SOME ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN ANARCHY

by

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Preface.

Whoever invented the preface made a great contribution to the social graces. He provided the means whereby the author could explain why he had written the work or why anyone should read it; and he enabled the author to come forward quite informally and publicly thank all those to whom thanks were due.

I have no good reason to give why anyone should read this essay, but I have very good reasons for writing it. In my work as a teacher of teen-age boys and girls I have been confronted with the task of making reasonably clear the problems of this complex world. The task has been one for which I was often ill fitted, since I could not clarify for younger people what was not clear to myself. Moreover, on many occasions I am sure that I have underestimated the difficulties of those entrusted with the conduct of public affairs. In these respects I have learned much. I have clarified in my own mind, by seeing their complexity, many of the problems which hitherto seemed impossible of understanding; and I have learned, at least, that the problems facing the world's leaders to-day are simple only
to those whose mental near-sightedness prevents a farther view. I know that the glasses which Mr. Soward prescribed by allowing me to write on this subject have corrected to some measure the mental near-sightedness from which I was suffering.

To Dr. Sage and Mr. Soward, both for their kindness in allowing me to write on this subject and for their very helpful criticisms and suggestions, to Mr. Irving for his very helpful suggestions in style, and to Mr. Robert McKenzie for help in many ways, my appreciation and my thanks.

Vancouver, B.C.

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Introduction.

Schopenhauer's remark that "the only teaching of history is that we have learned nothing from history," 1. is both an indictment and a challenge, not only to the historian, but to the whole of mankind. The growing emphasis upon social rather than upon individual needs, and the steadily increasing amount of speculative writing shows that this challenge is being met. But there still exists a fear that speculation upon the part of the historian may be only prophecy, and that history rightly belongs with the past. This idea is only partly true and neglects the raison d'être of historical research. The vicarious experience of the past is of real service to mankind when used for the benefit of the present and future. Otherwise the vast amount of human energy absorbed in the search for and in the coordination of past human experience is to be regarded as of

1. Quoted in Bratt, Major K.A., *That Next War*, Harcourt Brown, and Co., N.Y., 1931. Hegel is often given credit for this idea, but such is not fair to him for it takes out of context and quite changes the meaning of the point the author wished to make. "But what experience and history teach is this,—that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it." But Hegel goes on to say that "each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances and
no more value than the pleasure it gives to the historian himself and to those who enjoy the story of mankind merely as a story. That some knowledge of history is regarded as a necessary part of a well rounded education suggests that it has a definite bearing upon good citizenship, which in turn means social well-being. This in itself is sufficient evidence that history is to-day regarded as having a definite bearing upon the building of our society. Such a point of view should receive every encouragement. It takes history out of confinement and gives it a definite place and purpose. History need be no mere appendage to man's knowledge, but a real tool for use in the service of mankind. Like all tools its use is limited, but limited only to the proven facts of the past. Here prophecy

"exhibits a condition of things so idiosyncratic that its conduct must be regulated by considerations connected with itself and itself alone."

1. The word "fact" or "historical fact" does not necessarily imply that anything in history is established without doubt. But there is a vast amount of historical material which has been accepted by a large body of professional historians. It would be presumptuous on the part of the layman to attempt to challenge the accuracy of this material.
and historical speculation show themselves to be two quite different things. The former asserts itself without due regard for historical truth or historical probability, whereas the latter limits itself definitely to the proven facts of the past, and upon that basis suggests a reasonable probability for the future.

It is upon this conception of history that the present essay is written. It is written from the point of view of the layman with some knowledge of history rather than by the professional historian. This in itself has given a certain amount of freedom of expression which the professional historian would rightly be loathe to take. His is a profession which, if it is to maintain any degree of authority, must restrict itself to a certain specialized field. The layman, however, with no reputation at stake, and with no limit on his endeavors, may, by a correlation of many particular fields and particular authorities, arrive at certain fundamental truths which have a real bearing upon the problems of the moment. This in no way allows the layman (if his efforts are sincere) to trespass beyond the borders of established historical fact, nor does it excuse him from a close scrutiny of these facts. Moreover, any deductions from these accepted facts must be
made, not on a basis of mere speculation, but rather upon that of reasonable historical probability.

History is written by historians, but history is made by man; not only by the impact of great personalities upon their times, but in a growing measure by the awakening consciousness of the common man. This awakening consciousness may well be the prelude to a new age. In a world in which the aristocracy of privilege has been largely discredited and where the aristocracy of culture is rapidly giving place to universal knowledge (through the medium of public schools, the press, the talking pictures, and the radio) the latent energies of a hitherto large, though silent, class now become vocal. Moreover, governments and those aspiring to government offices must give to this new public a better measure of service. Governments are no longer dealing with a poorly informed and unlettered people, and although these people may still be prey to clever propaganda, they are less easily satisfied with unsound theories and practices. Public opinion to-day is not so readily moulded as it has been in the past, at least not in the democracies. Whereas in the past public opinion was largely moulded by the leaders, the leaders to-day are largely moulded by public opinion. 1. It is

1. "Foreign affairs and defence have hitherto been the...
significant that while in 1914 the British public were largely ignorant of the imminence of war, but were quite easily stirred into a war hysteria by their leaders, in 1939 British public practically forced parliament to take action. Moreover this public insistence upon definite action does not seem to be a war hysteria, but rather a serious and determined effort to create a better order in Europe. There is no enthusiasm for this war; there is a real determination to eliminate the errors which have caused it.

"monopoly of the governing class, and concerned solely and exclusively with their interests. The incursion of democracy obviously involves the danger that the vital interest of the common people in collective security and the reign of law should be taken too seriously and the vested interests of the plutocracy, requiring deals with the aggressors at the expense of their victims and of the League, should not be 'understood'.

Whereas in the three years before the world war there were only two debates and a score or so of questions on foreign policy, there were thirty debates and over 1,500 questions on foreign policy in the House of Commons between January and August 1938. Asquith and Grey were disingenuous in their dealings with Parliament and public opinion about foreign policy. But it took several years and the world war to reveal the fact, so that their reputations only suffered posthumously. Whereas Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues have been caught out taking a pragmatic view of truth so often and so promptly that the Government's reputation for veracity has suffered."

Vigilantes (K. Zilliacus) Why We are Losing the Peace, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1939.
IX

It may be that the tide in the affairs of man is reaching flood proportions, and that the greatest of man's ventures may be lost if he does not take this current as it serves. At no time has the tide of public opinion been more concerned with the relationships which exist between peoples and governments. At no time has the mass of mankind realized the gravity of the problems of war and peace. While action does not necessarily follow realization, it is safe to say that realization is the necessary prelude to action. This essay is merely a part of that realization. There are those who feel that all human thoughts flow into the great stream of human consciousness. It is a happy thought. At least all human thoughts are a part of the force of public opinion. Though this essay adds nothing to the practical solution of the problem it seeks to analyse, it may add something to that stream of human consciousness. If the stream is made strong enough by a multitude of small contributions, it may attain the flood proportions necessary to sweep away the debris of years of error, and prepare the way for the foundations of a society of nations built upon reason and the common decencies of life. This is not a Utopian dream. It is a practical problem. It is no longer the dream of a few visionaries, but the demand of mankind awakening to a fuller realization of the world in which he lives.

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CHAPTER I.

THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM.
CHAPTER 1.

The Roots of the Problem.

"Frontiers are indeed a razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life or death for nations." 1

A study of the problems of Europe finally becomes a study of national boundaries. In nearly all of the centuries of conflict and the periods of adjustment these boundaries have been a major consideration. They still remain a problem of paramount importance, and even now while this essay is being written a struggle is being waged over this age old question. However we may disguise, modify or add to the issue, it still remains a question of national frontiers. Europe for centuries has been engaged in one war or another to maintain or to change these boundaries. And after nearly every war there has been some change. But the changes for the most part have not resulted in any greater degree of stability. They have usually resulted in an ambitious desire to make additional change or in a revengeful desire to reverse the former change. Moreover any changes occurring in one part created national fears and

apprehensions which foreshadowed changes in other frontiers.
And so the cycle goes on from war to peace to war, with each war and each peace solving nothing except for a short time and creating for the future new frontiers and new problems with little hope of any stable settlement in sight. To change these frontiers on the part of one or more groups, and to resist that change on the part of one or more other groups the peoples of Europe have sacrificed millions of human lives; have expended countless billions of dollars; have undergone starvation, disease, and misery affecting millions of people over hundreds of years. And to-day the problem remains as far from solution as it was when Napoleon marched his armies to all the points of the compass in a fruitless struggle to dominate the whole area.

The solution of this problem has become the task not only of Europe but of the whole world. To-day the stability of the whole world depends upon the stability of all of its great areas - especially that of Europe. Since the old ways of solution have utterly failed, it becomes imperative that new ways be found. We must examine the roots of the tree to find the disease that affects the branches.
The problem then seems to be that of establishing reasonably permanent European boundaries. To do this one of three procedures seems necessary:

1. A formula must be devised for the solution of the boundaries which will so take into consideration all the points of conflict as to make them satisfactory to all the peoples concerned.

or

2. A formula must be devised which will establish and maintain order by international machinery, within or without the European framework.

or

3. A formula must be devised which will render these boundaries so unimportant as to make any revision of little importance.

This latter procedure is receiving a certain amount of thought at the present time. But it may be well to examine thoroughly the first two before dealing with the third.

The first task then is to examine the first procedure, - the possibilities of devising a formula for the solution of the boundaries which will have so taken into consideration all the points of conflict as to make them satisfactory to all the peoples concerned. This requires an examination of the various points of conflict, - a task so overwhelming that a thorough analysis would require volumes, but which can be summarized in a reasonably short space. The factors which must be taken into consideration are many, and they may be divided and
treated in many ways. The following selection is purely arbitrary and is chosen for the purpose of brevity rather than for any other consideration. A study will be made of the geographical, ethnological and ethnographical, and economic factors. These are probably the most important. The national factor is of course omitted as it is not one to be considered as an isolated force, but arises out of the conflicts and co-ordination of the others. If the above mentioned forces can be so arranged as to avoid any of the apparently inherent conflicts the national factor will emerge as a problem which has been solved in the process.

Geographical Considerations.

In the modern world geography does not provide stable political frontiers. This does not mean that geography plays no part in the separation of national states. Geographical barriers are quite definite in many cases, and coincide in varying degrees with political boundaries, but geographical permanence does not create political stability.

1. The social factor is today of real importance. But it is not one which has played a major part in the creation of frontiers. It becomes of real importance with the development of the totalitarian state. Then the national ideology creates a state, not only politically and economically distinct, but socially isolated.
These barriers, be they mountains, stretches of water, deserts, or rivers, only become lines of division when political units see fit to use them as such. The following quotation on the role of geography in general is equally applicable to geographical frontiers.

"Nature and geography are only the substratum of the life of mankind; they offer only possibilities of development, and not necessities. History is in no way prescribed or foreshadowed in the nature of any territory, though a territory is undoubtedly one of the given conditions of history. In human life the decision always rests with spiritual and individual factors, which use or neglect the given substratum, as disposition and will determine in each case." 1.

There is no geographic division between much of the boundary between Canada and the United States. Yet there are within the continent well-marked geographic regions which have no political significance. Whereas the political divisions of North America run east and west the geographical divisions run mainly north and south. In Europe the migrations of peoples were not greatly impeded by geographic barriers.

1. Meyer, E. Geschichte des Altertums, 1. i. (3rd edition), p.66. Quoted in Barker, Ernest, National Character and the Factors in its formation, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1927, p.52. The present essay does not subscribe to the idea that the determining factors are spiritual and individual. The point made here is that it is not the geographical factors, but the way in which man has used these factors which makes history.
While it is true that once settled the national group tended, whenever possible, to maintain itself within a geographically defined area, it is equally true that within these national groups were interspersed the minority groups which have so complicated the problem of boundaries. It is significant too that the Basques have lived for centuries on both sides of the best geographical frontier in Europe. In the case of Ireland (the island) there is a definite national cleavage between Eire and Ulster where no geographical division exists, while there is no national cleavage between Ulster and Great Britain. Whatever the reasons for these national divisions, they can hardly be said to be geographical.

Mr. H.B. George, in his "Relations of Geography and History", divides Europe geographically in a manner which cannot be said to follow very closely the pattern of national development.


Mr. George points out that even these divisions are not

strongly marked by nature. Even though these divisions be accepted it would be very difficult in most cases to define them. Where a range of mountains such as the Pyrenees occurs the watershed may be used as such a line of demarcation. What would constitute the limits of Rhone-land, Rhine-land, Danube-land, North Germany, or Russia, however, would have to be determined on other than geographical lines.

Geographical factors which under one set of conditions serve to divide, under another set of conditions serve the opposite purpose. In an agricultural society a range of mountains which acted as a barrier may well change that role in an industrial society. The mountains now become, not a frontier, but a repository of valuable mineral deposits. While the political frontier may remain, the economic intercourse between the peoples on both sides of the frontier overrides political considerations, and the industrial development which results from the exploitation of the natural wealth tends to create a border zone ethnically and culturally indefinable. This has occurred between France and Germany, between Germany and Czechoslovakia, between Germany and Poland, and wherever industries are concentrated near national boundaries. In the three cases mentioned there has arisen a very difficult problem of division. Geographic factors have led to two quite
antagonistic processes. While the physical barrier has been called upon to provide the political frontier, the resources of the physical barrier in their exploitation by both groups has tended to such a mixing of ethnic or national groups as to make the political boundary purely artificial.

Rivers and lakes have undergone a like transformation. With the development of commerce and industry they unite much more than they divide. The present attempt to establish an international waterway from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes is a very good example. The attempt here is not to establish but to break down a barrier. The fact that both Canada and the United States are both furthering their own national aims while giving lip service to the international character of the undertaking does not affect the argument. Regardless of the immediate aims of both countries, the scheme demands international co-operation in its initiation, and if undertaken must lead to a furtherance of this co-operative policy. The point here is not that the St. Lawrence does not provide a good geographical boundary line, but that such a waterway, a barrier under conditions of national hostility, becomes a bridge of international good-will, and a channel of international co-operation between friendly states. In Europe, the Danube as a means of commerce between European countries
serves much more the function of cooperation than that of division.

When we speak of the permanence of geographical frontiers we must bear in mind that geographic permanence does not create stability in a national frontier. The factor, be it mountain, sea, or river, only has a particular significance as it is applied to the needs of the moment. Where national feelings are aroused the geographical boundary may become for a time of paramount importance. Among other factors geography is called upon to sanction the frontier. Such a condition was created by the last war in respect to the frontiers of the new state of Czechoslovakia. The historic provinces of Bohemia and Moravia contained in the areas contiguous to Germany large numbers of Germans. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire these regions had been regarded as the frontiers of the historic provinces. The argument of self-determination was confronted with the argument of geography and economic necessity. Though the settlement was marred by the French insistence on security the boundary was drawn in what was considered the best interests of the inhabitants.

"With regard to the various salients which jutted out into Reich Germany territory, it would, I believe, have been wise to cede them to Germany, especially Egerland with its particular status and traditions and its violent nationalism; indeed, the mountain frontier breaks before the Asch-Eger corner in a fairly convenient strategic line. It would also, I think, have
been better to cede some territory in the south to Austria, a suggestion accepted by Masaryk in discussing the future with Dr. Seton-Watson in Holland in the autumn of 1914. One serious objection, however, had, already in the summer of 1919, appeared to cessions of such a kind -- this was the resistance of the German inhabitants themselves. As soon as they realized that the historic frontiers were sure to be preserved en principe, the feeling arose that if any Sudetendeutschen were to be the subjects of Czechoslovakia, then let it be all of them, so that they should the better be able to make their weight felt; this feeling has increased fairly steadily since 1919. 1

Miss Wiskemann from whose book the above quotation is taken shows throughout the early chapters of her work that the economic and geographical factors made this region indivisible. The problem therefore was whether Germany or Czechoslovakia should control the frontier. Historically, as part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire Czechoslovakia had the prior claim. It was natural, therefore that if the territory was not to be divided it should go to Czechoslovakia. When, however, Germany became powerful enough to challenge this settlement the frontier was changed by the Munich agreement and the territory was incorporated within the Reich.

This raises a very important question regarding mountain frontiers. Who is to control the frontier? Where there is no important national conflict, or where the

Mountains are not of great economic value; this question does not arise. The watershed may be used as the line of demarcation. But where for reasons of military or economic necessity control is regarded as essential the solution is not based on geography but upon force. Under such conditions, therefore, a mountain range no matter how well defined does not form a stable frontier, but tends rather to a condition of instability. Moreover, under the stimulus of aggressive nationalism a mountain range as a defensive frontier may well be used as the base from which an offensive war can be waged. If the neighboring territory is taken, the frontier is then extended, and what may have been the geographical frontier ceases to have any significance as a political frontier. The settlement of Munich gave to Germany such a point of vantage. From that point the occupation of the whole region was a small matter.

Apart entirely from the consideration of stability Europe has few geographical frontiers. The British Isles, and the Iberian Peninsula are the only two which are really

1. There is no intention here to enter any controversy over the Munich agreement, or to suggest that the granting of the Sudetan highland to Germany provided the sole modus operandi for the further extension of German power in Czechoslovakia. The whole point of the argument here is to show that what may be considered a geographical boundary does not constitute a stable political frontier.
fixed by geographical boundaries. Of these:— in Britain the geographical separation of Ireland has created a problem which has only been solved by the creation of a separate state or Eire; and the Iberian Peninsula is divided politically into the separate states of Spain and Portugal. Italy to the Po valley is clearly defined, and so is the Scandinavian Peninsula to the head of the Baltic Sea. Beyond this point there is no natural frontier, and even up to this point the peninsula is divided by no real frontier between Norway and Sweden. 1. The Dneister and the Danube form rather well marked boundaries for much of Rumania. The rest of Europe is not geographically outlined except where small mountain ranges and rivers form occasional boundaries which have been recognized as relatively permanent. A study of the geography of the continent from the point of view of physical features,—climate, fauna, topography, or any other geographical characteristic will show the impossibility of creating political boundaries along lines of geographical frontiers. This can be seen much more readily by a few minutes study of the maps of Europe which depict these points than by any lengthy written account.

1. A large part of the region between Norway and Sweden is mountainous. But this region is very wide and therefore does not constitute a boundary. The boundary must still be determined by man rather than by nature.
The above analysis of the geographical factors in boundary demarcation leads to certain conclusions which may be summarized as follows:

1. In Europe geographical factors can play but a very minor role in the establishment of national frontiers.

2. Many geographical factors which may be used for the purpose of dividing national states contain within themselves the very elements which destroy this function.

3. While geographical outlines may be constant, their functions do not remain so, but change with the development of new methods in industry, commerce, and transportation.

4. The establishment of a geographical frontier still leaves unsolved the problem of who should control it.

Ethnographical Considerations.  1.

Ethnographic considerations involve a study of various factors of which race and language are of primary importance. A third factor, the psychological, however, must be given due consideration. In many ways this latter factor is of far more importance in the evolution of nationality than either race or language. From the point of view of ethnography as a science the former are of course of paramount importance. The conception of nationality, however, is usually one

1. It is recognized that ethnographical, racial, and language groups have no real or necessary relation to one another. The following treatment though departing at times from this scientific consideration will nevertheless try to make that departure without sacrificing either scientific or historical accuracy.
which has no real regard for science, and, as a matter of fact, usually makes a quite deliberate attempt to avoid scientific considerations. The forces which motivate the conduct of individuals are emotional rather than rational. This fact is too often neglected in the analysis of historical movements. To prove that a popular opinion is fallacious, no matter how thorough the proof, does not in any way necessarily defeat that opinion or lessen the power of any movement founded upon it. Propaganda (a comparatively new word for a very old practice) has always thriven in the soil of untruth or part truth. What actually has happened or is the real truth at any time is never very important in the determination of group consciousness. The important thing is what the group thinks has happened, or thinks is the truth. Since the demagogue has often had much more influence on the formation of group opinion than the statesman, much of the tradition and the policy which unites a people is founded upon ideas which are scientifically untenable. In fact, scientific considerations are usually studiously avoided since they lack the emotional appeal so necessary to group action. The following quotation from Hankins is very much to the point.

"So deep are the springs of gregariousness and group loyalty, and so generally vague and symbolic the


* See footnote 1, p. 15.
methods of reasoning or appeal by which the group as a whole is moved to action, that broad generalizations have more vitality than careful discriminating logic. In such a generalization there should be some element of fact and some element of historical tradition, illumined with several elements of imagination and idealization which appeal strongly to the instinctive desire we all feel to be identified with the best, the superior. The exact and complete truth is fatal to its driving power. Yet of such a nature is the conception of nationality as it is now held in the different countries of the western world". (reference page 14) These facts must be carefully borne in mind when studying the ethnographical frontiers of Europe.

Ethnologically Europe may be divided into a very large number of regions. Basically, however, these groups are racially the result of the intermixture of three main racial types, Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic. These are racial rather than ethnic types, and bear no necessary relation to language groups. For our purpose language groups are of more importance, since language has far more significance in the formation of political groups than has

1. Hitler has created a very powerful Reich on a racial theory which has no scientific foundation. The Townsend Plan, Social Credit, Thirty Dollars every Thursday, and Technocracy show that ideas which have no scientific basis may still gain a large following.

2. Ripley, Wm. z., The Races of Europe, London, 1900. p. 103 et seq.

Huxley and Haddon give three, — Mediterranean, Nordic, and Eurasastic. (Alpine forms only part of Eurasastic)

racial origin. The language groups of Europe are classified by Fleure 1. into four main categories,— the Celtic, Romance, Teutonic, and Slavonic families, to which may be added a fifth which came by way of Asiatic migrations into Finland, Esthonia, Lapland, and Hungary. To divide Europe into political regions in accordance with these large language groups would be impossible since the languages formed from these groups have intermarried so extensively that only an expert can discover the roots. Moreover they merge to such an extent that no lines of demarcation are apparent. A number of well established languages have grown from these parent stocks. It remains to be seen how far present political frontiers coincide with these ethnic or language frontiers and how they may be modified to avoid conflict.

Spain and Portugal.

Colonized frequently from Africa and Europe alike, Spanish culture has been affected by a varied succession of peoples. In very early times Paleolithic immigrants from Africa brought Caspian, and later, Mesolithic culture. Neolithic invaders from the Eastern Mediterranean brought Megolithic culture. In the sixth century, B.C. came the Celts from the North. In the fourth century the Gauls forced the Iberians from the south of France into Spain. They

defeated the Celts and became the Celtiberians. In this
century too came the Alans, the Sueves, the Vandals, and a
little later, the Romanized Visigoths. The latter soon
mastered the Peninsula, which probably accounts for the fact
that the three main languages are founded upon the Latin.
In the Middle Ages came the Moors and the Saracens. Add
to this a large Jewish migration and Negro infiltrations
through slavery, and we have the main ingredients which
make up the people of the Peninsula. 1. Although the
three main languages, - - Portuguese, Castillian, and
Catalan, are Romance languages, a distinct ethnic group,
the Basques, still exists on both sides of the Franco-
Spanish border. Although their total number hardly exceeds
half a million, they probably retain a language which was
at one time quite wide-spread in Europe. In spite of these
successive impacts of peoples upon the Peninsula, Ripley
contends that, exclusive of the Basques, the Iberian
Peninsula is in the main racially homogeneous, more so in
fact than any other equally large area in Europe. 2.


2. Ripley, op. cit., p. 17.
A study of the language map of Spain and Portugal reveals that the language borders are reasonably close to the political. The Portuguese language frontier extends northward to take in the square portion north of Portugal which is politically Spanish. The Basque and Catalan language boundaries overlap the Franco-Spanish political borders to the north-east and south-east respectively. Within the Spanish nation itself, all four languages exist side by side without apparently meaning the unity of the state.

Here then, in the most homogeneous group in Europe, political boundaries while reasonably close are still far from being consistent with ethnographical or language frontiers. Should the occasion arise the boundary between Spain and Portugal might be drawn along the ethnographical frontier by extending the eastern boundary to the coast. This, however, would conflict with the geographical frontier.

