@prefix vivo: . @prefix edm: . @prefix ns0: . @prefix dcterms: . @prefix skos: . vivo:departmentOrSchool "Arts, Faculty of"@en, "Political Science, Department of"@en ; edm:dataProvider "DSpace"@en ; ns0:degreeCampus "UBCV"@en ; dcterms:creator "Kersch, T. J."@en ; dcterms:issued "2010-11-16T22:08:41Z"@en, "1990"@en ; vivo:relatedDegree "Master of Arts - MA"@en ; ns0:degreeGrantor "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:description """Hobbes' argument in Leviathan can be viewed as a response to the question of why rational human beings should choose to organize themselves into a state. In Hobbes' words, the argument, in large part, attempts to establish the 'causes' of a 'commonwealth'. However, the fact of the matter is that human beings do not organize themselves into a. state; rather, they organize themselves into a plurality of states. The question then becomes one of determining — again in Hobbes' words — the 'causes' of a plurality of 'commonwealths'. In other words, why do rational human beings choose to organize themselves into separate states? It is not clear to me that Hobbes' answered this question; nor is it clear to me that Hobbes' arguments can be extended in order to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Since international theory is concerned with the plurality of states, it seems reasonable to suppose that an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought would have provided at least some insight into the question of the 'causes' of such a plurality. In other words, an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought must have at least considered why it is that several Leviathans would emerge from the state of nature. However, having examined the current conception of the 'Hobbesian' tradition, I found that it was simply the 'realist' tradition under a different label; a tradition to which Hobbes' name had been appropriated. Furthermore, I found that the appropriation of Hobbes' name was justified on the basis of his chapter 13 analogy which compared— albeit in a limited way — his theoretical inference of the state of nature with his observations of relations among sovereigns. I argue that the analogy, being neither a definition nor an inference, has no theoretical relationship with Hobbes' main argument; in which case it cannot form the basis of a genuine Hobbesian tradition. Having established that the current Hobbesian tradition is not a genuine one, I propose that a genuine tradition should a least render an account of the emergence of several Levaithans from the state of nature and conclude that this cannot be done without compromising Hobbes' account of the state."""@en ; edm:aggregatedCHO "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/29985?expand=metadata"@en ; skos:note "IS THERE AN HOBBESIAN TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT? By T. J . KERSCH B.A. (Hons), The U n i v e r s i t y o-f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1989 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department o-f P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce We accept t h i s t h e s i s as con-forming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1990 © T.J. Kersch In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 19 ^ mo DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Hobbes' argument i n Leviathan can be viewed as a response t o the qu e s t i o n o-f why r a t i o n a l human beings should choose t o o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o a s t a t e . In Hobbes' words, the argument, i n l a r g e p a r t , attempts t o e s t a b l i s h the 'causes -\" o-f a 'commonwealth'. However, the -fact o-f the matter i s t h a t human beings do not o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o a. s t a t e ; r a t h e r , they o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o a p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s . The qu e s t i o n then becomes one o-f determining — again i n Hobbes' words — the 'causes' o-f a p l u r a l i t y o-f 'commonwealths'. In other words, why do r a t i o n a l human beings choose t o org a n i z e themselves i n t o separate s t a t e s ? I t i s not c l e a r t o me that Hobbes' answered t h i s q u e s t i o n ; nor i s i t c l e a r t o me t h a t Hobbes' arguments can be extended i n order t o p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n . S i n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l theory i s concerned with the p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s , i t seems reasonable t o suppose t h a t an 'Hobbesian' t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought would have provided at l e a s t some i n s i g h t i n t o the qu e s t i o n o-f the 'causes' o-f such a p l u r a l i t y . In other words, an 'Hobbesian' t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought must have at l e a s t c o nsidered why i t i s t h a t s e v e r a l L e v i a t h a n s would emerge -from the s t a t e o-f nature. However, having examined the c u r r e n t conception o-f the 'Hobbesian' t r a d i t i o n , I -found t h a t i t was simply the ' r e a l i s t ' t r a d i t i o n under a d i f f e r e n t l a b e l ; a t r a d i t i o n t o which Hobbes' name had been a p p r o p r i a t e d . Furthermore, I found t h a t the a p p r o p r i a t i o n i i i of Hobbes-\" name was j u s t i f i e d on the b a s i s of h i s chapter 13 analogy which c o m p a r e d — a l b e i t i n a l i m i t e d way — h i s t h e o r e t i c a l i n f e r e n c e of the s t a t e of nature with h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s of r e l a t i o n s among s o v e r e i g n s . I argue t h a t the analogy, being n e i t h e r a d e f i n i t i o n nor an i n f e r e n c e , has no t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with Hobbes•' main argument; i n which case i t cannot form the b a s i s of a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n . Having e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the c u r r e n t Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i s not a genuine one, I propose t h a t a genuine t r a d i t i o n should a l e a s t render an account of the emergence of s e v e r a l L e v a i t h a n s from the s t a t e of nature and conclude t h a t t h i s cannot be done without compromising Hobbes - 1 account of the s t a t e . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract. i i Acknowledgements v I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 Chapter one : The Problem with the Current Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n 6 (1) The Legacy of Hobbes-1 Analogy 6 Wight 9 Vincent 10 Navari 13 (2) The Analogy — R h e t o r i c or Theory? 14 The Analogy as an Apparent Proof 17 The Analogy and Hobbes-' Philosophy of Sc i e n c e 28 Chapter two- Toward a Genuine Hobbesian T r a d i t i o n 42 <1) The Problem 44 (2) O b j e c t i o n s 46 Defence a g a i n s t a Common Enemy 46 Murray F o r s y t h 51 Con c l u s i o n 59 Notes 61 B i b l i o g r a p h y 65 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS T h i s essay would have been very d i f f i c u l t t o complete s u c c e s s f u l l y without P r o f e s s o r Robert Jackson's continuous support and encouragement. In a d d i t i o n t o making me f e e l t h a t my c o n t r i b u t i o n was important, h i s manner gave me the con f i d e n c e t o pursue my q u e s t i o n s more or l e s s my own way. Pr o f e s s o r Sam LaSelva introduced me t o a n a l y t i c a l p o l i t i c a l theory and he was a l w a y s — w i t h o u t n o t i c e — p r e p a r e d t o d i s c u s s my ideas, d i f f i c u l t i e s , and concerns throughout t h i s p r o j e c t . I admire these two s c h o l a r s and o f f e r my s i n c e r e thanks. My two good f r i e n d s Michael and Kim Meade vol u n t e e r e d f o r the p a i n s t a k i n g task of p r o o f - r e a d i n g t h i s essay and consequently prevented me from doing too much damage t o the e n g l i s h language. Michael was my i n i t i a l and only c o n t a c t with p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e during my two years at Malaspina C o l l e g e ; and although our p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the d i s c i p l i n e may have diverged, M i c h a e l — i n perhaps many more ways than he can i m a g i n e — i s s t i l l my te a c h e r . And f i n a l l y , t o my dearest f r i e n d K i r s t e n S i g e r s o n — w h o s e i n f i n i t e p a t i e n c e o f t e n had t o contend with the sharp end of my f r u s t r a t i o n s during t h i s p r o j e c t — t h a n k you f o r c o n t i n u i n g t o be my f r i e n d . 1 INTRODUCTION Perhaps the best way t o begin t h i s d i s c u s s i o n concerning the q u e s t i o n of whether or not t h e r e i s a Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought i s by answering i t more or l e s s d i r e c t l y . No, I do not t h i n k t h a t such a t r a d i t i o n e x i s t s ; at l e a s t not based on h i s argument i n L e v i a t h a n . Having c l e a r l y s t a t e d my r e p l y , however, I must immediately q u a l i f y i t . The tone of my answer, r a t h e r than being one of s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n , i s one of disappointment. I had hoped t h a t t h e r e could be a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought so t h a t i t c o u l d help me t o move one step c l o s e r t o s e t t l i n g the l a r g e r and more d i s t u r b i n g q u e s t i o n of why a b s t r a c t ' n a t u r a l ' men would choose t o c r e a t e a p l u r a l i t y of separate p o l i t i c a l communities out of the s t a t e of nature. S i n c e I assume t h a t t h e r e i s nothing i n h e r e n t l y n a t u r a l about the s t a t e , nor any p o l i t i c a l community f o r t h a t m a t t e r , 1 I am c u r i o u s as t o why human beings should choose to o r g a n i z e themselves i n t o separate p o l i t i c a l communities r a t h e r than one g l o b a l p o l i t y . In s h o r t , u n l i k e many p a r t i c i p a n t s i n contemporary academic d i s c o u r s e , I accept n e i t h e r the s t a t e nor the p i u r a l i t v of s t a t e s as g i v e n . T h i s , however, i s not t o say t h a t I t h i n k the p l u r a l i t y of s t a t e s ought not e x i s t . I n t u i t i v e l y , I suspect t h a t t h e r e are good reasons f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e . My problem, however, i s t r a n s l a t i n g my i n t u i t i o n i n t o c o n c r e t e reasons. I t h i n k t h a t f i n d i n g the r e a s o n s — o r causes as .Hobbes 2 might have put i t E — - f o r the p l u r a l i t y o-f s t a t e s would satis-fy much more than simple c u r i o s i t y . Having e s t a b l i s h e d those reasons, perhaps we would be b e t t e r armed t o handle q u e s t i o n s about how s t a t e s ought t o r e l a t e t o each other; or we might -feel more comfortable d e a l i n g with q u e s t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e . F i n a l l y , we might even be b e t t e r prepared t o deal with q u e s t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n If. the analogy p l a y s an important i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n terms of Hobbes-1 argument; and <2) If. the analogy has no value i n terms of Hobbes-1 theory; then <3) the analogy must simply be a r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e . And (4) s i n c e the analogy i s a r h e t o r i c a l d e vice, i t cannot t h e r e f o r e form the b a s i s of a genuine Hobbesian t r a d i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l thought. 17 The • f i r s t stage i n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l attempt t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t the analogy d i d play an important r o l e and the second stage w i l l attempt t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t the analogy d i d not have any s u b s t a n t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l v a l u e . THE ANALOGY AS AN ' APPARENT' PROOF In order t o e s t a b l i s h the r o l e Hobbes' analogy may have played i n h i s argument, i t i s perhaps a good idea t o f i r s t determine what Hobbes' argument was. One way of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h i s , however, i s t o f i r s t determine what the q u e s t i o n was t h a t h i s argument was meant as a r e p l y t o . By doing t h i s , I am e s s e n t i a l l y conforming t o R.G. Col 1ingwood's technique of 'question and answer'; a technique which i s used t o help the reader t o 'get i n t o the author's mind', so to speak. \"You cannot f i n d out what a man means,\" argues Col Iingwood, by simply s t u d y i n g h i s spoken or w r i t t e n statements even though he has spoken or w r i t t e n with p e r f e c t command of language and p e r f e c t l y t r u t h f u l i n t e n t i o n . In order t o f i n d out h i s meaning you must a l s o know what the q u e s t i o n was (a q u e s t i o n i n h i s own mind, and presumed by him to be i n yours) t o which the t h i n g he has s a i d D r w r i t t e n was meant as an answer. 