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Interest group leadership and government funding : the Federation des Franco-Colombiens : community organisation… Savas, Daniel Johnathan 1987

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INTEREST GROUP LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING: THE FEDERATION DES FRANCO-COLOMBIENS - COMMUNITY ORGANISATION OR GOVERNMENT POLICY AGENT? By DANIEL JOHNATHAN SAVAS B.A., Uni v e r s i t y of Toronto, 1980 M.A., U n i v e r s i t l Laval, 1982 D.E.A., I n s t i t u t d'Etudes P o l i t i q u e s ( P a r i s ) , 1983 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January 1987 Daniel Johnathan Savas In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/8-n ABSTRACT Most i n t e r e s t group analyses focus on the impact of i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y i n the policymaking process, measured by the coincidence of i n t e r e s t demands and p o l i c y outputs. This study contends that the reverse case i s important for a more complete understanding of S t a t e - i n t e r e s t group r e l a t i o n s ; i t examines the impact of State support programmes on i n t e r e s t group leadership, and provides i n s i g h t s into how the State uses i n t e r e s t groups as agents fo r s o c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n . The analysis shows that S t a t e - i n t e r e s t group r e l a t i o n s can be a f f e c t e d by State funding programmes i n two fundamental ways: f i r s t , as p o l i c y agents and p o l i t i c a l actors, i n t e r e s t group leaders can become "captured" i n a v i c i o u s c i r c l e of f i n a n c i a l and p o l i c y dependency which allows a minimum amount of freedom i n community development a c t i v i t i e s ; second, the State can undermine the l i n k established between an i n t e r e s t group organisation and i t s i n t e r e s t community and, i n so doing, hinder i t s own a b i l i t y to pursue e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y action. As a case study, the thesis takes the Federation des Franco-Colombiens (FFC), and shows how B r i t i s h Columbia francophone leaders modified t h e i r leadership a c t i v i t i e s as a r e s u l t of access to federal government f i n a n c i a l and p o l i c y support through the O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y (1969). E s s e n t i a l l y , the FFC grew from a l a r g e l y l o c a l , Church-run community ass o c i a t i o n into a f u l l - f l e d g e d secular, bureaucratic, and p o l i t i c a l organisation. i i As Franco-Columbian leaders s h i f t e d t h e i r a c t i v i t y to the government arena as p o l i c y agents, they tended to pay less attention to t h e i r i n t e r e s t c l i e n t e l e , and thus severely jeopardized the effectiveness of t h e i r leadership. The implications of the study touch government., i n t e r e s t group leaders, and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s who wish to probe further i n t o S t a t e - i n t e r e s t group r e l a t i o n s . For the former two, i t i s c r u c i a l to be aware of the p o t e n t i a l l y negative e f f e c t s of e s t a b l i s h i n g too close a r e l a t i o n s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y i n those instances where the i n t e r e s t group has a low l e v e l of f i n a n c i a l autonomy. For the l a t t e r , i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y should not be perceived as being u n i - d i r e c t i o n a l ; i n t e r e s t groups are intermediaries i n the p o l i c y process whose actions v i s - a - v i s the government and the i n t e r e s t c l i e n t e l e must both be considered for a more complete understanding of t h e i r r o l e as s o c i e t a l actors. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements A b s t r a c t i i T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s i v L i s t o f F i g u r e s and T a b l e s v i i i P r e f a c e 1 F r e n c h C a n a d i a n M i n o r i t i e s & Language P o l i c y 2 The Case Study . . . . . . 5 M e t h o d o l o g i c a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 8 S t r u c t u r e o f the T h e s i s . . . 11 S e c t i o n 1: S e t t i n g the Stage 15 C h a p t e r 1 The P o l i t i c a l C o n t e x t : F r e n c h C a n a d i a n M i n o r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n s & the O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y 1960 - 1985 . . 16 1 . 1 . F r e n c h C a n a d i a n M i n o r i t i e s & the P o l i t i c s of Language 17 1 . 2 . The O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y Groups Programme 1969-1985 26 C o n c l u s i o n s 40 Endnotes 42 C h a p t e r 2 I n t e r e s t Group L e a d e r s h i p & Government F u n d i n g . . 46 2 . 1 . I n t e r e s t Groups & Government 48 2 . 2 . Forms of A c c e s s to Government 53 2 . 3 . Impact of A c c e s s & Government F u n d i n g 57 C o n c l u s i o n s 73 Endnotes 77 C h a p t e r 3 The I n t e r e s t Community: A P r o f i l e of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a Francophones 81 3 . 1 . A " M i n o r i t y " Community 82 3 . 2 . "Frenchness" o f Community L i f e 101 C o n c l u s i o n s I l l Endnotes 114 i v Section 2: The Federation des Franco-Colombiens - Community Organisation to Government P o l i c y Agent 116 Chapter 4 A History of the FFC 117 4.1. Absence of Organisation Leadership Before 1945 . . . 118 4.2. The Federation: Community Organisation 1945-1960 . . 125 4.3. Bureaucracy, Finances & Funding From Quebec . . . . 131 4.4. Federation Leaders & the P o l i c y Agent Role 1969-1981 135 4.5. Leadership C r i s i s & Aftermath 1981-1985 145 Conclusions , 148 Endnotes 151 Chapter 5 F i n a n c i a l Management: The Secretary of State Takes Over 158 5.1. Federation Revenues: Who's Footing the B i l l ? . . . 161 5.1.1. A Community Financed Federation 1945-1968 . . . . 162 5.1.2. The Secretary of State Takes Over 1969-1985 . . . . 168 5.2. Federation Expenditures: Bureaucratic Spending Spree 180 Conclusions 188 Endnotes 190 Chapter 6 Organisational Growth: Bureaucratisation & P r o f e s s i o n a l i s a t i o n . . . . 193 6.1. A Challenge to Local Authority 195 6.1.1. Limited Local Expansion 196 6.1.2. Growth of N o n - A f f i l i a t e d Local Organisations . . . . 200 6.1.3. A Permanent Secretariat 201 6.1.4. Confronting the Catholic Church 204 6.2. Remodelling the D i v i s i o n of Authority 210 6.2.1. Federation Control .' . 211 6.2.2. Administrative Authority 213 6.3. Bureaucratic Growth & the Erosion of Functional Links 219 6.4. Representativeness of Federation Structures . . . . 226 6.4.1. Decentralised Structures & Representation 226 6.4.2. Membership Status & Representation 234 Conclusions . . . 240 Endnotes . 243 v Chapter 7 Federation - Local Cooperation: A Leadership Gap 251 7.1. The D i l u t i o n of Cooperation 1945-1969 253 7.1.1. "Team-like" Cooperation . . . . . 254 7.1.2. D i s j o i n t e d Cooperation 263 7.2. A Service Centre Federation 1970-1985 279 7.2.1. The "Service Centre" Approach 280 7.2.2. An I n e f f e c t i v e Remedy: Representation Structures. . 303 Conclusions 306 Endnotes 310 Chapter 8 P o l i t i c a l Advocacy: The Triumph of P o l i t i c s ? . . 318 8.1. Redefining the Federation-Local Axis 320 8.1.1. A P o l i t i c a l V i s i o n 321 8.1.2. A Private Federation Domain 327 8.2. P o l i t i c a l Advocacy as Bureaucratic Management . . . 333 8.2.1. The P o l i t i c s of Dollars 333 8.2.2. Pressure Group versus P o l i c y Agent . 338 8.2.3. A Lack of Community M o b i l i s a t i o n 340 8.3. The P r o v i n c i a l i s a t i o n of P o l i t i c a l Advocacy . . . . 346 8-. 3.1. From Quebec C i t y to Ottawa 347 8.3.2. A National Francophone Minority Organisation . . . . 356 8.3.3. P o l i t i c a l Advocacy i n V i c t o r i a 361 Conclusions 370 Endnotes 372 Section 3: General Conclusions 382 Chapter 9 Conclusions 383 9.1. Contributory Factors to Federation Leadership . . . . 383 9.2. Federation Leadership & Federal Government Funding . 386 9.3. Nature of Federation Leadership 391 9.4. Interest Group Leadership & Government Funding . . . 394 9.5. Reflections 398 vi B i b l i o g r a p h y 409 Books and A r t i c l e s 409 O f f i c i a l Reports and S t u d i e s 424 Newspaper and Magazine A r t i c l e s 427 Records of O r g a n i s a t i o n Meetings & Proceedings . . . 429 Correspondence 430 I n t e r v i e w s 432 Appendices Appendix 1 - Francophone O r g a n i s a t i o n s Donating Funds to the F e d e r a t i o n Appendix 2 - Examples of E x p e n d i t u r e s i n D i f f e r e n t C a t e g o r i e s 1945-1969, 1970-1985 Appendix 3 - E v o l u t i o n of F e d e r a t i o n S t r u c t u r e s Appendix 4 - FFC E x e c u t i v e Committee Members 1950-1980 Appendix 5 - C r i t e r i a f o r S e l e c t i o n of I n t e r v i e w s vi i LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES F i g u r e 1.1 - Model of the O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y Groups Programme 3 0 F i g u r e 3.1 - N a t i o n a l & P r o v i n c i a l D i s t r i b u t i o n of Francophones Ou t s i d e Quebec, 1981 Census . . 84 F i g u r e 3.2 - R e g i o n a l D i s t r i b u t i o n of B r i t i s h Columbia Francophones, 1981 Census 84 F i g u r e 3.3A - H i g h e s t Francophone C o n c e n t r a t i o n i n one Census D i s t r i c t 85 F i g u r e 3.3B - H i g h e s t Francophone C o n c e n t r a t i o n i n one F e d e r a l E l e c t o r a l D i s t r i c t , 1981 Census . . . 87 F i g u r e 3.4A - Urban-Rural D i s t r i b u t i o n of Francophones Outs i d e Quebec, 1981 Census 88 F i g u r e 3.4B - Urban D i s t r i b u t i o n of Francophones O u t s i d e Quebec by Urban S i z e Groups, 1981 Census . . 89 F i g u r e 3.5A - French Mother Tongue vs French Home Language For Francophones O u t s i d e Quebec, CROP 1982 . 91 F i g u r e 3.5B - French Mother Tongue P o p u l a t i o n Knowledge Of The O f f i c i a l Languages, 1981 Census . . . 93 F i g u r e 3.6A - Percentage of Francophones Born i n P r o v i n c e of Residence, CROP 1982 94 F i g u r e 3.6B - Number Of Years In Your P r o v i n c e , CROP 1982 . 95 F i g u r e 3.7 - L e v e l of E d u c a t i o n by P r o v i n c e , CROP 1982 . . 97 F i g u r e 3.8A - Income L e v e l s of Francophones O u t s i d e Quebec, CROP 1982 . 98 F i g u r e 3.8B - Income L e v e l s f o r BC Language Groups, 1981 Census 99 F i g u r e 3.9 - D i s t r i b u t i o n of Francophones O u t s i d e Quebec by Economic S e c t o r , 1981 Census 99 F i g u r e 3.10 - Amount of French Used By BC Francophones In D i f f e r e n t Community Contexts, CROP 1982 . . . 101 v i i i F i g u r e 3.12A - T i e s To The French Language by Province,. CROP 1982 107 F i g u r e 3.12B - T i e s To The Francophone Group by P r o v i n c e , CROP 1982 107 F i g u r e 3.13A - DO NOT CARE To Speak French More Oft e n During L e i s u r e Time & S o c i a l L i f e , CROP 1982 . . . . 108 F i g u r e 3.13B - WANT TO SPEAK MORE/A LOT MORE French During L e i s u r e Time & In S o c i a l L i f e , CROP 1982 . . 109 F i g u r e 3.14 - Francophones O u t s i d e Quebec A b i l i t y To L i v e In French, CROP 1982 I l l F i g u r e 5.1 - FFC Revenue Sources 1945-1985 164 F i g u r e 5.2 - D i s t r i b u t i o n of S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e OLMG Programme Funds to FFC & L o c a l A s s o c i a t i o n s , 1971-1985 . . . . 178 F i g u r e 5.3 - FFC E x p e n d i t u r e C a t e g o r i e s 1945-1985 . . . . 181 F i g u r e 5.4 - S a l a r i e s as a Percentage of Community Development Spending, 1970-1985 186 F i g u r e 6.1 - Number of F e d e r a t i o n Members 1950-1984 . . . 199 F i g u r e 6.2 - Percentage of FFC Members by A s s o c i a t i o n Type 1963-1968 201 F i g u r e 6.3 - D i s t r i b u t i o n of E x e c u t i v e Committee Members by Region, 1949-1985 223 F i g u r e 6.4 - D i s t r i b u t i o n of Dele g a t e s by Region, 1950-1984 . 228 F i g u r e 6.5 - P r o p o r t i o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n at AGA by Region, 1975-1979 231 F i g u r e 6.6 - P r o p o r t i o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n at AGA by Region, 1980-1982 232 F i g u r e 6.7 - P r o p o r t i o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n at AGA by Region, 1984 233 Tabl e 6.1 - D i s t r i b u t i o n of I n d i v i d u a l & A s s o c i a t i o n Members Between the Centre & P e r i p h e r y , 1972-1981 239 i x F i g u r e 6.7 - P r o p o r t i o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i o n at AGA by Region, 1984 233 T a b l e 6.1 - D i s t r i b u t i o n of I n d i v i d u a l & A s s o c i a t i o n Members Between the Centre & P e r i p h e r y , 1972-1981 239 x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis could not have been undertaken nor completed without the help, support, and encouagement of a number of people whom I would l i k e to acknowledge here. I greatly appreciated the d i r e c t i o n and c r i t i c a l advice given thoughout the various stages of the entreprise by my thesis advisor, Professor Jean A. Laponce. Many thanks for helping me to f i n a l l y "noyer mes p e t i t s chats." For her patience and r e l e n t l e s s e f f o r t s i n helping me to master (?) the UBC computer system, I thank Ms. Laine Ruus of the UBC Data L i b r a r y . Je remercie aussi Marc Roy, de l a Federation des Franco-Colombiens, Catou Levesque de l a Societe Historique Franco-Colombienne et Huguette Leclerc du S e c r e t a r i a t d'Etat a Vancouver de toute 1'aide q u ' i l s m'ont fournie, que ce s o i t en forme de renseignements ou d'appui moral. La communaute franco-colombienne merite aussi une mention p a r t i c u l i e r e . Ceux et c e l l e s que j ' a i pu rencontrer et auxquels j 1 a i eu l 1 o c c a s i o n de p a r l e r au courant de l a recherche m'ont accord^ un a c c u e i l tres p o s i t i f . J'en suis tres reconnaissant. I owe a great debt of thanks to my colleagues and friends i n the P o l i t i c a l Science Department at UBC. They provided a source of enjoyment, a pleasant s o c i a l and studying environment (despite my many setbacks i n the hockey pools), and a valuable sounding board throughout the many stages of my research. Special thanks to Jim Fergusson, Marc Desjardins, David Stewart, Argen Moens, Radha Jhappan, John Fossum, Martin G r i f f i t h s , M. Ramesh, Ian Urquhart, and Jim Bruton. F i n a n c i a l support from the S o c i a l Sciences Humanities and Research Council of Canada and the Univ e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia made i t possible for me to complete my research. F i n a l l y , and most importantly, I dedicate the d i s s e r t a t i o n to my parents, E l s i e Savas and Ron Savas, whose unending support and encouragement throughout my u n i v e r s i t y years deserves recognition well beyond the pages written here. Thank you both for making t h i s p o s s i b l e . Daniel Johnathan Savas xi P R E F A C E The f edera l government adopted i t s O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y i n the l a t e 1960s i n response to a fervent Quebec nat iona l i sm which chal lenged the assumptions of Canada's d u a l i s t past . Through i t s Secretary of State Department, Ottawa developed p o l i c i e s and implemented a v a r i e t y of f edera l ly - funded programmes which would d i r e c t l y a i d and promote b i l i n g u a l i s m and language e q u a l i t y across the country. I t was feared that without these i n i t i a t i v e s Canada would become i r r e v e r s i b l y d i v i d e d along l i n g u i s t i c and c u l t u r a l l i n e s which threatened the i n t e g r i t y of the Canadian State . French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s were major targets for government a c t i o n . Federa l o f f i c i a l s and p o l i t i c i a n s f e l t that f e d e r a l funds could be used to b u i l d a network of p r o v i n c i a l l y - b a s e d francophone organisat ions ac t ing as agents for the O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y i n Engl i sh- speaking Canada. They be l i eved that as these organisat ions developed v i a b l e minor i ty communities, the f r u i t s of b i l i n g u a l i s m would be borne i n more harmonious French-E n g l i s h r e l a t i o n s , and a tempered Quebecois na t iona l i sm. The use of these m i n o r i t i e s to achieve n a t i o n a l p o l i c y objec t ives s i g n a l l e d a broadening of the f edera l government's preoccupation with French Canada, and had important r a m i f i c a t i o n s for francophone minor i ty communities. In t h i s study, I focus more d i r e c t l y on how French Canadian 1 minority organisations grew and changed under the tutelage of f e d e r a l government f i n a n c i a l and p o l i c y support. As such, I hope to add to a growing l i t e r a t u r e on Canadian i n t e r e s t groups, and provide new i n s i g h t s into the e f f e c t s ' o f State support programmes on i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y more generally. How the State "captures" s o c i e t a l actors to provide p o l i c y leadership i s the reverse side of most i n t e r e s t group analyses which examine the pressures they exert on the p o l i t i c a l system. My analysis o f f e r s i n s i g h t s into the r o l e of community organisations as i n t e r e s t groups i n society, and reveals the impact of State p o l i c y on these organisations. I argue that the government-funded p o l i c y agent r o l e tends to p u l l leaders away from t h e i r i n t e r e s t community by modifying the leadership functions they exercise on behalf of t h e i r members. I therefore r a i s e a number of questions concerning the p o t e n t i a l l y negative e f f e c t s of government funding on i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y . French Canadian M i n o r i t i e s and Language P o l i c y This study grew p r i m a r i l y out of my i n t e r e s t