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Anglo-French relations: 1898-1914 1937

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ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS: 1898-1914 by Eric Kelly A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History The University of Bri t i s h Columbia October - 1937 TABLE OF COETENTS page Introduction I-II. Chapter I The Departure from I s o l a t i o n . 1. Chapter II The Anglo-French Entente 23. Chapter III The Testing of the Entente -56. Chapter 17 The Further "Encirclement" of Germany? 118. Chapter V The Agadir C r i s i s , 1911 151. Chapter VI The Tightening- of the Entente Cordiale, 1918-1913 183. Chapter VII The Last Bays of Peace 231. Chapter VIII How B r i t a i n Entered the War 291. Bibliography I-XLIV. INTRODUCTION The period which this study covers, that of the years immediately preceding the World War, i s one to which many h i s t - orians have turned t h e i r attention. The diplomatic game of power-politics as i t was played hy governments i n these years, the fundamental causes of the War, and the problem of war g u i l t have furnished subjects for thousands of volumes. The various questions which have arisen probably never w i l l be solved to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l students of the period. But as Dr. P.W. Slosson reminds us, thi s should occasion no surprise, f o r there i s quite as wide a d i v e r s i t y of opinion over the merits of the wars of Napoleon, or those of Rome and Carthage. Nor does th i s fact of d i f f e r i n g opinions imply that investigation and discussion of the period are of no p r a c t i c a l valuei At least two important points have been attained. As a r e s u l t of h i s t o r - i c a l research, and with the opening of the archives of b e l l i g e r - ent Powers, scholars axe i n possession of most of the facts and written records which can contribute to more d e f i n i t e v e r d i c t s . Again, and more important, many of the extreme opinions widely held during the War, and i n the years following, have been d i s - 2 credited and replaced by more moderate views. Haile research has made scholars already aware of most of the problems which the period presents, writers w i l l for a 1» Slosson, P.W,, Europe Since 1870, (Boston, 1935), 332. 2. Ibid., 333. - I I - long time to come undoubtedly d i f f e r over the significance of c e r t a i n events and p a r t i c u l a r points, and w i l l d i f f e r e n t l y estimate the diplomatic blunders which prevented a peaceful settlement of the c r i s i s of the summer of 1.91.4» Most r e l i a b l e a u t h o r i t i e s seem to agree, however, on th i s one p o i n t — t h a t the catastrophe was the i o i n t product of a number of underlying causes,, some deeply rooted i n Europe*s past,, others of more recent o r i g i n . These are usually f i t t e d into a few general categories such as nationalism, imperialism, m i l i t a r i s m and the press;; the i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of diplomats to th e i r own parliaments or peoples; and f i n a l l y a system of secret a l l i - ances which divided Europe into two r i v a l camps. It i s the purpose of this study to trace the s i g n i f i - cance of the rftle o f the Anglo-French Entente i n the diplomat- i c background of the War, and more especially to ascertain to what extent i t was a factor i n bringing Great B r i t a i n , so long an adherent of the p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n from continental en- tanglements, Into the c o n f l i c t . I wish to acknowledge here my profound Indebtedness to Professor P. H. Soward, to whom I owe my Interest i n modern European h i s t o r y , and whose encouragement, suggestions and guidance have made thi s study possible. I must acknowledge also the kindness of the French Consul i n Vancouver, B. C», without whose generous g i f t to the Library of the University of B r i t i s h Columbia of the valuable Documents Diplomatiques Francais t h i s study could not have been undertaken. 5 CHAPTER I The Departure from I s o l a t i o n ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS 189.8-1914. CHAPTER. I The Departure From I s o l a t i o n . There can be no i n t e l l i g e n t understanding of the reasons for B r i t a i n ' s entry into the World War unless there i s a defin- i t e knowledge of the nature and development of, Anglo-French re- lations as they existed an June 28, 1914. It i s true that B r i t - a i n was engaged within the Entente i n relationships with Russia, as w e l l as with France,, but the Anglo-Russian rapprochement was never, as popular, i n England as the Anglo-French, Down to the outbreak of the War,; England s t e a d i l y viewed with disfavour the ch i e f aim, of Russian foreign p o l i c y - the seizure of the S t r a i t s and Constantinople. When the War broke out i t was not as an a l l y of Russia that B r i t a i n took up the swordw S i r Edward Grey p e r s i s t e n t l y refused to make a d i r e c t issue i n England the Austro-Serbian dispute which had involved Russia so deeply with Au s t r i a , In his memoirs he states, ttthe notion of being i n - volved i n a mar about a Balkan quarrel was repugnant....there 1 was no sentiment urging us to go into a war- on Serbia's behalf.'* Even the chauvinistic Bottomley journal, "John B u l l * , published a leading a r t i c l e i n the l a s t days under the heading, wTo H e l l 1. Viscount Grey of F allodon,. Twenty-five Tears,. (london, 19^25), I, 335. -2- 1 with Servia....,once more to H e l l with Servia.' 1 Nor. did England enter the War. primarily, because of the invasion of Belgium, by Germany,- despite the manner i n which propagandists, used this breach of neutrality to j u s t i f y the purity of B r i t a i n ' s motives i n the eyes of the p u b l i c . Grey had promised on August 2 to give Prance the protection of the B r i t i s h f l e e t i n the event of the German f l e e t coming into the Channel ox through the North Sea. to undertake h o s t i l e action against the French coast or shipping. This assurance was given before Germany had presented her ultimatum to Belgium, news of 2. which did not reach london u n t i l , the morning of August 3. Furthermore, Grey refused the proposal of the German ambassador to respect Belgian t e r r i t o r y on condition that England remain 3 neutral i n the coming struggle. One of the: main reasons why B r i t a i n was drawn into the War was because she was so closely bound to France by written and verba.1 promises, so bound by relationships which the Foreign Of f i c e had created, that Grey f e l t England must take part i n any 4 war i n which French security was menaced by, German aggression. 1. Cited In Barnes, H.E., The Genesis of the World War, (New York. -1927), 453. See Scott, J . F i , Five Weeks, (New York,, 1927), chapter IX, for a study of B r i t i s h public opinion and the press, during the c r i s i s of July, 1914. 2. Grey to Bertie, August 2,1914; Gooch & Temperley, B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, ( c i t e d hereafter as B.D.), (London, 192.7), XI, No. 487,, p.274. Fay, S.B., The Origins of the World War,, (New York, 1932), I I , 540. 3. Grey to Goschen, August 1,, 1914, B.D., XI, No.448, p.261. 4. Loreburn, E a r l , How the War Came, (London,, 1919 j , 16. D -3- In h i s memoirs Grey represents himself as regarding the o b l i - gation to aid France as re s t i n g more upon the conviction of the 1 interests of England than upon the debt of honour to France. Doubtless both f a c t o r s played a part i n h i s decision,, but he f e l t the obligation to aid France so keenly that he has con- fessed that he would have resigned i f he had not been able to 2 bring England into the c o n f l i c t . E a r l Loreburn, i n h i s book, "How. the War Camen, expresses England's p o s i t i o n i n August^ 1914, In t h i s ways When the most momentous decision of our- whole history had to be taken we were not free to decide. We entered upon a war to which we had heen commit- ted beforehand i n the dark, and Parliament found i t s e l f ; at two hours notice unable, had i t desired, to extricate us from t h i s f e a r f u l predicament. We went to war unprepared In a Hussian quarrel because we were t i e d to France.3 In the relationships between France and England as they existed In 1914 i s to be found the key to the understanding of B r i t a i n ' s r d l e i n the drama of July and August of that year. The roots from which these relationships grew reach back into the years before 1914. I t w i l l be necessary to go back over these years to discover what they were. Before the twentieth century England's t r a d i t i o n a l policy had for centuries been one of "splendid isolation.*• By maintaining a cool detachment to continental entanglements she hoped to enjoy the balance of power i n Europe between the r i v a l 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I I , 15,, 33-35. 2„ Ibid., I,, 312. 3. Loreburn, op. c i t . , 17. groups, and thus make her own influence i n either scale decis- ive. It was only at times when some one power sought to become overwhelmingly strong, or threatened to endanger B r i t i s h con- t r o l of. the Channel, or her maritime or c o l o n i a l supremacy, that England intervened a c t i v e l y and decisively i n European 1 a f f a i r s . This was the basis for her p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n wars against Spain i n the sixteenth century, against Louis XIV i n the seventeenth century, and against Prance and Hapoleon i n the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At other times she had r i g i d l y excluded h e r s e l f from continental, complications ' and taken a p o s i t i o n of i s o l a t i o n . In the years following the Franco-Prussian War she s t i l l adhered to her t r a d i t i o n a l policy The forming of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e i n 1882 between Germany, Austria and I t a l y , even though i t destroyed to a great er degree than did the Treaty of Frankfort the European balance of power, did not lead England to depart from her established p o l i c y . She manifested l i t t l e concern at the news of the great p o l i t i c a l combine erected by the Iron Chancellor. Although the A l l i a n c e further assured Germany of f i r s t place i n Europe, Eng- land, her insular p o s i t i o n secured by her invulnerable f l e e t , and primarily a maritime and c o l o n i a l power, was i n no way frightened. She believed h e r s e l f safe from danger, especially since at that time Germany w,as showing no great inte r e s t i n an overseas, empire or in the building of a f l e e t . Bismarck could say t r u t h f u l l y * 1. Headlam-Morley, James, Studies i n Diplomatic History, (Lon- don, 1930), Chapter VI, part I I , England and the Low Countries, 156 f f . . -5- As regards England we are i n the happy s i t u a t i o n of having no c o n f l i c t of interests,, except com- mercial r i v a l r y and passing differences such as must always arise;, hut there i s nothing that can bring about a. war between two p a c i f i c and hard- working nations. •"- But at the end of the nineteenth century B r i t a i n found i t necessary to reconsider her relationships to the Continent- al. Powers,; and i n the l i g h t of new factors i n the international sphere, to reconsider also the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of her foreign p o l i c y . Events of the previous years made such recon- sideration a necessity. By the l a s t decade of the century the forces of the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution which had come f i r s t to England had transformed the i n d u s t r i a l , commercial, and f i n a n c i a l l i f e of the Continent, Ho longer were the other Great Powers content to leave B r i t i s h supremacy i n the economic f i e l d unchallenged. Signs began to multiply of an imminent and widespread re v o l t against her h i t h e r t o unquestioned leadership. Since her supremacy mas held to be largely due to the "favoured place i n the sun'* which she had won for h e r s e l f i n so many parts of the world, the rev o l t began to involve a f i e r c e struggle for such ''places i n the sun" as were s t i l l l e f t open to occupation. This had far-reaching e f f e c t s on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y . . Hence- f o r t h the f i e l d to be covered by diplomacy in the conduct of International a f f a i r s , instead of being confined as i t had been since the Napoleonic Wars mainly to the Continent of Europe and the adjoining regions of Asia, extended rapidly, to every part of the globe. 1., Cited i n Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War 1870-1914, (New Haven, 1916),, 134, footnote. However detached. Britain, might he from the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of Europe, the protection of her imperial i n t e r e s t s and trade routes brought her into contact and often into c o l - l i s i o n with the c o l o n i a l aspirations of other Powers. Inter- national diplomacy s t i l l had i t s base i n Europe, and i t was s t i l l c h i e f l y preoccupied with the maintenance of the old European equilibrium, but i t s outposts now stretched to the remotesta parts of the earth, and every extension of European power beyond the seas was apt to react upon the delicate equi- poise of power i n Europe * Aa a res u l t B r i t a i n became involved i n dangerous controversies with France and Eussia, and while she continued f a i r l y f r i e n d l y towards-Germany there was some- times inevitable f r i c t i o n with that Power also. It was not u n t i l a f t e r the conclusion o f the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , when he became thoroughly assured of the safety of Germany's position i n Europe, that Bismarck consented to give h i s support to the demands of German i n d u s t r i a l i s t s for c o l o n i a l possessions. The next few years saw the German colony of South West A f r i c a established, German gains i n the Cameroons, and German advance Into Bast A f r i c a . I t i s true that at times the German ambitions brought temporary clouds over Anglo-German relations,, but generally speaking f r i e n d l y settlement of dis- putes was carried out. Although public opinion i n both count- r i e s was at times aroused over the clash of i n t e r e s t s , the re- la t i o n s of the two governments remained almost invariably f r i e n d - l y . Both Gladstone and Salisbury were well disposed.towards B e r l i n , and i n 1890; the l a t t e r concluded the important s e t t l e - ment of A f r i c a n disputes which exchanged Heligoland for 7- Zanzibar. But aft e r 1894 Anglo-German re l a t i o n s began to lose the f r i e n d l i n e s s of the days of Bismarck and of the opening years of William, I I . Further disputes over c o l o n i a l and east- ern questions arose to try the tempers of Downing Street and the Wilhelmstrasae. B r i t a i n took exception to the Franco- German treaty of March 1894 which dealt with French and German inter e s t s i n the Niger and Congo regions. Sim i l a r l y Germany took offense at the arrangements B r i t a i n concluded with King Leopold of Belgium over the Bahr-el-Ghazelle t e r r i t o r y of the Upper Nile and over t e r r i t o r y west of Lake Tanganyika. With France r e l a t i o n s became extremely strained over si m i l a r questions. Under Louis Philippe, Napoleon I I I and McMahon, France had taken over A s i a t i c and A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r y of which A l g e r i a was the most worthwhile. England had viewed these attempts at the reconstruction of a French empire with some alarm,, but her opposition became s t i l l stronger a f t e r 1880. After 1878, French Interests ceased to; be merely national?; she wished to make up f o r the disasters of 1870 i n so f a r as pos- s i b l e by acquiring an overseas empire. Bismarck, anxious to turn her interests from Europe, had encouraged her at the Con- gress of B e r l i n . Jules Ferry,, who became prime minister i n 1883, carried out a vigorous policy of acquiring overseas possessions. This era of French c o l o n i a l expansion opened up boundless v i s t a s of Anglo-French controversies. In June, 1884, Lord Lyons wrote from France t Generally speaking I am very unhappy about the grow- ing i l l - w i l l between France and England which exists on both sides of the Channel. It i s not, I suppose, that France has any deliberate intention of going to -8- war with us but the two nations come into contact i n every part of the globe. In every part of I t questions ari s e which, i n the.present state of f e e l i n g , excite mutual suspicion and i r r i t a t i o n . Who can say when and where, i n t h i s state of things,, some l o c a l events may not produce a serious quarrel, or some high-handed proceeding of some hot-headed o f f i c i a l s occasion an actual c o l l i s i o n . 1 A f r i c a was the main theatre of the struggle,but disputes took place i n many other parts of the world. The tension which arose out of the dispute over Slam i n 1893 brought the two countries to the verge of war. Furthermore, the weak pos i t i o n of B r i t a i n i n Egypt at the end of the century l e f t her open to the opposition of the Continental Bowers. Grey points out i n t h i s connection, when speaking of his f i r s t Foreign Office experiences i n the years 1892-95", that as long as we assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the govern- ment of Egypt, the Capitulations were l i k e a noose around our neck, which any Great Power, having rights under the Capitulations could tighten at w i l l . 2 Both Germany and France had used t h i s "noose* to gain con- cessions from Britain;; Germany i n connection with railway concessions i n Turkey, and France i n connection with the Siam 3 controversy. A l l the above factors combined to reveal how hollow was the phrase "splendid i s o l a t i o n . " As Grey says, " i t was not isolation,, and i t mas f a r from splendid." Thus i s o l a t i o n i n 1. Lyons to Gr a n v i l l e , i n Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, L i f e of Lord G r a n v i l l e , (London,, 1905), I I , 333. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 11. 3., r b i d . , , I I . 4.. Ibid., 11. the opening h a l f of the l a s t decade of the century did not appear to he safe or comfortable. And with the passing of the years which brought the century to a close the main stream of in t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , as i t kept changing and eddying, he- came more turbulent for England. The Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e became an accomplished fact i n 1894, and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e had been renewed for s i x years i n 1891. Thus i n 1895 B r i t a i n found h e r s e l f outside the two groups. Furthermore, the actions of the Impulsive Kaiser led to a widening r i f t i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In the summer of 1895 he paid his annual v i s i t to Cowes, on t h i s occasion a most regrettable one. He annoyed the Committee of the Royal Yacht Squadron by c r i t i c i z i n g t h e i r handicaps. He annoyed Lord Salisbury by scolding him f o r being l a t e . He annoyed h i s uncle, the Prince of Wales, by h i s I r r i t a t i n g f a m i l i a r i t i e s and over- bearing ways. By such undeft touches he antagonized j u s t those c i r c l e s i n England which were p o l i t i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y the most 1 a u t h o r i t a t i v e . Not only, did the actions of the Kaiser lead to h o s t i l i t y , , but Germany's Interest In the Transvaal at this time further loosened the bonds between the two nations and strained them almost to a breaking point. In 1894 Germany had shown a protective int e r e s t i n the Transvaal. In 1895 th i s Interest had been confirmed and advertised by a series of high- ly indiscreet speeches between President Kruger and the German 2 consul at Praetoria. Qn January 3, 1896, the Kaiser, though 1. Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock,. (London,, 1930), 125. 2. Spender,, J.A.„ F i f t y Years of Europe, (London, 1933)» 158. -lO- he claims i n h i s Memoirs that i t was against his hetter judg- ment and that he was reluctantly persuaded to agree to i t hy his advisers, addressed the famous telegram to Eresident Kruger 1 to congratulate him upon the f a i l u r e of the Jameson Raid. The most profound indignation was aroused i n B r i t a i n at this action* "The nation w i l l , never forget this telegram" wrote the "Morning 2 .. • Post." When Count Hatzfeldt i n London wrote to the Herman Foreign Office an January 4, he reported: A l l the English newspapers, with the exception of the "Daily Mews", describe the message as an act of unfriendliness towards England, and even the "Standard"' speaks out sharply about i t . This change i s . a l l the more s t r i k i n g , as, so f a r , the whale of the London press, with hardly an exception, decidedly blamed Dr. Jameson's action.3 On January 21 he wrote to t e l l Holstein of the English reaction In these words! It Is not a question of annoyance on the part of the Government, but of a deep-seated bitterness of f e e l i n g among the pu b l i c , which has shown i t - s e l f i n every way. I am assured that when the excitement was at i t s height, Germans i n the Cit y could hardly do any business with the Eng- l i s h , In the best known large Club3, such as the Turf, there was extreme bitterness j, I myself, 1. *T express my sincere congratulations that, supported by your people, without appealing for the help, of fr i e n d l y Powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic action against armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the Peace, and have thus been enabled to restore peace and safeguard the Independence of the country against attacks from outside." 1 (January 3, 1896). Cited i n Spender, op. c i t . , 160, footnote. 2. Cited i n Gooch, G. P., History of Modern Europe 1878-1919, (London, 1923), 220. •3. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , January 4, 1896, Dugdale, E. T. S., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, (London, 1930), I I , 389. • l i - re ceived many i n s u l t i n g and threatening l e t t e r s . I have no, doubt that the general f e e l i n g was such, that, i f the Government had l o s t i t s head or had wished for war for any reason, i t would have had the whole of public opinion behind i t " . 1 The sending of the telegram w,as one of the most d i s - astrous errors of the Kaiser's early r e i g n . "The r a i d was folly', 1 observed Salisbury to Eckardstein i n 18.99, "but the 2 telegram was even more f o o l i s h . * And although the B r i t i s h and German governments were l a t e r to resume t h e i r friendly, i n t e r - course, the rash act was net forgotten i n England, while the German people were angered by the fury which the action of their 3 impulsive r u l e r provoked. Though A f r i c a was the source of the most acute d i f f e r - ences between Great B r i t a i n and Germany, there were other f i e l d s i n which the p o l i c i e s of the two powers clashed. In the Cretan c r i s i s of 1897 the support Germany gave to Turkey led to a f u r - ther estrangement with England. That same year she seized Kiao- chair i n the Shantung peninsula, and the Kaiser's speech i n con- nection with that seizure and his reference to the "mailed f i s t " added to> the i l l - f e e l i n g . It was during these years also that Germany began her naval programme which was to arouse l a t e r such grave fears In England. In June, 1897, Admiral T i r p i t z was 1. Hatzfeldt to Holstein, January 21, 1896, Bugdale, op. cit.,, II, 403-04. 2. Eckardstein,,. Baron von, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, (London, 1921), 85. 3. "The outbreak of hatred, envy and rage which the Kruger telegram l e t loose In England against Germany contributed more than anything else to open the eyes of large sec- tions of the German people to an economic p o s i t i o n and the necessity for a f l e e t . " Admiral T i r p i t z i n h i s Memoirs, ci t e d i n Spender, op. c i t . , 162. 12- appainted chief of. the German Admiralty;, i n November of that year he introduced the f i r s t navy b i l l which created the High Seas F l e e t . Meanwhile rel a t i o n s with France were even more un- f r i e n d l y . The French seizure of Tunis, the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of B i s e r t a , the convict settlement i n New. Caledonia, the occupa- t i o n of the New Hebrides, the r i v a l r y i n Nigeria,, the coercion i n Slam, the exclusion of B r i t i s h trade from Madagascar, the question of the Newfoundland f i s h e r i e s , the B r i t i s h occupation of Dongola, and above a l l , the. B r i t i s h occupation of E g y p t — a l l these thorny problems were continually; pricking the fingers of the diplomats i n Downing Street and the ^.uai d'Orsay, and caus- ing anxiety to the friends of peace on both sides of the Channel. The tension between the two governments and peoples reached a breaking-point over the Fashoda Incident i n the Upper Nile i n 18,98. Because It brought the two nations so very close to war, and yet marked a turning-point i n t h e i r relations, i t might be discussed In some d e t a i l . Ever since the evacuation - of the Egyptian Sudan and the tr a g i c death of Gordon i n 1885, England had been awaiting an opportunity to retrieve that area., Xh 1896 an expedition f o r i t s recovery was sent out under Kitchener. The b e l i e f that c o n t r o l of the Sudan was e s s e n t i a l to the s t a b i l i t y of the B r i t i s h regime i n Egypt, combined with the fear of French expansion i n central A f r i c a , had forced the 1 , government to action. But B r i t i s h control of the area was not 1. Giffen, E. B», Fashoda, (Chicago, 1930), 27-29 -13- to be uncontested, for a simultaneous attempt to reach the Up- per N i l e was being made by the French. Captain Marchand had crossed A f r i c a from west to east with a small expedition and succeeded i n reaching the Upper waters of the N i l e i n July . When Kitchener, a f t e r defeating the Mahdi at Omdurman, advanced further up the r i v e r , and arrived at Fashoda, he found the f o r t f l y i n g the French f l a g and occupied by Marchand and his small force. Neither of the two forces would r e t i r e ; they neither fought nor gave way; they l e f t the struggle to be fought out between London and P a r i s . The diplomatic tension which resulted from t h i s c r i s i s was acute i n the extreme. There seemed to be no possible com- promise between the claims of the two powers. Such a clash over the Sudan had been foreseen by the statesmen of both lands some years before. S i r Edward Grey, when holding the post of Under- Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s under Lord Rosebery, on being questioned i n the House of Commons on March 28, 1905, about the rumoured advance of the French upon the N i l e , had declared that a French advance into the N i l e V a l l e y "would be an unfriendly 1 act and would be so viewed by England." This unequivocal stand was endorsed by the succeeding Salisbury administration. The Grey declaration had aroused anger and resentment i n the French Foreign O f f i c e - i t was warning France o f f a vast d i s t r i c t which belonged not to Great B r i t a i n , but to the Sultan of Turkey, and i t was accompanying a B r i t i s h claim by what amounted to 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 20. 1 a threat of war.., The day after, the declaration, as Grey says, "there was 2 a row In Paris", and i n the negotiations which followed, the French government p o l i t e l y hut firmly refused to recognize this new "Monroe Doctrine" in the K i l e V a l l e y . They proceeded on their way i n equatorial A f r i c a with the watchword " f i r s t come, 3 f i r s t served." Thus, the purpose of the Marchand expedition to l i n k up. French possessions i n east and west A f r i c a hy control of the Upper K i l e was i n direct contravention of the Grey declar- a t i o n . Though France had declined to admit the v a l i d i t y of the , 4 pronouncement of. Greyi she was w e l l aware that she would have to reckon with the consequences o f ignoring Its veto. When the meeting of Kitchener and Marchand took place at Fashoda In 1898, a greater Issue was at stake than the clash of interests In Cent- r a l A f r i c a alone. The danger wa-s a l l the greater because France feared B r i t i s h ambitions i n Morocco which adjoined A l g e r i a , while i n the Far East and i n many parts of the world French and B r i t i s h r i v a l r y had been becoming p a r t i c u l a r l y acute during the years 1, In his Memoirs, Grey states the B r i t i s h claim i n the follow- ing words, "The Soudan was s t i l l i n hands of the K h a l i f a . The claim of Egypt to i t , however had never been abandoned, though since the overthrow of Egyptian rule by the Mahdi i n 1886, i t was clear that the Soudan would never he reconquered "by Egypt again, without B r i t i s h assistance, nor would the Soudanese again tolerate the purely Egyptian rule against which they had revolted. It was, at any rate, evident that no other power except Egypt, or someone acting on behalf of Egypt had any claim'whatever to the Soudan and the K i l e Valley." Grey, op. c i t . , I, 19. 2. I b i d . , 20. 3., Gooch, op. c i t . , 277; Diplomaticus, Fashoda and l o r d S a l i s - bury's Vindication, Fortnightly Review, LXIV, new s e r i e s , December, 1898. 4., Monson to Salisbury, September 18, 1898, B.D., I, No. 191, p.165 - l a - immediate ly preceding* Per a time i t seemed highly probable that the whole question of French and B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l antag- onism, and na t i o n a l bitterness would be s e t t l e d by the sword. A diplomatic contest began between the governments, while the press and public opinion In both countries grew more and more excited.. B r i t a i n would admit the claim of no other nation to the Mile Valley t, she had only one thing to say - the French must withdraw. On the other hand France did not admit the B r i t i s h claim;; and i t needed l i t t l e e f f o r t on the part of the Paris press to convince the nation that the rights and honour of France had- been outraged. The s i t u a t i o n did not admit of compromise;- one side or the other had to give way* Peace hung on, a thread. Lord Rosebery i n an address at Epsom stated that the: question was of supreme gr a v i t y . He said, I hope t h i s Incident w i l l be p a c i f i c a l l y s e t t l e d , but i t must be understood that there can be no com- promise of the rights of Egypt, Great B r i t a i n ha.3 been treated too much as a n e g l i g i b l e quantity i n recent years. Let other nations remember that c o r d i a l i t y can only r e s t on mutual respect f o r each other's r i g h t s , each other's t e r r i t o r i e s , and each other's flag." 1- An equally strong sentiment was expressed by Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, i n a speech at Tynemouths It would be a great calamity that a f t e r a peace of eighty years, during which I had hoped that unfriend- l y f e e l i n g had p r a c t i c a l l y disappeared, those f r i e n d - ly r e l a t i o n s should be disturbed. But there are worse e v i l s than war, and we s h a l l not shrink from anything that may come,2 I, Cited i n Gooch, op. c i t , , 293 2.. I b i d . , 293, Such-ominous utterances reveal the dangerous temper which the incident had evoked. During the negotiations the French Mediterranean f l e e t was ordered to Cherbourg, and at dead of night, with l i g h t s extinguished, passed Gibraltar. u.nperceived by B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . The mayors of the Channel ports were instructed to r e q u i s i t i o n the churches for h o s p i t a l work, and report on the beds and ambulance available to, f i t them for immediate service., A hundred m i l l i o n francs were spent i n a few days i n providing Cherbourg as a naval base with the necessary ammunition and stores. Orders to march were i n a l l the commanding o f f i c e r s 1 hands,: and everything was i n readiness for mobilization, i f the French Government should be confronted 1 with an ultimatum., English merchants i n Paris held new orders in suspense, and standing orders were not executed.. Business 2 was almost at a s t a n d s t i l l f o r a few days i n September. In Britain,, too, there was a f l u r r y of warlike preparation. The Mediterranean f l e e t was sent to Alexandria and Port Said to protect the Suez Canal and negative any idea of a French land- 3 ing i n Egypt, and at Portsmouth there was a ferment of a c t i v i t y . In vain the French protested the superior claims of the B r i t i s h . Their case was based p r i n c i p a l l y on the f a c t that the country bordering on the White K i l e , though i t waa formerly under the government of Egypt, had become "res n u l l i u s " by i t s abandonment on the part of the Egyptian government}; and 1. Barclay, S i r Thomas, Thirty Tears Anglo-French Reminiscences, (London, 1914), 145.-46. 2., Giffen, op. c i t , , 67. 3., Barclay, op. c i t , , , 146. -17- that the French had a r i g h t to p o s i t i o n on the Nile as much as the Germans or the Belgians. Furthermore, i t was maintained. that the. French government, hy the reserves which they had made when the subject was mentioned i n previous years, had retained for themselves the right to occupy the banks of the K i l e when 1 they saw. f i t . In spite of French protests Salisbury and the B r i t i s h government made i t clear that there could be no a l t e r n a t i v e to French surrender but war.. The French minister f i n a l l y y ielded. Gn November 4, Baron de Courcel informed Salisbury that Fashoda would be evac- 2 uated,. and on December 11 Marchand l e f t h i s post. France was not i n a p o s i t i o n to r i s k a war - her f l e e t was weak and B r i t a i n might e a s i l y have taken the whole of her c o l o n i a l empire. Fur- thermore, Russia had shown h e r s e l f unwilling to support her a l l y ' s p o l i c y i f i t involved war with B r i t a i n , which fact was a dash to 3 French hopes. Then too, i t was r e a l i z e d that to quarrel with B r i t a i n was to play into the hands of Germany, and to destroy any chances of ultimately recovering the Rhine provinces. As Delcasse' t o l d the French Chamber, s ra c o n f l i c t would have i n - 4 volved s a c r i f i c e s disproportionate to the object.'•' within the following months negotiations were carried on between the two governments to determine the l i m i t s of zones of influence i n 1., Salisbury to: Monson, Oct. 6, 1898, B.D-, I, No. 203,, p.173. 2. Salisbury to Monson, Nov. 4, 1898., i b i d . , No. 227, p. 188. 3. G i f f e n , op. c i t . , 163. 4. I b i d . , 101 f f . . Charmes, Francis, Chronique de l a Ojjinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, November 14, 1898. - l a - the K i l e t e r r i t o r i e s . As a r e s u l t of these negotiations, by an agreement of March 21, 1899, a l i n e was l a i d out from a point where the French—Congolese boundary meets the Nile-Conga mater- o shed, northward along the crest of that watershed to 11 North Latitude;; thence i t was to follow i n general the old boundary of 1802 between Wadai and Darfur. The French Government promised to. acquire neither t e r r i t o r y nor p o l i t i c a l influence east of that l i n e ; and the B r i t i s h government promised to acquire neither 1 t e r r i t o r y nor p o l i t i c a l influence west of i t . In this way the very d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n was f i n a l l y s e t t l e d . But a legacy of extreme, bitterness waa l e f t on each side of the Channel, and Fashoda furnished one more evidence and warning that the per- sistence of i l l - w i l l between B r i t a i n and France would lead to Indefinite m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of provoking incidents, and i n the 2 long run to war. " The B r i t i s h victory i n the Fashoda c r i s i s did not tend to ameliorate r e l a t i o n s with France. The l a t t e r very naturally smarted under defeat, while her b i t t e r feelings were i n t e n s i f i e d 3 by the anger aroused i n England over the Dreyfus a f f a i r . In France feelings of jealousy and hatred were constantly manifest- ed % the French journals r a i l e d a n g r i l y at Great B r i t a i n , and the attacks sometimes degenerated into purposeless s c u r r i l i t y , going so far- as to caricature Qjueen V i c t o r i a , ©ne of the leading journals of Paris exclaimed, "we offered Lord Salisbury Fashoda 1» G l f f e n , op. c i t . , 90. 2. Grey, op» c i t . , I, 41. 3. Barclay, a.p> c i t . , 162. -19- 1 and our friendship,, and he r e p l i e d that he only wanted Fashoda."' In such a manner i l l - w i l l and anger, were aroused on each side of the Channel—every old incident w,as raked up i n order to fan the flame of i r r i t a t i o n , every difference exaggerated to the utmost. It happened, moreover, that early i n 18.99, and j u s t he- fore the settlement of the negotiations following the evacuation of Fashoda, there broke out another controversial s q u a l l between the two powers. This dispute, which was almost the Fashoda i n - cident over again i n miniature, was brought about by a concession which France: gained from the Sultan of Muscat for. a coaling- s t a t i o n on the Eersian Gulf. When, the arrangement was made pub- l i c i n February, 1899, three B r i t i s h warships arrived on the scene to prevent the f u l f i l l i n g of the concession and the h o i s t - ing of the French f l a g . Under the threat of bombardment the Sultan withdrew h i s concession to the French, and the French had no recourse but vain protest. Thus, once again, France had attempted to dispute a B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i a l monopoly, and again her- claims had been met by the s o l i d f a c t of B r i t i s h predominance. Thus at the end of the century relations, between Great B r i t a i n and France could hardly have been worse, short of an actual c o n f l i c t of war. "In England, France continued to be re- garded as the national enemy,, and the nineteenth century closed with Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s strained to the l i m i t , and with the hope of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n apparently excluded from the realm of 3 p o s s i b i l i t y . " The future was of course hidden from both 1. Anon.,, ""France, Russia, and the Mile," Contemporary Review, December,.. 1898, 761. 2. G i f f e n , op. c i t . , 187. 