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Anglo-French relations: 1898-1914 Kelly, Eric 1937

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ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS: 1898-1914  by  Eric Kelly  A Thesis submitted i n p a r t i a l fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Arts i n the Department of History  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia October - 1937  TABLE OF COETENTS page Introduction  I-II.  Chapter I  The Departure from I s o l a t i o n  Chapter I I  The Anglo-French Entente  Chapter I I I  The T e s t i n g o f the Entente  Chapter 17  The F u r t h e r " E n c i r c l e m e n t " o f  . 1. 23. -56.  Germany?  118.  Chapter V  The A g a d i r C r i s i s , 1911  151.  Chapter VI  The Tightening- o f the Entente C o r d i a l e , 1918-1913  183.  Chapter VII  The L a s t Bays o f Peace  231.  Chapter V I I I  How B r i t a i n E n t e r e d the War  291.  Bibliography  I-XLIV.  INTRODUCTION The p e r i o d which t h i s study immediately  covers, t h a t o f the years  p r e c e d i n g the World War, i s one to which many h i s t -  o r i a n s have turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n .  The d i p l o m a t i c game o f  p o w e r - p o l i t i c s as i t was played hy governments i n these  years,  the fundamental causes o f the War, and the problem of war g u i l t have f u r n i s h e d s u b j e c t s f o r thousands o f volumes. questions which have a r i s e n probably the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a l l students  The v a r i o u s  never w i l l be s o l v e d to  o f the p e r i o d .  But as Dr. P.W.  S l o s s o n reminds u s , t h i s should o c c a s i o n no s u r p r i s e , f o r there i s q u i t e as wide a d i v e r s i t y  o f o p i n i o n over the m e r i t s o f the  wars o f Napoleon, or those o f Rome and Carthage.  Nor does  t h i s f a c t o f d i f f e r i n g o p i n i o n s imply t h a t i n v e s t i g a t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n o f the p e r i o d are o f no p r a c t i c a l v a l u e i two  important  p o i n t s have been a t t a i n e d .  At l e a s t  As a r e s u l t o f h i s t o r -  i c a l r e s e a r c h , and with the opening o f the a r c h i v e s o f b e l l i g e r ent Powers, s c h o l a r s axe i n p o s s e s s i o n o f most o f the f a c t s and w r i t t e n r e c o r d s which can c o n t r i b u t e to more d e f i n i t e Again, and more important,  verdicts.  many o f the extreme o p i n i o n s widely  h e l d d u r i n g the War, and i n the years f o l l o w i n g , have been d i s 2 c r e d i t e d and r e p l a c e d by more moderate views. H a i l e r e s e a r c h has made s c h o l a r s already aware o f most of the problems which the p e r i o d p r e s e n t s , w r i t e r s w i l l f o r a  1» S l o s s o n , P.W,, 2. I b i d . , 333.  Europe S i n c e 1870, (Boston,  1935), 332.  -II-  long time to come undoubtedly  d i f f e r over the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f c e r t a i n events and p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s , and w i l l  differently  e s t i m a t e the d i p l o m a t i c blunders which prevented a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t of the c r i s i s o f the summer of 1.91.4» a u t h o r i t i e s seem to agree, however, on t h i s one the c a t a s t r o p h e was  point—that  the i o i n t product of a number o f u n d e r l y i n g  causes,, some deeply r o o t e d i n Europe*s recent o r i g i n .  Most r e l i a b l e  past,, others of more  These are u s u a l l y f i t t e d i n t o a few g e n e r a l  c a t e g o r i e s such as n a t i o n a l i s m , i m p e r i a l i s m , m i l i t a r i s m the press;; the i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of diplomats to t h e i r  and  own  p a r l i a m e n t s or peoples; and f i n a l l y a system of s e c r e t  alli-  ances which d i v i d e d Europe i n t o two r i v a l camps. It i s the purpose  o f t h i s study to t r a c e the  signifi-  cance of the rftle o f the Anglo-French E n t e n t e i n the diplomati c background  of the War,  what e x t e n t i t was an adherent tanglements,  and more e s p e c i a l l y  to a s c e r t a i n t o  a f a c t o r i n b r i n g i n g Great B r i t a i n , so long  of the p o l i c y o f i s o l a t i o n from c o n t i n e n t a l enInto the  conflict.  I wish to acknowledge here my  profound Indebtedness  P r o f e s s o r P. H. Soward, to whom I owe my  I n t e r e s t i n modern  European h i s t o r y , and whose encouragement, suggestions and guidance have made t h i s study p o s s i b l e .  I must acknowledge  a l s o the kindness of the French Consul i n Vancouver, without whose generous o f B r i t i s h Columbia  gift  C»,  to the L i b r a r y o f the U n i v e r s i t y  of the v a l u a b l e Documents Diplomatiques  F r a n c a i s t h i s study could not have been 5  B.  undertaken.  to  CHAPTER I The Departure from I s o l a t i o n  ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS 189.8-1914. CHAPTER. I The Departure From I s o l a t i o n . There can be no i n t e l l i g e n t understanding o f the reasons f o r B r i t a i n ' s entry i n t o the World War  u n l e s s there i s a d e f i n -  i t e knowledge of the nature and development l a t i o n s as they e x i s t e d an June 28, 1914. a i n was  of, Anglo-French r e I t i s t r u e that  Brit-  engaged w i t h i n the Entente i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h R u s s i a ,  as w e l l as w i t h France,, but the Anglo-Russian rapprochement never, as popular, i n England as the A n g l o - F r e n c h , outbreak of the War,  ;  was  Down to the  England s t e a d i l y viewed w i t h d i s f a v o u r the  c h i e f aim, o f R u s s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y - the s e i z u r e of the S t r a i t s and C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .  When the War  broke out i t was  a l l y o f R u s s i a that B r i t a i n took up the swordw  not as an  S i r Edward Grey  p e r s i s t e n t l y r e f u s e d to make a d i r e c t i s s u e i n England the A u s t r o - S e r b i a n d i s p u t e which had i n v o l v e d R u s s i a so deeply w i t h Austria,  In h i s memoirs he s t a t e s ,  tt  the  notion of being i n -  v o l v e d i n a mar about a Balkan q u a r r e l was  repugnant....there 1  was no sentiment u r g i n g us to go i n t o a war- on S e r b i a ' s behalf.'* Even the c h a u v i n i s t i c Bottomley j o u r n a l , "John B u l l * , p u b l i s h e d a leading a r t i c l e  i n the l a s t days under the heading, To w  Hell  1. V i s c o u n t Grey o f F l l o d o n , . Twenty-five Tears,. (london, 19^25), I , 335. a  -21 w i t h Servia....,once more to H e l l w i t h S e r v i a . '  1  Nor. d i d E n g l a n d enter the War. primarily, because o f the i n v a s i o n o f Belgium, by Germany,- d e s p i t e the manner i n which propagandists, used t h i s b r e a c h o f n e u t r a l i t y to j u s t i f y  the  p u r i t y o f B r i t a i n ' s motives i n the eyes o f the p u b l i c .  Grey  had promised on August 2 to give Prance the p r o t e c t i o n o f the B r i t i s h f l e e t i n the event o f the German f l e e t  coming i n t o the  Channel ox through the North Sea. to undertake h o s t i l e a g a i n s t the French coast or s h i p p i n g .  action  T h i s assurance was  given  b e f o r e Germany had presented her ultimatum to Belgium, news of 2. which d i d not r e a c h london u n t i l , the morning of August  3.  Furthermore, Grey r e f u s e d the p r o p o s a l o f the German ambassador to r e s p e c t B e l g i a n t e r r i t o r y n e u t r a l i n the coming One  on c o n d i t i o n that England remain 3  struggle.  of the: main reasons why  War was because she was  B r i t a i n was drawn i n t o the  so c l o s e l y bound to France by w r i t t e n  and verba.1 promises, so bound by r e l a t i o n s h i p s which the F o r e i g n O f f i c e had c r e a t e d , t h a t Grey f e l t England must take p a r t i n any 4 war i n which French s e c u r i t y was menaced by, German a g g r e s s i o n . 1. C i t e d I n Barnes, H.E., The Genesis of the World War, (New York. -1927), 453. See S c o t t , J . F i , F i v e Weeks, (New York,, 1927), chapter IX, f o r a study o f B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n and the press, d u r i n g the c r i s i s of J u l y , 1914. 2. Grey to B e r t i e , August 2,1914; Gooch & Temperley, B r i t i s h Documents on the O r i g i n s o f the War, ( c i t e d h e r e a f t e r as B.D.), (London, 192.7), X I , No. 487,, p.274. Fay, S.B., The O r i g i n s of the World War,, (New York, 1932), I I , 540. 3. Grey to Goschen, August 1,, 1914, B.D., X I , No.448, p.261. 4. Loreburn, E a r l , How the War Came, (London,, 1919 j , 16.  D  -3In h i s memoirs Grey r e p r e s e n t s h i m s e l f as r e g a r d i n g the  obli-  g a t i o n to a i d France as r e s t i n g more upon the c o n v i c t i o n o f the 1 i n t e r e s t s of England  than upon the debt o f honour to F r a n c e .  D o u b t l e s s both f a c t o r s p l a y e d a p a r t i n h i s decision,, but he f e l t the o b l i g a t i o n to a i d France so keenly t h a t he has  con-  f e s s e d that he would have r e s i g n e d i f he had not been able to 2 b r i n g England i n t o the c o n f l i c t . "How. In  the War  E a r l Loreburn, i n h i s book,  Came , expresses England's n  p o s i t i o n i n August^ 1914,  t h i s ways When the most momentous d e c i s i o n of our- whole h i s t o r y had to be taken we were not f r e e to d e c i d e . We entered upon a war to which we had heen committed beforehand i n the dark, and Parliament found i t s e l f ; a t two hours n o t i c e unable, had i t d e s i r e d , to e x t r i c a t e us from t h i s f e a r f u l predicament. We went to war unprepared In a Hussian q u a r r e l because we were t i e d to France.3 In  the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between France and England as they  e x i s t e d In 1914 Britain's rdle  i s to be found the key to the understanding of i n the drama of July and August  of that y e a r .  The r o o t s from which these r e l a t i o n s h i p s grew reach back i n t o the y e a r s b e f o r e 1914.  I t w i l l be necessary to go back over  these y e a r s to d i s c o v e r what they were. Before the t w e n t i e t h century England's  traditional  p o l i c y had f o r c e n t u r i e s been one of " s p l e n d i d i s o l a t i o n . * •  By  m a i n t a i n i n g a c o o l detachment to c o n t i n e n t a l entanglements  she  hoped to enjoy the balance of power i n Europe between the r i v a l  1. Grey, op. c i t . , I I , 15,, 33-35. 2„ I b i d . , I,, 312. 3. Loreburn, op. c i t . , 17.  groups, and ive.  thus make her own  I t was  influence i n either scale decis-  only a t times when some one  overwhelmingly s t r o n g , or threatened  power sought to become  to endanger B r i t i s h con-  t r o l of. the Channel, or her maritime or c o l o n i a l supremacy, that England i n t e r v e n e d a c t i v e l y and 1 affairs.  T h i s was  decisively  i n European  the b a s i s f o r her p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n wars  a g a i n s t Spain i n the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a g a i n s t L o u i s XIV the seventeenth century, the e i g h t e e n t h and had r i g i d l y and  and a g a i n s t Prance and Hapoleon i n  nineteenth  centuries.  At other times  Franco-Prussian  War  forming  Germany, A u s t r i a and  she  In the years f o l l o w i n g the  s t i l l adhered to her t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y  of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e i n 1882  between  I t a l y , even though i t destroyed  to a great  e r degree than d i d the Treaty o f F r a n k f o r t the European o f power, d i d not l e a d England to depart policy.  She manifested  little  p o l i t i c a l combine e r e c t e d by A l l i a n c e f u r t h e r assured l a n d , her and  from her e s t a b l i s h e d  the I r o n C h a n c e l l o r .  Although the  invulnerable  c o l o n i a l power, was  i n no  fleet, way  b e l i e v e d h e r s e l f safe from danger, e s p e c i a l l y  s i n c e at that time Germany w,as  showing no g r e a t i n t e r e s t i n an  overseas, empire or i n the b u i l d i n g of a f l e e t . say  great  Germany o f f i r s t place i n Europe, Eng-  p r i m a r i l y a maritime and She  balance  concern a t the news o f the  i n s u l a r p o s i t i o n secured by her  frightened.  she  excluded h e r s e l f from c o n t i n e n t a l , c o m p l i c a t i o n s '  taken a p o s i t i o n of i s o l a t i o n .  The  in  Bismarck could  truthfully*  1. Headlam-Morley, James, S t u d i e s i n D i p l o m a t i c H i s t o r y , don, 1930), Chapter VI, p a r t I I , England and the Low C o u n t r i e s , 156 f f . .  (Lon-  -5As regards England we a r e i n the happy s i t u a t i o n of having no c o n f l i c t o f interests,, except comm e r c i a l r i v a l r y and p a s s i n g d i f f e r e n c e s such as must always arise;, hut there i s nothing t h a t can b r i n g about a. war between two p a c i f i c and h a r d working n a t i o n s . •"But a t the end of the n i n e t e e n t h century B r i t a i n i t necessary  found  to r e c o n s i d e r h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s to the Continent-  al. Powers,; and i n the l i g h t of new f a c t o r s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l sphere, t o r e c o n s i d e r a l s o the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s o f h e r foreign policy.  Events  sideration a necessity.  o f the p r e v i o u s years made such  recon-  By the l a s t decade o f the century  the f o r c e s o f the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n which had come f i r s t to England  had transformed  financial life  the i n d u s t r i a l , commercial, and  o f the C o n t i n e n t ,  Ho longer were the other  Great Powers content to leave B r i t i s h supremacy i n the economic field  unchallenged.  Signs began to m u l t i p l y of an imminent and  widespread r e v o l t a g a i n s t h e r h i t h e r t o unquestioned  leadership.  Since her supremacy mas h e l d to be l a r g e l y due to the "favoured p l a c e i n the sun'* which she had won f o r h e r s e l f i n so many p a r t s of  the world, the r e v o l t began to i n v o l v e a f i e r c e s t r u g g l e f o r  such  ''places i n the sun" as were s t i l l  left  open to o c c u p a t i o n .  This had f a r - r e a c h i n g e f f e c t s on B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . . Hencef o r t h the f i e l d  to be covered by diplomacy  i n the conduct o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , i n s t e a d o f being c o n f i n e d as i t had been since the Napoleonic  Wars mainly  to the Continent of Europe and  the a d j o i n i n g r e g i o n s o f A s i a , extended rapidly, to every p a r t of  the g l o b e .  1., C i t e d i n Seymour, C h a r l e s , The D i p l o m a t i c Background o f the War 1870-1914, (New Haven, 1916),, 134, f o o t n o t e .  However detached. B r i t a i n , might he from the p o l i t i c s of Europe,  the p r o t e c t i o n of her i m p e r i a l  internal interests  and t r a d e r o u t e s brought her i n t o contact and o f t e n i n t o l i s i o n w i t h the c o l o n i a l a s p i r a t i o n s of other Powers. n a t i o n a l diplomacy still  s t i l l had  i t s base i n Europe,  and  col-  Interi t was  c h i e f l y p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the maintenance o f the o l d  European e q u i l i b r i u m , but i t s outposts now  s t r e t c h e d to the  remotesta p a r t s of the e a r t h , and every e x t e n s i o n of European power beyond the seas was p o i s e of power i n Europe *  apt to r e a c t upon the d e l i c a t e e q u i Aa a r e s u l t B r i t a i n became i n v o l v e d  i n dangerous c o n t r o v e r s i e s w i t h France and E u s s i a , and w h i l e she continued f a i r l y  friendly  towards-Germany there was  some-  times i n e v i t a b l e f r i c t i o n w i t h that Power a l s o . It was  not u n t i l a f t e r the c o n c l u s i o n o f the T r i p l e  A l l i a n c e , when he became thoroughly assured o f the s a f e t y Germany's p o s i t i o n i n Europe, his  consented to g i v e  support to the demands of German i n d u s t r i a l i s t s f o r  c o l o n i a l possessions. of  that Bismarck  of  The  next few years saw  the German colony  South West A f r i c a e s t a b l i s h e d , German g a i n s i n the Cameroons,  and German advance Into B a s t A f r i c a . the German ambitions brought  I t i s t r u e that a t times  temporary  clouds over Anglo-German  r e l a t i o n s , , but g e n e r a l l y speaking f r i e n d l y settlement of d i s putes was r i e s was  c a r r i e d out.  Although p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n both  a t times aroused over the c l a s h o f i n t e r e s t s , the r e -  l a t i o n s of the two governments remained ly.  count-  almost i n v a r i a b l y  Both Gladstone and S a l i s b u r y were w e l l  B e r l i n , and  friend-  disposed.towards  i n 1890; the l a t t e r concluded the important  ment of A f r i c a n d i s p u t e s which exchanged H e l i g o l a n d f o r  settle-  7Zanzibar.  But a f t e r 1894 Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s began to l o s e  the f r i e n d l i n e s s of the days o f Bismarck and of the opening years of William, I I .  F u r t h e r d i s p u t e s over c o l o n i a l and e a s t -  ern q u e s t i o n s arose to t r y the tempers o f Downing S t r e e t the W i l h e l m s t r a s a e .  and  B r i t a i n took e x c e p t i o n to the F r a n c o -  German t r e a t y o f March 1894 which d e a l t w i t h French and German i n t e r e s t s i n the Niger and Congo r e g i o n s . took o f f e n s e a t the arrangements  Similarly  Germany  B r i t a i n concluded w i t h K i n g  Leopold of Belgium over the B a h r - e l - G h a z e l l e t e r r i t o r y Upper N i l e and over t e r r i t o r y west of Lake  of the  Tanganyika.  With France r e l a t i o n s became extremely s t r a i n e d  over  similar questions.  Under L o u i s P h i l i p p e , Napoleon  McMahon, France had  taken over A s i a t i c and A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r y  which A l g e r i a was  the most w o r t h w h i l e .  England had  I I I and  viewed  these attempts a t the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a French empire some alarm,, but her o p p o s i t i o n became s t i l l  of  with  stronger a f t e r  1880.  A f t e r 1878, French I n t e r e s t s ceased to; be merely national?; she wished  to make up f o r the d i s a s t e r s o f 1870  s i b l e by a c q u i r i n g an overseas empire.  i n so f a r as pos-  Bismarck, anxious to  t u r n her i n t e r e s t s from Europe, had encouraged gress of B e r l i n . 1883,  J u l e s Ferry,, who  her a t the Con-  became prime m i n i s t e r i n  c a r r i e d out a v i g o r o u s p o l i c y of a c q u i r i n g  possessions.  overseas  T h i s e r a of French c o l o n i a l expansion opened up  boundless v i s t a s of Anglo-French c o n t r o v e r s i e s .  In June,  L o r d Lyons wrote from F r a n c e t G e n e r a l l y speaking I am very unhappy about the growi n g i l l - w i l l between France and England which e x i s t s on both s i d e s of the Channel. I t i s not, I suppose, t h a t France has any d e l i b e r a t e i n t e n t i o n o f g o i n g to  1884,  -8war w i t h us but the two n a t i o n s come i n t o contact i n every p a r t o f the globe. In every p a r t o f I t questions a r i s e which, i n the.present s t a t e o f f e e l i n g , e x c i t e mutual s u s p i c i o n and i r r i t a t i o n . Who can say when a n d where, i n t h i s s t a t e o f things,, some l o c a l events may not produce a s e r i o u s q u a r r e l , or some high-handed proceeding o f some hot-headed o f f i c i a l s o c c a s i o n an a c t u a l collision.1 A f r i c a was the main t h e a t r e o f the s t r u g g l e , b u t d i s p u t e s p l a c e i n many other p a r t s of the w o r l d . arose  took  The t e n s i o n which  out o f the dispute over Slam i n 1893 brought the two  c o u n t r i e s t o the verge o f war. Furthermore, the weak p o s i t i o n o f B r i t a i n i n Egypt a t the end o f the century C o n t i n e n t a l Bowers. speaking  l e f t h e r open to the o p p o s i t i o n o f the  Grey p o i n t s out i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , when  o f h i s f i r s t F o r e i g n O f f i c e experiences  i n the years  1892-95", that as long as we assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the government of Egypt, the C a p i t u l a t i o n s were l i k e a noose around our neck, which any Great Power, having r i g h t s under the C a p i t u l a t i o n s could t i g h t e n a t w i l l . 2 Both Germany and France had used t h i s "noose* t o g a i n conc e s s i o n s from B r i t a i n ; ; Germany i n connection concessions  with  railway  i n Turkey, and France i n connection w i t h the Siam 3  controversy. All  the above f a c t o r s combined to r e v e a l how  was the phrase " s p l e n d i d i s o l a t i o n . "  hollow  As Grey s a y s , " i t was not  i s o l a t i o n , , and i t mas f a r from s p l e n d i d . "  Thus i s o l a t i o n i n  1. Lyons t o G r a n v i l l e , i n F i t z m a u r i c e , L o r d Edmond, L i f e o f Lord G r a n v i l l e , (London,, 1905), I I , 333. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 11. 3., r b i d . , ,  II.  4.. I b i d . , 11.  the opening h a l f o f the l a s t decade o f the century d i d not appear t o he safe or c o m f o r t a b l e .  And w i t h the p a s s i n g o f the  y e a r s which brought the century to a c l o s e the main stream o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , as i t kept changing and eddying, hecame more t u r b u l e n t f o r E n g l a n d . The Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e became an accomplished f a c t i n 1894, i n 1891. groups.  and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e had been renewed f o r s i x y e a r s Thus i n 1895 B r i t a i n found h e r s e l f o u t s i d e the  two  Furthermore, the a c t i o n s o f the Impulsive K a i s e r l e d to  a widening r i f t  i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  of 1895 he p a i d h i s annual v i s i t most r e g r e t t a b l e one.  In the summer  to Cowes, on t h i s o c c a s i o n a  He annoyed the Committee o f the R o y a l  Yacht Squadron by c r i t i c i z i n g  t h e i r handicaps.  S a l i s b u r y by s c o l d i n g him f o r being l a t e .  He annoyed L o r d  He annoyed h i s u n c l e ,  the P r i n c e o f Wales, by h i s I r r i t a t i n g f a m i l i a r i t i e s and overb e a r i n g ways.  By such undeft touches he antagonized j u s t those  c i r c l e s i n England which were p o l i t i c a l l y 1 authoritative.  and s o c i a l l y  the most  Not only, d i d the a c t i o n s o f the K a i s e r  lead  to h o s t i l i t y , , but Germany's I n t e r e s t In the T r a n s v a a l a t t h i s time f u r t h e r loosened the bonds between the two n a t i o n s and s t r a i n e d them almost to a b r e a k i n g p o i n t .  I n 1894 Germany had  shown a p r o t e c t i v e i n t e r e s t i n the T r a n s v a a l .  In 1895  this  I n t e r e s t had been confirmed and a d v e r t i s e d by a s e r i e s of h i g h ly  i n d i s c r e e t speeches between P r e s i d e n t Kruger and the German 2 consul at P r a e t o r i a . Qn January 3, 1896, the K a i s e r , though  1. N i c o l s o n , H a r o l d , L o r d Carnock,. (London,, 1930), 125. 2. Spender,, J.A.„ F i f t y Years o f Europe, (London, 1933)»  158.  -lOhe  claims i n h i s Memoirs t h a t i t was a g a i n s t h i s h e t t e r  judg-  ment and t h a t he was r e l u c t a n t l y persuaded t o agree to i t hy his to  a d v i s e r s , addressed the famous telegram  t o E r e s i d e n t Kruger 1  c o n g r a t u l a t e h i m upon the f a i l u r e o f the Jameson R a i d .  The  most profound i n d i g n a t i o n was aroused i n B r i t a i n a t t h i s a c t i o n * "The  n a t i o n w i l l , never f o r g e t t h i s telegram" wrote the "Morning 2 .. • Post." When Count H a t z f e l d t i n London wrote t o the Herman F o r e i g n O f f i c e an January 4, he reported: A l l the E n g l i s h newspapers, with the e x c e p t i o n o f the " D a i l y Mews", d e s c r i b e the message as an a c t of u n f r i e n d l i n e s s towards England, and even the "Standard"' speaks out s h a r p l y about i t . T h i s change i s . a l l the more s t r i k i n g , a s , so f a r , the whale o f the London p r e s s , w i t h h a r d l y an e x c e p t i o n , d e c i d e d l y blamed Dr. Jameson's a c t i o n . 3 On  January 21 he wrote t o t e l l H o l s t e i n o f the E n g l i s h r e a c t i o n  I n these words! I t I s not a q u e s t i o n o f annoyance on the p a r t o f the Government, but o f a deep-seated b i t t e r n e s s o f f e e l i n g among the p u b l i c , which has shown i t s e l f i n every way. I am assured t h a t when the excitement was a t i t s h e i g h t , Germans i n the C i t y c o u l d h a r d l y do any b u s i n e s s w i t h the English, In the best known l a r g e Club3, such as the T u r f , there was extreme b i t t e r n e s s j, I myself,  1. *T express my s i n c e r e c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s t h a t , supported by your people, without a p p e a l i n g f o r the help, o f f r i e n d l y Powers, you have succeeded by your own e n e r g e t i c a c t i o n a g a i n s t armed bands which invaded your country as d i s t u r b e r s o f the Peace, and have thus been enabled to r e s t o r e peace and safeguard the Independence o f the country a g a i n s t a t t a c k s from outside." (January 3, 1896). C i t e d i n Spender, op. c i t . , 160, f o o t n o t e . 2. C i t e d i n Gooch, G. P., H i s t o r y o f Modern Europe 1878-1919, (London, 1923), 220. •3. H a t z f e l d t to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , January 4, 1896, Dugdale, E . T. S., German D i p l o m a t i c Documents, 1871-1914, (London, 1930), I I , 389. 1  •lire c e i v e d many i n s u l t i n g and t h r e a t e n i n g l e t t e r s . I have no, doubt that the g e n e r a l f e e l i n g was such, t h a t , i f the Government had l o s t i t s head or had wished f o r war f o r any reason, i t would have had the whole of p u b l i c o p i n i o n behind i t " . 1 The sending o f the telegram w,as one o f the most d i s a s t r o u s e r r o r s of the K a i s e r ' s e a r l y r e i g n . folly',  1  observed S a l i s b u r y  telegram was  "The  raid  was  to E c k a r d s t e i n i n 18.99, "but the 2  even more f o o l i s h . *  And a l t h o u g h the B r i t i s h  and German governments were l a t e r to resume t h e i r f r i e n d l y , course, the r a s h a c t was  inter-  net f o r g o t t e n i n England, w h i l e the  German people were angered by the f u r y which the a c t i o n of t h e i r 3 impulsive r u l e r  provoked.  Though A f r i c a was  the source of the most acute d i f f e r -  ences between Great B r i t a i n and Germany, there were other f i e l d s i n which the p o l i c i e s of the two powers c l a s h e d .  In the Cretan  crisis  l e d to a f u r -  of 1897  the support Germany gave to Turkey  ther estrangement w i t h England.  That same year she s e i z e d K i a o -  chair i n the Shantung p e n i n s u l a , and the K a i s e r ' s speech i n conn e c t i o n w i t h that s e i z u r e and h i s r e f e r e n c e to the "mailed f i s t " added to> the i l l - f e e l i n g .  I t was  d u r i n g these years a l s o  that  Germany began her n a v a l programme which was  to arouse  such grave f e a r s In E n g l a n d .  Admiral T i r p i t z  In June, 1897,  later was  1. H a t z f e l d t to H o l s t e i n , January 21, 1896, Bugdale, op. c i t . , , I I , 403-04. 2. Eckardstein,,. Baron von, Ten Years a t the Court o f S t . James, (London, 1921), 85. 3. "The outbreak of h a t r e d , envy and rage which the Kruger telegram l e t loose In England a g a i n s t Germany c o n t r i b u t e d more than a n y t h i n g e l s e to open the eyes of l a r g e s e c t i o n s of the German people to an economic p o s i t i o n and the n e c e s s i t y f o r a f l e e t . " A d m i r a l T i r p i t z i n h i s Memoirs, c i t e d i n Spender, op. c i t . , 162.  12appainted year he  c h i e f of. the German Admiralty;, i n November of t h a t  i n t r o d u c e d the f i r s t navy b i l l which c r e a t e d the H i g h  Seas F l e e t . Meanwhile r e l a t i o n s w i t h France were even more unfriendly.  The French s e i z u r e of T u n i s , the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of  B i s e r t a , the c o n v i c t settlement i n New. C a l e d o n i a , the occupat i o n of the New  Hebrides,  the r i v a l r y  i n Nigeria,, the c o e r c i o n  i n Slam, the e x c l u s i o n o f B r i t i s h trade from Madagascar, the q u e s t i o n of the Newfoundland f i s h e r i e s , the B r i t i s h o f Dongola, and above a l l ,  the. B r i t i s h o c c u p a t i o n of E g y p t — a l l  these thorny problems were c o n t i n u a l l y ; p r i c k i n g the diplomats  occupation  the f i n g e r s of  i n Downing S t r e e t and the ^.uai d'Orsay, and  caus-  i n g a n x i e t y to the f r i e n d s of peace on both s i d e s o f the Channel. The  t e n s i o n between the two governments and  peoples  reached a b r e a k i n g - p o i n t over the Fashoda I n c i d e n t i n the Upper N i l e i n 18,98. to war,  Because I t brought the two  n a t i o n s so very c l o s e  and yet marked a t u r n i n g - p o i n t i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , i t  might be d i s c u s s e d In some d e t a i l . o f the E g y p t i a n Sudan and  E v e r s i n c e the e v a c u a t i o n  the t r a g i c death o f Gordon i n  -  1885,  England had been a w a i t i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y to r e t r i e v e t h a t area., Xh 1896  an e x p e d i t i o n f o r i t s recovery was  Kitchener.  sent out under  The b e l i e f t h a t c o n t r o l of the Sudan was  to the s t a b i l i t y  o f the B r i t i s h regime i n Egypt,  essential  combined w i t h  the f e a r of French expansion i n c e n t r a l A f r i c a , had f o r c e d the 1 , government to a c t i o n . But B r i t i s h c o n t r o l of the a r e a was not  1. G i f f e n , E. B», Fashoda, (Chicago, 1930), 27-29  -13to be uncontested, f o r a simultaneous attempt per N i l e was b e i n g made by the French.  to r e a c h the Up-  C a p t a i n Marchand had  crossed A f r i c a from west to e a s t w i t h a s m a l l e x p e d i t i o n and succeeded  i n r e a c h i n g the Upper waters o f the N i l e i n J u l y .  When K i t c h e n e r , a f t e r d e f e a t i n g the Mahdi a t Omdurman, advanced f u r t h e r up the r i v e r , and a r r i v e d a t Fashoda, he found the f o r t f l y i n g the French f l a g and occupied by Marchand and h i s s m a l l force.  N e i t h e r o f the two f o r c e s would r e t i r e ; they n e i t h e r  fought nor gave way; they l e f t the s t r u g g l e to be fought out between London and P a r i s . The d i p l o m a t i c t e n s i o n which r e s u l t e d from t h i s was  acute i n the extreme.  crisis  There seemed to be no p o s s i b l e com-  promise between the c l a i m s o f the two powers.  Such a c l a s h over  the Sudan had been f o r e s e e n by the statesmen o f both lands some years b e f o r e .  S i r Edward Grey, when h o l d i n g the post o f Under-  S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s under Lord Rosebery, on being questioned i n the House o f Commons on March 28, 1905, about the rumoured advance o f the French upon the N i l e , had d e c l a r e d that a French advance i n t o the N i l e V a l l e y "would be an u n f r i e n d l y 1 act and would be so viewed by England." was  T h i s u n e q u i v o c a l stand  endorsed by the succeeding S a l i s b u r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Grey d e c l a r a t i o n had aroused anger and resentment  The  i n the French  F o r e i g n O f f i c e - i t was warning France o f f a v a s t d i s t r i c t which belonged not to Great B r i t a i n , but to the S u l t a n o f Turkey, and i t was accompanying a B r i t i s h c l a i m by what amounted to 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I , 20.  1 a t h r e a t of war.., The  a row  day  after, the d e c l a r a t i o n , as Grey says, "there was 2 In P a r i s " , and i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s which f o l l o w e d , the  French government p o l i t e l y hut f i r m l y r e f u s e d to recognize new  "Monroe D o c t r i n e " i n the K i l e V a l l e y .  t h e i r way first  served."  Thus, the purpose of the Marchand e x p e d i t i o n  of the Upper K i l e was  i n east and west A f r i c a hy c o n t r o l  i n d i r e c t c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f the Grey d e c l a r -  Though France had ,  d e c l i n e d to admit the v a l i d i t y of the  4  pronouncement of. Greyi  she was  w e l l aware that she would have  to r e c k o n w i t h the consequences o f i g n o r i n g I t s v e t o .  When the  meeting of K i t c h e n e r and Marchand took p l a c e a t Fashoda In a g r e a t e r Issue was r a l A f r i c a alone.  i n the Far E a s t and  1898,  at stake than the c l a s h o f i n t e r e s t s In CentThe  danger wa-s  f e a r e d B r i t i s h ambitions  a l l the g r e a t e r because France  i n Morocco which a d j o i n e d A l g e r i a , w h i l e  i n many p a r t s of the world French and  r i v a l r y had been becoming p a r t i c u l a r l y acute d u r i n g the 1,  on  i n e q u a t o r i a l A f r i c a with the watchword " f i r s t come, 3  to l i n k up. French possessions  ation.  They proceeded  this  British  years  In h i s Memoirs, Grey s t a t e s the B r i t i s h c l a i m i n the f o l l o w ing words, "The Soudan was s t i l l i n hands o f the K h a l i f a . The c l a i m o f Egypt to i t , however had never been abandoned, though s i n c e the overthrow o f E g y p t i a n r u l e by the Mahdi i n 1886, i t was c l e a r that the Soudan would never he reconquered "by Egypt again, without B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e , nor would the Soudanese a g a i n t o l e r a t e the p u r e l y E g y p t i a n r u l e a g a i n s t which they had r e v o l t e d . I t was, a t any r a t e , e v i d e n t t h a t no other power except E g y p t , o r someone a c t i n g on b e h a l f of Egypt had any claim'whatever to the Soudan and the K i l e V a l l e y . " Grey, op. c i t . , I, 19. 2. I b i d . , 20. 3., Gooch, op. c i t . , 277; D i p l o m a t i c u s , Fashoda and l o r d S a l i s bury's V i n d i c a t i o n , F o r t n i g h t l y Review, LXIV, new s e r i e s , December, 1898. 4., Monson to S a l i s b u r y , September 18, 1898, B.D., I , No. 191, p.165  -laimmediate l y p r e c e d i n g *  Per a time i t seemed h i g h l y  probable  t h a t the whole q u e s t i o n o f French and B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a n t a g onism, and n a t i o n a l b i t t e r n e s s would be s e t t l e d by the  sword.  A d i p l o m a t i c c o n t e s t began between the governments, while  the press and  and more excited..  p u b l i c o p i n i o n In both c o u n t r i e s grew more B r i t a i n would admit the c l a i m o f no  n a t i o n to the Mile V a l l e y t, she had  only one  other  t h i n g to say -  the  French must withdraw.  On the other hand France d i d not admit  the B r i t i s h claim;; and  i t needed l i t t l e  the P a r i s press to convince  e f f o r t on the p a r t o f  the n a t i o n t h a t the r i g h t s and  honour o f France had- been outraged.  The  s i t u a t i o n d i d not  of compromise;- one  s i d e or the other had  hung on, a t h r e a d .  Lord Rosebery i n an address at Epsom s t a t e d  t h a t the: q u e s t i o n was  to g i v e way*  admit  of supreme g r a v i t y .  Peace  He s a i d ,  I hope t h i s Incident w i l l be p a c i f i c a l l y s e t t l e d , but i t must be understood t h a t there can be no compromise of the r i g h t s of E g y p t , Great B r i t a i n ha.3 been t r e a t e d too much as a n e g l i g i b l e q u a n t i t y i n r e c e n t y e a r s . L e t other n a t i o n s remember t h a t c o r d i a l i t y can only r e s t on mutual r e s p e c t f o r each other's r i g h t s , each other's t e r r i t o r i e s , and each other's flag." 1  An e q u a l l y strong sentiment was  expressed  by Hicks-Beach, the  C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer, i n a speech at Tynemouths I t would be a g r e a t calamity t h a t a f t e r a peace o f e i g h t y y e a r s , d u r i n g which I had hoped t h a t u n f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g had p r a c t i c a l l y disappeared, those f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s should be d i s t u r b e d . But there are worse e v i l s than war, and we s h a l l not s h r i n k from anything that may come,2  I , C i t e d i n Gooch, op. c i t , , 2.. I b i d . , 293,  293  Such-ominous utterances r e v e a l the dangerous temper which the i n c i d e n t had French Mediterranean  evoked.  f l e e t was  During  the n e g o t i a t i o n s the  ordered to Cherbourg, and  at  dead of n i g h t , with l i g h t s e x t i n g u i s h e d , passed G i b r a l t a r . u.nperceived  by B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s .  The mayors o f the Channel  p o r t s were i n s t r u c t e d to r e q u i s i t i o n the churches f o r h o s p i t a l work, and  r e p o r t on the beds and ambulance a v a i l a b l e to, f i t  them f o r immediate service., A hundred m i l l i o n f r a n c s were spent i n a few days i n p r o v i d i n g Cherbourg as a n a v a l base w i t h necessary  ammunition and s t o r e s .  the commanding o f f i c e r s  1  the  Orders t o march were i n a l l  hands,: and  e v e r y t h i n g was  i n readiness  f o r m o b i l i z a t i o n , i f the French Government should be confronted 1 w i t h an ultimatum., E n g l i s h merchants i n P a r i s h e l d new orders i n suspense, and s t a n d i n g orders were not executed.. was  almost at a s t a n d s t i l l f o r a few  Business 2  days i n September.  In  B r i t a i n , , t o o , there was  a flurry  Mediterranean  sent to A l e x a n d r i a and P o r t S a i d to  f l e e t was  of w a r l i k e p r e p a r a t i o n .  p r o t e c t the Suez Canal and negative any  i d e a o f a French  The  land3  ing i n E g y p t , and  at Portsmouth t h e r e was  a ferment of a c t i v i t y .  In v a i n the French p r o t e s t e d the s u p e r i o r claims of the B r i t i s h .  T h e i r case was  that the country  based p r i n c i p a l l y on the  fact  b o r d e r i n g on the White K i l e , though i t waa  f o r m e r l y under the government of E g y p t , had become "res n u l l i u s " by  i t s abandonment on the p a r t o f the E g y p t i a n government}; and  1. B a r c l a y , S i r Thomas, T h i r t y Tears Anglo-French Reminiscences, (London, 1914), 145.-46. 2., G i f f e n , op. c i t , , 67. 3., B a r c l a y , op. c i t , , , 146.  -17that the French had  a r i g h t to p o s i t i o n on the N i l e as much  as the Germans or the B e l g i a n s . that the. French government, hy when the s u b j e c t was  Furthermore, i t was the r e s e r v e s  maintained.  which they had made  mentioned i n p r e v i o u s y e a r s , had  retained  f o r themselves the r i g h t to occupy the banks of the K i l e when 1 they saw. f i t . In s p i t e o f French p r o t e s t s S a l i s b u r y and government made i t c l e a r t h a t there French surrender but  the  British  could be no a l t e r n a t i v e to  war..  The French m i n i s t e r f i n a l l y y i e l d e d . Gn November 4, Baron de Courcel informed S a l i s b u r y that Fashoda would be evac2 uated,. not  and  on December 11 Marchand l e f t h i s p o s t .  i n a p o s i t i o n to r i s k a war  - her f l e e t was  might e a s i l y have taken the whole of her  France  weak and  was  Britain  c o l o n i a l empire.  Fur-  thermore, R u s s i a had shown h e r s e l f u n w i l l i n g to support her a l l y ' s p o l i c y i f i t i n v o l v e d war w i t h B r i t a i n , which f a c t was a dash t o 3 French hopes. Then t o o , i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t to q u a r r e l w i t h B r i t a i n was any  to play  i n t o the hands of Germany, and  chances of u l t i m a t e l y r e c o v e r i n g  to  destroy  the Rhine p r o v i n c e s .  As  Delcasse' t o l d the French Chamber, a c o n f l i c t would have i n sr  4 volved  s a c r i f i c e s disproportionate  to the object.'•'  within  f o l l o w i n g months n e g o t i a t i o n s  were c a r r i e d on between the  governments to determine the  l i m i t s o f zones of i n f l u e n c e  1., 2. 3. 4.  the  two in  S a l i s b u r y to: Monson, Oct. 6, 1898, B.D-, I, No. 203,, p.173. S a l i s b u r y to Monson, Nov. 4, 1898., i b i d . , No. 227, p. 188. G i f f e n , op. c i t . , 163. I b i d . , 101 f f . . Charmes, F r a n c i s , Chronique de l a Ojjinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, November 14, 1898.  -lathe K i l e t e r r i t o r i e s .  As a r e s u l t of these n e g o t i a t i o n s , by an  agreement of March 21, 1899, a l i n e was where the French—Congolese  l a i d out from a p o i n t  boundary meets the Nile-Conga matero  shed, northward along the c r e s t of t h a t watershed Latitude;; thence i t was  to 11  North  to f o l l o w i n g e n e r a l the o l d boundary  of 1802 between Wadai and D a r f u r .  The F r e n c h Government promised  to. a c q u i r e n e i t h e r t e r r i t o r y nor p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e e a s t of that l i n e ; and the B r i t i s h government promised t o a c q u i r e n e i t h e r 1 t e r r i t o r y nor p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e west of i t . very d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n was extreme, b i t t e r n e s s waa  finally  settled.  In t h i s way  the  But a l e g a c y o f  l e f t on each s i d e of the Channel, and  Fashoda f u r n i s h e d one more evidence and warning  t h a t the p e r -  s i s t e n c e o f i l l - w i l l between B r i t a i n and France would l e a d t o I n d e f i n i t e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of provoking i n c i d e n t s , and i n the 2 l o n g run to war.  "  The B r i t i s h v i c t o r y i n the Fashoda c r i s i s d i d not t e n d to a m e l i o r a t e r e l a t i o n s w i t h France. smarted  The l a t t e r very n a t u r a l l y  under d e f e a t , w h i l e her b i t t e r f e e l i n g s were i n t e n s i f i e d 3  by the anger aroused i n England over the Dreyfus a f f a i r .  In  France f e e l i n g s of j e a l o u s y and h a t r e d were c o n s t a n t l y m a n i f e s t ed % the French j o u r n a l s r a i l e d a n g r i l y a t Great B r i t a i n , and the a t t a c k s sometimes degenerated  i n t o p u r p o s e l e s s s c u r r i l i t y , going  so far- as t o c a r i c a t u r e Qjueen V i c t o r i a , j1»o u r P a r ic si t exclaimed, "we G nl af lf se n ,of op. . , 90. 2. Grey, op» c i t . , I , 41. 3. B a r c l a y , a.p> c i t . , 162.  ©ne of the l e a d i n g  o f f e r e d L o r d S a l i s b u r y Fashoda  -19and our friendship,, and he r e p l i e d that he only wanted  1 Fashoda."'  In such a manner i l l - w i l l and anger, were aroused on each s i d e o f the C h a n n e l — e v e r y  o l d i n c i d e n t w,as raked up i n order to f a n the  flame of i r r i t a t i o n , every d i f f e r e n c e exaggerated It happened, moreover, t h a t e a r l y  t o the utmost.  i n 18.99, and j u s t he-  f o r e the s e t t l e m e n t o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o l l o w i n g the e v a c u a t i o n of Fashoda,  there broke out another c o n t r o v e r s i a l s q u a l l between  the two powers.  T h i s d i s p u t e , which was almost the Fashoda i n -  c i d e n t over a g a i n i n m i n i a t u r e , was brought about by a c o n c e s s i o n which France: gained from the S u l t a n o f Muscat for. a c o a l i n g s t a t i o n on t h e E e r s i a n G u l f . lic  When, the arrangement was made pub-  i n February, 1899, t h r e e B r i t i s h warships a r r i v e d on the  scene to prevent the f u l f i l l i n g o f the c o n c e s s i o n and the h o i s t i n g o f the French f l a g .  Under the t h r e a t of bombardment the  S u l t a n withdrew h i s c o n c e s s i o n to the F r e n c h , and the French had no recourse but v a i n p r o t e s t . attempted  Thus, once a g a i n , France had  to d i s p u t e a B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i a l monopoly, and a g a i n  her- c l a i m s had been met by the s o l i d f a c t o f B r i t i s h predominance. Thus a t the end of the century r e l a t i o n s , between Great B r i t a i n and France c o u l d h a r d l y have been worse, s h o r t o f an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t o f war.  "In England, France continued to be r e -  garded as the n a t i o n a l enemy,, and the n i n e t e e n t h century c l o s e d w i t h Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s s t r a i n e d to the l i m i t , and w i t h the hope o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n apparently excluded from the realm o f 3 possibility." The f u t u r e was o f course h i d d e n from both  1. Anon.,, ""France, R u s s i a , and the Mile," Contemporary Review, December,.. 1898, 761. 2. G i f f e n , op. c i t . , 187. 3. Seymour, op. c i t . , 122.  -20peoples, and probably both, would have been i n c r e d u l o u s over the i d e a of an entente w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s ,  Yet from these unpromis-  i n g I n c i d e n t s of 18.99 Prance and Great B r i t a i n were t o advance steadily  toward the convention o f 1904. The. dangerous t e n s i o n which had been d e v e l o p i n g over the  p e r i o d o f y e a r s between Great B r i t a i n and the members o f the Dual A l l i a n c e out o f competing i n t e r e s t s in. A s i a and A f r i c a , and which had culminated  i n the i n c i d e n t s o f P o r t A r t h u r and Fashoda,  now gave a new d i r e c t i o n t o B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y ,  Nor, i n the  l i g h t o f events o f the p a s t few y e a r s , were r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h Germany, a t a l l r e a s s u r i n g . , As e a r l y as A p r i l , 1 8 9 8 , the f o l l o w i n g words  appeared  i n "The Contemporary Review" to express the w r i t e r ' s views on 2  the f a i l u r e  of E n g l i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y t  We have not the g o o d w i l l o f France and R u s s i a , n o r the a l l i a n c e of any other powers, nor y e t the degree o f s t r e n g t h i n i s o l a t i o n which would enable the government t o v i n d i c a t e our r i g h t s a g a i n s t any combination,.,.from whatever p o i n t o f view t h e r e f o r e we c o n s i d e r the f o r e i g n p o l i c y , o f the p r e s e n t government we f i n d t h a t i s u n r e a l i n i t s s u p p o s i t i o n s , r u i n o u s i n i t s r e s u l t s , and absolutely, unworthy o f the r e s p e c t and confidence o f those who put the I n t e r e s t s o f the n a t i o n above the c o n s i d erations of party.1 Another  w r i t e r In the same review  s t a t e s , "the present  n a t i o n a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s cannot w e l l pass o f f without 2 h a v i n g to make a momentous d e c i s i o n . " ' I f , however, there was. any f a i t h l e f t  inter-  England  i n the h e a r t s of  1. Anon,., The F a i l u r e o f Our F o r e i g n P o l i c y , The Contemporary Review, A p r i l , 1898, 464-67. 