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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Some aspects of the European anarchy Lane, Joseph Harold 1940

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SOME ASPECTS OP THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY by Joseph. Harold Lane A thesis submitted i n p a r t i a l fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts i n the Department of History. The University of B r i t i s h Columbia. A p r i l , 1940. Preface. Whoever invented the preface made a great contribution to the s o c i a l graces. He provided the means whereby the author could explain why he had written the work or why anyone should read i t ; and he enabled the author to come forward quite informally and p u b l i c l y thank a l l those to whom thanks were due. I have no good reason to give why anyone should read t h i s essay, but I have very good reasons for writing i t . In my work as a teacher of teen-age boys and g i r l s I have been confronted with the task of making reasonably cl e a r the problems of t h i s complex world. The task has been one for which I was often i l l f i t t e d , since I could not c l a r i f y for younger people what was not clear to myself. Moreover , on many occasions I am sure that I have underestimated the d i f f i c u l t i e s of those entrusted with the conduct of public a f f a i r s . In these respects I have learned much. I have c l a r i f i e d i n my own mind, by seeing t h e i r complexity, many of the problems which hitherto seemed impossible of understanding; and I have learned, at lea s t , that the problems facing the world's leaders to-day are simple only 11 t o "those whose mental n e a r - s i g h t e d n e s s p r e v e n t s a f a r t h e r v i e w . I know t h a t the g l a s s e s w h i c h Mr. Soward p r e s c r i b e d by a l l o w i n g me t o w r i t e on t h i s s u b j e c t have c o r r e c t e d to some measure the mental n e a r - s i g h t e d n e s s from w h i c h I was s u f f e r i n g . To Dr. Sage and Mr. Soward, b o t h f o r t h e i r k i n d n e s s i n a l l o w i n g me t o w r i t e on t h i s s u b j e c t and for t h e i r v e r y h e l p f u l c r i t i c i s m s and s u g g e s t i o n s , t o M r . I r v i n g f o r h i s v e r y h e l p f u l s u g g e s t i o n s i n s t y l e , and t o Mr. Robert McKenzie f o r h e l p i n many ways, my a p p r e c i a t i o n and my t h a n k s . Vancouver, B.C. A p r i l 11,1940. I l l CONTENTS. Page 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n . I V 2. Chapter I The Roots of the Problem 1. Geographic C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 4. E t h n o g r a p h i c a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 13. Economic C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 44. 3. Chapter I I War, Peace T r e a t i e s , and th e League. 57. War and Peace T r e a t i e s 61. The League of N a t i o n s 67. 4. Chapter I I I P r o p o s a l s f o r S o l u t i o n 126. World F e d e r a t i o n 133. "Union Now" 138. European F e d e r a t i o n 156. C o n c l u s i o n , F r a n c o - B r i t i s h F e d e r a t i o n 167. 5. Appendix A 177. Appendix B 180. Appendix C 182. 6. B i b l i o g r a p h y • 184. IV Introduction. Schopenhauer's remark that " the only teaching of history i s that we have learned nothing from history," 1. i s both an indictment and a challenge, not only to the hi s t o r i a n , but to the whole of mankind. The growing emphasis upon s o c i a l rather than upon i n d i v i d u a l needs, and the st e a d i l y increasing amount of speculative writing shows that this, challenge i s being met. But there s t i l l exists a fear that speculation upon the part of the h i s t o r i a n may be only prophecy, and that h i s t o r y r i g h t l y belongs with the past. This idea i s only p a r t l y true and neglects the raison d'etre of h i s t o r i c a l research. The vicarious experience of the past i s of real service to mankind when used for the benefit of the present and future. Otherwise the vast amount of human energy absorbed i n the search for and i n the co-ordination of past human experience i s to be regarded as of 1. Quoted in Bratt, Major K.A., That Next War, Harcourt Brown, and Go. ,N.Y., 1931. Hegel i s often given c r e d i t for t h i s idea, but such is not f a i r to him for i t takes out of context and quite changes the meaning of the point the author wished to make. " But what experience and hist o r y teach i s t h i s , - that peoples and governments never have, learned anything from history, or acted on p r i n c i p l e s deduced from i t . " But Hegel goes on to say that "each period i s involved i n such peculiar circumstances and no more value than the pleasure i t gives to the h i s t o r i a n himself and to those who enjoy the story of mankind merely as a story. That some knowledge of h i s t o r y i s regarded as a necessary part of a well rounded education suggests that i t has a d e f i n i t e bearing upon good c i t izenship,which i n turn means s o c i a l well-being. This i n i t s e l f i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence that hi s t o r y i s to-day regarded as having a def-i n i t e bearing upon the building of our society. Such a point of view should receive every encouragement. It takes h i s t o r y out of confinement and gives i t a d e f i n i t e place and purpose. History need be no mere appendage to man's knowledge, but a r e a l tool for use i n the service of man-kind. Like a l l tools i t s use i s l i m i t e d , but l i m i t e d only to the proven facts 1. of the past. Here prophecy "exhibits a condition of things so idios y n c r a t i c that i t s conduct must be regulated by considerations connected with i t s e l f and i t s e l f alone." (Hegel, G. W.P. Lectures i n the Philosophy of History, George B e l l and Sons, London, 1894, p. 6. 1. The word " f a c t " or " h i s t o r i c a l fact" does not necessar-i l y imply that anything i n h i s t o r y i s established with out- doubt. But there i s a vast amount of h i s t o r i c a l material which has been accepted by a large body of professional h i s t o r i a n s . l t would be presumptuous on the part of the layman to attempt to challenge the accuracy of t h i s material. and h i s t o r i c a l speculation show themselves to he two quite different things. The former asserts i t s e l f without due regard for h i s t o r i c a l truth or h i s t o r i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y , whereas the l a t t e r l i m i t s i t s e l f d e f i n i t e l y to the proven facts of the past, and upon that basis suggests a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y for the future. It i s upon t h i s conception of h i s t o r y that the present essay i s written. It i s written from the point of view of the layman with some knowledge of h i s t o r y rather than by the professional historian.This i n i t s e l f has given a c e r t a i n amount of freedom of expression which the professional h i s t o r i a n would r i g h t l y be loathe to take. His i s a profession which, i f i t i s . t o maintain any degree of authority, must r e s t r i c t i t s e l f to a c e r t a i n specialized f i e l d . The layman, however, with no reputation at stake, and with no l i m i t on his endeavors, may, by a c o r r e l a t i o n of many p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s and p a r t i c u l a r a u t h o r i t i e s , arrive at c e r t a i n fundamental truths which have a re a l bearing upon the problems of'the moment.'This i n no way allows the layman ( i f his e f f o r t s are sincere) to trespass beyond the borders of established h i s t o r i c a l fact, nor does i t excuse him from a close scrutiny of these f a c t s . More-over, any deductions from these accepted facts must be V l l made, not on a basis of mere speculation, but rather upon that of reasonable h i s t o r i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y . History i s written by hi s t o r i a n s , but h i s t o r y i s made by man; not only by the impact of great p e r s o n a l i t i e s upon th e i r times, but i n a growing measure by the awakening consciousness of the common man. This awakening conscious-ness may well be the prelude to a new age. In a world i n which the aristocracy of p r i v i l e g e has been l a r g e l y d i s -credited and where the aristocracy of culture i s r a p i d l y giving place to universal knowledge ( through the medium of public schools, the press, the t a l k i n g pictures , and the radio ) the latent energies of a hitherto large, though s i l e n t , class now become vocal. Moreover , governments and those aspiring to government o f f i c e s must give to this new public a better measure of service. Governments are no longer dealing with a poorly informed and unlettered people, and although these people may s t i l l be prey to clever pro-paganda, they are less e a s i l y s a t i s f i e d with unsound theories and practices. Public opinion to-day i s not so re a d i l y moulded as i t has been i n the past, at least not i n the democracies. Whereas i n the past public opinion was la r g e l y moulded by the leaders, the leaders to-day are l a r g e l y moulded by public opinion . 1. It i s 1. " Foreign a f f a i r s and defence have hitherto been the T i l l s i g n i f i c a n t that while i n 1914 the B r i t i s h public were l a r g -ely ignorant of the imminence of war, but were quite e a s i l y s t i r r e d into a war hysteria by t h e i r leaders, i n 1939 B r i t i s h public p r a c t i c a l l y forced parliament to take action. Moreover t h i s public insistence upon d e f i n i t e action does not seem to be a war hysteria, but rather a serious and determined ef f o r t to create a better order i n Europe. There i s no enthusiasm for t h i s war;there is a re a l deter-mination to eliminate the errors which have caused i t . "monopoly of the governing c l a s s , and concerned solely-and exclusively with th e i r i n t e r e s t s . The incursion of democ-racy obviously involves the danger that the v i t a l i n t e r e s t o f the common people i n c o l l e c t i v e security and the reign of law should be taken too seriously and the vested i n -terests of the plutocracy, requiring deals with the ag-ressors at the expense of th e i r victims and of the League, should not be 1 understood 1. Whereas i n the three years before the world war there were only two debates and a score or so of questions on foreign policy, there were t h i r t y debates and over 1,500 questions on foreign p o l i c y i n the House of Commons between January and August 1938. Asquith and Grey were disingenu-ous i n th e i r dealings with Parliament and public opinion about foreign p o l i c y . But i t took several years and the world war to reveal the fact, so that t h e i r reputations only suffered posthumously. Whereas Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues have been caught out taking a pragmatic view of truth so often and so promptly that the Government's reputation for v e r a c i t y has suffered." Vigilantes ( K. Z i l l i a c u s ) Why We are.Losing the Peace, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1939. IX It may be that the tid e i n the a f f a i r s of man i s reach-ing flood proportions, and that the greatest of man's ven-tures may be l o s t i f he does not take t h i s current as i t serves. At no time has the tide of public opinion been more concerned with the relationships which exist between peoples and governments. At no time has the mass of mankind realized the gr a v i t y of the problems of war and peace.While action does not necessarily follow r e a l i z a t i o n , i t i s safe to say that r e a l i z a t i o n i s the necessary prelude to action. This essay i s merely a part of that r e a l i z a t i o n . There are those who feel"that a l l human thoughts flow into the great stream of human consciousness. It i s a happy thought. At least a l l human thoughts are a part of the force of public opinion. Though.this essay adds nothing to the p r a c t i c a l solution of the problem i t seeks to analyse , i t may add something to that stream of human consciousness. If the stream i s made strong enough by a multitude of small contributions, i t may a t t a i n the flood proportions necessary to sweep away the debris of years of error, and prepare the way for the foundations of a society of nations b u i l t upon reason and the common decenoies of l i f e . This i s not a Utopian dream. It i s a p r a c t i c a l problem. It i s no longer the dream of a few v i s i o n a r i e s , but the demand of mankind awakening .to a f u l l e r r e a l i z a t i o n of the world i n which he l i v e s . 0HAPTES THE ROOTS OP THE PROBLEM. CHAPTER 1. The Roots of the Problem. " Frontiers are indeed a razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of l i f e or death for nations ." 1. A study of the problems of Europe f i n a l l y becomes a study of national boundaries. In nearly a l l of the centuries of c o n f l i c t and the periods of adjustment these boundaries have been a major consideration. They s t i l l remain a problem of paramount importance, and even now whU e t h i s essay i s being written a struggle i s being waged over t h i s age old question. However we may disguise, modify or add to the issue, i t s t i l l remains a question of national f r o n t i e r s . Europe f o r centuries has been engaged i n one war or another to maintain or to change these boundaries. And a f t e r nearly every war there has been some change. But the changes for the most part have not resulted i n any greater degree of s t a b i l i t y . They have usually resulted i n an ambitious desire to make additional change or i n a revengeful desire to reverse the former change. Moreover any changes occuring i n one part created national fears and 1. Bowman, Isiah, " The Hew World? World Book Company, N.Y., 1928, p.-31. ( quoted, no reference given ) apprehensions which foreshadowed changes i n other f r o n t i e r s . And so the cycle goes on from war to peace to war, with each war and each peace solving nothing except for a short time and creating for the future new f r o n t i e r s and new problems with l i t t l e hope of any stable settlement i n sight. To change these f r o n t i e r s on the part of one or more groups, and to r e s i s t that change on the part of one or more other groups the peoples of Europe have s a c r i f i c e d m i l l i o n s of human l i v e s ; have expended countless b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s ; have undergone starvation, disease, and misery a f f e c t i n g m i l l i o n s of people over hundreds of years. And to-day the problem remains as far from solution as i t was when Napoleon marched his armies to a l l the points of the compass i n a f r u i t l e s s struggle to dominate the whole area. The solution of t h i s problem has become the task not only of Europe but of the whole world. To-day the s t a b i l i t y of the whole world depends upon the s t a b i l i t y of a l l of i t s great areas - es p e c i a l l y that of Europe, Since the old ways of solution have u t t e r l y f a i l e d , i t becomes imperative that new ways be found. We must examine the roots of the tree to find the disease that a f f e c t s the branches. The problem then seems to be that of establishing reasonably permanent European boundaries. To do t h i s one of three procedures seems necessary: 1. A formula must be devised for the solution of the boundaries which w i l l so take into con-sid e r a t i o n a l l the points of c o n f l i c t as to make them s a t i s f a c t o r y to a l l the peoples concerned. or 2. A formula must be devised which w i l l establish and maintain order by international machinery, within or without the European framework. or 3. A formula must be devised which w i l l render these boundaries so unimportant as to make any r e v i s i o n of l i t t l e importance. This l a t t e r procedure i s receiving a c e r t a i n amount of thought at the present time. But i t may be well to examine thoroughly the f i r s t two before dealing with the t h i r d . The f i r s t task then i s to examine the f i r s t procedure, - the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of devising a formula f o r the solu t i o n of the boundaries which w i l l have so taken into consideration a l l the points of c o n f l i c t as to make them s a t i s f a c t o r y to a l l the peoples concerned. This requires an examination of the various points of c o n f l i c t , a task so overwhelming that a thorough analysis would require volumes, but which can be summarized i n a reasonably short space. The factors which must be taken int o consideration are many, and they may be divided and -4-treated i n many ways. The following s e l e c t i o n i s purely a r b i t r a r y and i s chosen f o r the purpose of brevity rather than for any other consideration. A study w i l l be made of the geographical, ethnological and ethnographical, and economic 1. factors. These are probably the most important. The national factor is of course omitted as i t i s not one to be considered as an iso l a t e d force, but arises out of the c o n f l i c t s and co-ordination of the others. If the above mentioned forces can be so arranged as to avoid any of the apparently inherent c o n f l i c t s the national fa c t o r w i l l emerge as a problem which has been solved i n the process. Geographical Considerations. In the modern world geography does not provide stable p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r s . This does not mean that geography plays no part i n the separation of national states. Geographical barriers are quite d e f i n i t e i n many cases, and coincide i n varying degrees with p o l i t i c a l boundaries, but geographical permanence does not create p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . 1. The s o c i a l factor i s today of r e a l importance.But i t i s not one which has played a major part i n the creation of f r o n t i e r s . It becomes of r e a l importance with the development of the t o t a l i t a r i a n state. Then the national ideology creates a state , not only p o l i t i c a l l y and economically d i s t i n c t , but s o c i a l l y i s o l a t e d . -5-These barriers, be they mountainsj stretches of water, deserts, or r i v e r s , only become l i n e s of d i v i s i o n when p o l i t i c a l units see f i t to use them as such. The following quotation on the ro l e of geography i n general i s equally applicable to geographical f r o n t i e r s . " Nature and geography are only the substratum of the l i f e of mankind; they offer only p o s s i b i l i t i e s of development, and not -ne c e s s i t i e s . History i s i n no way prescribed or foreshadowed i n the nature of any t e r r i t o r y , though a t e r r i t o r y i s undoubtedly one of the given conditions of histo r y . In human l i f e the decision always rests with s p i r i t u a l and ind i v i d u a l factors,which use or neglect the given substratum, as di s p o s i t i o n and w i l l determine i n each case." 1. There i s no geographic d i v i s i o n between much of the boundary between Canada and the United States. Yet there are within the continent well-marked geographic regions which have no p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Whereas the p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s of North America run east and west the geographical d i v i s i o n s run mainly north and south. In Europe the migrations of peoples were not greatly impeded by geographic b a r r i e r s . 1. Meyer, E. Geschichte des Alterturns, 1. i . ( 3rd edit i o n ) , p.66. Quoted i n Barker, Ernest, National Character and  the Pactors i n i t s formation, Methuen & Co. Ltd..London, - 1927,P.52. The present essay does not subscribe to the idea that the determing factors are s p i r i t u a l and i n d i v i d u a l . The point- made here i s that i t i s not the geographical factors, but the way i n which man has used these factors which makes history. -6-While i t i s true that onoe settled the national group tended, whenever possible, to maintain i t s e l f within a geographic-a l l y defined area, i t i s equally true that within these national groups were interspersed the minority groups which have so complicated the problem of boundaries. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t too that the Basques have l i v e d f o r centuries on both sides of the best geographical f r o n t i e r i n Europe. In the case of Ireland ( the island) there i s a d e f i n i t e national cleavage between E i r e and Ulster where no geographical d i v i s i o n exists, while there i s no national cleavage between Ulster and Great B r i t a i n . Whatever the reasons for these national d i v i s i o n s , they can hardly be said to be geographical. Mr. H.B.George , i n his "Relations of Geography and History" , divides Europe geographically i n a manner which can not be said to follow very c l o s e l y the pattern of national development. " It thus appears that physical geography would divide - Europe into the following sections:- 1. Spain, E.Gaul, 3. B r i t i s h I s l e s , 4.Rhone-land, 5.Rhine-land, 6.Italy, 7. Balkan-land, 8. Danube-land, 9.North Germany, 10. Russia, 11. Scandinavia, to which may be appended Bohemia as e a s i l y distinguishable from 8 and 9 i n which i t i s included " . 1. Mr. George points out that even these d i v i s i o n s are not 1. George , H.B., The Relations of Geography and History, Oxford, the Clarendon press, 1924 , p. 118. strongly marked by nature. Even though these d i v i s i o n s be aeeepted i t would be very d i f f i c u l t i n most eases to define them. Where a range of mountains suoh as the Pyrenees occurs the watershead may be used as suoh a l i n e of demarcation. What would constitute the l i m i t s of Rhone-land, Rhine-land, Danube-land, North Germany, or Russia, however, would have to be determined on other than geographical l i n e s . Geographical factors which under one set of con-di t i o n s serve to divide, under another set of conditions serve the opposite purpose. In an a g r i c u l t u r a l society a range of mountains which acted as a b a r r i e r may well change that role i n an i n d u s t r i a l society . The mountains now become, not a f r o n t i e r , but a repository of valuable mineral deposits. While the p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r may remain, the economic intercourse between the peoples on both sides of the f r o n t i e r overrides p o l i t i c a l considerations, and the i n d u s t r i a l development which results from the exploit-a t i o n of the natural wealth tends to create a border zone e t h n i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y indefinable. This has occurred between Prance and Germany,between Germany and Czechoslov-akia, between Germany and Poland, and wherever industries are concentrated near national boundaries. In the three cases mentioned there has arisen a very d i f f i c u l t problem of d i v i s i o n . Geographic factors' have led to two quite -8-antagonistic prooesses. While the physical b a r r i e r has been c a l l e d upon to provide the p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r , the resources of the physical barrier i n t h e i r e x p l o i t a t i o n by both groups has tended to such a mixing of ethnic or-national groups as to make the p o l i t i c a l boundary purely a r t i f i c i a l . Rivers and lakes have undergone a l i k e transformation. With the development of commerce and industry they unite muoh more than they divide. The present attempt to estab-l i s h an international waterway from the A t l a n t i c to the Great lakes i s a very good example. The attempt here i s not to e s t a b l i s h but to break down a b a r r i e r . The fact that both Canada and the United States are both furthering t h e i r own national aims while giving l i p service to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l charaoter of the undertaking does not effect the argument. Regardless of the immediate aims of both countries, the scheme demands international co-operation i n i t s i n i t i a t i o n , and i f undertaken must lead to a furtherance of t h i s co-operative p o l i c y . The point here i s not that the St.Lawrence does not provide a good geographic-a l boundary l i n e , but that-such a waterway, a b a r r i e r under conditions of national h o s t i l i t y , becomes a bridge of international good-will, and a channel of international co-operation between f r i e n d l y states. In Europe, the Danube as a means of commerce between European countries serves much more the function of co-operation than that of d i v i s i o n . When we speak of the permanence of geographical f r o n t i e r s we must bear i n mind that geographic permanence does not create s t a b i l i t y i n a national f r o n t i e r . The factor, be i t mountain, sea, or r i v e r , only has a par-t i c u l a r significance as i t i s applied to the needs of the moment. Where national feelings are aroused the geographical boundary may become for a time of paramount importance. Among other factors geography i s c a l l e d upon to sanction the f r o n t i e r . Such a condition was created by the l a s t war i n respect to the f r o n t i e r s of the new state of Czechoslovakia, The h i s t o r i c provinces of Bohemia and Moravia contained i n the areas contiguous to Germany large numbers of Germans. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire these regions had been regarded as the f r o n t i e r s of the h i s t o r i c provinces. The argument of self-determinat-ion was confronted with the argument of geography and economic necessity • Though the settlement was marred by the French insistence on se c u r i t y the boundary was drawn i n what was considered the best interests of the inhabitants. " With regard to the various s a l i e n t s which jutted - out into Reich Germany t e r r i t o r y , i t would, I believe, have been wise to cede them to Germany, esp e c i a l l y Egerland with i t s p a r t i c u l a r status and t r a d i t i o n s and i t s violent nationalism; indeed, the mountain f r o n t i e r breaks before the Asch-Eger corner i n a f a i r l y convenient strategic l i n e . It would also, I think, have -10- . " been better to cede some t e r r i t o r y ±n the south to Austria, a suggestion accepted by Masaryk i n discussing the future with Dr. Set on-Wat son i n Holland i n the autumn of 1914. One serious objection,however, had, already i n the summer of 1919, appeared to cessions of such a kind — t h i s was the resistence of the German inhabitants themselves. As soon as they r e a l i z e d that the h i s t o r -i c f r o n t i e r s were sure to be preserved en pri n c i p e , the f e e l i n g arose that i f any Sudetendeutschen were to be the subjects of Czechoslovakia,then l e t i t be a l l of' them, so that they should the better be able to make t h e i r weight f e l t j t h i s f e e l i n g has increased f a i r l y s t e a d i l y since 1919 , n 1, Miss Wiskemann from whose book the above quotation i s taken shows throughout the early chapters of her work that the economic and geographical factors made t h i s region i n -div i s a b l e . The problem therefore was whether Germany or Czechoslovakia should control the f r o n t i e r . H i s t o r i c a l l y , as part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire Czechoslovakia had the p r i o r claim. It was natural, therefore that i f the t e r r i t o r y was not to be divided i t should go to Czechoslova-k i a . When,however, Germany became powerful enough to ohallenge t h i s settlement the f r o n t i e r was changed by the Munich agreement and the t e r r i t o r y was incorporated within the Reich. This raises a very important question regarding mountain f r o n t i e r s . Who i s to control the f r o n t i e r ? Where there i s no important national c o n f l i c t , or where the 1. Wiskemann, Elizabeth, Czeohs and Germans, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, N.Y., 1938 . p. 91. mountains are not oi great economic value t h i s question does not a r i s e . The watershed may be used as the l i n e of demarcation. But where for reasons of m i l i t a r y or economic necessity c o n t r o l . i s regarded as essential the solution i s not based on geography but upon force. Under such condit-ions, therefore, a mountain range no matter how well defined does not form a stable f r o n t i e r , but tends rather to a condition of i n s t a b i l i t y . Moreover, under the stimulus of agressive nationalism a mountain range as a defensive f r o n t i e r may well be used as the base from which an offensive war can be waged. If the neighboring t e r r i t o r y i s taken , the f r o n t i e r is then extended, and what may have been the geographical f r o n t i e r ceases to have any s i g n i f i c -ance as a p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r . The settlement of Munich gave to Germany such a point of vantage. Prom that point the occupation of the whole region was a small matter. 1. Apart e n t i r e l y from the consideration of s t a b i l i t y Europe has few geographical f r o n t i e r s . The B r i t i s h I s l e s , and the Iberian Peninsula are the only two which are r e a l l y 1. There i s no intention here to enter any controversy over the Munich agreement, or to suggest that the granting of the Sudetan highland to Germany provided the sole modus operandi for the further extention of German power i n Czechoslovakia . The whole point of the argument here is to show that what may be considered a geographical boundary does not constitute a stable p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r . -IE-fixed by geographical boundaries . Of these:- i n B r i t a i n the geographical separation of Ireland has created a problem which has only been solved by the creation of a separate state or E i r e ; and the Iberian Peninsula i s divided p o l i t i c a l l y into the separate states of Spain and Portugal. I t a l y to the Po v a l l e y is c l e a r l y defined, and so i s the Scandinavian Peninsula to the head of the B a l t i c Sea. Beyond t h i s point there i s no natural f r o n t i e r , and even up to t h i s point the peninsula i s divided by no r e a l f r o n t i e r between Norway and Sweden . 1 . The Dneister and the Danube form rather well marked boundaries for much of Rumania. The rest of Europe i s not geographically out-li n e d except where small mountain ranges, and r i v e r s form occasional boundaries which have been recognized as r e l a t i v e l y permanent. A study of the geography of the continent from the point of view of physical features, -climate, fauna, topography, or any other geographical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w i l l show the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of creating p o l i t i c a l boundaries along l i n e s of geographical f r o n t i e r s . This can be seen much more r e a d i l y by a few minutes study of the maps of Europe which depict these points than by any lengthy written account. 1. A large part of the region between Norway andSweden i s mountainous. But t h i s region i s very wide and therefore does not constitute a boundary. The boundary must s t i l l be determined by man rather than by nature. The above analysis of the geographical factors i n boundary demarcation leads to c e r t a i n conclusions which may be summarized as follows:- ^ 1. In Europe geographical factors can play but a very minor role i n the establishment of national f r o n t i e r s . 2. Many geographical factors which may be used for the purpose of div i d i n g national states contain within themselves the very element's which destroy t h i s function. 3. While geographical outlines may be constant, t h e i r functions do not remain so, but change with the development of new methods i n industry , commerce, and transportation. 4. The establishment of a geographical f r o n t i e r s t i l l leaves unsolved the problem of who should control i t . Ethnographical Oonsiderations • 1. Ethnographic considerations involve a study of various factors of which race and language are of primary importance. A t h i r d factor, the psychological .however, must be given due consideration. In many ways t h i s l a t t e r factor i s of f a r more importance i n the evolution of n a t i o n a l i t y than either race or language. Irom the point of view of ethnography as a science the former are of course of paramount importance. The conception of nationality,however, i s usually one 1. It i s recognized that ethographical, r a c i a l , and lan-guage groups have no re a l or necessary r e l a t i o n to one another. The following treatment though departing at times from t h i s s c i e n t i f i c consideration w i l l neverthe-le s s t r y to make that departure without s a c r i f i c i n g either s c i e n t i f i c or h i s t o r i c a l accuracy. -14-which has no r e a l regard for science,and, as a matter of f a c t , usually makes a quite deliberate attempt to avoid s c i e n t i f i c considerations. The forces which motivate the conduct of individuals are emotional rather than r a t i o n a l . This fact i s too often neglected i n the analysis of h i s t o r i c a l movements. To prove that a popular opinion i s f a l l a c i o u s , no matter how thorough the proof, does not i n any way necessarily defeat that opinion or lessen the power of any movement founded upon i t . Propaganda ( a comparatively new word for a very old practice) has always thriven i n the s o i l of untruth or part t r u t h . What a c t u a l l y has happened or i s the r e a l t r u t h at any time i s never very important i n the determination of group con-sciousness . The important thing i s what the group thinks has happened, or thinks i s the truth. Since the demagogue has often had much more influence on the formation of group opinion than the statesman, much of the t r a d i t i o n and the p o l i c y which unites a people i s founded upon ideas which are s c i e n t i f i c a l l y untenable. In f a c t , s c i e n t i f i c considerations are usually studiously avoided since they lack the emotional appeal so necessary to group action. The following quotation from Hankins i s very much to the point . 1. " So deep are the springs of gregariousness and group l o y a l t y , and so generally vague and symbolic the 1. Hankins, .I'.JBE ., The Racial Basis of G i v i l i z a t i o n , lew York, 1926 • p. 8^  (reference i s to quotation p. 14-15.) # See footnote 1. p. 15. -15-"methods oi reasoning or appeal by which the group as a whole i s moved to action,that broad general-iz a t i o n s have more v i t a l i t y than c a r e f u l discrimin-ating l o g i c . In such a generalization there should be some element of fact and some element of h i s -t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n , illumined with several elements of imagination and i d e a l i z a t i o n which appeal strongly to the i n s t i n c t i v e desire we a l l f e e l to be i d e n t i f i e d with the best, the superior. The exact and complete t r u t h i s f a t a l to i t s driving power. Yet of such a nature i s the conception of n a t i o n a l i t y as i t is now held i n the different countries of the western world" . (reference page 14 ) These facts must be c a r e f u l l y borne i n mind when studying the ethnographical f r o n t i e r s of Europe. Ethnologically Europe may be divided into a very large number of regions. B a s i c a l l y ,however, these groups are r a c i a l l y the re s u l t of the intermixture of three main r a c i a l types, Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic. 2. These are r a c i a l rather than ethnic types, and bear no necessary r e l a t i o n to language groups. For our purpose language groups are of more importance, since language has far more s i g -n i f i c a n c e i n the formation of p o l i t i c a l groups than has 1. H i t l e r has created a very powerful Reich on a r a c i a l theory whioh has no s c i e n t i f i c foundation. The Townsend Plan, Social Credit, T h i r t y Dollars every Thursday, and Technocracy show that ideas which have no s c i e n t i f i c basis may s t i l l gain a large following. 2. Ripley, Wm. z.., The Races of Europe, London, 1900. p. 103 et seq. Huxley and Haddon give three , — Mediterranean,Nordic, and Eurasiatic . ( Alpine forms only part of Eurasiatic ) Huxley, J u l i a n S., & Haddon, A.C., We Europeans, London, 1925. p. 172 - 179. -16-r a c i a l o r i g i n . The language groups of Europe ane c l a s s i f i e d hy Fleure 1. into four main categories,-- the C e l t i c , Romance, Teutonic, and Slavonic fam i l i e s , t o which may be added a f i f t h which oame by way of A s i a t i c migrations into Finland, Esthonia, Lapland, and Hungary. To divide Europe into p o l i t i c a l regions i n accordance with these large language groups would be impossible since the languages formed from these groups have intermarried so extensively that only an expert can discover the roots. Moreover they merge to such an extent that no l i n e s of demarcation are apparent. A number of well established languages have grown from these parent stocks. It remains to be seen how f a r present p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r s coincide with these ethnic or language f r o n t i e r s and how they may be modified to avoid c o n f l i c t . Spain and Portugal. Colonized frequently from A f r i c a and Europe a l i k e , Spanish culture has been affected by a varied succession of p e o p l e s . I n very early times P a l e o l i t h i c immigrants from A f r i c a brought Caspian, and l a t e r , Mesolithic culture. Neolithic invaders from the Eastern Mediterranean brought Megolithic culture. In the si x t h century, B.C. came the Celts from the North.In the fourth century the Gauls forced the Iberians from the south of Prance into Spain. They 1. Pleure, H.J., The peoples of Europe.London,1925.p.16 et seq. -17-defeated the Celts and became the Geltiberians. In t h i s century too came the Alans , the Sueves, the Vandals, and a l i t t l e l a t e r , the Romanized Visigoths.The l a t t e r soon mastered the Peninsula, which probably accounts for the fact that the three main languages are founded upon the L a t i n . In the Middle Ages came the Moors and the Saracens. Add to t h i s a large Jewish migration and Negro i n f i l t r a t i o n s through slavery, and we have the main ingredients which make up the people of the Peninsula . 1. Although the three main languages, - - Portuguese, C a s t i l l i a n , and Catalan, are Romance languages, a d i s t i n c t ethnic group, the Basques, s t i l l exists on both sides of the Franco-Spanish border. Although t h e i r t o t a l number hardly exceeds h a l f a m i l l i o n , they probably r e t a i n a language which was at one time quite wide-spread i n Europe . In spite of these successive impacts of peoples upon the Peninsula, Ripley contends that, exclusive of the Basques, the Iberian Peninsula i s i n the main r a c i a l l y homogeneous, more so i n fact than any other equally large area i n Europe . 2. 1. Huxley and Haddon, Op, c i t . , p. 205 et seq. 2. Ripley , op. c i t . , p. 17. ^18-A study of the language map of Spain and Portugal reveals that the language borders are reasonably close to the p o l i t i c a l . The Portuguese language f r o n t i e r extends northward to take i n the square portion north of Portugal which i s p o l i t i c a l l y Spanish. The Basque and Catalan language boundaries overlap the Franco-Spanish p o l i t i c a l borders to the north-east and south-east respectively.Within the Spanish nation i t s e l f , a l l four languages exist side by side without apparently meancing the unity of the state . 1. Here then, i n the most homogeneous group i n Europe , p o l i t i c a l boundaries while reasonably close are s t i l l f a r from being consistent with ethnographical or language f r o n t i e r s . Should the occasion a r i s e the boundary between Spain and Portugal might be drawn along the ethnographical f r o n t i e r by extending the eastern boundary to the coast. This,however, would c o n f l i c t with the geographical f r o n t i e r 1. A national Catalonian movement occurred i n the l a s t century. (But ) " The Catalonian movement is not r e a l l y one for separation, even i f i t i s sometimes c a l l e d so; the i n d u s t r i a l development there depends too c l o s e l y on the Spanish hinterland to make obsolute independence desirable. But the energetic, progressive Catalonian -people hate the autocratic S p i r i t of C a s t i l e and f e e l that they are making a disproportionately large con-t r i b u t i o n Of taxes without getting much i n return. . " Quoted from Van Valkenburg, Samuel, & Huntington, Ellsworth, Europe , jfew York, 1935 . p. 396. See also Appendix A. - .19 -Franoe 1. The population of France^ i s the most heterogeneous to be found i n Europe, It comprises a l l three ethnic types, Teutonic, Alpine, and Nordic ( most countries are content with two ) and a goodly l i v i n g representation of a pr e h i s t o r i c race which has disappeared almost everywhere else i n Europe . 