2 5 3 In terms of Hobbes, t h i s task proved t o be much more d i f f i c u l t , f o r me than i t sounds. I t v i r t u a l l y meant h e s i t a t i n g a f t e r r e a d i n g each of Hobbes' p r o p o s i t i o n s and asking myself 1 What i s the q u e s t i o n t h a t Hobbes' i s t r y i n g to answer with t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n ? In the case of a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t passage, the problem of p r o v i d i n g a q u e s t i o n f o r Hobbes' answer i n v o l v e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree 18 of t r i a l and e r r o r . With r e s p e c t t o Hobbes-* d e f i n i t i o n s , however, the job was much e a s i e r because the quest i o n seemed obvious. For example, a f t e r r e a d i n g Hobbes-' d e f i n i t i o n of the ' w i l l ' , I simply p o s i t e d the question- what i s the w i l l ? Oddly enough, i n t h i s case and many o t h e r s , Hobbes' answer seemed t o ' f i t ' , but i t d i d not seem t o f i t q u i t e r i g h t . These occurrences, because they were repeated occurrences, l e d roe t o suspect t h a t perhaps i t were my qu e s t i o n s that were not q u i t e r i g h t ; although I could not begin t o imagine what was wrong with them. On the one hand, Hobbes' d i s c o u r s e seemed t o have a continuous and m o t i o n - l i k e q u a l i t y about i t whereas, on the other hand, my q u e s t i o n s beginning with •'what i s ' d i d not seem t o be capable of grasping t h a t q u a l i t y i n h i s work. My di s c o m f o r t continued u n t i l the word 'consequence' captured my a t t e n t i o n while I was r e - r e a d i n g chapter 5, \"Of Reason and Scien c e \" . \"Science,\" Hobbes argues, \" i s the knowledge of consequences, and the dependence of one f a c t upon the o t h e r . \" 5 2 3 I t then occurred t o me t h a t perhaps Hobbes was employing t h i s s c i e n t i f i c method throughout h i s d i s c u s s i o n . If t h i s were the case, I concluded t h a t a •'consequence' i s not a r e p l y t o the quest i o n 'what i_s X?' r a t h e r , i t i s a r e p l y t o the qu e s t i o n 'what causes X?'. For example, Hobbes advanced the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n on the idea of ' w i l l ' * In d e l i b e r a t i o n , the l a s t a p p e t i t e , or a v e r s i o n , immediately adhaering t o the a c t i o n , or t o the 19 omission t h e r e o f , i s t h a t we c a l l the w i l l ; the act (not the f a c u l t y ) of w i l l i n g . 5 2 * * If t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n was meant as a r e p l y t o the q u e s t i o n •'what _s the w i l l ? - ' , t h e r e i s a reasonable f i t between the supposed que s t i o n and the given answer. However, by s u b s t i t u t i n g the a c t i v e verb \"causes -' f o r ' is -\" , we f i n d t h a t the meaning of Hobbes-\" r e p l y i s c o n s i d e r a b l y enhanced. We can now e n v i s i o n a continuous connection between d e l i b e r a t i o n and w i l l . The w i l l now appears t o be an a c t i v e stage i n a l a r g e r and continuous process r a t h e r than as a l i f e l e s s t h i n g . I t t u r n s out t h a t the commonwealth l i e s at the end of t h i s continuous c h a i n of processes. Perhaps, then, P a r t one of Leviathan i s Hobbes-\" response t o the q u e s t i o n •'what causes the commonwealth?-\" Part two of L e v i a t h a n , on the other hand, appears t o be an answer more s u i t e d the the q u e s t i o n 'What i s the commonwealth?' Sin c e Hobbes' analogy i s an apparent proof of h i s i n f e r e n c e , or l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t , of the s t a t e of nature, and s i n c e the s t a t e of nature i s i n c l u d e d i n P a r t one of L e v i a t h a n , I s h a l l examine t h i s c o n s t r u c t , i n a d d i t i o n t o the apparent proof he o f f e r s i n support of i t , i n the context of the q u e s t i o n which seeks t o determine the causes of the commomwealth. In other words, I w i l l not be examining Hobbes' analogy i n terms of any q u e s t i o n s which might be of immediate i n t e r e s t or concern t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s . Rather, I w i l l be examining i t i n terms of what I suppose t o be the q u e s t i o n t h a t Hobbes s e t out t o answer in p a r t one of L e v i a t h a n . 20 Hobbes-' c o n s t r u c t , or ' in-ference- 1 as he p r e f e r s t o c a l l i t , of the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of mankind i s a v i t a l l i n k i n the c h a i n of processes which culminate i n the human c r e a t i o n of the commonwealth. Hobbes begins t h i s c h a i n of processes with a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of man. Whereas the inherent human i n c l i n a t i o n towards a c q u i r i n g the means of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n can be viewed as the end or consequence of a chain of processes generated by the pa s s i o n s i n s o l i p s i s t i c man, the c o n d i t i o n of the s t a t e of nature i s the immediate consequence when these men are pl a c e d i n pr o x i m i t y t o each other. In other words, man i s n a t u r a l l y equipped with the i n c l i n a t i o n and a b i l i t y t o get along well enough by h i m s e l f ; i t i s when he comes i n t o c o n t a c t with o t h e r s who are s i m i l a r l y equipped t h a t problems begin t o a r i s e . Although man, ac c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, i s designed t o l i v e alone, the f a c t i s t h a t he does not l i v e alone. I t i s because of t h i s predicament t h a t problems a r i s e . For Hobbes, th e r e i s no such t h i n g as n a t u r a l s o c i a l harmony among men. Rather, s o c i a l harmony i s something t h a t r e q u i r e s an a c t i v e and cons c i o u s e f f o r t on the p a r t of i n d i v i d u a l human beings. I t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e i s indeed at l e a s t a kernel of t r u t h i n Hobbes-1 p o s i t i o n t h a t man i s not n a t u r a l l y a s o c i a l c r e a t u r e . We need only r e f l e c t on what i s perhaps a very common admonishment between parent and c h i l d — ' y o u must l e a r n t h a t you can't have e v e r y t h i n g your own way! -'—in order t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t element of