2. Anon., The Arch-Enemy o f E n g l a n d , The Contemporary Iivlew, December, 1898, 90.8,.  the people or t h e i r r u l e r s i n the myth of the splendour o f i s o l a t i o n , t h i s f a i t h was r u d e l y d i s p e l l e d w i t h the outbreak of  the Boer War.  In the words o f H a r o l d N i c o l s o n ,  On October 11, 18.99, Great B r i t a i n d e c l a r e d war.upon the T r a n s v a a l * I t was only then that the f u l l e f f e c t s o f L o r d S a l i s b u r y ' s p o l i c y o f i s o l a t i o n c o u l d be guaged. Great B r i t a i n woke up infamous.. B r i t i s h o p i n i o n was shocked t o d i s c o v e r o v e r - n i g h t how much we were d i s l i k e d . 1 During the War. a wave of a n t i - B r i t i s h f e e l i n g swept over the c o n t i n e n t i p r e s s campaigns o f the utmost v i r u l e n c e were d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t B r i t a i n i n almost every c o u n t r y .  This  was t r u e o f Prance e s p e c i a l l y , and when Kruger f l e d from h i s own c o u n t r y he was most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y r e c e i v e d a t M a r s e i l l e s and  Paris. The i s o l a t e d p o s i t i o n o f t h e i r country i n a world wear-  ing  so h a r s h a f a c e began now to impress i t s e l f on the minds o f  B r i t i s h statesmen.  In view o f the f a c t that B r i t a i n had been  c l a s h i n g w i t h every Great Power i n every p a r t o;f the g l o b e , they began t o r e a l i z e t h a t there was n o t h i n g o f r e a l splendour in  i s o l a t i o n ; , they began t o doubt  i f i t was s a f e , to f e e l  a c o n t i n u a t i o n of such a p o l i c y might  that  prove embarrassing and  expensive, to q u e s t i o n i f c o u l d be longer m a i n t a i n e d .  The only  escape from the d i s c o m f o r t s o f i s o l a t i o n was a p o l i c y o f mak2 ing  friends.  And i n choosing f r i e n d s a choice had to be made  between the Dual A l l i a n c e and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e .  It is i n -  t e r e s t i n g to note that the path l e a d i n g from i s o l a t i o n chosen was not the path that was e v e n t u a l l y  first  pursued.  1. N i c o l s o n , op. c i t . , 128. 2. Hammond, J . L . , C. P. S c o t t o f the Manchester (london, 1934) , .135..  Guardian,  -22The  s t o r y o.f England's f o r e i g n p o l i c y from t h i s  date  onward i s t h a t o f the e f f o r t to f i n d s e c u r i t y i n the face o f new world c o n d i t i o n s .  The r o l e most c o n g e n i a l t o h e r , and most  i n keeping w i t h h e r past t r a d i t i o n s was t h a t o f r e f r a i n i n g from c o n t i n e n t a l entanglements.  But i t was now r e a l i z e d that she  was no longer f r e e to play t h a t r o l e .  The i d e a p e r s i s t e d i n  England  that Prance and R u s s i a were s t i l l the t r a d i t i o n a l  rivals,  i f not enemies, as they had heen a l l . through the n i n e -  t e e n t h century.  Thus i t was t h a t B r i t i s h p r e f e r e n c e f o r an  a l l y , i f an a l l i a n c e became necessary, was f o r Germany.  How-  e v e r , i n s p i t e o f t h i s f i r s t p r e f e r e n c e , events were to a r i s e which decided and Impelled B r i t a i n to make common cause w i t h her t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s and supposed enemies a g a i n s t Germany.  £t  the very moment when r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and  Prance and R u s s i a were most s t r a i n e d *  B r i t i s h p o l i c y went  through an e x t r a o r d i n a r y t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , and as a r e s u l t o f t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e v o l u t i o n d u r i n g the f i r s t years o f the t w e n t i e t h century a t o t a l l y f o r e i g n policy.. brought England foe,  new d i r e c t i o n was g i v e n t o B r i t i s h  The c h a r a c t e r and scope o f t h a t change, which to conclude  conventions  with the implacable  France, after- seeking the a f f e c t i o n s o f Germany, forma the  s u b j e c t o f the chapter which f o l l o w s .  CHAPTER I I The Anglo-French Entente  CHAPTER  II  The Angla.-Erench E n t e n t e . Having determined to abandon the p o l i c y o f a l o o f n e s s from c o n t i n e n t a l a f f a i r s , t h e f i r s t men  o f an a l l y was  Germany.  choice o f the B r i t i s h  The Kruger telegram was  states-  neither  f o r g o t t e n nor f o r g i v e n i n England, but there had been no f u r t h e r attempt  to i n t e r f e r e i n South A f r i c a .  Moreover, the support by  the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e during the reconquest o f the Sudan, and the K a i s e r ' s telegram o f c o n g r a t u l a t i o n on the B r i t i s h v i c t o r y o f Atbara had proven most welcome at a time when Prance and R u s s i a were p r o v i n g most h o s t i l e .  During the Boer War,  while public  o p i n i o n and the press i n Germany were undoubtedly most h o s t i l e to B r i t a i n , the German government took a stand o f n e u t r a l i t y and d e c l i n e d ' t o j o i n R u s s i a and Prance i n a p l a n o f i n t e r v e n t i o n on b e h a l f o f the Boers. Nor was new  the i d e a o f an a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany a l t o g e t h e r  a t t h i s time.  During Bismarck's day v a r i o u s attempts at  such an a l l i a n c e had been p r o s e c u t e d from time to t i m e , but 1 these had come to n o t h i n g .  And a g a i n , as e a r l y as 1898 Mr. .  Joseph Chamberlain had opened p r i v a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h a s i m i l a r purpose i n view w i t h E c k a r d s t e i n , o f the German embassy  1. Cambridge H i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 1923), H I , 144-47.  (Cambridge,  -24 In London, and Count H a t z f e l d t , the German ambassador.  Meetings  were h e l d at the home o f A l f r e d R o t h s c h i l d or o f E c k a r d s t e i n two, or  three times a week where p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f an a l l i a n c e were 1  discussed. Count H a t z f e l d t informed Bulow o f these p r i v a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Chamberlain i n a d i s p a t c h on March 29, 189,8, 3 l a t t e r r e p l i e d on March 30,. for  In h i s r e p l y he thanked  and the  Chamberlain  h i s o f f e r s but p o i n t e d out what he c o n s i d e r e d to be the draw-  backs to a. German a l l i a n c e w i t h E n g l a n d .  He f e l t  that England  wished the support o f Germany so as to become s t r o n g e r than her r i v a l s , and thus remove her from f e a r of a t t a c k , but he  was  a f r a i d that i f Germany should be a t t a c k e d , she could not count on E n g l i s h support.  Moreover, he expressed a doubt t h a t i f the  B r i t i s h government made an a l l i a n c e I t would not be maintained i f that government went out o f power -  he spoke of the E n g l i s h  Parliamentary system as a back door by which England c o u l d e s cape from f u l f i l l i n g her t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s .  He  c o n s i d e r e d the  r i s k s f o r Germany i n such an a l l i a n c e too g r e a t and thus o f f e r e d to  Chamberlain's p r o p o s a l s a p o l i t e In  refusal.  s p i t e o f the f a i l u r e o f these n e g o t i a t i o n s to b r i n g  m a t e r i a l r e s u l t s , Chamberlain,; H a t z f e l d t , and E c k a r d s t e i n cont i n u e d to work f o r good understanding between the two  countries,  1. J . L... G a r v i n i n h i s " L i f e o f Joseph Chamberlain," emphasizes the f a c t that the i n i t i a t i v e came from the German s i d e . G a r v i n , J . L,,, L i f e o f Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1934), III,, 225:. 2. H a t z f e l d t to the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , March 29, 1898, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I I , 21-23. 3. Billow to H a t z f e l d t , March 30, 18,98, i b i d . , 23-24. G a r v i n , op. c i t . , , I l l , 261-62.  1 t r y i n g to b r i n g about agreements i n l e s s e r m a t t e r s .  On h i s  s i d e Chamberlain continued t o hope f o r an a l l i a n c e and took the o p p o r t u n i t y 2 that  i n speeches^ to educate p u b l i c o p i n i o n  line. In s p i t e . o f Germany's f a i l u r e  o f f e r s made i n 18.9.8., new. o v e r t u r e s in  along  1899..  Yftndsor.  to take advantage o f the  f o r the a l l i a n c e were made  In November o f that year the K a i s e r p a i d a v i s i t to H i s v i s i t was a complete  success, and a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  between the c o u r t s a f t e r the e f f e c t s of the Kruger telegram was brought about.  But the v i s i t meant more than t h i s .  accompanied the K a i s e r ,  Billow had  and Chamberlain,in c o n v e r s a t i o n  with the  two, s e i z e d the o p p o r t u n i t y to d i s c u s s w i t h them the matter o f ~ 3 an a l l i a n c e . In these conversations he seems to have gained 4 the impression that they were f a v o u r a b l e to the i d e a . Then on November 30 he d e l i v e r e d a glowing speech a t L e i c e s t e r I n which he s t a t e d t There i s something that every f a r s e e i n g E n g l i s h statesman must have long d e s i r e d , and that i s that we should n o t remain permanently I s o l a t e d on the continent o f Europe, and I t h i n k that the moment that a s p i r a t i o n was formed i t must have appeared evident to everybody that the n a t u r a l a l l i a n c e i s between o u r s e l v e s and the Great German Empire.5 Chamberlain's speech aroused a storm of p r o t e s t i n Germany. German o p i n i o n a t t h i s time was d e c i d e d l y  1. 2. 3. 4.  pro-Boer  Garvin, op. c i t . , . I l l , 267 ££. H i s speech a t Birmingham, May 13, 1898j ibid.,, 282-83. I b i d . , 498-506.. Chamberlain's l e t t e r to E c k a r d s t e i n ; E c k a r d s t e i n , op. c i t . , 130; G a r v i n , op. c i t . , I l l , 506, 510, 512, 514. 5. G a r v i n , op. c i t , , I I I , 506-08,  -2.6and a n t i - B r i t i s h , and  the press denounced the i d e a of an asso1  c i a t i o n with B r i t a i n .  In view of t h i s h o s t i l e p u b l i c o p i n i o n ,  Bulow d i d not have the courage, when speaking i n on December 11,  the  Reichstag  Chamberlain's L e i c e s t e r 2 . speech. Instead, he poured c o l d water on the p r o p o s a l . This was accepted as a rude r e b u f f i n England, and Chamberlain n a t u r 3 a l l y deeply  to take up s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y  resented  such treatment.  Thus once more the e f -  f o r t s of the B r i t i s h statesmen were wrecked by of Bulow and  the  determination  the Emperor to c l i n g to t h e i r p r i n c i p l e o f a f r e e  hand.. I t was, a crossroads, early  however, i n 1901  and  c i d e d the separate  was  c o u n t r i e s reached  the f a i l u r e of the n e g o t i a t i o n s which opened  In t h a t year and  In the years  t h a t the two  continued  u n t i l December d e f i n i t e d l y  paths that the two  ahead.  de-  c o u n t r i e s were to f o l l o w  In the middle of January, Baron E c k a r d s t e i n  v i s i t i n g at the home of the Duke of Devonshire a t Chatsworth  when Chamberlain was  present.  During t h i s v i s i t  the Duke,  Chamberlain, and E c k a r d s t e i n d i s c u s s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l questions and  the f u t u r e of Anglo—German r e l a t i o n s .  a f t e r dinner definitely ment was  on January 16,  the Duke and  In a  conversation  Chamberlain  t h e i r p o s i t i o n on t h i s l a t t e r q u e s t i o n .  formulated Their state-  embodied i n a d i s p a t c h to the German C h a n c e l l o r  by  E c k a r d s t e i n a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h H a t z f e l d t , and i n a more 4 m o d i f i e d form i n one to H o l s t e i n . I t was r e p o r t e d that the 1. Garvin, op. c i t . , I l l , 508-09;- E c k a r d s t e i n , op. c i t . , 133. 2. G a r v i n , op. c i t . , , I l l , 511. 3.. L e t t e r to E c k a r d s t e i n , E c k a r d s t e i n , op. c i t . , 151. G a r v i n , op. c i t . , I l l , 512-13. 4. H a t z f e l d t to Bulow. and t o H o l s t e i n , January 18, 1901, E c k a r d s t e i n , op. c i t . , 185-187.  -27E n g l i s h l e a d e r s now r e a l i z e d that they must seek an a l l i a n c e and  t h a t the choice  l a y between the T r i p l e and Dual A l l i a n c e .  In s p i t e o f the i n c l i n a t i o n s f o r a R u s s i a n a l l i a n c e of some o f the Cabinet, for  on the p a r t  Chamberlain and h i s f r i e n d s would work  an agreement w i t h Germany.  T h i s , they expected, would be  brought about g r a d u a l l y , and as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t they suggested an arrangement r e g a r d i n g Morocco..  But should  an a l l i a n c e  with  Germany prove an i m p o s s i b i l i t y they would t u r n t o R u s s i a . In H o l s t e i n ' s r e p l y to E c k a r d s t e i n o f January 21. the former frowned upon the p o s s i b i l i t y claimed  o f a rapprochement.  He  that Germany would r u n too g r e a t a r i s k i n an a l l i a n c e  with England, and concluded that I f Germany was to stand for  sponsor  the B r i t i s h Empire she must e x t r a c t a t l e a s t an e q u i v a l e n t  p r i c e f o r h e r services..  Moreover, he d i s t r u s t e d S a l i s b u r y and 1  complained t h a t Germany had been o f t e n m i s t r e a t e d While these n e g o t i a t i o n s were being K a i s e r made a h u r r i e d v i s i t  c a r r i e d on,  t o England to be present  death bed o f Queen V i c t o r i a .  the  a t the  The warmth o f f e e l i n g he d i s p l a y e d  on t h i s v i s i t made a deep impression  on the R o y a l Family and  on the whole p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n E n g l a n d . January, 20, E c k a r d s t e i n  by him.  On h i s a r r i v a l on  t o l d him o f h i s r e c e n t  conversation  with  Chamberlain, and the K a i s e r expressed complete agreement  with  the i d e a of an a l l i a n c e .  In encouraging or d i s c o u r a g i n g  Bulow, however, had urged  caution  the p l a n , f e a r i n g t h a t eagerness  on the part of Germany might d i m i n i s h German g a i n s .  Thus, the  1. H o l s t e i n " to E c k a r d s t e i n , January 21, 1901, E c k a r d s t e i n , op. c i t . , 187.  -28K a i s e r avoided committing h i s government to any d e f i n i t e agreement w h i l e he encouraged f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . During the next few months n e g o t i a t i o n s little  progress was made.  continued, hut  Qn A p r i l 13 Lansdowne wrote the f o l -  lowing to L a s c e l l e s r e g a r d i n g  the n e g o t i a t i o n s !  I doubt whether much w i l l come o f the p r o ject. In p r i n c i p l e the idea i s good enough. But when each s i d e comes, i f ever i t does, to formulate i t s terms, we s h a l l break down; and I know l o r d S a l i s b u r y regards the scheme, w i t h to say the l e a s t , s u s p i c i o n . ^ B e r l i n i n s i s t e d on the n e c e s s i t y o f England j o i n i n g the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , and o f t r a n s f e r r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s  to V i e n n a .  London,^ however, was most u n w i l l i n g to undertake o b l i g a t i o n s towards A u s t r i a and I t a l y , and was not sure t h a t P a r l i a m e n t would s a n c t i o n  such a t r e a t y .  S a l i s b u r y from the beginning showed l i t t l e the p l a n f o r an a l l i a n c e .  Time had not changed h i s b e l i e f  I s o l a t i o n was England's wisest 29,  interest i n that  p o l i c y . . H i s memorandum o f May  i n which he c r i t i c i z e d the d r a f t o f a proposed a l l i a n c e ,  remains a c l a s s i c on the s u b j e c t o f i s o l a t i o n , and o f the s p e c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which beset a B r i t i s h government i n d e p a r t i n g 2  from  it. Negotiations,  however, d i d not e n t i r e l y  urst, the K a i s e r , i n c o n v e r s a t i o n at  lapse.  In Aug-  w i t h King Edward and L a s c e l l e s  Hbmhurg, expressed disappointment that an a l l i a n c e had not 3  been concluded. was reopened.  L a t e r , i n November and December the q u e s t i o n A memorandum o f Lansdowne's o f November 11  1. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , A p r i l 13, 19Q1. B.D., I I , No. 81, p. 63. 2. Memorandum by Salisbury,. May 29, 1901, B.D., I I , No. 86, p. 68. 3. l a s c e l l e s to Lansdowne, August 25., 1901, i b i d . , No. 90, p. 73.  -29o u t l i n e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n s t e a d of dropping formulated  of an a l l i a n c e hut  suggested  that  n e g o t i a t i o n s a g e n e r a l agreement might he 1  regarding policy  i n commercial i n t e r e s t s .  on December 19, when M e t t e r n i c h , who  Then  had r e p l a c e d H a t z f e l d t  as German ambassador, c a l l e d on Lansdowne before l e a v i n g f o r B e r l i n f o r Christmas,  the l a t t e r took the o p p o r t u n i t y  to r e f e r  to the n e g o t i a t i o n s which had been c a r r i e d on throughout year.  He "pointed out t h a t England could not j o i n the  the  Triple  A l l i a n c e , but he wished to preserve f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany,, and  suggested  a g e n e r a l commercial understanding  formulated.  M e t t e r n i c h was  sure that t h i s would not be 2  a b l e i n p l a c e of an a l l i a n c e .  be accept-  L a s c e l l e s relates a conversation  w i t h Billow on December 28 i n which he t o l d the C h a n c e l l o r of the above c o n v e r s a t i o n . i n t e r v i e w to Bulow, and views.  M e t t e r n i c h had the l a t t e r was  not yet r e p o r t e d  the  g l a d to hear Lansdowne's  He expressed the hope that the q u e s t i o n would not 3  be  dropped a l t o g e t h e r . Thus the n e g o t i a t i o n s g r a d u a l l y faded out i n p l a t i t u d inous e x p r e s s i o n s o f mutual g o o d w i l l and f r i e n d s h i p .  The  weeks were r a t h e r embittered when Mr.  Count  Chamberlain and  last  Bulow exchanged angry words about the comparative humanity o f B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s In the Boer War and the P r u s s i a n s o l d i e r s i n 4 the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n War. In t h i s manner the c u r t a i n was rung 1. Memorandum by Lansdowne, November 11, 1901, B..D», I I , No.78, pp. 76-79. 2. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , December 19, 1901, i b i d . , No. 94, pp. 80-83. 3. L a s c e l l e s to Lansdowne, January 3, 1902,ibid., No. 95, pp. 83084. 4. Lee, S i r Sidney, King Edward V I I , (London, 1927), I I , 132-33,137.  -30down on the f i n a l e f f o r t  to l i n k the f o r t u n e s of Great B r i t a i n  w i t h those of Germany.. I t was put i t ,  was  i n t h i s way  that the w i r e , as Bismarck would have  cut between London and B e r l i n , and events began to  move w i t h t r a g i c i n e v i t a b i l i t y c o u l d not be r e p a i r e d . lish offers.  towards a s i t u a t i o n i n which i t  Germany had f a i l e d  to take up the Eng-  Bulow, H o l s t e i n , and the K a i s e r had  consistently  taken the view t h a t England needed Germany as an a l l y more than Germany needed England.  The p o s s i b i l i t y , which Chamberlain had  so o f t e n tendered, that England and Russia,, or England and Prance might come to terms, was  c h a r a c t e r i z e d . a s r i d i c u l o u s , and  was  considered as a mere "bogey" used as a t h r e a t to win a German alliance.  Thus they put t h e i r terms f o r a German agreement  too  h i g h - a simple d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e would not do - England must 1 j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e - t h e i r p o l i c y was Brandenburg's  simple summihg-trp  " a l l or nothing."*  of the whole s i t u a t i o n  strikes  the c o r r e c t note w i t h a h i n t of tragedy when he says, "They had o f f e r e d us t h e i r hand and had withdrawn i t when we made the cond i t i o n s o f acceptance too onerous f o r f u l f i l m e n t . came back to us.  They never 2  They went i n s t e a d to our enemies."  These Anglo-German n e g o t i a t i o n s at the opening o f the t w e n t i e t h century which have been o u t l i n e d at some l e n g t h are important as showing perhaps the c h i e f reason why England chose an a l l i a n c e w i t h the members of the D u a l A l l i a n c e  i n 1904  and  1.907.. B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s had a©w been s a t i s f i e d that i f s e c u r i t y L. Few ton,. L o r d , Lord Lansdowne, (London, 1929), 208. 2. Brandenburg, E r i c h , Prom Bismarck to the ¥/orld War, 1927), 181.  (London,  - 31 could no l o n g e r be found i n i s o l a t i o n i t was be sought i n an a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany.  l e a s t of a l l to  The r e b u f f which  o v e r t u r e s had r e c e i v e d , the f e e l i n g s of animosity  their  engendered  by events o f the p a s t few y e a r s , along with the growing AngloGerman n a v a l r i v a l r y , were a l l determining f a c t o r s i n causing England  to c a s t her vote i n f a y o u r o f France and R u s s i a a g a i n s t  the C e n t r a l Powers. However, b e f o r e B r i t a i n took the f i r s t  step i n t h i s  move by forming the Anglo-French Entente she found h e r s e l f a f r i e n d , not i n Europe, but i n the f a r t h e s t E a s t .  The  island  o f Japan, s i n c e she had been f o r c e d to open her doors to western t r a d e , had transformed h e r s e l f i n an a s t o n i s h i n g l y short time i n t o a power of the western model, mechanized efficient.  and  In view of the unrest i n the Far East which r e s u l t e d i  from the s t a t e o f d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n which China then found h e r s e l f , and the scramble on the p a r t o f the Great Powers f o r c o n c e s s i o n s and t e r r i t o r y , L o r d Lansdowne, on succeeding L o r d S a l i s b u r y as F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r i n 1901, made i t h i s p o l i c y to p o o l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s w i t h those of Japan.  Negotiations for  an a l l i a n c e were concluded on January 30, 190S, when an agreement was  s i g n e d i n London.  L o r d Lansdowne d e s c r i b e d the agreement  as " p u r e l y a measure of p r e c a u t i o n , to be invoked should oocas1 i o n a r i s e , i n defense of Important B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . "  It  covered B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China, and Japanese i n t e r e s t s both i n China and Korea.  Only i n the event of e i t h e r p a r t y being  a t t a c k e d by more than one power d i d i t engage the o t h e r to come to i t s a s s i s t a n c e . 1. Lansdowne to MacDonald, January 30,1902,B.D.II, No.124, pp.113-114.  -32But one of the c h i e f r e s u l t s of the a l l i a n c e was  Anglo-Japanese  to show to the world that B r i t i s h i s o l a t i o n  not be so impenetrable as had been supposed.  T h i s thought  became more and.more f i x e d i n the minds of the French who  might  statesman,  saw a f u r t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y i n the growing c o o l n e s s between 1  Germany and  England.  