2 . This i s probably because France, to the west of Europe, and separated from Spain by the Pyrenees, was the l a s t resort for the westward driven peoples of the old world. In spite of t h i s Prance has become probably the most stable of a l l continental European countries. We said before that language was more important than r a c i a l o r i g i n i n determining group con-sciousness. France has developed a national language. With the exception of the C e l t i c speech of Brittany, and the Basque speech, t h i s national language i s spoken through-out the whole of France, Yet t h i s main language group i s not i n many points consistent with the p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r s . There i s no language f r o n t i e r between Prance and Belgium; the Basques , on the boundary between France and Spain, 1. In the case of Spain, though b r i e f l y stated, a rather complete ethnic history-was given. In t h i s and the following discussions t h i s w i l l not be done,but only those facts of major importance w i l l be chosen.This does not deny the importance of the ethnic h i s t o r y , but avoids needless repBtition since a l l European countries have had similar ethnic h i s t o r i e s . • • • • • 2. Ripley, Op. C i t . , p. 131. -2 CO-st i l l r e t a i n t h e i r ancient tongue, and the l i n e of de-marcation between French and German i n Alsace-Lorraine i s impossible to draw on the basis of language,French and German being so intermingled as to render a re a l boundary impossible. Apart from a purely language consideration, the ethnographical boundary i s i n many cases conspicuously absent. Ripley points out that " the northwestern t h i r d of Franoe and h a l f of Belgium are more Teutonic than the south of Germany", and that the " current of migration between France and Germany sets strongly to the south as i t has ever done i n v i r t u e of economic laws deeper than national prejudice or h o s t i l e l e g i s l a t i o n " • 1. It would therefore appear that the language or ethnic boundaries are not consistent with the present p o l i t i c a l f r o n t i e r s , and that i t would be very d i f f i c u l t , and perhaps u t t e r l y impossible , to draw such a f r o n t i e r without any points of c o n f l i c t . Germany. In spite of the Aryan claims of the present leaders i n Germany, the facts of the case would seem to be quite to the contrary. To quote Fleure — " Intermixture between Nordic and Alpine stocks . has spread the dominant Broad-headedness of the Alpine ever most of what i s now Germany, but i t i s often combined with characters derived from the Nordic side 1. Ripley, op. c i t . , p. 156. -21-" This spread of broad-headedness may be thought . of alongside of the spread of modified High German and of the Spread of southern r u l e r s l i k e the Hohenzollern northwards, and i t w i l l then be seen how i n many ways the south has permeated the north i n more modern as well as more remote times 1. Ripley too i s quite d e f i n i t e on t h i s point --" B r i e f l y stated the s i t u a t i o n i s t h i s :North-- western Germany — Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Westphalia — i s d i s t i n c t l y a l l i e d to the physical type of the Swedes,Nor-wegians, and Danes, A l l the remainder of the Empire -- no, not even excluding Prussia, east of the Elbe — i s l e s s Teutonic i n type; u n t i l f i n a l l y i n the e s s e n t i a l l y Alpine broad-headed populations of Baden Wurtemberg, and Bavaria i n the south the Teutonic race passes from view." 2. A glance at the map i s a l l that i s needed to see how t h i s statement a f f e c t s the Nordic theory as i t applies to Germany.Moreover the recent expansion of the country makes the s c i e n t i f i c acceptance of the German claims a l l the more untenable. To quote further from Ripley — " The only difference,then, between Germany and - Prance i n respect of race i s that the northern country has a l i t t l e more Teutonic blood i n i t . As f o r that portion of the Empire which was two generations ago p o l i t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from Prussia, the South German Sonfederation, i t i s i n no wise - r a c i a l l y distinguishable from central Prance. Thus has p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y preverted ethnology; and .notwithstanding, each nation i s probably the better for the blend, however loath i t may be to acknowledge i t ." 3. 1. Pleure, op. c i t . p. 42. 2. Ripley , op. c i t . , p. 214. • • • 3. i b i d . , p. 214. - -22 -In the matter oi languages too, i t would be very d i f f i c u l t to find any f r o n t i e r s , since on a l l sides, and incorporated within the state are peoples of d i s t i n c t languages. To the west l i e Belgium and Holland with languages akin to Germany, but giving plaoe to French i n the part of Belgium approximate to France. South of these l i e s Alsace-Lorraine with i t s mixture of French and German speaking peoples. To the east are the Poles who speak a Slavic language, and now has been added the Russian. To the east and south are many Slav groups with d i s t i n c t l y Slavic tongues, the Slovaks, Czechs, Wends, Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, and Bulgarians. Due to the economic interdependence of t h i s central European region there exists no c l e a r l y defined l i n e s of demarcation between these language groups. It i s clear, then, that to make any f r o n t i e r of Germany which would be drawn on a language or ethnographical basis would be an utter i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Italy.. Ethnographically I t a l y i s l e s s homogeneous than Spain. It i s l a r g e l y ,however, a mixture of the Alpine and Med-iterranean types. Although Teutonic invaders throughout the h i s t o r i c period , ( the Cimbri, Goths, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Saxons, and Lombards ) came over the Alps into the r i c h v a l l e y of the ]?o, they probably did not come i n large numbers. The Alps have acted as an e f f e c t i v e -23-b a r r i e r to mass Nordic invasion. What Teutonic elements entered I t a l y have l a r g e l y disappeared i n the present population,although traces are s t i l l to be found i n the north . From the point of view of language, I t a l y does not present a very serious problem, except i n c e r t a i n parts of the T y r o l . That I t a l y and Germany both recognize the ethnographical c o n f l i c t , or p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t , can be seen from the recent plan for the r e p a t r i a t i o n i n Germany of the German inhabitants of the I t a l i a n T y r o l . The problem of languages as i t relates to I t a l y , however, i s more apparent outside the European continent, but nevertheless s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t i n g the European problem. This i s the presence i n Tunis of a large number of I t a l i a n s . Because of the increasing number of I t a l i a n s i n t h i s French colony there i s a constantly recurring threat on the part of I t a l y to seize the colony from France. In whatever way the problem i s s e t t l e d , under the present concept of state sovereignty no language boundary seems possible. Poland. One has only to study the effects of h i s t o r i c times on Poland to r e a l i z e the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of establishing ethnog-raphic boundaries. Although the language of the Poles i s akin to the Russians, t h e i r c i v i l i z a t i o n and r e l i g i o n i s founded upon the L a t i n West rather than upon Byzantium. -24-The p a r t i t i o n of Poland i n the 18th Century created a con-d i t i o n which made the formation of ethnographical boundaries quite impossible. In fact there i s more difference ethnog-r a p h i c a l l y between town and country than exists between dif f e r e n t parts of the state. " West Poland has P o l i s h peasants and Jews and Germans i n the towns, and u n t i l 1914 many German landowners. Farther east P o l i s h land-owners and peasants have between them townsfolk s t i l l l a r g e l y Jew or German.Parther east s t i l l the peasants are Lithuanian or White Russian or Rutherian according to d i s t r i c t . . . One need but think of the misunderstandings these complexities of speech and claim involve to see how hard i t is to secure unity" • 1. If ethnographical or language f r o n t i e r s are to be taken into consideration i n the f i x i n g of boundaries, i t i s hard to see how any stable f r o n t i e r s could be created for the Po l i s h State. Indeed , p r a c t i c a l l y the whole boundary i s a r t i f i c i a l and bears no r e l a t i o n to language or ethnography . The border between Poland and Russia i s purely a r b i t r a r y , cutting through t e r r i t o r y e t h n i c a l l y Russian. Further south, the Poles form a minority i n an inextrdcable mixture of races, of which White Russians and Ukranians form the majority .Only i n the South do the Poles l i v e i n large numbers near the f r o n t i e r , and even here they mingle with a Ruthemian majority. In the west and south no l i n e of d i v i s i o n exists. Germans and Poles ( e s p e c i a l l y the Jewish elements of both nations) are so 1. Pleure, op. c i t . , p. 65. -25-intermingled as to make an ethnical d i v i s i o n impossible. • E s p e c i a l l y i s t h i s so i n Upper S i l e s i a . 1. The presence of East Prussia as an a l i e n island within the P o l i s h State adds, perhaps, the f i n a l touch to a national boundary i n which i t would be d i f f i c u l t to create a more ethnic disorder. The emotional and e n t i r e l y i r r a t i o n a l character of' nationalism i s nowhere better shown than i n the r e -surrection of the P o l i s h State. Every attempt at destroying P o l i s h national f e e l i n g by both Russia and Germany not only f a i l e d but caused the f i r e s of that nationalism to burn more f i e r c e l y . Yet when Poland was resurrected after war and revolution the new state was not s a t i s f i e d with a t e r r i t o r y e t h n i c a l l y P o l i s h but i n s i s t e d upon her h i s t o r i c a l f r o n t i e r s . With -the aid of Prance she drove back Russians and established a boundary which greatly aggravated an already d i f f i c u l t minority problem. There has been constant trouble since 1918 by the attempt of the strongly n a t i o n a l i s t Poles to impose a P o l i s h culture and outlook upon a l l the 1. Cole , G. D. H. and Margaret, The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's Review of Europe To-day., London., Victor Gollancz Ltd., 193S. p. 164 et seq. -26-minorities within the state . 1. The fact that t h i s p o l i c y has been so f u t i l e when used against the Poles them-selves seems to have been e n t i r e l y Ignored. The national s p i r i t which led to the recreation of the state seems to have gone a long way towards i t s destruction. Whether stable bound-ari e s could have been found for the state seems doubtful.Had national f e e l i n g been tempered with s u f f i c i e n t reasons to r e s i s t the desire for t e r r i t o r i a l control so far beyond that warranted by purely ethnic considerations a greater national s o l i d a r i t y would have resulted. To f i x the boundaries of such a state upon ethnic l i n e s .however, would s t i l l be very d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. Unless the exclusive ambitions of m i l i t a n t nationalism can be restrained or co-erced by some form of international control, the r e a l i z a t i o n of Paderewski's dream of a permanent P o l i s h State i s as remote as the mile- * nnium . 2. 1. Cole, Op. G i t . , p. 166. • • • 2. Even i f the defeat of Germany should lead to another re-v i v a l of the P o l i s h State i t i s hardly probable that Russia would r e l i n q u i s h the t e r r i t o r y she has occupied. The new state would be very much smaller than that f o r -med a f t e r the World War. Given the same conditions as now exist i n Europe between national states, such a state would find i t d i f f i c u l t to survive.In any case i t could survive only so long as i t was convenient for c e r t a i n stronger powers to guarantee i t s independence. . As a buffer state between Germany and Russia i t would be the f i r s t state to lose i t s independence should war break out between those two countries. The solution of the P o l i s h question i s not the re-establishment of an independent Poland but the establishment of a European States System based upon the acceptance of the i n t e r -dependent nature of Europe and a p o l i c y which works for and not against this p r i n c i p l e . -27-Other European States, - - General Conclusions. The treatment of individual states thus far has shown that for the most part no ethnographical f r o n t i e r s can be fixed for them. To discuss i n d i v i d u a l l y the remaining states of Europe would only be adding unnecessary proof for t h i s argument, since the states dealt with are,with the exception of Poland, much more stable and d i f f e r from one another to a much greater degree, than the remaining European states. P a r t i c u l a r l y i s t h i s true of Czechoslovakia, and the Balkan States, These l a t t e r states are i n a sense, the melt-ing pot of Europe i n which the ethnographical and language groups form such a complex maze of n a t i o n a l i t i e s that any effort to f i x boundaries on the p r i n c i p l e of either eth-nography or language would obviously be impossible. We must conclude, then, that on the basis of n a t i o n a l i t y as i t i s now conceived, neither language nor ethnography can be used as a basis upon which stable European f r o n t i e r s can be f i x e d . Before dismissing t h i s phase of our problem, however, and without a n t i c i p a t i n g the argument to any degree more than i s absolutely necessary, a few observations must be made here which r e l a t e d i r e c t l y to the ethnographical and language problem and t h e i r effect upon national f r o n t i e r s . Great B r i t a i n ( without Eire ) i s a case i n point,Here three d i s t i n c t language groups exist within a single nation, the English, the Gaelic Scottish, and the Welsh. Apart -28- . from an occasional national r e v i v a l i n Wales, and l e s s occasionally i n Scotland, there does not appear here to "be any c o n f l i c t s u f f i c i e n t to disturb the national unity of the Island, We must anticipate the argument here to point out that the boundaries between these three peoples, have been made so unimportant as to preclude any p o s s i b i l i t y of serious f r i c t i o n . T h i s i s a very important fact and must be borne i n mind i f the problem i s to be c l e a r l y understood. In the conclusion regarding the ethnographical basis f o r national f r o n t i e r s there was no implication that nationality, could not exist within stable f r o n t i e r s — but only that the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of what may be termed ethnographical f r i c t i o n could not be removed by f i x i n g ethnographical f r o n t i e r s , s i -nce such a solution was impossible. Although the people of Wales have been governed from London by English law for nearly seven hundred years they s t i l l r e t a i n t h e i r own language and t h e i r old customs. This, at f i r s t sight would seem to present a paradox. But upon examination i t w i l l be found that no contradiction exists and that the argument i s only strengthened by t h i s example. The reason that t h i s national group has been able to survive and f l o u r i s h without f r i c t i o n within an almost foreign state is because- the concept of nationalism i s quite d i f f e r e n t here from that of the continent. Were the people of Wales and England, to con-ceive of t h e i r nationalism i n the same way as the people of -29-Erance and Germany there would soon be apparent the need for f i x i n g a stable f r o n t i e r between the two countries, and there would arise national antagonisms which at present have no existence because they have nothing upon which t h e i r existence could be based. In the oase of E i r e , a number of f a c t o r s , ethnic, economic, and c u l t u r a l , have created a growth of national-ism h o s t i l e to Great Britain.Whether the creation of the separate state of E i r e i s a solution of the problem remains to be seen. The economic dependence of the country upon Great B r i t a i n i s i n marked contrast with the national separation. Should.Irish nationalism continue to follow the pattern of that of continental Europe these contrasting interests offer the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of continual c o n f l i c t . The present a c t i v i t i e s of the I r i s h Republican army seem to be following the militant p o l i c y which has so aggravated the European anarchy. The stubborn insistence upon a united Ireland is met by-an equally stubborn resistence by the inhabitants of North Ireland who refuse, to be drawn into a state i n which they w i l l be a minority. The n a t i o n a l i s t i c feelings which are apparent i n the reaction against English i n the effort to make Gaelic the language of the country are i n themselves cause for misgiving by the people of Ulster. At the present time E i r e i s an independent republic. The signing of a t r e a t y between E i r e and Great B r i t a i n i n -30-A p r i l 1938 might be taken as tantamount to acceptance by-Great B r i t a i n of the new con s t i t u t i o n which went into effect i n Deo ember,1937. North Ireland s t i l l remains outside the I r i s h Republic.Whether the r e a l i z a t i o n of the I r i s h dream of independence w i l l serve to abate or to heighten national f e e l i n g remains to be seen. Economically B r i t a i n and E i r e ( e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r ) have much to lose by in t e r n a t i o n a l s t r i f e . N e a r l y 45 percent of Eire's a g r i c u l t u r a l products go to England. What Ireland has gained i n the matter of s a t i s -fying national pride may yet be set against her economic l o s s . The sovereign state of E i r e must now compete as a foreign power for what was formerly hers as an inherent right , namely the economic wealth and prestige of Great B r i t a i n and the B r i t i s h Empire. Whatever may be the outcome of the present re l a t i o n s h i p , there i s l i t t l e doubt that any i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the f e e l i n g of national independence w i l l greatly impede the co-operation so essential to both countries. Since the problem of Ireland goes much beyond E i r e or the B r i t i s h Isles i t may be well here to consider i t s broader aspects. The problem a f f e c t s not one country but the whole world,and e s p e c i a l l y that part of the world which i s British.Moreover, i t bears v i t a l l y upon the whole problem of sovereignty.Especially i s t h i s important i n a post-Wilson world where the idea of self-determination has been so widely accepted. Here theory and practice show the necessity of tempering idealism with r e a l i t y . -31-Howhere does Wilson's idealism c o n f l i c t with r e a l i t y more c l e a r l y than i n t h i s I r i s h problem. Self-determination gives a simple remedy, an independent Ireland. Simple solutions of complex problems are always wrong. I r i s h indepen-dence not only does not solve the problem, but may be the genisis of much wider and more disturbing complexities. I r i s h independence and I r i s h nationalism i f they embody the concept of national sovereignty, create within the B r i t i s h I sles two nations acting independently i n t h e i r exclusive national int erests.The foreign p o l i c i e s of each of these national states w i l l be directed s o l e l y i n the interests of the individual states, with no consideration of the rights or walfare of the other. Great B r i t a i n w i l l , therefore, be c a l l e d upon not only to protect Ireland but to protect herself against Ireland — against Eire alone or E i r e i n a l l i a n c e with one or more foreign powers.The l a t t e r i s not a fantastic consideration. The German I r i s h collaboration of 1916 shows that I r i s h nationalism feels no obligation to preserve the security of Great B r i t a i n , and would s a c r i f i c e that security for what i s considered i t s exclusive national i n t e r e s t s . The present a c t i v i t i e s of the I r i s h Republican army show the same f e e l i n g . That such a c t i v i t i e s are the work of outlawed extremists does not s e r i o u s l y weaken the argument , since there i s no guarantee that such extremists may not at any time be i n control of the sovereign government of E i r e . The p e r i l to Great B r i t a i n i n the existence of a sovereign national state oi Eire i s very r e a l . It has the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the destruction of Great B r i t a i n as a great power,Suoh an event would mean the collapse of an empire of nearly f i v e hundred m i l l i o n people and a l l that such a calamnity may e n t a i l . To suppose that there would not be a mad scramb-l e for the parts of th i s disintegrated empire is the b l i n d -est s t u p i d i t y . And to suppose that such a mad scramble would not create world-wide confusion, only makes that s t u p i d i t y more fla g r a n t . Such a picture i s no ' Spenglerian 1 despair but a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n these pragmatic times. What then becomes of the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination? Have the three m i l l i o n people of Eire the right to determine t h e i r own destiny i f the security of the f i f t y m i l l i o n of the B r i t i s h I s l e s i s thereby threatened ? Have f i f t y m i l l i o n people i n the B r i t i s h Isles the right to permit a course of action which might lead, to the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of an empire of nearly f i v e hundred m i l l i o n people, and the chaos which such a disaster would bring ? Surely there can be only one answer. There i s here a r e a l challenge to the doctrine of national sovereignty. Only to the extent that the sovereig-nty of any group c a r r i e s no threat to the security of society can such sovereignty be deemed a r i g h t . The founders of the American co n s t i t u t i o n have made a great contribution to the science of government by a recognition of the -need for checks and balances i n the sovereign power of the people. -33-Wilson seems to have overlooked the fact that the world outside America was quite as r e a l as America i t s e l f . The p r i n c i p l e s upon which human right s are guaranteed i n America are only maintained by d e f i n i t e checks upon the a c t i v i t i e s of any branch of government. Such checks or. l i m i t a t i o n s are quite as essential i n international as i n national government. There can be no such thing as s e l f -determination i n an inter-dependent world unless d e f i n i t e checks are placed upon such a p o l i c y . Covenants are not enough . An international organization ceases t o be i n t e r -national i f the c r i t e r i o n of p o l i c y is consistence with national p o l i c y . It becomes international only when the c r i t e r i o n is consistenayt fwith international well-being.One must s a c r i f i c e the p r i n c i p l e of inter-dependence or the doctrine of national sovereignty. Here r e a l i t y c o n f l i c t s with theory. The former p r i n c i p l e i s r e a l , the l a t t e r i s do c t r i n a i r e . In a r e a l world, ideals, no matter how well meant, must be tempered with reality.The resistence of Great B r i t a i n to the growth of a sovereign state of Eire must^be regarded as a mere c o n f l i c t between the B r i t i s h and the I r i s h nations. It i s a c o n f l i c t which must be accepted as a universal challenge to the doctrine of state sovereignty . If t h i s challenge i s not accepted the p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of present necessity must be constantly obstructed by the dogmas of p o l i t i c a l theory. Theory i s as essential element of human progress. It should not only . . . . ... -34-explain but should aot as a brake upon too r a d i c a l departure from t r i e d and established practices. But when a theory e n t i r e l y stops the wheels of progress i t i s time to discard i t . The theory must be re-examined, not i n the l i g h t of the conditions under which i t was conceived and nourished, but under the conditions under which i t now finds i t s e l f . The doctrine of national sovereignty while adequate to the needs of the national age i n which i t was conceived finds i t s e l f inadequate to the needs of the international world i n which i t s t i l l t r i e s v a i n l y to function. A sovereign Ireland founded upon nineteenth century theory is^menaoe to twentieth century necessity. 1. Like Great B r i t a i n , Czechoslovakia was a state which comprised many languages and ethnic groups. Yet thi s did not aff e c t i t s function as a nation. It i s very questionable i f the German point of view that Czechoslovakia was an a r t i -f i c i a l state incapable of survival 2 could be substantiated. Without too much pressure from the outside there probably would have been no in t e r n a l problem incapable of solution. That a great deal of inter n a l f r i c t i o n did exist i n the state 1. It w i l l be necessary to further elaborate t h i s question of national sovereignty. It seemed fitting,however to touch upon the subject i n t h i s discussion of Ireland since i t cannot be divorced from the problem of I r i s h nationalism. 2. Speech of Aldolph H i t l e r to the Reichstag, A p r i l 28,1939, published by Muller & Sons, B e r l i n , p. 23-24. -35-there i s l i t t l e doubt. Made up out of the wreck of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the state incorporated within i t s borders peoples of d i f f e r e n t languages and cultures. There was a per-sistent demand for l o c a l autonomy, which was granted to some measure i n 1927. This did not f i n a l l y s e t t l e but did greatly lessen the forces of disruption. 1. The creation of a national state out of divergent elements i s a slow and painf u l process . That Czechoslovakia, surrounded by possible enemies and endangered by internal unrest f a i l e d to establish a r e a l national unity i n l e s s than one generation i s not a very f a i r indictment. The question is,whether the state was destroyed by i t s own i n t e r n a l weakness , or by the force of German arms. Miss Wiskemann, whose opinion seems very f a i r concludes her book as follows;: " In the circumstances of Europe to-day the problem of - the H i s t o r i c Provinces cannot be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y solved. A wise Government can greatly reduce f r i c t i o n , but whatever the Government, f r i c t i o n there w i l l be, so long as a r a o i a l i s t i c nationalism i s regarded as an obsolute standard of good. Some common p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e which different races can respect i s the cement whioh is needed to repair the Czech-German structure. The humanism of Thomas Masaryk might gradually have created the necessary cohesion, and the H i s t o r i c Provinces, by r e c o n c i l i n g German and Slav, might have pointed the way towards a genuine solution of the problem of Central Europe ." 2. 1. Cole , op. c i t . , p. 232. 2. Wiskemann, op. c i t . , p. 283 -36-This conclusion s t r i k e s at the very roots of the prob-lem, " the .circumstances of Europe to-day" , and " r a c i a l i s t i c nationalism as the standard of good." Here these two factors are not separate, but are one and the same thing. Otherwise i t would not be impossible to eliminate the l a t t e r . It i s being done constantly i n Canada and the United States. In Europe ,however, the national f e e l i n g i s not only burning from within f r o n t i e r s , but i s constantly being fed from the outside. This outside interference In. a state so e t h n i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y divided as Czechoslovakia was a very r e a l menace.1 . The fundamental causes of the collapse of the state were inherent i n i t s formation; not because i t was necessarily weak through the incorporation of more than one national 1. The United States could not be considered weak because of inte r n a l f r i c t i o n . Internal f r i c t i o n i s bound to be present to some extent i n any country. In a vigorous nation differences of opinion and of interest show themselves i n a very vigorous manner.Where i n t e r n a l f r i c t i o n ceases such a nation w i l l have l o s t i t s s p i r i t . I t i s to be noted, however, that the United States, even though thousand of miles removed from the European scene does not take the r i s k of outside interference which might aggravate i n -ternal f r i c t i o n and unrest. The recent vote i n Congress to continue the Dies Committee on Un-American A c t i v i t i e s show that, regardless of the exaggerated emphasis upon these a c t i v i t i e s ,there i s a r e a l fear of foreign i n t e r -ference. The Zinovieff l e t t e r of 1924 while i t may not have been the factor which led to the defeat of the labour party,nevertheless did have a very important part i n t h i s defeat, and seriously affected the foreign p o l i c y of the country. group, but because the conditions under,which i t was forced to l i v e were i n i m i c a l to i t s s u r v i v a l . In order .to safeguard the state and the post-war settlement of Europe i t was given a border region of predominantly German population. This was deemed necessary as an economic and strategic protection against Germany. But the very region which was to protect the state was i t s greatest weakness, and was the s t i c k with which i t could be beaten. The Treaty of Versailles.which had sanct-ioned, even i f i t had not created the state, did nothing to remove the national f r i c t i o n which was l a t e r to destroy i t . It does not follow that the boundaries were wrongly drawn or that the exclusion of the predominantly German area would have created a stable national state. The s t a b i l i t y of any Europ-ean state under the concept of m i l i t a n t nationalism does not depend alone upon i n t e r n a l unity —> but upon the outside pressure of other national states. While i t i s believed, r i g h t l y or wrongly, that national survival i s only possible by including the means of that survival within national f r o n t i e r s , there i s bound to be a persistent e f f o r t to expand national boundaries. The equilibrium which preserves the boundaries over any period of time does not depend on e t h i c a l , language, c u l t u r a l , or any other such considerations, but purely upon force. Within any state there are forces which are constantly threatening i t s internal unity . 1. A state i s i n t e r -1. The movement for independence i n Quebec, Social Credit i n -38-n a l l y stable to the extent that i t keeps these disrupting forces i n check. When, however, the enternal forces of d i s -ruption are aggravated from the outside, the resistence of the state to these combined e f f o r t s may become so weak as to break down e n t i r e l y . This i s what happened to Czechoslovakia.German a g i t a t i o n within and without the state weakened, and German arms destroyed i t . The Reich was only able to do so.however, because the conditions making such aggression(by propaganda and by arms) possible were inherent i n the European anarchy. V e r s a i l l e s had recreated Europe,but i t was at bottom the same Europe.The p o l i t i c a l foundation which had collapsed i n 1914 was pieced together using the same material and the same cement to form a di f f e r e n t pattern. Buttressed as the new structure was by the league of Nations i t could not survive. Czechoslovakia did not collapse because i t was impossible for two or more ethnic groups to l i v e within the p o l i t i c a l framework of a single state, but because i t i s impossible f o r ethnic groups to l i v e i n i s o l a t e d sovereign states within an economically interdependent Europe. The collapse of Czechoslovakia was not the collapse of a single state but the f a i l u r e of the whole national states system to s a t i s f y the needs of a region which has grown to such a stature of interdependence that the garments of i t s early formative age are e n t i r e l y unsuited to i t s present needs. Alberta, the movement for separation of Vancouver Island from B r i t i s h Columbia.regardless of t h e i r strength,are forces threatening i n t e r n a l unity. - -39-That ethnical unity i n i t s e l f i s far from providing s t a b i l i t y i n a national state i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the case of Jugoslavia. Except for a r e l a t i v e l y small minority. Jugo-sl a v i a i s preponderantly S l a v i c . This ethnical homogeneity, however, has not provided any r e a l unity of national f e e l i n g or of action • Indeed both f e e l i n g and action have grown more and more away from national s o l i d a r i t y . Ever since the scrapping of the federal p r i n c i p l e by the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1921, there has not been lack of co-operation alone, but 'actual r e b e l l i o n against the government. The Groats have been p a r t i c u l a r l y intransigent. They have elected deputies, but have refused to s i t i n the Belgrade parliament. In 1928 they went so far as to set up a r i v a l parliament at Zagreb . Later i n the same year they were joined by representatives from Dalmatia, and decided to work independently of the Belgrade government and to boycott Serbia. In lovember of the same year the Belgrade government offered to consider changes i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n which would give wide autonomy to Croatia, Dalmatia, and other discontented provinces. But the Croatian leaders refused to deal with the government and declared t h e i r willingness to negotiate only i f approached d i r e c t l y by the king. Under these circumstances the king took drastic measures. He declared that parliament had des-troyed rather than fostered national union. He dissolved parliament and set up a new government i n which he himself had almost complete control. Since that time Jugoslavia has -40-been a royal dictatorship. A semhlence of demooraey i s s t i l l retained. There are two houses of equal power. The king d i r e c t l y appoints half the members of the upper house. In cases of disagreement between the two houses the king decides. The system of electing i s very complicated. Each candidate must be nominated by a c e r t a i n number of votes from each part of the state. This was to avoid the recurrence of regional s t r i f e . It has resulted i n the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of getting a representative parliament . In fact, the only ones who can qualify are those i n favor of the centralized form of govern-ment; the very thing upon which the intransigent states have been unwilling to accept. National unity i s thereby assured, not by popular w i l l , but by the power of the king backed by a very a r t i f i c i a l system of government. 1. In spite of a large measure of ethnical homogeneity, Jugoslavia i s much l e s s united n a t i o n a l l y than was Czech-oslovakia or Poland, each of which has f a l l e n victim to agression. Cultural and r e l i g i o u s groups have been far more uncompromising than r a c i a l groups. The attempted domination of the state by the Serbs, vigorously opposed by'related 1. King Alexander was assassinated at M a r s e i l l e s ,1934. He was succeeded by 11 year old Peter IT • The government was headed by a Council of Regents under.Prince Paul. A p o l i c y of c o n c i l l i a t i o n followed, but the Serbs, Croates and Slavenes s t i l l remain intransigent. -41-Slavic groups, had led to suoh national disunity that the state i s even now being kept irom complete d i s i n t e g r a t i o n by the autocratic power o i the king d i c t a t o r . If one may be permitted to speculate on p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i t might be observed that had Mussolini adopted the H i t l e r technique, the com-bination o i external and internal pressure may well have led to r e s u l t s analogous to those i n Poland and Czechoslovakia, If Jugoslavia becomes involved i n the present c o n f l i c t i t i s hard to see how i t can p o s s i b l y survive under anything l i k e i t s present a r t i f i c i a l government. The national hopes of the Declaration of Corfu have i n no r e a l sense been f u l f i l l e d . Theory and practice have again found themselves far from agreement. The peoples who broke away from the Austro-Hungarian Empire because of national ambitions have demon-strated that n a t i o n a l i t y i s i n i t s e l f by no means adequate as the basis for a stable national state. The greatest danger spots i n Europe are what Van Valkenburg and Huntington c a l l zones of t r a n s i t i o n . 1, These are border regions where two groups, not necessarily di f f e r e n t ethnologically , have not yet become n a t i o n a l l y conscious of t h e i r existence i n the country within whioh they are incorporated; or i n whioh d i f f e r e n t ethnological or language groups have not become s u f f i c i e n t l y fused to avoid c o n f l i c t . In Belgium there i s constant f r i c t i o n 1. Van Valkenburg and Huntington, op. c i t . , p. 186-192. -42-between the French-speaking Walloons, and the Dutch-speaking Flemings. This i s not a serious problem, but the kind of thing which i s often seized upon by a neighboring power as an excuse for i n t e r f e r i n g to save the oppression of a minority by a tyrannical and brutal ma jority.Po'land and. Czechoslovakia offer convincing proof of the menacing , p o t e n t i a l i t y of such a zone of t r a n s i t i o n . In Alasce-Lorraine the population i s l a r g e l y German, but the culture l a r g e l y French. Although Germany has renounced a l l claims to 1. Alsace-Lorraine,this i s merely a verbal announcement which suits the p o l i t i c a l aspirations of the moment. There is no doubt that the s i t u a t i o n has s t i l l the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of ser-ious trouble. The eastern border of Germany was the occasion of the present war. Its solution by the pressure of German and Russian arms may or may not be f i n a l . The Sudetan area of Czechoslovakia has also been a major factor i n the present European unrest, and i t remains to be seen how t h i s problem w i l l f i n a l l y be solved. Given s u f f i c i e n t time these tran-s i t i o n areas might well cease lto be a problem. But under the present concept of, European n a t i o n a l i t y i t does not appear p o l i t i c a l l y expedient n to l e t sleeping dogs l i e " , but rather that they should be aroused i n one or another national i n t e r e s t . That time can solve the problemsis 1. Speech of Adolph H i t l e r , l o c . c i t . , p. 11. -43-apparent i n Switzerland where four d i s t i n c t language groups, Frenoh, German , I t a l i a n and Rumonsh have found a unity which has lasted for over a hundred years. In Canada two d i s t i n c t language^ groups have maintained such a national unity for nearly two hundred years; and i n Great B r i t a i n the same con-d i t i o n has existed for nearly seven hundred years. It begins to be apparent from our study of ethnog-raphical factors that the problem only becomes a source of trouble when stimulated by some other force; that i t i s not a problem i n i t s e l f , but that i t contains fuel for the f i r e s of p o l i t i c a l unrest and national aspirations. While we might i n truth,therefore, c a l l into being ethnographical or l i n g u i s t i c excuses for f r i c t i o n between p o l i t i c a l or national groups, we can not i n truth speak of ethnological or l i n g u i s t i c causes for such f r i c t i o n . Granted s u f f i c i e n t time and an absence of outside interference peoples of diffe r e n t ethnological groups or speaking d i f f e r e n t languages have learned, and can learn, to l i v e with one another without p o l i t i c a l l y insoluble f r i c t i o n within the framework of a single p o l i t i c a l state. The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of f i x i n g ethnographical or language f r o n t i e r s , therefore, does not necessarily present a problem i n i t s e l f , s i n c e the f a i l u r e to solve a problem i n any p a r t i c u l a r way i s r e a l l y a step ahead i n the search for a f i n a l solution . -44-Economic Considerations. While historians d i f f e r i n the degree to whioh they accept the economic factor as a determinant i n the history of mankind, i t would be hard to f i n d any who would not ac-knowledge t h i s factor of very great importance. This present treatment of the European problem does not at t h i s stage require any evaluation of the economic factor as i t relates to any others. Lest the space a l l o t t e d to i t would seem to indicate a prejudice one way or another, i t should be borne i n mind that the present treatment l i m i t s the economic, as well as the other fac/Stors dealt with, to a d e f i n i t e and re-s t r i c t e d consideration. Here we are only concerned with the a p p l i c a t i o n of these forces as they r e l a t e to the f i x i n g of European boundaries. In the following treatment economic considerations w i l l , therefore, of necessity be severely cur t a i l e d . The degree to which each of the factors considered suffers by such a r e s t r i c t i o n i s hardly a measurable quantit But, judging by the amount of material on the economic f i e l d i t would appear that t h i s factor w i l l suffer the most from such r e s t r i c t e d treatment. In order to f i x stable European national boundaries whioh take into consideration the economic factor, i t would seem essential to have a d e f i n i t e understanding as to what constitutes the economic r i g h t s of the national state.Just as the idea of private property has grown to be an accepted . -45-fact i n our c i v i l i z a t i o n , so national property has been accepted , and the nation has assumed the right to exploit and to dispose of the materials within i t s own borders as an inherent and exclusive r i g h t . Within the nation i t s e l f , how-ever, there has emerged an increasing demand for the modi-f i c a t i o n of in d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , and there has been incorporated into the laws of a l l nation states a greater or les s degree of control of the individual owner or exploiter. Indeed, i t i s the increase i n thi s s o c i a l as opposed to ind i v i d u a l r i g h t that i s the most s i g n i f i c a n t factor i n our present c i v i l i z -ation. That t h i s s o c i a l i z a t i o n has taken d i f f e r e n t forms does not deny i t s existence or modify i t s importance. In democratic countries the right of the individual i s pro-tected by constitutions which have established c e r t a i n fun-damental l i b e r t i e s ; but these l i b e r t i e s are only guaranteed by r e s t r i c t i n g the rights of c e r t a i n individuals or groups of individuals i n the i r e x p l o i t a t i o n of the great masses of the people • In other words, a l l the people who make up the state are r e s t r i c t e d i n t h e i r r i g h t s to l i v i n g within the law — the law being more and more the w i l l of the majority, and l e s s and less the imposition of powerful individuals or groups. In t o t a l i t a r i a n states,much as we may disagree with the method, the assumption on the part of the dictator i s that he speaks and acts for the whole