@prefix vivo: . @prefix edm: . @prefix ns0: . @prefix dcterms: . @prefix skos: . vivo:departmentOrSchool "Arts, Faculty of"@en, "History, Department of"@en ; edm:dataProvider "DSpace"@en ; ns0:degreeCampus "UBCV"@en ; dcterms:creator "Kelly, Eric"@en ; dcterms:issued "2010-11-29T22:17:38Z"@en, "1937"@en ; vivo:relatedDegree "Master of Arts - MA"@en ; ns0:degreeGrantor "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:description "No abstract included."@en ; edm:aggregatedCHO "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/30202?expand=metadata"@en ; skos:note "ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS: 1898-1914 by Eric Kelly A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History The University of Bri t i s h Columbia October - 1937 TABLE OF COETENTS page Introduction I-II. Chapter I The Departure from I s o l a t i o n . 1. Chapter II The Anglo-French Entente 23. Chapter III The Testing of the Entente -56. Chapter 17 The Further \"Encirclement\" of Germany? 118. Chapter V The Agadir C r i s i s , 1911 151. Chapter VI The Tightening- of the Entente Cordiale, 1918-1913 183. Chapter VII The Last Bays of Peace 231. Chapter VIII How B r i t a i n Entered the War 291. Bibliography I-XLIV. INTRODUCTION The period which this study covers, that of the years immediately preceding the World War, i s one to which many h i s t -orians have turned t h e i r attention. The diplomatic game of power-politics as i t was played hy governments i n these years, the fundamental causes of the War, and the problem of war g u i l t have furnished subjects for thousands of volumes. The various questions which have arisen probably never w i l l be solved to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l students of the period. But as Dr. P.W. Slosson reminds us, thi s should occasion no surprise, f o r there i s quite as wide a d i v e r s i t y of opinion over the merits of the wars of Napoleon, or those of Rome and Carthage. Nor does th i s fact of d i f f e r i n g opinions imply that investigation and discussion of the period are of no p r a c t i c a l valuei At least two important points have been attained. As a r e s u l t of h i s t o r -i c a l research, and with the opening of the archives of b e l l i g e r -ent Powers, scholars axe i n possession of most of the facts and written records which can contribute to more d e f i n i t e v e r d i c t s . Again, and more important, many of the extreme opinions widely held during the War, and i n the years following, have been d i s -2 credited and replaced by more moderate views. Haile research has made scholars already aware of most of the problems which the period presents, writers w i l l for a 1» Slosson, P.W,, Europe Since 1870, (Boston, 1935), 332. 2. Ibid., 333. - I I -long time to come undoubtedly d i f f e r over the significance of c e r t a i n events and p a r t i c u l a r points, and w i l l d i f f e r e n t l y estimate the diplomatic blunders which prevented a peaceful settlement of the c r i s i s of the summer of 1.91.4» Most r e l i a b l e a u t h o r i t i e s seem to agree, however, on th i s one p o i n t — t h a t the catastrophe was the i o i n t product of a number of underlying causes,, some deeply rooted i n Europe*s past,, others of more recent o r i g i n . These are usually f i t t e d into a few general categories such as nationalism, imperialism, m i l i t a r i s m and the press;; the i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of diplomats to th e i r own parliaments or peoples; and f i n a l l y a system of secret a l l i -ances which divided Europe into two r i v a l camps. It i s the purpose of this study to trace the s i g n i f i -cance of the rftle o f the Anglo-French Entente i n the diplomat-i c background of the War, and more especially to ascertain to what extent i t was a factor i n bringing Great B r i t a i n , so long an adherent of the p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n from continental en-tanglements, Into the c o n f l i c t . I wish to acknowledge here my profound Indebtedness to Professor P. H. Soward, to whom I owe my Interest i n modern European h i s t o r y , and whose encouragement, suggestions and guidance have made thi s study possible. I must acknowledge also the kindness of the French Consul i n Vancouver, B. C», without whose generous g i f t to the Library of the University of B r i t i s h Columbia of the valuable Documents Diplomatiques Francais t h i s study could not have been undertaken. 5 CHAPTER I The Departure from I s o l a t i o n ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS 189.8-1914. CHAPTER. I The Departure From I s o l a t i o n . There can be no i n t e l l i g e n t understanding of the reasons for B r i t a i n ' s entry into the World War unless there i s a defin-i t e knowledge of the nature and development of, Anglo-French re-lations as they existed an June 28, 1914. It i s true that B r i t -a i n was engaged within the Entente i n relationships with Russia, as w e l l as with France,, but the Anglo-Russian rapprochement was never, as popular, i n England as the Anglo-French, Down to the outbreak of the War,; England s t e a d i l y viewed with disfavour the ch i e f aim, of Russian foreign p o l i c y - the seizure of the S t r a i t s and Constantinople. When the War broke out i t was not as an a l l y of Russia that B r i t a i n took up the swordw S i r Edward Grey p e r s i s t e n t l y refused to make a d i r e c t issue i n England the Austro-Serbian dispute which had involved Russia so deeply with Au s t r i a , In his memoirs he states, ttthe notion of being i n -volved i n a mar about a Balkan quarrel was repugnant....there 1 was no sentiment urging us to go into a war- on Serbia's behalf.'* Even the chauvinistic Bottomley journal, \"John B u l l * , published a leading a r t i c l e i n the l a s t days under the heading, wTo H e l l 1. Viscount Grey of F allodon,. Twenty-five Tears,. (london, 19^25), I, 335. -2-1 with Servia....,once more to H e l l with Servia.' 1 Nor. did England enter the War. primarily, because of the invasion of Belgium, by Germany,- despite the manner i n which propagandists, used this breach of neutrality to j u s t i f y the purity of B r i t a i n ' s motives i n the eyes of the p u b l i c . Grey had promised on August 2 to give Prance the protection of the B r i t i s h f l e e t i n the event of the German f l e e t coming into the Channel ox through the North Sea. to undertake h o s t i l e action against the French coast or shipping. This assurance was given before Germany had presented her ultimatum to Belgium, news of 2. which did not reach london u n t i l , the morning of August 3. Furthermore, Grey refused the proposal of the German ambassador to respect Belgian t e r r i t o r y on condition that England remain 3 neutral i n the coming struggle. One of the: main reasons why B r i t a i n was drawn into the War was because she was so closely bound to France by written and verba.1 promises, so bound by relationships which the Foreign Of f i c e had created, that Grey f e l t England must take part i n any 4 war i n which French security was menaced by, German aggression. 1. Cited In Barnes, H.E., The Genesis of the World War, (New York. -1927), 453. See Scott, J . F i , Five Weeks, (New York,, 1927), chapter IX, for a study of B r i t i s h public opinion and the press, during the c r i s i s of July, 1914. 2. Grey to Bertie, August 2,1914; Gooch & Temperley, B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, ( c i t e d hereafter as B.D.), (London, 192.7), XI, No. 487,, p.274. Fay, S.B., The Origins of the World War,, (New York, 1932), I I , 540. 3. Grey to Goschen, August 1,, 1914, B.D., XI, No.448, p.261. 4. Loreburn, E a r l , How the War Came, (London,, 1919 j , 16. D -3-In h i s memoirs Grey represents himself as regarding the o b l i -gation to aid France as re s t i n g more upon the conviction of the 1 interests of England than upon the debt of honour to France. Doubtless both f a c t o r s played a part i n h i s decision,, but he f e l t the obligation to aid France so keenly that he has con-fessed that he would have resigned i f he had not been able to 2 bring England into the c o n f l i c t . E a r l Loreburn, i n h i s book, \"How. the War Camen, expresses England's p o s i t i o n i n August^ 1914, In t h i s ways When the most momentous decision of our- whole history had to be taken we were not free to decide. We entered upon a war to which we had heen commit-ted beforehand i n the dark, and Parliament found i t s e l f ; at two hours notice unable, had i t desired, to extricate us from t h i s f e a r f u l predicament. We went to war unprepared In a Hussian quarrel because we were t i e d to France.3 In the relationships between France and England as they existed In 1914 i s to be found the key to the understanding of B r i t a i n ' s r d l e i n the drama of July and August of that year. The roots from which these relationships grew reach back into the years before 1914. I t w i l l be necessary to go back over these years to discover what they were. Before the twentieth century England's t r a d i t i o n a l policy had for centuries been one of \"splendid isolation.*• By maintaining a cool detachment to continental entanglements she hoped to enjoy the balance of power i n Europe between the r i v a l 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I I , 15,, 33-35. 2„ Ibid., I,, 312. 3. Loreburn, op. c i t . , 17. groups, and thus make her own influence i n either scale decis-ive. It was only at times when some one power sought to become overwhelmingly strong, or threatened to endanger B r i t i s h con-t r o l of. the Channel, or her maritime or c o l o n i a l supremacy, that England intervened a c t i v e l y and decisively i n European 1 a f f a i r s . This was the basis for her p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n wars against Spain i n the sixteenth century, against Louis XIV i n the seventeenth century, and against Prance and Hapoleon i n the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At other times she had r i g i d l y excluded h e r s e l f from continental, complications ' and taken a p o s i t i o n of i s o l a t i o n . In the years following the Franco-Prussian War she s t i l l adhered to her t r a d i t i o n a l policy The forming of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e i n 1882 between Germany, Austria and I t a l y , even though i t destroyed to a great er degree than did the Treaty of Frankfort the European balance of power, did not lead England to depart from her established p o l i c y . She manifested l i t t l e concern at the news of the great p o l i t i c a l combine erected by the Iron Chancellor. Although the A l l i a n c e further assured Germany of f i r s t place i n Europe, Eng-land, her insular p o s i t i o n secured by her invulnerable f l e e t , and primarily a maritime and c o l o n i a l power, was i n no way frightened. She believed h e r s e l f safe from danger, especially since at that time Germany w,as showing no great inte r e s t i n an overseas, empire or in the building of a f l e e t . Bismarck could say t r u t h f u l l y * 1. Headlam-Morley, James, Studies i n Diplomatic History, (Lon-don, 1930), Chapter VI, part I I , England and the Low Countries, 156 f f . . -5-As regards England we are i n the happy s i t u a t i o n of having no c o n f l i c t of interests,, except com-mercial r i v a l r y and passing differences such as must always arise;, hut there i s nothing that can bring about a. war between two p a c i f i c and hard-working nations. •\"-But at the end of the nineteenth century B r i t a i n found i t necessary to reconsider her relationships to the Continent-al. Powers,; and i n the l i g h t of new factors i n the international sphere, to reconsider also the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of her foreign p o l i c y . Events of the previous years made such recon-sideration a necessity. By the l a s t decade of the century the forces of the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution which had come f i r s t to England had transformed the i n d u s t r i a l , commercial, and f i n a n c i a l l i f e of the Continent, Ho longer were the other Great Powers content to leave B r i t i s h supremacy i n the economic f i e l d unchallenged. Signs began to multiply of an imminent and widespread re v o l t against her h i t h e r t o unquestioned leadership. Since her supremacy mas held to be largely due to the \"favoured place i n the sun'* which she had won for h e r s e l f i n so many parts of the world, the rev o l t began to involve a f i e r c e struggle for such ''places i n the sun\" as were s t i l l l e f t open to occupation. This had far-reaching e f f e c t s on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y . . Hence-f o r t h the f i e l d to be covered by diplomacy in the conduct of International a f f a i r s , instead of being confined as i t had been since the Napoleonic Wars mainly to the Continent of Europe and the adjoining regions of Asia, extended rapidly, to every part of the globe. 1., Cited i n Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War 1870-1914, (New Haven, 1916),, 134, footnote. However detached. Britain, might he from the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of Europe, the protection of her imperial i n t e r e s t s and trade routes brought her into contact and often into c o l -l i s i o n with the c o l o n i a l aspirations of other Powers. Inter-national diplomacy s t i l l had i t s base i n Europe, and i t was s t i l l c h i e f l y preoccupied with the maintenance of the old European equilibrium, but i t s outposts now stretched to the remotesta parts of the earth, and every extension of European power beyond the seas was apt to react upon the delicate equi-poise of power i n Europe * Aa a res u l t B r i t a i n became involved i n dangerous controversies with France and Eussia, and while she continued f a i r l y f r i e n d l y towards-Germany there was some-times inevitable f r i c t i o n with that Power also. It was not u n t i l a f t e r the conclusion o f the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , when he became thoroughly assured of the safety of Germany's position i n Europe, that Bismarck consented to give h i s support to the demands of German i n d u s t r i a l i s t s for c o l o n i a l possessions. The next few years saw the German colony of South West A f r i c a established, German gains i n the Cameroons, and German advance Into Bast A f r i c a . I t i s true that at times the German ambitions brought temporary clouds over Anglo-German relations,, but generally speaking f r i e n d l y settlement of dis-putes was carried out. Although public opinion i n both count-r i e s was at times aroused over the clash of i n t e r e s t s , the re-la t i o n s of the two governments remained almost invariably f r i e n d -l y . Both Gladstone and Salisbury were well disposed.towards B e r l i n , and i n 1890; the l a t t e r concluded the important s e t t l e -ment of A f r i c a n disputes which exchanged Heligoland for 7-Zanzibar. But aft e r 1894 Anglo-German re l a t i o n s began to lose the f r i e n d l i n e s s of the days of Bismarck and of the opening years of William, I I . Further disputes over c o l o n i a l and east-ern questions arose to try the tempers of Downing Street and the Wilhelmstrasae. B r i t a i n took exception to the Franco-German treaty of March 1894 which dealt with French and German inter e s t s i n the Niger and Congo regions. Sim i l a r l y Germany took offense at the arrangements B r i t a i n concluded with King Leopold of Belgium over the Bahr-el-Ghazelle t e r r i t o r y of the Upper Nile and over t e r r i t o r y west of Lake Tanganyika. With France r e l a t i o n s became extremely strained over si m i l a r questions. Under Louis Philippe, Napoleon I I I and McMahon, France had taken over A s i a t i c and A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r y of which A l g e r i a was the most worthwhile. England had viewed these attempts at the reconstruction of a French empire with some alarm,, but her opposition became s t i l l stronger a f t e r 1880. After 1878, French Interests ceased to; be merely national?; she wished to make up f o r the disasters of 1870 i n so f a r as pos-s i b l e by acquiring an overseas empire. Bismarck, anxious to turn her interests from Europe, had encouraged her at the Con-gress of B e r l i n . Jules Ferry,, who became prime minister i n 1883, carried out a vigorous policy of acquiring overseas possessions. This era of French c o l o n i a l expansion opened up boundless v i s t a s of Anglo-French controversies. In June, 1884, Lord Lyons wrote from France t Generally speaking I am very unhappy about the grow-ing i l l - w i l l between France and England which exists on both sides of the Channel. It i s not, I suppose, that France has any deliberate intention of going to -8-war with us but the two nations come into contact i n every part of the globe. In every part of I t questions ari s e which, i n the.present state of f e e l i n g , excite mutual suspicion and i r r i t a t i o n . Who can say when and where, i n t h i s state of things,, some l o c a l events may not produce a serious quarrel, or some high-handed proceeding of some hot-headed o f f i c i a l s occasion an actual c o l l i s i o n . 1 A f r i c a was the main theatre of the struggle,but disputes took place i n many other parts of the world. The tension which arose out of the dispute over Slam i n 1893 brought the two countries to the verge of war. Furthermore, the weak pos i t i o n of B r i t a i n i n Egypt at the end of the century l e f t her open to the opposition of the Continental Bowers. Grey points out i n t h i s connection, when speaking of his f i r s t Foreign Office experiences i n the years 1892-95\", that as long as we assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the govern-ment of Egypt, the Capitulations were l i k e a noose around our neck, which any Great Power, having rights under the Capitulations could tighten at w i l l . 2 Both Germany and France had used t h i s \"noose* to gain con-cessions from Britain;; Germany i n connection with railway concessions i n Turkey, and France i n connection with the Siam 3 controversy. A l l the above factors combined to reveal how hollow was the phrase \"splendid i s o l a t i o n . \" As Grey says, \" i t was not isolation,, and i t mas f a r from splendid.\" Thus i s o l a t i o n i n 1. Lyons to Gr a n v i l l e , i n Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, L i f e of Lord G r a n v i l l e , (London,, 1905), I I , 333. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 11. 3., r b i d . , , I I . 4.. Ibid., 11. the opening h a l f of the l a s t decade of the century did not appear to he safe or comfortable. And with the passing of the years which brought the century to a close the main stream of in t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , as i t kept changing and eddying, he-came more turbulent for England. The Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e became an accomplished fact i n 1894, and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e had been renewed for s i x years i n 1891. Thus i n 1895 B r i t a i n found h e r s e l f outside the two groups. Furthermore, the actions of the Impulsive Kaiser led to a widening r i f t i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In the summer of 1895 he paid his annual v i s i t to Cowes, on t h i s occasion a most regrettable one. He annoyed the Committee of the Royal Yacht Squadron by c r i t i c i z i n g t h e i r handicaps. He annoyed Lord Salisbury by scolding him f o r being l a t e . He annoyed h i s uncle, the Prince of Wales, by h i s I r r i t a t i n g f a m i l i a r i t i e s and over-bearing ways. By such undeft touches he antagonized j u s t those c i r c l e s i n England which were p o l i t i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y the most 1 a u t h o r i t a t i v e . Not only, did the actions of the Kaiser lead to h o s t i l i t y , , but Germany's Interest In the Transvaal at this time further loosened the bonds between the two nations and strained them almost to a breaking point. In 1894 Germany had shown a protective int e r e s t i n the Transvaal. In 1895 th i s Interest had been confirmed and advertised by a series of high-ly indiscreet speeches between President Kruger and the German 2 consul at Praetoria. Qn January 3, 1896, the Kaiser, though 1. Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock,. (London,, 1930), 125. 2. Spender,, J.A.„ F i f t y Years of Europe, (London, 1933)» 158. -lO-he claims i n h i s Memoirs that i t was against his hetter judg-ment and that he was reluctantly persuaded to agree to i t hy his advisers, addressed the famous telegram to Eresident Kruger 1 to congratulate him upon the f a i l u r e of the Jameson Raid. The most profound indignation was aroused i n B r i t a i n at this action* \"The nation w i l l , never forget this telegram\" wrote the \"Morning 2 .. • Post.\" When Count Hatzfeldt i n London wrote to the Herman Foreign Office an January 4, he reported: A l l the English newspapers, with the exception of the \"Daily Mews\", describe the message as an act of unfriendliness towards England, and even the \"Standard\"' speaks out sharply about i t . This change i s . a l l the more s t r i k i n g , as, so f a r , the whale of the London press, with hardly an exception, decidedly blamed Dr. Jameson's action.3 On January 21 he wrote to t e l l Holstein of the English reaction In these words! It Is not a question of annoyance on the part of the Government, but of a deep-seated bitterness of f e e l i n g among the pu b l i c , which has shown i t -s e l f i n every way. I am assured that when the excitement was at i t s height, Germans i n the Cit y could hardly do any business with the Eng-l i s h , In the best known large Club3, such as the Turf, there was extreme bitterness j, I myself, 1. *T express my sincere congratulations that, supported by your people, without appealing for the help, of fr i e n d l y Powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic action against armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the Peace, and have thus been enabled to restore peace and safeguard the Independence of the country against attacks from outside.\" 1 (January 3, 1896). Cited i n Spender, op. c i t . , 160, footnote. 2. Cited i n Gooch, G. P., History of Modern Europe 1878-1919, (London, 1923), 220. •3. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , January 4, 1896, Dugdale, E. T. S., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, (London, 1930), I I , 389. • l i -re ceived many i n s u l t i n g and threatening l e t t e r s . I have no, doubt that the general f e e l i n g was such, that, i f the Government had l o s t i t s head or had wished for war for any reason, i t would have had the whole of public opinion behind i t \" . 1 The sending of the telegram w,as one of the most d i s -astrous errors of the Kaiser's early r e i g n . \"The r a i d was folly', 1 observed Salisbury to Eckardstein i n 18.99, \"but the 2 telegram was even more f o o l i s h . * And although the B r i t i s h and German governments were l a t e r to resume t h e i r friendly, i n t e r -course, the rash act was net forgotten i n England, while the German people were angered by the fury which the action of their 3 impulsive r u l e r provoked. Though A f r i c a was the source of the most acute d i f f e r -ences between Great B r i t a i n and Germany, there were other f i e l d s i n which the p o l i c i e s of the two powers clashed. In the Cretan c r i s i s of 1897 the support Germany gave to Turkey led to a f u r -ther estrangement with England. That same year she seized Kiao-chair i n the Shantung peninsula, and the Kaiser's speech i n con-nection with that seizure and his reference to the \"mailed f i s t \" added to> the i l l - f e e l i n g . It was during these years also that Germany began her naval programme which was to arouse l a t e r such grave fears In England. In June, 1897, Admiral T i r p i t z was 1. Hatzfeldt to Holstein, January 21, 1896, Bugdale, op. cit.,, II, 403-04. 2. Eckardstein,,. Baron von, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, (London, 1921), 85. 3. \"The outbreak of hatred, envy and rage which the Kruger telegram l e t loose In England against Germany contributed more than anything else to open the eyes of large sec-tions of the German people to an economic p o s i t i o n and the necessity for a f l e e t . \" Admiral T i r p i t z i n h i s Memoirs, ci t e d i n Spender, op. c i t . , 162. 12-appainted chief of. the German Admiralty;, i n November of that year he introduced the f i r s t navy b i l l which created the High Seas F l e e t . Meanwhile rel a t i o n s with France were even more un-f r i e n d l y . The French seizure of Tunis, the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of B i s e r t a , the convict settlement i n New. Caledonia, the occupa-t i o n of the New Hebrides, the r i v a l r y i n Nigeria,, the coercion i n Slam, the exclusion of B r i t i s h trade from Madagascar, the question of the Newfoundland f i s h e r i e s , the B r i t i s h occupation of Dongola, and above a l l , the. B r i t i s h occupation of E g y p t — a l l these thorny problems were continually; pricking the fingers of the diplomats i n Downing Street and the ^.uai d'Orsay, and caus-ing anxiety to the friends of peace on both sides of the Channel. The tension between the two governments and peoples reached a breaking-point over the Fashoda Incident i n the Upper Nile i n 18,98. Because It brought the two nations so very close to war, and yet marked a turning-point i n t h e i r relations, i t might be discussed In some d e t a i l . Ever since the evacuation -of the Egyptian Sudan and the tr a g i c death of Gordon i n 1885, England had been awaiting an opportunity to retrieve that area., Xh 1896 an expedition f o r i t s recovery was sent out under Kitchener. The b e l i e f that c o n t r o l of the Sudan was e s s e n t i a l to the s t a b i l i t y of the B r i t i s h regime i n Egypt, combined with the fear of French expansion i n central A f r i c a , had forced the 1 , government to action. But B r i t i s h control of the area was not 1. Giffen, E. B», Fashoda, (Chicago, 1930), 27-29 -13-to be uncontested, for a simultaneous attempt to reach the Up-per N i l e was being made by the French. Captain Marchand had crossed A f r i c a from west to east with a small expedition and succeeded i n reaching the Upper waters of the N i l e i n July . When Kitchener, a f t e r defeating the Mahdi at Omdurman, advanced further up the r i v e r , and arrived at Fashoda, he found the f o r t f l y i n g the French f l a g and occupied by Marchand and his small force. Neither of the two forces would r e t i r e ; they neither fought nor gave way; they l e f t the struggle to be fought out between London and P a r i s . The diplomatic tension which resulted from t h i s c r i s i s was acute i n the extreme. There seemed to be no possible com-promise between the claims of the two powers. Such a clash over the Sudan had been foreseen by the statesmen of both lands some years before. S i r Edward Grey, when holding the post of Under-Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s under Lord Rosebery, on being questioned i n the House of Commons on March 28, 1905, about the rumoured advance of the French upon the N i l e , had declared that a French advance into the N i l e V a l l e y \"would be an unfriendly 1 act and would be so viewed by England.\" This unequivocal stand was endorsed by the succeeding Salisbury administration. The Grey declaration had aroused anger and resentment i n the French Foreign O f f i c e - i t was warning France o f f a vast d i s t r i c t which belonged not to Great B r i t a i n , but to the Sultan of Turkey, and i t was accompanying a B r i t i s h claim by what amounted to 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 20. 1 a threat of war.., The day after, the declaration, as Grey says, \"there was 2 a row In Paris\", and i n the negotiations which followed, the French government p o l i t e l y hut firmly refused to recognize this new \"Monroe Doctrine\" in the K i l e V a l l e y . They proceeded on their way i n equatorial A f r i c a with the watchword \" f i r s t come, 3 f i r s t served.\" Thus, the purpose of the Marchand expedition to l i n k up. French possessions i n east and west A f r i c a hy control of the Upper K i l e was i n direct contravention of the Grey declar-a t i o n . Though France had declined to admit the v a l i d i t y of the , 4 pronouncement of. Greyi she was w e l l aware that she would have to reckon with the consequences o f ignoring Its veto. When the meeting of Kitchener and Marchand took place at Fashoda In 1898, a greater Issue was at stake than the clash of interests In Cent-r a l A f r i c a alone. The danger wa-s a l l the greater because France feared B r i t i s h ambitions i n Morocco which adjoined A l g e r i a , while i n the Far East and i n many parts of the world French and B r i t i s h r i v a l r y had been becoming p a r t i c u l a r l y acute during the years 1, In his Memoirs, Grey states the B r i t i s h claim i n the follow-ing words, \"The Soudan was s t i l l i n hands of the K h a l i f a . The claim of Egypt to i t , however had never been abandoned, though since the overthrow of Egyptian rule by the Mahdi i n 1886, i t was clear that the Soudan would never he reconquered \"by Egypt again, without B r i t i s h assistance, nor would the Soudanese again tolerate the purely Egyptian rule against which they had revolted. It was, at any rate, evident that no other power except Egypt, or someone acting on behalf of Egypt had any claim'whatever to the Soudan and the K i l e Valley.\" Grey, op. c i t . , I, 19. 2. I b i d . , 20. 3., Gooch, op. c i t . , 277; Diplomaticus, Fashoda and l o r d S a l i s -bury's Vindication, Fortnightly Review, LXIV, new s e r i e s , December, 1898. 4., Monson to Salisbury, September 18, 1898, B.D., I, No. 191, p.165 - l a -immediate ly preceding* Per a time i t seemed highly probable that the whole question of French and B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l antag-onism, and na t i o n a l bitterness would be s e t t l e d by the sword. A diplomatic contest began between the governments, while the press and public opinion In both countries grew more and more excited.. B r i t a i n would admit the claim of no other nation to the Mile Valley t, she had only one thing to say - the French must withdraw. On the other hand France did not admit the B r i t i s h claim;; and i t needed l i t t l e e f f o r t on the part of the Paris press to convince the nation that the rights and honour of France had- been outraged. The s i t u a t i o n did not admit of compromise;- one side or the other had to give way* Peace hung on, a thread. Lord Rosebery i n an address at Epsom stated that the: question was of supreme gr a v i t y . He said, I hope t h i s Incident w i l l be p a c i f i c a l l y s e t t l e d , but i t must be understood that there can be no com-promise of the rights of Egypt, Great B r i t a i n ha.3 been treated too much as a n e g l i g i b l e quantity i n recent years. Let other nations remember that c o r d i a l i t y can only r e s t on mutual respect f o r each other's r i g h t s , each other's t e r r i t o r i e s , and each other's flag.\" 1-An equally strong sentiment was expressed by Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, i n a speech at Tynemouths It would be a great calamity that a f t e r a peace of eighty years, during which I had hoped that unfriend-l y f e e l i n g had p r a c t i c a l l y disappeared, those f r i e n d -ly r e l a t i o n s should be disturbed. But there are worse e v i l s than war, and we s h a l l not shrink from anything that may come,2 I, Cited i n Gooch, op. c i t , , 293 2.. I b i d . , 293, Such-ominous utterances reveal the dangerous temper which the incident had evoked. During the negotiations the French Mediterranean f l e e t was ordered to Cherbourg, and at dead of night, with l i g h t s extinguished, passed Gibraltar. u.nperceived by B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . The mayors of the Channel ports were instructed to r e q u i s i t i o n the churches for h o s p i t a l work, and report on the beds and ambulance available to, f i t them for immediate service., A hundred m i l l i o n francs were spent i n a few days i n providing Cherbourg as a naval base with the necessary ammunition and stores. Orders to march were i n a l l the commanding o f f i c e r s 1 hands,: and everything was i n readiness for mobilization, i f the French Government should be confronted 1 with an ultimatum., English merchants i n Paris held new orders in suspense, and standing orders were not executed.. Business 2 was almost at a s t a n d s t i l l f o r a few days i n September. In Britain,, too, there was a f l u r r y of warlike preparation. The Mediterranean f l e e t was sent to Alexandria and Port Said to protect the Suez Canal and negative any idea of a French land-3 ing i n Egypt, and at Portsmouth there was a ferment of a c t i v i t y . In vain the French protested the superior claims of the B r i t i s h . Their case was based p r i n c i p a l l y on the f a c t that the country bordering on the White K i l e , though i t waa formerly under the government of Egypt, had become \"res n u l l i u s \" by i t s abandonment on the part of the Egyptian government}; and 1. Barclay, S i r Thomas, Thirty Tears Anglo-French Reminiscences, (London, 1914), 145.-46. 2., Giffen, op. c i t , , 67. 3., Barclay, op. c i t , , , 146. -17-that the French had a r i g h t to p o s i t i o n on the Nile as much as the Germans or the Belgians. Furthermore, i t was maintained. that the. French government, hy the reserves which they had made when the subject was mentioned i n previous years, had retained for themselves the right to occupy the banks of the K i l e when 1 they saw. f i t . In spite of French protests Salisbury and the B r i t i s h government made i t clear that there could be no a l t e r n a t i v e to French surrender but war.. The French minister f i n a l l y y ielded. Gn November 4, Baron de Courcel informed Salisbury that Fashoda would be evac-2 uated,. and on December 11 Marchand l e f t h i s post. France was not i n a p o s i t i o n to r i s k a war - her f l e e t was weak and B r i t a i n might e a s i l y have taken the whole of her c o l o n i a l empire. Fur-thermore, Russia had shown h e r s e l f unwilling to support her a l l y ' s p o l i c y i f i t involved war with B r i t a i n , which fact was a dash to 3 French hopes. Then too, i t was r e a l i z e d that to quarrel with B r i t a i n was to play into the hands of Germany, and to destroy any chances of ultimately recovering the Rhine provinces. As Delcasse' t o l d the French Chamber, s ra c o n f l i c t would have i n -4 volved s a c r i f i c e s disproportionate to the object.'•' within the following months negotiations were carried on between the two governments to determine the l i m i t s of zones of influence i n 1., Salisbury to: Monson, Oct. 6, 1898, B.D-, I, No. 203,, p.173. 2. Salisbury to Monson, Nov. 4, 1898., i b i d . , No. 227, p. 188. 3. G i f f e n , op. c i t . , 163. 4. I b i d . , 101 f f . . Charmes, Francis, Chronique de l a Ojjinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, November 14, 1898. - l a -the K i l e t e r r i t o r i e s . As a r e s u l t of these negotiations, by an agreement of March 21, 1899, a l i n e was l a i d out from a point where the French—Congolese boundary meets the Nile-Conga mater-o shed, northward along the crest of that watershed to 11 North Latitude;; thence i t was to follow i n general the old boundary of 1802 between Wadai and Darfur. The French Government promised to. acquire neither t e r r i t o r y nor p o l i t i c a l influence east of that l i n e ; and the B r i t i s h government promised to acquire neither 1 t e r r i t o r y nor p o l i t i c a l influence west of i t . In this way the very d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n was f i n a l l y s e t t l e d . But a legacy of extreme, bitterness waa l e f t on each side of the Channel, and Fashoda furnished one more evidence and warning that the per-sistence of i l l - w i l l between B r i t a i n and France would lead to Indefinite m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of provoking incidents, and i n the 2 long run to war. \" The B r i t i s h victory i n the Fashoda c r i s i s did not tend to ameliorate r e l a t i o n s with France. The l a t t e r very naturally smarted under defeat, while her b i t t e r feelings were i n t e n s i f i e d 3 by the anger aroused i n England over the Dreyfus a f f a i r . In France feelings of jealousy and hatred were constantly manifest-ed % the French journals r a i l e d a n g r i l y at Great B r i t a i n , and the attacks sometimes degenerated into purposeless s c u r r i l i t y , going so far- as to caricature Qjueen V i c t o r i a , ©ne of the leading journals of Paris exclaimed, \"we offered Lord Salisbury Fashoda 1» G l f f e n , op. c i t . , 90. 2. Grey, op» c i t . , I, 41. 3. Barclay, a.p> c i t . , 162. -19-1 and our friendship,, and he r e p l i e d that he only wanted Fashoda.\"' In such a manner i l l - w i l l and anger, were aroused on each side of the Channel—every old incident w,as raked up i n order to fan the flame of i r r i t a t i o n , every difference exaggerated to the utmost. It happened, moreover, that early i n 18.99, and j u s t he-fore the settlement of the negotiations following the evacuation of Fashoda, there broke out another controversial s q u a l l between the two powers. This dispute, which was almost the Fashoda i n -cident over again i n miniature, was brought about by a concession which France: gained from the Sultan of Muscat for. a coaling-s t a t i o n on the Eersian Gulf. When, the arrangement was made pub-l i c i n February, 1899, three B r i t i s h warships arrived on the scene to prevent the f u l f i l l i n g of the concession and the h o i s t -ing of the French f l a g . Under the threat of bombardment the Sultan withdrew h i s concession to the French, and the French had no recourse but vain protest. Thus, once again, France had attempted to dispute a B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i a l monopoly, and again her- claims had been met by the s o l i d f a c t of B r i t i s h predominance. Thus at the end of the century relations, between Great B r i t a i n and France could hardly have been worse, short of an actual c o n f l i c t of war. \"In England, France continued to be re-garded as the national enemy,, and the nineteenth century closed with Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s strained to the l i m i t , and with the hope of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n apparently excluded from the realm of 3 p o s s i b i l i t y . \" The future was of course hidden from both 1. Anon.,, \"\"France, Russia, and the Mile,\" Contemporary Review, December,.. 1898, 761. 2. G i f f e n , op. c i t . , 187. 3. Seymour, op. c i t . , 122. -20-peoples, and probably both, would have been incredulous over the idea of an entente within f i v e years, Yet from these unpromis-ing Incidents of 18.99 Prance and Great B r i t a i n were to advance steadily toward the convention of 1904. The. dangerous tension which had been developing over the period of years between Great B r i t a i n and the members of the Dual A l l i a n c e out of competing interests in. A s i a and A f r i c a , and which had culminated i n the incidents of Port Arthur and Fashoda, now gave a new d i r e c t i o n to B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , Nor, i n the l i g h t of events of the past few years, were rela t i o n s h i p s with Germany, at a l l reassuring. , As early as April,1898, the following words appeared i n \"The Contemporary Review\"2 to express the writer's views on the f a i l u r e of English foreign p o l i c y t We have not the goodwill of France and Russia, nor the a l l i a n c e of any other powers, nor yet the degree of strength i n i s o l a t i o n which would enable the government to vindicate our rights against any combination,.,.from whatever point of view there-fore we consider the foreign policy, of the present government we f i n d that i s unreal i n i t s supposit-ions, ruinous i n i t s r e s u l t s , and absolutely, un-worthy of the respect and confidence of those who put the Interests of the nation above the consid-erations of party.1 Another writer In the same review states, \"the present inter-n a t i o n a l complications cannot well pass o f f without England 2 having to make a momentous decision.\"' I f , however, there was. any f a i t h l e f t i n the hearts of 1. Anon,., The F a i l u r e of Our Foreign P o l i c y , The Contemporary Review, A p r i l , 1898, 464-67. 2. Anon., The Arch-Enemy of England, The Contemporary Iivlew, December, 1898, 90.8,. the people or th e i r r u l e r s i n the myth of the splendour of i s o l a t i o n , t h i s f a i t h was rudely d i s p e l l e d with the outbreak of the Boer War. In the words of Harold Nicolson, On October 11, 18.99, Great B r i t a i n declared war.upon the Transvaal* It was only then that the f u l l e ffects of Lord Salisbury's policy of i s o l a t i o n could be guaged. Great B r i t a i n woke up infamous.. B r i t i s h opinion was shocked to discover over-night how much we were d i s l i k e d . 1 During the War. a wave of a n t i - B r i t i s h f e e l i n g swept over the continenti press campaigns of the utmost virulence were directed against B r i t a i n i n almost every country. This was true of Prance e s p e c i a l l y , and when Kruger f l e d from h i s own country he was most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y received at Marseilles and P a r i s . The i s o l a t e d p o s i t i o n of th e i r country i n a world wear-ing so harsh a face began now to impress i t s e l f on the minds of B r i t i s h statesmen. In view of the f a c t that B r i t a i n had been clashing with every Great Power i n every part o;f the globe, they began to r e a l i z e that there was nothing of r e a l splendour i n isolation;, they began to doubt i f i t was safe, to f e e l that a continuation of such a p o l i c y might prove embarrassing and expensive, to question i f could be longer maintained. The only escape from the discomforts of i s o l a t i o n was a policy of mak-2 ing f r i e n d s . And i n choosing friends a choice had to be made between the Dual A l l i a n c e and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . I t i s i n -teresting to note that the path leading from i s o l a t i o n f i r s t chosen was not the path that was eventually pursued. 1. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 128. 2. Hammond, J . L., C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, (london, 1934) , .135.. -22-The story o.f England's foreign policy from th i s date onward i s that of the e f f o r t to f i n d security i n the face of new world conditions. The role most congenial to her, and most i n keeping with her past t r a d i t i o n s was that of r e f r a i n i n g from continental entanglements. But i t was now r e a l i z e d that she was no longer free to play that r o l e . The idea persisted i n England that Prance and Russia were s t i l l the t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s , i f not enemies, as they had heen a l l . through the nine-teenth century. Thus i t was that B r i t i s h preference f o r an a l l y , i f an a l l i a n c e became necessary, was f o r Germany. How-ever, i n spite of thi s f i r s t preference, events were to ar i s e which decided and Impelled B r i t a i n to make common cause with her t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s and supposed enemies against Germany. £t the very moment when re l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and Prance and Russia were most strained* B r i t i s h policy went through an extraordinary transformation, and as a re s u l t of that diplomatic revolution during the f i r s t years of the twentieth century a t o t a l l y new d i r e c t i o n was given to B r i t i s h f o r e i g n policy.. The character and scope of that change, which brought England to conclude conventions with the implacable foe, France, after- seeking the affections of Germany, forma the subject of the chapter which follows. CHAPTER I I The Anglo-French Entente CHAPTER I I The Angla.-Erench Entente. Having determined to abandon the policy of aloofness from continental a f f a i r s , t h e f i r s t choice of the B r i t i s h states-men of an a l l y was Germany. The Kruger telegram was neither forgotten nor forgiven i n England, but there had been no further attempt to in t e r f e r e i n South A f r i c a . Moreover, the support by the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e during the reconquest of the Sudan, and the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation on the B r i t i s h v i c t o r y of Atbara had proven most welcome at a time when Prance and Russia were proving most h o s t i l e . During the Boer War, while public opinion and the press i n Germany were undoubtedly most h o s t i l e to B r i t a i n , the German government took a stand of n e u t r a l i t y and declined'to j o i n Russia and Prance i n a plan of intervention on behalf of the Boers. Nor was the idea of an a l l i a n c e with Germany altogether new at t h i s time. During Bismarck's day various attempts at such an a l l i a n c e had been prosecuted from time to time, but 1 these had come to nothing. And again, as early as 1898 Mr. . Joseph Chamberlain had opened private negotiations with a s i m i l a r purpose i n view with Eckardstein, of the German embassy 1. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , (Cambridge, 1923), H I , 144-47. -24 In London, and Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador. Meetings were held at the home of A l f r e d Rothschild or of Eckardstein two, or three times a week where p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an a l l i a n c e were 1 discussed. Count Hatzfeldt informed Bulow of these private negotia-tions with Chamberlain i n a dispatch on March 29, 189,8, and the 3 l a t t e r r e p l i e d on March 30,. In h i s reply he thanked Chamberlain for his offers but pointed out what he considered to be the draw-backs to a. German a l l i a n c e with England. He f e l t that England wished the support of Germany so as to become stronger than her r i v a l s , and thus remove her from fear of attack, but he was a f r a i d that i f Germany should be attacked, she could not count on English support. Moreover, he expressed a doubt that i f the B r i t i s h government made an a l l i a n c e I t would not be maintained i f that government went out of power - he spoke of the English Parliamentary system as a back door by which England could es-cape from f u l f i l l i n g her treaty obligations. He considered the r i s k s f o r Germany i n such an a l l i a n c e too great and thus offered to Chamberlain's proposals a p o l i t e r e f u s a l . In spite of the f a i l u r e of these negotiations to bring material r e s u l t s , Chamberlain,; Hatzfeldt, and Eckardstein con-tinued to work f o r good understanding between the two countries, 1. J . L... Garvin i n h i s \"Life of Joseph Chamberlain,\" emphasizes the f a c t that the i n i t i a t i v e came from the German side. Garvin, J . L,,, L i f e of Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1934), III,, 225:. 2. Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign O f f i c e , March 29, 1898, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I I , 21-23. 3. Billow to Hatzfeldt, March 30, 18,98, i b i d . , 23-24. Garvin, op. cit.,, I l l , 261-62. 1 trying to bring about agreements i n lesser matters. On h i s side Chamberlain continued to hope for an a l l i a n c e and took the opportunity i n speeches^ to educate public opinion along 2 that l i n e . In spite.of Germany's f a i l u r e to take advantage of the offers made i n 18.9.8., new. overtures for the a l l i a n c e were made i n 1899.. In November of that year the Kaiser paid a v i s i t to Yftndsor. His v i s i t was a complete success, and a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between the courts a f t e r the eff e c t s of the Kruger telegram was brought about. But the v i s i t meant more than t h i s . Billow had accompanied the Kaiser, and Chamberlain,in conversation with the two, seized the opportunity to discuss with them the matter of ~ 3 an a l l i a n c e . In these conversations he seems to have gained 4 the impression that they were favourable to the idea. Then on November 30 he delivered a glowing speech at Leicester In which he statedt There i s something that every farseeing English statesman must have long desired, and that i s that we should not remain permanently Isolated on the continent of Europe, and I think that the moment that a s p i r a t i o n was formed i t must have appeared evident to everybody that the natural a l l i a n c e i s between ourselves and the Great German Empire.5 Chamberlain's speech aroused a storm of protest i n Germany. German opinion at t h i s time was decidedly pro-Boer 1. Garvin, op. cit . , . I l l , 267 ££. 2. His speech at Birmingham, May 13, 1898j ibid.,, 282-83. 3. Ibid., 498-506.. 4. Chamberlain's l e t t e r to Eckardstein; Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 130; Garvin, op. c i t . , I l l , 506, 510, 512, 514. 5. Garvin, op. c i t , , I I I , 506-08, -2.6-and a n t i - B r i t i s h , and the press denounced the idea of an asso-1 c i a t i o n with B r i t a i n . In view of t h i s h o s t i l e public opinion, Bulow did not have the courage, when speaking i n the Reichstag on December 11, to take up sympathetically Chamberlain's Leicester 2 . speech. Instead, he poured cold water on the proposal. This was accepted as a rude rebuff i n England, and Chamberlain natur-3 a l l y deeply resented such treatment. Thus once more the ef-f o r t s of the B r i t i s h statesmen were wrecked by the determination of Bulow and the Emperor to c l i n g to t h e i r p r i n c i p l e of a free hand.. It was, however, i n 1901 that the two countries reached a crossroads, and the f a i l u r e of the negotiations which opened early In that year and continued u n t i l December d e f i n i t e d l y de-cided the separate paths that the two countries were to follow In the years ahead. In the middle of January, Baron Eckardstein was v i s i t i n g at the home of the Duke of Devonshire at Chatsworth when Chamberlain was present. During t h i s v i s i t the Duke, Chamberlain, and Eckardstein discussed i n t e r n a t i o n a l questions and the future of Anglo—German r e l a t i o n s . In a conversation a f t e r dinner on January 16, the Duke and Chamberlain formulated d e f i n i t e l y their p o sition on t h i s l a t t e r question. Their state-ment was embodied i n a dispatch to the German Chancellor by Eckardstein a f t e r consultation with Hatzfeldt, and i n a more 4 modified form i n one to Holstein. It was reported that the 1. Garvin, op. c i t . , I l l , 508-09;- Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 133. 2. Garvin, op. cit.,, I l l , 511. 3.. Letter to Eckardstein, Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 151. Garvin, op. c i t . , I l l , 512-13. 4. Hatzfeldt to Bulow. and to Holstein, January 18, 1901, Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 185-187. -27-English leaders now r e a l i z e d that they must seek an a l l i a n c e and that the choice lay between the T r i p l e and Dual A l l i a n c e . In spite of the i n c l i n a t i o n s for a Russian a l l i a n c e on the part of some of the Cabinet, Chamberlain and his friends would work for an agreement with Germany. This, they expected, would be brought about gradually, and as a s t a r t i n g point they suggested an arrangement regarding Morocco.. But should an a l l i a n c e with Germany prove an impossibility they would turn to Russia. In Holstein's reply to Eckardstein of January 21. the former frowned upon the p o s s i b i l i t y of a rapprochement. He claimed that Germany would run too great a r i s k i n an a l l i a n c e with England, and concluded that If Germany was to stand sponsor for the B r i t i s h Empire she must extract at least an equivalent price f o r her services.. Moreover, he distrusted Salisbury and 1 complained that Germany had been often mistreated by him. While these negotiations were being carried on, the Kaiser made a hurried v i s i t to England to be present at the death bed of Queen V i c t o r i a . The warmth of f e e l i n g he displayed on this v i s i t made a deep impression on the Royal Family and on the whole public opinion i n England. On his a r r i v a l on January, 20, Eckardstein told him of h i s recent conversation with Chamberlain, and the Kaiser expressed complete agreement with the idea of an a l l i a n c e . Bulow, however, had urged caution In encouraging or discouraging the plan, fearing that eagerness on the part of Germany might diminish German gains. Thus, the 1. Holstein\" to Eckardstein, January 21, 1901, Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 187. -28-Kaiser avoided committing h i s government to any d e f i n i t e agree-ment while he encouraged f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . During the next few months negotiations continued, hut l i t t l e progress was made. Qn A p r i l 13 Lansdowne wrote the f o l -lowing to Lascelles regarding the negotiations! I doubt whether much w i l l come of the pro-j e c t . In p r i n c i p l e the idea i s good enough. But when each side comes, i f ever i t does, to formulate i t s terms, we s h a l l break down; and I know l o r d Salisbury regards the scheme, with to say the least, suspicion.^ B e r l i n i n s i s t e d on the necessity of England j o i n i n g the Tr i p l e A l l i a n c e , and of tr a n s f e r r i n g negotiations to Vienna. London,^ however, was most unwilling to undertake obligations towards Austria and It a l y , and was not sure that Parliament would sanction such a treaty. Salisbury from the beginning showed l i t t l e interest i n the plan for an a l l i a n c e . Time had not changed his b e l i e f that Isolation was England's wisest policy.. His memorandum of May 29, i n which he c r i t i c i z e d the draft of a proposed a l l i a n c e , remains a c l a s s i c on the subject of i s o l a t i o n , and of the sp e c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which beset a B r i t i s h government i n departing from 2 i t . Negotiations, however, did not entirely lapse. In Aug-urst, the Kaiser, i n conversation with King Edward and Lascelles at Hbmhurg, expressed disappointment that an a l l i a n c e had not 3 been concluded. Later, i n November and December the question was reopened. A memorandum of Lansdowne's of November 11 1. Lansdowne to Lascelles, A p r i l 13, 19Q1. B.D., I I , No. 81, p. 63. 2. Memorandum by Salisbury,. May 29, 1901, B.D., I I , No. 86, p. 68. 3. l a s c e l l e s to Lansdowne, August 25., 1901, i b i d . , No. 90, p. 73. -29-outlined the d i f f i c u l t i e s of an a l l i a n c e hut suggested that instead of dropping negotiations a general agreement might he 1 formulated regarding policy i n commercial i n t e r e s t s . Then on December 19, when Metternich, who had replaced Hatzfeldt as German ambassador, called on Lansdowne before leaving for B e r l i n for Christmas, the l a t t e r took the opportunity to refer to the negotiations which had been carried on throughout the year. He \"pointed out that England could not j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , but he wished to preserve f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with Germany,, and suggested a general commercial understanding be formulated. Metternich was sure that t h i s would not be accept-2 able i n place of an a l l i a n c e . Lascelles relates a conversation with Billow on December 28 i n which he t o l d the Chancellor of the above conversation. Metternich had not yet reported the interview to Bulow, and the l a t t e r was glad to hear Lansdowne's views. He expressed the hope that the question would not be 3 dropped altogether. Thus the negotiations gradually faded out i n p l a t i t u d -inous expressions of mutual goodwill and f r i e n d s h i p . The last weeks were rather embittered when Mr. Chamberlain and Count Bulow exchanged angry words about the comparative humanity of B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s In the Boer War and the Prussian soldiers i n 4 the Franco-Prussian War. In t h i s manner the curtain was rung 1. Memorandum by Lansdowne, November 11, 1901, B..D», I I , No.78, pp. 76-79. 2. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , December 19, 1901, i b i d . , No. 94, pp. 80-83. 3. L a s c e l l e s to Lansdowne, January 3, 1902,ibid., No. 95, pp. 83084. 4. Lee, S i r Sidney, King Edward VII, (London, 1927), I I , 132-33,137. -30-down on the f i n a l e f f o r t to l i n k the fortunes of Great B r i t a i n with those of Germany.. It was i n t h i s way that the wire, as Bismarck would have put i t , was cut between London and B e r l i n , and events began to move with tragic i n e v i t a b i l i t y towards a s i t u a t i o n i n which i t could not be repaired. Germany had f a i l e d to take up the Eng-l i s h o f f e r s . Bulow, Holstein, and the Kaiser had consistently taken the view that England needed Germany as an a l l y more than Germany needed England. The p o s s i b i l i t y , which Chamberlain had so often tendered, that England and Russia,, or England and Prance might come to terms, was characterized.as r i d i c u l o u s , and was considered as a mere \"bogey\" used as a threat to win a German a l l i a n c e . Thus they put t h e i r terms for a German agreement too high - a simple defensive a l l i a n c e would not do - England must 1 j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e - th e i r policy was \" a l l or nothing.\"* Brandenburg's simple summihg-trp of the whole s i t u a t i o n s t r i k e s the correct note with a hint of tragedy when he says, \"They had offered us their hand and had withdrawn i t when we made the con-d i t i o n s of acceptance too onerous for f u l f i l m e n t . They never 2 came back to us. They went instead to our enemies.\" These Anglo-German negotiations at the opening of the twentieth century which have been outlined at some length are important as showing perhaps the chief reason why England chose an a l l i a n c e with the members of the Dual A l l i a n c e i n 1904 and 1.907.. B r i t i s h ministers had a©w been s a t i s f i e d that i f security L. Few ton,. Lord, Lord Lansdowne, (London, 1929), 208. 2. Brandenburg, E r i c h , Prom Bismarck to the ¥/orld War, (London, 1927), 181. - 31 -could no longer be found in i s o l a t i o n i t was l e a s t of a l l to be sought i n an a l l i a n c e with Germany. The rebuff which their overtures had received, the feelings of animosity engendered by events of the past few years, along with the growing Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y , were a l l determining factors i n causing England to cast her vote i n f a y our of France and Russia against the Central Powers. However, before B r i t a i n took the f i r s t step i n this move by forming the Anglo-French Entente she found h e r s e l f a f r i e n d , not i n Europe, but i n the farthest East. The islan d of Japan, since she had been forced to open her doors to western trade, had transformed h e r s e l f i n an astonishingly short time into a power of the western model, mechanized and e f f i c i e n t . In view of the unrest i n the Far East which resulted i from the state of disi n t e g r a t i o n i n which China then found he r s e l f , and the scramble on the part of the Great Powers for concessions and t e r r i t o r y , Lord Lansdowne, on succeeding Lord Salisbury as Foreign Minister i n 1901, made i t h i s p o l i c y to pool B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s with those of Japan. Negotiations for an a l l i a n c e were concluded on January 30, 190S, when an agreement was signed i n London. Lord Lansdowne described the agreement as \"purely a measure of precaution, to be invoked should oocas-1 ion a r i s e , i n defense of Important B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . \" I t covered B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China, and Japanese i n t e r e s t s both i n China and Korea. Only i n the event of either party being attacked by more than one power did i t engage the other to come to i t s assistance. 1. Lansdowne to MacDonald, January 30,1902,B.D.II, No.124, pp.113-114. -32-But one of the chief r e s u l t s of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e was to show to the world that B r i t i s h i s o l a t i o n might not be so impenetrable as had been supposed. This thought became more and.more fixed i n the minds of the French statesman, who saw a further opportunity i n the growing coolness between 1 Germany and England. The idea of any bond unit i n g the common destinies of England and France at the opening of the new century might well have seemed fantastic when i t i s r e c a l l e d how strained the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries had been. But the Fashoda Incident has been c a l l e d , and not unwisely, \"the l a s t cloud i n an expiring storm.\" The Convention of March 21, 1899, had cleaned the slate so f a r as t e r r i t o r i a l claims of B r i t a i n and France i n Central A f r i c a were concerned. Not only that, but the smooth manner i n which the negotiations had been carried 9 out had brought into view, i n French minds at l e a s t , wider p o s s i b i l i t i e s of understanding and harmony. At the time when the March agreement was signed, M. Paul Cambon, who had succeeded the Baron de Courcel as French ambassador to London, suggested to Lord Salisbury that there were several other matters which might be s e t t l e d i n an equally f r i e n d l y s p i r i t . Salisbury, however, shook h i s head and smiled: ^1 have the greatest confid-ence i n M. Deloasse',\" he said, \"and also i n your present govern-ment. But i n a few months time they w i l l probably be overturned, and their successors w i l l do exactly the contrary. No, we must 1. Cambon to Del cas so', March 13,1903, Documents Diplomatiques Francais, (cited hereafter as D.D.F.), (Paris, 1931) ,2 e Se'rie, 'tome,III,No.137,p.184. - 33 -1 wait a b i t . \" This period of waiting was to la s t u n t i l 1904, but i n the i n t e r v a l many changes of great import bearing on the relationships of the two governments took place. In the f i r s t plaoe there was the widening o f the gu l f between England and Germany i n spi t e of the attempts to bring the two int o an agreement. And as these two d r i f t e d further apart, for various reasons warmer a i r s began to blow between England and France. The pe r s o n a l i t i e s of several new figures, who at this time appeared on the diplomatic stage i n both countries, were of tremendous importance i n determining the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Anglo-French r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . So long as men l i k e Hanotaux, a decided Anglophobe, and Salisbury, with his f a i t h i n i s o l a t i o n , were i n control of the Foreign O f f i c e s , such r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was out of the question. But with the coming to power of new figures a settlement of d i f f i c u l t i e s might be attempted. Deleasse's accession to power i n the French Foreign Of f i c e i n 1898 may be regarded as the f i r s t step i n the formation of the Entente. M. Delcasse took over h i s o f f i c e , succeeding M. Hano-taux, immediately before the Fashoda Incident. Thus he was too la t e to avert that c r i s i s , or to a l l e v i a t e immediately the hard feelings which res u l t e d . But the new dire c t i o n which French; foreign p o l i c y assumed under h i s guidance made Fashoda the l a s t of the incidents to se r i o u s l y endanger Franco-British r e l a t i o n s . He had entered the Foreign Office with the deliberate p o l i c y of making friends with B r i t a i n . On f i r s t coming to power he had 1. Cambon i n an interview i n the \"Times,\" December 22,1920; c i t e d i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y . 111,305. -34-expressed this wish to a fr i e n d saying, \"I do not wish to leave 1 this place without having concluded an entente with England.™ Through a l l the bitterness of a n t i - B r i t i s h rancour which seethed over France during the Fashoda c r i s i s and i n the succeeding years, and throughout those years when the English and German govern-ments were i n close association, M. Deleasse', who continued i n o f f i c e u n t i l 1905, held to h i s purpose and car r i e d i t through to splendid f u l f i l m e n t . The e f f o r t s of M. Deleasse were b r i l l i a n t l y seconded i n England by the ambassador he sent to London three months a f t e r h i s own accession to o f f i c e . M. Paul Cambon was eminently f i t t e d for the task of seeking the friendship of a successful antagonist without f o r f e i t i n g any of the dignity of h i s own country. Prudent and firm, pertinacious and adaptable, long-sighted yet t a c t f u l , and u n i t i n g charm of manner with strength of w i l l , he soon acquired l a s t i n g prestige i n England, and proved an i d e a l ambassador for carrying out the policy of h i s chief. Rebuffed by Salisbury i n his f i r s t overtures, he persisted i n advocating S on a l l occasions h i s cause. On the English side of the Channel new p e r s o n a l i t i e s were coming into control also, who, because they were l e s s bound than t h e i r predecessors by the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , were to play important roleB i n advancing 1. Berard, V i c t o r , La P o l i t i q u e F r a n c a i s , L a Revue de P a r i s , July 1,1905,817. Porter, C.W., The Career of Th^ophlle Deloasse\" (Philadelphia 1936),165. S. Cambon to Deleasse', March 13,1903, D.D.F.,2e S e r i e . I I I , H 0 i l 3 7,p.l85. -35-friendship with France. In October, 1900, l o r d Salisbury gave up the o f f i c e of Foreign Seoretaryw For f i f t e e n years, with the exception of one b r i e f i n t e r v a l , he had conducted B r i t i s h f oreign p o l i c y , and on the p r i n c i p l e that France was B r i t a i n * s national enemy. How he was succeeded by Lord Lansdowne, who proved a ready l i s t e n e r to the advances of Deloasse' and Cambon, and who a f t e r 1902, was encouraged i n this by the new prime minister, Mr. Balfour* In l i s t i n g the names of those who prepared the way for the Entente a place of prime Importance must be given to Edward VII. While h i s influence on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y during h i s reign has been greatly over estimated on the Continent, and i n Germany espec i a l l y , he did play a very happy part i n advancing friendship with Franoe. To him must go much of the credit for the successful termination of the negotiations whioh ended the old quarrels. Queen V i c t o r i a , who was noted f o r her German sympathies, and her i n a b i l i t y to understand the French, was sucoeeded i n 1901 by Edward VII. As the Prince of Wales he had travelled widely on the Continent; he had spent much time i n P a r i s , and on the R i v i e r a . He spoke French with perfect ease, had formed many warm attachments In France, and had a strong l i k i n g f o r the people. Ho small part i n the negotiations, when these a c t u a l l y began, was that taken by Lord Cromer, the B r i t i s h Agent and Consul-General i n Egypt. Knowing from his long experience i n Egyptian a f f a i r s the inconveniences and possible dangers of French opposition i n Egypt, he gave h i s strongest backing to the proposed Entente, and was most urgent that the newly -36-afforded opportunity f o r s e t t l i n g points of d i f f i c u l t y should 1 not be l o s t * On July 24, 1907, on the occasion of Lord Cromer's retirement, Lord Lansdowne stated stated i n the House of Lords that the Anglo-French Entente would hardly have been obtainable i n i t s e z i i s t i n g shape but for Lord Cromer's high authority 2 among foreign representatives i n Egypt* A writer i n \"the nineteenth Century\", looking back on the events whioh le d to the successful termination of negotiations for the agreement arrived at i n 1904,,stated t r u t h f u l l y , \"that i t has been brought to a p r a o t i o a l issue i s owing l a r g e l y to the tact of our sovereign, to the c o n c i l i a t o r y s p i r i t of Lord Lansdowne, to the statesmanship of Lord Cromer, to the diplom-a t i c a b i l i t y displayed by M. D e l c a s a n d by the French ambassador 3 i n London.\" These men i n positions of great authority were not alone i n th e i r desire f o r an Anglo-French understanding; they were warmly supported by a host of u n o f f i c i a l personages. The commercial i n t e r e s t s gave support to t h e i r e f f o r t s . England was France's most valuable customer, and French production competed only to a s l i g h t degree with that of England. It was believed i n commercial c i r c l e s that Anglo-French friendship would be of benefit to the industry of both lands. After 1900 i n f l u e n t i a l business men began a campaign f o r ameliorating the 1. Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17,1903, B.D.,11,Ho.359,pp.298-301; also h i s l e t t e r to Lansdowne, November 1,1903, c i t e d i n Newton, op.cit . , pp.283-84. 2. Lee, op.ci t . , I I , 218. 3. Blennerhassett, Rowland, England and France, The Nineteenth Century, June, 1904, 935. -37-r e l a t i o n s of the two countries. Among these u n o f f i c i a l ambassadors of goodwill was Mr. .{afterwards S i r Thomas) Barclay. As President of the B r i t i s h Chamber of Commerce i n Paris he was i n a p o s i t i o n to understand the advantages of an Anglo-French understanding. By long resldenoe i n Paris he had won for himself a d i s t i n c t place i n the l i f e of the French c a p i t a l , and i n spite of tiie soreness created by Fashoda, the Dreyfus A f f a i r , and the Boer War, he spared no e f f o r t to effect a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between France and England. It occurred to him that the cause would be helped i f the B r i t i s h Chambers of Commerce were i n v i t e d to meet i n P a r i s i n 1900. The approval of Salisbury and Delcasse' was secured, and the meeting was arranged, i t proved an encour-aging success and paved the way for many En g l i s h v i s i t o r s to attend the great P a r i s Exposition which was held i n that same year. These v i s i t s were followed by delegations of French Chambers of Commerce to England, and by exchanges of v i s i t s by members of Parliament and t h e i r wives. Though Kruger*s v i s i t to France followed s h o r t l y a f t e r , and though antl-English f e e l i n g by no means disappeared i n France, the seeds of goodwill had been sown, and the gross caricatures of Queen V i c t o r i a i n 1 the French papers disappeared. It has been shown how as early as 1899 Cambon had suggested to Salisbury that the two governments might come to an understanding on matters over which they d i f f e r e d , and how he had been told to \"wait a b i t \" on that occasion. No decisive advance was possible while Salisbury was In power and while 1. Barclay, S i r Thomas, Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminis-oenses, (London, 1914), for a f u l l account of these early endeavours to sow the seeds of goodwill. -38-the Boer War was i n progress. Deleasse' was moved to remark on one occasion to S i r Thomas Barclay that i t was hopeless to 1 try to c o n c i l i a t e England. The B r i t i s h Documents do not begin the story of the negotiations f o r the Entente before May, 1903, but there i s a hint of such negotiations i n the German Documents many months e a r l i e r . On January 30, 190S, Count Metternich, the German ambassador i n London, reported to the German Foreign Office that he had learned \" i n the s t r i c t e s t confidence that negotiat-ions had been proceeding between Chamberlain and the French ambassador for the settlement of a l l outstanding differences 2 between France and England on c o l o n i a l questions. 1* On February 3 he wrote to inform the Foreign O f f i c e that Lansdowne had denied to him that there had been any agreement reached with 3 France on c o l o n i a l questions. No doubt Lansdowne*s denial was correct; and i t may be true that he was unaware of the conversations whioh Chamberlain was holding with Cambon on this matter, f o r we have seen Chamberlain engaging i n private negotiations with the German ambassador i n his attempts to form an Anglo-German agreement. But i t was soon evident that negotiations with France were under way. There i s another hint of this i n an incident related by Eckardstein i n whioh he t e l l s of a conversation whioh took place between Chamberlain and Cambon. Re t e l l s of an o f f i c i a l 1. Bar d a y , op. c i t . , 210. 2. Metternich to the German Foreign O f f i c e , January 30, 1908, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 171. 3. Ibid., 172. -39-dinner on February 8, 1902, at Marlborough House which was attended by a l l the B r i t i s h and foreign ambassadors. After dinner he saw Chamberlain and Cambon go o f f into the b i l l i a r d room. n I watched them,\" he re l a t e s , \"and noted that they talked together for exactly twenty-eight minutes i n the most animated manner. I could not of course catch what they said, and only 1 heard two words, 'Morocco* and 'Egypt*.\" Further l i g h t i s thrown upon the sign i f i c a n c e of t h i s conversation by what Eckardstein t e l l s of a conversation he himself had with Chamberlain immediately following that which the l a t t e r had held with Cambon. \"As soon as the French Ambass-ador had l e f t Chamberlain I entered into conversation with the l a t t e r . He complained very much of the bad behaviour of the German press towards England and himself. He also referred to the Chancellor's speech i n the Reichstag and said: * l t i s not the f i r s t time that Count Bulow has thrown me over i n the Reichstag ( r e f e r r i n g to Bulow's public repudiation of the o f f e r of a l l i a n c e made i n Chamberlain's Leicester sppech of November 30, 1899). Now I have had enough of such treatment and there can be no more question of an association between Great B r i t a i n and Germany.'\" \"From that moment,\" Eckardstein goes on to say, \"I knew that Chamberlain was ready to adopt the a l t e r n a t i v e of an accession to the Dual A l l i a n c e which he had announced i n our conversation of January, 1901, at Chatsworth, as being the consequence of a f a i l u r e of an Anglo-German 2 negotiation.\" 1. Eckardstein, op. c i t . , 228. 2. Ibid., 228-29: supra 27. -49-I f any doubt remained i n the mind of Eckardstein about the truth of the impression he gained from his conversation with Chamberlain,it was d i s p e l l e d by a conversation he held l a t e r that same evening with King Edward. As the company was leaving, the King asked to see him i n h i s study. \"He was i n excellent humor,\" the German t e l l s us, and offered h i s guest a cigar and a whiskey and soda. After t a l k i n g of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e , and of how i t assured England's future i n the Far East, he went on to say, unfortunately I can't face the future with the same confidence as regards Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . You know of course what has happened of l a t e . . . . The renewed abuse of England i n the German press, and the unfriendly and sarcastic remarks of Bulow i n the Reiohstag have aroused so much resentment among my ministers and In public opinion that f o r a long time at least there cant be no more question of Great B r i t a i n and Germany working together i n any conceivable matter. We are being urged more strongly than ever by France to come to an agreement with her i n a l l c o l o n i a l disputes, and i t w i l l probably be best i n the end to make such a settlement. (1) The attitude of the B r i t i s h leaders to an Anglo-French understanding at this time i s shown by conversations which Cambon held with Lansdowne, King Edward, and the Prince of Wales. Lansdowne was more ready for discussion of such a project than Salisbury had been. Three weeks af t e r the incidents narrated above, Cambon mentioned to Lansdowne the conversation he had held with Salisbury i n 1899, and enumerated the questions on which he would l i k e to negotiate an agreement. \"He asked,\" r e l a t e s Cambon, \"whether he might make a note of them, but I said he need not trouble as I would write him a personal l e t t e r 1. Eokardstein, op. c i t . , 229-30. -41^ enumerating them. This I did, and ^ f o o l i s h l y - never kept a copy of i t . Next evening (sometime early i n 1902) there was a big dinner i n Buckingham Palace. I was placed next to King Edward, who said, 'Lansdowne has shown me your l e t t e r . I t i s excellent. We must go on. I have told the Prince of Wales about i t . You can discuss i t also with him.' A f t e r dinner the Prince of Wales, l a t e r King George V, spoke to me eagerly of the l e t t e r and said: 'What a good thing i t would be i f we could have a general agreement.' He wanted to know when i t would be concluded. I told him that we could not go quite so f a s t as he might wish, but that with patience and goodwill i t 1 ought to be possible.\" The e f f o r t s of the diplomats i n negotiating the under-standing between the two countries were greatly f a c i l i t a t e d by the v i s i t which King Edward paid to Paris i n the spring of 1903, when he made his f i r s t European tour as King of England. The general plan of h i s tour was a Mediterranean cruise i n h i s yacht, the \" V i c t o r i a and Albert,\" with a v i s i t to the King of Portugal, who had v i s i t e d England previously at the time of Queen V i c t o r i a ' s funeral and again i n November of 1902. He planned to pay a c a l l of courtesy on the King of I t a l y on the return journey overland, and to bring h i s tour to a close with a few days stay at P a r i s . This tour he decided on and planned on 2 h i s own i n i t i a t i v e . 1. Cambon's interview i n the \"Times,\" Beeember 22, 1908, c i t e d i n Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 218. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 221. -42-The ministry acquiesced i n the King's arrangements, but evinced no enthusiasm f o r the v i s i t to P a r i s , expressing doubt, i n view of the continued display of h o s t i l i t y to England i n the French press and among the French people, whether the King could count on a c o r d i a l or even re s p e c t f u l reception i n the French 1 c a p i t a l . When S i r Edward Monson, the B r i t i s h ambassador at P a r i s , was asked by Delcasse as to how the King wished to be received, the former, who was s l i g h t l y pesslmistio as to the wisdom of the proposed v i s i t , at once telegraphed for i n s t r u c t -ions to King Edward who answered that he wished to be received \"as o f f i c i a l l y as possible, and that the more honours that were 2 paid to Mm, the better i t would be.\" King Edward arrived at Paris on May 1. As the long procession drove from the Bois de Boulogne Station to the B r i t i s h Embassy, the crowd was by no means enthusiastic - for the most part i t was s u l l e n l y r e s p e c t f u l . Cries were heard of \"VI vent l e s Boers,\" \"Vive Marchand\" and \"Vive Fashoda,\" muoh to the discomfiture of the French o f f i c i a l s accompanying the King. He, however, was determinedly good-natured, s a l u t i n g to r i g h t and to l e f t , smiling whenever he was cheered. His suite was e s p e c i a l l y booed. Af t e r paying a v i s i t to the President of the Republic, he returned to the Embassy, and there, i n r e p l y to a deputation from the B r i t i s h Chamber of Commerce i n P a r i s , he delivered a speech which struck a personal note, and whioh, i n i t s warmth 1. l e e , op. c i t . , I I , 223. 2. Ibid., 223. -43-of utterance, did much to win over the people of P a r i s . In his speech he said: I t i s scarcely necessary to t e l l you with what sincere pleasure I fi n d myself onoe_more i n P a r i s , to which as you Know, I have paid very frequent v i s i t s -with ever increasing pleasure, and for which I f e e l an attachment f o r t i f i e d by so many happy and ineffaceable memories. The days of h o s t i l i t y between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries where prosperity i s more interdependent. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension i n the past; but that i s a l l happily over and forgotten. The friendship of the two countries i s my constant preoccupation,-and I count on you a l l , who enjoy French h o s p i t a l i t y i n th e i r magnificent c i t y , to ai d me to reach t h i s goal. (1). In the evening the King attended the Theatre Francais.. The house was f u l l , but his reoeption was decidedly c h i l l y . During the entr'acte he designedly l e f t h is loge to mix with the crowd, resolved to win i t over. In the lobby by chance he met B i l e . Jeanne Granier, an a r t i s t e whom he had seen act i n England. Holding out his hand, he said to her, \"Mademoiselle, I remember how I applauded you i n London. You personified 2 there a l l the grace, a l l the esprit of France.\" Again the King had found the right thing to say, and h i s bonhomie was beginning to make i t s e l f f e l t . Hext day there was a review at Vincennes, and a reception: at the H&tel de V i l l e . En route to Vincennes the cheering was stronger and warmer than on the day before. At the HStel de V i l l e the King spoke only b r i e f l y , but h i s words were most happily phrased and f u l l of ki n d l i n e s s : 1. Gifted i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 307. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 238. -44-\"I s h a l l never forget my v i s i t to your charming ci-ty; and. X .can assure you i t i s with the greatest of pleasure that I return each time to P a r i s , where I am treated exactly as i f I were at home.\" (1) In the afternoon he drove out to Longchamp to attend a race meeting s p e c i a l l y arranged by the Jockey Glub. In the evening there was a state banquet at the Elyse'e where the President and King exchanged professions of steadily growing friendship on behalf of t h e i r respective countries. In reply to M. Loubet, His Majesty said: n I am glad of this occasion, which w i l l strengthen the bonds of friendship and contribute to the friendship of our two countries i n their common in t e r e s t . Our great desire i s that we may march together i n the paths of c i v i l i z a t i o n and peace.\" (2) A gala performance took place at the Opera that evening, and other functions were arranged for the next day. On May 4 the King prepared to depart. The route to the Gare des Invalides, from which he was to leave, was l i n e d with an enthusiastic crowd, and whereas on his a r r i v a l there had been c r i e s of \"Vivent l e s Boers,\" there now was heard \"Vive Hotre Roi.\" The success of the v i s i t had exceeded a l l expectations, l a r g e l y owing to the King's personal charm of speech and manner, and his cheerful readiness to play a f u l l part i n a heavy programme of functions. Each day of his stay he had won public f e e l i n g more and more i n h i s favour. On every side were heard expressions of g r a t i f i c a t i o n that the King had renewed the t i e s of friendship which had bound him to France while he was yet 1. l e e , op. c i t . , I I , 839. 2. I b i d . , p.239. -45 Prince of Wales. There can be no doubt that h i s v i s i t did, much to terminate the acute stage of estrangement between the two countries, to promote an atmosphere of goodwill between them, and to give a great impetus to the movement towards an Anglo-French rapprochement. By hi s v i s i t King Edward secured 1 honourable mention among the arc h i t e c t s of the Entente C o r d i a l . \" Yet another step forward towards the Entente was taken two months l a t e r when on July 6 President Loubet paid King Edward a return v i s i t . This v i s i t was marked by the greatest c o r d i a l i t y . At a state dinner at Buckingham Palace M. Loubet declared i n speaking of his royal host, \"France preserves a precious memory of the v i s i t which you paid to P a r i s . I am sure that i t w i l l have the most happy r e s u l t s , and that i t w i l l greatly serve to maintain and bind s t i l l more , 2 c l o s e l y the r e l a t i o n s which e x i s t between our two countries.