t r u t h . In s h o r t , we must l e a r n how t o be s o c i a l c r e a t u r e s . Even a f t e r we have 21 supposedly learned t o be s o c i a l , we can perhaps imagine s i t u a t i o n s where i t takes a c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t on our p a r t i n the -form of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t i n order t o maintain our s o c i a -b i l i t y . I thi n k t h a t Hobbes was keenly aware of t h i s and because of t h i s awareness he was unable t o ho n e s t l y accept the A r i s t o t e l e a n precept t h a t man was a s o c i a l c r e a t u r e ; a precept which was undoubtedly founded on the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t everywhere men l i v e i n s o c i e t i e s . Hobbes was a l s o keen enough t o imagine s i t u a t i o n s i n which even s e l f - r e s t r a i n t was not enough t o maintain a s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n among men. Sometimes p a r t i c u l a r men might have t o be subdued by f o r c e in order t o maintain a s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n between them or among men at l a r g e . Thus, s e l f - r e s t r a i n t on behalf of i n d i v i d u a l persons i s a necessary but i n s u f f i c i e n t p r e -c o n d i t i o n f o r the establishment and maintenance of s o c i e t y because we can imagine s i t u a t i o n s where two people p e r c e i v e themselves t o be e x e r c i s i n g extreme s e l f - r e s t r a i n t w h i le n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r c e i v i n g the other t o be e x e r c i s i n g v i r t u a l l y none. Man i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, \" f o r want of r i g h t reason c o n s t i t u t e d by nature\", and because of t h i s n a t u r a l d e f i c i e n c y of man, when t h e r e i s a con t r o v e r s y i n an account, the p a r t i e s must by t h e i r own accord, set up f o r r i g h t Reason, the Reason of some A r b i t r a t o r , or Judge, t o whose sentence they w i l l both stand, or t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s i e must e i t h e r come t o blowes, or be undecided. . . . And when men t h a t t h i n k themselves wiser than a l l o t h e r s , clamor and demand r i g h t Reason f o r judge; yet seek no more, but t h a t t h i n g s should be determined, by no other mens reason but t h e i r own, i t i s as i n t o l e r a b l e i n the s o c i e t y of men, as i t i s i n play a f t e r trump 22 i s turned, t o use -for trump on every o c c a s i o n , t h a t s u i t e whereof they have most i n t h e i r hand. 5 2 3 S o c i e t y , then, can be s a i d t o e x i s t when two p r e - c o n d i t i o n s are met. The - f i r s t c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l human beings e x e r c i s e s e l - f - r e s t r a i n t c o n s i s t e n t with the s e l f -r e s t r a i n t of o t h e r s . In other words, because men e x i s t i n the company of other men, they must l e a r n t h a t they cannot have e v e r y t h i n g they want. The second c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t they must ' s et up' f o r r i g h t reason i n t h a t they must e s t a b l i s h a judge and must agree t o submit t o h i s judgements. But because \"Of the d i f f e r e n c e of Manners\" 5 2* 3 of men, th e r e i s a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some men w i l l not submit when t h e i r p e r c e i v e d v i t a l i n t e r e s t s are at stake. Consequently, the judge must be armed with s u f f i c i e n t power in order t o enf o r c e h i s or her judgements. I t i s only when these two c o n d i t i o n s are met, acc o r d i n g t o Hobbes, t h a t a s o c i e t y can be s a i d t o e x i s t among men. Conversely, when n e i t h e r of these c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t , t h e r e i s no s o c i e t y among p a r t i c u l a r men and Hobbes' s t a t e of nature i s an attempt at i n f e r r i n g i n the a b s t r a c t what such a predicament would be l i k e . However, such a predicament i s at odds with one of the fundamental human pas s i o n s namely, s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n . But, a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, i t i s the pass i o n of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t puts men i n t o t h i s c o n d i t i o n i n the f i r s t p l a c e . The p a s s i o n of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n when man i s alone i n the world i s conducive t o h i s own p r e s e v a t i o n , however, once persons are pla c e d i n p r o x i m i t y with each other, t h a t same p a s s i o n l e a d s 23 u l t i m a t e l y t o s e l f d e s t r u c t i o n . The problem f o r Hobbes, and presumably f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t might be i n t h i s predicament, i s t o f i n d a way of i n t e r r u p t i n g the c h a i n of events t h a t lead from s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n t o s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . Man i s not t o t a l l y l o s t , however, because i n a d d i t i o n to h i s p a s s i o n s he i s endowed with the f a c u l t y of reason. Through the use of reason he can break the i n e v i t a b l e l i n k between s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n and s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n by c r e a t i n g s o c i e t y ; and the c r e a t i o n of s o c i e t y simply i n v o l v e s e s t a b l i s h i n g the two c o n d i t i o n s t h a t were mentioned above, namely, s e l f -r e s t r a i n t and a common power to keep them a l l i n awe. The s t o r y , however, does not end here because Hobbes goes on t o t r a n s l a t e the f o r e g o i n g i n t o e t h i c a l and l e g a l terms v i a the language of n a t u r a l law. In t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n the fundamental human pass i o n of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n becomes the \"Law of Nature\"; which i s , f o r Hobbes, a Precept, or general 1 Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man i s f o r b i d d e n t o do, t h a t , which i s d e s t r u c t i v e of h i s l i f e , or t a k e t h away the means of p r e s e r v i n g the same; and t o omit, t h a t , by which he t h i n k e t h i t may be best preserved. S S 7* In other words, the law of nature commands t h a t man endeavour t o p r e s e r v e h i m s e l f . The right, of nature, on the other hand, i s not the •\"right of. s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n ' , r a t h e r , i t i s the r i g h t to the means of s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n . \"The Right of Nature,\" i n Hobbes' terms, i s the L i b e r t y each man hath, t o use h i s own power, as he w i l l h i m s e l f e , f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of h i s own Nature; t h a t i s t o say, of h i s own 24 L i f e ; and consequently, o-f doing any t h i n g , which i n h i s own Judgement, and Reason, he s h a l l c onceive t o be the apt e s t means thereunto. 