people. Indeed, .the f i r s t c r i t i c i s m directed against dictatorship by the exponents of democracy i s that the individual has been so interwoven into the pattern of the state that he almost e n t i r e l y loses his i d e n t i t y as an i n d i v i d u a l . In both democraoies and d i c t -atorships there i s a growing, tendency to l i m i t the right s of the in d i v i d u a l to those a c t i v i t i e s which are not incon-sistent with the welfare of the state as a whole. Ownership, therefore, i s no longer absolute and unrestricted. An i n -d i v i d u a l may own an automobile or a coal mine, but his use of either i s li m i t e d and controlled by the state. Moreover where the state i s threatened, i t has established the right not only to further r e s t r i c t i o n , but even to outright confiscation i n the interests of the whole people. Thus there has developed a conception of private property within the state which-re-cognizes not only the right of the i n d i v i d u a l , but the right of the whole people. In the matter of national rights, however, t h i s idea has not had the same recognition. Although the idea has been recognized by many as applicable 'to the sphere of international as well as to national affairs,:there has, as yet, been no ef f e c t i v e way of modifying the exclusive rights of a nation to exploit i t s own national resources for i t s own benefit regardless of welfare of a l l mankind. Attempts have been made i n the international f i e l d by bodies suoh as the league of Nations, and the International labour' Organization to make peaceful commerce a medium for the necessary exchange of the world's goods; but these attempts have not i n any way r e a l l y affected the right of the nation state to exploit i t s -47-own wealth, for i t s exclusive benefit. U n t i l suoh time, therefore, as t h i s exclusive national right i s e f f e c t i v e l y challenged, we must assume that the economic right of the national state ±& an exclusive right to the materials within i t s f r o n t i e r s . This r i g h t , which under the present concept of nationalism i s claimed by a l l nations, necessar-i l y establishes the c o r o l l a r y — that no nation has any right to the materials which l i e within the f r o n t i e r s of any other nation. In t h i s respect nations have not been at a l l oonsistent. While accepting t h e i r right to the materials within t h e i r own borders as inherent and God-given they have been un-w i l l i n g to accept the c o r o l l a r y , and have assumed that the need for j u s t i f i e d the rights to the materials within the borders of other countries. This inconsistency has been disguised by a demand for the t e r r i t o r y i t s e l f rather than for the raw materials i t contains; and i s usually excused by such phases as " the need for proper l i v i n g space", " the achievement of our national destiny ", and other slogans. Nations assert t h e i r r i g h t s as an exclusive problem without any regard for the r i g h t s of others. The mere assertion of a right on the part of a state, does not however, establish i t as a p r i n c i p l e . In the present as i n the past, an assertion of a right backed by s u f f i c i e n t -force to establish or maintain i t has been the formula -48-which has determined t h i s r i g h t . Any.principle established by force, must,of oourse, be maintained by force,and can be changed by force. As such i t vi o l a t e s the whole idea of sta b i l i t y , S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n as a p r i n c i p l e for boundary demarcation has at least the value of being definable. What might be c a l l e d economic right as such a principle,however, has no such advantage. Goal, iron,and other natural resources have no ethnic or national consciousness i n them-selves, and the right to these -r esourc es, i f there be such, i s merely one of geography.This right has been maintained by the old idea that "possession i s nine points of the law" with the further provision that the owning group had to maintain that possession by an armed strength s u f f i c i e n t to deter or defeat any other group which sought to establish i t s ownership.Thus the i r o n f i e l d s of Alsace-Lorraine have been the property of Germany or of France whenever either of these countries was i n a m i l i t a r i l y predominant po s i t i o n over the other. Each country was able to establish i t s economic necessity and i t s national right to t h i s region at such times as i t was i n a r e l a t i v e l y strong po s i t i o n . As i t stands to-day,France has established i t s economic right to Alsace-Lorraine while Germany retains the coal f i e l d s of the Saar and the Ruhr. France ,therefore, has an abundance of iron, but suffers from an i n s u f f i c i e n c y of coal; Germany has an abundance of coal, but suffers from an i n s u f f i c i e n c y of i r o n . If national ownership i s an -49-essential factor, then an exchange of some of the i r o n land of France for some of the coal land of Germany might create a condition of balance between coal and iron i n both France 1. and Germany.Such a boundary,however, would probably be impossible without destroying the ethnic factor which at the present i s reasonably quiescent. Moreover, the state of mind necessary for such a solution would render t h i s s o l u t i o n superfluous, since under such a state of mind the, coal and iron would be available to both countries regard-less of national f r o n t i e r s . Their national importance i n present-day Europe i s l a r g e l y that of m i l i t a r y necessity. In times of c o n f l i c t France, by retaining the i r o n f i e l d s creates an i n d u s t r i a l weakness i n a p o t e n t i a l enemy,Germany. Germany by possession of the Saar and the Ruhr,creates an i n d u s t r i a l weakness i n France. This i s considered by both countries as a m i l i t a r y necessity; and i t probably i s under the present exclusive nationalism prevalent i n Europe. Thus, *" From a purely economic point of view there i s here no f r o n t i e r , and any p o l i t i c a l l i n e which separates the coal of the Ruhr from the iron of Lorraine runs against overpowering economic forces." Raskins, Charles , H., " The Franco German Fron t i e r s " , Foreign A f f a i r s , Vol. 3, P. 197- 210. This essay also points out that similar d i f f i c u l t i e s are apparent i n the matters of race, language, and culture. -50--i n order to check the m i l i t a r y growth on either side of a national f r o n t i e r , two nations, both of which oould be i n d u s t r i a l l y strong,strangle one another i n the name of national interest -• 1. The same problem occurred i n drawing the boundaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia. As far as possible ethnic, geographical, and economic factors were taken into con-sideration. But they could not i n any case be determined i n one sense without s a c r i f i c e s i n others. It i s quite natural, too, that where c o n f l i c t i n g claims were made by the v i c t o r s and the vanquished the former would l i k e l y p r e v a i l . In t h i s sense, the new states of Poland, Czechoslo-vakia, Yugoslavia, and the Ba l t i c were not the result of a peace- conference butthe result of a war.The f r o n t i e r s were,therefore, dictated by force. Just so long as the vic t o r i o u s powers remained untied and strong, they were able to keep the vanquished poor and subdued.The boundaries had to be maintained by force of arms, or by the threat of armed intervention should the defeated states attempt to revise these established f r o n t i e r s . Thus what appeared to be a solution of the European problem was merely the 1. Large c a p i t a l i s t t r u s t s and c a r t e l s are very often international i n t h e i r control and overide national boundaries.Their activity,however, i s greatly l i m i t e d i n time of war. -51-oreation of other problems as great, i f not greater, than the ones supposedly s e t t l e d . To Poland and Czechoslavkia went much of the i n d u s t r i a l land of the former German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Germany was purposely made weak as a m i l i t a r y precaution and Austria was impoverished. 1. The experts had set t l e d the f r o n t i e r s , but they had not fixed them. They remained only so long as they could be maintained by force, and they were broken as soon as the opposing forces were strong enough to destroy them.Again the f r o n t i e r s are changed, but they are not fixed. Whereas i n 1918 the Czechs and Slovaks founded a nation on the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination and incorporated into the state s u f f i c i e n t iron and ooal to make the country s e l f -s u f f i c i e n t i n these respects as a national necessity, -i n 1938 Germany destroyed the Czech nation on p r e c i s e l y the same grounds. Whereas i n 1918 • i t was essential geog-r a p h i c a l l y . and economically to Czechoslovakia to incorporate 1 the Sudetanland into the new Republic, i t was essential i n 1938 for the same reason to incorporate t h i s region within the German Reich • 2. The same applies to Poland, to 1. It would serve no useful purpose i n t h i s essay to dwell upon the i n j u s t i c e s of V e r s a i l l e s . That there were grave i n j u s t i c e s committed goes without saying,but these i n -justices are not p e c u l i a r to any nation and arise out of the general European Anarchy. A very good account of the Economic i n j u s t i c e s i s given i n William Orton rs Twenty Years' Armistice, E'arrar & Rinehart, U.Y..1938. 2. Note also the recent seizure of t e r r i t o r y by Russia i n the Karelian Isthmus. -52-to Austra, to the B a l t i c States. The economic necessity oi any national state i s not peculiar to that state. A l l the states want the resources which are available i n Europe and outside Europe. Each s t r i v e s to be n a t i o n a l l y , i n d u s t r i a -l l y , and c u l t u r a l l y dominant within an expanding o r b i t . To do so each must extend i t s control over as large a i i e l d oi raw materials and natural resources as possible. For a limited time nations have l i v e d within d e i i n i t e f r o n t i e r s , but increases i n population, changes i n world trade, i n -d u s t r i a l development, and the constant changes occurring i n a l l parts o i the world at length create a s i t u a t i o n where national needs are changed. A g r i c u l t u r a l states have a desire for s e l f - s u i i i c i e n c y based upon manufacturing. Manufactur-ing states f e e l the need for a g r i c u l t u r a l areas to feed t h e i r growing population. Under conditions where war, economic or m i l i t a r y , may s e r i o u s l y l i m i t supplies, each country desires s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . From the point of view of economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , nature has been very f i c k l e i n bestowing her favours. Thus, I t a l y , t e r r i t o r i a l l y and e t h n i c a l l y compact has suffered greatly from the lack of nearly a l l the raw materials necessary to a highly developed national l i f e independent of the rest of Europe.While p o l i t i c a l l y independent and economically secure under conditions of ready access by trade to the raw materials of other countries, she f e e l s the danger of economic starvation i f t h i s access i s closed by war or by excessive trade b a r r i e r s . To give to I t a l y the raw materials she requires by the extension of her national boundaries, i s , of course, impossible unless that extent ion--i s very great indeed. Moreover, any such extention would be bound to add further to the European anarchy because of the antagonism of the peoples involved,and the change i n the m i l i t a r y balance thus effected. It i s paradoxical that I t a l y which suffers most from the lack of raw material,and has most to lose by national i n s u l a t i o n i s at the present time the country which i s f o s t e r i n g t h i s economic i s o l a t i o n as much as, i f not more than, any other European country. The country which has the most to gain by f r i e n d l y and fee intercourse with the wealthy countries of Europe seems to be one of the most ardent and persistent foes of internat-i o n a l co-operation. The solution of European boundaries i f they are to be based on economic necessity would be one that gave to each nation economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y • Each group could then l i v e within i t s own borders and need have no cause to envy or fear i t s neighbor. There need then be few int e r n a t i o n a l con-ventions, since eaoh nation would be e n t i r e l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Europe would resolve i t s e l f into self-contained and. r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d communities,and the constant fear of war f o r econ-omic power would be gone. Such a solution of course i s impossible , and as we s h a l l see. l a t e r , e n t i r e l y undesirable. -54-A glanoe at the economic map of Europe shows that any-equitable d i v i s i o n of the raw materials of the continent i s quite impossible i f such a d i v i s i o n i s to be made and maintained by the drawing of national f r o n t i e r s to conform to the economic necessity of each nation. Thus stable f r o n t i e r s can i n no way be drawn upon purely economic l i n e s . This does not render the problem any more insoluble, but rather indicates that the .basis of s o l u t i o n i s at fault and that some other basis i s necessary. Summary and Conclusion. It i s apparent now that Geographical, Ethnographical, and Economic factors, a l l of which have contributed to the formation of European f r o n t i e r s , are by no means s u f f i c i e n t -l y clear-cut to form stable boundaries between national states, and that while a l l these factors are considered i n the drawing of boundaries they are usually so much i n c o n f l i c t with one another that the boundaries which are fixed for any period of time are necessarily a r t i f i c i a l . There i s no p r i n c i p l e upon which other than a r t i f i c i a l boundaries can be drawn, although each of the factors considered i n t h i s chapter have a bearing upon where t h i s a r t i f i c i a l boundary s h a l l be drawn.Since none of these factors is very clear-cut i n most cases, and since there i s never any absolute agreement i n cases of dispute, any boundary i s a compromise and i s accepted only for a l i m i t e d period of time. In a dynamic c i v i l i z a t i o n such as exists i n -55- • Europe, i t i s natural that where so much attention i s paid to the necessity of national- power and prestige constant changes should occur i n the interests of these national aspirations. Boundaries are a f t e r a l l , e s s e n t i a l l y b a r r i e r s . 1. The more stable they become, the more e f f e c t i v e they are l i k e l y to become i n the i s o l a t i o n of one national group from another. I f each nation could become economically s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t national introversion must increase. In a world which has only reached i t s present high stage of development by the sucoesive breaking - up of man's in t r o v e r s i b l e tendencies from the family , £ . to the clan, to the t r i b e , to the nation — i t would appear that any solution which would erect permanent barriers to such an expanding, process would necessarily destroy the dynamic nature of present c i v i l i z a t i o n , and create i n i t s place 1. Holdich, Gel. S i r . Thomas H . P o l i t i c a l Frontiers and Boundary Making, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1916 . p. 46. £. The family s t i l l exists as a very stable unit i n the greater part of the world.But the family has survived as a s o c i a l rather than a p o l i t i c a l unit. Its s o c i a l unity i s based upon a b i o l o g i c a l necessity. In the realm of government.however, while the heads of the ' family s t i l l exercise authority within the family, every member of the family i s c a l l e d upon to obey the laws of the state. -56-a s t a t i c or feudal society. That no real basis for the erection of stable boundaries can be found does not there-fore make the problem of the European anarchy any more complex, but perhaps indicates that any such solution would be contrary to the best interests of Europe and the world. When Newton was forced to solve c e r t a i n problems he found that his mathematics was inadequate. This , however did not prevent him from solving his problems. He merely invented a new mathematics, d i f f e r e n t i a l c a l c u l u s . That the old p o l i t i c a l mathematics of Europe seems inadequate to deal with the complex problems of to-da does not render these problems insoluble. It perhaps means that we must devise a new mathematics to deal with them. CHAPTER 11 WAR, PEACE TREATIES, AND THE LEAGUE. CHAPTER 11 War,Peace Treaties,and the League. Since the maintenance oi stable, European boundaries i s seen to be inconsistent with the iaotors upon which such boundaries are drawn, i t i s necessary now to examine the means by which Europe has attempted to preserve these bound-aries by means oi international oo-operation. That t h i s method has Tailed may be due to either one of two main reasons. Either the nations of Europe have had no r e a l w i l l for such co-operation, or there exists i n the ef f o r t s to-ward such co-operation c e r t a i n fundamental contradictions which make i t i n e f f e c t i v e . If the f i r s t of these i s accepted, as has been done by many,then the problem must remain i n -soluble, and the European anarchy must be accepted as a permanent i n e v i t a b i l i t y , and to " death and taxes " there must be added "war" as one of the things which cannot be avoided. Por t h i s assumption the pessimist has much of the his t o r y of Europe and the world upon which to build a very powerful case. But no matter how much of such material he i s able to produce, his argument i s s t i l l based upon a -58-s u p e r f i c i a l examination of the clot h of history.Fundamen-t a l l y , man, l i k e every other animal behaves i n a manner which i s conducive to his s u r v i v a l . As a gregarious animal, t h i s i n s t i n c t for s u r v i v a l tends to transcend that of the in d i v i d u a l and to emerge as the motivation of the group. In an expanding society t h i s group motivation, i n spite of frequent clashes of in t e r e s t , has a p a r a l l e l expansion. Thus with the development of the national state the whole state i n i t s e f f o r t s for survival transcends that of the ind i v i d u a l members. But since no h i s t o r i c a l -process comes to any f i n a l i t y , i t seems i r r a t i o n a l to believe that the national state i s the culminating point i n the expansion of group consciousness. The family gave place to the t r i b e as the s o c i a l group only after many c o n f l i c t s between families, and only when the s u r v i v a l of the family as an exclusive unit had become impossible. When that time came, pa t r i a r c h a l sovereignty had to give place to t r i b a l soverei-gnty, and the w i l l of the family became subordinate to the w i l l of the t r i b a l assembly. The co-operative a c t i v i t i e s of man are not due to any abstract teachings or philosoph-i c a l leadership, but are a fundamental necessity to his surv i v a l as a r a t i o n a l being. A r a t i o n a l being can not be long content with a plane of l i f e which i s without improve-ment • Survival for man, therefore, does not mean mere existence, but existence upon an ever r i s i n g standard. This -59-existence i s only possible by an expanding area o i i n t e r -dependent a c t i v i t y , or by technical improvements i n the processes o i production ( In regard to the l a t t e r , the need i o r markets and for raw materials creates the necessary condition i o r the former.) Thus when any interdependent unit becomes too small to survive i n t h i s expanding sense, i t gives place to a larger unit. But since any unit arises out oi the necessity i o r s u r v i v a l , the l o y a l t y to i t i s tenacious, and i t only gives place to the larger a i t e r a long period oi struggle. Thus , though the feudal anarchy of Europe seen i n retrospect was impossible of survival upon a r i s i n g plane of existence , i t was only a f t e r years of feudal s t r i f e that the national state emerged. Like a l l group units, however, the national state builds up within i t s e l f c e r t a i n vested interests which oppose further expansion long a f t e r such expansion i s necessary to human progress. Just as i t was i n the interests of the Feudal barons to preserve intact t h e i r Feudal domains long after the development of inter-feudal commerce, so the manufacturing and commercial i n t e r e s t s , protected by national t a r i f f s and subsidies, find i t i n t h e i r best interest to stimulate and to protect national economy i n a world which retains i t s high standard of human existence only by an international commerce and industry. The p o l i t i c a l ' n a t i o n a l i s t machinery of to-day i s i n direct contradiction -60-to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic structure.There i s probably a very good reason ior t h i s inconsistency. When Mr. E'ord iinds the means oi improving his product and replaces the conventional iour cylinder motor by a V eight engine there i s no e f i o r t on the part oi society to condemn suoh a r a d i c a l departure irom established procedure. But when p o l i t i c a l change i s contemplated there i s always a fear that the new model i s a dangerous experiment, and a tendency to i i g h t i o r the retention oi the old established p r i n c i p l e s . P o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , l i k e wine, mellow with age, and man tends to revere that which has stood the test oi time. In one way t h i s human conservatism i s a very fortunate thing since i t i s the iactor which tends to consolidate and make permanent any gains which society on the whole i s able to wrest irom a r u l i n g class seeking to dominate and control the machinery oi government. Uniortunately,however, this same human con-servatism gives to economic iorces a much greater ireedom of action than i s possessed by p o l i t i c a l iorces,with the r e s u l t that the technological processes oi society are always some-what ahead oi the p o l i t i c a l processes. The p o l i t i c a l struggle i n Great B r i t a i n i n the 19th Gentury was not an i d e a l o g i c a l struggle ior democracy.lt was i n r e a l i t y a struggle on the part of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and traders to bring p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s into conformity with t h e i r economic power. The s i t u a t i o n wherein government was controlled by- a land-owning feudal class which had long since l o s t i t s economic power was int o l e r a b l e to the new holders of economic power, the i n d u s t r i a l and commercial c a p i t a l i s t s . Technologically Feudalism was dead hundreds of years before i t was dead p o l i t i c a l l y . Today we are faced with a p a r a l l e l s i t u a t i o n . Technologically, the national state has been replaced by an int e r n a t i o n a l economy i n an interdependent world; while p o l i t i c a l l y i t s t i l l seeks to dominate. The problem, therefore, i s one of rec o n c i l i n g national interests with human welfare. The attempt by war having f a i l e d , the attempt by international co-operation was made. It too, has,for the moment broken down, and war between the nations makes another attempt to solve the problem. The assumption i n t h i s essay i s that the war i t s e l f w i l l not solve the problem, but that i t may be part of the process which w i l l lead to a re a l solution.While denying, therefore, the pessimistic view that war i s inevitable and that i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation i s f u t i l e , there i s reason to believe that such co-operation as has been attempted does contain c e r t a i n fundamental contradictions which render i t i n e f f e c t i v e . It i s the purpose of t h i s chapter to examine these contradict-ions. Before the matter of international co-operation i s discussed.however, some observations on war as a solution of the international problems must be made. War and Peace Treaties. Mussolini i n his " P o l i t i c a l and Soc i a l Doctrine of Fascism" has t h i s to say of war: " War alone brings up/its -62-highest tension a l l human energy and puts the stamp of n o b i l i t y upon the peoples who have the courage to meet i t . " 1, Much as t h i s doctrine is to be deplored i n an enlightened world, i t does contain a measure of h i s t o r i c -a l truth.-Ruman co-operation over wide areas of the world has resulted from war, and wars, which are i n themselves brutal and ugly, have resulted i n solutions which have been of great benefit to mankind. To state that the same r e s u l t s could have been obtained by other methods i s merely to quibble, for no matter how these benefits might have been achieved, they were,nevertheless, achieved by war. In t h i s sense,such wars as have unified Britain,Prance and Germany; such as have established C h r i s t i a n i t y over barbarism; and those which have taken enlightenment to the darker places of the earth, must be regarded,though brutal i n t h e i r method, as e s s e n t i a l l y good i n t h e i r r e s u l t s . They have i n a broad sense done much to establish a world i n which universal co-operation i s practised, although too l i t t l e , and i n which there has developed a high degree of cosmopolit an idealism. They have brought out and emphasized the high 1. Mussolini, Benito, " The P o l i t i c a l and Social Doctrine of Fascism", P o l i t i c a l Quarterly. July 1933, P. 344-5. -63-courage of man, and h i s willingness to s a o r i f i o e his i n -d i v i d u a l l i f e i n the interests of his group or of a great i d e a l . They have i n the past often solved the problem of f r o n t i e r s , but with the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the grouping of peoples into national states they have tended more to aggravate-than to improve the problem, and to greatly impede the oo-operative efforts toward human well-being. Like a l l the instruments i n the development of human-well-being, that of war i s l i m i t e d , and reaches i t s l i m i t a t i o n i n the attempt,to s e t t l e differences between national states. An instrument which In the past has had a d e f i n i t e value i n the evolution of man's well-being now becomes a d e f i n i t e menace to mankind. It builds up i t s own inherent contradiction and thereby destroys i t s e l f as a useful function. The t r u t h of t h i s w i l l become apparent by a study of the more recent wars and t h e i r consequences. The wars which created such national states as Great B r i t a i n , Prance, Germany and I t a l y , were l a r g e l y b e n e f i c i a l i n t h e i r r e s u l t s . The national state as a large area of co-operative enterprise developed- a c i v i l i z a t i o n far i n advance of that which i t superceded. But the nation state so created developed i t s f e e l i n g of unity and exclusiveness to a point which made the ob l i g a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l to the state f i r s t , l a s t , and absolut e.. -Loyalty "bo the at afro -the obligation, of eveiy member- o-I Lhe aUa-W*-*.. To extend the f r o n t i e r s of the fatherland was of course the duty of a l l -64-i t s c i t i z e n s whenever suoh an opportunity presented i t -s e l f , 1. But i t was even more important that no part of state was to be allowed to f a l l into foreign hands. This f e e l i n g of nationalism became so deeprooted that where boundaries were changed by war the inhabitants of the severed t e r r i t o r y over generations refused to give more than l i p service to t h e i r new masters, and kept a l i v e the hope of some day returning to the fatherland., The sword which had created the nation became the symbol of i t s unity, and any war which sought to destroy the national s p i r i t of a coveted t e r r i t o r y only served to i n t e n s i f y that s p i r i t . Thus war which had created out of smaller units the national state found i t s e l f impotent to extend the state, and although boundaries were changed from time to time the cost of the expansion was far i n excess of i t s worth, for only by the maintenance of armed force could the conquered be held i n submission. The attempt to impose the nationalism of the conqueror upon the conquered f a i l e d u t t e r l y . The Poles remained Poles, the French remained French, and the Germans remained German. The sword could incorporate a new region within the state but i t could i n no r e a l sense make that region a part of the state. War had created the Nation 1. Not always accepted , In England , for example, there has long been a minority which has opposed " i m p e r i a l i s t i c " wars. -65-State and i n ao doing i t had created the weapon which des-troyed i t s further usefulness. War could change the bound-aries of the state, but i t oould no longer insure t h e i r s t a b i l i t y . To preserve intact any gains which had been made and to prepare the way for further conquests which might be contemplated there developed the idea of a l l i a n c e s of powers. Thus to protect the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck b u i l t up a series of al l i a n c e s which for a time rendered France impotent to wage a war of revenge. The a l l i a n c e of one moment was not i n the best interests of the next since under the exclusive concept of national sovereignty there was no common basis upon which any group of powers could' find any permanent p o l i c y . Indeed i f such a p o l i c y could have been found the whole of the hist o r y of modern Europe would have been e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t and nationalism as we know i t to-day would have given place to the super state. The system of a l l i a n c e s broke down because i t was based not upon co-operation but upon fear and suspicion.Just so long as they served the national purpose they survived; so long and no longer. Thus while I t a l y i n 1882 found i t convenient to j o i n an a l l i a n c e with Germany and Austra, she found her national interests best served A i n 1915 by not only deserting t h i s a l l i a n c e , but by a c t u a l l y going to war against her former a l l i e s . This i s only one of the numerous examples which occur i n modern European h i s t o r y . -66-The events of 1939 alone are s u f f i c i e n t to show that national ambitions are so e n t i r e l y s e l f i s h that any a l l i a n c e s or pacts that are made are merely those of convenience for the moment, and i n no way offer any solution to the European anarchy. 1. The conquered state never r e a l l y relinquished i t s claim to severed t e r r i t o r y , and i t s diplomacy was usually directed to the attainment of a new alignment of powers which would make good t h i s claim by a successful war. 2. To prevent such a contingency there was established by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s a new instrument to reduce the danger of war, and to stabalize the f r o n t i e r s of Europe ( This does not preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of change by peaceful means, A r t i c l e 19). The League of Nations was henceforth to be the means of settlement of international disputes, and the means of preserving the boundaries of Europe. The nation state was henceforth to be guaranteed i t s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and 1. It i s too soon as yet to ascertain the r e a l reason for the Russo-German pact. The occupation of part of Poland, and the recent invasion of Finland, however, seems to suggest that purely national motives dominate. £. Germany ( H i t l e r ) has renounced a l l claim to Alsac:e-Lorraine, but i t would be a small matter, to forget such a renunciation were Germany able to defeat France and destroy the Maginot Line. -67-i t s p o l i t i c a l independence by an international organization which was to substitute l a r g e l y for national armies and navies the p r i n c i p l e of o o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y by inte r n a t i o n a l co-operation, and the obligations of a binding covenant. The League of Nations. A s u p e r f i c i a l view of h i s t o r i c a l development leads to a cynical d i s c r e d i t i n g of the League of Nations. That the experiment was l a r g e l y unsuccessful, i n the prevention of war i s , unfortunately, true, but does not lessen i t s value as an attempt to create an instrument for human co-operation. The narrow view of hi s t o r y i s never true. The development of the h i s t o r i c a l process is nothing i f i t i s not a movement towards greater co-operation. Regardless of the number of instances when such co-operative expansion has met with checks and reverses, h i s t o r i c a l development s t i l l obeys t h i s general law. Man does not move forward with an unerring step, but gropes, f a l t e r s , and stumbles. From time to time he may be forced back, but he moves forward r e l e n t l e s s l y . The forces that motivate this progress are defined according to ones p a r t i c u l a r outlook. They may be conceived as s p i r i t u a l , r a t i o n a l , or material. That question may s a f e l y be l e f t to the theologian, metaphysician and the economist. We are here concerned only with the effects of human behavior i n the development of the h i s t o r i c a l process. Gregarious man behaves i n a manner which i s conducive to s o c i a l s u r v i v a l . The con-f l i c t between reason and emotion may delay tmomentarily ' -68-reverse, but oan not stop t h i s trend toward an ever, widen-ing f i e l d of co-operative e f f o r t . Hegel points out that peop-l e s and governments never act upon the p r i n c i p l e s deduced from h i s t o r y because each period i s involved i n i t s own peculiar circumstances, and " exhibits a condition of things so i d i o s y n c r a t i c that i t s conduct must be regulated by circumstances connected with i t s e l f and i t s e l f alone". 1. To meet these new circumstances man must create new i n -struments of government and p o l i c y . As new conditions ari s e the instruments which have given r i s e to them lose t h e i r usefulness and must be discarded.War as instrument of nat-ional p o l i c y , as was pointed out before, has l o s t i t s usefulness and must be replaced by something which w i l l break down the barriers to international co-operation inherent i n the national state. The League was the f i r s t step i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . It arose out of the conditions of the moment as an i n s t i n c t i v e urge to soc i a l s u r v i v i a l . War which at one time was conducive to t h i s s u r v i v a l , had now reached the point where i t threatened to destroy the whole fabri c of society. " The age of competitive armaments and competitive a l l i a n c e s culminated i n the "world war" , a monstrous struggle without i n t r i n s i c purpose, involving nation after nation in a c o n f l i c t whose i n i t i a l issues were obscure to them and irrelevant to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Mankind has never witnessed so tragio a d i s p a r i t y between means and 1. Hegel, G.W.F., Lectures i n the Philosophy of History , George B e l l and Sons, London, 1894. P. 6. -69-" ends. The struggle could not be l o c a l i z e d because - the nations were so interdependent, so bound up with one another. A l l the great nations of the world were embroiled, not because a single issue divided them, but because a single system held them f a s t . Nothing was common save the catas-trophe. In the words of Viscount Grey, 1 i t was a v i c t o r y of war i t s e l f over everybody who took part i n i t The significance of t h i s faot i s simply that war has become an anachronism, an i n -s t i t u t i o n incompatible with the c i v i l i z a b i o n which has overspread the world. It i s of course possible that the technical develop-ment of the art of war, the use of high explosives, poison gases^ and perhaps other yet unknown agencies of destruction,together with the ubiquitous menace of the aeroplane and a i r s h i p , w i l l render warefare so un-c o n t r o l l a b l y disastrous as. f i n a l l y to deter mankind from i t s arbitrament altogether. But whether t h i s may or may not be expected, the development of c i v i l i z a t i o n leads more d i r e c t l y to a l i k e necessity. The establishment of a League of Nations, directed towards the a b o l i t i o n of competitive armaments and the j u d i c i a l s e t t l e -ment of international disputes, i s not so much the i n s t i t u t i o n a l expression of an i d e a l as the belated adjustment of an i n s t i t u t i o n to r e a l i t i e s . To assume the c l o s i n g of the era of national wars i s not an act of u n s c i e n t i f i c utopianism but a reasonable inference from the premise that men i n the long run accommodate t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s to t h e i r n e c e s s i t i e s . No one can t e l l what a future c i v i l i z a t i o n may bring , but i t is permissible to judge what the present c i v i l i z a t i o n requires. How soon and on what terms we accept i t s demands remains s t i l l a matter of f a i t h ." 1. The League of Nations, born i n the aftermath of a great war, f a i l e d i n i t s main purpose; but t h i s does not, 1. Maclver, R.M., The Modern State, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926. P. 247 et. seq. except i n i t s present form, destroy i t . It only makes more apparent the need for such an i n s t i t u t i o n . Human i n -s t i t u t i o n s change and develop slowly. The national state had given much to man. He was not yet ready to s a c r i f i c e his national gains. But his needs were growing beyond national f r o n t i e r s . They s t i l l are. The demand for an i n s t i t u t i o n which w i l l s a t i s f y these needs becomes more and more apparent. That i n s t i t u t i o n w i l l be found. It will^be found because i t i s essential to the h i s t o r i c a l process. The League has sown the seeds of international co-operation i n the f e r t i l e s o i l of human necessity. Why the League f a i l e d i t is now our purpose to examine. As a f i r s t attempt to set up international machinery on a large scale i t was inevitable that the League should suffer from serious defects. That the Covenant of the League was incorporated into the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s was i n i t s e l f a grave error since the e v i l s of the Treaty became the e v i l s of the League. -Had the Treaty been drawn up by mutual con-sideration and consent between v i c t o r s and vanquished t h i s fault would not have occurred. Whether t h i s could have been done at the time i s an academic question which we cannot well answer. We are here only concerned with what did happen. The incorporation of the Covenant into a treaty imposed upon a-conquered people d e f i n i t e l y arraigned the League on the side of the conquerors. It was to preserve the peace, based upon a just settlement of European problems, that the covenant was designed. The union of Treaty and Covenant gave the former a sanc t i t y l a r g e l y unwarranted and estab-lished international j u s t i c e as the prerogative of the vict o r i o u s powers. Had the league been established as an international body working under the p r i n c i p l e s of the Covenant , composed of and-applicable to a l l states, and quite apart from any f i n a l settlement, i t may well have been used i n the calmness which time alone could establish, to remove the i n j u s t i c e s of a peaoe conceived i n fear and born i n hatred and suspicion. The exclusion of Germany, Turkey, and the other ex-enemy states i n the early years of the League was an added example of the biased attitude of the League , and further established i t as an instrument for the maintenance of the sp o i l s of v i c t o r y rather than an instrument for the estab-lishment of international justice and co-operation. Even though the war g u i l t were to be established beyond doubt as f a l l i n g e n t i r e l y upon the Central Powers, such , i n the eyes of Justice, could not exclude them from representation i n an international court. To attempt to achieve i n t e r -national co-operation while excluding the very nations whose co-operation was most essential was obviously doomed to f a i l u r e . The greatest need of the moment, the co-operative reconstruction of Europe was thereby s a c r i f i c e d . In i t s place there occurred a series, of m i l i t a r y and economic clashes between the v i c t o r i o u s powers over the spoils of v i c t o r y . Instead of dealing with the defeated powers i n a joint e f f o r t to promote s t a b i l i t y , Franoe and England found t h e i r national p o l i c i e s d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed. The French desire for a weakened and impoverished Germany clashed v i o l -ently with the B r i t i s h - desire for a reestablished and ec-onomically stable Germany. The Poles and the It a l i a n s were d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r share of the booty and waged minor wars to s a t i s f y t h e i r renewed national aspirations. What was l e f t of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was i n a deplorable condition of poverty. Had the defeated nations whose t e r r i t o r y or whose economic welfare had thus been despoiled been re-presented i n the League ait i t s inception t h e i r pleas would have at least been heard. As i t was, whatever redress the defeated powers could obtain from the international congress at Geneva had to be obtained without benefit of representat-ion or counsel. This was i n dir e c t v i o l a t i o n of the very f i r s t of Wilson's fourteen point program upon which the enemy had every right to f e e l peace was to be negotiated. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, a f t e r which there s h a l l be no private international under- takings of any kind, but- diplomacy s h a l l proceed  always frankly and i n the public view. There could be no such frankness of diplomacy unless a l l parties concerned are given equal opportunity to express t h e i r points of view. In his address at Mount Yernon, July 4, 1918, the following s i g n i f i c a n t passages appear bearing d i r e c t l y upon this point. " The destruction of every -73-a r b i t r a r y power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of i t s single choice disturb the peace of the world;. " " The settlement of every question, whether of t e r r i t o r y , sovereignty, of..... upon the basis of the free accept ance of the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of i t s own exterior interest or mastery." " The consent of a l l nations to be governed i n t h e i r con-duct towards each other by the same p r i n c i p l e s of honor and of respect for the common law of c i v i l i z e d society that govern the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s of a l l modern states i n thei r e l a t i o n s with one another " " What we seek i s the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." 1. The reign of law i s only possible where a l l who are governed the law-abiding and the law-breaking a l i k e , are given the protection which the law affords. Wilson 1s America destroyed i n a large measure what America's Wilson had brought into being. Any world wide organization i s a patent i m p o s s i b i l i t y without the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the United States. This i s not only due to the economic importance/the country i t s e l f but because of 1-. Quoted i n Simonds F. H. & Emeny ,Brooks, The Great Powers i n World P o l i t i c Apendix B American Book Go. H. Y. ,1939 • P ffll the natural leadership which i t enjoys i n the Western Hem-isphere. Just how far the Monroe Doctrine c o n f l i c t s with the general ideals of the Covenant i s a matter for the student of International law to decide. There is l i t t l e doubt however,that such a doctrine makes the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of two America's much less e f f e c t i v e . The growth of the i s o l a t i o n i s t sentiment ( i n no small measure due to the weakness of the league through American non-participation ) has been concomitant with the development of the Pan American.movement. While i n one sense t h i s movement l i m i t s the Monroe Doctrine by substituting c o l l e c t i v e action for United States' domination, i n a broader sence i t strengthens the Doctrine since i t creates i n the Western Hemisphere a union of Nations i n which the United States must always have the greater influence. The following quotation from an American book states t h i s point of view very c l e a r l y . " The essential fact about the American region to-day, - then, i s that, unlike the European and A s i a t i c regions, i t i s confronted by no problem of balance of power from within i t s own area and d i r e c t l y affected by none originating beyond i t s l i m i t s . Only the national p o l i c y of the United States among a l l the nations of both Americas has importance for international r e l a t i o n s , and for the American region the p o l i c i e s of European and A s i a t i c powers are without r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . " 1. The i s o l a t i o n i s t a t titude of the United States i s i n direct contradiction to the supposed realism which characterizes 1. Brooks and Emeny , op. c i t . , p. 462 - 463. - 7 5 - • •Amerioan business and p o l i c y . The high sounding phrases i n whioh the 'American Way 1 i s lauded would seem to indicate that pure A,merica must not be contaminated by impure Europe. Actually, America 'won the war 1 ,was the dominant influence i n bringing about peace, created a League of Nations which depended upon American p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and then r e t i r e d into the c l o i s t e r e d sanctury of i s o l a t i o n , to dwell upon the p u r i t y of the 'American Way ' , and to bewail and c r i t i c i z e the absence of anything good i n the European scene. If we were to reverse the jargon for a moment, and speak 1 American 1 we would probably describe the above as follows'. " The United States won the war, engineered an unsatisfaotory peace, created a League of Nations i n which she. f a i l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e , dumped the whole mess i n the lap of Geneva, and l e f t Europe holding the bag".. National interests were predominant. 1. The absence of Russia from the League created another great weakness :sinc e i t further embittered that country against c a p i t a l i s t Europe. It was quite natural under these circumstances that Russia would use any means available to sow discord among the European States. The emergence of the Soviet State just p r i o r to the establishment of the League created a d i f f i c u l t diplomatic problem. The Russia of the Gzars was an a l l y i n the war against Germany. The repudiation of the Gzarist regime by the Bolsheviks carried with i t a repudiation of the war aims of the A l l i e s . When, 1. Appendix 0. therefore, the Bolshevik Government signed a peaoe with Germany and published the secret t r e a t i e s , the A l l i e s refused to recognize the new regime as the lawful government of Russia and took steps to destroy the revolution. Inter-vention was carried on f o r some years, but t h i s only con-solidated the l o y a l t y of the masses to the new government • Under the leadership of Trotsky the Red Army saved the revolution. But the establishment of the Soviet Government did not bring immediate recognition by the c a p i t a l i s t powers. The l a t t e r refused for some years to have anything to do with the new regime. In fact, they could hardly do so since the Bolsheviks had not only set out to es t a b l i s h a new order i n Russia, but to destroy the c a p i t a l i s t world. With t h i s end i n view there was established i n Moscow i n 1919, the Third International. Many r a d i c a l s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s of other European countries became associated with t h i s body. At the 1920 Congress the International adopted a 21-point program as a condition for membership. These points were d i r e c t l y opposed to the European system of national states, since they sought to destroy the whole bourgeois world and to es t a b l i s h , by f a i r means or f o u l , the world-wide dictat o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t . There existed, therefore, two international organizations -- the League of Nations at Geneva, seeking to e s t a b l i s h international co-operation between national states, and the Third International seeking -77-destruction of the national states and the establishment • of the world-wide p r o l e t a r i a n dictatorship. Between the two there oould be no compromise. Indeed , i t v/as not u n t i l Russian nationalism had somewhat obscured the international p r o l e t a r i a n program that Russia was recognized and brought into the League . 1.- "  By the time Russia entered the League , however, Japan had invaded Manchuria, and was on the way out, H i t l e r had repudiated the disarmament clauses of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty and had also given notice of with-drawal and I t a l y was preparing to embark on an aggressive bring to the League was, therefore, by t h i s time quite inadequate to save the t o t t e r i n g structure. Moreover there s t i l l existed a convenient f r i c t i o n which enabled Russia to pursue two mutually antagonistic p o l i c i e s . The recognized government of Russia, i n order to preserve the peace necessa-r y for i t s security, had found i t necessary to co-operate with the c a p i t a l i s t powers, and with t h i s in view had joined the League. But the Third International, through dominated by Moscow , could claim as an international body that i t had no connection with the Soviet Government.The Soviet therefore could pursue the p o l i c y which best served i t s interests at any p a r t i c u l a r time.Through the League i t could reap whatever benefit might accrue from the system of 1. See Apendix B. Whatever strength Russia oould -78-c'ollective security. Through i t s domination of the Third International i t could s t i l l pursue the p o l i c y of 'Soviet-i z a t i o n * by the spread of propaganda. In 1939 Russia departed e n t i r e l y from the p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l e c t i v e security , and because of the invasion of.Finland was expelled from the league. By t h i s time the world had already witnessed the t h e joining of the Soviet State with/strongest member of the Ant i-Commit ern a l l i a n c e . In spite of the confusion into which the world was thrownby the Russo-German Pact, the issue has not become more complex. Indeed, i t has been greatly c l a r i f i e d . Two very important facts stand out. In the f i r s t place , i t seems that the aims of the Soviet may become imperialist rather than S o c i a l i s t i c . Whatever idealism existed in the S o c i a l i s t Third International have become d e f i n i t e l y sub-ordinate to the national ambitions of the Soviet State. 1. In the second place, i t has been shown quite d e f i n i t e l y that a League of Hational.states cannot function where national aims are given p r i o r i t y over international needs. Where nations of di f f e r e n t ideologies meet to organize i n t e r -national action they can only do so i f they are prepared to make a measure of s a c r i f i c e of national ambition an earnest of the i r r e a l desire for international co-operation. 1. The Soviet State claims that i t i s not at war with Finland but i s r e a l l y f i g h t i n g to save the people from the tyranny of an opressive government.The united re-sistance of the Finnish people i s a r e a l answer to that l i e . -79-Where the ideologies oi nationalism c o n f l i c t with the ideals of international goodwill there can be no such r e a l i t y as a properly functioning League of Nations. The weakness of the.Leaque to which a great deal of attention has been c a l l e d i s what has been termed " the absence of teeth" . This view supposes that the function of Geneva i s to p o l i c e the world and that i t s power to do so i s only possible i f i t i s backed by armed strength. The League has no army, navy , or a i r force. Its power does not extend beyond that which the i n d i v i d u a l states are prepared to give at any p a r t i c u l a r time, and there i s no weapon beyond the imposition of sanctions which i t can use. Even t h i s l a t t e r contribution i s not imperative since there i s no way of compelling League members to use these weapons. 1. The League , therefore, i s made economically and m i l i t a r i l y impotent to deal with serious questions which involve any of the Great Powers. This c r i t i c i s m of the League i s not quite sound. The League was formed at a time when the world was weary of war. It was founded upon the theory that nations could be bound by covenants. As an organization whose primary aim was to prevent war, the a b i l i t y to wage war 1. The Covenant ( A r t i c l e 16) provides for both economic sanctions and m i l i t a r y action. In practice,however, the l a t t e r has never been used, and the former, i n cases where Great Powers are concerned, has never had an a p p l i c a t i o n broad enough to be e f f e c t i v e . -80-was not only unnecessary , but contrary to the s p i r i t of the Covenant. Although the League does not prevent war, i t seeks to explore every p o s s i b i l i t y short of war to s e t t l e disputes, and carried with i t a d e f i n i t e obligation not to resort to arms. Precept by example would be e n t i r e l y lacking i f the League did resort to war. Moreover, an armed league, even though i t did not wage war would d e f i n i t e l y s a c r i f i c e the moral p r i n c i p l e s upon which i t i s founded and give to a l l i t s findings the compulsion of force instead of the obliga t i o n of j u s t i c e . The League, made up as i t was of national states could not make decisions as an impartial body. It had, therefore to r e l y upon the just i c e rather than upon the force behind i t s findings. The greatest source of strength of the League was public opinion, which, i t was f e l t , could be r e l i e d upon to guar-antee, i f not i m p a r t i a l i t y , at least f a i r play i n i n t e r -national a f f a i r s . This moral support of the world might well be lost i f the League were 1 given teeth' to back i t s decisions. I f war comes i n spite of the ef f o r t s of the -League, the onus of g u i l t i s d e f i n i t e l y upon the offending nation. Should the League, however, resort to war, i t might well have to share that burden, and thereby lose the moral p o s i t i o n upon which i t was founded. The argument above i s not the p o s i t i o n taken i n t h i s essay,but i s the argument whioh f o l l o w s i o g i c a l l y from the -81-ideals upon which the league was founded ( hy those who attempt to destroy force by ignoring i t s necessity.) Were these ideals consistent with r e a l i t y , there would be no need for an armed League. But the idealism of the League was i n marked contrast to the r e a l i t i e s of the world i t was designed to lead. The objection to force merely because i t i s armed force i s r a t i o n a l only when men have created a world i n which such force i s no longer required. It i s hard to understand the attitude that sanctions or force of any kind are i n i m i c a l to peace . 1. It i s not a question of force, but how and by whom such force i s used . Behind the i n s t i t u t i o n of law there is the force necessary to carry out the law. The arming of the League does not hinge upon the application of force to compel obedience to law, but rather upon the capacity of the League to e f f e c t i v e l y control and direct that force.Mr. Gilbert Murray makes t h i s point very c l e a r . M The re a l d i f f i c u l t y of the s i t u a t i o n l i e s i n the p r a c t i c a l working of the coercion. Let i t be l a i d down that the League as a whole w i l l take the necessary action, economic or military.Well and good; but the League i s not a m i l i t a r y or economic unit and possesses no central executive. It i s a society of independent sovereign states,their independence somewhat modified by tr e a t y o b l i -gations and a habit of regular conference, but none the l e s s r e a l . I doubt whether the League as a League could declare war or wage war. The 1. Swanwick, H.M., C o l l e c t i v e Insecurity, Jonothan Cape, London, 1937. Passim. -82-" force would have to be supplied by each state separately, of i t s own deliberate w i l l . Further-more, one cannot f a i r l y urge that every member of the League i s duty bound to act i n every case where coercion by the League i s necessary. One cannot expect Slam or Canada to mobilize because one Balkan state attacks another. And i f the duty i s not incumbent on a l l members, who i s to decide what members are to undertake i t ? The Council has no absolute authority. No nation w i l l be eager to subject i t s e l f to the s t r a i n and s a c r i f i c e of coercive action unless i t s own interests are sharply involved. But the quest-ion i s whether, i n a world that i n c r e a s i n g l y detests war and mistrusts force as an i n s t r u -ment of international p o l i c y , the various nat-ional Parliaments or Governments w i l l i n general have s u f f i c i e n t l o y a l t y to the League, s u f f i c i e n t public s p i r i t and sense of r e a l i t y , to be ready to face the prospect of war not i n defence of t h e i r own fr o n t i e r s or immediate national i n t e r e s t s , but simply to maintain the peace of the world." 1. The weaknesses of the League which have so f a r been discussed, though important, are not the real cause-of the f a i l u r e of international co-operation. Had these weaknesses not been present, there i s l i t t l e doubt that the course of international a f f a i r s would have been l e s s chaotio. But there would s t i l l have remained the many e v i l s of national l i f e which are a direc t barrier to international co-operation. While a League without these f a u l t s would have greatly fac-i l i t a t e d the co-operation necessary to an inter-dependent world,such co-operation to be r e a l l y e f f e c t i v e would have I.Murray, Gi l b e r t , The Ordeal of t h i s Generation, Harper Brothers, N. Y., 1929. P. 99 - 100 to go much beyond that possible i n a League of sovereign national states. The a c t i v i t i e s of the League were lim i t e d to those aoceptlble to the national states, each jealous of i t s sovereignty, and eaoh determined to safeguard i t s own national i n t e r e s t s . The delegates to the league were national delegates. They represented the states. There were no rep-resentatives of the league, per se, since the league had no existence except as a meeting of Nations ( or more properly) of national states. To think of the league as though i t were an i n s t i t u t i o n apart from, or acting independently of nat-ional states i s a very grave error. The r e a l weakness of the league as an attempt to preserve peace and to bring about human co-operation beyond the f r o n t i e r s of nationalism i s r e a l l y due to the fact that such co-operation i s impossible where national ambitions overwhelm international needs, and where national claims are voiced by those who hold p o l i t i c a l and economic power, whereas international needs are only voiced by those i d e a l i s t s who see beyond p o l i t i c a l front-i e r s , but who .have not the p o l i t i c a l or economic power to make the i r appeals e f f e c t i v e . The whole problem of international co-operation is so limited by i t s very nature, that i t soon reaches a point where further progress i s impossible. Co-operation between peoples need have no l i m i t s ; but co-operation between national states as we s h a l l see i n the development of t h i s -84-. section o i our problem, i s quite a d i f f e r e n t matter. Unless the national states can be induced to s a c r i f i c e some measure of t h e i r sovereignty to an international body which w i l l thereby have the power to function as an e f f e c t i v e i n s t r u -ment l i t t l e more can be expected than has already been contributed by the League. The League has never been an 'instrument 1 of international co-operation. At most, i t has been the possible means of forging such an 'instrument 1. An instrument pre-supposes the a b i l i t y to function for a p a r t i c u l a r purpose. The League, as i t i s at present con-s t i t u t e d , cannot function for the purpose for which i t was designed. 1. Its f a i l u r e i s not the fa u l t of those who founded i t , nor of those who sought to use i t . To attach suoh a blame is as f o o l i s h as to say that peace i s only possible where men have the w i l l to peace, or that the Millenium w i l l come when men have God i n t h e i r hearts. We must contend with a r e a l world where the motives of men are mixed, and run the gamut a l l the way from the very e v i l to the very good. An ordered society was not brought about by making people 'good1 , but by the creation of i n s t i t u t -ions which would e f f e c t i v e l y curb that which was e v i l or a n t i - s o c i a l . This has been achieved within the national state. The rule of law has been established throughout the greater part of the world. People obey the law , not because they f e e l a moral obligation to do so, but because the i n s t i t u t i o n s which preserve the law have become so 1. See footnote page 85. -85-f i r m l y established that obedience to the law has become the normal habit of the majority , and the disobedience of the few i s e f f e c t i v e l y checked. It i s the effectiveness of the instruments of law, and not the 'goodness 1 of those served by the law which guarantees order. The development of human co-operation from small to larger groups has been accompanied by a concomitant develop-ment i n the role of law. What was the law of the feudal p r i n c i p a l i t y , was, with the r i s e of the national state, r e -placed by the law of the nation. Th.e w i l l of the i n -dividual or group was subordinated to the w i l l of the nation. The centre of authority was the "national state. With the development of human co-operation beyond national f r o n t i e r s there has emerged international law. But i n t e r -national law has not replaced the laws of individual nations even i n the i r r e l a t i o n s beyond national f r o n t i e r s . The p r i n c i p l e of national sovereignty has not given place to an authority higher than the state i t s e l f . International law, therefore, while i t has established c e r t a i n rules by which the a f f a i r s between the nations are guided, has as yet not forged the instrument which makes obedience to these rules imperative. The c i t i z e n s of any state are compelled by the machinery of law developed within the state to submit to the 1. " to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security" . League Covenant. ( footnote refers to page 84.) -86-law, and, moreover, are compelled to appear before the tribunals of the law i f c a l l e d upon by the state to do so. In international law there i s no such compulsion because the necessary machinery for such a proceedure has not been developed. The trib u n a l s of the Hague and Geneva, and the League i t s e l f offer a means of settlement of differences between national states, but they can not compel the nations to submit to t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n , or to abide by t h e i r de-ci s i o n s i f such j u r i s d i c t i o n has been sought. " But the most serious l i m i t a t i o n on the range of international law i s that p r a c t i c a l l y the whole sphere of international economic re-l a t i o n s , except i n a few cases where mutual con-cessions have been arranged by treaty, belongs to domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n . T a r i f f s , bounties, pre-ferences, raw materials, markets and the l i k e are the matters which generally underlie the r i v a l r i e s of modern states and provide the causes, i f not the occasions, of t h e i r disputes; yet international law can very r a r e l y interpose i t s regulating influence here. Law w i l l never play a r e a l l y e f f e c t i v e part i n international r e l a t i o n s u n t i l i t can annex to i t s own shpere some of the matters which at present l i e within the 'domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n s ' of the several states; for so long as i t has to be admitted that one state may have i t s reasonable interests i n j u r i o u s l y affected by the unreasonable action of another, and yet have no l e g a l basis for complaint, i t i s inevitable that the injured state, i f i t i s strong enough, w i l l seek by other means the redress that the law cannot afford i t . At the best the present state of things leads to the maintenance by power-f u l states of p o l i t i e s outside the law,con-ceived i n t h e i r own in t e r e s t s , and paying only so -87-" much regard to the interests of other states as - prudence dictates.Such p o l i o i e s cannot even, as things are, he wholly condemned,because the interests which they protect are often per-f e c t l y reasonable interests such as any r e a l l y adequate system of law would recognize and safeguard; but, unfortunately, there i s at present no security whatever that these p o l i c i e s w i l l be confined to the protection of the reasonable interests of the states con-cerned. 1. We must,therefore, examine the League, not with the idea of f i x i n g the blame for i t s f a i l u r e upon the conduct of individuals or nations, but with a view to ascertaining the forces underlying such conduct. Since the word " f a i l u r e 1 has been used i n connection with the League, i t might be well here to state the p o s i t i o n of t h i s essay on that point. To say that the League has f a i l e d i s to state both a truth and an untruth. In many pa r t i c u l a r f i e l d s such as health, sanitation, economic reconstruction, and the prevention of minor wars, the League has been very successful. Its f a i l u r e has been i n the matter of preventing wars involving great powers and i n i t s attempt to replace the international anarchy by the reign of law. One cannot blame the horse for f a i l i n g i f the load he has to p u l l i s too great, or i f the harness with which he is equipped i s i l l - f i t t i n g or unsuitable for the purpose. There can be l i t t l e blame attached to the League for i t s f a i l u r e , to tho.se who founded i t , or to those who t r i e d to use i t . That i t could have been used to 1. See footnote page 88. -88-greater purpose there i s l i t t l e doubt. But those who t r i e d to use i t had a very, d i f f i c u l t choice to make. They oould only use the League when i t was i n t h e i r own national interest to do so. Whatever they may have f e l t to be the r e a l needs of the world, they were the servants, not of the world, but of t h e i r own nationals. Those who now blame the League for f a i l u r e are often blaming the founders or the national delegates.But had the founders or the dele-gates s a c r i f i c e d national ideas to serve the world community they would not have long remained i n a p o s i t i o n to do so. The founders of theLeague were engaged i n th e i r task at a time when national sentiment was at key pit c h . It i s hard to see how they could have gone further than they did without arousing a storm of national protest which might have destroyed the League at i t s inception. Their hope was that from t h i s modest beginning there might develop a r e a l i n s t i t u t i o n f o r - i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation. Lord Robert C e c i l speaking at the Plenary Session of February 14, 1919 had t h i s to say. " The President has pointed out that the frame of the organization suggested i s very simple. He has alluded to some respects i n which some may think, i t might have been more elaborate, but I agree with him that s i m p l i c i t y i s the essence of our plans. 1. B r i e r l y , J.L. The Law of Nations, Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1928, p. 53- 54. ( reference i s to page 87.) -89-We are not seeking to produce for the world a building finished and complete i n a l l respects. To have attempted such a thing would have been an arrogant piece of f o l l y . A l l we have t r i e d to do, a l l we have hoped to do, i s to l a y soundly and t r u l y , the foundations upon which our successors may b u i l d . " 1. The delegates to the League, as has been pointed out before, were expected to be l o y a l not to the world , but the states they represented. Had they departed from th e i r national duty they would have been re-pudiated by those whom they represented, and would soon have lost the opportunity to be present as delegates /to the League. The League f a i l e d to bring about the rule of law, but i t has not f a i l e d i n i t s work i n that d i r e c t i o n . It has not and can not i n i t s present form bring about the reign of law, but i t has served i f i n no other way by point-ing out the antagonism between national sovereignty and international action. The League of Nations, though i t has f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the hopes of man for an ordered society, s t i l l ranks as the greatest of man's achievements i n the development of a co-operative world c i v i l i z a t i o n . Man i s a creature of habit. The things which he has moulded to suit his needs, be they instruments of govern-ment or a pair of old shoes, he gives up with.the greatest reluctance. Those things which have been the hardest to 1.Miller, David Hunter, The.Drafting of the Govenant, G.P. Putnam's Sons, N. Y., 1928 . Vol. 2, p. 566-567. -90- -"build, which have heen fashioned to the pattern of his needs by generations of t o i l and suff e r i n g are jealously guarded. Progress i s not made jumping from the firm ground of es-tablished t r a d i t i o n s into the realm of idealism, but by the steady process of building stone by stone the steps which lead to that goal. Every revolution which has sought to go far beyond established ways has had to retreat a long way from the goal i t set i t s e l f before i t could find the firm ground upon which alone i t could find s t a b i l i t y . 1. The league was b u i l t , not upon the s o l i d ground of estab-lished proceedure, but rather upon the ideals of that which, though badly needed, was l a r g e l y untried. It was f e l t that the idealism to whioh i t was directed and the enthusiasm with which the common man accepted i t would make i t grow and prosper. But i t was not rooted i n the past. In s t i t u t i o n s , are,sustained from the materials i n which they are rooted. The League was not rooted i n the past. It had no past experience to nourish i t • The rule of law was attempted without f i r s t establishing the i n s t i t u t i o n necessary to carry out the law. The jury could decide and the magistrate could expound the law, but there was no l.Oompare the r e l a t i v e ease with which the American r e v o l -ution^founded upon the established p r i n c i p l e s of English c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government,was established^with the length of time i t took the French Revolution to find s t a b i l i t y . -91-i n s t i t u t i o n whioh. could s u s t a i n the judgment, and no force to compel obedience. The League had f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the needs of an interdependent world, but i t has not f a i l e d i n d i r e c t i n g attention to,and i n pointing the way to the attainment of the proper i n s t i t u t i o n s . Mr. B r i e r l y con-cludes his, " Law of Nations" with a very wise word of caution i n our judgment of the League. " The work of the League as a whole should be judged, not by comparing i t with the hopes that were entertained i n the intensely emotional atmosphere of the year 1919, but with the method, of conducting international a f f a i r s before the League came into existence.Moreover , i n estimating i t s value i t is necessary to have c e r t a i n general considerations i n mind : ( l ) that owing to the defection of the United States and the absence of Russia, the League has never been the comprehensive union that i t was i n -tended to be ; (2) that the League was not devised for the task of.bringing international order out of anarchy, but for maintaining, rather . than creating, peaceful re l a t i o n s between the nations; yet during the f i r s t c r i t i c a l years of i t s existence Europe was only nominally, and not always even nominally, at peace; (3) that the League i s not a power outside of or above the states which compose i t , but.an i n s t i t u t i o n which they can use or not, and use well or , i l l , as they think f i t . With a l l i t s imperfect-ions i t offers the best and perhaps the only hope of the eventual triumph of law and reason i n international r e l a t i o n . " 1. The framers of the Covenant were not unmindful of the weakness of the instrument they had created. On the whole, however, they seem to have accepted the hope of co-1. B r i e r l y , op. c i t . p. 221 - 222. -92-operation and the idealism which motivated t h e i r actions as the guarantee of success. In an atmosphere where intense nationalism was i n c o n f l i c t with a r e a l e f f o r t for i n t e r -national co-operation, the former rooted i n the t r a d i t i o n s of peoples, won over the l a t t e r , r e a l only i n the hopes of i t s advocates. The following excerpts from the speeches of the framers of the Covenant at the Plenary Session of February 14. 1919 show very c l e a r l y the c o n f l i c t between idealism and r e a l i t y , and show how far from r e a l i t y were the ideals incorporated i n the Covenant. President Wilson. " Armed force i s the background i n t h i s pro-gramme, but i t i s i n the background , and i f the moral force of the world w i l l not s u f f i c e , the physical force of the world s h a l l , But that i s the l a s t resort, because t h i s i s intended as a con-s t i t u t i o n of peace, not as a League of War. The s i m p l i c i t y of the document seems to me to be one of i t s chief virtues, because, speak-ing for myself, I was unable to foresee the v a r i e t y of circumstances with which t h i s League would have to deal. I was unable , therefore, to plan a l l the machinery that might be necessary to meet d i f f e r i n g and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say of t h i s document that i t i s not a straight jacket, but a vehicle of l i f e . A l i v i n g thing i s born,and we must see to i t that the clothes we put on i t do not hamper i t , and a vehicle of power,but a vehicle i n which power may be varied at the d i s c r e t i o n of those who exercise i t and i n accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet while i t i s e l a s t i c , while i t i s i n general i n i t s terms, i t i s d e f i n i t e i n the one thing that we were c a l l e d upon to make d e f i n i t e . It i s a d e f i n i t e guarantee of peace. It i s a d e f i n i t e -93-" guarantee by word against agression. It i s a . d e f i n i t e guarantee against the things whioh have just come hear bringing the whole struct-ure of c i v i l i z a t i o n into r u i n . I t s purposes do not for a moment l i e vague. Its purposes are declared and i t s powers made unmistakable." Lord Robert C e c i l . We are not seeking to produce for the world a bu i l d i n g finished and complete i n a l l respects. To have attempted such a thing would have been an arrogant piece of f o l l y . A l l we have to do, a l l we have hoped to do, i s to lay soundly and t r u l y , the foundations upon which our successors may b u i l d . I believe those found-ations have been well" l a i d and i t depends upon those who come after us what w i l l be the character and s t a b i l i t y of the building erected upon them. I f i t i s merely a r e p e t i t i o n of the old experiments of a l l i a n c e , i f we are merely to have a new version of the Holy A l l i a n c e , designed for however good a purpose, believe me, Gentlemen, our attempt i s doomed to f a i l u r e . Nor must i t be merely an unpractical effort i n international d i a l e c t i c s . It must be a p r a c t i c a l t h i n g , i n s t i n c t , and t h i s i s the' r e a l point, i n s t i n c t with a genuine purpose to achieve the main objects we have i n view. And i f those who build on these foundations r e a l l y believe that the interest of one i s the interest of a l l , and that the prosperity of the world i s bound up with the prosperity of each nation that makes i t up, that goes to compose the family, then and then only w i l l the finished structure of the League of Nations be what i t ought to be, a safety and a glory for the humanity of the world .". M i l l e r , op. c i t . Yol. 2. p. 562- 563. -94-M. V. S. Orlando " If I had only intended to take part i n t h i s . debate i n order to express my deep s a t i s f a c t i o n at having been able to collaborate i n the f i r s t draft of the document which has been l a i d before you, I venture to hope that my feelings would nevertheless have seemed j u s t i f i e d , seeing that we a l l await with fervent f a i t h , as a result of t h i s act, a r e b i r t h of the whole world the l i k e of which h i s t o r y has never seen. But the object of t h i s debate i s to submit to examination by the public opinion of the world a new internation-a l order, I should l i k e , then, to make my modest contribution to i t s discussion by supplementing the explanations made by my c o l l -eagues by a few remarks not r e l a t i n g to the general s p i r i t of the act,for that has been explained by the man who has the highest and noblest t i t l e for the task, a t i t l e before whioh we a l l bow; nor even r e l a t i n g to fundamental p r i n c i p l e s , which Lord Robert C e c i l set forth both f o r c i b l y and c l e a r l y . I w i l l rather say a few words on the general method by which we have pursued our work. The task was i n -comparably d i f f i c u l t . We started from two /Absolute p r i n c i p l e s which a p r i o r i i t might seem d i a l e o t i c a l l y impossible to reconcile with one another. On the one hand the p r i n c i p l e of sovereignty of States:,: which i s supreme and brooks no comparison or r e l a t i o n , and on the other the necessity of imposing from above a re s t r a i n t on the conduct of states so that the sphere of t h e i r r i g h t s should harmonize with that of the rights of a l l the others, i n order that t h e i r l i b e r t y should not include the l i b e r t y to do e v i l . We were able to effect a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between these two p r i n c i p l e s on the basis of. " s e l f -constraint" , a spontaneous coercion, so that states w i l l i n future be brought,under the control of the public opinion of the whole world, v o l -u n t a r i l y to recognize the re s t r a i n t imposed on them for the sake of universal peaoe, I know that even the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a transformation i s the object of attacks by sceptics, who are by turns sad or i r o n i c a l , according to t h e i r temper-ament .Towards these sceptics I w i l l act l i k e a Greek philosopher who, when a Sophist t o l d him that he could not move, answered by getting up and walking m 1. ,c i t . , M i l l e r , op.,/p. 567-568. -95-M. Leon Bourgiois. There i s , therefore, unamimity i n regard, to the p r i n c i p l e s . Signor Orlando, i n reminding us of these, said with unusual eloquence that there was something i n the nature of a contradiction i n the problem which confronted us. How were we to reconcile the p r i n c i p l e of the sovereignty of States with the obligation by which they were to bind themselves to l i m i t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y action to the precise point where Justice and Right summoned them to stop? This r e c o n c i l i a t i o n has been effected, i f I may say so, automatically and, to pursue the metaphor of our distinguished colleague, we have proved the existence of motion by moving. Among these p r i n c i p l e s i s i t necessary to r e c a l l those which constitute the very foundation of every international organization of law? In response to. the appeal of the'millions of dead whose memory has been invoked, of a l l those who have f a i l e d and of those who mourn them, of a l l those who by t h e i r personal s a c r i f i c e s the l i k e of which they themselves have borne, we have r i s e n up against the possible renewal of war. Together we have banded ourselves i n order to obviate,by eve-ry possible human means, the renewal of the war, i n the conviction that henceforth no private war w i l l be possible i n the world and that the complete and close interdependence i n which a l l nations are to-day united, by the community of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l , economical, i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral i n t e r e s t s , render impossible a fresh c o n f l i c t at any point on the globe's surface without the entire world being dragged into i t by reason of the inevi t a b l e community of interest of the peoples of the world. We are layin g down that Right and Justice must be the basis of settlement for a l l c o n f l i c t s and a l l international differences, and that the door of the Tribunal i s open to every State; i n that T r i -bunal each State w i l l be c e r t a i n of finding judges who w i l l not even know whether they themselves belong to a great or a small Power, but as the representatives of Right. There i s another p r i n c i p l e to which we are es p e c i a l l y attached because i t r e a l l y constitutes the kernel of international obligation; for a l l -96-States now consent to bow before a common justice , and agree at the same time mutually to guarantee to each other t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l independence on any occasion when one or Other of these higher interests may be threatened by violence or some disturbance. Such i s the group of obligations which we accept and such i s the object at which the Covenant now have before you aims; and I hope as you do a l l , that the means which have been proposed may enable us to a t t a i n our end i n fact We are most deeply and whole-heartedly united for the triumph of the cause which, from the f i r s t moment, inspired the assembly of t h i s Conference, that i s for the prevalence of Sight over violence and barbarity. We f i r m l y believe that the Plan now l a i d before you comprises, i n the general aspect of i t s clauses, the measures which are necessary for the attainment of our purposes; i n our opinion, however, and we have expressed i t i n a l l s i n c e r i t y , the Plan i s as yet only the foundat-ion on which we s h a l l have to work..... w 1. Mr. G.N.. Barnes. " F i r s t of a l l the su b s t i t u t i o n of an a l t r u i s t i c p r i n c i p l e for imperialism and violence i n the adjustment of international a f f a i r s . Nations which have suffered and s a c r i f i c e d i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of t e r r i t o r y have agreed to the overseership of the League of Nations i n the administration of that t e r r i t o r y . They have further agreed to the p r i n -c i p l e that the welfare and assent of the peoples s h a l l be the determining considerations i n i t s adminis-t r a t i o n . There i s i n t h i s agreement, Mr.President, to my mind a great advance i n the ap p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of moral idealism, and I can only say that I believe that that w i l l s t r i k e the imagination of the world There are just one or two things, Mr.President, which, to my mind, might have been more e x p l i c i t , and which, I believe, w i l l have to be grafted on to a League of Nations as the idea of world unity 1. M i l l e r , op. o i t . , p. 569 - 570, 573. " becomes more widely accepted, l e t me mention one. I am a f r a i d that when the time comes f.or the enforce-ment of decrees, i f ever i t does come,which God forbid, there may be delay and confusion on the part of the league. What I am a f r a i d of i s , that an agressive nation might again t r y to break through, and win i t s way to i t s object,before the forces of mankind can be mobilized against it.Therefore, I should have been glad to have seen some pro-v i s i o n for the nucleus of an international force which would be ready to s t r i k e against an agressive nation.This, I know, cuts into the idea of the sovereignty of nations, but I hope that there may be future discussion on the part of the a f f i l i a t e d states as to how they can adjust t h e i r national l i f e so as to admit of a greater degree of co-operation than i s i n this document.". 