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1. A national Catalan movement occurred in the last century. (But) "The Catalanian movement is not really one for separation, even if it is sometimes called so; the industrial development there depends too closely on the Spanish hinterland to make absolute independence desirable. But the energetic, progressive Catalonian people hate the autocratic spirit of Castile and feel that they are making a disproportionately large contribution of taxes without getting much in return."


See also Appendix A.
The population of France is the most heterogeneous to be found in Europe. It comprises all three ethnic types, Teutonic, Alpine, and Nordic (most countries are content with two) and a goodly living representation of a prehistoric race which has disappeared almost everywhere else in Europe. This is probably because France, to the west of Europe, and separated from Spain by the Pyrenees, was the last resort for the westward driven peoples of the old world. In spite of this, France has become probably the most stable of all continental European countries. We said before that language was more important than racial origin in determining group consciousness. France has developed a national language. With the exception of the Celtic speech of Brittany, and the Basque speech, this national language is spoken throughout the whole of France. Yet this main language group is not in many points consistent with the political frontiers. There is no language frontier between France and Belgium; the Basques, on the boundary between France and Spain,

1. In the case of Spain, though briefly stated, a rather complete ethnic history was given. In this and the following discussions this will not be done, but only those facts of major importance will be chosen. This does not deny the importance of the ethnic history, but avoids needless repetition since all European countries have had similar ethnic histories.

still retain their ancient tongue, and the line of de­
marcation between French and German in Alsace-Lorraine is impossible to draw on the basis of language, French and German being so intermingled as to render a real boundary impossible. Apart from a purely language consideration, the ethnographical boundary is in many cases conspicuously absent. Ripley points out that "the northwestern third of France and half of Belgium are more Teutonic than the south of Germany", and that the "current of migration between France and Germany sets strongly to the south as it has ever done in virtue of economic laws deeper than national prejudice or hostile legislation". It would therefore appear that the language or ethnic boundaries are not consistent with the present political frontiers, and that it would be very difficult, and perhaps utterly impossible, to draw such a frontier without any points of conflict.

Germany.

In spite of the Aryan claims of the present leaders in Germany, the facts of the case would seem to be quite to the contrary. To quote Fleure --

"Intermixture between Nordic and Alpine stocks has spread the dominant Broad-headedness of the Alpine over most of what is now Germany, but it is often combined with characters derived from the Nordic side .................

1. Ripley, op. cit., p. 156.
"This spread of broad-headedness may be thought of alongside of the spread of modified High German and of the Spread of southern rulers like the Hohenzollern northwards, and it will then be seen how in many ways the south has permeated the north in more modern as well as more remote times." 1.

Ripley too is quite definite on this point --

"Briefly stated the situation is this: Northwestern Germany -- Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Westphalia -- is distinctly allied to the physical type of the Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes. All the remainder of the Empire -- no, not even excluding Prussia, east of the Elbe -- is less Teutonic in type; until finally in the essentially Alpine broad-headed populations of Baden Wurttemberg, and Bavaria in the south the Teutonic race passes from view." 2.

A glance at the map is all that is needed to see how this statement affects the Nordic theory as it applies to Germany. Moreover the recent expansion of the country makes the scientific acceptance of the German claims all the more untenable. To quote further from Ripley --

"The only difference, then, between Germany and France in respect of race is that the northern country has a little more Teutonic blood in it. As for that portion of the Empire which was two generations ago politically distinct from Prussia, the South German Confederation, it is in no wise racially distinguishable from central France. Thus has political history prevented ethology; and notwithstanding, each nation is probably the better for the blend, however loath it may be to acknowledge it." 3.

1. Fleure, op. cit. p. 42.
3. ibid., p. 214.
In the matter of languages too, it would be very difficult to find any frontiers, since on all sides, and incorporated within the state are peoples of distinct languages. To the west lie Belgium and Holland with languages akin to Germany, but giving place to French in the part of Belgium approximate to France. South of these lies Alsace-Lorraine with its mixture of French and German speaking peoples. To the east are the Poles who speak a Slavic language, and now has been added the Russian. To the east and south are many Slav groups with distinctly Slavic tongues, the Slovaks, Czechs, Wends, Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, and Bulgarians. Due to the economic interdependence of this central European region there exists no clearly defined lines of demarcation between these language groups. It is clear, then, that to make any frontier of Germany which would be drawn on a language or ethnographical basis would be an utter impossibility.

Italy.

Ethnographically Italy is less homogeneous than Spain. It is largely, however, a mixture of the Alpine and Mediterranean types. Although Teutonic invaders throughout the historic period, (the Cimbri, Goths, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Saxons, and Lombards) came over the Alps into the rich valley of the Po, they probably did not come in large numbers. The Alps have acted as an effective
barrier to mass Nordic invasion. What Teutonic elements entered Italy have largely disappeared in the present population, although traces are still to be found in the north. From the point of view of language, Italy does not present a very serious problem, except in certain parts of the Tyrol. That Italy and Germany both recognize the ethnographical conflict, or possibility of conflict, can be seen from the recent plan for the repatriation in Germany of the German inhabitants of the Italian Tyrol.

The problem of languages as it relates to Italy, however, is more apparent outside the European continent, but nevertheless seriously affecting the European problem. This is the presence in Tunis of a large number of Italians. Because of the increasing number of Italians in this French colony there is a constantly recurring threat on the part of Italy to seize the colony from France. In whatever way the problem is settled, under the present concept of state sovereignty no language boundary seems possible.

Poland.

One has only to study the effects of historic times on Poland to realize the impossibility of establishing ethnographic boundaries. Although the language of the Poles is akin to the Russians, their civilization and religion is founded upon the Latin West rather than upon Byzantium.
The partition of Poland in the 18th Century created a condition which made the formation of ethnographical boundaries quite impossible. In fact there is more difference ethnographically between town and country than exists between different parts of the state.

"West Poland has Polish peasants and Jews and Germans in the towns, and until 1914 many German landowners. Farther east Polish landowners and peasants have between them townsfolk still largely Jew or German. Farther east still the peasants are Lithuanian or White Russian or Ruthenian according to district...

One need but think of the misunderstandings these complexities of speech and claim involve to see how hard it is to secure unity".

If ethnographical or language frontiers are to be taken into consideration in the fixing of boundaries, it is hard to see how any stable frontiers could be created for the Polish State. Indeed, practically the whole boundary is artificial and bears no relation to language or ethnography. The border between Poland and Russia is purely arbitrary, cutting through territory ethnically Russian. Further south, the Poles form a minority in an inextricable mixture of races, of which White Russians and Ukrainians form the majority. Only in the South do the Poles live in large numbers near the frontier, and even here they mingle with a Ruthenian majority. In the west and south no line of division exists. Germans and Poles (especially the Jewish elements of both nations) are so

1. Fleure, op. cit., p. 65.
intermingled as to make an ethnical division impossible. Especially is this so in Upper Silesia. 1. The presence of East Prussia as an alien island within the Polish State adds, perhaps, the final touch to a national boundary in which it would be difficult to create a more ethnic disorder.

The emotional and entirely irrational character of nationalism is nowhere better shown than in the resurrection of the Polish State. Every attempt at destroying Polish national feeling by both Russia and Germany not only failed but caused the fires of that nationalism to burn more fiercely. Yet when Poland was resurrected after war and revolution the new state was not satisfied with a territory ethnically Polish but insisted upon her historical frontiers. With the aid of France she drove back Russians and established a boundary which greatly aggravated an already difficult minority problem. There has been constant trouble since 1918 by the attempt of the strongly nationalist Poles to impose a Polish culture and outlook upon all the

minorities within the state. 1. The fact that this policy has been so futile when used against the Poles themselves seems to have been entirely ignored. The national spirit which led to the recreation of the state seems to have gone a long way towards its destruction. Whether stable boundaries could have been found for the state seems doubtful. Had national feeling been tempered with sufficient reasons to resist the desire for territorial control so far beyond that warranted by purely ethnic considerations a greater national solidarity would have resulted. To fix the boundaries of such a state upon ethnic lines, however, would still be very difficult, if not impossible. Unless the exclusive ambitions of militant nationalism can be restrained or coerced by some form of international control, the realization of Paderewski's dream of a permanent Polish State is as remote as the millennium. 2.


2. Even if the defeat of Germany should lead to another revival of the Polish State it is hardly probable that Russia would relinquish the territory she has occupied. The new state would be very much smaller than that formed after the World War. Given the same conditions as now exist in Europe between national states, such a state would find it difficult to survive. In any case it could survive only so long as it was convenient for certain stronger powers to guarantee its independence. As a buffer state between Germany and Russia it would be the first state to lose its independence should war break out between those two countries. The solution of the Polish question is not the re-establishment of an independent Poland but the establishment of a European States System based upon the acceptance of the interdependent nature of Europe and a policy which works for and not against this principle.
Other European States, -- General Conclusions.

The treatment of individual states thus far has shown that for the most part no ethnographical frontiers can be fixed for them. To discuss individually the remaining states of Europe would only be adding unnecessary proof for this argument, since the states dealt with are, with the exception of Poland, much more stable and differ from one another to a much greater degree, than the remaining European states. Particularly is this true of Czechoslovakia, and the Balkan States. These latter states are in a sense, the melting pot of Europe in which the ethnographical and language groups form such a complex maze of nationalities that any effort to fix boundaries on the principle of either ethnography or language would obviously be impossible. We must conclude, then, that on the basis of nationality as it is now conceived, neither language nor ethnography can be used as a basis upon which stable European frontiers can be fixed.

Before dismissing this phase of our problem, however, and without anticipating the argument to any degree more than is absolutely necessary, a few observations must be made here which relate directly to the ethnographical and language problem and their effect upon national frontiers. Great Britain (without Eire) is a case in point. Here three distinct language groups exist within a single nation, the English, the Gaelic Scottish, and the Welsh. Apart
from an occasional national revival in Wales, and less occasionally in Scotland, there does not appear here to be any conflict sufficient to disturb the national unity of the Island. We must anticipate the argument here to point out that the boundaries between these three peoples, have been made so unimportant as to preclude any possibility of serious friction. This is a very important fact and must be borne in mind if the problem is to be clearly understood. In the conclusion regarding the ethnographical basis for national frontiers there was no implication that nationality could not exist within stable frontiers -- but only that the possibilities of what may be termed ethnographical friction could not be removed by fixing ethnographical frontiers, since such a solution was impossible. Although the people of Wales have been governed from London by English law for nearly seven hundred years they still retain their own language and their old customs. This, at first sight would seem to present a paradox. But upon examination it will be found that no contradiction exists and that the argument is only strengthened by this example. The reason that this national group has been able to survive and flourish without friction within an almost foreign state is because the concept of nationalism is quite different here from that of the continent. Were the people of Wales and England to conceive of their nationalism in the same way as the people of
France and Germany there would soon be apparent the need
for fixing a stable frontier between the two countries,
and there would arise national antagonisms which at present
have no existence because they have nothing upon which their
existence could be based.

In the case of Eire, a number of factors, ethnic,
economic, and cultural, have created a growth of nationalism hostile to Great Britain. Whether the creation of the
separate state of Eire is a solution of the problem
remains to be seen. The economic dependence of the country
upon Great Britain is in marked contrast with the national
separation. Should Irish nationalism continue to follow
the pattern of that of continental Europe these contrasting
interests offer the potentialities of continual conflict.
The present activities of the Irish Republican army seem to
be following the militant policy which has so aggravated
the European anarchy. The stubborn insistence upon a
united Ireland is met by an equally stubborn resistance by
the inhabitants of North Ireland who refuse to be drawn into
a state in which they will be a minority. The nationalistic
feelings which are apparent in the reaction against English
in the effort to make Gaelic the language of the country
are in themselves cause for misgiving by the people of
Ulster. At the present time Eire is an independent republic.
The signing of a treaty between Eire and Great Britain in
April 1938 might be taken as tantamount to acceptance by Great Britain of the new constitution which went into effect in December, 1937. North Ireland still remains outside the Irish Republic. Whether the realization of the Irish dream of independence will serve to abate or to heighten national feeling remains to be seen. Economically Britain and Eire (especially the latter) have much to lose by international strife. Nearly 45 percent of Eire's agricultural products go to England. What Ireland has gained in the matter of satisfying national pride may yet be set against her economic loss. The sovereign state of Eire must now compete as a foreign power for what was formerly hers as an inherent right, namely the economic wealth and prestige of Great Britain and the British Empire. Whatever may be the outcome of the present relationship, there is little doubt that any intensification of the feeling of national independence will greatly impede the co-operation so essential to both countries.

Since the problem of Ireland goes much beyond Eire or the British Isles it may be well here to consider its broader aspects. The problem affects not one country but the whole world, and especially that part of the world which is British. Moreover, it bears vitally upon the whole problem of sovereignty. Especially is this important in a post-Wilson world where the idea of self-determination has been so widely accepted. Here theory and practice show the necessity of tempering idealism with reality.
Nowhere does Wilson's idealism conflict with reality more clearly than in this Irish problem. Self-determination gives a simple remedy, an independent Ireland. Simple solutions of complex problems are always wrong. Irish independence not only does not solve the problem, but may be the genesis of much wider and more disturbing complexities. Irish independence and Irish nationalism if they embody the concept of national sovereignty, create within the British Isles two nations acting independently in their exclusive national interests. The foreign policies of each of these national states will be directed solely in the interests of the individual states, with no consideration of the rights or welfare of the other. Great Britain will, therefore, be called upon not only to protect Ireland but to protect herself against Ireland -- against Eire alone or Eire in alliance with one or more foreign powers. The latter is not a fantastic consideration. The German Irish collaboration of 1916 shows that Irish nationalism feels no obligation to preserve the security of Great Britain, and would sacrifice that security for what is considered its exclusive national interests. The present activities of the Irish Republican army show the same feeling. That such activities are the work of outlawed extremists does not seriously weaken the argument, since there is no guarantee that such extremists may not at any time be in control of the sovereign government of Eire. The peril to Great Britain in the existence of a sovereign
national state of Eire is very real. It has the possibilities of the destruction of Great Britain as a great power. Such an event would mean the collapse of an empire of nearly five hundred million people and all that such a calamity may entail. To suppose that there would not be a mad scramble for the parts of this disintegrated empire is the blindest stupidity. And to suppose that such a mad scramble would not create world-wide confusion, only makes that stupidity more flagrant. Such a picture is no 'Spenglerian' despair but a real possibility in these pragmatic times. What then becomes of the principle of self-determination? Have the three million people of Eire the right to determine their own destiny if the security of the fifty million of the British Isles is thereby threatened? Have fifty million people in the British Isles the right to permit a course of action which might lead to the disintegration of an empire of nearly five hundred million people, and the chaos which such a disaster would bring? Surely there can be only one answer.

There is here a real challenge to the doctrine of national sovereignty. Only to the extent that the sovereignty of any group carries no threat to the security of society can such sovereignty be deemed a right. The founders of the American constitution have made a great contribution to the science of government by a recognition of the need for checks and balances in the sovereign power of the people.
Wilson seems to have overlooked the fact that the world outside America was quite as real as America itself. The principles upon which human rights are guaranteed in America are only maintained by definite checks upon the activities of any branch of government. Such checks or limitations are quite as essential in international as in national government. There can be no such thing as self-determination in an inter-dependent world unless definite checks are placed upon such a policy. Covenants are not enough. An international organization ceases to be international if the criterion of policy is consistence with national policy. It becomes international only when the criterion is consistence with international well-being. One must sacrifice the principle of inter-dependence or the doctrine of national sovereignty. Here reality conflicts with theory. The former principle is real, the latter is doctrinaire. In a real world, ideals, no matter how well meant, must be tempered with reality. The resistance of Great Britain to the growth of a sovereign state of Eire must be regarded as a mere conflict between the British and the Irish nations. It is a conflict which must be accepted as a universal challenge to the doctrine of state sovereignty. If this challenge is not accepted the practical realities of present necessity must be constantly obstructed by the dogmas of political theory. Theory is as essential element of human progress. It should not only
explain but should act as a brake upon too radical departure from tried and established practices. But when a theory entirely stops the wheels of progress it is time to discard it. The theory must be re-examined, not in the light of the conditions under which it was conceived and nourished, but under the conditions under which it now finds itself. The doctrine of national sovereignty while adequate to the needs of the national age in which it was conceived finds itself inadequate to the needs of the international world in which it still tries vainly to function. A sovereign Ireland founded upon nineteenth century theory is a menace to twentieth century necessity. 1.

Like Great Britain, Czechoslovakia was a state which comprised many languages and ethnic groups. Yet this did not affect its function as a nation. It is very questionable if the German point of view that Czechoslovakia was an artificial state incapable of survival 2 could be substantiated. Without too much pressure from the outside there probably would have been no internal problem incapable of solution. That a great deal of internal friction did exist in the state

1. It will be necessary to further elaborate this question of national sovereignty. It seemed fitting, however, to touch upon the subject in this discussion of Ireland since it cannot be divorced from the problem of Irish nationalism.

there is little doubt. Made up out of the wreck of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the state incorporated within its borders peoples of different languages and cultures. There was a persistent demand for local autonomy, which was granted to some measure in 1927. This did not finally settle but did greatly lessen the forces of disruption.  

1. The creation of a national state out of divergent elements is a slow and painful process. That Czechoslovakia, surrounded by possible enemies and endangered by internal unrest failed to establish a real national unity in less than one generation is not a very fair indictment. The question is, whether the state was destroyed by its own internal weakness, or by the force of German arms. Miss Wiskemann, whose opinion seems very fair concludes her book as follows:

"In the circumstances of Europe to-day the problem of the Historic Provinces cannot be satisfactorily solved. A wise Government can greatly reduce friction, but whatever the Government, friction there will be, so long as a racialistic nationalism is regarded as an absolute standard of good. Some common political principle which different races can respect is the cement which is needed to repair the Czech-German structure. The humanism of Thomas Masaryk might gradually have created the necessary cohesion, and the Historic Provinces, by reconciling German and Slav, might have pointed the way towards a genuine solution of the problem of Central Europe."


This conclusion strikes at the very roots of the problem, "the circumstances of Europe to-day", and "racialistic nationalism as the standard of good." Here these two factors are not separate, but are one and the same thing. Otherwise it would not be impossible to eliminate the latter. It is being done constantly in Canada and the United States. In Europe, however, the national feeling is not only burning from within frontiers, but is constantly being fed from the outside. This outside interference in a state so ethnically and culturally divided as Czechoslovakia was a very real menace.

The fundamental causes of the collapse of the state were inherent in its formation; not because it was necessarily weak through the incorporation of more than one national

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1. The United States could not be considered weak because of internal friction. Internal friction is bound to be present to some extent in any country. In a vigorous nation differences of opinion and of interest show themselves in a very vigorous manner. Where internal friction ceases such a nation will have lost its spirit. It is to be noted, however, that the United States, even though thousand of miles removed from the European scene does not take the risk of outside interference which might aggravate internal friction and unrest. The recent vote in Congress to continue the Dies Committee on Un-American Activities show that, regardless of the exaggerated emphasis upon these activities, there is a real fear of foreign interference. The Zinovieff letter of 1924 while it may not have been the factor which led to the defeat of the labour party, nevertheless did have a very important part in this defeat, and seriously affected the foreign policy of the country.
group, but because the conditions under which it was forced to live were inimical to its survival. In order to safeguard the state and the post-war settlement of Europe it was given a border region of predominantly German population. This was deemed necessary as an economic and strategic protection against Germany. But the very region which was to protect the state was its greatest weakness, and was the stick with which it could be beaten. The Treaty of Versailles, which had sanctioned, even if it had not created the state, did nothing to remove the national friction which was later to destroy it. It does not follow that the boundaries were wrongly drawn or that the exclusion of the predominantly German area would have created a stable national state. The stability of any European state under the concept of militant nationalism does not depend alone upon internal unity -- but upon the outside pressure of other national states. While it is believed, rightly or wrongly, that national survival is only possible by including the means of that survival within national frontiers, there is bound to be a persistent effort to expand national boundaries. The equilibrium which preserves the boundaries over any period of time does not depend on ethical, language, cultural, or any other such considerations, but purely upon force. Within any state there are forces which are constantly threatening its internal unity. 1. A state is inter-

1. The movement for independence in Quebec, Social Credit in
nally stable to the extent that it keeps these disrupting forces in check. When, however, the external forces of disruption are aggravated from the outside, the resistance of the state to these combined efforts may become so weak as to break down entirely. This is what happened to Czechoslovakia. German agitation within and without the state weakened, and German arms destroyed it.

The Reich was only able to do so, however, because the conditions making such aggression (by propaganda and by arms) possible were inherent in the European anarchy. Versailles had recreated Europe, but it was at bottom the same Europe. The political foundation which had collapsed in 1914 was pieced together using the same material and the same cement to form a different pattern. Buttressed as the new structure was by the League of Nations it could not survive. Czechoslovakia did not collapse because it was impossible for two or more ethnic groups to live within the political framework of a single state, but because it is impossible for ethnic groups to live in isolated sovereign states within an economically interdependent Europe. The collapse of Czechoslovakia was not the collapse of a single state but the failure of the whole national states system to satisfy the needs of a region which has grown to such a stature of interdependence that the garments of its early formative age are entirely unsuited to its present needs.

Alberta, the movement for separation of Vancouver Island from British Columbia, regardless of their strength, are forces threatening internal unity.
That ethnical unity in itself is far from providing stability in a national state is illustrated in the case of Jugoslavia. Except for a relatively small minority, Jugoslavia is preponderantly Slavic. This ethnical homogeneity, however, has not provided any real unity of national feeling or of action. Indeed both feeling and action have grown more and more away from national solidarity. Ever since the scrapping of the federal principle by the constitution of 1921, there has not been lack of co-operation alone, but actual rebellion against the government. The Croats have been particularly intransigent. They have elected deputies, but have refused to sit in the Belgrade parliament. In 1928 they went so far as to set up a rival parliament at Zagreb. Later in the same year they were joined by representatives from Dalmatia, and decided to work independently of the Belgrade government and to boycott Serbia. In November of the same year the Belgrade government offered to consider changes in the constitution which would give wide autonomy to Croatia, Dalmatia, and other discontented provinces. But the Croatian leaders refused to deal with the government and declared their willingness to negotiate only if approached directly by the king. Under these circumstances the king took drastic measures. He declared that parliament had destroyed rather than fostered national union. He dissolved parliament and set up a new government in which he himself had almost complete control. Since that time Jugoslavia has
been a royal dictatorship. A semblence of democracy is still retained. There are two houses of equal power. The king directly appoints half the members of the upper house. In cases of disagreement between the two houses the king decides. The system of electing is very complicated. Each candidate must be nominated by a certain number of votes from each part of the state. This was to avoid the recurrence of regional strife. It has resulted in the impossibility of getting a representative parliament. In fact, the only ones who can qualify are those in favor of the centralized form of government; the very thing upon which the intransigent states have been unwilling to accept. National unity is thereby assured, not by popular will, but by the power of the king backed by a very artificial system of government.

In spite of a large measure of ethnical homogeneity, Jugoslavia is much less united nationally than was Czechoslovakia or Poland, each of which has fallen victim to aggression. Cultural and religious groups have been far more uncompromising than racial groups. The attempted domination of the state by the Serbs, vigorously opposed by related

1. King Alexander was assassinated at Marseilles, 1934. He was succeeded by 11 year old Peter II. The government was headed by a Council of Regents under Prince Paul. A policy of conciliatory followed, but the Serbs, Croates and Slavenes still remain intransigent.
Slavic groups, had led to such national disunity that the state is even now being kept from complete disintegration by the autocratic power of the king dictator. If one may be permitted to speculate on possibilities, it might be observed that had Mussolini adopted the Hitler technique, the combination of external and internal pressure may well have led to results analogous to those in Poland and Czechoslovakia. If Jugoslavia becomes involved in the present conflict it is hard to see how it can possibly survive under anything like its present artificial government. The national hopes of the Declaration of Corfu have in no real sense been fulfilled. Theory and practice have again found themselves far from agreement. The peoples who broke away from the Austro-Hungarian Empire because of national ambitions have demonstrated that nationality is in itself by no means adequate as the basis for a stable national state.

