INTEREST GROUP LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING:
THE FEDERATION DES FRANCO-COLOMBIENS - COMMUNITY ORGANISATION OR GOVERNMENT POLICY AGENT?

By

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ABSTRACT

Most interest group analyses focus on the impact of interest group activity in the policymaking process, measured by the coincidence of interest demands and policy outputs. This study contends that the reverse case is important for a more complete understanding of State-interest group relations; it examines the impact of State support programmes on interest group leadership, and provides insights into how the State uses interest groups as agents for social intervention.

The analysis shows that State-interest group relations can be affected by State funding programmes in two fundamental ways: first, as policy agents and political actors, interest group leaders can become "captured" in a vicious circle of financial and policy dependency which allows a minimum amount of freedom in community development activities; second, the State can undermine the link established between an interest group organisation and its interest community and, in so doing, hinder its own ability to pursue effective policy action.

As a case study, the thesis takes the Fédération des Franco-Colombiens (FFC), and shows how British Columbia francophone leaders modified their leadership activities as a result of access to federal government financial and policy support through the Official Languages Policy (1969). Essentially, the FFC grew from a largely local, Church-run community association into a full-fledged secular, bureaucratic, and political organisation.
As Franco-Columbian leaders shifted their activity to the government arena as policy agents, they tended to pay less attention to their interest clientele, and thus severely jeopardized the effectiveness of their leadership.

The implications of the study touch government, interest group leaders, and political scientists who wish to probe further into State-interest group relations. For the former two, it is crucial to be aware of the potentially negative effects of establishing too close a relationship, especially in those instances where the interest group has a low level of financial autonomy. For the latter, interest group activity should not be perceived as being uni-directional; interest groups are intermediaries in the policy process whose actions vis-à-vis the government and the interest clientele must both be considered for a more complete understanding of their role as societal actors.
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PREFACE

The federal government adopted its Official Languages Policy in the late 1960s in response to a fervent Quebec nationalism which challenged the assumptions of Canada's dualist past. Through its Secretary of State Department, Ottawa developed policies and implemented a variety of federally-funded programmes which would directly aid and promote bilingualism and language equality across the country. It was feared that without these initiatives Canada would become irreversibly divided along linguistic and cultural lines which threatened the integrity of the Canadian State.

French Canadian minorities were major targets for government action. Federal officials and politicians felt that federal funds could be used to build a network of provincially-based francophone organisations acting as agents for the Official Languages Policy in English-speaking Canada. They believed that as these organisations developed viable minority communities, the fruits of bilingualism would be borne in more harmonious French-English relations, and a tempered Québécois nationalism. The use of these minorities to achieve national policy objectives signalled a broadening of the federal government's preoccupation with French Canada, and had important ramifications for francophone minority communities.

In this study, I focus more directly on how French Canadian
minority organisations grew and changed under the tutelage of federal government financial and policy support. As such, I hope to add to a growing literature on Canadian interest groups, and provide new insights into the effects of State support programmes on interest group activity more generally. How the State "captures" societal actors to provide policy leadership is the reverse side of most interest group analyses which examine the pressures they exert on the political system.

My analysis offers insights into the role of community organisations as interest groups in society, and reveals the impact of State policy on these organisations. I argue that the government-funded policy agent role tends to pull leaders away from their interest community by modifying the leadership functions they exercise on behalf of their members. I therefore raise a number of questions concerning the potentially negative effects of government funding on interest group activity.

French Canadian Minorities and Language Policy

This study grew primarily out of my interest in federal government language policy and French Canada. More generally, I wished to consider how the Canadian State used its language policy to mould a specific Canadian identity. In view of the perceived thrust of Quebec nationalism, federal government language policy became a tool designed to promote one particular perspective of the Canadian political community over another: an
officially bilingual country based on language equality through institutional bilingualism.

Why French Canadian minorities? Well, quite simply, after having spent several years in Quebec City studying the effects of Quebec nationalism on the definition of a Canadian political community, I came to realise that the existence of francophone communities outside Quebec posed some very interesting and unexplored questions concerning the socio-political and linguistic make-up of our country. I felt that these questions, when answered, could bring a new understanding to our conceptualisation of the dualist paradigm in Canadian politics.

First and foremost, I believe that even though francophone minorities are historically and culturally linked to Quebec, they are politically at odds with the general thrust of a Quebec nationalism which would divide up French Canada and dilute their own identity as French Canadians. Moreover, there are essential differences between the francophone majority and minority experiences which are tied to social factors beyond the language question. For example, though the presence of a French Canadian minority in every province is a constant historical reminder to us of the French fact in Canada, it is also a source of tension for the minorities, because they have to deal with an anglophone majority whose mindset for "things French" seems to be locked into Quebec separatism and the potential break-up of Canada. In
addition, we cannot under-estimate the ability of provincial boundaries to forge different types of minority communities. French Canadians in British Columbia may indeed have more in common with their provincial population than with their cultural and linguistic "confrères" in Quebec or Ontario.

Therefore, I believe that a political understanding of French Canadian minorities and, indeed, of our dualist roots, can be improved with a look beyond the larger Quebec-Canada debate. For too long, governments and analysts alike have made the mistake of examining these communities solely in terms of their "survival potential" and its ramifications for Quebec-Canada relations. They rarely go a step further to explore the political foundations of the minorities themselves. We are thus treated to the perennial socio-demographic analyses which show the dwindling numbers and high assimilation rates, and conclusions which state that something must be done to aid French Canadian minorities. Very little analysis is done to understand where, how, and why these minorities fit into the larger Canadian socio-political landscape. For instance, we do not know what exactly it means to be an Official Language Minority nor how francophones themselves feel about their special status. Do they look at government policies in ways different from their English-speaking counterparts? In this study, I do not address the full range of these issues, but I do make an attempt to highlight some of the political manifestations of minority activity outside the
rather rigid Quebec-Canada framework.

I chose Official Language Minority Organisations (OLMOs) as a research focus for three very specific methodological reasons: first, for the most part they are creations of the francophone minorities themselves, and are thus looked upon as extensions of the communities. Second, the federal government targeted these organisations as community representatives, tying them to the Official Languages Policy through various funding programmes; as such, they served as useful tools for my analysis of interest group-government relations. Third, they are tangible, easily identifiable political actors whose activities can provide insights into the societal implications of the State using interest groups as policy agents.

The Case Study

I look in depth at one Official Language Minority Organisation, the "Fédération des Franco-Colombiens" (FFC), provincial francophone organisation in British Columbia. In particular, I take a look at the actions of BC's francophone leaders as they tried to manage not only group-government relations, but also their own role as community leaders. The FFC serves as a useful case to examine the impact of federal government language policy on French Canadian minorities, because it is a government-funded interest group playing the role of policy agent. I ask two
questions: How have Federation leaders succeeded or failed to establish their leadership of the Franco-Columbian community? How has access to federal government funding programmes through the Official Languages Policy affected the development of Federation leadership?

Over the Federation's 40 year history (1945-1985), its leaders constructed a broad provincial organisational network and claimed to speak on behalf of a well-defined Franco-Columbian community. In my analysis I focus on a number of key dates and events which help to situate changes brought to Federation leadership. Prior to 1945, BC francophones had virtually no organisational network to speak of. Between 1945 and 1960, they gave life to the Federation and attempted to develop a broad provincial structure for the community. During this period, community members financed Federation activities, though they did receive occasional help from a few Quebec-based francophone associations. From 1961 to 1968, changes to Federation structures and operations desired by certain leaders appeared to coincide with the arrival of Quebec government funding and more substantial support from Quebec francophone associations. Since 1968, the federal government has contributed a significant amount of policy and financial support to the Federation. This provided a context for Federation leaders to make substantial modifications to their community development activities and to the Federation's internal structures. Paradoxically, however,
the growth of Federation leadership in the "government funding" period produced a less cohesive organisational network, and a "distance" between local francophone communities and their central organisation. How did this happen?

In response to a number of external forces, notably federal government language policy initiatives in the 1960s and general societal changes during the same period, Federation leaders began to focus more attention on the political process than they had in preceding years. Whereas this "refocussing" brought major changes in their leadership activities and multiple policy benefits to Franco-Columbians, it tended also to produce a gap between Federation leaders and the Franco-Columbian community. I therefore consider two propositions:

- Federation leaders succeeded in establishing their leadership of the Franco-Columbian community largely due to the availability of federal government language policies which used provincial francophone associations as government policy agents.

- As the FFC shifted its interest group activity to the government arena, it paid less attention to its interest clientele, and thus severely jeopardized the effectiveness of its leadership.

The British Columbia example is interesting from two perspectives. First, in the context of a national language policy whose goals address a country-wide francophone constituency, British Columbia's provincial OLMO receives treatment similar to other provincial organisations, and,
therefore, we would expect our analysis to apply consistently across provincial boundaries. Moreover, in light of the fact that the intermediary role played by interest group leaders is intimately linked to the interest community, our analysis can be more revealing due to the nature of the Franco-Columbian community. Indeed, the need for government support of Official Language Minority Organisations to generate viable OLM communities may be greater in the smaller, dispersed, and highly assimilated BC francophone community. From this perspective, looking at the FFC reveals all the more poignantly the importance of government financial support to an interest community. It can in the same breath, however, amplify the effects of government funding on interest group leadership as OLMOs become government policy agents.

Methodological Considerations

As with most case studies it is often difficult to extrapolate beyond the boundaries of the analysis. In this instance, the effects on interest group leadership may be more or less extreme, according to the nature of the francophone community and its need for organisational development. Nonetheless, I do feel that the analysis is easily expanded beyond British Columbia's borders, largely because discussions I have had with activists in various other provincial francophone associations suggest a number of similarities.
I used a variety of research methods and approaches in this thesis. My primary research focussed on original historical records provided by the Fédération des Franco-Colombiens and the Société Historique Franco-Colombienne. Both organisations gave me full access to all documents: minutes & proceedings of the Executive Committee and the Annual General Assembly, financial records, special reports, and various Federation studies. Very little published material existed. In addition, the Department of the Secretary of State in Ottawa, and its regional office in Vancouver, offered continual support throughout my research, providing valuable government information on various policies and programmes which affected francophone minorities.

I used two main statistical sources: Statistics Canada Census (1981), and a survey of francophone minorities done by the Montreal research firm, le Centre de recherche sur l'opinion publique (CROP). Largely a tool to highlight various sociological aspects of British Columbia's francophone community, these sources provided valuable information for discussions of attitudes and perceptions of Franco-Columbians on a variety of matters related to my research, and set measureable parameters for looking at the nature of French British Columbia.

I supplemented my primary and survey research through personal interviews with a number of BC francophone leaders. These interviews offered valuable insights into the Federation
and the francophone community in British Columbia. Far from a random selection, the people interviewed had, according to my investigative historical research, played important roles in the Federation's development. Though each and every leader could not be interviewed, all those selected did fit into the leader grid I constructed from my reading and understanding of Federation history (see Appendix 5).

I was a participant observer at a number of Federation meetings and events. This participation offered valuable "insider" information on the way Federation and community affairs were run. Conversations I had with many community members at these meetings brought further evidence in support of my research hypothesis, even though they were not structured.

My contention that federal government funding modified Federation leaders' approach to community development activities is not a statement of direct and uni-directional causality. My theoretical model of interest group activity distinctly refutes this possibility. In any case, it is highly unlikely that one could establish a uni-causal link in this instance. Many other factors, which I do mention throughout my research, contributed to the changes I observed in Federation leaders' activities, such as general societal changes in British Columbia and Canada, personality conflicts between leaders, the nature of volunteer
work, or characteristics of the Franco-Columbian community. Nonetheless, upon a reasonable interpretation of facts, I find a high degree of correlation between the arrival of federal government funds and changes brought to Federation leadership activities. I use the case study approach to suggest that certain changes did occur, but that the conclusions require further verification before one could establish a predictive model of the relationship between government funding and interest group leadership.

Structure of the Thesis

I divide my analysis into three sections. The first comprises three chapters, the second contains five, and the last is a summary of general conclusions and invites some reflections.

In section One, entitled "Setting the Stage", I present the political, theoretical, and sociological foundations of the study.

Chapter One places Official Language Minority Organisations in the context of the federal government's Official Languages Policy. I argue that the federal government used OLMOs as useful policy conduits in its attempt to respond to the perceived threat Quebec nationalism posed for Canadian unity.

Chapter Two places the study in a theoretical framework of interest group relations with the State. I focus on how
government funding may modify the roles and functions of interest group leaders as they try to address the needs and concerns of their interest communities.

Chapter Three outlines the socio-demographic bases of the Franco-Columbian community, and explores its "Frenchness" in light of a number of community life variables. In so doing, I hint at particular elements of relevance to interest group leaders and government policymakers.

In section Two, entitled "The Fédération des Franco-Colombiens: Community Organisation to Government Policy Agent", I explore the activities of FFC leaders as they established the Franco-Columbian, organisational network and managed government funding and policy support on behalf of BC's francophone population. Here, I attempt to show how federal government funding modified leadership strategies and thereby influenced attempts to develop a viable francophone community in British Columbia.

Chapter Four sketches the history of the Federation des Franco-Colombiens. In it, I discern several patterns of its leadership and outline general changes which coincided with the arrival of federal government funding.

Chapter Five examines more closely the financial relationships FFC leaders had with the Franco-Columbian community and the federal government. I consider how financial management early on brought the Federation closer to its interest community,
but how dramatic shifts in revenues and spending, which seemed to be linked directly to the arrival of federal government funds, significantly modified many of the strategies adopted by FFC leaders.

Chapter Six focuses on structural developments of the Franco-Columbian network. Here, I look at how Federation leaders used organisational growth to broaden Federation activities and to challenge the local and Church-led structural status quo. I focus on how the arrival of government funds facilitated this challenge, and how subsequent organisational growth dramatically altered how FFC leaders performed their functions as interest group leaders.

Chapter Seven observes Federation-local cooperation. I pay particular attention to how Federation leaders interacted with local communities to give a sense of collective spirit to BC's francophone population. I also consider how this "solidarity" was modified by the availability of federal funds.

Finally, Chapter Eight highlights Federation leadership through political advocacy. I look at the establishment of political contacts and at the pursuit of regular political activity which came to dominate FFC actions. How this modified leadership strategies, contributing further to changes in Federation leadership is the focus of this particular chapter.

In the last section, I put forth a number of general
conclusions which summarize the substantive research findings. I underline the theoretical implications of the study, and then make a few comments on the methodology of inquiry, relevance of the study, and avenues for further research.
SECTION 1:

SETTING THE STAGE
CHAPTER 1
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT:
FRENCH CANADIAN MINORITY ORGANISATIONS
& THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES POLICY 1960-1985

French Canadian minority organisations occupy a special, though unappreciated, role in Canadian politics. Their history is replete with struggles for minority language and religious rights in education, for French language government services, and more recently, for entrenched constitutional rights. Yet, their importance in the larger Canadian political context is more often than not drowned amidst concerns for Quebec's position as the predominant force of things French in this country. It is therefore helpful to deliver French Canadian minority organisations from virtual obscurity and appreciate their importance to Canadian language policy:

The official languages policy recognizes that English and French are sources of individual and collective enrichment for Canadians, that the continuing development of official language minorities in all provinces contributes to the openness of Canada's society to a variety of values and cultures, and that the weakening or disappearance of official language minorities would jeopardize Canada's unity. (1)

As representative interest groups serving to promote and legitimize official bilingualism in all provinces, they have acted as valuable policy agents working on behalf of the federal
government.

In this chapter, we first set the political stage for the entry of these organisations into the Canadian language debate, and then look more closely at how they fit into federal government language policy strategies.

1.1. French Canadian Minorities and the Politics of Language

Divergent interpretations of the nature of the Canadian political community catapulted French Canadian minorities into the political debates surrounding French-English relations which surfaced in the 1960s. Both Ottawa and Quebec City dodged each other in the language policy ring, feinting and counterpunching with different approaches and responses to the language crisis in Canada. French Canadian minorities became the frontispiece of Ottawa's Official Languages Policy whereas in Quebec City they appeared a less prominent priority of a government striving to ensure a stronger base for the French language and culture inside its own provincial borders.

Social and economic reforms in Quebec society during the 1960s, more popularly known as the "Quiet Revolution", were rooted in a rejection of the traditionally rural and religious social order by a new French Canadian middle class. The thrust of change strengthened and expanded the Quebec State as it became the key instrument for the expression of a more aggressive and
confident French Canadian people in Quebec. The development of stronger ties to Quebec alone, talk of a "French Canadian" State, and a litany of provincial demands emanating from Quebec, all couched in nationalist rhetoric, raised concern in Ottawa and across Canada:

Before long it became clear that the new ideology [in Quebec] was a menace to national unity (...) Rather than becoming increasingly integrated with the Canadian community, French Canadian elites were becoming increasingly attached to Quebec.(3)

This redefinition by French Canadians in Quebec of their psychological and political boundaries highlighted an underlying sense of alienation from the federal government. While sharing "the Canadian identity for political purposes, (...) many Québécois refused to merge their primary identity [as Québécois] with Canada as a whole." The absence of French Canadians in positions of power in Ottawa, the unequal treatment of languages in the federal civil service, and the serious plight of French Canadian minorities across Canada fuelled this alienation. Ottawa was increasingly viewed as the "Government of English Canada"; and therefore, only a strong Quebec State as the "Government of French Canada" would provide the balance needed for French Canadian survival.

Ottawa perceived a danger to the Canadian political community in this new Quebec perspective. First, equating French
Canada with Quebec and the Quebec government alone undermined the legitimacy of the federal government to speak on behalf of French-speaking Quebeckers. Second, this same equation jeopardized the position of French Canadian minorities outside Quebec. Indeed, if French Canada stopped at Quebec's borders, these minorities would quickly lose their legitimacy as one of Canada's founding peoples in an English Canada bereft of legislation guaranteeing their language rights. On both of these counts, Canada would emerge divided linguistically, culturally, and politically. All French Canadians had to belong to a unified country if Canada were to survive as a viable political unit. The real problem, according to Ottawa, was rooted in the "non-acceptance of French Canadians as individuals in the larger Canadian society." As a result, the federal government undertook to counter the nationalist tone of Quebec politics by speaking out for and designing policies to create a Canada which included all Canadians. This sparked the "politics of language" debate which has engaged both Ottawa and Quebec City for most of the past two decades.

The "politics" of language stemmed from a confrontation between two opposing views of Canada and two contrasting approaches to language policy. With its Official Languages Policy, Ottawa favoured a pan-Canadian vision which included all francophones as the "relevant" French Canadian community. This differed markedly from, what one author called, Quebec's
"segmentalist" view where that province constituted the core francophone area, and the rest of Canada would be the home of English-speaking Canadians.

The respective language policy initiatives mirrored these two views. In an effort to address the perceived threat to national unity, the federal government set up the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. "Equal partnership" and "language equality" emerged as key themes in the Commissioners' 1965 Preliminary Report. Due to their perception of the inadequacies of Canadian laws and institutions to give reality to language equality, they proposed a significant number of recommendations intended to make Canada an equal partnership between the two language communities. In direct reference to language minorities, the Bilingualism & Biculturalism Commissioners stated that, "the principle of equality implies the respect for the idea of minority both within the country as a whole, and in each of its regions." The guiding principle of their recommendations was therefore "the recognition of both official languages, in law and in practice, wherever the minority is numerous enough to be a viable group." (highlighting by author) It was this reference to "viability" which generated much of federal language policy directed at French Canadian minorities and their organisations over the past 20 years.

Ottawa accepted much of the Bilingualism & Biculturalism
Commission's Report from which it developed its Official Languages Policy. Institutional bilingualism, based on the right of English and French-speaking Canadians to use the official language of their choice in dealing with federal government offices and institutions, buttressed efforts to promote the bilingualisation of the federal civil service. Both initiatives sought to ensure French Canadians that they, too, had rights as individuals in the larger Canadian society. Furthermore, this same policy approach would promote French Canadian mobility in the federal government, and thereby reduce their sense of alienation from it. Overall, institutional bilingualism would encourage French Canadians to be a part of Canada as a whole, and to share in the growth of a bilingual country.

Some critics challenged the OLP for what they perceived to be its inability to address the real roots of linguistic and political tensions. Hubert Guindon, for example, questioned its frame of reference, because it did not appear to propose any structural changes which would have included the Québécois as equal partners. It would have been more appropriate, he suggests, to have focussed primarily on the French majority in Quebec, and to have broken down the language barriers there which prevented the upward mobility of the Quebec elites in Quebec's English-dominated corporate world. For Guindon, the institutional supports of the federal government would not adequately deal with the social reality of language
interaction.

Claude Castonguay, another critic, directly challenged the federal government's rejection of the territorial approach to language policy, according to which geographic concentration and numbers determined the application of language legislation. He claimed that the federal government purposely ignored the existence of a "bilingual belt" (known as the Soo-Moncton line, cf. Joy), and rejected "territory" because of its "primal fear of infringing on the integrity of Canadian territory." In other words, the federal government built its OLP to develop and promote its own conception of the Canadian political community, one which was being challenged by the territorial thrust of Quebec's more nationalistic language policy.

For Quebec, the problems of French Canada lay with the fact that it was a nation without the necessary government instruments to promote its national aspirations. The Quebec government therefore took steps within its own jurisdiction to unilingualise the province and to encourage the pursuit of collective rights for the preservation of the French language and culture. Believing that only a unilingual Quebec could guarantee the survival of French in North America, Quebec adopted a policy of territorial unilingualism.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, various federal and Quebec government language policy initiatives appeared to directly
challenge each other. According to one author, Ottawa scuttled the bilingual district's component of the OLP, because it would have brought into question the viability of various regions as potential districts, and would have thus fed fuel to Quebec nationalist claims that French Canadians outside Quebec were lost in a sea of English. It is further suggested that since the formation of the Parti Québécois, "the federal government has avoided giving the Quebec independence movement any further argument which might conceivably be turned to the latter's profit."

From the Quebec side, while Ottawa managed to get agreements from all provincial governments on behalf of minority language rights in education and justice, Quebec City adopted measures which promoted French unilingualism in the province. Quebec responded more directly to Ottawa's bilingualism initiatives by banning a kit prepared by the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Oh Canada, designed to promote bilingualism among school children.

In 1977, following the election of a PQ government in Quebec City, the "politics of language" took an official form in what one author described was the "Battle of the White Papers". The PQ's Charter of the French Language (which included Bill 101) provoked the federal government to launch its own French Language Charter, entitled A National Understanding, during public discussions of Bill 101. In it, the federal government
stressed its own commitment to individual bilingualism whereby the State would not impose a language on its citizens as, they believed, was occurring in Quebec.

In the aftermath of Quebec's 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association, Ottawa patriated the Canadian Constitution and adopted a new Charter of Rights which contained a number of provisions designed to guarantee language rights to French Canadians. In court challenges since 1982, many provisions of Quebec's Bill 101 have been found constitutionally wanting. At the same time, various provincial governments (notably Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick) have taken steps to enhance the availability of French language services in education, justice, and other areas. This has given some credence and legitimacy to Ottawa's approach to language policy, and to its claim to be able to address issues of concern to French-speaking Canadians.

More recently, in an attempt to bring Quebec into the Constitution, the federal government met with the ten provincial Premiers (including Quebec) at Meech Lake to discuss conditions for Quebec's signing the 1982 constitutional agreement. The "Meech Lake Accord", which resulted from the meeting, entrenches the fundamental principles of the OLP dealing with language equality in a variety of areas, and seeks to give Quebec rights to protect its status as a distinct society within Canada. In addition, it recognises the existence of Official Language
Minorities in all provinces, and of the responsibility of provincial governments to ensure their continued survival. The Fédération des Francophones hors Québec (FFHQ), national spokesperson for francophone minorities, has objected to the provision which requires provincial governments to "protect", but not "promote" their Official Language Minority communities. They feel that because the Quebec Government acquires the power to "protect" and "promote" its distinct society, francophone minorities suffer a constitutional inequality.

It is unclear at this point how the various provisions relating to language will affect the language policy debates between Ottawa and Quebec City, and whether or not the provisions affecting francophone minorities will provide them long term guarantees for community development. What seems to have occurred, however, is that the "politics of language" which placed francophone minorities in the middle of a Quebec-Ottawa struggle for the past 25 years appear to have subsided for the time being.

The federal government thus appeared willing to use its language policy as a tool to promote its own conception of the Canadian political community. In so doing, it viewed French language minorities as essential components of a strategy designed to enhance the French presence Canada-wide. As part of this strategy, Ottawa accepted its financial and policy commitments through a variety of bilingualism programmes which
directly aided francophone minorities outside of the legislative framework set up by its Official Languages Policy. The next section discusses one such programme.

1.2. The Official Language Minority Groups Programme 1969-1985

When Ottawa adopted the Official Languages Policy in 1969, it pursued a varied approach to the achievement of its language policy objectives. Apart from the Official Languages Act (which included language equality provisions and the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), Bilingual Districts, French Language Units, and civil servant language training courses, a number of "Bilingualism Promotion Programmes" were developed to enhance Canadians' appreciation of the opportunities offered them in a bilingual Canada. These programmes had specific importance to Official Language Minorities and their representative organisations. Support would be given directly to them to provide the social and cultural vitality of francophone and anglophone communities in provinces where they are minorities and to enable them to develop and flourish within the majority society, thus maintaining the presence of both official languages across the country.(18)

For this, the Department of the Secretary of State was given a mandate to develop and implement a series of programmes tied to the government's bilingualism and biculturalism objectives. Of
these, the Official Language Minority Groups Programme (OLMG) merits our particular attention, because of its specific focus on the Official Language Minority Organisations (OLMOs) as key policy agents in the implementation of the Programme:

[The federal government] knows that effective action cannot be taken in this area without collaboration from the volunteer organizations which the groups themselves have instituted. (…) Thus, the directorate sees the associations as "our best aid" in bringing communities together to achieve the objectives.(19)

Through OLMOs, the federal government hoped to develop viable francophone communities outside Quebec and thereby address three different goals linked to its language policy. First, French Canadians in Quebec would feel less alienated from the rest of Canada knowing that French Canada did exist outside their home province. For Ottawa, unless French-speaking Quebeckers could identify with French Canada writ large, they would retreat behind provincial boundaries and redefine Canada according to their own aspirations as a separate people and nation. Federal government efforts to support French Canadian minority organisations sought therefore to ensure the survival of French Canadian minority communities and thereby legitimize the integrity of the Canadian political community.

Second, provincial governments would be more easily swayed to accept federal funding for language policy in areas of
provincial jurisdiction. Unless the provinces acknowledged the need for Official Language Minority and second-language education programmes, and for French language services in the courts and other areas of government, the idea of a bilingual Canada would be severely jeopardized. Strategically placed to lobby provincial governments, and to show a francophone presence in their respective provinces, representative French Canadian minority organisations would help to justify federal action in the provincial arena.

Third, relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians would be harmonized. Unless tensions built up between the two language communities during the 1960s could be relieved, the idea of a privileged status for the French language in all jurisdictions across Canada would enflame prejudices and undermine the fabric of Canadian unity. The presence of French Canadian minority organisations would sensitize the provincial anglophone majorities to language issues, and provide them with opportunities to develop and pursue their interest in bilingualism as part of the Canadian socio-political reality.

The Secretary of States's OLMG programme developed policy strategies to work with OLMOs country-wide and to thus enhance the "visibility" of French Canadian minorities as key components in Canada's national survival:
The maintenance of official language minorities in all provinces is crucial to the language policy because without them the linguistic communities would be isolated within separate territorial limits. (...) For these reasons, the Official Languages Minority Group Directorate was established within the department to work with representative organisations to ensure the viability and vitality of the minority communities. (21)

Grants to minority language associations were earmarked for the building of community infrastructures which would promote minority community viability. Provincial OLMOs offered the most practical and readily available means to achieve this objective, not only because a number of voluntary associations already existed, but also because they were present in every province. A quick look at Figure 1.1 reveals the central role to be played by OLMOs in the Secretary of State's OLMG programme. As intermediaries between the government and local communities, these organisations received resources from the OLMG Directorate to design projects in a variety of activity areas. Essentially, the organisational strength of a minority community would determine its viability in government eyes and, therefore, permit access to government funds and support.

This link between community and organisation was somewhat self-serving, for it conveniently legitimized Ottawa's use of OLMOs as instruments for policy action in French Canada outside Quebec. Indeed, Secretary of State policy valued community
FIGURE 1.1

MODEL OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGE MINORITY GROUPS PROGRAM (OLMG), 1982

infrastructures for the visibility and permanence they seemed to provide the minority communities. By offering resources to minority group associations, federal officials hoped to achieve the intermediate objective of establishing viable minority communities and thus contribute to language equality and a culturally rich and unified Canada. This close relationship between government and client adorned the Secretary of State with a "minority protectorate" image. It is this very image which suggests the "capturing" of an interest group by government in order to promote policy goals. Since most of these OLMOs were essentially voluntary associations prior to the institution of the OLMG programme, the transformations brought to leadership activities as a result of the influx of federal government dollars warrant investigation.

Federal aid was filtered to the OLMOs in two forms: unconditional grants, and contributions which bound the government and associations to certain project and financial responsibilities. Early on, financial assistance fell into seven categories: seminars on problems related to bilingualism, cultural exchanges between minority groups in a variety of regions and provinces (artists' tours, theatre groups etc.), social activities to encourage the growth of community spirit and better understanding between the majority and the minority, youth activities, cultural centres, and programmes abroad. OLMG objectives in the early 1970s focussed on community awareness and
association formation. Community awareness signified the development of "vital minority communities (...) whose members have a strong sense of group identity." Only this group identity would ensure that French Canada outside Quebec had real meaning beyond the bureaucratic ink of federal language policy. Association formation would enable community members "to share perceptions and aspirations and to act together using the minority language." As community infrastructures grew they would reinforce community life and enhance opportunities for interaction between the majority and minority language communities. The ensuing dialogue would promote the federal government's goals of language equality and tolerance between anglophones and francophones in Canada.

The Secretary of State's administrative structure underlined the special status accorded Official Language Minority groups. A Social Action Directorate (as the OLMG was called from 1969-1973) was directly linked to the deputy Secretary of State in the decision-making hierarchy, and therefore ensured a voicing of minority concerns at high levels in the Department. With a close ear to French Canadian minority leaders in this way, Ottawa hoped to head off any major difficulties in the implementation of its bilingualism programme.

In addition, a network of regional officers would inform the government of the special needs of Official Language Minorities.
These officers assisted client groups in organising themselves in associations and preparing grant applications. In many cases, they were also active at the local level generating community awareness and promoting government programmes and policies.

Francophone minorities placed great value on their ability to be heard by the government:

Pour la première fois dans l'histoire canadienne, les minorités de langue officielle ont des interlocuteurs à qui elles peuvent s'adresser directement et qui s'efforcent de comprendre et de satisfaire les besoins des citoyens à part entière que sont les francophones. (28)

When the OLMG programme was moved to the Citizenship sector in 1973 as part of an overall Secretary of State structural reorganization, francophone leaders felt they had lost some of their special status. As far as the OLMO leaders were concerned, the locus of governmental power had shifted away from the Minister in Ottawa and therefore reduced their ability to give input on government policy. In response, they formed a National Liaison and Action Committee which criticized the changes and submitted recommendations directly to the Minister in a 1975 Report.

As a result, the Secretary of State commissioned a Study Group to examine the complaints of francophone leaders. Adopting some of the OLMOs' suggestions, the Group recommended modifications to the administration of the OLMG programme. The Group’s report appeared shortly before a general revision of the
bilingualism policy in 1976; it is therefore difficult to assess its real impact on government policy. Nonetheless, Ottawa's efforts to answer OLMO leaders' concerns hinted at the value they placed on their role in the overall language policy picture.

Events in Quebec and Canada during the mid-1970s changed the focus and intensity of federal government relations with OLMOs. First, successive Quebec government language laws undermined the federal government's bilingualism programme and heightened language tensions between French and English Canada. From Ottawa's point of view, the danger of the Quebec Government's language policy stemmed from the possibility that other provinces would follow suit, and that English-speaking Canadians would seriously question the federal government's bilingualism policy given that one of the most important players appeared to be quitting the team. In essence, English Canadians would interpret Quebec's unilingualism policy as an injustice imposed upon the English-speaking minority in that province, and would thus further resent the perceived imposition of bilingualism outside Quebec.

Second, the air traffic controller's strike brought French-English relations to a head, and directly challenged the federal government's commitment to language equality. From the francophone point of view, if the French language could not be used between French-speaking air traffic controller's and pilots
in Quebec, then language equality and official bilingualism had little substantive value to French Canadians in Quebec. In English Canada, this incident only heightened feelings that Quebeckers were demanding special rights which all Canadians did not possess.

Third, anglophone resentment to bilingualism surfaced as unilingual English-speaking Canadians felt threatened:

much of the resentment stems from a persistent and erroneous belief that Ottawa is somehow bent on requiring all Canadians to become bilingual. (32)

The often used assertion of having the French language "shoved down our throats" revealed bitterness on a number of items, from bilingual labelling to federal spending on civil service language training programmes to the creation of French Language units in various federal departments. A series of books, Bilingual Today, French Tomorrow, French Power, and Backdoor Bilingualism, were published on the English language markets protesting against the "francisation" of Canada and the general failure of the federal government to take proper consideration of English Canada's wishes. More encouraging signs of progress in the bilingualism field, such as the heightened interest in French immersion and second-language education, were continually drowned in the more highly publicized and heated debates on Quebec independence and constitutional politics.
In each of these areas - discontent in Quebec, questions of the federal government's commitment to its Official Languages Policy, and anglophone backlash - federal government language policy goals risked being weighed down by the English-French tensions they were designed to reduce. Ottawa reacted quickly, once again turning to Official Language Minority Organisations as key actors in its overall language policy strategy. In 1977, only months after the PQ election, the federal government produced its policy paper, *A National Understanding*, reiterating the principles of language equality. At the same time, it substantially increased federal funding to OLMOs and made "political advocacy" a direct objective of the Secretary of State's OLMG programme: "The minority group must be able to make the majority aware of and sensitive to its needs and aspirations, and must be able to advocate on its own behalf." Henceforth, OLMOs would pursue political activities at all levels of government, encouraged and paid for by Ottawa.

Allocations to the OLMG programme evolved in three periods. From 1969 to 1973, its total budget grew from $1 million to $2.5 million. Very little change occurred until 1977 when the federal government reaffirmed its financial commitment to the official language minorities. Then, for the next five-year period to 1982, more than $75 million was distributed to Official Language Minority groups. This influx of government funds substantially increased the number of projects developed by and grants accorded...
to minority associations, from 264 in 1975-76 to 419 in 1981-82. It also appeared to induce francophone minorities to form more associations. According to the Secretary of State's 1983 OLMG evaluation report, 72% of organisations receiving grants had been established during the life of the programme, 44% of these in the 1977-1982 period alone.

Administratively, the federal government established official relations with these organisations through the Secretary of State, its official spokesperson for francophones outside Quebec. In addition, it formed an interdepartmental Committee of senior officials to "assist the Canadian government in developing coherent policies and programmes in the spirit of the official languages policy." Modifications to the programme at this time significantly reduced the role of regional officers in community and OLMO activities, leaving the organisations more autonomy to decide the nature of projects for community development. More of the regional officers' time would now be spent processing grant applications received from the minority associations.

The entrenchment of language rights in Canada's patriated Constitution in 1982 further underscored the legitimacy of Official Language Minorities in the Canadian political community:

The validity of [the bilingualism policy] was reaffirmed by the inclusion of language rights in the Constitution. The minority communities play a crucial role in making these rights a reality, and for this reason, as well as for
reasons of fairness and justice, [they] have a claim to continued support. (38)

Federal thinking on the constitutional status of these communities centred on their representative organisations as key actors seeking language rights for French Canadian minorities. Special grants would be allocated to OLMOs from within the OLMG programme in the event of a judicial challenge designed to clarify specific sections of the Charter of Rights dealing with matters of official languages. Here, the organisations' representatives would take special and individual cases and, with federal funding, pursue provincial language rights cases in the courts.

Few modifications were brought to OLMG programme objectives until 1983-1984 when internal re-evaluation and budgetary restraint measures prompted policymakers to revise the thrust of Secretary of State policy. Three elements in these revisions further enhanced the role of OLMOs as language policy agents.

First, the federal government underlined its commitment to institutional development through the established organisational network in each province. Thus, OLMOs would continue to be the builders of viable minority communities.

Second, the "political advocacy" role played by these organisations would receive exclusive funding within the parameters of the OLMG programme. It was felt that by sensitizing the majority anglophone community and their provincial
governments, the promotion of bilingualism would move ahead more effectively. OLMO political activity would help this immeasurably.

Third, the Secretary of State implemented a "provincialisation" of the OLMG programme, giving OLMOs more autonomy to define their own needs and aspirations within their respective provincial contexts. This implied a greater role for OLMOs in each province as ready-made intermediaries for policy implementation, and as key players in the creation of community development projects.

Accompanying this latter change, the Secretary of State restructured its programme administration in order to give more decision-making authority to its regional directors who would now rely more heavily upon the recipient organisations than on policy directives from distant Ottawa. Federal action, in concert with OLMOs, would sustain more permanent OLM infrastructures and develop community self-sufficiency. With greater cooperation between the government and recipients of government aid in this regard, the federal government hoped to wean OLMOs from the public teat. It is unclear at this point how effective these new changes have been.
Conclusions

With the Official Languages Policy, the federal government linked its support of Official Language Minority Organisations to concerns for Canadian unity. Financial commitment to French Canadian minority organisations aimed to ensure a visible structural presence of Canada's two official languages in all parts of the country. As interest community representatives and intermediaries between the federal government and francophone minorities, these OLMOs acted as policy agents for Ottawa's language policy initiatives outside Quebec. Ottawa perceived them as instruments to reduce language tensions within that province which diluted goals for harmonious English-French relations. A closer look at how OLMO leaders played their intermediary role can shed light on our concerns with the effects of close government-group interaction on interest group leadership. Since the federal government placed great importance on the community-organisation link in its language policy, and therefore funded OLMOs to generate viable minority communities, these French Canadian minority organisations serve as a good test case for examining the "capturing" of interest groups by government for policy purposes.

Our next chapter places the OLMO-federal government relationship in the larger theoretical context of interest group-State interaction. In this way, we can better grasp how and why francophone minority leaders sought government support, and how
federal government policies and initiatives could have affected the kinds of activities these leaders pursued on behalf of the francophone populations they served.
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 96.


9. Lithwick and Winer, p. 44.


11. Ibid., p. 238.


13. Ibid., p. 6.


17. Secretary of State, p. 3.

18. Called the Social Action Directorate in 1969, the OLMG got its name during a Secretary of State structural reorganization in 1973. The name was changed again in 1982 to the "Official Language Communities Programme".

19. Secretary of State, p. 40.

20. For the role to be played by the provinces in the bilingualism policy, see Canada, Department of Supply & Services.


22. Ibid., p. 34. What is a viable community? According to the OLMG directives, it contains three components: vitality, solidarity, and coexistence. Vitality entails a "flourishing socio-cultural development", and the use of the community's mother tongue for participation in Canadian life. Solidarity implies "access to the entire culture and heritage of the community's language group." Coexistence signals harmonious relations with the official majority language community. (p. 36) The OLMG programme directorate gave top priority to vitality, "assuming that vitality is a precondition for the development of group solidarity, and for developing an effective dialogue with the majority." (p. 36) A "vital group" is one whose members "have a strong sense of group identity, (...) and one with a strong, flourishing infrastructure." (p. 36) Here, infrastructure is molded more strongly to the community, becoming part of its very essence and quest for "survivance".

23. Ibid.

24. Such things as itemized financial and activity reports, specific a priori allocation of financial resources, and project designations had to be followed according to predetermined deadlines.
25. Secretary of State, p. 25.

26. Ibid., p. 36.

27. Ibid.

28. Groupe de travail sur les minorités de langue française, C'est le temps ou jamais..., Report commissioned by the Department of the Secretary of State, (November 1975), p. 16.

29. In the Secretary of State's Evaluation Report of the OLMG programme, francophone leaders unanimously rejected the "political" changes brought to the OLMG by the federal programme:

A une direction visant au respect du "pouvoir" local, régional et national des communautés francophones minoritaires et favorisant toujours leur potentiel d'épanouissement par la prise en main de toutes situations, on substitue un "programme" qui côtoie, au sein de la Direction de la Citoyenneté, les programmes qui s'occupent des droits de l'homme, de la promotion de la femme, des organisations de citoyens, des autochtones, du multiculturalisme, des voyages d'échanges. En d'autres mots, on ne parle plus de "direction" et "d'action", mais d'"aide" et de "minorité". Les minorités francophones minoritaires ne se voient plus les bénéficiaires d'une action spéciale, mais d'une aide quelconque.

From 1969 to 1973, the Social Action Directorate came under the responsibility of the Bilingualism Expansion Programme. In 1973, it was moved to the Citizenship sector and became the Official Language Minority Group programme. At the same time, the administration of the programme was decentralized, giving more authority to regional officers to make recommendations for changes to the programme.

30. Groupe de travail, p. 16.


34. Secretary of State, p. 36.

35. Secretary of State, Evaluation Report..., see Table 2 on p. 63.

36. Ibid., p. 69.

37. Ibid., p. 29.

38. Ibid., p. 34.

39. Canada, Department of the Secretary of State, Chevauchement du Programme de Contestations judiciaires et du PCLO, 1983. Secretary of State document found in the Fédération des Franco-Colombiens files, document no. 0.1.8.2.39. The programme announced Secretary of State grants of up to $5000 for the pre-trial phase only of judicial challenges made by OLMOs to clarify points in the Charter of Rights dealing with matters of official languages.
CHAPTER 2

Interest Group Leadership and Government Funding

Interest group activity occurs within a specific socio-political context which has direct impact upon the intermediary role interest groups play on behalf of their interest clientele. A very important part of this role involves establishing contacts with government to secure or protect favourable policy outcomes. Normally, these contacts allow interest group leaders to sustain a give-and-take relationship with the political system which provides benefits to the interest population and legitimacy to their leadership. However, the practice of the State using interest groups for policy purposes can modify interest group leadership. Indeed, as government-funded policy agents, interest group leaders risk becoming so entangled in the governmental web that they lose sight of their intermediary role, becoming nothing more than bureaucratic extensions of government agencies. They pay less attention to their interest clientele and ultimately jeopardize the effectiveness and legitimacy of their leadership.

Since the 1970s, "the scope of state funding in Canada (...) expanded greatly in the domains of ethnic communities as in the voluntary sector in general." Very little has been done in the political science field, however, to examine the extent to which state involvement in funding interest groups affects the nature of their activity. Some authors hint at "cooptation" or "state
control" of interest groups, but never really delve deeper to discover what this means from the interest group's perspective. In the case of ethnocultural communities, Breton suggests that government subsidies can perpetuate an "artificial community organisation" for which there is no demand in the community. This contradicts government efforts to ensure the long term survival of these communities and raises doubts as to the legitimacy and/or relevance of interest group leadership.

Stasiulis calls out for more in-depth investigation "to assess the extent to which this state behavior influences the goals, social cohesion, leadership structure, targets of action, and the like of ethnic organizations." Whereas the interest group literature is particularly useful in establishing the role of interest groups as "intermediaries" between group members and the political system, it is less useful in explaining the importance of government funding to interest group leadership, or the impact of this funding on the intermediary role interest group leaders play. Hence, we ask: What does it mean for an interest group to become a government-funded policy agent? Answering this question provides more general insight into State efforts to provide policy leadership through interest groups, and on the role interest groups can play in society and the political process.
2.1. Interest Groups and Government

As intermediaries, interest group leaders will look to the political system for three reasons: representation of group concerns, legitimation of the interest group and its leadership, and financial support. All three are tied to the fundamental goal of group survival.

Interest group leaders hope to persuade public policy makers to act favourably on the various issues which affect their interest community. Access to government is the key component of the intermediary role. Governments grant access to leaders, because they are able to aggregate and articulate societal concerns, and act as a "pulse" of society which government can tap. In pluralist theory, interest group legitimation by government arises out of the recognition of the interest as a valid social concern, and of the leaders as having a mandate to speak to government on behalf of that interest. In fact, since the "entire political community is almost never involved in a specific policy discussion," interest groups help focus policy debate. On many occasions, governments even "create" interest groups through various funding initiatives in order to bring policy discussions to the public fore. Indeed, "the development of a working relationship between government and organized group leaders creates within government a vested interest in the continuation of that relationship." Interest groups become "allies" with specific government agencies and institutions which
use their interest clientele or "sectoral constituency" to justify the need for action in a given policy area. On the other side of the ledger, interest group leaders act as agents of government policy, building support for policy among their members and in society at large. Even though only a small percentage of organised potential members are viewed as belonging to the interest group organisation, interest groups are still considered the most effective means to locate and reach special publics. Leaders' special expertise and knowledge in a given area can lighten the government load, and facilitate policy implementation. Government-created or government-funded interest groups very often become policy instruments, because they share similar goals and are much closer to societal concerns than government:

From the point of view of the state, the granting of state aid involves the expansion of its function of gaining legitimation in often imaginative and innovative ways, within sectors of previously neglected subordinate interests. (9)

The federal government's White Paper on Indian Affairs (1970) established a close relationship between government and provincial Indian associations "where forceful and articulate Indian leadership has developed to express the aspirations and needs of the Indian community." In this way, government can derive political benefits as interest group leaders "sell
government policy."

The "representative quality" of interest group activity is the key factor to accessibility. If the group is "known to speak for its interest community, it is listened to by government, regardless of the quality of advice," because it can gain the attention of members concerning the effects of government policies.

Since interest group leaders play the intermediary role as links between members and the political system, they must make their political activity relevant to interest group members in order to sustain legitimacy for themselves and for the group. Bates says an interest group's relationship with its membership (input function) is a prerequisite for the effective performance of the policy agent role (output role). This is all the more critical in those cases where political activity becomes the sole focus of interest group leaders' activity, and notably in the case of ethnic communities whose "vitality", according to Breton, is linked to the importance of organisational activity. The intermediary role, then, must be rooted in the legitimacy and mandate granted by interest group members, and not that granted by Government.

The relevance of political activity to members has been given some treatment in the literature, but is usually seen as solely an incentive for members to join the interest group. Moe
suggests that the decision to join is linked closely to the individual's perception of political benefits, which he describes as the desire to have a greater sense of political efficacy. Salisbury states that "unless there is some politically relevant expressive content to a group's internal exchange, members may not join the group." Hansen echoes these writers, but adds that political benefits matter most often when group existence is threatened.