1. M.Sleftherios Veniselos. .Certain Powers object to the establishment not only of a maximum, but also to that of a " minimum armed force.F/or instance what M.leon Bourgeois asks i s the creation of an armed force ready to intervene. We have received the answer that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l considerations prevented the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s wi sh. I should be glad i f t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l oppos-i t i o n could be removed and i f a contingent could be fixed,which each State would be obliged to keep up-with a view to intervention, i f necessary. But , i f we cannot get s a t i s f a c t i o n on this' point, i t must not be thought that t h i s omission would leave the league of Nations without the ne-cessary force to make i t s w i l l obeyed. Anyone who wishes to disturb the peace of the world w i l l always know that there exists a great force com-posed of a l l the armies and of a l l the resources at the disposal of the States which form the league. A l l the Powers represented here, even those which had not i n time of peace s u f f i c i e n t forces, -have proved what they were able to do i n a r e l a t -i v e l y short time. Thus, the Power which might have thought that i t could by a sudden attack obtain a passing success, w i l l know henceforward M i l l e r , op. c i t . , P. 574, 575. -98-"that i t i s doomed to f a i l u r e , so that, I hope, such an attack w i l l never again take place. However, i n order that public opinion may not become too uneasy I express once more with M. Leon -Bourgeois, the' hope that i t w i l l be possible to a r r i v e at the establishment of a minimum force which each State s h a l l be obliged to main-t a i n " 1. The above words are from t h e l i p s of men who were honest and sincere i n t h e i r aims and i n t h e i r methods. They recognized the need for force to make the League e f f e c t i v e . They recognized the menace of national sovereignty , but they could not see i t as c l e a r l y as we see i t to-day. Hence they were not prepared to fight very hard for what they thought might be quite an unnecessary consideration. These men can not be blamed for attempting to preserve as much of the old t r a d i t i o n of national and international procedure as possible. One must conclude that the confidence they placed i n t h e i r ideals was genuine. The weakness of the instrument they f e l t they had created was not due to t h e i r lack of s i n c e r i t y , but to t h e i r logic which time has shown to be f a u l t y . I t i s the same f a u l t y l o g i c which has c a r r i e d the League into the Limbo of other l o s t causes. The l o g i c which assumes that i t i s the good, or good-will, or morality which must i n the long run survive. Rhetorical a l l e g -iance to any cause oan not survive against the opposition of established i n s t i t u t i o n s which oppose that cause, and whioh are backed by the force necessary to preserve themselves. The people who c r u c i f i e d Christ were probably quite as good 1. M i l l e r , op. c i t . , p. 576- 577. -99-as the people who l a t e r on worshipped him. C h r i s t i a n i t y did not become a r e a l force i n the world u n t i l i t had created a strong i n s t i t u t i o n , the church. The church has survived, not because of i t s morality, but because of i t s strength as an i n s t i t u t i o n . As an i n s t i t u t i o n i t used force to m a i n -t a i n and to expand i t s power. Indeed some of the most crue l persecution of a l l time was ca r r i e d on by the church i n order to overcome any movement , i n t e r n a l or external-, which threatened i t s power. Probably the greatest obstacle to the development of a strong national state was the church. Only after years of struggle did the state develop an i n s t i t u t i o n strong enough to challenge the authority of the ohuroh. Prom that time on, the state, and not the church has grown i n strength ; not because the state is morally better, but because I t has established a stronger i n s t i t u t i o n . The moral force of the church ( once i t s p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y strength has gone) could not compete with the materia^ force of the .state. The Bolsheviks established themselves i n Russia, not because they were the leaders of a cause that was good against a cause of e v i l , but because they had b u i l t up a d i s c i p l i n e d or-ganization whioh, though small, was powerful i n i t s unity and i t s purpose. The very ruthlessness with which i t fought a l l opposition was the factor whioh contributed most to i t s success. It i s useless to laud or to deplore the method. H i s t o r i c a l l y the method used had l i t t l e - 1 0 0 -bearing on the measurement of the r e s u l t . One oannot ignore force i n a r e a l world. The Bolsheviks came to power by-force and they have retained t h e i r power by creating a strong i n s t i t u t i o n backed by force. S t a l i n retains his p o s i t i o n because he has that force to command. The goodness or the e v i l of the ap p l i c a t i o n of that force has no re a l meaning i n a pragmatic world. When Mussolini speaks of the Imperial Bower of the Fascist State as being s p i r i t u a l and e t h i c a l , 1 • knowingly or unknowingly, he is t a l k i n g nonsense. But when he says " The Fas c i s t State expresses the w i l l to exercise power and to command. Here the Roman t r a d i t i o n i s embodied i n a conception of strength" T- 2. he i s speaking the language of r e a l i t y . The democratic state of I t a l y crumbled not because of the weak-ness of democracy, but because i n I t a l y democracy f a i l e d to establish a strong instrument of government. If democracy i t s e l f were the weakness , then none of the present democ-racies would have survived. The Third Reich i s to-day a powerful enemy of the democracies of France and B r i t a i n . Its power does not depend upon good or e v i l , but upon the instrument of control i t has developed within the state. The greatest error that the democracies can make to-day i s to assume that H i t l e r w i l l be destroyed through the 1. Langsam 2. i b i d . , op. c i t . , p. 501 - 502. • • • • -101-weakness ( supposedly) i n his coercive dictatorship. The slogan that 11 we mast win eventually because our cause i s just", i s splendid as a tonic for keeping up the morale, of a nation, hut only arms, men, and money w i l l win the war. Eventual v i c t o r y w i l l come to the side whose i n -s t i t u t i o n s and whose armed forces are the stronger. It w i l l not depend upon moral issues. One thing, at l e a s t , H i t l e r , S t a l i n , and Mussolini have shown. They have shown that a r e a l i s t i c conception hacked by a r e a l i s t i c program can achieve i t s aims. The same realism can be applied by the democracies to what we consider the cause gtS good as has been applied by the dictators to what we consider the cause of e v i l . There i s here no quarrel with morality, and no desire to prove that force i s the arbitrament of r i g h t . On the contrary, what i s here urged i s that the nations of the world which pride themselves on the justice upon which t h e i r con-s t i t u t i o n s are based must be able to protect those con-s t i t u t i o n s i f that j u s t i c e i s to be saved from the savage attacks of unprincipled power. Confucius was no doubt correct i n his fundamental premise that the majority of men, given a chance, are decent i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with one another. There are generally accepted ideas of the common decencies of human behavior. But these ideas alone can not compete against the indecent practices of a H i t l e r , -102-a S t a l i n , or a Mussolini backed by the armed might of a state inculcated with the doctrine that success on the b a t t l e f i e l d alone determines the j u s t i c e of a cause. Many c r i t i c s of the league find i n i t s f a i l u r e the lack of moral enthusiasm i n the world. The argument i s hard to meet because i t is based on f a i t h . To the f a i t h f u l , f a i t h i s a l l important. There i s l i t t l e doubt that v/ere the league given universal moral support the problem would be solved. But having admitted that point we are s t i l l faced with the problem of how to bring about that happy con-d i t i o n . The doctrine of goodwill has been preached from the beginning of time. It i s not as though persistent preaching w i l l bring about some form of s p i r i t u a l r e v i v a l whioh w i l l remove the obstacles to international co-operation. There must , of course, be a return to the p r i n c i p l e s of the Covenant i n international a f f a i r s . But there must f i r s t be created a world which w i l l guarantee security to such p r i n c i p l e s . The individual or the nation which i s w i l l i n g to put i t s trust i n p r i n c i p l e s alone i s merely courting disaster. The following are only two of numerous quotations which could be given to i l l u s t r a t e the above type of think-ing. " The moral authority of the league and of the - States which compose i t ultimately depends upon the enthusiasm for or at least the approval of the results of t h e i r operation i n terms of the l i v e s of ordinary f o l k . If peace i s the means of j u s t i c e , then i t w i l l l a s t . If i t i s -103-" merely an opportunity for preserving un-troubled the existing d i v i s i o n between the bene f i c i a r i e s and the victims of the s o c i a l system, i t w i l l collapse as the Roman system collapsed i n the Dark Ages — not because of the attack of the barbarians, but because the majority did not think i t worth maintaining. The weakness of the League i s due to the lack of moral enthusiasm and imaginativeness i n those who profess to support i t : no system for the maintenance pf peace can be successful i f peace i s assumed to be a mere scramble for private gain and war continues to be believed to be the " best instance of service for a common good. Mere opposition to the barbarism of dogmatic dictatorships resting on force, i s not enough.Moral authority must be reinforded i n the State system of the Western World by the creation of a new b e l i e f i n the common good. M 1. " Peace i s a way of l i f e . A r a t i o n a l conduct of international r e l a t i o n s would result i n peace. It requires and i n turn encourages a state of mind. That state of mind i s based on a strong e t h i c a l f a i t h . This i s not the place to argue whether such a f a i t h must be based on a theology or even on a r e l i g i o n . Whatever else may be believed, this, can be: t h i s f a i t h works. I propound i t for no other than the pragmatical reason that i t works. Man i s a herd animal. Now that the herd has become world-wide, he must learn to l i v e with his fellow man, or he w i l l die out. In the practised and e f f o r t l e s s funct-ioning of t h i s f a i t h l i e s happiness beyond a l l other earthly happiness. To the extent that man has learnt to practise t h i s f a i t h he i s happy. Virtue i s i t s own reward; i t often has no other, but that i s s u r e — none can deprive him of i t . A l l so-called s e l f - i n t e r e s t , whether applied to individuals or to nations, i s a rotten foundation unless i t combines with the s e l f - i n t e r e s t of others. Humanity i s an organism, and hypertrophied Burns , Dr. G. L e s l i e , " Authority and Force i n the State System ", i n Problems of Peace , 8th series. George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., London, 1933. p. 281-282. -104-" parts are diseased parts. The s e l f i s h r e a l i s t p o l i c y - i s not r e a l i s t at a l l ; i t does not work," 1. The above type of thinking may.be academically quite sound. To the f a i t h f u l i t is very r e a l perhaps. But the mass of mankind while giving l i p - s e r v i c e to f a i t h generally demand p o l i c i e s which are based on something more tangible. A program based upon the assumption that a regenerated morality w i l l solve the problem can do l i t t l e to establish international order. Onoe the material structure of international co-operation i s created moral support i s invaluable. But p o l i c i e s , national or inte r n a t i o n a l , can command moral support only i f they function. Once the international machinery i s created which r e a l l y works i t . w i l l have no lack of moral support . But the i n s t i t u t i o n which i s required i s one which not only provides the means for international co-operation, but one with the inherent power to compel such co-operation. The values whioh have been established and accepted i n democratic society are quite as necessary a part of the equipment of a stable world as are the i n s t i t u t i o n s of coercion. These values be they moral, e t h i c a l , or s p i r i t u a l , are accepted standards of decency among the vast majority of mankind. But standards of decency can not stand alone against the unprincipled pragmatism of Mussolini,Hitler, 1. Swanwick, op. c i t . , p. 261. or S t a l i n . The society which seeks to maintain a world i n which there i s to remain such decency i n human re l a t i o n s must equip i t s e l f with the instruments of power. Give the dictatorships a l l the power, and the democracies a l l the morality, and the l a t t e r w i l l f a l l a prey to the former. The great mistake of the p a c i f i s t s i s not i n t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s , but i n th e i r common sense. An ordered society cannot survive i f that part of i t which i s guided by the pr i n c i p l e s of decency i n human a f f a i r s i s content to make speeches while the unprincipled part i s making guns. When the Federal government of the United States organized the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation i t was ham-pered i n two ways. The federal p o l i c e could not cross state l i n e s and they were not permitted to carry guns. The crim-i n a l s on the other hand were not so hampered. The government men were f i g h t i n g a l o s i n g game. It was only when Mr. J. Edgar Hoover after a long fight was able to arm hi s men and to obtain the necessary permission to cross state l i n e s that they were able to cope e f f e c t i v e l y with organized crime. Once given the same advantage i n weapons and move-ment as the criminals they sought the Federal Bureau was not long i n wiping out the gangster criminals who were t e r r -o r i z i n g the country. The use of force here i s i n no sense a lauding of the " blood and iron" doctrine of h i s t o r i c a l development. It simply means that an enlightened state -106-oannot afford to allow the p r i n c i p l e s upon which i t s enlight-enment i s based to blind i t t o the necessity of constant vi g i l a n c e , or to give to the forces of unprincipled power the idea that the acceptance of moral p r i n c i p l e s i s a sign of weakness. Force must be used to preserve the order necessary to the proper functioning of the reign of law. The idealism of Wilson put force i n the background, but so far i n the background that the League was destroyed as an effective i n -strument for preserving such a reign of law. While force should r i g h t l y be i n the background i t must not be so far i n the background that i t cannot hear the command when c a l l e d upon to act. Moreover, while force i s i n the background, the r e a l i z a t i o n by society of i t s existence must always be present. If the world of nations i s to maintain order based cm decency i n human re l a t i o n s the nations must be convinced that there is available an effective instrument of coercion should t h e i r freedon and t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s be challenged by an intransigent power motivated by purely pragmatic con-siderations. It i s not the purpose of this chapter to go through the history of the League.But merely to point out, i f possible, the fundamental weakness inherent i n i t s structure. It may be well here, however, to give a very b r i e f resume' of the events which have led up to the present discredited p o s i t i o n i n which the League finds i t s e l f . For the f i r s t ten years -107-t'he League functioned smoothly. Many problems were solved from the prevention of minor wars to the economio recon-st r u c t i o n of Europe, Geneva seemed i n a real sense to be the c a p i t a l of the world. Germany was brought i n , and Locarno and the Kellogg Pact' seemed to have solved the problems of security and of war. Henceforth Germany was to be a partner i n the European system, nearly a l l the world had renounced war as an instrument of national p o l i c y ; and international action directed from Geneva was to take the place of national r i v a l r i e s and international s t r i f e . Por these f i r s t ten years the League was not faced with a major problem. There were major problems to solve, but they were not pressing. The Great Powers were too exhausted and too busy at the task of post-war reconstruction to ser i o u s l y contemplate another war, and the major problem of disarmanent was only a matter of the time necessary to arr i v e at a work-able formula. The League had not yet been r e a l l y tested. The f i r s t test came with the world depression. Imm-ediately the economic structure started i t s rapid d i s i n t e -gration the League, i f i t was to function to bring about 'international co-operation', was faced with a major problem. How i t met t h i s problem i s best described as not meeting i t at a l l . It oould not do so. The League was not an i n s t r u -ment designed with the capacity to deal with such a problem. It was merely a meeting place for the national delegates. -108-With the collapse of national economy the meeting broke up. The oentre of interest and of action was transferred from Geneva to London, P a r i s , and other world c a p i t a l s . There was no unity of action. The world was what Mr.Gilbert Murray, c a l l s an T i n f i r m cosmos'. 1. Each country set about f e v e r i s h l y to prevent the utter collapse of i t s own monetary and economic systems. P o l i t i c a l l y f r i e n d l y nations became economic enemies. To bolster i t s economic structure t a r i f f s were raised higher and higher, not only to protect home industries and to r a i s e revenue, but to provide a favorable balance of trade. The p o l i c i e s of the old d i s -credited Mercantile system, were ca l l e d into play i n order that the excess of exports over imports would provide the money with which alone external debts could be paid.( since the acceptance of goods by .the creditor nation would have c a l l e d f o r t h violent protests from the manufacturing, int erests anxious to s e l l their own goods and keep t h e i r own plants i n operation) But the greater the national i n s o l a t i o n .the more d i f f i c u l t the problem became. With the decline i n foreign trade there was a steady decline i n home industries. National unemployment reached staggering figures.National debts mounted i n every country because of the great decline i n national income and the concomitant increase i n the burden of national expenditure for unemployment r e l i e f and govern-ment subsidies to industry. Under these circumstances 1.Murray, Gi l b e r t , " A Survey of International A f f a i r s " , i n Problems of Peace. , 8th Series, P. 2. -109-the nations were unable to pay their war debts. Currencies were depreciated and' countries were forced off the gold standard. Every means possible was used to repair the damage within the state . But a l l the e f f o r t s were national i n a cause which only i n t e r n a t i o n a l effort could solve. Geneva was forgotten i n the economic warfare which develop-ed throughout the whole world. ! Eoonomic nationalism was i n f i n i t e l y stronger than international action. The need for the l a t t e r was recognized. In 1933 the world economic conference was held i n aneffort to stem the t i d e of f i n a n c i a l anarchy which was crippling^ the whole world. But i t f a i l e d to achieve any r e a l r e s u l t s . Indeed i t s e f f o r t s led to further d i s c r e d i t i n g of the p r i n c i p l e s of international action since they gave to the idea of international con-ferences the suggestion of f u t i l i t y . There were probably technical reasons for the f a i l u r e of the conference. They cannot be discussed i n t h i s essay because the writer has no knowledge of the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of monetary standards. The main d i f f i c u l t y seems to have been the r o l e of the United S t a t e s ^ t h e c o n f l i c t between those who wished to r e t a i n the gold standard and those who opposed that p o l i c y . Whether t h i s i s a point of s u f f i c -ient importance that compromise i s impossible is. a question to whioh th i s essay can give no answer. It seems safe to assume, however, that since the technical problems of -110-finance can be solved within the nation i t s e l f they can also be solved i n the international f i e l d . They could not be solved i n the state i t s e l f without a central authority. If each small community were to have complete control of i t s own finances and i t s own monetary system there could be no organized national f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y . It would appear .there-fore that the fundamental reason for the international anarchy i n matters f i n a n c i a l and economic i s due to the same lack of some form of centralized control as i s apparent i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . While engulfed i n the chaos of the economic depression the League was confronted with i t s f i r s t major problem i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . Japan by invasion of China created a r e a l test of the p r i n c i p l e of C o l l e c t i v e Security.How the test was met i s known to a l l the world.Although eventually found g u i l t y of agression by the League the national states seemed powerless to f u l f i l the obligations which they had accepted when they became members of the league.Not only was the prestige of the league destroyed; the League i t s e l f ( a s an instrument for the preservation of peaoe) was destroyed . If one i s to blame Japan for agression i n v i o l a t i o n of i t s solemn obligations, one can no l e s s blame the other members, es p e c i a l l y the Great Powers, for v i o l a t i n g t h e i r obligat-ions i n allowing her to do so. Indeed i t appears that both B r i t a i n and France were more concerned with safeguarding -111-t h e i r Eastern interests and t h e i r p r o f i t a b l e trade with the aggressor than with upholding the solemn Covenant of the League. 1. Germany was engaged i s a revolutionary movement which was. destined to destroy the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and to bring Europe again into the orbit of Mars. I t a l y had t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions similar to those of Japan;• and i t i s probable that Mussolini was not only an interested spectator of the Japanese defiance of C o l l e c t i v e Security, but a d i l i g e n t student learning the fundamentals of the lesson of cynical disregard for world opinion. Only the minor states such as Spain, Chechoslovakia, and Ireland who had no re a l interests i n Japan or China and who had no national axe to grind, were d e f i n i t e i n t h e i r defence of the Covenant. Mr.. Rappard states that; " In London Japan seems throughout to have enjoyed r e a l popularity.When the Foreign Secretary declared that under no circumstances would his Government allow Great B r i t a i n to be brought into c o n f l i c t with her former a l l y i n the Far East, his statement was well received i n the house and i n the Press." 2. One sees here a curious paradox i n international action.One would assume that once the problem has been accepted for solution by the League that the League alone would have the right to deal with i t , and that the national states would 1. Rappard, Wm., " Nationalism and the League of Nations To-day" Problems of Peace, 8th Series, P. 30 - 31. .... 2. i b i d . -112-r e f r a i n from any action or comment which might injure the ef f o r t s of Geneva. In any business or s o c i a l organization i f a committee i s appointed to deal with a problem and finds that members of the executive or i n d i v i d u a l members are "putting t h e i r fingers i n the pie" , the committee has every right to resign. It i s an accepted standard of business ethics that where a committee i s appointed to deal v/ith a problem, that the committee alone s h a l l deal with i t , and by the same token, that individual members of the organizat-ion r e f r a i n from any action.or discussion l i k e l y to jeopard-ise the e f f o r t s of the appointed body. As a matter of fact t h i s i s one of the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of cabinet govern-ment. There does not seem to be the same ethios i n i n t e r -national ' a f f a i r s . The foreign ministers of the national states did not hesitate even while the problem was i n the hands of the League to give expression to opinions which c l e a r l y jeopardized the work of that organization by show-ing Japan that she could with impunity defy the League. Great B r i t a i n and France as i n d i v i d u a l states were openly sympathetic to Japan, and yet as members of the League they were associated with the unanimous ( except for Japan) condemnation of Japan i m p l i c i t i n the acceptance of the Lytton report. The tragedy of the s i t u a t i o n makes very grim the humor of t h i s absurd condition i n international a f f a i r s . It i s the grim humor of e v i l national pragmatism -113-stal k i n g i n the path o i the Covenant oi good intentions. The open defiance of Japan not only destroyed the prest-ige of the League , but the international prestige of i t s two most powerful members, B r i t a i n and France. Mussolini, the High Priest of Fascist violence, was not blind to the chaos into which the world was thrown. The time was now r i p e to f u l f i l the prophesy of Imperial Grandeur. It was obvious that not only was the League a mere t a l k i n g shop, but that Great B r i t a i n and Prance were p r i m a r i l y concerned with t h e i r Imperial i n t e r e s t s , and were i n no mood to s a c r i f i c e these interests i n defence of the Covenant. The invasion of Abyssinia was not an impulsive adventure, nor the answer to a border incident. It was a planned enterprise. 1. Mussolini may not be a profound thinker, but he knows the temper of Europe as Napoleon knew i t s geography.The r e s u l t s of the invasion, the feeble e f f o r t s of the League, and the f a i l u r e of sanctions need not be repeated here. Collective-Security was dead. International co-operation and an ordered society under the reign of law had given place to the rule of violence and the creed of international anarchy -- v i c t o r y to the strong. But Mussolini was not the only student graduated from the school of violence. H i t l e r seized upon the chaotic con-ditions of the moment to destroy Locarno and to m i l i t a r i z e 1. " Abyssinia", by a group of experts, International C o n c i l - i a t i o n , November, 1935, No. 314. P. 452 et seq. -114- -the Rhineland. France and B r i t a i n were powerless to cheok the march of anarchy whioh had marched through Asia, A f r i c a , and now through Europe. The only organization which could check the avalanche of European d i s i n t e g r a t i o n was gone. The cry for peace hy c o l l e c t i v e action was but dimly heard amidst the fe v e r i s h preparation for war by Germany and I t a l y , spurred on by the o r a t o r i c a l blasts of leurher and Duce. For years both i n I t a l y and Germany the decent process of human pro-pagation had sunk into the indecency of mass production. For the hungry mouths, product of this stimulated over-population, came the cry for raw materials and for l i v i n g space. Nor had t h i s mass production stopped at the breeding stage; the b i o l o g i c a l function was of necessity a private one, but the educational process was that of the state. Inculcated into the minds of the new generation was the creed of violence. Feurher and Duce each became a new Moses able and ready to lead his people into the land of plenty. But the s t a f f of Moses was replaced by the gleaming sword, symbol of the holy crusade against the decadent doctrine the of peace.For them/vital force of armed might was to destroy the senile encumbrance of democracy. In the face of the threat of the combined arms of Germany and Italy, both B r i t a i n and France had to resort to the momentarily discarded practices of power p o l i t i c s , diplomany.and a l l i a n c e s . At the same time they had to con-vince those whom they wished to aid i n the cause that they themselves were s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to meet the challenge to arms. Re-armament had to come, and come quickly. The democracies could not depend any longer on the c o l l e c t i v e action they themselves had l a r g e l y destroyed. Again they had to meet arms with arms. While pleading against the insanity of war, they were forced by the pressing necessity of events to make the most feverish preparations for i t s i n e v i t a b i l i t y . In the l a s t analysis, m i l i t a r y strength was now the only safeguard. No matter how much B r i t a i n and Franoe might s t r i v e by diplomatic means to win I t a l y away from Germany, or to arrange a security block against agression, there could be no rea l confidence placed upon diplomatic action. In the absence of an e f f e c t i v e central authority seourity became a purely national problem, based upon national armed strength.What ever a l l i a n c e s f i n a l l y developed would not depend upon diplomatic juggling, but upon what each i n d i v i d -ual state, working s o l e l y i n i t s exclusive national i n t e r e s t s , considered i t s best p o l i c y at the moment of c o n f l i c t . Only under a condition of centralized control could there be any release from the arms race. The League had not provided t h i s centralized control, and i t therefore was powerless to prevent the threat of c o n f l i c t between the national states, a l l b r i s t l i n g with the arms which symbolized t h e i r deter-mination to protect t h e i r exclusive sovereign status. -116-Here again the haunting spectre of national sovereignty-hovered over the temple of Geneva. It may with justice be argued that i n an armed world the problem of preserving l a s t i n g peace i s well nigh impossible. In t h i s respect armaments are a cause of war, and disarmament i s a d e f i n i t e step i n the path of peace. But i t i s a mistake to assume that the problem of disarmament can i n any way be considered as a problem i n i t s e l f , or that i t oan be solved by the process of mutual consent. The r e f u s a l of the national states to surrender t h e i r vested national rights of complete sovereignty i n the cause of international co-operation was a weakness which the League could not p o s s i b l y overcome. The massed forces of the national states members of the League were never at the disposal of the League. They were national forces, designed to protect national interests and to further national aims. A l l the nations were armed and powerful;only the League v/as unarmed. To suggest that the states i n a federal union, such a's The United States, were to organize th e i r own armies and that the federal government were to be without arms, but with power to c a l l upon the i n d i v i d u a l states, would r i g h t l y be c a l l e d the most flagrant s t u p i d i t y . And yet, that was the basis upon which the League of Nations was expected to survive. The nations were not armed to preserve i n t e r n a l order, but to protect against external agression, t e r r i t o r i a l or economic. Such protection i n i t s e l f -117-assumed the p o s s i b i l i t y and the p r o b a b i l i t y of such a con-tingency. I f a Covenant were enough there would be no need for a Covenant, for the Covenant pre-supposed the goodwill which would render i t s existence e n t i r e l y unnecessary. Disarmament of the national states was impossible i f such disarmament was to be on the basis of national s e c u r i t y which pre-supposed the p o s s i b i l i t y of departure from the s p i r i t of the Covenant. On that basis, and without an armed League to intervene, there could be no minimum of national armament, and the maximum could only be reached when the state was prepared to defend i t s e l f against any possible combination of states. Consistency with national safety has no meaning as a measurement of the necessary armaments unless there i s an international force s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to guarantee that such national armaments w i l l not be used i n a" manner deemed i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y i l l e g a l . This question o'f armaments had been one of the greatest problems of the League, and one which i t has not been able to solve. If we here draw a p a r a l l e l between the international anarchy and the s o c i ^ a l anarchy of the 'wild west' the issue may be greatly c l a r i f i e d . The problem of order i n the 'two gun' era of the west was not the problem of guns, but the lack: of an i n e f f e c t i v e instrument of law. The era where each man was a law unto himself was not ended by mutual consent, nor by the voluntary disarmament of the -118-i n d i v i d u a l members of the community, but by t h e s e t t i n g up of a r e i g n o f l a w backed by the overwhelming armament of t h e s h -e r i f f and h i s d e p u t i e s . Even t h e n f o r a t i m e , the i n d i v i d u a l d i d not g i v e up h i s arms; but h i s use of arms was l i m i t e d t o t h e l e g a l e x e r c i s e o f t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n , a p o i n t upon which he had t o s a t i s f y t h e law. W i t h t h e d e v e l o p -ment of t h e p r o p e r c o u r t s and t h e p r e t e c t i v e arms of a competent p o l i c e f o r c e , the i n d i v i d u a l soon found no need f o r h i s p r i v a t e a r s e n a l and disarmament became t h e normal c o n d i t i o n . But t h e i n d i v i d u a l d i d not d i s a r m ' b e f o r e he was s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e i n s t r u m e n t s of law were s t r o n g enough t h a t t h e y o f f e r e d him g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n t h a n c o u l d be p r o v i d e d by h i s own arms and h i s s k i l l i n u s i n g them. There c o u l d have been no disarmament w i t h o u t f i r s t e s t a b l i s h i n g a c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y w i t h the e f f e c t i v e power of c o e r c i o n . The guns t h e m s e l v e s were not t h e p r o b l e m . Given t h e need f o r i n d i v i d u a l p r o t e c t i o n , man w i l l a v a i l h i m s e l f of a weapon o f d e f e n s e , be i t a gun, a k n i f e , o r m e r e l y a good s t o u t c l u b . N a t i o n a l disarmament i s o n l y p o s s i b l e where t h e n a t i o n can be a s s u r e d t h a t such disarmament does not f o r f e i t i t s r i g h t t o n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e . The p r i n c i p l e e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e Covenant " t h a t t h e maintenance of peaoe r e q u i r e s t h e r e -d u c t i o n o f n a t i o n a l armaments t o t h e l o w e s t l e v e l con-s i s t e n t w i t h n a t i o n a l s a f e t y and t h e enforcement by common a c t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s " , i s under a c o n d i t i o n -119- .. oi exclusive national sovereignty, merely r h e t o r i c a l nonsense, since there i s no way i n which such 'consistency with national safety' can be measured. While each oi the nations i s a law unto i t s e l f , there i s no point at which any nation is nation-a l l y secure. Security is not concerned only with the m i l i t a r y strength of the nation concerned, but can be measured only by the m i l i t a r y strength of a possible enemy, or any combination of possible enemies. Since the same problem con-fronts every nation,, there oan be/real p o l i c y of arms re-duction, the way to security seemingly pointing i n the other d i r e c t i o n . The armament race which ensues from this con-d i t i o n only serves to aggravate the problem, and makes the dilemma of the i n d i v i d u a l state more b a f f l i n g . There i s no question that disarmament i s r e a l l y desired, i f for nothing else, to r e l i e v e the excessive burden of taxation. There i s , therefore, nothing inconsistent with the appeal for peace and disarmament being made by a government which at the same time i s arming as thoroughly and as r a p i d l y as possible. The problem though d i f f i c u l t , i s quite c l e a r . Mr. Rappard shows that i t was apparent i n 1919. " That armaments were i n themselves a cause of war and not merely, as claimed by t h e i r apologists, an inevit a b l e consequence of the fear of war and a necessary protection against war, has always been maintained by a l l throughgoing p a c i f i s t s . On November IE, 1917, President Wilson i n his Buffalo address before the American Federation of labor, had said : ' What I am opposed to i s not the fee l i n g of the p a c i f i s t s , but t h e i r s t u p i d i t y . My -120-" heart i s with them, but my mind has a contempt - for them. I want peace, but I know how to get i t , and they do not. 1 This did not prevent him, however, a few weeks l a t e r , from embodying one of th e i r main tenets i n his peace program: fAdequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments w i l l be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safet y 1 . It was with the intention of giving and taking such guarantees that President Wilson proceeded to Paris i n December, 1918. At the Peace Conference he soon discovered that his colleagues were profoundly divided on t h i s issue. Whereas the B r i t i s h delegation, and notably Lord Robert C e c i l and General Smuts, warmly supported his view, at lea s t with respect to land armaments, his other associates, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the French, the I t a l i a n , and t h e i r continental a l l i e s , strongly opposed them. They a l l r e a d i l y agreed on the necessity of disarming t h e i r enemies and even consented to preface the M i l i t a r y , Naval, and A i r Clauses of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s with the following declaration; 1 In order to render possible the i n i t a t i o n of a general l i m i t a t i o n of the armaments of a l l the nations, Germany undertakes s t r i c t l y to observe the m i l i t a r y , naval and a i r clauses which follow 1 When i t came .however, t o this " i n i t i a t i o n " the continental European A l l i e s with one voice declared: ' F i r s t give us a guarantee against the renewal of the aggressions of 1914, for instance by en-dowing your League of Nations with a r e l i a b l e i n -ternational p o l i c e forCe,then, and then only w i l l we agree to the reduction of our own armies. They alone saved us from a n n i h i l a t i o n i n the war and u n t i l you w i l l have supplied us with an adequate substitute we cannot and w i l l not d i s -pense with them.1 w 1. Major Bratt i n his stimulating " That Next War" brings home some very pertinent points i n this connection. 1. Rappard, Wm. E. International Relations as Viewed from  Geneva, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1925. p. 145-146. -121-" There are,- indeed, some who see i n d i s -armament the real solution of the problem of war and peace.For our part we deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s s o l ution, so far as i s meant mere disarmament and noth-ing more. It i s olear already that the disarmament question has been driven into- a' cul-de-sac by t h i s l i m i t a t i o n of view. It i s not only the resistance of the reactionary forces and groups behind war which has hitherto prevented any r a t i o n a l progress on t h i s question. The fundamental reason why noth-ing has been done and nothing i s l i k e l y to be done i s probably that the whole problem has been treated i n so one-sided a manner, and has been torn out of i t s h i s t o r i c a l s etting. To regard disarmament as the end i s to show that the problem has not been c l e a r l y thought out. It i s necessary that we should c l e a r l y r e a l i z e t h i s . There cannot- be any disarmament or even reduction of armaments worthy of the name, u n t i l the nations have begun,at least i n p r i n c i p l e , to prepare for some federation, or u n t i l some more e f f e c t i v e form'than the present League of Nations has been found. The absence of decisive measures for guarantees must be regarded as the p r i n c i p a l reason why the solution of the dis-armament -problem does not make any progress.Only when i t is made w i l l the demand for s e c u t f t y — which now cripples everything--begin to rest on a new foundation. No endeavor i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n can be made, however, u n t i l present-day m i l i t -arism has been defeated i n p r i n c i p l e and to-gether with nationalism, has been pressed into the background by the nations. There must be a ^ p a r a l l e l development. Just i n the same way as, formerly, armaments and the p o l i c y of power of the' i n d i v i d u a l States influenced and sustained each other, so also must a system of guarantees and- disarmament do the same thing. Many people regard i t as a complioation of the problem to combine v/ith disarmament the successive and p a r a l l e l l i m i t a t i o n of sovereignty. But they are wrong,for the question i s r e a l l y complex. To make th i s clear i s i n a manner to simp l i f y the problem and to sound the depths u n t i l bottom i s reached." 