3. Seymour, op. c i t . , 122. -20- peoples, and probably both, would have been incredulous over the idea of an entente within f i v e years, Yet from these unpromis- ing Incidents of 18.99 Prance and Great B r i t a i n were to advance steadily toward the convention of 1904. The. dangerous tension which had been developing over the period of years between Great B r i t a i n and the members of the Dual A l l i a n c e out of competing interests in. A s i a and A f r i c a , and which had culminated i n the incidents of Port Arthur and Fashoda, now gave a new d i r e c t i o n to B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , Nor, i n the l i g h t of events of the past few years, were rela t i o n s h i p s with Germany, at a l l reassuring. , As early as April,1898, the following words appeared i n "The Contemporary Review"2 to express the writer's views on the f a i l u r e of English foreign p o l i c y t We have not the goodwill of France and Russia, nor the a l l i a n c e of any other powers, nor yet the degree of strength i n i s o l a t i o n which would enable the government to vindicate our rights against any combination,.,.from whatever point of view there- fore we consider the foreign policy, of the present government we f i n d that i s unreal i n i t s supposit- ions, ruinous i n i t s r e s u l t s , and absolutely, un- worthy of the respect and confidence of those who put the Interests of the nation above the consid- erations of party.1 Another writer In the same review states, "the present inter- n a t i o n a l complications cannot well pass o f f without England 2 having to make a momentous decision."' I f , however, there was. any f a i t h l e f t i n the hearts of 1. Anon,., The F a i l u r e of Our Foreign P o l i c y , The Contemporary Review, A p r i l , 1898, 464-67. 2. Anon., The Arch-Enemy of England, The Contemporary Iivlew, December, 1898, 90.8,. the people or th e i r r u l e r s i n the myth of the splendour of i s o l a t i o n , t h i s f a i t h was rudely d i s p e l l e d with the outbreak of the Boer War. In the words of Harold Nicolson, On October 11, 18.99, Great B r i t a i n declared war.upon the Transvaal* It was only then that the f u l l e ffects of Lord Salisbury's policy of i s o l a t i o n could be guaged. Great B r i t a i n woke up infamous.. B r i t i s h opinion was shocked to discover over-night how much we were d i s l i k e d . 1 During the War. a wave of a n t i - B r i t i s h f e e l i n g swept over the continenti press campaigns of the utmost virulence were directed against B r i t a i n i n almost every country. This was true of Prance e s p e c i a l l y , and when Kruger f l e d from h i s own country he was most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y received at Marseilles and P a r i s . The i s o l a t e d p o s i t i o n of th e i r country i n a world wear- ing so harsh a face began now to impress i t s e l f on the minds of B r i t i s h statesmen. In view of the f a c t that B r i t a i n had been clashing with every Great Power i n every part o;f the globe, they began to r e a l i z e that there was nothing of r e a l splendour i n isolation;, they began to doubt i f i t was safe, to f e e l that a continuation of such a p o l i c y might prove embarrassing and expensive, to question i f could be longer maintained. The only escape from the discomforts of i s o l a t i o n was a policy of mak- 2 ing f r i e n d s . And i n choosing friends a choice had to be made between the Dual A l l i a n c e and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . I t i s i n - teresting to note that the path leading from i s o l a t i o n f i r s t chosen was not the path that was eventually pursued. 1. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 128. 2. Hammond, J . L., C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, (london, 1934) , .135.. -22- The story o.f England's foreign policy from th i s date onward i s that of the e f f o r t to f i n d security i n the face of new world conditions. The role most congenial to her, and most i n keeping with her past t r a d i t i o n s was that of r e f r a i n i n g from continental entanglements. But i t was now r e a l i z e d that she was no longer free to play that r o l e . The idea persisted i n England that Prance and Russia were s t i l l the t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s , i f not enemies, as they had heen a l l . through the nine- teenth century. Thus i t was that B r i t i s h preference f o r an a l l y , i f an a l l i a n c e became necessary, was f o r Germany. How- ever, i n spite of thi s f i r s t preference, events were to ar i s e which decided and Impelled B r i t a i n to make common cause with her t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s and supposed enemies against Germany. £t the very moment when re l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and Prance and Russia were most strained* B r i t i s h policy went through an extraordinary transformation, and as a re s u l t of that diplomatic revolution during the f i r s t years of the twentieth century a t o t a l l y new d i r e c t i o n was given to B r i t i s h f o r e i g n policy.. The character and scope of that change, which brought England to conclude conventions with the implacable foe, France, after- seeking the affections of Germany, forma the subject of the chapter which follows. CHAPTER I I The Anglo-French Entente CHAPTER I I The Angla.-Erench Entente. Having determined to abandon the policy of aloofness from continental a f f a i r s , t h e f i r s t choice of the B r i t i s h states- men of an a l l y was Germany. The Kruger telegram was neither forgotten nor forgiven i n England, but there had been no further attempt to in t e r f e r e i n South A f r i c a . Moreover, the support by the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e during the reconquest of the Sudan, and the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation on the B r i t i s h v i c t o r y of Atbara had proven most welcome at a time when Prance and Russia were proving most h o s t i l e . During the Boer War, while public opinion and the press i n Germany were undoubtedly most h o s t i l e to B r i t a i n , the German government took a stand of n e u t r a l i t y and declined'to j o i n Russia and Prance i n a plan of intervention on behalf of the Boers. Nor was the idea of an a l l i a n c e with Germany altogether new at t h i s time. During Bismarck's day various attempts at such an a l l i a n c e had been prosecuted from time to time, but 1 these had come to nothing. And again, as early as 1898 Mr. . Joseph Chamberlain had opened private negotiations with a s i m i l a r purpose i n view with Eckardstein, of the German embassy 1. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , (Cambridge, 1923), H I , 144-47. -24 In London, and Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador. Meetings were held at the home of A l f r e d Rothschild or of Eckardstein two, or three times a week where p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an a l l i a n c e were 1 discussed. Count Hatzfeldt informed Bulow of these private negotia- tions with Chamberlain i n a dispatch on March 29, 189,8, and the 3 l a t t e r r e p l i e d on March 30,. In h i s reply he thanked Chamberlain for his offers but pointed out what he considered to be the draw- backs to a. German a l l i a n c e with England. He f e l t that England wished the support of Germany so as to become stronger than her r i v a l s , and thus remove her from fear of attack, but he was a f r a i d that i f Germany should be attacked, she could not count on English support. Moreover, he expressed a doubt that i f the B r i t i s h government made an a l l i a n c e I t would not be maintained i f that government went out of power - he spoke of the English Parliamentary system as a back door by which England could es- cape from f u l f i l l i n g her treaty obligations. He considered the r i s k s f o r Germany i n such an a l l i a n c e too great and thus offered to Chamberlain's proposals a p o l i t e r e f u s a l . In spite of the f a i l u r e of these negotiations to bring material r e s u l t s , Chamberlain,; Hatzfeldt, and Eckardstein con- tinued to work f o r good understanding between the two countries, 1. J . L... Garvin i n h i s "Life of Joseph Chamberlain," emphasizes the f a c t that the i n i t i a t i v e came from the German side. Garvin, J . L,,, L i f e of Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1934), III,, 225:. 2. Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign O f f i c e , March 29, 1898, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I I , 21-23. 3. Billow to Hatzfeldt, March 30, 18,98, i b i d . , 23-24. Garvin, op. cit.,, I l l , 261-62. 1 trying to bring about agreements i n lesser matters. On h i s side Chamberlain continued to hope for an a l l i a n c e and took the opportunity i n speeches^ to educate public opinion along 2 that l i n e . In spite.of Germany's f a i l u r e to take advantage of the offers made i n 18.9.8., new. overtures for the a l l i a n c e were made i n 1899.. In November of that year the Kaiser paid a v i s i t to Yftndsor. His v i s i t was a complete success, and a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between the courts a f t e r the eff e c t s of the Kruger telegram was brought about. But the v i s i t meant more than t h i s . Billow had accompanied the Kaiser, and Chamberlain,in conversation with the two, seized the opportunity to discuss with them the matter of ~ 3 an a l l i a n c e . In these conversations he seems to have gained 4 the impression that they were favourable to the idea. Then on November 30 he delivered a glowing speech at Leicester In which he statedt There i s something that every farseeing English statesman must have long desired, and that i s that we should not remain permanently Isolated on the continent of Europe, and I think that the moment that a s p i r a t i o n was formed i t must have appeared evident to everybody that the natural a l l i a n c e i s between ourselves and the Great German Empire.5 Chamberlain's speech aroused a storm of protest i n Germany. German opinion at t h i s time was decidedly pro-Boer 1. Garvin, op. cit . , . I l l , 267 ££. 2. His speech at Birmingham, May 13, 1898j ibid.,, 282-83. 3. Ibid., 498-506.. 4. Chamberlain's l e t t e r to Eckardstein; Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 130; Garvin, op. c i t . , I l l , 506, 510, 512, 514. 5. Garvin, op. c i t , , I I I , 506-08, -2.6- and a n t i - B r i t i s h , and the press denounced the idea of an asso- 1 c i a t i o n with B r i t a i n . In view of t h i s h o s t i l e public opinion, Bulow did not have the courage, when speaking i n the Reichstag on December 11, to take up sympathetically Chamberlain's Leicester 2 . speech. Instead, he poured cold water on the proposal. This was accepted as a rude rebuff i n England, and Chamberlain natur- 3 a l l y deeply resented such treatment. Thus once more the ef- f o r t s of the B r i t i s h statesmen were wrecked by the determination of Bulow and the Emperor to c l i n g to t h e i r p r i n c i p l e of a free hand.. It was, however, i n 1901 that the two countries reached a crossroads, and the f a i l u r e of the negotiations which opened early In that year and continued u n t i l December d e f i n i t e d l y de- cided the separate paths that the two countries were to follow In the years ahead. In the middle of January, Baron Eckardstein was v i s i t i n g at the home of the Duke of Devonshire at Chatsworth when Chamberlain was present. During t h i s v i s i t the Duke, Chamberlain, and Eckardstein discussed i n t e r n a t i o n a l questions and the future of Anglo—German r e l a t i o n s . In a conversation a f t e r dinner on January 16, the Duke and Chamberlain formulated d e f i n i t e l y their p o sition on t h i s l a t t e r question. Their state- ment was embodied i n a dispatch to the German Chancellor by Eckardstein a f t e r consultation with Hatzfeldt, and i n a more 4 modified form i n one to Holstein. It was reported that the 1. Garvin, op. c i t . , I l l , 508-09;- Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 133. 2. Garvin, op. cit.,, I l l , 511. 3.. Letter to Eckardstein, Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 151. Garvin, op. c i t . , I l l , 512-13. 4. Hatzfeldt to Bulow. and to Holstein, January 18, 1901, Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 185-187. -27- English leaders now r e a l i z e d that they must seek an a l l i a n c e and that the choice lay between the T r i p l e and Dual A l l i a n c e . In spite of the i n c l i n a t i o n s for a Russian a l l i a n c e on the part of some of the Cabinet, Chamberlain and his friends would work for an agreement with Germany. This, they expected, would be brought about gradually, and as a s t a r t i n g point they suggested an arrangement regarding Morocco.. But should an a l l i a n c e with Germany prove an impossibility they would turn to Russia. In Holstein's reply to Eckardstein of January 21. the former frowned upon the p o s s i b i l i t y of a rapprochement. He claimed that Germany would run too great a r i s k i n an a l l i a n c e with England, and concluded that If Germany was to stand sponsor for the B r i t i s h Empire she must extract at least an equivalent price f o r her services.. Moreover, he distrusted Salisbury and 1 complained that Germany had been often mistreated by him. While these negotiations were being carried on, the Kaiser made a hurried v i s i t to England to be present at the death bed of Queen V i c t o r i a . The warmth of f e e l i n g he displayed on this v i s i t made a deep impression on the Royal Family and on the whole public opinion i n England. On his a r r i v a l on January, 20, Eckardstein told him of h i s recent conversation with Chamberlain, and the Kaiser expressed complete agreement with the idea of an a l l i a n c e . Bulow, however, had urged caution In encouraging or discouraging the plan, fearing that eagerness on the part of Germany might diminish German gains. Thus, the 1. Holstein" to Eckardstein, January 21, 1901, Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 187. -28- Kaiser avoided committing h i s government to any d e f i n i t e agree- ment while he encouraged f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . During the next few months negotiations continued, hut l i t t l e progress was made. Qn A p r i l 13 Lansdowne wrote the f o l - lowing to Lascelles regarding the negotiations! I doubt whether much w i l l come of the pro- j e c t . In p r i n c i p l e the idea i s good enough. But when each side comes, i f ever i t does, to formulate i t s terms, we s h a l l break down; and I know l o r d Salisbury regards the scheme, with to say the least, suspicion.^ B e r l i n i n s i s t e d on the necessity of England j o i n i n g the Tr i p l e A l l i a n c e , and of tr a n s f e r r i n g negotiations to Vienna. London,^ however, was most unwilling to undertake obligations towards Austria and It a l y , and was not sure that Parliament would sanction such a treaty. Salisbury from the beginning showed l i t t l e interest i n the plan for an a l l i a n c e . Time had not changed his b e l i e f that Isolation was England's wisest policy.. His memorandum of May 29, i n which he c r i t i c i z e d the draft of a proposed a l l i a n c e , remains a c l a s s i c on the subject of i s o l a t i o n , and of the sp e c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which beset a B r i t i s h government i n departing from 2 i t . Negotiations, however, did not entirely lapse. In Aug- urst, the Kaiser, i n conversation with King Edward and Lascelles at Hbmhurg, expressed disappointment that an a l l i a n c e had not 3 been concluded. Later, i n November and December the question was reopened. A memorandum of Lansdowne's of November 11 1. Lansdowne to Lascelles, A p r i l 13, 19Q1. B.D., I I , No. 81, p. 63. 2. Memorandum by Salisbury,. May 29, 1901, B.D., I I , No. 86, p. 68. 3. l a s c e l l e s to Lansdowne, August 25., 1901, i b i d . , No. 90, p. 73. -29- outlined the d i f f i c u l t i e s of an a l l i a n c e hut suggested that instead of dropping negotiations a general agreement might he 1 formulated regarding policy i n commercial i n t e r e s t s . Then on December 19, when Metternich, who had replaced Hatzfeldt as German ambassador, called on Lansdowne before leaving for B e r l i n for Christmas, the l a t t e r took the opportunity to refer to the negotiations which had been carried on throughout the year. He "pointed out that England could not j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , but he wished to preserve f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with Germany,, and suggested a general commercial understanding be formulated. Metternich was sure that t h i s would not be accept- 2 able i n place of an a l l i a n c e . Lascelles relates a conversation with Billow on December 28 i n which he t o l d the Chancellor of the above conversation. Metternich had not yet reported the interview to Bulow, and the l a t t e r was glad to hear Lansdowne's views. He expressed the hope that the question would not be 3 dropped altogether. Thus the negotiations gradually faded out i n p l a t i t u d - inous expressions of mutual goodwill and f r i e n d s h i p . The last weeks were rather embittered when Mr. Chamberlain and Count Bulow exchanged angry words about the comparative humanity of B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s In the Boer War and the Prussian soldiers i n 4 the Franco-Prussian War. In t h i s manner the curtain was rung 1. Memorandum by Lansdowne, November 11, 1901, B..D», I I , No.78, pp. 76-79. 2. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , December 19, 1901, i b i d . , No. 94, pp. 80-83. 3. L a s c e l l e s to Lansdowne, January 3, 1902,ibid., No. 95, pp. 83084. 4. Lee, S i r Sidney, King Edward VII, (London, 1927), I I , 132-33,137. -30- down on the f i n a l e f f o r t to l i n k the fortunes of Great B r i t a i n with those of Germany.. It was i n t h i s way that the wire, as Bismarck would have put i t , was cut between London and B e r l i n , and events began to move with tragic i n e v i t a b i l i t y towards a s i t u a t i o n i n which i t could not be repaired. Germany had f a i l e d to take up the Eng- l i s h o f f e r s . Bulow, Holstein, and the Kaiser had consistently taken the view that England needed Germany as an a l l y more than Germany needed England. The p o s s i b i l i t y , which Chamberlain had so often tendered, that England and Russia,, or England and Prance might come to terms, was characterized.as r i d i c u l o u s , and was considered as a mere "bogey" used as a threat to win a German a l l i a n c e . Thus they put t h e i r terms for a German agreement too high - a simple defensive a l l i a n c e would not do - England must 1 j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e - th e i r policy was " a l l or nothing."* Brandenburg's simple summihg-trp of the whole s i t u a t i o n s t r i k e s the correct note with a hint of tragedy when he says, "They had offered us their hand and had withdrawn i t when we made the con- d i t i o n s of acceptance too onerous for f u l f i l m e n t . They never 2 came back to us. They went instead to our enemies." These Anglo-German negotiations at the opening of the twentieth century which have been outlined at some length are important as showing perhaps the chief reason why England chose an a l l i a n c e with the members of the Dual A l l i a n c e i n 1904 and 1.907.. B r i t i s h ministers had a©w been s a t i s f i e d that i f security L. Few ton,. Lord, Lord Lansdowne, (London, 1929), 208. 2. Brandenburg, E r i c h , Prom Bismarck to the ¥/orld War, (London, 1927), 181. - 31 - could no longer be found in i s o l a t i o n i t was l e a s t of a l l to be sought i n an a l l i a n c e with Germany. The rebuff which their overtures had received, the feelings of animosity engendered by events of the past few years, along with the growing Anglo- German naval r i v a l r y , were a l l determining factors i n causing England to cast her vote i n f a y our of France and Russia against the Central Powers. However, before B r i t a i n took the f i r s t step i n this move by forming the Anglo-French Entente she found h e r s e l f a f r i e n d , not i n Europe, but i n the farthest East. The islan d of Japan, since she had been forced to open her doors to western trade, had transformed h e r s e l f i n an astonishingly short time into a power of the western model, mechanized and e f f i c i e n t . In view of the unrest i n the Far East which resulted i from the state of disi n t e g r a t i o n i n which China then found he r s e l f , and the scramble on the part of the Great Powers for concessions and t e r r i t o r y , Lord Lansdowne, on succeeding Lord Salisbury as Foreign Minister i n 1901, made i t h i s p o l i c y to pool B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s with those of Japan. Negotiations for an a l l i a n c e were concluded on January 30, 190S, when an agreement was signed i n London. Lord Lansdowne described the agreement as "purely a measure of precaution, to be invoked should oocas- 1 ion a r i s e , i n defense of Important B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . " I t covered B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China, and Japanese i n t e r e s t s both i n China and Korea. Only i n the event of either party being attacked by more than one power did i t engage the other to come to i t s assistance. 1. Lansdowne to MacDonald, January 30,1902,B.D.II, No.124, pp.113-114. -32- But one of the chief r e s u l t s of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e was to show to the world that B r i t i s h i s o l a t i o n might not be so impenetrable as had been supposed. This thought became more and.more fixed i n the minds of the French statesman, who saw a further opportunity i n the growing coolness between 1 Germany and England. The idea of any bond unit i n g the common destinies of England and France at the opening of the new century might well have seemed fantastic when i t i s r e c a l l e d how strained the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries had been. But the Fashoda Incident has been c a l l e d , and not unwisely, "the l a s t cloud i n an expiring storm." The Convention of March 21, 1899, had cleaned the slate so f a r as t e r r i t o r i a l claims of B r i t a i n and France i n Central A f r i c a were concerned. Not only that, but the smooth manner i n which the negotiations had been carried 9 out had brought into view, i n French minds at l e a s t , wider p o s s i b i l i t i e s of understanding and harmony. At the time when the March agreement was signed, M. Paul Cambon, who had succeeded the Baron de Courcel as French ambassador to London, suggested to Lord Salisbury that there were several other matters which might be s e t t l e d i n an equally f r i e n d l y s p i r i t . Salisbury, however, shook h i s head and smiled: ^1 have the greatest confid- ence i n M. Deloasse'," he said, "and also i n your present govern- ment. But i n a few months time they w i l l probably be overturned, and their successors w i l l do exactly the contrary. No, we must 1. Cambon to Del cas so', March 13,1903, Documents Diplomatiques Francais, (cited hereafter as D.D.F.), (Paris, 1931) ,2 e Se'rie, 'tome,III,No.137,p.184. - 33 - 1 wait a b i t . " This period of waiting was to la s t u n t i l 1904, but i n the i n t e r v a l many changes of great import bearing on the relationships of the two governments took place. In the f i r s t plaoe there was the widening o f the gu l f between England and Germany i n spi t e of the attempts to bring the two int o an agreement. And as these two d r i f t e d further apart, for various reasons warmer a i r s began to blow between England and France. The pe r s o n a l i t i e s of several new figures, who at this time appeared on the diplomatic stage i n both countries, were of tremendous importance i n determining the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Anglo-French r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . So long as men l i k e Hanotaux, a decided Anglophobe, and Salisbury, with his f a i t h i n i s o l a t i o n , were i n control of the Foreign O f f i c e s , such r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was out of the question. But with the coming to power of new figures a settlement of d i f f i c u l t i e s might be attempted. Deleasse's accession to power i n the French Foreign Of f i c e i n 1898 may be regarded as the f i r s t step i n the formation of the Entente. M. Delcasse took over h i s o f f i c e , succeeding M. Hano- taux, immediately before the Fashoda Incident. Thus he was too la t e to avert that c r i s i s , or to a l l e v i a t e immediately the hard feelings which res u l t e d . But the new dire c t i o n which French; foreign p o l i c y assumed under h i s guidance made Fashoda the l a s t of the incidents to se r i o u s l y endanger Franco-British r e l a t i o n s . He had entered the Foreign Office with the deliberate p o l i c y of making friends with B r i t a i n . On f i r s t coming to power he had 1. Cambon i n an interview i n the "Times," December 22,1920; c i t e d i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y . 111,305. -34- expressed this wish to a fr i e n d saying, "I do not wish to leave 1 this place without having concluded an entente with England.™ Through a l l the bitterness of a n t i - B r i t i s h rancour which seethed over France during the Fashoda c r i s i s and i n the succeeding years, and throughout those years when the English and German govern- ments were i n close association, M. Deleasse', who continued i n o f f i c e u n t i l 1905, held to h i s purpose and car r i e d i t through to splendid f u l f i l m e n t . The e f f o r t s of M. Deleasse were b r i l l i a n t l y seconded i n England by the ambassador he sent to London three months a f t e r h i s own accession to o f f i c e . M. Paul Cambon was eminently f i t t e d for the task of seeking the friendship of a successful antagonist without f o r f e i t i n g any of the dignity of h i s own country. Prudent and firm, pertinacious and adaptable, long-sighted yet t a c t f u l , and u n i t i n g charm of manner with strength of w i l l , he soon acquired l a s t i n g prestige i n England, and proved an i d e a l ambassador for carrying out the policy of h i s chief. Rebuffed by Salisbury i n his f i r s t overtures, he persisted i n advocating S on a l l occasions h i s cause. On the English side of the Channel new p e r s o n a l i t i e s were coming into control also, who, because they were l e s s bound than t h e i r predecessors by the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , were to play important roleB i n advancing 1. Berard, V i c t o r , La P o l i t i q u e F r a n c a i s , L a Revue de P a r i s , July 1,1905,817. Porter, C.W., The Career of Th^ophlle Deloasse" (Philadelphia 1936),165. S. Cambon to Deleasse', March 13,1903, D.D.F.,2e S e r i e . I I I , H 0 i l 3 7,p.l85. -35- friendship with France. In October, 1900, l o r d Salisbury gave up the o f f i c e of Foreign Seoretaryw For f i f t e e n years, with the exception of one b r i e f i n t e r v a l , he had conducted B r i t i s h f oreign p o l i c y , and on the p r i n c i p l e that France was B r i t a i n * s national enemy. How he was succeeded by Lord Lansdowne, who proved a ready l i s t e n e r to the advances of Deloasse' and Cambon, and who a f t e r 1902, was encouraged i n this by the new prime minister, Mr. Balfour* In l i s t i n g the names of those who prepared the way for the Entente a place of prime Importance must be given to Edward VII. While h i s influence on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y during h i s reign has been greatly over estimated on the Continent, and i n Germany espec i a l l y , he did play a very happy part i n advancing friendship with Franoe. To him must go much of the credit for the successful termination of the negotiations whioh ended the old quarrels. Queen V i c t o r i a , who was noted f o r her German sympathies, and her i n a b i l i t y to understand the French, was sucoeeded i n 1901 by Edward VII. As the Prince of Wales he had travelled widely on the Continent; he had spent much time i n P a r i s , and on the R i v i e r a . He spoke French with perfect ease, had formed many warm attachments In France, and had a strong l i k i n g f o r the people. Ho small part i n the negotiations, when these a c t u a l l y began, was that taken by Lord Cromer, the B r i t i s h Agent and Consul-General i n Egypt. Knowing from his long experience i n Egyptian a f f a i r s the inconveniences and possible dangers of French opposition i n Egypt, he gave h i s strongest backing to the proposed Entente, and was most urgent that the newly -36- afforded opportunity f o r s e t t l i n g points of d i f f i c u l t y should 1 not be l o s t * On July 24, 1907, on the occasion of Lord Cromer's retirement, Lord Lansdowne stated stated i n the House of Lords that the Anglo-French Entente would hardly have been obtainable i n i t s e z i i s t i n g shape but for Lord Cromer's high authority 2 among foreign representatives i n Egypt* A writer i n "the nineteenth Century", looking back on the events whioh le d to the successful termination of negotiations for the agreement arrived at i n 1904,,stated t r u t h f u l l y , "that i t has been brought to a p r a o t i o a l issue i s owing l a r g e l y to the tact of our sovereign, to the c o n c i l i a t o r y s p i r i t of Lord Lansdowne, to the statesmanship of Lord Cromer, to the diplom- a t i c a b i l i t y displayed by M. D e l c a s a n d by the French ambassador 3 i n London." These men i n positions of great authority were not alone i n th e i r desire f o r an Anglo-French understanding; they were warmly supported by a host of u n o f f i c i a l personages. The commercial i n t e r e s t s gave support to t h e i r e f f o r t s . England was France's most valuable customer, and French production competed only to a s l i g h t degree with that of England. It was believed i n commercial c i r c l e s that Anglo-French friendship would be of benefit to the industry of both lands. After 1900 i n f l u e n t i a l business men began a campaign f o r ameliorating the 1. Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17,1903, B.D.,11,Ho.359,pp.298- 301; also h i s l e t t e r to Lansdowne, November 1,1903, c i t e d i n Newton, op.cit . , pp.283-84. 2. Lee, op.ci t . , I I , 218. 3. Blennerhassett, Rowland, England and France, The Nineteenth Century, June, 1904, 935. -37- r e l a t i o n s of the two countries. Among these u n o f f i c i a l ambassadors of goodwill was Mr. .{afterwards S i r Thomas) Barclay. As President of the B r i t i s h Chamber of Commerce i n Paris he was i n a p o s i t i o n to understand the advantages of an Anglo-French understanding. By long resldenoe i n Paris he had won for himself a d i s t i n c t place i n the l i f e of the French c a p i t a l , and i n spite of tiie soreness created by Fashoda, the Dreyfus A f f a i r , and the Boer War, he spared no e f f o r t to effect a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between France and England. It occurred to him that the cause would be helped i f the B r i t i s h Chambers of Commerce were i n v i t e d to meet i n P a r i s i n 1900. The approval of Salisbury and Delcasse' was secured, and the meeting was arranged, i t proved an encour- aging success and paved the way for many En g l i s h v i s i t o r s to attend the great P a r i s Exposition which was held i n that same year. These v i s i t s were followed by delegations of French Chambers of Commerce to England, and by exchanges of v i s i t s by members of Parliament and t h e i r wives. Though Kruger*s v i s i t to France followed s h o r t l y a f t e r , and though antl-English f e e l i n g by no means disappeared i n France, the seeds of goodwill had been sown, and the gross caricatures of Queen V i c t o r i a i n 1 the French papers disappeared. It has been shown how as early as 1899 Cambon had suggested to Salisbury that the two governments might come to an understanding on matters over which they d i f f e r e d , and how he had been told to "wait a b i t " on that occasion. No decisive advance was possible while Salisbury was In power and while 1. Barclay, S i r Thomas, Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminis- oenses, (London, 1914), for a f u l l account of these early endeavours to sow the seeds of goodwill. -38- the Boer War was i n progress. Deleasse' was moved to remark on one occasion to S i r Thomas Barclay that i t was hopeless to 1 try to c o n c i l i a t e England. The B r i t i s h Documents do not begin the story of the negotiations f o r the Entente before May, 1903, but there i s a hint of such negotiations i n the German Documents many months e a r l i e r . On January 30, 190S, Count Metternich, the German ambassador i n London, reported to the German Foreign Office that he had learned " i n the s t r i c t e s t confidence that negotiat- ions had been proceeding between Chamberlain and the French ambassador for the settlement of a l l outstanding differences 2 between France and England on c o l o n i a l questions. 1* On February 3 he wrote to inform the Foreign O f f i c e that Lansdowne had denied to him that there had been any agreement reached with 3 France on c o l o n i a l questions. No doubt Lansdowne*s denial was correct; and i t may be true that he was unaware of the conversations whioh Chamberlain was holding with Cambon on this matter, f o r we have seen Chamberlain engaging i n private negotiations with the German ambassador i n his attempts to form an Anglo-German agreement. But i t was soon evident that negotiations with France were under way. There i s another hint of this i n an incident related by Eckardstein i n whioh he t e l l s of a conversation whioh took place between Chamberlain and Cambon. Re t e l l s of an o f f i c i a l 1. Bar d a y , op. c i t . , 210. 2. Metternich to the German Foreign O f f i c e , January 30, 1908, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 171. 3. Ibid., 172. -39- dinner on February 8, 1902, at Marlborough House which was attended by a l l the B r i t i s h and foreign ambassadors. After dinner he saw Chamberlain and Cambon go o f f into the b i l l i a r d room. n I watched them," he re l a t e s , "and noted that they talked together for exactly twenty-eight minutes i n the most animated manner. I could not of course catch what they said, and only 1 heard two words, 'Morocco* and 'Egypt*." Further l i g h t i s thrown upon the sign i f i c a n c e of t h i s conversation by what Eckardstein t e l l s of a conversation he himself had with Chamberlain immediately following that which the l a t t e r had held with Cambon. "As soon as the French Ambass- ador had l e f t Chamberlain I entered into conversation with the l a t t e r . He complained very much of the bad behaviour of the German press towards England and himself. He also referred to the Chancellor's speech i n the Reichstag and said: * l t i s not the f i r s t time that Count Bulow has thrown me over i n the Reichstag ( r e f e r r i n g to Bulow's public repudiation of the o f f e r of a l l i a n c e made i n Chamberlain's Leicester sppech of November 30, 1899). Now I have had enough of such treatment and there can be no more question of an association between Great B r i t a i n and Germany.'" "From that moment," Eckardstein goes on to say, "I knew that Chamberlain was ready to adopt the a l t e r n a t i v e of an accession to the Dual A l l i a n c e which he had announced i n our conversation of January, 1901, at Chatsworth, as being the consequence of a f a i l u r e of an Anglo-German 2 negotiation." 1. Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 228. 2. Ibid., 228-29: supra 27. -49- I f any doubt remained i n the mind of Eckardstein about the truth of the impression he gained from his conversation with Chamberlain,it was d i s p e l l e d by a conversation he held l a t e r that same evening with King Edward. As the company was leaving, the King asked to see him i n h i s study. "He was i n excellent humor," the German t e l l s us, and offered h i s guest a cigar and a whiskey and soda. After t a l k i n g of the Anglo- Japanese a l l i a n c e , and of how i t assured England's future i n the Far East, he went on to say, unfortunately I can't face the future with the same confidence as regards Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . You know of course what has happened of l a t e . . . . The renewed abuse of England i n the German press, and the unfriendly and sarcastic remarks of Bulow i n the Reiohstag have aroused so much resentment among my ministers and In public opinion that f o r a long time at least there cant be no more question of Great B r i t a i n and Germany working together i n any conceivable matter. We are being urged more strongly than ever by France to come to an agreement with her i n a l l c o l o n i a l disputes, and i t w i l l probably be best i n the end to make such a settlement. (1) The attitude of the B r i t i s h leaders to an Anglo-French understanding at this time i s shown by conversations which Cambon held with Lansdowne, King Edward, and the Prince of Wales. Lansdowne was more ready for discussion of such a project than Salisbury had been. Three weeks af t e r the incidents narrated above, Cambon mentioned to Lansdowne the conversation he had held with Salisbury i n 1899, and enumerated the questions on which he would l i k e to negotiate an agreement. "He asked," r e l a t e s Cambon, "whether he might make a note of them, but I said he need not trouble as I would write him a personal l e t t e r 1. Eokardstein, op. c i t . , 229-30. -41^ enumerating them. This I did, and ^ f o o l i s h l y - never kept a copy of i t . Next evening (sometime early i n 1902) there was a big dinner i n Buckingham Palace. I was placed next to King Edward, who said, 'Lansdowne has shown me your l e t t e r . I t i s excellent. We must go on. I have told the Prince of Wales about i t . You can discuss i t also with him.' A f t e r dinner the Prince of Wales, l a t e r King George V, spoke to me eagerly of the l e t t e r and said: 'What a good thing i t would be i f we could have a general agreement.' He wanted to know when i t would be concluded. I told him that we could not go quite so f a s t as he might wish, but that with patience and goodwill i t 1 ought to be possible." The e f f o r t s of the diplomats i n negotiating the under- standing between the two countries were greatly f a c i l i t a t e d by the v i s i t which King Edward paid to Paris i n the spring of 1903, when he made his f i r s t European tour as King of England. The general plan of h i s tour was a Mediterranean cruise i n h i s yacht, the " V i c t o r i a and Albert," with a v i s i t to the King of Portugal, who had v i s i t e d England previously at the time of Queen V i c t o r i a ' s funeral and again i n November of 1902. He planned to pay a c a l l of courtesy on the King of I t a l y on the return journey overland, and to bring h i s tour to a close with a few days stay at P a r i s . This tour he decided on and planned on 2 h i s own i n i t i a t i v e . 