\" In return King Edward expressed the hope, \"that the welcome you have received today has convinced you of the true friendship, indeed I w i l l say the a f f e c t i o n , which my country f e e l s f o r 3 France.\" The toast of the Lord Mayor at the G-uildhall the next day was no l e s s c o r d i a l when he said: \"How we have shaken hands i n the firm intention of l e t t i n g no cloud obscure the path we have marked out, i s i t too much to hope that our statesmen w i l l f i n d means of removing forever the horrib l e p o s s i b i l i t y of a war between the two peoples who have so many common i n t e r e s t s , 1. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 308. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de l a Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 15, 1903, 469-76. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 154. 3. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 244. -46-1 and whose hopes and aspirations are the same?\" The whole v i s i t proved a spectacular success* On the President's departure, the King, in reply to his guest's farewell message, telegraphed the following reply which found a warm response on both sides of the Channel: \" I t i s my most ardent wish that the rapprochement between the two countries 8 may be lasting. 1\" By this v i s i t another step was taken along the path of amicable understanding between England and France. M. Belcasse' had accompanied the President on his v i s i t to England and had held conversations with Lord Lansdowne 3 i n which the general outlines of a treaty of amity were sketched. In August the complete problems were discussed i n d e t a i l by M. Cambon and the B r i t i s h foreign minister. By the beginning of September the negotiations had gone far enough to J u s t i f y Lord Lansdowne i n d r a f t i n g a co n f i d e n t i a l minute for the consideration of the Cabinet on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of reaching an understanding, with precise d e t a i l s as to how i t might be reasonably achieved. The f i r s t f r u i t s of the seeds of goodwill sown by the o f f i c i a l v i s i t s and by the negotiations which followed were gathered when a general treaty of a r b i t r a t i o n was signed on October 14, 1903. This convention was p r i m a r i l y the work of S i r Thomas Barclay and the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, both of whom had spared no e f f o r t i n arousing public opinion 1. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 308. 8. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 154. 3. Delcasse' to Cambon, July 21, 1903, D.D.F., 8 es, I I I , Ho.368, p.471; Hewton, op. c i t . , 879. -47-on both sides of the Channel i n i t s favour. In France, as a result of t h e i r e f f o r t s , the plan of such a convention was endorsed by the Chambers of Commerce of Bordeaux, Havre, Mars e i l l e s , L i l l e , Calais, Dunkirk, Toulouse, Lyons, Rouen, and other important business centres. Many municipal councils and peace s o c i e t i e s had passed resolutions favourable to i t s conclusion. Eminent j u r i s t s and writers had expressed themselves at one with the plan, and many leading newspapers had given i t hearty support. The proposal had also been taken up i n an encouraging manner i n England. Mr. Barclay had set f o r t h the plan at a meeting of members of Parliament held i n the House of Commons, and resolutions i n i t s favour were passed by Chambers 1 of Commerce a l l over the United Kingdom. In the agreement signed by the governments i n October i t was agreed to submit a l l differences of a J u r i d i c a l . order, p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g to d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n t e r -pretation of t r e a t i e s , provided that they did not affect the v i t a l interests nor the honour of the contracting P a r t i e s , to the Hague Tribunal. This a r b i t r a t i o n treaty connoted a perceptible improvement i n the r e l a t i o n s of the two countries, though i t had merely a theoretic value. True, i t removed no misunderstandings, but i t s adoption can be c i t e d as an interim manifesto of goodwill. On i t s being concluded M. Cambon wrote to Mr. Barclay, thanking him for the part he had played i n the making of the treaty. In h i s l e t t e r he said that the 1. Barclay's Thirty Years Anglo-Reminiscences gives an excellent account of t h i s work. -48-treaty was \"calculated to cut short a quantity of d a i l y d i f f i c u l t i e s and incidents of which one can never foresee the 1 consequences.\" With the signing of this agreement, along with the negotiations which had already taken place, the atmosphere had now cleared to such an extent that r e a l progress i n the s e t t l e -ment of controversial issues could be made. The two foreign ministerSj aided by M. Cambon,were busily engaged throughout the winter, and they proved that with goodwill on both sides even the thorniest problems could be solved. The task of reaohing an agreement was In no way easy -the many latent causes of dispute between the two countries were world-wide. At every turn the question of \"compensations\" turned up, \"oompensations\" which would j u s t i f y each minister i n the eyes of h i s government for the concessions and s a c r i f i c e s he himself had to y i e l d . But of a l l the problems the most formidable lay i n Morocco and Egypt. France had never f i n a l l y recognized the status of England i n Egypt, and her r e f u s a l would have enabled her at any time to reopen the whole Egyptian question, and even manufacture possibly a \"casus b e l l i \" whenever conditions might appear auspicious to an adventurous Cabinet. On the other hand, the Republic was known to have designs on Morocco to whioh England might, i f i t so suited her, take strong exception. The interests of the two powers i n Slam likewise b r i s t l e d with thorny points l i k e l y at any time to pr i c k national tempers. The f i s h i n g r i g h t s whioh the French claimed i n Newfoundland by vi r t u e of terms l a i d down i n the 1. Barclay, op. c i t . , 835. -49-Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 was another stumbling block to neighbourly r e l a t i o n s . These problems, along with questions of r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s i n West A f r i c a , Madagascar, and i n the Hew Hebrides, had a l l caused f r i c t i o n i n the past. 1 The negotiations conducted throughout the winter months f i n a l l y took p r a c t i c a l shape on A p r i l 8, 1904, when an agreement was signed by the two governments. This agreement was made up of three separate conventions - the f i r s t dealt with Anglo-French in t e r e s t s i n Newfoundland, and West and Central A f r i c a , the second with those i n Egypt and Morocoo, while a t h i r d dealt with those i n Slam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. The f i r s t agreement s e t t l e d the old Newfoundland dispute. France now renounced her exclusive r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s on the French Shore, and French fishermen were put on an equality with the B r i t i s h i n taking f i s h . In compensation B r i t a i n relinquished c e r t a i n t e r r i t o r i e s i n Western A f r i c a . The f r o n t i e r between the B r i t i s h colony of Gambia and the French Senegambia was modified to give France access to the r i v e r Gambia. The f r o n t i e r between B r i t i s h and French Nigeria was modified so as to give France a more accessible route to Lake Chad. The Los Islands commanding the c a p i t a l of French Guinea* Konakry, 1. On January 8, 1904, Lord Lansdowne was given a shock when Monson reported from Paris that Delcasse' had not oonsulted his colleagues i n the Cabinet even on the general question of the proposed accord; Newton, op . c i t . , 287-88. Even as l a t e as March 2, he had not taken the French Col o n i a l Minister into his confidence. This almost i n c r e d i b l e omission can be explained only by hi s extreme anxiety for secrecy, and f o r his desire to conduct the negotiations himself. So well entrenched i n his o f f i c e did he consider himself to be, he f e l t sure he could count on his personal prestige and influence to secure r a t i f i c a t i o n ; Newton, op. c i t . , 288-89; Porter, op.ext., 185. -50-1 were ceded to France* Of f a r greater importance was the Declaration respeot-2 ing Egypt and Morocco. Here again c r i t i c a l problems were solved s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by following the general p r i n c i p l e underlying the whole agreement,of surrendering claims i n one d i r e c t i o n i n return for compensation elsewhere. Both countries disclaimed any intention of a l t e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l status of either Egypt or Morocco. France undertook not to i n t e r f e r e i n any way with B r i t i s h action i n Egypt, nor to demand any time l i m i t to B r i t i s h occupation, recognizing the paramount i n t e r e s t s of B r i t a i n i n that oountry. In return, B r i t a i n , recognizing the paramount in t e r e s t s of France i n Morocco, gave France ent i r e l i b e r t y to intervene there for the purpose of maintaining peace, and a s s i s t i n g the r u l e r to carry out necessary administrative, economie, f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y reforms. Questions concerning the Egyptian debt were so s e t t l e d as to give the Egyptian government a free hand i n the disposal of the funds accumulated by the Caisse de l a Dette so long as payment of i n t e r e s t on the debt was assured. French schools were to enjoy the same l i b e r t i e s as formerly, and a l l r i g h t s enjoyed by the French through tr e a t i e s and customs were to be respected. Freedom of commerce was to be guaranteed f o r t h i r t y years, and Great B r i t a i n promised to insure the freedom of the Suez Canal. In Morocoo France agreed on freedom of commerce for t h i r t y years, 1. Convention between the United Kingdom and France respecting Newfoundland, West and Central A f r i c a , A p r i l 8, 1904, B.D., I I , 375-384. 2. Declaration between the united Kingdom and Franoe respecting Egypt and Morocoo, A p r i l 8, 1904, i b i d . , 385-98. 51-promlsed that there should be no f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on the northern ooast opposite Gibraltar, and undertook to conclude an agreement with Spain whereby the Anglo-French agreement might be f u l f i l l e d without encroaching on Spanish i n t e r e s t s . In conclusion the two governments agreed \"to a f f o r d one another diplomatic support i n order to obtain the execution of the clauses\" of the Declaration. In the t h i r d agreement the two signatories determined th e i r respective zones of influence i n Slam by mutual agreement. In Madagascar, B r i t a i n recognized the r i g h t of France to e s t a b l i s h customs against which she had protested since 1896. F i n a l l y , the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the New Hebrides a r i s i n g from disputes over land t i t l e s and the absence of j u r i s d i c t i o n over the natives 1 were referred to a commission. Along with the a r t i c l e s set f o r t h above, which were made public, Lord Lansdowne and M. Cambon signed secret a r t i c l e s whioh contemplated an eventual p a r t i t i o n of Morocco between 8 France and Spain should the state of Morocco disin t e g r a t e . When Spain adhered to the Anglo-French Agreement on October 3, 1904, and declared h e r s e l f \"firmly attached to the i n t e g r i t y of the Moorish empire under,the sovereignty of the Sultan,\" she signed a convention with France which frankly contemplated 3 p a r t i t i o n . This l a t t e r pact was sent by Cambon to Lansdowne 4 with the request that i t be kept secret. The secret a r t i c l e s 1. Declaration between the United Kingdom and France concerning Slam, Madagascar, and the Hew Hebrides, A p r i l 8, 1904, B.D., I I , 396-98. 8. Secret a r t i c l e s of the declaration respecting Egypt and Morocoa, B.D., I I , pp.398-95. 3. B.D., I I I , Ho.59, p.49. 4. Cambon to Lansdowne, October 6, 1904, i b i d , Ho.58, p.48. -52-of these two t r e a t i e s were not revealed to the public u n t i l 1 1911. The Agreement was received most c o r d i a l l y i n England, the vast majority of the public and leaders h a i l i n g i t as a great achievement. In the House of Commons opportunity was taken to express hearty s a t i s f a c t i o n . Staunch i m p e r i a l i s t s c r i t i c i z e d i t , however, and t h e i r papers voiced some protest. But i n the main i t was regarded as a step to secure general peace by clearing away misunderstandings and differences with the t r a d i t i o n a l enemy. One of the few leaders to r a i s e his voice against i t was Lord Rosebery, who declared, \"My mournful and supreme conviction i s that t h i s agreement i s much more 2 l i k e l y to lead to complications than to peace.** In France the general sentiment was decidedly favourable, but there was some strong opposition. The protests came mainly from reactionaries and n a t i o n a l i s t s who f e l t that France had been worsted i n the deal. I t was maintained that France had given more than she had received - the concessions i n A f r i c a did not make up f o r the loss of r i g h t s In Newfound-land - England had her positon i n Egypt while France had yet 1. It has been asserted by a German h i s t o r i a n , though without proof, that the German government i n some o f f i c i a l way speedily became informed of these secret a r t i c l e s , and saw i n them an evidence of h o s t i l e f e e l i n g . Gooch endorses t h i s assertion; Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 340. Fay claims that there i s no tangible proof that Germany was made aware of these secret dealings; op. c i t . , I, 164. 2. Cited i n C h u r c h i l l , W.S., The World C r i s i s , (New York, 1923), I, 15. ^53 to win hers i n Morocoo. In spite of these protests, the Chamber and the Senate supported M. Delcasse' and approved the agreement. One of the f a i r e s t estimates of the value of the Entente to the French i s found i n the Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, and the writer's views might well be applied to the English case also. He states: \" I t i s impossible f o r us indeed not to express some regrets with regard to Egypt, and some apprehensions on the subject of Morocoo. But th i s does not a l t e r our judgment on the t o t a l i t y of the arrangements concluded. How could such an agreement be worked out without reciprocal concessions?! We have yielded on some points, and some of these are c o s t l y . England has yielded also .... Above a l l the entente i s concluded. Nothing henceforth divides us; we can now enter i n on anew era where doubtless we have much to\": forget, but i n which we have also much to hope f o r . \" (1) In the l i g h t of future events i t might be well to note here the attitude of Germany i n the matter of the Entente of 1904. As early as March 23, 1904, Delcasse' had mentioned informally to Prinoe Radolin, of the German Embassy i n P a r i s , the negotiations for the proposed Anglo-French agreement. 2 Radolin had informed Bulow of this conversation, the f i r s t d e f i n i t e knowledge which Bulow had received of the impending agreement. Aside from this informal n o t i f i c a t i o n , and the fact that the public a r t i c l e s were soon a f t e r printed i n the newspapers, Germany was not o f f i c i a l l y n o t i f i e d of the text, nor formally consulted about the agreement, whioh involved i n 1. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de l a Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, 239. 2. von Radolin to Bulow, March 23, 1904, Dugdale, op. c i t . , 188 - 90. -54-1 a r e a l way her commercial and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco* In spite of these facts the attitude of o f f i c i a l Germany was at f i r s t f r i e n d l y . In answer to a question on the subject i n the Reichstag on A p r i l 12, Bulow cautiously stated that he could hardly say much because the English and French ministers had not explained i t p u b l i c l y . He went on to state: \"I can only say that we have no cause to imagine that the Treaty has a point against any other Power. It seems to be an attempt to remove a number of differences by peaceful methods. We have nothing from the standpoint of German i n t e r e s t s to object to i n that. As to Morocco, the kernel of the Treaty, we are interested i n the economic aspect. We have commercial i n t e r e s t s , which we must and s h a l l protect. We have, however, no ground to fear that they w i l l be overlooked or i n f r i n g e d . \" (2) The pan-German party f e l t Germany to be humiliated by the agreement and gave voice to i t s protests. The Kaiser, however, expressed no alarm, and on his v i s i t to K i e l i n June he informed King Edward that he had no objection to the Treaty, 3 and that Morocco had never interested him. But as events moved forward Germany was not to take just as l i g h t l y a view of the Agreement as was i n f e r r e d i n the Chancellor's speech. The next few months were to reveal a dramatic change of front at B e r l i n , and the forces which were set moving by this change of front were to make Morocco the storm centre of European p o l i t i c s , and this i n turn was to react upon Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s i n a most s i g n i f i c a n t manner. 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 178. 2. Gooch, op. c i t . , 350. 3. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , I I I , 338. -55-In t h i s then l i e s the importance of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 - England had plunged into the contentious a f f a i r s of the Continent. For years the casting vote of England had been the great prize sought by the European Powers, and how she would bestow i t , and whether i t would be bestowed at a l l , had been one of the great problems. Now i t had been cast i n favour of France. True, i n the Agreement of 1904 B r i t a i n had promised only \"diplomatic support\" to France i n ce r t a i n s p e c i f i e d problems, and there was nothing i n the secret a r t i c l e s to enlarge or strengthen that promise. I t - may well have seemed to the B r i t i s h leaders that i n pledging themselves to \"diplomatic support\" on certain c o l o n i a l questions that England was paying a small price f o r ridding herself of the chronic trouble and f r i c t i o n with France. But i f the forming of the Entente was an immense achievement, i t was not an unalloyed gain. The price of partnership w&fiaa Great Power i s entanglement i n i t s feuds. The following chapter w i l l show that the casting of the B r i t i s h vote on the side of France was to have serious implications i n the future. CHAPTER III The Testing of the Entente -56-CRAPTER III The Testing of the Entente The Anglo-Freneh Agreement within a few short months brought Morocoo, a country which hitherto had played a r e l a t i v e l y unimportant part i n world a f f a i r s , to the very forefront of international p o l i t i c s . I t was now to r i v a l Alsace-Lorraine as a point of discord between Prance and Germany, and to react i n a very r e a l way upon Anglo-German and Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s . To f i n d how this came about w i l l involve a somewhat detailed following of the events of the years 1904, 1905 and 1906. It has been charged against Germany that her sudden intervention i n Moroccan a f f a i r s early i n 1905 was due to her desire to break up the Dual A l l i a n c e , since at that time Russia was engaged i n war with Japan, and that she was seeking a pretext to force a war on France, while the Republic would be 1 without the aid of her a l l y . From a m i l i t a r y point of view that prospeot was undoubtedly e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y a t t r a c t i v e . General von Sohlieffen, the Chief of the German General S t a f f , declared to the Chancellor at this time that Russia could not possibly carry on two large wars, and at th.e same time added, \" I f the necessity of a war with France should present i t s e l f 1. Newton, Lord, op. c i t . , 340. Spender, J.A., F i f t y Years of Europe, (London, 1933), 341; Tardieu, Andre*, France and the A l l i a n c e s , (New York, 1908), 168f. -57-1 to us, the present moment would be undoubtedly favourable.\" In spite of the many who uphold this view, and of circumstances which are pointed to i n substantiation of i t , there i s no evidence i n the German documents to prove that the German Government 2 contemplated taking advantage of the s i t u a t i o n . It has been frequently maintained also that Germany was influenced by a keen desire to weaken the Anglo-French Entente - that she was motivated by the desire to drive a wedge 3 between England and France. Just to what extent this influenced German action i s not easy to decide. But this assumption also 4 seems to have l i t t l e foundation i n f a c t . The r e a l reason f o r the sudden intervention i n Morocoo would seem to have been l a r g e l y one of prestige, combined with the desire to safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of Germany i n 5 Morocco* Fearing that France might, as i n Tunis, take into her 1. S c h l i e f f e n to Bulow, A p r i l 20* 1904, c i t e d i n Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 209. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 185. Dickinson, G.L., The International Anarchy, (London, 1926), 125; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 209. 3. Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the Great War, (Hew York, 1916), 168-74; Grey, S i r Edward, Twenty-Five Years, (London,1925) I, 54; Lee, op.cit*, I I , 337. Spender, op. c i t . * 235. 4. Ewart, J.S., Roats and Causes of the War, (Hew York, 1932), I I , 751; Fabre-Luce, A l f r e d , La V l c t o i r e , (Paris,1924),118. Bourgeois, E., et Pages, 6., Les Origenes et l e s Respon-s a b i l i t e s de l a Grande Guerre, (Paris, 1922),307-09. 5. \"Germany,\" Billow had written on June 3, 1904,\" must object to the c o n t r o l over Morocco that France has i n view, not only f o r material reasons, but even more for considerations of prestige.\" Hote to Holstein, cited i n Renouvin, P., How the War Came, Foreign A f f a i r s , T i l , A p r i l , 1929, p.387. -58-hands a l l the administrative machinery of the government and put Morocco under her p o l i t i c a l and economic domination, and th i s i n spite of very r e a l German in t e r e s t s , Germany decided to act. There can be no doubt that Germany had a good case f o r complaint against the French action, as s h a l l be shown shortly. The d i f f i c u l t y was that i n spite of her legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n the p o l i c y which she adopted to defend her case lacked finesse. Her methods were blundering and her claims were asserted i n a blustering and arrogant manner. Her crude diplomacy and the amount of violence she expended i n the handling of her case aroused such resentment and fears that she defeated her own 1 purpose. In claiming a voice i n the settlement of Moroccan a f f a i r s i n 1905, Germany could r i g h t f u l l y point to substantial 2 eoonomio in t e r e s t s there. An equally important point, and one on which she based the l e g a l i t y of her claims, was that i n 1880 she had been one of the Signatory Powers to the Madrid Convention. This Treaty had been signed by twelve of the Powers who met with the Sultan 1s representative to determine the r i g h t s of foreigners i n Morocco. In 1890 she had signed a commercial treaty with Morocco i n which i t was declared \"that the subjects of the two p a r t i e s w i l l have the same r i g h t s and advantages as those which e x i s t , or may come to e x i s t , as 3 regards subjects of the most favoured nation.\" C l e a r l y Germany 1. Trevelyan, G.M_., Grey of Fallodon, (London, 1937), 125. 2. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 755-57; Barclay, op. o i t . , 276. 3. Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 757. -59-had a strong case when she asked to he considered i n Moroccan a f f a i r s . From time to time a f t e r 1890 Germany had displayed her i n t e r e s t i n Morocco. In 1899 the German ambassador and 1 Lord Salisbury had exchanged views on the future of Morocco. When the Kaiser made his v i s i t to England i n 1899 Chamberlain put forward the suggestion of a possible p a r t i t i o n between 2 England and Germany, but t h i s came to nothing. In 1900 Bulow had stated that Germany had interests i n Morocco and that as a r e s u l t she could not be i n d i f f e r e n t to the future of that 3 country. Again, i n 1901 when Chamberlain was proposing a possible agreement between England and Germany he favoured as a f i r s t step a secret agreement between the two countries 4 with reference to Morocco. Though nothing came of these proposals they do show that Morocco did have a place i n German diplomacy. In s p i t e of these very r e a l German inte r e s t s France had chosen to disregard Germany i n carrying out her Moroccan p o l i c y . As M. Pens' M i l l e t has said i n c r i t i c i z i n g t h i s grave blunder In French p o l i c y , \"With inc r e d i b l e blindness the Government took precautions with everybody except the only one of i t s neighbours whom i t had serious cause to fear.\" 1. B.D., I I , No.307, pp.256-57. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 146. 3. Anderson, E.N., The F i r s t MoroccanCrisis,(Chicago, 1930)64. 4. Supra 27. 5. Cited i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. cit.,111,340; Report of the Belgian Minister i n London June 8, 1905, Morel, E.D., Diplomacy Revealed, (London, 192 -60-By a treaty with I t a l y i n 19G0 France removed I t a l i a n opposition 1 by promising to allow her a free hand i n T r i p o l i . Negotiations with Spain f a i l e d i n 1902 owing to a change i n the government, but a f t e r the success of the Anglo-French Entente of A p r i l 1904, whioh assured France of B r i t i s h support i n Moroooo, an accord was made with Spain, as has been shown, on October 3 of that 2 year. France did not attempt to assure he r s e l f of German support or acquiescence of her Moroccan plans, nor did she, according to diplomatic usage, give o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n to the German Government of the Franco-British Declaration referred 3 to above. She chose to ignore Germany, and assured of B r i t i s h , Italian,and Spanish support, proceeded to carry out her own plans. 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 761-62. 2. Supra. 51 3. Bulow to the German ambassador i n Pa r i s , May 1, 1905: \"I t was conformable to international usage that France a f t e r the conclusion of the Anglo-French Accord concerning Morocoo, should communicate this Accord i n the customary form to a l l the interested p a r t i e s . M. Dele as se' has declared, i t i s true, that this communication had become superfluous by the fac t of the pub l i c a t i o n of the conven-t i o n i n the French Journal o f f i c i e l . The Minister w i l l not omit to notice however, that these two methods of n o t i f i c a t i o n possess a character e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t . The d i r e c t communication i s not a simple act of courtesy. The French Government, i n deciding to make i t , would have declared i t s e l f ready to enter into discussion with the persons to whom i t i s delivered with reference to their i n t e r e s t s , i n case they estimated them to be affected. Publication i n a French o f f i o i a l paper, on the contrary, places the other persons interested who have not been interrogated i n the presence simply of an accomplished f a c t . \" (Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 770;). -61 The Chancellor's Reichstag speech on A p r i l 18, 1904, was only a temporary acquiescence i n the Anglo-Frenoh Agreement, and an i n v i t a t i o n to France and B r i t a i n to consult Germany over Morocoo. The German Government i n truth l i k e d that Accord l e s s than the German people, even though i t knew nothing of the secret a r t i c l e s . Bulow, who p u b l i c l y proclaimed that the -agreement placed Germany i n no actual danger, admitted that \"doubtlessly both Powers (France and Great B r i t a i n ) win i n international influence and i n freedom of movement by th i s accord and by t h e i r rapprochement, and that the drawing force 1 of the Anglo-French Entente on I t a l y w i l l also be strengthened.\" The prospective l o s s of Morocoo to Germany,and the general d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n Germany over the conduct of foreign a f f a i r s , accentuated Bulow*s i l l - w i l l towards the agreement. To manifest i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n at being excluded from the Moroccan settlement and to force M. Deloasse' to come to an agreement with Germany on that question, the German Government f i r s t considered i n A p r i l the project of dispatching a warship to Tangier, ostensibly to s e t t l e c e r t a i n grievances 2 which Germany held against Morocoo at the time. The proposal was not acted upon at the time however. On May 81, the German Foreign O f f i c e telegraphed to Mentzingen that \"since a f o r c e f u l action could be e a s i l y misunderstood and lead to erroneous 1. Bulow to William I I , A p r i l 80, 1904; c i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 143. 8. Dr. Genthe, a German resident i n Morocoo, had been recently murdered by natives; a native employee of a German f i r m had been i l l e g a l l y imprisoned; and c e r t a i n indemnities from the Moroccan Government had to be c o l l e c t e d . See also Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 219. 1 conclusions about Germany policy 1* the ship would not be sent. It i s regretable that similar foresight was not adopted i n the spring of 1905. Bulow, however, had not made up his mind to r e l i n q u i s h German ambitions i n Morocco; he was determined to share i n the settlement of Moroccan a f f a i r s . In spite of the f a c t that the Kaiser himself had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n Morocco, and had disclaimed i n a conversation with the King of Spain at) Vigo on March 16, 1904, any interest i n t e r r i t o r i a l a c quisitions, but only i n the maintainance of the \"open door,\" Bulow held other views. It i s only f a i r to say of the Kaiser that i n these days he played no great part i n determining German Moroccan p o l i c y ; the motive force behind i t was Bulow. Late i n A p r i l , 1904, Bulow seized the opportunity to intervene In Moroccan a f f a i r s through Spain, with whose Government France was then negotiating f o r the l a t e r agreement. He gave every encouragement to Spain i n order that she might receive 2 better terms from the more powerful France. But i t was soon seen that Germany could derive l i t t l e p r o f i t from the Franco-Spanish negotiations. German grievances against Morocco meanwhile remained unsettled. German trading firms were demanding protection against monopolistic actions of the French. In June France had p r a c t i c a l l y gained control of the Sultan's finances. 1. Anderson, op. c i t . ,148. 2. Ibid., 152-53} Lansdowne to Lasc e l l e s , June 1, 1904, B.B., I I I , Ho.61, p.53. Renouvin, P i e r r e , La Crise Europe*enne et l a Grande Guerre, (Paris, 1934), 70. Nor had M. Delcasse up to t h i s time shown any i n c l i n a t i o n to open up negotiations with Germany. Already disgruntled at the French foreign minister, the German Government now came to f e e l i t s e l f s l i g h t e d and humiliated by this disregard. Its resistance towards h i s p o l i c y came to be concentrated upon the one grievance which could be best upheld i n the eyes of the public, that France was i n f r i n g i n g upon German economic int e r e s t s i n Morocoo. I t therefore began to adopt a more active p o l i c y . On June 3 the Belgian minister at B e r l i n informed the German Foreign O f f i c e that he suspected that there were secret a r t i c l e s i n the Anglo-French Accord concerning the Rhenish f r o n t i e r . Count Metternich, although he believed the Agreement did contain secret a r t i c l e s concerning Egypt, doubted the suspicions of the Belgian minister, but mentioned the rumor to Lord Lansdowne on June 19. The l a t t e r assured him that the Accord contained no a r t i c l e s whioh concerned European 1 complications. Nevertheless, Bulow r e a l i z e d that any attempt of Germany to i n t e r f e r e i n the Moroccan question would lead to far-reaching consequences, and would need caution; for this reason he sought to learn how the B r i t i s h Government regarded i t s obligations to France with respect to Morocco. With this i n mind,Metternich discussed the question of Morocco with Lord Lansdowne on August 15. Expressing fears of French monopolization i n Morocoo, he asked Lord Lansdowne, i n view of the danger to German economic i n t e r e s t s , how the B r i t i s h Government would interpret A r t i c l e IV of the Anglo-French 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 155. 64 Agreement, which a r t i c l e stated that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., were to be granted \"only on such condition as w i l l maintain int a c t the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public i n t e r e s t . \" He wished also to know how A r t i c l e IX pledging Great B r i t a i n to lend diplomatic support to France would be interpreted. Lord Lansdowne cautiously stated that he did not wish to express an opinion upon A r t i c l e IX i n a purely hypothetical case. He went on to say: \"We made no attempt to dispose of the r i g h t s of other Powers, although we made certain concessions i n respect of the rights and opportunities to which we were ourselves e n t i t l e d . I could at any rate say that i t was not at a l l probable that, i f any Third Power were to have occasion to uphold i t s treaty r i g h t s , we should use our influence i n derogation of them.\" (1) Metternich i n f e r r e d from th i s interview that the B r i t i s h Government would l i m i t the scope of A r t i c l e IX, and that i n case Germany's actions did not Infringe upon the Sultan's authority Germany would be quite safe i n opposing France i n Morocco. He reported, however, that Great B r i t a i n would oppose Germany seeking control of a harbour there* and warned h i s government that i f a t h i r d Power should dispute p o l i t i c a l l y the French p o s i t i o n that both the English people and the government would support France. Within these l i m i t s 2 Germany might carry out her Moroccan p o l i c y . Just previous to receiving this reply Bulow had proposed dispatching an ultimatum to the Sultan, demanding under threat of a naval demonstration that the outstanding 1. Lansdowne to Las c e l l e s , August 15 ,1904 ,B.D., I I I , Ho.62. 2. Anderson, op. c i t . , 156-7. -65-German claims be s a t i s f i e d w ithin three months. The Emperor, who remained s t e a d i l y opposed to active interference i n the S h e r i f l a n Empire, refused h i s consent to the plan, and nothing was done. But while no German action was taken during these months, f e e l i n g continued to smolder. The non-committal communications from the French Government with regard to the Franco-Spanish agreement i n October, along within the repeated p e t i t i o n s from German firms for defense of t h e i r interests augmented the bitterness against France. By the end of the year the Morocco question was s t i l l very much a l i v e . As the American vice-consul remarked to a leading Moor, \"Germany has not yet spoken, and u n t i l then we cannot believe that anything 1 definite.has been decided.\" Soon afterwards Germany put to one side her grievances with the Sultan and his government, and began to assume an attitude of f r i e n d l i n e s s . She began to encourage the Sultan to r e s i s t the \" T u n i s i f i c a t i o n \" programme which Belcasse' and the French Government were believed to be f o r c i n g on Morocco. On February I I , 1905, the French charge' at Tangier reported to Delcasse' an ominous communication received from JDihlmann, the German ambassador-; i n which the l a t t e r stated, After the Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 we supposed the French Government was waiting for the Franoo-Spanish agreement before putting us i n possession of the new s i t u a t i o n . But now that everything i s se t t l e d , we see that we have been systematically kept aloof. The Chancellor t e l l s me that the German Government 1. Cited i n Fay, op. c i t . , I, 181. 66-was ignorant of a l l the agreements concerning Morocco, and does not acknowledge himself bound to them i n any way. (1) Delcasse' complained to B e r l i n of this language, and reminded the German Government that he had answered Prince Radolin's enquiries of March 23, 1904, and stated that B e r l i n had asked for no explanations of the Agreement. The German Under-Secretary, von Muhlberg, who received the complaint, r e p l i e d that he knew nothing of Kuhlmann's declaration, but added that Germany was not bound by the Anglo-French or the 2 Franco-Spanish t r e a t i e s . France meanwhile had been proceeding with her p o l i c i e s i n Morocco. On January 11, 1905, the French minister at Tangier, M. Saint-Rene' T a i l l a n d i e r , had been ordered to Fez, the Moroccan c a p i t a l , to lay before the Sultan a programme of reforms consisting of a m i l i t a r y programme and a l i s t of rigorous demands dealing with finances, t a r i f f s and concessions for public works, i n a l l of which France was to act as a general adviser, in s t r u c t o r and regulator. I t has been alleged that the French Ambassador, i n carrying out his mission, sought to produce the impression that he was acting on behalf of a l l the Great Powers i n reorganizing the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l government 3 of Morocco. Germany was now convinced that very soon her 1. Gooch, G.P., History of Modern Europe, (London, 1923),351. Debidour, A., H i s t o i r e Diplomatique de l'Europe,(Paris,1920), 11,15. Paleologue, M., Uh Grand Tournant de l a P o l i t i q u e M0r»diale,(Paris,1934), 238-39. 2. Gooch, op. c i t . , 351 ; i Paleologue, op. c i t . , 242. 3. Deloasse denied t h i s charge; Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 768. It was denied-also by T a i l l a n d i e r , himself; Debidour, op. c i t . , I l ; ^ i 8 ; also i n Berard, V i c t o r , Le Livre jaune Sur Maroc, LaRevue de P a r i s , January 1,1906, 210. -67-economic a c t i v i t i e s i n Morocco would be at an end i f the French obtained t h e i r demands. Accordingly, Dr. Vessel was sent to Fez to inform the Sultan that Germany had not given her consent to the French programme. Bulow was careful to warn his agent, however, not to encourage the Sultan to expect German support i n a war with 1 France, but yet the Sultan was to be encouraged to r e s i s t the French demands. The Sultan decided to c a l l together an Assembly of Notables to examine what steps should be taken. 2 Kuhlmann approved t h i s step as a \" s k i l f u l anti-French move.\" In order to strengthen his hand against France, Bulow sought to win the support of President Roosevelt i n the Morocoan question. As Germany and United States had cooperated c o r d i a l l y i n preserving the \"open door\" i n China, Billow endeavoured to extend this e f f o r t to Morocco, and to win the United States to his side against France and B r i t a i n . On February 25 he i n v i t e d Roosevelt to unite with Germany i n advising the Sultan that the c a l l i n g of the Notables was a correct move i n f o r t i f y i n g h i s government and i n inaugurating reforms. Although not interested i n Morocoo, the President agreed to i n s t r u c t the American representative i n Tangier to keep i n close touch with h i s German colleague. This answer s a t i s f i e d the German Government, for they now f e l t assured of 3 Roosevelt's moral support. 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 183. 2. Ibid., 182. 3. Anderson, op. c i t . , 185. 0 68 On March 10 a note was sent to the Sultan stati n g , that although the German Government r e a l i z e d that his country must be reorganized, Germany hopes that the rumours of a prospective change i n e x i s t i n g conditions i n Morocco - equal r i g h t s and freedom for a l l nations - are unfounded; Germany would disapprove of such a change. Germany and the United States are favourably i n c l i n e d towards the maintenance of the present oonditions ..... the attitude of the other Powers i s not d e f i n i t e l y known. (1) Germany here showed her Btrong disapproval of the whole French action, and sought to augment Moroccan resistance without committing h e r s e l f to any d e f i n i t e p o l i c y . When speaking i n the Reichstag on March 15, the Chancellor intimated that Germany intended taking steps to defend her Moroccan i n t e r e s t s . He stated: I understand e n t i r e l y the a t t i t u d e which i s given here to events i n and around Morocco. I regard i t as a duty of the German Government to see that ..... our economic interests i n Morocco are not injured. (2) At this same time a most dramatic coup was being planned. Holstein has been charged as the moving s p i r i t behind 3 t h i s , but i n h i s memoirs Bulow takes unto himself the f u l l 4 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In the spring of 1905 the Kaiser was planning a t r i p i n the Mediterranean, and i t was now suggested that he use the opportunity to land at Tangier to v i s i t the Sultan. The Kaiser, i n keeping with his past p o l i c y with regard to 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 185. 8. Ibid., 186. 3. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 220; Paleclogue, op. c i t . , 289, Hamman, Otto, The World P o l i c y of Germany, 1890-1912, (London, 1927), 149. 4. Bulow, Prince von, Memoirs,(London,1931),II,107. Debidour blames the Kaiser; op. c i t . , I I , 17. -69-1 Morocco, had small i n c l i n a t i o n for this under talcing, but was persuaded by Billow to agree. In order to prevent the r u l e r changing h i s mind the Chancellor had the newspapers announce the forthcoming v i s i t . In answer to objections of the Kaiser, he wrote the same day, \"Your Majesty's v i s i t to Tangier w i l l . embarrass M. Deloasse, traverse his schemes, and further our business in t e r e s t s i n Morocco.\" A few days l a t e r he wrote; \"For apart from the f a c t that the systematic exclusion of a l l non-French merchants and promoters from Morocoo according to the example of Tunis would s i g n i f y an important economic l o s s for Germany, i t i s also a want of appreciation of our power when M. Delcasse has not considered i t worth the e f f o r t to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M. Delcasse' 3 has completely ignored us In this a f f a i r . \" The Emperor had agreed to the plan, but when he learned from the newspapers that the Tangier population was planning to exploit h i s v i s i t against the French,he wrote to Billow; \"Telegraph at once to Tangier that i t i s most doubtful whether I land, and that I am only t r a v e l l i n g incognito as a 4 t o u r i s t ; therefore no audiences, no receptions.\" The Chanoellor, however, pointed out that a public announcement of the v i s i t had already been made, and i f i t was now given up i t might appear that the plans had been changed owing to pressure from 1. Bulow, op. c i t . , I I , 106. 2. Bulow to the Emperor, March 20, 1905, Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 223. 3. Cited i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 187. 4. Cited i n Fay, op. c i t . , I, 183. -70-France. William again consented, though at Lisbon, and even at the l a s t moment i n the harbour at Tangier, he hesitated once 1 more. But he f i n a l l y yielded and carried out the programme others had arranged for him. It was on March 31 he landed to play his dramatic r o l e . The object of the v i s i t had been previously explained i n the Reichstag by Bulow on March 29, when he declared: A year ago the Kaiser told the King of Spain that Germany does not s t r i v e f o r t e r r i t o r y i n Morocco. It i s therefore useless to attribute to- the Tangier v i s i t any s e l f i s h purpose directed against i t s i n t e g r i t y or independence. No one who does not pursue an aggressive goal can fin d cause for apprehension. We have economic i n t e r e s t s , and i n Morocco, as i n China, i t i s to our interests to keep the open door. (2). Onethe Kaiser's a r r i v a l at Tangier there was a reception of the fo r e i g n diplomats at which the French charge d'affaires unexpectedly made a speech as i f he were welcoming the Kaiser to Morocco i n the name of France, stating that his government had no thought of i n f r i n g i n g upon the economic equality of other nations. The Kaiser r e p l i e d somewhat brusquely that he would deal d i r e c t l y with the Sultan as a ru l e r of an independent country and would secure s a t i s f a c t i o n for h i s own just claims, and expected that these would be 3 respected also by France. 1. Schoen to the German Foreign Office, March 31,1905, Pugdale, op. c i t . ,111,224. Ludwig, op. c i t . ,286-87 . 2. Cited i n Gooch, op. c i t . , 352. 3. Brandenburg, op.cit.,221; Anderson,op.cit.,194. See also Newton, op. c i t . , 332-33, who relates a conversation which the Kaiser had with Prince Louis of Battenburg on A p r i l 1 i n which-he unbosomed himself f r e e l y on the subject of his v i s i t i n his well-known s t y l e . This conversation was l a t e r reported to Lansdowne by King Edward. The Kaiser said: \"I went to Tangier for the -71-In an address to the German colony he s a i d , \"I am happy to salute the devoted pioneers of ..German industry and commerce who aid me i n my task of maintaining the i n t e r e s t s of the Fatherland i n a free country. The Empire has great and growing i n t e r e s t s i n Morocoo. Commerce can only progress i f a l l the Pbwers are considered to have equal r i g h t s under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and compatible with the independence of the country. My v i s i t i s a recognition of t h i s independence.\" (1) The theme of this address was further developed i n a speech delivered to the Sultan's uncle and Plenipotentiary. \"My v i s i t i s to show my resolve to do a l l i n my power to safeguard German in t e r e s t s i n Morocco. Considering the Sultan as absolutely f r e e , I wish to discuss \"with him the means to secure these i n t e r e s t s . As for the reforms he contemplates i t seems to me he should proceed with great caution.\" (2) The Kaiser's v i s i t and his speeches\"at Tangier created a sensation throughout Europe. What d i d Germany mean by this t h e a t r i c a l step? The r e a l object of the v i s i t was for the public at large shrouded i n mystery, and t h i s very n a t u r a l l y gave r i s e to the wildest of rumors. Bulow, himself, contributed to t h i s by h i s instructions to the Foreign O f f i c e on March 24 to give out no explanations whatsoever to foreign 3 diplomats should they make i n q u i r i e s , but to \"play the Sphinx.\" It was most commonly held i n Paris and i n London that Germany express purpose of t e l l i n g the French minister what my views were. I said, 'I know nothing of any agreement between France and Morocco. For me, the Sultan i s an independent sovereign. I am determined not to have a r e p e t i t i o n of what happened i n Tunis .... When the minister t r i e d to argue with me I said, \"Good morning,\" and l e f t him standing.'\" Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 340 -Paleolbgue mentions t h i s conversation, 279. 1. Cited i n Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , 111,339. 8. Ibid, 330. 3. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 222. -78-was seeking a quarrel with France, or was endeavouring to 1 destroy the Entente. As has been mentioned above, there i s no evidence to show that Germany was seeking such ends. The purpose of the German leaders seems to have been to uphold German prestige, to show that Germany was not w i l l i n g to be l e f t out where her inte r e s t s were concerned, to check French pentration i n Morocco u n t i l Germany's consent had been obtained or bought by means of concessions elsewhere. The French press had spoken openly of 8 se t t i n g up a second Tunis i n Morocco, and c e r t a i n l y French p o l i c y seemed to be tending i n that d i r e c t i o n . Germany believed, and not without reason, that unless she entered an emphatic protest, Morocoo would be e n t i r e l y l o s t to France. It i s Important to r e a l i z e that Delcasse' had not purchased Germany's assent to French p o l i c y . He had assured himself of the goodwill of I t a l y , Spain,and Great Britain,but he had t o t a l l y disregarded Germany as a factor i n Moroccan aff a i r s , d e e p i t e her great economic inte r e s t s there and her signing of the Madrid Treaty, and 3 despite the fact that of a l l Powers her pride was most se n s i t i v e . 1. Ewart, op. cllfc., 7,74, Supra. 57. 8. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c l t. ,111,339. 3. laniEflW Mr. G.P. Gooch censures Great B r i t a i n for her part i n disregarding German i n t e r e s t s . He states: \" I t i s regrettable that the B r i t i s h cabinet did not perceive - or at any rate d i d not help France to perceive - the wisdom of securing German consent by a \"solatium.\" Though the Secret Treaties of 1904 reserved no share f o r Great B r i t a i n i n the contingent p a r t i t i o n of Morocoo, and though It has been argued that i t was reasonable for the contracting pa r t i e s to make alternative arrangements i n the event of Morocoo c o l l a p s i n g from i n t e r n a l weakness, our share i n a transaction which suggested double-dealing involves the B r i t i s h Government i n p a r t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c r i s e s of 1905 and 1911.\" Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , I l l , 340. 73-Though the Tangier v i s i t was to bring about many unexpected and unhappy r e s u l t s i t d i d have the desired r e s u l t for Germany of making France aware that she could no longer disregard the Empire i n Morocoo. On Maroh 31, the day of the Kaiser's landing, Delcasse' declared i n the Senate: Nothing i n our Moroccan po l i c y /'nothing i n our execution of the accords of A p r i l 8, and October 3, 1904, can explain the movements of the German press .... You may legitemately hope that i n the western basin of the Mediterranean .... Franoe w i l l succeed, without ignoring any r i g h t , without i n j u r i n g any in t e r e s t , i n assuring her future. (I) At the same time he instructed M. Saint-Rene T a i l l a n d i e r , who was s t i l l carrying on his negotiations with the Sultan, to warn the monarch against following the proposals put forward i n the German press for an international conference to discuss Moroccan a a f f a i r s . He f e l t i t was wise also to now open up negotiations with B e r l i n for an understanding with regard to Morocco, and he made e f f o r t s to approach i n d i r e c t l y the German Government with this end i n view. On A p r i l 7 he stated p u b l i c l y i n the French Chamber that ''France was ready to dissipate any misunderstandings 3 whioh .... may s t i l l e x i s t . \" On A p r i l 13, while dining at the German Embassy, he repeated this o f f e r to Prince Radolin, and discussed with him French p o l i c y i n Morocco, pointing out that freedom of commerce for a l l nations was safeguarded i n the 4 agreements made with England and Spain. Immediately after, the 1. Cited i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 198. 2. Ibid., 198. 3. Ibid., 199. 4. Ibid., 199; Paleologue, op. c i t . , 290-91. -74-B r i t l s h Government was asked \"to help convince the Emperor 1 that German inte r e s t s were i n no way threatened\"ln Morocco. M. Delcasse was greatly handicapped i n carrying out h i s p o l i c i e s at this time because he did not have the l o y a l 2 support of either the public or of his government. The ff«Ssr; that he had blundered and aroused German enmity, the feac; of complications with might r e s u l t , along with, p o l i t i c a l jealousy, aroused by his long tenure of o f f i c e and a d i s l i k e of his secretiveness, a l l combined against him. He was attacked by a l l p arties as well as his colleagues; hardly a voice was raised i n h i s support. On A p r i l 22 he offered his resignation, but 3 reconsidered i t on the appeals of President loubet and Paul Cambon who was i n P a r i s . M. Rouvier half-heartedly supported the foreign minister, but assured the Chamber that i n future 4 he would personally supervise foreig n a f f a i r s . Thus public opinion forced an almost complete surrender i n the face of a German menace. I t remained, however, to be seen how far France would y i e l d before her desire for peace would c o n f l i c t with her national honour. I f the Kaiser's dramatic assertions at Tangier had forced Prance to reconsider her Moroccan p o l i c y , they also forced 1. Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , A p r i l 27,1905;B.D.,111,No.80,p.67, Hote (1). See also Ho.90,p.73, editor's note. 2. Hale, O.J.* Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, (Philadelphia, 1931), Chapter V. Pale'ologue, op.cl t . , 293, 296; Porter ,C.W.,The Career of Theophile Delcasse 7, (Philadelphia, 1936), 232-33. 3. Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 300; Porter, op. c i t . , 239^40. 4. Porter, op. c i t . , 239. -75-Germany now to take positive action i n that question. As Holstein said, n a re t r e a t would stand on the same l e v e l with 1 Olmutz and cause Fashoda to be forgotten.\" Bulow had now decided on the following p o l i c y : to continue denying any t e r r i t o r i a l amMtions i n Morocco, to demand economic equality f o r a l l nations, to i n s i s t upon an in t e r n a t i o n a l conference l i k e that at Madrid i n 1880 to discuss the whole question of 2 Moroccan reform. No separate negotiations with France would be considered. Had German p o l i c y with regard to Morocco not been so widely proclaimed to the world at Tangier, and i n so t h e a t r i c a l a fashion, there i s l i t t l e doubt that the German Government could have obtained compensations from France and set t l e d outstanding differences with the Republic. Delcasse' 3 was w i l l i n g to s e t t l e such differences, and Rouvier was l a t e r to o f f e r proposals to t h i s e f f e c t . Germany, however, i n s i s t e d always on the conference as the best means of s e t t l i n g the question. Bulow did not doubt that the proposal f o r a conference would be accepted, and that the conference on meeting would refuse to turn Morocco over to France. Writing to the Kaiser on A p r i l 14, he said: In case a conference meets, we are already certa i n of the diplomatic support of America i n favour of the open door .... Austria w i l l not quarrel with us over Morocco .... Russia i s busy with herself .... _. — g • •— 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 202. 2. Bulow to the Emperor, A p r i l 4, 1905, Dugdale, op.ci t . , I l l , 224. 3. Supra 73; Also, Lester to Lansdowne, A p r i l 21, 1905, B.D. I l l , No. 89, p.72; and Bertie to Lansdowne, A p r i l 27, 1905. Ibid, No.84, p.68. Renouvin, o p . c i t . , 71. -76-The English Government - between Roosevelt and those English groups whioh think as the \"Morning Post,\" \"Manchester Guardian\" and l o r d Rosebery(I) - w i l l not s t i r . Spain i s of no Importance, and also has a strong party i n favour of the status quo. We should c e r t a i n l y be able to hold I t a l y i n order .... I f Franee refuses the conference she w i l l put herself i n wrong towards a l l the Signatory Powers (2) and thereby w i l l give England, Spain and I t a l y a probably welcome excuse to withdraw. (3) On A p r i l 9 i t was decided to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat the e f f o r t s of the French mission under T a i l l a n d i e r , and to win the Sultan's approval of a conference. At the same time, by messages to the Sultan, Bulow sought to prevent him from making any decisions before the Count arrived. Bulow r e a l i z e d that i f the French succeeded i n gaining the Sultan's acceptance of t h e i r proposals for reforms the entire German po l i o y would be f r u s t r a t e d . On A p r i l IS, by means of a o i r c u l a r dispatch to the Signatory Powers of the Madrid Treaty, he explained Germany's stand and proposed the referenoe 4 of the whole question to an international conference. Meanwhile what was the B r i t i s h reaction to t h i s situation? Both the Government and the public believed that Germany was s t r i k i n g as much at Great B r i t a i n as at France i n 1. These three had c r i t i c i z e d the Anglo-French accord. 2. Referring to those Powers which had signed the Treaty of Madrid i n 1880. 3. Bulow to William I I , A p r i l 4, 1905, o i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . , 203. 4. For t h i s dispatch see Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 774-75. 77-In an e f f o r t to break the Entente. B r i t i s h f e e l i n g was well expressed by King Edward, who wrote indignantly on A p r i l 15 to Lord Lansdowne: The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for event which the German Emperor has ever engaged i n since he came to the throne. It was also a t h e a t r i c a l f i a s c o , and l f he thinks he has done himself good i n the eyes of the world he i s very much mistaken. He i s no more or le s s than a p o l i t i c a l \"enfant t e r r i b l e , 1 * and one can have no f a i t h i n any of h i s assurances. His own pleasure seems to wish to set every country by the ears. (1) The c r i t i c i s m by Lord Lansdowne was no less severe. In a l e t t e r to Lascelles on A p r i l 9 he wrote: I am a f r a i d that we can hardly regard this Tangier e b u l l i t i o n as an i s o l a t e d incident. There can be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by the Anglo-French Agreement, and probably even more so by our r e f u s a l to vamp up some agreement of the same kind with Germany over the Egyptian question. We s h a l l , I have l i t t l e doubt, f i n d that the Kaiser a v a i l s himself of every opportunity to put spokes i n our wheels, and convince those who are watching the progress of the game that he means to take an important part i n i t . My impression i s that the German Government have r e a l l y no cause for complaint either of us or the French i n regard to the Morocoo part of the Agreement. We made no secret of i t s existence. It dealt exclusively with French and B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco, and so far as the other Powers were concerned, i t provided adequate security for t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and f o r the i n t e g r i t y of Morocco i t s e l f . What else does the Kaiser want? (2) What was considered the threatening attitude of the Kaiser suggested to that a*dent s p i r i t , Admiral Fisher, a \"golden opportunity\" for making war on Germany. In a l e t t e r 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 340. 2. Cited i n Hewton, op. c i t . , 334. 76> to Lord Lansdowne on A p r i l 22 he a c t u a l l y undertook that i f i t came about, ftwe could have the German Fle e t , the K i e l Canal, 1 and Sohleswig-Holstein within a f o r t n i g h t . \" The B r i t i s h Government feared for a time that Germany was seeking a port i n Morocco, and was very anxious to cheek the r e a l i z a t i o n of such an objective. On A p r i l 22 Lord Lansdowne wrote to Bertie i n Paris with regard to this matter: It seems to me not u n l i k e l y that German Government may ask f o r a port on the Moorish coast. You are authorized to inform Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s that we should be prepared to j o i n French Government i n o f f e r i n g strong opposition to such a proposal and to beg that i f question i s raised French Government w i l l a f f o r d us a f u l l opportunity of conferring with them as to steps which might be taken to meet i t . German attitude i n this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having regard to M. Delcasse*s attitude, and we desire to give him a l l the support we can. (2) On A p r i l 24 Bertie communicated these views of Lord Lansdowne to M. Belcass^, but i n his draft of the communication he seems to have gone a l i t t l e further than d i d h i s chief, giving greater emphasis to the off e r of B r i t i s h support. The B r i t i s h Government f i n d s that the conduct of Germany i n the Moroccan question i s most unreasonable i n view of M. Delcasse'*s attitude, and i t desires to give hi s Excellency a l l the support i n i t s power. It seems not improbable that the German Government may ask f o r a port on the Moroccan coast. In that event the B r i t i s h Government would be w i l l i n g to j o i n the French Government i n o f f e r i n g strong opposition to such a proposal, and i t asks M. Delcasse', i n case the question i s raised, to give the British-Government f u l l opportunity to concert with the French Government upon the measures whioh might be taken to meet that demand. (3) 1. Cited i n Newton, op. c i t . , 334-5. 2. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , A p r i l 22, 1905, B.D.Ill,No.90,472-73. 3. Draft by B e r t i e , A p r i l 24,1905,Ibid,No.91,pp.73-74. -79-1 M. Delcasse' was\"very gr a t e f u l 1 1 for this o f f e r of B r i t i s h support. He denied that Germany had made a request for a Moroccan port, but promised.to communicate with the B r i t i s h Government i f such a request should be made, and to warn the Sultan against making any concessions to Germany. By the o f f e r of support from B r i t a i n Delcasse' f e l t encouraged to hold to his policy i n spite of Germany's opposition, and i n spite of the lack of support from h i s own people. He was hot supported, however, by h i s premier, M. Rouvier* who as we l l as being premier, had assumed a general 2 control over foreign p o l i c y since A p r i l . M. Rouvier was much more cautious than the daring Delcasse^ he was e s s e n t i a l l y a man of peace, and feared an open c o n f l i c t with Germany. Offers of B r i t i s h support did l i t t l e to quiet his fears, since he r e a l i z e d that the B r i t i s h navy \"did not have wheels.\" He now intervened personally i n the question to attempt a settlement with Germany. In conversations with Prince Radolin on A p r i l 26 and A p r i l 28 he stated that the idea of a conference was not acceptable to Prance. He suggested that i f B e r l i n was w i l l i n g , the purpose of the proposed conference might be served by sending a French c i r c u l a r note to a l l the Signatory Powers, and i f the majority of those Powers were opposed to French action i n Morocoo, i t would not be carried out. Again and again he endeavoured to learn what concessions Germany would ask for r e l i n q u i s h i n g her demand for a conference, and showed himself ready to enter into 1. Bertie to Lansdowne, A p r i l 26, 1905, D.D.,III,No.92, p.74 2. Supra. 74. 1 a general agreement concerning disputed c o l o n i a l question®. But since Germany had so widely proclaimed her disinterestedness i n Morocco she was not i n a position to negotiate for compen-sations. Moreover, i t would have meant now s a c r i f i c i n g the Sultan to the French, after having encouraged him to r e s i s t them. Thus Germany was forced to continue t r a v e l l i n g along the route on which she had set out. Meanwhile the German Government had sought the aid of the United States i n overcoming the resistance of France and B r i t a i n to the holding of the conference. It was f e l t that the attitude of B r i t a i n would be greatly influenced by that of the United States, and therefore Germany asked £ President Roosevelt on A p r i l 5 for his support. On A p r i l 85 x the German ambassador i n Washington again wrote the President,\" saying that the Emperor would be most gr a t e f u l i f he (Roosevelt) would intimate to England that he would l i k e to see England and 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , £18-819; Hamman, op. c i t . , 166; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 3£3. Ludwig, op. c i t . , 359. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that Bulow and Holstein concealed from William I I , M. Rouvier's o f f e r s of a dir e c t Franco-German agreement. They doubtless f e l t that he, who was no very sound supporter of t h e i r Morocoan p o l i c y , might aooept. In this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his probable attitude they were co r r e c t . Some years l a t e r when the Kaiser came to learn of M. Rouvier's o f f e r s and their r e j e c t i o n by Bulow, he wrote, \" I f I had been told about t h i s , I should have gone into i t thoroughly, and that i d i o t i c conference would never have taken place.\" See Hicolson, op. c i t . , 166. 8. Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, (Hew York, 1980), I, 468. Jusserand, J.J., What M e B e f e l l , (London, 1933), 314-15. We might note i n t h i s connection that the United States had signed the Madrid Convention of 1880. -81-1 Germany In harmony In t h e i r dealing with Morocco. 0 On May 13 another memorandum was sent to Roosevelt, i n s i s t i n g on the necessity of the conference and complaining 2 of English opposition. Again, on May 31 a third memorandum declared\"that England i s the only Power which opposes such a conference, though i t seems she w i l l drop her objections i n a case you should p a r t i c i p a t e i n the conference.\" Roosevelt's attitude can best be gathered from the l e t t e r he wrote to Taft, the acting Secretary of State. It contained the following: I do not f e e l that as a Government we should i n t e r f e r e i n the Morocoo matter. We have other f i s h to f r y , and we have no r e a l interest i n Morocoo. I do not care to take sides between Prance and Germany i n the matter. At the same time i f I can find out what Germany wants I s h a l l be glad to oblige her i f possible, and I am s i n c e r e l y anxious to bring about a better state of f e e l i n g between England and Germany. Each nation i s working i t s e l f up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. (4) In a l e t t e r to the German ambassador on the same date he r e i t e r a t e d that the United States had no d i r e c t interest i n Morocco, but offered to serve as a mediator between Germany and Great B r i t a i n - \"to sound the B r i t i s h Government 5 and f i n d out what i t s views are.\" 1. Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 469. 2. Ibid., 469. 3. Ibid., 471. 4. Ibid., 472. 5. Ibid., 474. 82-The B r i t i s h Government proved most unwilling to accept the mediation of the President and assured him through their ambassador that there was.no idea i n England of attacking 1 Germany or of a n t i c i p a t i n g a German attack on England. The German Government, however, was encouraged by the attitude of Roosevelt, f o r i t seemed to place the United States on the side of Germany. Distressed by the German rejections of French o f f e r s , and f e a r f u l of war, M. Rouvier went a step farther to meet Germany by o f f e r i n g at the end of A p r i l to get r i d of Delcasse', suggesting that i t could be done over some domestic d i f f i c u l t y 2 within the course of the next few weeks. In s p i t e of this o f f e r Germany proved unwilling to e f f e c t a d i r e c t settlement. Meanwhile, she was pressing Spain and I t a l y as well 3 as the United States for support. Then on May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived i n Fez to persuade the Sultan to r e s i s t the French demands. A few days l a t e r he reported that M. Delcasse' had instructed the French minister to issue a v e i l e d threat of violence against Morocoo should the Sultan agree to a 4 conference. Bulow thereupon warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcasse 7*s \"stormy and violent Moroccan p o l i c y . \" Pursuing 1. Durand lansdowne, A p r i l 26, 1905, B.D. I l l , Kb.82, pp.67-68. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 223. Porter, op. c i t . , p.242. Anderson, op. c i t . , S19. Bulow to German Foreign O f f i c e , May 5, 1905; Dugdale, op. c i t . , I l l , 227. 3. Hicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.87, p.70. Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905. Ibid., Ho.88, p.71. 4. Anderson, op. c i t . , 223; Bourgeois et Pages, op. c i t . , 309. The French minister, Saint Rene'-Tai Hand i e r denies t h i s charge - see his l e t t e r to Rouvier, June 15,1905, ci t e d i n \"Le L i v r e Jaune Sur Maroc,\" by Victor Berard, i n the La Revue de P a r i s , January I, 1906, 212. -83-th i s matter s t i l l further, the Chancellor instructed Herr von Miguel, councilor i n the German Embassy at Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but f i r m l y that Delcasse would have to go, and that Franco-German r e l a t i o n s would not improve as long as 1 he remained i n o f f i c e . On May 28 the Sultan rejected the French proposals and gave h i s approval to the holding of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference to discuss Morocoan a f f a i r s . Bulow then warned the French premier that since the Sultan had acquiesced i n the matter of German polioy Germany would \"follow up the consequences i f France continued the p o l i c y of intimidation and violence 2 hitherto pursued by Delcasse'.\" In this way the German Government was attempting to force the dismissal of the French foreign minister* But Delcasse', f e e l i n g sure of the support of Great B r i t a i n and of Russia, held out stubbornly against the proposed conference. To his colleagues, however, this p o l i c y seemed fraught with danger. The a i r was t h i c k with rumours of a German ultimatum, and with t a l k of French unpreparedness for war. At a meeting of the cabinet on June 6, M. Delcasse', 1. Anderson, op. c i t . , 224, Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 350. 2. The \"Gaulois\" published a r t i c l e s on June 9 and 17, 1905, asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarek had also been sent by the German Government to Paris about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcasse' must be dismissed. See Bourgeois et Pages, op. c i t . , 310; Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , 21; Fabre-Luce, op. c i t . , 119. Authorities seem to d i f f e r greatly on this point. Some doubt the truth of the facts as published by the \"Gaulois,\" and a t t r i b u t e the story to French j o u r n a l i s t i c imagination. See Fay, op. c i t . , I, 187, footnote; and Anderson, op. c i t . , 225, footnote. Hale claims that the words attributed to the Prince were merely opinions and rumours current i n Paris from June 6 to 17; op.cit., chapter VI. On the other hand, Porter, the biog-rapher of Delcasse*, suggests that the Prince was sent as a; -84-though aware of h i s i s o l a t i o n , stoutly defended h i s stand and hi s p o l i c y of the past few years. He claimed that i n an exchange of notes with Great B r i t a i n he had recently received an assurance of armed support i n the event of a German attack. Asserting the p o s s i b i l i t y of a formal a l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n , he urged the acceptance of her offer and the refusal of the idea of a conference. M. Rouvier and h i s oolleagues held, however, that the acceptance of the B r i t i s h o f f e r would mean ce r t a i n war with Germany, and f e l t that France should agree to the conference. Delcasse', a f t e r warning them that such a weak p o l i c y would only encourage German insolence, 1 resigned. The \" B r i t i s h o f f e r , \" on the strength of which the foreign minister was prepared to r i s k a Franco-German war, has remained somewhat of a puzzle to h i s t o r i a n s . In October of 1905 the \"Matin\" published a series of revelations concerning the f a l l of Delcasse'. These included the assertion, as coming from him, that he had been promised by the B r i t i s h Government, i n case of a German attack, that the B r i t i s h f l e e t would be mobilized to seize the K i e l Canal, and would land one hundred 2 thousand men i n Schleswig-Holstein. That such an o f f e r was ever made by, or on behalf of, the B r i t i s h Government was denied at the time by the Foreign O f f i c e , and B r i t i s h leaders have always since denied that any o f f e r of an a l l i a n c e or of emissary of the Kaiser without the consent of the German Foreign O f f i c e ; op. c i t . , 248-50. 1. Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , 22-24. Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 350-52; Porter, op. c i t . , 258-60. 2. Porter, op. c i t . , 262-63. 1 armed assistance was ever made to France. In the middle of May, 1905, M. Paul Cambon had complained to Lord Lansdowne of the attitude of the German Government. He stated that M. Delcasse regarded the s i t u a t i o n not as \"profoundly alarming,\" but as \" s u f f i c i e n t l y serious to occasion him much preoccupation.\" Lansdowne r e p l i e d that the moral to him seemed to be that each government (of France and of England) should continue to treat the other with the most absolute mutual confidence, that each should keep the other f u l l y informed of everything which came to i t s knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss i n advance any contingencies by which i n the course of events they should f i n d themselves 2 confronted. In an e f f o r t to avoid misunderstandings Lansdowne and Cambon exchanged notes to v e r i f y the above conversation. Cambon, i n his note dated May 24, referred to Lansdowne as having sa i d that .... i f the circumstances demanded i t , i f f o r example we had serious reason to expect an unprovoked aggression on the part of a c e r t a i n Power, the B r i t i s h Government would be ready to concert with the French Government on the measures to be taken. (3) 1. Asquith, H.H., The Genesis of the War, (London, 1923), 90. See the written assertion of Lord Sanderson, August 17, 1922, i n B.D.,III, No.105 (a), p.87, and the comment by Lord Lansdowne, A p r i l 4, 1927, Ho.105 (b), p.87. Lord Newton, the biographer of Lansdowne, states, \"there are no traces of any such undertaking i n Lord Lansdowne*s private papers.\" op. c i t . , 343. 2. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , May 17, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.94, p.76. D.D.F., 2 es.,VI, No.443, pp.522-23. 3. D.D.F., 2 e s, 71, NO.455, pp.538-39. 86-Landsowne, i n his note, dated May 25, sought to avoid suoh a broad commitment, and sai d i t was the B r i t i s h desire that there should be f u l l and c o n f i d e n t i a l discussion between the two Governments, not so much i n consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of another Power, as i n an t i c i p a t i o n of any complications to be apprehended during the somewhat 1 anxious period through which we are at present passing. In transmitting t h i s note to Delcasse, Cambon remarked that the wording had been c a r e f u l l y studied by the B r i t i s h Government and had the approval of the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, and that i t gave recognition of lansdowne*s willingness to discuss i n advance measures to be taken i n view of every contingency. According to the Ambassador's interpre-tation Lansdowne intended i t to apply not only i n the case of an unprovoked aggression, as i n the French version, but to every possible contingency. This would mean i f France acoepted the B r i t i s h proposal, she might be l e d into a general entente 2 which would be i n r e a l i t y an a l l i a n c e . Delcasse' and his advisers i n the diplomatic service seem to have given this broad interpretation to Lansdowne*s 3 note. Having received the B r i t i s h message and the comments of Cambon on May 30, Delcasse' at once telegraphed to the l a t t e r : 1. B.D.III, No.95, p.77; D.D.F. 2 es.VI, No.465,pp.558-559. 2. D.D.F. 2 es, vT,No.415, pp.557-558; Paleologue,op.cit.,p,346. 3. Maurois, op. c i t . , 176; Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , 352; Barrere, Camille, La Chute da Delcasse*, Revue des Deux Mondes, August 1, 1932, 616. -87-Say to Lord Lansdowne that I am also of the opinion that the two Governments should more than ever give eaoh other their entire confidence and that I am ready to examine with him a l l aspects of a s i t u a t i o n which does not f a i l to he a l i t t l e disq.uieting. , , (1) More than this had not been promised at the time. On June 12 however, La s c e l l e s , i n B e r l i n , informed Lord Lansdowne that Bulow had mentioned that the German Government had received information to the e f f e c t that B r i t a i n had made an o f f e r of a defensive and offensive a l l i a n c e to France. He reported to Lansdowne that he had told the Chancellor that he, personally, knew nothing of such an o f f e r , and that he greatly doubted i f any such o f f e r had been made. To t h i s , the Chancellor had r e p l i e d , that although his information was not o f f i c i a l , i t was of such a nature that he could not doubt i t s 2 accuracy. On the same date, i n another dispatch, L a s c e l l e s informed h i s chief that Holstein had mentioned the same matter 3 to him. On receipt of this news Lansdowne sent for the German ambassador i n London, Count Metternich, and told him that he could scarcely believe that the suggestion of such an a l l i a n c e was seriously made, or that that the story was worth contradicting. If , however, he stated, the ambassador thought that a contradiction would serve a useful purpose, he was glad to assure him that no such an a l l i a n c e had been offered or discussed by either 1. D.D.F., 2 s., 71, Ho.470,pp.563-64; minute by Hioolson, A p r i l 15, 1912, B.D., 71, Ho.576, pp.747-48. 2. Lascelles to Lansdowne,June 12,1905, B.D.III,No.97,pp.79-80. 3. Ibid., Ho.98, pp.80-81. - 8 8 -1 England or Prance. Thus i t would seem from the evidence outlined above that no a l l i a n c e was contracted. But there can be l i t t l e doubt that Delcasse seems to have been encouraged by the f r i e n d l y B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . He seems to have erred i n i n t e r -preting Lansdowne*s f r i e n d l y attitude as an assurance of a 2 B r i t i s h a l l i a n c e and armed support. It has been suggested that h i s mistakenly wide i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h i s matter may be explained by the p r o b a b i l i t y that King Edward, while on a v i s i t to P a r i s , intimated to him that i n case of need B r i t a i n 3 would intervene on the French side. It has been offered also as an explanation that the suggestion of armed support came from S i r Francis B e r t i e , who was c e r t a i n l y strongly pro-French 4 In h i s sympathies. Mr. Fay suggests that the idea of landing one hundred thousand men i n Sohleswig-Holstein originated perhaps with S i r John Fisher, for i t was the kind of strategy 5 he had often urged and commended, i t i s quite clear, however, 1. Lansdowne to Lasce l l e s , June 16, 1905 ,B.1B.'I:I1,, Ho.99, p.82 2. Swain, J.W., Beginning the Twentieth Century (Hew York, 1 9 3 3 ) , gives an i n t e r e s t i n g analysis of how Deloasse possibly made his error; 271. 3. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , I l l , 343, footnote. King Edward had v i s i t e d Paris on A p r i l 29, and on A p r i l 30 and May 3 he talked with M5- Delcasse. Lee, op. cit.., I I , 342; Paleologue, op. c i t . , 3 1 5 . 4. Dickinson, op; c i t . , 229. 5. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 198. This view i s supported also i n Wingfield-Stratford, Esme, Victorian Aftermath, (London, 1 9 3 3 ) , 228. -89-that Delcasse\" greatly exaggerated the nature of Lansdowne*s offers, whatever may have been the assurances received from other English proposals,in order to persuade his h e s i t a t i n g 1 colleagues to stand firm against Germany. There was keen disappointment i n England over the f a l l of the French foreign minister. Lord Lansdowne wrote to B e r t i e on June 12: Delcasse*s resignation, has, as you may well suppose, produced a very p a i n f u l impression here. What people say i s that i f one of our ministers had had a dead set made at him by a foreign Power, the country and the Government would not only have stood by him, but probably have supported him more vigorously than ever, whereas France has apparently thrown Delcasse overboard i n a p a n i c , Of comrse the r e s u l t i s that the Entente i s quoted at a much lower price than i t was a fortnight ago. (2) In a l e t t e r to a friend he wrote i n a similar vein when he said, \"The f a l l of Delcasse i s disgusting, and has sent the 3 Entente down any number of points i n the market.1* Mr. Balfour, expressed the same view when w r i t i n g to the King: Delcasse's dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German Government displayed a weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not be counted on as an e f f e c t i v e force i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i e s . She could no longer be trusted not to y i e l d to threats at the c r i t i c a l moment of a negotiation. (4) As Lord Newton says, i t was one of the most humiliating 5 incidents that had occurred i n France for many years, and since i t was commonly believed i n England that France had suffered this humiliation for having ventured to make friends with England, 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 199. 8. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12,1905,B.D.,III,No.152,p.119; Newton, op. c i t . , 341. 3. Newton, op. c i t . , 341. 4. Maurois, Andre, King Edward and His Times,(London,1933),178. 5. Newton, op. c i t . , 342. -90-i t was only to a lesser degree held to be a blow at England. Thus, while at the time the f a l l of Delcasse seemed a triumph for the German Government, the incident produced r e s u l t s quite unforeseen - i t made the Anglo-French Agreement closer and deeper. M. Delcasse*s biographer has pointed out i n this connection that i t quickly become apparent that the important p o l i c i e s of the f a l l e n minister were in no way mat e r i a l l y affected by his resignation. The p o l i c y of the entente was sound, and rested upon the common inte r e s t s of the Entente Powers, and this system was maintained. Furthermore, although Germany got r i d of Delcasse, she d i d not get r i d of the permanent s t a f f of the Qua! d'Orsay. Paleologue, a sincere admirer of Delcasse*s diplomacy remained there, and the foreign diplomats who shared his views were not removed. M. Barrere said to h i s B r i t i s h colleague i n Rome on June IS, 1908: .... that the leaders of French diplomacy, the two Cambons, Jusserand, and himself, were f i r m l y united i n sympathy for the policy of their l a t e Chief and considered that there was no cause for alarm; the French p o s i t i o n was a sound one in harmony with England and others. (1) This was made p a r t i c u l a r l y clear when Germany made the blunder of i n s i s t i n g that the humiliation of France shcmld be complete. Had she been content to stop when the f a l l of Delcasse was brought about, and taken advantage of that moment to c o n c i l i a t e M. Rouvier, she might have arrested the development of the Entente at that point, and thus l i m i t e d i t to the f r i e n d l y c o l o n i a l agreement which i t s authors intended i t to be. But 1. Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, B.D., I I I , Ho.123, p. 95. -91-the German diplomats wished to take a l l the trioks i n the game; as i n so many oases they f a i l e d to seize the favourable moment. Before the end of the year the continuance of German pressure and threats had thrown France and Great B r i t a i n closer together, and given the Entente the weight and significance i t was to hold u n t i l the outbreak of the Great War. The f a l l of Delcasse might be taken to mark the close of the f i r s t stage of the Morocco C r i s i s of 1905-1906. Germany had thus far gained her objectives - the Sultan had accepted the plan of a Conference-, and M. Delcasse*s f a l l had been secured. But so many complications had been aroused that the c r i s i s continued just as acutely after that event as before. M. Deloasse's resignation did not r e l i e v e the tension as M. 2 Rouvier had hoped. There followed weeks of d i f f i c u l t negotiations with Germany before the two governments could agree on a formula estab l i s h i n g a basis on which the conference should meet. On June 11 M. Rouvier explained h i s position to the German ambassador as follows: 1. The views of l o r d Bertie on the f a l l of Delcasse are of i n t e r e s t . He says, \"Delcasse would have f a l l e n even i f Germany had not been menacing, but he might not have f a l l e n so soon. His elimination from the Cabinet was i n great part due to his treatment of h i s colleagues. He did not keep them informed of what he did and proposed to do. He had got to consider himself indispensable .... Several of h i s chers collegues d i s l i k e d him and i t ended i n h i s being put aside. The German Government took advantage of the f e e l i n g that a scapegoat should be found. They spent money and spread about that Delcasse*s mismanagement was the sole cause of the misunderstanding, and they so assisted i n bringing about h i s f a l l . \" Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15,1905,Hewton, op. c i t . , p.341. 