i n federal government language p o l i c y and French Canada. More generally, I wished to consider how the Canadian State used i t s language p o l i c y to mould a s p e c i f i c Canadian i d e n t i t y . In view of the perceived thrust of Quebec nationalism, federal government language p o l i c y became a t o o l designed to promote one p a r t i c u l a r perspective of the Canadian p o l i t i c a l community over another: an 2 o f f i c i a l l y b i l i n g u a l country based on language equality through i n s t i t u t i o n a l b i l i n g u a l i s m . Why French Canadian minorities? Well, quite simply, a f t e r having spent several years i n Quebec C i t y studying the e f f e c t s of Quebec nationalism on the d e f i n i t i o n of a Canadian p o l i t i c a l community, I came to r e a l i s e that the existence of francophone communities outside Quebec posed some very i n t e r e s t i n g and unexplored questions concerning the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l and l i n g u i s t i c make-up of our country. I f e l t that these questions, when answered, could bring a new understanding to our conceptualisation of the d u a l i s t paradigm i n Canadian p o l i t i c s . F i r s t and foremost, I believe that even though francophone min o r i t i e s are h i s t o r i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y l i n k e d to Quebec, they are p o l i t i c a l l y at odds with the general thrust of a Quebec nationalism which would divide up French Canada and d i l u t e t h e i r own i d e n t i t y as French Canadians. Moreover, there are e s s e n t i a l d i f ferences between the francophone majority and minority experiences which are t i e d to s o c i a l factors beyond the language question. For example, though the presence of a French Canadian minority i n every province i s a constant h i s t o r i c a l reminder - to us of the French f a c t i n Canada, i t i s also a source of tension for the m i n o r i t i e s , because they have to deal with an anglophone majority whose mindset for "things French" seems to be locked into Quebec separatism and the p o t e n t i a l break-up of Canada. In 3 addition, we cannot under-estimate the a b i l i t y of p r o v i n c i a l boundaries to forge d i f f e r e n t types of minority communities. French Canadians i n B r i t i s h Columbia may indeed have more i n common with t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l population than with t h e i r c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c "confreres" i n Quebec or Ontario. Therefore, I believe that a p o l i t i c a l understanding of French Canadian mi n o r i t i e s and, indeed, of our d u a l i s t roots, can be improved with a look beyond the larger Quebec-Canada debate. For too long, governments and analysts a l i k e have made the mistake of examining these communities s o l e l y i n terms of t h e i r " s u r v i v a l p o t e n t i a l " and i t s r a m i f i c a t i o n s for Quebec-Canada r e l a t i o n s . They r a r e l y go a step further to explore the p o l i t i c a l foundations of the m i n o r i t i e s themselves. We are thus treated to the perennial socio-demographic analyses which show the dwindling numbers and high a s s i m i l a t i o n rates, and conclusions which state that something must be done to aid French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s . Very l i t t l e analysis i s done to understand where, how, and why these minorities f i t into the larger Canadian s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l landscape. For instance, we do not know what exactly i t means to be an O f f i c i a l Language Minority nor how francophones themselves f e e l about t h e i r s p e c i a l status. Do they look at government p o l i c i e s i n ways d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r English-speaking counterparts? In t h i s study, I do not address the f u l l range of these issues, but I do make an attempt to h i g h l i g h t some of the p o l i t i c a l manifestations of minority a c t i v i t y outside the 4 rather r i g i d Quebec-Canada framework. I chose O f f i c i a l Language Minority Organisations (OLMOs) as a research focus for three very s p e c i f i c methodological reasons: f i r s t , f o r the most part they are creations of the francophone mi n o r i t i e s themselves, and are thus looked upon as extensions of the communities. Second, the federal government targeted these organisations as community representatives, t y i n g them to the O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y through various funding programmes; as such, they served as useful tools for my analysis of i n t e r e s t group-government r e l a t i o n s . Third, they are tangible, e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e p o l i t i c a l actors whose a c t i v i t i e s can provide i n s i g h t s into the s o c i e t a l implications of the State using i n t e r e s t groups as p o l i c y agents. The Case Study I look i n depth at one O f f i c i a l Language Minority Organisa-t i o n , the "Federation des Franco-Colombiens" (FFC), p r o v i n c i a l francophone organisation i n B r i t i s h Columbia. In p a r t i c u l a r , I take a look at the actions of BC's francophone leaders as they t r i e d to manage not only group-government r e l a t i o n s , but also t h e i r own r o l e as community leaders. The FFC serves as a useful case to examine the impact of f e d e r a l government language p o l i c y on French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s , because i t i s a government-funded i n t e r e s t group playing the r o l e of p o l i c y agent. I ask two 5 q u e s t i o n s : How have F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s succeeded or f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p of the Franco-Columbian community? How has access to f e d e r a l government f u n d i n g programmes through the O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y a f f e c t e d the development of F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s h i p ? Over the F e d e r a t i o n ' s 40 year h i s t o r y (1945-1985), i t s l e a -d e r s c o n s t r u c t e d a broad p r o v i n c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a l network and c l a i m e d to speak on b e h a l f of a w e l l - d e f i n e d Franco-Columbian community. In my a n a l y s i s I f o c u s on a number of key dates and events which h e l p to s i t u a t e changes brought to F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s h i p . P r i o r to 1945, BC francophones had v i r t u a l l y no o r g a n i s a t i o n a l network to speak o f . Between 1945 and 1960, they gave l i f e to the F e d e r a t i o n and attempted to develop a broad p r o v i n c i a l s t r u c t u r e f o r the community. Duri n g t h i s p e r i o d , community members f i n a n c e d F e d e r a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s , though they d i d r e c e i v e o c c a s i o n a l h e l p from a few Quebec-based francophone a s s o c i a t i o n s . From 1961 to 1968, changes to F e d e r a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s and o p e r a t i o n s d e s i r e d by c e r t a i n l e a d e r s appeared to c o i n c i d e w i t h the a r r i v a l of Quebec government f u n d i n g and more s u b s t a n t i a l support from Quebec francophone a s s o c i a t i o n s . S i n c e 1968, the f e d e r a l government has c o n t r i b u t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of p o l i c y and f i n a n c i a l support to the F e d e r a t i o n . T h i s p r o v i d e d a c o n t e x t f o r F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s to make s u b s t a n t i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s to t h e i r community development a c t i v i t i e s and to the F e d e r a t i o n ' s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , however, 6 the growth of F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s h i p i n the "government f u n d i n g " p e r i o d produced a l e s s c o h e s i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l network, and a " d i s t a n c e " between l o c a l francophone communities and t h e i r c e n t r a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . How d i d t h i s happen? In response to a number of e x t e r n a l f o r c e s , n o t a b l y f e d e r a l government language p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s i n the 1960s and g e n e r a l s o c i e t a l changes d u r i n g the same p e r i o d , F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s began to focus more a t t e n t i o n on the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s than they had i n p r e c e d i n g y e a r s . Whereas t h i s " r e f o c u s s i n g " brought major changes i n t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t i e s and m u l t i p l e p o l i c y b e n e f i t s to Franco-Columbians, i t tended a l s o to produce a gap between F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s and the Franco-Columbian community. I t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r two p r o p o s i t i o n s : o F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p of the Franco-Columbian community l a r g e l y due to the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f e d e r a l govern-ment language p o l i c i e s which used p r o v i n c i a l f r a n -cophone a s s o c i a t i o n s as government p o l i c y agents. o As the FFC s h i f t e d i t s i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y to the government arena, i t p a i d l e s s a t t e n t i o n to i t s i n t e r e s t c l i e n t e l e , and thus s e v e r e l y j e o p a r d -i z e d the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of i t s l e a d e r s h i p . The B r i t i s h Columbia example i s i n t e r e s t i n g from two p e r s p e c t i v e s . F i r s t , i n the c o n t e x t of a n a t i o n a l language p o l i c y whose g o a l s address a country-wide francophone c o n s t i t u e n c y , B r i t i s h Columbia's p r o v i n c i a l OLMO r e c e i v e s treatment s i m i l a r to o t h e r p r o v i n c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , and, 7 t h e r e f o r e , we would expec t our a n a l y s i s to a p p l y c o n s i s t e n t l y a c r o s s p r o v i n c i a l b o u n d a r i e s . M o r e o v e r , i n l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t the i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e p l a y e d by i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s i s i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d to the i n t e r e s t community, our a n a l y s i s can be more r e v e a l i n g due to the n a t u r e o f the F r a n c o - C o l u m b i a n community. Indeed , the need f o r government s u p p o r t o f O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n s to g e n e r a t e v i a b l e OLM communit ies may be g r e a t e r i n the s m a l l e r , d i s p e r s e d , and h i g h l y a s s i m i l a t e d BC f rancophone community. From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , l o o k i n g a t the FFC r e v e a l s a l l the more p o i g n a n t l y the i m p o r t a n c e of government f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t to an i n t e r e s t community. I t can i n the same b r e a t h , however, a m p l i f y the e f f e c t s of government . f u n d i n g on i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p as OLMOs become, government p o l i c y a g e n t s . Methodological Considerations As w i t h most case s t u d i e s i t i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t to e x t r a p o l a t e beyond the b o u n d a r i e s of the a n a l y s i s . In t h i s i n s t a n c e , the e f f e c t s on i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p may be more or l e s s extreme, a c c o r d i n g to the n a t u r e o f the f rancophone communi-t y and i t s need f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l deve lopment . N o n e t h e l e s s , I do f e e l t h a t the a n a l y s i s i s e a s i l y expanded beyond B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ' s b o r d e r s , l a r g e l y because d i s c u s s i o n s I have had w i t h a c t i v i s t s i n v a r i o u s o t h e r p r o v i n c i a l f rancophone a s s o c i a t i o n s sugges t a number o f s i m i l a r i t i e s . 8 I used a v a r i e t y of research methods and approaches i n t h i s t h e s i s . My primary research focussed on o r i g i n a l h i s t o r i c a l records provided by the Federation des Franco-Golombiens and the Societe Historique Franco-Colombienne. Both organisations gave me f u l l access to a l l documents: minutes & proceedings of the Executive Committee and the Annual General Assembly, f i n a n c i a l records, s p e c i a l reports, and various Federation studies. Very l i t t l e published material existed. In addition, the Department of the Secretary of State i n Ottawa, and i t s regional o f f i c e i n Vancouver, offered continual support throughout my research, providing valuable government information on various p o l i c i e s and programmes which affected francophone m i n o r i t i e s . I used two main s t a t i s t i c a l sources: S t a t i s t i c s Canada Census (1981), and a survey of francophone minorities done by the Montreal research firm, l e Centre de recherche sur 1'opinion publique (CROP). Largely a tool to h i g h l i g h t various s o c i o l o g i c a l aspects of B r i t i s h Columbia's francophone community, these sources provided valuable information for discussions of attitudes and perceptions of Franco-Columbians on a va r i e t y of matters r e l a t e d to my research, and set measureable parameters for looking at the nature of French B r i t i s h Columbia. I supplemented my primary and survey research through personal interviews with a number of BC francophone leaders. These interviews offered valuable in s i g h t s into the Federation 9 and the francophone community i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Far from a random s e l e c t i o n , the people i n t e r v i e w e d had, a c c o r d i n g to my i n v e s t i g a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h , p l a y e d important r o l e s i n the F e d e r a t i o n ' s development. Though each and every l e a d e r c o u l d not be i n t e r v i e w e d , a l l those s e l e c t e d d i d f i t i n t o the l e a d e r g r i d I c o n s t r u c t e d from my r e a d i n g and u n d e r s t a n d i n g of F e d e r a t i o n h i s t o r y (see Appendix 5). I was a p a r t i c i p a n t o b s e r v e r at a number of F e d e r a t i o n meetings and eve n t s . T h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f f e r e d v a l u a b l e " i n s i d e r " i n f o r m a t i o n on the way F e d e r a t i o n and community a f f a i r s were run. C o n v e r s a t i o n s I had w i t h many community members at these meetings brought f u r t h e r evidence i n support of my r e s e a r c h h y p o t h e s i s , even though they were not s t r u c t u r e d . My c o n t e n t i o n t h a t f e d e r a l government f u n d i n g m o d i f i e d F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s ' approach to community development a c t i v i t i e s i s not a statement of d i r e c t and u n i - d i r e c t i o n a l c a u s a l i t y . My t h e o r e t i c a l model of i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y d i s t i n c t l y r e f u t e s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . In any case, i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t one c o u l d e s t a b l i s h a u n i - c a u s a l l i n k i n t h i s i n s t a n c e . Many oth e r f a c t o r s , which I do mention throughout my r e s e a r c h , c o n t r i b u t e d to the changes I observed i n F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s ' a c t i v i t i e s , such as g e n e r a l s o c i e t a l changes i n B r i t i s h Columbia and Canada, p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f l i c t s between l e a d e r s , the nature of v o l u n t e e r 10 work, or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Franco-Columbian community. Nonethe l e s s , upon a r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a c t s , I f i n d a h i g h degree of c o r r e l a t i o n between the a r r i v a l of f e d e r a l government funds and changes brought to F e d e r a t i o n l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t i e s . I use the case study approach to suggest t h a t c e r t a i n changes d i d occur, but t h a t the c o n c l u s i o n s r e q u i r e f u r t h e r v e r i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e one c o u l d e s t a b l i s h a p r e d i c t i v e model of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between government f u n d i n g and i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p . Structure o f the Thesis I d i v i d e my a n a l y s i s i n t o t h r e e s e c t i o n s . The f i r s t comprises t h r e e c h a p t e r s , the second c o n t a i n s f i v e , and the l a s t i s a summary of g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s and i n v i t e s some r e f l e c t i o n s . In s e c t i o n One, e n t i t l e d " S e t t i n g the Stage", I p r e s e n t the p o l i t i c a l , t h e o r e t i c a l , and s o c i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s of the study. Chapter One p l a c e s O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n s i n the c o n t e x t of the f e d e r a l government's O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y . I argue t h a t the f e d e r a l government used OLMOs as u s e f u l p o l i c y c o n d u i t s i n i t s attempt to respond to the p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t Quebec n a t i o n a l i s m posed f o r Canadian u n i t y . Chapter Two p l a c e s the