The greatest danger spots in Europe are what Van Valkenburg and Huntington call zones of transition. These are border regions where two groups, not necessarily different ethnologically, have not yet become nationally conscious of their existence in the country within which they are incorporated; or in which different ethnological or language groups have not become sufficiently fused to avoid conflict. In Belgium there is constant friction

between the French-speaking Walloons, and the Dutch-speaking Flemings. This is not a serious problem, but the kind of thing which is often seized upon by a neighboring power as an excuse for interfering to save the oppression of a minority by a tyrannical and brutal majority. Poland and Czechoslovakia offer convincing proof of the menacing potentiality of such a zone of transition. In Alsace-Lorraine the population is largely German, but the culture largely French. Although Germany has renounced all claims to Alsace-Lorraine, this is merely a verbal announcement which suits the political aspirations of the moment. There is no doubt that the situation has still the potentialities of serious trouble. The eastern border of Germany was the occasion of the present war. Its solution by the pressure of German and Russian arms may or may not be final. The Sudetan area of Czechoslovakia has also been a major factor in the present European unrest, and it remains to be seen how this problem will finally be solved. Given sufficient time these transition areas might well cease to be a problem. But under the present concept of European nationality it does not appear politically expedient "to let sleeping dogs lie", but rather that they should be aroused in one or another national interest. That time can solve the problems is

apparent in Switzerland where four distinct language groups, French, German, Italian and Rumonsh have found a unity which has lasted for over a hundred years. In Canada two distinct language groups have maintained such a national unity for nearly two hundred years; and in Great Britain the same condition has existed for nearly seven hundred years.

It begins to be apparent from our study of ethnographical factors that the problem only becomes a source of trouble when stimulated by some other force; that it is not a problem in itself, but that it contains fuel for the fires of political unrest and national aspirations. While we might in truth, therefore, call into being ethnographical or linguistic excuses for friction between political or national groups, we can not in truth speak of ethnological or linguistic causes for such friction. Granted sufficient time and an absence of outside interference peoples of different ethnological groups or speaking different languages have learned, and can learn, to live with one another without politically insoluble friction within the framework of a single political state. The impossibility of fixing ethnographical or language frontiers, therefore, does not necessarily present a problem in itself, since the failure to solve a problem in any particular way is really a step ahead in the search for a final solution.
Economic Considerations.

While historians differ in the degree to which they accept the economic factor as a determinant in the history of mankind, it would be hard to find any who would not acknowledge this factor of very great importance. This present treatment of the European problem does not, at this stage, require any evaluation of the economic factor as it relates to any others. Lest the space allotted to it would seem to indicate a prejudice one way or another, it should be borne in mind that the present treatment limits the economic, as well as the other factors dealt with, to a definite and restricted consideration. Here we are only concerned with the application of these forces as they relate to the fixing of European boundaries. In the following treatment economic considerations will, therefore, of necessity be severely curtailed. The degree to which each of the factors considered suffers by such a restriction is hardly a measurable quantity. But, judging by the amount of material on the economic field it would appear that this factor will suffer the most from such restricted treatment.

In order to fix stable European national boundaries which take into consideration the economic factor, it would seem essential to have a definite understanding as to what constitutes the economic rights of the national state. Just as the idea of private property has grown to be an accepted
fact in our civilization, so national property has been accepted, and the nation has assumed the right to exploit and to dispose of the materials within its own borders as an inherent and exclusive right. Within the nation itself, however, there has emerged an increasing demand for the modification of individual rights, and there has been incorporated into the laws of all nation states a greater or less degree of control of the individual owner or exploiter. Indeed, it is the increase in this social as opposed to individual right that is the most significant factor in our present civilisation. That this socialization has taken different forms does not deny its existence or modify its importance. In democratic countries the right of the individual is protected by constitutions which have established certain fundamental liberties; but these liberties are only guaranteed by restricting the rights of certain individuals or groups of individuals in their exploitation of the great masses of the people. In other words, all the people who make up the state are restricted in their rights to living within the law — the law being more and more the will of the majority, and less and less the imposition of powerful individuals or groups. In totalitarian states, much as we may disagree with the method, the assumption on the part of the dictator is that he speaks and acts for the whole people. Indeed, the first criticism directed against dictatorship by the exponents
of democracy is that the individual has been so interwoven into the pattern of the state that he almost entirely loses his identity as an individual. In both democracies and dictatorships there is a growing tendency to limit the rights of the individual to those activities which are not inconsistent with the welfare of the state as a whole. Ownership, therefore, is no longer absolute and unrestricted. An individual may own an automobile or a coal mine, but his use of either is limited and controlled by the state. Moreover where the state is threatened, it has established the right not only to further restriction, but even to outright confiscation in the interests of the whole people. Thus there has developed a conception of private property within the state which recognizes not only the right of the individual, but the right of the whole people. In the matter of national rights, however, this idea has not had the same recognition. Although the idea has been recognized by many as applicable to the sphere of international as well as to national affairs, there has, as yet, been no effective way of modifying the exclusive rights of a nation to exploit its own national resources for its own benefit regardless of welfare of all mankind. Attempts have been made in the international field by bodies such as the League of Nations, and the International Labour Organization to make peaceful commerce a medium for the necessary exchange of the world's goods; but these attempts have not in any way really affected the right of the nation state to exploit its
own wealth for its exclusive benefit. Until such time, therefore, as this exclusive national right is effectively challenged, we must assume that the economic right of the national state is an exclusive right to the materials within its frontiers. This right, which under the present concept of nationalism is claimed by all nations, necessarily establishes the corollary — that no nation has any right to the materials which lie within the frontiers of any other nation.

In this respect nations have not been at all consistent. While accepting their right to the materials within their own borders as inherent and God-given they have been unwilling to accept the corollary, and have assumed that the need for justified the rights to the materials within the borders of other countries. This inconsistency has been disguised by a demand for the territory itself rather than for the raw materials it contains; and is usually excused by such phases as "the need for proper living space", "the achievement of our national destiny", and other slogans. Nations assert their rights as an exclusive problem without any regard for the rights of others. The mere assertion of a right on the part of a state, does not however, establish it as a principle. In the present as in the past, an assertion of a right backed by sufficient force to establish or maintain it has been the formula
which has determined this right. Any principle established by force, must, of course, be maintained by force, and can be changed by force. As such it violates the whole idea of stability. Self-determination as a principle for boundary demarcation has at least the value of being definable. What might be called economic right as such a principle, however, has no such advantage. Coal, iron, and other natural resources have no ethnic or national consciousness in themselves, and the right to these resources, if there be such, is merely one of geography. This right has been maintained by the old idea that "possession is nine points of the law" with the further provision that the owning group had to maintain that possession by an armed strength sufficient to deter or defeat any other group which sought to establish its ownership. Thus the iron fields of Alsace-Lorraine have been the property of Germany or of France whenever either of these countries was in a militarily predominant position over the other. Each country was able to establish its economic necessity and its national right to this region at such times as it was in a relatively strong position. As it stands to-day, France has established its economic right to Alsace-Lorraine while Germany retains the coal fields of the Saar and the Ruhr. France, therefore, has an abundance of iron, but suffers from an insufficiency of coal; Germany has an abundance of coal, but suffers from an insufficiency of iron. If national ownership is an
essential factor, then an exchange of some of the iron land of France for some of the coal land of Germany might create a condition of balance between coal and iron in both France and Germany. Such a boundary, however, would probably be impossible without destroying the ethnic factor which at the present is reasonably quiescent. Moreover, the state of mind necessary for such a solution would render this solution superfluous, since under such a state of mind the coal and iron would be available to both countries regardless of national frontiers. Their national importance in present-day Europe is largely that of military necessity. In times of conflict France, by retaining the iron fields creates an industrial weakness in a potential enemy, Germany. Germany by possession of the Saar and the Ruhr, creates an industrial weakness in France. This is considered by both countries as a military necessity; and it probably is under the present exclusive nationalism prevalent in Europe. Thus,

\[1\] "From a purely economic point of view there is here no frontier, and any political line which separates the coal of the Ruhr from the iron of Lorraine runs against overpowering economic forces." Haskins, Charles, H., "The Franco German Frontiers"; Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3, P. 197-210. This essay also points out that similar difficulties are apparent in the matters of race, language, and culture.
in order to check the military growth on either side of a national frontier, two nations, both of which could be industrially strong, strangle one another in the name of national interest.

The same problem occurred in drawing the boundaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia. As far as possible ethnic, geographical, and economic factors were taken into consideration. But they could not in any case be determined in one sense without sacrifices in others. It is quite natural, too, that where conflicting claims were made by the victors and the vanquished the former would likely prevail. In this sense, the new states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic were not the result of a peace conference but the result of a war. The frontiers were, therefore, dictated by force. Just so long as the victorious powers remained untied and strong, they were able to keep the vanquished poor and subdued. The boundaries had to be maintained by force of arms, or by the threat of armed intervention should the defeated states attempt to revise these established frontiers. Thus what appeared to be a solution of the European problem was merely the

1. Large capitalist trusts and cartels are very often international in their control and override national boundaries. Their activity, however, is greatly limited in time of war.
creation of other problems as great, if not greater, than the ones supposedly settled. To Poland and Czechoslovakia went much of the industrial land of the former German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Germany was purposely made weak as a military precaution and Austria was impoverished. 1. The experts had settled the frontiers, but they had not fixed them. They remained only so long as they could be maintained by force, and they were broken as soon as the opposing forces were strong enough to destroy them. Again the frontiers are changed, but they are not fixed. Whereas in 1918 the Czechs and Slovaks founded a nation on the principle of self-determination and incorporated into the state sufficient iron and coal to make the country self-sufficient in these respects as a national necessity, in 1938 Germany destroyed the Czech nation on precisely the same grounds. Whereas in 1918 it was essential geographically and economically to Czechoslovakia to incorporate the Sudetenland into the new Republic, it was essential in 1938 for the same reason to incorporate this region within the German Reich. 2. The same applies to Poland, to

1. It would serve no useful purpose in this essay to dwell upon the injustices of Versailles. That there were grave injustices committed goes without saying, but these injustices are not peculiar to any nation and arise out of the general European Anarchy. A very good account of the Economic injustices is given in William Orton's Twenty Years' Armistice, Farrar & Rinehart, N.Y. 1938.

2. Note also the recent seizure of territory by Russia in the Karelian Isthmus.
to Austria, to the Baltic States. The economic necessity of any national state is not peculiar to that state. All the states want the resources which are available in Europe and outside Europe. Each strives to be nationally, industrially, and culturally dominant within an expanding orbit. To do so each must extend its control over as large a field of raw materials and natural resources as possible. For a limited time nations have lived within definite frontiers, but increases in population, changes in world trade, industrial development, and the constant changes occurring in all parts of the world at length create a situation where national needs are changed. Agricultural states have a desire for self-sufficiency based upon manufacturing. Manufacturing states feel the need for agricultural areas to feed their growing population. Under conditions where war, economic or military, may seriously limit supplies, each country desires self-sufficiency.

From the point of view of economic self-sufficiency, nature has been very fickle in bestowing her favours. Thus, Italy, territorially and ethnically compact has suffered greatly from the lack of nearly all the raw materials necessary to a highly developed national life independent of the rest of Europe. While politically independent and economically secure under conditions of ready access by trade to the raw materials of other countries, she feels
the danger of economic starvation if this access is closed by war or by excessive trade barriers. To give to Italy the raw materials she requires by the extension of her national boundaries, is, of course, impossible unless that extension is very great indeed. Moreover, any such extension would be bound to add further to the European anarchy because of the antagonism of the peoples involved, and the change in the military balance thus effected. It is paradoxical that Italy which suffers most from the lack of raw material, and has most to lose by national insulation is at the present time the country which is fostering this economic isolation as much as, if not more than, any other European country. The country which has the most to gain by friendly and free intercourse with the wealthy countries of Europe seems to be one of the most ardent and persistent foes of international co-operation.

The solution of European boundaries if they are to be based on economic necessity would be one that gave to each nation economic self-sufficiency. Each group could then live within its own borders and need have no cause to envy or fear its neighbor. There need then be few international conventions, since each nation would be entirely self-sufficient. Europe would resolve itself into self-contained and relatively isolated communities, and the constant fear of war for economic power would be gone. Such a solution of course is impossible, and as we shall see later, entirely undesirable.
A glance at the economic map of Europe shows that any equitable division of the raw materials of the continent is quite impossible if such a division is to be made and maintained by the drawing of national frontiers to conform to the economic necessity of each nation. Thus stable frontiers can in no way be drawn upon purely economic lines. This does not render the problem any more insoluble, but rather indicates that the basis of solution is at fault and that some other basis is necessary.

**Summary and Conclusion.**

It is apparent now that Geographical, Ethnographical, and Economic factors, all of which have contributed to the formation of European frontiers, are by no means sufficient-ly clear-cut to form stable boundaries between national states, and that while all these factors are considered in the drawing of boundaries they are usually so much in conflict with one another that the boundaries which are fixed for any period of time are necessarily artificial. There is no principle upon which other than artificial boundaries can be drawn, although each of the factors considered in this chapter have a bearing upon where this artificial boundary shall be drawn. Since none of these factors is very clear-cut in most cases, and since there is never any absolute agreement in cases of dispute, any boundary is a compromise and is accepted only for a limited period of time. In a dynamic civilization such as exists in
Europe, it is natural that where so much attention is paid to the necessity of national power and prestige constant changes should occur in the interests of these national aspirations.

Boundaries are after all, essentially barriers. 1. The more stable they become, the more effective they are likely to become in the isolation of one national group from another. If each nation could become economically self-sufficient national introversion must increase. In a world which has only reached its present high stage of development by the successive breaking - up of man's introversible tendencies -- from the family, to the clan, to the tribe, to the nation -- it would appear that any solution which would erect permanent barriers to such an expanding process would necessarily destroy the dynamic nature of present civilization, and create in its place  


2. The family still exists as a very stable unit in the greater part of the world. But the family has survived as a social rather than a political unit. Its social unity is based upon a biological necessity. In the realm of government, however, while the heads of the family still exercise authority within the family, every member of the family is called upon to obey the laws of the state.
a static or feudal society. That no real basis for the erection of stable boundaries can be found does not therefore make the problem of the European anarchy any more complex, but perhaps indicates that any such solution would be contrary to the best interests of Europe and the world. When Newton was forced to solve certain problems he found that his mathematics was inadequate. This, however did not prevent him from solving his problems. He merely invented a new mathematics, differential calculus. That the old political mathematics of Europe seems inadequate to deal with the complex problems of to-day, does not render these problems insoluble. It perhaps means that we must devise a new mathematics to deal with them.

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CHAPTER II

WAR, PEACE TREATIES, AND THE LEAGUE.
Since the maintenance of stable, European boundaries is seen to be inconsistent with the factors upon which such boundaries are drawn, it is necessary now to examine the means by which Europe has attempted to preserve these boundaries by means of international co-operation. That this method has failed may be due to either one of two main reasons. Either the nations of Europe have had no real will for such co-operation, or there exists in the efforts toward such co-operation certain fundamental contradictions which make it ineffective. If the first of these is accepted, as has been done by many, then the problem must remain insoluble, and the European anarchy must be accepted as a permanent inevitability, and to "death and taxes" there must be added "war" as one of the things which cannot be avoided. For this assumption the pessimist has much of the history of Europe and the world upon which to build a very powerful case. But no matter how much of such material he is able to produce, his argument is still based upon a
superficial examination of the cloth of history. Fundamentally, man, like every other animal behaves in a manner which is conducive to his survival. As a gregarious animal, this instinct for survival tends to transcend that of the individual and to emerge as the motivation of the group. In an expanding society this group motivation, in spite of frequent clashes of interest, has a parallel expansion. Thus with the development of the national state the whole state in its efforts for survival transcends that of the individual members. But since no historical process comes to any finality, it seems irrational to believe that the national state is the culminating point in the expansion of group consciousness. The family gave place to the tribe as the social group only after many conflicts between families, and only when the survival of the family as an exclusive unit had become impossible. When that time came, patriarchal sovereignty had to give place to tribal sovereignty, and the will of the family became subordinate to the will of the tribal assembly. The co-operative activities of man are not due to any abstract teachings or philosophical leadership, but are a fundamental necessity to his survival as a rational being. A rational being can not be long content with a plane of life which is without improvement. Survival for man, therefore, does not mean mere existence, but existence upon an ever rising standard. This
existence is only possible by an expanding area of inter-
dependent activity, or by technical improvements in the
processes of production (In regard to the latter, the
need for markets and for raw materials creates the necessary
condition for the former.) Thus when any interdependent
unit becomes too small to survive in this expanding sense,
it gives place to a larger unit. But since any unit
arises out of the necessity for survival, the loyalty to
it is tenacious, and it only gives place to the larger
after a long period of struggle. Thus, though the feudal
anarchy of Europe seen in retrospect was impossible of
survival upon a rising plane of existence, it was only
after years of feudal strife that the national state
emerged. Like all group units, however, the national state
builds up within itself certain vested interests which
oppose further expansion long after such expansion is
necessary to human progress. Just as it was in the interests
of the Feudal barons to preserve intact their Feudal
domains long after the development of inter-feudal commerce,
so the manufacturing and commercial interests, protected
by national tariffs and subsidies, find it in their best
interest to stimulate and to protect national economy in a
world which retains its high standard of human existence
only by an international commerce and industry. The political
nationalist machinery of to-day is in direct contradiction
to the international economic structure. There is probably a very good reason for this inconsistency. When Mr. Ford finds the means of improving his product and replaces the conventional four cylinder motor by a V eight engine there is no effort on the part of society to condemn such a radical departure from established procedure. But when political change is contemplated there is always a fear that the new model is a dangerous experiment, and a tendency to fight for the retention of the old established principles. Political institutions, like wine, mellow with age, and man tends to revere that which has stood the test of time. In one way this human conservatism is a very fortunate thing since it is the factor which tends to consolidate and make permanent any gains which society on the whole is able to wrest from a ruling class seeking to dominate and control the machinery of government. Unfortunately, however, this same human conservatism gives to economic forces a much greater freedom of action than is possessed by political forces, with the result that the technological processes of society are always somewhat ahead of the political processes. The political struggle in Great Britain in the 19th Century was not an idealogical struggle for democracy. It was in reality a struggle on the part of the industrialists and traders to bring political institutions into conformity with their economic power. The situation wherein government was controlled by a land-owning feudal class which had long since lost its economic power
was intolerable to the new holders of economic power, the industrial and commercial capitalists. Technologically Feudalism was dead hundreds of years before it was dead politically. Today we are faced with a parallel situation. Technologically, the national state has been replaced by an international economy in an interdependent world; while politically it still seeks to domine.

The problem, therefore, is one of reconciling national interests with human welfare. The attempt by war having failed, the attempt by international co-operation was made. It too, has, for the moment broken down, and war between the nations makes another attempt to solve the problem. The assumption in this essay is that the war itself will not solve the problem, but that it may be part of the process which will lead to a real solution. While denying, therefore, the pessimistic view that war is inevitable and that international co-operation is futile, there is reason to believe that such co-operation as has been attempted does contain certain fundamental contradictions which render it ineffective. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine these contradictions. Before the matter of international co-operation is discussed, however, some observations on war as a solution of the international problems must be made.

War and Peace Treaties.

Mussolini in his "Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism" has this to say of war: "War alone brings up/its
highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it."

1. Much as this doctrine is to be deplored in an enlightened world, it does contain a measure of historical truth. Human co-operation over wide areas of the world has resulted from war, and wars, which are in themselves brutal and ugly, have resulted in solutions which have been of great benefit to mankind. To state that the same results could have been obtained by other methods is merely to quibble, for no matter how these benefits might have been achieved, they were, nevertheless, achieved by war. In this sense, such wars as have unified Britain, France and Germany; such as have established Christianity over barbarism; and those which have taken enlightenment to the darker places of the earth, must be regarded, though brutal in their method, as essentially good in their results. They have in a broad sense done much to establish a world in which universal co-operation is practiced, although too little, and in which there has developed a high degree of cosmopolitan idealism. They have brought out and emphasized the high

courage of man, and his willingness to sacrifice his individual life in the interests of his group or of a great ideal. They have in the past often solved the problem of frontiers, but with the intensification of the grouping of peoples into national states they have tended more to aggravate than to improve the problem, and to greatly impede the co-operative efforts toward human well-being. Like all the instruments in the development of human-well-being, that of war is limited, and reaches its limitation in the attempt to settle differences between national states. An instrument which in the past has had a definite value in the evolution of man's well-being now becomes a definite menace to mankind. It builds up its own inherent contradiction and thereby destroys itself as a useful function. The truth of this will become apparent by a study of the more recent wars and their consequences.

The wars which created such national states as Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, were largely beneficial in their results. The national state as a large area of co-operative enterprise developed a civilization far in advance of that which it superseded. But the nation state so created developed its feeling of unity and exclusiveness to a point which made the obligation of the individual to the state first, last, and absolute. Loyalty to the state the obligation of every member of the state. To extend the frontiers of the fatherland was of course the duty of all
its citizens whenever such an opportunity presented itself. But it was even more important that no part of state was to be allowed to fall into foreign hands. This feeling of nationalism became so deeprooted that where boundaries were changed by war the inhabitants of the severed territory over generations refused to give more than lip service to their new masters, and kept alive the hope of some day returning to the fatherland. The sword which had created the nation became the symbol of its unity, and any war which sought to destroy the national spirit of a coveted territory only served to intensify that spirit. Thus war which had created out of smaller units the national state found itself impotent to extend the state, and although boundaries were changed from time to time the cost of the expansion was far in excess of its worth, for only by the maintenance of armed force could the conquered be held in submission. The attempt to impose the nationalism of the conqueror upon the conquered failed utterly. The Poles remained Poles, the French remained French, and the Germans remained German. The sword could incorporate a new region within the state but it could in no real sense make that region a part of the state. War had created the Nation

1. Not always accepted. In England, for example, there has long been a minority which has opposed "imperialistic" wars.
State and in so doing it had created the weapon which destroyed its further usefulness. War could change the boundaries of the state, but it could no longer insure their stability.

To preserve intact any gains which had been made and to prepare the way for further conquests which might be contemplated there developed the idea of alliances of powers. Thus to protect the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck built up a series of alliances which for a time rendered France impotent to wage a war of revenge. The alliance of one moment was not in the best interests of the next since under the exclusive concept of national sovereignty there was no common basis upon which any group of powers could find any permanent policy. Indeed if such a policy could have been found the whole of the history of modern Europe would have been entirely different and nationalism as we know it to-day would have given place to the super state. The system of alliances broke down because it was based not upon co-operation but upon fear and suspicion. Just so long as they served the national purpose they survived; so long and no longer. Thus while Italy in 1882 found it convenient to join an alliance with Germany and Austria, she found her national interests best served in 1915 by not only deserting this alliance, but by actually going to war against her former allies. This is only one of the numerous examples which occur in modern European history.
The events of 1939 alone are sufficient to show that national ambitions are so entirely selfish that any alliances or pacts that are made are merely those of convenience for the moment, and in no way offer any solution to the European anarchy. 1. The conquered state never really relinquished its claim to severed territory, and its diplomacy was usually directed to the attainment of a new alignment of powers which would make good this claim by a successful war. 2. To prevent such a contingency there was established by the Treaty of Versailles a new instrument to reduce the danger of war, and to stabilize the frontiers of Europe (This does not preclude the possibility of change by peaceful means, Article 19). The League of Nations was henceforth to be the means of settlement of international disputes, and the means of preserving the boundaries of Europe. The nation state was henceforth to be guaranteed its territorial integrity and

1. It is too soon as yet to ascertain the real reason for the Russo-German pact. The occupation of part of Poland, and the recent invasion of Finland, however, seems to suggest that purely national motives dominate.

2. Germany (Hitler) has renounced all claim to Alsace-Lorraine, but it would be a small matter to forget such a renunciation were Germany able to defeat France and destroy the Maginot Line.
its political independence by an international organization which was to substitute largely for national armies and navies the principle of collective security by international co-operation, and the obligations of a binding covenant. The League of Nations.

