ΧΑΡΗΣ ΑΓΓΕΛΗΘΕΝ: BIOGRAPHY OF A FOURTH-CENTURY ATHENIAN STRATEGOS

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Classics, Faculty of Arts)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

August 1986

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Date 10 October 1986
ABSTRACT

Khares of Angele was an Athenian military magistrate and mercenary soldier for over forty years in the mid-fourth century B.C. For two decades between the outbreak of the Social War and the battle of Khaironeia he was Athens' pre-eminent military leader. The ancient sources dealing with this era of Greek history mention him with great frequency and his role in the events of his times provoked strong comments and vivid portraits from contemporary writers.

In modern interpretations of fourth-century history Khares is cited as an example of the increasing trend in the city-state towards professionalism and specialization. He is commonly referred to as the quintessential example of the fourth-century mercenary adventurer, or condottiere, who increasingly operated beyond the control of, and without regard for, his home government. These factors have often been considered important in contributing to the decline of Athens as a political power and to the breakdown in the ideal of the Classical city-state.

Despite his long presence at the hub of the political history of the later fourth century, there has been no systematic attempt to study his career in its entirety for almost 140 years. Scholars who encounter this important figure in Athenian history have relied on selected, isolated incidents or on vague reports in the orators and other sources to form opinions about Khares, and to make generalizations about him and other military and political leaders on that basis without regard to the rest of the available evidence.

This study seeks to provide a full and detailed account of the entire career of Khares in order to create a balanced and complete foundation on which his role in the history of Athens and Greece in the fourth century may be fairly and accurately assessed. It is believed that a detailed survey of his
whole career in its historical, social and literary context will contribute to a better appreciation of the relationship between military magistrates and the Athenian democracy, an improved understanding of Athenian politics and a keener awareness of certain problems facing the city-states in this period as well as their representation in the sources.

This study is divided into three parts. The first part, consisting of two chapters, surveys the magisterial and military career of Khares. The second part, also consisting of two chapters, examines Khares' relationships with other politically active Athenians. The third part, comprising one chapter, investigates the contemporary literary sources that mention Khares in an attempt to determine what, if any, motivations or bias they may have had in their characterizations of him.

In the first part the evidence shows clearly that Khares was a popular and durable elected magistrate, accountable and obedient to his government. The evidence does not support the notion that he was a mercenary adventurer at any time while engaged in his career as strategos. In fact, he accepted service as a mercenary only after his days as an elected magistrate at Athens were over, and then he consistently served against the Macedonians. This activity fits the pattern of similarly motivated Athenian military men, who resisted Macedonian domination as foreign mercenaries when their city no longer could.

In the second part the evidence indicates that Khares was allied with other politically prominent Athenians only for short periods of time in order to achieve specific and limited political goals. He is consistently characterized as one of, or in co-operation with those characterized as, the demotikoi. His career was not dependent on any of the major political figures.

In the third part the severely negative portraits of Khares are seen to have been motivated by personal animosity and political expediency. Contributing to this tradition is the conventional nature of ancient oratory and the
pervasive literary influence over that genre exercised by Isokrates, whose malevolence can be explained on personal grounds.
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PREFACE

This thesis is a study of the fourth-century Athenian strategos, Khares of Angele. Khares was strategos often over a long period, almost the entire middle third of the fourth century B.C. Along with Phokion he is the strategos most frequently mentioned in the sources on this period of Greek history. His was an era in which Athenian power and influence waned, and his role in the city's decline was, and is controversial.

A modern treatment of Khares is lacking. H. Cassianus' 1849 dissertation, De Charetis Atheniensis rebus gestis ac moribus, although brief, was a useful collection of the sources, but it generally failed to have much impact. At any rate, none of the standard prosopographical works (for which see the Index Prosopographica) show any awareness of it. The most frequently cited source of information on the man aside from these works is H.W. Parke's Greek Mercenary Soldiers, especially the chapter entitled "Greek Mercenary Adventurers." Parke's attitude is implicit in the chapter's title, but, despite the fact that his book is now over fifty years old, its influence is still pervasive. Particularly widespread is Parke's characterization of the Athenian strategos as a "roving condottiere over whose movements his city had little control" (p.144). More recently W.K. Pritchett has devoted a chapter of his book The Greek State at War, Part II to "The Condottieri of the Fourth Century B.C." His study focused on the activities abroad of eight fourth-century generals from several states, one of whom was Khares of Athens. Pritchett argued convincingly that for his entire sample the notion of the mercenary general out of control is erroneous.

Despite Pritchett's efforts old attitudes prevail. An example of this is Jack Cargill's Second Athenian League, in which the author blames Khares almost solely for the decline of the fourth-century Athenian maritime alliance,
and he does so, literally, from introduction to conclusion. Other works could be cited as well, such as Jennifer Roberts' *Accountability in Athenian Government*, in which isolated incidents from the life of Khares have been seized upon and extrapolated into patterns used to explain his entire career.

A detailed study of Khares' whole career, then, is both long overdue and needed to provide a more even foundation on which to base assessments of its effect on the history of Athens in the later fourth century. In addition to offering a detailed account of this man's career in its broader political, social and literary context, it is hoped that such a study will test Pritchett's conclusions about military magistrates who commanded mercenary soldiers, that it will contribute to our understanding of Athenian politics and to the relationship between the democracy of Athens and its magistrates, and that it will illuminate the process of the creation of a literary-historical tradition.

The ancient sources for the life of Khares have been gathered into an *Appendix Testimoniorum* which follows the bibliography. Each independent piece of evidence has been assigned a number from 1 to 90 prefixed by the letter T (e.g., T1, T2...T90). This has been done to simplify references and to avoid repeatedly reproducing long passages in the original languages. A list of testimonia may be found at the beginning of the appendix. Following the appendix is an *Index Prosopographica* in which references to historical persons mentioned in this thesis in several standard prosopographical works are listed.

The thesis is divided into three parts. The first concentrates on Khares' career as a magistrate and soldier, the second on his 'political' career, or his relations with other politically prominent Athenians, and the third on the contemporary sources mentioning Khares, in order to determine if there is evidence of possibly partisan bias in their reporting on his acts and character. Following the last chapter are some conclusions and a brief discussion of the validity of one method of determining political friendships in ancient Athens.
In this section we shall review Khares' 'official' career, that is, his career as an Athenian magistrate and liturgy-bearer apart from his role in the city's internal politics. Khares was a soldier. He spent thirty years leading Athens' forces against her enemies and another five to ten struggling against Athens' enemies as a mercenary soldier. In view of the consistency between his actions as an Athenian military magistrate and those as a mercenary soldier, it does not seem inappropriate to include them all together in the present section, "Part I".

The primary concern in this section is to determine precisely, according to the ancient evidence, when and how many times Khares was elected or appointed to office, and exactly what he did or did not do while in office. In this manner we may view his career as a whole, rather than extrapolate it from salient episodes, as is so often the case in modern scholarship. This will enable us to make a proper assessment of Khares' career and its impact on Athenian foreign policy as well as the history of Greece during the middle third of the fourth century B.C.

Khares' military career spans some fifty years and an account of it would make an excessively long chapter. Therefore, the account is divided into two chapters: one covering the events of his career through the end of the Social War, and another describing the period after that war, an era dominated by the struggle between Athens and Macedon. In addition to signalling an almost exclusively northern focus for Athenian diplomacy, this point seems conveniently to divide generations of the Athenian military establishment, since within a period of less than two years Khabrias, Timotheos, and Iphikrates,
all heroes of wars against the Lakedaimonians and soon to be canonized, either
died or ceased utterly to influence Athenian politics and diplomacy. Thus,
both in relation to the life of Khares and to the broader sphere of Athenian
and Greek history, such a division is not entirely arbitrary. Discussion of
Khares' 'political' career (those friendships and enmities with other politically
active Athenians that were not dictated by law or the duties of office) is re-
served for "Part II", unless it has a direct bearing on his official, magist-
erial career in the strictest sense.
CHAPTER ONE: KHARES' EARLY MILITARY CAREER

Family and Social Status

Khares, son of Theokhares, of Angele was born not long after 400 B.C. His father, Theokhares, is merely a name to us and our ignorance of other relatives of Khares, either ancestors or descendants, is total. This ignorance of any known relative has led to a commonly accepted suggestion that Khares was a novus homo, a term misleadingly inappropriate to classical Greek society and especially meaningless in the context of fourth-century Athens after the ravages of the Peloponnesian War.

Whatever the achievements of his family, or lack thereof, Khares possessed sufficient landed wealth to be included in the liturgical class: he was trierarch in or about 348/7, and in 344/3 he served his tribe as khoregos at the Thargelia. Ancient evidence suggests that strategoi generally came (or ideally should come) from wealthy, propertied families. Although many scholars assume this to have been the case, not all are convinced. One need look no further than an elder contemporary of Khares, Iphikrates, for an apparent example of a man whose wealth was reputedly acquired not from his family, but in the course of his own, mainly military, career.

One might cast suspicion on the origin of Khares' wealth for two reasons: first, we have specific evidence that he was twice the recipient of largesse from foreign powers, and second, it has become a commonplace in modern scholarship to characterize fourth-century military leaders as condottieri and, consequently, to assume not only that men serving as mercenaries in classical times behaved similarly to those of much later ages, but also that these classical "free-lances" behaved similarly to one another.
A neglected piece of evidence suggests that a Khares, probably Khares of Angele, was already a trierarch, and therefore a member of the liturgical class, by or before 366, the date of Khares' first known strategia. The evidence (T6) is a naval archive, inscribed on stone, from the early years of the second Athenian League. This archive has been traditionally assigned a date "non post a. 370/69", but more recently an attempt has been made to bring the date down to 366/5. The extant fragment of the archive begins with a fairly long entry that lists a number of trierarchs who have taken out ships to be used on a kleroukhia-expedition, followed by several short and seemingly unrelated entries, perhaps added hastily. One of these short entries begins halfway through line 116 of the document:

T6 = IG II² 1609.116-119

The formulae found on this document are not exactly paralleled anywhere else in the series of extant naval archives (IG II² 1604-1632), nevertheless it is sufficiently clear that Khares is listed as responsible for one of the city's ships just as -demos and Xenopeithes are listed as responsible for another. The perfect tenses of the verb 'to sail out' in lines 116 and 118 (ἐξηλογεύσαν and ἐξηλογέθηκασαν, respectively: see T6 in the Appendix Testimoniorum) indicate that at the time when the document was drafted (presumably at the end of the official or 'archon year') the ships specified were out on service and had not yet been returned. The men whose names are listed were to be held responsible for the ships by the succeeding board of naval epimeletai. Although many names occur on the naval archive series, only trierarchs are
listed as being responsible for the city's ships and naval gear. The conclusion that the men in question were trierarchs is unavoidable.\textsuperscript{15}

The Khares of the naval archive is not identified by his demotic. This is unusual but not unique.\textsuperscript{16} The naval archives are, in a sense, both tax and bookkeeping records and as such the men charged with keeping these records generally took great pains to provide information sufficient enough that persons responsible for equipment could be easily identified and thus held accountable. On the present document, however, there is some reason to believe that the inscribing following line 111 was done in haste or possibly by a new mason.\textsuperscript{17}

The missing demotic leaves open the possibility that another Khares is listed on the document and there are two other fourth-century trierarchs of that name: Khares Eleusinios, first attested in 322, and Khares Aixoneus, first attested on a document of 342/1, but which refers to earlier events, some as early as 356.\textsuperscript{18} Khares of Angele is attested as adult at some time between 378-373 (T25), was strategos in 366 (T2, T3, T4, T5) and trierarch ca. 348 (T44), and thus is a more likely candidate to be the trierarch on T6. The secretary, scribe or mason, may make a mistake under any circumstances, but the omission of the demotic such as the one under discussion is a little more understandable if the demotic belongs to a politically prominent man.\textsuperscript{19} As we shall see Khares had probably already been a taxiarkhos by 373 and was strategos in 366. Thus, it appears not unlikely that Khares had been trierarch as a young man, before he had had much opportunity to enrich himself by soldiering.

To the preceding argument concerning Khares' social and economic status another can be added \textit{ex silentio}. Neither Isokrates, in his \textit{Symmakhikos}, also known as \textit{On the Peace}, (T24), \textit{Antidosis} (T25) and elsewhere, nor Aiskhines, in his \textit{False Embassy} (T52), nor yet Theopompos, in his \textit{Philippika} (T32, T36, T62), calumniated Khares on the basis of social origin or dubiously founded wealth, although each had occasion to do so. Indeed, they accuse him, not of taking, but of giving bribes. The tenor of the sources points to a man adroit at using
wealth, and not to one obsessed with accumulating it.

One ought also to consider the testimony of Demosthenes (T54), albeit cautiously, when in 343 he implied that Aiskhines was pretentiously overreaching himself when he dared to slander a man of Khares' standing. In sum, it does not seem justifiable to denigrate Khares' social status and source of wealth, simply because we know of no illustrious forebears, especially since his own hostile contemporaries refrained from doing so.

There remains to be considered a possible relation by marriage to Khares. She was a woman named Boidion and was well known, at least to later antiquity, because of a famous epigram and monument. Hesykhios of Miletos provides the fullest account of her, the epigram and the monument, which, he claimed, still stood in his own time on a promontory near Khalkedon that overlooked the Bosporos:

29 There, having lost the woman who accompanied him—she was smitten by disease—he (Khares) buried her in a tomb, raising for her an altar and a worked column on which a heifer lying down is portrayed in marble. For so she was named and, down until our own time, she is immortalized through the inscribed verses. 30 Here are the verses:

"I am not the image of the Inakhian cow, nor from me
Is the sea opposite called Bosporian,
For long ago the deep wrath of Hera drove her
Into Pharos. I who lie here am Athenian.
I was the bedfellow of Khares; I sailed when he sailed
Here, an opponent of the hulls of Philip.
Boidion was my name then, but now the bedfellow
Of Khares delights in both continents."

T70 = FGrHist 390 Hesykhios F1 #29-30

The epigram's ἐνυετυς, rendered "bedfellow" in the translation, is more ambiguous than Hesykhios' description of her as a γυνή. ἐνυετυς is a not uncommon poetic euphemism, not only for "wife" but also for "mistress", "concubine". It would be singularly strange to find the wife of a prominent Athenian, or of a military magistrate of any city-state for that matter, sharing the hardships and hazards of active campaigning in a combat zone.

Boidion certainly did not conform to the ideal of an Athenian wife as,
say, described in the 'training manual' of Iskhomakhos which Xenophon relates in chapters 7-10 of his Oikonomikos. The presence of Boidion, however, in the company of a military leader on campaign far from his home conforms to a roughly parallel military custom familiar to the Greeks as early as the time of Homer: the concubine. In the later fifth and throughout the fourth centuries we hear of many prominent Athenians that consorted with *hetairai*, some who acquired a second, foreign wife abroad, and we know of more than one army campaigning far from home in the company of large contingents of women, at least some of whom were *hetairai*. Theopompos (T62) asserted that Khares "carried around on campaign flutegirls, dancers and common *hetairai*." Despite his obsession with the sexual habits of generals, politicians and statesmen, and his use of it as a rhetorical commonplace, there just may be a kernel of truth in the rhetor's words. The fact that Boidion accompanied Khares on this campaign, that she died and was buried abroad, may well have been the seed from which Theopompos' typically lurid exaggeration grew. However dearly missed and commemorated, Boidion doubtlessly stood in the same relationship with her "bedfellow", as did many of his soldiers: that of a mercenary.

Junior Offices

Apart from the inscription (T6) discussed above, we have no closely datable evidence for Khares' career before he appears for the first time in the sources (T2, T3, T4, T5) as an Athenian *strategos* in 366. Yet, at that time he occupied a position of such prestige and responsibility as to presuppose an earlier, distinguished record as a soldier and officer. Although there was no recognized *cursus honorum* through which a man had to move before he was eligible to hold the highest offices at Athens, nevertheless there were several junior military offices available in which an ambitious soldier might demonstrate his ability to command. Indeed, it was considered advisable, if not mandatory, to gain experience through service as a *lokhagos* and *taxiarchos*.
before becoming a strategos, or as a phylarkhos before becoming a hipparkhos. That Khares did fill one or both of the junior offices of lokhagos and taxiarkhos is implied by statements Isokrates made in his Antidosis.

Isokrates composed his Antidosis about 353, shortly after the death of Timotheos, whom he eulogized in sections 101-139 of the composition. In the course of that eulogy he wrote:

(115) I think that you (Athenians) would like to hear, then, why some of the strategoi, who are highly thought of by you and who seem to be warlike, have not been able to capture even a village, while Timotheos, having neither a robust physique nor experience with roving armies, but who, rather, with you, taking part in the city's affairs, has accomplished such great things. An account concerning these things is contentious, but not without advantage to be told.

(116) For in this respect he was superior to all the rest, because he did not have the same opinion as you do concerning the affairs of the Hellenes and your allies and the management of them. For you elect strategoi, who have the sturdiest bodies and who have been many times in mercenary armies, as though you will accomplish what is required through them. But Timotheos made use of such men as lokhagoi and taxiarkhoi,

(117) while he himself was skilful regarding all the things about which a good strategos must be prudent.... (Isokrates lists the qualities that a general must have and shows that Timotheos had them).

(121) Such then are his great and compelling qualities, but one might justly praise him still more for the following: for although he saw that you considered them 'the one and only', who frightened and threatened the other cities and were always stirring up revolution among the allies, he did not comply with your opinions, nor was he willing to harm the city while acquiring a good reputation...

T25 = Isokrates Antidosis 15.115-117, 121

Neither here nor elsewhere did Isokrates actually name Khares as the butt of his attacks, but that he was the object of the rhetor's scorn is clear from the circumstantial evidence. First, Isokrates had bitterly attacked Khares just a few years earlier in the Symmakhikos (= On the Peace). Again the rhetor did not name the man, but made it abundantly clear to his contemp-
oraries that he referred to Khares. Aristotle (T23) perceived this and mentioned it as if it were common knowledge. Moreover, several details in Isokrates' description of the anonymous strategoi whom the Athenians preferred to Timotheos suit what might have been said about Khares in 353. Khares had been 'preferred' to Timotheos on the occasion of the latter's trial (T16, T17). From other sources Khares is known to have had a 'robust physique' and physical courage, and Timotheos is known to have been self-conscious about comparison with Khares in just these qualities. Isokrates maligned the anonymous strategoi because they had served with 'roving' and 'mercenary armies'. Like most Athenian combat generals during the fourth century, Khares did command mercenary forces employed by Athens several times, particularly in the recent Social War, during which his mercenary force had mutinied and compelled him to abandon the main theater of war in order to provide a source of maintenance. Isokrates contrasted Timotheos' attitude towards the Hellenes and the allies with that of the anonymous strategoi. Khares had, in about 361, been the ranking officer present on Kerkyra, an Athenian ally, when its garrison joined in a coup against the democratic government, and at some undetermined point Khares had contemplated aiding an attempted coup on Aigina. Thus, Isokrates' description of the anonymous strategoi in the Antidosis suits very well what an embittered detractor might have said about him in 353.

Isokrates is almost certainly exaggerating an early relationship between the two future rivals, but the basic statement that Khares served under Timotheos as either taxiarkhos or lokhagos or both is entirely plausible. Many Athenian soldiers must have seen action under Timotheos and others during the 370's. Some of them no doubt benefitted from their commander's tutelage, just as Phokion is said to have done from Khabrias'. Khares' distinguished tenure of one or more of these junior offices at a promising young age would go a long way in helping to explain his first appearance in the sources in 366 as strategos in a post of great peril and importance.
Khares in the Peloponnesos and Oropos: 366

Khares first appears in a datable context during the campaigning season of 366. At that time he commanded Athenian forces based in the Korinthiad. During the course of the Lakonian-Boiotian War, the Boiotians and their Peloponnesian allies applied intense and relentless pressure on Spartan (and, since early in 369, Athenian) allies, particularly those in the north-east Peloponnesos. One of the cities that suffered the most was Phleious. That city withstood no less than five major attacks between 369 and 366, and both Sparta and Athens had demonstrated early in the war just how important they considered Phleious. By the summer of 366 the city was surrounded by hostile neighbors, two of which were building threatening installations against her. The Argives had captured and fortified Trikaranon in Phleiasian territory, while the Sikyonians were in the process of building a fort at Thyamia, a place on their border with Phleious. Xenophon admired the pluck of the Phleiasians so much that he digressed from his narrative and recounted their exploits in the war from the time of Epameinondas' first invasion in 370. The aristeia of the Phleiasians comes to a vivid climax in the following episode:

(17) How through perseverance they maintained their faith with their friends is quite clear: when they were being kept from the produce of their land, they lived partly by seizing things from enemy territory, partly by purchasing things from Korinth, by going through many perils to get to market and obtaining a price with difficulty, arranging transporters with difficulty, and hardly finding guarantors of the pack-beasts that would carry their purchases.

(18) Already being wholly at a loss, they arranged for Khares to provide an escort for themselves. When they were in Phleious they begged him to help escort their non-combatants to Pellene, and there they left them. Once they had done their marketing and had packed as many beasts of burden as was possible, they started back at night, not unaware that they would be ambushed by the enemy, but rather imagining that not having supplies was more difficult than fighting.

(19) So the Phleiasians set forth with Khares. When they fell in with the enemy they immediately got to work and, encouraging one another, they attacked and at the same time they
shouted for Khares to come to their relief. Once the victory had been won and the enemy driven from their path, they got themselves and the things they were carrying back home safely. Since they had been up during the night, they slept until past daybreak.

(20) When Khares arose the cavalrymen and the best of the hoplites approached him and said, "Khares, today it is possible for you to achieve a very fine thing. The Sikyonians are fortifying a place on our borders and although they have many builders, there are not many hoplites at all. We cavalrymen and the sturdiest of the hoplites will lead the way, but you, if you follow with the mercenary force, will perhaps find the job already finished for you or perhaps your appearance will cause the rout just as in Pellene. But if any of what we say troubles you, then sacrifice and consult the gods, for we believe that they will bid you to do this even more than we do. Of this you can be sure, Khares: if you achieve this you will be fortified against the enemy while saving a friendly city; you will be glorious in your own country and renowned among both allies and the enemy."

(21) Convinced, Khares sacrificed while the Phleiasian cavalrymen immediately began donning their corselets and bridling their horses. The hoplites made such preparations as befit infantry. When they had taken up their arms and came to where he was sacrificing, Khares and the seer met them and informed them that the sacrifices were good. "But wait", they said "for we too are coming out now." As soon as it was announced, even the mercenaries ran out quickly with some divine enthusiasm.

(22) When Khares began to march, the Phleiasian cavalry and infantry went before him. At first, they marched quickly, then they began to run smartly and finally the cavalry charged at a gallop, the infantry ran as fast as they could in formation, and Khares followed them eagerly. It was the time of day just before sunset and they caught the enemy in the fortification, some while they were bathing, some cooking or kneading bread, and some making up their beds.

(23) But when they saw the determination of the attack they broke and fled, leaving behind all their provisions to the brave men, who dining on these things and more which came from home, poured a libation for their good fortune, sang the paian and went to sleep once sentries had been posted. When a messenger about Thyamia arrived there at night, the Korinthians benevolently made a proclamation for teams of pack animals and brought them filled with food into Phleious. And so long as the fortification was under construction there were convoys each day.

T2 = Xenophon Hellenika 7.2.17-23

Diodoros also records these actions in his narration of the events of the year in which Polyzelos held office at Athens (367/6 B.C.). His account
adds little to Xenophon's except that he conceived of Khares' role in the battles as being the main one and he specifies the enemy as being the more formidable Argives:

Khares was sent out with a force by the Athenians to help the Phleiasians, who were at war with the Argives. Beating the Argives in two battles and providing for the security of Phleious, he returned to Athens.

T3 = Diodoros 15.75.3

Apart from an obviously demonstrated military competence, two facts about Khares' involvement in this campaign deserve comment. First, he held a position of great responsibility and strategic importance (one previously held by the city's senior strategoi), a fact that presupposes considerable experience as well as the demos' confidence in him. Second, the forces under his command were mainly mercenaries, although there were probably citizen troops present as well.

Within a very few days after these actions around Phleious, Khares was summoned back to Attica, apparently to help deal with the urgent crisis over Oropos:

Oropos was seized by exiles while the Phleiasians were still fortifying Thyamia and while Khares was still present. When the Athenians marched out in full force and sent after Khares from Thyamia, the harbor of the Sikyonians was again captured back by the citizens and the Arkadians. However, none of the allies came to the aid of the Athenians; rather the Athenians withdrew entrusting Oropos into the hands of the Thebans pending arbitration.

T4 = Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.1

As we learn elsewhere, the Thebans had intruded into the dispute, but acquired Oropos in the end. The loss humiliated the Athenians and they were particularly vexed at their allies' failure to appear. Their vexation had immediate political as well as diplomatic consequences. Two prominent Athenian political leaders were held culpable and tried: Kallistratos Aphidnaios and
Khabrias Aixoneus, the distinguished strategos. Both men were acquitted. One may assume that Khares arrived on the scene before a decision was made to yield to the Thebans. His force was already mobilized and had no farther to travel than did the nearest Athenian ally that could reasonably be expected to send aid. Xenophon indicates that the Athenian decision was strongly influenced by the lack of allied support, and the Athenians cannot have known their allies would not come until some time after Khares' arrival. Nevertheless, he was not implicated in the trials of Kallistratos and Khabrias in any way, either as a culprit or as an ally of the prosecution. This fact has not prevented modern scholars from inventing a role for Khares in these trials. It certainly is true that for the next several years after 366/5 Khares drops from our view, but not before returning to his post in the Peloponnesos several weeks or even months after the crisis over Oropos.

The diplomatic consequence of the affair over Oropos was that the Athenians gave thought to their Peloponnesian interests and entered into a defensive alliance with the Arkadian league. This alliance could be made effective provided only that either party was actually able to lend the other aid. So long as Argos continued loyal to the Boiotians, and Korinth and the cities of Akte to Sparta, there could be real problems of logistics and communication between the parties of the Arkado-Athenian alliance. An Athenian named Demotion perceived this and proposed a solution:

(4) Demotion proposed in the demos of the Athenians that, whereas the friendship with the Arkadians seemed to him to be well made, nevertheless, he said that the strategoi ought to be ordered that Korinth, too, be made safe for the demos of the Athenians. When the Korinthians heard of this, they quickly sent sufficient garrisons of their own troops to all the places the Athenians were garrisoning and told them to go away, as they no longer required garrisons. The Athenians obeyed. When the Athenians from the garrisons came together into the city, the Korinthians announced that, if any of the Athenians had been wronged, they were to register a complaint in order to receive justice.

(5) This was the situation when Khares arrived with a
Naval force at Kenkhreai. When he realized what had happened, he said that he was present to bring aid since he had heard that there was a plot against the city. The Korinthians praised him but nonetheless they did not receive his ships into the harbor, but bade him to sail away. They sent away the hoplites, too, after giving them their justice. Thus, then, the Athenians departed from Korinth.

T5 = Xenophon *Hellenika* 7.4.4-5

No other source refers to this attempt "to make Korinth safe for the demos of the Athenians", but it is very likely to have taken place weeks and perhaps even months later than the Oropos affair. Khares' involvement in operations at Korinth at this time reinforces the impression that he escaped the furore over Oropos unscathed.

As was mentioned above, we lose sight of Khares for the next several years. Those with preconceived notions about the man have been tempted to misinterpret the action at Korinth to his detriment. To combat such notions several details from the evidence must be emphasized. Khares was not acting on his own authority, but on orders which were authorized by a decree of the people. Moreover, we can compare Xenophon's text (possibly a cynical abbreviation) of Demotion's proposal with actual examples of very similar proposals from about the same time. It is possible that Athenian intentions toward Korinth have been distorted by Xenophon, and, in any case, suspicions about a "plot" against the city of Korinth soon proved to be justified, since a tyrant seized power there a few months later.

There is really no need to juggle the evidence or stretch it beyond its meaning, as some have done, in order to retroject a bad reputation onto Khares at this early date. He disappears from the sources for several years but there is no cogent reason nor any evidence to support the belief that this represents a 'fall from grace' or the like.
Khares on Kerkyra: 361

After a hiatus of several years, Khares resurfaces in our sources amidst controversy. In his account of the year in which Nikophemos was archon at Athens (361/0), Diodoros narrates a single episode of political history, a conflict between Alexandros, tyrant of Pherai, and the Athenians. This conflict culminated in a humiliating defeat for the Athenians.

Alexandros had come to power in Pherai following the assassination of Jason's successor. Alexandros was allied with Athens in 368, when together with an Athenian force under Autokles he had frustrated a Boiotian invasion of Thessaly. By 364, however, he had been forced into an alliance with the Boiotians, and as their ally he and the other Thessalians contributed troops to Epameinondas' invasion of the Peloponnesos, which ended in the battle of Mantineia. In this battle it happened that Athenians and Thessalians actually fought one another. 51

The hostility between Alexandros and Athens continued, for within a few months after the battle he raided Athenian allies in the Cyclades, and ravaged Tenos. The Athenians responded militarily, but we are wholly ignorant of what they attempted and accomplished. 52 Again in 361 Alexandros was raiding Athenian allies in the northern Sporades. The confrontation between his forces and the Athenians on the island of Peparethos was one of only two political events that Diodoros found worthy of record:

(1) When Nikophemos was archon at Athens (361/0) G. Sulpicius and G. Licinius took over the consular office at Rome. At this time Alexandros, the tyrant of Pherai, sent out raiding ships to the Kyklades islands. Some of them he carried by assault and became master of many prisoners, but on Peparethos he disembarked mercenary soldiers and began to besiege the city. (2) But when the Athenians came to the aid of Peparethos and left behind the strategos Leosthenes, Alexandros attacked them. They happened to be closely guarding Alexandros' soldiers, who were stationed at Panormos. But when the forces of the dynast attacked unexpectedly, they gained an incredible turn of fortune. For, not only did Alexandros safely
retrieve those ordered into Panormos from the greatest peril, but he also captured five Athenian and one Pe-arethian trireme and got possession of six hundred prisoners. (3) The Athenians were exceedingly angry with Leosthenes and they condemned him to death on a charge of betrayal and confiscated his property. Choosing Khares as strategos, they sent him out with a naval force. This man continually avoided the enemy and wronged the allies. For sailing into Korkyra, an allied city, he aroused great civil disturbances in it. Out of these many slaughters and seizures of property took place, through which the demos of the Athenians was calumniated among the allies. Khares, then, while committing other such acts of lawlessness, accomplished nothing good for his country but calumnies.

T7 = Diodoros 15.95.1-3

We are fortunate to have a rather detailed account of the actual coup that took place on Kerkyra. There can be no doubt that the event described by Aineias the "Tactician" is the same as Diodoros'. In a section of his manual concerning plots Aineias gives the following illustration:

(13) In Korkyra there was need for an uprising of the wealthy oligarchs against the demos (Khares the Athenian was present with a garrison, and he himself consented to the uprising). It was contrived as follows. (14) Certain arkhontes of the men of the garrison applied cupping glasses to themselves and inflicted wounds on their bodies. Bloodied, they ran out into the agora as though suffering wounds. At the same time as this, those who were prepared in advance immediately brought forth their weapons, both the other soldiers and the Korkyraian plotters. (15) Since the others were unaware of the matter and they were summoned into the assembly, the leaders of the demos were arrested on the grounds that the uprising sprang from them. They (sc. the conspirators) arranged everything else to their own advantage.

T8 = Aineias Taktikos Poliorcetica 11.13-15

Aineias has no discernable reason to present a biased account, nor otherwise to distort it. Nothing in his narrative deviates from his customarily clinical manner. It is perfectly clear that the garrison was integral to the plot and that Khares consented to it, although he played no direct role. The whole episode stands apart from the main strands of Greek history known to us during this period, and it presents some perplexing problems.
One would like to know the answers to several questions: (1) Did Khares sail to Kerkyra when he had apparently been sent to succeed Leosthenes? (2) for what purpose was the garrison in Kerkyra in the first place? (3) why would an elected Athenian magistrate become a party to such an action? Some of these questions have been answered by resorting to the image of Khares as the irresponsible and brutal *condottiere*, but in view of the record of Athens in trying, convicting, and punishing her magistrates, in these very years, one ought to take a closer look.54

In answering the first question, it would be helpful to determine if Khares was sent to Peparethos at all. Diodoros' transitional sentence, "This man continually avoided the enemy and wronged the allies", does not make that very clear, although the logic of the situation described seems to demand Athenian aid to Peparethos, and Diodoros' phraseology may indicate that he understood Khares to have been sent to Peparethos. Otherwise one would have to posit a stupendous lapse in the historian's train of thought or even a lacuna.55 It may be that Khares did nothing worthy of mention or, as Diodoros puts it, he "avoided the enemy". In fact, there was not much to be done on Peparethos, because Alexandros' victory consisted partially in extricating his men.56 Moreover, the Athenians may have been loath to take aggressive action against an enemy who held several hundred Athenian and allied prisoners, other than to provide security for other allies in the region. The Athenians did make a diplomatic initiative. In 361/0 they made an alliance with those of the Thessalians opposed to Alexandros, under the terms of which each party swore to prosecute the war against the tyrant and not to cease hostilities without the consent of the other. This alliance may not have seemed to achieve much in the eyes of later observers, but at the time it probably held out bright prospects. Athens could hope that she might, with a minimum of effort on her part, neutralize Alexandros or at least keep him occupied. In addition, Athens will now have secured the alliance of an
important ally of the Boiotians. Such hopes are consistent with the pattern of Athenian diplomacy during this period.\textsuperscript{57} Of course, there is no evidence that Khares was involved in the negotiations that led to the alliance, although such business was a regular part of a strategos' duties and Khares very shortly demonstrated his competence in negotiating agreements.\textsuperscript{58} However this may be, it appears that Diodoros believed that Khares was sent out to replace Leosthenes. He gives no indication of the lapse of time, if any, between Khares' setting out and his involvement in Kerkyra, and more importantly he gives no hint that in sailing to Kerkyra Khares was disobeying orders.

In answering the next two questions, particularly the one concerning the purpose of the garrison on Kerkyra, chronology is important. Cargill wishes to dislocate the Kerkyra episode from its context and place it in 368, but none of his arguments carry any conviction.\textsuperscript{59} One sympathizes with Cargill's perplexity, but Diodoros has deliberately placed the episode in its present context, it would seem. He introduces the Kerkyra account with a 'generalizing' statement: "This man continually avoided the enemy and wronged the allies", and then proceeds to cite a specific, although undetailed, example: Kerkyra. If the event is displaced from its true context, it must be because Diodoros was following thematic, rather than chronological considerations. Otherwise we must admit that the historian has made a chronological slip of eight years for no reason whatsoever. Diodoros makes many mistakes, but there is almost always an intelligible, if not always a good, reason.\textsuperscript{60} If Diodoros located the Kerkyra incident elsewhere than in its proper chronological context, he missed the most obvious and effective place for it: the outbreak of the Social War. After all, the complaint against Khares is that he "wronged the allies". It is preferable to keep Diodoros' chronology if there is any way we can make sense of it.

Under what circumstances, then, might Kerkyra have needed the protection
of a garrison in 361? The most obvious external threat would have been naval power. Athens was an ally and Sparta would seem to be excluded for both political and military reasons. Thebes did have naval capabilities that included an installation on the Gulf of Korinth capable of supporting at least a small squadron. Furthermore, the Thebans were not without naval experience, even of the Ionian Sea, by 361. Their ally, Alexandros of Pherai, demonstrated how much nuisance even a small navy could create among Athens' far-flung allies. The common peace of 362 was considered to have broken down when the Thebans moved into the Peloponnesos to work against the interests of newly-found Athenian allies there. Perhaps the mere threat of Theban naval action in the West was cause (or excuse) enough for a garrison to be introduced onto the island. Against this line of reasoning is the total absence in the extant sources of any independent Theban naval activity beyond the Gulf of Korinth, but our sources are such that a minor and uneventful Theban probe could well go unnoticed by them, and the Athenian League might have been justifiably skittish. In any event, a possible Theban threat to Kerkyra, after Epameinondas had demonstrated to his countrymen the possibilities of a bold naval policy, is probably as plausible or more so than one before that time.

In the face of such a threat, it may be that the League was primarily concerned with an internal threat to the government of Kerkyra. The island was notoriously plagued with stasis, not only during the Peloponnesian War but also during the recent Boiotian War of 379-371. If this was a primary concern, then the coup, aided by Athenian military authorities is doubly surprising. The garrison will have abetted what it was supposed to prevent, and the uprising was aimed against a democracy. Athens had generally supported democratic movements during the 370s and this action on Kerkyra was a violation of both the letter and the spirit of agreements between Athens and her League in general and Kerkyra in particular. As to the motives for
Khares' complicity in the coup one can only guess. It may be that the government of Kerkyra began to show signs that it wanted to exercise the autonomy guaranteed all states by the terms of the common peace, and that Athens felt that she must retain the loyalty of the island at any price. If so, it didn't work, for Kerkyra became hostile to Athens at some point between 361 and 353. 65

No satisfactory reason has been advanced to answer the question, why Khares, an elected representative of Athens, participated (albeit indirectly) in this action; one can only guess. One answer, however, can be rejected with a fair degree of confidence: that Khares was acting on his own initiative. The government of Athens approved of the deed and accepted responsibility. That this is so is implied by Diodoros' words (T8), "the demos of the Athenians was calumniated among the allies"; the demos, not Khares. This impression is reinforced by the utter silence in the sources about any outcry, trial or punishment against Khares. It is true that he drops from the view of our sources for the next three or four years, but when he reappears he does so as a soldier in great demand and as a serious rival to Timotheos and Iphikrates. 66

At this point it is perhaps not out of place to mention briefly another instance of Khares' involvement in a revolution in a foreign state. Aristotle, in his Politics, discusses the motivations for revolution under various constitutions. He observes that some revolutions against oligarchic states arise from people who have consumed their own substance by extravagant living and cites this illustration: "...and in Aigina the man who accomplished the deed with Khares, tried to change the constitution for just such a reason" (T9 = Aristotle Politics 1306a 4-6). Clearly, there is not enough information given here to do other than make an informed guess at the date and context of this event.

Aigina was not a League ally, rather as a staunch Spartan ally she had served as a base for Peloponnesian naval forces and piratical raiders, during both
the Korinthian and Boiotian Wars. It is possible to imagine an Athenian attempt to bring Aigina under her influence during the hostilities of the Boiotian War of 379-71, but perhaps a more plausible occasion for this incident is sometime when Spartan influence, both on land and sea, had ebbed. Both the period just after the Arkado-Athenian alliance of 366 and that after the battle of Mantineia, when Sparta was left out of the general peace, come readily to mind. In the one period Athens showed herself ready to "make Korinth safe for the demos of the Athenians" even though she was allied with Sparta, while in the other period Athens clearly was prepared to usurp Spartan influence even in the Peloponnesos. Moreover, the raid of Alexandros on the Peiraius may have prompted Athens to sanction such a project. But even the decades following 360 are probably not out of the question and the date and context must remain obscure.

Euboia and the Khersonesos: 357

If there was any controversy surrounding the coup on Kerkyra, it had no lasting effect on Khares' career, since he was soon afterwards exercising commands of great importance and responsibility. In 357 stasis broke out in Euboia and it induced both the Boiotians and the Athenians to intervene there. Although there were no major battles, Athens managed to bring several, perhaps all, of the cities on the island back into alliance with her. In this campaign Khares commanded a force of mercenaries for Athens and his performance must have been commendable, because immediately after the successful conclusion of hostilities he and his troops were dispatched to the Hellespont in order to press Athenian claims to the Khersonesos. The evidence for this is found in a speech of Demosthenes:

But once the ambassadors sailed out it happened that, what with them wasting time and being unwilling to accomplish anything plain and honest for you, the business was drawn out to such a point, that we went out on a relief expedition to Euboia
Sestos in the Khersonesos had been lost ca. 360 and subsequent attempts by the strategoi, Kephisodotos and later, Khabrias, to coerce or persuade the Thracian kings to return it had been frustrated by Kharidemos, according to the speaker of this oration. It is particularly noteworthy that the demos held Khares in such confidence that they invested him with the powers of an autokrator, that is, a strategos with full authority to negotiate a binding agreement on behalf of them. Nor was the demos disappointed, since the speaker of the Against Aristokrates characterized Khares' agreement as "the best and most just", that is, the most advantageous to Athens.

A fragment of an inscription recording the agreement is preserved. It makes clear that the Thracian kings recognized the Hellenic cities in the Khersonesos as free and autonomous (allies?) of the Athenians, although those cities were apparently liable to pay tribute to the kings. Despite relinquishing their claims to the cities of the Khersonesos, the kings may not have actually surrendered them or committed themselves to forcing the unwilling to comply with the agreement. Sestos had to be recovered by force in 353/2 (T38), and it is possible that Khares remained in the region in order to restore any recalcitrant cities to de facto Athenian control.

The Social War: 357 and 356

How long Khares remained in the Khersonesos is not known, nor is it known exactly when or why the Social War broke out. If Khares was still in the Khersonesos when the war erupted, that fact would help explain why he was dispatched to prosecute the war when other soldiers like Iphikrates, Timotheos
and Khabrias were presumably available.\textsuperscript{72}

The immediate causes of the war are quite obscure, despite the unsubstantiated suspicions that, somehow, Khares was responsible.\textsuperscript{73} As a matter of fact, the ancient writers are surprisingly silent on the war's causes. The most direct contemporary statement was that made by Demosthenes in his speech \textit{On Behalf of the Freedom of the Rhodians} delivered in 351:

\begin{quote}
(3) For the Khians and the Byzantines and Rhodians charge us with plotting against them, and for this reason they joined against us in this late war; but the one who presided over this business will be shown to be Mausolos. He claims to be a friend of the Rhodians but is robbing them of their freedom, while those who put themselves forward as allies, the Khians and Byzantines, have not given aid in their misfortunes...

(15) For, begrudging you the recovery of what was yours, they lost their own freedom...

Demosthenes \textit{On Behalf of the Freedom of the Rhodians}, 15.3,15
\end{quote}

Several modern analyses of the war's causes have been made, but in no case has any evidence for Khares' direct culpability been advanced, except for the Hypothesis to Isokrates' speech \textit{Symmakhikos} or \textit{On the Peace}.\textsuperscript{74}

Khares was sent to enslave Amphipolis, which was at that time autonomous and on its own, since the Lakedaimonians were in a bad way after Leuktra and the Athenians were weak. This man, in the belief that he could capture it easily at any time, and wishing to restore their ancient power to the Athenians, attacked the Khians and Rhodians and the other allies. Accordingly, they revolted and Khares was defeated so that he was at a loss what must be done thereafter. For if he withdrew from them and came into Amphipolis, they would come right up to Attika in retaliation. When the Athenians heard this, they asked for a truce and immediately the Khians and the Rhodians along with the others agreed. And this is the Social War.

\textit{T12 = Hypothesis to Isokrates Symmakhikos 8}

This account is wholly at variance with nearly everything else we do know about the Social War and demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the war's immediate context, as well as ignorance of several key aspects of the conflict. Its author envisioned a situation in which Khares
was ordered to make war on Amphipolis, but chose rather to attack his own allies (for no apparent reason) in order to restore to Athens her former power. In fact, Athens had been engaged for the past ten years in a struggle to regain two particularly coveted possessions which had been hers in the fifth century, Amphipolis and the Khersonesos. It is possible that Khares was ordered to renew the struggle for Amphipolis as a follow-up to his operations in the Khersonesos, but other evidence leads us to believe that Athens suspended her military efforts against Amphipolis in the expectation that she might acquire the place in negotiations with Philip of Macedon.

The author of the hypothesis indicates no awareness of the roles that Khabrias, Iphikrates, Timotheos or Mausolos played in the war, let alone the campaign in Asia. His statement that Khares attacked the allies is at variance with all other known accounts of the war, which make the sending of an Athenian fleet under Khares (and Khabrias) a consequence of the allied revolt. Moreover, the other sources which treat the Social War in any detail, Nepos (T14, T17) and Diodoros (T13, T16, T26), show a manifest lack of sympathy for Khares, but do not make use of the damning information that the hypothesis contains. When we compare the evidence of the other sources and their silence on Khares' alleged culpability, we must conclude that the hypothesis is worthless; we do not know the immediate cause of the Social War.

We are not much better informed about the course of the war than we are about the immediate causes. The most extensive account of the war's outbreak and early stages is that of Diodoros. Immediately following his narration of the affair on Euboia (which he dates 358/7), he continues with a description of the Social War's first action:

(2) ... The Boiotians, then, making their return home, kept quiet.

(3) But the Athenians, since the Khians and Rhodians and Koans and also the Byzantines had revolted, became involved in the so-called Social War, which lasted three years. Choosing Khares and Khabrias as strategoi, they sent them away with a force. These men sailed
for Khios and encountered allies come to the aid of the Khians from the Byzantines and the Rhodians and Koans and, furthermore from Mausolos, the dynast of Karia. Marshalling their force, they began besieging the city by land and sea. So, Khares, leading the foot army on land attacked the walls and was fighting it out against those pouring out from the city against him. Khabrias, meanwhile, sailed to the harbor, engaged in a mighty sea-battle and, when his ship was broken up by rams, was overwhelmed.

(4) Some of his men, then, leaped onto the other ships and were saved in time but he, exchanging a glorious death for defeat, was wounded while struggling on behalf of his ship and died.

T13 = Diodoros 16.7.2-4

We are fortunate to have another version of this battle against which to check the accuracy of Diodoros, namely that of Cornelius Nepos. Nepos, while he has greater detail in his version of the battle, has a more narrow focus, in keeping with his biographical aims:

(1) Khabrias, moreover, died in the Social War in the following manner: The Athenians were attacking Khios. Khabrias was present in the fleet as a private citizen, but he surpassed in authority all those who were magistrates and the soldiers looked to him more than to those in command.

(2) This hastened his death. For when he was eager to be the first to enter the harbor and he ordered his helmsman to guide the ship there, he caused his own destruction. For, although he penetrated the harbor, the other ships did not follow. Because of this he was surrounded by an onset of the enemy and, although he fought most bravely, his ship was stricken by a ram and began to sink.

(3) Although had he thrown himself into the sea, he could have escaped, since the fleet of the Athenians was coming up in support to pick up the men who were swimming, he preferred to die rather than to throw away his arms and leave the ship in which he had travelled. The others preferred not to do that and they reached safety by swimming. But he, judging an honorable death preferable to a base life, was killed by the weapons of the enemy while fighting hand-to-hand.

T14 = Nepos Chabrias 4.1-3

Except for the detail of Khabrias' official position, the two accounts do not contradict one another and agree on the circumstances surrounding his death. Together they provide us with at least a skeleton outline of the
military operations. As Diodoros understood the war, the rebels were already in a state of revolt when the Athenians dispatched a force against them. Evidently, both sides regarded Khios as the key to the war, since that is where the Athenians came upon the allies of the Khians gathering, both those from the other rebels and those from Mausolos of Karia. Although we are not told so, the Athenians must have gained an initial superiority, for both of our sources envision a siege or an attack on the city of Khios. Khares, perhaps still in command of his mercenary force, attacked on land and met determined resistance, while the naval force in which Khabrias served tried to force its way into the harbor. Unfortunately, both sources focus on this naval attack, particularly on the 'last stand' of Khabrias.

Khabrias rashly advanced ahead of the main Athenian force and was cut off from it. His ship was disabled and he died fighting. Just at the point where we would like to know more precisely the results of the battle we are instead treated to a dramatic vignette of the great man's death and an encomium of him. Neither source gives any information about the consequences of the Athenian failure or about the subsequent movements of the two sides. Strictly on the evidence, one might conclude that only a single Athenian ship was lost and that the defeat consisted in a loss of morale which followed the failure and the death of a famous soldier. This was the decisive defeat of the Athenian fleet, according to modern literature.

We are at a loss to say what happened next, although the Athenians almost certainly must have given up the attack on Khios. We know that between the battle of Khios and that of Embata the rebels achieved naval superiority in the eastern Aegean, while the Athenians assumed a defensive posture garrisoning some of the islands of their allies. Another factor that influenced Athenian strategy was war on a new front with a new enemy, Philip of Macedon. Between the time when the Athenians returned from Euboia and the beginning of the new Attic year, 356/5, Philip had captured both Amphipolis...
and Krenides. Such energy alarmed Philip's neighbors and three of them, representing Thracians, Paionians and Illyrians, formed a coalition against Macedon. Khares was in the general region of these affairs and he must have been paying attention to them, for he helped negotiate an alliance between the coalition and Athens, which was sworn at Athens in July of 356. Apparently, the situation in the region of Thrace was so important to the Athenians that they assigned to the negotiations the commander of their largest mobilized force, despite the fact that he was engaged in the suppression of a major revolt. In the end, the coalition was smashed before it accomplished anything, but to the Athenians at the time the alliance with the three kings must have seemed like a promising and economical alternative to splitting the city's strained resources between two different wars.

Khares, then, was probably in the northern Aegean at the beginning of the new Attic year, 356/5 when the Athenians decided to make a major effort in order to force a decisive confrontation with the rebels. We are dependent on the same two sources, Diodoros and Nepos, for this second major action of the Social War. Diodoros gives the following version in his account of the year 356/5:

(1) In Hellas the Khians and Rhodians and Koans, and furthermore the Byzantines, continued fighting the Social War against the Athenians; both sides made great preparations in the hope of deciding the war in a sea-battle. The Athenians had sent out ahead previously Khares with sixty ships, but at this time they manned another sixty and appointed as strategoi the most distinguished of the citizens, Iphikrates and Timotheos. They sent them out to continue the war against the rebellious allies in common with Khares.

(2) The Khians and Rhodians and Byzantines with their allies manned one hundred ships and ravaged Imbros and Lemnos, Athenian possessions, but campaigning against Samos with a great force they wasted the country and began besieging the city by land and sea. Also, by maltreating many other islands that were under the Athenians, they gathered money for the necessities of war.

(3) Once all the strategoi of the Athenians were gathered together, they first applied themselves to besieging the city of the Byzantines. After this, when the Khians and their allies abandoned the siege of Samos and turned to the relief of the Byzantines, all of
the fleets were gathered together around the Hellespont. When the sea-battle was about to take place, a great wind fell upon them and hindered their plan of action.

(4) But when Khares wished to fight a sea-battle despite nature and those around Iphikrates and Timotheos were opposed because of the magnitude of the swell, Khares, calling upon the soldiers as witnesses, calumniated his colleagues as traitors and wrote to the demos about them, how they had deliberately left the sea-battle. The Athenians were very angry and, having put Iphikrates and Timotheos on trial, they fined them many talents and removed them from their office as strategoi.

T16 = Diodoros 16.21.1-4

Nepos, in his life of Timotheos, provides another version of this campaign and, although he is manifestly more interested in its biographical aspects, his version adds a few significant details to and discrepancies from Diodoros':

(1) When he (sc. Timotheos) was old and had ceased to hold magistracies, the Athenians began to be pressed on all sides by war. Samos rebelled, the Hellespont had defected, Philip the Macedonian, already at this time powerful, was contriving many things. When Khares was put up against him, he was not thought a sufficient defence.

(2) Menestheus was made commander, the son of Iphikrates, son-in-law of Timotheos, and it was decreed that he set out to the war. To him were given as advisors two men pre-eminent in wisdom and experience, his father and his father-in-law, because there was such prestige in these men that there was great hope that what had been lost could be recovered through them.

(3) When they had set out for Samos and Khares, once their arrival was known, set out for the same place with his own troops, in order that nothing be seen to be done while he was absent, it happened that a great storm arose when they were nearing the island. Judging it advantageous to avoid the storm, the two old generals held their fleet at anchor.

(4) But he (sc. Khares), employing rash judgement, did not yield to the prestige of his elders, just as if fortune were in his own hand. He reached his destination and sent a message to Timotheos and Iphikrates to follow him there. Then, when the battle had gone badly and many ships had been lost, he retreated to the place from which he had set out and sent an official note to Athens, that he could have easily captured Samos if he had not been deserted by Timotheos and Iphikrates.

(5) The people, being impulsive, suspicious, and for that reason, fickle, hostile and envious (the men charged were powerful), summoned them home. They were accused of betrayal. On this charge Timotheos was convicted and his fine was levied at one hundred
talents. Compelled by the odium of his ungrateful city, he took himself off to Khalkis.

T17 = Cornelius Nepos Timotheos 3.1-5

For the most part, these two versions of the campaign can be reconciled to provide a reasonably clear picture of it. As suggested above, Khares was probably in the northern Aegean already. The rebels, now enjoying naval superiority, launched a major offensive. They first concentrated their efforts against strictly Athenian possessions, Imbros, Lemnos and, later, Samos, where they laid siege to the city. Then, needing money to finance the war, they began to harass Athenian allies. Athens, responded by making an extraordinary effort. She sent out a fleet of sixty ships, ordered that it link up with Khares' force, which was of equal size, and that the combined force bring about a decisive engagement. The Athenians were committing to battle the largest number of ships since the last days of the Peloponnesian War and entrusted part of the command to two old strategoi, who had the greatest prestige of those still alive. At this point the picture becomes somewhat confused.

According to Nepos, the force under Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus proceeded to Samos, where Khares joined them only because he feared they might accomplish something without him. Diodoros, on the other hand, maintains that the two forces first linked up and then attacked Byzantion, with the apparent intention of drawing the rebels away from their siege of Samos; at least this is what he records as actually happening. This discrepancy is compounded when the sources give the location of the battle. Nepos imagines it to have taken place off Samos, while Diodoros puts it "around the Hellespont". Both sources are probably mistaken, for Polyainos (T18) gives the battle's location as Embata, in the straits between Khios and Erythrai. There are several reasons for preferring Diodoros' version to Nepos' up to this point.
Most scholars are inclined to agree with Polyainos on the location of the battle and to accept that Diodoros is being very lax in his geographical terminology, because of the earlier, strategic prominence of Khios and Diodoros' vague indications that the Khians were the leaders of the rebel movement. Moreover, had the Athenians sailed into hostile waters divided, as Nepos suggests, they would have been violating a cardinal military principle by giving their adversaries an opportunity to fight either Athenian squadron at a great superiority, and, by defeating it, to render the Athenians numerically inferior. There is also reason to believe that some operations during the Social War did take place in the Hellespont, as Diodoros asserts. Furthermore, if we were simply to assume that Nepos had made a mental error, and wrote "Samos" when he meant "Khios" at the three places in the text where the name occurs, his version would be easily reconcilable with the other sources.

Both sources agree that there was a storm and that there was a difference of opinion over whether a battle could be fought. They also agree that Khares acted rashly: "contrary to nature" (T16) or "employing rash judgement... as if fortune were in his hand" (T17). To be sure, it is too much to expect to discover precisely at what stage in the action the storm arose. Diodoros implied that a course of action (προαυλέστης) had already been plotted, while Nepos portrayed Khares as in a position to inform the others by message to follow him. Both sources imply that the Athenian command was divided (equally, according to Diodoros) between the reinforcing strategoi and Khares, and in both sources Khares accused his colleagues, not of refusing to engage, but of withdrawing from the battle: "they... left the sea-battle" (Diodoros); "if he had not been deserted" (Nepos). The older men exercised caution, while Khares, perhaps already engaged, did not.

In any case, the Athenians lost their chance to defeat the rebels in a sea-battle and there were bitter recriminations. Both sources explicitly
state that Khares sent an official note to the demos that accused his colleagues of "betrayal". The demos deposed and recalled Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus, charged and tried them. The courts upheld Khares' version of the events, for the three strategoi were not reinstated, and Timotheos was found guilty. How well-advised their caution was, we are not likely to discover, but, no doubt, the salient point of Khares' accusation could be summed up in single word: νεναμάχησαν.  

Khares in Asia Minor: 356/5

When the other strategoi were deposed and not reinstated, Khares took command of the entire force:

(1) Taking over the leadership of the entire expedition and being eager to relieve the Athenians of the expense, Khares attempted a desperate endeavor. For Artabazos had revolted from the king and, with a few soldiers, was about to fight it out against satraps commanding seventy thousand soldiers. When Khares, with his entire force, became his ally and conquered the force of the king, Artabazos granted him a great deal of money in payment of his gratitude, from which it was possible to provide opsonion for the entire force.

(2) The Athenians, on the other hand, at first welcomed Khares' action, but later, when the king sent ambassadors and denounced Khares, they had the opposite opinion. For a story was spread abroad that the king announced he would make war on the Athenians with three hundred ships in alliance with Athens' enemies. So, under this threat the demos decided to resolve the war against the rebels. Upon finding them also eager for peace, they easily came to terms with them.

T26 = Diodoros 16.22.1-2

This "desperate endeavor" immediately follows the narrative of the battle of Embata and the punishment of Timotheos and Iphikrates in Diodoros' account. Fortunately, we can add a number of significant and revealing details to our knowledge of this campaign from a series of ancient, scholarly comments to Demosthenes' speeches.

A scholion that attempts to explain a phrase in Demosthenes' First
Philippic gives us details we would hardly have guessed at, had we only Diodoros to rely on. The orator's words "not for me a myriad, or even two, of mercenaries, nor these 'epistolary' forces, but let it be one from the city and one that will obey and follow any strategos or strategoi you choose, be he X, Y or Z," (4.19) are explained thus:

When the king of the Persians ordered the satraps along the seacoast to disband their mercenary forces because of the great expenditures of money, the satraps released the soldiers. These numbered about ten thousand and they came to Khares, the strategos of the Athenians, who had a mercenary force, and made him their leader. Artabazos, the Persian, had revolted from the king and was at war with him. He sent to Khares, inviting him to bring his army across into the territory of the king. So, when the soldiers were compelling Khares either to supply them or they would go away to one who paid, he brought the army across under compulsion and engaging twenty thousand Persians, most of them mounted under the command of Tithraustes, he defeated them. He even wrote to the Athenians about the ten thousand, that he had won a battle that was a sister of Marathon. They bade Khares through letters to hire others, too. So the rhetor means 'let us not, through a letter, order the strategoi to hire ten or twenty thousand mercenaries.'

T27 = Scholion to Demosthenes 4.19

A scrap of papyrus, thought to be a fragment of a commentary on an orator, complements nicely the scholion's account:

[He (sc. Khares) was making war against the king and, invading Phrygia, he ravaged the territory of Tithraustes until an embassy from Athens came preventing him from making war on the royal satraps. Then, having made peace between Tithraustes and Artabazos, he went down to the sea and pay[...]

T29 = Papyrus Fragmente FGrHist 105 F4 (Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer)

Finally, we can sketch in a few details with information provided by a series of scholia to Demosthenes' Third Olynthiac. The orator says, "but you, the demos, hamstrung and stripped of money and allies, have taken the part of an assistant and an appendage, content if these men (sc. the political leaders) share out with you the Theoric fund or grant you a procession at the Boedromia; and most courageous of all, you still owe them your own
thanks" (3.31). The scholiast(s) explain:

(146a) "Boïdia": This refers to Khares. For having crossed over into Asia to Artabazos and having sacked Lampsakos and Sigeion with his mercenary forces, he sent to the Athenians cattle, which they distributed among the tribes.

(146b) "Boïdia": "Boedromia" is another reading. For they say that, when Khares sent the spoil, it was the Boedromia. The word "boidia" is a diminutive in Attic contraction.

(147) "Most uncourageous of all": "most courageous" is another reading, in order that it be ironic; some, who are unaware of it, made the present reading. He says 'you still owe thanks' because they say that they crowned Khares for the spoil.

T30 = Scholia to Demosthenes 3.31 (146a, 146b, 147 Dilts)

No other source contradicts what the scholia and papyrus fragment have to say, nor is there any information in them that is inherently illogical, suspicious or difficult to believe, unless it is a question of the figures involved in the battle.  

The picture that emerges from these scraps of evidence does not challenge the basic accuracy of Diodoros' condensation, but it does throw the campaign in Asia Minor wholly into a different light. A mass of unemployed (Greek, certainly) mercenaries marched down to the coast of Asia Minor. It is only natural that they sought employment where there were likely to be rewards. The Athenians were at war with states whose territories could be expected to yield valuable booty. It was undoubtedly not difficult to persuade the unemployed soldiers to join Khares' mercenaries with merely the prospect of the spoils of war. As soon as a more rewarding offer presented itself, however, Khares was faced with a mutiny, not just of the newly acquired mercenaries, but probably of his own mercenary force as well. The scholion (T27) is quite explicit that Khares was compelled (ἀναγκαζόντων, ἀναγκασθείς) to act as he did.

It is doubtful whether the demos approved of Khares' action beforehand, although their recent experience of Persia suggests that they were probably
not unprepared to consider such a strategy if the opportunity arose. In any event, with an army that was probably the largest led by an Athenian since the Peloponnesian War Khares won a victory that was indeed the sister of Marathon, tactically speaking, but that was strategically a twin of the mercenaries' victory at Kounaxa.

The demos certainly gave its belated approval. Both Diodoros (T26) and the scholion to Demosthenes 4.19 (T27) make it clear that the Athenians enthusiastically received the news of the battle and repented only under the threat of the great king. It is equally clear that Khares' purpose in undertaking the expedition was to further the interests of Athens and not simply to enrich himself and his men. Artabazos' grant of money was used to provide the soldiers with opsonion, money for provisions (ὤναξεσθαι). From the spoil of Lampsakos and Sigeion Khares sent a drove of possibly 300 cattle to the Athenians to help them celebrate the Boedromia (T30).

Neither is there any question of the strategos being out of the city's control, for we hear of letters being sent, not only from the strategos to Athens, but also from Athens to the strategos. Moreover, when the Athenians did decide that their interests required Khares' withdrawal and they had sent an embassy to so inform him, he withdrew, having arranged a cessation of hostilities between his erstwhile ally, Artabazos, and Tithraustes.

The majority of Athenians did not hold Khares liable for their failure in the war, it seems. He was voted a crown for his efforts (T30), and he was elected strategos again for 354/3 (T34, T35). Thus, there is no basis for the frequent assertion in the modern literature that he laid low in his "feste Sigeion".
CHAPTER TWO: KHARES AND THE MACEDONIANS

Thrace and Thessaly: 353-2

Athens made peace with her rebellious allies, but remained at war with Macedon. Pydna and Poteidaia fell to Philip while the Athenians were engaged in the Social War, and Methone, the last remaining Athenian foothold in Macedonia, was besieged and taken after peace had been made with the allies. The Athenians were exhausted and they mounted rather feeble resistance.¹ The loss of these possessions increased the importance of Neapolis, Athens' ally in Thrace. Neapolis itself may have come under pressure from the Macedonians.² It is here, in the spring of 353, that Khares is next met. He was there on guard and watching the movements of Philip, who was accompanying his ally and xenos, Pammenes, on a march towards the Hellespont. After their victory at Neon, the Boiotians were sending Pammenes and an army to help Khares' erstwhile ally, Artabazos.³ Khares was shadowing these enemies of Athens and keeping the demos informed of their movements:

For when Philip came into Maroneia, he (Kharidemos) sent Apollonides to him, giving assurances to him and Pammenes. And had not Amadokos, the man controlling the territory, forbidden Philip to set foot there, nothing would have stood in the way of our being at war with both the Kardians and Kersobleptes. And that I speak the truth, take the letter of Khares.

T34 = Demosthenes Against Aristokrates 23.183

On the return march Philip ravaged the territories of Athenian allies and apparently feared that Khares might attack the naval squadron accompanying him on his march through Thrace:
Philip, having overrun the territory of Abdera and Maroneia, was returning with many ships, and leading a land army. Khares was lying in wait around Neapolis with twenty triremes. Philip, having selected from his ships the four best sailers, filled them with his best rowers, those at their peak of both strength and skill, and he gave them an order to sail out in front of the entire squadron and to sail by Neapolis, keeping not far from the shore. They did so and Khares launched his twenty ships intending to take the four. But the four, being swift and having the best rowers, quickly sped into the open sea. While the ships with Khares were eagerly pursuing, Philip safely sailed past Neapolis unnoticed, but Khares did not even capture the four ships.

T35 = Polyainos Strategemata 4.2.22

Thus Khares missed an opportunity to inflict a reverse on Philip's infant navy, although he eagerly desired to do so.⁴

At about the same time as these events in Thrace, the situation in Central Greece took a startling turn. The Sacred War had festered for a couple of years now, but with the Boiotian defeat of the Phokians in 354 it seemed as if the war was all but over. The Boiotians were so confident of this that they sent Pammenes to Asia Minor. A new leader of the Phokians emerged, however: Onomarkhos. He revived the fortunes of the Phokians and soon placed the Boiotians and their friends on the defensive. This was accomplished by means of a new weapon: the sacred treasures of Apollo.

With this new weapon Onomarkhos hired a multitude of mercenaries, distributed money to the allies of Phokis, bribed their foremost men, and even purchased the friendship or neutrality of some of his enemies, notably the Thessalians. The sources abound with lurid tales about the seizure of ancient treasures dedicated in the heroic age and their use by the Phokian and other leaders as bribes and love-gifts, but it is also clear that the money financed a number of offensives by the allies of Phokis.⁵ Khares received a share of this money and he put it to good use for Athens:

In the composition of Theopompos entitled "On the money plundered from Delphi" he says, "to Khares the Athenian through Lysandros sixty talents from which Khares feasted the Athenians in the agora, making victory sacrifices for the battle against the mercenaries
of Philip, whom Adaios, nicknamed Alektryon ("Cock") commanded. (=Theopompos FGrHist 115 F249) Herakleides the writer of comedies also mentions him thus:
Catching Philip's Cock/ Crowing too early and wandering about/ he butchered him, for he had not yet a crest./ Butchering one, many, indeed, of the Athenians/did Khares feast once/ So generous was he. (Herakleides FAC Edmonds F2) Douris relates the same things as well. (=Douris FGrHist 76 F35)

T36 = Athenaios Deipnosophistai 12 532D-E (= Theopompos FGrHist 115 F249; Herakleides FAC Edmonds F2; Douris FGrHist 76 F35)

This victory has left no trace in the historical sources, but it must have been newsworthy in its own time for another comic writer also mentioned it: 6

Philip's Cock: this is used in the case of those boasting on small successes. For Alektryon ("Cock") was a certain strategos of Philip, whom, so they say, Khares the Athenian killed. Herakleides the comic mentions him; Antiphanes does too.

T37 = Zenobios 6,34 (Corpus Paroemiographorum) (= Antiphanes FAC Edmonds F303)

Regrettably, neither the time nor the place of this victory is known, although the time is likely to have been between the winter of 354/3 and Onomarkhos' death early in the summer of 352, and the most attractive suggestion for the location is near Krenides. 7 The transaction between the Phokians and Khares may have gone something like this: the Phokians gave money to Khares and other allies so that they might recruit mercenary troops; the recruited mercenaries were then to be used for whatever purpose the recruiter saw fit, perhaps only until they were needed again by the Phokians themselves; the allied generals used their mercenaries for various actions that were of benefit to their own cities; Khares was able, either with the spoils from his campaign or from money unexpended, to celebrate his success by providing his countrymen with a public feast. 8 In any event, there is certainly a connection between the gifts of money and ambitious military expeditions. Khares is not one of those visited by divine vengeance for temple-robbing, and his scrupulous use of the Phokians' largesse may, in part,
be the reason for that.\textsuperscript{9}

It has been suggested above that the money distributed to the allies of Phokis was not so much personal bribe-money, but funds to finance operations of mutual benefit to Phokis and her allies. It is surely no coincidence that immediately after the rise of Onomarkhos, both Athens and Sparta undertook ambitious and successful campaigns. The Lakedaimonians successfully attacked Argos and the Athenians conquered the Khersonesos.\textsuperscript{10} Khares led the Athenian effort:

Khares, the strategos of the Athenians, having sailed into the Hellespont and having captured Sestos, slaughtered those of military age and sold the rest into slavery. But when Kersobleptes, the son of Kotys, owing both to alienation from Philip and friendship with the Athenians, put into the hands of the Athenians the cities in the Khersonesos except Kardia, the demos sent out kleroukhoi into the cities.

T38 = Diodoros 16.34.3-4

Sestos had defied the Athenians for several years and one would like to know how Khares succeeded where so many others had failed. A stratagem recorded by Frontinus may fill in the picture somewhat:

Khares, general of the Athenians, was about to attack a city situated on the coast. With his fleet hidden behind a certain promontory, he ordered his swiftest ship to sail past the enemy guards. It was seen, and, when all the ships that were keeping guard over the harbor raced to the pursuit, Khares, having sailed into the undefended harbor with the rest of the fleet, also captured the city.

T39 = Frontinus Strategemata 3.10.8

There are two reasons for believing that this stratagem refers to the capture of Sestos. First, Sestos is the only city situated on the coast that Khares is known to have captured with a fleet. Second, the harsh treatment of Sestos, once it was captured, implies strongly that it was captured by storm and not surrendered. Khares had learned the lesson taught to him by Philip.\textsuperscript{11} The capture of Sestos almost immediately put the entire Khersonesos, except
Kardia, into Athenian hands. It was the most significant Athenian victory in over a decade.

The *exandrapodismos* of Sestos stands out as one of Athens' more brutal acts during the period of the Second League, especially in comparison with the treatment of Samos a decade earlier. Sestos, however, was neither a League ally nor was it in the same category as Samos. The Athenians were as obsessed with the Khersonesos as they were with Amphipolis and for the same reason: it was "theirs" just as Lemnos, Skyros and Imbros were. Moreover, control of the region was considered vital to the Athenians. The town had revolted and preferred a barbarian master to an Athenian one. It had also cost the Athenians much effort and frustration, and its inhabitants paid the price for this. A comparison of other examples of *exandrapodismos* during this period and under the earlier Athenian democracy assures one that such a punishment was generally decided by the government, and not by the field commander; the plan may even have been pre-meditated, for *kleroukhoi* were being sent more and more to important Athenian possessions. The atrocity cannot be laid solely at the feet of Khares and his soldiers.

It has been pointed out supra that there is a coincidence between Onomarkhos' distribution of money and aggressive actions on the part of his allies, for their own benefit. Phokian largesse also may have benefitted themselves. In the spring of 352 a decisive battle was fought by the Phokians against the Macedonians and their Thessalian allies. Nearly 45,000 men met in Phthiotis and engaged in the so-called Battle of Krokos Fields. The Phokians were badly defeated, routed, and many were trapped against the sea in the Gulf of Pagasai. Diodoros describes their flight:

But when those around Onomarkhos were fleeing into the sea and Khares the Athenian was sailing by fortuitously with many triremes, there was a great slaughter of the Phokians. For the fugitives, discarding their panoplies, swam for it to the triremes; among them was Onomarkhos himself. In the end over 6,000 of the Phokians and their mercenaries were destroyed, among them the strategos
himself, and not less than 3,000 were captured. Philip crucified Onomarkhos; the rest he threw into the sea on the grounds that they were temple-robbers.

T40 = Diodoros 16.35.5-6

It is very difficult to believe that Khares could bring "many triremes" into the Gulf of Pagasai, just when 45,000 men were facing each other with deadly intent, "fortuitously" (ὉΧΥΧΩ). The fact that the Gulf of Pagasai is somewhat off the beaten path for the Athenians, combined with Onomarkhos' recent largesse to Khares makes it unlikely, although it is not implausible that Khares was on his way to or from the Khersonesos and arrived to give whatever assistance he could. How many (if any) Phokians and mercenaries saved themselves by swimming to the Athenian ships Diodoros does not say, although less than half of the Phokian army is accounted for in his casualty figures. Perhaps the fact that Khares had "many triremes" was added to emphasize the capacity of a potential rescue effort. In any case, the Phokians did not lack mercenaries during the next several years.