2. Lansdowne to Bertie,July 12,1905,B.D.,III,Ho.l5B, p.119 Paleologue, op. c i t . , 359-360. -92-I d i s l i k e a conference, but i f I accept there must be a preliminary understanding. Yet i f that i s secured a conference i s needless. We have no i n t e r e s t i n i n f r i n g i n g the sovereignty or i n t e g r i t y of Morocoo, but our common f r o n t i e r of 1,200 kilometres makes us the party most concerned i n law and order. You seem resolved to block a l l our proposals, and we cannot accept a conference where that would happen. We must therefore, f i r s t know how Germany regards reforms. (1) Germany i n s i s t e d on the other hand that she could discuss the programme only when France agreed to accept the 2 conference. Meanwhile B r i t a i n supported the French stand most vigorously - Rouvier was assured of the entire support of the B r i t i s h Government. On June 16 Lansdowne remarked to Paul Cambon, who was leaving London f o r Paris to advise M. Rouvier, that he saw nothing to be gained, by admitting the theoretical necessity of a Conference; except perhaps to enable Germany which had brought about M. Deleasse's downfall, to secure a further success. Our attitude must of course depend upon that of the French Government, but i f they maintained th e i r r e f u s a l , so most c e r t a i n l y should we. (3) Without accepting or r e j e c t i n g the idea of a conference M. Rouvier endeavoured to dissipate a l l misunderstandings with Germany, and i n v i t e d the l a t t e r to negotiate further i n order 4 to make unnecessary the proposed gathering. The German reaction was exceedingly h o s t i l e ; the Government did not hesitate to use 1. Cited i n Gooch, op. c i t . , 357-58; Pale'ologue, op. cit.,359-60. 2. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 365 3. Lansdowne to B e r t i e , June 16, 1905, B . D . i l l l , No.124, p.97. 4. Gooch, op. c i t . , p.358. See Victor Berard, L i v r e Jaune Sur Maroo, loo. c i t . , 213-214. -93-threats to bring France to terms. The French.Ambassador in B e r l i n reported that i n a conversation with the Chancellor on June S3 the l a t t e r emphasized \"the necessity not to l e t this question mauvaise, tres mauvaise, drag on, and not to l i n g e r on a road horde de precipices et meme d'abimes.\" At the same time the German representatives i n Rome and Madrid were using violent language to win I t a l y and Spain to the German side. While these negotiations were being carried on, Germany was seeking also further support from President Roosevelt. In asking h i s mediation i n the dispute i t was proposed that he should suggest to Paris and London that the United States considered a conference the best means of 3 bringing the Moroccan question to a peaceful solution. Mr. Roosevelt did take up the task of mediation, and working through the French and German ambassadors i n Washington, Jusserand and Sternburg, he played a valuable part i n securing .. the assent of the French government to the holding oT xthe 4' proposed conference. 1. Debidour, op. c i t . , I I , £7. Berard, L i v r e Jaune Sur MaroOjloc c i t . , S14. S. Lansdowne to Be r t i e , June SI, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.186,p.97. 3. Memorandum from the Kaiser to Roosevelt sent through Baron Sternburg, June 11, 1905, Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 477. Jusserand, op. c i t . , 317. 4. Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 477-79; Jusserand, op. c i t . , 319-80. On securing the assent of the French government on June £3, Roosevelt endeavoured to persuade Germany she should be s a t i s f i e d with this triumph, and not to raise questions of minor d e t a i l s . Roosevelt to Sternburg, June £5, 1905; Bishop, op. c i t . , I,,_483-85. See also Paleologue, op. c i t . , 364*65. 94-M. Rouvier had. by this time become more i n c l i n e d to accept the plan of a conference, despairing of any other solu t i o n . On June 88 he j u s t i f i e d this course to the B r i t i s h charge d' a f f a i r e s as follows: He (M. Rouvier) considered that under the conditions a conference was perhaps the best way of a r r i v i n g at a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n . The Emperor had made i t a point of personal honour: France would go into i t with the support of England, Spain and possibly I t a l y , whereas Germany would be alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French i n t e r e s t s on the Algerian f r o n t i e r . It was absolutely necessary to a r r i v e at some solution as the present s i t u a t i n n was excessively dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany considered that she was e n t i t l e d to a free hand i n Morocoo, and she was very ac t i v e . (1) The French assent now given, terms were then drawn up i n an agreement to form a basis on which the conference 2 might be h i l d . These were signed on July 8. France was assured that Germany would pursue no goal at the Conference which would compromise the legitimate i n t e r e s t s of France i n Morocco, or thatrwould be contrary to the r i g h t s of France r e s u l t i n g from tr e a t i e s or arrangements. Agreements reached were to be i n harmony with the following p r i n c i p l e s : the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; the i n t e g r i t y of h i s Empire; economic l i b e r t y without any inequality; the u t i l i t y of p o l i c e and f i n a n c i a l reforms, the introduction o f which would be regulated for a short time by means of an international agreement. It was further agreed that the 1. L i s t e r to Lansdowne, June 88, 1905, B.D., I I I , No.134, p.107. 8. Before these were signed France submitted them to London for approval, Approval was given by Lansdowne. Lansdowne to Bertie July 1, 1905, i b i d . , No.137, p.110. -95-spe c i a l i n t e r e s t s of France as a f r o n t i e r neighbour i n the maintenance of order throughout the whole of Morocco should he recognized. F i n a l l y the two governments agreed to work out a programme for the conference which was to be submitted to the 1 Sultan for acceptance. An analysis of this agreement reveals c l e a r l y Germany's f i r s t reverse i n her Moroccan campaign. It i s true that the winning of the French assent to the plan of a confer-ence, which the Republic had so vigorously opposed, might be taken as a diplomatic triumph, but the agreement of July 8 recognized the s p e c i a l interest of France i n Morocco, and i n 2 no way n u l l i f i e d her accords with B r i t a i n and with Spain. Germany had not weakened the Entente. Moreover, she had f a i l e d to make a c o l o n i a l accord of her own with France, when she had refused the o f f e r s tendered by Delcasse and Rouvier. She had chosen rather to keep her promises to the Sultan, and to force a conference on an unwilling Europe, refusing offers of present c o l o n i a l gain i n the hope of winning these i n the future. As Mr. Anderson puts i t , \"her vi r t u e , not appreciated by any 3 other Power, was greater than her common sense.1* What i s s t i l l more important, however, than Germany's f a i l u r e to make any appreciable gains by this agreement i s that her government had embittered the French nation against 1. These terms given i n B.D., I I I , No.147, pp.115-116. 2. Fabre-Luce, op. c i t . , 120-121. Pale'ologue, op. cit.,381-82. 3. Anderson, op. c i t . , 256. -96-the Empire, and aroused i t to the united defense of i t s 1 national honour. On July 11, M> Jusserand wrote to President Roosevelt: I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement arrived at i s one which we had considered, and the acceptance of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me from Paris .... confirmed what I guessed was the ease, that i s , that there was a point where more y i e l d i n g would have been impossible; everybody i n France f e l t i t , and people braced up s i l e n t l y i n view of possible great events. (2) Germany's actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and converted him s o l i d l y to the Entente. The B r i t i s h charge d'a f f a i r e s reported on June 28; His Majesty (The German Emperor) had expected a complete climb-down to follow upon the change of d i r e c t i o n of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , but as His Excellency (M. Rouvier) said, there was no reason because he had parted with M. Delcasse that he should throw himself \"dans les bras de l'Empereur, et sur son ecu.\" (3) M. Cambon had informed Lord Lansdowne: that af t e r a l l that had happened M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country (Great B r i t a i n ) . It was, i n his view, essential that the two governments should treat one another with the f u l l e s t confidence, and that no further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us. (4) This p o l i c y , as expressed by the French leaders, met with Lord Lansdowne's entire approval, for i t s i g n i f i e d success i n the 1. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 386-87, Report of the Belgian Minister i n P a r i s , October 24, 1905, Morel, op.cit.,22-23. 2. Bishop, op. c i t . , I, 488. 3. Lester to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, B.D., I I I , Ho.134,p.108. Also Paleologue, op. c i t . , 387. 4. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, B.D., I I I , Ho.l58,p.ll8. -97-e f f o r t s to maintain intact the Entente Cordials. He assured M. Cambon that \"we had no intentions of withdrawing our 1 support.\" Yet another sign which further assured the strength of the Entente i n the eyes of the world was the exchange of v i s i t s between the f l e e t s of Great B r i t a i n and France which took place i n July and August of 1905. The B r i t i s h A t l a n t i c f l e e t was received at Brest i n July with the greatest enthusiasm. \"The f e e l i n g , openly expressed on a l l sides, was one of intense gratitude to the King and the B r i t i s h nation for the way i n which they had stood by France i n the recent Morocoo incident. It was a public r a t i f i c a t i o n of the 2 Entente Cordiale.\" This v i s i t was returned by the French f l e e t i n August, when i t was received i n England with 3 enthusiastic demonstrations of English goodwill. Germany's vaction had thus furthered the process which Germans have c a l l e d her \"encirclement\" and i s o l a t i o n . After the signing of the agreement of July 8 new and wearisome discussions began between the French and German governments to work out the formulae for deliberations at the forthcoming conference. It was not u n t i l September 28 1. lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, B.D. I l l , Ho.152,p.119. 2. Lee. op. c i t . , I I , 345. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 387-88. 3. Paleologue, op. c i t . , 393-94. -98-1 that an agreement as to the programme was signed. The conference was to he held, not at Tangier, to which the French had objections, but i n Algeciras, i n southern Spain. In the programme drawn up the subjects for consideration were defined i n general terms as the police force, the suppression of the smuggling of arms, the reform of finances, the opening up of new sources of revenue, the Sultan's undertaking not to part with any branch of the public service f o r the benefit of private i n t e r e s t s , and the allotment of contracts f o r public works, A few minor disputes of a l o c a l nature were also regulated. After some opposition the Sultan agreed to the . 2 programme on October 23. L. A grave s i t u a t i o n arose during these negotiations when news reached France that through Count Tattenbach a German firm had received from the Sultan a contract f o r building a mole i n the harbour of Tangier, and also, that a loan had been arranged by German banks fo r 10,000,000 marks. France accused the German Government of double-dealing; and England and Spain joined her i n protest. Billow upheld the transactions, asserting that the negotiations f o r the mole contract had been going on for months, and that the loan was not a r e a l \"loan,\" but merely a \"Temporary advance\" which could be repaid at any time. See Anderson, op. c i t . , 264-67. Also, Berard, LeLivre Jaune Sur Maroc, l o c . c i t . , 217-22. Also, Francis Charmes, i n his Chrohique de l a Quinzaine, in La Revue des Deux Mondes, September 15, 1905, 472. 2. After t h i s agreement was signed Bulow expressed to France the willingness of the German Government to negotiate over other c o l o n i a l matters, such as the f r o n t i e r s of the Cameroons, and the Bagdad Railway. M. Rouvier c o l d l y r e p l i e d that he had previously offered to negotiate on such matters so as to avoid the holding of the forthcoming conference, and to s e t t l e the Morocco question i n a f r i e n d l y manner between France and Germany alone. They could not return to that now, he said, u n t i l It was seen how the conference turned out. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 229. 99-The Conference was to open i n January of 1906. Before that time, however, a new government came into power i n England, when on December 4, 1905, the Conservative administ-r a t i o n of Balfour was replaced by the L i b e r a l government of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman. S i r Edward Grey succeeded Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary. It seemed of supreme importance to the French Government to ascertain the intentions of thi s new administration i n the matter of foreign policy before the Conference opened. Would France be able to count on i t s support as i t had i n the past been able to count on the support of Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues? In a speech on December 22 at the Albert H a l l the new Prime Minister pledged h i s government to continue the p o l i c y of his predecessors, and affirmed his adhesion to the p o l i c y of the Entente Gordiale. But the French Government f e l t i t necessary to have S i r (Edward Grey renew the assurances given formerly by Lord Lansdowne. Colonel Repington, the m i l i t a r y correspondent of the \"Times,* has related how on December 28 he met with Major Huguet, the French M i l i t a r y Attache i n London, who stated that h i s Government was seriou s l y alarmed about the intentions of Germany and was worried over the f a i l u r e of the new B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary to renew the assurances given by h i s 1 predecessor. \"The French knew,\" records Colonel Repington, \"that our sympathies were with them, but they wanted to know 2 what we should do i n case Germany confronted them with a c r i s i s . \" He immediately reported his conversation with Major Huguet to 1. Repington,Colonel, The F i r s t World War,(New York,1921),1,2-6. C a l l w e l l , CE., Fie Id -Marshall S i r Henry Wilson, (London, 1927), 2. Repington, op.cit., I, 1. I » 8 9 f f . -100-S i r Edward Grey, who was at the time electioneering i n Northumberland. The l a t t e r r e p l i e d on December 30, \"I have not receded from anything that l o r d Lansdowne said to the • 1 French, and have no hesitation i n affirming i t . \" Colonel Repington communicated his conversation with the French M i l i t a r y Attach^ to S i r George Clarke, Secretary of the Defense Committee, and to Lord Esher, a member of that Committee. They agreed that i n view of the German menace 2 active steps towards cooperation with France should be taken. nThey thought i t indispensable that something should be done, and as both Lord Esher and S i r George Clarke were serving i n o f f i c i a l c apacities, and as Repington was a free lance, i t was eventually agreed that he should sound the French Government through Major Huguet, and that when the French views were thus p r i v a t e l y and u n o f f i c i a l l y ascertained that they should pass the matter on to the B r i t i s h Government which would be completely uncommitted and able to continue the conversations or to drop 3 them as they pleased.\" The Colonel prepared a short l i s t of questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These were considered i n P aris by M. Rouvier, the Prime Minister, M* Etienne, Minister of War, M. Thomson, Minister of Marine, and his naval s t a f f , and by General Br un and General Brugere. On January 12.. Major 1. Repington, op. c i t . , I, 4. 2. Ibid., 5. 3. Ibid., 5-6. -101-Huguet again v i s i t e d Colonel Repington, bringing a c o r d i a l reply from Paris and assuring him that everything possible would be done to make the necessary arrangements f o r cooperation. Colonel Repington then imparted this r e p l y to the Defense Committee. Meanwhile, on January 10 M. Cambon, who had discussed 1 the matter with M. Rouvier, approached S i r Edward Grey on the matter of a closer and more de f i n i t e understanding between the two governments. Grey r e p l i e d as follows: that at the present moment the Prime Minister was out of town, and the Cabinet were a l l dispersed seeing a f t e r the elections; that we were not as yet aware of the sentiments of the country as they would be expressed at the p o l l s ; and that i t was impossible therefore for me, i n the circumstances, to give a reply to h i s Excellency's question. I could only state as my personal opinion that, i f France were to be attacked by Germany i n consequence of a question a r i s i n g out of the Agreement (of A p r i l 8, 1904) which our predecessor had recently concluded with the French Government, public opinion i n England would be strongly moved i n favour of France. (2) When M. Cambon r e p l i e d that \"nothing would have a more p a c i f i c influence on the Emperor of Germany than the conviction, that i f Germany attacked France, she would f i n d England a l l i e d 3 against her,\" Grey answered that he thought \"the German Emperor did believe t h i s , but that i t was one thing that this opinion should be held i n Germany and another that we should 4 give a po s i t i v e assurance to France on the subject*\" He could give no assurance, he added, of which he was uncertain. 1. Huguet, General, L*Intervention M i l i t a i r e Britannique en 1914, c i t e d i n Anderson, op. c i t . * 337. 2. Grey to Be r t i e , January 10,1906 ,B.D., IIX,No.210(a), p.170. 3. Ibid., 171. 4. Ibid. , 171. -102-He \"did not believe that any Minister could, i n present circumstances, say more than I had done, and, however strong the sympathy of Great B r i t a i n might be with France i n the case of a rupture with Germany, the expression which might be given to i t and the action which might follow must depend l a r g e l y upon the circumstances i n which the rupture took place.\" Since a p o s i t i v e answer was thus postponed u n t i l a f t e r the elections M. Cambon r e p l i e d that he would repeat his request at that time. But he asked that i n the meantime \"the u n o f f i c i a l communications\" between the B r i t i s h Admiralty and War Office and the French Naval and M i l i t a r y Attaches \"as to what action might advantageously be taken i n case the two countries found themselves i n a l l i a n c e i n such a war\" might be permitted to continue. \"They did not pledge either Government\" he added, and S i r Edward \"did not dissent from 2 this view.\" The ministers of the Cabinet were scattered for the elections, but Grey sent a report of this conversation to the Prime Minister, and also to Lord Ripon, the senior minister available i n London. On January 12, he met Mr. Haldane, Secretary of State f o r War, at Berwick, and discussed with him 3 the question of the M i l i t a r y conversations. He had learned that under the former government i n the previous year such m i l i t a r y and naval conversations had taken place, and that at 1. Grey to Bertie,JanuaryilQ,lffQ6, B.D.III, No.210 (a), p.171 2. Ibid. 3. Spender, J.A., The L i f e of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, II (hereafter c i t e d as Spender, Campbell-Bannerman), London, 1923) 251f. rlOS-the present time o f f i c i a l conversations were going on between Admiral S i r John Fisher and the French Naval Attache', while the m i l i t a r y conversations were being held u n o f f i c i a l l y be-1 tween the French M i l i t a r y Attache' and Colonel Repington. When consulted on January 11, General Grierson, the Director of M i l i t a r y Operations, had stated \"that i f there i s even a chance of our having to give armed assistance on land to France, or to take the f i e l d on her side i n Belgium i n consequence of a v i o l a t i o n of Belgian t e r r i t o r y by the Germans, we should have as soon as possible informal communication between the m i l i t a r y authorities of France and/or i n Belgium and the Gen-2 e r a l s t a f f . \" In agreeing that these conversations might be carried on o f f i c i a l l y neither Haldane nor Grey could see anything against such a p o l i c y . As Grey argues i n his memoirs: I was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any obli g a t i o n to go to war; but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular i n B r i t a i n . I t was certai n that i f Germany forced a quarrel on France upon the very matter of that Agreement, the pro-French f e e l i n g i n B r i t a i n would be very strong, so strong probably as to j u s t i f y a B r i t i s h Government i n intervening on the side of France or even to i n s i s t on i t s doing so. We must, therefore, be free to go to the help of France as well as free to stand aside. But modern war may be an a f f a i r of days. I f there were not m i l i t a r y plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the a s s i s t -ance of France i n time, however strongly public opinion i n B r i t a i n might desire i t . We should i n eff e c t not have preserved our freedom to help France, but have cut ourselves o f f from the p o s s i b i l i t y of doing so, unless we had allowed the B r i t i s h and French s t a f f s to concert s plans for common action. (3) 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 74-78. 2. Grierson to Sanderson, January 11,1906,B.D.,111,No.211,p.172 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 75, Also, Haldane, Viscount, Before the War, (New York, 1920), 44-49. -rl04-Such was the reasoning of the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s who approved the conversations. In an interview with Cambon oh January 15 S i r Edward Grey gave h i s consent. That interview was recorded i n a dispatch to the B r i t i s h ambassador i n P a r i s : I told M. Cambon today that I had communicated to the Prime Minister my account of his conversation with me on the 10th instant. I had heard from the Prime Minister that he could not be i n London before the 25th January, and i t would therefore not be possible for me to discuss things with him before then, and the Members of the Government would not assemble In London before the 29th; I could therefore give no further answer today on the question he had addressed to me. He had spoken to me on the 10th of communications passing between the French Naval Attache* and the Admiralty. I understood that these communications had been with S i r John Fisher. I f that was so, i t was not necessary f o r me to do any more; but, with regard fto the communications between the French M i l i t a r y Attache and the War O f f i c e , I understood from him that these had taken place through an intermediary. •I had therefore taken the opportunity of speaking to Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, who had been taking part i n my election contest i n Northumberland on Friday,, and he had authorized me to say that these communications might proceed between the French M i l i t a r y Attache and General Grierson d i r e c t ; but i t must be understood^tha.t these communications did not commit either Government. M. Cambon said that the intermediary i n question had been a r e t i r e d colonel, the m i l i t a r y correspondent of the \"Times,\" who. he understood, had been sent from the War O f f i c e . (1) The Prime Minister seems to have had some misgivings about the interpretation which might be put upon these \"commun-ic a t i o n s . \" \"I do not l i k e the stress l a i d upon jo i n t preparat-ions,\" he wrote to Lord Ripon.on February 2, \"It comes very close to an honorable undertaking; and i t w i l l be known on both 8 sides of the Rhine. But l e t us hope f o r the best.\" But he 1. Greyto^Bertie, January 15, 1906, B.D., ffill, No.215, p.177. Sanderson to Grierson, January 15, 1906, i b i d . No.217 (a), pp.178-79. '8. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 257. -105-was cogniziant of and a party to the steps taken i n this p o l i c y ; he had been made aware of a l l the circumstances, and had given hi s consent on the understanding that they were prov i s i o n a l and precautionary measures, and that the Government was not bound by t h e i r r e s u l t s . Thus li m i t e d , he regarded them as r a i s i n g no new question of p o l i c y and therefore within the 1 competence of the War O f f i c e . It was d e f i n i t e l y understood 2 that these conversations did not bind the governments. On January 17 the conversations were begun between Major Huguet and General Grierson and continued uninterrupted between the general s t a f f s u n t i l the outbreak of the War i n 3 1914. The same l i n e of reasoning which had led the B r i t i s h to enter upon these ncommunications n with France applied with equal force to Belgium, f o r both the B r i t i s h and French authorities expected Germany to v i o l a t e Belgian n e u t r a l i t y should she wish to s t r i k e at France. On January 15, therefore, S i r Edward Grey instructed General Grierson to open conversations with the Belgian m i l i t a r y authorities \"as to the manner i n which, i n case of need, B r i t i s h assistance could be most e f f e c t u a l l y 4 afforded to Belgium f o r the defense of her neutrality. 1* \"Such 5 communications must be s o l e l y provisional and non-committal.\" 1. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, I I , E53. 2. Repington, op. c i t . , I, 13, Grey, op. c i t . , I, 76. 3. Repington, op. c i t . , I, 14. 4. Sanderson to Grierson, January 15, 1906, B.D., I I I , Ho;214, pp.176-77. 5. Grierson to Barnardiston, January 16, 1905 i b i d , Ho.217 (b) p.179. 106-Colonel Barnardiston, the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Attache^in Brussels, broached the subject to the Belgian Chief of Sta f f , General Ducarne, on January 18, t e l l i n g him that the B r i t i s h Minister would take up the matter with the Belgian Foreign Minister. After consulting the Minister of War, General Ducarne agreed 1 to the conversations. These conversations, both m i l i t a r y and naval, were kept secret. The Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only a very few personsj the ones with France were not known 2 to a l l the members of the B r i t i s h Cabinet. How S i r Edward Grey had to again answer that larger request of the French ambassador, the request for a formal agreement between the two governments, which had been made on January 10, and the answer to which the Foreign Secretary had postponed u n t i l a f t e r the elections. After discussing the matter with the Prime Minister and Mr. Haldane, both of whom were i n london a f t e r January 26, S i r Edward met M. Cambon on 1. Barnardiston to Grierson, January 19, 1906* B.D. I l l , No*221 (C 1), p . l 8 7 f f . C a l l w e l l , op. c i t . , I, 89. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 93, Anderson* op. c i t . , 342. See Ea r l loreburn and l l o y d George, both of whom were members of the Cabinet at this time. Loreburn, op. c i t . * 80-81. Lloyd George, War Memoirs,.(London, 1933) I, 46-51. While Grey admits that he did not reveal these conver-sations to the cabinet at the time, he states i n his memoirs, \"they must subsequently have become known to those ministers who attended the committee of Imperial Defense;\" op. c i t . , I, 93. Lord Sydenham, a member of that committee u n t i l September, 1907, writes, \"This was not so. In my time the question never came to me o f f i c -i a l l y , and I only heard quite informally what was going on .... Whether d i f f e r e n t arrangements, enabling the Committee of Imperial Defense to be cognizant of the negotiations, were made a f t e r the end of September (1907) when I l e f t for India I do not know.\" Written statement by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927, B.D,, I I I , Ho.221 (a),p.l85. -107-the l a s t day of the month.- That interview was reported i n a long dispatch to the B r i t i s h ambassador at P a r i s . When M. Cambon again asked whether France would be able to count on the assistance of England i n the event of an attack upon her by Germany, Grey submitted f i r s t of a l l a review of the r e l a t i o n s between the two governments as they stood at that moment. Pointing to the m i l i t a r y and naval communications, he stated that i f a c r i s i s arose no time would be l o s t f o r want of a formal engagement. Secondly, only a week previously he had informed Count Metternich, the German ambassador i n London, that i t was his personal opinion that \" i n the event of an attack upon France by Germany a r i s i n g out of the Morocco Agreement, public opinion i n England would be so strong that no B r i t i s h Government could remain neutral.\" In t h i s way, he assured M. Cambon that what would be the moral e f f e c t upon Germany of a formal engagement between France and England had been already given e f f e c t . In the t h i r d place, he pointed out that the present r e l a t i o n s h i p between England and France as a r e s u l t of the Entente of 1904 l e f t France a free hand in Morocco and gave her unreservedly B r i t a i n ' s diplomatic support. But, should this promise be extended beyond diplomatic support, and \"should we take an engagement which might involve us i n a war,\" he f e l t sure that B r i t a i n would demand consultation with regard to French p o l i c y i n Morocco, and demand concessions or alterations i n that p o l i c y 1 which might seem desirable to avoid a war. 1. Grey to B e r t i e , January 31, 1906, B.D.,III, No.219, p.180. -108-In summing up his case, he asked M. Cambon \"to weigh these considerations i n his mind, and to consider whether the present s i t u a t i o n as regards ourselves and France was not so s a t i s f a c t o r y that i t was unnecessary to a l t e r i t 1 by a formal declaration as he desired.\" To this M. Cambon r e p l i e d that a war might break out so quickly that i f i t were necessary for the B r i t i s h Government \"to consult and wait for manifestations of English public opinion, i t might be too l a t e to be of use.\" To his repeated request for some form of verbal assurance Grey pointed out the main d i f f i c u l t i e s i n giving what could be \"nothing short of a solemn undertaking.'' '.'It was one which I could not give without submitting i t to 'the Cabinet,\" and i f t h i s were done, he f e l t sure that they would say i t was too serious a matter to be dealt with by a mere verbal engagement, but i t would have to be i n writing. Such a change as t h i s , Grey maintained, would transform the \"Entente\" into a defensive a l l i a n c e . He admitted that pressure of circumstances - the a c t i v i t y of Germany, for instance - \"might eventually transform the \"Entente\" into a defensive a l l i a n c e , \" but he did not think such a change was needed at the moment. To t h i s he added, that a defensive a l l i a n c e could not be kept from Parliament; \"no B r i t i s h Government could commit the country to such a serious thing and keep I the engagement secret.\" For B r i t a i n to support 1. Grey to Bertie, January 31, 1906, B.D., I I I , No.219, p.181. -109-France i n a war with Germany, \"much would depend on the manner i n which war broke out.\" The B r i t i s h would not be w i l l i n g to fig h t i n order to put France i n possession of Morocco, but \" i f i t appeared that war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French 'entente,* public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France.\" He added, however, that B r i t i s h sentiment was much averse to war and that he could not be certa i n whether this aversion would be overcome by the desire to a i d France. He informed M. Cambon that he was w i l l i n g to reopen the conversation at any time i n the future, but he did, not think that the s i t u a t i o n 1 j u s t i f i e d , such a r a d i c a l change as had been suggested. M. 2 CamboJi appeared to be s a t i s f i e d with that answer. Thus S i r Edward Grey embarked upon the policy with France which he followed u n t i l the outbreak of the War. In his mind he was open and frank with both France and Germany. He had told the German ambassador of the p r o b a b i l i t y of . B r i t i s h intervention i n favour of France i n the event of a Franco-German war. To France he had pledged f u l l diplomatic support, while permitting preparations f o r an emergency. He had refused her absolute assurance of a i d i n case of war, pr e f e r r i n g to keep, as he believed he had kept, B r i t i s h hands free. By this apparently simple, but what was r e a l l y to prove 1. Grey to Ber t i e , B.D., I I I , Ho.219, p.182. 2. Memorandum by Sanderson, February 2, 19^06, B.D. I l l , Ho.220*{b), p.185. Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Ripon, February 2, 1906, cited i n Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II , 257. -110-an i n t r i c a t e p o l i c y , he hoped to s a t i s f y the needs of Br i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y . He has j u s t i f i e d this p o l i c y to what seems h i s own s a t i s f a c t i o n i n his speech i n the House of Commons on August 3, 1914, and has further developed the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n h i s Memoirs. He clings consistently to h i s contention that England was i n no way bound to France, and that he had kept her hands 1 completely free. But i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand how he could have deceived himself into this b e l i e f . It may be true, as he so often maintains, that the m i l i t a r y and naval conversations, did not absolutely bind the two Powers, but i t cannot be denied that they constituted an exceedingly powerful t i e between them. It i s impossible to escape the contention that at least a potent moral obligation to aid France had been created. In spite of Grey's protests such at least i s 2 the verdict of hi s t o r y . As has been pointed out, these preparations continued down to the outbreak of war i n 1914, and \"i n e v i t a b l y came to involve England i n increasingly binding obligations of honour to support France i n case of a European War a r i s i n g out of any question whatsoever - not merely one a r i s i n g out of the Morocco question - provided 3 that France did not appear to be the active aggressor.\" 1. Grey, op. c i t . * I, 76, 82, 85, 96, 251. 2. Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . ^ I I I , 508.Dickinson, op.clt.,398,405,470-71,480. Ewart,op.cit;yl, 115-131; Churchill,op.cit;,27. Loreburn,op;ci t;,17,225-26. Fay,op.cit;,1,208. Lutz*Hermann,Lord Grey and the World War, (London, 1928),94-105; Rewouvin,Pierre,0?he Part Played i n International Relations by the Conversations between the General Staffs on the Eve of the World War,Studies In Anglo-French History, edited;by A l f r e d C o v i l l e and Harold' Temperley, (London,1935), 170. 3 . Fay, op. c i t ; , I, 208. - I l l -Ana Grey stands condemned on this point out of h i s own mouth; as Gooch points out i n speaking of the Foreign Secretary's speech of August 3, 1914, \"His whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be forever disgraced i f we l e f t 1 France i n the lurch.* 1 A further weakness i n this p o l i c y was that neither S i r Edward Grey's statement to M. Cambon, nor his approval of the naval and m i l i t a r y conversations, was made with the knowledge and sanction of the Cabinet. (The explanation, he offe r s , of his f a i l u r e to eonsult with his colleagues i n these matters i s by no means convincing.. He explains that the Ministers were scattered, seeing to the elections, and could not be summoned. It has been c l e a r l y shown that i t would not 8 have been impossible to summon the Cabinet at that time. On January 81 the Prime Minister wrote to ask him i f he wished to eonsult the Cabinet, and suggested January 30 and 31 and 3 February 1 as dates for a meeting. In his memoirs Grey 4 states he has no r e c o l l e c t i o n of his answer to that question. He explains that the e a r l i e s t date suggested by the Prime Minister was January 30 and that \"the French had been kept 5 long enough waiting f o r a reply.\" But, this can hardly be 1. Cambridge History of. B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , 111,508; 2. loreburn* op. c i t . , 80. Ewart, op. c i t . , I, 116. 3. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 253. 4. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 86. 5. Ibid., 86. -112-regarded as sat i s f a c t o r y since his interview with Cambon did not take place u n t i l the January 31, and moreover, since a .1 Cabinet meeting was held on that very day. It would therefore seem that he might e a s i l y have consulted h i s colleagues on such a grave matter before t a l k i n g with Cambon, or at least immediately a f t e r . But he did not reveal h i s p o l i c y then, nor f o r a long time to come; i t was not u n t i l 1912 that circumstances-caused the matter of m i l i t a r y and naval conversations to be revealed to the Cabinet, and not u n t i l his speech of August 3, 1914, 2 that Parliament and the public were made aware of them. In the l i g h t of what experience showed him i n a f t e r years Grey admits i n his memoirs that the Cabinet should have been 3 consulted. The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on January 16, 19G6. Twelve Powers i n addition to Morocco were represented. The p r e s i d e n t i a l chair was occupied by the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Buke of Almadovar. For almost three months the Conference swung from c r i s i s to c r i s i s . It would be superfluous to record here i n any d e t a i l the discussions which took place since they bore mainly on technical points. But behind the whole question lay the essential problem of the balance of power, and i t i s i n this aspect only that i n t e r e s t l i e s . 1. loreburn, op. c i t . , p.81. Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 130 and 138. 2. See Lloyd George, o p . c i t . , I , 46-51, on this question of the Cabinet and i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n matters of foreign a f f a i r s . 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 86-99. -113-Agreement was soon reached on a number of minor 1. problems. The r e a l l y troublesome questions were those of the organization of the police and the establishment of a state bank, since the solu t i o n reached on these questions would determine whether France or Germany should emerge v i c t o r i o u s . Germany's aim seems to have been to have the Moroccan pol i c e o f f i c e r e d by the Minor Powers, or to permit the Sultan f r e e l y to choose his own p o l i c e . She wished to prevent France from organizing them, and thus rejected France's demand for a p o l i c e mandate, and l a t e r her revised proposal to share such a mandate with Spain. When the question of the State bank reached a deadlock a rupture i n the Conference was expected. After much discussion, and a f t e r Roosevelt intervened on behalf of France, Austria put forward a plan of mediation that the Franco-Spanish p o l i c e mandate be accepted under a Swiss 2 Inspector-General. This was accepted at the end of March. The bank question had meanwhile been s e t t l e d on a basis of joint p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The main d i f f i c u l t i e s having thus been overcome the Conference was h a s t i l y concluded and the f i n a l Act of Algeoiras was signed on A p r i l 7. While i t i s unnecessary to l i s t a l l the d e t a i l s of the Act, the chief provisions might be noted to show how, 1. Such problems as - the surveillance and repression of contrabrand of arms. - the better c o l l e c t i o n of taxes and creation of new revenues - regulations concerning oustoms duties - the question of public services and public works. Anderson* op. c i t . , 350-351. 2. Anderson, op. c i t . , 392; Gooch, op. c i t . , 364-365. -114-though Germany had won her point i n securing the holding of the Conference, France had won i n p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s . From two thousand to twenty-five hundred police were to be d i s t r i b u t e d among the eight Moroccan ports, with Spanish and French o f f i c e r s to act as instructors under a Swiss-Inspector General at Tangier. Thus, i n this a l l important question of p o l i c e France r e a l l y triumphed, for she had secured the predominant share of the control and excluded Germany and her A l l i e s altogether. In a backward and disturbed area such as Morocco the police control was l i k e l y to be the lever of power. In the matter of f i n a n c i a l control and commercial opportunity Germany had more success. A State Bank p r a c t i c a l l y under the control of the four Powers - France, England, Germany and Spain - was set up, with equal opportunities f o r each nation. But France and her s a t e l l i t e , Spain, made further gains i n that the regulation of the Customs Act and of the t r a f f i c of arms on the Algerian f r o n t i e r was to be ca r r i e d out by France i n conjunction with Morocco, and on the R i f f f r o n t i e r by 1 Spain and Morocco. The effect of the Conference upon Morocco can be dispensed with i n this study. To the Powers taking part Moroccan interests was not the issue. The conclusions reached \"were determined by the exigencies of international r e l a t i o n s and the interests of European Powers, not by the needs of 1, Gooch, op. c i t . , 366-367. -115-1 Morocco. n The less interested Powers had aimed c h i e f l y at preserving peace. Prance and Spain had been concerned with maintaining their i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco and with preventing any other Power from gaining a foothold there. Germany alone appeared to be the champion of Moroccan r i g h t s , but only because that p o l i c y had been i n accord with her i n t e r e s t s . Throughout the Conference France had been s t e a d i l y and openly supported by her neighbour, Spain, her old a l l y , Russia, 2 and her new friend, England. She had received less open, but no le s s e f f e c t i v e , support from Roosevelt, on behalf of the v* 3 United States. Germany, on the other hand, received only scanty support from her friends. Austria was determined not to quarrel with France, while I t a l y , already pledged i n advance by her secret arrangement with France respecting Morocco and T r i p o l i , supported the Republic and not her a l l y . Germany had established the t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e that Morocco concerned a l l Powers equally, and the p r i n c i p l e of the open-door. But France had p r a c t i c a l l y safeguarded her i n d i v i d u a l action f o r the future. The French and Spanish m i l i t a r y control assured those two Powers the main economic advantages. Both sides expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome, which according to o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n l e f t neither v i c t o r nor vanquished. None the less, i t was evident that Germany had 1. Anderson, op. c i t . * 394. 2. Report of the Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n , A p r i l 5, 1906, IMorel,, op. c i t . , 44-45. 3. Jusserand, op. c i t . * 322-25. -116-emerged the l o s e r . She had been opposed by every Power, except Austria, and she had f a i l e d to obtain more than l i p service to her demands. What i s more s i g n i f i c a n t , she had driven France and Great B r i t a i n into a closer intimacy and had strengthened the t i e s between them. When Grey wrote to President Roosevelt a year l a t e r i n a co n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r giving an account of his policy, he summed matters up i n these words: \"The long and the short of the matter i s that, to secure peace, we must maintain the Entente with France, and attempts from outside to 1 shake i t w i l l only make i t stronger.\" It has been shown that Germany had an excellent case on which to base her interference i n Morocco. But, as Nicolson 2 points out, she had handled i t badly. By her menacing attitude and her p o l i c y of mystification, she had l o s t the confidence of Europe; she obtained no compensation, she had caused France, Spain, England and Russia to draw closer together. Above a l l else, she had given the Anglo-French Entente a new character; i t now assumed a new meaning i n international a f f a i r s . Not only had the two countries remained refractory to every e f f o r t made to disunite them, but i n the play of events the Entente had changed i t s nature; a f t e r being o r i g i n a l l y signed f o r the purpose of l i q u i d a t i n g past differences between the governments i t had now become a 3 p r i n c i p l e of action. As Tardieu says, \"the Franco-English 1. Grey to Roosevelt i n a confidential letter.December, 1906, cit e d i n Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 115. 2. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 198, Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 125. 3. Tardieu, op. c i t . , 204-205. -117-binomial had acquired weight. It had changed from the 1 s t a t i c to the dynamic state.\" The Morocco C r i s i s of 1905-1906 thus marked an important stage i n the development of the Entente; from the test supplied by that C r i s i s i t had emerged strengthened and confirmed. In 1901 Great B r i t a i n had offered an a l l i a n c e to Germany; i n 1904 she had s e t t l e d her d i f f i c u l t i e s with France; i n 1906 the two, brought more c l o s e l y together, were discussing possible measures of war against Germany. The process which the Entente Powers l i k e to c a l l \"insurance,\" and which the Germans describe as \"encirclement\" had begun. It must be r e a l i z e d , moreover, that the forces which had caused this s i t u a t i o n s t i l l obtained as before. Algeciras was merely a breathing space between the rounds. Prestige and national interests were at stake on both sides; neither side appreciated the other's point of view. Each accused the other of aiming at i t s defeat, of being a menace. Neither side had learned anything from the C r i s i s except to be more cautious; neither had changed i t s method. So events were moving. The road to Armageddon lay open. 1. Tardieu, op. c i t . , 204* CHAPTER IV The Further \"Encirclement\" of Germany? -118-CRAPTER 17 The Further \"Encirclement' 1 of Germany? It was not s u r p r i s i n g that the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with France should r a i s e the question of an agreement between England and Russia to remove the many sources of f r i c t i o n which existed between the two Powers. A rapprochement with Russia was, as S i r Edward Grey states, \"the natural complement; 1 of the agreement with France.\" There were numerous points of difference between the two i n the Middle East, with P e r s i a and the Indian f r o n t i e r as p a r t i c u l a r danger points: And since Russia was an a l l y of France* B r i t a i n could not pursue at one and the same time a p o l i c y of agreement with the l a t t e r and a p o l i c y of h o s t i l i t y against the former. Moreover, now that B r i t a i n was d e f i n i t e l y committed to European a f f a i r s , the assurance of Russian friendship i n the face of the growing German menace, to which we s h a l l turn shortly, would be most welcome. Russia, too, was anxious f o r B r i t i s h friendship. She had suffered a spectacular humiliation i n the Far East in. 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 153$ The \"Times* pointed out that such a rapprochement was \"an ine v i t a b l e corollary'' to the Entente Cordials; c i t e d i n Morel* op. c i t . , 68. See also Trevelyan* op. c i t . , m 180-85. -119-i n 1904-05, and a rapprochement with B r i t a i n added to her a l l i a n c e with France would prove valuable i n helping her regain her p o s i t i o n as a Great Power. During the Morocoo C r i s i s of 1906 Russia l i k e England had cast her vote i n favour of France against Germany, and f r i e n d l y feelings had heen thus fostered. But there was no easy pathway to such an agreement; many obstacles new and old blocked the way. Russian despotism was repugnant to B r i t i s h ideals of l i b e r a l i s m , and the int e r n a l a f f a i r s of Russia, the Czar's suspension of the Duma i n 1906, and the treatment of Jews and Poles, did much to alienate B r i t i s h opinion and to s t i r up indignation. Nevertheless, when negotiations were seriously undertaken i t was found possible to reach an agreement. As f a r back as 1903 such an agreement had been considered i n England, and a conversation between Chamberlain and Delcasse, when the l a t t e r v i s i t e d London i n July of that year, may be taken as the s t a r t i n g point. of the. discussions which l a t e r culminated i n the f i n a l convention of 1907. Delcasse' and Cambon acted the r o l e of mediators between the two i n discussions during 1903, but differences over Tibet, Manchuria, Turkestan and P e r s i a proved 2 formidable d i f f i c u l t i e s . During the Russo-Japanese War* the position of B r i t a i n as an a l l y of Japan caused f r i c t i o n with Russia, although 1. B.D;, I I , No.242, p.212. Gooch,G.P., Before the War, (London, 1936), I, 70. 2. D.D.F., 2eserie,IV,No.44,N6;56,No.58. Gooch, Before the War, I, 71-74. 120-during the opening phases of the war the r e l a t i o n s between 1 the two governments remained f r i e n d l y enough. A most c r i t i c a l point i n Anglo-Russian relations was reached, however, during the War when a Russian squadron en route to the Par East f i r e d on a Hull f i s h i n g f l e e t on the Dogger Bank. Fortunately both governments acted cooly .while Delcasse* pleaded i n both 2 capitals for moderation. Thus the War had made necessary the postponment of negotiations for a general settlement. But the ending of the war removed the main obstacle to a rapproche-ment, and England's closer association with Prance i n 1904 and 1905 made the prospects f a r more promising. lansdowne went out of o f f i c e with the change of government i n 1905, but the same considerations which had induced him to enter into negotiations with Russia were not without influence on the new government. We have already seen the views of S i r Edward Grey i n regard to . t h i s matter. In the following months the two sides drew nearer. Ho useful purpose can be served here by entering 3 into the d e t a i l s of the negotiations. On August 31, 1907, a Convention was signed i n Petrograd concluding arrangements concerning a f f a i r s i n Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. This Pact, though more li m i t e d i n scope than the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, had the same purpose of c l e a r i n g o f f the slate the causes of antagonism between two h i s t o r i c r i v a l s . 1. Conversation between King Edward and Isvolsky, A p r i l , 1904; c i t e d i n Lee, op. c i t . * I I , 284-87. 2. D.D.F., 2 e s e r i e , V, 468-477; Gooch, Before the War, I, 77-8. Porter, op. c i t . , 186. 3. The negotiations are given i n B.D;, Vol.IV. For the part played by S i r Arthur Nicolson i n these negotiations see Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock, (London, 1930), 203-57. -121-The contents of the Convention were a l l made public. I t included no obligations of m i l i t a r y or diplomatic support, and thus i t did not at once lead to a clo s e l y - k n i t diplomatic partnership. But i t did nevertheless complete the c i r c l e f o r a closer p o l i t i c a l cooperation hetweeen Russia, France and England. The Anglo-French Entente and the Dual A l l i a n c e had as a re s u l t of the new treaty, broadened into the T r i p l e Entente which now confronted the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e on the chess board of European diplomacy. Though not d e f i n i t e l y a l l i e d to France and Russia, and i n theory s t i l l r e taining l i b e r t y of action, England had chosen to throw i n her l o t with these Powers. The French made no secret of their s a t i s f a c t i o n over the new Convention, or of the i r opinion that B r i t a i n had 1 advanced a step further into t h e i r camp. The h i s t o r y of the next seven years i s mainly that of the diplomatic c o n f l i c t which l e d to the f i n a l struggle between the now established groups of T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente. During these seven years a l l manner of seemingly unrelated subjeots are seen gradually becoming c l a s s i f i e d into causes f o r which - ir r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r merits - the two groups were committed to stand. There developed an increasing c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of opposition between the two camps. During the f i r s t four years i t developed more slowly, then a f t e r 1911, with the French occupation of Fez, the German threat at Agadlr, the I t a l i a n seizure of T r i p o l i , 1. Spender, J.A., F i f t y Years of Europe, (hereafter c i t e d as F i f t y Years), 266. -122-the growing menace of Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y , the f a i l u r e of the Haldane Mission, and the Balkan Wars, i t proceeded more ra p i d l y . This growing tension was r e f l e c t e d i n events both large and small over widely-separated areas. To give a f u l l account of a l l the factors which made for t h i s c r y s t a l l -i z a t i o n of opposition would go far beyond the l i m i t s of this work. Ho attempt, therefore, i s made to give a de t a i l e d analysis of the period. The aim, rather, i s to bring to l i g h t those factors which tightened and strengthened the Anglo-French Entente. The f i r s t serious c r i s i s to affect the new balance of power was the Bosnian C r i s i s of 1908. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 seemed to o f f e r to Isvolsky of Russia and to Aehrenthal of Austria a favourable opportunity f o r a mutually advantageous bargain at the expense of Turkey. Isvolsky saw i n i t an opportunity of opening the S t r a i t s , and Aehrenthal an opportunity of converting Austria's occupation of Bosnia-Herzogovina, assigned to her for administration by the Treaty of B e r l i n 1878, into a f u l l annexation. While 1 Aehrenthal had long been considering the annexation, the i n i t i a t i v e i n t h i s bargain seems to have come from Isvolsky i n a lengthy aide-memoire dated July 2, 1908, which discussed 2 Balkan railways?, the entente of 1897, and Macedonian reforms. 1. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 314. 2. Gooch, Before the War, I, 332, 394-95. -123-Aehrenthal was keen to accept the o f f e r , and at the end of 1 August gave h i s assent, although no d e f i n i t e agreement was made. Following this reply, the two met as the guests of Count Berchtold at Buchlau on September 15 where the matter was discussed and further d e t a i l s were arranged. There were no witnesses to the discussions, and since no d e f i n i t e agreement was put i n writing, violent controversy arose a few weeks l a t e r when the plans did not work out as Isvolsky had anticipated. He has claimed that the consent of the Powers was to be obtained i n a Conference before the annexation took place; but the point of most b i t t e r controversy was the date at which the changes were to be made. Whatever were the agreements reached,Isvolsky does not seem to have expected that Aehrenthal would act so p r e c i p i t a t e l y , and he appears to have been taken by complete surprise when, on a r r i v i n g at Paris on October 8, he received word that the annexation would take place within the next few 2 days. It was carried out on October 5. The news of the sudden annexation produced an instant reverberation throughout Europe; surprise and indignation were voiced on a l l sides. Isvolsky f e l t he had been tr i c k e d . A 1. Gooch, Before the War, I, for h i s reply. 2. The controversy i s summed up i n two a r t i c l e s i n the Fortnig h t l y Review of September and November of 1909 attributed to the two statesmen. Isvolsky*s statement that he had been trioked over the date i s hard to understand i n view of h i s statement of September 85 to Herr von Sohon at Berchtesgaden that the matter would be announced to the Delegations which were to meet on October 8. Gooch, Before the War, I, 400. •124-storm of indignation rose i n Serbia, and there was t a l k of war. Ho warning of the change had been given to either the govern-ments of Prance or of B r i t a i n . Turkey, very na t u r a l l y , was most indignant, and i n protest she organized a boycott of Austrian goods. In the eyes of Europe, presented with this \" f a i t accompli,'* Turkey stood as a v i c t i m of Austrian aggression. It remained to be seen what stand the Powers would take. Aehrenthal had anticipated that Germany would support her a l l y , Austria, although the Kaiser was furious that h i s government had not been warned when the annexation was to have taken place. The Austrian statesman f e l t that i f Germany stood with Austria, Russia and France would submit. France, he knew, was only remotely interested i n the Balkans, and Russia, a f t e r her recent defeat, was notoriously unprepared for war. But what stand would B r i t a i n take? I f she were to take a strong stand her two associates might hold out with her, and i n t h i s event the s i t u a t i o n might well become d i f f i c u l t . Isvolsky was i n a most p a i n f u l p o s i t i o n . He feared Aehrenthal was about to secure h i s part of the Buchlau agreement, before he himself had obtained the assent of the Powers to his share. In Paris he found the French Government sympathetic but rather non-committal. The French were prepared to adhere to the Russian A l l i a n c e and give support to the Russian Government, but i t was made clea r that public opinion could not be converted to the notion that enough was at stake to r i s k a war. The French Government, moreover, disapproved of Russia*s having come to an agreement with Austria without the knowledge of France. -125-In London he met with hardly l i t t l e more success f o r h i s plans of opening the S t r a i t s . Grey admitted that the request for opening the S t r a i t s was \" f a i r and reasonable\" and not objectionable \"dn p r i n c i p l e , \" but i n s i s t e d they must be opened \"on terms of equality to a l l . \" He refused to consider opening them to Russian warships while leaving them closed against those of other Powers. This of course was what 1 Isvolsky wanted. But though the Russian Minister had f a i l e d to win support f o r h i s main objective, h i s v i s i t to London was not wholly i n vain. Grey was not prepared to accept the sudden annexation of Bosnia by Aust r i a as a \" f a i t accompli.\" He f e l t that action was a blow to good f a i t h and to treaty obligations and should be discussed at a Conference of the Powers. He maintained that the annexation was an untimely and unmerited blow at the Young Turks, who, as i t appeared to him, were struggling to put t h e i r house i n order, and for whom B r i t i s h sympathy was known to be strong. Accordingly, standing on p r i n c i p l e , he c a l l e d for a European Conference, and i f then the annexation was approved, he f e l t Turkey must 2 receive compensation. A v i s i t to B e r l i n brought the unhappy Russian Minister no more comfort. Appeals to the German Government fo r discussion of the annexation at a Conference and for the 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 177-179. 2. Ibid., 175-77; Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 224. Also, Spender, J. A., and Asquith, C y r i l , L i f e of Lord Oxford and Asquith, ( c i t e d hereafter as Spender, Asquith),(London, 1932), I, 244-49. -126-opening of the S t r a i t s proved vain. He saw c l e a r l y that Germany was determined to stand by her a l l y . Isvolsky saw his dreams fading; B r i t a i n would back him only i n the matter of a Conference; and France was unwilling to give e f f e c t i v e support i n a matter i n which she had not been consulted and i n which she had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t . Aehrenthal had the firm support of Germany, and with this support he refused to submit the question to a Conference unless i t was agreed to beforehand that i t would be held only to sanction the annexation and not to discuss i t . During the next few months no settlement was arrived at. Meanwhile the tension was increased by the excitement which was raging i n Serbia, which country was putting forward loud claims for compensation. Encouraged by Russian sympathy, armed bands were massed along the Austrian f r o n t i e r and agitators sent into Bosnia. To keep a check on this s i t u a t i o n an Austrian army was mobilized and kept i n readiness. Meanwhile the Austrian war party was suggesting that the time was now at hand f o r a f i n a l settlement with Serbia; The s i t u a t i o n became increasingly fraught with danger as the weeks r o l l e d on. It was eased somewhat on February 26, 1909, by an offer of Austria to compensate Turkey f o r the loss of her shadowy rights over Bosnia-H&rzogovina with two and a h a l f m i l l i o n pounds. But Isvolsky was unwilling to agree that a d i r e c t understanding between Austria and Turkey excluded the necessity of submitting the whole question to a -127-Conference. 1 Isvolsky*s f a i l u r e , however, was a foregone con-clusion. The Serbian claim had no l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and i t was clear neither England nor France would go to war over a Balkan question. Russia standing alone against Austria and Ger-many was unthinkable. In the weeks following Austria's s e t t l e -ment with Turkey the Great Powers made several attempts to reconcile Isvolsky's views with those of Aehrenthal. When no solution seemed possible the German Government on March 17 made a proposal of mediation to the Russian Minister which eventually relieved the tension. The o f f e r stated that the German Government would re-quest Austria to i n v i t e the Powers to give t h e i r formal approval to the changes made by an exchange of notes, provided that Russia beforehand promised to give her sanction to the changes when invited by Austria to do so. Isvolsky, s t i l l c l i n g i n g to the hope of a Conference, acknowledged the c o n c i l i a t o r y purpose of the o f f e r , but hesitated to give a d e f i n i t e answer. A week l a t e r , when no answer had been received from Isvolsky, Germany renewed her o f f e r of mediation, t h i s time with greater emphasis, i n a note of March 23, which has been interpreted as somewhat c l o s e l y resembling an ultimatum. Before suggesting that Austria should approach the Powers, Germany wished d e f i n i t e l y to know that Russia would accept the 1. Isvolsky to the Russian Embassy at London, March 11, 1909, Siebert, B. de, Entente Diplomacy and the World, (New York, 1922); 248. -128-note, and Russia was informed \"that a negative or even an evasive answer\" on her part would r e s u l t i n Germany withdrawing 1 and allowing \"things to take t h e i r own course.\" 2 Thus pinned down, Isvolsky, a f t e r consulting the Czar, surrendered, and gave an affirmative reply. After Russia accepted the proposal, England, France and I t a l y agreed also, and the exchange of notes followed giving a belated sanction to the annexation. Serbia, too, yielded, deciding to place her hopes i n the future. On March 31 she made an agreement with Vienna promising to l i v e on good neighbourly 3 terms with the Dual Monarchy. The long c r i s i s was oyer. The r e s u l t s of this bloodless c o n f l i c t on the chancelleries may not be passed over l i g h t l y . Its eff e c t s continued to be f e l t down the years u n t i l the time of the f i n a l c o n f l i c t i n 1914. In the phrase of Dr. Gooch, \" i t 4 l e f t deep scars on the body p o l i t i c of Europe.\" Aust r i a had 1. Isvolsky to Russian Embassies at Paris and london, March 23, 1909, Siebert, op. c i t . , 260. 2. The idea that t h i s note was sent as an ultimatum grew up i n l a t e r days. Mr. Fay claims that t h i s idea was exploited i n the Russian Press and used by Isvolsky d e l i b e r a t e l y to save h i s face before his c r i t i c s . The idea that i t was to be regarded as an ultimatum was spread i n England by S i r Arthur Hicolson; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 391. Mr. Fay adds that i t was not intended by the German Government as an ultimatum, but merely as an attempt to bridge the gulf between Russia and Austria, and to prevent war between Serbia and Austria. Mr. Gooch agrees with this view - Gooch, Before the War, I, 348. Mr. Spender appears to view the note as an ultimatum however; - F i f t y Years, 310. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 393. 4. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, (cited hereafter as Modern Europe), 422-23. -129-unquestionably secured a diplomatic victo r y , but a Pyrrhic v i c t o r y ; viewed i n the l i g h t of l a t e r years i t brought mis-1 fortune rather than success. In the words of Mr. Dickinson, \"Serbian irredentism had been provoked, and the formula she was 2 constrained to sign was nothing but words\". She did not l i v e up to her promise to \" l i v e i n future on good neighbourly terms\" with Austria - \"she allowed her s o i l to be the hearth from which a subversive agita t i o n was spread, encouraging d i s l o y a l t y and treason among the Bosnians and other Slav subjects of the 3 Hapsburg Monarchy.\" And, as l a t e r events were to prove, this Serbian question threatened at every moment to involve Russia, and so Germany, Prance and B r i t a i n . Furthermore, Aehrenthal had caused Europe to view with dis t r u s t Austrian diplomacy, and he incurred the odium attendant upon the u n j u s t i f i e d breach of a solemn treaty. His a l l y , Germany, likewise, i n giving her support to the Austrian action, incurred some of the suspicion which f e l l upon him; e s p e c i a l l y the suspicion among the Entente Powers. It was commonly held that the Imperial Government was an accomplice i n the whole situation, approving v of i t s a l l y ' s action. It has been shown how the attempt of B e r l i n to f i n d a f i n a l solution whioh would sanction Austria's \" f a i t accompli\", and yet at the same time afford Isvolsky a d i g n i f i e d l i n e of retreat from h i s most d i f f i c u l t posit!on,was twisted into a \"threat of force\" or 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , I, 31; Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 224. 2. Dickinson, op. c i t . , 181. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 394. -130-\"ultimatum.\" I t was represented as a brutal German attempt to humiliate Russia and drive a wedge into the Tr i p l e Entente. It was set down as new evidence of the b r u t a l i t y of Germany's 1 diplomatic methods. It was used as further evidence to prove Germany's reputation of t h i r s t f o r mastery and leadership, 2 which was already obnoxious to France and the Western Powers. It was i n Russia that the Bosnian C r i s i s l e f t i t s most serious e f f e c t s . In the press there was the most b i t t e r resentment against a settlement which brought such deep humil-3 i a t i o n and submission to the dictates of a foreign Power. The Pan-Slav press was excited to a violent campaign against Germany, the tenor of which was that a war between Slavdom and Germanism was i n e v i t a b l e . To Isvolsky, personally, this diplomatic defeat was perhaps the most b i t t e r experience of 1. Fay, op. c i t . , 395-96. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 332. Confirmation seemed to be given to this f e e l i n g by Emperor William's vainglorious and tactless speech when on a v i s i t to Vienna i n 1910, he proclaimed to the world that he had stood by his a l l y \" i n shining armour\" - Fay, op. c i t . , I, 396. Grey uses this speech against the Kaiser; op. c i t . * I, 186. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note as Mr. Ewart, points out, that l i t t l e notice has been taken of the fact that the B r i t i s h Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, by his speech at-the G u i l d h a l l Banquet on November 9, 1908, p l a i n l y announced to the world that the United Kingdom was standing by her a l l y , France, and through France, by Russia. He said: \"Nothing w i l l induce us i n th i s country to f a l t e r and f a l l short i n any one of the sp e c i a l engagements which we have undertaken, to be d i s l o y a l or u n f a i t h f u l even for a moment to the s p i r i t of any e x i s t i n g friendship.\" Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I, 167-68. 3. Nicolson to Grey, March 29, 1909, Grey, op. c i t . , I, 188-89. -131-his l i f e ; the desire for revenge and f o r the recovery of l o s t personal prestige was never to leave him i n the days which followed. The c r i t i c i s m l e v e l l e d at him for h i s f a i l u r e was one of the reasons for h i s leaving the Foreign Of f i c e for the Russian ambassadorship i n P a r i s . There he was to work unceas-1 i n g l y for closer-knit bonds with France and England. In retirement Bulow stated with reference to the events of the years 1908-1909, n t h e group of Powers whose influence had been so much overestimated at Algeuiras f e l l to 2 pieees when faced with the tough problems of Continental p o l i c y . \" Most c e r t a i n l y t h i s i s a sentiment of delusion, and not at a l l i n accord with f a c t . I f Austria and Germany had won a s t r i k i n g diplomatic v i c t o r y , i t was not at the expense of the Entente. The c r i s i s i n no way estranged the Three Powers. On the contrary, i t had the completely opposite effect of consolidating and making much closer t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n the face of what was interpreted as a Teutonic threat, the s o l i d i t y of the Entente was considered even more of a necessity than previously, i f German hegemony was to be checked. Mr. C h u r c h i l l sums up the effects of the C r i s i s on France-Russian r e l a t i o n s i n these words: France, aft e r her treatment i n 1905, had begun a thorough m i l i t a r y reorganization. Now Russia, i n 1910 made an enormous increase i n \"her already vast army; and both Russia and France, smarting under s i m i l a r experiences, closed their ranks, cemented t h e i r a l l i a n c e s 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, p.397. Gooch, Before the War, I, 363. 2. Cited i n Hicolson, op. c i t . , 309. rl32-and set to work to construct with Russian labour and French money, the new strategic railway systems of which Russia's western f r o n t i e r stood i n need. (1) And the Russian Ambassador, wri t i n g from P a r i s on A p r i l 1, 1909, shows the r e s u l t on a l l three Entente governments when he reported; In connection with this (the C r i s i s ) , German and Austrian journals have emphasized the success of Austrian diplomacy, and the predominant p o s i t i o n of the Dual Monarchy i n the Balkans. In consequence of t h i s , public opinion i n France as well as i n England demands more and more a s t i l l greater rapprochement between Russia, France and England, as they have already acted i n common during the Austrian-Serbian c o n f l i c t . Foreseeing the further development of the European s i t u a t i o n , many newspapers come to the conclusion that p r e c i s e l y as Germany and Austria have now achieved a b r i l l i a n t v i c t o r y , so must the two Western Powers, together with Russia, now pay th e i r attention to the systematic development of t h e i r forces i n order to be able, once they are in a p o s i t i o n not to fear a challenge of the Tr i p l e A l l i a n c e - and i n th i s case I t a l y would separate he r s e l f from the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e - to set up on t h e i r part demands which would restore the p o l i t i c a l balance which has now been displaced i n favour of Germany and Au s t r i a .... This i s the d i r e c t i o n which the Pari s , and also apparently, the London cabinet wish to give to t h e i r p o l i c y . (2) In another report of the same date he wrote: The cabinets of Paris and London have concluded from this that Russia, France and England must pay more attention than ever to action i n common and must at the same time proceed to the necessary m i l i t a r y measures i n order to convince their opponents they are dealing with a p o l i t i c a l combinati which knows how to make i t s e l f respected and to carry through i t s demands. (3) 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , I, 31. 2. Russian Ambassador at P a r i s to Isvolsky, A p r i l 1, 1909, Siebert, op. c i t . , 266-67. 3. Ibid., 269-70. -133-The Czar expressed a s i m i l a r view when he assured Uieolson on A p r i l 14 that the res u l t of the c r i s i s had been to strengthen the Entente. \"We must,\" he said, \"keep closer 1 and closer together.\" Important as i s the C r i s i s of 1908 as a factor i n the consolidating the Tr i p l e Entente, i n the matter of England's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the alignment of the Powers before 1914 there was an i n f i n i t e l y more important factor, namely, the naval r i v a l r y with Germany. Among a l l the many problems making f o r r i v a l r y t h i s question stands out i n the foreground. In the Navy Law of 1900 Germany had embarked on her plan for b u i l d i n g her navy. B r i t a i n , having \"ruled the waves\" for a hundred years, f e l t that r i v a l r y i n battleships was not only a menace i n the matter of a possible attack, but an unwarranted i n f r i n g e -ment upon her r i g h t f u l prerogative. German r i v a l r y i n colonies, i n industry, i n trade, or i n shipping, these might have been tolerated, but a r i v a l i n the matter of naval power - never. O f f i c i a l assurances by German leaders f a i l e d u t t e r l y to d i s p e l anxiety roused by the appearance of a German navy, the completion of the K i e l Canal and the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of Heligoland. I t 1. Hicolson, op. c i t . , 313. The next year a misunderstanding arose between the Entente Powers i n connection with the Czar's v i s i t to the Kaiser at Potsdam on November 4, 1910. Sazonov, who accompanied the Czar, had interviews with the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary. In the conver-sations during the v i s i t Sazonov promised Germany a free hand, so f a r as Russia was concerned, i n the completion of the Bagdad Railway. France feared that Germany was t r y i n g to weaken the Dual A l l i a n c e . It was feared i n England that Russia was abandoning the T r i p l e Entente. The German press paid glowing tributes to Russia on account of what was regarded as a blow to France and England. As a matter of fact none of these apprehensions or hppes i t transpired, were j u s t i f i e d . Nicolson, op. cit.,336-38. -134-cannot be denied that Germany, i n the words of Mr. Haldane, was within her \"unfettered r i g h t s \" i n building up a f l e e t , i f she chose to follow such a policy, but the faot remained, that i n choosing such a course she rendered impossible f r i e n d l y relations with England, and by p e r s i s t -ently c l i n g i n g to that p o l i c y , she raised an almost insur-mountable b a r r i e r to English amity. The ine v i t a b l e r e s u l t followed - the maintenance of close cooperation with Prance and Russia \"became the pivot of B r i t i s h foreign 1 po l i c y . \" The s t a r t of the r i v a l r y goes back to the opening of the century when the f i r s t beginnings of the German navy resulted i n the adoption by the B r i t i s h Government of the Cawdor programme c a l l i n g for four new battleships a year. S i r John Fisher, who was. appointed F i r s t Sea Lord i n 1904, proceeded d r a s t i c a l l y to change the d i s t r i b u t i o n and composi-ti o n of the f l e e t . The Channel Squadron was greatly reinforced and a Home Fleet stationed i n the North Sea. The harbour of Rosyth i n Scotland was developed into a permanent base, and i n 1905 the \"Dreadnought,\" the f i r s t of a new type of ship, which fa r surpassed a l l previous types i n f i g h t i n g power, was l a i d down. On February 3, 1905, Mr. Arthur Lee, F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, i n a speech to his constitutents struck an ominous note when he declared that the B r i t i s h f l e e t should concentrate 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 683. -125-i n the North Sea, and i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of war, should \" s t r i k e the f i r s t blow, before the other side found time to read i n 1 the newspapers that war had been declared.\" These events had inevitable repercussions i n Germany. T i r p i t z i n a new Naval B i l l of 1906 added s i x new cruisers to the German f l e e t which had been refused i n 1900, and secured money to widen the K i e l Canal. Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y had begun i n earnest; a dangerous stage was thus reached i n 1906 with the admiralties of each Power a t t r i b u t i n g aggressive designs to the other. The L i b e r a l Government which took o f f i c e under Campbell-Bannerman i n December, 1905, was opposed to increases i n naval estimates. Pledged to inaugurate an extensive programme of s o c i a l reforms there was need of economy i n the 2 matter of armaments. As a r e s u l t the naval estimates f o r 1906-08 showed a s l i g h t decrease. It was stated that one o f of the four ships provided f o r i n the Cawdor programme would be omitted, and the prime minister announced h i s intentions of proposing l i m i t a t i o n of armaments at the second Hague Conference which had been c a l l e d to meet i n 1907. This intention was communicated to the other Powers. Any hope of the B r i t i s h for success i n this plan was d i s p e l l e d when the German Government announced that i t eould not take part i n any such discussion 1. Cited i n Ewart, I I , I I , op. c i t . , 682. 2. Speech of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, December 21, 1905; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 237. 3. Belgian Minister i n London, July 28, 1906, Morel, op. ci t . , 49. -136-since i t was f e l t to be impractical, and i n s i s t e d that the 1 matter of l i m i t a t i o n should not be raised at the Conference. Despite t h i s attitude of Germany, the subject was brought up at the fourth plenary session by the B r i t i s h delegate. The matter, however, was passed over almost without debate and nothing of value achieved. It was unfortunate Germany did not take up t h i s o f f e r . There i s l i t t l e reason to believe that discussion would have l e d to any valuable formulae which could have prevented the catastrophe of 1914, but her p a r t i c -ipation i n such discussion would have lightened B r i t i s h suspicions of her peaceful intentions, and saved her from 2 in c u r r i n g the odium of having wrecked the proposals. The K a i s e r s v i s i t to Windsor i n November, 1907, seemed to somewhat lessen the tension which had been growing up between the two countries. He wa$ most c o r d i a l l y received, and friends of peace i n both countries were f i l l e d with 3 s a t i s f a c t i o n . The aspirations of peace and friendship expressed by press and leaders appeared to be f u l l y r e a l i z e d . The v i s i t had not been intended f o r p o l i t i c a l discussion, but 4 the matter of the Bagdad Railway did a r i s e . S i r Edward Grey 1. Russia and Austria were also opposed to i t s being discussed. E. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 233; Brandenburg, op: c i t . , S77-78. 3. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 557-559. 4. Ibid., 559. The Kaiser spoke of i t f i r s t of a l l to Mr. Haldane who took the matter up with Grey. 137-S i r Edward Grey i n s i s t e d that i n any settlement of t h i s question France and Russia would have to be consulted, f o r 1 th e i r i n t e r e s t s were involved. Some weeks l a t e r the B e r l i n Government stated i t s readiness to discuss the Railway with the B r i t i s h Government but placed a veto on discussion with Russia 8 and France. The matter ended there. This royal v i s i t had brought a short period of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between the two countries. For a few weeks Anglo-German re l a t i o n s had breathed a c o r d i a l i t y they had not known for some years, and which they were not to know again f o r years to come. Under the influence of a warm royal welcome relationships had yielded to a r e v i v a l of family associations, and a desire to resume the p o l i t i c a l intimacy of e a r l i e r years. But the good omens were soon to vanish, as darkening clouds 3 f i l l e d the sky. With the opening of 1908 the atmosphere became charged with e l e c t r i c i t y . Germany was unwilling to admit the r i g h t of any foreign Power to dictate the extent of her naval armaments. While William II was on English s o i l a new German Naval B i l l reduced- the l i f e of battleships from twenty-fiire to twenty years, and provided f o r the early replacement of old obsolete vessels by new ships of the new Dreadnought type. The construction of the new and replacement ships was to proceed at 1. Note of conversation between Grey and Haldane, November 14, 1907, B.D., VI, No.68, pp.95-96. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 559-561. Haldane, op.cit., 62-66. 3. Lee* op. c i t . , I I , 563. -138-tho rate of four a year from 1908 to 1911 and two a year from 1912 to 1917. I t was this programme which seems to have brought home to the English ministers the f u l l seriousness of the 1 s i t u a t i o n . The Press on both sides was whipping up national passions. Then, early i n 1908 the Kaiser wrote h i s well-meant but injudicious l e t t e r to l o r d Tweedsmouth, the F i r s t Lord of 2 the B r i t i s h Admiralty. This was a private l e t t e r , sent without the Imperial Chancellor's knowledge, i n which the Emperor sought to produce a t r a n q u i l l i z i n g e f f e c t by emphasizing the fact that Germany was not thinking of challenging B r i t a i n ' s supremacy of the sea, and i n which he endeavoured to j u s t i f y 3 the German naval programme. Lord Tweedsmouth sent a courteous reply. But vague rumours of the exchange of l e t t e r s leaked out 4 to reach the public ear. The Kaiser was suspected of attempting to influence a B r i t i s h minister to effect reductions i n the naval budget. The matter came up i n Parliament, where the English leaders defended th e i r colleague, who had shown them the l e t t e r , and they maintained that the matter was one of a 5 purely private exchange of l e t t e r s . The matter was thus closed. It was,however, a most imprudent act of the Kaiser*s, well-intended no doubt, but tactless, and i t brought untoward r e s u l t s 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 237. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 278. 2. For this incident see B.D. VI, Ho.88, 89, 90, 91. 3. Lee, op. c i t . , II, 606. 4. The \"Times,1' March 6, 1908; a r t i c l e by Colonel Repington. 