A superficial view of historical development leads to a cynical discrediting of the League of Nations. That the experiment was largely unsuccessful in the prevention of war is, unfortunately, true, but does not lessen its value as an attempt to create an instrument for human co-operation. The narrow view of history is never true. The development of the historical process is nothing if it is not a movement towards greater co-operation. Regardless of the number of instances when such co-operative expansion has met with checks and reverses, historical development still obeys this general law. Man does not move forward with an unerring step, but gropes, falters, and stumbles. From time to time he may be forced back, but he moves forward relentlessly. The forces that motivate this progress are defined according to one's particular outlook. They may be conceived as spiritual, rational, or material. That question may safely be left to the theologian, metaphysician and the economist. We are here concerned only with the effects of human behavior in the development of the historical process. Gregarious man behaves in a manner which is conducive to social survival. The conflict between reason and emotion may delay, momentarily
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reverse, but cannot stop this trend toward an ever widening field of co-operative effort. Hegel points out that peoples and governments never act upon the principles deduced from history because each period is involved in its own peculiar circumstances, and "exhibits a condition of things so idiosyncratic that its conduct must be regulated by circumstances connected with itself and itself alone". 1. To meet these new circumstances man must create new instruments of government and policy. As new conditions arise the instruments which have given rise to them lose their usefulness and must be discarded. War as instrument of national policy, as was pointed out before, has lost its usefulness and must be replaced by something which will break down the barriers to international co-operation inherent in the national state. The League was the first step in this direction. It arose out of the conditions of the moment as an instinctive urge to social survival. War which at one time was conducive to this survival, had now reached the point where it threatened to destroy the whole fabric of society.

"The age of competitive armaments and competitive alliances culminated in the "world war", a monstrous struggle without intrinsic purpose, involving nation after nation in a conflict whose initial issues were obscure to them and irrelevant to their interests. Mankind has never witnessed so tragic a disparity between means and

ends. The struggle could not be localized because the nations were so interdependent, so bound up with one another. All the great nations of the world were embroiled, not because a single issue divided them, but because a single system held them fast. Nothing was common save the catastrophe. In the words of Viscount Grey, it was a victory of war itself over everybody who took part in it.

The significance of this fact is simply that war has become an anachronism, an institution incompatible with the civilization which has overspread the world. It is of course possible that the technical development of the art of war, the use of high explosives, poison gases, and perhaps other yet unknown agencies of destruction, together with the ubiquitous menace of the aeroplane and airship, will render warfare so uncontrollably disastrous as finally to deter mankind from its arbitrament altogether. But whether this may or may not be expected, the development of civilization leads more directly to a like necessity. The establishment of a League of Nations, directed towards the abolition of competitive armaments and the judicial settlement of international disputes, is not so much the institutional expression of an ideal as the belated adjustment of an institution to realities. To assume the closing of the era of national wars is not an act of unscientific utopianism but a reasonable inference from the premise that men in the long run accommodate their institutions to their necessities. No one can tell what a future civilization may bring, but it is permissible to judge what the present civilization requires. How soon and on what terms we accept its demands remains still a matter of faith.

The League of Nations, born in the aftermath of a great war, failed in its main purpose; but this does not,

except in its present form, destroy it. It only makes more apparent the need for such an institution. Human institutions change and develop slowly. The national state had given much to man. He was not yet ready to sacrifice his national gains. But his needs were growing beyond national frontiers. They still are. The demand for an institution which will satisfy these needs becomes more and more apparent. That institution will be found. It will be found because it is essential to the historical process. The League has sown the seeds of international co-operation in the fertile soil of human necessity. Why the League failed it is now our purpose to examine.

As a first attempt to set up international machinery on a large scale it was inevitable that the League should suffer from serious defects. That the Covenant of the League was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles was in itself a grave error since the evils of the Treaty became the evils of the League. Had the Treaty been drawn up by mutual consideration and consent between victors and vanquished this fault would not have occurred. Whether this could have been done at the time is an academic question which we cannot well answer. We are here only concerned with what did happen. The incorporation of the Covenant into a treaty imposed upon a conquered people definitely arraigned the League on the side of the conquerors. It was to preserve the peace, based upon a just settlement of European problems, that the
covenant was designed. The union of Treaty and Covenant
gave the former a sanctity largely unwarranted and estab­
lished international justice as the prerogative of the
victorious powers. Had the League been established as an
international body working under the principles of the
Covenant, composed of and applicable to all states, and
quite apart from any final settlement, it may well have been
used in the calmness which time alone could establish, to
remove the injustices of a peace conceived in fear and born
in hatred and suspicion.

The exclusion of Germany, Turkey, and the other ex­
enemy states in the early years of the League was an added
example of the biased attitude of the League, and further
established it as an instrument for the maintenance of the
spoils of victory rather than an instrument for the estab­
ishment of international justice and co-operation. Even
though the war guilt were to be established beyond doubt
as falling entirely upon the Central Powers, such, in the
eyes of Justice, could not exclude them from representation
in an international court. To attempt to achieve inter­
national co-operation while excluding the very nations
whose co-operation was most essential was obviously doomed
to failure. The greatest need of the moment, the co-operative
reconstruction of Europe was thereby sacrificed. In its
place there occurred a series of military and economic
clashes between the victorious powers over the spoils of
victory. Instead of dealing with the defeated powers in a joint effort to promote stability, France and England found their national policies diametrically opposed. The French desire for a weakened and impoverished Germany clashed violently with the British desire for a reestablished and economically stable Germany. The Poles and the Italians were dissatisfied with their share of the booty and waged minor wars to satisfy their renewed national aspirations. What was left of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was in a deplorable condition of poverty. Had the defeated nations whose territory or whose economic welfare had thus been despoiled been represented in the League at its inception their pleas would have at least been heard. As it was, whatever redress the defeated powers could obtain from the international congress at Geneva had to be obtained without benefit of representation or counsel. This was in direct violation of the very first of Wilson's fourteen point program upon which the enemy had every right to feel peace was to be negotiated.

Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international undertakings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

There could be no such frankness of diplomacy unless all parties concerned are given equal opportunity to express their points of view. In his address at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918, the following significant passages appear bearing directly upon this point. " The destruction of every
arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world;......"
"The settlement of every question, whether of territory, sovereignty, of........ upon the basis of the free acceptance of the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior interest or mastery."
"The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another........."
"What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."

The reign of law is only possible where all who are governed, the law-abiding and the law-breaking alike, are given the protection which the law affords.

Wilson's America destroyed in a large measure what America's Wilson had brought into being. Any world wide organization is a patent impossibility without the active participation of the United States. This is not only due to the economic importance of the country itself but because of

the natural leadership which it enjoys in the Western Hem-
isphere. Just how far the Monroe Doctrine conflicts with
the general ideals of the Covenant is a matter for the
student of International Law to decide. There is little doubt
however, that such a doctrine makes the participation of
two America's much less effective. The growth of the
isolationist sentiment (in no small measure due to the
weakness of the League through American non-participation)
has been concomitant with the development of the Pan
American movement. While in one sense this movement limits
the Monroe Doctrine by substituting collective action for
United States' domination, in a broader sense it strengthens
the Doctrine since it creates in the Western Hemisphere a
union of Nations in which the United States must always
have the greater influence. The following quotation from an
American book states this point of view very clearly.

"The essential fact about the American region to-day,
then, is that, unlike the European and Asiatic
regions, it is confronted by no problem of
balance of power from within its own area and
directly affected by none originating beyond its
limits. Only the national policy of the United
States among all the nations of both Americas
has importance for international relations, and
for the American region the policies of European
and Asiatic powers are without real significance."

The isolationist attitude of the United States is in direct
contradiction to the supposed realism which characterizes

American business and policy. The high sounding phrases in which the 'American Way' is lauded would seem to indicate that pure America must not be contaminated by impure Europe. Actually, America 'won the war', was the dominant influence in bringing about peace, created a League of Nations which depended upon American participation, and then retired into the cloistered sanctuary of isolation, to dwell upon the purity of the 'American Way', and to bewail and criticize the absence of anything good in the European scene. If we were to reverse the jargon for a moment, and speak 'American' we would probably describe the above as follows: "The United States won the war, engineered an unsatisfactory peace, created a League of Nations in which she failed to participate, dumped the whole mess in the lap of Geneva, and left Europe holding the bag". National interests were predominant. 1.

The absence of Russia from the League created another great weakness since it further embittered that country against capitalist Europe. It was quite natural under these circumstances that Russia would use any means available to sow discord among the European States. The emergence of the Soviet State just prior to the establishment of the League created a difficult diplomatic problem. The Russia of the Czars was an ally in the war against Germany. The repudiation of the Czarist regime by the Bolsheviks carried with it a repudiation of the war aims of the Allies. When, 1. Appendix C.

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therefore, the Bolshevik Government signed a peace with Germany and published the secret treaties, the Allies refused to recognize the new regime as the lawful government of Russia and took steps to destroy the revolution. Intervention was carried on for some years, but this only consolidated the loyalty of the masses to the new government. Under the leadership of Trotsky the Red Army saved the revolution. But the establishment of the Soviet Government did not bring immediate recognition by the capitalist powers. The latter refused for some years to have anything to do with the new regime. In fact, they could hardly do so since the Bolsheviks had not only set out to establish a new order in Russia, but to destroy the capitalist world. With this end in view there was established in Moscow in 1919, the Third International. Many radical socialist parties of other European countries became associated with this body. At the 1920 Congress the International adopted a 21-point program as a condition for membership. These points were directly opposed to the European system of national states, since they sought to destroy the whole bourgeois world and to establish, by fair means or foul, the world-wide dictatorship of the proletariat. There existed, therefore, two international organizations -- the League of Nations at Geneva, seeking to establish international co-operation between national states, and the Third International seeking
destruction of the national states and the establishment of the world-wide proletarian dictatorship. Between the two there could be no compromise. Indeed, it was not until Russian nationalism had somewhat obscured the international proletarian program that Russia was recognized and brought into the League.

By the time Russia entered the League, however, Japan had invaded Manchuria, and was on the way out, Hitler had repudiated the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty and had also given notice of withdrawal and Italy was preparing to embark on an aggressive campaign in Abyssinia. Whatever strength Russia could bring to the League was, therefore, by this time quite inadequate to save the tottering structure. Moreover there still existed a convenient friction which enabled Russia to pursue two mutually antagonistic policies. The recognized government of Russia, in order to preserve the peace necessary for its security, had found it necessary to co-operate with the capitalist powers, and with this in view had joined the League. But the Third International, through dominated by Moscow, could claim as an international body that it had no connection with the Soviet Government. The Soviet therefore could pursue the policy which best served its interests at any particular time. Through the League it could reap whatever benefit might accrue from the system of

1. See Appendix B.
collective security. Through its domination of the Third International it could still pursue the policy of 'Soviet-ization' by the spread of propaganda. In 1939 Russia departed entirely from the principles of collective security, and because of the invasion of Finland was expelled from the League. By this time the world had already witnessed the joining of the Soviet State with the strongest member of the Anti-Commintern alliance.

In spite of the confusion into which the world was thrown by the Russo-German Pact, the issue has not become more complex. Indeed, it has been greatly clarified. Two very important facts stand out. In the first place, it seems that the aims of the Soviet may become imperialist rather than Socialistic. Whatever idealism existed in the Socialist Third International have become definitely subordinate to the national ambitions of the Soviet State. 1. In the second place, it has been shown quite definitely that a League of National states cannot function where national aims are given priority over international needs. Where nations of different ideologies meet to organize international action they can only do so if they are prepared to make a measure of sacrifice of national ambition an earnest of their real desire for international co-operation.

1. The Soviet State claims that it is not at war with Finland but is really fighting to save the people from the tyranny of an oppressive government. The united resistance of the Finnish people is a real answer to that lie.
Where the ideologies of nationalism conflict with the ideals of international goodwill there can be no such reality as a properly functioning League of Nations.

The weakness of the League to which a great deal of attention has been called is what has been termed "the absence of teeth". This view supposes that the function of Geneva is to police the world and that its power to do so is only possible if it is backed by armed strength. The League has no army, navy, or air force. Its power does not extend beyond that which the individual states are prepared to give at any particular time, and there is no weapon beyond the imposition of sanctions which it can use. Even this latter contribution is not imperative since there is no way of compelling League members to use these weapons.

The League, therefore, is made economically and militarily impotent to deal with serious questions which involve any of the Great Powers. This criticism of the League is not quite sound. The League was formed at a time when the world was weary of war. It was founded upon the theory that nations could be bound by covenants. As an organization whose primary aim was to prevent war, the ability to wage war

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1. The Covenant (Article 16) provides for both economic sanctions and military action. In practice, however, the latter has never been used, and the former, in cases where Great Powers are concerned, has never had an application broad enough to be effective.
was not only unnecessary, but contrary to the spirit of the Covenant. Although the League does not prevent war, it seeks to explore every possibility short of war to settle disputes, and carried with it a definite obligation not to resort to arms. Precept by example would be entirely lacking if the League did resort to war. Moreover, an armed league, even though it did not wage war would definitely sacrifice the moral principles upon which it is founded and give to all its findings the compulsion of force instead of the obligation of justice. The League, made up as it was of national states could not make decisions as an impartial body. It had, therefore to rely upon the justice rather than upon the force behind its findings. The greatest source of strength of the League was public opinion, which, it was felt, could be relied upon to guarantee, if not impartiality, at least fair play in international affairs. This moral support of the world might well be lost if the League were 'given teeth' to back its decisions. If war comes in spite of the efforts of the League, the onus of guilt is definitely upon the offending nation. Should the League, however, resort to war, it might well have to share that burden, and thereby lose the moral position upon which it was founded.

The argument above is not the position taken in this essay, but is the argument which follows logically from the
ideals upon which the League was founded (by those who attempt to destroy force by ignoring its necessity.) Were these ideals consistent with reality, there would be no need for an armed League. But the idealism of the League was in marked contrast to the realities of the world it was designed to lead. The objection to force merely because it is armed force is rational only when men have created a world in which such force is no longer required. It is hard to understand the attitude that sanctions or force of any kind are inimical to peace. 1. It is not a question of force, but how and by whom such force is used. Behind the institution of law there is the force necessary to carry out the law. The arming of the League does not hinge upon the application of force to compel obedience to law, but rather upon the capacity of the League to effectively control and direct that force. Mr. Gilbert Murray makes this point very clear.

"The real difficulty of the situation lies in the practical working of the coercion. Let it be laid down that the League as a whole will take the necessary action, economic or military. Well and good; but the League is not a military or economic unit and possesses no central executive. It is a society of independent sovereign states, their independence somewhat modified by treaty obligations and a habit of regular conference, but none the less real. I doubt whether the League as a League could declare war or wage war. The

force would have to be supplied by each state separately, of its own deliberate will. Furthermore, one cannot fairly urge that every member of the League is duty bound to act in every case where coercion by the League is necessary. One cannot expect Siam or Canada to mobilize because one Balkan state attacks another. And if the duty is not incumbent on all members, who is to decide what members are to undertake it? The Council has no absolute authority. No nation will be eager to subject itself to the strain and sacrifice of coercive action unless its own interests are sharply involved. But the question is whether, in a world that increasingly detests war and mistrusts force as an instrument of international policy, the various national Parliaments or Governments will in general have sufficient loyalty to the League, sufficient public spirit and sense of reality, to be ready to face the prospect of war not in defence of their own frontiers or immediate national interests, but simply to maintain the peace of the world."

The weaknesses of the League which have so far been discussed, though important, are not the real cause of the failure of international co-operation. Had these weaknesses not been present, there is little doubt that the course of international affairs would have been less chaotic. But there would still have remained the many evils of national life which are a direct barrier to international co-operation. While a League without these faults would have greatly facilitated the co-operation necessary to an inter-dependent world, such co-operation to be really effective would have

1. Murray, Gilbert, The Ordeal of this Generation, Harper Brothers, N. Y., 1929, p. 99 - 100
to go much beyond that possible in a League of sovereign national states. The activities of the League were limited to those acceptable to the national states, each jealous of its sovereignty, and each determined to safeguard its own national interests. The delegates to the League were national delegates. They represented the states. There were no representatives of the League, per se, since the League had no existence except as a meeting of Nations (or more properly) of national states. To think of the League as though it were an institution apart from, or acting independently of national states is a very grave error. The real weakness of the League as an attempt to preserve peace and to bring about human co-operation beyond the frontiers of nationalism is really due to the fact that such co-operation is impossible where national ambitions overwhelm international needs, and where national claims are voiced by those who hold political and economic power, whereas international needs are only voiced by those idealists who see beyond political frontiers, but who have not the political or economic power to make their appeals effective.

The whole problem of international co-operation is so limited by its very nature, that it soon reaches a point where further progress is impossible. Co-operation between peoples need have no limits; but co-operation between national states as we shall see in the development of this
section of our problem, is quite a different matter. Unless the national states can be induced to sacrifice some measure of their sovereignty to an international body which will thereby have the power to function as an effective instrument little more can be expected than has already been contributed by the League. The League has never been an 'instrument' of international co-operation. At most, it has been the possible means of forging such an 'instrument'. An instrument pre-supposes the ability to function for a particular purpose. The League, as it is at present constituted, cannot function for the purpose for which it was designed. 1. Its failure is not the fault of those who founded it, nor of those who sought to use it. To attach such a blame is as foolish as to say that peace is only possible where men have the will to peace, or that the Millenium will come when men have God in their hearts. We must contend with a real world where the motives of men are mixed, and run the gamut all the way from the very evil to the very good. An ordered society was not brought about by making people 'good', but by the creation of institutions which would effectively curb that which was evil or anti-social. This has been achieved within the national state. The rule of law has been established throughout the greater part of the world. People obey the law, not because they feel a moral obligation to do so, but because the institutions which preserve the law have become so 1. See footnote page 85.
firmly established that obedience to the law has become the normal habit of the majority, and the disobedience of the few is effectively checked. It is the effectiveness of the instruments of law, and not the 'goodness' of those served by the law which guarantees order.

The development of human co-operation from small to larger groups has been accompanied by a concomitant development in the role of law. What was the law of the feudal principality, was, with the rise of the national state, replaced by the law of the nation. The will of the individual or group was subordinated to the will of the nation. The centre of authority was the national state. With the development of human co-operation beyond national frontiers there has emerged international law. But international law has not replaced the laws of individual nations even in their relations beyond national frontiers. The principle of national sovereignty has not given place to an authority higher than the state itself. International law, therefore, while it has established certain rules by which the affairs between the nations are guided, has as yet not forged the instrument which makes obedience to these rules imperative. The citizens of any state are compelled by the machinery of law developed within the state to submit to the

1. "to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security". League Covenant. (footnote refers to page 84.)
law, and, moreover, are compelled to appear before the
tribunals of the law if called upon by the state to do so.
In international law there is no such compulsion because the
necessary machinery for such a procedure has not been
developed. The tribunals of the Hague and Geneva, and the
League itself offer a means of settlement of differences
between national states, but they can not compel the nations
to submit to their jurisdiction, or to abide by their de-
cisions if such jurisdiction has been sought.

"........ But the most serious limitation on the
range of international law is that practically
the whole sphere of international economic re-
lations, except in a few cases where mutual con-
cessions have been arranged by treaty, belongs
to domestic jurisdiction. Tariffs, bounties, pre-
ferences, raw materials, markets and the like are
the matters which generally underlie the rivalries
of modern states and provide the causes, if not
the occasions, of their disputes; yet international
law can very rarely interpose its regulating
influence here. Law will never play a really
effective part in international relations until
it can annex to its own shpere some of the
matters which at present lie within the 'domestic
jurisdictions' of the several states; for so
long as it has to be admitted that one state
may have its reasonable interests injuriously
affected by the unreasonable action of another,
and yet have no legal basis for complaint, it is
inevitable that the injured state, if it is strong
enough, will seek by other means the redress that
the law cannot afford it. At the best the present
state of things leads to the maintenance by power-
ful states of policies outside the law, con-
ceived in their own interests, and paying only so

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much regard to the interests of other states as prudence dictates. Such policies cannot even, as things are, be wholly condemned, because the interests which they protect are often perfectly reasonable interests such as any really adequate system of law would recognize and safeguard; but, unfortunately, there is at present no security whatever that these policies will be confined to the protection of the reasonable interests of the states concerned.

We must, therefore, examine the League, not with the idea of fixing the blame for its failure upon the conduct of individuals or nations, but with a view to ascertaining the forces underlying such conduct.

Since the word 'failure' has been used in connection with the League, it might be well here to state the position of this essay on that point. To say that the League has failed is to state both a truth and an untruth. In many particular fields such as health, sanitation, economic reconstruction, and the prevention of minor wars, the League has been very successful. Its failure has been in the matter of preventing wars involving great powers and in its attempt to replace the international anarchy by the reign of law. One cannot blame the horse for failing if the load he has to pull is too great, or if the harness with which he is equipped is ill-fitting or unsuitable for the purpose. There can be little blame attached to the League for its failure, to those who founded it, or to those who tried to use it. That it could have been used to

1. See footnote page 88.
greater purpose there is little doubt. But those who tried to use it had a very difficult choice to make. They could only use the League when it was in their own national interest to do so. Whatever they may have felt to be the real needs of the world, they were the servants, not of the world, but of their own nationals. Those who now blame the League for failure are often blaming the founders or the national delegates. But had the founders or the delegates sacrificed national ideas to serve the world community they would not have long remained in a position to do so. The founders of the League were engaged in their task at a time when national sentiment was at key pitch. It is hard to see how they could have gone further than they did without arousing a storm of national protest which might have destroyed the League at its inception. Their hope was that from this modest beginning there might develop a real institution for international co-operation. Lord Robert Cecil speaking at the Plenary Session of February 14, 1919 had this to say. "The President has pointed out that the frame of the organization suggested is very simple. He has alluded to some respects in which some may think it might have been more elaborate, but I agree with him that simplicity is the essence of our plans. 

We are not seeking to produce for the world a building finished and complete in all respects. To have attempted such a thing would have been an arrogant piece of folly. All we have tried to do, all we have hoped to do, is to lay soundly and truly, the foundations upon which our successors may build."

1. The delegates to the League, as has been pointed out before, were expected to be loyal not to the world, but the states they represented. Had they departed from their national duty they would have been repudiated by those whom they represented, and would soon have lost the opportunity to be present as delegates to the League. The League failed to bring about the rule of law, but it has not failed in its work in that direction. It has not and can not in its present form bring about the reign of law, but it has served if in no other way by pointing out the antagonism between national sovereignty and international action. The League of Nations, though it has failed to satisfy the hopes of man for an ordered society, still ranks as the greatest of man’s achievements in the development of a co-operative world civilization.

Man is a creature of habit. The things which he has moulded to suit his needs, be they instruments of government or a pair of old shoes, he gives up with the greatest reluctance. Those things which have been the hardest to

build, which have been fashioned to the pattern of his needs by generations of toil and suffering are jealously guarded. Progress is not made jumping from the firm ground of established traditions into the realm of idealism, but by the steady process of building stone by stone the steps which lead to that goal. Every revolution which has sought to go far beyond established ways has had to retreat a long way from the goal it set itself before it could find the firm ground upon which alone it could find stability. 1.

The League was built, not upon the solid ground of established procedure, but rather upon the ideals of that which, though badly needed, was largely untried. It was felt that the idealism to which it was directed and the enthusiasm with which the common man accepted it would make it grow and prosper. But it was not rooted in the past. Institutions, are sustained from the materials in which they are rooted. The League was not rooted in the past. It had no past experience to nourish it. The rule of law was attempted without first establishing the institution necessary to carry out the law. The jury could decide and the magistrate could expound the law, but there was no

1. Compare the relative ease with which the American revolution, founded upon the established principles of English constitutional government, was established, with the length of time it took the French Revolution to find stability.
institution which could sustain the judgment, and no force to compel obedience. The League had failed to satisfy the needs of an interdependent world, but it has not failed in directing attention to, and in pointing the way to the attainment of the proper institutions. Mr. Brierly concludes his "Law of Nations" with a very wise word of caution in our judgment of the League.