1. Cambon's interview i n the "Times," Beeember 22, 1908, c i t e d i n Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 218. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 221. -42- The ministry acquiesced i n the King's arrangements, but evinced no enthusiasm f o r the v i s i t to P a r i s , expressing doubt, i n view of the continued display of h o s t i l i t y to England i n the French press and among the French people, whether the King could count on a c o r d i a l or even re s p e c t f u l reception i n the French 1 c a p i t a l . When S i r Edward Monson, the B r i t i s h ambassador at P a r i s , was asked by Delcasse as to how the King wished to be received, the former, who was s l i g h t l y pesslmistio as to the wisdom of the proposed v i s i t , at once telegraphed for i n s t r u c t - ions to King Edward who answered that he wished to be received "as o f f i c i a l l y as possible, and that the more honours that were 2 paid to Mm, the better i t would be." King Edward arrived at Paris on May 1. As the long procession drove from the Bois de Boulogne Station to the B r i t i s h Embassy, the crowd was by no means enthusiastic - for the most part i t was s u l l e n l y r e s p e c t f u l . Cries were heard of "VI vent l e s Boers," "Vive Marchand" and "Vive Fashoda," muoh to the discomfiture of the French o f f i c i a l s accompanying the King. He, however, was determinedly good-natured, s a l u t i n g to r i g h t and to l e f t , smiling whenever he was cheered. His suite was e s p e c i a l l y booed. Af t e r paying a v i s i t to the President of the Republic, he returned to the Embassy, and there, i n r e p l y to a deputation from the B r i t i s h Chamber of Commerce i n P a r i s , he delivered a speech which struck a personal note, and whioh, i n i t s warmth 1. l e e , op. c i t . , I I , 223. 2. Ibid., 223. -43- of utterance, did much to win over the people of P a r i s . In his speech he said: I t i s scarcely necessary to t e l l you with what sincere pleasure I fi n d myself onoe_more i n P a r i s , to which as you Know, I have paid very frequent v i s i t s - with ever increasing pleasure, and for which I f e e l an attachment f o r t i f i e d by so many happy and ineffaceable memories. The days of h o s t i l i t y between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries where prosperity i s more interdependent. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension i n the past; but that i s a l l happily over and forgotten. The friendship of the two countries i s my constant preoccupation,-and I count on you a l l , who enjoy French h o s p i t a l i t y i n th e i r magnificent c i t y , to ai d me to reach t h i s goal. (1). In the evening the King attended the Theatre Francais.. The house was f u l l , but his reoeption was decidedly c h i l l y . During the entr'acte he designedly l e f t h is loge to mix with the crowd, resolved to win i t over. In the lobby by chance he met B i l e . Jeanne Granier, an a r t i s t e whom he had seen act i n England. Holding out his hand, he said to her, "Mademoiselle, I remember how I applauded you i n London. You personified 2 there a l l the grace, a l l the esprit of France." Again the King had found the right thing to say, and h i s bonhomie was beginning to make i t s e l f f e l t . Hext day there was a review at Vincennes, and a reception: at the H&tel de V i l l e . En route to Vincennes the cheering was stronger and warmer than on the day before. At the HStel de V i l l e the King spoke only b r i e f l y , but h i s words were most happily phrased and f u l l of ki n d l i n e s s : 1. Gifted i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 307. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 238. -44- "I s h a l l never forget my v i s i t to your charming ci-ty; and. X .can assure you i t i s with the greatest of pleasure that I return each time to P a r i s , where I am treated exactly as i f I were at home." (1) In the afternoon he drove out to Longchamp to attend a race meeting s p e c i a l l y arranged by the Jockey Glub. In the evening there was a state banquet at the Elyse'e where the President and King exchanged professions of steadily growing friendship on behalf of t h e i r respective countries. In reply to M. Loubet, His Majesty said: n I am glad of this occasion, which w i l l strengthen the bonds of friendship and contribute to the friendship of our two countries i n their common in t e r e s t . Our great desire i s that we may march together i n the paths of c i v i l i z a t i o n and peace." (2) A gala performance took place at the Opera that evening, and other functions were arranged for the next day. On May 4 the King prepared to depart. The route to the Gare des Invalides, from which he was to leave, was l i n e d with an enthusiastic crowd, and whereas on his a r r i v a l there had been c r i e s of "Vivent l e s Boers," there now was heard "Vive Hotre Roi." The success of the v i s i t had exceeded a l l expectations, l a r g e l y owing to the King's personal charm of speech and manner, and his cheerful readiness to play a f u l l part i n a heavy programme of functions. Each day of his stay he had won public f e e l i n g more and more i n h i s favour. On every side were heard expressions of g r a t i f i c a t i o n that the King had renewed the t i e s of friendship which had bound him to France while he was yet 1. l e e , op. c i t . , I I , 839. 2. I b i d . , p.239. -45 Prince of Wales. There can be no doubt that h i s v i s i t did, much to terminate the acute stage of estrangement between the two countries, to promote an atmosphere of goodwill between them, and to give a great impetus to the movement towards an Anglo-French rapprochement. By hi s v i s i t King Edward secured 1 honourable mention among the arc h i t e c t s of the Entente C o r d i a l . " Yet another step forward towards the Entente was taken two months l a t e r when on July 6 President Loubet paid King Edward a return v i s i t . This v i s i t was marked by the greatest c o r d i a l i t y . At a state dinner at Buckingham Palace M. Loubet declared i n speaking of his royal host, "France preserves a precious memory of the v i s i t which you paid to P a r i s . I am sure that i t w i l l have the most happy r e s u l t s , and that i t w i l l greatly serve to maintain and bind s t i l l more , 2 c l o s e l y the r e l a t i o n s which e x i s t between our two countries." In return King Edward expressed the hope, "that the welcome you have received today has convinced you of the true friendship, indeed I w i l l say the a f f e c t i o n , which my country f e e l s f o r 3 France." The toast of the Lord Mayor at the G-uildhall the next day was no l e s s c o r d i a l when he said: "How we have shaken hands i n the firm intention of l e t t i n g no cloud obscure the path we have marked out, i s i t too much to hope that our statesmen w i l l f i n d means of removing forever the horrib l e p o s s i b i l i t y of a war between the two peoples who have so many common i n t e r e s t s , 1. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 308. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de l a Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 15, 1903, 469-76. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 154. 3. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 244. -46- 1 and whose hopes and aspirations are the same?" The whole v i s i t proved a spectacular success* On the President's departure, the King, in reply to his guest's farewell message, telegraphed the following reply which found a warm response on both sides of the Channel: " I t i s my most ardent wish that the rapprochement between the two countries 8 may be lasting. 1" By this v i s i t another step was taken along the path of amicable understanding between England and France. M. Belcasse' had accompanied the President on his v i s i t to England and had held conversations with Lord Lansdowne 3 i n which the general outlines of a treaty of amity were sketched. In August the complete problems were discussed i n d e t a i l by M. Cambon and the B r i t i s h foreign minister. By the beginning of September the negotiations had gone far enough to J u s t i f y Lord Lansdowne i n d r a f t i n g a co n f i d e n t i a l minute for the consideration of the Cabinet on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of reaching an understanding, with precise d e t a i l s as to how i t might be reasonably achieved. The f i r s t f r u i t s of the seeds of goodwill sown by the o f f i c i a l v i s i t s and by the negotiations which followed were gathered when a general treaty of a r b i t r a t i o n was signed on October 14, 1903. This convention was p r i m a r i l y the work of S i r Thomas Barclay and the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, both of whom had spared no e f f o r t i n arousing public opinion 1. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 308. 8. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 154. 3. Delcasse' to Cambon, July 21, 1903, D.D.F., 8 es, I I I , Ho.368, p.471; Hewton, op. c i t . , 879. -47- on both sides of the Channel i n i t s favour. In France, as a result of t h e i r e f f o r t s , the plan of such a convention was endorsed by the Chambers of Commerce of Bordeaux, Havre, Mars e i l l e s , L i l l e , Calais, Dunkirk, Toulouse, Lyons, Rouen, and other important business centres. Many municipal councils and peace s o c i e t i e s had passed resolutions favourable to i t s conclusion. Eminent j u r i s t s and writers had expressed themselves at one with the plan, and many leading newspapers had given i t hearty support. The proposal had also been taken up i n an encouraging manner i n England. Mr. Barclay had set f o r t h the plan at a meeting of members of Parliament held i n the House of Commons, and resolutions i n i t s favour were passed by Chambers 1 of Commerce a l l over the United Kingdom. In the agreement signed by the governments i n October i t was agreed to submit a l l differences of a J u r i d i c a l . order, p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g to d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n t e r - pretation of t r e a t i e s , provided that they did not affect the v i t a l interests nor the honour of the contracting P a r t i e s , to the Hague Tribunal. This a r b i t r a t i o n treaty connoted a perceptible improvement i n the r e l a t i o n s of the two countries, though i t had merely a theoretic value. True, i t removed no misunderstandings, but i t s adoption can be c i t e d as an interim manifesto of goodwill. On i t s being concluded M. Cambon wrote to Mr. Barclay, thanking him for the part he had played i n the making of the treaty. In h i s l e t t e r he said that the 1. Barclay's Thirty Years Anglo-Reminiscences gives an excellent account of t h i s work. -48- treaty was "calculated to cut short a quantity of d a i l y d i f f i c u l t i e s and incidents of which one can never foresee the 1 consequences." With the signing of this agreement, along with the negotiations which had already taken place, the atmosphere had now cleared to such an extent that r e a l progress i n the s e t t l e - ment of controversial issues could be made. The two foreign ministerSj aided by M. Cambon,were busily engaged throughout the winter, and they proved that with goodwill on both sides even the thorniest problems could be solved. The task of reaohing an agreement was In no way easy - the many latent causes of dispute between the two countries were world-wide. At every turn the question of "compensations" turned up, "oompensations" which would j u s t i f y each minister i n the eyes of h i s government for the concessions and s a c r i f i c e s he himself had to y i e l d . But of a l l the problems the most formidable lay i n Morocco and Egypt. France had never f i n a l l y recognized the status of England i n Egypt, and her r e f u s a l would have enabled her at any time to reopen the whole Egyptian question, and even manufacture possibly a "casus b e l l i " whenever conditions might appear auspicious to an adventurous Cabinet. On the other hand, the Republic was known to have designs on Morocco to whioh England might, i f i t so suited her, take strong exception. The interests of the two powers i n Slam likewise b r i s t l e d with thorny points l i k e l y at any time to pr i c k national tempers. The f i s h i n g r i g h t s whioh the French claimed i n Newfoundland by vi r t u e of terms l a i d down i n the 1. Barclay, op. c i t . , 835. -49- Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 was another stumbling block to neighbourly r e l a t i o n s . These problems, along with questions of r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s i n West A f r i c a , Madagascar, and i n the Hew Hebrides, had a l l caused f r i c t i o n i n the past. 1 The negotiations conducted throughout the winter months f i n a l l y took p r a c t i c a l shape on A p r i l 8, 1904, when an agreement was signed by the two governments. This agreement was made up of three separate conventions - the f i r s t dealt with Anglo- French in t e r e s t s i n Newfoundland, and West and Central A f r i c a , the second with those i n Egypt and Morocoo, while a t h i r d dealt with those i n Slam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. The f i r s t agreement s e t t l e d the old Newfoundland dispute. France now renounced her exclusive r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s on the French Shore, and French fishermen were put on an equality with the B r i t i s h i n taking f i s h . In compensation B r i t a i n relinquished c e r t a i n t e r r i t o r i e s i n Western A f r i c a . The f r o n t i e r between the B r i t i s h colony of Gambia and the French Senegambia was modified to give France access to the r i v e r Gambia. The f r o n t i e r between B r i t i s h and French Nigeria was modified so as to give France a more accessible route to Lake Chad. The Los Islands commanding the c a p i t a l of French Guinea* Konakry, 1. On January 8, 1904, Lord Lansdowne was given a shock when Monson reported from Paris that Delcasse' had not oonsulted his colleagues i n the Cabinet even on the general question of the proposed accord; Newton, op . c i t . , 287-88. Even as l a t e as March 2, he had not taken the French Col o n i a l Minister into his confidence. This almost i n c r e d i b l e omission can be explained only by hi s extreme anxiety for secrecy, and f o r his desire to conduct the negotiations himself. So well entrenched i n his o f f i c e did he consider himself to be, he f e l t sure he could count on his personal prestige and influence to secure r a t i f i c a t i o n ; Newton, op. c i t . , 288-89; Porter, op.ext., 185. -50- 1 were ceded to France* Of f a r greater importance was the Declaration respeot- 2 ing Egypt and Morocco. Here again c r i t i c a l problems were solved s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by following the general p r i n c i p l e underlying the whole agreement,of surrendering claims i n one d i r e c t i o n i n return for compensation elsewhere. Both countries disclaimed any intention of a l t e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l status of either Egypt or Morocco. France undertook not to i n t e r f e r e i n any way with B r i t i s h action i n Egypt, nor to demand any time l i m i t to B r i t i s h occupation, recognizing the paramount i n t e r e s t s of B r i t a i n i n that oountry. In return, B r i t a i n , recognizing the paramount in t e r e s t s of France i n Morocco, gave France ent i r e l i b e r t y to intervene there for the purpose of maintaining peace, and a s s i s t i n g the r u l e r to carry out necessary administrative, economie, f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y reforms. Questions concerning the Egyptian debt were so s e t t l e d as to give the Egyptian government a free hand i n the disposal of the funds accumulated by the Caisse de l a Dette so long as payment of i n t e r e s t on the debt was assured. French schools were to enjoy the same l i b e r t i e s as formerly, and a l l r i g h t s enjoyed by the French through tr e a t i e s and customs were to be respected. Freedom of commerce was to be guaranteed f o r t h i r t y years, and Great B r i t a i n promised to insure the freedom of the Suez Canal. In Morocoo France agreed on freedom of commerce for t h i r t y years, 1. Convention between the United Kingdom and France respecting Newfoundland, West and Central A f r i c a , A p r i l 8, 1904, B.D., I I , 375-384. 2. Declaration between the united Kingdom and Franoe respecting Egypt and Morocoo, A p r i l 8, 1904, i b i d . , 385-98. 51- promlsed that there should be no f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on the northern ooast opposite Gibraltar, and undertook to conclude an agreement with Spain whereby the Anglo-French agreement might be f u l f i l l e d without encroaching on Spanish i n t e r e s t s . In conclusion the two governments agreed "to a f f o r d one another diplomatic support i n order to obtain the execution of the clauses" of the Declaration. In the t h i r d agreement the two signatories determined th e i r respective zones of influence i n Slam by mutual agreement. In Madagascar, B r i t a i n recognized the r i g h t of France to e s t a b l i s h customs against which she had protested since 1896. F i n a l l y , the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the New Hebrides a r i s i n g from disputes over land t i t l e s and the absence of j u r i s d i c t i o n over the natives 1 were referred to a commission. Along with the a r t i c l e s set f o r t h above, which were made public, Lord Lansdowne and M. Cambon signed secret a r t i c l e s whioh contemplated an eventual p a r t i t i o n of Morocco between 8 France and Spain should the state of Morocco disin t e g r a t e . When Spain adhered to the Anglo-French Agreement on October 3, 1904, and declared h e r s e l f "firmly attached to the i n t e g r i t y of the Moorish empire under,the sovereignty of the Sultan," she signed a convention with France which frankly contemplated 3 p a r t i t i o n . This l a t t e r pact was sent by Cambon to Lansdowne 4 with the request that i t be kept secret. The secret a r t i c l e s 1. Declaration between the United Kingdom and France concerning Slam, Madagascar, and the Hew Hebrides, A p r i l 8, 1904, B.D., I I , 396-98. 8. Secret a r t i c l e s of the declaration respecting Egypt and Morocoa, B.D., I I , pp.398-95. 3. B.D., I I I , Ho.59, p.49. 4. Cambon to Lansdowne, October 6, 1904, i b i d , Ho.58, p.48. -52- of these two t r e a t i e s were not revealed to the public u n t i l 1 1911. The Agreement was received most c o r d i a l l y i n England, the vast majority of the public and leaders h a i l i n g i t as a great achievement. In the House of Commons opportunity was taken to express hearty s a t i s f a c t i o n . Staunch i m p e r i a l i s t s c r i t i c i z e d i t , however, and t h e i r papers voiced some protest. But i n the main i t was regarded as a step to secure general peace by clearing away misunderstandings and differences with the t r a d i t i o n a l enemy. One of the few leaders to r a i s e his voice against i t was Lord Rosebery, who declared, "My mournful and supreme conviction i s that t h i s agreement i s much more 2 l i k e l y to lead to complications than to peace.** In France the general sentiment was decidedly favourable, but there was some strong opposition. The protests came mainly from reactionaries and n a t i o n a l i s t s who f e l t that France had been worsted i n the deal. I t was maintained that France had given more than she had received - the concessions i n A f r i c a did not make up f o r the loss of r i g h t s In Newfound- land - England had her positon i n Egypt while France had yet 1. It has been asserted by a German h i s t o r i a n , though without proof, that the German government i n some o f f i c i a l way speedily became informed of these secret a r t i c l e s , and saw i n them an evidence of h o s t i l e f e e l i n g . Gooch endorses t h i s assertion; Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 340. Fay claims that there i s no tangible proof that Germany was made aware of these secret dealings; op. c i t . , I, 164. 2. Cited i n C h u r c h i l l , W.S., The World C r i s i s , (New York, 1923), I, 15. ^53 to win hers i n Morocoo. In spite of these protests, the Chamber and the Senate supported M. Delcasse' and approved the agreement. One of the f a i r e s t estimates of the value of the Entente to the French i s found i n the Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, and the writer's views might well be applied to the English case also. He states: " I t i s impossible f o r us indeed not to express some regrets with regard to Egypt, and some apprehensions on the subject of Morocoo. But th i s does not a l t e r our judgment on the t o t a l i t y of the arrangements concluded. How could such an agreement be worked out without reciprocal concessions?! We have yielded on some points, and some of these are c o s t l y . England has yielded also .... Above a l l the entente i s concluded. Nothing henceforth divides us; we can now enter i n on anew era where doubtless we have much to": forget, but i n which we have also much to hope f o r . " (1) In the l i g h t of future events i t might be well to note here the attitude of Germany i n the matter of the Entente of 1904. As early as March 23, 1904, Delcasse' had mentioned informally to Prinoe Radolin, of the German Embassy i n P a r i s , the negotiations for the proposed Anglo-French agreement. 2 Radolin had informed Bulow of this conversation, the f i r s t d e f i n i t e knowledge which Bulow had received of the impending agreement. Aside from this informal n o t i f i c a t i o n , and the fact that the public a r t i c l e s were soon a f t e r printed i n the newspapers, Germany was not o f f i c i a l l y n o t i f i e d of the text, nor formally consulted about the agreement, whioh involved i n 1. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de l a Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, 239. 2. von Radolin to Bulow, March 23, 1904, Dugdale, op. c i t . , 188 - 90. -54- 1 a r e a l way her commercial and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco* In spite of these facts the attitude of o f f i c i a l Germany was at f i r s t f r i e n d l y . In answer to a question on the subject i n the Reichstag on A p r i l 12, Bulow cautiously stated that he could hardly say much because the English and French ministers had not explained i t p u b l i c l y . He went on to state: "I can only say that we have no cause to imagine that the Treaty has a point against any other Power. It seems to be an attempt to remove a number of differences by peaceful methods. We have nothing from the standpoint of German i n t e r e s t s to object to i n that. As to Morocco, the kernel of the Treaty, we are interested i n the economic aspect. We have commercial i n t e r e s t s , which we must and s h a l l protect. We have, however, no ground to fear that they w i l l be overlooked or i n f r i n g e d . " (2) The pan-German party f e l t Germany to be humiliated by the agreement and gave voice to i t s protests. The Kaiser, however, expressed no alarm, and on his v i s i t to K i e l i n June he informed King Edward that he had no objection to the Treaty, 3 and that Morocco had never interested him. But as events moved forward Germany was not to take just as l i g h t l y a view of the Agreement as was i n f e r r e d i n the Chancellor's speech. The next few months were to reveal a dramatic change of front at B e r l i n , and the forces which were set moving by this change of front were to make Morocco the storm centre of European p o l i t i c s , and this i n turn was to react upon Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s i n a most s i g n i f i c a n t manner. 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 178. 2. Gooch, op. c i t . , 350. 3. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 338. -55- In t h i s then l i e s the importance of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 - England had plunged into the contentious a f f a i r s of the Continent. For years the casting vote of England had been the great prize sought by the European Powers, and how she would bestow i t , and whether i t would be bestowed at a l l , had been one of the great problems. Now i t had been cast i n favour of France. True, i n the Agreement of 1904 B r i t a i n had promised only "diplomatic support" to France i n ce r t a i n s p e c i f i e d problems, and there was nothing i n the secret a r t i c l e s to enlarge or strengthen that promise. I t - may well have seemed to the B r i t i s h leaders that i n pledging themselves to "diplomatic support" on certain c o l o n i a l questions that England was paying a small price f o r ridding herself of the chronic trouble and f r i c t i o n with France. But i f the forming of the Entente was an immense achievement, i t was not an unalloyed gain. The price of partnership w&fiaa Great Power i s entanglement i n i t s feuds. The following chapter w i l l show that the casting of the B r i t i s h vote on the side of France was to have serious implications i n the future. CHAPTER III The Testing of the Entente -56- CRAPTER III The Testing of the Entente The Anglo-Freneh Agreement within a few short months brought Morocoo, a country which hitherto had played a r e l a t i v e l y unimportant part i n world a f f a i r s , to the very forefront of international p o l i t i c s . I t was now to r i v a l Alsace-Lorraine as a point of discord between Prance and Germany, and to react i n a very r e a l way upon Anglo-German and Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s . To f i n d how this came about w i l l involve a somewhat detailed following of the events of the years 1904, 1905 and 1906. It has been charged against Germany that her sudden intervention i n Moroccan a f f a i r s early i n 1905 was due to her desire to break up the Dual A l l i a n c e , since at that time Russia was engaged i n war with Japan, and that she was seeking a pretext to force a war on France, while the Republic would be 1 without the aid of her a l l y . From a m i l i t a r y point of view that prospeot was undoubtedly e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y a t t r a c t i v e . General von Sohlieffen, the Chief of the German General S t a f f , declared to the Chancellor at this time that Russia could not possibly carry on two large wars, and at th.e same time added, " I f the necessity of a war with France should present i t s e l f 1. Newton, Lord, op. c i t . , 340. Spender, J.A., F i f t y Years of Europe, (London, 1933), 341; Tardieu, Andre*, France and the A l l i a n c e s , (New York, 1908), 168f. -57- 1 to us, the present moment would be undoubtedly favourable." In spite of the many who uphold this view, and of circumstances which are pointed to i n substantiation of i t , there i s no evidence i n the German documents to prove that the German Government 2 contemplated taking advantage of the s i t u a t i o n . It has been frequently maintained also that Germany was influenced by a keen desire to weaken the Anglo-French Entente - that she was motivated by the desire to drive a wedge 3 between England and France. Just to what extent this influenced German action i s not easy to decide. But this assumption also 4 seems to have l i t t l e foundation i n f a c t . The r e a l reason f o r the sudden intervention i n Morocoo would seem to have been l a r g e l y one of prestige, combined with the desire to safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of Germany i n 5 Morocco* Fearing that France might, as i n Tunis, take into her 1. S c h l i e f f e n to Bulow, A p r i l 20* 1904, c i t e d i n Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 209. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 185. Dickinson, G.L., The International Anarchy, (London, 1926), 125; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 209. 3. Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the Great War, (Hew York, 1916), 168-74; Grey, S i r Edward, Twenty- Five Years, (London,1925) I, 54; Lee, op.cit*, I I , 337. Spender, op. c i t . * 235. 4. Ewart, J.S., Roats and Causes of the War, (Hew York, 1932), I I , 751; Fabre-Luce, A l f r e d , La V l c t o i r e , (Paris,1924),118. Bourgeois, E., et Pages, 6., Les Origenes et l e s Respon- s a b i l i t e s de l a Grande Guerre, (Paris, 1922),307-09. 5. "Germany," Billow had written on June 3, 1904," must object to the c o n t r o l over Morocco that France has i n view, not only f o r material reasons, but even more for considerations of prestige." Hote to Holstein, cited i n Renouvin, P., How the War Came, Foreign A f f a i r s , T i l , A p r i l , 1929, p.387. -58- hands a l l the administrative machinery of the government and put Morocco under her p o l i t i c a l and economic domination, and th i s i n spite of very r e a l German in t e r e s t s , Germany decided to act. There can be no doubt that Germany had a good case f o r complaint against the French action, as s h a l l be shown shortly. The d i f f i c u l t y was that i n spite of her legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n the p o l i c y which she adopted to defend her case lacked finesse. Her methods were blundering and her claims were asserted i n a blustering and arrogant manner. Her crude diplomacy and the amount of violence she expended i n the handling of her case aroused such resentment and fears that she defeated her own 1 purpose. In claiming a voice i n the settlement of Moroccan a f f a i r s i n 1905, Germany could r i g h t f u l l y point to substantial 2 eoonomio in t e r e s t s there. An equally important point, and one on which she based the l e g a l i t y of her claims, was that i n 1880 she had been one of the Signatory Powers to the Madrid Convention. This Treaty had been signed by twelve of the Powers who met with the Sultan 1s representative to determine the r i g h t s of foreigners i n Morocco. In 1890 she had signed a commercial treaty with Morocco i n which i t was declared "that the subjects of the two p a r t i e s w i l l have the same r i g h t s and advantages as those which e x i s t , or may come to e x i s t , as 3 regards subjects of the most favoured nation." C l e a r l y Germany 1. Trevelyan, G.M_., Grey of Fallodon, (London, 1937), 125. 2. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 755-57; Barclay, op. o i t . , 276. 3. Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 757. -59- had a strong case when she asked to he considered i n Moroccan a f f a i r s . From time to time a f t e r 1890 Germany had displayed her i n t e r e s t i n Morocco. In 1899 the German ambassador and 1 Lord Salisbury had exchanged views on the future of Morocco. When the Kaiser made his v i s i t to England i n 1899 Chamberlain put forward the suggestion of a possible p a r t i t i o n between 2 England and Germany, but t h i s came to nothing. In 1900 Bulow had stated that Germany had interests i n Morocco and that as a r e s u l t she could not be i n d i f f e r e n t to the future of that 3 country. Again, i n 1901 when Chamberlain was proposing a possible agreement between England and Germany he favoured as a f i r s t step a secret agreement between the two countries 4 with reference to Morocco. Though nothing came of these proposals they do show that Morocco did have a place i n German diplomacy. In s p i t e of these very r e a l German inte r e s t s France had chosen to disregard Germany i n carrying out her Moroccan p o l i c y . As M. Pens' M i l l e t has said i n c r i t i c i z i n g t h i s grave blunder In French p o l i c y , "With inc r e d i b l e blindness the Government took precautions with everybody except the only one of i t s neighbours whom i t had serious cause to fear." 1. B.D., I I , No.307, pp.256-57. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 146. 3. Anderson, E.N., The F i r s t MoroccanCrisis,(Chicago, 1930)64. 4. Supra 27. 5. Cited i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. cit.,111,340; Report of the Belgian Minister i n London June 8, 1905, Morel, E.D., Diplomacy Revealed, (London, 192 -60- By a treaty with I t a l y i n 19G0 France removed I t a l i a n opposition 1 by promising to allow her a free hand i n T r i p o l i . Negotiations with Spain f a i l e d i n 1902 owing to a change i n the government, but a f t e r the success of the Anglo-French Entente of A p r i l 1904, whioh assured France of B r i t i s h support i n Moroooo, an accord was made with Spain, as has been shown, on October 3 of that 2 year. France did not attempt to assure he r s e l f of German support or acquiescence of her Moroccan plans, nor did she, according to diplomatic usage, give o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n to the German Government of the Franco-British Declaration referred 3 to above. She chose to ignore Germany, and assured of B r i t i s h , Italian,and Spanish support, proceeded to carry out her own plans. 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 761-62. 2. Supra. 51 3. Bulow to the German ambassador i n Pa r i s , May 1, 1905: "I t was conformable to international usage that France a f t e r the conclusion of the Anglo-French Accord concerning Morocoo, should communicate this Accord i n the customary form to a l l the interested p a r t i e s . M. Dele as se' has declared, i t i s true, that this communication had become superfluous by the fac t of the pub l i c a t i o n of the conven- t i o n i n the French Journal o f f i c i e l . The Minister w i l l not omit to notice however, that these two methods of n o t i f i c a t i o n possess a character e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t . The d i r e c t communication i s not a simple act of courtesy. The French Government, i n deciding to make i t , would have declared i t s e l f ready to enter into discussion with the persons to whom i t i s delivered with reference to their i n t e r e s t s , i n case they estimated them to be affected. Publication i n a French o f f i o i a l paper, on the contrary, places the other persons interested who have not been interrogated i n the presence simply of an accomplished f a c t . " (Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 770;). -61 The Chancellor's Reichstag speech on A p r i l 18, 1904, was only a temporary acquiescence i n the Anglo-Frenoh Agreement, and an i n v i t a t i o n to France and B r i t a i n to consult Germany over Morocoo. The German Government i n truth l i k e d that Accord l e s s than the German people, even though i t knew nothing of the secret a r t i c l e s . Bulow, who p u b l i c l y proclaimed that the -agreement placed Germany i n no actual danger, admitted that "doubtlessly both Powers (France and Great B r i t a i n ) win i n international influence and i n freedom of movement by th i s accord and by t h e i r rapprochement, and that the drawing force 1 of the Anglo-French Entente on I t a l y w i l l also be strengthened." The prospective l o s s of Morocoo to Germany,and the general d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n Germany over the conduct of foreign a f f a i r s , accentuated Bulow*s i l l - w i l l towards the agreement. To manifest i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n at being excluded from the Moroccan settlement and to force M. Deloasse' to come to an agreement with Germany on that question, the German Government f i r s t considered i n A p r i l the project of dispatching a warship to Tangier, ostensibly to s e t t l e c e r t a i n grievances 2 which Germany held against Morocoo at the time. The proposal was not acted upon at the time however. On May 81, the German Foreign O f f i c e telegraphed to Mentzingen that "since a f o r c e f u l action could be e a s i l y misunderstood and lead to erroneous 1. Bulow to William I I , A p r i l 80, 1904; c i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 143. 8. Dr. Genthe, a German resident i n Morocoo, had been recently murdered by natives; a native employee of a German f i r m had been i l l e g a l l y imprisoned; and c e r t a i n indemnities from the Moroccan Government had to be c o l l e c t e d . See also Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 219. 1 conclusions about Germany policy 1* the ship would not be sent. It i s regretable that similar foresight was not adopted i n the spring of 1905. Bulow, however, had not made up his mind to r e l i n q u i s h German ambitions i n Morocco; he was determined to share i n the settlement of Moroccan a f f a i r s . In spite of the f a c t that the Kaiser himself had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n Morocco, and had disclaimed i n a conversation with the King of Spain at) Vigo on March 16, 1904, any interest i n t e r r i t o r i a l a c quisitions, but only i n the maintainance of the "open door," Bulow held other views. It i s only f a i r to say of the Kaiser that i n these days he played no great part i n determining German Moroccan p o l i c y ; the motive force behind i t was Bulow. Late i n A p r i l , 1904, Bulow seized the opportunity to intervene In Moroccan a f f a i r s through Spain, with whose Government France was then negotiating f o r the l a t e r agreement. He gave every encouragement to Spain i n order that she might receive 2 better terms from the more powerful France. But i t was soon seen that Germany could derive l i t t l e p r o f i t from the Franco- Spanish negotiations. German grievances against Morocco meanwhile remained unsettled. German trading firms were demanding protection against monopolistic actions of the French. In June France had p r a c t i c a l l y gained control of the Sultan's finances. 1. Anderson, op. c i t . ,148. 2. Ibid., 152-53} Lansdowne to Lasc e l l e s , June 1, 1904, B.B., I I I , Ho.61, p.53. Renouvin, P i e r r e , La Crise Europe*enne et l a Grande Guerre, (Paris, 1934), 70. Nor had M. Delcasse up to t h i s time shown any i n c l i n a t i o n to open up negotiations with Germany. Already disgruntled at the French foreign minister, the German Government now came to f e e l i t s e l f s l i g h t e d and humiliated by this disregard. Its resistance towards h i s p o l i c y came to be concentrated upon the one grievance which could be best upheld i n the eyes of the public, that France was i n f r i n g i n g upon German economic int e r e s t s i n Morocoo. I t therefore began to adopt a more active p o l i c y . On June 3 the Belgian minister at B e r l i n informed the German Foreign O f f i c e that he suspected that there were secret a r t i c l e s i n the Anglo-French Accord concerning the Rhenish f r o n t i e r . Count Metternich, although he believed the Agreement did contain secret a r t i c l e s concerning Egypt, doubted the suspicions of the Belgian minister, but mentioned the rumor to Lord Lansdowne on June 19. The l a t t e r assured him that the Accord contained no a r t i c l e s whioh concerned European 1 complications. Nevertheless, Bulow r e a l i z e d that any attempt of Germany to i n t e r f e r e i n the Moroccan question would lead to far-reaching consequences, and would need caution; for this reason he sought to learn how the B r i t i s h Government regarded i t s obligations to France with respect to Morocco. With this i n mind,Metternich discussed the question of Morocco with Lord Lansdowne on August 15. Expressing fears of French monopolization i n Morocoo, he asked Lord Lansdowne, i n view of the danger to German economic i n t e r e s t s , how the B r i t i s h Government would interpret A r t i c l e IV of the Anglo-French 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 155. 