study i n a t h e o r e t i c a l framework of i n t e r e s t group r e l a t i o n s w i t h the S t a t e . I focus on how 11 government f u n d i n g may modify the r o l e s and f u n c t i o n s of i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s as they t r y to address the needs and concerns of t h e i r i n t e r e s t communities. Chapter Three o u t l i n e s the socio-demographic bases of the Franco-Columbian community, and e x p l o r e s i t s "Frenchness" i n l i g h t of a number of community l i f e v a r i a b l e s . In so doing, I h i n t a t p a r t i c u l a r elements of r e l e v a n c e to i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s and government p o l i c y m a k e r s . In s e c t i o n Two, e n t i t l e d "The F e d e r a t i o n des Franco-Colombiens: Community O r g a n i s a t i o n to Government P o l i c y Agent", I e x p l o r e the a c t i v i t i e s of FFC l e a d e r s as they e s t a b l i s h e d the Franco-Columbian o r g a n i s a t i o n a l network and managed government f u n d i n g and p o l i c y support on b e h a l f of BC's francophone p o p u l a t i o n . Here, I attempt to show how f e d e r a l government f u n d i n g m o d i f i e d l e a d e r s h i p s t r a t e g i e s and thereby i n f l u e n c e d attempts to develop a v i a b l e francophone community i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Chapter Four sketches the h i s t o r y of the F e d e r a t i o n des Franco-Colombiens. In i t , I d i s c e r n s e v e r a l p a t t e r n s of i t s l e a d e r s h i p and o u t l i n e g e n e r a l changes which c o i n c i d e d w i t h the a r r i v a l of f e d e r a l government f u n d i n g . Chapter F i v e examines more c l o s e l y the f i n a n c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s FFC l e a d e r s had w i t h the Franco-Columbian community and the f e d e r a l government. I c o n s i d e r how f i n a n c i a l management e a r l y on brought the F e d e r a t i o n c l o s e r to i t s i n t e r e s t community, but how dramatic s h i f t s i n revenues and spending, which seemed to be l i n k e d d i r e c t l y to the a r r i v a l of federal government funds, s i g n i f i c a n t l y modified many of the s t r a t e g i e s adopted by FFC leaders. Chapter Six focuses on s t r u c t u r a l developments of the Franco-Columbian network. Here, I look at how Federation leaders used organisational growth to broaden Federation a c t i v i t i e s and to challenge the l o c a l and Church-led s t r u c t u r a l status quo. I focus on how the a r r i v a l of government funds f a c i l i t a t e d t h i s challenge, and how subsequent organisational growth dramatically a l t e r e d how FFC leaders performed t h e i r functions as i n t e r e s t group leaders. Chapter Seven observes Federation-local cooperation. I pay p a r t i c u l a r attention to how Federation leaders interacted with l o c a l communities to give a sense of c o l l e c t i v e s p i r i t to BC's francophone population. I also consider how t h i s " s o l i d a r i t y " was modified by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of federal funds. F i n a l l y , Chapter Eight h i g h l i g h t s Federation leadership through p o l i t i c a l advocacy. I look at the establishment of p o l i t i c a l contacts and at the pursuit of regular p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y which came to dominate FFC actions. How t h i s modified leadership s t r a t e g i e s , contributing further to changes i n Federation leadership i s the focus of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r chapter. In the l a s t section, I put f o r t h a number of general 13 c o n c l u s i o n s which summarize the s u b s t a n t i v e r e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s . I u n d e r l i n e the t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the study, and then make a few comments on the methodology of i n q u i r y , r e l e v a n c e of the study, and avenues f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h . 14 SECTION 1: SETTING THE STAGE 15 CHAPTER 1 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT: FRENCH CANADIAN MINORITY ORGANISATIONS & THE O F F I C I A L LANGUAGES POLICY 1960-1985 French Canadian m i n o r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s occupy a s p e c i a l , though u n a p p r e c i a t e d , r o l e i n Canadian p o l i t i c s . T h e i r h i s t o r y i s r e p l e t e w i t h s t r u g g l e s f o r m i n o r i t y language and r e l i g i o u s r i g h t s i n e d u c a t i o n , f o r French language government s e r v i c e s , and more r e c e n t l y , f o r entrenched c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Yet, t h e i r importance i n the l a r g e r Canadian p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t i s more o f t e n than not drowned amidst concerns f o r Quebec's p o s i t i o n as the predominant f o r c e of t h i n g s French i n t h i s c o u n t r y . I t i s t h e r e f o r e h e l p f u l to d e l i v e r French Canadian m i n o r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s from v i r t u a l o b s c u r i t y and a p p r e c i a t e t h e i r importance to Canadian language p o l i c y : The o f f i c i a l languages p o l i c y r e c o g n i z e s t h a t E n g l i s h and French are sources of i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e enrichment f o r Canadians, t h a t the c o n t i n u i n g development of o f f i c i a l language m i n o r i t i e s i n a l l p r o v i n c e s c o n t r i b u t e s to the openness of Canada's s o c i e t y to a v a r i e t y of v a l u e s and c u l t u r e s , and t h a t the weakening or " d i s a p p e a r a n c e of o f f i c i a l language m i n o r i t i e s would j e o p a r d i z e Canada's u n i t y . ( 1 ) As r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t e r e s t groups s e r v i n g to promote and l e g i t i m i z e o f f i c i a l b i l i n g u a l i s m i n a l l p r o v i n c e s , they have a c t e d as v a l u a b l e p o l i c y agents working on b e h a l f of the f e d e r a l 16 government. In t h i s c h a p t e r , we f i r s t s e t the p o l i t i c a l stage f o r the e n t r y of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n t o the Canadian language debate, and then look more c l o s e l y a t how they f i t i n t o f e d e r a l government language p o l i c y s t r a t e g i e s . 1.1. French Canadian M i n o r i t i e s and the P o l i t i c s of Language D i v e r g e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the nature of the Canadian p o l i t i c a l community c a t a p u l t e d French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s i n t o the p o l i t i c a l debates s u r r o u n d i n g F r e n c h - E n g l i s h r e l a t i o n s which s u r f a c e d i n the 1960s. Both Ottawa and Quebec C i t y dodged each o t h e r i n the language p o l i c y r i n g , f e i n t i n g and counterpunching w i t h d i f f e r e n t approaches and responses to the language c r i s i s i n Canada. French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s became the f r o n t i s p i e c e of Ottawa's O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y whereas i n Quebec C i t y they appeared a l e s s prominent p r i o r i t y of a government s t r i v i n g to ensure a s t r o n g e r base f o r the French language and c u l t u r e i n s i d e i t s own p r o v i n c i a l b o r d e r s . S o c i a l and economic reforms i n Quebec s o c i e t y d u r i n g the 1960s, more p o p u l a r l y known as the '"Quiet R e v o l u t i o n " , were r o o t e d i n a r e j e c t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l l y r u r a l and r e l i g i o u s 2 s o c i a l o r d e r by a new French Canadian middle c l a s s . The t h r u s t of change s t r e n g t h e n e d and expanded the Quebec S t a t e as i t became the key i n s t r u m e n t f o r the e x p r e s s i o n of a more a g g r e s s i v e and 17 confident French Canadian people in Quebec. The development of stronger ties to Quebec alone, talk of a "French Canadian" State, and a l i tany of provincial demands emanating from Quebec, a l l couched in national ist rhetoric , raised concern in Ottawa and across Canada: Before long i t became clear that the new ideology [in Quebec] was a menace to national unity (.. .) [R]ather than becoming increasingly integrated with the Canadian community, French Canadian e l i tes were becoming increasingly attached to Quebec.(3) This redef init ion by French Canadians in Quebec of their psychological and p o l i t i c a l boundaries highlighted an underlying sense of alienation from the federal government. While sharing "the Canadian identity for p o l i t i c a l purposes, (...) many Quebecois refused to merge their primary identity [as Quebecois] 4 with Canada as a whole." The absence of French Canadians in positions of power in Ottawa, the unequal treatment of languages in the federal c i v i l service, and the serious pl ight of French Canadian minorities across Canada fuelled this al ienation. Ottawa was increasingly viewed as the "Government of English Canada"; and therefore, only a strong Quebec State as the "Government of French Canada" would provide the balance needed for French Canadian surviva l . Ottawa perceived a danger to the Canadian p o l i t i c a l community in this new Quebec perspective. F i r s t , equating French 18 Canada w i t h Quebec and the Quebec government alone undermined the l e g i t i m a c y of the f e d e r a l government to speak on b e h a l f of F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g Quebeckers. Second, t h i s same e q u a t i o n j e o p a r d i z e d the p o s i t i o n of French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s o u t s i d e Quebec. Indeed, i f French Canada stopped a t Quebec's b o r d e r s , these m i n o r i t i e s would q u i c k l y l o s e t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y as one of Canada's founding peoples i n an E n g l i s h Canada b e r e f t of l e g i s l a t i o n g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e i r language r i g h t s . On both of these counts, Canada would emerge d i v i d e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , c u l t u r a l l y , and p o l i t i c a l l y . A l l French Canadians had to b e l o n g to a u n i f i e d c o u n t r y i f Canada were to s u r v i v e as a v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l u n i t . The r e a l problem, a c c o r d i n g to Ottawa, was r o o t e d i n the "non-acceptance of French Canadians as i n d i v i d u a l s i n the l a r g e r 5 Canadian s o c i e t y . " As a r e s u l t , the f e d e r a l government undertook to counter the n a t i o n a l i s t tone of Quebec p o l i t i c s by spe a k i n g out f o r and d e s i g n i n g p o l i c i e s to c r e a t e a Canada which i n c l u d e d a l l Canadians. T h i s sparked the " p o l i t i c s of language" debate which has engaged both Ottawa and Quebec C i t y f o r most of the p a s t two decades. The " p o l i t i c s " of language stemmed from a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between two opposing views of Canada and two c o n t r a s t i n g approaches to language p o l i c y . With i t s O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y , Ottawa f a v o u r e d a pan-Canadian v i s i o n which i n c l u d e d a l l francophones as the " r e l e v a n t " French Canadian community. T h i s d i f f e r e d markedly from, what one author c a l l e d , Quebec's " s e g m e n t a l i s t " view where t h a t p r o v i n c e c o n s t i t u t e d the core francophone area, and the r e s t of Canada would be the home of 6 E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g Canadians. The r e s p e c t i v e language p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s m i r r o r e d these two views. In an e f f o r t to address the p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t to n a t i o n a l u n i t y , the f e d e r a l government s e t up the Royal Commission on B i l i n g u a l i s m and B i c u l t u r a l i s m i n 1963. "Equal p a r t n e r s h i p " and "language e q u a l i t y " emerged as key themes i n the Commissioners' 1965 P r e l i m i n a r y Report. Due to t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of the i n a d e q u a c i e s of Canadian laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s to g i v e r e a l i t y to language e q u a l i t y , they proposed a s i g n i f i c a n t number of recommendations i n t e n d e d to make Canada an e q u a l p a r t n e r s h i p between the two language communities. In d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e to language m i n o r i t i e s , the B i l i n g u a l i s m & B i c u l t u r a l i s m Commissioners s t a t e d t h a t , "the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y i m p l i e s the r e s p e c t f o r the i d e a of m i n o r i t y both w i t h i n the c o u n t r y as a 7 whole, and i n each of i t s r e g i o n s . " The g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e of t h e i r recommendations was t h e r e f o r e "the r e c o g n i t i o n of both o f f i c i a l languages, i n law and i n p r a c t i c e , wherever the m i n o r i t y 8 i s numerous enough to be a v i a b l e group." ( h i g h l i g h t i n g by author) I t was t h i s r e f e r e n c e to " v i a b i l i t y " which generated much of f e d e r a l language p o l i c y d i r e c t e d at French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s and t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n s over the p a s t 20 y e a r s . Ottawa accepted much of the B i l i n g u a l i s m & B i c u l t u r a l i s m 20 Commission's Report from which i t developed i t s O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y . I n s t i t u t i o n a l b i l i n g u a l i s m , based on the r i g h t of E n g l i s h and F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g Canadians to use the o f f i c i a l language of t h e i r c h o i c e i n d e a l i n g w i t h f e d e r a l government o f f i c e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t t r e s s e d e f f o r t s to promote the b i l i n g u a l i s a t i o n of the f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e . Both i n i t i a t i v e s sought to ensure French Canadians t h a t they, too, had r i g h t s as 9 i n d i v i d u a l s i n the l a r g e r Canadian s o c i e t y . Furthermore, t h i s same p o l i c y approach would promote French Canadian m o b i l i t y i n the f e d e r a l government, and thereby reduce t h e i r sense of a l i e n a t i o n from i t . O v e r a l l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l b i l i n g u a l i s m would encourage French Canadians to be a p a r t of Canada as a whole, and to share i n the growth of a b i l i n g u a l c o u n t r y . Some c r i t i c s c h a l l e n g e d the OLP f o r what they p e r c e i v e d to be i t s i n a b i l i t y t o address the r e a l r o o t s of l i n g u i s t i c and p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n s . Hubert Guindon, f o r example, q u e s t i o n e d i t s frame of r e f e r e n c e , because i t d i d not appear to propose any s t r u c t u r a l changes which would have i n c l u d e d the Quebecois as equal p a r t n e r s . I t would have been more a p p r o p r i a t e , he suggests, to have f o c u s s e d p r i m a r i l y on the French m a j o r i t y i n Quebec, and to have broken down the language b a r r i e r s t h e r e which p r e v e n t e d the upward m o b i l i t y of the Quebec e l i t e s i n Quebec's 10 E n g l i s h - d o m i n a t e d c o r p o r a t e world. For Guindon, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l s u p p o r ts of the f e d e r a l government would not a d e q u a t e l y d e a l w i t h the s o c i a l r e a l i t y of language 11 i n t e r a c t i o n . C l a u d e C a s t o n g u a y , a n o t h e r c r i t i c , d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g e d the f e d e r a l government ' s r e j e c t i o n o f the t e r r i t o r i a l approach to language p o l i c y , a c c o r d i n g to which g e o g r a p h i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n and numbers d e t e r m i n e d the a p p l i c a t i o n o f language l e g i s l a t i o n . He c l a i m e d t h a t the f e d e r a l government p u r p o s e l y i g n o r e d the e x i s t e n c e of a " b i l i n g u a l b e l t " (known as the Soo-Moncton l i n e , c f . J o y ) , and r e j e c t e d " t e r r i t o r y " because of i t s " p r i m a l f e a r of 12 i n f r i n g i n g on the i n t e g r i t y of C a n a d i a n t e r r i t o r y . " In o t h e r words , the f e d e r a l government b u i l t i t s OLP to d e v e l o p and promote i t s own c o n c e p t i o n of the C a n a d i a n p o l i t i c a l community, one which was b e i n g c h a l l e n g e d by the t e r r i t o r i a l t h r u s t of Q u e b e c ' s more n a t i o n a l i s t i c language p o l i c y . F o r Quebec , the prob lems of F r e n c h Canada l a y w i t h the f a c t t h a t i t was a n a t i o n w i t h o u t the n e c e s s a r y government i n s t r u m e n t s to promote i t s n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s . The Quebec government t h e r e f o r e took s t e p s w i t h i n i t s own j u r i s d i c t i o n to u n i l i n g u a l i s e the p r o v i n c e and to encourage the p u r s u i t of c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the F r e n c h language and c u l t u r e . B e l i e v i n g t h a t o n l y a u n i l i n g u a l Quebec c o u l d g u a r a n t e e the s u r v i v a l o f F r e n c h i n N o r t h A m e r i c a , Quebec adopted a p o l i c y of t e r r i t o r i a l u n i l i n g u a l i s m . Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, v a r i o u s f e d e r a l and Quebec government language p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s appeared to d i r e c t l y 22 c h a l l e n g e each o t h e r . A c c o r d i n g to one author, Ottawa s c u t t l e d the b i l i n g u a l d i s t r i c t ' s component of the OLP, because i t would have brought i n t o q u e s t i o n the v i a b i l i t y of v a r i o u s r e g i o n s as p o t e n t i a l d i s t r i c t s , and would have thus f e d f u e l to Quebec n a t i o n a l i s t c l a i m s t h a t French Canadians o u t s i d e Quebec were l o s t i n a sea of E n g l i s h . I t i s f u r t h e r suggested t h a t s i n c e the f o r m a t i o n of the P a r t i Quebecois, "the f e d e r a l government has avoided g i v i n g the Quebec independence movement any f u r t h e r argument which might c o n c e i v a b l y be turned to the l a t t e r * s 13 p r o f i t . " From the Quebec s i d e , w h i l e Ottawa managed to get agreements from a l l p r o v i n c i a l governments on b e h a l f of m i n o r i t y language r i g h t s i n e d u c a t i o n and j u s t i c e , Quebec C i t y adopted measures 14 which promoted French u n i l i n g u a l i s m i n the p r o v i n c e . Quebec responded more d i r e c t l y to Ottawa's b i l i n g u a l i s m i n i t i a t i v e s by banning a k i t prepared by the O f f i c e of the Commissioner of O f f i c i a l Languages, Oh Canada, designed to promote b i l i n g u a l i s m among s c h o o l c h i l d r e n . In 1977, f o l l o w i n g the e l e c t i o n of a PQ government i n Quebec C i t y , the " p o l i t i c s of language" took an o f f i c i a l form i n what 15 one author d e s c r i b e d was the " B a t t l e of the White Papers". The PQ's C h a r t e r of the French Language (which i n c l u d e d B i l l 101) provoked the f e d e r a l government to launch i t s own French Language C h a r t e r , e n t i t l e d A N a t i o n a l Understanding, d u r i n g p u b l i c 16 d i s c u s s i o n s of B i l l 101. In i t , the f e d e r a l government 23 s t r e s s e d i t s own commitment to i n d i v i d u a l b i l i n g u a l i s m whereby the S t a t e would not impose a language on i t s c i t i z e n s as, they b e l i e v e d , was o c c u r r i n g i n Quebec. In the a f t e r m a t h of Quebec's 1980 referendum on s o v e r e i g n t y -a s s o c i a t i o n , Ottawa p a t r i a t e d the Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n and adopted a new C h a r t e r of R i g h t s which c o n t a i n e d a number of p r o v i s i o n s d e s i g n e d to guarantee language r i g h t s to F r e n c h Canadians. In c o u r t c h a l l e n g e s s i n c e 1982, many p r o v i s i o n s of Quebec's B i l l 101 have been found c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y wanting. At the same time, v a r i o u s p r o v i n c i a l governments ( n o t a b l y O n t a r i o , Manitoba, and New Brunswick) have taken s t e p s to enhance the a v a i l a b i l i t y of French language s e r v i c e s i n e d u c a t i o n , j u s t i c e , and o t h e r a r e a s . T h i s has g i v e n some credence and l e g i t i m a c y to Ottawa's approach to language p o l i c y , and to i t s c l a i m to be able to address i s s u e s of concern to F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g Canadians. More r e c e n t l y , i n an attempt to b r i n g Quebec i n t o the C o n s t i t u t i o n , the f e d e r a l government met w i t h the ten p r o v i n c i a l Premiers ( i n c l u d i n g Quebec) at Meech Lake to d i s c u s s c o n d i t i o n s f o r Quebec's s i g n i n g the 1982 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l agreement. The "Meech Lake Accord", which r e s u l t e d from the meeting, entrenches the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of the OLP d e a l i n g w i t h language e q u a l i t y i n a v a r i e t y of areas, and seeks to g i v e Quebec r i g h t s to p r o t e c t i t s s t a t u s as a d i s t i n c t s o c i e t y w i t h i n Canada. In a d d i t i o n , i t r e c o g n i s e s the e x i s t e n c e of O f f i c i a l Language 24 M i n o r i t i e s i n a l l p r o v i n c e s , and of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of p r o v i n c i a l governments to ensure t h e i r c o n t i n u e d s u r v i v a l . The F e d e r a t i o n des Francophones h o r s Quebec (FFHQ), n a t i o n a l s p o k e s p e r s o n f o r f rancophone m i n o r i t i e s , has o b j e c t e d to the p r o v i s i o n which r e q u i r e s p r o v i n c i a l governments to " p r o t e c t " , but no t "promote" t h e i r O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s . They f e e l t h a t because the Quebec Government a c q u i r e s the power to " p r o t e c t " and "promote" i t s d i s t i n c t s o c i e t y , f rancophone m i n o r i t i e s s u f f e r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y . I t i s u n c l e a r a t t h i s p o i n t how the v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g to language w i l l a f f e c t the language p o l i c y debates between Ottawa and Quebec C i t y , and whether o r no t the p r o v i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g f rancophone m i n o r i t i e s w i l l p r o v i d e them l o n g term g u a r a n t e e s f o r community deve lopment . What seems to have o c c u r r e d , however, i s t h a t the " p o l i t i c s of language" which p l a c e d f rancophone m i n o r i t i e s i n the m i d d l e of a Quebec-Ottawa s t r u g g l e f o r the p a s t 25 y e a r s appear to have s u b s i d e d f o r the t ime b e i n g . The f e d e r a l government thus appeared w i l l i n g to use i t s language p o l i c y as a t o o l to promote i t s own c o n c e p t i o n of the C a n a d i a n p o l i t i c a l community. In so d o i n g , i t v iewed F r e n c h language m i n o r i t i e s as e s s e n t i a l components o f a s t r a t e g y d e s i g n e d to enhance the F r e n c h p r e s e n c e C a n a d a - w i d e . As p a r t of t h i s s t r a t e g y , Ottawa a c c e p t e d i t s f i n a n c i a l and p o l i c y commitments t h r o u g h a v a r i e t y o f b i l i n g u a l i s m programmes which d i r e c t l y a i d e d francophone m i n o r i t i e s o u t s i d e of the l e g i s l a t i v e framework s e t up by i t s O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y . The next s e c t i o n d i s c u s s e s one such programme. 1.2. The O f f i c i a l Language Minority Groups Programme 1969-1985 When Ottawa adopted the O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y i n 1969, i t pursued a v a r i e d approach to the achievement of i t s language p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . A p a r t from the O f f i c i a l Languages Act (which i n c l u d e d language e q u a l i t y p r o v i s i o n s and the O f f i c e of the Commissioner of O f f i c i a l Languages), B i l i n g u a l D i s t r i c t s , French Language U n i t s , and c i v i l s e r v a n t language t r a i n i n g c o u r s e s , a number of " B i l i n g u a l i s m Promotion Programmes" were developed to enhance Canadians' a p p r e c i a t i o n of the o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f f e r e d them i n a b i l i n g u a l Canada. These programmes had s p e c i f i c importance to O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t i e s and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s . Support would be g i v e n d i r e c t l y to them to p r o v i d e the s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l v i t a l i t y of francophone and anglophone communities i n p r o v i n c e s where they are m i n o r i t i e s and to enable them to develop and f l o u r i s h w i t h i n the m a j o r i t y s o c i e t y , thus m a i n t a i n i n g the presence of both o f f i c i a l languages a c r o s s the country.(18) For t h i s , the Department of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e was g i v e n a mandate to develop and implement a s e r i e s of programmes t i e d t o the government's b i l i n g u a l i s m and b i c u l t u r a l i s m o b j e c t i v e s . Of 26 18 these, the O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y Groups Programme (OLMG) m e r i t s our p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n , because of i t s s p e c i f i c focus on the O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n s (OLMOs) as key p o l i c y agents i n the implementation of the Programme: [The f e d e r a l government] knows t h a t e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n cannot be taken i n t h i s area without c o l l a b o r a t i o n from the v o l u n t e e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s which the groups themselves have i n s t i t u t e d . (...) Thus, the d i r e c t o r a t e sees the a s s o c i a t i o n s as "our b e s t a i d " i n b r i n g i n g communities t o g e t h e r to a c h i e v e the o b j e c t i v e s . ( 1 9 ) Through OLMOs, the f e d e r a l government hoped to develop v i a b l e francophone communities o u t s i d e Quebec and thereby address t h r e e d i f f e r e n t g o a l s l i n k e d to i t s language p o l i c y . F i r s t , F r e n c h Canadians i n Quebec would f e e l l e s s a l i e n a t e d from the r e s t of Canada knowing t h a t French Canada d i d e x i s t o u t s i d e t h e i r home p r o v i n c e . For Ottawa, u n l e s s F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g Quebeckers c o u l d i d e n t i f y w i t h French Canada w r i t l a r g e , they would r e t r e a t b e hind p r o v i n c i a l boundaries and r e d e f i n e Canada a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own a s p i r a t i o n s as a s e p a r a t e people and n a t i o n . F e d e r a l government e f f o r t s to support French Canadian m i n o r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s sought t h e r e f o r e to ensure the s u r v i v a l of French Canadian m i n o r i t y communities and thereby l e g i t i m i z e the i n t e g r i t y of the Canadian p o l i t i c a l community. Second, p r o v i n c i a l governments would be more e a s i l y swayed to a c cept f e d e r a l f u n d i n g f o r language p o l i c y i n areas of 27 p r o v i n c i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . Unless the p r o v i n c e s acknowledged the need f o r O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y and second-language e d u c a t i o n programmes, and f o r French language s e r v i c e s i n the c o u r t s and othe r areas of government, the i d e a of a b i l i n g u a l Canada would 20 be s e v e r e l y j e o p a r d i z e d . S t r a t e g i c a l l y p l a c e d to lobby p r o v i n c i a l governments, and to show a francophone presence i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o v i n c e s , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e French Canadian m i n o r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s would h e l p to j u s t i f y f e d e r a l a c t i o n i n the p r o v i n c i a l arena. T h i r d , r e l a t i o n s between F r e n c h - and E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g Canadians would be harmonized. Unless t e n s i o n s b u i l t up between the two language communities d u r i n g the 1960s c o u l d be r e l i e v e d , the i d e a o f a p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s f o r the French language i n a l l j u r i s d i c t i o n s a c r o s s Canada would enflame p r e j u d i c e s and undermine the f a b r i c of Canadian u n i t y . The presence of French Canadian m i n o r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s would s e n s i t i z e the p r o v i n c i a l anglophone m a j o r i t i e s to language i s s u e s , and p r o v i d e them w i t h o p p o r t u n i t i e s to develop and pursue t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n b i l i n g u a l i s m as p a r t of the Canadian s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e s ' s OLMG programme developed p o l i c y s t r a t e g i e s to work w i t h OLMOs country-wide and to thus enhance the " v i s i b i l i t y " of French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s as key components i n Canada's n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l : 28 The maintenance of o f f i c i a l language m i n o r i -t i e s i n a l l p r o v i n c e s i s c r u c i a l to the l a n g -uage p o l i c y because w i t h o u t them the l i n g u i s -t i c communit ies would be i s o l a t e d w i t h i n s e p -a r a t e t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s . ( . . . ) F o r these r e a s o n s , the O f f i c i a l Languages M i n o r i t y Group D i r e c t o r a t e was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n the d e p a r t -ment to work w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s to ensure the v i a b i l i t y and v i t a l i t y o f the m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s . ( 2 1 ) G r a n t s to m i n o r i t y language a s s o c i a t i o n s were earmarked f o r the b u i l d i n g o f community i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s which would promote 22 m i n o r i t y community v i a b i l i t y . P r o v i n c i a l OLMOs o f f e r e d the most p r a c t i c a l and r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e means to a c h i e v e t h i s o b j e c t i v e , not o n l y because a number o f v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s a l r e a d y e x i s t e d , but a l s o because they were p r e s e n t i n e v e r y p r o v i n c e . A q u i c k l o o k a t F i g u r e 1.1 r e v e a l s the c e n t r a l r o l e to be p l a y e d by OLMOs i n the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ' s OLMG programme. As i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between the government and l o c a l c o m m u n i t i e s , the se o r g a n i s a t i o n s r e c e i v e d r e s o u r c e s from the OLMG D i r e c t o r a t e to d e s i g n p r o j e c t s i n a v a r i e t y of a c t i v i t y a r e a s . E s s e n t i a l l y , the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h o f a m i n o r i t y community would d e t e r m i n e i t s v i a b i l i t y i n government eyes and , t h e r e f o r e , p e r m i t a c c e s s to government funds and s u p p o r t . T h i s l i n k between community and o r g a n i s a t i o n was somewhat s e l f - s e r v i n g , f o r i t c o n v e n i e n t l y l e g i t i m i z e d O t t a w a ' s use o f OLMOs as i n s t r u m e n t s f o r p o l i c y a c t i o n i n F r e n c h Canada o u t s i d e Quebec . Indeed , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e p o l i c y v a l u e d community 29 FIGURE 1.1 MODEL Of OFFICIAL LANGUAGE MINORITY GROUPS PROGRAM (OLMG), 19 8 2 A C T I V I T I E S G O A O OLHC Ui r c c t o r a l e I'ruvcnC a s s i m i l d t i o n ( I d o n t i ty) i Ucve1 op i n t r e s t r u c t u r e } Ii r ( u c t i v u a dvocacy and s e n s u i z i ng m «j cit aik i aros M i n o r i t y 9 r o i i | i v i t a l i t y Hino r i l y i II f r a - <j • >• <• |< I M a j o r i t y -m l n o r i ty cooutt r a t Ion l -: J t-< Cx W S o u r c e : S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , E v a l u a t i o n R e p o r t o f the O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y Group program (OLMG) 1970-1982, E v a l u a t i o n D i r e c t o r a t e , Ottawa, 19 83. i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s f o r the v i s i b i l i t y and permanence they seemed to p r o v i d e the m i n o r i t y communities. By o f f e r i n g r e s o u r c e s to m i n o r i t y group a s s o c i a t i o n s , f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l s hoped to ach i e v e the i n t e r m e d i a t e o b j e c t i v e of e s t a b l i s h i n g v i a b l e m i n o r i t y communities and thus c o n t r i b u t e to language e q u a l i t y and a 23 c u l t u r a l l y r i c h and u n i f i e d Canada. T h i s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between government and c l i e n t adorned the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e w i t h a " m i n o r i t y p r o t e c t o r a t e " image. I t i s t h i s v e r y image which suggests the " c a p t u r i n g " of an i n t e r e s t group by government i n ord e r to promote p o l i c y g o a l s . S i n c e most of these OLMOs were e s s e n t i a l l y v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s p r i o r to the i n s t i t u t i o n of the OLMG programme, the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s brought to l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t i e s as a r e s u l t of the i n f l u x of f e d e r a l government d o l l a r s warrant i n v e s t i g a t i o n . F e d e r a l a i d was f i l t e r e d to the OLMOs i n two forms: u n c o n d i t i o n a l g r a n t s , and c o n t r i b u t i o n s which bound the government and a s s o c i a t i o n s to c e r t a i n p r o j e c t and f i n a n c i a l 24 r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . E a r l y on, f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e f e l l i n t o seven c a t e g o r i e s : seminars on problems r e l a t e d to b i l i n g u a l i s m , c u l t u r a l exchanges between m i n o r i t y groups i n a v a r i e t y of r e g i o n s and p r o v i n c e s ( a r t i s t s ' t o u r s , t h e a t r e groups e t c . ) , s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s to encourage the growth of community s p i r i t and b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g between the m a j o r i t y and the m i n o r i t y , youth 25 a c t i v i t i e s , c u l t u r a l c e n t r e s , and programmes abroad. OLMG o b j e c t i v e s i n the e a r l y 1970s f o c u s s e d on community awareness and 31 a s s o c i a t i o n f o r m a t i o n . Community awareness s i g n i f i e d the development of " v i t a l m i n o r i t y communities (...) whose members 26 have a s t r o n g sense of group i d e n t i t y . " Only t h i s . group i d e n t i t y would ensure t h a t French Canada o u t s i d e Quebec had r e a l meaning beyond the b u r e a u c r a t i c i n k of f e d e r a l language p o l i c y . A s s o c i a t i o n f o r m a t i o n would enable community members "to share p e r c e p t i o n s and a s p i r a t i o n s and to a c t t o g e t h e r u s i n g the 27 m i n o r i t y language." As community i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s grew they would r e i n f o r c e community l i f e and enhance o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r i n t e r a c t i o n between the m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y language communities. The ensuing d i a l o g u e would promote the f e d e r a l government's g o a l s of language e q u a l i t y and t o l e r a n c e between anglophones and francophones i n Canada. The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e u n d e r l i n e d the s p e c i a l s t a t u s accorded O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y groups. A S o c i a l A c t i o n D i r e c t o r a t e (as the OLMG was c a l l e d from 1969-1973) was d i r e c t l y l i n k e d to the deputy S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g h i e r a r c h y , and t h e r e f o r e ensured a v o i c i n g of m i n o r i t y concerns at h i g h l e v e l s i n the Department. With a c l o s e ear t o French Canadian m i n o r i t y l e a d e r s i n t h i s way, Ottawa hoped to head o f f any major d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the implementation of i t s b i l i n g u a l i s m programme. In a d d i t i o n , a network of r e g i o n a l o f f i c e r s would i n f o r m the government of the s p e c i a l needs of O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t i e s . 