5 2 6 3 Thus, i n the s t a t e o-f nature, men are commanded t o pr e s e r v e themselves and they a l s o have the l i b e r t y t o a c q u i r e and use whatever means they deem necessary -for t h e i r s u r v i v a l . Having r e c o g n i z e d t h e i r m i s e r a b l e c o n d i t i o n , they are commanded by the law o-f nature t o do something about i t because the e x i s t i n g s t a t e o-f a - f f a i r s i s not conducive t o t h e i r own p r e s e r v a t i o n . Thus, they lay down t h e i r n a t u r a l r i g h t (a form of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t ) by c o n c u r r e n t l y t r a n s f e r i n g i t t o a common power. In s h o r t , the way out of an otherwise m i s e r a b l e c o n d i t i o n i s t o c r e a t e s o c i e t y . They are o b l i g e d t o c r e a t e s o c i e t y because the law of nature commands th a t they do not omit t o do anything t h a t i s conducive t o t h e i r p r e s e r v a t i o n , and t h e i r reason t e l l s them t h a t s o c i e t y i s the only s o l u t i o n . By t r a n s l a t i n g h i s otherwise s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t of the s t a t e of nature i n t o e t h i c a l - I e g a l terms, Hobbes succeeds i n g i v i n g s o c i e t y and the Leviathan a dual source of moral l e g i t i m a c y . On the one hand, s o c i e t y i s good because the i n d i v i d u a l can lead a b e t t e r and longer-l i f e w i t h i n i t . Because i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o s e l f -p r e s e r v a t i o n , i t s continued e x i s t e n c e c a r r i e s with i t a degree of moral f o r c e . On the other hand, the law of nature commands, a l b e i t i n d i r e c t l y , t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s enter i n t o s o c i e t y ; and s i n c e s o c i e t y , by d e f i n i t i o n , means s e l f r e s t r a i n t i n a d d i t i o n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n of the so v e r e i g n , 25 a c t s a g a i n s t the s o v e r e i g n , again i n d i r e c t l y , c o n s t i t u t e v i o l a t i o n s a g a i n s t n a t u r a l law. However, by t r a n s l a t i n g the s t a t e of nature i n t o l e g a l e t h i c a l terms v i a the language of n a t u r a l law, Hobbes denies himself the p o s s i b i l i t y of making a d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i e t y , on the one hand, and p o l i t y , on the other. Thus, f o r Hobbes, the commonwealth, or s t a t e as we p r e f e r t o c a l l i t , is. s o c i e t y . R e f l e c t i n g on what I understand t o be the essence of Hobbes-1 argument i n p a r t one of L e v i a t h a n , i t appears t h a t the s t a t e of nature i s a c r u c i a l component of h i s theory f o r at l e a s t two reasons. F i r s t of a l l , i n terms of the q u e s t i o n of causes, i t p r o v i d e s an account of what e x i s t e n c e without the s t a t e would be l i k e i n order t o e s t a b l i s h a motive f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g one. In other words, the s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t might s u i t a b l y p r o v i d e an answer t o the q u e s t i o n 1 If the s t a t e d i d not e x i s t , why would men be i n c l i n e d t o c r e a t e i t ? The second, and perhaps more important reason why the s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t i s c r u c i a l t o Hobbes - 1 theory i s t h a t i t p r o v i d e s a s u i t a b l e s c e n a r i o i n which he can t r a n s l a t e the s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n of man i n t o moral and e t h i c a l terms by employing the language of n a t u r a l law. Hobbes perhaps found i t d i f f i c u l t , as I c e r t a i n l y would, t o i n t r o d u c e the concept of n a t u r a l law i n t o a p r e - e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s e t t i n g . In summary, the s t a t e of nature i s c r u c i a l t o Hobbes - 1 theory because, i n a d d i t i o n t o p r o v i d i n g the b a s i s f o r the c r e a t i o n of s o c i e t y , i t 26 provided the b a s i s f o r the p a r t i c u l a r kind of s o c i e t y he wanted t o c r e a t e . Thus, the r e s t of Hobbes' theory would remain e i t h e r meaningless or unconvincing t o anyone who would not, or could not, accept h i s s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t . It i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, t h a t Hobbes would depart from h i s usual method and employ e x t r a o r d i n a r y means t o convince h i s re a d e r s t o accept the s t a t e of nature as a v a l i d c o n s t r u c t . Immediately f o l l o w i n g what i s perhaps Hobbes' most-quoted s t a t e m e n t — \" a n d the l i f e of man, s o l i t a r y , poore, nasty, b r u t i s h , and s h o r t \" — h e i n t r o d u c e s h i s apparent a n a l o g i c a l proof i n t h i s way-It may seem strange t o some man, t h a t has not well weighed these t h i n g s ; t h a t nature should thus d i s s o c i a t e , and render men apt t o invade, and destroy one another- and he may t h e r e f o r e , not t r u s t i n g t o t h i s i n f e r e n c e , made from the pas s i o n s , d e s i r e perhaps t o have the same confirmed by e x p e r i e n c e . s s \" Here Hobbes appears t o be speaking d i r e c t l y t o a p a r t i c u l a r group of r e a d e r s who were probably sympathetic with A r i s t o t e l e a n d o c t r i n e ; a group who f e l t r a t h e r comfortable with the n o t i o n t h a t man i s a ' p o l i t i c a l animal' and the b e l i e f t h a t s o c i e t y i s an e n t i t y which i s n a t u r a l i n i t s own r i g h t . He a l s o may have been aware t h a t t h i s same group of rea d e r s p l a c e d a great deal of weight on the s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d i t y of t h e i r experience and o b s e r v a t i o n s with respect. to the