All of these ingredients - benefits, expression, context - are important, but political activity as such is more than an incentive thrown out at members as a carrot to encourage their participation. Indeed, members quite often prefer to leave the political role to interest group leaders due to the complexity of the issues involved and to the time commitment it demands. This does not mean that members do not appreciate the usefulness of political action, however. It must be made relevant to them in their day-to-day existence if interest group leaders hope to maintain some level of legitimacy:

Par ailleurs, "les besoins de langue", d'expression culturelle, de solidarité ethnique ou de protection contre la discrimination, de même que les désirs de revendications auprès des institutions sociétales peuvent demeurer insatisfaits. Une telle situation peut être dûe au fait qu'il ne se présente pas "d'entrepreneurs" capables de construire les organisations ou les systèmes symboliques appropriés. (17)
If they succeed, political activity will enhance group survival, because members will continue to value interest group leadership and perceive it as important to their concerns.

Leaders also turn to government for financial support. They need financial resources in order to pay for activities which attract and maintain group membership, and to build organisational structures which define the parameters of the interest group. Though most interest groups depend on membership dues for financial survival, the amounts received vary considerably with member incomes and with the context of interest group activity. Moe suggests that "unless subsidized from the outside", the interest group is maintained by the member-group exchange. Hansen claims that "[f]or a group to be organized (...) it must be subsidized by entrepreneurs, by other groups or by government."

Whether leaders depend more on volunteers or paid staff, and whether members are willing to contribute volunteer time does affect the kinds of activities leaders can pursue. The number of potential members for any given interest group is likely to be finite, and it is therefore difficult to generate the flow of funds needed to provide a constant or enhanced level of benefits. This often generates member apathy, a low leadership turnover, no member renewal, a decrease in the financial resources, and ultimately, a risk to interest group survival. For this reason, interest group leaders tend to look beyond the immediate group.
membership for financial resources, usually to government.

2.2. Forms of Access to Government

The forms and points of access are many and varied. Interest group leaders learn to adapt to the changing shifts in power between government institutions, honing in on those areas of government authority which will reap maximum yields for their interest community. We distinguish between four different types of access: quiescent diplomacy, pressure politics, consultation and/or lobbying, and policy agent. These categories are similar to Pross' typology of access-oriented interest groups. Pross does not, however, discuss their relationship to leadership activity.

Quiescent diplomacy indicates a minimalist approach to political activity. Interest group leaders are either unaware of possibilities to influence the political system, ignore them because they are irrelevant to particular group goals, or believe that nothing can be gained from a more active political stance. For the most part, access to the political system is limited to the occasional letter-writing campaign in hope of receiving some government service or donation to enhance organisational activities. It is, however, less a priority than sustaining an active organisation and achieving organisational goals. No clear link is made between these two pursuits. The effectiveness of
interest group leadership is revealed by its ability to attract members and generate organization activities.

Pressure politics is also a tactic pursued largely from outside the political process. However, unlike quiescent diplomacy, leaders design strategies to "confront" public officials with their concerns. Very often, they encourage members to sign petitions, participate in public demonstrations, and write letters to their government representatives. In a more activist stance, leaders hope to persuade government, through media-oriented activities, that they speak on behalf of a large social force whose concerns require immediate attention. Very often, many try to assert influence by directly lobbying government officials or elected representatives.

The effectiveness of leadership through pressure politics is linked to member support and/or participation. Without it, group leaders would have some difficulty in convincing government that they speak for an important proportion of the interest community. For this reason, leaders are quite active in generating member activity. Members, in turn, perceive the relevance of leadership as an avenue for the representation of their concerns.

Consultation with and lobbying of public officials denotes interest group efforts to participate directly in policy formation through various government consultative mechanisms or contacts within the bureaucracy. Leaders feel that if they can plug into the policy process before final decisions are made,
they will enhance policy benefits for members or at least minimize the detrimental effects. In turn, they use the legitimacy gained from government recognition to demand they be consulted on all initiatives affecting their interest community. This usually involves appointing a group emissary to the various government consultative mechanisms (task forces, Royal Commissions, advisory boards), or hiring a professional lobbyist to develop tactics for consultation; both involve the preparation of briefs and memoranda focussing on group concerns.

For the consultation/lobbying technique to be effective, group leaders must be able to articulate the concerns of the interest population effectively. For this, they design strategies to sound the membership for its opinions and attitudes on relevant issues. Questionnaires are distributed and meetings are held, because leaders want the government to know what the interest community thinks. This will give their consultative and lobbying efforts more credibility and legitimacy with government. Members are then aware of leadership activity, and can offer contributions to it. In this way, leaders tend to use their participation in the consultation process to give members a sign of their legitimacy, and to show the importance of having leaders active in the policy process.

As policy agents, interest group leaders transmit policy benefits to members through the implementation of government
programmes designed to satisfy government policy goals. In contrast to access by consultation, the government incorporates group participation right into its policy, using groups as instruments for implementation, and often offering financial incentives to do so. Government's acceptance of group leaders as policy agents implies that government accepts the legitimacy of the group and its leadership. To maintain this recognition, leaders focus a great deal of their energy on being government "servants". Member participation or support of the policy agent role becomes less of a prerequisite for its success; leaders tend to interact with members insofar as government policy requires this interaction.

The immediate relevance of leadership activity to membership is clouded in this instance, and depends fundamentally upon how effectively leaders portray themselves and their political activity as essential to group survival. This very often means pursuing other member activities (meetings, social gatherings, public relations exercises) which give symbolic value to leader activity and reason for members' continued support.

What would make interest group leaders prefer one type of access over another? The possibility of financial resources for continued interest group activity would certainly attract leader attention to the policy agent role. Leaders may also perceive one type of access as being more effective in terms of their goals for the interest group. More simply, one type of access
may seem more in tune with the role interest group leaders perceive themselves as playing. Much depends on the context of activity and the willingness of public officials to roll out the welcoming mat.

In contrast to Pross, who assumes that as interest groups become more organised, they experience a concomitant increase in political activity, we believe that interest groups can and do skip certain stages. This occurs most often in the case of government-financed interest groups whose leaders are looking for financial resources, and who thus become government policy agents as a means to ensure group survival. In the next section, we outline the impact of this occurrence on the ability of leaders to interact with their members and maintain an effective intermediary role.

2.3. The Impact of Access and Government Funding

What impact does access to the political system and leader interaction with political institutions as government-funded policy agents have on the intermediary role? The interest group literature is fairly sparse in its response to this question. Most authors examine access according to various institutional referent points without unveiling the underlying effects accessibility has on interest group activity. Key talks of "persuading legislators" or of "relations with administrators";
Truman addresses the "dynamics of access to the legislative process" or the "web of relationships in the administrative process"; and Pross describes the existence of "policy communities" which include, at various levels, all those affected by or engaged in government policy-making.

Pross does assert, however, that "an apparent pressure group is really a government agency" when it can no longer represent its membership, act autonomously or define the common group interest. He thus underscores how accessibility to the political process may be really a double-edged sword for interest group survival. Closeness to or a high level of integration with the political process affects the intermediary role, because the relevance of leadership activity to members diminishes the more entangled leaders become in the governmental policy web. Stasiulis claims that:

[I]t is in the relationship of dependency established when an ethnic organization accepts funds from a government agency that one can observe the most serious effects of state intervention in ethnic community affairs. (28)

We must therefore look more closely at the impact of government funding on interest group leadership.

Interest group leaders perform four closely related functions as intermediaries between their members and the political process: contact with members, definition of the
interest community and the role of its leaders, member recruitment, and group management. The performance of these functions ensures the legitimacy and mandate of the leaders. However, as government-funded policy agents, there is a propensity for them to alter their performance of each function and thereby bring into question their mandate and legitimacy. Wedded to the government policy, leaders can easily grow away from their members enough that leadership activity loses much of its relevance to the interest community. This "gap" between leaders and their community will become manifest in each of the four functions.

Contact In order to receive a mandate from members, leaders must develop regular contact to convince them that only through interest group activity can their concerns be met. As an example, Indian political organisations in Canada developed out of the efforts of Indian leaders to convince Indian populations and their local band councils that the services offered by the provincial associations were essential, and that only they could deliver them. Dion believes that members will, in fact, identify their own interests with those of the interest group, because without a spokesperson, their needs could very well remain unpoliticized and hence unanswered.

Creating a high profile for their leadership, and acquiring knowledge of members is achieved through the articulation and
aggregation of interests, and the communication of leader activity to the members. As such, leaders attempt to build a collective consciousness which will buttress the interest group and induce members to equate group survival with the furtherance of leadership activity.

Practically speaking, interest group leaders build an organisational infrastructure to promote contact. For example, in an attempt to reduce the geographical distance between provincial association officials and reserves, Canadian Indian leaders decentralized the operations of association activities. The infrastructure usually includes a broad communication network (often a group newspaper and, where available, the use of radio and television), public relations strategies, and regular group meetings. This helps leaders provide valuable information to the group.

Contact between interest group leaders and members is altered, however, when changes made to the interest group organisation for improved intra-group activity are directed instead at managing group-Government relations through the policy agent role. The underlying assumption is that enhanced leadership activity at the political level brings more effective responses to group concerns and activities, attracts new membership, and thereby ensures group survival. Pross suggests that contacts with the interest group membership generally atrophy due to a preference for more easily managed
relations between interest group leaders and government officials. The operation of leadership activity in the political process can thus overshadow and ultimately replace ties to the interest community.

Group-government relations can also modify leadership activities as "groups [try] to adapt their behaviour and structures to conditions imposed by the sector of the political system in which they operate." The growth of organisation beyond the level needed to cope with intra-group relations means that interest group leaders must come to terms with the complex technical nature of public policymaking. This can preclude effective leadership at the interest community level:

> The highly bureaucratized process of applying for government funds and accounting for their expenditure drains the leadership of organisations of valuable time and energy, which could otherwise be more directly utilized in the pursuit of the organization's objectives.(36)

Very often, then, interest group leaders turn into nothing more than government bureaucrats, paid to administer programmes.

The possibility of access to government invariably acts as a catalyst for extensive bureaucratisation which can undermine leaders' ability to induce contact between members and their interest group leadership. The nature of the organisational bureaucracy designed for policy agent tasks often conflicts with
the intermediary role, because it can reduce the amount of contact with members. This occurs largely as a result of the activities of hired administrative professionals. Staff personnel are paid a wage and are often recruited from outside the interest group, experts trained in specific areas thought useful to the particular interest group context. In this sense, they are different from volunteer activists who emerge from the interest community and who are more in touch with the real concerns of members.

Staff personnel are responsible for translating interest group activity into rewards and/or sanctions for members, usually without adequate prior knowledge of members or of the general nature of the interest community. They can selectively confer benefits upon certain participants and not others, given that they are in control of the required expertise and service structures. This often breeds discontent with the "paid" professionals, because group members view staff as being insensitive to intra-group differences. In the case of Canadian Indian associations, members pinned a "brown bureaucrat" epithet on Indian leaders who they felt were "getting too much like Indian affairs", "selling out to government for big salaries and cars" while "forgetting the people". Thus, not only can leadership activity as policy agents generate less contact with members, the establishment of structures to ensure contact can undermine leaders' attempts to make their political activity
relevant to members.

Definition Interest group leaders set the functional, structural, and often territorial limits for interest group activity. They attempt to draw boundaries which will give symbolic and instrumental value to the interest organisation. Leaders view themselves as legitimate referent points for members as proof of the interest group’s existence. For Breton, community vitality is a direct function of the quality of its organisational infrastructure and of its ability to satisfy the needs and aspirations of members in the community. In this sense, definition generates loyalty to the organisation, which is critical for the stability and sense of permanence it offers to members and leaders.

In defining the interest group, leaders tend to claim the exclusive right of representation against all rivals. Formalized decision-making procedures, democratic authority structures, and bureaucratic "rules of the game" provide interest group leaders a platform from which to claim this right. They have a distinct advantage over rivals, because of an arsenal of organisational tools they can use to attract and hold members. Their ability to exercise and maintain that right speaks much of the success of leadership activity vis-a-vis its membership. Members either accept the leaders' definition and identify with it, or reject it and look elsewhere. They will question the "representativeness"
of leader action if it diverges too far from the way they perceive their interest group. Changes to the original definition bring the highest risk of conflict, because very often it served as the primary inducement for interest group formation and member attraction.

Close involvement with the political process as government-funded policy agents means that interest group definition can, like contact, occur in isolation of the membership. As interest groups evolve with government policy, interest group leaders tend to rely more and more on information generated by staff members who, though understanding the importance of government policy and funds to the interest group, may not appreciate the subtleties of group definition needed to satisfy members. Hence, leaders may depend less on relations with their own interest community, and thus lose the capacity to determine the common interest via the group membership.

Government recognition and access to the political process can therefore become valued for themselves rather than for what they contribute to the definition of interest group concerns. Meyer and Rowan suggest that the "rise of external assessment criteria enable an organization to remain successful by social [or government] definition, buffering it from failure." Hence, in this case, whether or not leadership becomes disconnected from the interest group in no way affects the relevance of their
activities. What holds the interest group in place is the logic of confidence and good faith of members in interest group leaders and government officials. Ironically, interest group leaders continue to receive their mandate from members despite their ineffectiveness in fulfilling the demands of the intermediary role at the community level.

One very serious consequence of this process has been what Olsen calls the loss of freedom to act and the dilution of identity. With a part to play in the political process as policy agents, interest group leaders must adhere to the rules of the game and not try to undermine the process. Very often, this entails the compromise of interest identity and the de-radicalisation of interest group activity both of which can constrain the organisation's responsiveness to its members' wishes. If true, leaders' ability to define interest group needs and concerns becomes tied to external priorities which may not always coincide with those of the interest group. For Canadian Indian leaders, the extent of the "Indianness" of their leadership became a concern as associations became more bureaucratic. Some attempted to "redraw the line between the bureaucratic and threatening activities of government and the much-needed 'Indian' activities of the organization."

If government-paid staff personnel expend more energy on researching the effects of government policy and on how to present their findings to government, the needs and concerns of
members can quickly become mere reflections of government policy initiatives. The definition of the interest group, in this instance, is engulfed in government priorities as interest group leaders become nothing less than "instruments propagandized on behalf of government policy." Pross worries that the pursuit of group-government relations in this direction can lead to easy manipulation of the interest group by government. As government-funded policy agents, interest group leaders are usually less autonomous in the use of their resources which are derived from departmental budgets with conditions attached to pursue specific activities and not others (ex. partisan or pressure politics are often forbidden). Dyck suggests that this occurred with the federally-funded Indian associations. Federal government policy disguised attempts to silence Indian protests by diverting funds away from the provincial associations and towards local band councils. In this way, Dyck says, "if the funds were not redirected by the band councils to provincial associations, then the associations would lack the funds for further organizational work, and government could dispute their credentials as representatives of the Indian people [and withdraw the funds]."

Hence, group definition can become entangled in efforts to comply with government demands.

**Member Recruitment** The number of members who participate, and the frequency of their participation hints at interest group
vitality and at the relevance of leadership activity. If, as Dion suggests, the acceptance of an interest group's representativeness implies an individual's underlying affinity to the group, a concern for the welfare of the group, and desire for personal commitment to it, then a lack of interest in group activities may weaken the claim of leaders to represent their members' interests. Ultimately, Dion is correct; without member participation there would be very little internal group activity, a lack of support for leaders, and a slow death for the group.

Member recruitment occurs through group activities and decision-making. Group activities, such as conferences, meetings, and social gatherings help bring members together to share in the benefits of membership. As long as these activities generate member satisfaction, interest leaders will reap the benefits, because members will continue to value the interest group as an effective way to express their common interest.

One particularly effective method employed by leaders to encourage participation is the deliberate creation of subgroups to "regularize interactions" between members. The strategy here is to tie members more closely to the interest group organisation and to thus guarantee their continued contribution. In addition, democratic structures and procedures (ex. general assemblies, executive leadership positions, committees) are constructed and developed to give all members a "representative
voice", and thus a role in group decision-making. Through these structures, interest group leaders offer members administrative positions as staff personnel or encourage them to seek one of the elected leadership positions.

Democratic structures can, however, be a source of intra-group conflict. Competition for leadership positions, differences of opinion in decisions made, and personal favouritism undermine group cohesion. If the institutions themselves do not provide an effective outlet for member concerns, disgruntled members will either launch criticisms of the organisation and hope for change from within, or leave the interest group and set up a rival organisation. Interest group leaders can respond by "opening up" the institutional process to allow for more effective member participation. This serves as a minor palliative to a much deeper problem - the dissociation of leaders' activity from the active recruitment of members.

Member recruitment can suffer from leaders' access to the political system because, as government-funded policy agents, interest group leaders have a tendency to be less concerned with the willingness of supporters to pay dues and with the recruitment of membership to ensure representativeness. This is most noticeable in their use of government funds to build a broad administrative bureaucracy rather than to develop activities which will encourage member participation. Pross states that "groups become flabby" as they build new-fangled
bureaucracies with new projects, new staff, and new headquarters. The "flabbiness" he alludes to can easily be called interest group complacency vis-à-vis its membership. Much time is spent on designing projects, planning strategies, and building structures to provide benefits for the interest group, but little direct leadership activity with members. Financial resources are merely fed into the bureaucratic machine, leaving the "trickle down" effect to play its magic. Generally, however, members feel distant from the interest organization and its leadership and, by extension, lose the desire to be a part of the interest group.

In an interesting account of the Mineworker's Union of Zambia, Bates claims that the policy agent role undermines the interest group role, because interest group leaders are no longer responsive to their members. They "come to see themselves as public figures, not as merely spokesmen for a subgroup of the nation," while members come to view the leaders as agents of Government who profit from the relationship, rather than as representatives of group interests. Furthermore, Olsen suggests that members feel they no longer have control of the interest group. Access may produce effective representatives, but it also gives greater control to leaders over decisions made on behalf of members. "[G]reater discretion for the representatives increases the chance that [they] become coopted.
by environmental actors and that goal displacement takes place."

Under these circumstances, leadership activity threatens member valuation of the interest group. "Members are deprived of the direct experiences with the realities facing an organisation; they stay passive and do not develop the competence in politics and problem solving skills necessary to influence and control the representatives." This is likely to alienate and discourage even some of the more active volunteers who view political activity in a positive light. If so, group survival is severely jeopardized for lack of an activist core.

Group Management The most important component of group management activity is interest group survival. It is key to the intermediary role, because it ensures that interest group leaders not only seek means to promote group survival, but that they must also determine how to pay for interest group activities.

Interest group survival is linked to intra-group unity. Leaders deal with the question of unity by assuring that rival leaders or rival groups do not undermine their efforts to speak with one voice on behalf of all members. Wilson speaks of efforts to "minimize organisational strain" by ensuring that available incentives correspond more or less to the tasks to be performed. This is achieved, he suggests, through an institutionalization process which establishes "a distinctive
For Truman, interest group leaders embark on a search for an equilibrium within the organised group. The stability of the organisation is critical, in this case, because resistance can then be "channeled through formalized procedures" and thus prevent the complete breakdown of the group itself. Leaders use a variety of techniques to "regulate the flow of ideas concerning the organisation and policies," impose sanctions against rival groups or leaders, offer services to induce member loyalty, invoke executive privilege to preserve an appearance of unity, and recognize new interests by setting up parallel services or competing organisations. This is group management at work.

Very often, group management is changed as leaders become policy agents. In his study of the Canadian Labour Congress, Kwavnick suggests that interest group leaders will look to the political process for reasons other than direct group concerns:

[T]he aims of interest group leaders ... go beyond the mere articulation of the demands of members and obtaining the satisfaction of those demands. ...[A]mong the more important determinants of the activities of organized interest groups, on the same plane as the substantive demands of the group's membership, the ostensible goals of the group as outlined in its constitution, in its public manifestos, and in the statements of its leaders, are the organizational goals of the group's leadership.(65)
The most important of leadership goals "[becomes] the preservation and continued growth of the organisation itself and the continuation of leaders in positions of leadership." Whether or not leaders translate these "organisational goals" into meaningful benefits for members is crucial to their intermediary role. Much like other aspects of interest group leadership, however, group management can as easily become disconnected from the interest community.

Privileged access to government and to government funds is a much valued tool of interest group leaders for group management. Once achieved, leaders cling to the advantages access offers in terms of their own legitimacy, and use it to benefit their own position by providing services, activities, and financial rewards to members. In fact, they are quick to protest when the privilege is granted to other organisations attempting to speak on behalf of the interest group they alone claim to represent. This inevitably leads to competition for control of government resources, and jealousies amongst members who can, as a result, become opposed to the incumbent leadership. Government funding very often compounds the problem, creating a competition amongst various organisations for scarce government resources:

The state, hoping to achieve the greatest impact for its dollar, will attempt to channel funds into the most "representative" organization that is or claims to be the national or umbrella body. (...) The state's choice to financially support the national or umbrella
organization often occurs despite its lack of legitimacy amongst the leadership and rank and file of other community organizations, which attempt to compete for the same government funds. (68)

In the Canadian Indian example, the "continual challenge to the Union of BC Indian Chiefs was very much influenced by its monopoly position in the DIAND [(Department of Indian and Northern Affairs)] secretariat and by DIAND's support for this monopoly." The success of the Union in Ottawa only intensified the pressure of other organisations for the same access and funding granted the Union. Government preference for the larger and well-established organisations generates jealousies and disunity amongst the interest population. In this sense, the cohesion of community interests is less important than grabbing a bigger chunk of the government pie. Group management focuses more directly on "organisational survival" as an indicator of interest group viability, with less emphasis being placed on links between the organisation and the interest community.

Conclusions

The role of government-funded policy agents, whatever its positive impact on the supply of resources to interest groups, can cloud leadership activities.

First, it may disconnect interest group leaders from their interest groups, because they no longer need to pay the price of
member withdrawal when they neglect the membership. Less vulnerable in this way, leaders no longer feel obliged to "farm the membership" for contributions nor do they cut back the level of services as membership diminishes. They take members for granted, yet expect their unconditional support. As such, leaders become hollow representative shells of their interest community.

Second, government financing tends to feed the overzealous desire for organisation and bureaucracy shared by leaders, and further contributes to their isolation from members. The representation and definition of group interests, as well as group management, become nothing more than a ritual of going hat in hand to the government for more funds. Effective leadership is measured not in the number of members nor their participation rate, nor even their acceptance of leadership, but only in terms of the amount of funds received in government grants.

Third, leaders may come to perceive interest group survival as possible only through the active pursuit of group-government relations and at the expense of intra-group relations. They tend to view their political role as the primary, if not only, means to guarantee longevity to the interest community.

The policy agent role, when linked to government financing, can fundamentally alter the essence of the intermediary role assumed by interest group leaders. The nature of leadership activity becomes linked more and more to factors beyond the grasp
of members, and leaders can lose sight of the value of a strong membership base. The "distance" built up between interest group members and leaders, and the focus on organisational survival through government recognition and financing, may ultimately break the psychological and functional links holding members to the organisation and to the interest group. Even if they benefit from the effects of their leaders' political activities, members will not necessarily make the connection between those benefits, the organisation, and interest group leaders. It is highly likely that Government steals this recognition, and all the more so if it holds the financial lifeline of the interest organisation.

What does this say about the usefulness of viewing interest groups as intermediaries between society and government? This is of critical importance, because, without the connection, leader activity and government recognition seem nothing more than bureaucratic creations which give artificial life to the interest community. In effect, as government-funded policy agents, interest group leaders may become so closely tied to government policy that they speak on behalf of interest group members who give but scant recognition to their incumbency. Governments who use interest groups as policy instruments contribute to this artificiality, and very often undermine efforts by interest group leaders to play an effective intermediary role. In the final
analysis, we must question the "intermediary" status of
government-funded interest groups whose leaders play a policy
agent role in the political process.

Interest groups do not, however, function in a vacuum. Their particular socio-political environment is as important to
understanding the nature of leadership activity as are the more
uniquely attributable characteristics of the interest community. Our preoccupation with the intermediary role played by interest
groups between government and society, leads us to offer a
preliminary discussion in the next chapter of the nature of the
interest community on whose behalf interest group leaders act. This offers valuable information concerning the choices of
leadership activity, the importance of government funding, and
the nature of the policy agent role.
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid., p. 98


9. Stasiulis, p. 35.


17. Breton, p. 7.

18. Hansen, pp. 81-82. Overall, Hansen questions the assumptions that "associations offering only intangible incentives are less stable than those offering tangible benefits."


20. Hansen, p. 94.


23. Ibid.


25. Truman, see Chapters 9 to 15.

26. Pross, Group Politics ..., see Chapter 6.

27. Ibid., p. 9.

29. Stasiulis, p. 34.
32. Dyck, p. 256.
33. Pross Group Politics ..., p. 119.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 109.
36. Stasiulis, p. 35.
37. Ibid., p. 97.
39. Ibid., p. 114.
40. Breton, p. 6.
42. Moe, pp. 104-105.
45. Ibid., p. 350.
47. Ibid., p. 497.
50. Pross, Group Politics ..., p. 199.
52. Dion, p. 277.
53. Moe, p. 57.
54. Pross, Group Politics ..., p. 9.
55. Ibid., p. 199.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Kwavnick, p. 18.
61. Wilson, p. 31.
62. Ibid., p. 204.
63. Truman, p. 193.
64. Ibid., pp. 195-205.
66. Ibid., p. 1.
68. Stasiulis, pp. 35-6.
70. Ibid., p. 128.
71. Pross, p. 199.
CHAPTER 3

THE INTEREST COMMUNITY:
A PROFILE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA FRANCOPHONES

To most outside observers, anglophone and francophone alike, the existence of a French-speaking population in Canada's westernmost province strikes chords of disbelief or at best a chorus of cynical disclaimers. For some, "French BC" awakens but dormant memories of Maillardville, a small town outside Vancouver which once harboured the spirit of French Canadian culture in the province. For others, French Canadians constitute such an insignificant proportion of the provincial population that it makes little sense to attach any great importance to a Franco-Columbian community. It is not my intention here to confirm or deny the nature and social reality of the community. However, in light of federal government language policies which support francophones in British Columbia, and of a broad organisational network built to serve them, it is important for political scientists to look more closely at Franco-Columbians as a target group for political actors who attempt to address francophone needs and concerns.

This chapter gives readers a snapshot of the French-speaking community in British Columbia. It will outline the playing field for Fédération des Franco-Colombiens (FFC) leadership activity, and hint at a number of the problems and concerns addressed by
Federation leaders and government policymakers. We ask two questions: What does the Franco-Columbian community look like? How "French" is the community? In answering them, we will compare BC francophones with other francophone minorities across Canada.

3.1. A "Minority" Community

How much of a minority population is the Franco-Columbian community? What are some of the elements which affect the vitality and the viability of this community? We deal first with a number of socio-demographic variables which draw parameters around the community. Then we look at several components which highlight the socio-economic status of francophones living in British Columbia.

* In this Chapter, the term "francophone" is defined according to two sources:

Centre de recherche sur l'opinion publique (CROP, 1982)

1. A person whose mother tongue (first learned and still understood) is French.

2. A person whose father and/or mother had or have French as a mother tongue.

Statistics Canada (1981)

1. Canadians who identify themselves as "French mother tongue" - refers to first language learned in childhood and still understood by an individual.
Population size is a crucial element in determining the nature of a language community. The strength of the language and of the community's cultural identity is greatly affected by numbers. Isolated in a mainly English-speaking province, Franco-Columbians are quite susceptible to the forces of assimilation. Government willingness to respond to the needs of a minority population can depend upon the relative size of the population. Setting up a variety of French language services makes a good deal more social and political sense when there is a large enough French Canadian population to use them. In turn, interest group political activity can be all the more forceful the larger the interest population.

Figure 3.1 shows that Franco-Columbians represent only 1.7% of British Columbia's population, after Newfoundland the second smallest francophone minority in Canada. Moreover, nationally, they are only the sixth largest provincial francophone community outside of Quebec, with 4.1% of Canada's French-speaking minority population.

Community concentration gives us some purchase on the potential vitality of the French Canadian community in British Columbia. The greater the concentration of Franco-Columbians the more likely there is a day-to-day socio-cultural interaction between them in the French language. The consequence would seemingly be a more secure environment for the language.
FIGURE 3.1
National & Provincial Distribution of Francophones Outside Quebec, 1981 Census.

Legend
- Provincial
- National

FIGURE 3.2
Regional Distribution of British Columbia Francophones 1981 Census

Greater Vancouver 42.4%
Vancouver Island 16.2%
Interior 12.0%
Fraser Valley 8.3%
Kootenays 9.5%
North 7.2%
Coast 3.1%
Central 3.4%
Most of BC's francophones can be found in the Greater Vancouver area. Figure 3.2 reveals that 42.4% reside there, with significant proportions also found in the adjacent Fraser Valley (8.2%), on Vancouver Island (16.2%), and in the Interior (12.0%).

Importantly, however, Franco-Columbians represent a mere 1.6% of Vancouver's population. This low concentration level in Vancouver reflects the general pattern for the rest of the province. In no area do Franco-Columbians make up more than 2.2% of the population, which suggests that BC francophones are quite dispersed and live in highly anglicized environments. Figure 3.3A shows that, in this regard, Franco-Columbians resemble Newfoundland francophones who make up, at most, 3.3% of the population in any particular area of their province. By way of contrast, most other francophone minorities have significantly
higher levels of concentration, with those in the Prairies and some Atlantic provinces reaching beyond 20% in a few regions.

This high level of dispersion greatly reduces the Franco-Columbian population's ability to live and work in French on a day-to-day basis, and renders interest group activity to promote and encourage use of the French language all the more difficult. In fact, generating contact between community members and giving definition to a widely dispersed and fragmented francophone population has to be a key concern of Federation leaders. If the Franco-Columbian population is to preserve any semblance of "community", and thus measure up as a viable political unit for federal language policies, they must find ways to make Franco-Columbians aware of the language and cultural bonds which unite them.

The low level of concentration also reaches into the political realm. In no BC federal electoral district does the francophone population constitute a significant political block. Figure 3.3B reveals that the highest francophone concentration is 3.3%, which is located in the Interior (Cariboo-Chilcotin). Even in the electoral district which houses Vancouver's francophone quarter (Vancouver Quadra), Franco-Columbians represent only 1.4% of the population.
Once again, BC francophones resemble their counterparts in Newfoundland who have at most 1.2% of a given electoral district. Both contrast markedly with all other francophone minority populations, from Alberta (6.5%) to PEI (15.0%) to Manitoba (19.1%), and New Brunswick (80.6%). The Franco-Columbian community is just not recognised on BC's political map. This obviously limits the ability of FFC leaders to pursue effective political activity on behalf of their community. Lobbying the provincial government is not quite as easy for the FFC with Franco-Columbians being a somewhat "invisible" minority community.

Urbanisation brings the importance of social milieu to the fore. Indeed, as one moves from a rural to an urban setting, the
The chances of cultural and linguistic assimilation increase. The rural farming community has been the backbone of French Canadian culture. In this sense, rural French Canadian communities have been less likely to lose those traditional cultural values, such as language, religion, and family, so crucial to the vitality and viability of a French Canadian community. French Canadians who find themselves engulfed in large urban centres have a more intense contact with other linguistic groups, and thus lose touch more readily with their roots and their cultural identity. British Columbia's francophones are highly urbanized, with some 79.1% living in cities, the highest urban proportion of all francophone minorities (Figure 3.4A). Only in Alberta (77.4%) and Ontario (77.5%) are francophones as urbanized.

![FIGURE 3.4A](ImageURL)

**Urban-Rural Distribution of Francophones Outside Quebec, 1981 Census**

- **Legend**
  - Rural
  - Urban
A more detailed look at the urban-rural distribution in Figure 3.4B reveals that Franco-Columbians live mostly in urban centres with more than 100,000 people. They differ little in this respect from francophones in Alberta (67.2%), Ontario (60.4%), and Nova Scotia (58.5%). Thus, not only do Franco-

Columbians represent insignificant proportions of the BC population, their level of urbanisation may create further obstacles to their ability to live in French, and to maintain some level of cultural and linguistic security. Community development activities become all the more difficult for interest group leaders who very often find themselves competing with the many other forms of social and cultural entertainment found in
large cities. When the population is as small and dispersed as francophones in British Columbia, the ability to generate community awareness is severely curtailed.

The level of assimilation of a minority language group determines the potential survival or disappearance of that group. Though language is not the only measure of cultural vitality, it is by far the most important insofar as communication between group members in their mother tongue is essential to the transmission of one's language and culture. Moreover, the less a language is spoken, and the less a minority group identifies itself in linguistic terms, the less important will be community associations designed to promote language and cultural survival, and the less likely it is that governments formulate language policies to abate language assimilation.

Figure 3.5A provides a fairly blunt portrait of the strength (or weakness) of BC's francophone community. It shows that whereas 72.3% of Franco-Columbians have French as their mother tongue, a figure comparable with other francophone minorities, only one-fifth (21.1%) use French as their home language; four-fifths (80.4%) use English at home. With such a high proportion of BC francophones no longer speaking French in their home, the

* Proportion of francophone population whose mother tongue is French, but whose home language is English. Hence, the formula:

\[
\frac{[(FMT - FHL) \times 100]}{FHL}
\]

90
French-speaking community in BC is vulnerable to linguistic (and probably cultural) extinction.

Franco-Columbians appear much more susceptible to assimilation than other francophone minorities. Whereas in all cases, there is a downward shift in the relative proportion of French mother tongue and French home language populations within each province, the shift in BC is the most dramatic, 63.4% points. Only Prairie francophones have as substantial a shift, 41.1%.

This high level of assimilation can be partially explained by the predominantly English-speaking environment within which BC francophones function on a daily basis. One general tendency,
for example, is that francophone minorities tend to assimilate to the English language through marriage. This was noted by Charles Castonguay in his study of exogamy rates of French Canadian minorities. His analysis of 1971 census data revealed that the "anglicisation rate" for all francophone minorities in linguistically-mixed marriages averaged 91.9%. Francophones in British Columbia (96.2%), Alberta (96.2%), and Saskatchewan tended to assimilate through marriage more readily than those in Ontario (90.1%), Newfoundland (90%), Prince Edward Island (90.3%), Nova Scotia (91.8%), and New Brunswick (79.7%). Moreover, British Columbia francophones appear to marry outside their language group more often (68.3%) than those in all other provinces except Newfoundland (69.2%). Their Prairie counterparts in Alberta (56.7%) and Saskatchewan (53.5%) share equally high mixed marriage rates whereas moving further eastward the rates drop significantly: Manitoba (39.6%), Ontario (39.6%), New Brunswick (39.6%), Nova Scotia (40.7%), and PEI (37.7%).

Figure 3.5B shows that 12% of British Columbia's French mother tongue population are now unilingual English-speaking, while 85% are bilingual. The high rate of bilingualism may not be too comforting for the French language in British Columbia, if, as some suggest, bilingualism is merely a step towards complete assimilation of the minority language population. In the Canadian context, BC appears to confirm the argument that outside the core language area, the power of the minority
language to resist assimilation is greatly reduced. In this area, New Brunswick (9.7%) and Ontario (33.9%) have the lowest assimilation rates of francophone minorities in Canada.

For interest group leaders with clear objectives to ensure a "viable" community, the high level of assimilation must be counter-balanced with activities designed to encourage francophones to use and maintain their language. Various French social activities must be combined with some political activity to enhance community vitality. In an English-speaking province like British Columbia, it is important for interest group leaders to pursue goals which coincide with the sense of urgency brought on by a rapidly assimilating Franco-Columbian population.

Population mobility can affect the vitality of the language
community, because high levels of transiency (measured by the length of time spent in a given community) reduce the likelihood of community members developing permanent ties to the community. BC francophones have very high levels of transiency. With less permanent roots in British Columbia, many fail to establish close ties to the francophone community in the province; this plays against attempts of government and of community associations to generate loyalties to a distinctly "Franco-Columbian" community in British Columbia.

A study done by the Centre de recherche sur l'opinion publique (CROP) in 1982, indicates that more than four-fifths of Franco-Columbians (83.0%) are not indigenous to British Columbia (Figure 3.6A). Most are originally from the Prairie provinces.
(47.8%) or Quebec (32.8%). This makes the BC's francophone community the youngest of all francophone minorities. Most francophones in the Prairie (69.5%) and Atlantic (82.7%) provinces are predominantly natives of their respective province. Of those born in BC, one-third (32.3%) have not always lived here. In fact, only 13.7% of all Franco-Columbians now living in the province, have always lived in BC. The comparable figure in all other provinces is over 60%.

In Figure 3.6B, moreover, we find that BC francophones tend to differ from their "confreres" in all other provinces in terms of their length of provincial residency. Indeed, Franco-

[Diagram showing the distribution of years lived in different provinces, with BC having the lowest level of permanency, more than half the francophone population (56.1%) having lived in BC for less than 5 years. The Prairie provinces are a distant second at]
27.1%. This only confirms the relative youth of BC's francophone community. Still, it does appear to be attracting francophones from other provinces who are willing to remain in the province for extended periods of time. In fact, when asked whether or not they planned to be in British Columbia in five years time, a vast majority of BC respondents (90.8%) answered "yes". A full three-quarters (78.8%) of the more recent arrivals responded in the same fashion.

Community associations have a great task in trying to encourage their clientele to remain in the community. If their reasons for leaving are tied to a concern for language retention or cultural survival, as has been the case for many newcomers to British Columbia, interest group leaders have to take this transiency factor into consideration when designing community development strategies. In a province where not much of a public or private infrastructure exists to provide services in French, interest group leadership is perhaps the only means to contact or recruit new community members. Hence, leaders must know why francophones venture to BC and why they leave. If the transient nature of the community is a permanent characteristic of the Franco-Columbian landscape, they need to deal with it as part of their leadership responsibilities.

Generally, then, the Franco-Columbian community appears to be built on a fragile foundation. Indeed, with small numbers,
and a highly dispersed, urbanized, and assimilated population, this community differs significantly from the large, concentrated, and more indigenous minority communities we find in Ontario, Manitoba or Nova Scotia. What do Franco-Columbians look like in their social and economic life?

A brief socio-economic sketch, going beyond these rather static demographic variables helps to round out an account of the community's general parameters. Here, we find a relatively successful Franco-Columbian population.

Level of education comparisons show Franco-Columbians to be relatively well-educated in comparison with other francophone minorities and with English-speaking British Columbians. Figure 3.7 shows that 29.4% have attended a post-secondary institution, the second highest proportion of all francophones outside Quebec.
Not surprisingly, income level comparisons reflect much the same pattern. Figure 3.8A shows that Franco-Columbians are better off than all other francophone minority population, with 53.7% earning over $25,000 per year. Only Prairie francophones have as high a percentage in this income category (49.1%). In addition, Figure 3.8B indicates that BC anglophones and francophones have almost identical income levels. More than a third of anglophones (34.4%) and francophones (35.4%) earn $15,000 or more per year while 14.2% of anglophones and 13.8% of francophones earn $25,000 or more. Both language populations have identical average incomes ($12,750) which are above the provincial average ($12,461).
FIGURE 3.8B
Income Levels for BC Language Groups, 1981 Census

Legend
- $15,000+
- $25,000+

FIGURE 3.9
Distribution of Francophones Outside Quebec by Economic Sector, 1981 Census

Legend
- Tertiary
- Secondary
- Primary
Occupation patterns offer a third valuable comparison. What Franco-Columbians do for a living differs only slightly from other francophone minority populations. Figure 3.9 shows that a majority of francophone minorities in all provinces work in the tertiary sector. British Columbia francophones have the fifth highest proportion (57.0%). Most Franco-Columbians work in the social services area (29.7%).

From a socio-economic point of view, then, Franco-Columbians tend to shine beside their francophone minority counterparts. In addition, they compare more favourably with their anglophone population than most other francophones outside Quebec. Thus, whereas cultural and linguistic characteristics render the Franco-Columbian community less cohesive and less likely to sustain itself, from a socio-economic perspective, Franco-Columbians fare much better.

Interest group leaders must therefore be able to determine how important the French language and culture really are to Franco-Columbians. While being a francophone is important, it could be secondary to the pursuit of other social and economic options. Leaders must discover whether such attitudes are borne of ignorance or of conviction. If the former, strategies for contact and member recruitment would be necessary to build a stronger identification with the French-speaking community in British Columbia. If the latter, interest group activity would be seriously affected.
3.2. "Frenchness" of Community Life

To get a sense of Franco-Columbian community life we must go beyond the simple demographic profile which can sometimes hide the more subtle aspects of how Franco-Columbians live their life in French. Here, "Frenchness" is the extent to which francophones use the French language on a daily basis in various community contexts. We look at four areas: home/personal life, leisure time, work, and social life.

When we compare the level of French used in each area, as in Figure 3.10, some interesting patterns emerge regarding the occasions when Franco-Columbians use their mother tongue. Though

![Figure 3.10: Amount of French Used by BC Francophones in Different Community Contexts, CROP 1982](chart)

the levels of French language use are alarmingly low, the home and work environments appear more conducive to the use of French
than others: 42.9% of Franco-Columbians report that they speak French "a little" or "some of the time" in these two contexts. Use of the French language seems least present in their wider social life, where 93.4% say they use French "very little". French is also significantly absent from Franco-Columbian leisure time, with 75.8% not using it very often. A more detailed look at each of these areas sheds some light on the various real life situations where French is used most and least often by Franco-Columbians.

In the home/personal life, close to or more than half of Franco-Columbians are more likely to use English than French when speaking with their neighbours (86.9%), francophone neighbours (50%), spouse (72.7%) or in a group with one anglophone present (58.3%). Friends are predominantly anglophone (67.9%), as are neighbours (86.2%). With francophone friends, however, French is used more often by at least half of the Franco-Columbian population (48.9%), and a smaller proportion (16.1%) use both English and French; over one-third (35%) speak English with francophone friends.

Leisure time is seldom spent in French. Well above half of Franco-Columbians watch English television most often (70%), listen to English radio (86.1%), and read English newspapers (92.3%). This is particularly surprising given the availability of French language television and radio via the French CBC.
At work, the environment is predominantly English-speaking for most Franco-Columbians. A vast majority have anglophone managers (93.7%) and share their work space with anglophone employees (90.3%). Most (89.0%) have anglophone co-workers and speak English at coffee breaks (93.5%) and after work (89.0%). In all these respects, the Franco-Columbian work environment is significantly more English than for francophone minorities in all other provinces.

Franco-Columbian social life is no different. In all areas of their time spent outside the home, Franco-Columbians use English more than French. Thus, 89.8% play sports in English, 96.3% use English when shopping for groceries, and 96.6% when shopping for other personal items. The percentage using English in restaurants (94.1%) and bars (89.8%), or at the cinema (96.2%) and theatre (92.5%) draws a very English picture for BC francophones' social life.

When we compare Franco-Columbians to other francophone communities according to the levels of "Frenchness", we see how different BC francophones really are from other francophones living in a minority context. First, more Franco-Columbians use "very little" French in the various community contexts than all other francophone minorities. Figure 3.11A shows that though this is least evident in the home environment, the level of
FIGURE 3.11A
VERY LITTLE FRENCH USED In Different Community Contexts, CROP 1982

Legend
Atlantic
NS
Ontario
Prairies
BC

FIGURE 3.11B
SOME/A LOT OF FRENCH USED In Different Community Contexts, CROP 1982

Legend
Atlantic
NS
Ontario
Prairies
BC
French language use by BC francophones in all other contexts diverges markedly from other francophone minorities. Hence, Franco-Columbians have the highest level of "very little French" used at work (50.5%) or in social life (93.4%). In leisure activity, only Atlantic francophones have as high a level of "no French" language use (78.5%). As Western French Canadians, Franco-Columbians are significantly different from Prairie francophones in the absence of French in their community life.

If we reverse the angle of our observations, and compare Franco-Columbians with other francophone minorities in those contexts where the French language is used "somewhat or a lot", Franco-Columbians fare even worse. Figure 3.11B shows them well below the average for all francophones outside Quebec in all community life situations. Even in the home environment, where French is used most often, BC francophones (8.2%) rank some 30% points lower than the next lowest score for a provincial francophone minority, found in the Prairies (41.9%).

The level of "Frenchness" of the Franco-Columbian community is thus relatively low. In most areas, the French language is either completely absent or seldom used by a majority of Franco-Columbians. Does this mean that Franco-Columbians do not identify themselves as francophones or that they do not feel it important to speak French? Answering these questions goes a long way in determining the vitality and viability of the francophone population in BC. Indeed, the absence of any attachment to the
French fact risks deflating all claims to the existence of a Franco-Columbian community, and places interest group activity on very shaky grounds.

We have created two composite indicators from the CROP study: "ties to the French language" and "ties to the francophone group". In Figure 3.12A, we see that, despite the low levels of French language use in their community life, close to one half (48.9%) of Franco-Columbians have noticeably strong ties to the French language. This compares quite favourably with minority populations in the Prairie (59.1%) and Atlantic (65.9%) provinces.

Over two-thirds (69.2%) of the Franco-Columbian population have medium or very strong ties to the francophone group (Figure 3.12B). This is comparably less than other minority communities. When we look more closely at these ties, a significant majority of BC francophones (75.6%) do not consider themselves members of an ethnic minority, and 97.6% are proud to be francophone or of French origin. Curiously, however, when asked whether they feel closer to francophones, anglophones or both groups, a mere 13.6% chose their own language group, with the majority (76.6%) identifying with both.

One would expect that pride in and strong ties to the French language and francophone group would translate into preferences for a greater French environment in BC. In fact, this is the
FIGURE 3.12A
Ties To The French Language by Province, CROP 1982

FIGURE 3.12B
Ties To The Francophone Group By Province, CROP 1982
case for their leisure time. Figure 3.13A reveals that BC francophones are the least likely among francophone minorities to have no particular preference for more French in their leisure time (31.9%). Yet, with Atlantic francophones (30.8%), they are more likely than other minority populations to not prefer more French in the various social contexts (31.9%).

From a different perspective of these two contexts, Figure 3.13B indicates that 53.9% of Franco-Columbians would like to be able to use French "more" or "a lot more" often in their leisure time. This is the highest amongst all francophone minorities. In their social life, most Franco-Columbians (62.1%) would like to use French more often, a score comparable with provincial
minorities in the Atlantic (57.9%) and Prairie (61.7%) provinces.

Whereas this preference for more French exists for the leisure and social contexts, Franco-Columbians have no particular preference for the French language at work, nor do they prefer a French education for their children. At work, a large majority (72.4%) prefer to use the English language, and more than half (55.6%) want their children to have an English language education.

Despite the rather English community environment, therefore, Franco-Columbians still maintain a level of loyalty to or identification with the French culture. Interest group leaders
must attempt to address this contrast between identity and language use, and examine the consequences for community development strategies.