5. Lee, op. c i t : , I I , 607. -139-whioh added f u e l to the flames of national f e e l i n g , and widened the gulf between the two countries. The growing conviction i n Germany that England was tryi n g to put a check on her navy, and \" e n c i r c l e \" her i n other ways, was fostered to a s t i l l greater extent by numerous v i s i t s and interviews which Edward VII had with French and Russian 1 r u l e r s and ministers i n the summer of 1908. In May President 2 F a l l i e r e s was c o r d i a l l y received i n London, and given a dinner at the Foreign O f f i c e , to which the only person i n v i t e d outside 3 the French and English group, was the Russian Ambassador. In June King Edward v i s i t e d the Czar at Reval, accompanied by Admiral Fisher, S i r John French and S i r Charles Hardinge, who had long conversations with Isvolsky and the Russian Premier, Stolypin. There was no attempt to Reval to b u i l d up a closer Anglo-Russian combination, and assurances were offered to 4 Germany that no unfriendly steps towards her were taken. But the v i s i t put the seal on the Anglo-Russian r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and rumours of agreements h o s t i l e to Germany increased the conviction that the Fatherland was being hemmed i n . When i n 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 596; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 240. 2. L i s t e r to Grey, May 28, 1908, B.D.VI, No.95, pp.149-150. Lee, op. cit.., I I , 584-86. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , 1, 240. 4. Grey to do S a i l s , June 15, 1908, B.D.VI, No.97, p.154. 5. The idea that King Edward was a busy i n t r i g u e r using these v i s i t s f o r p o l i t i c a l ends, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r weakening the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and for \" e n c i r c l i n g \" Germany became more deeply rooted i n the German mind. Lee, op. c i t . , I I, 596. Grey*s comment on the years 1907-1908 are of i n t e r e s t . He says, \"In looking through old papers, i t i s depressing to read of the d i s t r u s t and suspicion with which Governments and peoples regarded each other i n these'years. The impression given i s of an atmosphere so miserable and unwholesome that nothing healthy could l i v e i n i t ; --140-the course of h i s stay abroad i n the summer of 1908 His Majesty v i s i t e d the Austrian Emperor at I s c h l , vague rumours arose that England was endeavouring to weaken the T r i p l e 1 A l l i a n c e by winning the support of Austria from Germany. Ho one recognized the Anglo-German tension more c l e a r l y , nor deplored i t to a greater extent, that did Count Metternich i n London, who accurately guaged the B r i t i s h f e e l i n g i n t h i s matter of naval armaments. He kept the German Government informed of B r i t i s h opinion, pointing out that while there was no r e a l h o s t i l i t y to Germany there was a growing fear of her naval power, and that the increase of the German f l e e t prevented confidence. The Kaiser was incensed at the Ambassador's suggestion that English friendship could be obtained only at the cost of Germany's f l e e t . \" I f England only intends graoiously to o f f e r us her hand on condition that we reduce our f l e e t . that i s an unparalleled impertinence, and a b i t t e r i n s u l t to the German people and t h e i r Kaiser, which the Ambassador must 2 r e j e c t . \" He was of course strengthened i n this attitude by the leading naval c i r c l e s . A p o s i t i v e r e f u s a l to discuss l i m i t a t i o n was put forward by the Kaiser when Hardinge broached the subject to him on the occasion of King Edward's v i s i t to Cronberg i n August op.ci t. ,1,143; Again, speaking of the royal v i s i t s he states, \"An even more f e r t i l e source of suspicion were royal v i s i t s . These v i s i t s were matters of c i v i l i t y and courtesy; as such t h e i r e f f e c t was good; they made a f r i e n d l y atmosphere. But they caused me the greatest trouble;\" { i b i d . , 149-151. 13. Gooch, Modern Europe, 439. Grey, op.cit., I, 150. 8. Cited i n Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 284. -141-1 of 1908. Hardinge explained the uneasiness of the B r i t i s h leaders and pointed out the dangers of naval competition. He i n s i s t e d on the necessity of l i m i t i n g such r i v a l r y ; \"You must stop or b u i l d more slowly.\" The discussion became rather heated; and the Kaiser r e p l i e d rather brusquely, \"Then we s h a l l 2 f i g h t , f o r i t i s a question of national honour and d i g n i t y . \" I t was the l a s t time that the B r i t i s h Government o f f i c i a l l y suggested an agreed l i m i t a t i o n . In the following months English alarm s t e a d i l y increased,and the tide of excited f e e l i n g rose higher. In October, 1908, further antagonism between the two countries was caused by the publication of the \"Daily 3 Telegraph\" interview. A conversation the Kaiser had held with a private c i t i z e n , Colonel Stuart-Wortley, whose guest the Emperor had been i n 1907, was published with h i s approval i n October E8, 1908. The interview was undoubtedly meant as a sincere gesture of friendship and as a contribution to f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . But i t produced the opposite r e s u l t . The dominant note of the reported interview was the Kaiser's avowed friendship for Great B r i t a i n , as evinced both openly and s e c r e t l y during the years of the Boer War, and since s t e a d i l y maintained, though neither shared by h i s own people nor recognized by the B r i t i s h . He declared that although Germany was expanding her navy, the sole aim of her f l e e t was the protection of her 1. l e e , op. c i t . , I I , 618. 2. Pay, op. c i t . , I, 242; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 243. The long memorandum of f i r Charles Hardinge, August 16,1908 B.D. 711, Ho.117, pp.184-90. ' 3. For t h i s incident see B.D. 71, pp.201ff. -142-Increasing trade, the maintenance of German i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East. He posed throughout his reported words as one who 1 was completely misunderstood i n Great B r i t a i n . The gesture was another pathetic example of the Kaiser's ineptitude. However well-intentioned, i t increased 2 the \"malaise\" i t was intended to d i s p e l . His protestation of friendship was jeered i n England; h i s s i n c e r i t y was doubted, and the idea that h i s advice had been of service against the Boers was resented. But h i s admission that the German public was h o s t i l e to B r i t a i n was noted, and thus further colour was added to the B r i t i s h mind of Germany as an Anglophobe nation. The publication of the interview caused a storm of newspaper attacks on both sides qf the Channel; In Germany the action was regarded as most i l l - c o n s i d e r e d , and attacks were made on 3 the personal r u l e of the Kaiser by the L i b e r a l s and S o c i a l i s t s . 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 621. 2. Grey wrote i n this connection, \"The German Emperor i s ageing me; he i s l i k e a battleship with steam up and screws going, but with no rudder, and he w i l l run into something some day and cause a catastrophe.\" Grey to E l l a Pease, November 8, 1908, c i t e d i n Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 154. 3. Before the interview was published the Kaiser had sent the manuscript to the Foreign O f f i c e f o r approval. It was forwarded to Bulow who was taking a cure at Horderney. He unfortunately omitted to read i t . Minor o f f i c i a l s did not • venture on any c r i t i c i s m s , supposing i t had Bulow*s approval; i t was allowed to go out, and was published October 28, 1908. As a r e s u l t of the storm raised by this mistake Bulow offered h i s resignation, which was declined. In the debate which followed i n the Reichstag the Kaiser f e l t the Chancellor did not adequately defend him and this incident l e d to a growing coolness between them. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 291. -143-In 1908 b e l i e f i n England t h a t the German \"menace\" was a r e a l i t y was growing stronger. Powerful voices were s t r i k i n g t h i s note, and the danger was portrayed i n such a manner as to catch popular imagination. From the opening o f the century the \"National Review\" had preached Germany as \"the enemy.\" Lord Cromer i n a speech i n the House of Lords i n J u l y , 1908, urged the Government to make provision f o r a coming c o n f l i c t . On November 23 Lord Roberts i n t h e same place made a s t i r r i n g appeal f o r compulsory m i l i t a r y service. S i r John Fisher had talked to KinCJ Edward of the wisdom of \"Copenhagenlng\" the German F l e e t . In France also s i m i l a r feelings were growing. During his cure at Marienbad i n August o f 1908 King Edward received a v i s i t from Clemenceau, the French Premier, who urged upon England the creation of a 2 national army. To what extent these views represented public opinion i s uncertain, but as long as the question o f naval armaments remained unsolved,normal re l a t i o n s between Germany and England were an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . The United Kingdom would not permit encroachment upon her ocean-predominance. As has been shown above Metternich i n London was greatly perturbed over the growing tension; he saw the two countries d r i f i n g into misunderstandings and recriminations which might soon lead to war.. \" I t i s not the economic development of Germany which makes our r e l a t i o n s to England 1. Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 604. 2. Goschen to Grey, August 29, 1908; B.D., 71, Ho.109, pp.157 Lee, op. c i t . , I I , 628. -144-1 worse from year to year, but the rap i d increase of our f l e e t . \" Hessuggested the d e s i r a b i l i t y of slowing down the German programme of construction from four to three ships annually, and of tr y i n g to ar r i v e at some understanding with England. Bulow personally favoured such a p o l i c y , and s t i r r e d by the Ambassador's repeated warnings, he took up the matter with T i r p i t z . The Admiral's answer was a decided negative; he disagreed absolutely with the Ambassador's diagnosis of the si t u a t i o n . There must be no slowing down of pace, but rather the pressing forward of the programme with i r o n energy. I f such a l t e r a t i o n s i n the naval programme were i n s i s t e d upon, as Bulow suggested, he would res i g n . The correspondence between the Chancellor and T i r p i t z ended with Bulow giving way; they came to no agreement, and Bulow v i r t u a l l y abandoned Metternich's suggestion f o r the time at l e a s t . In February of 1909 there arose a new opportunity f o r coming to some agreement with England, but i t came to nothing. The v i s i t of the English King and Queen to B e r l i n produced a 2 . momentary detente. l o r d Crewe who accompanied t h e i r Majesties touched upon the question of naval competition i n conversation with Bulow, but while the conversations were f r i e n d l y enough, and while c o r d i a l assurances were given, they, 3 were without s i g n i f i c a n c e . 1. Metternich to Billow, c i t e d i n Gooch, Before the War, I, 269. 2. Lee, op. c i t . , I I, 673-77. 3. Gooch, Before the War, I, 272. -145-Metternich reported at t h i s time that the B r i t i s h Government believed Germany to be secretly accelerating her programme, that they were se c r e t l y alarmed, but had not asked for an explanation. Bulow r e p l i e d that no acceleration was planned. This statement produced l i t t l e effect, however, since the B r i t i s h \" leaders preferred the information of the B r i t i s h Admiralty. Grey u n o f f i c i a l l y suggested an occasional exchange of information, but Bulow re p l i e d that since precise declar-ations were not believed such a plan would be of no use. When, however, Asquith and Grey suggested inspection by the respective Naval Attaches, the Chancellor/ advised the accept-ance of the proposal as a means of calming opinion i n England. T i r p i t z was also i n favour of t h i s within c e r t a i n l i m i t s , but 1 the Kaiser refused his consent. n l n England the suspicion grew that Germany was building at a faster rate than prescribed by law. The e f f e c t of the r i v a l r y of the past few years came to a climax i n the spring of 1909 i n the form of the \"German naval scare.\" As a r e s u l t of the increasing B r i t i s h a g i t a t i o n , Mr. McKenna, F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, i n his speech of March 16, 1909, proposed that f o r three years England should lay down s i x Dreadnoughts. To aid his argument he hinted that Germany, by concealing her building a c t i v i t i e s , had almost reached equality i n naval power with B r i t a i n . His words c r y s t a l l i z e d the 1. Gooch, Bp. c i t . , 272-73; Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 294-95. -146-general f e e l i n g of uneasiness which existed i n England. This speech was followed by an Opposition attack led by Mr. Balfour which increased the p r e v a i l i n g fear. He pictured most v i v i d l y \"the alarming circumstances i n which this country finds i t s e l f , \" and declared that \"the programme as presented by the Government i s u t t e r l y i n s u f f i c i e n t . \" By 1910, he said, Germany would be ahead of B r i t a i n with thirteen Dreadnoughts to B r i t a i n ' s ten. By 1912 Germany would have twenty-five. His figures, time was to prove, were unbelievably f a n t a s t i c - i n 191E Germany had only twelve. But the B r i t i s h were i n a mood to believe the wildest prophesying. \"There was no l i m i t to the s t u p i d i t y of the s t o r i e s which f i l l e d the newspapers, and the conversation 1 of the readers.\" The demand arose over a l l England, \"we want eight and we won't wait,\" and i n response to this cry, f a n t a s t i c though i t was, and based upon nothing more than suspicion, 2 d i s l i k e and apprehension, the eight were voted. Although Mr* McKenna l a t e r admitted his statements to have been incor r e c t , they had done their damage i n further increasing Anglo-German 3 antagonism. 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 690. Reports of the Belgian M i n i s t e r i n B e r l i n , March 22 and 31, 1909, Morel, op. c i t ; , 151-53. 2. Spender, Asquith, I, 253. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 298. Mr. Winston C h u r c h i l l , who suoceeded Mr. McKenna as F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, has the following to say of t h i s \"naval scare;\" \"I was s t i l l a sceptic about the danger of the European s i t u a t i o n , and not convinced by the Admiralty case. In conjunction with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I proceeded at once to canvass this scheme and to examine the reasons by which i t was supported. The conclusions which we both reached were that a programme of four ships would s u f f i c i e n t l y meet our needs I could not agree with the Admiralty conten-ti o n that a dangerous sit u a t i o n would be reached i n the year 1912. I found the Admiralty figures on t h i s subject -147-In July of 1909 Bethman-Hollw£g succeeded von Bulow as Imperial Chancellor, and Kinderlen-Wachter entered the German foreign o f f i c e . The former was powerless to a l t e r the course which had heen set i n the past few years, but he agreed with Metternich as to the need for coming to some agreement over the naval question with England. His views were shared by the new Foreign Secretary. Thus a more accomodating s p i r i t entered into the Wilhelmstrasse. The new Chancellor was determined on a frank exchange of views, and with this i n mind he opened negotiations with the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n B e r l i n , S i r Edward 1 Goschen, i n August 1909. The discussions thus begun, and which lasted during the next few months, took much the same course as the l a t e r ones of 1912.. The Germans i n s i s t e d , that desirable as any building truce might be i n i t s e l f , i t must'be conditional 2 upon a p o l i t i c a l agreement. In the eyes of the B r i t i s h , however, there was l i t t l e hope of a p o l i t i c a l agreement unless 3 the tension was f i r s t relaxed by a substantial naval reduction. \\ were exaggerated .... The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were i n no respect f u l f i l l e d i n the year 1912. The B r i t i s h margin was found to be ample i n that year. There were no secret German Dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral von T i r p i t z made any untrue statement i n respect of major construction. The Admiralty had demanded s i x ships; the economists offered four; and we f i n a l l y compromised on eight.** op. c i t . , I, 32-33. 1. Goschen to Grey, August 21, 1909, B.D., VI, Ho.186, p.883; Ho.187, p.284. 2. Ibid;, pp.283-84. 3- Hicolson to Grey, September 22, 1909; B.D;, VI, Ho;198, p.291. Goschen to Grey, October 15, 1909, i b i d . , Ho.200. -148-There was l i t t l e room for compromise. The German Government could not agree to any departure from th e i r b u i l d i n g programme, (since i t was claimed t h i s would not be supported i n the Reichstag), but they were w i l l i n g to discuss \"retarding the 1 r a t e \" of b u i l d i n g new ships. The draft p o l i t i c a l agreement that was suggested proposed that i n the event of an attack made oh either Party by a t h i r d Power or group of Powers the 2 Party not attacked should remain neutral. The signing of such an agreement by the B r i t i s h would prevent them from supporting Prance or Russia and from taking a part i n future 3 Continental a f f a i r s i n which they might be greatly interested. Neither i n 1909, nor i n 1912, was B r i t a i n w i l l i n g to pledge n e u t r a l i t y . It i s not s u r p r i s i n g therefore that the proposal was turned down. P o l i t i c a l l y i t was open to the gravest objections, and on the naval side i t offered no substantial 4 reduction. The negotiations were taken up several times i n the 5 next year but led to no r e s u l t . The B r i t i s h suggested the plan, of I n s t i t u t i n g p e r i o d i c a l reports by the naval attaches on both sides as to the progress of building new vessels, and 1. Goschen to Grey, November 4, 1909, B.D.vT, No.204, p.305. 2. Ibid. 3. Grey to Goschen, May 5, 1910; i b i d . , No.361, p.479. 4. Nicolson to Goschen, February 6, 1911, Nicolson, op. c i t . , 339. 5. Memorandum of S i r Edward Grey, B.D., VI* July 29, 1910, enclosure i n No.387, pp.501-508. -149-the inspection of shipyards i n both countries, i n order to remove the suspicion of the English that Germany was building 1 more ships than was o f f i c i a l l y admitted. But these came to 2 nothing. During 1909 and 1910 En g l i s h domestic p o l i t i e s was • disturbed by the acute c o n s t i t u t i o n a l struggle waged by the two Houses over finances. There were two general elections. These circumstances interfered with negotiations with Germany 3 so that by the end of 1910 no progress had been made. Despite the f a i l u r e to mitigate the r i v a l r y , the Anglo-German tension seemed less acute by 1911. The death of 4 King Edward seemed to bring about a s l i g h t detente. The Kaiser had come to London f o r the funeral i n May, 1910, and his 5 manifest sympathy was warmly appreciated. In May, 1911, he accepted King George*s i n v i t a t i o n to attend the u n v e i l i n g of a statue of Queen V i c t o r i a . His reoeption i n London was most c o r d i a l . Shortly afterwards the Crown Prince attended the coronation of King George. But just at this time, when the tension seemed eased, a new c r i s i s broke out i n Morocoo, the C r i s i s of Agadir, which put to an end the p o l i t i c a l dead calm. 1. Memorandum of S i r Edward Grey, July 29, 1910, B.D., VI, Ho.387, pp.501-2, and statement handed to T i r p i t z by Captain Watson, August 24, 1910. B.D., VI, enclosure 3 i n Ho.397, pp.517-18* 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 368-369. 3. The negotiations outlined i n the previous pages were summarised for the Cabinet Committee i n a memorandum of May 24, 1911 by S i r Edward Grey, given i n B.D., VI, Ho. 468, pp.631-35. 4. Goooh, Modern Europe, 457. 5. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 359. -150-Thus, up to 1911, attempts to solve the r i v a l r y i n naval armaments had f a i l e d . It i s d i f f i c u l t to see how there could have been any result but f a i l u r e . During a l l the discussions the fundamental issues had not been touched. Was i t possible to reconcile the interests of two powerful states;*.;.- the one of which desired to prevent change, the other of which was bent on changing a r a t i o o f power which i t f e l t to be unjust? Each side approached the question from i t s own point of view only. Each could make out a good case f o r i t s e l f ; each had grounds f o r fear; each changed and magnified the objective o f the other. Underlying t h i s fundamental issue there were two s i g n i f i c a n t problems - B r i t a i n was unwilling to make any p o l i t i c a l agreement with Germany which would i n any respect l i m i t her ex i s t i n g relationship with France - and Germany was unwilling to make any reduction i n her naval programme which would s a t i s f y B r i t a i n . While this question of naval r i v a l r y remained no nearer solution, adhesion to the Tri p l e Entente seemed more than ever a necessity to B r i t a i n . CHAPTER V The Agadir C r i s i s , 1911 -151-CHAPTER 7 The Agadir C r i s i s 1911 On July 1, 1911,the diplomatic world was s t a r t l e d and alarmed by an announcement on the part of the German Government that a gunboat, the \"Panther,\" had been dispatched to Agadir. Agadir was an A t l a n t i c port i n the extreme south of Morocco, some f i v e hundred miles south of Tangier. It was claimed that German, firms established i n the south of Morocco had been alarmed by unrest among the l o c a l tribesmen and had applied to the home government f o r protection. The gunboat had been sent to their assistance, and to watch over German interests, which were said to be considerable i n that area. As soon as normal t r a n q u i l l i t y had been restored the ship 1 would leave. The news of this action on the part of the German Government, fo r which no warning had been given, aroused 2 indignation and surprise i n the chancellories of Europe. What did i t mean? To f i n d an answer i t w i l l be necessary to review the course of Moroccan a f f a i r s a f t e r the Conference of Algeciras. 1. B.D*, 711, No.338, p.322. Aide-memoire communicated by Count Metternich, July 1, 1911; No.339, pp.322-23, minute by S i r Arthur Nicolson. 2. Agadir was a closed port, and not open to trade. It was doubted i f there were German residents or merchants i n the v i c i n i t y ; -152-The Conference of 1906 had produced no t r u l y s a t i s f a c t o r y conditions i n Morocoo; i t was followed hy neither improvement i n the i n t e r n a l conditions, nor by improvement i n the r e l a t i o n s between France and Germany. The French found themselves b u s i l y engaged i n the onerous and thankless task of enforcing economic and administrative reforms. The Sultan's brother, Mulai Hafid, gained a strong following among the chi e f t a i n s , who resented French and Spanish in t r u s i o n , and with this backing he revolted. In the disorders which arose i n 1907 the murder of a doctor gave the French occasion to ocoupy Oudja, near the Algerian border, and further outrages led to the landing of troops i n Casablanca and to the placing of French p o l i c e i n seaports on the west coast. In the struggle Mulai 1 Hafid proved strong enough to depose his brother. While negotiations were being carried on with regard to the recognition of the new Sultan, an incident at Casablanca threatened to cause a serious breach i n Franoo-German r e l a t i o n s . Six deserters from the French Foreign l e g i o n had been assisted by the German Consul at Casablanca i n an attempt to escape aboard a German ship i n September, 1908* French s o l d i e r s attempted to arrest them, and i n the struggle which followed two German o f f i c i a l s were maltreated. Over t h i s incident a b i t t e r dispute arose between the two governments. In spite of the excitement which f l a r e d i n the press good sense prevailed 1. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 806-13. For a c r i t i c i s m of French p o l i c y i n Morocco during these years see the reports of the Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n given i n Morel, op. c i t . p.68-70, 71-72, 117-18, 118-20, 121-22, 181. -153-among the leaders, for f a u l t existed on both sides. The matter was referred to the Hague Tribunal f o r a r b i t r a t i o n which declared both parties must share the blame. The incident i t s e l f was not important, but minor episode though i t was, i t proved p a i n f u l and dangerous, and pre c i p i t a t e d almost a c r i s i s i n the whole Moroccan Question and i n the r e l a t i o n s between France 1 and Germany. The Incident i s important also i n that i t reveals c l e a r l y , as did the a f f a i r s of 1905 and 1906, how the B r i t i s h and French Entente policy might have become operative. In November, before the a f f a i r was s e t t l e d , the French Government, through S i r Francis B e r t i e , asked whether France could count on the support of B r i t a i n i n r e s i s t i n g what they chose to 2 term , f t h e u n j u s t i f i a b l e demands'1 of the German Government. This request obviously contemplated for c e r t a i n eventualities m i l i t a r y support. Grey placed the following minute on Bertie's dispatch: ''The l i n e , i f the question becomes acute, w i l l have \"3 to be decided by the Cabinet.'' This reply or comment, which presumably would be conveyed to the French Government, was ce r t a i n l y not a re f u s a l to consider giving support, and as Professor Mowat suggests, i t would not, according to the normal 1. Gooch, Before the War, I, 275; B.D., T i l , pp.l09r-131. The fears of the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s that the incident might lead to grave r e s u l t s - minutes to Ho.129, p.118. Also, see Nicolson to Grey, November 5, 1908, Ho*130, p*118, f o r the alarm of the Hussian Government. 2. Bertie to Grey, November 4, 1908, B.D., VII, No;129, p.117* 3. Ibid., p*118. -154-interpretation of diplomatic language, be considered 1 discouraging. France, however, had no need at t h i s time to ask further for the contemplated support. But there was l i t t l e doubt that the increasing a c t i v i t y of the French i n Morocco would i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t i n the establishment of a preponder-ating p o l i t i c a l influence there. Ho one saw this more c l e a r l y than the Kaiser, and i t i s to his c r e d i t that he displayed much wisdom i n favouring a p o l i c y of f r i e n d l y c o n c i l i a t i o n . He had never favoured the Bulow-Hdlstein Moroccan p o l i c y , and he now came to the conclusion that i t was impossible to check the extension of French control i n Morocco without resort to force. On October 4, 1908, he informed his Foreign Of f i c e that so far as was practicable Germany should withdraw with dignity £ from Moroccan a f f a i r s , and come to an understanding with France. Bulow was by this time also i n favour of l i q u i d a t i n g this question, and he thus intimated to France that Germany would be w i l l i n g to negotiate a settlement. Pichon, the French premier, was anxious to avoid f r i c t i o n with Germany and 3 favoured a \"detente.\" After short negotiations an agreement was signed on February 9, 1909. \"To f a c i l i t a t e the execution of the Act of Algeciras,\" France, professing s t i l l to respect the independence and i n t e g r i t y of Morocco, promised equality 1. Mowat, R.B., Hew l i g h t on the Agadir C r i s i s , the Contemporary Review, Vol.141, June, 193£, 709. 2. Fay, op. c i t * , I, £47-48. 3. Gooch, Before the War, I, £76. -155-of economic opportunity to the Germans; and Germany, promising to pursue only economic aims, recognized the sp e c i a l p o l i t i c a l interests of France i n preserving peace and order, and promised 1 not to interfere with them. The c o n c i l i a t o r y attitude of Germany was warmly welcomed i n France as putting an end to a long standing source of i r r i t a t i o n between the two nations. The B r i t i s h Government, too, was delighted, and expressed pleasure that a question which had occasioned such anxiety to England, and over which £ England was bound to give France support, was now s e t t l e d . I t was welcomed as well i n most of the European c a p i t a l s , more esp e c i a l l y at this p a r t i c u l a r time, since Europe was entangled i n the Bosnian C r i s i s . But unfortunately for the peace of Europe this pact of 1909 proved only a breathing-space and not a solution of Moroccan problems. For a short time i t did bring about more co r d i a l relations between France and Germany, but i t did not bring to f r u i t i o n a l l the happy r e s u l t s expected of i t . The proposed economic partnership served as a basis for f r i e n d l y relations during the next two years, and cooperation i n the economic f i e l d was begun hopefully. But every one of the schemes embarked upon proved f a i l u r e s , whatever may have been the intentions of the p a r t i e s . This was seen i n plans made with regard to mines, railways, and other public works. At every 1. Fay, op. c i t ; , I, 248* 2. Grey-to Goschen, February 9, 1909, B.D., 711* jb,152, p.136, and Grey to Be r t i e , February 9, 1909, Io.l53, pp,136-37. -156-1 point, i n every region, arrangements broke down. The Germans, not unnaturally, were angry and m i s t r u s t f u l . And as a r e s u l t of the f a i l u r e of the Agreement to reconcile the economic inte r e s t s of the two Powers p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s continued to occur. At the same time, while the Pact of 1909 was f a i l i n g to bring f o r t h the r e s u l t s f o r which i t had been arranged, further disorders i n Morocoo were furnishing the French with a pretext f o r a steady extension of their p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l . I t can be e a s i l y understood that i n the eyes of Germany the stipulated basis of the agreement, \"the maintenance of the independence and i n t e g r i t y of the Shereefian Empire,\" 2 was becoming more and more of a myth. \" I t became clearer and clearer that with this extension of French influence the equality of economic opportunity contemplated i n the 1909 Agreement, and the idea of an independent Sultan at the head of a w e l l -regulated government, were both f i c t i o n s i n contradiction 3 with the actual trend of events.\" It was while events were passing thus i n Morocco that S i r Edward Grey was asked i n the House of Commons, i n March of 1911, a question with regard to England's obligations to support France. Both h i s reply to t h i s question, and the attitude of 1. Dickinson, op. c i t ; , 189; Ewart, op. c i t . , II, 815-17. For a c r i t i c i s m of French p o l i c y i n this regard see Fabre-Iuce, op. c i t . , 123, and HaleVy, E l i e , World•Crisis, 1914-1918, (London, 1930), 24. 2. Brandenburg, op; c i t . * 370. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 278. For the way i n which France continued to extend f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y control over the Sultan, see Ewart, op. c i t ; , I I , 808-24 and The Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n , A p r i l 21, 1911, Morel, op. c i t . , 177-78, and May 1, 1911, i b i d . , 181. -157-the French Foreign Minister to that reply are of i n t e r e s t , to say the l e a s t . Did there exist at the time he entered into o f f i c e , S i r Edward was asked, any understanding, \"expressed or implied, i n virtue of which Great B r i t a i n would he under obligations to France to send troops, i n c e r t a i n eventualities, to a s s i s t the operations of the French army?\" Grey r e p l i e d , \"The extent of the obligations to which Great B r i t a i n was committed was that expressed or implied i n the Anglo-French Convention l a i d before Parliament. There was no other engagement 1 bearing on the subject.\" This answer, of course, gave no hint of the secret a r t i c l e s of the 1904 Agreement which were 2 unknown to Parliament at this time, nor of the m i l i t a r y and naval \"conversations\" which began i n 1906. When M. Cruppi, the French Foreign Minister, heard of S i r Edward's answer he complained to S i r Francis B e r t i e i n Paris that Grey's statement was rather regrettably p o s i t i v e i n i t s denial of the existence of an obligation to support France. \"He regretted that you had found i t necessary to repudiate so strongly the existence of any unknown Agreement between England and France,for your repudiation has had a regrettable e f f e c t i n certain Parliamentary c i r c l e s . He (M. Cruppi) knew what had passed between the Departments of the two Governments f o r he had seen the dossier. He would have preferred that there should have been a suspicion that an 1. B.D., VII, Ho*197, p.182. 2, Supra. -158-1 understanding did exist for possible e v e n t u a l i t i e s . \" Meanwhile trouble was r i s i n g i n Morocco. The new Sultan had roused native discontent, as had h i s predecessor, by his subservience to the French. This discontent came to a head i n March, 1911, when a r e v o l t broke out i n Fez. This was the s i t u a t i o n when the French sent out alarming reports that the Europeans i n Fez were i n danger. On A p r i l 5, Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador i n B e r l i n , informed the German Government that a French expedition was to be dispatched to Fez to r e l i e v e the Sultan and to ensure the safety of the Europeans there. The troops started early i n A p r i l , and arrived i n Fez on May 21. The expedition was not dispatched before warning had been sent to the various Powers; and not before Kiderlen, who directed Germany's p o l i c y at this time, and the Chancellor had offered repeated warnings that such action might reopen the whole Moroccan Question. They warned Cambon that the occupation of Fez might be considered as a further step i n the annulling of the Act of Algeciras, and that i t would e n t i t l e Germany to resume complete l i b e r t y of action. They expressed the hope that the action would be delayed as long as possible, and that France and Germany might work out a s a t i s f a c t o r y compromise on Moroccan a f f a i r s . This was a hint at compensation f o r Germany. It was pointed out that i t was much easier to occupy a c i t y than to leave i t , and that once 1. Bertie to Grey, A p r i l 9, 1911, B.D., VII, No.205, pp.188-89. -159-Fez was i n French possession public opinion on both sides would be roused, and a compromise would be d i f f i c u l t . They did not give an approval, nor did they lodge a protest, but e contented themselves with warnings, p r e f e r r i n g to wait on events The French i n s i s t e d that the action was only due to extreme necessity, and would be expressed i n accordance with the s p i r i t of the Act of Algeciras. The troops would restore order and then r e t i r e . S i r Edward Grey accepted the assurances of the French Government without question, and i n pursuance of treaty promises to give France diplomatic support i n Morocco, approved the expedition. Some English leaders at f i r s t shared the German feelings as to the d i f f i c u l t y of withdrawal once French troops had undertaken occupation. S i r Arthur Nicolson, the Foreign Under-Secretary, reports the Russian Ambassador i n London, \"did not conceal from me the fact that the Morocco question i s disquieting^ the London Cabinet.... The experience of a l l European states, beginning with England, shows that i t i s 2 easier to occupy a c i t y than to withdraw again. 1. Bertie to Grey, A p r i l 25, 1911, B.D,, VII, No.216, p.199. Goschen to Grey, A p r i l 28, 1911, i b i d . , No.227, p.206 and No.229, p,207. Minute by S i r Arthur Nicolson, A p r i l 28, 1911, i b i d . , No.230, p.209. Ewart, op. cit.', II, 829-831; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 278-79. Russian Charge ' d»Affaires at B e r l i n to Sazonov, A p r i l 13, and A p r i l 28, 1911, Siebert, op. c i t . , 578-80. 2. Russian Ambassador at London to Neratov, May 9, 1911 and May 23, 1911; Siebert, op; c i t . , 581. The question has been raised - were Europeans i n r e a l danger? On this point there i s much c o n f l i c t of evidence. How true the French reports were, to what extent they were exaggerated as a pretext f o r their actions, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to say. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 280; Dickinson, op. c i t . , P 194--160-It i s important to note at t h i s stage that Delcasse, who had been forced from o f f i c e over the Moroccan problem i n 1905, had again become a member of the French Cabinet i n Maroh, 1911. He had not charge of foreign a f f a i r s , but held only the naval p o r t f o l i o . The Prime Minister, Monis, had told the German Ambassador that he had taken Deloasse' into his cabinet on account of his notable work i n the navy, and because of h i s great technical knowledge. He further assured the Ambassador that,*Deleasse' has fir m l y promised not to mix i n foreign p o l i c y ; 1 anyway his views today d i f f e r from those of some years ago.1* But with the memories of 1905-06 unforgotten, i t was natural that the German press should suspect Delcasse of taking a leading part i n the d i r e c t i n g of France's Moroccan p o l i c y of 1911* The Hussian Charge d'Affaires at B e r l i n , w r i t i n g to Sazonov on A p r i l 28,informed him that \" i n some of the German papers, Delcasse i s regarded as the true originator of French 3 Moroccan p o l i c y . \" M. Cruppi was Foreign Minister, but he was Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 834. Apparently neither the B r i t i s h nor German Governments had any apprehensions for the safety of their nationals. See questions asked i n the House of Commons, A p r i l 25, 1911, with reference to the danger to B r i t i s h interests and Europeans at Fez; B.D., VII, Ho.129, pp.201-02. A fortnight a f t e r the a r r i v a l of the French occupation of Fez Spain had landed troops at larache and El-Kasar, which action, i n imitation of the French precedent, was explained by the necessity of preserving order, and acoompanied by the assurance that the occupation would be only temporary. 1. Cited i n Fay, op. c i t . , I, 280. 2. Report of the Belgian Minister i n B e r l i n , March 3, 1911, Morel, op. c i t . , 170-72. 3. Siebert, op. cit.,rn 580. -161 rather weak, and without experience i n foreign a f f a i r s . There was every good reason to suspect that the f o r c e f u l , and energetic Deloasse with #he experience of 1905 behind him, would influence the work of Cruppi and the Cabinet. Such was 1 the assumption generally held i n Europe. Mr. Porter, h i s biographer, claims that he \"occupied a very i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n i n this ministry,\" and that he \"completely overshadowed 2 M. Cruppi.\" The German po l i c y remained somewhat of a puzzle to the French when the expedition to Fez was f i r s t suggested, but Kiderden's p o l i c y i s c l e a r l y revealed i n a memorandum he drew a up on May 3. When Fez would be occupied by the French he would ask how long they intended to remain there. I f they did not adhere to the time l i m i t announced, Germany would then declare the Act of Algeciras annulled by the French action and demand compensation. As protests alone would prove useless Germany should send a warship to Agadir, claiming j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s action by revealing i t as a measure to protect the l i f e and property of German subjects. The ship would be s t a t i o n -ed there, and developments awaited to see i f France would o f f e r suitable compensation. In this way he f e l t past f a i l u r e s might be made up for, and a good effect would be provided on the 4 impending Reichstag elections. 1. Belgian Minister i n P a r i s , March 4,1911, Morel, op. c i t . , 173. Russian Ambassador at Paris to Sazonov, March 14, 1911, Siebert, op. c i t . , 559. 2. Porter, op. c i t . , 284. 3. Given i n Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, p.204. 4. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 281-82. Brandenburg, op. c i t . * 371. -162-The German Minister does not seem to have looked through c a r e f u l l y to the possible r e s u l t s h i s p o l i c y might have brought about. He did not co4sider, apparently, what ef f e c t h i s plan might produce on France and the outside world. What was to happen should France, i n spite of his action, refuse compensation, or inadequate compensation? Would Agadir then be occupied i n d e f i n i t e l y ? These questions seemingly did not present themselves to his mind. He seems to have expected with rather extraordinary s i m p l i c i t y that his gesture of sending the ship would immediately bring forth o f f e r s of compensation from France. The Chancellor was i n favour of this plan, and the Kaiser gave h i s approval to the p r i n c i p l e of seeking compensation, although at th i s time he did not d e f i n i t e l y 1 authorize the dispatch of a gun-boat. On May 21 the French occupied Fez. Kiderlen waited. On June 11 Cambon dropped a guarded hint to the Imperial Chancellor that France was prepared to discuss compensation for Germany, and mentioned concessions i n the Congo. Kiderlen now saw his p o l i c y working out as he planned. He met Cambon at Kissengen on June 19 to discuss the matter of compensation. It was agreed on p r i n c i p l e that compensation for Germany could be found i n the Congo. Cambon returned to Paris to arrange matters with his Government, but not before Kiderlen warned him Germany must receive \"a decent mouthful.\" During the next several days no o f f e r was made from P a r i s . Kiderlen then 1. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 372, and footnote (3) -163-decided to act. By occupying Agadir he hoped to force Franca to surrender suitable compensation; i n negotiating v/ith her he wished his hand strengthened by a \" f a i t accompli.\" On June E6 he v i s i t e d the Kaiser who was at K i e l , described to him the s i t u a t i o n as i t existed, and secured his consent to dispatch a 1 warship. Accordingly, the gunboat \"Panther,\" which was return-i n g from southern A f r i c a , and which was the only vessel near enough to the North African coast to be of use i n the plan, was ordered to drop anchor at Agadir on July 1. At the same time a note was sent to the Great Powers explaining the German 3 action. In spite of the explanation so offered,the r e a l motive undoubtedly was to bring the French to the point of making a generous o f f e r of compensation. The French Government was deeply s t i r r e d by this sudden action. Germany had given no warning of the step taken, whereas, France had given a preliminary n o t i f i c a t i o n of her 3 march to Fez. The news was received with consternation i n Downing Street, for i t raised great fears that Germany was 4 planning the s e t t i n g up of a naval base i n Morocco. On July 3 S i r Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador that \"we regard the s i t u a t i o n as so important that 5 i t must be discussed at a Cabinet.\" On July 4, a f t e r 1. Dugdale, op* c i t . , IT, 6. 2. Supra.151, 3. Belgian Minister i n P a r i s , July 2, 1911, Morel, op. cit.,190. 4. Belgian Minister i n london, July 5, 1911, i b i d . , 191-92. 5. Grey to de S a l i s , July 3, 1911, B.D., VII, No.347, p.328. - 1 6 4 * consultation in.the Cabinet, he t o l d him that the B r i t i s h attitude could not be disinterested i n view of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco,and of B r i t a i n ' s treaty obligations to France;\".... a new s i t u a t i o n had been created by the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might aff e c t B r i t i s h interests more d i r e c t l y than they had hitherto been affected, and therefore we could not recognize any new arrangements \"that 1 might be come to without us*\" In a note of July 2,i a f t e r announcing to the Powers the dispatch of the \"Panther,\" the German Government issued the following notice: \"The German Government i s quite ready to enter upon an amicable exchange of views i n order to obtain a solution of the Moroccan question s a t i s f a c t o r y to a l l Powers,\" and \" i t i s altogether disposed to examine i n a f r i e n d l y s p i r i t 2 every proposition made by the French Government.\" In pursuance of this statement negotiations between Jules Cambon and Kiderlen began, negotiations which were to prove most d i f f i c u l t , and 3 which were to be extended over the next four months. S i r Edward Grey seems to have expected information from B e r l i n i n the matter of German p o l i c y after his conversation 4 with the German Ambassador on July 4 ; but Kiderlen disregarded 1 . Grey to do S a l i s , July 4 , 1 9 1 1 , B.Di, VII, N o . 3 6 6 , p . 3 3 4 . Mr. Asquith expressed the same view i n almost i d e n t i c a l words i n answer to a question on Moroccan a f f a i r s i n the House of Commons on July 6 , 1 9 1 1 ; c i t e d i n i b i d . , H o . 3 6 4 , p . 3 4 2 . 2 . Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , J J , 8 3 9 - 4 0 . 3 . Only a few days before the dispatch of the \"Panther\" to Agadir Mi Monis had been succeeded i n the French premiership by M. Caillaux, and M. Cruppi as Foreign Secretary by M. de Selves. 4 . Grey, op. c i t . , I, 2 2 3 . -165-the very obvious hint given i n that conversation that England wished to be consulted. This f a i l u r e to give reassurances to Grey was to prove a great mistake; but the German \"Government appears to have f e l t i t unnecessary, and gave the B r i t i s h Government no assurances u n t i l three weeks l a t e r . Grey would oer t a i n l y have been less disturbed had he known that Germany's objective was compensation outside Morocco, and not a naval base on the coast. Kiderlen seemingly f e l t quite safe i n disregarding B r i t a i n because he was not seeking Moroccan t e r r i t o r y . He had as a matter of fact mentioned to Cambon at the commencement of the negotiations that the conversations must be confined to the two Powers - that i t would be impossible to admit a t h i r d Party, without bringing i n a l l the signatories 1 of the Act of Algeoiras. To t h i s negotiation \"8. deux\" M. Cambon agreed, but made i t quite clear that France \"meant to remain absolutely f a i t h f u l to her understandings with Great B r i t a i n \" and to \"keep His Majesty's Government informed of any conversations which might take place on the above or any £ other basis.\" There can be no value for the purpose of this study i n here recording the Franco-German negotiation i n any d e t a i l . It i s s u f f i c i e n t to point out only t h e i r extremely thorny and d i f f i c u l t nature. On July 15, a f t e r a previous meeting i n which eaoh side was reluctant to commit i t s e l f to anything 1. Goschen to Grey, July 10, 1911, B.D., VII, Ho.367, p.345. Bertie to Grey, July 11, 1911, i b i d . , Ho.369, p.347. 2. Goschen to Grey, July 10, 1911, i b i d . , No.367, p.345. -166-d e f i n i t e , Kiderlen asked f o r a l l the French Congo f o r Germany. The French Ambassador appeared shocked at such a demand. He r e p l i e d that while French public opinion might consent to compensation f o r Germany, the ceding of a whole oolony was 1 unthinkable. He stated, however, that part of the Congo might be ceded i f Germany on her part was w i l l i n g to y i e l d to France t e r r i t o r y i n Togoland and the Cameroons. The negotiations reached a point of extreme tension at t h i s stage, and the interview between Cambon and Kiderlen on July EO, following E that of the 15, was rather b i t t e r . It was at t h i s point, when the negotiations seemed to be.making l i t t l e progress, that England intervened. When Kiderlen demanded the French Congo the French and B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e s exchanged views as to the possible outcome. On July 30 the p o s s i b i l i t y of holding an international confer-ence i n the event of a breakdown of the negotiations was discussed by S i r Francis Bertie and the French Foreign Minister. The l a t t e r r e p l i e d that the negotiations had reached a c r i t i c a l stage and although they had not as yet broken down, they would l i k e l y continue f o r some long time, but should they f a i l France would not object to B r i t a i n i n v i t i n g a conference as 3 had been suggested. It w i l l be noted from these communioations that the B r i t i s h and the French were considering together 1. Bethmann's report of this meeting to the Kaiser i s given i n Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, 11-13. 3, Bertie to Grey, July 18, 1911, B.D., VII, pp.371-73, and minutes added, e s p e c i a l l y minute by Hicolson, p.373. 3. Grey to B e r t i e , July 19, 1911, B.D., VII, Ho.397, pp.376-77. Bertie to Grey, July 30, 1911, i b i d . , Ho.401, pp.378-79. -167-eventualities i n this c r i s i s . It must be noted also that i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of a possible outbreak of war, the \"Conversations\" between the General M i l i t a r y S t a f f s , which had been inaugurated during the f i r s t Morocoo C r i s i s of 1905-1906, were now being 1 pressed. Thus, by July 20 something of a c r i s i s had been reached. Negotiations were on the point of rupture, and there were feelings of s t r a i n , uncertainty and apprehension. S i r Edward Grey seems to have shared these f e e l i n g s . He, therefore, asked the German Ambassador to come to see him on July SI. In his speech i n the House of Commons, on November 37, 1911, he t e l l s of the conversation which took place. After s t a t i n g to the Ambassador that he understood that there was danger of the negotiations ending i n f a i l u r e , he went on to say: I wished i t to be understood that our silence i n the absence of any communication from the German Government - our silence since the Cabinet communication of July 4, and since the Prime Minister's statement of July 7 i n t h i s House - our silence since then must not he interpreted as meaning that we were not taking, i n the Moroccan question, the inter e s t which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month. .... We thought i t possible that a settlement might be come between Germany and France .... without a f f e c t i n g B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . We would be very glad i f t h i s happened, and i n the hope that i t would happen at a l a t e r stage we had hitherto put i t aside .... I heard that negotiations were s t i l l proceeding, and I s t i l l hoped they might lead to a s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t , but i t must be understood that i f they were unsuccessful, a very embarrassing s i t u a t i o n would a r i s e . I pointed out to the German Ambassador that the Germans were i n 1. Infra.iHEwart, op. c i t . , I I , 849; Grey, op. c i t . , I, 343. Mr. l l o y d George i n a speech i n Toronto, October 10, 1933, made reference to these m i l i t a r y conversations. -168-the closed port of Agadir*... which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval base.... We could not say-to what extent the s i t u a t i o n might be altered to our disadvantage, and i f the negotiat-ions with France came to nothing we should be obliged to. watch over B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s and to become a party to discussion of the matter.... I wished to say a l l this now while we were s t i l l waiting i n hope that the negotiations with France would succeed, for i f I did not say this now, i t would cause resentment l a t e r on i f the German Government had been led to suppose by our previous silence - our silence since July 4 - that we did not take an interest i n the matter.\" The Foreign Secretary explained to the House, \"I made that statement on July 21 because I was getting anxious, because the s i t u a t i o n seemed to me to be developing unfavour-ably, and the German Ambassador was s t i l l not i n a p o s i t i o n 1 to make a communication to me from the German Government.\" Count Metternich*s report of this conversation reached B e r l i n the next day, and the German Government gave a reassuring answer as to t h e i r intentions on July 23. It would have been well had Downing Street waited for that reply r before taking t h e i r next step, or had Germany given her guarantee of good f a i t h e a r l i e r , f o r a few hours after the interview between Grey and Metternich a new element of danger 1. This speech of November 27, 1911, i s c i t e d i n Knaplund, Paul, Speeches on Foreign A f f a i r s , (London, 1.93!) ,145-71. The content of the conversation with Metternich i s given also i n a dispatch from Grey to Goschen, July 21, 1911, B.D., T i l , No.411, p.390. An extract from Metternich's report of the conversation i s given i n Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, 13. With regard to Grey's statement of B r i t i s h p o l i c y to Metternich on July 4, and to which Grey complains the German Government gave no answer, Professor R.B.Mowat says, \"This statement did not c a l l for any answer; i t was just a declaration of p o l i c y . It could not even be formally acknowledged by the German Government, for - 1 6 9 -had been introduced into the already d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n . In the evening of July 21, and thus before the German reply had been received, Mr. l l o y d George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a resounding declaration of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . In a public address at the Mansion House he reviewed the general s i t u a t i o n and stated that B r i t a i n should at a l l hazards maintain her place and her prestige among the Great Powers of the world...* If a s i t u a t i o n were to be forced on us i n which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the Great and beneficent p o s i t i o n B r i t a i n has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing B r i t a i n to be treated, where her i n t e r e s t s were v i t a l l y affected, as i f she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that p r i c e would be humiliation i n t o l e r a b l e for a great country l i k e ours to endure. (1) This speech coming from a Minister who was supposed to belong to the most p a c i f i c section of the Cabinet created an immense sensation i n Germany, where i t was interpreted as a threat on the part of the B r i t i s h Government, and as an act of unwarranted interference i n the Franco-German negotiations. It greatly increased the already e x i s t i n g tension between Germany and England growing out of the naval competition. It might indeed i n the e x i s t i n g state of a f f a i r s have led to war Grey appears to have sent no Hote, but passed on the statement i n h i s conversation v/i th Metternich. There was, therefore, nothing to alarm the Cabinet i n the fact that no reply came.\" Hew l i g h t on the Agadir C r i s i s , l oo. c i t . , 7 1 2 . 1 . Lloyd George gives an account of his action i n volume I of h i s \"War Memoirs,\" p. 4 1 - 4 5 . Both S i r Edward Grey and the Prime Minister had been consulted before t h i s speech was given and approved i t . Grey, op* c i t . , I, 2 2 5 ; C h u r c h i l l also approved i t ; C h u r c h i l l , op* c i t . , 4 3 . -170-had not the Kaiser and Bethmann been determined not to allow the Moroccan question to cause an aotual c o n f l i c t . The reply of the German Government to S i r Edward's questions i n the Interview of July E l had been dispatched before the text of the Chancellor's speech had reached B e r l i n . The German answer 1 to those questions was given by Metternich on July E4. On the following day he again saw Grey, and on this occasion he presented a strong protest against the Mansion House speech. Grey, however, remained determined i n his defense of the a B r i t i s h stand, and conversations between the two on July 86 3 and 27 were more courteous, On July 27 the B r i t i s h Prime Minister made a reassuring speech i n the House of Commons i n which he made i t clear that while B r i t a i n had no desire to par t i c i p a t e i n the negotiations then being ca r r i e d on between Prance and Germany, and while i t was the B r i t i s h hope that these might issue i n a settlement s a t i s f a c t o r y to both P a r t i e s , i n the event of a rupture, however, B r i t a i n would be obliged to watch over her in t e r e s t s , and become an active Party i n the discussion of the s i t u a t i o n . ''That would be our rig h t as a Signatory of the Treaty of Algeciras; i t might be our obli g a t -4 ion under the terms of our agreement of 1904 with France.\" 1. Grey to Goschen, July 24, 1911; B.D., VII, Ho.417, pp.394-96. 2, Grey to Goschen, July 25, 1911; i b i d . , Ho.419, pp.397-99. Also Russian ambassador i n London to Heratov, August 1, 1911, Siebert, op. c i t . , pp. 594-95. 3, Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 380-81. 4. Asquith, The Genesis of the War, 149; B.D., 711, Ho.426 p.406. -171 The B r i t i s h stand at t h i s time had an immediate eff e c t on the s i t u a t i o n which had been arrived at i n the past weeks. It greatly increased Anglo-German tension, but i t s i m p l i f i e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s which had arisen over Morocco. The B r i t i s h had accurately defined their attitude to t h i s problem, displayed what their i n t e r e s t s were, denied a l l h o s t i l e intention, expressed the hope for a peaceful solution, yet made i t cl e a r to Germany that Great B r i t a i n would be on the side of France i f war was forced upon the Republic. Germany now adopted a more c o n c i l i a t o r y attitude towards France; she did not immediately recede from her p o l i c y of demanding concessions, but she was c a r e f u l to avoid acts of provocation, and her future conduct of the negotiations tended to open i n 1 directions of accommodation and r e t r e a t . The immediate danger of a rupture i n July was thus passed; but the core of the question remained unaltered. Kiderlen and Cambon were unable to carry t h e i r negotiations to a s a t i s f a c t o r y settlement for some time. The discussion lasted for another three months, with compensations proposed, rejected and proposed anew. Several times the s i t u a t i o n became so acute that a breakdown was threatened. A p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l stage was arrived at i n September. A solution was f i n a l l y reached however. On October 11 an agreement was signed over Morocco, and on November 3 a settlement over the Congo. On the following 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 47; Fay, op. c i t . , I, §89-90. Russian Ambassador i n London to Neratov, August 1, 1911, Siebert, op. c i t . , 596. -178-day a joint treaty was drawn up. By these agreements Germany agreed that the French might establish v i r t u a l l y a protectorate over Morocco, while, on her part, France ceded to Germany more than one hundred thousand miles of the French Congo. The Agadir C r i s i s had come peacefully to an end. But, although i t had ended i n a peaceful solution, the C r i s i s had created reverberations i n Europe which were to be f e l t down to 1914. Much more had been at stake than merely the question of whether France should obtain Morocco, or Germany t e r r i t o r y i n the Congo. In this c r i s i s there was displayed once again a clash between the two opposing camps i n the f i e l d of power p o l i t i c s . As i n 1906 over Morocco, and as i n 1908 through th e i r friendship with Russia, so again i n 1911, France and England stood together to oppose Germany. And, as i n the former instances, this l a t e s t c r i s i s l e d to a tightening of the bonds between the two Entente Powers. The action of Germany had given r i s e to increased suspicion i n the minds of leaders i n both France and B r i t a i n of the Imperial Government's war-like intention. We know today from facts obtainable that there was no intention on the part of Germany to go as far as war i n this matter, but the manner i n which her p o l i c y was conducted did l i t t l e to reassure the English and French leaders. Her action was regarded as further evidence of her war-like .tendencies, and as another instance of her brutal t a c t i c s i n diplomatic sabre-rattling^ S i r Edward Grey c e r t a i n l y shared this view. -173-In his memoirs he states that the Agadir C r i s i s convinced the Entente Powers of the dangerous r e a l i t y of German militarism, and made them more anxious to act together. \"The Agadir C r i s i s was intended to end either i n the diplomatic humiliation of I Prance or i n war.\" Winston Ch u r c h i l l was only one of a number of others who concurred i n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . \" I t (the Agadir C r i s i s ) had terminated i n the diplomatic rebuff of Germany. Once more she had disturbed a l l Europe by a sudden 2 and menacing gesture.\" The importance of these suspicions of German intent-ions, which now further coloured the minds of B r i t i s h and French leaders, may not be minimized, but i t was as a clash between the two diplomatic groups of Powers that Agadir takes on significance i n the play of forces before 1914. The Entente Cordials was given deeper meaning; during the days of tension r e s u l t i n g from the \"coup\" of Agadir i t had grown i n cohesion and strength. Nicolson was expressing the f e e l i n g of many i n England and i n France when he wrote on July 24, 1911,to S i r Edward Goschen, There is no disguising the fact that the s i t u a t i o n i s a serious and de l i c a t e one, and i t i s not simply a question as to whether the French w i l l give such and such concessions to Germany, or whether the establishment of 1. Grey, op. c i t . * I, 240. 2 i C h u r c h i l l , o p * c i t ; , I, 65. F o r si m i l a r expressions of t h i s view - Nicolson, op*cit;, 350-51; memorandum of S i r Eyre Crowe, January 14,1912^.D* ,711, Appendix III,p.284; memorandum by Mr* H;A. Gwynne, editor of the \"Morning Post,\" July 25,1912, B.D. ,7II,p*795; poincare', Raymond, Memoirs * (London, 1926), I, 37-41. -174-Germany i n such and such ports of Morocco i s or i s not a v i t a l question for us. The whole question i s whether we intend to maintain the T r i p l e Entente, and I think that i t i s upon this broad ground that the si t u a t i o n should be viewed. (1) Whether the English leaders, and e s p e c i a l l y S i r Edward Grey, who has made such protestations to the contrary, would admit i t or not, the Entente was being hardened into an a l l i a n c e . In h i s speech of August 3, 1914, when discussing the C r i s i s of 1911, he explained \"that he took p r e c i s e l y the same l i n e that had been taken i n 1906,\" at which time, \" i n my view public opinion i n t h i s country would have r a l l i e d to 3 the material support of France.\" France was to be supported diplomatically, and, i f necessary, by arms. As Mr. Ewart points out, \"the great significance of thi s attitude was, and, is,- that (as i n 1914) the merits of the quarrel were immater-4 i a l . \" Whether France or Germany was right , the B r i t i s h Government was determined to support France. Even before the French troops had arrived at Fez, on May 18, 1911, when t a l k i n g with Count Metternich, Grey maintained, i n the words of the Russian Ambassador, who reported this conversation on May S3, that France \"was not only j u s t i f i e d , but obliged to protect 1. Hleolson to Goschen, July 24, 1911, nicolson, op. c i t . , 350. S. Speech by S i r Edward Grey i n the House of Commons, August 3, 1914; Grey,op.cit., I I , appendix B, S97. 3. Ibid., 296. 4. Ewart, op. c i t . , I I , 853. -175-the in t e r e s t s of the French, English and other foreigners i n the c a p i t a l of Morocco*\" He made i t clear to Metternich \"that the Agreements between England and France imposed on England the obligation to support France.\" The German Ambassador did not oppose these arguments; he expressed thor-oughly f r i e n d l y sentiments, but pressed the contingency that the French occupation of Fez might' be of \"considerable duration.\" In that case the hands of the Powers would be Treed. S i r Edward r e p l i e d \"that even i n this case, the 1 English standpoint would remain unchanged.\" In h i s own report of t h i s conversation sent to S i r Edward Goschen on May 18, Grey states that he told Metternich, \"the question of Morocco was one i n regard to which some of us were bound by Treaty engagements, which would of course come into * operation i f d i f f i c u l t i e s arose. It was not l i k e a general 2 question i n which there were no s p e c i a l engagements.\" Relating further d e t a i l s of t h i s cc-nversation,the Russian Ambassador reports, (and these he gained from S i r Edward himself), \"Count Metternich had asked what the consequences would be i f the Morocco Government came under French influence, and the Algeciras Aot were v i o l a t e d . S i r Edward r e p l i e d , that, i n the event of entanglements, a l l English obligations would 3 become •operative.*\" After the Mansion House speech, the 1. Russian ambassador to london to Heratov, May 23, 1911, Siebert, op* c i t . , 583. 2. Grey to Goschen, May 18, 1911, B.D., VII, Ho.278, p.256. 3. Siebert, op. c i t . , 584. -176-Ambassador reported that \"there i s no use concealing the fact -one step further, and a war between England and Germany might 1 have broken out as a r e s u l t of the Franco-German dispute.\" On August 16 the same Ambassador reported a conversation with Grey i n which the l a t t e r stated, \" i n the event of war between 2 Germany and France, England would have to p a r t i c i p a t e . \" To preserve the Entente with France, England had been drawn to the verge of war, and had the need arisen, would have plugged into war i t s e l f . With respect to this l a t t e r and very much more important s t e p t i t must be noted that England was prepared to mobilize not only her entire Fleet but also her Expeditionary 3 Army against Germany. The preparations made in a n t i c i p a t i o n of a c o n f l i c t were far more advanced than was r e a l i z e d by B r i t i s h public opinion. Mr. C h u r c h i l l t e l l s how on July 25 S i r Edward Grey, a f t e r h i s interview with Count Metternich, stated to him, \"I have just received a communication from the German Ambassador so s t i f f that the Fleet might be attacked at any moment. I have just sent f o r McKenna (head of the Admiralty) to warn him.\" The warning orders were then sent 4 to. the F l e e t . 1. Russian Ambassador to London to Neratov, August 1, 1911, i b i d . , 595. 2. Ibid., 598. 3. C a l l w e l l , C E . , Field-Marshall S i r Henry Wilson, (London, 1927),I,96ff. Wilson was Director of M i l i t a r y Operations. 4. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , I, 44. B.D., 711, Editor's Note to No.637, p.625. -177-As has been shown the C r i s i s was not s e t t l e d u n t i l November. During the tense days of September Grey f e l t the danger, and on September 17 wrote to Nicolson: The negotiations with Germany may at any moment take an unfavourable turn, and i f they do so, the Germans may act very quickly, even suddenly. The admiralty should remain prepared f o r t h i s . It i s what I have always said to McKenna. Our f l e e t s should, therefore, always be i n such a condition and p o s i t i o n that they would welcome a German attack, i f the Germans should decide on that suddenly. We should, of course, give the Admiralty news immediately of any unfavourable turn i n the Franco-German negotiations. (1) It was not commonly known that from September 8 to September 22, i n constant expectation of h o s t i l i t i e s , the tunnels and bridges on the South-Eastern Railway were being p a t r o l l e d day and night. And Nicolson's biographer t e l l s us, \" i t was not u n t i l the morning of September 22, om the r e c e i p t of news from B e r l i n that Herr von Kiderlen was weakening, that Nicolson was able to give the word that a state of 'war prepar-2 edness* might be relaxed.\" The extent of the preparedness which had been maintained can be guaged from the l e t t e r Nicolson wrote to Lord Hardinge on September 14: I spent a week at Balmoral l a s t week, but nothing very important occured during my v i s i t . I was glad to f i n d that the King i s p e r f e c t l y sound as regards foreign a f f a i r s . I have had some talks since my return with Haldane, Lloyd George, and Winston C h u r c h i l l ; I am glad to f i n d that a l l three are p e r f e c t l y ready - I might almost say eager - to face a l l possible e v e n t u a l i t i e s , and most careful preparations have been made to meet any contingencies that may a r i s e . These three have thoroughly grasped the point that i t i s not merely Morocco which i s at stake. It r e a l l y amounts to a question of whether we ought to submit to any d i c t a t i o n by Germany, whenever she considers i t necessary to raise her voice. I may t e l l you i n confidence that preparations for landing four or 1. Cited i n Nicolson, op. c i t . , 346; also i n B.D., VII. No.647, p.638. 8. Nlcblspn:,. p»p. c i t . , 346-47. -178-s i x d i v i s i o n s on the Continent have been worked out to the minutest d e t a i l * On the other hand, reports which we have received from our various m i l i t a r y informants a l l point to the fact that the French army has never been i n a better state of equipment, organization and armament, or been inspired by so strong a f e e l i n g of perfect confidence and unity.... (1) These preparations i n both England and France were the being carried out along l i n e s l a i d down by A General S t a f f s of the two countries cooperating the one with the other. The m i l i t a r y and naval conversations begun i n 1906 had been c a r r i e d on down to the present C r i s i s . On July 20, a f t e r Kiderlen's demands proved unacceptable to the French, and the day before Lloyd George's Mansion House Speech, there took place at the French M i n i s t r y of War a Conference between General Wilson, the.Head of the Department for M i l i t a r y Operations of the English General S t a f f , and General Dubail, the French Chief of S t a f f . The purpose of t h e i r meeting was \"to determine the new 1. Hicolson, op. c i t . , p.347. l o r d Haldane t e l l s how he was prepared to mobilize the Expeditionary Force \"to send i t straight o f f to the Continent;\" Autobiography, (London, 1929), 224-25. The d e t a i l s of m i l i t a r y and naval preparations undertaken at this time are given i n a memorandum by Brigadier-General S i r G.H. Hicolson drawn up on November 6, 1911. It i s given i n B*D., VII, Ho.639, pp.626-629. It i s headed \"action taken by the General S t a f f since 1906 i n preparing a plan for rendering m i l i t a r y assistance to France i n the event of an unprovoked attack on that Power by Germany.\" Further l i g h t i s given i n C h u r c h i l l ' s aooount, op. c i t . , I, 49-64. He gives a f u l l account of the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense held on August 23, showing the difference between the m i l i t a r y and naval points of view expressed there. See also Spender, F i f t y Years of Europe, 337-38. i n the matter of French preparations, Hicolson's summary given above i s borne, out i n ^ i s p a t c h e s of Colonel Fairholme, the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Attache i n P a r i s , given to Bertie and passed on to Grey. See B.D., VII, Ho.641, August 25, 1911 pp.632-34; Ho.643, September 2, 1911, pp.634-635; Ho.644 ' September 8, 1911, pp.635-37. ' -179-conditions for the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of an English army i n the operations of the French armies i n the Horth-East i n case of a war with Germany.\" It was d e f i n i t e l y stated, as was usual i n the e a r l i e r conversations, \"that these conversations, devoid of a l l o f f i c i a l character, cannot bind either Government i n any way\", and were aimed merely at planning f o r cert a i n indispensable 1\" preparatory measures. Six weeks after this meeting, aooording to Mr. Fay, General Dubail stated to the Russians, as i f there were no doubt i n the matter, that the French army was ready to take the offensive against Germany \"with the aid of the E n g l i s h 2 army on i t s l e f t wing.\" Members of Parliament were t o t a l l y unaware of these preparations, preparations for dispatching men 3 to the Continent, or of the orders given to the F l e e t . The events set forth i n the pages of t h i s ohapter must have made clea r the manner i n which the entente was being gradually transformed into what amounted to a v i r t u a l m i l i t a r y 1. A memorandum of this matter i s given i n B.D., VII, 10.640, pp.629-632. See also Fay, op. c i t . , I, 291-92. Asquith himself expressed fear that the French might come to r e l y too much on English support. He wrote to Grey on September 5, 1911 as follows: \"Conversations such as that between General Joffre and Colonel Fairholme seems to me rather dangerous, es p e c i a l l y the part which refers to possible B r i t i s h assistance. The French ought not to be encouraged, i n present circumstances, to make their plans on any assumptions of t h i s kind.\" Grey's answer i s of i n t e r e s t , written on September 8. He r e p l i e d , \" I t would create consternation i f we forbade our m i l i t a r y experts to converse with the French. Ho doubt these conversations and our speeches have given an expectation of support. I do not see how i t can be helped.\" Grey, op. c i t . , I, 95. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 292. Lutz, Hermannm Lord Grey and the World War, (London, 1928), 90. 3. Conwell-Evans, T.P., Foreign P o l i c y from a Back Bench, (London, 1932), 56. -180-a l l i a n c e ; how a gradual t r a n s i t i o n had taken place from the s t a t i c to the dynamic state. It had become an a l l i a n c e i n almost everything but name. B r i t a i n , with S i r Edward Grey d i r e c t i n g foreign a f f a i r s , was following a p o l i c y of which he was seemingly unaware, a p o l i c y which seems not to'vhave been clear to him, a p o l i c y he p a r t i a l l y concealed and which he frequently repudiated, but yet nevertheless which he r i g i d l y pursued. Great B r i t a i n had entered into entente r e l a t i o n s with France. When disputes arose between that Power and Germany, B r i t a i n supported her diplomatically, and had i t been demanded by the occasion, would have lent m i l i t a r y assistance. Growing tension between England and Germany, along with her new friendship with Russia, the a l l y of France, made this entente p o l i c y of greater importance to B r i t a i n and even of greater necessity. B r i t a i n was d e f i n i t e l y committed to that p o l i c y at the end of 1911, and S i r Edward was determined to continue i n that path. In his speech to the House of Commons on November 27 he stated he was w i l l i n g to enter into new friendships, but these must not be to the detriment of those already e x i s t i n g . He said: One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by a l l means l e t us make, but not at the expense of the ones we have. I desire to do a l l I can to improve the r e l a t i o n s with Germany, as I s h a l l presently show. But the friendships we have have lasted now for some years, and i t must be a cardinal point of improved r e l a t i o n s with Germany that we do not s a c r i f i c e one of these.... We keep our friendships. We intend to r e t a i n them unimpaired, and the more we can do, so long as we can preserve that -181-p o s i t i o n , so much the better, and we s h a l l endeavour to do i t . \" (1) He f e l t i t was England's paramount duty to hold fast to the Entente. And this he continued to do during the l a s t days before Armageddon. 1. B.D., 71, Ho.721, p.733. CHAPTER VI The Tightening of the Entente Cordiale, 1912-1913 -182-CHAPTER VI The Tightening of the Entente Cordiale, 1912-1913. The preceding chapter has shown how the Agadir C r i s i s was to prove a most important episode i n the play of events which was preparing the way for the tremendous c o n f l i c t soon to array i n combat the nations of Europe. The Agreement concluded on November 4, 1911, between France and Germany can by no means be regarded as a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . France did not forgive Germany fo r what she chose to interpret as the Imperial Power*s p o l i c y of intimidation. Germany, on her side, resented the fact that France had proved less p l i a b l e i n the negotiations than she had counted on. But her resent-ment was vented more p a r t i c u l a r l y upon B r i t a i n for having intervened i n a Franco-German dispute, and f o r having forced oh Germany a diplomatic defeat. It was held that but f o r the B r i t i s h interference Germany could more e a s i l y have come to a settlement with France, and a settlement less damaging to German dignity and prestige. In England, despite the assurances and explanations of B r i t i s h p o l i c y during the C r i s i s which S i r Edward Grey offered i n the House of Commons on November 27, there were many expressions of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n from a public eager for peace; d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which was aimed at the Government -183 when i t was r e a l i z e d how close to the abyss of war the nation had been l e d . When f i r s t the Entente with France had been concluded the country as a whole had supported the new p o l i c y , r e j o i c i n g i n the hope that i t meant the end of dangerous quarrels with the Republic, But after Agadir i t was r e a l i z e d that i n some mysterious way the nature of the Entente had changed, and that i t was bringing new dangers to peace and making r e l a t i o n s with Germany more d i f f i c u l t . Mr. J . l . Hammond, i n his l i f e of C P . Scott of the \"Manchester Guardian,\" points out how at this time many L i b e r a l s turned against Grey's conduct of the Entente po l i c y , suspecting that i t was being transformed into 1 \"something s i n i s t e r . \" Three main objections were stressed by those who were protesting against the d i r e c t i o n i n which B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y was pointing; England was seemingly being t i e d dangerously to French ambition, the r e s u l t i n g tension with Germany was leading to a great naval expenditure, and the r i g h t s of weaker peoples, l i k e those of Morocoo and Persia, were being disregarded. Whether or not these objections were v a l i d , or whether or not those who put them forward understood f u l l y the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the inte r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n which faced the Foreign Office and which had led those i n charge there to lean so heavily i n favour of the Entente, cannot be discussed here. Whatever might be argued i n this regard, 1. Hammond, J.L., C P . Scott of the \"Manchester Guardian,\" (London, 1934), 149ff. -184-nevertheless the objections to Grey's p o l i c y were vigorously set forth i n the press, and es p e c i a l l y i n the L i b e r a l journals. The \"Manchester Guardian\" was most outspoken i n i t s c r i t i c i s m , but i t was by no means alone i n the views i t expressed. Mr. Hammond states: Seldom, indeed, has a Government or Minister encountered such s k i l l e d and such severe c r i t i c i s m from p o l i t i c a l opponents as Grey encountered from h i s p o l i t i c a l friends .... The L i b e r a l Foreign Secretary found himself depending almost e n t i r e l y on Conservative support, a support often embarrassing and misleading, for among L i b e r a l writers h i s only steady advocate was Mr. J.A. Spender, the able and experienced editor of the \"Westminster Gazette.\" (1) Some measure of the extent of the opposition i n the House of Commons to the foreign p o l i c y of the Government i s revealed i n the papers of Mr. Noel-Buxton, i n 1911 a private member of the' House, and l a t e r a cabinet minister. He reveals how a number of the L i b e r a l Party, alarmed by the Agadir C r i s i s , were roused to consider ways and means of e f f e c t i n g some control, however s l i g h t , over the p o l i c y which Grey, Asquith and Haldane were developing, a p o l i c y with which, i t was f e l t , Parliament was not kept s u f f i c i e n t l y i n touch. Accordingly, Mr. Hoel-Buxton and Mr. Arthur Ponsonby )l a t e r Lord Ponsonby) organized a Foreign A f f a i r s Group of the L i b e r a l Party, the aims of which were to e s t a b l i s h a more e f f e c t i v e contact with the p o l i c y of the Foreign O f f i c e , and especially,to improve AngEoHGeafman 1. Hammond, J.L.* op. c i t . , 150-51. Ensor, R.C.K., England, 1870-1914, (London, 1936), Appendix C, 578-74, gives an i n t e r e s t i n g study of Grey's relationship to the L i b e r a l s . -185-1 r e l a t i o n s . The f i r s t resolution of the group read: This meeting of the L i b e r a l Foreign A f f a i r s Group views with great concern the r e l a t i o n s of Great B r i t a i n and Germany, regards with disapproval any p o l i c y which might seek to oppose the legitimate aspirations of Bermany, and urges upon H.M. Government the necessity 2 of taking action with a view to reaching an understanding. This opposition was not s u f f i c i e n t l y serious to threaten the position of the Government, but Mr. Asquith and S i r Edward Grey perceived that the only way to s a t i s f y public opinion was to do everything possible to appease r e l a t i o n s with the Germany, i f this could be done without endangering either AAnglo-French Entente or B r i t i s h naval supremacy. The Ministers hoped that with the settlement of the Agadir question a new chapter would be opened. It was f e l t that e f f o r t s should be made to heal the smarts from which Germany might be suffering, and to 3 ar r i v e at a common understanding on the matter of naval strength. This task was to be made easier by the fact that certain members of the German Government entertained s i m i l a r 1. Gonwell-Evans, T.P. * Foreign P o l i c y From a Back Bench, 1904-1918, (London, 1932), 81. This study i s based on the papers of Lord Hoel Buxton. 2. Ibid., 82-83. Meetings of the Group continued at frequent i n t e r v a l s . Mr. P h i l l i p Mprrel became Chairman in 1913, and Mr. Ponsonby i n 1914. The outbreak of the War brought the organization to an end. The Committee, says Mr. Conwell-Evans, f a i l e d i n i t s purpose. \"Few of the members exerted themselves with s u f f i c i e n t vigour. They were i n general too e a s i l y s a t i s f i e d and l u l l e d into t r a n q u i l l i t y by the soothing speeches of the Foreign Secretary, and by the misleading assurances of the Prime Minister.\" 84. 3. Spender, Asquith, I I , 64. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 95. Halevy, E., A History of the English People, 1895-1915, (London, 1934), I I , 557. Russian Ambassador i n London to Heratov, February 28, 1912, Siebert, op. c i t * , 614-18. Kuhlman, i n London, to the Chancellor, January 8 1912 Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, 56. ' -186-sentiments. It has been shown how Bethmann-Hollweg, impressed by the persistence with which Count Metternich urged from London a p o l i c y of caution on his government i n the matter of the naval programme, had favoured a rapprochement. A previous chapter revealed how negotiations had been opened i n 1909 and had continued u n t i l they were broken o f f at the time of the 1 Agadir C r i s i s . The Emperor now consented to the reopening of these negotiations:,; though he had l i t t l e f a i t h i n t h e i r r e s u l t i n g i n success. The negotiations which took place i n the f i r s t h a l f of 1912 were opened by two business men, Albert B a l l i n , the head of the Hamburg-American Line, and S i r Ernest Cassel, a r i c h and i n f l u e n t i a l London banker, eaeh of whom was \"persona grata\" with h i s own Government, and each anxious to b r i n g about better understanding between the two nations. These two constituted themselves u n o f f i c i a l diplomats early In 1918, and t h e i r work paved the way for the Haldane Mission. B a l l i n suggested that Mr. Winston C h u r c h i l l , who had succeeded Mr. McKenna as F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, should come to B e r l i n . Mr. C h u r c h i l l answered on January 7, 1912, 2 that i t would be inexpedient f o r him to make a special journey. Mr. C h u r c h i l l referred the matter to S i r Edward Grey and Lloyd George, and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, i t was agreed to send Cassel to B e r l i n with a special memorandum. >1. Supra 147-49. 