32 These o f f i c e r s a s s i s t e d c l i e n t groups i n o r g a n i s i n g themselves i n a s s o c i a t i o n s and p r e p a r i n g g r a n t a p p l i c a t i o n s . In many cases, they were a l s o a c t i v e at the l o c a l l e v e l g e n e r a t i n g community awareness and promoting government programmes and p o l i c i e s . Francophone m i n o r i t i e s p l a c e d g r e a t v a l u e on t h e i r a b i l i t y to be heard by the government: Pour l a premiere f o i s dans l ' h i s t o i r e cana-dienne, l e s m i n o r i t e s de langue o f f i c i e l l e ont des i n t e r l o c u t e u r s a q u i e l l e s peuvent s ' a d r e s s e r d i r e c t e m e n t et q u i s ' e f f o r c e n t de comprendre e t de s a t i s f a i r e l e s b e s o i n s des c i t o y e n s a p a r t e n t i e r e que sont l e s f r a n c o -phones . (28) When the OLMG programme was moved to the C i t i z e n s h i p s e c t o r i n 1973 as p a r t of an o v e r a l l S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e s t r u c t u r a l r e o r g a n -i s a t i o n , francophone l e a d e r s f e l t they had l o s t some of t h e i r 29 s p e c i a l s t a t u s . As f a r as the OLMO l e a d e r s were concerned, the l o c u s of governmental power had s h i f t e d away from the M i n i s t e r i n Ottawa and t h e r e f o r e reduced t h e i r a b i l i t y to g i v e i n p u t on government p o l i c y . In response, they formed a N a t i o n a l L i a i s o n and A c t i o n Committee which c r i t i c i z e d the changes and submitted recommendations d i r e c t l y to the M i n i s t e r i n a 1975 Report. As a r e s u l t , the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e commissioned a Study Group to examine the complaints of francophone l e a d e r s . A d o p t i n g some of the OLMOs' s u g g e s t i o n s , the Group recommended 30 m o d i f i c a t i o n s to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the OLMG programme. The Group's r e p o r t appeared s h o r t l y b e f o r e a g e n e r a l r e v i s i o n of the 33 b i l i n g u a l i s m p o l i c y i n 1976; i t i s t h e r e f o r e d i f f i c u l t to assess i t s r e a l impact on government p o l i c y . N onetheless, Ottawa's e f f o r t s to answer OLMO l e a d e r s ' concerns h i n t e d at the v a l u e they p l a c e d on t h e i r r o l e i n the o v e r a l l language p o l i c y p i c t u r e . Events i n Quebec and Canada d u r i n g the mid-1970s changed the f o c us and i n t e n s i t y of f e d e r a l government r e l a t i o n s w i t h OLMOs. F i r s t , s u c c e s s i v e Quebec government language laws undermined the f e d e r a l government's b i l i n g u a l i s m programme and h e i g h t e n e d language t e n s i o n s between French and E n g l i s h Canada. From Ottawa's p o i n t of view, the danger of the Quebec Government's language p o l i c y stemmed from the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t o t h e r p r o v i n c e s would f o l l o w s u i t , and t h a t E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g Canadians would s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n the f e d e r a l government's b i l i n g u a l i s m p o l i c y g i v e n t h a t one of the most important p l a y e r s appeared to be q u i t t i n g the team. In essence, E n g l i s h .Canadians would i n t e r p r e t Quebec's u n i l i n g u a l i s m p o l i c y as an i n j u s t i c e imposed upon the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g m i n o r i t y i n t h a t p r o v i n c e , and would thus f u r t h e r r e s e n t the p e r c e i v e d i m p o s i t i o n of b i l i n g u a l i s m o u t s i d e Quebec. Second, the a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r ' s s t r i k e brought French-E n g l i s h r e l a t i o n s to a head, and d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g e d the f e d e r a l government's commitment to language e q u a l i t y . From the francophone p o i n t of view, i f the French language c o u l d not be used between Fr e n c h - s p e a k i n g a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r ' s and p i l o t s 34 i n Quebec, then language e q u a l i t y and o f f i c i a l b i l i n g u a l i s m had 31 l i t t l e s u b s t a n t i v e v a l u e to French Canadians i n Quebec. In E n g l i s h Canada, t h i s i n c i d e n t o n l y h e i g h t e n e d f e e l i n g s t h a t Quebeckers were demanding s p e c i a l r i g h t s which a l l Canadians d i d not p o s s e s s . T h i r d , anglophone resentment to b i l i n g u a l i s m s u r f a c e d as u n i l i n g u a l E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g Canadians f e l t t h r e a t e n e d : Much of the resentment stems from a p e r s i s t e n t and erroneous b e l i e f t h a t Ottawa i s somehow bent on r e q u i r i n g a l l Canadians to become b i l i n g u a l . ( 3 2 ) The o f t e n used a s s e r t i o n of h a v i n g the French language "shoved down our t h r o a t s " r e v e a l e d b i t t e r n e s s on a number of items, from b i l i n g u a l l a b e l l i n g to f e d e r a l spending on c i v i l s e r v i c e language t r a i n i n g programmes to the c r e a t i o n of French Language u n i t s i n v a r i o u s f e d e r a l departments. A s e r i e s of books, B i l i n g u a l Today, French Tomorrow, French Power, and Backdoor B i l i n g u a l i s m , were p u b l i s h e d on the E n g l i s h language markets p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t the " f r a n c i s a t i o n " of Canada and the g e n e r a l f a i l u r e of the f e d e r a l government to take proper c o n s i d e r a t i o n of E n g l i s h Canada's 33 wishes. More encouraging s i g n s of p r o g r e s s i n the b i l i n g u a l i s m f i e l d , such as the h e i g h t e n e d i n t e r e s t i n French immersion and second-language e d u c a t i o n , were c o n t i n u a l l y drowned i n the more h i g h l y p u b l i c i z e d and heated debates on Quebec independence and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . In each of these areas - d i s c o n t e n t i n Quebec, q u e s t i o n s of the f e d e r a l government's commitment to i t s O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y , and anglophone b a c k l a s h - f e d e r a l government language p o l i c y g o a l s r i s k e d b e i n g weighed down by the E n g l i s h - F r e n c h t e n s i o n s they were de s i g n e d to reduce. Ottawa r e a c t e d q u i c k l y , once a g a i n t u r n i n g to O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n s as key a c t o r s i n i t s o v e r a l l language p o l i c y s t r a t e g y . In 1977, o n l y months a f t e r the PQ e l e c t i o n , the f e d e r a l government produced i t s p o l i c y paper, A National Understanding, r e i t e r a t i n g the p r i n c i p l e s of language e q u a l i t y . At the same time, i t s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s e d f e d e r a l f u n d i n g to OLMOs and made " p o l i t i c a l advocacy" a d i r e c t o b j e c t i v e of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ' s OLMG programme: "The m i n o r i t y group must be a b l e to make the m a j o r i t y aware of and s e n s i t i v e to i t s needs and a s p i r a t i o n s , 34 and must be a b l e to advocate on i t s own b e h a l f . " H e n c e f o r t h , OLMOs would pursue p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s at a l l l e v e l s of government, encouraged and p a i d f o r by Ottawa. A l l o c a t i o n s to the OLMG programme e v o l v e d i n t h r e e p e r i o d s . From 1969 to 1973, i t s t o t a l budget grew from $1 m i l l i o n to $2.5 m i l l i o n . Very l i t t l e change o c c u r r e d u n t i l 1977 when the f e d e r a l government r e a f f i r m e d i t s f i n a n c i a l commitment to the o f f i c i a l language m i n o r i t i e s . Then, f o r the next f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d to 1982, more than $75 m i l l i o n was d i s t r i b u t e d to O f f i c i a l Language 35 M i n o r i t y groups. T h i s i n f l u x of government funds s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s e d the number of p r o j e c t s developed by and g r a n t s accorded to minority associations, from 264 i n 1975-76 to 419 i n 1981-82. I t also appeared to induce francophone minorities to form more associations. According to the Secretary of State's 1983 OLMG evaluation report, 72% of organisations r e c e i v i n g grants had been established during the l i f e of the programme, 44% of these i n the 36 1977-1982 period alone. Administratively, the federal government established o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s with these organisations through the Secretary of State, i t s o f f i c i a l spokesperson for francophones outside Quebec. In addition, i t formed an interdepartmental Committee of senior o f f i c i a l s to " a s s i s t the Canadian -government i n developing coherent p o l i c i e s and programmes i n the s p i r i t of the o f f i c i a l 37 languages p o l i c y . " Modifications to the programme at t h i s time s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced the r o l e of regional o f f i c e r s i n community and OLMO a c t i v i t i e s , leaving the organisations more autonomy to decide the nature of projects for community development. More of the regional o f f i c e r s ' time would now be spent processing grant applica t i o n s received from the minority associations. The entrenchment of language r i g h t s i n Canada's p a t r i a t e d C o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1982 further underscored the legitimacy of O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t i e s i n the Canadian p o l i t i c a l community: The v a l i d i t y of [the b i l i n g u a l i s m policy] was reaffirmed by the i n c l u s i o n of language r i g h t s i n the Con s t i t u t i o n . The minority communities play a c r u c i a l r o l e i n making these r i g h t s a r e a l i t y , and for t h i s reason, as well as for 37 reasons of f a i r n e s s and j u s t i c e , [they] have a c l a i m to c o n t i n u e d support.(38) F e d e r a l t h i n k i n g on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s of these communities c e n t r e d on t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s as key a c t o r s s e e k i n g language r i g h t s f o r French Canadian m i n o r i t i e s . S p e c i a l g r a n t s would be a l l o c a t e d to OLMOs from w i t h i n the OLMG programme i n the event of a j u d i c i a l c h a l l e n g e d e s i g n e d to c l a r i f y s p e c i f i c s e c t i o n s of the C h a r t e r of R i g h t s d e a l i n g w i t h 39 matters of o f f i c i a l languages. Here, the o r g a n i s a t i o n s ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would take s p e c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l cases and, with f e d e r a l f u n d i n g , pursue p r o v i n c i a l language r i g h t s cases i n the c o u r t s . Few m o d i f i c a t i o n s were brought to OLMG programme o b j e c t i v e s u n t i l 1983-1984 when i n t e r n a l r e - e v a l u a t i o n and budgetary r e s t r a i n t measures prompted p o l i c y m a k e r s to r e v i s e the t h r u s t of S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e p o l i c y . Three elements i n these r e v i s i o n s f u r t h e r enhanced the r o l e of OLMOs as language p o l i c y agents. F i r s t , the f e d e r a l government u n d e r l i n e d i t s commitment to i n s t i t u t i o n a l development through the e s t a b l i s h e d o r g a n i s a t i o n a l network i n each p r o v i n c e . Thus, OLMOs would c o n t i n u e to be the b u i l d e r s of v i a b l e m i n o r i t y communities. Second, the " p o l i t i c a l advocacy" r o l e p l a y e d by these o r g a n i s a t i o n s would r e c e i v e e x c l u s i v e f u n d i n g w i t h i n the parameters of the OLMG programme. I t was f e l t t h a t by s e n s i t i z i n g the m a j o r i t y anglophone community and t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l 38 governments, the promotion of b i l i n g u a l i s m would move ahead more e f f e c t i v e l y . OLMO p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y would h e l p t h i s immeasurably. T h i r d , the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e implemented a " p r o v i n c i a l i s a t i o n " of the OLMG programme, g i v i n g OLMOs more autonomy to d e f i n e t h e i r own needs and a s p i r a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o v i n c i a l c o n t e x t s . T h i s i m p l i e d a g r e a t e r r o l e f o r OLMOs i n each p r o v i n c e as ready-made i n t e r m e d i a r i e s f o r p o l i c y implementation, and as key p l a y e r s i n the c r e a t i o n of community development p r o j e c t s . Accompanying t h i s l a t t e r change, the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e r e s t r u c t u r e d i t s programme a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n or d e r to g i v e more d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y to i t s r e g i o n a l d i r e c t o r s who would now r e l y more h e a v i l y upon the r e c i p i e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n s than on p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e s from d i s t a n t Ottawa. F e d e r a l a c t i o n , i n c o n c e r t w i t h OLMOs, would s u s t a i n more permanent OLM i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s and deve l o p community s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . With g r e a t e r c o o p e r a t i o n between the government and r e c i p i e n t s of government a i d i n t h i s r e g a r d , the f e d e r a l government hoped to wean OLMOs from the p u b l i c t e a t . I t i s u n c l e a r at t h i s p o i n t how e f f e c t i v e these new changes have been. 39 Conclusions With the O f f i c i a l Languages P o l i c y , the f e d e r a l government l i n k e d i t s support of O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n s to concerns f o r Canadian u n i t y . F i n a n c i a l commitment to French Canadian m i n o r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s aimed to ensure a v i s i b l e s t r u c t u r a l presence of Canada's two o f f i c i a l languages i n a l l p a r t s of the c o u n t r y . As i n t e r e s t community r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between the f e d e r a l government and francophone m i n o r i t i e s , these OLMOs. a c t e d as p o l i c y agents f o r Ottawa's language p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s o u t s i d e Quebec. Ottawa p e r c e i v e d them as ins t r u m e n t s to reduce language t e n s i o n s w i t h i n t h a t p r o v i n c e which d i l u t e d g o a l s f o r harmonious E n g l i s h - F r e n c h r e l a t i o n s . A c l o s e r look a t how OLMO l e a d e r s p l a y e d t h e i r i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e can shed l i g h t on our concerns w i t h the e f f e c t s of c l o s e government-group i n t e r a c t i o n on i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p . S i n c e the f e d e r a l government p l a c e d g r e a t importance on the community-organisation l i n k i n i t s language p o l i c y , and t h e r e f o r e funded OLMOs to generate v i a b l e m i n o r i t y communities, these French Canadian m i n o r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s serve as a good t e s t case f o r examining the " c a p t u r i n g " of i n t e r e s t groups by government f o r p o l i c y purposes. Our next c h a p t e r p l a c e s the OLMO-federal government r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the l a r g e r t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t e x t of i n t e r e s t group-S t a t e i n t e r a c t i o n . In t h i s way, we can b e t t e r grasp how and why francophone m i n o r i t y l e a d e r s sought government support, and how 40 f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s a n d i n i t i a t i v e s c o u l d h a v e a f f e c t e d t h e k i n d s o f a c t i v i t i e s t h e s e l e a d e r s p u r s u e d o n b e h a l f of t h e f r a n c o p h o n e p o p u l a t i o n s t h e y s e r v e d . 