n a t u r a l and e t h i c a l worlds. Since Hobbes a n t i c i p a t e d that, not only would h i s d e p i c t i o n of the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n of mankind f i n d o b j e c t i o n s among these readers, h i s method of e s t a b l i s h i n g the causes of such a c o n d i t i o n would appear 27 e n t i r e l y -foreign t o them. However, Hobbes may have supposed t h a t he o f f e r e d them something t h a t they c o u l d more comfortably r e l a t e t o as a 'proof' of h i s i n f e r e n c e , perhaps they might j u s t accept t h a t c r u c i a l element of h i s theory. Regardless, l e t us r e t u r n t o the above q u o t a t i o n f o r a moment and c o n s i d e r two important words contained w i t h i n i t . The words I would l i k e t o emphasize are ' i n f e r e n c e ' and 'experience-'. I t should a l s o be noted t h a t ' i n f e r e n c e ' appears t o r e f e r t o the type of knowledge t h a t Hobbes had developed i n the passages preceding t h i s paragraph; and the word 'experience' r e f e r s t o the type of knowledge t h a t w i l l be recorded i n the few passages which f o l l o w i t . What Hobbes e s s e n t i a l l y does i n the f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s — t h e l a s t p a r t of chapter 1 3 — i s t h a t he d e s c r i b e s some of h i s e xperiences and o b s e r v a t i o n s of the p o l i t i c a l world i n terms of h i s l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t . Thus he i s c o n s t r u c t i n g an analogy between, on the one hand, what he c l a i m s t o p e r c e i v e about the p o l i t i c a l world and, on the other hand, h i s s c i e n t i f i c i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of nature. H i s analogy i s c l e a r l y a d e s c r i p t i v e one i n that he i s i n essence s a y i n g : t h i s i s what I, Thomas Hobbes, c l a i m to p e r c e i v e about the p o l i t i c a l world; and my claimed p e r c e p t i o n i s s i m i l a r i n 'apparence' t o my i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of nature. In s h o r t , he i s simply r e p o r t i n g and d e s c r i b i n g a f a c t — a f a c t which i s u n r e l a t e d t o h i s theory. \"The R e g i s t e r D f Knowledge of F a c t \" , a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, \" i s c a l l e d H i s t o r y \" ; and Hobbes draws a 28 c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between h i s t o r y and s c i e n c e . 3 0 Hobbes' analogy, then, can only have h i s t o r i c a l v a l u e i n the twe n t i e t h century because a l l he has t o l d us i s t h a t r e l a t i o n s among s o v e r e i g n s in. h i s time appeared t o be s i m i l a r , but not e n t i r e l y s i m i l a r , t o h i s i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e of nature. T h i s h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , on the other hand, t e l l s us nothing about h i s i n f e r e n c e . Nevertheless, I s p e c u l a t e t h a t rn h i s time he hoped t h a t many of h i s contemporaries would draw a d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n by t a k i n g i t upon themselves t o i n f l a t e the apparent t h e o r e t i c a l importance of h i s analogy because of i t s 'empi r i c a l - ' p r e t e n s i o n s . Perhaps h i s contemporaries would draw the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hobbes himself c o u l d not p o s s i b l y draw without compromising h i s philosophy of s c i e n c e . Perhaps they would simply accept i t as ' p r o o f of the v a l i d i t y of h i s th e o r y ' s l i n c h p i n , namely, the s t a t e of nature. Thus, i t seems t h a t Hobbes' analogy was a r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e which he o f f e r e d as an apparent proof f o r an important j u n c t u r e i n h i s theory; a j u n c t u r e which attempts t o e s t a b l i s h the causes of the commonwealth. However, the burden of proof s t i l l r e s t s with me t o demonstrate t h a t , i n view of h i s philosophy of s c i e n c e , Hobbes would have s u r e l y r e j e c t e d the analogy as c o n s t i t u t i n g a v a l i d proof of h i s i n f e r e n c e . THE ANALOGY AND HOBBES' PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Although the analogy seems t o be intended as an apparent proof of h i s s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t , the 29 q u e s t i o n now, however, i s whether or not Hobbes himself would have accepted i t as such. If he h i m s e l f would not accept i t as a v a l i d proof, but he n e v e r t h e l e s s employed the analogy i n order to i n f l u e n c e o t h e r s t o accept h i s s t a t e of nature c o n s t r u c t , we can perhaps s a f e l y conclude t h a t the analogy i s simply a r h e t o r i c a l r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l d e v i c e . Consequently i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y the p r a c t i c e of basing a ' Hobbesian - 1 t r a d i t i o n upon the analogy. The argument t h a t the analogy does not c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d proof i n Hobbes - 1 view very much r e s t s on the s t r e n g t h of the d i s t i n c t i o n he makes between, on the one hand, knowledge obtained by experience (knowledge of f a c t ) and, on the other hand, knowledge obtained by reason (knowledge of the consequences of one a f f i r m a t i o n t o a n o t h e r ) . 3 1 S i n c e the f o r c e of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s c r u c i a l t o my argument, i t w i l l be necessary t o examine i t i n l i g h t of Hobbes - 1 philosophy of s c i e n c e so t h a t we can determine why he made such a d i s t i n c t i o n . What i s even more important, however, i s not so much the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f , but r a t h e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p Hobbes - 1 method attempts t o e s t a b l i s h between both forms of knowledge. E s s e n t i a l l y , i t i s i n f e r e n c e s t h a t are used t o prove o b s e r v a t i o n s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hobbes, and not the other way around. Once we have r e f l e c t e d upon the one way d i r e c t i o n of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , we should be a b l e t o conclude t h a t t h e r e i s v i r t u a l l y no t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k between, on the one hand, h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about 30 