Can this contrast be a reflection of the ability of Franco-Columbians to live in French in British Columbia? Only the federal government accords them the right to French language services in government institutions. Provincialy, Victoria did set up a French language education programme (Programme Cadre de Francais) in 1977, designed to give francophones an education in their mother tongue. As well, a burgeoning French immersion sector exists for anglophone children and for francophones who want their children to regain their lost French language skills. It is important to note, however, that the PCF exists only at the behest of Orders-in-Council passed by the provincial Cabinet. Franco-Columbians very often do not enrol their children in the programme for fear of its withdrawal. Provincial government services in other areas are rarely offered or simply non-existent. Hence, the "public" face of BC society does little to encourage ties to a Franco-Columbian community.

In fact, Figure 3.14 suggests that BC francophones find it difficult to live in French in their province. Indeed, more than four-fifths (88.5%) say they find it "difficult" or "very difficult" to do so. This is significantly higher than francophones in all other provinces, with francophone minorities in the Prairies (68.7%) and the Atlantic provinces (67%), more...
particularly, having lower proportions of francophones who feel able to live in French without difficulty.

Conclusions

Overall, BC francophones constitute a relatively small, dispersed, and urbanized provincial community. To make their community existence even less secure, they are highly assimilated due to the high level of language transfers from French to English. On these more demographic elements, the BC francophone community is quite different from other minority francophone communities in Canada.

On a broader social scale, Franco-Columbians are highly
educated, financially well off, and work predominantly in the tertiary sector. Here, they compare favourably with other francophones outside Quebec and with BC's English-speaking population, being at the upper end of the socio-economic scale.

The Franco-Columbian community is not, however, very French. In all areas of community life, French language use is at a minimum, whether in the home, where it is used most often, at work, during leisure time or on social occasions. BC is an extreme case in this respect; no other francophone community in the country has such low levels of French language use. Even in Atlantic Canada's smaller Newfoundland and PEI francophone communities, the French language occupies a more predominant place in the lives of francophones than in British Columbia.

Still, francophones in BC tend to be strongly tied to the French language and to the francophone group. Moreover, they exhibit a fundamental pride in themselves as francophones, and reinforce this sentiment with a belief in their special minority status within Canadian and British Columbian society.

It is this incongruence between attitude and practice which must be addressed by interest group leaders and government officials. Adequate public institutions at the provincial level just do not exist to serve the Franco-Columbian community. In fact, activities of community organisations and the reinforcement of other community infrastructures (Church, Caisse populaire,
schools) through interest group activity may be the only way to ensure a "viable" francophone community in BC.

This appears to have been the goal of the federal government in many of its language policy initiatives to support OLMOs and their respective communities. How interest group leaders in BC have attempted to perform their community development role in the past, and how they have changed their approach due to federal government funding is the key focal point for the rest of this study. Since the FFC is the representative umbrella organisation for BCs francophone community, bringing together a multitude of local associations, its leadership activities are of great importance to the survival of a Franco-Columbian community. It is with this background in mind that we now introduce our case study of the FFC as an interest group cum government-funded policy agent whose leadership activities have been supported by federal government language policies.

For the purposes of analysis undertaken with the CROP data in this chapter I designed a particular configuration of the "francophone respondent" which deserves mention here. I created a variable - SPEAK FRENCH - to select out only those survey respondents who had some capacity to speak the French language. Hence, knowledge of and capacity to speak the French language constitutes the base for the "francophone" I am interested in. The variable comprised those respondents who:

a. Answered the questionnaire in French, could speak the other official language, English, well or a little.

b. Answered the questionnaire in English, could speak the other official language, French, well or a little.

c. Answered the questionnaire in French, were unilingual French, that is they could not speak the other official language, English.

It may seem strange that we classify as a "francophone" someone who may only speak French a little. I use here the definition employed by CROP.


3. Ibid., p. 93.

4. Joy, p. 34.


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8. Interview with Martine Galibois-Barss, President, Association des Parents de Programme Cadre, July 1986.

9. Ibid.
SECTION 2:

THE FEDERATION DES FRANCO-COLOMBIENS -
COMMUNITY ORGANISATION TO GOVERNMENT POLICY AGENT
"Il ne fait aucun doute que si elle n'existait pas, il faudrait la fonder."

Roméo Paquette.

Now in its fourtieth year, the Fédération des Franco-Colombiens (FFC) has undergone several transformations while seeking to promote the continued existence of a francophone population in Canada's westernmost province. Formed in 1945 as the Fédération Canadienne Francaise de la Colombie Britannique (FCFCB), the FFC evolved from a conglomeration of French Canadian parishes and local French Clubs devoted to "survivance" into a full-fledged political organisation determined to ensure the recognition of language rights for francophones in British Columbia. The organisational network built up under its stewardship provided concrete symbolic and practical benefits to the Franco-Columbian community. As it grew with the help of government funding, however, its leaders instituted a number of changes which underscored different facets of a more "distant" Federation leadership.

This chapter provides a general overview of FFC history, and outlines the methods used by Federation leaders to build a viable organisational network for francophones in British Columbia.
From this, readers learn not only of the inherent divisions within the Franco-Columbian community which Federation leaders had to address, but also of the transformations brought to Federation leadership methods with the advent of federal government language policies in the late 1960s.

4.1. Absence of Organisation Leadership Before 1945

We first notice a French presence in British Columbia with the many French Canadian voyageurs and coureurs de bois who served as guides, interpreters, and expert canoemen for the numerous exploring expeditions commissioned by the Hudson's Bay and North West Companies in the 19th century. As hired help, or as "free hunters", these men were very mobile adventurers who travelled frequently according to their own needs and livelihood. Those who chose to remain in settled camps did so as Company personnel in existing forts or as farmers under Company rule. Little evidence exists to suggest the germination of a French Canadian organisational structure at this time. Both the transiency of the voyageurs and the English-speaking environment worked against such a possibility.

Religious missionaries sent to minister the small Catholic population found in Company settlements provided the first sign of hope for a lasting French Canadian presence. From this, a number of Catholic missions were established throughout the territory as a means to provide some form of permanence to the
Catholic populations working in the mining or lumber industries.

The Quebec-born Fathers Modeste Demers and Francis Norbert Blanchet spent some time in the Oregon territory as Catholic missionaries. The former was appointed Bishop of Vancouver Island in 1844 due to his "energetic programme of evangelism in New Caledonia." He would be aided a few years later by Oblate missionaries from France and Quebec. The missionary programme, which set up a number of Catholic missions in the Okanagan valley, represented the only real sign of French Canadian activity in British Columbia during this period. The support given it by the francophone employees of the Hudson's Bay Company hinted at the role of the Church for French Canadians in the province. Some settlers even returned to Quebec and convinced other French Canadian families to make the trip westward.

Though energetic evangelism helped to maintain ties to religion and language, there is little evidence to suggest that these religious visits fused in any way the disparate French Canadian communities. Concern for religious salvation and daily social needs could cement bonds to the Church and the language, but not to an undefined French Canadian territory.

During the mid-1800s a substantial number of French Europeans and French Canadians travelled to British Columbia from California and Quebec. Attracted by the gold rush, many of them settled in Victoria while others ventured inland once the lure of
quick fortunes disappeared. One Quebec-born mining pioneer, Joseph Christian, took part in a mining boom at Rock Creek in 1861, to later settle near Okanagan Lake. Another, Luc Girouard, came to BC by way of California, participated in various mining company ventures before being appointed Post Master in "Priests' Valley", Okanagan. The Okanagan area remained a key site of French Canadian settlement well into the late 1880s. Once the railroad arrived, however, many people moved further west to the Fraser Valley as rail workers or farmers. By 1901, "one of the most homogeneous French settlements in the province had been established at Hatzic Prairie[;]...all but three of twenty-seven names listed in the directory of Hatzic Prairie Postal station were French."

Despite their numerical significance, estimated at over 60% of the total white population at the time, no real organisational structure existed to provide direction or cohesion to the French-speaking population. Once again, only the limited and isolated efforts of the Catholic church brought French Canadians together in religious services. Later, a massive English immigration buried the infant community before it could take its first step; population figures reveal that not only did francophone immigration taper off, those who did remain were quickly engulfed by the English-speaking majority.

A number of local organisations and social institutions did flourish near the end of the 19th century, however; Sainte-
Marie's Hospital (1886), St-Paul's Hospital (1894), and Providence Sainte-Geneviève (1900) were founded by the "Soeurs de la Providence de Montréal". The "Union canadienne-française de Vancouver" (1905) provided relief to the small number of French Canadians in the Vancouver area, and was the first truly socio-cultural organisation attempting to breathe life into the Vancouver francophone community. Little is known of this latter organisation, because it lasted only a number of years, folding in 1912. Franco-Columbians would have to wait some time before any permanent organisational structures took root.

Early in the 20th century, a French Canadian "centre" of sorts sprouted up close to Vancouver thanks to the hiring of a French Canadian labour force from Quebec to work in the Western Canadian lumber industry; close to 500 workers ventured westward and settled on the banks of the Fraser River in 1909. Known today as Maillardville, the community housed the largest French Canadian community in the province and the first French Canadian parish, Notre-Dame de Lourdes. Due to its roots in the BC lumber industry, the French Canadian population in Maillardville developed a certain amount of community spirit through common church and work ties. Successful ice hockey and baseball teams, and a French Canadian band gave some social enjoyment to the community.

The impact of the Catholic Church was felt because of the
vaunted efforts of Father Edmond Maillard, a France-born Oblate priest who would hold mass for lumber workers on the company site. As an active community leader, he organised bazaars to raise money for a church building where, among other things, the Sisters of the Child Jesus would hold classes for the French Canadian children. Another priest, Father de Lestre, of Belgian origin, "laboured hard to keep parishioners true to the Catholic faith, and constantly urged them to use good French in the home and in daily associations.

Though the townsite offered suitable religious and educational activities through its parish church, it had no official status as a local government, and was commonly known as "Frenchtown". This unofficial status, typical to Franco-Columbian society, constituted a roadblock to the development of an entrenched Franco-Columbian community, because in areas where a substantial number of French Canadians lived, they lacked the institutional structures needed to control their own development as a community.

Some twenty years after the first organisational impulse in the British Columbian French Canadian community, a second, more significant initiative occurred in 1926 with the formation of the "Cercle dramatique et musical" by a group of Vancouver women worried about the future of the "French Canadian race". In 1929, the "Cercle" or Club changed its name to the "Association des Dames et Demoiselles de Langue Française"; the objectives of
the new Association reflected a concern for the unification of the francophone community more generally. These women hoped that it would serve as a "meeting place" for French Canadians, and thus encourage the BC francophone population to form French Canadian parishes. Meanwhile, the "Association Canadienne-Française" was formed in 1927, with Jean-Baptiste Paris, the Besuille family, and a few others all working to bring together the French Canadian element in Vancouver. Though this Association folded a few years later, the organisational impulse was not arrested; William P. Léveque set up the "Club Montcalm" in 1935 as a means for French Canadian men to share their "intellectual and artistic pursuits." Other names included Dr. J.-B. Paris, G.P. Lambert, and F. Giroux, some of whom would find themselves on the executive of the future Fédération Canadienne-Française de la Colombie-Britannique. The "Club" itself attracted mostly those of the French-speaking elite: diplomats, professionals, and artists. This orientation changed significantly a short time later when the Club became more of a French Canadian social organisation, adopting the name "Club Dramatique et musical Montcalm." Though its activities petered out in the next decade with the birth of the Federation, the seed for growth had been planted, one which would bring more a permanent organisational network to French British Columbia.

In 1941, the seed blossomed. With only twenty active
members, the doors to the Association des Dames et Demoiselles were opened to all French Canadians under a new banner, the "Association canadienne française de Vancouver." According to its leaders, it was time to heighten the morale of French Canadians in British Columbia and to demand respect from English-speaking Canadians in the province. Efforts would also be made to educate Eastern French Canadians about the plight of Franco-

Columbians as they struggle for "survivance". In Victoria, meanwhile, French Canadians created the "Club canadien français de la Colombie-Britannique" giving cohesion to a number of associations on Vancouver Island. Then, in 1942, several community leaders attempted to federate francophone groups in Victoria, Port Alberni, Duncan, Nanaimo, Vancouver, and Maillardville. Franco-Columbians were not ready, however, and the attempt failed.

This surge of French Canadian organisational activity in the 1940s can be partially explained by an increase in the French Canadian population in BC between 1931 and 1941, from 15,028 to 21,876. Largely an exodus from the Prairie provinces during the Depression, these French Canadians swelled the ranks of BC's francophone population. Also, the formation of military training centres brought a number of French Canadian recruits to the West who married other French Canadians and established permanent residence in the province.

Thus, by 1945, French Canadians in British Columbia had
developed a few local institutional structures. Geographic iso-
lation and dispersion, small population size, and an unfavourable
socio-cultural milieu had prevented any sustained efforts to
establish a distinctive structural leadership for French
Canadians in the province. Only the Catholic church had the
required resources to spread its influence throughout the French
Canadian community; yet, it, too, was handicapped by the
dispersed nature of the community. It is difficult, therefore,
to speak of an established organisational network at this time,
and even less of Franco-Columbian leaders capable of defining
territorial boundaries, recruiting members, sustaining an inter-
est group organisation and regrouping francophones province-wide.

4.2. The Federation: Community Organisation 1945 - 1960

With the formation of the Fédération Canadienne Française de
la Colombie Britannique (FCFCB) in 1945, under the banner "Dieu
et nos devises, nous maintiendrons", Franco-Columbians
signalled a desire to take matters into their own hands. Long
frustrated by the disunity and dispersion of the French Canadian
population in the province, Franco-Columbians looked to their new
Federation for leadership:

Le plus grand espoir de sauver notre patri-
moine français en Colombie, repose, dans une
large mesure sur l'énergique travail qu'accom-
plit la Fédération canadienne française.(26)
In the initial stages Federation leaders attempted to "define" a legitimate territory for the French Canadian population by setting up an organisational framework. Franco-Columbians in various areas were encouraged to form local "Cercle français" or French Clubs as a means to establish contact between francophones living in the same community. In some cases, local parishes were formed and became Federation affiliates.

The triangle - Federation, French Club, parish - gave organisational definition to the Franco-Columbian community and provided the means for increased activity in many areas of the province. Federation leaders preoccupied themselves with questions of community representation, raising of funds, unifying the many dispersed French-speaking communities, encouraging French Canadians from other provinces to settle in BC, and developing activities in a variety of different areas. Notable accomplishments before the 1960s included the establishment of a weekly half-hour French radio programme on CKNW in New Westminster, French classes in local parishes, postal services in French bookstores, and the formation of theatre and choir groups.

By establishing contacts between French Canadians in local communities, the leaders hoped to instil some loyalties to a broader French Canadian culture and to the Federation as its main proponent in the province. Very early on, its leaders drew lines around a broad "provincial" community image which blurred local
community boundaries. Social, cultural, and financial ties developed by the Federation to a network of national and other provincial francophone organisations only served to highlight benefits of the Federation perspective.

Concern with the power of local authorities mirrored a negative sentiment towards local community narrow-mindedness. No real French community could flourish if Federation members remained imprisoned in local chains. This local-Federation axis would eventually pit Federation and local leaders against one another as the former brought major changes to Federation activities. Local organisations were supposed to serve as the means to French Canadian longevity in the province and the country, not as ends in themselves. In effect, Federation leaders were determined to keep local activities within the context of a viable Franco-Columbian community tied to the larger French-Canadian picture. On more than one occasion in the early years, speeches at annual meetings focussed on the role of the Federation as the "appropriate organism to assure the survival of the dispersed groups in the province".

Ironically, the "regrouping" of Franco-Columbians in local parishes and French Clubs served to localize Franco-Columbian activity, perhaps to the exclusion of this broad community and Federation perspective. Due to a relatively dispersed francophone population, geographic reality dictated the need for a decen-
tralized organisational structure. Heightened interest in French Canadian customs and the French language was therefore achieved through sundry local social activities (bazaars, soirées canadiennes-françaises), and not through enhanced social or political awareness beyond the local community. The real focus of Franco-Columbian activities remained inward-looking and turned more on the provision of local activities than on visions of a broader provincial or national reality.

In this sense, little distinction was drawn between local and Federation structures. The Federation constituted an organisational network which was more the sum of its local parts than as a separate force controlling community activities from above. For this reason, its leaders were in close contact with the local community and its organisational structures. Indeed, it served very much the role of a crossroads institution through which local organisation leaders passed to occasionally meet each other and provide some cohesion to the community.

The driving local force during this period was the Catholic church and its local parish associations. The Federation's principal goal was to defend the French language and the Catholic religion. Being a member of the Federation was an effective way to remain French and Catholic, and to thus spread French Canadian values in an English-speaking province. With its roots in BC dating back to the early 1800s, the Catholic church had a moral and social impact on the nature of the French Canadian community.
in the province. Much like French Canadian communities elsewhere in Canada, the role of the Church was unparalleled in shaping society and determining values. For example, a 1931 strike by the International Woodworker's of America became a "community affair" when a local priest not only attempted to get the French Canadian union members to return to work, but went so far as to give sermons to the Maillardville congregation on the dangers of communism, and threatened to refuse absolution during confession if all strikers did not tear up their union cards.

Clergy members were also very prominent leaders of the community organisations in BC, and became quite active in the FCFCB. For Federation leaders, this took advantage of the church's role in the community and served as an efficient way to reach a majority of the local French Canadian population. The 1951—Maillardville Catholic schools strike gives us some indication as to the relative importance of the clergy in Federation activities during this period, and confirms the nature of its leadership status vis-à-vis the Church. In April 1951, upon the initiative of the Joint Catholic School Board and local parish authorities, 850 pupils in Maillardville's Catholic schools went on strike to protest the refusal by public authorities to provide bus transportation to local parish schools as was done for public schools. Though the strike failed to satisfy French Canadian demands, it did highlight the prominent
role of the Catholic church in this first "political" action by French Canadians in BC. Whereas the underlying reasons for the strike were intimately linked to Federation objectives for French language education in BC, Federation support for the strike was limited to a unanimous approval from the Executive Committee in a 1951 meeting; no overt action was taken. Newspaper reports of the day do not even mention the Federation as an active participant.

This Church-Federation link was all the more important, because it overlapped the already prominent local-Federation axis mentioned earlier. Not only were Federation leaders tightly associated with local associations, they had strong ties to the local clergy which commanded attention amongst community members. Through these mutually-supporting organisation ties, they were able to generate an unprecedented level of community activity, establishing a full gambit of Federation-run community activities.

For a variety of reasons, however, Federation successes in developing a permanent local organisational network petered out in the late 1950s. Mostly, it is suggested, French Canadians lacked the sustained enthusiasm which had brought them together a few years earlier. The dwindling numbers in small northern francophone communities just did not possess sufficient human and financial resources, and were quickly becoming anglicized. Moreover, the larger communities no longer had the desire to
continue expansion, content to preserve what they had. Thus, goals of a broad "provincial" Franco-Columbian organisational structure had not been achieved. Perceiving a threat to the survival of a French-Canadian community in BC, Federation leaders began to move in new directions, challenging the traditional image of a locally, Church-run organisational network.

4.3. Bureaucracy, Finances, and Funding From Quebec 1960 - 1968

Efforts to rejuvenate the Federation in the early 1960s underscored the worries of its leaders. In a letter to the Conseil de la Vie Française en Amérique, the Federation's Secretary-General wrote that the Franco-Columbian community had a spirit, but no body. What was needed was a central coordinating institution. Seeking funds to finance such an undertaking, a flurry of letters passed between the FCFCB and the Conseil; they indicate that the Federation executive hoped to save the community through the establishment of a permanent administrative Secretariat. More importantly for the Federation, this Secretariat would give tangible credence to its leadership.

Early in the 1950s, the Federation had quite actively searched for funds from various sources. Financially, Federation leaders depended on donations from the local Clubs and parishes. Some funds were received from outside the province,
but not nearly enough money was raised on a continual basis to strengthen the structural foundations of Franco-Columbian society. Federation leaders thus turned their sights outward and to a more active pursuit of financial resources from all corners.

Active on the Quebec scene since the early 1960s, they had succeeded in obtaining cultural project grants from the "Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières" which was part of the newly-formed Quebec Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Within the context of general social change during the 1960s, which included Quebec's Quiet Revolution, the Bilingualism & Biculturalism Commission, and the growing presence of French Canadians in positions of power, French Canadian leaders in British Columbia took the opportunity to express the view of Franco-Columbians as members in a dual society. As Ottawa and Quebec became further embroiled in discussions on the nature of the Canadian polity, a new, more politically-aware group of leaders adjusted Federation sights propitiously to the government arena. Financial and political gains from this new course coincided with their desire to dramatically change Federation activities. This stepped up the pace of Federation growth, and placed its development within the context of government language policy and the national debate on French-English relations.

In 1964, thanks to subsidies from two Quebec-based francophone associations, l'Association Canadienne des Educateurs de Langue Française (ACELF) and le Conseil de la Vie
Francaise, the Federation hired its own personnel and took on a more visibly permanent status in the province. Gradually, new administrative structures evolved, and the number of members, both individual and association, increased. More and more, the Federation would be looked upon as a distinct administrative structure performing specific functions for the French-speaking population in BC, but separate from the local associations. However, this new lease on life forced Federation leaders to evaluate their leadership and thus their ability to respond to and represent Franco-Columbian interests.

The 1960s witnessed fundamental changes to the nature of the Franco-Columbian community which contributed to modifications in Federation activities. A general secularisation of society meant that the religious focus of French Canadians had been modified somewhat. Many new local organisations were formed which competed for members of the traditional French Clubs and local parish organisations. Federation leadership also changed as a new educated elite from Quebec came to have more influence in Federation activities. The diversity of French-speaking BC (French, Belgian, and French Canadians) revealed itself more dramatically as a shift in leadership pitted French Canadians and European French against one another. As well, Franco-Columbians benefitted from an established communications network, Radio-Canada (1967) and le Soleil de Colombie (1968), which highlighted
French issues in the province and lessened the negative effects of isolation and dispersion on community survival. As these changes became evident, Federation administrative structures and traditional leadership activities were found lacking. For some, the FCFCB needed to go beyond acting as a mere symbolic force of unity for a small proportion of the francophone population if it hoped to ensure community survival.

As the decade progressed, Federation leaders began to assert their leadership. Structurally, they saw fit to replace what they considered to be outdated local organisational structures; culturally, the religious and ethnic bases of membership status were questioned; and as a federation, it was necessary to devise new methods of representation for community members. Conscious of the coming changes and their new role, Federation leaders tried to speak above local structures and addressed concerns as the sole representative of Franco-Columbians. In stark contrast to the preceding decade, they played a lead role in lobbying the provincial government for French language school financing in the 1960s; many could not accept the Federation's position on secular schools, but its leaders pushed ahead anyway, differentiating themselves from the Catholic church, and challenging the authority of the local clergy. With briefs to the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, to the Beaupré Commission on French Canadian school problems in BC, and to the Coquitlam School Board in
anticipation of French language education, a more politically-active Federation became quickly recognized as the porte-parole of Franco-Columbians. In this way, FCFCB leaders claimed community leadership, and challenged others to question their legitimacy.

By the end of the decade, then, Federation leaders had adopted an active and distinct leadership posture with the help of funding from both the Quebec government and francophone associations. This created a context within which they could more easily move the Federation away from the Catholic church, and thereby transform its traditionally less activist "local French Club" image. Despite the reluctance of local association leaders and the Catholic clergy to embark upon a new path of extensive community development, Federation leaders proposed changes which dramatically altered the Federation's leadership roles. The only remaining task was to define the nature of that leadership more precisely, and decide upon the new orientations to be taken.


Federal government language policy initiatives in the late 1960's coincided with a desire shared by some FCFCB leaders to reorganise the Federation in view of the changing needs of the French Canadian population. In fact, it is extremely difficult
to separate Federation activities of this period from the financial security granted it via the Official Languages Policy.

With the Secretary of State's commitment to aid Official Language Minority groups, there existed a new sense of security for the future. Federal funds allayed fears of financial destitution built-up from previous failures to self-finance a community network, and of dried up revenue sources. The Federation could now expand its activities, develop new programmes, and reach out to francophones in all parts of the province.

However, the federal government was not about to let francophone minority groups wander willy-nilly down a money-laden garden path. Indeed, Federation leaders had to take full charge of their own community development and show that a potential for community viability existed; only then would the public tap be turned on.

Responding to this favourable environment, and fearful of losing much-needed federal funds, Federation leaders made community development an immediate priority. There was a problem, however: no one was really clear about the mechanics of community development. Local associations had run a very parochial community show for so long that concerns for broader community development had never really been addressed. Now, with an opportunity to enhance its credibility through active leadership in community renewal, the Federation appeared unfit
for the task. Indeed, its own role beyond the local associations remained ambiguous. Was it a rallying point for local associations, or a grand central coordinating station for community activities? Too much responsibility and money had been doled out in a very short time; there were just not enough qualified francophones in BC to take advantage of it.

Unprepared as they were for a complete organisational overhaul, Federation leaders did not shy away from their new responsibilities. In 1969, they offered a comprehensive package of objectives to the Franco-Columbian community. Echoing the spirit of renewal, this package sought to do five things: reunite collective units in the community, focus on the centres of francophone strength in the province, strengthen community life through cooperatives, encourage participation, and increase membership in the Federation. In addition, as part of a more profound review process concerning its own role, the leaders commissioned professionals from the Centre Interdisciplinaire de Montréal (CIM) to produce a comprehensive report on the Federation covering five specific areas - image, representativeness, information services, cultural promotion, and community participation. In all respects, the CIM reported in late 1970, the Federation lacked sufficient elements to respond to the needs of the Franco-Columbian community. The Federation was perceived to be out of touch with the community; social changes were not
reflected in new objectives, new structures, new images, or in recruitment practices. Nor was the Federation perceived to be willing to undertake real action to encourage community development.

From this rather negative sounding of the Franco-Columbian community, Federation leaders undertook a reconstruction of the organisational network, and reviewed the Federation's role as community leader. This meant redefining what it meant to be a Franco-Columbian, changing the ways francophones could express their identification with the community, and creating new representative structures which would enable many more Franco-Columbians to become active in Federation activities. Not only would leaders revise its role, they would involve the whole community in the process of self-renewal.

Not so strangely, perhaps, this process reflected Secretary of State priorities vis-à-vis minority communities. Federal government funds were, in fact, allocated to provide for the development of viable communities. It is apparent that certain Federation leaders, who shared the vision of a revitalized Franco-Columbian community, were quite aware of government policy objectives, and grasped the opportunity offered by government funding to redirect Federation leadership towards a more systematic pursuit of community development activities, administrative restructuring, and political lobbying. The availability of government funding and policy support facilitated
changes many Federation leaders wished to bring to Federation activities.

The 1971 annual meeting proved to be a major turning point for the Federation. Reflecting the wishes of President Roger Albert to have a Federation clearly representative of Franco-Columbians, participants dramatically modified its form. More democratic, secular, and more open, the new "Fédération des Franco-Colombiens" (FFC) assumed a more legitimate and distinct role in deciding what kind of Franco-Columbian community would develop and how decisions were to be made considering its evolution. The FFC sought to redefine the place of Franco-Columbians in BC and Canada, and, with sufficient financial resources, began a process of community development which would better involve francophones in a British Columbian French-speaking-milieu.

Three years later, however, discontent surfaced within the Federation as the local-Federation axis displayed its importance to the workings of a Franco-Columbian organisational network. There was a call for a decentralisation of Federation activities and structures; the 1971 rebuilding had failed to produce the expected, and desired, local and regional reorganisation. In addition, general dissatisfaction with the FFC, and especially with its leaders, hinted at an isolated and arrogant leadership which was unconcerned with the mass of the community; the
question of Federation representativeness thus crept more openly into discussions. In short, as Federation leaders assumed a more definite role in directing the organisational network, they not only differentiated themselves from the community, but Federation activities became more centralized in Vancouver. Local associations and regions felt isolated in, and disconnected from a bureaucratic machine which had taken on a life of its own.

The decentralisation and constitutional reform which followed granted greater autonomy and authority to the regions in setting their own priorities. Changes in membership status also granted local organisations in the regions and individual members enhanced voting rights in Federation bodies, and thus a greater say in community activities. The future of the Federation, proclaimed its leaders, would reside in the strong and active regions. More people would participate from more areas of the province, and the Federation structure would become much more representative province-wide. Paradoxically, this mixed, individual and organisation membership status, which was aimed at creating a broader community participation, would breed conflict rather than unity early in the next decade.

During the 1970s, the FFC focussed a lot of attention on specific issues which affected BC francophones. In fact, there was a dramatic increase in the number of "political" activities with which Federation leaders became directly involved. It commanded a presence on constitutional questions, on French
educational programmes, and French television, amongst others. "Revendiquer" was now the goal of the Federation - demand recognition of francophone rights. At both the national and provincial level, the FFC pursued a more active "political" role, playing their policy agent role to give support to the federal government's Official Languages Policy.

Education issues served as the major focus for Federation leaders. With the Official Languages Policy and a growing consciousness in the anglophone population concerning French language instruction, FFC leaders looked to the provincial government to authorize French language public schools. Despite the favourable government response to a Federation brief on education in 1973 - "Nous voulons que les francophones se sentent chez eux en Colombie-Britannique" - FFC demands were met with a very cold shoulder. Not discouraged, the Federation Executive Committee designed a more extensive lobbying strategy to pursue more actively the education portfolio. The provincial government harboured refusals until 1976 when, amidst fears of Quebec independence, an offer of reciprocal minority language education agreements by the Quebec government, and lobbying by the FFC, it introduced the Programme Cadre de Français. Here, the politics of language debate described in Chapter 1 provided Federation leaders a favourable political climate with which to pursue their demands at the provincial level. Three years later,
FFC action proved fruitful with the opening of publicly-financed French classes.

Strangely enough, the Education Committee had struggled not only with the provincial government, but also with a general indifference or apathy amongst francophones towards the whole schools issue. To counter this, FFC leaders undertook a full-scale lobbying effort to contact and encourage francophone parents to enrol their children in the programme. Without the necessary numbers, they insisted, the provincial government would have reason to pull the rug out from under them. When classes finally opened in 1979, enrolment figures of francophones surpassed all expectations of the FFC.

Confident in its activist role, and no longer content to react to events, the FFC pressed further in an attempt to push the provincial government door wide open for its lobbying activities. Contacts within the Ministry of Education were constantly nourished in an attempt to establish more direct relations with members of the government. Conversations and discussions with Ministers, deputy-Ministers, and civil servants proved fruitful in 1977 when, in a bilingual presentation to the Legislative Assembly, the provincial government recognised the FFC as the official porte-parole of the francophone population in BC. This prompted an even greater concern for the Federation's political role vis-à-vis Victoria.

Two crucial events outside British Columbia toughened-up the
Federation's political skin: the formation of the Fédération des Francophones Hors Québec (FFHQ) in 1975 and the election of a Parti Québécois government in Quebec in 1976. Both helped to place FFC demands at the provincial level within the larger national context. Using the call to national unity, Federation leaders spoke out forcefully for, and participated actively in the constitutional debates sparked by the Quebec independence issue.

Federation leaders proposed the formation of a Political Committee for the first time in 1977. Linking politics and "survivance", they hoped to prevent the folklorisation of minority communities. Not until 1979, however, did the Committee become a reality, addressing such issues as the referendum, the federal and provincial elections of the time, and the possibility of setting up a special consulting office within the provincial government. According to one Federation official, this political activity and pondering coincided with a sense of insecurity resulting from the looming federal cutbacks. Such a situation bedeviled FFC leaders; although they wanted to lessen their financial dependency relationship with the federal government, they also needed to make the Federation's presence felt in the corridors of power if they hoped to secure its survival.

During the 1970s, the FFC also experienced an internal
bureaucratic growth which could not have been achieved without the availability of government funding. From 1974 to 1981, leaders hired both social animators and agents responsible for specific areas (education, community development, public relations etc.) who formed the core of an active Federation personnel. In many ways, this "professionalisation" of the FFC paralleled its own evolution as the porte-parole of an entire community. Planning, and the development of coherent short- and long-term objectives, were part of a more general Federation goal to efficiently perform complex tasks on behalf of Franco-Columbians, and to assume responsibility for coordinating the variety of demands placed upon them.

Successes in the education field, an enhanced political presence at both levels of government, French television stations, a Franco-Columbian Historical Society, a five year community development plan, self-financing, and more, left little doubt that the FFC had proven its worth to Franco-Columbians. The motors were well-oiled, and the machine appeared to be running smoothly. But, because of its broader perspective and increased bureaucratisation, the Federation came to be separated from the society it governed.

As leaders transformed the Federation into a federally-funded bureaucratic machine, it grew increasingly differentiated from the local community associations. With enhanced political action and increased interference in local community activities, administrative problems linked to the representativeness of the Federation surfaced once again. Lack of membership renewal, internecine conflicts between local associations and the Federation head office, and personality conflicts based somewhat on a French European versus French Canadian cultural division within the Franco-Columbian community were harbingers of a growth crisis within the Federation. After a series of minor events and one resignation, the floor gave way early in 1981. In an attempt to resolve their frustration with a centralized administration, a group of regional officers and local representatives within the Federation's General Council felt compelled to act decisively. The Federation's lethargic leadership was, in their view, unable to provide an efficient, open administration representative of the francophone community. They had become isolated from Franco-Columbians during the Federation's growth process. The Federation had taken on a life of its own and had succumbed to bureaucratic inertia. Consequently, both the Executive Committee and the Director-General were forced to resign in what amounted to a well-orchestrated "coup d'état".

Much like a decade earlier, the 1981 annual meeting focussed
on a redefinition of the Federation's role as its leaders once again re-established contacts with the community to seek new directions. "Orientations 1980" left little doubt as to the forward-looking approach desired by all. The Federation had to re-establish its credibility. A general malaise hung over the organisation for a year during which time Federation leaders and the active francophone population discussed the role of the FFC. Political pressure group? A central coordinating station offering services? A unifying instrument? Should individuals have membership status?

The francophone community shared surprisingly little interest in these internal squabbles. Symptomatic of the gap between leaders and the francophone population, concern for the Federation seemed limited to those very people caught up in the crisis itself. Letters to the editor of le Soleil de Colombie contained more personal attacks and criticisms from those involved than comments from the community-at-large which seemed generally disinterested in the Federation. This leaves little doubt as to the image of the Federation as a coterie of activists wrestling control for themselves, and as a structure quite separate from the community.

At the 1982 General Congress, Federation members opted for a former version of the same organisational animal. Its leaders acknowledged the gap which had grown between the central
organisation and its local constituent members, and opted to tie local leaders more directly to Federation decision-making structures. Henceforth, only local associations would be members of the Federation. One wonders aloud whether this was not a practical decision to hide the fact that the Federation needed these associations to instil some interest in the Franco-Columbian community for things French.

Federation leadership exited somewhat scathed from the crisis. It remains without a doubt the symbolic leader of the Franco-Columbian community, but is now more concerned with achieving the consensus of its component parts and maintaining a regular contact with the Franco-Columbian community. Since 1982, the stormy waters have calmed considerably. Much of Federation attention now focuses on the technical aspects of planning on a yearly basis. Goal setting and the organisation of priorities, including progress reports, reflect a more "administrative centre" approach. The local-Federation division, which so easily deepened during the bureaucratisation of Federation leadership, has left a bitter after-taste in the mouths of many. Before that has been washed away completely, the FFC will continue to pursue community development activities, but through a more systematic use of its representative structures to prod the pulse of the community and its local leaders.
Conclusions

We have looked at the evolution of the Federation des Franco-Colombiens as leader of the French-speaking community in British Columbia. The slow growth of organisational development in this community took a dramatic turn in 1945 with the formation of the Fédération des Canadiens-Français de la Colombie-Britannique. The Federation became the focal point of an organisational network which hoped to develop a cohesive community from a dispersed group of francophones living in British Columbia.

This overview provides a number of key historical referent points for the rest of our analysis. Clearly, four periods outline the evolution of Federation leadership.

The formative years, from 1945 to 1960, highlight the slow growth of a socio-cultural community organisation. Two underlying divisions in the organisational network shaped the nature and scope of Federation leadership. First, whether the Federation would remain essentially a creature of the local associations or expand its breadth of operations brought to the fore different interpretations of the Franco-Columbian community. At the same time, local Catholic clergymen sought to maintain their influence in the Federation and the Franco-Columbian community amidst a growing secularisation of society.

During the 1960s, Federation leaders established a more permanent administrative base for themselves and thus
strengthened their leadership of the organisational network. Challenging the Catholic clergy and local leaders, they redirected Federation activities. It is here that we first gain sight of a new type of FFC leadership, one which favoured a more politically-active Federation as a means to secure access to all levels of government and, most importantly, to government financing. These new leaders used their administrative talents and took advantage of a favourable political climate to successfully re-orient Federation activities.

With the announcement of the Official Languages Policy by the federal government in 1969, and a series of funding programmes to support OLMs, the Federation became a government-funded policy agent and was able to secure a more entrenched position as community leader. The increased bureaucratisation and professionalisation of Federation activities encouraged by government policy and funds drew criticism, however, from the local community associations; the Federation appeared to ignore their needs.

By 1981, a Federation growth crisis revealed a number of key problems with Federation leadership which were symptomatic of the dramatic changes brought to its leadership role since 1969.

From this historical overview, we can also discern four methods used by Federation leaders to develop an organisational
network for the Franco-Columbian community. They are: financial management, organisational growth, interaction with community members, and political advocacy. Each method encompasses one or more of the functions we have already attributed to interest group leaders as intermediaries between their interest community and the political process (contact, definition, member recruitment, and group management; see Chapter 2). How and why the relationships between these methods and functions changed as the Federation became a government-funded policy agent is the focus for the rest of our study. In conjunction with the three preceding chapters, therefore, these historical periods can help us appreciate the impact of federal funding on Federation leadership. Chapters 5 through 8 deal in turn with each of the four methods used by FFC leaders.
ENDNOTES

1. Many French Canadians accompanied Alexander Mackenzie, Simon Fraser, and David Thompson. The city of Quesnel, and river of the same name, honour a French Canadian, Jules Quesnel, second in command to Fraser in 1808.

2. John R. Stewart, French Canadian Settlement in British Columbia, unpublished MA thesis, UBC, 1956, p. 15. Also, see Olivier Maurault, Au berceau de la Colombie, Montréal: Les Editions de Dix, 1948. The author tells of a French Canadian presence at Fort George (Prince George) and Fort Langley, and of a French Canadian, Ovide de Montigny, who was instrumental in setting up Fort Okanagan.

3. Olivier Maurault, p. 16. In 1838, Fathers Modeste Demers and Norbert Blanchet arrived at the Willamette settlement and began a series of missionary expeditions to various Catholic communities in the province, notably on Vancouver and Whitby Islands, at Fort Vancouver, Prince George, and in Puget Sound. British Columbia at the time encompassed a large part of Washington State. The territorial component of the French Canadian community was anything but definite. The settlement of a boundary dispute with the Treaty of Washington in 1813 established the boundaries of religious activity. Bishop Demers would have specific responsibilities for the French Catholic population in British territory.

4. Stewart, p. 22.

5. Ibid., p. 28.

6. Ibid., p. 16.

7. Ibid., p. 27.

8. Ibid., p. 33.

9. Catherine Lengyel and Dominic Watson, La situation de la langue française en Colombie-Britannique, Montréal: Conseil de la langue française, 1983, p. 18. The fact that many of the priests and settlers were not only French Canadian, but Belgian, French, and Swiss, also hindered the development of a homogeneous community.

10. Ibid., p. 24.
12. Stewart, p. 47.
13. Ibid., p. 52.
14. Ibid., p. 49.
15. Lengyel, p. 18.
18. de la Gironday, p. 165.
20. Ibid.
21. de la Gironday, p. 165.
22. Savoie, p. 69.
23. Maurault, p. 28.
25. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1945. This text is from the Federation's 1945 founding Constitution. Translated, it reads: "We will maintain our faith and our rights." From the Archives of the Societe historique franco-colombienne (SHFC), PO1.03.02.01.
26. Savoie, p. 68.
27. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1951. SHFC P01.03.08.01.
29. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1951. Speech by R.P. Meek s.s.s., SHFC PO1.03.08.01.

30. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1946. SHFC PO1.03.02.01.


33. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 8 April 1951. A $50.00 donation to the Joint Catholic Committee is proposed and adopted. SHFC PO1.02.09.02.

34. Beaudin, appendix.


37. Lengyel, p. 18.

38. G. Bergeron (General Secretary FCFCB) to Paul-Emile Gosselin (Conseil de la Vie Française en Amérique) 01 February 1963, SHFC PO1.06.05.02.

39. Ibid.

40. In the 1960s, money is solicited from the ACELF, the Conseil de la Vie Française en Amérique, and from l'Assurance-Vie Desjardins during discussions of establishing a permanent Secretariat for the Federation.

41. In the 1950s, the Federation received funds from the Comité permanent de la survivance française en Amérique. At a 1951 executive meeting, there is talk of how to distribute $500 received amongst Federation members. SHFC PO1.02.09.02.

42. Roméo Paquette (Federation Liaison Agent) to Paul-Emile Gosselin (Conseil de la Vie Française en Amérique) 03 July 1963. SHFC PO1.06.05.02. Money from these organisations was given by the Government of Quebec through its new Ministry of Cultural Affairs.

43. Beaudin, p. 8.
44. With the Quebec Quiet Revolution, new ideas and a new class of well-educated people came to BC. Religion began to lose its importance for French Canadians more generally, and B.C. was no different. Interview with Catou Lévesque, president, SHFC, 19 nov. 1985.

45. For example, la Société Bi-culturelle de Maillardville, l'Association des Pensionnaires de Maillardville et l'Association des Scouts et Guides de Maillardville.


47. Lengyel, p. 39. At the 1964 annual meeting, members adopted a resolution in favour of pressuring the provincial government for French language schools.


49. Paquette, "La Fédération ... c'est quoi," p. 3.

50. Ibid.

51. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1970. SHFC PO1.03.27.01.

52. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1971 SHFC PO1.03.28.01.


56. "Congrès de la Fédération ...", p. 4.

57. In the Reports of 1971 annual meeting we discover that the federal government subsidized the CIM study to the tune of $17 000, SHFC PO1.03.27.01.
58. l'Appel, vol. 6, no. 9, 20 November 1970, p. 2. Many Franco-Columbians perceived the Federation as an exclusive, conservative, Catholic clique which was indifferent to interests of the whole community; the Federation had been unable to attract a sufficient proportion of the Franco-Columbian community to participate in a Franco-Columbian collectivity. That there were only 400 active members in the Federation out of a population of 75 000 hinted at the general apathy. Personality conflicts, lack of publicity, and inadequate communication links between the Federation and local associations explained this lack of interest; and successes in lobbying the provincial government on specific issues were overshadowed by the general misperception of the Federation's representative role, which was partially linked to its inability to account for regional needs.

59. FFC, Annual General Assembly, 1970. SHFC PO1.03.27.01.


63. "FFC: La Fédération des Franco-Colombiens," Le Soleil de Colombie, vol. 8, no. 8, 20 June 1975, p. 5. The number of regions increased from 3 to 9. The new regions include:

   Lower Fraser (Maillardville, Coquitlam, New Westminster, Surrey)
   Cariboo-Okanagan (Kamloops, Kelowna, Penticton, Vernon)
   Greater Vancouver (Burnaby, Delta, Richmond, N. Vancouver, W. Vancouver)
   Vancouver Island-North (Port Alberni, Campbell River, Comox, Courtenay, Powell River)
   Vancouver Island-South (Victoria)
   Peace River (Dawson Creek, Fort St. John)
   Fraser Valley (Chilliwack, Haney, Mission)
   Skeena Valley (Kitimat, Prince Rupert, Terrace)


66. "L'éducation: une vraie priorité ..."

67. Lengyel, p. 40.


71. Marc Béliveau, "Editorial: 32ème Congrès de la F.F.C.", Le Soleil de Colombie, vol. 10, no. 5, 27 May 1977, p. 2. Two national forums on minority language issues, two publications reflecting the dismal state of French language minority populations in Canada, and a political manifesto presented during the 1979 federal election, all raised the political consciousness of Federation members, and reflected a desire to expand beyond social and cultural activities.


73. Interview with François Savard, Agent politique, FFC, 24 October 1985.

74. Beaudin, p. 8.

75. Ibid., p. 11.

76. Interview with Marc Roy, Director-General, FFC, May 1986. Roy accounts for the crisis as a revolt by the regional representatives against the head office in Vancouver.

77. From a reading of the letters to the editor of the Soleil during the period, and from a reading of the reports of the crisis, it is clear that the Vancouver vs. regions division was prominent. Moreover, all of the dissidents were regional representatives and stood to gain from the crisis.

78. Letters to the editor of any great depth were from either of the two camps fighting for control of the FFC.

80. Ibid.

81. This comes out of a General Council meeting in mid-September 1981, as reported in Le Soleil de Colombie, vol. 14, no. 16, 2 October 1981.

82. Interview with Marc Roy
CHAPTER 5

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THE SECRETARY OF STATE TAKES OVER

In order to understand the success of Federation leadership, we have to examine the evolution of its financial framework, since it is with financial resources that FFC leaders have been able to supply the necessary personnel and activities which give life to the community organisation. The most significant impact on Federation finances and leadership occurred with the announcement of the federal government's Official Languages Policy in 1969. In this chapter we outline why this singular event was so critical to Federation finances, and explain how it helped facilitate changes in the methods FFC leaders used to shape and maintain an organisational network for the Franco-Columbian community.

Financial management means, quite simply, the generation of sufficient revenues to pay for a wide variety of interest group activities, and the spending of the acquired funds to benefit the interest community. In both instances, interest group leaders use financial management to satisfy the four leadership functions.

On the revenue side, they seek out contributions from members of the interest community not only to acquire the much-needed funds, but also to contact and encourage them to feel a
part of the interest group. Those who do contribute and join, develop an affinity for the group and come to value its leadership for what it brings to the community. Leaders, therefore, value financial contributions as a measurement of their legitimacy and mandate.

At another level, members' contributions are a guarantor of power. The "power of the purse" confers authority on members who can, if they wish, play an important role in defining the interest group, whether with voting rights, through elected positions or as a result of their participation in the decision-making process. Moreover, leaders need member contributions for group survival, and thereby freely acknowledge the importance of membership to interest group management.

On the expenditure side, leaders use the money to provide activities which will attract members. They develop community activities, build bureaucratic structures, undertake political action, and design cultural events which give scope, shape, and definition to interest group leadership. Since leaders spend for the benefit of the interest community, it is assumed that these various activities will generate a high level of affinity with the group and its leaders. How they spend, therefore, will affect the strength of member commitment to the group.

