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Is there an Hobbesian tradition in international thought Kersch, T. J. 1990

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IS THERE AN HOBBESIAN TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT? By T. J . KERSCH B.A. (Hons), The U n i v e r s i t y o-f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1989 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department o-f P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce We accept t h i s t h e s i s as con-forming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1990 © T.J. Kersch In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 19 ^ mo DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Hobbes' argument i n Leviathan can be viewed as a response t o the qu e s t i o n o-f why r a t i o n a l human beings should choose t o o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o a s t a t e . In Hobbes' words, the argument, i n l a r g e p a r t , attempts t o e s t a b l i s h the 'causes -" o-f a 'commonwealth'. However, the -fact o-f the matter i s t h a t human beings do  not o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o a. s t a t e ; r a t h e r , they o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o a p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s . The qu e s t i o n then becomes one o-f determining — again i n Hobbes' words — the 'causes' o-f a p l u r a l i t y o-f 'commonwealths'. In other words, why do r a t i o n a l human beings choose t o org a n i z e themselves i n t o separate s t a t e s ? I t i s not c l e a r t o me that Hobbes' answered t h i s q u e s t i o n ; nor i s i t c l e a r t o me t h a t Hobbes' arguments can be extended i n order t o p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n . S i n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory i s concerned with the p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s , i t seems reasonable t o suppose t h a t an 'Hobbesian' t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought would have provided at l e a s t some i n s i g h t i n t o the qu e s t i o n o-f the 'causes' o-f such a p l u r a l i t y . In other words, an 'Hobbesian' t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought must have at l e a s t c o nsidered why i t i s t h a t s e v e r a l L e v i a t h a n s would emerge -from the s t a t e o-f nature. However, having examined the c u r r e n t conception o-f the 'Hobbesian' t r a d i t i o n , I -found t h a t i t was simply the ' r e a l i s t ' t r a d i t i o n under a d i f f e r e n t l a b e l ; a t r a d i t i o n t o which Hobbes' name had been a p p r o p r i a t e d . Furthermore, I found t h a t the a p p r o p r i a t i o n i i i of Hobbes-" name was j u s t i f i e d on the b a s i s of h i s chapter 13 analogy which c o m p a r e d — a l b e i t i n a l i m i t e d way — h i s t h e o r e t i c a l i n f e r e n c e of the s t a t e of nature with h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s of r e l a t i o n s among s o v e r e i g n s . I argue t h a t the analogy, being n e i t h e r a d e f i n i t i o n nor an i n f e r e n c e , has no t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with Hobbes•' main argument; i n which case i t cannot form the b a s i s of a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n . Having e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the c u r r e n t Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i s not a genuine one, I propose t h a t a genuine t r a d i t i o n should a l e a s t render an account of the emergence of s e v e r a l L e v a i t h a n s from the s t a t e of nature and conclude t h a t t h i s cannot be done without compromising Hobbes - 1 account of the s t a t e . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract. i i Acknowledgements v I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 Chapter one : The Problem with the Current Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n 6 (1) The Legacy of Hobbes-1 Analogy 6 Wight 9 Vincent 10 Navari 13 (2) The Analogy — R h e t o r i c or Theory? 14 The Analogy as an Apparent Proof 17 The Analogy and Hobbes-' Philosophy of Sc i e n c e 28 Chapter two- Toward a Genuine Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n 42 <1) The Problem 44 (2) O b j e c t i o n s 46 Defence a g a i n s t a Common Enemy 46 Murray F o r s y t h 51 Con c l u s i o n 59 Notes 61 B i b l i o g r a p h y 65 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS T h i s essay would have been very d i f f i c u l t t o complete s u c c e s s f u l l y without P r o f e s s o r Robert Jackson's continuous support and encouragement. In a d d i t i o n t o making me f e e l t h a t my c o n t r i b u t i o n was important, h i s manner gave me the con f i d e n c e t o pursue my q u e s t i o n s more or l e s s my own way. Pr o f e s s o r Sam LaSelva introduced me t o a n a l y t i c a l p o l i t i c a l theory and he was a l w a y s — w i t h o u t n o t i c e — p r e p a r e d t o d i s c u s s my ideas, d i f f i c u l t i e s , and concerns throughout t h i s p r o j e c t . I admire these two s c h o l a r s and o f f e r my s i n c e r e thanks. My two good f r i e n d s Michael and Kim Meade vol u n t e e r e d f o r the p a i n s t a k i n g task of p r o o f - r e a d i n g t h i s essay and consequently prevented me from doing too much damage t o the e n g l i s h language. Michael was my i n i t i a l and only c o n t a c t with p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e during my two years at Malaspina C o l l e g e ; and although our p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the d i s c i p l i n e may have diverged, M i c h a e l — i n perhaps many more ways than he can i m a g i n e — i s s t i l l my te a c h e r . And f i n a l l y , t o my dearest f r i e n d K i r s t e n S i g e r s o n — w h o s e i n f i n i t e p a t i e n c e o f t e n had t o contend with the sharp end of my f r u s t r a t i o n s during t h i s p r o j e c t — t h a n k you f o r c o n t i n u i n g t o be my f r i e n d . 1 INTRODUCTION Perhaps the best way t o begin t h i s d i s c u s s i o n concerning the q u e s t i o n of whether or not t h e r e i s a Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought i s by answering i t more or l e s s d i r e c t l y . No, I do not t h i n k t h a t such a t r a d i t i o n e x i s t s ; at l e a s t not based on h i s argument i n L e v i a t h a n . Having c l e a r l y s t a t e d my r e p l y , however, I must immediately q u a l i f y i t . The tone of my answer, r a t h e r than being one of s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n , i s one of disappointment. I had hoped t h a t t h e r e could be a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought so t h a t i t c o u l d help me t o move one step c l o s e r t o s e t t l i n g the l a r g e r and more d i s t u r b i n g q u e s t i o n of why a b s t r a c t ' n a t u r a l ' men would choose t o c r e a t e a p l u r a l i t y of separate p o l i t i c a l communities out of the s t a t e of nature. S i n c e I assume t h a t t h e r e i s nothing i n h e r e n t l y n a t u r a l about the s t a t e , nor any p o l i t i c a l community f o r t h a t m a t t e r , 1 I am c u r i o u s as t o why human beings should choose to o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o separate p o l i t i c a l communities r a t h e r than one g l o b a l p o l i t y . In s h o r t , u n l i k e many p a r t i c i p a n t s i n contemporary academic d i s c o u r s e , I accept n e i t h e r the s t a t e nor the p i u r a l i t v of s t a t e s as g i v e n . T h i s , however, i s not t o say t h a t I t h i n k the p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s ought not e x i s t . I n t u i t i v e l y , I suspect t h a t t h e r e are good reasons f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e . My problem, however, i s t r a n s l a t i n g my i n t u i t i o n i n t o c o n c r e t e reasons. I t h i n k t h a t f i n d i n g the r e a s o n s — o r causes as .Hobbes 2 might have put i t E — - f o r the p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s would satis-fy much more than simple c u r i o s i t y . Having e s t a b l i s h e d those reasons, perhaps we would be b e t t e r armed t o handle q u e s t i o n s about how s t a t e s ought t o r e l a t e t o each other; or we might -feel more comfortable d e a l i n g with q u e s t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e . F i n a l l y , we might even be b e t t e r prepared t o deal with q u e s t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n <or c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ) , d i v i s i o n of powers, and perhaps even s e c e s s i o n , i n f e d e r a l l y organized s o c i e t i e s . I t h i n k t h a t i n order t o address the above concerns with any degree of confidence, we must f i r s t e s t a b l i s h t h e o r e t i c a l reasons as t o why the human a r t i f a c t D - f separate p o l i t i c a l communities e x i s t s . In other words, human beings do not c r e a t e the s t a t e , r a t h e r , they c r e a t e a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s . The problem i s t o determine the causes of such a c r e a t i o n . Due t o my concern with the human causes of p o l i t i c a l a r t i f a c t s , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t I should t u r n t o Thomas Hobbes and h i s argument i n Leviathan f o r i n s i g h t and p o s s i b l e answers. L e v i a t h a n , i t w i l l be argued i n due course, addresses the q u e s t i o n about causes of a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l a r t i f a c t known t o Hobbes as the commonwealth. The term •'Leviathan-' r e f e r s t o the c o u r t of f i n a l appeal w i t h i n the commonwealth; a c o u r t which embraces what has come t o be known as the t h r e e branches of government, namely' the j u d i c i a r y , the l e g i s l a t u r e , and the e x e c u t i v e . In other words, Leviathan i s the human m a n i f e s t a t i o n and 3 source of -"right reason-" i n the community who a l s o c o n t r o l s the -"purse-" and the -"sword-". For Hobbes, both the s t a t e and the L e v i a t h a n are human a r t i f a c t s ; they are products of cons c i o u s human design and a c t i o n s . They are the necessary consequences of the c h o i c e human beings make t o l i v e a s o c i a l l i f e r a t h e r than an a n t i - s o c i a l one. It should be noted t h a t the t i t l e of Hobbes-" argument i s L e v i a t h a n and not Leviathans.. Although i t i s reasonably c l e a r t h a t Hobbes d i d not r e f e r t o one g l o b a l L e v i a t h a n d u r i n g the course of h i s d i s c u s s i o n , he g i v e s us h a r d l y any reason t o suppose t h a t a p l u r a l i t y of Lev i a t h a n s would emerge from the s t a t e of nature. In other words, Hobbes begins h i s argument with a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of man and not t h i s or t h a t p a r t i c u l a r group of men, and because of t h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t the l o g i c of h i s argument would lead us t o expect only one Levia t h a n t o emerge. However, at the outset of p a r t two of Lev i a t h a n , i t i s reasonably c l e a r t o me t h a t Hobbes expects us t o assume t h a t a p l u r a l i t y of l e v i a t h a n s have emerged. I f i n d t h i s q u i t e p u z z l i n g because i t seems t o me t h a t , beginning with a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of man, the emergence of a p l u r a l i t y of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t s would defeat the purpose of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t i n the f i r s t p l a c e . My hope of f i n d i n g a ready made s o l u t i o n t o t h i s p u z z l e was r a i s e d when I happened t o read about the •"Hobbesian-" t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. I had i n f e r r e d from the name of t h i s t r a d i t i o n t h a t these i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s had managed t o b r i d g e the t 4 Hobbesian gap between the causes o-f the s t a t e and the causes o-f the p l u r a l i t v o-f s t a t e s . However, when I came t o understand what i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s meant by using the term 'Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n ' , and when I -further learned the t e x t u a l b a s i s f o r the a s c r i p t i o n of h i s name t o t h i s t r a d i t i o n , I was, needless t o say, d i s a p p o i n t e d . I was n e v e r t h e l e s s i n s p i r e d t o t r y to b r i d g e the gap myself. Thus, I have undertaken t o attempt t o answer the questions Is t h e r e r e a l l y an Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought? In chapter one of t h i s essay I s h a l l present my f i n d i n g s about the c u r r e n t -"Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n ' i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought and I s h a l l employ an argument which, I b e l i e v e , should c a s t doubt on the p r a c t i c e of a s c r i b i n g Hobbes' name t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t r a d i t i o n . E s s e n t i a l l y , I s h a l l argue that, the t e x t u a l remarks from Leviathan t h a t are used t o j u s t i f y the a s c r i p t i o n of h i s name t o the R e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n have very l i t t l e b earing on Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l theory and v i r t u a l l y no bearing on h i s p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n t i f i c approach t o understanding the world. In chapter two I undertake t o search f o r a new and f i r m e r b a s i s f o r an Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. I s p e c u l a t e t h a t such a b a s i s might be found by f i r s t posing a very s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n and then by t r y i n g t o answer i t with arguments from L e v i a t h a n . In s h o r t , I am asking Hobbes- What causes the p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s ? Although Hobbes does r e p l y t o the ques t i o n with "defence 5 a g a i n s t a common enemy", I •find t h a t h i s answer simply c r e a t e s a new p u z z l e . The new problem, a problem which I co u l d not s o l v e , i s t o determine how i t comes t o pass t h a t the predicament of mankind becomes transformed from a c o n d i t i o n of defence of a l l a g a i n s t a l l t o a c o n d i t i o n of defence of group a g a i n s t group. T h i s new p u z z l e , I b e l i e v e , a l s o has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Hobbes-1 domestic p o l i t i c a l t heory. For the meantime, however, l e t us t u r n t o the f i r s t problem at hand; the problem of the e x i s t i n g conception of the Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. 6 CHAPTER ONE The Problem with the Current Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n O-f a l l the c o n s t r a i n t s upon the p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r ' s -freedom t o s p e c u l a t e , none has been so powerful as the t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l philosophy i t s e l f . In the act of p h i l o s o p h i z i n g , the t h e o r i s t e n t e r s i n t o a debate the terms of which have been l a r g e l y s e t bef o r e h a n d . 3 It appears t h a t the l a b e l 'Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n ' i s but simply another name f o r the ' R e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n ' i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. In other words, the two e x p r e s s i o n s , 'Hobbesian' and ' R e a l i s t ' , have been used interchangeably t o re p r e s e n t the same t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. Thus, an otherwise innocent o b s e r v e r — p e r h a p s an u n d e r g r a d u a t e — c o u l d not be blamed f o r reasonably c o n c l u d i n g t h a t Hobbes was a r e a l i s t a l o n g s i d e f i g u r e s such as M a c h i a v e l l i and Morgenthau. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, t h a t Hobbes i s viewed o f t e n unquestionably as one of Mart i n Wight's 'blood and i r o n and immorality men.' I t seems t h a t the well entrenched p r a c t i c e of l a b e l l i n g the R e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n as 'Hobbesian' may c o n t r i b u t e t o a form of academic p r e j u d i c e which, I b e l i e v e , adds l i t t l e t o the advancement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. (1) The Legacy of Hobbes' Analogy There must be some b a s i s , however, f o r the p r a c t i c e of l a b e l l i n g Realism with Hobbes' name. Academics of the s t a t u r e of Martin Wight and John Vincent, f o r example, could not p o s s i b l y make the connection p u r e l y on the b a s i s of something t h a t one of t h e i r t e a c h e r s had s a i d during t h e i r 7 undergraduate years. The b a s i s of the p r a c t i c e must l i e i n something t h a t Hobbes himself had w r i t t e n — something t h a t s u r e l y would serve t o c o n v i c t him, beyond a shadow of a doubt, as one of the v i l l a i n s i n the h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l thought. The t e x t u a l b a s i s of Hobbes' s e l f i n c r i m i n a t i o n , i t seems, i s an analogy he presented t o h i s audience i n chapter 13 of L e v i a t h a n . The analogy reads' But though th e r e had never been any time, wherein p a r t i c u l a r men were i n a c o n d i t i o n of warre one a g a i n s t another; yet i n a l l times, kings, and Persons of Soveraigne a u t h o r i t y , because of t h e i r Independency, are i n c o n t i n u a l I j e a l o u s i e s , and i n the s t a t e and posture of G l a d i a t o r s ; having t h e i r weapons p o i n t i n g , and t h e i r eyes f i x e d on one another; t h a t i s , t h e i r F o r t s , G a r r i s o n s , and Guns upon the F r o n t i e r s of t h e i r Kingdomes; and c o n t i n u a l I Spyes upon t h e i r neighbours; which i s a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of t h e i r S u b j e c t s ; t h e r e does not f o l l o w from i t , t h a t misery, which accompanies the L i b e r t y of p a r t i c u l a r men. 4 Martin Wight w i l l be the f i r s t t h e o r i s t t h a t I s h a l l examine i n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n . 1 3 There seems t o be l i t t l e doubt t h a t Wight f e l t t h a t Hobbes' analogy l i e s at the core of i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory. I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t Wight c a t e g o r i z e d Hobbes under the r u b r i c of ' r e a l i s t " ' . However, i n a l l f a i r n e s s , I am not convinced t h a t Wight e i t h e r coined or used the e x p r e s s i o n 'Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n ' as a synonym f o r Realism. F o l l o w i n g the d i s c u s s i o n of Wight, I s h a l l b r i e f l y c o n s i d e r the arguments advanced by John V i n c e n t . s Vincent, l i k e myself, i s concerned about the ' R e a l i s t ' p r i s o n i n t o 8 which Hobbes had been locked. He would p r e f e r t o have us view Hobbes as occupying the ' marchlands' between the Wightian c a t e g o r i e s of ' r e a l i s m ' and ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' . I t seems t o me, however, t h a t Vincent f a l l s s h o r t of f r e e i n g Hobbes e n t i r e l y from the r e a l i s t , yoke because Hobbes' analogy remains very much i n h i s f i e l d of v i s i o n . Next, I s h a l l present C o r n e l i a N a v a r i ' s view. 7' Although N a v a r i ' s paper has given me a great deal of comfort because of our shared i n t e n t i o n s , I am not sure t h a t she has succeeded i n d i s t a n c i n g Hobbes' theory from the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . Rather, i t seems t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of her argument s e r v e s t o entrench Hobbes w i t h i n r e a l i s m . B r i e f l y s t a t e d , her d e c i s i o n t o t r e a t the s t a t e of nature as a l o g i c a l category unto i t s e l f , r a t h e r than as a l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i n the course of a l a r g e r argument, has consequences she may not have been aware o f . In s h o r t , by doing so she has adopted an e s s e n t i a l l y r e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hobbes' analogy. The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n of the views advanced by these t h e o r i s t s w i l l serve p r i m a r i l y t o e s t a b l i s h the agenda f o r rny argument i n the l a s t p a r t of t h i s chapter. To r e i t e r a t e , the purpose of t h i s chapter i s t o cast, doubt on the p r a c t i c e of a s s o c i a t i n g Hobbes' name with the r e a l i s t , t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. T h i s end, I b e l i e v e , i s best, achieved by f i r s t examining the t e x t u a l grounds used as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s p r a c t i c e , namely Hobbes' chapter 13 analogy; and secondly by determining the p r e c i s e 9 r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t the analogy has with Hobbes-1 theory. I s h a l l argue t h a t t h e r e i s no r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two. Consequently, any t h e o r e t i c a l t r a d i t i o n which l a y s c l a i m t o the analogy as c o n s t i t u t i n g i t s b a s i s i s c e r t a i n l y f r e e t o do so, but i t may not be e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d i n c a l l i n g i t s e l f •" Hobbesi an •" . In s h o r t , I s h a l l argue t h a t the analogy was simply one of Hobbes' r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e s , and as such i t has l i t t l e t h e o r e t i c a l value i n terms of Hobbes-' own p r o j e c t . MARTIN MIGHT ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l theory", a c c o r d i n g t o Wight, i s "a t r a d i t i o n of s p e c u l a t i o n about r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s , a t r a d i t i o n imagined as the twin of s p e c u l a t i o n about the s t a t e t o which the name ' p o l i t i c a l theory" i s a p p r o p r i a t e d . " 0 Given t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that. Wight spends a great deal of i n t e l l e c t u a l energy s e a r c h i n g f o r the r o o t s of t h i s t r a d i t i o n . Although Wight f e e l s t h a t the bulk of the t r a d i t i o n has been borne by the c l a s s i c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l lawyers, he argues t h a t i t i s "the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s with the p r e -c o n t r a c t u a l s t a t e of n a t u r e " 9 t h a t l i e s at the heart of the t r a d i t i o n . In other words, Hobbes-" analogy c o n s t i t u t e s the core of i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory. Having e s t a b l i s h e d the 'core' of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y — a n " . . . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f i r s t made by Hobbes and . . . c a r r i e d from him i n t o the law D f n a t i o n s by Pufendorf"—Wight, goes on t o d i s c u s s an ' i n c o n s i s t e n c y " or 'ambiguity" at t h a t core. Wight concludes t h a t Hobbes-" 10 analogy i s " e m p i r i c a l l y t r u e . . . . But t h e o r e t i c a l l y odd." Wight concludes t h i s because " f o r i n d i v i d u a l s , the s t a t e of nature . . . l e a d s t o the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . For s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s , i t does no such t h i n g . " T h i s 'ambiguity', Wight continues, "becomes a p e r s i s t e n t f e a t u r e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y . " 1 0 At t h i s time, I would l i k e t o draw p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o Wight's c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hobbes' analogy i s e m p i r i c a l 1v t r u e but t h e o r e t i c a l 1v odd. Although I must agree with t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , i t causes me no great d i s c o m f o r t . I s h a l l argue i n due course t h a t the key t o i s o l a t i n g Hobbes' analogy from h i s theory i s by simply acknowledging i t as a p u r e l y e m p i r i c a l statement; a statement t o which Hobbes a s c r i b e d v i r t u a l l y no t h e o r e t i c a l value. As such, the ' t h e o r e t i c a l o d d i t y ' t h a t Wight n o t i c e d i s not a concern i n terms of Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l theory. Thus, i f Hobbes d i d i n t r o d u c e an i n c o n s i s t e n c y or ambiguity i n t o the core of i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory, he d i d so with what i s perhaps one of h i s more ingenious r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e s . However, t h i s i s t o a n t i c i p a t e my argument i n the l a s t p a r t of t h i s chapter. In the meantime, l e t us t u r n t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of V i n c e n t ' s views on the 'Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n ' i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. JOHN VINCENT Vincent begins h i s treatment of the 'Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n ' by e x p l i c i t l y s t a t i n g t h a t h i s concern i s with the c u r r e n t importance of the t r a d i t i o n . He wants "to be s e l f - c o n s c i o u s about the way i n which we now t h i n k about 11 i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s Cin o r d e r ] t o d i s c o v e r the extent t o which i t i s shaped by the legacy of Hobbes." That t r a d i t i o n , he adds, "can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as having at i t s c e n t e r the problem, grim and i n s o l u b l e , of the c o e x i s t e n c e of s t a t e s i n the absence of i n t e r n a t i o n a l government." 1 1 I t i s c l e a r t h a t Vincent i s speaking about the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , but he i s using Hobbes-1 name t o d e s c r i b e i t . More important t o my a n a l y s i s , however, Vincent argues t h a t the 'Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n - 1 p r o v i d e s "a s t a r t i n g p l a c e f o r thought about i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . " 1 5 2 Although t h i s s t a r t i n g p l a c e , a c c o r d i n g t o V i n c e n t , " i s o f t e n thought t o be a r e a l i s t one, indeed t o c o n s t i t u t e with M a c h i a v e l l i , the d e f i n i t i o n of r e a l i s m , " 1 3 he goes on to argue t h a t ' Hobbesians' such a Morgenthau and Kissinger-d i s p l a y a ' Rat i o n a l i s t ' i n f l u e n c e i n t h e i r work. In other words, these t h e o r i s t s seem t o f i t i n t o Wight's category of 'law and order and keep your word men' i n a d d i t i o n t o the category of 'blood and i r o n and immorality men.' Vincent then asks, "how f a r can t h i s [ r a t i o n a l i s t ] concern be s a i d t o belong t o the Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n ? " 1 * * The essence of V i n c e n t ' s response i s t h a t they do remain w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n because Hobbes was a l s o a r a t i o n a l i s t . In terms of the Wightian ' r e a l i s t ' and ' r a t i o n a l i s t ' c a t e g o r i e s , Vincent concludes that "Hobbes occupied the marchlands between these two, and c o n s t a n t l y kept one as a check on the enthusiasm of the other. Academic i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . . . has, i n t h i s r egard, 12 • f l a t t e r e d Hobbes by i m i t a t i n g him." 1 , 3 In terms o-f my concern i n t h i s chapter, however, the most i n t e r e s t i n g p a r t o-f V i n c e n t ' s argument i s the t e x t u a l b a s i s he used f o r the c l a i m t h a t Hobbes was a l s o a r a t i o n a l i s t . Whereas Vincent employed Hobbes' analogy t o support the c l a i m t h a t Hobbes could be c l a s s i f i e d as a r e a l i s t , he used Hobbes' q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the analogy as the t e x t u a l b a s i s f o r h i s c l a i m t h a t Hobbes was a l s o a r a t i o n a l i s t . According to V i n c e n t , "Hobbes' remark t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l anarchy i s , because i t upholds the i n d u s t r y of the s u b j e c t s of s o v e r e i g n s , more bearab l e than anarchy among i n d i v i d u a l human beings, has been the s t a r t i n g p l a c e , and a very p r o d u c t i v e one, of much thought about the nature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . " * * 5 Against V i n c e n t ' s c l a i m t h a t "Hobbes f i r s t had the wit t o n o t i c e the important d i s t i n c t i o n , " 1 7 * I s h a l l argue t h a t Hobbes was f o r c e d by h i s own l o g i c t o make the d i s t i n c t i o n , l e s t he be compelled t o i n c o r p o r a t e h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about r e l a t i o n s among so v e r e i g n s i n t o h i s theory. Hobbes c a r e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d knowledge gained by experience ( h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about s o v e r e i g n s ) and knowledge gained by h i s conception of s c i e n t i f i c r e a s o n i n g <his i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of n a t u r e ) . Hobbes would be the f i r s t t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t mixing the two forms of knowledge as he d i d i n h i s analogy was unacceptable s c i e n t i f i c r e asoning. Although t h i s r easoning may have been unacceptable t o h i m s e l f , he n e v e r t h e l e s s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t much of h i s a u d i e n c e — i n p a r t i c u l a r , those 13 a s c r i b i n g t o A r i s t o t e l e a n or S c h o l a s t i c d o c t r i n e — w o u l d probably accept h i s analogy as c o n s t i t u t i n g a v a l i d proof of h i s e a r l i e r i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of nature. Regardless, by q u a l i f y i n g h i s a n a l o g y — i . e . by e x p l i c i t l y s t a t i n g t h a t the s t a t e of nature and r e l a t i o n s among so v e r e i g n s are not the same—he e f f e c t i v e l y f r e e d himself t o s t a t e the analogy without having t o employ h i s r i g o r o u s method t o check and see i f an a c t u a l t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d between h i s e a r l i e r i n f e r e n c e and h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about r e l a t i o n s among so v e r e i g n s . I s h a l l develop t h i s reasoning f u r t h e r i n the l a s t p a r t of t h i s chapter f o l l o w i n g the d i s c u s s i o n of N a v a r i ' s argument. CORNELIA NAVARI Although the form and substance of Nav a r i ' s argument may d i f f e r somewhat, the i n t e n t of her p r o j e c t i s i d e n t i c a l t o mine. I t i s c l e a r t h a t she o b j e c t s t o the p r a c t i c e of using Hobbes-* name t o d e s c r i b e the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. Her d i s c u s s i o n which c o n t r a s t s r e a l i s m and Hobbes-1 philosophy a c h i e v e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree of depth and I f i n d i t q u i t e c o n v i n c i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I am uncomfortable with her d e c i s i o n t o t r e a t the s t a t e of nature as a l o g i c a l  category.! e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of her c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought would employ these c a t e g o r i e s . i e I do not deny t h a t Hobbes-' •"natural c o n d i t i o n of mankind-' i s a l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t or, as Hobbes put i t , an " i n f e r e n c e , made from the pas s i o n s ; 14 but I do have d i f f i c u l t y c o n c e i v i n g t h i s c o n s t r u c t as a l o g i c a l category similar- t o some of the other concepts Navari mentions, such as s o v e r e i g n t y and j u s t i c e . C a t e g o r i e s which, Navari argues, can "be a p p l i e d t o any p o l i t i c a l phenomena wherever they appear." 8 2 0 In l i g h t of the i n t e n t of N a v a r i ' s paper, I was s u r p r i s e d t h a t she would consider- the s t a t e of nature as a l o g i c a l category because i t seems t o me t h a t t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y how the r e a l i s t s c o n s i d e r i t when they apply i t t o the r e l a t i o n s of s t a t e s . In c o n t r a s t with N a v a r i ' s c o n t e n t i o n , they do not seem t o be employing i t i n any d e s c r i p t i v e way. By a p p l y i n g i t as a l o g i c a l category rather- than as a d e s c r i p t i v e p a r a l l e l , r e a l i s t s are ab l e t o conceive the core of t h e i r p r o j e c t as the "problem, grim and i n s o l u b l e , of the c o e x i s t e n c e of s t a t e s i n the absence of i n t e r n a t i o n a l government."® 1 For the r e a l i s t s , i n other words, i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s does not appear l i k e the s t a t e of nature, i t is. the s t a t e of nature. For Hobbes, on the other hand, i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s appeared l i k e the s t a t e of nature. In s h o r t , by choosing t o t r e a t the s t a t e of nature as a l o g i c a l category, i t appears t h a t she may have i n a d v e r t e n t l y s a n c t i o n e d the p r a c t i c e of c a l l i n g r e a l i s m the Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n . <2) Hobbes' Analogy — R h e t o r i c or Theory? The primary aim of the f o e r g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n was t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Hobbes' analogy i n f a c t does c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i s of the r e a l i s t , t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. 