"The work of the League as a whole should be judged, not by comparing it with the hopes that were entertained in the intensely emotional atmosphere of the year 1919, but with the method of conducting international affairs before the League came into existence. Moreover, in estimating its value it is necessary to have certain general considerations in mind: (1) that owing to the defection of the United States and the absence of Russia, the League has never been the comprehensive union that it was intended to be; (2) that the League was not devised for the task of bringing international order out of anarchy, but for maintaining, rather than creating, peaceful relations between the nations; yet during the first critical years of its existence Europe was only nominally, and not always even nominally, at peace; (3) that the League is not a power outside of or above the states which compose it, but an institution which they can use or not, and use well or ill, as they think fit. With all its imperfections it offers the best and perhaps the only hope of the eventual triumph of law and reason in international relation."  

The framers of the Covenant were not unmindful of the weakness of the instrument they had created. On the whole, however, they seem to have accepted the hope of co-

operation and the idealism which motivated their actions as the guarantee of success. In an atmosphere where intense nationalism was in conflict with a real effort for international co-operation, the former rooted in the traditions of peoples, won over the latter, real only in the hopes of its advocates. The following excerpts from the speeches of the framers of the Covenant at the Plenary Session of February 14, 1919 show very clearly the conflict between idealism and reality, and show how far from reality were the ideals incorporated in the Covenant.

President Wilson.

........" Armed force is the background in this programme, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a League of War.

The simplicity of the document seems to me to be one of its chief virtues, because, speaking for myself, I was unable to foresee the variety of circumstances with which this League would have to deal. I was unable, therefore, to plan all the machinery that might be necessary to meet differing and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say of this document that it is not a straight jacket, but a vehicle of life. A living thing is born, and we must see to it that the clothes we put on it do not hamper it, and a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in which power may be varied at the discretion of those who exercise it and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet while it is elastic, while it is in general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we were called upon to make definite. It is a definite guarantee of peace. It is a definite
"guarantee by word against aggression. It is a definite guarantee against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin. Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared and its powers made unmistakable." 1.

Lord Robert Cecil.

"...... We are not seeking to produce for the world a building finished and complete in all respects. To have attempted such a thing would have been an arrogant piece of folly. All we have to do, all we have hoped to do, is to lay soundly and truly, the foundations upon which our successors may build. I believe those foundations have been well laid and it depends upon those who come after us what will be the character and stability of the building erected upon them. If it is merely a repetition of the old experiments of alliance, if we are merely to have a new version of the Holy Alliance, designed for however good a purpose, believe me, Gentlemen, our attempt is doomed to failure. Nor must it be merely an unpractical effort in international dialectics. It must be a practical thing, instinct, and this is the real point, instinct with a genuine purpose to achieve the main objects we have in view. And if those who build on these foundations really believe that the interest of one is the interest of all, and that the prosperity of the world is bound up with the prosperity of each nation that makes it up, that goes to compose the family, then and then only will the finished structure of the League of Nations be what it ought to be, a safety and a glory for the humanity of the world." 2.

2. ibid
M. V. E. Orlando

"..... If I had only intended to take part in this debate in order to express my deep satisfaction at having been able to collaborate in the first draft of the document which has been laid before you, I venture to hope that my feelings would nevertheless have seemed justified, seeing that we all await with fervent faith, as a result of this act, a rebirth of the whole world the like of which history has never seen. But the object of this debate is to submit to examination by the public opinion of the world a new international order. I should like, then, to make my modest contribution to its discussion by supplementing the explanations made by my colleagues by a few remarks not relating to the general spirit of the act, for that has been explained by the man who has the highest and noblest title for the task, a title before which we all bow; nor even relating to fundamental principles, which Lord Robert Cecil set forth both forcibly and clearly. I will rather say a few words on the general method by which we have pursued our work. The task was incomparably difficult. We started from two absolute principles which a priori it might seem dialectically impossible to reconcile with one another. On the one hand the principle of sovereignty of States, which is supreme and brooks no comparison or relation, and on the other the necessity of imposing from above a restraint on the conduct of states so that the sphere of their rights should harmonize with that of the rights of all the others, in order that their liberty should not include the liberty to do evil. We were able to effect a reconciliation between these two principles on the basis of "self-constraint", a spontaneous coercion, so that states will in future be brought, under the control of the public opinion of the whole world, voluntarily to recognize the restraint imposed on them for the sake of universal peace. I know that even the possibility of such a transformation is the object of attacks by sceptics, who are by turns sad or ironical, according to their temperament. Towards these sceptics I will act like a Greek philosopher who, when a Sophist told him that he could not move, answered by getting up and walking......"

M. Leon Bourgeois.

"...... There is, therefore, unanimity in regard to the principles. Signor Orlando, in reminding us of these, said with unusual eloquence that there was something in the nature of a contradiction in the problem which confronted us. How were we to reconcile the principle of the sovereignty of States with the obligation by which they were to bind themselves to limit their political and military action to the precise point where Justice and Right summoned them to stop? This reconciliation has been effected, if I may say so, automatically and, to pursue the metaphor of our distinguished colleague, we have proved the existence of motion by moving.

Among these principles is it necessary to recall those which constitute the very foundation of every international organization of law? In response to the appeal of the millions of dead whose memory has been invoked, of all those who have failed and of those who mourn them, of all those who by their personal sacrifices the like of which they themselves have borne, we have risen up against the possible renewal of war. Together we have banded ourselves in order to obviate, by every possible human means, the renewal of the war, in the conviction that henceforth no private war will be possible in the world and that the complete and close interdependence in which all nations are to-day united, by the community of their financial, economical, intellectual and moral interests, render impossible a fresh conflict at any point on the globe's surface without the entire world being dragged into it by reason of the inevitable community of interest of the peoples of the world.

We are laying down that Right and Justice must be the basis of settlement for all conflicts and all international differences, and that the door of the Tribunal is open to every State; in that Tribunal each State will be certain of finding judges who will not even know whether they themselves belong to a great or a small Power, but as the representatives of Right.

There is another principle to which we are especially attached because it really constitutes the kernel of international obligation; for all
States now consent to bow before a common justice, and agree at the same time mutually to guarantee to each other their territorial integrity and their political independence on any occasion when one or other of these higher interests may be threatened by violence or some disturbance.

Such is the group of obligations which we accept and such is the object at which the Covenant now have before you aims; and I hope as you do all, that the means which have been proposed may enable us to attain our end in fact.

We are most deeply and whole-heartedly united for the triumph of the cause which, from the first moment, inspired the assembly of this Conference, that is for the prevalence of Right over violence and barbarity. We firmly believe that the Plan now laid before you comprises, in the general aspect of its clauses, the measures which are necessary for the attainment of our purposes; in our opinion, however, and we have expressed it in all sincerity, the Plan is as yet only the foundation on which we shall have to work.

Mr. G.N. Barnes.

"First of all the substitution of an altruistic principle for imperialism and violence in the adjustment of international affairs. Nations which have suffered and sacrificed in the acquisition of territory have agreed to the overseership of the League of Nations in the administration of that territory. They have further agreed to the principle that the welfare and assent of the peoples shall be the determining considerations in its administration. There is in this agreement, Mr. President, to my mind a great advance in the application of the principle of moral idealism, and I can only say that I believe that that will strike the imagination of the world.

There are just one or two things, Mr. President, which, to my mind, might have been more explicit, and which, I believe, will have to be grafted on to a League of Nations as the idea of world unity.

1. Miller, op. cit., p. 569 - 570, 573.
"becomes more widely accepted. Let me mention one. I am afraid that when the time comes for the enforcement of decrees, if ever it does come, which God forbid, there may be delay and confusion on the part of the League. What I am afraid of is, that an agressive nation might again try to break through, and win its way to its object, before the forces of mankind can be mobilized against it. Therefore, I should have been glad to have seen some provision for the nucleus of an international force which would be ready to strike against an agressive nation. This, I know, cuts into the idea of the sovereignty of nations, but I hope that there may be future discussion on the part of the affiliated states as to how they can adjust their national life so as to admit of a greater degree of cooperation than is in this document."

M. Eleftherios Venizelos.

"...... Certain Powers object to the establishment not only of a maximum, but also to that of a minimum armed force. For instance what M. Leon Bourgeois asks is the creation of an armed force ready to intervene.

We have received the answer that constitutional considerations prevented the realization of this wish.

I should be glad if this constitutional opposition could be removed and if a contingent could be fixed, which each State would be obliged to keep up with a view to intervention, if necessary.

But, if we cannot get satisfaction on this point, it must not be thought that this omission would leave the League of Nations without the necessary force to make its will obeyed. Anyone who wishes to disturb the peace of the world will always know that there exists a great force composed of all the armies and of all the resources at the disposal of the States which form the League.

All the Powers represented here, even those which had not in time of peace sufficient forces, have proved what they were able to do in a relatively short time. Thus, the Power which might have thought that it could by a sudden attack obtain a passing success, will know henceforward

1. Miller, op. cit., P. 574, 575.
"that it is doomed to failure, so that, I hope, such an attack will never again take place. However, in order that public opinion may not become too uneasy I express once more with M. Leon Bourgeois, the hope that it will be possible to arrive at the establishment of a minimum force which each State shall be obliged to main­tain". .............................. 1.

The above words are from the lips of men who were honest and sincere in their aims and in their methods. They recognized the need for force to make the League effective. They recognized the menace of national sovereignty, but they could not see it as clearly as we see it to-day. Hence they were not prepared to fight very hard for what they thought might be quite an unnecessary consideration. These men can not be blamed for attempting to preserve as much of the old tradition of national and international procedure as possible. One must conclude that the confidence they placed in their ideals was genuine. The weakness of the instrument they felt they had created was not due to their lack of sincerity, but to their logic which time has shown to be faulty. It is the same faulty logic which has carried the League into the Limbo of other lost causes. The logic which assumes that it is the good, or good-will, or morality which must in the long run survive. Rhetorical alleg­iance to any cause can not survive against the opposition of established institutions which oppose that cause, and which are backed by the force necessary to preserve themselves. The people who crucified Christ were probably quite as good

as the people who later on worshipped him. Christianity did not become a real force in the world until it had created a strong institution, the church. The church has survived, not because of its morality, but because of its strength as an institution. As an institution it used force to maintain and to expand its power. Indeed some of the most cruel persecution of all time was carried on by the church in order to overcome any movement, internal or external, which threatened its power. Probably the greatest obstacle to the development of a strong national state was the church. Only after years of struggle did the state develop an institution strong enough to challenge the authority of the church. From that time on, the state, and not the church has grown in strength; not because the state is morally better, but because it has established a stronger institution. The moral force of the church (once its political and military strength has gone) could not compete with the material force of the state. The Bolsheviks established themselves in Russia, not because they were the leaders of a cause that was good against a cause of evil, but because they had built up a disciplined organization which, though small, was powerful in its unity and its purpose. The very ruthlessness with which it fought all opposition was the factor which contributed most to its success. It is useless to laud or to deplore the method. Historically the method used had little
bearing on the measurement of the result. One cannot ignore force in a real world. The Bolsheviks came to power by force and they have retained their power by creating a strong institution backed by force. Stalin retains his position because he has that force to command. The goodness or the evil of the application of that force has no real meaning in a pragmatic world. When Mussolini speaks of the Imperial Power of the Fascist State as being spiritual and ethical, knowing or unknowingly, he is talking nonsense. But when he says "The Fascist State expresses the will to exercise power and to command. Here the Roman tradition is embodied in a conception of strength" he is speaking the language of reality. The democratic state of Italy crumbled not because of the weakness of democracy, but because in Italy democracy failed to establish a strong instrument of government. If democracy itself were the weakness, then none of the present democracies would have survived. The Third Reich is to-day a powerful enemy of the democracies of France and Britain. Its power does not depend upon good or evil, but upon the instrument of control it has developed within the state. The greatest error that the democracies can make to-day is to assume that Hitler will be destroyed through the


2. ibid.
weakness (supposedly) in his coercive dictatorship. The slogan that "we must win eventually because our cause is just", is splendid as a tonic for keeping up the morale of a nation, but only arms, men, and money will win the war. Eventual victory will come to the side whose institutions and whose armed forces are the stronger. It will not depend upon moral issues.

One thing, at least, Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini have shown. They have shown that a realistic conception backed by a realistic program can achieve its aims. The same realism can be applied by the democracies to what we consider the cause of good as has been applied by the dictators to what we consider the cause of evil. There is here no quarrel with morality, and no desire to prove that force is the arbitrament of right. On the contrary, what is here urged is that the nations of the world which pride themselves on the justice upon which their constitutions are based must be able to protect those constitutions if that justice is to be saved from the savage attacks of unprincipled power. Confucius was no doubt correct in his fundamental premise that the majority of men, given a chance, are decent in their relations with one another. There are generally accepted ideas of the common decencies of human behavior. But these ideas alone can not compete against the indecent practices of a Hitler,
a Stalin, or a Mussolini backed by the armed might of a state inculcated with the doctrine that success on the battlefield alone determines the justice of a cause.

Many critics of the League find in its failure the lack of moral enthusiasm in the world. The argument is hard to meet because it is based on faith. To the faithful, faith is all important. There is little doubt that were the League given universal moral support the problem would be solved. But having admitted that point we are still faced with the problem of how to bring about that happy condition. The doctrine of goodwill has been preached from the beginning of time. It is not as though persistent preaching will bring about some form of spiritual revival which will remove the obstacles to international co-operation. There must, of course, be a return to the principles of the Covenant in international affairs. But there must first be created a world which will guarantee security to such principles. The individual or the nation which is willing to put its trust in principles alone is merely courting disaster. The following are only two of numerous quotations which could be given to illustrate the above type of thinking.

"The moral authority of the League and of the States which compose it ultimately depends upon the enthusiasm for or at least the approval of the results of their operation in terms of the lives of ordinary folk. If peace is the means of justice, then it will last. If it is
"merely an opportunity for preserving untroubled the existing division between the beneficiaries and the victims of the social system, it will collapse as the Roman system collapsed in the Dark Ages -- not because of the attack of the barbarians, but because the majority did not think it worth maintaining. The weakness of the League is due to the lack of moral enthusiasm and imaginativeness in those who profess to support it: no system for the maintenance of peace can be successful if peace is assumed to be a mere scramble for private gain and war continues to be believed to be the best instance of service for a common good. Mere opposition to the barbarism of dogmatic dictatorships, resting on force, is not enough. Moral authority must be reinforced in the State system of the Western World by the creation of a new belief in the common good."

1. "Peace is a way of life. A rational conduct of international relations would result in peace. It requires and in turn encourages a state of mind. That state of mind is based on a strong ethical faith. This is not the place to argue whether such a faith must be based on a theology or even on a religion. Whatever else may be believed, this can be: this faith works. I propound it for no other than the pragmatical reason that it works. Man is a herd animal. Now that the herd has become world-wide, he must learn to live with his fellow man, or he will die out. In the practised and effortless functioning of this faith lies happiness beyond all other earthly happiness. To the extent that man has learnt to practise this faith he is happy. Virtue is its own reward; it often has no other, but that is sure--none can deprive him of it. All so-called self-interest, whether applied to individuals or to nations, is a rotten foundation unless it combines with the self-interest of others. Humanity is an organism, and hypertrophied

"parts are diseased parts. The selfish realist policy is not realist at all; it does not work," 1.

The above type of thinking may be academically quite sound. To the faithful it is very real perhaps. But the mass of mankind while giving lip-service to faith generally demand policies which are based on something more tangible. A program based upon the assumption that a regenerated morality will solve the problem can do little to establish international order. Once the material structure of international co-operation is created moral support is invaluable. But policies, national or international, can command moral support only if they function. Once the international machinery is created which really works it will have no lack of moral support. But the institution which is required is one which not only provides the means for international co-operation, but one with the inherent power to compel such co-operation.

The values which have been established and accepted in democratic society are quite as necessary a part of the equipment of a stable world as are the institutions of coercion. These values be they moral, ethical, or spiritual, are accepted standards of decency among the vast majority of mankind. But standards of decency can not stand alone against the unprincipled pragmatism of Mussolini, Hitler,

or Stalin. The society which seeks to maintain a world in which there is to remain such decency in human relations must equip itself with the instruments of power. Give the dictatorships all the power, and the democracies all the morality, and the latter will fall a prey to the former. The great mistake of the pacifists is not in their principles, but in their common sense. An ordered society cannot survive if that part of it which is guided by the principles of decency in human affairs is content to make speeches while the unprincipled part is making guns. When the Federal government of the United States organized the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation it was hampered in two ways. The federal police could not cross state lines and they were not permitted to carry guns. The criminals on the other hand were not so hampered. The government men were fighting a losing game. It was only when Mr. J. Edgar Hoover after a long fight was able to arm his men and to obtain the necessary permission to cross state lines that they were able to cope effectively with organized crime. Once given the same advantage in weapons and movement as the criminals they sought the Federal Bureau was not long in wiping out the gangster criminals who were terrorizing the country. The use of force here is in no sense a lauding of the "blood and iron" doctrine of historical development. It simply means that an enlightened state
cannot afford to allow the principles upon which its enlighten- 
ment is based to blind it to the necessity of constant 
vigilance, or to give to the forces of unprincipled power the 
idea that the acceptance of moral principles is a sign of 
weakness. Force must be used to preserve the order necessary 
to the proper functioning of the reign of law. The idealism 
of Wilson put force in the background, but so far in the 
background that the League was destroyed as an effective in-
strument for preserving such a reign of law. While force 
should rightly be in the background it must not be so far in 
the background that it cannot hear the command when called 
upon to act. Moreover, while force is in the background, 
the realization by society of its existence must always be 
present. If the world of nations is to maintain order based 
on decency in human relations the nations must be convinced 
that there is available an effective instrument of coercion 
should their freedom and their institutions be challenged 
by an intransigent power motivated by purely pragmatic con-
siderations.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to go through the 
history of the League. But merely to point out, if possible, 
the fundamental weakness inherent in its structure. It may be 
well here, however, to give a very brief resume of the 
events which have led up to the present discredited position 
in which the League finds itself. For the first ten years
the League functioned smoothly. Many problems were solved from the prevention of minor wars to the economic reconstruction of Europe. Geneva seemed in a real sense to be the capital of the world. Germany was brought in, and Locarno and the Kellogg Pact seemed to have solved the problems of security and of war. Henceforth Germany was to be a partner in the European system, nearly all the world had renounced war as an instrument of national policy; and international action directed from Geneva was to take the place of national rivalries and international strife. For these first ten years the League was not faced with a major problem. There were major problems to solve, but they were not pressing. The Great Powers were too exhausted and too busy at the task of post-war reconstruction to seriously contemplate another war, and the major problem of disarmament was only a matter of the time necessary to arrive at a workable formula. The League had not yet been really tested.

The first test came with the world depression. Immediately the economic structure started its rapid disintegration the League, if it was to function to bring about 'international co-operation', was faced with a major problem. How it met this problem is best described as not meeting it at all. It could not do so. The League was not an instrument designed with the capacity to deal with such a problem. It was merely a meeting place for the national delegates.
With the collapse of national economy the meeting broke up. The centre of interest and of action was transferred from Geneva to London, Paris, and other world capitals. There was no unity of action. The world was what Mr. Gilbert Murray calls an 'infirm cosmos'.

Each country set about feverishly to prevent the utter collapse of its own monetary and economic systems. Politically friendly nations became economic enemies. To bolster its economic structure tariffs were raised higher and higher, not only to protect home industries and to raise revenue, but to provide a favorable balance of trade. The policies of the old discredited Mercantile system were called into play in order that the excess of exports over imports would provide the money with which alone external debts could be paid. (since the acceptance of goods by the creditor nation would have called forth violent protests from the manufacturing interests anxious to sell their own goods and keep their own plants in operation.)

But the greater the national isolation the more difficult the problem became. With the decline in foreign trade there was a steady decline in home industries. National unemployment reached staggering figures. National debts mounted in every country because of the great decline in national income and the concomitant increase in the burden of national expenditure for unemployment relief and government subsidies to industry. Under these circumstances

the nations were unable to pay their war debts. Currencies were depreciated and countries were forced off the gold standard. Every means possible was used to repair the damage within the state. But all the efforts were national in a cause which only international effort could solve. Geneva was forgotten in the economic warfare which developed throughout the whole world. Economic nationalism was infinitely stronger than international action. The need for the latter was recognized. In 1933 the world economic conference was held in an effort to stem the tide of financial anarchy which was crippling the whole world. But it failed to achieve any real results. Indeed its efforts led to further discrediting of the principles of international action since they gave to the idea of international conferences the suggestion of futility.

There were probably technical reasons for the failure of the conference. They cannot be discussed in this essay because the writer has no knowledge of the technicalities of monetary standards. The main difficulty seems to have been the role of the United States and the conflict between those who wished to retain the gold standard and those who opposed that policy. Whether this is a point of sufficient importance that compromise is impossible is a question to which this essay can give no answer. It seems safe to assume, however, that since the technical problems of
finance can be solved within the nation itself they can also be solved in the international field. They could not be solved in the state itself without a central authority. If each small community were to have complete control of its own finances and its own monetary system there could be no organized national financial policy. It would appear, therefore that the fundamental reason for the international anarchy in matters financial and economic is due to the same lack of some form of centralized control as is apparent in the political field.

While engulfed in the chaos of the economic depression the League was confronted with its first major problem in the political field. Japan by invasion of China created a real test of the principle of Collective Security. How the test was met is known to all the world. Although eventually found guilty of aggression by the League the national states seemed powerless to fulfill the obligations which they had accepted when they became members of the League. Not only was the prestige of the League destroyed; the League itself (as an instrument for the preservation of peace) was destroyed. If one is to blame Japan for aggression in violation of its solemn obligations, one can no less blame the other members, especially the Great Powers, for violating their obligations in allowing her to do so. Indeed it appears that both Britain and France were more concerned with safeguarding
their Eastern interests and their profitable trade with the aggressor than with upholding the solemn Covenant of the League. 1. Germany was engaged in a revolutionary movement which was destined to destroy the Treaty of Versailles and to bring Europe again into the orbit of Mars. Italy had territorial ambitions similar to those of Japan; and it is probable that Mussolini was not only an interested spectator of the Japanese defiance of Collective Security, but a diligent student learning the fundamentals of the lesson of cynical disregard for world opinion. Only the minor states such as Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Ireland who had no real interests in Japan or China and who had no national axe to grind, were definite in their defence of the Covenant. Mr. Rappard states that;

"In London Japan seems throughout to have enjoyed real popularity. When the Foreign Secretary declared that under no circumstances would his Government allow Great Britain to be brought into conflict with her former ally in the Far East, his statement was well received in the house and in the Press."

One sees here a curious paradox in international action. One would assume that once the problem has been accepted for solution by the League that the League alone would have the right to deal with it, and that the national states would


2. ibid.
refrain from any action or comment which might injure the efforts of Geneva. In any business or social organization if a committee is appointed to deal with a problem and finds that members of the executive or individual members are "putting their fingers in the pie", the committee has every right to resign. It is an accepted standard of business ethics that where a committee is appointed to deal with a problem, that the committee alone shall deal with it, and by the same token, that individual members of the organization refrain from any action or discussion likely to jeopardise the efforts of the appointed body. As a matter of fact this is one of the fundamental principles of cabinet government. There does not seem to be the same ethics in international affairs. The foreign ministers of the national states did not hesitate even while the problem was in the hands of the League to give expression to opinions which clearly jeopardized the work of that organization by showing Japan that she could with impunity defy the League. Great Britain and France as individual states were openly sympathetic to Japan, and yet as members of the League they were associated with the unanimous (except for Japan) condemnation of Japan implicit in the acceptance of the Lytton report. The tragedy of the situation makes very grim the humor of this absurd condition in international affairs. It is the grim humor of evil national pragmatism
stalking in the path of the Covenant of good intentions.