Olynthos and Thrace: 349-346

Several Athenian military ventures were undertaken between the disaster in Phthiotis and the siege of Olynthos: an expedition to Thermopylai at the end of 353/2, some activity in Thrace in the winter of 352/1, a kleroukhia-expedition to Samos in that same year, an unofficial (?) involvement in the defence of Egypt against a Persian invasion ca. 351, and a foray into Megara in 350/49. Where Khares was amidst this activity is not known, but Thrace is a very good guess.

There is a series of stratagems in which Khares is the main figure, but which provides almost no clues about their date or exact context. Three of the stratagems come from Polyainos and a fourth from Frontinus. Two of them specifically mention Thrace and three of the four portray Khares as being
in hostile territory. The stratagems may or may not belong to the same campaign or series of campaigns, but this is as good a point as any to discuss them.

Khares, noticing spies in the camp, stationed a guard outside the palisade and gave the order that each man was to take hold of the man next to him and not release him until he told who he was and of which unit. So, then, it turned out that the spies were captured since they were unable to tell their division, company, messmate or watch-word.

T47 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.13.1

In the dead of winter in Thrace, Khares, seeing the soldiers sparring their tunics and shrinking from doing what was necessary, passed a message around to them to exchange tunics with one another. Once this was done, each man, no longer sparing another person's clothing, was readier to do what was ordered.

T48 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.13.2

Khares was leading an army away from Thrace. The Thracians were attacking and were breaking down the rearguard. But he, wishing to draw off the enemy and to get through safely, spied a suspicious place and mounted some of his trumpeters on horses and sent a few cavalrymen with them; he ordered them to ride around it by the quickest way possible and, coming from behind the enemy to sound the signal for battle. They sounded it, and the pursuing Thracians, thinking it was an ambush, broke their formation and departed in flight. But Khares made a safe retreat.

T49 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.13.3

Khares, general of the Athenians, when he was expecting reinforcements and was afraid that in the meanwhile the enemy might assault his camp in contempt of his present weakness, ordered several of those he had to be sent out at night by the rear of the camp, and to return to camp by a route where they would be conspicuous to the enemy and offer the appearance of new forces arriving. And so, with pretended reinforcements, he was safe until he could be provided with those he was expecting.

T50 = Frontinus Strategemata 2.12.3

It becomes immediately clear that, without another personality or specific locale it is virtually impossible to say with much certainty what the context of these episodes is. One suspects that the enemy is no one very notable,
or else the stratagems would be doubly worthy of inclusion in their respective collections. Two of the stratagems (T48, T49) mention Thrace, three imply operations in hostile territory (T47, T49, T50 and, since Thrace is hostile in T49, one suspects it is also so in T48), in three of them Khares is in a fortified camp or outnumbered (all but T48) and T48 takes place in winter. All involve a land campaign.

What are the possibilities, based on the known facts of Khares' career? The 360s seem to be ruled out, because Khares is not known to have been either in Thrace or occupying a fortified camp. Likewise, the years from 357-355 are out of the question, because during them Khares commanded considerable forces and was unlikely to have been so seriously outnumbered. The period around 353-2 (and until 349?) is a distinct possibility. Khares was in the region, perhaps early in both 353 and 349, and one can imagine a certain amount of military activity in securing the Khersonesos for the new kleroukhia. Another possibility is the time after the fall of Olynthos, when the Macedonians were rapidly absorbing the remaining independent places in Thrace before the Peace of Philokrates. The period between 343-0, when Khares was stationed in Thracian waters, is remotely possible, but he will have wanted to be careful not to break the peace as his caution in the summer of 340 shows. Of these periods, that around 353-2 is decidedly the most plausible.

It is not very likely that any of these actions was very significant in itself, but together they show that the man could, on occasion, be resourceful and that he was not always on the receiving end of military trickery.

The Olynthians, meanwhile, had made peace with the Athenians, possibly as early as 352. When it became clear to them in 349 that there would be hostilities with Macedon, they turned to Athens for even closer ties. Thanks to the scholarly erudition of Dionysios of Halikarnassos an unusually detailed account of Athenian efforts to save Olynthos is preserved.
The Philosopher himself (sc. Aristotle) thus clearly shows that the tekhnai (sc. the Rhetoric) were written by him after the Olynthian War. This war took place when Kallimakhos was archon (349/8), as Philokhoros makes clear in the sixth book of his Atthis writing thus verbatim: "Kallimakhos Pergasethen—in this man’s term of office, since the Olynthians were at war with Philip and had sent an embassy to Athens, the Athenians made an alliance with them and they also sent as a relief force two thousand peltasts, the thirty triremes with Khares and eight that they manned in addition." (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F49)

Then relating a few things that happened in between, he has this: "At about the same time, since the Khalkidians in Thrace were being pressed by the war and had sent an embassy to Athens, the Athenians sent to them Kharidemos, the strategos in the Hellespont. With eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts and one hundred fifty cavalry, he came into Pallene and Bottiaia along with the Olynthians and ravaged the country." (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F50)

Then about the third relief force he says this: "But when the Olynthians again sent ambassadors to Athens and begged them not to allow themselves to be overwhelmed, but rather to send in addition to the existing forces a relief force, not of mercenaries but of Athenians themselves, the demos sent to them another seventeen triremes, two thousand citizen hoplites, three hundred cavalry in horse transports, and as strategos of the entire expedition, Khares." (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F51)

Dionysios of Halikarnassos Ad Ammaeum 9 (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F49-51)

It is difficult to grasp precisely what the Athenians accomplished, or what strategies either the Olynthians or Philip pursued. It seems that the first Athenian force sailed fairly early in the archon-year and that the second force, diverted from the Hellespont, helped the Olynthians counter-attack against Macedonian territory and against Khalkidic League territory that had already capitulated. Evidently, Philip spent most of 349/8 in capturing or winning over the smaller cities in the Khalkidic League, before undertaking the siege and capture of Olynthos in the late summer of 348.

Khares did not remain in Olynthos throughout the entire campaign, since it was he who led the third force composed of citizens. Despite modern assertions to the contrary, there is no evidence whatsoever that either Khares or Kharidemos was recalled or replaced or otherwise kept from pursuing his duties. Philokhoros explicitly states that the two earlier forces remained
in the theater of war, at least until the time of the third embassy. Surely, one or the other of the two strategoi he names exercised direct command of these forces. There is simply no time for the recall, trial or dismissal of either strategos.\textsuperscript{27}

The third Athenian relief force under Khares probably set out in the summer of 348, but it did not arrive in time to help the Olynthians:\textsuperscript{28}

...nevertheless the Athenians sent aid of forty ships and the strategos Khares. Since he was held up by a storm, while Euthykrates and Lasthenes betrayed Olynthos; Philip razed the place, but captured the other cities. The Athenians made the survivors citizens.\textsuperscript{T42 = Souda s.v. \textquoteleft\textquoteleft\textsuperscript{356}}

The clear indication is that the relief force was delayed by bad weather, possibly the Etesian Winds.\textsuperscript{29} Only one source hints at any culpability on the part of Khares and the Athenians, and that source's testimony is neither convincing nor unequivocal. It is a gloss on a passage in the \textit{Panathenaikos} of Aristeides, a rhetorician active in the second century A.D.:

By "Khalkidians" he means Olynthians. Olynthos is a part of the Khalkidians. He says "as far as she could", seeing that they (sc. the Athenians) sent to them Khares, the strategos for aid. But when he arrived too late, Philip sacked Olynthos, on whose behalf Demosthenes spent many fine speeches, in order that it be saved. (Some MSS read, instead of the words underlined: But he, having come too late, lost Olynthos.)

\textsuperscript{T43 = Scholia to Aristeides Panathenaikos (= Dindorf 179, 8-9)}

The reading "Philip sacked Olynthos" is clearly more accurate than "he (sc. Khares) lost Olynthos", since there were already Athenian forces on the scene and since Olynthos was not Khares' to "lose". The scholia add nothing to what can be gathered from the notice in the \textit{Souda}. Neither Aiskhines (T52) nor any other of the detractors of Khares mentions his culpability in the fall of Olynthos, and that is not surprising because Olynthos was betrayed.

The Athenians cannot have known that treachery was imminent or else they
would not have committed so many citizen-troops in the summer of 348. The enemy may have been closing in around Olynthos when the third embassy reached Athens, but that was no reason for undue urgency, at least not for those who were acquainted with the history of Olynthos. The city had defied the combined might of the Peloponnesian League and Macedon thirty years earlier, and had held out for two years with the enemy under their walls, before finally coming to terms. Before the present war was over, Athens had committed almost 8,500 men (including 2,450 citizens), and perhaps as many as 73 triremes to the Olynthian cause; she cannot reasonably have been expected to do much more, nor could she be expected to predict treachery.

The demand for Athenian naval forces during the simultaneous campaigns in the Khalkidike and Euboia put a strain on Athenian resources. A request was made for volunteer trierarchs and several men did volunteer. Khares may have been one of them, since it was at just about this time that he was registered on the naval archives as a trierarch. This was not the act of a rapacious condottiere, but of a responsible and concerned political leader.

There is some speculation that Khares' role in the Olynthian War was controversial. This view is based on a remark quoted by Aristotle:

And Kephisodotos, when Khares was hastening to render his euthynai for the Olynthian War, became vexed, saying that he was trying to render his euthynai while holding the demos in a chokehold.

T45 = Aristotle Rhetoric (3.10) 1411a 6-9

Presumably, Kephisodotos was vexed because Khares had been re-elected and in his eagerness to get back into the field was trying to hasten the process of rendering his euthynai. In this way he could be said to have the demos in a chokehold. At any rate, Khares was strategos continually from 349/8 through 347/6.

The war between Athens and Macedon continued with Athens attempting to organize an alliance of Greek states against Macedon, while Macedon
was harassing Athenian overseas possessions. In particular Macedonian pressure was applied in the region of the Khersonesos and Propontis, against both Athenian and Thracian interests there. By 346 the situation was deteriorating rapidly. The Athenian commander trying to help Kersobleptes was Khares:

Hear, then, the letter of Khares, which he sent at that time to the demos, that Kersobleptes had lost his kingdom and Philip had captured Hieron Oros on the 24th of Elaphebolion. But Demosthenes was serving as proedros that month, while being one of the ambassadors on the 25th...

You hear that it was decreed on the third of Mounikhion. How many days earlier had Kersobleptes lost his kingdom before I left? As Khares the strategos says, it was the month before, if indeed Elaphebolion comes before Mounikhion!

$T_{46} = \text{Aiskhines Parapresbeias ("On the False Embassy") } 2.90,92$

Khares and his force were not able to prevent the loss of Hieron Oros, a place on the western coast of the Propontis. Apparently all he could manage to do was to keep the demos informed of their enemy's activities. Subsequently, events in Central Greece persuaded Athens to make the Peace of Philokrates, and little is heard of Athenian arms for the next few years.\(^{35}\)

**The Peace of Philokrates**

During the next few years of uneasy peace, little is heard of Athenian arms and nothing of Khares. There was political in-fighting at Athens between prominent policy-makers, mainly the ambassadors who negotiated the peace. The in-fighting also involved some of the strategoi, and Khares' part in the "War for Amphipolis" became a topic of discussion.\(^{36}\) There is nothing to indicate that he fell from favor or withdrew from public life; there is simply no evidence for the activities of any of the strategoi from 346-344. We may be confident that Khares was in Athens for at least part of this period, because he served as khoregos for his tribe, Pandionis, and Akamantis at the Thargelia of 344/3, and was victorious with the boys' chorus.\(^{37}\)
In this same year, 344/3, the Hellenes were invited to share in the conquest of Egypt with the king of Persia. 38 Thebes, Argos and some of the cities of Asia Minor accepted the invitation, and supplied the king with what proved to be the decisively effective mercenary force. 39 Athens and Sparta publicly refused, but private individuals from both of these states did take part in the campaign. 40

In the following year (343/2) growing Athenian concerns about the ambitions of Philip were reflected in the dispatch of new kleroukhoi to the Khersonesos under the strategos Diopeithes. 41 It is also about this same time that Khares was again on duty in Thracian waters. Two pieces of evidence place him in Thasos and Ainos. One is contained in a scholion to a speech delivered in spring 342 (343/2) the other in a speech delivered after 344/3. 42 The additional evidence that Khares was in command of a naval force in Thracian waters in 341/0 makes it quite likely that he was on duty there each year from 343/2-340/39. 43

The speaker of On Halonesos (Dem. 7), probably Hegesippos of Sounion (also known as 'Krobylos'), 44 denigrated Philip's offer to share with Athens the task of patrolling the sea against pirates as simply an opportunity to demonstrate Athenian naval weakness and to corrupt her allies. At one point the speaker alluded to a recent, and apparently well-known, event:

...and not only are exiles conveyed from himself to Thasos through your strategoi, but other islands are being appropriated, since he is sending out people to sail along with your strategoi, as though they were intending to share in the guardianship of the sea. (Dem. 7.15)

A scholiast explains this passage thus:

For, some of the Thasians were proven to be about to betray affairs to Philip; they were exiled from the citizens. These people Philip restored after persuading those around Khares.
The allusion is very obscure and there are no other facts that might aid in determining the context, or the value of the scholiast's information. The scholiast certainly did not simply deduce what he wrote from the speech. That the exiles were 'Philippizing' might have been guessed, but that Khares conveyed them back to Thasos requires information independent of the speech. Whether or not the scholiast has referred his independent information appropriately to explain this allusion in the speech cannot be known. In any event, there is no reason to believe that this obscure business alienated Thasos from Athens. On the contrary, Thasos hosted enemies of Philip in 341.

In the speech Against Theokrines, numbered 58 in the Demosthenic corpus, the speaker tried to characterize his opponent, Theokrines, as a bold-faced sycophant. As an example of the defendant's sycophancy, the prosecutor cites the alienation of Ainos:

For they say that the Ainians no longer pay any attention to our city, and this has occurred because of Theokrines here. For being harassed by his sycophancy in those times, when some were leaning towards Philip and some towards Athens, and learning that the decree that Thoukydides proposed, the one about the syntaxis, had been indicted as unconstitutional—earlier Kharinos had indicted it—and when no progress was being made, but the demos was willing that the Ainians pay the syntaxis that they had agreed upon with Khares the strategos, then this damned fellow undertook to do the same as the traitor Kharinos. Learning this, they did what was forced upon them; they chose the least of the evils before them. And what must we imagine them to have suffered at the hands of those bringing indictments here, if they found it preferable to receive a garrison, revolt from you and pay heed to barbarians? I think that you alone are able to bear the wickedness of these men, but no one else of the Hellenes.

Clearly, for some allies, there was a fate worse than Khares.

In 342 Philip began campaigning in Thrace again, and at about the same time friction developed between the Athenian settlers in the Khersonesos and Kardia, Philip's ally. Eventually, Diopeithes raided Macedonian Thrace after
Philip supported Kardia with troops. There was a discussion in Athens about removing Diopeithes and sending another strategos in his place. Khares may have continued at his post in Thasos during these events, but by the spring of 340 he was himself in the Khersonesos in command of an Athenian squadron, monitoring Philip's movements and trying to alert Byzantion to the approaching menace.

Khares was in the Khersonesos at the very end of the Attic month of Anthesterion. Less than two weeks earlier a conference had been held at Athens, in order to put together a League of Greek states to oppose Macedon. In addition, the Athenians had recently been in contact with the Persians, and were continuing to develop their contacts. There is some evidence that Khares and other Athenian strategoi were operating on and near Lesbos at about this time, perhaps doing one or both of collecting syntaxeis and defining the boundaries between Persian and Athenian spheres of influence in the aftermath of Hermias of Atarneus' fall.

There are two pieces of evidence for Khares' presence on Lesbos, both of disputed date. One of them is contained in a stratagem related by Polyainos:

> When Khares was besieging Aristonymos in Methymna, he sent an embassy to Memnon asking him not to aid Aristonymos. He (sc. Memnon) answered that he would aid him with all his might, for he was an ancestral friend and xenos, and that he would be there with all his soldiers on the next night. Khares disdained this when the ambassadors announced it, on the grounds that it was impossible for a great and slow army to be there on the next night. But Memnon, having travelled five stades by road and having embarked 1,200 soldiers into boats at dusk, gave them an order, that, whenever they had disembarked and come into the akropolis, they were to light a beacon-fire and attack the enemy. When these things were done, the attack in the dark appeared unexpectedly, but the beacon-fire, once lit, turned Khares to flight, as if Memnon had seized the akropolis with his full force.

T69 = Polyainos Strategemata 5.44.3

The anecdote contains no clear indication of date, but the time between ca. 342-340 makes the best sense for a number of reasons. Memnon and Khares had...
been allies when the two had both been in the region during the Social War. Shortly thereafter, Memnon was driven into exile with his brother-in-law, Artabazos and was restored ca. 342, as part of the great king's reward for his brother Mentor's services in the reconquest of Egypt.\textsuperscript{54} When Khares and Memnon were again in the same general region at the same time, in 333, Memnon enjoyed a great naval superiority over the Macedonians and all others, while Khares lacked any official standing from which he might send and receive an embassy, or from which he might expect effectively to warn Memnon off from aiding Aristonymos. Moreover, Khares was clearly co-operating with Memnon's successors in 332, and it is less likely that he was entrusted with command in 332, if he had been hostile and 'piratical' in the previous year.\textsuperscript{55} This interpretation is corroborated by a document on which Khares, Phokion, a Persian Orontes, syntaxeis from Lesbos, the Attic month Thargelion, and the archon Nikomakhos (341/0) are all mentioned (T68).

The document in question unequivocally refers to the "thesmothetai in the archonship of Nikomakhos", and the name of a proposer, Polykrates son of Polykrates, is preserved (T68, fragment a lines 12 and 2, respectively). It also mentions dealings involving one Orontes, apparently a Persian, and the Athenian strategoi Khares, Kharidemos, Phokion and Proxenos. Despite every indication that the document is to be dated in the very late 340s, previous students of it have disregarded the indications of date solely on the basis of a desire to identify the Orontes mentioned on it with the famous satrap of Armenia.\textsuperscript{56} The satrap Orontes was already ruling Armenia and married to a daughter of king Artaxerxes by 401, and he was an important participant in: a) the suppression of Kyros' revolt in that year; b) the suppression of Euagoras, king of Kypros ca. 385; c) the great Revolt of the Satraps ca. 362-1.\textsuperscript{57} It is generally felt that this Orontes cannot have been active in the West, or, indeed, alive, as late as 341/0, and for this reason earlier dates, such as 361/0 and 349/8, have been suggested for the document.\textsuperscript{58}
Such views are wrongheaded. There is nothing in the document that helps to identify the Orontes named on it, except to suggest that he was a dynast. Other Persian dynasts of that name are known, however, and one would do well to exercise similar caution in identifying this Persian as W.E. Thompson advises in the identification of Athenians; to rephrase Thompson, "Tot Persis idem nomen erat." 59

On the other hand, there are abundant reasons to accept the document in the context of 341/0. Epigraphically, there is simply no obstacle to the later date, rather emendation is needed to support either of the earlier dates. 60 Turning to the prosopographical data one finds that, of the six Athenians named on the document, five can be positively and precisely identified, while the sixth may be identified with a citizen politically active ca. 341-0. 61 Historically speaking, the dealings between Athens and this Persian dynast, Orontes, fit comfortably into the context of relations between the Athenians and Persia in 341-0. Athens had recently been in contact with, and had received help from, Persia. Moreover, when Philip attacked the grain-convoy in the summer of 340, Khares was consulting with the royal generals, one of whom was a fellow Athenian. 62 There is no reason why the Athenians cannot have conducted business with the Persian dynast, Orontes, in 341-0, and one may rely on the information provided by T68 without resorting to conjecture and emendation.

Whatever the case may be about Orontes and the Athenian strategoi, Khares was watching the Macedonians as they approached the Khersonesos in the summer of 340. The Macedonian army escorted a naval force through the Hellespont, and despite the fact that Athenian land and naval forces were present, neither side engaged in active hostilities. 63 In fact, it does not appear that war broke out between Athens and Macedon for some time. There is no evidence that Athens aided Perinthos, and a state of war was not provoked until Philip seized the Athenian grain convoy in the late summer. 64

There are several pieces of evidence for Khares' sojourn in the Bosporos, but only one seems to have understood the situation. It is the commentary
of Didymos, who drew on Philokhoros, Theopompos and others:

The war of the Athenians against the Macedonians was kindled by all the other matters in which Philip offended the Athenians while pretending to keep the peace, but especially the campaign against Byzantion and Perinthos. He was vying to bring the cities over for two reasons: to deprive the Athenians of their grain convoy, and so that they might not have coastal cities, getting the jump on him in having anchorages and places of refuge for the war against him. But (it was kindled) most when he accomplished a very lawless deed, seizing the boats of the merchants at Hieron, 230 of them according to Philokhoros, but 180 according to Theopompos, from which he gathered 700 talents. These things were done in the year before, in the archonship of Theophrastos (340/39) who was archon after Nikomakhos (341/0), as others recount, but in particular Philokhoros says this: "And Khares went away to a gathering of the royal strategoi, leaving the ships in Hieron so that they might escort the boats from the Pontos. Philip, seeing that Khares was not present, first tried sending ships to seize the boats. But being unable to force the issue, he shipped soldiers onto the other side against Hieron and he became master of the boats. They were not less than 230 in all. He deemed them enemy property, broke them up and used the wood for his siege-machines, and he came into the possession of much money, grain and hides."

T71 = Didymos Commentary on Demosthenes 10.34-11.5 (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F162)

From this evidence it seems that the Athenians and Khares avoided becoming actively engaged in the sieges until very late in the summer, perhaps September, and that Philip deliberately provoked them into war. Khares' mission was not to aid the Byzantines, but to convoy the grainships, although he was clearly taking counsel with those who were actively engaged in resisting Philip.65

It was probably only now that the Athenians declared war, and that Khares engaged in hostilities:

...Khares the strategos of the Athenians came with forty ships for the alliance with Byzantion in the war against Philip. He seized a height on the Propontis that lies between Khrysopolis and Khalkedon, and there he dropped anchor and made trial of the war.

T70 = Hesykhios of Miletos FGrHist 390 F1 §28

Khares' force was reinforced by another under Phokion, but perhaps first he won a minor naval victory.66 Although Plutarch does not seem to have understood the situation at Byzantion, he may preserve some evidence of friction
between the Byzantines and Athenians:

But when Philip came into the Hellespont with his whole force nourishing hopes that he would win the Khersonesos, Perinthos and Byzantion at the same time, and the Athenians were eager to send help, the rhetores strove to send out the strategos Khares. He sailed, but accomplished nothing worthy of his force, nor did the cities receive his fleet, but he wandered around, suspected by all, exacting money from the allies and despised by the enemy. The demos, kindled by the rhetores, became angry and repented for having sent aid to the Byzantines. Phokion, rising up, said that they must not be angry with the distrustful allies, but at the distrusted strategoi. "For these men make you frightening even to those who cannot save themselves without you." Then the demos was moved by this speech and changed its mind. It bade Phokion himself to take a second force and go to the aid of the allies in the Hellespont. That made the greatest contribution towards saving Byzantion.

T73 = Plutarch Phokion 14.2-3

Plutarch clearly did not understand the precise context in which Phokion was sent forth from Athens with another fleet. Phokion had been otherwise occupied in 341/0, and Khares, as has been seen above, was in the Hellespont before Philip arrived. It may be that Plutarch has misunderstood the true nature of Khares' mission in the Bosporos, and the relationship between the sending of the two forces. In any event, during the siege of Byzantion and Philip's withdrawal, it is Phokion's exploits, rather than Khares', that are handed down in the tradition. Nevertheless, there is nothing to indicate that Khares was held responsible for the disaster at Hieron or his conduct in the war; his election as strategos for 339/8 and perhaps 338/7 confirm this. The Athenians had good reasons to send Phokion with Athenian reinforcements to Byzantion, and those reasons had little to do with Khares.

Khaironeia and the Destruction of Thebes

In the late fall of 339 an Amphiktyonic army with Philip of Macedon as its hegemon marched into Phokis and seized Elateia. There was an immediate competition for alliance with the Boiotian League, which Athens and her allies won, thanks to Demosthenes. The Athenians sensibly made a number of conces-
sions to the Boiotians, as Aiskhines made clear in his review (3.142-3) of the terms of the alliance: the Athenians were to recognize Theban (i.e., Boiotian League) hegemony over all the cities of Boiotia, they undertook to meet all naval expenses and two-thirds of other expenses, they agreed to share command at sea, while on land the Boiotians probably retained ultimate control. Under the circumstances these concessions were certainly a bargain for Athens. 71

The major expense of the campaign on land was undoubtedly the money to hire a great force of mercenaries. This force was to be stationed at the Gravia Pass to protect Amphissa, while the citizen armies held the Parapotamoi Pass to cover Khaironeia and the entrance into Boiotia. 72 Apparently, the command structure paired military leaders from each of the two major powers, for the sources mention two Athenian strategoi and two Boiotarkhoi specifically associated with the force at Khaironeia, and another strategos and Boiotarkhos associated only with the mercenary force; the Athenians Lysikles and Stratokles, and the Thebans Timolaos and Theagenes are associated with the forces and battle of Khaironeia, Khares and the Theban Proxenos are associated with the mercenary force. 73

After they were several months in these positions, Philip suddenly struck at the mercenary force, having first deceived Khares and Proxenos with a ruse:

Philip was campaigning against the territory of Amphissa. The Athenians and Thebans seized the pass beforehand and the way through it was difficult. Philip deceived the enemy by sending a false letter to Antipatros in Macedonia, saying that he was putting off the campaign against Amphissa and hastening to Thrace, because he learned that there was a revolt there. The courier went through the pass. The strategoi, Khares and Proxenos, captured him and, reading the letter, believed its contents and ceased guarding the pass. But Philip burst into the place and seized it since it was deserted and unguarded. When the strategoi turned back, he defeated them and became master of Amphissa.

T77 = Polyainos Strategemata 4.2.8
The defeat was serious, more so for considerations of morale and diplomacy than strictly military ones. The citizen forces fell back a few miles to a new position in order to be able to cover a Macedonian invasion by way of either the Kephissos valley, or the route along the Gulf of Korinth. What became of the two defeated commanders of the mercenaries is quite obscure, although it is very difficult to imagine that they were allowed to play any substantial role in the command of the undefeated force at Khaironeia.\footnote{74}

The ancient testimony on the final battle, at Khaironeia, is very spotty and disappointing. Diodoros, the main narrative source, is typically brief and is far more interested in Demosthenes' role in the negotiations between the demos of Athens and that of Thebes. He does relate that Khares and Lysikles were sent into Boiotia after the Boiotian alliance was concluded (T76), but this was late in 339. He describes, however, none of the preliminary skirmishing, nor the defeat at Amphissa; rather, he delights in the verbal duel between Python, Philip's envoy, and Demosthenes.\footnote{75} Instead of giving the deployment of the armies and so forth, Diodoros launches into a comparison of the relative merits of the generals of the Athenians and Philip:

Among the Athenians the best of their strategoi had died, Iphikrates, Khabrias, and also Timotheos, while of those remaining Khares held first place, but he did not even excel ordinary individuals in the energy and counsel required of a general.

\[\text{T78 = Diodoros 16.85.7}\]

Whether or not Diodoros even thought of Khares as having a part in the battle is wholly unclear. In fact, the only piece of evidence that specifically associates Khares with the battle of Khaironeia is the witty rejoinder attributed to Demades by Stobaios:

Demades the rhetor, having been taken prisoner in the battle of Khaironeia by Philip, and being introduced to him while he was drunkenly exulting "Where is the nobility and dignity of the city of the Athenians?", (sc. he replied) "You would know, king, the power of the city had Philip commanded the Athenians and Khares
the Macedonians."

T79 = Stobaios Florilegium 54.47

All the other evidence points to Lysikles and Stratokles as strategoi at Khaironeia along with their Theban counterparts. It is likely that neither Khares nor Proxenos played any significant role in the battle.76

Many of those who have believed that Khares was involved in the final battle have drawn inferences about his behaviour following the battle: he failed to return to Athens and took refuge in his private retreat, Sigeion, or he managed to foist the blame for the defeat onto the unfortunate Lysikles. There were repercussions felt by some individuals, to be sure, and Lysikles was one of them, but the inferences about Khares are both unfounded and 'creative', to say the least. The orthodox Athenian view soon became one which blamed the calamity on the venality and turpitude of the Theban leaders.77

Moreover, there is some positive evidence that Khares was in Athens and regarded as politically influential in 335. After Alexander destroyed Thebes in that year, Athens tried to mollify him with an embassy. As a means of humbling the city and insuring her future docility Alexander demanded that the demos hand over to him those political leaders whom he felt to be most hostile to Macedon. In the end only one man was exiled, Kharidemos.78 There were two different traditions in antiquity about precisely which men Alexander demanded:

Then straightaway, Alexander sent to Athens a demand for ten of the demagogoi, as Idomeneus and Douris have said, but, as the majority and the most reliable say, rather these eight: Demosthenes, Polyeuktos, Ephialtes, Lykourgos, Moirokles, Demon, Kallisthenes, Kharidemos.

Plutarch Demosthenes 23.4

But this passage in Plutarch is the only evidence for the 'eight-name' tradition. All other ancient testimony on this subject followed a list that con-
tained more than eight, and probably ten, names.

The fullest representatives of the 'ten-name' tradition are Arrian and the Souda:  

\[T80 = \text{Arrian } \textit{Anabasis} \ 1.10.4-5\]

In all else he answered in a friendly fashion to the embassy, but writing a letter to the demos he demanded those around Demosthenes and Lykourgos; he also demanded Hypereides, Polyeuktos, Khares, Kharidemos, Ephialtes, Diotimos and Moirokles. These men he held responsible for the city's disaster at Khaironeia, for the insults at the death of Philip as well as those against himself and Philip. He revealed them as being no less to blame for the revolt of the Thebans than those of the Thebans who fomented the revolt.

\[T81 = \text{Souda } s.v. 'Αντίπατρος (A2704)\]

Other sources representing the 'ten-name' tradition are Diodoros (17.15.1), Plutarch (Phokion 17.2), probably Justin (11.4.10-12) and perhaps the author of the Plutarchean \textit{Vitae Decem Oratorum} (Mor. 848E). Despite the odds against him, Plutarch (Demosthenes) may well be right, but it can be demonstrated that in addition to Idomeneus and Douris, Ptolemy endorsed the 'ten-name' tradition. In other words, a contemporary source, who was in an especially privileged position to know about such things, believed that Khares was present and influential at Athens in 335.

Khares and the anti-Macedonian Mercenaries

Several of these men named on one or the other of the lists turned up in Asia Minor a few months later as mercenaries in the service of Persia. They joined a considerable number of anonymous Athenians in the armies opposing the Macedonians. A large number of Athenians were taken prisoner at the Granikos. Thrasyboulos and Ephialtes distinguished themselves at the siege
of Halikarnassos. Kharidemos was at the court of Dareios himself, and he angled for the position made vacant by Memnon's death in 333. Athenodoros the Imbrian, an acquaintance of both Kharidemos and Khares from their days in Thrace, was held prisoner in Sardis, and the Athenian Demokrates preferred suicide to surrendering to the Macedonians in 331. Among these politically motivated resisters was Khares.

Like Kharidemos and others, Khares probably fled Athens after the sack of Thebes, for he was in Sigeion when Alexander crossed into Asia in the spring of 334:

When Alexander was going up to Ilion Menoitios, his pilot, crowned him with a golden crown and for this reason, too, Khares the Athenian came, as well as certain others, some Hellenes and some natives (a lacuna here * * *) but some (say?) that he also crowned the grave of Akhilleus, but they say that Hephaistion crowned the grave of Patroklos.

T82 = Arrian Anabasis 1.12.1

Khares had clearly not committed himself publicly to the Persian cause but he was certainly in a good position to monitor events as they unfolded before he committed himself irrevocably (and dare one guess that he was keeping Athens informed of the state of things in his area?).

It is not known if Khares took part in Memnon's counter-offensive in spring of 333, but he had joined the Persians by the following year. In the spring of 332 the Macedonians under Hegelokhos and Amphoteros were retaking the islands which Memnon had captured the previous year. Khares was commanding the Persian garrison at Mitylene:

(Hegelokhos reported) that he had taken Mitylene which was held by Khares, and the other cities on Lesbos and that he had brought them over by an agreement.

T83 = Arrian Anabasis 3.2.6

From here the Macedonians crossed over to Mitylene which had been recently occupied by Khares the Athenian and held with a garrison of 2,000 Persians. But, when he was unable to endure a siege, he
handed the city over on the condition that he be allowed to go away unharmed. He set out for Imbros; the Macedonians spared the surren­
ered.

T84 = Q. Curtius Rufus History of Alexander the Great 4.5.22

Khares continued to seek ways to oppose Macedon. He was in command of a mercenary force at Tainaron:

And concerning the strategoi whom Alexander demanded, he (sc. Hypereides) spoke against ***(a lacuna here)*** and concerning the triremes. He counseled against disbanding the mercenary force at Tainaron that Khares led, being well disposed toward the strategos.

T85 = Plutarch Moralia 848E (Vitae Decem Oratorum: Hypereides)

The date of this command in uncertain. Most date it to the period just before the Lamian War, but some have realized that the war of Agis of Sparta is more likely.

Khares had opposed Philip and Alexander for most of his career and when he died, perhaps a little before the exile of Demosthenes, he was remembered as one of the demotikoi, as Demosthenes writes:

I fear that you may become bereft of those who speak on your be­
half (i.e., the demos), especially since of the demotikoi some fate, time and a fitting end have taken away, such as Nausikles, Khares, Diotimos, Menestheus, Eudoxos and also Euthydikos, Ephialtes and Lykourgos, while others you have thrown out, just as Kharidemos, Philokles and myself.

T86 = Demosthenes Epistula 3.31

Like the octogenarian Agesilaos, Khares had continued, even into his extreme old age, to "work trustily and faithfully on behalf of the demos of the Athenians, as far as it was in his control" (T54). He fell far short of the heroic canon of his colleagues and contemporaries, Iphikrates, Khabrias and Timotheos, but Demosthenes was surely right to grant him a place among the demotikoi.
Summary of Part I

Khares was a member of the liturgical class at Athens and probably came from a family that could afford to bear such liturgies. He served as an Athenian military magistrate for nearly forty years, thirty of them at the rank of strategos. There is evidence to document that he was strategos certainly or very probably in sixteen of those years. This constitutes good evidence of his popularity at Athens, and that conclusion is supported by ancient evidence. There is no evidence that he was convicted of wrongdoing as a magistrate, nor that he went into self-imposed exile between magistracies. There is good evidence, however, that he followed regular procedures for communication with, and obtaining instructions from, the home government.

It was only after his career as a magistrate was ended at Athens, that he took service as a mercenary. This mercenary service is politically consistent, i.e., anti-Macedonian, and it fits into a pattern of Athenian resistance to Macedon after the founding of the League of Korinth. The label of condottiere does not fit him, as far as that term is used and understood.
In the previous chapters Khares' long career as an Athenian military magistrate and, later, as a mercenary soldier fighting against the Macedonians, has been reviewed. There it was seen that the Athenians entrusted him with their most important elective office repeatedly over a period of thirty years. Fourteen or more tenures of the office of strategos can be documented during this period, and there is reason to believe that more would be discovered, were the evidence fuller.¹ This record of electoral success bears ample witness to the man's popularity among his fellow citizens, particularly when one considers how precarious public life in ancient Athens could be. According to one recent definition of ancient political leaders, Khares' long career should qualify him as one of Athens' most prominent politicians during the middle third of the fourth century B.C.²

Regardless of ancient or modern assessments of his character, or skill as a general, it is quite evident that Khares was one of his city's more enduring and popular public figures. The ancient sources admit as much. Theopompos (T62) conceded that the Athenians loved Khares more than other citizens; Nepos (T33) excluded him from the same class as Timotheos, Konon, Khabrias and Iphikrates, but confessed, sed tamen Athenis et honoratus et potens; and Demosthenes (T54) reminded the Athenians that, although tried in every manner, Khares had always been found to have acted trustily and loyally on their behalf.

In view of Khares' obvious durability and popularity as a public figure at Athens, it seems justifiable to investigate his relations with other Athenians, that is, his 'political career'. By this term is meant the un-
official activity that a politician undertook, that which he was not obliged to do *ex officio*. What elements or persons in the state supported or opposed him, and what elements did he in turn oppose or support? Who were Khares' supporters and allies, enemies and rivals? How long and to what extent were they such, and how did he maintain his position in the state for so long? These are the questions to which some answers will be sought.

Modern students of the fourth century B.C. focus their attention on two salient associations between Khares and other prominent Athenians. One is with the *rhetor* Aristophon Azenieus, a man especially influential in the late 360s and 350s, the other with the famous orator Demosthenes, who began to achieve prominence in the mid-340s.\(^3\) Between 352 and 349 Khares' career is a blank; this is also a period when Aristophon's influence apparently waned, and during which Demosthenes began to thrust himself into the forefront of Athenian political life. The hiatus in Khares' career provides a convenient place at which to divide this account, and so a chapter will be devoted to the early period and another to the later. Such a division does not in any way imply that Khares is believed to have been allied to one man or one group during the one period, and another in the other period, although generally there does seem to have been a 'changing of the guard', when a new generation of political leaders came forth.\(^4\)

This investigation will attempt to proceed, as much as possible, without reliance on preconceived notions about political leaders, political groups, their programs and goals, or on unexamined criteria upon which political alliance or enmity is determined. It is hoped thereby to test the validity of some traditional and current methods and models upon which modern conceptions about Athenian political life are based.\(^5\)
CHAPTER THREE: KHARES AND ARISTOPHON

Introduction

As far as can be ascertained from the ancient evidence, Khares' early 'political career' was dominated by a single, controversial political conflict. This conflict manifested itself in the accusation and trial of the men who were his colleagues in the battle of Embata, Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Menestheus. Aristophon Azenieus played a prominent part in their prosecution. In this chapter the evidence for Khares' political activity during this early period will be examined, and special attention will be paid to his enmity with Timotheos and Iphikrates, his association with Aristophon, and his conjectured relationship with other prominent Athenians during the period before Embata. First, however, some general considerations pertaining to the relationship between elected magistrates and the people need to be discussed.

Military Magistrates and the Electorate

In the preceding two chapters it has been shown that Khares was made strategos many times by the Athenians, and that he probably served in other, lesser military magistracies as well. The major military magistracies in Athens were elective, while the vast majority of offices under the democracy were filled by sortition.¹ This means that men pursuing military careers in Athens were dependent upon popular support in order to continue their position in government. They needed this popular support on a fairly consistent and regular basis, more so, at any rate, than did the rhetores. This was neither more nor less true for Khares than for other Athenian military
magistrates. All this is obvious, to be sure, but it is worthwhile to remember how much and in what ways these magistrates were dependent upon popular support, and to emphasize that, at least in this regard, Khares was just like other Athenians who served the city in a military role, and not dissimilis horum (T33).

There are sufficient examples to suggest that popular support began with one's family or, at least, with family traditions of participation in public life. Nothing is known of Khares' family, let alone their traditions, although one suspects that it was sufficiently well-placed for him to contemplate a public life at a fairly young age. A certain amount of tribal support for Khares can probably be assumed from the sneer of Isokrates, that Timotheos had used such men (as Khares) as lokhagoi and taxiarkhoi (T25). Both of these offices depended, at least in part, on tribal approval, if not outright tribal support. This assumption of tribal approval and support is confirmed by Khares' appointment as khoregos of the boys' chorus of his tribe, Pandionis, and Akamantis at the Thargelia of 344/3 (T51). Khares' tribe considered him fit both to lead them on the battlefield, while still a young man, and to represent them at a public, festival competition, when he was a mature adult.

It is all but certain that by the time Khares was standing for the strategia the election of strategoi was the business, not of the tribe, but of the whole people. Clearly, he was not only popular enough to be elected strategos again and again, but he was also consistently selected as the man who would fight for the city's interests. He was not one of those strategoi whose official duties consisted chiefly of 'strutting in the public processions', but a fighting general.

Aristophon of Azenia

Aristophon Azenieus was a particularly long-lived Athenian political
leader, who seems to have achieved prominence at Athens in the late 360s and to have participated in the city's business continuously for the next 25 years. He and Khares are frequently identified as the kingpins of a 'hard-line' faction in Athenian diplomacy or "le partie impéréaliste." Aristophon is believed to have been the dominant political leader between the decline of Kallistratos, who went into exile in 361, and the emergence of a political group dominated by Euboulos and Diophantos, which rose to prominence after the Social War. Because of Aristophon's prominence and his long-lasting participation in Athenian politics and diplomacy, it will be useful to review his career.

Aristophon was born before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. He was first active politically, as far as it is known, in the restoration of the democracy in 403. Thereafter not a word about him is heard for some forty years. He emerges again in the year 363/2, when he moved a decree concerning a settlement with a recalcitrant League ally, the city of Ioulis on Keos, and was perhaps also strategos. In the following year (late summer 362) he moved another decree authorizing an expeditionary force to sail to Tenos, the Khersonesos and the Propontis to deal with problems in those places. In 361, after Leosthenes had been defeated on Peparethos, Aristophon prosecuted some of the trierarchs in Leosthenes' command. Leosthenes, himself, was accused and convicted in absentia and it was approximately this time when Kallistratos Aphidnaios, too, went into exile.

During the Social War Aristophon was involved in efforts to improve Athens' military preparedness, especially in the fiscal sphere, and after Embata he joined Khares in the prosecution of Iphikrates, Timotheos and Menestheus. The trial was famous. In the years following the Social War one hears less frequently about Aristophon, although it is known that he continued to be politically active until at least 342. He spoke against the Peace of Philokrates, opposed Euboulos, and persisted in making and carrying public proposals.
He died between 340 and 330.\(^{18}\)

Any attempt to assess Aristophon's influence during the early period of Khares' career must also take into account other political groups. The most extensive and influential modern analysis of political groups in this period is that of R. Sealey.\(^{19}\) In attempting to understand the career of Kallistratos of Aphidna and the period following the Social War, Sealey has offered a reconstruction of political groups in Athens. In addition to the political groups centered around Kallistratos, Sealey reconstructs those around Aristophon, Timotheos and Euboulos as well. Because of widespread influence of Sealey's treatment, it is necessary to outline his views here.\(^{20}\)

In Sealey's reconstruction Aristophon has two main allies. One is Autokles Euonymeus, who accompanied Demostratos, the son of (an) Aristophon, on the embassy to Sparta in 371 and delivered there a speech strongly critical of the Lakedaimonians.\(^{21}\) Autokles was strategos in 368/7 and was sent to Thessaly with an army to aid the Thessalians against the Boiotians. This expedition represents a slight divergence in Athenian policy at the time. In 370/69, 369/8 and 367/6 Athens sent forces into the Peloponnesos to aid their allies there. These forces were led by Iphikrates, Khabrias and Timomakhos, respectively, all associates of Kallistratos at some time or other.\(^{22}\) Autokles was also dispatched to Tenos and the Hellespont with a force in 362/1, an expedition authorized by a decree proposed by Aristophon. Eight months later Autokles was deposed; he and Aristophon were each prosecuted by Hypereides, but when and exactly for what is unknown.\(^{23}\)

Aristophon's other main ally is Khares. According to Sealey, Khares' assignment to the command of the Peloponnesos in 366 (as well as Timotheos' command in the eastern Aegean) represents a diminishing of Kallistratos' influence, the return of Timotheos and rise of Aristophon.\(^{24}\) The fact that Kallistratos and Khabrias were prosecuted over the Oropos affair, but Khares was not, and the fact that they were acquitted, but Khares disappears for
several years, leads Sealey to suggest a rivalry between the two groups. Some have even suggested that either Khares, or Khabrias and Kallistratos, contrived to foist the blame on each other.\textsuperscript{25} It is assumed that Khares and Aristophon were associates, not only because of their cooperation in the trials of Iphikrates, Timotheos and Menestheus (T18), but also because Aristophon took actions in 361 that benefitted Khares: Aristophon prosecuted Leosthenes' trierarchs and, conjecturally, Leosthenes himself; Leosthenes' replacement was Khares and Aristophon had spoken on behalf of Khares for pay (T19).\textsuperscript{26}

This, then, is a generally accepted reconstruction of the "notorious" and "lasting friendship" between Khares and Aristophon that is "well-attested".\textsuperscript{27} In fact, it can be demonstrated that the association between the two was neither lasting, well-attested nor any more notorious than that between, e.g., Kallistratos and Iphikrates or between Aiskhines and Euboulos or any other ancient, Athenian political liaison one cares to name.\textsuperscript{28} The evidence for cooperation between Khares and Aristophon in an attack on Timotheos and Iphikrates does exist and the trial was famous, perhaps even "notorious", but there is no other direct evidence for an association between the two. The remaining evidence for hostility towards the 'Kallistratos-group', for an earlier (than 356) association with Aristophon, or for similarities between the two in policy and attitude, is purely circumstantial and, in some cases, tendentious. It will be necessary to review the evidence for relations between Khares and 1) the 'Kallistratos-group', 2) Aristophon, 3) Timotheos, and finally, for similarities in attitude and policy between Khares and other Athenian political leaders.

Khares and the 'Kallistratos-group'

There is simply no evidence for hostility between Khares (or Aristophon) and Kallistratos or any of his associates. Kallistratos' relative, Timomakhos
Akharneus, was strategos in the Peloponnesos in 367/6 during Epameinondas' invasion (mainly into Akhaia) and, admittedly, his performance was criticized by Xenophon, who was prone to quibbles about strategy and tactics. There is no good reason, however, to believe that the Athenians shared Xenophon's criticism of Timomakhos or that Khares replaced, rather than succeeded, him. In fact, one finds that the command of Athenian forces in the Peloponnesos revolved, i.e., that it was not held twice consecutively by any one man. Iphikrates held the command in the winter of 370/69 and was criticized by Xenophon, yet in the following year he was given an important command in the northern Aegean. Khabrias performed laudably in the Peloponnesos in 369/8, but did not return the next time Athenian forces were sent there. The same is true of Khares. In fact, the names of seven senior commanders who served in the Peloponnesos between 370 and 362 are known, and none of them served more than once. According to Sealey, Kallistratos began to lose influence as a result of the loss of Oropos and the gains made by Timotheos on Samos and the Hellespont, yet both of these things happened well after Khares was elected and assigned to the command in the Peloponnesos. Thus there is no reason to view his appointment to that position as a blow against Kallistratos. On the contrary, if peace and alliance with Sparta and other enemies of Boiotia in the Peloponnesos were the policy of Kallistratos, then one might infer that he approved of all the commanders sent there between 370/69 and 366. Interestingly enough, it was in the years of Kallistratos' alleged decline that Khares disappears from the sources.

Kallistratos and Khabrias were caught in the storm over Oropos in 366, Khares was not. Presumably, Khabrias was initially sent out with an Athenian force, while Khares was recalled from Phleious. As has been argued in chapter one, Khares almost certainly arrived at Oropos before the Athenian decision to yield to the Thebans, pending arbitration, was made. It is unclear what role Kallistratos played, except that is must have been an official
The fact that Khares avoided any immediate entanglement in this affair need not have sinister implications. The prosecutors of Khabrias and Kallistratos are known; at least one of them was an inveterate enemy of Khabrias, and none of them can be shown to have had any connection, either at this time or later, with Khares. Moreover, a major factor in the Athenians' anger over the Oropos affair was the fact that their allies had not reciprocated their military aid. The Athenians had sent four armies to the Peloponnnesos in the past four years, and they may have vented their rage on those responsible for such an unprofitable alliance as much as those who failed to regain Oropos. Khares had just returned to Athens, victorious. Oropos was not his show. There is no reason to suspect that he, on the one hand, or the other two men, on the other, foisted the blame on each other in an act of "self-preservation".

There is a tradition of enmity between Khares and Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Phokion, as well as indications of hostility between him and Euboulos, Aiskhines and Kephisodotos ek Kerameon. Between him and Kallistratos and Khabrias there is none. Instead, there is one, admittedly highly circumstantial, indication of favorable feeling towards Khabrias.

Khabrias was a member of Khares' force that sailed to Khios in 357. He went as a private citizen, perhaps as a trierarch. As Nepos reports (T14), Khabrias "surpassed in authority all those who were magistrates, and the soldiers looked to him more than to those in command." Perhaps Khares concurred in this estimate of him, since Khabrias is represented by the sources as either leading or taking the most prominent part in the attack on the harbor of the Khians. One cannot be certain that Khabrias' role was an official one, but on at least one other occasion strategoi gave special assignments to trierarchs who were former strategoi. Khabrias had an opportunity to retrieve his recently tarnished reputation in the attack on the harbor. If he was in an official position of authority, then whoever put him in it was
doing him a favor.\textsuperscript{41}

Khares and Aristophon

The only argument on which even a circumstantial case can be made for an early connection between Khares and Aristophon, centers on the fiasco on Peparethos in 361. Aristophon prosecuted Leosthenes' trierarchs, the strategos himself was tried and condemned \textit{in absentia}, and Khares replaced him; \textit{ergo}, Khares benefitted from Aristophon's actions and must have been a friend. To accept this argument one must assume both that Aristophon prosecuted the strategos as well as the trierarchs, and that he influenced the decision on which strategos to send out as his replacement. There is evidence for neither.

In light of the plethora of litigation in the years around 362 until 359, it is very difficult to be confident in the first assumption. During that time at least fourteen high-ranking military officers, \textit{rhetores} and trierarchs, in addition to those of Leosthenes, were prosecuted.\textsuperscript{42} The names of five of the prosecutors are known. The most litigious of them, Apollodoros, was clearly engaged in a series of lawsuits that seem to have been financially motivated.\textsuperscript{43}

Aristophon carried a motion authorizing an expeditionary force to sail to Tenos, the Khersonesos, Propontis and the Bosporos in September of 362. Autokles sailed out as strategos of this force, but after eight months he was deposed from office and replaced by Menon Potamios, who was succeeded in the new year by Timomakhos Akharneus.\textsuperscript{44} Timomakhos was apparently succeeded by Kephisodotos in the following year, 360/59. Kephisodotos, like his three successive predecessors was prosecuted.\textsuperscript{45} Leosthenes was "left behind" on Peparethos, perhaps in the spring of 361. After his defeat, he was deposed and replaced by Khares.\textsuperscript{46} There seems to be no discernable political pattern here. Aristophon prosecuted the trierarchs, who had leased out their trier-
archies. Apollodoros prosecuted Autokles, Menon, and Timomakhos after having served under each of them as a trierarch. He also prosecuted Kallippos Aixoneus, another trierarch in this force. Kephisodotos was prosecuted by the relatively obscure Euthykles Thriasios whose only other known political act was to attack Kharidemos, the very man who had caused Kephisodotos so much trouble. Amidst such a forensic free-for-all, one is justified in hesitating to assume that Aristophon prosecuted Leosthenes. There is another very good reason for rejecting this circumstantial evidence for a relationship between Khares (or Autokles) and Aristophon at this early date. The entire reconstruction depends on the assumption that Aristophon influenced the decision to replace Leosthenes with Khares. It is taken for granted that the proposer of a decree (and Leosthenes must have been deposed by some decree before he was tried) was a political ally of the strategos actually sent out to enforce the decree. In fact, this assumption is untested, and is unprovable.

No systematic attempt to test this assumption's validity has been made to date, nor can one be made here. Nevertheless, some preliminary observations to such a study will be appended to the conclusion following chapter five. They strongly suggest that the selection of a strategos was not made at the same time as the proposal of the decree, that the evidence independently corroborating political alliances between proposers and executors of decrees is scant, and that there is a logical pattern in the assignment of strategoi to particular tasks, a pattern that indicates mundane, practical criteria weighed more heavily on the decision-makers than did cronyism or nepotism.

It is time now to turn to the direct evidence for an association between Aristophon and Khares. There are precisely three pieces of evidence that explicitly connect the two men. One is an anecdote in Polyainos' Strategemata (T18), the second is a scholion to Aiskhines' speech Against Timarkhos (T19) and the third is a passage from Demosthenes' speech On the Khersonesos (T55).
The anecdote related by Polyainos concerns a courtroom stratagem used by Iphikrates during his trial for betrayal at the battle of Embata.48

Iphikrates was being prosecuted on a charge of betrayal; Aristophon and Khares were prosecuting. The accusation was that, being able to destroy the enemy around Embata, he did not engage them in the sea-battle. Seeing the court inclining toward the prosecution, he stopped his speech and somehow revealed his sword to the jurymen. Fearing that he had armed his entire hetairia and surrounded the court, they all voted an acquittal for him. After his success, when someone asked how he had diverted the jurymen, he said, "I would be a fool to be strategos on behalf of the Athenians, but not to be one on my own behalf against them."

T18 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.9.29

The anecdote patently refers to the trial which took place as a consequence of the Athenian defeat in 356 and of Khares' public accusation of his colleagues.

The second piece of evidence for "lasting friendship" between Khares and Aristophon, the scholion to Aiskhines, is frequently cited as proof that, on some previous occasion, also, Aristophon spoke on Khares' behalf.49 In fact, almost without doubt it refers to the very same series of trials. The scholiast explains Aiskhines' reference to Aristophon (1.64) with the following information:

Aristophon is ridiculed as speaking on behalf of Khares for pay, and as having escaped 75 indictments for unconstitutional procedure, and as having wreaked many evils on the inhabitants of Keos due to his avarice, when he was strategos there. For this he was indicted; he was convicted on a charge of unconstitutional procedure by Hypereides. Hypereides says that he was nicknamed 'Ardettos' because of his frequently foreseeing himself there. Nevertheless, Aristophon survived for 100 years less nine months.

T19 = Scholion to Aiskhines 1.64 (= Hypereides F40 Jensen)50

This scholion is cited as a fragment of a lost speech of Hypereides. It does, indeed, contain a fragment of Hypereides, but the scholion is a compendium of information about Aristophon that has been gleaned from a collection of the orators. The scholiast has cited three examples from the orators in which
Aristophon is ridiculed. First, Aristophon was ridiculed\(^{51}\) for having spoken on behalf of Khares for money. This charge against Aristophon and Khares became notorious, because the defendants at the Embata-trials had made it part of their defence.\(^{52}\) The charge was picked up and repeated by several contemporaries: Isokrates alluded to it ca. 355 (T24, §50, cf. T23), Aiskhines in 343 (T52 §71) and Theopompos (T62) in perhaps the same context.\(^{53}\)

The scholiast's second example of ridicule of Aristophon is already known to us from Aiskhines 3.194, where it perhaps originated, as well as from the scholia to Demosthenes' speeches.\(^{54}\) The third example of ridicule of Aristophon is obviously from a speech of Hypereides no longer extant. The scholiast provides the occasion for which Hypereides prosecuted Aristophon, his actions as a strategos on Keos, perhaps in 363/2\(^{55}\) and cites what is apparently the ridicule or joke that Hypereides actually used in his speech.\(^{56}\) The scholiast is certainly mistaken about the results of Hypereides' prosecution, because the orator himself admits in his speech on behalf of Euxenippos (3.28) that Aristophon escaped by only two votes.\(^{57}\) The scholiast caps his explanation by the observation that Aristophon lived to be ninety-nine years old, a fact that cannot have been known until after 340.\(^{58}\) The scholion is not without value, but with the exception of the 'Ardettos' joke of Hypereides and its context, one could have assembled this information today by culling the extant collection of the orators. Thus, the mention of cooperation between Khares and Aristophon is not bound to the same context as Hypereides' prosecution of the latter.\(^{59}\)

**The Trials of Timotheos and Iphikrates**

Thus far it has been seen that the evidence for cooperation between Khares and Aristophon cannot be pushed back any further than the date of their combined attack on Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus. It may well be that their alliance was newly contrived for the specific purpose of
neutralizing Timotheos and the others. One can never know with certainty what Khares' motives were: self-preservation, mean-spirited rivalry, or genuine outrage at being left in the lurch. Likewise, Aristophon is not known to have had any hostile encounters with any of the accused.

Timotheos and Iphikrates had suffered setbacks that affected their popularity. But in what was perhaps an attempt to regain influence they formed an alliance with one another. A threatened lawsuit against Iphikrates was withdrawn by Timotheos and instead he gave his daughter to Menestheus, Iphikrates' son. When the three of them, father, son and father-in-law, sailed out in charge of the reinforcements sent to join Khares, they had an opportunity to recoup all their lost political favor. Instead, their popularity plummeted when they failed to engage in the battle of Embata and Khares sent home an official complaint and accusation. Aristophon took the lead in the prosecution, but he does not seem to have lacked helpers.

Confusion about the date and the legal process under which the strategoi were indicted surrounds the trials. In one tradition the trials occur during the war, in another after the war, in 354/3. In addition to these divergent traditions, the sources mention two different processes: an impeachment procedure (ἐλασγῆσις), and the magistrate's audit upon termination of office (ἐξοθισμός). M.H. Hansen has devoted a monograph to the former process and has studied the trials of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus, in particular. His conclusions are that the trials were held during the war and that they were "ἐλασγῆσις in form but ἐξοθισμός in substance". Nevertheless, there is a tradition of a face-to-face encounter between Khares, on the one hand, and Timotheos and Iphikrates, on the other. The context of this encounter is vague, but it involves a physical comparison of the men in an official or, at least, public setting. It will be worthwhile, then, to review the evidence for the trials and to determine if this encounter is connected with, or can shed any new light on the trials.
The evidence for Aristophon as prosecutor is full, but, although Khares' involvement in the attack is well documented, his participation in the prosecution is not. The specific charge was betrayal (προδοσία); Timotheos was convicted for "betraying the ships for money from the Khians and Rhodians". The process(es) employed were eisangelia and euthynai. It is particularly interesting that this apparent conflict in the tradition is not the result of two different sources; rather both processes are cited by two different authors. Diodoros (T16) and Nepos (T17) imply that the trial took place directly after the accusation and recall of the strategoi and Dionysios (Lysias 12 p480) seems to confirm this. Elsewhere, however, Dionysios (Deinarkhos 13 p668) dates Timotheos’ euthynai to 354/3. This date would support the situation represented by Polyainos (T18), in which Khares, too, was present in the prosecution. The results of the trials are agreed upon, on the whole. Iphikrates and Menestheus were acquitted, but Timotheos was convicted, fined and, when he was unable or unwilling to pay, he retired to Khalkis and died soon after. There were charges that Khares had induced Aristophon to undertake the prosecutions for money and Khares' actions were brought up in the course of the trials, since Aristotle, in a discussion on Metaphor, reports a saying of Iphikrates: "For the path of my words is through the middle of Khares' deeds" (T22 = Aristotle Rhetoric 1411b 1-3).

Evidence for an encounter between Khares and Timotheos and Iphikrates may solve the impasse. It consists of two anecdotes from Plutarch (T20, T21), a passage from Isokrates' Antidosis (T25) and a scholion to Homer's Iliad (Book 13.289-91). In Plutarch's essay on whether the State Ought to be Governed by an Old Man the following anecdote is related:

...the rhetores at Athens were stripping down Khares the son of Theokhares against Timotheos and Iphikrates; being robust and at his physical peak, they regarded such a man as worthy to be strategos of the Athenians. But Timotheos said, "By the gods, no. But, rather, such a man is fit to carry the bed of the strategos. The strategos must be one who 'looks both forward and behind and by no misfortune
is disturbed with respect to considerations concerning what is advantageous'".

T20 = Plutarch Moralia 788D

In the introduction to his life of Pelopidas, Plutarch provides another vignette:

Therefore, Timotheos rightly said once, when Khares was displaying to the Athenians some scars on his body and his shield pierced by a spear-point, "I was quite ashamed because a missile fell near me when I was besieging Samos, on the grounds that I was behaving more foolishly than befits the strategos and leader of such a force".

T21 = Plutarch Pelopidas 2.3

These two anecdotes show several common elements. They envision Khares as being in physical proximity to one or both of Timotheos and Iphikrates, they picture Khares displaying his body publicly, and a self-conscious Timotheos asserting qualities that are important for a strategos to have, other than physical fortitude. The mention of rhetores in T20 and 'the Athenians' in T21 makes it clear that the encounter was public and strongly implies that it was also official. The mention of Timotheos and Iphikrates in T20 suggests that its context is the period when these two were allies, while T21 clearly dates to the period after the capture of Samos in 365. The similarities in the contexts of these two anecdotes suggest that they refer to the same occasion. One is immediately reminded of the passage in Isokrates' Antidosis (T25), where the orator defensively admits that Timotheos was not physically robust and castigates the Athenians for preferring to him, as their strategoi, men who "have the most sturdy bodies and who have many times been in mercenary armies". It seems that this encounter was memorable.

Under what circumstances might Khares have disrobed in the presence of Timotheos and Iphikrates in order to display his robust and scarred body? One context comes immediately to mind: the election of magistrates. In his
Coriolanus 14-15 Plutarch narrates an incident at Rome in which a candidate for the consulship was expected to disrobe and display to the electorate wounds acquired in the service of his country. Xenophon relates a conversation between an unsuccessful candidate for strategos and Sokrates. The unlucky candidate complains that the Athenians have preferred someone else, despite his own numerous wounds. Whether this was a genuine and regular election ploy at Athens is uncertain. It is very difficult to find a context in the careers of Khares, Timotheos and Iphikrates when such an encounter might have taken place before the Athenian voters. In Athens a strategos could be re-elected again and again and service abroad would make it impossible to canvass the voters each year. Moreover, there is evidence that physical presence at the elections was rarely, if ever, required.

A second context for such an encounter is at a trial. The orators employed various stratagems in the courtroom, which included bringing in family members, providing supporters with costumes, and demonstrating the proofs of one's service to the city. It seems that this last stratagem was used by Iphikrates himself. A scholiast to Homer's Iliad, Book 13 line 289-291 quotes a passage from Lysias: "Lysias, too, presents Iphikrates saying, 'I have wounds, not of others coming against me, but I myself going against them.'" The scholiast's mention of Lysias makes it possible to narrow the choice of contexts for this remark to three specific occasions: Iphikrates' attack on Timotheos in 373, his speech against Harmodios in 371, and his defence against the charge of betrayal during the Social War. The defensive tone of Iphikrates' words and the focus on wounds makes the last context a decided favorite.

There is no tradition of speech-making at elections in Athens, yet the context of this encounter produced a number of memorable sayings and was perhaps famous for Iphikrates' 'Lysianic' speech. A courtroom encounter in which Khares and Iphikrates displayed their wounds, while Timotheos self-
consciously tried to deflect attention from his body, or lack of wounds, will accommodate all the evidence. The obvious context for such an encounter is the dispute over the battle of Embata.\textsuperscript{86}

If the context for Khares' encounter with his two colleagues is the trial over the Embata affair, then the case for a trial after the war becomes stronger. Euthynai could be postponed for a long time, but it is quite uncertain if the same is true for eisangeliai.\textsuperscript{87} Cawkwell has argued that the trials of Timotheos and Iphikrates were do delayed.\textsuperscript{88} It may be that the sources are to be taken literally, and that there were two rounds of trials, an eisangelia during the war and euthynai a year or so after the war, and that it was only then, that Timotheos was convicted.

In either case, it does appear that the evidence for hostility between Khares, and Timotheos and Iphikrates, as well as for friendship between him and Aristophon derives from a single, famous political conflict that was fought out during and just after the Social War. Thus, there is no proof that Khares had a prior alliance with the latter, or lasting hostility with the former.\textsuperscript{89}

**Khares and the Imperialists**

After the time of these famous trials there is only one piece of objective evidence that can be construed as indirectly linking Khares and Aristophon. That evidence has as its context the deliberations in the Athenian ekklesia on the recall of Diopeithes, Athens' strategos in the Khersonesos, in the early part of 341. In the course of the deliberations Demosthenes made a speech arguing against any action that might cause the Athenian force in the Khersonesos to disband. Those who did favor some such action are characterized by Demosthenes as "spiteful persons bent on ruining the state":

That such men exist, although terrible, is not so terrible as that you, who are sitting here, are so predisposed that, should anyone
come up and say that Diopeithes is the cause of all our ills, or Khares or Aristophon or whomever of the citizens someone might name, you would immediately agree and clamor that he spoke rightly. But if ever someone comes forward and speaks the truth that, "you are talking rubbish, Athenians: the man responsible for all our ills and these troubles is Philip. For if he were keeping quiet, the city would have no problem," you cannot argue that this is not true.

T55 = Demosthenes On the Khersonesos 8.30-1

Demosthenes implies that in 341 the Athenians were in such a state that they could be persuaded to blame their ills on Diopeithes, Khares, Aristophon or anyone else, in his opinion wrongly. Demosthenes does not make it clear why these three political leaders are singled out. He does not say that they have acted in concert, nor does he imply that they necessarily share attitudes or tendencies. They are simply mentioned as hypothetically vulnerable to censure in 341 B.C. A cause for this vulnerability can be found.

Aside from the present passage, the sources do not connect Diopeithes with Khares, Aristophon or Demosthenes, nor is Aristophon known to be connected in any way with Demosthenes. These four political leaders had in common the fact that they had all been the victims of attack within the past four years, perhaps from the same quarter. The intense political struggle that took place in the wake of the Peace of Philokrates is properly the subject of the following chapter. At this point the concern is with demonstrating that, in 341, Khares was no more associated with Aristophon than was Demosthenes or Diopeithes, so one need only touch on the points of the struggle pertinent to them.

In the scramble to distance themselves from the peace, its supporters blamed one another or the strategoi. In 343 Aiskhines publicly blamed Khares (T52) as part of his defence. He was supported by Euboulos. Demosthenes defended Khares (T54) and attacked Euboulos in the course of his prosecution of Aiskhines. Euboulos had clashed with Aristophon in the past and the two
were at odds after the peace (and perhaps over it). Now, in 341, Diopeithes came under attack and was defended by Demosthenes. From what quarter this attack came is not known, although Demosthenes and Aiskhines struggled against one another in the following year and for the next decade. It seems, then, that Demosthenes and his policies had enemies common to Khares, Aristophon, and Diopeithes. That these men presented a common front to such attacks, one cannot say.

In his hypothetical list (T55) of political leaders who might be vulnerable to censure in 341, Demosthenes did not associate those leaders with one another in any concrete way. Nevertheless, some modern scholars argue that Aristophon, Khares and perhaps others should be grouped together on the basis of shared attitudes and policies. This political tendency, it is maintained, represents "the imperialists", who fought the allies, resisted the peace and were for preserving Athenian hegemony. Against this group of imperialists were ranged the 'moderates', "those who... opposed extreme democracy, imperialism or simply war" and favored financial retrenchment. This moderate opposition included Euboulos, Aiskhines, Phokion, their friends and associates.

J. de Romilly strives to demonstrate that this moderate opposition's ideals were expressed by Aiskhines, Xenophon and Isokrates and shared by Theopompos. She notes that these men (except for the last) were somehow all connected with Euboulos and that they shared moralizing tendencies and espoused common themes: to minimize expenditures, deplore the use of mercenaries, desire peace and give up imperialism. At least two of these authors contrasted Khares most unfavorably with Timotheos (T25, T52).

Against these views it has recently been argued that the impulse of the allies to revolt had less to do with Athenian aggression than with local ambitions and foreign interference. It has also been argued that the evidence on which is based the notion that Euboulos and Aristophon stood for peace and war, respectively, is not satisfactory. Moreover, while it does
seem certain that Euboulos devoted much attention to financial matters, one cannot be confident that Aristophon opposed such measures. Most of Aristophon's financial policies must be viewed in the context of the Social War, when there may have been something like a national consensus to finance the war by any means available. A comparison of the Social War activities of other Athenians, Androton for example, should be a caution against construing fund-raising activities at that time as indications of political attitude.\textsuperscript{102}

What Khares' attitude was is not known. In general, his actions are indistinguishable from those of other strategoi with respect to war, peace and imperialism. It is difficult to see how Khabrias, Iphikrates and Timotheos, "who brought into the \textit{synedrion} 75 cities" (T52), were any less 'imperialistic' than Khares was.\textsuperscript{103}

Finally, it is quite extraordinary that during the 'time of Euboulos', who allegedly pursued a pacific policy, the Athenians sent out substantial expeditions to Thrace, Thessaly and against Sestos (all led by Khares), and another very large expedition to Thermopylai, which was certainly approved by the associates of Euboulos.\textsuperscript{104} Furthermore, in 349 and 348 Athens committed nearly 8,500 men and over fifty ships to the defence of Olynthos, while supporting a serious effort in Euboia at the same time. Khares commanded twice in these years.\textsuperscript{105} It is quite clear that his popularity transcended the rise and decline of the city's most influential \textit{rhetores}, men like Kallistratos, Aristophon, Euboulos and Demosthenes. Far from being an adjunct to one or the other of these political groups, he was probably an independent political force in his own right. At any rate, his success did not depend on them.
CHAPTER FOUR: KHARES AND DEMOSTHENES

Demosthenes

It has been argued in the previous chapter that Khares' cooperation with Aristophon was short-lived and was probably an ad hoc arrangement for the purpose of neutralizing Timotheos and Iphikrates. The evidence for Khares' association with Demosthenes is much fuller, and it seems to indicate a fairly lengthy friendship. Demosthenes was an advocate of aid to Olynthos and Khares was one of those eventually selected to lead the Athenian effort in that region. Some ancient writers believed that Demosthenes was chiefly responsible for the three relief expeditions that sailed to Olynthos' rescue. Demosthenes defended Khares by name in 343 (T54), and again in 341 he spoke defensively about Khares, although in a general, hypothetical context (T55). In the final war with Macedon, which Demosthenes strongly supported, Khares played an important part. Several sources regarded him as one of "those around Demosthenes". Hypereides, a longtime ally of Demosthenes was εὐνόως towards Khares, probably around 331, and Demosthenes himself remembered Khares with nostalgia after his death.

Plutarch seems to have been especially impressed by the relationship between the two men and mentions it on several occasions:

In both of them, then, (sc. Demosthenes and Cicero) there existed equally the power of leading the people and being a statesman, so that even those who had authority over arms and armies had need of them: Khares, Diopeithes, and Leosthenes of Demosthenes, while of Cicero, Pompeius and the young Caesar...

T56 = Plutarch Cicero 52(3).1
Those, then, travelling different roads help one another not at all, but those following different kinds of lives turn away envy and, rather, work together with one another as Demosthenes and Khares, and again Aiskhines and Euboulos, and Hypereides and Leosthenes; some speaking among the people and producing decrees while others were strategoi and men of deeds.

T57 = Plutarch Moralia ("de fraterno amore") 486D

Seeing that the men who at that time busied themselves with the commonwealth had divided among themselves as though by lot the military and the speaker's platform, the latter speaking among the people and producing decrees only, of which Euboulos was one as well as Aristophon, Demosthenes, Lykourgos and Hypereides, too, while Diopeithes and Menestheus and Leosthenes and Khares advanced themselves by being strategoi and fighting wars...

T58 = Plutarch Phokion 7.3

For Plutarch as well as other later writers Demosthenes and Khares were political associates. It will be the business of this chapter to examine this association in order to determine its inception, extent and possible influence on Athenian foreign policy. Evidence of Khares' friendship and hostility or rivalry with other prominent Athenians in this period will also be investigated.