64 Agreement, which a r t i c l e stated that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., were to be granted "only on such condition as w i l l maintain int a c t the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public i n t e r e s t . " He wished also to know how A r t i c l e IX pledging Great B r i t a i n to lend diplomatic support to France would be interpreted. Lord Lansdowne cautiously stated that he did not wish to express an opinion upon A r t i c l e IX i n a purely hypothetical case. He went on to say: "We made no attempt to dispose of the r i g h t s of other Powers, although we made certain concessions i n respect of the rights and opportunities to which we were ourselves e n t i t l e d . I could at any rate say that i t was not at a l l probable that, i f any Third Power were to have occasion to uphold i t s treaty r i g h t s , we should use our influence i n derogation of them." (1) Metternich i n f e r r e d from th i s interview that the B r i t i s h Government would l i m i t the scope of A r t i c l e IX, and that i n case Germany's actions did not Infringe upon the Sultan's authority Germany would be quite safe i n opposing France i n Morocco. He reported, however, that Great B r i t a i n would oppose Germany seeking control of a harbour there* and warned h i s government that i f a t h i r d Power should dispute p o l i t i c a l l y the French p o s i t i o n that both the English people and the government would support France. Within these l i m i t s 2 Germany might carry out her Moroccan p o l i c y . Just previous to receiving this reply Bulow had proposed dispatching an ultimatum to the Sultan, demanding under threat of a naval demonstration that the outstanding 1. Lansdowne to Las c e l l e s , August 15 ,1904 ,B.D., I I I , Ho.62. 2. Anderson, op. c i t . , 156-7. -65- German claims be s a t i s f i e d w ithin three months. The Emperor, who remained s t e a d i l y opposed to active interference i n the S h e r i f l a n Empire, refused h i s consent to the plan, and nothing was done. But while no German action was taken during these months, f e e l i n g continued to smolder. The non-committal communications from the French Government with regard to the Franco-Spanish agreement i n October, along within the repeated p e t i t i o n s from German firms for defense of t h e i r interests augmented the bitterness against France. By the end of the year the Morocco question was s t i l l very much a l i v e . As the American vice-consul remarked to a leading Moor, "Germany has not yet spoken, and u n t i l then we cannot believe that anything 1 definite.has been decided." Soon afterwards Germany put to one side her grievances with the Sultan and his government, and began to assume an attitude of f r i e n d l i n e s s . She began to encourage the Sultan to r e s i s t the " T u n i s i f i c a t i o n " programme which Belcasse' and the French Government were believed to be f o r c i n g on Morocco. On February I I , 1905, the French charge' at Tangier reported to Delcasse' an ominous communication received from JDihlmann, the German ambassador-; i n which the l a t t e r stated, After the Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 we supposed the French Government was waiting for the Franoo-Spanish agreement before putting us i n possession of the new s i t u a t i o n . But now that everything i s se t t l e d , we see that we have been systematically kept aloof. The Chancellor t e l l s me that the German Government 1. Cited i n Fay, op. c i t . , I, 181. 66- was ignorant of a l l the agreements concerning Morocco, and does not acknowledge himself bound to them i n any way. (1) Delcasse' complained to B e r l i n of this language, and reminded the German Government that he had answered Prince Radolin's enquiries of March 23, 1904, and stated that B e r l i n had asked for no explanations of the Agreement. The German Under-Secretary, von Muhlberg, who received the complaint, r e p l i e d that he knew nothing of Kuhlmann's declaration, but added that Germany was not bound by the Anglo-French or the 2 Franco-Spanish t r e a t i e s . France meanwhile had been proceeding with her p o l i c i e s i n Morocco. On January 11, 1905, the French minister at Tangier, M. Saint-Rene' T a i l l a n d i e r , had been ordered to Fez, the Moroccan c a p i t a l , to lay before the Sultan a programme of reforms consisting of a m i l i t a r y programme and a l i s t of rigorous demands dealing with finances, t a r i f f s and concessions for public works, i n a l l of which France was to act as a general adviser, in s t r u c t o r and regulator. I t has been alleged that the French Ambassador, i n carrying out his mission, sought to produce the impression that he was acting on behalf of a l l the Great Powers i n reorganizing the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l government 3 of Morocco. Germany was now convinced that very soon her 1. Gooch, G.P., History of Modern Europe, (London, 1923),351. Debidour, A., H i s t o i r e Diplomatique de l'Europe,(Paris,1920), 11,15. Paleologue, M., Uh Grand Tournant de l a P o l i t i q u e M0r»diale,(Paris,1934), 238-39. 2. Gooch, op. c i t . , 351 ; i Paleologue, op. c i t . , 242. 3. Deloasse denied t h i s charge; Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 768. It was denied-also by T a i l l a n d i e r , himself; Debidour, op. c i t . , I l ; ^ i 8 ; also i n Berard, V i c t o r , Le Livre jaune Sur Maroc, LaRevue de P a r i s , January 1,1906, 210. -67- economic a c t i v i t i e s i n Morocco would be at an end i f the French obtained t h e i r demands. Accordingly, Dr. Vessel was sent to Fez to inform the Sultan that Germany had not given her consent to the French programme. Bulow was careful to warn his agent, however, not to encourage the Sultan to expect German support i n a war with 1 France, but yet the Sultan was to be encouraged to r e s i s t the French demands. The Sultan decided to c a l l together an Assembly of Notables to examine what steps should be taken. 2 Kuhlmann approved t h i s step as a " s k i l f u l anti-French move." In order to strengthen his hand against France, Bulow sought to win the support of President Roosevelt i n the Morocoan question. As Germany and United States had cooperated c o r d i a l l y i n preserving the "open door" i n China, Billow endeavoured to extend this e f f o r t to Morocco, and to win the United States to his side against France and B r i t a i n . On February 25 he i n v i t e d Roosevelt to unite with Germany i n advising the Sultan that the c a l l i n g of the Notables was a correct move i n f o r t i f y i n g h i s government and i n inaugurating reforms. Although not interested i n Morocoo, the President agreed to i n s t r u c t the American representative i n Tangier to keep i n close touch with h i s German colleague. This answer s a t i s f i e d the German Government, for they now f e l t assured of 3 Roosevelt's moral support. 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 183. 2. Ibid., 182. 3. Anderson, op. c i t . , 185. 0 68 On March 10 a note was sent to the Sultan stati n g , that although the German Government r e a l i z e d that his country must be reorganized, Germany hopes that the rumours of a prospective change i n e x i s t i n g conditions i n Morocco - equal r i g h t s and freedom for a l l nations - are unfounded; Germany would disapprove of such a change. Germany and the United States are favourably i n c l i n e d towards the maintenance of the present oonditions ..... the attitude of the other Powers i s not d e f i n i t e l y known. (1) Germany here showed her Btrong disapproval of the whole French action, and sought to augment Moroccan resistance without committing h e r s e l f to any d e f i n i t e p o l i c y . When speaking i n the Reichstag on March 15, the Chancellor intimated that Germany intended taking steps to defend her Moroccan i n t e r e s t s . He stated: I understand e n t i r e l y the a t t i t u d e which i s given here to events i n and around Morocco. I regard i t as a duty of the German Government to see that ..... our economic interests i n Morocco are not injured. (2) At this same time a most dramatic coup was being planned. Holstein has been charged as the moving s p i r i t behind 3 t h i s , but i n h i s memoirs Bulow takes unto himself the f u l l 4 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In the spring of 1905 the Kaiser was planning a t r i p i n the Mediterranean, and i t was now suggested that he use the opportunity to land at Tangier to v i s i t the Sultan. The Kaiser, i n keeping with his past p o l i c y with regard to 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 185. 8. Ibid., 186. 3. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 220; Paleclogue, op. c i t . , 289, Hamman, Otto, The World P o l i c y of Germany, 1890-1912, (London, 1927), 149. 4. Bulow, Prince von, Memoirs,(London,1931),II,107. Debidour blames the Kaiser; op. c i t . , I I , 17. -69- 1 Morocco, had small i n c l i n a t i o n for this under talcing, but was persuaded by Billow to agree. In order to prevent the r u l e r changing h i s mind the Chancellor had the newspapers announce the forthcoming v i s i t . In answer to objections of the Kaiser, he wrote the same day, "Your Majesty's v i s i t to Tangier w i l l . embarrass M. Deloasse, traverse his schemes, and further our business in t e r e s t s i n Morocco." A few days l a t e r he wrote; "For apart from the f a c t that the systematic exclusion of a l l non-French merchants and promoters from Morocoo according to the example of Tunis would s i g n i f y an important economic l o s s for Germany, i t i s also a want of appreciation of our power when M. Delcasse has not considered i t worth the e f f o r t to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M. Delcasse' 3 has completely ignored us In this a f f a i r . " The Emperor had agreed to the plan, but when he learned from the newspapers that the Tangier population was planning to exploit h i s v i s i t against the French,he wrote to Billow; "Telegraph at once to Tangier that i t i s most doubtful whether I land, and that I am only t r a v e l l i n g incognito as a 4 t o u r i s t ; therefore no audiences, no receptions." The Chanoellor, however, pointed out that a public announcement of the v i s i t had already been made, and i f i t was now given up i t might appear that the plans had been changed owing to pressure from 1. Bulow, op. c i t . , I I , 106. 2. Bulow to the Emperor, March 20, 1905, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 223. 3. Cited i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 187. 4. Cited i n Fay, op. c i t . , I, 183. -70- France. William again consented, though at Lisbon, and even at the l a s t moment i n the harbour at Tangier, he hesitated once 1 more. But he f i n a l l y yielded and carried out the programme others had arranged for him. It was on March 31 he landed to play his dramatic r o l e . The object of the v i s i t had been previously explained i n the Reichstag by Bulow on March 29, when he declared: A year ago the Kaiser told the King of Spain that Germany does not s t r i v e f o r t e r r i t o r y i n Morocco. It i s therefore useless to attribute to- the Tangier v i s i t any s e l f i s h purpose directed against i t s i n t e g r i t y or independence. No one who does not pursue an aggressive goal can fin d cause for apprehension. We have economic i n t e r e s t s , and i n Morocco, as i n China, i t i s to our interests to keep the open door. (2). Onethe Kaiser's a r r i v a l at Tangier there was a reception of the fo r e i g n diplomats at which the French charge d'affaires unexpectedly made a speech as i f he were welcoming the Kaiser to Morocco i n the name of France, stating that his government had no thought of i n f r i n g i n g upon the economic equality of other nations. The Kaiser r e p l i e d somewhat brusquely that he would deal d i r e c t l y with the Sultan as a ru l e r of an independent country and would secure s a t i s f a c t i o n for h i s own just claims, and expected that these would be 3 respected also by France. 1. Schoen to the German Foreign Office, March 31,1905, Pugdale, op. c i t . ,111,224. Ludwig, op. c i t . ,286-87 . 2. Cited i n Gooch, op. c i t . , 352. 3. Brandenburg, op.cit.,221; Anderson,op.cit.,194. See also Newton, op. c i t . , 332-33, who relates a conversation which the Kaiser had with Prince Louis of Battenburg on A p r i l 1 i n which-he unbosomed himself f r e e l y on the subject of his v i s i t i n his well-known s t y l e . This conversation was l a t e r reported to Lansdowne by King Edward. The Kaiser said: "I went to Tangier for the -71- In an address to the German colony he s a i d , "I am happy to salute the devoted pioneers of ..German industry and commerce who aid me i n my task of maintaining the i n t e r e s t s of the Fatherland i n a free country. The Empire has great and growing i n t e r e s t s i n Morocoo. Commerce can only progress i f a l l the Pbwers are considered to have equal r i g h t s under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and compatible with the independence of the country. My v i s i t i s a recognition of t h i s independence." (1) The theme of this address was further developed i n a speech delivered to the Sultan's uncle and Plenipotentiary. "My v i s i t i s to show my resolve to do a l l i n my power to safeguard German in t e r e s t s i n Morocco. Considering the Sultan as absolutely f r e e , I wish to discuss "with him the means to secure these i n t e r e s t s . As for the reforms he contemplates i t seems to me he should proceed with great caution." (2) The Kaiser's v i s i t and his speeches"at Tangier created a sensation throughout Europe. What d i d Germany mean by this t h e a t r i c a l step? The r e a l object of the v i s i t was for the public at large shrouded i n mystery, and t h i s very n a t u r a l l y gave r i s e to the wildest of rumors. Bulow, himself, contributed to t h i s by h i s instructions to the Foreign O f f i c e on March 24 to give out no explanations whatsoever to foreign 3 diplomats should they make i n q u i r i e s , but to "play the Sphinx." It was most commonly held i n Paris and i n London that Germany express purpose of t e l l i n g the French minister what my views were. I said, 'I know nothing of any agreement between France and Morocco. For me, the Sultan i s an independent sovereign. I am determined not to have a r e p e t i t i o n of what happened i n Tunis .... When the minister t r i e d to argue with me I said, "Good morning," and l e f t him standing.'" Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 340 - Paleolbgue mentions t h i s conversation, 279. 1. Cited i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , 111,339. 8. Ibid, 330. 3. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 222. -78- was seeking a quarrel with France, or was endeavouring to 1 destroy the Entente. As has been mentioned above, there i s no evidence to show that Germany was seeking such ends. The purpose of the German leaders seems to have been to uphold German prestige, to show that Germany was not w i l l i n g to be l e f t out where her inte r e s t s were concerned, to check French pentration i n Morocco u n t i l Germany's consent had been obtained or bought by means of concessions elsewhere. The French press had spoken openly of 8 se t t i n g up a second Tunis i n Morocco, and c e r t a i n l y French p o l i c y seemed to be tending i n that d i r e c t i o n . Germany believed, and not without reason, that unless she entered an emphatic protest, Morocoo would be e n t i r e l y l o s t to France. It i s Important to r e a l i z e that Delcasse' had not purchased Germany's assent to French p o l i c y . He had assured himself of the goodwill of I t a l y , Spain,and Great Britain,but he had t o t a l l y disregarded Germany as a factor i n Moroccan aff a i r s , d e e p i t e her great economic inte r e s t s there and her signing of the Madrid Treaty, and 3 despite the fact that of a l l Powers her pride was most se n s i t i v e . 1. Ewart, op. cllfc., 7,74, Supra. 57. 8. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c l t. ,111,339. 3. laniEflW Mr. G.P. Gooch censures Great B r i t a i n for her part i n disregarding German i n t e r e s t s . He states: " I t i s regrettable that the B r i t i s h cabinet did not perceive - or at any rate d i d not help France to perceive - the wisdom of securing German consent by a "solatium." Though the Secret Treaties of 1904 reserved no share f o r Great B r i t a i n i n the contingent p a r t i t i o n of Morocoo, and though It has been argued that i t was reasonable for the contracting pa r t i e s to make alternative arrangements i n the event of Morocoo c o l l a p s i n g from i n t e r n a l weakness, our share i n a transaction which suggested double-dealing involves the B r i t i s h Government i n p a r t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c r i s e s of 1905 and 1911." Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , I l l , 340. 73- Though the Tangier v i s i t was to bring about many unexpected and unhappy r e s u l t s i t d i d have the desired r e s u l t for Germany of making France aware that she could no longer disregard the Empire i n Morocoo. On Maroh 31, the day of the Kaiser's landing, Delcasse' declared i n the Senate: Nothing i n our Moroccan po l i c y /'nothing i n our execution of the accords of A p r i l 8, and October 3, 1904, can explain the movements of the German press .... You may legitemately hope that i n the western basin of the Mediterranean .... Franoe w i l l succeed, without ignoring any r i g h t , without i n j u r i n g any in t e r e s t , i n assuring her future. (I) At the same time he instructed M. Saint-Rene T a i l l a n d i e r , who was s t i l l carrying on his negotiations with the Sultan, to warn the monarch against following the proposals put forward i n the German press for an international conference to discuss Moroccan a a f f a i r s . He f e l t i t was wise also to now open up negotiations with B e r l i n for an understanding with regard to Morocco, and he made e f f o r t s to approach i n d i r e c t l y the German Government with this end i n view. On A p r i l 7 he stated p u b l i c l y i n the French Chamber that ''France was ready to dissipate any misunderstandings 3 whioh .... may s t i l l e x i s t . " On A p r i l 13, while dining at the German Embassy, he repeated this o f f e r to Prince Radolin, and discussed with him French p o l i c y i n Morocco, pointing out that freedom of commerce for a l l nations was safeguarded i n the 4 agreements made with England and Spain. Immediately after, the 1. Cited i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 198. 2. Ibid., 198. 3. Ibid., 199. 4. Ibid., 199; Paleologue, op. c i t . , 290-91. -74- B r i t l s h Government was asked "to help convince the Emperor 1 that German inte r e s t s were i n no way threatened"ln Morocco. M. Delcasse was greatly handicapped i n carrying out h i s p o l i c i e s at this time because he did not have the l o y a l 2 support of either the public or of his government. The ff«Ssr; that he had blundered and aroused German enmity, the feac; of complications with might r e s u l t , along with, p o l i t i c a l jealousy, aroused by his long tenure of o f f i c e and a d i s l i k e of his secretiveness, a l l combined against him. He was attacked by a l l p arties as well as his colleagues; hardly a voice was raised i n h i s support. On A p r i l 22 he offered his resignation, but 3 reconsidered i t on the appeals of President loubet and Paul Cambon who was i n P a r i s . M. Rouvier half-heartedly supported the foreign minister, but assured the Chamber that i n future 4 he would personally supervise foreig n a f f a i r s . Thus public opinion forced an almost complete surrender i n the face of a German menace. I t remained, however, to be seen how far France would y i e l d before her desire for peace would c o n f l i c t with her national honour. I f the Kaiser's dramatic assertions at Tangier had forced Prance to reconsider her Moroccan p o l i c y , they also forced 1. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , A p r i l 27,1905;B.D.,111,No.80,p.67, Hote (1). See also Ho.90,p.73, editor's note. 2. Hale, O.J.* Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, (Philadelphia, 1931), Chapter V. Pale'ologue, op.cl t . , 293, 296; Porter ,C.W.,The Career of Theophile Delcasse 7, (Philadelphia, 1936), 232-33. 3. Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 300; Porter, op. c i t . , 239^40. 4. Porter, op. c i t . , 239. -75- Germany now to take positive action i n that question. As Holstein said, n a re t r e a t would stand on the same l e v e l with 1 Olmutz and cause Fashoda to be forgotten." Bulow had now decided on the following p o l i c y : to continue denying any t e r r i t o r i a l amMtions i n Morocco, to demand economic equality f o r a l l nations, to i n s i s t upon an in t e r n a t i o n a l conference l i k e that at Madrid i n 1880 to discuss the whole question of 2 Moroccan reform. No separate negotiations with France would be considered. Had German p o l i c y with regard to Morocco not been so widely proclaimed to the world at Tangier, and i n so t h e a t r i c a l a fashion, there i s l i t t l e doubt that the German Government could have obtained compensations from France and set t l e d outstanding differences with the Republic. Delcasse' 3 was w i l l i n g to s e t t l e such differences, and Rouvier was l a t e r to o f f e r proposals to t h i s e f f e c t . Germany, however, i n s i s t e d always on the conference as the best means of s e t t l i n g the question. Bulow did not doubt that the proposal f o r a conference would be accepted, and that the conference on meeting would refuse to turn Morocco over to France. Writing to the Kaiser on A p r i l 14, he said: In case a conference meets, we are already certa i n of the diplomatic support of America i n favour of the open door .... Austria w i l l not quarrel with us over Morocco .... Russia i s busy with herself .... _. — g • •— 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 202. 2. Bulow to the Emperor, A p r i l 4, 1905, Dugdale, op.ci t . , I l l , 224. 3. Supra 73; Also, Lester to Lansdowne, A p r i l 21, 1905, B.D. I l l , No. 89, p.72; and Bertie to Lansdowne, A p r i l 27, 1905. Ibid, No.84, p.68. Renouvin, o p . c i t . , 71. -76- The English Government - between Roosevelt and those English groups whioh think as the "Morning Post," "Manchester Guardian" and l o r d Rosebery(I) - w i l l not s t i r . Spain i s of no Importance, and also has a strong party i n favour of the status quo. We should c e r t a i n l y be able to hold I t a l y i n order .... I f Franee refuses the conference she w i l l put herself i n wrong towards a l l the Signatory Powers (2) and thereby w i l l give England, Spain and I t a l y a probably welcome excuse to withdraw. (3) On A p r i l 9 i t was decided to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat the e f f o r t s of the French mission under T a i l l a n d i e r , and to win the Sultan's approval of a conference. At the same time, by messages to the Sultan, Bulow sought to prevent him from making any decisions before the Count arrived. Bulow r e a l i z e d that i f the French succeeded i n gaining the Sultan's acceptance of t h e i r proposals for reforms the entire German po l i o y would be f r u s t r a t e d . On A p r i l IS, by means of a o i r c u l a r dispatch to the Signatory Powers of the Madrid Treaty, he explained Germany's stand and proposed the referenoe 4 of the whole question to an international conference. Meanwhile what was the B r i t i s h reaction to t h i s situation? Both the Government and the public believed that Germany was s t r i k i n g as much at Great B r i t a i n as at France i n 1. These three had c r i t i c i z e d the Anglo-French accord. 2. Referring to those Powers which had signed the Treaty of Madrid i n 1880. 3. Bulow to William I I , A p r i l 4, 1905, o i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 203. 4. For t h i s dispatch see Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 774-75. 77- In an e f f o r t to break the Entente. B r i t i s h f e e l i n g was well expressed by King Edward, who wrote indignantly on A p r i l 15 to Lord Lansdowne: The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for event which the German Emperor has ever engaged i n since he came to the throne. It was also a t h e a t r i c a l f i a s c o , and l f he thinks he has done himself good i n the eyes of the world he i s very much mistaken. He i s no more or le s s than a p o l i t i c a l "enfant t e r r i b l e , 1 * and one can have no f a i t h i n any of h i s assurances. His own pleasure seems to wish to set every country by the ears. (1) The c r i t i c i s m by Lord Lansdowne was no less severe. In a l e t t e r to Lascelles on A p r i l 9 he wrote: I am a f r a i d that we can hardly regard this Tangier e b u l l i t i o n as an i s o l a t e d incident. There can be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by the Anglo-French Agreement, and probably even more so by our r e f u s a l to vamp up some agreement of the same kind with Germany over the Egyptian question. We s h a l l , I have l i t t l e doubt, f i n d that the Kaiser a v a i l s himself of every opportunity to put spokes i n our wheels, and convince those who are watching the progress of the game that he means to take an important part i n i t . My impression i s that the German Government have r e a l l y no cause for complaint either of us or the French i n regard to the Morocoo part of the Agreement. We made no secret of i t s existence. It dealt exclusively with French and B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco, and so far as the other Powers were concerned, i t provided adequate security for t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and f o r the i n t e g r i t y of Morocco i t s e l f . What else does the Kaiser want? (2) What was considered the threatening attitude of the Kaiser suggested to that a*dent s p i r i t , Admiral Fisher, a "golden opportunity" for making war on Germany. In a l e t t e r 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 340. 2. Cited i n Hewton, op. c i t . , 334. 76> to Lord Lansdowne on A p r i l 22 he a c t u a l l y undertook that i f i t came about, ftwe could have the German Fle e t , the K i e l Canal, 1 and Sohleswig-Holstein within a f o r t n i g h t . " The B r i t i s h Government feared for a time that Germany was seeking a port i n Morocco, and was very anxious to cheek the r e a l i z a t i o n of such an objective. On A p r i l 22 Lord Lansdowne wrote to Bertie i n Paris with regard to this matter: It seems to me not u n l i k e l y that German Government may ask f o r a port on the Moorish coast. You are authorized to inform Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s that we should be prepared to j o i n French Government i n o f f e r i n g strong opposition to such a proposal and to beg that i f question i s raised French Government w i l l a f f o r d us a f u l l opportunity of conferring with them as to steps which might be taken to meet i t . German attitude i n this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having regard to M. Delcasse*s attitude, and we desire to give him a l l the support we can. (2) On A p r i l 24 Bertie communicated these views of Lord Lansdowne to M. Belcass^, but i n his draft of the communication he seems to have gone a l i t t l e further than d i d h i s chief, giving greater emphasis to the off e r of B r i t i s h support. The B r i t i s h Government f i n d s that the conduct of Germany i n the Moroccan question i s most unreasonable i n view of M. Delcasse'*s attitude, and i t desires to give hi s Excellency a l l the support i n i t s power. It seems not improbable that the German Government may ask f o r a port on the Moroccan coast. In that event the B r i t i s h Government would be w i l l i n g to j o i n the French Government i n o f f e r i n g strong opposition to such a proposal, and i t asks M. Delcasse', i n case the question i s raised, to give the British-Government f u l l opportunity to concert with the French Government upon the measures whioh might be taken to meet that demand. (3) 1. Cited i n Newton, op. c i t . , 334-5. 2. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , A p r i l 22, 1905, B.D.Ill,No.90,472-73. 3. Draft by B e r t i e , A p r i l 24,1905,Ibid,No.91,pp.73-74. -79- 1 M. Delcasse' was"very gr a t e f u l 1 1 for this o f f e r of B r i t i s h support. He denied that Germany had made a request for a Moroccan port, but promised.to communicate with the B r i t i s h Government i f such a request should be made, and to warn the Sultan against making any concessions to Germany. By the o f f e r of support from B r i t a i n Delcasse' f e l t encouraged to hold to his policy i n spite of Germany's opposition, and i n spite of the lack of support from h i s own people. He was hot supported, however, by h i s premier, M. Rouvier* who as we l l as being premier, had assumed a general 2 control over foreign p o l i c y since A p r i l . M. Rouvier was much more cautious than the daring Delcasse^ he was e s s e n t i a l l y a man of peace, and feared an open c o n f l i c t with Germany. Offers of B r i t i s h support did l i t t l e to quiet his fears, since he r e a l i z e d that the B r i t i s h navy "did not have wheels." He now intervened personally i n the question to attempt a settlement with Germany. In conversations with Prince Radolin on A p r i l 26 and A p r i l 28 he stated that the idea of a conference was not acceptable to Prance. He suggested that i f B e r l i n was w i l l i n g , the purpose of the proposed conference might be served by sending a French c i r c u l a r note to a l l the Signatory Powers, and i f the majority of those Powers were opposed to French action i n Morocoo, i t would not be carried out. Again and again he endeavoured to learn what concessions Germany would ask for r e l i n q u i s h i n g her demand for a conference, and showed himself ready to enter into 1. Bertie to Lansdowne, A p r i l 26, 1905, D.D.,III,No.92, p.74 2. Supra. 74. 1 a general agreement concerning disputed c o l o n i a l question®. But since Germany had so widely proclaimed her disinterestedness i n Morocco she was not i n a position to negotiate for compen- sations. Moreover, i t would have meant now s a c r i f i c i n g the Sultan to the French, after having encouraged him to r e s i s t them. Thus Germany was forced to continue t r a v e l l i n g along the route on which she had set out. Meanwhile the German Government had sought the aid of the United States i n overcoming the resistance of France and B r i t a i n to the holding of the conference. It was f e l t that the attitude of B r i t a i n would be greatly influenced by that of the United States, and therefore Germany asked £ President Roosevelt on A p r i l 5 for his support. On A p r i l 85 x the German ambassador i n Washington again wrote the President," saying that the Emperor would be most gr a t e f u l i f he (Roosevelt) would intimate to England that he would l i k e to see England and 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , £18-819; Hamman, op. c i t . , 166; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 3£3. Ludwig, op. c i t . , 359. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that Bulow and Holstein concealed from William I I , M. Rouvier's o f f e r s of a dir e c t Franco- German agreement. They doubtless f e l t that he, who was no very sound supporter of t h e i r Morocoan p o l i c y , might aooept. In this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his probable attitude they were co r r e c t . Some years l a t e r when the Kaiser came to learn of M. Rouvier's o f f e r s and their r e j e c t i o n by Bulow, he wrote, " I f I had been told about t h i s , I should have gone into i t thoroughly, and that i d i o t i c conference would never have taken place." See Hicolson, op. c i t . , 166. 8. Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, (Hew York, 1980), I, 468. Jusserand, J.J., What M e B e f e l l , (London, 1933), 314-15. We might note i n t h i s connection that the United States had signed the Madrid Convention of 1880. -81- 1 Germany In harmony In t h e i r dealing with Morocco. 0 On May 13 another memorandum was sent to Roosevelt, i n s i s t i n g on the necessity of the conference and complaining 2 of English opposition. Again, on May 31 a third memorandum declared"that England i s the only Power which opposes such a conference, though i t seems she w i l l drop her objections i n a case you should p a r t i c i p a t e i n the conference." Roosevelt's attitude can best be gathered from the l e t t e r he wrote to Taft, the acting Secretary of State. It contained the following: I do not f e e l that as a Government we should i n t e r f e r e i n the Morocoo matter. We have other f i s h to f r y , and we have no r e a l interest i n Morocoo. I do not care to take sides between Prance and Germany i n the matter. At the same time i f I can find out what Germany wants I s h a l l be glad to oblige her i f possible, and I am s i n c e r e l y anxious to bring about a better state of f e e l i n g between England and Germany. Each nation i s working i t s e l f up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. (4) In a l e t t e r to the German ambassador on the same date he r e i t e r a t e d that the United States had no d i r e c t interest i n Morocco, but offered to serve as a mediator between Germany and Great B r i t a i n - "to sound the B r i t i s h Government 5 and f i n d out what i t s views are." 1. Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 469. 2. Ibid., 469. 3. Ibid., 471. 4. Ibid., 472. 5. Ibid., 474. 82- The B r i t i s h Government proved most unwilling to accept the mediation of the President and assured him through their ambassador that there was.no idea i n England of attacking 1 Germany or of a n t i c i p a t i n g a German attack on England. The German Government, however, was encouraged by the attitude of Roosevelt, f o r i t seemed to place the United States on the side of Germany. Distressed by the German rejections of French o f f e r s , and f e a r f u l of war, M. Rouvier went a step farther to meet Germany by o f f e r i n g at the end of A p r i l to get r i d of Delcasse', suggesting that i t could be done over some domestic d i f f i c u l t y 2 within the course of the next few weeks. In s p i t e of this o f f e r Germany proved unwilling to e f f e c t a d i r e c t settlement. Meanwhile, she was pressing Spain and I t a l y as well 3 as the United States for support. Then on May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived i n Fez to persuade the Sultan to r e s i s t the French demands. A few days l a t e r he reported that M. Delcasse' had instructed the French minister to issue a v e i l e d threat of violence against Morocoo should the Sultan agree to a 4 conference. Bulow thereupon warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcasse 7*s "stormy and violent Moroccan p o l i c y . " Pursuing 1. Durand  lansdowne, A p r i l 26, 1905, B.D. I l l , Kb.82, pp.67-68. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 223. Porter, op. c i t . , p.242. Anderson, op. c i t . , S19. Bulow to German Foreign O f f i c e , May 5, 1905; Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 227. 3. Hicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.87, p.70. Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905. Ibid., Ho.88, p.71. 4. Anderson, op. c i t . , 223; Bourgeois et Pages, op. c i t . , 309. The French minister, Saint Rene'-Tai Hand i e r denies t h i s charge - see his l e t t e r to Rouvier, June 15,1905, ci t e d i n "Le L i v r e Jaune Sur Maroc," by Victor Berard, i n the La Revue de P a r i s , January I, 1906, 212. -83- th i s matter s t i l l further, the Chancellor instructed Herr von Miguel, councilor i n the German Embassy at Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but f i r m l y that Delcasse would have to go, and that Franco-German r e l a t i o n s would not improve as long as 1 he remained i n o f f i c e . On May 28 the Sultan rejected the French proposals and gave h i s approval to the holding of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference to discuss Morocoan a f f a i r s . Bulow then warned the French premier that since the Sultan had acquiesced i n the matter of German polioy Germany would "follow up the consequences i f France continued the p o l i c y of intimidation and violence 2 hitherto pursued by Delcasse'." In this way the German Government was attempting to force the dismissal of the French foreign minister* But Delcasse', f e e l i n g sure of the support of Great B r i t a i n and of Russia, held out stubbornly against the proposed conference. To his colleagues, however, this p o l i c y seemed fraught with danger. The a i r was t h i c k with rumours of a German ultimatum, and with t a l k of French unpreparedness for war. At a meeting of the cabinet on June 6, M. Delcasse', 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 224, Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 350. 