The i d e a of any bond u n i t i n g the common d e s t i n i e s o f England and France at the opening of the new  century might  have seemed f a n t a s t i c when i t i s r e c a l l e d how  strained  r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s had been. Incident  But  well  the  the Fashoda  has been c a l l e d , and not unwisely, "the l a s t c l o u d  i n an e x p i r i n g storm."  The Convention o f March 21, 1899,  cleaned the s l a t e so f a r as t e r r i t o r i a l France i n C e n t r a l A f r i c a were concerned.  had  claims of B r i t a i n Not  and  o n l y that, but  the smooth manner i n which the n e g o t i a t i o n s had been c a r r i e d 9  out had brought i n t o view, i n F r e n c h minds at l e a s t , p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f understanding and harmony. the March agreement was  wider  At the time when  s i g n e d , M. P a u l Cambon, who  had  succeeded  the Baron de C o u r c e l as F r e n c h ambassador t o London, suggested to L o r d S a l i s b u r y that t h e r e were s e v e r a l o t h e r matters which might  be s e t t l e d i n an e q u a l l y f r i e n d l y s p i r i t .  Salisbury,  however, shook h i s head and s m i l e d : ^1 have the g r e a t e s t c o n f i d ence i n M. Deloasse'," he s a i d , "and a l s o i n your p r e s e n t government. and  But i n a few months time they w i l l p r o b a b l y be o v e r t u r n e d ,  t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s w i l l do e x a c t l y the c o n t r a r y .  No, we must  1. Cambon to D e l cas so', March 13,1903, Documents Diplomatiques F r a n c a i s , ( c i t e d h e r e a f t e r as D.D.F.), ( P a r i s , 1931) , 2 Se'rie, 'tome,III,No.137,p.184. e  - 33 wait a b i t . " in  1  T h i s p e r i o d o f w a i t i n g was t o l a s t u n t i l 1904, but  the i n t e r v a l many changes o f g r e a t import b e a r i n g on the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the two governments took p l a c e . In  the f i r s t  plaoe there was the widening o f the g u l f  between England and Germany i n s p i t e o f t h e attempts  to b r i n g  the two i n t o an agreement.  further  And as these two d r i f t e d  a p a r t , f o r v a r i o u s reasons warmer a i r s began to blow between England and France.  The p e r s o n a l i t i e s o f s e v e r a l new f i g u r e s ,  who a t t h i s time appeared  on the d i p l o m a t i c stage i n both c o u n t r i e s ,  were o f tremendous importance  i n determining the p o s s i b i l i t y o f  an Anglo-French r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .  So l o n g as men l i k e Hanotaux,  a d e c i d e d Anglophobe, and S a l i s b u r y , with h i s f a i t h i n i s o l a t i o n , were i n c o n t r o l of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e s , such r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was out o f the q u e s t i o n .  But w i t h t h e coming to power o f new f i g u r e s  a settlement o f d i f f i c u l t i e s might be attempted.  Deleasse's  a c c e s s i o n to power i n the French F o r e i g n O f f i c e i n 1898 may be regarded as the f i r s t  step i n the f o r m a t i o n of the E n t e n t e .  M. D e l c a s s e took over h i s o f f i c e ,  succeeding M. Hano-  taux, immediately before the Fashoda I n c i d e n t .  Thus he was too  l a t e to a v e r t that c r i s i s , o r to a l l e v i a t e immediately f e e l i n g s which r e s u l t e d .  the h a r d  But the new d i r e c t i o n which French;  f o r e i g n p o l i c y assumed under h i s guidance made Fashoda the l a s t of  the i n c i d e n t s to s e r i o u s l y endanger F r a n c o - B r i t i s h  relations.  He had entered the F o r e i g n O f f i c e with the d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y o f making f r i e n d s w i t h B r i t a i n .  On f i r s t  coming to power he had  1. Cambon i n an i n t e r v i e w i n the "Times," December 22,1920; c i t e d i n Cambridge H i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y . 111,305.  -34expressed t h i s wish  to a f r i e n d s a y i n g , " I do not wish  to l e a v e 1  t h i s p l a c e without having concluded an entente w i t h England.™ Through a l l the b i t t e r n e s s o f a n t i - B r i t i s h rancour which seethed over France d u r i n g the Fashoda c r i s i s and i n the succeeding y e a r s , and  throughout  those y e a r s when the E n g l i s h and German govern-  ments were i n c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n , M. Deleasse', who o f f i c e u n t i l 1905, to s p l e n d i d  continued i n  h e l d to h i s purpose and c a r r i e d i t through  fulfilment.  The e f f o r t s o f M. Deleasse were b r i l l i a n t l y  seconded  i n England by the ambassador he sent to London three months a f t e r h i s own a c c e s s i o n to o f f i c e . M. P a u l Cambon was  eminently f i t t e d  f o r the task of s e e k i n g the f r i e n d s h i p of a s u c c e s s f u l a n t a g o n i s t without f o r f e i t i n g any o f the d i g n i t y o f h i s own  country.  Prudent and f i r m , p e r t i n a c i o u s and adaptable, l o n g - s i g h t e d y e t t a c t f u l , and u n i t i n g charm of manner w i t h s t r e n g t h of w i l l , soon a c q u i r e d l a s t i n g p r e s t i g e i n England, and proved an ambassador f o r c a r r y i n g out the p o l i c y o f h i s c h i e f .  he  ideal  Rebuffed  by S a l i s b u r y i n h i s f i r s t o v e r t u r e s , he p e r s i s t e d i n a d v o c a t i n g S on a l l o c c a s i o n s h i s cause. On the E n g l i s h s i d e of the Channel new were coming i n t o c o n t r o l a l s o , who,  personalities  because they were l e s s bound  than t h e i r predecessors by the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s o f the B r i t i s h F o r e i g n O f f i c e , were to p l a y important r o l e B i n advancing 1. B e r a r d , V i c t o r , L a P o l i t i q u e F r a n c a i s , L a Revue de P a r i s , J u l y 1,1905,817. P o r t e r , C.W., The Career o f T h ^ o p h l l e Deloasse" ( P h i l a d e l p h i a 1936),165. S. Cambon to Deleasse', March 13,1903, D.D.F.,2 S e r i e . I I I , H0il37,p.l85. e  -35friendship with France.  In October, 1900,  up the o f f i c e o f F o r e i g n Seoretaryw  l o r d S a l i s b u r y gave  For f i f t e e n y e a r s , w i t h  the e x c e p t i o n o f one b r i e f i n t e r v a l , he had conducted f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and on the p r i n c i p l e n a t i o n a l enemy.  How  he was  that France was  British Britain*s  succeeded by L o r d Lansdowne,  who  proved a ready l i s t e n e r to the advances of Deloasse' and Cambon, and who  a f t e r 1902,  m i n i s t e r , Mr.  was  encouraged  i n t h i s by the new  prime  Balfour*  I n l i s t i n g the names of those who  prepared the  way  f o r the Entente a p l a c e o f prime Importance must be g i v e n to Edward V I I .  While h i s i n f l u e n c e on B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y  d u r i n g h i s r e i g n has been g r e a t l y over estimated on the C o n t i n e n t , and i n Germany e s p e c i a l l y , he d i d p l a y a very happy p a r t i n advancing f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Franoe.  To him must go much of the  c r e d i t f o r the s u c c e s s f u l t e r m i n a t i o n o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s whioh ended the o l d q u a r r e l s . German sympathies, was  sucoeeded  he had  Queen V i c t o r i a , who  and h e r i n a b i l i t y  was  noted f o r her  to understand the French,  i n 1901 by Edward V I I .  As the P r i n c e of Wales  t r a v e l l e d w i d e l y on the C o n t i n e n t ; he had spent much  time i n P a r i s , and on the R i v i e r a .  He spoke French w i t h p e r f e c t  ease, had formed many warm attachments  I n France, and had a  s t r o n g l i k i n g f o r the people. Ho s m a l l p a r t i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s , when these a c t u a l l y began, was  that taken by L o r d Cromer, the B r i t i s h Agent and  Consul-General i n Egypt.  Knowing from h i s l o n g e x p e r i e n c e i n  E g y p t i a n a f f a i r s the inconveniences and p o s s i b l e dangers  of  F r e n c h o p p o s i t i o n i n Egypt, he gave h i s s t r o n g e s t b a c k i n g to the proposed E n t e n t e , and was most urgent that the newly  -36a f f o r d e d o p p o r t u n i t y f o r s e t t l i n g p o i n t s o f d i f f i c u l t y should 1 not be l o s t * On J u l y 24, 1907, on the o c c a s i o n of L o r d Cromer's r e t i r e m e n t , L o r d Lansdowne s t a t e d s t a t e d i n the House of L o r d s that the Anglo-French Entente would h a r d l y have been o b t a i n a b l e i n i t s e z i i s t i n g shape but f o r L o r d Cromer's h i g h a u t h o r i t y 2 among f o r e i g n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Egypt* A w r i t e r i n "the n i n e t e e n t h Century", l o o k i n g back on the events whioh l e d to the s u c c e s s f u l t e r m i n a t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the agreement a r r i v e d a t i n 1904,,stated t r u t h f u l l y ,  "that  i t has been brought to a p r a o t i o a l i s s u e i s owing l a r g e l y to the t a c t o f our s o v e r e i g n , to the c o n c i l i a t o r y s p i r i t  of L o r d  Lansdowne, to the statesmanship o f L o r d Cromer, to the diploma t i c a b i l i t y d i s p l a y e d by M. D e l c a s a n d  by the French ambassador  3 i n London." These men  i n p o s i t i o n s of great a u t h o r i t y were not  alone i n t h e i r d e s i r e f o r an Anglo-French understanding; they were warmly supported by a host o f u n o f f i c i a l personages. commercial  i n t e r e s t s gave support to t h e i r e f f o r t s .  The  England  was France's most v a l u a b l e customer, and French p r o d u c t i o n competed o n l y to a s l i g h t degree w i t h that of England. b e l i e v e d i n commercial  I t was  c i r c l e s that Anglo-French f r i e n d s h i p  would be o f b e n e f i t t o the i n d u s t r y o f b o t h l a n d s . i n f l u e n t i a l b u s i n e s s men  After  1900  began a campaign f o r a m e l i o r a t i n g the  1. Cromer to Lansdowne, J u l y 17,1903, B.D.,11,Ho.359,pp.298301; a l s o h i s l e t t e r to Lansdowne, November 1,1903, c i t e d i n Newton, o p . c i t . , pp.283-84. 2. Lee, o p . c i t . , I I , 218. 3. B l e n n e r h a s s e t t , Rowland, England and France, The N i n e t e e n t h Century, June, 1904, 935.  -37r e l a t i o n s o f the two c o u n t r i e s .  Among these u n o f f i c i a l  ambassadors o f g o o d w i l l was Mr. .{afterwards S i r Thomas) B a r c l a y . As P r e s i d e n t o f the B r i t i s h Chamber o f Commerce i n P a r i s he was i n a p o s i t i o n to understand understanding.  the advantages o f an Anglo-French  By l o n g r e s l d e n o e i n P a r i s he had won f o r  h i m s e l f a d i s t i n c t p l a c e i n the l i f e in  o f the French c a p i t a l , and  s p i t e o f tiie soreness c r e a t e d by Fashoda, the Dreyfus  Affair,  and the Boer War, he spared no e f f o r t to e f f e c t a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between France and England.  I t o c c u r r e d to him that  the cause  would be helped i f the B r i t i s h Chambers o f Commerce were i n v i t e d to  meet i n P a r i s i n 1900.  The approval o f S a l i s b u r y and Delcasse'  was secured, and the meeting was arranged,  i t proved an encour-  a g i n g success and paved the way f o r many E n g l i s h v i s i t o r s to a t t e n d the g r e a t P a r i s E x p o s i t i o n which was h e l d i n that same year.  These v i s i t s were f o l l o w e d by d e l e g a t i o n s o f French  Chambers o f Commerce to England, and by exchanges o f v i s i t s by members o f P a r l i a m e n t and t h e i r wives. visit  Though Kruger*s  to France f o l l o w e d s h o r t l y a f t e r , and though a n t l - E n g l i s h  f e e l i n g by no means disappeared i n France, the seeds o f g o o d w i l l had been sown, and the g r o s s c a r i c a t u r e s o f Queen V i c t o r i a i n 1 the French papers  disappeared.  I t has been shown how as e a r l y as 1899 Cambon had suggested  to S a l i s b u r y  that the two governments might come to  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g on matters over which they d i f f e r e d , and how he had been t o l d to "wait a b i t " on that o c c a s i o n .  No d e c i s i v e  advance was p o s s i b l e w h i l e S a l i s b u r y was I n power and w h i l e 1. B a r c l a y , S i r Thomas, T h i r t y Years Anglo-French Reminisoenses, (London, 1914), f o r a f u l l account o f these e a r l y endeavours to sow the seeds of g o o d w i l l .  -38the Boer War on one try  was  i n progress.  Deleasse' was  moved to remark  o c c a s i o n to S i r Thomas B a r c l a y that i t was 1  hopeless  to  to c o n c i l i a t e England. The B r i t i s h Documents do not begin  n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the Entente  before May,  the s t o r y of the  1903,  but there i s a  h i n t of such n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the German Documents many months earlier.  On January 30, 190S,  Count M e t t e r n i c h , the German  ambassador i n London, r e p o r t e d to the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e that he had l e a r n e d " i n the s t r i c t e s t i o n s had been proceeding  confidence  that n e g o t i a t -  between Chamberlain and  the  French  ambassador f o r the settlement o f a l l o u t s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s 2 between France and England on c o l o n i a l questions. * 1  3  February  he wrote to inform the F o r e i g n O f f i c e that Lansdowne had  denied  to him  France  on c o l o n i a l q u e s t i o n s .  was  On  that t h e r e had been any agreement reached 3  c o r r e c t ; and  i t may  with  No doubt Lansdowne*s d e n i a l  be t r u e that he was  c o n v e r s a t i o n s whioh Chamberlain was  unaware o f t h e  h o l d i n g w i t h Cambon on  t h i s matter, f o r we have seen Chamberlain engaging i n p r i v a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s with  the German ambassador i n h i s attempts to  form an Anglo-German agreement.  But i t was  n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h France were under  soon evident that  way.  There i s another h i n t of t h i s i n an i n c i d e n t r e l a t e d by E c k a r d s t e i n i n whioh he  t e l l s o f a c o n v e r s a t i o n whioh took  p l a c e between Chamberlain and Cambon. Re t e l l s o f an o f f i c i a l 1. Bar d a y , op. c i t . , 210. 2. M e t t e r n i c h t o the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , January 30, 1908, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 171. 3. I b i d . , 172.  -39-  d i n n e r on February 8, 1902, a t Marlborough House which was attended by a l l the B r i t i s h and f o r e i g n ambassadors.  After  d i n n e r he saw Chamberlain and Cambon go o f f i n t o the b i l l i a r d room.  n  I watched  them," he r e l a t e s , "and noted that they t a l k e d  together f o r e x a c t l y twenty-eight minutes i n the most animated manner.  I could n o t o f course c a t c h what they s a i d , and o n l y 1  heard two words, 'Morocco*  and 'Egypt*."  F u r t h e r l i g h t i s thrown upon the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n by what E c k a r d s t e i n t e l l s o f a c o n v e r s a t i o n he h i m s e l f had w i t h Chamberlain immediately f o l l o w i n g t h a t the  l a t t e r had h e l d w i t h Cambon.  which  "As soon as the French Ambass-  ador had l e f t Chamberlain I entered i n t o c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h the latter.  He complained v e r y much o f the bad behaviour o f the  German p r e s s towards England and h i m s e l f .  He a l s o r e f e r r e d to  the  C h a n c e l l o r ' s speech i n the R e i c h s t a g and s a i d :  * l t i s not  the  f i r s t time t h a t Count Bulow has thrown me over i n the  R e i c h s t a g ( r e f e r r i n g to Bulow's p u b l i c r e p u d i a t i o n o f the o f f e r o f a l l i a n c e made i n Chamberlain's L e i c e s t e r sppech o f November 30, 1899).  Now I have had enough o f such treatment  and there can be no more q u e s t i o n o f an a s s o c i a t i o n between Great B r i t a i n and Germany.'"  "From t h a t moment," E c k a r d s t e i n  goes on to say, " I knew t h a t Chamberlain was ready to adopt the  a l t e r n a t i v e o f an a c c e s s i o n t o the Dual A l l i a n c e which he  had announced i n our c o n v e r s a t i o n o f January, 1901, a t Chatsworth, as being the consequence o f a f a i l u r e o f an Anglo-German 2 negotiation." 1. E c k a r d s t e i n , op. c i t . , 228. 2. I b i d . , 228-29: supra 27.  -49I f any doubt remained i n the mind o f E c k a r d s t e i n about the t r u t h of the impression he gained from h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Chamberlain,it was  d i s p e l l e d by a c o n v e r s a t i o n he h e l d  l a t e r that same evening w i t h K i n g Edward.  As  the company  l e a v i n g , the K i n g asked to see him i n h i s study.  was  "He was  in  e x c e l l e n t humor," the German t e l l s us, and o f f e r e d h i s guest a c i g a r and a whiskey and soda. Japanese a l l i a n c e , and o f how  A f t e r t a l k i n g of the  i t assured England's  Anglo-  future i n  the Far E a s t , he went on to say, u n f o r t u n a t e l y I can't f a c e the f u t u r e w i t h the same c o n f i d e n c e as regards Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . You know of course what has happened o f l a t e . . . . The renewed abuse of England i n the German p r e s s , and the u n f r i e n d l y and s a r c a s t i c remarks of Bulow i n the R e i o h s t a g have aroused so much resentment among my m i n i s t e r s and I n p u b l i c o p i n i o n that f o r a l o n g time at l e a s t t h e r e cant be no more q u e s t i o n o f Great B r i t a i n and Germany working together i n any c o n c e i v a b l e matter. We are being urged more s t r o n g l y than ever by France to come to an agreement w i t h h e r i n a l l c o l o n i a l d i s p u t e s , and i t w i l l p r o b a b l y be best i n the end to make such a s e t t l e m e n t . (1) The a t t i t u d e of the B r i t i s h  l e a d e r s to an  Anglo-French  understanding a t t h i s time i s shown by c o n v e r s a t i o n s which Cambon h e l d w i t h Lansdowne, K i n g Edward, and Wales.  Lansdowne was  project  than S a l i s b u r y had been.  the P r i n c e of  more ready f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f such a Three weeks a f t e r the i n c i d e n t s  n a r r a t e d above, Cambon mentioned t o Lansdowne the c o n v e r s a t i o n he had h e l d w i t h S a l i s b u r y i n 1899, on which he would l i k e  and enumerated the  to n e g o t i a t e an agreement.  "He  questions asked,"  r e l a t e s Cambon, "whether he might make a note o f them, but s a i d he need not t r o u b l e as I would w r i t e him a p e r s o n a l  1. E o k a r d s t e i n , op. c i t . ,  229-30.  I  letter  -41^ enumerating them.  T h i s I d i d , and  ^ f o o l i s h l y - n e v e r kept a  copy o f i t .  Next evening (sometime e a r l y i n 1902)  a b i g dinner  i n Buckingham P a l a c e .  I was  there  p l a c e d next to K i n g  Edward, who  s a i d , 'Lansdowne has shown me your l e t t e r .  excellent.  We  about i t . You  must go on.  I have t o l d  was  It i s  the P r i n c e of Wales  can d i s c u s s i t a l s o with him.'  After  the P r i n c e o f Wales, l a t e r K i n g George V, spoke to me  dinner eagerly  o f the l e t t e r and s a i d : 'What a good t h i n g i t would be i f we could have a g e n e r a l  agreement.'  would be concluded.  I t o l d him  f a s t as he might wish, but 1  He wanted to know when i t that we  c o u l d not  go q u i t e so  that with p a t i e n c e and  goodwill i t  ought to be p o s s i b l e . " The  e f f o r t s of the diplomats i n n e g o t i a t i n g the under-  s t a n d i n g between the two  c o u n t r i e s were g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e d  the v i s i t which K i n g Edward p a i d  to P a r i s i n the s p r i n g of  when he made h i s f i r s t European tour as King o f England. general p l a n of h i s tour was yacht,  the " V i c t o r i a and  P o r t u g a l , who  1903, The  a Mediterranean c r u i s e i n h i s  A l b e r t , " with a v i s i t  to the K i n g  of  had v i s i t e d England p r e v i o u s l y at the time o f Queen  V i c t o r i a ' s f u n e r a l and again i n November of 1902.  He  to pay a c a l l of c o u r t e s y on the K i n g of I t a l y on the journey  overland,  and  days s t a y at P a r i s .  planned return  to b r i n g h i s tour to a c l o s e w i t h a T h i s tour he decided  on and planned  few on  2 h i s own  by  initiative.  1. Cambon's i n t e r v i e w i n the "Times," Beeember 22, c i t e d i n Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 218. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 221.  1908,  -42The m i n i s t r y a c q u i e s c e d i n the King's arrangements, but e v i n c e d no enthusiasm  f o r the v i s i t  to P a r i s , e x p r e s s i n g doubt,  i n view of the c o n t i n u e d d i s p l a y of h o s t i l i t y to England  i n the  French p r e s s and among the French people, whether the K i n g c o u l d count  on a c o r d i a l or even r e s p e c t f u l r e c e p t i o n i n the F r e n c h 1  capital.  When S i r Edward Monson, the B r i t i s h ambassador a t  P a r i s , was  asked by D e l c a s s e as to how  r e c e i v e d , the former, who  was  wisdom o f the proposed v i s i t , i o n s to K i n g Edward who "as o f f i c i a l l y paid  to Mm,  the K i n g wished to be  s l i g h t l y p e s s l m i s t i o as to the at once telegraphed f o r i n s t r u c t -  answered that he wished to be r e c e i v e d  as p o s s i b l e , and  that the more honours that were 2  the b e t t e r i t would  be."  K i n g Edward a r r i v e d at P a r i s on May p r o c e s s i o n drove  the most p a r t i t was "VI v e n t l e s Boers,"  by no means e n t h u s i a s t i c - f o r  sullenly respectful.  to l e f t ,  C r i e s were heard of  "Vive Marchand" and "Vive Fashoda," muoh to  the d i s c o m f i t u r e of the French o f f i c i a l s  and  As the l o n g  from the B o i s de Boulogne S t a t i o n to the  B r i t i s h Embassy, the crowd was  He, however, was  1.  accompanying the K i n g .  determinedly good-natured, s a l u t i n g to r i g h t  s m i l i n g whenever he was  cheered.  His suite  was  e s p e c i a l l y booed. A f t e r paying a v i s i t he r e t u r n e d to the Embassy, and  to the P r e s i d e n t o f the R e p u b l i c , t h e r e , i n r e p l y to a d e p u t a t i o n  from the B r i t i s h Chamber of Commerce i n P a r i s , he d e l i v e r e d a speech which s t r u c k a p e r s o n a l note, and whioh, i n i t s warmth 1. l e e , op. c i t . , 2. I b i d . , 223.  I I , 223.  -43of  u t t e r a n c e , d i d much to win over the people o f P a r i s .  In h i s  speech he s a i d : I t i s s c a r c e l y necessary to t e l l you w i t h what s i n c e r e p l e a s u r e I f i n d myself onoe_more i n P a r i s , to which as you Know, I have p a i d v e r y frequent v i s i t s w i t h ever i n c r e a s i n g p l e a s u r e , and f o r which I f e e l an attachment f o r t i f i e d by so many happy and i n e f f a c e a b l e memories. The days o f h o s t i l i t y between the two c o u n t r i e s are, I am c e r t a i n , h a p p i l y at an end. I know o f no two c o u n t r i e s where p r o s p e r i t y i s more interdependent. There may have been misunderstandings and causes o f d i s s e n s i o n i n the p a s t ; but that i s a l l h a p p i l y over and forgotten. The f r i e n d s h i p of the two c o u n t r i e s i s my constant preoccupation,-and I count on you a l l , who enjoy French h o s p i t a l i t y i n t h e i r m a g n i f i c e n t c i t y , to a i d me to r e a c h t h i s g o a l . ( 1 ) . In  the evening the K i n g attended the Theatre F r a n c a i s . .  