15 Although I have no o b j e c t i o n t o such use, I do o b j e c t t o the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of Hobbes-" name because the analogy has no bear i n g on Hobbes-" theory. As I have mentioned e a r l i e r , the key t o my argument i n t h i s chapter i s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Hobbes-" analogy i s a r h e t o r i c a l r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l d e v i c e . Thus, any t r a d i t i o n of thought t h a t uses the analogy as c o n s t i t u t i n g the core of th a t t r a d i t i o n cannot p r o p e r l y c a l l i t s e l f Hobbesian. My assumption here i s t h a t a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n would at l e a s t e s t a b l i s h a s u b s t a n t i v e t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k with Hobbes, r a t h e r than simply adopting p o r t i o n s of Hobbes'text which may have l i t t l e b e a r i n g on h i s theory. I b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i o n i s an important one because i t seems t h a t a l e s s than c a r e f u l s e l e c t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n of l a b e l s , e s p e c i a l l y when c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i s t s are i n v o l v e d , u l t i m a t e l y s e r v e s t o l i m i t r a t h e r than expand the spectrum of i n t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r y . I f , f o r example, an undergraduate i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , while attempting t o grapple with the r e a l i s t p e r s p e c t i v e , c o n s t a n t l y encountered the •" Hobbesian' l a b e l as s i g n i f y i n g t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h i s person might never be i n c l i n e d t o read Hobbes because he or she apparently already knows what i t i s t h a t he had t o say. But, whether or not the Hobbesian l a b e l i s c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d depends on the f o l l o w i n g argument. Let rne suggest t h a t the most s i g n i f i c a n t reason why Hobbes-' name i s a s c r i b e d t o the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i s 16 because of the apparent t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k between h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about r e l a t i o n s among s o v e r e i g n s and h i s i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e o-f nature. Thus, i t seems t o me that, the key t o d i s t a n c i n g Hobbes -from the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i s t o sever the apparent t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k between h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s and h i s i n f e r e n c e . T h i s , however, would r a i s e the q u e s t i o n of why Hobbes employed the analogy i n the f i r s t p l a c e i f i t d i d not i n f a c t have any s u b s t a n t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l v a l u e . A f t e r a l l , the analogy does seem t o play an important r o l e i n h i s argument. I s h a l l address t h i s q u e s t i o n by demonstrating t h a t the analogy d i d , i f f a c t , p l ay a v i t a l i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n h i s argument, but i t played v i r t u a l l y no r o l e i n h i s p o l i t i c a l theory. Having e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s , we can thus conclude t h a t the analogy was simply a r h e t o r i c a l and not a t h e o r e t i c a l d e v i c e . In order t o i d e n t i f y Hobbes-1 analogy as a r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e , I proceed i n two stages. In the f i r s t stage, I s h a l l hold constant the a s s e r t i o n t h a t the analogy has no t h e o r e t i c a l v a l u e while e x p l a i n i n g why the analogy played an important i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n h i s argument. During the second stage of the argument, I s h a l l demonstrate why the analogy c o u l d not h o l d any t h e o r e t i c a l v alue f o r Hobbes. In summary, my argument can be conceived as f o l l o w s ' <1> If. the analogy p l a y s an important i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n terms of Hobbes-1 argument; and <2) If. the analogy has no value i n terms of Hobbes-1 theory; then <3) the analogy must simply be a r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e . And (4) s i n c e the analogy i s a r h e t o r i c a l d e vice, i t cannot t h e r e f o r e form the b a s i s of a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. 17 The • f i r s t stage i n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l attempt t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t the analogy d i d play an important r o l e and the second stage w i l l attempt t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t the analogy d i d not have any s u b s t a n t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l v a l u e . THE ANALOGY AS AN ' APPARENT' PROOF In order t o e s t a b l i s h the r o l e Hobbes' analogy may have played i n h i s argument, i t i s perhaps a good idea t o f i r s t determine what Hobbes' argument was. One way of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h i s , however, i s t o f i r s t determine what the q u e s t i o n was t h a t h i s argument was meant as a r e p l y t o . By doing t h i s , I am e s s e n t i a l l y conforming t o R.G. Col 1ingwood's technique of 'question and answer'; a technique which i s used t o help the reader t o 'get i n t o the author's mind', so to speak. "You cannot f i n d out what a man means," argues Col Iingwood, by simply s t u d y i n g h i s spoken or w r i t t e n statements even though he has spoken or w r i t t e n with p e r f e c t command of language and p e r f e c t l y t r u t h f u l i n t e n t i o n . In order t o f i n d out h i s meaning you must a l s o know what the q u e s t i o n was (a q u e s t i o n i n h i s own mind, and presumed by him to be i n yours) t o which the t h i n g he has s a i d D r w r i t t e n was meant as an answer. 2 5 3 In terms of Hobbes, t h i s task proved t o be much more d i f f i c u l t , f o r me than i t sounds. I t v i r t u a l l y meant h e s i t a t i n g a f t e r r e a d i n g each of Hobbes' p r o p o s i t i o n s and asking myself 1 What i s the q u e s t i o n t h a t Hobbes' i s t r y i n g to answer with t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n ? In the case of a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t passage, the problem of p r o v i d i n g a q u e s t i o n f o r Hobbes' answer i n v o l v e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree 18 of t r i a l and e r r o r . With r e s p e c t t o Hobbes-* d e f i n i t i o n s , however, the job was much e a s i e r because the quest i o n seemed obvious. For example, a f t e r r e a d i n g Hobbes-' d e f i n i t i o n of the ' w i l l ' , I simply p o s i t e d the question- what i s the w i l l ? Oddly enough, i n t h i s case and many o t h e r s , Hobbes' answer seemed t o ' f i t ' , but i t d i d not seem t o f i t q u i t e r i g h t . These occurrences, because they were repeated occurrences, l e d roe t o suspect t h a t perhaps i t were my qu e s t i o n s that were not q u i t e r i g h t ; although I could not begin t o imagine what was wrong with them. On the one hand, Hobbes' d i s c o u r s e seemed t o have a continuous and m o t i o n - l i k e q u a l i t y about i t whereas, on the other hand, my q u e s t i o n s beginning with •'what i s ' d i d not seem t o be capable of grasping t h a t q u a l i t y i n h i s work. My di s c o m f o r t continued u n t i l the word 'consequence' captured my a t t e n t i o n while I was r e - r e a d i n g chapter 5, "Of Reason and Scien c e " . "Science," Hobbes argues, " i s the knowledge of consequences, and the dependence of one f a c t upon the o t h e r . " 5 2 3 I t then occurred t o me t h a t perhaps Hobbes was employing t h i s s c i e n t i f i c method throughout h i s d i s c u s s i o n . If t h i s were the case, I concluded t h a t a •'consequence' i s not a r e p l y t o the quest i o n 'what i_s X?' r a t h e r , i t i s a r e p l y t o the qu e s t i o n 'what causes X?'. For example, Hobbes advanced the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n on the idea of ' w i l l ' * In d e l i b e r a t i o n , the l a s t a p p e t i t e , or a v e r s i o n , immediately adhaering t o the a c t i o n , or t o the 19 omission t h e r e o f , i s t h a t we c a l l the w i l l ; the act (not the f a c u l t y ) of w i l l i n g . 5 2 * * If t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n was meant as a r e p l y t o the q u e s t i o n •'what _s the w i l l ? - ' , t h e r e i s a reasonable f i t between the supposed que s t i o n and the given answer. However, by s u b s t i t u t i n g the a c t i v e verb "causes -' f o r ' is -" , we f i n d t h a t the meaning of Hobbes-" r e p l y i s c o n s i d e r a b l y enhanced. We can now e n v i s i o n a continuous connection between d e l i b e r a t i o n and w i l l . The w i l l now appears t o be an a c t i v e stage i n a l a r g e r and continuous process r a t h e r than as a l i f e l e s s t h i n g . I t t u r n s out t h a t the commonwealth l i e s at the end of t h i s continuous c h a i n of processes. Perhaps, then, P a r t one of Leviathan i s Hobbes-" response t o the q u e s t i o n •'what causes the commonwealth?-" Part two of L e v i a t h a n , on the other hand, appears t o be an answer more s u i t e d the the q u e s t i o n 'What i s the commonwealth?' Sin c e Hobbes' analogy i s an apparent proof of h i s i n f e r e n c e , or l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t , of the s t a t e of nature, and s i n c e the s t a t e of nature i s i n c l u d e d i n P a r t one of L e v i a t h a n , I s h a l l examine t h i s c o n s t r u c t , i n a d d i t i o n t o the apparent proof he o f f e r s i n support of i t , i n the context of the q u e s t i o n which seeks t o determine the causes of the commomwealth. In other words, I w i l l not be examining Hobbes' analogy i n terms of any q u e s t i o n s which might be of immediate i n t e r e s t or concern t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s . Rather, I w i l l be examining i t i n terms of what I suppose t o be the q u e s t i o n t h a t Hobbes s e t out t o answer in p a r t one of L e v i a t h a n . 20 Hobbes-' c o n s t r u c t , or ' in-ference- 1 as he p r e f e r s t o c a l l i t , of the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of mankind i s a v i t a l l i n k i n the c h a i n of processes which culminate i n the human c r e a t i o n of the commonwealth. Hobbes begins t h i s c h a i n of processes with a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of man. Whereas the inherent human i n c l i n a t i o n towards a c q u i r i n g the means of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n can be viewed as the end or consequence of a chain of processes generated by the pa s s i o n s i n s o l i p s i s t i c man, the c o n d i t i o n of the s t a t e of nature i s the immediate consequence when these men are pl a c e d i n pr o x i m i t y t o each other. In other words, man i s n a t u r a l l y equipped with the i n c l i n a t i o n and a b i l i t y t o get along well enough by h i m s e l f ; i t i s when he comes i n t o c o n t a c t with o t h e r s who are s i m i l a r l y equipped t h a t problems begin t o a r i s e . Although man, ac c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, i s designed t o l i v e alone, the f a c t i s t h a t he does not l i v e alone. I t i s because of t h i s predicament t h a t problems a r i s e . For Hobbes, th e r e i s no such t h i n g as n a t u r a l s o c i a l harmony among men. Rather, s o c i a l harmony i s something t h a t r e q u i r e s an a c t i v e and cons c i o u s e f f o r t on the p a r t of i n d i v i d u a l human beings. I t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e i s indeed at l e a s t a kernel of t r u t h i n Hobbes-1 p o s i t i o n t h a t man i s not n a t u r a l l y a s o c i a l c r e a t u r e . We need only r e f l e c t on what i s perhaps a very common admonishment between parent and c h i l d — ' y o u must l e a r n t h a t you can't have e v e r y t h i n g your own way! -'—in order t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t element of t r u t h . In s h o r t , we must l e a r n how t o be s o c i a l c r e a t u r e s . Even a f t e r we have 21 supposedly learned t o be s o c i a l , we can perhaps imagine s i t u a t i o n s where i t takes a c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t on our p a r t i n the -form of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t i n order t o maintain our s o c i a -b i l i t y . I thi n k t h a t Hobbes was keenly aware of t h i s and because of t h i s awareness he was unable t o ho n e s t l y accept the A r i s t o t e l e a n precept t h a t man was a s o c i a l c r e a t u r e ; a precept which was undoubtedly founded on the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t everywhere men l i v e i n s o c i e t i e s . Hobbes was a l s o keen enough t o imagine s i t u a t i o n s i n which even s e l f - r e s t r a i n t was not enough t o maintain a s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n among men. Sometimes p a r t i c u l a r men might have t o be subdued by f o r c e in order t o maintain a s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n between them or among men at l a r g e . Thus, s e l f - r e s t r a i n t on behalf of i n d i v i d u a l persons i s a necessary but i n s u f f i c i e n t p r e -c o n d i t i o n f o r the establishment and maintenance of s o c i e t y because we can imagine s i t u a t i o n s where two people p e r c e i v e themselves t o be e x e r c i s i n g extreme s e l f - r e s t r a i n t w h i le n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r c e i v i n g the other t o be e x e r c i s i n g v i r t u a l l y none. Man i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, " f o r want of r i g h t reason c o n s t i t u t e d by nature", and because of t h i s n a t u r a l d e f i c i e n c y of man, when t h e r e i s a con t r o v e r s y i n an account, the p a r t i e s must by t h e i r own accord, set up f o r r i g h t Reason, the Reason of some A r b i t r a t o r , or Judge, t o whose sentence they w i l l both stand, or t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s i e must e i t h e r come t o blowes, or be undecided. . . . And when men t h a t t h i n k themselves wiser than a l l o t h e r s , clamor and demand r i g h t Reason f o r judge; yet seek no more, but t h a t t h i n g s should be determined, by no other mens reason but t h e i r own, i t i s as i n t o l e r a b l e i n the s o c i e t y of men, as i t i s i n play a f t e r trump 22 i s turned, t o use -for trump on every o c c a s i o n , t h a t s u i t e whereof they have most i n t h e i r hand. 5 2 3 S o c i e t y , then, can be s a i d t o e x i s t when two p r e - c o n d i t i o n s are met. The - f i r s t c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l human beings e x e r c i s e s e l - f - r e s t r a i n t c o n s i s t e n t with the s e l f -r e s t r a i n t of o t h e r s . In other words, because men e x i s t i n the company of other men, they must l e a r n t h a t they cannot have e v e r y t h i n g they want. The second c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t they must ' s et up' f o r r i g h t reason i n t h a t they must e s t a b l i s h a judge and must agree t o submit t o h i s judgements. But because "Of the d i f f e r e n c e of Manners" 5 2* 3 of men, th e r e i s a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some men w i l l not submit when t h e i r p e r c e i v e d v i t a l i n t e r e s t s are at stake. Consequently, the judge must be armed with s u f f i c i e n t power in order t o enf o r c e h i s or her judgements. I t i s only when these two c o n d i t i o n s are met, acc o r d i n g t o Hobbes, t h a t a s o c i e t y can be s a i d t o e x i s t among men. Conversely, when n e i t h e r of these c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t , t h e r e i s no s o c i e t y among p a r t i c u l a r men and Hobbes' s t a t e of nature i s an attempt at i n f e r r i n g i n the a b s t r a c t what such a predicament would be l i k e . However, such a predicament i s at odds with one of the fundamental human pas s i o n s namely, s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n . But, a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, i t i s the pass i o n of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t puts men i n t o t h i s c o n d i t i o n i n the f i r s t p l a c e . The p a s s i o n of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n when man i s alone i n the world i s conducive t o h i s own p r e s e v a t i o n , however, once persons are pla c e d i n p r o x i m i t y with each other, t h a t same p a s s i o n l e a d s 23 u l t i m a t e l y t o s e l f d e s t r u c t i o n . The problem f o r Hobbes, and presumably f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t might be i n t h i s predicament, i s t o f i n d a way of i n t e r r u p t i n g the c h a i n of events t h a t lead from s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n t o s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . Man i s not t o t a l l y l o s t , however, because i n a d d i t i o n to h i s p a s s i o n s he i s endowed with the f a c u l t y of reason. Through the use of reason he can break the i n e v i t a b l e l i n k between s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n and s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n by c r e a t i n g s o c i e t y ; and the c r e a t i o n of s o c i e t y simply i n v o l v e s e s t a b l i s h i n g the two c o n d i t i o n s t h a t were mentioned above, namely, s e l f -r e s t r a i n t and a common power to keep them a l l i n awe. The s t o r y , however, does not end here because Hobbes goes on t o t r a n s l a t e the f o r e g o i n g i n t o e t h i c a l and l e g a l terms v i a the language of n a t u r a l law. In t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n the fundamental human pass i o n of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n becomes the "Law of Nature"; which i s , f o r Hobbes, a Precept, or general 1 Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man i s f o r b i d d e n t o do, t h a t , which i s d e s t r u c t i v e of h i s l i f e , or t a k e t h away the means of p r e s e r v i n g the same; and t o omit, t h a t , by which he t h i n k e t h i t may be best preserved. S S 7* In other words, the law of nature commands t h a t man endeavour t o p r e s e r v e h i m s e l f . The right, of nature, on the other hand, i s not the •"right of. s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n ' , r a t h e r , i t i s the r i g h t to the means of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n . "The Right of Nature," i n Hobbes' terms, i s the L i b e r t y each man hath, t o use h i s own power, as he w i l l h i m s e l f e , f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of h i s own Nature; t h a t i s t o say, of h i s own 24 L i f e ; and consequently, o-f doing any t h i n g , which i n h i s own Judgement, and Reason, he s h a l l c onceive t o be the apt e s t means thereunto. 