41 ENDNOTES 1. Canada, Department of the Secretary of State, Evaluation Report of the O f f i c i a l Language Minority Group Programme (OLMG) 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 2 , Evaluation Directorate, (Ottawa, 1983), p. 2. 2. Hubert Guindon, "The Modernization of Quebec and the L e g i t i -macy of the Canadian State," i n Daniel Glenday, Hubert Guindon, and A l l a n Turowitz (eds.) Modernization and the Canadian State, (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd.), 1978, p. 213. 3. Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Postgate, Quebec: S o c i a l Change and P o l i t i c a l C r i s i s , (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1980), p. 97. 4. Ibid., p. 96. 5. N.H. Lithwick and Stanley L. Winer, " F a l t e r i n g Federalism and French Canadians," Journal of Canadian Studies, (July 1977), Vol. 12, no. 3, p. 44. 6. C o l i n H. Williams, "Official-language d i s t r i c t s : 'a gesture of f a i t h i n the future of Canada'," Ethnic & R a c i a l Studies, (July 03, 1981) v o l . 4, no. 3, p. 344. 7. Hugh I n i s , B i l i n g u a l i s m & B i c u l t u r a l i s m : An Abridged Vers-ion of the Royal Commission Report, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973), pp. 4-5. 8. Canada, Department of Supply & Services, The O f f i c i a l Languages, Book 1, (Ottawa, 1968), p. 86. 9. Lithwick and Winer, p. 44. 10. Guindon, p. 230. 11. Ibid., p. 238. 12. Claude Castonguay, "Why Hide the Facts? The F e d e r a l i s t Approach to the Language C r i s i s i n Canada," Canadian Public P o l i c y , (winter 1979) v o l . 1, p. 7. 13 . I b i d . , p. 6. 42 14. David P h i l l i p s , " N a t i o n a l / R e g i o n a l Language P l a n n i n g i n Canada: O f f i c i a l B i l i n g u a l i s m and B i l l 101," Paper prepared f o r the Canadian P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n Annual Meeting, May 30-June 01, 1979, Saskatoon, paper 61, p. 13. 15. R a i n e r Knopff, "Language and C u l t u r e i n the Canadian Debate: The B a t t l e of the White Papers," Canadian Review of S t u d i e s i n N a t i o n a l i s m , ( S p r i n g 1977) pp. 66-82. 16. Castonguay, p. 7. 17. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , p. 3. 18. C a l l e d the S o c i a l A c t i o n D i r e c t o r a t e i n 1969, the OLMG got i t s name d u r i n g a S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e s t r u c t u r a l r e o r g a n i s a -t i o n i n 1973. The name was changed a g a i n i n 1982 to the " O f f i c i a l Language Communities Programme". 19. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , p. 40. 20. For the r o l e t o be p l a y e d by the p r o v i n c e s i n the b i l i n g u a l -ism p o l i c y , see Canada, Department of Supply & S e r v i c e s . 21. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , pp. 33-4. 22. I b i d . , p. 34. What i s a v i a b l e community? A c c o r d i n g to the OLMG d i r e c t i v e s , i t c o n t a i n s t h r e e components: v i t a l i t y , s o l i d a r i t y , and c o e x i s t e n c e . V i t a l i t y e n t a i l s a " f l o u r i s h -i n g s o c i o - c u l t u r a l development", and the use of the communi-t y ' s mother tongue f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Canadian l i f e . S o l i d a r i t y i m p l i e s "access to the e n t i r e c u l t u r e and h e r i -tage of the community's language group." C o e x i s t e n c e s i g -n a l s harmonious r e l a t i o n s w i t h the o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y l a n g -uage community, (p. 36) The OLMG programme d i r e c t o r a t e gave top p r i o r i t y to v i t a l i t y , "assuming t h a t v i t a l i t y i s a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the development of group s o l i d a r i t y , and f o r d e v e l o p i n g an e f f e c t i v e d i a l o g u e w i t h the m a j o r i t y . " (p. 36) A " v i t a l group" i s one whose members "have a s t r o n g sense of group i d e n t i t y , (...) and one with a s t r o n g , f l o u r i s h i n g i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . " (p. 36) Here, i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i s molded more s t r o n g l y to the community, becoming p a r t of i t s v e ry essence and quest f o r " s u r v i v a n c e " . 23. I b i d . 24. Such t h i n g s as i t e m i z e d f i n a n c i a l and a c t i v i t y r e p o r t s , s p e c i f i c a p r i o r i a l l o c a t i o n of f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , and p r o j e c t d e s i g n a t i o n s had to be f o l l o w e d a c c o r d i n g to p r e -determined d e a d l i n e s . 43 25. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , p. 25. 26. I b i d . , p. 36. 27. I b i d . 28. Groupe de t r a v a i l sur l e s m i n o r i t e s de langue f r a n c a i s e , C'es t l e temps ou j a m a i s . . . , Report commissioned by the Department of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , (November 1975), p. 16. 29. In the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ' s E v a l u a t i o n Report of the OLMG programme, francophone l e a d e r s unanimously r e j e c t e d the " p o l i t i c a l " changes brought to the OLMG by the f e d e r a l programme: A une d i r e c t i o n v i s a n t au r e s p e c t du "p o u v o i r " l o c a l , r e g i o n a l et n a t i o n a l des communautes francophones m i n o r i t a i r e s et f a v o r i s a n t t o u j o u r s l e u r p o t e n t i e l d'epanouissement par l a p r i s e en main de t o u t e s s i t u a t i o n s , on s u b s t i t u e un "programme" q u i c d t o i e , au s e i n de l a D i r e c t i o n de l a Citoyenn§te, l e s programmes q u i s'occupent des d r o i t s de l'homme, de l a promotion de l a femme, des o r g a n i s a t i o n s de c i t o y e n s , des autochtones, du m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m e , des voyages d'echanges. En d'au t r e s mots, on ne p a r l e p l u s de " d i r e c t i o n " et " d ' a c t i o n " , mais d ' " a i d e " e t de " m i n o r i t e " . Les 'm i n o r i t e s francophones m i n o r i t a i r e s ne se v o i e n t p l u s l e s b e n e f i c i a i r e s d'une a c t i o n s p e c i a l e , mais d'une a i d e quelconque. From 1969 to 1973, the S o c i a l A c t i o n D i r e c t o r a t e came under the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the B i l i n g u a l i s m Expansion Programme. In 1973, i t was moved to the C i t i z e n s h i p s e c t o r and became the O f f i c i a l Language M i n o r i t y Group programme. At the same time, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the programme was d e c e n t r a l i z e d , g i v i n g more a u t h o r i t y to r e g i o n a l o f f i c e r s to make recommen-d a t i o n s f o r changes to the programme. 30. Groupe de t r a v a i l , p. 16. 31. Sandford F. B o r i n s , The Language of the S k i e s : The B i l i n g u a l A i r T r a f f i c C o n t r o l C o n f l i c t i n Canada, (Ki n g s t o n : McGill-Queen's P r e s s , The I n s t i t u t e of P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Canada, 1983) . 44 32. "A t e r m i n a l f a i l u r e to communicate?," Maclean's, v o l . 89, no. 19, November 1, 1976, p. 19. 33. See J . V. Andrew, B i l i n g u a l Today, French Tomorrow, Richmond H i l l , O n t a r i o : BMG P u b l i s h e r s , 1976; J . V. Andrew, Backdoor B i l i n g u a l i s m : D a v i s ' s s e l l o u t of O n t a r i o and i t s n a t i o n a l consequences, Richmond H i l l , O n t a r i o : BMG P u b l i s h e r s , 1979; and Sam A l l i s o n , French Power: the f r a n c i z a t i o n of Canada, Richmond H i l l , O n t a r i o : BMG P u b l i s h e r s , 197 8. 34. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , p. 36. 35. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , E v a l u a t i o n Report..., see T a b l e 2 on p. 63. 36. I b i d . , P- 69. 37. I b i d . , P- 29. 38. I b i d . , P- 34. 39. Canada, Department of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Chevauchement du Programme de C o n t e s t a t i o n s j u d i c i a i r e s e t du PCLO, 1983. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e document found i n the F e d e r a t i o n des Franco-Colombiens f i l e s , document no. 0.1.8,2.39. The programme announced S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e g r a n t s of up to $5000 f o r the p r e - t r i a l phase o n l y of j u d i c i a l c h a l l e n g e s made by OLMOs to c l a r i f y p o i n t s i n the C h a r t e r of R i g h t s d e a l i n g w i t h matters of o f f i c i a l languages. 45 CHAPTER 2 Interest Group Leadership and Government Funding Interest group a c t i v i t y occurs within a s p e c i f i c socio-p o l i t i c a l context which has d i r e c t impact upon the intermediary r o l e i n t e r e s t groups play on behalf of t h e i r i n t e r e s t c l i e n t e l e . A very important part of t h i s r o l e involves e s t a b l i s h i n g contacts with government to secure or protect favourable p o l i c y outcomes. Normally, these contacts allow i n t e r e s t group leaders to sustain a give-and-take r e l a t i o n s h i p with the p o l i t i c a l system which provides benefits to the i n t e r e s t population and legitimacy to t h e i r leadership. However, the p r a c t i c e of the State using i n t e r e s t groups for p o l i c y purposes can modify i n t e r e s t group leadership. Indeed, as government-funded p o l i c y agents, i n t e r e s t group leaders r i s k becoming so entangled i n the governmental web that they lose sigh t of t h e i r intermediary r o l e , becoming nothing more than bureaucratic extensions of government agencies. They pay l e s s a t t e ntion to t h e i r i n t e r e s t c l i e n t e l e and u l t i m a t e l y jeopardize the effectiveness and legitimacy of t h e i r leadership. Since the 1970s, "the scope of state funding i n Canada (...) expanded gr e a t l y i n the domains of ethnic communities as i n the 1 voluntary sector i n general." Very l i t t l e has been done i n the p o l i t i c a l science f i e l d , however, to examine the extent to which state involvement i n funding i n t e r e s t groups a f f e c t s the nature of t h e i r a c t i v i t y . Some authors h i n t at "cooptation" or "state 46 2 c o n t r o l " of i n t e r e s t groups , but never r e a l l y delve deeper to discover what t h i s means from the i n t e r e s t group's perspective. In the case of ethnocultural communities, Breton suggests that government subsidies can perpetuate an " a r t i f i c i a l community 3 organisation" f o r which there i s no demand i n the community. This contradicts government e f f o r t s to ensure the long term s u r v i v a l of these communities and r a i s e s doubts as to the legitimacy and/or relevance of i n t e r e s t group leadership. S t a s i u l i s c a l l s out for more in-depth i n v e s t i g a t i o n "to assess the extent to which t h i s state behavior influences the goals, s o c i a l cohesion, leadership structure, targets of action, 4 and the l i k e of ethnic organizations." Whereas the i n t e r e s t group l i t e r a t u r e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y useful i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the r o l e of i n t e r e s t groups as "intermediaries" between group members and the p o l i t i c a l system, i t i s l e s s useful i n explaining the import-ance of government funding to i n t e r e s t group leadership, or the impact of t h i s funding on the intermediary r o l e i n t e r e s t group leaders play. Hence, we ask: What does i t mean fo r an i n t e r e s t group to become a government-funded p o l i c y agent? Answering t h i s question provides more general i n s i g h t into State e f f o r t s to provide p o l i c y leadership through i n t e r e s t groups, and on the r o l e i n t e r e s t groups can play i n society and the p o l i t i c a l process. 47 2.1. Interest Groups and Government As intermediaries, i n t e r e s t group leaders w i l l look to the p o l i t i c a l system for three reasons: representation of group concerns, l e g i t i m a t i o n of the i n t e r e s t group and i t s leadership, and f i n a n c i a l support. A l l three are t i e d to the fundamental goal of group s u r v i v a l . Interest group leaders hope to persuade public p o l i c y makers to act favourably on the various issues which a f f e c t t h e i r 5 i n t e r e s t community. Access to government i s the key component of the intermediary r o l e . Governments grant access to leaders, because they are able to aggregate and a r t i c u l a t e s o c i e t a l concerns, and act as a "pulse" of society which government can tap. In p l u r a l i s t theory, i n t e r e s t group l e g i t i m a t i o n by government a r i s e s out of the recognition of the i n t e r e s t as a v a l i d s o c i a l concern, and of the leaders as having a mandate to speak to government on behalf of that i n t e r e s t . In f a c t , since the "entire p o l i t i c a l community i s almost never involved i n a 6 s p e c i f i c p o l i c y discussion," i n t e r e s t groups help focus p o l i c y debate. On many occasions, governments even "create" i n t e r e s t groups through various funding i n i t i a t i v e s i n order to bring p o l i c y discussions to the public fore. Indeed, "the development of a working r e l a t i o n s h i p between government and organized group leaders creates within government a vested i n t e r e s t i n the 7 continuation of that r e l a t i o n s h i p . " Interest groups become " a l l i e s " with s p e c i f i c government agencies and i n s t i t u t i o n s which 48 use t h e i r i n t e r e s t c l i e n t e l e or "se c t o r a l constituency" to 8 j u s t i f y the need for action i n a given p o l i c y area. On the other side of the ledger, i n t e r e s t group leaders act as agents of government p o l i c y , b u i l d i n g support for p o l i c y among t h e i r members and i n society at large. Even though only a small percentage of organised p o t e n t i a l members are viewed as belonging to the i n t e r e s t group organisation, i n t e r e s t groups are s t i l l considered the most e f f e c t i v e means to locate and reach s p e c i a l p u b l i c s . Leaders' s p e c i a l expertise and knowledge i n a given area can l i g h t e n the government load, and f a c i l i t a t e p o l i c y implementation. Government-created or government-funded i n t e r e s t groups very often become p o l i c y instruments, because they share s i m i l a r goals and are much closer to s o c i e t a l concerns than government: From the point of view of the state, the granting of state a i d involves the expansion of i t s function of gaining l e g i t i m a t i o n i n often imaginative and innovative ways, within sectors of previously neglected subordinate interests.(9) The f e d e r a l government's White Paper on Indian A f f a i r s (1970) established a close r e l a t i o n s h i p between government and p r o v i n c i a l Indian associations "where f o r c e f u l and a r t i c u l a t e Indian leadership has developed to express the aspirations and 10 needs of the Indian community." In t h i s way, government can derive p o l i t i c a l benefits as i n t e r e s t group leaders " s e l l 49 government p o l i c y . " The "representative q u a l i t y " of i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y i s the key factor to a c c e s s i b i l i t y . If the group i s "known to speak for i t s i n t e r e s t community, i t i s l i s t e n e d to by government, 11 regardless of the q u a l i t y of advice," because i t can gain the attention of members concerning the e f f e c t s of government p o l i c i e s . Since i n t e r e s t group leaders play the intermediary r o l e as l i n k s between members and the p o l i t i c a l system, they must make t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y relevant to i n t e r e s t group members i n order to sustain legitimacy for themselves and for the group. Bates says an i n t e r e s t group's r e l a t i o n s h i p with i t s membership (input function) i s a pr e r e q u i s i t e for the e f f e c t i v e performance 12 of the p o l i c y agent r o l e (output r o l e ) . This i s a l l the more c r i t i c a l i n those cases where p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y becomes the sole focus of i n t e r e s t group leaders' a c t i v i t y , and notably i n the case of ethnic communities whose " v i t a l i t y " , according to Breton, 13 i s l i n k e d to the importance of organisational a c t i v i t y . The intermediary r o l e , then, must be rooted i n the legitimacy and mandate granted by i n t e r e s t group members, and not that granted by Government. The relevance of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y to members has been given some treatment i n the l i t e r a t u r e , but i s usually seen as s o l e l y an incentive for members to j o i n the i n t e r e s t group. Moe 50 suggests that the decision to j o i n i s linked c l o s e l y to the in d i v i d u a l ' s perception of p o l i t i c a l benefits, which he describes 14 as the desire to have a greater sense of p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . Salisbury states that "unless there i s some p o l i t i c a l l y relevant expressive content to a group's i n t e r n a l exchange, members may 15 not j o i n the group." Hansen echoes these writers, but adds that p o l i t i c a l benefits matter most often when group existence i s 16 threatened. A l l of these ingredients - benefits, expression, context -are important, but p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y as such i s more than an incentive thrown out at members as a carrot to encourage