2. C h u r c h i l l to C a s s e l l , January 7, 1912, B.D.,VI,No.492, p.666. •187-1 S i r Ernest, through B a l l i n , saw the Kaiser and the Chancellor, and returned home bringing a c o r d i a l l e t t e r , and a statement from Bethmann-Hollweg of the newly proposed German Havy Law. It was suggested that S i r Edward Grey should v i s i t B e r l i n as the most e f f e c t u a l way of bringing negotiations to a successful 2 conclusion. S i r Edward r e p l i e d to the German offer through Cassel that i f the German naval expenditure could be so arranged by a modification of the rate of construction, or i n some other way so as to render unnecessary any serious increase of B r i t i s h naval expenditures, \"the B r i t i s h Government w i l l be prepared at once to pursue negotiations, on the understanding, that the point of naval expenditure i s open to discussion and that there i s a f a i r prospect of s e t t l i n g i t favourably.\" I f thi s under-standing proved acceptable to Germany, a B r i t i s h Minister would go to B e r l i n . Bethmann r e p l i e d that t h i s was acceptable, provided England gave adequate guarantees of a f r i e n d l y orientation ot her general p o l i c y . \"The Agreement would have to give expression to a statement that both Powers agreed to part i c i p a t e i n no plans, combinations or warlike engagements 3 directed against e i t h e r Power.\" Grey was unwilling to accept the i n v i t a t i o n for himself to go to B e r l i n , and i t was arranged that Mr. Haldane, 1. Memorandum by the Chancellor, January 29, 1912, Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, 71. 8. Grey to Goschen, February 7, 1912; B.D., VI, Ho.497, pp.668-69. 3. Fay, op* c i t ; , I, 301-02; C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t * , 96-100. •188 1 the Minister of War, should undertake the mission. Mr. Haldane arrived i n B e r l i n on February 8, 1912. The d e t a i l s of the discussions which followed his 2 a r r i v a l need not be set f o r t h i n this study. Haldane has given a f u l l account of what took place i n his book, \"Before 3 the War.\" He was c o r d i a l l y received i n B e r l i n , where he held conversations with the Kaiser, Bethmann and T i r p i t z . After the general f i e l d of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s was surveyed, c o l o n i a l and marine problems were discussed. The Kaiser declared himself ready, i f a p o l i t i c a l agreement could be reached, to renounce the building of a new ship i n 1912, and to delay the three new ships Germany proposed b u i l d i n g i n 1912, 1914 and 1916, u n t i l 1913, 1916 and 1919. The B r i t i s h Minister welcomed th i s suggestion and attempted to work out 1. His reasons are given i n Grey, op. c i t . , I, 250-52; Grey to Goschen, February 7, 1912, B.D., VI, Ho.497, pp.668-69. This dispatch t e l l s why Mr. Haldane was chosen. It was convenient for Mr. Haldane to undertake the mission. He was Chairman of a University Committee on s c i e n t i f i c education, and was at this time planning to go to B e r l i n with h i s brother, Professor Haldane, to make some studies on that subject. It was f e l t he could at the same time enter upon a frank exchange of views with the German Chancellor to discover i f there was a favourable prospect f o r negotiations to improve the r e l a t i o n s of the two countries. 2. Grey informed the French and Russian ambassadors of the undertaking and also of what took place at B e r l i n . In the negotiations which followed Haldane fs return the Russian and French Governments were kept informed o f . developments. From the B r i t i s h and French documents we learn that the French Government was most uneasy at the prospect of an Anglo-German understanding. 3. Also, Diary of Lord Haldane's v i s i t to B e r l i n , B.D., VI, Ho.506, pp.676-684; Reports of the conversations by William II and the Chancellor are given i n Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, 74-76. See also Bethmann-Hollweg, Th.von, Reflections on the World War, (London,1920),47ff. -189-with the Chancellor the formula for a p o l i t i c a l agreement. The Chancellor, however, wanted a promise of benevolent n e u t r a l i t y from England, and of help i n l o c a l i z i n g a c o n f l i c t i n the event of one of the Parties being involved i n a war with one or several opponents. Such a proposal, Haldane aaw, was too far-reaching f o r h i s Government. I t would preclude England from coming to the assistance of France should Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as 1 Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Furthermore, such a formula might hamper England i n discharging her treaty obligations to Belgium, Portugal and Japan. He offered, instead of the German proposal, a much more modified formula - that neither of the contracting P a r t i e s should make an unprovoked attack on the other, nor j o i n any c o a l i t i o n s designed against the other. This did not s a t i s f y the Chancellor. A new formula had to be formed. In c o l o n i a l matters i t was easier to come to a tentative agreement, which, however, was not to be regarded as binding on either. In the matter of the Portuguese colonies Germany was to get Angola, and England Timor; Germany might buy the Belgian Congo, i n return for granting a right of way to the Cape-to-Cairo Railway. It was further indicated that England might cede to Germany Zanzibar and Pemba i n the event of a s a t i s f a c t o r y arrangement being arrived at i n the matter of the f i n a l sector of the Bagdad Railway. 1. Asquith, The Genesis of the War, 56-57. -190-Haldane returned to London bringing with, him the drafts f o r a p o l i t i c a l and c o l o n i a l agreement. The Kaiser had given him as well the draft of the new German Haval Law to show p r i v a t e l y to h i s colleagues, although i t s contents had not yet been revealed to the Reichstag. When the B r i t i s h leaders studied the new Naval Law they found i t much less to t h e i r l i k i n g than they had a n t i c i p -ated i t would be. It provided not only f o r three new c a p i t a l ships, but at the same time there was to be a greater increase i n personnel and i n the number of minor c r a f t . To meet this new programme would involve England i n tremendous expenditures during the next few years. It was agreed by the Cabinet that Grey should inform Count Metternich of the grave d i f f i c u l t i e s which these naval proposals put i n the way of the desired rapprochement, and point out that for any p o l i t i c a l agreement to be made at a time when both countries were making increased 1 naval expenditures was an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . There were d i f f i c -u l t i e s also i n the matter of a c o l o n i a l agreement. The settlement reached i n this problem would depend on the s e t t l e -ment of the naval estimates. Hence Grey suggested the l a t t e r 2 point should be discussed f i r s t . The Kaiser and Chancellor f e l t that Grey was how changing the basis for negotiations agreed upon i n B e r l i n with Haldane; he was, they f e l t , s h i f t i n g from the n e u t r a l i t y 1. Memorandum by Grey, February 22, 1912, B.B.,71, Ho.523, pp.696-97. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 408; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 309; 191-agreement, and. g i v i n g p r i o r i t y to a c r i t i c i s m of the Naval 1 law. Meanwhile, negotiations continued i n london through Metternich. But there was l i t t l e chance of suocess. The problems of the n e u t r a l i t y agreement and naval l i m i t a t i o n proved stumbling blocks. On March 29 Grey informed Metternich that the English Government could not accept the German n e u t r a l i t y formula. The B r i t i s h were o f f e r i n g i n i t s place a more r e s t r i c t e d formula, which Germany, i n her turn, rejected, f e e l i n g that i t gave no s a t i s f a c t o r y s e c u r i t y against war 2 with England. To avoid severing communications altogether, the proposal was revived as to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p e r i o d i c a l exchange of information on the progress of ships under const-3 ruction; and the discussion of c o l o n i a l questions - the African colonies, the Bagdad Railway, Persia - was continued i n the hope that an understanding on special points might prepare the ground f o r a compromise agreement l a t e r on. The negotiations for a treaty of n e u t r a l i t y and f o r a reduction of the f l e e t s was considered to have f a i l e d . On A p r i l 15 the German Naval law was submitted to the Reichstag where i t was accepted on 1. Memorandum communicated by Metternich, March 6, 1912, B.D., VI, No.529, pp.704-06. 2. Grey to Goschen, March 29, 1912, B.D., VI, No.557, p.730; also March 15, 1912, No.539, pp*714-15. Pay, op. c i t . , I, 311, Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 413. 3. In this l e s s d i f f i c u l t f i e l d mutually s a t i s f a c t o r y agreements were worked out, and were complete f o r signatures on the eve of the War. -192-1 May 14. The Haldane Mission had proven a f a i l u r e - neither of the two great questions, which loomed so large i n the minds of the Governments had been solved - the two questions which constituted the essence of the negotiations. B r i t a i n had f a i l e d to achieve a slackening i n the pace of German naval construction, and Germany had f a i l e d to obtain her objective, a promise of English n e u t r a l i t y . B r i t a i n might claim i n accounting f o r the f a i l u r e that Germany*s terms were too onerous. In reply, Germany could answer that England was asking of her too great a s a c r i f i c e i n demanding that she regulate her f l e e t , not i n accordance with the standard she regarded as necessary to protect her commerce and uphold her prestige, but by the standard prescribed by the security and 2 prestige of a foreign power. 1. On March 18, Mr. Ch u r c h i l l had l a i d before the B r i t i s h Parliament the Havy Estimates, providing for two keels to every additional German one, and for the other greatly increased naval expenditures which he had threatened as England*s reply to the expected Herman Haval law. The A t l a n t i c Fleet would be moved from Gibraltar to Home Waters and replaced at G i b r a l t a r by the Mediterranean ships which had hitherto had t h e i r base at Malta. He indicated, however, that i f Germany made no increase neither would England. He did not make this proposal o f f i c i a l l y to Germany however, Ch u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 107ff; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 311. A year l a t e r , on March 26, 1913 Mr. C h u r c h i l l made an appeal to Germany for a \"naval holiday,\" a cessation of new construction f o r twelve months, but this evoked no response. Asquith, op. c i t . , 102. 2. Halevy, op. c i t . , I I , 572. -193-But i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r study, the great importance of the f a i l u r e of the Mission i s that i t reveals, among other f a c t s , the s o l i d a r i t y with which B r i t a i n was c l i n g i n g to her Entente p o l i c y . Polncare's boast, as reported by Isvolsky, that he had wrecked the negotiations by bringing pressure to 1 bear on S i r Edward Grey, seems to be a gross exaggeration. But there can be no doubt that Grey's r e j e c t i o n of Germany's proposals of n e u t r a l i t y was based upon French f e e l i n g . He was quite d e f i n i t e i n his opinion that the friendship of France was too high a price to pay f o r German friendship. On May 26, 1911, when i n v i t e d by the Prime Minister to give before a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense to which Dominion delegates to the Imperial Conference were i n v i t e d , \"an exposition, comprehensive and s t r i c t l y confiden-2 t i a l , \" of the international s i t u a t i o n , he had stated as an important point i n his p o l i c y : We must make i t a cardinal condition i n a l l our negotiations with Germany that i f we come to any understanding with Germany of a public kind which puts us on good r e l a t i o n s with Germany, i t must be an understanding which must not put us back into the old bad r e l a t i o n s with France and Russia. That means to say that i f we p u b l i c l y make friendship with Germany, i t must be a friendship i n which we take our e x i s t i n g friends i n Europe with us. (3) From a report of the German Ambassador i n London, of March 17, 1912, we learn: 1* Infra 201 and note 5. 2. Asquith, op. c i t . , 121. 3. Extract from the Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defense at a Meeting of May 26, 1911, B.D., VI, Appendix V, p.783. -194-Th. e Minister ( S i r Edward Grey) said he would frankly t e l l me why the B r i t i s h Government objected to incorporating the word \"neutral\" or \" n e u t r a l i t y \" i n the treaty. With regard to the proposal f o r a treaty, S i r Edward Grey said he must consider not only r e l a t i o n s with Germany, but also those with other countries. The B r i t i s h Government must reckon with the facts of Germany's growing naval power, which would be considerably increased by the projected Navy B i l l * Therefore Great B r i t a i n could not jeopar-dize her exi s t i n g friendships. A dir e c t n e u t r a l i t y treaty would most c e r t a i n l y i r r i t a t e French s e n s i b i l i t y , which the B r i t i s h Government must avoid. S i r Edward Grey could not go so f a r as to imperil the friendship. with France. (1) That the maintenance of c o r d i a l entente r e l a t i o n s with France was the p i v o t a l factor i n the conduct of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y i s further emphasized by Grey's Memoirs, where he states i n t e l l i n g of the plans for the Haldane Mission; I always f e l t that the pro-German element here had a right to demand that our foreign p o l i c y should go to the utmost point that i t could to be f r i e n d l y to Germany. That point would be passed only when something was proposed that would t i e us to Germany and break the Entente with France. (2) These previous paragraphs prove beyond doubt that B r i t a i n ' s membership i n the Entente contributed very l a r g e l y to the f a i l u r e of the negotiations begun by the v i s i t of Haldane to B e r l i n . But what i s of i n f i n i t e l y greater importance, 1. Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I, 174* 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 252. For further evidence that the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e was determined to make no p o l i t i c a l understanding or n e u t r a l i t y agreement with Germany which would i n any way l i m i t England's freedom to aid France, see Grey to Goschen, May 5, 1911, B.D., VT, Ho.361, p.479; Hicolson to Hardinge, A p r i l 11, 1911, Ho.461, p.621; the minute of S i r Eyre Crowe, March 3, 1913, pp.702-03; and afte r the f a i l u r e of the Haldane Mission, Goschen to Hicolson, A p r i l 20, 1912, Ho.579, p.750, and Grey to Hicolson, A p r i l 31, 1913, Ho.580 'p.751 -195-the f a i l u r e of the negotiations reacted i n turn upon B r i t a i n ' s Entente p o l i c y , reacted i n such a manner, that she made further decisions i n favour of the Entente, which gave more r i g i d form and more s o l i d substance to i t s rather nebulous r e l a t i o n s h i p . After the negotiations had admittedly broken down, when speaking i n the House of Commons on July 10, 1912, the Foreign Secretary took the occasion to reaffirm h i s attachment to the Entente. He said: The s t a r t i n g point of any new development i n European foreign p o l i c y i s the maintenance of our friendship with France and Russia. Taking that as our s t a r t i n g point, l e t us have the best possible r e l a t i o n s with other countries. (1) During the same debate, Mr. Bonar law, leader of the Opposition, made a statement i n t h i s regard, worthy of note: The r i g h t honourable Gentleman said tonight that the T r i p l e Entente - the good understanding with France and Russia - should be the s t a r t i n g point of our foreign p o l i c y . I prefer to say that i t i s the keynote of our foreign policy The strength of this p a r t i c u l a r part of our foreign p o l i c y i s t h i s : It i s not the p o l i c y of that Government, i t was not the p o l i c y of their predecessors; or i t was equally the p o l i c y of their predecessors. What i s f a r more important, i t i s the p o l i c y which i s necessitated by the facts of the s i t u a t i o n . It i s the national policy of t h i s country. It was r e a l l y f o r the purpose of saying t h i s that I have taken part i n the debate. It i s the p o l i c y of country, and i f the party to which I belong i s ever returned to power, i t w i l l equally be the p o l i c y of that party. (2) 1. Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t * , I, 175. 2. Ibid., 176. -196-The f e e l i n g that B r i t a i n was now attached more d e f i n i t e l y than ever to the Entente was also keenly f e l t i n B e r l i n . On June 7, 1912, the Russian Charge there telegraphed to h i s Foreign O f f i c e : Hot the fact of the conclusion of an a l l i a n c e between England and France makes i t s e l f f e l t , but rather the circumstance that the Germans have been f i n a l l y convinced that England i s now turning away from the p o s s i b i l i t y of a rapprochement with Germany - a rapprochement which Germany i n truth passionately desired. (1) Although the Haldane conversations, and the negotiat-ions which followed had f a i l e d to establish an Anglo-German agreement, and although the French had been kept informed of 2 what was tra n s p i r i n g while the negotiations were i n progress, and given every assurance that no action p r e j u d i c i a l to the 3 Entente would be considered, the negotiations had caused great uneasiness i n P a r i s . This was e s p e c i a l l y true i n the case of Mr. Raymond Poincare. He had come to power i n the French Government immediately a f t e r the Agadir C r i s i s at the head of a n a t i o n a l i s t M i n i s t r y . Although B r i t a i n had supported France during the C r i s i s of 1911, he was most anxious to tighten 4 re l a t i o n s between the two nations. The actions of Germany i n Moroccan a f f a i r s i n 1905 and 1911, her support of Austria i n the Bosnian C r i s i s of 1908, fcnd the b e l l i c o s e gestures of the Kaiser had aroused i n a small 1. S i e b e r t v op. c i t . , 644. 2. Poincare, op. c i t . , I, 80-82. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 251* 3. B.D., VI, numbers, 498,499,504,505,509,513,514,525,540, 550,556,558,559,564, and D.D.F. 3 e s e r i e , I I , Numbers 9 4,12,30,35,105,119. 4. Poincare', op. c i t . , I, 71. -197-1 group of French leaders a new national s p i r i t . The f e e l i n g had been created by 1911 that France had suffered long enough from the German \"menace.\" There had grown up a determination that i n the future, i f Germany should make a new threat of force, i t would be better to r i s k a war than accept a new humiliation. The desire f o r \"revanche,\" and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine had been revived anew. This new national s p i r i t of determination and self-confidence had been fostered also by the assurance of English friendship, and the conviction that i n the event of a Franco-German c o n f l i c t the support of B r i t a i n could be counted upon. It was not that these French leaders wanted war, any more than did the mass of the French people, but i f Germany i n her desire for the hegemony of Europe, should attempt again to use the \"mailed f i s t \" i t was f e l t i t would be better to fight than to y i e l d . And the l o n g - f e l t suspicion of Germany had l e d French leaders to f e e l sure that Germany, i n l i n e with what was interpreted as her aggressive designs of the past, would most c e r t a i n l y attempt 2 some new threat i n the future. This, then, created the f e e l i n g that war was \" i n e v i t a b l e . \" France would have to f i g h t ; France must prepare for such a day by increasing her army and navy at home, and by further cementing her friendships with Great 3 B r i t a i n and Russia. 1. Sohmitt, B.E., T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente (New York, 1934), 94. 2. Ibid., 93. 3. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 312-16. -198-This new f e e l i n g was personified i n M. Poincare', and the small group with which he was associated. He was not only the embodiment of the \" r e v e i l national, 1' but by h i s determination, firmness and a b i l i t y , he, more than any other man, did most to strengthen and stimulate i t . One of the f i r s t tasks to which he gave himself was the establishment 1 of closer relationships with England. While Poincare was anxious to strengthen the Entente, h i s f e e l i n g was shared by a good many people i n England, who, with the f a i l u r e of the Haldane negotiations, began to make themselves a r t i c u l a t e i n this view, and to express the opinion that the bonds with France should be drawn s t i l l more cl o s e l y . Previous pages have shown how anxious the Government was to preserve the Entente, and i f there were many who desired better r e l a t i o n s with Germany, there was this most active group which desired even closer r e l a t i o n s with the Republic. The \"Morning Post,\" the \"Daily Express,\" the \"Spectator,\" the \"Daily Graphic,\" the \"Observer,\" and the \" P a l l Mall Gazette\" conducted a campaign to transform the Entente into 2 an a l l i a n c e . On May 31, 1912 the Russian Ambassador wrote from London i n t h i s connection: 1. Poincare, op.c i t . ,1*71. For a year Poincare directed French foreign p o l i c y as prime minister. He was then elected President of the Republic, i n which o f f i c e he continued to exert a powerful influence on foreign a f f a i r s as well as on domestic p o l i c i e s . 2. Halevy,op.cit.,11,565; M.Fleuriau, Charge d'Affaires of France i n London to Poincare', May 30,1912, D.D.F., 3 Q s e r i e , I I I , Ho.56, pp*76-77, and Ho.57, pp.78-79. -199-I have sent you l a t e l y various newspaper a r t i c l e s , dealing with a question which i s very important i n i t s e l f , but which, as f a r as I know, has so f a r been discussed only by the Press - i . e . , the question of an a l l i a n c e between England and France. I think that this press campaign has been the i n d i r e c t r e s u l t of various a r t i c l e s published i n the \"Times\" and written by i t s m i l i t a r y correspondent, Colonel Repington, who i s himself one of the most convinced adherents of the Entente of England with France and Russia. These a r t i c l e s referred to England's m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n i n the Mediterr-anean, which has been rather weakened since the withdrawal of the B r i t i s h Squadron,(1) and which i s not, i n the b e l i e f of a considerable part of the B r i t i s h public, s u f f i c i e n t l y secured by su b s t i t u t i n g a French squadron, as long as the r e l a t i o n s of the two countries are based upon an entente and not an a l l i a n c e . (2) In h i s report of June 2, 1912, the same o f f i c i a l wrote* I should not l i k e to' assert, that the majority of the nation has already been won for an a l l i a n c e with Franoe. Things do not move so fast i n England, but, roused by a cert a i n part of the B r i t i s h public, which from various, undefined, and not always p a t r i o t i c reasons, begins to i n c l i n e towards Germany, thi s majority i s beginning to f e e l a c e r t a i n anxiety, and believes that a p o l i c y based exclusively on ententes i s not wholly s a t i s f a c t o r y ; (3) S i r Francis Bertie, the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Pari s , seems to have shared these views. On March 27, 1912, he had taken a rather curious step. Although no concessions had been made to Germany, and although the negotiations at that date had v i r t u a l l y broken down, he appears to have been alarmed, and evidently fearing that S i r Edward Grey might be influenced 1. Incident to the growth of the German navy which had made necessary the strengthening of the B r i t i s h Home Fl e e t . Supra. 2. Siebert, op. c i t . , 640-42; S i r Henry Wilson favoured an A l l i a n c e ; C a l l w e l l , op. c i t . , 112-13. 3. Siebert, op. c i t . , 642-43. -200-by members of the Cabinet such as Loreburn, Harcourt and others, who were more eager for an understanding with Germany, and who might make trouble i f they learned of the Anglo-French m i l i t a r y and naval conversations of which they had not as yet been.made aware, he c a l l e d on M. Poincare, quite p r i v a t e l y and u n o f f i c i a l l y , and asked leave to speak \"as though he were not 1 an ambassador.\" He suggested to M. Poincare that he would do well to point out f i r m l y to S i r Edward Grey the dangers involved i n any n e u t r a l i t y agreement with Germany. \" I t i s e s s e n t i a l , \" he declared, \"that Cambon express h i s d i s s a t i s -f a c t i o n . I f you w i l l only employ firm language i n London, 2 the f a l s e step I dread w i l l not be taken.\" 1. Poincare', dp. c i t . , I , 85. Wolff, Theodor, The Eve of 1914, (New York, 1936), 109-110, suggests that Bertie's action might have been inspired by Nicolson, or by \"other opponents of the L i b e r a l p a c i f i s t s at home.\" 2. Poincare' to Cambon, March 28, 1912, D.D.F., 3© s e r i e , I I , No. 269, pp.264-65; Poincar^, op. c i t . , I , 86. A dispatch from Bertie to Grey giving an account of an interview he held with Poincare on March 27 contains no hint of this conversation; B.D., VI, No.564, pp. 736-37. Bertie, pro-French as he was, was suspicious of, and opposed to, the Haldane Mission from the beginning of the undertaking. On February 11, 1912, he wrote to Nicolson; \"I think that the Haldane Mission, which i t was absurd and of no use to surround with mystery, i s a f o o l i s h move, intended I suppose to s a t i s f y the Grey-must-go r a d i c a l s . It c e r t a i n l y creates suspicion here, not with Poincare and perhaps not with those of the Ministry who are i n his confidence, but with many p o l i t i c a l people. We ought to bear i n mind, that i n any t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements or exchanges which we may make with the Germans we may injure the interests of our friends i f not our own. The French consulted us in the course of th e i r negotiations with the Germans whether we wouldv have any objection to cert a i n cessions of t e r r i t o r y including islands. We ought to act s i m i l a r l y i n regard to the French i f there be questions of cessions of B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s to Germany. It i s evident that the German Government whatever they may pretend to us w i l l not abate th e i r intention to compete with us at sea. The more d i g n i f i e d course for -201-Poincare welcomed this suggestion of S i r Francis; i t was e n t i r e l y in accord with M s own views. Accordingly, he at once sent an energetic dispatch to Cambon to the e f f e c t 1 proposed. Cambon presented the substance of this dispatch to 2 Grey on March .29. This happened to be the very date on which the B r i t i s h Cabinet f i n a l l y decided to give a negative answer 3 to the German Chancellor's n e u t r a l i t y formula. Although Cambon's interview with Grey preceded the Cabinet meeting of 4 that day, i t was not his interview which had the decisive 5 e f f e c t on the Cabinet decision. That decision had already 6 been arrived at. In view of the very evident determination of the B r i t i s h leaders from the outset not to concede to any n e u t r a l i t y agreement which would l i m i t B r i t i s h freedom i n taking 7 sides with France, and i n view of the f a c t that even before March 29 negotiations had v i r t u a l l y broken down, i t i s not true us would be not to waste words, but to go on i n increasing ratio, to construct against the German bui l d i n g programmes. Any undertaking given to us by the German Government would not be -observed i n the s p i r i t as would any engagements entered into by us. We have many examples of t h i s . . . . \" B.D., op. c i t . , VI, No.509, pp.687-88. 1. Poincare' to Cambon, March 28, 1912, D.D.F., 3e s e r i e l l , No. 269, p. 265. 2. Cambon to Poincare, March 29, 1912, D.D.F., 3e seVie, I I , No. 271, pp.266-67; B.D. VI, No. 559, p. 731. 3. Grey to Goschen, March 29, 1912, B.D., VI, No. 559, p. 730. 4. Cambon to Poincare, March 29, 1912, D.D.F., 3 e serie I I , No. 271, p. 267. 5. According to Isvolsky, Poincare' boasted of having wrecked the negotiations with Germany by bringing pressure to bear on the B r i t i s h leaders: Un Livre Noir (Paris, 1922), I, 365-66; op. c i t . , 133-34, 394-95. 6. Cambon to Poincare', March 29, 1912, D.D.F., 3 e s e r i e , No. 271, p. 267. Grey to Bertie, March 29, 1912, B.D., VI, No.559, p.731. Woodward, E.L., Great B r i t a i n and the German Navy, (London, 1935),360. 7. Supra 190-91. -202-to say that this interview did weigh heavily i n determining 1 the B r i t i s h p o l i c y . M. Poincare' was now impelled to endeavour to secure from England a binding statement i n w r i t i n g . The plan of Mr. C h u r c h i l l to with draw B r i t i s h ships from the Mediterranean f o r a stronger concentration of the f l e e t i n home waters against Germany, which was fore-shadowed i n his speech on March 18, had aroused l i v e l y discussion not only i n the 2 B r i t i s h , but also i n the French press. I t was seen that i f B r i t a i n withdrew her forces from the Mediterranean and protect-ed the north coast of France against the p o s s i b i l i t y of a German attack, France could, i n return for t h i s protection, withdraw her f l e e t from Brest, and look af t e r B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , 3 as well as her own, in the Mediterranean. I t was i n t h i s connection that many B r i t i s h papers were urging that the 4 Entente should be extended into a defensive a l l i a n c e . The French Government f e l t the time was now ripe to 5 attempt to work out a more precise agreement. In reviewing the s i t u a t i o n M.- Paul Cambon was summoned from London to 1. Mr. Barnes believes that i t was the influence of Poincare which led to the B r i t i s h r e f u s a l ; op. c i t . , 133-34, 394-95. 2. Supra 198-99; Poincare', op. c i t . , I, 111; Fay, op. c i t . , I, 318. 3. Schmitt, T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente, 96. 4. \"The only alternative to the constant menace of war i s a new system of precise a l l i a n c e , \" i n the \"London Daily Express,\" May 27, 1912, cited in Fay, op. c i t . , I, 319. 5. Poincare', op. c i t . , I, 87-88. -203-attend t h e i r deliberations. He returned to London on A p r i l 14, and on the following day v i s i t e d S i r Arthur Hicolson at the 1 Foreign O f f i c e . Hicolson has recorded t h e i r conversation i n 2 a minute of some length. M. Cambon f i r s t reviewed AnglO-French r e l a t i o n s as f a r back as 1905, pointing out the main develop-ments i n the forming of the Entente. In reviewing the s i t u a t i o n of the moment he stressed the danger i n the Agadir C r i s i s and French fears of future r e l a t i o n s with Germany. His Government, he said, was not sure, \"as to how f a r France could count upon B r i t i s h support i n the event of any d i f f i c u l t i e s with Germany.\" He went on to say: In these circumstances, M. Poincare considered that i t was necessary to take stock of the p o s i t i o n of France, and to see on what outside assistance she could r e l y when the moment arrived* It was evident that the attitude of England was a very important factor, and the recent endeavours of Germany to neutralize her c l e a r l y indicated that England was regarded as the Power which held l a r g e l y the balance f o r or against peace. Were Germany assured that England would remain neutral, her hands would be free f o r dealing with France. Were she i n doubt, she would hesitate. But i t was of great importance to France also to be assured what would be the attitude of England, and i f she could count on her. M. P o i n c a r l was anxious to be clear i n his mind on that point, and the very recent assurances and commuhications which he had reoeived from H.M. Government had not been s u f f i c i e n t l y clear and precise thoroughly to s a t i s f y and enlighten him. (3) Hicolson answered that, i n a question of such importance, he n a t u r a l l y could give only his personal opinion. He assured the French Ambassador, that he, personally, was a 1. Cambon to Poincare, A p r i l 18,1912,D.D.F., 3 e II,Ho.362, pp.369-71; Hicolson, op.cit., 267. 2. Minute by S i r Arthur Hicolson A p r i l 15,1912, B.D., VI, Ho.576, pp.747-49; Hicolson, op.cit*, 267-69. 3. Hicolson, op. c i t . , 268-69. -204-warm adherent of the understanding with France, and that \"no one would be hetter pleased than himself i f i t were strengthened.\" But there were many factors which had to be taken into consideration. He f i r s t of a l l doubted i f the B r i t i s h Government would be at a l l disposed to t i e t h e i r hands i n any possible contingency. \"They would,\" he f e l t sure, \"desire to preserve complete l i b e r t y of action.\" Then, i t must be remembered, among large sections of the community there was a strong f e e l i n g , which was shared possibly by some members of the Government, that an understanding should be arrived at with Germany. In view of these circumstances, Hicolson said; I f , at this moment, France were to come forward with proposals so to reshape our understanding, as to give i t more or less the character of an a l l i a n c e , I f e l t pretty sure that neither the Government as a whole nor large sections of B r i t i s h public opinion would be disposed to welcome such proposals, which would be regarded by many as o f f e r i n g umbrage and a challenge to Germany. It would be f a r wiser to leave matters as they were; and not to s t r a i n an understanding which was at present generally popular, and did not by i t s e l f a f ford the s l i g h t e s t 1 reason to any other country to resent or to demur to i t . This important minute, which analyses so l u c i d l y the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of that time, was sent to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Secretary. That Hicolson had c o r r e c t l y interpreted the p o l i c y of h i s Government i s revealed by the answers received from Asquith and Grey. The former r e p l i e d on 1. Hicolson, op;cit.,269. For some reason the French and English kept Russia i n the dark i n the matter of these negotiations. Denials that negotiations were undertaken were made to the Russian ambassadors i n London and Pa r i s by Hicolson and Poincare. Siebert, op. c i t . , 641 and 644. -205-A p r i l 18, \"I e n t i r e l y approve the language used by S i r 1 Arthur Nicolson.\" S i r Edward wrote on A p r i l 21: You could have taken no other l i n e with Cambon except what you did take. I s h a l l have to say the same; I s h a l l however, impress upon him that although we cannot bind ourselves under a l l circumstances to go to war with France against Germany, we s h a l l also not bind ourselves to Germany not to a s s i s t France* (2) Thus, the endeavour of the French to ascertain to just what extent they could r e l y on B r i t i s h assistance was checked by the re f u s a l of the B r i t i s h Government to commit 3 themselves i n advance to any binding engagement. The attempt was to be renewed again i n the f a l l . But although the B r i t i s h had rejected the French overtures i n the spring of 1912, a few weeks afte r t h e i r r e j e c t i o n , circumstances arose which led the Cabinet to make ce r t a i n dispositions and arrangements i n the f l e e t which i n effect committed Great B r i t a i n to intervention i n any war between Franoe and Germany. Mr. Spender, i n his \" F i f t y Years of Europe,\" r e f e r r i n g to these naval arrangements, emphasizes 1. Minute to No*577, B.D., VI, p.749. 2. Grey to Nicolson, A p r i l 21,1912, B.D.VI,No*580, p.751. 3. M. Poincare's answer to Cambon's summary of the conver-sation with Nicolson i s of i n t e r e s t . He wrote: \"The conversation you had with the Under-Secretary w i l l have c e r t a i n l y enlightened the B r i t i s h Government as to the price we attach to the Entente Cordiale, and which we would wish to see affirmed i n wr i t i n g so that i t s existence could not be doubted. I am glad to l e a r n that Mr^ Nicolson shares personally i n this opinion.\" Poincare to Cambon, A p r i l 30, 1912, D.D.F., 3fe s e r i e , I I , Ho.396, p.414. -206-their importance when he says, \" I f there i s one l i n k i n the long chain of fate or circumstances compelling B r i t a i n and France to stand together upon which we can lay our finger and 1 say that here the decision was taken, i t i s t h i s . \" What was this important .move? In May, 1912, Mr. C h u r c h i l l , accompanied by Mr. Asquith, had v i s i t e d Malta to confer with General Kitchener as to the s i t u a t i o n i n Egypt and the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the Mediterranean. Upon their return, C h u r c h i l l announced more d e f i n i t e l y i n Parliament on July 22, when introducing a Supplementary Naval Estimate, the plan of the Admiralty f o r withdrawing ships from the Mediterranean for concentration i n the North Sea, which act had been foreshadowed i n h i s 2 e a r l i e r speech of March 18. At the same time he proposed to the French Naval Attache a draft plan f o r the cooperation of 3 B r i t i s h and French f l e e t s . The French, however, hesitated to accept this plan, because C h u r c h i l l had drafted with i t a eautious preamble, s t a t i n g that the plan was i n no way to affect the l i b e r t y of action of either Party - a statement, i n the eyes of the French, which robbed the proposed concert 4 of action of i t s value. 1. Spender, F i f t y Years, 384. 2. Supra* 7 f 3. French Naval Attache i n london to Delcasse, July 18,1912, D.D.F*, 3 e s e r i e , I I I , No.207, pp.270-72. Renouvin, P., Conversations Between the General S t a f f s on the Eve of War, Studies i n Anglo-French History, C o v i l l e and Temperley, editors,164; Poincare, o p . c i t . , I , 110-111; Porter, op.cit.,303. 4. Cambon to Poincare, September 21,1912,D.D.F., 3 e s e r i e , I I I , No.431,p.524,No*448,p.544. Poincare 7, op.cit., I, 111. 207-Consistently adhering to t h e i r p o l i c y of making sure that t h e i r hands would be free, the B r i t i s h were exceedingly anxious to avoid a binding written agreement. But, even though there was no written agreement, of which they were so a f r a i d , an arrangement by which B r i t a i n would withdraw her Mediterranean f l e e t to the North Sea, while the French would s h i f t t h e i r f l e e t from Brest to Toulon, was most dangerous; i n fact i t would contain a l l the elements of l i m i t i n g B r i t i s h freedom of action, i n so far as i t would of necessity create an obligation on the part of B r i t a i n to protect the northern coast of France .1 i n the case of that country being engaged i n a war. Mr. Ch u r c h i l l , himself, was keenly aware of the obligation which would thus be created. He perceived that the French would be encouraged to count upon B r i t i s h assistance, which fact would v i r t u a l l y create the oblig a t i o n upon England, and thus l i m i t 2 England's freedom of action. Despite the dangers inherent i n such a po l i c y , the Cabinet decided i n August that naval conversations should take place between the French and B r i t i s h admiralties, conversations si m i l a r to those which had been held since 1906 between the 3 General S t a f f s . Mr. Harold Hicolson, i n h i s father's biography, states that few of the Cabinet r e a l i z e d the v i t a l importance 4 of the move at the time. But when the step was decided upon 1. Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 217. 2. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 114-16. 3. Ibid., 115. 4. Hicolson, op. c i t . , 271. -208-i t was not without warnings from Mr. C h u r c h i l l . In h i s \"World C r i s i s \" he t e l l s how he f u l l y r e a l i z e d that \"the moral claims which France could make upon Great B r i t a i n i f attacked hy Germany, whatever we had stipulated to the contrary, were 1 enormously extended*\" He set for t h the dangers of such a p o l i c y i n a minute of August 23 to S i r Edward Grey and the 2 Prime Minister. He t e l l s how d i f f i c u l t the negotiations were; 3 but adds,\"We did our utmost to safeguard ourselves.\" The technical naval discussions could only be conducted on the basis that the French Fleet should be concentrated i n the Mediterranean, and that i n case of a war i n which both countries took part, i t would f a l l to the B r i t i s h f l e e t to defend the Northern and Western coasts of France. The French,, as I had foreseen, n a t u r a l l y r a i s e d the point that i f Great B r i t a i n did not take part i n the war, t h e i r Northern and Western coasts would be completely exposed. We, however, while recognizing the d i f f i c u l t y steadfastly declined to allow the naval arrangements to bind us i n any p o l i t i c a l sense. It was eventually agreed that i f there was any menace of war, the two Governments should consult together and concert beforehand what common action, i f any, they should take. The French were obliged to accept this p o s i t i o n , and to a f f i r m d e f i n i t e l y that the naval conversations did not involve any obligation of common action. This was the best we could do f o r ourselves and for them* (4) While these negotiations were s t i l l under consider-ation, but before any decision had been reached, i t was announced prematurely, through an error of French Admiralty o f f i c i a l s , when M. Delcasse was absent i n his constituency, 5 that the Brest Fleet was to be transferred to the Mediterranean. 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t * , 115. 2. Ibid., 115. 3. \" c 115. 4. \" 116. . 5. D.D.F., 3 e s e r i e , I I I , Ho.431, p.523, and footnote on p.523; Poincare, op. c i t * , I, 112; Porter, op. cit.,304. -209 This news caused great excitement i n the Press of both countries, and was interpreted as a certain sign that an Anglo-French 1 naval agreement had been d e f i n i t e l y concluded. France was thus assuming before the whole world the task of protecting against possible attack B r i t a i n ' s route to India between Gib r a l t a r and Port Said now stripped of B r i t i s h c a p i t a l ships, and B r i t a i n was making hers e l f responsible f&r the defense of the French coast on the North Sea, the Channel and even the A t l a n t i c . As the negotiations continued, the 2 draft agreement drawn up i n July was discussed and amended 3 , several times u n t i l i t f i n a l l y took shape i n February, 1913. On A p r i l 4 the French Naval Attache i n London reported that the Admiralty considered \"the agreement\" as \" d e f i n i t e l y 4 concluded.\" His reference i s to three conventions which l a i d the foundation for Franco-British naval cooperation i n the Mediterranean, Western Channel and the S t r a i t s of Dover. The 5 text of these agreements i s given i n the French Documents. 1. Poincare, op.cit., I, 112. Woodward,op.cit.,380-81. 2. Supra. / 3. Delcasse to Poincare, September 17,1918, l e t t e r enclosing a preliminary draft of a naval convention with notes; D . D i F * , 3 9 s e r i e , I I I , No.420,pp.506ff; Cambon, to Poincare, September 19,1912, i b i d . , No.431, pp.523ff. Poincare to Cambon, September 20, 1912, i b i d . , No.436,p.530. Captain de fregate Le Gouz-de-Saint-Seine to Vice-Admiral Aubert, September 21,1912, i b i d . No.449, p.546. See also,. Halevey, op.cit., I I , pp.603-04; Renouvin, P i e r r e , Conversations between the General Staffs on the Eve of the War; l o c . c i t . , 164. 4. Le Commandant de Saint-Seine to Vice-Admiral Aubert, D.D. F., 3® se r i e , VI, No.198, p.247. 5. Ibid., V, No.397, p.483-490. -210-1 At the same time cooperation was provided for i n the Far East. 2 As Mr. C h u r c h i l l t e l l s us, these technical agreements were merely p r o v i s i o n a l , binding the contracting parties only to take the necessary steps for cooperation i n the Mediterranean or e l s e -where \" i n the event of a war i n which Great B r i t a i n and France are a l l i e d against the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , \" and to defend the S t r a i t s of Dover and the Channel \" i n the event of being a l l i e d with the French Government i n a war with Germany.\" M. Poincare' t e l l s i n his Memoirs how unsatisfactory this arrangement was to the French. They could not remain 3 s a t i s f i e d with so loose an arrangement. Accordingly there was once more urged upon S i r Edward Grey the necessity of a written agreement. M. Cambon i n London pressed the matter i n the f a l l of 1912. \"How could we,\" he asked, \"expose our Channel and A t l a n t i c coasts to the i n s u l t of a German f l e e t without knowing how f a r we could r e l y on England?\" When the Foreign Secretary explained that no engagement could be entered upon without r e f e r r i n g i t to Parliament for i t s consent, M. Cambon r e p l i e d : It i s no question of an agreement here and now; we only want some assurance as to the defence of our coast. Could we not revert to Lord Lansdowne's proposal, and agree that i n the event of a threatening s i t u a t i o n we would put our heads together, and decide how best mutually to protect ourselves from the dangers of war? In a word, i f i n presence of such danger we should consider an a l l i a n c e or a m i l i t a r y convention our best way out, we should resort to t h i s . I f our opinions d i f f e r e d , and then e i t h e r of us refused to go to war, each party would take i t s own 1. D.D.F., 3 e s e r i e , V, No. 303, p.385; i b i d , VT, No.198, p.247. 2. Supra 208. Porter, op. c i t . , 305. 3. Poincare, op. c i t . , I, 112. - 2 1 1 -preoautions; France could not p o l i c e the Mediterranean without agreement i n other respects. ( 1 ) When the French i n s i s t e d on the matter, S i r Edward Grey took i t up with Mr. Asquith. The Prime Minister saw the same d i f f i c u l t i e s as h i s Foreign Secretary. It was f i n a l l y agreed, however, that an exchange of l e t t e r s might take place between the two Powers, i t being f i r s t c l e a r l y understood that these l e t t e r s must not be ranked as diplomatic documents, but merely as a personal correspondence between a Secretary of State and an Ambassador, and secondly that the wording must be approved 2 by the Cabinet. The B r i t i s h Cabinet discussed the matter on October 30, and i t was at this meeting that a l l i t s members were at l a s t informed of the Anglo-French \"conversations\" which 3 had been conducted s t e a d i l y since 1 906. The B r i t i s h l e t t e r was drawn up and approved, and according to the plan, an exchange of l e t t e r s took place with Cambon on November 22 and 23. So important i s this exchange of l e t t e r s , they must be given here. Grey's l e t t e r , courteously expressed, read as follows: 1. Cambon to Poincare, September 21, 1912, D.D.F., 3 E s e V i e , II, No.448, p.545. Poincare, op.cit., I, 1 1 3 . 2. Cambon to Poincare, October 31,1912, D.D.F* 3 E se*rie, IV, No.301, pp.318-20; Poincare, op.cit., I, 1 1 3 ; Grey, op. c i t . , I, 9 6 - 9 7 . 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, pp.96-97. Lloyd George t e l l s that when the Cabinet heard of these, most of them f o r the f i r s t time, \"The majority of i t s Members were aghast. H o s t i l i t y barely represents the strength of the sentiment which the revelation aroused; i t was more akin to consternation.\" Grey and Asquith endeavoured to a l l a y apprehensions by \"emphatic assurances\" that B r i t a i n was not bound by the conversations, op.cit., 50. -212-S i r Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador i n london. Foreign O f f i c e , November 22, 1912. My Dear Ambassador, - From time to time i n recent years the French and B r i t i s h naval and m i l i t a r y experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not r e s t r i c t the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to as s i s t the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts i s not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action i n a contingency that has not arisen and may never a r i s e . The d i s p o s i t i o n , for instance, of the French and B r i t i s h f l e e t s respectively at the present moment i s not based upon an engagement to cooperate i n war. You have, however, pointed out that i f either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a t h i r d -Power i t might become essential to know whether i t eould, i n that event, depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that, i f either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a t h i r d Power, or. something that threatened the general peace, i t should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, i f so, what measures theylwould be prepared to take i n common. I f these measures involved action, the plans of the general s t a f f s would at once be taken into consid-eration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, e t c., E. Grey. The l e t t e r which M. Cambon gave i n exchange for that of S i r Edward Ts reads: M. Cambon to S i r Edward Grey (Translation) French Embassy, London, November 23, 1912. Dear S i r Edward, - You reminded me i n your l e t t e r of yesterday, November 22, that during the l a s t few years the -213-m i l i t a r y and naval authorities of France and Great B r i t a i n had consulted with each other from time to time; that i t had always been understood that these consultations.should x not r e s t r i c t the l i b e r t y of either Government to decide i n the future whether they should lend each other the support of t h e i r armed forces; that, on either side, these consult-ations between experts were not, and should not be, consid-ered as engagements binding our Governments to take action i n c e r t a i n eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, i f one or the other of the two Governments had grave reason to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a t h i r d Power, i t would become es s e n t i a l to know whether i t eould count on the armed support of the other. Your l e t t e r answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, i n the event of one of our two Governments having grave reason to fear either an act of aggression from a t h i r d Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together i n order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. I f so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take i n common; i f those measures involved action, the two Govern-ments would take into immediate consideration the plans of t h e i r General S t a f f s and would then decide as to the ef f e c t to be given to those plans. Yours, etc., 1 Paul Cambon. 1. These l e t t e r s c i t e d i n Grey, op. c i t . , I, 97-98. Mr. B.E. Schmitt i n his a r t i c l e , \" T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente,\" American H i s t o r i c a l Review, A p r i l , 1924, asks us to compare the concluding paragraph of each of the l e t t e r s with the p o l i t i c a l clauses of the Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e . These l a t t e r read: \"The two Governments declare that they w i l l take counsel together upon every question of a nature to jeopardize the general peace; i n case.that peace should be a c t u a l l y i n danger, and especially i f one of the two parties should be threatened with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an understanding on the measures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption would be Imposed upon the two Governments by the r e a l i z a t i o n of this eventuality....\" Mr. Schmitt points out that i t i s d i f f i c u l t to make any d i s t i n c t i o n between the engagements contracted i n each case. -214-These l e t t e r s , exchanged i n November, 1912, f i x e d the relations between'the B r i t i s h and French Cabinets down to the outbreak of the Great War so f a r as any written statements were concerned. Actually the only engagement undertaken i n them was to make a joint study of the s i t u a t i o n should a c r i s i s a r i s e . France had received a promise that there should be a conferring i n the face of danger, and with t h i s , a hypot-h e t i c a l acceptance of the plans drawn up by the General S t a f f s . Thus, l i t e r a l l y , there was no a l l i a n c e , no d e f i n i t e promise that armed help would be given. In actual wording the l e t t e r s l e f t the hands of the B r i t i s h Government free, and that freedom was to be frequently solemnly r e i t e r a t e d i n l a t e r months by 1 the Prime Minister and S i r Edward Grey. And t h e o r e t i c a l l y the B r i t i s h hands were free. But as S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman 2 had pointed out i n 1906, and as Mr. Asquith had himself pointed 3 out i n 1911, the m i l i t a r y conversations were dangerous i n the 1. On March 10, 1913, the following question was put to the Prime Minister i n the House of Commons: \"There i s a general b e l i e f that this country i s under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation a r i s i n g out of an assurance given by the Ministry, i n the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of t h i s country to operate i n Europe. That i s the general b e l i e f . \" Mr. Asquith rep l i e d , \"I ought to say that i s not true.\" On March 24, 1913, two weeks l a t e r , he went even further to say, \"As has been repeat-edly stated, this country i s not under any obligation, not public and known to Parliament, which compels i t to take part i n a war. In other words, i f war, arises between European Powers, there are no unpublished agree-ments which w i l l r e s t r i c t or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to decide whether or not Great B r i t a i n should p a r t i c i p a t e i n a war.\" Cited i n Ewart, op. c i t . , I, 128. 8. Supra. 104. 3. Supra. 179 (note 1). -215-encouragement they giave the French. Mr. C h u r c h i l l had expressed warnings i n 1912 that the new arrangements f o r the B r i t i s h and French f l e e t s t i e d England and France i n a dangerous manner, creating, as they did, an inescapable moral obligation to protect the coast of France i n the events of a Franco-German war - that i s to p a r t i c i p a t e on the French side, no matter how the war arose. In the words of Mr. Hicolson, the B r i t i s h had \"committed themselves to a guarantee which would involve 1 England either in a breach of f a i t h or a war with Germany.\" And now, i n November of 1912, i n the Grey-Cambon l e t t e r s , the conversations, m i l i t a r y and naval, assumed a new character and sig n i f i c a n c e , i n however a guarded form i t might be, i n the form of a written agreement. It i s necessary to examine only b r i e f l y England's diplomatic relationship with France to see how very c l o s e l y her fate was i n r e a l i t y bound up with that of France by the end of 1912. By her departure from i s o l a t i o n at the s t a r t of the century, and by the very act of entering into the Continental system, however anxious she might be to think herself free, she was forced to accept obligations and i n v i t e r i s k s . Her Agreement with France i n 1904 had been based on a common pol i c y with regard to Morocco, and i t had v i r t u a l l y insured the s o l i d -a r i t y of the two Powers i n case of a war a r i s i n g over Morocco. But, as Mr. Fabre-luce points out, the Agreement of 1912 prepared 1. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 272 -216-th e way. for concerted action on a much more widely extended basis. Coming at a time when the question of Morocco was set t l e d , and the Agreement of 1904 consequently no longer need apply, the new agreement \"meant i n fact that Franco-BritishL s o l i d a r i t y would now he extended to a l l other problems i n 1 which the Entente might have common i n t e r e s t . \" And, what i s more important, the technical supplements to the Entente defined this attitude more c l e a r l y . The cautious correspondence of Grey and Cambon was backed by conversations between the m i l i t a r y and naval experts which decided on possible methods of common action, and by an intimacy between them which prepared the way for such action, and which anticipated i t . In the eyes of the B r i t i s h Cabinet the l e t t e r s were intended to put on record the fact that the B r i t i s h were s t i l l free to act as they/ thought best i n a time of c r i s i s ; from this view, they were interpreted as an admission on the part of the French of B r i t a i n ' s freedom. But, the French saw i n them a quite different interpretation, or at le a s t , a quite d i f f e r e n t emphasis; to them the l e t t e r s were an admission on the part of the B r i t i s h to France's claim for support. There can be l i t t l e doubt that M. Poincare took from them this assurance. On February 27, 1913, Isvolsky wrote to Sazonov, reporting a conversation with Poincare: 1. Fabre-luce, op. c i t . , 154; Lutz, op. c i t . , 88. -317-England i s not bound to France by any d e f i n i t e p o l i t i c a l engagement, but the tone and nature of the assurances given by the Cabinet of London allow the French Government, i n the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l conjunctures, to count upon the armed support of England i n case of c o n f l i c t with Germany. (1) The B r i t i s h leaders were sure th e i r hands were free, and did not hesitate to t e l l the people that this was so. The French meanwhile were f u l l y prepared to gamble, as on a sure certainty, 2 on B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a war which might break out. There was a further element of danger i n th i s r e l a t -ionship of 1913. The i n d e f i n i t e nature of the Entente at this time did not give the B r i t i s h any r i g h t to exercise any measure of control over French p o l i c y . It merely gave the l a t t e r , i n th e i r minds at l e a s t , as has been shown, increased hopes f o r v i c t o r y should the threat of war come, without enabling the former to exert any e f f e c t i v e influence i n the d i r e c t i o n of peace. Mr. C h u r c h i l l has written no truer words .than those he penned when he described the s i t u a t i o n , \"Everyone must f e e l , who knows the facts, that we have the obligations of an a l l i a n c e , without i t s advantages, and above a l l without 3 i t s precise d e f i n i t i o n s . \" 1. Un Livre Noir, I I , 32-33; Schmitt, T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente, l o c . c i t . , 461. 3. The French authorities i n drawing up Plan XVII, upon which t h e i r plan of campaign i n 1914 was based, counted d e f i n i t e l y on B r i t i s h naval assistance. They were not e n t i r e l y sure of m i l i t a r y a i d on land, but stated that, \"on sea* however, we can count without r i s k upon the e f f e c t i v e support of the B r i t i s h f l e e t . \" Porter, op. c i t . , 307; Fay, op. c i t * , I, 324. 3. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 116, 217. Chamberlain, Austen, Down the Years, (London, 1935), 66. -218-The exchange of l e t t e r s i n 1912, following upon the consistent diplomatic support which England had given France throughout the Morocco C r i s i s of 1911, had thus established a wider basis of mutual confidence between the two Governments. After 1912 England was brought s t i l l further within the o r b i t of French p o l i c y by her closer relationship with Russia. Just as her friendship with Franoe before 1907 was a factor i n aiding England to negotiate the Anglo-Russian Convention of that year, the closer friendship i n 1912 was an important factor i n drawing tighter the bonds with Russia i n 1913 and 1914. It i s true that B r i t i s h r e lations with Russia never reached the same degree of intimacy as those with France. This i s accounted for i n part by the fact that B r i t i s h public opinion did not regard questions of the Near East, which were of such v i t a l concern to Russia, as f a l l i n g within the scope of B r i t i s h interests which might be worth f i g h t i n g f o r , and i n part by the fact that Russian a c t i v i t y i n Persia caused considerable concern to Great B r i t a i n , and often seemed not i n 1 harmony with the Convention of 1907. During the Balkan C r i s i s of 1912-13 B r i t i s h e f f o r t s were directed to mediate between Russian and Austrian claims, and Grey refused to commit himself on the question of whether Great B r i t a i n would take part i n a war a r i s i n g out of the Balkans. Likewise, i n the winter of 1913-14, when the Russian Government became greatly aroused over the sending of a German m i l i t a r y mission to Turkey, the 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 166-170. -219-the liman von Sanders Missions, S i r Edward Grey, did not give 1 whole-hearted support to the Russian protests. In the spring of 1914, however, a new turn was given to Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s , brought about, i n part at l e a s t , through the closer relationship each of the two Powers had cemented with France during 1912, f o r not only England during that year, but Russia, also, had come into closer friendship with the Republic. Closely connected with the Anglo-French Naval Agreement was a Franco-Russian Naval Convention of July, 1912. Negotiations for such an agreement had started i n the spring to arrange a naval convention analogous to the m i l i t a r y convention of 1894. The re s u l t was the secret naval convention signed on July 16, 1912, by the admirals and naval ministers, and confirmed by an exchange of notes between Sazonov and 2 Poincare when the l a t t e r v i s i t e d Russia a month l a t e r . On t h i s v i s i t one of the main topics of conversation was the closer cooperation of the naval forces of the T r i p l e Entente. Poincare confided to Sazonov, according to the l a t t e r ' s report to the Czar, that \"although there does not exist between France and England any written treaty, the Army and Navy St a f f s of the two countries have nevertheless been i n close contact. This constant exchange of views has resulted i n the conclusion between the French and English Governments of a verbal agreement, 1. GFay, op. c i t . , I, 498-524. 2. Poincare', op. c i t . , I, 204, 212, 225; Porter, op. c i t . , 301-03. -220-by v i r t u e of which England has declared herself ready to aid France with her m i l i t a r y and naval forces i n case of an attack 1 by Germany.\" He begged the Russian Minister to \"preserve the most absolute secrecy i n regard to the information,\" and not to give the English themselves any reason to suspect that he had been told of i t . He. urged him to take advantage of h i s coming v i s i t to England to discuss the question of a possible Anglo-Russian naval agreement, which would thus complete the naval cooperation of the three Entente Powers i n case of war with Germany. Sazonov followed this suggestion. On his v i s i t to England, which took place i n September, he informed Grey of the substance of the Franco-Russian Naval Convention and asked whether England would safeguard Russia i n the north by keeping 2 the German f l e e t out of the B a l t i c . Aocording to Sazonov's report of this interview, Grey declared that i n the case of a war with Germany, England would make every e f f o r t to c r i p p l e the German f l e e t , but explained that, i n the view of the naval authorities, B r i t i s h entrance into the B a l t i c would be r i s k y since Germany might succeed i n gaining control of Denmark and thus close the e x i t from that sea. \"Accordingly, Great B r i t a i n would have to confine her operations to the North Sea.\" But Grey wentoon to inform Sazonov, \"on his own i n i t i a t i v e , \" so the l a t t e r reports, of what Poincare had made him already aware 1. Sazonov to the Czar, August 4, 1912, Un Li v r e Noir, op. c i t . , 11,-339. 8. Ibid., 347. -221-of the agreement which existed between France and B r i t a i n , \"under which i n the event of war with Germany, Great B r i t a i n has accepted the obligation of bringing assistance to France not only on the sea but on land, by landing troops on the 1 Continent.\" Whether Sazonov reported corr e c t l y what Poincare 7 2 and Grey had said i s very doubtful. But, the fact that he made such statements to the Czar would indicate how much the French and Russians were encouraged by the existence of the Anglo-French m i l i t a r y and naval \"conversations,\" and i n c l i n e d to interpret them as a promise of B r i t i s h support i n the case 3 of a European War. Although the Balkan Wars closed without breeding wider c o n f l i c t , serious tension remained. Having good reason for apprehension, when the liman von Sanders a f f a i r created 1. Sazonov to the Czar, op. c i t . , 347. In h i s Memoirs Grey has something to say with regard to this report of Sazonov to the Czar, \"That I (Grey) made a promise to Russia going far beyond anything promised to France i n communication with the French Government.\" He says, that i f Sazonov's report to the Czar was made \"without giving the Czar c l e a r l y to understand that B r i t a i n could make no promise and come under no obligation, i t was i n effect an untrue report.\" \"The record of our conver-sation which I made at the time i s quite clear on this point.\" - he gives the record at thi s point. He goes on to say, ''To construe these words as a declaration of an intention to go to war with Germany, and s t i l l more as an obligation to do so, would have been unpardonable. Sazonov never for a moment understood them i n this sense; neither he nor Beckendorf nor anyone ever suggested such a'construction to me afterwards.\" Grey, op. c i t . , I, £98-99. 2. Fay, op. c i t . , I, 328; Schmitt, T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente, l o c . c i t . , 460 (note 75); 3. Lloyd George, op. c i t . , I, 49. -222-further uneasiness, Sazonov, on February 12, 1914, suggested to the Russian Ambassador i n London that Grey be sounded on a proposal of having representatives of the three entente 1 powers meet to \" e s t a b l i s h the community of their views.\" 2 Grey raised no objection to this proposal, and since a v i s i t to Paris by George V, who was to be accompanied by S i r Edward Grey, had been arranged f o r the near future, Sazonov telegrap-hed to his ambassador there on A p r i l 2, proposing \"a further reinforcement and development of the so-called T r i p l e Entente, and, i f possible, i t s transformation into a new T r i p l e 3 A l l i a n c e . \" The Ambassador i n his reply informed Sazonov that he had taken the matter up with the French leaders,and that M. Doumergue,the French Foreign Minister,would speak to Grey 4 when he was i n P a r i s . \"He believes that i t w i l l prove very easy to bring forth convincing arguments i n favour of this thought, for i t i s very obvious that, France, having m i l i t a r y and naval conventions v/ith Russia and England, the system ought to be co-ordinated and completed by a corresponding 5 accord between Russia and England.\" 1. Siebert, op. c i t . , 712-13. 2. Ibid., 713. 3. Ibid., 714. 4. I b i d . , 715. 5. Ibid., 715. -223-S i r Edward Grey accompanied His Majesty to Paris i n a v i s i t from A p r i l 21 to 24 and during the v i s i t found time to meet with Doumergue and Isvolsky. The question of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s was brought up for discussion. Grey was of the opinion that the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n England would not permit the conversion of the T r i p l e Entente into a formal a l l i a n c e . But, at the wish of the French, he agreed to communicate to the Russian Government the notes which had been exchanged between Great B r i t a i n and France i n November of 1912, and he consented also that conversations should be carried on between the Russian and B r i t i s h admiralties analogous to those between the B r i t i s h and French naval experts. These offers were subject to Grey obtaining the concurrence 1 of Mr. Asquith and the other members of h i s Government. Asquith saw no d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the carrying out of the plan, and on May 23 the Russian Ambassador reported that Grey had informed him that \"the English Minister's Council had approved of the answer which he (Grey) gave to Doumergue i n P a r i s i n 2 his own name.\" As Grey t e l l s us i n his own words: I could see l i t t l e i f any strategic necessity or value i n the suggestion. To my l a y mind i t seemed that i n a war against Germany, the Russian Fleet would not get out of the B a l t i c and the B r i t i s h Fleet would not get into i t ; but the d i f f i c u l t y of refusing was obvious. To refuse would offend Russia by giving the impression that she was not treated on equal terms with France; i t might even 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 283-85; Un L i v r e Noire, op.cit.,11, 261. 2. Siebert, op. c i t . , 538; Grey, op. c i t . , I, 285. -224-give her the impression that, since we f i r s t agreed to m i l i t a r y conversations with France, we had closed our minds against p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a war. To give t h i s impression might have unsettling consequences, as well as being untrue. On the other hand, i t was unthinkable that we should incur an obliga t i o n to Russia which we had refused to France. It was as impossible as ever to give any pledge that B r i t a i n would take part i n a contin-ental war. The fact that we remained unpledged must be made quite clear. On t h i s understanding we agreed to l e t the B r i t i s h and Russian naval authorities communicate as the French asked. (1) Thus through her close relationship with France, England was brought into closer friendship with Russia before July, 1914. Mr. Sazonov was exceedingly happy over this f a c t . On May 28, 1914, he wrote to his Ambassador i n London: The readiness of the B r i t i s h Government to begin, without delay, negotiations, regarding the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and England, which would concern joint operations of our naval forces i n the event of a common m i l i t a r y action, has been received on our part with a f e e l i n g of greatest s a t i s f a c t i o n . Quite apart from the fact, that such an agreement i s desirable from a special m i l i t a r y standpoint, we attach great importance to i t i n a general p o l i t i c a l sense. In the conclusion of such an agreement, we see an important step towards bringing England into closer union with the Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e . (2) Sazonov saw that the T r i p l e Entente was being tightened and took joy i n that prospect. True, the Entente was not a d e f i n i t e a l l i a n c e , but i t was being conducted as i f i t were one i n e f f e c t . The words which Grey himself used i n describing the Entente to the German Ambassador on June 24, 1914, reveal how close to an a l l i a n c e i t had become. He summed up the 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 284-85. 2. Siebert, op. c i t . , 724--225-s i t u a t i o n most admirably when he said, \"Though we (Britain) are not bound by engagement (to France and Russia) as A l l i e s , 1 we did from time to time t a l k as intimately as A l l i e s . \" Meanwhile, the nation as a whole knew almost next to nothing of the p o l i c y the B r i t i s h Government was following. I t has been shown how Grey had kept secret from most of his colleagues important facts of B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s with France before 1911, and that i t was only a f t e r 1911 that the whole cabinet became aware of what had been and was being done. But these facts were not revealed to the whole nation u n t i l the eve of the war. Whether Grey a c t u a l l y believed that B r i t a i n was absolutely free from entanglements, as he so often avowed, w i l l ; perhaps never be known. The important point is that he kept r e i t e r a t i n g t h i s fact u n t i l war came. The s i t u a t i o n became d i f f i c u l t when the German 2 Government learned of these Anglo-Russian naval conversations. Suspicion was immediately kindled i n Germany that hostil e measures were being prepared against the Empire. Reports 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I , 304, Schmitt, T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente, 99. 2. Jagow to B a l l i n , July 15, 1914, Dugdale, op. c i t . , IV, No. 640, pp. 375-77; B a l l i n to Jagow, July 24, 1914, No.643, pp. 377-78, Bethmann-Hollweg, op.cit.,64. See Wolff, op. c i t . , 379-86. Theodor Wolff was editor of the \" B e r l i n e r Tageblatt\" which f i r s t published d e t a i l s of the Anglo-Russian conversations i n Germany. He reveals how the German Diplomatic Service was kept secre t l y i n touch with the Russian Embassy i n London through M. de Siebert, and how news of the project of the Anglo-Russian naval conversations reached Germany through this source. Copies of the Russian diplomatic telegrams and l e t t e r s were supplied by de Siebert, 380-81, 357-60. -226-appeared i n the Press, and thus f u e l was added to the flames 1 of bitterness and suspicion already b r i g h t l y ablaze. This led to questions about m i l i t a r y arrangements a r i s i n g i n the House of Commons. Similar questions asked on previous occasions of Grey and the Prime Minister had been answered 2 emphatically i n the negative. Once again, on June 11, 1914, and this was within two months of the outbreak of the war, S i r Edward was asked i f there was any naval engagement with Russia. His reply follows: The Honourable Member for North Somerset asked a similar question l a s t year with regard to m i l i t a r y forces, and the Honourable Member for North Salford asked a si m i l a r question also on the same day as he has again done today. The Prime, Minis ter them r e p l i e d that, i f war arose between European Powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would r e s t r i c t or hamper the freedom of the Government, or of Parliament, to decide whether or not Great B r i t a i n should p a r t i c i p a t e i n a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true today as i t was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any Power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are i n progress, and none are l i k e l y to be entered upon, as far as I can judge. But, i f any agreement were to be concluded, that made i t necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of l a s t year, which I have quoted, i t ought i n my opinion, to be, and I suppose that i t would be, l a i d before Parliament. (3) It i s obvious that t h i s answer, to offer the most kindly c r i t i c i s m of i t , i s an evasion of the question that was asked. Grey admits i n h i s Memoirs that he did not answer 4 the question. But i n defense of his evasion he goes on to 1. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 469; Grey, op. c i t . , I, 888-89. 2. Supra. 214. 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 289. Wolff, op.cit., 383-84. 4. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 289, Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 241. -227-explain i n his most disarming and naive style that while \"Parliament has an unqualified right to know of any agreements or arrangements that bind the country to action or r e s t r a i n i t s freedom i t cannot be told of m i l i t a r y and naval measures 1 to meet possible contingencies.\" His f a i t h , openly avowed and proclaimed to the nation, that the hands of the Government, were s t i l l unfettered i n the matter of continental entangle-ments was at this l a t e date apparently unshaken. Events which followed were not to j u s t i f y that f a i t h . From this account of how the Entente had been strengthened i t might be wise to turn b r i e f l y to a review of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i n Europe on the eve of the war to see what was the l i k e l i h o o d of England having to plunge into war either on her own account, or to aid her fr i e n d s . It must be noted f i r s t of a l l , that while the Powers of the T r i p l e Entente were more closely united i n July of 1914 than at any previous time, the same was true of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . During the Balkan C r i s i s of 1912-13 Germany had resolutely supported Austria-Hungary i n presenting Serbia secure an outlet on the A d r i a t i c . It i s true that Germany had i n July, 1913, counselled moderation and vetoed her a l l y ' s wish to save Bulgaria by action against Serbia. But i n October of.that year William II had promised Conrad, 1. Grey, op. c i t . , 289-90. The German Foreign Office was of course not deceived by Grey's answer, since the truth was known i n B e r l i n through the work of de Siebert; Wolff, op. c i t . , 386. -228-the Austrian Chief of Sta f f , that i f Austria marched against Serbia, \" I ' l l go with you,\" and to Berehold, the Foreign Minister he had said, \"I stand behind you, and am ready to 1 draw the sabre i f ever your action makes i t necessary.\" The Austrians were surely j u s t i f i e d i n thinking that they had only to seize the f i r s t opportunity offered for a reckoning with Serbia. She Balkan Wars had also had the effect of bringing I t a l y back into the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e more securely. The A l l i a n c e was formally renewed by the three Powers i n December, 1912, a year and a h a l f before i t s expiration. During the Balkan C r i s i s I t a l y had stood with Austria i n opposing Serbian claims on the A d r i a t i c . Although these two members of the A l l i a n c e continued to be suspicious of each other over Albania, a naval convention was signed by a l l three members providing for naval cooperation i n the Mediterranean. This convention went into effect on November 1, 1913. Furthermore, i n March, 1914, an agreement was reached between Germany and I t a l y by which the l a t t e r pledged herself to send three army corps and two cavalry divisions to the German army i n the event o f war with France. Moltke f e l t that I t a l y could be counted on as a f a i t h f u l member, and endeavoured to convince his s c e p t i c a l Austrian colleagues of t h i s . He wrote i n t h i s connection, \" A l l these agreements were made so clear and so binding that 2 a doubt of I t a l y * s l o y a l t y to the a l l i a n c e could hardly a r i s e . \" 1. Cited i n Schmitt, T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and Tr i p l e Entente, 100. 2. Ibid., 101. -229-Whether the Austrian and German Foreign Offices were equally-optimistic may be open to doubt; but the fact remains that i n 1914 the m i l i t a r y and naval arrangements of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , as well as those of the T r i p l e Entente, were more complete 1. and extensive than they had ever been before. In 1914 then, the two r i v a l s diplomatic groups stood face to face. Was there any immediate prospect of war between them? It would seem not, beyond the general f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y of the past few years. Europe had succ e s s f u l l y weathered the storms raised by the Morocco c r i s i s of 1906, by Bosnia-Herzogovia i n 1909, by Agadir i n 1911, and perhaps the most d i f f i c u l t of a l l , the Balkan Wars of 1913-13; and these were i n f i n i t e l y worse problems than any that appeared above 2 the horizon i n the spring and early summer of 1914. And of a l l the Powers, England perhaps had the least concern as to the coming of war. Her r e l a t i o n s with Germany had at this / date reached a more c o r d i a l state than at any time since the Boer War. One cannot say that the naval r i v a l r y had subsided, but the calmer temper i n which the leaders now discussed th e i r problems was i n marked contrast to the fe v e r i s h excite-ment which had previously attended upon t h i s vexed problem. So greatly had the tension been appeased that i n June, 1914, 1 a B r i t i s h squadron v i s i t e d K i e l , where the intercourse between 1. Cited i n Schmitt, T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente, 101. 2i Grey r ;0p..o:ioit,, I, 302. 3. Schmitt, B.E., England and Germany, 1740-1914, (Princeton 1916), 192 and 194. ' -230-the o f f i c e r s and crews of the two countries proved most 1 f r i e n d l y . The two Governments had cooperated during the Balkan Wars i n working for peace, r e s t r a i n i n g respectively, Russia and Austria. Most important of a l l , they had negotiated successfully agreements to l i q u i d a t e t h e i r differences i n A f r i c a and with respect to the Bagdad Railway. These agree-ments had not been formally signed when war came, but for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes they had been sealed when the Austrian 2 ultimatum to Serbia ushered i n the f i n a l c r i s i s . It would seem then, that by the summer of 1914 England and Germany 3 were well on the way to \"clean the s l a t e . \" The collapse of • these auspicious e f f o r t s i s one of the most tra g i c features of the c r i s i s of July, 1914, 1. Rumbold to Grey, July 2, 1914, B.D., XI, No.6, pp.6-7. Captain Henderson to Rumbold, enclosure i n No.7, pp.8-11. 2. Brandenburg, op. c i t . , 465-68. 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 303; Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 842. CHAPTER VII The l a s t Days of Peace -231-CHAPTER VII The l a s t Days of. Peace On June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Pranz Ferdinand and his wife, was struck the spark which set f i r e to the p i l e of combustible material which the diplomatic clashes of the previous decade had heaped up. The murderous act was carried out by Bosnian n a t i o n a l i s t s i n Sarajevo, the c a p i t a l of the provinces of Bosnia-Herzogovina, which had been administered by Austria-Hungary since 1908. Many d e t a i l s of the plot have not yet been revealed, but enough has come to l i g h t to prove that Serbian o f f i c i a l s were to some 1 extent implicated or at least had some knowledge of the p l o t . The Austrian government was not aware of these facts i n 1914, but investigation at the time gave r i s e to strong suspicions that Serbian o f f i c i a l s shared the g u i l t . The Archduke was not at a l l well-known i n England, and i t i s true to say that few Englishmen could have located 1. Dr. R.W. Seton-Watson, one of the leading authorities oh South Slav a f f a i r s and history, declares Serbia to be innocent. In his study, \"Sarajevo,\" (London, 1926), he champions the Serb case and condemns the p o l i c y of Berchtold and the complicity of Germany. Miss Edith M. Durham has presented the case against Serbia; \"The Sarajevo Crime,\" (London,1925). In this study she summarizes evidence to show that the Serbian government was aware of the plot and did nothing to warn Austria or to prevent i t s being car r i e d out. \"Austria was right when stating that the threads of the crime reached Belgrade.