1 The f a i l u r e of the League of Nations to solve the Bratt, That Next War, Harcourt Brace and Go. N.Y., 1930 p. 233rBT^ -122-problem of armaments and to replace tne anarchy of i n t e r -national s t r i f e by eo-operative action.under the reign of law, i s seen f i n a l l y to be inherent i n the inadequacy of league machinery. It has been shown that v/hile the League exists merely as a means of bringing together national delegates, and without i n i t s e l f possessing any authority to coerce, i t cannot function as an e f f e c t i v e instrument. It i s obvious that international co-operative action i s inconsistent with the concept of exclusive national 'sovereignty. While i t i s possible to blame i n -dividual statesmen and individual states, t h i s essay takes the p o s i t i o n that such c r i t i c i s m i s very s u p e r f i c i a l and that i t serves l i t t l e useful purposes. It i s easy to be wise aft e r the fact and to trace the successive steps by whioh the League was destroyed by the actions of statesmen and nations through the f a i l u r e to stop Japan and I t a l y . It i s easy to be b r i l l i a n t l y cynical and to see i n the motives of individuals and states only that which i s e v i l . Every man on the street can say what could have been done, and what should have been done. But national and i n t e r -national problems are not that simple. They are complex problems. They are the result^not of the actions or the opinions of individuals or groups of individuals working alone, tout of the divergent aims and ambitions of m i l l i o n s -123-of individuals and groups of i n d i v i d u a l s . Out of the complex c o n f l i c t of divergent interests there emerges c e r t a i n common needs. To s a t i s f y these needs there emerge c e r t a i n i d e a l s . But the ideal must precede the actual manifestation i n r e a l i t y . Even when the ideal takes d e f i n i t e form i n the minds of men, i t must s t i l l do battle with the vested ideas which i t challenges. Here the battle i s but a minor clash. The r e a l c o n f l i c t comes when an ideal i s given actual material form. The struggle then i s transferred from the academic realm to the physical. It i s i n e v i t a b l e that amidst the c o n f l i c t i n g interests of mankind a l l human e f f o r t s thus idealized and thus materialized oan not function according to a pre-arranged plan, but must proceed along the p a i n f u l path of t r i a l and error. The League of Nations i s here no d i f f e r e n t from any other of the ideals which man has attempted to r e a l i z e i n p r a c t i c e . The story of the struggles for human l i b e r t y , r e l i g i o u s freedom, democracy, a l l follow the same general pattern. To expect the League, to accomplish i n practice, what I t was conceived to do i n theory, within a period of twenty years i s to expect the impossible from mankind. In being wise a f t e r the fact we are a l l prophets. But such reversed prophecy adds l i t t l e to the effort at solution of the problems which confront us, unless from the errors we oan trace the motives which gave them b i r t h . .-124-It has been pointed out before that i t i s useless to blame i n d i v i d u a l s for what i s obvious aft e r the fact. This does not make human a c t i v i t i e s impersonal. It merely gives to the individual the benefit of human charity. The actions of statesmen and states i n the oonduot of League a f f a i r s were l a r g e l y determined by the interests which they represented, and by the i n s t -i t u t i o n s - which were the manifestations of these i n t e r e s t s . Of these i n s t i t u t i o n s the national state was the most fir m l y entrenched. To expect that such an i n s t i t u t i o n backed by the economic forces which i t has so long pro-tected would w i l l i n g l y surrender i t s sovereignty to an international organization was to expect more than a proper h i s t o r i c a l perspective would warrant. Only when int e r n a t i o n a l needs become more pressing than national needs w i l l national sovereignty be modified i n favor of international control. It would appear that the world has reached or i s r a p i d l y reaching that point. The present war may well deal the f i n a l blow to the concept of exclusive nationalism as a workable feature i n the present state of world interdependence. The utterances of public men and the amount of writing, upon the subject seems to indicate that the ideal of what Laski c a l l s the " C i v i t a s Maxima" 1. has taken quite d e f i n i t e shape 1. Laski, Harold J., Nationalism and the Future of  C i v i l i z a t i o n , London, Watts & Co., 1933, passim. -12.5-i n the minds of men. The next stage i s that of the material manifestation of t h i s i d e a l . That i t w i l l come after the present war i s a reasonably safe p r e d i c t i o n . Just i n what form, and how f a r the manifestation of the ideal w i l l be possible i t i s hard to predict. A discussion of suggestions and p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s the subject of the next chapter. CHAPTER 111 PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION. -126-CHAPTER 111 Proposals for Solution. So far thi s essay has been concerned with an analysis of the European anarchy. The analysis has revealed that exclusive national sovereignty, i f not the e v i l i t s e l f , i s at least the obstacle v/hich has prevented the growth of a healthy international co-operation. The attempt to overcome the obstacle by means of a Covenant has proven a f a i l u r e . It would appear that the only solu t i o n i s one which tears down the barrier of national i s o l a t i o n , i f not com-pl e t e l y , at least to the point where i t ceases to be i n -surmountable. The analysis of the problem is a r e l a t i v e l y simple process and the e v i l of national sovereignty has been recognized very widely. .The solution .however, i s by no means simple, and as yet there has not come fo r t h any suggestion of s u f f i c i e n t l y wide acceptance to warrant i t s probable adoption.While there have been numerous remedies suggested, they have so far gone l i t t l e beyond the f i e l d of academic speculation. That the e v i l has been recognized, and that suggestions have been made for i t s eradication i s a hopeful sign, and indeed, i s the seed from which a p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n may grow. It w i l l be necessary to -127-examine some oi the major suggestions both i n regard to_ t h e i r i n t r i n s i c merits and th e i r prospects o i success. The path oi iuture development.however, w i l l , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , be chosen not by i t s merits, but by i t s proximity to established proceedure. Only when a revolution ( an unpredictable event ) e i i e c t s h i s t o r i c a l change i s there any departure from t h i s general r u l e . At present there seems l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of such rev o l u t i o n . S t a l i n , the High Priest of the s o c i a l revolution, (which at one time was at least a p o s s i b i l i t y ) has so discredited the L e f t i s t movement as to render any threat or hope of world-wide co-operation by s o c i a l i s t governments a very remote p o s s i b i l i t y . Indeed, the Russian invasions of Poland and Finland would seem to suggest that Communism has suffered a metamorphosis, or that S t a l i n has been converted from socialism to imperialism, throwing o f f the simple garments of the p r o l e t a r i a n leading the masses to t h e i r s o c i a l i s t triumph, to don the imperial robes of the Czars, offering his s e r v i l e legions on the a l t e r of Mars for the greater glory of Imperial Russia. The d e f l e c t i o n of i t s leaders, be they MacDonalds or Stal i n s , does not i n i t s e l f destroy the merits of a move-ment; nevertheless , i t may so dis c r e d i t i t i n the eyes of the public, and even in the eyes of i t s own adherents as to render i t s e f f o r t s f u t i l e . The L e f t i s t cause was making -128-slow, but steady progress, against the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s of en-trenched reaction, .but when i t s e f f o r t s were sabotaged by i t s trusted leaders the movement not only ceased to advance, but was compelled to retreat i n ignoble confusion. Both as a const i t utional development and as a m i l i t a n t crusade the s o c i a l i s t movement has suffered a crushing defeat. The defeat of the movement i n Great B r i t a i n by the d e f l e c t i o n of MacDonald, followed by the v i c t o r y of the Rightist non-intervention i n Spain, and culminating i n the f i n a l crush--ing blow dealt by S t a l i n , has not only l e f t the S o c i a l i s t movement leaderless, but has replaced the enthusiasm of i t s adherents by the despair of defeatism. Without prejudice for or against the S o c i a l i s t movement, we can to-day assume that i t i s for some time at l e a s t , a l o s t cause. At the outset, therefore, we can eliminate as a possible cure of the European anarchy any i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n based upon an organized s o c i a l i s t revolution, 1. 1, The s o c i a l i s t movement has too much r e a l merit to be permanently crushed. There i s always t h e " p o s s i b i l i t y that the masses now 'inactive because of the f r u s t r a t -ion following t h e i r recent defeats together with the i n t o x i c a t i o n of the war s p i r i t , and the r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e i r action deemed necessary i n waretime, may with the spread, and i n t e n s i t y of the present c o n f l i c t , be so driven by suffering and p r i v a t i o n as to stake everything on the prospects of a violent revolution. -129-Since t h i s essay is-concerned not only with the possib-i l i t i e s , but with the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of solution, i t i s necessary to consider further the change i n the world s i t u a t i o n brought about by the volte-face of Russia. The vi c t o r y of S t a l i n over Trotsky and the steps by which the new Russia gained recognition and was f i n a l l y admitted to the league seemed to have l a r g e l y removed the fear of the so-ca l l e d Communist Menace. The prospect of war was considerably lessened, and for two main reasons. In the f i r s t place, Russia, as a member of the league and a protagonist of peaceful c o l l a b o r a t i o n and international co-operation, weighted the balance against aggression to the extent that, onoe spurred to action, the combined forces of the nations advocating the rule of law were i n an unassailable p o s i t i o n . Moreover, the smaller powers wishing to preserve t h e i r independence were i n such a p o s i t i o n that t h e i r associat-ion with rather than against the league powers made such a p o l i c y imperative. Against these overwhelming odds neither Germany, I t a l y or Japan could hope to survive were the actual challenge to a major war accepted. In the second plaoe , the f e e l i n g against war especially i n B r i t a i n and France was so great that were either of these governments to i n i t i a t e the issue i t would, have to stand the chance of such a popular outcry as to d i s c r e d i t i t s government and to establ i s h a d e f i n i t e l y l e f t i s t regime. With Russia i n the role of a co-operative power, preaching the doctrine of -130-peace, the prospect of a s o c i a l i s t era would have a very wide appeal. The challenge that the Russian system was a menace to freedom could carry l i t t l e weight since i t could be shown that the new c o n s t i t u t i o n and the increasing emphasis placed by her on League co-operation suggested a t r u l y democratic s p i r i t . War, therefore, between the Great Powers was a prospect which could be faced by neither side. Prom the point of view of Germany, I t a l y or Japan ( b e l l i -cose speeches notwithstanding) the external odds were too great, and from the point of view of Britain,Prance ,( or Russia, so i t seemed), the internal f e e l i n g against war was so great as to obviate i t s probability.Under these condit-ions , the L e f t i s t movement might well have prospered and grown i n strength to the point where, either by c o n s t i t u t -ional means or by m i l i t a n t revolution, the i n t e r n a l control of at least three very powerful states would be i n the hands of governments dominated by a philosophy which has always emphasized international rather than national int e r e s t s . The close co-operation i m p l i c i t i n such a prospect may well have led to such European co-operation as to make recourse to national wars more and more remote. The d e f l e c t i o n of Russia, however, has shifted the balance to the point where Great B r i t a i n and Prance face the prospect of f i g h t i n g at a tremendous disadvantage, the extent of which i s not yet apparent. While the ohoice of p o s i t i o n for -131-the smaller powers was obviously with the A l l i e s while Russia remained l o y a l to the p r i n c i p l e s oi c o l l e c t i v e sec-u r i t y and i n a l l i a n c e with France, that choice has now become most d i i i i c u l t . These small powers can a l l y them-selves with France and B r i t a i n and r i s k the prospect oi a iate l i k e that oi Poland, or they can succumb to the pressure o i Germany and Russia and thereby be instrumental i n the v i c t o r y oi the powers which w i l l ultimately dominate and destroy them. The above i s now written from the point of view of h i s t o r i c a l speculation, but to emphasize the degree to which recent events, and esp e c i a l l y the volte-face of Russia, have complicated the European and the international anarchy. The alignment of the powers to-day i s not i n accordance with p o l i t i c a l philosophies, but i n accordance with the supposed-l y discarded practice of power p o l i t i c s . While as yet the democracies of B r i t a i n and France are f i g h t i n g the au-tocracy of H i t l e r , there i s no guarantee that the spread of the c o n f l i c t w i l l be i n accordance with t h i s preliminary scheme. Indeed , though Russia i s apparently a l l i e d with Germany, B r i t a i n and France have not recognized her o f f i c i a -l l y as an enemy. Moreover, neither B r i t a i n nor France are prepared to recognize i n Mussolini the same menaoe as i s inherent i n H i t l e r .While the a l l i e s fight the war of democracy against dictatorship, they probably would be -132-quite w i l l i n g , and. even eager, to grasp the hand of Mussolini, the arch enemy of democracy, were i t extended i n t h e i r behalf. The dice have not yet been thrown which w i l l determine whether Mussolini s h a l l play the role of Saint or D e v i l . The a l l i e s , too, would also look with favour upon the blood-stained hands-of Japan were that country to seize the opportunity to j o i n them against Russia. Just what the f i n a l alignment i n the present con-f l i c t w i l l be, i s by no means cle a r , but i t would seem safe to predict that i t w i l l be determined by the prospect of national s e c u r i t y or national aggrandisement rather than upon id e a l o g i c a l considerations. Any probable solution for the European anarchy which i s adopted at the terminat-ion of the present war i s , therefore, l i k e l y to depend upon the world s i t u a t i o n at that time, and not upon any ideal which the present war i s seeking to establish. Should Germany be victorious i t i s hard to v i s u a l i z e any chance for internationalism. The p o s s i b i l i t i e s envisaged i n t h i s chapter are, therefore, based upon the assumption of vi c t o r y by B r i t a i n , France, and whatever powers cast i n th e i r lot with these two democracies. The prospects for solut i o n may be divided into four categories, each of which must be considered as a p o s s i -b i l i t y and as a p r o b a b i l i t y . The four schemes we s h a l l discuss i n this chapter are : -133-1. World Federation. 2. Federation of the Democracies , " Union Now". 3. Federation of the European States. 4. Franco- B r i t i s h Federation. While one may agree with Browning that a man's reaoh must exceed h i s grasp , one need not hesitate, i f the facts warrant the conclusion, to discard as impracticable a solution no matter how l o f t y i t s idealism. World federat-ion i s probably the ideal to which a l l who believe i n international co-operation are working. The question , however, is not so much that of aim as of method. The problem is not concerned v/ith estimating the merits of an unattainable Utopia, but with an attainable step i n that d i r e c t i o n . The prospect of world federation must, therefore , be analysed, not i n the l i g h t of i t s capacity to solve the problem of the European and world anarchy, but i n the l i g h t of the f e a s a b i l i t y of i t s attainment. In this way the proposal needs l i t t l e analysis.,, since the obstacles to i t s adoption are so c l e a r l y apparent. Such a federation must f i r s t be based....upon a reasonably stable order within i t s various parts. Asia alone would here present a major obstacle. Were China a well organized state, Japan would find i t impossible, to wage her present aggressive war. In the world community someone must have the authority to speak -134-China. That authority could not be designated by Japan, B r i t a i n , or any country other than China herself. China could not enter a world Federation; she has f i r s t to f i n d her own unity. India, and a great part of A f r i c a would also, i f they were to take part i n t e l l i g e n t l y i n a world federation, be under serious- disadvantages, But these are perhaps minor obstacles. There would f i r s t of a l l be required, i f not a common p o l i c y , at least a common w i l l to co-operate. The fact that today three wars are being waged over matters which conceivably might be negotiated, shows that such a w i l l ' i s far from being present. But perhaps the greatest obstacle is the c o n f l i c t of ideas which has v i r t u a l l y s p l i t ' t h e world into two camps. If i t were conceivable that Democratic states could find a common meeting .ground with the dictatorships the plan, i n spite of i t s other d i f f i c u l t i e s ^ might conceivably be given e f f e c t . But i t i s impossible that states which exist i n t h e i r present p o l i t i o a l pattern by the strength of a leader-ship founded upon a hatred and a denunciation of a l l that the Democracies extol, could find common cause with the objects of t h e i r abuse. 1. Even were i t possible to convoke an international conference to organize a world federation, such a prospect at the present time, -would be 1. Armstrong i n his " We or They" makes t h i s point very clear. '-135-doomed to f a i l u r e . Such a conference would require as i t s . f i r s t premise the assumption of the common ground of honesty and goodwill. To allow the gangster hands of S t a l i n , H i t l e r , . or Mussolini to "be the moulders of international destiny would destroy the prospects of international co-operation, and would make Justice not only blind, but stark mad. Between Justice and i n j u s t i c e , between freedon and tyranny, between tolerance and i n t o l l s r a n c e , there can be no common ground. Even though i t may be recognized that the present dictatorships are the res u l t s of the very anarchy we wish to destroy , i t would s t i l l be necessary to b u i l d a world federation from the materials available at the moment. There could be no place i n such a structure for the explosive elements of Ease ism, Uaziism, or Stalinism. An international Munich could have no s t a b i l i t y . The development of world federation was no doubt i n ' the minds of many of the champions of the league. Mr. Oscar Newfang i n his " Road to Yforld Peace", 1. had even gone so far as to outline the constitution of such a world government. Mr. Newfang published his book i n 1924 when the League , untried i n any major d i f f i c u l t y seemed to promise much for mankind. Mr. Hewfang does not conceive of the world government being born i n l u s t y vigor l i k e Gargantua out of the ear of Gargamelle, but as developing from the League i t s e l f . l.Hewfang, Oscar, The Road to World Peace, G. P. Putnman's Sons. E. Y., 1924. -136-" F?our steps would develop the League of Nations into a federation of nations whioh would eliminate a l l the imperfections of the League as an organizat-ion for the maintenance of permanent international peace. These steps are : 1, the addition to the Assembly of a second chamber whose members are apportioned according to population; 2. the adopt-ion of majority rule instead of the rule of un-animity; 3. the gradual transfer of the control of the armament of the member states to the control of the federation, and, 4. the grant of compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n to the Permanent Oourt of Internat-ional Justice, i t s decisions to be enforced by the power of the federation." 1. The author while he colors his work with a very decided theological t i n t , does nevertheless create a very r a t i o n a l picture of a possible future world government. At the time when Mr.Newfang was writing there may have been the poss-i b i l i t y of such a program. S i r Arthur Salter r e f e r r i n g to "Union Now" , has t h i s to say: " So much I had written before the p u b l i c a t i o n of Mr. Clarence Streit'.'s book, " Union Now". Now that I have read i t I think i t well to add a few comments. It w i l l be evident from what I have said i n t h i s chapter, and s t i l l more i n Chapter 1 of t h i s Part, that I, l i k e him, desire a form of world government which i s based upon a greater surrender of national sovereignty than the " Inter-State" c o n s t i t u t i o n of the League of Nations, and that I was i n favour of the l a t t e r because i t seemed not only to embody as much l i m i t a t i o n of sovereignty as i t was possible to a t t a i n at the time but because i t contained within i t s e l f the means of develop-ing , and consolidating, further l i m i t a t i o n s 1. Newfang, op. c i t . , p. 285. -137-" and cessions of sovereignty as a developing world opinion made these possible; so that i n the end the way would be prepared f o r the f i n a l step of federation. This has been the aspect of the League of Nations, and t h i s the ultimate goal, which, as far as I am concerned ,. has always had my deepest and ultimate l o y a l t y , and I believe that the same i s true of many of those who have been among the most ardent of the supporters of the League of Nations. For myself I stressed t h i s side of the League ,. and i n a 1 ong. argument based upon the experience of A l l i e d co-operation i n the war, defended the p r i n c i p l e of. proc eeding step by step towards a more complete'system i n the f i r s t book: I ever wrote, as early as 1922, " A l l i e d Shipping Control; an Experiment i n International Adminis-tration',' which concludes with the following comment; 1 The conception here presented i s thus not that.of a central super-Government. It may be that t h i s w i l l come. It may be that the central organ of the League w i l l i n time i t s e l f become possessed of executive power, which , within a wide and widening sphere, w i l l override the powers of national Governments. It may even be that i n future ages the world w i l l find a single centre of l e g i s l a t i v e and executive authority by a process of development similar to that by which provinces have been united into kingdoms and kingdoms into Empires. Such direct power,however, i f i t comes, must be delegated, not usurped. It must grow by a natural process from the gradual union of the national a u t h o r i t i e s , and the increasing harmony of t h e i r p o l i c i e s . It must not appear suddenly as a new, an a l i e n , and a r i v a l force. In the immediate future executive power can neither be seized from, nor i s i t to any very important extent l i k e l y to be delegated by, the national Governments. Looking at our problem, therefore within the perhaps r e s t r i c t e d range of an administrative v i s i o n , we must contemplate the League attaining i t s ends through the more humble methods here described.... So gradually under t h i s ( the League) system a l l the forces which exist i n the world to as s i s t the development of p o l i c y i n a d i r e c t i o n which con-duces to peace and the general welfare, as d i s t i n c t from national advantages and international d i s -pute, may be mobilized and brought to bear at the most v i t a l and e f f e c t i v e points of national -138 " T administration. And a mechanism so constructed can never break under the s t r a i n of what i t under-takes. It i s e l a s t i c . It adjusts i t s e l f automatic-a l l y to .the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the moment. It gives expression i n i t s most effective form to the r e a l international f e e l i n g of the world. But there i t stops. It does not attempt to impose by either superior force or administrative device the i n t e r -national p o l i c y of any minority upon the reluctant or resistant national Governments of the world * I agree completely with Mr. Clarence S t r e i t , as I have long done on t h i s point v/ith Lord Lothian and Mr. H.G.Wells, that what is ultimately needed i s a form of international Government which w i l l , on a few but essential matters( of v/hich the most important are defence and the conditions Under which international trade i s carried on), take over the sovereign rights of separate States as. the inter-State System of the League does not do." 1. While i t might, therefore have been f e a s i b l e to c u l t i v a t e such a world government i n the f e r t i l e s o i l of a healthy League, i t i s not probable that i t could grow in any other v/ay. With the League i n i t s present state of i l l health it. would seem that the only organization capable of further-ing such a plan i s i n no p o s i t i o n to undertake i t . In the l i g h t of t h i s condition i t would seem fantastic to expect anything so mature as a world federation* "Union Now". The most concrete proposal for the solution of the . world's i l l s i s Mr. S t r e i t T s " Union Now" . It i s very d i f f i c u l t to give i n b r i e f form the substance of t h i s book, but perhaps the following quotation from the book i t s e l f w i l l give the 1. Salter, S i r Arthur " Security" Macmillian & Co.. London, 1939. -139-general idea. " In the North A t l a n t i c or founder democracies I would include at least-these f i f t e e n ( or ten) ; The American Union, the B r i t i s h Commonwealth ( s p e c i f i c a l l y the United Kingdom, The Federal Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, the Union of South A f r i c a , Ireland ), the French Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Swiss Confederation, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. These few include the world's greatest, oldest, most homogeneous and c l o s e l y linked democracies, the peoples most experienced and successful i n solving the problem at hand - the peaceful, rea-sonable establishment of ef f e c t i v e inter-state democratic world government, language divides them into only f i v e big groups and for a l l p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l purposes,into only two, English and French.Their combined c i t i z e n r y of nearly 300,000.000 i s well balanced, half i n Europe and half overseas. None of these democracies has been at war with any of the others since more than 100 years. Each 'now fears war, but not one fears war from the others. These few democracies s u f f i c e to provide the nucleus of world government with the fi n a n c i a l , , monetary•economic and p o l i t i c a l power necessary both to assure peace to i t s members peacefully from the outset by sheer overwhelming preponder-ance and i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y , and p r a c t i c a l l y to end the monetary i n s e c u r i t y and economic warfare now ravaging the whole world. These few divide among them such wealth and., power that the so-called world p o l i t i c a l , economic and monetary anarchy i s at bottom nothing but t h e i r own anarchy--since to end i t they need only unite i n establish-. ing law and order among themselves. Together these f i f t e e n own almost half the earth, r u l e a l l i t s oceans, govern nearly half mankind. They do two-thirds of the world's trade, and most of t h i s would be called t h e i r domestic trade once they united, for i t i s among themselves. They have more than 50 per cent control of nearly every e s s e n t i a l material. They have more than 60 per cent control of suoh war essentials as o i l , copper, lead, steel , iron, coal, t i n , cotton, wool, wood pulp,shipping tonnage. They have almost complete control of such keys as n i c k e l , rubber and automobile production. Thoy pooB-o«8~p«ga-e44re-6JA^ -140-" They possess p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the world's gold and hanked wealth. Their existing armed strength is such that once they united it- they could r a d i c a l l y reduce t h e i r armaments and yet gain a two-power standard of armed s u p e r i o r i t y over the powers whose aggression any of them now fears. The Union's existing and potential power from the outset would be so gigantic , i t s bulk so vast, i t s v i t a l centres so scattered, that Germany, I t a l y and Japan even put together could no more dream of attacking i t than Mexico dreams of invading the American Union now. Once established the Union's s u p e r i o r i t y i n power would be constantly increasing simply through the admission to i t of outside nations. A number would no doubt be admitted immediately.- By t h i s process the absolutist powers would constantly become weaker and more i s o l a t e d . " 1. Mr. S t r e i t would unite these powers i n a federal union and would give the Union the following r i g h t s or powers: " 1. The r i g h t to grant c i t i z e n s h i p . 2. The right to make peace and war; to negotiate t r e a t i e s and otherwise deal with the outside world, to r a i s e and maintain a defense force. 3. The right to regulate inter-state and foreign trade. 4. The right to c o i n and issue money, and f i x other measures. 5. The right to govern communications; To operate the postal service, and regulate, control or operate other inter-state communication services." 2. One cannot read Mr. S t r e i t ' s book without being impressed by the soundness of much of his argument, and of the s i n -c e r i t y of his appeal. The greater part of his argument i s 1. •• " Union How * p. 7- 8. 2. i b i d . p. 179. -141-devoted to comparison between League and Union. Not only does he show ho?/ a League must f a i l because of the contradiction to concerted action i m p l i c i t i n national sovereignty, but he attempts to show how a Union must work. The l a t t e r part of his argument i s based l a r g e l y upon the effectiveness of the American Union. This is perhaps the weakest part of his l o g i c , since the analogy i s not very close. It i s not the purpose of t h i s essay to make anything l i k e a. thorough review of Mr. S t r e i t r s proposal or to suggest that i t i s impossible. Indeed, i t seems to the present writer to be an ideal s o l -ution, and quite possible i f we accept the somewhat naive optimism which characterizes " Union How" " A l l i t w i l l take to make t h i s Union— whether i n - a thousand years or now, whether long a f t e r catastrophe or just i n time to prevent i t , — is agreement by a majority to do i t . Union i s one of those things which to do we need but agree to do, and which we can not poss i b l y ever do except by agreeing to do i t . Why then can we not do i t now i n time for us to benefit by i t and save millions of l i v e s ? Are we so much feebler than our fathers and our chi l d r e n that we can not do what our fathers did and what we expect our ch i l d r e n to do ? Why can we not agree on Union now ? 1, From the point of view of p o s s i b i l i t y there i s l i t t l e that oan be Condemned i n Mr. S t r e i t ' s plan. The argument for the most part i s very sound. But p o s s i b i l i t y i s only one c r i t e r i o n . " Union How " must be judged on the basis of pro b a b i l i t y , and here Mr. S t r e i t enjoys an optimism which ' too greatly minimizes the d i f f i o u l t i e s . It must be borne in mind that neither the soundness of an argument nor the 1. footnote appears on page 142. -142-g l i t t e r o f t h e p r o s p e c t e n v i s a g e d i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c a r r y a n y p l a n t o a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n . The p r i n c i p l e s o f C h r i s t i a n -i t y / have been p r e a c h e d f o r n e a r l y 2000 y e a r s . Were t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s p u t i n t o p r a c t i c e t h e r e would be l i t t l e n e ed f o r a n y o t h e r c u r e . We might , t h e r e f o r e , a s k w i t h t h e same n a i v e t y , " Why c a n ' t we have C h r i s t i a n i t y now ? " The s o c i a l i s t , were h i s p l a n a d o p t e d might b r i n g a b o u t a l i k e s a n g u i n e w o r l d , but i t i s d o u b t f u l i f t h e m a j o r i t y o f p e o p l e would e v e n d e i g n t o answer t h e q u e s t i o n , " Why c a n ' t we have S o c i a l i s m now ? " Were i t m e r e l y t h e p r o b l e m o f d i v i s i n g a p l a n o r d r a w i n g up a c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e r e w o u l d be l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y . T h e r e i s no d e a r t h o f e x p e r t op-i n i o n a v a i l a b l e f o r s u o h a t a s k . I t i s t h e a c c e p t a n c e by enough o f a n y p l a n w h i c h c r e a t e s t h e d i f f i c u l t y . M o r e o v e r , t h e m a j o r i t y r e q u i r e d must n o t o n l y f a v o u r a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y , b u t m u s t be i n a p o s i t i o n t o t r a n s l a t e i t s a p p r o v a l i n t o a c t i o n . T h e r e i s l i t t l e d oubt t h a t were i t m e r e l y a q u e s t i o n o f p e a c e or war a r e a l m a j o r i t y c o u l d be f o u n d w h i c h f a v o u r e d p e a c e . But how t o t r a n s m u t e t h e d e s i r e f o r p e a c e i n t o t h e i n s t r u m e n t w h i o h w i l l i n s u r e i t i s t h e r e a l p r o b l e m . Mr. S t r e i t seems t o p l a c e t r e m e n d o u s f a i t h i n t h e power o f t h e o r d i n a r y man under d e m o c r a t i c r u l e t o p u t h i s p l a n i n t o o p e r a t i o n . W h i l e a d e m o c r a c y a l l o w s f r e e d o m o f 1. U n i o n Now p . 4-5. ( r e f e r s t o q u o t a t i o n on page 141) -143-expression f i n time of peace) and gives the ordinary man a chanoe to take part i n government , i t does not i n any par-t i c u l a r instance necessarily mean government by the whole people. While p o l i t i c a l candidates are often swept into o f f i c e on d e f i n i t e or general p o l i t i c a l promises, there i s no guarantee that these promises w i l l be carried out. Moreover, changing conditions may create situations whereby action i s taken and consent i s sought after the f a c t . In the case of the present war, Canada declared war i n support of Great B r i t a i n . This i s hardly correct i f i t i s assumed that the whole of the people of Canada had a part i n taking t h i s step.The assumption i s that Canada means the people of Canada, and that these people are wholeheartedly i n favour of the step taken by t h e i r government. This assumption may be correct. It may be correct now, while i t may have been i n -correct' at the time i t was taken. I f we assume that the people of Canada are i n favour of active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war we would s t i l l have to determine whether they are i n favour because they support the o r i g i n a l step or because they see no good reason for changing ; they see d e f i n i t e harm i n changing; they are resigned to a f a i t accompli. So far no government has ever given to outline any sp e c i f i c p r i n c i p l e upon which a declaration of war w i l l be made. The present declaration of war appears to have been made by.right of a statute enacted during the l a s t world war. 1. 1. War Measures Act of 1914 , Grube, G.M.A. " Freedon and War", Canadian Forum , November, 1939. . -144~ Since i t w i l l be quite democratic to challenge the entry of Canada into the war when the war i s over, there w i l l probably be a great deal heard about i t then. Por the present .however, democracy, as i t relates to t h i s question i s a dead issue. There i s here a weakness i n democracy, but a weakness which might be very d i f f i c u l t to eliminate. 1. Moreover, i f steps were taken to remove t h i s shortcoming i t might mean the s a c r i f i c e to the p r i n c i p l e s of democracy of the speed of action necessary to meet succe s s f u l l y the challenge of a t o t a l i t a r i a n power. The point to note i s that modern democracy,in order to function at a l l , f e s p e c i a l l y when i t must be prepared at a moment's notice to cope with the unpredictable moves of d i c -t a t o r i a l states ) s a c r i f i c e s a c e r t a i n measure of i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government.Power must be delegated to representatives. A government i n power may assume that i t i s granted a mandate to carry out a defined p o l i c y . But as a general rule t h i s i s not the case. The v i c t o r y of a par-t i c u l a r group or party merely means that that group has been given authority to enact l e g i s l a t i o n and to carry on government for a c e r t a i n length of time. By the system of patronage, such a government builds up a group of supporters who have vested interest i n i t , and who can be r e l i e d upon to support i t s p o l i c i e s and to work to keep i t i n power. 1. I n i t i a t i v e , Referendum, and Recall are attempts at elim-inating the e v i l . Switzerland and U.S.A. makes some use of them but they are not yet generally practised i n democracy, '145-Th e means of moulding public opinion are l a r g e l y economic• The holders of economic power can exert pressure upon employees and can spend vast sums of money i n newspaper and radio propaganda. Public Opinion i s not to be conceived of as the unbiased expression of the opinion of ind i v i d u a l s , but as the expression of the opinion of individuals con-ditioned by p o l i t i c a l progaganda fed them by newspapers, magazines, and the radio, ( l a r g e l y controlled by a wealthy owning group), and by the pressure which employers can exert upon employees* Freedom of speech does not mean that one i s necessarily able to reach the ears of a large number of people free of charge; i t means only that the in d i v i d u a l has the right to express his opinions without fear -( t h e o r e t i c a l l y , not always so i n p r a c t i c e ) . It does not guarantee that the world w i l l make a beaten path to the door of the individual who can offer the best or most democratic solution to any given s o c i a l , economic, or p o l i t i c a l problem. Freedom of speech merely gives the right to speak; i t does not give the economic power to speak to the country at large through press or radio; nor does'Aeven provide the money necessary to hire a h a l l and to pay fo r the adver-t i s i n g for a l o c a l gathering. This does not preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of the growth of public opinion which often challenges the vested interests, but i t does give a decided advantage to the holders of economic power. When Mr. S t r e i t , -146- • therefore, speaks about the relati-ve ease with which the democracies could put Union into practice he seems to assume far too much democracy i n democracy. He does not take into consideration the fact that nationalism does not survive because i t i s the w i l l of the majority, or i s i n the best interests of t h i s majority, but because the economic power vested i n t h i s condition i s used to mould the minds of the majority. It i s these vested interests whowMr.Streit w i l l have to convince of the soundness of his plan( and of i t s economic advantages to them) for they, i n the f i n a l analysis, are public opinion. One other factor must be taken into consideration when estimating the p r o b a b i l i t y of adoption of M r . S t r e i t Ts proposal, and that i s , the p o l i t i c a l philosophies motivat-ing the individual democtatic states, e s p e c i a l l y B r i t a i n , France, and the United States. When we speak of the United States of America or American foreign p o l i c y , do we mean an America under President Roosevelt and a Hew Deal ad-ministration, or a United States under a d e f i n i t e l y i s o l a t -i o n i s t President and a Congress of the same persuasion ? Do we mean a United States with Gordell Hull as Secretary of State, or a United States with foreign p o l i c y directed by a highly protectionist Secretary of State? The same considerations w i l l have to be borne i n mind i n reference to B r i t a i n and Prance. In Democratic countries a long term -147-p o l i c y may w e l l be t h e t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o a c t i o n of t h e common w i l l ; but i n r e l a t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n c i d e n t or a t any p a r t i c u l a r t ime t h e i n d i v i d u a l l e a d e r or g o v e r n i n g group i s t h e s o l e a r b i t e r . A U n i t e d S t a t e s under R o o s e v e l t and a B r i t a i n under a l a b o u r government may have much more i n common i n r e f e r e n c e t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h a n e i t h e r of t h e s e governments have w i t h t h e p a r t i e s w h i c h oppose them w i t h i n t h e i r own b o r d e r s . I f we c o u l d assume a New D e a l government i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a P o p u l a r F r o n t Government i n F r a n c e , and a Labour Government i n B r i t a i n , we c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y expect from such, a c o m b i n a t i o n t h e development of such a p r o p o s a l as Mr. S t r e i t s u g g e s t s . Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e t h r e e governments, a c t i n g a l o n e , or i n c o n c e r t w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o t h e r d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e s , might be c o n c e i v e d of as drawing up p r o p o s a l s f o r a f e d e r a l u n i o n w h i c h c o u l d be s u b m i t t e d f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n by p o p u l a r v o t e by t h e n a t i o n a l s of a l l t h e governments c o n c e r n e d . But w i t h any or a l l of t h e s e t h r e e main democracies i n the hands of r e a c t i o n a r y governments i t i s hard t o v i s u a l i z e any such a p r o b a b i l i t y . The d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two above c o n d i t i o n s i s not t h e d i f f e r e n c e between two forms of g o v e r n m e n t . l t i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a c c e p t a n c e of a p o l i c y by a group w h i c h might have e v e r y t h i n g t o g a i n by such a c t i o n , a n d acceptance by a group w h i c h might have much t o l o s e . F o r t h e o r d i n a r y man Union might w e l l ensure a s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g -148-far i n advance of that he at present enjoys. For the cap-i t a l i s t , Union might destroy the national monopoly or nation-a l protection upon which his wealth i s based. The vested interests which nationalism protects are not pri m a r i l y the interests of the wage-earner, but the interests of the i n d u s t r i a l and commercial c a p i t a l i s t . ( To which must be added the interests of the professional p o l i t i c i a n . ) Even though Mr. S t r e i t points out that the s a c r i f i c e involved by changing from a national to a union economy w i l l soon be offset by the resultant prosperity, he w i l l s t i l l f i n d i t hard to convince the interests s u f f e r i n g from the change that two birds i n the bush are better than one i n the hand. " Suppose Detroit could s t i l l d e l i v e r a l l the cars demanded i n France — and everywhere else i n Europe — more cheaply than the maker on the spot could. There would remain the problem of d i s t r i b u t i o n and service and t h i s would require building up a greater organization than the French makers now have, and t h i s takes time and money. .When a l l t h i s was done, there would s t i l l be business l e f t the French maker. For one thing, there would remain a l l the tens of thousands of his sold cars to help protect him for several years. At worst, from his viewpoint, these might a l l be traded i n for American cars, but even then they would have to be re-sold and kept running, and the demand for t h e i r parts would continue." 1. Surely Mr. S t r e i t does not suppose that the above argument w i l l carry much weight with the French motor manufacturer? 1. " Union Now " , p. 267.This Is only one of several • such examples i n " Union Now". -149-If i t could be assumed that the vested national interests could be moved by such a s p i r i t of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e for the general welfare of mankind there would be no great problem to solve. .. It i s very d i f f i c u l t to refute the basic argument of " Union Now", and yet i t is impossible to f e e l the least b i t hopeful of the prospect whioh Mr. S t r e i t envisages. There is so much that must be assumed that can not be assumed. There is. the assumption that man by w i l l i n g Union can achieve i t — and that such widespread w i l l i n g can be brought about. There i s the assumption that the world oan or w i l l be righted by the l o g i c of a course of action. There i s the assumption that the United States can of w i l l depart from a t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y to join, not a loose League, but a binding federation. There i s the assumption that democratic countries are necessarily kindred and could be moved to unite because of t h i s f r a t e r n a l bond. And there i s the assumption that nations can or w i l l renounce t h e i r nation-alism by uniting i n a Federation for the.common welfare. .If i t could be assumed that these conditions were i n the least probable the logic of "Union Now" would be the prelude to i t s adoption as a p r a c t i c a l experiment. But neither Rome nor Western C i v i l i z a t i o n were b u i l t i n a day. P o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y grow very slowly though they may be destroyed very quickly. The greater the -150-degree of p o l i t i c a l freedom the s2©wer the pace i n t h e evolution of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i f the changes contemplated depart r a d i c a l l y from established i n s t i t u t i o n s . Democratic government has taken great pains to e s t a b l i s h i t s p o s i t i o n by making change a very com-plicated procedure. Constitutions, written or unwritten are relig.&ujsly guarded to prevent the loss of the freedom won a f t e r many years of struggle. The same machinery which guarantees against reaction i s also a d e f i n i t e obstacle i n the path of progressive change, since i t i s always a question to be determined whether any proposed change i s i n the interests of or detrimental to democratic govern-ment. Democracy therefore s a c r i f i c e s speed of action i n favor of the d u r a b i l i t y of i t s p o l i t i c a l machinery. The Democracies are founded upon a widening area of p o l i t i c a l control that i s , more and more people determine the course of events, and more and more f i e l d s of human endeavor become matters of common concern and common control. I n i t i a t i o n , debate, and r a t i f i c a t i o n of any important step i s not a question of hours but may be a question of days, months, or years. H i t l e r and S t a l i n could completely reverse t h e i r national p o l i c i e s i n r e l a t i o n to one another, and change overnight from enemies to friends.Mussolini i s , t o a l l intents and purposes, the I t a l i a n nation.Though he may be compelled to gauge his actions by the measure -151-of public approval they a r e : l i k e l y to e l i c i t he can do much to create the public opinion he wishes to p r e v a i l at any given time. There i s l i t t l e e f f o r t required i n a d i c t a t o r -ship to create the public opinion necessary to support any project which the dictator has i n mind, sire e a l l the machinery for moulding public opinion i s d i r e c t l y controlled by the dictator. The measure of freedom i n these countries i s reduced to the smallest f r a c t i o n , and conversely, the speed of action i s increased to the highest power. In the Democracies the expansion of the measure of freedom and of the rights of the individual to a very high point has reduced the speed of action to a very low point. When Mr. S t r e i t speaks of union of the Democracies and the w i l l i n g of such a union he does not give s u f f i c i e n t attention to the fact that democratic action i s determined by not one con-t r o l l i n g w i l l , but by the c o n f l i c t i n g w i l l s of a very large number of individuals, or groups of ind i v i d u a l s . Even though i t may be possible to obtain a majority i n favour, and a majority working d e f i n i t e l y for union i n one of the democ-racies , i t would s t i l l be necessary to bring about a l i k e condition i n many more. As far as Great B r i t a i n i s concerned there would be required a majority i n not one, but i n f i v e nations, Without B r i t a i n , France, and the United States the whole scheme breaks down. Who i s to assume leadership In such a scheme ? Is i t to be assumed by the.governments -152- -i n power, and i l so, i s i t l i k e l y that a l l or any of these governments would be prepared to s a c r i f i c e i t s p o l i t i c a l future on suoh an untried program? Is leadership to be dependent on the formation of new p o l i t i c a l parties pledged to Union ? I f so, what- chanoe would such parties have of obtaining power? They would immedaitely create out of apathy a d e f i n i t e opposition to the proposal. While the c r i e s of " far fetched", " Utopian**, " an American idea", " destruction of our national freedom",; and other- such slogans may contain no l o g i c , they would for that reason be no less powerful, and carry no less weight. It i s not a question only of obtaining a majority i n the democracies. The f i r s t problem i s necessarily one of creating the p o l i t i c a l machinery essential to building up such a majority and of popularizing the idea of union. Mr.Streit's post-card p l e b i s c i t e , or his scheme for w r i t i n g to con-gressmen seems a very feeble substitute for the necessary p o l i t i c a l machinery. Mr. S t r e i t ' s proposal may be quite l o g i c a l , but that does not make i t any more r e a l or at a l l probable. The wonderful one-hoss shay was b u i l t on l o g i c ; as a p r a c t i c a l proposal, " Union Now" w i l l probably suffer the same fate as that ingenious contrivance. As far as the United States i s concerned one can only judge future action on the basis of past and present conditions. There does not seem to be any indications -153-that the United States i s ready to enter the f i e l d of world p o l i t i c s as an active p a r t i c i p a n t , or i s at a l l disposed to r e l i n q u i s h i t s iso l a t e d dominance of the New World by sharing suoh a p o s i t i o n with the other Democracies. President Roosevelt and Oordell Hull are quite free to give moral advice to the rest of the world; but they would not dare to undertake to even suggest a course of action which would necessarily involve obligations on the part of the country to other powers. Any party i n America which would stake i t s p o l i t i c a l future on such a course of action as Mr. S t r e i t suggests would be committing p o l i t i c a l s u i c i d e . Moreover, union of the Democracies, even though founded upon co-operation among them and not upon opposition to the Dictatorships would hardly be regarded by the l a t t e r as a f r i e n d l y action. The L a t i n American countries, l a r g e l y undemocratic, would be d i s t r u s t f u l of the Good Neighbor. .It i s not l i k e l y that the United States would overlook t h i s fact. Union Now must have the support of the United States. Such a prospect oan hardly be termed impossible; but i t ' i s d e f i n i t e l y improbable. Apart from t h e i r p o l i t i c a l persuasion, democracy, there does not seem to be any bond between the Democracies. Even within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth there i s nothing l i k e the collaboration which Mr.Streit proposes. The -154-p o s s i b i l i t y of creating such a Union as far as the smaller Democracies are concerned , would seem to depend upon leadership by union between Britain,France, and the United States, or between any two of these great powers. Since i t i s u n l i k e l y that the United States w i l l j o i n such a Union i t i s necessary that B r i t a i n and France f i r s t federate.' Under peaceful conditions t h i s federation might be joined by Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. Under present war conditions, however, t h i s does not seem possible, since the smaller countries are much more concerned with preserving t h e i r national safety than with the struggle against d i c t a t o r s h i p . Should France and B r i t a i n be able to federate there i s the prospect of the extension of the idea to include these countries at the end of the war. This, however, i s not " Union Now" , and must be reserved for l a t e r discussion. There remains the question of the voluntary renunciat-ion of nationalism i n favor of a Democratic Federation. This does not seem a very probable development, at least not i n one step. There i s l i t t l e doubt that nationalism i n i t s present militant form w i l l have to be broken down before any co-operation can be achieved between the various peoples of the world. But such a process w i l l be slow. Here again i t is probable that B r i t a i n and France can and w i l l make the f i r s t move. Within the space of one generation -155-these two countries have been forced to co-operate very c l o s e l y f o r th e i r mutual protection. The departure from t h i s close co-operation between 1920 and 1939 has been a contributing factor i n the creation of the d i f f i c u l t y i n which they now f i n d themselves. This b i t t e r experience, rather than the logic of the stsp i s the f a c t which w i l l tend to create a permanent union between thes two ppwers. Here again we depart from " Union Now " and must reserve further discussion f o r a l a t e r part of t h i s essay. While i t has been pointed out that " Union Nov/ " i s a very improbable development, i t must also be noted that Mr. S t r e i t has made a very valuabe contribution to the ultimate solution of the world and the European anarchy. " Union Nov/ " has already stimulated a great deal of thought. I t has been widely quoted and discussed. Mr. W. B. Curry 1s " The Case f o r Federal Union " intthe Penguin Series i s r e a l l y a low-priced edition of Mr. S t r e i t ' s book. The f a c t that the idea ariginated i n the United States, and that i t i s so l o y a l to the American Con-s t i t u t i o n may well serve to remove much of the American prejudice against foreign entanglements. V/hile Mr. S t r e i t has published h i s proposal as a p r a c t i c a l polution, i t i s as a stimulus to thought on the part of the public, bewildered by the complexity and the anarchy of present world conditions that " Union Now " w i l l probalby make i t s greatest -156-contribution. European Federation. It i s obvious that the European anarchy, cannot be destroyed without the setting^of some form of federal control which can where necessary override national sovereignty. It i s useless to consider any international, action i n Europe which depends s o l e l y upon the consent of the national states. Wherever there i s a c o n f l i c t over the question of authority there must be a means of decid-ing the issue. The whole p r i n c i p l e of federation depends upon a d i v i s i o n of power based upon an accepted c o n s t i t u t i o n . The d i v i s i o n of power necessarily means that c e r t a i n powers are given to the federal government. There can be no federal union i n whioh there i s no re a l federal cont r o l . In t h i s connection i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the r e p l i e s to Mr. Briand's proposal for a European Federation. " -All the States, except Holland, agreed that the European Association should be 1 on the plan of absolute sovereignty and of entire p o l i t i c a l independence 1. " 1. If such a premise i s adopted at the outset there can be no federation since 1 absolute sovereignty and entire p o l i t i c a l independence 1 leaves the federation with no authority at 1. Salter, S i r Arthur, T he Un i t ed St a t e s of Ejurjjpg, George • A l l e n and Unwin l t d . , london, 1933, p. 123. -157-a l l except that vague weapon c a l l e d 1 moral authority 1 . The same obstacle which has proven insurmountable "by the League, national sovereignty, would be equally insurmount-able i n a European Federation "based upon the entire retent-ion of absolute power by the national states. The necessary step, therefore, must be a very bold one. It must, i f any re a l union i s to be achieved, be a step which w i l l crush the idea of absolute sovereignty. This does not necessarily mean the destruction of the national state or of national r i g h t s except that national rights become what they must become under federal control, states rights or p r o v i n c i a l r i g h t s . To protect these a c o n s t i t u t i o n must be set up, and i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , a court of appeal i n case of dispute between the national governnent. and the federal governament. Under the League system t h i s court might well be the League i t s e l f , or, the Permanent Oourt of international Justice; though i t would probably be better to set up a supreme court as part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Federation. The Briand proposal, i n spite..of i t s name, i s not i n r e a l i t y a proposal for a European Federal Union. It i s merely a proposal for the setting up of machinery which might f a c i l i t a t e a greater measure of co-operation between the European States. It i s no more a proposal for European Federation than was the League for World -158-Federation, Indeed the organization envisaged followsvery muoh along the l i n e s of the League i t s e l f . The emphasis i s placed upon economic questions, and i n t h i s respect i t resembles a Z o l l v e r e i n . There does not appear to be any suggestion for the setting up of a' federal governing body with the necessary authority to l e g i s l a t e and to carry out the function of a Federal Government. While i t might be t r i t e to say i t , i t must be said that there can be no European Federation without a Federal Government, and there can be no government without authority. While the authority of the Federal Government must be open to challenge, i t must only give way when the opposing force represents the w i l l . of a majority, either of States or peoples. If the author-i t y of the Federal Government can be successfully challen-ged by a few people or a single state ( which the retention of absolute sovereignty and complete p o l i t i c a l independence permits) there can be no such thing as a federation.This point, v/hich has been stressed previously i n the present essay i s very c l e a r l y presented i n the following quotation. " A S o c i a l i s t , and accordingly an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , . writer makes short work of t h i s idea. M.Leon Blum, i n n Le Populaire" of'May 21st and 22nd,1930, demands r e a l powers for the future federal i n -s t i t u t i o n s of Europe , and a diminution therefore of individual sovereignty. He attacks the very idea of sovereignty, which he deems a r t i f i c i a l and archaic. R e f l e c t i o n on these matters, he contends, compels us to recognize that there i s an insurmountable contradiction between the solemnly -159-" proclaimed intention to unite the States of Europe by a federal bond and equally solemn engagement to preserve the national sovereignties. M.Leon Blum points out very ably that federat-ion v/ould be d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible , between States without a minimum of p r i n c i p l e s i n common. He i s thinking , i t w i l l be observed, of democratic p r i n c i p l e s . On thi s point-we agree with M.Leon Blum, believing with^him that the s t a b i l i t y of peace depends upon the s t a b i l i t y of free i n s t i t u t i o n s . In a memorandum presented at B e r l i n on February 25th,1930 , Count Coudenhove-Kaler g i , on the contrary, provides for the preservation of the absolute sovereignty of European States. M. Joseph Barthelemy, Member of the French In s t i t u t e , goes deeply into the question i n a remarkable work presented at Geneva i n June 1930 before the Federal Committee of European Co-Operation. He recog-nizes that when we get past the area of negat-ions , or even that of comparisons, the problem of sovereignty represents the essential d i f f i c u l t y . . He c r i t i c i z e s the text of the Memorandum as being weak on the legal side, and , a r r i v i n g by a diff e r e n t route at the same conclusions as M. Leon Blum, he lays down the p r i n c i p l e that we cannot create a new order without cur-t a i l i n g the old l i b e r t i e s . This, indeed, i s self-evident. The whole h i s t o r y of progress and the evolution of humanity i n the di r e c t i o n of c i v i l i z a t i o n i s marked by r e s t r i c t i o n s , imposed or accepted, of the i n i t i a l freedom. As soon as society comes into being, i n d i v i d u a l right i s modified. Certainly European Federation , eould not promise to leave each State i t s absolute sovereignty, On the other hand, we must not lose ourselves i n th e o r e t i c a l discussions. The fact i s that sovereignty ," l i k e i n d ividual l i b e r t y and property, i s a product of evolution. Public t r e a t i e s r e s t r i c t r i g h t s just as private contracts do M.Joseph Barthelemy 1s contention, which deserves at least to be. studied, i s that we have to develop M. Briand's idea and carry i t to a point at which the States would -160-" remain independent i n their mutual r e l a t -- ions, but would necessarily abandon a part of t h e i r sovereignty for the benefit of the new organization. " 1. At the ourset, therefore, i t must be understood that there i s a r e a l difference between a federated Europe and what may be termed a pan - European league. It i s the l a t t e r which i s necessary to overcome the European anarchy . The question immediately arises of the means of bringing such a federation into being, and of the extent to which such an undertaking i s possible now or i n the near future. The most recent proposal for such a federation is contained i n Mr. W.Ivor Jennings' " Rough Draft' of a proposed Constitution for a Federation of Western Europe." E. Mr. Jennings' proposal has the merit- of being quite d e f i n i t e i n i t s outline' and i t s objectives. It i s based l a r g e l y upon the Federal p r i n c i p l e s of the United States of America with occasional borrowings from the practices of B r i t a i n and France. The general nature of the Federation i s set fo r t h i n A r t i c l e 1. 1. Herriot, Edouard, The United States of Europe, The Viking Press, N.Y., 1930 . p. 275- 278. E. Published by the Cambridge University Press ( no date given, probably the Spring of 1940) for private c i r c u l a t i o n only. -161-The Federation 1. The Federation of Western Europe ( hereinafter c a l l e d " the Federation" ) i s a federal union composed of suoh States ( hereinafter c a l l e d " the federal States") as s h a l l have r a t i f i e d t h i s Constitution i n accordance with t h i s A r t i c l e , 2. Any of the following States s h a l l become a federated State on giving notice to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands that i t has . r a t i f i e d t h i s Constitution: the German Reich, Belgium , Denmark, Eire, Finland, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great B r i t a i n and Northern Ireland, Iceland, the Grand Duchy of Luxem-burg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the Swiss Confederation. 3. Subsequent provisions of t h i s Constitution s h a l l take effect from the date when four of the States mem-tioned i n section 2 of t h i s A r t i c l e have given notice of r a t i f i c a t i o n , and for the purposes of t h i s Con-s t i t u t i o n " the establishment of the Federation" i s that date: provided that, where a State r a t i f i e s this Constitution a f t e r that date, t h i s Constitution s h a l l a P P l y "to that State as from the date of such r a t i f i c -ation, 4. A federated State named i n Section 2 of t h i s A r t i c l e may not be expelled from the Federation nor s h a l l i t withdraw from the Federation, except by an amend-ment of t h i s Constitution, 5>* Any of the following s h a l l become a federated State on giving notice of r a t i f i c a t i o n to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands: the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , the Union of South A f r i c a , the Dominion of New Zealand, Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia: provided that: (A) Newfoundland s h a l l not become a federated State u n t i l ' i t has become s e l f - governing. (B) Nothing in t h i s Constitution s h a l l forbid the union of Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia, or any part thereof , and the united t e r r i t o r y s h a l l succeed to the rights and duties of Southern Rhodesia as a federated State under t h i s Constitution. -162-(Cv»C Except where a contrary intention appears, nothing i n t h i s Constitution s h a l l affect_the r e l a t i o n s inter se of the members of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth, of Nations. (D) Any f>:ederat:ecl State named i n t h i s section of t h i s A r t i c l e may withdraw from the Federation one year a f t e r giving notice to the President of i t s intention so to do. 6. Other States may be admitted to the Federation, on such conditions as may be prescribed, by a law assented to by at l e a s t two-thirds of the whole number of members i n each House of the Federal Legislature (and) approved by the l e g i s l a t u r e s i n at least two-thirds of the federated States): such Statesjshall then become federated States. 7. The federal l e g i s l a t u r e may, by a law assented to by at least two-thirds of the whole number of members i n each House, extend to any State, not being a federated State, at the request ofsuch State, any of the provis-ions of t h i s Constitution: and f o r the purposes of such provisions only such State s h a l l be deemed to be a federated State. 8. Except where the contrary intention appears, " State" i n t h i s Constitution includes the dependencies of the State,'and " dependency" includes a colony, a protected State, a protectorate-,", a t e r r i t o r y i n respect of which a mandete on behalf of the League of Nations has", been accepted by the State or the head thereof, and any other country or t e r r i t o r y under the protection or suzerainty of a State or the head thereof." A r t i c l e 2 sets f o r t h the p r i n c i p l e that the Constitution i s the supreme law. The federation guarantees to a l l States democratic government and assistance i n maintaining public order. The Constitution follows the United States of America i n d i v i d i n g the government into three parts; (1) an exec-utive , president, Prime Minister, and Council Members; (2) a l e g i s l a t u r e of two houses, a State's House, and a People's House; (3) a f e d e r a l Supreme Court. The powers of these three bodies are much the same as those obtaining i n the United Statestof. America. The President, however, i s -163-s e l e o t e d by both houses meeting i n j o i n t s e s s i o n as i n Prance, r a t h e r t h a n by p o p u l a r v o t e . The Prime M i n i s t e r i s a p p o i n t e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t ; t h e o t h e r M i n i s t e r s by t h e P r e s i -dent upon the a d v i s e of the Prime- M i n i s t e r . A compromise i s made between t h e American and E n g l i s h systems i n t h a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r and other M i n i s t e r s may be chosen from members of the L e g i s l a t u r e or from p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e L e g i s -l a t u r e . I n the l a t t e r event t h e M i n i s t e r s become members of one or the o t h e r House w i t h i n a p e r i o d of s i x months a f t e r app ointment. The f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t u r e i s composed of two houses, a S t a t e ' s House, and a P e o p l e ' s House. The members of b o t h Houses a r e e l e c t e d . B i l l s become l a w when passed by a m a j o r i t y i n b o t h Houses and a r e s i g n e d by the P r e s i d e n t . Por reas o n s which a r e not c l e a r t o the p r e s e n t w r i t e r Mr. Je n n i n g s h e r e i n t r o d u c e s the e x c e p t i o n o b t a i n i n g i n Great B r i t a i n s i n c e 1911. " A B i l l a s s e n t e d t o by a m a j o r i t y i n each House s h a l l become law on b e i n g s i g n e d by t h e P r e s i -dent ; P r o v i d e d t h a t a money B i l l a s s e n t e d t o by the P e o p l e ' s House and r e j e c t e d by the S t a t e ' s House, or a s s e n t e d t o by the S t a t e ' s House w i t h amendments wh i c h a r e r e j e c t e d by t h e P e o p l e ' s House, or not a s s e n t e d t o by t h e S t a t e ' s House w i t h i n t h r e e months of i t s r e c e i p t by the S t a t e ' s House, or on being, a s s e n t e d t o by t h e People'.s House w i t h o u t f u r t h e r amendment ( e x e p t i n g o n l y such amendments as have been a c c e p t e d by the S t a t e ' s House) and being s i g n e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t s h a l l become law w i t h o u t b e i n g a s s e n t e d t o by -164-the State's House." 1. The Federal Supreme Court has^powers very s i m i l a r to those of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. Amendment to the Constitution i s much l i k e that obtaining i n the United States. " Amendments to t h i s Constitution may be prepared i n either House, and any such amendment s h a l l take ef f e c t i f i t i s supported by at least two-thirds of the members voting i n each House ( and by a majority i n the l e g i s l a t u r e s of two-thirds of the federated States ? ): provided that the proportional representat-ion of a federated State i n the States' House s h a l l not be diminished without the consent of the l e g i s l a t u r e of that State, nor s h a l l t h i s A r t i c l e be so amended as to enable the proportional representation of a federated State i n the States' House to be diminished without the consent of the l e g i s l a t u r e of that State." 2. The powers of the Federal Government are very d e f i n i t e , and follow very c l o s e l y the powers assumed by the f e d e r a l governments i n any federated state. I t i s notable that defense i s given d i f i n i t e l y andyexclusively to the Federation. 1. The command of the armed forces of the Federation s h a l l be vested i n the' Fresident. 2. From, such a date as may be f i x e d by the Federal l e g i s l a t u r e , the armed forces of the federated State, or such af them as may be indicated by the Federal Legislatures, s h a l l be transferred to the Fresident and s h a l l become part of the armed forcesof the Federation. 1. " "Rough Draft", A r t i c l e 7, Sec. 2. 2. i b i d , A r t i c l e 23. -165-W i t h i n t w e l v e months of t h a t d a t e , armed f o r c e s of any f e d e r a t e d S t a t e not so t r a n s f e r r e d s h a l l be disbanded and, s u b j e c t t o t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , no f e d e r a t e d S t a t e or a u t h o r i t y or p e r s o n s h a l l e s t a b l i s h or m a i n t a i n armed f o r c e s w i t h i n the F e d e r a t i o n ; p r o v i d e d t h a t a f e d e r a t e d S t a t e may a u t h o r i z e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t or maintenance of suoh p o l i c e f o r c e s a^&ay be n e c e s s a r y f o r the maintenance of o r d e r w i t h i n i t s own b o u n d a r i e s . 3. From t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the F e d e r a t i o n , no arms, m u n i t i o n s , m i l i t a r y equipment or o t h e r i m p l e -ments of war s h a l l be manufactured i n or i m p o r t e d i n t o the F e d e r a t i o n except under the l i c e n c e of t h e P r e s i d e n t . 4. The P r e s i d e n t s h a l l , a t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t y i n a f e d e r a t e d S t a t e , a u t h o r -i z e the armed f o r c e s of t h e F e d e r a t i o n t o a s s i s t the S t a t e a u t h o r i t y i n t h e enforcement of the laws of the f e d e r a t e d S t a t e and the maintenance of o r d e r i n t h e f e d e r a t e d S t a t e . 5. I n s e c t i o n 2 of t h i s . A r t i c l e , "armed f o r c e s " i n c l u d e s the arms, equipment, m u n i t i o n s and o t h e r implements of war, and t h e l a n d and b u i l d i n g s used e x c l u s i v e l y f o r defence p u r p o s e s . 6. Laws of any S t a t e which, i n the o p i n i o n of t h e C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , are i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s . A r t i c l e may be d i s a l l o w e d by the P r e s i d e n t . 1. The F e d e r a t i o n i s a l s o g i v e n power t o d i s a l l o w s t a t e l e g i s -l a t i o n . 1. Where under t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n the P r e s i d e n t has a power t o d i s a l l o w S t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n he s h a l l have power a l s o to d i s a l l o w a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t s of the same c h a r a c t e r ; and such power may be e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n a p e r i o d of t h r e e months from the enactment of the l e g i s -l a t i o n or t h e coming i n t o o p e r a t i o n of the a d m i n i s t r a -t i v e a c t . Any such d i s a l l o w a n c e s h a l l be n o t i f i e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t by p r o c l a m a t i o n , and t h e l e g i s l a t i o n or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t s h a l l , from t h e date of the p r o c l a m a t i o n , cease t o be law. 2. Without p r e j u d i c e t o o t h e r powers s e t out i n t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e P r e s i d e n t s h a l l have power t o d i s -a l l o w any law of a f e d e r a t e d S t a t e w h i c h , i n t h e o p i n i o n of the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , (A) Tends t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the freedom of e l e c t i o n s t o t h e - P e o p l e ' s House; _or !• Rough D r a f t , A r t i c l e 15 -166-(B) Tends t o p r e v e n t t h e f o r m a t i o n or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s h a v i n g f e d e r a l o b j e c t s ; or (0) I s l i k e l y t o r e q u i r e the performance by t h e F e d e r a t i o n of i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under A r t i c l e 111 of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n . 11. Mr. J e n n i n g s ' p r o p o s a l seems t o be t h e b e s t y e t o f f e r e d f o r t h e s o l u t i o n of the European a n a r c h y . I t f o l l o w s l o g i -c a l l y from the a n a l y s i s made i n t h e p r e s e n t e s s a y . I f t h a t a n a l y s i s i s i n the main c o r r e c t , t h e European F e d e r a t i o n i s the r e a l s o l u t i o n . To work out a s o l u t i o n does n o t , however n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t i t w i l l be adopted. W h i l e i t i s d i f f i -c u l t t o f o r e t e l l what the f u t u r e h o l d s , and w h i l e p r o o f f o r th e c o n t e n t i o n cannot be given,, i t i s the c o n t e n t i o n of the p r e s e n t w r i t e r t h a t Mr. Jennings' F e d e r a t i o n i s s t i l l some d i s t a n c e away, and t h a t i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y t o take t h e i n i t i a l s t e p i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . I t i s h a r d l y l i k e l y t h a t as many as f o u r European democracies w i l l be w i l l i n g t o ta k e t h i s s t e p , a t l e a s t not u n t i l i t has been shown t o be p r a c -t i c a l by i t s a d o p t i o n by two c o u n t r i e s . The two c o u n t r i e s w h i c h . a r e best f i t t e d by t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e i n c o - o p e r a t i o n over a l o n g p e r i o d of time a r e B r i t a i n and France . Whether or not Europe l o o k s t o t h e s e two n a t i o n s f o r l e a d e r s h i p , i t i s h a r d l y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e y c o u l d escape t h a t r o l e i f t h e y u n i t e d as a s t r o n g f e d e r a t i o n . A c t i n g t o g e t h e r i n peaoe or war t h e y would s o o n ' r e g a i n t h a t l e a d e r s h i p i n European 1. Rough D r a f t , A r t i c l e 12. -167-a f f a i r s whioh has i n r e c e n t y e a r s been so o f t e n menaced by the p r e s e n c e of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . Once a Franco-B r i t i s h F e d e r a t i o n ( a l o n g the l i n e s s uggested by Mr. J e n n i n g s ' "Rough D r a f t " ) i s brought i n t o b e i n g European F e d e r a t i o n might w e l l f o l l o w . I t seems t o the p r e s e n t w r i t e r , however, t h a t B r i t a i n and France must t a k e the i n i t i a t i v e and p r o v e , not by r e p e a t e d d e c l a r a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i p , but by the p r a c t i c a l a d o p t i o n of F e d e r a t i o n t h a t -such a s o l u t i o n i s both p o s s i b l e , and p r o f i t a b l e t o a l l t h o s e who p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t . CONCLUSION. I t i s h e r e , t h e r e f o r e p r e s e n t e d as a t h e s i s , t h a t t h e European anarchy can be l a r g e l y s o l v e d by the F e d e r a t i o n of B r i t a i n and Franc e . T h i s i s not a f i n a l s o l u t i o n , but m e r e l y t h e f i r s t and n e c e s s a r y st e p i n a program whioh e n v i s a g e s the u l t i m a t e f e d e r a t i o n of the whole of Europe. The p o i n t v/hich must be borne i n mind i s t h a t f e d e r a t i o n w i l l not be e s t a b l i s h e d i n Europe because of a b s t r a c t r e a s o n i n g , but t h a t i t w i l l a r i s e out of the n e c e s s i t y f o r i t s a d o p t i o n , and t h a t i t w a l l o n l y come i n t o b e i n g when i t has been shown t o be both p r a c -t i c a l and p r o f i t a b l e . There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t b o t h France and B r i t a i n a r e f a c e d t o - d a y w i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y of f e d e r a t i o n , and t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t such f e d e r a t i o n would be h i g h l y b e n e f i c i a l t o both c o u n t r i e s . -168-B r i t a i n oan not a f f o r d t o i s o l a t e h e r s e l f from c o n t i n -e n t a l Europe. I f f o r no o t h e r r e a s o n , her s a f e t y a l o n e demands t h a t she have a say i n European a f f a i r s . She can not a f f o r d t o see Franoe f a l l a v i c t i m t o a h o s t i l e Germany, or t o an envious I t a l y . The defence of France has been s i n c e t h e r i s e of Germany the defence of B r i t a i n . The t r a g e d y of the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n i s due i n no s m a l l measure to t h e f a i l u r e of t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s t o a c t always as a u n i t e d p e o p l e between 1918 and 1939. There can be no such c o n t i n u e d u n i t e d a c t i o n under t h e concept of e x c l u s i v e n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y except i n t i m e s of grave danger. I f B r i t a i n and France do not soon r e a l i z e the a b s o l u t e neces-s i t y f o r a b i n d i n g f e d e r a t i o n t h e r e seems l i t t l e hope f o r the s u r v i v a l of e i t h e r power. The dominions and p o s s e s s i o n s of both c o u n t r i e s can o n l y be expected t o remain l o y a l so l o n g as t h a t l o y a l t y i s p a r t of t h e i r own p r o t e c t i o n . Should e i t h e r power be d e f e a t e d and not be i n a p o s i t i o n t o g i v e the n e c e s s a r y p r o t e c t i o n t o i t s dominions and depend-e n c i e s i t : seems h a r d l y l i k e l y t h a t t h e s e v/ould r e m a i n l o y a l . Moreover the d e f e a t of e i t h e r power would be a c r u s h i n g blow t o democracy i n Europe. From t h e p o i n t of view of France, B r i t i s h c o - o p e r a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l . The Maginot l i n e p r o t e c t s France on o n l y one f r o n t , and i s o n l y e f f e c t i v e w h i l e she can r e l y upon the seas t o b r i n g her t h e s u p p l i e s t o c a r r y on a major war and t o p r o v i d e f o r her -169-p e o p l e . The f o r t y m i l l i o n p e o p l e of Franoe oan not a l o n e h o l d back t h e massed power of German arms, a i d e d p o s s i b l y by I t a l y and the r e s o u r c e s of C e n t r a l Europe. B r i t a i n , t o o , must have a c o n t i n e n t a l b a t t l e f r o n t , i f f o r no o t h e r r e a s o n , t o d i v e r t a l a r g e measure of European man-power from d i r e c t a t t a c k upon the B r i t i s h I s l e s . The b l o c k a d e too would be i n e f f e c t i v e u n l e s s a i d e d by F r a n c e , s i n c e B r i t a i n a l o n e can not b l o c k a d e t h e whole of Europe. Only by a s t r o n g d e t e r -r e n t t o any t o t a l i t a r i a n t h r e a t can B r i t a i n be a s s u r e d of her own freedom and t h e maintenance of her i m p e r i a l power. She oan no l o n g e r a l o n e present, the n e c e s s a r y d e t e r r e n t , but o n l y by u n i o n w i t h F r a n c e . Together B r i t a i n and France c r e a t e not o n l y a p o w e r f u l European s t a t e , but have a c c e s s to a l a r g e p a r t of the w o r l d 1 s w e a l t h and p r o v i d e d e m o c r a t i c government f o r n e a r l y a t h i r d of the p e o p l e of the w o r l d . The p r o s p e c t of immedi-a t e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of such a F e d e r a t i o n would be a g r e a t d e t e r r e n t t o a g g r e s s i o n , and would have a v e r y p o w e r f u l r e p e r c u s s i o n i n t h e f i e l d of d i p l o m a c y . Such u n i t e d a c t i o n , however, must be a v a i l a b l e a t a l l t i m e s . The door must be l o c k e d b e f o r e the h o r s e i s s t o l e n . U n i t e d a c t i o n t a k e n a f t e r a g g r e s s i o n has broken out has p r o v e n of l i t t l e v a l u e . Indeed, i t would appear t h a t t h e r e i s not too much c o n f i -dence p l a c e d on u n i t e d a c t i o n by e i t h e r s i d e when such a c t i o n i s taken as a l a s t d e s p e r a t e e f f o r t t o a v e r t d i s a s t e r . -170-The r e p e a t e d a s s u r a n c e s of both B r i t a i n and Prance of t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y c a l l t o mind t h e p h r a s e from Hamlet, "The l a d y d o t h p r o t e s t t o o much.,methinks." A F r a n c o - B r i t i s h F e d e r a t i o n would speak f o r i t s e l f , and would be i n no danger of d i s i n t e -g r a t i o n i n t h e f a c e of danger s i n c e t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e one would not be t h e i n t e r e s t s m e r e l y of the o t h e r , b u t ! t h e i n t e r e s t s of b o t h would be the i n t e r e s t s of t h e F e d e r a t i o n , i n w hich t o a l l i n t e n t s and purposes t h e r e would be no France, and no B r