t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Indeed, members quite often prefer to leave the p o l i t i c a l r o l e to i n t e r e s t group leaders due to the complexity of the issues involved and to the time commitment i t demands. This does not mean that members do not appreciate the usefulness of p o l i t i c a l action, however. I t must be made relevant to them i n t h e i r day-to-day existence i f i n t e r e s t group leaders hope to maintain some l e v e l of legitimacy: Par a i l l e u r s , "les besoins de langue", d'ex-pression c u l t u r e l l e , de s o l i d a r i t y ethnique ou de protection contre l a discrimination, de meme que les desirs de revendications aupres des i n s t i t u t i o n s s o c i e t a l e s peuvent demeurer i n s a t i s f aits... Une t e l l e s i t u a t i o n peut etre due au f a i t q u ' i l ne se presente pas "d*entre-preneurs" capables de construire les organisa-tions ou l e s systemes symboliques appro-p r i e s . (17) 51 I f they succeed, p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y w i l l enhance group s u r v i v a l , because members w i l l c o n t i n u e to v a l u e i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p and p e r c e i v e i t as important to t h e i r concerns. Leaders a l s o t u r n to government f o r f i n a n c i a l s u pport. They need f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s i n o r d e r to pay f o r a c t i v i t i e s which a t t r a c t and m a i n t a i n group membership, and to b u i l d o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s which d e f i n e the parameters of the i n t e r e s t group. Though most i n t e r e s t groups depend on membership dues f o r f i n a n c i a l s u r v i v a l , the amounts r e c e i v e d v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y w i t h member incomes and w i t h the c o n t e x t of i n t e r e s t 18 group a c t i v i t y . Moe suggests t h a t " u n l e s s s u b s i d i z e d from the o u t s i d e " , the i n t e r e s t group i s m a i n t a i n e d by the member-group 19 exchange. Hansen c l a i m s t h a t " [ f ] o r a group to be o r g a n i z e d (...) i t must be s u b s i d i z e d by e n t r e p r e n e u r s , by o t h e r groups or 20 by government." Whether l e a d e r s depend more on v o l u n t e e r s or p a i d s t a f f , and whether members are w i l l i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e v o l u n t e e r time does a f f e c t the k i n d s of a c t i v i t i e s l e a d e r s can pursue. The number of p o t e n t i a l members f o r any g i v e n i n t e r e s t group i s l i k e l y to be f i n i t e , and i t i s t h e r e f o r e d i f f i c u l t t o generate the flow of funds needed to p r o v i d e a c o n s t a n t or enhanced l e v e l of b e n e f i t s . T h i s o f t e n generates member apathy, a low l e a d e r s h i p t u r n o v e r , no member renewal, a decrease i n the f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , and u l t i m a t e l y , a r i s k t o i n t e r e s t group s u r v i v a l . For t h i s reason, i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s tend to l o o k beyond the immediate group 52 membership f o r f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , u s u a l l y to government. 2.2. Forms of Access to Government The forms and p o i n t s of access are many and v a r i e d . I n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s l e a r n t o adapt t o the changing s h i f t s i n 21 power between government i n s t i t u t i o n s , honing i n on those areas of government a u t h o r i t y which w i l l reap maximum y i e l d s f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t community. We d i s t i n g u i s h between f o u r d i f f e r e n t types of a c c e s s : q u i e s c e n t diplomacy, p r e s s u r e p o l i t i c s , c o n s u l t a t i o n and/or l o b b y i n g , and p o l i c y agent. These c a t e g o r i e s are s i m i l a r t o P r o s s ' t y p o l o g y of a c c e s s - o r i e n t e d i n t e r e s t 22 groups. Pross does not, however, d i s c u s s t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y . Q u i e s c e n t diplomacy i n d i c a t e s a m i n i m a l i s t approach to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . I n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s are e i t h e r unaware of p o s s i b i l i t i e s to i n f l u e n c e the p o l i t i c a l system, i g n o r e them because they are i r r e l e v a n t t o p a r t i c u l a r group g o a l s , or b e l i e v e t h a t n o t h i n g can be ga i n e d from a more a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l s t a n c e . For the most p a r t , access t o the p o l i t i c a l system i s l i m i t e d to the o c c a s i o n a l l e t t e r - w r i t i n g campaign i n hope of r e c e i v i n g some government s e r v i c e or d o n a t i o n to enhance o r g a n i s a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s , however, l e s s a p r i o r i t y than s u s t a i n i n g an a c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n and a c h i e v i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n a l g o a l s . No c l e a r l i n k i s made between these two p u r s u i t s . The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 5 3 i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p i s r e v e a l e d by i t s a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t members and generate o r g a n i s a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s . P r e s s u r e p o l i t i c s i s a l s o a t a c t i c pursued l a r g e l y from o u t s i d e the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . However, u n l i k e q u i e s c e n t d i p l o -macy, l e a d e r s d e s i g n s t r a t e g i e s to " c o n f r o n t " p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s w i t h t h e i r concerns. Very o f t e n , they encourage members to s i g n p e t i t i o n s , p a r t i c i p a t e i n p u b l i c d e monstrations, and w r i t e l e t -t e r s t o t h e i r government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . In a more a c t i v i s t s t a n c e , l e a d e r s hope to persuade government, through media-o r i e n t e d a c t i v i t i e s , t h a t they speak on b e h a l f of a l a r g e s o c i a l f o r c e whose concerns r e q u i r e immediate a t t e n t i o n . Very o f t e n , many t r y to a s s e r t i n f l u e n c e by d i r e c t l y l o b b y i n g government o f f i c i a l s or e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of l e a d e r s h i p through p r e s s u r e p o l i t i c s i s l i n k e d t o member support and/or p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Without i t , group l e a d e r s would have some d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n v i n c i n g government t h a t they speak f o r an important p r o p o r t i o n of the i n t e r e s t community. For t h i s reason, l e a d e r s are q u i t e a c t i v e i n g e n e r a t i n g member a c t i v i t y . Members, i n t u r n , p e r c e i v e the r e l e v a n c e of l e a d e r s h i p as an avenue f o r the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e i r concerns. C o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h and l o b b y i n g of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s denotes i n t e r e s t group e f f o r t s to p a r t i c i p a t e d i r e c t l y i n p o l i c y f o r m a t i o n through v a r i o u s government c o n s u l t a t i v e mechanisms or c o n t a c t s w i t h i n the b u r e a u c r a c y . Leaders f e e l t h a t i f they can p l u g i n t o the p o l i c y p r o c e s s b e f o r e f i n a l d e c i s i o n s are made, 54 they w i l l enhance p o l i c y b e n e f i t s f o r members or a t l e a s t minimize the d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s . In t u r n , they use the l e g i t i m a c y g a i n e d from government r e c o g n i t i o n to demand they be c o n s u l t e d on a l l i n i t i a t i v e s a f f e c t i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t community. T h i s u s u a l l y i n v o l v e s a p p o i n t i n g a group emissary to the v a r i o u s government c o n s u l t a t i v e mechanisms (task f o r c e s , Royal Commissions, a d v i s o r y b o a r d s ) , or h i r i n g a p r o f e s s i o n a l l o b b y i s t to develop t a c t i c s f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n ; both i n v o l v e the p r e p a r a t i o n of b r i e f s and memoranda f o c u s s i n g on group concerns. For the c o n s u l t a t i o n / l o b b y i n g technique to be e f f e c t i v e , group l e a d e r s must be a b l e to a r t i c u l a t e the concerns of the i n t e r e s t p o p u l a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y . For t h i s , they d e s i g n s t r a t e g i e s to sound the membership f o r i t s o p i n i o n s and a t t i t u d e s on r e l e v a n t i s s u e s . Q u e s t i o n n a i r e s are d i s t r i b u t e d and meetings are h e l d , because l e a d e r s want the government to know what the i n t e r e s t community t h i n k s . T h i s w i l l g i v e t h e i r c o n s u l t a t i v e and l o b b y i n g e f f o r t s more c r e d i b i l i t y and l e g i t i m a c y w i t h government. Members are then aware of l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y , and can o f f e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s to i t . In t h i s way, l e a d e r s tend to use t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o n s u l t a t i o n p r o c e s s to g i v e members a s i g n of t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y , and to show the importance of h a ving l e a d e r s a c t i v e i n the p o l i c y p r o c e s s . As p o l i c y agents, i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s t r a n s m i t p o l i c y b e n e f i t s to members through the implementation of government 55 programmes desi g n e d to s a t i s f y government p o l i c y g o a l s . In c o n t r a s t to access by c o n s u l t a t i o n , the government i n c o r p o r a t e s group p a r t i c i p a t i o n r i g h t i n t o i t s p o l i c y , u s i n g groups as i n s t r u m e n t s f o r implementation, and o f t e n o f f e r i n g f i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e s to do so. Government's acceptance of group l e a d e r s as p o l i c y agents i m p l i e s t h a t government a c c e p t s the l e g i t i m a c y of the group and i t s l e a d e r s h i p . To m a i n t a i n t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n , l e a d e r s focus a g r e a t d e a l of t h e i r energy on b e i n g government " s e r v a n t s " . Member p a r t i c i p a t i o n or support of the p o l i c y agent r o l e becomes l e s s of a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r i t s s u c c e s s ; l e a d e r s tend to i n t e r a c t w i t h members i n s o f a r as government p o l i c y r e q u i r e s t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n . The immediate r e l e v a n c e of l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y t o membership i s c l o u d e d i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , and depends fu n d a m e n t a l l y upon how e f f e c t i v e l y l e a d e r s p o r t r a y themselves and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y as e s s e n t i a l to group s u r v i v a l . T h i s v e r y o f t e n means p u r s u i n g o t h e r member a c t i v i t i e s (meetings, s o c i a l g a t h e r i n g s , p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s e x e r c i s e s ) which g i v e symbolic v a l u e to l e a d e r a c t i v i t y and reason f o r members' c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t . What would make i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s p r e f e r one type of access over another? The p o s s i b i l i t y of f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s f o r c o n t i n u e d i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y would c e r t a i n l y a t t r a c t l e a d e r a t t e n t i o n to the p o l i c y agent r o l e . Leaders may a l s o p e r c e i v e one type of a c c e s s as b e i n g more e f f e c t i v e i n terms of t h e i r g o a l s f o r the i n t e r e s t group. More simply, one type of access may seem more i n tune w i t h the r o l e i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s p e r c e i v e themselves as p l a y i n g . Much depends on the c o n t e x t of a c t i v i t y and the w i l l i n g n e s s of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s to r o l l out the welcoming mat. In c o n t r a s t t o Pros s , who assumes t h a t as i n t e r e s t groups become more o r g a n i s e d , they e x p e r i e n c e a concommitant i n c r e a s e i n 23 p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , we b e l i e v e t h a t i n t e r e s t groups can and do s k i p c e r t a i n s t a g e s . T h i s o c c u r s most o f t e n i n the case of government-financed i n t e r e s t groups whose l e a d e r s are l o o k i n g f o r f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , and who thus become government p o l i c y agents as a means to ensure group s u r v i v a l . In the next s e c t i o n , we o u t l i n e the impact of t h i s o c c u r r e n c e on the a b i l i t y of l e a d e r s to i n t e r a c t w i t h t h e i r members and m a i n t a i n an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e . 2 . 3 . The Impact of Access and Government Funding What impact does access to the p o l i t i c a l system and l e a d e r i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as government-funded p o l i c y agents have on the i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e ? The i n t e r e s t group l i t e r a t u r e i s f a i r l y s p a r s e i n i t s response t o t h i s q u e s t i o n . Most authors examine access a c c o r d i n g to v a r i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f e r e n t p o i n t s without u n v e i l i n g the u n d e r l y i n g e f f e c t s a c c e s s i b i l i t y has on i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y . Key t a l k s of 24 "persuading l e g i s l a t o r s " or of " r e l a t i o n s w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s " ; 57 Truman addresses the "dynamics of access to the l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s " or the "web of r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 25 p r o c e s s " ; and Pross d e s c r i b e s the e x i s t e n c e of " p o l i c y communities" which i n c l u d e , a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s , a l l those a f f e c t e d 26 by or engaged i n government p o l i c y - m a k i n g . Pross does a s s e r t , however, t h a t "an apparent p r e s s u r e group i s r e a l l y a government agency" when i t can no l o n g e r r e p r e s e n t i t s membership, a c t autonomously or d e f i n e the common group 27 i n t e r e s t . He thus underscores how a c c e s s i b i l i t y to the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s may be r e a l l y a double-edged sword f o r i n t e r e s t group s u r v i v a l . C l o s e n e s s to or a h i g h l e v e l of i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s a f f e c t s the i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e , because the r e l e v a n c e of l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y to members d i m i n i s h e s the more en t a n g l e d l e a d e r s become i n the governmental p o l i c y web. S t a s i u l i s c l a i m s t h a t : [ I ] t i s i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of dependency e s t a b l i s h e d when an e t h n i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a c c e p t s funds from a government agency t h a t one can observe the most s e r i o u s e f f e c t s of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n e t h n i c community a f f a i r s . ( 2 8 ) We must t h e r e f o r e l o o k more c l o s e l y a t the impact of government f u n d i n g on i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p . I n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s perform f o u r c l o s e l y r e l a t e d f u n c t i o n s as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between t h e i r members and the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s : c o n t a c t w i t h members, d e f i n i t i o n of the 58 i n t e r e s t community and the r o l e of i t s l e a d e r s , member r e c r u i t m e n t , and group management. The performance of these f u n c t i o n s ensures the l e g i t i m a c y and mandate of the l e a d e r s . However, as government-funded' p o l i c y agents, t h e r e i s a p r o p e n s i t y f o r them to a l t e r t h e i r performance of each f u n c t i o n and thereby b r i n g i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e i r mandate and l e g i t i m a c y . Wedded to the government p o l i c y , l e a d e r s can e a s i l y grow away from t h e i r members enough t h a t l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y l o s e s much of i t s r e l e v a n c e to the i n t e r e s t community. T h i s "gap" between l e a d e r s and t h e i r community w i l l become m a n i f e s t i n each of the f o u r f u n c t i o n s . C o n t a c t In o r d e r to r e c e i v e a mandate from members, l e a d e r s must develop r e g u l a r c o n t a c t to c o n v i n c e them t h a t o n l y through i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y can t h e i r concerns be met. As an example, I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n Canada developed out of the e f f o r t s of I n d i a n l e a d e r s to convince I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n s and t h e i r l o c a l band c o u n c i l s t h a t the s e r v i c e s o f f e r e d by the p r o v i n c i a l a s s o c i a t i o n s were