2. The "Gaulois" published a r t i c l e s on June 9 and 17, 1905, asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarek had also been sent by the German Government to Paris about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcasse' must be dismissed. See Bourgeois et Pages, op. c i t . , 310; Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , 21; Fabre-Luce, op. c i t . , 119. Authorities seem to d i f f e r greatly on this point. Some doubt the truth of the facts as published by the "Gaulois," and a t t r i b u t e the story to French j o u r n a l i s t i c imagination. See Fay, op. c i t . , I, 187, footnote; and Anderson, op. c i t . , 225, footnote. Hale claims that the words attributed to the Prince were merely opinions and rumours current i n Paris from June 6 to 17; op.cit., chapter VI. On the other hand, Porter, the biog- rapher of Delcasse*, suggests that the Prince was sent as a; -84- though aware of h i s i s o l a t i o n , stoutly defended h i s stand and hi s p o l i c y of the past few years. He claimed that i n an exchange of notes with Great B r i t a i n he had recently received an assurance of armed support i n the event of a German attack. Asserting the p o s s i b i l i t y of a formal a l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n , he urged the acceptance of her offer and the refusal of the idea of a conference. M. Rouvier and h i s oolleagues held, however, that the acceptance of the B r i t i s h o f f e r would mean ce r t a i n war with Germany, and f e l t that France should agree to the conference. Delcasse', a f t e r warning them that such a weak p o l i c y would only encourage German insolence, 1 resigned. The " B r i t i s h o f f e r , " on the strength of which the foreign minister was prepared to r i s k a Franco-German war, has remained somewhat of a puzzle to h i s t o r i a n s . In October of 1905 the "Matin" published a series of revelations concerning the f a l l of Delcasse'. These included the assertion, as coming from him, that he had been promised by the B r i t i s h Government, i n case of a German attack, that the B r i t i s h f l e e t would be mobilized to seize the K i e l Canal, and would land one hundred 2 thousand men i n Schleswig-Holstein. That such an o f f e r was ever made by, or on behalf of, the B r i t i s h Government was denied at the time by the Foreign O f f i c e , and B r i t i s h leaders have always since denied that any o f f e r of an a l l i a n c e or of emissary of the Kaiser without the consent of the German Foreign O f f i c e ; op. c i t . , 248-50. 1. Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , 22-24. Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 350-52; Porter, op. c i t . , 258-60. 2. Porter, op. c i t . , 262-63. 1 armed assistance was ever made to France. In the middle of May, 1905, M. Paul Cambon had complained to Lord Lansdowne of the attitude of the German Government. He stated that M. Delcasse regarded the s i t u a t i o n not as "profoundly alarming," but as " s u f f i c i e n t l y serious to occasion him much preoccupation." Lansdowne r e p l i e d that the moral to him seemed to be that each government (of France and of England) should continue to treat the other with the most absolute mutual confidence, that each should keep the other f u l l y informed of everything which came to i t s knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss i n advance any contingencies by which i n the course of events they should f i n d themselves 2 confronted. In an e f f o r t to avoid misunderstandings Lansdowne and Cambon exchanged notes to v e r i f y the above conversation. Cambon, i n his note dated May 24, referred to Lansdowne as having sa i d that .... i f the circumstances demanded i t , i f f o r example we had serious reason to expect an unprovoked aggression on the part of a c e r t a i n Power, the B r i t i s h Government would be ready to concert with the French Government on the measures to be taken. (3) 1. Asquith, H.H., The Genesis of the War, (London, 1923), 90. See the written assertion of Lord Sanderson, August 17, 1922, i n B.D.,III, No.105 (a), p.87, and the comment by Lord Lansdowne, A p r i l 4, 1927, Ho.105 (b), p.87. Lord Newton, the biographer of Lansdowne, states, "there are no traces of any such undertaking i n Lord Lansdowne*s private papers." op. c i t . , 343. 2. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , May 17, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.94, p.76. D.D.F., 2 es.,VI, No.443, pp.522-23. 3. D.D.F., 2 e s, 71, NO.455, pp.538-39. 86- Landsowne, i n his note, dated May 25, sought to avoid suoh a broad commitment, and sai d i t was the B r i t i s h desire that there should be f u l l and c o n f i d e n t i a l discussion between the two Governments, not so much i n consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of another Power, as i n an t i c i p a t i o n of any complications to be apprehended during the somewhat 1 anxious period through which we are at present passing. In transmitting t h i s note to Delcasse, Cambon remarked that the wording had been c a r e f u l l y studied by the B r i t i s h Government and had the approval of the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, and that i t gave recognition of lansdowne*s willingness to discuss i n advance measures to be taken i n view of every contingency. According to the Ambassador's interpre- tation Lansdowne intended i t to apply not only i n the case of an unprovoked aggression, as i n the French version, but to every possible contingency. This would mean i f France acoepted the B r i t i s h proposal, she might be l e d into a general entente 2 which would be i n r e a l i t y an a l l i a n c e . Delcasse' and his advisers i n the diplomatic service seem to have given this broad interpretation to Lansdowne*s 3 note. Having received the B r i t i s h message and the comments of Cambon on May 30, Delcasse' at once telegraphed to the l a t t e r : 1. B.D.III, No.95, p.77; D.D.F. 2 es.VI, No.465,pp.558-559. 2. D.D.F. 2 es, vT,No.415, pp.557-558; Paleologue,op.cit.,p,346. 3. Maurois, op. c i t . , 176; Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 352; Barrere, Camille, La Chute da Delcasse*, Revue des Deux Mondes, August 1, 1932, 616. -87- Say to Lord Lansdowne that I am also of the opinion that the two Governments should more than ever give eaoh other their entire confidence and that I am ready to examine with him a l l aspects of a s i t u a t i o n which does not f a i l to he a l i t t l e disq.uieting. , , (1) More than this had not been promised at the time. On June 12 however, La s c e l l e s , i n B e r l i n , informed Lord Lansdowne that Bulow had mentioned that the German Government had received information to the e f f e c t that B r i t a i n had made an o f f e r of a defensive and offensive a l l i a n c e to France. He reported to Lansdowne that he had told the Chancellor that he, personally, knew nothing of such an o f f e r , and that he greatly doubted i f any such o f f e r had been made. To t h i s , the Chancellor had r e p l i e d , that although his information was not o f f i c i a l , i t was of such a nature that he could not doubt i t s 2 accuracy. On the same date, i n another dispatch, L a s c e l l e s informed h i s chief that Holstein had mentioned the same matter 3 to him. On receipt of this news Lansdowne sent for the German ambassador i n London, Count Metternich, and told him that he could scarcely believe that the suggestion of such an a l l i a n c e was seriously made, or that that the story was worth contradicting. If , however, he stated, the ambassador thought that a contradiction would serve a useful purpose, he was glad to assure him that no such an a l l i a n c e had been offered or discussed by either 1. D.D.F., 2 s., 71, Ho.470,pp.563-64; minute by Hioolson, A p r i l 15, 1912, B.D., 71, Ho.576, pp.747-48. 2. Lascelles to Lansdowne,June 12,1905, B.D.III,No.97,pp.79-80. 3. Ibid., Ho.98, pp.80-81. - 8 8 - 1 England or Prance. Thus i t would seem from the evidence outlined above that no a l l i a n c e was contracted. But there can be l i t t l e doubt that Delcasse seems to have been encouraged by the f r i e n d l y B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . He seems to have erred i n i n t e r - preting Lansdowne*s f r i e n d l y attitude as an assurance of a 2 B r i t i s h a l l i a n c e and armed support. It has been suggested that h i s mistakenly wide i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h i s matter may be explained by the p r o b a b i l i t y that King Edward, while on a v i s i t to P a r i s , intimated to him that i n case of need B r i t a i n 3 would intervene on the French side. It has been offered also as an explanation that the suggestion of armed support came from S i r Francis B e r t i e , who was c e r t a i n l y strongly pro-French 4 In h i s sympathies. Mr. Fay suggests that the idea of landing one hundred thousand men i n Sohleswig-Holstein originated perhaps with S i r John Fisher, for i t was the kind of strategy 5 he had often urged and commended, i t i s quite clear, however, 1. Lansdowne to Lasce l l e s , June 16, 1905 ,B.1B.'I:I1,, Ho.99, p.82 2. Swain, J.W., Beginning the Twentieth Century (Hew York, 1 9 3 3 ) , gives an i n t e r e s t i n g analysis of how Deloasse possibly made his error; 271. 3. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , I l l , 343, footnote. King Edward had v i s i t e d Paris on A p r i l 29, and on A p r i l 30 and May 3 he talked with M5- Delcasse. Lee, op. cit.., I I , 342; Paleologue, op. c i t . , 3 1 5 . 4. Dickinson, op; c i t . , 229. 5. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 198. This view i s supported also i n Wingfield-Stratford, Esme, Victorian Aftermath, (London, 1 9 3 3 ) , 228. -89- that Delcasse" greatly exaggerated the nature of Lansdowne*s offers, whatever may have been the assurances received from other English proposals,in order to persuade his h e s i t a t i n g 1 colleagues to stand firm against Germany. There was keen disappointment i n England over the f a l l of the French foreign minister. Lord Lansdowne wrote to B e r t i e on June 12: Delcasse*s resignation, has, as you may well suppose, produced a very p a i n f u l impression here. What people say i s that i f one of our ministers had had a dead set made at him by a foreign Power, the country and the Government would not only have stood by him, but probably have supported him more vigorously than ever, whereas France has apparently thrown Delcasse overboard i n a p a n i c , Of comrse the r e s u l t i s that the Entente i s quoted at a much lower price than i t was a fortnight ago. (2) In a l e t t e r to a friend he wrote i n a similar vein when he said, "The f a l l of Delcasse i s disgusting, and has sent the 3 Entente down any number of points i n the market.1* Mr. Balfour, expressed the same view when w r i t i n g to the King: Delcasse's dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German Government displayed a weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not be counted on as an e f f e c t i v e force i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i e s . She could no longer be trusted not to y i e l d to threats at the c r i t i c a l moment of a negotiation. (4) As Lord Newton says, i t was one of the most humiliating 5 incidents that had occurred i n France for many years, and since i t was commonly believed i n England that France had suffered this humiliation for having ventured to make friends with England, 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 199. 8. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12,1905,B.D.,III,No.152,p.119; Newton, op. c i t . , 341. 3. Newton, op. c i t . , 341. 4. Maurois, Andre, King Edward and His Times,(London,1933),178. 5. Newton, op. c i t . , 342. -90- i t was only to a lesser degree held to be a blow at England. Thus, while at the time the f a l l of Delcasse seemed a triumph for the German Government, the incident produced r e s u l t s quite unforeseen - i t made the Anglo-French Agreement closer and deeper. M. Delcasse*s biographer has pointed out i n this connection that i t quickly become apparent that the important p o l i c i e s of the f a l l e n minister were in no way mat e r i a l l y affected by his resignation. The p o l i c y of the entente was sound, and rested upon the common inte r e s t s of the Entente Powers, and this system was maintained. Furthermore, although Germany got r i d of Delcasse, she d i d not get r i d of the permanent s t a f f of the Qua! d'Orsay. Paleologue, a sincere admirer of Delcasse*s diplomacy remained there, and the foreign diplomats who shared his views were not removed. M. Barrere said to h i s B r i t i s h colleague i n Rome on June IS, 1908: .... that the leaders of French diplomacy, the two Cambons, Jusserand, and himself, were f i r m l y united i n sympathy for the policy of their l a t e Chief and considered that there was no cause for alarm; the French p o s i t i o n was a sound one in harmony with England and others. (1) This was made p a r t i c u l a r l y clear when Germany made the blunder of i n s i s t i n g that the humiliation of France shcmld be complete. Had she been content to stop when the f a l l of Delcasse was brought about, and taken advantage of that moment to c o n c i l i a t e M. Rouvier, she might have arrested the development of the Entente at that point, and thus l i m i t e d i t to the f r i e n d l y c o l o n i a l agreement which i t s authors intended i t to be. But 1. Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, B.D., I I I , Ho.123, p. 95. -91- the German diplomats wished to take a l l the trioks i n the game; as i n so many oases they f a i l e d to seize the favourable moment. Before the end of the year the continuance of German pressure and threats had thrown France and Great B r i t a i n closer together, and given the Entente the weight and significance i t was to hold u n t i l the outbreak of the Great War. The f a l l of Delcasse might be taken to mark the close of the f i r s t stage of the Morocco C r i s i s of 1905-1906. Germany had thus far gained her objectives - the Sultan had accepted the plan of a Conference-, and M. Delcasse*s f a l l had been secured. But so many complications had been aroused that the c r i s i s continued just as acutely after that event as before. M. Deloasse's resignation did not r e l i e v e the tension as M. 2 Rouvier had hoped. There followed weeks of d i f f i c u l t negotiations with Germany before the two governments could agree on a formula estab l i s h i n g a basis on which the conference should meet. On June 11 M. Rouvier explained h i s position to the German ambassador as follows: 1. The views of l o r d Bertie on the f a l l of Delcasse are of i n t e r e s t . He says, "Delcasse would have f a l l e n even i f Germany had not been menacing, but he might not have f a l l e n so soon. His elimination from the Cabinet was i n great part due to his treatment of h i s colleagues. He did not keep them informed of what he did and proposed to do. He had got to consider himself indispensable .... Several of h i s chers collegues d i s l i k e d him and i t ended i n h i s being put aside. The German Government took advantage of the f e e l i n g that a scapegoat should be found. They spent money and spread about that Delcasse*s mismanagement was the sole cause of the misunderstanding, and they so assisted i n bringing about h i s f a l l . " Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15,1905,Hewton, op. c i t . , p.341. 2. Lansdowne to Bertie,July 12,1905,B.D.,III,Ho.l5B, p.119 Paleologue, op. c i t . , 359-360. -92- I d i s l i k e a conference, but i f I accept there must be a preliminary understanding. Yet i f that i s secured a conference i s needless. We have no i n t e r e s t i n i n f r i n g i n g the sovereignty or i n t e g r i t y of Morocoo, but our common f r o n t i e r of 1,200 kilometres makes us the party most concerned i n law and order. You seem resolved to block a l l our proposals, and we cannot accept a conference where that would happen. We must therefore, f i r s t know how Germany regards reforms. (1) Germany i n s i s t e d on the other hand that she could discuss the programme only when France agreed to accept the 2 conference. Meanwhile B r i t a i n supported the French stand most vigorously - Rouvier was assured of the entire support of the B r i t i s h Government. On June 16 Lansdowne remarked to Paul Cambon, who was leaving London f o r Paris to advise M. Rouvier, that he saw nothing to be gained, by admitting the theoretical necessity of a Conference; except perhaps to enable Germany which had brought about M. Deleasse's downfall, to secure a further success. Our attitude must of course depend upon that of the French Government, but i f they maintained th e i r r e f u s a l , so most c e r t a i n l y should we. (3) Without accepting or r e j e c t i n g the idea of a conference M. Rouvier endeavoured to dissipate a l l misunderstandings with Germany, and i n v i t e d the l a t t e r to negotiate further i n order 4 to make unnecessary the proposed gathering. The German reaction was exceedingly h o s t i l e ; the Government did not hesitate to use 1. Cited i n Gooch, op. c i t . , 357-58; Pale'ologue, op. cit.,359-60. 2. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 365 3. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , June 16, 1905, B . D . i l l l , No.124, p.97. 4. Gooch, op. c i t . , p.358. See Victor Berard, L i v r e Jaune Sur Maroo, loo. c i t . , 213-214. -93- threats to bring France to terms. The French.Ambassador in B e r l i n reported that i n a conversation with the Chancellor on June S3 the l a t t e r emphasized "the necessity not to l e t this question mauvaise, tres mauvaise, drag on, and not to l i n g e r on a road horde de precipices et meme d'abimes." At the same time the German representatives i n Rome and Madrid were using violent language to win I t a l y and Spain to the German side. While these negotiations were being carried on, Germany was seeking also further support from President Roosevelt. In asking h i s mediation i n the dispute i t was proposed that he should suggest to Paris and London that the United States considered a conference the best means of 3 bringing the Moroccan question to a peaceful solution. Mr. Roosevelt did take up the task of mediation, and working through the French and German ambassadors i n Washington, Jusserand and Sternburg, he played a valuable part i n securing .. the assent of the French government to the holding oT xthe 4' proposed conference. 1. Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , £7. Berard, L i v r e Jaune Sur MaroOjloc c i t . , S14. S. Lansdowne to Be r t i e , June SI, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.186,p.97. 3. Memorandum from the Kaiser to Roosevelt sent through Baron Sternburg, June 11, 1905, Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 477. Jusserand, op. c i t . , 317. 4. Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 477-79; Jusserand, op. c i t . , 319-80. On securing the assent of the French government on June £3, Roosevelt endeavoured to persuade Germany she should be s a t i s f i e d with this triumph, and not to raise questions of minor d e t a i l s . Roosevelt to Sternburg, June £5, 1905; Bishop, op. c i t . , I,,_483-85. See also Paleologue, op. c i t . , 364*65. 94- M. Rouvier had. by this time become more i n c l i n e d to accept the plan of a conference, despairing of any other solu t i o n . On June 88 he j u s t i f i e d this course to the B r i t i s h charge d' a f f a i r e s as follows: He (M. Rouvier) considered that under the conditions a conference was perhaps the best way of a r r i v i n g at a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n . The Emperor had made i t a point of personal honour: France would go into i t with the support of England, Spain and possibly I t a l y , whereas Germany would be alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French i n t e r e s t s on the Algerian f r o n t i e r . It was absolutely necessary to a r r i v e at some solution as the present s i t u a t i n n was excessively dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany considered that she was e n t i t l e d to a free hand i n Morocoo, and she was very ac t i v e . (1) The French assent now given, terms were then drawn up i n an agreement to form a basis on which the conference 2 might be h i l d . These were signed on July 8. France was assured that Germany would pursue no goal at the Conference which would compromise the legitimate i n t e r e s t s of France i n Morocco, or thatrwould be contrary to the r i g h t s of France r e s u l t i n g from tr e a t i e s or arrangements. Agreements reached were to be i n harmony with the following p r i n c i p l e s : the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; the i n t e g r i t y of h i s Empire; economic l i b e r t y without any inequality; the u t i l i t y of p o l i c e and f i n a n c i a l reforms, the introduction o f which would be regulated for a short time by means of an international agreement. It was further agreed that the 1. L i s t e r to Lansdowne, June 88, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.134, p.107. 8. Before these were signed France submitted them to London for approval, Approval was given by Lansdowne. Lansdowne to Bertie July 1, 1905, i b i d . , No.137, p.110. -95- spe c i a l i n t e r e s t s of France as a f r o n t i e r neighbour i n the maintenance of order throughout the whole of Morocco should he recognized. F i n a l l y the two governments agreed to work out a programme for the conference which was to be submitted to the 1 Sultan for acceptance. An analysis of this agreement reveals c l e a r l y Germany's f i r s t reverse i n her Moroccan campaign. It i s true that the winning of the French assent to the plan of a confer- ence, which the Republic had so vigorously opposed, might be taken as a diplomatic triumph, but the agreement of July 8 recognized the s p e c i a l interest of France i n Morocco, and i n 2 no way n u l l i f i e d her accords with B r i t a i n and with Spain. Germany had not weakened the Entente. Moreover, she had f a i l e d to make a c o l o n i a l accord of her own with France, when she had refused the o f f e r s tendered by Delcasse and Rouvier. She had chosen rather to keep her promises to the Sultan, and to force a conference on an unwilling Europe, refusing offers of present c o l o n i a l gain i n the hope of winning these i n the future. As Mr. Anderson puts i t , "her vi r t u e , not appreciated by any 3 other Power, was greater than her common sense.1* What i s s t i l l more important, however, than Germany's f a i l u r e to make any appreciable gains by this agreement i s that her government had embittered the French nation against 1. These terms given i n B.D., I I I , No.147, pp.115-116. 2. Fabre-Luce, op. c i t . , 120-121. Pale'ologue, op. cit.,381-82. 3. Anderson, op. c i t . , 256. -96- the Empire, and aroused i t to the united defense of i t s 1 national honour. On July 11, M> Jusserand wrote to President Roosevelt: I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement arrived at i s one which we had considered, and the acceptance of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me from Paris .... confirmed what I guessed was the ease, that i s , that there was a point where more y i e l d i n g would have been impossible; everybody i n France f e l t i t , and people braced up s i l e n t l y i n view of possible great events. (2) Germany's actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and converted him s o l i d l y to the Entente. The B r i t i s h charge d'a f f a i r e s reported on June 28; His Majesty (The German Emperor) had expected a complete climb-down to follow upon the change of d i r e c t i o n of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , but as His Excellency (M. Rouvier) said, there was no reason because he had parted with M. Delcasse that he should throw himself "dans les bras de l'Empereur, et sur son ecu." (3) M. Cambon had informed Lord Lansdowne: that af t e r a l l that had happened M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country (Great B r i t a i n ) . It was, i n his view, essential that the two governments should treat one another with the f u l l e s t confidence, and that no further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us. (4) This p o l i c y , as expressed by the French leaders, met with Lord Lansdowne's entire approval, for i t s i g n i f i e d success i n the 1. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 386-87, Report of the Belgian Minister i n P a r i s , October 24, 1905, Morel, op.cit.,22-23. 2. Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 488. 3. Lester to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, B.D., I I I , Ho.134,p.108. Also Paleologue, op. c i t . , 387. 4. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, B.D., I I I , Ho.l58,p.ll8. -97- e f f o r t s to maintain intact the Entente Cordials. He assured M. Cambon that "we had no intentions of withdrawing our 1 support." Yet another sign which further assured the strength of the Entente i n the eyes of the world was the exchange of v i s i t s between the f l e e t s of Great B r i t a i n and France which took place i n July and August of 1905. The B r i t i s h A t l a n t i c f l e e t was received at Brest i n July with the greatest enthusiasm. "The f e e l i n g , openly expressed on a l l sides, was one of intense gratitude to the King and the B r i t i s h nation for the way i n which they had stood by France i n the recent Morocoo incident. It was a public r a t i f i c a t i o n of the 2 Entente Cordiale." This v i s i t was returned by the French f l e e t i n August, when i t was received i n England with 3 enthusiastic demonstrations of English goodwill. Germany's vaction had thus furthered the process which Germans have c a l l e d her "encirclement" and i s o l a t i o n . After the signing of the agreement of July 8 new and wearisome discussions began between the French and German governments to work out the formulae for deliberations at the forthcoming conference. It was not u n t i l September 28 1. lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, B.D. I l l , Ho.152,p.119. 2. Lee. op. c i t . , I I , 345. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 387-88. 3. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 393-94. -98- 1 that an agreement as to the programme was signed. The conference was to he held, not at Tangier, to which the French had objections, but i n Algeciras, i n southern Spain. In the programme drawn up the subjects for consideration were defined i n general terms as the police force, the suppression of the smuggling of arms, the reform of finances, the opening up of new sources of revenue, the Sultan's undertaking not to part with any branch of the public service f o r the benefit of private i n t e r e s t s , and the allotment of contracts f o r public works, A few minor disputes of a l o c a l nature were also regulated. After some opposition the Sultan agreed to the . 2 programme on October 23. L. A grave s i t u a t i o n arose during these negotiations when news reached France that through Count Tattenbach a German firm had received from the Sultan a contract f o r building a mole i n the harbour of Tangier, and also, that a loan had been arranged by German banks fo r 10,000,000 marks. France accused the German Government of double-dealing; and England and Spain joined her i n protest. Billow upheld the transactions, asserting that the negotiations f o r the mole contract had been going on for months, and that the loan was not a r e a l "loan," but merely a "Temporary advance" which could be repaid at any time. See Anderson, op. c i t . , 264-67. Also, Berard, LeLivre Jaune Sur Maroc, l o c . c i t . , 217-22. Also, Francis Charmes, i n his Chrohique de l a Quinzaine, in La Revue des Deux Mondes, September 15, 1905, 472. 2. After t h i s agreement was signed Bulow expressed to France the willingness of the German Government to negotiate over other c o l o n i a l matters, such as the f r o n t i e r s of the Cameroons, and the Bagdad Railway. M. Rouvier c o l d l y r e p l i e d that he had previously offered to negotiate on such matters so as to avoid the holding of the forthcoming conference, and to s e t t l e the Morocco question i n a f r i e n d l y manner between France and Germany alone. They could not return to that now, he said, u n t i l It was seen how the conference turned out. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 229. 99- The Conference was to open i n January of 1906. Before that time, however, a new government came into power i n England, when on December 4, 1905, the Conservative administ- r a t i o n of Balfour was replaced by the L i b e r a l government of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman. S i r Edward Grey succeeded Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary. It seemed of supreme importance to the French Government to ascertain the intentions of thi s new administration i n the matter of foreign policy before the Conference opened. Would France be able to count on i t s support as i t had i n the past been able to count on the support of Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues? In a speech on December 22 at the Albert H a l l the new Prime Minister pledged h i s government to continue the p o l i c y of his predecessors, and affirmed his adhesion to the p o l i c y of the Entente Gordiale. But the French Government f e l t i t necessary to have S i r (Edward Grey renew the assurances given formerly by Lord Lansdowne. Colonel Repington, the m i l i t a r y correspondent of the "Times,* has related how on December 28 he met with Major Huguet, the French M i l i t a r y Attache i n London, who stated that h i s Government was seriou s l y alarmed about the intentions of Germany and was worried over the f a i l u r e of the new B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary to renew the assurances given by h i s 1 predecessor. "The French knew," records Colonel Repington, "that our sympathies were with them, but they wanted to know 2 what we should do i n case Germany confronted them with a c r i s i s . " He immediately reported his conversation with Major Huguet to 1. Repington,Colonel, The F i r s t World War,(New York,1921),1,2-6. C a l l w e l l , CE., Fie Id -Marshall S i r Henry Wilson, (London, 1927), 2. Repington, op.cit., I, 1. I » 8 9 f f . -100- S i r Edward Grey, who was at the time electioneering i n Northumberland. The l a t t e r r e p l i e d on December 30, "I have not receded from anything that l o r d Lansdowne said to the • 1 French, and have no hesitation i n affirming i t . " Colonel Repington communicated his conversation with the French M i l i t a r y Attach^ to S i r George Clarke, Secretary of the Defense Committee, and to Lord Esher, a member of that Committee. They agreed that i n view of the German menace 2 active steps towards cooperation with France should be taken. nThey thought i t indispensable that something should be done, and as both Lord Esher and S i r George Clarke were serving i n o f f i c i a l c apacities, and as Repington was a free lance, i t was eventually agreed that he should sound the French Government through Major Huguet, and that when the French views were thus p r i v a t e l y and u n o f f i c i a l l y ascertained that they should pass the matter on to the B r i t i s h Government which would be completely uncommitted and able to continue the conversations or to drop 3 them as they pleased." The Colonel prepared a short l i s t of questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These were considered i n P aris by M. Rouvier, the Prime Minister, M* Etienne, Minister of War, M. Thomson, Minister of Marine, and his naval s t a f f , and by General Br un and General Brugere. On January 12.. Major 1. Repington, op. c i t . , I, 4. 2. Ibid., 5. 3. Ibid., 5-6. -101- Huguet again v i s i t e d Colonel Repington, bringing a c o r d i a l reply from Paris and assuring him that everything possible would be done to make the necessary arrangements f o r cooperation. Colonel Repington then imparted this r e p l y to the Defense Committee. Meanwhile, on January 10 M. Cambon, who had discussed 1 the matter with M. Rouvier, approached S i r Edward Grey on the matter of a closer and more de f i n i t e understanding between the two governments. Grey r e p l i e d as follows: that at the present moment the Prime Minister was out of town, and the Cabinet were a l l dispersed seeing a f t e r the elections; that we were not as yet aware of the sentiments of the country as they would be expressed at the p o l l s ; and that i t was impossible therefore for me, i n the circumstances, to give a reply to h i s Excellency's question. I could only state as my personal opinion that, i f France were to be attacked by Germany i n consequence of a question a r i s i n g out of the Agreement (of A p r i l 8, 1904) which our predecessor had recently concluded with the French Government, public opinion i n England would be strongly moved i n favour of France. (2) When M. Cambon r e p l i e d that "nothing would have a more p a c i f i c influence on the Emperor of Germany than the conviction, that i f Germany attacked France, she would f i n d England a l l i e d 3 against her," Grey answered that he thought "the German Emperor did believe t h i s , but that i t was one thing that this opinion should be held i n Germany and another that we should 4 give a po s i t i v e assurance to France on the subject*" He could give no assurance, he added, of which he was uncertain. 1. Huguet, General, L*Intervention M i l i t a i r e Britannique en 1914, c i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . * 337. 2. Grey to Be r t i e , January 10,1906 ,B.D., IIX,No.210(a), p.170. 3. Ibid., 171. 4. Ibid. , 171. -102- He "did not believe that any Minister could, i n present circumstances, say more than I had done, and, however strong the sympathy of Great B r i t a i n might be with France i n the case of a rupture with Germany, the expression which might be given to i t and the action which might follow must depend l a r g e l y upon the circumstances i n which the rupture took place." Since a p o s i t i v e answer was thus postponed u n t i l a f t e r the elections M. Cambon r e p l i e d that he would repeat his request at that time. But he asked that i n the meantime "the u n o f f i c i a l communications" between the B r i t i s h Admiralty and War Office and the French Naval and M i l i t a r y Attaches "as to what action might advantageously be taken i n case the two countries found themselves i n a l l i a n c e i n such a war" might be permitted to continue. "They did not pledge either Government" he added, and S i r Edward "did not dissent from 2 this view." The ministers of the Cabinet were scattered for the elections, but Grey sent a report of this conversation to the Prime Minister, and also to Lord Ripon, the senior minister available i n London. On January 12, he met Mr. Haldane, Secretary of State f o r War, at Berwick, and discussed with him 3 the question of the M i l i t a r y conversations. He had learned that under the former government i n the previous year such m i l i t a r y and naval conversations had taken place, and that at 1. Grey to Bertie,JanuaryilQ,lffQ6, B.D.III, No.210 (a), p.171 2. Ibid. 3. Spender, J.A., The L i f e of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, II (hereafter c i t e d as Spender, Campbell-Bannerman), London, 1923) 251f. rlOS- the present time o f f i c i a l conversations were going on between Admiral S i r John Fisher and the French Naval Attache', while the m i l i t a r y conversations were being held u n o f f i c i a l l y be- 1 tween the French M i l i t a r y Attache' and Colonel Repington. When consulted on January 11, General Grierson, the Director of M i l i t a r y Operations, had stated "that i f there i s even a chance of our having to give armed assistance on land to France, or to take the f i e l d on her side i n Belgium i n consequence of a v i o l a t i o n of Belgian t e r r i t o r y by the Germans, we should have as soon as possible informal communication between the m i l i t a r y authorities of France and/or i n Belgium and the Gen- 2 e r a l s t a f f . " In agreeing that these conversations might be carried on o f f i c i a l l y neither Haldane nor Grey could see anything against such a p o l i c y . As Grey argues i n his memoirs: I was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any obli g a t i o n to go to war; but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular i n B r i t a i n . I t was certai n that i f Germany forced a quarrel on France upon the very matter of that Agreement, the pro-French f e e l i n g i n B r i t a i n would be very strong, so strong probably as to j u s t i f y a B r i t i s h Government i n intervening on the side of France or even to i n s i s t on i t s doing so. We must, therefore, be free to go to the help of France as well as free to stand aside. But modern war may be an a f f a i r of days. I f there were not m i l i t a r y plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the a s s i s t - ance of France i n time, however strongly public opinion i n B r i t a i n might desire i t . We should i n eff e c t not have preserved our freedom to help France, but have cut ourselves o f f from the p o s s i b i l i t y of doing so, unless we had allowed the B r i t i s h and French s t a f f s to concert s plans for common action. (3) 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 74-78. 2. Grierson to Sanderson, January 11,1906,B.D.,111,No.211,p.172 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 75, Also, Haldane, Viscount, Before the War, (New York, 1920), 44-49. -rl04- Such was the reasoning of the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s who approved the conversations. In an interview with Cambon oh January 15 S i r Edward Grey gave h i s consent. That interview was recorded i n a dispatch to the B r i t i s h ambassador i n P a r i s : I told M. Cambon today that I had communicated to the Prime Minister my account of his conversation with me on the 10th instant. I had heard from the Prime Minister that he could not be i n London before the 25th January, and i t would therefore not be possible for me to discuss things with him before then, and the Members of the Government would not assemble In London before the 29th; I could therefore give no further answer today on the question he had addressed to me. He had spoken to me on the 10th of communications passing between the French Naval Attache* and the Admiralty. I understood that these communications had been with S i r John Fisher. I f that was so, i t was not necessary f o r me to do any more; but, with regard fto the communications between the French M i l i t a r y Attache and the War O f f i c e , I understood from him that these had taken place through an intermediary. •I had therefore taken the opportunity of speaking to Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, who had been taking part i n my election contest i n Northumberland on Friday,, and he had authorized me to say that these communications might proceed between the French M i l i t a r y Attache and General Grierson d i r e c t ; but i t must be understood^tha.t these communications did not commit either Government. M. Cambon said that the intermediary i n question had been a r e t i r e d colonel, the m i l i t a r y correspondent of the "Times," who. he understood, had been sent from the War O f f i c e . (1) The Prime Minister seems to have had some misgivings about the interpretation which might be put upon these "commun- ic a t i o n s . " "I do not l i k e the stress l a i d upon jo i n t preparat- ions," he wrote to Lord Ripon.on February 2, "It comes very close to an honorable undertaking; and i t w i l l be known on both 8 sides of the Rhine. But l e t us hope f o r the best." But he 1. Greyto^Bertie, January 15, 1906, B.D., ffill, No.215, p.177. Sanderson to Grierson, January 15, 1906, i b i d . No.217 (a), pp.178-79. '8. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 257. -105- was cogniziant of and a party to the steps taken i n this p o l i c y ; he had been made aware of a l l the circumstances, and had given hi s consent on the understanding that they were prov i s i o n a l and precautionary measures, and that the Government was not bound by t h e i r r e s u l t s . Thus li m i t e d , he regarded them as r a i s i n g no new question of p o l i c y and therefore within the 1 competence of the War O f f i c e . It was d e f i n i t e l y understood 2 that these conversations did not bind the governments. On January 17 the conversations were begun between Major Huguet and General Grierson and continued uninterrupted between the general s t a f f s u n t i l the outbreak of the War i n 3 1914. The same l i n e of reasoning which had led the B r i t i s h to enter upon these ncommunications n with France applied with equal force to Belgium, f o r both the B r i t i s h and French authorities expected Germany to v i o l a t e Belgian n e u t r a l i t y should she wish to s t r i k e at France. On January 15, therefore, S i r Edward Grey instructed General Grierson to open conversations with the Belgian m i l i t a r y authorities "as to the manner i n which, i n case of need, B r i t i s h assistance could be most e f f e c t u a l l y 4 afforded to Belgium f o r the defense of her neutrality. 1* "Such 5 communications must be s o l e l y provisional and non-committal." 1. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, I I , E53. 2. Repington, op. c i t . , I, 13, Grey, op. c i t . , I, 76. 3. Repington, op. c i t . , I, 14. 4. Sanderson to Grierson, January 15, 1906, B.D., I I I , Ho;214, pp.176-77. 5. Grierson to Barnardiston, January 16, 1905 i b i d , Ho.217 (b) p.179. 106- Colonel Barnardiston, the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Attache^in Brussels, broached the subject to the Belgian Chief of Sta f f , General Ducarne, on January 18, t e l l i n g him that the B r i t i s h Minister would take up the matter with the Belgian Foreign Minister. After consulting the Minister of War, General Ducarne agreed 1 to the conversations. These conversations, both m i l i t a r y and naval, were kept secret. The Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only a very few personsj the ones with France were not known 2 to a l l the members of the B r i t i s h Cabinet. How S i r Edward Grey had to again answer that larger request of the French ambassador, the request for a formal agreement between the two governments, which had been made on January 10, and the answer to which the Foreign Secretary had postponed u n t i l a f t e r the elections. After discussing the matter with the Prime Minister and Mr. Haldane, both of whom were i n london a f t e r January 26, S i r Edward met M. Cambon on 1. Barnardiston to Grierson, January 19, 1906* B.D. I l l , No*221 (C 1), p . l 8 7 f f . C a l l w e l l , op. c i t . , I, 89. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 93, Anderson* op. c i t . , 342. See Ea r l loreburn and l l o y d George, both of whom were members of the Cabinet at this time. Loreburn, op. c i t . * 80-81. Lloyd George, War Memoirs,.(London, 1933) I, 46-51. While Grey admits that he did not reveal these conver- sations to the cabinet at the time, he states i n his memoirs, "they must subsequently have become known to those ministers who attended the committee of Imperial Defense;" op. c i t . , I, 93. Lord Sydenham, a member of that committee u n t i l September, 1907, writes, "This was not so. In my time the question never came to me o f f i c - i a l l y , and I only heard quite informally what was going on .... Whether d i f f e r e n t arrangements, enabling the Committee of Imperial Defense to be cognizant of the negotiations, were made a f t e r the end of September (1907) when I l e f t for India I do not know." Written statement by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927, B.D,, I I I , Ho.221 (a),p.l85. -107- the l a s t day of the month.- That interview was reported i n a long dispatch to the B r i t i s h ambassador at P a r i s . When M. Cambon again asked whether France would be able to count on the assistance of England i n the event of an attack upon her by Germany, Grey submitted f i r s t of a l l a review of the r e l a t i o n s between the two governments as they stood at that moment. Pointing to the m i l i t a r y and naval communications, he stated that i f a c r i s i s arose no time would be l o s t f o r want of a formal engagement. Secondly, only a week previously he had informed Count Metternich, the German ambassador i n London, that i t was his personal opinion that " i n the event of an attack upon France by Germany a r i s i n g out of the Morocco Agreement, public opinion i n England would be so strong that no B r i t i s h Government could remain neutral." In t h i s way, he assured M. Cambon that what would be the moral e f f e c t upon Germany of a formal engagement between France and England had been already given e f f e c t . In the t h i r d place, he pointed out that the present r e l a t i o n s h i p between England and France as a r e s u l t of the Entente of 1904 l e f t France a free hand in Morocco and gave her unreservedly B r i t a i n ' s diplomatic support. But, should this promise be extended beyond diplomatic support, and "should we take an engagement which might involve us i n a war," he f e l t sure that B r i t a i n would demand consultation with regard to French p o l i c y i n Morocco, and demand concessions or alterations i n that p o l i c y 1 which might seem desirable to avoid a war. 1. Grey to B e r t i e , January 31, 1906, B.D.,III, No.219, p.180. -108- In summing up his case, he asked M. Cambon "to weigh these considerations i n his mind, and to consider whether the present s i t u a t i o n as regards ourselves and France was not so s a t i s f a c t o r y that i t was unnecessary to a l t e r i t 1 by a formal declaration as he desired." To this M. Cambon r e p l i e d that a war might break out so quickly that i f i t were necessary for the B r i t i s h Government "to consult and wait for manifestations of English public opinion, i t might be too l a t e to be of use." To his repeated request for some form of verbal assurance Grey pointed out the main d i f f i c u l t i e s i n giving what could be "nothing short of a solemn undertaking.'' '.'It was one which I could not give without submitting i t to 'the Cabinet," and i f t h i s were done, he f e l t sure that they would say i t was too serious a matter to be dealt with by a mere verbal engagement, but i t would have to be i n writing. Such a change as t h i s , Grey maintained, would transform the "Entente" into a defensive a l l i a n c e . He admitted that pressure of circumstances - the a c t i v i t y of Germany, for instance - "might eventually transform the "Entente" into a defensive a l l i a n c e , " but he did not think such a change was needed at the moment. To t h i s he added, that a defensive a l l i a n c e could not be kept from Parliament; "no B r i t i s h Government could commit the country to such a serious thing and keep I the engagement secret." For B r i t a i n to support 1. Grey to Bertie, January 31, 1906, B.D., I I I , No.219, p.181. -109- France i n a war with Germany, "much would depend on the manner i n which war broke out." The B r i t i s h would not be w i l l i n g to fig h t i n order to put France i n possession of Morocco, but " i f i t appeared that war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French 'entente,* public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France." He added, however, that B r i t i s h sentiment was much averse to war and that he could not be certa i n whether this aversion would be overcome by the desire to a i d France. He informed M. Cambon that he was w i l l i n g to reopen the conversation at any time i n the future, but he did, not think that the s i t u a t i o n 1 j u s t i f i e d , such a r a d i c a l change as had been suggested. M. 2 CamboJi appeared to be s a t i s f i e d with that answer. Thus S i r Edward Grey embarked upon the policy with France which he followed u n t i l the outbreak of the War. In his mind he was open and frank with both France and Germany. He had told the German ambassador of the p r o b a b i l i t y of . B r i t i s h intervention i n favour of France i n the event of a Franco-German war. To France he had pledged f u l l diplomatic support, while permitting preparations f o r an emergency. He had refused her absolute assurance of a i d i n case of war, pr e f e r r i n g to keep, as he believed he had kept, B r i t i s h hands free. By this apparently simple, but what was r e a l l y to prove 1. Grey to Ber t i e , B.D., I I I , Ho.219, p.182. 2. Memorandum by Sanderson, February 2, 19^06, B.D. I l l , Ho.220*{b), p.185. Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Ripon, February 2, 1906, cited i n Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II , 257. -110- an i n t r i c a t e p o l i c y , he hoped to s a t i s f y the needs of Br i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y . He has j u s t i f i e d this p o l i c y to what seems h i s own s a t i s f a c t i o n i n his speech i n the House of Commons on August 3, 1914, and has further developed the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n h i s Memoirs. He clings consistently to h i s contention that England was i n no way bound to France, and that he had kept her hands 1 completely free. But i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand how he could have deceived himself into this b e l i e f . It may be true, as he so often maintains, that the m i l i t a r y and naval conversations, did not absolutely bind the two Powers, but i t cannot be denied that they constituted an exceedingly powerful t i e between them. It i s impossible to escape the contention that at least a potent moral obligation to aid France had been created. In spite of Grey's protests such at least i s 2 the verdict of hi s t o r y . As has been pointed out, these preparations continued down to the outbreak of war i n 1914, and "i n e v i t a b l y came to involve England i n increasingly binding obligations of honour to support France i n case of a European War a r i s i n g out of any question whatsoever - not merely one a r i s i n g out of the Morocco question - provided 3 that France did not appear to be the active aggressor." 1. Grey, op. c i t . * I, 76, 82, 85, 96, 251. 2. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . ^ I I I , 508.Dickinson, op.clt.,398,405,470-71,480. Ewart,op.cit;yl, 115-131; Churchill,op.cit;,27. Loreburn,op;ci t;,17,225-26. Fay,op.cit;,1,208. Lutz*Hermann,Lord Grey and the World War, (London, 1928),94-105; Rewouvin,Pierre,0?he Part Played i n International Relations by the Conversations between the General Staffs on the Eve of the World War,Studies In Anglo-French History, edited;by A l f r e d C o v i l l e and Harold' Temperley, (London,1935), 170. 3 . Fay, op. c i t ; , I, 208. - I l l - Ana Grey stands condemned on this point out of h i s own mouth; as Gooch points out i n speaking of the Foreign Secretary's speech of August 3, 1914, "His whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be forever disgraced i f we l e f t 1 France i n the lurch.* 1 A further weakness i n this p o l i c y was that neither S i r Edward Grey's statement to M. Cambon, nor his approval of the naval and m i l i t a r y conversations, was made with the knowledge and sanction of the Cabinet. (The explanation, he offe r s , of his f a i l u r e to eonsult with his colleagues i n these matters i s by no means convincing.. He explains that the Ministers were scattered, seeing to the elections, and could not be summoned. It has been c l e a r l y shown that i t would not 8 have been impossible to summon the Cabinet at that time. On January 81 the Prime Minister wrote to ask him i f he wished to eonsult the Cabinet, and suggested January 30 and 31 and 3 February 1 as dates for a meeting. In his memoirs Grey 4 states he has no r e c o l l e c t i o n of his answer to that question. He explains that the e a r l i e s t date suggested by the Prime Minister was January 30 and that "the French had been kept 5 long enough waiting f o r a reply." But, this can hardly be 1. Cambridge History of. B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , 111,508; 2. loreburn* op. c i t . , 80. Ewart, op. c i t . , I, 116. 3. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 253. 4. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 86. 5. Ibid., 86. -112- regarded as sat i s f a c t o r y since his interview with Cambon did not take place u n t i l the January 31, and moreover, since a .1 Cabinet meeting was held on that very day. It would therefore seem that he might e a s i l y have consulted h i s colleagues on such a grave matter before t a l k i n g with Cambon, or at least immediately a f t e r . But he did not reveal h i s p o l i c y then, nor f o r a long time to come; i t was not u n t i l 1912 that circumstances-caused the matter of m i l i t a r y and naval conversations to be revealed to the Cabinet, and not u n t i l his speech of August 3, 1914, 2 that Parliament and the public were made aware of them. In the l i g h t of what experience showed him i n a f t e r years Grey admits i n his memoirs that the Cabinet should have been 3 consulted. The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on January 16, 19G6. Twelve Powers i n addition to Morocco were represented. The p r e s i d e n t i a l chair was occupied by the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Buke of Almadovar. For almost three months the Conference swung from c r i s i s to c r i s i s . It would be superfluous to record here i n any d e t a i l the discussions which took place since they bore mainly on technical points. But behind the whole question lay the essential problem of the balance of power, and i t i s i n this aspect only that i n t e r e s t l i e s . 1. loreburn, op. c i t . , p.81. Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 130 and 138. 2. See Lloyd George, o p . c i t . , I , 46-51, on this question of the Cabinet and i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n matters of foreign a f f a i r s . 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 86-99. -113- Agreement was soon reached on a number of minor 1. problems. The r e a l l y troublesome questions were those of the organization of the police and the establishment of a state bank, since the solu t i o n reached on these questions would determine whether France or Germany should emerge v i c t o r i o u s . Germany's aim seems to have been to have the Moroccan pol i c e o f f i c e r e d by the Minor Powers, or to permit the Sultan f r e e l y to choose his own p o l i c e . She wished to prevent France from organizing them, and thus rejected France's demand for a p o l i c e mandate, and l a t e r her revised proposal to share such a mandate with Spain. When the question of the State bank reached a deadlock a rupture i n the Conference was expected. After much discussion, and a f t e r Roosevelt intervened on behalf of France, Austria put forward a plan of mediation that the Franco-Spanish p o l i c e mandate be accepted under a Swiss 2 Inspector-General. This was accepted at the end of March. The bank question had meanwhile been s e t t l e d on a basis of joint p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The main d i f f i c u l t i e s having thus been overcome the Conference was h a s t i l y concluded and the f i n a l Act of Algeoiras was signed on A p r i l 7. While i t i s unnecessary to l i s t a l l the d e t a i l s of the Act, the chief provisions might be noted to show how, 1. Such problems as - the surveillance and repression of contrabrand of arms. - the better c o l l e c t i o n of taxes and creation of new revenues - regulations concerning oustoms duties - the question of public services and public works. Anderson* op. c i t . , 350-351. 2. Anderson, op. c i t . , 392; Gooch, op. c i t . , 364-365. -114- though Germany had won her point i n securing the holding of the Conference, France had won i n p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s . From two thousand to twenty-five hundred police were to be d i s t r i b u t e d among the eight Moroccan ports, with Spanish and French o f f i c e r s to act as instructors under a Swiss-Inspector General at Tangier. Thus, i n this a l l important question of p o l i c e France r e a l l y triumphed, for she had secured the predominant share of the control and excluded Germany and her A l l i e s altogether. In a backward and disturbed area such as Morocco the police control was l i k e l y to be the lever of power. In the matter of f i n a n c i a l control and commercial opportunity Germany had more success. A State Bank p r a c t i c a l l y under the control of the four Powers - France, England, Germany and Spain - was set up, with equal opportunities f o r each nation. But France and her s a t e l l i t e , Spain, made further gains i n that the regulation of the Customs Act and of the t r a f f i c of arms on the Algerian f r o n t i e r was to be ca r r i e d out by France i n conjunction with Morocco, and on the R i f f f r o n t i e r by 1 Spain and Morocco. The effect of the Conference upon Morocco can be dispensed with i n this study. To the Powers taking part Moroccan interests was not the issue. The conclusions reached "were determined by the exigencies of international r e l a t i o n s and the interests of European Powers, not by the needs of 1, Gooch, op. c i t . , 366-367. -115- 1 Morocco. n The less interested Powers had aimed c h i e f l y at preserving peace. Prance and Spain had been concerned with maintaining their i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco and with preventing any other Power from gaining a foothold there. Germany alone appeared to be the champion of Moroccan r i g h t s , but only because that p o l i c y had been i n accord with her i n t e r e s t s . Throughout the Conference France had been s t e a d i l y and openly supported by her neighbour, Spain, her old a l l y , Russia, 2 and her new friend, England. She had received less open, but no le s s e f f e c t i v e , support from Roosevelt, on behalf of the v* 3 United States. Germany, on the other hand, received only scanty support from her friends. Austria was determined not to quarrel with France, while I t a l y , already pledged i n advance by her secret arrangement with France respecting Morocco and T r i p o l i , supported the Republic and not her a l l y . Germany had established the t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e that Morocco concerned a l l Powers equally, and the p r i n c i p l e of the open-door. But France had p r a c t i c a l l y safeguarded her i n d i v i d u a l action f o r the future. The French and Spanish m i l i t a r y control assured those two Powers the main economic advantages. Both sides expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome, which according to o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n l e f t neither v i c t o r nor vanquished. None the less, i t was evident that Germany had 1. Anderson, op. c i t . * 394. 2. Report of the Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n , A p r i l 5, 1906, IMorel,, op. c i t . , 44-45. 3. Jusserand, op. c i t . * 322-25. -116- emerged the l o s e r . She had been opposed by every Power, except Austria, and she had f a i l e d to obtain more than l i p service to her demands. What i s more s i g n i f i c a n t , she had driven France and Great B r i t a i n into a closer intimacy and had strengthened the t i e s between them. When Grey wrote to President Roosevelt a year l a t e r i n a co n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r giving an account of his policy, he summed matters up i n these words: "The long and the short of the matter i s that, to secure peace, we must maintain the Entente with France, and attempts from outside to 1 shake i t w i l l only make i t stronger." It has been shown that Germany had an excellent case on which to base her interference i n Morocco. But, as Nicolson 2 points out, she had handled i t badly. By her menacing attitude and her p o l i c y of mystification, she had l o s t the confidence of Europe; she obtained no compensation, she had caused France, Spain, England and Russia to draw closer together. Above a l l else, she had given the Anglo-French Entente a new character; i t now assumed a new meaning i n international a f f a i r s . Not only had the two countries remained refractory to every e f f o r t made to disunite them, but i n the play of events the Entente had changed i t s nature; a f t e r being o r i g i n a l l y signed f o r the purpose of l i q u i d a t i n g past differences between the governments i t had now become a 3 p r i n c i p l e of action. As Tardieu says, "the Franco-English 1. Grey to Roosevelt i n a confidential letter.December, 1906, cit e d i n Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 115. 2. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 198, Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 125. 3. Tardieu, op. c i t . , 204-205. -117- binomial had acquired weight. It had changed from the 1 s t a t i c to the dynamic state." The Morocco C r i s i s of 1905-1906 thus marked an important stage i n the development of the Entente; from the test supplied by that C r i s i s i t had emerged strengthened and confirmed. In 1901 Great B r i t a i n had offered an a l l i a n c e to Germany; i n 1904 she had s e t t l e d her d i f f i c u l t i e s with France; i n 1906 the two, brought more c l o s e l y together, were discussing possible measures of war against Germany. The process which the Entente Powers l i k e to c a l l "insurance," and which the Germans describe as "encirclement" had begun. It must be r e a l i z e d , moreover, that the forces which had caused this s i t u a t i o n s t i l l obtained as before. Algeciras was merely a breathing space between the rounds. Prestige and national interests were at stake on both sides; neither side appreciated the other's point of view. Each accused the other of aiming at i t s defeat, of being a menace. Neither side had learned anything from the C r i s i s except to be more cautious; neither had changed i t s method. So events were moving. The road to Armageddon lay open. 1. Tardieu, op. c i t . , 204* CHAPTER IV The Further "Encirclement" of Germany? -118- CRAPTER 17 The Further "Encirclement' 1 of Germany? It was not s u r p r i s i n g that the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with France should r a i s e the question of an agreement between England and Russia to remove the many sources of f r i c t i o n which existed between the two Powers. A rapprochement with Russia was, as S i r Edward Grey states, "the natural complement; 1 of the agreement with France." There were numerous points of difference between the two i n the Middle East, with P e r s i a and the Indian f r o n t i e r as p a r t i c u l a r danger points: And since Russia was an a l l y of France* B r i t a i n could not pursue at one and the same time a p o l i c y of agreement with the l a t t e r and a p o l i c y of h o s t i l i t y against the former. Moreover, now that B r i t a i n was d e f i n i t e l y committed to European a f f a i r s , the assurance of Russian friendship i n the face of the growing German menace, to which we s h a l l turn shortly, would be most welcome. Russia, too, was anxious f o r B r i t i s h friendship. She had suffered a spectacular humiliation i n the Far East in. 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 153$ The "Times* pointed out that such a rapprochement was "an ine v i t a b l e corollary'' to the Entente Cordials; c i t e d i n Morel* op. c i t . , 68. See also Trevelyan* op. c i t . , m 180-85. -119- i n 1904-05, and a rapprochement with B r i t a i n added to her a l l i a n c e with France would prove valuable i n helping her regain her p o s i t i o n as a Great Power. During the Morocoo C r i s i s of 1906 Russia l i k e England had cast her vote i n favour of France against Germany, and f r i e n d l y feelings had heen thus fostered. But there was no easy pathway to such an agreement; many obstacles new and old blocked the way. Russian despotism was repugnant to B r i t i s h ideals of l i b e r a l i s m , and the int e r n a l a f f a i r s of Russia, the Czar's suspension of the Duma i n 1906, and the treatment of Jews and Poles, did much to alienate B r i t i s h opinion and to s t i r up indignation. Nevertheless, when negotiations were seriously undertaken i t was found possible to reach an agreement. As f a r back as 1903 such an agreement had been considered i n England, and a conversation between Chamberlain and Delcasse, when the l a t t e r v i s i t e d London i n July of that year, may be taken as the s t a r t i n g point. of the. discussions which l a t e r culminated i n the f i n a l convention of 1907. Delcasse' and Cambon acted the r o l e of mediators between the two i n discussions during 1903, but differences over Tibet, Manchuria, Turkestan and P e r s i a proved 2 formidable d i f f i c u l t i e s . During the Russo-Japanese War* the position of B r i t a i n as an a l l y of Japan caused f r i c t i o n with Russia, although 1. B.D;, I I , No.242, p.212. Gooch,G.P., Before the War, (London, 1936), I, 70. 2. D.D.F., 2eserie,IV,No.44,N6;56,No.58. Gooch, Before the War, I, 71-74. 120- during the opening phases of the war the r e l a t i o n s between 1 the two governments remained f r i e n d l y enough. A most c r i t i c a l point i n Anglo-Russian relations was reached, however, during the War when a Russian squadron en route to the Par East f i r e d on a Hull f i s h i n g f l e e t on the Dogger Bank. Fortunately both governments acted cooly .while Delcasse* pleaded i n both 2 capitals for moderation. Thus the War had made necessary the postponment of negotiations for a general settlement. But the ending of the war removed the main obstacle to a rapproche- ment, and England's closer association with Prance i n 1904 and 1905 made the prospects f a r more promising. lansdowne went out of o f f i c e with the change of government i n 1905, but the same considerations which had induced him to enter into negotiations with Russia were not without influence on the new government. We have already seen the views of S i r Edward Grey i n regard to . t h i s matter. In the following months the two sides drew nearer. Ho useful purpose can be served here by entering 3 into the d e t a i l s of the negotiations. On August 31, 1907, a Convention was signed i n Petrograd concluding arrangements concerning a f f a i r s i n Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. This Pact, though more li m i t e d i n scope than the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, had the same purpose of c l e a r i n g o f f the slate the causes of antagonism between two h i s t o r i c r i v a l s . 1. Conversation between King Edward and Isvolsky, A p r i l , 1904; c i t e d i n Lee, op. c i t . * I I , 284-87. 2. D.D.F., 2 e s e r i e , V, 468-477; Gooch, Before the War, I, 77-8. Porter, op. c i t . , 186. 3. The negotiations are given i n B.D;, Vol.IV. For the part played by S i r Arthur Nicolson i n these negotiations see Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock, (London, 1930), 203-57. -121- The contents of the Convention were a l l made public. I t included no obligations of m i l i t a r y or diplomatic support, and thus i t did not at once lead to a clo s e l y - k n i t diplomatic partnership. But i t did nevertheless complete the c i r c l e f o r a closer p o l i t i c a l cooperation hetweeen Russia, France and England. The Anglo-French Entente and the Dual A l l i a n c e had as a re s u l t of the new treaty, broadened into the T r i p l e Entente which now confronted the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e on the chess board of European diplomacy. Though not d e f i n i t e l y a l l i e d to France and Russia, and i n theory s t i l l r e taining l i b e r t y of action, England had chosen to throw i n her l o t with these Powers. The French made no secret of their s a t i s f a c t i o n over the new Convention, or of the i r opinion that B r i t a i n had 1 advanced a step further into t h e i r camp. The h i s t o r y of the next seven years i s mainly that of the diplomatic c o n f l i c t which l e d to the f i n a l struggle between the now established groups of T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente. During these seven years a l l manner of seemingly unrelated subjeots are seen gradually becoming c l a s s i f i e d into causes f o r which - ir r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r merits - the two groups were committed to stand. There developed an increasing c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of opposition between the two camps. During the f i r s t four years i t developed more slowly, then a f t e r 1911, with the French occupation of Fez, the German threat at Agadlr, the I t a l i a n seizure of T r i p o l i , 1. Spender, J.A., F i f t y Years of Europe, (hereafter c i t e d as F i f t y Years), 266. -122- the growing menace of Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y , the f a i l u r e of the Haldane Mission, and the Balkan Wars, i t proceeded more ra p i d l y . This growing tension was r e f l e c t e d i n events both large and small over widely-separated areas. To give a f u l l account of a l l the factors which made for t h i s c r y s t a l l - i z a t i o n of opposition would go far beyond the l i m i t s of this work. Ho attempt, therefore, i s made to give a de t a i l e d analysis of the period. The aim, rather, i s to bring to l i g h t those factors which tightened and strengthened the Anglo-French Entente. The f i r s t serious c r i s i s to affect the new balance of power was the Bosnian C r i s i s of 1908. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 seemed to o f f e r to Isvolsky of Russia and to Aehrenthal of Austria a favourable opportunity f o r a mutually advantageous bargain at the expense of Turkey. Isvolsky saw i n i t an opportunity of opening the S t r a i t s , and Aehrenthal an opportunity of converting Austria's occupation of Bosnia-Herzogovina, assigned to her for administration by the Treaty of B e r l i n 1878, into a f u l l annexation. While 1 Aehrenthal had long been considering the annexation, the i n i t i a t i v e i n t h i s bargain seems to have come from Isvolsky i n a lengthy aide-memoire dated July 2, 1908, which discussed 2 Balkan railways?, the entente of 1897, and Macedonian reforms. 1. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 314. 2. Gooch, Before the War, I, 332, 394-95. -123- Aehrenthal was keen to accept the o f f e r , and at the end of 1 August gave h i s assent, although no d e f i n i t e agreement was made. Following this reply, the two met as the guests of Count Berchtold at Buchlau on September 15 where the matter was discussed and further d e t a i l s were arranged. There were no witnesses to the discussions, and since no d e f i n i t e agreement was put i n writing, violent controversy arose a few weeks l a t e r when the plans did not work out as Isvolsky had anticipated. He has claimed that the consent of the Powers was to be obtained i n a Conference before the annexation took place; but the point of most b i t t e r controversy was the date at which the changes were to be made. Whatever were the agreements reached,Isvolsky does not seem to have expected that Aehrenthal would act so p r e c i p i t a t e l y , and he appears to have been taken by complete surprise when, on a r r i v i n g at Paris on October 8, he received word that the annexation would take place within the next few 2 days. It was carried out on October 5. The news of the sudden annexation produced an instant reverberation throughout Europe; surprise and indignation were voiced on a l l sides. Isvolsky f e l t he had been tr i c k e d . A 1. Gooch, Before the War, I, for h i s reply. 2. The controversy i s summed up i n two a r t i c l e s i n the Fortnig h t l y Review of September and November of 1909 attributed to the two statesmen. Isvolsky*s statement that he had been trioked over the date i s hard to understand i n view of h i s statement of September 85 to Herr von Sohon at Berchtesgaden that the matter would be announced to the Delegations which were to meet on October 8. Gooch, Before the War, I, 400. •124- storm of indignation rose i n Serbia, and there was t a l k of war. Ho warning of the change had been given to either the govern- ments of Prance or of B r i t a i n . Turkey, very na t u r a l l y , was most indignant, and i n protest she organized a boycott of Austrian goods. In the eyes of Europe, presented with this " f a i t accompli,'* Turkey stood as a v i c t i m of Austrian aggression. It remained to be seen what stand the Powers would take. Aehrenthal had anticipated that Germany would support her a l l y , Austria, although the Kaiser was furious that h i s government had not been warned when the annexation was to have taken place. The Austrian statesman f e l t that i f Germany stood with Austria, Russia and France would submit. France, he knew, was only remotely interested i n the Balkans, and Russia, a f t e r her recent defeat, was notoriously unprepared for war. But what stand would B r i t a i n take? I f she were to take a strong stand her two associates might hold out with her, and i n t h i s event the s i t u a t i o n might well become d i f f i c u l t . Isvolsky was i n a most p a i n f u l p o s i t i o n . He feared Aehrenthal was about to secure h i s part of the Buchlau agreement, before he himself had obtained the assent of the Powers to his share. In Paris he found the French Government sympathetic but rather non-committal. The French were prepared to adhere to the Russian A l l i a n c e and give support to the Russian Government, but i t was made clea r that public opinion could not be converted to the notion that enough was at stake to r i s k a war. The French Government, moreover, disapproved of Russia*s having come to an agreement with Austria without the knowledge of France. -125- In London he met with hardly l i t t l e more success f o r h i s plans of opening the S t r a i t s . Grey admitted that the request for opening the S t r a i t s was " f a i r and reasonable" and not objectionable "dn p r i n c i p l e , " but i n s i s t e d they must be opened "on terms of equality to a l l . " He refused to consider opening them to Russian warships while leaving them closed against those of other Powers. This of course was what 1 Isvolsky wanted. But though the Russian Minister had f a i l e d to win support f o r h i s main objective, h i s v i s i t to London was not wholly i n vain. Grey was not prepared to accept the sudden annexation of Bosnia by Aust r i a as a " f a i t accompli." He f e l t that action was a blow to good f a i t h and to treaty obligations and should be discussed at a Conference of the Powers. He maintained that the annexation was an untimely and unmerited blow at the Young Turks, who, as i t appeared to him, were struggling to put t h e i r house i n order, and for whom B r i t i s h sympathy was known to be strong. Accordingly, standing on p r i n c i p l e , he c a l l e d for a European Conference, and i f then the annexation was approved, he f e l t Turkey must 2 receive compensation. A v i s i t to B e r l i n brought the unhappy Russian Minister no more comfort. Appeals to the German Government fo r discussion of the annexation at a Conference and for the 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 177-179. 2. Ibid., 175-77; Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 224. Also, Spender, J. A., and Asquith, C y r i l , L i f e of Lord Oxford and Asquith, ( c i t e d hereafter as Spender, Asquith),(London, 1932), I, 244-49. -126- opening of the S t r a i t s proved vain. He saw c l e a r l y that Germany was determined to stand by her a l l y . Isvolsky saw his dreams fading; B r i t a i n would back him only i n the matter of a Conference; and France was unwilling to give e f f e c t i v e support i n a matter i n which she had not been consulted and i n which she had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t . Aehrenthal had the firm support of Germany, and with this support he refused to submit the question to a Conference unless i t was agreed to beforehand that i t would be held only to sanction the annexation and not to discuss i t . During the next few months no settlement was arrived at. Meanwhile the tension was increased by the excitement which was raging i n Serbia, which country was putting forward loud claims for compensation. Encouraged by Russian sympathy, armed bands were massed along the Austrian f r o n t i e r and agitators sent into Bosnia. To keep a check on this s i t u a t i o n an Austrian army was mobilized and kept i n readiness. Meanwhile the Austrian war party was suggesting that the time was now at hand f o r a f i n a l settlement with Serbia; The s i t u a t i o n became increasingly fraught with danger as the weeks r o l l e d on. It was eased somewhat on February 26, 1909, by an offer of Austria to compensate Turkey f o r the loss of her shadowy rights over Bosnia-H&rzogovina with two and a h a l f m i l l i o n pounds. But Isvolsky was unwilling to agree that a d i r e c t understanding between Austria and Turkey excluded the necessity of submitting the whole question to a -127- Conference. 1 Isvolsky*s f a i l u r e , however, was a foregone con- clusion. The Serbian claim had no l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and i t was clear neither England nor France would go to war over a Balkan question. Russia standing alone against Austria and Ger- many was unthinkable. In the weeks following Austria's s e t t l e - ment with Turkey the Great Powers made several attempts to reconcile Isvolsky's views with those of Aehrenthal. When no solution seemed possible the German Government on March 17 made a proposal of mediation to the Russian Minister which eventually relieved the tension. The o f f e r stated that the German Government would re- quest Austria to i n v i t e the Powers to give t h e i r formal approval to the changes made by an exchange of notes, provided that Russia beforehand promised to give her sanction to the changes when invited by Austria to do so. Isvolsky, s t i l l c l i n g i n g to the hope of a Conference, acknowledged the c o n c i l i a t o r y purpose of the o f f e r , but hesitated to give a d e f i n i t e answer. A week l a t e r , when no answer had been received from Isvolsky, Germany renewed her o f f e r of mediation, t h i s time with greater emphasis, i n a note of March 23, which has been interpreted as somewhat c l o s e l y resembling an ultimatum. Before suggesting that Austria should approach the Powers, Germany wished d e f i n i t e l y to know that Russia would accept the 1. Isvolsky to the Russian Embassy at London, March 11, 1909, Siebert, B. de, Entente Diplomacy and the World, (New York, 1922); 248. -128- note, and Russia was informed "that a negative or even an evasive answer" on her part would r e s u l t i n Germany withdrawing 1 and allowing "things to take t h e i r own course." 