\" (p.200). -232-Sarajevo on the map, yet such was the diplomatic net i n which the European Powers were caught, and i n which England had now become entangled, that within a few short weeks after the assassination B r i t i s h soldiers were meeting death on the continent. The news of the assassination had no audible ef f e c t i n Downing Street. In the early summer of 1914, before the tragedy, and during the days immediately following i t , B r i t i s h leaders were far more concerned with events which were passing i n Ireland than i n those i n the Balkans. The news of the murders reached London at the height of the I r i s h C r i s i s and of the feminist agitation, and i n the turmoil created by these problems l i t t l e significance was attached to the Sarajevo incident. There appeared to be no reason why the European s i t u a t i o n should be seriously disturbed. The attention and the time of the Cabinet were la r g e l y absorbed by the acute domestic problems, and i t was not u n t i l some days l a t e r that S i r Edward Grey expressed a f e e l i n g of anxiety as to the European s i t u a t i o n which was then a r i s i n g as a res u l t of the murders. Mr. C h u r c h i l l records that i t was as l a t e as Friday, July 24, that S i r Edward asked the Cabinet to remain for a few moments a f t e r a session which had met to discuss the I r i s h C r i s i s . It was then he told the members f o r the f i r s t time of the grave s i t u a t i o n developing 1 on the continent. Preoccupied with the I r i s h situation,the 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 204; Lloyd George, op. c i t . , I, 54. -233-Cabinet had l e f t foreign a f f a i r s to the Foreign Minister. He now announced to the members the note which Austria had delivered to Serbia, and expressed the hope \"that the conversations which were proceeding between Austria and Russia might lead to a 1 p a c i f i c settlement.\" The Cabinet separated on that assurance. Grey states i n h i s Memoirs, \"that things were not yet so 2 c r i t i c a l that i t was unsafe to be out of town,\" and he passed the weekend at his f i s h i n g lodge i n Hampshire leaving Hicolson 3 i n charge of the Foreign O f f i c e . Lloyd George records that 4 \" a l l other Ministers followed his example and l e f t town.\" It was auite evident that no one doubted but that the c r i s i s would pass, and that an Austro-Serbian quarrel was of no di r e c t concern to B r i t a i n . Perhaps the best reason f o r the r i s e of this f e e l i n g i n B r i t a i n was that the European c r i s i s developed only very slowly i n the f i r s t few weeks afte r June 28. It i s quite evident today that the Austrian Government saw immediately i n the assassinations a pretext for the long contemplated move against Serbia. On June 29 Berchtold declared to Conrad von Hotzendorf that the time had come to s e t t l e the Serbian question once and for a l l , and he announced to Count Tisza \"his i n t e n t i o n of taking advantage of the crime at Sarajevo to square his 5 account with Serbia.\" But though the chief of s t a f f was eager 1. Lloyd George, op. c i t . , 54. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 315. 3. Ibid., 315, Hicolson, op. c i t . , 413. 4. Lloyd George, op. c i t . , I, 54. 5. Renouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War, (London,1928),36. - 2 3 4 -for immediate mobilization, Berehtold wished to be sure of German support i n the event of European complications a r i s i n g , and he had to win over to his view point the Emperor and Count Tisza. These necessary preliminaries took time, and thus f o r some days the Austrian action was delayed, and the European capi t a l s were unaware of Austria's intentions. Germany's pledge to support her a l l y was obtained on July 5 , when Count Hoyos was sent to B e r l i n with a \"memorandum,\" part of which had been prepared before the crime, accompanied by a personal l e t t e r from the Emperor. The l e t t e r stated i n part that \"the e f f o r t s of my government must i n future be directed toward the i s o l a t i o n and diminution of Serbia,\" and declared that the murders had made i t necessary for the Monarchy \"to destroy with a determined hand the net which i t s enemies 1 are attempting to throw about i t s head.\" The Kaiser declared that Austria might count on the \"whole-hearted support of Germany,\" and expressed the opinion that she should act without delay. The Chancellor was more restrained i n h i s assurances of support, but promised that his government would \" f a i t h f u l l y \" stand by Austria, \"as i s required by the obligations of their a l l i a n c e 2 and t h e i r ancient friendship.\" This was the f a t e f u l \"blank cheque\" which Germany gave to Austria, and which the l a t t e r proceeded at once to cash with such dire r e s u l t s for a l l the world. 1 . Renouvin, op. c i t . , 3 8 - 4 0 . 3 . Ibid., 5 3 - 5 5 ; -235-Assured of German support the choice of methods now lay e n t i r e l y with the Ballpatz. While energetic and immediate action seemed c a l l e d for, further preliminary measures dragged on for some eighteen days. In a Crown Council meeting of July 7, Tisza raised strong objections to war against Serbia i n view of the danger of European complications. It was not u n t i l July 14 that his opposition was overcome, and agreement 1 was reached on the conditions to be demanded of Serbia. The 2 draft of the ultimatum was not completed u n t i l July 19, nor 3 approved by the Emperor u n t i l July 21. It was not handed to the Serbian Government with i t s b r i e f time-limit u n t i l July 23. Thus, almost four weeks had passed since the crime had taken place at Sarajevo, and more than two weeks since Germany's promise of support had been secured. It was on July 28 that war was declared against Serbia, and July 30 that the bombard-ment of Belgrade began. Aside from the fact that S i r Edward's time'and attention were l a r g e l y absorbed during these e a r l i e r days with Parliamentary a f f a i r s and the acute I r i s h s i t u a t i o n , there was no reason why he should have f e l t serious alarm for the peace of Europe. It was generally f e l t i n England that A u s t r i a would be j u s t i f i e d i n taking some action against Serbia to prevent the recurrence of s i m i l a r outrages, and with few 1. Renouvin, op. c i t . , 53-55. 2. Ibid., 56. 3. Ibid., 57. 236 1 exceptions the entire B r i t i s h press r e f l e c t e d this view. As the days passed and the Austrian Government took no apparent action at Belgrade, reports from Vienna, though containing notes of strong action to be taken, were f o r the most part 2 reassuring. Grey's f a i l u r e to r e a l i z e grave danger was shared by his subordinates i n the Foreign O f f i c e . On July 6 Nicolson expressed the opinion that apart from the Albanian problem nwe have no very urgent and pressing question to preoccupy us 3 i n the rest of Europe.\" On July 9 he wrote, \"I have ray doubts as to whether Austria w i l l take any action of a serious 4 character, and I expect the storm w i l l blow over.\" The German ambassador noted the same day that Grey was equally o p t i m i s t i c . He was \" i n a thoroughly confident mood,\" Lichnowsky wrote, \"and declared i n cheerful tones that he saw no reason f o r 5 taking a pessimistic view of the s i t u a t i o n . \" As l a t e as 1. Scott, J.F., Five Weeks, (New York, 1927), 208ff. for a study of B r i t i s h Press. B.D., XI, Ho.58, p.46, contains an extract from the \"Westminster Gazette, dated July 17, 1914, which contains the following: \"In such circumstances the ^Austrian) Government cannot be expected to remain inactive; and Servia w i l l be well-advised i f she r e a l i z e s the reasonableness of her great neighbour's anxiety, and does whatever i s i n her power to a l l a y i t , without waiting for a pressure which might involve what Count Tisza c a l l s \"warlike complications.\" 2. S i r M. de Bunsen to Grey, Numbers, 46,50,55,56,59,65, dated p r i o r to July 23, B.D., XI, pp.37ff. 3. Nicolson to de Bunsen, July 6, 1914, i b i d . , No.33, p.25-26. 4. Minute to' de Bunsen's telegram to Grey, i b i d . , Ho.40, p.33. 5. Lichnowsky to the Chancellor, July 9, 1914, German T, Documents on the Outbreak of the World War, c o l l e c t e d by Kautsky, (cited hereafter as K.D.), (Hew York, 1924), Ho.30, p.95. -237-As late;- as July 17 Lloyd George, i n d e l i v e r i n g a speech at Mansion House, passed l i g h t l y over questions concerning peace abroad, reminding h i s l i s t e n e r s that the international s i t u a t i o n had been more serious i n 1913, and added that i f there were s t i l l clouds on the horizon i t was because \"you never get a 1 p e r f e c t l y blue sky i n foreign a f f a i r s . \" From a report of Lichnowsky we learn that on July 20 S i r Edward was \" s t i l l viewing the Austro-Serbian quarrel o p t i m i s t i c a l l y , \" and that he \"believed that a peaceful solution would be reached. He said that he had received no information that would indicate 2 anything to the contrary.\" Lichnowsky himself at this time 3 regarded the s i t u a t i o n as \"very uncomfortable.\" He assured Grey that although he had no news of what Austria planned to do, she was \" c e r t a i n l y going to take some step\" with regard to Serbia. After July 20 Grey saw that the s i t u a t i o n was not just as hopeful as he had previously viewed i t . De Bunsen's warning from Vienna on July 16 that Austria was contemplating 4 strong measures he now saw to be worthy of attention. On July 18 S i r George Buchanan had reported to Grey \"the great uneasiness v/hich Austria's attitude to Serbia\" was causing i n Russia, and gave warning that \"anything i n the nature of an Austrian ultimatum at Belgrade could not leave Russia i n d i f f e r e n t . 1. Cited i n HaleVy, I I , op. c i t . , 647. 2. K.D., Ho.92, pp.144-45. 3. Grey to Rumbold, July 20, 1914, B.D.,XI, No.68, p.54. 4. De Bunsen to Grey, July 16, 1914, i b i d . , No.50, p.39. 5. Buchanan to Grey, July 18, 1914, i b i d . , No.60, p.47. 238-The change i n Grey's attitude i s r e f l e c t e d i n the warning notice which he sent to Buchanan on July 20, suggesting direct conversations between Russia and Austria as a solution 1 of d i f f i c u l t i e s \" i f occasion seems to require i t . \" Two days l a t e r he set f o r t h this idea more d e f i n i t e l y to the Russian ambassador i n London, Count Beckendorff, who did not see that 2 i t was at a l l f e a s i b l e . The suggestion had undoubted merit, but i t met with an instant and emphatic condemnation from Poincare when Buchanan proposed i t during the l a t t e r ' s v i s i t to St. Petersburg a f t e r July 20. \"His Excellency,\" wrote Buchanan, \"expressed opinion that a conversation a deux between Austria and Russia would be dangerous at the present moment, and seemed favourable to moderating counsels by France and 3 England at Vienna.\" To Count Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador, who interviewed him on July 23, to give notice of the ultimatum to be delivered to Serbia, Grey spoke gravely of the \"awful consequences involved i n the s i t u a t i o n , \" and warned him that any influence B r i t a i n might be expected to use i n r e s t r a i n t of Russia \"would depend on how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 4 that Austria might have discovered for making her demands.\" In turning down Grey'-s proposal of \"direct conver-sations\" between Austria and Russia,Poincare had suggested 1. Grey to Buchanan, July 20,1914, B.B..XI, No.67, p.54. 2. Grey to Buchanan, July 22,1914, i b i d . , No.79, p.64. 3. Buchanan to Grey, July 22,1914, i b i a . , No.76, p.62. 4. Grey to de Bunsen, July 23,1914, i b i d . , No.86, p.70. -239-that the ambassadors of the Tr i p l e Entente should make a 1 jo i n t representation to the Austrian Government. In l i n e with his past p o l i c y the French President was r e i t e r a t i n g h i s desire to have the Entente Powers concert together t h e i r l i n e of action. The Russian Government approved this plan, and their ambassador i n Vienna was instructed to act with his French and B r i t i s h colleagues \"with a view to giv i n g f r i e n d l y 2 counsels of moderation.\" This proposal, however, was not approved i n london since i t ' ran contrary to the p o l i c y which the Foreign O f f i c e had consistently pursued for the past two years, never to oppose to each other the two diplomatic groups of the T r i p l e Entente and T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . It i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that S i r Edward's proposal of \" d i r e c t conversations\" would have sucoeeded, i n view of Austria's determination to carry through her humiliation of Serbia, but i t was the opposition of the French and Russians which prevented i t s adoption. But, while unwilling to f a l l i n l i n e with the French and Russian proposals Grey at the same time refused to l i n k himself with German p o l i c y . In conversation with Lichnowsky, the l a t t e r had urged England to exercise r e s t r a i n t upon 4 Russia.. Committed since July 5 to support Austria, Germany was most anxious to l o c a l i z e the c r i s i s , and desired that 1. Buchanan to Grey, July 22,1914, B.D.XI, Ho.76, p.62. 2. Buchanan to Grey, July 23,1914, i b i d . , Ho.84, p.69, and note (3); de Bunsen to Grey, July 23, 1914, Ho.90, p.73. 3. Minutes to Ho.84, i b i d ; , p.69. 4. Grey to Rumbold, July 6, 1914, i b i d . , Ho.32, p.64* -240-B r i t i s h a c t i v i t y should be directed to holding back Russia. S i r Edward answered cautiously that the s i t u a t i o n would depend upon what measures Austria might take, and hinted that \"the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable l i m i t s , and the stronger the j u s t i f i c a t i o n she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing 1 things over.\" Grey was thus endeavouring to steer a middle course -to avoid offending Germany by s i d i n g too d e f i n i t e l y with. Russia and France i n exercising pressure on Vienna, and to avoid arousing the i l l - w i l l of Russia by concurring i n the p o l i c y of Germany. This was consistent with his p o l i c y of the past years, a policy of keeping i n with the Entente Powers, yet attempting also to remain on good terms with Germany, and of giving her no reason for offense. I f events had moved rather slowly up to this point, they now moved with s t a r t l i n g and breath-taking r a p i d i t y with the dispatch of the ultimatum to Serbia on July 23. Grey says of the ultimatum, i t was \"unexpectedly severe; harsher i n tone and more humiliating i n i t s terms than any communication of which we had r e c o l l e c t i o n addressed by one independent Govern-2 ment to another.\" It was i n such terms that no independent Power could accept i t . Sazonov tersely described i t , \"c'est 3 l a guerre europeenne.\" On July 25, Serbia gave her answer -1. Grey to Rumbold, July 20, 1914,B.-D. ,-XI,Ho.68, p.54. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 310. 3. How the War Began i n 1914, Diary of the Russian Foreign O f f i c e , (london, 1925), 28. -241-a reply of a contrite and c o n c i l i a t o r y nature. As Grey says, \"The Serbian answer went further than we had ventured to hope 1 i n the way of submission.\". Nevertheless, i t was immediately rejected by the Austrian Government, who instructed t h e i r representative to leave Belgrade. At the same time mobilizat-ion against Serbia was begun. The excessively harsh terms of the ultimatum and the summary r e j e c t i o n of the reply made i t p l a i n l y evident that Austria would be content with no ordinary reparation, but had f u l l y determined on crushing Serbia. Again, to use words of 2 Grey,- \"from that moment, things went from bad to worse.\" The c r i s i s now entered upon a second stage; i t could no longer be regarded as a purely Austro-Serbian quarrel. Russian- support of Serbia i n the event of an Austrian attack was regarded as a certainty. Thus, the c r i s i s was widening into one between Austria and Russia, with Germany and France bound by the terms of their a l l i a n c e s to support t h e i r respective a l l i e s . A memorandum of S i r Eyre Crowe,-dated July 25, reveals the s i t u a t i o n as i t then was, charged with danger: It i s clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of T r i p l e A l l i a n c e versus T r i p l e Entente i s d e f i n i t e l y engaged. (3) 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 311. 2. Ibid.j 311. 3. Minute by S i r Eyre Crowe, July 25, B.P., XI, pp.81-82. -242-What p o l i c y would England follow now that i t seemed that Austria was determined to move against Serbia? Would S i r Edward Grey join with Russia and France to b r i n g pressure on Vienna, or would he, as the Central Powers hoped, stand to one side, concurring i n the view that the whole matter should be regarded merely as an Austro-Serb quarrel? S i r Edward i n c l i n e d as yet to neither of these p o l i c i e s ; he chose s t i l l a third path. Though seriously alarmed by July 23, he continued to place his f a i t h i n mediation, and to seek a formula which might preserve the honour and prestige of the Powers and thus maintain the peace. He showed himself most ready to take the lead i n such a p o l i c y . It i s not easy to see at this stage that he could have chosen any wiser, or f o r that matter, any alternative p o l i c y . Public opinion was not yet t r u l y aware of the real gravity of the sit u a t i o n , and had been concerned thus f a r , as has been pointed out, with the I r i s h struggle. Nor had the Cabinet yet considered the matter. Thus, S i r Edward, could only wait upon developments, working a l l the while to guide them, i n so f a r as he could, i n the d i r e c t i o n of peace. Those who c r i t i c i z e h is f a i l u r e to take a determined stand i n the c r i s i s at this stage on either one side or the other apparently< have no understanding of the si t u a t i o n as i t obtained i n England at this moment. On July 24 Count Mensdorff c a l l e d on S i r Edward to communicate the text of the Austrian note. S i r Edward commented adversely on the time l i m i t , and declared that point -243-f i v e \"would hardly be consistent with maintenance of the i n -dependent sovereignty of Serbia.\" Though admitting that many of the demands were j u s t i f i e d , he \"refused to discuss the merits of the dispute\" or l i s t e n to Count Berchtold's complaints against the Serbian Government. He was, he said,' concerned \" s o l e l y from the point of view of the peace of Europe\" and he expressed \"great apprehension.\" He stated that he would enter into an exchange of views with the other Powers to see what could be 1 done to mitigate d i f f i c u l t i e s . On the same date, July 24, the German ambassadors i n the Entente c a p i t a l s delivered notes to the governments, defend-ing the Austrian action. \"The course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate,\" but since Serbia might refuse these demands and allow herself \"to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary,\" the l a t t e r \"would then have no choice but to obtain the f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r demands from the Serbian Government by strong; pressure, and, i f necessary, by using m i l i t a r y measures.\" The notes went on to state: The Imperial Government want to emphasize t h e i r opinion that i n the present case there i s only question of a matter to be se t t l e d exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve i t to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the l o c a l i z a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t , because every interference of another Power would, owing to the d i f f e r e n t treaty o b l i g a t i o n s , be followed by incalculable consequences. (2) 1. Grey to de Bunsen, July 24, 1914, B.D., XI, No.91, pp.73-74. 2. Communication by the German Ambassador, July 24, B.D., XI, No. 100, p. 79. - 2 4 4 -1 T h i s was most a s s u r e d l y \" v e r y s t r o n g s u p p o r t , \" on b e h a l f o f A u s t r i a , ana r e v e a l e d c l e a r l y the l i n e Germany was pr e p a r e d to tak e . The i n t e r f e r e n c e o f o t h e r Powers was warned o f f by a t h r e a t of what might f o l l o w i f the*system o f a l l i a n c e s was i n v o k e d . War was to be the a l t e r n a t i v e to a c c e p t a n c e o f the A u s t r i a n p o l i c y . Grey had met w i t h P a u l Cambon on the a f t e r n o o n o f J u l y 2 4 , p r e v i o u s to a meeting w i t h l i c h n o w s k y , t o d i s c u s s , the q u e s t i o n o f m e d i a t i o n . A d i v e r g e n c e of v i e w s a r o s e between the two when Cambon f a v o u r e d m e d i a t i o n between A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and S e r b i a , w h i l e Grey was c o n s i d e r i n g m e d i a t i o n between A u s t r o -2 Hungary and R u s s i a . I n meeting w i t h L i c h n o w s k y to hea r the German s t a n d , Grey r e p l i e d t h a t i f the u l t i m a t u m d i d n o t l e a d to t r o u b l e between A u s t r i a and R u s s i a \"he had no c o n c e r n w i t h i t . \" But he was a p p r e h e n s i v e o f t h e s t a n d R u s s i a might t a k e . \" I n view o f the e x t r a o r d i n a r y s t i f f c h a r a c t e r o f the A u s t r i a n n o t e , the s h o r t n e s s o f the time a l l o w e d , and the wide scope o f the demands upon S e r b i a , I f e l t q u i t e h e l p l e s s as f a r as R u s s i a was concerned, and I d i d n o t b e l i e v e any Power c o u l d e x e r c i s e 3 i n f l u e n c e a l o n e . \" He t h e n proposed a p l a n o f m e d i a t i o n a d d i n g to i t Cambon's p r o p o s a l f o r r e s t r a i n i n g A u s t r i a . The o n l y chance I c o u l d see o f m e d i a t i n g o r m o d e r a t i n g i n f l u e n c e b e i n g e f f e c t i v e was t h a t the f o u r Powers, Germany, I t a l y , F r a n c e and o u r s e l v e s , s h o u l d work t o g e t h e r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a t V i e n n a and S t . P e t e r s b u r g i n f a v o u r o f moder a t i o n i n the event o f the J\" re l a t i o n s between A u s t r i a and R u s s i a becoming t h r e a t e n i n g . 1 . M i n u t e to No.100 , B V D . ^ X I , P » 7 9 . E. Grey to B e r t i e , J u l y 2 4 , 1 9 1 4 , i b i d . , No.98 , pp. 7 7 - 7 8 . . Cambon to B i e n v e n u - M a r t i n , D . D . F . 3 E s e r i e , X I , No.23 , pp. 2 2 - 2 3 . 3 . Grey to Rumbold, J u l y 2 4 , 1 9 1 4 , B .D . , X I , N o . 9 9 , p . 7 8 . Liohnowsky to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , J u l y 2 4 , 1 9 1 4 , K . D . , NO.1 5 7 ,pp.1 8 3 - 8 4 . -245-The immediate danger was that i n a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion, demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; i t would be very desirable to get Austria not to p r e c i p i t a t e m i l i t a r y action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria i n this d i r e c t i o n unless Germany would propose and p a r t i c i p a t e i n such action at Vienna. (1) Grey was thus refusing to j o i n i n the German plan of mere l o c a l i z a t i o n . More than that, he was appealing to Germany to abandon the p o s i t i o n set f o r t h i n her note and to j o i n the Powers i n r e s t r a i n t of Austria. He would not promise to r e s t r a i n Russia, but rather was asking Germany to put pressure on Vienna to prevent war from s t a r t i n g . The next day, July; 25, having received news that 2 Russia was l i k e l y to make alarming moves, S i r Edward telegraphed 3 his proposal of mediation to Buchanan i n St. Petersburg and to Be r t i e In Paris,and discussed the proposal with Beckendorff i n 4 london. It i s of inte r e s t to note the attitude of the Powers to this proposal. Germany quite approved the plan at t h i s 5 date. ' The proposal was one of mediation, i t must be pointed out, between Austria and Russia - there was no question of intervening between Austria and Serbia, and Germany was thus quite s a t i s f i e d . But Russia and France took a d e f i n i t e l y negative attitude. Beckendorff objected to i t , being \"very apprehensive that what (Grey) had said would give Germany the 1. Grey to Rumbold, July 24, 1914, B.D., XT, Ho.99, p.78. 2. Buchanan to Grey, July 25, 1914, i b i d . , Ho.101, pp.80-81. 3. Grey to Buchanan, July 25, 1914, i b i d . , Ho.112, pp.86-87. 4. Grey to Buchanan, July 25, 7. , ibld.. ;, Ho.138,. pp.97-98. 5. Lichnowsky to Grey, July 26, 1914, i b i d . , Ho.145,(postscript) p.103. -246-1 impression that France and England were detached from Russia.\" Cambon, likewise, was opposed to mediating between Austria and Russia, as he had e a r l i e r represented to Grey,since he 2 favoured mediation between Austria and Serbia. He was absent from london on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth, and the known documents record no further attempt on the part of the French Government to exert any influence at t h i s time upon London. The reply of the French Government to the proposal, which had 3 been sent to P a r i s on the twenty-fifth, was handed to S i r 4 Francis Bertie only on the twenty-seventh, along with a reply 5 to a l a t e r proposal of Grey f o r a conference. While the French Ministry f o r Foreign A f f a i r s expressed i t s e l f i n favour' of common action toward Austria and Russia on the part of the Powers, the view was expressed that \" i t would be dangerous for Entente Ambassadors to speak at Vienna u n t i l i t i s known that 6 the Germans have done so with some success.\" Meanwhile.a proposal Grey had made on the twenty-fourth that Vienna extend the time-limit of the ultimatum had met with 1. Grey to Buchanan, July 25, B.D., XI,No.132, p.97. It should be noted that this dispatch was omitted from the B r i t i s h Blue Book of 1914, i b i d * , p.98 (note). 2. Cf. supra. 244. 3. D.D.F. 3 e serie, XI, No.48, p.49. It was not delivered u n t i l 11 o'clock, July 26. 4. Ibid., No.164, p.135. 5. This was the proposal made on July 26; i b i d . , No.107, p.91. 6. Bertie to Grey, July 27, 1914, B.D., XI, No.183, p.127. -247-no success. He had requested the German Ambassador to communicate t h i s proposal to B e r l i n where i t arrived at ten 1 o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth. The German Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s did not reply u n t i l the early afternooUjwhen he gave a negative reply to the proposal i n which he said, \"as the ultimatum expires today, and Count Berchtold, according to newspaper reports, i s at I s c h l , I believe that a prolongation of the time l i m i t w i l l 2 no longer be possible.\" It i s now evident that von Jagow did not communicate this suggestion to Vienna u n t i l four o'clock that afternoon, only two hours before the time l i m i t was to expire, and i n his communication at that l a t e hour, he indicated 3 that he had already made a reply to the B r i t i s h . It i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that this action was the r e s u l t of mere chance. Grey's f i r s t peace proposals had thus f a i l e d of the re s u l t s desired, but he was nevertheless s t i l l unprepared to a l i g n his Government d e f i n i t e l y with either of the two d i p l o -matic groups, in spite of the views expressed by his subordinates, S i r Eyre Crowe and S i r Arthur Nicolson, who f e l t strongly that a declaration of B r i t i s h s o l i d a r i t y with France and Russia was 1. Rumbold to Grey, July 25,1914, i b i d . , No.122,p.91. Renouvin, says one o'clock; op. c i t . , 91. 2. Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s to Lichnowsky, K.D., No.164,p.190; Rumbold to Grey, July 25,1914, B.D., op. c i t . , X I , No,122, p.91. 3. Jagow to Ambassador at Vienna, July 25, 1914, K • D,, No.171; p.195* Renouvin> op. c i t * , 91-92; Sohmitt,B*E., The Coming of the War, (New York, 1930), I, 521-22. -248-1 the only e f f e c t i v e means of preventing war. The Foreign Minister continued s t i l l to work for mediation. S i r Edward could f e e l that on the twenty-fifth war was probable, but not e n t i r e l y certain. However, by the late evening news of ominous events began to reach london. Austria 2 had broken o f f diplomatic relations with Serbia. From St. Petersburg came news that Russia was ready to mobilize 1,100,000 men, that \"necessary preliminary preparations would be begun at once,\" and that \"secure of support of France, 3 Russia w i l l face a l l the r i s k s of war.\" With this menacing news>Buchanan appealed for B r i t i s h support for Russia; \" f o r ourselves p o s i t i o n i s a most perilous one, and we s h a l l have to choose between givi n g Russia our active support or renouncing her friendship. I f we f a i l her now we cannot hope to maintain that f r i e n d l y cooperation with her i n Asia that i s of such 4 importance to us.\" S t i l l more ominous was the news received the following morning; from Vienna came word from the Ambassador, 5 \"war i s thought to be imminent.\" Alarming notes came also from Norway; according to Norwegian papers the German f l e e t had \"received orders to concentrate during l a s t night at 1. Minutes by Crowe and Nicolson, July 24, 1914, to No.101, B.D., XI, pp.81-82. 2. Crackanthorpe to Grey, July 25,1914, i b i d . , No.131, p.97. 3. Buchanan to Grey, July 25,1914, i b i d : ; No.125, p.94. 4. Ibid. 5. De Bunsen to Grey, July 25,1914, i b i d ; , No.135, p.99; received 8 A.M., July 26. -249-1 predetermined point o f f the Norwegian coast,\" and the Kaiser 2 had given up h i s northern cruise to return to K i e l . It was at this point i n the c r i s i s that the F i r s t Sea Lord of the Admiralty, with the approval of Mr. C h u r c h i l l , who, though he had gone to the seaside, was i n constant touch with the Admiralty, decided that the s i t u a t i o n j u s t i f i e d holding together at Portsmouth the B r i t i s h f l e e t which was about to 3 disperse a f t e r manoeuvres. Mr. C h u r c h i l l returned to London on the evening of the twenty-sixth to inform Grey of this precautionary measure. He writes: Grey viewed the s i t u a t i o n gravely. He said there was a great deal yet to be done before a r e a l l y dangerous c r i s i s was reached, but that he did not at a l l l i k e the way i n which this business had begun. I asked whether i t would be h e l p f u l or the reverse i f we stated i n public that we were keeping the Fleet together. Both he and T y r r e l l (Grey's secretary) were most i n s i s t e n t that we should proclaim i t at the e a r l i e s t possible moment; i t might have the e f f e c t of sobering the Central Powers and steadying Europe. Accordingly, Mr. C h u r c h i l l sent the press a notice of the step 4 taken which appeared i n the papers on Monday, July 27. On t h i s same date, while the Admiralty was thus preparing for any eventuality, the Foreign Office also took a d e f i n i t e step i n a further endeavour to preserve the peace. It should be noted that while Beckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, had frowned upon Grey's e a r l i e r suggestion of \"mediation a 1. Findlay to Grey, July 26, 1914, B'.'D.XL, No.137, p.100. 2. Findlay to Grey, July 26, 1914, i b i d . , No.138, p.100. 3. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t * , 209. 4. Ibid., 210. -250-quatre,\" h i s chief,Sazonov, i n the Russian Foreign O f f i c e , had expressed himself i n favour of such a proposal to Buchanan on July 25. \"Were Serbia to appeal to the Powers,\" he stated, \"Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the 1 question i n the hands of England, France, I t a l y and Germany.\" Noting this suggestion, S i r Arthur Nicolson, i n charge of the Foreign Office, i n the absence of S i r Edward,who had gone to the country, wrote to his superior: I think that the only hope of avoiding a general c o n f l i c t would be for us to take advantage at once of the suggestion thrown out by Sazonov i n the second paragraph of Buchanan's telegram No.169,\" (2) which you w i l l receive t h i s morning, and that you should telegraph to B e r l i n , P a r i s , Rome, asking that they s h a l l authorize th e i r Ambassadors here to j o i n you i n a Conference to endeavour to f i n d an?issue :to prevent complications and that abstention on a l l sides from active m i l i t a r y operations should be requested of Vienna, Serbia, and St. Petersburg pending r e s u l t s of Conference. (2) 4 Grey at once telegraphed h i s approval, and the proposal for a Conference of Ambassadors i n London was communicated that 5 afternoon to the B r i t i s h representatives i n P a r i s , Rome and -B e r l i n . It was repeated also to the representatives i n St. Petersburg, Nish and Vienna, with instructions to endeavour to prevent active m i l i t a r y operations pending the r e s u l t s of the 1. Buchanan to Grey, July 25, B.D., op. c i t . , XI, No.125, p.93. De Fleuriau to Biehvenu-Martin, July 27, 1914, D.D.F., 3 se'rie, XI, No. 115, p.99. 2. Supra. 3. Nicolson to Grey, July 26, B.D., op. c i t . , XI, No.139 (a) p.100. 4. Ibid., No.139, (b), p.100.' 5. Note de l'ambassade de Grande Bretagne, D.D*F., 3 e s ^ r i e XI, NO.107, pp.91-92. -251-1 C o n f e r e n c e . T h i s p r o p o s a l most a s s u r e d l y marks an u n d e n i a b l e change i n the mind o f S i r Edward G r e y . H i s m e d i a t i o n p r o p o s a l o f two days b e f o r e c a l l e d f o r m e d i a t i o n between A u s t r i a and R u s s i a . Though the d r a f t o f t h e new p r o p o s a l s e n t o u t on the t w e n t y - s i x t h d i d n o t e x p r e s s l y s t a t e t h e f a c t , i t c o u l d o n l y mean i n t e r v e n t i o n b e t w e e n A u s t r i a and S e r b i a i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t 2 A u s t r i a f r o m i n v a d i n g S e r b i a n t e r r i t o r y . The m a i n p o i n t s i n the S e r b i a n r e p l y were now known i n L o n d o n , a n d the i n t r a n s i g e n c y o f A u s t r i a was c l e a r l y r e v e a l e d . The r u p t u r e o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s m i g h t a t any moment l e a d to war and R u s s i a n i n t e r v e n t -i o n was imminent. The A u s t r o - S e r b i a n c o n f l i c t h a d to be s e t t l e d by i m m e d i a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n , and t h e l o c a l c r i s i s t h e r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m s p r e a d i n g . The g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n had become much more s e r i o u s s i n c e J u l y 24, and w i t h t h e c r i s i s t a k i n g on s u c h a m e n a c i n g a s p e c t a n a l t o g e t h e r new p o l i c y was n e e d e d . The C o n f e r e n c e p l a n was f e l t to answer t h i s n e e d . W i t h what s u c c e s s d i d the p r o p o s a l meet? 3 I t a l y gave u n q u a l i f i e d a p p r o v a l t h e same day. The F r e n c h Government a c c e p t e d on t h e t w e n t y - s e v e n t h , a l t h o u g h t h e v i e w was e x p r e s s e d t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be l i t t l e hope o f s u c c e s s u n l e s s t h e German Government was d i s p o s e d to p l a c e r e s t r a i n t 1. B.D., op. c i t . , X I , Ho.140, p.101. 2. R e n o u v i n , op. c i t . , 107; F a y , op. c i t . , I I , 383; S c h m i t t , op. c i t . , I I , 46. 3. Rodd t o Grey, J u l y 26, 1914, B.D., op. c i t . , X I , Ho.154, p.107* -252-1 on the p o l i c y of Austria. The reply of Sazonov was also favourable, though he stated that he would prefer direct conversations with Vienna. I f these, however, could not be a. r e a l i z e d he was ready to accept the B r i t i s h proposal. Germany, however, answered with an absolute r e f u s a l , lichnowsky i n 3 London personally favoured the plan, but Bethmann telegraphed to him on July 27, \"We could not take part i n such a conference, as we should not be able to summon Austria before a European 4 court of justice i n her case with Serbia.\" To the ambassador i n Paris he wired, \"We must hold fas t to the contention that the Austro-Serbian c o n f l i c t concerns those two nations alone. Therefore we cannot mediate i n the c o n f l i c t between Austri a 5 and Serbia but possibly between Austria and Russia.\" Ja^gow's answer given to S i r Edward Goschen i n B e r l i n was i n a sim i l a r vein: '^Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s says that the conference you suggest would p r a c t i c a l l y amount to a court of a r b i t r a t i o n and could not i n his opinion, be c a l l e d together 6 except at the request of Austria and Russia,\" As Mr. Fay 1. Bienvenu-Martin to de Fleuriau; July 27,1914, D.DF., 3 s i r i e XI, No\".128, pp.107-108; Bertie to Grey, July 27, B'.D:xi,No.l83, p.127. 2. Buchanan to Grey, July 27, 1914, B.D., op. c i t . , XI, No.198, p.139. Communication by the Russian Ambassador, July 28, i b i d . , No.206, p.142. 3. Lichnowsky to Foreign O f f i c e , July 26,-1914, E.D. , No.236, pp.230-31; also No.258, No.265, No.266. 4. Bethmann to Lichnowsky, i b i d . , No.248, p,237. 5. Bethmann to Ambassador i n Pa r i s , July 27, K.D., 10.247,p.237. 6. Goschen to Grey, July 27, 1914, B.D., XI, No.185, p.128. J. Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin, July 27, 1914, D.DF., 3 e se'rie, XI, No.148, pp. 123-24. -253-points out, there may have been good reasons f o r Germany's opposition to the holding of the conference, but her absolute 1 r e j e c t i o n of the proposal was nothing short of a grave blunder. The suspicion was now strengthened among the Entente Powers that Germany was not sincere i n her protestations that she wished peace, and they were led to doubt the good f a i t h of Germany's l a t e r desperate e f f o r t s to avert the catastrophe. The suspicion was steadily growing i n the B r i t i s h Foreign Office that Germany was determined to stay with Austria whatever haopened; and that the issue of peace or war 2 now depended on what action Germany might take. \"So f a r as we know,\" wrote Crowe on the dispatch which brought notice of Germany's refusal to take part in the Conference, \"the German Government has up to now said not a single word at Vienna i n the d i r e c t i o n of r e s t r a i n t or moderation.... The inference i s 3 not reassuring as to Germany's goodwill.\" And S i r Arthur Nicolson complained b i t t e r l y to Buchanan, \"lichnowsky says he i s so pleased that Anglo-German cooperation seems l i k e l y to be successful. His i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the word \"cooperation\" 4 must be t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from that which i s usually accepted.\" Grey's own feelings of pessimism at this stage of the c r i s i s are recorded i n his Memoirs. The e f f e c t of the 1. Fay, op. c i t . , I I , 385-86. 2. Minute to No.174 byNicolson, July 27,1914, B.D., XI, p.123; Minute to No.175 by Crowe, July 27, i b i d . , p.124. 3. Minute by Crowe to No.185 July 28, 1914, i b i d . , p.129. 4. Nicolson to Buchanan, (private) July 28, 1914, B.D., XI, No.239, p.157. -254-German reply, he states, was \"not only depressing'* but \"exasp-erating.\" He f e l t \"angry\" with Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow. \"I remember well the impulse to say that, as Germany forbade a conference, I could do no more, and that i t was on Germany that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y must rest i f war came.\" But t h i s impulse was set aside. \"To have acted on i t , \" he says, \"would have been to give up hopes of peace and to make i t the object of diplomatic action to throw the blame for war on Germany i n advance. That would mean not only ceasing to work for peace, but making war c e r t a i n . \" He was, therefore, \" s t i l l ready to cooperate i n any other way for peace that von Bethmann-Hollweg 1 could devise and preferred.\" S i r Edward was s t i l l at this l a t e date unable to take a d e f i n i t e stand i n the c r i s i s . His personal view was that B r i t i s h p o l i c y should be t i e d to that of France, not because of any e x i s t i n g committments necessarily, but rather 2 from the point of view of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . The other members of the Foreign Office agreed with him, f e e l i n g that war was inevitable and. that B r i t a i n could not afford to stand 3 aside. But i f the Foreign Office was decided as to what course should be taken, the Cabinet was not. The c r i s i s had 4 f i r s t been brought to i t s attention on July 24, but after the 1. Grey, op. - c i t . , I, 321-22. 2. Ibid., 336-37. 3. Minute by Crowe, July 27, 1914, to No.170, B.D., XI, pp.120-21; Nicolson to Buchanan, July 28, 1914, i b i d . , No.239, (private), pp.156-57. 4. Supra. 232. -255 twenty-seventh i t was discussed at length d a i l y . \"Every day,\" records C h u r c h i l l , \"there were long cabinets from eleven , 1 onwards.\" Though the Foreign Minister sought to secure from his colleagues a clear l i n e of action, he found this impossible. On July 27 he communicated to them Buchanan's telegram of July 24 which indicated that Russia and France were prepared \"to make a strong stand,\" and which car r i e d an appeal from Sazonov for a promise of B r i t i s h s o l i d a r i t y with them* Grey then c l e a r l y stated his own view: The time had come when the Cabinet was bound to make up i t s mind p l a i n l y whether we were to take an active part with the other two Powers of the Entente, or to stand aside i n the general European question, and preserve an absolute n e u t r a l i t y . We could no longer defer decision. Things were moving very rapi d l y . We could no longer wait on accident and postpone. I f the Cabinet was f o r n e u t r a l i t y , he did hot think he was the man to carry out such a p o l i c y . (2) This placed the Cabinet face to face with the situation* But no decision was taken, divided as the members were i n t h e i r views. \"We rambled,\" says l o r d Morley, \"as even the best Cabinets are apt to do.... I could not, on the instant^ gather 3 with any certainty i n which d i r e c t i o n opinion was i n c l i n i n g * \" War had not yet broken out, and there was s t i l l hope that i t might be averted. The resu l t - Grey could only cast about for a possible plan of preventing war from s t a r t i n g on the continent. C h u r c h i l l , meanwhile, was determined not to allow the diplomatic s i t u a t i o n to develop dangerously before the 1. C h u r c h i l l , op* c i t * , 212. 2. Morley, Viscount John, Memorandum on Resignation, (London), (1928), 1-2. 3. I b i d . , 2 . -256-B r i t i s h Fleet was prepared for action, and he wished to he sure that the Grand Fleet would be i n i t s War Station before war came. It has been shown that some preparatory measures were taken on July 27* That same night a secret telegram was sent to a l l foreign stations s t a t i n g that war was \"by no means impossible,\" and that preparations should be. made to shadow \"possible h o s t i l e men of war\" of the Central Powers. On July 28 orders were given that the ships were to complete f u l l crews and take a l l precautions against surprise. At f i v e P.M. the F i r s t Fleet, stationed at Portland, was ordered to proceed during the night at high speed and with l i g h t s out through the S t r a i t s of Dover to Scapa Flow, i t s f i g h t i n g base. This order was not brought before the Cabinet; Mr. C h u r c h i l l had informed only Mr. Asquith, who at once gave h i s approval. Mr. Churchill says i n regard to these moves, \"We were now i n a p o s i t i o n , 1 whatever happened, to control events.\" S i r Edward Grey, now that his Conference proposal had been rejected by Germany, decided before making another move to await the outcome of the d i r e c t negotiations, which 2 had begun between Austria and Russia. These negotiations, however, i n which the Russians hoped the Serbian reply might serve as a basis f o r discussion, came to nothing owing to the 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 226. 2. Grey to Goschen, July 28, 1914, B.D., op. c i t . , XI, No.223, p.150. The c r e d i t for tha s t a r t i n g of these negotiations ^gs/due la r g e l y to the German Ambassador i n St. Petersburg, Count Pourtales. Buchanan to Grey, July 29, 1914, i b i d ; , No.271, p.175. -257-unoomproraising attitude of Berchtold. \"No one i n Austria, he wrote, \"could understand or approve negotiations bearing on the terms of the Serbian reply, at the very moment when we have declared i t to be unacceptable.\" He clinched this r e j e c t i o n with a f i n a l argument, \" I t would be s t i l l l e s s possible now, because of the way i n which f e e l i n g has been r i s i n g both i n Austria and i n Hungary, and, furthermore, war, 1 has actually been declared today upon Serbia.\" Grey had supported this plan of conversations between Russia and Austria, seeing i n them a prospect of peace, but that prospect was thwarted by Austria's refusal to consent to any modification of her demands, and by a declaration of war to f o r e s t a l l any kind of mediation which might prevent her action against Serbia. This decision on the part of Berchtold to prevent further measures of c o n c i l i a t i o n by means of a \" f a i t accompli\" had thus brought to nought yet another of Grey's endeavours to f i n d a solution to the c r i s i s . The previous day, July 27, while he had been at the time unaware of how B e r l i n had reacted to his proposal of a Conference, he had received the f u l l text of Serbia's reply to the Serbian note. He f e l t that \"Serbia had agreed to the Austrian demands to an extent he would never have believed possible.\" S i r Eyre Crowe wrote i n a minute that \"the answer i s reasonable. If Austria demands absolute compliance with her ultimatum i t can only mean that 2 ahe wants war.™ The Kaiser expressed a somewhat s i m i l a r 1. De Bunsen to Grey, July 28, 1914, B.D., XI, No.248, p.163. a. Minute by Crowe, July 28, 1914 to No.171, i b i d . , XI, p.181. -258-sentiment when he said, \"With i t every reason for war drops 1 away.\" Should Austria reject the answer as a foundation for negotiations, or occupy Belgrade, said Grey to. Lichnowsky, \"Russia could not regard such action with equanimity, and would have to regard i t as a d i r e c t i o n challenge. The r e s u l t would be the most f r i g h t f u l war Europe had ever seen.\" Communicating these views to the German ambassador, Grey urged Germany to use her influence to have Vienna accept the Serbian reply either as s a t i s f a c t o r y or as the basis f o r a conference for 2 peaceful negotiations. Lichnowsky added i n h i s report: I found the Minister i r r i t a t e d for the f i r s t time. He spoke with great seriousness and seemed absolutely to expect that we should successfully make use of our influence to s e t t l e the matter .... I am convinced that i n case i t should come to war a f t e r a l l , we should no longer be able to count on B r i t i s h sympathy or B r i t i s h support, as every evidence of i l l - w i l l would be seen i n Austria's procedure. Also, everybody here i s convinced.... that the key to the s i t u a t i o n i s to be found i n B e r l i n * (3) The way i n which the s i t u a t i o n had developed by July 27, and this report of Lichnowsky's, along with equally alarming telegrams from St. Petersburg and Rome, somewhat shook the confidence of Bethmann i n the wisdom of the p o l i c y his Government had hitherto pursued. He decided now to accede to Grey's request, \"to press the button\" for peace, and to accept f o r the f i r s t time the r6le of mediator. He telegraphed 1. Note by the Kaiser, July 27,1914, K.D., No.271, p.254; Also his l e t t e r to the Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s , July 28,1914, No.293, p.273. 2. Grey to Goschen, July 27,1914, B.D..XI, No.176, p.124. Lichnowsky to the German Foreign O f f i c e , July 27, 1914 K.D., No.138, pp.243-44. 3. K.D., No.138, p.244. -259-lichnowsky 1s warning telegram to his ambassador at Vienna, with the B r i t i s h proposal that the Serbian answer be accepted as a basis for settlement. He pointed out t h a t - i t would be impossible to re j e c t this new suggestion on the part of B r i t a i n . \"By refusing every proposition for mediation, we should be held responsible for the conflagration by the whole world, and 1 be set fo r t h as the o r i g i n a l i n s t i g a t o r s of the war.\" At the same time he n o t i f i e d lichnowsky i n london, \"We have at once inaugurated a move f o r mediation at Vienna along the 2 l i n e s desired by S i r Edward G-rey.\" Doubt has been expressed as to the s i n c e r i t y of the German Chancellor i n thus accepting his new r6le of mediator. That he should consent at a l l to counsel moderation at Vienna was a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n German pol i c y , and a reversal i n attitude. It i s pointed out i n questioning h i s s i n c e r i t y that while he did submit the B r i t i s h proposal f o r consideration at Vienna,he did not urge i t s adoption, although he.knew at the time that Berchtold was going to declare war on Serbia the next morning, for a telegram giving this information had 3 reached B e r l i n on July 27 at 4:30 P.M. The essential fact i n the B r i t i s h proposal was that there should be no m i l i t a r y action taken whatsoever, yet Bethmann made no e f f o r t , other than the mere sending of the proposal, to' r e s t r a i n Austrian 1. Bethmann to Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914, K.D., No.277, pp.255-56. 2. Bethmann to Lichnowsky, July 27,1914, ibid.,No.278, p.257. 3. Ibid., No.257, p.243. \"They have decided to send out the declaration of war tomorrow, or the day a f t e r tomorrow, at the l a t e s t , c h i e f l y to fru s t r a t e any attempt at i n t e r -vention.\" Bethmann did not send his dispatch to Vienna u n t i l 11:50 P.M. -260-action. It i s further charged that he merely wanted to give 1 some tangible evidence of p a c i f i c intentions to B r i t a i n . There are students of the c r i s i s , however, who cre d i t the ;, 2 Chancellor with s i n c e r i t y and good f a i t h . Whatever were the motives behind the change of p o l i c y , i t was barren of good r e s u l t s . Berchtold had e a r l i e r won from the Emperor permission to declare war. When Tschirschky presented Bethmann's communication, the Foreign Minister, according to the report of the ambassador, thanks your Excellency most kindly for the communication of the English mediation proposal and w i l l very soon forward a reply to the Imperial Government. The Minister states now, however, that since the opening of h o s t i l i t i e s on the part of Serbia (3) and the ensuing declaration of war, he thinks that England's move was made too l a t e . (4) On July 29 Austria drew up a d e f i n i t e r e f u s a l . \"To her great regret\" the B r i t i s h suggestion could not be accepted since 5 \"the Serbian reply had been superceded already by other events.\" Thus, by July 29 the s i t u a t i o n had assumed a most menacing aspect. Austria-Hungary had declared war; Berchtold had refused-negotiations with Russia; and M. Sazonov, when the 1. Renouvin, op. c i t . , 124-25. Nicolson wrote to Buchanan, July 28, 1914. \"She (Germany) contented h e r s e l f with simply passing on our proposal as our proposal, which of course was not what we desired or requested.\" B.B., No.239, p.157. 2. Mr. Fay i s of this opinion; op. c i t . , I I , 416. 3. It was said i n Vienna that Serbian troops had f i r e d f i r s t on Austrian outposts. 4. Ambassador at Vienna to German Foreign O f f i c e , July 88, 1914, K.D., No.313, p.283. 5. Ibid*, No.400, p.348. -261-declaration of war became known, abandoned his previously c o n c i l i a t o r y manner. With regard to Austrian assurances a propos of Serbia's independence and i n t e g r i t y , the Russian minister had declared that no engagements that Austria might take on these two points would s a t i s f y Russia, and that on the day Austria crossed the Serbian f r o n t i e r the order f o r 1 mobilization against Austria would be issued. A European war seemed almost i n e v i t a b l e . \"What i s the use of exchanging views at this juncture,\" asked S i r Arthur Nicolson, on July 29, \"I am of opinion that the resources of diplomacy are, for the 2 present, exhausted.\"' He agreed with a suggestion made by S i r Eyre Crowe,that \"We should not, i n present circumstances, issue the otherwise usual declaration of n e u t r a l i t y \" between Austria 3 and Serbia. S i r Edward Grey was impelled now to a firmer p o l i c y than that of the days preceding; he decided to give Germany a more d e f i n i t e warning,as both Russia and France had been urging. But he was most careful to point out to Cambon i n London, to whom he explained, what he intended to say to Lichnowsky, that his warning to Germany would not mean that England had as yet decided what p o l i c y she would follow i n the event of Germany and France being involved i n war. England was \"free from engagements,\" he pointed out, and would have to 1. Buchanan to Grey, July 28,1914, B.D.,XI,Ho.247, p.163. 2. Hicolson, i n a minute, July 29,1914, to Ho.252,B.D. XI,p.166. 3. Minutes, July 29,1914, to Ho.250, i b i d . , p.165. -262-1 decide what B r i t i s h interests required,\" Hews had arrived i n the B r i t i s h Foreign Office that Russia had decided to mobilize four southern d i s t r i c t s , and that she f e l t \"mediation by the Cabinet of London with a view to stopping m i l i t a r y operations against Serbia was a matter 2 of extreme urgency.\" Russia had quite evidently not waited for Austrian troops to enter Serbia. Grey now told Lichnowsky of the Russian decision and of the request for mediation. Accordingly he suggested a new peace proposal - that i t might be a suitable basis for mediation, i f Austria, a f t e r occupying Belgrade for example, or other places, should announce her conditions. Should your Excellency (Bethmann), however, undertake mediation...,* this would of course.suit him (Grey) equally wel l . But mediation seemed now to him to be urgently necessary, i f a European catastrophe were not to result* (3) .This new suggestion of the B r i t i s h Foreign Minister was almost i d e n t i c a l with the \"halt i n Belgrade' 1 proposal which the German Chancellor had already recommended to Vienna on July 28, although at this time London was quite unaware of 4 the B e r l i n suggestion. Grey then went on to give Lichnowsky i n a \" f r i e n d l y and private communication\" a warning that as 1. Grey to Bertie, July 29, B.D.XI,, No.283, p. 180; Cambon-to V i v i a n i , July 29, 1914, D.D*F*, 3 e serie,XI, Ho.266, p.220, and No.281, pp*228-29. 2. Beckendorff to Nicolson, July 29,1914, B.D.., XI,No.258,p.168. 3. Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office July 29,1914, - K.D,, Ho,368, p.321* Grey to Goschen, July 29, 1914, B.D*, XI, No.285, p.182. 4. Fay, op. c i t . , I I , 424-25; Renouvin, op. c i t . j 129-30. Schmitt, op. c i t . , II, 155. -263-long as the c o n f l i c t remained confined to Austria and Russia, England could stand aside, but i f Germany and France should be involved, the s i t u a t i o n would be immediately altered, and the B r i t i s h Government would i n that event be forced to rapid 1 decisions. He expressed the hope that the f r i e n d l y tone of Anglo-German conversations would continue, but i f we f a i l e d i n our e f f o r t s to keep the peace, and i f the issue spread so that i t involved p r a c t i c a l l y every European i n t e r e s t , I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the f r i e n d l y tone of a l l our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, i f they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been d i f f e r e n t . (2) This pronouncement on the part of Grey of B r i t i s h p o l i c y surely marks a new stage i n i t s evolution. He was warning Germany now that the p o s s i b i l i t y of B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a European war, should such a war arise from the c r i s i s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y should France be involved, must not be set aside. A more frank avowal of t h e ' B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n at that time could hardly have been possible; and i t i s d i f f i c u l t i n view of this exposition to see how S i r Edward's c r i t i c s can maintain that he was g u i l t y of not l e t t i n g Germany know just where B r i t a i n stood i n the c r i s i s . The l a s t sentence of the quotation given above rather s t r i k i n g l y anticipates the charges of many of his most b i t t e r c r i t i c s i n the post-war years. 1. lichnowsky to German Foreign O f f i c e , July 29, 1914, K.B., Ho.368, pp.321-22. Grey to Goschen, July 29, 1914, B.B., XI, Ho.286, pp.182-83. 2. Grey to Goschen, i b i d . , pp.182-83. -264-While the Cabinet had not even at this l a t e date, July 29, been able to come to any decision on B r i t i s h p o l i c y , further steps of preparedness were taken by the naval and m i l i t a r y departments of the government, which, had they been known, would have convinced Germany that B r i t i s h intervention was a factor which might possibly have to be reckoned with i n a European c o n f l i c t . On the afternoon of July 29, a \"warning telegram\" was sent from the Admiralty to the ships of the navy throughout the world, and \"precautionary measures\" arranged by the General S t a f f \"to meet an immediate prospect of war\" were 1 put into force by the Army. The \"pledge plan,\" or the idea of \"a h a l t \" i n Belgrade,\" which had originated i n B e r l i n and which was endorsed by London, was the basis of the diplomatic negotiations i n B e r l i n and i n Vienna aft e r July 28. In spite of urging on the part of Bethmann, who had by now made an almost complete \"reversal 2 of p o l i c y \" to r e s t r a i n his a l l y , Berchtold would not hear of any concession. He evaded giving an answer u n t i l the t h i r t y -f i r s t , and then he answered i n the negative. It would be impossible to discontinue h o s t i l i t i e s against Serbia, he claimed, and negotiation with the other Powers would be possible only 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t , , 220. 2. On July 29 the Chancellor sent three telegrams to Vienna urging the \"halt i n Belgrade\" proposal be accepted* In the t h i r d he directed the Ambassador to inform Berchtold \"with a l l impresslveness and great seriousness\" that he refused to allow Germany \"to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any regard paid to our c o u n s e l . \" K*P., No.396, pp.345-46. ^265-a f t e r Russia had countermanded her mobilization. This attitude, of the Austrian Government did not conform i n any way with the proposals made. The stubbornness of Berchtold and the intran-sigence of the Austrian Government were primary and fundamental factors overshadowing a l l else during these days. But i f prospects of peace were shattered by the Austrian answer on July 31, they were made f i n a l l y impossible when news of Russia's mobilization reached B e r l i n on that day. Control then passed into the hands of. the m i l i t a r y leaders,and the diplomats were quickly pushed into the background. It i s of exceeding importance that attention be directed at this point, to the events which had transpired i n St. Petersburg following the Sarajevo murders, and which had led up the Russian decision to mobilize. Was that decision encouraged by assurances of support from Paris and London? To what extent can the other two partners i n the Entente be held responsible for the f a t e f u l step? In how far did French and Russian policy coincide with each other and with the eff o r t s which S i r Edward Grey exerted to preserve peace? Had Paris or London given their approval i n advance to the Russian action, assuring the Czarist Government of the i r support? The f i r s t reaction i n Russia, e s p e c i a l l y i n those c i r c l e s i n which the monarchical p r i n c i p l e was strong, was oho' of horror at the crime and sympathy with the House of Hapsburg. \"The assassination at Sarajevo,\" reported the German Ambassador at the Czar's Court on July 13, \"has i t seems, made a deep impression here also, and condemnation of the shameless deed -266-1 was expressed far and wide at the e a r l i e s t moment.\" But i n the days following, i n the wide c i r c l e s of the Pan-Slav party Russian nationalism resented the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of Austrian action against Serbia, and i n this set., where Russia was held to be the natural and t r a d i t i o n a l protector of the Balkan Slavs, lack of sympathy for the Austrian Government became quickly noticeable. Anti-Austrian f e e l i n g early found cause for complaint against the Dual Monarchy i n the anti-Serbian demonstrations and r i o t s that followed the assassinations. The German Ambassador became gravely impressed during July with the bitterness of this f e e l i n g against Austria. \"The deep hatred of Austria-Hungary that i s f e l t here,\" he wrote, \"very soon began to assert i t s e l f , even during this sad event, and the indignation at the revenge exercised against the Serbs i n the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy superseded within a few days a l l expressions of sympathy f o r the aged Emperor Francis Joseph and his realm.\" Grey, i n London, was well aware of the danger inherent i n this situation,and warned the Austrian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, against any action on the part 3 of his Government which might inflame f e e l i n g i n Russia. As early as July 6 M. Sazonov had warned the Austrian attache' that Russia would oppose any violence on the part of Austria against Serbia. On July 21 Pourtales reported; \"Russia would not be able to permit Austria-Hungary to make any threats 1. The Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Chancellor, July 13, 1914, K.D., No.53, p.115. 2. Ibid. 3. Grey to de Bunsen, July 23,1914, B.D., XI, No.86, p.70. -267-against Serbia or to take m i l i t a r y measures.;.. 'La p o l i t i q u e 1 de l a Russie est paeifique, mais pas passive.'\" How was this Russian p o l i c y conditioned, i f at a l l , by the v i s i t of President Poincare' and Prime Minister V i v i a n i of France, who arrived i n St. Petersburg on July SO, for a 2 v i s i t which had been planned some months before? Apparently no o f f i c i a l records have been preserved, i f any were made, of the Franco-Russian conversations which took place on t h i s v i s i t , f o r the only documents given i n the Russian c o l l e c t i o n are the toasts exchanged between Poincare' and Nicholas II at 3 the state banquets which have long been known f o r some time. But i f no o f f i c i a l records were kept, we do know from a variety of sources that the v i s i t revealed the closest r e l a t i o n s existed between the two Governments, and that on numerous oocas ions at various functions the leaders gave repeated expressions of their governments' mutual f r i e n d l i n e s s . The three days v i s i t was \"more than a round of ceremonial banquets and undoubtedly strengthened the bonds of the Franco-Russian 4 A l l i a n c e . \" 1. The Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Chancellor, July 21, 1914, K.D., No.120, p.162. 2. M. T i v i a n i was also Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s . The absence of Poincare' and V i v i a n i from Paris i n these days as the c r i s i s developed made the s i t u a t i o n much more d i f f i c u l t for the French Government. 3. Schmitt, B.E., Russia and\" the War, reprinted from Foreign A f f a i r s , October, 1934, 17. 4. Soward, F.H., The Outbreak of the World War, off p r i n t from Queen's Quarterly, 1929, 10. -268-On the afternoon of July 21, when meeting with the Diplomatic Corps, Poincare spoke in\" f r i e n d l y manner to a l l except the Austrian ambassador. The l a t t e r he questioned on Austrian intentions i n Serbia, warning him that .....With a l i t t l e good w i l l , this Serbian a f f a i r i s easy to s e t t l e . But i t i s easy also for i t to become envenomed. Serbia has very warm friends i n the Russian people. And Russia has an a l l y , France. What complications are to be feared there. (1) He remarked l a t e r to Pale'ologue on this conversation, \"that interview has l e f t an unfavourable impression. Szarpary, (the Austrian ambassador) was undoubtedly concealing something. Austria i s preparing some sudden stroke. Sazonov must be firm 2 and we must support him,\" A more d e f i n i t e step i n the l i n e of cooperation was taken on the morning of July 23, when Sazonov dispatched to his representative i n Vienna a warning telegram: According to rumours which we have heardj the Austrian Government appears to be on the point of making certain demands at Belgrade with regard to the event at Sarajevo. Draw the attention of the Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s i n a f r i e n d l y but energetic way to the dangerous consequences of such action, i n case this a c t i o n i s incompatible with the dignity of Serbia. From my conversation with the French Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s , i t seems that France i s also following with great interest the r e l a t i o n s between Austria and Serbia, and i s not disposed to tolerate any(3) humiliation which i s not j u s t i f i e d by the circumstances. 1. Pale'ologue, M., l a Russie d'es Tsars Pendant l a Grande Guerre, (Paris,1921), I, 10. 2. i b i d . , 10, 3. Cited i n Renouvin, op. c i t ; , 82-83. The telegram i s dated July 22 and Renouvin accepts this date. Mr. Fay explains this error, Fay op. c i t . , II, 284, footnote. It did not reach Vienna u n t i l 3 P.M. on July 23. Even then the Ambassador did not see the Foreign Minister u n t i l the morning of July 24. Renouvin, op. c i t . , 82, footnote. V -269-Poincare* had approved this warning, and the French Ambassador 1 also was instructed to give counsels of moderation at Vienna. The B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , however, saw danger i n a vei l e d threat of this kind. S i r Eyre Crowe noted, \"Any such communication at Vienna would be l i k e l y to produce intense i r r i t a t i o n , without any b e n e f i c i a l other e f f e c t . \" Nicolson was a f r a i d i t was not a \"judicious\" move, while Grey decided 2 to postpone action i n this regard u n t i l the next day. This Franco-Russian warning came to nothing, however, for before i t could be acted upon by the representatives i n Vienna the Austrian ultimatum had been presented to Belgrade, at 6 P.M., on July 23rd. The sending of the ultimatum had been so timed that Poincare' and V i v i a n i , who were scheduled to leave St. Petersburg on the evening of July 23, would be at sea when news of the 3 delivery of the note arrived at the Russian c a p i t a l . Thus i t was that the f i n a l f e s t i v i t i e s of the President's v i s i t took place i n ignorance of the fa c t that Austria had presented her demands at Belgrade,and that the Franco-Russian step to prevent such a measure was to prove f u t i l e . The v i s i t came to an end with the President and Czar exohanging warm words of the high regard i n which each held the other's Government, and by 1. Buchanan to Grey, July 23, 1914, B.D., XI, No.84, p.69. V i v i a n i to Bienvenu-Martin, July 24,1914, D.D.F., 3 e seVie, XI, No.l* p . l . 2. Minutes to Buchanan's telegram to Grey, July 23,1914,B.D.XI. No.84, p.69. De Bunsen to Grey, July 23,1914, i b i d . , No.90, p.73. 3. Wolff, op. c i t . , 535. -270-expressions of mutual c o r d i a l i t y which placed a seal on the 1 Franco-Russian Accord. There can he no doubt that the v i s i t did have a marked effect on Russian p o l i c y i n the days which followed. Acoording to Buchanan, who ref e r s to statements made to him by Sazonov and Pale'ologue, agreement had been arrived at on the following points: 1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted as regards the maintenance of general peace and balance of power i n Europe, more especially i n the East. 2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Serbia which the l a t t e r would be j u s t i f i e d i n regard-ing as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. 3. Solemn affirmation of obligations imposed by the a l l i a n c e of the two countries.^ It would seem as i f the Russian Government had thus obtained at the very outset of the c r i s i s , and before either knew of the Austrian ultimatum, assurance that the French could be depended upon to l i v e up to the terms of the a l l i a n c e . And we know for a fact that the war party i n Russia, headed by the Grand Dukes, was to a great extent encouraged. The wife of one of the Grand Dukes said to Pale'ologue at a state dinner on July 22 \"War i s going to break out. Nothing w i l l be l e f t of Austria. You w i l l get back Alsace-Lorraine. Our armies w i l l 1. Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars, I, 19-21. 2. Buchanan to Grey, July 24,1914, B.D., XI, No.101, p.80. Pale'ologue to Bienvenu-Martin, July 24,1914, D.D.F. 3 s s ^ r i e , XI, No.19, p.18. -271-1 meet i n B e r l i n . Germany w i l l be annihilated.\" Whatever might be the assurances of French support given to Russia on t h i s . v i s i t , these were confirmed again and again as the c r i s i s developed. On July 25, according to Buchanan, Pale'ologue stated to Sazanov that \"he was i n a p o s i t -ion to give his Excellency (Sazonov) assurance that France 2 placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side.\" On July 27 M. Isvolsky wrote from P a r i s : I was struck with the degree to which the Minister of Justice and his assistants understood the whole s i t u a t i o n and had calmly but f i r m l y decided to give us their whole-hearted support, and to avoid the least appearance of a divergence i n point of view. (3) On the same day M. V i v i a n i sent instructions to M. Pale'ologue from on board the \"France;\" Please t e l l M. Sazonov that France, appreciating as does Russia the great importance of the two countries affirming their entire accord i n the face of other Powers and of neglecting no e f f o r t i n the s o l u t i o n of the c r i s i s , ' Is e n t i r e l y ready to second, i n the i n t e r e s t s of the general peace, the action of the Imperial Government. In carrying out these instructions the Ambassador gave a formal promise to Sazonov that France would l i v e up to the obligations of the a l l i a n c e , but he begged the Minister to be prudent. \"I beg you not to take any measures on the German front, and to be very careful on the Austrian front, as long as Germany has not uncovered her r e a l game. The least Imprudence 1. Pale'ologue, l a Russie des Tsars, I, 15, Fay, op.ci t. , II,283. 2. Buchanan to Grey, July 25,1914,B.D., XI, No.125, p.94. 3. Cited i n Renouvin, op.cit., 64. 4. V i v i a n i to Pale'ologue, July 27, 1914, D.D.F., 3 e se'rie, XI, No. 138 p. 118. Pale'ologue to Bienvenu-Martin, July 29, 1914, i b i d ; , No.248, p.210. -27 2-1 on your part would cost us the help of England.\" It i s d i f f i c u l t to state how much weight was attached to the note of prudence i n t h i s communication, but the Russian Government noted with s a t i s f a c t i o n the of f e r of support. On July 29 the Russian Ambassador i n Paris \"was instructed to sincerely thank the French Government for the declaration made i n i t s name by the French Ambassador that we can count on the 2 entire a l l i e d support of France.\" According to Mr. Sohmitt the Russian documents reveal c l e a r l y the attitude of French m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s i n support of thei r a l l y * On July 28 Ignatiev, Russian M i l i t a r y Attache' i n Pa r i s , reported that the French Minister of War and the Chief of S t a f f had expressed \"complete and enthusiastic readiness to f u l f i l t r u l y the obligations of the a l l i a n c e , \" and on July 29 he stated that \"everything possible had been done i n France, and the ministry i s quietly waiting on events.\" This assurance of support from the French m i l i t a r y leaders appears to have played an important part i n the f i n a l decision of the Russians to carry out general mobilization. The French Government received a communication from Isvolsky at 3 A.M. on July 30 that the Russian Government had decided to 4 \"speed up\" i t s armaments. M. Poincare', aft e r interviewing M. Messimy, Minister of War, sent instructions to Paleologue 1. Pale'ologue, op. c i t . , I, 33-34. 2. D.D.F., 3 e se*rie, XI, No.301, p.258; Diary of the Russian Foreign Offic e , 50. 3. Schmitt, Russia and the War, l o c . c i t . , 21. 4. V i v i a n i to French Ambassadors, July 30,1914, D.D.F., 3 e se'rie, No.305, p.261. -273-and renewed the declaration that \"France i s resolved to f u l f i l 1 a l l the obligations of her a l l i a n c e . \" Then he went on to caution M. Sazonov to avoid any act which might give Germany the opportunity for r e t a l i a t o r y measures: I therefore think i t would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defense which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a t o t a l or p a r t i a l mobilization of her forces. (2) When; M. Isvolsky communicated the contents of these instructions to his Government he reported at the same time, however, two conversations, the one with M. de Margerie, Director of the French Foreign O f f i c e , and the other with H. Messimy, Minister of War, which when -coupled with the directions of V i v i a n i , were of i n t e r e s t , to say the l e a s t . De Margerie had told him that the French Government did not wish to i n t e r f e r e with Russia's m i l i t a r y preparations, but that they \"would consider i t most desirable on account of the s t i l l continuing negotiations for the preservation of the peace, i f these preparations were carried on i n the least open, least ^ provocative manner possible.\" M. Messimy had t o l d Count Ignatiev that Russia might declare that she was \" w i l l i n g to slow down\" f o r the time being her preparations, but that she might nevertheless \"continue and even accelerate\" these preparations, only avoiding so far as possible \"the 3 transportation of troops on a larger scale.\" In a written 1. V i v i a n i to French Ambassadors, J u l y 30,1914, D.D.F., 3e se r i e , No. 305, p.262. 2. Ibi d . , p. 262. 3. D.D.F., 3© se\"rie, XI, (Note), p.262; Un Livre Noir, o p . c i t . , I I , 290-91; Renouvin, op. c i t . , 206; Fabre-Luce, o p . c l t . , 211-12. -274 report of the same date, according to Mr. Schmitt, who i s here reporting on his study of the Russian documents, Ignatiev explained that the reservations were not to be interpreted as a tendency on the part of France \"to draw back at the l a s t minute,\" and that they \"had no effect on the normal course of France's preparations for War.\" \"Ho importance,\" he reported, was being attached to the demonstrations against war, which were r e s t r i c t e d to the boulevards, and the tone of the press 1 caused \"general s a t i s f a c t i o n . \" M. Renouvin does his utmost to minimize the importance of these facts, and to emphasize the moderating influence of 2 the French, but they would seem to be undeniable facts of French encouragement, and i t i s impossible to explain them away. Counsels of moderation may have been given, but no r e a l r e s t r a i n t was exercised, and i t i s p l a i n l y evident that the Russians had every reason to f e e l sure that t h e i r a l l y would march with them. This confidence can not be minimized as a factor i n the Russian decision to mobilize, just as i t was the assurance of German support which caused Austria to refuse a l l suggestions of compromise and mediation. To what extent did B r i t i s h p o l i c y at St. Petersburg correspond with that of the French? From the Russian view England was throughout the c r i s i s something of an enigma. On July 24, i n a meeting with Pale'ologue and Buchanan, Sazonov strongly urged the l a t t e r to obtain from his Government a 1. Schmitt, l o c . c i t . , 21. 2. Renouvin, op. c i t . , 206-09. -275-stateraent of i t s s o l i d a r i t y with France and Russia. He vehem-ently c r i t i c i s e d Austrian p o l i c y , and told the B r i t i s h ambassador of the agreement of views established by the French and Russians 1 during the v i s i t of Poincare*. To this Pale'ologue added that \"France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but would, i f necessary, f u l f i l a l l the obligations imposed on her by the a l l i a n c e . \" It was then urged upon Buchanan that i f England did not take sides \"from the very s t a r t , \" she would thus encourage the Central Powers, and make war \"more probable.\" To this Buchanan answered that he could not speak for his Government, but promised that he would telegraph to London a l l that had been said. But he held out l i t t l e hope f o r a B r i t i s h -declaration of s o l i d a r i t y with France and Russia, s t a t i n g that \"we had no d i r e c t interests i n Serbia,\" and that \"public opinion 2 would never sanction a war on her behalf.\" S i r Edward r e a d i l y 3 endorsed the ambassador's declaration, and Sazonov was n o t i f i e d 4 to this e f f e c t on July 26. On July 27 S i r Edward gave Beckendorff i n London some l i t t l e hope when he stated that i t should not be taken f o r . granted that B r i t a i n would keep out of war, under a l l circumst-ances, i f a c o n f l i c t broke out; but he was c a r e f u l to add that this assurance must not be interpreted as a promise to undertake 5 anything more than diplomatic action. The Russian Government ?~10; 1. Supra. 270. 2. Buchanan to Grey, July 24,1914, B.D., XI, Ho.101, p.80. 3. Grey to Buchanan, July 25,1914, i b i d . , Ho.112, p.86. 4. Buchanan to Grey, July 27,1914, i b i d . , Ho.170, p.120. 5. Grey to Buchanan, July 27,1914, i b i d . , Ho.177, p.125. -276-could thus notice at least a favourable tendency i n London i n spite of the guarded statements of the Foreign Minister, Russia had proceeded with p a r t i a l mobilization measures after July 25, and while the B r i t i s h Foreign Office was unaware of the extent of these measures, i t was f e l t that some such preparations were j u s t i f i e d . As early as July 25 Grey informed Buchanan that Russian mobilization would be an 1 inevitable r e s u l t of the Austrian note. The day before he had 2 expressed a s i m i l a r viewpoint to Lichnowsky. On July 26 Buchanan urged Sazonov to delay mobilization orders \"as long 3 as possible,\" but to his report S i r Eyre Crowe noted on July 27, \"Austria i s already mobilizing .... Russia cannot be expected to delay her own mobilization; which, as i t i s , can only become ef f e c t i v e i n something l i k e double the time required 4 by Austria and by Germany.\" But while there was the f e e l i n g of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for Russia, when on July 28 Buchanan learned of the imminence of p a r t i a l mobilization,he cautioned Sazonov against taking \"any m i l i t a r y measures which might be considered 5 as a challenge by Germany.\" It has been charged that Grey's expression of sympathy for the Russian p o s i t i o n did much to minimize the effect of his refusal to pledge his Government to aid the Dual A l l i a n c e . He has been b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i s e d for not exercising greater 1. Grey to Buchanan, July 27, 1914, B.D., XI, No.112, p*87. 2. Supra. 244. 3. Buchanan to Grey, July 26, 1914, B.D. -t XI, No;170, p,120. 4. Minute by S i r Eyre Crowe, July 27, 1914, i b i d . , No.170,p.120. 5. Pale'ologue, La Russie des Tsars, I, 32. -277-1 r e s t r a i n t upon Russia i n this matter of mobilization* But i t would appear, on analysing the si t u a t i o n , that i t would have been most d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, for t h e . B r i t i s h Government to take any firmer policy towards r e s t r a i n i n g Russia while i t neither wished nor was able to promise her 2 eventual support i n case she were attacked. Grey could promise nothing, could take no d e f i n i t e stand, as has been pointed out, because he was not sure of public opinion or of the support of the whole Cabinet. In summing up the s i t u a t i o n at St. Petersburg i t would then appear that while England gave Russia no such strong assurance of support as did France, she did not d e f i n i t -ely urge M. Sazonov to not mobilize. Nor does i t appear at a l l certain that either London or Paris gave their approval i n advance to any de f i n i t e step on the part of Russia. The French Government did not know d e f i n i t e l y u n t i l the evening of July 31 3 that Russia had ordered general mobilization. Russia f e l t that she could not allow Austrian action against Serbia, and when the former declared war on July 28, and began the bombard-ment of Belgrade, f e e l i n g sure of the support of France, and knowing that England would not oppose her action, she ordered her mobilization. But for this action i t might have been possible f o r diplomacy to arrange a compromise. The m i l i t a r y time-tables of a l l the Great Powers were now primary consider-ations and control passed into the hands of the m i l i t a r y . 1. Barnes, op, c i t . j 371. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 313. S. Infra. 287 (note 1). -278-The news of Russia's mobilization did not reach the other c a p i t a l s u n t i l Friday, July 31; and the Austrian move to mobilize was not known, except to B e r l i n , u n t i l Saturday, 1 August 1. It has been e a r l i e r shown that Austria had delayed 2 i n r e j e c t i n g S i r Edward's l a s t peace suggestion, consequently, on July 30 he was s t i l l hoping for a peaceful solution of the growing danger. But on July 30 he received news from S i r Edward Goschen i n B e r l i n that convinced him and the Foreign Office that Germany had p r a c t i c a l l y determined on war, the v i o l a t i o n of Belgian neutrality, and on the crushing of France. On the previous evening Bethmann had sent for Goschen and made- \"a strong bid for B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y i n the event of war.\" Provided that B r i t a i n remained neutral, he said, Germany was prepared to give every assurance that she aimed at no t e r r i t o r i a l gains at the expense of France i n Europe, though she could give no such assurances concerning French colonies. Germany would respect the n e u t r a l i t y of Holland, but as regards Belgium, he \"could not t e l l to what operations Germany might be forced by the action of France,\" but he could state that, \"provided Belgium did not take sides against Germany, her i n t e g r i t y would be respected a f t e r the 3 conclusion of the war.\" This move on the part of Bethmann created a disastrous impression of German intentions i n London. \"I read i t through 1. Schmitt, op. c i t . , II, 257. 2. Supra. 264. 3. Goschen to Grey, July 29, 1914, B.D., XI, Mo.293, pp.185-86. Received July 30, 1914, at 9 A.M. -279-with a f e e l i n g of despair,\" says Grey. \"The document made clear that Bethmann-Hollweg now thoughtwar was probable. We were henceforth to discuss upon how we should conduct ourselves i n war, no longer how war could be avoided.... The proposal 1 made to us meant everlasting disgrace i f we accepted i t . \" S i r Eyre Crowe had this to say, \"The only comment that need be made on these astounding proposals i s that they r e f l e c t d i s c r e d i t on the statesman who makes them.... Incidentally i t i s of interest to note that Germany p r a c t i c a l l y admits the intention to v i o l a t e Belgian n e u t r a l i t y ; . . . I t i s clear that Germany i s 2 p r a c t i c a l l y determined to go to war.\" The reply which Grey returned to Goschen was approved by Mr. Asquith, but was not shown to the Cabinet which did not meet u n t i l the afternoon. The Ambassador was to inform the Chancellor that his proposal could not \"for a moment be entertained.\" He asks us i n effect to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French t e r r i t o r y as d i s t i n c t from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal I s unacceptable, for France could be so crushed as to lose . her p o s i t i o n as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German p o l i c y without further, t e r r i t o r y i n Europe being taken from her. But apart from that, for us to make this bargain at the expense of France would be a disgraee from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also i n effect asks us to bargain away 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 326. 2. Minute by S i r Eyre Crowe, July 30, 1914, B.D., XI, No.293, p,186. 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 329. 280-whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. .... We must preserve our f u l l freedom to act as -circumstances may seem to us to require. (1) But while declining this German suggestion that his Government should promise to stand aside, Grey at the same time continued to r e s i s t pressure from the Entente Powers that he should a l i g n h i s country with them. On July 30 M. Cambon came to remind him of the terms of the l e t t e r s exchanged i n November, 1912, ?/hich provided for discussion between the governments of France and B r i t a i n i f the peace of Europe was 2 threatened; such a threat now existed, claimed M. Cambon. Instead of responding to this appeal the Foreign Minister 3 evaded an answer u n t i l the following afternoon, wishing to avoid taxing any irrevocable stand and placing hope s t i l l i n peaceful negotiations. In spite of the growing danger, S i r Edward f e l t , even at this late date, that there was s t i l l a basis f o r discussion among the Powers. Sazonov had offered a formula according to which he would engage to stop a l l m i l i t a r y preparations i n Russia i f Austria would agree to eliminate from her ultimatum 4 a l l points which v i o l a t e d Serbian sovereignty. Besides t h i s there was the B r i t i s h suggestion of the Austrian occupation ;:f 1. Grey to Goschen, July 30,1914, B.D.,XI, No.303, p.193. 