The open defiance of Japan not only destroyed the prestige of the League, but the international prestige of its two most powerful members, Britain and France. Mussolini, the High Priest of Fascist violence, was not blind to the chaos into which the world was thrown. The time was now ripe to fulfil the prophecy of Imperial Grandeur. It was obvious that not only was the League a mere talking shop, but that Great Britain and France were primarily concerned with their Imperial interests, and were in no mood to sacrifice these interests in defence of the Covenant. The invasion of Abyssinia was not an impulsive adventure, nor the answer to a border incident. It was a planned enterprise. 1. Mussolini may not be a profound thinker, but he knows the temper of Europe as Napoleon knew its geography. The results of the invasion, the feeble efforts of the League, and the failure of sanctions need not be repeated here. Collective Security was dead. International co-operation and an ordered society under the reign of law had given place to the rule of violence and the creed of international anarchy — victory to the strong.

But Mussolini was not the only student graduated from the school of violence. Hitler seized upon the chaotic conditions of the moment to destroy Locarno and to militarize

the Rhineland. France and Britain were powerless to check
the march of anarchy which had marched through Asia, Africa,
and now through Europe. The only organization which could
check the avalanche of European disintegration was gone. The
cry for peace by collective action was but dimly heard amidst
the feverish preparation for war by Germany and Italy, spurred
on by the oratorical blasts of Führer and Duce. For years
both in Italy and Germany the decent process of human pro-
pagation had sunk into the indecency of mass production.
For the hungry mouths, product of this stimulated over-
population, came the cry for raw materials and for living
space. Nor had this mass production stopped at the breeding
stage; the biological function was of necessity a private
one, but the educational process was that of the state.
Inculcated into the minds of the new generation was the
creed of violence. Führer and Duce each became a new Moses
able and ready to lead his people into the land of plenty.
But the staff of Moses was replaced by the gleaming sword,
symbol of the holy crusade against the decadent doctrine
of peace. For them/vital force of armed might was to destroy
the senile encumbrance of democracy.

In the face of the threat of the combined arms of
Germany and Italy, both Britain and France had to resort to
the momentarily discarded practices of power politics,
diplomacy, and alliances. At the same time they had to con-
vince those whom they wished to aid in the cause that they
themselves were sufficiently strong to meet the challenge
to arms. Re-armament had to come, and come quickly. The
democracies could not depend any longer on the collective
action they themselves had largely destroyed. Again they had
to meet arms with arms. While pleading against the insanity
of war, they were forced by the pressing necessity of events
to make the most feverish preparations for its inevitability.
In the last analysis, military strength was now the only
safeguard. No matter how much Britain and France might
strive by diplomatic means to win Italy away from Germany,
or to arrange a security block against aggression, there
could be no real confidence placed upon diplomatic action.
In the absence of an effective central authority security
became a purely national problem, based upon national armed
strength. Whatever alliances finally developed would not
depend upon diplomatic juggling, but upon what each individ-
ual state, working solely in its exclusive national interests,
considered its best policy at the moment of conflict. Only
under a condition of centralized control could there be any
release from the arms race. The League had not provided this
centralized control, and it therefore was powerless to
prevent the threat of conflict between the national states,
all bristling with the arms which symbolized their deter-
mination to protect their exclusive sovereign status.
Here again the haunting spectre of national sovereignty hovered over the temple of Geneva. It may with justice be argued that in an armed world the problem of preserving lasting peace is well nigh impossible. In this respect armaments are a cause of war, and disarmament is a definite step in the path of peace. But it is a mistake to assume that the problem of disarmament can in any way be considered as a problem in itself, or that it can be solved by the process of mutual consent. The refusal of the national states to surrender their vested national rights of complete sovereignty in the cause of international co-operation was a weakness which the League could not possibly overcome. The massed forces of the national states members of the League were never at the disposal of the League. They were national forces, designed to protect national interests and to further national aims. All the nations were armed and powerful; only the League was unarmed. To suggest that the states in a federal union, such as The United States, were to organize their own armies and that the federal government were to be without arms, but with power to call upon the individual states, would rightly be called the most flagrant stupidity. And yet, that was the basis upon which the League of Nations was expected to survive. The nations were not armed to preserve internal order, but to protect against external aggression, territorial or economic. Such protection in itself
assumed the possibility and the probability of such a contingency. If a Covenant were enough there would be no need for a Covenant, for the Covenant pre-supposed the goodwill which would render its existence entirely unnecessary. Disarmament of the national states was impossible if such disarmament was to be on the basis of national security which pre-supposed the possibility of departure from the spirit of the Covenant. On that basis, and without an armed League to intervene, there could be no minimum of national armament, and the maximum could only be reached when the state was prepared to defend itself against any possible combination of states. Consistency with national safety has no meaning as a measurement of the necessary armaments unless there is an international force sufficiently strong to guarantee that such national armaments will not be used in a manner deemed internationally illegal.

This question of armaments had been one of the greatest problems of the League, and one which it has not been able to solve. If we here draw a parallel between the international anarchy and the social anarchy of the 'wild west' the issue may be greatly clarified. The problem of order in the 'two gun' era of the west was not the problem of guns, but the lack of an ineffective instrument of law. The era where each man was a law unto himself was not ended by mutual consent, nor by the voluntary disarmament of the
individual members of the community, but by the setting up of a reign of law backed by the overwhelming armament of the sheriff and his deputies. Even then for a time, the individual did not give up his arms; but his use of arms was limited to the legal exercise of the right of self-protection, a point upon which he had to satisfy the law. With the development of the proper courts and the protective arms of a competent police force, the individual soon found no need for his private arsenal and disarmament became the normal condition. But the individual did not disarm before he was satisfied that the instruments of law were strong enough that they offered him greater protection than could be provided by his own arms and his skill in using them. There could have been no disarmament without first establishing a central authority with the effective power of coercion. The guns themselves were not the problem. Given the need for individual protection, man will avail himself of a weapon of defense, be it a gun, a knife, or merely a good stout club.

National disarmament is only possible where the nation can be assured that such disarmament does not forfeit its right to national existence. The principle established in the Covenant "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest level consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations", is under a condition
of exclusive national sovereignty, merely rhetorical nonsense, since there is no way in which such 'consistency with national safety' can be measured. While each of the nations is a law unto itself, there is no point at which any nation is nationally secure. Security is not concerned only with the military strength of the nation concerned, but can be measured only by the military strength of a possible enemy, or any combination of possible enemies. Since the same problem confronts every nation, there can be no real policy of arms reduction, the way to security seemingly pointing in the other direction. The armament race which ensues from this condition only serves to aggravate the problem, and makes the dilemma of the individual state more baffling. There is no question that disarmament is really desired, if for nothing else, to relieve the excessive burden of taxation. There is, therefore, nothing inconsistent with the appeal for peace and disarmament being made by a government which at the same time is arming as thoroughly and as rapidly as possible. The problem though difficult, is quite clear. Mr. Rappard shows that it was apparent in 1919.

"That armaments were in themselves a cause of war and not merely, as claimed by their apologists, an inevitable consequence of the fear of war and a necessary protection against war, has always been maintained by all thorough-going pacifists. On November 12, 1917, President Wilson in his Buffalo address before the American Federation of Labor, had said: 'What I am opposed to is not the feeling of the pacifists, but their stupidity. My
"heart is with them, but my mind has a contempt for them. I want peace, but I know how to get it, and they do not."

This did not prevent him, however, a few weeks later, from embodying one of their main tenets in his peace program: 'Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety'. It was with the intention of giving and taking such guarantees that President Wilson proceeded to Paris in December, 1918.

At the Peace Conference he soon discovered that his colleagues were profoundly divided on this issue. Whereas the British delegation, and notably Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, warmly supported his view, at least with respect to land armaments, his other associates, and particularly the French, the Italian, and their continental allies, strongly opposed them. They all readily agreed on the necessity of disarming their enemies and even consented to preface the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles with the following declaration:

'In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all the nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.'

When it came, however, to this "initiation" the continental European Allies with one voice declared: 'First give us a guarantee against the renewal of the aggressions of 1914, for instance by endowing your League of Nations with a reliable international police force, then, and then only will we agree to the reduction of our own armies. They alone saved us from annihilation in the war and until you will have supplied us with an adequate substitute we cannot and will not dispense with them.'

Major Bratt in his stimulating "That Next War" brings home some very pertinent points in this connection.

There are, indeed, some who see in disarmament the real solution of the problem of war and peace. For our part we deny the possibility of this solution, so far as is meant mere disarmament and nothing more. It is clear already that the disarmament question has been driven into a cul-de-sac by this limitation of view. It is not only the resistance of the reactionary forces and groups behind war which has hitherto prevented any rational progress on this question. The fundamental reason why nothing has been done and nothing is likely to be done is probably that the whole problem has been treated in so one-sided a manner, and has been torn out of its historical setting. To regard disarmament as the end is to show that the problem has not been clearly thought out. It is necessary that we should clearly realize this. There cannot be any disarmament or even reduction of armaments worthy of the name, until the nations have begun, at least in principle, to prepare for some federation, or until some more effective form than the present League of Nations has been found. The absence of decisive measures for guarantees must be regarded as the principal reason why the solution of the disarmament problem does not make any progress. Only when it is made will the demand for security—which now cripples everything—begin to rest on a new foundation. No endeavor in this direction can be made, however, until present-day militarism has been defeated in principle and together with nationalism, has been pressed into the background by the nations. There must be a parallel development. Just in the same way as, formerly, armaments and the policy of power of the individual States influenced and sustained each other, so also must a system of guarantees and disarmament do the same thing. Many people regard it as a complication of the problem to combine with disarmament the successive and parallel limitation of sovereignty. But they are wrong, for the question is really complex. To make this clear is in a manner to simplify the problem and to sound the depths until bottom is reached.

The failure of the League of Nations to solve the

problem of armaments and to replace the anarchy of international strife by co-operative action under the reign of law, is seen finally to be inherent in the inadequacy of League machinery. It has been shown that while the League exists merely as a means of bringing together national delegates, and without in itself possessing any authority to coerce, it cannot function as an effective instrument. It is obvious that international co-operative action is inconsistent with the concept of exclusive national sovereignty. While it is possible to blame individual statesmen and individual states, this essay takes the position that such criticism is very superficial and that it serves little useful purposes. It is easy to be wise after the fact and to trace the successive steps by which the League was destroyed by the actions of statesmen and nations through the failure to stop Japan and Italy. It is easy to be brilliantly cynical and to see in the motives of individuals and states only that which is evil. Every man on the street can say what could have been done, and what should have been done. But national and international problems are not that simple. They are complex problems. They are the result, not of the actions or the opinions of individuals or groups of individuals working alone, but of the divergent aims and ambitions of millions
of individuals and groups of individuals. Out of the complex conflict of divergent interests there emerges certain common needs. To satisfy these needs there emerge certain ideals. But the ideal must precede the actual manifestation in reality. Even when the ideal takes definite form in the minds of men, it must still do battle with the vested ideas which it challenges. Here the battle is but a minor clash. The real conflict comes when an ideal is given actual material form. The struggle then is transferred from the academic realm to the physical. It is inevitable that amidst the conflicting interests of mankind all human efforts thus idealized and thus materialized cannot function according to a pre-arranged plan, but must proceed along the painful path of trial and error. The League of Nations is here no different from any other of the ideals which man has attempted to realize in practice. The story of the struggles for human liberty, religious freedom, democracy, all follow the same general pattern. To expect the League to accomplish in practice, what it was conceived to do in theory, within a period of twenty years is to expect the impossible from mankind. In being wise after the fact we are all prophets. But such reversed prophecy adds little to the effort at solution of the problems which confront us, unless from the errors we can trace the motives which gave them birth.
It has been pointed out before that it is useless to blame individuals for what is obvious after the fact. This does not make human activities impersonal. It merely gives to the individual the benefit of human charity. The actions of statesmen and states in the conduct of League affairs were largely determined by the interests which they represented, and by the institutions which were the manifestations of these interests. Of these institutions the national state was the most firmly entrenched. To expect that such an institution backed by the economic forces which it has so long protected would willingly surrender its sovereignty to an international organization was to expect more than a proper historical perspective would warrant. Only when international needs become more pressing than national needs will national sovereignty be modified in favor of international control. It would appear that the world has reached or is rapidly reaching that point. The present war may well deal the final blow to the concept of exclusive nationalism as a workable feature in the present state of world interdependence. The utterances of public men and the amount of writing upon the subject seems to indicate that the ideal of what Laski calls the "Civitas Maxima" has taken quite definite shape.

in the minds of men. The next stage is that of the material manifestation of this ideal. That it will come after the present war is a reasonably safe prediction. Just in what form, and how far the manifestation of the ideal will be possible it is hard to predict. A discussion of suggestions and possibilities is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 111

PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION.
CHAPTER III

Proposals for Solution.

So far this essay has been concerned with an analysis of the European anarchy. The analysis has revealed that exclusive national sovereignty, if not the evil itself, is at least the obstacle which has prevented the growth of a healthy international co-operation. The attempt to overcome the obstacle by means of a Covenant has proven a failure. It would appear that the only solution is one which tears down the barrier of national isolation, if not completely, at least to the point where it ceases to be insurmountable. The analysis of the problem is a relatively simple process and the evil of national sovereignty has been recognized very widely. The solution, however, is by no means simple, and as yet there has not come forth any suggestion of sufficiently wide acceptance to warrant its probable adoption. While there have been numerous remedies suggested, they have so far gone little beyond the field of academic speculation. That the evil has been recognized, and that suggestions have been made for its eradication is a hopeful sign, and indeed, is the seed from which a practical solution may grow. It will be necessary to
examine some of the major suggestions both in regard to their intrinsic merits and their prospects of success. The path of future development, however, will, in all probability, be chosen not by its merits, but by its proximity to established procedure. Only when a revolution (an unpredictable event) effects historical change is there any departure from this general rule. At present there seems little likelihood of such revolution. Stalin, the High Priest of the social revolution, (which at one time was at least a possibility) has so discredited the Leftist movement as to render any threat or hope of world-wide co-operation by socialist governments a very remote possibility. Indeed, the Russian invasions of Poland and Finland would seem to suggest that Communism has suffered a metamorphosis, or that Stalin has been converted from socialism to imperialism, throwing off the simple garments of the proletarian leading the masses to their socialist triumph, to don the imperial robes of the Czars, offering his servile legions on the altar of Mars for the greater glory of Imperial Russia.

The deflection of its leaders, be they MacDonalda or Stalins, does not in itself destroy the merits of a movement; nevertheless, it may so discredit it in the eyes of the public, and even in the eyes of its own adherents as to render its efforts futile. The Leftist cause was making
slow, but steady progress against the fortifications of entrenched reaction, but when its efforts were sabotaged by its trusted leaders the movement not only ceased to advance, but was compelled to retreat in ignoble confusion. Both as a constitutional development and as a militant crusade the socialist movement has suffered a crushing defeat. The defeat of the movement in Great Britain by the deflection of MacDonald, followed by the victory of the Rightist non-intervention in Spain, and culminating in the final crushing blow dealt by Stalin, has not only left the Socialist movement leaderless, but has replaced the enthusiasm of its adherents by the despair of defeatism. Without prejudice for or against the Socialist movement, we can to-day assume that it is for some time at least, a lost cause. At the outset, therefore, we can eliminate as a possible cure of the European anarchy any international action based upon an organized socialist revolution. 1.

1. The socialist movement has too much real merit to be permanently crushed. There is always the possibility that the masses now inactive because of the frustration following their recent defeats together with the intoxication of the war spirit, and the restrictions on their action deemed necessary in war time, may with the spread and intensity of the present conflict, be so driven by suffering and privation as to stake everything on the prospects of a violent revolution.
Since this essay is concerned not only with the possibilities, but with the probabilities of solution, it is necessary to consider further the change in the world situation brought about by the volte-face of Russia. The victory of Stalin over Trotsky and the steps by which the new Russia gained recognition and was finally admitted to the League seemed to have largely removed the fear of the so-called Communist Menace. The prospect of war was considerably lessened, and for two main reasons. In the first place, Russia, as a member of the League and a protagonist of peaceful collaboration and international co-operation, weighted the balance against aggression to the extent that, once spurred to action, the combined forces of the nations advocating the rule of law were in an unassailable position. Moreover, the smaller powers wishing to preserve their independence were in such a position that their association with rather than against the League powers made such a policy imperative. Against these overwhelming odds neither Germany, Italy or Japan could hope to survive were the actual challenge to a major war accepted. In the second place, the feeling against war especially in Britain and France was so great that were either of these governments to initiate the issue it would have to stand the chance of such a popular outcry as to discredit its government and to establish a definitely Leftist regime. With Russia in the role of a co-operative power, preaching the doctrine of
peace, the prospect of a socialist era would have a very wide appeal. The challenge that the Russian system was a menace to freedom could carry little weight since it could be shown that the new constitution and the increasing emphasis placed by her on League co-operation suggested a truly democratic spirit. War, therefore, between the Great Powers was a prospect which could be faced by neither side. From the point of view of Germany, Italy or Japan (belli­cose speeches notwithstanding) the external odds were too great, and from the point of view of Britain, France, (or Russia, so it seemed), the internal feeling against war was so great as to obviate its probability. Under these conditions, the Leftist movement might well have prospered and grown in strength to the point where, either by constitutional means or by militant revolution, the internal control of at least three very powerful states would be in the hands of governments dominated by a philosophy which has always emphasized international rather than national interests. The close co-operation implicit in such a prospect may well have led to such European co-operation as to make recourse to national wars more and more remote. The deflection of Russia, however, has shifted the balance to the point where Great Britain and France face the prospect of fighting at a tremendous disadvantage, the extent of which is not yet apparent. While the choice of position for
the smaller powers was obviously with the Allies while Russia remained loyal to the principles of collective security and in alliance with France, that choice has now become most difficult. These small powers can ally themselves with France and Britain and risk the prospect of a fate like that of Poland, or they can succumb to the pressure of Germany and Russia and thereby be instrumental in the victory of the powers which will ultimately dominate and destroy them.

The above is now written from the point of view of historical speculation, but to emphasize the degree to which recent events, and especially the volte-face of Russia, have complicated the European and the international anarchy. The alignment of the powers to-day is not in accordance with political philosophies, but in accordance with the supposedly discarded practice of power politics. While as yet the democracies of Britain and France are fighting the autocracy of Hitler, there is no guarantee that the spread of the conflict will be in accordance with this preliminary scheme. Indeed, though Russia is apparently allied with Germany, Britain and France have not recognized her officially as an enemy. Moreover, neither Britain nor France are prepared to recognize in Mussolini the same menace as is inherent in Hitler. While the allies fight the war of democracy against dictatorship, they probably would be
quite willing, and even eager, to grasp the hand of Mussolini, the arch enemy of democracy, were it extended in their behalf. The dice have not yet been thrown which will determine whether Mussolini shall play the role of Saint or Devil. The allies, too, would also look with favour upon the blood-stained hands of Japan were that country to seize the opportunity to join them against Russia. Just what the final alignment in the present conflict will be, is by no means clear, but it would seem safe to predict that it will be determined by the prospect of national security or national aggrandisement rather than upon idealogical considerations. Any probable solution for the European anarchy which is adopted at the termination of the present war is, therefore, likely to depend upon the world situation at that time, and not upon any ideal which the present war is seeking to establish. Should Germany be victorious it is hard to visualize any chance for internationalism. The possibilities envisaged in this chapter are, therefore, based upon the assumption of victory by Britain, France, and whatever powers cast in their lot with these two democracies.

The prospects for solution may be divided into four categories, each of which must be considered as a possibility and as a probability. The four schemes we shall discuss in this chapter are:
1. World Federation.
2. Federation of the Democracies, "Union Now".
3. Federation of the European States.

While one may agree with Browning that a man's reach must exceed his grasp, one need not hesitate, if the facts warrant the conclusion, to discard as impracticable a solution no matter how lofty its idealism. World federation is probably the ideal to which all who believe in international co-operation are working. The question, however, is not so much that of aim as of method. The problem is not concerned with estimating the merits of an unattainable Utopia, but with an attainable step in that direction. The prospect of world federation must, therefore, be analysed, not in the light of its capacity to solve the problem of the European and world anarchy, but in the light of the feasibility of its attainment. In this way the proposal needs little analysis, since the obstacles to its adoption are so clearly apparent. Such a federation must first be based upon a reasonably stable order within its various parts. Asia alone would here present a major obstacle. Were China a well-organized state, Japan would find it impossible to wage her present aggressive war. In the world community someone must have the authority to
China. That authority could not be designated by Japan, Britain, or any country other than China herself. China could not enter a world Federation; she has first to find her own unity. India, and a great part of Africa would also, if they were to take part intelligently in a world federation, be under serious disadvantages. But these are perhaps minor obstacles. There would first of all be required, if not a common policy, at least a common will to co-operate. The fact that today three wars are being waged over matters which conceivably might be negotiated, shows that such a will is far from being present.

But perhaps the greatest obstacle is the conflict of ideas which has virtually split the world into two camps. If it were conceivable that Democratic states could find a common meeting ground with the dictatorships the plan, in spite of its other difficulties, might conceivably be given effect. But it is impossible that states which exist in their present political pattern by the strength of a leadership founded upon a hatred and a denunciation of all that the Democracies extol, could find common cause with the objects of their abuse. 1. Even were it possible to convocate an international conference to organize a world federation, such a prospect at the present time, would be

1. Armstrong in his "We or They" makes this point very clear.
doomed to failure. Such a conference would require as its first premise the assumption of the common ground of honesty and goodwill. To allow the gangster hands of Stalin, Hitler, or Mussolini to be the moulders of international destiny would destroy the prospects of international co-operation, and would make Justice not only blind, but stark mad. Between Justice and injustice, between freedom and tyranny, between tolerance and intolerance, there can be no common ground. Even though it may be recognized that the present dictatorships are the results of the very anarchy we wish to destroy, it would still be necessary to build a world federation from the materials available at the moment. There could be no place in such a structure for the explosive elements of Fascism, Naziism, or Stalinism. An international Munich could have no stability.

The development of world federation was no doubt in the minds of many of the champions of the League. Mr. Oscar Newfang in his "Road to World Peace", had even gone so far as to outline the constitution of such a world government. Mr. Newfang published his book in 1924 when the League, untried in any major difficulty seemed to promise much for mankind. Mr. Newfang does not conceive of the world government being born in lusty vigor like Gargantua out of the ear of Gargamelle, but as developing from the League itself.

Four steps would develop the League of Nations into a federation of nations which would eliminate all the imperfections of the League as an organization for the maintenance of permanent international peace. These steps are: 1. the addition to the Assembly of a second chamber whose members are apportioned according to population; 2. the adoption of majority rule instead of the rule of unanimity; 3. the gradual transfer of the control of the armament of the member states to the control of the federation, and, 4. the grant of compulsory jurisdiction to the Permanent Court of International Justice, its decisions to be enforced by the power of the federation.

The author while he colors his work with a very decided theological tint, does nevertheless create a very rational picture of a possible future world government. At the time when Mr. Newfang was writing there may have been the possibility of such a program.

Sir Arthur Salter referring to "Union Now", has this to say:

"So much I had written before the publication of Mr. Clarence Streit's book, "Union Now". Now that I have read it I think it well to add a few comments. It will be evident from what I have said in this chapter, and still more in Chapter 1 of this Part, that I, like him, desire a form of world government which is based upon a greater surrender of national sovereignty than the "Inter-State" constitution of the League of Nations, and that I was in favour of the latter because it seemed not only to embody as much limitation of sovereignty as it was possible to attain at the time but because it contained within itself the means of developing, and consolidating, further limitations.