The house was f u l l ,  but h i s r e o e p t i o n was d e c i d e d l y c h i l l y .  D u r i n g the e n t r ' a c t e he d e s i g n e d l y l e f t h i s l o g e to mix w i t h the crowd, r e s o l v e d to win i t o v e r .  I n the l o b b y by chance he  met B i l e . Jeanne G r a n i e r , an a r t i s t e whom he had seen a c t i n England.  H o l d i n g out h i s hand, he s a i d to h e r ,  I remember how  I applauded you i n London.  there a l l the grace, a l l the e s p r i t  "Mademoiselle,  You p e r s o n i f i e d 2  of France."  Again the K i n g  had found the r i g h t t h i n g to say, and h i s bonhomie was b e g i n n i n g to  make i t s e l f  felt.  Hext day there was a review at Vincennes, reception:  at the H&tel de V i l l e .  and a  En route to Vincennes the  c h e e r i n g was s t r o n g e r and warmer than on the day b e f o r e .  At  the H S t e l de V i l l e the K i n g spoke o n l y b r i e f l y , but h i s words were most h a p p i l y phrased and f u l l o f k i n d l i n e s s : 1. Gifted i n Cambridge H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , I I I , 307. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 238.  -44" I s h a l l never f o r g e t my v i s i t to your charming ci-ty; and. X .can assure y o u i t i s w i t h the g r e a t e s t o f p l e a s u r e that I r e t u r n each time to P a r i s , where I am t r e a t e d e x a c t l y as i f I were at home." (1) I n the a f t e r n o o n he drove out to Longchamp to a t t e n d a r a c e meeting s p e c i a l l y arranged evening  by the Jockey Glub.  I n the  there was a s t a t e banquet a t the Elyse'e where the P r e s i d e n t  and K i n g exchanged p r o f e s s i o n s o f s t e a d i l y growing f r i e n d s h i p on b e h a l f o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s . H i s Majesty  I n r e p l y to M. Loubet,  said:  I am g l a d o f t h i s o c c a s i o n , which w i l l strengthen the bonds o f f r i e n d s h i p and c o n t r i b u t e to the f r i e n d s h i p o f our two c o u n t r i e s i n t h e i r common interest. Our great d e s i r e i s that we may march together i n the paths o f c i v i l i z a t i o n and peace." (2) n  A g a l a performance took p l a c e at the Opera that evening,  and other f u n c t i o n s were arranged  On May 4 the K i n g prepared  to d e p a r t .  f o r the next day.  The r o u t e to the Gare  des I n v a l i d e s , from which he was to l e a v e , was l i n e d with an e n t h u s i a s t i c crowd, and whereas on h i s a r r i v a l c r i e s o f "Vivent l e s Boers,"  there had been  there now was heard  "Vive H o t r e  Roi." The  success  o f the v i s i t had exceeded a l l e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  l a r g e l y owing to the King's p e r s o n a l charm o f speech and manner, and h i s c h e e r f u l r e a d i n e s s to p l a y a f u l l p a r t i n a heavy programme o f f u n c t i o n s .  Each day of h i s s t a y he had won p u b l i c  f e e l i n g more and more i n h i s f a v o u r .  On every s i d e were heard  expressions o f g r a t i f i c a t i o n that the K i n g had renewed the t i e s of  f r i e n d s h i p which had bound him to France while he was y e t 1. l e e , op. c i t . , I I , 839. 2. I b i d . , p.239.  -45 P r i n c e o f Wales.  There can be no doubt that h i s v i s i t did,  much to terminate the acute stage o f estrangement between the two c o u n t r i e s , to promote an atmosphere o f g o o d w i l l between them, and to g i v e a great impetus to the movement towards an Anglo-French  rapprochement.  By h i s v i s i t K i n g Edward secured 1  honourable  mention among the a r c h i t e c t s of t h e Entente Yet another step forward  Cordial."  towards the Entente was  taken two months l a t e r when on J u l y 6 P r e s i d e n t Loubet p a i d K i n g Edward a r e t u r n v i s i t . greatest c o r d i a l i t y .  T h i s v i s i t was marked by the  At a s t a t e d i n n e r a t Buckingham P a l a c e  M. Loubet d e c l a r e d i n speaking o f h i s r o y a l h o s t ,  "France  p r e s e r v e s a p r e c i o u s memory o f the v i s i t which you p a i d to Paris. and  I am sure that i t w i l l have the most happy r e s u l t s ,  that i t w i l l g r e a t l y serve to m a i n t a i n and bind s t i l l more , 2  c l o s e l y the r e l a t i o n s which e x i s t between our two c o u n t r i e s . " In  r e t u r n K i n g Edward expressed the hope, " t h a t the welcome  you have r e c e i v e d today has convinced you o f the true f r i e n d s h i p , indeed I w i l l say the a f f e c t i o n , which my country f e e l s f o r 3 France."  The t o a s t o f the L o r d Mayor at the G-uildhall the  next day was no l e s s c o r d i a l when he s a i d : "How we have shaken hands i n the f i r m i n t e n t i o n o f l e t t i n g no cloud obscure  the path  we have marked out, i s i t too much to hope that our statesmen w i l l f i n d means o f removing f o r e v e r the h o r r i b l e p o s s i b i l i t y of a war between the two peoples who have so many common i n t e r e s t s , 1. Cambridge H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , I I I , 308. Charmes, F r a n c i s , Chronique de l a Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 15, 1903, 469-76. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I , 154. 3. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 244.  -46and whose hopes and  1 a s p i r a t i o n s are the same?"  The whole v i s i t proved the P r e s i d e n t ' s departure,  a s p e c t a c u l a r success*  On  the K i n g , i n r e p l y to h i s guest's  f a r e w e l l message, telegraphed the f o l l o w i n g r e p l y which a warm response  on both s i d e s of the Channel: " I t i s my most  ardent wish that the rapprochement between the two 8 may  be l a s t i n g . " 1  By  this v i s i t  another  the path o f amicable understanding M. Belcasse' had visit  found  to England  step was  countries  taken  between England  along  and  France.  accompanied the P r e s i d e n t on h i s  and had h e l d c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h L o r d Lansdowne 3  i n which the general o u t l i n e s o f a t r e a t y of amity were  sketched.  In August the complete problems were d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l M.  Cambon and the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r .  of  September the n e g o t i a t i o n s had  By  the  by  beginning  gone f a r enough to  Justify  L o r d Lansdowne i n d r a f t i n g a c o n f i d e n t i a l minute f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the Cabinet on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f r e a c h i n g an understanding, reasonably  with p r e c i s e d e t a i l s as to how  i t might  achieved. The  the o f f i c i a l  first  f r u i t s of the seeds of g o o d w i l l sown by  v i s i t s and by the n e g o t i a t i o n s which f o l l o w e d  were gathered when a general t r e a t y o f a r b i t r a t i o n was on October 14, 1903. of  be  This convention was  p r i m a r i l y the work  S i r Thomas B a r c l a y and the Baron d ' E s t o u r n e l l e s de  both of whom had  signed  Constant,  spared no e f f o r t i n a r o u s i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n  1. Cambridge H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , I I I , 308. 8. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 154. 3. Delcasse' to Cambon, J u l y 21, 1903, D.D.F., 8 s , I I I , Ho.368, p.471; Hewton, op. c i t . , 879. e  -47on both s i d e s of the Channel i n i t s f a v o u r . r e s u l t of t h e i r e f f o r t s ,  I n France, as a  the p l a n o f such a convention  was  endorsed by the Chambers o f Commerce of Bordeaux, Havre, M a r s e i l l e s , L i l l e , C a l a i s , Dunkirk, Toulouse, Lyons, Rouen, and other important b u s i n e s s c e n t r e s .  Many m u n i c i p a l c o u n c i l s  and peace s o c i e t i e s had passed r e s o l u t i o n s f a v o u r a b l e to i t s conclusion.  Eminent j u r i s t s and w r i t e r s had expressed  themselves  at one with the p l a n , and many l e a d i n g newspapers had g i v e n i t hearty s u p p o r t .  The p r o p o s a l had a l s o been taken up i n an  encouraging manner i n England.  Mr. B a r c l a y had  set f o r t h the  p l a n at a meeting o f members of Parliament h e l d i n the House o f Commons, and r e s o l u t i o n s i n i t s favour were passed by Chambers 1 of Commerce a l l over the U n i t e d Kingdom. In the agreement s i g n e d by the governments i n October i t was  agreed to submit a l l d i f f e r e n c e s of a J u r i d i c a l .  order, p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g to d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t r e a t i e s , p r o v i d e d that they d i d not a f f e c t  the  v i t a l i n t e r e s t s nor the honour of the c o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s , to the Hague T r i b u n a l .  T h i s a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t y connoted  p e r c e p t i b l e improvement i n the r e l a t i o n s of the two though i t had merely a t h e o r e t i c v a l u e . misunderstandings,  a  countries,  True, i t removed no  but i t s adoption can be c i t e d as an i n t e r i m  manifesto of g o o d w i l l .  On i t s being concluded M. Cambon  wrote to Mr. B a r c l a y , thanking him f o r the p a r t he had p l a y e d i n the making o f the t r e a t y .  I n h i s l e t t e r he s a i d  1. B a r c l a y ' s T h i r t y Years Anglo-Reminiscences e x c e l l e n t account o f t h i s work.  that  g i v e s an  the  -48t r e a t y was " c a l c u l a t e d to cut s h o r t a q u a n t i t y o f d a i l y difficulties  and i n c i d e n t s of which one can never f o r e s e e the 1  consequences." With the s i g n i n g o f t h i s agreement, a l o n g w i t h the n e g o t i a t i o n s which had a l r e a d y taken p l a c e , the atmosphere had now c l e a r e d to such an extent that r e a l p r o g r e s s i n the s e t t l e ment o f c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s could be made.  The two f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r S j aided by M. Cambon,were b u s i l y engaged throughout the w i n t e r , and they proved that w i t h g o o d w i l l on both s i d e s the  even  t h o r n i e s t problems could be s o l v e d . The t a s k o f reaohing an agreement was I n no way easy -  the  many l a t e n t  causes o f d i s p u t e between the two c o u n t r i e s  were world-wide.  At every t u r n the q u e s t i o n o f "compensations"  turned up, "oompensations" which would in  j u s t i f y each m i n i s t e r  the eyes o f h i s government f o r the c o n c e s s i o n s and s a c r i f i c e s  he h i m s e l f had to y i e l d .  But o f a l l the problems  formidable l a y i n Morocco and Egypt.  the most  France had never  finally  r e c o g n i z e d the s t a t u s o f England i n Egypt, and h e r r e f u s a l would have enabled her at any time to reopen the whole E g y p t i a n q u e s t i o n , and even manufacture p o s s i b l y a "casus b e l l i " whenever c o n d i t i o n s might appear a u s p i c i o u s to an adventurous C a b i n e t . On the other hand, the R e p u b l i c was known t o have designs on Morocco to whioh England might, i f i t so s u i t e d her, take strong exception.  The i n t e r e s t s o f the two powers i n Slam  l i k e w i s e b r i s t l e d w i t h thorny p o i n t s l i k e l y a t any time to p r i c k n a t i o n a l tempers.  The f i s h i n g r i g h t s whioh the French  claimed i n Newfoundland by v i r t u e o f terms l a i d down i n the 1. B a r c l a y , op. c i t . , 835.  -49T r e a t y o f U t r e c h t o f 1713 neighbourly r e l a t i o n s .  was  another stumbling b l o c k to  These problems, along w i t h questions o f  r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s i n West A f r i c a , Madagascar, and i n the Hew  Hebrides, had  a l l caused  f r i c t i o n i n the p a s t . 1  The n e g o t i a t i o n s conducted  throughout  f i n a l l y took p r a c t i c a l shape on A p r i l 8, 1904, was  signed by the two governments.  up o f three separate conventions  the w i n t e r months when an agreement  T h i s agreement was  - the f i r s t  made  dealt with  French i n t e r e s t s i n Newfoundland, and West and  Anglo-  Central A f r i c a ,  the second with those i n Egypt and Morocoo, w h i l e a t h i r d d e a l t w i t h those i n Slam, Madagascar and the New The f i r s t dispute.  France now  Hebrides.  agreement s e t t l e d the o l d Newfoundland renounced h e r e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s and  on the French Shore, and French w i t h the B r i t i s h i n t a k i n g f i s h .  fishermen were put on an e q u a l i t y I n compensation B r i t a i n  r e l i n q u i s h e d c e r t a i n t e r r i t o r i e s i n Western A f r i c a . between the B r i t i s h colony o f Gambia and was  m o d i f i e d to g i v e France  the French  g i v e France  The  frontier  Senegambia  access to the r i v e r Gambia.  f r o n t i e r between B r i t i s h and French N i g e r i a was to  privileges  The  m o d i f i e d so as  a more a c c e s s i b l e r o u t e to Lake Chad.  The  Los  I s l a n d s commanding the c a p i t a l o f French Guinea* Konakry, 1. On January 8, 1904, L o r d Lansdowne was g i v e n a shock when Monson r e p o r t e d from P a r i s that Delcasse' had not oonsulted h i s c o l l e a g u e s i n the Cabinet even on the g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n o f the proposed accord; Newton, o p . c i t . , 287-88. Even as l a t e as March 2, he had not taken the French C o l o n i a l M i n i s t e r i n t o h i s c o n f i d e n c e . This almost i n c r e d i b l e omission can be e x p l a i n e d o n l y by h i s extreme a n x i e t y f o r s e c r e c y , and f o r h i s d e s i r e to conduct the n e g o t i a t i o n s h i m s e l f . So w e l l entrenched i n h i s o f f i c e d i d he c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f to be, he f e l t sure he c o u l d count on h i s p e r s o n a l p r e s t i g e and i n f l u e n c e to secure r a t i f i c a t i o n ; Newton, op. c i t . , op.ext., 185.  288-89; P o r t e r ,  -50were ceded to France*  1  Of f a r g r e a t e r importance was the D e c l a r a t i o n r e s p e o t 2 i n g E g y p t and Morocco.  Here a g a i n c r i t i c a l problems  were s o l v e d  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by f o l l o w i n g the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e u n d e r l y i n g the whole agreement,of  s u r r e n d e r i n g claims i n one d i r e c t i o n i n  r e t u r n f o r compensation  elsewhere.  Both c o u n t r i e s d i s c l a i m e d  any i n t e n t i o n o f a l t e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s o f e i t h e r Egypt or Morocco.  France undertook not to i n t e r f e r e i n any way  B r i t i s h a c t i o n i n Egypt, nor to demand any time l i m i t  with  to B r i t i s h  o c c u p a t i o n , r e c o g n i z i n g the paramount i n t e r e s t s o f B r i t a i n i n that oountry.  In r e t u r n , B r i t a i n , r e c o g n i z i n g the paramount  i n t e r e s t s o f France i n Morocco, gave France e n t i r e l i b e r t y to i n t e r v e n e there f o r the purpose  of m a i n t a i n i n g peace,  and  a s s i s t i n g the r u l e r to c a r r y out necessary a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , economie, f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s .  Questions c o n c e r n i n g  the E g y p t i a n debt were so s e t t l e d as to g i v e the E g y p t i a n government a f r e e hand i n the d i s p o s a l of the funds  accumulated  by the C a i s s e de l a Dette so l o n g as payment o f i n t e r e s t on the debt was a s s u r e d .  French s c h o o l s were to enjoy the same  l i b e r t i e s as f o r m e r l y , and a l l r i g h t s enjoyed by the French through t r e a t i e s and customs were to be r e s p e c t e d . commerce was  Freedom o f  to be guaranteed f o r t h i r t y y e a r s , and Great  B r i t a i n promised  to i n s u r e the freedom of the Suez Canal.  In  Morocoo France agreed on freedom o f commerce f o r t h i r t y y e a r s , 1. Convention between the U n i t e d Kingdom and France r e s p e c t i n g Newfoundland, West and C e n t r a l A f r i c a , A p r i l 8, 1904, B.D., I I , 375-384. 2. D e c l a r a t i o n between the u n i t e d Kingdom and Franoe r e s p e c t i n g Egypt and Morocoo, A p r i l 8, 1904, i b i d . , 385-98.  51promlsed that there should be no f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on the n o r t h e r n ooast o p p o s i t e G i b r a l t a r , and undertook to conclude w i t h S p a i n whereby the Anglo-French without  encroaching on Spanish  governments agreed  agreement might be  interests.  "to a f f o r d one  an agreement  another  fulfilled  In c o n c l u s i o n the  two  d i p l o m a t i c support i n  order to o b t a i n the e x e c u t i o n o f the c l a u s e s " o f the D e c l a r a t i o n . I n the t h i r d agreement the two  s i g n a t o r i e s determined  t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e zones of i n f l u e n c e i n Slam by mutual agreement. In Madagascar, B r i t a i n r e c o g n i z e d the r i g h t o f France customs a g a i n s t which she had p r o t e s t e d s i n c e 1896. the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the New l a n d t i t l e s and  to e s t a b l i s h Finally,  Hebrides a r i s i n g from d i s p u t e s  over  the absence of j u r i s d i c t i o n over the n a t i v e s 1  were r e f e r r e d to a commission. Along w i t h the a r t i c l e s s e t f o r t h above, which were made p u b l i c , L o r d Lansdowne and M. whioh contemplated 8  Cambon s i g n e d s e c r e t a r t i c l e s  an e v e n t u a l p a r t i t i o n of Morocco between  France and Spain should the s t a t e of Morocco d i s i n t e g r a t e . When S p a i n adhered to the Anglo-French 1904,  Agreement on October 3,  and d e c l a r e d h e r s e l f " f i r m l y a t t a c h e d to the  integrity  of the Moorish empire under,the s o v e r e i g n t y o f the S u l t a n , " she s i g n e d a c o n v e n t i o n w i t h France which f r a n k l y contemplated 3 partition. T h i s l a t t e r pact was sent by Cambon to Lansdowne 4 with the request that i t be kept s e c r e t . The s e c r e t a r t i c l e s 1. D e c l a r a t i o n between the U n i t e d Kingdom and France concerning Slam, Madagascar, and the Hew Hebrides, A p r i l 8, 1904, B.D., I I , 396-98. 8. S e c r e t a r t i c l e s of the d e c l a r a t i o n r e s p e c t i n g Egypt and Morocoa, B.D., I I , pp.398-95. 3. B.D., I I I , Ho.59, p.49. 4. Cambon to Lansdowne, October 6, 1904, i b i d , Ho.58, p.48.  -52o f these two 1 1911.  t r e a t i e s were not r e v e a l e d  The  Agreement was  r e c e i v e d most c o r d i a l l y i n England,  the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f the p u b l i c and great achievement.  l e a d e r s h a i l i n g i t as  In the House o f Commons o p p o r t u n i t y  taken to express h e a r t y  satisfaction.  c r i t i c i z e d i t , however, and But  to the p u b l i c u n t i l  i n the main i t was  t h e i r papers v o i c e d some p r o t e s t .  regarded as a step to secure  voice against and  i t was  One  was  Staunch i m p e r i a l i s t s  peace by c l e a r i n g away misunderstandings and the t r a d i t i o n a l enemy.  a  o f the few  general  d i f f e r e n c e s with  l e a d e r s to r a i s e h i s  Lord Rosebery, who  d e c l a r e d , "My  mournful  supreme c o n v i c t i o n i s t h a t t h i s agreement i s much more 2  l i k e l y to l e a d to c o m p l i c a t i o n s In France the g e n e r a l favourable,  but  there was  than to peace.** sentiment was  some s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n .  came m a i n l y from r e a c t i o n a r i e s and  n a t i o n a l i s t s who  France had  been worsted i n the d e a l .  France had  given more than she had  i n A f r i c a d i d not make up land - England had  decidedly  I t was  The  protests  felt  maintained  that that  r e c e i v e d - the concessions  f o r the l o s s o f r i g h t s In Newfound-  her p o s i t o n  i n Egypt while France had  yet  1. I t has been a s s e r t e d by a German h i s t o r i a n , though without proof, t h a t the German government i n some o f f i c i a l way s p e e d i l y became informed o f these s e c r e t a r t i c l e s , and saw i n them an evidence o f h o s t i l e f e e l i n g . Gooch endorses t h i s a s s e r t i o n ; Cambridge H i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , I I I , 340. Fay claims that there i s no t a n g i b l e p r o o f that Germany was made aware o f these s e c r e t d e a l i n g s ; op. c i t . , I , 164. 2. C i t e d i n C h u r c h i l l , W.S., The World C r i s i s , (New York, 1923), I , 15.  ^53 to win h e r s i n Morocoo.  In s p i t e of these p r o t e s t s ,  the  Chamber and the Senate supported M. Delcasse' and approved agreement.  One  the  of the f a i r e s t estimates of the v a l u e of the  Entente to the F r e n c h i s found i n the Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904,  and the w r i t e r ' s views might w e l l be a p p l i e d to  the E n g l i s h case a l s o .  He  states:  " I t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r us indeed not to express some r e g r e t s w i t h r e g a r d to Egypt, and some apprehensions on the s u b j e c t of Morocoo. But t h i s does not a l t e r our judgment on the t o t a l i t y of the arrangements concluded. How c o u l d such an agreement be worked out without r e c i p r o c a l c o n c e s s i o n s ? ! We have y i e l d e d on some p o i n t s , and some of these a r e c o s t l y . England has y i e l d e d a l s o .... Above a l l the entente i s concluded. N o t h i n g h e n c e f o r t h d i v i d e s us; we can now e n t e r i n on a n e w e r a where d o u b t l e s s we have much to": f o r g e t , but i n which we have a l s o much to hope f o r . " (1) In the l i g h t of f u t u r e events i t might be w e l l to note here the a t t i t u d e o f Germany i n the matter of the Entente o f 1904.  As e a r l y as March 23, 1904,  Delcasse' had  mentioned  i n f o r m a l l y to P r i n o e R a d o l i n , o f the German Embassy i n P a r i s , the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the proposed Anglo-French agreement. 2 R a d o l i n had informed Bulow o f t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n , the d e f i n i t e knowledge which Bulow had r e c e i v e d of the agreement.  first  impending  A s i d e from t h i s i n f o r m a l n o t i f i c a t i o n , and  the  f a c t that the p u b l i c a r t i c l e s were soon a f t e r p r i n t e d i n the newspapers, Germany was  not o f f i c i a l l y n o t i f i e d o f the t e x t ,  nor f o r m a l l y c o n s u l t e d about  the agreement, whioh i n v o l v e d i n  1. Charmes, F r a n c i s , Chronique de l a Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, 239. 2. von R a d o l i n to Bulow, March 23, 1904, Dugdale, op. c i t . , 188 - 90.  -54a r e a l way  her commercial and  political  i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco*  In s p i t e of these f a c t s the a t t i t u d e of o f f i c i a l at f i r s t  friendly.  i n the R e i c h s t a g could hardly had not  In answer to a question  Germany  on the  1  was  subject  on A p r i l 12, Bulow c a u t i o u s l y s t a t e d that  he  say much because the E n g l i s h and F r e n c h m i n i s t e r s  explained  i t publicly.  