Demosthenes' early career is well documented and illuminated by both ancient and modern scholars and there does not seem to be any evidence that it is especially relevant to the career of Khares, at least until he began to address the people of Athens in his own right. This is partly because much of the evidence for this early period comes from speeches written to be delivered by others. It is not at all clear where Demosthenes, himself, stood in terms of politics during these early years, but the common opinion is that he sided with Euboulos and opposed Aristophon, and then later became an opponent of Euboulos. However this may be, it is rather clear that by 351 Demosthenes was a proponent of a 'forward' foreign policy and had perhaps already run afoul of Euboulos and his associates. This is about the time when the first awareness of the strategos Khares as a political leader, may be discerned in the speeches of Demosthenes.
Demosthenes, Khares and Olynthos

Philip's decisive victory at the battle of the Krokos Fields caused many a Greek to take notice of him. The Athenians showed that they took him seriously when they sent Nausikles to Thermopylai with over 5,000 troops. The young Demosthenes found in Philip both a menace against whom his countrymen needed alerting and an issue on which to erect his own political career. From the year 351 until the end of his career, his chief political concern was resisting the Macedonians. It is precisely at the beginning of this period (particularly 351-349/8) that allusions to the strategos Khares began to find their way into the speeches of the orator; at least this is the opinion of several ancient writers.

In his *First Philippic* (4), delivered in the early part of 351, Demosthenes made a proposal for prosecuting the war with Macedon. Besides putting forth a concrete plan of action, the orator spent much of his effort berating his countrymen both with respect to their will and to the methods they had employed. One of the features of the contemporary system he deplored, and one which was clearly a controversial subject, was the employment of mercenary soldiers. The Athenians were relying heavily on mercenaries in their campaigns abroad and the custom of requiring the strategos to provide pay from plunder for their maintenance had led to abuses and embarrassments. In the course of his arguments for requiring that one quarter of the proposed force be citizen-troops, Demosthenes made several topical allusions to the existing system. Various readers have imagined them to be references to identifiable events and persons. In particular, there have been suggestions that Khares is being referred to.

Demosthenes proposed a standing force be established in these words:

...I say, Athenians, that you should ready some force that will continuously make war and harm him. Not for me a myriad or even two of mercenaries nor these 'epistolary' forces but rather one (com-
posed of men) of the city and one that will obey and follow that man or men you elect as strategoi, however obscure they may be. I also bid you to provide maintenance for this force.

Demosthenes 4.19

Demosthenes went on to propose the size and composition of his force and as evidence of the need for a mixed army of mercenaries and citizens he said this:

...I hear that once before, the city maintained a mercenary force in Korinth which Polystratos led and also Iphikrates, Khabrias and some others and that you yourselves served alongside them. I also know from hearing it, that these mercenaries, marshalled together with you, defeated the Lakedaimonians, and so did you with them. But ever since mercenary forces have campaigned for you on their own, they defeat friends and allies, while our enemies have become greater. They take one look at the city's war and off they sail to Artabazos and wherever else and the strategos, naturally, follows, for he cannot command, if he does not pay them.

Demosthenes 4.24 = T28

The reference to Artabazos is a clear allusion to Khares' campaign in Asia in 355. Nevertheless, the orator was careful to exonerate the anonymous strategos and throughout the speech he avoided remarks which might be construed as offensive to the military magistrates; he placed the blame on the home administration of the military. There is little room for doubt to whom the historical exemplum refers, but it is not so clear what the orator's attitude towards the strategos was. Demosthenes carefully avoided making personal slurs in these early symbouleutic speeches delivered by himself. Rather, he railed against the demos at large. In short, it appears that, while Demosthenes was aware of the past and recent history of his city and Khares' role in it, he revealed little about his personal attitudes towards him or any of the magistrates. Instead of casting blame, he implied he was willing to co-operate with them to improve Athens' ability to defend her interests. Further attempts to read hidden allusions to political leaders into this speech or others of the period prior to the Olynthian crisis are highly spec-
In 351 Demosthenes had made a reference to Athens' experiences in the Social War. In contrasting the successes of an earlier generation which employed mixed armies of citizens and mercenaries with the failures of his own generation with purely mercenary forces, the orator cited as an example the army that "sailed away to Artabazos" and the strategos who followed it because he could not command, if he could not pay. This allusion was understood by the orator's audience and by readers of a later generation as referring to Khares' campaign into Asia Minor in 356/5, and few today would disagree. Whether the allusion was meant as criticism of the strategos, an apology for him, or simply as an historical exemplum is quite debatable. That it implies a friendship between the orator and the strategos is very dubious.

When, in 349, Philip threatened Olynthos and that city asked Athens for an alliance, Demosthenes added his voice to those advising support for the new and endangered ally. Three speeches made by Demosthenes, the Olynthiacs, are preserved. In them he proposed that Athens commit military resources to the Olynthians' struggle against the Macedonians. We have it on good authority that Athens sent three separate forces to the beleaguered city. The coincidence of the three preserved speeches and the like number of relief expeditions has lured many a scholar, ancient and modern, into making a connection between them. This theory of a connection between the speeches and the relief forces needs examining, not the least because of the common assumption that a political relationship must exist between the proposer and executor of decrees in democratic Athens.

Dionysios, probably Philokhoros, and others believed that Demosthenes persuaded the Athenians to send the relief expeditions to Olynthos, one speech for each force. A majority of Athenians obviously did favor such a policy, but it is not known who was actually recorded as the official proponent of any of the expeditions. To be sure, Demosthenes
spoke in favor of such a policy, but others did so as well.²⁷ There are, however, some very good reasons for doubting that the three Olynthiacs in fact corresponded to the three debates on the expeditions, or that any of Demosthenes' proposals was implemented, at least in the form in which it is presented in the extant speeches.

The first reason has to do with the chronology of the speeches. It can be determined with a fair degree of certainty when the first and third expeditions were sent out, and it is also known that Athens' invasion of Euboia took place between them. Demosthenes' utter silence about Euboia in all three speeches strongly suggests that they were delivered before the Athenians intervened there, particularly since Demosthenes claimed later that he did speak against the Euboian expedition.²⁸ Thus, it is unlikely that any one of the Olynthiacs inspired the third relief expedition.

Another reason for doubting that each speech inspired an expedition is that Demosthenes' specific proposals were not adopted. In Olynthiac 1 he urged that two separate forces be sent: one to harass Philip's coastline and another to help the Olynthians directly (1.17-18). As far as it is known, this was not done. Demosthenes also repeatedly advised that citizen-forces be sent out to Olynthos.²⁹ This was not done until the third force was sent, when it had been specifically requested by the Olynthians themselves (T41).

But the fact remains that Demosthenes did speak on behalf of sending aid to Olynthos. Perhaps his orations carried the day for one or more of the expeditions, or they may have cleared the way for some more prominent statesman to succeed in carrying a motion for aid.³⁰ Even if one grants this, there is still no reason to imagine that Demosthenes or any other rhetor exercised undue influence in deciding which men to send out as commanders of the relief forces. In fact, that decision was almost certainly made on the basis of existing military circumstances, as Philokhoros makes clear. His words
(T41) leave no doubt that both Khares and Kharidemos were already on duty: "They (sc. the Athenians) sent as help two thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, the ones with Khares and eight which they manned in addition... they sent Kharidemos, strategos in the Hellespont, who had eighteen triremes, 4,000 peltasts and 150 cavalrymen." Khares and Kharidemos were not chosen because the promoters of the policy of aiding Olynthos preferred them, or were their friends and allies. They were not selected over Phokion, Molossos and Hegesileos because they favored a policy of fighting far from Athens, while the latter favored fighting in Euboia. They were sent because they commanded already mobilized forces; they were probably in the general vicinity; they were familiar with Thrace and Thracian dynasts who might be potential allies; they were familiar with the enemy; and they commanded forces composed of mercenary peltasts, the sort of troops that the Athenians were willing to commit at the time.

Plutarch's glorification of Phokion makes it hard for some to believe that the Athenians preferred Kharidemos and Khares to their "ablest" general, but, over and above the practical considerations listed above, it must be noted that Phokion's career was singularly undistinguished until his campaign on Euboia, and he may also have been inexperienced with the type of troops sent to the Olynthians. In the event, the Athenian decision was not ill-considered, since, when the trouble on Euboia broke out, a citizen army could be easily and quickly transported across the Hollows of Euboia and, at least while under the command of the competent Phokion, was successful. The fact that Demosthenes or others proposed aid to Olynthos cannot be taken, of itself, as proof of a relationship between them and the strategoi who were eventually sent to do the job.

Yet, there are several possible allusions to Khares in the Olynthiacs that have led some to consider the two men were associated at the time Demosthenes delivered the speeches. These allusions deserve to be looked at in detail.
In his Second Olynthiac Demosthenes tried to persuade his fellow citizens that aiding Olynthos was in their own interest, and that they should serve on the campaign in person. At one point he said:

I am amazed at this and in addition to this, that none of you, Athenians, is able to calculate how long you have been at war with Philip and what you have been doing while this time has gone by. For, to be sure, you know this, that while you are delaying, hoping some others will act, blaming one another, sitting in judgement, hoping again, that is, doing nearly the same things that you are now doing, the entire time has passed.

Demosthenes 2.25

The scholiast offers these explanations of the passage:

"Some others": That is, the mercenaries and Khares and Kharidemos. "Sitting in judgement": This refers to Khares. In order that he may not seem to apologize on his behalf, he conceals the suspicion by generality. Sending after the strategoi, they used to put them on trial.

T59 = Scholia to Demosthenes 2.25 (173, 175 Dilts)

A few paragraphs further on the orator said:

Why do you think, Athenians, that all the strategoi you send out to this war find private wars? — if it is necessary to speak the truth even about the strategoi. Because here, the prizes for which the war is fought are yours (if Amphipolis is taken you will gain immediately) but the perils are theirs and there is no pay. But there the perils are less and the spoils belong to the leaders and the soldiers; Lampsakos, Sigeion and the ships which they plunder.

Demosthenes 2.28

On this passage the scholiast remarks:

"Private (wars)"; By "private" he means ones which they, themselves, wage privately, apart from the city. He is probably hinting at Khares.

T31 = Scholion to Demosthenes 2.28 (189 Dilts)

In the Third Olynthiac Demosthenes contrasted the successes of Athens
under Aristeides and Miltiades with the contemporary failures under the present (anonymous) leaders. In the old days, he says, the demos was master of policy and dispensed honors to its leaders but now, when \( \text{o}i \ \text{po}l\text{i} \text{t}e\nu\theta\mu\varepsilon\nu\omicron\omicron\) control everything, the demos is content "if they hand over some of the Theoric Monies or put on a Boedromia. And what is most manly of all is that you add thanks for what is your own." (3.31) The scholiast explained this passage by noting that Boedromia (or the alternate reading bo\(\delta\)dia) alluded to the fact that Khares sent home a drove of cattle from the spoils of Lampsakos and Sigeion and that the cattle were distributed among the tribes at a celebration of the Boedromia, for which beneficence Khares was crowned. A little later in the speech Demosthenes urged the Athenians to serve in person:

There is no way that I have said that what belongs to those who act ought to be distributed to those who do nothing, nor that we ought to be inactive, idle and helpless, because we learn that the mercenaries of so-and-so are victorious. For this is happening now. And I don't censure one who does what is necessary on behalf of you, but rather, I think that you should do, on behalf of yourselves, these things for which you honor others..."

Demosthenes 3.35-6

The scholiast explains:

"Of so-and-so": That is, those of Khares.

"I do not censure": Since he calumniated the mercenary force above. For, Khares used a mercenary force. It is as if he were saying "I praise Khares, who always labors, even with mercenaries, but in fact, I prefer soldiers from the city."

T60 = Scholia to Demosthenes 3.35-6 (165, 166 Dilts)

It must be admitted that Demosthenes did, indeed, refer to events in which Khares was a participant, but this does not necessarily imply any explicit relationship between the two men. The scholiast's guess at 2.25 may
or may not be right. Nevertheless Demosthenes was certainly referring to Khares' campaign in Asia a few paragraphs later when he mentioned Lampsakos and Sigeion. The allusion, however, is more in the nature of 'current events', which are cited to demonstrate the weaknesses of current Athenian military administration. Again in the Third Olynthiac (§31) the scholiast facilely explains two alternate readings with a slight variation on the details of Khares' beneficence. There is some reason to believe that a particularly sumptuous Boedromia was held before the time of this speech and one of the scholiast's explanations may be more or less correct. Even if this is so, it implies nothing about a supposed friendship or enmity between the orator and the strategos, since such an allusion is no more than a topos designed to appeal to the demos. Finally, at the end of the speech Demosthenes retreated somewhat from his denunciations of the military system, by excusing those who toil on behalf of the city. The scholiast clearly believed that the orator was avoiding the censure of a particular strategos, Khares. Again, even if this is so (and it need not be since most Athenian campaigns far from home in this period were waged by mercenary forces), it tells no more than that this still fairly insignificant rhetor provided himself with a little insurance in the prospect of the day when he would be one of οἱ πολιτευόμενοι and would need the goodwill of those military men willing to fight the city's enemies.

In sum there is no firm basis for hypothesizing a friendship between the very prominent strategos and the fairly minor rhetor at this time. Demosthenes refers to current events as proofs of the correctness of his views. He objects to the present military administration and points out its weaknesses, while at the same time avoiding remarks which might irrevocably offend important and influential military magistrates.
Before moving on to a discussion of Khares' involvement in the Peace of Philokrates and Aiskhines' trial for *parapresbeia*, the most unequivocal political relationship between Khares and another prominent Athenian ought to be considered. In 343 Aiskhines (T52) named as one of the friends and companions of Khares, Kephisophon Paianieus. If Aiskhines' characterization of their relationship was accurate, they were bound by ties stronger than mere political expediency and self-interest. This is the only known case of a man who was a φίλος καὶ ἐπατρος of Khares.  

Kephisophon represents the third generation of a family honored with public office under the restored democracy. His father was *grammateus* of the *boule* when the decree of Aristoteles proclaimed the formation of the second Athenian League in 378/7. His grandfather, Kephisophon, was also *grammateus* of the *boule* in 403/2 and proposed a decree on behalf of the Samians in that year. He was also *tamias* of the goddess in 398/7 and had married into a family which was both wealthy and particularly distinguished by military office in the period of the fifth-century "emperie". Thus, Kephisophon carried on a family tradition of commitment to the democracy and involvement in the city's affairs.  

Kephisophon's stance on matters of policy is somewhat confused by the existence of an equally prominent and distinguished strategos, Kephisophon Aphidnaios. It appears that he was especially active in the *ekklesia* in the 340s. None of the inscriptional evidence about him is very revealing, but his involvement in the Peace of Philokrates, and perhaps in the wrangles which followed it, is quite intriguing.  

Before the negotiations leading up to the Peace next to nothing is known about Kephisophon. His involvement in Athenian politics and diplomacy is
known mainly from allusions to him in two speeches of Demosthenes. When, in 330, Demosthenes was defending his own role in the making of the peace, he claimed that the supporters of Philokrates' proposal were Euboulos and Kephisophon (18.21). Later in the speech he again defended himself against the charges (of Aiskhines, 3.62-82) that he had proposed decrees that supported Philokrates and his peace-initiatives, and that, later, he had quibbled about the Athenian strongholds in Thrace. Demosthenes asserted, "and yet you said that my speaking about these things threw us into enmity, while the decrees concerned with these places were really Euboulos' and Aristophon's and Diopeithes', not mine" (18.70). Just a little later in the same speech Demosthenes provided a kaleidoscopic review of Athenian relations with Philip in the course of which he produced a collection of decrees to demonstrate that he was not the one responsible for them: "This decree was moved by Euboulos, not I, and the next by Aristophon, then Hegesippos, then Aristophon again, then Philokrates, then Kephisophon, then them all. But I have nothing to do with these. Read them." (18.75). Unfortunately, there is no way to know the precise contents of the decrees, their true chronology, or if the policies proposed were even vaguely similar to one another. If one were to take Demosthenes at his word, then there was quite a consensus regarding the need for a cessation of hostilities with Macedon, and consequently one should exercise caution when trying to assign leaders to political groups on such bases.

After the fall of Olynthos it no doubt seemed wise to many Athenians to consider peace, and one should not be surprised if all the political leaders mentioned in Demosthenes 18.70,75 did, at some point or another, support negotiations with Macedon. The fact that some may have later opposed the final document, or denounced the peace (especially after Philip ended the Sacred War), does not prove that they never supported diplomatic contacts and negotiations. The situation in 346 became very fluid with much shifting and dodging among Athenian political leaders, especially those with a desire
to survive. There is no good reason to assign Kephisophon, the friend of Khares, to the supporters of Euboulos. Reluctant support for a peace was probably widespread and may have made for strange bedfellows.

In any case, since there is no good reason to believe that Khares and Demosthenes were associates at the time, or that Khares and Euboulos were yet enemies, and little reason to think that the strategos and Aristophon were still working closely together, one is not permitted to infer much about Khares' attitude from any of these relationships. It may be noted that the friend and companion of the "imperialist" Khares was one of those who recognized the need for a cessation of hostilities with Macedon, and that he was probably a political leader of roughly equal stature with Aristophon, Euboulos, Philokrates and Hegesippos.

It is worth adding that, by the time of Aiskhines' trial in 343, Euboulos and Kephisophon were at odds, since the former had prosecuted the latter at some point before the trial on a charge of mishandling sacred monies. This may have been due to the fallout from the peace. In any event, at that time Aiskhines was being supported by Euboulos and Phokion, and was also, no doubt, hostile to Khares and Kephisophon.

**Khares and the Trial of Aiskhines**

Once Philip penetrated Thermopylae in the summer of 346, the Athenians realized that they had been hoodwinked and that the peace of Philokrates was a hindrance and not a help in their struggle against Philip. There began to be recriminations against those considered most responsible for the peace and there was likely a rather vigorous scramble, on the part of those who feared they might be blamed, to distance themselves from the peace and implicate others who had been instrumental in making it. In particular, Philokrates himself and Aiskhines were the targets of, at the least, Demosthenes. At the same time there was an attempt to foist the blame for the mess onto
some of the strategoi. Proxenos Aphidnaios, who was strategos with a fleet off Euboia in 346, was prosecuted and apparently condemned before the time of Aiskhines' trial in 343. By the time of Aiskhines' trial, Khares' role, too, was called into question. It was perhaps in an atmosphere similar to this that he had some difficulties at his euthynai following the siege of Olynthos:

And Kephisodotos, when Khares was hastening to render his euthynai for the Olynthian War, was angry, saying that he was trying to render his euthynai while holding the demos in a chokehold.

T45 = Aristotle Rhetoric 1411a 6-9 (3.10)

Whether or not this incident was in some way a precursor of the situation following the Peace of Philokrates, or simply reflects an unrelated, or private feud, is unknown. At any rate there was most certainly an attempt in 343 to blame the conditions of the peace on the conduct of the war by Khares.

When Aiskhines was brought to trial to account for his part in the making of the Peace of Philokrates one of his lines of defence was to show that Athens' poor military showing in the war against Philip necessitated the kind of terms which had been accepted. In particular he charged that Khares' mishandling of the war was largely to blame in these words:

(70) But I wish to remind you also of the circumstances under which you took counsel. For we made a beginning of the war for Amphipolis, but it happened that our strategos in the war lost seventy-five allied cities which Timotheos the son of Konon acquired and introduced into the synedrion. (You see, I prefer to speak right out and to save myself by speaking at the same time freely and truthfully; if you feel otherwise, do what you like with me, for I would not restrict myself). (71) Taking one hundred and fifty triremes from their sheds he did not bring them back, and the accusers of Khares always point this out to you in court; he also spent fifteen hundred talents not on the soldiers but upon the fraudulence of the leaders, runaways like Deiares and Deipyros and Polyphontes gathered together from all Hellas (and this is apart from the mercenaries around the speaker's platform and the ekklesia), who while they were exacting from the poor islanders sixty talents each year as syntaxeis kept on plundering the Hellenes and their boats from the open sea. (72) But instead of the hegemony of the Hellenes and their respect our city was defiled with the reputation of Mouse-
island and her pirates while Philip, based in Macedonia, contested with us no longer for Amphipolis but now for Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, our own possessions. Our citizens were abandoning the Khersonesos, which is agreed to be Athenian territory. You were compelled to call special sessions of the ekklesia in fear and uproar, more even than are required by law. (73) Our affairs were so perilous and precarious that Kephisophon Paianieus, one of the friends and companions of Khares, was compelled to draft a decree that Antiokhos, who was in charge of the dispatch boats, should sail out as quickly as possible and seek out the strategos, who had been put in command of our force, and, if he should find him anywhere, he should say that the demos of the Athenians was surprised to learn that Philip was marching on the Khersonesos, an Athenian possession, while the Athenians did not know the whereabouts of the strategos or his force which they had sent out. And that I speak the truth hear the decree, and remember the war and blame not the ambassadors for the peace, but the leaders of our arms.

T52 = Aiskhines (On the Embassy) 2.70-3

Whatever the truth of Aiskhines' claims it is quite clear that he is trying to arouse some sentiment or resentment of the demos against the military leaders, and Khares in particular. His supporters at the trial were the rhetor, Euboulos and two strategoi, Phokion and his own brother Philokhares. In fact, Euboulos rose to speak just after Aiskhines and it seems quite plausible that he, too, made similar remarks about Khares. This trial or the maneuvering which took place between 346-343 seems to be the best context in which to place Euboulos' disparaging comments about Khares:

Thus, Euboulos in the law courts used against Khares what Platon said against Arkhibios, that "the admission of being wicked had increased in the city"

T53 = Aristotle Rhetoric 1376a (1.15)

The prosecutor in this trial, Demosthenes, found it advisable to defend the reputation of Khares:

Someone just now came up to me in front of the court telling me a very strange thing, that Aiskhines was preparing to accuse Khares and that he hoped in this way and with these topics to deceive you. I do not place too much emphasis upon the fact that, although judged in every way, Khares has been found to be working trustily and faithfully on your behalf, as far as it was in his control, but that it was through the influence of those who ruin our affairs for money that he failed on many occasions. I shall pass this over. For, let us suppose that Aiskhines will tell
the truth about him. It's quite a joke that a fellow of his ilk denounces that strategos.

T54 = Demosthenes (On the Embassy) 19.332

This, then, is the first real indication that Demosthenes and Khares were supporting one another. Demosthenes could simply have said (as he does) "If some strategos has wronged you (sc. the demos), it has nothing to do with the present euthynai. For what strategos lost Halos or the Phokians, Doriskos or Kersobleptes? Who lost Hieron Oros, Thermopylai? Who gave Philip an open path right up to Attica through our friends and allies? Who made Koroneia, Orkomenos and Euboia hostile? et cetera" (19.334). The fact that he defended the strategos by name indicates that he wanted to contain the damage done to Khares' prestige and that therefore Khares was a person on whom it was worthwhile to spend some effort. Whether or not one can say that Khares now belonged to the Demosthenes-group or Demosthenes to the Khares-group is doubtful. Euboulos had prosecuted Kephisophon by the time of the trial and it might be better to imagine that the 'group' which Demosthenes represented and that of Khares and Kephisophon found that they had much in common in the political climate which followed the peace of Philokrates. There is no evidence that Khares was strategos in the years 346/5 through 344/3, and one might infer that his appearance as khoregos in 344/3 points to his not being strategos in that year.63 There is also evidence that Aiskhines was much honored in these very years, since (1) he had successfully prosecuted Timarkhos Sphettios, an associate of both Demosthenes and the prominent brothers from Sounion, Hægesippos and Hægesandros,64 (2) his brother had been elected strategos for 346/5, 345/4, and 344/3 and (3) another brother had served as an ambassador to the king of Persia.65 Khares may have found it greatly to his advantage to cooperate with the rapidly rising Demosthenes. When this alliance took place is unknown but it may have been in existence as early as the trial of Timarkhos.66
The relationship or co-operation between Khares and Demosthenes may have continued for some time although one cannot point to any other specific occasion on which they were known to have made common cause. Demosthenes named Khares in his speech On the Khersonesos (T55), but with reference to what, precisely, is unclear. In the summer of 343 Athens had reinforced the Khersonesos with kleroukhoi under the strategos Diopeithes and over the course of the next two years considerable friction developed between the Athenians there and the city of Kardia. By 341 Philip had aided his ally Kardia with troops and there was a public discussion about recalling the strategos and his force. Demosthenes argued against this course of action. He complained that the home authorities were not providing the proper maintenance, that this was the cause of the alleged abuses of Diopeithes and that sending another strategos would solve nothing (§§24-29). One of his arguments was that malcontents and those trying to ruin the state were behind the attempt to recall Diopeithes:

That such men exist, although terrible, is not so terrible as that you, who are sitting here, are so predisposed that, should anyone come up and say that Diopeithes is the cause of all our ills, or Khares or Aristophon or whomever of the citizens someone might name, you would immediately agree and clamor that he spoke rightly. But if ever someone comes forward and speaks the truth that, "you are talking rubbish, Athenians: the man responsible for all our ills and these troubles is Philip. For if he were keeping quiet, the city would have no problem," you cannot argue that this is not true.

T55 = Demosthenes On the Khersonesos 8.30-1

Demosthenes was certainly trying to defend the basic policy that Diopeithes had been ordered to carry out, but he did not make it clear why Aristophon and Khares might have been similarly vulnerable. A clue may be provided by the notice of the author of the Plutarchean Vitae Decem Oratorum (Mor. 845F), who relates that Demosthenes spoke advising the people to maintain the mercenary force on Thasos. It may be that the mercenary force on Thasos was the force that Khares commanded there in 343/2, and that Khares had been liable
to the same sort of political pressure that Diopeithes came under now. That Aristophon could have been in the same position is hard to believe, given his advanced age at this late date. Nevertheless, it may be that attempts to lay the blame for Athenian misfortunes came from the same quarter, and that they were perceived by Demosthenes as attacks on the Athenian policy of maintaining forces in advanced positions.

After this there is no certain point of contact between Khares and Demosthenes. Demosthenes and others may have continued to support the disposition and initiatives of their strategoi in the field, but there is no clear-cut evidence of anything more than statutory co-operation. That is, Khares was again strategos in 343/2, and from 341/0-338/7, but there is no evidence that Demosthenes or any other political leader made any special arrangements or pleas to procure assignments for him. As strategos in the Khersonesos in 341/0 Khares was the most sensible choice (since he was on the spot) to shadow Philip's movements around the Hellespont and to keep Athens informed of the situation. It was perhaps Demosthenes who advised sending reinforcements to Byzantion under Khares' rival, Phokion.

In the same way, there were good reasons why Khares was selected to command at Amphissa in the Khaironeia campaign of 339 and 338. No other Athenian strategos had as much combat experience, especially against the Macedonians. Khares had commanded large armies, and was highly experienced with mercenaries (which is precisely the command that he was given in 339/8). Although it is strange that not men like Nausikles, Kephisophon Aphidnaios, Phaidros Sphetios or Phokion himself, but the non-entities Lysikles and Stratokles were given the command of the citizens at Khaironeia, there is no reason to suspect that "cronyism" played any great role in the selection of the strategoi who commanded in this campaign. Diodoros was probably right when he said that the Athenians put in command the best that they had (T78).
After the defeat at Khaironeia it was still possible to think of Demosthenes and Khares as on friendly terms, or at least adhering to similar principles. Khares was widely believed to have been "one of those around Demosthenes" and in the third letter of Demosthenes the orator lamented the loss of the demotikoi, one of whom was Khares (T86).

Hypereides and Phokion

There are no solid grounds for believing that associates of Demosthenes were necessarily associates of Khares, except Hypereides. He gained a conviction against Philokrates a little before Demosthenes prosecuted Aiskhines in 343. He was chosen to represent Athens (in place of Aiskhines) before the Amphiktyones concerning possession of Delos, and he proposed a motion to crown Demosthenes. He is generally believed to have been allied with Demosthenes for most of his career, but this need not mean they had the same friends and enemies. At some time after Khares left Athens during the reign of Alexander, Hypereides "advised against disbanding the mercenary force at Tainaron which Khares led, being well-disposed to the strategos." This gives very little on which to base much of a relationship and, regardless when one finally decides to date this incident, one can say that the championing of Khares' force fits in much better with Hypereides' overall policy than it does with any special relationship with the strategos Khares.

As for other men who were directly or indirectly attested as associates of Demosthenes a circumstantial case could be made for some commonality of interest with Thrasyboulos Erkhieus, Kallisthenes, and other even more obscure persons. These relationships, however, are based on highly inferential grounds and perhaps even on bad method.

On the other side there is a tradition that Khares and Phokion were rivals. When Khares sailed to the Hellespont in 340, the grain ships were
attacked by Philip and the demos decided either to reinforce or replace him, Phokion made a disparaging remark that Plutarch relates:

When the Athenians were eager to aid Byzantion, the rhetores strove to send Khares as strategos and he, having sailed there, accomplished nothing worthy of his force, nor did the cities receive his fleet, but he wandered about suspected by all, collecting money from the allies and being despised by the enemy. The demos, incited by the orators, became angry and repented of having sent aid to Byzantion. Phokion rose up and said that there was no reason to be angry at their allies, who distrusted, but rather at those of the strategoi who were distrusted, "for these men make you feared even by those who cannot save themselves without you".

T73 = Plutarch Phokion 14.2-3

Another anecdote from the same source relates the following riposte:

While he (sc. Phokion) had a nature which was gentle and kind, the expression on his face seemed sullen and hard to deal with so that anyone not accustomed to him did not easily converse with him alone. For that reason once, when Khares made the Athenians laugh about his eyebrows, he said, "this eyebrow has grieved none of you, but the laughter of these people has caused the city to shed many a tear"

T74 = Plutarch Phokion 5.1

Such a rivalry is credible and perhaps expected between colleagues, particularly since they were on opposite sides in the trial of Aiskhines, but Phokion proved to be very dangerous indeed to the demotikoi in times of crisis.

Liturgies

Khares' public benefactions to the city of Athens have been touched on in the preceding discussions, but a very brief review is in order since benefactions were exploited for political and legal purposes. It has been pointed out that he performed the trierarchy, probably twice, and that he provided the city with a chorus of boys at the Thargelia. It has not, perhaps, been sufficiently emphasized that Khares performed other public benefactions, by adorning religious and other celebrations. He twice enhanced
public celebrations by providing feasts. Just after the Social War, he provided a *koreanomia* for the Boedromia from the spoils of his campaign in Asia Minor (T30). Again, after his victory over the mercenaries of Philip a few years later, he feasted the Athenians in the agora from his victory-sacrifices (T36). One may view such acts with cynicism, but they are not at all out of the ordinary for a strategos; others did much the same, Khabrias, for example. Thus, these are not the acts of a brigand trying to buy forgiveness, but a regular and recognized deployment of success to glorify the city and, at the same time, invest in some political goodwill.

An interesting aspect of these attempts to acquire public goodwill is the desire to secure a memorial of that favor. Khares was crowned for his Social-War benefaction (T30), which was the result of "the Sister of Marathon" (T27). Here one can see what was probably an attempt to obtain a lasting symbol of his success and the people's gratitude. Khares will surely have seen the statues of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Khabrias, and his hyperbolic description of the victory in Asia was, perhaps, an attempt to capture the Athenian imagination, and thereby enshrine his name both in bronze and in words. Unfortunately for him, he could not join the triad of great Athenian heroes: the last age of Athenian greatness was over.

**Summary of Part II**

In the preceding discussions Khares' relationship with several prominent Athenian political leaders has been examined. It has been seen that there is no reason to think him an enemy of Kallistratos, Khabrias and their associates. If anything, he cooperated with them. His cooperation with Aristophon can be documented for the trials of Timotheos and Iphikrates, but neither before nor after them. Likewise, his hostility with Iphikrates and Timotheos cannot be shown to have existed before the battle of Embata.

It has been suggested that Khares' association with Demosthenes does not
predate the latter's political conflict with Aiskhines, but that an apparently friendly feeling continued to exist, at least by Demosthenes for Khares, until after the strategos' death. There is also evidence that this association was not constant, for at some point Demosthenes promoted Phokion at the expense of Khares. Aiskhines, Euboulos and Phokion were all hostile to Khares, but again this hostility is concentrated on the occasion of Aiskhines' trial. The rivalry with Phokion may have been enduring, but if the truth be known, a list of those to whom Phokion was hostile would be a long one. It has also been seen that Hypereides, generally pursuing goals similar to Demosthenes, also spoke on behalf of Khares.

Another point that has been made is that Khares was very popular with the demos. In addition to his repeated success with the voters, there is positive evidence that Athenian juries failed to convict him, although he was tried "in every way" (T54). He performed a full range of public benefactions and liturgies and was publicly honored for them.
PART III: DE CHARETIS MORIBUS

dissimilis quidem Chares horum et factis et moribus. Thus Cornelius Nepos (T33) apologized for naming Khares in the company of Konon, Iphikrates, Timotheos and Khabrias, Athens' great, fourth-century military heroes. Nepos' near-contemporary, Diodoros, reported that Khares "accomplished nothing good for his country, but only calumnies" (T7), and later lamented that, by the time the Athenians faced Philip of Macedon at Khaironeia, "the best of their strategoi had died: Iphikrates, Khabrias, and Timotheos, too, but of those remaining the foremost, Khares, did not surpass the ordinary individual in strategic counsel or vigor" (T78). A century earlier than Nepos or Diodoros, Polybios (T63) contrasted Athenian policy 'under Kleon and Khares' most unfavorably with that 'under Perikles and Aristeides.' Khares' colleagues were enshrined in a canon of Athenian heroes; he joined the ranks of Athenian villains.¹

This tradition of Khares' villainy prevails in modern scholarship and it is not hard to see why. The most eloquent judgements of Khares during his own lifetime were scathingly negative. The views of several of his contemporaries are extant. Xenophon, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Aiskhines and Theopompos have all left behind vivid impressions of him. The views of such men are all the more influential because of their stature as literary figures. But these men were also intimately, sometimes passionately, involved with many of the persons and events of their times. Their expressed judgements were influenced by political, moral and personal partisanship. Yet, the power and persuasion of their words may have the effect of charming
away their audience's consideration of their objectivity. After all, most if not all of them were highly trained in the art of persuasion.

If one wants to understand a political figure, such as Khares, an effort must be made to recreate, as much as possible, the context, not only historical and personal, but also political, moral and literary in which the man operated and from which the information about him derives. To do otherwise is to be left at the mercy of the sources' possibly partisan assessment of character. As the title of this chapter indicates, character has long been an overriding concern of historians. In the view of Polybios, Athens prospered 'under Perikles and Aristeides' because they were good men; 'under Kleon and Khares' Athens failed, because they were bad.

In chapter five, then, the bias of the contemporary sources will come under investigation, both generally and with specific reference to their views on Khares of Angele. Those sources include two military experts, Aineias and Xenophon; two practicing political leaders, Aiskhines and Demosthenes; and two experts in rhetoric, Isokrates and Theopompos. Following chapter five is a section on the conclusions to be drawn from this study, to which is appended a brief essay on the relationship between proposers and executors of Athenian public decrees.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOURCES

Aineias and Xenophon

Among the earliest narrative accounts mentioning Khares are those of Aineias ('the Tactician') and Xenophon. These two men seem to have shared several interests and experiences. Both showed a keen interest in military science, had extensive (mercenary) military experience and were contemporaries, possibly even acquainted. It is worth noting that by universal agreement, their works were written, or at least completed, before mid-century and relatively early in Khares' career. Both men seem to have written at some distance from the turmoil of Athenian political life; Aineias was almost certainly a Peloponnesian and Xenophon, both by inclination and habituation, was a Peloponnesian at heart. In any event, the works of both exhibit a decidedly Peloponnesian outlook.

Aineias mentions Khares (T8) only incidentally in the course of a discussion on how to forestall plots. One example of a successful plot, the coup against the government of Kerkyra includes several specific details: the uprising was necessary, the plotters were oligarchic, the government democratic, the garrison foreign and commanded by Khares the Athenian, who was aware of the plot, and the arkhontes of the garrison used cupping glasses to enhance their self-inflicted wounds. Aineias' narrative lacks any discernable political, social or moral bias. Rather, it is coolly detached and clinical; he provides as many details as are necessary to make his illustration effective. There is hint of neither judgement nor rhetorical embellishment. In this respect it is interesting to compare his account with that of
Diodoros (T7). Diodoros mentions the bare fact of Khares' interference and gives a very general statement of its ultimate consequences amidst a great deal of rhetorical decoration. 6

The detailed narrative of the plot is very much in the manner of Aineias. He refers to historical events as if to case studies, for the purpose of illustrating a technical point. Nowhere in his extant work can he be shown to criticize or judge, except on strictly tactical or strategic grounds. Nor does he betray any clue to his own political views or leanings or to how he feels about a given event. 7 Given these characteristics of his approach and the almost total obscurity of his identity, it is quite useless to speculate on his political bias or beliefs. 8 How Aineias regarded the coup on Kerkyra and Khares' (or Athens') complicity in it one cannot know, except that it was successful and, in someone's eyes, necessary. 9

Xenophon is very different from Aineias. His purpose, in the Hellenika, is not technical, but moral and political. He unashamedly propounds his views and in so doing gives his reader every opportunity to perceive his bias. Not only does he allow his own prejudices to be revealed, but his choice of sources and point of view give a fairly good idea of their origin, both in a geographical as well as a socio-economic and political sense. 10 He does not hesitate to offer criticism on moral, religious or practical grounds, and even his silence entails his bias. 11

Xenophon has the typical Greek disdain for barbarian autocracy, he belittles those who would usurp the hegemony of the Peloponnnesos from the Lakedaimonians and he has little sympathy for democracies. 12 Despite these obvious prejudices, Xenophon's attitudes towards individuals cannot be predicted on the basis of political tendencies or ethnic origin. Xenophon judges on the character and actions of the individual, and is fully capable of expressing admiration for a wide variety of men. Moreover, he was able to criticize his own friends or those whom he had praised elsewhere, and he
was not so malevolent as to withhold praise from those of whom he did not approve.13

With specific reference to Khares, we cannot predict Xenophon's attitude towards him. We have no way of knowing if Xenophon thought of him as a 'radical democrat', 'imperialist', 'polypragmon', or as venal and corrupt. In fact, it can be shown that, at least during one stage of his career, Xenophon regarded Khares as a prudent and effective ally and as a man circumspect in his relations with the divine. For Xenophon this was not merely a matter of religious devotion, but one of the most important qualities in a military or political leader.

Before Xenophon's portrayal of Khares is examined, there is one small point that needs to be highlighted, the date at which Xenophon described Khares' strategia in 366 B.C. in Book 7 of the Hellenika. Xenophon almost certainly lived to see the end of the Social War.14 The question of the composition of the Hellenika is a much debated one, but it is perfectly clear that Books 3-7, at least, were written much later than the events they describe. Book 6 was certainly not written before 357 and it is very likely that Book 7 was later still.15 Xenophon's narrative of Khares' actions as strategos in 366 was written several years later than the coup on Kerkyra and perhaps even after some of the events of the Social War.16 As will be seen presently there is no sign of the notoriety that later writers attached to these deeds in Xenophon's account.

In Book 7 Xenophon digressed from his narrative of the war between the Boiotians and the Lakedaimonians in order to embark upon a sketch of the aristeia of the relatively small and unimportant city of Phleious during this war.17 Xenophon apologized for the digression onto such a trivial topic, but felt compelled to describe the nobility, faithfulness and valor of the small city (7.2.1,16; 3.1). Xenophon had a long-standing interest in Phleious, probably because he had friends, including ancestral xenoi there.18 Admittedly,
the narrative is partial to Phleious and the source of the information comes from the "inside", probably from Phleiasian eyewitnesses and perhaps from his own observations. With this information Xenophon produced an immediate and vivid picture, one of the liveliest in the entire *Hellenika*, of how the Phleiasians and their Athenian allies, led by Khares, boldly took the offensive in the summer of 366 and, for a time, relieved their city.

The heroes of Xenophon's vignette are the Phleiasians themselves. No individual citizen is named throughout the digression. The Phleiasians were occasionally aided by their allies (7.2.10), but only once did Xenophon name one of the allies: the Athenian strategos, Khares. For the final event of the Phleiasian aristeia, in 366, Xenophon summoned all of his literary skill to produce a jewel of narrative description. Khares agreed to a Phleiasian request to escort their non-combatants to Pellene and proved to be the decisive factor in repelling an ambush on the return journey. On the next day the Phleiasians appealed again to their effective ally, using the sort of verbal persuasion that no Xenophontic hero could resist:

"You should know this well, Khares, that if you accomplish this thing you will be fortified against the enemy and the saviour of a friendly city; you will be most glorious in your father-land and renowned, both among your allies and your enemies" (T2 §20).

With these words the Phleiasians politely invited Khares to consult the gods concerning the prudence of their plans. He did so and obtained favorable omens. What followed was nothing short of miraculous, in the eyes on Xenophon. The citizens advanced gathering speed as they went, Khares followed them eagerly and "even the mercenaries ran out quickly with some divine goodwill (emphasis mine)" (T2 §21). The result was complete victory, apparently without casualty. The Phleiasians, to be sure, are represented as being mainly responsible for the initiative and much of the fighting, but nonetheless Xenophon presents Khares as helpful, compliant and prudent.
It could be argued that Khares was merely fortunate to have been the particular ally present on the occasion that Xenophon chose to make the climax of the Phleiasian aristeia, but several salient details tell against such an argument. Xenophon repeatedly (10 times) uses Khares' name within his narrative, twice vocatively in a lively speech. In this speech the Phleiasians hold out the prospects of glory and renown, the rewards of a hero, not of a venal politician, if their purpose is accomplished. There can be no doubt that Khares is cast deliberately into the vignette's central role.

There is one further way in which Xenophon makes clear how the reader is to regard Khares' actions. He is not only a willing and effective ally, but he displays the prudence and religious circumspection that are the trademarks of an Xenophontic "good soldier": Khares included the gods in his counsel. This may seem trivial, but a close inspection of Xenophon's work will reveal a deep and serious religious conviction that proper religious attitudes were an integral requirement of good generalship. Xenophon believed that the consultation of the divine before embarking on important undertakings was a first principle of military practice, and he said so, both in his representation of events and in plain words.\(^{22}\)

The portrait of Khares' generalship at Phleious in 366 is a statement of the Xenophontic ideal of a good soldier. Xenophon almost certainly wrote about Khares several years later than, and in the full knowledge of, the coup on Kerkyra and, perhaps, some or all of the Social War, yet that episode neither affected his portrait of Khares, nor was it deemed worthy itself to be included within the scope of the Hellenika.\(^{23}\)

Khares crosses the pages on Xenophon's Hellenika twice more, but in each case his is a peripheral role from which no inference, positive or negative, about Xenophon's attitude can be drawn.
Isokrates

In the immediate aftermath of the Social War and the trials of Timotheos and his colleagues, Khares was bitterly attacked in at least two works composed by Xenophon's fellow demesman, Isokrates. Isokrates is most famous as a rhetor and educator, and his works and ideas had a great and lasting impact on both literature and pedagogy throughout classical antiquity and beyond. Isokrates was famous and influential in his own lifetime, certainly in the field of rhetoric, and, in the view of some, in contemporary political life as well. Because he was a contemporary and a figure of such influential literary stature, it is worthwhile to examine some aspects of his life and career in order to understand better the context of his attacks on Khares. Three facets of his life and career demand special attention: his relationship with his pupils, particularly Timotheos, his own political attitudes and activities, and his influence on contemporary rhetoric.

Isokrates was not at all reticent about mentioning himself in his own works, and as a consequence much is known about his life. He began his career writing speeches for others, but later ceased in order to develop a curriculum and found a school. This occupation was presumably lucrative enough to place him in the liturgical class at Athens. Perhaps in rivalry to Plato's Academy, Isokrates offered an education that was of practical value to men interested in public life. The school's goal was to produce men capable of success in public affairs.

Ancient authorities claim as many as one hundred pupils for Isokrates, including several who played prominent parts in public life at Athens. Many of the pupils attributed to Isokrates, however, are named only by late sources whose authority has been questioned recently. Indeed, perhaps only those pupils whom the master himself or other contemporary sources named can safely be attributed to him. Some of these men are known to have played minor
roles in public life, but there is only one who stood out as a figure of the first rank in Athenian political life: Timotheos, the son of Konon. 32

Timotheos was the most brilliant example of the practical results that Isokrates' training might achieve, and the master was boundlessly proud of his pupil. 33 A catalogue of Sokrates' pupils and his pupil's pupils surely would have sent chills down the spine of many an Athenian democrat, but Timotheos served the democracy successfully and well. His preeminence in Athens' political and diplomatic affairs for some twenty years was the best advertisement for Isokrates' tutelage one can imagine.

It is hardly surprising, then, that Isokrates attacked Khares so bitterly after the trials of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus (T24, T25). Not only had Khares contributed to the ruin of Isokrates' friend and prize pupil, but in the trials Timotheos was the only one of the accused unable to get himself acquitted! 34 Timotheos' disgrace and his subsequent withdrawal from public life was a blow to Isokrates personally, and professionally.

Thus, Khares became a target of Isokrates after he had laid an accusation and aided in the prosecution of Timotheos. It is fair to ask if the rhetor opposed Khares on more general issues of policy and politics, but this question is not at all easy to answer, because it is difficult to discover what political beliefs Isokrates held. His actions are not much help in this respect. Despite the wealth of information about him, one is hard pressed, indeed, to name any act of Isokrates that indicates he participated in the city's political life at all, unless it be his liturgies, at least one of which he resisted. 35 Contemporaries regarded Isokrates as a professor of rhetoric, not as a political figure, and the more astute of the ancient critics agreed that his speeches were not practical forensic works, but were actually undeliverable. 36 Isokrates himself asserts that he shunned a political career, and there is no direct, objective evidence that his compositions influenced current, public decisions on Athenian policy, or that they were intended to do
so, at least in any timely, topical manner. 37

It has been suggested that Isokrates' ideas were put into practice by others, either his students or an influential political group centered around Euboulos, Phokion, Meidias, Aiskhines and their associates. These notions are purely modern and have been convincingly refuted. 38 Nevertheless, they linger on in some quarters, and therefore it is in order briefly to refute them.

First, it is difficult to reconcile the entire career of Timotheos, who contributed more to the growth and development of the Second Athenian League than anyone else, with the 'anti-imperialist' views of Isokrates. 39 Moreover, if one were to accept for the sake of argument that those pupils attributed to Isokrates by later authorities were in fact his students, men such as Androtion, Leodamas, Lykourgos, Hypereides and others, what consistent political pattern could be discerned in this diverse group, and how are the actions of any one of them consistent with the ideas of Isokrates? About all one can say is that they all took an active part in the city's public affairs and operated within the existing system in a manner indistinguishable from that of any other Athenian political leader.

As for Euboulos and his associates, no evidence or tradition links him or any of his friends with Isokrates, and it is not easy to imagine these practical, political leaders as avid followers of a political program that took years to be promulgated and that contradicted itself from one long-awaited installment to another. 40

If there is a model for Isokrates' political stance, it is probably to be found in the career of Plato. Both men deliberately stood aloof from Athenian political life, and wrote with a certain amount of detached disdain about the democracy as it then existed. 41 Isokrates' political outlook in the case of Khares was probably determined largely by what frequently determined many a political position in Athens: friendship. 42 That very
friendship with Timotheos indicates that the rhetor did not differ so much on the substance of the policy that Khares and Timotheos carried out, as much as on the supposed style in which it was carried out. What, then, were Isokrates' precise complaints against Khares?

The premise of Isokrates' speech on the League (Symmakhikos or On the Peace) is that Athens should extend the peace to all cities, abandon empire, and to assert her worthiness of Hellenic hegemony by setting an example of superior moral behaviour (8.16-35). This entails a modification of Athens' internal political behaviour. Isokrates compares the Athenians of old with those of his own day in order to point out present-day mistakes, especially in the leadership:

(50) We make a multitude of laws, but think so little of them (for if you hear about one you will judge the others) that, although a penalty of death is fixed if anyone is convicted of bribery, we elect as strategoi those who do this most patently, and who is able to corrupt the greatest number of citizens, we put in charge of our most important affairs...

(54) We differ from our forefathers so much that, whereas they chose the same men leaders of the city and strategoi, in the belief that he who was able to give the best counsel on the speaker's platform would also take the best counsel with himself when alone. We do the opposite, for those whose counsel we use in matters of most importance, we do not deem worthy to elect as strategoi, as if they had no sense, but those whom no one would consult, either on their own affairs or on the state's, we send out as autokratores, as if they will become wiser abroad and will take better counsel concerning Hellenic affairs than concerning things put forward here. I say this not with reference to all, but against those liable to what I have said.

T24 = Isokrates Symmakhikos (On the Peace) 8.50, 54-56

In essence, Isokrates says that the demos is deluded to pick bad men both as advisors at home and as strategoi abroad. He means Khares, as Aristotle (T23) perceived, but the only specific charge against him, aside from being a bad counsellor and a brutal commander, is that he is flagrantly guilty of bribery. Isokrates' point is that the demos is so befuddled that they elect men patently guilty of bribery, and, as it becomes clear from the Antidosis,
they prefer such men to Timotheos.

In the Antidosis, Isokrates eulogized Timotheos (15.101-139). In this eulogy he listed the military successes of Timotheos and summed up his catalogue by saying "he made you masters of twenty-four cities, spending less than what your fathers spent on the siege of Melos" (113). He then turned to explain why the Athenians preferred to Timotheos "men who were physically impressive and had served with wandering mercenaries, but were unable to capture even a village" (115), "men who threaten and terrorize other cities, and are always causing revolution among the allies" (121). Again, the poor, deluded demos preferred a physically impressive strategos to one less impressive, but who had captured many cities and spent little money; they have preferred him in a court case that resulted in a conviction and fine for Timotheos (129). If the statements of the two speeches were combined one cannot help being struck by the irony: 'you Athenians are so foolish that you have convicted Timotheos on a capital charge, preferring a man who committed a capital offensive to secure Timotheos' conviction'. Isokrates' words had no practical effect, but their literary influence was not lost on other orators.

Demosthenes and Aiskhines

The careers of, and rivalry between, Demosthenes and Aiskhines are well documented and analysed, and there is no need to review them here. It is necessary only to concentrate on two periods; from about 351 until 348 for Demosthenes, and from 346 until 343 for both him and Aiskhines. It is in the context of these two periods that they publicly expressed comments about Khares. It is accepted here that they were two successful, practical, political leaders, more or less equally committed to the democracy and best interests of the city, and that both were honestly striving towards that goal. They certainly differed on how foreign policy ought to be directed and by whose advice, but both
are to be seen as political leaders of the democracy.\textsuperscript{48} It is the contention here that their comments on Khares were determined not so much by philosophical differences, although those did exist to some extent, as by their own positions in Athenian political life, and the relationships between those positions and that of Khares.

The relationship between Demosthenes and Khares has been discussed already in chapter four, and it was seen there that the two men cooperated with one another, at least after the Peace of Philokrates. In fact, the assumption that they were cooperating as early as 351, or 349/8 is not so well-founded. It has been argued that Demosthenes probably did not influence the choice of strategoi who were sent to Olynthos, and that his position at the time of the First Philippic and three Olynthiac speeches was probably one of a young outsider trying to break into the ranks of the more prominent and influential political leaders.\textsuperscript{49} In those speeches he alluded to Khares or his deeds several times (T28, T30, T31, T59, T60). These comments deserve to be looked at in some detail, because they form a substantial part of the basis on which later judgement of Khares is based.\textsuperscript{50}

The context of all the remarks about Khares is essentially the same. Demosthenes was attempting to incite the Athenians to action and castigated them because they kept sending their strategoi out with mercenary forces but no pay for them. He argued that the citizens themselves must serve in person.\textsuperscript{51} Demosthenes alluded to recent examples of the failure of the present system, but in each case he deflected criticism from the magistrates.\textsuperscript{52} Clearly, Demosthenes criticized the system, not the individuals involved. This may reflect, as in the case of Khares, how the demos at large perceived things, that is, Khares, Kharidemos or others were not responsible for the difficulties with ill-paid mercenaries, they did the best they could.\textsuperscript{53} Demosthenes may also have realized that one day, perhaps soon, he would have to cooperate with those powerful magistrates and there was no need to offend
them now, if he could avoid doing so.

Perhaps what makes Demosthenes' remarks seem so damaging, at least to modern observers, is that they call to mind less kind words written not long before Demosthenes' First Philippic and Olynthiac orations. Isokrates, in his Symmakhikos, castigated his fellow citizens by comparing them to their illustrious ancestors, he too inveighed against mercenary armies, urged the Athenians to abandon their depraved leaders and to seek 'cures' for their 'maladies'. These early symbouleutic speeches of Demosthenes contain many of the same themes and commonplaces that studded Isokrates' "symbouleutic" and forensic exercises. Whether this was due to the coincidence of purpose or genre of the speeches, or the popularity of the commonplaces, is, perhaps a matter of subjective judgement. One should not be surprised that orators played theme and variation off one another, as musicians do. It is not being suggested that Demosthenes was a disciple of Isokrates, or followed his philosophies and policies, but that there was a conventional manner of treating certain topics, now brought to its peak of effectiveness by Isokrates. Demosthenes has his ear cocked to innovations in rhetoric and he was not the only orator to do so.

Aiskhines, too, must have kept current with new achievements in rhetoric. Perhaps even before his trial, in 343, when he attacked Khares publicly, Aiskhines was already his opponent. In this year he found himself in a perilous position. The peace that he, Demosthenes, Philokrates, and others had negotiated between Athens and Philip soon became unpopular and grew more so as time went on. Early on, Demosthenes had established a position disassociating himself from the peace and by 343 Philokrates, the peace's namesake, had been indicted and condemned to death in absentia. Aiskhines, in his own defence, was obliged to show that, under the existing circumstances, peace had to be made in 346. At one point in his defence he attempted to shift the blame onto Athens' military leaders, as had probably already been
It was here that he attacked Khares (T52).

Aiskhines began his attack by asserting "frankly and truly" that:

For we made a beginning of the war for Amphipolis, but it happened that our strategos in the war lost seventy-five allied cities which Timotheos the son of Konon acquired and introduced into the synedr-ion. (You see, I prefer to speak right out and to save myself by speaking at the same time freely and truthfully; if you feel otherwise, do what you like with me, for I would not restrict myself.)

(71) Taking one hundred and fifty triremes from their sheds, he did not bring them back, and the accusers of Khares always point this out to you in court; he also spent fifteen hundred talents, not on the soldiers, but on the fraudulence of the leaders, runaways like Dei ares and Deipyros and Polyphontes gathered together from all Hellas (and this is apart from the mercenaries around the speaker's platform and the ekklesia), who while they were exacting from the poor islanders sixty talents each year as syntaxeis kept on plundering the Hellenes and their boats from the open sea. (72) But instead of the hegemony of the Hellenes and their respect our city was defiled with the reputation of Mouse-island and her pirates.

T52 = Aiskhines Parapresbeias 2.70-72

Aiskhines went on to imply that, when Philip was threatening the Khersonesos, Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, Khares was nowhere to be found and had to be hunted down by a decree proposed by his own companion. In this Aiskhines did, indeed, speak freely, so much so that the chronology of the events he alludes to is still in doubt.61

Demosthenes, in his turn, defended Khares by pointing out that on every occasion on which he gave an accounting of his deeds he had been found to have acted "trustily and faithfully on your behalf, as far as it was in his control, but that it was through the influence of those who ruin our affairs for money that he failed" (T54). In both of these passages only the most obtuse observer can fail to recognize the crucial expediency of the moment. Each orator strained with all his persuasive might to convince the jury. The attack and defence have to be seen in the context of a bitter political struggle. Aiskhines must prove that the strategoi were to blame; Demosthenes, the 'traitorous' diplomats. Nonetheless, Aiskhines' attack is much more effective, rhetorically speaking. It was shrewdly conceived and deserves closer inspection.
Aiskhines cast Khares' alleged failure in such a way as to achieve maximum effect on the jurors' emotions. In his words, Khares lost the seventy-five cities that Timotheos the son of Konon acquired and brought into the League. The number 'seventy-five' was probably a conventional exaggeration for 'a lot' with Aiskhines, but no one could fail to remember the great trial of the Social-War period and the glorious days of Athenian naval power under Timotheos, and under his father before him. Isokrates had already shown, in his Antidosis, how to attack Khares. Timotheos had failed to make the proper use of his teacher's skills at his trial, but Aiskhines did not. He did not miss his opportunity to mention the large number of ships Khares allegedly lost, nor the many talents spent. He went one better than Isokrates in giving fanciful names to the 'runaways, deserters and stateless men' who comprised mercenary forces. Aiskhines also managed to draw in the old charge against Khares, that he bribed or 'bought' the rhetores in the assembly. If anything, Aiskhines' version is much more effective than Isokrates' in its economy.

The preceding discussion is not intended to prove that there was some conspiracy among these literati to denigrate Khares. It is suggested that, once a classic 'tag' was created against him, it was referred to and varied depending on the occasion and purpose of a particular forensic contest. Many strategoi and other prominent men at Athens must have endured the same sort of treatment. Khares happened to live in a time when his notoriety could be pilloried by so many great literary figures. But perhaps the greatest damage was yet to be done.

Theopompos

Apart from Book Seven of Xenophon's Hellenika Khares is mentioned in the extant fragments of only one contemporary historian, Theopompos of Khios. Theopompos' Philippika, was immensely popular and his works, in
general, long exerted a great and pervasive influence on Greek and Roman historiography. Because of his popularity and his influence on other historical writers, Theopompos merits an investigation into his methods, attitudes and the influence he had on later writers, particularly as they relate to his representation of Khares. Two aspects of Theopompos' remarks on Khares need especially to be emphasized: their moral and literary context, and their influence on later historians, especially those writing on the late-fourth century.

Theopompos was a little younger than Demosthenes and almost certainly outlived him. His father, Damasistratos, was probably active politically on his native Khios, as may be inferred from the fact that he was exiled for 'Lakonism'. When he went into exile and where he went are not known, although some time spent at Athens is likely, if the traditions about Theopompos' education are reliable. Theopompos is known to have travelled to Karia in 353/2, to have spent time at the court of Philip of Macedon, and to have been restored to his native land through the agency of Alexander, probably around 332. He himself boasted that he had visited most places in the Greek world. Once restored to Khios, Theopompos seems to have taken part in public affairs there, but was expelled from the island upon Alexander's death. He sought refuge in Egypt, where he narrowly escaped being put to death by king Ptolemy on the grounds that he was a polypragmon.

Theopompos and his brother, Kaukalos, were adepts in rhetoric, and Theopompos wroteprodigiously in the genres of history and rhetoric. For many in antiquity Theopompos was an orator as much as an historian, and he himself held a high opinion of his own stature as a practitioner of the art of persuasion; many later writers regarded him as a student of Isokrates. The validity of this claim has been challenged, but the influence of Isokrates on Theopompos, as well as on several other contemporary orators, can be detected.
In any event, one need not assume that Theopompos acquired his political outlook from Isokrates, either directly or indirectly. In fact, one might be hard-pressed to define Theopompos' political ideology on the basis of his preserved fragments, simply because there are few states, individuals or political systems that he does not attack, implicitly or explicitly. Nevertheless, democracy comes in for more than its fair share of censure in Theopompos, and the bulk of the abuse is directed at the democracy of the Athenians and its political leaders.\textsuperscript{73} An entire section of the \textit{Philippika}, Book Ten ("On the Demagogues at Athens"), was devoted to a history of Athens' political leaders, few of whom came off unscathed. Moreover, Athens' fourth-century military leaders did not fare much better.\textsuperscript{74}

For the purpose of the present discussion, attention must be focused on the \textit{Philippika}, since it was by far the most popular work of Theopompos, and it dealt with the period during which Khares was active. The date of this work's composition is not certain, but Book Thirteen was composed after 342 and Book Forty-Three after 331/0, and it would seem unlikely that the work was undertaken much before the Peace of Philokrates.\textsuperscript{75} Thus, a great deal of the history was written during and after the period of Athens' military decline.

Theopompos made mention of Khares at least three times in his history. The three passages mentioning him do not necessarily represent fairly or completely Theopompos' attitude towards Khares, since their preservation is due to the erudite whim of Athenaios. In fact, Athenaios cited three passages of Theopompos' history consecutively, each of which mentioned Khares.\textsuperscript{76} Before these passages are looked at in some detail, it will be helpful to review some opinions about Theopompos which have emerged recently.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the \textit{Philippika}, far from being a 58-book encomium of Philip of Macedon, is more a chronicle of the moral and political decline of the Greek city-states, written by a sternly moralistic rhetorician. Philip achieved his ascendancy in the Greek world because of his
superior ability to corrupt friend and foe alike, and that corruption cut across national and political lines: each people, politeia and their leaders were as bad as the next.\textsuperscript{77} Theopompos was highly skilled at, and relished, describing vice. As Plutarch said, "one might rely on him when he praises more than when he censures, for he censures with more relish than he praises."\textsuperscript{78} It has always been quite evident that Theopompos was strongly influenced by contemporary, forensic rhetoric, both in his style and perhaps his content as well.\textsuperscript{79} At least one modern scholar perceives an analogy between the work of Theopompos and New Comedy.\textsuperscript{80} With these thoughts in mind it is time to turn to the fragments themselves.

T36 came from a section of the Philippika subtitled "On the money plundered from Delphi." This citation follows on the heels of T62, and relates that Khares received money from Lysandros (presumably a Phokian), with which he feasted the Athenians in celebration of a victory over a Macedonian commander, Adataos, nicknamed 'Cock' (\(\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\chi\tau\omicron\upomicron\upomicron\nu)). The fragment of Theopompos contains no overt censure of Khares, but one can be suspicious because of what was apparently the overall treatment in this section of the Philippika. His use of the verb \textit{o\-\textcircled{\textomega}} is a clue to how he felt towards the Phokians and those who partook of the sacred treasures.\textsuperscript{81} Of the two other known fragments of this section of the Philippika, one describes how the Phokian generals employed sacred dedications to purchase sexual favors.\textsuperscript{82} A number of ancient sources, including Diodoros, repeat this motif and add lurid stories of the awful revenge visited upon those who shared the sacred monies.\textsuperscript{83} To suggest that Theopompos was the origin of these tales is not at all implausible. No source implicates Khares directly in Apollo's revenge, but it is known that another Athenian, Iphikrates, was believed to have enmeshed his city in the revenge of Apollo.\textsuperscript{84} Theopompos clearly meant his readers to understand that the Athenians enjoyed the benefits of the sacred money given to Khares. How he imagined this to have affected Khares and the Athenians is not known, but
it is likely that he made something of it at some point in his history.  

Immediately after the quotation of Theopompos, Athenaios cites five verses from a comedy by Herakleides on the subject of Khares' victory, although it is not clear exactly where the citation of Theopompos ends. It is even possible that he, not Athenaios, cited the comic fragment. It is characteristic of Athenaios to string together various quotations on a single subject, but another source, Eustathios, also quotes these, and only these, verses of Herakleides.  

One cannot be certain whether Eustathios quoted Theopompos directly, or used Athenaios as an intermediary, but it would not be at all out of character for the historian to employ comedy, either for its technique or for its content.

Another comic writer also mentioned 'Cock': Antiphanes, according to Zenobios (T37). Zenobios understood the phrase 'Philip's Cock' to mean "one who boasts over trivial successes", but there is certainly nothing like that meaning inherent in the preserved lines of Herakleides. Indeed, there is no clear indication that either comic writer intended the phrase 'Philip's Cock' to be a pejorative reference to Khares. It cannot be proven, but the origin of the 'proverbial' interpretation of this phrase may derive from Theopompos. At any rate, he is known to have cut Athenian boasts down to size with great vigor.

With much less speculation one may perceive the literary context of Theopompos' character sketch of Khares and the Athenian demos (T62). He began with specific examples of Khares' τρυφη, a variety of prostitutes, before moving on to insinuations of political turpitude. He rather cleverly combined the old charge of bribery with an accusation that Khares misappropriated public funds. At this point the sketch turned into a blanket denunciation of the moral decay of the entire Athenian demos. Neither with respect to the individual, nor to the whole people, is this sketch unique in the fragments of Theopompos. It is entirely characteristic of him. Nor is it sub-
stantially different from what Isokrates never tired of saying about the Athenians, and what he and Aiskhines said about Khares.\textsuperscript{92}

All the conventional elements are present: prostitutes, drinking, gambling,\textsuperscript{93} bribery, misappropriation of public funds, and squandering money on public feasts instead of legitimate public administration.\textsuperscript{94} Because of the conventional nature of this \(\lambda\omega\iota\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\) one can expect a certain amount of similarity in subject matter and vocabulary. \textit{But} there are even close parallels in the phraseology.\textsuperscript{95} It is not far-fetched to suggest that Theopompos formed his judgement of Khares from the speeches of Aiskhines and Isokrates.\textsuperscript{96} At any rate, he certainly cast his description in terms they would have been familiar with.

There remains one last reference to Khares in the fragments of Theopompos, but it was probably only incidental (T32). This passage may come from a portrait of Khabrias on the occasion of his last sojourn in Egypt in 361 B.C. Khabrias is castigated in familiar terms, and it is claimed that he, as well as other Athenian military leaders, generally dwelt abroad because of their conspicuous extravagance, and because the Athenian people were so difficult.\textsuperscript{97} Theopompos lists the Athenian strategoi who did this: Iphikrates, Konon, Timotheos, Khares and Khabrias. Here, at last, Khares is in respectable company. \textit{But} there is a good reason to believe that the historian added a disclaimer, since Nepos (T33) reproduces this passage almost word for word. The similarity is so close that several editors have used Nepos' words to supplement Theopompos'.\textsuperscript{98} Nepos adds the words with which Part III of this study began: \textit{dissimilis quidem Chares horum et factis et moribus, sed tamen Athenis et honoratus et potens}. It is patently clear that Theopompos is the source for Nepos in this passage, and this raises the question of Theopompos' influence on later historical writers. A case can be made that two of the main sources for the period of the Social War and later, Nepos and Diodoros, made considerable use of Theopompos for that very time.
W.R. Connor has recognized that Nepos' source for much of the material in the character sketches of fifth-century Athenians derived from Theopompos. It is likely that the same is true for the sketches of fourth-century Athenians, since Theopompos is explicitly named as a source for the life of Iphikrates (Iphic. 3.1-2 = FGrHist 115 F289). Another historian who claimed to have used Theopompos was Diodoros (16.3.8), although he rarely made it clear precisely when he used him. Perhaps a couple of instances may be suggested.

Diodoros (T78) remarked on the occasion of the Khaironeia campaign that, with the noblest of the Athenian strategoi dead, Iphikrates, Khabrias and also Timotheos, the best of those remaining was Khares, whose skills did not surpass the ordinary. Nepos, after having narrated the lives of Iphikrates, Khabrias and Timotheos, commented (Timoth. 4.4) that "this was the final age of Athenian generals, Iphikrates, Khabrias, Timotheos: after their deaths there was no leader in that city worthy of memory." The perspective of each of these passages is the same: it remembers the 'canon' of fourth-century heroes with nostalgia after their deaths. The words are not precisely parallel, but the sentiment certainly is.

There is considerably more similarity between Nepos' description of the death of Khabrias and Diodoros' account of it (T14 and T13). These two passages have already been discussed to some extent in chapter one. They are generally similar in that they are both concerned primarily with the death of Khabrias, rather than with the battle in which he fell. This is understandable in Nepos' case, less so in Diodoros'. In particular, the descriptions of the sea-battle in which Khabrias died correspond in several details, as well as in the embellishment of the narrative. Both sources specify that the fight took place at the port. Both explicitly state that Khabrias' ship was stricken by (a) ram(s). Both note that others (presumably Khabrias' crew) saved themselves by leaping or swimming to the other ships, but that Khabrias "exchanged a glorious death for defeat, and died while fighting on behalf of
his ship" (Diodoros)/"judging an honorable death preferable to a base life, died fighting hand-to-hand under the weapons of the enemy" (Nepos). These parallels point to a common source. Both Nepos and Diodoros explicitly state that they have consulted Theopompos, and Nepos can be demonstrated to have used Theopompos at least twice to enhance his character-sketches of fourth-century Athenian strategoi. It has been shown that concerning one of these strategoi (Khabrias) Nepos and Diodoros agree very closely, and it has also been shown that in at least one or two further instances these two authors show notable agreement in passages concerning other famous fourth-century strategoi. If a common source is to be sought, Theopompos has to be the prime suspect.\footnote{100}

Theopompos viewed Khares and the Athenians in an unfavorable light. He may even have considered the relationship between Khares and the demos as the quintessential example of the degree of corruption to which a democracy was susceptible.\footnote{101} The manner in which he expressed his views is that of a forensic orator, highly embellished with rhetorical decoration. The nature of his analyses of the characters and careers of fourth-century Athenian soldiers and statesmen, and the nature of the attitude of our two extant, narrative sources towards Khares leads to a very strong suspicion that Theopompos was of paramount influence in the way that the extant sources represent Khares and the Athenians in the twilight of the Athenian democracy. If that is true, it is no wonder that Polybios, who was so thoroughly acquainted with Theopompos' work, lumped Khares together with another κόμων τοῦ δῆμου, Kleon (T63).\footnote{102}

**Summary**

In this chapter it has been seen that two military experts, Aineias and Xenophon, both writing as late as the Social War, viewed the strategos Khares in a favorable, or at least neutral, light. For Xenophon Khares fit the model of the circumspect and successful general. In neither of them is there
any hint of controversy surrounding Khares' involvement in the affair on Kerkyra or his other actions.

It has also been demonstrated that Isokrates, a man who stood aloof from the turmoil of Athenian politics, had personal grounds for portraying Khares in such ugly colors. One may have serious doubts that controversy about Khares' role in foreign policy existed before it was made a subject of discussion in the trials of Timotheos and Iphikrates, and in Isokrates' defence of the former in speeches of the same period.

The remarks of Demosthenes and Aiskhines, both favorable and unfavorable, are to be viewed in the context of an intense and perilous political struggle. Their expressed attitudes about the strategos were obviously dictated by circumstance.

Theopompos, another man who had little sympathy for the political infighting of the Athenian democracy, viewed Khares through the filter of an almost obsessive moral interpretation of political motivation. This is as true of his assessment of kings, tyrants, and entire states, as it is of individual political leaders of every stripe. His opinions are all the more important, since they are quite likely to have exercised great influence on the historical tradition.

It has also been seen throughout, that the orators expressed their views in a highly conventional, even formulaic fashion, and it has been suggested that, in the case of Khares, there has been perhaps more than the usual amount of literary borrowing for the purpose of censuring him. This is not to suggest that these writers maliciously conspired to create a nasty picture of him, but that, once a weapon had been devised to malign him, it was conveniently re-shaped and used on him again and again.
CONCLUSION

This study of the career of Khares of Angele allows several conclusions to be drawn about his role in the history of the later fourth century B.C., and suggests that some aspects of current thinking on the relationship between military magistrates and the city-state need to be reconsidered.

The evidence for Khares' career as a military leader makes it clear that he was a popular and durable magistrate. The Athenian demos expressed its continuing confidence in him over a period of thirty years or more by repeatedly electing him to the office of strategos. This expression of confidence is confirmed, often begrudgingly, by the ancient sources. Unless one is prepared to maintain that the Athenians were continually misled, or assiduously exercised poor judgement throughout this entire period, one is forced to conclude that they regarded Khares as a man whom they "found to have always worked trustily and faithfully on their behalf" (T54). It is suggested that, when making an assessment of Khares, the evidence of approval by the faceless majority of Athenians be weighed against the diatribes of Isokrates, Aiskhines and Theopompos.