"and cessions of sovereignty as a developing world opinion made these possible; so that in the end the way would be prepared for the final step of federation. This has been the aspect of the League of Nations, and this the ultimate goal, which, as far as I am concerned, has always had my deepest and ultimate loyalty, and I believe that the same is true of many of those who have been among the most ardent of the supporters of the League of Nations. For myself I stressed this side of the League, and in a long argument based upon the experience of Allied co-operation in the war, defended the principle of proceeding step by step towards a more complete system in the first book I ever wrote, as early as 1922, "Allied Shipping Control; an Experiment in International Administration," which concludes with the following comment: 'The conception here presented is thus not that of a central super-Government. It may be that this will come. It may be that the central organ of the League will in time itself become possessed of executive power, which, within a wide and widening sphere, will override the powers of national Governments. It may even be that in future ages the world will find a single centre of legislative and executive authority by a process of development similar to that by which provinces have been united into kingdoms and kingdoms into Empires. Such direct power, however, if it comes, must be delegated, not usurped. It must grow by a natural process from the gradual union of the national authorities, and the increasing harmony of their policies. It must not appear suddenly as a new, an alien, and a rival force. In the immediate future executive power can neither be seized from, nor is it to any very important extent likely to be delegated by, the national Governments. Looking at our problem, therefore within the perhaps restricted range of an administrative vision, we must contemplate the League attaining its ends through the more humble methods here described.... So gradually under this (the League) system all the forces which exist in the world to assist the development of policy in a direction which conduces to peace and the general welfare, as distinct from national advantages and international dispute, may be mobilized and brought to bear at the most vital and effective points of national
administration. And a mechanism so constructed can never break under the strain of what it undertakes. It is elastic. It adjusts itself automatically to the possibilities of the moment. It gives expression in its most effective form to the real international feeling of the world. But there it stops. It does not attempt to impose by either superior force or administrative device the international policy of any minority upon the reluctant or resistant national Governments of the world.

I agree completely with Mr. Clarence Streit, as I have long done on this point with Lord Lothian and Mr. H.G.Wells, that what is ultimately needed is a form of international Government which will, on a few but essential matters (of which the most important are defence and the conditions under which international trade is carried on), take over the sovereign rights of separate States as the inter-State System of the League does not do."

While it might, therefore have been feasible to cultivate such a world government in the fertile soil of a healthy League, it is not probable that it could grow in any other way. With the League in its present state of ill health it would seem that the only organization capable of furthering such a plan is in no position to undertake it. In the light of this condition it would seem fantastic to expect anything so mature as a world federation.

"Union Now".

The most concrete proposal for the solution of the world's ills is Mr. Streit's "Union Now". It is very difficult to give in brief form the substance of this book, but perhaps the following quotation from the book itself will give the

general idea.

"In the North Atlantic or founder democracies I would include at least these fifteen (or ten); The American Union, the British Commonwealth specifically the United Kingdom, The Federal Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ireland, the French Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Swiss Confederation, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.

These few include the world's greatest, oldest, most homogeneous and closely linked democracies, the peoples most experienced and successful in solving the problem at hand - the peaceful, reasonable establishment of effective inter-state democratic world government. Language divides them into only five big groups and for all practical political purposes, into only two, English and French. Their combined citizenry of nearly 300,000,000 is well balanced, half in Europe and half overseas. None of these democracies has been at war with any of the others since more than 100 years. Each now fears war, but not one fears war from the others.

These few democracies suffice to provide the nucleus of world government with the financial, monetary economic and political power necessary both to assure peace to its members peacefully from the outset by sheer overwhelming preponderance and invulnerability, and practically to end the monetary insecurity and economic warfare now ravaging the whole world. These few divide among them such wealth and power that the so-called world political, economic and monetary anarchy is at bottom nothing but their own anarchy — since to end it they need only unite in establishing law and order among themselves.

Together these fifteen own almost half the earth, rule all its oceans, govern nearly half mankind. They do two-thirds of the world's trade, and most of this would be called their domestic trade once they united, for it is among themselves. They have more than 50 per cent control of nearly every essential material. They have more than 60 per cent control of such war essentials as oil, copper, lead, steel, iron, coal, tin, cotton, wool, wood pulp, shipping tonnage. They have almost complete control of such keys as nickel, rubber and automobile production. They possess practically
"They possess practically all the world's gold and banked wealth. Their existing armed strength is such that once they united it they could radically reduce their armaments and yet gain a two-power standard of armed superiority over the powers whose aggression any of them now fears. The Union's existing and potential power from the outset would be so gigantic, its bulk so vast, its vital centres so scattered, that Germany, Italy and Japan even put together could no more dream of attacking it than Mexico dreams of invading the American Union now. Once established the Union's superiority in power would be constantly increasing simply through the admission to it of outside nations. A number would no doubt be admitted immediately. By this process the absolutist powers would constantly become weaker and more isolated."

Mr. Streit would unite these powers in a federal union and would give the Union the following rights or powers:

1. The right to grant citizenship.
2. The right to make peace and war, to negotiate treaties and otherwise deal with the outside world, to raise and maintain a defense force.
3. The right to regulate inter-state and foreign trade.
4. The right to coin and issue money, and fix other measures.
5. The right to govern communications; To operate the postal service, and regulate, control or operate other inter-state communication services.

One cannot read Mr. Streit's book without being impressed by the soundness of much of his argument, and of the sincerity of his appeal. The greater part of his argument is

2. ibid. p. 179.
devoted to comparison between League and Union. Not only does he show how a League must fail because of the contradiction to concerted action implicit in national sovereignty, but he attempts to show how a Union must work. The latter part of his argument is based largely upon the effectiveness of the American Union. This is perhaps the weakest part of his logic, since the analogy is not very close. It is not the purpose of this essay to make anything like a thorough review of Mr. Streit's proposal or to suggest that it is impossible. Indeed, it seems to the present writer to be an ideal solution, and quite possible if we accept the somewhat naive optimism which characterizes "Union Now"

"All it will take to make this Union—whether in a thousand years or now, whether long after catastrophe or just in time to prevent it, is agreement by a majority to do it. Union is one of those things which to do we need but agree to do, and which we can not possibly ever do except by agreeing to do it. Why then can we not do it now in time for us to benefit by it and save millions of lives? Are we so much feebleer than our fathers and our children that we can not do what our fathers did and what we expect our children to do? Why can we not agree on Union now?"

From the point of view of possibility there is little that can be condemned in Mr. Streit's plan. The argument for the most part is very sound. But possibility is only one criterion. "Union Now" must be judged on the basis of probability, and here Mr. Streit enjoys an optimism which too greatly minimizes the difficulties. It must be borne in mind that neither the soundness of an argument nor the

1. footnote appears on page 142.
glitter of the prospect envisaged is sufficient to carry any plan to a successful conclusion. The principles of Christianity have been preached for nearly 2000 years. Were these principles put into practice there would be little need for any other cure. We might, therefore, ask with the same naivety, "Why can't we have Christianity now?" The socialist, were his plan adopted might bring about a like sanguine world, but it is doubtful if the majority of people would even deign to answer the question, "Why can't we have Socialism now?" Were it merely the problem of devising a plan or drawing up a constitution, there would be little difficulty. There is no dearth of expert opinion available for such a task. It is the acceptance by enough of any plan which creates the difficulty. Moreover, the majority required must not only favour a particular policy, but must be in a position to translate its approval into action. There is little doubt that were it merely a question of peace or war a real majority could be found which favoured peace. But how to transmute the desire for peace into the instrument which will insure it is the real problem.

Mr. Streit seems to place tremendous faith in the power of the ordinary man under democratic rule to put his plan into operation. While a democracy allows freedom of

1. Union Now p. 4-5. (refers to quotation on page 141)
expression (in time of peace) and gives the ordinary man a chance to take part in government, it does not in any particular instance necessarily mean government by the whole people. While political candidates are often swept into office on definite or general political promises, there is no guarantee that these promises will be carried out. Moreover, changing conditions may create situations whereby action is taken and consent is sought after the fact. In the case of the present war, Canada declared war in support of Great Britain. This is hardly correct if it is assumed that the whole of the people of Canada had a part in taking this step. The assumption is that Canada means the people of Canada, and that these people are wholeheartedly in favour of the step taken by their government. This assumption may be correct. It may be correct now, while it may have been incorrect at the time it was taken. If we assume that the people of Canada are in favour of active participation in war we would still have to determine whether they are in favour because they support the original step or because they see no good reason for changing; they see definite harm in changing; they are resigned to a fait accompli. So far no government has ever given to outline any specific principle upon which a declaration of war will be made. The present declaration of war appears to have been made by right of a statute enacted during the last world war.

Since it will be quite democratic to challenge the entry of Canada into the war when the war is over, there will probably be a great deal heard about it then. For the present, however, democracy, as it relates to this question is a dead issue. There is here a weakness in democracy, but a weakness which might be very difficult to eliminate. Moreover, if steps were taken to remove this shortcoming it might mean the sacrifice to the principles of democracy of the speed of action necessary to meet successfully the challenge of a totalitarian power.

The point to note is that modern democracy, in order to function at all, especially when it must be prepared at a moment's notice to cope with the unpredictable moves of totalitarian states, sacrifices a certain measure of individual participation in government. Power must be delegated to representatives. A government in power may assume that it is granted a mandate to carry out a defined policy. But as a general rule this is not the case. The victory of a particular group or party merely means that that group has been given authority to enact legislation and to carry on government for a certain length of time. By the system of patronage, such a government builds up a group of supporters who have vested interest in it, and who can be relied upon to support its policies and to work to keep it in power.

1. Initiative, Referendum, and Recall are attempts at eliminating the evil. Switzerland and U.S.A. makes some use of them but they are not yet generally practised in democracy.
The means of moulding public opinion are largely economic. The holders of economic power can exert pressure upon employees and can spend vast sums of money in newspaper and radio propaganda. Public Opinion is not to be conceived of as the unbiased expression of the opinion of individuals, but as the expression of the opinion of individuals conditioned by political propaganda fed them by newspapers, magazines, and the radio, (largely controlled by a wealthy owning group), and by the pressure which employers can exert upon employees. Freedom of speech does not mean that one is necessarily able to reach the ears of a large number of people free of charge; it means only that the individual has the right to express his opinions without fear—(theoretically, not always so in practice). It does not guarantee that the world will make a beaten path to the door of the individual who can offer the best or most democratic solution to any given social, economic, or political problem. Freedom of speech merely gives the right to speak; it does not give the economic power to speak to the country at large through press or radio; nor does it even provide the money necessary to hire a hall and to pay for the advertising for a local gathering. This does not preclude the possibility of the growth of public opinion which often challenges the vested interests, but it does give a decided advantage to the holders of economic power. When Mr. Streit,
therefore, speaks about the relative ease with which the democracies could put Union into practice he seems to assume far too much democracy in democracy. He does not take into consideration the fact that nationalism does not survive because it is the will of the majority, or is in the best interests of this majority, but because the economic power vested in this condition is used to mould the minds of the majority. It is these vested interests whom Mr. Streit will have to convince of the soundness of his plan (and of its economic advantages to them) for they, in the final analysis, are public opinion.

One other factor must be taken into consideration when estimating the probability of adoption of Mr. Streit's proposal, and that is, the political philosophies motivating the individual democratic states, especially Britain, France, and the United States. When we speak of the United States of America or American foreign policy, do we mean an America under President Roosevelt and a New Deal administration, or a United States under a definitely isolationist President and a Congress of the same persuasion? Do we mean a United States with Cordell Hull as Secretary of State, or a United States with foreign policy directed by a highly protectionist Secretary of State? The same considerations will have to be borne in mind in reference to Britain and France. In Democratic countries a long term
policy may well be the translation into action of the common will; but in relation to a particular incident or at any particular time the individual leader or governing group is the sole arbiter. A United States under Roosevelt and a Britain under a labour government may have much more in common in reference to foreign policy than either of these governments have with the parties which oppose them within their own borders. If we could assume a New Deal government in the United States, a Popular Front Government in France, and a Labour Government in Britain, we could conceivably expect from such a combination the development of such a proposal as Mr. Streit suggests. Under these conditions representatives of the three governments, acting alone, or in concert with representatives of other democratic states, might be conceived of as drawing up proposals for a federal union which could be submitted for ratification by popular vote by the nationals of all the governments concerned. But with any or all of these three main democracies in the hands of reactionary governments it is hard to visualize any such a probability. The difference in the two above conditions is not the difference between two forms of government. It is the difference between acceptance of a policy by a group which might have everything to gain by such action, and acceptance by a group which might have much to lose. For the ordinary man Union might well ensure a standard of living
far in advance of that he at present enjoys. For the capitalist, Union might destroy the national monopoly or national protection upon which his wealth is based. The vested interests which nationalism protects are not primarily the interests of the wage-earner, but the interests of the industrial and commercial capitalist. (To which must be added the interests of the professional politician.) Even though Mr. Streit points out that the sacrifice involved by changing from a national to a union economy will soon be offset by the resultant prosperity, he will still find it hard to convince the interests suffering from the change that two birds in the bush are better than one in the hand.

"Suppose Detroit could still deliver all the cars demanded in France -- and everywhere else in Europe -- more cheaply than the maker on the spot could. There would remain the problem of distribution and service and this would require building up a greater organization than the French makers now have, and this takes time and money. When all this was done, there would still be business left the French maker. For one thing, there would remain all the tens of thousands of his sold cars to help protect him for several years. At worst, from his viewpoint, these might all be traded in for American cars, but even then they would have to be re-sold and kept running, and the demand for their parts would continue."

Surely Mr. Streit does not suppose that the above argument will carry much weight with the French motor manufacturer?

1. "Union Now", p. 267. This is only one of several such examples in "Union Now".
If it could be assumed that the vested national interests could be moved by such a spirit of self-sacrifice for the general welfare of mankind there would be no great problem to solve.

It is very difficult to refute the basic argument of "Union Now", and yet it is impossible to feel the least bit hopeful of the prospect which Mr. Streit envisages. There is so much that must be assumed that can not be assumed. There is the assumption that man by willing Union can achieve it -- and that such widespread willing can be brought about. There is the assumption that the world can or will be righted by the logic of a course of action. There is the assumption that the United States can of will depart from a traditional policy to join, not a loose League, but a binding federation. There is the assumption that democratic countries are necessarily kindred and could be moved to unite because of this fraternal bond. And there is the assumption that nations can or will renounce their nationalism by uniting in a Federation for the common welfare.

If it could be assumed that these conditions were in the least probable the logic of "Union Now" would be the prelude to its adoption as a practical experiment.

But neither Rome nor Western Civilization were built in a day. Political institutions especially grow very slowly though they may be destroyed very quickly. The greater the
degree of political freedom the slower the pace in the evolution of political institutions, especially if the changes contemplated depart radically from established institutions. Democratic government has taken great pains to establish its position by making change a very complicated procedure. Constitutions, written or unwritten are religiously guarded to prevent the loss of the freedom won after many years of struggle. The same machinery which guarantees against reaction is also a definite obstacle in the path of progressive change, since it is always a question to be determined whether any proposed change is in the interests of or detrimental to democratic government. Democracy therefore sacrifices speed of action in favor of the durability of its political machinery. The Democracies are founded upon a widening area of political control — that is, more and more people determine the course of events, and more and more fields of human endeavor become matters of common concern and common control. Initiation, debate, and ratification of any important step is not a question of hours but may be a question of days, months, or years. Hitler and Stalin could completely reverse their national policies in relation to one another, and change overnight from enemies to friends. Mussolini is, to all intents and purposes, the Italian nation. Though he may be compelled to gauge his actions by the measure
of public approval they are likely to elicit he can do much to create the public opinion he wishes to prevail at any given time. There is little effort required in a dictatorship to create the public opinion necessary to support any project which the dictator has in mind, since all the machinery for moulding public opinion is directly controlled by the dictator. The measure of freedom in these countries is reduced to the smallest fraction, and conversely, the speed of action is increased to the highest power. In the Democracies the expansion of the measure of freedom and of the rights of the individual to a very high point has reduced the speed of action to a very low point. When Mr. Streit speaks of union of the Democracies and the willing of such a union he does not give sufficient attention to the fact that democratic action is determined by not one controlling will, but by the conflicting wills of a very large number of individuals, or groups of individuals. Even though it may be possible to obtain a majority in favour, and a majority working definitely for union in one of the democracies, it would still be necessary to bring about a like condition in many more. As far as Great Britain is concerned there would be required a majority in not one, but in five nations. Without Britain, France, and the United States the whole scheme breaks down. Who is to assume leadership in such a scheme? Is it to be assumed by the governments
in power, and if so, is it likely that all or any of these
governments would be prepared to sacrifice its political
future on such an untried program? Is leadership to be
dependent on the formation of new political parties pledged
to Union? If so, what chance would such parties have of
obtaining power? They would immediately create out of
apathy a definite opposition to the proposal. While the
cries of "far fetched", "Utopian", "an American idea",
"destruction of our national freedom", and other such
slogans may contain no logic, they would for that reason
be no less powerful, and carry no less weight. It is not
a question only of obtaining a majority in the democracies.
The first problem is necessarily one of creating the
political machinery essential to building up such a
majority and of popularizing the idea of union. Mr. Streit's
post-card plebiscite, or his scheme for writing to con­
gressmen seems a very feeble substitute for the necessary
political machinery. Mr. Streit's proposal may be quite
logical, but that does not make it any more real or at all
probable. The wonderful one-hoss shay was built on logic;
as a practical proposal, "Union Now" will probably suffer
the same fate as that ingenious contrivance.

As far as the United States is concerned one can
only judge future action on the basis of past and present
conditions. There does not seem to be any indications
that the United States is ready to enter the field of world politics as an active participant, or is at all disposed to relinquish its isolated dominance of the New World by sharing such a position with the other Democracies. President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull are quite free to give moral advice to the rest of the world; but they would not dare to undertake to even suggest a course of action which would necessarily involve obligations on the part of the country to other powers. Any party in America which would stake its political future on such a course of action as Mr. Streit suggests would be committing political suicide. Moreover, union of the Democracies, even though founded upon co-operation among them and not upon opposition to the Dictatorships would hardly be regarded by the latter as a friendly action. The Latin American countries, largely undemocratic, would be distrustful of the Good Neighbor. It is not likely that the United States would overlook this fact. "Union Now" must have the support of the United States. Such a prospect can hardly be termed impossible; but it is definitely improbable.

Apart from their political persuasion, democracy, there does not seem to be any bond between the Democracies. Even within the British Commonwealth there is nothing like the collaboration which Mr. Streit proposes. The
possibility of creating such a Union as far as the smaller Democracies are concerned, would seem to depend upon leadership by union between Britain, France, and the United States, or between any two of these great powers. Since it is unlikely that the United States will join such a Union it is necessary that Britain and France first federate. Under peaceful conditions this federation might be joined by Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. Under present war conditions, however, this does not seem possible, since the smaller countries are much more concerned with preserving their national safety than with the struggle against dictatorship. Should France and Britain be able to federate there is the prospect of the extension of the idea to include these countries at the end of the war. This, however, is not "Union Now", and must be reserved for later discussion.

There remains the question of the voluntary renunciation of nationalism in favor of a Democratic Federation. This does not seem a very probable development, at least not in one step. There is little doubt that nationalism in its present militant form will have to be broken down before any co-operation can be achieved between the various peoples of the world. But such a process will be slow. Here again it is probable that Britain and France can and will make the first move. Within the space of one generation
these two countries have been forced to co-operate very closely for their mutual protection. The departure from this close co-operation between 1920 and 1939 has been a contributing factor in the creation of the difficulty in which they now find themselves. This bitter experience, rather than the logic of the step is the fact which will tend to create a permanent union between these two powers. Here again we depart from " Union Now " and must reserve further discussion for a later part of this essay.

While it has been pointed out that " Union Now " is a very improbable development, it must also be noted that Mr. Streit has made a very valuable contribution to the ultimate solution of the world and the European anarchy. " Union Now " has already stimulated a great deal of thought. It has been widely quoted and discussed. Mr. W. B. Curry's " The Case for Federal Union " in the Penguin Series is really a low-priced edition of Mr. Streit's book. The fact that the idea originated in the United States, and that it is so loyal to the American Constitution may well serve to remove much of the American prejudice against foreign entanglements. While Mr. Streit has published his proposal as a practical solution, it is as a stimulus to thought on the part of the public, bewildered by the complexity and the anarchy of present world conditions that " Union Now " will probably make its greatest
contribution.

European Federation.

It is obvious that the European anarchy cannot be destroyed without the setting of some form of federal control which can where necessary override national sovereignty. It is useless to consider any international action in Europe which depends solely upon the consent of the national states. Wherever there is a conflict over the question of authority there must be a means of deciding the issue. The whole principle of federation depends upon a division of power based upon an accepted constitution. The division of power necessarily means that certain powers are given to the federal government. There can be no federal union in which there is no real federal control. In this connection it is interesting to note the replies to Mr. Briand's proposal for a European Federation. "All the States, except Holland, agreed that the European Association should be 'on the plan of absolute sovereignty and of entire political independence'. "

If such a premise is adopted at the outset there can be no federation since 'absolute sovereignty and entire political independence' leaves the federation with no authority at

all except that vague weapon called 'moral authority'. The same obstacle which has proven insurmountable by the League, national sovereignty, would be equally insurmountable in a European Federation based upon the entire retention of absolute power by the national states.

The necessary step, therefore, must be a very bold one. It must, if any real union is to be achieved, be a step which will crush the idea of absolute sovereignty. This does not necessarily mean the destruction of the national state or of national rights except that national rights become what they must become under federal control, states' rights or provincial rights. To protect these a constitution must be set up, and in all probability, a court of appeal in case of dispute between the national government and the federal government. Under the League system this court might well be the League itself, or the Permanent Court of International Justice; though it would probably be better to set up a supreme court as part of the constitution of the Federation.

The Briand proposal, in spite of its name, is not in reality a proposal for a European Federal Union. It is merely a proposal for the setting up of machinery which might facilitate a greater measure of co-operation between the European States. It is no more a proposal for European Federation than was the League for World
Federation, Indeed the organization envisaged follows very much along the lines of the League itself. The emphasis is placed upon economic questions, and in this respect it resembles a Zollverein. There does not appear to be any suggestion for the setting up of a federal governing body with the necessary authority to legislate and to carry out the function of a Federal Government. While it might be trite to say it, it must be said that there can be no European Federation without a Federal Government, and there can be no government without authority. While the authority of the Federal Government must be open to challenge, it must only give way when the opposing force represents the will of a majority, either of States or peoples. If the authority of the Federal Government can be successfully challenged by a few people or a single state (which the retention of absolute sovereignty and complete political independence permits) there can be no such thing as a federation. This point, which has been stressed previously in the present essay is very clearly presented in the following quotation.

"A Socialist, and accordingly an internationalist, writer makes short work of this idea. M. Leon Blum, in "Le Populaire" of May 21st and 22nd, 1930, demands real powers for the future federal institutions of Europe, and a diminution therefore of individual sovereignty. He attacks the very idea of sovereignty, which he deems artificial and archaic. Reflection on these matters, he contends, compels us to recognize that there is an insurmountable contradiction between the solemnly
proclaimed intention to unite the States of Europe by a federal bond and equally solemn engagement to preserve the national sovereignties. M. Leon Blum points out very ably that federation would be difficult, if not impossible, between States without a minimum of principles in common. He is thinking, it will be observed, of democratic principles. On this point we agree with M. Leon Blum, believing with him that the stability of peace depends upon the stability of free institutions.

In a memorandum presented at Berlin on February 25th, 1930, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, on the contrary, provides for the preservation of the absolute sovereignty of European States. M. Joseph Barthelemy, Member of the French Institute, goes deeply into the question in a remarkable work presented at Geneva in June 1930 before the Federal Committee of European Co-Operation. He recognizes that when we get past the area of negations, or even that of comparisons, the problem of sovereignty represents the essential difficulty. He criticizes the text of the Memorandum as being weak on the legal side, and, arriving by a different route at the same conclusions as M. Leon Blum, he lays down the principle that we cannot create a new order without curtailing the old liberties.

This, indeed, is self-evident. The whole history of progress and the evolution of humanity in the direction of civilization is marked by restrictions, imposed or accepted, of the initial freedom. As soon as society comes into being, individual right is modified. Certainly European Federation, could not promise to leave each State its absolute sovereignty. On the other hand, we must not lose ourselves in theoretical discussions. The fact is that sovereignty, like individual liberty and property, is a product of evolution. Public treaties restrict rights just as private contracts do .................

........................ M. Joseph Barthelemy's contention, which deserves at least to be studied, is that we have to develop M. Briand's idea and carry it to a point at which the States would
"remain independent in their mutual relations, but would necessarily abandon a part of their sovereignty for the benefit of the new organization." 1.