e s s e n t i a l , and t h a t o n l y they c o u l d 29 d e l i v e r them. Dion b e l i e v e s t h a t members w i l l , i n f a c t , i d e n t i f y t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s w i t h those of the i n t e r e s t group, because without a spokesperson, t h e i r needs c o u l d very w e l l 30 remain u n p o l i t i c i z e d and hence unanswered. C r e a t i n g a h i g h p r o f i l e f o r t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p , and a c q u i r i n g knowledge of members i s a c h i e v e d through the a r t i c u l a t i o n and 59 a g g r e g r a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s , and the communication of l e a d e r a c t i v i t y to the members. As such, l e a d e r s attempt to b u i l d a 31 c o l l e c t i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s which w i l l b u t t r e s s the i n t e r e s t group and induce members to equate group s u r v i v a l w i t h the f u r t h e r a n c e of l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y . P r a c t i c a l l y speaking, i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s b u i l d an o r g a n i s a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e to promote c o n t a c t . For example, i n an attempt to reduce the g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t a n c e between p r o v i n c i a l a s s o c i a t i o n o f f i c i a l s and r e s e r v e s , Canadian I n d i a n 32 l e a d e r s d e c e n t r a l i z e d the o p e r a t i o n s of a s s o c i a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s . The i n f r a s t r u c t u r e u s u a l l y i n c l u d e s a broad communication network ( o f t e n a group newspaper and, where a v a i l a b l e , the use of r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n ) , p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s s t r a t e g i e s , and r e g u l a r group meetings. T h i s h e l p s l e a d e r s p r o v i d e v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n to the group. Contact between i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s and members i s a l t e r e d , however, when changes made to the i n t e r e s t group o r g a n i s a t i o n f o r improved i n t r a - g r o u p a c t i v i t y are d i r e c t e d i n s t e a d a t managing group-Government r e l a t i o n s through the p o l i c y agent r o l e . The u n d e r l y i n g assumption i s t h a t enhanced l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y a t the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l b r i n g s more e f f e c t i v e responses to group concerns and a c t i v i t i e s , a t t r a c t s new 33 membership, and thereby ensures group s u r v i v a l . Pross suggests t h a t c o n t a c t s w i t h the i n t e r e s t group membership g e n e r a l l y atrophy due to a p r e f e r e n c e f o r more e a s i l y managed r e l a t i o n s between i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s and government 34 o f f i c i a l s . The o p e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y i n the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s can thus overshadow and u l t i m a t e l y r e p l a c e t i e s to the i n t e r e s t community. Group-government r e l a t i o n s can a l s o modify l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v -i t i e s as "groups [ t r y ] to adapt t h e i r behaviour and s t r u c t u r e s to c o n d i t i o n s imposed by the s e c t o r of the p o l i t i c a l system i n which 35 they o p e r a t e . " The growth of o r g a n i s a t i o n beyond the l e v e l needed to cope w i t h i n t r a - g r o u p r e l a t i o n s means t h a t i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s must come to terms w i t h the complex t e c h n i c a l n a t u r e of p u b l i c p o l i c y m a k i n g . T h i s can p r e c l u d e e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p a t the i n t e r e s t community l e v e l : The h i g h l y b u r e a u c r a t i z e d p r o c e s s of a p p l y i n g f o r government funds and a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e i r e x p e n d i t u r e d r a i n s the l e a d e r s h i p of o r g a n i s a t i o n s of v a l u a b l e time and energy, which c o u l d o t h e r w i s e be more d i r e c t l y u t i l i z e d i n the p u r s u i t of the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s o b j e c t i v e s . ( 3 6 ) Very o f t e n , then, i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s t u r n i n t o n o t h i n g more than government b u r e a u c r a t s , p a i d to a d m i n i s t e r programmes. The p o s s i b i l i t y of access to government i n v a r i a b l y a c t s as a c a t a l y s t f o r e x t e n s i v e b u r e a c r a t i s a t i o n which can undermine l e a d e r s ' a b i l i t y t o induce c o n t a c t between members and t h e i r i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s h i p . The n a t u r e of the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l b ureaucracy d e s i g n e d f o r p o l i c y agent t a s k s o f t e n c o n f l i c t s w i t h 61 the i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e , because i t can reduce the amount of c o n t a c t w i t h members. T h i s o c c u r s l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of the a c t i v i t i e s of h i r e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o f e s s i o n a l s . S t a f f p e r s o n n e l are p a i d a wage and are o f t e n r e c r u i t e d from o u t s i d e the i n t e r e s t group, e x p e r t s t r a i n e d i n s p e c i f i c areas thought u s e f u l to the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t group c o n t e x t . In t h i s sense, they are d i f f e r e n t from v o l u n t e e r a c t i v i s t s who emerge from the i n t e r e s t community and who are more i n touch w i t h the r e a l concerns of members. S t a f f p e r s o n n e l are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t r a n s l a t i n g i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y i n t o rewards and/or s a n c t i o n s f o r members, u s u a l l y without adequate p r i o r knowledge of members or of the g e n e r a l n a t u r e of the i n t e r e s t community. They can s e l e c t i v e l y c o n f e r 37 b e n e f i t s upon c e r t a i n p a r t i c i p a n t s and not o t h e r s , g i v e n t h a t they are i n c o n t r o l of the r e q u i r e d e x p e r t i s e and s e r v i c e s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s o f t e n breeds d i s c o n t e n t w i t h the " p a i d " p r o f e s s i o n a l s , because group members view s t a f f as b e i n g i n s e n s i t i v e to i n t r a - g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s . In the case of Canadian I n d i a n a s s o c i a t i o n s , members pinned a "brown b u r e a u c r a t " e p i t h e t on I n d i a n l e a d e r s who they f e l t were " g e t t i n g too much l i k e I n d i a n a f f a i r s " , " s e l l i n g out to government f o r b i g s a l a r i e s and 38 c a r s " w h i l e " f o r g e t t i n g the p e o p l e " . Thus, not o n l y can l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y as p o l i c y agents generate l e s s c o n t a c t w i t h members, the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s t r u c t u r e s to ensure c o n t a c t can undermine l e a d e r s ' attempts t o make t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y r e l e v a n t to members. D e f i n i t i o n I n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s s e t the f u n c t i o n a l , s t r u c t u r a l , and o f t e n t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s f o r i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y . They attempt to draw boundaries which w i l l g i v e 39 symbolic and i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e to the i n t e r e s t o r g a n i s a t i o n . Leaders view themselves as l e g i t i m a t e r e f e r e n t p o i n t s f o r members as proof of the i n t e r e s t group's e x i s t e n c e . For Breton, community v i t a l i t y i s a d i r e c t f u n c t i o n of the q u a l i t y of i t s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and of i t s a b i l i t y to s a t i s f y the 40 needs and a s p i r a t i o n s of members i n the community. In t h i s sense, d e f i n i t i o n g e nerates l o y a l t y t o the o r g a n i s a t i o n , which i s c r i t i c a l f o r the s t a b i l i t y and sense of permanence i t o f f e r s to 41 members and l e a d e r s . In d e f i n i n g the i n t e r e s t group, l e a d e r s tend to c l a i m the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a g a i n s t a l l r i v a l s . F o r m a l i z e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g procedures, d e m o c r a t i c a u t h o r i t y s t r u c t u r e s , and b u r e a u c r a t i c " r u l e s of the game" p r o v i d e i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s a p l a t f o r m from which t o c l a i m t h i s r i g h t . They have a d i s t i n c t advantage over r i v a l s , because of an a r s e n a l of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 42 t o o l s they can use to a t t r a c t and h o l d members. T h e i r a b i l i t y t o e x e r c i s e and m a i n t a i n t h a t r i g h t speaks much of the success of l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y v i s - a - v i s i t s membership. Members e i t h e r a c cept the l e a d e r s ' d e f i n i t i o n and i d e n t i f y w i t h i t , or r e j e c t i t and look elsewhere. They w i l l q u e s t i o n the " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s " 63 of l e a d e r a c t i o n i f i t d i v e r g e s too f a r from the way they p e r c e i v e t h e i r i n t e r e s t group. Changes to the o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n b r i n g the h i g h e s t r i s k of c o n f l i c t , because v e r y o f t e n i t s e r v e d as the primary inducement f o r i n t e r e s t group f o r m a t i o n and member a t t r a c t i o n . C l o s e involvement w i t h the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s as government-funded p o l i c y agents means t h a t i n t e r e s t group d e f i n i t i o n can, l i k e c o n t a c t , occur i n i s o l a t i o n of the membership. As i n t e r e s t groups e v o l v e w i t h government p o l i c y , i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s tend to r e l y more and more on i n f o r m a t i o n generated by s t a f f members who, though u n d e r s t a n d i n g the importance of government p o l i c y and funds to the i n t e r e s t group, may not a p p r e c i a t e the s u b t l e t i e s of group d e f i n i t i o n needed to s a t i s f y members. Hence, l e a d e r s may depend l e s s on r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r own i n t e r e s t community, and thus l o s e the c a p a c i t y to determine the common i n t e r e s t v i a the 43 group membership. Government r e c o g n i t i o n and access to the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s can t h e r e f o r e become v a l u e d f o r themselves r a t h e r than f o r what they c o n t r i b u t e to the d e f i n i t i o n of i n t e r e s t group concerns. Meyer and Rowan suggest t h a t the " r i s e of e x t e r n a l assessment c r i t e r i a enable an o r g a n i z a t i o n to remain s u c c e s s f u l by s o c i a l 44 tor government] d e f i n i t i o n , b u f f e r i n g i t from f a i l u r e . " Hence, i n t h i s case, whether or not l e a d e r s h i p becomes d i s c o n n e c t e d from the i n t e r e s t group i n no way a f f e c t s the r e l e v a n c e of t h e i r 64 a c t i v i t i e s . What h o l d s the i n t e r e s t group i n p l a c e i s the l o g i c of c o n f i d e n c e and good f a i t h of members i n i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s 45 and government o f f i c i a l s . I r o n i c a l l y , i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s c o n t i n u e to r e c e i v e t h e i r mandate from members d e s p i t e t h e i r i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n f u l f i l l i n g the demands of the i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e a t the community l e v e l . One very s e r i o u s consequence of t h i s p r o c e s s has been what Ol s e n c a l l s the l o s s of freedom to a c t and the d i l u t i o n of 46 i d e n t i t y . With a p a r t to p l a y i n the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s as p o l i c y agents, i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s must adhere to the r u l e s of the game and not t r y to undermine the p r o c e s s . Very o f t e n , t h i s e n t a i l s the compromise of i n t e r e s t i d e n t i t y and the d e - r a d i c a l i s a t i o n of i n t e r e s t group a c t i v i t y both of which can c o n s t r a i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s r e s p o n s i v e n e s s to i t s members' 47 wishes. I f t r u e , l e a d e r s ' a b i l i t y to d e f i n e i n t e r e s t group needs and concerns becomes t i e d to e x t e r n a l p r i o r i t i e s which may not always c o i n c i d e w i t h those of the i n t e r e s t group. For Canadian I n d i a n l e a d e r s , the e x t e n t of the " I n d i a n n e s s " of t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p became a concern as a s s o c i a t i o n s became more b u r e a u c r a t i c . Some attempted to "redraw the l i n e between the b u r e a u c r a t i c and t h r e a t e n i n g a c t i v i t i e s of government and the 48 much-needed 'Indian' a c t i v i t i e s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . " I f government-paid s t a f f p e r s o n n e l expend more energy on r e s e a r c h i n g the e f f e c t s of government p o l i c y and on how to p r e s e n t t h e i r f i n d i n g s to government, the needs and concerns of members can q u i c k l y become mere r e f l e c t i o n s of government p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s - The d e f i n i t i o n of the i n t e r e s t group, i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , i s e n g u l f e d i n government p r i o r i t i e s as i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s become n o t h i n g l e s s than "instruments propagandized on 49 b e h a l f of government p o l i c y . " Pross w o r r i e s t h a t the p u r s u i t of group-government r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n can l e a d to easy m a n i p u l a t i o n of the i n t e r e s t group by government. As government-funded p o l i c y agents, i n t e r e s t group l e a d e r s are u s u a l l y l e s s autonomous i n the use of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s which are d e r i v e d from departmental budgets w i t h c o n d i t i o n s a t t a c h e d to pursue s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s and not o t h e r s (ex. p a r t i s a n or p r e s s u r e p o l i t i c s are 50 o f t e n f o r b i d d e n ) . Dyck suggests t h a t t h i s o c c u r r e d w i t h the f e d e r a l l y - f u n d e d I n d i a n a s s o c i a t i o n s . F e d e r a l government p o l i c y d i s g u i s e d attempts to s i l e n c e I n d i a n p r o t e s t s by d i v e r t i n g funds away from the p r o v i n c i a l a s s o c i a t i o n s and towards l o c a l band c o u n c i l s . In t h i s way, Dyck says, " i f the funds were not r e d i r e c t e d by the band c o u n c i l s to p r o v i n c i a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , then the a s s o c i a t i o n s would l a c k the funds f o r f u r t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l work, and government c o u l d d i s p u t e t h e i r c r e d e n t i a l s as 51 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the I n d i a n people [and withdraw the f u n d s ] . " Hence, group d e f i n i t i o n can become e n t a n g l e d i n e f f o r t s to comply w i t h government demands. Member Recruitment The number of members who p a r t i c i p a t e , and the frequency of t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n h i n t s a t i n t e r e s t group v i t a l i t y and a t the r e l e v a n c e of l e a d e r s h i p a c t i v i t y . I f , as Dion suggests, the acceptance of an i n t e r e s t group's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s i m p l i e s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s u n d e r l y i n g a f f i n i t y to the group, a concern f o r the w e l f a r e of the group, and d e s i r e f o r p e r s o n a l commitment to i t , then a l a c k of i n t e r e s t i n group a c t i v i t i e s may weaken the c l a i m of l e a d e r s to r e p r e s e n t t h e i r members' i n t e r e s t s . U l t i m a t e l y , Dion i s c o r r e c t ; without member p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h e r e would be ve r y l i t t l e i n t e r n a l group a c t i v i t y , 52 a l a c k of support f o r l e a d e r s , and a slow death f o r the group. Member r e c r u i t m e n t o c c u r s through group a c t i v i t i e s and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . Group a c t i v i t i e s , such as c o n f e r e n c e s , meetings, and s o c i a l g a t h e r i n g s h e l p b r i n g members t o g e t h e r to share i n the b e n e f i t s of membership. As lo n g as these a c t i v i t i e s g e nerate member s a t i s f a c t i o n , i n t e r e s t l e a d e r s w i l l reap the b e n e f i t s , because members w i l l c o n t i n u e to v a l u e the i n t e r e s t group as an e f f e c t i v e way to express their.common i n t e r e s t . One p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e method employed by l e a d e r s to encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the d e l i b e r a t e c r e a t i o n of subgroups 53 to " r e g u l a r i z e i n t e r a c t i o n s " between mem