2. Cambon; to V i v i a n i , July 30,1914, D.D.F. , 3 e s e r i e , XI, 10.363, p.301; Grey to Bertie, July 30,B.D.XI,No.319,p.201. 3. Ibid. 4. Buchanan to Grey, July 30,1914, B.D., XI, No.302 (A) and (B), pp.191-92. -281-of Belgrade to be followed by negotiation which the German Government was to support i n Vienna, and to which no answer had at this date been received* Late on July 30 S i r Edward offered a new proposal, a combination of these two plans. I f Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Serbian t e r r i t o r y , declares herself ready, i n the interest - of European peace^ to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further m i l i t a r y preparations:',: provided that other Powers did the same.(l) This wasshe recognized,\"a slender chance of preserving peace,\" but i t was an appeal to Russia to' stay her hand, the f i r s t of i t s kind, and made at this date because now Germany seemed at l a s t w i l l i n g to cooperate. The o f f e r was communicated to Paris, the French Government was asked to support i t at 3 St. Petersburg, and a copy was given to Lichnowsky to be sent 3 on to B e r l i n , This last' e f f o r t to save the s i t u a t i o n , however, was immediately destroyed by the events of the following day. On the morning of July 31 news reached B e r l i n of Russia's mobilization. The m i l i t a r y party i n the German c a p i t a l now pressed f o r immediate action, and i n the face of the Russian move, i t s hand was immeasurably strengthened. At one P.M. the Government proclaimed a \"state of danger of war\" which set i n motion a number of precautionary measures preparatory to actual mobilization. It was taken for granted that the order f o r 1. Grey to Buchanan, July 30, K.35^X1^0.309, pp.196-97. 3, Grey to Be r t i e , July 30, 1914, i b i d . , No.310, p.197, D.D.F., 3 e serie, XI, No.389, pp.337-29. 3. Lichnowsky to German Foreign O f f i c e , July 30, 1914, K.D., No.460, p.385. -282-1 . general mobilization would follow within forty-eight hours. How that mobilization was being undertaken i n three c a p i t a l s considerations of m i l i t a r y necessity tended to f a r out-weigh diplomatic considerations. Such a statement i s almost axiomatic for any country facing such a c r i s i s as was presented on July 31, but i t was more p a r t i c u l a r l y true f o r B e r l i n . In a war with Russia supported by France the German plan of campaign ca l l e d for a sudden and decisive drive to the west to crush France, and then a turning on Russia where forces would be mobilized more slowly. Speed was the essential factor i n the German plan to make up f o r i n f e r i o r i t y of numbers. To the m i l i t a r y leaders, to answer mobilization by countermobilization, and then to stand on the defensive waiting for diplomatic developments would mean los i n g the advantage which quick action would bring. Thus the German plan of campaign impelled the Imperial Government to i t s next step, the step which a c t u a l l y p r e c i p i t a t e d war. It was decided to force the s i t u a t i o n , and not to wait on developments. Peaceful negotiations which were pending had completely broken down, for at 2:45 P.M. Austria gave an 2 absolute r e f u s a l to the l a s t Anglo-German proposal to negotiate. And since Austria declined to negotiate i t was to be expected that Russia might attack forthwith. At 3:30 P.M. a double ultimatum was therefore dispatched i n the form of instructions 1. Renouvin, op. c i t . , 222; Fay, op. c i t . , II, 523; Schmitt, op. c i t . , I I , 266. 2. Emperor of Austria to William II, July 31, 1914, K.D., Ho.482, p.400. 283 to the German ambassadors i n St. Petersburg and Pa r i s , to be 1 presented to the respective governments. The message to Russia announced the \"threatening danger of war,\" and declared that \"mobilization must follow i n case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria-Hungary and ourselves within twelve hours and make us a d i s t i n c t declaration to that e f f e c t . \" France was asked for a declaration of n e u t r a l i t y i n a Russo-German war, her answer to be given within eighteen hours. While i t was not expected that France would o f f e r such a declaration, i f she should declare for n e u t r a l i t y , the Ambassador was ordered to demand as a pledge of good f a i t h that the fortresses of Toul and Verdun be turned over to Germany to be returned a f t e r the 2 war. While these m i l i t a r y considerations were dragging Europe closer and closer to the abyss, the B r i t i s h Foreign Minister i n london made one more e f f o r t to stave o f f the catastrophe. He did not know by July 31, how the idea of the \"halt i n Belgrade\" proposal had been received i n Vienna, and during the morning Lichnowsky had informed'him that Austria was w i l l i n g to renew d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s with Russia, \"to give explanations about the Austrian note,\" and to discuss \"any 3 questions that affect Austro-Russian r e l a t i o n s . \" Grey at once 1. Imperial Chancellor to the Ambassador i n St. Petersburg, July 31,1914, K.D., No.490,p.404; to the Ambassador i n Paris, i b i d . , No.491, p.405. 2. This provisional clause in.ithe ultimatum was not used at the time since France rejected the German question. It was published only i n 1918. Schoen.F.,von, The Memoirs of an Ambassador,(London,1922), 194-95. 3. Jagow to Lichnowsky,July 30,1914,K.D.,No.444,p.374. Grey to Buchanan,July 31,1914,B.D.,XI, No.335, p.213. 284-formulated a new proposal. He telegraphed to St. Petersburg and to P a r i s , that he \"earnestly\" hoped that M. Sazonov would 1 encourage the conversations. As to m i l i t a r y preparations,.he t o l d Lichnowsky that \"he could not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless Austria would put some l i m i t to 2 her advance into Serbia.\" It was \"suspicion\", he said, which was blocking a solution of the d i f f i c u l t i e s . Could not the four disinterested Powers, England, France, Germany and I t a l y assure Austria that Serbia would give her \" f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n , \" and assure Russia that Serbian sovereignty and i n t e g r i t y would not be impaired. In addition, of course, \" a l l Powers would suspend further m i l i t a r y operations or preparations,\" He then went on to say: I f Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made i t clear that Germany and Austria were s t r i v i n g to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable i f they rejected i t , I would support i t at St. Petersburg and Paris and go to the length of saying that i f Russia and France would not accept i t His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but otherwise .... i f France became involved we s h a l l be drawn i n * (3) Most c e r t a i n l y this was going much farther than he had gone at any time previously; he was actually s t a t i n g that B r i t a i n would, under certain circumstances, abandon the Entente. The proposal, however, was not a practicable one i n the e x i s t i n g circumstances. Russia had e a r l i e r made i t clear that she would not be s a t i s f i e d with Austrian assurances, and Austria had given 1. B.D., op. c i t . , XI, NO.335, p.213. 2. Ibid,, p.213. 3. Grey to Goschen July 31, 1914, i b i d . , No.340, pp.215-16. 285-every i n d i c a t i o n that she would agree to nothing l e s s than the fulfilment of a l l her demands on Serbia. S i r Edward Goschen discussed the project with von Jagow i n B e r l i n , on the evening of July 31, \"urging him most earnestly\" to act upon i t . While the l a t t e r \"expressed himself very sympathetically\" toward the proposal, and \"appreciated the continued e f f o r t s to maintain peace,\" he declared that \" i t was impossible f o r the Imperial Government to consider any proposal u n t i l they had received an answer from Russia to t h e i r communication of today,\" that i s to the ultimatum. \"Russia's 1 mobilization has s p o i l t everything,\" he added. On August 1 Goschen again met with Jagow to communicate another memorandum from Grey, stat i n g that i t would be possible s t i l l to maintain peace \" i f only a l i t t l e respite i n time can 2 be gained before any Great Power begins war.\" To this Jagow re p l i e d that Russia \"had the weight of numbers on her side;\" that speed was essential to Germany, and that \"the safety o f the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from a l l parts of her wide dominions.\" Russia had sent no answer to the German note; \"Germany had therefore ordered mobilization.\" The Russian refusal to \"demobilize must be regarded as creating \"a state 3 of war.\" The B e r l i n Government was refusing to reconsider or 1. Goschen to Grey, July 31,1914, B.D., XI, Mo.385, p.236. 2. Grey to Goschen, August 1,1914, i b i d . , No.411, p.246. 3. Goschen to Grey, August 1,1914, i b i d . , No.458, p.265. -286-to wait. M i l i t a r y arguments were i n absolute control of the si t u a t i o n . A declaration of war was dispatched to be presented i n St. Petersburg at 5 P.M. i f at that time the German ambassador had not received a s a t i s f a c t o r y reply to the 1 ultimatum. The answer of the French Government to the ultimatum 2 was to be given by 1 P.M. on August 1. The Government had been taking measures of m i l i t a r y precaution since the evening 3 of July 25, and from July 30 had been pressing the B r i t i s h Government to discover what course i t would follow., When covering troops were ordered to th e i r places on the f r o n t i e r s 4 on July 30 the famous decision to keep back ten kilometres 5 was given i n order to influence B r i t i s h opinion favourably. The French did not know d e f i n i t e l y of the Russian mobilization 1. Jagow to German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914, K.B., No.542, pp.432-33. 2. D.D.F., 3 e serie, XI, No.417, p.347. 3. Jo f f r e , Marshall, Memoirs, (london, 1932), I, 115-16. 4. D.D.F., 3 e serie, XI, No.333, pp.281-82; No.390, p.329. 5. This order did a great deal to convince the outside world of the peaceful intentions of France but i t d i d l i t t l e to impede her preparations. In many places the l i n e designated i n the order was only four or f i v e kilometres from the f r o n t i e r , and generals admitted l a t e r that the order was not obeyed i n absolute s t r i c t n e s s . Marshall Joffre has written, \"In regard to the ten kilometre l i m i t , I made l i t t l e objection recognizing the strength of the motive d i c t a t i n g i t and r e a l i z i n g moreover, that t h i s measure would i n no way compromise our mobilization or our l a t e r operations, op. c i t . , I, 123. -287-u n t i l the evening of July 31, since Paleologue's telegram did 1 not arrive u n t i l 8:30 P.M., but Joffre had been pressing.for complete mobilization i n P a r i s since the afternoon of that date, when news of the German proclamation of the \"state of 2 threatening danger of war\" reached P a r i s . At a cabinet meeting i n the morning of August 1 Joffre's demand f o r mobilization was granted, and the order was issued at 3:45 P.M. When Baron Schoen c a l l e d at the Foreign Office at one o'clock for the answer to Germany's ultimatum he was told b r i e f l y that \"France 4 w i l l act i n accordance with her i n t e r e s t s , \" a formula agreed upon by Poincare and V i v i a n i , which made i t s u f f i c i e n t l y clear that France would f i g h t . Shortly a f t e r the ultimatum was sent to France on July 31, the draft of a declaration of war waa drawn up, but i t was not sent u n t i l August 3. Bethmann hesitated to declare war against the Republic. Inclined to emphasize le g a l formulae, he knew that although a formal declaration of war might have l i t t l e r e a l significance, i t would loom large i n the public mind. He therefore waited for a pretext to s a t i s f y his own scruples and public opinion.InThereewas some hope held that public opinion i n France might force the Government i n Paris to commit acts of war. But besides these reasons, Admiral von 1. D.D.F. , 3 e se'rie,XI,No.432,p.356. According to French evidence Paleologue had dispatched this telegram at 10:25 A.M. It thus took ten hours to reach P a r i s . This delay has never been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y explained. It may have been due to the confusion a r i s i n g from the m i l i t a r y occupation of the central telegraph o f f i c e , i t was sent by way of Scandinavia and did not reach Paris u n t i l 8:30 P.M. However, the news of Russia's mobilization had arrived- i n Paris by i n d i r e c t means. 2. J o f f r e , op. c i t * , I, 126. 3. V i v i a n i a to Paul Cambon, August 1,1914,D.D.F.,3 eserie,XI, No.523, pp.418-19. Joffre,op . c i t. ,1,127-28. 4. D.D.F., 3 serie,XI, No.430, pp.360-61. -288-T i r p i t z had raised another problem. He stressed the problem of the Navy, and requested that the declaration of war upon France might be made as late as possible, so that the Fleet might have time to complete i t s preparations. And according to the German plan of campaign French s o i l would not have to be invaded for a few days. Thus the declaration of war was held up; Bethmann sent the following note to the Emperor on the morning of August 2: In accordance with understanding with Ministry of War and General S t a f f , presentation of declaration of war to France not necessary today for any m i l i t a r y reasons. Consequently i t w i l l not be done, i n the hope that French w i l l attack us. (1) But once the German m i l i t a r y machine was i n motion Luxemburg had to be occupied^and then Belgium. On the morning of August 2 troops moved into Luxemburg, the German Government expressing regret that such a step was necessary and promising compensation a f t e r the war. On the evening of the same day the German minister i n Brussels was ordered to deliver an ultimatum to Belgium. \"The Imperial Government,\" read the note, \" i s i n receipt of r e l i a b l e information i n r e l a t i o n to the proposed advance of French armed forces along the Meuse, route Givet-lamur. This information leaves no doubt as to France's intention 2 to advance against Germany through Belgian t e r r i t o r y . \" As Belgium was not i n a p o s i t i o n to assure her n e u t r a l i t y , Germany was thus forced to send troops into the country to defend her 1. The Chancellor to the Emperor, August 2, 1914, K.D., No.629, p.478. 2. The text of this ultimatum had been sent to the German minister i n a sealed envelope on July 29, -289-own t e r r i t o r y . The note went on to assure Belgium that the German Government contemplated no h o s t i l e measures against her, that recompense for damages would be given, and that the t e r r i t o r y would be l a t e r evacuated. But, should Belgium refuse passage to the troops she would be treated as an enemy. A reply was demanded within twelve hours. The Belgian cabinet decided to answer the German demands i n the negative. The next morning the Powers were n o t i f i e d of the ultimatum and i t s r e j e c t i o n ; no m i l i t a r y a id was asked for, though King Albert asked King George for diplomatic action. The Germans were given the answer i n the afternoon, and they accordingly instructed their minister to give notice at s i x o'clock the following morning, that Germany was \"going to act by force of arms.\" On August 3 Germany declared war on France. Large movements of troops had been going on for two days i n both countries, and v i o l a t i o n s of the f r o n t i e r had been reported by each side; reports of which were printed i n the papers. One such report announced that French airmen had dropped bombs at Nuremberg - a report l a t e r proven to be f a l s e . When the German Government drew up the declaration of war for presentation at P a r i s , h o s t i l i t i e s were j u s t i f i e d by these reported f r o n t i e r v i o l a t i o n s and by the Nuremberg bombs. Schoen received the declaration late in the afternoon i n a badly mutilated telegram, the text having been \"jumbled,\" as he reports, during i t s transmission. Taking what he could decode of the message he -290-1 presented It as a declaration of war to V i v i a n i at 6:45 P.M. At this point end the long negotiations to preserve peace which had begun some weeks before. The l a s t stays which had restrained the launching of the Powers upon a European war had been now knocked away. It remains to be seen how Great B r i t a i n was dragged into the catastrophe, and this i s the theme of the chapter v/hich follows. 1. Schoen, op. c i t . , 200-01. Schoen to V i v i a n i , August 3, 1914, D.D.F., 3 e serie XI, Ho.678, p.509; Note du Departement, August 4, 1914, i b i d . j No.725, p.537. Wolff, op. c i t . , 579-81. Chapter JS/TII How B r i t a i n Entered the War -291-CHAPTER T i l l HOW BRITAIN ENTERED THE WAR The previous pages show c l e a r l y how anxiously S i r Edward Grey had worked for peace, how he had t r i e d plan a f t e r plan to save Europe from war, how i n his desire to avert a c o n f l i c t he had made a variety of suggestions, and given his support to those which had arisen from other sources. It has been revealed how ready he was to take the lead i n impartial mediation to s e t t l e the c r i s i s which threatened Europe, and that while there remained any possible hope that the c r i s i s might pass he had refused f i r m l y to give his support to either of the diplomatic groups, always f e a r f u l that the pledging of the support of B r i t a i n to one side or the other might p r e c i p i t a t e the catastrophe he dreaded. It now remains to be seen, how, when war came i n spite of his e f f o r t s , B r i t a i n became involved. Careful analysis makes p l a i n l y evident the fact that B r i t a i n ' s entry was f i n a l l y determined by three mixed motives -to protect her own material i n t e r e s t s , to f u l f i l l her obligations 1 to France, and to preserve the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium. In various works each of these three has been put forward as the 1. Fay, S.B., New Light i n the Origins of the War, I I I , American H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . XXVI, No.2, January 1921, p. 254. -292-single determining factor; but i t was a l l three together v/hich brought about her decision to go to war. In 1914 the l a s t of the three was \"played up\" by the Government as the a l l important reason for the decision, but to any one with a clear understand-ing of the si t u a t i o n i t was, i f anything, of least importance. Before Belgium was invaded Asquith and Grey had resolved on support of France, and the v i o l a t i o n of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y made no v i t a l difference to that resolve. Where i t s r e a l importance l a y was i n the fact that i t preserved the unity of the Cabinet, except f o r two members, and of the country as a whole, and enlist e d the support of the entire nation behind the Government. In his momentous speech of August 3 the question of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y was put forward very s k i l f u l l y by the Foreign Minister, very s k i l f u l l y , and most prominently. He was convinced at the time that England must take part i n the c o n f l i c t , that she must not stand aside, and his appeal for support of t h i s policy was made c h i e f l y as an appeal to save Belgium, because no other appeal, he knew, would so c l e a r l y and so powerfully move Parliament and the B r i t i s h p u b l i c . He wished for intervention regardless of the Belgian question, but he saw i n the fate of that l i t t l e country a powerful lever v/ith which to move Parliam-ent and the country to his side. No great idealism could be woven about B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ; the obligation to France, concealed for years from the House, he repudiated as being a deciding fac t o r i n the sit u a t i o n , though i n truth i t was just such a factor; but the fate of Belgium served as a most powerful appeal, -293-clothed i n noble idealism, a righteous cause, which won Parliament and the public to the side of intervention. It gave the nation enthusiasm for the crusade against the Central Powers. The Belgian issue thus gave a splendid excuse for a decision already arrived at on the issues of B r i t i s h i nterests and B r i t i s h obligations to France. If; then, as i s here maintained, the Belgian issue was not the deciding factor, to what extent did the obligations to France weigh i n favour of the decision for intervention? It has been shown that there was l i t t l e question of England being involved u n t i l l a t e i n the c r i s i s . There was wide spread c r i t i c i s m of Serbia a f t e r Serajevo, and as the c r i s i s developed, a decided d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to support Russia and France i n a war a r i s i n g out of an Austro-Serbian quarrel. Austria's intransient policy, culminating i n her declaration of war on Serbia,did a great deal to alienate English sympathy, i t i s true, but there was l i t t l e enthusiasm for helping Serbia 1 against Austria, and very l i t t l e more for a s s i s t i n g Russia. Grey, we have seen, made no move to take part i n negotiations- u n t i l July 20; he had not referred to the c r i s i s i n the Cabinet u n t i l July 24. On July 25 when King George s a i d to Prince Henry of Prussia, \"We s h a l l t r y a l l we can to keep out of this and s h a l l remain neutral,\" he was without doubt expressing an opinion shared by the majority of the E n g l i s h 1. Scott, J.F., Five-Weeks, chapter IX, f o r a study of B r i t i s h press and public opinion. 2. Cited i n Renouvin, op. c i t . , 270. -294-people at the time. As M. Charles-Roux, speaking from the French viewpoint says, \"England, had a long way to come before she was to take an active part in any continental c o n f l i c t , so far that one wondered whether she would ever do so, or whether 1 , she would not do so when i t , was too l a t e . \" Reference has been made to the personal opinion Grey held that should war ,come, Great B r i t a i n must support France, and to the strong f e e l i n g of his associates i n the Foreign Office i n ' this., same , regard. Reference too has been made to-the secret preparatory measures' taken a f t e r July 27 by the ' 3 Admiralty and the General S t a f f . But since' the Cabinet was 4 divided i n i t s opinion, and could come -to no decision as to what stand England should take, Grey could only continue to work for mediation, preserving \"our f u l l freedom,\" as he t o l d the German Government i n refusing their \"bid\" for B r i t i s h 5 n e u t r a l i t y on July 30. Yet he d i d not f a i l to warn the Germans 6 that B r i t a i n might be forced to come i n . Mr. C h u r c h i l l has 1. Charles-Roux, F., T e i l l e e d'Armes a Londres, 22 j u i n -4aout, 1914, Revue des Deux Mondes, August 15, 1926, 727. 2. Supra. 253-54. 3. Supra. 256 4. Lord Riddell states that as l a t e as August 2 there were four parties i n the Cabinet; (1) the party headed by Asquith and Grey, who thought i t v i t a l to support France; (2) the \"Peace Party,\" headed by S i r John Simon, who would not have war at any p r i c e ; (3) a party headed by Lloyd George i n favour of intervention i n c e r t a i n circum-stances; and (4) a party headed by Mackinnon Wood and Masterman which was endeavouring to compose the differences between the other three parties v/ith a view to avoiding: a s p l i t i n the Government. Lord Riddell»s Diary, (London, 1933), 3. 5. Supra. 279-80. 6. Supra. 263 and 284. 295-aptly stated the s i t u a t i o n i n which Grey found himself when he says, \"We had to l e t the Germans know that we were a force to be reckoned with, without l e t t i n g the French and Russians 1 think that they had us sa°fely i n t h e i r pockets.\" S i r Arthur Nicolson, i n writing to Buohanan on July 28, outlined the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l system which made matters so d i f f i c u l t f o r the Foreign Minister, b e l i e v i n g as he did personally that B r i t i s h intervention was inevitable should war come, yet knowing that that opinion was not at the time shared generally i n p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s or by public opinion at large. Nicolson wrote: We, of course, l i v i n g under such conditions as we do here, when no Government p r a c t i c a l l y can take any decided l i n e without f e e l i n g that public opinion amply supports them, are unable to give any decided engagements as to 2 what we should or should not do i n any future emergencies. According to Mr. Churchill three-quarters of the Cabinet members were anxious \"not to allow themselves to be drawn into a European quarrel, unless Great B r i t a i n h e r s e l f were 3 attacked. l l o y d George agrees that \"the Cabinet was hopelessly divided - f u l l y one t h i r d , i f not one-half, being opposed to 4 our entry. Moreover, the L i b e r a l press was almost unanimously 5 advocating n e u t r a l i t y . Professor G.M. Trevelyan says that i f 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 212. Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 251-^57. 2. Nicolson to Buchanan, July 28,1914, B.D..XI, No.239,p.157. He had expressed s i m i l a r words to M. de Fleuriau, French f. Charge d'Affaires i n london, on July 27,D.D*F., 3 e s e r i e , XI, No.117, p.100. 3. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , 211. 4. Lloyd George, op. c i t . , I, 66. 5. Hammond, op. c i t . , 215-56 passim. C P . Scott sent a wire to Lloyd George to state that any L i b e r a l who supported war would never be allowed by L i b e r a l s to enter another L i b e r a l Cabinet. R i d d e l l , op. c i t . , 5. -296-Grey i n the l a s t week of July had announced that B r i t a i n would join France i n war, Most of the Cabinet would have repudiated him, most of the L i b e r a l s i n the country: and a l l the Labour Party, and a large section of opinion i n the City and the Conservative business c l a s s . He could not speak that word for England. (1) On Friday, July 31, Lloyd George told Lord R i d d e l l that he was \" f i g h t i n g f o r peace.\" He said, \" A l l the bankers and commercial people are begging us not to intervene. .The Governor of the Bank of England (Lord C u n l i f f e ) said to me with tears i n his eyes, ^eep us out of i t . We s h a l l a l l be 2 ruined i f we are dragged i n . ' \" The hands of the Foreign Secretary were thus most e f f e c t i v e l y t i e d . He has said, himself, r e c a l l i n g those days: It was clear to me that no authority would be obtained from the Cabinet to give the pledge f o r which France pressed more and more urgently, and that to press the Cabinet for a pledge would be f a t a l ; i t would r e s u l t i n the resignation of one group or the other, and the consequent breakup of the Cabinet altogether.... There was also more than the d i v i s i o n of opinion i n the Cabinet to be taken into account. There was d i v i s i o n i n Parliament and i n the country. (3) Elsewhere i n h i s Memoirs he says i n this connection: One danger I saw so hideous that i t must be avoided and guarded against at every word, i t was that France and Russia might face the ordeal of war with Germany, r e l y i n g upon our support; that t h i s support might not be forthcoming, and that we might then, when too i a t e , be held responsible by them for having l e t them i n for a disastrous war. (4) 1. Trevelyan, G.M., op. cit.,'p.251. 2. R i d d e l l , op. c i t . , 2. 3. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 334-35. 4. Ibid., 313. -892-The attitude of reserve on the part of the Foreign Office was therefore not the r e s u l t of any deliberate wish, nor of any preconceived plan, but i t arose of necessity from circumstances linked with domestic p o l i t i c s and the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l system. And Grey took advantage of this detached position of his Government to negotiate a compromise among the Powers to avert war. The Foreign Minister's p o s i t i o n was not an easy one. The French were pressing him for an assurance of active support on behalf of his country, because of past assurances and the conversations of the General S t a f f s . Grey firm l y believed that England would i n the end be forced to intervene along side France, but the Cabinet was divided, and he found himself hindered by the assurances he had given Parliament that England was under no obligations to any country to give support. He could only wait on events. On July 29 when he gave the warning to the German 1 ambassador that England might be forced to come i n , he endeav-oured to minimize the significance of this warning to M. Cambon, l e s t the l a t t e r should count too surely on B r i t i s h support. The situation^he informed the Ambassador,was di f f e r e n t from that of the Morocco C r i s i s , of 1911'-. The dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one i n _ which we f e l t c a l l e d to take a hand. Even i f the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not f e e l c a l l e d upon to take a hand i n i t . . . . I f Germany became involved and France became involved, we have not made up 1. Supra. 263. -298-our minds what we should do; i t was a case we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not-hers, but i n which, owing to her a l l i a n c e , her honour and interests obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what B r i t i s h i nterests required us to do.(l) Grey could go no further than this when on July 30 M. Cambon reminded him of the l e t t e r s exchanged between the two Governments i n 1912. S i r Edward evaded an answer, and stated that \"the•Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning,\" and 2 that he \"would see him again tomorrow afternoon.\" On the evening of July 30 the President of France made a further appeal for supporty through Mr. Bertie i n P a r i s . According to the report of the l a t t e r , M. Poincare i s convinced that preservation of peace between the Powers i s i n the hands of England, for i f his Majesty's Government announce that, i n the event of c o n f l i c t .between Germany and France, r e s u l t i n g from present differences between Austria and Serbia, England would come to the aid of France, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her a t t i t u d e . (3) Bertie r e p l i e d that i t would be very d i f f i c u l t for the British. Government to make any such announcement as was sought by the French, and held out l i t t l e hope. Poincare then answered that 4 i f a.general war resulted England would i n e v i t a b l y be involved. When the Cabinet met on July 31 no decision to support France was forthcoming. The interview between S i r 1. Grey to Bertie, July 29, 1914, B.D.XI, Mo.283,p.180. Cambon to V i v i a n i , July 29,1914, D.D.F., 3 e serle,XI,No.28l, 2. Grey to Bertie, July 30,1914,B.D.XI,Mo.319,p.201. p.229. Cambon to V i v i a n i , July 30,1914,D.D.F. ,3ese'rie,XI,Mo.363,p.301 3. Bertie to Grey, July 30, 1914, B.D.XI, Mo.318, p.200. 4. Bertie to Grey, July 30,1914, B.D.,XI, Mo.318,p.200. Bertie's answer was approved by Grey; Mo.352, p.220. -299-Edward and Cambon was accordingly \"rather p a i n f u l , \" as the 1 former told Mr. Asquith. When Cambon referred to a telegram from his brother i n B e r l i n stating that \" i t was the uncertainty with regard to whether we (Britain) should intervene which was the encouraging element i n B e r l i n , \" Grey denied t h i s , claiming, \" i t was quite wrong to suppose we had l e f t Germany under the impression that we should not intervene.\" On the main topic of the interview, the French appeal for a promise of support, he could o f f e r nothing new. \"We could not give any pledge at the present time.\" He stressed the commercial and f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , which was, he claimed, a grave consideration; England's standing aside might be \"the only means of preventing a complete collapse of European c r e d i t . \" But, he added, though no pledge could at this moment be given, \"further developments might a l t e r the si t u a t i o n , and cause the Government and 2 Parliament to take the view that intervention was j u s t i f i e d . \" S i r Edward did not say what the new development .might be which would a l t e r the decision of the B r i t i s h Government, but the question of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y was mentioned i n t h i s connection. He went on to say he would ask the French and German Governments i f they were \"prepared to undertake an engagement\" to respect the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium. This'question 1. Asquith, H.H., Memories and Reflections, (Boston,1928), (cited hereafter as Memories),11, 7. 2. Grey to Ber t i e , July 31,1914, B.D.,XI, No.367,pp.226-27. Cambon to V i v i a n i , July 31,1914, D.D.F. 3 e s e r i e XI No.459, pp.375-76. ' 3. I b i d . -300-might be an \"important'* though not a \"decisive\" factor i n the 1 Cabinet's decision. Mr. Cambon expressed \"great disappointment\" over the Foreign Minister's communication. He asked that the whole question be submitted to the Cabinet again. S i r Edward r e p l i e d that the Cabinet \"would c e r t a i n l y be summoned as soon as there was some new development.\" New developments were not slow i n a r i s i n g . That afternoon the German Embassy informed the Foreign Office of the Russian general mobilization, and of the German intention to mobilize i f Russia did not within twelve hours countermand her 2 order. As the German plan of campaign i n the event of war against the Dual A l l i a n c e was believed to involve the invasion of Belgium, Grey now raised t h i s question at B e r l i n and Pari s , as he had hinted to Cambon he might do. The question of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y had been discussed 3 4 i n the Cabinet that morning, and had arisen at e a r l i e r meetings. 1. Grey to Bertie, July 31, 1914, B.D.,XI, No.367, p.227. Cambon to V i v i a n i , July 31, 1914, D.D.F., 3 e serie,XI, No.459, p. 376. 2. B.D., XI, No.344, p.217. Buchanan's telegram reporting Russian mobilization was not received i n London u n t i l 5:20 P.M. The Foreign Office received i t s f i r s t i n f o r -mation through reports from B e r l i n ; note to No.347, p.218 i n B.D,, XI. 3. Asquith, Memories, I I , 7. 4. Morley, op. c i t . , 3. -S03--It was a question which involved both B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s and obligations. It was c e r t a i n l y to the interest of B r i t a i n to prevent the crushing of France by Germany, and i n l i n e with B r i t i s h p o l i c y to keep any strong continental Power from gaining possession of the Channel ports. Germany must therefore be kept from entering France by the most strategic route, through Belgium. In.addition-to this matter of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , there was also the question of l e g a l obligation under the Treaty of * 1 1839 to defend Belgian n e u t r a l i t y . It was a case then, i n which honour, obligation and interests coincided. Thus, i t was. of great convenience f o r S i r Edward Grey to be able to urge B r i t i s h intervention i n case Belgian n e u t r a l i t y should be viol a t e d . And as Mr. Schmitt says, \" I t cannot be made a reproach to him that he exploited the l e g a l advantage which 8 the s i t u a t i o n offered him.\" At 5:30 P.M. Grey addressed to the German and French Governments a. request asking each for an assurance that i t would respect the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium so long as no other 3 Power vi o l a t e d i t . The Belgian Government was informed of this step, and to the Brussels communication was added, \"I assume that Belgium w i l l to the utmost of her power maintain n e u t r a l i t y , and desire and expect other Powers to observe and 1. The question has been widely discussed whether the Treaty of 1839 imposed on B r i t a i n th© obligation to do more than respect the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium; that i s , whether she was obligated to make another Power respect i t . This l a t t e r view obtained i n the Foreign Office i n 1914. E. Schmitt, op. c i t . , I I , E91, 3. Grey to Ber t i e and Goschen, July 31,1914, B.D.,XI, No.348, p.E18. -302-1 uphold i t . \" The French and German Governments were asked f o r an early reply. France at once gave an unqualified assurance i n the 2 affirmative. In B e r l i n , however, von Jagow told Goschen he must consult the Chancellor and the Emperor. \"He rather doubted whether they could answer at a l l , as any reply they might give could not f a i l , i n the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of d i s c l o s i n g to a certain extent part of their plan 3 of campaign.\" Although S i r Edward had put o f f the French Ambassador i n London, i n the evening of July 31 the French Government prepared a new appeal for support. The President of the Republic, with the approval of h i s Government, made a personal appeal to the King by means of an autograph l e t t e r which was sent by special messenger and presented to His Majesty late 4 the same evening. After o u t l i n i n g the m i l i t a r y preparations which Germany was pushing forward \" e s p e c i a l l y i n the immediate neighbourhood of the French f r o n t i e r , \" Poincare pointed out the dangers i n further delay on the part of B r i t a i n : From a l l the information which reaches us i t would seem that war would be inevitable i f Germany were convinced that the B r i t i s h Government would not intervene i n a c o n f l i c t i n which France might be engaged; i f , on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the Entente Cordiale would 1. BreyltotViQaiersAujuly 31, 1914, B.D.XI, No.35, p.220. 2. Bertie to Grey, August 1,1914,B.D., XI,No.382,p.284. 3. Goschen to Grey, August 1,1914,ibid.,No.383,pp.234-35. 4. Communication from the French Embassy, ibid.,No.366,p.226. sea be affirmed i n ease of need, even to the extent of taxing the f i e l d side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken. (1) Admitting.that the m i l i t a r y and naval arrangements and the l e t t e r s of 1912 l e f t \"complete liberty, to Your Majesty's Government,\" he appealed to the dangers of the moment; \" i t i s , I consider, on the language and the action of the B r i t i s h Government that henceforward the l a s t chances of a peaceful settlement depend.\" When this new appeal was presented to the Cabinet the next morning ,the European c r i s i s had been advanced another stage. Germany had sent her double ultimatum to St. Petersburg and Paris, and had refused to reply to the question regarding Belgian n e u t r a l i t y . But the Cabinet was not yet prepared to come to a decision. S i r Arthur Nicolson and S i r Eyre Crowe were again urging a d e f i n i t e alignment with France and Russia. Crowe had emphatically expressed the view on July 31: The whole p o l i c y of the Entente can have no meaning i f i t does, not s i g n i f y that i n a just quarrel England would stand by her friends. This honourable expectation has been raised. We cannot repudiate i t without exposing our good name to grave c r i t i c i s m . (2) S i r Arthur Nicolson urged the immediate mobilization of the army; \" i t i s useless to shut our eyes to the fact that possibly within, the next twenty-four hours Germany w i l l be moving across the French f r o n t i e r . 1. M. Poincare to His Majesty, King George 7, July 31,1914, D.D.F., 3 e serie XI, No.457, pp.372-73. Poincare', op. c i t . . II, 244. 2. Crowe's memorandum, July 31,1914,B.D.,XI,No.369, p.229. 3. Nicolson to. Grey, July 31,1914, i b i d . , No.368, p.227. -304-But Grey was not yet i n the position, however much these views coincided with his own, to determine p o l i c y along these l i n e s . The Cabinet was s t i l l opposed to intervention, and the prospect of i t s changing i t s opinion was as yet s l i g h t . His Majesty's reply to M« Poincare, prepared at the Foreign Office, thus evaded the issue raised,' and offered l i t t l e to s a t i s f y the French. Great admiration for the French attitude during the c r i s i s was expressed, an attitude, i t was said, which could i n no way be interpreted as provocative; reference was made to B r i t i s h e f f o r t s to preserve peace, and i t was promised these would be continued; but, \"as for the attitude of my country,\" wrote the King,\"events are changing so r a p i d l y that i t i s impossible to f o r e t e l l what their future development 1 -w i l l be.\" This was August 1, and the Cabinet could not yet decide on intervention. After a l i v e l y discussion Mr. Churchill's request that the t o t a l mobilization of the Fleet be ordered 2 was also refused. Thus, when S i r Edward saw M. Cambon af t e r the meeting he had s t i l l to reaffirm the view already expressed, that the c r i s i s of 1914 d i f f e r e d e n t i r e l y from those created by the Morocoo incidents. Now, the position was that \"Germany would agree not to attack France i f France remained neutral i n the event of war between Russia amd Germany. I f France could not take 1. His Majesty King George V to M. Poincare, August 1,1914, D.D.F., 3 e se'rie XI, No.550,p.434. poincare, op. c i t . ,11,276. 2. This order was to a f f e c t only the oldest units, since the others were already at t h e i r war bases. -305-advantage of t h i s p o s i t i o n , i t was because she was bound by an al l i a n c e to which we were not p a r t i e s , and of which we did not know the terms. But though there was t h i s difference, Grey did add, \"This did not mean that under no circumstances would we a s s i s t France, but i t did mean that France must make her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were 1 not now i n a position to promise.\" Cambon answered i n dismay that he could not transmit this reply to his Government, and asked to be authorized to 2 answer that the Cabinet had not yet come to any decision. To t h i s S i r Edward r e p l i e d , \"We had come to a decision: that we could not propose to Parliament at thi s moment to send an 3 expeditionary force to the continent.\" The Ambassador then objected that as a consequence of the Anglo-French naval agreements the French coasts were defenseless. \" W i l l you allow Cherbourg and Brest to be bombarded,\" he asked, \"seeing that i t was i n agreement with you, to serve your interests as much as ours, that we have • 4 concentrated a l l our ships f a r from there.\" When the question of support was put i n t h i s way Grey could hardly evade an answer. He i n s i s t e d , however, that B r i t a i n was bound by no obligation to help France, or to enter into a war because of French obligations to Russia. Cambon admitted there was no 1. Grey to Bertie, A gust 1, 1914, B.D. XI, No. 426, p»253. 2. Ibid. 3. I b i d . 4. Cited i n Schmitt, o p . c i t . , II,p.355;D.D.F. 3 e serie,XI, No. 532, p.424; B.D.,XI, No.426,p.253. - 3 0 6 -obligation \"of thi s kind,\" but asked pointedly, In default of a formal a l l i a n c e , i s there not a moral obligation for you to help us, at least to lend us the support of your f l e e t , since i t was on your advice that we moved ours away. (1) Grey could not but see the force of this argument, and promised Cambon to ask the Cabinet on this point. Meanwhile the Ambassador could report to his Government that the Cabinet 2 had not yet taken any decision. 3 Harold Nicolson relates how Cambon was much upset when he l e f t Grey to v i s i t S i r Arthur Nicolson. \" I l s vont nous laeher,\" was a l l he could say. Nicolson went to Grey's room and found him also much disturbed, pacing up and down, and b i t i n g his l i p . Grey gave no answer, but made only a geature of despair when Nicolson asked i f i t was true that B r i t a i n r e a l l y refused to support France at this moment of her greatest danger- \"You w i l l render us a by-word among nations,\" declared Nicolson angrily, and returned to M. Cambon. The l a t t e r declared that he would now be compelled to produce the agreement of 1912,to make known how France, r e l y i n g on B r i t i s h help, had deprived her northern coasts of defence. Nicolson advised against publication, and himself sent a l e t t e r to Grey recommending that the Cabinet should now be reminded of the 4 Agreement. Grey r e p l i e d that he would look a f t e r the matter, and he spoke to Mr. Asquith to have this p a r t i c u l a r point 1. Cited i n Schmitt, op. c i t . , I I , 355. 2. B.D., XI,No.426,p.253.D.D.F. 3 e serie,XI,No,532, p.424. 3. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 419-20. 4. B.D., XI, NO.424, p.252. -307-1 s e t t l e d by the Cabinet the next day. The B r i t i s h now began to move more ra p i d l y towards that decision so eagerly awaited by the French. l a t e that evening the word arrived i n london that Germany had declared 2 war on Russia. This news was car r i e d to C h u r c h i l l at the Admiralty, where he was entertaining some friends. He immed-^ l a t e l y excused himself, and l e f t to meet Grey and the Prime 3 Minister. . When Grey saw Churchill the former said, \"You Should know that I have just done a very important thing. I have t o l d Cambon that we should not allow the German f l e e t to 4 come into the Channel.\" It would seem that the Prime Minister had sanctioned such a step without waiting for the decision o f the Cabinet. It was a step with which Mr. Ch u r c h i l l \"was i n 1. B.D., XI, Ho .4 24, p.252. Shortly a f t e r this v i s i t with Nicolson, Cambon, on returning to the French Embassy was v i s i t e d by Mr. Wickham Steed, the foreign editor of the \"Times.\" The l a t t e r asked the Ambassador what he was going to do. \"I am waiting,\" r e p l i e d Cambon, \"to learn whether the word 'honour' has been struck out of the English vocabulary.\" Steed, Wickham, Through Thirty Years, (london,1924), II, 14. Cambon expressed si m i l a r words to Mr.George Lloyd;; \"II vous reste de l'honneur dans votre pays?\" Complaining of Grey's stand, he said, \"He (Grey) seems to- forget that i t was on your advice, and under your guarantee, that we moved a l l our ships to the south and our munitions, to Toulon. S i vous restex neutres, nos co*tes sont l i v r e e s aux Allemands.\" Cited i n Colvin, D., The L i f e of Lord Carson,(London,1936) 14-15. . 2. This news from Buchanan arrived at 11:15 P.M., B.D.,XI, No.445, p.259. 3. Beaverbrook, Lord, P o l i t i c i a n s and the War, 1914-1916, (London,1928), I, 34-36; C h u r c h i l l , op.clt., I, 230-31. 4. C h u r c h i l l , o p . c i t . , I , 231. There i s no record of this conversation i n the published B r i t i s h or French documents. Mr. Temperley gives i t as his opinion that C h u r c h i l l may have misunderstood Grey. As we know, Grey had on August 1 discussed only \" p o s s i b i l i t i e s \" with Cambon, and there i s no evidence of assurances as stated by C h u r c h i l l . See Temperley, The Coming of the War,Foreign Affairs,January 1931, 334-35. - 3 0 8 -entire accord.\" He returned at once to the Admiralty and gave forthwith the order to mobilize the navy, although this step 1 was not yet authorized by the Cabinet. Meanwhile the German Ambassador had taken a step i n an endeavour to discover what pos i t i o n England was going to adopt, and i n which was c l e a r l y revealed Grey Ts determination to support France, and what i s more, his r e f u s a l to promise n e u t r a l i t y even when i n a p o s i t i o n to make his own terms. Lichnowsky on August 1 had come to discuss the German reply to the B r i t i s h question on Belgian n e u t r a l i t y . Grey informed him that the evasive reply of the German Government \"was a matter of very great regret, because the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium affected f e e l i n g \" i n England. Lichnowsky then pressed Grey to formulate the conditions i n return f o r which England would promise to remain neutral. S i r Edward refused to make any promise, i n s i s t i n g s t i l l on keeping B r i t a i n f r e e . When the Ambassador asked i f B r i t a i n would remain neutral i f Germany promised not to v i o l a t e Belgian n e u t r a l i t y he refused d e f i n i t e l y 2 any such promise. It was on August 2 that the Cabinet took i t s f i r s t -important deoision, a decision which v i r t u a l l y brought B r i t a i n into the war which had broken out. Before the Cabinet met at 11 A.M. both Lichnowsky and Cambon met Grey to urge th e i r respective cases, the one f o r B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y , the other f o r 1. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , I, 231. 2. Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, B.D., XI, Ho,448, pp.260-61. -309-' 1 intervention. Cambon had received news from France of the v i o l a t i o n of French t e r r i t o r y by German troops and of the 2 invasion of Luxemburg, and he pointed out to Grey that t h i s l a t t e r indicated f o r a certainty that Belgium would be invaded. Grey promised to see him a f t e r the Cabinet meeting. The Cabinet sat almost a l l day. I t was at the s t a r t of the meeting s t i l l too uncertain of B r i t i s h opinion and too divided among i t s own members to come to a decision. For a time there was danger that a number would resign and thus 3 greatly weaken the Government at a most c r i t i c a l time. The news of the v i o l a t i o n of Luxemburg did not of i t s e l f bring a decisive change. That a l l important change was made possible to a very great extent by the a r r i v a l of a l e t t e r from Mr. Bonar Law, leader of the Unionist Party, which assured the 4 Cabinet of the support of his party i n Parliament. The l e t t e r read: 1. Schmitt, op. c i t . , I I , 357-58.Cambon to V i v i a n i , August 2, 1914, D.D.F., 3 e s e r l e , XI, No.579, pp.452-53. 2. D.D.F., 3 e s e r i e , XI, No.578, p.452.B.D.,XI, No.473, p.270. 3. Asquith, Memories, I I , 8; C h u r c h i l l , o p . c i t . , I , 232. 4. The i n i t i a t i v e i n t h i s move to get action from the Opposition leaders appears to have been taken by Mr. Leo Maxse of the \"National Review,\" and S i r Henry Wilson. Maxse has t o l d i n his \"Retrospect and Reminiscence\" i n the \"National Review,\" August, 1918, how a small group of determined i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , including Wickham Steed, Mr. Amery, Mr. George Lloyd, Lord Lovat, and Lord Edmund Talbot, got i n touch with the Conservative leaders, Lord Landdowne, Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain, who were out o f town. A meeting was held at Lansdowne House at 11 P.M. Saturday, August 1, and there was further conferring i n the morning of August 2 between Lansdowne, Bonar Law and Chamberlain, when the l e t t e r was drafted and sent by s p e c i a l messenger to Asquith shortly before noon. See also, Chamberlain, Austen, Down the Years, (London, 1935), 92-99; C a l l w e l l , o p . c i t . , I , 153-55; Colvin, o p . c i t . , I l l 13-21. Newton, op.cit.,439. Lord Newton i s mistaken when he states that the f i r s t meeting took place on Sunday, August 2. -310-August 2, 1914. Dear Mr. Asquith: l o r d lansdowne and I f e e l i t our duty to inform you that, i n our opinion, as well as i n that of a l l our colleagues whom we have been able to consult, i t would be f a t a l to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate i n supporting. France and Russia at the present juncture; and we off e r our unhesitating support to the Government i n any measures that they consider necessary for that object. (1) It should be noted that the l e t t e r said nothing of Belgium; the offer was an unconditional off e r to support any decision taken on behalf of the Entente Powers. The significance of the l e t t e r lay i n this-, whereas there had been d i v i s i o n i n the Cabinet, and doubt i f the Government could r a l l y a majority of the L i b e r a l Party i n favour of intervention, now the support of the Conservatives would make i t possible to obtain that majority. But even after the receipt of the o f f e r , i t was 2 only \"with some d i f f i c u l t y , \" states Mr. Asquith, that the Cabinet agreed that Grey should be authorized to give to Cambon the assurance concerning the coasts of France which the l a t t e r had sought the day before; If the German f l e e t comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake h o s t i l e operations against French coasts or shipping the B r i t i s h f l e e t w i l l give a l l the protection i n i t s power. (3) 1. Newton, op.cit., 439-40; Chamberlain, op.cit.,99. Mr. C h u r c h i l l notes that he received a similar assurance of support from the Unionist leaders through Mr.F.E.Smith, l a t e r Lord Birkenhead, On July 31, of which he informed Mr. Asquith on August 1. op.cit., 1,229-30. Grey questions the influence of the l e t t e r of August 2 as a deciding f a c t o r i n the Cabinet 1 s decision*, op. c i t . , II, 11. But i n the opinion of such authorities on the c r i s i s of 1914 as Schmitt, Fay and Renouvin i t was most decisive.Schmitt,op.cit.,II, 539; Renouvin, op.cit.,293. 2. Asquith, Memories, II , 8 i 3. B.D.,XI, No.487,p.274. Cambon to Viviani.August 2 1914 D.D.F. 36 serie,XI, No.612,p.469. -311-This assurance was, however,, s t i l l subject to approval by Parliament^ and did not mean that England would send troops to the'Continent. Grey states i n h i s Memoirs, \"the promise to defend these coasts was given to France. The German Government were informed. They promised not to attack these coasts, of course 1 on the understanding that we remained neutral, and this naval point ceased to have any di r e c t influence on the decision of 2 the B r i t i s h Government.\" Despite the s l i g h t importance which Grey would .here seem to attach to this assurance to France, i t was a step of exceeding import. It gave much comfort to the French; i n the opinion of M. Cambon i t was a decisive t; guarantee which would lead sooner or l a t e r to f u l l intervention. He wrote l a t e r , \"I was convinced (on August 2nd) that the game was won. A Great Power does not wage war ha l f and h a l f . From the moment i t decides to carry i t on water i t has no choice 3 but to wage i t on land.\" Marshall Joffre has expressed a sim i l a r view: \"When I received this important news I no longer f e l t any doubts as to the B r i t i s h giving us on land as well as on sea the support we so greatly desired; for i t seemed to me quite impossible that i n a c o n f l i c t of this magnitude a country l i k e England would make war i n any half-hearted fashion. The 4 matter was of the highest importance for us.\" And M. V i v i a n i - 1. The German Government gave this assurance to the B r i t i s h about noon on August 3. B.D.,XI,No.531, p.291. 2. Grey, o p . c i t . , I I , 3. 3. Cited i n Henderson,F.E.,The S u p e r f i c i a l Grey, The Nation (New York), October 28, 1925, 491. 4. Jo f f r e , op. c i t . , I, 134-35. -312-wrote to Cambon on receipt of the newSj \"We have obtained from Great B r i t a i n a f i r s t assistance which i s most valuable to 1 us, w Nor did the Germans view th i s step as of no importance. \"That i s the help of an a l l y , \" wrote the Kaiser, on hearing the news. Lord Loreburn too i s of a similar opinion. He writes i n \"How the War Came:n This Memorandum of 2nd August f i x e s the date at which Great B r i t a i n became d e f i n i t e l y and irrevocably committed to war with Germany. War between France and Germany was then certain and was declared next day. I t prohibited Germany from using her Fleet against French coasts or shipping, without a corresponding p r o h i b i t i o n of the use of the French Fleet against German coasts or shipping. (3) It must be pointed out that t h i s step had been taken before Germany presented her ultimatum to Belgium, news of which did not reach London u n t i l the morning of the next day, August 3. The step was d e f i n i t e l y i n l i n e with the determination of Grey and Asquith to support France at a l l costs. In t h i s connection an extract from Asquith's own record of the Cabinet meeting of August 2 contains the following; There i s a strong party against any kind of intervent-ion i n any event. Grey, of course, w i l l never consent to t h i s , and I s h a l l not separate myself from him. (4) Several members had assented to the declaration to defend the French coasts with only the greatest reluctance. When the Cabinet met i n the evening, Mr. John Burns, who regarded 1. V i v i a n i to Cambon, August 2, 1914, D.D.F.,3 eserie,XI,No.621, p.474.. 2. Annotation by the Kaiser, K.D., No.661, p.492. 3. Loreburn, op.ci t . , 211-12. 4. Asquith, Memories, I I , 8. -313-i t as a declaration, of war resigned. Lord Morley also tendered his resignation, and although he accepted the Prime Minister's appeal to defer a f i n a l deoisioh t i l l the morrow, he resigned the next day. It was feared that four others might also resign, l o r d Beauchamp, S i r John Simon, Mr. Harcourt, and Mr. Masterrnan. Belgium had hitherto played a secondary part i n the discussions of the Cabinet; up to this point i t had been kept i n a secondary place. But now that the Germans had occupied Luxemburg, and their Foreign Office had refused to give an assurance that Belgian n e u t r a l i t y would be respected, the question became the p r i n c i p a l card of the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s . Grey, Churchill^ and the others saw i n i t the means of beating the non-interventionists, of overcoming th e i r opposition, and of winning over public opinion. When S i r Edward was giving the assurance of naval support to M. Cambon on the morning of August 2, he stated i n r e f e r r i n g to Belgium, \"We were considering what statement, we should make i n Parliament tomorrow - i n effect whether we should declare the v i o l a t i o n of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y to be a 1 casus b e l l i . \" At the Cabinet meeting that evening a d e f i n i t e 2 decision was made on this point. I n L o r d Crewe's report of the meeting to the King we read: 1. B.D., XI, No.487, p.275. 2. Ensor, op. c i t . , 493. -31*-It was agreed without any attempts to state a formula, that i t should he made evident that a substantial; ' v i o l a t i o n of the n e u t r a l i t y of that country would place us i n the s i t u a t i o n contemplated by Mr. Gladstone i n 1870, when interference with Belgian independence was held to compel us to take action. (1) Monday, August 3, was the f a t e f u l day f o r England, The Cabinet met that morning at 11 o'clock i n a mood quite d i f f e r e n t from that of the previous morning when,, i n Mr. Churchill's opinion, i t had \"looked as i f the majority would resign.\" Just before noon the important news came through of a the German ultimatum to Belgium, and that i t had been rejected. The Cabinet at once consented to the immediate mobilization of the army, and i t was agreed that B r i t a i n had no option but to defend Belgium by arms. No decision, however, was yet taken to send an ultimatum to Germany, or to send an army to Prance. These decisions were reached i n the face of l a t e r events. But general approval to the statement which S i r Edward was to make before the House during the afternoon was given. None of the doubtful members of the previous day resigned; for them Belgium had proved a deciding factor. At 3 P.M. Grey went to the House of Commons to give public utterance to his opinion, and as i t had now become, the opinion of the great majority of the Cabinet, of what po l i c y England ought to follow. What the House and the country would 1. Lord Crewe to the King, August 2, 1914, Spender, Oxford and Asquith, II, 83. 2. V i l l i e r s to Grey, August 3,1914, 9:31 A.M., received 10:55 A.M., B.D., XI, No.521, p.288. The actual text of the ultimatum, which had been presented at 7 P.M. on August 2nd, was not known i n London u n t i l the afternoon of August 3rd. -315-think had yet to be discovered. The House was crowded to the roof and tense with doubt and dreadful expectation as i t had seldom been i n i t s long his t o r y . Many have paid tribute to the great dignity, the simple eloquence, and the tragic seriousness with which the Foreign Minister presented the most memorable speech of his career. Avoiding a l l the eff e c t s of an orator and a l l appeals to passion i n the tones of his voice, i n the choice of hi s words^ and i n the s e l e c t i o n of his facts, he informed the House of the si t u a t i o n i n which Eggland now 1 found herself i n international a f f a i r s . He began f i r s t with- a discussion of the question whether or. not B r i t a i n was under any binding engagement to support France. The story of the^Entente, the M i l i t a r y Conversations, the exchange of notes i n 1912; the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the two fleets..since 1912, and the previous day's pledge to France was f u l l y told, giving the House on many of these points i t s f i r s t knowledge. He i n s i s t e d , however, that \"whatever took place between the m i l i t a r y and naval experts, they were not 2 binding engagements upon the Government.\" \"We do not construe anything which has previously taken place i n our diplomatic relations with other Powers i n this matter as r e s t r i c t i n g the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should now take, or r e s t r i c t the freedom of the House of Commons to 3 decide what the i r attitude should be.\" Summing up - was England 1. The text of the Speech i s given i n Grey, o p . c i t . , I I , Appendix D, p.294-309. Also i n Speeches on Foreign A f f a i r s , 1904-1914, by S i r Edward Grey, selected by Paul Knaplund, (London,1931), 292ff. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , II, 297. 3. ibid.., 298. -316-committed to France? - technically, he said, not at a l l . But whether morally - \" l e t every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the o b l i g a t i o n f o r himself.\" He did not \"wish to urge upon anyone else more than t h e i r feelings dictate as to what they should f e e l about; . 1 the o b l i g a t i o n . \" Whatever view one takes of this r e velation to the Commons, one must admit that i t makes strange reading beside the statement made by the same speaker e a r l i e r i n that same year to the effect that\" there were no unpublished agreements which would r e s t r i c t or hamper the freedom of the Government, or Parliament, to decide whether or not Great B r i t a i n should 2 p a r t i c i p a t e i n a war.\" He was pointing out that i n the written records of the negotiations and understandings with Prance f u l l freedom of action had been reserved, yet he was admitting that i f ' some sort of obligation existed. Its extent he was leaving to the consciences of men who were now hearing of these matters for the f i r s t time, who were being asked to make a decision i n a time of acute c r i s i s , and who were i n truth having no choice l e f t them. He was t e l l i n g the Members they were free to make a choice whether or not France should be supported, but he was also making i t clear - and he was the one man who knew a l l about the promises, exchanges, assurances, conversations or whatever they might be c a l l e d - that he construed these as 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I I 2 9 9 • 2. Supra. 226. -317-binding upon England to aid France, and furthermore, he would have resigned had Parliament construed them otherwise.' That i s surely the amazing and perplexing note i n his address - i f he who directed, the secret negotiations f e l t that England was i n honour bound to aid France how then he could t r u l y say that ' 1 England was unpledged and free? He turned from this question to discuss the matter of Belgium, \"a more serious consideration,\" he termed i t , 2 \"becoming more serious every hour.\" He cited the committments of 1839 and 1870 by which B r i t a i n bound herself to guarantee Belgium, and referred to Germany's re f u s a l to give an unequivocal promise to respect Belgian n e u t r a l i t y . He told of the German ultimatum, of i t s r e j e c t i o n , and of an appeal which Zing Albert had made for \"diplomatic intervention.\" He pictured for h i s l i s t e n e r s how B r i t i s h interests as well as B r i t i s h honour were involved i n the fate of Belgium - for i f Belgium lost, her 1. In reading to the House the l e t t e r given to Cambon i n the exchange of notes i n November, 1912, Grey omitted to read the l a s t sentence. (Supra 212). His c r i t i c s have made this a strfcng point i n esta b l i s h i n g their case against him. ( l u t z , op.cit.,100). In defense he states that the omission must have been quite unintentional. He claims he was not aware of having.omitted the sentence u n t i l he was charged with having done so as l a t e as 1923. He adds that the omission was perhaps the r e s u l t of a question about the date of the l e t t e r which i n t e r r -upted the reading, or perhaps \"I thought the l a s t sentence unimportant.\" He cannot explain i t i n any other way. Grey, op.clt., II, 16. Whatever o£e might think of the f i r s t explanation offered, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that Grey, or any one else, could regard the sentence as unimportant. ;2. Grey,, op'.bit, I I , 301. 318-independence, then Holland and perhaps Denmark might lose theirs, and i f France was beaten and l o s t her position as a Great Power, England would be faoed by \"the unmeasured aggrand-izement\" of Germany. \"If,, i u a c r i s i s l i k e this,, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, i t would be of very much value i n face 1 of the respect that we should have l o s t . \" Although he was maintaining that i t was up to Parliament now to decide B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y , he was i n r e a l i t y leaving Parliament no choice. \"There i s but one way i n which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war,\" he said, \"and that would be that i t should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional n e u t r a l i t y . \" But to t h i s he added, \"We cannot do that. We have made the commitmentfct to France (of August 2nd) that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from an unconditional n e u t r a l i t y , and without those conditions absolutely s a t i s f i e d , and sati s f a c t o r y , we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of a l l the forces i n our 2 power.\" He was not asking the House for a d e f i n i t e endorsement of any precise measures. He was informing them of what had been 1. Grey;r pp...c!i.t., I I , 305. 2. Ihi4.;,30_7.. . ' - : . \\ 319-done up to this date, assuring them that B r i t a i n ' s hands were s t i l l free, a fact which i t i s hard to believe from his own words, and that i t was for Parliament to decide. At the same time he was placing before the House i n a most decided and persuasive manner hi s own conviction that England ought not, almost could not, stand aside. He ended with a passionate declaration that the country would be disgraced i f i t d i d not declare war. The tenor of the whole speech was that England must support France. The speech was received most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y by the House; the applause with which i t was greeted l e f t no doubt that Parliament would support him. The news that \"they have cheered him\" when carried to the Foreign O f f i c e , gave 1 inexpressible r e l i e f to S i r Arthur Nicolson. Out side the House Grey told C h u r c h i l l , \"Now we s h a l l send them (Germany) an ultimatum to stop the invasion 2 of Belgium within twenty-four hours.\" The Cabinet met i n the evening, and aft e r the session S i r Edward confided to Cambon that i t had been decided to send instructions the next morning to the Ambassador i n B e r l i n to demand that the German ultimatum to Belgium be withdrawn. \" I f they refuse,\" he added, \"there 3 w i l l be war.\" At 9:30 A.M. on August 4 a s t i f f note was sent to B e r l i n s t a t i n g that Belgium had appealed to B r i t a i n f o r 1. ' Nicolson, op. c i t . , 422. 2. C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , I, 235. 3. Cambon to Doumergue, August 4,1914, D.D.F., 3 9 s e r i e , XI, No.712, pp.531-32. -320-diplomatic intervention against the German demands. The note stated; His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this v i o l a t i o n of a treaty to which Germany i s a party i n common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made on Belgium w i l l not be proceeded with, and that her n e u t r a l i t y w i l l be respected by Germany. (1) r The B e r l i n Government was asked f o r an \"immediate reply.\" At the same time the Belgian Government was informed that B r i t a i n would help i n r e s i s t i n g Germany i f the l a t t e r should \"exert 2 pressure to make her give up her n e u t r a l i t y . \" By this time German troops were already i n Belgian t e r r i t o r y . During the afternoon lichnowsky informed S i r Edward, i n accord with i n s t r u c t i o n s , that Germany had no intention of annexing Belgian t e r r i t o r y , but that the invasion of the small Power was for Germany a v i t a l matter: Impress upon S i r Edward Grey that the German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian n e u t r a l i t y , i t being f o r her a question of l i f e or death to prevent French advance. (3) This communication was i n no way s a t i s f a c t o r y to London, and accordingly at 2 P.M., the B r i t i s h ultimatum was dispatched. It referred to the ultimatum to Belgium and the report that Belgian t e r r i t o r y had been v i o l a t e d . \"In these 1. Grey to Goschen, August 4,1914,B.D.,XI,Ho,573, p.306. 2. Grey to V i l l i e r s , August 4,1914, i b i d . , Ho.580, p.309. 3. Jagow to Lichnowsky, Communicated by the German Ambassador, August, 4, 1914, at noon, B.D..XI, Ho.587 p.312. -321-cireumstances, and i n view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurances respecting Belgium as Franoe gave l a s t week i n reply to our request,\" the request was repeated, and a s a t i s f a c t o r y reply asked for i n London hy midnight. F a i l i n g such a reply, S i r Edward Goschen was to ask f o r h i s 1 passports. Ho s a t i s f a c t o r y reply was expected i n London, nor was one received. Accordingly, at 11 P.M. (midnight by Central European time) the Foreign Office delivered to Lichnowsky the 2 formal declaration of war. The sands of peace had now run out; B r i t a i n too had been dragged over the abyss - the nation, which had so long enjoyed i t s insular security. S i r Edward Grey might well have congratulated himself on his success i n having brought B r i t a i n as a united nation into the War to aid France. But he took l i t t l e s a t i s f a c t i o n i n this success at the time; for i n his f i r s t and greatest aim, that of preserving the peace of Europe, he had f a i l e d - f a i l e d i n spite of a l l his e f f o r t s . And this f a i l u r e he f e l t most b i t t e r l y . \"I hate war! I hate war!\" he had exclaimed when Nicolson came to congratulate him on his speech which had won 3 over the House of Commons. His biographer points out that no p a c i f i s t r e a l i z e d more c l e a r l y than he the irreparable damage 4 to c i v i l i z a t i o n that must ensue from war under modern conditions. 1. Grey to Goschen, August 4, 1914, B.D,,XI, No.594, p.314. 2. B.D. XI, No.643, p.330. 3. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 422. 4. Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 266. -322 Late i n the evening of August 3 he stood with a f r i e n d at a window i n his room at the Foreign Office looking out into the summer dusk, and as the f i r s t l i g h t s began to appear, he said, \"The lamps are going out a l l over Europe, and we s h a l l not see 1 them l i t again i n our l i f e - t i m e . \" In conclusion, looking for the prime factor which had decided B r i t a i n ' s entry into the war, one must agree with Mr. John Ewart that t h i s i s found i n the determination to 2 conserve B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . Even had B r i t a i n stood aside at the outset of h o s t i l i t i e s , she must, as Grey stated on August 3, surely have intervened during the course of the war i n order to avoid the consequences of a German v i c t o r y . But, back of this, l i e s the fact that B r i t a i n had been brought into opposit-ion to Germany through her \"entente\" p o l i c y with Prance and Russia; her interests pointed a course i n opposition to Germany very l a r g e l y because she was linked with France and the Sla v i c Power. Her entry into the c o n f l i c t i n 1914 i n support of France was the l o g i c a l outcome and the inevitable sequel of the p o l i c y pursued since 1904. 1. The f r i e n d to whom Grey addressed these words was Mr. J.A. Spender of the \"Westminster Gazette.\" Spender mentions the occasion in his L i f e , Journalism and P o l i t i c s , (London, 1927), I I , 14. Grey mentions this incident i n his Memoirs. I I , 20. 2. Ewart, op. c i t . , I, Chapter V, and conclusions, 198. See also Grey's l e t t e r to Mr. Barclay (Manchester, Mass.), dated August 4, 1914, i n which he defines the Chief issue f o r B r i t a i n i n these words. \"The issue for us was that, i f Germany won, she would dominate France; the independence of Belgium, Holland, Denmark and perhaps Norway and Sweden, wbmld be a mere shadow;their separate existence as nations would r e a l l y be a f i c t i o n j a l l their harbours would be at Germany's disposal; she would dominate the whole of Western Europe;and this would make our position quite impossible. We could not exist as a f i r s t class State under such stances.\" B.D..XI, No.638, p.328. circum--323 After years of close cooperation with France, B r i t a i n could not, because of her interests and the moral obligation involved, desert the Republic i n the hour of c r i s i s . The assurances given so emphatically by the Foreign Secretary on August 3 that B r i t a i n was free and unpledged were formally correct, but inaccurate i n substance. By her interests and her honour B r i t a i n was bound not to leave France unprotected; she was tied to France i n e x t r i c a b l y by countless threads which had been woven down through the years. The conversations, diplomatic, m i l i t a r y and naval, were commitments deeply rooted i n honour, i f not i n formal documents, which gradually, but formidably and i n e v i t a b l y bound B r i t a i n to support the Republic. I f B r i t a i n had l i t e r a l l y preserved her freedom of action, she had bound herself morally to France as clos e l y as i f there had been a written a l l i a n c e . S i r Edward's speech made manifest how deeply he f e l t that England must not f a i l the obligation which his words showed to be founded equally on honour as well as on consider-ations of B r i t i s h safety. The question of B r i t i s h entry was settl e d for the most of the public on the issue of the v i o l a t i o n of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y ; Grey, however, though he f e l t the weight of this point, never pretended or f e l t that i t was the only or 1 deciding factor. He saw B r i t a i n ' s policy linked with that of France; facing the assumption of B r i t a i n standing aside, he 1, Schmitt, op. c i t . , II, 401. -324-pictured a crushed France, and a victorious Germany i n possess-ion of the Channel ports turning next to s e t t l e accounts with a B r i t a i n l e f t without a friend or a l l y . How i s i t possible to explain, however, the po s i t i o n i n which the Government had to face the fa c t , whether i t was admitted or not, that i t was not free to act with detachment, that B r i t i s h hands were tied, i n spite of the assurances of the Foreign Minister. This was unquestionably the re s u l t of the policy which Grey had followed throughout the previous decade, a p o l i c y which was at no time clear-cut, a p o l i c y which he hoped always, and at a l l times maintained, would leave' his Government midway between $he two continental diplomatic camps, but which i n r e a l i t y bound i t to France and Russia. It must be made clear that the B r i t i s h Foreign Office was during these years pervaded by a persistent and an ever-increasing fear of a c o n f l i c t with Germany. That fear was • basic i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Grey had entered into o f f i c e , as his Memoirs make clear, with a deep prejudice against Germany, a prejudice shared and nourished by his associates i n the Foreign Office, as well as by events which followed his entry there. S i r Byre Crowe and S i r Arthur F i c o l s o n had an almost morbid suspicion of Germany, of her dishonesty, her h o s t i l i t y , and of her determination to seize the hegemony of the world. Their comments on dispatches published i n the B r i t i s h Documents maker this fear abundantly evident, and these most assuredly influenced -325-1 Grey and other o f f i c i a l s , who read them. Dominated by this fear, and continually i n the grip of thi s bogey, Grey was anti-f German against his w i l l . His very r e a l desire to effect a rapprochement with the Teutonic Power was thus n u l l i f i e d , and he was driven to seek closer r e l a t i o n s v/ith France and Russia. This does not mean that he had no reason to be suspicious of Germany. Germany, i n the pre-war years - under the tactless and outspoken Kaiser, who was supported by the noisy propagandists demanding a \"place i n the sun,\" and who was determined to bui l d up a navy for which the B r i t i s h could see l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and governed by o f f i c i a l s who lacked finesse i n the conduct of foreign a f f a i r s , and v/hose conduct of foreign a f f a i r s was exasperating and often inexcusably inept - v/ould have taxed the patience and the resources of any Foreign Secretary who sought a happy understanding. There was then, admittedly good reason at times to be suspicious of Germany, and this added materially to the deep-rooted fears i n the Foreign O f f i c e . The r i s e of the new Germany afte r 1870, the blundering p o l i c i e s of the German diplomats i n the post-Bismarckian era, and the suspicions of her intentions, were primary factors i n turning B r i t a i n to 2 seek and close the friendship with France. But in fairness to Germany, to admit the above facts i s not to imply as an absolute truth that European peace would 1. Crowe's long memorandum of January 1,1907,which Grey marked as most valuable and h e l p f u l as a guide to p o l i c y and which he gave to the Cabinet;B.D.,111, Appendix A; pp.397-420. , 2. See Grey's c o n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r to President Roosevelt written a f t e r the Algeciras Conference, c i t e d i n Trevelyan op.cit., 114-16. ' •386-have been assured could Germany or any other single Power have been eliminated as a factor i n international a f f a i r s . Europe was l i v i n g unquestionably before 1914 under a system of \"international anarchy,\" of which a l l the Powers were ready at any time to take advantage to push forward t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . B l i n d to the dangers of t h i s \"international anarchy\" the leaders of the Powers were stumbling along the road to ru i n , nevertheless, under this system, f o r B r i t a i n i t was Germany which dominated the international stage, and shaped the issues for the B r i t i s h leaders. The importance of the B r i t i s h reaction i n this respect has been well summarized by the eminent Austrian scholar, Professor Pribram: It was quite obvious to B r i t i s h statesmen* during the decades that preceded the World War, that England must re t a i n her supremacy at sea; that she could not permit any Continental Power to est a b l i s h a hegemony i n Europe and by so doing upset the European Balance of Power i n a sense contrary to B r i t i s h i nterests; and f i n a l l y , that she could not allow Belgium to pass into the hands of the strongest Continental Power. Since the \"fear\" that Germany entertained such plans increased from year to year, B r i t i s h statesmen held i t to be their duty to defeat such plans i f Germany should one day seek to put them into operation. Hence the increase i n naval armaments, the successive agreements with their a l l i e s , and hence also t h e i r endeavours to win for England new fr i e n d s . (1) Mr. Ensor, i n passing judgment on these words, declares, \"the 2 reason for the Ententes could not be better stated.\" This analysis of the B r i t i s h attitude towards the Entente i s no less true f o r France. The French were i f anything 1. Pribram, A.F., England and the International P o l i c y of the European Great Powers, 1871-1914, (London, 1931) p.149. 2. Ensor, op. c i t . , 496. -327-more deeply motivated by that fear of the new Germany af t e r 1870, and their most subtle diplomacy v/as directed towards gaining friends f o r the Republic, to leave behind that i s o l a t i o n i n which Bismarck's p o l i c y had placed her. To regain for France her former rank i n Europe French leaders played the game of power-politics with peculiar s k i l l , ready to seize any opening leading to the improvement of their position, and as they would claim, of French security. Mr. Spender pays tribute to the French leaders when he writes, \" I t i s scarcely an exaggeration to say that the French were the cleverest, the most clear-sighted and the wisest i n th e i r generation of a l l 1 the diplomatists of this period.\" The Russian A l l i a n c e was the cornerstone of Frencli security, and to have with this an intimate friendship with England, with her great sea power, was a consideration of tremendous weight. To keep that friendship, to draw i t closer when possible, was the p o l i c y of the French under Delcasse, Millerand, Pichon and Poincare, a p o l i c y d e f i n i t e l y conceived, u n i f i e d and continuous i n i t s execution. B r i t a i n ' s declaration for war on August 4 marked the triumph of this program i n national defense and foreign a f f a i r s . The preceding chapters have shown how the Anglo-French Entente did not stop as i t began - with merely c o r d i a l offers on the part of the Governments to support the other's oolonial 1. Spender, F i f t y Years, 372. -328-ambitions i n Morocco and Egypt - i t led to naval and m i l i t a r y conversations - s t a f f s met - preparations for war were consid-ered as suspicion of German intentions deepened - and conver-sations of this nature, l i k e growing armaments, stimulated b e l i e f in the greater p o s s i b i l i t y of war, and thus f a i t h i n the necessity of an even closer Entente. S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, i t has been pointed out, was a f r a i d that the c'onver-1 sations might create at least \"an honourable understanding,\" and Mr. Asquith i n 1911 hinted that they might be \"rather 2 dangerous.\" But once embarked upon they could not e a s i l y be dropped. And too much evidence has been revealed i n e a r l i e r pages to douht that they did create on the part of France an expectation that B r i t i s h support i n the event of war could be counted upon. It i s not clear, however, despite the fears expressed by Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, that the l i a b i l i t i e s which might r e s u l t from the Entente as i t developed were ever f u l l y r e a l i z e d by the B r i t i s h leaders who i n i t i a t e d the policy, or f u l l y appreciated by the L i b e r a l Cabinet when the measures taken were f i n a l l y revealed to them. They were, of course, kept quite deliberately from the knowledge of the House of Commons, and on numerous occasions hints of them absolutely denied. One must agree with Lord loreburn i n censuring S i r Edward Grey and his associates f o r thus i n v o l v i n g England i n secret understandings with France of which members of the Cabinet 1. Supra, 104. 2. Supra, 179 (Bote 1); -329-and Parliament were unaware. As Mr. Fay points out, \"This was not i n accord with v/hat was understood to be the constitutional 1 practice i n England.