5 2 6 3 Thus, i n the s t a t e o-f nature, men are commanded t o pr e s e r v e themselves and they a l s o have the l i b e r t y t o a c q u i r e and use whatever means they deem necessary -for t h e i r s u r v i v a l . Having r e c o g n i z e d t h e i r m i s e r a b l e c o n d i t i o n , they are commanded by the law o-f nature t o do something about i t because the e x i s t i n g s t a t e o-f a - f f a i r s i s not conducive t o t h e i r own p r e s e r v a t i o n . Thus, they lay down t h e i r n a t u r a l r i g h t (a form of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t ) by c o n c u r r e n t l y t r a n s f e r i n g i t t o a common power. In s h o r t , the way out of an otherwise m i s e r a b l e c o n d i t i o n i s t o c r e a t e s o c i e t y . They are o b l i g e d t o c r e a t e s o c i e t y because the law of nature commands th a t they do not omit t o do anything t h a t i s conducive t o t h e i r p r e s e r v a t i o n , and t h e i r reason t e l l s them t h a t s o c i e t y i s the only s o l u t i o n . By t r a n s l a t i n g h i s otherwise s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t of the s t a t e of nature i n t o e t h i c a l - I e g a l terms, Hobbes succeeds i n g i v i n g s o c i e t y and the Leviathan a dual source of moral l e g i t i m a c y . On the one hand, s o c i e t y i s good because the i n d i v i d u a l can lead a b e t t e r and longer-l i f e w i t h i n i t . Because i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o s e l f -p r e s e r v a t i o n , i t s continued e x i s t e n c e c a r r i e s with i t a degree of moral f o r c e . On the other hand, the law of nature commands, a l b e i t i n d i r e c t l y , t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s enter i n t o s o c i e t y ; and s i n c e s o c i e t y , by d e f i n i t i o n , means s e l f r e s t r a i n t i n a d d i t i o n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n of the so v e r e i g n , 25 a c t s a g a i n s t the s o v e r e i g n , again i n d i r e c t l y , c o n s t i t u t e v i o l a t i o n s a g a i n s t n a t u r a l law. However, by t r a n s l a t i n g the s t a t e of nature i n t o l e g a l e t h i c a l terms v i a the language of n a t u r a l law, Hobbes denies himself the p o s s i b i l i t y of making a d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i e t y , on the one hand, and p o l i t y , on the other. Thus, f o r Hobbes, the commonwealth, or s t a t e as we p r e f e r t o c a l l i t , is. s o c i e t y . R e f l e c t i n g on what I understand t o be the essence of Hobbes-1 argument i n p a r t one of L e v i a t h a n , i t appears t h a t the s t a t e of nature i s a c r u c i a l component of h i s theory f o r at l e a s t two reasons. F i r s t of a l l , i n terms of the q u e s t i o n of causes, i t p r o v i d e s an account of what e x i s t e n c e without the s t a t e would be l i k e i n order t o e s t a b l i s h a motive f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g one. In other words, the s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t might s u i t a b l y p r o v i d e an answer t o the q u e s t i o n 1 If the s t a t e d i d not e x i s t , why would men be i n c l i n e d t o c r e a t e i t ? The second, and perhaps more important reason why the s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t i s c r u c i a l t o Hobbes - 1 theory i s t h a t i t p r o v i d e s a s u i t a b l e s c e n a r i o i n which he can t r a n s l a t e the s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n of man i n t o moral and e t h i c a l terms by employing the language of n a t u r a l law. Hobbes perhaps found i t d i f f i c u l t , as I c e r t a i n l y would, t o i n t r o d u c e the concept of n a t u r a l law i n t o a p r e - e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s e t t i n g . In summary, the s t a t e of nature i s c r u c i a l t o Hobbes - 1 theory because, i n a d d i t i o n t o p r o v i d i n g the b a s i s f o r the c r e a t i o n of s o c i e t y , i t 26 provided the b a s i s f o r the p a r t i c u l a r kind of s o c i e t y he wanted t o c r e a t e . Thus, the r e s t of Hobbes' theory would remain e i t h e r meaningless or unconvincing t o anyone who would not, or could not, accept h i s s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t . It i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, t h a t Hobbes would depart from h i s usual method and employ e x t r a o r d i n a r y means t o convince h i s re a d e r s t o accept the s t a t e of nature as a v a l i d c o n s t r u c t . Immediately f o l l o w i n g what i s perhaps Hobbes' most-quoted s t a t e m e n t — " a n d the l i f e of man, s o l i t a r y , poore, nasty, b r u t i s h , and s h o r t " — h e i n t r o d u c e s h i s apparent a n a l o g i c a l proof i n t h i s way-It may seem strange t o some man, t h a t has not well weighed these t h i n g s ; t h a t nature should thus d i s s o c i a t e , and render men apt t o invade, and destroy one another- and he may t h e r e f o r e , not t r u s t i n g t o t h i s i n f e r e n c e , made from the pas s i o n s , d e s i r e perhaps t o have the same confirmed by e x p e r i e n c e . s s " Here Hobbes appears t o be speaking d i r e c t l y t o a p a r t i c u l a r group of r e a d e r s who were probably sympathetic with A r i s t o t e l e a n d o c t r i n e ; a group who f e l t r a t h e r comfortable with the n o t i o n t h a t man i s a ' p o l i t i c a l animal' and the b e l i e f t h a t s o c i e t y i s an e n t i t y which i s n a t u r a l i n i t s own r i g h t . He a l s o may have been aware t h a t t h i s same group of rea d e r s p l a c e d a great deal of weight on the s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d i t y of t h e i r experience and o b s e r v a t i o n s with respect. to the n a t u r a l and e t h i c a l worlds. Since Hobbes a n t i c i p a t e d that, not only would h i s d e p i c t i o n of the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of mankind f i n d o b j e c t i o n s among these readers, h i s method of e s t a b l i s h i n g the causes of such a c o n d i t i o n would appear 27 e n t i r e l y -foreign t o them. However, Hobbes may have supposed t h a t he o f f e r e d them something t h a t they c o u l d more comfortably r e l a t e t o as a 'proof' of h i s i n f e r e n c e , perhaps they might j u s t accept t h a t c r u c i a l element of h i s theory. Regardless, l e t us r e t u r n t o the above q u o t a t i o n f o r a moment and c o n s i d e r two important words contained w i t h i n i t . The words I would l i k e t o emphasize are ' i n f e r e n c e ' and 'experience-'. I t should a l s o be noted t h a t ' i n f e r e n c e ' appears t o r e f e r t o the type of knowledge t h a t Hobbes had developed i n the passages preceding t h i s paragraph; and the word 'experience' r e f e r s t o the type of knowledge t h a t w i l l be recorded i n the few passages which f o l l o w i t . What Hobbes e s s e n t i a l l y does i n the f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s — t h e l a s t p a r t of chapter 1 3 — i s t h a t he d e s c r i b e s some of h i s e xperiences and o b s e r v a t i o n s of the p o l i t i c a l world i n terms of h i s l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t . Thus he i s c o n s t r u c t i n g an analogy between, on the one hand, what he c l a i m s t o p e r c e i v e about the p o l i t i c a l world and, on the other hand, h i s s c i e n t i f i c i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of nature. H i s analogy i s c l e a r l y a d e s c r i p t i v e one i n that he i s i n essence s a y i n g : t h i s i s what I, Thomas Hobbes, c l a i m to p e r c e i v e about the p o l i t i c a l world; and my claimed p e r c e p t i o n i s s i m i l a r i n 'apparence' t o my i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of nature. In s h o r t , he i s simply r e p o r t i n g and d e s c r i b i n g a f a c t — a f a c t which i s u n r e l a t e d t o h i s theory. "The R e g i s t e r D f Knowledge of F a c t " , a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, " i s c a l l e d H i s t o r y " ; and Hobbes draws a 28 c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between h i s t o r y and s c i e n c e . 3 0 Hobbes' analogy, then, can only have h i s t o r i c a l v a l u e i n the twe n t i e t h century because a l l he has t o l d us i s t h a t r e l a t i o n s among s o v e r e i g n s in. h i s time appeared t o be s i m i l a r , but not e n t i r e l y s i m i l a r , t o h i s i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of nature. T h i s h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , on the other hand, t e l l s us nothing about h i s i n f e r e n c e . Nevertheless, I s p e c u l a t e t h a t rn h i s time he hoped t h a t many of h i s contemporaries would draw a d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n by t a k i n g i t upon themselves t o i n f l a t e the apparent t h e o r e t i c a l importance of h i s analogy because of i t s 'empi r i c a l - ' p r e t e n s i o n s . Perhaps h i s contemporaries would draw the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hobbes himself c o u l d not p o s s i b l y draw without compromising h i s philosophy of s c i e n c e . Perhaps they would simply accept i t as ' p r o o f of the v a l i d i t y of h i s th e o r y ' s l i n c h p i n , namely, the s t a t e of nature. Thus, i t seems t h a t Hobbes' analogy was a r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e which he o f f e r e d as an apparent proof f o r an important j u n c t u r e i n h i s theory; a j u n c t u r e which attempts t o e s t a b l i s h the causes of the commonwealth. However, the burden of proof s t i l l r e s t s with me t o demonstrate t h a t , i n view of h i s philosophy of s c i e n c e , Hobbes would have s u r e l y r e j e c t e d the analogy as c o n s t i t u t i n g a v a l i d proof of h i s i n f e r e n c e . THE ANALOGY AND HOBBES' PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Although the analogy seems t o be intended as an apparent proof of h i s s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t , the 29 q u e s t i o n now, however, i s whether or not Hobbes himself would have accepted i t as such. If he h i m s e l f would not accept i t as a v a l i d proof, but he n e v e r t h e l e s s employed the analogy i n order to i n f l u e n c e o t h e r s t o accept h i s s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t , we can perhaps s a f e l y conclude t h a t the analogy i s simply a r h e t o r i c a l r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l d e v i c e . Consequently i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y the p r a c t i c e of basing a ' Hobbesian - 1 t r a d i t i o n upon the analogy. The argument t h a t the analogy does not c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d proof i n Hobbes - 1 view very much r e s t s on the s t r e n g t h of the d i s t i n c t i o n he makes between, on the one hand, knowledge obtained by experience (knowledge of f a c t ) and, on the other hand, knowledge obtained by reason (knowledge of the consequences of one a f f i r m a t i o n t o a n o t h e r ) . 3 1 S i n c e the f o r c e of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s c r u c i a l t o my argument, i t w i l l be necessary t o examine i t i n l i g h t of Hobbes - 1 philosophy of s c i e n c e so t h a t we can determine why he made such a d i s t i n c t i o n . What i s even more important, however, i s not so much the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f , but r a t h e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p Hobbes - 1 method attempts t o e s t a b l i s h between both forms of knowledge. E s s e n t i a l l y , i t i s i n f e r e n c e s t h a t are used t o prove o b s e r v a t i o n s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, and not the other way around. Once we have r e f l e c t e d upon the one way d i r e c t i o n of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , we should be a b l e t o conclude t h a t t h e r e i s v i r t u a l l y no t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k between, on the one hand, h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about 30 r e l a t i o n s h i p s among sove r e i g n s and, on the other hand, h i s i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e o-f nature. For t h e r e t o be a t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k between h i s theory and h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s , Hobbes would have t o c o n s t r u c t a new i n f e r e n c e which would serve t o confirm the v a l i d i t y of h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about s o v e r e i g n s . As I s h a l l argue i n chapter two, th e r e i s much to be done be f o r e such an i n f e r e n c e can be made. In the meantime, however, l e t us co n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g remarks taken from chapter f i v e of L e v i a t h a n . These remarks, I b e l i e v e , capture the essence of Hobbes-" philosophy of s c i e n c e . "Reason", Hobbes argues, i s not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence i s ; but attayned by Industry; f i r s t , i n apt imposing of Names; and secondly by g e t t i n g a good and o r d e r l y Method i n proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, t o A s s e r t i o n s made by Connexion of one of them t o another; and so t o Sy l l o g i s m e s , which are the Connexions of one A s s e r t i o n t o another, t i l l we come t o a knowledge of a l l the consequences of names a p p e r t a i n i n g t o the subject, i n hand; and th a t i s i t , men c a l l S c i e n c e . And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which i s a t h i n g past, and i r r e v o c a b l e ; Science i s the knowledge of consequences, and dependance of one f a c t upon another: by which, out of t h a t we can p r e s e n t l y do, we know how t o do something e l s e when we w i l l , or the l i k e , another time- Because when we see how any t h i n g comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the l i k e causes come i n t o our power, we see how t o make it-produce the l i k e e f f e c t s . 3 5 2 Although these remarks might at f i r s t seem i n s i g n i f i c a n t , they n e v e r t h e l e s s deserve some r e f l e c t i o n because they d e s c r i b e the p a r t i c u l a r approach t o knowledge t h a t Hobbes adopts i n Leviathan. I t h i n k t h a t t r y i n g t o make sense of Leviathan without t h i s approach i n mind can 31 lead t o — a r i d perhaps has l e d t o — g r a v e misunderstandings about what i t i s t h a t he had t o say. In a d d i t i o n , philosophy of s c i e n c e was not a t r i v i a l concern f o r Hobbes. Rather, i t seems t o have informed h i s e n t i r e approach t o understanding the n a t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l worlds. There i s a l s o reason t o suggest, t h a t i n terms of h i s contemporaries such as G a l i l e o , Bacon, and Descartes, Hobbes was a p h i l o s o p h e r of s c i e n c e par e x e l 1 e n c e . 