2 Thus pinned down, Isvolsky, a f t e r consulting the Czar, surrendered, and gave an affirmative reply. After Russia accepted the proposal, England, France and I t a l y agreed also, and the exchange of notes followed giving a belated sanction to the annexation. Serbia, too, yielded, deciding to place her hopes i n the future. On March 31 she made an agreement with Vienna promising to l i v e on good neighbourly 3 terms with the Dual Monarchy. The long c r i s i s was oyer. The r e s u l t s of this bloodless c o n f l i c t on the chancelleries may not be passed over l i g h t l y . Its eff e c t s continued to be f e l t down the years u n t i l the time of the f i n a l c o n f l i c t i n 1914. In the phrase of Dr. Gooch, " i t 4 l e f t deep scars on the body p o l i t i c of Europe." Aust r i a had 1. Isvolsky to Russian Embassies at Paris and london, March 23, 1909, Siebert, op. c i t . , 260. 2. The idea that t h i s note was sent as an ultimatum grew up i n l a t e r days. Mr. Fay claims that t h i s idea was exploited i n the Russian Press and used by Isvolsky d e l i b e r a t e l y to save h i s face before his c r i t i c s . The idea that i t was to be regarded as an ultimatum was spread i n England by S i r Arthur Hicolson; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 391. Mr. Fay adds that i t was not intended by the German Government as an ultimatum, but merely as an attempt to bridge the gulf between Russia and Austria, and to prevent war between Serbia and Austria. Mr. Gooch agrees with this view - Gooch, Before the War, I, 348. Mr. Spender appears to view the note as an ultimatum however; - F i f t y Years, 310. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 393. 4. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, (cited hereafter as Modern Europe), 422-23. -129- unquestionably secured a diplomatic victo r y , but a Pyrrhic v i c t o r y ; viewed i n the l i g h t of l a t e r years i t brought mis- 1 fortune rather than success. In the words of Mr. Dickinson, "Serbian irredentism had been provoked, and the formula she was 2 constrained to sign was nothing but words". She did not l i v e up to her promise to " l i v e i n future on good neighbourly terms" with Austria - "she allowed her s o i l to be the hearth from which a subversive agita t i o n was spread, encouraging d i s l o y a l t y and treason among the Bosnians and other Slav subjects of the 3 Hapsburg Monarchy." And, as l a t e r events were to prove, this Serbian question threatened at every moment to involve Russia, and so Germany, Prance and B r i t a i n . Furthermore, Aehrenthal had caused Europe to view with dis t r u s t Austrian diplomacy, and he incurred the odium attendant upon the u n j u s t i f i e d breach of a solemn treaty. His a l l y , Germany, likewise, i n giving her support to the Austrian action, incurred some of the suspicion which f e l l upon him; e s p e c i a l l y the suspicion among the Entente Powers. It was commonly held that the Imperial Government was an accomplice i n the whole situation, approving v of i t s a l l y ' s action. It has been shown how the attempt of B e r l i n to f i n d a f i n a l solution whioh would sanction Austria's " f a i t accompli", and yet at the same time afford Isvolsky a d i g n i f i e d l i n e of retreat from h i s most d i f f i c u l t posit!on,was twisted into a "threat of force" or 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , I, 31; Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 224. 2. Dickinson, op. c i t . , 181. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 394. -130- "ultimatum." I t was represented as a brutal German attempt to humiliate Russia and drive a wedge into the Tr i p l e Entente. It was set down as new evidence of the b r u t a l i t y of Germany's 1 diplomatic methods. It was used as further evidence to prove Germany's reputation of t h i r s t f o r mastery and leadership, 2 which was already obnoxious to France and the Western Powers. It was i n Russia that the Bosnian C r i s i s l e f t i t s most serious e f f e c t s . In the press there was the most b i t t e r resentment against a settlement which brought such deep humil- 3 i a t i o n and submission to the dictates of a foreign Power. The Pan-Slav press was excited to a violent campaign against Germany, the tenor of which was that a war between Slavdom and Germanism was i n e v i t a b l e . To Isvolsky, personally, this diplomatic defeat was perhaps the most b i t t e r experience of 1. Fay, op. c i t . , 395-96. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 332. Confirmation seemed to be given to this f e e l i n g by Emperor William's vainglorious and tactless speech when on a v i s i t to Vienna i n 1910, he proclaimed to the world that he had stood by his a l l y " i n shining armour" - Fay, op. c i t . , I, 396. Grey uses this speech against the Kaiser; op. c i t . * I, 186. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note as Mr. Ewart, points out, that l i t t l e notice has been taken of the fact that the B r i t i s h Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, by his speech at- the G u i l d h a l l Banquet on November 9, 1908, p l a i n l y announced to the world that the United Kingdom was standing by her a l l y , France, and through France, by Russia. He said: "Nothing w i l l induce us i n th i s country to f a l t e r and f a l l short i n any one of the sp e c i a l engagements which we have undertaken, to be d i s l o y a l or u n f a i t h f u l even for a moment to the s p i r i t of any e x i s t i n g friendship." Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I, 167-68. 3. Nicolson to Grey, March 29, 1909, Grey, op. c i t . , I, 188-89. -131- his l i f e ; the desire for revenge and f o r the recovery of l o s t personal prestige was never to leave him i n the days which followed. The c r i t i c i s m l e v e l l e d at him for h i s f a i l u r e was one of the reasons for h i s leaving the Foreign Of f i c e for the Russian ambassadorship i n P a r i s . There he was to work unceas- 1 i n g l y for closer-knit bonds with France and England. In retirement Bulow stated with reference to the events of the years 1908-1909, n t h e group of Powers whose influence had been so much overestimated at Algeuiras f e l l to 2 pieees when faced with the tough problems of Continental p o l i c y . " Most c e r t a i n l y t h i s i s a sentiment of delusion, and not at a l l i n accord with f a c t . I f Austria and Germany had won a s t r i k i n g diplomatic v i c t o r y , i t was not at the expense of the Entente. The c r i s i s i n no way estranged the Three Powers. On the contrary, i t had the completely opposite effect of consolidating and making much closer t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n the face of what was interpreted as a Teutonic threat, the s o l i d i t y of the Entente was considered even more of a necessity than previously, i f German hegemony was to be checked. Mr. C h u r c h i l l sums up the effects of the C r i s i s on France-Russian r e l a t i o n s i n these words: France, aft e r her treatment i n 1905, had begun a thorough m i l i t a r y reorganization. Now Russia, i n 1910 made an enormous increase i n "her already vast army; and both Russia and France, smarting under s i m i l a r experiences, closed their ranks, cemented t h e i r a l l i a n c e s 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, p.397. Gooch, Before the War, I, 363. 2. Cited i n Hicolson, op. c i t . , 309. rl32- and set to work to construct with Russian labour and French money, the new strategic railway systems of which Russia's western f r o n t i e r stood i n need. (1) And the Russian Ambassador, wri t i n g from P a r i s on A p r i l 1, 1909, shows the r e s u l t on a l l three Entente governments when he reported; In connection with this (the C r i s i s ) , German and Austrian journals have emphasized the success of Austrian diplomacy, and the predominant p o s i t i o n of the Dual Monarchy i n the Balkans. In consequence of t h i s , public opinion i n France as well as i n England demands more and more a s t i l l greater rapprochement between Russia, France and England, as they have already acted i n common during the Austrian-Serbian c o n f l i c t . Foreseeing the further development of the European s i t u a t i o n , many newspapers come to the conclusion that p r e c i s e l y as Germany and Austria have now achieved a b r i l l i a n t v i c t o r y , so must the two Western Powers, together with Russia, now pay th e i r attention to the systematic development of t h e i r forces i n order to be able, once they are in a p o s i t i o n not to fear a challenge of the Tr i p l e A l l i a n c e - and i n th i s case I t a l y would separate he r s e l f from the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e - to set up on t h e i r part demands which would restore the p o l i t i c a l balance which has now been displaced i n favour of Germany and Au s t r i a .... This i s the d i r e c t i o n which the Pari s , and also apparently, the London cabinet wish to give to t h e i r p o l i c y . (2) In another report of the same date he wrote: The cabinets of Paris and London have concluded from this that Russia, France and England must pay more attention than ever to action i n common and must at the same time proceed to the necessary m i l i t a r y measures i n order to convince their opponents they are dealing with a p o l i t i c a l combinati which knows how to make i t s e l f respected and to carry through i t s demands. (3) 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , I, 31. 2. Russian Ambassador at P a r i s to Isvolsky, A p r i l 1, 1909, Siebert, op. c i t . , 266-67. 3. Ibid., 269-70. -133- The Czar expressed a s i m i l a r view when he assured Uieolson on A p r i l 14 that the res u l t of the c r i s i s had been to strengthen the Entente. "We must," he said, "keep closer 1 and closer together." Important as i s the C r i s i s of 1908 as a factor i n the consolidating the Tr i p l e Entente, i n the matter of England's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the alignment of the Powers before 1914 there was an i n f i n i t e l y more important factor, namely, the naval r i v a l r y with Germany. Among a l l the many problems making f o r r i v a l r y t h i s question stands out i n the foreground. In the Navy Law of 1900 Germany had embarked on her plan for b u i l d i n g her navy. B r i t a i n , having "ruled the waves" for a hundred years, f e l t that r i v a l r y i n battleships was not only a menace i n the matter of a possible attack, but an unwarranted i n f r i n g e - ment upon her r i g h t f u l prerogative. German r i v a l r y i n colonies, i n industry, i n trade, or i n shipping, these might have been tolerated, but a r i v a l i n the matter of naval power - never. O f f i c i a l assurances by German leaders f a i l e d u t t e r l y to d i s p e l anxiety roused by the appearance of a German navy, the completion of the K i e l Canal and the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of Heligoland. I t 1. Hicolson, op. c i t . , 313. The next year a misunderstanding arose between the Entente Powers i n connection with the Czar's v i s i t to the Kaiser at Potsdam on November 4, 1910. Sazonov, who accompanied the Czar, had interviews with the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary. In the conver- sations during the v i s i t Sazonov promised Germany a free hand, so f a r as Russia was concerned, i n the completion of the Bagdad Railway. France feared that Germany was t r y i n g to weaken the Dual A l l i a n c e . It was feared i n England that Russia was abandoning the T r i p l e Entente. The German press paid glowing tributes to Russia on account of what was regarded as a blow to France and England. As a matter of fact none of these apprehensions or hppes i t transpired, were j u s t i f i e d . Nicolson, op. cit.,336-38. -134- cannot be denied that Germany, i n the words of Mr. Haldane, was within her "unfettered r i g h t s " i n building up a f l e e t , i f she chose to follow such a policy, but the faot remained, that i n choosing such a course she rendered impossible f r i e n d l y relations with England, and by p e r s i s t - ently c l i n g i n g to that p o l i c y , she raised an almost insur- mountable b a r r i e r to English amity. The ine v i t a b l e r e s u l t followed - the maintenance of close cooperation with Prance and Russia "became the pivot of B r i t i s h foreign 1 po l i c y . " The s t a r t of the r i v a l r y goes back to the opening of the century when the f i r s t beginnings of the German navy resulted i n the adoption by the B r i t i s h Government of the Cawdor programme c a l l i n g for four new battleships a year. S i r John Fisher, who was. appointed F i r s t Sea Lord i n 1904, proceeded d r a s t i c a l l y to change the d i s t r i b u t i o n and composi- ti o n of the f l e e t . The Channel Squadron was greatly reinforced and a Home Fleet stationed i n the North Sea. The harbour of Rosyth i n Scotland was developed into a permanent base, and i n 1905 the "Dreadnought," the f i r s t of a new type of ship, which fa r surpassed a l l previous types i n f i g h t i n g power, was l a i d down. On February 3, 1905, Mr. Arthur Lee, F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, i n a speech to his constitutents struck an ominous note when he declared that the B r i t i s h f l e e t should concentrate 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 683. -125- i n the North Sea, and i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of war, should " s t r i k e the f i r s t blow, before the other side found time to read i n 1 the newspapers that war had been declared." These events had inevitable repercussions i n Germany. T i r p i t z i n a new Naval B i l l of 1906 added s i x new cruisers to the German f l e e t which had been refused i n 1900, and secured money to widen the K i e l Canal. Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y had begun i n earnest; a dangerous stage was thus reached i n 1906 with the admiralties of each Power a t t r i b u t i n g aggressive designs to the other. The L i b e r a l Government which took o f f i c e under Campbell-Bannerman i n December, 1905, was opposed to increases i n naval estimates. Pledged to inaugurate an extensive programme of s o c i a l reforms there was need of economy i n the 2 matter of armaments. As a r e s u l t the naval estimates f o r 1906-08 showed a s l i g h t decrease. It was stated that one o f of the four ships provided f o r i n the Cawdor programme would be omitted, and the prime minister announced h i s intentions of proposing l i m i t a t i o n of armaments at the second Hague Conference which had been c a l l e d to meet i n 1907. This intention was communicated to the other Powers. Any hope of the B r i t i s h for success i n this plan was d i s p e l l e d when the German Government announced that i t eould not take part i n any such discussion 1. Cited i n Ewart, I I , I I , op. c i t . , 682. 2. Speech of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, December 21, 1905; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 237. 3. Belgian Minister i n London, July 28, 1906, Morel, op. ci t . , 49. -136- since i t was f e l t to be impractical, and i n s i s t e d that the 1 matter of l i m i t a t i o n should not be raised at the Conference. Despite t h i s attitude of Germany, the subject was brought up at the fourth plenary session by the B r i t i s h delegate. The matter, however, was passed over almost without debate and nothing of value achieved. It was unfortunate Germany did not take up t h i s o f f e r . There i s l i t t l e reason to believe that discussion would have l e d to any valuable formulae which could have prevented the catastrophe of 1914, but her p a r t i c - ipation i n such discussion would have lightened B r i t i s h suspicions of her peaceful intentions, and saved her from 2 in c u r r i n g the odium of having wrecked the proposals. The K a i s e r s v i s i t to Windsor i n November, 1907, seemed to somewhat lessen the tension which had been growing up between the two countries. He wa$ most c o r d i a l l y received, and friends of peace i n both countries were f i l l e d with 3 s a t i s f a c t i o n . The aspirations of peace and friendship expressed by press and leaders appeared to be f u l l y r e a l i z e d . The v i s i t had not been intended f o r p o l i t i c a l discussion, but 4 the matter of the Bagdad Railway did a r i s e . S i r Edward Grey 1. Russia and Austria were also opposed to i t s being discussed. E. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 233; Brandenburg, op: c i t . , S77-78. 3. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 557-559. 4. Ibid., 559. The Kaiser spoke of i t f i r s t of a l l to Mr. Haldane who took the matter up with Grey. 137- S i r Edward Grey i n s i s t e d that i n any settlement of t h i s question France and Russia would have to be consulted, f o r 1 th e i r i n t e r e s t s were involved. Some weeks l a t e r the B e r l i n Government stated i t s readiness to discuss the Railway with the B r i t i s h Government but placed a veto on discussion with Russia 8 and France. The matter ended there. This royal v i s i t had brought a short period of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between the two countries. For a few weeks Anglo-German re l a t i o n s had breathed a c o r d i a l i t y they had not known for some years, and which they were not to know again f o r years to come. Under the influence of a warm royal welcome relationships had yielded to a r e v i v a l of family associations, and a desire to resume the p o l i t i c a l intimacy of e a r l i e r years. But the good omens were soon to vanish, as darkening clouds 3 f i l l e d the sky. With the opening of 1908 the atmosphere became charged with e l e c t r i c i t y . Germany was unwilling to admit the r i g h t of any foreign Power to dictate the extent of her naval armaments. While William II was on English s o i l a new German Naval B i l l reduced- the l i f e of battleships from twenty-fiire to twenty years, and provided f o r the early replacement of old obsolete vessels by new ships of the new Dreadnought type. The construction of the new and replacement ships was to proceed at 1. Note of conversation between Grey and Haldane, November 14, 1907, B.D., VI, No.68, pp.95-96. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 559-561. Haldane, op.cit., 62-66. 3. Lee* op. c i t . , I I , 563. -138- tho rate of four a year from 1908 to 1911 and two a year from 1912 to 1917. I t was this programme which seems to have brought home to the English ministers the f u l l seriousness of the 1 s i t u a t i o n . The Press on both sides was whipping up national passions. Then, early i n 1908 the Kaiser wrote h i s well-meant but injudicious l e t t e r to l o r d Tweedsmouth, the F i r s t Lord of 2 the B r i t i s h Admiralty. This was a private l e t t e r , sent without the Imperial Chancellor's knowledge, i n which the Emperor sought to produce a t r a n q u i l l i z i n g e f f e c t by emphasizing the fact that Germany was not thinking of challenging B r i t a i n ' s supremacy of the sea, and i n which he endeavoured to j u s t i f y 3 the German naval programme. Lord Tweedsmouth sent a courteous reply. But vague rumours of the exchange of l e t t e r s leaked out 4 to reach the public ear. The Kaiser was suspected of attempting to influence a B r i t i s h minister to effect reductions i n the naval budget. The matter came up i n Parliament, where the English leaders defended th e i r colleague, who had shown them the l e t t e r , and they maintained that the matter was one of a 5 purely private exchange of l e t t e r s . The matter was thus closed. It was,however, a most imprudent act of the Kaiser*s, well- intended no doubt, but tactless, and i t brought untoward r e s u l t s 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 237. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 278. 2. For this incident see B.D. VI, Ho.88, 89, 90, 91. 3. Lee, op. c i t . , II, 606. 4. The "Times,1' March 6, 1908; a r t i c l e by Colonel Repington. 5. Lee, op. c i t : , I I , 607. -139- whioh added f u e l to the flames of national f e e l i n g , and widened the gulf between the two countries. The growing conviction i n Germany that England was tryi n g to put a check on her navy, and " e n c i r c l e " her i n other ways, was fostered to a s t i l l greater extent by numerous v i s i t s and interviews which Edward VII had with French and Russian 1 r u l e r s and ministers i n the summer of 1908. In May President 2 F a l l i e r e s was c o r d i a l l y received i n London, and given a dinner at the Foreign O f f i c e , to which the only person i n v i t e d outside 3 the French and English group, was the Russian Ambassador. In June King Edward v i s i t e d the Czar at Reval, accompanied by Admiral Fisher, S i r John French and S i r Charles Hardinge, who had long conversations with Isvolsky and the Russian Premier, Stolypin. There was no attempt to Reval to b u i l d up a closer Anglo-Russian combination, and assurances were offered to 4 Germany that no unfriendly steps towards her were taken. But the v i s i t put the seal on the Anglo-Russian r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and rumours of agreements h o s t i l e to Germany increased the conviction that the Fatherland was being hemmed i n . When i n 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 596; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 240. 2. L i s t e r to Grey, May 28, 1908, B.D.VI, No.95, pp.149-150. Lee, op. cit.., I I , 584-86. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , 1, 240. 4. Grey to do S a i l s , June 15, 1908, B.D.VI, No.97, p.154. 5. The idea that King Edward was a busy i n t r i g u e r using these v i s i t s f o r p o l i t i c a l ends, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r weakening the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and for " e n c i r c l i n g " Germany became more deeply rooted i n the German mind. Lee, op. c i t . , I I, 596. Grey*s comment on the years 1907-1908 are of i n t e r e s t . He says, "In looking through old papers, i t i s depressing to read of the d i s t r u s t and suspicion with which Governments and peoples regarded each other i n these'years. The impression given i s of an atmosphere so miserable and unwholesome that nothing healthy could l i v e i n i t ; - -140- the course of h i s stay abroad i n the summer of 1908 His Majesty v i s i t e d the Austrian Emperor at I s c h l , vague rumours arose that England was endeavouring to weaken the T r i p l e 1 A l l i a n c e by winning the support of Austria from Germany. Ho one recognized the Anglo-German tension more c l e a r l y , nor deplored i t to a greater extent, that did Count Metternich i n London, who accurately guaged the B r i t i s h f e e l i n g i n t h i s matter of naval armaments. He kept the German Government informed of B r i t i s h opinion, pointing out that while there was no r e a l h o s t i l i t y to Germany there was a growing fear of her naval power, and that the increase of the German f l e e t prevented confidence. The Kaiser was incensed at the Ambassador's suggestion that English friendship could be obtained only at the cost of Germany's f l e e t . " I f England only intends graoiously to o f f e r us her hand on condition that we reduce our f l e e t . that i s an unparalleled impertinence, and a b i t t e r i n s u l t to the German people and t h e i r Kaiser, which the Ambassador must 2 r e j e c t . " He was of course strengthened i n this attitude by the leading naval c i r c l e s . A p o s i t i v e r e f u s a l to discuss l i m i t a t i o n was put forward by the Kaiser when Hardinge broached the subject to him on the occasion of King Edward's v i s i t to Cronberg i n August op.ci t. ,1,143; Again, speaking of the royal v i s i t s he states, "An even more f e r t i l e source of suspicion were royal v i s i t s . These v i s i t s were matters of c i v i l i t y and courtesy; as such t h e i r e f f e c t was good; they made a f r i e n d l y atmosphere. But they caused me the greatest trouble;" { i b i d . , 149-151. 13. Gooch, Modern Europe, 439. Grey, op.cit., I, 150. 8. Cited i n Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 284. -141- 1 of 1908. Hardinge explained the uneasiness of the B r i t i s h leaders and pointed out the dangers of naval competition. He i n s i s t e d on the necessity of l i m i t i n g such r i v a l r y ; "You must stop or b u i l d more slowly." The discussion became rather heated; and the Kaiser r e p l i e d rather brusquely, "Then we s h a l l 2 f i g h t , f o r i t i s a question of national honour and d i g n i t y . " I t was the l a s t time that the B r i t i s h Government o f f i c i a l l y suggested an agreed l i m i t a t i o n . In the following months English alarm s t e a d i l y increased,and the tide of excited f e e l i n g rose higher. In October, 1908, further antagonism between the two countries was caused by the publication of the "Daily 3 Telegraph" interview. A conversation the Kaiser had held with a private c i t i z e n , Colonel Stuart-Wortley, whose guest the Emperor had been i n 1907, was published with h i s approval i n October E8, 1908. The interview was undoubtedly meant as a sincere gesture of friendship and as a contribution to f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . But i t produced the opposite r e s u l t . The dominant note of the reported interview was the Kaiser's avowed friendship for Great B r i t a i n , as evinced both openly and s e c r e t l y during the years of the Boer War, and since s t e a d i l y maintained, though neither shared by h i s own people nor recognized by the B r i t i s h . He declared that although Germany was expanding her navy, the sole aim of her f l e e t was the protection of her 1. l e e , op. c i t . , I I , 618. 2. Pay, op. c i t . , I, 242; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 243. The long memorandum of f i r Charles Hardinge, August 16,1908 B.D. 711, Ho.117, pp.184-90. ' 3. For t h i s incident see B.D. 71, pp.201ff. -142- Increasing trade, the maintenance of German i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East. He posed throughout his reported words as one who 1 was completely misunderstood i n Great B r i t a i n . The gesture was another pathetic example of the Kaiser's ineptitude. However well-intentioned, i t increased 2 the "malaise" i t was intended to d i s p e l . His protestation of friendship was jeered i n England; h i s s i n c e r i t y was doubted, and the idea that h i s advice had been of service against the Boers was resented. But h i s admission that the German public was h o s t i l e to B r i t a i n was noted, and thus further colour was added to the B r i t i s h mind of Germany as an Anglophobe nation. The publication of the interview caused a storm of newspaper attacks on both sides qf the Channel; In Germany the action was regarded as most i l l - c o n s i d e r e d , and attacks were made on 3 the personal r u l e of the Kaiser by the L i b e r a l s and S o c i a l i s t s . 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 621. 2. Grey wrote i n this connection, "The German Emperor i s ageing me; he i s l i k e a battleship with steam up and screws going, but with no rudder, and he w i l l run into something some day and cause a catastrophe." Grey to E l l a Pease, November 8, 1908, c i t e d i n Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 154. 3. Before the interview was published the Kaiser had sent the manuscript to the Foreign O f f i c e f o r approval. It was forwarded to Bulow who was taking a cure at Horderney. He unfortunately omitted to read i t . Minor o f f i c i a l s did not • venture on any c r i t i c i s m s , supposing i t had Bulow*s approval; i t was allowed to go out, and was published October 28, 1908. As a r e s u l t of the storm raised by this mistake Bulow offered h i s resignation, which was declined. In the debate which followed i n the Reichstag the Kaiser f e l t the Chancellor did not adequately defend him and this incident l e d to a growing coolness between them. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 291. -143- In 1908 b e l i e f i n England t h a t the German "menace" was a r e a l i t y was growing stronger. Powerful voices were s t r i k i n g t h i s note, and the danger was portrayed i n such a manner as to catch popular imagination. From the opening o f the century the "National Review" had preached Germany as "the enemy." Lord Cromer i n a speech i n the House of Lords i n J u l y , 1908, urged the Government to make provision f o r a coming c o n f l i c t . On November 23 Lord Roberts i n t h e same place made a s t i r r i n g appeal f o r compulsory m i l i t a r y service. S i r John Fisher had talked to KinCJ Edward of the wisdom of "Copenhagenlng" the German F l e e t . In France also s i m i l a r feelings were growing. During his cure at Marienbad i n August o f 1908 King Edward received a v i s i t from Clemenceau, the French Premier, who urged upon England the creation of a 2 national army. To what extent these views represented public opinion i s uncertain, but as long as the question o f naval armaments remained unsolved,normal re l a t i o n s between Germany and England were an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . The United Kingdom would not permit encroachment upon her ocean-predominance. As has been shown above Metternich i n London was greatly perturbed over the growing tension; he saw the two countries d r i f i n g into misunderstandings and recriminations which might soon lead to war.. " I t i s not the economic development of Germany which makes our r e l a t i o n s to England 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 604. 2. Goschen to Grey, August 29, 1908; B.D., 71, Ho.109, pp.157 Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 628. -144- 1 worse from year to year, but the rap i d increase of our f l e e t . " Hessuggested the d e s i r a b i l i t y of slowing down the German programme of construction from four to three ships annually, and of tr y i n g to ar r i v e at some understanding with England. Bulow personally favoured such a p o l i c y , and s t i r r e d by the Ambassador's repeated warnings, he took up the matter with T i r p i t z . The Admiral's answer was a decided negative; he disagreed absolutely with the Ambassador's diagnosis of the si t u a t i o n . There must be no slowing down of pace, but rather the pressing forward of the programme with i r o n energy. I f such a l t e r a t i o n s i n the naval programme were i n s i s t e d upon, as Bulow suggested, he would res i g n . The correspondence between the Chancellor and T i r p i t z ended with Bulow giving way; they came to no agreement, and Bulow v i r t u a l l y abandoned Metternich's suggestion f o r the time at l e a s t . In February of 1909 there arose a new opportunity f o r coming to some agreement with England, but i t came to nothing. The v i s i t of the English King and Queen to B e r l i n produced a 2 . momentary detente. l o r d Crewe who accompanied t h e i r Majesties touched upon the question of naval competition i n conversation with Bulow, but while the conversations were f r i e n d l y enough, and while c o r d i a l assurances were given, they, 3 were without s i g n i f i c a n c e . 1. Metternich to Billow, c i t e d i n Gooch, Before the War, I, 269. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I, 673-77. 3. Gooch, Before the War, I, 272. -145- Metternich reported at t h i s time that the B r i t i s h Government believed Germany to be secretly accelerating her programme, that they were se c r e t l y alarmed, but had not asked for an explanation. Bulow r e p l i e d that no acceleration was planned. This statement produced l i t t l e effect, however, since the B r i t i s h " leaders preferred the information of the B r i t i s h Admiralty. Grey u n o f f i c i a l l y suggested an occasional exchange of information, but Bulow re p l i e d that since precise declar- ations were not believed such a plan would be of no use. When, however, Asquith and Grey suggested inspection by the respective Naval Attaches, the Chancellor/ advised the accept- ance of the proposal as a means of calming opinion i n England. T i r p i t z was also i n favour of t h i s within c e r t a i n l i m i t s , but 1 the Kaiser refused his consent. n l n England the suspicion grew that Germany was building at a faster rate than prescribed by law. The e f f e c t of the r i v a l r y of the past few years came to a climax i n the spring of 1909 i n the form of the "German naval scare." As a r e s u l t of the increasing B r i t i s h a g i t a t i o n , Mr. McKenna, F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, i n his speech of March 16, 1909, proposed that f o r three years England should lay down s i x Dreadnoughts. To aid his argument he hinted that Germany, by concealing her building a c t i v i t i e s , had almost reached equality i n naval power with B r i t a i n . His words c r y s t a l l i z e d the 1. Gooch, Bp. c i t . , 272-73; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 294-95. -146- general f e e l i n g of uneasiness which existed i n England. This speech was followed by an Opposition attack led by Mr. Balfour which increased the p r e v a i l i n g fear. He pictured most v i v i d l y "the alarming circumstances i n which this country finds i t s e l f , " and declared that "the programme as presented by the Government i s u t t e r l y i n s u f f i c i e n t . " By 1910, he said, Germany would be ahead of B r i t a i n with thirteen Dreadnoughts to B r i t a i n ' s ten. By 1912 Germany would have twenty-five. His figures, time was to prove, were unbelievably f a n t a s t i c - i n 191E Germany had only twelve. But the B r i t i s h were i n a mood to believe the wildest prophesying. "There was no l i m i t to the s t u p i d i t y of the s t o r i e s which f i l l e d the newspapers, and the conversation 1 of the readers." The demand arose over a l l England, "we want eight and we won't wait," and i n response to this cry, f a n t a s t i c though i t was, and based upon nothing more than suspicion, 2 d i s l i k e and apprehension, the eight were voted. Although Mr* McKenna l a t e r admitted his statements to have been incor r e c t , they had done their damage i n further increasing Anglo-German 3 antagonism. 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 690. Reports of the Belgian M i n i s t e r i n B e r l i n , March 22 and 31, 1909, Morel, op. c i t ; , 151-53. 2. Spender, Asquith, I, 253. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 298. Mr. Winston C h u r c h i l l , who suoceeded Mr. McKenna as F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, has the following to say of t h i s "naval scare;" "I was s t i l l a sceptic about the danger of the European s i t u a t i o n , and not convinced by the Admiralty case. In conjunction with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I proceeded at once to canvass this scheme and to examine the reasons by which i t was supported. The conclusions which we both reached were that a programme of four ships would s u f f i c i e n t l y meet our needs I could not agree with the Admiralty conten- ti o n that a dangerous sit u a t i o n would be reached i n the year 1912. I found the Admiralty figures on t h i s subject -147- In July of 1909 Bethman-Hollw£g succeeded von Bulow as Imperial Chancellor, and Kinderlen-Wachter entered the German foreign o f f i c e . The former was powerless to a l t e r the course which had heen set i n the past few years, but he agreed with Metternich as to the need for coming to some agreement over the naval question with England. His views were shared by the new Foreign Secretary. Thus a more accomodating s p i r i t entered into the Wilhelmstrasse. The new Chancellor was determined on a frank exchange of views, and with this i n mind he opened negotiations with the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n B e r l i n , S i r Edward 1 Goschen, i n August 1909. The discussions thus begun, and which lasted during the next few months, took much the same course as the l a t e r ones of 1912.. The Germans i n s i s t e d , that desirable as any building truce might be i n i t s e l f , i t must'be conditional 2 upon a p o l i t i c a l agreement. In the eyes of the B r i t i s h , however, there was l i t t l e hope of a p o l i t i c a l agreement unless 3 the tension was f i r s t relaxed by a substantial naval reduction. \ were exaggerated .... The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were i n no respect f u l f i l l e d i n the year 1912. The B r i t i s h margin was found to be ample i n that year. There were no secret German Dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral von T i r p i t z made any untrue statement i n respect of major construction. The Admiralty had demanded s i x ships; the economists offered four; and we f i n a l l y compromised on eight.** op. c i t . , I, 32-33. 1. Goschen to Grey, August 21, 1909, B.D., VI, Ho.186, p.883; Ho.187, p.284. 2. Ibid;, pp.283-84. 3- Hicolson to Grey, September 22, 1909; B.D;, VI, Ho;198, p.291. Goschen to Grey, October 15, 1909, i b i d . , Ho.200. -148- There was l i t t l e room for compromise. The German Government could not agree to any departure from th e i r b u i l d i n g programme, (since i t was claimed t h i s would not be supported i n the Reichstag), but they were w i l l i n g to discuss "retarding the 1 r a t e " of b u i l d i n g new ships. The draft p o l i t i c a l agreement that was suggested proposed that i n the event of an attack made oh either Party by a t h i r d Power or group of Powers the 2 Party not attacked should remain neutral. The signing of such an agreement by the B r i t i s h would prevent them from supporting Prance or Russia and from taking a part i n future 3 Continental a f f a i r s i n which they might be greatly interested. Neither i n 1909, nor i n 1912, was B r i t a i n w i l l i n g to pledge n e u t r a l i t y . It i s not s u r p r i s i n g therefore that the proposal was turned down. P o l i t i c a l l y i t was open to the gravest objections, and on the naval side i t offered no substantial 4 reduction. The negotiations were taken up several times i n the 5 next year but led to no r e s u l t . The B r i t i s h suggested the plan, of I n s t i t u t i n g p e r i o d i c a l reports by the naval attaches on both sides as to the progress of building new vessels, and 1. Goschen to Grey, November 4, 1909, B.D.vT, No.204, p.305. 2. Ibid. 3. Grey to Goschen, May 5, 1910; i b i d . , No.361, p.479. 4. Nicolson to Goschen, February 6, 1911, Nicolson, op. c i t . , 339. 