i t a i n , but the F e d e r a t i o n . For p u rposes of communication b o t h domestio and m i l i -t a r y a t u n n e l under t h e Channel would be a g r e a t a s s e t . The bl o c k a d e of B r i t a i n or of Franoe under such c o n d i t i o n s would n e c e s s i t a t e a blockade of b o t h c o u n t r i e s . To b l o c k a d e such a l o n g c o a s t l i n e would be a v e r y d i f f i c u l t t a s k and would l e a v e b oth c o u n t r i e s a much l a r g e r s h are of t h e i r n a v a l f o r c e s f o r a c t u a l o f f e n s i v e w a r f a r e . The shipment of t r o o p s and s u p p l i e s t o t h e c o n t i n e n t would be a r e l a t i v e l y easy t a s k . The c o s t of t h i s u n d e r t a k i n g v/ould no doubt be g r e a t , but would p r o b a b l y be no more p r o h i b i t i v e t h a n t h e burden borne now by b o t h c o u n t r i e s f o r n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e , much of which c o u l d be a v o i d e d under a F e d e r a l system. The F r a n c o - B r i t i s h F e d e r a t i o n , as has been s t a t e d , might w e l l be e s t a b l i s h e d a l o n g t h e l i n e s of Mr. J e n n i n g s ' "Rough D r a f t " , and c o u l d be l e f t open t o o t h e r n a t i o n s t o j o i n , p r o v i d i n g such s t a t e s were d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e s and t h a t -171-t h e y would s u b s c r i b e t o the o b l i g a t i o n s o i the C o n s t i t u t i o n . The p r o b a b i l i t y i s t h a t were France and B r i t a i n t o f e d e r a t e (as t h e y must do i f t h e y a r e t o s u r v i v e - t h i s t h e s i s ) t h e i r r e s u l t a n t p r o s p e r i t y would be a gre a t inducement t o oth e r s t a t e s t o j o i n . E s p e c i a l l y i s t h i s t r u e of the s o - c a l l e d "have n o t " s t a t e s , s i n c e the F e d e r a t i o n would guarantee t o them t h e r e s o u r c e s of such a l a r g e p a r t of the w o r l d . The q u e s t i o n of p r e s t i g e would v a n i s h i n such a F e d e r a t i o n s i n o e a l l would be members of one s t a t e , s h a r i n g d e m o c r a t i c a l l y t h e same p r i v i l e g e s and o b l i g a t i o n s . I t i s hard t o see how under such c o n d i t i o n s t h e r e c o u l d p o s s i b l y a r i s e the c o n d i -t i o n s now p r e v a l e n t i n Europe. Such a F e d e r a t i o n , however, must be prove n e f f e c t i v e ; t h e r e a r e o n l y two n a t i o n s 'which can make t h e experiment. B r i t a i n and France have now, w h i l e t h e y a r e so n e c e s s a r i l y c a l l e d upon t o work t o g e t h e r , the g r e a t e s t o p p o r t u n i t y t o b a n i s h t h e European a n a r c h y . T h e i r p e o p l e s a re now both engaged i n a l i f e and d e a t h s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t a common enemy t o uphold t h e same p r i n c i p l e s of l i f e and l i b e r t y . H i s t o r y has never p r e s e n t e d a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y . The excuse t h a t such F e d e r a t i o n s h o u l d w a i t u n t i l the end of the war i s a poor one. Now w h i l e the war i s on, b e f o r e i t goes i n t o i t s most d e s p e r a t e phase i s t h e t i m e when France and B r i t a i n s h o u l d f e d e r a t e . The speeches of p u b l i c men i n h i g h o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s i n both B r i t a i n and France d u r i n g t h e past s i x months show t h a t t h e i d e a of -172-f e d e r a t i o n , f o r France and B r i t a i n or f o r 'western Europe, i s b e i n g g i v e n c o n s i d e r a t i o n . D u r i n g the c o u r s e of a speech on November 26, Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n had t h i s t o say: " "Our d e s i r e , t h e n , when we have a c h i e v e d our war aims, would be t o e s t a b l i s h a new Europe, not new i n t h e - s e n s e of t e a r i n g up a l l t h e f r o n t i e r p o s t s and r e d r a w i n g • t h e map a c c o r d i n g t o the i d e a s of the v i c t o r s , but a Europe w i t h a new s p i r i t i n which the n a t i o n s which i n h a b i t i t w i l l approach t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h good w i l l and mutual t o l e r a n c e . I n such a Europe, f e a r of a g g r e s s i o n w i l l have ceased t o e x i s t , and such a d j u s t m e n t s of b o u n d a r i e s as would be n e c e s s a r y would be t h r e s h e d out between n e i g h b o r s s i t t i n g on equal terms around a t a b l e , v/ith the h e l p of d i s i n t e r e s t e d t h i r d p a r t i e s i f i t were so d e s i r e d . I n such a Europe i t would be r e c o g n i z e d that t h e r e can be no l a s t i n g peace u n l e s s t h e r e i s a f u l l and c o n s t a n t f l o w of t r a d e between t h e n a t i o n s con-c e r n e d , f o r o n l y by i n c r e a s e d i n t e r c h a n g e of goods and s e r v i c e s can t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g be improved. I n such a Europe each c o u n t r y would have the u n f e t t e r e d r i g h t t o choose i t s own form of i n t e r n a l government so l o n g as t h a t government d i d not pursue an i n t e r n a l p o l i c y i n j u r i o u s t o i t s n e i g h b o r s . L a s t l y , i n such a. Europe armaments would gradu-a l l y be dropped as a u s e l e s s expense, except ' i n so f a r as they were needed f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of i n t e r n a l law and o r d e r . I t i s obvious t h a t the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the U t o p i a n Europe w h i c h I have s k e t c h e d out c o u l d not be t h e work: of weeks or even months. I t would be a c o n t i n u o u s p r o c e s s , s t r e t c h i n g over many y e a r s . Indeed, i t would be i m p o s s i b l e t o s e t a time l i m i t upon which, i t , f o r c o n d i t i o n s never cease t o change, and c o r r e s p o n d i n g a d j u s t m e n t s would be r e q u i r e d i f f r i c t i o n was t o be a v o i d e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , you -,,ould need some machinery c a p a b l e of c o n d u c t i n g and g u i d i n g t h e development of t h e new Europe i n t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . I do not t h i n k i t n e c e s s a r y , nor i n d e e d , i s i t p o s s i b l e - , t o s p e c i f y a t t h i s s t a g e t h e k i n d of machinery which s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h i s p u rpose. I m e r e l y e x p r e s s the o p i n i o n t h a t something of t h a t s o r t would have to be p r o v i d e d , and I would add my hope t h a t a Germany animated by a new s p i r i t might be among the n a t i o n s which v/ould t a k e p a r t i n i t s o p e r a t i o n s . 1. 1. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n " no. 357, F e b r u a r y , 1940, p.41 -42 -173-Lord Halifax, speaking to the House of Lords on December 5, said during the course of h i s speech, " I t has already been said that a new order i n Europe can only come by the surrender i n some measure by nations of their sovereign r i g h t s , i n order to clear the way f o r some more organized union." 1. Judging from the tone of his address t h i s statement was tantamount to an acceptance of that idea by Halifax himself. The Marquess of Lothian, B r i t i s h Ambassador to the United States, speaking on October 25, said, " Some form of economic federation, perhaps even of p o l i t i c a l federation, at any rate for part of Europe, i s , I am sure, a necessary condition on any stable world order." 2. In January of t h i s year the Right Honourable, the Marquess of Crewe, -wrote In " Contemporary Review", " The idea of a Federated Europe makes a strong appeal to others, and used i n the widest sense i t appears to o f f e r the most hopeful l i n e of advance." 3. In the f i r s t week of t h i s year, Premier Edouard Daladier also spoke of federation-; " Premier Edouard Daladier, i n ^ fepeedh on the French m i l i t a r y budget before the Senate, 1 spoke a good word f o r federation. The French and 1. International C o n c i l i a t i o n , c i t e d , no. 357, p. 47. 2. i b i d , December, 1939, no. 355, p. 590. 3. The Right Honourable, the Marquess of Crewe, K. G., "Looking Ahead", Contemporary Review, January, 1940, p. 5. -174-B r i t i s h Empires he d e c l a r e d , have p e r m a n e n t l y ' d i s m i s s e d n a t i o n a l egoism' and have come i n t o an agreement on community of a c t i o n 'whose consequences a r e i n c a l c u l a b l e " The P r e m i e r c o n t i n u e d ; 'This agreement has been e n l a r g e d ' "by the d i s t r i b u t i o n on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s i n a l l common ch a r g e s , and by the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of complete s o l i d a r i t y between our two monies, the f r a n c and t h e pound s t e r l i n g . T h i s F r a n c o - B r i t i s h u n i o n i s open t o a l l . . I (can) c o n c e i v e that the new Europe s h o u l d have a w i d e r o r g a n i -z a t i o n commercial exchange must be m u l t i p l i e d , and perhaps f e d e r a t i v e bonds e n v i s a g e d between t h e v a r i o u s European s t a t e s . ' " . 1. These somewhat vague references;, t o f e d e r a t i o n a r e not enough. What i s r e q u i r e d i s not s u g g e s t i o n of some f u t u r e "Hew Europe", but a r e a l s t e p now i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n by t h e o n l y two c o u n t r i e s w hich at t h e moment a r e c a p a b l e , and ( i f t h e i r l e a d e r s b e l i e v e s i n c e r e l y i n the i d e a l s t h e y e x p r e s s ) s h o u l d be i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a k e p o s i t i v e a c t i o n w i t h o u t d e l a y . Such a c t i o n would do much t o c o n v i n c e a w ;orld s c e p t i -c a l of vague promises t h a t t h i s t i me t h e two g r e a t democ-r a c i e s r e a l l y meant b u s i n e s s . Such a program would not be the j o i n i n g of the two g r e a t i m p e r i a l powers t o promote a g r e a t e r i m p e r i a l i s m , but t h e u n i o n of two g r e a t freedom-l o v i n g p e o p l e s t o promote and p r e s e r v e t h e p r i n c i p l e f o r wh i c h m i l l i o n s of t h e i r sons have had t o l a y down t h e i r l i v e s . Such a c t i o n f o l l o w e d by an i n v i t a t i o n t o a l l p e o p l e s of Europe who d e s i r e d freedom and democracy t o j o i n the f e d e r a t i o n as equal p a r t n e r s would e f f e c t i v e l y e l i m i n a t e any 1. Time, January 8, 1940. -175-n e c e s s i t y l o r a c o u n t r y t o arm and l i g h t because i t "had n o t " . There v/ould be no n e c e s s i t y l o r such a t h i n g as a "have,not" n a t i o n , unless-, such a n a t i o n p r e f e r r e d bondage t o l i b e r t y . I t does not seem p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e i s so l i t t l e sense i n t h e w o r l d t h a t n a t i o n s would not be q u i c k t o a v a i l themselves of t h e p r i v i l e g e s so f r e e l y o f f e r e d , were the i n s t i t u t i o n c r e a t e d which would make t h i s p o s s i b l e . T h i s i n s t i t u t i o n l i k e a l l g r e a t i n s t i t u t i o n s must d e v e l o p from a w e l l l a i d f o u n d a t i o n . I t must develop not- from a x. c o n f e r e n c e of many powers each jj c o c f c i i n g f o r p o s i t i o n and g e t t i n g nowhere, but Irom t h e s m a l l t o the l a r g e . F i r s t t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n , t h e F e d e r a t i o n , must be c r e a t e d . France and B r i t a i n can c r e a t e i t . I I i t i s of no v a l u e i t w i l l d i e ; and i f i t i s of no- v a l u e , i t ought t o d i e . But i f i t i s of v a l u e i t w i l l l i v e and f l o u r i s h . N o t h i n g succeeds l i k e s u c c e s s . I f France and B r i t a i n can not succeed i n c r e a t i n g a F e d e r a t i o n and i n making i t f u n c t i o n , t h e n i t i s u s e l e s s t o t a l k of a F e d e r a t i o n of Western Europe.. I f France and B r i t a i n can make, and make f u n c t i o n , a F r a n c o - B r i t i s h Feder-a t i o n t h e y w i l l have l a i d the f i r m f o u n d a t i o n s of an i n s t i t u t i o n c a p a b l e of s u r v i v a l and growth. Such an i n s t i t -u t i o n would mean the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of what has h i t h e r t o been mere l i p s e r v i c e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n i n t o the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t p r i n c i p l e . Europe does not need, ( i n d e e d she h e a r t i l y d i s t r u s t s ) speeches, and sermons, -176-and p r a y e r s , f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n . She does need a c t u a l and c o n c r e t e c o - o p e r a t i o n ; she needs i t b a d l y , and she needs i t now. France and B r i t a i n can show by d o i n g what t h e y have been unable t o show by words t h a t n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s a re not i n s u r m o u n t a b l e b a r r i e r s between men of g o o d w i l l , and t h a t o o r o p e r a t i o n f o r the w e l f a r e of mankind i s a s t r o n g e r f o r c e t h a n s t r i f e f o r mutual d e s t r u c t i o n . There i s no sound r e a s o n why we s h o u l d not have F r a n c o -B r i t i s h F e d e r a t i o n HOW. -177-Appendex A. Catalonian Autonomy and the Spanish C i v i l War. Catalonian autonomy was only one factor among many which gave r i s e to the Spanish C i v i l War. It cannot be said to be a cause of the c o n f l i c t , but was a very v i t a l factor once the war had a c t u a l l y started. The c o n f l i c t s which gave r i s e to the war were very numerous, On the Right were large landowners, m i l i t a r i s t s , the Catholic Church, and those who f e l t that regional autonomy was l i k e l y to destroy the state. On the Left were the Communists, Anarchists, the peasants, and those l i b e r a l s who were determined to preserve the Republio as a democratic state. The problem of Catalonian autonomy had complicated Spanish p o l i t i c s for a long time. Since the Right was opposed to such autonomy, the Left favoured i t , Catalonia became a government stronghold. Both Borkenau's w Spanish Cockpit", and Peers' " The Spanish Tragedy" i n d i -cate the importance of the Catalonian problem . 1 Both writers, however, i n s i s t that the problem i s peculiar to Spain, and cannot be judged apart from the culture and 1. Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit, Faber and Faber, Ltd., London, 1937. passim. Peers, The Spanish Tragedy, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1936, passim. -178-t r a d i t i o n s of Spain whioh are so dif f e r e n t from those any-where else on the continent.Both writers emphasize the complexity of the numerous forces which have determined recent Spanish history. A reasonable estimate of the Catalonian problem i n r e l a t i o n to the Spanish C i v i l War would seem to be that Calalonian autonomy was not i n any r e a l sense a challenge to the national unity of Republican Spain, but that i t was seized upon as a convenient st i c k to beat the l i b e r a l i s m of the l e f t . The following quotations from Peers are very much to the point. " It i s a popular but mistaken b e l i e f that the Catalonian people are anxious for complete separation from the rest of Spain. The separat-i s t party i s , as a matter of fact, a very small one, and the p r i n c i p a l cleavage between Cat-alonians on matters of p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e i s on the question of federalism. When the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was published i n the form drafted for submission to the people , and, i f duly approved by them, to the Cortes of the Spanish Republic, there was no suggestion of complete separation, and the wishes of the Provisional Government, which had already been made knowm at Barcelona, were meticulously observed. Thus the word " Generalist" was found where one might have expected the word 'State 1, and the federation expressly repudiated i n the Spanish Constitution was excluded also from the draft Statute. Prom f i r s t to l a s t , the Statute was characterized by statesman l i k e moderation, and t h i s was generally recognized by people outside Catalonia who were familiar with-the country's history.... There was no doubt about the approval of the people The majority was i n the proportion of nearly 200 voters to 1 If votes 'ever show anything, these votes showed beyond a doubt that Catalonia was as nearly as -179-possible unanimous i n support , not merely of a vague ideal of autonomy, "but of a c l e a r l y defined document of which, the terms were known to a l l . " Mr. Peers goes on to point out that as soon as the Catalan Statute was on the way to the Cortes a violent reaction against i t began. " But the majority of the protesters were - Conservaties who were stoutly opposed to the greater part of the Provisional Government's programme, and were, to say the least of i t , lukewarm towards the Republic i t s e l f . The fact i s that anti-Catalanism was an ex-tremely convenient form of opposition to the regime and about as safe a form as i t was possible to find It was not practicable to attack the Government p u b l i c l y for i t s e c c l e s i a s t i c a l or agrarian p o l i c y , but i t was p e r f e c t l y "Practicable to attack a p o l i c y to v/hich the Government was, by the Pact of San Sebastion, a c t u a l l y committed, but which had originated elsewhere. Further there was a magnificant slogan which sounded splendidly p a r t r i o t i c : 'Vote for a united Spain .' ' ' The dismemberment of our country 1 was a:phrase worked by opponents of the Statute to i t s uttermost l i m i t — at a safe distance, of course,from Barcelona.lt was an unexceptionable p r o c e e d i n g , p o l i t i c a l l y , to defend a united Spain, and i f ( i t was argued) the Government could be weakened by the defeat of i t s regionist p o l i c y , other defeats might soon follow" 1. 1. Peers, op. c i t . , p. 103 et seq. -180-Appendix B. Extract from the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, 1921. The present agreement i s subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions, namely: (a) That, each party r e f r a i n from h o s t i l e a ction or under-takings against the other, and from conducting out-side of i t s own borders any o f f i c i a l propaganda, direct or i n d i r e c t , against the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the B r i t i s h Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y that the Russian Soviet Government r e f r a i n s from any attempt by m i l i t a r y or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia i n any form of h o s t i l e action against B r i t i s h interests or the B r i t i s h Empire e s p e c i a l l y i n India and i n the independent State of Afghanistan. The B r i t i s h Government gives a similar par-t i c u l a r undertaking to the Russian Soviet Govern-ment i n respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent. It i s understood that the term"conducting any o f f i c i a l propaganda" includes the giving by either party of assistance or encouragement to any pro-paganda conducted outside i t s own borders. 1. Extract from Press Release , United States, Department of State, November 25, 1933. There were 3 days of conference between o f f i c i a l s of the State Department and Mr.. L i t v i n o f f, and there, were va s t l y more important and p i v o t a l conversations between Mr. L i t v i n o f f and President Roosevelt at the White House. There were no stenographers present and no reports made 1. Langsam, Walter Consuelo, Documents and Readings i n the History ofEurope,_31nc^_1.918., J. B. Lippinoott Company, N. Y. , 1939, p. 283. -181-There was an agreement touching the matter of subversive propaganda...... The agreement i s expressed i n one of Mr. L i t v i n o f f ' s notes to the President He described i t as a " fixed p o l i c y " coincident with the establishment of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . . . that his government would scrupul-ously respect the indisputable right of the United States to order i t s own l i f e within i t s own j u r i s d i c t i o n , i n i t s own way, and would r e f r a i n from interference i n any manner in the i n t e r n a l affairs of the United States, i t s t e r r i t o r i e s or poss essions....... Langsam, Walter Oonsuelo, Documents and Readings.. i n the History of Europe Since 1918. J. B. l i p p i n c o t t Company; I. Y., 1939, p. 837. \ Appendix C. The United States and the League. There i s no desire i n t h i s essay to over simplify the American f a i l u r e to j o i n the League of Nations. What i s intended i s to show that national, rather than i n t e r -national i n t e r e s t s were paramount, or at l e a s t , that national party p o l i t i c s decided the issue. President Wilson, by making the question of the League a p o l i t i c a l issue, s a c r i f i c e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s on the a l t a r p o l i t i c a l partisanship within h i s own country. As an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i d e a l i s t he forgot f o r the moment that he was also a p o l i t i c i a n . He seems to have overlooked the f a c t that a p o l i t i c a l opposition i s always seeking power, i s always looking f o r strategic points of attack, and i s always ready to use every means available to obtain power. Both the Treaty and the League, drawn ( as f a r as the up United States was concerned )/by a Democratic President, and made an issue of party p o l i t i c s , were legitimate targets f o r the shafts of the Republican Party. The League v/as defeated i n America, not because of i t s weak-nesses, nor because of i s o l a t i o n i s t sentiment, but because the President, an advocate of co-operation i n foreign a f f a i r s , was, paradoxically, an intransigent i s o l a t i o n i s t i n the matter of domestic p o l i t i c s . By i s o l a t i n g h i s own party from the nation he i s o l a t e d the nation from Europe. He created a s i t u a t i o n whereby repudiation at the p o l l s of -183-the Democratic Party became synonymous with repudiation by the nation of the Treaty and the League. I t i s probable thatthe American voters who won the elections of 1920 were not voting against the League, but against the Democ-1. rati c - Partyr.. That American leaders to-day r e a l i z e the necessity f o r co-operation i n European a f f a i r s i s obvious from the attempts of President Roosevelt and C o r d e l l H u l l to qu i e t l y lead the nation back into p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n world a f f a i r s . President R o o s e v e l t addressed the 3rd Session of the 76theCongress on Jan.3 and began by drawing attention to the - connection between domestic problems and the U^,h.eavais that were taking place i n other parts of the world ." I can understand the f e e l -ings of those who warn the nation that they w i l l never again consent to the sending of American youth on the s o i l of Europe. But, as I remember, nobody has asked them to consent I can understand the wishfulness of those who oversimplify the s i t u a t i o n by repeating that a l l we have to do i s to mind our own business and keep the nation from war. But there i s a vast difference between keeping from war and pretending t h i s war i s none of our business. We have not to go to war with other nations, but at lea s t we can s t r i v e with other i nations to encourage the kind of peace that w i l l l ighten the troubles of the world, and by so doing help our own nation as w e l l . " I t became clearer and cle a r e r that the world v/ould be a shabby and dangerous place to l i v e i n — e v e n f o r Americans to l i v e i n — i f i t was ruled by force i n the hands of a few. Swiftly moving events a l l over Europe had made them pause to think i n a longer view. That thinking could not be controlled by partisanship; such labels as the Peace Party or-the Peace Bloc now belonged to every r i g h t -thinking man, woman and c h i l d i n the country. 2. 1. Schapiro, J . S., Morris, R. B., and Soward, F. H., C i v i l i z a t i o n i n Europe and the World, Toronto, the Cot>p Clark Co., 1936. p. 756. 2. " President Roosevelt's Address to Congress ", The  B u l l e t i n of International News, ( Chatham House ) The Royal I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , Jan.13,/40. -184-BIBLIOGRAPHY. BOOKS. Angel, Norman. Prom Ohaos to Control . London, George A l l a n and Enwin, Ltd., 1933. Mr. Angel makes some' -searching comments on B r i t i s h nationalism during the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. He has a very good chapter on education. Angel , Norman. Preface to Peace. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1935. Even though one i s not convinced-"of the p o s s i b i l i t y of pacifism, one must admire Mr. Angel for his courage and for his f a i t h . There are not enough Mr. Angels i n t h i s mad world. Armstrong, Hamilton Pish. We or They - Two Worlds i n C o n f l i c t . New York. The MacMillan Company, 1939. °A small but very powerful l i t t l e book which shows i n a very convincing way the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of compromise between democraoy and d i c t a t o r s h i p . Barker, Ernest . National Character - and the Factors i n i t s Formation. London, Methuen and Co.Ltd., 1927. Traces the development of national character through the factors of race, geography and economics; confined almost exclusively to England. o Benns, F. Lee. Europe Since 1914. New York, P.S. Crofts and Co., 1934. A. good general survey, well i l l u s t r a t e d . Borghi, Armando. Mussolini - Red and Black. Translated by Dorothy Daudley. New York, F r e i e Arbeiter Stimme,1937. Mr. Borghi knows Mussolini and he doesn't l i k e him. In spite of Its obvious bias the book has great vigor. Thoroughly documented. Borkenau, Pranz. The Spanish Cockpit. London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1937. A j o u r n a l i s t ' s account of the Spanish C i v i l War with an introduction explaining the causes which gave r i s e to the struggle. -185-Bowman, Isiah. The Hew World - Problems i n P o l i t i c a l Geography. Hew York. World Book Company. 1928. A very useful book for the study of p o l i t i c a l geography. Bratt, Major K.A. That Hext War. Hew York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1931. An interesting volume. Has a very good chapter on " The I l l u s i o n of the P a c i f i s t s " . B r i e r l y , J.L. The Law of Harions - An Introduction to the International Law of Peace. Oxford , The Clarendon Press, 1928. A very readable and sound l i t t l e volume. Buell, Raymond L e s l i e . Europe: A History of Ten Years Hew York, The MacMillan Co., 1928. Buell, R. L. International Relations Hew York, Henry Holt and Co., 1925. Cole, G.D.H. and Cole M. I. " The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's  Review of Europe To-day" London, Victor Gollanz, Ltd., 1933. Written for.the average reader, the volume contains a vast amount of material presented i n a very c l e a r and i n t e r e s t i n g manner. E l l i o t , W.Y. The Pragmatic Revolt i n P o l i t i c s . Hew York, MacMillan Co., 1928 . A scholarly and searching indictment on syndicalism and Fascism. The chapter on Mussolini i s especially good. This is not just a good book . It i s an unusually good book. Fleure, Herbert John. The Peoples of Europe. London, Oxford University Press, 1925. An excellent l i t t l e book dealing with various national and ethnic groups in Europe. George, H.B. The Relations of Geography and History , Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1924-. A small , but very useful volume. Hankins, F.H. The Racial Basis of C i v i l i z a t i o n , Hew York, Alfred Knopfi Inc. 1926 . Mr. Hankins has written an excellent book on the race question. He very e f f e c t i v e l y disposes o f t h e Aryan Myth. -186-Herriot, Edward. The. United States of Europe. New York The Viking Press, 1930. Mr. Herriot stresses the need for some form of close co-operation i n Europe. The p o l i t i c a l question unfortunately i s not given s u f f i c i e n t emphasis. H i t l e r , Adolph. Mein Kampf . Complete,unabridged and f u l l y annotated. New York , Reyhal and Hitchcock, 1939. H i t l e r t o l d the world years ago what he was going'to do, and how he was going to do i t . Holdick, Col. S i r . Thomas H. P o l i t i c a l Frontiers and  Boundary Making, London, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1916 The technical problems of f r o n t i e r making. Huxley, Julian S and Haddon, A. G. We- Europeans ,London Jonathan' Cape. 1925. The authors are very c r i t i c a l of the whole question of race. An int e r e s t i n g and understandable treatment of a s c i e n t i f i c problem. Keynes, J.M. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York , MacMillan Co., 1920. Mr. Keynes foresaw the consequences of V e r s a i l l e s . His v i s i o n was very c l e a r . King- H a l l , Stephen . Our Own Times 1913 - 1914. London, Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd., 1935. 2 volumes. Langsam, Walter Consuelo. Documents and Readings i n the  History of Europe since 1918. New York, J.B.Lippincott Co., 1939. An excellent c o l l e c t i o n of documents and readings. Laski, Harold J . Studies i n the Problem, of Sovereignty. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1917. Mr. l a s k i has written some very f i n e books , but t h i s i s not one of them. Maclver, R.M. The Modern State. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1926. Mr. Maclver deals with the origins, the development and the functions of the state i n a very clear and readable manner. -187-Madariaga, Salvador de. The World's Design , London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1938 i . The author analyses the wdrld anaro.hy. He argues that Great B r i t a i n assumes a leadership i n world a f f a i r s . Mr. Madariaga has a world outlook and advocates the formation of a world c i t i z e n s h i p organization to promote t h i s i d e a l . Madariaga, Salvador de, Theory and Practice i n International  Relat ions . Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937. Mr. Madariaga i n common v/ith most students of International Law sees the f u t i l i t y of r e a l internat-ional co-operation, i n a world i n which the emphasis i s placed almost exclusively on national sovereignty. Mendelssohn, Barthody. The European Situation. Hew Haven, Yale University Press, 19E7. Marred hy the very heavy and cumbersome s t y l e . M i l l e r , David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant. Hew York. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928. 2 volumes. The second volume i s a..large volume of documents. An invaluable primary source of material. Murray, G i l b e r t . The Ordeal of t h i s Generation. Hew York, Harper and Brothers, 1929. Mr. Hurray i s convinced that only by the a b o l i t i o n of war Can c i v i l i z a t i o n be saved. Muir, Ramsay, fhe Interdependent World and i t s Problems. London, Constance and Co. Ltd., 1932. Mr . Muir stresses the need for equipping democracy with the necessary machinery for its survival . He shows very c l e a r l y the interdependent nature of our present c i v i l i z a t i o n . Mussolini, Benito. My Autobiography. Translated by Richard Washburn C h i l d . London, Rurat and Blackett Ltd. , 1936. Mussolini, ever boastful, t e l l s the story of his l i f e and r i s e to power. Well written and i n t e r e s t i n g . The author never departs from his subject. Hewfang,. Oscar. The Road to World Peace. Hew York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1924. Mr. Hewfang outlines a program for-the development of a world federation from the League of Hations. Mr. Hewfang makes a very good case for World Federation. He has a strong the o l o g i c a l bias. His optimism has been l a r g e l y discredited. -188-Nicholson, Harold, Peacemaking 1919 London, Constance & Co. Ltd., 1933. Based upon Mr. Nicholsons diary of the peace conference. Mr. Nicholson gives some very candid opinions on the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and events i n Paris i n 1919. Both i n t e r e s t i n g and informative. Qppenheim, 1. The League of Nations and i t s Problems. London, Longmans Green & Co. 1919. Orton, W., Twenty Years Armistice. New York, l a r r a r and Rhinehart, 1938. A very c r i t i c a l study of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and i t s effects on Europe 1918-1938. A great deal of information i n a r e l a t i v e l y small and e a s i l y read book. Peers, E. A l l i s o n . The Spanish Tragedy - Dictatorships, Republic Chaos, 1900 - 1936. New York , Oxford University Press 1936. A very f a i r and very p i e r c i n g study of Spain and the problems which gave r i s e to the C i v i l War. Mr. Peers has made a r e a l effort to give an impartial account. Problems of the Peace. Published for the Committee of the Geneva In s t i t u t e of International Relations by The Oxford University Press, London, Series 1-12; 1927 - 1938. An invaluable series of books of essays on a l l phases of the international problem. Rappard, Wm.E. The Geneva Experiment. London, Oxford University Press. 1931. An excellent, l i t t l e book on the League -of Nations. Rappard, Wm.E. The C r i s i s of Democracy Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938. A very searching analysis of the threat of the dictatorships. Ends on a note of optimism by showing that democracy i s more capable of survival than dictatorship. Rappard, Wm.E. International Relations as Viewed  from Geneva. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1925. An excellent study of the League . Mr. Rappard shows very c l e a r l y the obstacle to international co-operation inherent i n national sovereignty. 189 Ripley, Wm. Z. The Races of Europe. London, D. Appleton and Co., ^ 1899. Though f o r t y years of age t h i s book i s s t i l l the standard volume on t h i s question. A very thorough survey; useful to the h i s t o r i a n and to the anthrop-o l o g i s t . Salter, S i r Arthur. Reoovery - the Second E f f o r t . New York, The Century Co., 1932. Salter, S i r Arthur. Security - Can we Retrieve i t ? London, MacMillan & Co.Ltd., 1939. Mr. Salter pleads for a vigorous p o l i c y to insure world peace . He d i s l i k e s the v a c c i l a t i n g p o l i c y of appeasement. He believes that concessions must be made by Great B r i t a i n -but they should be made a part of a strong p o l i c y and not as a sign of weakness . He closes his book with a very s i g n i f i c a n t phrase." A cause worthy of B r i t a i n must be more than Br i t a i n ' s Cause ." Salter, Sir Arthur. The Framework of an Ordered Society Cambridge, The University Press, 1933. Mr. Salter stresses the need for economic planning i n the International f i e l d . Salter, Sir A. The United States of Europe. London, George A l l e n and IDSnwln Ltd., 1933. A series of papers by the author on various aspects of the European Anarchy. Spender, J.A. These Times London, Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1934. Mr. Splender pleads for honesty i n national and international a f f a i r s . He stresses the need for bringing p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s into conformity with economic necessities . He says of the League, " The League as i t stands to-day i s neither an executive authority nor an eff e c t i v e organ of opinion,and i t i s perpetually f a l l i n g between these two stools." Swanwick, H. M. Co l l e c t i v e . I n s e c u r i t y , London, Jonathan Cape, 1937. Miss Swanwick". spoils an otherwise very good book by a s u p e r f i c i a l analysis of the ro l e of force i n the preservation of world order. -19Q-Van Valkenburg, Samuel and Huntington, E. Usworth.-EUrope Hew York, John Wiley & Sons, 1935. An invaluable source for material on the economic geography of Europe. Vigilantes ( K. Z i l l i a c u s ) Why we are Losing the Peace-The National Government's Foreign P o l i c y . Its Causes, Consequences and Cure. .London, Victor Gollanz,Ltd.,1939. A scathing indictment of the foreign p o l i c y of the Chamberlain government. Wright, John Kirkland The Geographical Basis of  European History - Hew York, Henry Holt & Co., 1928. Whitbeck and Pinch - Economic Geography Hew York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1930. ' Wi l l e r t , S i r Arthur. What Next i n Europe ? Hew York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936 . Mr. W i l l e r t shows the fear of war i n Europe ( i n 1936) and the dis t r u s t of European states i n the protection of the League. Wiskeman, Elizabeth . Czechs and Germans - A study of the struggle i n the Hi s t o r i c Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. Hew York, Oxford University Press, 1938. A comprehensive study of the problem of Czechoslovakia, h i s t o r i c a l , c u l t u r a l , and economic, from the medieval background u n t i l the events just prior to Munich. Shot well, H.J. On The Rim of the Abyss Hew York, The MacMillan Co., 1936. An analysis of the World Situ a t i o n . Mr. Shotwell pleads for international economic planning and for American entry into the League• Simonds, Prank H. and Emery, Brooks. The Great Powers  i n World P o l i t i c s . Hew York, American Book Co., 1937. A very comprehensive study of International r e l a t i o n s interpreted i n the l i g h t of the basic factors of the problem - economic, ethnic, geographic, and h i s t o r i c . Well supplied with maps and graphs. The economic factor is given special emphasis. Slocombe, George. C r i s i s i n Europe. London, Selwyn & Blount , l t d . 1934. Mr. Slocombe probably wishes he had not made so many predictions since they have a l l turned out to be quite wrong. -191-Soward, F.H. Moulders of National Destinies. Oxford University Press. 1939. Very useful short biographies of the men who have shaped the pattern of contemporary Europe. Zimmern, Alfred E. The League of Nations and the Rule  of Law London, MacMillan & Go. Ltd., 1936. All a n a l y t i c a l study of the'League , i t s forms and i t s forces. Optimistic. Zimmern, A l f r e d E. Nationalism and Government with other war-time Essays. New York, Robt. M. McBride & Co., 1919. PAMPHLETS. Arms and the Man by the editors of " Fortune". Published i n pamphlet form by Doubleday.Doran and Co.,1934. A very f o r c i b l e statement of the menace of private arms manufacturer. Shows the power of the Comite' des Forges de France i n the international armament business. Duranty, Walter, Europe. - War and Peace. World A f f a i r s pamphlet No. 7. New York,. 1935. Mr. Duranty sketches Europe country by country. He comes to the conclusion that war w i l l not solve Europe's problems and that the greatest deterrent to war i s the fear of revolution should war come • H i l t e r , Adolph. Speech Delivered i n the Reichstag, A p r i l 28, 1939. Be r l i n , M.Miller. No matter when you hear i t , i t s the same speech. Laski, H.J. Nationalism and the Future Civilization,London, Watts and "Co., 1932. An address given at Conway Ha l l , A p r i l 6, 1932. A very r a t i o n a l attack on the p r i n c i p l e of national sovereignty. -192-World Order Papers Ho. 1 - 4. - Williams, S i r . John Pischer Murray, Professor G i l b e r t . Bereridge, S i r . William H o r s f a l l , Percy, Published by the Royal I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s . Por private c i r c u l a t i o n only . 1940. Jennings, V/. Ivor. Rough Draft. - a proposed Constitution f o r a Federation of Western Europe. Woo?Id Ordoy-fia.j&«BO. Private C i r c u l a t i o n . Mr. Jennings draws up a constitu t i o n for a proposed federation of western Europe. International C o n c i l i a t i o n Published by Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace . Ho. 354. Text of Chancellor H i t l e r ' s speech before Reichstag, October 6, 1939. Text of Premier Deladier's Broadcast to the French nation, October 10, 193-9. Text of Prime Minister Chamberlain's speech before the House of Commons, October 12, 1939. Ho. 355. Address of the Marquess of Lothian, B r i t i s h Ambassador to U.S.A. Ho. 357. Speech of Lord Halifax to the House of Lords,December 5, 1939. ARTICLES: Right Honorable the Marquess of Crewe, 2 . G. "Looking Ahead". Contemporary Review , January, 1940.-Haskihs, Charles H. "The Franco-German Frontiers" Foreign A f f a i r s . Vol. 3,; p. 197. -210. Whittlesey, Der went, " A Utopia for Europe" Hew Republic, February 12, 1914. Scott, F.R. "The Constitution and the War." Canadian Forum, November, 1939. Scott, F.R. " Parliament Should Decide", Canadian Forum February, 1940. Credit should also be given to many other current pub-l i c a t i o n s too numerous to mention. -193-Biblography Addenda. S t r e i t , Clarence, K. Union Now. Eondon, Jonothan Cape, 1939. Mr. S t r e i t proposes a federation of the f i f t e e n democracise of the North A t l a n t i c . The book, has a decided valus i n c a l l i n g attention to the f o l l y of the present world anarchy; and ihoshowing how the united strength of the democracies would have nothing to fear from the menace of dictatorships. Mr. S t r e i t .allows h i s optimism to b l i n d him to the d i f f i c u l t i e s / o f putting h i s proposal into e f f e c t . In spite of t h i s , however, the book i s a valuable contribution to the e f f o r t s to create a stable world, e s p e c i a l l y since i t i s written by an American. Curry, W. B. The Case for a Federal Union, Penguin Series, 1939. Based almost e n t i r e l y on " Union Nov/ ". This inexpensive l i t t l e volume may serve to give the f e d e r a l idea wide p u b l i c i t y . Schapiro.J. S., Morris, R. B., and Soward,F. H. C i v i l i s a t i o n i n Europe and the World. Toronto, the Copp Clark Co. Ltd. 1936. Used asca text book i n the High Schools i n the Provinc'e of B r i t i s h Columbia. The second part of t h i s text i s very good, but the chapters on Ancient and Medieval History are so sketchy that they are very unsatisfactory. Used i n connection with a course of study which i s very broad, the f i r s t part of t h i s volume can i n no way be considered a text. The chapter on American History i s one of the best i n the whole volume. 

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