He went on to s t a t e :  " I can o n l y say that we have no cause to imagine that the T r e a t y has a p o i n t against any other Power. I t seems to be an attempt to remove a number o f d i f f e r e n c e s by p e a c e f u l methods. We have nothing from the s t a n d p o i n t of German i n t e r e s t s to o b j e c t to i n t h a t . As to Morocco, the k e r n e l o f the Treaty, we are i n t e r e s t e d i n the economic a s p e c t . We have commercial i n t e r e s t s , which we must and s h a l l p r o t e c t . We have, however, no ground to f e a r that they w i l l be overlooked or i n f r i n g e d . " (2) The pan-German p a r t y f e l t  Germany to be h u m i l i a t e d  agreement and gave v o i c e to i t s p r o t e s t s . expressed no  alarm, and on h i s v i s i t  informed K i n g Edward that he had and  that Morocco had  o f the Agreement as was  not  the  K a i s e r , however,  to K i e l i n June he  no o b j e c t i o n 3  never i n t e r e s t e d him.  moved forward Germany was  The  by  to the But  as  Treaty, events  to take j u s t as l i g h t l y a view  i n f e r r e d i n the C h a n c e l l o r ' s  speech.  The next few months were to r e v e a l a dramatic change o f f r o n t at B e r l i n , and  the f o r c e s which were set moving by  t h i s change  o f f r o n t were to make Morocco the storm centre of European p o l i t i c s , and  t h i s i n turn was  to r e a c t upon Anglo-French  r e l a t i o n s i n a most s i g n i f i c a n t manner.  1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 178. 2. Gooch, op. c i t . , 350. 3. Cambridge H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , I I I ,  338.  -55In t h i s then l i e s the importance Agreement o f 1904  - England had plunged  a f f a i r s o f the C o n t i n e n t .  of the  Anglo-French  i n t o the c o n t e n t i o u s  For years the c a s t i n g vote o f  England had been the g r e a t p r i z e sought by the European Powers, and how  she would bestow i t ,  and whether i t would be bestowed  at a l l , had been one o f the g r e a t problems. c a s t i n favour o f France. B r i t a i n had promised  Now  i t had been  True, i n the Agreement o f  o n l y " d i p l o m a t i c support" to France i n  c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d problems,  and there was  n o t h i n g i n the  s e c r e t a r t i c l e s to e n l a r g e o r strengthen t h a t promise. -  may  1904  It  w e l l have seemed to the B r i t i s h l e a d e r s t h a t i n p l e d g i n g  themselves  to " d i p l o m a t i c support" on c e r t a i n c o l o n i a l q u e s t i o n s  t h a t England was  paying a s m a l l p r i c e f o r r i d d i n g h e r s e l f o f  the c h r o n i c t r o u b l e and f r i c t i o n w i t h France. forming o f the Entente was an u n a l l o y e d g a i n .  But i f the  an immense achievement, i t was  not  The p r i c e of p a r t n e r s h i p w&fiaa Great Power  i s entanglement i n i t s f e u d s .  The f o l l o w i n g chapter w i l l show  t h a t the c a s t i n g of the B r i t i s h vote on the s i d e of France to have s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s i n the f u t u r e .  was  CHAPTER I I I The T e s t i n g of the Entente  -56-  CRAPTER I I I The  T e s t i n g o f the Entente  The Anglo-Freneh Agreement w i t h i n  a few  s h o r t months  brought Morocoo, a country which h i t h e r t o had p l a y e d unimportant p a r t i n world a f f a i r s , international p o l i t i c s .  I t was  now  to the very to r i v a l  a relatively  f o r e f r o n t of Alsace-Lorraine  as a p o i n t of d i s c o r d between Prance and  Germany, and  i n a very r e a l way  Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s .  To f i n d how  upon Anglo-German and  to r e a c t  t h i s came about w i l l i n v o l v e a somewhat d e t a i l e d  f o l l o w i n g o f the I t has  events of the y e a r s 1904, been charged a g a i n s t  1905  and  1906.  Germany that her  i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Moroccan a f f a i r s e a r l y i n 1905  was  due  sudden to  d e s i r e to break up  the Dual A l l i a n c e , s i n c e at that time  was  w i t h Japan, and  engaged i n war  pretext  to f o r c e a war  General von declared  seeking  on F r a n c e , while the Republic 1  without the a i d of her a l l y . that prospeot was  that she was  her Russia  a  would  be  From a m i l i t a r y p o i n t o f view  undoubtedly e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y a t t r a c t i v e .  S o h l i e f f e n , the C h i e f of the German General S t a f f ,  to the C h a n c e l l o r  p o s s i b l y c a r r y on two  at t h i s time that R u s s i a  l a r g e wars, and  " I f the n e c e s s i t y o f a war  could  not  at th.e same time added,  w i t h France should  present  itself  1. Newton, L o r d , op. c i t . , 340. Spender, J.A., F i f t y Years o f Europe, (London, 1933), 341; T a r d i e u , Andre*, France and the A l l i a n c e s , (New York, 1908), 168f.  -57to us,  the present  In s p i t e o f the many who which are p o i n t e d  1 favourable."  moment would be undoubtedly uphold t h i s view, and  to i n s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of i t ,  of circumstances there i s no  evidence  i n the German documents to prove that the German Government 2 contemplated t a k i n g advantage o f the s i t u a t i o n . I t has been f r e q u e n t l y maintained a l s o was  i n f l u e n c e d by a keen d e s i r e to weaken the  that Germany  Anglo-French  Entente - that she was  motivated by the d e s i r e to d r i v e a wedge 3 between England and France. Just to what extent t h i s i n f l u e n c e d German a c t i o n i s not easy to d e c i d e . seems to have l i t t l e The  foundation  But t h i s assumption a l s o 4 in fact.  r e a l reason f o r the sudden i n t e r v e n t i o n i n  Morocoo would seem to have been l a r g e l y one  of p r e s t i g e , combined  w i t h the d e s i r e to safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of Germany i n 5 Morocco* F e a r i n g that France might, as i n Tunis, take i n t o her  1. S c h l i e f f e n to Bulow, A p r i l 20* 1904, c i t e d i n Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 209. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 185. D i c k i n s o n , G.L., The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Anarchy, (London, 1926), 125; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 209. 3. Seymour, C h a r l e s , The Diplomatic Background o f the Great War, (Hew York, 1916), 168-74; Grey, S i r Edward, TwentyF i v e Y e a r s , (London,1925) I, 54; Lee, o p . c i t * , I I , 337. Spender, op. c i t . * 235. 4. Ewart, J.S., Roats and Causes of the War, (Hew York, 1932), I I , 751; Fabre-Luce, A l f r e d , La V l c t o i r e , (Paris,1924),118. Bourgeois, E., et Pages, 6., Les Origenes et l e s Respons a b i l i t e s de l a Grande Guerre, ( P a r i s , 1922),307-09. 5. "Germany," Billow had w r i t t e n on June 3, 1904," must o b j e c t to the c o n t r o l over Morocco that France has i n view, not o n l y f o r m a t e r i a l reasons, but even more f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p r e s t i g e . " Hote to H o l s t e i n , c i t e d i n Renouvin, P., How the War Came, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , T i l , A p r i l , 1929, p.387.  -58hands a l l the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machinery of the government and p u t Morocco under her p o l i t i c a l and  economic domination,  and  t h i s i n s p i t e of very r e a l German i n t e r e s t s , Germany decided act.  There can be no doubt t h a t Germany had a good case f o r  complaint The  to  against  the French a c t i o n , as s h a l l be shown s h o r t l y .  d i f f i c u l t y was  that i n s p i t e o f her l e g a l  justification  the p o l i c y which she adopted to defend her  case l a c k e d f i n e s s e .  Her methods were b l u n d e r i n g  were a s s e r t e d i n a  b l u s t e r i n g and  arrogant  and h e r claims  manner.  Her  crude diplomacy and  amount of v i o l e n c e she expended i n the h a n d l i n g o f her aroused such resentment and 1 purpose.  f e a r s that she defeated  I n c l a i m i n g a v o i c e i n the settlement a f f a i r s i n 1905,  1880  been one  with  that i n  been signed by twelve of the  the S u l t a n s 1  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to determine  the r i g h t s o f f o r e i g n e r s i n Morocco.  In 1890  she had  a commercial t r e a t y w i t h Morocco i n which i t was " t h a t the s u b j e c t s o f the two and  one  o f the S i g n a t o r y Powers to the Madrid  T h i s T r e a t y had met  own  An e q u a l l y important p o i n t , and  based the l e g a l i t y of her c l a i m s , was  Powers who  her  of Moroccan  on which she  Convention.  case  Germany c o u l d r i g h t f u l l y p o i n t to s u b s t a n t i a l 2  eoonomio i n t e r e s t s there.  she had  the  signed  declared  p a r t i e s w i l l have the same r i g h t s  advantages as those which e x i s t , or may  regards  s u b j e c t s of the most favoured  come to e x i s t , as 3 nation." C l e a r l y Germany  1. T r e v e l y a n , G.M_., Grey o f F a l l o d o n , (London, 1937), 125. 2. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 755-57; B a r c l a y , op. o i t . , 276. 3. C i t e d i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 757.  -59had a s t r o n g case when she asked to he c o n s i d e r e d i n Moroccan affairs. From time to time a f t e r 1890 Germany had d i s p l a y e d her i n t e r e s t i n Morocco.  In 1899  the German ambassador and 1  Lord S a l i s b u r y had exchanged views on the f u t u r e o f Morocco. When the K a i s e r made h i s v i s i t to England i n 1899  Chamberlain  put forward the s u g g e s t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e p a r t i t i o n between 2 England and Germany, but t h i s came to n o t h i n g . In 1900 Bulow had s t a t e d that Germany had i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco and t h a t as a r e s u l t she c o u l d not be i n d i f f e r e n t to the f u t u r e o f that 3 c o u n t r y . Again, i n 1901 when Chamberlain was p r o p o s i n g a p o s s i b l e agreement between England and Germany he favoured as a first  step a s e c r e t agreement between the two  countries  4 with r e f e r e n c e to Morocco.  Though n o t h i n g came o f these  p r o p o s a l s they do show that Morocco d i d have a p l a c e i n German diplomacy. In s p i t e o f these v e r y r e a l German i n t e r e s t s France had chosen to d i s r e g a r d Germany i n c a r r y i n g out her Moroccan policy.  As M. Pens' M i l l e t has s a i d i n c r i t i c i z i n g t h i s  grave  blunder In French p o l i c y , "With i n c r e d i b l e b l i n d n e s s the Government took p r e c a u t i o n s with everybody except the o n l y one o f i t s neighbours whom i t had s e r i o u s cause to f e a r . " 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  B.D., I I , No.307, pp.256-57. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 146. Anderson, E.N., The F i r s t M o r o c c a n C r i s i s , ( C h i c a g o , 1930)64. Supra 27. C i t e d i n Cambridge H i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , op. cit.,111,340; Report o f the B e l g i a n M i n i s t e r i n London June 8, 1905, M o r e l , E.D., Diplomacy Revealed, (London, 192  -60By a t r e a t y w i t h I t a l y i n 19G0 France removed I t a l i a n o p p o s i t i o n 1 by p r o m i s i n g to allow h e r a f r e e hand i n T r i p o l i . Negotiations w i t h S p a i n f a i l e d i n 1902 owing to a change i n the government, but a f t e r the s u c c e s s o f the Anglo-French Entente o f A p r i l 1904, whioh assured France o f B r i t i s h support i n Moroooo, an a c c o r d was  made with S p a i n , as has been shown, on October 3 o f t h a t 2 year. France d i d n o t attempt to assure h e r s e l f o f German support o r acquiescence o f h e r Moroccan p l a n s , nor d i d she, a c c o r d i n g to d i p l o m a t i c usage, g i v e o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n to the German Government o f the F r a n c o - B r i t i s h D e c l a r a t i o n r e f e r r e d 3 to above.  She chose  to i g n o r e Germany, and assured o f B r i t i s h ,  I t a l i a n , a n d Spanish support, proceeded  to c a r r y out h e r own  plans. 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 761-62. 2. Supra. 51 3. Bulow to the German ambassador i n P a r i s , May 1, 1905: " I t was conformable to i n t e r n a t i o n a l usage that France a f t e r the c o n c l u s i o n o f the Anglo-French Accord c o n c e r n i n g Morocoo, should communicate t h i s Accord i n the customary form to a l l the i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . M. Dele as se' has d e c l a r e d , i t i s t r u e , that t h i s communication had become s u p e r f l u o u s by the f a c t o f the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the convent i o n i n the French J o u r n a l o f f i c i e l . The M i n i s t e r w i l l not omit to n o t i c e however, that these two methods o f n o t i f i c a t i o n possess a c h a r a c t e r e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t . The d i r e c t communication i s not a simple a c t o f c o u r t e s y . The French Government, i n d e c i d i n g to make i t , would have d e c l a r e d i t s e l f ready to e n t e r i n t o d i s c u s s i o n w i t h the persons to whom i t i s d e l i v e r e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , i n case they estimated them to be a f f e c t e d . P u b l i c a t i o n i n a French o f f i o i a l paper, on the c o n t r a r y , p l a c e s the other persons i n t e r e s t e d who have not been i n t e r r o g a t e d i n the presence simply o f an accomplished f a c t . " ( C i t e d i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 770;).  -61 The C h a n c e l l o r ' s R e i c h s t a g speech on A p r i l 18, was  o n l y a temporary  and an i n v i t a t i o n Morocoo.  acquiescence i n the Anglo-Frenoh  1904,  Agreement,  to France and B r i t a i n to c o n s u l t Germany over  The German Government i n t r u t h l i k e d that Accord  less  than the German people, even though i t knew n o t h i n g o f the secret a r t i c l e s .  Bulow, who  p u b l i c l y p r o c l a i m e d that the  -agreement p l a c e d Germany i n no a c t u a l danger, admitted  that  " d o u b t l e s s l y both Powers (France and Great B r i t a i n ) win i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e and i n freedom of movement by accord and by t h e i r rapprochement, and that  this  the drawing  force 1  o f the Anglo-French Entente on I t a l y w i l l a l s o be  strengthened."  The p r o s p e c t i v e l o s s of Morocoo to Germany,and the g e n e r a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n Germany over the conduct accentuated Bulow*s i l l - w i l l  of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ,  towards the agreement.  To manifest i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a t b e i n g excluded from the Moroccan settlement and to f o r c e M. Deloasse' to come to an agreement with Germany on that q u e s t i o n , the German Government f i r s t a warship  c o n s i d e r e d i n A p r i l the p r o j e c t of d i s p a t c h i n g  to T a n g i e r , o s t e n s i b l y to s e t t l e c e r t a i n g r i e v a n c e s 2  which Germany h e l d a g a i n s t Morocoo at the time. was  not a c t e d upon at the time however.  F o r e i g n O f f i c e telegraphed to Mentzingen  On May  The p r o p o s a l 81, the German  that " s i n c e a f o r c e f u l  a c t i o n c o u l d be e a s i l y misunderstood and l e a d to erroneous 1. Bulow to W i l l i a m I I , A p r i l 80, 1904; c i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 143. 8. Dr. Genthe, a German r e s i d e n t i n Morocoo, had been r e c e n t l y murdered by n a t i v e s ; a n a t i v e employee o f a German f i r m had been i l l e g a l l y imprisoned; and c e r t a i n i n d e m n i t i e s from the Moroccan Government had to be c o l l e c t e d . See a l s o Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 219.  conclusions It  about Germany p o l i c y * the ship would not be  i s regretable  s p r i n g of  that s i m i l a r f o r e s i g h t was  not made up  German ambitions i n Morocco; he was o f Moroccan a f f a i r s .  K a i s e r h i m s e l f had in  a conversation  1904,  any  1  not adopted i n the  1905. Bulow, however, had  settlement  sent.  1  little  h i s mind to r e l i n q u i s h  determined to share i n the  In s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t  i n t e r e s t i n Morocco, and had  the  disclaimed  with the King of Spain at) Vigo on March  16,  i n t e r e s t i n t e r r i t o r i a l a c q u i s i t i o n s , but o n l y i n  the maintainance of the "open door," Bulow h e l d other views. It  i s o n l y f a i r to say of the K a i s e r t h a t i n these days he  p l a y e d no great p a r t i n determining the motive f o r c e behind i t was Late i n A p r i l , 1904, intervene France was  German Moroccan p o l i c y ;  Bulow. Bulow s e i z e d the o p p o r t u n i t y  to  I n Moroccan a f f a i r s through Spain, w i t h whose Government then n e g o t i a t i n g f o r the l a t e r agreement.  He  gave  every encouragement to Spain i n order that she might r e c e i v e 2 b e t t e r terms from the more powerful France. seen that Germany could d e r i v e l i t t l e  But  i t was  p r o f i t from the  soon  Franco-  Spanish n e g o t i a t i o n s . German grievances unsettled.  a g a i n s t Morocco meanwhile remained  German t r a d i n g f i r m s were demanding p r o t e c t i o n  against monopolistic  a c t i o n s o f the F r e n c h .  had p r a c t i c a l l y gained  In June France  c o n t r o l o f the S u l t a n ' s  finances.  1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 1 4 8 . 2. I b i d . , 152-53} Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , June 1, 1904, B.B., I I I , Ho.61, p.53. Renouvin, P i e r r e , La C r i s e Europe*enne et l a Grande Guerre, ( P a r i s , 1934), 70.  Nor had M.  Delcasse up  to t h i s time  shown any i n c l i n a t i o n  to open  up n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Germany. A l r e a d y d i s g r u n t l e d a t the French f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , the German Government now  came to f e e l i t s e l f s l i g h t e d  h u m i l i a t e d by t h i s d i s r e g a r d .  and  I t s r e s i s t a n c e towards h i s  p o l i c y came to be c o n c e n t r a t e d upon the one g r i e v a n c e which could be best upheld i n the eyes o f the p u b l i c , that France was  i n f r i n g i n g upon German economic i n t e r e s t s i n Morocoo.  t h e r e f o r e began to adopt a more a c t i v e On June 3  policy.  the B e l g i a n m i n i s t e r a t B e r l i n  the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e that he suspected s e c r e t a r t i c l e s i n the Anglo-French Rhenish f r o n t i e r .  It  informed  that t h e r e were  Accord concerning  the  Count M e t t e r n i c h , although he b e l i e v e d the  Agreement d i d c o n t a i n s e c r e t a r t i c l e s c o n c e r n i n g Egypt,  doubted  the s u s p i c i o n s of the B e l g i a n m i n i s t e r , but mentioned the rumor to L o r d Lansdowne on June 19.  The l a t t e r a s s u r e d  that the Accord contained no a r t i c l e s whioh concerned 1 complications.  him  European  N e v e r t h e l e s s , Bulow r e a l i z e d that any  attempt  o f Germany to i n t e r f e r e i n the Moroccan q u e s t i o n would l e a d to f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences, and would need c a u t i o n ; f o r t h i s reason he sought to l e a r n how  the B r i t i s h Government  regarded  i t s o b l i g a t i o n s to France w i t h r e s p e c t to Morocco. With t h i s i n mind,Metternich  d i s c u s s e d the q u e s t i o n  o f Morocco w i t h L o r d Lansdowne on August 15. o f French m o n o p o l i z a t i o n  Expressing fears  i n Morocoo, he asked L o r d Lansdowne,  i n view of the danger to German economic i n t e r e s t s , how B r i t i s h Government would i n t e r p r e t A r t i c l e IV of the 1.  Anderson, op. c i t . ,  155.  the  Anglo-French  64 Agreement, which a r t i c l e s t a t e d that the c o n c e s s i o n s f o r roads, railways, ports,  e t c . , were to be granted "only on such c o n d i t i o n  as w i l l m a i n t a i n i n t a c t  the a u t h o r i t y of the S t a t e over these  great undertakings o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " how A r t i c l e IX p l e d g i n g  He wished also to know  Great B r i t a i n to l e n d d i p l o m a t i c  support  to France would be i n t e r p r e t e d . L o r d Lansdowne c a u t i o u s l y s t a t e d that he d i d not wish to express an o p i n i o n upon A r t i c l e case.  IX i n a p u r e l y  hypothetical  He went on to say: "We made no attempt to d i s p o s e o f the r i g h t s of other Powers, although we made c e r t a i n concessions i n r e s p e c t of the r i g h t s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s to which we were o u r s e l v e s e n t i t l e d . I could at any r a t e say that i t was not at a l l probable t h a t , i f any T h i r d Power were to have o c c a s i o n to uphold i t s t r e a t y r i g h t s , we should use our i n f l u e n c e i n derogation o f them." (1) Metternich  i n f e r r e d from t h i s i n t e r v i e w  B r i t i s h Government would l i m i t  that the  the scope o f A r t i c l e  IX, and  that i n case Germany's a c t i o n s d i d not I n f r i n g e upon the Sultan's  a u t h o r i t y Germany would be q u i t e s a f e i n opposing  France i n Morocco.  He r e p o r t e d ,  however, t h a t Great  Britain  would oppose Germany seeking c o n t r o l o f a harbour there* and warned h i s government that i f a t h i r d Power should politically and  dispute  the French p o s i t i o n that both the E n g l i s h people  the government would support France.  Within 2  these l i m i t s  Germany might c a r r y out h e r Moroccan p o l i c y . Just previous  to r e c e i v i n g  t h i s r e p l y Bulow had  proposed d i s p a t c h i n g an ultimatum to the S u l t a n ,  demanding  under threat o f a n a v a l demonstration that the o u t s t a n d i n g 1. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , August 15 ,1904 ,B.D., I I I , Ho.62. 2. Anderson, op. c i t . , 156-7.  -65German claims be s a t i s f i e d w i t h i n three months. who  Emperor,  remained s t e a d i l y opposed to a c t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the  S h e r i f l a n Empire, r e f u s e d h i s consent was  The  to the p l a n , and n o t h i n g  done. But while no German a c t i o n was  months, f e e l i n g continued to smolder.  taken d u r i n g these  The  non-committal  communications from the French Government with r e g a r d to the Franco-Spanish  agreement i n October,  a l o n g w i t h i n the repeated  p e t i t i o n s from German f i r m s f o r defense of t h e i r augmented the b i t t e r n e s s a g a i n s t France. year the Morocco q u e s t i o n was  By  interests  the end of the  s t i l l very much a l i v e .  As  the  American v i c e - c o n s u l remarked to a l e a d i n g Moor, "Germany has not y e t spoken, and u n t i l  then we 1  cannot  b e l i e v e that a n y t h i n g  d e f i n i t e . h a s been d e c i d e d . " Soon afterwards Germany put  to one  s i d e her g r i e v a n c e s  w i t h the S u l t a n and h i s government, and began to assume an a t t i t u d e of f r i e n d l i n e s s .  She began to encourage the S u l t a n  to r e s i s t the " T u n i s i f i c a t i o n " programme which Belcasse' and the French Government were b e l i e v e d to be f o r c i n g on Morocco. On February I I , 1905,  the French charge' at T a n g i e r  reported  to Delcasse' an ominous communication r e c e i v e d from JDihlmann, the German ambassador-; i n which the l a t t e r s t a t e d , A f t e r the Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 we supposed the French Government was w a i t i n g f o r the Franoo-Spanish agreement b e f o r e p u t t i n g us i n p o s s e s s i o n o f the new s i t u a t i o n . But now t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s s e t t l e d , we see t h a t we have been s y s t e m a t i c a l l y kept a l o o f . The C h a n c e l l o r t e l l s me that the German Government 1. C i t e d i n Fay, op. c i t . ,  I,  181.  