The availability of government funds can transform the ways interest group leaders use financial management to execute their four functions. No longer dependent solely on members for
financial survival, and free of the "power of the purse", they can act more independently of membership. Leaders may, in fact, be encouraged by government policies to spend in areas previously neglected due to a lack of funds. The type of activity pursued may be changed substantially once leaders adopt the bureaucratic norms which come to pervade the group-government relationship. Concerns for contact and member recruitment can be easily lost amidst those of cost effectiveness and the constant worry of the availability of funds.

In the specific case of the Fédération des Franco-Colombiens, federal grants and subsidies allocated through the OLMG programme helped to transform FFC financial management in three ways.

First, local community organisations played a greatly diminished financial role in Federation affairs. The FFC moved from being an organisation largely financed by members of the Franco-Columbian community to an organisation almost completely supported through public funds. This reduced the financial ties Franco-Columbians had with their Federation and, plausibly, diminished the perceived value of volunteer involvement in Federation activities. Moreover, as Federation leaders became increasingly frustrated with the low level of member contributions, they were able instead to use government funds, often moving the community in new directions against the wishes of local activists.
Second, Federation leaders increasingly turned to one revenue source to finance Federation activities. The federal government essentially replaced all other financial contributors. As a government-funded policy agent, the Federation's future became intimately linked to the success or failure of federal public policy.

Third, Federation spending patterns broke with the past. As more money came available, FFC leaders turned to the construction of a bureaucratic and professional organisation. This tended to reinforce the Federation's image as a "distant", separate, and largely unknown entity working on behalf of Franco-Columbians.

5.1. Federation Revenues: Who's Footing The Bill?

The FFC draws revenues from three sources: the Franco-Columbian community, private francophone organisations outside British Columbia (largely Quebec-based), and governments. As Federation financial management evolved, government essentially replaced the Franco-Columbian community and private francophone organisations as the main source of Federation revenues. The key turning point in this transition coincided with the federal government's Official Languages Policy in 1969.
5.1.1. A Community-financed Federation 1945 - 1968

During its first years, Federation leaders had to work with the meagre sums found in Franco-Columbian pockets. To quote a long time activist: "On passait beaucoup de temps à ramasser des sous." Various socio-cultural activities like the "Federation Day", draws, bazaars, and French-Canadian soirées brought revenues to Federation coffers. Annual membership fees and regular financial campaigns also helped to consolidate a "community" financial base.

One notable source of non-governmental revenues came in the form of a "financial club" called the "Club des 200". Created in 1955, the "Club" solicited personal donations from Franco-Columbians to create a reserve fund for the Federation. Members of this Club desired a better-organised Federation and envisaged its influence spreading to all parts of the province. Between 1956 and 1964, the "Club" held an average fund of $620 for Federation use. During the 1960s, the "Club de soutien" continued gathering community dollars to help finance Federation activities, but fell to the wayside once government funding came available.

In 1961, the Federation tried to raise community money through a deal it made with a Montreal-based insurance company, Assurance-Vie Desjardins. As the company's BC agent, FFC leaders attempted to recruit Franco-Columbians through a new form of membership - "assured members" - according to which those who
bought an insurance policy from the Desjardins company automatically became Federation members. In this way, the leaders could attract both members and dollars to the Federation.

If we look at Figure 5.1, which shows the distribution of total revenues across the three sources over the Federation's history, it is easy to see the preponderance of revenues derived from the Franco-Columbian community and private francophone organisations during its first 20 years. In fact, from 1945 to 1955, Franco-Columbians contributed more than 85% of annual Federation revenues. The curve in Figure 5.1A shows this high level of community contributions. Though the same curve drops off somewhat after 1955, Franco-Columbians consistently offered a relatively high level of financial support to their Federation until 1963, averaging 53.1% of total Federation revenues.

What impact did this "community-based" financial framework have on Federation leadership? First, as a product of local community membership and activity, the Federation seemed part of the Franco-Columbian community. Its leaders moved in and out of local associations to drum up support and solicit donations. Contributing time and money to social activities, local volunteers had a great deal of personal involvement with the success or failure of the Federation. This generated ties to local structures and meant that FCFCB leadership grew out of a cohesive community effort.
FIGURE 5.1 - PPC Revenue Sources 1945-1985

A. Community

B. Private Francophone Organisations

C. Government/Non-government

D. Quebec vs. Ottawa
Second, as long as local community organisations financed Federation activities, contact with members was critical to the survival of the network, because only community funds and participation would ensure its viability. This produced a built-in two-fold restriction on the kind of activities leaders could pursue: limited funds slowed the growth of a broad organisational network, and therefore left the Federation with a simple administrative framework. Concurrently, since the Federation was quite dependent on local organisations for revenues, it could not readily forego local commitment to particular programmes or activities.

Several private francophone organisations, principally the Conseil de la Vie Française and the Association Canadienne des Educateurs de Langue Française, gave financial support to the FCFCB through general grants and donations. (See Appendix 1 for complete list of donating organisations.) Their commitment to a broad French Canadian solidarity translated into support funds for various Federation cultural and education projects.

The influx of these funds immediately affected the revenue distribution as can be seen in Figures 5.1A and 5.1B. Between 1956, when the first funds arrived from outside the province, and 1967, when government dollars began to pour into Federation coffers, the "community" proportion of Federation revenues stood at an annual average of 39%. Private organisation contributions, on the other hand, averaged 46% annually. The tide turned most
noticeably in 1964 when the Conseil de la Vie Française provided financial support for the Federation's permanent Secretariat, and as a result, boosted the private organisation share of Federation revenues to an annual average of 65.7% until 1967; for the same three-year period, Franco-Columbians contributed a mere 15.3% to Federation coffers annually, falling from the 53% average in the previous decade.

The effects of this transition from Franco-Columbian community to private revenue sources outside the province had four effects on Federation leadership functions.

First, the Federation became less financially dependent on local associations. Indeed, its financial survival would no longer be tied to the ebb and flow of the number of active members at the local level nor to the amounts derived from community activities. Other sources would fill the pecuniary vacuum left by a waning local membership. In this situation, contact with members for financial management seemed less crucial. Leaders were attracted to the possibility of enhanced revenues, and actively pursued relations with the various outside private organisations. Our later discussions show that these outside sources became critical to Federation survival in the late 1960s when local organisations were unable to generate enough funds to sustain its administrative Secretariat.

Second, since it was Federation leaders who actively sought
these outside funds, and given that the contributions were made directly to the Executive Committee, and not to the local associations, Federation leaders gained increased recognition and importance within the Franco-Columbian community as financial managers. This brought legitimacy to their criticisms of local and Church authorities during the 1960s for their inability to generate funds for Federation activities.

Third, financial help from private organisations outside the province reinforced the idea that Franco-Columbians were indeed part of a larger French Canadian society, one which was ready to provide support. This gave credence to Federation assertions regarding the importance of looking beyond the local parish and French Clubs to define the Franco-Columbian community within a national perspective.

Another, and perhaps unintended, consequence of these outside private funds was that they eventually drove the FCFCB to search for government aid. As noted earlier, financial support from the Conseil de la Vie Française in the early 1960s aimed to create a permanent francophone administrative base in British Columbia. The three-year $24 000 agreement, which expired in 1968, was supposed to put the Federation's Secretariat on its feet and thereby generate enough community activity to guarantee long term financial success. This objective fell victim to several unsuccessful financial campaigns which showed Franco-Columbians unable or unwilling to sustain permanent
Therefore, money had to be found elsewhere if the Federation were to survive.

Conscious of this reality, Federation leaders began questioning the utility of an organisation which could not pay for itself. However, discussions between Federation and local leaders regarding financial self-sufficiency painted the picture of a child still dearly attached to the maternal baby bottle. Unappreciative of the Federation's financial straits, or merely unwilling to relinquish their administrative base, local activists queried: Why was it necessary to dismantle the Secretariat when money to support it was still coming in from external sources? Federation leaders thus had to turn to government for financial help or else face organisational bankruptcy.

5.1.2. The Secretary of State Takes Over 1969-1985

Already in 1964, the first glimmer of government financing shone through to Federation coffers. Active on the Quebec scene since the early 1960s, Franco-Columbian leaders had succeeded in obtaining grants from the "Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières" which was part of the newly-formed Quebec Ministry of Cultural Affairs. On the federal side, it was largely in response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism that the first hints of federal participation were felt in Federation
financial affairs. Ottawa relieved Federation needs from the late 1960s onward through its various bilingualism promotion programmes. From this moment on, we can distinguish a dramatic turn in Federation revenue sources.

Figure 5.1C shows the radical upswing in the "government" curve which combines both federal and Quebec funds. Conversely, there is a rapid downturn in the "non-government" curve comprising revenues from the Franco-Columbian community and private francophone organisations. Between 1967 and 1969, the government share of revenues increased from 8.4% to 68.9%. For the same period, the non-government portion dropped from 82.9% to 25.9%. As the graph shows, the key turning point occurred in 1968-69 which coincides with the arrival of federal funds through the Official Languages Policy. Since then, the government share of Federation revenues has only once fallen below the 80% level annually; its average has hovered around 85.2%. The Franco-Columbian community, on the other hand, has contributed on average only 7.1% of Federation revenues annually.

If we take a closer look at the origin of government funds, we notice the relative preponderance of one source, the federal government. Both governmental actors had different interests in according financial support to the Federation. Amidst broad socio-political changes in Canadian society during the 1960s, which included a more nationalist-oriented Quebec government, both Ottawa and Quebec City vied for the position of "porte-
parole" for French Canadians both inside and outside Quebec. Financial support through new civil service structures and various policy initiatives provide ample evidence of this underlying rivalry.

Out of Quebec's Quiet Revolution emerged a political flowering of sorts which encompassed a nationalist pride and a contemporary version of the "mission civilisatrice". Instead of Catholic missionaries, however, the Quebec Government used financial support to show French Canadian minorities its commitment to French Canada. Financial aid for cultural projects was forthcoming through the "Service" as the Quebec government played its "mère-patrie" role for francophone minorities. A strong Quebec meant a strong French Canada; this would in turn legitimize Quebec's demands for special status within the Canadian Confederation.

In Ottawa, this heightened Quebec nationalism, and the Quebec/French Canada equation, flew in the face of federal government attempts to generate French-English harmony and national unity. Moreover, it risked undermining the legitimacy of the Canadian State to speak on behalf of all Canadians. As a result, Ottawa appeared to challenge Quebec City dollar for dollar, and eventually outlasted the Quebec Government's financial commitment to French Canadian minorities.

Quebec's reaction to this "spending war" was one of
complacent acceptance. By the late 1960s, Quebec had already begun to reduce the scope of its commitment to the francophone minorities. In 1969, "Service" Director, G.H. Dagneau, explained that grant renewals would only cover "cultural" projects falling directly under his Ministry's mandate. Support for activities in education and organisational operations would no longer be forthcoming. In a 1974 speech to francophone minority leaders, Cultural Affairs Minister, Denis Hardy, acknowledged the federal Secretary of State's predominant role in French Canada outside Quebec, and explained that the Quebec Government no longer needed to be as financially committed to francophone minority associations. As we will see in Chapter 8, the Quebec Government continued to support French Canadian minorities during the 1970s, but tended to tie its efforts to developments within Quebec itself.

The force of the federal government's spending power in francophone communities outside Quebec legitimized the Quebec government's decision to speak on behalf of the Québécois, but undermined the latter's attempts to equate all of French Canada with Quebec. Given the federal government's enthusiasm for the development of minority communities and the large sums of money made available to the FFC, Federation leaders came to perceive the federal government as its protector.

Thus, for Federation leaders' financial management concerns, there was a definite transition from Quebec City to Ottawa in the
late 1960s as they turned to the latter for financial salvation. This displacement of Quebec occurred not only because of FFC actions, whose leaders sought to derive benefits from government initiatives, but also because, with the adoption of the Official Languages Policy, the federal government proved willing to use its spending power to secure a legitimate national role as spokesperson for French Canada (see Chapter 1).

Figure 5.1D reveals that between 1964 and 1969, when Quebec regularly garnished Federation coffers, its average annual share represented 80.9% of governmental funds given to the Federation. In one year, 1968-1969 Ottawa and Quebec changed places; Quebec's share of government contributions dropped from 68.5% to 35.7%, whereas Ottawa's portion more than doubled, from 31.2% to 64.3%.

Since 1970, Quebec's share has averaged a mere 3.1% of government funds; its average annual contribution to total Federation revenues fell to 5.7%. Conversely, the Federation received an average of 85.2% of its revenues from the federal government. It is also noteworthy that the frequency of Quebec's contributions diminished markedly after 1973, only twice in 12 years.

This domination of government revenues has had three major effects both on Federation financial management and on the exercise of its leadership functions.

First, the FFC's financial "security" became more intimately
linked to fluctuations in the Canadian political system than to leadership activities at the community level. Though federal language policies of the 1970s favoured bureaucratic growth within the Federation and other OLMOs, modifications made to these policies have had an impact on the actions of these associations. One good example of this vulnerability occurred with the adoption of a federal multiculturalism policy. Francophone minority leaders found that this directly threatened them, and felt betrayed by the "politics" involved:

On parle désormais de "multiculturalisme" comme solution à tous les problèmes mais pour les minorités francophones, c'est la sentence de mort du biculturalisme. (...) Car ces minorités francophones ont déjà fourni sa justification à la politique de monsieur Trudeau, et elles ont contribué à assurer à Ottawa l'appui du Québec en se manifestant comme "vivantes" dans une Confédération renouvelée, signe qu'elles seraient difficilement viables dans une Confédération désintégrée. Puisque l'unité nationale semble assurée, puisque la prophétie de 1968 s'est accomplie, pourquoi continuer de se soucier de l'épanouissement culturel total de ces minorités francophones, qui ne constituent plus un atout politique majeur?(15)

When structural changes to the Secretary of State were implemented to reflect this new multiculturalism policy, francophone leaders vigorously criticized the "political" changes which diminished the special status granted French language minorities in the Official Languages Policy:
Les minorités sont reconnues par Ottawa, de 1969 à 1973: on leur fait espérer une vie nouvelle. En 1973 c'est le début de la fin. Changement des priorités, réorganisation au sein du Secrétariat d'État et réaction négative anglophone font que les minorités francophones se retrouvent à l'heure actuelle dans une situation d'arrêt, de déception, de découragement.(16)

This vulnerability to policy changes, and to the political process in general, is also tied more directly to the availability of government funding. Grumblings in Ottawa over the federal debt at the end of the 1970s brought criticisms of the OLMG programme, with certain politicians and the Auditor General questioning the use of government funds by minority associations. Some claimed that these associations had too much freedom with federal dollars. Yet another evaluation of government support loomed, and this caused concern in the minority communities.

Financial security, then, appeared to guarantee nothing more than a precarious existence for the Federation, according to which the FFC's capacity to respond to Franco-Columbian needs is tied more to changes in the political system than to financial management rooted in community activities. As long as the Official Languages Policy remains a legitimate concern atop the federal political agenda, the Federation may have little cause for concern. Still, the nature of its organisation activities will certainly be affected by the prospect of losing much-needed federal funds. Ultimately, this will have an impact on the way
the Federation exercises leadership on behalf of Franco-Columbians. The more they turn to Ottawa, the less they depend on the community. Thus, whereas the desire for financial security drives them to expend a great deal of energy on developing political advocacy strategies and generating ties to the political system, it can also reduce the amount of time and money spent on ensuring the vitality of its organisational network base through regular contact, member recruitment, and community activities.

Second, Federation leaders developed an insatiable appetite for federal funds, one which translated into a dependency on those same funds for accomplishing goals and objectives linked to their leadership functions. This has occurred on several occasions. For example, Federation leaders attributed a financial crisis in 1973 more to the low level of federal government financing than to the FFC's use of available funds. They held this opinion despite a government auditor's report stating that the FFC did not know how to control its own spending.

Again, in 1976, the Federation suggested modifications be made to government financing in order that it receive more money for long term planning:

Le gouvernement devrait nous donner la possibilité de créer des projets d'autofinancement — (...) plutôt que de nous donner juste de quoi payer le loyer, les salaires et le transport.
Federation leaders confirmed the clear link established between financial management and federal funds as a member association of the Fédération Canadienne-Française de l'Ouest (FCFO). In a statement to the Secretary of State, the FCFO claimed that

[l']essor même des associations grâce au soutien du Secrétariat d'État a créé chez la population francophone de nouveaux besoins auxquels il leur faut aujourd'hui répondre.(20)

In other words, Secretary of State money encouraged the expansion of Federation programmes and activities, but also nourished a desire for increased revenues to enhance programme activity. It was incumbent upon the Secretary of State to assume its full responsibilities to satisfy this desire.

Interestingly, a 1982 study commissioned by the Secretary of State revealed that FFC leaders recognised and felt this financial dependency. When asked to list the means by which government could best help the Franco-Columbian community, "financial support" was mentioned most often (45% of responses). In the same study, certain advantages and disadvantages of federal grants were noted. The category "Excessive dependency on the Secretary of State" received the
most attention (37.5% of responses). As for advantages, the category "Organisation independence" accumulated a mere 4.2% of the responses.

The real significance of financial dependency on Ottawa to Federation leadership seeps to the surface when one considers the possibility of a Federation without federal government financing. Demonstrably, cutting the financial lifeline of the Federation would dramatically alter the nature of its financial management and leadership roles. It being impossible to establish the same levels of financial revenues from the community alone, FFC leaders would either rally to sustain a less active central organisation or focus more attention on local community associations. Greater responsibility would need to be delegated to local leaders, thus creating a more decentralized organisational network. Federation leadership in this instance would probably be limited to the Vancouver area.

Third, the nature of government financing appeared to directly affect Federation leaders' definition of the organisational network. Here, government policy came to shape the Franco-Columbian community in two ways.

On a strictly financial basis, we see from Figure 5.2 that the Federation received an average of 56.1% of total federal funds distributed annually to British Columbia through the OLMG programme between 1971 and 1985. The other 44% was shared by a
multitude of other local organisations. In this sense, the federal government chose the Federation as its major policy agent, building a financial and administrative giant compared to local organisations. On occasion, this has provoked a reaction against the extravagant expenses needed to maintain the Federation's Secretariat.

A closer look at the distribution of federal funds to BC francophone organisations suggests that the financial imbalance in the province as a whole could have enhanced the divisive effects of the local-Federation axis on the organisational network (see Chapter 4). In fact, the large percentage of non-FFC locally-allocated funds went to two Vancouver-based
organisations, the Centre Culturel Colombien and the Fédération Jeunesse Colombienne, both of which received on average 42.2% of these funds between 1979 and 1985. If we include the funds placed in Federation coffers, an average of 68.8% of all federal monies for British Columbia went to three Vancouver-based associations. Regional jealousies and a Vancouver-centred Federation could very well have contributed to the centre-periphery battle which appeared to underlie the 1981 administrative crisis. We take a more detailed look at this possibility in the next chapter.

In terms of Federation leadership, government financing may have also endangered the overall success of volunteer recruitment. Some Franco-Columbians appeared less willing to become involved in a "distant" bureaucratic Federation. For a few, community spirit and participation lost some of its life when the Federation's professional staff replaced local volunteers. To quote one activist: "Why do volunteer work when they're paid for it at the Federation?" Former Federation president, Roger Albert, went so far as to announce the death knoll of Franco-Columbian community spirit; federal government financing, he stated, was maintaining a bureaucratic structure which no longer had the support of the community. In the Secretary of State study cited earlier, one of the disadvantages of government funding mentioned most often was the danger of losing volunteers and of killing community initiative (25% of
responses). Separated as such from the organisational bases it helped build to serve Franco-Columbians, Federation leadership may thus function in somewhat of a vacuum.

These three consequences of federal government financing on Federation revenues help put into perspective the relationship between FFC financial management and the functions exercised by its leaders on behalf of the Franco-Columbian community. Whereas government funding brought new activities and an expanded administrative structure, it also created a dependency on government funds and, in many ways, replaced the community spirit which so often embellished the organisational network with a stagnant air of officialdom. More money has not meant necessarily a more vibrant Federation. Where better to view this transformation than in changes made to Federation leaders' spending patterns.

5.2. Federation Expenditures: A Bureaucratic Spending Spree

The impact of federal government support also touched the way Federation leaders spent their revenues. Not only was there a great deal more money to spend, but the influx of government funds produced a number of spending priority changes.

If we examine Figure 5.3A, which shows the total amount of money (in 1985 dollars) available for Federation spending since 1945, we can immediately see how the arrival of government
FIGURE 5.3 - FFC Expenditure Categories 1945-1985

C. Federation Affairs

Available Funds (1985 dollars)

A. FFC Budget ($1000)

D. Administration

Percent of Total Expenditures

Percent of Total Expenditures
support dramatically modified Federation financial fortunes. From 1946 to 1963, a period characterized by the two principal non-governmental revenue sources, Federation coffers contained an average of $6,615 annually. Once the Quebec government began to give financial aid, which added to Conseil de la Vie Francaise support, the well of funds filled to an annual average of $65,150, increasing some 885%. Since 1969, and the beginning of Ottawa's contributions, the amount of money available for spending climbed even more markedly; henceforth, FFC leaders could dip into an average annual budget well totalling $434,163. With this broadened financial base, the Federation had more money with which to expand activities and provide more services to local associations. Since the FFC controlled the distribution of outside funds, its leaders could more effectively determine the priorities and orientation of the organisational network. As we see in Chapter 6, increased funds expanded Federation activities and led leaders to favour a more complete and complex administrative framework to manage these activities.

Where exactly did Federation leaders spend this money? FFC expenditures can be separated into three broad categories: administration, community development, and Federation affairs (See Appendix 2 for examples of each). Figures 5.3B to 5.3D illustrate four prevailing changes in the allocation of resources to each spending category.
For the period 1946 to 1956, when the Franco-Columbian community contributed the majority of dollars to Federation coffers, its leaders concentrated on Federation affairs and community development, with annual averages of 35.4% and 34.5% of Federation spending respectively. Expenditure patterns indicate, and historical evidence corroborates, that the Federation was interested in consolidating itself as a community organisation during this period, tying this goal to community activities, most notably in the area of education and schools. Some concrete examples like the financing of parish schools in 1951 (61.1% of expenditures) and of a Franco-Columbian delegation to Quebec City in 1952 (81.0% of expenditures) reveal that the Federation funnelled a major part of its revenues back into the community via concrete activities. Clearly, the focus was on developing the community at the local level. Since no permanent Federation office existed, and no salaries had to be paid, the administrative costs of the Federation were relatively low. The administration category averaged 22.4% of expenditures annually.

From 1956 to 1963, when private francophone organisations shared the revenue scene with Franco-Columbians, Federation leaders once again directed their spending attention towards community development, this time at the expense of administrative priorities, which fell to an annual average of 13.4% of expenditures. The average amount spent on community development in—
creased from 35.4% to 44.4% annually. Thus, a growth in revenues translated into a promotion of community activities. As for Federation affairs expenditures, they remained stable at 36.2% annually. It was during this time that Federation leaders engaged in an expansion of community activities. In fact, from 1956 on, a series of Federation committees (radio, education, constitution, press, organisation) developed priorities in particular areas of Federation concern.

After 1963, Federation expenditures took a dramatic turn towards administrative expenses. (see Figures 5.3B and 5.3D) This coincided with the building of a permanent administrative Secretariat financed by the Conseil de la Vie Française. As we discover in later chapters, this decision by Federation leaders provoked opposition within the community as local and Church leaders objected to changes in the organisational network.

* The mirror images in the curves in Figures 5.3B and 5.3D for the 1963-1970 period are partially explained by the methods the author used to account for the Secretary-General's salary. We placed his salary in the administrative expense category due to the nature of the work he performed on behalf of the Federation in setting up and running the permanent Secretariat. As a result, administrative expenses accounted for nearly 90% of the total Federation budget, whereas in years previous to 1964 they were almost nil, according to Federation records. Our method for including salaries as expenses changes somewhat in the post-1970 period (see Figure 5.4), because the nature of the work performed by professional staff is more community development oriented. Hence, we measure salaries as a percentage of overall community development expenditures.
Not surprisingly, group management became a major preoccupation of Federation leaders. According to them, only with the Secretariat could the Franco-Columbian community hope to survive and flourish. Hence, from 1964 to 1968, administrative expenditures accounted for more than half the Federation's total annual spending, averaging 56.4%. Community development and Federation affairs average expenditures dropped as a result, to 18.2% and 21.5% annually.

Secretary of State funds allocated at the beginning of the 1970s, permitted a broadening of Federation activities, and sparked a return to spending on community development. During its structural rebuilding period, the Federation spent regularly on regional development and institutional support to local organisations. Between 1970 and 1985, administration expenditures (24.3% annually) took second place behind those for community development (63.0% annually). This showed that the Federation re-established a previous practice of funnelling external funds into initiatives which directly benefitted Franco-Columbians. However, the 1970s version of this practice exposed a very important characteristic of Federation community development spending.

The post-1970 period of federal financing highlighted the growth of a professional and bureaucratic Federation. Professionals were hired, and salaries paid, for work previously performed by volunteers. Even though more money was allocated
to community development than all other sectors, educated professionals in an enlarged bureaucratic structure drew a greater proportion of revenues in the form of salaries. (See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the professionalisation) The shaded portion in Figure 5.4 reveals that salaries took an average of 59.4% of community development dollars. Salary increases closely followed the fluctuations in community development expenditures noted in Figure 5.3B, most particularly in the post-1977 period when marked increases in federal allocations occurred. Franco-Columbians therefore saw the fruits of Federation work more in terms of personnel services than as concrete activities for which direct aid was received at the local level.

![Figure 5.4](image)

**FIGURE 5.4**
Salaries as a Percentage of Community Development Spending, 1970–85

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These modifications in Federation spending seemed to reinforce the Federation's image as "separate" from the local organisational network. The FFC became little more than an instrument to be used when needed. The more money leaders received, the more they put into salaried staff positions to offer services to Franco-Columbians from an increasingly bureaucratic Federation:

Les associations sont convaincues que le moyen le plus approprié pour que ces orientations puissent être prises et maintenues réside dans l'assistance que le Secrétariat d'État fournirait aux associations provinciales afin de permettre l'augmentation du personnel assignés à ces services et tâches indispensables à nos besoins.(29)

This bureaucratic image certainly inspired confidence in the Federation's instrumental cum practical usefulness, but appeared to offer little in the way of a collective consciousness which would attract induce member involvement and thereby give more life to the Franco-Columbian community. Therefore, whereas Federation spending has increased with the availability of government funds, leaders appear to have doled out more money for bureaucratic endeavours which, conceivably, limit their capacity to define and promote a viable francophone community.
Conclusions

In this chapter, we have unveiled different elements of Federation financial management as FFC leaders came under the influence of the single most important event in FFC history: the adoption of an Official Languages Policy in 1969 by the federal government. From our analysis emerged three general tendencies: the diminishing financial role played by the Franco-Columbian community; the growing preponderance of Secretary of State funds over that of all other financial sources; and the expansion of Federation expenditures, with a penchant for spending to sustain a bureaucratic structure of salaried professionals.

What are the consequences of these patterns? We identified three. First, Franco-Columbians tend to view Federation financial strength as a sign that their active participation in the organisational network is less important. As a result, it becomes more difficult to attract volunteers to do work for which Federation personnel receive salaries. This jeopardizes Federation leadership, because it is no longer perceived to be as closely bonded to the community it serves.

Second, the Federation is graced with a double-edged "political" financial security which sways with fluctuations in the political and economic environment. This results in an excessive financial dependency detrimental to the long term exercise of Federation leadership functions.

Third, Franco-Columbian leaders have developed an insatiable
appetite for government funds, tying the level of Federation activities to government financing. Its financial priorities are thus affected by policy considerations often beyond Federation control.

Federation leadership functions flourished with financial management, but in an environment which favoured bureaucratic structures dependent on outside, principally government, funds. In this light, financial management drew Federation leaders away from local associations and the Franco-Columbian community. Thanks to the large share of outside funds distributed to Federation coffers, FFC leaders could successfully develop "community-wide" activities above and beyond the local level, but expenditure patterns, which focussed on the build-up of a professional staff, only encrusted group definition in static administrative structures. Moreover, group management constructed a strong centre, but established weak links to buttress local foundations. Federation leaders benefitted from government funds while local organisations struggled financially, unable to compete for the same resources. In the next few chapters we expand upon some of these findings, and discover financial management to be particularly troublesome as Federation leaders continually minimized the importance of contact with the local organisational network, and ignored member recruitment for the more bureaucratic chores of group management and definition.
ENDNOTES

1. Raymond Breton, "Les réseaux d'organisations des communautés ethnoculturelles," Actes du premier colloque national des chercheurs: l'état de la recherche sur les communautés francophones hors Québec, Ottawa, 1984, p. 6. Breton mentions that the use of financial resources can determine whether or not the community organisational structure gives life to a viable community or whether, instead, an artificial structure is developed which bears no ties to the community itself.


3. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 06 December 1955. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

4. Ibid., 19 January 1967. SHFC P01.02.09.11.

5. Ibid., 28 May 1961. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

6. Interview with Napoléon and Amélie Gareau.

7. Roméo Paquette (FCFCB) to Paul E. Gosselin (Conseil de la Vie Française), 07 February 1963. SHFC P01.05.07.20.01.

8. The Assurance Vie Desjardins project failed to generate the necessary funds. In 1962, 70 "assured members" were reported in the records. However, the lack of sufficient evidence prevents us to verify the number of these members were already Federation members who were taking advantage of the opportunity to buy an insurance policy. In effect, at the 1966 AGA it was reported that this particular self-financing project had not attracted enough Franco-Columbians since the majority already had their own insurance policy. The provincial "recruitment" campaign launched in 1967 also failed to generate sufficient funds. (See FCFCB, Executive Committee, 29 June 1967. SHFC P01.02.09.14.) In early 1968, the financial base was dry, so Federation leaders decided to ask for more money from the Conseil de la Vie Française. In April of the same year, they wrote to the Secretary of State requesting financial aid. (See FCFCB, Executive Committee, 03 March 1968, 14 March 1968, and 18 April 1968. SHFC P01.02.09.15.)
9. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 03 November 1966. SHFC P01.02.09.14. At this Executive Committee meeting, Romeo Paquette questions the ability of Franco-Columbians to pay for the Secretariat.

10. Ibid.

11. Ministère des Affaires Culturelles du Québec, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières, Déclaration du Premier Ministre du Québec au sujet des minorités Canadiennes-Françaises, 03 May 1965, p. 2. SHFC P01.05.06.01.01.

12. G.H. Dagneau (Director, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières) to Roméo Paquette (FCFCB Director-General), 25 September 1970. SHFC P01.05.06.01.03.

13. Québec, Ministère des Affaires Culturelles, Discours de Denis Hardy, Ministre des Affaires Culturelles, 18 February 1975. SHFC P01.05.06.01.05.

14. FFC, Annual General Assembly, Secretary-General Report, 1970. SHFC P01.03.27.01. In his report, the Secretary General acknowledges that the functioning of Federation affairs had been greatly modified since the federal government took interest in francophone minorities. In that year, the FFC received $17 000 for a training and community mobilisation programme to be run by the Centre Interdisciplinaire de Montreal.

15. Groupe de travail sur les minorités de la langue française, C'est le temps ou jamais..., Report commissioned by the Department of the Secretary of State, November 1975, pp. 19-20.

16. Ibid., p. 21.

17. Jean Riou (Director-General FFC) to FFC General Council, 28 March 1979. SHFC P01.05.01.14.01.

18. "Commentaires de Edmond W. Lanthier, Comptable agréé", 15 November 1973. SHFC P01.05.01.14.03.

19. Canada, Department of the Secretary of State, Les Cahiers de Bilinguisme, Article by Jean Riou, June 1976.

21. Canada, Department of the Secretary of State, Besoins et perceptions des Franco-Colombiens, rapport final, Study done by the Centre de recherche et de consultation (CERECO) in Winnipeg, December 1982, p. 5.


23. Interview with André Piolat, owner of Le Soleil de Colombie and long time Federation activist, Vancouver, 04 July 1986.


25. Canada, Secretary of State, Besoins et perceptions..., p. 7.

26. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 05 February 1950. SHFC P01.02.25.01. Debates on the distribution of money received from the Comité permanent de la Survivance ($500) occurred at this meeting.

27. Personnel trained in communications, publicity, community development, and education were hired.

28. Interviews with:


Peggy Sigouin, coordinator, Club Bon Accueil de Powell River, Powell River, 07 July 1986.

29. FCFO, p. 9.
CHAPTER 6

ORGANISATIONAL GROWTH: BUREAUCRATISATION & PROFESSIONALISATION

Between 1945 and 1985, the Fédération des Canadiens-Français de la Colombie-Britannique (FCFCB) evolved structurally from a relatively simple institutional framework with decentralised authority into a more complex organisation with a distinctly more centralised authority. This chapter examines how Federation leaders used organisational growth as a leadership tool, and how the availability of government funds allowed them to build a bureaucratic and professional organisation which fundamentally altered the nature of their leadership functions.

When we speak of "organisational growth" as a leadership tool, we are referring to how interest group leaders use administrative structures to define the parameters of the interest community, to provide benefits to members through bureaucratic planning and management, and to encourage member participation through representational bodies.

Organisation provides leaders the means to contact their interest community, to become informed of the issues they must address, and to distribute information and messages which encourage members to join and remain loyal to the interest group. It also gives definition and scope to community development as leaders design projects which offer their own vision of the
interest community. Representational structures aid group management, because they permit an effective airing of members' concerns regarding the kinds of projects and the nature of leadership activity.

Once leaders gain access to government funds, and play a policy agent role on behalf of government, organisational growth becomes a less effective method for leaders to exercise their leadership functions. In the case of the FFC, Federation leaders' use of government funds facilitated the building of an organisational infrastructure for the Franco-Columbian community, and in the process contributed to four major changes to their leadership activity.

First, they challenged the foundations of local authority, redefining the structural apparatus of the Franco-Columbian community.

Second, they remodelled the division of powers within the organisational network to place much of the real group management authority in a centralised structure.

Third, Federation leaders built a bureaucratic and professional organisation which eroded functional contact links between itself and local associations.

Fourth, leaders used organisational growth to encourage member recruitment through more representative Federation bodies.
6.1. A Challenge to Local Authority

As a creature of local associations called "Cercles français", or French Clubs, the Fédération des Canadiens-Français de la Colombie-Britannique initially placed much executive, administrative, and democratic authority in the hands of local leaders. For these leaders, the true motor of French BC existed at the local community level. They viewed the Federation as an instrument to unite and strengthen, rather than replace, the many local organisations. The Federation, stated one long-time activist, was there as a tool to support local French Club activities.

Federation leaders, on the other hand, envisaged a Franco-Columbian organisation which extended beyond local community boundaries. Foremost in their minds was a desire to generate an awareness amongst Franco-Columbians of the distinct cultural and linguistic roots they shared with French Canadians beyond British Columbian borders. They deemed the Federation a guardian of Franco-Columbian collective interests and a central coordinator of community activities which sat atop the local organisational network.

This local-Federation axis encompasses much of what explains Federation organisational growth. In effect, developments within the organisational network gradually shifted authority toward the Federation. Between 1945 and 1965, four factors contributed to the breaking down of local foundations and the subsequent
redefinition of the organisational network by FFC leaders.

First, the limited expansion of local associations into all areas of the province and the low level of membership growth raised doubts as to the ability of local authorities to generate francophone participation and ties to the Franco-Columbian community.

Second, the growth of a number of "other" local organisations, which competed with local French Clubs as centres of community activity, drew Franco-Columbians away from the Federation.

Third, the institutionalisation of Federation authority in a permanent administrative Secretariat effectively replaced local organisations as the motor of community development.

Fourth, Federation leaders confronted the local French Canadian clergy on the issue of secular membership, and ultimately supplanted Church authority within the organisational network.

6.1.1. Limited Local Expansion

Local French Clubs held authority in Federation structures through constitutionally-acquired guarantees of representation on Federation bodies, through membership requirements which focused on local associations, and also by local financial contributions to Federation coffers. (See this latter point in Chapter 5.)
The basic structural framework of the FCFCB in its first years comprised two main democratic bodies: the Annual General Assembly (AGA) and the Executive Committee (see Appendix 3). Local organisations sent delegates to the AGA where they elected Executive Committee officers and made decisions on behalf of the whole organisational network.

At the instigation of local leaders, this simple arrangement underwent several modifications. In order to correct imperfections in the definition of decision-making relationships between the Executive Committee and the AGA, a flurry of constitutional amendments between 1949 and 1965 accorded local associations a better-defined position within the Federation, and assured a more decentralized control of Federation activities.

Membership requirements for the Federation also gave local French Clubs a determinant role in its activities. In effect, Franco-Columbians became members of the Federation only through these local Clubs. Active participation in specifically "Federation" affairs manifested itself only when members were elected to or worked on the various Federation Committees or the Executive.

This structural division of powers provided a framework for Federation and local leaders to work together to expand and consolidate a broad provincial francophone organisational network. The growth of local French Clubs across the province would enhance the Federation's "survivability" as members were
brought together in association, and would thereby give concrete definition to the community:

Il est désirable de recommander que tous les Canadiens-Français se donnent la main pour encourager les groupes à se joindre à la Fédération dans l'intérêt de la langue et pour propager notre survivance Catholique et française en Colombie.(4)

However, despite efforts to organise Franco-Columbians province-wide, the desired provincial network never really materialized. Local Club participation in Federation structures, particularly at the Annual General Assembly, reveals a pattern of limited growth.

In 1945, the Federation comprised six local French Clubs, all concentrated in the Lower Fraser Valley (Maillardville, Vancouver, New Westminster) and on Vancouver Island (Victoria, Port Alberni, Duncan). The Executive Committee could boast of substantial expansion to many areas early on, but, in reality, little growth occurred outside of the core six local French Clubs between 1950 and 1963. Whereas the number of active local Clubs did increase in the first ten years of the Federation, expanding to Prince George, Nanaimo, Duncan, and Kennedy, active participation in Federation affairs after 1950 was highly inconsistent. Nanaimo's delegation to the AGA fell off after 1955; Prince George did not become active until 1960; Duncan's participation was sporadic, and Kennedy's almost non-existent.
A look at Figure 6.1 shows that the membership rolls barely increased between 1950 and 1963; reaching 850 active members in 1961. Federation membership fell back to 500 in 1963. Only 1.2% of British Columbia's francophones were active local members in 1951, increasing to 3.2% in 1961. A yearly average of 547 members or 2.4% of BC francophones were active during this 10-year period. After more than a decade of organisational activity, then, Federation and local leaders had not succeeded in accomplishing many of their original organisational goals. Membership drives seemed unable to substantially increase either the number of local French Clubs or the overall active membership. Blueprints for an organisational network which would
stretch into all parts of the province, giving definition to the Franco-Columbian community, remained largely on the drawing board.

6.1.2. Growth of Non-Affiliated Local Organisations

To drive this point home further, we find that a substantial amount of organisational growth during this period occurred outside of traditional local French Club and parish structures. A range of "other" local organisations, which had no official linkages to Federation structures until 1962, sprouted up in the Vancouver-Maillardville area. Associations like the Association des Scouts de Maillardville (1955), the Association des Guides Catholiques (1957), the Société Bi-Culturelle de Maillardville (1967) or the Association des Pensionnaires de Maillardville, among others, competed quite successfully with local French Clubs for the Franco-Columbian clientele. Available records indicate that the number of members in these new organisations, expressed as a proportion of total community organisational membership, increased from 18% in 1963 to 66% in 1965 (Figure 6.2). As alternative outlets for community activity, they reflected the failure of Federation leaders to stir up interest amongst Franco-Columbians for the provincial association.
6.1.3. A Permanent Secretariat

To overcome organisational stagnation and decreasing membership, and to bring unity to all organisational efforts in the province, Federation leaders suggested serious structural revisions and the establishment of a permanent Federation Secretariat. In 1965, they formed five Federation committees to discuss the kinds of structures needed to rejuvenate the organisational network. Committee reports called for a remodelling of the separation of powers by centralising decision-making in Federation hands.

Importantly, the Committee on Structures voiced substantive criticisms of local French Clubs, asserting that they had not
evolved to reflect new community realities. Local leaders, it was claimed, had remained attached to their local Clubs without realising that, as social clubs for cultural activities, the structure was outdated and had become little more than a meeting place for elites.

The Federation fared much better in the report. Committee members believed that community survival was more likely to be assured with a central organisation tied to a pan-Canadian network. If the Federation remained an association of local French Clubs and parishes, the report claimed, it would disappear with those same Clubs and parishes as they became less significant community structures. It was therefore necessary to establish the Federation's role as coordinator of community activities. Tying this role to socio-political changes provincially and nationally, the report demanded an expansion of Federation activities into the political, social, and economic realms, beyond what the local Clubs could offer or were prepared to undertake. As we see in the next section, knowing that government funds were available for financing such an endeavour made the idea of organisational restructuring appear more feasible and, as such, more palatable to local associations.

In this light, a permanent administrative Secretariat would assure the viability of the Franco-Columbian community, and would respond to and guarantee four basic Federation concerns which could not be addressed by the less effective local associations.
First, it would ensure a growth in awareness amongst Franco-Columbians by unifying the many diverse francophone organisations in the province, and by increasing and assuring practical and effective participation by members in these organisations. In a letter to Paul E. Gosselin of the Conseil de la Vie Française, then Federation Secretary-General, G. Bergeron, wrote that social contacts between local French Clubs were still in the embryo stage, because no one was there to provide the necessary information and advice. The Secretariat would thus perform tasks previously a responsibility of the Executive Committee and local associations. Among other things, in 1965, Federation leaders launched an official newspaper, l'Appel, to serve as the motor of a Federation and Franco-Columbian communications network.

Second, the Federation's symbolic value would be enhanced. A permanent central administrative body would present more tangible evidence of Federation activities to encourage BC francophones to commit energies to the development of a viable community. Membership ranks in all organisations did swell somewhat. Figure 6.1 shows that from 714 active members in 1964, there was a steady increase to 864 in 1965, 1543 in 1967, then a drop to 1060 occurred in 1968.

Third, the Secretariat would serve as a focal point for financing Federation activities and for contact with
organisations outside the province. This would associate Franco-
Columbians more closely with the larger French Canadian society,
and provide an entry point for support from other francophone
groups and from governments. Moreover, the Secretariat would
take responsibility for the efficient use of funds received.

Last, as the Federation's administrative centre, with
representatives from associations and French Clubs on a new
Administrative Council, the Secretariat would provide better
administration of community development simply because it would
be a common institution to all. Its ability to produce official
documents, and to speak on behalf of Franco-Columbians would
ultimately help to legitimize the community as one worth
preserving. Since no common civil structures existed to provide
all these services, the Secretariat was deemed essential to the
survival of the Franco-Columbian community. Roméo Paquette
stated unequivocally in 1968 that only the FCFCB could claim a
provincial stature and provide the necessary leadership for
Franco-Columbians.

6.1.4. Confronting the Catholic Church

Many local leaders were unwilling to embrace such widespread
Federation assertions, being unsure of the consequences for local
priorities. Federation leaders attacked local authorities for
their failure to encompass Federation-defined objectives to
rejuvenate interest in the organisational network through
It would have been possible, suggested Roméo Paquette in 1969, to have a self-sufficient Federation within the context of a vibrant community, but due to narrow local elite priorities the importance of the Federation was reduced to nothing. Many local leaders did not, in fact, embrace the same vision of a Federation in which local concerns would be minimized or forgotten. Even if they valued the Secretariat, they preferred to concentrate on local priorities, and effectively boycotted the structural remodelling undertaken by Federation leaders. More determined efforts were needed to reintegrate them into the more centralised structures.

The most visible, and potentially most serious, manifestation of these efforts pitted local religious authorities against Federation leaders. The French Canadian Catholic church in British Columbia had played a crucial social and cultural role at the local community level in maintaining loyalties to "la langue
et la foi" amongst BC French Canadians. Some even considered the Federation a "Catholic movement". Before 1962, membership in the Federation was restricted to French Canadian Catholics. Well-entrenched in some French Canadian communities, the Church did not, however, possess a broadly-based structure which touched all areas of the province. Hence, Church authorities were most threatened by a secular force like the Federation, especially if it were to gain prominence at the local level.

Local clergymen concentrated most of their efforts in the local parish and French Club organisations. They oriented their participation on Federation bodies more towards delegate representation at the Annual General Assembly and managing the Education and Bursaries Committees than towards holding elective positions. Of the 84 individuals who were members of the Executive Committee between 1950 and 1969, only 17 or 19.3% were clergymen (see Appendix 4). Of these, 11 or 64.7% were direct local Club representatives who, thanks largely to a 1956 constitutional amendment, were permitted to sit on that body.

Spiritually, a religious presence in Federation affairs can be noted with the holding of mass before each Annual General Assembly and Executive meeting; also, the report of the Moral Officer (always a clergyman) as part of the official proceedings of the AGA provided spiritual direction to Federation members until the late 1960s. Some even spoke of a de facto veto held by the clergy on all Federation initiatives.
Though the Church became active in social and economic affairs, its most prominent community role was the creation and maintenance of French Catholic schools in BC. Church control of education matters - bursaries to Franco-Columbians to study outside the province, curriculum, and the hiring of teachers - guaranteed them a strong voice in any Federation policy concerning demands for French schools.

In their challenge to local authority, therefore, Federation leaders had to overcome the structural and spiritual force of local parish organisations in the community at large. They eventually perceived church structures as too restrictive and ineffective for developing a broad Franco-Columbian provincial organisational network. Hence, these structures were no longer valued as the only way to ensure the collective survival of Franco-Columbians. In those areas where parish organisations had effectively replaced French Clubs as the centre of community activity, it was felt that local elites somehow insulated the community from the importance of broad secular realities. The Federation suffered, as did Franco-Columbians:

Si nous en restons aux objectifs premiers de la Fédération, qui voyaient l'édifice paroissial comme une fin plutôt qu'une des cellules nécessaires à notre émancipation, nous devons nous accuser d'avoir pris un police d'assurance ne dépassant pas les bénéfices d'un enterrement de première classe. (23)
As the decade closed, the impact of religion and of clerical leaders within the Federation had been diminished quite significantly. Mass was no longer part of the AGA or Executive meetings; Federation leaders removed the Moral Officer position from the Executive; and membership requirements excluded any reference to religion.

It is important to underline that Federation leaders could not have undertaken this organisational growth without government funds, first from Quebec, and later from Ottawa. In the early 1960s, they knew of and were in close collaboration with officials in Quebec City who encouraged the formation of a more permanent administrative framework for French Canadian activities in the province. This government connection reinforced their conviction that the Federation was the only organisation competent enough to serve Franco-Columbians.

The availability of government funds appeared to contribute also to the general secularisation process, because Federation leaders believed that, in order to receive the funds, and show signs of a renewal process they would have to detach the organisation from the religious influence. Looking to advance organisation survival, and to broaden the membership base, they thus wished to remove the image of a Church-controlled organisation shared by many Franco-Columbians.