3 3 However, I t h i n k t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n c e of Hobbes' a p p r o a c h — a n d thus h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between ' i n f e r e n c e ' and ' o b s e r v a t i o n ' — c a n n o t f u l l y be a p p r e c i a t e d without a d i s c u s s i o n about how Hobbes came t o develop h i s phi Iosophy. Let us f i r s t , l a y the h i s t o r i c a l groundwork f o r h i s philosophy through a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of the v a r i o u s ' s c h o o l s ' of thought t h a t were p r e v a l e n t among Hobbes' contemporaries. The purpose of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l d i s c u s s i o n i s simply t o a s s i s t us i n g a i n i n g a b e t t e r purchase on the p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems f a c i n g Hobbes i n h i s day. A g a i n s t t h i s background h i s arguments i n L e v i a t h a n should become t h a t much more c l e a r and s i g n i f i c a n t . " 3 * * The t h r e e dominant p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d d u r i n g Hobbes' time were t h a t of A r i s t o t l e a n i s m , s k e p t i c i s m , and modern n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ( f o r lack of a b e t t e r term). Each o r i e n t a t i o n c o u l d perhaps be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r view on what kind of knowledge, i f any, c o n s t i t u t e d v a l i d s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. In other words, each o r i e n t a t i o n had i t s own d i s t i n c t answer to q u e s t i o n s 32 about, what i t i s t h a t human beings can p o s s i b l y come t o know about the world e x t e r n a l t o the s e l f , and how they can come to a c q u i r e t h a t knowledge. For example, the t h i n k e r s whD c a l l e d themselves A r i s t o t l e a n s tended t-D argue t h a t p e r c e p t i o n s a c q u i r e d by the human senses were more or l e s s a c c u r a t e -for determining the r e a l i t y , and the nature of t h a t r e a l i t y , of the world e x t e r n a l t o the s e l f . For A r i s t o t l e , / ' i f something looks white t o an o r d i n a r y healthy observer, then i t _s_ white. " 5 3 0 Thus, the A r i s t o t e l e a n s were c o n f i d e n t t h a t a more or l e s s complete body of knowledge about the e x t e r n a l world c o u l d be compiled; and t h a t such a body of knowledge could be acqu i r e d through human o b s e r v a t i o n . In other words, f o r the A r i s t o t e l e a n s , o b j e c t i v e t r u t h s l a y beyond and e x t e r n a l t o the s e l f and those t r u t h s c o u l d be p e r c e i v e d through the senses. T h i s c o n f i d e n c e i n the e x i s t e n c e of o b j e c t i v e t r u t h s a l s o seemed t o pervade t h e i r view of the e t h i c a l world i n t h a t " A r i s t o t l e had expressed great c o n f i d e n c e i n the u n i v e r s a l i t y of (roughly) the conve n t i o n a l moral b e l i e f s of a middle c l a s s Athenian of h i s day." 3* 3 However, both A r i s t o t l e i n h i s time and the A r i s t o t e l e a n s of the l a t e s i x t e e n t h century were faced with a s e r i o u s s k e p t i c a l c h a l l e n g e . T h i s new o r i e n t a t i o n emphasized the l i m i t a t i o n s of the a b i l i t y of the senses t o a c c u r a t e l y p e r c e i v e the r e a l nature of the e x t e r n a l world. From a tw e n t i e t h century vantage p o i n t we do not f i n d t h i s a s s e r t i o n a l l t h a t unreasonable. We l e a r n i n elementary 33 s c h o o l , d e s p i t e appearances t o the c o n t r a r y , t h a t the ea r t h i s a c t u a l l y round. We a l s o l e a r n , d e s p i t e our s e n s a t i o n t o the c o n t r a r y , t h a t the ea r t h r o t a t e s on i t s a x i s and h u r t l e s through space at a tremendous speed. We are a l s o q u i t e •familiar with o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n s and the apparently ' r e a l ' impact o-f dreams on those n i g h t s when we awaken s t a r t l e d and d i s o r i e n t e d . C o n s i d e r i n g these experiences, the s k e p t i c a l argument seems t o go l i k e t h i s ' If our sense p e r c e p t i o n s are c l e a r l y wrong i n some i n s t a n c e s , how do we know -for sure that, they are correct, i n other i n s t a n c e s ? Perhaps those senses are c o r r e c t when we co n s i d e r them t o be wrong, and wrong when we c o n s i d e r them t o be c o r r e c t . Perhaps when we are dreaming we are i n f a c t awake, and when we are awake we are i n f a c t dreaming. The problem f o r the s k e p t i c , then, i s determining i l l u s i o n from r e a l i t y ; and s i n c e the only means we have of doing t h i s (the senses) are not accur a t e , we t h e r e f o r e cannot p o s s i b l y know anything about the world. However, d e s p i t e t h e i r pessimism about the p o s s i b i l i t y of compiling any v a l i d body of knowledge about the e x t e r n a l world, they s t i l l f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t such a world e x i s t e d and t h a t i t had a nature independent of the s e l f . T h i s pessimism a l s o c a r r i e d i t s e l f i n t o the e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l world which, f o r the s k e p t i c s and n o n - s k e p t i c s a l i k e , was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p r a c t i c e s of d e c e i t , manipulation, and i n t i m i d a t i o n , r a t h e r than by those of v i r t u e and honour. T h i s provided more f u e l f o r the s k e p t i c a l assault, on A r i s t o t e l e a n i s m . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the 34 d o c t r i n e s born by s k e p t i c i s m such as c u l t u r a l and moral r e l a t i v i s m and reason of s t a t e 3 7 " were themselves a c q u i r e d through o b s e r v a t i o n o-f •"real-" p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . The i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s inherent i n s k e p t i c a l arguments d i d not go unnoticed by t h e o r i s t s who h e l d t o the t h i r d p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n namely, the modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s . The modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s were a l s o f a m i l i a r with o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n s and the l i k e and concluded, l i k e the s k e p t i c s , t h a t o b s e r v a t i o n and experience on t h e i r own could not c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i s f o r v a l i d s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. However, they r e c o g n i z e d one, perhaps f a t a l , flaw i n the s k e p t i c a l argument. E s s e n t i a l l y , i f the s k e p t i c s a s s e r t e d t h a t the senses were u n r e l i a b l e , how could they p o s s i b l y conclude t h a t any r e a l i t y a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d o u t s i d e the s e l f at a l l ? Perhaps we simply imagine t h a t such a r e a l i t y e x i s t s . R ichard Tuck expressed t h i s new ' s u p e r - s k e p t i c a l •* doubt i n t h i s way : If we can imagine a language which i s complete i n i t s e l f but which does not r e f e r t o any r e a l o b j e c t s ( l i k e the language which T o l k e i n invented t o accompany Lord of the R i n g s ) , so why can we not imagine an o r d e r l y and systematic sequence of images which do not r e f e r t o a n y t h i n g ? 3 0 In s h o r t , the modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s responded t o the s k e p t i c s by demonstrating the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e i r shared a s s e r t i o n t h a t human senses are u n r e l i a b l e with r e s p e c t t o p e r c e i v i n g r e a l i t y . The modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s , however, had an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t agenda i n mind. They b e l i e v e d t h a t a s y s t e m a t i c and more or l e s s complete body of knowledge was p o s s i b l e ; a body of knowledge 35 t h a t i n c l u d e d both the n a t u r a l and e t h i c a l - p o l i t i c a l realms. At the o u t s e t they were e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t h a t they were not prepared t o simply accept the e x i s t e n c e o-f an e x t e r n a l world. They b e l i e v e d t h a t the r e a l i t y o-f such a world had t o be argued i n t o e x i s t e n c e ; a world t h a t had t o be e x p l a i n e d and t h a t e x p l a n a t i o n had to be grounded on reason and not the senses. Descartes was one o-f the f i r s t t h e o r i s t s t o attempt such an e x p l a n a t i o n . Richard Tuck t e l l s us t h a t , a g a i n s t the A r i s t o t e l e a n s and s k e p t i c s a l i k e , Descartes argued t h a t t h e r e " i s no reason t o suppose t h a t t h e r e are c o l o u r s . . . i n the r e a l e x t e r n a l world at a l I . . . ." For t h a t matter, "perhaps not only c o l o u r s are n o n - e x i s t e n t , but a l s o the m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s i n which they seem t o inhere. " 3 S > Having presented h i s doubt, Descartes goes on t o argue why the e x t e r n a l world t h a t we p e r c e i v e must e x i s t and t h a t our p e r c e p t i o n s of t h a t world, at l e a s t t o some minimal extent, must r e f l e c t the nature of t h a t r e a l i t y . D escartes performs t h i s task with b a s i c a l l y two arguments. The f i r s t , a s s e r t s t h a t "though t h e r e may be nothing o u t s i d e , we know t h e r e i s something i n s i d e , f o r we have d i r e c t e xperience of the i n t e r i o r world of c o l o u r s , sounds and so on."** 0 In other words, although our knowledge of the world e x t e r n a l t o o u r s e l v e s i s more or l e s s s p e c u l a t i v e , we have a b s o l u t e l y compelling knowledge of what goes on i n s i d e us. Thus we have e s t a b l i s h e d Descartes- 1 famous maxim-- C o g i t o erg Sum <I t h i n k t h e r e f o r e I am). The p u z z l e , however, i s 36 whether or not t h i s i n t e r n a l world r e - f l e c t s anything about the e x t e r n a l world. At t h i s p o i n t Descartes deploys h i s second argument which, t o h i s own s a t i s f a c t i o n , e s t a b l i s h e s the e x i s t e n c e of a benevolent God. From t h i s argument he concludes t h a t "such a God would not mislead h i s favoured c r e a t i o n , man. What we genuinely t h i n k we p e r c e i v e must t h e r e f o r e be more or l e s s what i s a c t u a l l y out there.'"* 1 Hobbes, among oth e r s , r e c o g n i z e d t h a t Descartes -' s o l u t i o n t o the p u z z l e r e s t e d on the cogency of h i s p a r t i c u l a r argument f o r God's e x i s t e n c e , and Hobbes f e l t that, t h i s argument was r a t h e r shaky. Hobbes thus s e t out "with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n t e l l e c t u a l s e l f c o n f i d e n c e " t o s o l v e the p u z z l e f o r himself.** 5 2 Hobbes begins h i s argument by a c c e p t i n g Descartes' maxim <I t h i n k t h e r e f o r e I am) and, perhaps more f o r c e f u l l y than Descartes, he a s s e r t s t h a t human p e r c e p t i o n s bear no r e l a t i o n s h i p of v e r s i m i I i t u d e t o the e x t e r n a l world. A c c o r d i n g l y , "man i s e f f e c t i v e l y a p r i s o n e r w i t h i n the c e l l of h i s own mind, and has no idea what i n r e a l i t y l i e s o u t s i d e h i s p r i s o n w a l l s . " * * 3 In Elements of Law, Hobbes t e l l s us t h a t Whatsoever a c c i d e n t s or q u a l i t i e s our senses make us th i n k t h e r e be i n the world, they are not t h e r e , but seemings and a p p a r i t i o n s only . . . . And t h i s i s the great deception of sense, which a l s o i s by sense c o r r e c t e d . For as sense t e l l e t h rne, when I see d i r e c t l y , t h a t the c o l o u r seemeth t o be i n the o b j e c t ; so a l s o sense t e l l e t h me, when I see by r e f l e c t i o n , t h a t c o l o u r i s not i n the o b j e c t . **** Tuck i n t e r p r e t s t h i s t o mean—and I have no reason t o 37 suppose a d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — t h a t "we have only to r e f l e c t on the i m p l i c a t i o n s of such t h i n g s as a r e f l e c t e d image to r e a l i z e t h a t seeing something does not i n i t s e l f g i v e us any grounds f o r supposing t h a t the t h i n g seen i s r e a l 1y i n the p l a c e i t appears t o be or has the p r o p e r t i e s which we t h i n k i t has. ""*B At t h i s p o i n t we are no c l o s e r t o a s o l u t i o n t o the problem of whether or not anything e x i s t s o u t s i d e the s e l f . In f a c t , we seem t o be f u r t h e r away from a s o l u t i o n than we were at the beginning of Descartes-' argument. Because of the way t h a t Descartes poses h i s q u e s t i o n , we can s t i l l d e t e c t the assumption t h a t a r e a l e x t e r n a l world does e x i s t . It seems t h a t the problem Descartes set out t o s o l v e was simply t h a t of making the connection between i n t e r n a l r e a l i t y and the e x t e r n a l world; and, as we have alr e a d y seen, t h i s connection was made by e s t a b l i s h i n g the e x i s t e n c e of a benevolent c r e a t o r who could not p o s s i b l y wish to deceive us. The problem t h a t Hobbes s e t s out f o r h i m s e l f , on the other hand, seems t o be more fundamental and c l e a r l y f ocussed. In other words, he seemed t o see more c l e a r l y than Descartes t h a t b e f o r e one can e s t a b l i s h a I ink between the i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l w o r l d s — w i t h o u t r e v e r t i n g t o t h e o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s — o n e f i r s t had t o c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h the e x i s t e n c e of such a world. In t h i s sense, the h y p e r b o l i c a l doubt t h a t Hobbes introduced was even more s k e p t i c a l than Descartes- 1 . Hobbes-* s o l u t i o n , perhaps because of i t s elegance and s i m p l i c i t y , i s q u i t e 38 • f a s c i n a t i n g . In a d d i t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h i n g what I c o n s i d e r t o be a more fundamental problem, Hobbes a l s o c o n s t r u c t s an image of the s e l f which c l e a r l y d i v e r g e s from Descartes-" c o n s t r u c t . Whereas Descartes d e p i c t e d the s e l f as a mind which was separate "from i t s own p e r c e p t i o n s and wi t n e s s i n g these l i k e an observer witnesses the events o u t s i d e him", Hobbes i n s i s t s t h a t the s e l f would thi n k of him or h e r s e l f " j u s t as the t r a i n of p e r c e p t i o n s , because he could not p e r c e i v e anything (so t o speak) doing the t h i n k i n g . . . . The s e l f i n t h i s sense i s imaginary, simply a c o n s t r u c t a r i s i n g from our i n a b i l i t y t o conceive of t h i n k i n g without a t h i n k e r t o do i t . In a d d i t i o n t o Hobbes-' c o n s t r u c t of the s e l f , perhaps h i s g r e a t e s t i n n o v a t i o n i n terms of the immediate problem at h a n d — t h a t i s , determining the e x i s t e n c e of an e x t e r n a l w o r l d — i s t h a t Hobbes emphasizes the f a c t t h a t the images we p e r c e i v e are moving images. The quest i o n then becomes one of determining what i t i s t h a t causes the s e l f t o have these changing images."*7* Hobbes employs th r e e metaphysical p r o p o s i t i o n s i n order-t o answer the quest i o n of what causes moving images i n the s e l f . The f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n i s based on the ' p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n ' — t h a t i s , the p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e r e has t o be some new f e a t u r e i n a s i t u a t i o n t o e x p l a i n some new a l t e r a t i o n i n i t . The p r o p o s i t i o n simply a s s e r t s t h a t nothing can move i t s e l f . The second p r o p o s i t i o n i s t h a t 39 nothing c o u l d be moved except bodies i n space, and the t h i r d i s t h a t only bodies could move other- b o d i e s . 