It is also quite clear that between 366 and 338 Khares did not serve foreign governments as a mercenary soldier for his own personal gain, rather he was an Athenian strategos accountable and obedient to, and in regular communication with his home government. Only after he could no longer serve Athens in this capacity did he take service as a foreign mercenary, and then he consistently chose to oppose the Macedonians. There is no evidence that he profited financially from his activities as a magistrate or as a mercenary. The sources unequivocally indicate that money and booty acquired on active service was used either to pay or to provision the soldiers, or to enhance
the city's public festivals. These are not the acts of a **condottiere**.

As a matter of fact, of the Athenian military leaders so classified, Khares least of all deserves that epithet. Iphikrates, Khabrias, Timotheos and even Phokion each took time out from their public careers to serve a foreign power as a mercenary general. This is not to make a paradoxical claim that Khares was a singular paragon of patriotism, since a careful survey of the actions of Athenian ex-strategoi serving as mercenaries reveals that in virtually every case great care was taken to insure that personal interests dovetailed with those of the city. As for Khares' mercenary service, it fits into a pattern of Athenian military leaders who fled Athens to continue the struggle against the Macedonians as foreign mercenaries, after their city could no longer do so officially.

The term **condottieri** and concepts associated with it are misapplied when used of the military magistrates of the Classical Greek city-states. It is inappropriate, misleading and detrimental to a sympathetic understanding of fourth-century history, and it should be deleted from the vocabulary of students of that period.

Khares' career spans the supposed periods of influence of Kallistratos, Aristophon, Euboulos and Demosthenes, yet there is no sign that it was affected, for better or worse, by the fluctuations in their political fortunes. The evidence for his friendships and hostilities with other politically prominent Athenians points to short-lived cooperation or opposition for the purpose of achieving specific, immediate political goals. His popularity was obviously not dependent on the influence of the aforementioned political leaders, and there are positive indications that he was regarded as a **demotikos** and cooperated with other leaders so characterized.

The negative contemporary judgements of Khares' impact on the foreign and domestic policy of Athens are very largely the result of personal animosity, political expediency and the conventional nature of ancient oratory. Quite
simply, Khares ran afoul of the most influential litterateur of his day, the rhetor Isokrates. There is even a test that can be applied to help make clear Isokrates' motivations.

Konon, the father of Isokrates' friend, Timotheos, clearly shared complicity in the democratic revolution on Rhodes in 395 B.C. He knew about it beforehand, promised support and gave at least passive aid in the form of his troops' daily parades (Hellenika Oxyrhynchia X). Those overthrown by the revolution were his friends and they had driven the Lakedaimonians out and had welcomed Konon to Rhodes. His complicity in the uprising is quite similar to Khares' on Kerkyra in 361 (T8), yet it clearly never became a controversial issue and was certainly not objectionable to Isokrates. On the other hand, Khares' involvement in the coup on Kerkyra does not seem to have become controversial until Isokrates launched his diatribes against him in the aftermath of the trial of Timotheos. Isokrates did not object to such an action when perpetrated by his friend's father, but bitterly complained to one complied with by his friend's enemy. Isokrates' denunciation of Khares became famous and was ready for the practical use to which Aiskhines shrewdly put it, and both orators became sensational source material for Theopompos.

The time of Athens' military decline had already begun before the Social War, as the failures of Iphikrates, Khabrias and Timotheos in the years before the war indicate. There were few victories left for Athens after 362 and most of them were Khares'. Yet, each of the other strategoi had a famous victory on which his reputation rested, regardless of his ultimate failure, and each had a tangible and lasting reminder of his triumph. This is the sort of glory Khares sought for his "Sister of Marathon", no doubt.

All this is not an attempt to elevate Khares into the ranks of the great Athenian generals 'but for luck'. His victories, however, at Phleious, in Asia Minor and at Sestos argue for a basic military competence. Very few soldiers fared well against Philip or his son, and few men fared well when an Isokrates
or a Theopompos raised his pen against them. Attacks on 'heroes' such as that against Thrasyboulos (Lysias 28 and cf. 16.15), or that against Timotheos (Dem. 49) should, perhaps, cause one to reflect that the reporter of a fight can do as much harm as the opponent.
A Brief Discussion on 'Proposers and Executors' of Athenian Decrees

In the course of the present study one type of evidence for determining the existence of political alliances has been consistently rejected: the assumption that the coincidence of a) the proposer of a decree (the rhetor) and b) the executor of the same decree (the magistrate) constitutes evidence for a political friendship between them. At this point some observations that have led me to disregard this sort of evidence will be offered. The subject of this study has been the Athenian strategos, Khares, and so the comments tendered here will be focused on the relationship between the rhetor of a decree and the strategos eventually assigned to execute the decree. The term rhetor is considered to include any citizen who publicly voiced his opinion at an official meeting of the ekklesia or boule, whether making a proposal himself or speaking in support of another's.

Properly, one ought to include ambassadors as executors of decrees, and their relationship with rhetores should also be examined. They comprise the other major category of Athenian diplomatic agents. There are several reasons, however, why this would not be practical in the present forum. The number of those eligible to be appointed ambassador on any given day was much larger than that of strategoi, and ambassadors could be nominated on the spur of the moment. Their area of responsibility was much more restricted. Ambassadors were assigned a specific goal to be negotiated with a specific entity. For example, the embassy to Macedon in 347/6 was authorized to negotiate with Philip on the subject of peace. A new embassy was authorized to negotiate the alliance which Philip offered. Thus, the ad hoc nature of the magistracy of ambassador renders it sufficiently different from that of strategoi that to include them in the discussion would lengthen and complicate it inordinately. Ambassadors, then, will be mentioned only in passing. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that
several of the same criteria that seem to have been used in selecting strategoi for individual tasks were also used in nominating ambassadors.

The larger question at issue here is: "Can the coincidence of rhetor as instigator of foreign policy and strategos as executor of that same policy be taken as evidence for their political cooperation?" The answer to this question will have an impact on the interpretation of the career of Khares, but it also has much wider implications for our understanding of Athenian politics and government. If the assumption — it has never been proven to be fact— about the coincidence is proven, it implies that cronyism and/or nepotism was a major criterion in the Athenian democracy's process of selecting the agents of its foreign policy.

It may not be possible to arrive at a definitive answer to the question posed above, but it will be suggested that several other criteria for assigning strategoi to particular tasks are indicated by the evidence, whereas instances of cronyism are quite rare. It should be clear from the outset that this discussion cannot be exhaustive; the problem deserves its own study. Ideally, one would collect as many known examples of decrees as possible and try to determine how many political relationships between the decree's rhetores and executors could be independently confirmed. A list of decrees (or sources from which they might be culled) has been compiled by M.H. Hansen, The Athenian Ecclesia (Copenhagen, 1983) 163-165 notes 6 and 15. A cursory survey of these sources and their decrees indicates that the number whose proposer and executor are known is quite small. Of that small number only a fraction involves men about whom enough is known to make a case for political friendship between executor and proposer, and most of those cases are highly circumstantial, tendentious or both, as will be made clear from the examples cited below.

On the other hand, a review of the careers of several fifth- and fourth-century strategoi reveals recurring patterns that strongly suggest a definite, albeit mundane, set of criteria in use for deciding which strategos to send to
a particular theater of operations, or a specific mission. Before discussing these patterns and the criteria they suggest, it will be worthwhile to illustrate the method in which evidence from 'coincidence' is employed. Following this will be a brief consideration of some evidence for how and when the assignment of strategoi was made, and, finally, the careers of three or four strategoi will be examined in order to elucidate the criteria which appear to have been employed in assigning those strategoi to their individual missions.

To illustrate the 'coincidence-method', three examples of its use have been chosen from the work of R. Sealey, *Essays in Greek Politics*. Sealey is singled out because his studies in fourth-century politics are influential and frequently cited as standard authorities on the subject (see chapter three 66 n. 20 above), and because he relies on the method repeatedly, apparently taking its validity for granted. This is not to despise his valuable contributions to our understanding of ancient Greek politics.

In "Callistratos of Aphidna and his Contemporaries" Sealey investigates the political allies of Timotheos: "Perhaps one of his friends can be named. Iphicrates had an enemy, Diocles of Pithos; there was little love lost between Iphicrates and Timotheos since 373; Diocles commanded the expedition to Euboea in 357, an expedition promoted by Timotheos" (*Essays* 148). Unfortunately for Sealey, the strategos on Euboia was Diokles Alopekethen, not Pittheus (T11 line 23). But, paradoxically, one could turn this method around to argue for a relationship between Khares and Timotheos. Khares commanded on Euboia in 357 (T10), and he had previously served with or under Timotheos between 377-373 (T25). As shall be seen below, this is inconceivable on Sealey's reconstruction of Athenian politics in the 360s and 350s.

In the same essay Sealey writes about the friends of Aristophon of Azenia: "...Autocles, who may well have been a friend of Aristophon. For in 362/1, when Aristophon carried a decree for sending a force to the Hellespont, the commander sent was Autocles; and Autocles and Aristophon were both prosecuted,
perhaps on the same occasion, by the same man, Hypereides" (Essays 147). In the essay entitled "Athens after the Social War" Sealey discusses the trials of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus, and their prosecutor, Aristophon: "In prosecuting the three generals he seems to have acted as the friend of Chares, and he had appeared as such in 362. For in that year an Athenian force under Leosthenes was defeated by Alexander of Pherai, so the Athenians executed Leosthenes and gave the command to Chares; some of the trierarchs serving under Leosthenes were also prosecuted, and the prosecutor was Aristophon, that is, he took part in activities which led to the advancement of Chares. There was, then, lasting friendship between Aristophon and Chares" (Essays 165).

Sealey seems to believe that Aristophon influenced the assignment of Autokles (in 362/1) and of Khares (in 362) to the command of Athenian fleets. It has already been argued in chapter three that there is no evidence for cooperation between Khares and Aristophon except during the trials of Timotheos and Iphikrates in the Social War, and it is noteworthy (as will be made clearer below) that Autokles had previously campaigned in Thessaly, probably in cooperation with Alexandros of Pherai (Diodoros 15.71.4: in 368, cf. Xen. 7.1.28).

Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine, as Sealey perhaps assumes, that once a rhetor won the people's approval for his proposal, he rode the crest of that approval by nominating a particular magistrate to carry out the proposal. Thus, for example, Thrasyboulos promoted an alliance with Boiotia in 395 (Xen. 3.5.16), and commanded troops sent to help Boiotia at Orkhomenos in 395/4 (Plu. Lysandros 29; Paus. 3.5.4) and again at Nemea in 394/3 (Lysias 16.15). Likewise, Philokrates proposed an embassy to Macedon in 347/6 and both he, himself, and his nominee, Demosthenes, were appointed ambassadors (Aiskh. 2.18). Perhaps it would be helpful to review some of the evidence for the assignment of magistrates.

In the case of ambassadors we have a rather detailed description of the procedure involved from Aiskhínes' speech On the False Embassy 2.17-18. There
we are told that Aristodemos reported to the\textit{ boule} that Philip was interested in discussing peace, that he repeated this report before the\textit{ ekklesia} and that Demosthenes proposed that he be crowned for this. Once these things were said, Philokrates moved a decree to choose ten ambassadors to talk to Philip about a peace. At the election of the ten Philokrates nominated Demosthenes, Nausikles nominated Aiskhines and Demosthenes (apparently) nominated Aristodemos. The decree authorizing the embassy and the selection of ambassadors seems to have taken place at the same meeting of the\textit{ ekklesia}, at least such a process is indicated by preserved decrees authorizing embassies: they frequently list the names of the ambassadors actually chosen (e.g., T15; \textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 43).

Inscriptional evidence for the selection of strategoi is not so helpful, since preserved decrees rarely name the strategos eventually assigned to a mission. An example is \textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 123. In it, Hegesippos "proposed that... a strategos be chosen from those elected, and the one chosen to look after Andros" (see chapter one n. 47), but the one chosen is not named. This is also the case in the decree proposed by Demotion in 366: "the strategoi should see to it that Korinth be made safe for the demos of the Athenians" (T5). The man who was selected in this instance was Khares, and he had campaigned in the Korinthiad only a few weeks or months earlier (T2, T3, T4). The same situation may apply to a reference in Aristophanes' \textit{Akarnians} (1073), in which it is stated that "the strategoi bid Lamakhos to leave at once and guard the pass." It seems that there were circumstances under which the strategoi as a board decided whom to assign to a specific mission. At any rate, there is at least one \textit{γράμμα στρατηγοῦ} preserved (\textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 27). It may be that, for example in the case of Khares, once a strategos was assigned to a theater of operations it remained his responsibility until relieved: Khares had been strategos at Phleious, and there were still Athenian troops at Korinth, so the mission of 'making Korinth safe for the demos of the Athenians' fell to him without debate by the\textit{ ekklēsia} or the board of strategoi. This may explain references to semi-regular postings such as \textit{τὸν}
There is evidence that some of the strategoi were voted into regular posts, perhaps at about the same time as the general elections of military magistrates each spring (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 44.4; 61.1 and cf. Rhodes, *CommAthPol* 678-9).

Aristotle, writing in the years after Khaironeia, described a system whereby five of the strategoi were voted into postings concerned with guarding and administering the navy and its installations or with guarding Attica or with commanding the citizen hoplites; the other five were left available for *ad hoc* assignments. At least one of these fixed postings in Attica existed as early as 352 (*IG* II² 204, lines 19-20). Thus, when the Megarians encroached on the sacred land in 350/49, Ephialtes was sent out against them in his role as *δεσπότης στρατηγός ἐπὶ τῆν χώραν* (Philokhoros *FGrHist* 328 F155), without any need for debate.

(But note that there were only two strategoi available in Athens in 368 to swear to an alliance: *IG* II² 104). Still, there is evidence that the *ekklesia* made decisions on the *ad hoc* assignments.

Xenophon implied that, in the fourth century, the people of Athens did make *ad hoc* assignments. He wrote that the Athenians "decreed to man sixty ships and they voted Timotheos as strategos of them" in 373 (6.2.11), and that "they voted to go to their aid (sc. the Lakedaimonians) in full force and they chose Iphikrates strategos" in 370/69 (6.5.49). This procedure is portrayed in more detail by Thucydides when he described the Athenian decision to invade Sicily in 415; the Athenians held an *ekklesia* and, having heard an embassy from Segesta and an Athenian one that had visited there, they voted to send sixty ships and appointed three men as strategoi *autokratores* (6.8). Since Thucydides mentioned that another *ekklesia* was held five days later to discuss details of the expedition, it is logical to conclude that the expedition was authorized and its commanders selected at the previous *ekklesia*. In none of the three examples cited above is the proposer of the expedition known, but it can be suggested that the men assigned to the command were reasonably good choices.
Iphikrates and Timotheos will come under discussion below, but for the present the example of the strategoi sent to Sicily will be instructive. Alkibiades was younger and somewhat less experienced than his colleagues, but was very enthusiastic about the project. He used his influence to add some 750 hoplites from Argos and Arkadia to the expedition, and this addition was considered significant (Thuc. 6.15, 29). Nikias was highly experienced, particularly in the skill of attacking fortified places (Thuc. 3.51, 91; 4.54, 129-131); he was reluctant, but he was also a personal enemy of Alkibiades (Thuc. 6.8-15). Lamakhos was an aggressive soldier (Plu. Alkibiades 18; Aristophanes Akarnians passim) and perhaps made a suitable mediator and watchdog over his colleagues. At any rate he was from a different economic class than they (Plu. Nikias 15), and they, after all, had cooperated in eliminating the radically democratic Hyperbolos a year or so earlier (Plu. Nikias 11, Alkibiades 13). The decision to send these three individuals was reasonably sound on military, diplomatic and political grounds, and there is no indication that powerful cronies or relatives engineered their appointment. In fact, one, Nikias, was reluctant to go.

If one turns to an examination of some individual careers of strategoi, patterns of service abroad begin to appear which suggest that the prime criteria for assigning strategoi to missions were the experience of the particular strategos, expediency and economics. The subjects of this investigation are Phormion and Timotheos, with Khabrias, Iphikrates and Khares considered more briefly.

Phormion had, at some point before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, campaigned in Akarnania (for complete sources see PA 14958). He helped the Akarnanians defeat Amphilokhian Argos and his success resulted in an alliance between Athens and the Akarnanians (Thuc. 2.68). So, in the winter of 430/29 he was the natural choice to send to Naupaktos and guard the entrance to the Gulf of Korinth (Thuc. 2.69). Undoubtedly, he was to cooperate with the Akarnanians (at least the enemy expected him to do this, and the Akarnanians were in contact with him: Thuc. 2.81-92). His command in the region was continued into
429/8, when he expelled some anti-Athenian elements from Akarnania and restored some pro-Athenians. He also contemplated an attack on Oiniadai before returning to Naupaktos and, in the spring, Athens (Thuc. 2.102-3). Presumably, he died shortly thereafter, since no more is heard of him. In the following summer, however, the Akarnanians bade the Athenians to send them as commander "some son or relative of Phormion"; this the Athenians did, sending Asopios, Phormion's son, who raised an army from all Akarnania and made an attack on Oiniadai (Thuc. 3.7). Clearly, Phormion gained a knowledge of the region and the confidence of its inhabitants such that he became the most qualified Athenian soldier to campaign in that area, and when he was dead his son was sent in his stead, undoubtedly for diplomatic reasons. The classic example of assigning a strategos on the basis of his knowledge and influence in a foreign region is that of the historian, Thucydides. He was posted to Thasos to guard Eion and Amphipolis. Even to the enemy, Brasidas, he was known as the man who possessed the right of working the gold-mines in that part of Thrace and who had great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland (Thuc. 4.104-5).

Timotheos, as a youth, probably accompanied his father in 395-4, as may be inferred from Pausianias 6.3.16, Lysias 19.36 (and cf. Aristophanes Ploutos 180). He was first elected strategos (so far as is known) in 378/7, the year in which the Second Athenian maritime alliance was organized (Diodoros 15.29.6). He, Khabrias and Kallistratos were made strategoi to prosecute the war against the Lakedaimonians, according to Diodoros. Khabrias was an experienced soldier, and Kallistratos was probably the architect of the new League, but Timotheos was relatively untried. Perhaps the reason why he appears so prominently in this year is connected with the inauguration of the League. Athens was advertising liberation from Spartan oppression and high-handedness, and what better 'advance man' to promote this than the son of Konon, victor of the battle of Knidos?

Timotheos' next mission was to Kerkyra, a place that had probably not been
affected by the battle of Knidos, yet Timotheos was still an excellent choice to represent Athens there, since his father had been stationed at Naupaktos from 413 until 410, and, in this last year, had intervened into a civil dispute on Kerkyra in favor of the democratic faction (Thuc. 7.31; Diodoros 13.48). In 375 Timotheos won over the island as well as the Akarnanians and Alketas, king of the Molossians (Xen. 5.4.64-66; Diodoros 15.36.5-6). Xenophon noted that Timotheos did not execute, exile or change the laws on Kerkyra, but he clearly aided the democratic faction on Zakynthos (Xen. 6.2.2-3; Diodoros 15.45.2-4), and by 374 a democratic government ruled Kerkyra, not without opposition from 'pro-Lakedaimonians' (Diodoros 15.46.1-47.1). It is reasonable to assume that his father had friends among the Akarnanians and Kerkyraians, particularly those of the democratic persuasion. It is also noteworthy that in 375 Timotheos was assigned to go to Kerkyra despite the fact that Khabrias, the victor of the battle of Naxos, was the man of the hour.

Thus, it is only natural that, when another expedition to Kerkyra was needed in 373, Timotheos was selected to command it, although the Athenians took the expedient of diverting Ktesikles from his mission on Zakynthos to Kerkyra (Xen. 6.2.10-26; Diodoros 15.46.3; 47.4-5). In the event, it was this force of Ktesikles which averted the Lakedaimonian threat from the island. Clearly, in 373 both Khabrias and Iphikrates were available (since they, along with Kallistratos, were sent to Kerkyra in place of Timotheos), but Ktesikles was diverted for reasons of expediency and Timotheos sent because of his experience there (Xen. 6.2.39).

When Timotheos finally won his way back into favor at Athens in 366, he was dispatched to aid the rebel Persian, Ariobarzanes, who was usurping the satrapy of his nephew, Artabazos (Dem. 15.9; Nepos Timotheus 1.3). Of course, Timotheos' father had worked hand in hand with Pharnabazos some thirty years earlier, and Pharnabazos was the brother and father, respectively, of the two disputants (Xen. 4.3.11; 4.7.1-3, 6-10). Timotheos had accompanied his father
on that campaign, and it is reasonable to expect that his family had ties of xenia with the relatives of Pharnabazos. Timotheos could be expected to win a favorable hearing from either disputant (he had served the king of Persia in 372: Dem. 49.25, 28, 60), something which neither Iphikrates nor Khabrias could be expected to do, since both had been denounced by Pharnabazos (Diodoros 15.29.1-4; 15.41-43). In the event, Timotheos turned his efforts to ridding of its pro-Persian tyrant Samos, a place where a statue of himself and Konon already stood (see chapter four n. 89).

The careers of Phormion and Timotheos demonstrate what was undoubtedly an important criterion in deciding which of the ten strategoi to choose for any given mission. Their experience of the theater of operations, both topographical and human, would be a valuable asset in any undertaking. This principle probably also applies in the matter of the precise goals of any given mission, as well as the tools with which those goals were to be achieved. In other words, the more experience a man had with peltasts, say, or mercenaries, the more likely he was to be chosen to command in a situation in which these types of troops were to be employed. Even Kleon perceived this during the Peloponnesian War, when he requested Demosthenes (knowledgeable in the use of peltasts, and already acquainted with the geography and military situation on Pylos, and enthusiastic for a decisive victory there) as his colleague in 425 (Thuc. 4.29). This may even explain why it is so little is heard about Phokion before 349. He commanded Athenian hoplites; only in ca. 343 on Kypros did he command mercenaries.

Much the same pattern emerges if one looks into the careers of Iphikrates, Khabrias or Khares (for full sources see PA 7737, 15086, 15292, respectively). The two former commanded mercenary peltasts at Korinth during the Korinthian War, and both were sent back to Korinth some twenty years later. Iphikrates had experience and personal connections in Thrace: he was sent there ca. 368. Khabrias fought several campaigns in Central Greece alongside the Boiotians:
who better (unless Kallistratos, who was also sent) to negotiate or fight, if necessary, with the Thebans over Oropos in 366?

Other important criteria in the decision-making process have been touched on already: expediency and economy. Ktesikles was diverted from Zakynthos to Kerkyra in 373, and he reached the island much quicker that did the fleet from Athens. Khares and Kharidemos were diverted from their missions in Thrace (probably) and the Hellespont to Olynthos in 349 and 348 (T41). It must have been far quicker and economical to divert forces that were already mobilized and in operation, than to go through the process of assigning new trierarchs, outfitting triremes, mobilizing crews and calling up or hiring soldiers. One even suspects that the Athenians wanted to obtain the maximum cost effectiveness for their mercenaries, who, after all were being paid (theoretically, at any rate). Thus, in 357 Khares' force of mercenaries was shipped off to the Khersonesos immediately upon their departure from Euboia (T10).

In conclusion, there is precious little evidence that the Athenians selected their strategoi for missions abroad on the basis of political alignment with the instigators of policy. Much of what evidence there is for this involves special pleading and circular argument. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that the democracy made a great effort to choose men whose ability and experience would prove advantageous to their undertakings, and that alacrity of response in an economical fashion was given more consideration than cronyism.
ABBREVIATIONS

The names of ancient authors are abbreviated in references and notes according to H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (9th ed. by Sir H.S. Jones, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940) xvi-xxxviii, except that here they are transliterated, and some are given in a longer, or even full form. E.g., Dem. = Demosthenes (for the Lexicon's D.); Xen. = Xenophon (for the Lexicon's X.); Polyainos (for the Lexicon's Polyaeon.). Diodoros is always Diodoros of Sicily, Dionysios is always Dionysios of Halikarnassos. References simply to Xen. or Xenophon are to the Hellenika.


Below is a list of abbreviations for frequently cited books. Those not cited by page number, but rather by item number are marked with an asterisk (*). In the event that item number and page number are referred to, the abbreviation "p." for page is used. Sundwall, NPA is cited sub nomine.

Beloch, GG^2
K.J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte^2
(Berlin 1922)

Bengtson, SV*
H. Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, vols. 2 (Munich 1962)

Berve, Alexanderreich*
H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich auf Prosopographische Grundlage, (Munich 1926)

Buckler, Hegemony

Bury-Meiggs, HG^4

CAH
The Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge 1923-9)

Cargill, League

Cassianus, de Charetis
H. Cassianus, de Charetis Atheniensis rebus gestis ac moribus (Marburg 1849)

Connor, New Politicians

Connor, Theopompus
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>E. Delebecque</td>
<td>Essai sur la Vie de Xenophon</td>
<td>(Paris 1957)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.M. Edmonds</td>
<td>The Fragments of Attic Comedy</td>
<td>(Leiden 1957-61)</td>
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<td>F. Jacoby</td>
<td>Die Fragmenten der griechischen Historiker</td>
<td>(Leiden 1923-)</td>
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<td>C. and T. Müller</td>
<td>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum (Paris 1841-70)</td>
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<td>C. Müller</td>
<td>Geographi Graeci Minores (Paris 1855-61)</td>
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<td>M.H. Hansen</td>
<td>Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C.</td>
<td>(Odense 1975)</td>
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<td>P. Harding</td>
<td>From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus</td>
<td>(Cambridge 1985)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Hignett</td>
<td>A History of the Athenian Constitution to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.</td>
<td>(Oxford 1952)</td>
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<td>S. Hornblower</td>
<td>Mausolus</td>
<td>(Oxford 1982)</td>
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<td>J. Kirchner</td>
<td>Prosopographia Attica</td>
<td>(Berlin 1902)</td>
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<tr>
<td>H.W. Parke</td>
<td>Greek Mercenary Soldiers</td>
<td>(Oxford 1933)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Wissowa, W. Kroll and others</td>
<td>Paulys Realencyclopaedie de Classischen Altertums-wissenschaft (Stuttgart 1893-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>W.K. Pritchett</td>
<td>The Greek State at War: Part II</td>
<td>(Berkeley 1974)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.T. Roberts</td>
<td>Accountability in Athenian Government</td>
<td>(Madison 1982)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schaefer, Demosthenes</td>
<td>A. Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1885-7)</td>
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<td>Sealey, Essays</td>
<td>R. Sealey, Essays in Greek Politics (New York 1966)</td>
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<td>SEG*</td>
<td>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sundwall, NPA*</td>
<td>J. Sundwall, Nächtrage zur Prosopographia Attica (Helsinki 1910)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tod, GHI*</td>
<td>M.N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, vol. 2 (Oxford 1948)</td>
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Notes to Chapter One:

1 The patronym and demotic preserved in the literary sources (T20 and T1: in the latter the patronym is slightly corrupted) are confirmed by inscriptional evidence, T44 and T51.

2 Unless otherwise stated, all dates are B.C. Khares' birthdate depends on the generally held assumption that, like membership in the boule and the dikasteria, the strategia had a minimum age requirement of 30 years. See Hignett, Constitution 224, but, for a tradition that Iphikrates was strategos at the age of 20, see Justin 6.5.2 and Orosios 3.1.21, and cf. Pritchett, War 63 n.17, Parke, GMS 15, and Davies, APF 249. Khares was first strategos (so far as we know) in 366 (T2, T3, T4, T5 and ? T6). He was still actively campaigning some forty years later (T85). If one accepts the assumption about an age requirement, then his birthdate cannot be later than ca. 396, and due to the length of his career one would hesitate to push the birthdate much farther back than ca. 400. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind examples such as Phokion and Agesilaos, both of whom held office and actively served in the field while in their eighties (Plu. Phokion 24.5; Agesilaos 36.2).

3 IG II² 5230 attests a family from Angele with members named Epikhares and (his son?) Ergokhares. The simple name ΧΑΡΗΣ, ΧΑΡΗΣΟΣ and compounds in -ΧΑΡΗΣ, -ΧΑΡΟΥΣ are both common and well distributed in many demes of Attika. From the indices in PA and SEG 1-29 alone, one can find the following frequency and distribution of these names:

a) Khares 24, from 12 demes, where only 15 demotics are known
b) Epikhares 45, from 24 demes, where only 24 demotics are known
c) Ergokhares 11, from 7 demes, where only 8 demotics are known
d) Theokhares 6, from 5 demes, where only 5 demotics are known

Statistically, the (-)ΧΑΡΗΣ element is more frequent in Angele that in other demes (6 of 72 = 8%), but the data is too scanty to make such a statistic significant.
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The name Theokhares is relatively rare, and in Prasiai, a deme neighboring Angele, there was a certain Theokhares, son of Ergokhares (PA 7185) of the mid-fourth century, but there are insufficient grounds for connecting the famous strategos or his father with any of their demesmen or homonyms.

4 First suggested by U. Koehler, "Der Strateg Chares," MDAI (A) 2 (1877) 188-9 and subsequently endorsed by Kirchner, PA 15292; Berve, Alexanderreich 819; and Davies, APF 569, who calls the suggestion "highly probable".

5 That is, no magistracy at Athens conferred instant and everlasting nobilitas on its holder and his family as in Republican Rome. See Matthias Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, trans. Robin Seager (Oxford, 1969), 52-3. One assumes that, when the term novus homo is used by a modern author about a Greek of the classical period, something like "a family's first member to become prominent in the city's affairs" is meant rather than "nouveau riche". Culturally and politically, fifth- and fourth-century Athens was quite different from Republican Rome. Moreover, the prosopographical data for the former is not such as to insure the validity of the conclusion reached by the authors cited in the previous note. The term is exceedingly misleading and ought not to be used in the context of classical Greece. Davies, APF uses the term at least twice more: 440, where he so labels Apollodoros Akharneus (son of the former slave, Pasion), and 107, where it is used of Himeraios and Demetrios of Phaleron!

6 T44 and T51, respectively. Khoregoi for the Dionysia and Thargelia were appointed by the tribe (Arist. Ath. Pol. 56.2-3). Among other victors at the Thargelia (IG II² 3063-72; SEG 27.12-19; 29.47) and other Pandionid khoregoi (IG II² 1138) Khares was in distinguished company.

7 Dein. 1.71; Arist. Ath. Pol. 4.2; Politics 1282a 25-32 and cf. Aiskh. 1.27; FAC Eupolis F118 and Theophrastos' remarks in a fragment published by
Notes to Chapter One:

8 See Hignett, Constitution 224 n.10 for some dissenters and cf. the discussion in Rhodes, CommAthPol 510-11.

9 For his poverty at birth see Arist. Rhet. 1367b 18; Plu. Mor. 186F, 187b and Souda I 772. For his wealth at death see Dem. 21.62. But note that Iphikrates had married a Thracian princess: sources and discussion in Davies, APF 249.

10 T26, T36. Clearly, in both cases the money was given in order to maintain troops and it was so spent. Pritchett, War 132, is unjustified in saying "fortunes such as those of Konon, Chabrias, Chares, and others could have been made legitimately in foreign service."


12 For a history of the date-controversy and a strong case for the date of 366/5 see J.K. Davies, "The Date of IG II² 1609," Historia 18 (1969) 309-33 and cf. the short rebuttal by George L. Cawkwell, "The Date of IG II² 1609 Again," Historia 22 (1973) 759-61. One element of Cawkwell's rebuttal rests on the assumption that a man could not be both trierarch and strategos at the same time, but Khares almost certainly was ca. 348 (T44), as was Nausikles Oethen at some time before 334/3 (IG II² 1623.326-33 and cf. 1628. 100-8).

13 The kleroukhia-expedition trierarchs (lines 88-111) comprise an astonishing array of Athenians politically prominent in the second quarter of
Notes to Chapter One:

the fourth century. They include: Apollodoros Akharneus, Timokrates (?), Krioëus, Demomeles Paianieus, Phanostratos Kephisieus, Deinias Erkhieus, Khabrias Aixoneus, Kallippos Aixoneus, Timotheos Anaphystios, Kallistratos; Aphidnaios, Kephalion Aphidnaios and others. For prosopographical references to these men see the Index Prosopographica.

14 See Kirchner's comments in the notes to IG II² 1609. Among other things, beginning at line 111 the letters are more closely crowded together.

15 On the naval archive series of inscriptions the feminine, genitive of the relative pronoun (i.e., referring to a ship) is invariably governed by a form or compound of the verb ἀρχεω, e.g., IG II² 1607.4,10,12 etc. Cf. the related formula τὰ της σκευη ξει on IG II² 1604.13,15; 1613.201; 1621.111 etc. For the meaning of the perfect tense see IG II² 1611.1-18, which illustrates lucidly that ships thus described became the responsibility of the succeeding board of epimeletai, even though the ships were not present at Athens.

16 See IG II² 1613.100-1, where the mason probably realized, after cutting the first three letters of the trierarch's name, that the word trierarkhos should precede the man's name. Cf. line 201. Note also the care with which the names of the sons of Mantias Thorikios are listed on IG II² 1622 lines 442-3, despite the fact that two of them are the same (i.e., Mantitheos, for whom see Dem. 39 and 40, and see Davies, APF 364-8). It was impossible to tell which was which from the stone, but the list nevertheless makes it quite clear that both men who laid claim to this name were equally liable.

17 See note 14 above. The stoichedon pattern ends halfway through line 111 and just after the kleroukhia-expedition entry. There may even have been a change of mason at this point, since the epsilon after the vacat which separates entries in line 111 tends to have a central horizontal somewhat shorter
Notes to Chapter One:

than the top and bottom horizontals. The ends of the hastae also have slightly more pronounced wedges.

If Davies' date (see n. 12) is accepted, Khares will have been strategos when he took out the trireme. Nevertheless, if he was responsible for the ship, then his demotic should be present. Persons not identified by demotic on the naval archives are invariably mentioned merely as a means of identifying something else. Archons are named to provide a date, shipwrights to distinguish ships with identical names, strategoi to distinguish different squadrons in service and so forth. The only other explanation for a missing demotic is when the man has recently been mentioned on the document, such as Khabrias, whose demotic is given at line 95 of the present document, but not at line 116, where the equipment in question was captured by (the strategos) Khabrias. Enough of the previous thirty lines are preserved sufficiently to insure that Khares was not mentioned there. It can only be concluded that the missing demotic is a slip of either the grammateus of the epimeletai, or of the mason.

18 Khares Eleusinios: PA 15298 and APF 569. Khares Aixoneus: PA 15294 and APF 569. Kh. Aix. is first mentioned on IG II² 1622.751, which is an archive of 342/1, but contains debts from perhaps a decade earlier. Davies, APF 149 misidentifies Kh. Aix. (from IG II² 276.9) as Khares the strategos.

19 That is, strategos, if one accepts the date 366/5 (see n. 12) and taxiarkhos, if non post a. 370/69. See the discussion infra for Khares as a taxiarkhos between 377-373 (T25). Menon, a trierarch who lacks a demotic on IG II² 1613.101 is the name of a strategos (M. Potamios, PA 10085) as well as a trierarch (M. Akharneus, PA 10076; APF 482-3).

20 See the note T70 in the Appendix Testimoniorum for the many sources that preserve the epigram. Except for textual variants on the epigram itself,
Notes to Chapter One:

none of them adds anything to Hesykhios' account.

21 εὐνήτηρο, εὐνήταλρα, εὐνήτης, their variants and compounds are common, e.g., in Attic tragedy. εὐνήτης, the feminine of εὐνήτης, is also found in Apollonios Rhodios Argonautika 4.96 and Hippokrates Epidemiai 7.42. εὐνήτης is, perhaps, better suited to elegiac meter: in the Boidion epigram it is twice dactylic.

22 Kyros took two of them along with him on his march to Babylon (Xen. Anab. 1.10.2-3) and it is clear that a very large number of women accompanied his Greek army (Anab. 4.3.19; 5.4.33; 6.1.13 and cf. 6.1.12 for one who was a professional dancer). Alexander, too, took along a famous hetaira on his anabasis (Kleitarkhos FGrHist 137 F11; Plu. Alexander 38; Diodoros 17.72; Curtius Rufus 5.7.3 and cf. Berve, Alexanderreich 359). Her name was Thais.

Konon and some of his associates even married during their self-imposed exile on Kypros (Lysias 19.36).

23 Athenaios' Deipnosophistai, Book 13, is filled with 'couples' of illustrious Greek statesmen and their professional, female companions. Among them are many fourth-century Athenians. As a rhetorical topos see, e.g., Lykourgos 1.17; Aiskh. 1.42; Dem. 58.21 and cf. 33, where Khabrias had hired Neaira for a party. Theopompos raised the topos into a sort of yardstick of statesmanly morality. Theopompos FGrHist 115 F49, 114, 236, 248, are but a few examples.

24 Boidion is somewhat suggestive as a name. For hetaira-names see Pauly-Wissowa, RE s.v. hetaira 1362 and ff. Nonetheless, Boidion is known as a proper Athenian woman's name (IG II² 5534 and cf. Davies, APF 569, PA 2896, 2895a, 2895b and 2895c).

The tale Hesykhios tells is very reminiscent of the commemoration of the hetaira, Pythonike, by Harpalos as told by Plutarch, Phokian 22. One wonders
Notes to Chapter One:

if the tradition of Boidion is in any way connected with the variant reading at Dem. 3.31, where some MSS had 'Boidion' for 'Boedromia'. See T30 for the text and scholion.

25 See note 39 below.

26 Xen. Mem. 3.4.1 and 3.1.5, imply that experience in one of the junior offices was considered a normal prerequisite to becoming strategos. Arist. Politics 1277b 11 strongly recommends experience in junior offices. Hyper. 2.17 (For Lykophrion) and Ar. Birds 799 imply the same thing about the phylarkhos-hipparkhos succession. For other 'ideal' qualifications see Arist. Politics 1309a 27-32 and Theophrastos (see n. 7) line 172-183.

27 For the duties of these officials see Arist. AthPol. 61.3. λοχοί are infrequently mentioned in the context of the Athenian army. Xen. 1.2.3, mentions them in Thrasyllos' army in 409 and the speaker of Isaios 9.14 is proud that his father was a λοχειός.

Lysias 16.15-16 indicates both a tribal organization of the Athenian army (and cf. Xen. 4.2.19-21) in 394 and the connection of the taxiarkhos to the tribal taxis. The taxiarkhoi were combat officers (Xen. 1.6.29,35; 1.7.30; Th. 4.4.; 7.60; Athenian Agora XVII 23.111-14), were strongly associated with the strategoi in function (IG II² 334.13; 112.38-9; Dem. 54.5) and were magistrates to be reckoned with (Lysias 13.7,13; Th. 4.4; 7.60 and cf. Arist. AthPol. 30.2 and Aishk. 2.169). On taxiarkhoi, in general, see Rhodes, CommAthPol 684-5.

28 T20, T21 and cf. T45, where Khares is derided in a wrestling metaphor. See further chapter three for a discussion of the encounter between Khares, Timotheos and Iphikrates.

29 T2, T10, T26, T27, T28, T30.

30 T26, T27, T28.

31 T7, T8. For the episode concerning Aigina (T9) see infra and n. 67.
Notes to Chapter One:

32 Timotheos first appears in the sources as a strategos in 377 (Diodoros 15.29.6). He was deposed from office in disgrace early in 373/2 (Xen. 6.2.13; Dem. 49.9 and f.), and was apparently not strategos again until 366/5 (Dem. 15.9; Nepos Timotheos 1.3; Polyainos 3.10.9; Isokrates 15.111 f. [Antidosis]), despite Diodoros 15. 47.3-7. Khares, then, will have served under Timotheos between 377-373, the time when (see n. 2) he was just becoming old enough to serve abroad.

33 Plu. Phokion 6.

34 See the discussion of the possible relationship between Khares and Timotheos in chapter three. Plutarch asserts that Phokion (see previous note) was a 'disciple' of Khabrias. Such martial tutelage (that is, the pairing of older with younger strategoi, or potential strategoi) is recommended by Theophrastos (see n. 7 above, lines 105-140). Perhaps Khares was a 'disciple' of Timotheos, but one cannot be certain that Isokrates is not trying to insinuate that Timotheos stood in the same relationship to Khares, as Iphikrates did to Kharidemos (at least according to the speaker of Dem. 23).

35 The Julian chronology (i.e., summer of 366 B.C.) is not in dispute; however, there is a discrepancy about the archon-year. Diodoros 15.75-76.1 narrates the actions around Phleious under the year 367/6, but the Oropos-affair under 366/5. A scholion to Aiskh. 3.85 explicitly gives 367/6 for the date of Oropos. Moreover, it is quite clear from Xen. (T4) that the two events were separated by only a few days. For attempts to sort this out see J. Roy, "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs, 370-362 B.C.," Historia 20 (1971) 569-99 and Buckler, Hegemony 249-52. Buckler argues for a date of ca. June 366 for Phleious (but remains uncertain about the archon-year) and agrees with Roy (593) that Khares' voyage to Korinth cannot have taken
Notes to Chapter One:

place before Autumn, 366.

It is assumed that strategoi, like other magistrates, held office concur-
rently with the official archon-year, and attempts to discredit this as-
sumption have not been convincing. See Hignett, Constitution 347-8 and
W.K. Pritchett, "The Term of Office of Attic Strategoi," AJPh 61 (1940)
469-474. Khares, therefore, was strategos in 366/5, and possibly also in
367/6, rather than simply in 367/6 as is almost universally stated in
prosopographical works (see Index). If Khares was also strategos in 367/6
and the chronology of Roy and Buckler is accepted, one might be in a better
position to assess Xenophon's (7.1.41) criticism of Timomakhos' performance
during the (third) Boiotian invasion. One might then be able to say
whether Khares replaced, or simply succeeded him.

36 I.e., the war of 371-365; it is so-called by Diodoros 15.76.3. Cf.
15.25.1 for the "Boiotian War", = 378/7-371.

of the Phleiasians (Xen. 7.2.1-23) is ringed by a digression on Euphron of
Sikyon (7.1.44-46 and 7.3.1-12).

38 In the summer of 369 Trikaranon had been in Phleiasian control (Xen.
7.2.5), but within a year or two it was in the hands of the Argives (Xen.
7.2.11).

39 Athenian forces in the Peloponnesos had been led by these men in the
previous years: Iphikrates (Xen. 6.5.49; Diodoros 15.63.2); Khabrias (Xen.
7.1.25; Diodoros 15.68.1-2; 69.1-4); Timomakhos Akharneus (Xen. 7.1.41),
a ηηιεστής of Kallistratos of Aphidna (Dem. 50.48). These men were all assoc-
iated, at one time or another, with Kallistratos, the influential rhetor. For
Notes to Chapter One:

him and them, see Sealey, Essays 140-8. In the following years Lysistratos (Xen. Poroi 3.7 and cf. Hellenika 7.4.6,29) and Hegesileos (Xen. Poroi 3.7; Ephoros FGrHist 70 F85 and Diodoros 15.84.2, who calls him Hegelokhos), commanded in the Peloponnesos. The latter may have been a relative of another rhetor influential in the 350s and 340s, Euboulos Probalisios (Dem. 19.290 and cf. PA 6339).

40 Aiskh. 2.168 and cf. Ephoros FGrHist 70 F82, but see W.E. Thompson, "Chares in Phlius," Philologus 27 (1983) 303-305. For a discussion of Xenophon's attitude toward Khares, see chapter five.

41 Diodoros 15.76.1 and cf. following note.

42 Dem. 21.64 and scholion ad loc. (= Dindorf Vol. 9, p. 566-7 [534,18]); Plu. Demosthenes 5.1-4 and cf. Mor. 844B; Arist. Rhet. 1364a 19-23 and 1411b 6-7; Diogenes Laertios 3.24; Hermippos FHG (Mueller) III.49-51 F61. Cf. also FAC Antiphanes F300 and Agatharkides FGrHist 86 F8.

For modern discussions see Buckler, Hegemony 313 n. 19 and, above all, Hansen Eisangelia 92-3 (catalogue numbers 83 and 84).

43 See previous note. The prosecutors are known: they were Leodamas Akharneus, Philostratos Kolonethen and perhaps also Hegesippos Sounieus (i.e., 'Krobylos'). No ancient source associates Khares with either the prosecution, prosecutors, defence or defenders in this trial, only modern scholars have done so, e.g., Sealey, Essays 150 and Roberts, Accountability 72, 77-8, and cf. 165 for a theory that Khares "understood how to use the machinery of impeachment to advance his own long career." On this topic more in chapter three.

44 Xen. 7.4.2-3

45 See n. 35 above.

46 E.g., Cargill, League 174-5, tries to dislocate Khares' involvement in a coup on Kerkyra, T7 and T8, which is traditionally dated 361, to the period before Khares was first strategos, "If the revelation of his complicity
in the coup occurred just after his appearance at Korinth, such a develop­ment might tend to explain why he then disappears from the sources for almost a decade" (175). See infra for a fuller counter argument to Cargill's theory, but for now suffice it to say that, to imagine the Korinthians could learn of a decision made a few days previously in the Athenian assembly even before Athenian garrison troops learned of it, on the one hand, but that, on the other hand, Khares' complicity in a coup against the democratic govern­ment of an allied state two years prior could have been covered up until just now, is simply ludicrous. One might compare Diodoros 15.46.2-3, wherein a Lakedaimonian force is sent to Kerkyra representing itself as on its way to Syracuse but actually plotting to aid pro-Lakonians within the city: the Kerkyraians discovered the plot beforehand. See also the article of D.J. Mosley cited in n. 49 below.

47 IG II² 123 (= Tod, GHI 156; Dittenberger, Syll.³ 192 and translated in Harding, Ipsus 69) is a decree passed by the ekklesia in 357/6. Lines 7-15 may be translated as follows: "Hegesandros proposed: in order that Andros be safe for the demos of the Athenians and for the demos of the Andrians, and that the garrison might have their pay from the syntaxeis according to the resolutions of the allies and so that there may not be a dissolution of the guard, a strategos shall be chosen from those who have been elected, and the one chosen shall be in charge of Andros." Actual text: 

["Ηγή"σανδριοις εἶπεν. ὅπως δὲν Ἀνδροι
[ἐν] ἑνὶ οἶκαλ τῶι δικήμωι τῶι Ἀθηναῖων κα
ἑπὶ τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀνδριων καὶ ἑπὶ Ἐλλοι

[ν] ἐν ἑνὶ φορούμενοι σα ἐν Ἀλποριοὶ μεσιθεὶς


ν ἐν τῶι συντάξεωι καὶ τίς τὰ ἅγια μαί


[τ] ἐπὶ τῶι συμμάχων καὶ μὴ καταλήγητι

ἀν ὥ συλακη, ἐλέσθαι στρατιτιτικῶν ἔν


καὶ τῶι κεχειροστοιμένωι, ἐπὶ δὲ αἱ


[τ] ἐπὶ τῇ ἐξεσεθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Ἀνδροὺ.]
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Cargill, *League* 155-160, discusses this and related decrees such as IG II² 404, which contains similar formulae concerning Keos. Keos and Andros were Athenian allies, of course (IG II² 43.16 Face A and 23-6 Face B). Korinth, however, was an ally only by virtue of belonging to the Peloponnesian League.

Xenophon represents Khares as having to invent a story about a plot against Korinth in order to save face. But, as a matter of fact, there were a number of Korinthians in exile in Argos, who had fled after the Korinthian War (Xen. 5.1.34), and it was perhaps these people who attempted to restore themselves in 375/4, when they came from Argos (Diodoros 15.40.3). They failed, and further executions and exiles took place. Some prefer to associate this civil disturbance and others in the Peloponnesos (also mentioned by Diodoros) with an upheaval at Argos known as the skytalismos and dated by Diodoros 15.57-58 to 370/69, for which cf. Xen. 6.5.16 where the Argives are unable to aid the Arkadians "in full force". One advocate for the later date of these disturbances is Bury-Meiggs, HG 369-70. Furthermore, after Khares and the Athenians departed in 366, the Korinthians did indeed hire mercenaries to replace the Athenians and began to negotiate a separate peace with the Boiotians and their allies (Xen. 7.4.6-11). A distinguished citizen of Korinth, Timophanes, was put in charge of the mercenaries and used them to establish a tyranny (Diodoros 16.65.3; Plu. Timoleon 4). Diodoros explicitly says that Timophanes was aided by τοὺς ἀνδροὺς and τοὺς πονηροτάτους. It is evident that there was civil discord in Korinth in 366-5 and Timophanes may not have been the only one to have perceived it.

As Cargill, *League* (see my notes 46 and 59) has. It was not Khares' reputation that put the Korinthians on guard. Reports on the Athenian ekklesia's deliberations were probably not hard to come by. See D.J. Mosley, "Diplomacy in Classical Greece," *Ancient Society* 3 (1972) 1-16 esp. 5-7.
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Moreover, the Korinthians were mindful of their own history. During the Korinthian War their allies, the Argives and Iphikrates had competed with one another to gain control of Korinth (Xen. 4.8.34; Diodoros 14.92.1-2). In the event, the Argives were successful, and so long as they maintained their influence at Korinth, they fared well during the war (Xen. 5.1.34). Note that Iphikrates was relieved of his post at Korinth on that occasion (partly because he had executed some 'argolizing Korinthians'), but he was not deposed from office. Shortly thereafter he was given another important command in the Hellespont (Xen. 4.8.34).

50 See, e.g. Cargill, *League* 175. Khares does indeed disappear from sight for some five years, unless Davies' arguments for redating IG II² 1609 (n. 12 above) are accepted. Davies seems to believe that the inscription gives evidence that Khares was strategos in 365 (see APF 397). It is fair to point out that our main narrative sources, Xenophon and Diodoros, focus on Boiotian affairs and the Arkado-Eleian War for the next several years. Timotheos' campaigns on Samos, the Hellespont and Thrace are recounted by Diodoros in a single sentence, 15.81.6, while Iphikrates' campaign in the Khalkidike is not mentioned by either historian.

H. Cassianus, *de Charetis* 3, supposes that Khares took part in the naval effort against Epameinondas in 364/3 and even goes so far as to tentatively conjecture (n. 6) that Χάρης should be read for Λάχης at Diodoros 15.79.1. This is not so far-fetched as it seems, since the names are similar and such a mistake has been made before, and more than once. The scholia to Aristophanes' *Wasps* 909, 924 and 962 all read Χάρητα where it is perfectly clear that Λάχητα is meant (cf. Th. 3.86, 90, 103, 115; 4.118; 5.19, 24, 43, 74 etc.). A scholiast to *Knights* 834, clearly thinking of Pakhes (cf. Th. 3.18, 28-50), writes Χάρης four different times. Thus, it is conceivable that, either by a slip of the
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pen or a mental lapse, the names Lakhes and Khares (and Pakhes) might be confused. Notwithstanding, there are two reasons for rejecting Cassianus' emendation.

First, as the scholiasts' mistakes make clear, Khares was more famous in later antiquity than even the famous Lakhes. Therefore, it is more difficult to understand a slip from Khares to Lakhes than one from Lakhes to Khares. Lakhes is a nomen difficilius, so to speak. Moreover, Diodoros has just written Khares a few pages earlier and will do so again in a few more pages (15.75.93; 16.7.21 etc.). The way that Diodoros confused Thrasyboulos and Thrasyllos in Book 13, e.g., 64.1,4; 74.1; 97.6; 98.3, one would expect the obscure Lakhes to be displaced by Khares. In fact, Diodoros did almost that at 13.50.7; 51.2, where he substituted Χάρητα for Χαλρέαν, and Χάρητος for Χαλρέον, for the proper form of whose name cf. 13.49.6 and Th. 8.74.1; 86.3.

Second, there was a military man named Lakhes active in the first half of the fourth century; he was taxiarkhos at the battle of Koroneia in 394 (Lysias 3.45). It is not known if Lakhes, the strategos of 364/3, and Lakhes the taxiarkhos of 394 are related, but it is worth noting that the fifth-century Lakhes was from Aixone and that there was a fourth-century Lakhes from Aixone (Dem. 24.126-7) whose son, Melanopos, was strategos ca. 355 (IG II² 150), and whose grandson Lakhes was a man of some political stature near the end of the fourth century. For the taxiarkhos see PA 9012; the fourth-century strategos PA 9018; the father of Melanopos PA 9017; the son of Melanopos PA 9020; and the fifth-century strategos PA 9019. In view of these facts Cassianus' emendation appears too adventurous.

51 For the career of Alexandros see Diodoros 15.61.2-5 and Xen. 6.5.35 (369 B.C.); 15.71.3-6 and cf. 7.1.28 (368 B.C.); 15.80.1-6 (364 B.C.);
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15.85.2-8 and 7.5.4,16,24-5 (362 B.C.), and for a more continuous source see Plu. Pelopidas 26-35. In the battle of Mantinea Athenian cavalry fought against Thessalian light-armed troops on the (Peloponnesians') left wing. For modern discussions of the career of Alexandros see W.D. Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. (Groningen, 1969) 126-59 and Marta Sordi, La lega tessaia fino ad Alessandro Magno (Roma, 1958) 193-234.

The battle of Mantinea took place in about June 362, or almost at the end of 363/2 according to Plu. Mor. 350A, 845E and Diodoros 15.82. In September of 362, or late in Metageitnion 362/1 word had reached Athens of Alexandros' raid on Tenos (Dem. 50.4). The speaker of Dem. 50 mentions a number of crises in the Hellespont-Bosporos area as well, and indicates that a single force commanded by Autokles was sent out to deal with the several crises and that Autokles was replaced eight months later by Menon (Dem. 50.4-12). Whether Leosthenes was detached from this force or commanded an entirely independent one is not clear. Diodoros (T7) indicates that Leosthenes was "left behind", στρατηγοὶ Λεωσθένην ἀπολίποντος, and Polyainos 6.2.1 represents Leosthenes as sending for reinforcements before he was defeated. It is noteworthy that the speaker of Dem. 50, who was on active service in Thrace and the Hellespont from ca. September 362 until ca. November 361 does not allude to the battle.

Polyainos 6.2.1 mentions a consequence of the defeat: Alexandros raided the Peiraieus. Leosthenes did not, however, actually suffer the death penalty. Rather, he declined to stand trial and sought refuge in Macedonia (Hyper. 3.1-2, Aiskh. 2.21 and scholion ad loc.).

For Diodoros, αἵ κυκλάδες νῆσον include what are now known as the northern Sporades (15.30.5).

For more on Aineias' method see chapter five. Aineias uses the words:
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φρουρά (11.13,14; 12.3 bis), φροδραρχος (22.20), φροδρομον (3.3.), and φρουρδς (5.2; 12.3) almost exclusively of foreign troops in garrison. See D. Barends, Lexicon Aeneium (Assen, 1955) and cf. Liddell, Scott and Jones, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. φρουρά, II.1. φυλακη Aineias uses of native guards. The verb συνεθέλεντες Aineias uses twice elsewhere (23.8 and 28.5) of plotters. Note that he does not use the word ἀρχων in its Athenian technical sense of 'governor', but in the sense of 'leader' or 'officer'.

54 Most recently Jack Cargill has wrestled with these problems in League, 172-6; see also the following notes in this chapter.

Recently tried and/or punished strategoi, rhetores and others were:
Kallistratos of Aphidna and Khabrias of Aixone (Dem. 21.64 and scholion ad loc., Arist. Rhet. 1364a 19, 1411b 6, Plu. Demosthenes 5, Mor. 844B and cf. Diogenes Laertios 3.23); Kallisthenes, ca. 362, (Aiskh. 2.40, Arist. Rhet. 1308b 10 f.); Ergophilos, ca. 362, (Dem. 19.180; 23.104; Arist. ibid.); the trierarchs serving under Leosthenes, ca. 361, (Dem. 51.8,16); Philon (Aixoneus?; cf. Davies, APF 247), ca. 360, (Hyper. 3.1-2); Autokles, ca. 361, (Dem. 23.104; 36.52; 50.12; Hyper. F59-69 Jensen); Timomakhos, ca. 360, (Dem. 19.180; 36.53; Aiskh. 1.56; Hyper. 3.1-2); Kallippos Aixoneus, ca. 360, (Dem. 36.53); Timotheos, ca. 360-59, (Dem. 36.53 and cf. Dem. 49); Theotimos, ca. 361-359, (Hyper. 3.1-2 and cf. Polyainos 1.37); Menon Potamios, ca. 360, (Dem. 36.53); Kephisodotos, ca. 359, (Dem. 23.5, 167-8; 19.180; Aiskh. 3.52 and scholion ad 3.51; Androcion FGrHist 324 F19); and Kallistratos again, ca. 361, (Hyper. 3.1-2; Lykourgos 1.93). For discussion of these trials see Hansen, Eisangelia 93-99 and Roberts, Accountability 40-49, 69-77, 111-115, 170.

55 Diodoros' expressions describing the replacement of a dead or unsatisfactory commander are monotonously similar. See 14.38.2; 14. 99.5; 15.47.4 and cf. 13.74.1; 13.104.1; 14.92.2; 15.29.4.
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Cargill, *League* 172-176, who claims (n. 24) to follow Pritchett, *War* 57-8, argues to disassociate the two events and wants to redate the Kerkyra episode to ca. 368 B.C. Cargill's motive is, in part, to explain Korinthian suspicions of Khares and the Athenians in 366 (T5), but, as I have already explained in note 49 above, the Korinthians had reason to suspect Athenian intentions from their own past experience. For more arguments against Cargill's suggestion see *infra*.

In most of the years between 368 and 359 Athens had two strategoi operating in Macedonia and nearby regions (such as Thessaly or Khalkidike), another in Thrace or the Hellespont-Bosporos, and often another in the islands. Iphikrates was in Macedonia from 368-5 and Timotheos was in the eastern Aegean in 366-5 before replacing Iphikrates from ca. 365-4 until ca. 360 (for sources see *PA* 7737 and 13700). Autokles was in Thessaly in 368 (Diodoros 15.71.3), Alkimakhos was in Macedonia (see *PA* 616) ca. 364, Kallisthenes ca. 362 (PA 8089), Leosthenes was on Peparethos in 361, and Mantias in Macedonia in 360 or 359 (Diodoros 16.2.6). Ergophilos was in Thrace 363/2 (PA 5062), Autokles in 362/1 (PA 2727) replaced by Menon (PA 10085), who was succeeded by Timomakhos (PA 13797); Kephisodotos in ca. 360-59 (PA 8313) and perhaps Theotimos (Hyper. 3.1). Among the islands were Lakhes in 364 (Diodoros 15.79), Khabrias in 363/2 (*IG II²* 111) and possibly Philon ca. 361-0 (Hyper. 3.1-2).

The point is that Khares may have been ordered to stabilize the situation and then to leave it in the care of the strategoi who were operating in the region. Cf. *IG II²* 110 lines 15-16.

This alliance is preserved on *IG II²* 116 = Tod, GHI 147 (translated in Harding, *Ipsus* 59). The decree instructs (lines 39-40) the *tamiai* of the goddess to destroy the stele on which the alliance with Alexandros was in-
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scribed (see n. 51 above). Hostility between Alexandros and the other Thessalians existed already in 362 (Xen. Hel. 7.5.4).

After the battle of Leuktra, Athens explored several new friendships. She sponsored a common peace of which she was the guarantor (Xen. 6.5.1). As we have seen above, she contracted an alliance with the Arkadian League in 366, despite the fact that she was an ally of Sparta, while the Arkadians were still allied with Thebes (Xen. 7.4.2-6 and cf. 7.4.29). In 362, after the battle of Mantineia, she concluded an alliance with Elis, Akhaia, Phleious and "the Arkadians": IG II² 112 = Tod, GHI 144 (translated in Harding, Ipsus 56). Presumably the Arkadians were those who sided with Mantineia and fought beside the Spartans in the late battle, as did the Akhaians and Eleians (Xen. 7.5.18). Tegea, Megalopolis and other cities in southern Arkadia remained in alliance with Thebes (Xen. 7.5.5). The split among the Arkadians erupted into armed struggle in 361 (Diodoros 15.94).

In addition to this alliance, Athens probably also swore to the common peace which was made after the battle of Mantineia (Diodoros 15.89; Plu. Agesilaos 35): Messenia was included in it, and, naturally, the Lakedaimonians were not. Athens was clearly prepared to exploit the weakness of either Thebes or Sparta.

Strategoi as diplomats: IG II² 21; 111; 124 line 10; 213; Dem. 23.167-173 for which cf. IG II² 126. For Khares' diplomatic activities see T10, T15, T29, T65, T68, T71.

Cargill expands on an idea put forth in a slightly different form by Pritchett (see n. 55 above) in suggesting that Khares was an ἀρχηγός and not strategos, and rejects Diodoros' date and context because it "fits his narrative very poorly", 173. Cargill prefers a context ca. 368 B.C. Cargill's arguments may be summarized as follows: 1) Aineias Taktikos is "probably
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Diodoros' ultimate source", and Aineias does not indicate a chronological setting (Cargill accepts that Aineias is to be identified with Aineias Stymphalios, the Arkadian strategos of Xen. 7.3.1, although such an identification is not made by the Arkadian Polybios; rather it was first advanced by Issac Casaubon. The appeal to Aineias' authority is irrelevant anyhow). 2) "it is not believable that a general chosen in response to a situation taken so seriously by the demos could cavalierly disregard the Aegean crisis and sail halfway to Italy to stir up trouble in Korkyra", 3) "In Aineias' account ... Chares does not sail up as a general in command of a naval force", 173. Moreover, Cargill senses in Diodoros' words consultation of a source that mentioned several misdeeds of Khares. He also suggests that command of a garrison seems a logical steppingstone to one's first generalship and seeks a date when garrisons were common in allied cities and when Athenian allies might have been susceptible to Theban democratic propaganda. Thus 368 B.C., when Akarnania joined the Thebans, is the date for Cargill.

Cargill's arguments are not convincing: 1) There is no reason to believe Aineias is Diodoros' ultimate source; on the contrary, Diodoros mentions slaughters and confiscations, Aineias does not. 2) I have tried to meet this argument in the text. It is quite believable that the demos might order a strategos to go to one problem spot and then to proceed on to another. Dem. 50.4–6 describes how in September 362 news reached Athens that there was need for Athenian help in Tenos, the Khersonesos, Propontis and Bosporos. The demos voted and sent a (i.e., one) fleet to give aid to each place: ἔτον ἀπόστολον πολεοδομοῦν καὶ βοηθεῖν ἐκαστὰκοι (50.6). Likewise in 429 when Phormion urgently requested reinforcements to be sent to Naupaktos, the Athenians sent twenty ships instructing their commander first to sail to Krete
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to carry out an attack on Kydonia (Th. 2.85). 3) Aineias mentions no fleet, because it is totally irrelevant to his illustration of the stratagem. Aineias is not a historian.

Finally, Cargill's suggestion that Khares was an ἀρχηγός and that such an office was a logical steppingstone to a first generalship ignores the little we do know about the men who held this office. Timarkhos Sphettios was at least 35 when he was ἀρχηγός of Andros (see PA 13636); Androtion Gargettios was over 50 when he was ἀρχηγός of Arkesine on Amorgos (IG XII[7], 5 and see Jacoby FGrHist III.B Supplement Vol. I, 87-92 = the introduction to the commentary on the fragments of Androtion); Diotimos Euonymeus had already been strategos during the Korinthian War before serving as ἀρχηγός on Syros ca. 376 (see Davies, APF 162). Cargill's position must be rejected.


61 The Lakedaimonians are not know to have had a major naval force on the seas since 373/2, although they probably maintained some naval capability since Agesilaos was operating or negotiating in the Hellespont ca. 366 and served in Egypt in 361 (Xen. Agesilaos 2.26-31; Plu. Agesilaos 36-40). It is difficult to imagine Sparta posing a threat to Kerkyra in 361.

Thebes, on the other hand, had gained naval experience during the early years of the Second Athenian League, in the 370s (Dem. 49.14 f. and cf. Xen. 6.2.1). Thebes had a naval installation and a small squadron at Kreusis in 371 (Xen. 6.4.3), and launched a major and successful naval offensive in 364/3 (Diodoros 15.78-79). At some point they made diplomatic contact with Carthage: see IG VII 2407 = Syll. 3 179 (translated in Harding, Ipsus 48).
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62 Diodoros 15.94 and cf. 89. Diodoros says that the common peace lasted only one year before the threatened disintegration of Megalopolis brought the Thebans into the Peloponnesos once again; thus in 361 this common peace was considered to be abrogated. Athens had recently made an alliance with Akhaia, Elis, Phleious and "the Arkadians" (i.e., Mantineia and her allies: see n. 57), the very states which were prepared to allow the weakening of Megalopolis, according to Diodoros.

There is a problem with the text of Diodoros 15.94.2. He describes how some of the immigrants to Megalopolis wished to return to their villages after the common peace, but that the Megalopolitans were compelling them to abandon their native cities and that a dispute arose for this reason. He continues: οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν πολισμάτων ἥξιοιν αὐτοῖς βοηθέειν Μαντινεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρκάδων, ἐτι δὲ Ἡλείους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς μετεχικότας τοὺς Μαντινεῖθι συμμαχίας. οἱ δὲ Μεγαλοπολῖται τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρεκάλουν συμμαχεῖν. He goes on to describe how Pammenes led an expedition into the Peloponnesos and forced the people to settle in Megalopolis. The editor of the Teubner Diodoros posits a lacuna thus: 'Ἀρκάδων..., ἐτι and emends 'Ἀθηναίους το Θηβαίους. Pammenes, of course, was a Theban (Diodoros 16.34; Dem. 23.183; Plu. Pelopidas 18, 26) and his force, in Diodoros' account, acted in the interests of Megalopolis. Thus the emendation is correct, but one wonders if the MSS 'Ἀθηναίους is not based on something which has dropped out of the passage. See the apparatus criticus ad loc.

63 There were two major rounds of civil strife on Kerkyra during the Peloponnesian War, in 427-425 and again in 410 (Th. 3.69-85; 4.2, 46-48 and Diodoros 13.48.1-8, respectively). There is good evidence for civil strife ca. 375-43 (Diodoros 15.46.1-3; 47.5 and cf. Xen. 5.4.64). See also Diodoros 15.40, 45 for other political disturbances in the Peloponnesos and cf.
Notes to Chapter One:

15.57.3-58.4.

64 Athens supported democracies to the point of interfering in internal affairs of other states (Diodoros 15.45). Timotheos even ruined the peace of 375/4 to help Zakynthian democrats (Xen. 6.2.2-3).

The League's prospectus, preserved on IG II^2 43 (see especially lines 20-24 on face A), gave specific guarantees against such actions. Cargill, League 40-1, 68-74, points out that Kerkyra was perhaps not a League member. Nevertheless, she did make an alliance with Athens, preserved on IG II^2 96 and 97, which guaranteed her democratic constitution. Cargill, League 175, points out that Akarnania, another League ally with whom Kerkyra and Kephallenia had cooperated in approaching Athens for the purpose of alliance in 375/4, later defected to the Boiotians (Xen. 6.5.23) and was probably loyal to them until at least the time of the Sacred War. See IG VII 2418 (= Tod, GHI 160 = Syll. 3 201).

65 Dem. 24.202. From the Peace of Antalkidas on, a clause guaranteeing autonomy to each city seems to have been a regular feature of all common peaces. See Diodoros 14.110.2-3 and Xen. 5.1.31 (387 B.C.); Diodoros 15.38.2-3 (375/4 B.C.); Xen. 6.3.8, 11-12 and 6.4.1-3 (both in 371 B.C.); Xen. 7.1.36-7 (367 B.C.). Diodoros 15.89.94 does not call the peace of 362 a common peace, but it does seem to have contained a clause allowing the return of all to their own cities. See T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene (London, 1965) 84-6, 140-44.

There are several cases of political crisis arising when the smaller states tried to exercise their autonomy: Diodoros 15.5.1-5; 38-40, 94; Xen. 6.5.1-5. Perhaps Kerkyra had also shown signs of wishing to do so.

66 One has only to think of Leosthenes, Kallistratos and others (see n. 54) to realize that, even granting that Khares was not re-elected for the next few years, his involvement was not a serious detriment to his career. Isokrates
Notes to Chapter One:

implies as much (T25 #121), and, to judge from T10, T11, T16, T17, Khares was soon in great demand as a trouble-shooter.

One can find an interesting parallel to Khares' actions in those of Konon on Rhodes in 395. The Rhodians had thrown out their Lakonian garrison and welcomed him, yet he still allowed a coup to take place while he briefly absented himself. See Hellenika Oxyrhynchia 15(10), Diodoros 14.79.6, Pausanias 6.7.6 and cf. I.A.F. Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," CQ n.s. 11 (1961) 166-70. Cf. also Th. 8.21, where Athenians aided a democratic uprising on Samos in which 200 were executed, 400 exiled and their property confiscated. There are no indications that Samos' loyalty was doubtful at the time. In 411 some in the new Samian regime were receptive to overtures from the oligarchic '400' (Th. 8.63,73).

67 For Aigina as a base for Peloponnesian League forces and raiders during the Korinthian and Boiotian Wars see Xen. 5.1.1-24 (and esp. 29, where the raiders' depredations are given as one of the reasons for making peace); 5.4.61; 6.2.1. Piracy was rampant in the Saronic Gulf (Dem. 52.5; 53.6 and cf. E. Ziebarth, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs [Berlin, 1929] 15).

68 Diodoros 16.7.2-3 is the main authority for the war on Euboia. He states that there were many engagements and skirmishes, but no great battle. Aiskh. 3.85 claims that the campaign lasted barely a month, for which cf. Dem. 22.14. The agreement whereby Karystos and perhaps other cities were welcomed back into alliance with Athens was sworn in 357/6. See IG II² 124.19 and cf. IG II² 125, which is concerned with Eretria. There is a minor question of chronology here, since Diodoros dates the war to 358/7. Modern authorities are confident that the war took place in 357 and, again, the matter of the precise archon-year is of concern only insofar as we would like to know if Khares was strategos in both 358/7 and 357/6.

On the general question of the chronology of the Social War, with which
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this is all tied up, the calculations of Beloch, Ga\textsuperscript{2} III.2, 258 f., defended
by Cawkwell, C&M 23 (1962) 34-49, are preferable: the war broke out in 357/6,
in which year the battle of Khios was fought; Embata was fought in 356/5 and
peace was made in 355.

Timotheos and, perhaps, Kephisodotos avidly supported the expedition
into Euboia (Arist. Rhet. 1411a 8; Dem. 8.74 and cf. Plu. Mor. 305f). The
strategoi actually sent were Menon Potamios, Diokles Alopekethen, and Khares
(IG II\textsuperscript{2} 124.10, 21, 23 and Dem. 21.174). Pritchett, War 107-8, thinks Timo-
theos led the expedition himself. Both Timotheos and Kephisodotos are gen-
erally regarded as political enemies of Khares. See further discussion in
chapters three and four.

Khares may have been present in Athens long enough to swear the oath
sealing the alliance (see T11); Kirchner, IG II\textsuperscript{2} 124, Tod, GHI 153, Ditten-
berger, Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 190, and Bengtson, SV 304 all restore Khares' name and demotic
in line 20. However, Cawkwell, C&M 20 (1962) 38 n. 23 points out that XA
[BΠΙΑΣ ΑΙΩΓ(ΝΥΞ)] -- i.e., a dittography--will fit the lacuna equally as
as well as the now universally restored XΑ[ΡΗΣ ΑΓΓΕΛΗ(ΘΕΝ)]. Cf. S. Accame,
La lega Ateniese del Secolo IV A.C. (Roma, 1941) 252-5, who assumes that
Khabrias' name is a mistake for Khares'. Cawkwell assumes an error within
a lacuna, which is a little less probable than other alternatives. On the
same reasoning it may be observed that another lacuna in the same line might
as easily contain [ΜΕΝΕΩΓΕΥΣ] ΡΑΜΝΩ(ΤΙΟΣ) as the universally restored
[IΠΙΚΡΑΘΗΣ] ΡΑΜΝΩ(ΤΙΟΣ).