Overall, then, Federation leaders used organisational growth to challenge local authority and to thereby define the community
organisation within a more secular, centralised framework. Resistance to Federation initiatives came from Church and local French Club leaders and divided the organisational network along a Federation-local axis. This seriously undermined group management efforts during the 1960s, because local leader reluctance to accept proposed changes threatened Federation unity and survival.

The availability of government funds offered salvation to Federation leaders in their efforts to finance the Secretariat and to increase membership. It also allowed them to proceed without the support of local leaders. This "dissociation" of the local and Federation levels did not last long, however, because as government funds brought increased Federation activities, local leaders became more convinced of the benefits of a restructured Federation apparatus. Moreover, Federation leaders realised that the continued availability of government funds depended fundamentally upon the growth of local community activity. A rejoining of forces thus occurred to bring more cohesion to community efforts under the government umbrella. Only Church leaders remained adamant in their refusal to accept the new secular approach. No longer able to fit within Federation organisational structures as association members, they withdrew from active participation in Federation affairs. This closed a chapter in the Federation's organisational evolution.
6.2. Remodelling the Division of Authority

With federal government policy and financial support behind their actions, Federation leaders launched a major structural renewal at the 1971 annual meeting, using organisational growth to remodel relations between the local and Federation levels. The main objective in this reform was to decentralise Federation structures, and to thereby encourage BC francophones to become part of a viable organisational network which was an extension of their community. Secretary of State policy pushed this "infrastructural growth" as a means to bring life to the community through enhanced community participation. Here, Federation goals for organisational growth coincided with federal government policy to establish a francophone "presence" in all provinces through the respective provincial policy agents. For FFC leaders, government funds made the expansion of decentralised structures and the extension of community activities into many different areas of the province a more realistic possibility. Along with the decentralisation, they instituted new membership requirements to attract many more francophones into the organisational network, and also provided a new name, the "Fédération des Franco-Colombiens" (FFC), to reflect the secular nature of a Federation which represented all Franco-Columbians.

However, decentralisation failed to open the door for more concrete local authority. Whereas the availability of government funds helped build a broad organisational network, these funds
could not stem the centralising tide, and may even have enhanced it. Organisational control of community activities actually grew more centralised in Federation offices, because of two factors: a well-integrated Federation-controlled structure, and an administrative hierarchy of authority. This modified relations between Federation leaders and the local community, and hindered the effective performance of leadership functions, most notably group management.

6.2.1. Federation Control

The expansion of Federation structures into all areas of the province certainly brought local francophone organisations province-wide into a well-defined organisational framework. With the Federation as their central player, francophones in Terrace, Dawson Creek, and Kamloops joined others from Prince George, Victoria, and Kelowna to give the network a truly "provincial" image. The Federation's Constitution established local authority in a set of regional bodies which paralleled the Annual General Assembly, General Council, and Executive Committee (see Appendix 3). Three regions - Lower Fraser Valley, Vancouver Island, North - were created in 1971. Administrative links between levels integrated regional and central authorities. For example, regional appointees and presidents of local associations within the different regions sat on the Federation's General Council.
Despite the best of intentions, this structural modification contributed little to enhance local autonomy, and generated minimal community participation. In fact, Federation leaders further cemented their leadership position, and membership levels dropped somewhat. As seen in Figure 6.1, the membership curve tends downward between 1968 and 1978. Complaints from regional representatives of "distant" leaders and over centralisation do suggest that dissatisfaction with the changes brought to Federation affairs could have caused a diminution of community participation. Due to inadequate membership records of the time, however, we thought it prudent to leave a gap in the curve for this period. This gap in our knowledge detracts little from the reality that FFC leaders did assert their authority in a number of ways.

Though the General Council was the constitutionally-designated motor of the Federation, and therefore gave local associations a role in decision-making, the Executive Committee and Federation Secretariat exercised considerable authority in three areas. First, Federation offices had primacy over regional decisions. Second, regional authority depended upon the regional "type" assigned to a specific region by the Federation's General Council, with the approval of the Executive Committee. Third, control of regional budgets and the complexity of regional structures were both subject to Executive scrutiny. Since the Executive was the final arbiter in these three ways, Federation
leaders maintained a strong grip on organisational development in the province. Organisational growth may have expanded structures geographically to give provincial definition to the community, but this new framework further reinforced the authority imbalance between local and Federation leaders born a decade earlier. Aware of their still limited role in decision-making, local leaders initiated efforts in 1974 to correct this imbalance. Federation leaders wished to avoid jeopardizing group unity and, as a result, increased the number of administrative regions. This furnished local leaders a more representative say in Federation affairs, and a numerically better chance of exacting more favourable changes in the future.

6.2.2. Administrative Authority

The administrative hierarchy also blurred what little control local and regional leaders exercised. Here, administrative practice, and some imprecision in the definition of roles, circumvented democratically-assigned tasks, and provided much leeway for the assertion of Federation leadership.

Structurally and constitutionally, the hierarchy of Federation decision-making authority remained pyramid-shaped, with power flowing upward from the Annual General Assembly of Federation members to the elected General Council and Executive Committee, and finally to the permanent Secretariat.
Constitutional parameters defined the decision-making authority and accountability relationships between specific Federation bodies. The Annual General Assembly remained the supreme authority of the Federation, exercising ultimate democratic control over all policies and decisions taken on behalf of Franco-Columbians. The General Council assured smooth functional operations between meetings of the AGA, and was accountable to it. Duly-elected regional presidents and advisers accompanied other elected Federation officers on the Council. All other community representatives were elected at regional and local levels. The Executive Committee took responsibility for the administrative Secretariat of the Federation and worked to implement decisions made by the General Council.

Despite these clear-cut structural divisions, however, there was some ambiguity regarding the limits of authority between levels of the pyramid. Though Executive Committee decisions could not contradict objectives and priorities agreed to either in the General Council or at the Annual General Assembly, Executive members were allowed to pursue new activities and policies as long as these were subsequently ratified by the AGA; they could also assume responsibilities delegated by the General Council. The specific description of Executive Committee powers left room for interpretation, however. For example, it was not entirely clear which General Council powers could be
delegated to the Executive, nor what this implied for its general authority within the Federation; and one could not tell how far its innovative capacity could or would be taken. As such, this created a grey area within which the Executive exercised its authority.

By contrast, regional representatives sitting on the General Council acted merely as intermediaries representing regional and local interests on central and regional structures. No specific constitutional authority was granted to regional leaders in their relationship with central Federation actors. Consequently, the frequency of Executive Committee meetings, the relatively small number of its sitting members, and the hands-on, day-to-day involvement with Federation affairs placed much authority in Executive Committee hands. Officers were better-positioned and more sensitive to structural problems, programmes and the general functioning of Federation affairs. Ultimate democratic authority rested with the Annual General Assembly and the General Council, while knowledge and expertise placed the Executive Committee in a potentially more influential position than these other bodies.

Tensions erupted in 1981 as regional authorities rebelled against this centralisation and concentration of authority within Federation structures. Complaints and criticisms focussed on its pervasiveness, its lack of method in setting objectives, and, critically, its image as a federation working in its own
interests rather than for its members. Local associations became isolated from the Federation, unable or unwilling to function beyond local parameters. Such disjointedness caused frustration for the regional authorities who felt powerless, for the General Council and the Executive Committee who were attempting to enhance community awareness and mobilisation, and for the Secretariat which was responsible for the administration of programmes. What resulted from this crisis was a major shake-up of Federation foundations which, for all intents and purpose, had not functioned according to the plans laid by constitutional framers in the early 1970s. Three elements emerged from the crisis to guide the organisational revision.

First, functional inefficiencies of Federation structures were caused largely by a complex overloaded system which lacked coordination between the centre and regional branches. The Federation had simply grown too big too quickly, and its leaders had designed ineffective bureaucratic and structural solutions.

Second, practical decision-making authority was not only too centralised in the Executive Committee and the Secretariat, but it rested in the hands of a small number of people, notably the Director-General. Regional leaders had the necessary instruments to exercise influence in the community, but exercised very little real practical decision-making power in the organisational network.

Third, personality conflicts and characteristics were re-
responsible for part of the tension. Poorly defined responsibilities, with gaping holes open for interpretation, engendered power struggles between certain Federation members.

Constitutional revisionism in the 1981-1982 period entailed a simplification of administrative structures, a more clearly-defined authority for local leaders, and a general shrinking of the bureaucratic machine and its control over community activities.

A look at the various elements of the Federation's organizational structure since 1981 reveals one predominant component as the leading domino for change: the central role of locally-elected representatives. This one element affected Federation operations and reflected a general willingness to stem the centralising tide.

Federation leaders relocated the new Council of Presidents and the Annual General Assembly to the centre of decision-making authority. The Council's powers to watch over and control the development and orientation of the Federation placed it at the centre of the organisational network. Locally-elected association presidents were the only voting members after 1981. This re-built the link between Federation leaders and members which had been severed during the 1970s. Though the Executive Committee remained the administrative motor of the Federation, it would operate less in isolation of its controlling bodies.
Federation leaders also took on a less involved role in local community activities, choosing instead to retain an administrative and political lobbying function. The administrative role in the post-1981 period has been limited to the more technical aspects of efficient management planning, including goal setting, the organisation of priorities, and specific lobbying efforts on behalf of Franco-Columbians. Content to serve as a centre of administration and intermediary between all local areas, Federation leaders exited from direct involvement in local affairs, but retained their central leadership role of the Franco-Columbian network.

Thus, despite attempts to use structural remodelling to enhance the role of local associations in Federation decisions, and to bring BC francophones closer to their organisational network, Federation leaders produced a centralised organisation which gave little real power to local authorities. Organisational growth acted as a wedge separating the two levels, and ultimately reduced the effectiveness of overall Federation leadership to bring Franco-Columbians in touch with their community network.

On the one hand, group management became less of a problem, because a centralised Federation leadership made many of the decisions regarding community development. Yet, on the other hand, interest group unity suffered, because local leaders' discontent with the definition of authority relationships
fomented major divisions within the network, and eventually sparked an organisational crisis. The availability of government funding may have indeed fostered organisational growth, but this did not appear to ensure organisational viability. In fact, despite government funds, the cohesion of the organisational network seemed to be undermined by changes made to Federation leadership functions as a result of this growth.

6.3. Bureaucratic Growth and the Erosion of Functional Links

With the arrival of substantial financial resources from the federal government in 1971, Federation authorities also promoted an expansion of their own internal administrative machinery. This tended to differentiate the Federation from its interest community, because most practical decision-making authority lay henceforth with a group of professional administrators who were quite different from the local lay volunteers.

As we have seen, prior to 1971, only a skeletal internal structure existed. Subsidies from the Conseil de la Vie Française between 1964 and 1968 afforded Federation leaders the means to create its first administrative position, the Liaison Officer; in 1968 they added a part-time administrative secretary. In 1972, amidst general restructuration and the development of community mobilisation programmes financed by the Secretary of State, the Federation created three new permanent staff positions to work in the areas of youth, information, and communications; and a new
financial director assisted the Director-General. The three "community development officers" helped leaders contact members through a variety of projects designed to encourage community participation and to inform members of activities offered by the Federation. At the same time, leaders hoped to display an image of competent leadership, defining the needs and concerns of Franco-Columbians. Government funds had permitted them to acquire professionals well-versed in the various tools of community development. As government-funded policy agents, Federation leaders played the much-valued intermediary role for government, bringing relevant benefits back to the Franco-Columbian community.

In the years following the structural expansion of 1974, the Federation hired a series of regional officers who acted as messengers and distributors of services to local organisations; five Federation professionals worked in specific fields (culture, information, cooperation, education, and youth), and various other contracted individuals gave credence to the term "bureaucratic explosion" used by one author. Available records indicate that the Federation had 14 full-time and 5 part-time staff in 1977, and 11 full-time positions in 1978. Compared to the single full-time Liaison Officer position of a decade earlier, this enlarged professional staff added special expertise to Federation activities, and concentrated a wealth of knowledge
in Federation offices. This federally-funded "bureaucratisation" was focussed largely in Federation offices, and thus contributed to a differentiation between local and Federation levels. For example, in Chapter 8 we discuss how Federation political activities drew it closer to the federal government and away from the local associations.

Internal personnel expansion paralleled an equally aggressive administrative thrust into a broader sphere of activities. As a political lobbying group, a community organisation responsible for the development of community activities, services, and infrastructures, and an information and communication source, the Federation commanded centre stage in the Franco-Columbian organisational network. Whether in the economic, education, community development, information, communication or culture fields, objectives, priorities, budgetary previsions, and expenditure trends all ultimately emerged from Federation offices and personnel. Local associations had neither the financial resources, nor the bureaucratic "know-how" to engage in the same type of administrative activities. As a result, functional differentiation eroded Federal-local linkages, and compounded the group management and contact difficulties leaders experienced with the centralised division of authority.

As we have seen, local leaders attempted to counterbalance the "knowledge network" via the democratic chain of command.
However, though democratic authority remained closely tied to the AGA, General Council, and Executive Committee, administratively, most practical decision-making authority became lodged in the Federation's Secretariat. Administrative practice entailed a hands-on control of Federation activities by Secretariat staff which effectively reduced the number of people having a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the Federation and the Franco-Columbian community.

The Director-General controlled the Secretariat and its personnel. As a salaried full-time professional, unlike other elected Federation positions, he was invested with a considerable amount of authority and responsibility vis-à-vis not only the Executive Committee, but also the General Council, the AGA, and regional bodies. In many ways, elected officials depended a great deal on the talents of its hired administrators. Former Director-General, Jean Riou, asserts that there was a lack of competence and education in the Executive Committee which prevented officers there from making important decisions affecting the community. Riou's predecessor, Doug Brown, corroborated this view in his 1974 letter of resignation, hinting at the Executive Committee's dependency on the Secretariat:

A défaut d'une présence soutenue de l'Exécutif aux activités de la FFC, je suis souvent obligé d'improviser des décisions dans son absence pour répondre aux besoins du moment après quoi les membres de l'Exécutif peuvent
se plaindre que ces décisions ne correspondent pas à leur volonté. (46)

That the Executive Committee subsequently established a set of functional guidelines in accordance with Brown's concerns only confirms the crucial role played by the Director-General in Federation affairs.

Though Riou stated that he always exercised his authority within the required operational framework, much of what constituted a Federation decision appeared to originate in the Secretariat, and hence with a bureaucratic elite. Constitutional limitations may have restricted the Director-General's authority over local and regional structures, but his role in coordinating Federation services, distributing information, designing Federation policy through Secretariat officers, and creating special committees, nonetheless reduced the impact of regional authorities, and instilled a de facto locus of power in the Secretariat. Regional structures were either by-passed or merely dwarfed in face of a professional bureaucracy which outdistanced the local associations in its knowledge of complex issues facing the community.

As a 1976 example shows, centralized bureaucratic control also produced a local level dependency on Federation programmes, services, and expertise. In that year, Federation leaders set up a network of regional officers who were sent out to assist local organisations in the promotion of local community development. A
community development officer in Federation offices in Vancouver coordinated these regional activities. Contrary to the wishes of regional autonomy advocates, however, local community organisations eventually grew dependent on the regional officers as community organisers and as a service support structure for the community as a whole. Despite attempts to build viable local administrations through training programmes, the Federation still held vastly superior resources for the provision of services. Far from establishing autonomous local structures, the Secretariat became quite involved in orienting local community organisation activities.

Control of the Federation Secretariat, and of its decision-making authority, ultimately generated discussions of too much central power and of a lack of respect for local communities. Since there was no replacement for or alternative to Federation expertise in administrative techniques and programme design, the definition of community development became a Secretariat responsibility. An examination of Federation records indicates, however, that staff personnel were quite occupied with satisfying the bureaucratic guidelines of government policy. Activity reports, financial accountability statements, and project applications all provided a good deal of work for them. Though it is difficult to accurately measure the amount of time spent performing these duties, it would not be incorrect to suggest
that "community development" became largely a bureaucratic exercise for designing projects to fit government funding guidelines. Here, the local community voice lie buried beneath the weight of centralised authority, hidden amongst the various bureaucratic trinkets needed to receive more government funds.

Contact with members and community definition, then, seemed to grow out of government policy, and eventually undermined the effectiveness of group management. By the late 1970s, local leaders were criticizing the Federation for its lack of provincial coordination and continuity in the programmes offered. In a sense, the Federation's bureaucratic flowering not only reduced the effectiveness of a decentralised structural framework designed to put more decision-making power in the hands of local and regional authorities, it also produced a bureaucratic machine functionally distant from the local community, and tied to government policy. This ultimately provided grist to the critic mill for those who objected to a centralised and isolated Federation bureaucracy. In fact, though administrative control circumvented and/or undermined the decentralized structure of authority, local and regional authorities eventually used their representative power to effect a crisis and bring dramatic modifications to Federation administration. That they were able to do so speaks favourably to the Federation's representative structures.
6.4. Representativeness of Federation Structures

Despite the gradual centralisation of authority, modifications made to Federation structures did produce a more democratically representative community organisation which gave some reality to a "provincial" francophone infrastructure. Leadership effectiveness and community viability came to depend on the Federation's representativeness. Two factors - new decentralised structures, and changes to membership requirements - enhanced member recruitment and gave a broader definition to Federation activities.

6.4.1. Decentralized Structures and Representation

In order for Federation leaders to secure province-wide legitimacy for their actions, they sought to expand structural foundations into all areas of the province and, as we have seen, used government funds to do this. In so doing, however, they gave birth to a centre-periphery or Vancouver-regions division, the manifestations of which dramatically shaped discussions of Federation representativeness.

Control of Federation bodies early on tended to reside in the hands of a Vancouver-Maillardville elite. The relative lack of representation on Federation bodies from outside the Vancouver-Maillardville area portrayed the Federation as an organisation for francophones in the lower mainland only. In
fact, francophones in Vancouver, New Westminster, and Maillardville controlled over 60% of the Executive Committee positions from 1949 to 1969 (Figure 6.3), and had an annual average of 78.4% of these positions. Moreover, we find that, between 1950 and 1970, the Lower Fraser Valley area sent an annual average of 77.7% of delegates to the Federation's AGA (Figure 6.4). Since participation in Federation affairs was proportional to the number of active local members, and because of the concentration of francophones in the Vancouver-Maillardville area, the Lower Fraser Valley community elite could easily maintain its control of the AGA and the Executive Committee.

One other trend confirms this elite image of the Federation in its early years. A very small number of francophone individuals were ever elected to the Executive Committee (see Appendix 4). In fact, during the 20-year period between 1950 and 1969, only 84 different individuals served on the Executive Committee. An even smaller number of francophones repeatedly held Executive positions on a yearly basis. Of the 84 individuals, 24% held Executive positions 5 or more times over the 20 years, whereas close to half (48.9%) served only once, and most of these were local representatives granted authority through various constitutional amendments. Thus, a small group of people wielded executive power in the Federation in its first 20 years.
Geography (a dispersed francophone population) and financial limitations (to pay for transportation costs) prevented this Vancouver leadership from establishing regular contact with other local francophone communities. Federation activities would therefore be defined in Vancouver-Maillardville by leaders from that area. Group management and member recruitment were seriously affected by the lack of adequate representation, because members did not see many of the benefits of Federation leadership. This non-representativeness became a crucial issue for Franco-Columbians in the late 1960s, and, as we have seen, produced significant changes to Federation activities throughout the 1970s.

With government funds, and policy guidelines encouraging infrastructural expansion, these limitations became less problematic. Federation leaders saw opportunities to ensure, if not enhance, local and regional representation from all areas of the province on the various Federation bodies:

Armée de la nouvelle constitution, il est à espérer que la Fédération s'épanouisse et devienne le mouvement vraiment représentatif des Franco-Colombiens.(51)

Only through strong local associations tied to a central Federation body could they hope to recruit members and maintain contact with BC francophones. Otherwise, talk of a viable "Franco-Columbian" community through organisational growth was
but a whisper in the wind.

In the post-1969 period, many successes were registered; solid local organisations in some new areas of the province extended democratic authority beyond the Vancouver-Maillardville elite. Quite unlike previous years, a balance of representational power established itself at both the AGA and Executive Committee levels. Growth in a number of specific cities—Prince George, Kelowna, and Port Alberni—effectively expanded the organisational activity of the whole Franco-Columbian community in a more permanent fashion. From Figures 6.3 & 6.4, we find that, in representation terms, regional authorities increased their respective share of AGA delegates over the decade, reaching parity and eventually surpassing the Vancouver area. In substantive terms, they moved from 54.6% of delegates in 1976 to 81.7% in 1982. Hence, the general impression here is one of growing advantages for the regional areas outside Vancouver.

When we look at the proportional representativeness of the Federation as a community organisation, we find that representational advantages, due to Vancouver-Maillardville's demographic strength and its unfair and exaggerated distribution of authority, are considerably diminished over the period of federal government funding. In Figure 6.5, which compares the average share of delegates to average membership and percentage of total francophone population in the centre (Vancouver-Maillardville) and the periphery (regions), we see that the
centre did in fact have a disproportionate average share of AGA delegates between 1975 and 1979. At 51.7%, its average annual proportion was greater than the average annual proportion of active Federation members (38.1%) and its share of the total francophone population (49.3%) in 1976. The periphery, on the other hand, was quite under-represented. With 50.7% of the francophone population in 1976, and a 61.9% average annual share of active members, it averaged only 47.8% of the delegates during the same period.

Representation on the Executive Committee paints much the same picture. Figure 6.3 reveals quite clearly the domination of the Vancouver-Maillardville area; it averaged 82.5% of Executive
Committee positions between 1970 and 1977. In many ways, then, the FFC still remained an ineffective representative body until the mid-1970s.

Remarkable improvements were brought to bear later in the decade when delegates from the regions came to outnumber those in the Vancouver area (Figure 6.4). Though the regions were still slightly under-represented, if one compares the average annual share of delegates (73.9%) to the average annual percentage of francophones active in local organisations (75%), we see from Figure 6.6 that between 1980 and 1982, the periphery was significantly over-represented at the AGA with a lesser proportion of the total BC francophone population in 1981 (50.3%). The centre still remained slightly over-represented in

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terms of its average share of active francophones (23.3%), but its average annual share of delegates dropped considerably, from 51.7% between 1975 and 1979 to 26.5% for the 1980-82 period.

Representation problems lost some of their importance in the post-1981 period largely because Federation structures were simplified. Considerations of specific regional or local representation were decided by local authorities through the presence of active local associations, or the lack thereof. Complaints or criticisms regarding Federation representativeness would henceforth be linked to the organisational prowess of the local communities themselves.

From a 1984 snapshot of delegate representation, shown in Figure 6.7, we see that the representational balance had, if
anything, tilted in favour of the regions outside Vancouver. With only 39.4% of active francophone members, the periphery had 52.2% of the delegates. For Vancouver, the proportional under-representation was as prevalent; 60.6% of active francophones compared unfavourably with its 47.8% of Annual General Assembly delegates.

Much the same tendency can be noticed on the Executive Committee. The continual turnover of its members in the post-1970 period dispelled the idea of a small coterie of Franco-Columbians in Vancouver controlling this decision-making body. In fact, of the 66 Executive officers between 1970 and 1980 (see Appendix 4), only three held positions more than five times. The vast majority held office for two-year terms. In addition, we see that—Committee members from the periphery reached near parity with those from the Vancouver-Maillardville area by the late 1970s (Figure 6.3). This only confirmed the extent to which regional authorities succeeded in redressing the representational imbalance which had long prevented the development of a province-wide organisational network.

6.4.2. Membership Status and Representation

Membership status contributed to and at the same time broke down the predominance of Vancouver-Maillardville francophones in the Federation. In effect, membership requirements may have
favoured the centre, but, as we shall see, they also played into the hands of the periphery.

Attempts to accommodate newly-formed lay community organisations, non-French Canadians, and secular values in the Federation altered the nature of membership status. As we noted earlier, French Canadian Catholics, joined together in local associations, were the only official Federation members until the late 1960s. Then, Federation leaders devised a much more complex and expansive notion of membership for the 1970s period, one consistent with its goal to encourage more Franco-Columbians to become active in community activities.

Government policy objectives for viable francophone communities also demanded that more community members become involved in decisions affecting them. Hence, member recruitment and contact became key targets of these changes. Most prominent of the changes was a distinction made between individual and association membership.

Differing views of membership status became a source of tension within the Federation. For some, the inclusion of "individual" Federation members with voting rights would increase the number of Franco-Columbians tied directly to the Federation and thereby ensure a more democratic organisation. In 1974, Roméo Paquette asserted that collective or association representation undercut Federation action, because local organisations focussed on local priorities. Former Director-
General, Jean Riou, criticized the present association membership as anti-democratic, because only local association presidents have a right to vote at the Annual General Assembly, and since only affiliated members have the right to receive Federation services. The Franco-Columbian community, he stated, is in this sense detached from its community organisation.

Regional authorities, however, viewed individual membership as according unfair advantages in Federation affairs to the more densely-populated Vancouver and Lower Fraser Valley areas. Local authorities also defended their position in terms of better representation for francophones outside Vancouver. They succeeded in inserting a clause in the Constitution stating that the number of individual AGA delegates could at no time surpass 49% of the total number of delegates. In this, the Federation remained a federation of "associations".

The nature of this "individual" versus "association" membership debate, and its focus on the Vancouver-regions division, compounded complaints of a centralised Federation which caused the uproar against Federation authority in the late 1970s. This divergence posed a particularly difficult dilemma for Federation leaders who had to weigh the relative benefits of contacting and encouraging a larger proportion of Franco-Columbians to join with the equally vital component of defining the interest community through democratic representation and
group management.

The real effects of membership status on the Vancouver-regions representation dilemma are two-sided according to the relationship between membership type and member participation.

At first glance, the way individual Franco-Columbians participate in their local organisations and community activities does suggest that access given individual members accords representational advantages to the Vancouver-Lower Fraser Valley region. Most francophones outside the Vancouver area join the Federation through their local associations. The smaller francophone populations in regional urban centres possess fewer opportunities to participate in French cultural activities outside of their local francophone organisation. In addition, the fact that, for the most part, only one main francophone organisation serves the French-speaking population in each of the various localities limits the number of access points for individual participation. Thus, francophones in the periphery regions tend to utilise association membership more often as a vehicle for community activity.

In Vancouver, on the other hand, participation is somewhat different. Set in a large, diversified urban milieu, francophones are not necessarily drawn to a single form of entertainment. There is, in fact, a wider variety of activities to enjoy. Moreover, the lack of one all-encompassing and easily identifiable community association in the Vancouver area means
that, even within francophone circles, they can gravitate quite easily from one association to another. From this, they may prefer the freedom of direct representation at Federation meetings over the need to choose a particular organisation for that purpose. Vancouver francophones would, therefore, have a greater tendency to become individual members of the Federation than their regional counterparts. Hence, the very possibility of individual membership seems to favour Vancouver and put the regions at a relative disadvantage.

However, a look at Table 6.1, which shows the number of individual and association members per region between 1971 and 1981, reveals that the Vancouver-Lower Fraser Valley region (centre) had an annual average of 46.8% of individual members and 70.4% of association members. Differentiating between individual and association members appears to produce the exact opposite effect on participation in the centre and periphery than expected. In fact, it seems that individual membership actually came to favour the regions. When we breakdown the decade into two periods, we see that a significant shift had occurred after the regional structural expansion of 1974. From its 1973 level of 78.0% of individual members, the Vancouver-Maillardville region dropped to 49.4% in 1975 and to 18.6% in 1981. Its association membership fell from 75.0% in 1974 to 60.8% in 1975, and stabilized at 71.0% in 1978.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS</th>
<th>ASSOCIATION MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(177)</td>
<td>(181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(109)</td>
<td>(140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(142)</td>
<td>(265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(216)</td>
<td>(501)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(243)</td>
<td>(620)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(200)</td>
<td>(876)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Membership decline in the Vancouver-Maillardville area late in the decade reflected the lack of a real cohesive community in urban Vancouver as opposed to that in the regions. This can be accounted for by the large number and variety of organisations,
the transiency of the francophone population coming from outside the province, and the high turnover of Federation leadership, all of which played against a collective consciousness amongst Vancouver francophones and ultimately weakened their dominance on Federation bodies. Individual membership, in this sense, gave very little advantage to Vancouver.

The opposite trend in the regions can best be explained, ironically, by the success of Federation efforts to create solid local and regional organisations which were actively involved in community activity. On two occasions regional authorities proved quite adept in their ability to effect changes to Federation parameters for regional status. These relaxed regional requirements and opened up the possibility for more regional representation. So, on a strictly numerical basis, membership status came to favour the regions over the Vancouver-Maillardville area, not the reverse.

Conclusions

This examination of structural changes to the FFC highlighted the growth of a centralised, bureaucratic, and professional community organisation which grew to be very representative of its Franco-Columbian membership. Over the past 40 years, Federation leaders have been able to position the Federation as the structural focal point of the Franco-Columbian organisational network. They used government-funds to
facilitate a form of organisational growth which challenged local authority in the 1960s, built centralized bureaucratic structures in the 1970s, and at the same time implemented a programme of expanded activities for community development.

The expanded structural framework produced a more representative Federation, but internal professional growth created a centralized bureaucratic monster which left little decision-making authority at the local level and which appeared increasingly disconnected from the community it served. This ultimately struck the ire of local community activists and set the stage for dramatic structural modifications which, despite changing fundamentally little of the administrative practice of Federation affairs, did place more democratic authority in the hands of local leaders.

What have we learned about the nature of Federation leadership through their use of organisational growth? First, the growing centralisation of authority undermined group management, and threatened to break-up the organisational network. Efforts to counterbalance this trend have not resolved many of the inherent problems in the Federation-local axis, but representative structures have at least provided a palliative outlet. Second, its professional stature and bureaucratic relations with the Secretary of State made it the only organisation competent enough to perform many tasks on behalf of
the Franco-Columbian community. This differentiated it from the local level, and widened the gap in its leadership activities. Third, thanks to the Federation's organisational growth, its leaders have been able to contact and recruit Franco-Columbians from many parts of the province. This has enabled them to give legitimate definition to the provincial organisational network.

Overall, the availability of government funds greatly helped Federation leaders to enhance organisational growth. Modifications to organisational growth have been linked here to the use of government funds which seemed to move the FFC in a particular organisational direction. The form it took modified leadership activities enough to generate serious questions about the Federation's role in the community. Who Federation leaders speak for primarily - government, themselves or Franco-Columbians - became a more valid query as organisational growth proceeded.
ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Napoléon Gareau, President of the Association des Scouts de Maillardville, and long time Federation activist, Maillardville, 21 July 1986.

2. In 1953, the AGA adopted a resolution requiring that all Executive officers be members of their respective local associations, thus establishing a direct structural link between local French Clubs and the Executive. In addition, this prevented the possibility of direct outside influence in the Federation, and gave local authorities the opportunity to select specific candidates perhaps more favourable to their views. Finally, in the same year, two new positions, General Secretary and Archivist, became elective rather than appointive, giving the local authorities more say in who would sit on the Executive Committee. Other amendments in 1951 and 1953 dealt more directly with the flow of information from the Executive to local associations. In both instances, resolutions made by local associations for discussion at the AGA were to be submitted to the General Secretary and then sent back to the local authorities in ample time for their consideration. Not only would this prevent unforeseen issues coming before the AGA, but local authorities would be able to participate more actively in Federation decisions. In a very dispersed community, with few communication links to local communities, the possibility of inter-community discussion of resolutions affecting the whole community was significantly limited outside of the annual meetings. The nature of these "information" amendments, then, provided critical aid to local authorities with respect to their participation in Federation decisions.

In 1962, local French Clubs were permitted two representatives on the Executive Committee, and gained official recognition as the key administrative unit of the Federation. Finally, a new Administrative Council of local Club representatives was created in 1964 and offered yet another structural avenue for local organisations to assert their authority. The 1962 Federation Constitution displayed two critical patterns which recognised the changing nature of both the Franco-Columbian community and the Federation. First, the local French Clubs became more substantially entrenched as the structural focal point of the Federation. A number of constitutional amendments touched their authority:
article 2(b) - only active local Club members having paid their fees to their local "Cercle" or to the closest "Cercle" were eligible to vote.

article 2(a) - a specific reference to French-speaking Catholics acknowledged the importance of the local parish cum local Club to the Federation.

article 3(d) - all resolutions presented at the A.G.A. must originate in the deliberations of the local Club. The explicit compulsory nature of this item is unprecendented.

article 6 - the local Clubs are given complete autonomy insofar as they respected the Constitution. This reference to autonomy is without precedent.

- two members of each local Club would sit on the Executive Committee. This would increase the number of members on the Committee.

article 13 - the local Club is recognized for the first time as an administrative structure of the Federation. Before this time, its status was only implied through membership and positions on the executive.

More generally, the AGA is presented as the centre of all Federation authority, which implicitly acknowledges the importance of local initiatives and decision-making.

Second, there is constitutional recognition accorded other community organisations, both in terms of their active membership (article 2-b) and their rights to send resolutions to the AGA (article 3-d). Active members of these organisations also possessed voting rights at the AGA and the right to sit on the Executive Committee, much like the local Club. However, there is no parallel equivalent specification for the recognition of these organisations which mirrors that of the local Club. Instead, there is an expansion of the number of Committee advisers from two to four which would increase opportunities for these organisations to have representatives on the Committee.

3. Active members in the initial stages of the Federation were acknowledged through family membership in local Clubs. Delegates to the Annual General Assembly were designated proportionately, one delegate per ten families per local Club. For
more practical reasons of encouraging community participation in the Federation, a constitutional amendment in 1949 changed delegate requirements to one per ten individuals per local Club.

4. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly: Secretary's Report, 1951. SHFC P01.03.08.01.


6. Of 19,366 francophones in the 1951 census, i.e. those whose mother tongue is French, only 240 (24 delegates x 10) were registered at the local level. In 1961, of 26 179 francophones, only 850 (85 delegates x 10) were registered.

7. See footnote 4.


9. Ibid.


11. G. Bergeron (Secrétaire-Général, FCFCB) to Paul-Emile Gosselin (Conseil de la Vie Française), 01 February 1963. SHFC P01.05.07.20.01.

12. Roméo Paquette, "La Fédération Canadienne-Française de la Colombie-Britannique...c'est quoi?", l'Appel, vols. 7,8,9 October-December 1968, special number "Un congrès nous renseigne! Un congrès nous engage!", p. 7.

13. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly: Liaison Officer's Report, 1969, SHFC, P01.03.26.01.

14. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly: Secretary's Report, 1969, SHFC, P01.03.26.01.

15. Ibid.

17. The French Catholic church in British Columbia had little official presence until 1910 when the parish church of Notre Dame de Lourdes was recognised in Maillardville. Not until 1946 was there another Catholic church established, again in Maillardville, called Notre Dame de Fatima. In Vancouver, meanwhile, the church Saint-Sacrement served French Catholics from 1946, and Notre Dame de la Paix did so for New Westminster. As one can see, there is a geographical concentration of church authorities in the Maillardville-Vancouver axis. Elsewhere in the province, they were either non-existent or in the hands of the English-speaking British Columbians Catholic clergy.

18. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1956. SHFC P01.03.12.01. A list of constitutional amendments made since 1949 was presented for adoption at this AGA. These amendments dealt with local representation on the Executive Committee, and with the elective rather than appointive status of Executive officers.


20. The church was active in the 1930s in fights against unions; it helped set up the Caisse populaire in Maillardville; and it was instrumental in the formation of Associations of Scouts and of Guides in Vancouver and Maillardville. For further information, consult: Jean Riou, "Une histoire qui a 75 ans: Maillardville!", in Programme Souvenir Maillardville 1909-1984. and Jocelyne Laflamme, "La fondation de la Paroisse St. Sacrement," Le Chronographe, vol. 2, no. 4, Automne-Hiver 1985, pp. 4-6.


23. Ibid.
24. G.H. Dagneau (Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières) to Roméo Paquette (Liaison Agent, FCFCB) 07 February 1964. Dagneau makes it clear that if no organisation exists, this should not deter applicants, because organisations may be formed at some time in the future. He also put emphasis on a "representative organisation" as the intermediary between the government of Quebec and francophones outside Quebec.

25. FFC, Annual General Assembly, 1971. SHFC PO1.03.28.01.

26. FFC Constitution de la FFC, Chapter V, arts. 13-17.

27. Ibid., Chapter VI, articles 8, 12a) c), 33b).

28. Concerned with regional participation, the representativeness of regional delegates, and structural flexibility respecting regional differences, the Federation derived specific formulae to differentiate between regions.

29. Ibid., Chapter VII, articles 2-55. According to four criteria: the number of affiliated organisations in the region, the number of individual Federation members, the administrative complexity of the region and the breadth of administrative competence in the region, a "region" was granted or refused admission to the Federation. The greater the number of organisations and individual members and the higher the administrative complexity and competence, the more regional autonomy would be granted a region in the form of regional structures and budgets.

30. FFC, Annual General Assembly, 1974. The nine designated regions were: Vancouver, Lower Fraser Valley, Vancouver Island North, Vancouver Island South, Okanagan, Prince George, Kamloops, Peace River, Skeena

31. Only those decisions ratified by the AGA would be considered legitimate by the Franco-Columbian community. The AGA was responsible for the election of the six members to the General Council and it accepted or refused the annual financial and proposed budgetary reports of the Federation.

32. It must represent the Federation to the public and to organisations outside of the Federation. The six General Council members - president, vice-president, and 4 advisers - elected by the AGA must be active Federation members according to the statutes of the Federation. The outgoing president is a de jure member of the Council with full voting privileges.
With 3 regions in 1971, the Council had 16 sitting members with voting rights. Proposals to increase the number of regions to a maximum of six meant that regional representatives on this body would vary between 56% (9) and 72% (18) of Council membership. Moreover, this signified that only 7 of the total number of Council members would be elected by the AGA as representative of the whole community.

FFC, Constitution, Chapter VI, article 4.

Ibid., Chapter VII, articles 5a), 20a).

The Executive Committee was required by the Constitution to meet as often as necessary (Chapter V, article 3). This contrasted with the once a year meeting of the Annual General Assembly, and the minimum of three per year for the General Council. Six members of the 25 member General Council were elected to the Executive Committee.


FFC, Rapport du Comité consultatif sur la Constitution, 23 avril 1982. The existence of personality conflicts was also corroborated in a number of interviews with members of the Federation.


This comes out of a General Council meeting in mid-September 1981, as reported in Le Soleil de Colombie, vol. 14, no. 16, 02 October, 1981.

FFC, Annual General Assembly: President's Report, 1973. SHFC P01.03.29.01.

Francine Beaudin, "Une analyse de la Fédération des Franco-Columbiens: groupe de pression auprès du gouvernement provincial," unpublished paper, University of British Columbia 1985, p. 8. Based on an interview with former Director-General Jean Riou, this author claimed that the number of employees grew from 1.5 to 26 in the 1974-1981 period.
44. FFC, Annual General Assembly: Personnel List, 1977 and Annual General Assembly: Personnel List, 1978. Records looked at by this author were both incomplete and unclear, which leaves the actual number of staff positions somewhat ambiguous.


46. FFC, Executive Committee, 06 April 1979. SHFC P01.02.09.26.

47. Riou interview.

48. FFC, Constitution, 1972, Chapter VI, article 16.

49. FFC, Rapport du développement communautaire, 1976, p.3.

50. See footnote 3.

51. FFC, Annual General Assembly, 1971. SHFC P01.03.28.01. Federation President, Roger Albert, expresses his concern for Federation representativeness in the following statement at the 1971 AGA.

52. FFC, Annual General Assembly, 1974.

53. Interview with Riou.

54. FFC, Constitution, 1972, Chapter II, article 2b, Chapter IV, article 2e. However, some felt that the Franco-Columbian population was being undercut by "collective representation" whereby preoccupations of local organisations were of a more local nature. The underlying assumption here being that individual loyalty or solidarity to the Federation would enhance its image as a true community organisation rather than as a mere distributor of funds received from the government. Because the Federation was also engaged in attempts to expand community awareness and participation, however, the local associations were still considered valuable instruments for reaching the francophone population. Consequently, a 1974 resolution to transform the Federation into an association of individuals received little support.

55. Between 1971 and 1981 there was a trend towards favouring individual membership. This coincided with the general transition to a more centralised Federation structure. As an example, we can look at the nature of delegates to the AGA. Four of five delegate categories in 1971 accorded voting rights to local organisations, whereas only two of
five did so for individuals. Also, if we take a look at the number of possible delegates per delegate category, it is clear that the number of possible association delegates is greater in 1971 than in 1976. Hence, the opportunity for individual members to become delegates appeared greater than for collective members. The notion of "collective member" changes in the post 1976 period. From 1971 to 1976, the focus was on the organisation; the number of association delegates depended on the global number of local association members. After 1976, the focus shifted to the individual; Franco-Columbians could join associations as "collective members", and the number of collective member delegates depended on the number of individuals who decided to become affiliated to an association in this manner.

56. Interview with Marc Roy, Director-General, FFC, 22 nov. 1985.

57. In the 1976 Federation Constitution, the designation "region" entailed a social milieu. This effectively broadened the concept of region beyond the previously empirically-based criteria, and provided for further regional expansion. By 1980, sub-groups within regions acquired a legitimate status on their own. This latter change was implemented on a trial basis, and fell victim to the Federation crisis in early 1981.
CHAPTER 7

FEDERATION - LOCAL COOPERATION: A LEADERSHIP GAP

As Franco-Columbian leader, the Fédération des Franco-Colombiens cooperates with a wide variety of local francophone organisations across British Columbia in order to develop effective community activities. Federation-local cooperation has experienced a dramatic shift in emphasis since 1945, however. Whereas in the early years FFC leaders tied themselves closely to local activities and people in an integrated team-like approach, their use of available government funds seemed to induce a gradual "stepping back" from the local level, revealed by a more managerial and service role vis-à-vis local organisations. This widened the gulf between the Federation and its organisational network, and changed the general thrust of leadership activity. Cooperation of this nature actually reinforced the inherent bureaucratic and management barriers which hinder community development and made Federation activities less relevant to Franco-Columbians.

Interest group leaders interact and/or cooperate with local members in order to generate cohesion among the membership and the interest community, and as a means to display the relevance of leadership activities which address their needs and concerns. Cooperation puts members and leaders in contact with one another.
As a result, leaders are better able to induce loyalties, because they are perceived as being "a part of" the community. Cooperation also provides an avenue for leaders to acquire knowledge of the interest community when defining parameters for leadership action. They can appreciate intra-group differences and design their activities accordingly. Member recruitment can be enhanced, because leaders may exploit the opportunity of cooperation to "sell" their wares and otherwise convince potential volunteers of the benefits of membership. Group management is rendered less problematic through cooperation, because leaders tend to be more sensitive to problems which may jeopardize group unity and survival. In all of these ways, then, cooperation with local members helps leaders perform their leadership functions.

Access to government funds as policy agents can modify the type of cooperation between levels, and thereby re-orient leadership functions. For instance, members may develop a sense of alienation from leaders if group activity is redirected only to fulfill government policy objectives. Some may reject the changes outright whereas others, not aware of leadership action, may simply lose general interest in group activity. From this develops a "leadership gap" which underlines the inability of leaders to make their actions relevant to the interest community.

In the case of the FFC, the availability and use of government funds helped to restructure cooperation in two very fundamental ways: first, Federation leaders diluted their team-
like attitude toward cooperation; they built a disjointed co-partnership for community activities wherein most of the work occurred in isolation of local community organisations. Second, they developed a "service centre" approach to cooperation which foresaw cooperation only through representative structures. In both instances, it is clear that a modified socio-political environment and the availability of government funds attracted a different kind of Federation leader desirous of changes in the local-Federation relationship. This, too, contributed to a less effective overall leadership.

More generally, then, cooperation with the use of government funds did little to enhance the degree of contact or the level of consensus for community definition. It did, however, facilitate group-management activities and develop more systematic means to recruit members from the interest community.

7.1. The Dilution of Cooperation 1945 - 1969

The Federation's formative years displayed a team-like collaboration in community activities which seemed to blur distinctions between it and local organisations. This generated positive community support for initiatives launched to preserve the French Canadian culture and language in British Columbia. Franco-Columbians viewed the Federation as the focal point for community activities, and there was a collaborative sense to the
cooperation leaders developed with the francophone community.

Organisational changes brought to the Federation in the early 1960s dramatically affected the nature of Federation-local cooperation. Unlike previous years, Federation leaders would sit above and separate from the local associations. They differentiated between local and Federation tasks, and attempted to redirect local efforts. As such, cooperation was less a team effort than an imposition of Federation will.

In this section, we look at the transition in Federation-local cooperation in light of government funding from Quebec, and of a more favourable socio-political environment which convinced Federation leaders to modify their leadership functions.

7.1.1. "Team-like" Cooperation

Close Federation-local interaction was greatly advanced because of three very important characteristics of Franco-Columbian organisations during this period.

First, the core of BC's francophone population was located mainly in the Lower Fraser Valley, and, as noted earlier, Vancouver, Maillardville, and New Westminster had the greatest proportion of Federation and local organisation activists. Only a short bus or car ride between Maillardville and Vancouver meant that the Federation's Maillardville headquarters provided easy access to local Clubs in these areas. In fact, of the 156 Executive Committee meetings held between 1950 and 1969, not one
was held outside the Lower Fraser Valley. In addition, only two Annual General Assemblies, in Port Alberni (1951) and Victoria (1954), were held beyond the Vancouver-Maillardville axis. Geographic concentration and community size, therefore, facilitated closer collaboration and contact between the two levels.

Second, Federation and local activists were very often the same people. An examination of the names of Federation Executive Committee members and those serving as local Club presidents and secretaries reveals the consistency with which the Lefebvre, Beauregard, Goulet, Chéramy, Gareau, Ledet, Filiatrault, Savoie, Alain, Parent, and Fortin-Terrien family names appeared on the list of active local and Federation leaders. In some cases, inter-locking memberships provided key ties to local activities. The "Comité des Ecoles de Maillardville", for example, comprised four previous or sitting Executive Committee members out of seven, including the Federation president. This School's Committee was actively involved in organising the 1952 Maillardville school's strike, and thus through its membership brought the Federation closer to a local activity of great importance. In this way, general day-to-day knowledge of activities and decisions provided for continuity and immediacy in Federation activities.

Close personal ties also developed within the clique of
Federation and local leaders. This built an even stronger base for community teamwork. Conversations with a number of long time activists brought fond memories of the friendship and laughter shared while serving the community. At times, blood relations attracted new people to the Federation. When Napoléon and Amélie Gareau hit BC soil from Manitoba in 1945, the latter's brother, Georges Ledet, had just participated in the Federation's founding meeting. When invited to join, both Gareau's jumped at the opportunity and have remained active for the better part of 41 years.