66was i g n o r a n t o f a l l the agreements c o n c e r n i n g Morocco, and does not acknowledge h i m s e l f bound to them i n any way. (1) Delcasse' complained  to B e r l i n o f t h i s language,  and  reminded the German Government t h a t he had answered P r i n c e R a d o l i n ' s e n q u i r i e s o f March 23, 1904,  and s t a t e d t h a t B e r l i n  had asked f o r no e x p l a n a t i o n s of the Agreement. Under-Secretary,  von Muhlberg, who  r e c e i v e d the  The German complaint,  r e p l i e d that he knew n o t h i n g o f Kuhlmann's d e c l a r a t i o n , added that Germany was Franco-Spanish  not bound by the Anglo-French 2  but  or the  treaties.  France meanwhile had been proceeding w i t h h e r p o l i c i e s i n Morocco.  On January 11, 1905,  the French m i n i s t e r at Tangier,  M. Saint-Rene' T a i l l a n d i e r , had been ordered to Fez,  the  Moroccan c a p i t a l , to l a y b e f o r e the S u l t a n a programme of reforms c o n s i s t i n g o f a m i l i t a r y programme and a l i s t r i g o r o u s demands d e a l i n g w i t h f i n a n c e s , t a r i f f s and for  p u b l i c works, i n a l l of which France was  a d v i s e r , i n s t r u c t o r and r e g u l a t o r .  of  concessions  to a c t as a general  I t has been a l l e g e d that  the French Ambassador, i n c a r r y i n g out h i s m i s s i o n , sought  to  produce the impression that he was a c t i n g on b e h a l f of a l l the Great Powers i n r e o r g a n i z i n g the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l government 3 of Morocco. Germany was now convinced that very soon her  1. Gooch, G.P., H i s t o r y of Modern Europe, (London, 1923),351. Debidour, A., H i s t o i r e Diplomatique de l ' E u r o p e , ( P a r i s , 1 9 2 0 ) , 11,15. P a l e o l o g u e , M., Uh Grand Tournant de l a P o l i t i q u e M0r»diale,(Paris,1934), 238-39. 2. Gooch, op. c i t . , 351 ; i P a l e o l o g u e , op. c i t . , 242. 3. Deloasse denied t h i s charge; Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 768. I t was d e n i e d - a l s o by T a i l l a n d i e r , h i m s e l f ; Debidour, op. c i t . , I l ; ^ i 8 ; also i n B e r a r d , V i c t o r , Le L i v r e jaune S u r Maroc, L a R e v u e de P a r i s , January 1,1906, 210.  -67economic a c t i v i t i e s i n Morocco would be at an end i f the French obtained t h e i r demands. A c c o r d i n g l y , Dr. V e s s e l was  sent to Fez to inform  the S u l t a n that Germany had not g i v e n her consent programme. to  Bulow was  to the  French  c a r e f u l to warn h i s agent, however, not  encourage the S u l t a n to expect German support i n a war 1  F r a n c e , but y e t the S u l t a n was F r e n c h demands.  to be encouraged to r e s i s t  The S u l t a n decided  Assembly of Notables  with  to c a l l  together  to examine what steps should be  the  an taken. 2  Kuhlmann approved t h i s step as a " s k i l f u l  a n t i - F r e n c h move."  I n order to strengthen h i s hand a g a i n s t  France,  Bulow sought to win  the support of P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt  Morocoan q u e s t i o n .  As Germany and U n i t e d S t a t e s had  i n the cooperated  c o r d i a l l y i n p r e s e r v i n g the "open door" i n China, Billow endeavoured to extend  this effort  to Morocco, and  to win  U n i t e d S t a t e s to h i s s i d e a g a i n s t France and B r i t a i n . February  25 he i n v i t e d Roosevelt  On  to u n i t e w i t h Germany i n  a d v i s i n g the S u l t a n that the c a l l i n g of the Notables was c o r r e c t move i n f o r t i f y i n g h i s government and reforms. agreed  the  a  i n inaugurating  Although not i n t e r e s t e d i n Morocoo, the P r e s i d e n t  to i n s t r u c t the American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Tangier  to  keep i n c l o s e touch with h i s German c o l l e a g u e . T h i s answer s a t i s f i e d the German Government, f o r they now f e l t assured o f 3 R o o s e v e l t ' s moral support. 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I , 183. 2. I b i d . , 182. 3. Anderson, op. c i t . , 185.  0  68  On March 10 a note was  sent to the S u l t a n s t a t i n g ,  that although the German Government r e a l i z e d that h i s country must be r e o r g a n i z e d , Germany hopes that the rumours of a p r o s p e c t i v e change i n e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s i n Morocco - equal r i g h t s and freedom f o r a l l n a t i o n s - are unfounded; Germany would disapprove o f such a change. Germany and the U n i t e d S t a t e s are f a v o u r a b l y i n c l i n e d towards the maintenance of the present o o n d i t i o n s ..... the a t t i t u d e of the other Powers i s not d e f i n i t e l y known. (1) Germany here showed h e r B t r o n g d i s a p p r o v a l of the whole a c t i o n , and committing  French  sought to augment Moroccan r e s i s t a n c e without h e r s e l f to any d e f i n i t e  policy.  When s p e a k i n g i n the R e i c h s t a g on March 15,  the  C h a n c e l l o r i n t i m a t e d that Germany intended t a k i n g steps to defend h e r Moroccan i n t e r e s t s .  He s t a t e d :  I understand e n t i r e l y the a t t i t u d e which i s g i v e n here to events i n and around Morocco. I regard i t as a duty o f the German Government to see that ..... our economic i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco are not i n j u r e d . (2) At t h i s same time a most dramatic coup was  being  planned. H o l s t e i n has been charged as the moving s p i r i t behind 3 t h i s , but i n h i s memoirs Bulow takes unto h i m s e l f the f u l l 4 responsibility. a trip use  In the s p r i n g o f 1905  i n the Mediterranean,  and  i t was  the K a i s e r was now  suggested  planning that he  the o p p o r t u n i t y to l a n d at Tangier to v i s i t the S u l t a n .  The K a i s e r , i n keeping w i t h h i s past p o l i c y w i t h r e g a r d to 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 185. 8. I b i d . , 186. 3. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 220; P a l e c l o g u e , op. c i t . , 289, Hamman, Otto, The World P o l i c y of Germany, 1890-1912, (London, 1927), 149. 4. Bulow, P r i n c e von, Memoirs,(London,1931),II,107. Debidour blames the K a i s e r ; op. c i t . , I I , 17.  -69Morocco, had  1 f o r t h i s under talcing, but  small i n c l i n a t i o n  persuaded by Billow to agree.  In order to prevent  the  was  ruler  changing h i s mind the C h a n c e l l o r had the newspapers announce the forthcoming v i s i t .  In answer to o b j e c t i o n s of the Kaiser,  he wrote the same day,  "Your Majesty's  embarrass M. Deloasse,  t r a v e r s e h i s schemes, and f u r t h e r our  business i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco." "For apart from the f a c t  visit  to Tangier  will.  A few days l a t e r he wrote;  that the s y s t e m a t i c  e x c l u s i o n of a l l  non-French merchants and promoters from Morocoo a c c o r d i n g to the example o f Tunis would s i g n i f y an important  economic l o s s  f o r Germany, i t i s also a want of a p p r e c i a t i o n of our power when M. Delcasse has not c o n s i d e r e d  i t worth the e f f o r t  n e g o t i a t e w i t h Germany over h i s Moroccan p l a n s . 3 has  completely  i g n o r e d us In t h i s  The Emperor had  agreed  M.  to  Delcasse'  affair." to the p l a n , but when he  l e a r n e d from the newspapers that the Tangier p o p u l a t i o n p l a n n i n g to e x p l o i t h i s v i s i t  a g a i n s t the French,he wrote to  Billow; "Telegraph a t once to Tangier whether I l a n d , and tourist;  that i t i s most d o u b t f u l  only t r a v e l l i n g i n c o g n i t o as a 4  t h e r e f o r e no audiences,  however, p o i n t e d out had  that I am  no r e c e p t i o n s . "  The  that a p u b l i c announcement o f the  a l r e a d y been made, and  was  i f i t was  now  g i v e n up  Chanoellor, visit  i t might  appear that the p l a n s had been changed owing to p r e s s u r e 1. Bulow, op. c i t . , I I , 106. 2. Bulow to the Emperor, March 20, 1905, I l l , 223. 3. C i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 187. 4. C i t e d i n Fay, op. c i t . , I, 183.  from  Dugdale, op. c i t . ,  -70France. at  W i l l i a m a g a i n consented, though at L i s b o n , and even  the l a s t moment i n the harbour a t Tangier, he h e s i t a t e d once 1  more.  But he f i n a l l y y i e l d e d and c a r r i e d out the programme  ot he rs had arranged p l a y h i s dramatic  f o r him.  role.  I t was on March 31 he landed to  The o b j e c t o f the v i s i t had been  p r e v i o u s l y e x p l a i n e d i n the R e i c h s t a g by Bulow on March 29, when he d e c l a r e d : A year ago the K a i s e r t o l d the K i n g o f Spain that Germany does not s t r i v e f o r t e r r i t o r y i n Morocco. I t i s t h e r e f o r e u s e l e s s to a t t r i b u t e to- the Tangier v i s i t any s e l f i s h purpose d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t i t s i n t e g r i t y or independence. No one who does not pursue an a g g r e s s i v e g o a l can f i n d cause f o r apprehension. We have economic i n t e r e s t s , and i n Morocco, as i n China, i t i s to our i n t e r e s t s to keep the open door. ( 2 ) . Onethe K a i s e r ' s a r r i v a l a t Tangier r e c e p t i o n o f the f o r e i g n diplomats  there was a  at which the French charge  d ' a f f a i r e s unexpectedly made a speech as i f he were welcoming the K a i s e r to Morocco i n the name of France,  s t a t i n g that h i s  government had no thought o f i n f r i n g i n g upon the economic e q u a l i t y o f other n a t i o n s . brusquely  The K a i s e r r e p l i e d somewhat  that he would d e a l d i r e c t l y w i t h the S u l t a n as a  r u l e r of an independent country and would secure  satisfaction  for  h i s own j u s t c l a i m s , and expected that these would be 3 r e s p e c t e d a l s o by France. 1. Schoen to the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , March 31,1905, Pugdale, op. c i t . ,111,224. Ludwig, op. c i t . ,286-87 . 2. C i t e d i n Gooch, op. c i t . , 352. 3. Brandenburg, op.cit.,221; Anderson,op.cit.,194. See a l s o Newton, op. c i t . , 332-33, who r e l a t e s a c o n v e r s a t i o n which the K a i s e r had w i t h P r i n c e L o u i s of Battenburg on A p r i l 1 i n which-he unbosomed h i m s e l f f r e e l y on the s u b j e c t o f h i s v i s i t i n h i s well-known s t y l e . This c o n v e r s a t i o n was l a t e r r e p o r t e d to Lansdowne by K i n g Edward. The K a i s e r s a i d : " I went to Tangier f o r the  -71-  I n an address  to the German colony he  said,  "I am happy to s a l u t e the devoted p i o n e e r s of ..German i n d u s t r y and commerce who a i d me i n my task of m a i n t a i n i n g the i n t e r e s t s of the F a t h e r l a n d i n a f r e e country. The Empire has great and growing i n t e r e s t s i n Morocoo. Commerce can only p r o g r e s s i f a l l the Pbwers are c o n s i d e r e d to have equal r i g h t s under the s o v e r e i g n t y o f the S u l t a n , and compatible with the independence of the c o u n t r y . My v i s i t i s a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s independence." (1) The  theme of t h i s address was  f u r t h e r developed  i n a speech  d e l i v e r e d to the S u l t a n ' s uncle and P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y . "My v i s i t i s to show my r e s o l v e to do a l l i n my power to safeguard German i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco. C o n s i d e r i n g the S u l t a n as a b s o l u t e l y f r e e , I wish to d i s c u s s "with him the means to secure these i n t e r e s t s . As f o r the reforms he contemplates i t seems to me he should proceed w i t h great c a u t i o n . " (2) The K a i s e r ' s v i s i t  and h i s speeches"at  c r e a t e d a s e n s a t i o n throughout Europe. by t h i s for  t h e a t r i c a l step?  Tangier  What d i d Germany mean  The r e a l o b j e c t of the v i s i t  the p u b l i c at l a r g e shrouded i n mystery, and  n a t u r a l l y gave r i s e to the w i l d e s t o f rumors.  was  t h i s very  Bulow, h i m s e l f ,  c o n t r i b u t e d to t h i s by h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s to the F o r e i g n O f f i c e on March 24 to g i v e out no explanations whatsoever to f o r e i g n 3 diplomats I t was  should  they make i n q u i r i e s , but  to " p l a y the Sphinx."  most commonly h e l d i n P a r i s and i n London that Germany  express purpose of t e l l i n g the French m i n i s t e r what my views were. I s a i d , 'I know n o t h i n g o f any agreement between France and Morocco. For me, the S u l t a n i s an independent s o v e r e i g n . I am determined not to have a r e p e t i t i o n of what happened i n T u n i s .... When the m i n i s t e r t r i e d to argue w i t h me I s a i d , "Good morning," and l e f t him s t a n d i n g . ' " Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 340 Paleolbgue mentions t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n , 279. 1. C i t e d i n Cambridge H i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 111,339. 8. I b i d , 330. 3. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 222.  -78was  seeking a q u a r r e l w i t h France, or was 1 d e s t r o y the E n t e n t e . As has been mentioned to show that Germany was  endeavouring  above, t h e r e i s no  seeking such ends.  to  evidence  The purpose  of  the German l e a d e r s seems to have been to uphold German p r e s t i g e , to show that Germany was not w i l l i n g to be l e f t out where her i n t e r e s t s were concerned, to check French p e n t r a t i o n i n Morocco u n t i l Germany's consent had been o b t a i n e d or bought by means o f concessions elsewhere.  The French p r e s s had spoken openly of 8  s e t t i n g up a second Tunis i n Morocco, and c e r t a i n l y French p o l i c y seemed to be tending i n that d i r e c t i o n .  Germany b e l i e v e d ,  and not without reason, that u n l e s s she e n t e r e d an emphatic Morocoo would be e n t i r e l y l o s t  to France.  I t i s Important  protest, to  r e a l i z e that Delcasse' had not purchased Germany's assent to French p o l i c y .  He had assured h i m s e l f o f the g o o d w i l l o f I t a l y ,  Spain,and Great B r i t a i n , b u t he had t o t a l l y d i s r e g a r d e d Germany as a f a c t o r i n Moroccan a f f a i r s , d e e p i t e her great economic i n t e r e s t s there and h e r s i g n i n g of the Madrid T r e a t y , and 3 d e s p i t e the f a c t that o f a l l Powers her p r i d e was  most  sensitive.  1. Ewart, op. cllfc., 7,74, Supra. 57. 8. Cambridge H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , op. c l t. ,111,339. 3. laniEflW Mr. G.P. Gooch censures Great B r i t a i n f o r her p a r t i n d i s r e g a r d i n g German i n t e r e s t s . He s t a t e s : " I t i s r e g r e t t a b l e that the B r i t i s h c a b i n e t d i d not p e r c e i v e - or at any r a t e d i d not h e l p France to p e r c e i v e - the wisdom o f s e c u r i n g German consent by a " s o l a t i u m . " Though the S e c r e t T r e a t i e s o f 1904 r e s e r v e d no share f o r Great B r i t a i n i n the c o n t i n g e n t p a r t i t i o n o f Morocoo, and though I t has been argued that i t was reasonable f o r the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s to make a l t e r n a t i v e arrangements i n the event o f Morocoo c o l l a p s i n g from i n t e r n a l weakness, our share i n a t r a n s a c t i o n which suggested d o u b l e - d e a l i n g i n v o l v e s the B r i t i s h Government i n p a r t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c r i s e s o f 1905 and 1911." Cambridge H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y , op. c i t . , I l l , 340.  73-  Though the Tangier v i s i t was t o b r i n g about many unexpected for  and unhappy r e s u l t s i t d i d have the d e s i r e d r e s u l t  Germany o f making France aware that she could no l o n g e r  d i s r e g a r d the Empire i n Morocoo.  On Maroh 31, the day o f the  K a i s e r ' s l a n d i n g , Delcasse' d e c l a r e d i n the Senate: Nothing i n our Moroccan p o l i c y /'nothing i n our execution o f the accords o f A p r i l 8, and October 3, 1904, can e x p l a i n the movements o f the German p r e s s .... You may l e g i t e m a t e l y hope that i n the western b a s i n o f the Mediterranean .... Franoe w i l l succeed, without i g n o r i n g any r i g h t , without i n j u r i n g any i n t e r e s t , i n a s s u r i n g her f u t u r e . ( I ) At was  the same time he i n s t r u c t e d M. Saint-Rene still  T a i l l a n d i e r , who  c a r r y i n g on h i s n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the S u l t a n , to warn  the monarch a g a i n s t f o l l o w i n g the p r o p o s a l s put forward i n the German p r e s s f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference to d i s c u s s Moroccan  a affairs.  He f e l t  i t was wise a l s o to now open up n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h B e r l i n f o r an understanding w i t h r e g a r d to Morocco, and he made e f f o r t s to approach i n d i r e c t l y the German Government w i t h t h i s end i n view.  On A p r i l 7 he s t a t e d p u b l i c l y i n the French  Chamber that ''France was ready to d i s s i p a t e any misunderstandings 3 whioh .... may s t i l l  exist."  On A p r i l 13, w h i l e d i n i n g a t the  German Embassy, he r e p e a t e d t h i s o f f e r to P r i n c e R a d o l i n , and d i s c u s s e d w i t h him French p o l i c y i n Morocco, p o i n t i n g out that freedom  o f commerce f o r a l l n a t i o n s was safeguarded i n the 4 agreements made w i t h England and S p a i n . Immediately a f t e r , the 1. C i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 198. 2. I b i d . , 198. 3. I b i d . , 199. 4. I b i d . , 199; P a l e o l o g u e , op. c i t . , 290-91.  -74B r i t l s h Government was  asked  "to help convince the Emperor 1  that German i n t e r e s t s were i n no way M. D e l c a s s e was  t h r e a t e n e d " l n Morocco.  g r e a t l y handicapped  i n c a r r y i n g out  h i s p o l i c i e s at t h i s time because he d i d not have the l o y a l 2 support of e i t h e r the p u b l i c or o f h i s government.  The ff«Ssr  ;  that he had blundered and aroused German enmity, the feac; of c o m p l i c a t i o n s with might r e s u l t , a l o n g with, p o l i t i c a l  jealousy,  aroused by h i s l o n g tenure of o f f i c e and a d i s l i k e of h i s s e c r e t i v e n e s s , a l l combined a g a i n s t him.  He was  a t t a c k e d by  a l l p a r t i e s as w e l l as h i s c o l l e a g u e s ; h a r d l y a v o i c e was i n h i s support.  raised  On A p r i l 22 he o f f e r e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n , but 3  r e c o n s i d e r e d i t on the appeals of P r e s i d e n t l o u b e t and P a u l Cambon who  was  in Paris.  M. Rouvier h a l f - h e a r t e d l y supported  the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , but assured the Chamber that i n f u t u r e  4 he would p e r s o n a l l y s u p e r v i s e f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . o p i n i o n f o r c e d an almost German menace.  Thus p u b l i c  complete s u r r e n d e r i n the f a c e of a  I t remained, however, to be seen how  f a r France  would y i e l d b e f o r e h e r d e s i r e f o r peace would c o n f l i c t w i t h her n a t i o n a l honour. I f the K a i s e r ' s dramatic a s s e r t i o n s at T a n g i e r had 1. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , A p r i l 27,1905;B.D.,111,No.80,p.67, f o r c e d Hote Prance reco e r her Moroccan p ro 'l si c ynote. , they a l s o f o r c e d ( 1 ) to . See a lnssoi dHo.90,p.73, edito 2. Hale, O.J.* Germany and the D i p l o m a t i c R e v o l u t i o n , ( P h i l a d e l p h i a , 1931), Chapter V. Pale'ologue, o p . c l t . , 293, 296; P o r t e r ,C.W.,The Career of Theophile Delcasse , ( P h i l a d e l p h i a , 1936), 232-33. 3. Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 300; P o r t e r , op. c i t . , 239^40. 4. P o r t e r , op. c i t . , 239. 7  -75Germany now  to take p o s i t i v e a c t i o n i n that q u e s t i o n .  As  H o l s t e i n s a i d , a r e t r e a t would stand on the same l e v e l w i t h 1 n  Olmutz and cause Fashoda to be f o r g o t t e n . " decided on the f o l l o w i n g p o l i c y :  Bulow had  to continue denying  now any  t e r r i t o r i a l a m M t i o n s i n Morocco, to demand economic e q u a l i t y f o r a l l n a t i o n s , to i n s i s t upon an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i k e that at Madrid i n 1880 2 Moroccan reform.  No  conference  t o d i s c u s s the whole q u e s t i o n of  separate n e g o t i a t i o n s with France would  be c o n s i d e r e d . Had German p o l i c y with regard to Morocco not been so w i d e l y proclaimed t o the world a t T a n g i e r , and i n so t h e a t r i c a l a f a s h i o n , there i s l i t t l e  doubt t h a t the German  Government could have obtained compensations from France s e t t l e d o u t s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s with the R e p u b l i c . 3 was  w i l l i n g to s e t t l e such d i f f e r e n c e s ,  to o f f e r p r o p o s a l s to t h i s e f f e c t .  Delcasse'  and Rouvier was  later  Germany, however, i n s i s t e d  always on the conference as the b e s t means o f s e t t l i n g question.  and  the  Bulow d i d not doubt t h a t the p r o p o s a l f o r a  conference would be accepted, and t h a t the conference on would r e f u s e to t u r n Morocco over to France.  meeting  W r i t i n g to the  K a i s e r on A p r i l 14, he s a i d : In case a conference meets, we are a l r e a d y c e r t a i n o f the d i p l o m a t i c support o f America i n favour of the open door .... A u s t r i a w i l l not q u a r r e l w i t h us over Morocco .... R u s s i a i s busy w i t h h e r s e l f .... _. —g • •— 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 202. 2. Bulow to the Emperor, A p r i l 4, 1905, Dugdale, o p . c i t . , I l l , 224. 3. Supra 73; A l s o , L e s t e r to Lansdowne, A p r i l 21, 1905, B.D. I l l , No. 89, p.72; and B e r t i e to Lansdowne, A p r i l 27, 1905. I b i d , No.84, p.68. Renouvin, o p . c i t . , 71.  -76The E n g l i s h Government - between Roosevelt and those E n g l i s h groups whioh t h i n k as the "Morning P o s t , " "Manchester Guardian" and l o r d Rosebery(I) - w i l l n o t stir. S p a i n i s o f no Importance, and a l s o has a s t r o n g p a r t y i n favour of the s t a t u s quo. We should c e r t a i n l y be able to h o l d I t a l y i n o r d e r .... I f Franee r e f u s e s the conference she w i l l put h e r s e l f i n wrong towards a l l the S i g n a t o r y Powers (2) and thereby w i l l g i v e England, Spain and I t a l y a probably welcome excuse to withdraw. (3) On A p r i l 9 i t was  decided to send Count  Tattenbach  to Fez to combat the e f f o r t s of the French m i s s i o n under T a i l l a n d i e r , and  to win  the S u l t a n ' s approval of a  conference.  At the same time, by messages to the S u l t a n , Bulow sought to prevent him from making any d e c i s i o n s before the Count a r r i v e d . Bulow r e a l i z e d that i f the French S u l t a n ' s acceptance  succeeded i n g a i n i n g the  o f t h e i r p r o p o s a l s f o r reforms  German p o l i o y would be f r u s t r a t e d .  