1 " * 0 Based on these t h r e e p r o p o s i t i o n s and the idea t h a t the s e l f e x p e r i e n c e s change i n h i s or her p e r c e p t i o n s , Hobbes concludes t h a t t h e r e must be "some m a t e r i a l o b j e c t o u t s i d e himsel-f which was causing him t o have the p e r c e p t i o n s which he had. ,,-»» Although Hobbes-' s o l u t i o n i s elegant and simple, the very l i m i t e d nature o-f h i s s o l u t i o n must be emphasized. Richard Tuck t e l l s us t h a t T h i s i s a c t u a l l y as -far as Hobbes ever went, or intended t o go. . . . E v e r y t h i n g e l s e — t h a t i s , the a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r of the e x t e r n a l world and of our r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i t — must remain c o n j e c t u r a l or h y p o t h e t i c a l , though some hypotheses are b e t t e r than o t h e r s . s o In other words, the e x t e r n a l world e x i s t s only through our a b i l i t y t o reason t h a t i t does e x i s t ; and as f a r as i t s nature i s concerned, the most t h a t we can a s s e r t i s that-some hypotheses are b e t t e r than o t h e r s . L e v i a t h a n embodies such a h y p o t h e s i s about the commonwealth and i t s causes; whereas the causes are human pa s s i o n s combined with reason, the effect, i s s o c i e t y . S ince s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, f o r Hobbes, i s knowledge about, causes and t h e i r e f f e c t s , such knowledge can only remain c o n d i t i o n a l . Thus, not only does he leave room f o r improvement i n terms of h i s own hypothesis-about s o c i e t y , he a c t u a l l y i n v i t e s i t . What he does not seem t o compromise, however, i s the method through which such an hyp o t h e s i s i s 40 t o be e s t a b l i s h e d because h i s method o-f e s t a b l i s h i n g such knowledge i s grounded i n h i s philosophy o-f s c i e n c e . A philosophy which can perhaps be summed up by the e x p r e s s i o n 5 •'things are not n e c e s s a r i l y the way they seem t o be-'. But Hobbes i s not prepared t o a s s e r t t h a t h i s s c i e n t i f i c method o-f e s t a b l i s h i n g causes and e f f e c t s through reasoning w i l l t e l l us anything about the way t h i n g s a c t u a l l y are. For Hobbes, we can never know the way t h i n g s a c t u a l l y are; we can only advance hypotheses about the way t h i n g s are and, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , some hypotheses are b e t t e r than o t h e r s depending on the cogency of the reas o n i n g . "No d i s c o u r s e whatsoever", a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, can End i n a b s o l u t e knowledge of f a c t , past, or t o come. For as the knowledge of f a c t , i t i s o r i g i n a l l y , sense- and ever a f t e r , Memory. And f o r the knowledge of Consequence, which I have s a i d b e f o r e i s c a l l e d Science, i t i s not Absolute, but c o n d i t i o n a l . No man can know by d i s c o u r s e , that, t h i s , or t h a t , i s , has been, or w i l l be-which i s t o know a b s o l u t e l y - but onely, i f t h i s be [then3 t h a t is.; Cor3 i f t h i s has been Cthen3 t h a t has been; Cor3 i f t h i s s h a l l be [then3 t h a t s h a l l be; which i s t o know Csomething3 c o n d i t i o n a l l y ; [and c o n d i t i o n a l knowledge does not i n c l u d e ] the consequence of one t h i n g t o another; but Crather 3 of one name of a t h i n g , t o another name of the same t h i n g . And t h e r e f o r e , when the Di s c o u r s e i s put i n t o speech, and begins with the d e f i n i t i o n s of words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same i n t o general a f f i r m a t i o n s , and or these again i n t o S y l l o g i s m e s ; the End or l a s t summe i s c a l l e d the c o n c l u s i o n ; and the thought of the mind by i t s i g n i f i e d , i s th a t c o n d i t i o n a l knowledge, or the knowledge of consequences of words, which i s commonly c a l l e d s c i e n c e . But i f the f i r s t ground of such D i s c o u r s e , be not d e f i n i t i o n s ; or i f the D e f i n i t i o n s be not r i g h t l y joyned together i n t o S y l l o g i s m e s , then the End or c o n c l u s i o n , i s again op i n i on . . . . 3 1 It should be noted t h a t Hobbes - 1 l a s t sentence i n t h i s 41 passage can be s a i d t o r e f e r s p e c i f i c a l l y t o h i s a n a l o g y — t h a t i s , i f he intended h i s analogy t o be some kind of c o n c l u s i o n or end, as he puts i t . Although s o v e r e i g n s i n h i s day were a c t u a l men who were more or l e s s unconstrained by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s , they were n e v e r t h e l e s s d i f f e r e n t from n a t u r a l men. They were ' a c t o r s ' who acted on behalf of t h e i r 'authors' t o maintain peace and commodious l i v i n g i n the community. 3 5 2 Thus, i f he were t o c o n s t r u c t an i n f e r e n c e about 'the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of s o v e r e i g n s ' by employing the same meticulous method t h a t he used t o c o n s t r u c t 'the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of mankind', the i n f e r e n c e would be n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r e n t from the s t a t e of nature because he would have begun h i s i n f e r e n c e with a d e f i n i t i o n of 'sovereign' and not of ' n a t u r a l man'. In a d d i t i o n , as I s h a l l argue i n the next chapter, i t i s not c l e a r t h a t Hobbes s a t i s f a c t o r i l y accounted f o r a p l u r a l i t y of s o v e r e i g n s i n the f i r s t p l a c e . Thus, i f Hobbes meant h i s analogy as some kind of c o n c l u s i o n which was i n f e r r e d from b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n s and so on, he would c o n s i d e r such a c o n c l u s i o n — i n h i s own w o r d s — a s an ' o p i n i o n ' at best. However, although Hobbes' analogy c o u l d be conceived as an o p i n i o n on h i s p a r t , I p r e f e r t o conceive i t as a r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e i n view of the important i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i t seems t o play i n h i s argument; but i t was n e v e t h e l e s s an ' o p i n i o n ' , by Hobbes' own c r i t e r i a , which played t h a t i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e . 42 CHAPTER TWO  Toward a Genuine Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n In chapter one of t h i s essay I argued t h a t t h e r e seems t o be l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e of a s c r i b i n g Hobbes - 1 name t o the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. The c u r r e n t t e x t u a l b a s i s of t h a t p r a c t i c e , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , i s the analogy which Hobbes used t o compare h i s i n f e r e n c e of the s t a t e of nature with h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s of r e l a t i o n s among so v e r e i g n s . Although many of h i s contemporaries may have accepted the analogy as c o n s t i t u t i n g proof of h i s i n f e r e n c e , Hobbes himself c e r t a i n l y would not have because, f o r Hobbes, i t i s o b s e r v a t i o n s themselves which r e q u i r e proof. Hobbes - 1 philosophy of s c i e n c e r e q u i r e d t h a t any o b s e r v a t i o n be t e s t e d by i n f e r r i n g i t s causes through a r i g o r o u s process of r e a s o n i n g . The proof of the i n f e r e n c e i t s e l f i s not e s t a b l i s h e d by the degree t o which i t s c o n c l u s i o n s correspond t o observed phenomena; r a t h e r , i t s proof i s e s t a b l i s h e d by the cogency of the reasoning used i n the i n f e r e n c e . In order t o a p p r e c i a t e the v a l i d i t y of t h i s a s s e r t i o n , we need only r e f l e c t , on the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n s t r u c t i n g — t h r o u g h f a u l t y r e a s o n i n g — a n i n f e r e n c e which e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t one's image i s rn a m i r r o r . Thus, i n order t o t e s t h i s own o b s e r v a t i o n s of r e l a t i o n s h i p s among sov e r e i g n s , Hobbes would have had t o c o n s t r u c t an i n f e r e n c e i n the same meticulous f a s h i o n as he d i d t o c o n s t r u c t the commonwealth i n p a r t one. The problem, 43 then, f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r y — t h a t i s , any i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory which p u r p o r t s t o be H o b b e s i a n — i s t o begin " • f i r s t i n apt imposing o-f names, and secondly by g e t t i n g a good and o r d e r l y method i n proceeding -from the elements which are names, t o a s s e r t i o n s . . . t i l l we come t o a knowledge o-f a l l the consequences o-f names a p p e r t a i n i n g t o the s u b j e c t i n hand. 1 , 8 3 3 If such a t h e o r e t i c a l approach were to proceed i n t h i s f a s h i o n , we at the t u r n of the twenty f i r s t century might have t o be prepared t o accept t h a t the r e s u l t i n g i n f e r e n c e of r e l a t i o n s h i p s among sove r e i g n s t a t e s might not n e c e s s a r i l y be i d e n t i c a l t o Hobbes-* seventeenth century o b s e r v a t i o n s of r e l a t i o n s h i p s among sove r e i g n p r i n c e s j nor do I t h i n k t h a t Hobbes would be at a l l s u r p r i s e d i f such was the case. It seems t o me t h a t one of the f i r s t i n f e r e n c e s t h a t such a theory would have t o make i s one which e s t a b l i s h e s the causes of the P l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s . Only a f t e r such an i n f e r e n c e i s made co u l d we then begin to i n f e r anything about r e l a t i o n s among s t a t e s . Although i t i s c l e a r t h a t Hobbes i n f e r r e d the causes of the s t a t e , i t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r t o me t h a t he i n f e r r e d a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s . In other words, Hobbes-' argument i n p a r t one of L e v i a than g i v e s me no reason t o suppose t h a t more than one Leviathan should emerge from the s t a t e of nature. What I am suggesting i s t h a t something has t o be added t o Hobbes' argument i n order f o r such an i n f e r e n c e t o be made. If t h i s i s i n f a c t the case, we can conclude t h a t Hobbes' theory---as i t s t a n d s — c a n n o t 44 •form the b a s i s of a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. I s h a l l begin my argument by s t a t i n g the problem as I understand i t . In other words, I w i l l present my understanding of Hobbes-" l o g i c a l dynamic of the s t a t e of nature and i n d i c a t e why I t h i n k t h a t only one Leviathan can be i n f e r r e d from i t . Immediately f o l l o w i n g my statement of the problem, I s h a l l c o n s i d e r two o b j e c t i o n s t o my t h e s i s . The f i r s t o b j e c t i o n i s an a n t i c i p a t e d one and the second o b j e c t i o n i s an e x i s t i n g one. Whereas the a n t i c i p a t e d o b j e c t i o n concerns Hobbes' n o t i o n of 'defence a g a i n s t a common enemy', the a c t u a l o b j e c t i o n i s an argument advanced by Murray F o r s y t h . <1 ) The Problem The problem, as I see i t , i n making an i n f e r e n c e about a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s emerging from the s t a t e of nature can be s t a t e d i n t h i s way. Given t h a t the r e l a t i v e nature of man—an a b s t r a c t e n t i t y conceived as an otherwise complete person minus any a t t r i b u t e s of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g — c a u s e s a c o n d i t i o n of war when he i s placed i n pr o x i m i t y with other s i m i l a r l y conceived men, and given t h a t men are a l s o equipped with the a b i l i t y t o reason, each man w i l l determine t h a t such a c o n d i t i o n i s not conducive t o t h e i r end of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n . Consequently they w i l l be d r i v e n by t h e i r b a s i c p a s s i o n t o use t h e i r reason t o f i n d a way out of t h i s predicament. In time, a l l reasonable persons reach the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i n order t o s u r v i v e and 45 l i v e a commodious l i f e , they must c r e a t e s o c i e t y . To c r e a t e such an e n t i t y , however, they must do c e r t a i n t h i n g s . They must - f i r s t undertake t o r e s t r a i n themselves by l a y i n g down t h e i r n a t u r a l r i g h t t o a l l t h i n g s and con-form t o c e r t a i n r u l e s o-f reason which would p r e d i c t a b l y c r e a t e a c o n d i t i o n o-f p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e among them. However, because they have i n t i m a t e knowledge of t h e i r r e l a t i v e natures, they can a n t i c i p a t e c o n t r o v e r s i a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which reason and s e l f r e s t r a i n t , by themselves, are i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r m a i n t a i n i n g s o c i a l peace among th e m — t h e a b o r t i o n i s s u e , f o r example. Consequently, they c r e a t e a Leviathan t o e n f o r c e the laws of nature and t o e s t a b l i s h and e n f o r c e any other laws which may, from time t o time, become necessary to c o o r d i n a t e and maintain an o r d e r l y and peaceful c o e x i s t e n c e i n the community—laws such as weights and measures, t r a f f i c laws, a common currency, r u l e s of ownership, p u b l i c goods, p r o v i d i n g f o r the disadvantaged, d i s p u t e s e t t l i n g mechanisms, and so on. However, i f these are the reasons why men should wish t o leave the s t a t e of nature, why do they do so by e s t a b l i s h i n g separate s o c i e t i e s ? Why do they not c o n t r a c t i n t o one s o c i e t y under-one g l o b a l Leviathan? By c o n t r a c t i n g i n t o separate s o c i e t i e s , do they not only p a r t i a l l y s o l v e the problem f o r which they decided t o enter s o c i e t y i n the f i r s t p l a c e ? Do they not exacerbate t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n d i t i o n because what was p r e v i o u s l y small s c a l e unorganized v i o l e n c e , now has the p o t e n t i a l of becoming l a r g e s c a l e organized v i o l e n c e ? 46 Because Hobbes d i d not address these concerns, i t remains uncl e a r t o me how Hobbes i n f e r r e d a p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s -from the s t a t e o-f nature. <2) O b j e c t i o n s  DEFENCE AGAINST A COMMON ENEMY The n o t i o n o-f 'de-fence a g a i n s t a common enemy' i s e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with reason and the p a s s i o n of sel-f p r e s e r v a t i o n . Thus i t appears as though i t can be c o n s i d e r e d as an a d d i t i o n a l reason -for human beings t o c o n t r a c t i n t o the commonwealth. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g , however, t h a t Hobbes does not i n t r o d u c e t h i s idea u n t i l p a r t two o-f L e v i a t h a n . Hobbes begins p a r t two with a summary o-f h i s argument i n p a r t one. I must quote him at l e n g t h i n order t o demonstrate the s i m i l a r i t y between h i s summary and mine, i n a d d i t i o n t o showing t h a t 'defence a g a i n s t a common enemy' i s not i n c l u d e d as one of the causes of the commonwealth. The f i n a l l Cause, End, or Designe of men, <who n a t u r a l l y l o v e L i b e r t y , and Dominion over o t h e r s , ) i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h a t r e s t r a i n t upon themselves, ( i n which we see them l i v e i n Commonwealths, ) i s the f o r e s i g h t of their- own p r e s e r v a t i o n , and of a more contented l i f e thereby; t h a t i s t o say, of g e t t i n g themselves out from t h a t m i serable c o n d i t i o n of Warre, which i s n e c e s s a r i l y consequent (as hath been shewn) to the n a t u r a l p a s s i o n s of men, when t h e r e i s no v i s i b l e Power t o keep them i n performance of t h e i r Covenants, and' o b s e r v a t i o n of those Lawes of Nature s e t down i n the f o u r t e e n t h and f i f t e e n t h c h a p t e r s . For the Lawes of Nature (as J u s t i c e , E q u i t y , Modesty, Mercy, and ( i n summe) doing t o o t h e r s , as we would be done to,) of themselves, without the t e r r o u r of some power, t o cause them t o be observed, are c o n t r a r y t o our n a t u r a l I Passions, t h a t c a r r y us t o P a r t i a l i t y , P r i d e , Revenge, and 47 the l i k e . And Covenants, without the Sword, are but words, and of no s t r e n g t h t o secure a man at a l l . There-fore notwithstanding the Lawes o-f Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the w i l l t o keep them, when he can do i t sa-fely, ) i-f t h e r e be no Power e r e c t e d , or not great enough -for our s e c u r i t y J every man w i l l and may l a w f u l l y r e l y on h i s own s t r e n g t h and a r t , f o r c a u t i o n a g a i n s t a l l other men.5"* Here the phrase I have emphasized i s important because of i t s ambiguity. The words 'our s e c u r i t y ' can perhaps be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y ( p r o t e c t i n g c i t i z e n s from c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y ) , e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y (defence a g a i n s t a common enemy), or both. However, the immediate context in which he uses these words, i t seems t o me, c l e a r l y i m p l i e s the former meaning. I t h i n k t h i s because i f an enemy commonwealth were t o s u c c e s s f u l l y invade the f r i e n d l y commonwealth, the l a t t e r would then become a commonwealth by a c q u i s i t i o n ; i n which case men would c e r t a i n l y not be l a w f u l l y p ermitted t o " r e l y on h i s own s t r e n g t h and a r t , f o r c a u t i o n a g a i n s t a l l other men". No doubt the reader i s becoming impatient with t h i s wearisome ex e g e s i s . However, i t i s important t o p o i n t out t h a t Hobbes d e l i c a t e l y s h i f t s the meaning of ' s e c u r i t y * d u r i n g the course of the d i s c u s s i o n immediately f o l l o w i n g h i s summary of p a r t one. In s h o r t , Hobbes r a t h e r i n g e n i o u s l y a l t e r s the meaning by a l t e r i n g the context i n which i t i s used. Whereas i n p a r t one and at the beginning of p a r t two ' s e c u r i t y ' means domestic s e c u r i t y , the meaning i s changed t o e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y through the course of a few s h o r t paragraphs. T h i s s u r r e p t i t i o u s s h i f t i n meaning 48 through d e l i c a t e l y changing the context o-f i t s use l e d me t o suspect t h a t Hobbes himself may have been q u i t e aware o-f the l o g i c a l problem o-f in-f e r r i n g a p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s -from the s t a t e o-f nature. E s s e n t i a l l y , I am suggesting t h a t Hobbes e s t a b l i s h e d a p l u r a l i t y o-f s o v e r e i g n s through the 'apparence' o-f an in-ference r a t h e r than an a c t u a l i n f e r e n c e . Immediately f o l l o w i n g the passage which i s quoted above, Hobbes changes the nature of h i s d i s c u s s i o n — without breaking p a r a g r a p h — f r o m one which summarizes h i s a n a l y t i c a l arguments t o one which i s q u a s i - h i s t o r i c a l i n nature. I t i s through the course of t h i s q u a s i - h i s t o r i c a l d i s c u s s i o n t h a t Hobbes changes the meaning of ' s e c u r i t y ' from domestic s e c u r i t y t o e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y . In the course of the same d i s c u s s i o n he then r e i n t r o d u c e s the former meaning a l o n g s i d e the new meaning i n t h i s way • And be t h e r e never so great a mu l t i t u d e . . . they can expect thereby no defence, nor p r o t e c t i o n , n e i t h e r a g a i n s t a common enemy, nor a g a i n s t the i n j u r i e s of one another. 