Third, the key role played by the Catholic clergy in Federation and local affairs brought its already well-established ties to the French Canadian community into the Franco-Columbian organisational structure. Two local parishes (Notre Dame de Lourdes and Notre Dame de Fatima) were official Federation members until the 1960s. In many cases, Federation and local Club activities occurred in the local parish Church hall which served as a "rallying centre" for Franco-Columbians. Local priests were always the first to step forward and gather the people, says one activist; they encouraged the community to participate. From another, we learn that a friendly competition existed between local parishes to see how many delegates they could send to Annual General Assemblies. Since delegateship was tied to the number of members, the effects of this rivalry were undoubtedly felt; in fact, Lourdes and Fatima membership figures
always surpassed those of other local organisations during this period.

Given its important community role, the Church had to become involved in an organisation which claimed to represent community interests. "Le clergé s'est impliqué par la force des choses," states Reverend Jean-Louis Lemire. Whether writing the Federation newsletter, running the Education and Bursaries Committees, or campaigning for funds and new members, priests served to bring francophones together in local communities. In addition, the position of Federation "Aumonier" provided a liaison agent for the different parishes, and gave the organisation a moral foundation. Since the Church had an influence in the community at large, it helped bring Franco-Columbians together in the Federation.

These characteristics induced the "team-like" approach to cooperation which is manifest in three areas of Federation activity: financial management, the organisation of community activities, and Committee work.

Management of Federation finances consolidated Federation-local cooperation, because of the importance of membership fees collected from local Clubs. Early on, much time was spent "digging for pennies," says one long-time activist proudly. "L'union fait la force," and everyone pitched in to support the organisation. Both Federation and local leaders developed a
number of cooperative ventures to ensure themselves a minimal level of financial security. One, a "Federation Day", brought Franco-Columbians together to celebrate the Federation's importance to the community as the legitimate voice of all Franco-Columbians, with funds collected going into Federation coffers. Locally-based fund raising activities like dances, bazaars, bingo nights, draws, and films also brought in needed dollars. Devotion to the survival of a French Canadian spirit found volunteers willing to cooperate through "their" Federation. Without this sense of commitment encouraged by leaders' contact with the local community, the Federation would have had great difficulty in launching any sort of programme for Franco-Columbians.

In spending the dollars collected, Federation leaders diverged little from the practice of close cooperation with local organisations. Membership fees and other donations went largely towards paying delegate costs for the Federation's Annual General Assembly (AGA) and for its regular Executive Committee meetings. Here, a "pool" system was designed to spread the burden evenly across all local Clubs. Each Club paid a certain amount per delegate into a general "pooled" fund; as such, delegates from the more distant Clubs were "subsidized" by those in the central Vancouver-Maillardville core. For lodging, one local activist recalled fondly the welcoming of delegates into his home in the true French Canadian tradition, of opening the doors wide open.
and eating good home cooking "à la canadienne française." "We had no money, he stated, to stay in hotels and pay for fancy meals like they do today." Without this constant community spirit, and a groundswell of local support, Federation leaders would undoubtedly have had to question their ability to act on behalf of the Franco-Columbian community.

When money began to trickle in from outside the province, Federation leadership took over but did not completely detach itself from local Club membership. Rather, it served as a financial centre, distributing funds to the various local Clubs according to pre-determined needs. Federation leaders received a $500 donation from the "Comité permanent de la survivance française en Amérique" in 1951, and distributed it to local Clubs after discussion in the Executive Committee. In financial management of another sort, they invited local Clubs to participate in a national fund-raising drive launched by the Conseil de la Vie Française; local Clubs responded favourably with their own donations.

When Federation or local Club leaders organised activities, it was very often a collective effort which lost very little of its French Canadian flavour in the rather incongruous anglophone surroundings:

Toute l'assistance chanta avec l'entrain de la jeunesse nos vieux refrains: "Vive la canadienne", "À la claire fontaine", "Un canadien errant". (14)
If the activity was locally-based, the whole community eventually learned of it either through the Federation (at monthly Executive Committee meetings), the Church, or by word-of-mouth. Local Club reports (submitted monthly to the Federation) informed leaders of the "soirées canadiennes", the bazaars, the picnics, and other sundry social gatherings which gave Franco-Columbians the opportunity to live their culture and language. From his report to the 1953 Annual General Assembly, we learn that the Secretary-General received 352 letters and 520 reports from local Clubs and community members regarding various local projects and concerns. In this way, the Federation also served as somewhat of a "message centre" for local Clubs to contact the interest community and inform them of group activities.

As well, Federation leaders attended various locally-run activities. This helped put them in contact with Franco-Columbians and laced Federation-local interaction with a strong cohesive thread. "Dans la communauté on savait que la Fédération existait parce que le président visitait les Cercles." In 1952, for example, Port Alberni leaders invited the Federation to attend inaugural celebrations for their local French Canadian parish. Showing that it did more than make pronouncements from on high, the Federation sent Vice-President Jean-Baptiste Goulet who assured them of mainland concern for their area.

Ideas for community-wide activities usually originated in
the Federation, but included most of the active local Clubs through consultation exercises or the active participation of local volunteers. Local Clubs were mostly enthusiastic in their collaboration. In 1953, for example, both the Federation and local Clubs welcomed a group of French Canadians from Quebec, the "Voyageurs de la Liaison Française", to Vancouver. Though Federation leaders took a lead role in bringing the community together for this event, local Clubs responded favourably by 18 organising local receptions. Preparations for the "Liaison Française" arrival included a song programme developed by local parishes on Federation request which gave the visitors evidence 19 of a lively French Canadian community on the West coast.

Work done by Federation Committees also consolidated Federation ties to the local level. This was due, in part, to their direct impact on the daily lives of Franco-Columbians, and because local Club members were often active Committee participants.

The Radio Committee, formed in 1952, sought to bring French radio to the Franco-Columbian community. Before the CBC accorded BC francophones a station late in the decade, they had to be content with a half-hour French programme broadcast on a Vancouver-based radio station (CKNW) each Sunday evening. Since they were in charge of French programming for CKNW, Federation leaders initially requested that each local Club or parish prepare a song so that the full half-hour time slot be filled
up. Then, in 1953, the Committee proposed the formation of a sub-committee comprising two members from each local Club to take charge of the programming. This sub-committee eventually produced twenty-four half-hour programmes of songs and music from different parish groups like "Les Compagnons de Vancouver", "La Troupe Molière", and "Les Hirondelles".

Education Committee initiatives revealed a Federation willingness to decentralise decision-making authority and to develop Federation-local cooperation. Formed in 1952, it oversaw all aspects of the French Catholic education system which existed at the time, including selection and training of teachers, setting curriculum, and lobbying. Local Club activists and the local clergy were both represented officially on the Committee. Though decisions had to be ratified by the Executive, much of the legwork remained in the hands of those in close touch with the local community.

Equally, the Education Committee encouraged Franco-Columbians to appreciate French education as a means to hold on to cultural, religious, and linguistic values. French contests and festivals it organised rewarded students for achievements in French-speaking skills. Through the "Festival Interscolaire de la Bonne Chanson" and the "Concours de Français" Federation leaders gave prizes to pupils for their writing and singing abilities. These community activities generated projects for the
local Clubs, and made the Federation more relevant to local communities, since it paid for and presented the prizes.

Overall, then, there was a substantial level of Federation-local collaboration during this period. Through financial management, ties to local Club activities, community-wide projects, and committee work, Federation and local Club leaders joined together in a relatively cohesive and integrated fashion. The overall impression we extract is one of "community effort" and a "collective work" attitude bringing together a community of Franco-Columbians who wanted nothing more than to survive as francophones. Cooperation of this nature facilitated Federation leaders' tasks to contact and recruit Franco-Columbians, and provided the necessary foundation for effective group management and community definition. Changes to many of these activities, however, brought on by a new socio-political environment and the availability of government funds, would dilute Federation-local cooperation and alter the nature of Federation leadership functions.

7.1.2. Disjointed Cooperation

The availability of government funds offered those Federation leaders who shared new, forward-looking ideas the opportunity and the means to "go it alone" with a new administrative Secretariat as the lead runner. In the end, these leaders preferred to do all the work over the heads of local
authorities. Hence, efforts to cooperate with the stagnating local associations were disjointed and very often non-existent.

The permanent Secretariat became the key instrument around which Federation-local cooperation would revolve:

In focussing on the Secretariat, however, leaders separated the Federation from local associations, because they were determined to redefine it as more than just another cog in the organisation-al network:

To make this idea of cooperation work required the support of local organisations. Unfortunately for those who desired change, it fell on deaf ears. Differences emerged between what Federation leaders proposed as cooperation and what local leaders were ready to accept. "Il y avait un écart entre ce que [Roméo] Paquette faisait et ce que la communauté voulait", commented one local activist. Local authorities were either reluctant to embark on a new path, preferring to stick to the status quo, or
they simply failed to understand exactly what Federation leaders intended to do. In a revealing interview, one activist commented that the new ideas did not take root in the community, because people either believed them to be somewhat incredulous, if not scatter-brained, or failed to see great potential for success. "Comment peut-on faire cela quand on ne peut même pas ouvrir nos écoles?" asked some. Meanwhile, many were quite unfamiliar with the more sophisticated social science analyses presented by the Executive Committee. "Ça prenait ta Larousse pour [les] comprendre," one remarked. Many did not even bother to read much of what was distributed due to its complicated vocabulary and terminology. "Ah, c'est de Roméo [Paquette]," they sighed, and put it on the shelve to collect dust. Used to running a less-complicated show with simple ideas and attainable projects, their hesitation seemed natural, but was reinforced by what one author has called the "intellectualism" of some Federation leaders.

One further element helps explain this reluctance. Part of the problem came from what one activist called the role of "outsiders" who did not understand the Franco-Columbian community, but who wanted to institute major changes to its organisation. Others complained of the "transients", people who took control of the Federation for a certain period, made some modifications according to their own perceptions of the
community, and then left. In fact, the arrival of a group of better-educated, generally Québécois, individuals in the early 1960s did provide the Federation with something of a leadership renewal. These "newcomers" occupied positions of influence, one activist said, because people were impressed by the way they spoke and by their obvious administrative qualifications. Unfortunately, their intellectualism went over many heads and caused much discomfort and suspicion amongst some members who were unsure where these "intellectuals" wanted to take the Franco-Columbian community. Overall, leadership definition failed to coincide with or encompass member concerns. As a result, the level of commitment to Federation activity diminished, and left leaders quite alone in their pursuits.

It is useful at this point to examine the personal histories of some Federation leaders in order to understand better how the availability of government funding and a new socio-political environment may have contributed to changes in the type of Federation leader, and thus to a different kind of Federation-local cooperation.

The paucity of the historical record makes it extremely difficult to extract a "leader type" from the leaders we consider, or to examine changes in the type of leaders and their influence in British Columbia's francophone community. Nonetheless, our previous discussions of the importance of the Church, of the growth of a Federation administrative structure, and of
the various activities of Federation leadership in the early years tend to confirm the picture of the change we offer here.

Most, if not all, of the early leaders had roots outside British Columbia, usually from the various Prairie French Canadian communities. Of those we looked at, three quarters had origins in the Prairie provinces. Whereas many French-Canadians from Quebec did eventually settle in British Columbia, they also tended to spend a number of years in Manitoba, Saskatchewan or Alberta before making their way over the Rockies. Leaving behind their families and friends, the first pioneers endeavoured to generate some semblance of French Canadian community life on a small scale through various social associations (see Chapter 4). Strongly religious, and devoted to work for the continued survival of the French language and the Catholic faith, these people from various walks of life (doctors, engineers, labourers, clergymen) remained long time volunteers and active participants at all levels of the Federation. They were virtual forerunners, laying down community structures and sustaining some level of a collective French Canadian pride in the virgin Franco-Columbian territory.

Albert Lefebvre, Blanche Lambert, and Dr. Léon Beaudoin serve as good examples of the first Federation leaders. Lefebvre became interested in the French Canadian cause in 1940 with the formation of the "Club des Canadiens-francais du Québec". Born
in Michigan of Quebec parents, he spent eleven years in Morinville, Alberta before reaching Vancouver in 1918 at the age of thirteen. A locomotive engineer and businessman by trade, Lefebvre became President of the newly-formed "Club", and as such participated in the founding meeting of the FCFCB four years later. He helped subsequently in the establishment of Vancouver's St. Sacrement parish and its Caisse populaire.

Lambert, a Quebec native, moved to Edmonton with her family at a young age in 1914. She arrived in Vancouver in 1941 and, with her artistic background, participated in the Vancouver Little Theatre. In 1946, she founded the French Canadian "Troupe Molière", serving as its artistic director for eighteen years. As a member association of the Federation, this theatre group provided a valuable cultural outlet for BC's small French Canadian community. Over the years, Lambert also became active in the Club d'Age d'Or, the Société Historique Franco-Colombienne, the Centre Culturel Colombien, and the FFC.

Dr. Beaudoing was Federation President from 1952 to 1959. Manitoba-born, he studied medicine in his native province before moving to practice in Saskatchewan and eventually in British Columbia. He arrived in Maillardville in 1950 and became involved immediately in Federation affairs, wanting to unite the francophone population to promote the French Canadian cause.

Since the Federation was closely tied to the Church in its first 20 years, it is not surprising to find many clergymen
active in Federation and local affairs. Names of priests from the various Catholic parishes - St. Sacrement, Notre Dame de Lourdes, Notre Dame de Fatima, Notre Dame de la Paix, Notre Dame des Victoires - can be readily found amongst the key community actors. Of these, Father Jean-Louis Lemire seems to stand out most clearly. Originally from Quebec, like most of BC's French Catholic clergy, Lemire came to Vancouver's St. Sacrement parish in the 1950's. Whether as an active member of the Federation's Education or Bursaries Committees or as the author of many Federation bulletins, Lemire provided relentless energy and support to the survival of the French Canadian community in British Columbia.

Many others adorned the Federation member rolls on a permanent basis. Here we speak of Yvonne Fortin-Terrien, Jean-Baptiste Goulet, Arthur Cheramy, Napoléon and Amélie Gareau, Jeanne Parent, and Irène Alain, to mention a few. Records of election to the Federation's Executive Committee reveal that they were very prominent in Federation affairs until the early 1960s.

The availability of government funding in the 1960s coincided with changes in the socio-political environment and the arrival in the Franco-Columbian community of a new type of leader. They tended to be more politically-oriented, often directly from Quebec, university educated, and brought more secular approaches and less traditional ideas to bear on
Federation activities. Having experienced the growth in French Canadian nationalism in Quebec, and having gained a more developed, self-assured commitment to French language rights in their majority setting, these Quebec-educated and largely Quebec-born leaders would transform the Federation, modernise it so as to respond to a more favourable and politically-charged environment. In many ways, they brought their ideas from Quebec, trying, like the Catholic missionaries before them, to contribute to the survival of the French Canadian culture.

Leaders of this new era, such as Roméo Paquette, Gérald Moreau, Léo Comeau, André Piolat, and Dr. Henri St. Louis had less history in the province, but were still devoted to the French Canadian cause. However, they saw politics and a closer relationship with government as the most effective means to achieve results. For them, this meant accepting new ideas which questioned the traditional role of the Church in the community, most notably in the area of education. As such, the availability of government funding served as a catalyst for change in a socio-political environment which saw French Canadian rights and French-English relations on top of the public agenda.

Three of these new leaders, Paquette, Moreau, and Piolat, were important players in bringing changes to the Federation. Piolat, born in Paris, France, spent much of his youth in Saskatchewan. He arrived in Vancouver in 1955 and opened the General Credit Bureau. His participation in the Franco-Columbian
community was both immediate and extensive. President of the Caisse populaire, founder of Le Soleil de Colombie, Vice-President of the FCFCB, founder of "La Fondation Le Soleil", Piolat has been described as an "independent, free-thinker", whose will and determination drew both the ire and admiration of many. His confrontations with the Catholic clergy on education matters and on the editorial content of the Federation newspaper, l'Appel, are summed up by the man himself:

Les curés voulaient avoir la main sur tout. Moi, j'avais toujours dit: coopération, oui, domination, non. (38)

Paquette, a Quebec-born engineer, proved to be the driving force behind the administrative and political direction the Federation took in the early 1960s. Convinced of the benefits to be drawn from the new political environment, he endeavoured to build a "French Canadian village" in Maillardville, one which would contain all the necessary institutions to guarantee French Canadian survival. His belief in secular institutional growth, and the need to use government contacts to make Franco-Columbians "masters in their own house" confronted the Federation's Catholic social club image, and challenged the role of the Church in a changing society.

Gérald Moreau, a British Columbian by birth, studied abroad in France, and spent a number of years in Quebec City as the
Federation's representative on the Conseil de la Vie Francaise. During his presidency (1964-1966) FCFCB leaders re-directed their policy towards French language education, favouring public rather than religious schools. Ironically, Moreau's own studies were the product of Federation efforts to send BC French Canadians outside the province in order to create an intellectual leadership for the community.

These leaders, and others, achieved notoriety in an already stagnant Federation, because they brought fresh energy and a renewed, though less than traditional, commitment to the French Canadian cause. As proven administrators and intellectuals they "took over" Federation operations and pushed them beyond the parish church, looking to build a more efficient and self-sufficient community organisation. In the process, however, they alienated many community members who were very much tied to the "old way of doing things", and who appeared quite apprehensive about the new directions.

Local apprehensions grew most particularly out of different impressions of the permanent Secretariat's role in the community. These differences reflected the division of opinion regarding the type of Federation-local cooperation desired. Some Federation leaders gave top priority to the Secretariat's coordination role, and to its position as Franco-Columbian representative outside the province. With visions of a broad organisational structure beyond the Vancouver-Maillardville core, and a vastly increased
membership, they believed local activities and recruitment could be left to the local organisations. In fact, Roméo Paquette, then Liaison Agent in charge of the Secretariat, did not view his role as a community traveller, going from door-to-door to recruit members. If this was not the task of local Clubs, he quipped, what are they there for?:

Si le recrutement doit être confié totalement au secrétariat, la raison d'être des groupes et des organismes cesse d'exister. (40)

Yet, according to one active member, the generally-accepted local view of the Secretariat included these recruitment and local responsibilities. After all, had not the Federation always been part of the local community in this way?

Due to these differences, Federation leaders appeared to ignore the local Clubs. For some, separation was even a conscious goal of Federation leaders: "Il [(Paquette)] s'est enfermé dans sa tour d'ivoire pour écrire de la papérasse." At one Executive Committe meeting, amidst warnings that more visits had to be made to the regions, because local populations felt somewhat forgotten or ignored by the Federation, the Secretary-General reluctantly accepted to travel more, but only for un-specified "important" reasons.

In some ways, then, the presence of and commitment to a particular view of the permanent Secretariat, funded from outside the province, weakened the community spirit and team-work.

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attitude which had prevailed during the 1950s. Misunderstandings of its role led people to believe that because they received the lion's share of outside funds, Federation leaders would take most of the responsibility for local activities. Since the Secretariat took the lead role in a number of issue areas, notably in education (French language public schools), political lobbying (Bilingualism & Biculturalism Commission), and communications (a Federation newspaper, l'Appel), FFC leaders did actually seem to be doing everything! Federation-local cooperation for community-wide projects appeared to disappear in the 1960s, giving way to a disjointed partnership with Federation leaders planning community development activities.

Concrete evidence of this growing differentiation and disjointed cooperation showed itself in a few specific areas.

First, Federation leaders appeared unable to overcome Franco-Columbian apathy for community development. Membership drives, financial campaigns, and plans to reorganise the Vancouver-Maillardville French Clubs stalled. Serious doubts were expressed about the "laissez-faire" community attitude:

Qui va mettre en pratique toutes ces suggestions qui sont intéressantes mais pour les quelles peu d'animateurs ne s'offrent? Il nous manquent une équipe d'hommes totalement engagés dans la cause. On a tout laissé sur les épaules de l'agent de liaison. Nous avons besoin d'un exécutif fort qui sera en relations étroites avec le secrétariat pour l'inspirer et l'aider. (44)
No substantial new blood was being injected into the Federation to ensure its longevity. A Franco-Columbian youth movement formed in 1956, "La Relève colombienne", seemed to disappear from Federation reports in the 1960s. As a result, the old guard still kept Federation wheels turning:

Nous manquons d'hommes dévoués. (...) Ce sont les mêmes personnes aujourd'hui qu'hier. (...) Le seul moyen d'arriver c'est de compter encore sur l'aide de l'extérieur.(46)

Without a new generation of local activists, much was demanded of the pioneers of the movement who were tired, and reluctant to join in new Federation projects.

Second, many local activists began distinguishing more concretely between the Federation and local levels. We have already mentioned the growth of a number of "other" local organisations which came to the fore in the early 1960s, and which competed for members with the Federation's local French Clubs. One long time activist commented that it was necessary to choose between local Federation affiliates and these other organisations. For him, these new associations took so much of his time that participation in the Federation was no longer possible. Evidence of membership decline in local French Clubs indicates that Franco-Columbians appeared to prefer the non-affiliates. Instead of rejuvenating interest in the Franco-Columbian community, then, Federation leaders appeared to be
alienating many of the long standing members, and creating more
distinct lines of division on the Federation-local axis.

Third, local parish leaders in Vancouver and Maillardville
also rejected Federation changes which aimed to disengage the
Church from the community. As we have seen, Federation leaders
wished to transform the parish edifice into a secular structure,
whereby differences of the cloth would become less important than
the common cultural and linguistic bonds shared by BC
francophones. The Church reacted to this idea with disdain;
for example, the Catholic clergy thwarted Federation plans for a
bilingual programme at a local Maillardville public school by
discouraging francophone parents from sending their children to
the school. Thus, these changes diminished the role played by
the Church, and made it all the more difficult to encourage
cooperation in local Clubs.

Last, those local activists who continued to participate in
Federation activities did so unenthusiastically, almost ritually.
We can see this in a number of revealing statements made by
Federation leaders of the time. Is it really participation and
representation, they asked rhetorically, when each organisation
simply sends a volunteer, or a person chosen by chance, to a
meeting or an Assembly without previous consultation? For
them, the Annual Assemblies should not have been mere popularity
contests between five or six individuals, nor should resolutions
have been the personal wishes of a single individual, hastily
prepared the day of the meeting. Candidates for elected office
offered no programmes, and therefore no debates on different
options took place; and volunteers accepted the jobs according to
their own conception of the movement.

The spirit of cooperation, and signs of energetic activism
based on a belief in the Federation, appeared lost amidst the
ambiguity of the changes proposed by Federation leaders. By
1969, Federation leaders realised that an impasse had been
reached in Federation-local cooperation:

Malgré le fait que tous les animateurs, passés
et présents, du mouvement canadien-français et
des institutions qui en émanent, réalisent la
nécessité d'une association provinciale, les
impératifs locaux gouvernent l'ordre des
priorités, bouleversent les plans les mieux
conçus et donnent à l'association un air de
parasite. (53)

In an appropriately titled article in l'Appel at the end of 1968,
Roméo Paquette queried: "La FCFCB ... c'est quoi?" and then
joined other Federation authorities in 1969 to impose changes on
local associations. Writing to Paul E. Gosselin of the Conseil
de la Vie Française, he stated bluntly that they had waited long
enough for local acceptance of the changes; it was time to move
ahead with a redefinition of Federation structures as a means to
rejuvenate the whole organisational network. Thanks to new
financial support from outside the province, the gamble appeared
to work. In effect, according to Federation leaders, government funds brought renewed hope to local activists who suddenly seemed more willing to cooperate in Federation initiatives:

Un nouvel élan est en voie de modifier l'attitude des nôtres - c'est l'apparente générosité soudaine des pouvoirs publics en faveur du français...la masse des gens semble voir le débat poursuivre à un palier supérieur à celui des Associations Provinciales...(56)

Federation leaders were thus met initially with indifference and opposition as they struggled to re-define Federation-local cooperation with the help of government funds. "Disjointed" cooperation was an ineffective leadership tool, because it implicitly reduced contact between leaders and members. In addition, opposition to new directions decreased opportunities for successful group management and member recruitment.

Once legitimated by federal government recognition and financial support, Federation leaders found it far more easy to ignore the dissenters and take good advantage of government willingness to support community development. Whereas government funds did not in themselves cause this outcome, their availability provided a context within which Federation leaders could act in spite of local associations. Opposition to the changes fell silent as local leaders decided eventually to participate fully in efforts to redefine Federation activity, even if it meant a fundamental change in Federation-local
cooperation. In the next section, we discover that, as government-funded policy agents, Federation leaders consolidated changes which reduced cooperation between the two levels, and thus fostered a sense of alienation from their leadership within the Franco-Columbian community.

7.2. A Service Centre Federation 1970 - 1985

As the Federation emerged from the tumultuous 1960s, its leaders set a course for the construction of an organisational network which would function on the strength of its local infrastructures, and on their ability to control community development from the centre. To encourage this evolution, Federation leaders used federal government funds to implement a "service centre" approach to Federation-local cooperation which contributed to the building of a distance between the FFC and local activists. As central coordinators at the head of a "think tank" operation, Federation leaders left much of the community activity groundwork to local activists. Differentiation in the kinds of activities pursued at both levels produced an increasingly distant and isolated Federation which, for local communities, existed more as a symbolic force and practical tool than as a base for community activity.

Reasons for this "distancing" in Federation-local cooperation are two-fold. First, as a means to satisfy Secretary of State policy goals for the development of viable
communities, Federation leaders built a service structure designed to develop competent local administrations which would be responsible for the enhancement of local community activity. However, instead of being an active team player as in the past, the Federation tended to act as a bureaucratic overseer of local activities, ready to respond when called upon.

Second, Federation leaders held a misplaced confidence in the ability of representative structures to forge a new style of Federation-local cooperation. These structures failed, however, to fill the gap in Federation-local cooperation left by the service centre approach. Moreover, due to the more administrative policy agent role played by the Federation, a different type of leader emerged, one who tended to perpetuate and enhance the secular, administrative, and political interest group image the Federation had already begun to assert in the mid-1960s. This tended to widen the gap between leaders and the Franco-Columbian community.

7.2.1. The "Service Centre" Approach

Four key elements underscored how Federation leaders attempted to build a viable francophone community through a "service centre" cooperation: professionals trained in community development, regional Federation officers, a communications network, and project development. Each of these brought Federation benefits to the local communities, and
pinpointed certain key leadership functions. However, a new breed of leader, as well as an "imported", largely Québécois personnel team, frustrated efforts to build an effective community leadership. The use of a government-funded service centre approach thus modified Federation-local cooperation and reduced the local impact of efforts taken by FFC leaders to enhance community activity.

Community Development Professionals. In 1970-1971, the Federation assembled a team of community volunteers to provide them workshops in group dynamics and leadership, both key elements for community development. Preliminary results revealed a nagging Federation dilemma: participants did not emerge with a keen sense of what constituted a francophone community in BC, because short-term objectives were somehow disconnected from the broad, concrete community reality. For Federation leaders, the Franco-Columbian community signified more than association membership and Sunday morning mass in the local parish church; one had to identify long-term community projects which would awaken a community spirit in Franco-Columbians and give them a sense of who they were. "Provoquer une conscience communautaire franco-colombienne," affirmed Federation directors. The community was there, it was a question of how to put it in touch with itself.

Such lofty principles and social science terminology alone
do not build community spirit, however. Similar ideas floated through Franco-Columbian minds during the 1960s, but without success. According to FFC leaders, Franco-Columbians now wanted something tangible to show for their volunteer work, services which justified them paying membership fees. They thus decided to hire a team of experts which would visit various francophone centres in an attempt to imbue volunteers with the organisational skills needed to build permanent, stable local infrastructures. Training sessions showing how to run an organisation, and how to manage its administration were practical instruments offered local activists.

Response to these services was generally quite favourable. Many local organisations needed the administrative and technical expertise provided by the Federation, some of which dramatically altered the nature of their association. The "Club Bon Accueil" in Powell River serves as a good case in point. Formed in 1967 by a group of local francophone women, the Club met regularly to enjoy the luxury of conversational French, to partake in the odd celebration of the Mardi Gras, or simply to have knitting bees and community suppers. The Club grew to become a full-fledged Federation member in 1977, active in a variety of areas such as films, theatre, social parties, daycare, and French language education.

When asked what the Federation brought to the Club, two local activists replied that it helped the organisation set up a
proper administrative team, trained local volunteers for such tasks as Secretary, Treasurer or even President, and gave the impetus needed to get the Club off the ground; "On a poussé le Club à faire des choses," remarked one. Moreover, another continued, it encouraged some of the more reluctant activists to assume leadership positions. With an "I can do that" attitude, the Club secured a team of volunteers who have remained active since the late 1970s. Knowledge that the Federation was there to help resolve problems or to give moral support for the Club's grant applications to the federal government ("Ça passait mieux si on avait l'appui de la FFC."), comforted local activists, who gained a sense of security and confidence which was missing before the Federation entered the picture.

Powell River is not an isolated example. Interviews done with local leaders in Campbell River and Maillardville told much the same story. Records from local Clubs in other areas, such as Namaimo, Dawson Creek, and Prince George confirm a general enthusiasm for the Federation as an aid to strengthen local organisations:

Nous comprenons bien que seule l'union de tous les Francophones de la Colombie-Britannique renforcera notre club et une Fédération représentative.(66)

Yet, whereas the use of professional experts contributed much to group management, and a strengthened local community
organisational network, it also reinforced the image of a distant Federation which blurred Federation-local cooperation. This distance manifested itself in three ways.

First, local leaders felt somehow "disconnected" from the Federation. The Federation is appreciated for what tangible services it can bring to local organisations, and not necessarily for the collective, less concrete benefits which accrue to Franco-Columbians from its political or group management activities. One common perception of the FFC held by local activists is that of an "instrument to be used when needed," useful only to those who need it. Its value is more practical than emotional. Though references to "l'union fait la force" come quite easily to the lips of many Franco-Columbians, they emerge as a well-used phrase dug up from the past which registers but intangible loyalties to a symbolic collective community spirit. No sign of deep attachment surfaces when you mention the Federation to Franco-Columbians. Less than one half (44.3%) of respondents to the CROP survey (1982) said they felt close to the FFC. One local activist affirmed in an interview that the daily activities of the FFC did not even affect the local Club. Another stated bitterly that the Federation comes around or pays attention only when there are problems; rare is the visit to acknowledge accomplishments. Others saw no use for it at all; one Vancouver activist stated bluntly: "Je ne voulais rien
savoir de la FFC à cause des chicanes et de la mauvaise administration."

Therefore, Federation leaders have not succeeded very well in entrenching a cohesive and consistent image or definition of the Federation which inspires loyalty amongst the general population or the local activists. What does exist is a "for lack of anything better" attitude couched in an expressed need for something to represent Franco-Columbians. "On peut bien se plaindre du bonhomme, said one activist, ça ne veut pas dire qu'on veut le sacrer dehors." Remarks another: "Si la Fédération n'existait pas, elle serait remplacée par quelque chose d'identique, car on a besoin de se sentir ensemble et pas seul et individu."

One possible explanation for this failure is the fact that the growth of a government-funded bureaucracy split Federation leadership into permanent staff and volunteer Executive Committee members. This tended to widen further the gap between Federation and local levels, because it introduced a third "intermediate" level which had its drawbacks.

Generally speaking, the growth of a Federation bureaucracy made it possible for francophones in BC to work as hired staff, managing relations with government, developing community programmes, and responding to Franco-Columbian needs. This attracted an increasingly specialized Federation personnel, people having studied in community development, organisational
and group dynamics, communications, public relations, recreation etc. Since it was largely universities in Quebec which offered French language programmes in these areas, Federation leaders looked to those Quebeckers who had ventured westward during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Federation leaders tended to use government funds to hire a largely Québécois professional staff, because they were qualified in the various areas of community development. As such, over the years, the Federation has served as a means of employment for a transient Quebec population, some of whom have remained in BC, others not. Though no accurate record exists of the number of Quebec natives who were hired by the Federation during this period, our discussions with a number of people and the general observations we noted in our many contacts with the organisation leads us to believe that the "Quebec contingent" was significant enough to play a role in a variety of community development activities. Here, it is clearly the use of government funds by leaders which appeared to cause problems. Indeed, had FFC leaders used these funds to hire and/or train local activists for Federation jobs, the impact of the "intermediate" level may have been lessened somewhat.

At the beginning of the 1970s, when Secretary of State funds were being allocated for social animation programmes, many Québécois were hired by various provincial francophone associations. They were there to "get things moving in the
community", states Marc Roy, Federation Director-General. The same thing occurred in his home province of Manitoba. Very often, however, this intimidated the less active Franco-Columbian natives who were less than pleased with the "maudits Québécois" who arrived like an elephant in a china shop, wanting to change things too quickly and too dramatically without considering the environment. A 1973 editorial comment in Le Soleil de Colombie referred quit explicitly to these "outside forces" and the build-up of bureaucratic structures:

La multiplication des structures et le poids qu'elles prennent depuis quelque temps chez la Fédération des Franco-colombiens en laissent quelques uns songeurs et plusieurs indifférents... Notre situation est unique, on ne peut parachuter les formules de l'extérieur.(75)

For many, these "outsiders" were unfamiliar with the Franco-Columbian community, and therefore could not properly address its needs. This alone generated a sense of alienation from the Federation. Moreover, because the Québécois were not used to living in a minority situation, many became frustrated when they realised that they could not change everything in a very short period of time and left soon after. This transient character only reinforced the lack of continuity which contributed to the Federation leaders' overall ineffectiveness in reaching the community.

In addition, one local activist suggested that FFC leaders
later on often selected Quebecers over local Franco-Columbian talent, thereby generating local frustrations and resentment. An examination of Federation personnel records shows that a majority of those hired were in fact from outside the province. For example, Roger Fournier, Federation Director-General in 1972, was born in the Gaspésie; Fernand Gilbert was an administrator by profession, born in Sherbrooke; Violette Gingras, originally from Montreal, had a degree in communications.

Two of the more influential men during this period, Doug Brown and Jean Riou, were not, however, Québécois. Brown was a BC native from Port Alberni who had worked with the Secretary of State in Edmonton before replacing Fournier in 1973. The France-born Riou had been very active at the community level since the 1960s before becoming Director-General in 1976. He arrived a year before the federal government instituted vast increases to the OLMG programme. It was Riou who not only provided for a more active Federation, but who also sparked the 1981 Federation crisis. Still, the role of the Director-General to run the central Vancouver office meant that the success of his missives depended more on the lower level bureaucracy.

What of the leaders themselves, those who gave voluntarily of their time to direct Federation affairs? Most, if not all, had already spent some time in BC, and were active in the community before serving as Federation leaders. They did,
however, adopt the new administrative and political spirit, and continued to focus on the availability of government funds.

Francois Coulombe, president from 1968 to 1970, lived in Vancouver since 1946, and was active as president of the Caisse populaire and the Chevaliers de Colomb before becoming active in the Federation. Originally from Quebec and Alberta, he operated a small business in Vancouver.

Roger Albert, a Maillardville native, was the first BC born Federation president. He represented the new blood which flowed through the organisation at the turn of the 1970s. A college student at the time, Albert took the reins of a changing Federation and oversaw the major administrative restructuration which took place between 1970 and 1972. However, his presidency, from 1970 to 1973, ended in disillusionment and bitterness towards government funding programmes and the growth of the Federation away from the Franco-Columbian community:

Mais si...le soutien financier de la FFC par le gouvernement fédéral a contribué...à mettre Ottawa en surtôt, il a en revanche, eu des effets très négatifs sur la communauté franco-colombienne. Il a sapé toute la capacité de la communauté à décider de son propre destin en soutenant ou rejetant ses organisations représentatives.(77)

Father Nestor Therrien, president from 1973 to 1977, had been an active Executive Committee member during the 1960s. His presence in this period did little to reinject a Church influence
into the Federation, though Father Godard of Vancouver's St. Sacrement parish did run for office in the mid-1970s.

Since the 1981 Federation crisis, a new, relatively well-entrenched BC leadership has begun to take form. Though largely of non-BC extraction, these leaders have been in the province for a relatively long period of time. Interestingly, they came to BC to work or study and not with the idea of "building" a francophone community. Their presence atop the Federation occurred as a happenstance, but opened their eyes to the reality of the minority situation. As such, they took the reins of power with optimism and a firm conviction to raise a Franco-Columbian consciousness.

Yves Merzisen, presently Federation president, is quite exemplary of the new leader. Born in Paris, France, Merzisen came to Canada in 1969 to study at the University of British Columbia. Later a Kamloops professor at Cariboo College, he admits to not having had any particular ties to the francophone community at the time. His contact with the local Kamloops francophone Club occurred largely because local leaders were readying to close its doors permanently. Accepting to play the "saviour" role, Merzisen has been very active in the community ever since. "C'est en s'impliquant personnellement dans des associations qu'il a été peu à peu sensibilisé à la cause canadienne-française."

Christine Pallascio-Bernard, president of the Chambre de
Commerce Franco-colombienne, came to Vancouver in 1970 for the climate, which soothed her problems with asthma. Born in Chicoutimi, of business-oriented parents, she worked as a UBC teaching assistant from 1976 to 1981 before starting her own public relations business. In 1983, she participated in the founding of the Chambre de Commerce. This has helped her "prendre conscience de sa condition de francophone minoritaire".

Marc Roy, president from 1982-1984, and Federation Director-General since 1984, is Manitoba-born. He arrived in British Columbia in 1978 fresh out of the College St-Boniface. After working a few years with Canada Packers in Vancouver, he became a Federation "conseiller général" and sat on its Executive Committee in the aftermath of the 1981 crisis. His presidency brought the Federation out of its "crisis management" stage, and re-directed it down a more positive path. For him, becoming involved in BC's francophone community, "working for the cause", was already part of his heritage as a Franco-Manitoban.

It is clear that the availability of government funding has divided Federation leaders along a permanent-volunteer continuum. This continuum coincides with the Federation's bureaucratic growth during the 1970s, ever since the OLMG programme began to inject funds into Federation coffers (see Chapter 5). There does not appear to have been a specific type of elected volunteer
Federation leader, however, since the early 1970s. Marc Roy notes that, since the late 1970s, leaders have tended to come from the entrepreneurial class - businessmen, lawyers, accountants - because of the Federation need to become more professional and competent in managing community affairs. Yet, he also remarks that a greater number of teachers and professors are now taking over the more active leadership roles; their yearly time commitments open the possibility for more community activity.

For one local leader, the bureaucratic and professionalized role of the Federation attracts people who approach their participation as merely performing a function, which is in direct contrast to leaders of the past, whose personal sense of devotion explained their community activity. While conceding that the professional mindset of these leaders can create a gap between the Federation and the Franco-Columbian community at large, Marc Roy nonetheless believes that the level and nature of the activities produced has maintained a broad appeal in the community. The traditional volunteer group (workers, housewives, artists) is still very much valued, but will participate in a different fashion than in the past. Our analysis has shown, however, that in contributing to a bureaucratic and professionalized Federation, government funding has tended to generate a "disconnectedness" amongst Franco-Columbians vis-à-vis the Federation.
Second, local autonomy seemed to encourage local leaders to affirm their independence from the Federation. In order to facilitate the growth of local associations, Federation leaders adopted an "outsider" attitude to Federation-local cooperation:

L'exécutif est unanime à dire qu'il n'est pas dans la nature des programmes de la FFC d'organiser une activité spécifique (...) Le rôle de la FFC est de promouvoir et de permettre aux organismes l'organisation de telles activités et non d'en faire elle-même.(83)

This created many independently-minded local activists, jealous of their territory and leadership. "On ne se laissait pas 'runner' par les animateurs," stated one activist quite matter of factly. "La FFC est là pour donner des services, pas pour mettre en marche les activités," echoed another. One example illustrates the extent to which local autonomy reduced cooperation between the two levels. The Association des Parents de Programme Cadre (APPCF) tried for a number of years to acquire full responsibility for the education dossier from the FFC. Virtually created by Federation leaders in 1979, the APPCF fell under the Education Committee's mandate for a few years, and thus depended on the FFC for financial and policy support. As time passed, however, its leaders came to be frustrated with Federation politics and policies, and they eventually asserted more independence from the Federation.

Conflicts between the two organisations arose because of the
doubling of efforts, services, and mandates, the lack of communication, and the existence of personality conflicts. According to APPCF President, Martine Galibois-Barss, problems occurred whenever the FFC became involved in the Programme Cadre. In those areas where it was active, Parents' Committees tended to depend on local Federation associations to do all the work on their behalf. These local associations did not, however, wish to "play with politics" and therefore left the responsibility with the FFC's central office. Yet, the Federation had no real mandate to deal with the School Boards, because they only recognised the parents' associations. As such, nothing effective was ever accomplished.

Moreover, there was a difference of opinion as to the role the APPCF would or could play in the pursuit of education rights for francophones. Federation leaders and the Secretary of State doubted the expertise of a "parents" association in areas as complex as federal-provincial relations and education. From the APPCF point of view, the FFC was simply scared to lose a bit of its power and influence in the community and vis-à-vis the federal government. Objecting to the FFC's paternalism, its leaders took article 23 of the Charter of Rights to task in order to secure real authority for education once and for all. With this in mind, they adopted a resolution at their 1984 Annual meeting and, a couple of months later, accomplished the same task.
before a bewildered FFC Annual General Assembly. Claiming victory, its President asserted, "l'APPCF a volé le mandat politique pour l'éducation." Local autonomy pushed to this extent reduces the need to cooperate within the Federation's schema of activities. The service structure approach may thus cloud the immediate relevance of Federation membership for local leaders in associations like the APPCF.

Third, the availability of professional experts through the service structure created a dependency on the Federation for its services, and dulled local community spirit. In some areas, local activists were either not educated enough to do the work, or simply decided that since the Federation had paid professionals it was better that they earn their pay. For Federation leaders, however, this image of the Federation hindered their ability to contact and recruit members. Former President, Roger Albert, claimed that the Federation had become a cancerous organism born of government ilk, and had no right to survive:

La Fédération des Franco-Colombiens est une organisation sans membres, sans base. Elle est soutenue par une élite et une bureaucratie fédérale sans considération de la population canadienne française de la Colombie-Britannique, et sans son support. (93)

Not only did a federally-funded bureaucratic service structure modelled on government policies disconnect the Federation from
local organisations, it therefore also appeared to discourage local volunteer participation.

Regional Officers. In order to decentralise the social mobilisation programme in the mid-1970s, FFC leaders hired a group of regional officers who worked hand-in-hand with local activists to provide the necessary inertia for community activities. In Nanaimo, for instance, the regional officer took on a full range of tasks: organising different activities set up by the Executive Committee of the Club; performing office duties and overseeing the production of a local bulletin; coordinating resources for Clubs in the region (Port Alberni, Powell River, Nanaimo); keeping in touch with events affecting francophones in the province; and maintaining a contact with the elected regional adviser so as to keep up to date with FFC developments. In many ways, this programme provided a direct link between local Clubs and the Federation, if only because these officers were FFC employees working at the local level. This type of Federation-local cooperation appears to have contributed to a general and steady increase in membership (see Figure 6.1).

Response from community organisations for regional officers was very positive, because of the direct and constant link with the Federation. "We had more contact and services when the Federation officers were here", stated one activist. "Today the Federation doesn't pay attention to what goes on in the regions." Government funds, in this instant, helped Federation
leaders establish a viable cooperative effort with local associations, induce community activity and participation, and thereby develop loyalties to the central organisation.

Ironically, however, whereas use of these Federation officers brought the Federation closer to local organisations, it also provided an outlet for local grievances once tensions over the "gap" between the two levels erupted in the early 1980s. According to one local activist present at the time of the 1981 crisis, regional officers actually led the charge against the Federation's Director-General for having hindered their ability to respond to local needs. Thus, a programme which appeared to be a useful tool for the promotion of Federation-local cooperation became the source of conflict within the Federation itself.

Communications Network. The third component in the Federation's "service centre" consisted of a communications network designed to provide information to local communities about Federation services, and about issues which directly concerned Franco-Columbians. This would enhance the leaders' ability to contact the population, recruit members, and, most importantly, give concrete definition to a province-wide Franco-Columbian community.

As early as 1970, Federation leaders acknowledged the need to become an information centre and to publicize Federation
activities. By 1973, a Federation bulletin, *le Cornouiller*, was being circulated to all local Clubs, with space reserved for local Club ads or reports. The *Trait d'Union* followed later in the decade. A major communications project took form when negotiations between Federation leaders and the owner of the only French language newspaper in the province (*Le Soleil de Colombie*) gave part ownership to the FFC. Federation leaders used the newspaper as a communication tool to reach all regions and to thus give an impression of collective "oneness" to the community. Special Federation inserts adorned many an issue; local activists received a free newspaper subscription with their membership fees; and local organisations publicized their own activities and reported on local events in the paper. Thus, all local communities could keep in touch with each other through the newspaper.

Another Federation initiative, the "Centre d'Info", set up in 1975, served as a resource centre for "things French" in BC. It listed the names of francophone lawyers, doctors, and businesses, as well as various other French services available in the province. By 1978, this information centre played an intermediary role as the distributor of Federation information to local Club members. In the 1980s, Federation personnel developed a telephone book listing, "*l'Annuaire des commerçants et professionnels de la Colombie-Britannique*" which continued this information gathering service for Franco-Columbians.
As it turned out, however, most of these Federation initiatives used to enhance Federation-local cooperation ended up serving only Federation needs, with relatively little news of local activities and concerns. The Cornouiller and the Trait d'Union contained mostly President's reports and a listing of the Federation activities for the previous month. The Soleil-FFC association ended in the mid-1970s, though local activity reports continued to be published in the newspaper. In this sense, very little inter-Club communication passed through the Federation's own network.

One consequence of the lack of local news circulating through the Federation's own network was the build-up of a number of local bulletins which replaced the inadequate Federation communication instruments, and further widened the gap between the two levels. Moreover, Franco-Columbians would look more to their local associations than the FFC for information which concerned them. In Nanaimo, for example, the "Bulletin de Nanaimo" provided information as varied as developments in government services, the "Franco-fête" in Vancouver, and social activities such as French Canadian suppers or card nights. "La Bonne Pêche de Campbell River", "Le Petit Accueil" in Powell River, and "Le Bulletin" in Prince George are other local Club newspapers which provided a similar service. The existence of these local bulletins underlined the extent to which Federation-
local cooperation through the communications network was less integrative than expected.