69 Athenian allies and possessions in the Khersonesos included Elaious
which joined the Athenian League in the 370s (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 43, line 27 on face B
and cf. Cargill, League 61-2), Sestos and Krithote, both of which were ac-
quired by Timotheos ca. 365 (Isok. 15.112; Nepos Timotheus 1.3). Athenian
Notes to Chapter One:

efforts at expanding their influence in the region continued, but in 360
Sestos was seized by Kotys, king of Thrace. Athenian attempts to regain
the place by negotiation were frustrated repeatedly thereafter. See Dem.
23.150-178, Dem. 50.4-6, 12-23 and, for the loss of Sestos, Hyper. 3.1 and
cf. Polyainos 1.37.

For the importance of Sestos to the Athenians see Hdt. 9.114-118 and
Th. 1.89.

70 The strategos autokrator had competence to conclude an alliance with­
out reference to the ekklesia. See U. Kahrstedt, Studien zum öffentlich Recht
Athens (Berlin, 1936) II, 265-6; A. Hauvett-Besnault, Les stratèges Athéniens
(Paris, 1885) 89 ff., 120-21; M. Scheele, Strategos Autokrator (Diss., Leipzig,
and W. Schwann, RE Supplement band 6 (1935) 1071-1082. The evidence suggests
that, although the powers of the autokrator were wide, their province was
not. Some examples are: Th. 6.8.2; 6.26.1, the strategoi sent to Sicily in
415 and their Syracusan counterparts were autokratores; Xen. 1.4.20,
Alkibiades was strategos autokrator in 407. The powers were generally con­
nected with diplomatic matters. Theramenes was an ambassador autokrator in
405/4: see Lysias 13.9 and see H.C. Youtie and R. Merkelbach, "Ein Michigan­
employed the concept in their role as leaders of the League of Korinth: Philip
was strategos autokrator (Diodoros 16.89.3), and Alexander hegemon autokrator
(Arrian 7.9.5). Other instances include: syngrapheis aut. (to revise laws)
in Th. 8.67; kleroukharkos aut. in IG I² 45.9; boule aut. (to investigate
the profanation of the Mysteries) in Andok. 1.15; and divine ambassadors
aut. in Aristophanes' Birds 1595. Khares' powers did not extend beyond the
immediate negotiations with Kersobleptes.
Notes to Chapter One:

For a theory that Khares sponsored a grant of citizenship for Kersobleptes' uncle, Rheboulas (a son of Seuthes, and brother of Kotys), at this time see Kirchner, IG II^2 349 and Davies, APF 430-1.

The document in question is IG II^2 126. G. Grote, in History of Greece (reprinted from the second edition by P.F. Collier: New York, 1899), vol. X 380 n. 1, followed by W. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 228 n. 1 and cf. 294 n. 3, and Bury-Meiggs, HG 4 415, relies on this document combined with IG II^2 133, T10 and T17 to support the contention that Sestos was returned to de facto Athenian control at this time, only to be lost again during the Social War. Additional arguments have been based on a note in Theodoros Metokhites (see n. 94 below).

Kersobleptes, however, was holding Sestos in 355, the time of Isoc. 8.22, and he may have withdrawn to Kardia in 357 to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude, as Dem. 23.179-183 suggests. IG II^2 126 mentions provisions whereby either party to the agreement was to help the other exact tribute from unwilling cities. This suggests that Kersobleptes may have simply withdrawn his garrison (if he had one there) without actually handing the city over to the Athenians. A similar situation is that of Amphipolis. It was formally ceded to Athens by Macedon in 370/69 (Aiskh. 2.32-3; Dem. 19.253; 7.29 and cf. T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene 128-138 for the date). The cession was reaffirmed in 359 (Diodoros 16.3.3; 4.1; Dem. 23.121; Polyainos 4.2.17 and cf. Dem. 2.6; 23.116; 7.27 and see the discussion of Griffith, Macedonia 236 n. 4). At the most this only meant the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrison: Athens never recovered the place in fact.

Khares had the successes on Euboia and the Khersonesos to his credit, while Timotheos, Iphikrates and Khabrias had all failed recently. See scholion to Aiskh. 2.31, Polyainos 3.10.8 and cf. Dem. 36.53 for Timotheos;
Notes to Chapter One:

Dem. 23.149, 151 and cf. 130 and Dem. 49.66 for Iphikrates; Dem. 23.171 for Khabrias. But probably the best reason to send Khares was simple economics: he was in the region with an already mobilized force.


74 The Hypothesis was written no earlier than the second century A.D., since it mentions (Aelius) Aristeides. It has not convinced many: see n. 78 below.


An Athenian naval force including the state-ship Paralos, commanded by Meidias Anagyrasios, may have been present in the Propontis in the same archon-year as the expedition to Euboia. Demosthenes 21.173-4 says that Meidias plundered the Kyzikenes of five talents at that time. A scholion *ad loc.* (Dindorf Vol. 9, 638 [570,15]) explains: Κυζικηνων ἡμπασε πλεῖον ἢ πέντε: ἐν τῇ συμμαχικῇ πολέμῳ ἐγκηκοντο Αθηναίοι ληφθησαν τοὺς ἀδέλφους πλέοντας, κἂν ἐμπόροι ἔστι, τῶν πολέμων. παρατυχθάν ὡς πόλεμος Κυζικηνος ἀφελεῖται αὐτῶν δις πολέμων τὰ χρήματα. οἱ δὲ ἑλθόντες εἰς 'Αθήνας ἀπεδεικνύσαν αὐτοῖς φιλίαν ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ Μειδίας μέχρι τοσοῦτον ἀντείπειν, ἣς ἐπείσε μὴ ἀποδοῦναι αὐτοῖς τὰ χρήματα. οἱ δὲ ἑλθόντες ἀπέστησαν τὴν οὐτάν πατρίδα. κατ' ἄμφοτερον τοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἡδίκησε, καὶ τὰ χρήματα λαβὼν καὶ εἰς ἱερὰν ἐμβαλὼν.

Cawkwell, *C&M* 23 (1962) 37 n. 19 warns that the scholion may be misleading.
Notes to Chapter One:

Indeed, Kyzikos was not a member of the League and so cannot have "revolted", although Timotheos had aided the city ca. 363 (Diodoros 15.81.5; Nepos Timotheus 1.2). Kyzikos had been engaged in several actions hostile to Athens recently (Dem. 50.4-6). Meidias and the Paralos could have been part of the force that conveyed Khares and his troops from Euboia to Attika and thence to the Khersonesos.

75 Athens engaged in strenuous efforts to "recover" Amphipolis since ca. 370 (see n. 71). Iphikrates had spent perhaps three years in the region without much success (Nepos Iphicrates 3.2; Aiskh. 2.26-29). He was succeeded by Timotheos and others ca. 365 (Dem. 23.149; scholion to Aiskh. 2.31; Diodoros 15.81.5; Isok. 15.108, 113; Nepos Timotheus 1.2; Polyainos 3.10.1,7), but after some initial success they, too, were frustrated. In 359 Mantias was sent with a force to support a pretender to the Macedonian throne. His explicit intentions were to obtain leverage in negotiations over Amphipolis, according to Diodoros (16.2.6-3.6).

For similar efforts in the Khersonesos see n. 69. In addition to their purely strategic importance, these places were regarded by the Athenians as "theirs", just as Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros were. They were originally settled by Athenians. Thus, Demosthenes says in the speech On Behalf of the Freedom of the Rhodians 15.15 "they begrudged you what was yours"; this may be behind the words of the author of the Hypothesis to Isok. 8 "their ancient power".

76 Theopompos FGrHist 115 F30 and cf. n. 71 above. Forces might be shifted back and forth from the Khersonesos to Khalkidike fairly easily. See Dem. 23.149-50; 50.17-52 and cf. Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 I, 164.

77 Neither Nepos, T33, nor Diodoros, T78, shrink from the opportunity to denigrate Khares.

78 Among those rejecting the Hypothesis to Isok. 8 as worthless are:
Notes to Chapter One:

Cawkwell, C&M 23 (1962) 38 n. 21 and JHS 101 (1981) 52; Hornblower; Mausolus 207; Cargill, League 176; and Schaefer, Demosthenes II, 164 n. 4.

Diodoros, T13, states that Khabrias was strategos, but Nepos T14, specifically asserts that he was a privatus and emphasizes that status by contrasting Khabrias' auctoritas with that of those actually in command. Demosthenes 20.82 (Against Leptines), delivered only a couple of years after Khabrias' death, seems to confirm Nepos' version. Cf. T11, an inscription of 357/6, from which Khabrias' name has been deliberately erased, and the remarks of R. Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates," REG 68 (1955) 77-120, esp. 112-4, and Cawkwell, C&M 23 (1962) 38 n. 23 and (my) n. 68 above. It is not impossible that Khabrias was trierarch when he died. See Xen. 1.7.5 for former strategoi who, as trierarchs, were entrusted with special responsibilities.

For more on the similarity between Nepos' and Diodoros' accounts of this event, see chapter five.

As suggested in the text, Khares may have been already abroad when war broke out. See Hornblower; Mausolus 207 and Cawkwell, JHS 101 (1981) 52. If so, then Khabrias was probably a member of a reinforcement sent to Khares. The combined force totalled sixty ships, according to T16. For an estimate of Athenian naval strength during this period see G. Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century," CQ 34 (1984) 334-45.

Does the Athenian assault imply there was some urgency in neutralizing Khios? Perhaps the Athenians anticipated the rebel reinforcements that did eventually give them a temporary superiority (T16). Dem. 47.50 (and cf. 44) mentions the urgency with which an Athenian force was raised in 357/6.

It appears that there was a famous description of Khabrias' death. Diodoros, Nepos and Plu. Phokion 6 all single out his rashness. One wonders
Notes to Chapter One:

if this rashness/boldness was an attempt on his part to win back the esteem of his fellow citizens.

83 N.G.L. Hammond, *History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford, 1959) 515, and S. Accame, *Lega Ateniense* 190, characterize the defeat as substantial. Cf. Bury-Meiggs *HG* 418. Evidence from the naval archives suggests that Athenian losses were very small during the war. *IG II* 1611.9 counts 283 ships at the beginning of 357/6; four years later in 353/2 Athens possessed 349 ships, according to *IG II* 1613.302. Supposing the loss of only 15 ships during the course of the war, one is forced to conclude that the Athenians were building ships at a rate of 20 a year, and this does not take into account the fact that in one of those years the quota for new ships was not met: Dem. 22.8-20. Cf. Cawkwell, *CQ* 34 (1984) 345 n. 33.

Nepos' use of the plural "they looked to him (Khabrias) rather than to those who were in magistracies" (T14), may imply that Khares was not the only strategos present. We know of at least one other strategos who took part in the war in 357/6: Alkimakhos Anagyrasios (Dem. 47.50,78 and cf. 44 for the date; T11 line 22; Harp. s.v. "Ἀλκιμαχώς").

84 *IG II* 123 (= Tod, *GHI* 156) mentions a garrison on Andros ca. May 356; *IG XII* (7), 5 (= Tod, *GHI* 152) another in Arkesine, a city on Amorgos. These documents are translated in Harding, *Ipsus* 69 and 68. Cf. E. Schweigert, "Greek Inscriptions," *Hesperia* 8 (1939) 12-17 for a possible reference to Elaious during the Social War (#4), and *IG XII* (5) 1,000 (addenda) for a possible garrison on Ios.

85 Dem. 1.8 alludes to an embassy from Amphipolis to Athens seeking Athenian help against Philip of Macedon. For the chronology see Griffith, *Macedonia* 236-52. Krenides was captured before 11 Hekatombaion 356/5 (ca. July 356), the date of the alliance between Athens and the coalition (T15).
Notes to Chapter One:

86 T15, lines 17, 21. Khares had negotiated with the father of Ketriporis, Berisades, just a year earlier (T10). For that reason alone he was a good choice to represent Athens.

87 Diodoros 16.22.3 relates the failure of the coalition. Pydna was captured at about this time and Griffith, Macedonia 236-52 suggests that Neapolis, too, was threatened. Cf. J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London; 1976) 72-3, who thinks that Neapolis was lost to Philip and recaptured by Khares.

The naval reform of Periandros in Dem. 47.20 ff. and cf. 44, is just one indication of financial stress felt by Athens during the Social War. See also Cawkwell, CQ 34 (1984) 334-345 and Borimir Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles; 1975) 73-83.

88 The Athenians had captured Samos from a pro-Persian tyrant in 366/5 (Isok. 15.111; Polyainos 3.10.5,9,10) and installed a kleroukhia there (Diodoros 18.8.7; 18.18.9), which was reinforced in 361/0 (scholion to Aiskh. 1.53) and again in 352/1 (Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F154). See E. Schweigert, "The Athenian Cleruchy on Samos," AJPh 61 (1940) 194-8 and Cargill, League 148-9 n. 8. Samos was the key to the all-weather Aegean crossing. (Hornblower, Mausolus 198). See now Jack Cargill, "IG II² 1 and the Athenian Kleruchy on Samos," GRBS 24 (1983) 321-332.

89 See n. 84 above and note that the Arkesine inscription (IG XII [7], 5 = Tod, GHI 152), lines 15-16, mention citizens of that city who were prisoners.

90 Timotheos, a few years previously, had been threatening Iphikrates with litigation, but this hostility was resolved with the marriage to his daughter of Menestheus, Iphikrates' son (Dem. 49.66 and cf. Davies APF 250-1). These two old soldiers were without any recent successes (n. 72 above).
Notes to Chapter One:

91 Diodoros may have been misled because, in his version, the Athenians were operating in the Hellespont-Bosporos region. Elsewhere at 16.53.2 he applies the term "Hellespont" to Torone and Mekyberna.

92 See Th. 3.29,31-2 and scholion to 3.29; Stephanos Byzantinos s.v. Ἐμπατον (= Theopompos FGrHist 115 F14).

93 For Diodoros' lax use of geographical terms see notes 53 and 91. In addition to being the scene of the war's two major battles, Khios seems to have been the ringleader of the rebels. Diodoros always lists Khios first, as do most contemporary sources: Diodoros 16.7.3 bis; 16.21.1,2; 16.21.3 ("the Khians and their allies"); Dem. 15.3; Isok. 8.16; Dein. 1.14 = 3.17; Theopompos FGrHist 115 F164 (quoting Philokrates); and scholion to Dem. 3.28. Hornblower, Mausolus 212 and Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 I, 166 n. 3 argue that Rhodes was especially prominent.

94 IG II² 133 (=Dittenberger, Syll. 3 199) and cf. the scholion to Dem. 21.173 (n. 74 above). Some believe there was action around Sestos during the Social War, e.g., W. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien 228 n. 1 and 294 n. 3, who suggests that a rebellion at Sestos may have been one of the reasons the Athenians sailed to the Hellespont as they did in Diodoros T16. See also G. Grote, History of Greece vol. X, 380 n. 1 and vol. XI, 224-5 and n. 1; CAH vol. VI, 210; and (?) Bury-Meiggs, HG 4 415 (Meiggs does not mention the sack of Sestos in 353/2, for which see Diodoros T38 and cf. IG II² 1613.297). Into this reconstruction fits a notice from Theodoros Metokhites' Essay on Ethics or Education, a notice which was brought to scholarly attention by Ihor Sevcenko, "A New Fragment of Sappho?," Annals, Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. 1 (1951) 150-2. The source of the notice is unknown, but may derive from a tradition not otherwise extant. Sevcenko's text follows:
Sevcenko suggests the possibility that Metokhites "fused Iphicrates with Chares", and suggests a date of 356. This view seems to be endorsed by S. Hornblower, "An undetected fragment about the Social War," Liverpool Classical Monthly 9.2 (Feb. 1984) 32. Hornblower concedes that there is no way to control Metokhites' evidence. This notice may, indeed, refer to the Social War, but in no way can Chares be brought into the picture. The passage deserves further discussion on two counts.

First, the notion that Chares is involved needs to be rejected, because he never served in Egypt, a fact which sets him apart from Timotheos, Iphikrates and Khabrias. The passage specifically presents a parallel observation: each of the men mentioned commanded huge fleets in Egypt, apparently as members of larger staffs (Χαβρίας...τρίτος στρατηγός; Ἰφικράτης ἐβδομος). Furthermore, in both cases, this huge command is contrasted with a sole command of a few ships in operations against Greek cities (as autokratores, whatever that means here). Second, the Social War is not necessarily the only possible context for the actions at Sestos. Khabrias was regarded at Khios as a benefactor, despite the fact that he died fighting the Khians (Dem. 20.81). This is less likely if Khabrias had besieged the Khians on a prior occasion, so Theodoros' passage may well refer to Khabrias' attack in 356, although Khabrias had sailed several times in the eastern Aegean.

Iphikrates, on the other hand, most certainly did operate in the Hellespont with a handful of ships in the Korinthian War. He was sent to root out the Lakedaimonians from Abydos, to which place and Sestos Lakedaimonian harmosts and others had fled after the battle of Knidos (Xen. 4.8.3-6). Abydos was
under pressure throughout that war (Xen. 4.8.31-9; 5.1.6-7, 25), but was never lost to the Athenians, it seems. Sestos, although "strong and difficult to besiege" (Xen. 4.8.5) may have fallen into Athenian hands, since they besieged Abydos setting out from the Khersonesos (Xen. 5.1.7). Iphikrates was initially sent out with eight ships (Xen. 4.8.34); subsequently he was sharing command with Diotimos in the same theater of war (Xen. 5.1.25). Of the many times when Iphikrates was operating in the Hellespont, the Social War is the one during which Iphikrates is least likely to have been attacking with only three ships.

The Athenian motive for sailing to the Bosporos may have had as much to do with grain ships as with trying to relieve Samos; the grain supply was insecure and there were shortages in 362-1 and again in 357 (Dem. 50.6,16 and 20.33, respectively).

The rebel siege of Samos was presumably prominent in Nepos' source, as it was in Diodoros'. This may have caused the slip; Samos did not 'defect' as Nepos states, but it was under siege by the rebels and it was held by Athenian kleroukhoi. Khios had 'defected', and it was at Khios that the battle of Embata took place, if we accept Polyainos (T18) on this. Khares' official complaint would be more damning against his colleagues if he wrote that, 'had he not been betrayed, he could easily have taken Khios,' not Samos.

Both of these 'flourishes' seem like rhetorical embellishment (but that is not to say they are untrue). See chapter five for a discussion of the possible source(s) of these 'flourishes'.

Nepos portrays the action as if Khares 'tagged along' in order that he not miss out on the glory. When the storm arose Timotheos and Iphikrates kept their ships at anchor, while Khares 'strived to reach his destination and then sent back a message for his colleagues to follow'. Diodoros implies
Notes to Chapter One:

that the three new stategoi were sent with sixty ships to join the sixty of Khares. Both sources envision a divided command, possibly an unequal division. This need not trouble us, because a forced equal division of military resources in the middle of a campaign could have a negative effect on morale, as in Xen. 1.2.15.

98 For the sources on this trial see Hansen, Eisangelia 101-2. Iphikrates and Menestheus were apparently acquitted (Isok. 15.129; Nepos Iphicrates 3.3, against Diodoros, T16). Timotheos was convicted and fined 100 talents (Isok. 15.129; Dein. 1.14 = 3.17). See further discussion in chapter three.

99 Our view has been prejudiced because of the enshrinement of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Khabrias into a canon of fourth-century Athenian heroes, which began very shortly after their deaths (Dem. 13.22; 23.198; Aiskh. 3.243) and perhaps also because of a superficial resemblance to the Arginousai-trial, for which see Xen. 1.6.34-5; 1.7.1-35; Diodoros 13.101-103.2.

Strategoi were obliged to cooperate, nor was Khares obliged to defer to his 'elders'. There are other cases of a single strategos overruling two colleagues, e.g., Th. 7.47; 8.27: in both of these cases, the majority could not convince the lone holdout and eventually yielded to him. The storm of 406, which prevented picking up the shipwrecked, was not an adequate defence in court, regardless of whomever the people finally held responsible. See Xen. 1.6.35; 1.7.3 and cf. 2.3.35 and 1.7.29-33.

100 See n. 109 below.

101 Plu. Aratos 16.3 also reports Khares' epithet for his victory. See the note to the text of T27 in the Appendix Testimoniorum and n. 108 below.

102 It is possibly part of a commentary on Demosthenes' First Philippic. See Beloch, GG² III.1, 244 n. 1; Jacoby, FGrHist II.C. 338 (= commentary on Papyrus Fragments 105 F4).
Notes to Chapter One:

103 βούρα was a variant for βοηρόμια in several MSS, as was ἀνδρόποτον for ἀνδροπιστοτον. Perhaps knowledge of the epigram, T70, is to blame for this faulty reading.

104 The numbers of the mercenaries and of the Persian army suspiciously suit the context of Dem. 4.19, while the information in the scholion seems more appropriate to 4.24. Still, the scholion's figures seem more believable than Diodoros' "70,000" (T26). Perhaps since the time of "The Ten Thousand" a myriad may have been a conventional figure for armies of mercenaries (Dem. 19.266, ἄρα cf. T41; Aiskh. 2.151; 3.146; Dein. 1.34; Diodoros 14.78.2; 15.92.2; Polyainos 7.14.3).

105 Athens, and no doubt others, frequently dispatched strategoi with mercenaries, but no pay. The soldiers were expected to be paid out of the spoils which they captured. See Pritchett, War 3-84 passim; Parke, GMS 232-3.

106 An instructive parallel is the recruitment and subsequent loyalty of Kyros' mercenaries to their recruiting officers. See especially Xen. Anab. 1.3.7; 1.4.3.

107 There is no question but that Athens condoned Khares' actions, at least at some point before the great king's threat reached them. Hornblower, Mausolus 168-9 denies that Mausolos' involvement was sanctioned by the king, but the Athenians could not have been very impressed by such legalistic technicalities. Athens had been tending towards a more hostile attitude with regard to the Persians since 367/6 (Xen. 7.1.37-8) and her support of the rebel satraps in 365 demonstrates that. See Hornblower, Mausolus 197-201; N.G.L. Hammond, Studies in Greek History (Oxford, 1973) 528 n. 5; K.J. Beloch, Die
Notes to Chapter One:


108 Chares' comparison of his victory to that at Marathon strikes us as pretentious, but the metaphor is probably contemporary: the liberation of the Kadmeia came to be called the sister of Thrasyboulos' accomplishment (Plu. Pelopidas 13) and Epameinondas' dying words were that he left behind two daughters, Leuktra and Mantinea (Diodoros 15.87.6).

109 See Pritchett, War 54,79 and The Greek State at War Vol. I 27 n. 105 and 30-52 for a general discussion. Opsonion is by no means the same as misthos. Note the scholiast's word χορηγησας = 'to supply, furnish with maintenance'.

110 Isok. 7.29 (Areopagitikos) probably refers to this. But cf. chapter four n. 38.

111 Chares wrote and/or received official communications: 1) after Embata (T16, T17); 2) after the battle in Asia Minor (T27 and Plu. Aratos 16.3), and he obeyed the embassy sent to him (T29); 3) from Thrace in 353 (T34); 4) and again in 346 (T46). It was clearly standard practice (Diodoros 16.57.2 and cf. Pritchett, War 34-58).

112 The date for T34 and T35 is Spring 353, for which see Hammond, Studies in Greek History 506-8. This means an archon-year of 354/3 for which the elections were held in the sixth prytany of 355/4, or ca. February 354 (Arist. AthPol. 44.4). His role in the war may have been controversial, but Chares was popular with the electorate. The controversy is known primarily through Isokrates (T24 and T25) and Aiskhines (T52 and cf. T54), both of whom had good cause to portray Chares in the worst possible light. See further chapter five.

113 Schaefer, Demosthenes^2 II, 54 and cf. Beloch, GG^2 III, 619 ("Furstentum Sigeion"). Parke, GMS 123 is more cautious. T30 relates that
Notes to Chapter One:

Khares' army sacked Lampsakos and Sigeion, and Demosthenes (T31) alluded to this in 349/8. Theopompos (T32 and cf. T33) says that Khares, like a number of other Athenian strategoi, spent time in a hideout, Sigeion, when not holding a magistracy. Theopompos may be thinking of a situation similar to that of Alkibiades ca. 407, who had his own stronghold in the Khersonesos (Xen. 1.5.17). But for Khares there was no time for such a withdrawal (see previous note). He did go into voluntary exile in 335/4 and took up temporary residence at Sigeion (T82). This is the basis for Theopompos' statement. For more on this see chapter two. For Lampsakos see Pausanias 6.18.2-4.

Persian satraps and dynasts sometimes rewarded friends with towns and cities. This is how Timotheos acquired Sestos and Krithote in 365 (Nepos Timotheus 1.3) and note that Memnon and Mentor (brothers-in-law of Artabazos) hired Kharidemos (Dem. 23.154-7), who subsequently captured Skepsis, Kebren and Ilion, in Artabazos' territory, although the speaker of Dem. 23 claims he did it against their will.
Notes to Chapter Two: Khares and the Macedonians

1 For the early part of the war between Athens and Macedon see Griffith, Macedonia 242-258.

2 For the importance of Neapolis and an argument that it came under pressure at this time, see Griffith, Macedonia 255-6; the argument is based on IG II2 128 (= Tod, GHI 159).

3 See Diodoros 16.34.1-2: Pammenes had 5,000 soldiers. For the chronology of these years see Hammond, Studies in Greek History 499-510 (= JHS 57 [1937] 44-78) and Griffith, Macedonia 264-7. The chronology accepted therein is: battle of Neon 354/3, Onomarkhos takes power in Phokis winter 354/3, Pammenes to Asia in early spring 354/3, capture of Sestos 353/2, kleroukhia-expedition to Sestos by 352/1, battle of Krokos Fields spring 353/2, expedition of Nausikles to Thermopylai near the end of 353/2, i.e., summer 352. Demosthenes 23 was delivered between the battle of Krokos Fields and ca. November 352, and after the capture of Sestos.

4 Obviously, Philip did not feel his "many ships" capable of taking on twenty Athenian triremes. Cf. Griffith, Macedonia 266.

There is no question that Maroneia and Abdera were not captured, as is implied by the MSS of Polyainos (see note at T35 in the Appendix Testimoniorum). Dem. 12.17 and IG II2 218 support this conclusion.

One might have expected Athenian intelligence to be better, but Philip knew the value of a forced march. Ignorance of his whereabouts may have contributed to Khares' overeagerness.

5 For the rise of Onomarkhos and his use of the sacred treasures, see Diodoros 16.32-33. For the use of famous dedications as love-gifts and bribes see Phylarkhos FGrHist 81 F70; Theopompos FGrHist 115 F248; Plu. Mor. 397F (de Pyth. orac.); Ephoros FGrHist 70 F96 and Pausanias 3.10.3-5 (=Theopompos FGrHist 115 F312). In several instances of this bribery there is a link
Notes to Chapter Two:

with the mythic past, rather like 'the curse of the mummy' E.g. the woman who obtained the jewelry of Eriphyle suffers the same fate as the heroine (Phylarkhos); the woman who obtained Helen's jewelry abandoned her husband for a handsome youth (Ephoros), and so on. It is interesting that the motif of the Amphiaraos-Eriphyle myth occurs in the story of how Deinikha persuaded her husband, Arkhidamos, to help the Phokians because she was bribed; Arkhidamos died far from home and, like Amphiaraos, his body was never found (Pausanias). Cf. also Diodoros 16.64.2.

For expeditions financed by the sacred treasures see p. 38 and n. 10.

6 Zenobios knows of a proverb "Philip's Cock" that was used of those boasting over trivial successes. Exactly what Antiphanes wrote we do not know, but the lines of Herakleides do not give any indication that they were meant to be taken in the sense that Zenobios takes them. Herakleides is making fun of Adaiaos, not Khares, who generously fed many Athenians with only one "Cock". The joke is an old one: cf. Aristophanes Birds 279-293. Eustathios Rhapsodia 4 (1479, 35-40) repeats most of what Athenaios says verbatim, and is unaware of a joke at Khares' expense.

7 The date is based on the assumption that Lysandros was acting as an agent of Onomarkhos. Some have tried to remove mention of this man from the text of Athenaios: see Jacoby's apparatus criticus at FGrHist 115 F249. For the locale of the battle see Griffith, Macedonia 281-2, which seems better than the suggestion of Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 I, 443 n. 3, i.e., Kypsela, which he bases on Damoxenos FAC Edmonds F1. Cf. B. Niese, "Beiträge zur Geschichte und Chronologie des Hellenismus" Hermes 35 (1900) 69.

8 This hypothesis is based on 1) a parallel of mercenary recruitment found in Xenophon's Anabasis 1.1.6-11 (Kyros gave money to his friends to recruit soldiers and to use them for their own projects until he was ready for them
Notes to Chapter Two:

in 401) and 2) Khares' previous experience with Artabazos (T30 and cf. T31), when he obtained maintenance for his troops and later sent home spoils to the Athenians after a victory.

In addition to the sources in n. 5 see Diodoros 16.61-64, a passage that might well be called "Apollo's Revenge". All those who accepted the sacred treasure came to a bad end, whether women, mercenary soldiers, king Arkhidamos, or the Phokians themselves. It is noteworthy that, although the Lakedaimonians and Athenians were also implicated in the 'temple-robbing', Khares' receipt of money was not remembered as the act that incurred divine wrath. Rather, it was Iphikrates' seizure of dedications sent by Dionysios the Elder to Olympia and Delphi in 373/2, as Diodoros relates at 16. 57. Note that Iphikrates wrote to the demos for instructions and the demos told him "not to enquire into divine affairs, but see to it how he might continue sustaining his soldiers" (16.57.2).

The money given by the Phokians to Khares was quantified in terms of currency (60 talents), no doubt ready cash, and not jewelry or the like.

Diodoros 16.34.3-4. At 16.33.2 he said that money was given to the foremost men among the Phokians' allies. Arkhidamos (Paus. 3.10.3-5 and cf. Diodoros 16.24, 63) and Khares (T36) are the only ones actually named. It cannot be coincidence that Athens and Sparta, led by Khares and Arkhidamos, respectively, became suddenly aggressive. Cf. also Diodoros 16.39.

I.e., T35. T35 (Polyainos, who lived in the second century A.D.) is similar to T39 (Frontinus, who died ca. A.D. 103), enough so that one might suspect a doublet. Yet, there are some differences that would be hard to explain in that event. The number of decoy ships is different, the role of deceiver is reversed, and it is hard to see how the roles could be reversed and how the more notable Philip could have dropped out of Frontinus' stratagem
Notes to Chapter Two:

altogether. The identification of Frontinus' stratagem with Khares' sack of Sestos receives some support from the fact that some naval spoils were turned in at the dockyards in Peiraeus in 353/2, according to IG II² 1613.268-283.

For the treatment of the Sestians see infra, n. 14.

12 See Dem. 9.16; 23.167; 59.3; Aiskh. T52.

13 The Khersonesos had been colonized by Athenians in the sixth century (Hdt. 6.34-41), it was the first place recovered by Athens after the defeat of the Persians in 479 (Hdt. 9.114-5; Th. 1.89), and was an important source of grain in its own right (Th. 1.11 and cf. Arist. Rhet. (3.10) 1411a 13-15).

14 The Athenian kleroukhi had been expelled in 405 by Lysandros, according to Plu. Lysandros 14. These kleroukhi had paid tribute in the fifth century (IG I² 193.3; 198.101; 199.26,31). The Athenians may have installed a kleroukhia in Sestos when they acquired it ca. 365: see Schaefer, Demosthenes I, 101 n. 5, who based his conjecture on Isok. 15.112. Cf. Pritchett, War 110, who lists Athenian kleroukhiai in Samos (365), Poteidaia (362/1), Samos (361/0), the Kersonesos (353/2), Samos (352) and the Khersonesos again (344/3), and gives the sources for them.

For Athenian efforts to recover the region see Dem. 23.158-178 and cf. IG II² 126.

Cities punished with exandrapodismos in the fourth century include: Karyai (Xen. 7.1.28) and perhaps Sellasia (Xen. 7.4.12 and cf. Diodoros 15. 64.1), Orkhomenos (Diodoros 15.79.3-6), Olynthos (Diodoros 16.53-55; Aiskh. 2.156) and Thebes (Diodoros 17.41). These were all 'disloyal' allies or confederates. Cf. also Poteidaia (Diodoros 16.8.5) and Thronion (Diodoros 16.33.3). All of these places were ruined as part of state policy, not the whim of field-commanders or the soldiery. Cf. the milder treatment of Methone which sur-
Notes to Chapter Two:

rendered on terms (Diodoros 16.34.5). To execute prisoners who had surren­
dered was considered shocking (Th. 3.52-68 and note that the execution
of the Plataians was sanctioned by the authorities at Sparta).

Under the earlier democracy treatment of captured cities was subject to
a decision of the demos (Th. 3.28-50 and cf. 2.70, where the strategoi are
censured for not referring a decision to the government). In this last, ex­
ample, Poteidaia in 429, and in the example of Melos (Th. 5.116), in 415,
the Athenian treatment of Sestos finds close parallels.

15 Few do believe it. See Griffith, Macedonia 274; Bury-Meiggs, HG^4
453; Hammond, Studies in Greek History 519 and History of Greece 543; Beloch,
GG^2 III. 1, 476 n. 3.

16 Presuming that Khares sailed from Athens on a voyage to the Hellespont,
the Gulf of Pagasai would not be too far out of the way to reconnoiter.
Perhaps he was escorting the settlers to the Khersonesos, who set out in
353/2, but the ships used to convey them had not yet returned by the end of
that year (IG II^2 1613.297).

17 For the date of the battle of Krokos-Fields see Hammond, Studies in
Greek History 503-4, 531. After the death of Onomarkhos, Phayllos succeeded
to the leadership of the Phokians and doubled the pay of the mercenaries
(Diodoros 16.36.1; 37-38; 39.8-40.2; 56-64 completes the only narrative ac­
count of the Sacred War). Even after six more years of war, Phalaikos had
8,000 mercenary soldiers in 346.

18 To Thermopylai went 5,400 Athenians under Nausikles plus 3,000 of Athens' Peloponnesian allies (Diodoros 16.37.3; 38.2; Dem. 4.7; Philokhoros FGrHist
328 F153). Heraion Teikhos in Thrace was reported under attack by Philip ca.
November 352; a force was voted but never sent because it was learned Philip
was ill (Dem. 4.11). Later, in the autumn of 351 Kharidemos was sent to Thrace
with ten empty ships and five talents of silver (Dem. 3.4-5). For the kleroukhia to Samos see Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F154. Diophantos the Athenian was serving in Egypt ca. 351 with Lamios the Spartan. Athens and Sparta had refused a Persian request to join the invasion of Egypt (Diodoros 16.48.2; 44.1 and cf. Isok. Epist. 8.8). This aid to Egypt, if not official, probably expressed the majority sentiment at Athens. For the incursion into Megara under Ephialtes see Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F155 and Androtion FGrHist 324 F30.

19 Kharidemos was sent to the Hellespont in 351 (Dem. 4.11), was (still?/again?) there in 348 (T41) and probably served there often, perhaps in conjunction with his relative, Kersobleptes. When Khares was sent to Olynthos in 349, he was already operating elsewhere (T41), probably Thrace, where between 353-340 the bulk of his activities were. See infra.

20 See pp. 51-53. There the view of Griffith, Macedonia 570-78 is followed: the war broke out only when Philip siezed the Athenian grain ships. Philip, not Khares, struck the first blow.

21 Dem. 23.107-9; 3.7; Libanios' Hypothesis to Dem. 1 and cf. Griffith, Macedonia 296-304 for events leading up to hostilities between Olynthos and Macedon.

22 Dionysios is trying to demonstrate that Demosthenes cannot have been acquainted with Aristotle's Rhetoric because it was written after the fall of Olynthos. He cites Philokhoros verbatim (T41 and FGrHist 328 F156) to date Demosthenes' Olynthiac orations and quotes a clever saying of Kephisodotos (T45: a jibe at Khares for being in haste to submit his euthynai for the war at Olynthos), which Aristotle cited in the Rhetoric. For modern discussions of the chronology of the Olynthian War see G.L. Cawkwell, "The Defence of Olynthus," CQ 12 (1962) 122-140 and J.M. Carter, "Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus," Historia 20 (1971) 418-429.
Notes to Chapter Two:

23 The event seems to be the first entry in Philokhoros' account of the year 349/8, since it immediately follows the archon's name. See Jacoby, FGrHist III. b. Suppl. vol. I, 532.


25 Diodoros (16.52.9-53.3) puts the war in two years (349/8 and 348/7) and this is confirmed by Dionysios Ad Ammaeum 10 (probably following Philokhoros, see FGrHist 328 F156), who states that Philip captured Olynthos in the year during which Theophilos was archon (348/7). Cf. Plu. Mor. 845D. More specifically, Olynthos fell shortly before the Macedonian Olympia, ca. September/October (Dem. 19.192; Diodoros 16.55).

26 E.g., the account in CAH vol. 6 (Pickard-Cambridge) 228-232. Some excerpts include: "and the expedition proved ineffective, probably because Chares had to raise funds by plundering friend and foe alike" ..."Chares was recalled and prosecuted for misconduct; but Kharidemos ... abandoned active warfare to indulge in gross luxury at the expense of the Olynthians." (230). "...but the charges against Chares, which had not yet come to trial, were hurriedly dropped and he was sent off" (232). This reconstruction is based on T45 and Theopompos FGrHist 115 F143. The former merely implies that Kephisodotos was irritated at Khares' rush to render his euthynai after the Olynthian War, while the latter is a typically Theopompan description of the personal habits of a political leader, including drunkenness and fornication with freeborn women: the only fact presented by Theopompos is that
Notes to Chapter Two:

Kharidemos asked the boule of Olynthos for a handsome prisoner-of-war, part of the booty, no doubt.

27 The third Olythnian embassy asked for an Athenian citizen force "in addition to the existing forces" (T41). Both Khares and Kharidemos had been diverted from other places, and it may well be that Khares had to leave Kharidemos in sole command while he met other commitments. Since Khares did not return in time to save Olynthos (see infra), how can Kharidemos have been recalled until a replacement arrived? The fact that Khares was put in charge of the citizen forces proves that he was not in political trouble at home. Compare the simultaneous campaign on Euboia: Phokion began it, but was succeeded by Molossos even though hostilities continued (Plu. Phokion 14).

28 See n. 25. The Athenians set out perhaps in June 348 (Griffith, Macedonia 323 n. 4).

29 On these winds see Dem. 4.31; 8.14; Hdt. 6.139.4; 140.1; and Arist. Meteorologica (2.5) 361b 35-362a 31. Khares may have had to go to Euboia first to pick up the cavalry (Dem. 21.197 and cf. 162-4).

30 Griffith, Macedonia 323 n. 4 and, for the treachery, 321-4. The sources are unanimous in attributing the city's fall to treachery (Dem. 9.56; 19.266-7; Souda s.v. Καραβος; Diodoros 16.53.2).

31 See Xen. 5.2.11-3.9; 5.3.18-20, 26; Diodoros 15.19.2-23.3. In this campaign Poteidaia was captured almost immediately, and by the time Teleutias succeeded to the command battles were being fought within 10 stades of the city; yet Olynthos held out for two more campaigning seasons. The Athenians knew well the history of the earlier siege of Olynthos (Dem. 19.263-4).

32 See. Dem. 21.160-7. Among the volunteers were Demosthenes and his colleague Philinos, Meidias Anagyrasios, Nikeratos, Euktemon and Euthydemos; nearly all of these men were active politically or came from (recently)
Notes to Chapter Two:

politically active families (Demosthenes' contribution may be earlier: see Davies APF 136). Cf. T41, where the first expedition to Olynthos is composed of "thirty ships with Khares and eight which they manned in addition".

For Khares' trierarchy see T44. It has been established by Donald Laing Jr., "A Reconstruction of IG II² 1628," Hesperia 37 (1968) 244-54, (see esp. 245 n. 4) that IG II² 1620 (T44) and 1621 belong to the same document, and he suggests a date of 348/7 for them.

33 See the note to the text in the Appendix Testimoniorum at T45. Dionysios of Halikarnassos also quotes this fragment with a slight variant; the variant reading has caused some editors to emend, unnecessarily. Kephisodotos said, literally, "choke-hold."

34 See T41, notes 25 and 28 above, and T46 for evidence of the dates of Khares' strategia.

35 Athenian embassies: Aiskh. 2.79; Dem. 19.10, 303-6 (distinguished from those of 346, i.e., Aiskh. 2.57-60; 3.67-70, by Griffith, Macedonia 330 n. 1). Macedonian military activity: T52, and for earlier harassment in these same regions, cf. Dem. 4.34; Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F47 (= Androtion FGrHist 324 F24). Some scholars such as, Schaefer, Demosthenes² I, 443; Kirchner, PA 15292 (page 418); Davies, APF 149, date the activities mentioned in T52 to 353, but cf. Dem. 59.3-4, spoken in the context of 349/8. Aiskhines is trying to persuade his audience of the necessity of making peace (in 346), so that these actions are probably better dated in 347 or 346, as Parke, GMS 144 and Griffith, Macedonia 331, do.

Athens was now in alliance with Kersobleptes (T38) and Athenian troops garrisoned the forts at Serrion and Hieron Oros (Dem. 9.15). For the strategic importance of Hieron Oros see Xen. Anab. 7.1.14.

36 See T52, T54, Dem. 19.147 and cf. the discussion in chapter four.
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37 See T51. Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 56.3, says that *khoregoi* were selected by their fellow tribesmen at the beginning of the archon-year (so, ca. July 344; the festival itself was held in the spring of 343). See p. 97 n. 66 for the conjecture that Khares was present at the trial of Timarkhos in 345. Didymos 8.7 (on Dem. 10.34) cites Androtion (= *FGrHist* 324 F53), Anaximenes (= *FGrHist* 72 F28) and Philokhoros (= *FGrHist* 328 F157). Cf. Diodoros 16.44.1.

38 Diodoros 16.44.1-4; 46.4-51.3.

39 See n. 38; Diodoros says Athens and Sparta declined to send any troops, but at 16.46.8 a Philophron is mentioned: στρατηγοῦντος Φιλόφρονος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. For the redundant στρατηγοῦ Hertlein has suggested Σπάρτιάτου. Another prominent mercenary on the Egyptian side was Kleinios of Kos: Diodoros 16.48.5.

Another man who took part in helping to reduce Kypros, an important preliminairy to the reconquest of Egypt, was the Athenian Phokion. See Diodoros 16.42.3-9; 46.1-3: Phokion's army is explicitly described as mercenary and he was appointed by Idrieus, satrap of Karia. In this action Phokion was clearly acting as a private person. For discussions on the date see H-J. Gehrke, *Phokion* 225-230; Hornblower, *Mausolus* 43-4; Cawkwell, *CQ* 13 (1963) 122-3.

40 Philokhoros *FGrHist* 328 F158.

41 Dem. 7 (with scholion = T64) was delivered in spring of 342, it is generally agreed. See Griffith, *Macedonia* 510-16; Schaefer, *Demosthenes* II. 434 ff. and III. 443. Dem. 58 (T65) was delivered after the end of 344/3, and probably after the trial of Aiskhines in 343/2 (Dem. 58.28, 43). Griffith, *Macedonia* 380 and n. 3 suggests that Ainos defected during or after the war of 340-338.

42 T66, T67, T70, T71, T72, T73 certainly put Khares in the Hellespont-
Notes to Chapter Two:

Bosporos region with a fleet in 341/0 and 340/39, and it will be argued that T68 and T69 fit the same context. One assumes that the incident referred to in T64 was recent. Dem. 58 (T65) seems to have been spoken before Athens had lost her League, but how much earlier the syntaxeis were arranged between Khares and the Ainians is not clear. It was probably not too long before. Cf. IG II² 111.17-18 for the "agreements that Khabrias made."

44 Libanios claimed that the speaker was Hegesippos in his hypothesis to the speech. Hegesippos had been sent on an embassy to Philip in 343 (Dem. 19.331). He was prominent in organizing opposition to the Macedonians (Dem. 9.72; Plu. Demosthenes 17).

45 Two exiles did return home 'from Philip' at about this time: Artabazos and Memnon (Diodoros 16.52.1-8). Khares had known these men long before (see n. 54 below), relations between Athens and Persia were improving (Aiskh. 2.149; Plu. Mor. 847F) and a kindness to these two men might come in handy for both Athens and Khares in the future. To believe that these are the exiles referred to in the speech, however, requires an enormous lapse on the scholiast's part, when, in fact, his information is clearly derived from a source other than the speech.

46 Dem. 12.2.

47 The speaker of Dem. 58, Epikhares, implied that the agreement about the syntaxis was acceptable to both Ainos and the demos of Athens; this is contrary to the general picture of Khares' rapaciousness painted in modern works.

The political background and personalities involved in Dem. 58 are very interesting. The speech is generally rejected as not being a genuine work of Demosthenes. The defendant, Theokrines, had allegedly annoyed Demosthenes and Hypereides with the threat of prosecution, but was bought off (35); he may be the same man attacked by Demosthenes in 330 (Dem. 18.313). The speaker was bitterly disappointed when Demosthenes did not support him as expected
Notes to Chapter Two:

(41-4). He anticipated that Theokrines would claim his suit was simply an attempt to prevent the indictment of Thoukydides and Demosthenes (36). Moreover, Moirokles, a prominent statesman (PA 10400), was appearing on Theokrines' behalf (53-6), while the speaker's father had collaborated with a Polyeuuktos (31-2), perhaps one of the political leaders of that name, Polyeuuktos Sphettios (PA 11950) or Polyeuuktos Kydantides (PA 11947). Polyeuuktos S. was one of those demanded by Alexander in 335 (Davies, APF 7). All this should serve to illustrate just how complicated and fluid political cooperation actually was.

48 Diopeithes was sent out in 343/2 (n. 41), and had come into conflict, perhaps deliberately, with Kardia (Dem. 7.39-44). In 341 Philip supported Kardia with troops (Dem. 8.58, 64; 12.11; and cf. scholion to Aiskh. 3.83). Diopeithes then retaliated against some Thracian towns subject to Macedon (Dem. 12.3 and cf. Hypothesis to Dem. 8). Further retaliation from Philip was expected (Dem. 8.16).

49 Dem. 8.28.

50 For Khares' naval force see T66; for his location in the Khersonesos in early spring 340 (Anthersterion, 341/0) see T67. Cf. Dem. 12.16.

51 Aiskh. 3.98; Dem. 18.83 and cf. Plu. Demosthenes 17.3 and Griffith, Macedonia 545-54. T67 implies that Khares was in or nearby the Khersonesos on the 29th of Anthersterion.

52 Recent contacts with Persia included an embassy in which Aphobetos took part before Autumn 343 (Aiskh. 2.149) and the embassy of Ephialtes, probably in 341 (Plu. Mor. 847F, 848E; Demosthenes 20 and cf. Aiskh. 3.173 and Dein. 1.18). Diopeithes was perhaps being subsidized by Persia (Arist. Rhet. 1386a 13 and cf. Dem. 12.6).

During the siege of Perinthos Persian satraps aided the city (Diodoros
Notes to Chapter Two:

16.75.1-2; Dem. 11.5-6; Arrian 2.14.5; Pausanias 1.29.10) and cf. Khares' conference with the royal generals when the grain-ships were attacked (T71).

53 On syntaxeis see Dem. 8.25; IG II² 213.13-4; 233 b 7-17; T68 (fragment b, line 13).

On Hermias see Didymos 4.48-6.62; Diodoros 16.52.1-8 and cf. Griffith, Macedonia 518-22. Polyainos, 5.21, records an anecdote in which Athenodoros (surely the Imbrian = PA 280) was general for "the king" against Phokion around Atarneus. This episode is dated ca. 360 by Schaefer, Demosthenes² I, 156 and Koehler, IG II 108, perhaps on the basis of Aineias Taktikos 24.3-14 and Polyainos 3.14. If so, then Dem. 23.12, delivered in 353/2, would not have persuaded: "... Athenodoros, an Athenian by birth, would not dream... of opposing one of your strategoi". Athenodoros was later a mercenary in the service of the great king, captured by the Macedonians and released through the agency of Phokion (Aelian VH 1.25; Plu. Phokion 18).

54 Khares was allied with Artabazos in 356-5 (T26, T27, T28, T29, T30). Artabazos' brothers-in-law were associated with him in his rule (Dem. 23.157). He and Memnon were exiled (at the court of Philip), and restored through the agency of Mentor (Diodoros 16.52.1-4).

55 See Diodoros 17.29.1-4; 31.3; Arrian 2.1.1-3 for Memnon's naval force, and T83, T84 for Khares' service in Asia Minor.

The date adopted here for Polyainos' anecdote is the 'traditional' one, as accepted by Schaefer, Demosthenes² III. 171 n. 1; Berve, Alexanderreich Vol. I p. 246, and H.G. Buchholz, Methymna (Mainz, 1975) 149.

Books 3 and 4 (Amsterdam, 1980) 330-1. Bosworth, Commentary 180, argues that Khares "acted on his own initiative, perhaps to avenge acts of piracy from Methymna... His action was unfortunately simultaneous with Memnon's invasion of the island, and he lifted the blockade. The effectiveness of Memnon's intervention may well have caused Chares to change sides." But this cannot be right. Besides the reasons given in the text, the following ought to be considered. What forces was Khares commanding in 333, freelances from Sigeion? If so, how could he compete for mercenaries with Memnon and Alexander? Polyainos implies that 1,200 men were not enough to overwhelm Khares, but enough to deceive him that there were more: Khares' force must have been much larger than 1,200. How is it that Khares was unaware that a fleet of 300 ships that had already won over Khios was on its way to Lesbos? Why did Memnon, with his naval superiority, have to send an advance force by night, and on what basis could Khares have expected Memnon to keep away from Methymna? The date of 333 does not fit the military and political situation and is founded on the belief that Khares was an apolitical freebooter.

Bosworth was influenced by the similarity of the names of the tyrants of Methymna, Aristonymos (T69) and Aristonikos (Curtius 4.5.19-21; 4.8.11; Arrian 3.2.3-7). Both Arrian, 2.1.1, and Diodoros, 17.29.2, indicate that all the cities of Lesbos came over except Mytilene. No trouble at Methymna is reported by any source.

The fact that Polyainos mentioned Memnon, not Mentor, is no obstacle. Once Mentor obtained the restoration of Artabazos and Memnon, he was ordered to make war on the rebels and he entrusted his relatives with high military commands. He campaigned first against Hermias and then against other rebels. Such is the account of Diodoros 17.52.1-8. From Didymos it is learned that Hermias had charge of territory entrusted to him by, or claimed by, Khios.
and Mytilene, and that Assos, opposite Methymna, was part of his area of control (5.1-11, 60-62; cf. Strabo 13.1.57). Plu. Phokion 18 implies (official?) Athenian involvement in the region, perhaps at about this same time, since Phokion was strategos in this year (Didymos 1.18-25 = Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F160).

For the relations of Athens and Mytilene see Isok. Epistula 8; Dem. 13.8; 15.19; 40.36-7; IG II² 213 (= Tod, GHI 168). It seems that a non-democratic Mytilene was hostile to Athens from the late 350s until no later than 347/6, when a friendly democracy was in power. For Athens and Methymna see Isok. Epist. 7.8; IG II² 284 (= Tod, GHI 170); Theopompos FGrHist 115 F227. Kleom(m)is (Theopompos' Kleomenes) was tyrant of Methymna ca. 345 and friendly to Athens. The point is, there does not seem to have been a great deal of stability on the island, and a transition from Kleomis to Aristonymos to Artistonikos at Methymna is not impossible, just as the transition at Mytilene between 350-333 was from oligarchy to tyranny, to pro-Athenian democracy, to pro-Macedonian (democracy?), to pro-Persian autocracy was not. Cf. Arrian 3.2.3-7 and Curtius 4.5.17-22.


As Osborne points out, Naturalization vol. II 61, there is scholarly agreement on the identification of the document's Orontes with the famous, rebel satrap, for whom see following note.

57 The basic outline for the career of Orontes, satrap of Armenia, may be formed from Xen. Anabasis 2.4.8, 5.40; 3.4.13, 5.17; 4.3.4; Diodoros 15.8-11;
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58 Osborne (n. 56) has revived an old theory in arguing for a date ca. 361. For over a century before Osborne's studies a date of 349/8 for the document has been generally accepted, and it is worthwhile to explain why briefly. Fragment a, which contains the proposer's and the archon's name, was seen and transcribed by K.S. Pittakys and published by him in L'Ancienne Athènes (Athens, 1835) 500 f. The stone was subsequently lost. The inscription was re-published by A.R. Rangabis, who associated with it two other fragments (b and c), since all the fragments mentioned Orontes. They were published in Antiquités helléniques vol. II (Athens, 1855) as #397, 398 and 399 (a fourth fragment, d, has since been discovered: it physically joins b and c). Rangabis, however, did not see fragment a. By his own admission he had only Pittakys' publication on which to base his own text, yet his text differs considerably from Pittakys', and frequently not for the better. Nevertheless, his text became the basis for all later ones until Osborne's.

The most crucial difference between Pittakys' text and Rangabis' is in the archon's name. Where Pittakys clearly read E(INIKOMAXOY, Rangabis read the non-sensical ENIKAMMAXOY, which he deciphered as a mistake for E(INIKAAIAMAXOY (the archon for 349/8). The reason for this is undoubtedly the fact that fragments b and c mentioned the strategoi Khares, Kharidemos and Phokion, who are known to have been on the same board of strategoi only in 349/8 and 338/7 (this date seemed to be reinforced when fragment d was published, because it referred to the Athenian Proxenos, who is known to have been strategos in 347/6). Rangabis' cavalier attitude to Pittakys' text may have been helped
Notes to Chapter Two:

by the fact that the two were rivals, and Rangabis was contemptuous of his rival. This is well known. See, e.g., Frank Frost, "Troizen and the Persian War: Some New Data," AJA 82 (1978) 105-107.

59 See his "Tot Atheniensibus idem nomen erat...," in ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt, D.W. Bradeen and M.F. MacGregor, editors (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1974) 144-149.

For some homonymous Persians see: 1) an Orontas who was related to king Artaxerxes, held some position in Sardis, operated in Mysia and defected from the army of Kyros (and was executed by him), all during the last decade of the fifth century (Xen. Anabasis 1.6.1-11); 2) an Orontes who was a dynast in Armenia (probably satrap and, in all likelihood, son or grandson of the famous rebel satrap) between 331 and 316 (Arrian Anabasis 3.8.5; Diodoros 19.23.3). Strabo (11.14.12) knew of a ruler of Armenia by this name in the third or second century B.C.

60 Osborne, ABSA 66 (1971) 310-312, demonstrates that there is no obstacle to the later date on epigraphical grounds. In Naturalization he maintains that fragment a is a separate decree from fragments b, c and d, but admits that both "probably belong close together in time" and that there is a strong possibility that both were inscribed on the same stele (vol. I 52; vol. II 61).

Despite the fact that Osborne discovered and made known the invalidity of Rangabis' 'emendation' (see n. 58), he has gone on to suggest one himself: for ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΟΥ read ΝΙΚΟΦΜΟΥ, the archon of 361/0 (ABSA 66 [1971] 319 and Naturalization vol. I 53)! It should be pointed out that Pittakys, unlike Rangabis and Osborne, had no preconceived reason to misread or emend the archon's name.

61 The main obstacle to the early date of 361 has always been the mention of Athenian strategoi. Very few believe that Kharidemos was a citizen, let alone
Notes to Chapter Two:

a strategos, as early as 361. See, e.g., Hornblower, Mausolus 179 n. 74. Kharidemos was, however, strategos in 353/2 (probably), in 351/0, 349/8, 338/7, and (probably) 337/6 as well, perhaps, as the following two years.

Phokion was many times strategos (see Plu. Phokion 8 and 19), but no strategia of his can be documented before 349/8. See H.-J. Gehrke, Phokion: Studien zur Erfassung seiner historische Gestalt (Munich, 1976) 5-7.

Apart from a trierarchy, nothing is known about Proxenos before he was strategos in 347/6 (Aiskh. 2.133-4; Dem. 19,50,52,73-4,154-5). He may have been prosecuted and convicted between that time and the trial of Aiskhines in 343 (Dem. 19.280 and scholion, and cf. Dein. 1.63), but was in possession of his civic rights again by 341/0, when he, along with several other prominent Athenians (including other former strategoi), contributed money for the expedition to Euboia (IG II² 1623.163-4).

Thus, Khares and Phokion were strategoi in 341/0, and there is no reason why Kharidemos and Proxenos cannot have been also. Of the two Athenians mentioned on fragment a of the document, Nikomakhos was archon in 341/0 (see PA 10936), and Polykrates Polykratous is unknown. A Polykrates, however, did propose a decree concerning the Athenian forces in the Khersonesos ca. 341-0 (Dem. 12.16).

It should be added that Osborne, ABSA 66 (1971) 302, canvassed the possibility that behind Pittakys' ΠΡΥΤΑΝΕΥΟΥΣΙΣ at the end of line 1 in fragment a, lurked ΠΡΥΤΑΝΕΥ<Ε> ΟΝΗΣ[ΠΠΟΣ. Indeed, Osborne did adopt the reading ΠΡΥΤΑΝΕΥ<Ε> in his text (Naturalization vol. I 53). Onesippos was grammateus in 341/0.

62 See n. 52 for Athenian relations with Persia ca. 341. The date of 361/0 for Athenian relations with Orontes is not sound on historical grounds according to Hornblower, Mausolus 202 n. 160. Apollodoros the Athenian commanded the mercenaries of Arsites, who was aiding Perinthos in 340 (Paus.1. 29.10).
Notes to Chapter Two:

63 Dem. 12.16. Cf. T67 and, for Khares' fleet, T70.

64 So Dem. 18.73 and T71. Diodoros 16.74.2-5; 75.1-4 specifies aid to Perinthos from Persian satraps and Byzantion, but mentions none from Athens. Cf. 16.77.2-3.

65 See previous note. Diodoros 16.77.2-3 writes that the Athenians decided that Philip had broken the peace and then they sent a fleet in aid of Byzantion, as did the Khians, Rhodians, Koans and others. The time of Philip's attack can be fixed with some degree of accuracy. In 362 the merchant ships were about to sail out of the Pontos on 24 Metageitnion (ca. September), and in 361 the business of convoying the merchant ships (from Hieron) took 45 days and ended after the rising of Arcturus (late September) (Dem. 50.6, 17-21). For the chronology of the Perinthos-Byzantion campaign see Griffith, Macedonia 566-581.

66 See T72 (not very valuable) and T73 for Phokion's force. Diodoros 17.77.2, Dionysios Ad Ammaeum 11 and Didymos 1.67-2.1 (both quoting Philokhoros = FGrHist 328 F55a,b), all indicate that an official decision was made at Athens (after Philip's letter was received) to declare war, and then ships were manned and sent. The strategos Kephisophon was also sent out (IG II² 1628.436; 1629.957-9).

Philip's fleet suffered a defeat according to Hesykhios FGrHist 390 F1 §27, and the third couplet of the epigram in T70 implies that Khares thought he had scored a victory against Philip. Cf. Griffith, Macedonia 579 n. 1.

67 Phokion had been involved in the campaign on Euboia in 341, as had Kephisophon, the other strategos sent out with a naval force in 340 (n. 66): Didymos 1.13-25 (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F159-160). Although in different archon-years, the campaigns of Phokion and Kephisophon both took place in the summer of 341. Khares was already in the Hellespont in February 340
Notes to Chapter Two:

(T67).

The tradition of rivalry between Phokion and Khares is supported by other evidence (T74, T75, Plu. Phokion 17), but Plutarch may have imported the anecdote about Khares from elsewhere. The words ἵππος τῶν συμμάχων καὶ καταφρονομένος ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων are more than faintly suggestive of Diodorus T7, Demosthenes 4.24 and Isokrates T25 (and cf. 8.46). See further at n. 69.

68 Plu. Phokion 14.4-5 (cf. Frontinus 1.4.13, 13a); Dem. 18.139; Justin 9.1.6f. The siege probably lasted until spring of 339 (Griffith, Macedonia 578 n. 4).

69 Note that in T73 the demos was not annoyed with Khares, but with the Byzantines. Khares was again elected strategos for 339/8 and placed in a position of importance (T76, T77, T78 and cf. T79).

Byzantion had, perhaps, reason to suspect Khares from his activities in the Social War, but the choice of Phokion was a good one because he was the friend of a leading Byzantine statesman, Leon (Plu. Phokion 14.4 and cf. Hesykhios of Miletos FGrHist 390 F1 §26-7). One source imagines Leon to have been venal (Souda s.v. Λέων Λ.265), and perhaps Phokion was to remind him of their student days at the Academy.

70 Dem. 18.169-180, 211-14; Diodoros 16.84.1-85.4. For events leading up to the Amphiktyonic War see Dem. 18.147-158 and Aiskh. 3.115-129.

71 Aiskhines says (3.143) "but the command on land, if we are not to talk nonsense, he carried away and put into the hands of the Thebans," and (145) talked about joint command with the Boiotarkhoi. That the Boiotians would insist on supreme command on land is neither unusual nor implausible, since the war was certainly going to be fought in their territory. Cf. the alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis in 420/19 (Thuc. 5.47;
Notes to Chapter Two:

IG II² 86) and that with the Arkadians, Elis, Akhaian and Phleious of 362/1 (IG II² 112 lines 34-5) and, for a truly 'equal' alliance, see Xen. 7.1.12-14.

Considering the circumstances under which the war was certain to be fought, Boiotia, the strongest land power in Greece, was not being overly demanding. See D.J. Mosely, "Athens' Alliance with Thebes 339 B.C.," Historia 20 (1971) 508-10.

72 For the mercenaries see Dem. 18.237; Aiskh. 3.146; Dein. 1.74. For the Khaironeia campaign see N.G.L. Hammond, Studies in Greek History 534-557 (= Chapter 16) and Griffith, Macedonia 589-96 and n. 1.

73 For Lysikles see Diodoros T76; 16.88.1-2; Plu. Mor. 843D. All the data about this man seems to have come from Lykourgos' famous prosecution speech against him (cf. Harpokration s. v. Αεβαδεα and εν δηλω μάχη); for Stratokles, Aiskh. 3.143; Polyainos 4.2.2, for the Thebans Dein. 1.74; Plu. Mor. 259D; Polyainos 8.40; Plu. Alexander 12 (and cf. Theopompos FGrHist 115 F210; Dem. 18.48). Note that Theagenes is associated solely with the battle of Khaironeia; Proxenos with the mercenaries and Amphissa (cf. T77).

74 See Griffith, Macedonia 594-5 for the consequences of the defeat at Amphissa. The diplomatic damage was contained by Demosthenes (Plu. Phokion 16; Demosthenes 18; Aiskh. 3.148-151).

75 For the sources on the battle see Hammond, Studies in Greek History 536-8. It is striking that so much of what the extant sources knew about the battle was apparently based on the evidence of contemporary oratory. See Diodoros 16.84.3-85.1; 85.3-4 (based on Dem. 18.169-178 and 136 respectively); Plu. Demosthenes 18 (using the same speech of Demosthenes, as well as reports by the historians Marsyas and Theopompos, who themselves resorted to oratory); Demosthenes 17 (a speech? by 'Krobylos) and 20 (a speech by Pytheas); and Diodoros 16.88.1-2 (a speech by Lykourgos).
Notes to Chapter Two:

76 See n. 73. The bon mot of Demades is also found in the Pseudo-Plutarchean de Nobilitate 2 (which adds: ἐτυχε δ' ἡ χάρις τότε στρατηγήσας.), but this is probably a late Byzantine work and possibly as dependent on Stobaios as on Plutarch. See Wyttenbach, Plutarch Moralia Vol. 5 pt. 2 page 915. The speeches of Demades were no longer extant in the time of Cicero (Brutus 9.36; Orator 26.90; Quintilian 12.10.49), nor does Harpokration or the other lexicographers quote him. Demades' famous repartees circulated and perhaps multiplied. In addition to the more famous one from Khaironeia (Diodoros 16.87.1-2), there are a great number in Plutarch's lives of Demosthenes 11,13,31 and Phokion 1, 22, 30 bis. As for the repartee currently under discussion, one wonders how many clever things Demades dared to say while a prisoner at Khaironeia.

It is not very likely that the defeated Khares and Proxenos were associated in any meaningful way with the high command of the citizen forces. The two had presumably been chosen in the first place because of their experience with mercenary forces. Furthermore, sometimes defeated armies were considered to be tainted with bad luck (e.g., Xen. 1.2.15).

77 In addition to Lysikles, Lykourgos prosecuted Leokrates and Autolykos (Lykourgos 1 passim and 1.53; the offences were deserting the city, and sending off family members, respectively), and Aiskhines tried to hang the label "runaway" on Demosthenes (Aiskh. 3.159, 252-3 and cf. Plu. Demosthenes 21).

Very shortly after the battle it became a commonplace that the Thebans had been the traitors at Khaironeia (Dem. 18.48,295; Dein. 1.74; Dem. 60.22).

Endorsing the view that Khares 'ran away' after the battle or tried to shift the blame are Hammond, History of Greece 570 and J. Roberts, Accountability 77-8.

78 Diodoros 17.15.1-5; Arrian 1.10.1-6; Justin 11.4.9-12; Plu. Demosthenes
Notes to Chapter Two:


Arrian and the Souda are used to supplement and confirm one another's list. Both traditions include Moirokles, so it is assumed that Patrokles/Prokles in the Souda is a corruption (but cf. Plu. Mor. 846C). Thrasyboulos helped in the defence of Halikarnassos with Ephialtes (Diodoros 17.25.6) and so can be plausibly used to bring Arrian's list up to ten names. The Souda has confused 'those demanded by Alexander' in 335 with 'those demanded by Antipatros' in 322, namely Demosthenes, Hypereides, Himeraios Phalereus, and Arisonikos Marathonios (Plu. Demosthenes 28.2-4; Souda A2703). This may help to explain how an eleventh name, Kassandros (Antipatros' son), has slipped into the list.

The texts are reproduced along with T80 in the Appendix. Diodoros calls the men "the ten rhetores"; Plutarch Phokion mentions Hypereides, who occurs only in the 'ten-name' tradition. One of the differences in the two lists is that the 'ten' are divided into five strategoi (Khares, Kharidemos, Ephialtes, Thrasyboulos, Diotimos) and five rhetores. Justin calls the men "oratores et duces" and claims that Alexander relented so that only the duces were exiled, and they were of no small help to the Persians (all the strategoi except Diotimos are known to have helped the Persians). Presumably, this is the tradition that the author of Vitae Decem Oratorum is thinking of, although he paradoxically has Hypereides (one of the 'ten') speak "on behalf of the strategoi".

For discussions on the variant traditions see Jacoby, FGrHist II.C 124 (= commentary on Douris 76 F39); P.A. Brunt, in the Loeb Arrian: History of Alexander Vol. I.44 n. 3; and especially Bosworth, Commentary on Arrian Vol. I.93-5. Bosworth argues that the 'eight' include some quite obscure
Notes to Chapter Two:

names, while the 'ten' include some very obvious ones. Therefore, the more obscure list is less likely to have been fictitious. Note that in Plu. Demosthenes 23.6 Aristobouloos appears to be the source for the 'eight', and so is eliminated as a source for Arrian's 'ten'. That leaves Ptolemy as Arrian's source according to Brunt and Bosworth.

Bosworth is somewhat insensitive to the origins of the 'ten'. Arrian, Diodoros, and Plu. Phokion describe the men as "those around Demosthenes and Lykourgos et al." Thus, the 'ten', if indeed fictitious, may be an attempt to describe the political circle of Lykourgos and Demosthenes.

82 Anonymous Athenians at Granikos: Arrian 1.16.2,6; Plu. Alexander 16. Those that were not slaughtered were interned in Macedon for three years. That there were many Athenians is shown by the repeated embassies from Athens to secure their release (Arrian 1.29.3 and 3.6.2; Curtius 3.1.9 and 4.8.12-13).

Thrasyboulos and Ephialtes: Diodoros 17.25.6-27.3. Kharidemos: Arrian 1.10.4; Diodoros 17.30.2-7; Curtius 3.2.10-19. Dein. 1.32 claims that Demosthenes associated himself with an unwilling Kharidemos, but Demosthenes lamented his death ca. 324 (Dem. Epistula 3.31), and they were probably cooperating in 336 when Philip died (Aiskh. 3.77). Cf. Diodoros 17.4.7-8, 5.1: even Demosthenes tried to do what he could. Athenodoros: Plu. Phokion 18; Aelian VH 1.25 and cf. Polyainos 5.21 for his earlier service with Persia. Demokrates: Curtius 6.5.9. In the course of the war Alexander captured several envoys from the Greek states to Dareios, some of whom 'sided with the Persians' or actually joined the mercenaries. See Curtius 3.13.15 and Arrian 2.15.2; Curtius 6.5.1-10 and Arrian 3.23.24, respectively.

83 Dein. 1.32 implies that political leaders in Athens were involved, and presumably in communication, with the projects of the men who went to serve the Persians in Asia. Cooperation between Demosthenes and Kharidemos against Macedon is also implied by Aiskh. 3.77. For the influence of Demos-
thenes and Kharidemos with the king of Persia see Curtius 3.2.10; Diodoros 17.4.7-8, 5.1, 30.1-6.

This is the only occasion on which Khares is known to have taken refuge at Sigeion, although ancient statements such as T32 and T33 fuel conjectures that he retreated there every time things became uncomfortable at Athens. Theopompos (T32 and, therefore, Nepos, T33) may have known only this incident on which to base his statement.

When Mytilene finally did capitulate to Memnon, or his nephew(s), it was not Khares, but Lykomedes of Rhodes who was put in charge of the garrison (Arrian 2.1.5). Perhaps the command was offered to Khares after the Persian fleet was stripped of its mercenaries for the Issos campaign (Arrian 2.1.6, 13.2-3; Curtius 3.8.1).

Curtius calls Khares' garrison "Persians", which is hard to believe since most of the garrisons in Ionia were composed of Greeks. In a few instances mixed garrisons of natives and Greeks are mentioned as at Halikarnassos (Arrian 1.20.2-3); at Syllion in Pamphylia (Arrian 1.27.5); Kelainai in Karia (100 Greeks and 1,000 Karians: Arrian 1.29.1); apparently at Khios, where the "Persian" garrison was slaughtered, but 3,000 Greeks were taken alive (Curtius 4.5.17); and Crete was said to be 'occupied by Persian and Spartan armies' (Curtius 4.8.15). A purely Persian garrison in Mytilene would be most unusual.

Curtius also does not make clear if Khares negotiated the safe departure of himself only, or of his command as well. It is inconceivable that one man could surrender 2,000, and given the trouble it would take to recapture Mytilene (cf. Arr. 2.1-2), evacuation of the whole force is plausible. This would be particularly understandable if Khares and his command were seeking to link up with the mercenaries Agis was collecting (see following note). The only obstacle to this interpretation is the sentence "the Macedonians
Notes to Chapter Two:

spared the surrendered." This may refer to the people of Mytilene, for whom Alexander felt sympathy (Curtius 4.8.13). Curtius 4.5.17 is not a parallel, because Khios was captured during a siege and it appears that the Khians themselves slaughtered the Persian garrison.