\" Grey claims i n defense of his policy, and perhaps with some element of j u s t i c e , that Parliament, could not be told of m i l i t a r y and naval measures taken to meet 2 possible contingencies. But at times the d i f f i c u l t i e s and the dangers i n his p o s i t i o n must have been clear to him, whether or not he would admit them, and though he clung i n s i s t e n t l y to hi s f a i t h that h i s p o l i c y was the wiser one. Time afte r time Nicolson, Crowe, Goschen and Bertie sought to have the Entente converted into an a l l i a n c e , an a l l i a n c e i n f a c t i f not i n name, believing as they did that Anglo-French s o l i d a r i t y should . be patent and proclaimed. The question a r i s e s at this point -did Grey i n h i s heart agree with this view, and was he forced to content himself with the d i f f i c u l t half-measures ant. evasions because he feared his colleagues i n the Cabinet and Parliament 3 might repudiate him? It must be understood, as Mr. Ensor makes clear, that whatever be thought on other grounds of S i r Edward Grey's Entente p o l i c y , one of i t s greatest weaknesses was that the 4 bulk of the L i b e r a l Party neither understood nor l i k e d i t . In the years before 1914, and even on the brink of the catastrophe 1. Fay, loo.- c i t . , 253. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 289-90. 3. Nicolson, op. c i t . , 329-34, f o r an admirable summary of the divergent views i n the Foreign O f f i c e . 4. Ensor, op. c i t . , Appendix C. 3, 572. Trevelyan, op.cit.,112. -330-of the War, most L i b e r a l s were pro-German, i n their sympathies, and anti-French. Opposition to the Entente p o l i c y of close friendship with France had arisen a f t e r Agadir C r i s i s , and 1 the p o l i c y at that time had been under f i r e by the L i b e r a l Press. The leading-Liberals, and chief among these, C.P. Scott, of the \"Manchester Guardian,\" were opposed not only to the d e t a i l s of Grey's po l i c y , but to his whole plan, and were i n r e a l i t y 2 i s o l a t i o n i s t s , , wishing to see B r i t a i n adopt an attitude of i m p a r t i a l i t y among the Powers. Others i n the party, according to Mr. Ensor, \"the less i n t e l l i g e n t rank and f i l e , \" when they thought of foreign a f f a i r s at a l l , did so i n terms of t r a d i t -i onal prejudice against the French people and the Russian Empire. Had Grey been less aloof by nature, his c r i t i c s would ce r t a i n l y have .'judged h i s p o l i c y less severely, for they .greatly underestimated his d i f f i c u l t i e s ; the obstacles which Germany offered to friendship were not t r u l y understood, nor the lengths to which he, despite his anti-German pr e d i l e c t i o n s , went to overcome them. His d i f f i c u l t i e s were thus enormously augmented. How d i d he seek to deal with this h o s t i l i t y ? In general he sought to evade i t ; he did not face up to i t , p r e f e r r i n g rather to side-step i t ; with the r e s u l t that this defect i n his p o l i c y continued. For the most part he made no attempt to s e t t l e i t ; 1. Supra, 182-85. 2. Hammond, op. c i t . , 152; Ensor, op. c i t . , 572. Trevelyan op.cit.,200. Trevelyan speaks of Scott as \"the most well-informed and i n t e l l i g e n t of Grey's c r i t i c s , \" and adds that \"his reasoned attacks on the entente p o l i c y rendered the d i v i s i o n of opinion i n the L i b e r a l Party a l l the more d i f f i c u l t for the Foreign Secretary.\" -331-and on occasion when a serious breach threatened, or when pointed questions were asked, by a speech of tact and moderation, or even of evasion, he silenced c r i t i c i s m . Because of the p r e s t i he enjoyed i n public l i f e , and by reason of the high regard i n which his character and i n t e g r i t y were generally held, he 1 restored confidence. One of the \"chief c r i t i c i s m s that can be l a i d against his conduct of B r i t i s h foreign a f f a i r s i s that he never r e a l l y instructed his party nor the House i n the r e a l i t i e s of the international s i t u a t i o n . And to no lesser degree he f a i l e d to educate public opinion as a whole through the press. He made no provision for keeping what should have 2 been the f r i e n d l y press informed. Among the L i b e r a l p u b l i c i s t s Mr. J.A* Spender of the \"Westminster Gazette,\" an i n f l u e n t i a l paper but with only a small c i r c u l a t i o n , was his only steady advocate, and the only one i n which he or Asquith ever o r d i n a r i l y 3 confided. In the debate i n the House of Commons on August 3, a member made this t e r r i b l e reproach to Grey as Foreign Secretary: 1. Mr. Conwell-E^ans, i n discussing why the Government was able to ignore the attitude of those who were not i n agreement with i t s p o l i c i e s , points out that these l a t t e r were greatly at f a u l t too i n that while they were not i n accord their c r i t i c i s m was \"neither sustained and constant, nor whole-hearted and vigorous.\" Those who were f i l l e d with forebodings of a coming war with Germany \"greatly erred',.lthe.3say.Sv??tIh:..nott coming out into the open, address-ing themselves to the people, and conducting a widespread campaign of protest and alarm throughout the land.\" op.cit. 84-85. 2. Ensor, op. c i t . , 574. 3. Hammond, op. c i t . , 151; Trevelyan, op. c i t . , 201. -232-I regret very much that at the end of eight years the best you can say of the p o l i c y that has been pursued - of the T r i p l e Entente - i s that i t should have landed us i n a war l i k e t h i s . (1) It i s possible to argue i n this vein - that while the object of the Entente may have been to secure peace i n Europe i t did not prevent war. It i s possible to reason along the l i n e of thought - that the development of close r e l a t i o n s between i B r i t a i n and France, and thus between B r i t a i n and Russia, carrying support i n diplomacy and plans for cooperation i n the event of war - that this could hardly f a i l to breed apprehension i n a state l i k e Germany, and thus involve B r i t a i n i n the c o n f l i c t the p r e c i p i t a t i o n of which she was presumably seeking to avert. But i t i s also possible to argue, as i n fact S i r Edward Grey contends, that whether or not B r i t a i n was bound to France, no matter what her r e l a t i o n s i n the Entente might be, B r i t a i n could not i n any case have stood aside i n 1914 and have refused to j o i n i n the war when the c o n f l i c t came, that she could not have stood aside and have seen France crushed. After the outbreak of the War,.as Grey t e l l s us, his mind often reverted to the question whether the catastrophe could have been averted by anything he had omitted to do i n the carrying out of B r i t i s h foreign a f f a i r s throughout the pre-war years. He arrives at a conclusion in his Memoirs, which sets 2 his doubts a.t r e s t . But before dismissing t h i s question a 1. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1914, vol.LXY 1826-27. 2. Grey, op. c i t . , II, p.47. 2. Ibid., p.47 et seq. -333-further problem i n the matter of the Anglo-French Entente must be raised - was the secrecy i n which the r e l a t i o n s were carried out r e a l l y wise - i f there was f a u l t , i n how far does i t l i e i n the secret manner i n which the negotiations were conducted? Grey's claim that Parliament could not have been t o l d of the measures taken to meet possible dangers must bear examination. Perhaps members could not have been t o l d of the det a i l s of those measures, perhaps they need not have been to l d of the d e t a i l s . But was i t wise to withhold from Parliament the knowledge of the fact that t h e i r did exist communications of a nature which might lead France, though this was not intended, to count on help i n case of war. And when i t i s rea l i z e d that the existence of these conversations, though kept from Parliament, were suspected i n Germany, which Power Grey admits, \"may thereby have been led to think that B r i t i s h 1 relations with France and Russia had an aggressive character,\" one wonders whether a frank and open statement on the subject would not have lessened suspicion on a l l sides. These no doubt are d i f f i c u l t questions on which hi s t o r i a n s w i l l continue to speculate i n d e f i n i t e l y . 1. Grey, op. c i t . , I, 296. BIBLIOGRAPHY V BIBLIOGRAPHY. Documents: B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, His Majesty's Stationery Offic e , London. The End of B r i t i s h I s o l a t i o n . The Anglo-Japanese All i a n c e and the Franco-British Entente. The Testing of the Entente, 1904-6. The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-7 The Near East, 1930-9. Anglo-German Tension, 1907-12. The Agadir C r i s i s . The Outbreak of the War. (edited by J . W. Headlam-Morleyi) These volumes present a f u l l picture of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y after 1898. Along with dispatches are printed con-f i d e n t i a l minutes and l e t t e r s as well as papers of various kinds. The whole series i s a thorough work by most com-petent editors whose names are ample guarantee of the hon-esty and accuracy of t h e i r accomplishment. The notes and tables of contents are clear and most h e l p f u l . Vo l . I. (1927): Vo l . I I . (1927): Vol. I I I . (1928): Vol. IV. (1929): Vol. V. (1928): Vol. VI. (1930): Vo l . VII. (1932): Vo l . XI. (1926): Documents Diplomatiques Francais (1871-1914), Commission de Publication des Documents R e l a t i f s aux Origines de l a Guerre de 1914; Imprimerie Nationale, P a r i s . The French have begun the publication of t h e i r documents at 1871. In order to cover the period to 1914 more quick-l y the documents are being published i n three series sim-ultaneously; the f i r s t extending to the year 1900, the second to November 4, 1911, when the agreement over Mor-occo, and the Congo was signed, and the t h i r d to the out-break of the War. Of the f i r s t series the writer had available only the volumes covering the period up to 1887, and of the second series, only those up to June, 1905. Of the t h i r d s e r i e s the volumes for the period January 1 -Ju l y 23, 1914 were not a v a i l a b l e . 2 e s e r i e ; tome 1, 1930 (2 janvier-31 decembre, 1901). tome 2, 1931 ( l e r janvier-31 decembre, 1902). tome 3, 1931 (3 janvier-4 octobre, 1903). tome 4, 1931 (5 octobre, 1903- 8 a v r i l , 1904). tome 5, 1934 ( 9 avril-3 1 decembre, 1904). tome 6, 1935 (2 janvier-6 j u i n , 1905). - I I -3 e s e r i e , tome 1, 1929 (4 novembre, 1911-7 f e v r i e r , 1912). tome 2, 1931 (8 fevrier-10 mai, 1912). tome 3, 1931 (11 mai-30 septembre, 1912). tome 4, 1932 (1® octobre-4 decembre, 1912). tome 5, 1933 (5 decembre, 1912-14 mars, 1913). tome 6, 1933 (15 mars-30 mai, 1913). tome 7, 1934 (31 mai-10 aout, 1913). tome 8, 1935 (11 aout-31 decembre, 1913). tome 11,1936 (23 j u i l l e t - 4 aout, 1914). Unlike the B r i t i s h documents which are grouped i n sections dealing with p a r t i c u l a r issues, the French documents are published i n a s t r i c t l y chronological order. While t h i s i s open to serious objection, force of c r i t i c i s m i s lessen-ed somewhat by the i n c l u s i o n i n each volume of a t o p i c a l guide which c l a s s i f i e s the documents according to subject. The editors have included useful notes. German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, selected and trans-lated by E. T. S. Dugdale, London, Methuen and Go. V o l . I I I . (1930): The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910. Vo l . IV. (1931): The Descent to the Abyss, 1911-1914, These documents are selected from the German publication, \"Die Grosse P o l i t i k der Europaeschen Machte, 1871-1914.\" Explanatory and reference notes connect and explain the se l e c t i o n . Doubtless many useful and i n t e r e s t i n g docu-ments have been omitted, but the c o l l e c t i o n i s most help-f u l . The Outbreak of the World War, German Documents co l l e c t e d by Karl Kautsky, edited by Max \"Montgelas and Walther Schucking, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, Oxford University Press, 1924. These are the documents f i r s t published when the Repub-l i c a n Government opened the German archives soon a f t e r taking o f f i c e i n 1918. The c o l l e c t i o n furnishes valu-able source material for the c r i s i s of J u l y and August, 1914. Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, London, His Majesty's Stationery O f f i c e , 1915. A c o l l e c t i o n of the documents published by the various European Powers on the outbreak of war i n 1914. Con-tains the B r i t i s h Diplomatic Correspondence, the French Yellow Book, the Russian Orange Book, the Belgian Grey Book, the Serbian Blue Book, the German White Book, and the Austro-Hungarian Red Book. - I I I -Gooke, W.H. and Stickney, Edith, P., ( e d i t o r s ) , Readings i n European International Relations since 1879, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1931. Contains extracts from important t r e a t i e s , o f f i c i a l re-ports, dispatches, and memoirs, with b r i e f explanations to give each extract i t s setting i n point of time. A useful c o l l e c t i o n . How the War Began i n 1914, Diary of the Russian Foreign O f f i c e , July, 1914, London, A l l e n & Unwin Co.,1925. The diary of Baron S c h i l l i n g of events from J u l y 16 to August 2, 1914, with a foreword by Sazonov. A useful addition to the knowledge of Russian p o l i c y on the eve of the War. Siebert, B. de, Entente Diplomacy and the World, 1909-1914, Hew York, the Knickerbocker Press, 1921. A c o l l e c t i o n of the dispatches exchanged between London and St. Petersburgh during the years 1909-1914. Siebert was secretary to the Russian Embassy i n London during these years. I t i s now known that he was wont to f o r -ward important dispatches to B e r l i n . The volume furnish-es important documentary material on the diplomacy of the Entente Powers. Un L i v r e Noir, Diplomatie d'Avant Guerre d'Apres les Documents des Archives Russes, novembre 1910-juillet 1914; Z vols.; edited and translated by Rene Marchand, P a r i s , L i b r a i r e de T r a v a i l , 1922. Contains the correspondence of Isvolsky from P a r i s , where he was ambassador a f t e r 1910. Volume I covers the years 1911 and 1912, volume II the period from 1913 to the out-break of war. Most valuable f o r i t s revelations of Isvolsky*s part i n the diplomacy of the period. -IV-Memoirs. Asquith, H.H., Memories and Reflections, 2 v o l s . Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and C o . , 1928. The memoirs of the B r i t i s h Prime Minister of the decade before the War. There are no rev-elations of great importance, although ex-tracts from the author's diary of the days of July and August, 1914, are u s e f u l . Asquith, H.H., The Genesis of the War. London, C a s s e l l and Co., 1923 A defense of the p a c i f i c aims of B r i t i s h p o l -i c y by the Prime Minister. Contains l i t t l e that i s of outstanding value to the student of the c r i s i s of 1914. Barclay, S i r Thomas, Th i r t y Years Anglo-French Reminiscences. London, Constable and Company Ltd., 1914. The author's account of AnglorFrench r e l a t i o n s during the period 1876-1906, and of the part he himself took establishing f r i e n d l i e r f e e l -ings between the two nations which led to the entente. Bertie, Lord, The Diary of Lord B e r t i e . London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1924. The diary of the B r i t i s h Ambassador to P a r i s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note how early i n the c r i s i s he was b i t t e r i n his denunciation of Russian p o l i c y and of Isvolsky. When war comes, however, he turns to denounce Germany. Bethmann Hollweg, von Th., Reflections on the World War. London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1920. The memoirs of the German Chancellor. Reveal, -V-his own love of peace, but also his helplessness i n c r i t i c a l days. Places the blame for the out-break of war on the Entente Powers. Contributes very l i t t l e to our knowledge. Bulow, Prince Bernhardt von, Imperial Germany. London, Cassel l and Co., 1914. The former chancellor's account of the r i s e of the German Empire—written i n an extremely pat-r i o t i c and i m p e r i a l i s t i c Vein. Is i n t e r e s t i n g as a revelation of the character of the author. Billow, Prince Bernhardt von, Memoirs, 3 v o l s . London, Putnam and Sons, 1932. The memoirs of the former Chancellor, i n which he gives f r e e l y his opinions on the events of the pre-war years. He i s the hero of the story he has to t e l l . He can see l i t t l e that was wrong with Germany or with von Bulow. Chamberlain, Austen, Down the Years. London, C a s s e l l and Co. Ltd., 1935. A series of sketches of the writer's experiences over a long period of l i f e i n public a f f a i r s . Valuable r e c o l l e c t i o n s of incidents. A p a r t i c -u l a r l y useful account of the actions of the op-p o s i t i o n leaders on the eve of the outbreak of the' War which shows how serious was the con-fusion:,at that time. T e l l s how the l e t t e r to Asquith on August 2 comes to be written. Chamberlain, Austen, P o l i t i c s from Inside, 1906-1914. London, Cassel l and Company, 1936. Letters of Austen Chamberlain to members of h i s family, i n t e r e s t i n g for the comments on public matters and f o r the views expressed on foreign a f f a i r s . C h u r c h i l l , Winston, The World C r i s i s , v o l . I. New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1923. VI-A work of prime importance. While i t deals f o r the most part with the author's work at the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915, i t throws a good deal of l i g h t on European diplomacy before 1914. Written i n an extremely dramatic s t y l e . Eckardstein, Hermann, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, 1895-1905. London, T. Butterworth Ltd., 1921. Gives a f u l l , but not an e n t i r e l y objective ac-count of the Anglo-German negotiations of 1898-1901. Throws much l i g h t on these, but not a l -ways accurate; i n c l i n e d to exaggerate his own rOle i n the negotiations. Inclined to sym-pathize with the B r i t i s h side. Grey, S i r Edward, Twenty-five Years, 2 v o l s . London, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1925. The c l a s s i c exposition of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Writ-ten i n a charming s t y l e , most disarming, and seemingly so j u d i c i a l one finds i t almost im-possible to disagree. Does not go into d e t a i l s nor deal with controversial points. While the author does not f a l s i f y , he often skims over d i f f i c u l t i e s . Most valuable for i t s revelation of Grey's personality. Does reveal his d i s -trust of Germany while he held o f f i c e . Haldane, R. B., An Autobiography. London, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1929. Gives useful information on B r i t a i n ' s m i l i t a r y preparations, valuable accounts of his v i s i t s to Germany. Haldane, R. B., Before the War. London, C a s s e l l and Co. Ltd., 1920. The apologia of the former Minister of War. Not a detailed work but useful for his i n f o r -mation on his v i s i t s to Germany, es p e c i a l l y his mission of 1912. He i s i n c l i n e d to blame Germany, but i s never b i t t e r . House, Colonel, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House -VII-Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1926. The papers of the trusted adviser of President Wilson who served often as his personal rep-resentative. Arranged as a narrative hy Pro-fessor Charles Seymour. Gives an i l l u m i n a t -ing picture of House's mission to Europe i n 1914 on the eve of the War, when he talked with German and B r i t i s h leaders i n the hope of accomplishing something to check the armament race. J o f f r e , Marshal, Memoirs, 2 v o l s . London, G. Bles, 1932. Contains the m i l i t a r y record of the French High Command from 1914 to 1916. The author gives a l i t t l e information of some value on the actions of the French Government i n the days immediate-l y preceding the outbreak of war. Jusserand, J . J . , What Me B e f e l l . London, Constable and Co. Ltd., 1933. The reminiscences of the French ambassador to Washington a f t e r 1903. Contains useful i n -formation on the part President Roosevelt played i n the Morocco C r i s i s of 1905-06. Lichnowsky, K.M., Heading f o r the Abyss. New York, Payson and Clark Ltd.!, 1928. The reminiscences of the German ambassador to London from 1912 to 1914. B i t t e r i n his c r i t i -cism of German p o l i c y before the War. One can-not but be impressed with his s i n c e r i t y and the v a l i d i t y of many of his c r i t i c i s m s of German p o l i c y . Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs, v o l . I. London, Nicholson and Watson, 1933. This volume dealing with the year 1914 has only a l i t t l e to say on the events leading up to the War. I t does offe r a b i t t e r attack on Grey's handling of foreign a f f a i r s . The writer finds l i t t l e to Grey's credit as Foreign Secretary. Explains also his own part i n the Agadir C r i s i s of 1911. -VIII-Morley, John, Memorandum on Resignation. New York, Macmillan Company, 1928. Valuable f o r i t s information on the B r i t i s h Cab-inet discussions on the eve of the War. Presents the views of minority group, those who f e l t B r i -t a i n should keep free from continental entangle-ments. Not wholly r e l i a b l e since the writer i s vague i n his memory of dates and sequences. Paleologue, Maurice, La Russie des Tsars Pendant La Grande Guerre, I. Pa r i s , L i b r a i r e Plon, 1921. This volume i s the journal of the French Ambas-sador to St. Petersburgh f o r the period July 20, 1914, to June 2, 1915. Interesting and valuable entries f o r the v i s i t of Poincare\" to St. Peters-burgh and f o r the l a s t days of peace i n the Russian c a p i t a l . But much of what could have been t o l d i s not recorded. According to Paleo-logue the enemies of peace were a l l i n B e r l i n . Paleologue, Maurice, Un Grand Tournant de l a P o l i t i q u e Mondiale, 1904-06. Pa r i s , L i b r a i r e Plon, 1934. A portion of the writers journal f o r the years 1904-1906. Is decidedly anti-German and o f f e r s a complete j u s t i f i c a t i o n of Delcassefe p o l i c y . Poincare', Raymond, Memoirs, 2 v o l s . London, W. Heinemann Ltd., 1926. The English edition of the more voluminous or-i g i n a l , \"Au Service de l a France.\" Furnishes Poincare*'s defense against his c r i t i c s * charges that he fomented the War. Of importance.to students f o r i t s exposition of French p o l i c y a f t e r 1912 when the writer took o f f i c e . As one might expect there i s a decided personal bias. Poincare, Raymond, The Origins of the War. London, Ca s s e l l and Company, 1922. The French President's account of the War's or i g i n s , being a rep r i n t of s ix lectures de-li v e r e d i n 1921. The f i r s t three lectures -IX-give an account of French p o l i c y after 1871, while others deal with the events a f t e r June 28, 1914. Repington, C. a Court, The F i r s t World War, 1914-1918, v o l . I . New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1921. The personal experiences of the author, who was M i l i t a r y Correspondent of the \"Times\". Of great importance f o r the d e t a i l s he gives of how the m i l i t a r y conversations of 1905 and 1906 be-tween England and France began. R i d d e l l , Lord, War Diary. London, Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd., 1933. The early pages give a very useful account of the d i v i s i o n i n the B r i t i s h Cabinet on the eve of the War. Sazonov, Serge, F a t e f u l Years. New York, F.A. Stokes Co., 1928. The recollections of the Russian Foreign Min-i s t e r , being a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of Russian p o l i c y . Useful as an exposition of the Russian point of view. Schoen, Freiherr von, The Memoirs of an Ambassador. London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1922. The author served as the German Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s from 1907 to 1910, and from then u n t i l the outbreak of the War he was Ambassador i n P a r i s . His memoirs throw l i g h t on many events of those years-. Steed, Wickham, Through T h i r t y Years, 2 v o l s . New York, Doubleday, Page and Co.,1924. The i n t e r e s t i n g reminiscences of the Vienna correspondent and l a t e r the foreign e d i t o r of the \"Times.\" Contains useful and int e r e s t i n g material on many points, though the writer's judgment may often be open to question - f o r example h i s contention that the German leaders wille d the War. -X-Wi111am I I , The Kaiser*s Memoirs. London, Harper and Brothers, 1922. The Kaiser*s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of himself and his government. Not at a l l r e l i a b l e as his t o r y , but i n t e r e s t i n g as a revelation of personality. He transfers r e s p o n s i b i l -i t y for the unfortunate episodes of his reign to others. -XI-Secondary Sources. Albin,Pierre, Le \"Coup\" d'Agadir. P a r i s , L i b r a i r e F e l i x Alcan, 1912. A detailed narrative account of the Agadir C r i s i s of 1911 written from the French point of view. Anderson, E.N., The F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s , 1904-06. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930. A detailed and scholarly study of the subject showing a thorough investigation of a wide range of sources. A notable contribution to an important subject. Written i n best h i s -t o r i c a l s p i r i t , revealing i m p a r t i a l i t y i n the views expressed. Archer, William, The Thirteen Days, July 23-AugUs*A 1914. London, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1915. A study of the c r i s i s of 1914 as i t developed day by day i n the d i f f e r e n t c a p i t a l s . In need of re-v i s i o n i n the l i g h t of the revelations of recent years. Barnes, H.E., The Genesis of the World War. New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1927. Written from the extreme r e v i s i o n i s t view point, upholding the thesis of Franco-Russian war-guilt. Is anything but dispassionate or objective; i s rather the case of an emotional advocate. An impassioned protest against a l l Germany's re-s p o n s i b i l i t y for the outbreak of war. Is open to serious c r i t i c i s m i n i t s interpretations. Beard, Charles A., Cross Currents i n Europe Today. London, George G. Harrop and Co. Ltd., 1922. -XII-Contains an i n t e r e s t i n g and valuable chapter on the B r i t i s h and French m i l i t a r y conversations. Beaverbrook, Lord, P o l i t i c i a n s and the War, 1914-1916, vol.1-, London, Thornton, Butterworth Ltd., 1928. Contains an useful chapter on the way i n which the B r i t i s h Cabinet was divided i n August, 1914, over the question of intervention. Is rather vague on the meeting of the Conservative leaders on August 1 and 2, when they decided to support a p o l i c y of intervention on behalf of France. Beazley, Raymond, The Road to Ruin i n Europe, 1890-1914. London, J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1932. A b r i e f survey of pre-war diplomacy, written from the r e v i s i o n i s t point of view. A strong i n d i c t -ment of the p o l i c i e s of the Entente Powers. Con-tains l i t t l e that i s new. Benson, E. F., The Outbreak of the War, 1914. New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1934. A graphic account of the l a s t days of peace from the view point of the ordinary c i t i z e n . The author s k i l f u l l y pictures the dramatic days of Ju l y and August as Europe slipped over the precipice into war. Birkenhead, E a r l of, Contemporary P e r s o n a l i t i e s . London, Cassel and Co. Ltd., 1924. Contains an i n t e r e s t i n g sketch of S i r Edward Grey, d i s t i n c t l y favourable to the Foreign Secretary. Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, v o l . I. New York, Charles Seribner's Sons, 1920. < Contains anaccount of the part Roosevelt took i n mediating between the opposing Powers i n the Morocco C r i s i s of 1905-06. The author i s i n c l i n -ed to overestimate the influence the President exercised. -XIII-Bloch, Camille, The Causes of the World War. London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1935f Written by the Director of the French War L i b -rary-Museum, a narrative of the events of July, 1914, from which i s drawn the conclusion of the g u i l t of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Decided-l y biased i n interpretations. Bourgeois, E, et Pages, G., Les Origines et les Responsabilites de l a Grande Guerre. P a r i s , L i b r a i r e Hachette, 1922. An authoritative but conventional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , rather lacking i n j u d i c i a l temper. One of the most important French works, and a usef u l study of Franco-German rel a t i o n s before 1914. Brandenburg, E r i c h , From Bismarck to the World War. London, Oxford University Press, 1927. The accepted authoritative account of German po l i c y before the War. E s p e c i a l l y noted f o r i t s scholarly i m p a r t i a l i t y . The author has made a f u l l use of German documents. Truly an i n v a l -uable work. Ca l l w e l l , C.E., Field-Marshal S i r Henry Wilson, v o l . I . London, Ca s s e l l and Co. Ltd., 1927. A biography of S i r Henry Wilson who was Direct-or of M i l i t a r y Operations at the War Office a f t e r 1910. Praises him as a great s o l d i e r , an able administrator, possessed of v i s i o n and devotion to his country. Reveals how he prepared the Expeditionary Force, giving l i t t l e c r e d i t to Haldane, i t s creator, and how he cooperated with the French General S t a f f a f t e r 1910. Reveals also the close contact he maintained with the o f f i c i a l s i n the Foreign O f f i c e . Cambridge History of A.W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed i t o r s . B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , v o l . I l l , Cambridge, University Press, 1922. This h i s t o r y of B r i t i s h diplomacy i n the pre--XIV-war years i s written by G. P. Gooch—written i n narrative s t y l e , simple and c l e a r . Useful as an outline of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . C e c i l , Algernon, B r i t i s h Foreign Secretaries, 1807-1916. London, G. B e l l and Sons, 1927. Gives i n condensed form sketches of in t e r n a t i o n a l issues and biographies of B r i t i s h foreign ministers. C h i r o l , Valentine, S i r , F i f t y Years i n a Changing World. London, J . Cape, 1927. The reminiscences of the foreign editor of the London \"Times,\" p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g i n the matter of Anglo-German re l a t i o n s before • 1914 i n the chapter \"On the Road to Armageddon.\" Colvin, Ian. The L i f e of Lord Carson, I I I . London, V i c t o r Gollanez, Ltd., 1936. Gives a most inter e s t i n g account which i s of great value of the meeting of the Conservative leaders on the weekend of August 1 and 2. when the decision was taken to support the Cabinet on the questions of intervention i n the War on behalf of France. Conwe11-Evans, T.P., Foreign P o l i c y from a Back Bench, 1904-1918. London, Oxford University Press, 1932. A valuable contribution to the study of B r i t i s h p o l i c y based on the papers of Lord Noel-Buxton. E s p e c i a l l y valuable for i t s revelation of the opposition among the L i b e r a l s to Grey's entente p o l i c y . C o v i l l e , A l f r e d and studies i n Anglo-French History dur-Temperley, Harold, i n g t h e Eighteenth, Nineteenth and ( e d i t o r s ) t Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge, The University Press, 1935, A number of studies the r e s u l t of h i s t o r i c a l con-ferences held i n London i n 1933 and i n Paris i n 1934. Contains a valuable study by Pier r e Renouvin -XV-on the agreements and conversations worked out hy the chiefs of s t a f f seeking to answer to what extent the governments approved these or were engaged by them. Crewe, Marquess of, Lord Rosebery, 2 v o l s . London, J . Murray, 1931. A disappointing work; contains l i t t l e of r e a l importance i n the matter of foreign p o l i c y . Debidour, A., H i s t o i r e Diplomatique de l'Europe, 2 v o l s . P a r i s , L i b r a i r e F e l i x Alcan, 1919-1920, A narrative account of European i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s from 1878 to 1914. Volume I covers the period to 1904, and volume II the decade be-fore the War. The work suffers from a decided anti-German bias and reveals German leaders, and the Kaiser i n p a r t i c u l a r , as working for war. Denis, Ernest., La Guerre. P a r i s , L i b r a i r e Delagrave, 1915. An attempt at a psychological approach to the study of the causes of the War, by a profes-sor of the University of P a r i s . Tries to be f a i r , but offers the t r a d i t i o n a l French view of the g u i l t y Germany. Dickinson, G. Lowes, The International Anarchy. London, Geo. Allen and Unwin Co.c, 1926. A scholarly study of pre-war diplomacy written from the p a c i f i s t viewpoint, showing the war not as the r e s u l t of the p o l i c i e s of i n d i v i d u a l nations, but as the r e s u l t of the system or rather the lack of system by which European a f f a i r s were conducted. Admirable h i s t o r i c a l writing showing wide reading. Dugdale, Blanche, E.C., Arthur James Balfour, 2 v o l s . London, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1936. The biography of Balfour written by his niece. -XVI -Contains b r i e f references to foreign a f f a i r s and reveals his attitude to the entente p o l i c y which began when he was prime minister. T e l l s of his part i n the r o l e played by the opposition leaders on the eve of the outbreak of the War. Durham, Edith, M., The Sarajevo Crime. London, George A l l e n and Unwin, 1925. Presents the case against the Serbian govern-ment. The writer reveals the Serbian provo-cations of Austria, the conspiracies of the \"Black Hand P l o t t e r s , \" and summarizes the ev-idence to show that the Serbian government was aware of the plot but did nothing to prevent i t or warn the Austrian government. Ensor, R.C.K., England, 1870-1914. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936. A notable work, covering nearly a l l aspects of English h i s t o r y from 1870 to 1914 i n an accurate and scholarly manner, and giving a careful and adequate r e c i t a l o f the change i n B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y and of events which led to the \"War. The writer tends towards a rather con-servative view of the causes of the War leaning i n favour of the view of Germany's g u i l t . Gives a splendid analysis of the attitude of the L i b -e r a l Party towards the in t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . Ewart, John S., The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918, 2 v o l s . New York, George H. Doran Co., 1925. A notably thorough analysis of the causes of the War by the eminent Canadian j u r i s t . The author distinguishes between the roots and the causes which precipitated c o n f l i c t . He treats the con-f l i c t not as one war but as a number of wars, and analyses the reasons f o r the entrance into war of each of the b e l l i g e r e n t s . Of high value to students of the period. Fabre-Luce, A., La V i c t o i r e . P a r i s , La Nouvelle Revu e Francaise,1924. Written from the r e v i s i o n i s t point of view o f f e r i n g -XVII a strong c r i t i c i s m of the p o l i c i e s of the En-tente Powers. Concludes that the Central Powers hy th e i r actions made the War possible, but the Entente Powers made i t c e r t a i n . Farrer, J.A., England,Under Edward VII. London, G. A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1922. Reveals the part played by Edward VII i n i n -ternational a f f a i r s , a t t r i b u t i n g to him a large r 6 l e , claiming he was his own foreign minister. Fay, S.B., The Origins of the World War,2 vo l s , i n one.; (2d. ed.,revised). New York, the Macmillan Company, 1932. Ranks as one of the f i n e s t works i n i t s f i e l d . Noted for i t s comprehensive scope, i t s author-i t a t i v e and impartial views, and i t s sound re-search. Volume I i s a review of European dip-lomacy to 1914. Volume II i s devoted to the c r i s i s of 1914. Fisher, H.A.L. A History of Europe, v o l . I I I . T London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1935. The t h i r d and f i n a l volume of a series the author has written on the history of Europe from early times - one of the most valuable general h i s t o r i e s that has yet appeared. The work re-veals an encyclopedic knowledge, s k i l f u l con-densation, scholarly judgment, and great l i t e r -ary s k i l l . Gardiner, A.G., P o r t r a i t s and Portents. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1926. A series of sketches by the editor of the London \"Daily News\" i n which he presents s a l i e n t aspects of post-war English l i f e i n the terms of leading p e r s o n a l i t i e s . There i s an interesting sketch of S i r Edward Grey i n which the author commands h i s character and his s i n c e r i t y , but finds f a u l t with his understanding and methods. -XVIII-Garvin, J.L. The L i f e of Joseph Chamberlain, v o l . I I I . London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1934. This t h i r d volume of Chamberlain's biography-dealing with the years 1895-1900 reveals his part i n the Anglo-German negotiations aft e r 1898. The writer's admiration for Chamberlain i s very evident. G i f f e n , M.B., Fashoda, the Incident and Its Setting. Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1950. A concise and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e study of the c r i s i s of 1898 tracing with s k i l l and c l a r i t y the p o l i c i e s of B r i t a i n and France towards the Sudan. A valuable contribution to the f i e l d of i n t e r -national diplomacy. Gooch, G.P. Before the War, v o l . I. London, Longmans Green and Co. 1936. The author i s one of the closest students of pre-war diplomacy as well as a master i n the art of h i s t o r i c a l j u s t i c e . This work of f e r s a series of sketches i n which he gives v i v i d pictures of f i v e of the foreign ministers who were charged with the conduct of diplomacy i n the pre-war y e a r s , — Delcasse*, Lansdowne, Bulow, Isvolsky and Aehrenthal. Based on the documents and l a t e s t material, i t i s a valuable addition to the author's many splendid works i n this f i e l d . Students w i l l look forward to the volume he promises, to contain studies of Grey, Poincare', Bethmann-Hollweg, Sazonov and Berchtold. Gooch, G.P. History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919. London, Ca s s e l l and Company Ltd., 1923. A scholarly and objective narrative account of the events of the pre-war years with frequent quota-tions from documents. There i s l i t t l e discussion of controversial questions or interpretation of p o l i c i e s . A useful aid to students of the period. Gooch, G.P. Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy London, Longmans, Green and Co. 1930. A masterly discussion of the l i t e r a t u r e dealing with the Great War. Possibly no better b i b l i o -graphy i n moderate compass has been published. The s a l i e n t points of each book are discussed b r i e f l y , b r i e f quotations given, and the per-son a l i t y and point of view of the authors re-vealed. An invaluable guide to students of the period. Gooch, G.P., Studies i n Modern History. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1931, Contains an i n t e r e s t i n g study of Holstein who played such an important part i n shaping Ger-man p o l i c y a f t e r the f a l l of Bismarck u n t i l his own forced retirement i n 1906. Grey, S i r Edward. Speeches on Foreign A f f a i r s , selected with an introduction by Paul Khaplund. London, G. Alle n and Unwin Ltd., 1931. An excellent c o l l e c t i o n of Grey's speeches and a useful contribution to the study of the pre-war period. Hale, O.J. Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931 An excellent study of diplomacy and the press i n the years 1904-06. Sheds valuable l i g h t on the Morocco C r i s i s , and i s a useful guide for the opinions of the press of England, France, and Germany. Halevy, E l l e , A History of the English People, 1895-1915, 2 v o l s . London, T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1929-1934, A b r i l l i a n t h i s t o r y of these years i n England, giving a f u l l account of the period, and reveal-ing an amazingly detailed knowledge. Deals only to a s l i g h t extent with foreign a f f a i r s , but the views expressed are of value. Halevy, E l i e , The World C r i s i s of 1914-1918. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930. -XX-Contains the Rhodes Memorial Lectures delivered i n 1929. There i s a chapter on the causes of the War^—an int e r e s t i n g interpretation of nationalism as one of the chief factors. Hamman, Otto, The World P o l i c y of Germany, 1890-1912. London, G. Al l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1927. A readable and i n s t r u c t i v e account of German pol i c y , written with understanding, generosity and tolerance, based on personal r e c o l l e c t i o n s and documents. The author was the former head of the Press Div i s i o n of the German Foreign O f f i c e . Hammond, J*L., . C P . Scott of the \"Manchester Guardian.\" London, G. B e l l and Sons Ltd., 1934. A biography of Scott who was for more than f i f t y years editor of the great L i b e r a l newspaper, written by his f r i e n d and associate. Gives a • splendid insight into Scott's public l i f e , his p o l i c i e s , his p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . There are two excellent chapters on his views on foreign a f f a i r s , which reveal his opposition to the En-tente p o l i c y and how he opposed B r i t i s h i n t e r -vention on the eve of the War. Headlam-Morley, James, Studies i n Diplomatic History. London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1930. A c o l l e c t i o n of eight essays on diplomatic sub-jects written during the time the author was H i s t o r i c a l Adviser to the Foreign O f f i c e . The problem of Egypt i s discussed and the position of England as a European state and as head of an overseas empire. Hearnshaw, F.J.C. (editor) Edwardian England. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1953. A series of lectures delivered at King's College, University of London, which attempt to interpret the Edwardian decade. There i s an interesting study of King Edward VII by the editor, and a valuable study of foreign a f f a i r s by R.W. Seton-Watson. -XXI-Hendrick, B.J., The L i f e and Letters of Walter H. Page, v o l , I. New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922, The l i f e of the American ambassador to London at the time of the outbreak of the War. Gives an int e r e s t i n g account of Page's reaction to the international s i t u a t i o n . Very favourable to S i r Edward Grey. Hoffman, Ross, J.S, Great B r i t a i n and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933. A study of the inroads made by Germany into Great B r i t a i n ' s trade, the B r i t i s h nation's reaction to th i s r i v a l r y , and the influence of these factors upon the shaping of B r i t i s h p o l i c y toward Germany. Shows that while the B r i t i s h Government did not declare war on Germany f o r the ends of trade, nevertheless, the anti-German orientation of the B r i t i s h mind did arise from the competition i n trade. Hubert, Lucien, P o l i t i q u e Exterieure. P a r i s , L i b r a i r e P e l i x Alcan, 1911. A volume of sketches and speeches on internation-a l problems by a member of the Foreign A f f a i r s Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies. The speeches on\"France and Morocco\"are of special i n t e r e s t . Kennedy, A.L., Old Diplomacy and New, 1876-1922 London, J . Murray, 1922. An exposition and c r i t i q u e of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y a f t e r the time of D i s r a e l i . A s l i g h t work of minor importance. Langer, W.L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism, v o l . I I . New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1935. This volume covers the years 1890-1902. I t i s an exhaustive account of international r e l a t i o n s from the f a l l of Bismarck to the forming of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . A scholarly work of -XXII-outstanding merit revealing painstaking re search and sound c r i t i c a l judgment. Lee, S i r Sidney, King Edward VII, 2 v o l s . New York, the Macmillan Co., 1925-27. The standard biography of Edward VII, based l a r g e l y on his personal papers. Should correct the mistaken yet popular idea that he directed B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y . I t does show his i n t e r e s t i n state matters, how extensive was his general acquaintance with the problems and pers o n a l i t i e s of Europe, and how his per-sonal charm and reputation aided the conduct of foreign p o l i c y . Lemonon, Ernest, L'Europe et l a P o l i t i q u e Britannique Pa r i s , F. Alcan, 1912. A; useful study of B r i t a i n ' s relationships with the European powers from 1882 up to 1911, show-ing how she turned from friendship with the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e to form the Entente with France and Russia. Loreburn, E a r l , How the War Came. London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1919. Is notable for i t s b i t t e r condemnation of secret diplomacy. The author, who was i n the Cabinet as Lord Chancellor u n t i l 1912, attacks the secrecy i n which Grey authorized the conversa-tions which, were carried on between the B r i t i s h and French General S t a f f s after 1906. Ludwig, Emil, July »L4 # New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929. Though i t purports to be a h i s t o r i c a l study of the immediate orig i n s of the War, i t i s drama rather than history. As such i s a b r i l l i a n t and successful work. The author has pictured i n an excellent manner the tense atmosphere of the c r i s i s of 1914. Exculpates the peoples of Europe and blames the kings and statesmen. -XXIII-Ludwig, Emil, Kaiser Wilhelm I I . London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927. A splendid study of the complex and d i f f i c u l t character of the Kaiser, written i n a dramatic s t y l e , and showing r e a l insight, s t r i k i n g on a note of tragedy. Lutz, Hermann, Lord Grey and the World War. London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1928 A scathing c r i t i c i s m , with c a r e f u l references to auth o r i t i e s , of the narrative Grey has given i n his \"Twenty-five Years.\" A careful study of Grey's p o l i c y , valuable f o r i t s shrewd judgments. The author i s an outstanding German c r i t i c who regards Grey as well-meaning but altogether i n -competent as foreign secretary. Maurois, Andre*, King Edward VII and His Times. London, C a s s e l l and Co. Ltd., 1933. A l i v e l y and entertaining account of B r i t i s h leaders, p o l i t i c s and foreign p o l i c y woven around King Edward as the centre. Useful for i t s account of the forming of the Entente Cordiale. Meech, T.C., This Generation, v o l . I. London, Chatto and Windus, 1927. This f i r s t volume of a two volume history of Great B r i t a i n and Ireland i n the f i r s t quarter of the twentieth century covers the years from 1900 to 1914. While i t deals mainly with p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s some attention i s given to foreign p o l i c y . Is written i n j o u r n a l i s t i c s t y l e . Montgelas, Max, B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y Under S i r Edward Grey. New York, A.A. Knopf, 1928. A searching criticism;, of Grey's p o l i c y by a well-known German writer on the question of war-guilt. -XXIV-Morel, E.D., Diplomacy Revealed. London, National Labour Press, 1921. A denunciation of the secret diplomacy o f the pre-war years. Contains dispatches from the Belgian diplomats i n P a r i s , London, and B e r l i n accompanied by intere s t i n g notes. Morhardt, M., Les Preuves. Paris , L i b r a i r e du T r a v a i l , 1924. A study of the c r i s i s of 1914, from the r e v i s i o n -i s t viewpoint. Places the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the outbreak of war on Russia because of her mobi-l i z a t i o n . Condemns the French government, and Poincare' i n p a r t i c u l a r , f o r not re s t r a i n i n g Russia. Mowat, R,B., The Concert of Europe. London, Macmillan Company, 1930. A survey of European international r e l a t i o n s a f t e r 1870, which u t i l i z e s the idea of the Concert of Europe as a continuous thread through-out, showing how i t was accepted i n s e t t l i n g problems before 1914, but how the d i v i s i o n of Europe into two diplomatic groups made the functioning of the Concert more d i f f i c u l t , and how i n 1914 the Concert was destroyed. By no means impartial, i n c l i n e d to favor the Entente Powers. Mowat, R.B., A History of European Diplomacy. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1928. A scholarly and substantial work ?/hich gives an excellent survey of the f i e l d of European diplomacy. Murray, G i l b e r t , The Foreign P o l i c y of S i r Edward Grey. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915. A defense of S i r Edward Grey's conduct of B r i t i s h foreign a f f a i r s written i n answer to c r i t i c i s m of his work as foreign secretary. -XXV-Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne. London, Macmillan and Co., 1929. The authorized biography of Lord Lansdowne. Expresses admiration for him as a man and o f f i c i a l . Readable, but disappointing, i n that i t throws l i t t l e l i g h t on Lansdowne's p o l i c i e s apart from what we already know. Nicolson, Harold, S i r Arthur Nicolson, F i r s t Lord Carnock, London, Constable and Co. Ltd., 1930. A b r i l l i a n t story of one of the leading diplomats of the period, written by his son. A remarkable delineation of character, revealing Nicolson as the \"type\" of pre-war diplomat, and giving a clever account of how diplomacy was conducted before 1914. Nowak, K.F., Germany's Road to Ruin. London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1932. Valuable as a reference for i t s excellent character sketches of the German leaders. Written i n defense of the Kaiser, very c r i t -i c a l of Bulow. But i s often inaccurate and prejudiced. Pinon, R., France et Allemagne. Pa r i s , P e r r i n , 1913. A study of Franco-German r e l a t i o n s a f t e r 1870. While c r i t i c a l of German po l i c y , the author reveals also errors made i n the conduct of French foreign a f f a i r s . Offers an in t e r e s t i n g analysis of the place of Morocco i n Franco-German r e l a t i o n s . P o l i t i c u s , Viscount Grey of Fallodon. London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1934. A defense of Grey's work as foreign secretary written i n answer to Lloyd George's b i t t e r attack i n Volume I of his War Memoirs. -XXVI-Porter, C.W., The Career of Theophile Delcasse*. Philadelphia, U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania Press, 1936. A scholarly study of the career of the French statesman who gave the new orient-ation to French foreign p o l i c y . The work i s extremely valuable f o r the new l i g h t i t sheds on many points of Delcasse's work. Pribram, A.F., England and the International P o l i c y o f the European Great Powers, 1871-1914. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931. A concise work, with l i t t l e d e t a i l , but i n i t s b r i e f scope a clear, impartial study of B r i t i s h continental p o l i c y before 1914, by the foremost Austrian authority on pre-war diplomacy. Renouvin, P i e r r e , La Crise Europeenne et l a Grande-Guerre. P a r i s , F. Alcan, 1934. A study of the War.preceded by a survey of the decade of cris e s which culminated i n i t s out-break. The f i r s t t h i r d of the book i s devoted to the i n t e r n a l problems and. the diplomatic struggle of the Powers. Whether or not one subscribes to the author's theory of the g u i l t of the Central Powers one must admit that his survey of Europe before 1914 i s b r i l l i a n t . Renouvin, P i e r r e , The Immediate Origins of the War. London, Oxford Uni v e r s i t y Press, 1928. The author i s the leading French writer on pre-war diplomacy and t h i s i s the best Freneh work on the subject of the ori g i n s of the War. A comprehensive treatment, revealing a wide range of knowledge on the part of the author, fairness of temper and a c r i t i c a l technique. Though the author absolves Germany from the charge of con-s p i r i n g to bring about the War, nevertheless he finds her more g u i l t y than the other Powers f o r i t s outbreak. Reynald, Georges, • La Diplomatie Franchise, P a r i s , L i b r a i r i e M i l i t a i r e Berger-Levrault, 1915. -XXVII-A b r i e f study of the work of Delcasse i n his various o f f i c e s as foreign minister, minister of marine and ambassador to Russia. Extremely laudatory. Russell, Bertrand, Freedom and Organization, 1814-1914. London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,1934, A volume of essays which trace the main causes of p o l i t i c a l change i n the hundred years from 1814 to 1914 - economic forces, p o l i t i c a l theories, and important i n d i v i d u a l s . There i s an in t e r e s t i n g essay on the leaders of the Great Powers i n 1914. Schmitt, B.E., Coming of the War, 2 v o l s . New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1930. Important as one of the major works on the out-break of the War. An immensely detailed work, showing careful study of a mass of source material, accompanied by voluminous references and extensive footnotes. Suffers somewhat from a decided bias - the author i s i n c l i n e d to view favourably the Entente Powers and blame the Central Powers fo r the coming of the War. Schmitt, B.E., England and Germany, 1740-1914. Princeton, Princeton Uni v e r s i t y Press, 1916. A study of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s showing how the pre-war r i v a l r y developed from the r i s e of Germany as a new Power, whose commercial advance, c o l o n i a l aspirations, and naval ambitions were interpreted i n England as a threat to the safety of the Empire. The author maintains that while there may have been wrong on both sides, the greater blame f o r the tragic ending of the r i v a l -ry must rest with Germany. Schmitt, B.E., T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente. New York, H. Holt and Co., 1934. A small work which traces i n b r i e f compass the orig i n s and development of the system of a l l i a n c e s . The presentation i s clear and at-t r a c t i v e , though b r i e f . Rather pro-entente. -XXVIII-Scott J.F., Five ¥feeks. New York, John Day Company, 19E7. The writer contends that the fundamental ex-planation f o r the disastrous outcome of the c r i s i s of 1914 i s to he found i n the influence of public opinion. He. bases his thesis on a study of the press of the various European nations from June 28 to August 4, 1914. The work shows careful research, i s free of bias and i s extremely readable. Seton-Watson, R.W., Sarajevo. London, Hutchinson and Co., 1926. A c a r e f u l study of the Sarajevo murders which exculpates Serbia and condemns the actions of Austria and the p o l i c y of Germany. The author's statements are supported by references to docu-ments and private conversations with Jugo-Slav friends. Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1916. A useful study, considering the time of i t s writing, which shows the h i s t o r i c a l develop-ment of the factors which were making f o r war a f t e r 1870. Slosson, P.W., Europe Since 1870. New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1935. A useful text on the p o l i t i c a l history of Europe af t e r the Franco-Prussian War. Somervell, D.C., The Reign of King George the F i f t h . London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1935. A narrative of the outstanding events of the reign of King George V. Only s l i g h t reference i s made to foreign a f f a i r s . The Agadir C r i s i s , Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y and the outbreak of the War are treated l i g h t l y . -XXIX-Spender, J.A., F i f t y Years of Europe. London, Ca s s e l l and Company, 1933. A masterly study of the pre-war period based on a mass of o f f i c i a l documents. The author was one of the leading L i b e r a l p u b l i c i s t s of the day, i n close touch with L i b e r a l leaders, and with Grey and Asquith i n p a r t i c u l a r . He gives an illuminating picture of the i n t e r -national s i t u a t i o n before 1914 and shows how the German navy and fear of Germany shaped B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Spender, J.A., Great B r i t a i n , Empire and Commonwealth, 1886-1935. London, C a s s e l l and Company, 1935. A summary of the most important events of the period, with adequate reference to foreign a f f a i r s , made valuable by the great knowledge and experience of the writer. Spender, J.A., L i f e , Journalism and P o l i t i c s , 2 v o l s . London, C a s s e l l and Company, Ltd., 1927. The record of the writer's career, of great value f o r the keen insight i t gives of the p o l i t i c s of the day. There i s a valuable chapter on \"The Men of 1906w which gives an inte r e s t i n g study of the leading p e r s o n a l i t i e s of the L i b e r a l party. The writer holds them i n high esteem and pays high tribute through-out the two volumes to his f r i e n d , Grey. Spender, J.A., The L i f e of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman. 2 vols London, Hodder and Stoughton Limited,1923 The o f f i c i a l biography of the L i b e r a l Prime Minister. Is es p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g for the revelation i t makes of the fact that Campbell-Bannerman was aware of and approved the steps taken to carry on the m i l i t a r y conversations with France i n 1906. Spender, J.A,, and The L i f e of Henry Herbert Asquith, 2 vols Asquith, C y r i l , London, Hutchinson and Company. ;1932...., The standard l i f e of Asquith who was prime -XXX-mlnister during the pre-war decade. The early chapters are written by his son, while Mr. Spender records his public l i f e . A read-able work, and an important contribution to the h i s t o r y o f the period. Sontag, R.J., European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932, New York, The Century Company, 1933. The author approaches his subject through a study of pe r s o n a l i t i e s , and gives not so much a narrative account of what took place, as a penetrating interpretation of what leaders desired, and the technique used i n t h e i r attempts. A useful survey. Stieve, F r i e d r i c h , Isvolsky and the World War. London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1926. The author, who was an o f f i c i a l i n the German Foreign O f f i c e , reveals Isvolsky's rSle i n pre-war diplomacy basing the work on the l a t t e r ' s l e t t e r s and telegrams. He reveals Isvolsky as a g u i l t y accomplice of Poincare. Swain, J.W., Beginning the Twentieth Century. New York, Norton, 1933. A well-informed, and well written text on European a f f a i r s from 1900 to the close of the War. Tardieu, A., France and the A l l i a n c e s . New York, Macmillan and Company, 1908. A useful study of the r6le played by France i n the diplomatic drama af t e r 1870. Traces the part played by the Republic i n the Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e , the formation of the Anglo-French Entente, and the c o n f l i c t of the a l l i a n c e s . The author was at the time of writing a high o f f i c i a l i n the French diplomatic service, and he writes i n favour of the French case. -XXXI-Trevelyan, G.M., Grey of Fallodon. London, Longmans, Green and Co.,1937. A b r i e f biography of Grey by his f r i e n d , the eminent L i b e r a l h i s t o r i a n . Recreates splendid-l y Grey's personality, p i c t u r i n g him i n the dual r o l e of statesman and n a t u r a l i s t . Praises Grey as a man and as foreign minister, and defends him against the ruthless c r i t i c i s m to which he has been subjected. Offers l i t t l e new evidence on questions of the period. An important work but cannot be accepted as an impartial study. Wilson, H.W., The War G u i l t . London, Sampson Low, Marston and Co. Ltd.,1928. A study of European int e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s a f t e r 1870 to determine the question of the war g u i l t . I t i s written from the conserv-ative view and i s coloured by a decided a n t i -German bias. Wingfield-Stratford, E.C., The V i c t o r i a n Sunset. London, G. Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1932. The second volume i n a t r i l o g y on the V i c t o r i a n era carrying the story to the end of the century and the passing of the Queen. A b r i l l i a n t l y written s o c i a l h i s -tory of the l a s t three decades of the V i c -torian age, i r o n i c a l i n s t y l e . Wingfield-Stratford, E.C., The V i c t o r i a n Aftermath. London, G. Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1933. The l a s t volume of the V i c t o r i a n t r i l o g y , being a study of the end of the V i c t o r i a n age and of the Edwardian period. A great deal of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l history i s woven into an i n t e r e s t i n g narrative. I t i s f u l l of irony and humour. The whole period i s viewed with a pessimistic sense of im-pending disa s t e r . Wolff, Theodor, The Eve of 1914. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1936. -XXXII-An attempt at a psychological approach to the problem of war r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , by the editor of the \" B e r l i n e r Tageblatt,\" which paper was known for i t s independence of comment on foreign a f f a i r s . The author knew;personally many of the p o l i t i c i a n s and diplomats whom he c a r e f u l l y analyses ,and v i v i d l y portrays. He shows how peaceful populations i n a l l the nations were turned into supporters of war. The book i s a l i t e r a r y masterpiece, i n t e r e s t -ing for i t s interpretations, but does not add greatly to our knowledge of the o r i g i n s of the War. Woodward, E.L., Great B r i t a i n and the German Navy. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935. A detailed study of the n a v a l r r i v a l r y before 1914, based on the documents for the period. A useful synthesis of material, but reveals l i t t l e that i s new. Rather indulgent towards the English part i n the naval race, showing l i t t l e understanding of the German view. Heavy i n s t y l e . Zetland, Marquis of, Lord Cromer. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1932. The authorized l i f e of Lord Cromer. Con-tains an i n t e r e s t i n g account of the part he played i n the rapprochement between B r i t a i n and France after 1903. -XXXIII-A r t i c l e s , Essays, Reviews* Anon., Edouard VII, La Revue de Paris , May 15, 1904. Anon., France, Russia, and the N i l e , The Contemporary Review, v o l . LXXIV, December, 1898. Anon., La Mission Marchand, La Revue de P a r i s , June 1, 1899. Anon., Our Foreign P o l i c y and Its Reform, The Contemporary Review, v o l . CI, A p r i l , 1912. Presents the case of the L i b e r a l Radicals who were opposed to Grey's conduct of foreign a f f a i r s . Points out the dangers i n the way i n which the entente was being transformed i n -to an a l l i a n c e and makes a plea for a better understanding with Germany. Anon., Paul Cambon et les Preliminaires de l'Entente Cordiale, Revue de Pa r i s , v o l . 44, No. '7, A p r i l 1, 1937. Anon., The Agreement With France, The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 241, May 14, 1904. Anon., The Arch-Enemy of England, The Contemporary Review, v o l . LXXIV, December, 1898. An attempt to picture the Kaiser and the German government as desirous of r a i s i n g a Continental A l l i a n c e against England and of sei z i n g the hegemony of the world. Claims England's p o l i c y had been weak and v a c i l l a t -ing and c a l l s on the government to take ac-tion to safeguard B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . Anon;, The Crux of Foreign P o l i c y , the Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXVIII (new s e r i e s ) , July, 1900. Anon., The F a i l u r e of Our Foreign P o l i c y , The Contemporary Review, v o l . LXXIII, A p r i l , 1898. Anon., The International Ferment, The Quarterly Review, v o l . 188, July, 1898. Anon., Vingt-huit Ans de P o l i t i q u e Etrangere, La Revue de P a r i s , November 1, 1898. -XXXIV-Barclay, Thomas, A General Treaty of A r b i t r a t i o n Between Great B r i t a i n and France, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXIX (new s e r i e s ) , June, 1901. Presents the writer's plan f o r a general a r b i t r a t i o n treaty f o r which he worked afte r the Fashoda C r i s i s , and f i n a l l y saw signed in 1903. Barclay, Thomas, A Lance for the French, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXVII (new s e r i e s ) , February, 1900. Sets f o r t h the desire of the writer to pro-mote k i n d l i e r r elations on both sides of the Channel a f t e r the bitterness roused by the Fashoda C r i s i s . Barker, J . E l l i s , Anglo-German Relations and S i r Edward Grey, The Fort-nightly Review, v o l . XCI (new s e r i e s ) , March, 1912. Barnes, H.E., Assessing the Blame for the World War, Current History, v o l . XX, No. 2, May, 1924. Barnes, H.E., Poincare's G u i l t i n the War, The Nation (New York), v o l . 121, No. 3144:, October 7, 1925. Barrere, Camille, La Chute de Delcasse (I & I I ) , Revue des Deux Mondes, v o l . X, August 1, 1932, v o l . XIII, January 1, 1933. A study of the c r i s i s of 1905 which resulted i n the f a l l of Delcasse'. D i s t i n c t l y favour-able to Delcasse's handling of French p o l i c y , and c r i t i c a l of his associates who l e t him down i n the force of what i s interpreted as a German threat to break the Entente. Bashford, J.L., Germany in the Mediterranean, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXXVII (new s e r i e s ) , June, 1905. Beard, C.A., Viscount Grey on War G u i l t , The New Republic, v o l . XLIV, No. 566, October 7, 1925. Berard, Victor, France et Maroc, La Revue de P a r i s , January 15, 1906. Berard, V i c t o r , La France et Guillaume I I , La Revue de P a r i s , May 15, 1905. -XXXV-Berard, V i c t o r , Le Livre Jaune Sur Le Maroc, La Revue de P a r i s , January 1, 1906. Berard, V i c t o r , Les Accords Anglo-Franc, a i s (I & I I ) , La Revue de Pa r i s , June 15, 1904, and July 1, 1904. Bickford, J.D. and Johnson, E.N. The Contemplated Anglo-German A l l i a n c e , 1890-1901, The P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, v o l . 42, March, 1927. A c a r e f u l account of the attempts to negotiate an Anglo-German a l l i a n c e at the end of the nineteenth century. Drawn mainly from the Ger-man documents. Places the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the f a i l u r e of the negotiations on the German leaders. Blennerhassett, Rowland, England and France, The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LV, June, 1904. Blennerhassett, Rowland, German Foreign P o l i c y , The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXXVII (new s e r i e s ) , May, 1905. Blennerhassett, Rowland, German P o l i c y i n Morocco, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXXXIV (new s e r i e s ) , October, 1908. Boulger, D.C., Fashoda and the Upper N i l e , The Contemporary Review, v o l . LXXIV, November, 1898. B r a i l s f o r d , H.N., The Last of the English L i b e r a l s , Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . XI, No. 4, July, 1933. An in t e r e s t i n g review of \"The L i f e of Henry Herbert Asquith\" written by J.A. Spender and C y r i l Asquith. Offers shrewd comments on f o r -eign p o l i c y as conducted by Asquith 1s govern-ment. Buxton, Noel, Diplomacy and Parliament, The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LXXI, A p r i l , 1912. A plea f o r a larger measure of parliamentary control over foreign a f f a i r s , written a f t e r the C r i s i s of Agadir when i t was r e a l i z e d how close to war the country had been brought. -XXXVI-Charles-Roux, M.F., V e i l l e e d'Armes a Londres (22 j u i n — 4 aout, 1914). Revue des Deux Mondes, v o l . XXIV, August 15, 1926. A dramatic presentation of the events which took place i n London i n the l a s t days of peace, written from the French viewpoint. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de l a Quinzaine; H i s t o i r e P o l i t i q u e , Revue des Deux Mondes, January, 1898 - August, 1914. (passim). Charmes, Francis, Germany, and the Question of Morocco, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXXVII (new s e r i e s ) , May, 1905. C h i r o l , Valentine, . The Origins of the Present War, The Quarterly Review, v o l . 221, October, 1914. Coubertin, Pierre de, M. Delcasse. A Character Sketch, The Living Age, v o l . 232, March 8, 1902. An ill u m i n a t i n g sketch of Delcasse - of his character and his work. Acclaims him as one of the most accomplished statesmen of the Third Republic. Daniels, Harriet, M.E., Anglo-German Relations, 1898-1914. A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, April,1932. Dawson, W.H., The Anglo-German Al l i a n c e Proposals, The Contemporary Review, v o l . CXXVI, November, 1924. Decle, L i o n e l , The Fashoda Question, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXIV (new s e r i e s ) , November, 1898. Delafosse, Jules, The Foreign P o l i c y of France, The National Review, v o l . XLVI, September, 1905. D^roulede, Paul, Franc-Parler, The National Review, v o l . XLVI, October, 1905. -XXXVII-Did Germany Incite Austria i n 1914? Current History, v o l . XXVIII, No. 4, July, 1928. A symposium on the questions of how f a r Austria-Hungary was j u s t i f i e d i n making war on Serbia af t e r the Sarajevo murders and to what extent did Germany encourage or i n c i t e Austria i n her action against Serbia. Contributions are made by H. E. Barnes, Count Berchtold, who was Austrian foreign secretary i n 1914, Count Hoyos, Chief of the Cabinet of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry i n 1914, Dr. Fri e d e r i c h von Weisner, Legal Counsellor of the Austro-Hun-garian Foreign Ministry and O f f i c i a l Invest-igator for Austria for the Sarajevo Assassin-ation, Von Jagow, the former German Foreign Minister, Alfred Zimmerman, former German Under-Secretary of State, and M.T* Florinsky of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. D i l l o n E.J., The Anglo-French Convention, The Contemporary Review, v o l . LXXXV, May, 1904. Diplomaticus, Fashoda and Lord Salisbury's Vindication, The Fort-n i g h t l y Review, v o l . LXIV (new s e r i e s ) , December, 1898, Diplomaticus, .Sir Edward Grey's Stewardship, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . CX (new s e r i e s ) , December, 1911. Presents a case against S i r Edward Grey's con-duct of foreign a f f a i r s since he f i r s t took o f f i c e . Appeals f o r a better understanding with Germany. Doumer, Paul, The Anglo-French Agreement, The Living Age, v o l . 242, Ju l y 16, 1904. Ewart, J.S., The Russian Order for General M o b i l i z a t i o n . Current History, v o l . XXII, No. 2, May, 1925. Fay, S.B., Grey: A Tragic Blunderer. Current History, v o l . XXXIX, No. 2, November, 1933. A study of Grey as foreign secretary written after his death i n September, 1933. Commends his honesty and his devotion but regards him as f a l l i n g short as a statesman, lacking i n foresight and i n a b i l i t y to make decisions. XXXVIII-Fay, S.B., New Light on the Origins of the War. The American H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . XXV, Number 4, July, 1920; v o l . XXVI, Number 1, October, 1920; v o l . XXVI , Number 2, January, 1921. Fay, S.B., Pre-War Diplomacy and the European Press. Current History, v o l . XXXIII, No. 2, November, 1930. Fay, S.B., The Black Hand Plot that Led to the World War. Current History, v o l . XXIII, No. 2, November, 1925. A careful study of the plot which led to the murder of the Austrian Archduke. Well-sub-stantiated by a wide range of evidence. Gives the conclusion that while Serbian o f f i c i a l s were involved i n the p l o t , Austria was not j u s t i f i e d i n going to war with Serbia i n 1914. Fay, S.B., The Coming of the War; 1914. The Journal of Modern History, v o l . I l l , No. I, March, 1931. A review of Schmitt's book, \"The Coming of the War: 1914.\" Is c r i t i c a l of some of the aauthor's conclusions, and reveals him as i n -clined to favour the Entente Powers. Glazebrook, George, de T., The End of B r i t i s h I s o l a t i o n . Queen's Quarterly, v o l . XXXVIII, Autumn, 1931. Gooch, G.P., Baron von Holstein. The Cambridge H i s t o r i c a l Journal, v o l . I, No. 1, 1923. Gooch, G.P., Delcasse. The Contemporary Review, v o l . CXXIII, A p r i l , 1923. Gooch, G,P., Kiderlen-Wachter. The Cambridge H i s t o r i c a l Journal, v o l . V, No.2, 1936. Henderson, E.F., The S u p e r f i c i a l Grey. The Nation (New York), v o l . CXXI, October 28, 1925. A review of S i r Edward Grey's \"Twenty-five Years.\" Takes him severely to task f o r skimming over d i f f i c u l t points. States that while Grey does not d i r e c t l y f a l s i f y , he comes as near i t as possible. -XXXIX-Harris, Walter, B.., The Morocco C r i s i s . Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, v o l . 178, August, 1905. Harrison, A.F., Germany and Morocco. The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LVIII, July, 1905. Hart, A.B., Assessing the Blame for the World War. A dissent from the Conclusions of Professor Barnes. Current History, v o l . XX, No. 2, May, 1924. A b r i e f a r t i c l e which questions the findings of Dr. Barnes i n an a r t i c l e i n the same review. Herrick, F.H., The Abandonment of \"Splendid I s o l a t i o n . \" B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s and the Foreign Office at the close of the Nineteenth Century. Proceedings of the P a c i f i c Coast Branch of the American H i s t o r i c a l Association, 1920. An interesting study of the workings of the B r i t i s h foreign o f f i c e before the War, show-ing the great importance of the permanent o f f i c i a l s and how they influenced p o l i c y . I t i s claimed that the o f f i c e was more important i n determining p o l i c y than the temporary p o l i t i c a l head. Ignotus., The German Emperor's Crusade Against the Entente Cordiale. The National Review, v o l . XLVI, February, 1906. Langer, W.L., The 1908 Prelude to the World War. Foreign A f f a i r s , V o l . VII, No. 4, July, 1929. Lascelles, the Rt. Hon. S i r Frank, Thoughts on the Anglo-German Problem. The Contemporary Review, v o l . CI, January, 1912. Lavisse, Ernest, France et Angleterre. La Revue de P a r i s , February 1, 1899. Lees, Frederic, Some Promoters of Anglo-French Amity. The Fortnightly Review, v o l . LXXIV (new s e r i e s ) , July, 1903 Describes the attempts of a number of o f f i c i a l s , j o u r nalists and writers who were working f o r an Anglo-French rapprochement. Gives great c r e d i t to Delcasse, Paul-Cambon, and S i r Thomas Barclay in p a r t i c u l a r . -XL-Lewis, S.E., Anglo-German Diplomatic Relations, 1898-1902. B u l l e t i n of the Insti t u t e of H i s t o r i c a l Research, v o l . IX, 1931-32. Lingelbach, W.E., Belgian Neutrality: I t s Origin and Interpretation. The American H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . XXXIX, Number 1, October, 1933. Low, Sidney, The Foreign O f f i c e Autocracy. The Fortnightly Review, v o l . XCI, (new s e r i e s ) , January, 1912. Very c r i t i c a l of the secret manner i n which the Foreign Secretary and Cabinet conduct foreign p o l i c y , and of the apparent lack of r e s p o n s i b i l -i t y i n this matter to the House of Commons. The a r t i c l e was inspired by the danger revealed i n the Agadir C r i s i s . Suggests the setting up of a Foreign A f f a i r s Committee to discuss with the Minister, general outlines of p o l i c y . Lutz, H., Lord Grey's Responsibility for Russia's Mobilization. Current History, v o l . XXII, No. 2, May, 1925. Mallet, S i r Charles, Lord Grey and the Peace of Europe. The Contemporary Review, v o l . CXXVIII, November, 1925. A careful review of Lord Grey's \"Twenty-five Years.\" Raises some of the int e r e s t i n g questions which Grey has passed over too l i g h t -l y i n his book. Marx, Wilhelm, The Responsibility for the War. Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . IV, No. 2, January, 1926. Maxse, L.J., Retrospect and Reminiscence. The National Review, v o l . LXXXI, August, 1918. A scathing c r i t i c i s m of B r i t i s h p o l i c y before 1914 as being too yie l d i n g to Germany. V i o l e n t l y anti-German. Gives i n t e r e s t i n g and valuable d e t a i l s of the meeting of the Unionist leaders who wrote the important l e t t e r of August 2 to the Cabinet. An important contribution to our knowledge of the events i n London on the eve of the War. M i l l e t , Philippe, The Truth About the Franco-German C r i s i s of 1911. The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LXXI, June, 1912. -XLI-M i l l e t Rend1, La Lutte Pacifique Entre La France et L*Angleterre. Revue des Deux Mondes, v o l . 81, June 15, 1904. Morel, E.D., The National Interest i n the Franco-German Dispute. The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LXX, November, 1911. Morel, E.D., The True Story of the Morocco Negotiations. The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LXXI, February, 1912. Morel, E.D., The \"Truth\" About the Franco-German C r i s i s . The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LXXII, July, 1912. Mortimer, Raymond, Edward Grey. The New Statesman and Nation, v o l . XIII, No. 316 (new s e r i e s ) , March 13, 1937. A review of G. M. Trevelyan's \"Grey of Fallodon.\" C r i t i c i z e s the author i n so f a r as he has not adequately answered or stated the case against Grey. Mowat, R.B., Great B r i t a i n and GermahStin the Early Twentieth Century. The English H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . 46, July, 1931. Mowat, R.B., New Light on the Agadir C r i s i s . The Contemporary Review, v o l . CXLI, June, 1932. An i n t e r e s t i n g review of volume VII of the B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, which deals with the Agadir C r i s i s . The reviewer i s s c e p t i c a l as to the wisdom of Anglo-French p o l i c y i n the c r i s i s and sees l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n for Lloyd George 1s Mansion House speech. Murray, L t . C o l . the Hon. Arthur, Lord Grey of Fallodon. The Quarterly Review, v o l . 262, No. 519, January, 1934. A staunch defense of Grey as a man and as foreign secretary, written i n answer to the c r i t i c i s m made by Lloyd George i n volume I of his \"War Memoirs.\" Poincare, Raymond, The Responsibility f o r the War, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . IV, No. I, October, 1925. Poincare's answer to h i s c r i t i c s who place the g u i l t f o r the outbreak of the War on France and Russia. He places a l l the blame on Germany. -XLII-P r a t t , E.J., La Derniere Etape sur l a Route de l a Grande Guerre, Revue Historique, tome CLXXVIII, Septembre-Octobre, 1936. Based on volumes V-VIII of the Documents Diplomatiques Francais, showing how the Balkan Wars were a pre-lude* to the Great War. Shows the change.which took place i n French foreign p o l i c y a f t e r 1912, - how Poincare\" and his group, while perhaps not wanting war, were resolved bra a firmer p o l i c y . Pressense, Francis de, England and France. The Contemporary Review, v o l , LXXV, February, 1899. Pressens^, Francis de, France and England. The Nineteenth Century, v o l . XLIII, A p r i l , 1898, Pressense, Francis de, ' France, Morocco, and Europe. The Contemporary Review, v o l . XCII, December, 1907. Pressense', Francis de, The F a l l of M. Delcasse'. The Nineteenth Century, v o l . LVTII, July, 1905. An attempt to show that the French Government In l e t t i n g Delcasse' go was not y i e l d i n g to the threats of Germany, nor abandoning the entente with England, but rather, that Delcasse' f e l l through his own. mistaken p o l i c i e s . Quorem Pars, Fui, The Balance of Power. The Contemporary Review, v o l . LXXIII, A p r i l , 1898. Renouvin, P i e r r e , How the War Came. Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . VII, No. 3, A p r i l , 1929. A careful review of Fay's \"The Origins of the World War\", by the leading French student of the War. C r i t i c i z e s Professor Fay for leaning i n favour of Germany and for loading a prepond-erance of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon the Russian government. Schmitt, B.E., France and the O utbreak of the World War. Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 15, No. 3, A p r i l , 1937. A review of volume XI of Documents Diplomatiques Francais which contains the French documents f o r the:events of the c r i s i s of 1914 af t e r July 24. -XLIII-The reviewer reveals how i n comparison with these documents the French Yellow Book of 1914 was f a l s i f i e d . Schmitt, B.E., July, 1914. Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . V, No. 1, October, 1986. A review of a number of books on the subject of the outbreak of the War inspired by a r t i c l e s i n e a r l i e r issues of the same p e r i o d i c a l by Raymond Poincare and Dr. Wilhelm Marx. Discusses \"Isvolsky and the World War\" by F r i e d e r i c h Stieve; \"An Ser-vice de l a France\" by Raymond Poincare*; \"Twenty-f i v e Years\" by S i r Edward Grey; \"The International Anarchy \" by G. Lowes Dickinson; \"The..Sarajevo Crime\" by Edith Durham; \"Sarajevo\" by R.W. Seton-Watson; and \"The Genesis of the World War\" by H.E. Barnes. Schmitt, B.E., T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and T r i p l e Entente,. 1902-1914. The American H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . XXIX, Number 3, A p r i l , 1924. Schmitt, B.E., Russia and the War. Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . XIII, No. 1, October, 1934. A careful review of the Russian documents on the ori g i n s of the Great ?/ar* The reviewer states that the documents reveal no proof that Russia wanted to go to war i n 1914. Seton-Watson, R.W., The Murder at Sarajevo. Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . I l l , No. 3, A p r i l , 1925. Slosson, Preston, The Genesis of the World War. The American Historical'Review, v o l . XXXII, No.2, January, 1927. A c a r e f u l review of H.E. Barne's \"The Genesis of the World War.\" Very c r i t i c a l of the author's judgments. Sontag, R.J., B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y , 1898-1912. The Journal of Modern History, v o l . I I , No.3, September, 1930. Sontag, R.J., German Foreign P o l i c y , 1904-06. The American H i s t o r i c a l Review, vol.XXXIII, Number 2, January, 1928. -XLIV-Soward, F.H., ft^^ The Gdiicoo- of the World War. Queen's Quarterly, v o l . XXXVI, Autumn, 1929. Spender, J.A., B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y i n the Reign of King George V. International A f f a i r s , v o l . XXV, July-August, 1935. The t r a n s c r i p t of an address hy Mr. Spender delivered May 14, 1935. Deals for the most part with B r i t i s h p o l i c y before the War. Has nothing but praise for B r i t i s h actions and for S i r Edward Grey's conduct of p o l i c y . There are i n t e r e s t i n g points raised i n discussion a f t e r the address by Professor G.M. Trevelyan, Dr. Gooch, Dr. Seton-Watson, and Lord C e c i l . Spender, J.A., Lord Grey as Foreign Secretary. The Spectator, v o l . 151, September 8, 1933. A defense of Grey's work as foreign secretary writ-ten on the occasion of his death by his friend and associate who so greatly admired him. Temperley, Harold, The Coming of the War. Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 9, No. 2, January, 1931. An exhaustive review of B.E. Schmitt's \"The Coming of the War, 1914.\" Deals mainly with questions concerning the Sarajevo murders and B r i t a i n ' s entry into the War. "@en ; edm:hasType "Thesis/Dissertation"@en ; dcterms:spatial "France"@en, "Great Britain"@en ; edm:isShownAt "10.14288/1.0098639"@en ; dcterms:language "eng"@en ; ns0:degreeDiscipline "History"@en ; edm:provider "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en ; dcterms:publisher "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:rights "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en ; ns0:scholarLevel "Graduate"@en ; dcterms:title "Anglo-French relations: 1898-1914"@en ; dcterms:type "Text"@en ; ns0:identifierURI "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/30202"@en .