Project Development. The Federation excelled in this, the final block of its service centre approach. Professional staff researched issues and developed projects for government funding. Planning and priority sessions took advantage of their administrative and academic qualifications, and corresponded well with their idea of the type of organisation they wanted to build. In 1973 alone, the Federation engaged in a minimum of five projects, wrote a number of briefs to government officials, and organised a few internship programmes for Franco-Columbians. As the decade progressed, and as more government money came available, project development proceeded unabated. FFC leaders offered a veritable hodge-podge of projects which served to highlight the Federation's presence in BC's francophone community. Some of the more successful and appreciated projects included "le Centre Culturel Colombien", "La Francophonie & You", "le Centre d'Info", "la Chambre de Commerce", "Pacifête", and "la Vérendrye".

However, project development, too, appeared to widen the gap in Federation-local cooperation, this time by favouring the Vancouver area over the periphery. Though most projects attempted to enhance the lives of all Franco-Columbians, many directly touched only Vancouver francophones. Except for funds allocated to regional development between 1977 and 1980, very few
specifically addressed or reached regions outside Vancouver. Whether this was due to the inability of local organisations to make use of Federation projects, or whether one can attribute it merely to inactivity on the part of Federation personnel is unknown. Nonetheless, whereas the FFC served as a rallying point for an unintegrated francophone core in Vancouver, it was an ineffective integrative tool for the rest of the province:

Pour [les francophones en région,] la FFC est uniquement pour la ville de Vancouver. Ils voudraient que la FFC établisse un service de Secrétariat dans leur région.(99)

Project development thus seemed to create a distance between the Federation and local organisations outside Vancouver more particularly, and thereby compounded the difficulties of reaching a dispersed population.

Overall, Federation-local cooperation through a "service centre" approach appeared to build up rather than reduce the distance between FFC leaders and the Franco-Columbian community. Distance from local organisations translated into distance from the community at large, which raises questions about the premise that infrastructures alone make a community. In fact, despite the benefits felt and expressed by local activists for each element in the Federation's "service centre" approach, the FFC and other francophone associations, especially in Vancouver, remained largely unknown to a large percentage of the Franco-

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Columbian population. According to the CROP study (1982) mentioned in Chapter 3, only 47.0% of Franco-Columbian respondents knew of the FFC when named. When asked which was the principal francophone organisation in BC, 76.7% of those who were able to identify one, named the Federation; a substantial majority of respondents (84%) did not know of a single organisation. Local associations fared much worse. In all cases, less than one-third of Franco-Columbian respondents knew of the associations mentioned: Fédération Jeunesse Colombienne (28.7%), Conseil Culturel Franco-Colombien (17.2%), Troupe de la 16e (17.2%), Danseurs du Pacifique (18.9%), and the Centre Culturel Colombien (30.7%).

Most Franco-Columbians did not even view the organisational network as particularly important for community development in BC. When asked who most encouraged living in French in the province, a larger percentage (47.4%) mentioned the government; 27.2% claimed that francophones themselves played the greatest role in this regard, whereas only one-quarter (25.4%) chose francophone associations. Opinions regarding who should encourage community development painted an even darker picture for the associations; only 8.5% of respondents felt that these associations should be the primary instrument for community development. Both government (44.9%) and individual francophones (46.6%) were seen as more important tools.
These results could suggest any of a number of things about the relative importance of the FFC and other organisations to Franco-Columbians, but they do nonetheless bring to light the relative failure of Federation-local cooperation to contact and inform francophones about their activities. It is clear that the distance built-up between the two levels from the Federation's service centre approach hinders the passage of a consistent and coordinated message. Whether using professional experts to ensure group management, regional officers for contact and local recruitment, a communications network to establish contact and definition, or project development for group management and recruitment, FFC leaders have been somewhat unsuccessful in developing a sense of community through cooperation in the Franco-Columbian organisational network. Unable to develop unity from afar, they grew increasingly, and perhaps too dependent on the effectiveness of representative structures to bridge the leadership gap.

7.2.2. An Ineffective Remedy: Representation Structures

Unfortunately for Federation leaders, the service centre approach depends a great deal on the ability of representative structures to enhance Federation-local cooperation. We have already shown that the Federation grew to be quite representative of the Franco-Columbian community (see Chapter 6). Even here, however, the nature of cooperation through these structures
belie the existence of true community interplay between the two levels. The nature of local participation in these structures is not consistent with efforts to develop a viable community organisation through cooperation. We can see this on two counts: Federation leaders and personnel overwhelm local activists with their knowledge of complex issues; and serious debate of key issues is substantially lacking.

The Federation's image as a bureaucratic and professional organisation intimidates local leaders to the point of silence. Talking to governments, meeting with civil servants, and producing academic-like analyses of community problems contrasts markedly with the more social and community activities undertaken at the local level. For one activist, his lack of experience and knowledge of the issues, given as excuses for silence during AGA debates, reveal both a timidity to stand up and speak his mind, and a failure to have fully understood or read the contents of the many documents distributed to him. Harking back to the 1960s, and problems with the "intellectualism" of Federation leaders, many of the reports appear to serve more as justifications for government dollars than as useful benefits for Franco-Columbians. One long time activist commented in this vein:

La FFC produit beaucoup trop de papérass. Les études sont faites pour prouver au gouvernement qu'on existe, ce qui justifie les sommes données. (102)
When asked whether or not these reports were beneficial, local activists either ignored their existence, never read them or simply queried, "Qu'est-ce que ça peut nous apporter?" Surprisingly, even staff personnel are often not aware of reports and studies done or commissioned by Federation leaders. This "paper factory" image of the Federation, raises much doubt amongst local activists. Though they readily admit the need for a Federation acting on their behalf at the government level, and as a symbolic force of unity, they do question the kinds of intangible results which emerge from these projects.

Moreover, functional differentiation between the professional staff and local activists tends to undermine productive cooperation. On the one hand, local volunteers have lives outside the Federation which often take precedence over its activities. On the other hand, as full-time Federation professionals, staff are more knowledgeable and up to date on all the issues. For one former staff member, Federation meetings are therefore often unproductive, because local activists have trouble grasping "what's at stake" in many of the reports. What this produces in the form of concrete debate amounts to the ritual showing of hands during voting, and some occasional brouhaha and wrist-slapping when the Federation performs inadequately on a particular issue. In fact, according to one former Federation staff member, community debates are not
encouraged for fear of creating problems amongst local activists. Evidence of this occurred in 1986 when some questionable financial decisions by FFC leaders forced the closing of Federation doors, essentially disrobing the community of its leaders for three months. At the President's Council meeting which followed, remarkably little debate emerged from local representatives to condemn Federation actions or to request resignations from members of the Executive Committee. Shyness and timidity may account for some of this; so might the fear of inflicting irreversible damage on the Federation. In any case, the low level of community debate raises serious questions about the value of these structures as anything but rubber stamps for a bureaucratic machine quite content to pass over the heads of its locally-elected representatives who, for all intents and purposes, are largely unable or unwilling to confront the Federation's professional staff. Ironically, the very structures set up to encourage a more substantive Federation-local cooperation only confirms the distance built up between them.

Conclusions

Team-like cooperation in the Federation's formative years helped its leaders build a cohesive community organisation which flourished on a belief in collective solidarity and a desire to preserve the French presence in British Columbia. Federation-local interaction blurred structural lines of distinction between
levels. Community activities, financial management, and Committee work provided a background for solid cooperation to develop a viable community. Contact was at a premium, and all participated in the definition of a French and Catholic community. Member recruitment and group management were shared responsibilities where both levels saw benefits to the whole network as they cooperated in many community ventures.

This cooperative spirit changed as the socio-political environment provided opportunities for a new group of Federation leaders to transform the parochial Catholic social club operation. With outside funds flowing to Federation coffers, a more politically-active, Quebec-educated leadership built up administrative barriers between levels, and transformed Federation-local cooperation. In the name of community survival, cooperation became disjointed, with Federation leaders pushing new ideas and projects at reluctant local associations. The ineffective transmission of ideas and a general resistance to change infiltrated Federation-local cooperation. This reduced contact, hindered community definition, and ground member recruitment and group management to a halt.

Whereas federal government funding enabled Federation leaders to move ahead without local acquiescence, it also served to re-establish some confidence in the usefulness of Federation-local cooperation for community development. However, the
resulting cooperative framework actually obstructed Federation leadership.

Based on the Secretary of State premise that developing stronger and more autonomous local organisations was the best path to a more active community organisational network, Federation leaders used government funds to help build a "service centre" approach in their dealings with local organisations. Professional management services, a communications network, regional officers, and project development encompassed a wide variety of Federation activities at the local level which appeared to help leaders develop a viable francophone community. Though local response was favourable, due to the high value placed on services received, the Federation seemed more distant and separated from local activities. Representative structures brought both levels together but only highlighted the functional differentiation between them. The political strategies, administrative reports, and complex issues which became part of its day-to-day affairs made the Federation less a "community" organisation and more a bureaucratic machine to be used by local activists. The new type of Federation leader, more political, and more an administrator, transmitted a bureaucratic image, hiring personnel with specialized university degrees to provide competent community development with new-fangled social science methodologies unfamiliar to many local volunteers. Except for its important symbolic image as a force of Franco-Columbian unity,
the Federation thus distanced itself from the integrative function it once performed on behalf of the Franco-Columbian community.

Overall, the use of government funds by Federation leaders transformed the cooperative tool in a way that reduced their ability to perform leadership functions effectively. Contact was achieved through a service centre approach which appeared to minimize its importance. Community definition through cooperation brought disagreement, then agreement, and ultimately ambiguity as local communities failed to coalesce around the Federation. Member recruitment actually increased as government funds provided benefits to Franco-Columbians. However, as a local responsibility, it did not always grow out of cooperation between levels. Group management under Federation auspices alone meant less cooperation, but a more efficiently run community development.
ENDNOTES

1. Olivier Maurault, Au berceau de la Colombie, (Montréal: Editions de Dix, 1948). Of the 21,876 francophones in the province, according to 1941 census figures, 6,303 were in Vancouver, and 756 in Victoria.

2. See Figure 6.4 in the Chapter on Organisational Growth.

3. From 1951 until well into the 1960s, the pioneers of the Federation remained quite active at both levels of the organisation. In 1952, for instance, T. Filiatrault, Donat Savoie, and Oscar Cheramy were local leaders in Notre Dame de Lourdes, Vancouver, and Notre Dame de Fatima as well as serving on the Federation's Executive Committee.

4. Interview with Napoléon and Amélie Gareau, Maillardville, July 21, 1986. I also had interviews with the following people:

André Piolat, owner of Le Soleil de Colombie, Vancouver, 04 July 1986.


5. Interview - Gareau.

6. Ibid.

7. Interview - Piolat.

8. Interview - Lemire.

9. The "Rapport Moral" became a regular part of Annual General Assemblies during the 1950s, but was discontinued shortly after the decision to lobby for French language public schools.

10. Interview - Gareau.

11. Ibid.
12. In the 1950s, the Federation received funds from the Comité permanent de la survivance française en Amérique. At a 1951 Executive Committee meeting, there was talk of how to distribute the $500 received amongst Federation members. Societe Historique Franco-Colombienne (SHFC) P01.02.09.02.

13. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 03 May 1955. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

14. Taken from a 1949 Church Bulletin on display at the St. Sacrement Church in Vancouver during its 40th anniversary in 1986.

15. Interview - Gareau.

16. Ibid.

17. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 04 February 1952. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

18. FCFCB, Executive Committee - Local Club Reports, 06 July 1953. SHFC P01.02.25.01. The "Voyageurs de la Liaison Française" were a group of French Canadians tied to the Conseil de la Vie Française in Quebec City, and who travelled to meet other French Canadians across North America. The fact that they decided to come to British Columbia underlined the link Franco-Columbians had with the broader French Canadian society. That the Federation and its local Club members formed a welcoming Committee highlights the value of the organisational network as a base for community activity.

19. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 01 June 1953, SHFC P01.02.25.01.

20. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 04 December 1950, SHFC P01.02.25.01.

21. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 02 March 1953, SHFC P01.02.25.01.

22. Taken from a 1949 Church Bulletin on display at the Blessed St. Sacrement Church in Vancouver during its 40th anniversary in 1986.

23. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 21 October 1952, SHFC P01.02.25.01. The parish priests were represented; and one representative from each parish was chosen by the local Club and approved by the Federation president.

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24. Interview - Gareau.

25. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, October 1965 SHFC P01.02.25.02.

26. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 30 November 1968, SHFC P01.02.09.15.

27. Interview - Gareau.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. This comes out quite clearly in the interviews with local activists. People like Roméo Paquette and Gérald Moreau were both educated in Quebec before coming to BC and becoming involved in the Federation. See also Catou Lévesque, "L'arrivée des intellectuels," Paper presented to the 6th Annual Conference of the Centre d'études franco-canadiennes de l'Ouest, October 1986.

33. Interview - Lemire.

34. Interview - Riou.

35. Interview - Piolat.

36. Interview with Catou Lévesque, former President of the Société Historique Franco-Colombienne, September 1987.


38. Ibid.

39. Interview - Lévesque.

40. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, President's Report, October 1969. SHFC P01.02.25.02.

41. Interview - Piolat.

42. Ibid.
43. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 03 November 1966. SHFC P01.02.09.14.

44. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1966. SHFC P01.02.25.02.

45. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 04 June 1957, 29 April 1956, SHFC P01.02.25.01. At its founding meeting, the "Relève colombienne" has 6 clergy representatives who are there to ostensibly help in the direction of the Club. Also, 11 June 1957, SHFC One of these forums was entitled: "Is the French language the guardian of the faith?"

46. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, October 1966, SHFC P01.03.23.01. This is a statement from Harry Beauregard made during the discussion period.

47. Interview - Gareau.

48. Roméo Paquette, "La Fédération canadienne française de la Colombie-Britannique...c'est quoi?" l'Appel, vols. 7,8,9 oct.-dec. 1968, numéro special, "Un congrès nous renseigne! Un congrès nous engage!"

49. Interview - Piolat, op.cit.

50. FCFCB, Documentaire préliminaire d'étude en vue de la réunion spéciale de l'exécutif de la FCFCB prévu pour le samedi 26 avril 1969, p. 7. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

51. Ibid., p. 7.

52. Ibid., p. 7.

53. Ibid., p. 2.


55. Roméo Paquette (FCFCB Secretary-General to Paul-Emile Gosselin (Conseil de la Vie Française) 11 January 1969. SHFC P01.05.07.20.01.

56. Paquette to Gosselin, 06 February 1967. SHFC P01.05.07.20.01.

Between 300 and 400 local volunteers participated in these initial sessions; one third took part in a more intensive programme dealing with mobilisation methods used to induce community participation.

"La difficulté en Colombie-Britannique c'est que les éléments d'une communauté francophone sont là, mais que la communauté--ou les communautés--est ou sont à bâtir. Les animateurs de la FFC ne se sont donc pas adressés à une communauté existante, mais à une communauté en devenir.

En effet, il paraît évident que le francophone moyen, pour s'engager personnellement vis-à-vis d'un organisme socio-culturel communautaire à l'échelle de la province exige d'abord des garanties à l'avance, par lesquelles cet organisme pourra lui fournir des services quelconques qui soient à la fois concrets et visibles."

Interview with Peggy Sigouin (Director-General) and Josée Crossland (former President), Club Bon Accueil de Powell River, Powell River, 07 July 1986.

Interview - Sigouin and Crossland.

Interview with Suzie Dionne, (President), and Johanne Dufour, (Director), Association Francophone de Campbell River, Campbell River, 27-28 June 1986.

Interview - Sigouin and Crossland.
72. Interview - Piolat.

73. Interview with Marc Roy, FFC Director-General, 22 September 1987.

74. Ibid.


76. Interview - Roy.


79. Ibid.


81. Interview - Roy.

82. Interview with Father Godard, Blessed St. Sacrement Church, Vancouver, 21 September 1987.

83. FFC, Executive Committee, 06 April 1979. SHFC P01.02.09.26.

84. Ibid.

85. Interview - Dionne and Dufour.

86. Interview - Galibois-Barss.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Canada, *Constitution Act, 1982*. Article 23 of this Act gives the right to parents to have their children educated in one of the two official languages, French or English, according to a number of specific stipulations.

90. Interview - Galibois-Barss.
91. Interview - Sigouin and Crossland.

92. Interview - Piolat, op.cit.

93. FFC, Executive Committee, 08 February, 1974. SHFC P01.02.09.21.

94. Interview - Sigouin and Crossland.

95. Ibid.

96. FFC, Executive Committee, 19 October, 1970. SHFC P01.02.09.17.

97. FFC, Executive Committee, 29 February, 1978. SHFC P01.02.09.25.

98. FFC, Executive Committee, 1973. SHFC P01.02.09.25. To list but a few of these activities and projects for the year: "Centre culturel pour Vancouver", "Au bout d'un pays", "Maison du Québec", "Maison de la Parole et de l'Image", "Cartes Noël", opening of Information Centre, brief to CRTC, brief to Ministry of Education, "Le Cornouiller", Manual on how to use mass media, etc.


100. Yvan Corbeil and Camille Delude, Etudes des communautés francophones hors Québec, des communautés anglophones au Québec, des francophones au Québec et des anglophones hors Québec: Rapport final, Centre de recherche sur l'opinion publique, Montréal, November 1982, p. 120.

101. Interview - Sigouin and Crossland.

102. Interview - Piolat.

103. Interview - Sigouin and Crossland.


105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.
I attended the President's Council meeting in March 1986 which discussed the financial crisis. Local Presidents had very little to say on the floor of the meeting, but at a cocktail later, a few gave the impression that they were not too happy with not having been consulted by the Executive Committee and the Director-General of the Federation's financial management activities which led to the closing of Federation doors. Moreover, some were quite surprised that such little debate had occurred. Nonetheless, resolutions were adopted restricting the financial leeway of the Executive, and giving the impression that in the future consultation would be the general rule.
CHAPTER 8

POLITICAL ADVOCACY: THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS?

Federation leaders act as intermediaries between the Franco-Columbian community and various levels of government. Since the early 1960s, they have adorned a more activist political image, using political advocacy to promote the rights of BC's francophone population. As a government-funded policy agent, however, FFC political activities occur within a government-defined framework which modifies the exercise of leadership functions. The triumph of politics, here, lies more in the acquisition of government funds and the successful implementation of policy than in the mobilisation of an interest community.

Political advocacy is the pursuit of interest group leaders to gain access to government benefits. They view this access as a sign of legitimacy which can be sold to community members to recruit them for group action. It can also be used to justify specific actions which facilitate group management or to redefine the group's raison d'être.

As government-funded policy agents, however, leaders can become so involved in the task of managing group-government relations that they transform their leadership functions. Contact may only be achieved indirectly through the distribution of studies and reports. Leaders tend to define their interest community according to government policy and a broad political
schema which may infringe upon their own model of community development. Member recruitment is likely to be tied to leaders' ability to secure benefits from government rather than from active recruiting and community development activities. As for group management, interest group leaders may concentrate more energy on building up the interest organisation as they link community vitality and survival to organisational strength.

Over the Federation's 40-year history, three specific patterns emerged to illustrate how FFC leaders used political advocacy to advance their leadership, and how the availability of government funding, in legitimizing it, modified the nature of their leadership functions.

First, they used political advocacy as a justification of their mandate to speak on behalf of the Franco-Columbian community. It served as a stepping stone for redefining the Federation-local axis, and was increasingly used by leaders as a measure of the Federation's value to Franco-Columbians.

Second, with the influx of government funding, political advocacy shifted from community development to organisational survival. FFC leaders viewed organisational strength as the only way to ensure community viability and, therefore, adopted a bureaucratic management style for group-government relations which would guarantee a constant flow of funds. Through it, they gained recognition for their "politics", but were unable to
mobilise BC's francophones for political action.

Third, Federation leaders used political advocacy to place BC's francophone minority within the larger Canadian political framework. They shifted within a Quebec-Ottawa-BC triangle, but, with the arrival of federal government funding, and its distinct policy thrust, increasingly focussed lobbying at the provincial level to promote a distinctly "Franco-Columbian" community. In this, Federation political advocacy came to mirror the federal government's conception of OLMOs as provincial agents for the Official Languages Policy; FFC leaders adopted policy positions which, more often than not, coincided with those pursued by the federal government.

8.1. Redefining the Federation-Local Axis

Federation leaders came late to politics as a means to promote community development. Confronted with a stagnating organisational network in the early 1960s, however, they saw benefits in expanding the scope of Federation action to bolster community vitality. Changes in the socio-political environment, together with the availability of government funds, offered Federation leaders the opportunity to pursue political advocacy and encouraged its use. This "politicisation" significantly modified the Federation-local axis in two ways: Federation leaders challenged local and Church authorities, and imposed their political vision on the Franco-Columbian community; and,
the political role became a private Federation domain recognised and accepted by governments and by BC's francophone population.

8.1.1. A Political Vision

In its early years, Federation political leadership remained largely undeveloped. Contacts with government were few and displayed a passive, slow-growing quiescent political activity. FCFCB leaders believed that Franco-Columbians were part of the larger French Canadian society which contained one of Canada's two founding peoples. Yet, not until the political climate changed did they begin to actively lobby government for language equality rights in a broad range of areas. Lobbying government occurred, but sporadically, and with little coherent overall political strategy. The FCFCB functioned somewhat "on the fringe" of the political system, because few direct government access points (Ministries, policies) existed. When it did act, efforts were either locally-based or involved a form of cooperation between the Federation and local leaders.

Three points underscored the low level of political activity. First, Federation leaders neither made extensive use of nor attempted to build a network of governmental contacts which could be used at a further date. For example, though they pursued the issue of a French radio station for the better part of 15 years, they failed to identify systematically key pressure
points at the federal level. Lobbying efforts remained both ad hoc and reaction-oriented rather than planned and action-oriented. No Political Committee existed to design strategies or lobbying methods; nor was there a coherent political advocacy message which originated in the Executive Committee.

Second, evidence from Executive Committee records of the early years reveal no discussion of "politics" as a means to further Federation demands. "Government" remained an ambiguous measure in Federation calculations. Its leaders appeared aware of the political system, but never really developed a broad conceptualisation of Franco-Columbian interests through political affairs. For example, though in 1956 they demanded the redistribution of radio and television French language programmes in proportion to BC's francophone population, equating this with similar rights given the English-speaking minority in Quebec, only much later did FFC leaders expand this demand for language equality beyond the specific communications issue.

Third, whereas Federation leaders engaged in some direct political action on education issues, the Catholic church rivalled their authority in this area. For instance, although they sent a delegation to Victoria in 1950 to seek education rights for Franco-Columbians, Federation leaders relinquished their role to the Church-led "Comité des Ecoles de Maillardville" during the 1951 School's protest strike. Moreover, records show that it was only through clergy representatives that Federation
Executive Committee members were kept abreast of the events.

The Federation played only a tangential role in the strike. Its Executive Committee sent a message of support and a $50 donation (only 4.1% of its annual budget) to the Church Committee leading the strike, and it issued a press release (in English) during the 1952 provincial elections exhorting French Canadians to tie their vote to the settlement of the separate school's question. There is no recorded evidence of debate, however, on whether Federation leaders should have become more actively involved in an issue of such paramount concern to Franco-Columbians. This fact leads one to believe that they were either unprepared to act more decisively or were merely unsure of their place in the political realm. The pre-eminent role played by religious authorities in education matters could easily explain the Federation's absence. Overall, then, Federation political advocacy early on displayed a low level of political sophistication.

With changes in the socio-political environment during the 1960s, competing visions surfaced as to the nature of the organisation and its community development role. A new group of "activists", educated largely in Quebec universities, joined the Franco-Columbian fold and proposed a model of a politically-active Federation which would better address community needs. Only by linking the BC situation to the national debate on
Il s'agit de redonner un sens de la collectivité qui n'est pas assuré ni par les uns ni par les autres organisations pris isolement ni par les paroisses dont les intérêts ne sont pas d'ordre national.(8)

They believed the social club image had failed to appeal to a broad Franco-Columbian audience, and then proposed a more aggressively political orientation. For example, Roméo Paquette, then Federation Liaison Agent and Secretariat Director, spoke openly of a Franco-Columbian "cause" and nationalist interests within the context of Canadian duality. Through political advocacy, he asserted, the Federation could take advantage of new government funds and policies to build a more viable Franco-Columbian community, one with rights and privileges concommitant with its status as one of Canada's founding peoples.

For Federation leaders, two alternative routes could be followed to redirect the faltering community organisation. The Federation could continue to exist merely to form organisations and reunite French Canadians in Clubs across the province, or it could represent the union of all institutions, groups, and cooperatives identified with the BC francophone community, with the goal to recognise and pursue demands for the rights of Franco-Columbians in Canadian society.

This new political vision challenged the local, Church-run
social club image by proposing politics as the road to community salvation. Many local activists, well-ensconced in traditional ways, appeared unwilling to let go of the community spirit which had served them well for 15 years. They had difficulty in conceiving of a Federation outside the influence of the Church and the local parish organisations. Responding to attacks on the role of the parish as too folklorish, one clergy member stated bluntly: "Le folklore peut-être, mais cela a bien servi les Franco-Colombiens depuis vingt ans." Church leaders were left questioning the new directions: "Qu'est-ce que ça pourrait nous apporter?" asked one priest. The non-affiliated local associations did not appear to be interested in the Federation either, largely because their role in a renewed Federation remained somewhat ambiguous. Would they exist as representatives of a more "politicized" Franco-Columbian network? Could they remain essentially community institutions which happened to be owned by francophones and which served French-speaking as well as other British Columbians?

Hence, while Federation leaders attempted to invoke new ideas into the community organisation network, the local parish and French Club leaders balked at the changes. This brought the scorn of Secretary-General Roméo Paquette:

La crise actuelle est dûe au fait que l'orientation émanant du secrétariat et entérinée par le bureau exécutif voudrait répondre aux nou-
veaux impératifs d'une société changeante, d'un pays qui se dirige officiellement vers le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme, pendant que l'organisation présente du mouvement, l'orientation des institutions et l'attitude générale de nos gens cherchent à préserver le statu-quo et à favoriser le traditionalisme.(16)

Determined to push ahead, and conscious of government willingness to allocate funds, the "intellectuals" tried to impose a new vision on Federation activities. As we have already seen, however, it was not until federal government funds and policy support came available that Federation leaders were able to show reluctant local leaders some of the interesting possibilities available to them in the changes they proposed:

[D]epuis le dernier Congrès l'orientation de la Fédération s'est beaucoup modifiée en conséquence de l'intérêt que porte maintenant le gouvernement fédéral au relèvement des groupes francophones en dehors du Québec.(18)

Convinced that government support would put new life in the community organisation, and that they could best help the Franco-Columbian community through a unified, and more politically-active Federation, local leaders joined the movement to reconstruct it as a more effective community organisation.
8.1.2. A Private Federation Domain

In the Federation's formative years, local Clubs participated in what little political activity FFC leaders undertook. On a few occasions, Federation leaders requested local participation as a sign of community demand. For example, when they first sought to acquire French language tax forms from the federal Ministry of Revenue in April 1953, local Clubs were encouraged to write to the Ministry. A cooperative spirit also prevailed when the Federation lobbied a number of banks for bilingual cheques, and when the Notre Dame de Fatima Club issued a request to the Coquitlam Municipal Council to have the name "Maillardville" included on the Coquitlam city signs. Through this collaboration, the Federation gained recognition within the community, and was perceived as a legitimate and valuable means to pressure the government for concerns of relevance to Franco-

However, since local authorities expressed great reluctance with the new political vision, Federation leaders easily cornered the market on Franco-Columbian political activities. Access to government funds, and a more competent administrative Secretariat, gave them a recognised political role which they nurtured frequently and jealously guarded from local association intrusions. They succeeded by refusing to allow other associations to address government on behalf of Franco-

Columbians, by challenging traditional authority in education.
matters, and by seeking recognition as the official spokesperson for BC's francophone population.

In 1965, for example, efforts by an organisation representing BC's French European (as opposed to French-Canadian) population to set up a "Maison du Québec" in Vancouver sparked a rather blunt Federation response. When G.H. Dagneau of Quebec's Ministry of Cultural Affairs requested Federation opinion on the matter, Roméo Paquette replied that the "Alliance Française" mentality was quite incompatible with the immediate interests of French Canadians, implying that only the Federation could speak on their behalf. Without categorically denouncing the "Alliance", it is evident from the tone of the letter that Paquette did not appreciate what he interpreted as an attempt to divide the francophone population: "Je n'ai pas l'impression que l'Alliance est prête à descendre de son piédestal." Fifteen years later, in 1980, when Secretary of State, Francis Fox, wished to meet a number of BC francophones, Federation officials requested that they first meet with the Director-General in order to prepare for the meeting.

While lobbying the provincial government for French language education (schools, rights, etc.) in the mid-1960s, the Federation asserted its control of the political realm. Its leaders relinquished their passive role of the past to define education demands for BC's francophone minority and gain access
to a theretofore unresponsive provincial government. Their political activity comprised of briefs to Ministers, meetings with key government officials, and contact with school boards interested in implementing French language programmes. By the mid-1960s, before federal government funding, Federation leaders had already begun to articulate a more coherent Franco-Columbian position in education, one based on language equality in education and the need to go beyond the religious issue to achieve gains in this area. For them, the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism outside Quebec had hidden behind the problem of religious schools, submerging the "language" question; there were no French schools because provincial governments did not want to fund Catholic institutions for a "religious" minority. Hence, when they began to see the religious issue as a roadblock to progress in education demands made to the provincial government on behalf of Franco-Columbians, they confronted the Catholic clergy and won.

The Federation first asserted its political leadership at the federal level in 1964, but maintained it well into the next decade. As the only BC francophone organisation to submit a brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Romeo Paquette writes that the Federation merely responded to the need for a Franco-Columbian perspective in the national debate of the day. When they submitted a brief to the Pépin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity in 1978, they asked for local
participation, but set an agenda of subjects for local associations to follow. This practice of "directing" local political activities was commonplace. On another occasion, in 1975, FFC leaders asked for local support in lobbying the Secretary of State for changes to the OLMG programme, but sent a "model letter" for local leaders to follow.

In order to consolidate this monopoly of political power, Federation leaders sought to legitimize the Federation as the official spokesperson for Franco-Columbians at all levels of government. With Quebec, they emphasized the Federation's role as representative of the French Canadian minority in BC. In Victoria, after much lobbying by Federation leaders, the British Columbia government confirmed the FFC's status in a speech by the Honourable James Chabot in English and French to the Legislative Assembly in 1977. In Ottawa, federal government officials not only recognized the Federation as the central BC organization, they distributed the lion's share of government funds to it, ensuring that its leaders would be largely responsible for group-government relations (see Chapter 5). According to Huguette Leclerc, principal officer for the Secretary of State in the Pacific region, the FFC represented the watchdog of Franco-Columbian collective interests, and was there to ensure that Secretary of State investments corresponded to the orientation of the community.
By the 1980s, however, cracks in the Federation's otherwise solid political shell began to show as local associations questioned its monopoly. In 1984, for instance, the "Groupe de réflexion de Vancouver", launched an attack on Federation activities. A joining of disgruntled local association activists, this "Groupe" harboured doubts regarding the absence of control on "political" positions taken by Secretariat personnel in the name of the FFC. Though this challenge received little support from the majority of associations, it was a harbinger of future events.

The most critical affront to Federation leadership in the political arena came from an unexpected sector: education. The independence of the Association des Parents du Programme Cadre (APPCF), its frustration with Federation leaders, and its position as a parents' organisation able to exploit the "parents' rights" clause in the Canadian Charter of Rights, led its leaders to demand full political responsibility for primary and secondary school matters within the organisational network. As noted in Chapter 7, APPCF leaders rejoiced in their "stealing" of the political mandate for education from the FFC. For the FFC, relinquishing part of the education mandate to one of its association-members signalled an "opening up" of its private domain. It is unclear at this time how this shift may affect the way Federation leaders perform their leadership functions. A more decentralised political advocacy may allow them to reach a
broader section of BC's francophone population.

In general, then, changes to the socio-political environment, and the availability of government funds, contributed to the politicisation of Federation activity. Federation leaders redefined the Federation-local axis by challenging the traditional social club vision of community activity, and by claiming sole authority for political advocacy. In the first instance, they used political advocacy to impose their definition of the Federation and of the Franco-Columbian community on local authorities. This imposition threatened group management, because of the conflict it generated between levels, and reduced leaders' contact with members, because of their inability to transmit effectively the new political vision. In the end, member recruitment and support proved unmanageable, because Franco-Columbians failed to grasp the relevance of political activities. Nonetheless, government recognition of the Federation's political role enabled leaders to forego the immediate support of all local members in hope of re-establishing their loyalties through a rejuvenated Federation. We turn now to look at these efforts.
8.2. Political Advocacy As Bureaucratic Management

As they became more convinced of the advantages of political advocacy, Federation leaders also realised that they would need a competent administrative organisation in order to achieve many of their political objectives for Franco-Columbians. Occasioned by the availability of government funds, this "organisation survival" mentality shifted political advocacy from community development activities to a more bureaucratic style of group-government relations which seemed to undermined efforts to develop a political awareness in the interest community. Three elements of Federation political advocacy illustrated this pattern: First, Federation leaders became increasingly preoccupied with guaranteeing the influx of funds to maintain the administrative Secretariat. Second, political advocacy occurred as part of the FFC's policy agent role within the Secretary of State's OLMG programme. Third, FFC leaders endeavoured unsuccessfully to mobilise the Franco-Columbian community.

8.2.1. The Politics of Dollars

In the pre-1960s period, most political energies focussed on bringing concrete socio-cultural benefits to BC francophones in the interest of preserving a French Canadian culture in the province. For example, work of its Radio Committee (1950) brought French language segments on a local English radio station, CKNW. Before the CBC accorded BC francophones a radio
station in the late 1950s, Federation leaders engaged in several lobbying efforts directed at the CBC Board of Governors, one of which was a brief to the 1956 Royal Commission on Radio and Television.

As enthusiasm for the Federation and for community activities waned in the early 1960s, however, its leaders increasingly tied community development to organisation growth:

Sans des structures définies, adaptées au temps présents; destinées à remplacer les mesures arbitraires et les générosités gratuites; l'aide directe et discrétionnaire, si forte serait-elle, équivalrait à rendre plus solennel un enterrement de première classe de notre minorité de langue française. (38)

Political advocacy would serve to acquire financial and policy benefits to build a viable administrative structure, and would thus promote interest in community development activities. As government-funded policy agents, however, Federation leaders spent a good deal more time filling out project grant applications, preparing budgets to government guidelines, and supplying year-end financial reports to various funding agencies. In the early 1960s, Secretary-General, Roméo Paquette, hinted at a close "bureaucratic" integration of Federation activities and Quebec's Ministry of Cultural Affairs:

Je ne crois pas me tromper en prévoyant une orientation de nos activités en fonction des cadres ou initiatives qui relèveront de votre département. (39)
Exploiting the opened access to Quebec government offices, Paquette foresaw the eventual formation of a cross-Canada network of permanent provincial Secretariats or "mini-consuls". Accordingly, this required a permanent Federation Secretariat financed by the Quebec government.

Lobbying of this nature proved to be quite fruitful initially, because the Ministry of Cultural Affairs willingly provided opportunities for the Federation to receive money, to fit within programme guidelines, and to develop methods of submitting grant applications. Since Quebec's responsibility for francophone minorities was only historically and culturally based, and therefore not legally binding, Franco-Columbian political advocacy adopted a passive and access-oriented focus. Access was the key. When grant restrictions were imposed late in the decade, however, Federation leaders pursued more earnest lobbying and persuasion tactics to acquire funds from areas beyond the Ministry's "cultural affairs" mandate. In the end, amounts given the Federation did not correspond to the desired or projected level of activity, and leaders therefore shifted their political focus to the federal government.

With its new Official Languages Policy, Ottawa was more than ready to finance Federation activities, but only isofar as Franco-Columbians showed interest in their own community:

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C'est dans cette optique [(associer les Franco-Colombiens au processus de découverte qui les sensibiliserait)] que le Secrétariat d'Etat a opté pour l'appui financier du programme d'animation sociale: là où un potentiel raisonnable existe. La raison en est que sans prise de conscience collective, toute initiative risquerait d'être artificielle. (42)

In this light, federal government policy encouraged (even demanded) organisation development as a sign of community vitality. Early relations with Ottawa, therefore, resembled less those of an activist pressure group than of a policy agent receiving funds to build an organisation which would implement government policy. Political advocacy, in this sense, was more bureaucratic and management-like than "political".

Federation leaders played the bureaucratic game quite well, but political advocacy appeared to serve Federation growth more than community development. Thanks to a Secretary of State policy of non-intervention in association decision-making, and a set of broad programme criteria, they enjoyed a quasi-autonomous status in designing and implementing programmes to address community needs. On a number of occasions, the Secretary of State had to rein in Federation leaders for misspending allocated funds and, significantly, for overspending. For example, in a 1971 letter to then President, Roger Albert, the Director of the Secretary of State's Social Action Branch (OLMG's predecessor), J. René Préfontaine, scolded the Federation for its questionable financial management in transferring funds allocated for
community development activities to administration, and noted
that special attention should be paid to amounts spent on
banquets, hotels, and conferences.

Stretching programme guidelines also meant that the FFC used
project grants destined for community development as a means to
maintain its own internal operations, with the justification
that "an infrastructure of associations is an objective in its
own right and an essential aspect of community vitality." It
was noted in a 1982 OLMG programme evaluation that some ambiguity
did exist regarding the role of the associations in programme
objectives:

For instance, if the associations are seen as
all of the "infrastructure" that has been
wanted, then one of the program objectives
would appear to have been achieved. On the
other hand, if these associations are seen as
the means to achieve community infrastructure,
then the directorate should consider "core
funding" as one of its "project" categories
and set up guidelines for granting it.(47)

The Federation took advantage of this ambiguity to exercise
substantial autonomy within its government-client relationship.
In effect, as the FFC grew stronger and more self-confident in
its role as government policy agent, it, along with other OLMOs,
contributed to adjustments in the OLMG programme and to vast
increases in financial outlays for the programme in the late
1970s. With hindsight, one Secretary of State official
acknowledged, not only were francophone organisations better structured, they exercised a considerable amount of lobbying talent in achieving their projected funding objectives and contributed to a rapid expansion of the OLMG programme.

Success in generating consistently higher financial outlays to FFC coffers did not, however, breed a "political" relationship in Ottawa. Political advocacy really seemed a matter of how much money FFC leaders could extract from the government well. Since Ottawa was a willing banker, their political marrow was never really tested.

8.2.2. Pressure Group versus Policy Agent

Relations with Ottawa built a stronger, more politically-confident Federation whose leaders knew how to use government access points to benefit the Federation. However, bureaucratic management infringed upon efforts to develop effective political advocacy. Federation leaders appeared too preoccupied with and limited by federal government policy guidelines. As federal government policy agents, they were very much "prisoners" of the bureaucratic process. In fact, a reading of direct Secretary of State-FFC relations since 1970 reveals five basic components of their political advocacy: requests for funds, complaints about the insufficient level of funding, reports on funded projects, information-gathering on specific funding programmes, and letters of gratitude for funding or for Secretary of State participation.
in community activities.

Federation leaders, much like other OLMO activists, were not blind to the effects of bureaucratic management. In a Secretary of State study, it was shown that they worried of government intervention in group management, and of government policy defining group activity through funding guidelines which did not always correspond to real community needs. Since there was no pre-policy consultation process, they felt impotent to effect changes through the bureaucratic process. A large majority of them (91.7%) favoured instituting evaluation and consultation mechanisms to monitor the impact of the programme. As government-funded policy agents, Federation leaders had to be aware of these effects, but ironically became increasingly tied to bureaucratic management as the solution.

Political advocacy through bureaucratic management restricted Federation leaders in one other very important fashion: it limited the pursuit of full-scale pressure or partisan politics. Secretary of State guidelines actually forbid partisan activities. In fact, Federation leaders rarely engaged in confrontational actions or publicity-focused protests. In this, the Federation resembles Pross' "access-oriented" interest group which pursues regular contact with officials, representation on advisory boards, and staff exchanges. On one occasion, they actually refused to act as the "Franco-Columbian" representative.
at a NDP conference, because of its "political" nature. Their contact with provincial government officials consisted of polite, information-oriented reports and meetings to sensitize the government to the Franco-Columbian situation. A former Federation staff member complained of the Federation's political pacifism, asserting that its leaders were too "collaborateur", and that they did not "make enough noise" when demanding francophone rights. For example, when provincial Ministers did not keep scheduled meetings, Federation leaders merely returned another day. "They should have occupied his office," she proclaimed, admitting that government funding dampened the Federation's dynamism, because it became little more than a para-public institution.

8.2.3. A Lack Of Community Mobilisation

As community leaders active at the political level, it was important that political advocacy stir up local interest. A mobilised population would provide strong support for FFC demands, and would develop a reserve of local activists ready to take on new projects. Unfortunately, Franco-Columbians were rarely mobilised behind their Federation. Its leaders, moreover, seemed unable to transfer their political advocacy goals to BC's francophone population.

Federation leaders used three main methods to mobilise Franco-Columbians for political activity. They solicited
political support from local associations; they distributed reports and studies of subjects which they considered politically important to Franco-Columbians; and they acted as go-betweens for local associations dealing with government. On a number of successful political activities, they used one or a combination of all three methods.

Lobbying for a French TV station in Vancouver serves as a good case in point. After having invited CBC representatives to attend several Executive Committee meetings, and after sending a series of letters to the CBC in the mid-1970s, Federation leaders decided to enlist local support as a sign of Franco-Columbian solidarity. They even drafted a model letter for local presidents to follow. Later, copies of the Federation's CRT memoire were distributed to local community organisations for their reading.

FFC leaders were also reasonably successful in mobilising francophones to support Federation demands on government in the education field. In 1972, for example, they released a position-piece for francophone demands, tried to keep Franco-Columbians abreast of developments at the government level, and informed them of Federation activities in the field. When the Ministry of Education left the FFC to do the policy implementation work for the Programme Cadre de Français, Federation leaders immediately launched an information campaign imploring its
member-associations to inform francophone parents of the Programme. This impulse culminated in the formation of the Association des Parents du Programme Cadre de Français (APPCF) and an intense recruitment campaign for student enrolment.

Despite these successes, one gets the impression from the Secretary of State study cited earlier that even Federation leaders were not satisfied with what political advocacy had achieved. Not only was the Franco-Columbian political infrastructure under-developed, few believed that BC's francophone minority had been politicised thanks to FFC efforts. Many thought political advocacy had a relatively low capacity to respond to the needs of the community; a third (33.3%) of the respondents mentioned "politics" as an important part of their overall leadership, behind education (95.8%), economics (50%), and social activity (37.5%). Though they saw the FFC as the best means to promote and defend community interests, they felt that mobilisation efforts were amongst the least developed of their objectives. Given that no direct attempt was made to push the analysis beyond single answer responses, it is impossible to correlate these results with comments made earlier regarding bureaucratic management. We can nonetheless infer from this study, and from various comments of FFC activists, that political advocacy as bureaucratic management hindered mobilisation.

This is most clearly shown in an apparent incongruency
between how Franco-Columbians view political affairs and how they perceive the Federation's political role. According to one official, Federation activities drew general indifference in the population:

Malheureusement nous souffrons d'une timidité chronique qui nous rend pratiquement inconnus. Nous sommes victimes d'une clandestinité trop souvent entretenue et qui favorise la (sic) statu quo plutôt que le développement. (64)

Efforts to generate political activity at the local level often stranded the FFC's Political Committee. When FFC officials wrote to local Presidents in 1982 exhorting the need for a local political representative on the Committee, not one President responded.

'Some indicators in the CROP study (1982) reveal that Franco-Columbians are very unaware of or do not pay too much attention to their special status as an Official Language Minority. First, a significant majority of them (91.8%) seldom use government services in French. An equally large proportion (87.2%) do not even know of the Secretary of State's regional office in Vancouver. Of those who do, only half (48.1%) knew of its activities. Hence, both the federal government and its funded policy agent appear to have been unsuccessful in reaching the Franco-Columbian population. This pattern mirrors other francophone minority communities across Canada.'
Strangely, however, the same CROP study shows that Franco-Columbians are generally pleased with the Federation's political performance. When asked to agree or disagree with a number of statements about the Federation, a majority agreed with the following: "Aware of needs" (85.9%), "Issue positions the same" (60.4%), "Defends francophone rights at the federal level" (83.3%), "at the provincial level" (76.0%), "at the local level" (53.3%), and "Leaders represent interests" (71.7%). To the extent that political advocacy is important, therefore, it remains a Federation affair.

This incongruency between community mobilisation and Franco-Columbian confidence in the FFC shows up in a general ambiguity surrounding the importance of its political advocacy. For many, the Federation's work at the government level represents by far the most important task for the Federation as community leader. Keeping up to date with the issues, supporting community efforts, and presenting briefs to politicians and civil servants all help to create a Franco-Columbian presence in the province. "On sait que c'est la Fédération qui représente les Franco-Colombiens; c'est une bonne chose qu'on fasse ça." At the same time, however, some local activists view the Federation's political role as a wasted effort. They appreciate the work it accomplishes on behalf of Franco-Colombians, but in the same breath claim not to know of its activities. In some communities, the local francophone population is divided over the value of the
FFC; attitudes vary from "a useful service" to "what good does it do?" Others are quick to praise the Federation's role as community leader, but show an equal proclivity to criticism. Many see a gap between effort and results which may be linked to the fact that the political process can be painstakingly slow in producing visible results. Indeed, successful lobbying results in the education field took the better part of 15 years to reach the community. Comments from local activists reveal an unconscious acknowledgement of this gap: "Qu'est-ce que ça pourrait nous apporter de concret? Ils perdent leur temps car il n'y a pas de résultats immédiats concrets." The bottom-line for these Franco-Columbians is that for all the reports and studies produced by Secretariat personnel, very little is read by local activists, because they find it difficult to translate words into deeds on a day-to-day basis.

Thus, whereas the Federation has had few difficulties in managing bureaucratic relations with government, attempts to foment political interest for a variety of issues, even amongst association presidents, have proven largely fruitless. Local leaders saw politics as a job for the Federation; they did not wish to get involved in "political affairs." This inability to mobilise local political support frustrated Federation leaders, but did little to hinder their determination to tackle a number of different issues with various governments. In many ways,
then, FFC political advocacy was less a reflection of grassroots demands than a result of decisions made in Federation offices. Bureaucratic management and a focus on group-government relations have left local leaders to appreciate political advocacy as something the Federation does, but they have not created an understanding amongst Franco-Columbians of its importance for community development.

As a leadership tool, therefore, political advocacy has done little to enhance either contact with members or member recruitment, largely because it is not perceived by Franco-Columbians as being all that relevant. On the other hand, FFC leaders have managed to redefine the Federation through their political activities, and have effectively used political advocacy for group management. The distribution here between the contact-recruitment and definition-group management functions shows that Federation political advocacy may be isolated from its interest community, because in the latter case, Federation leaders can function out of local view. Its increased provincial focus hoped to modify this somewhat.