r e l a t i o n s h i p s among sove r e i g n s and, on the other hand, h i s i n f e r e n c e about the s t a t e o-f nature. For t h e r e t o be a t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k between h i s theory and h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s , Hobbes would have t o c o n s t r u c t a new i n f e r e n c e which would serve t o confirm the v a l i d i t y of h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s about s o v e r e i g n s . As I s h a l l argue i n chapter two, th e r e i s much to be done be f o r e such an i n f e r e n c e can be made. In the meantime, however, l e t us co n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g remarks taken from chapter f i v e of L e v i a t h a n . These remarks, I b e l i e v e , capture the essence of Hobbes-\" philosophy of s c i e n c e . \"Reason\", Hobbes argues, i s not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence i s ; but attayned by Industry; f i r s t , i n apt imposing of Names; and secondly by g e t t i n g a good and o r d e r l y Method i n proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, t o A s s e r t i o n s made by Connexion of one of them t o another; and so t o Sy l l o g i s m e s , which are the Connexions of one A s s e r t i o n t o another, t i l l we come t o a knowledge of a l l the consequences of names a p p e r t a i n i n g t o the subject, i n hand; and th a t i s i t , men c a l l S c i e n c e . And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which i s a t h i n g past, and i r r e v o c a b l e ; Science i s the knowledge of consequences, and dependance of one f a c t upon another: by which, out of t h a t we can p r e s e n t l y do, we know how t o do something e l s e when we w i l l , or the l i k e , another time- Because when we see how any t h i n g comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the l i k e causes come i n t o our power, we see how t o make it-produce the l i k e e f f e c t s . 3 5 2 Although these remarks might at f i r s t seem i n s i g n i f i c a n t , they n e v e r t h e l e s s deserve some r e f l e c t i o n because they d e s c r i b e the p a r t i c u l a r approach t o knowledge t h a t Hobbes adopts i n Leviathan. I t h i n k t h a t t r y i n g t o make sense of Leviathan without t h i s approach i n mind can 31 lead t o — a r i d perhaps has l e d t o — g r a v e misunderstandings about what i t i s t h a t he had t o say. In a d d i t i o n , philosophy of s c i e n c e was not a t r i v i a l concern f o r Hobbes. Rather, i t seems t o have informed h i s e n t i r e approach t o understanding the n a t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l worlds. There i s a l s o reason t o suggest, t h a t i n terms of h i s contemporaries such as G a l i l e o , Bacon, and Descartes, Hobbes was a p h i l o s o p h e r of s c i e n c e par e x e l 1 e n c e . 3 3 However, I t h i n k t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n c e of Hobbes' a p p r o a c h — a n d thus h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between ' i n f e r e n c e ' and ' o b s e r v a t i o n ' — c a n n o t f u l l y be a p p r e c i a t e d without a d i s c u s s i o n about how Hobbes came t o develop h i s phi Iosophy. Let us f i r s t , l a y the h i s t o r i c a l groundwork f o r h i s philosophy through a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of the v a r i o u s ' s c h o o l s ' of thought t h a t were p r e v a l e n t among Hobbes' contemporaries. The purpose of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l d i s c u s s i o n i s simply t o a s s i s t us i n g a i n i n g a b e t t e r purchase on the p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems f a c i n g Hobbes i n h i s day. A g a i n s t t h i s background h i s arguments i n L e v i a t h a n should become t h a t much more c l e a r and s i g n i f i c a n t . \" 3 * * The t h r e e dominant p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d d u r i n g Hobbes' time were t h a t of A r i s t o t l e a n i s m , s k e p t i c i s m , and modern n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ( f o r lack of a b e t t e r term). Each o r i e n t a t i o n c o u l d perhaps be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r view on what kind of knowledge, i f any, c o n s t i t u t e d v a l i d s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. In other words, each o r i e n t a t i o n had i t s own d i s t i n c t answer to q u e s t i o n s 32 about, what i t i s t h a t human beings can p o s s i b l y come t o know about the world e x t e r n a l t o the s e l f , and how they can come to a c q u i r e t h a t knowledge. For example, the t h i n k e r s whD c a l l e d themselves A r i s t o t l e a n s tended t-D argue t h a t p e r c e p t i o n s a c q u i r e d by the human senses were more or l e s s a c c u r a t e -for determining the r e a l i t y , and the nature of t h a t r e a l i t y , of the world e x t e r n a l t o the s e l f . For A r i s t o t l e , / ' i f something looks white t o an o r d i n a r y healthy observer, then i t _s_ white. \" 5 3 0 Thus, the A r i s t o t e l e a n s were c o n f i d e n t t h a t a more or l e s s complete body of knowledge about the e x t e r n a l world c o u l d be compiled; and t h a t such a body of knowledge could be acqu i r e d through human o b s e r v a t i o n . In other words, f o r the A r i s t o t e l e a n s , o b j e c t i v e t r u t h s l a y beyond and e x t e r n a l t o the s e l f and those t r u t h s c o u l d be p e r c e i v e d through the senses. T h i s c o n f i d e n c e i n the e x i s t e n c e of o b j e c t i v e t r u t h s a l s o seemed t o pervade t h e i r view of the e t h i c a l world i n t h a t \" A r i s t o t l e had expressed great c o n f i d e n c e i n the u n i v e r s a l i t y of (roughly) the conve n t i o n a l moral b e l i e f s of a middle c l a s s Athenian of h i s day.