the  entire  On A p r i l IS, by means o f  a o i r c u l a r d i s p a t c h to the S i g n a t o r y Powers of the  Madrid  T r e a t y , he e x p l a i n e d Germany's stand and proposed the r e f e r e n o e 4 o f the whole q u e s t i o n to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l Meanwhile what was  conference.  the B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n to t h i s  situation?  Both the Government and the p u b l i c b e l i e v e d t h a t  Germany was  s t r i k i n g as much at Great B r i t a i n as a t France i n  1. These three had c r i t i c i z e d the Anglo-French a c c o r d . 2. R e f e r r i n g to those Powers which had signed the T r e a t y of Madrid i n 1880. 3. Bulow to W i l l i a m I I , A p r i l 4, 1905, o i t e d i n Anderson, o p . c i t . , 203. 4. For t h i s d i s p a t c h see Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 774-75.  77I n an e f f o r t to break the Entente. expressed  by K i n g Edward, who  B r i t i s h f e e l i n g was  well  wrote i n d i g n a n t l y on A p r i l  15  to L o r d Lansdowne: The Tangier i n c i d e n t was the most mischievous and u n c a l l e d f o r event which the German Emperor has ever engaged i n s i n c e he came to the t h r o n e . I t was a l s o a t h e a t r i c a l f i a s c o , and l f he thinks he has done h i m s e l f good i n the eyes of the world he i s very much mistaken. He i s no more or l e s s than a p o l i t i c a l "enfant t e r r i b l e , * and one can have no f a i t h i n any of h i s assurances. His own p l e a s u r e seems to wish to set every country by the e a r s . (1) 1  The  c r i t i c i s m by L o r d Lansdowne was  l e t t e r to L a s c e l l e s on A p r i l 9 he  no  l e s s severe.  In a  wrote:  I am a f r a i d that we can h a r d l y r e g a r d t h i s Tangier e b u l l i t i o n as an i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t . There can be no doubt t h a t the K a i s e r was much annoyed by the Anglo-French Agreement, and probably even more so by our r e f u s a l to vamp up some agreement o f the same k i n d w i t h Germany over the E g y p t i a n q u e s t i o n . We s h a l l , I have l i t t l e doubt, f i n d that the K a i s e r a v a i l s h i m s e l f of every o p p o r t u n i t y to put spokes i n our wheels, and convince those who are watching the p r o g r e s s o f the game that he means to take an important part i n i t . My impression i s that the German Government have r e a l l y no cause f o r complaint e i t h e r of us or the French i n r e g a r d to the Morocoo p a r t of the Agreement. We made no s e c r e t of i t s e x i s t e n c e . I t d e a l t e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h French and B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco, and so f a r as the other Powers were concerned, i t p r o v i d e d adequate s e c u r i t y f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and f o r the i n t e g r i t y o f Morocco i t s e l f . What e l s e does the K a i s e r want? (2) What was K a i s e r suggested  c o n s i d e r e d the t h r e a t e n i n g a t t i t u d e o f the  to that a*dent s p i r i t , Admiral F i s h e r , a  "golden o p p o r t u n i t y " f o r making war 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 340. 2. C i t e d i n Hewton, op. c i t . ,  on Germany.  334.  In a l e t t e r  76> to it  Lord Lansdowne on A p r i l 22 he a c t u a l l y undertook that i f  came about, we could have the German F l e e t , the K i e l 1 and S o h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n w i t h i n a f o r t n i g h t . " ft  Canal,  The B r i t i s h Government f e a r e d f o r a time t h a t Germany was  s e e k i n g a p o r t i n Morocco, and was  the r e a l i z a t i o n o f such an o b j e c t i v e .  v e r y anxious to cheek On A p r i l 22 Lord Lansdowne  wrote to B e r t i e i n P a r i s w i t h r e g a r d to t h i s matter: I t seems to me not u n l i k e l y that German Government may ask f o r a p o r t on the Moorish c o a s t . You are a u t h o r i z e d to inform M i n i s t e r f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s that we should be prepared to j o i n French Government i n o f f e r i n g s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n to such a p r o p o s a l and to beg that i f question i s r a i s e d French Government w i l l a f f o r d us a f u l l o p p o r t u n i t y of c o n f e r r i n g w i t h them as to steps which might be taken to meet i t . German a t t i t u d e i n t h i s d i s p u t e seems to me most unreasonable having r e g a r d to M. D e l c a s s e * s a t t i t u d e , and we d e s i r e to g i v e him a l l the support we can. (2) On A p r i l 24 B e r t i e communicated these views of L o r d Lansdowne to M. B e l c a s s ^ , but  i n h i s d r a f t of the  communication  he seems to have gone a l i t t l e f u r t h e r than d i d h i s c h i e f , g i v i n g g r e a t e r emphasis to the o f f e r of B r i t i s h  support.  The B r i t i s h Government f i n d s that the conduct of Germany i n the Moroccan question i s most unreasonable i n view o f M. Delcasse'*s a t t i t u d e , and i t d e s i r e s to g i v e h i s E x c e l l e n c y a l l the support i n i t s power. I t seems not improbable t h a t the German Government may ask f o r a p o r t on the Moroccan c o a s t . In that event the B r i t i s h Government would be w i l l i n g to j o i n the French Government i n o f f e r i n g s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n to such a p r o p o s a l , and i t asks M. Delcasse', i n case the question i s r a i s e d , to g i v e the British-Government f u l l opportunity to concert w i t h the French Government upon the measures whioh might be taken to meet that demand. (3) 1. C i t e d i n Newton, op. c i t . , 334-5. 2. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , A p r i l 22, 1905, B.D.Ill,No.90,472-73. 3. D r a f t by B e r t i e , A p r i l 24,1905,Ibid,No.91,pp.73-74.  -79M. Delcasse' was"very g r a t e f u l B r i t i s h support.  1 1 1  f o r this offer o f  He denied that Germany had made a request  f o r a Moroccan p o r t , but promised.to  communicate w i t h the  B r i t i s h Government i f such a request should be made, and to warn the S u l t a n against making any concessions  to Germany.  By  the o f f e r o f support from B r i t a i n Delcasse' f e l t encouraged to h o l d to h i s p o l i c y i n s p i t e o f Germany's o p p o s i t i o n , and i n s p i t e o f the l a c k o f support from h i s own people. He was hot supported, however, by h i s premier,  M.  Rouvier* who as w e l l as being premier, had assumed a g e n e r a l 2 c o n t r o l over f o r e i g n p o l i c y s i n c e A p r i l .  M. R o u v i e r was much  more c a u t i o u s than the d a r i n g Delcasse^ he was e s s e n t i a l l y a man o f peace, and f e a r e d an open c o n f l i c t w i t h Germany. of B r i t i s h  support d i d l i t t l e  Offers  to q u i e t h i s f e a r s , s i n c e he r e a l i z e d  that the B r i t i s h navy " d i d not have wheels." p e r s o n a l l y i n the question to attempt  He now i n t e r v e n e d  a settlement w i t h Germany.  In c o n v e r s a t i o n s with P r i n c e R a d o l i n on A p r i l 26 and A p r i l 28 he s t a t e d that the i d e a o f a conference was not acceptable to Prance.  He suggested  o f the proposed  that i f B e r l i n was w i l l i n g , the purpose  conference might be served by sending a French  c i r c u l a r note to a l l the S i g n a t o r y Powers, and i f the m a j o r i t y o f those Powers were opposed to French a c t i o n i n Morocoo, i t would not be c a r r i e d out.  A g a i n and again he endeavoured to  l e a r n what concessions Germany would ask f o r r e l i n q u i s h i n g h e r demand f o r a conference, and showed h i m s e l f ready  to e n t e r i n t o  1. B e r t i e to Lansdowne, A p r i l 26, 1905, D.D.,III,No.92, p.74 2. Supra. 74.  a g e n e r a l agreement concerning d i s p u t e d c o l o n i a l  1 question®.  But s i n c e Germany had so w i d e l y p r o c l a i m e d her d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s i n Morocco she was sations.  not i n a p o s i t i o n  to n e g o t i a t e f o r compen-  Moreover, i t would have meant now  sacrificing  S u l t a n to the French, a f t e r having encouraged him them.  Thus Germany was  f o r c e d t o continue  the r o u t e on which she had  to r e s i s t  travelling  along  set out.  Meanwhile the German Government had sought of  the  the a i d  the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n overcoming the r e s i s t a n c e of France  and B r i t a i n to the h o l d i n g of the conference.  I t was  felt  that the a t t i t u d e o f B r i t a i n would be g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by that o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h e r e f o r e Germany asked £  P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt on A p r i l 5 f o r h i s support.  On A p r i l 85  x  the German ambassador i n Washington again wrote the President," s a y i n g that  the Emperor would be most g r a t e f u l i f he  would i n t i m a t e to England  that he would l i k e  (Roosevelt)  to see England  and  1. Anderson, op. c i t . , £18-819; Hamman, op. c i t . , 166; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 3£3. Ludwig, op. c i t . , 359. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that Bulow and H o l s t e i n concealed from W i l l i a m I I , M. Rouvier's o f f e r s o f a d i r e c t FrancoGerman agreement. They d o u b t l e s s f e l t that he, who was no v e r y sound supporter of t h e i r Morocoan p o l i c y , might aooept. In t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s probable a t t i t u d e they were c o r r e c t . Some years l a t e r when the K a i s e r came to l e a r n o f M. Rouvier's o f f e r s and t h e i r r e j e c t i o n by Bulow, he wrote, " I f I had been t o l d about t h i s , I should have gone i n t o i t thoroughly, and that i d i o t i c conference would never have taken p l a c e . " See H i c o l s o n , op. c i t . , 166. 8. Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, (Hew York, 1980), I , 468. Jusserand, J . J . , What M B e f e l l , (London, 1933), 314-15. We might note i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n that the U n i t e d S t a t e s had s i g n e d the Madrid Convention of 1880. e  -811 Germany I n harmony In t h e i r d e a l i n g w i t h Morocco. On May  13 another memorandum was  sent to R o o s e v e l t ,  i n s i s t i n g on the n e c e s s i t y of the conference and 2 of E n g l i s h o p p o s i t i o n . d e c l a r e d " t h a t England conference,  Again, on May  0  complaining  31 a t h i r d memorandum  i s the o n l y Power which opposes such a  though i t seems she w i l l drop her o b j e c t i o n s i n a  case you should p a r t i c i p a t e i n the  conference."  R o o s e v e l t ' s a t t i t u d e can best be gathered from l e t t e r he wrote to T a f t , the a c t i n g S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e .  the It  c o n t a i n e d the f o l l o w i n g : I do not f e e l that as a Government we should i n t e r f e r e i n the Morocoo matter. We have other f i s h to f r y , and we have no r e a l i n t e r e s t i n Morocoo. I do not c a r e to take s i d e s between Prance and Germany i n the matter. At the same time i f I can f i n d out what Germany wants I s h a l l be g l a d to o b l i g e her i f p o s s i b l e , and I am s i n c e r e l y anxious to b r i n g about a b e t t e r s t a t e of f e e l i n g between England and Germany. Each n a t i o n i s working i t s e l f up to a c o n d i t i o n o f desperate h a t r e d o f the o t h e r ; each from sheer fear of the o t h e r . (4) I n a l e t t e r to the German ambassador on the same date he r e i t e r a t e d that the U n i t e d S t a t e s had no interest  direct  i n Morocco, but o f f e r e d to serve as a mediator  between  Germany and Great B r i t a i n - "to sound the B r i t i s h Government 5 and f i n d out what i t s views a r e . "  1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  Bishop, Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,  op. c i t . , 469. 471. 472. 474.  I,  469.  82The B r i t i s h Government proved most u n w i l l i n g to accept the mediation o f the P r e s i d e n t and assured him t h e i r ambassador that there was.no i d e a i n England  through  of attacking 1  Germany or of a n t i c i p a t i n g a German a t t a c k on England. German Government, however, was  The  encouraged by the a t t i t u d e o f  R o o s e v e l t , f o r i t seemed to p l a c e the U n i t e d S t a t e s on the s i d e o f Germany. D i s t r e s s e d by the German r e j e c t i o n s o f French and f e a r f u l o f war,  offers,  M. Rouvier went a step f a r t h e r to meet  Germany by o f f e r i n g a t the end o f A p r i l  to get r i d of Delcasse',  s u g g e s t i n g that i t c o u l d be done over some domestic 2 w i t h i n the course of the next few weeks.  In s p i t e o f  o f f e r Germany proved u n w i l l i n g to e f f e c t a d i r e c t Meanwhile, she was  difficulty this  settlement.  p r e s s i n g Spain and I t a l y as w e l l 3  as the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r support.  Then on May  13 Count  Tattenbach a r r i v e d i n Fez to persuade the S u l t a n to r e s i s t French demands.  A few days l a t e r he  reported that M.  the  Delcasse'  had i n s t r u c t e d the French m i n i s t e r to i s s u e a v e i l e d t h r e a t o f v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t Morocoo should the S u l t a n agree to a 4 conference.  Bulow thereupon warned M. Rouvier a g a i n s t M.  Delcasse *s "stormy and v i o l eA np tr i Moroccan p o l iB.D. c y . " I l lP,u rKb.82, suing 1. Durand to lansdowne, l 26, 1905, pp.67-68. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 223. P o r t e r , op. c i t . , p.242. Anderson, op. c i t . , S19. Bulow to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , May 5, 1905; Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 227. 3. H i c o l s o n to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.87, p.70. E g e r t o n to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905. I b i d . , Ho.88, p.71. 4. Anderson, op. c i t . , 223; Bourgeois et Pages, op. c i t . , 309. The French m i n i s t e r , S a i n t Rene'-Tai H a n d i e r denies t h i s charge - see h i s l e t t e r to Rouvier, June 15,1905, c i t e d i n "Le L i v r e Jaune Sur Maroc," by V i c t o r B e r a r d , i n the La Revue de P a r i s , January I, 1906, 212. 7  -83t h i s matter  s t i l l f u r t h e r , the C h a n c e l l o r i n s t r u c t e d Herr  M i g u e l , c o u n c i l o r i n the German  Embassy at P a r i s , to inform  Rouvier amicably but f i r m l y that Delcasse would have to and  von M.  go,  that Franco-German r e l a t i o n s would not improve as l o n g as 1  he remained i n o f f i c e . On May  28 the S u l t a n r e j e c t e d the French  and gave h i s approval to the h o l d i n g o f an conference  to d i s c u s s Morocoan a f f a i r s .  French premier  proposals  international  Bulow then warned the  that s i n c e the S u l t a n had a c q u i e s c e d i n the  matter  o f German p o l i o y Germany would " f o l l o w up the consequences i f France c o n t i n u e d the p o l i c y of i n t i m i d a t i o n and v i o l e n c e 2 h i t h e r t o pursued was  by Delcasse'."  I n t h i s way  the German Government  attempting to f o r c e the d i s m i s s a l of the French  foreign  minister* But Delcasse', f e e l i n g sure of the support o f Great B r i t a i n and o f R u s s i a , h e l d out s t u b b o r n l y a g a i n s t the conference.  proposed  To h i s c o l l e a g u e s , however, t h i s p o l i c y seemed  f r a u g h t w i t h danger. German ultimatum,  The a i r was  t h i c k w i t h rumours of a  and w i t h t a l k of French unpreparedness f o r  war. At a meeting of the c a b i n e t on June 6, M. Delcasse', 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 224, Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 350. 2. The " G a u l o i s " p u b l i s h e d a r t i c l e s on June 9 and 17, 1905, a s s e r t i n g that P r i n c e Henckel von Donnersmarek had also been sent by the German Government to P a r i s about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcasse' must be d i s m i s s e d . See Bourgeois et Pages, op. c i t . , 310; Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , 21; Fabre-Luce, op. c i t . , 119. A u t h o r i t i e s seem to d i f f e r g r e a t l y on t h i s p o i n t . Some doubt the t r u t h of the f a c t s as p u b l i s h e d by the " G a u l o i s , " and a t t r i b u t e the s t o r y to French j o u r n a l i s t i c i m a g i n a t i o n . See Fay, op. c i t . , I , 187, f o o t n o t e ; and Anderson, op. c i t . , 225, f o o t n o t e . Hale claims that the words a t t r i b u t e d to the P r i n c e were merely o p i n i o n s and rumours c u r r e n t i n P a r i s from June 6 to 17; o p . c i t . , chapter VI. On the other hand, P o r t e r , the b i o g r a p h e r of Delcasse*, suggests t h a t the P r i n c e was sent as a;  -84though aware of h i s i s o l a t i o n , s t o u t l y defended h i s p o l i c y of the past few y e a r s .  h i s stand  and  He claimed that i n an  exchange of notes with Great B r i t a i n he had r e c e n t l y r e c e i v e d an assurance  of armed support i n the event o f a German a t t a c k .  A s s e r t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a formal a l l i a n c e w i t h B r i t a i n , he urged  the acceptance  of the i d e a o f a conference.  o f her o f f e r and  agree  refusal  of the B r i t i s h o f f e r would  w i t h Germany, and f e l t  to the conference.  the  M. Rouvier and h i s o o l l e a g u e s  h e l d , however, that the acceptance mean c e r t a i n war  Great  that France  should  Delcasse', a f t e r warning them that  such a weak p o l i c y would o n l y encourage German i n s o l e n c e , 1 resigned. The  " B r i t i s h o f f e r , " on the s t r e n g t h of which the  f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r was prepared  to r i s k a Franco-German war,  remained somewhat o f a p u z z l e to h i s t o r i a n s . 1905  In October  the "Matin" p u b l i s h e d a s e r i e s of r e v e l a t i o n s  the f a l l o f Delcasse'. from him,  has  of  concerning  These i n c l u d e d the a s s e r t i o n , as coming  that he had been promised  by the B r i t i s h Government,  i n case of a German a t t a c k , that the B r i t i s h f l e e t would be m o b i l i z e d to s e i z e the K i e l Canal, and would land one 2 thousand  men  i n Schleswig-Holstein.  hundred  That such an o f f e r  ever made by, or on b e h a l f o f , the B r i t i s h Government  was  was  denied at the time by the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , and B r i t i s h l e a d e r s have always s i n c e denied that any o f f e r of an a l l i a n c e or  of  emissary o f the K a i s e r without the consent of the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e ; op. c i t . , 248-50. 1. Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , 22-24. Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 350-52; P o r t e r , op. c i t . , 258-60. 2. P o r t e r , op. c i t . , 262-63.  armed a s s i s t a n c e was  ever made to  In the middle complained  of May,  1 France.  1905,  M. P a u l Cambon had  to L o r d Lansdowne of the a t t i t u d e  Government.  He  of the German  s t a t e d that M. Delcasse regarded  the  situation  not as "profoundly a l a r m i n g , " but as " s u f f i c i e n t l y s e r i o u s to o c c a s i o n him much p r e o c c u p a t i o n . "  Lansdowne r e p l i e d  that the  moral to him seemed to be that each government (of France o f England) should continue to t r e a t  and  the other w i t h the most  a b s o l u t e mutual c o n f i d e n c e , that each should keep the  other  f u l l y informed o f e v e r y t h i n g which came to i t s knowledge, and should, so f a r as p o s s i b l e , d i s c u s s i n advance any by which i n the course of events 2  they s h o u l d f i n d  contingencies themselves  confronted. In an e f f o r t  to avoid misunderstandings  Lansdowne and  Cambon exchanged notes to v e r i f y the above c o n v e r s a t i o n .  Cambon,  i n h i s note dated May  said  24, r e f e r r e d to Lansdowne as h a v i n g  that .... i f the circumstances demanded i t , i f f o r example we had s e r i o u s reason to expect an unprovoked a g g r e s s i o n on the p a r t of a c e r t a i n Power, the B r i t i s h Government would be ready to c o n c e r t w i t h the F r e n c h Government on the measures to be taken. (3)  1. A s q u i t h , H.H., The Genesis of the War, (London, 1923), 90. See the w r i t t e n a s s e r t i o n of L o r d Sanderson, August 17, 1922, i n B.D.,III, No.105 ( a ) , p.87, and the comment by L o r d Lansdowne, A p r i l 4, 1927, Ho.105 ( b ) , p.87. L o r d Newton, the biographer of Lansdowne, s t a t e s , " t h e r e are no t r a c e s o f any such u n d e r t a k i n g i n Lord Lansdowne*s p r i v a t e papers." op. c i t . , 343. 2. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , May 17, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.94, p.76. D.D.F., 2 s . , V I , No.443, pp.522-23. 3. D.D.F., 2 s, 71, NO.455, pp.538-39. e e  86Landsowne, i n h i s note, dated May  25, sought to avoid suoh a  broad commitment, and s a i d i t was  the B r i t i s h d e s i r e  that there should be f u l l and c o n f i d e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n between the two Governments, not so much i n consequence o f some a c t s of unprovoked aggression on the p a r t of another Power, as i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f any c o m p l i c a t i o n s to be apprehended d u r i n g the somewhat 1 anxious p e r i o d through which we are at present p a s s i n g . In t r a n s m i t t i n g t h i s note remarked  to D e l c a s s e , Cambon  that the wording had been c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d by  the  B r i t i s h Government and had the approval of the Prime M i n i s t e r , A r t h u r B a l f o u r , and  that i t gave r e c o g n i t i o n o f lansdowne*s  w i l l i n g n e s s to d i s c u s s i n advance measures t o be taken i n view o f every c o n t i n g e n c y .  According  to the Ambassador's i n t e r p r e -  t a t i o n Lansdowne intended i t to a p p l y not  only i n the case o f  an unprovoked a g g r e s s i o n , as i n the French v e r s i o n , but every p o s s i b l e contingency.  This would mean i f France  the B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l , she might be l e d i n t o a g e n e r a l 2 which would be i n r e a l i t y an a l l i a n c e .  to acoepted  entente  Delcasse' and h i s a d v i s e r s i n the d i p l o m a t i c s e r v i c e seem to have given t h i s broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to Lansdowne*s 3 note. Having r e c e i v e d the B r i t i s h message and the comments of Cambon on May  30, Delcasse' at once t e l e g r a p h e d to the  latter:  1. B.D.III, No.95, p.77; D.D.F. 2 s . V I , No.465,pp.558-559. 2. D.D.F. 2 s , vT,No.415, pp.557-558; P a l e o l o g u e , o p . c i t . , p , 3 4 6 . 3. Maurois, op. c i t . , 176; Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 352; B a r r e r e , C a m i l l e , L a Chute da Delcasse*, Revue des Deux Mondes, August 1, 1932, 616. e  e  -87-  Say to L o r d Lansdowne that I am a l s o of the o p i n i o n that the two Governments should more than ever g i v e eaoh other t h e i r e n t i r e confidence and that I am ready to examine w i t h him a l l aspects of a s i t u a t i o n which does not f a i l to he a l i t t l e d i s q . u i e t i n g . (1) ,,  More than t h i s had  not been promised a t the  time.  On June 12 however, L a s c e l l e s , i n B e r l i n , informed L o r d Lansdowne that Bulow had  mentioned that the German Government  had  to the e f f e c t that B r i t a i n had made  received information  an o f f e r o f a d e f e n s i v e He r e p