The Lamian War seems to have been Leosthenes' project from the beginning (Diodoros 17.111.1-4; 18.9.1-5). By 332 Khares was getting to be an old man. He had already committed himself against the Macedonians, and must have known that Agis was looking for mercenaries and that a base for them had been established on Cape Tainaron (Arrian 2.13.5-6; Diodoros 17.48.1; Curtius 4.1.39). During Agis' war the Lakedaimonians had up to 10,000 mercenaries in their service (Dein. 1.34; Aiskh. 3.165; Diodoros 17.62.2 and cf. Justin 21.1).

An objection might be raised against this date: why were the Athenians debating about this force and why did they think Khares might obey their authority, if the army was ultimately under Agis' command? The answer to that question is that the city-states did exercise control over their private citizens' affairs abroad. The demos ordered Khabrias to desist from his activities in Egypt (Diodoros 15.29.3; Nepos *Chabrias* 3.1). The demos also took an official interest in the welfare of their private citizens who fought against the Macedonians at the Granikos (see n. 82), and policies hostile to Macedon were openly debated in the assembly. Hypereides spoke against sending Athenian triremes, as requested by Alexander (Plu. *Phokion* 21 and cf. Hyper. 3.20,24) and Demosthenes made at least some attempt to elicit support for Agis (Plu. *Demosthenes* 24).
Notes to Chapter Two:

87 For the history of the controversy about the authenticity of Demosthenes' Letters, and a sustained argument that Letters 1-4 are genuine see J.A. Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes*. In any case, the author of *Epistula 3* is extremely well informed about the situation in Athens in 323; much of his information is so obscure, and he so avoids 'grandstanding', common in forgeries, that a date much later than the purported one seems ruled out.
Notes to Part Two: ΧΑΡΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΤΙΚΟΣ

1 Plutarch, Phokion 8, maintains that Phokion was strategos 45 times, yet a recent study (Gehrke, Phokion 5-7) can document only 19 of these.


3 Aristophon had been active as early as the restoration of the democracy in 403, but the evidence for his fourth-century activities begins only around 363/2, and is concentrated in the period from that time until the peace of Philokrates. For more on him see chapter three.

Demosthenes began to be politically active in 355 (Dem. 20), but he was of rather little significance until after the Olynthian War. See Cawkwell, "Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Fund," Mnemosyne 15 (1962) 377-383.

4 As noted in the introduction to Part I, Timotheos, Iphikrates and Khabrias ended their careers during or just after the Social War. Kallistratos of Aphidna, too, failed in his bid to come back to Athens, while other men such as Euboulos, Phokion, Demosthenes and Philokrates began to emerge.

5 Recent contributions include: R. Sealey, Essays, W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens, S. Perlman, "The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century B.C.", Athenaeum N.S. 41 (1963) 327-355, and M.H. Hansen, see n. 2 and "The Number of Rhetores in the Athenian Ecclesia, 355-322 B.C.", GRBS 25 (1984) 123-155. In general the trend is towards a belief in a large number of political groups, the dropping of programmatic labels such a "patriotic", "conservative", "radical"; but some of these die hard and the term "imperialists" is still bandied about. Hansen's studies represent the view that many more Athenians participated in the decision-making process than was previously supposed. The idea that the proposer and the executor of a decree were political allies is still a mainstay in determining political groups. See, e.g., Sealey, Essays passim and cf. my note appended to the conclusion.
Notes to Chapter Three:

1 Arist. Ath. Pol. 61, and for the date of elections see 44.4.

2 Numerous examples of families with successive generations of strategoi exist. Examples from the period under discussion are Konon-Timotheos-Konon, Diotimos-Strombikides-Autokles (see Davies, APF 254-271 and Table I) and cf. the self-conscious Kallias Hipponikou's words as reported by Xenophon 6.3.2-6.

Family support cannot be taken for granted, however. Cf. the divergent political leanings of the sons of Phanostratos of Phaleron: Himeraios was put to death along with Hypereides and other democrats, while Demetrios became tyrant of Athens (see Davies, APF 107-110). Cf. likewise the sons of Thymokhares of Sphettos, Kallias and Phaidros (T.L. Shear, Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C. [Princeton, 1978]).

Khares' career lasted at least 35 years after his first strategia, he was probably already thirty years old by then, and had probably been taxiarkhos 7-10 years before that. He likely nourished ambitions for a public career as a very young adult. See chapter one p. 3.

3 See Arist. 61.3. The taxiarkhoi led their own tribesmen and appointed the lokhagoi, but it is not known if they were elected by their own tribe alone or by the entire demos. In either case, it makes good sense that the members of a tribe would take great interest in the election of their taxi­arkhos, who might lead them in battle. Likewise, it was in the tribe's interest to see to it that their taxiarkhos appointed competent lokhagoi for the same reason. On these magistrates in general see Rhodes, CommAthPol 684-5. The Athenian army was still organized along tribal lines in the fourth century (Xen. 4.2.19,21 and Lysias 16.15-16).

4 Each tribe appointed a khoregos to the Thargelia in alternate years (Arist. AthPol. 56.3).
Notes to Chapter Three:

5 See chapter one n. 27 for the tribal association of the taxiarkhoi. Rhodes, CommAthPol 685 cites SEG XIV.64 as evidence that the tribal association became moribund (i.e., by 271/0 there were ten taxiarkhoi, but twelve tribes), but during the time under discussion there was still one for each tribe. See Arist. (n. 3 above), and cf. Dem. 4.26 and 14.23.

6 See C. Fornara, The Athenian Board of Generals from 501-404, Historia Einzelschriften 16 (Wiesbaden, 1971) and Rhodes, CommAthPol 677-8. Note that there were two strategoi from Rhamnous in both 357/6 (T11) and 356/5 (T17 and cf. Isok. 15.129). Aiantis was also doubly represented in 373/2 and 372/1, by Iphikrates Rhamnousios and Kallistratos Aphidnaios (Xen. 6.2.39 and cf. 6.3.3,10 and Plu. Agesilaos 28).

It is noteworthy that during Khares' 30 year career, no other strategos from Pandionis is known.

7 Dem. 4.26-7.


9 For Kallistratos see Sealey, Essays 133-163; for Euboulos and Diophantos see Cawkwell, "Euboulos," JHS 83 (1963) 47-67 and Sealey, Essays 164-182.

10 For sources see PA 2108 and Davies, APF 64-6.

11 Dem. 20.148-9; Athenaios Deipnosophistai 13.577C (= Karystios FHG Müller IV 358 F11); Dem. 57.32. His brother was tamias of the goddess in 400/399 (IG II² 1374.6).

12 S.I. Oost, "Two Notes on Aristophon of Azenia," CPh 72 (1977) 238-242, suggests that Aristophon withdrew from political life during these forty years. Others, e.g., Sealey, Essays 147 and Davies, APF 65, identify Demostatos son of Aristophon, an ambassador to Sparta in 371 (Xen. 6.3.2), as his
Notes to Chapter Three:

son. A fellow ambassador, Autokles, is supposed by some also to have been an ally of Aristophon.

13 See IG II² 111 (= Tod, GHI 142; Bengtson, SV 289; translated in Harding, Ipsus 55) and cf. the grant of proxenia to him by Karthaia on Keos (IG XII [5] 542 line 43). He was strategos according to T19.

14 Dem. 50.4 -6.

15 Peparethos: T7; Polyainos 6.2.1,2. Prosecution of trierarchs: Dem. 51.8-9,16 and cf. Hansen, Eisangelia 142 (pp. 118-9). Leosthenes: T7; Hyper. 3.1-2. Aiskh. 2.124 and scholion to 2.21 show that, contrary to Diodoros, Leosthenes went into exile and was still alive in 343. Cf. Hansen, Eisangelia 88 (p. 95). Kallistratos: Hyper. 3.1-2; Lykourgos 1.93. His exile took place between his embassy to the Peloponnesos in 362 (Nepos Epameinondas 6; Plu. Mor. 193C; Arist. Rhet. 1418b 9), and ca. November 361 (Dem. 50.48).

16 For his fiscal measures see Dem. 20.146; 24.11 and cf. IG II² 121 and 130. For his prosecution of the strategoi see T18, T19 and cf. Hansen, Eisangelia 100, 101, 102 (pp. 100-2). In chapter five it is argued that Isokrates (T24), Aiskhines (T52) and Theopompos (T62), all allude to this trial.

17 Aristophon opposed the peace (Theopompos FGrHist 115 F166), and he opposed Euboulos (Dem. 20.137,146; 18.162; 19.290-1). See also Dem. 18.70, 75; 21.218 and scholion.

18 He proposed IG II² 224 in 343/2 and IG II² 289 at an unknown date. Cf. T55 and Aiskh. 1.158. He dedicated a phiale to Asklepios in 340 (IG II² 1533.13), but was dead by 330 (Dem. 18.162; Aiskh. 3.139). A scholion to Aiskh. 1.64 (= T19) asserts he lived to be 99 years old.

19 In Essays 133-182.

20 Sealey is referred to as an authority by Buckler, Hegemony 88 n. 28, 194 n. 19, 198-9 nn. 24,25; Cargill, League 76 n. 28, 171 n. 19, 173 n. 23;
Notes to Chapter Three:

Hornblower, Mausolus 205 n. 182; Roberts, Accountability 112 n. 24; C. Mossé, Athens in Decline 54 n. 4, 168; C.D. Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War, (Ithaca, N.Y., 1979) 172 n. 29; and L. Kallet, "Iphikrates, Timotheos and Athens, 371-360 B.C.,” GRBS 24 (1983) 241 n. 8 and 252 n. 34.

21 Xen. 6.3.2,7-10. Aristophon was reputedly "pro-Theban" (Dem. 18.162; Aiskh. 3.139).

22 For Autokles in Thessaly see Diodoros 15.71.3-4 and cf. Xen. 7.1.28. For the expeditions to the Peloponnesos see chapter one n. 39.

23 Dem. 50.6,12. Autokles was prosecuted by Apollodoros Akharneus (Dem. 36.53 and cf. 23.104), with Hypereides as either a synegoros or logographer. Cf. Hyper. F55-65 Jensen and Hansen, Eisangelia 90 (pp. 95-6). Aristophon was prosecuted by Hypereides at an unknown date (Hyper. 3.28 and cf. Hansen, Eisangelia 97 [pp. 99] and the discussion infra).

24 Essays 148.

25 Sealey, Essays 150 asks "did they perhaps contrive to pass the blame on to the Aristophon-group?" Roberts, Accountability 77,165, suggests that Khares was behind the attack on the other two men.

26 Dem. 51.8-9,16. Because he prosecuted the trierarchs, it is assumed that he also prosecuted Leosthenes. So Hansen, Eisangelia 88 (p. 95) and 142 (pp. 118-9).

27 Sealey, Essays 148,165 and Cargill, League 173 n. 23, respectively.

28 Kallistratos and Iphikrates combined in 373 to attack Timotheos (Dem. 49.9; Lysias F228 = cxvi in Sauppe-Baiter Oratores Attici). Iphikrates then requested Kallistratos and Khabrias as his colleagues on Keryra (Xen. 6.2.13 and cf. Diodoros 15.47.7), and he and Kallistratos were supposedly allied for the next decade. Cf. Sealey, Essays 146-7. Ca. 362 Iphikrates was forced
Notes to Chapter Three:

into an alliance with Timotheos (Dem. 49.66-7 and cf. L. Kallet, n. 20 above, for a challenge to the date of this alliance).

For Aiskhines and Euboulos see Aiskh. 2.8,184; T57; Dem. 18.21,162; 19.290,304, and note that Aiskhines was previously a supporter of Aristophon (Dem. 18.162; 19.290-1).

29 Xen. 7.1.41. Elsewhere Xenophon criticizes Agesilaos' tactics at Koroneia (4.3.19) and Iphikrates' at Korinth (6.5.51-2 and cf. 49, where his own soldiers criticize him). There is no question of bias, since Xenophon praised each of these men on other occasions. See Xen. 4.8.18-19 and 4.8.36-38 for further Xenophontic criticism of Anaxibios and Thibron. Where Xenophon criticizes Iphikrates, Diodoros (15.63.2; 65.6) merely notes that he accomplished nothing worthy of mention. Cf. Nepos Iphicrates 2.5.

30 Dem. 23.149 and cf. Nepos Iphicrates 3.2 and Aiskh. 2.26-9. For the date see Diodoros 15.60.3; 71.1.

31 See chapter one n. 39 and add Kephisodoros Marathonios, who was hipparkhos at the battle of Mantinea (Pausanias 8.9.10; Ephoros FGrHist 70 F85).

32 Essays 148-150. Kallistratos helped negotiate the peace with Sparta in 371 (Xen. 6.3.3,10), he supported sending aid to the Lakedaimonians (Dem. 59.27 and cf. Xen. 6.5.49), participated in a diplomatic mission to the Arkadians (Nepos Epameinondas 6; Plu. Mor. 193C, 810F), and in another to Messene (Arist. Rhet. 1418b 9). For the dates of these last two see Buckler, Hegemony 198 n. 24 (366 for the former, 362 for the latter) and cf. Sealey, Essays 150 and Roy, Historia 20 (1971) 596.

33 Hypereides 3.1-2 implies that he was either a rhetor, who "did not say what was best for the demos" or a strategos. Hansen, Eisangelia 87 (pp. 94-5) argues that Hypereides' "rhetor" must be Kallistratos.
Notes to Chapter Three:

34 The prosecutors were Philostratos Kolonethen (Dem. 21.64) and Leodamas Akharneus (Arist. Rhet. 1364a 19-23). Leodamas had already indicted Khabrias after the battle of Naxos (Dem. 20.146) and was a syndikos of Leptines' law, which harmed Khabrias' son, Ktesippos, and presumably Aristophon as well, since he and Ktesippos both enjoyed atelia (Dem. 20.148).

An otherwise unknown Lykoleon was synegoros for Khabrias (Arist. Rhet. 1411b 6-7), and, according to Diogenes Laertios 3.24, Plato was threatened by Hegesippos of Sounion when he sought to help Khabrias. Hansen, Eisangelia p. 93 n. 17, dismisses Diogenes as unreliable, but Hegesippos' brother, Hugesandros, was an associate of Leodamas (Aiskh. 1.111 and cf. 69). Sealey, Essays 149 finds the anecdote "credible", and suggests (154 n. 175) that the two brothers were supporting the friends of Kallistratos by 361. Cf. Aiskh. 1.56,64,110 and chapter one n. 42.

35 See Xen. 7.4.1-6 for Athenian feelings about their allies and the diplomatic repercussions of those feelings. For the charge against Kallistratos see n. 33 above and cf. Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 I. 95. Khabrias may have been perceived as a 'philo-Boiotes' for his famous victory in their defence (Dem. 20.76; Diodoros 15.32-33; Polyainos 2.1.2; Nepos Chabrias 1.2 and scholion to Aristides' Panathenaikos 173.11,13 [vol. 3 p.281 Dindorf]). For other philo-Boiotians see Dem. 18.162 and Aiskh. 3.138-9.

36 As Sealey and Roberts do (see n. 25 above). For sources on the trials see Hansen, Eisangelia 83,84 (pp. 92-3).

37 For Enmity (or rivalry) with Timotheos and Iphikrates see T16, T17, T18, T19, T20, T21, T22; with Phokion see T73, T74, T75 and cf. Phokion's support of Aiskhines in 343, when the latter attacked Khares (Aiskh. 2.170,184); with Euboulos see T53 (and his support of Aiskhines, likewise); with Kephisodotos see T45; and with Aiskhines see T52 and cf. Aiskh. 1.132.
Notes to Chapter Three:

38 Nepos T14 calls Khabrias *privatus*, and the words of Demosthenes, 20. 82, imply that he was under another's orders. Nepos and Plutarch Phokion 6 imply that Khabrias had command of a ship; Nepos says he gave orders to the *gubernator*, and note his reluctance to abandon his ship. He had been a trierarch before, and was probably one now. See Davies, APF 560-1.

39 T13 and the sources in n. 38.

40 Xen. 1.7.5 and cf. 1.6.35: the strategoi at Arginousai ordered the *taxiarkhoi* and some trierarchs *διστρατηγικῶς* *τὸν* to rescue those whose ships had been sunk.

41 Khabrias' recent performance had not pleased the Athenians (Dem. 23. 172), and he may have been deposed from office early in 357/6. His name has been erased from T11, but cf. Cawkwell, C&M 23 (1962) 38 n. 23. The sources (nn. 38, 39) may suggest that his actions at Khios were somewhat desperate. Cf. Lysias 29.3, where the speaker implies that a strategos who appointed a trierarch to sail with him was doing him a favor.

One wonders what to make of *IG II²* 84, if the Kallistratos there is the famous political leader, and if the Alkibiades honored is the mercenary commander mentioned by Aiskhines 2.168? It would make Kallistratos praise a subordinate of Khares.

42 The sources are gathered by Hansen, *Eisangelia*, whose catalogue numbers are given here: the strategoi Kallisthenes (85), Ergophilos (86), Leosthenes (88), Autokles (90), Timomakhos (91), Timotheos (93), Menon (95), Kephisodotos (96), Aristophon (97), Theotimos (94: he was certainly a military commander, possibly a strategos), Philon Aixoneus (89: possibly a strategos). Trierarchs include those with Leosthenes (142) and Kallippos Aixoneus (92). *Rhetores* are Kallistratos (87) and Timarkhos Sphettios (143).

43 See previous note for location of sources. Prosecutors were Arist-
ophon (of Leosthenes' trierarchs); Euthykles Thriasios (of Kephisodotos); Hypereides Kollyteus (of Aristophon); Pamphilos Akherdousios (of Timarkhos); and Apollodoros (of Autokles, Timomakhos, Kallippos, Menon and Timotheos). Apollodoros' lawsuits against Timotheos and others suggests that finance was never far from his mind (cf. Dem. 49, 36, 50, 52, 53 and 59).

44 Dem. 50.4-6, 12, 14.


46 T7; Polyainos 6.2.1-2. Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 I.131 n. 3, dates the battle to the spring of 361.

47 Hypereides is known to have prosecuted both Aristophon (F40-44 Jensen and cf. 3.28) and Autokles (F55-65 Jensen).

For Euthykles see Dem. 23.5, 163 and cf. Dionysios ad Ammaeum I.4 (p. 725); Libanios' Hypothesis to Dem. 23 and the scholion to Aiskh. 3.52. Dem. 23 Against Aristokrates is a sustained attack on Kharidemos, who gave Kephisodotos and other strategoi so many problems.

48 See T16, T17.

49 Sealey, Essays 165, followed by Hornblower, Mausolus 205 n. 182. But cf. Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 I. 174 n. 1, who connects the fragment to the Timotheos-trial.

50 See the note to T19 in the Appendix Testimoniorum: the number "75" (οέ) is the conjecture of Baiter-Sauppe and accepted by Jensen. As the text stands the information that Aristophon "escaped a graphe paranomon" is unremarkable, but Aiskh. 3.194 and a scholion to Dem. 19.297 give the number as 75 and 70, respectively. Cf. the scholion to Dem. 18.70. The Aiskhines-scholion has, in some MSS, lost the number "9" (ε') in the reference to Aristophon's age, and some MSS of the scholion to Dem. 19.297 have corrupted the number "70" (δ) to the definite article το.

51 κεκομηδητα, meaning "to ridicule" was also used by Lykourgos (F89
Notes to Chapter Three:

Conomis = Harpokration _s.v._\( \kappa \tau \rho \lambda \sigma \delta \omega \rho \omega _{\zeta} \) in a speech Against Menesaikhmos.

It is not necessary to suppose, as Schaefer, _Demosthenes_² I. 174, and Edmonds, _FAC_ III.A. Adespota F312 do, that there is a comic fragment here. Cf. n. 59.

52 Aelian _VH_ 14.3; Lysias F131, 132 (where Iphikrates refers to his opponent as a sycophant and an actor, respectively). Cf. Isok. T24 §§36,50; Aiskh. T52; Theopompos T62. This charge is ubiquitous in Athenian forensic oratory. See Plu. _Demosthenes_ 13.2 (Kallistratos used to bribe Melanopos) and Davies, _APF_ 133-5 and 319 has collected the sources for the _\δωροδοξία_ of Demosthenes and Kleon, respectively.

53 This is the context into which Jacoby, _FGrHist_ II.B.2. 386 (commentary to Theopompos 115 F213), has placed the fragment, because Khares was strategos in Thasos in 343/2. Athenaios cites the book number as 45, so it is possible that Aiskhines' trial is the fragment's context.

54 See n. 50. The number of indictments, "75", may have originated with Aiskhines, for elsewhere (T52) he uses "75", "150" and "1,500" as conventional exaggerations for "a great number". Cf. Oost, _CPh_ 72 (1977) 238-242.

55 _IG_ II² 111 (= Tod, _GHI_ 142 = Bengtson, _SV_ 289, translated by Harding, _Ipsus_ 55).

56 See Harpokration _s.v._\( \dot{A} \rho \delta \nu \tau \tau o s \) for this place. It was the hill just west of the Panathenaic stadium where the _Heliastai_ swore their oaths. Cf. Pauly-Wissowa _RE_ s.v. 614-615 (Wachsmuth).

57 The speech is dated 330 or later by Jensen, _Hypereides: Orationes_ xxxvi-xxxvii.

58 See the sources listed in notes 11 and 18. Orators mention their own and other's ages not infrequently (Isok. 15.9; 12.3; Aiskh. 2.147; 3.191; 1.49; Dem. 21.154; Hyper. 5.22).
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59 That is, the information of the scholion could be assembled from T24, T52 and cf. T23 (bribery); Aiskh. 3.194 and scholion to Dem. 19.297 (the 75 graphai); Dem. 57.32, 20.149 and T55 (Aristophon's age). The corpus of Hypereides would probably have given the context for Aristophon's rapaciousness as strategos on Keos, the date of which could be guessed as 363/2 (n. 55). This is perhaps about the same date as Hegesandros' attack (Aiskh. 1.64) on Aristophon. Cf. Aiskh. 1.55-6, 109-10 and Dem. 50.16.

There was an ancient genre in which passages ridiculing a particular individual were collected. They often found their way into scholia. See J. Steinhausen, Κοινοδοξία των οπίσθων (Diss. Bonn, 1910) and Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 2192.28 (these references are from K.J. Dover, Aristophanes Clouds xcvii n. 2 and have not been seen by this author).

60 Iphikrates had not been very successful in the northern Aegean in 368-365 and was replaced by Timotheos (Aiskh. 2.26-9, 149; Dem. 23.149, 151), whereupon he served his in-law, Kotys of Thrace, and actually fought against the Athenians before withdrawing to Antissa and then Drys, clearly fearing to return to Athens (Dem. 23.130-2).

Timotheos, after a number of successes between 366-362, was badly defeated at Amphipolis, probably in 360/59 (Polyainos 3.10.8; scholion to Aiskh. 2.31), where he burnt his fleet to prevent its capture by the enemy. At home he faced troublesome litigation from Apollodoros (Dem. 36.53 and Dem. 49). Nepos (T17) reports that by 356 Timotheos was no longer holding magistracies.

61 Dem. 49.66 and cf. T17. L. Kallet, "Iphikrates, Timotheos, and Athens, 371-360 B.C.,” GRBS 24 (1983) 239-252, dates the marriage-alliance to 371-368 and maintains that the two generals were allies from that date. Her criteria for this date are: 1) that both men had to have been present in Athens for
Notes to Chapter Three:

the reconciliation and marriage, but one or the other was in fact absent from 368-360/59. 2) Timotheos recovered from his setback more quickly than is generally thought and can have demanded an alliance with Iphikrates on an equal basis at an early date (371-368). 3) Both men had mutual interests in Macedonia and Thrace. Kallet then goes on to interpret the actions of Iphikrates and Timotheos in the northern Aegean as "in concert" and for the good of Athens.

This argument is highly circumstantial and unconvincing. 1) no evidence is brought forward to prove that both men must have been present in Athens, nor is it proven that Iphikrates could not have been present in 362. 2) The sole piece of evidence for Timotheos' recovery between ca. 371 and 366 is his trierarchy (IG II² 1609.100). Not only is the date of this trierarchy in dispute (see chapter one n. 12: Cawkwell's arguments are not so strong as Kallet believes), but it is rather slender proof that Timotheos' comeback was rapid. Why, if he had made his comeback in 371, is nothing heard of him for five years? 3) Timotheos and Iphikrates did have 'mutual interests' in Macedonia and Thrace. So did every other Athenian strategos: the 'mutual interests' of Timotheos and Iphikrates are the interests of the Athenian state.

If Timotheos' comeback was so rapid and his alliance with Iphikrates made by 368, why was he unable to protect Menestheus in the early 360s? (see Arist. Rhet. 1399a 35 and Davies, APF 249-50.). What sort of an alliance was it that Timotheos replaced his 'ally' in command in Thrace? Most damaging of all is the utter absence of any evidence that the two men acted in concert between 365 and 360. Kallet's hypothesis is to be rejected, and with it the challenge to the traditional date.

62 Isok. 15.138-9 implies that there was more than one rhetor who attacked Timotheos.
Notes to Chapter Three:

63 Dionysios Lysias 12 (p 480) seems to date the trial during the war; Diodoros, T16, and Nepos, T17, imply as much. But at Deinarkhos 13 (p 668) Dionysios explicitly dates the conviction of Timotheos to 354/3, which date one may also infer from Polyainos, T18, since Khares appears to have been busy in Asia for some time after the battle (T26, T27).

64 Isok. 15.129 and Dionysios Lysias 12 (p 480) mention both processes. Elsewhere Dionysios (n. 63) mentions euthynai only, but Nepos Iphicrates 3.3 says Iphikrates spoke on a capital charge. Eisangelia, but not euthynai carried a capital charge, according to Hansen, Eisangelia p. 45.

65 Eisangelia p. 45-49 and 100-102 (#100, #101, #102).

66 Eisangelia p. 101 for the date, p. 45-6 for a discussion of the process.

67 See T20, T21 (and notes to the texts), T25 and a scholion to Homer's Iliad 13.289-291, for which see n. 89.

68 Aristophon: Arist. Rhet. 1398a 4-7; Dein. 1.14 = 3.17; Polyainos T18; Plu. Mor. 605F, 801F; Aelian VH 14.3. Only Polyainos names Khares, but Nepos T17 and Diodoros T16 relate that Khares accused his colleagues by letter and Arist. T22 affirms that his deeds were a subject of discussion at a trial.

69 Isok., Nepos, Diodoros, Polyainos and Arist. (n. 68). Dein. (n. 68) and Arist. add the information about the bribery.

70 See n. 64.

71 The relevant passage is:

Ωμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν τοῦ ἄνδρος, καὶ αὐτὴν εἰς Λυσίαν ἀναφερομένην, οὕτω τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀτόπως ἠχοῦσαν οὗτοι τοὺς ὀνομάσαν ἀσθενῶς, δι’ ὑποψίας ἔλαβον, οὐκ ἐπανθέσθης τῇ λέξει τῆς Λυσίακῆς χάριτος, καὶ παραθέντος τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἀλέγους ἠτέσσαν ἑδρον ὑπερθέουσαν τῆς τελευτής τοῦ βήτορος, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰκοσιν ὄλοις...ἐν τῷ συμμαχίας πολέμῳ τῆς ἔλατεγελάν, ἰμακρήτης ἠγάνωσται καὶ τὰς ἐθνίνας ὑπέσχηκε τῆς στρατηγίας, δι’ ἐκ αὐτοῦ γίνεται τὸ λόγον καταφαίνεις. οὕτως δὲ ὁ πολέμος πληκτει κατὰ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Ἐλπίνην ἔρχοντας.
Notes to Chapter Three:

72 The relevant text is:

ο μὲν λέγων ἐστὶν Ἀφαρεῦς. ἦξω δ' ἐστὶ τῶν δευνάρχου χρόνων.
εἴρηται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμόθεου ξώντος κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν
τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας, ἐφ' ἣ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑποσχέων ἔδωλα.
Τιμόθεος δὲ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπεδιδότηκεν ἐπὶ Διοτίμου τοῦ μετὰ Καλλιστράτου.
δότα καὶ ***. The rest is lost.

73 Isok. 15.129; Nepos Iphicrates 3.3; Polyainos T18; Plu. Mor. 836D.

74 Isok., Plu. (n. 73), Nepos T17, Diodoros T16, and Dein. (n. 68). Plu.
Mor. 605F and Nepos T17 refer to the exile. He was dead by the time of
Isokrates' Antidosis (15.101), which is generally dated 353.

75 T19, T24 and cf. the following: Plu. Mor. 187B (where Aristophon is
referred to as a συκοφάντης), 801F (he is called the "actor of Iphikrates' opponents"),
Arist. Rhet. 1398a 4-7 (the charge of betrayal for money is cast
back into Aristophon's face), and Aelian VH 14.3 (where Timotheos refers to
Aristophon's insatiate avarice).

76 Understood by Baiter-Sauppe, Oratores Attici 191 (Lysias F129/1xx)
"as if passing through enemy territory."

77 See at T20 in the Appendix for two other versions of this anecdote,
which are dependent on the present passage.

78 See at T21 in the Appendix for another version of this anecdote, again
dependent on the present passage.

79 Note that Isokrates, 15.117-120, employed the same argument that
Timotheos did in the two anecdotes: he brushes aside Timotheos' lack of an
impressive physique and emphasizes instead "the things which a prudent strategos
must know".

80 Memorabilia 3.4.1.

81 In this regard Lisa Kallet's arguments (n. 61) are valid: not only
Timotheos and Iphikrates, but also Khares would all have to be present at
Notes to Chapter Three:

Athens at the same time. Most, if not all of the period from 368 to 360/59 is ruled out for that reason. See n. 60. It would also seem that all three had to have been strategoi recently.

Common sense dictates, and Plu. Phokion 8 explicitly states, that candidates for strategos need not be present at the election.

82 Aiskh. 3.147-152: in 343 Aiskhines brought three generations of his family into the courtroom. Xen. 1.7.8: in 406 Theramenes arranged for persons in mourning dress to appear at a meeting of the ekklesia at which the charges against the strategoi of Arginousai were to be discussed. Cf. Timarkhos' alleged 'naked' speech in the assembly (Aiskh. 1.25-6), and Aiskhines' parody of it (Dem. 19.252) and Demosthenes' dramatic shedding of his himation in court (Dem. 21.216).

83 Scholion to Homer's Iliad 13.289-91:
καὶ ὁ Λυσίας τὸν ἵφακράτην ποιεῖ λέγοντα: "τραύματα ἔχον οὖν ἐξάτερον ἐπ᾽ ἐμὲ ἑρχομένων, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ἐπιλάν.

84 The author of the Vitae Decem Oratorum (Plu. Mor. 836D) and Dionysios (Lysias 12 [p 477]) knew of three Lysianic speeches delivered by Iphikrates. For the fragments see Baiter-Saupe, Oratores Attici Lysias F36-43/xviii, F128-133/lxv, and cxvi. Dionysios demonstrated that two of the three cannot have been genuine compositions of Lysias and conjectured that they were by Iphikrates himself.

85 So Baiter-Saupe, Oratores Attici Lysias F130/lxv (p. 191).

86 The elections were held in the ekklesia (Arist. AthPol. 60.4), but there seems to be no tradition of speeches on such occasions. If Plu. Phokion 8 is accurate, it is unlikely there were speeches.

87 Timotheos was deposed from office in 373 and tried in ca. November of that year. He departed Athens in May or June of 372, allegedly to avoid
Notes to Chapter Three:

rendering his *euthynai* (Dem. 49.6-28). Cf. the long delay of Aiskhines in rendering his *euthynai*. It would seem that *eisangeliai* were held promptly, but not immediately (i.e., there was time for Jason and Alketas to travel to Athens for Timotheos' trial).

88 In C&M 23 (1962) 45-9, especially 46 for earlier scholarship. Hansen, *Eisangelia* 100 n. 14 (pp. 46, 101) states the case for the date of 356.

89 Khares served as a subordinate to Timotheos in the 370s (T25 and see the discussion in chapter one nn. 26, 27 and 34). It is unclear if strategoi could select their subordinate *taxiarkhoi*. Sometimes strategoi were allowed to select colleagues (Xen. 6.2.39 and cf. Thuc. 4.29). Plutarch seems to think some sort of military tutelage existed between Khabrias and Phokion and again between Phokion and Khabrias' son, Ktesippos (Phokion 6-7). One wonders if Timotheos had given Khares such an opportunity at some early date.

Presumably, Isokrates was using Athenian technical military terms and not using *taxiarkhos* and *lokhagos* in a sense that suggests a mercenary hireling, since both of these offices existed in the mercenary forces of Kyros (Xen. *Anabasis* 1.2.25; 3.1.37; 3.4.21; 4.1.28; 4.3.22), and of the Spartans (Xen. 3.1.28; 3.2.16). Cf. Aineias 22.29. The word ἑχοῦτο, "Timotheos used such men" (T25), may be used pejoratively, as in Aiskh. 1.63 (one politician cum ἐρευνήτης "used" another) and Hyper. 1.20 (Demosthenes "uses" these fellows, i.e., Kallias and Taurosthenes of Khalkis).

Finally, there are two interesting details. First, Timotheos supported the invasion of Euboia in 357 and Khares was one of those sent out to Euboia (Dem. 8.74, T10, T11 and cf. Dem. 21.174). Sealey, *Essays* 148 tries to use such data to prove political relationships (mistakenly connecting Diokles the strategos with Timotheos). See my discussion in the note appended to the conclusion, where this method is rejected. Nevertheless, Timotheos and Khares
Notes to Chapter Three:

are seen to be on the 'same side' in this venture. Second, note that Aristotle, Aristophon's son, was syntrierarch with Timotheos before 356 (IG II² 1612.289).

90 Here and elsewhere Demosthenes tried to avert the blame from the strategoi and put it on the Athenians at large (Dem. 2.28-30; 3.4-5; 4.24-27, 45-47; 10.18).

91 Contrast this hypothetical list with lists of genuine allies or opponents in the orators: Aiskh. 2.184 (cf. 2.8); Hyper. 3.28; Dem. 18.249 and 285. Here (T55) Demosthenes no more implies that Khares, Diopeithes and Aristophon are allies than were the men in the following lists: Dem. 18.14, 70, 75; Hyper. 3.1.

92 Presumably the Diopeithes mentioned here is Sounieus, the strategos, whose force is being debated, and not Diopeithes Sphettios, the rhetor. Aiskh. 1.63 insinuated that Diopeithes Sounieus and his fellow demesman Hugesandroctes were 'associated'.

93 Aiskh. 2.184. This was perhaps the occasion of Euboulos' attack on Khares (T53). See chapter four.

94 Aiskh. 2.8; Dem. 19.270-7 and cf. 304. In Demosthenes' wrangle with Meidias Anagyrasios he expected Euboulos to support Meidias against him (Dem. 21.206-7).

95 Euboulos and Aristophon were known to be rivals (Dem. 18.162 and cf. 20.137, 146). The former threatened action against the latter before ca. 348 (Dem. 21.218 and scholion = Dindorf Vol. 9 p. 659 [584, 14]), and the latter publicly attacked the former's policies shortly before 343 (Dem. 19.291).

Aiskhines worked towards the same ends as Euboulos before the peace (Dem. 19.304), made an unflattering remark about Arisophon in 345 (Aiskh. 1.158) and compared him unfavorably to past rhetores in 330 (Aiskh. 3.194-6).
Notes to Chapter Three:

Eubouloos supported the peace early in 346 (Dem. 19.291), while Aristophon, at some point, opposed it (Theopompos FGrHist i5 F166).

96 Aiskh. 3.223-4 and cf. Dem. 18.137 and Plu. Mor. 848A.

97 J. deRomilly, REG 67 (1954) 327 "on peut appeler modérés, à Athènes, tous ceux qui se sont opposes, en quelque circonstance que se soit, à une politique de démocratie extreme, d'imperialisme, ou simplement de guerre."

98 See Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 I. 186-212, C. Mossé, Athens in Decline 28, 54-5, and n. 102 below. Cf. the outmoded CAH VI 221-225.

99 In REG (1954) 327-354.

100 Cargill, League 170-184, and Hornblower, Mausolus 206-214, have argued persuasively that the allies were not so much disaffected with Athens as they were motivated by self-interest and instigated by Mausolos.


102 For Eubouloos' achievements in the realm of finance see Cawkwell, (n. 101 above) 53-66. Rhys F. Townsend, "Aspects of Athenian Architectural Activity In the Second Half of the Fourth Century B.C." (Diss. Univ. of North Carolina, 1982), has argued on archaeological grounds that much of the so-called 'Lykourgan' building program was begun in the 'time of Eubouloos' (private communication with author).

For a discussion of Athenian fiscal policy during and after the Social War see Sealey, Essays 169-176, especially 173, where he suggests that the policy was not the work of one faction, but was "a national necessity acknowledged by all parties."

On Androtion see P. Harding, "Androtion's Political Career," Historia 25 (1976) 186-200: the so-called 'moderate', who was attacked by Demosthenes, was very active raising funds during the Social War period. An unpublished inscription from the Agora at Athens (Agora Inv. # I 7495) mentions the very
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matters that are the subject of debate in Dem. 22 and 24. The inscription tallies very closely with the decree at Dem. 24.27: the proposer is the same (Epikrates), but the inscription records a decree passed in the sixth prytany of 354/3 (as opposed to the first in Dem. 24) and concerns a nomos regarding the appointment of epistatai to oversee financial matters with respect to Hephaistos and Athena Hephaistia. It discusses silver, a mint, money-changers, bullion and ἑξα πώματα. This information was generously shared with me by John McK. Camp, assistant director of the Agora Excavations.

Political leaders proposing fiscal reforms during and after the Social War include: Periandros (Dem. 47.21), Leptines (Dem. 20), Androtion (Dem. 22.42 and cf. 63), Aristophon (Dem. 24.11), Demosthenes and others (Dem. 14 and 13). Economic reform continued to be an important item of public business in the late 340s and 330s (Dem. 18.107). For Lykourgos' program see Fordyce Mitchel, "Lykourgan Athens, 338-322" (Cincinnati, 1972).

103 Cargill, League 170-8 rather one-sidedly examines the attitudes of Khabrias, Iphikrates, Timotheos and Khares towards the allies: Khares, of course, is the radix malorum. Others, however, recognize Timotheos as a leading 'imperialist': Sealey, Essays 169; Davies, APF 510; Harding, "The Purpose of Isokrates' Archidamos and On the Peace," CSCA 6 (1973) 140 n. 12; and Hornblower, Mausolus 191.

104 For Thrace see T34, T35, T36, T37; for Thessaly see T40; for Sestos see T38 and possibly T39; for Thermopylai see Diodoros 16.37.3; 38.1. For the connection between this last expedition and Euboulos see Cawkwell, JHS 83 (1963) 48 nn. 14-16.

105 For Olynthos see T41 and cf. Dem. 19.266; for Euboia see Plu. Phokion 12-14; Aiskh. 3.86-105; 2.169.
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1 Dionysios, Ad Ammaeum 9-10 (pp 734-36), clearly believed that the three Athenian relief forces were prompted by Demosthenes' three Olynthiacs and he cited Philokhoros (my T41) to prove it. The scholiast to Dem. 2.1 (1d in Dilts) says, on the authority of Philokhoros, that three relief forces were sent out, one for each speech, since the first was insufficient. Cf. Plu. Mor. 845D.

2 See the discussion in chapter three. Khares was strategos at Thasos and in Thrace between 343/2 and 341/0 (T64, T65, T66, T67) and it may have been his force on behalf of which Demosthenes spoke (Plu. Mor. 845F).

3 T80, T81 and cf. the supplements to these in the appendix.

4 T85 and cf. the discussion of the date in chapter two. p. 59 n. 86. For Hypereides and Demosthenes see Plu. Mor. 848F and cf. 846A; Dem. 18.223.

5 T86.

6 The Loeb translation, but not the Greek text, of Bernadette Perrin, Plutarch's Lives: Vol. VIII (Cambridge, Mass: 1959) 160-1 reads "Chabrias" here; the true reading is "Khares". This is especially worth noting because this mistake has been duplicated in one popular translation, Ian Scott-Kilvert, The Age of Alexander: Nine Greek Lives by Plutarch, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973, as well as at least two scholarly works, Pritchett, War 59 and Roberts, Accountability 171.

7 T58 does not, strictly speaking, link Demosthenes and Khares, but it does seem to be a variant of the topos illustrated in the other two passages. It is noteworthy that, for Plutarch and others (see next note), Khares was the associate of Demosthenes, not of Aristophon.

T57 Is not precisely accurate, since neither Aiskhines nor Euboulos is known to have been a strategos.

8 See Lucian, Encomium of Demosthenes 37: "It is well indeed that they
Notes to Chapter Four:

give the command to such as Khares or Diopeithes or Proxenos, and keep Demosthenes to the platform at home". Cf. Libanios 23 (p 33).

9 See APF 113 for bibliography.

10 Of six early speeches, three (22, 24 and 23) were written for others and attacked Androtion, Timokrates and Kharidemos (nominally against Aristokrates). Demosthenes' later close association with the latter should be a caution against inferring the politics of the speechwriter. In three speeches delivered by Demosthenes himself, he 1) argued against a financial reform (20: specifically on behalf of Ktesippos, the son of Khabrias), which brought him into conflict with Aristophon and others; 2) advocated naval reform and urged caution in going to war against the king of Persia (14); 3) argued in support of Megalopolis (16). All three of these speeches are fairly lacking in acrimony and none of the issues Demosthenes advocated were very popular.

In Demosthenes' 'pre-political' career he made enemies of the sons of Kephisodoros Anagyrasios (Meidias and Thrasylokhos), one of whom was a friend of Euboulos (Dem. 21.205-7). He was also believed to have drawn inspiration from hearing the orator Kallistratos (Hegesias Magnetes FGrHist 142 F22; Plu. Demosthenes 5; Gellius 3.13). All of this activity is not terribly consistent politically, and it may be that Demosthenes' friends and enemies were determined by other than political motivations.

11 See previous note. The question of Demosthenes' political alignment from 355-352 seems to be inextricably bound up with his supposed hostility towards Aristophon and his associates. See Schaefer, Demosthenes 1.179-80, 361; J. de Romilly, REG 67 (1954) 330; Paul Clochê, Démosthènes et la fin de la Démocratie Athénienne, (Paris, 1957) 44-6; G.L. Cawkwell, OCD 330 (sub "Demosthenes") and JHS 83 (1963) 48. But this view has been dealt some serious blows in the past couple of decades. P. Harding, "Androtion's Political
Notes to Chapter Four:

Career," *Historia* 25 (1976) 186-200, has ruined Jacoby's notion (FGrHist III.B. Supplement Vol. I 85-106 = introduction to the commentary on the fragments of Androtion) that Demosthenes and Androtion were political enemies and that Androtion was an ally of Aristophon.

Moreover, the idea that Demosthenes was an ally of Euboulos hinges on the belief that 1) all those who tried to help raise money during the Social War were associates of Aristophon, and 2) that Demosthenes seems to attack those fund-raisers and advocates caution in distant military ventures (i.e., against the king of Persia). Sealey, *Essays* 164-178 questions the connection between Euboulos and Demosthenes and there is good reason to do so, since a wide variety of men were active in efforts to fight and finance the Social War (see chapter three n. 102). Furthermore, the inference from Dem. 20. 137,146 that the *syndikoi* of Leptines' law were allies and so opposed to Euboulos and Diophantos is unfounded. The *syndikoi* were nominated by the people and to refuse to serve as such could be politically damaging (*Plu. Demosthenes* 14.3). At least one of the *syndikoi*, Leodamas, was the friend of an enemy of Aristophon (*Aiskh. 1.64,69-70).

12 That is, in 351 Demosthenes advocated aggressive action against Philip (Dem. 4) and intervention on Rhodes (Dem. 15).

If Dem. 13 is genuine, for which see Cawkwell, *JHS* 83 (1963) 48 n. 9, then he made an unflattering remark against Euboulos' building program in 353 (13.30), which was repeated even more emphatically in 349 (Dem. 3.29). At the time of his lawsuit against Meidias he professed that he had no personal enmity towards Euboulos (21.207).

13 T27, T28.

14 Demosthenes did not become a politically significant figure until the time of the siege of Olynthos or perhaps even later. Diodoros first mentions

15 E.g., T27, T28, T30, T31, T59, T60. Another place where one might reasonably expect to hear something about Khares is Dem. 20, since it was under Khares' command that Khabrias died. But Demosthenes avoided making any enemies besides Leptines.


17 See chapter five nn. 51, 55 and cf. Dem. 13.6; 14.31 and Arist. *Rhet.* 1399b 1-5 (Theodektes). This was clearly a rhetorical *topos*. Note that after all his railing against mercenaries, Demosthenes suggests that 3/4 of his proposed force be composed of mercenaries. See also Aineias, *Poliorketika* 12.1-5, who recommends not more than 1/2 of a force be mercenary, and cf. his section. 13.


19 See T27, T28, T61 and cf. Dem. 4.46.

20 T27, T29, T30, T31 and cf. the discussion in chapter one.

21 See Dem. 4.25-27, 33, 40-1, 45-7 and cf. chapter five n. 52.

22 That is, Demosthenes avoided antagonizing any individual by name. Cf. Dem. 2.28-9 and 3.36.

23 This theme of citizen involvement may be explained by the fact that the citizens were encouraged to believe that when they fought in person they were invincible. See Dem. 4.24; Isok. 8.43-48 and cf. the discussion of N. Loraux, *L'invention d'Athènes: Histoire de l'oraison funèbre dans la "cité classique"*, (Paris, 1981) 151-4.
Notes to Chapter Four:

24 E.g., at Dem. 4.46, where the word ὀποσχέσθαι ("to promise"), is taken as an allusion to the proverb ἄλ Χάρτης ὀποσχέσης ("the promises of Khares"). See T61. The lucubrator Libanios so understood the reference in Epistulae 352, 700, 1178.

25 E.g., at Dem. 4.14, behind the phrase "those who cry 'quickly' or 'today'" is Aristophon, according to Cawkwell, JHS 83 (1963) 50.

26 See n. 1 and cf. Schaefer, Demosthenes II. 132 n. 1. Dionysios and the author of the Plutarchean Vit.Dec.Or. use the word πειθω ("persuade"), while the scholiast vouches for Philokhoros' words "one being sent for each speech". Philokhoros apparently had knowledge of Athenian decrees (FGrHist 328 F55,56, 155), and so the scholiast's claim is not impossible.

27 See Dem. 3.1,18 and cf. 1.1.

28 For the chronology of the two campaigns see Cawkwell, CQ 12 (1962) 122-140 and J.M. Carter, Historia 20 (1971) 418-429, but cf. chapter two n. 24. Both Cawkwell, 133, and Carter, 429, believe that all the Olynthiacs were delivered before Athens intervened in Euboia. Demosthenes himself claimed (5.5) that he had spoken against the expedition into Euboia. Cf. W. Jaeger, Demosthenes: the Origin and Growth of His Policy, (Berkeley, 1938) 125-149 who also rejects the idea of one speech for each expedition, and H. Erbse, "Zu den Olynthischen Reden des Demosthenes," RhM 99 (1956) 364-380, who argues that all these speeches were delivered at the same assembly.

29 Dem. 1.6, 28; 2.13, 27, 31; 3.34-6.

30 See n. 14. Aiskhines, in his review of Demosthenes' career (3.54-7), makes no references to the orator's actions before the negotiations leading
Notes to Chapter Four:

up to the Peace of Philokrates. Cf. Dem. 18.18-52, who also neglects to mention anything before the Peace.

31 For the expedition to Euboia and these strategoi see Plu. Phokion 12-14; Dem. 19.290 and scholion (Dindorf Vol. 8, 443 [434,14]). Dem. 21.162-7; Aiskh. 2.169-70; 3.86-8.

32 Besides Plutarch's narrative on Phokion's role as a subordinate of Khabrias at the battle of Naxos (Phokion 6, but cf. Diodoros 15.34.3-35.2), no specific military deed of Phokion is known before the Euboia-campaign of 349/8. That Phokion's mercenary service in Kypros (Diodoros 16.42.3-9; 46.1-3) belongs to 344/3 is argued by Gehrke, Phokion 225-230.

33 For the speed with which Athenian forces could be put onto Euboia see Aiskh. 3.85, and that they were citizens who served in 348 is implicit in the sources cited in n. 31 above.

34 This should make it clear to those who regard Phokion as Athens' "best general", why Khares and Kharidemos were sent instead of him. Hegesileos, if he was indeed the strategos at Mantineia, had experience commanding a large army in a set battle (Diodoros 15.84.2; Xen. Poroi 3.7; Ephoros FGrHist 70 F85). Of Molossos nothing more is known. It is interesting that a later intervention into Euboia, in 341, was also led by Phokion (Diodoros 16.74.1; Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F160). He also led an expedition of citizens to Megara in 340 (Plu. Phokion 15). In general Phokion seems to have preferred campaigns close to home, and was hesitant even then (Plu. Phokion 24,25,32).

35 The reference at 3.29 (cf. 13.30) is generally taken as a dig against Euboulos' building program. Cf. Cawkwell, JHS 83 (1963) 56.

36 T30. This seems to have been a habit with Khares (cf. T36).

37 The phrase "some others" arguably does not refer to Khares, Kharidemos and their mercenaries, but to other states (cf. Dem. 9.74), but, in fairness
Notes to Chapter Four:

to the scholiast, Demosthenes has just contrasted Philip's personal sacrifices with the Athenians, "who fight with decrees and mercenaries" (Dem. 2.23-28).

38 See n. 36 and cf. Isok. 7.29 "they did not, whenever it seemed good to them, hold a procession with 300 cattle while ignoring their ancestral sacrifices, whenever they fancied it...". That this refers to Khares is widely believed, but G. Mathieu, in Isocrate Discours vol. III (Paris: Budé, 1960) 70 n. 1 draws attention to the episode in Aristophanes' Knights 656-9, where Paphlagon and the sausage-seller bid for the support of the demos by promising to sacrifice 100, then 200 cattle. Isokrates, perhaps, indulged in a hyperbolic pun.

39 For other examples of the theme that the people have surrendered their rights and privileges to the politicians see Dem. 8.34; 13.21-5; 23.196-201.

40 See, e.g., Dem. 4.27, where he disclaims any slander against the hipparkhos, Menelaos.

41 For the phrase see Isok. 8.112; 15.96 and cf. 12.184 (brothers... hetairoi... and τῶν κοινωνῶντος) and Aiskh. 2.184 (ἐκ δὲ τῶν φίλων καὶ τῶν ἃλλωδεῶν τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ Ναυσικέλα). But ἡταίρος is frequently used pejoratively, to suggest "a member of a hetairia:" Thuc. 8.48.4; 65.2; Lysias 12.43; 13.19; Dem. 21.20; Theopompos FGrHist 115 F121.

42 His name was Kallibios, son of Kephisophon. See IG II² 43 lines 2-3, and 1604.87 for his secretaryship and trierarchy, respectively.

43 IG II² 1.1,42,56. The stele contains a compendium of decrees regarding the Samians. The first is a reinscription from 405/4; the second, proposed by Kephisophon, promises aid to the Samian embassy to Sparta in 403/2; a third decree honors an individual Samian and contains a rider, perhaps authorizing the re-validation of the war-time decree: Kephisophon is the grammateus.
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ordered to see to the stele. He made sure that his name was proudly displayed at the top of the document followed by the phrase: \( \text{Σ} \text{ΑΜΙΟΙΣ ΩΣΟΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ ΔΗΜΟ ΤΟ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΕΓΕΝΟΝΤΟ,} \) which is boldly defiant, considering the circumstances. It is an interesting coincidence that father and son were secretaries on the occasions of decrees so proudly reasserting Athenian prestige.

44 Tamias: \text{IG II}^2 1388.4; 1392.4-5. He married the daughter of Menexenos Kydathenaieus, for whom see Isaios 5 and Davies, \text{APF} 145-9 and cf. following note.

45 Davies' characterization (\text{APF} 148) of the elder Kephisophon as "to the Right of his wife's family" is overly simplistic and unfair. It is based on the identification of him as the Kephisophon who, along with a Meletos, went to Sparta in 403 as representatives of "the men of the city" (Xen. 2.4. 36). The identification is not disputed, but one should pay close attention to the context and words of Xenophon. After Pausanias defeated "the men of Peiraieus", the ephors who supported his policy against Lysandros' sent to Lakedaimon representatives both of the "men from Peiraieus" and private persons from "those in the city." After these left, "those officially from the city" also sent representatives to Sparta ("officially": \( \text{o} \text{i απ} \text{o το} \text{ο οικινου} \)). Kephisophon and Meletos represented a group within the city who privately sympathized with the revolutionaries and were instrumental in having Pausanias authorized to conclude a settlement that allowed for the return of democracy. They rank just behind the men from Peiraieus as the restorers of democracy.

46 K. Aphidnaios was strategos, possibly in 345/4, certainly in 342/1, 340/39 and perhaps in other years. He was \( \text{επι το θεορηκουν} \) in 343/2. His father, Kephalion, was an associate of the banker, Pasion, and served as trustee of his will (this is known only because of the \text{martyrion} at Dem. 45.19, for the validity of which cf. n. 102, chapter three). For this reason Kephisophon
Notes to Chapter Four:

became embroiled in the dispute between Pasion's son, Apollodoros, and Phormion. For the sources see Davies, \textit{APF} 291-3 and add Dem. 46.5.

Generally, where a Kephisophon is found without demotic, he is thought to be Aphidnaios if concerned with military affairs, and Paianieus if with the assembly. Thus, Dem. 18.21,75; 19.293; Dein. 1.45 (one of those bribed by Harpalos); Dem. 59.10 refer to K. Paian., although Davies (\textit{APF} 149) assigns Dein. 1.45 to another Kephisophon. On Dem. 59.10 see note 48 below.

47 He proposed praise and a crown for the boule of 343/2 (\textit{IG I}I^2 223.87) and he proposed a rider to a decree (\textit{IG I}I^2 276.23) honoring a mercenary, one Asklepiodotos, for his actions on board a ship whose trierarch was Khares Aixoneus (Davies', \textit{APF} 149, inference that his man was a subordinate of the strategos Khares is a mistake). See \textit{IG I}I^2 7062 for K. Paianieus' gravestone.

48 Davies. (\textit{APF} 149) takes Dem. 59.10 to be a reference to K. Paian. I disagree. The Kephisophon of Dem. 59 helped Stephanos Eroiades in trying to get the latter's opponent, Apollodoros, son of Pasion, disenfranchised for murdering a woman in Aphidna. Stephanos had been an associate of Kallistratos of Aphidna and was perhaps a friend of Euboulos (Dem. 59.43,48). On political grounds, then, Davies identified this Kephisophon as K. Paian. K. Aphidnaios, however, was involved with Stephanos Akharneus, whom Apollodoros sued (Dem. 45 and 46), and is known to have been associated with another banker, Blepaios (\textit{IG I}I^2 1675.33). Thus, if the Kephisophon of Dem. 59 is to be identified with one of the two prominent men of that name, he is more likely to be K. Aphidnaios, as Kirchner (\textit{PA} 8410) thought.

49 Aristophon did (Theopompos \textit{FGrHist} 115 F166).

50 Demosthenes spoke on behalf of the Peace at one point (Dem. 5, \textit{On the Peace}), Hegesippos was involved in an effort to change it (Dem. 7.24), and at some point before the Peace was made Euboulos denounced Philip in the strongest terms (Dem. 19.292, and cf. Cawkwell, \textit{JHS} 83 (1963) 49-50).
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51 For a series of discussions on the rapidly changing situation in 346 and various leaders' attempts to cope with it see Cawkwell, REG 73 (1960) 416-438; REG 75 (1962) 453-459; CQ 28 (1978) 93-104.

52 Davies, APF 149, is perplexed by the evidence which "ought to place him with the supporters of Euboulos." But there is no way to know what was contained in the decrees Demosthenes referred to at 18.21,70,75, since Hegesippos and Aristophon are mentioned in the same breath with Euboulos, Philokrates and Kephisophon. Kephisophon Aphidnaios need not be an enemy of Euboulos, as Cawkwell, JHS 83 (1963) 47, argues. On page 49 Cawkwell has confused the demotics: "Paiania" should be read for "Cephisophon of Aphidna who was one of Chares' supporters."

53 For the date of this attack see the text infra and n.61.

54 Dem. 19.293. Davies suggests that Kephisophon, like his grandfather, was tamias of the goddess (see n.44 above).

55 Hypereides was the prosecutor of Philokrates (Dem. 19.116; Hyper. 3.29). The attack on Aiskhines and Philokrates had already begun by 345 (Aiskh. 1.174).

56 Dem. 19.93.

57 See Dem. 19.50,52,73-4,154-5 and Aiskh. 2.133-4 for Proxenos' role in the affair. He was prosecuted and punished (Dem. 19.280-1 and scholion = Dindorf vol. 8, 440 [431,15 and 22]). It is not clear who his prosecutor was, but see Dein. 1.63, Schaefer, Demosthenes 2 11.369 and Sealey, Essays 184.

58 He is generally identified with Kephisodotos ek Kerameon, prominent as early as 371. Sources are at PA 8331. He was an ambassador to Sparta in 371, insisted on a strictly equal alliance with the Lakedaimonians in 369, favored Athenian intervention into Euboia (presumably in 357), was a syndikos of Leptines' law and was rather distinguished as an orator. The scholiast at Dem. 4.46 believed that a Kephisodotos was being alluded to in that passage.
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No attempt has been made to identify him with the strategos = PA 8313, but both Kallistratos and Aristophon were strategoi at least once. Davies, Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (New York, 1981) 164, conjectures that the strategos' demotic was Akharneus.

59 Aiskhines patently exaggerates not only the number of cities and ships, but also, no doubt, the amount of money. His chief interest is to contrast the fact that cities won by Timotheos were lost by Khares. On the numbers of ships and cities see chapter one 26 n.83 and chapter three 65 n.12. On the money spent cf. Isok. 7.9, Dem. 3.28 and 13.27.

60 Aiskh. 2.149, 170, 184.

61 Probably Platon Comicus rather than the philosopher. See Edmonds, FAC Plato F219. The name Arkhibios is a conjecture, for which see the text and note of T53 in the appendix. Cawkwell, C&M 23 (1962) 48, supposes that the Social-War trials were the context of Euboulos' attack on Khares, but why would the "peacemaker" (scholion to Dem. 3.28) and purported champion of entrenchment want to intervene in a struggle between three leading "imperialists"? If Euboulos really favored the policies for which he is given credit, why would he not want to see the "imperialists" tear one another to shreds? There is no reason to believe Timotheos and Euboulos were ever allies. Khares, on the other hand, prospered through the 'period of Euboulos', and the trial of Aiskhines provides a more plausible context for an attack by Euboulos on him.

62 Demosthenes knew that Aiskhines would try to blame the military leaders (19.93), but he may not have been prepared for a direct attack on Khares. The formula "someone just came up to me and told me..." might be suspect as a later revision, just as is Aiskhines' (1.132) "someone of the strategoi will rise up in the defence, so I hear..."

63 On the grounds that the strategoi were exempt from performing liturgies.
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So Cawkwell, Historia 22 (1973) 759-761, argues, but see chapter one 4 n.12.  
64 For Timarkhos' supporters at his trial see Aiskh. 1.71,119. He lost his case (Dem. 19.284).  
65 Aiskh. 2.149.  
66 See Aiskh. 1.132 and n.62 above. Aiskhines anticipates that one of the strategoi will rise up "with head held high and a self-conscious air as though accustomed to the diatribai and wrestling schools" and will defend Timarkhos' conduct and point out that the prosecutor, too, had made a pest of himself in the gymnasia. One wonders if the strategos was Khares? At any rate, this would provide an additional motive for Aiskhines' hostility in 343, although one is hardly needed.  
67 Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F158; Dem. 8.6; 9.15-16; 12.3. Cf. the hypothesis to Dem. 8.  
68 T64 and, perhaps, T65.  
69 Note that in 343, Diopeithes, not Khares, was sent out to the Kher-sonesos, and that Demosthenes opposed (8.28) sending another strategos to replace him.  

T65 might be inferred to support the idea of some cooperation between Khares and Demosthenes. Khares (at an unspecified time) had made an agreement with the people of Ainos concerning syntaxeis. Thoukydides proposed to ratify this agreement, but was indicted by a Kharinos and again by Theokrines. The speaker of Dem. 58 was expecting Demosthenes and Hypereides to support him, but had been left in the lurch. He said that Theokrines would claim that the lawsuit against himself was an attempt to keep him from prosecuting Demosthenes. It might be that Hypereides and Demosthenes were supporters of Thoukydides, and were thus supporting an agreement made by Khares. The terminus post quem for the action is 344/3, but Khares' agreement with the people of Ainos may
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be earlier. Sealey, *Essays* 184, dates the speech to 339 B.C. It is even conceivable that Khares' agreement was made long before. Cf. *IG II* 111.17-18 and 404.12, neither of which are, however, decisive.

The speaker of Dem. 58 appealed in his helplessness to Moirocles, who was earlier an opponent of Euboulos (Dem. 19.293), and later of Lykourgos (Dem. *Epist.* 3.16).

70 T64, T65, T66, T67, T70, T71, T72, T73, T77 and T78.

71 T75: *namque auctus adiutusque a Demosthene eum, quem tenebat, ascend-eret gradum, cum adversus Charetem eum subornaret.* Schäfer, *Demosthenes* II. 513 n.1, argues that this referred to the debate on whom to send out in 340 to aid Byzantion. It was Demosthenes who proposed the declaration of war at that time (Aiskh. 3.55).

There is no more likely occasion on which Demosthenes might have helped Phokion at Khares' expense. Elsewhere Demosthenes and Phokion are hostile to one another (Plu. *Phokion* 5.4; 9.5; 16.2; 17.1,2; 27.3-4; *Demosthenes* 10).

72 Khares' mercenary army in 356/5 exceeded 10,000 (T27). Of Athenian commanders still active Nausikles had commanded a force of 5,400 (Diodoros 16.37.3: they were citizens according to Pritchett, *War* 108 and Parke; *GMS* 146), while Phokion had shared the joint command of 8,000 mercenaries on Kypros, a force which subsequently doubled (Diodoros 16.42.7-9). The decision to put Khares in command of the mercenaries at Amphissa and to put the obscure Lysikles and Stratokles in command of the citizens seems to be one based on the particular skills and experience of the individual strategos.

73 See chapter two 57 and nn.80,81. No contemporary source makes a direct connection between the two men, but, as has been argued above, Ptolemy probably did.
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74 See chapter two 59 and n.87 for the authenticity of this document.

75 Hyper. 3.29; Dem. 19.116. Cf. Aiskh. 1.174, where it is revealed that Philokrates' trial fell between that of Timarkhos and that of Aiskhines.

76 Dem. 18.134; Hyper. F67-75 Jensen; Plu, Mor. 850A.

77 Dem. 18.222-3; Plu, Mor. 846A, 848F.

78 Hypereides is one of "those around Demosthenes and Lykourgos" demanded by Alexander according to the "ten-name" tradition (n.73). He broke (was forced to break?) with Demosthenes over the Harpalos-affair and joined in the successful prosecution against him (Plu, Mor. 846C, 848F; Hyper. 5). After the death of Alexander the two men were reconciled (Plu. Mor. 849B; Plu. Demosthenes 28; Phokion 27,29 and cf. 26).

Although Hypereides and Demosthenes were long pursuing the same goals and cooperating with one another, it is not safe to assume that they, or other cooperating political leaders, had the same friends and enemies. Hypereides opposed Lykourgos twice on behalf of others, but defended his sons. See PA 13912 for the sources.

79 T85 = Plutarch Moralia 848E. See chapter two 59 n.86 for the date.

80 That is, Hypereides was a staunch opponent of accommodation with the Macedonians, both during the time of Philip and of Alexander. See T85; Plu. Phokion 21, and 23, Mor. 849F-850A; Hyper. 6.10; T57; Dexippos FGrHist 100 F32; Justin 13.5.10; Diodoros 18.13.5. It is known that Demosthenes made some effort to involve Athens in Agis' war (Plu. Demosthenes 23.1), and perhaps Hypereides did so as well.

81 IG II² 1613.270 (from 353/2) refers to captured equipment conveyed home by Thrasyboulos. He is identified with Th. Erkhieus, and it is inferred that he was a colleague of Khares at this time by Davies, APF 239, and Kirchner, IG II² page 211 (commentary ad loc.). Thrasyboulos was later strategos in
Notes to Chapter Four:

326/5 (IG II2 1628.40-42; 2969). According to the "ten-name" tradition he was one of those demanded by Alexander in 335, and he was prominent in the defence of Halikarnassos (Diodoros 17.25.6). There is another point of coincidence between the family of this man and Khares: Thrasyboulos' father, Thrason, was one of the ambassadors chosen to follow up on the diplomatic contacts with the three kings, Ketriporis, Lyppeios and Grabos, initiated by Khares in 356 (T15). All this really implies is that these magistrates cooperated with each other in the line of duty, and that they had common interests with regard to Macedon.

82 He proposed the embassy on which Thrason served (T15), and was one of those demanded by Alexander in 335, according to the "eight-name" tradition (see supplement A to T80 and T81 in the appendix = Plu. Demosthenes 23.4-6).

83 One might add 1) Demotion, who proposed that "the strategoi see to it that Korinth be made safe for the demos of the Athenians." Khares was eventually sent, but clearly Demotion did not suggest which strategos should be sent (T5); 2) Hippostratos Etearkhidou Palleneus, who proposed T67 (nothing more is known of him); and 3) Thoukydides, who tried to get Khares' agreement with the Ainians ratified (T65). All of these relationships depend on the assumption that political friendship exists between the proposer and the executor of a decree.

84 One might conjecture also Hegesippos Sounieus, who supported Timarkhos in 345, as Khares may have (see n.66). Surprisingly, he was not one of those demanded by Alexander, despite his nickname of 'misophilippos' (scholion to Aiskh. 1.64 and cf. Aiskh. 2.14, where Demosthenes is 'misophilippos'). He cooperated with Demosthenes a great deal in the 340s (Dem. 7.23; 19.331; 9.72; Plu. Demosthenes 17). He proposed IG II2 125 concerning Euboia in 357 and his brother proposed IG II2 123 concerning a garrison for Andros in 356.
Notes to Chapter Four:

Hegesippos proposed the alliance with Phokis of ca. 355 (Aiskh. 3.118 and scholion; Dem. 19.72-4 and scholia = Dindorf vol. 8 375-7 [363,27; 364,1]; scholion to Aiskh. 1.71). He also proposed a grant of citizenship to two Akarnanian exiles (IG II² 237: they were presumably exiled because they had fought Philip at Khaireoneia). He may also have made a remark in his speech On Halonesos (= Dem. 7: cf. Libanios' hypothesis to the speech) that was embarrassing to Khares (T64).

85 Plutarch was not well-informed on the precise sequence of events, it seems. Cf. chapter two 52-53 and nn.65-68. The context of T73 appears to be a debate on what to do about Philip's seizure of the merchant ships. Khares was away in the Bosporos, and Phokion and Kephisophon Aphidnaios were eventually dispatched (IG II² 1628.436; 1629.957; Plu. Mor. 850F— which requires emendation, if Kephisophon's voyage is meant—; Phokion 14).

The allusion to an occasion when Demosthenes aided Phokion at Khares' expense (T75) could be this same debate in 340. On the other hand, it might be just possible that for Nepos' Charetem, Charidemum ought to be read, and that the anecdote (T75) refers to the situation that existed in Athens after Khaireoneia (Plu. Phokion 16).

One can only guess at the context of T74, but the trial of Aiskhines in 343 is quite plausible. For Khares' joke cf. Aristophanes, Eirene 395 and Batrakhoi 925: bushy eyebrows were a "martial" attribute.

86 For two separate occasions on which Phokion was prepared to deliver his own political foes into the hands of the city's enemies see Plu. Phokion 17 and 27, Diodoros 17.15 and Nepos (T75). Another man of this ilk was Demades, the reputed author of the witticism against Khares (T79).

87 T6, T44 (trierarchies) and T51 (khoregia).

88 Plu. Phokion 6.7: Khabrias provided wine to the Athenians each year
Notes to Chapter Four:

during the festival of the Mysteries in Boedromion, which coincided with the anniversary of his victory at Naxos. Konon provided a public feast "for all the Athenians" upon completing the fortification walls in the Peiraieus (Athenaios Deipnosophistai 1. 3D), and he also had built a temple of Aphrodite (Euploia?), a reminder of his victory at Knidos, no doubt (Paus. 1.1.3).

It seems to have been a rhetorical topos to rant against such public feasts. See Isok. 7.10, 29-30; Dem. 3.31; Theopompos FGrHist 115 F213 (= my T62), F215, F233, F249 and cf. Plu. Phokion 9.

89 Khabrias was granted a crown for his victory at Naxos (Dem. 24.180) and a statue for his victory in Boiotia against Agesilaos (Aiskh. 3.243; Arist. Rhet. 1411b 6), which later became quite famous (Nepos Chabrias 1.3; Diodoros 15.33.4 and cf. 32.5; Athenaios Deipnosophistai 4. 165E). For a modern reconstruction of this monument see A.P. Burnett and C. Edmonson, "The Chabrias Monument in the Athenian Agora," Hesperia 30 (1961) 74-91 with plates 11 and 12.

Timotheos was granted a crown for his victory at Alyzeia (Nepos Timotheus 2.3; Dem. 23.198; Aiskh. 3.243). There were also at least two statue-groups of Timotheos, his father and others in Athens. There was one of him and Konon along the north colonnade of the Parthenon (Paus. 1.24.3, of which IG II^2 3774 is probably the base), and another of him, Konon and Euagoras near the Stoa Basileios (Paus. 1.3.2). There were also groups of Timotheos and Konon in the sanctuaries of Hera on Samos and Artemis at Ephesos (Paus. 6.3.16), as well as one of Konon alone at Erythrai (Tod, GHI 106 = Syll. 3 126).

Iphikrates' statue stood near the entrance to the Parthenon (Paus. 1.24.7 and cf. Aiskh. 3.243; Dem. 23.130,136,198). His effigy was erected ca. 371, but not without some resistance (Dionysios Lysias 12 [p 478]).
Notes to Chapter Four:

These honors, as well as Khares' crown (T30) were granted for victories in battle, rather than for spoil, as the scholiast to Dem. (T30) asserted. See Aiskh. 2.80.

90 Enshrinement in a literary form was presumably as desirable as in bronze. The "canon" became standardized very shortly after the deaths of the three (?) men. See Dem. 23.198; Aiskh. 3.243; Dein. 1.75; Theopompos (my) T32 (and cf. T33). Theopompos was, perhaps, responsible for the notion that the age of Athenian military heroes was at an end. See Diodoros (T78), and cf. Nepos Timotheus 4.4: Haec extrema fuit aetas imperatorum Atheniensium, Iphicratis, Chabriae, Timothei, neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoria. For a discussion of the similarity between these passages and others in Nepos and Diodoros see chapter five.
Notes to Part III and Chapter Five:

1 This 'canon' first appears as a commonplace just a few years after the deaths of the men. Dem. 23.198 is the earliest example, but see also Aiskh. 3.243 and Dein. 1.75. A corresponding list of 'villains' did not come into being as a commonplace, although certain rhetores did attempt to associate their opponents with Kleon, Kleophon, Hyperbolos and their ilk. See Isok. 8.75; Aiskh.2.76, 3.150. Isokrates (8.126-7) was among the earliest to insist upon a fundamental change in Athenian politics after Perikles. He was followed in this by Aristotle (Ath.Pol. 28 and Politics 1274a) and probably also Theopompos (FGrHist 115 F92-96). Cf. the scholion to Aristophanes' Eirene 681 and the discussion of this whole matter by Connor, New Politicians 141-2 and Theopompus 62-64.