\" 3* 3 However, both A r i s t o t l e i n h i s time and the A r i s t o t e l e a n s of the l a t e s i x t e e n t h century were faced with a s e r i o u s s k e p t i c a l c h a l l e n g e . T h i s new o r i e n t a t i o n emphasized the l i m i t a t i o n s of the a b i l i t y of the senses t o a c c u r a t e l y p e r c e i v e the r e a l nature of the e x t e r n a l world. From a tw e n t i e t h century vantage p o i n t we do not f i n d t h i s a s s e r t i o n a l l t h a t unreasonable. We l e a r n i n elementary 33 s c h o o l , d e s p i t e appearances t o the c o n t r a r y , t h a t the ea r t h i s a c t u a l l y round. We a l s o l e a r n , d e s p i t e our s e n s a t i o n t o the c o n t r a r y , t h a t the ea r t h r o t a t e s on i t s a x i s and h u r t l e s through space at a tremendous speed. We are a l s o q u i t e •familiar with o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n s and the apparently ' r e a l ' impact o-f dreams on those n i g h t s when we awaken s t a r t l e d and d i s o r i e n t e d . C o n s i d e r i n g these experiences, the s k e p t i c a l argument seems t o go l i k e t h i s ' If our sense p e r c e p t i o n s are c l e a r l y wrong i n some i n s t a n c e s , how do we know -for sure that, they are correct, i n other i n s t a n c e s ? Perhaps those senses are c o r r e c t when we co n s i d e r them t o be wrong, and wrong when we c o n s i d e r them t o be c o r r e c t . Perhaps when we are dreaming we are i n f a c t awake, and when we are awake we are i n f a c t dreaming. The problem f o r the s k e p t i c , then, i s determining i l l u s i o n from r e a l i t y ; and s i n c e the only means we have of doing t h i s (the senses) are not accur a t e , we t h e r e f o r e cannot p o s s i b l y know anything about the world. However, d e s p i t e t h e i r pessimism about the p o s s i b i l i t y of compiling any v a l i d body of knowledge about the e x t e r n a l world, they s t i l l f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t such a world e x i s t e d and t h a t i t had a nature independent of the s e l f . T h i s pessimism a l s o c a r r i e d i t s e l f i n t o the e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l world which, f o r the s k e p t i c s and n o n - s k e p t i c s a l i k e , was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p r a c t i c e s of d e c e i t , manipulation, and i n t i m i d a t i o n , r a t h e r than by those of v i r t u e and honour. T h i s provided more f u e l f o r the s k e p t i c a l assault, on A r i s t o t e l e a n i s m . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the 34 d o c t r i n e s born by s k e p t i c i s m such as c u l t u r a l and moral r e l a t i v i s m and reason of s t a t e 3 7 \" were themselves a c q u i r e d through o b s e r v a t i o n o-f •\"real-\" p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s . The i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s inherent i n s k e p t i c a l arguments d i d not go unnoticed by t h e o r i s t s who h e l d t o the t h i r d p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n namely, the modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s . The modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s were a l s o f a m i l i a r with o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n s and the l i k e and concluded, l i k e the s k e p t i c s , t h a t o b s e r v a t i o n and experience on t h e i r own could not c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i s f o r v a l i d s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. However, they r e c o g n i z e d one, perhaps f a t a l , flaw i n the s k e p t i c a l argument. E s s e n t i a l l y , i f the s k e p t i c s a s s e r t e d t h a t the senses were u n r e l i a b l e , how could they p o s s i b l y conclude t h a t any r e a l i t y a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d o u t s i d e the s e l f at a l l ? Perhaps we simply imagine t h a t such a r e a l i t y e x i s t s . R ichard Tuck expressed t h i s new ' s u p e r - s k e p t i c a l •* doubt i n t h i s way : If we can imagine a language which i s complete i n i t s e l f but which does not r e f e r t o any r e a l o b j e c t s ( l i k e the language which T o l k e i n invented t o accompany Lord of the R i n g s ) , so why can we not imagine an o r d e r l y and systematic sequence of images which do not r e f e r t o a n y t h i n g ? 3 0 In s h o r t , the modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s responded t o the s k e p t i c s by demonstrating the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e i r shared a s s e r t i o n t h a t human senses are u n r e l i a b l e with r e s p e c t t o p e r c e i v i n g r e a l i t y . The modern n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s , however, had an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t agenda i n mind. They b e l i e v e d t h a t a s y s t e m a t i c and more or l e s s complete body of knowledge was p o s s i b l e ; a body of knowledge 35 t h a t i n c l u d e d both the n a t u r a l and e t h i c a l - p o l i t i c a l realms. At the o u t s e t they were e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t h a t they were not prepared t o simply accept the e x i s t e n c e o-f an e x t e r n a l world. They b e l i e v e d t h a t the r e a l i t y o-f such a world had t o be argued i n t o e x i s t e n c e ; a world t h a t had t o be e x p l a i n e d and t h a t e x p l a n a t i o n had to be grounded on reason and not the senses. Descartes was one o-f the f i r s t t h e o r i s t s t o attempt such an e x p l a n a t i o n . Richard Tuck t e l l s us t h a t , a g a i n s t the A r i s t o t e l e a n s and s k e p t i c s a l i k e , Descartes argued t h a t t h e r e \" i s no reason t o suppose t h a t t h e r e are c o l o u r s . . . i n the r e a l e x t e r n a l world at a l I . . . .\" For t h a t matter, \"perhaps not only c o l o u r s are n o n - e x i s t e n t , but a l s o the m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s i n which they seem t o inhere. \" 3 S > Having presented h i s doubt, Descartes goes on t o argue why the e x t e r n a l world t h a t we p e r c e i v e must e x i s t and t h a t our p e r c e p t i o n s of t h a t world, at l e a s t t o some minimal extent, must r e f l e c t the nature of t h a t r e a l i t y . D escartes performs t h i s task with b a s i c a l l y two arguments. The f i r s t , a s s e r t s t h a t \"though t h e r e may be nothing o u t s i d e , we know t h e r e i s something i n s i d e , f o r we have d i r e c t e xperience of the i n t e r i o r world of c o l o u r s , sounds and so on.\"** 0 In other words, although our knowledge of the world e x t e r n a l t o o u r s e l v e s i s more or l e s s s p e c u l a t i v e , we have a b s o l u t e l y compelling knowledge of what goes on i n s i d e us. Thus we have e s t a b l i s h e d Descartes- 1 famous maxim-- C o g i t o erg Sum