1 3 , 3 F i n a l l y , Hobbes simply d i s c o n t i n u e s using ' s e c u r i t y ' i n the domestic sense. In s h o r t , i t seems t o me t h a t Hobbes e x p l o i t e d the p o t e n t i a l dual meaning of ' s e c u r i t y ' i n order-t o account f o r the emergence of a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s , r a t h e r than overcoming the p o t e n t i a l l y i n s o l u b l e l o g i c a l problem of i n f e r r i n g such a p l u r a l i t y . By encountering the n o t i o n of 'defence a g a i n s t a common enemy', we are simply l e d t o suppose t h a t a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s has already been accounted f o r . Let us now c o n s i d e r the l o g i c a l problem t h a t I suspect Hobbes may have attempted t o cover up with what 49 seems t o be another one o-f h i s ingenious r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e s . I have already a s s e r t e d t h a t Hobbes g i v e s us no reason t o suppose t h a t more than one s o v e r e i g n should emerge from the s t a t e of nature. In f a c t , the emergence of more than one s o v e r e i g n would seem t o undermine the reasons f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a s o v e r e i g n i n the f i r s t p l a c e . However, the idea of 'defence a g a i n s t a common enemy' appears as though i t c o u l d be a l o g i c a l d e v i c e which serve s t o generate a p l u r a l i t y of s o v e r e i g n s . I s h a l l argue t h a t although the idea of a 'common enemy' presupposes the e x i s t e n c e of s e v e r a l s o v e r e i g n s , i t cannot serve t o generate them. In f a c t , when the idea i s used i n the context of the s t a t e of nature, i t r e i n f o r c e s the emergence of only one s o v e r e i g n . It w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t the s t a t e of nature i s a war of a l l a g a i n s t a l I J a c o n d i t i o n t h a t f o l l o w s from the idea t h a t every man i s the enemy of every other man. T h i s latter-idea, i t w i l l a l s o be r e c a l l e d , i s i n f e r r e d from the n a t u r a l p a s s i o n s of man. I t seems, then, t h a t i f we are t o speak of a common enemy i n t h i s c o n d i t i o n , i t must be t h a t every man i s every other man's common enemy. I t would of course be d e s i r a b l e f o r each man t o be a b l e t o muster f o r hi m s e l f s u f f i c i e n t power t o defend himself a g a i n s t every other man; but he cannot accomplish t h i s because every man i s t r y i n g t o do the same t h i n g . One man cannot e f f e c t i v e l y subdue another because they are a l l more or l e s s e q u a l l y endowed with n a t u r a l power. One cannot subdue another u n l e s s the other i s asleep or h i s back i s turned. T r a n s i t o r y , s i n g l e 50 purpose c o n f e d e r a c i e s might a r i s e iri order t o e x p l o i t the goods o-f a s i n g l e man, but these con-federacies w i l l immediatly c o l l a p s e as the con-f ed era t e s themselves q u a r r e l over the d i s t r i b u t i o n o-f the s p o i l s . Thus everyone i s a f r a i d t o s l e e p , t u r n t h e i r backs, or accumulate goods. It i s because of t h i s stalemated c o n d i t i o n of perpetual f e a r of the imminent threat, of v i o l e n t death t h a t men use t h e i r reason t o d e r i v e the laws of nature and e s t a b l i s h a Levia t h a n t o e n f o r c e them. Thus, they c r e a t e s o c i e t y because the c o n d i t i o n of l i f e without s o c i e t y i s i n t o l e r a b l e . The laws of nature are u n i v e r s a l p r e c e p t s which any reasonable man ought t o be abl e t o i n f e r as a s o l u t i o n t o the miserable c o n d i t i o n i n a d d i t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h i n g a Lev i a t h a n t o e n f o r c e them. Consequently, i f a l l r easonable persons reach the same c o n c l u s i o n about the laws of nature and th a t a Leviathan i s needed t o en f o r c e them, once they e s t a b l i s h the Leviathan and c r e a t e a commonwealth thereby, t h e r e i s no f u r t h e r grounds f o r enmity among them. Of course, c o n f l i c t s w i l l a r i s e between men w i t h i n the commonwealth because of t h e i r ' d i f f e r e n c e of manners', but the Leviathan can handle these c o n f l i c t s more or l e s s e f f e c t i v e l y without, d i s t u r b i n g s o c i a l peace. However, i f we i n t r o d u c e a 'common enemy' as an a d d i t i o n a l reason why reasonable men would c o n s t i t u t e a commonwealth, the only people could be the 'common enemy' would be unreasonable men. But these unreasonable men, 51 presumably an unorganized m u l t i t u d e o-f b a r b a r i a n s , c o u l d n o t — b y d e f i n i t i o n — c o n s t i t u t e a commonwealth. Thus, the i n t r o d u c t i o n o-f a •'common enemy' as an a d d i t i o n a l reason •for men t o c r e a t e a commonwealth does not change the -fact that, only one commonwealth would emerge from the s t a t e of nature. If anything, i t r e i n f o r c e s the l o g i c which generates only one commonwealth. In s h o r t , the idea of a 'common enemy' exacerbates the problem of i n f e r r i n g a p l u r a l i t y of so v e r e i g n s from the s t a t e of nature. We simply have a s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e are two c l a s s e s of persons, namely those who are p a r t of the commonwealth and those who choose, f o r whatever unimaginable reason, t o remain i n the s t a t e of nature. Thus, a g a i n s t my t h e s i s t h a t a p l u r a l i t y of so v e r e i g n s cannot be i n f e r r e d from the s t a t e of nature, the a n t i c i p a t e d o b j e c t i o n that a 'common enemy' se r v e s as a b a s i s f o r i n f e r r i n g such a p l u r a l i t y , does not seem t o be a v i a b l e one. I suspect t h a t Hobbes re c o g n i z e d the l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t y of i n f e r r i n g a p l u r a l i t y of so v e r e i g n s and th a t i s why he c a r e f u l l y and d e l i b e r a t e l y introduced the 'common enemy' as an apparent cause. Leaving t h i s o b j e c t i o n a s i d e , l e t us now t u r n t o Fo r s y t h ' s o b j e c t i o n . MURRAY FORSYTH Sin c e i t appears t h a t Hobbes' theory, as i t stands, has not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n f e r r e d a p l u r a l i t y of sov e r e i g n s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o conclude t h a t i t can form the b a s i s of a genuine t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. Murray F o r s y t h , 52 however, suggests t h a t Hobbes d i d account f o r such a p l u r a l i t y . F o r s y t h bases h i s argument on the n o t i o n of d e f e n s i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s which somehow spontaneously emerge i n the s t a t e of nature i n order t o c o u n t e r a c t the t h r e a t of a common enemy which presumably a l s o spontaneously emerged i n the s t a t e of nature. But i t seems t o me t h a t t h i s proposed s o l u t i o n t o the problem of the emergence of a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s only s e r v e s t o i n t r o d u c e a new puz z l e ; namely, how does i t come t o pass t h a t , i n the s t a t e of nature, defence of every man a g a i n s t every man transforms i t s e l f i n t o a c o n d i t i o n of defence of group a g a i n s t group? Notwithstanding t h i s new pu z z l e , however, l e t us examine F o r s y t h ' s argument i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l . F o r s y t h ' s argument"3"3 has s t i m u l a t e d much of my thought on the qu e s t i o n of i n f e r r i n g a p l u r a l i t y of s o v e r e i g n s from Hobbes' s t a t e of nature. I t i s because of t h i s t h a t I co n s i d e r h i s a r t i c l e t o be a very important one. F o r s y t h i s a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i n d i s p l a c i n g the Hobbesian debate from one of a n a l o g i e s and p a r a l l e l s t o one t h a t attempts t o i l l u m i n a t e the c e n t r a l core of h i s theory. " A f t e r a l l " , F o r s y t h notes, Hobbes . . . never begins h i s p o l i t i c a l theory with t h i s or t h a t p a r t i c u l a r group of men, but always with a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of man. Why then i s the p o l i t i c a l community t h a t emerges i n h i s theory a body designed f o r common defence a g a i n s t f o r e i g n e r s ? Why does not Leviathan l o g i c a l l y embrace the whole of mankind? 3 7* Although i t may appear t h a t F o r s y t h ' s question i s v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o mine, t h e r e i s n e v e r t h e l e s s one very important S3 d i f f e r e n c e i n the assumptions upon which each of our q u e s t i o n s are based. Whereas F o r s y t h begins with the assumption t h a t Hobbes-" theory i s . an i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory — consequently he takes on the task of demonstrating why i t i s so—my i n q u i r y begins with the o p p o s i t e assumption. I begin with the a s s e r t i o n t h a t Leviathan does l o g i c a l l y embrace the whole of mankind and the problem i s t h e r e f o r e t o add something t o Hobbes' theory so t h a t i t can account f o r the p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s . Whatever t h i s new a d d i t i o n i s , however, i t cannot compromise Hobbes-* account of the s t a t e i the r e s u l t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory i s t o remain genuinely Hobbesian. I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t F o r s y t h ' s argument i s c r i t i c a l t o whether or not I can s u s t a i n mine. Whereas F o r s y t h concludes t h a t Hobbes-" theory does i n f e r the p l u r a l i t y of s o v e r e i g n s , I conclude t h a t i t does not do so. There are e s s e n t i a l l y two independent p a r t s t o F o r s y t h ' s argument. Although each p a r t r e p r e s e n t s a separate argument, they n e v e r t h e l e s s d i r e c t us toward the same c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hobbes' theory does s a t i s f a c t o r i l y account f o r the p l u r a l i t y of s o v e r e i g n s . The f i r s t p a r t of the argument i s based on Elements of Law and De C i v e , and th second p a r t i s based on L e v i a t h a n . I s h a l l l i m i t my d i s c u s s i o n t o F o r s y t h ' s second argument which i s based on h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of L e v i a t h a n . 0 3 I t h i n k t h a t the key t o F o r s y t h ' s argument i s the p a r t i c u l a r way t h a t he e n v i s i o n s the s t a t e of nature. Although F o r s y t h c l e a r l y a c c epts t h a t i t i s an a b s t r a c t 54 c o n s t r u c t , he seems to view i t i n terms of an h i s t o r i c a l era. That i s , he views i t as a c e r t a i n block o-f time encompassing a sequence o-f events. Thus, -for Forsyth, the s t a t e o-f nature was an imaginary time when a l l men l i v e d i n a s t a t e o-f war. As time passed during t h i s imaginary era, men began to -form a s e r i e s o-f defensive unions. Although these men were capable o-f forming a l l i a n c e s when the era began, being equipped with reason and t h e i r passion f o r s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n , they nevertheless d i d not do so at f i r s t . However, a f t e r a w h i l e these men began to recognize the -i n s t a b i l i t y of these defensive unions and they e s t a b l i s h e d Leviathans i n order t o maintain peace and commodius l i v i n g w i t h i n the p a r t i c u l a r communities. Once these communities were * perfected •' by the i n s t i t u t i o n of Leviathans, the era of the s t a t e of nature came to an end. Thus, f o r Forsyth, i t i s the t h r e a t of a common enemy which f i r s t molds men i n t o groups, but i t i s the d e s i r e f o r peace and commodious l i v i n g w i t h i n the p a r t i c u l a r groups that leads men t o lay down t h e i r r i g h t t o a l l , t o determine the laws of nature, and f i n a l l y , t o e s t a b l i s h a Leviathan. I t seems t o me t h a t such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the sequence of events i n the s t a t e of n a t u r e — t h a t i s , i f i t can be viewed as a kind of a b s t r a c t era—must presuppose an inherent human a t t r i b u t e of s o c i a l bonding, at l e a s t i n the f i r s t instance. I t a l s o seems that Hobbes would s u r e l y r e j e c t such a suggestion because s o c i e t y , i n that case, would be a n a t u r a l e n t i t y rather than a c r e a t i o n of reason 55 and the p a s s i o n -for s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . Hobbes-" philosophy of s c i e n c e was p a r t i c u l a r l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t such A r i s t o t e l e a n n o t i o n s . It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t F o r s y t h would conceive the s t a t e of nature as a kind of q u a s i - h i s t o r i c a l sequence of events in a d d i t i o n t o adopting Hobbes-' 'common enemy" d e v i c e . T h i s suggests t o me t h a t F o r s y t h may have been i n a d v e r t e n t l y s t e e r e d o f f course amidst Hobbes-" smoke screen at the beginning of p a r t two of L e v i a t h a n . Regardless, even i f Hobbes-" s t a t e of nature c o u l d be conceived i n such a way, I would s t i l l have d i f f i c u l t i e s with a c c e p t i n g F o r s y t h ' s argument. In terms of c o n c e p t i o n s of Hobbes-' s t a t e of nature, I t h i n k t h a t i t i s important t o d i s t i n g u i s h , on the one hand, the n a t u r a l s t a t e of man and, on the other hand, the c o n d i t i o n which would ensue i f a l l these n a t u r a l men were pl a c e d i n p r o x i m i t y with each other. The s t a t e of nature can be conceived of as an attempt by Hobbes t o answer the q u e s t i o n ' what would i t be l i k e i f t h e r e were men but no s o c i e t y ? S i n c e no one has ever experienced 'no s o c i e t y " , the answer t o the q u e s t i o n would o b v i o u s l y have t o be an imagined one. The f i r s t step i n imagining such a c o n d i t i o n would be t o imagine what man would be l i k e i f he had somehow managed t o reach b i o l o g i c a l maturity without any s o c i a l c o n t a c t or s o c i a l l e a r n i n g . The d e s c r i p t i o n of such a c r e a t u r e would thus be conceived as the n a t u r a l s t a t e of man; t h a t i s , a s i n g l e minded bundle of p a s s i o n s d i r e c t e d 56 e x c l u s i v e l y t o the end o-f h i s own s e l -f - p r e s e r v a t i o n i and anything he came i n t o c o n t a c t with would simply be a means t o h i s end as -far as he was concerned. The i n f e r e n c e about 'what i t would be l i k e without society- 1 