At the outset, therefore, it must be understood that there is a real difference between a federated Europe and what may be termed a pan-European League. It is the latter which is necessary to overcome the European anarchy. The question immediately arises of the means of bringing such a federation into being, and of the extent to which such an undertaking is possible now or in the near future. The most recent proposal for such a federation is contained in Mr. W. Ivor Jennings' "Rough Draft" of a proposed Constitution for a Federation of Western Europe." 2. Mr. Jennings' proposal has the merit of being quite definite in its outline and its objectives. It is based largely upon the Federal principles of the United States of America with occasional borrowings from the practices of Britain and France. The general nature of the Federation is set forth in Article 1.


2. Published by the Cambridge University Press (no date given, probably the Spring of 1940) for private circulation only.
The Federation

1. The Federation of Western Europe (hereinafter called "the Federation") is a federal union composed of such States (hereinafter called "the federal States") as shall have ratified this Constitution in accordance with this Article.

2. Any of the following States shall become a federated State on giving notice to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands that it has ratified this Constitution: the German Reich, Belgium, Denmark, Eire, Finland, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Iceland, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the Swiss Confederation.

3. Subsequent provisions of this Constitution shall take effect from the date when four of the States mentioned in section 2 of this Article have given notice of ratification, and for the purposes of this Constitution "the establishment of the Federation" is that date: provided that, where a State ratifies this Constitution after that date, this Constitution shall apply to that State as from the date of such ratification.

4. A federated State named in Section 2 of this Article may not be expelled from the Federation nor shall it withdraw from the Federation, except by an amendment of this Constitution.

5. Any of the following shall become a federated State on giving notice of ratification to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands: the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, the Dominion of New Zealand, Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia: provided that:

(A) Newfoundland shall not become a federated State until it has become self-governing.

(B) Nothing in this Constitution shall forbid the union of Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia, or any part thereof, and the united territory shall succeed to the rights and duties of Southern Rhodesia as a federated State under this Constitution.
(C) Except where a contrary intention appears, nothing in this Constitution shall affect the relations inter se of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

(D) Any federated State named in this section of this Article may withdraw from the Federation one year after giving notice to the President of its intention so to do.

6. Other States may be admitted to the Federation, on such conditions as may be prescribed, by a law assented to by at least two-thirds of the whole number of members in each House of the Federal Legislature (and approved by the legislatures in at least two-thirds of the federated States); such States shall then become federated States.

7. The federal legislature may, by a law assented to by at least two-thirds of the whole number of members in each House, extend to any State, not being a federated State, at the request of such State, any of the provisions of this Constitution; and for the purposes of such provisions only such State shall be deemed to be a federated State.

8. Except where the contrary intention appears, "State" in this Constitution includes the dependencies of the State, and "dependency" includes a colony, a protectorate, a territory in respect of which a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations has been accepted by the State or the head thereof, and any other country or territory under the protection or suzerainty of a State or the head thereof."

Article 2 sets forth the principle that the Constitution is the supreme law.

The federation guarantees to all States democratic government and assistance in maintaining public order.

The Constitution follows the United States of America in dividing the government into three parts; (1) an executive, president, Prime Minister, and Council Members; (2) a legislature of two houses, a State's House, and a People's House; (3) a federal Supreme Court. The powers of these three bodies are much the same as those obtaining in the United States of America. The President, however, is
selected by both houses meeting in joint session as in France, rather than by popular vote. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President; the other Ministers by the President upon the advise of the Prime Minister. A compromise is made between the American and English systems in that the Prime Minister and other Ministers may be chosen from members of the Legislature or from persons outside the Legislature. In the latter event the Ministers become members of one or the other House within a period of six months after appointment.

The federal legislature is composed of two houses, a State's House, and a People's House. The members of both Houses are elected. Bills become law when passed by a majority in both Houses and are signed by the President. For reasons which are not clear to the present writer Mr. Jennings here introduces the exception obtaining in Great Britain since 1911.

"A Bill assented to by a majority in each House shall become law on being signed by the President;

Provided that a money Bill assented to by the People's House and rejected by the State's House, or assented to by the State's House with amendments which are rejected by the People's House, or not assented to by the State's House within three months of its receipt by the State's House, or on being assented to by the People's House without further amendment (excepting only such amendments as have been accepted by the State's House) and being signed by the President shall become law without being assented to by
The Federal Supreme Court has powers very similar to those of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. Amendment to the Constitution is much like that obtaining in the United States.

"Amendments to this Constitution may be prepared in either House, and any such amendment shall take effect if it is supported by at least two-thirds of the members voting in each House (and by a majority in the legislatures of two-thirds of the federated States): provided that the proportional representation of a federated State in the States' House shall not be diminished without the consent of the legislature of that State, nor shall this Article be so amended as to enable the proportional representation of a federated State in the States' House to be diminished without the consent of the legislature of that State."  

The powers of the Federal Government are very definite, and follow very closely the powers assumed by the federal governments in any federated state. It is notable that defense is given definitively and exclusively to the Federation.

1. The command of the armed forces of the Federation shall be vested in the President.

2. From such a date as may be fixed by the Federal Legislature, the armed forces of the federated State, or such of them as may be indicated by the Federal Legislatures, shall be transferred to the President and shall become part of the armed forces of the Federation.

1. "Rough Draft", Article 7, Sec. 2.

2. ibid, Article 23.
Within twelve months of that date, armed forces of any federated State not so transferred shall be disbanded and, subject to this Constitution, no federated State or authority or person shall establish or maintain armed forces within the Federation; provided that a federated State may authorize the establishment or maintenance of such police forces as may be necessary for the maintenance of order within its own boundaries.

2. From the establishment of the Federation, no arms, munitions, military equipment or other implements of war shall be manufactured in or imported into the Federation except under the licence of the President.

4. The President shall, at the request of the appropriate authority in a federated State, authorize the armed forces of the Federation to assist the State authority in the enforcement of the laws of the federated State and the maintenance of order in the federated State.

5. In section 2 of this Article, "armed forces" includes the arms, equipment, munitions and other implements of war, and the land and buildings used exclusively for defence purposes.

6. Laws of any State which, in the opinion of the Council of Ministers, are inconsistent with this Article may be disallowed by the President.

The Federation is also given power to disallow state legislation.

1. Where under this Constitution the President has a power to disallow State legislation he shall have power also to disallow administrative acts of the same character; and such power may be exercised within a period of three months from the enactment of the legislation or the coming into operation of the administrative act. Any such disallowance shall be notified by the President by proclamation, and the legislation or administrative act shall, from the date of the proclamation, cease to be law.

2. Without prejudice to other powers set out in this Constitution, the President shall have power to disallow any law of a federated State which, in the opinion of the Council of Ministers,

(A) Tends to interfere with the freedom of elections to the People's House; or

1. Rough Draft, Article 15
(B) Tends to prevent the formation or constitutional operation of political parties having federal objects; or

(C) Is likely to require the performance by the Federation of its obligations under Article 111 of this Constitution. I.

Mr. Jennings' proposal seems to be the best yet offered for the solution of the European anarchy. It follows logically from the analysis made in the present essay. If that analysis is in the main correct, the European Federation is the real solution. To work out a solution does not, however necessarily mean that it will be adopted. While it is difficult to foretell what the future holds, and while proof for the contention cannot be given, it is the contention of the present writer that Mr. Jennings' Federation is still some distance away, and that it is first necessary to take the initial step in this direction. It is hardly likely that as many as four European democracies will be willing to take this step, at least not until it has been shown to be practical by its adoption by two countries. The two countries which are best fitted by their experience in co-operation over a long period of time are Britain and France. Whether or not Europe looks to these two nations for leadership, it is hardly possible that they could escape that role if they united as a strong federation. Acting together in peace or war they would soon regain that leadership in European

.................

1. Rough Draft, Article 12.
affairs which has in recent years been so often menaced by the presence of conflicting interests. Once a Franco-British Federation (along the lines suggested by Mr. Jennings' "Rough Draft") is brought into being European Federation might well follow. It seems to the present writer, however, that Britain and France must take the initiative and prove, not by repeated declarations of friendship, but by the practical adoption of Federation that such a solution is both possible, and profitable to all those who participate in it.

CONCLUSION.

It is here, therefore presented as a thesis, that the European anarchy can be largely solved by the Federation of Britain and France.

This is not a final solution, but merely the first and necessary step in a program which envisages the ultimate federation of the whole of Europe. The point which must be borne in mind is that federation will not be established in Europe because of abstract reasoning, but that it will arise out of the necessity for its adoption, and that it will only come into being when it has been shown to be both practical and profitable. There is little doubt that both France and Britain are faced to-day with the necessity of federation, and there is little doubt that such federation would be highly beneficial to both countries.
Britain cannot afford to isolate herself from continental Europe. If for no other reason, her safety alone demands that she have a say in European affairs. She cannot afford to see France fall a victim to a hostile Germany, or to an envious Italy. The defence of France has been since the rise of Germany the defence of Britain. The tragedy of the present situation is due in no small measure to the failure of these two countries to act always as a united people between 1918 and 1939. There can be no such continued united action under the concept of exclusive national sovereignty except in times of grave danger. If Britain and France do not soon realize the absolute necessity for a binding federation there seems little hope for the survival of either power. The dominions and possessions of both countries can only be expected to remain loyal so long as that loyalty is part of their own protection. Should either power be defeated and not be in a position to give the necessary protection to its dominions and dependencies it seems hardly likely that these would remain loyal. Moreover the defeat of either power would be a crushing blow to democracy in Europe. From the point of view of France, British cooperation is essential. The Maginot line protects France on only one front, and is only effective while she can rely upon the seas to bring her the supplies to carry on a major war and to provide for her
people. The forty million people of France can not alone hold back the massed power of German arms, aided possibly by Italy and the resources of Central Europe. Britain, too, must have a continental battle front, if for no other reason, to divert a large measure of European man-power from direct attack upon the British Isles. The blockade too would be ineffective unless aided by France, since Britain alone can not blockade the whole of Europe. Only by a strong deterrent to any totalitarian threat can Britain be assured of her own freedom and the maintenance of her imperial power. She can no longer alone present the necessary deterrent, but only by union with France.

Together Britain and France create not only a powerful European state, but have access to a large part of the world's wealth and provide democratic government for nearly a third of the people of the world. The prospect of immediate action on the part of such a Federation would be a great deterrent to aggression, and would have a very powerful repercussion in the field of diplomacy. Such united action, however, must be available at all times. The door must be locked before the horse is stolen. United action taken after aggression has broken out has proven of little value. Indeed, it would appear that there is not too much confidence placed on united action by either side when such action is taken as a last desperate effort to avert disaster.
The repeated assurances of both Britain and France of their solidarity call to mind the phrase from Hamlet, "The lady doth protest too much, methinks." A Franco-British Federation would speak for itself, and would be in no danger of disintegration in the face of danger since the interests of the one would not be the interests merely of the other, but the interests of both would be the interests of the Federation, in which to all intents and purposes there would be no France, and no Britain, but the Federation.

For purposes of communication both domestic and military a tunnel under the Channel would be a great asset. The blockade of Britain or of France under such conditions would necessitate a blockade of both countries. To blockade such a long coastline would be a very difficult task and would leave both countries a much larger share of their naval forces for actual offensive warfare. The shipment of troops and supplies to the continent would be a relatively easy task. The cost of this undertaking would no doubt be great, but would probably be no more prohibitive than the burden borne now by both countries for national defense, much of which would be avoided under a Federal system.

The Franco-British Federation, as has been stated, might well be established along the lines of Mr. Jennings' "Rough Draft", and could be left open to other nations to join, providing such states were democratic states and that
they would subscribe to the obligations of the Constitution. The probability is that were France and Britain to federate (as they must do if they are to survive; this thesis) their resultant prosperity would be a great inducement to other states to join. Especially is this true of the so-called "have not" states, since the Federation would guarantee to them the resources of such a large part of the world. The question of prestige would vanish in such a Federation since all would be members of one state, sharing democratically the same privileges and obligations. It is hard to see how under such conditions there could possibly arise the conditions now prevalent in Europe. Such a Federation, however, must be proven effective; there are only two nations which can make the experiment. Britain and France have now, while they are so necessarily called upon to work together, the greatest opportunity to banish the European anarchy. Their peoples are now both engaged in a life and death struggle against a common enemy to uphold the same principles of life and liberty. History has never presented a better opportunity. The excuse that such Federation should wait until the end of the war is a poor one. Now while the war is on, before it goes into its most desperate phase is the time when France and Britain should federate. The speeches of public men in high official positions in both Britain and France during the past six months show that the idea of
federation, for France and Britain or for western Europe, is being given consideration. During the course of a speech on November 26, Mr. Chamberlain had this to say:

"Our desire, then, when we have achieved our war aims, would be to establish a new Europe, not new in the sense of tearing up all the frontier posts and redrawing the map according to the ideas of the victors, but a Europe with a new spirit in which the nations which inhabit it will approach their difficulties with good will and mutual tolerance.

In such a Europe, fear of aggression will have ceased to exist, and such adjustments of boundaries as would be necessary would be threshed out between neighbors sitting on equal terms around a table, with the help of disinterested third parties if it were so desired.

In such a Europe it would be recognized that there can be no lasting peace unless there is a full and constant flow of trade between the nations concerned, for only by increased interchange of goods and services can the standard of living be improved.

In such a Europe each country would have the unfettered right to choose its own form of internal government so long as that government did not pursue an internal policy injurious to its neighbors.

Lastly, in such a Europe armaments would gradually be dropped as a useless expense, except in so far as they were needed for the preservation of internal law and order.

It is obvious that the establishment of the Utopian Europe which I have sketched out could not be the work of weeks or even months. It would be a continuous process, stretching over many years. Indeed, it would be impossible to set a time limit upon which, it, for conditions never cease to change, and corresponding adjustments would be required if friction was to be avoided.

Consequently, you would need some machinery capable of conducting and guiding the development of the new Europe in the right direction. I do not think it necessary, nor indeed, is it possible, to specify at this stage the kind of machinery which should be established for this purpose. I merely express the opinion that something of that sort would have to be provided, and I would add my hope that a Germany animated by a new spirit might be among the nations which would take part in its operations.

1. "International Conciliation" no. 357, February, 1940, p.41
Lord Halifax, speaking to the House of Lords on December 5, said during the course of his speech,

"It has already been said that a new order in Europe can only come by the surrender in some measure by nations of their sovereign rights, in order to clear the way for some more organized union." 1.

Judging from the tone of his address this statement was tantamount to an acceptance of that idea by Halifax himself.

The Marquess of Lothian, British Ambassador to the United States, speaking on October 25, said,

"Some form of economic federation, perhaps even of political federation, at any rate for part of Europe, is, I am sure, a necessary condition on any stable world order." 2.

In January of this year the Right Honourable, the Marquess of Crewe, wrote in "Contemporary Review",

"The idea of a Federated Europe makes a strong appeal to others, and used in the widest sense it appears to offer the most hopeful line of advance." 3.

In the first week of this year, Premier Edouard Daladier also spoke of federation;

".................Premier Edouard Daladier, in a speech on the French military budget before the Senate, spoke a good word for federation. The French and

1. International Conciliation, cited, no. 357, p. 47.
2. ibid, December, 1939, no. 355, p. 590.
British Empires he declared, have permanently 'dismissed national egoism' and have come into an agreement on community of action 'whose consequences are incalculable'. The Premier continued; 'This agreement has been enlarged by the distribution on an equitable basis in all common charges, and by the establishment of complete solidarity between our two monies, the franc and the pound sterling. This Franco-British union is open to all. . . . I (can) conceive that the new Europe should have a wider organization. . . . . commercial exchange must be multiplied, and perhaps federative bonds envisaged between the various European states.'

These somewhat vague references to federation are not enough. What is required is not suggestion of some future "New Europe", but a real step now in that direction by the only two countries which at the moment are capable, and (if their leaders believe sincerely in the ideals they express) should be in a position to take positive action without delay. Such action would do much to convince a world sceptical of vague promises that this time the two great democracies really meant business. Such a program would not be the joining of the two great imperial powers to promote a greater imperialism, but the union of two great freedom-loving peoples to promote and preserve the principle for which millions of their sons have had to lay down their lives. Such action followed by an invitation to all peoples of Europe who desired freedom and democracy to join the federation as equal partners would effectively eliminate any

1. *Time*, January 8, 1940.
necessity for a country to arm and fight because it "had not". There would be no necessity for such a thing as a "have not" nation, unless such a nation preferred bondage to liberty. It does not seem possible that there is so little sense in the world that nations would not be quick to avail themselves of the privileges so freely offered, were the institution created which would make this possible. This institution like all great institutions must develop from a well laid foundation. It must develop not from a conference of many powers each jockeying for position and getting nowhere, but from the small to the large. First the institution, the Federation, must be created. France and Britain can create it. If it is of no value it will die; and if it is of no value, it ought to die. But if it is of value it will live and flourish. Nothing succeeds like success. If France and Britain can not succeed in creating a Federation and in making it function, then it is useless to talk of a Federation of Western Europe. If France and Britain can make, and make function, a Franco-British Federation they will have laid the firm foundations of an institution capable of survival and growth. Such an institution would mean the transformation of what has hitherto been mere lip service to international co-operation into the practical application of that principle. Europe does not need, (indeed she heartily distrusts) speeches, and sermons,
and prayers, for international co-operation. She does need actual and concrete co-operation; she needs it badly, and she needs it now. France and Britain can show by doing what they have been unable to show by words that national boundaries are not insurmountable barriers between men of goodwill, and that co-operation for the welfare of mankind is a stronger force than strife for mutual destruction. There is no sound reason why we should not have Franco-British Federation NOW.
Appendix A.

Catalonian Autonomy and the Spanish Civil War.

Catalonian autonomy was only one factor among many which gave rise to the Spanish Civil War. It cannot be said to be a cause of the conflict, but was a very vital factor once the war had actually started. The conflicts which gave rise to the war were very numerous. On the Right were large landowners, militarists, the Catholic Church, and those who felt that regional autonomy was likely to destroy the state. On the Left were the Communists, Anarchists, the peasants, and those liberals who were determined to preserve the Republic as a democratic state. The problem of Catalonian autonomy had complicated Spanish politics for a long time. Since the Right was opposed to such autonomy, the Left favoured it, Catalonia became a government stronghold. Both Borkenau's "Spanish Cockpit", and Peers' "The Spanish Tragedy" indicate the importance of the Catalonian problem. 1

Both writers, however, insist that the problem is peculiar to Spain, and cannot be judged apart from the culture and

traditions of Spain which are so different from those anywhere else on the continent. Both writers emphasize the complexity of the numerous forces which have determined recent Spanish history. A reasonable estimate of the Catalan problem in relation to the Spanish Civil War would seem to be that Catalan autonomy was not in any real sense a challenge to the national unity of Republican Spain, but that it was seized upon as a convenient stick to beat the liberalism of the Left. The following quotations from Peers are very much to the point.

"It is a popular but mistaken belief that the Catalan people are anxious for complete separation from the rest of Spain. The separatist party is, as a matter of fact, a very small one, and the principal cleavage between Catalonians on matters of political principle is on the question of federalism. When the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was published in the form drafted for submission to the people, and, if duly approved by them, to the Cortes of the Spanish Republic, there was no suggestion of complete separation, and the wishes of the Provisional Government, which had already been made known at Barcelona, were meticulously observed. Thus the word "Generalist" was found where one might have expected the word 'State', and the federation expressly repudiated in the Spanish Constitution was excluded also from the draft Statute. From first to last, the Statute was characterized by statesman like moderation, and this was generally recognized by people outside Catalonia who were familiar with the country's history..........

There was no doubt about the approval of the people........ The majority was in the proportion of nearly 200 voters to 1...... If votes ever show anything, these votes showed beyond a doubt that Catalonia was as nearly as
"possible unanimous in support, not merely of a vague ideal of autonomy, but of a clearly defined document of which the terms were known to all."

Mr. Peers goes on to point out that as soon as the Catalan Statute was on the way to the Cortes a violent reaction against it began.

"But the majority of the protesters were Conservatives who were stoutly opposed to the greater part of the Provisional Government's programme, and were, to say the least of it, lukewarm towards the Republic itself. The fact is that anti-Catalanism was an extremely convenient form of opposition to the regime and about as safe a form as it was possible to find. .........................

It was not practicable to attack the Government publicly for its ecclesiastical or agrarian policy, but it was perfectly practicable to attack a policy to which the Government was, by the Pact of San Sebastian, actually committed, but which had originated elsewhere. Further there was a magnificent slogan which sounded splendidly patriotic: 'Vote for a united Spain!' 'The dismemberment of our country' was a phrase worked by opponents of the Statute to its uttermost limit—at a safe distance, of course, from Barcelona. It was an unexceptionable proceeding, politically, to defend a united Spain, and if (it was argued) the Government could be weakened by the defeat of its regionist policy, other defeats might soon follow."  

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1. Peers, op. cit., p. 103 et seq.
Appendix B.

Extract from the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, 1921.

The present agreement is subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions, namely:

(a) That each party refrain from hostile action or undertakings against the other, and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire especially in India and in the independent State of Afghanistan.

The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent.

It is understood that the term "conducting any official propaganda" includes the giving by either party of assistance or encouragement to any propaganda conducted outside its own borders.

Extract from Press Release, United States, Department of State, November 25, 1933.

There were 3 days of conference between officials of the State Department and Mr. Litvinoff, and there were vastly more important and pivotal conversations between Mr. Litvinoff and President Roosevelt at the White House. There were no stenographers present and no reports made ............

There was an agreement touching the matter of subversive propaganda. The agreement is expressed in one of Mr. Litvinoff's notes to the President. He described it as a "fixed policy" coincident with the establishment of diplomatic relations... that his government would scrupulously respect the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction, in its own way, and would refrain from interference in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions.

Appendix C.

The United States and the League.

There is no desire in this essay to over simplify the American failure to join the League of Nations. What is intended is to show that national, rather than international interests were paramount, or at least, that national party politics decided the issue. President Wilson, by making the question of the League a political issue, sacrificed international interests on the altar of political partisanship within his own country. As an international idealist he forgot for the moment that he was also a politician. He seems to have overlooked the fact that a political opposition is always seeking power, is always looking for strategic points of attack, and is always ready to use every means available to obtain power. Both the Treaty and the League, drawn (as far as the United States was concerned) by a Democratic President, and made an issue of party politics, were legitimate targets for the shafts of the Republican Party. The League was defeated in America, not because of its weaknesses, nor because of isolationist sentiment, but because the President, an advocate of co-operation in foreign affairs, was, paradoxically, an intransigent isolationist in the matter of domestic politics. By isolating his own party from the nation he isolated the nation from Europe. He created a situation whereby repudiation at the polls of
the Democratic Party became synonymous with repudiation by
the nation of the Treaty and the League. It is probable
that the American voters who won the elections of 1920
were not voting against the League, but against the Democ-

tic Party.

That American leaders to-day realize the necessity
for co-operation in European affairs is obvious from the
attempts of President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull to quietly
lead the nation back into participation in world affairs.

President Roosevelt addressed the 3rd Session of the
76th Congress on Jan. 3 and began by drawing attention
to the connection between domestic problems and the
upheavals that were taking place in other parts of the
world. "I can understand the feelings of those who warn the nation that they will never
again consent to the sending of American youth on the
soil of Europe. But, as I remember, nobody has asked
them to consent...... I can understand the wishfulness
of those who oversimplify the situation by repeating
that all we have to do is to mind our own business and
keep the nation from war. But there is a vast difference
between keeping from war and pretending this war is
none of our business. We have not to go to war with
other nations, but at least we can strive with other nations to encourage the kind of peace that will lighten
the troubles of the world, and by so doing help our
own nation as well."...... It became clearer and
clearer that the world would be a shabby and dangerous
place to live in—even for Americans to live in—if
it was ruled by force in the hands of a few. Swiftly
moving events all over Europe had made them pause to
think in a longer view. That thinking could not be
controlled by partisanship; such labels as the Peace
Party or the Peace Bloc now belonged to every right-
thinking man, woman and child in the country. 2.

1. Schapiro, J. S., Morris, R. B., and Soward, F. H.,
Civilization in Europe and the World, Toronto, the Copp

2. " President Roosevelt's Address to Congress ", The
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