2 In his Anabasis Xenophon portrays himself as a prudent, vigorous and imaginative military officer, while still at a comparatively young age. His detailed knowledge of, and interest in, military matters surfaces again and again in the Anabasis, Hellenika and other works. He was especially interested in cavalry. See Anab. 3.3.19-20; Hell. 3.4.13-15; 6.4.10-12; 7.5.14-17 and cf. his two technical treatises on the subject: On Horsemanship and Cavalry-Commander's Manual (= peri Hippikes and Hipparkhikos).

Aineias, even from what little we have of his work, reveals a vast and intimate knowledge of military practice and stratagem. His own references in the Poliorketika show that he wrote extensively on technical military topics. The bulk of the datable events mentioned in the extant portion of his work occurred between 400-360 B.C., the very period covered by Xenophon in books 3-7 of the Hellenika. For more on the dates of composition of these two works and on conjectures about Aineias' identity see notes 3 and 8 below.

3 The Hellenika as we have it was certainly not completed before 357 B.C. For a discussion of the date of composition see Delebecque, Essai 432-458. The consensus of opinion on the date of the Poliorketika is "ca. 357". See A.
Notes to Chapter Five:


4 Xenophon's life is well known and need not be reviewed here, except to emphasize his military service in Asia Minor from 401-394, either in close association with or under the command of the Spartans, his return to Greece in 394 with Agesilaos, and his exile and subsequent settlement on land near Olympia, about which he himself tells us (*Anab.* 5.3.4-13). Ancient tradition, as represented by Diogenes Laertios (2.6.53,56), held that Xenophon lived out his days in Korinth, despite the cancellation of the decree of exile. See PA 11307, Delebecque, *Essai*, and J.K. Anderson, *Xenophon* for the sources and full discussions of them. On the cancellation of the decree of exile see Cawkwell, *JHS* 83 (1963) 47-67 and cf. P. Gauthier, *Un Commentaire Historique des Poroi de Xénophon* (Geneva and Paris, 1976) 64, who assumes Xenophon to have lived at Athens ca. 355.


Aineias, too, was probably a Peloponnesian, as Oldfather concludes in the Loeb *Aeneas* 4-5. Oldfather (ibid.) points out that Aineias' "experience in military operations...is almost wholly confined to the geographical limits of the Peloponnesus and the western coast of Asia Minor (with the adjacent islands). For conjectures on Aineias' identity see n.8 below. It is perhaps significant that Aineias wrote not in Attic, but in what is generally regarded as an early form of koine.

5 The sentence mentioning Khares interrupts the syntax of the passage, as
Notes to Chapter Five:

diodoros left the transition from the action around peparethos to that on Kerkyra entirely obscure, for which see the discussion in chapter one. Diodoros chose rather to criticize Khares in a pair of antitheses: "this man continually avoided the enemy and wronged the allies...he accomplished nothing good, but rather calumnies for his country" (T7).

7 The only remotely overt example of any such judgement by Aineias came at 24.8, where he characterized Kharidemos' actions at Ilion (ca. 360 B.C.) as εξένας. The translators of the Loeb Aeneas render this word "barbarous", but a rather more accurate translation is suggested by A-M. Bon, Énée Le Tacticien 129, who prefers a meaning close to "mercenary", i.e., "mercenary-soldier-like."

8 Aineias is commonly identified with Aineias of Stymphalos, strategos of the Arkadian League in 366 (Xen. 7.3.1). Dain and Bon, Énée Le Tacticien vii-viii, Oldfather, in the Loeb Aeneas 7 and W.W. Tarn, Oxford Classical Dictionary s.v. Aeneas, all favor such an identification, but Schwartz, in Pauly-Wissowa's RE, s.v. Aineias (3) 1019-1021, is more cautious. The identification is not ancient, but originates in a conjecture by Issac Casaubon. It is noteworthy that the Arkadian Polybios did not reveal Aineias' ethnic (10.44.1), if, indeed, he knew it. Attempts to found arguments on the identification of Aineias with the Arkadian strategos (e.g., Cargill, League 174) are rash. It is, nevertheless, an intriguing coincidence that Xenophon knew another Aineias of Stymphalos, who died in 401/0 (Anab. 4.7.13).

9 T8: ἐπανάστασιν ἰδεόν γενέσθαι. Cargill, League 172, has mistranslated ἰδεόν as "wished".

10 For some views on Xenophon's bias see Buckler, Hegemony 263-268; Cawkwell, History of My Times 33-46 and cf. 14; W.P. Henry, Greek Historical Writing 200-210; W.E. Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian (Albany, N.Y., 1977) 99-127.
Notes to Chapter Five:

Books 3-7 of the *Hellenika* present an almost myopic concern for the Peloponnnesos and campaigns of the Peloponnnesians, the point of view is consistently 'Lakedaimonian', and Xenophon reveals a number of details that indicate the very highest sources at Sparta itself. Xenophon knew intimate details about the kings and trials at Sparta, yet he did not bother to mention such crucial events as the foundation of the Athenian maritime alliance in 377 B.C. Cf., for example, the details behind the trial of Sphodrias (5.4.25-33) or the conspiracy of Kinadon (3.3.4-11). Xenophon also knew a lot about the history of Phleious and the speeches of Prokles of Phleious (see n.19 below).

11 A theory of Xenophon's condemnation by silence is advanced by Cawkwell (n.10 above). For a somewhat similar condemnation by deliberate silence in a historian see Herodotos 1.51.4.

12 See the secondary sources in n.10 above. Xenophon liked to belittle those who challenged Lakedaimonian supremacy, or those allies of the Lakedaimonians who took advantage of them. Examples of the former are the Arkadians and the Thebans, and of the latter, the Eleians. (1) The Arkadians among the Ten Thousand split the army into two because they refused to follow Xenophon and they later came to grief (*Anab.* 6.2.9-4.11 and cf. 6.3.18: "the god wished to humble the big-talkers"); the Arkadians feared Iphikrates' peltasts "like children fear boogey-men" (*Hell.* 4.4.16-17); Lykomedes persuaded the Arkadians to found a confederacy to wean them of their dependence on Boiotia by flattering them and "hearing this the Arkadians became puffed up" (*Hell.* 7.1.23-25), but shortly thereafter they were defeated in the Tearless Battle, a defeat that "gladdened the Thebans and Eleians, so irritated were they at the arrogance of those men" (*Hell.* 7.1.28-32). (2) Likewise the Thebans were upstarts (*Hell.* 3.5.5) and Xenophon relished scenes in which they were humiliated (*Hell.* 5.1.32-3; 7.1.39-40; 7.5.12). (3) The Eleians, too, were "made to come to their
Notes to Chapter Five:

"senses" (Hell. 3.2.21-23).

This is not to say, however, that Xenophon was prejudiced against Arkadians, Thebans and Eleians simply on the basis of ethnic origin. One need only recall Xenophon's feelings for his friend Proxenos (Anab. 3.1.4,10; 5.3.5: Diodoros, 14.19.8; 25.4, called him a Theban, but Xenophon was less explicit), or his boon companion Agasias of Stymphalos (Anab. 6.6.11 and passim). See more at n. 13.

Xenophon seems to have had little patience with democracies, at least Peloponnesian ones. Xenophon thought that states behaved less sensibly under democracies, and he often characterized democratic leaders in pejorative terms. See Hell. 3.2.28; 5.2.7; 5.3.24 for comments on the democracies and their leaders at Elis, Mantinea and Phleious. Nevertheless, Xenophon was able to praise democratic political leaders if he deemed them worthy of it. See Hell. 4.8.31 and cf. 2.4.40-43 (Thrasyboulos). He admired the exploits of a certain Delphion of Phleious (5.3.22), who was not only opposed to the Lakedaimonians, but probably also to the friends of Xenophon in Phleious, such as Prokles (5.3.13: and cf. 6.5.38 and 7.1.1).

As in the case, perhaps, of Delphion (n. 12 above), Xenophon could express admiration for men we might not expect him to admire. A pair of examples are the Theban Epameinondas and the Athenian Theramenes. Xenophon may have recognized the genius and importance of Epameinondas late (7.1.41 is the first mention of him; Xenophon passed over the specific exploits of him and Pelopidas until ca. 367, or book 7), but he gave him his due at last (7.5.4-25). Cf. the comments of Henry, Greek Historical Writing 200-210, Buckler, Hegemony 263-268, and J.K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley, 1970) 199. On the other hand, Theramenes' actions were those of a scoundrel, as Xenophon reported them. See Hell. 1.7.4-11, 17-18, 31 (the trial of the strategoi); 2.2.16-22 (his duplicity as an ambassador to Lysandros and
Notes to Chapter Five:

the Spartans); 2.3.2, 11-14 (his inclusion in the Thirty Tyrants). Yet, Xenophon found the humor and courage that the man showed when facing death amazing, although not really worthy of mention (2.3.56). Neither Xenophon nor other extant, contemporary sources seem to have thought highly of Theramenes. See P. Harding, "The Theramenes Myth," Phoenix 28 (1974) 101-111.

On the other hand, Xenophon was not blind to the faults of those whom he otherwise regarded as admirable. Iphikrates' training regimen and security precautions were praised (Hell. 6.2.27-39), but his timid tactics around Korinth in 370/69 came in for censure (Hell. 6.5.51-2). Most surprising are the explicit and implicit criticisms of Agesilaos. The soundness of the king's strategic judgement at the battle of Koroneia was called into question (Hell. 4.3.19), as was his restoration of exiles to Korinth, Thebes and Phleious (Agesilaos 2.21; Hell. 5.3.16) and his role in the acquittals of Phoibidas (Hell. 5.2.32 and cf. 5.4.1) and Sphodrias (Hell. 5.4.24-32 and cf. 34) was not concealed. In sum, Xenophon had his prejudices, but they must be considered ad hominem.

14 Poroi 4.40 suggests that the treatise was written after the end of the Social War. See Delebecque, Essai 470-476 and 495, who dates Xenophon's death tentatively to 354 B.C., Sealey, Essays 168-9, who puts Xenophon's death even later and P. Gauthier, Commentaire des Poroi 4-6, who dates the Poroi to 355/4.

15 On the composition of the Hellenika see, above all, Henry, Greek Historical Writing. For the present it is enough to point out that book 3, covering the events of 401-395 B.C., mentions the death of king Pausanias (3.5.25). Pausanias' son, Agesipolis, predeceased his father in the summer of 380 B.C. (Xen. 5.3.19; Diodoros 15.23.2), as an inscription from Delphi shows (Tod, GHI 120 = Fouilles de Delphes III [1] 509). Book 5 includes the events of 389-375
Notes to Chapter Five:

B.C., but refers to the battle of Leuktra (5.4.1). Regardless of how the Hellenika was divided in antiquity, Xenophon mentioned the battle as a prelude to the events of 379 B.C. Book 6 was still in progress at a point after the death of Alexandros of Pherai (6.4.37-5.1), which occurred in 357 B.C. at the latest (Diodoros 16.14.1 and cf. Plutarch, Pelopidas 35). For the chronology of Alexandros' death see Sealey, REG 68 (1955) 111-120, Griffith, Macedonia 226-229 and cf. (my) chapter one n. 51.

Books 3 and 6 were written at least 13 years after the events they describe, and what evidence we have of the date of composition of books 3-7 indicates that each book was written later than its predecessor, so book 7 was probably composed last of all. Delebecque, Essai 450, argues for 355 B.C. as the date at which the book was completed. Although Xenophon does not mention the Phokian seizure of Delphi in the Hellenika, his speculation about Jason's intentions there in 370 (6.4.30) and his interest in the Arkadian seizure of Olympia (7.4.14, 28-34) has more point after the Phokian seizure of Apollô's sanctuary.

16 Cawkwell, A History of My Times 19, suggests that "the seemingly gratuitous comment on the upright conduct of Timotheos on Corcyra in 375 (V.4.64) has point if it was written after the scandalous conduct of another Athenian general, Chares, in the same place in 361." This is over-subtle. Xenophon said of Timotheos on Kerkyra: "He did not, however, enslave nor exile men, nor did he change laws; thereby he had all the cities in those parts rather well-disposed" (5.4.64: emphasis mine). Diodoros also makes it clear that Timotheos' mission was to win over to Athens the cities in the region (15.36.5). Timotheos wanted to contrast his own conduct with that of the Lakedaimonians, and in so doing he followed the advice of his own father (to Pharnabazos after the battle of Knidos) "in order to make all the cities friendly" (Xen. 4.8.1-2). At any rate, Xenophon did not seem terribly concerned by the intervention of Iphikrates.
Notes to Chapter Five:

in the governments of some cities on Kephallenia (Xen. 6.2.33).

It is also worth noting that the final appearances of Timotheos and Iphikrates in the Hellenika are rather inglorious. Timotheos is deposed from his command in favor of Iphikrates (6.2.12-13), whose energy and efficiency Xenophon praised at length. Iphikrates himself last appears censured both by his own soldiers and by Xenophon (6.5.49-52). It hardly seems credible that Xenophon would make a subtle comparison here and later portray Khares in such a good light in book 7.

17 The digression (7.2.1-23) is itself ringed by another on Euphron of Sikyon (7.1.44-46 and 7.3.1-4.1). The point from which the digression starts is Epameinondas' third invasion (into Akhaia), but it goes all the way back to the first invasion of 370/69 and gives the deeds of Phleious in chronological sequence down to the summer of 366, whence approximately it began. This appears to be the case with the digression on Sikyon as well. The pair of digressions set the stage for the peace which Korinth, Phleious and other states made in 365 and which represents their official withdrawal from the Peloponnesian League. The chronology of the digression is sorted out by Piero Meloni, "la tirannide di Euphrone I in Sicione," RFIC 79 (1951) 10-33 and cf. Buckler, Hegemony 242-244.

18 Xenophon informs us about more events in Phleious than in any other city of comparable size, or even most larger ones. See Hellenika 4.2.16; 4.4.15; 4.7.3; 5.2.8-10; 5.3.10-17, 21-25; 6.4.9, 18; 6.5.14,17,19; 7.2.1-23; 7.4.10-11. This is perhaps understandable in light of the fact that he had ancestral friends there, one of whom, Eukleides the son of the painter Kleagoras (who had worked in Athens before 399), was a seer and met Xenophon at Lampsakos in 399 (Anab. 7.8.1-4). Cf. also n. 19 below.

19 Xenophon knew such details as that "those around Podanemos were xenoi
of Agesilaos," while "those around Prokles, son of Hipponikos, were xenoi of Agesilaos' son, Arkhidamos," (5.3.13). He also reproduced at great length two speeches by this Prokles, both delivered at Athens (6.5.38-48 and cf. the much briefer speech of the Korinthian, Kleiteles at 6.5.37; 7.1.1-11 and cf. the fact that all we are told of the role of Timokrates, the main Spartan emissary in the negotiations, is his one-word answer to an Athenian question: 7.1.13).

The ancient tradition held that the decree of exile against Xenophon was rescinded at about this time, but that he resided at Korinth (Diogenes Laertios 2.6.53,56).

20 T2 §19: καὶ ἧμα Χάρητα ἐπιβοσθεῖν ἐβδόμων... (§20) ζως δὲ ἐπιφανεῖς σὺ τροπήν, ἄσπερ ἐν Πελλήνῳ, ποιήσεις. Buckler, Hegemony 244, infers that this is a reference to a battle "that Xenophon mentions nowhere else." But the Phleiasian plan is for Khares to come up after their own attack, just as they had done in the previous night's battle on the way from Pellene. This action was apparently known as the battle of the Nemean Ravine (Νεμέας χαράδρα), as Aiskhines (2.168) and Ephoros (FGrHist 70 F82, as quoted by Harpokration s.v.: the reference came from book 23 of Ephoros' history, a book covering the mid-360s) called it. Cf. Xen. 4.2.15 and chapter one n. 40.

21 Diodoros (T3) regarded both victories as Khares' and provided the additional information that, in his sources, the chief enemies were the Argives and not merely the Sikyonians.

22 The Poroi, an apparently practical, politico-economic proposal, ends with the advice to consult the gods before undertaking the proposed measures (6.2-3), and the Cavalry-Commander's Manual suggests (1.1) doing the same, in order that the magistrate might fulfill his office in a manner "most pleasing, glorious and advantageous to yourself, your friends and the city": σαυτῷ δὲ καὶ φίλοις καὶ τῷ πόλει προσφιλέστατα καὶ εὐχλεστάτα καὶ πολυφιλέστατα (cf.T2 §20). There is hardly a work of Xenophon in which this religiosity does not come out.
Notes to Chapter Five:


Xenophon himself was most scrupulous about consulting the gods before any crucial undertaking, particularly military ones: he consultedApollo before joining Kyros' expedition (Anab. 3.1.5-8); he consulted about founding a city (Anab. 5.6.28), about remaining with or leaving the army (Anab. 6.2.15), about continuing the march (Anab. 6.4.9), about travelling (Anab. 6.5.2) and about taking service with Seuthes in the winter of 400/399 (Anab. 7.2.15).

Xenophon also made it abundantly clear that such consultations were of crucial importance in political and military actions. Unfavorable omens deter Agesilaos from continuing his campaign after being defeated in a cavalry skirmish (Hell. 3.4.15); terrible omens portend the conspiracy of Kinadon (Hell. 3.3.4); the Theban claim that the sacrifices were favorable for battle, once the Athenians (and not themselves) are facing the Spartans, resulted in a severe defeat for the allies at the battle of Korinth (Hell. 4.2.18). Failure to heed the omens resulted in defeat or disaster: Neon ignored repeatedly unfavorable sacrifices, went on a raid and lost five hundred men, but Xenophon finally obtained favorable ones and was able to rescue Neon's force (Anab. 6.4.12-25); the lokhagos, Athenadas, ignored unfavorable sacrifices and made an attack in which he was defeated and killed (Hell. 3.1.17-19); Agesilaos rejoiced that Tissaphernes had broken his oath, while he himself had kept his own, and he subsequently inflicted a defeat on Tissaphernes (Hell. 3.4.11-12); Anaxibios, thinking himself safe in friendly territory, neglected to consult the gods, was ambushed and killed (Hell. 4.8.36); the negotiators of the Peace of Philiskos neglected to include the god in their deliberations, even though they were at Delphi and the peace failed (Hell. 7.1.27).

Xenophon also believed such consultations were of personal advantage: his own financial fortunes revived markedly after a mantis pointed out that
Notes to Chapter Five:

Xenophon had neglected to sacrifice to Zeus Meilikhios since his departure from Athens (Anab. 7.8.1-6); before setting out on a raid to capture the wealthy Persian, Asidates, Xenophon sacrificed, the attempt narrowly failed, but upon a second sacrifice the raid succeeded beyond his wildest expectations (Anab. 7.8.20).

23 T4, T5. See chapter one for a discussion of T5. There is no reason to believe that Khares and Demotion, the proposer of the decree "to make Korinth safe for the demos of the Athenians", were connected in any way. Xenophon made it clear that Khares was acting according to a decree of the people which ordered "the strategoi" to take the necessary actions. Khares was chosen, not because of a tendency towards stern treatment of the allies or the like, but because the command of Athenian forces in the Peloponnesos had been his responsibility that year. This is not to say that the posting was akin to those mentioned by Aristotle (Ath.Pol: 61.1), but the Athenians did seem to assign a theater of operations to individual strategoi, probably on an ad hoc basis.

Cf. T41 (Philokhoros, as quoted by Dionysios), where Kharidemos was described in 348 as τὸν ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ στρατηγὸν. Moreover, Khares had recently earned some goodwill in the Peloponnesos and had been stationed in Korinth prior to his operations around Phæious: he was the natural and logical choice to go back. Xenophon's terse (mis-)representation of the Athenian decree does not reflect badly on Khares, or, perhaps, even on the sovereign body which passed it.

24 T24, T25 and perhaps the allusion in the Areopagitikos 7.29. Ancient sources on Isokrates of Erkhia may be found in PA 7716, and are discussed to some extent by Davies, APF 245-248.


26 See K. Bringmann, Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates, (Göttingen, 1965); F. Jacoby, Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens,
Notes to Chapter Five:


27 For Isokrates as a logographos see Cicero, Brutus 48 (on the authority of Aristotle) and Dionysios, Isokrates 18 (p 577.6: on the authority of Kephisodoros). This period is presumably represented by speeches 16-21. For his liturgies see Antidosis 15.145 and cf. Dem. 47.31-2 and Davies, APF 247.

28 Jaeger, Paideia III 46 and n. 1.


30 Plu. Mor. 837C-D and Dionysios Isokrates 1 (p 536). The names of some forty students are known or conjectured. Among those claimed by these sources and the anonymous vita of Isokrates (par. 4b 24-27 in Baiter-Sauppe, Oratores Attici = lines 100-104 in the Budé edition) are Hypereides, Lykourgos and Androtion, but cf. nn. 31 and 32 below.

31 The validity of the later attributions of students to Isokrates is challenged by Kathleen Reed, "Theopompos of Chios: History and Oratory in the Fourth Century"(dissertation: Berkeley, 1976) 7-51. Isokrates himself named only ten or so (Antidosis 15.93, 101 and cf. 224; Epist. 4 [To Antipatros]; cf. also 15.40. Other contemporary sources confirm some of these (Dem. 52.14; 61.46) or add another (Dem. 35.15).

32 Of the pupils named by Isokrates (Antidosis 15.93,101) who were citizens, several did play some role in Athenian public life, such as Lysitheides, Onetor, Kallippos, Philomelos, Kharmantides and, perhaps, Eunomos, but none were in the same category as Timotheos. One is reluctant to accept the later attributions, Androtion, for example: why would Isokrates mention such relative non-entities in 354, but fail to mention the distinguished Androtion, after having gone on so about Timotheos?
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33 Isok. 15.101-139; 7.12; Epistula 8.8.

34 Isok. 15.129. For more on the trials see T16, T17, T18, T19, T20, T21, T22 and the discussion of these testimonia and other evidence in chapter three. It is interesting that Iphikrates was thought to have defended himself with a 'Lysianic' speech on this occasion. Although Dionysios (Lysias 12 [480]) argued rightly that the speech is not a genuine work of Lysias, nonetheless citations of fragments of the speech (e.g., scholion to Homer's Iliad 13. 289-291) confirm that the tradition of Lysianic authorship was widespread.

35 I.e., the Antidosis: see especially 15.1-14, 145. For the purposes of the mise en scène the prosecutor is named Lysimakhos, but Plutarch (Mor. 839C) named him Megakleides, for whom cf. Dionysios, Deinarkhos 13 (667).

36 Contemporaries include Plato (Phaidros 278e), Demosthenes (35.15; 61. 46) and Aristotle (Rhet. passim). Ancient critics include Dionysios (Isokrates 2 [538-9]), who cited a similar criticism by Hieronymos in this same work (13 [560]).

37 Isok. 12.9-11; 5.81; Epist. 1.9 and 8.7. For arguments against the idea of his influence on public policy see S. Perlman, "The Politicians in the Athenian democracy of the Fourth Century," Athenaeum 41 (1963) 327-355; Sealey, Essays 164-182; P. Harding, "The Purpose of Isokrates' Archidamos and On the Peace," CSCA 6 (1973) 137-149 (cf. especially the statement on page 148: "Any man who takes ten years to write a speech is not concerned to influence the politics of the moment"), but see contra Cargill, League 176 n.29 and R.A. Moysey, "Isokrates' On the Peace: Rhetorical Exercise or Political Advice?" American Journal of Ancient History 7 (1982) 118-127. The Panegyrikos took ten years to write, while the Panathenaikos was delayed for three years due to the author's illness (Plu. Mor. 837F and Isok. 12.267).

38 See notes 26 and 27 above, and for perhaps the most thorough refutation
Notes to Chapter Five:

see N. Baynes, Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (London, 1955) 144-167.

One imagines that the model for this sort of 'ideologue' is Antiphon of Rhamnous, who avoided public speeches, but was prepared to advise others (Thuc. 8.68). Those who suppose Isokrates to have been this kind of mentor also cast Xenophon into a similar role. There is no known link between the two men.

39 Compare the review of Timotheos' career in the Antidosis (15:101-114) with the denunciation of empire in the Symmakhikos. Cargill, League 171, 176-178 tries to reconcile the two.


41 See Plato's Seventh Letter 324C and ff., and cf. Isok. 15.150-1. Plato's Republic is, in part, a reaction to his experience of Athenian democracy. Cf. Isokrates in the Areopagitikos, e.g., 7.20-25 and 12.131. Isokrates is so condescending, and even insulting at times, that it is unimaginable that such things could have been said at public meetings (e.g., Antidosis 15.115-6, 121-2, 132-9).

On withdrawal as a mode of political expression see the discussion of Connor, New Politicians 175-194. The tradition that Isokrates' teacher was the shifty Theramenes (Plu. Mor. 836F-837A; Diodoros 14.5; Souda s.v. Isokrates [I652]) seems politically appropriate.

42 See Connor, New Politicians 30-52: that is, Isokrates' attack is not motivated by deep differences on policy or philosophy, but by the fact that Khares ruined his friend.

43 The Athenians are, in effect, being asked (8.26) to trade their "meddlesomeness" (πολυπραγμοσόνη) for peace and quiet (ἡσυχία), their injustice (ἀδικία) for justice (δικαιοσύνη); that is, to cease playing a leading role in international affairs.
Notes to Chapter Five:

44 Paragraphs 41-48 contain a comparison in the realm of foreign policy: "they fought the barbarian on behalf of the Hellenes, we take those from Asia and lead them against the Hellenes"; "they liberated the cities of Hellas, we enslave them"; "they abandoned their country to save Hellas, we do not take the field ourselves, but hire mercenaries, cityless men, deserters thronged together from other misdeeds, who, if someone gives them more pay, will follow him against us"; "we undertake to support mercenaries and harm our own allies and extort money from them in order to pay the common enemies of all men" (excerpts 42-46).

45 The reference to bribery, autokratores and, perhaps, the statements cited in the previous note make it clear that Khares is meant. Cf. Aristotle T23. For the charge of bribery, see the discussion in chapter three.

46 Isokrates made mention of the fact that bribery was a capital offence. It should be pointed out that the person bribed was also committing a capital offence. Hyper. 3.8 quotes the law, apparently the one on which Timotheos was convicted, and under which both Aristophon and Khares were indictable, according to Isokrates: "... ἐὰν τις πῶλην τινὰ προδὸ & ναὸς & πεῖζῃ & ναυτικῆς στρατιάς, ἢ ἄρτωρ ὁν μὴ λέγῃ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, χρήματα λαμβάνων." Cf. section 29 of the same speech.

47 The reader is referred to the bibliography in Davies, APF 113 (first section) for Demosthenes, and APF 543 (i.e., at 14625 Philokrates [I] Philokydous [I] Paianieus) for Aiskhines. See also following note.

Notes to Chapter Five:


49 See chapter four and Cawkwell, Mnemosyne 15 (1962) 77-8.

50 See the passages listed by Pritchett, War 82-84.

51 Dem. 2.28-9; 3.5, 34; 4.24, 28-9, 33 and cf. 1.19-20 for financial problems with the mercenaries and the solution to those problems. For exhortations to serve in person see 1.6, 24; 2.13, 27; 3.34 and cf. 24; 4.7, 19, 43-4, 47.

52 Dem. 2.28-9; 3.36 and scholion wherein the scholiast believed that Demosthenes was protecting Khares; 4.24, 27. Cf. also the tone of Dem. 8.24-29, where Demosthenes defended Diopeithes openly and by name.

53 Dem. 2.29; 4.25, 45-7. Aiskhines (T52) and Demosthenes (T54) implied that Khares was always exonerated.

54 Isok. 8.42-48 and cf. Dem. 2.24; 3.21-9; 4.24.

55 Isok. 8.42-48; T25 and cf. Isok. 4.116, 168 and Epist. 9.8-9. Cf. the references to Demosthenes in nn. 51 and 52 above. Both call mercenaries "the common enemies of all": Dem. 23.139 and Isok. 8.46.

56 Isok. 8.49-56 and cf. Dem. 2.29-33 and 3.29-32. See also Isok. 8.36. Both orators suggested that the demos should wrest control from their bad leaders, a thing from which a person not yet influential might profit. Both prescribe drastic remedies in medical metaphors: Isok. 8.39-41; Dem. 2.21; 3.33. Both claim to put the public good above personal reputation: Isok. 8.39; Dem. 3.21 and cf. 4.51. Both speak with frankness: Dem. 3.3; Isok. 8.41 and cf. Aiskh. 2.70 (= T52).

57 See the following discussion on Aiskhines and Theopompos. This subject cannot be gone into here in any sort of depth, but consider a couple of
Notes to Chapter Five:

elements: Isokrates (15.113) claimed 24 cities captured by Timotheos and Deinarkhos (1.14) claimed "Samos, Methone, Pydna, Poteidaia and twenty others"; Aiskhines (3.90) likened Kallias of Khalkis to the Euripos and Hypereides borrowed the phrase some six years later against the same opponent (Against Demosthenes V, frag. V column xx in the Budé text). Perhaps the most obvious of all is Aiskhines' use in 343 (2.172-176) of Andokides' review of fifth-century history (On the Peace 3.3-10).

58 See the suggestion in chapter four that Khares might have been the strategos who mounted the platform in 345 to defend Timarkhos and to ridicule Aiskhines by reading out his erotic poems (Aiskh. 1.132-5). In the trial of 343 Phokion and Euboulos spoke on Aiskhines' behalf; both are known to have been rivals or enemies of Khares, for which see chapter four 97 n. 66.

59 He was prosecuted by Hypereides (Hyper. 3.29; Dem. 19.116; Aiskh. 2.6; 3.79-81; Dein. 1.28). For more on the circumstances surrounding the trial see Cawkwell (n. 48 above).

60 I.e., Proxenos, strategos in 347/6 and involved with Phokis and Euboia, had been recently punished (Dem. 19.280 and scholion, and cf. Dein. 1.63).

61 The precise occasion of these events is uncertain. See Pritchett, War 81 and the discussion in (my) chapter two.

62 See Oost, CPh 72 (1977) 238-242; Isok. 15.113, and cf. Dein. 1.14; 3.17. For the actual number of League members see Cargill, League 45-47.

63 See previous note and cf. the discussion in chapter one, where it is demonstrated that between 357 and 353/2 Athens' navy increased by 66 ships. Aiskhines' figures for the ships and talents spent are multiples of 75. Isokrates (7.9) mentioned the figure of 1,000 talents, Demosthenes (3.28; 13.27) one of 1,500. Isokrates pointedly mentioned how economically Timotheos had accomplished his achievements (15.108-9, 111-113). One cannot but regard such figures with scepticism in view of normal Athenian financial practices. Cf.
Notes to Chapter Five:

Khares' obvious impoverished situation in 356 (T26, T27, T28, T31), Kharidemos' in 351 (Dem. 3.5) and Diopeithes' in 341 (Dem. 8.19-27).

64 Δηλόρης, Δηπύρος, and Πολυφόντης. The latter two names are actually Homeric (Iliad 13.576 and 4.395, respectively), but a check of PA will reveal how old-fashioned and relatively unpopular names with the Δηλ- element were in Classical Athens (cf. PA 3253 Δηλίμαχος; 3254 Δηλίζενος). The collocation of the three names in Aiskh. T52 is too much of a coincidence: Aiskhines is being facetious.

Isokrates called the mercenaries ἄνθρώπους τὸς μὲν ἀπόλλιδας τοὺς δ' ἀυτομικός τῶν δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων κακουργημῶν συνεργηθέντας (8.44), Aiskhines, δημαρχός ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος συνειληκμένους (2.71). Both orators mentioned exactions from the allies/islanders (Isok. 8.46; Aiskh. 2.71). Isokrates related this amidst a comparison of the modern Athenians with their glorious ancestors; Aiskhines launched immediately into a similar topos (2.74-78) that gave him a splendid opportunity to run through his own family's rather impressive military contributions to the city.

65 Isok. T24 §50 and cf. T19 and the discussion of the trial of Timotheos in chapter three.

66 Compare the types of things that are said about Thrasyboulos Steirieus and Ergokles (Lysias 28.4-11), about Timotheos (Dem. 49) and about Kharidemos (Dem. 23.148-183). The same principle exists in a different genre, Old Comedy. A History of the fifth century dependent upon comedies and comic fragments might not have distinguished between the characters of Kleon and Perikles.

67 See Theopompos FGrHist 115 F105, F213, F249 (= my T32, T62, T36, respectively). The popularity of Theopompos' work, particularly the Philippika, is attested by the vast number of citations in widely varied ancient sources. They can be found in Jacoby's collection of the fragments in FGrHist II.B.
Notes to Chapter Five:

Theopompos 115. For Theopompos' influence on later historians see Connor, *Theopompus* 6-10. Diodoros cited only Ephoros and Timaios more frequently; Polybios cited him six times, Plutarch eighteen or nineteen times and even Nepos mentioned him twice, which is more than he cited any other source except Thucydides.

68 Photios (FGrHist 115 T2) is generally considered a more reliable source for biographical information on Theopompos that the Souda (FGrHist 115 T1). Cf. Connor, *Theopompus* 2 n. 4. For Theopompos' possible sojourn to Athens see FGrHist 115 T5 and T6, but cf. n. 72 below.

69 Theopompos FGrHist 115 T6, T7, T2 and F25, respectively. A.J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks* (Norman, Okla., 1980) 83-95, argues for a slightly earlier date for the return of the Khian exiles.

70 FGrHist 115 T2, and cf. T8 and T9. Connor, *Theopompus* 3-4, remarks that he was "at least a nominal democrat" during his time on Khios, but this is a meaningless label.

71 Kaukalos: FGrHist 115 T4. See F25 for Theopompos' own estimate of himself and for a calculation of his output before the time the proem to book one was written. Many ancient sources list him as a student of Isokrates, usually coupled with Ephoros (FGrHist 115 T1, T5, T6, T20, T24 and others listed at T5), but cf. the following note.

72 For a challenge to this see Kathleen Reed, "Theopompos of Chios" 7-51. She argues that the tradition of pupil-teacher relationships was a product of later (3rd century B.C.) scholarly attempts to construct a literary history. See also W.R. Connor, "History without Heroes: Theopompus' Treatment of Philip of Macedon," *GRBS* 8 (1967) 133-154, especially 139; I.A.F. Bruce, "Theopompus and Classical Greek Historiography," *H&T* 9 (1970) 86-109, especially 87-8; Gordon Shrimpton, "Theopompus' Treatment of Philip in the Philippika," *Phoenix*
Notes to Chapter Five:

31 (1977) 123-144, especially 144.

73 Theopompos FGrHist 115 F85-100 and perhaps 325-327 are from the digression "On the Demagogues". F152-158 and perhaps 281 and 306 are from another digression in book twenty-five, perhaps concerning Athenian propaganda. Connor, GRBS 8 (1967) 148-151, illustrates the negative views of the historian towards a variety of political systems.

74 Connor's Theopompus is a study of the two digressions mentioned in n. 73. For Theopompos on fourth-century Athenian military men see F105, 143, and 213.

75 See Connor, Theopompus 4-5 with n. 17, and 68-9 with n. 53.

76 Deipnosophistai 12.43 (p. 532A-F = my T32, T62, T36 = Theopompos FGrHist 115 F105, 213 and 249, respectively). This compendium on Khares is, in turn, sandwiched between F114, F31 and fragments 135 and 89. Cf. Connor, Theopompus 12.

77 To the authorities listed in n. 72 add G. Murray, "Theopompus, or the Cynic as Historian," in Greek Studies (Oxford, 1946) 149-170.


79 FGrHist 115 F25, T20 and T48 attest to the huge rhetorical output. That the rhetorical training affected his style is nicely put by Lucian, How History Should be Written §59: "Theopompos impeached nearly everyone in a quarrelsome spirit and made a business of it, to the extent that he was a prosecutor rather than a recorder of affairs" (translation of K. Kilburn, Lucian vol. VI, Loeb Classical Library). The metaphor for courtroom litigation is apropos. The point that Theopompos styled his use of historical censure on forensic oratory will be made in more detail below.

80 Connor, Theopompus 123 and cf. his n. 19, where the analogy on Theopompos' ideas about motive is made to those in Isokrates' Antidosis.
Notes to Chapter Five:

81 See LSJ s.v. The verb is used most frequently of stripping something from a helpless person or place, as arms from a corpse or treasures from temples and sanctuaries. Cf. ἐρασωλέω, the vox propria for temple-robbing.

82 F248. Cf. notes 83 and 84 below.

83 See chapter two notes 5 and 9. Ephoros (FGrHist 70 F96), or rather his son Demophilos, recounted how the wives of the generals cast lots for the jewelry of Helen and Eriphyle. It so happened that the items in question were allotted, each to the woman whose personality most resembled that of the item's original owner; and each woman committed a crime similar to that of the original owner. When Demophilos wrote is not known, but the position of his contribution to his father's history (book thirty) may indicate that it was undertaken after the last events recorded by Ephoros, i.e., 340/39. It is conceivable that it was later than Theopompos' "On the Money Plundered from Delphi".

84 Diodoros 16.57 and cf. 16.64.1, where the ultimate punishment was the Athenian defeat in the Lamian War.

85 See n. 83 above. It cannot be proven how much of this material came from Demophilos and how much from Theopompos, but FGrHist 115 F312 and 232 (on Arkhidamos, king of Sparta, his share in the temple-robbing and his end) suggest the sort of things Theopompos could have written about Khares.

86 Eustathios 1479, 35-40 (on Odyssey 4.10).

87 See Connor, Theopompus 102-3.


89 The word and its cognates occur in F31, 62, 114, 192, 204 as well as 213. Cf. Connor, Theopompus 15 n. 47.

90 τὰν χρημάτων τὰν εἰσφερομένων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, suggests the citizens' contributions, no doubt. See Dem. 1.6; 2.30 and cf. Theopompos FGrHist 115 F98 for the term for allied contributions.
Notes to Chapter Five:

91 For other blanket condemnations of entire peoples see FGrHist 115 F40, 49, 62, 139, 162, 204, 227, 233; of individual political leaders F81, 97, 99, 100, 105, 114, 121, 124, 134, 143, 185-8, 210, 224-5, 232, 236, 253-4, 263, 282-3.

92 Isok. 7.48 (and cf. 29); 15.286-7 and cf. what Aiskhines said about Timarkhos (1.42, 53, 75). Aiskhines' charges that Timarkhos prostituted himself to Hegesandros, and Hegesandros to Leodamas (1.57, 70) are to be taken as nothing more than indications of political cooperation. Cf. Dem. 22.30-32; Lysias 14.25-28; Aristophanes Ekklesiazousai 111.

For Isokrates and Aiskhines on Khares see T24, T25, T52 and the discussion above in this chapter.

93 Prostitutes: Aiskh. 1.42, 75; Isok. 7.48; 15.287. Drinking: Aiskh. 1.58; Isok. 15.286-7 (modern youth is so decadent they even cool their wine in Ennekrounos!). Gambling: Aiskh. 1.42, 53, 75; Isok. 7.48; 15.286-7.


95 The similarity of vocabulary, subject matter and phraseology amongst the three is remarkable. Consider the similarities between passages from Aiskhines' speech against Timarkhos, Isokrates' Areopagitkos and Antidosis, and compare them with the passage of Theopompos in question (T62): Aiskhines:

αδητορίζοντο καὶ ἐταίρετα καὶ χύβοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπερτεροῦσιν... διατηρήσασθαι τῶν γενεσιῶν καὶ ἐλευθερούν (1.42); διατηρηθέν... διημέρευεν ἐν τῷ χυβήθει... χυβεδοῦσι (1.53); αδητορίζοντο ἀχχο καὶ ἐταίρες τὰς πολυτελεστάτας καὶ χυβεδή (1.75).

Isokrates: ἐν τοῖς σκυραφεῖσιν οἱ νεώτεροι διετέρησαν, οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς αδητορίζοντο... διημέρευσεν (7.48); τοῖς νεώτεροι... ἐν πάσιν καὶ συνοικίαις καὶ βραδύμαξιν καὶ παιδιαῖς τῆς ἡλικίας διάγειν... τοῖς δὲ χείρω τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντας ἐν τοσάττας ἀκολουθίας ἡμερεῖν ἐν αἷς πρόσφορον οὐδ' ἐν οἷκής ἐπελευκίας οὐδεὶς ἐτέλησεν... ἐν τοῖς καπηλεύοις πέννοις, ἔτεροι ἐν τοῖς σκυραφεῖσιν χυβεδοῦσι, πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν αδητορίζων διδακτικοῖς διατηρῆσαν (15.285-7).

Words (including compounds, verbal forms et cetera) which occur in two or
Notes to Chapter Five:

more of these authors are underlined. In addition, one obviously engaged in the same activities in Aiskhines' \( \kappa \mu \beta \varepsilon \iota \omicron \upsilon \) as in Isokrates' \( \sigma \chi \mu \rho \alpha \phi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \), and Isokrates' \( \delta \iota \delta \alpha \sigma \kappa \alpha \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omicron \upsilon \) of the flute-girls may well be the same thing as Theopompos' \( \alpha \lambda \kappa \lambda \pi \tau \eta \rho \iota \delta \omicron \zeta \varsigma \). \( \text{LSJ s.v.} \) and Connor, \text{Tepompous (index s.v.)} take this word as a diminutive. Note also that these activities are ones to which 'honest gentleman ought to be a slave' (Aiskhines), ones in which 'previously not even an honest slave' indulged (Isokrates). Isokrates contrasted two categories of dissolute youth and their pertinent vices just as Theopompos distinguished between the vices of the older and younger Athenians. Cf. also Theopompos \text{FRHist} 115 F49, 62, 114, 139. Much of Isokrates' vocabulary not duplicated in the above passages can be found in the other fragments of Theopompos.

96 Especially with respect to the charge of bribing \text{ rhetores} to speak on his behalf, which Isokrates (T24), Aiskhines (T52) and Theopompos (T62) all made. Admittedly, this charge is almost ubiquitous against strategoi. Cf. e.g., Lysias 28.9; 29.6; Dem. 23.184.

97 The mention of Egypt in T32 (= \text{FRHist} 115 F105) and references to Agesilaos in book thirteen of the \text{Philippika} (i.e., F106 and cf. 107 and 108) indicate the fragment's context.

For another example of the extravagant strategos unable to dwell in his native city see F232 (Arkhidamos, king of Sparta).

It is noteworthy that Plutarch (\text{Phokion 6.1}) described Khabrias with the same adjective Theopompos used of Khares in (my) T62: \( \nu \omega \theta \rho \delta \varsigma \ldots \kappa \alpha \tau \delta \omicron \kappa \iota \kappa \iota \eta \tau \kappa \iota \omicron \varsigma \). See the note to T32 in the \text{appendix testimoniorum}.

99 \text{Theopompos 111-112}. He also suggests that Plutarch made extensive use of Theopompos.

100 The rhetorical embellishment is the evidence that tips the scale in favor of belief in a common source. It is just possible that details such as
Notes to Chapter Five:

the port, the rams and perhaps even the crew's salvation by abandoning ship might have been coincidence, but the antithesis between "a noble death... and defeat/a base life" cannot be. One might also compare the vague similarity of the rhetorical details in these same two authors' description of the battle of Embata (T16 = Diodoros; T17 = Nepos Timotheus). According to Nepos, Khares acted "as if fortuna were in his own hand", while Diodoros stated that he fought "against nature" (παρὰ φύσιν).


101 See Shrimpton, Phoenix 31 (1977) 140-1 and notes, and Connor, Theopompus 67-69 on this fragment as central to Theopompos' thinking on the decline of Athens.

102 The metaphor of the democratic leader as a watchdog of the people was not uncommon at Athens, e.g., Aristophanes Knights 1023 and Wasps 895 (Kleon); Plutarch, Demosthenes 23 (Demosthenes); Demosthenes 25.40; 26.22 (Aristogeiton).
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scholia, indices and lexica.

The following abbreviations for text series are employed in this
section. The place and date of publication of text(s) actually con­
sulted are cited.

Budé = Société D'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"
LCL = Loeb Classical Library, Harvard Univ. Press
OCT = Oxford Classical Texts, Oxford Univ., or Clarendon Press
Teubner = B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft

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APPENDIX TESTIMONIORUM

Herein are reproduced the Greek and Latin texts pertaining to Khares of Angele. The editions followed are generally those cited in the Bibliography. Deviations from this practice, or from the edition being followed are acknowledged in notes to the individual testimonia. In some cases (T20, T21, T27, T37, T45, T66, T70, T73, T79) there exist secondary witnesses to testimonia. In nearly every one of these the secondary witness was, in antiquity or the mediaeval period, derived from the primary witness (i.e., the testimonium), or is a less perfect version of it. In no case does a secondary witness vary in any meaningful way from the primary, or add anything of significance to it; they are without independent value, except for two or three variant readings for individual words. These secondary witnesses are cited at the relevant testimonium and their variant readings, if any, are reproduced in the notes to the testimonia.

In a couple of instances (T68 and T80-T81) variant editions or some short, parallel supplements are included. The reasons for this will be readily apparent from the testimonia themselves.

Several of the testimonia are conveniently located in collections, such as those containing fragments of the historians, the orators, the comic writers and so forth. References to these collections are usually given at the heading of the testimonium itself.

Below is an index of the testimonia in numerical order.

T1 Stephanos Byzantinos Ethnika, s.v. 'Αγγέλη
T2 Xenophon Hellenika 7.2.17-23
T3 Diodoros 15.75.3
T4 Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.1
T5 Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.4-5
T6 IG II² 1609, lines 110-119
T7 Diodoros 15.95.1-3
T8 Aineias Taktikos Poliorketika 11.13-15
T9 Aristotle Politics (5.5.6) 1306a 4-6
T10 Demosthenes Against Aristokrates 23.173, 178
T11 IG II² 124
T12 Hypothesis to Isokrates Symmakhikos (= On the Peace) 8
T13  Diodoros 16.7.3-4
T14  Cornelius Nepos  Chabrias 4.1-3
T15  IG II² 127
T16  Diodoros 16.21.1-4
T17  Cornelius Nepos  Timotheus 3.1-5
T18  Polyainos  Strategemata 3.9.29
T19  Scholion to Aiskhines  Against Timarkhos 1.64
T20  Plutarch  Moralia 788D ("an seni sit gerenda res publica")
T21  Plutarch  Pelopidas 2.6
T22  Aristotle  Rhetoric (3.10) 1411b 1-6
T23  Aristotle  Rhetoric (3.17) 1418a 29-34
T24  Isokrates  Symmakhikos (= On the Peace) 8.50, 54-56
T25  Isokrates  Antidosis 15.115-117, 121
T26  Diodoros 16.22.1-2; 34.1
T27  Scholion to (and text of) Demosthenes  First Philippic 4.19
T28  Demosthenes  First Philippic 4.24
T29  FGrHist 105  Papyrus Fragmente F4 (Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer)
T30  Scholia to (and text of) Demosthenes  Third Olynthiac 3.31
T31  Demosthenes  Second Olynthiac 2.28-9 and scholion ad locum
T32  Athenaios  Deipnosophistai 12.43 (p. 532A-B)
T33  Cornelius Nepos  Chabrias 3.2-4
T34  Demosthenes  Against Aristokrates 23.183
T35  Polyainos  Strategemata 4.2.22
T36  Athenaios  Deipnosophistai 12.43 (p. 532D-E)
T37  Zenobios 6.34
T38  Diodoros 16.34.3-4
T39  Frontinus  Strategemata 3.10.8
T40  Diodoros 16.35.5
T41  Dionysios Halikarnasseus  Ad Ammaeum 9
T42  Souda s.v. Καρανακογ (K356)
T43  Scholion to Aristelides  Panathenaikos (Dindorf 179, 8-9)
T44  IG II² 1620 lines 16-49
T45  Aristotelé  Rhetoric (3.10) 1411a 6-9
T46  Aiskhines  Parapresbeias (= On the False Embassy) 2.90-2
T47  Polyainos  Strategemata 3.13.1
T48  Polyainos  Strategemata 3.13.2
T49  Polyainos  Strategemata 3.13.3
T50  Frontinus  Strategemata 2.12.3
T51  IG II 3068
T52  Aiskhines Parapresbeias (= On the False Embassy) 2.70-73
T53  Aristotle Rhetoric (1.15) 1376a 8-13
T54  Demosthenes On the Embassy 19.332
T55  Demosthenes On the Khersonesos 8.30
T56  Plutarch Cicero 52(3)
T57  Plutarch Moralia 486D ("de fraterno amore")
T58  Plutarch Phokion 7
T59  Demosthenes Second Olynthiac 2.25 and scholia
T60  Demosthenes Third Olynthiac 3.35-6 and scholia
T61  Zenobios 2,13 (= Souda s.v. αἰ Χάριτος ἀποσχέσεις [Χ101])
T62  Athenaios Deipnosophistai 12.43 (p. 532B-D)
T63  Polybios 9.23.6
T64  Scholion to (and text of) Demosthenes On Halonesos 7.15
T65  Demosthenes Against Theokrines 58.38
T66  IG II 1628 c 420 = IG II 1629 d 941
T67  IG II 228
T68  IG II 207
T69  Polyainos Strategemata 5.44.3
T70  FGrHist 390 Hesychios of Miletos F1 §28-31
T71  Didymos Commentary on Demosthenes 11,1 col. 10,34 (= FGrHist 328 Philokhoros F162)
T72  Plutarch Moralia 851A ("vitae decem oratorum": Demosthenes)
T73  Plutarch Phokion 14
T74  Plutarch Phokion 5
T75  Cornelius Nepos Phocion 2.3
T76  Diodoros 16.85.2
T77  Polyainos Strategemata 4.2.8
T78  Diodoros 16.85.7
T79  Stobaios Florilegium 54.47
T80  Arrian Anabasis 1.10.4-6
T81  Souda s.v. Αὐτέπατρος (A2704)
T82  Arrian Anabasis 1.12.1
T83  Arrian Anabasis 3.2.6
T84  Q. Curtius Rufus Historia Alexandri 4.5.22
T85  Plutarch Moralia 848E ("vitae decem oratorum": Hypereides)
T86  Demosthenes Epistula 3.31
DUBIA

T87 Dionysios Halikarnasseus 653 (Deinarkhos 10)
T88 Dionysios Halikarnasseus 663 (Deinarkhos 12)
T89 Harpokration s.v. ἐπιδειτῶς ἱβηκατ
T90 Priscian 7.7 ("de vocativo") = FAC (Edmonds) Theopompos F97
17 ὃς γε μὴν καὶ διὰ καρτερίας τὴν πίστιν τοὺς φίλους διεσφοξών περιφανεῖς· οἱ ἐπεὶ εἰργοῦντο τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς καρπῶν, ἔξων τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας λαμβάνοντες, τὰ δὲ ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἀνοικοῦσα, διὰ πολλῶν κινήθων ἔπει τὴν ἀγορᾶν ἱδντες, χαλε-πῶς μὲν τιμὴν πορίζοντες, χαλεπῶς δὲ τοὺς πορίζοντας διαπρατ-τόμενοι, γλίσχρος δ' ἐγγυητάς καθιστάντας τῶν ἐξόντων ὑπο-ζυγίων. 18 ἴδη δὲ παντάπασιν ἀπορούντες ἡρήτητα διεπρέξαντο σφίσι παραπέμψαι τὴν παραπομπὴν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν φλειοῦντι ἐγέν-οντο, ἐδεξήθησαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοὺς ἀχρείους· συνεκπέμπανείς τὴν Πελλήνην. κακεῖνους μὲν ἐκεὶ κατέλυμον, ἀγοράσαντες δὲ καὶ ἐπισκευασάμενοι ὁπόθεσα ἐδώναντο ὑποζηγία νυκτὸς ἀπήδαν, οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες δὴ ἐνδερεθοῦντο ὑπὲ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλὰ νομίζοντες χαλεπώτερον εἶναι τοὺς μάχεσθαι τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τάπισθεια. 19 καὶ προῆγαν μὲν οἱ Φλειάσιοι μετὰ ἡρήτητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνέτυχον τοὺς πολεμίους, εἴθες ἔργον τε ἐξοχοντο καὶ παρακελευσάμενοι ἄλληκ-λοις ἐνεκείντο, καὶ ἐμα ἡρήτητα ἐπιβοηθεῖν ἐβδόμων· νικῆς δὲ γενομένης καὶ ἐκφθαγμένων ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῶν πολεμίων, οὕτω δὴ οὐκαδὲ καὶ ἑαυτούς καὶ ἐὰν ἤγον τὸν ἀπέσωσαν. ὡς δὲ τὴν νυκτὰ ἡγρή-πνησαν, ἐκάθευδον μέχρι πάρθῳ τῆς ἡμέρας. 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀντοτή ὁ ἡρήτης, προελθόντες οἱ τε ἥπετες καὶ οἱ χρησιμοτατοί τῶν ὀπλ-ιτῶν ἐλεγον. ὦ ἡρήτης, ἐξεστί σοι τῷ τετράντον καλλιστον ἔργον δια-πρέξαςβαι. χωρίν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄροις ἡμῖν οἱ Σικυώνιοι τελει-ξοῦσιν, οἰκοδόμους μὲν πολλοὺς ἔχοντες, ἐπολίτας δὲ ὑπὸ πάνυ πολλοὺς. ἡγησθήμεθα μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς οἱ ἥπετες καὶ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ∨ οἱ ἡρωμενευστατοί· σο δὲ τῷ ξενικῷ ἔχων ἑάν ἀκολουθῆς, ἵσως μὲν διαπεπραγμένα σοι καταλήψῃς, ἵσως δὲ ἐπιφανεῖς σο τροπῆν,
δισπερ ἐν Πελλήνη, ποιήσεσε. εἰ δὲ τι δυσχερὲς σοι ἐστι τὸν λέγομεν, ἀνακοινώσαι τοὺς θεοὺς θυμιμένος· οἴδιμεθα γὰρ ἐτι σε μᾶλλον ἰμῶν τοὺς θεοὺς ταῦτα πράττειν κελέσειν. τούτο δὲ κρῆ, ὁ Χάρης, εὗρε εἰδέναι, διὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράξεις, τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους ἐπιτετειχικῶς ἔσει, μιλῶν δὲ πάλιν διασειώξας, εὐχλε- ἔστατος δὲ ἐν τῷ πατρίδι ἔσει, ὀνομαστότατος δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ πολεμίοις. 21 ὁ μὲν ὁ Χάρης πεισθεὶς ἔθετο, τῶν δὲ Φλειασίων εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν ἵππεις τοὺς θώρακας ἐνεδόντο καὶ τοὺς Ἰπποὺς ἑχαλίνουν, οἱ δὲ ὅπλιται ὡς εἰς πεζὸν παρε- εσχενόχοντο. ἔπει δὲ ἀναλαβήταις τὰ ὁπλὰ ἐπορεύοντο ἐνεα ἔθετο, ἀπήντα αὐτοῖς ὁ Χάρης καὶ ὁ μάντης, καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι καλὰ τὰ λεγόμενα. ἄλλα περιμένετε, ἔφασαν· ἥδη γὰρ καὶ ἤμεις ἐξε- ὦμεν. δὲ δὲ τάχιστα ἐκχηθῆσαν, θεία τινὶ προθυμία καὶ οἱ μισο- θοφόροι ταχὺ ἐξέθραμμον. 22 ἔπει δὲ Χάρης ἡρέματο περιθέουσαν, προῆγαν αὐτοῖς οἱ τῶν Φλειασίων ἵππεις καὶ πεζοὶ· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ταχέως ἤγοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐτρέχαξον· τέλος δὲ οἱ μὲν ἵππεις κατὰ κράτος ἤλαυνον, οἱ δὲ πεζοὶ κατὰ κράτος ἦθεον ὡς ὑποκατὰ ἐν ταξιν, οὔς καὶ ὁ Χάρης σπουδῇ ἐπηκολοθεῖ. ἢν μὲν ὁδὸν τής δρας μικρὸν πρὸς δύντος ἡλίου· κατελάμβανον δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῇ τεῖχει πολεμίους τοὺς μὲν λουσμένους, τοὺς δὲ ὑποπολαμ- μένους, τοὺς δὲ πυρὰντας, τοὺς δὲ στειβᾶς πολυμένους. 23 δὲ δὲ εὗρον τὴν σφοδρότητα τῆς ἐφοδίου, εὔθες ἐκπλαγήτες ἐξανεύνι νυκτὶς ἐπίθεον τόπους ἀνάβαςε πάντα τάπιτηδεία. ἐπὶ εὐτυ- χίας σπείρασκες καὶ πανανικάτος καὶ φυλακῶς κατασκευασάμενοι, κατέδραμον. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἀφικομένου τῆς νυκτὸς ἄγγελου περὶ τῆς θυμίας, μάλα φιλικῶς ἄγριως περὶ τῆς θυμίας, ἀνάξια καὶ τὰ ὑπο- χήνυ πάντα καὶ σίτου γεμίζαντες εἰς τὸν Φλειασίνα παρῆγαγον· καὶ ἕως ὅ περ ἐτείχετο τὸ τεῖχος, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας παραπομπάλ ἐγίνοντο.

Τ3. Diodoros 15.75.3 (sub archon Polyzelos = 367/6)

3 Φλειασίοις δὲ πολεμουμένοις ὑπ' Ἀργείων Χάρης ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων πειραθῆς στρατηγὸς μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐβοήθησε [τοῖς Φλειασίοις πολ- λορκουμένοις]. ἐνεκήσας δὲ τοὺς Ἀργείους δυσὶ μάχαις καὶ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν περιποιήσας τοὺς Φλειασίοις ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.
1. Madvig and all subsequent editors bracket these words.


1 καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Εὐφρόνους εἰρηται· ἕγα δὲ ἔνθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἐξῆθην ἐπάνειμι. ἔτι γὰρ τειχιζόμενων τῶν Φλειασάιων τῇ Θεομίλῃ καὶ τοῦ Χάρητος ἦτο παρόντος ὁρῶν ὑπὸ τῶν φευγόντων κατ-ἐλήσθη. στρατευσάμενων δὲ πάντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπ’ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν Χάρητος μεταπεμψαμένων ἐκ τῆς Θεομίλης, ὃ μὲν λίμην ὃ τῶν Σικουσών πάλιν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τε τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἀρχάδων ἀλίσκεται· τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδέπερ τῶν συμμάχων ἐβοηθησεν, ἀλλ’ ἀνεχόμεναν Θηβαίους παρακαταθέμενοι τὸν ὁρῶν μὲχρι δίκης.

T5. Xenophon. Hellenika 7.4.4-5.

4 εἰπόντος δὲ Δημοσίωνος ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δὲ ἢ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀρχάδας φιλία χαλῶς αὐτῷ δοχοίη πράττεσθαι, τοῖς μὲντοι στρατηγοῖς προστάξασθαι ἐκεὶν ἡρῴη ὡς καὶ Κρινθοῖς οὕτα ἡ τῷ δῆμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων· ἀκούσαντες δ’ εἰς ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι, ταχὺ πέμψαντες ἰκανοῦς φρουροὺς ἕαυτῶν πάντωσε οὕτω Ἀθηναίοι ἐφοβοῦσιν εἰπαν αὐτοῖς ἀπείπαν, ὡς συνῆκαν οὐκ εἰς τῶν φρουρῶν Ἀθηναίου εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐκήρυξαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι, εἰ τις ἀδικεῖτο Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀπογράφησθαι, ὡς λησμόνους τὰ δίκαια. 5 οὕτω δὲ τοῦτων ἐχθρῶν Χάρης ἀφίκνεται μετὰ ναυτικοῦ πρὸς Κεγχρείας. ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνὸ τὰς πεπραγμένα, ἔλεξαν ὡς ἄκοισας ἐπερουλθέσσαι τῇ πόλει βοηθῶν παρείη. οἱ δὲ ἐπαινέσαντες αὐτῶν οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἄθεναν τὰς ναῦς εἰς τὴν λιμένα, ἀλλ’ ἀποπλεῦν ἐκέλευον καὶ τοὺς ὀπλίτας δὲ τὰ δίκαια ποιήσαντες ἀπέπεμψαν. ἔκ μὲν οὖν τῆς Κορίνθου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως ἀπηλλάγησαν.
110 Φεύλοσι τα χρ[ε]ματα ἑπτά, τῶν δὲ ἐκλίνων κεραίας μεγά, κλιμακίδας· [τὰ δὲ ἄλλα]-
α δὲ ἀποδούναι Τιμόθεον Ἁχαρί, Θεόδωρον Μελί ν οὐδὲ ἔλαβον κρεμαστὰ σκεῦος κατὰ ἄρσημα με[λῆς.]
ος Μαρα, Ἀναπαιός Ἐλευσίνιος ὑποξώματα, δὲ Κηφισοδόρος ὑθήε ἐλημένης· τοπεία, δὲ Ἀριστότ[έων.]
ἐπὶ τὴν Δορκάδα· παραρράματα τρίχων, παραρράματα λευκά, δὲ Δαίμονας Μαραθώνιος ἐλημένη[κεν ἐπὶ τὴν]
Μόσχος. ἄγκυρα, ἢν Ἐκθέμος Κηφή ἐλημένης ἐπὶ τὴν Χρυσῆν. ἄγκυραν, ἢν Νικίας Λαμπτ ἐν[σήμενη]
115 ἐπὶ τὴν Σειρήνα· σχοινία ἑπτά, τἀ 'Αμφιδάμας(ς) Κηφισοδόρος ἐλημένης· ὑπόβλημα, κατάβλημα, ἄγκυρας δὲ-
δο, δὲ Ἐραύνιας ἔλαβε δημοσίας ἀπὸ τὰ ταῖ[λ[ντ[ν] ν Χάρης· οὗτος παρέλαβεν κατ ἐκπελευκέν 

1 The inscription is stoichedon (67) down to line 70. In lines 70-110 the number of letters diminishes, and the stoichedon pattern is disturbed at the ends of lines 71 and 104-110. Beginning at line 111 the letters are inscribed more closely together, with as many as 81 on a line.

The end of line 116 is to be supplemented with the name of a ship containing six letters.
Τ7. Diodoros 15.95.1-3 (Nikophemos = 361/0).

1 Ἐπ' ἀρχοντος δ' Ἀθηναίων Νικοφήμου τὴν ὑπατικὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν Ἐρυμή διέλαβε Γάιος Σουλπίκιος καὶ Γάιος Λικίντος. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀλεξάνδρος μὲν ὁ θερόν τὑραννος λῃστρίδας ναῦς ἐκ-πέμμας ἐπὶ τὰς Κυκλάδας νῆσους, τινὰς μὲν ἑκκολορκήσας πολλὰν σωμάτων ἐκυρίευσεν, εἰς δὲ τὴν Πεπάρθησαν ἀποβεβάζας μεσο-φρόνους στρατιώτας ἐπολεύσχε τὴν πόλιν. 2 Ἀθηναίων δὲ βοηθήσαντων τοῖς Πεπάρθησις, καὶ στρατηγὴν Λεωσθίνην ἀπολέπιν δυντοῖς, ἐπέθετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκτήσασθαι δ' οὔτοι παραφυλάττοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πανόμῳ διατρίβοντας τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου στρα-τιωτῶν. ἀπορροθήκτως δὲ ἐπιθεμένων τῶν τοῦ δυνάστου, παραδόχος εὐθυμερτα περὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐγένετο. οὐ μὴν γὰρ τοὺς ἀπεσταλμένους ἐν τῷ Πανόμῳ διατρίβοντας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κυνδύνων, ἄλλα καὶ τριήρεις μὲν Ἀττικὰς πέντε, μὲν δὲ Πεπαρ-θῆσις εἴλε, καὶ σωμάτων ἐκυρίευσεν ἔκκοσσις. 3 οὐ δ' Ἀθη-ναίοι παραγυνηθέντες τοῦ μὲν Λεωσθίνους δ' ἀνδρῶν κατέγνωσαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐδήμευσαν, ἐλθονοὶ δὲ στρατηγὴν ἀρχητα καὶ ναυτικὴν δύναμιν δύντες ἐξεπεμψαν. οὕτως δὲ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους εὑραμοῦς, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἀδικῶν διετελεὶ. καταπλῆθες γὰρ εἰς Κόρκυραν συμμαχίδα πόλιν, στάσεις ἐν αὐτῇ μεγάλας ἐξέπεσεν, ἐξ δὲ συνέπεσε γενέσθαι σφαγᾶς πολλῆς καὶ ἀρπαγῆς, δι' ἀς συνέβη τῶν δήμων τῶν Ἀθηναίων διαβληθῆναι παρὰ τοὺς συμμάχους. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἡρῴς καὶ ἕπετα τοιαῦτα παρα-νομῶν ἄγαθνι μὲν ὀδὴν διεπρέσετο, τῇ δὲ πατρίδι διαβολὰς.

Τ8. Aineias Taktikos, Poliorketika 11.13-15

13 Ἔν Κορκύρα δὲ ἐπανάστασιν ἕτον γενέσθαι ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὅλης φιλοτιμίας τῷ δήμῳ (ἐπεδήμει δὲ καὶ Χάρης Ἀθηναῖος φουράν ἔχων, ὥσπερ συνήθειν τῇ ἐπαναστάσει) ἐτεχνάσθη τοιχοδος. 14 τῶν τῆς φουρᾶς τινὲς ἔρχοντες σικάδας προσβάλ-μενοι καὶ τομὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ποιησάμενοι καὶ αἰματωθέντες ἐξέδραμον εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ὡς πληγὰς ἔχοντες, ἡμα δ' αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς προπαρασκευασμένοι οὐ τε ἄλλοι στρατιῶται τὰ ὑπά ξι-νὲγχαινοι καὶ τῶν Κορκυραίων οἱ ἐπιμουλαθόντες. 15 Τῶν <δ'> ἄλλων ἄγνοοντων τὸ πράγμα καὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν παρακληθέντων
συνελαμβάνοντο οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου, ὡς ἐπαναστάσεως γενομένης ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μεθύσταταν πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον αὐτοῖς.

T9
Aristotle Politics 1306a 4-6 (5.6)
(... καὶ ἐν Ἁλιγνῷ ὅ τιν πράξειν τὴν πρὸς Χάριτα πράξας ἐνεχεύρησε μεταβάλειν τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοιαύτην αὐτίκοιν).

T10
Demosthenes Against Aristokrates 23.173,178

ἐκπεπλευκότων δὲ τῶν πρέσβεων συμβαίνει τοῖς χρόνοις ἐις τοῦτ’ ὑπηγομένα τὰ πράγματ’ ἤση, διατριβῶντος τούτων καὶ ὀδόν ἀπλοῦν οὐδέ δύκαιον ὑμῖν ἐθελόντων πράξας, διότι ἐπήθευσαί εἰς Ἐβροὺς, καὶ Χάρις ἤκεν ἐκὼν τῶν ξένων, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπ’ ὑμῶν αὐτοκράτωρ εἰς Χεροβνησον ἔξεπλευ. οὕτω γράφεται πάλιν συνήθης πρὸς τὸν Χάριτα, παραγενομένου Αἰθηνοδώρου καὶ τῶν βασιλέων, ταύτας αἵπερ εἰσὶν ἀρίστατα καὶ δικαιότατα. (173)...

ὅρατε καὶ συνείτε, καὶ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τὴν πονηρῶν καὶ τὴν ἄμυσταν, ὡς ἁνω καὶ κάτω. τὸ πρῶτον ἠδοκεί Κηφισοῦσον, πάλιν φοβηθεῖς Ἀθηνοδώρου ἐπαύσατο αὕτης ἠδοκεί Χαρῦαν, πάλιν ἀμολογεί Χάριτης. πάντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω [πεποίηκεν], καὶ ὀδόν ἀπλῶς οὐδὲ δικαίως ἔπραξεν. (178)

T11
IG II² 124 (= Dittenberger, Syll. 3) 190 = Tod, GHI 153 = Bengtson, SV 304)¹

[α] τοῦ πρέσβε τοῦ πειρη[θείναι εἰς] [Κάρυστον καὶ καλ[έσα]—
[ι] ἐπὶ δευτέρου εἰς τὸ πρυτ[α]ν αὐτὸν [κ]ριν. ἄποδον δὲ τὰ—
[ὁ] τοῖς καὶ ἐκδύσα τὸν ταμί[ία]ν τοῦ δῆμο[ῦ] Δ χρημάτων εἰς τῶν [ε]—
[ι]ς τα κατὰ ψυχρομάτα ἀναλογικῶν [τῶ]ν δήμων. ἀποδο[υ]—
[α] δὲ τὸν ταμίαν τὸ δήμο καὶ τοὺς προ[φέτες] τοὺς προβῆδε·—15
[σα]σα εἰς 'Ερετρίαν καὶ χαλ[κ]ίδα καὶ ἐς Ἁστιαίαν ΔΔ δραχμ—
[ε]ς ἐκάστωλι· ἀποδόν δὲ κα[ὶ] τοῖς τὴν συμμίαταν προβῆδε· ἐκάστωλι—
[σα]σα τοῦ ταμίαν τὸ δήμο Δ δ[ραχμά]ς [ἐκάστωλι]. 0—
[ἐ]δε ὑμοίου· ἡ βουλή ἡ ἐπ’ Ἀγαθο[κλέους ἀρχοντὸς] οἰς — vacat
τραπεζῇ [Χαβρίας [Αλ]έων, Χάρις Ἀγαθῆ, 'Ἰσχράτης] 'Ραμόν, —20
Μέων Ποτα, Φιλοχάρης 'Ραμον, 'Εξηκτησίδης Θωρίκη, 'Ἀλκον [α]ράγυρ [άσιος],
Διοκλης Ἀλωπεκήθεν. vacat

¹ Lines 1-17 are stoichedon (45). The stone is preserved in three fragments which have not been indicated here. Little of lines 1-8 is preserved. In line 20 a deliberate attempt has been made to erase the name and demotic of Khabriasis, but the unbracketed letters are still visible.
Hypothesis to Isokrates Symmachikos or On the Peace 8

πειρατείς ὁ Χάρης καταδουλώσασθαι τῷ Ἀμφιπόλιν, αὐτονομουμένην κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν γεγομένην, ὡς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν κραίσιν διακεφαλώσαν μετὰ τὰ Ἐλευτερικὰ, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀθείνων ὄγκων, οὕτως οὐκέτις εὐθείᾳ αὖθις ὅτε δὴ ποτὲ λαβέτοι, καὶ μᾶλλον βουλήμενος τὴν ἀρχαίαν δύναμιν περιποιηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀμφιπόλιοι, ἐπεχείρησε Χίους καὶ Ἰωνίους καὶ τοῖς λύσιοις συμμάχους. Εἶτα ἔκεινυ ἀντέστησαν καὶ ἤττήθη ὁ Χάρης οὕτως διὸ ἄπορεῖν τι δεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ γὰρ εἶ ἄνεκάρησαν εἰς αὐτῶν καὶ ἤλθεν εἰς τῷ Ἀμφιπόλιν, αὐτοῖς τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦν ἔρχοντο εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν. τάτα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἤτησαν σπουδᾶς, καὶ εὐθὺς οἱ Χίοι καὶ Ἰωνίοι σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις συνέθεντο, καὶ οὕτως ἔστιν ὁ συμμαχίας πόλεως. νῦν οὖν πρόκειται ἐκκλησία περὶ τὸ καταθεῖσαι τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἀνύπαται οἱ Ἰσοκράτης συμβουλεύων δεῖ δεῖ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν ἀλλ’ ἱσουχάζειν.