or, ' the s t a t e o-f nature', simply imagines these men placed i n p r o x i m i t y with other men. In a d d i t i o n t o the q u e s t i o n , 'what would i t be l i k e without s o c i e t y ? ' , Hobbes attempts t o answer another q u e s t i o n , namely, 'what would men do about i t i-f t h e r e were no s o c i e t y ? ' . To t h i s q u e s t i o n he simply o-f-fers the r e p l y that, they would c r e a t e i t . T h i s r e p l y , i t seems, demonstrates a great deal o-f optimism, r a t h e r than pessimism, about human nature. However, the q u e s t i o n t h a t I do not t h i n k Hobbes answers i s ; Why do men c r e a t e separate s o c i e t i e s ? F o r s y t h , on the other hand, by c o n c e i v i n g the s t a t e o-f nature as a kind o-f q u a s i - h i s t o r i c a l e ra, argues t h a t Hobbes does answer the q u e s t i o n concerning the c r e a t i o n o-f s e v e r a l s o c i e t i e s . F o r s y t h ' s conception o-f the ' n a t u r a l s t a t e o-f man' i s v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o mine in t h a t he c o n c e i v e s man as n a t u r a l l y endowed with reason and i s thus capable o-f c r e a t i n g s o c i e t y , but he c o n c e i v e s the - f i r s t event i n h i s sequence o-f events as one i n which men -form discreet, groups on the b a s i s o-f -friend .and enemy. By d e f i n i t i o n man already knows who h i s enemies a r e — t h a t i s , al 1 other men—but what c r i t e r i a does t h i s n a t u r a l man use t o determine who h i s f r i e n d s are? We know how he maintains t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 57 a f t e r the commonwealth i s formed, but how does man c r e a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n , l e t alone maintain i t , b e f o r e commonwealths are formed? T h i s , I b e l i e v e , i s the p u z z l e t h a t F o r s y t h c r e a t e s by v i r t u e of h i s apparent s o l u t i o n . There seems t o be no way of determining how i t comes to pass t h a t mutual enemies become mutual f r i e n d s w i t h i n the c o n s t r a i n t s of Hobbes-' conception of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of n a t u r a l man; at l e a s t not while they e x i s t i n a s t a t e of nature. There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t , d u r i n g h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the s t a t e of nature, Hobbes makes r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r s coming "prepared with f o r c e s u n i t e d , t o d i s p o s s e , and d e p r i v e him, not only of the f r u i t of h i s labour, but a l s o of h i s l i f e , or 1 i b e r t y " , " but t h i s "confederacy" cannot, by d e f i n i t i o n , be anything but a p u r e l y s i t u a t i o n a l and e x p l o i t a t i v e act by a m u l t i t u d e of passers-by who j u s t happen to have the same o b j e c t i v e i n mind. In other words, a multitude of men see what they want (which happens t o be the f r u i t of one man's l a b o u r ) , and they simply endeavor t o take i t f o r themselves (as they have a n a t u r a l r i g h t t o do). But Hobbes himself i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s s i n g l e act of many would i t s e l f degenerate i n t o a b a t t l e over the s p o i l s ; t h a t i s , "the invader again i s i n the l i k e danger of another. , , < 3° In a d d i t i o n , t h i s small e x p l o i t a t i v e f o r c e of maybe ten or twenty men could h a r d l y form the b a s i s of a commonwealth as Hobbes conceived i t . Thus, F o r s y t h ' s s o l u t i o n does not seem t o be a s o l u t i o n a f t e r a l l and, i f my argument i s c o r r e c t , my t h e s i s remains 59 intact.. But F o r s y t h does succeed, however, i n narrowing the scope of the problem of i n f e r r i n g a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s . I suspect t h a t whatever the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s t h a t must be added t o Hobbes-1 conception of n a t u r a l man i n order t o be a b l e t o i n f e r a p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s , i t must have something t o do with an inherent a b i l i t y t o d i s t i n g u i s h f r i e n d from p o t e n t i a l foe. And t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , I b e l i e v e , would put Hobbes dangerously c l o s e , i f not w i t h i n , the conception of man as a s o c i a l c r e a t u r e by nature. The r e s u l t i n g f o r m u l a t i o n , i t seems, would c o n s t i t u t e a r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g 'paradox of the p a s s i o n s ' ; whereas man's s e l f i s h p a s s i o n s l e a d him t o c r e a t e a u n i v e r s a l s o c i e t y , h i s more a l t r u i s t i c p a s s i o n s < i f they e x i s t ) would lead hirn t o c r e a t e p a r t i c u l a r and d i s t i n c t s o c i e t i e s . In order t o a p p r e c i a t e the kernel of t r u t h i n such a f o r m u l a t i o n , we need only r e f l e c t on the s i m i l a r i t y between ' a l t r u i s m ' and 'dying f o r one's country'. 59 CONCLUSION I began t h i s d i s c u s s i o n with the quest i o n o-f whether or not t h e r e i s an Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t I answered ' r i o J to t h i s q u e s t i o n and proceeded t o argue why I thought t h i s was the case. Having e s t a b l i s h e d t o my s a t i s f a c t i o n t h at the c u r r e n t 'Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n - ' i s based on a r h e t o r i c a l r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l d e v i c e . I then proceeded t o demonstrate t h a t a genuine Hobbesian approach, as I understand i t , has d i f f i c u l t y i n f e r r i n g the causes of a p l u r a l i t y of sover e i g n s , l e t alone r e l a t i o n s among them. These f i n d i n g s , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , caused great disappointment r a t h e r than s a t i s f a c t i o n on my p a r t because I had hoped t h a t a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought might p r o v i d e i n s i g h t and answers t o the l a r g e r q u e s t i o n of why human beings choose t o o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o s eparate p o l i t i c a l communities. I sensed t h a t the answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n might p r o v i d e some kind of b a s i s f o r d i s c u s s i o n s about inter-national j u s t i c e and even f o r d i s c u s s i o n s about, domestic concerns such as the a p p r o p r i a t e d i v i s i o n s of power i n f e d e r a l s o c i e t i e s . In a d d i t i o n , I f e l t t h a t i f I had some idea, i n the a b s t r a c t , as t o why human beings choose d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l communities, I might be a b l e t o get a b e t t e r handle on concepts such as -'self d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' and i t s u l t i m a t e consequence of ' s e c e s s i o n ' . Although examining Leviathan i n terms of i t s p o t e n t i a l 60 c o n t r i b u t i o n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory has not provided me with any c o n c l u s i v e answers t o my concerns, the e x e r c i s e may have provided me with some idea o-f what might be the r i g h t q u e s t i o n s t o ask. In one sense Hobbes does p r o v i d e a s o l u t i o n t o the problem. E s s e n t i a l l y , he equips human beings with the -faculty o-f reason and because o-f t h i s •faculty they can simply choose t o c r e a t e separate s o c i e t i e s out o-f the s t a t e o-f nature. He does not, however, p r o v i d e a s o l u t i o n i n another sense, t h a t i s , why would they choose t o do so? 61 NOTES 1 On t h i s assumption I am a l i g n e d with Hobbes r a t h e r than A r i s t o t l e . A r i s t o t l e -felt t h a t human beings were p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l animals whereas Hobbes i n s i s t e d t h a t s o c i a l or a n t i - s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e was a matter o-f c h o i c e . He argued, however, t h a t s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e was much more conducive t o s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n d e s p i t e the s a c r i f i c e of one's r i g h t t o whatever- means t h a t were deemed necessary f o r s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n . Thus, the p o l i t i c a l community i s a product of human a r t i f i c e . I s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s p o i n t i n due course. a Of course t h e r e are many 'common sense' reasons why one g l o b a l s t a t e would be i n c o n c e i v a b l e ; reasons such as language, c u l t u r e , h i s t o r y , and pure geographical l i m i t a t i o n s . The reasons I am l o o k i n g f o r , however, are those which would apply independently of the aforementioned reasons. In other words, i f were t o assume l i n g u i s t i c , c u l t u r a l , and h i s t o r i c a l homogeneity, and i f we were t o take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the c a p a b i l i t i e s of modern t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and telecommunications technology, i t s t i l l seems t h a t t h e r e might be reasons f o r human beings t o o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o s eparate p o l i t i c a l communities. Hobbes approach, i t seems, i s perhaps one way of determining those non-common sense reasons. 3 Sheldon Wolin, c i t e d i n R. John Vincent, "The Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n i n Twentieth Century I n t e r n a t i o n a l Thought" M i l l e n i u m Vol 10 No.2 (Summer 1981)= 91. * Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed., C.B. Macpherson (Middlesex' Penguin Books L t d . , 1968) 187 - 188. ra M a r t i n Wight, "Why i s t h e r e no I n t e r n a t i o n a l Theory?" i n H. B u t t e r - f i e l d and M. Wight, eds. , D i p l omat i c  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s (London 5 A l l e n and Unwin, 1966) 17. s Vincent 91 - 101. ^ C o r n e l i a N a v a r i , "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n ' i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Thought" Millennium Vol 11, No 3 ( 1982) • 203 - 223. a Wight 17. * Wight 30 - 31. 1 0 Wight 31. 1 X Vincent 91. l s a Vincent 93. 62 1 3 Vincent. 93. 1** Vincent 94. 1 B Vincent 96. 1 S Vincent 94. 1 7" Vincent 94. l s Navari 213. Hobbes 196. 5 2 0 Navari 213. 3 5 1 Vincent 91. 5 2 3 2 R.G. Col 1 ingwood, An Autobiography (London 5 Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1939) 31. 5 2 3 Hobbes 115. Hobbes 129. 5 2 5 3 Hobbes 111 - 112. ~" Hobbes 189. 5 2 , 3 Hobbes 189. I t should be noted t h a t Richard Tuck does not. seem t o make a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the law of nature as an o b i i g a t ion t o p r e s e r v e oneself and the r i g h t of nature as the r i g h t t o the means of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n . Because he r e f e r s t o n a t u r a l r i g h t as the ' r i g h t of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n ' r a t h e r than as the ' r i g h t t o the means of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n ' , he concludes r a t h e r awkwardly t h a t by ' r i g h t of nature' Hobbes i m p l i e s t h a t i f we wish t o p r e s e r v e o u r s e l v e s , we must do something. However, t h i s element of o b l i g a t i o n t h a t Tuck p e r c e i v e s i n Hobbes ' r i g h t of nature' might be b e t t e r conceived as stemming from Hobbes' law of nature. 5 2 3 Hobbes 186. 3 0 Hobbes 148. See i n p a r t i c u l a r c h a p t e r s 3, 5, and 9 of L e v i a t h a n . 3 E Hobbes 115. 3 3 Richard Tuck notes t h a t " i n many ways Hobbes's philosophy i s c l o s e r t o the assumptions on which modern s c i e n c e r e s t s than any of the competing p h i l o s o p h i e s on o f f e r i n the seventeenth century. I t shared with 3 1 63 Des c a r t e s ' s the s t r e s s on the need t o thin k o-f the r e a l world as e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from how we experience i t , and t h i s s t r e s s has been c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the most important achievements of the p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s — beginning with G a l i l e o p o i n t i n g out t h a t the experience of someone on the e a r t h i t s e l f c o uld not determine whether the ea r t h was r o t a t i n g , and ending with the u t t e r l y unimaginable p o s t u l a t e s of modern t h e o r e t i c a l p h y s i c s about the o b j e c t s which r e a l l y make up the m a t e r i a l u n i v e r s e . But, u n l i k e Descartes, Hobbes was abl e t o make sense of a m a t e r i a l world o u t s i d e our minds without, b r i n g i n g i n e l a b o r a t e t h e o l o g i c a l p o s t u l a t e s , which f i t s the s e c u l a r cast, of mind of many modern s c i e n t i s t s . I t should be s a i d , however, t h a t Hobbes ( d e s p i t e h i s own p l e a s ) has r a r e l y been seen as the key t h e o r e t i c i a n of modern s c i e n c e . . . . Seventeenth and eight e e n t h - c e n t u r y s c i e n t i s t s i n f a c t disowned the one t r u l y s e c u l a r philosophy of s c i e n c e on o f f e r t o them, p r e f e r r i n g i n s t e a d the e l a b o r a t e t h e o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s i n which Newton indulged. In t h i s r e s p e c t , Hobbes's theory of s c i e n c e represented an e x p l o r a t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s which were not t o be opened up again f o r another two hundred years. Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford' Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1989) 50. 3'* The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s a b o i l e d down v e r s i o n of Richard Tuck's. Tuck 6 - 10, 13 - 17. 3 = 5 Tuck 9. 3 S Tuck 9. 3 T* Tuck 7. 3 0 Tuck 17. 3 S" Tuck 16 - 17. •*° Tuck 17. Tuck 17. **E Tuck 18. <*3 Tuck 40. Hobbes, c i t e d i n Tuck 40 - 41. " s Tuck 41. **s Tuck 43. Tuck 44. Tuck 44 - 45. Although these p r o p o s i t i o n s may seem 64 e n t i r e l y p l a u s i b l e , they are c u r r e n t l y being c h a l l e n g e d by the i n c r e d u l o u s -findings o-f quantum mechanics. "What Quantum theory seems t o c h a l l e n g e i s nothing l e s s than the whole concept o-f c o n t i n u i t y i n nature. Words l i k e cause and e f f e c t appear t o l o s e t h e i r meaning. One speaks o-f motion but no longer dares t o imagine a continuous path. The very •functioning of r e a l i t y on i t s u l t i m a t e l e v e l seems reduced to a cosmic d i c e game, e v e r y t h i n g i s s u b j e c t to the whims of chance." Robert H. March, P h y s i c s f o r Poets 2nd ed. , (New York' McGraw H i l l , 1978) 212 - 213. Although these new hypotheses tend t o undermine Hobbes-" b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n s , the p o i n t i s that, not only d i d Hobbes' philosophy of s c i e n c e i n v i t e such new hypotheses, but embodied a way of t h i n k i n g about, the world t h a t i s c r u c i a l f o r the development of such hypotheses. Tuck 45. s o Tuck 45. ~ 1 Hobbes 131. £53 Hobbes 217 -• 222. Hobbes 115. 55 Hobbes 223 -• 224. Emphasis mine. ESS Hobbes 224. «3€» Murray F o r s y t h , " Thomas Hobbes and R e l a t i o n s of S t a t e s " B r i t i s h Journal of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s 5 (1979)= 196 - 209. F o r s y t h 196. s & I have adopted the perhaps p l a u s i b l e assumption t h a t L e v i a t h a n was Hobbes' most mature work. However, not having s t u d i e d Elements of Law or DeCive, I o b v i o u s l y cannot be c e r t a i n of t h i s , nor can I c h a l l e n g e F o r s y t h ' s arguments i n the f i r s t , p a r t of h i s essay. B » Hobbes 184. 1 3 0 Hobbes 184. 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY Col 1 ingwood, R.G. , An Autobiography. London 5 Ox-ford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1939. F o r s y t h , Murray, "Thomas Hobbes and the E x t e r n a l R e l a t i o n s o-f S t a t e s " , B r i t i s h Journal o-f I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s . 5< 1979) 5 169 - 209. Hobbes, Thomas, L e v i a t h a n . Ed., C.B. Macpherson. Middlesex Penguin Books L t d . , 1968. March, Robert. K. , P h y s i c s -for Poets. 2nd ed. , New York 5 McGraw H i l 1 , 1978. N a v a r i , C o r n e l i a , "Hobbes and the 'Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n - ' i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Thought" Mi 11 eniurn Vol 11, No 3 < 1982) 5 203 - 223. Tuck, Richard, Hobbes. Ox-ford ! Ox-ford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1989. Vincent, R. John, "The Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n i n Twentieth Century I n t e r n a t i o n a l Thought." Mi 11 enium Vol 10 No. <1981) 5 91 Wight, Mar t i n , "Why i s There No I n t e r n a t i o n a l Theory?" i n H. B u t t e r - f i e l d and M. Wight eds. , D i p l o m a t i c  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . London 5 A l l e n and Unwin, 1966. 

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