5. Memorandum of S i r Edward Grey, B.D., VI* July 29, 1910, enclosure i n No.387, pp.501-508. -149- the inspection of shipyards i n both countries, i n order to remove the suspicion of the English that Germany was building 1 more ships than was o f f i c i a l l y admitted. But these came to 2 nothing. During 1909 and 1910 En g l i s h domestic p o l i t i e s was • disturbed by the acute c o n s t i t u t i o n a l struggle waged by the two Houses over finances. There were two general elections. These circumstances interfered with negotiations with Germany 3 so that by the end of 1910 no progress had been made. Despite the f a i l u r e to mitigate the r i v a l r y , the Anglo-German tension seemed less acute by 1911. The death of 4 King Edward seemed to bring about a s l i g h t detente. The Kaiser had come to London f o r the funeral i n May, 1910, and his 5 manifest sympathy was warmly appreciated. In May, 1911, he accepted King George*s i n v i t a t i o n to attend the u n v e i l i n g of a statue of Queen V i c t o r i a . His reoeption i n London was most c o r d i a l . Shortly afterwards the Crown Prince attended the coronation of King George. But just at this time, when the tension seemed eased, a new c r i s i s broke out i n Morocoo, the C r i s i s of Agadir, which put to an end the p o l i t i c a l dead calm. 1. Memorandum of S i r Edward Grey, July 29, 1910, B.D., VI, Ho.387, pp.501-2, and statement handed to T i r p i t z by Captain Watson, August 24, 1910. B.D., VI, enclosure 3 i n Ho.397, pp.517-18* 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 368-369. 3. The negotiations outlined i n the previous pages were summarised for the Cabinet Committee i n a memorandum of May 24, 1911 by S i r Edward Grey, given i n B.D., VI, Ho. 468, pp.631-35. 4. Goooh, Modern Europe, 457. 5. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 359. -150- Thus, up to 1911, attempts to solve the r i v a l r y i n naval armaments had f a i l e d . It i s d i f f i c u l t to see how there could have been any result but f a i l u r e . During a l l the discussions the fundamental issues had not been touched. Was i t possible to reconcile the interests of two powerful states;*.;.- the one of which desired to prevent change, the other of which was bent on changing a r a t i o o f power which i t f e l t to be unjust? Each side approached the question from i t s own point of view only. Each could make out a good case f o r i t s e l f ; each had grounds f o r fear; each changed and magnified the objective o f the other. Underlying t h i s fundamental issue there were two s i g n i f i c a n t problems - B r i t a i n was unwilling to make any p o l i t i c a l agreement with Germany which would i n any respect l i m i t her ex i s t i n g relationship with France - and Germany was unwilling to make any reduction i n her naval programme which would s a t i s f y B r i t a i n . While this question of naval r i v a l r y remained no nearer solution, adhesion to the Tri p l e Entente seemed more than ever a necessity to B r i t a i n . CHAPTER V The Agadir C r i s i s , 1911 -151- CHAPTER 7 The Agadir C r i s i s 1911 On July 1, 1911,the diplomatic world was s t a r t l e d and alarmed by an announcement on the part of the German Government that a gunboat, the "Panther," had been dispatched to Agadir. Agadir was an A t l a n t i c port i n the extreme south of Morocco, some f i v e hundred miles south of Tangier. It was claimed that German, firms established i n the south of Morocco had been alarmed by unrest among the l o c a l tribesmen and had applied to the home government f o r protection. The gunboat had been sent to their assistance, and to watch over German interests, which were said to be considerable i n that area. As soon as normal t r a n q u i l l i t y had been restored the ship 1 would leave. The news of this action on the part of the German Government, fo r which no warning had been given, aroused 2 indignation and surprise i n the chancellories of Europe. What did i t mean? To f i n d an answer i t w i l l be necessary to review the course of Moroccan a f f a i r s a f t e r the Conference of Algeciras. 1. B.D*, 711, No.338, p.322. Aide-memoire communicated by Count Metternich, July 1, 1911; No.339, pp.322-23, minute by S i r Arthur Nicolson. 2. Agadir was a closed port, and not open to trade. It was doubted i f there were German residents or merchants i n the v i c i n i t y ; -152- The Conference of 1906 had produced no t r u l y s a t i s f a c t o r y conditions i n Morocoo; i t was followed hy neither improvement i n the i n t e r n a l conditions, nor by improvement i n the r e l a t i o n s between France and Germany. The French found themselves b u s i l y engaged i n the onerous and thankless task of enforcing economic and administrative reforms. The Sultan's brother, Mulai Hafid, gained a strong following among the chi e f t a i n s , who resented French and Spanish in t r u s i o n , and with this backing he revolted. In the disorders which arose i n 1907 the murder of a doctor gave the French occasion to ocoupy Oudja, near the Algerian border, and further outrages led to the landing of troops i n Casablanca and to the placing of French p o l i c e i n seaports on the west coast. In the struggle Mulai 1 Hafid proved strong enough to depose his brother. While negotiations were being carried on with regard to the recognition of the new Sultan, an incident at Casablanca threatened to cause a serious breach i n Franoo-German r e l a t i o n s . Six deserters from the French Foreign l e g i o n had been assisted by the German Consul at Casablanca i n an attempt to escape aboard a German ship i n September, 1908* French s o l d i e r s attempted to arrest them, and i n the struggle which followed two German o f f i c i a l s were maltreated. Over t h i s incident a b i t t e r dispute arose between the two governments. In spite of the excitement which f l a r e d i n the press good sense prevailed 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 806-13. For a c r i t i c i s m of French p o l i c y i n Morocco during these years see the reports of the Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n given i n Morel, op. c i t . p.68-70, 71-72, 117-18, 118-20, 121-22, 181. -153- among the leaders, for f a u l t existed on both sides. The matter was referred to the Hague Tribunal f o r a r b i t r a t i o n which declared both parties must share the blame. The incident i t s e l f was not important, but minor episode though i t was, i t proved p a i n f u l and dangerous, and pre c i p i t a t e d almost a c r i s i s i n the whole Moroccan Question and i n the r e l a t i o n s between France 1 and Germany. The Incident i s important also i n that i t reveals c l e a r l y , as did the a f f a i r s of 1905 and 1906, how the B r i t i s h and French Entente policy might have become operative. In November, before the a f f a i r was s e t t l e d , the French Government, through S i r Francis B e r t i e , asked whether France could count on the support of B r i t a i n i n r e s i s t i n g what they chose to 2 term , f t h e u n j u s t i f i a b l e demands'1 of the German Government. This request obviously contemplated for c e r t a i n eventualities m i l i t a r y support. Grey placed the following minute on Bertie's dispatch: ''The l i n e , i f the question becomes acute, w i l l have "3 to be decided by the Cabinet.'' This reply or comment, which presumably would be conveyed to the French Government, was ce r t a i n l y not a re f u s a l to consider giving support, and as Professor Mowat suggests, i t would not, according to the normal 1. Gooch, Before the War, I, 275; B.D., T i l , pp.l09r-131. The fears of the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s that the incident might lead to grave r e s u l t s - minutes to Ho.129, p.118. Also, see Nicolson to Grey, November 5, 1908, Ho*130, p*118, f o r the alarm of the Hussian Government. 2. Bertie to Grey, November 4, 1908, B.D., VII, No;129, p.117* 3. Ibid., p*118. -154- interpretation of diplomatic language, be considered 1 discouraging. France, however, had no need at t h i s time to ask further for the contemplated support. But there was l i t t l e doubt that the increasing a c t i v i t y of the French i n Morocco would i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t i n the establishment of a preponder- ating p o l i t i c a l influence there. Ho one saw this more c l e a r l y than the Kaiser, and i t i s to his c r e d i t that he displayed much wisdom i n favouring a p o l i c y of f r i e n d l y c o n c i l i a t i o n . He had never favoured the Bulow-Hdlstein Moroccan p o l i c y , and he now came to the conclusion that i t was impossible to check the extension of French control i n Morocco without resort to force. On October 4, 1908, he informed his Foreign Of f i c e that so far as was practicable Germany should withdraw with dignity £ from Moroccan a f f a i r s , and come to an understanding with France. Bulow was by this time also i n favour of l i q u i d a t i n g this question, and he thus intimated to France that Germany would be w i l l i n g to negotiate a settlement. Pichon, the French premier, was anxious to avoid f r i c t i o n with Germany and 3 favoured a "detente." After short negotiations an agreement was signed on February 9, 1909. "To f a c i l i t a t e the execution of the Act of Algeciras," France, professing s t i l l to respect the independence and i n t e g r i t y of Morocco, promised equality 1. Mowat, R.B., Hew l i g h t on the Agadir C r i s i s , the Contemporary Review, Vol.141, June, 193£, 709. 2. Fay, op. c i t * , I, £47-48. 3. Gooch, Before the War, I, £76. -155- of economic opportunity to the Germans; and Germany, promising to pursue only economic aims, recognized the sp e c i a l p o l i t i c a l interests of France i n preserving peace and order, and promised 1 not to interfere with them. The c o n c i l i a t o r y attitude of Germany was warmly welcomed i n France as putting an end to a long standing source of i r r i t a t i o n between the two nations. The B r i t i s h Government, too, was delighted, and expressed pleasure that a question which had occasioned such anxiety to England, and over which £ England was bound to give France support, was now s e t t l e d . I t was welcomed as well i n most of the European c a p i t a l s , more esp e c i a l l y at this p a r t i c u l a r time, since Europe was entangled i n the Bosnian C r i s i s . But unfortunately for the peace of Europe this pact of 1909 proved only a breathing-space and not a solution of Moroccan problems. For a short time i t did bring about more co r d i a l relations between France and Germany, but i t did not bring to f r u i t i o n a l l the happy r e s u l t s expected of i t . The proposed economic partnership served as a basis for f r i e n d l y relations during the next two years, and cooperation i n the economic f i e l d was begun hopefully. But every one of the schemes embarked upon proved f a i l u r e s , whatever may have been the intentions of the p a r t i e s . This was seen i n plans made with regard to mines, railways, and other public works. At every 1. Fay, op. c i t ; , I, 248* 2. Grey-to Goschen, February 9, 1909, B.D., 711* jb,152, p.136, and Grey to Be r t i e , February 9, 1909, Io.l53, pp,136-37. -156- 1 point, i n every region, arrangements broke down. The Germans, not unnaturally, were angry and m i s t r u s t f u l . And as a r e s u l t of the f a i l u r e of the Agreement to reconcile the economic inte r e s t s of the two Powers p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s continued to occur. At the same time, while the Pact of 1909 was f a i l i n g to bring f o r t h the r e s u l t s f o r which i t had been arranged, further disorders i n Morocoo were furnishing the French with a pretext f o r a steady extension of their p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l . I t can be e a s i l y understood that i n the eyes of Germany the stipulated basis of the agreement, "the maintenance of the independence and i n t e g r i t y of the Shereefian Empire," 2 was becoming more and more of a myth. " I t became clearer and clearer that with this extension of French influence the equality of economic opportunity contemplated i n the 1909 Agreement, and the idea of an independent Sultan at the head of a w e l l - regulated government, were both f i c t i o n s i n contradiction 3 with the actual trend of events." It was while events were passing thus i n Morocco that S i r Edward Grey was asked i n the House of Commons, i n March of 1911, a question with regard to England's obligations to support France. Both h i s reply to t h i s question, and the attitude of 1. Dickinson, op. c i t ; , 189; Ewart, op. c i t . , II, 815-17. For a c r i t i c i s m of French p o l i c y i n this regard see Fabre-Iuce, op. c i t . , 123, and HaleVy, E l i e , World•Crisis, 1914-1918, (London, 1930), 24. 2. Brandenburg, op; c i t . * 370. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 278. For the way i n which France continued to extend f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y control over the Sultan, see Ewart, op. c i t ; , I I , 808-24 and The Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n , A p r i l 21, 1911, Morel, op. c i t . , 177-78, and May 1, 1911, i b i d . , 181. -157- the French Foreign Minister to that reply are of i n t e r e s t , to say the l e a s t . Did there exist at the time he entered into o f f i c e , S i r Edward was asked, any understanding, "expressed or implied, i n virtue of which Great B r i t a i n would he under obligations to France to send troops, i n c e r t a i n eventualities, to a s s i s t the operations of the French army?" Grey r e p l i e d , "The extent of the obligations to which Great B r i t a i n was committed was that expressed or implied i n the Anglo-French Convention l a i d before Parliament. There was no other engagement 1 bearing on the subject." This answer, of course, gave no hint of the secret a r t i c l e s of the 1904 Agreement which were 2 unknown to Parliament at this time, nor of the m i l i t a r y and naval "conversations" which began i n 1906. When M. Cruppi, the French Foreign Minister, heard of S i r Edward's answer he complained to S i r Francis B e r t i e i n Paris that Grey's statement was rather regrettably p o s i t i v e i n i t s denial of the existence of an obligation to support France. "He regretted that you had found i t necessary to repudiate so strongly the existence of any unknown Agreement between England and France,for your repudiation has had a regrettable e f f e c t i n certain Parliamentary c i r c l e s . He (M. Cruppi) knew what had passed between the Departments of the two Governments f o r he had seen the dossier. He would have preferred that there should have been a suspicion that an 1. B.D., VII, Ho*197, p.182. 2, Supra. -158- 1 understanding did exist for possible e v e n t u a l i t i e s . " Meanwhile trouble was r i s i n g i n Morocco. The new Sultan had roused native discontent, as had h i s predecessor, by his subservience to the French. This discontent came to a head i n March, 1911, when a r e v o l t broke out i n Fez. This was the s i t u a t i o n when the French sent out alarming reports that the Europeans i n Fez were i n danger. On A p r i l 5, Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador i n B e r l i n , informed the German Government that a French expedition was to be dispatched to Fez to r e l i e v e the Sultan and to ensure the safety of the Europeans there. The troops started early i n A p r i l , and arrived i n Fez on May 21. The expedition was not dispatched before warning had been sent to the various Powers; and not before Kiderlen, who directed Germany's p o l i c y at this time, and the Chancellor had offered repeated warnings that such action might reopen the whole Moroccan Question. They warned Cambon that the occupation of Fez might be considered as a further step i n the annulling of the Act of Algeciras, and that i t would e n t i t l e Germany to resume complete l i b e r t y of action. They expressed the hope that the action would be delayed as long as possible, and that France and Germany might work out a s a t i s f a c t o r y compromise on Moroccan a f f a i r s . This was a hint at compensation f o r Germany. It was pointed out that i t was much easier to occupy a c i t y than to leave i t , and that once 1. Bertie to Grey, A p r i l 9, 1911, B.D., VII, No.205, pp.188-89. -159- Fez was i n French possession public opinion on both sides would be roused, and a compromise would be d i f f i c u l t . They did not give an approval, nor did they lodge a protest, but e contented themselves with warnings, p r e f e r r i n g to wait on events The French i n s i s t e d that the action was only due to extreme necessity, and would be expressed i n accordance with the s p i r i t of the Act of Algeciras. The troops would restore order and then r e t i r e . S i r Edward Grey accepted the assurances of the French Government without question, and i n pursuance of treaty promises to give France diplomatic support i n Morocco, approved the expedition. Some English leaders at f i r s t shared the German feelings as to the d i f f i c u l t y of withdrawal once French troops had undertaken occupation. S i r Arthur Nicolson, the Foreign Under-Secretary, reports the Russian Ambassador i n London, "did not conceal from me the fact that the Morocco question i s disquieting^ the London Cabinet.... The experience of a l l European states, beginning with England, shows that i t i s 2 easier to occupy a c i t y than to withdraw again. 1. Bertie to Grey, A p r i l 25, 1911, B.D,, VII, No.216, p.199. Goschen to Grey, A p r i l 28, 1911, i b i d . , No.227, p.206 and No.229, p,207. Minute by S i r Arthur Nicolson, A p r i l 28, 1911, i b i d . , No.230, p.209. Ewart, op. cit.', II, 829-831; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 278-79. Russian Charge ' d»Affaires at B e r l i n to Sazonov, A p r i l 13, and A p r i l 28, 1911, Siebert, op. c i t . , 578-80. 2. Russian Ambassador at London to Neratov, May 9, 1911 and May 23, 1911; Siebert, op; c i t . , 581. The question has been raised - were Europeans i n r e a l danger? On this point there i s much c o n f l i c t of evidence. How true the French reports were, to what extent they were exaggerated as a pretext f o r their actions, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to say. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 280; Dickinson, op. c i t . , P 194- -160- It i s important to note at t h i s stage that Delcasse, who had been forced from o f f i c e over the Moroccan problem i n 1905, had again become a member of the French Cabinet i n Maroh, 1911. He had not charge of foreign a f f a i r s , but held only the naval p o r t f o l i o . The Prime Minister, Monis, had told the German Ambassador that he had taken Deloasse' into his cabinet on account of his notable work i n the navy, and because of h i s great technical knowledge. He further assured the Ambassador that,*Deleasse' has fir m l y promised not to mix i n foreign p o l i c y ; 1 anyway his views today d i f f e r from those of some years ago.1* But with the memories of 1905-06 unforgotten, i t was natural that the German press should suspect Delcasse of taking a leading part i n the d i r e c t i n g of France's Moroccan p o l i c y of 1911* The Hussian Charge d'Affaires at B e r l i n , w r i t i n g to Sazonov on A p r i l 28,informed him that " i n some of the German papers, Delcasse i s regarded as the true originator of French 3 Moroccan p o l i c y . " M. Cruppi was Foreign Minister, but he was Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 834. Apparently neither the B r i t i s h nor German Governments had any apprehensions for the safety of their nationals. See questions asked i n the House of Commons, A p r i l 25, 1911, with reference to the danger to B r i t i s h interests and Europeans at Fez; B.D., VII, Ho.129, pp.201-02. A fortnight a f t e r the a r r i v a l of the French occupation of Fez Spain had landed troops at larache and El-Kasar, which action, i n imitation of the French precedent, was explained by the necessity of preserving order, and acoompanied by the assurance that the occupation would be only temporary. 1. Cited i n Fay, op. c i t . , I, 280. 2. Report of the Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n , March 3, 1911, Morel, op. c i t . , 170-72. 3. Siebert, op. cit.,rn 580. -161 rather weak, and without experience i n foreign a f f a i r s . There was every good reason to suspect that the f o r c e f u l , and energetic Deloasse with #he experience of 1905 behind him, would influence the work of Cruppi and the Cabinet. Such was 1 the assumption generally held i n Europe. Mr. Porter, h i s biographer, claims that he "occupied a very i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n i n this ministry," and that he "completely overshadowed 2 M. Cruppi." The German po l i c y remained somewhat of a puzzle to the French when the expedition to Fez was f i r s t suggested, but Kiderden's p o l i c y i s c l e a r l y revealed i n a memorandum he drew a up on May 3. When Fez would be occupied by the French he would ask how long they intended to remain there. I f they did not adhere to the time l i m i t announced, Germany would then declare the Act of Algeciras annulled by the French action and demand compensation. As protests alone would prove useless Germany should send a warship to Agadir, claiming j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s action by revealing i t as a measure to protect the l i f e and property of German subjects. The ship would be s t a t i o n - ed there, and developments awaited to see i f France would o f f e r suitable compensation. In this way he f e l t past f a i l u r e s might be made up for, and a good effect would be provided on the 4 impending Reichstag elections. 1. Belgian Minister i n P a r i s , March 4,1911, Morel, op. c i t . , 173. Russian Ambassador at Paris to Sazonov, March 14, 1911, Siebert, op. c i t . , 559. 2. Porter, op. c i t . , 284. 3. Given i n Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, p.204. 4. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 281-82. Brandenburg, op. c i t . * 371. -162- The German Minister does not seem to have looked through c a r e f u l l y to the possible r e s u l t s h i s p o l i c y might have brought about. He did not co4sider, apparently, what ef f e c t h i s plan might produce on France and the outside world. What was to happen should France, i n spite of his action, refuse compensation, or inadequate compensation? Would Agadir then be occupied i n d e f i n i t e l y ? These questions seemingly did not present themselves to his mind. He seems to have expected with rather extraordinary s i m p l i c i t y that his gesture of sending the ship would immediately bring forth o f f e r s of compensation from France. The Chancellor was i n favour of this plan, and the Kaiser gave h i s approval to the p r i n c i p l e of seeking compensation, although at th i s time he did not d e f i n i t e l y 1 authorize the dispatch of a gun-boat. On May 21 the French occupied Fez. Kiderlen waited. On June 11 Cambon dropped a guarded hint to the Imperial Chancellor that France was prepared to discuss compensation for Germany, and mentioned concessions i n the Congo. Kiderlen now saw his p o l i c y working out as he planned. He met Cambon at Kissengen on June 19 to discuss the matter of compensation. It was agreed on p r i n c i p l e that compensation for Germany could be found i n the Congo. Cambon returned to Paris to arrange matters with his Government, but not before Kiderlen warned him Germany must receive "a decent mouthful." During the next several days no o f f e r was made from P a r i s . Kiderlen then 1. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 372, and footnote (3) -163- decided to act. By occupying Agadir he hoped to force Franca to surrender suitable compensation; i n negotiating v/ith her he wished his hand strengthened by a " f a i t accompli." On June E6 he v i s i t e d the Kaiser who was at K i e l , described to him the s i t u a t i o n as i t existed, and secured his consent to dispatch a 1 warship. Accordingly, the gunboat "Panther," which was return- i n g from southern A f r i c a , and which was the only vessel near enough to the North African coast to be of use i n the plan, was ordered to drop anchor at Agadir on July 1. At the same time a note was sent to the Great Powers explaining the German 3 action. In spite of the explanation so offered,the r e a l motive undoubtedly was to bring the French to the point of making a generous o f f e r of compensation. The French Government was deeply s t i r r e d by this sudden action. Germany had given no warning of the step taken, whereas, France had given a preliminary n o t i f i c a t i o n of her 3 march to Fez. The news was received with consternation i n Downing Street, for i t raised great fears that Germany was 4 planning the s e t t i n g up of a naval base i n Morocco. On July 3 S i r Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador that "we regard the s i t u a t i o n as so important that 5 i t must be discussed at a Cabinet." On July 4, a f t e r 1. Dugdale, op* c i t . , IT, 6. 2. Supra.151, 3. Belgian Minister i n P a r i s , July 2, 1911, Morel, op. cit.,190. 4. Belgian Minister i n london, July 5, 1911, i b i d . , 191-92. 5. Grey to de S a l i s , July 3, 1911, B.D., VII, No.347, p.328. - 1 6 4 * consultation in.the Cabinet, he t o l d him that the B r i t i s h attitude could not be disinterested i n view of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco,and of B r i t a i n ' s treaty obligations to France;".... a new s i t u a t i o n had been created by the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might aff e c t B r i t i s h interests more d i r e c t l y than they had hitherto been affected, and therefore we could not recognize any new arrangements "that 1 might be come to without us*" In a note of July 2,i a f t e r announcing to the Powers the dispatch of the "Panther," the German Government issued the following notice: "The German Government i s quite ready to enter upon an amicable exchange of views i n order to obtain a solution of the Moroccan question s a t i s f a c t o r y to a l l Powers," and " i t i s altogether disposed to examine i n a f r i e n d l y s p i r i t 2 every proposition made by the French Government." In pursuance of this statement negotiations between Jules Cambon and Kiderlen began, negotiations which were to prove most d i f f i c u l t , and 3 which were to be extended over the next four months. S i r Edward Grey seems to have expected information from B e r l i n i n the matter of German p o l i c y after his conversation 4 with the German Ambassador on July 4 ; but Kiderlen disregarded 1 . Grey to do S a l i s , July 4 , 1 9 1 1 , B.Di, VII, N o . 3 6 6 , p . 3 3 4 . Mr. Asquith expressed the same view i n almost i d e n t i c a l words i n answer to a question on Moroccan a f f a i r s i n the House of Commons on July 6 , 1 9 1 1 ; c i t e d i n i b i d . , H o . 3 6 4 , p . 3 4 2 . 2 . Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , J J , 8 3 9 - 4 0 . 3 . Only a few days before the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir Mi Monis had been succeeded i n the French premiership by M. Caillaux, and M. Cruppi as Foreign Secretary by M. de Selves. 4 . Grey, op. c i t . , I, 2 2 3 . -165- the very obvious hint given i n that conversation that England wished to be consulted. This f a i l u r e to give reassurances to Grey was to prove a great mistake; but the German "Government appears to have f e l t i t unnecessary, and gave the B r i t i s h Government no assurances u n t i l three weeks l a t e r . Grey would oer t a i n l y have been less disturbed had he known that Germany's objective was compensation outside Morocco, and not a naval base on the coast. Kiderlen seemingly f e l t quite safe i n disregarding B r i t a i n because he was not seeking Moroccan t e r r i t o r y . He had as a matter of fact mentioned to Cambon at the commencement of the negotiations that the conversations must be confined to the two Powers - that i t would be impossible to admit a t h i r d Party, without bringing i n a l l the signatories 1 of the Act of Algeoiras. To t h i s negotiation "8. deux" M. Cambon agreed, but made i t quite clear that France "meant to remain absolutely f a i t h f u l to her understandings with Great B r i t a i n " and to "keep His Majesty's Government informed of any conversations which might take place on the above or any £ other basis." There can be no value for the purpose of this study i n here recording the Franco-German negotiation i n any d e t a i l . It i s s u f f i c i e n t to point out only t h e i r extremely thorny and d i f f i c u l t nature. On July 15, a f t e r a previous meeting i n which eaoh side was reluctant to commit i t s e l f to anything 1. Goschen to Grey, July 10, 1911, B.D., VII, Ho.367, p.345. Bertie to Grey, July 11, 1911, i b i d . , Ho.369, p.347. 2. Goschen to Grey, July 10, 1911, i b i d . , No.367, p.345. -166- d e f i n i t e , Kiderlen asked f o r a l l the French Congo f o r Germany. The French Ambassador appeared shocked at such a demand. He r e p l i e d that while French public opinion might consent to compensation f o r Germany, the ceding of a whole oolony was 1 unthinkable. He stated, however, that part of the Congo might be ceded i f Germany on her part was w i l l i n g to y i e l d to France t e r r i t o r y i n Togoland and the Cameroons. The negotiations reached a point of extreme tension at t h i s stage, and the interview between Cambon and Kiderlen on July EO, following E that of the 15, was rather b i t t e r . It was at t h i s point, when the negotiations seemed to be.making l i t t l e progress, that England intervened. When Kiderlen demanded the French Congo the French and B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e s exchanged views as to the possible outcome. On July 30 the p o s s i b i l i t y of holding an international confer- ence i n the event of a breakdown of the negotiations was discussed by S i r Francis Bertie and the French Foreign Minister. The l a t t e r r e p l i e d that the negotiations had reached a c r i t i c a l stage and although they had not as yet broken down, they would l i k e l y continue f o r some long time, but should they f a i l France would not object to B r i t a i n i n v i t i n g a conference as 3 had been suggested. It w i l l be noted from these communioations that the B r i t i s h and the French were considering together 1. Bethmann's report of this meeting to the Kaiser i s given i n Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, 11-13. 3, Bertie to Grey, July 18, 1911, B.D., VII, pp.371-73, and minutes added, e s p e c i a l l y minute by Hicolson, p.373. 3. Grey to B e r t i e , July 19, 1911, B.D., VII, Ho.397, pp.376-77. Bertie to Grey, July 30, 1911, i b i d . , Ho.401, pp.378-79. -167- eventualities i n this c r i s i s . It must be noted also that i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of a possible outbreak of war, the "Conversations" between the General M i l i t a r y S t a f f s , which had been inaugurated during the f i r s t Morocoo C r i s i s of 1905-1906, were now being 1 pressed. Thus, by July 20 something of a c r i s i s had been reached. Negotiations were on the point of rupture, and there were feelings of s t r a i n , uncertainty and apprehension. S i r Edward Grey seems to have shared these f e e l i n g s . He, therefore, asked the German Ambassador to come to see him on July SI. In his speech i n the House of Commons, on November 37, 1911, he t e l l s of the conversation which took place. After s t a t i n g to the Ambassador that he understood that there was danger of the negotiations ending i n f a i l u r e , he went on to say: I wished i t to be understood that our silence i n the absence of any communication from the German Government - our silence since the Cabinet communication of July 4, and since the Prime Minister's statement of July 7 i n t h i s House - our silence since then must not he interpreted as meaning that we were not taking, i n the Moroccan question, the inter e s t which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month. .... We thought i t possible that a settlement might be come between Germany and France .... without a f f e c t i n g B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . We would be very glad i f t h i s happened, and i n the hope that i t would happen at a l a t e r stage we had hitherto put i t aside .... I heard that negotiations were s t i l l proceeding, and I s t i l l hoped they might lead to a s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t , but i t must be understood that i f they were unsuccessful, a very embarrassing s i t u a t i o n would a r i s e . I pointed out to the German Ambassador that the Germans were i n 1. Infra.iHEwart, op. c i t . , I I , 849; Grey, op. c i t . , I, 343. Mr. l l o y d George i n a speech i n Toronto, October 10, 1933, made reference to these m i l i t a r y conversations. -168- the closed port of Agadir*... which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval base.... We could not say-to what extent the s i t u a t i o n might be altered to our disadvantage, and i f the negotiat- ions with France came to nothing we should be obliged to. watch over B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s and to become a party to discussion of the matter.... I wished to say a l l this now while we were s t i l l waiting i n hope that the negotiations with France would succeed, for i f I did not say this now, i t would cause resentment l a t e r on i f the German Government had been led to suppose by our previous silence - our silence since July 4 - that we did not take an interest i n the matter." The Foreign Secretary explained to the House, "I made that statement on July 21 because I was getting anxious, because the s i t u a t i o n seemed to me to be developing unfavour- ably, and the German Ambassador was s t i l l not i n a p o s i t i o n 1 to make a communication to me from the German Government." Count Metternich*s report of this conversation reached B e r l i n the next day, and the German Government gave a reassuring answer as to t h e i r intentions on July 23. It would have been well had Downing Street waited for that reply r before taking t h e i r next step, or had Germany given her guarantee of good f a i t h e a r l i e r , f o r a few hours after the interview between Grey and Metternich a new element of danger 1. This speech of November 27, 1911, i s c i t e d i n Knaplund, Paul, Speeches on Foreign A f f a i r s , (London, 1.93!) ,145-71. The content of the conversation with Metternich i s given also i n a dispatch from Grey to Goschen, July 21, 1911, B.D., T i l , No.411, p.390. An extract from Metternich's report of the conversation i s given i n Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, 13. With regard to Grey's statement of B r i t i s h p o l i c y to Metternich on July 4, and to which Grey complains the German Government gave no answer, Professor R.B.Mowat says, "This statement did not c a l l for any answer; i t was just a declaration of p o l i c y . It could not even be formally acknowledged by the German Government, for - 1 6 9 - had been introduced into the already d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n . In the evening of July 21, and thus before the German reply had been received, Mr. l l o y d George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a resounding declaration of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . In a public address at the Mansion House he reviewed the general s i t u a t i o n and stated that B r i t a i n should at a l l hazards maintain her place and her prestige among the Great Powers of the world...* If a s i t u a t i o n were to be forced on us i n which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the Great and beneficent p o s i t i o n B r i t a i n has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing B r i t a i n to be treated, where her i n t e r e s t s were v i t a l l y affected, as i f she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that p r i c e would be humiliation i n t o l e r a b l e for a great country l i k e ours to endure. (1) This speech coming from a Minister who was supposed to belong to the most p a c i f i c section of the Cabinet created an immense sensation i n Germany, where i t was interpreted as a threat on the part of the B r i t i s h Government, and as an act of unwarranted interference i n the Franco-German negotiations. It greatly increased the already e x i s t i n g tension between Germany and England growing out of the naval competition. It might indeed i n the e x i s t i n g state of a f f a i r s have led to war Grey appears to have sent no Hote, but passed on the statement i n h i s conversation v/i th Metternich. There was, therefore, nothing to alarm the Cabinet i n the fact that no reply came." Hew l i g h t on the Agadir C r i s i s , l oo. c i t . , 7 1 2 . 1 . Lloyd George gives an account of his action i n volume I of h i s "War Memoirs," p. 4 1 - 4 5 . Both S i r Edward Grey and the Prime Minister had been consulted before t h i s speech was given and approved i t . Grey, op* c i t . , I, 2 2 5 ; C h u r c h i l l also approved i t ; C h u r c h i l l , op* c i t . , 4 3 . -170- had not the Kaiser and Bethmann been determined not to allow the Moroccan question to cause an aotual c o n f l i c t . The reply of the German Government to S i r Edward's questions i n the Interview of July E l had been dispatched before the text of the Chancellor's speech had reached B e r l i n . The German answer 1 to those questions was given by Metternich on July E4. On the following day he again saw Grey, and on this occasion he presented a strong protest against the Mansion House speech. Grey, however, remained determined i n his defense of the a B r i t i s h stand, and conversations between the two on July 86 3 and 27 were more courteous, On July 27 the B r i t i s h Prime Minister made a reassuring speech i n the House of Commons i n which he made i t clear that while B r i t a i n had no desire to par t i c i p a t e i n the negotiations then being ca r r i e d on between Prance and Germany, and while i t was the B r i t i s h hope that these might issue i n a settlement s a t i s f a c t o r y to both P a r t i e s , i n the event of a rupture, however, B r i t a i n would be obliged to watch over her in t e r e s t s , and become an active Party i n the discussion of the s i t u a t i o n . ''That would be our rig h t as a Signatory of the Treaty of Algeciras; i t might be our obli g a t - 4 ion under the terms of our agreement of 1904 with France." 1. Grey to Goschen, July 24, 1911; B.D., VII, Ho.417, pp.394-96. 2, Grey to Goschen, July 25, 1911; i b i d . , Ho.419, pp.397-99. Also Russian ambassador i n London to Heratov, August 1, 1911, Siebert, op. c i t . , pp. 594-95. 3, Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 380-81. 4. Asquith, The Genesis of the War, 149; B.D., 711, Ho.426 p.406. -171 The B r i t i s h stand at t h i s time had an immediate eff e c t on the s i t u a t i o n which had been arrived at i n the past weeks. It greatly increased Anglo-German tension, but i t s i m p l i f i e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s which had arisen over Morocco. The B r i t i s h had accurately defined their attitude to t h i s problem, displayed what their i n t e r e s t s were, denied a l l h o s t i l e