Diodoros 16.7.3-4

οἱ μὲν οὖν Βουλοὶ τῇ εἰς οὖν ἐπανόδῳ ποιημένου τῇ ἡσυχίαν ἤγον. (3) οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι Χίους καὶ Ἰωνίους καὶ Κέφως ἔτη δὲ Βυζαντίων ἀποστάσιν ἔνεπεσον εἰς πόλεμον τῶν δυνασθέντα συμμαχός δὲ δείχνειν τῇ τριά. ἔλομεν δὲ στρατηγοῦς Χάρητα καὶ Χάριταν ἀπέστειλαν μετὰ δυνάμεως. οὕτως δὲ πλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν Χίου καταλαβοῦσα παραγεγονότα συμμάχους τοῖς Χίους παρὰ Βυζαντίων καὶ Ἰωνίους καὶ Κέφως, ἔτη δὲ Μαυσολίου τῆς Καρανδυνάτου. ἔκταχαντες δὲ τῇ δύναμιν ἐπολυσάσθαι τῇ πόλιν κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, δὲ μὴν οὖν Χάρητος τοῦ πείχοσ στρατεύεστας ἡγομένος κατὰ γῆν προσήκει τοῖς τείχεσι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐκχυθέντας ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ εὐφυσεινεῖν. δὲ δὲ Χάριτας προσπλέσασθα τῷ λιμένι ναυμαχίαν καρπεράν συνεντεῦθατο καὶ τῆς νεκρῆς τοῖς ἐμβολίοις ἀναφιγείσης κατεπονεῖτο. (4) οἱ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων νεκρῶν ἐξελέγει τῷ καιρῷ διεσθέσθην, δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἂθλητῆς ἀλλαξαμένος τὸν εὐκλεῖα θάνατον ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς νεκρῆς καὶ τρωθείς ἐτελεύτησε.

Cornelius Nepos Chabrias 4.1-3

(1) Chabrias autem periit bello sociali tali modo. oppugnabat Athenienses Chium. erat in classe Chabrias privatus, sed omnes, qui in magistratu erant, auctoritate anteibat, eumque magis milites quam qui praeerant aspiriebant. (2) quae res ei maturavit mortem. nam dum primus studet portum intrare gubernatoremque ibet eo dirigere navem, ipse sibi perniciei fuit: cum enim eo penetrasset, ceterae non sunt secutae. quo facto circumfusus est hostium concursu cum fortissime pugnaret, navis rostro percussa coeptit sidere. (3) hinc fugerunt cum possent, si se in mare deiecissent, quod suberat classis Atheniensium, quae exciperat natantis, perire maluit quam armis abiectis navem relinquere, in qua fuerat vectus. id ceteri facere noluerunt, qui nando in tutum pervenerunt. at ille, praestare honestam mortem existimans turpi vitae, comminus pugnans telis hostium interfactus est.
The inscription is stoichedon (44).
1 Diodoros recounts these events in his narrative of the archonship of Elpines (356/5).

16 Diodoros 16.21.1-4

1 Kata δε την Ἑλλάδα Χίων καὶ Ῥόδιων καὶ Κύθων, ἦτο δὲ Βυζάντιων διαπολεμοῦνταν πρὸς Ἀθηναίως τῶν συμμαχίκων πόλεμον ἀμφότεροι μεγάλας παρασκευάξας ἐπονομάζας, βουλήμενοι ναυμαχίς κρίνας τοῦ πόλεμου. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ Ἡρώτα μὲν μετὰ ὑποθενίων ἐξηγοῦντα προσεπεταλκότες ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς ἅὶ δυνατοῖς, τὸτε δὲ ἄλλα ἐξήγοντα πληρώσαντες καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἐπίστησάν τες ἐπιμελετότατος τῶν πολιτῶν, Ἦφισσάτην καὶ Τιμόθεουν, ἐξαπέστειλαν κοινῇ μετὰ Ἡρώτα διαπολεμεῖν τοὺς ἀφεστηκόσα τῶν συμμάχων. 2 οἱ δὲ Χίοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων ἀκατὸν ναῦς πληρώσαντες Ἰμβρον μὲν καὶ Λήμνον οὖσας Ἀθηναίων ἐπόρθησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ Σάμῳ πολλῇ δυναμὶ στρατεύσασθαι τῇ μὲν χώρᾳ ἔδωσαν, τῇ δὲ πόλιν ἐπολεῖρον κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν πολλὰς δε καὶ ἄλλας νῆσους οὖσας ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίως κακοποιήσαντες χρήσιμα ἤθελον εἰς τὰς τοῦ πολέμου χρείας. 3 οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ πάντες ἀθροισθέντες τῷ μὲν πρῶτῳ ἐπεβάλλον πολλορκήσας τῆς τῶν Βυζάντιων πόλιν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τῶν Χίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων τῆς μὲν πολιορκήσεως τῆς Σάμου λύσαντας, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν ἐπιθάλασσαν τοῖς Βυζάντιοις τρεπομένων συνεργοῦσαν πάντες οἱ στόλοι περὶ τοῦ Ἐλλήσποντος, μελλόντες δὲ γένεσαι τῆς ναυμαχίας μέγας ἀνεμοῦ ἐπιπεσόν διεκκολάσσετο αὐτῶν τῇ προαίρεσιν. 4 τὸ δὲ Ἡρώτας παρὰ φόβῳ βουλήμενοι ναυμαχεῖν καὶ τῶν περὶ τῶν Ἦφισσάτην καὶ Τιμόθεουν ἐναντίον-μένων διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κλέδωνος ὁ μὲν Ἡρώς ἐπιμελετόμενος τοὐς στρατιώτας διέβαλε τοὺς συνάρχοντας διὰ προδότας καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὑμὸν ἔγγραφε περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ ἐγκαταλελυστῶν ἐκουσίας τῆς ναυμαχίας, ὁ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι παραστενθέντες καὶ χρίσσει τῷ Ἦφισσάτητα καὶ Τιμόθεῳ προσθέντες ἐξημίσωσαν αὐτοὺς πολλῶς ταλάντους καὶ τῆς στρατηγίας ἀπέστησαν.

17 Cornelius Nepos Timotheus 3.1-5

1 Hic cum esset magno natu et magistratus gerere desisset, bello Athenienses undique premi sunt coepti. defecerat Samus, descierat Hellespontus, Philippus iam tum valens, Macedo, multa moliatur: cui oppositus Chares cum esset, non satis in eo praesidii putabatur. 2 fit Menestheus praetor, filius Iphicratis, gener Timothei, et ut ad bellum proficiscatur decernitur. huic in consilium dantur duo usu sapientiaque praestantes, pater et socer, quod in his tanta erat auctoritas, ut magna spes esset per eos amissa posse recuperari. 3 hi cum Samum profecti essent et eodem Charis illorum adventu cognito cum suis copiis proficisceretur, ne quid absentе se gestum videretur, accidit, cum ad insulam approquinarent, ut magna tempestas oriretur: quam evitare duo veteres imperatores utile arbitrati suam classem supresserunt. 4 at ille temeraria usus ratione non cessit maiorum natu auctoritati velut in sua manu esset fortuna. quo contederat, pervenit, oedemque ut sequerentur, ad Timotheum et Iphicratenuntium misit. hinc male re gesta, compluribus amissis navibus eo, unde erat professus, se
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recepit litterasque Athenas publice misit, sibi proclive fuisse Samum capere, nisi a Timotheo et Iphicrate desertus esset. 5 populus acer, suspicax ob eamque rem mobilis, adversarius, invidus (etiam potentiae in crimen vocabantur) domum revocat: accusantur proditionis. hoc iudicio damnatur Timotheus lisque eius aestimatur centum talentis. ille odio ingratae civitatis coactus Chalcidem se contulit.

T18 Polyainos Strategemata 3.9.29

"Ipsihratís proedótsas dékhn épheugn, 'Aristotófwn và Xárhsc ἐδίωκικαί aiúaia dé òh, éthi ébrα peri" ἐμβατα δυνάμενος ἐλείν τοὺς πολεμίους οὐ διεναμά-χησσεν. ὅρων τὸ δικαστήριον ὑποφερόμενον εἰς τούθαντίον, τὸν λόγον παραδεύοντα παρεφύνε pax tó ἐξίως τοὺς δικαστάς. οὐ δὲ καταδείκνυτες, μὴ τὴν ἑτατείαν διῆλθη ἐξοθιλμαία νυκτάσσετε τὸ δικαστήριον, ἀφευν αὐτῷ πάντες ἐγκαταντο. μετὰ τὴν νύκταν φήματός τινος, ἃς παρεκκρήσατο τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπίθετος ἄν εἶν, ἔφη, "ὅπερ Ἀθηναίων μὲν στρατηγῶν, ὅπερ ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ πρὸς Ἀθηναίως μηκέτι."

T19 Scholion to Aiskhines Against Timarkhos 1.64 (=Hypereides F40 Jensen)

κεκωμδήται ο Ὠ Aristotófwn ὅς ὑπὲρ Χάρητος μισθοῦ λέγων καὶ ὡς παρανόμων γραφαὶ οἱ ἐν πεφυγός καὶ ὡς στρατηγής ἐν ὦ Κέω διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν πολλὰ κακὰ ἔργασμεν τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, ἐφ᾽ ὡς γραφεῖς ὑπὸ ὕπερειδου παρα-νόμων ἐδίκα. φυτοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν ὑπερείδες καὶ Ἀρκεττήν ἐπυκληθήναι, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις αὐτῶν ἐπιστρεφθήναι. ἐπεβίωσε μέντοι σῷ Ὠ Aristotófwn ἦτο παρὰ μὴνας θ᾽.

1 γραφαὶ οὲ is Sauppe's conjecture for the MSS γραφὴν. That Aristophon was indicted on a graphe paranomon and thus ridiculed is hardly noteworthy. The conjecture is supported by Aiskhines 3.194, a scholion to Demosthenes 19.297 (Dindorf vol. 8 p.445,6-7 [436,13]), where the number of indictments of Aristophon is given as "70", and a scholion to Demosthenes 18.70 (Dindorf vol. 8 p.287,21-22 [248,8]), where the indictments are "many".
Plutarch, Moralia 187B ("reg. et imp. apophthegmata") and Stobaios Florilegium 4.13.43 also preserve this anecdote, but are less complete versions (and probably derive from Mor. 788D) that add nothing of any authority to it.

Plutarch, Pelopidas 2.6

Aristotle, Rhetoric (3.10) 1411b 1-6

Aristotle, Rhetoric (3.17) 1418a 29-34
T24 Isokrates Symmachikos (= On the Peace) 50, 54-56

50...πλεόστος δὲ τιθέμενοι νόμους οὕτως ὀλίγον αὐτῶν φροντίζομεν, ἐν γὰρ ἀκοφισταίς γνώσεσθε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὡστε θανάτου τῆς ζῆμιας ἐπικειμένης, ἢ τε ἄλλη δικάς, τοῦτο τούτῳ φανερώτατα ποιοῦντάς στρατηγοῦς χειροτονοῦμεν, καὶ τὸν πλεόστος διαφθείραι τῶν πολιτῶν δυνητέρα, τούτοις ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων καθεσταμένοι.

54 τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων, ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐποιεύοντο καὶ στρατηγοῦς ἤρωνον, νομίζοντες τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βῆματος τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύει διυκίμενον, τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον ἐρυθρὰν βουλεύσασθαι καὶ κρῆναν γενόμενον, ἡμές δὲ τοῦντὸν τούτου ποιοῦμεν. 55 οἷς μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβολῶν χράμεθα, τούτους μὲν οὐκ ἀξιόθεν στρατηγοῦς χειροτονεῖν ἢ νοῦν οὕτως ἔχοντας, οὐς δὲ οὐδεὶς οἷς οὐκ εἶπεν περὶ τῶν ἵδιων οὕτως περὶ τῶν κοινῶν συμβουλευόμενο, τοῦτος δὲ αὐτοκράτορας ἐκπέμπομεν ἢ ἐκεὶ σωματεύομεν ἐσώμενος καὶ θεοὶ βουλευομένης περὶ τῶν 'Ελληνικῶν πραγμάτων ἢ περὶ τῶν εὐθέως προτεθεμένων. 56 λέγω δὲ ταύτ' οὖ κατὰ πάντων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν ἐνδόχων τοὺς λεγομένους ὄντων.

T25 Isokrates Antidosis 15.115-117, 121

115 Ἡγούμεν δ', ὅμας ἡδέως ἐν ἀκούσας διὰ τί ποτὲ τῶν μενεδόκοιμοντων ἀνδρῶν παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ πολεμικῶν εἶναι δοκοῦντων οὔδὲ κάμην ἐνοι λαβέτιν ἥδονησαν, Τιμόθεος δ', οὕτω τῆς τοῦ ἀκάματος φόνον ἔχων ερωμένην οὕτω, ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς πλανομένοις κατατετριμένος, ἄλλο, ὁ μεθ', ὑμῶν πολετικοῦμενος τηλικάπτα διεπράξετο τὸ μέγεθος. ἦστε δ', ὁ λόγος δ' περὶ τούτων φυλακὴθήμενος μὲν, ῥυθήσαται δ', οὐκ ἄσμυρος. 116 ἔκεινον γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἄλλων διήγεγκεν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν 'Ελληνικῶν καὶ συμμαχικῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τῆς τούτων ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς ὄμων γνῶμην εἶχεν. ὡς εἰς τοῖς χειροτονοῦντας στρατηγοὺς τοὺς εὐρωτοποιήτους τοὺς σώμας καὶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ἔξωνις στρατεύεσθαι γεγενημένοις, ὡς διὰ τοῖς διαμαραθμένοι τοῖς δεδομένοις. ὁ δ' τοῖς μὲν τοιούτοις λογοκοι ἐχρήσσε καὶ ταξιάρχους, 117 αὕτως δ' περὶ τάτα δεινὸς ἤπε, περὶ ἄπερ χρῆ φρύμοιν εἶναι τοστὶν στρατηγὸν τῶν-ἀγάθων.

121 Οὕτω τοῖς τούτων τοῖς μεγάλων δυνών καὶ σφόδρα καταπελεγώντων, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐχόμενοις δικαίως ἀν τοὺς αὐτῶν ἑπιμετέχεσαν. ὁ δ' ἦν ὑμῖς τούτους μόνους ἄνδρας νομίζετε, τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντες; καὶ τοὺς ἐκτροβοῦσας τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἀνεί τοὺς νεωτεριζόμενα ἐν τοῖς συμμάχοις, οὐκ ἐπικολογηθήσας ταῖς ὑμετέραις γνώμαις, οὐδὲ ἡμουλήθη βλάπτων τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμεῖν, Κ.Τ.Λ.

T26 Diodoros 16.22.1-2; 34.1

1 Χάρις δὲ παραλαμβάνων παντὸς τοῦ στόλου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ σπεδῶν τῆς διαπάνης ἀπαλλάξαι τοὺς 'Αθηναίους ἐπεκείρησε ποιῆσαι παραβόλα: 'Αρταμάχου γὰρ ἀποστάντος ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέας καὶ μέλλοντος ὀλέγους στρατιώτως πρὸς τοὺς σατράπας διαγωνίζεσθαι μυριάδας ἐπίτα στρατιώτων ἔχοντας, συμμαχ-
Demosthenes 4.19: μὴ μοι μυρίας μηδὲ δισμιρίας ξένους, μηδὲ τὰς ἐπιστολιμαίας τάσσας δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ ἢ τῆς πόλεως ἔσται, κἂν διμεῖς ἐνα κἂν πλεόνος κἂν τὸν δεῖνα κἂν ὄντινοιν χειροτονήσητε στρατηγὸν τοῦτω πείσαται καὶ ἀκολουθήσῃ.

μὴ μοι μυρίας] τὸ σχῆμα ἀποτρεπτικῶς πνεῦμάτος. βασιλέως τοῦ Περσῶν ἐπιστελλάντος τοὺς ἐπὶ θαλάσσης σατράπας διαλύσας τὰ μυσθοφορικὰ στρατεύματα διὰ τὸ πολλά χρήματα καταναλώσασαι, ἀφήσας οἱ σατράπαι τοὺς στρατάτας. οὐτοὶ περὶ μιρίας δινείς ἢκουσι πρὸς Χάριτα στρατηγὴν Ἀθηναίων ἔχουσι εξενικὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐποίησαν αὐτὸν ἤγερμαν. Ἀρταβάζος δὲ Πέρσης ἄνη, ἀποστᾶς βασιλέως καὶ πολέμων πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἔπεμψε πρὸς Χάριτα, παρακαλών αὐτῶν διαβρύσας τὸν στράτην εἰς τὴν βασιλέως χώραν. τῶν οὖν στρατιωτῶν ἢ χορηγήσας αὐτότος ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν Χάριτα, ἢ ἀπελευθέρωσαν πρὸς τὸν διδόντα, διεξῆπται ἀναγκασθείς τὸν στράτην, καὶ ἔνεκησε συμβαλλόν δυσμιρίους Περσῶν καὶ πλεῖστον αὐτῶν ἐπιτυχὼν ὡς Εὐθραυστοῦ στρατηγοῦςμον ἐδῶ καὶ ἔγραψε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῶν μιρίων ὡς νενικήσας μάχην ἀδέλφην τῆς ἐν Μαραθών. οἱ δὲ δὲ ἐπιστολῶν καὶ ἔτερους ἔκλεισαν μισθώσασαι Χάριτα. λέγει οὖν ὃν ὃ δήμῳ ὅτι, μὴ δὲ ἐπιστολῆς τοῖς στρατηγοῖς ἐπιτάττωμας μισθώσασαι ξένους μυρίας ἢ δυσμιρίους.

1 Cf. Plutarch Aratos 16.3: Χάρις μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τοῖς μάχῃ πρὸς τοὺς Βασιλέως στρατηγοὺς εὐνυχίας ἔγραψε τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς νενικήσας μάχην ἀδέλφην τῆς ἐν Μαραθών μάχης ἀδέλφην.

The scholiast's information is actually better suited as an explic­ation of Dem. 4.24: see T28 below.

Demosthenes First Philippic 4.24

...ὅτι καὶ πρῶτον πρὸς ἀκούω εξενικὸν τρέφειν ἐκ Κορινθίων τὴν πόλιν, οὔ Πολιστράτου ἦγεῖτο καὶ Ἰφικράτης καὶ Χαρίας καὶ ἄλλου τινὲς, καὶ αὐτοὺς


Demosthenes 3.31: ...καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀνανάπτησαν, ὡς τὸν ἀκοών ὑμᾶς, αὐτὸς αὐτής ἡ τὴν ἑνύξεις μὲν ἕκεινον καὶ ὅμως μὲν ἕκεινον. ἐξ οὗ δὲ αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ τὰ ἕκειν ἑνύξεις, καὶ τὸν ἑκέες τούτων γεγονόσως, καὶ παρακολύησαν ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πόλεων, πρὸς Ἀρτάβασι καὶ πανταχοὶ μᾶλλον οἰκεῖοι πλέοντα, ὧ δὲ στρατηγῆς ἀκολουθεῖ, εἰκότως. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθὸν.

Demosthenes Second Olynthiac 2.28-29 and scholion (189 Dilts)

28 τῶν γὰρ εἶνεν, ὧ ἀνδρείας ἢ ἀνθρώπου, νομίζετε τούτων μὲν ἐνεχεῖαν τῶν πόλεων πάντων δοσοὺς ἄν ἐκπέμψετε στρατηγοὺς, ἰδίος δὲ εὐρείον πολέμους, εἰ δὲ τοῖς δυναστέῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν στρατηγοῖς εἴπετε; ὥστε ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰθλ' ὑπὲρ ἐντὸν ἐστίν ὁ πόλεμος ὑμετέρα ('Ἀμφίπολῆς γ' ἀν
The words enclosed in pointed brackets are the supplements suggested by Kaibel, Meineke and Jacoby, respectively, for which see Jacoby's apparatus. The supplements are based on a comparison with Nepos' Chabrias 3.2-4 (see T33 immediately below).

T33 Cornelius Nepos Chabrias 3.2-4

Non enim libenter erat ante oculos suorum civium, quod et vivebat laute et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut invidiam vulgi posset effugere. 3 est enim hoc commune vitium magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriae comes sit et libenter de iis detrahant, quos aestimant aequi, neque animo aequo pauperes alienam intueantur fortunam. 4 itaque Chabrias quoniam ei licebat, plurimum aberat. neque vero solus ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, quod tum tantum se ab invidia putabant futuros, quantum a conspectu suorum recesserint. itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thraecia, Timotheos Lesbo, Chares Sigeo, dissimilis quidem Chares horum et factis et moribus, sed tamen Athenis et honoratus et potens.

T34 Demosthenes Against Aristokrates 23.183

φιλέππου γὰρ εἰς Μαρώνειαν ἔλθοντος ἔπεμψεν πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνίδην, πίστευς δὲς οὐκ ἔκειν καὶ Παιμένει. καὶ εἰ μὴ κράτοι τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπέθε Φιλέππῳ μὴ ἐπιβάνειν, ὁδὸν ἄν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμικὴ ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδανοῦς ἰδὸ καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην. Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγει, λαβὲ τὴν Χάρητος ἐπιστολὴν.
3.10

T35 Polyainos Strategemata 4.2.22

φιλίππος τὴν 'Αθηναίον καὶ Μαρώνιτῶν καταδραμὼν ἐπανεῖς καὶ ναὸς ἔχων πολλὰς καὶ στρατιάν πεκτῶν ἄγων. Χάρης περὶ Νέαν πόλιν ἐναχώρησε τριήμερως ἔχων εἶκοσ. Φιλίππος ἐπιλεξάμενος τῶν νεῶν τέσσαρας τὰς ἁριστὰ πλεούσας ἐπήρωσεν ἔρεταν ἀμην καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ὅμοι ἄριστων, καὶ παράγγελμα ἔδωκε, προσαναθῆναι τοῦ στόλου παντὸς καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν Νέαν πόλιν οὐ πολὺ τῆς γῆς ἀπέχοντας. οἱ μὲν παρέπλεον· ὁ δὲ ἡράς ὡς ἀναμασώσομεν τὰς τέσσαρας ναὸς ἐπανήχθη ταῖς εἰκοσι. αἱ δὲ τέσσαρες, ἀλαφραὶ καὶ ἁριστοὺς ἔρετας ἔχουσαν, ταχέως ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἑπισκόρπιζοντας. τῶν δὲ ἄμω τὸν Χάρητα συντεταμένους διώκοντων ἠλαθεν οἱ Φιλίππος Νέαν πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς παραπλεῖσθαι. Χάρης δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς τέσσαρας ναὸς κατέλαβεν.

1 καταδραμὼν is a conjecture for the MSS καταλαβὲν, and is accepted by the editor of the Teubner text.

T36 Athenaios Deipnosophistai 12. 532D-E (= Theopompos FGrHist 115 F249; Herakleides FAC [Edmonds] F2; Douris FGrHist 76 F35)

ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ τοῦ Θεοπομποῦ συγγράματι περὶ τῶν ἐκ δελφῶν συνήθετων χρήματῶν "Χάρῃτι", φησὶν, "ὁ άθηναῖος δόθη λυσάνθρω τάλαντα ἐξήκοντα. ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐδεξιύσεν ἑπικαλομένος ἕως ἀρχὰς θέσας τὰ ἐπινῦκια τῆς γενομένης μέχρις πρὸς τὸς Φιλίππου; εὕνοιοι. ἄφεντο μὲν ἀδαίος ὁ Ἀλεκτρών ἐπικαλομένος·" περὶ οὗ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ τῶν καμηλῶν ποιητὴς μεμνῄσκεται οὕτως·

'Αλεκτρῶνα τοῦ τοῦ Φιλίππου παραλαβῶν ἀφ' κοκκύκτανα καὶ πλανάμενον κατέκοψαν· οὔ γὰρ εἶχεν ὀβδέπω λόφον. ἐνα κατακόψας μέλα συχνὸς ἐδεξίωσιν Χάρης ἑπικαλομένος τὸν τον καμηλῶν ποιητὴν ὁ γενναῖος ὃν·

τὰ αὐτὰ ἱστορεῖ καὶ Δοβηρίς.1

1 Eustathios 1479,35-40 (on Odyssey 4.10) also quoted the fragment of Herakleides. The words from ἀφ' ὧν το ἐπικαλομένος were also cited by Eustathios in almost exactly the same words. He was 'totally unaware of any joke at Khares' expense such as is implied by T37 (see below).

ἡ γενναῖος seems to refer to Khares, "he was so generous", but the word is used elsewhere of well-bred or 'choice' fowl (Menander Theophorum II, 12 and Athenaios Deipnosophistai 14. 655C: "butchering one Khares fed many... so choice was he [sc. 'Cock']."

T37 Zenobios 6,34 (Corpus Paroemiographorum)1

Φιλίππου Ἀλεκτρῶν· αὐτὴ τάττεται ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μικροῖς κατορθώμασιν ἀλαξονευομένων. Ἀλεκτρῶν γὰρ τις ἐγένετο Φιλίππου στρατηγὸς, ὥστε ἀπεκτεῖνεν, ὡς φασι, Χάρης ὁ Ἑθναίας. Μέμνηται δὲ αὐτὸῦ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ καμηλὸς, καὶ Ἀντιφάνης.
311

1 T37 = Edmonds, FAC Antiphanes F303. The proverb is repeated many times by Byzantine Paroemographers (e.g., Mikhaelis Apostolios 17,85, which adds nothing whatsoever to Zenobios).

T38 Diodoros 16.34.3-4

Χάρης δὲ ὃ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς εἰσπλέοσας εἰς 'Ελλήσποντον καὶ Σιστᾶν πόλειν ἐδὼν τοὺς μὲν ἱβάντας ἀπέσφαξεν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐξανδραποδίσατο. 'Ερωτοβεβέλτου δὲ τοῦ Κότιου διὰ τὴν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἀλλοτριότητα καὶ τὴν πρὸς 'Αθηναίους φιλίαν ἐγχειρήσαντος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὰς ἐν Χερσονήσῳ πόλεις πλὴν Καρδίας ἀπέστειλεν ὁ ὄμος κληροδοχὸς εἰς τὰς πόλεις.

1 Diodoros related this event in the archonship of "Eudemos" (i.e., Thoudemos: 353/2).

T39 Frontinus Strategemata 3.10.8

Chares, dux Atheniensium, civitatem aggressurus litoris appositam, post quaedam promunturiam occulte habitam classe, et navibus velociissimam praeter hostilia praesidia ire iussit: qua visa cum omnia navigia, quae pro custodia portus agebant, ad persequendam evolassent, Chares indecens portum cum reliqua classe inventus etiam civitatem occupavit.

T40 Diodoros 16.35.5-6

τάν δὲ περὶ τὸν Ὀνδμαρχον καταφυγόντων εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τυχικῶς παραπλέοντος τοῦ Ἀθηναίου Χάρητος μετὰ πολλῶν τριήρων πολὺς ἐγένετο φόνος τῶν Φωκῶν: οἱ γὰρ φεύγοντες δύσαντες τὰς πανοπλίας διενήχοντο πρὸς τὰς τροχῆς, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς Ὀνδμαρχὸς. τέλος δὲ τῶν Φωκῶν καὶ μισθοφόρων ἀναρρήτησαν μὲν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐξακολουθοῦς, ἐν οἷς οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ στρατηγὸς, ἠλισαν δὲ ὅλη ἐξάττους τῶν τρισχιλίων. δὴ δὲ Φιλίππου τὸν μὲν Ὀνδμαρχὸν ἐκρέμασε, τοὺς δὲ θήλαξε δὲ ἔρημος καταπλεύσσαν.

T41 Dionysios of Halikarnassos Ad Ammaeum 9 (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F49-51)

Οὔτως μὲν δὴ σαφῶς αὐτὸς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀποδεικνύει μετὰ τὸν Ὀλυμψικῶν πόλεμον γεγραμμένας ὡς αὐτὸς τὰς τέχνας. οὕτως δ᾽ ἐπὶ Καλλιμαχοῦ γέγονεν ἀρχοντος, διότι Πιλόχορος ἐν ἐκτη βίβλῳ τῆς 'Αττιδος κατὰ λέξεις οὕτω γράφειν: 'Καλλιμαχος Περγασήθην: ἐπὶ τοῦτο Ὀλυνθίους πολεμομένους ὑπὸ Φιλίππου καὶ πρόσεβεις Ἀθηναίες πέμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι συμμαχόν καὶ ἐποιήσαν τον σαντο:***1 καὶ ὑπῆρθεν ἐπεμένως πεθαντάς δυσχήλος, τριήρεις δὲ τριάκοντα τὰς μετὰ Χάρητος καὶ δὲ συνεπλήρωσαν ὅπως. ἔπειτα διεξελθὼν ὁλίγα τὰ μεταξὺ γενόμενα νήπης ταιτῆς: "περὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Χαλκιδέων
Some MSS have a lacuna here of about 18 letters. For some suggested supplements see the apparatus criticus of the Teubner edition of Usener and Rademacher.

Some editors accept the conjecture ὀσθεθαίς for συμμαχίας.
Donald Laing, Jr. has established (Hesperia 37 [1968] 245 n. 4) that IG II.2 1621 belongs to the same document. He suggests a date of 348/7. At lines 42 and ff. the epimeletai neorion of the archonship of Kallimakhos (349/8) are named in a lawsuit.

Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Ad Ammaeum 9 cites this passage as proof that the Rhetoric is later than Demosthenes' Olynthiac speeches (cf. T41). Dionysios has ψαλιούτα here for the ἔχοντα of the MSS of Aristotle. Abresch conjectured ἐγχοντατο to reconcile the variant traditions, but cf. LSJ ἔχω (A) A.II.2. ἔχων τινα μέσον is an idiom for a wrestling hold (Aristophanes Clouds 1047, Akarnians 571, Knights 388, Frogs 469). It is not unlikely that Kephisodotos was using a metaphor taken from the palaistra: the reading in the MSS of Aristotle can stand.

Aiskhines Parapresbeias ("On the False Embassy") 2.90-2

...ἀνασύστησε δὴ τῆς Χάριτος ἀπιστολῆς ἢν ἐπέστειλε τότε τῷ ὅμω, ὡστε Κεραυνόπλεττης ἀπολογίας τῆς ἄρχῃ καὶ Ἡρωδίω Υπερτείρας. Φίλιππος ἐλαφρυπλικόν μηνός, ἐβδόμη φθένοντος. Δημοσθένης δὲ τῷ ὅμω προσήρευεν τοῦτο τοῦ μηνὸς, εἰς ἓν τῶν προσβεβον, ἐκτὸς φθένοντος.
...(Aiskhines introduces a decree and its date into evidence)...
92 Ἄκοπετε, διτι μουνιχίωνος ἡγημονία τρίτη ἵσταμένου. ὃ δὲ Κερσο-βλέπτης πόσας πρότερον ἡμέρας ἀπώκει τὴν ἀρχὴν πρὶν ἐκεῖ ἀπείναι; ὡς φησι Χάρης ὁ στρατηγὸς τοῦ πρότερου μηνὸς, εἶπερ ἐλαφροβολῶν ἔστι μουνιχίωνος πρότερος.

T47, T48, T49 Polyainos Strategemata 3.13.1-3

T47 Χάρης ὑν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ κατασκόπους ὑπονοήσας εἶναι φιλακὴν ἐξωθεν τῷ χάρακι περιστάσεως, προσέταξεν ἑκαστὸν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τὸν πλήθον καὶ μὴ πρότερον ἀφιέναι, πρὶν εἰπεῖν, ὡς τες εἰς καὶ τίνος τάξεως. οὕτω δὴ συνέβη τοῖς κατασκόπους ἀλώναι μὴ δυναμένους ἐλπεῖν μήτε τάγμα μήτε λύχνων μήτε συσστίτων μήτε σύνθημα.

T48 Χάρης ἐν Θράκης χειμῶνος ὑπότις ἡπερβολῇ τοὺς στρατιλάτας ὁδῶν φειδομένους τῶν ἱματίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶττεν ἀ χρὴ διακειμένους δικηρῶς παρήγγειλεν αὐτοῖς ἀλλάττειν παρ’ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἱμάτια. τοῦτον γὰρ γενομένοι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἔσοδον ἑκαστος ὡς φειδομένος ἐτοιμότερος ἢ πρᾶττεν τὰ κελευθέντα.

T49 Χάρης ἀπήγγεισε στρατόπεδον ἐν Θράκης· ἐπέκειντο οἱ Θράκες καὶ τὴν ὁδραγίαν ἔθραυσον. ὃ δὲ βουλόμενος ἀποσπάσαι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ διελθεῖν ἄσφαλῶς, τόπον ὑποπτον συνιδὼν, ἀναβράσας τῶν σαλπυγκτῶν ἐπὶ ἢποιους καὶ συμπέμπας αὐτοὺς ἀδύνας τῶν ἢπειον ἐκέλευσε περιπεπευμενόνοις τῇ ταχιστὴν γενομένους ὑπώσακαν τῶν πολεμιῶν τὰ πολεμικὰ υπήρχαν. οἱ μὲν ἔσομεν οἱ δὲ προσκεκεμένοι Θράκες ἐνέδραν εἶναι νομίζουσας τῇ τάξιν ἄσαντας φεύγοντες ἄχωντο. Χάρης δὲ ἄσφαλῆ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐποιήσατο.

1 Some editors prefer παραπεπευμενόν here, but cf. Polyainos 4.8.4.

T50 Frontinus Strategemata 2.12.3

Chares, dux Atheniensium, cum exspectaret auxilia et vereretur, ne interea contemptu praesentis paucitatis hostes castra eius oppugnarent, complures ex eis quos habeat per aversam partem nocte ἐπισσεῖτο, quæ praecipue conspicui forent hostibus, redire in castra et accedentium novarum virium speciem praebere: atque ita simulatis auxilliis tutus est, donec inluxeret exspectatis.
315

T51 IG II² 3068 (= Dittenberger, Syll. 3 1086)¹

[Χ]άρις Θεοκάρους Ἀγγελήθεν χορηγῶν ἐ[νίκα]
[Π]ανδυνώδει Ἀκαμάντίδαι παῖδ[αν].
[Σ]άτυρος Σακωνίου ηθέλει.
[Ε]πίκουρος Σακωνίους εδίδας[κα].

Λυσιόκος ἰρ[χέν].

¹ The inscription is non-stoichedon. There is a photograph of it in P. Amandry, BCH 101 (1977) 188.

T52 Aiskhines On the "False" Embassy (Parapresbeias) 2.70-73

70 βούλομαι δ’ ἢμᾶς καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς ὑπομνῆσαι, ἐν οἷς ἐβουλεύσατε. τήν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐποιησαμέθα τοῦ πολέμου ὑπὲρ Ἀμφίπλεως, συνέβαινε δ’ ἡμῶν τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐβδομίκοντα μὲν καὶ πέντε πόλεις συμμαχίδας ἀποβεβηκόμενα, δὲ ἐκτίθετο Τιμίθεος ὁ Κόπωνος καὶ κατέστησε εἰς τὸ συνέδριον’ (προφέραμε γὰρ παραρτήσασθαι, καὶ ἐλευθέρος ἦμα καὶ τάληθι· εἰπάν σκέφτηκα· ἢν δὲ ἄλλος πὼς γυνώσκοιτε, καταχρησάσθε μοι· οὐ γὰρ ἃν ὑποστειλάμην) 71 ἐκατὸν δὲ καὶ πεντήκοντα τριῳδεὶς λαβόντα ἐκ τῶν νεώτερῶν μὲν κατακεκομικέναι, καὶ ταῦτά ἦμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶνις οἱ τοῖς Χάρτοις οἱ κατηγοροῦν δεικνύοντο, ἡλίας δὲ καὶ πεντακόσια τάλαντα οὐκ οἷς στρατιώτας, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἢγεμόνων ἀλαξονείας· ἀνηλοδότης, ἢημάρην· τεκειάδις καὶ ἀπόδησε καὶ Πολυφόρτην, δροπέτας ἀνθρώπους ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος συνειλεγμένους, καὶ χωρὶς εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὰ βῆμα καὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μισθοφόρους, οἱ τοὺς μὲν ταλαμάριους νησίωτας καὶ ἐκατὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξήκοντα τάλαντα εἰδίπραττον σύνταξε, κατήργον δὲ τὰ πλοῖα καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς θαλάσσης. 72 ἀντὶ δὲ ἀναματάτας καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἠγεμονίας, ἡ πόλεις ἦμῖν <τῆς> Μυσονήσου καὶ τῆς τῶν λεπτῶν ὀδῖς ἀνεπίπλατος Φιλίππος δὲ ὀμηθεῖς ἐκ Μικεδόνιας, οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφίπλεως πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἢγομένετο, ἀλλ’ ἦδη περὶ Λήμνου καὶ Σικώρου, τῶν ἡμετέρων κτιμάτων· ἐξέκλισεν δὲ Ἀρχαῖος οἱ πολέμοι, τὴν οὸναν ὁμολογομένως Ἀθηναίων· πλεῖσσος δὲ ἐκκλησίας συγκλίτησεν ἡγακότησθαι ἐκκλησίας εκκλησίας, καὶ ἀνεμόπτερος, εἰς τὰ τεταγμένα ἐκ τῶν νύμφων. 73. οὕτω δ’ ἦν αὑτερά καὶ ἐπικύρωθα τὰ πράγματα, ἐκεῖ ἡακάδησθη γράφαται γήρωροι Κηφαλοῦν οἱ Παιανεῖς, εἰς τῶν φίλων καὶ ἓταμον τῶν Χάρτοις, ἐκπέλειν τὴν ταχίστην Ἀντιλόχον τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπηρετικῶν, καὶ ἐπιτείμησιν τῶν στρατηγὸν τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν δυνάμει τεταγμένον, καὶ ἐντοχὴ ποιεῖ, ὑπῆρετε γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων, εἰς Φιλίππος μὲν ἐπὶ Ἀρχαῖος ἐκ τῆς ἡγακότης ἐκκλησίας ἐκκλησίας ἐκκλησίας, ἠθηναίων πορευομεν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἴκου τῶν στρατηγὸν ἐκατοσφαίρων οἴκου τῆς δυνάμει, ἦν ἐξεπεμβαν, ὅπως ἐκκλησίας, δι’ ἔλθει ιὸν λέγον, ἀκοόμοι τοῦ ὑπηρετικοῦ, καὶ ἀναμιγνύετε τὸν πολέμοι καὶ τὴν εἱρήνη τοὺς τῶν ὀπλῶν ἢγεμόνας, ἀλλ’ μὴ τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀπαίτετε.

¹ A pair of scholia to §70 and 71 mention Khares, but neither seem to contain anything more than guesses from information provided by the text of Aiskhines.
T53 Aristotle Rhetoric 1376a 8-13 (1.15)

χρήσμων γὰρ αἱ τοῦτων κρίσεις τοὺς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄμφοτεροὺς, οὗν Ἐβρουλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἔχρηστο κατὰ Χάρητας ὁ Πλάτων εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίμνον, ὅτι ἐπεξεύθεκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τῷ ὄλογοιν πονηρός εἶναι. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τῷ κινδύνῳ, ἂν ἔδωκαν ψευδεσθαι.¹

¹ For Ἀρχίμνον one very good MS ("A" in the OCT sigla) reads ἄρτιμνον, for which Meineke suggests Ἀρχίνον.

T54 Demosthenes On the Embassy 19.332

eἷπε τοῖς νῦν μοί τις ἀρτὶ προσελθὼν πρὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου πράγμα καινότατον πάντων, Χάρητος κατηγορεῖν αὐτὸν παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τοῦτων τῶν λόγων ἐξαπατήσειν ἄμας ἐλπίζειν. ἦδε δ' ὅτι μὲν πάντα τρόπον κρινόμενος Χάρης εὑρήται πιστάς καὶ εὐνοίακος, δους ἢν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνῳ, πράπτων ὑπὲρ ἦμων, διὰ τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ χρήσας λυμαίνομενος τοὺς πράγματες πολλῶν υστερῶν, οὐ σφόδρ' ἔσχριζομαι, ἀλλ' ὑπερβολὴν ποιήσομαι: ἄντω γὰρ πάντ' ἀληθῆ λέειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον. καὶ οὕτω τοῖς νῦν κομιδῇ γέλασε ὡστὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐκείνου τοῦτον.

T55 Demosthenes On the Khersonesos 8.30-1

καὶ τὸ μὲν τοῦτων τινὰς εἶναι τουλίτους, δεινῶν δὲν οὖ δεινῶν ἔστιν' ἀλλ' ἴμμεις οἱ καθήμενοι οὕτως ἡ διάκεισθαι, ὡστ', ἀν μὲν τις εἴπῃ παρελθὸν ὅτι διοπείης ἐστὶ τῶν κακῶν πάντων αὐτοῦ, ἡ Ἰάρατος ἢ Ἀριστοφάνη ἢ δὲν ἀν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς, εὐθέως φάτε καὶ θροβεῖ' ὡς θρέως λέγει: ἀν δὲ παρελθὸν λέγει τις τἀληθῆ, ὅτι ἀπείτε' 'Ἀμηναίοις πάντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τοῦτον φθίνον ὡστ' αὐτοῦ·

T56 Plutarch Demosthenes 52(3).

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δημοσφορεῖν καὶ πολιτεύομαι δύναμις ὄμολας ἀμφότερος ὑπήρξεν, ὡστε καὶ τοὺς τῶν ὑπαλλ. καὶ στρατοπέδων κυρίους δεῖσθαι, ἄρμοσθένους μὲν Ἰάρατος καὶ Διοπείθη καὶ Λεωσθένη, Κικέρωνος δὲ Πομηθέου καὶ Καίσαρα τὸν νέον,

¹ Cf. Libanios oratio 23 p 294 (vol. 6, 394a in the Teubner edition) and Lucian Encomium of Demosthenes 37: they mention Khares, Diopheithes and Proxenos, but presumably their testimony is dependent on Plutarch, if not the speeches of Demosthenes themselves.
T57 Plutarch _Moralia_ 486D ("de fraterno amore")

οἱ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑτέρας ὀδοὺς βαδίζοντες οὐδὲν ἀλλήλους ὕφελοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ βίους χρόνους διαφόρους τὸν τε φθόνον ἐκτρέπονται καὶ συνεργοῦσιν ἀλλήλους μᾶλλον, δὲ δημοσθένης καὶ Χάρης, καὶ πάλιν Ἀλσίνης καὶ Ἐβρουλος, καὶ Ὑπερείδης καὶ Λεωσθένης, οἱ μὲν λέγοντες ἐν τῷ ὑμνῷ καὶ γράφοντες οἱ δὲ στρατηγοῦντες καὶ πράττοντες.

T58 Plutarch _Phokion_ 7

ὤριν δὲ τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ πράσσοντας τότε διαφορετικοὺς ἔστη αὐτὸ κλήρου τὸ στρατηγεῖον καὶ τὸ βήμα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν λέγοντας ἐν τῷ ὑμνῷ καὶ γράφοντας μόνον, δὲν Ἐβρουλός ἢν καὶ Ἄρισταφός καὶ Δημοσθένης καὶ Λυκούργος καὶ Ὑπερείδης, Διοπέτης δὲ καὶ Μενεσθέα καὶ Λεωσθένη καὶ Χάρητα τὸ στρατηγεῖον καὶ πολεμεῖν αὐξὸντας ἐαυτοῖς, ὑβόλευτο τὴν Περικλέους καὶ Ἄρισταφόδου καὶ Ἐδώμος πολιτείαν.

1 The Loeb edition of the life of Phokion has this text, but mistakenly prints "Chabrias" for "Chares". This error has crept into another widely available translation, the Penguin _Age of Alexander_ as well as a couple of scholarly books for which see Chapter Four n.6.

T59 Scholia to Demosthenes _Second Olynthiac_ 2.25 (173 and 175 Dilts)

_Demosthenes_ 2.25: ταῦτα θαυμάζω, κατ' πρός τοῦτοις, εἰ μηδὲν ἤμων, ὁ ἀνδρεὺς Ἀθηναίοι, δύναται λογίζομαι πόσον πολλομεῖτε χρόνον φιλίππω, καὶ τὰ ποιούντων ὦμον ὁ χρόνος διελθεῖσθαι οὕτως. Ἐστε γὰρ δήμῳ τούθ', ὅτι μελέτησαν αὐτῶν, ἑτέρους τινὰς ἐλπίζοντας πράξειν, αὐτωμένων ἀλλήλως, κρινόμενοι, πάλιν ἐλπίζομεν, σχεδὸν ταῦθ' ἀπέρ νυνὶ πολιοῦντων, ἀπὸς ὁ χρόνος διελθεῖσθαι.

ἐτέρους τινὰς] οὖν τοὺς ἔξωνος καὶ Χάρητα καὶ Χαριδημον. (173 Dilts)
κρινόμενων] τοῦτο εἰς Χάρητα. Ἦνα δὲ μὴ δοξῇ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰ κοινὰ καὶ ὅτι τὴν ὑποψίαν. μεταπεμφθηκαί γὰρ τοὺς στρατηγους εἰς κρίσιν καθιστάσαι. (175 Dilts)

T60 Scholia to Demosthenes _Third Olynthiac_ 3.35-6 (165 and 166 Dilts)

_Demosthenes_ 3.35-6: οὐχ ἔστιν ὅπου μηδὲν ἔγιν πολυοῦσι τὰ τῶν πολιοῦντων ἐκποίησες ἀλλὰ ἕτεροι καί ὅπου ἐκποίηκαί ταῦτα πυθάνεσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ νυνι γίνεται. 36 καὶ οὐχὶ μέμοροι τὸν πολιοῦντα ταῦτα πυθῆναι· ταῦτα γὰρ νυνι γίνεται. 36 καὶ οὐχὶ μέμοροι τὸν πολιοῦντα ταῦτα πυθῆναι· ταῦτα γὰρ νυνι γίνεται. 36 καὶ οὐχὶ μέμοροι τὸν πολιοῦντα ταῦτα πυθῆναι· ταῦτα γὰρ νυνι γίνεται.
τῆς ἀρετῆς μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν κυνήγιων κτησάμενοι κατέληπον.

τοῦ δείκνυος ὡς τὸν Χάρητος.(165 Dilts)
οὐχὶ μέμφομαι ἐπεὶ δεικνύειν τὸ ἐν κυνήγιον ἄνω· ἐνεπικράτεσε ὁ Χάρητος. ἄφανεν ἔλεγεν: “ἐπαινών τὸν Χάρητα πονοῦντα· ἄλλ' σον γε προκρίνω τοὺς ἐν τῆς πόλεως στρατιῶτας.”(166 Dilts)

T61 Zenobios 2,13 (Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum)¹

Αἱ Χάρητος ὁποιαδήποτε ἐπὶ τῶν προχείρως ἐπαγγελλόμενων πολλά. Χάρητος γὰρ ἔγενετο στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων προθῆκας ἐπαγγελλόμενος.

¹ The Souda s.v. Χάρητος ὁποιαδήποτε (X 101) contains this proverb as well as many of the Byzantine proverb-writers: Apostolios 18,13; Makarios 8.80; Diogenianos 2.1. None of these sources adds anything to Zenobios' proverb. Libanios alludes to the proverb in several letters: 352, 700, 1178 (from 358/9, 362, 364 A.D., respectively).

T62 Athenaios Deipnosophistai 12.43 (p 532B-D) = Theopompos FGrHist 115 F213

καὶ περὶ τοῦ Χάρητος ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ καὶ τεσσαρακοστῇ φησὶν· Χάρητος τε νοηρὸς τε ὁντος καὶ βραδεός, καὶ τοῦ γε καὶ πρὸς τρυφήν ἢ ἢ ὢντος· ὡς γε περιήγητο στρατεύματος αὐλητρίδας καὶ ψυλτρίδας καὶ πεκάζων ἐταίρας, καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν εἰσφερομένων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὰ μὲν εἰς ταῦτα τὴν ἐκβολὴν τὰ δὲ αὐτοῦ κατέλειπεν Ἀθηναίων πολλά. Χάρητος γὰρ αὐτός τοὐτοῖς τῇ λέγοντι καὶ τῇ ψηφίσματα γράφοντι καὶ τῶν ἁγίων τοῖς δικαζόμενοι· ἐφ' οὖς ὧν δὴμος ὑγίνα τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐδεπόστε ἡγανάκτησεν, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ μάλλον αὐτὸν ἡγάπα τῶν πολιτῶν· καὶ δικαζόμενος καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχων, ὡστε τοὺς μὲν νέους ἐν τοῖς ἀδικητριβοῖς· ὅταν παρὰ ταῖς ἐταίρασις διατρίβετον, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἐκεῖνον προσβυμένου εἰς πότος καὶ καὶ νόμος καὶ ταῖς τουστάσις ἄσωτος, τὸν δὲ δήμου ἀπαίτηται πλεῖος καταναλωθέντως εἰς τοῖς δικαιώνδες καὶ κρεανομένου ἤπερ εἰς τὴν τῆς πόλεως διοίκησιν.

T63 Polybios 9.23.6

Ἀθηναίων γονών εἴρηται τις ἂν ὅλη τὰ πολλὰ· πολλὰ δὲ τὰ κρητικὰ καὶ σειμάτα τῆς πολιτείας Ἀριστερείου καὶ Περικλέους προεστῶτων, Κλέανος δὲ καὶ Χάρητος τάναντα·

T64 Scholion to Demosthenes On Halonesos 7.15 (22a Dilts)

14. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ληστῶν δικαίων φησιν εἴηνι κοινῷ φυλάττειν τοὺς ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κακουργοῦντας ὡς τε καὶ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἢ τούτῳ ἄξιών, ὥπ
ήμων εἰς τὴν θάλατταν κατασταθήναι, καὶ ὡμολογήσαι ὑμᾶς ὡς ἄνενοι Φελλίππου
οὐδὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἑλάττηθι φυλακὴν δυνατοὶ ἑστε φυλάττειν, 15 ἐκὶ δὲ καὶ
δοθήσω αὐτῷ τὰ ἀνδρεύματα τῆς ἄδειας, περιπλέσσοι καὶ ὀρμυζομένως εἰς τὰς νῆσους
ἐπὶ προφατεῖ τῇ τῶν χρυσῶν φυλακῆς διαφερέσθων τοὺς νησίλατας καὶ
ἀφυστάναι ὑμῖν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς φυγάδας τοὺς παρ' ἐαυτοῦ εἰς Θάσον
κεκομικέναι διὰ τῶν ὀμητέρων στρατηγῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νῆσους
οἰκεῖοισασθαί, συμπεπιμελεῖσθαι μετὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν τῶν
ομητέρων ὡς κοινώνοισθαντας τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν φυλακῆς. (Demosthenes 7:14-15)

καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς φυγάδας τοὺς παρ' ἐαυτοῦ εἰς Θάσον κεκομικέναι]
ἐλεγχθέντες γὰρ τινὲς τῶν θασίων, ὡς μέλλουσι Φελλίππῳ προδιδόναι τὰ
πράγματα, ἐφυγαδεύθησαν ἐκ τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτος δὲ Φελλίππος πέλασε τοὺς
περὶ τὸν Χάρητα κάτηγαγεν. (22a Dilts)

τὸ δὲ "τοὺς παρ' ἐαυτοῦ" ἀντὶ τοῦ τοὺς τὰ αὐτοῦ φρονοῦντας. (22b Dilts)

T65 Demosthenes Against Theokrines 58.37-8

37 Τούτων τῶν ψυχισμάτων, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὡς μενδόντων κατὰ χώραν ἢ
ἀλόντων (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε διαφέρει) τί πόλεις κερδάναι ἢ βλάπτεται; ἕγα
μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν οἴμαι. τοὺς γὰρ Ἀθινοὺς φανεὶν οὐδὲ προσέχειν τῇ πόλει, τούτῳ
dὲ γεγονέναι διὰ Θεοκρῆνος τούτων. συκοφαντοιμένου γὰρ ἐν ἕκεινοις τοῖς
χρόνοις ὑπὸ τοῦτον. ἐν οἷς οἱ μὲν ἐφιλοπποῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐγείροντες αὐτῶν, καὶ
πυνθανόμενοι γεγοράθη τὸ ψυχισμα παρανόμων ὁ Χαρίνος πρότερον ἐγράφατο,
tοῦτο τὸ περὶ τῆς συντάξεως, δὲ Θεοκρῆνος εἶπε, καὶ πέρας τῶν πραγμάτων
οὐδὲν γινομένου, 38: ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ὠμοίοις γυγχαρούντος τὴν συντάξεων
dιδάσκα τοὺς Ἀθινοὺς δοσιν Χάρητε τῇ στρατηγῷ συνεχάρασιν, τοῦτον δὲ τῶν
μερίδων παραδεξόμενον Χαρίνῳ τῷ προδήτῃ ταῦτα πράττειν, ὅπερ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτοῖς, τούτῳ ἐπραξαν· εἶλοντα γὰρ τῶν παρὼν τακών τὰ ἡλέχστα. καὶ τούτῳ
τῇ χρῆ νομίζειν αὐτῶδ θάγης πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνθάδε γραφομένων, οἷς ἦν
αιρέτατον φρουράν ὑποδέχεσθαι καὶ βαρβάρων ἄκοδειν, ὑμῖν ἀποστάντας;
ἀλλ' οἴμαι τὴν τούτων πονηρίαν ὑμεῖς μόνον δεδοσεθέ φέρειν, ἀλλος δὲ ὀδεῖς
tῶν Ἑλλήνων.

T66 IG II² 1628. 419-20 (column C); 1629.940-1 (column D)¹

1 1628 is a document of 326/5 B.C., 1629 of 325/4 B.C. Both have, no
doubt, been copied from a still earlier document.
The underdotted letters in lines 2 and 11 are restored by the editor of IG II². In fact, traces of the vertical hastae of these four letters are visible. The inscription is stoichedon (26) and it is possible to say that the traces of the dotted letters are compatible with the editor's restorations.
Fragment a

'Εδεσε τῷ ὁλμῷ: Πανδιονίς ἐξ πρωτάνει[ε --- (secretary)--(epistates)---]

Fragment b, c, d

[...]

321
The text followed here is that of M.J. Osborne, *Naturalization* vol. I 52-4 and vol. II 61-3. For the history of this document, bibliography and the reasons why Osborne's is the only reliable text (especially of fragment a) see chapter two, notes 56-62.

Fragment a has been lost and Osborne insists that it is a separate enactment from the one comprised of fragments b, c and d. He does concede that the two enactments belong close together in time (vol. II 61) and that there is a strong likelihood that the two were inscribed on the same stele (vol. I 52).

Fragment b is from the right side of the stele and contains parts of lines 1-28. Fragment c is from the left side of the stele and contains parts of lines 7-18. Fragment d is from the middle of the stele and contains parts of lines 21-29. For a visual representation of each fragment's position with respect to the others see *IG II²* 207.
323

T69 Polyainos Strategemata 5.44.3

The epigram is cited in Stephanos Byzantinos Ethnika s.v. Βόσπορος; Konstantinos Porphyrogenetos De Thematibus 2,12; the Palatine Anthology (Planudes) 7.169; a scholion to Dionysios Byzantinos Müller GGM II, 40 F66 and cf. F65; and elsewhere in Byzantine collections. None of these sources have any independent value, except as variant readings to the epigram.

T70 Hesykhios of Miletos FGrHist 390 F1 §§ 28-31

1 The epigram is cited in Stephanos Byzantinos Ethnika s.v. Βόσπορος; Konstantinos Porphyrogenetos De Thematibus 2,12; the Palatine Anthology (Planudes) 7.169; a scholion to Dionysios Byzantinos Müller GGM II, 40 F66 and cf. F65; and elsewhere in Byzantine collections. None of these sources have any independent value, except as variant readings to the epigram.

T71 Didymos Commentary on Demosthenes column 10.34-11.5 (commentary to Demosthenes Reply to Philip 11.1)
The Teubner text of Pearson and Stephens has been followed except that here abbreviated words (generally particles, prepositions, connectives, and some genitive and accusative plural endings) are given in full without indications of abbreviation. Cf. xix-xx for their list of abbreviations.
325

T74
Plutarch Phokion 5.1

Τῷ δ’ ἦσε προσηνέστατος δὲν καὶ φιλανθρωπότατος, ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου δυσέμβολος ἐφαίνετο καὶ σκυθρωπός, ὡστε μὴ βραδίαν ἂν τινα μόνον ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ τῶν ἀσυνήθων. διὸ καὶ Χάρτη ποτὲ πρὸς ταῖς ὀφρῶς αὐτοῦ λέγοντι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιγελάδων, "οὐδὲν" ἐπεν "ἄστε μής λελιπηκέν ἡ ὀφρῶς." ὁ δὲ τοῦτων γέλως πολλὰ κλαῦσαι τὴν πόλιν πεποίηκεν.

T75
Cornelius Nepos Phocion 2.1-4

Idem cum prope ad annum octogesimum prospera pervenisset fortuna, extremis temporibus magnum in odium pervenit suorum civium. primo quod cum Demade de urbe tradenda Antipatro consenserat eiusque consilio Demosthenes cum ceteris, qui bene de re publica meriti existimabantur, populi scito in exilium erant expulsi. neque in eo solum offenderat, quod patriae male consulerat, sed etiam quod amicitiae fidem non praestiterat. namque auctus aditusque a Demosthene eum, quem tenebat, ascenderat gradum, cum adversus Charetem eum subornaret: ab eodem in iudiciis, cum capitis causam diceret, defensus aliquotiens, liberatus discesserat. hunc non solum in periculis non defendit, sed etiam prodit.
T76 Diodoros 16.85.2

ενδή δὲ καὶ στρατηγὸς κατέστησε τοὺς περὶ Χάρητα καὶ Λυσικλέα καὶ πανδούμει μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων ἔξεσμευε τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Βοωισίαν. τῶν δὲ νέων ἀπάντων προθύμιας εἰς τὸν ἄγανα καταντών τὸν μὲν κατὰ σπουδὴν ὀδούς ἔδονεν ἔλλειποντες ἀπήγησαν μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων καὶ κοινῇ στρατιοφεδεσσαντες ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἱμάδον.

T77 Polyainos Strategemata 4.2.8

φίλιππος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφισσέων ἐστράτευεν· Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Θηβαῖοι τὰ στενὰ προκατελέβοντο, καὶ ἕδεις ὀμῆχανος. ἐξαπατά τοὺς πολεμίους φίλιππος ἐπιστολὴν πεπλασμένην Ἀντιπάτρῳ πέμψας ὡς Μακεδόνιοι, ἃς τὴν μὲν στρατεύει τῇ Ἀμφισσέως ἀναφέροντο, σπεύδου δὲ ὡς ἀφέκεν πεπιστείλαν τοὺς ἐκεῖ νεωτερίζειν. ὁ γραμματοφόρος [δεόμεν] διὰ τῶν στενῶν. ὁ στρατηγὸς, Χάρης καὶ Πρόξενος, αἰροῦσιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀναγόννητες πιστεύεις τοὺς γεγραμμένοις καὶ τὴν φυλακὴ τῶν στενῶν ἀπολείπουν. Φίλιππος δὲ λαβόμενος ἐρημίας ἀφιλάξως διεξεπάλασα καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀναστρέφαντα ἐνίκησε καὶ τῆς Ἀμφισσῆς ἔκρατησεν.

T78 Diodoros 16.85.7

παρὰ δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ μὲν ἄγαδότατοι τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπετελευτήκεισαν, Ἰφικράτης καὶ Χάρης, ἔτι δὲ Τιμάθεος, τῶν δὲ ὑπολειμμένων Χάρης πρωτεύον οὐδέν διέφερε τῶν τυχόντων ἤδητων κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ στρατηγεῖν ἐνέργειαν καὶ βουλὴν.

T79 Stobaios Florilegium 54.47

Δημάδης.

Δημάδης ὁ δὲ τωρὶς ληφθεὶς ἀγίμαλωτος ἐν τῷ κατὰ Χαιρώνειαν μάχῃ ὑπὸ φίλιππου καὶ συστάθει αὐτῷ, ἐκείνῳ παρὰ πότων σεμνυνομένου "ποῦ ἡ ἐγνύεια καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή τῆς Αθηναίων πόλεως;" ἢ γνωρὶς ἐν ἐρήμῳ ἢ βασιλεῖ, τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην, εἰ Αθηναίων μὲν φίλιππος, Μακεδόνων δὲ Χάρης ἐστρατήγηε."  

1 The mediaeval or Byzantine Pseudo-Plutarchean de Nobilitate also contains a version of this anecdote.
T80 Arrian Anabasis 1.10.4-6

4 ο δὲ τα μὲν ἄλλα φιλανθρώπως πρὸς τὴν προσβελαν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐπιστολὴν δὲ γράφως πρὸς τὸν ὄμον ἔξετει τοὺς ἁμρέ Δήμοσθένην καὶ Λυκούργον· καὶ Ὑπερεξῆς δὲ ἔστηκε καὶ Πολυδευκτὸν καὶ Χάρητα καὶ Χαρδημόν καὶ Ἐφιάλτην καὶ Διότιμον καὶ Μουροκλέα· τοῖσος γὰρ αὐτῶς εἶναι τῆς τε ἐν Χαρικελλᾶς ἐξομορφῶς τῇ πόλει γενομένης καὶ τῶν ὄστερον ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίππῳ τελευτῆ πλημμεληθέντων ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐς φιλιπποῦ καὶ Θηβαίως δὲ τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀπέφαρμεν αὐτῶς οὐ μείον ή τοὺς αὐτῶν Θηβαίων νεωτερίσαντας. ἐ' Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπος οὐκ ἔξεδοσαν, προσβεβληκαν δὲ αὕτης παρὰ 'Αλέξανδρον, ἀφεῖναι δεδεμένοι τῇ ὁρᾷ τοὺς ἐξαιτηθεῖσα· καὶ 'Αλέξανδρος ἀφῆκε, τυχόν μὲν αἰδοὶ τῆς πόλεως, τυχόν δὲ σπουδῆ τοῦ ἐς τὴν 'Ασσαν στόλου, οἶχθὲν ἑθέλων οὐδὲν ὑποπον ἐν τοῖς Ἐλληνον ὁπολειπεσθαι. Χαρδημόν μὲν τούτοις μὸνον τῶν ἐξαιτηθέντων τε καὶ ὁ δοθὲν τεθηκέν ἑκέλευσε· καὶ ἑκέλευχε Χαρδημός ως τῆς 'Ασσαν παρὰ βασιλέα Δαρείου.

T81 Souda s.v. 'Αντίπατρος (A 2704)

νικήσας δὲ ἤτει τοὺς ἱρήτορας, οὗτος ἔξεδοσαν' Ἀθηναίοι, Δημοσθένης, Ὑπερεξῆς, Λυκούργον, Πολυδευκτόν, Ἐφιάλτην, Θρασδύβουλον, Χάρητα, Χαρδημόν, Διότιμον, Πατροκλέα, Κάσσανδρον.

1 For Πατροκλέα some MSS have Προκλέα.

Supplements to T80 and T81

A. Plutarch Demosthenes 23.4-6

eὐθὺς δ', δ' Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξειτε πέμπων τῶν δημαγωγῶν δέκα μὲν δ' Ἰδιομενεὸς καὶ Δούρεις εἱρήμασεν, οὐκά δ', δ' ὡς οἱ πλείστοι καὶ δοκιμῶταί τοῖς συγγραφέοις, τοσδὲ· Δημοσθένην, Πολυδευκτόν, Ἐφιάλτην, Λυκούργον, Μουροκλέα, Δήμονα, Καλλισθένην, Χαρδημόν. οὔτε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν προβάτων λόγον δ' Ἡμοσθένης, δ' τοὺς λύκους τοὺς κόνιας ἐξέδωκε, διηγητὰμένος, αὐτῶν μὲν εἰκάσει καὶ τοὺς σὸν αὐτῷ κυστὶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅμοιον μαχομένοις, 'Αλέξανδρόν δὲ τὸν Μακεδόνα μονολύκουν προστηθέσεν. ἐστὶ δ', δ' ἀσπερ ἔφη τοὺς ἐμπόδους δράμεν, ὅταν ἐν πρυθέῃ δεῖξιμα περιφράσα, δ', δ' λύγων πυρῶν τοὺς πολυλος πιεράζοντος, οὕτως ἡμῖν λαυθάνετε πάντας αὐτοὺς συνεκδίδοντες. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοβοῦλος δ' Κασσανδρῆς ἑστήρηκε.

B. Plutarch Phokion 17.2

Ας δ' ἀπολώλευσαι αἱ Θῆκαι, καὶ δ' Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξετετο τοὺς περὶ Ἡμοσθένης καὶ Λυκούργον καὶ Ὑπερεξῆς καὶ Χαρδημόν, ὃς δ' ἐκκλησία ποὺς ἐκεῖνον ἀπέβλεπεν, ὄνομαστι πολλάκις καλομένος ἀνέστη. 

C. Diodoros 17.15

Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα εἰς τὰς Αἴγνας ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ἐξαιτήσαντας τῶν Ῥήτωρων δόξα τοὺς κατ' αὐτοῦ πεπολυτευμένους, ἢν ὑπήρχον ἐπιφανεστατοι Δημοσθένης.
καὶ Λυχνώργος.

D. Justin 11.4.10-12

Quam rem ita graviter tulit Alexander, ut secunda legatione denuo bellum deprecantibus ita demum remiserit, ut oratores et duces, quorum fiducia totiens rebellent, sibi dedantur; paratisque Atheniensibus, ne cogantur, subire bellum, eo res deducta est, ut retentis oratoribus duces in exilium agerentur, qui ex continenti ad Darium profecti non mediocre momentum Persarum viribus accesserent.

E. Plutarch Moralia 848E (= T85)

καὶ περὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν δὲν ἔπει παρ᾿ Ἀθηναίων ἄντείπε *** (there is a lacuna in the text).

T82 Arrian Anabasis 1.12.1

'Ανείγει ὅς αὐτὸν ἐς Ἐλλον Μενοτύδες το ὁ κυβερνήτης χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ εστεφάνωσε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο Χάρης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐκ σιγείου ἔλθων καὶ τινες καὶ Ἐλλοι, οἱ μὲν Ἑλληνες, οἱ δὲ ἐπιχώριου. *** οἱ δὲ, ὅτι καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλέως ἀρα τάφον ἐσταφάνωσεν Ἡραστίων δὲ λέγουσιν ὅτι τοῦ Πατρόκλου τὸν τάφον ἐστεφάνωσε.

T83 Arrian Anabasis 3.2.6

καὶ Μυτυλήνην δὲ Χάρητα ἔχοντα ὅτι ἄφειλετο καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν Λέσβῳ πόλεις καὶ αὕτης ὁμολογίᾳ προσηγάγετο, Ἡμφοτερὸν δὲ σὺν ἐξήκοντα ναυσίν ἐπὶ Καὶ ἐπεμψεν.

T84 Curtius Rufus 4.5.22

Hinc Macedones transiere Mytilenem, quam Chares Atheniensis nuper occupatam II milium Persarum praesidio tenebat; sed cum obsidionem tolerare non posset, urbe tradita pactus ut incolumni abire liceret, Imbrum petit; deditis Macedones perpercrunt.
T85 Plutarch Moralia 848E ("vitae decem oratorum": Hypereides)

...ἐποιτεύσατο Ἀθήνησι, καθ' δὲν χρόνον Ἀλέξανδρος τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἦτετο πραγμάτων καὶ περὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν δὲν ἦτετο παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἀντείπει ***ι καὶ περὶ τῶν τριτριτον' συνεβούλευσε δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ Ταυνάφω ξενικόν μὴ διαλύσαι οδ Ἰάρης ἢγετο, εὐνόως πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν διακεῖμενος.

1 There is a lacuna here.

T86 Demosthenes Epistula 3.31

φεβοῦμαι μέσον ἐρήμου τῶν ὑπὲρ ὁμών ἐρούντων γένησθε, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ὅταν τῶν δημοτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἡ καθήκουσα μοῖρα καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ ὁ χρόνος παραιρηθεῖται, οἶον Ναυσικλέα καὶ Χάρητα καὶ Διδυμόν καὶ Μενεσθέα καὶ Εὐθοδόν, ἔτι δ' Ἐθελδίκων καὶ Εὐφάλλην καὶ Λυκοῦργον, τοὺς δ' ὑμεῖς προῆσθε, ὡσπερ Χαρίδημον καὶ Φιλοκλέα καὶ ἐμὲ.

DUBIA

T87 Dionysios of Halikarnassos Deinarkhos 10 (p 653)¹

'Απολογία διαμαρτυρίας πρὸς τὴν Χάρητας ***2 εἰσαγγελία κατὰ Φειδιάδου γραμματέως: "οὗτ' ἐκχρας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐνεκα."

¹ Deinarkhos F23Conomis. Dionysios lists this speech with the genuine, public speeches of Deinarkhos, and thus dates it no earlier than 336/5 (cf. Deinarkhos 9 p 649 ). It is noteworthy that the list of genuine, public speeches also includes two defending against an ἀπογραφήν of a Kephisophon.

² Blass conjectures the lacuna, Sylburg εἰσαγγελίαν.

T88 Dionysios of Halikarnassos Deinarkhos 12 (p 663)¹

Διαμαρτυρία περὶ τοῦ Ἐδίππου κλήρου πρὸς Χάρητα: "πολλάκις ἦδη ἦκουσα."

¹ Deinarkhos F62 Conomis. Εδίππου is a conjecture for the MSS εττηπου, i.e., ἐττι ἦ που. Also among these speeches is a διαμαρτυρία "that the daughters of Aristophon be not enfranchised."
καθά φησιν ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ πρὸς Χάρητα ἐπιτροπικῷ: "ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνεγράφην ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ νόμος ἀπέδωκε τὴν κομιδὴν τῶν καταλειφθέντων τῇ μητρὶ, ὅσα κελεύει κυρίους εἶναι τῆς ἐπικλήσου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης τοὺς παῖδας, ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδιετές ἠμῶσιν."

1 Pollux 8.142 also cites this speech.

Priscian 7.7 ("de vocativo") = Edmonds, FAC Theopompos F97

Theopompus "Χάρη" pro "Χάρης."
INDEX PROSOPOGRAPHICA

Below are listed in (English) alphabetical order the names of historical persons mentioned in the text and notes of this thesis. They have been placed in this index in order to avoid repeated reference in the notes. The name, patronym, deme and tribal number (in the official order, i.e., i= Erekhtheis, ii= Aigeis, iii= Pandionis et cetera) of each is given. Where the deme is not known, or where the individual is a non-Athenian, the ethnic is given in parentheses. In the columns to the left of the name is given the number from Kirchner's register in Prosopographia Attica. In the columns to the right are given references to 1) page numbers in Davies, APF, 2) the catalogue number from Berve, Alexanderreich, and 3) the catalogue number from J. Hofstetter, Die Griechen in Persien. In a few cases ancient sources are cited (when only one or two are known), or other, modern works are cited for a more recent treatment, or as the source for a conjecture of filiation, deme or the like.

A 'plus' symbol (+) means see addenda to that work; an asterisk (*) after a PA number means see Sundwall, NPA (sub nomine).

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