8.3. The Provincialisation of Political Advocacy

Over the Federation's 40-year history, its leaders used political advocacy to define the Franco-Columbian community within French Canada. To do so, they constructed a triangular pattern of relations with the Canadian political system, and
increasingly turned to the provincial arena. As time passed, in fact, there was a distinct shift of focus from Quebec City to Ottawa to Victoria. This shift occurred, it seems, more in response to changes to the external socio-political environment which gave leaders greater access to government funds, and to the federal government's perception of the Federation's role as a provincial agent for the Official Languages Policy than to any real reflections of Franco-Columbians as part of the provincial society. FFC leaders maintained a certain amount of continuity in their positions regarding language equality and the nature of French Canada, but have only recently changed significantly the focus of their political concerns vis-à-vis the Franco-Columbian community.

We can see this "provincialisation" in three specific areas: the gradual shift away from Quebec once Ottawa began funding OLMOs; the setting up of a national political organisation which would represent Federation interests in Ottawa; and, the nature of political advocacy at the provincial level.

8.3.1. From Quebec City to Ottawa

The rise of QuébÉcois nationalism in the 1960s opened up a national debate on French-English relations, but for francophone minorities it redefined the nature of French Canada and the dualist framework. With French Canadians in Quebec increasingly
defining themselves as "Québécois", francophone minority leaders had to focus more attention on their own provincial identities. In 1969, Roméo Paquette commented that, though Federation activities had to be tied to the evolution of the national debate, the Franco-Columbian minority would have to show its own collective desire. Moreover, he claimed, Quebec would need to recognize francophones outside Quebec as existing beyond the traditional framework of two solitudes. No immediate attempt was made to reconcile this Quebec-outside Quebec distinction, however, because there were still significant political benefits to be gained.

Federation leaders viewed political renewal in Quebec as a source of support for lobbying efforts in British Columbia. They situated the Federation as the focal point between two provincial governments, hoping to use the Quebec connection to pressure Victoria into helping BC's francophone community:

Pour ce qui est de l'aide que nous réclamons encore de nos frères du Québec, nous voudrions la justifier dans le sens de la solidarité canadienne-française. Nos efforts pour nous inscrire dans la facture politique de la Colombie-Britannique sont en perspective de l'égalité de droit des deux groupes linguistiques officiels du pays. (75)

Using the threat posed to Canadian unity by the unequal treatment of language minorities, the FFC hoped early on to persuade the BC government to contribute to Canadian unity by establishing a
network of French language schools in the province, one which mirrored that available for the anglophone minority in Quebec.

Direct policy involvement of the Quebec government emerged from a concern for equality between the two founding peoples, and for Quebec's responsibility to contribute towards that equality:

Le Québec se considère comme la mère-patrie des Français d'Amérique. Il doit donc veiller à ce que les intérêts des minorités françaises des neuf autres provinces soient sauvegardés et que leurs droits soient respectés intégralement de la même façon que le Québec sauvegarde les droits des Anglo-Canadiens dans ses limites.(76)

New policies and the creation of institutional access points facilitated Federation efforts to lock into the governmental system. As we have already seen, the "Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières" was set up to provide financial aid through francophone minority organisations. Between 1961 and 1976, the "Service" spent $1.5 million in direct aid to French Canadian minorities. Prior to this, Quebec had provided financial contributions indirectly through various Quebec religious, cultural, and nationalist organisations (ex. Conseil de la Vie Française, Fraternité Française, Comité de la Survivance Française en Amérique).

As Quebec focussed increasingly on its own provincial development, however, it distanced itself from French Canadians outside Quebec; henceforth, aid to francophone minorities would

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be linked to aspirations of the "peuple québécois". As they became affected by the politics of Quebec nationalism, francophone minorities turned to Ottawa for support. It is clear that the Official Languages Policy, and the general thrust of Ottawa-Quebec negotiations played a role in this transition. In 1975, for example, Quebec's Minister of Cultural Affairs stated that the building up of a francophone minority organisational network through Secretary of State funding meant that Quebec was no longer the most important "interlocuteur" for francophones outside Quebec. In light of the federal government's role, Quebec ultimately decided to abandon the more direct relations it had with the minorities. Reflecting an increasingly detached focus, it would limit initiatives to technical aid via the national minority organisational network, and would seek to pressure provincial governments to respond to the needs of their respective francophone minorities. The Parti Québécois consolidated this trend when it set up a "Direction de la francophonie hors Québec" in 1977 within its federal-provincial relations office. Quebec-FFC relations thus became entangled in inter-provincial relations, tying FFC political activities closer to the federal and British Columbia governments, and away from Quebec City.

The shift towards Ottawa at the end of the 1960s must be viewed as an indication of Federation attempts to gain more direct access to all points of entry to the Canadian governmental
system, and of its ability to take advantage of the favourable financial and policy offerings which surfaced at the federal level due to the Official Languages Policy.

Though Federation positions on a range of language policy related issues pre-dated the OLP, they acquired new importance as the federal government sought to address concerns of national unity. As partners in the bilingualism entreprise, FFC leaders actively promoted their belief in language equality between Canada's two founding peoples. This came out most clearly in their submission to the Bilingualism & Biculturalism Commission in 1964:

La condition essentielle d'un renversement du courant séparatiste actuel qui tend à diviser irrémédiablement c'est l'admission de cette dualité par tout le pays. ...Il nous semble logique de croire cette unité nationale impossible si la solution des problèmes culturels des deux grands ensembles n'est pas envisagée en fonction de la superficie totale du pays.(80)

Their recommendations included the constitutional recognition of the language equality principle at both levels of government, and the formation of a Ministry of Minorities. As such, the Commission, like the Official Languages Policy which followed, served as a useful conduit for Federation assertions of language rights, tying them more closely to the federal government's conception of French Canada.
As we have seen, Federation leaders later appeared to accept the fact that the Secretary of State had effectively taken over as their prime target for financial and policy benefits. They found it easier to deal with an enthusiastic federal government, which handed out a bigger bag of financial goodies, than with a Quebec government reluctant to go beyond certain established limits. In the "politics of language" debate (discussed in Chapter 1), French Canadian minorities could not accept an independent Quebec without sealing their own fate as language minorities. Turning to Ottawa provided ample shelter from recalcitrant provincial governments, and guaranteed them a government spokesperson as Quebec asserted its own political identity and independence from the minorities. Hinting at this shift in 1964, FCFCB leaders viewed the federal government as the "guardian of the bicultural character of the country". Quebec would thus become nothing more than the "cultural homeland" of francophone minorities:

Il y a eu pas mal de duplication depuis un an ou deux par le Secrétariat d'État dans des domaines qui étaient surtout du ressort de votre service il y a quelques années. Mais il n'y a pas de doute dans notre esprit que le foyer de la culture française au Canada, c'est toujours le Québec. (82)

More preoccupied with internal concerns and the plight of French-speaking Québécois, the Quebec government appeared willing to let Ottawa take prime responsibility for the minorities. Our
discussion in Chapter 1 showed that, in many ways, this legitimized its own viewpoint that the federal government did not speak for the Québécois, and that only a strong Quebec government could ensure the survival of the Québécois people. Once this occurred, however, the Franco-Columbian community became less an extension of one French Canada traditionally portrayed, and more a "provincial minority", defined as such by its Official Language Minority status and Quebec's own provincialist focus. The "Quebec-outside Quebec" distinction implicitly distanced Franco-Columbians from their cultural homeland and encouraged Federation leaders to provincialise their focus within a national framework.

In realpolitik terms, this situation limited avenues for Federation political activity and reduced the number of levers FFC leaders could pull to assert their leadership. As Quebec became a less prominent actor on the language minority stage, Federation political advocacy could no longer make as effective use of its cultural ties to extract gains from the political system. Thus, when Quebec independence became the hot political issue at the end of the 1970s, FFC leaders acknowledged Quebec's right to self-determination, but could not support its separatist programme. Though a strong Quebec may have benefitted francophones outside Quebec, ties to federal government language policy imposed caution and restraint on Federation political support. It is highly unlikely that FFC leaders would have
otherwise supported Quebec's demands, as we show later in this chapter, but, as recipients of federal government funds, their reluctance became all the more likely.

Federation leaders thus tied themselves to the national framework because of and/or despite Quebec. Ottawa succeeded in helping Franco-Columbians focus more energy on their own concerns as a francophone minority than on the potential fruits of independence. Hence, we see that French Canadian minority leaders made a number of important decisions which gave shape to a distinct francophone minority population having interests separate from Quebec.

We can, in fact, discern a pattern in francophone minority politics. The shift from Quebec City to Ottawa occurred initially as a result of their desire to retain a level of distinction from the Quebec nationalists who redefined the nature of French Canada to benefit the Québécois population. Ottawa's willingness to "play politics" with language policy in order to address national issues made francophone minorities targets for federal government initiatives. As the minorities became increasingly tied to the national framework, however, a triple adjustment occurred. First, they became less directly linked politically to their cultural homeland. Ottawa thus succeeded in establishing its role as government for French Canadians. Second, they were increasingly able to define a specific minority position, one which dealt more directly with minority language
interests. Third, though the minorities were nationally-focused as a result of the various federal government language policy initiatives, they were also more provincialized because Ottawa realised the need for provincial action to achieve national language policy objectives.

Relationships with Ottawa only reinforced this adjustment of the lense, because, over the years, the OLMG programme management became more regionalised and decentralised. In fact, Federation leaders dealt increasingly with the Secretary of State's regional office in Vancouver instead of directly with Ottawa. Moreover, programme operations used provincial boundaries to distribute project funds. This promoted Ottawa's conceptualisation of francophone minority communities as provincial entities, using a network of "provincial" francophone organisations to act as agents for its national language policy at the provincial level. Federation political action vis-à-vis the federal government thus occurred within an Ottawa-defined structure which provincialised organisation activities. We can see this even more readily with the advent of a national political organisation network for francophone minorities.
8.3.2. A National Francophone Minority Organisation

Federation leaders developed a number of early contacts with private francophone organisations. Always a means to reach out to the rest of French Canada, the francophone organisational network served the Federation as a vehicle for information and dollars. With one organisation in particular, the Conseil de la Vie Française, this role took on a special meaning for Federation leaders. Thanks to its Quebec-based offices, and close ties with the Quebec government, the Conseil was a window on the government triangle. Indeed, it was through the Conseil that Federation leaders first learned of the new Ministry of Cultural Affairs and of its "Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières". Letters exchanged throughout the 1960s between Roméo Paquette and Paul E. Gosselin of the Conseil displayed a close personal relationship, and provide ample evidence of the contact developed by Federation leaders with those in the francophone network. On a number of occasions, this close FFC-Conseil interaction benefitted Franco-Columbians with opportunities for new project money and with indications of imminent changes to Quebec government policy. The availability of federal government funds, however, reduced its role to an information source for French Canadian minorities. This is another example of the distance being built-up between the minorities and Quebec.

In addition to this Quebec-centred network, Franco-Columbian leaders branched out and participated in the development of a
Western French Canadian political consciousness, one which further diluted the image of one French Canada. In 1961, they helped to form the Fédération Canadienne-Française de l'Ouest (FCFO) as a means to voice the concerns of French Canadians from the four Western provinces. This led to the development of a number of projects involving Western French Canadians in national issues; for example, a letter sent to the House of Commons concerning the Canadian flag debate, positions on the financing of francophone organisations, and on the federal role in education.

Not until Ottawa brought significant changes to the OLMG programme, however, did provincial minority group leaders decide to form a national francophone organisation. The Fédération des Francophones Hors Québec (FFHQ) was formed in 1976 to represent francophone minority interests in Ottawa. Though each provincial association was a member of the national federation, they effectively relinquished their federal political mandate to the FFHQ. In 1977, for instance, when the Secretary of State invited all provincial associations to a meeting in Ottawa, Federation leaders demurred, asserting that the FFHQ held the national mandate. Moreover, during the 1978 constitutional debates, Federation Director-General, Jean Riou, suggested that the FFC make no political comments until the FFHQ's political committee had finished its work.
Though a "national" federation, the FFHQ displaced the FFC as the primary means for Franco-Columbians to maintain contact with their cultural homeland. Political change in Quebec with the Parti Québécois electoral victory in 1976 substantially modified the FFC-FFHQ relationship. Within its "Direction de la francophonie hors Québec", the Quebec government singled out the FFHQ as the intermediary between itself and all francophone minorities. For example, in response to a FFC request for funds regarding its participation in a volunteer and personnel training programme, the Quebec government deferred authority to the FFHQ. Thus, only in British Columbia could FFC leaders pursue political avenues. Replaced outside the province by a national francophone organisation and decentralised federal government structures, they turned to Victoria.

Since the FFC had a representative on the national body, it lent support to a single francophone minority community position on a number of important issues, and added the "Franco-Columbian" voice to the national position. This reinforced the "provincialisation" of its political activities.

Internal FFHQ politics have, in addition, made it necessary for FFC leaders to assert themselves more forcefully as BC representatives in order to make themselves heard. For a period of time, FFHQ leaders viewed BC's francophone minority as a "cause perdue", and the FFC was thus not taken too seriously. Only the Acadian, Franco-Ontarian, and Franco-Manitoban cases
appeared to generate interest in the FFHQ. However, thanks to the aggressive leadership of some key people—Fernand Gilbert, Rene Chenoll, Marc Roy, and Pierre Lapointe et al—who sat on the FFHQ's Board of Directors and who provided insightful and innovative solutions to some administrative problems, the FFC is now perceived more favourably, as is the continued survival of the Franco-Columbian community. Still, the Franco-Columbian voice appears to be somewhat of a murmur in the larger francophone minority crowd.

One further stumbling block for FFC leaders to overcome in the national organisation is the existence of regional power blocks which place individual provinces like BC at a relative disadvantage. The Acadian contingent, far more cohesive due to its already powerful "Société Nationale des Acadiens", appears to be the strongest force in the organisation, with Ontario holding a key central role due to the numerical significance of Franco-Ontarians in French Canada outside Quebec. For Marc Roy, FFC Director-General, the lack of solidarity between French Canadians in the Western provinces makes it extremely difficult to push their point of view or to wield any administrative power. As a result, either the Acadian perspective prevails or, as individual provincial representatives, FFC leaders can win concessions from other provinces in exchange for BC support. The Federation's isolation tends to reinforce the provincial focus, and leaders
often by-pass the FFHQ, sending their demands directly to the federal government.

The two most important events which directly involved the Federation and the FFHQ were the Quebec referendum debate and the subsequent constitutional negotiations. In their contribution to the FFHQ's referendum response, Franco-Columbian leaders continued to espouse a fragmented view of French Canada where, from Atlantic to Pacific, there existed several distinct peoples - Québécois, Acadians, Franco-Ontarians, and French Canadians in the West. They accepted Quebec's right to self-determination as a French-speaking people, but did not support the dismantling of the Canadian political system. This hardened the Quebec-outside Quebec distinction of French Canada. In the constitutional debates, FFHQ leaders sought official recognition of francophone minorities as one of Canada's two founding peoples, and aimed to ensure minority language rights in education and provincial government services. Here, they recognised the critical importance of provincial jurisdictions.

What is important to note is that the FFHQ dealt exclusively with the impact of the new Constitution on francophone minorities, and made recommendations therein. Quebec is only of passing interest as the "principal foyer of French Canada". Moreover, the FFHQ's positions tend to follow quite closely the general thrust of federal policy, notably in the areas of language equality, education rights, and government services.
Much like the federal government, the FFHQ admits the extent to which francophone minorities are really at the mercy of their provincial governments. It is for this very reason, one assumes, that Ottawa has attempted to use the OLMOs as policy agents at the provincial level, and why, indeed, the OLMOs themselves have tended to provincialize their political activities in accordance with Ottawa's OLMG programme.

8.3.3. Political Advocacy in Victoria

The visibility of French language issues on the national level, the federal government's willingness to fund provincial French language programmes, and the history of previous Federation initiatives to establish French schools in BC, all provide a good base for Federation action in Victoria. Its relatively solid "political" position in Ottawa and Quebec City during the 1970s contrasted, however, with the still somewhat limited political activity in Victoria. Confidence expressed outside the province changed to hesitation, reluctance, and frustration inside. Only scattered contacts with provincial government officials emphasizing the benefits of closer Federation-Victoria relations were undertaken.

For many years, the Education Committee functioned as the Federation's de facto political arm. Education had been the ticket to more effective overall political advocacy in the 1960s,
but had derived only limited benefits. In order to change the less than favourable BC government position on French language education in the 1970s, Federation leaders also began building up a network of support structures, particularly in the anglophone community. Relations with the British Columbia Teacher's Federation and its Modern Languages Teachers Association, for example, evolved to the point where anglophones and francophones were elaborating common strategies, sharing research information, and organising conferences. It is important to note that "rapprochement" between the two Official Language groups was a specific federal government objective. Max Beck, former Regional Director for the Secretary of State, believed this to be an essential part of what could be accomplished in British Columbia with the help of francophone organisations.

By 1975, the Federation's Executive Committee had isolated a number of clear positions establishing the right to French language education. Inserting this right within a broader socio-political framework, including concerns for national unity and language equality, Federation leaders adopted positions coincident with federal government language policy objectives on a national scale. In their 1973 brief to the provincial Minister of Education, they laid out four elements of an education strategy to guarantee francophone minority rights: recognition of the French Canadian cultural roots Canada-wide; French
Canadian culture could not be restricted to Quebec without endangering national unity; the need for institutional modifications to permit the French Canadian community to grow; and the setting up of a programme to outline Franco-Columbian needs. In 1977, thanks to meetings with the BC Premier and his officials, to a Quebec consultant's report on French language education in BC, and to the provincial Premier's annual gathering held in St. Andrew's, New Brunswick, the BC government worked a dramatic about face in its position on French language education by establishing the Programme Cadre de Français (PCF).

Lobbying successes by the Education Committee appeared to direct Federation political advocacy to other areas of provincial concern:

L'idée dans tout ça est de frapper à la bonne porte selon la nature du problème. Contacter, faire pression sur les personnes dont la responsabilité est d'agir. Ils sont obligés d'agir; les politiques sont là et il faut qu'ils les suivent. (99)

In fact, breaching issues other than education with the provincial government marked the beginning of a more determined Federation effort to expand its political presence in BC as an OLM organisation. Constitutional issues on the national political scene, for example, provided numerous opportunities for the FFC to exploit its links to both Ottawa, Quebec, and the national minority organisational network in order to buttress
political activities in Victoria. For example, FFC leaders met BC Premier Bill Bennett and his officials in 1980 in an attempt to establish means for Franco-Columbians to participate in the post-referendum constitutional process.

Following the provincial government's 1977 recognition of the FFC as spokesperson for Franco-Columbians, Federation leaders formed a separate Political Committee in order to coordinate lobbying activities at the provincial and municipal levels. It was not until 1981, however, that this Political Committee was able to articulate Franco-Columbian demands for provincial services in all sectors:

[La FFC possède le mandat de] chercher à obtenir des pouvoirs publics, des lois et des règlements, des gestes et des comportements pouvant faciliter ou garantir l'exercice des droits fondamentaux des franco-colombiens. Son mandat secondaire est de renseigner les franco-colombiens sur les lois et règlements que régissent les services publics et les encourager à ne pas accepter des niveaux de services inférieurs, du fait qu'ils sont francophones (...).(102)

In a 1983 Political Committee report, Les stratégies politiques de la Fédération des Franco-Colombiens 1983-1988, Federation leaders acknowledged for the first time the need to become a "political pressure group", and outlined parameters for a broad gradualist approach to political action. The document proposed the acquisition of a number of negotiating tools which would
create a climate of mutual dependency between the FFC and different levels of government. This strategy comprised efforts to contact provincial party caucuses regarding the needs of Franco-Columbians, to prepare for future provincial elections, and to establish relations with various provincial Ministries (MHR, Transport, Tourism) whose jurisdiction affected Franco-Columbian interests.

Political activity outside the realm of education was, however, quite limited and ineffective. Part of the difficulty in achieving success at the provincial level must rest with the Federation's traditional dependency on education issues to lead political advocacy. One activity, sending questionnaires to provincial election candidates, received little response and underlined for Federation leaders the political insignificance of Franco-Columbians in BC:

[Cela] confirme (...) que le sujet de la survie de la presence francaise dans la Colombie-Britannique rencontre l'indifference quasi-generale chez ceux qui forment deja ou aspirent a former le gouvernement provincial.(105)

In searching to reverse the Federation's stature provincially, its leaders decided to build upon the symbolic and legal opportunities furnished by the new Canadian Charter of Rights (1981). They became particularly active on the national scene by organising a public debate on language rights in Vancouver, with
participants from both government and francophone milieux. However, Director-General Marc Roy underlined in 1985 that the provincial government still refused to guarantee francophones rights recognised in a Constitution it had signed. He thus admitted that sensitizing provincial politicians remained a problem.

To explain the difficulties, we must turn to a number of different areas. First, Federation leaders appeared to lack a developed appreciation of the political process in British Columbia due to their distance from that process over the years. Because of this, and though provincial politicians and bureaucrats held a positive image of the Federation, and recognized it as the legitimate voice of Franco-Columbians, the FFC did not constitute a major political force in the province. This is due, in part, to the low level of concentration of francophones across the province, and their small population size, both of which weaken the Federation's influence vis-à-vis the BC government (see Chapter 3).

Second, the national political organisation may also have hindered provincial lobbying activities, because it failed to take into account provincial views. In a way markedly similar to federal-provincial negotiations, Federation leaders complained of a central Canadian bias within the FFHQ, and of its ignoring the points of view of periphery provinces like BC. In 1980, for example, they felt that a FFHQ document, Pour ne plus être...sans
pays, was harmful to discussions with the BC government. The aggressive tone of the text, and the high level of political rhetoric, seems to veil some of the otherwise sound recommendations which touch upon the more or less traditional francophone minority demands for language equality, official recognition of both languages, and government services in French. In its concluding remarks, the text appears to threaten violence as well as the break-up of the Canadian whole:

> Et ceux qui sont fiers, ceux qui ne pourront supporter l'outrage d'un tel refus, ceux qui seront poussés au comble de l'indignation, devront se résoudre à les poser ces gestes, peut-être les plus importants de leur vie, gestes dont l'importance sera directement proportionnelle au tragique du refus. Voilà qui pourrait laisser des conséquences très encombrantes à la porte de la maison de la majorité, maison qu'elle nommera peut-être toujours Canada, mais de laquelle plusieurs auront pris congé.(112)

It may also have been that the FFHQ was seen to have overstepped its lobbying role by proposing wide-sweeping changes to Canada's constitutional framework. For FFC leaders, the reality of the BC political scene made it highly unlikely that BCs political leaders would take seriously such dramatic proposals. From this point of view, the document was not particularly well-suited to the Federation's provincial activity. Throughout the 1980s, Federation leaders have remained affiliated to the FFHQ, but have questioned its role as a national minority organisation as they
became more active at the provincial level.

Third, much responsibility lies also with the unwillingness of the provincial government to give special recognition to the Federation as an OLM organisation. Paradoxically, though they have developed an identity which is somewhat separate from Quebec, French Canadian minorities are ineluctably perceived by provincial governments to be provincial extensions of "la belle province", and are treated as such. In 1977, for example, a provincial Minister commented that BC had a particularly difficult problem ... satisfying all the ambitions of the francophones because they are so few in this province [and that he was sure that] the people from Quebec who have given any thought at all to what the spread of francophones is across the nation ... realize that within the practicality of our system we're doing the best we can to accommodate their wishes.(115)

Federal government initiatives which use OLMOs as provincial agents for language policy, initially designed to respond to Quebec, have not helped matters. The provincialisation of Federation activities is tied to the national framework, but one does not easily discern the transition between levels, especially insofar as benefits (symbolic and real) accrued to the provincial francophone minority.

From the lack of results in Victoria, FFC officials concluded that the only real means of pressure they possessed
resided in the protection received from Ottawa. Ironically, the OLMG programme, having promoted strong provincial francophone advocates, had, in the case of the FFC at least, only reinforced the dependency of OLMOs on a federal government which supports them financially.

Overall, the "provincialisation" of FFC activities may have rendered its political advocacy less effective. Not only were Federation leaders less prepared for the pursuit of provincial avenues, access to the BC government appeared restricted to the education field. The small size of the francophone population, and its geographic dispersion (both noted in Chapter 3) certainly weakened its political influence in Victoria. In the end, they remained dependent on Ottawa for the legitimacy acquired through the OLMG programme. This presents somewhat of a conundrum to BC's francophone minority: as the OLMG programme redirected FFC leaders toward Victoria, it distanced them from the only government arena where they had any political legitimacy. Consequently, the provincialisation of political advocacy under the Official Languages Policy reduced the scope of political benefits Federation leaders could offer BC's francophones. As a leadership tool, then, political advocacy appeared to make leaders' activities less relevant to the interest community.
Conclusions

Over the Federation's 40-year history, its leaders came to use political advocacy to exercise their leadership functions on behalf of BC's francophone population. Changes in the external socio-political environment, which included access to government policy and the availability of public funds, provided the impetus for substantive modifications to FFC leadership. Federation leaders redefined their activities, becoming more politically-oriented, and increasingly tied their actions to political events and the governmental process. Yet, however much bureaucratic management of group-government relations may have guaranteed a sufficient flow of government funds, it also dissociated Federation advocacy from community mobilisation, and rendered "politics" a less tangible, and perhaps less relevant, benefit for Franco-Columbians. Since political advocacy originated only in Federation offices, local authorities either took no interest in "politics" or ignored its usefulness for francophones in their communities. This not only frustrated Federation initiatives, which often needed local support, but left one wondering whether Federation political advocacy had any relevance at all beyond its offices in Vancouver. In the pursuit of politics, Federation leaders seem to pay less attention to contact and member recruitment, believing that political benefits can fill the gap. As a result, on this level they acted increasingly in isolation of the Franco-Columbian community.
On another level, the FFC has become less and less a direct actor beyond its provincial borders. Recognised and moulded as federal policy agents at the provincial level, FFC leaders relinquished their federal mandate to the national francophone federation (FFHQ) and "provincialised" their political activities in accordance with federal government language policy. Ties to the national framework enabled them to continue their promotion of language equality and education rights in unison with federal government policy. However, at the same time, they distanced themselves from their traditional Quebec homeland, and their focus became increasingly provincialized. Political advocacy served to redefine the Franco-Columbian community and the Federation as provincial entities.

Federation leaders certainly facilitated group management through political advocacy, because they ensured a constant flow of funds to maintain the organisation for community development activities. However, activity at the BC level tended to reduce the FFC's political posture, and even further lessened the relevance of Federation "politics" for the francophone population. Hence, until the BC government is willing to recognise its OLM status, political advocacy may remain an ineffective leadership tool for Federation leaders as they try to build a viable francophone community in British Columbia.
ENDNOTES

1. See the "team-like" approach in Chapter 4.

2. Fédération Canadienne Française de la Colombie-Britannique (FCFCB), Executive Committee, 04 September 1956, Société Historique Franco-Colombienne (SHFC) P01.02.25.01.

3. Ibid., 04 August 1952, SHFC P01.02.25.01.

4. Ibid., 05 May 1952, SHFC P01.02.25.01.

5. Ibid., 08 April 1951, SHFC P01.02.25.01.

6. Ibid., 05 May 1952, SHFC P01.02.25.01.


8. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1967. SHFC P01.03.24.01.


10. Catou Lévesque, "L'arrivée des intellectuels".

11. FCFCB, Document préliminaire d'étude en vue de la réunion spéciale de l'exécutif de la FCFCB prévu pour le samedi 26 avril 1969, p. 6. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

12. Ibid.


14. Ibid.

15. FCFCB, Document préliminaire....


17. Catou Lévesque. This phrase was coined by Lévesque to describe the university educated newcomers who pushed for a heightened political vision.

19. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 13 April 1953. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

20. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 06 March 1956. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

21. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 02 April 1957. SHFC P01.02.25.01.


23. Roméo Paquette (FCFCB Liaison Officer) to G.H. Dagneau (Director, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières), 27 January 1965, SHFC P01.05.06.01.01. It is with this letter that we get an appreciation of the cultural divisions within the Franco-Columbian community between French Canadians and other francophones.

24. Ibid.

25. FFC, Executive Committee, 14 November 1980. SHFC P01.02.09.27.

26. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, President's Report, 1966. It is at a meeting with the Minister of Education on May 2nd 1966 that the Federation receives acknowledgement of changes to the BC School Act regarding the official recognition of French schools in B.C. SHFC P01.03.23.01.

27. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1965, SHFC P01.02.26.01.

28. Roméo Paquette (FCFCB Secretary-General) to G.H. Dagneau 27 October 1966. SHFC P01.05.06.01.02.

29. Roméo Paquette, "La FCFCB ... c'est quoi?".

30. FFC, Executive Committee, 09 December 1977. SHFC P01.02.09.24.

31. FFC, Executive Committee, 17 November 1975. SHFC P01.02.09.22.

33. Huguette Leclerc (Secretary of State, Pacific Region) to Marc Roy (Director-General, FFC), 22 November 1983. FFC archives 0.1.6.2.1.

34. FFC, Council of Presidents, March 1984. FFC archives 0.1.6.2.3.

35. FCFCB, Constitution 1945, article 2. SHFC P01.03.02.01. In article 2 we read the words: "pour la conservation, la défense et l'avancement de leurs intérêts religieux et nationaux.

36. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 04 December 1950. In an interview with Mr. Rae, owner/manager of CKNW radio station in New Westminster, the Federation was granted a 30 minute French programme (from 5:30 to 6:30 on Sundays). The programme would consist of French songs, and be run by a bilingual announcer. The "Comité de la Radio" would be responsible for the programme. SHFC P01.02.25.01.

37. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 04 September 1956. SHFC P01.02.25.01. Federation leaders demanded that a fair share of CBC's French language programmes be given to BC francophones. Meetings with and letters written to CBC governors also served as a means to address particular Franco-Columbian needs. Justifying their demands on the grounds of equality with Quebec anglophones, Federation leaders established parameters for future political action.


39. Roméo Paquette (FCFCB Secretary-General) to G.H. Dagneau, 29 November 1963. SHFC P01.05.06.01.02.

40. Paquette to Dagneau, 09 August 1968, SHFC P01.05.06.01.04.

41. Ibid.

42. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, 1969, Document des résolutions et des objectifs. SHFC P01.03.26.01.

44. J. René Préfontaine (Director, Social Action Branch, Secretary of State) to Roger Albert (FFC President), 30 December 1971. SHFC P01.05.01.14.03.

45. Paule Desgroseillers-Macdonald (Secretary of State Officer, Vancouver) to Jean Riou (FFC Director-General), 04 December 1977. Here it is explained that the FFC could fit into many of the categories for funds; for example, to enhance Canadian unity, have a media impact, short-term basis for long-term effect, not a duplicate effort, appropriate organisation to do so, education-action project. But she underlines that "project" funding was not designed to cover the long term operating costs of the Federation.

46. Secretary of State, p. 49.

47. Ibid., p. 52.

48. Michel Bastarache, "Discours présenté au Conseil des Présidents de la FFC" 16-18 March 1984. FFC archives 0.1.6.2.3 and in Secretary of State, Evaluation Report..., p. 58. Bastarache did attribute this to association activity.

49. Canada, Department of the Secretary of State, Besoins et perceptions de Franco-Colombiens, rapport final, Study done by the Centre de recherche et de consultation (CERECO) in Winnipeg, December 1982, p. 11.

50. Ibid., p. 16.

51. There is usually a reference to this in all financial agreements between the Secretary of State and the Federation.


53. FFC, Executive Committee, 26 September 1974. SHFC P01.02.09.21.

54. Interview with Violette Gingras, former FFC Publicity & Communications Officer, July 1986.
55. FFC, Executive Committee, 10 January 1974. SHFC P01.02.09.22.
56. FFC, Executive Committee, 20 September 1976. SHFC P01.02.09.23.
57. FFC, Minutes & Proceedings of the FFC Education Committee, 13 December 1975. SHFC P01.02.07.09.
58. Ghislaine Templeman (V.-P. FFC, Officer of Education Committee) to Claudette Deshaies (Secretary of State), 22 August 1981.
59. Canada, Department of the Secretary of State, Besoins et perceptions..., p.3.
60. Ibid., p. 10.
61. Ibid., p. 24.
62. Ibid., p. 27.
63. Ibid., p. 24.
64. FFC, Executive Committee, 01 September 1978. SHFC P01.02.09.25.
65. FFC, Compte-rendu de la réunion du Comité Politique de la FFC, 03 October 1982. FFC archives 8.3.2.3.
66. Interview with André Piolat, owner of Le Soleil de Colombie, Vancouver, 04 July 1986.
67. Interview - Gareau.
68. Interview with Peggy Sigouin (Director) and Josée Crossland (former President), Club Bon Accueil de Powell River, Powell River, 07 July 1986.
69. Interview - Piolat.
70. Though the FFC started to seriously lobby in Victoria in the early 1960s, it was not until 1977 that the BC government announced its intentions to set up a publicly-funded French language education programme, and not until September of 1979 that the programme officially began.
71. Interview - Sigouin and Crossland.
72. FFC, Political Committee, 03 October 1982.

73. Interviews with the following people who commented on the FFC's political role:

Josée Crossland, Club Bon Accueil de Powell River, Powell River, 07 July 1986. She saw the FFC as a political spokesperson above all else.

Peggy Sigouin, Club Bon Accueil de Powell River, Powell River, 07 July 1986. She commented that the Club preferred to leave politics to the FFC.

Violette Gingras, former Publicity & Communications Officer, FFC, July 1986. She sees the FFCs political role as principally a lobbying action vis-a-vis governments.

André Piolat, owner of Le Soleil de Colombie, Vancouver, 04 July 1986. He views the FFC's political role as the most important role for the FFC. It lets Ottawa know that their is an important demand in the community.

74. Paquette to Dagneau, 12 February 1968. SHFC P01.05.06.01.03.

75. Paquette to Dagneau, 27 October 1966. SHFC P01.05.06.01.02.

76. Quebec, Ministère des Affaires Culturelles, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières, Déclaration du Premier Ministre du Québec au sujet des minorités Canadiennes-Françaises, 03 May 1965, p. 2. SHFC P01.05.06.01.01.


78. Quebec, Ministère des Affaires Culturelles, Discours de Denis Hardy, Ministre des Affaires Culturelles, Québec, 18 February 1975. SHFC P01.05.06.01.05. See also, Quebec, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales du Québec, Press Release, 15 November 1977. SHFC P01.05.06.01.04.

(...) même si le Québec et les Québécois n'ont pas de responsabilités juridiques ou politiques envers les minorités francophones des autres provinces, ils ne sauraient rester indifférents au sort de ces minorités envers lesquelles ils se reconnaissent une responsabilité morale.
When the Quebec government announced changes to its policies affecting francophone minorities in 1974, the FFC wrote extolling the mutual benefits to be derived from a continued FFC-Quebec contact. Because Quebec's decision stemmed partly from the belief that provincial francophone associations had attained a level of maturity concomitant with functional autonomy, the Federation perceived an opportunity to strengthen its ties with Quebec thereby consolidating its leadership. Once the first hints of a less active Quebec government surfaced, FFC President, Nestor Therrien, positioned the Federation as Quebec's window on the Pacific; not only would a Quebec-FFC relationship help the growing number of Québécois settling in British Columbia, but Quebec could benefit economically, politically, and socially from closer ties to the B.C. government. When the Ministry of Cultural Affairs proposed the formation of a Consultative policy committee in 1975, the Federation was prepared to take the lead intermediary role in the negotiations. Outlining Franco-Columbian interests to its own association membership, it suggested that a common front around two issues—unconditional grants and political benefits for Quebec—would provide optimum collective results. These examples of FFC-Quebec interaction can be found in the following references. Paquette to Dagneau, 16 February 1971. SHFC P01.05.06.01.04. Nestor Therrien (President, FFC) to Honorable Denis Hardy (Minister of Cultural Affairs, Quebec), 12 August 1974. SHFC P01.05.06.01.05. Denis Hardy to Nestor Therrien 16 July 1974. SHFC P01.05.06.01.05. Therrien to Hardy, op.cit. Jean Riou (Director-General, FFC) to Association-Members, 20 March 1975. SHFC P01.05.06.01.04.

79. FCFCB, Annual General Assembly, President's Report, 1965. The President mentions the beginnings of a "politique de l'offensive", which included the lobbying of the federal government for financial aid.

80. FCFCB, Mémoire..., pp. 81-82.

81. Ibid.

82. Roméo Paquette (FFC Director-General) to G.H. Dagneau, 16 February 1971. SHFC P01.05.06.01.04.

83. FFC, Position de la FFC face au référendum du Québec présentée à l'Assemblée Générale de la FPHQ, 21 February 1979.
84. Conseil de la Vie Francaise, Annual General Assembly, 24 May 1961. P01.05.07.20.01. Here, we learn that the Conseil receives $6,000 annually from the Quebec government.

85. Gérald Moreau (FFC representative at the Conseil de la Vie Française) to FFC Executive Committee, 29 October 1966. P01.02.09.14. The Conseil de la Vie Française also lobbied the Quebec government on behalf of francophone minorities in the same year.

86. FCFCB, Executive Committee, 13 June 1961. SHFC P01.02.25.01. See also, FCFCB, Executive Committee, 11 May 1967. SHFC P01.02.09.14.

87. FFC, Executive Committee, 09 December 1977. SHFC P01.02.09.24.

88. FFC, Executive Committee, 24 June 1978. SHFC P01.02.09.25.

89. Roger St. Louis (M.A.I.Q. - Officer of "A.F.H.Q.") to Jean Riou (FFC Director-General), 21 June 1978. SHFC P01.05.06.01.04.

90. Among other things, the FFHQ pushed for the special recognition of francophone minority communities, and for the construction of a bureaucratic support structure in the Secretary of State to ensure consultation and dialogue with minorities. The FFC also continued to participate actively in the Federation des Canadiens-Francais de l'Ouest (FCFO). It was through FCFO that Federation leaders expressed a number of opinions concerning financial relationships with the government. The FCFO argued that the federal government had a responsibility to ensure the continued growth of the francophone minority associations it had helped to build through its Official Languages Minority Group programme. The argumentation employed here reflects the degree to which francophone associations had, by that time, developed a sophisticated set of key pressure points in the federal government's Official Languages Policy.

91. Interview with Marc Roy, Director-General FFC, 21 September 1987.

92. Ibid.

93. FFC, Position de la FFC face au référendum.
94. Doug Brown (FFC Director-General) to L.J. Wallace (Deputy provincial secretary), 10 September 1974. SHFC P01.04.02.05.: [FFC offers] a number of concrete suggestions which we hope will constructively reinforce the French fact in B.C., both within the social context of the province itself as well as in terms of developing creative ties between British Columbians and the traditional sources of French Canadian cultural heritage in other parts of Canada and particularly in Quebec.

95. W.C. Barrell, (French Programme Coordinator, Ministry of Education) to A.C. Toutant (Chairman, District French Committee, Kamloops), 13 March 1974. SHFC P01.02.07.07. As an example of the BC government attitude:

French as the language of instruction is a very critical area to get into and can create serious problems for a school district. (...) I suggest quite categorically that it would be best to leave it alone.

96. Doug Brown (FFC Director-General,) to John Powell (BCTF Representative, Commission de la Langue Francaise, Canadian Federation of Teachers), 05 September 1974. SHFC P01.02.07.04.

97. Interview with Max Beck, former Regional Director for the Secretary of State, Vancouver, May 1987.


102. FFC, Political Committee, 15 August 1981.


105. FFC "Communiqué: les résultats du questionnaire de la FFC réaffirment le mandat de celle-ci", 01 May 1979. SHFC P01.02.13.01.


110. FFC, Executive Committee, 03 July 1980. SHFC P01.02.09.27.

111. Ibid.

112. Kristianson. Kristianson goes on to comment that "[t]he latter part of this comment reveals an important element in the attitude of the present government towards services to francophones. While in some measure the Socreds see themselves (sic) as responding to the needs of an element within the provincial electorate, the need is assessed in the context of national politics and a response to the debate about Quebec's role in Canada. Hence, government action is seen as an 'important contribution to the country' but 'far beyond our constitutional responsibilities.'" pp. 7-8.

113. Interview with Marc Roy, FFC Director-General, Vancouver, 22 November 1985.

114. Kristianson. Kristianson gives some interesting comments from provincial politicians regarding the FFC.

115. Ibid.

SECTION 3:

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

We have looked at the effects of federal government funding on the growth and evolution of FFC leadership. In this concluding section, we bring together the results of our study in five parts. First, we offer summary remarks concerning the broad contributory factors to Federation leadership. Second, we deal more specifically with how the availability of federal government funds modified Federation leadership. Third, we outline the nature of Federation leadership given the effects of government funding. Fourth, we draw more general inferences about the effects of government funding on interest group leadership. Last, we expand our analysis beyond the limits of our case study to explore its relevance to the broader political science literature which deals with how the State uses interest group actors as policy agents to intervene directly in society and shape its direction.

9.1. Contributory Factors to Federation Leadership

Over the Federation's 40-year history (1945-1985) a set of four factors moulded its leadership: the socio-political environment, government financing, policy support from various levels of government, and the nature of the Franco-Columbian community. All inter-related, these factors provided a bulwark
of support to Federation leaders who sought to preserve the westernmost wing of French Canada.

Changes in the socio-political environment offered a generally positive ambiance for Federation forays into various areas of activity, be they financial management, organisational growth, cooperation with local community leaders or political advocacy. Largely due to nationalist rumblings in Quebec for most of the past 25 years (Quiet Revolution, separatism, PQ election, referendum), and to the ensuing "politics of language" debates between Quebec City and Ottawa, French Canadian minorities became key elements in national discussions about French Canada and Canadian unity. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism & Biculturalism and its offspring, the Official Languages Policy, brought francophone minorities to centre stage, providing Franco-Columbians and FFC leaders new opportunities to pursue community development objectives and to voice their own concerns on national issues as an Official Language Minority.

Government financing brought much-needed financial resources to the whole Franco-Columbian organisational network, and specifically to Federation coffers as it became the "central bank" for the development of BC's francophone community. Funds from Quebec City and Ottawa, with Victoria being notably absent, enhanced Federation legitimacy as community leader and allowed its leaders to make substantial changes to their leadership activities. These funds also helped Federation leaders outline
plans for the development of a viable Franco-Columbian community.

Policy support from various levels of government opened access points to the Canadian political system for Federation leaders. Generally, the federal government's Official Languages Policy, its Official Languages Act, and the new Canadian Constitution anointed francophone minorities with an Official Language Minority status and offered them legislative avenues to lobby for their rights at the provincial level. More specifically, Quebec's "Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières" (1960s) and "Direction de la francophonie canadienne" (1970s) paralleled Ottawa's "Social Action Directorate" (1969-1973) and "Official Language Minority Groups programme" (1974-1985) as prime policy support structures for French Canadian minorities. These "institutional" access points favoured the infrastructural development of minority communities, and generated a system of bureaucratic relations with francophone minority organisations modelled on the Canadian federal system. In effect, provincial francophone associations, like the FFC, were chosen by governments as key policy agents for the respective provincial minority populations. In addition, as Ottawa and Quebec City exchanged views over their respective positions on language policy for French Canada, they offered the minorities a role in the debates of the period. Legitimacy conferred by the political system translated into legitimacy at the community level, and thus
contributed to Federation leadership.

Last, the nature of the Franco-Columbian community itself cried out for some means to unify its members if it was to survive as a viable cultural and linguistic entity. Dispersed, a small proportion of the provincial population, highly assimilated, and isolated from the Quebec heartland, Franco-Columbians were late to adorn themselves with any form of organisational backbone. As time passed, and as the risk of cultural assimilation was felt more strongly in the post-1940 period, they saw the need for and appreciated the formation of a federation designed to bring symbolic cohesion and organisational unity to their community. A "strength in numbers" philosophy pervaded much of this attitude, and contributed to the Federation's leadership stature throughout the many changes and events in its history.

9.2. Federation Leadership and Federal Government Funding

How did Federation leaders take advantage of these four factors to attempt to ensure the development of a viable francophone community in BC? How did federal government funding modify the strategies they used, and thereby affect or change Federation leadership?

Our study outlined four instruments used by Federation leaders to perform leadership functions: financial management, organisational growth, cooperation with local leaders, and
political advocacy. Throughout we isolated a number of patterns highlighting how the influx and use of government funds provided a context within which Federation leaders could transform these instruments and thereby affect the pursuit of the four functions attributed to interest group leaders more generally—contact, definition, member recruitment, and group management.

In Chapter 5 on financial management, we noted three changes in Federation leadership. First, FFC leaders depended less on community financing and, in fact, rarely looked to the francophone population for financial contributions once government funds came available. Second, the level of Secretary of State funding surpassed that from all other revenue sources combined. This resulted in an excessive financial dependency whereby the exercise of Federation leadership functions became tied to fluctuations in the political and economic environment. Third, the availability of government funding expanded Federation spending limits well beyond previous levels. Consequently, Franco-Columbian leaders developed an insatiable appetite for government funds, directly tying new community development activities to increases in government allocations. Their financial priorities became affected by policy considerations often beyond Federation control.

Financial management suffered as an effective leadership instrument once the availability of government funds modified its
use. Less dependent financially, Federation leaders appeared to "grow away from" the local communities thereby reducing the amount of direct contact with BC's francophone population. Group definition became rooted in static administrative structures which, paid for by government funds, were easily imposed on the organisational network. Yet, the Federation's definition did not necessarily filter down to the interest community. On another front, Federation leaders no longer took responsibility for member recruitment, viewing it as a local task for which hired FFC administrative personnel could train local authorities. Amidst these less than positive effects of government funding, group management did benefit, because Federation leaders were better able to guarantee interest group survival through an enhanced financial security.

In Chapter 6, we outlined three ways Federation leaders used organisational growth as a leadership tool, and how the availability of federal funds influenced their efforts. First, they successfully challenged local authority in restructuring the organisational network. Second, they built centralized bureaucratic structures which have made the Federation more representative of francophones from all parts of the province. Third, government-funded organisational growth allowed them to implement an expanded community development programme.

However, government funding seemed to reduce the effectiveness of organisational growth as a leadership tool. With
a centralised bureaucratic Federation, contact and recruitment became less direct, less frequent, and less oriented towards community activities. The Federation's professional stature also differentiated it markedly from the local level. As a result, FFC leaders were unable to establish a broadly-shared definition of the Franco-Columbian community and of the type of Federation desired. Group management, however, appears to have been facilitated over the long run, despite threats to intra-group unity early on.

In Chapter 7, Federation leaders used cooperation with local organisations to heighten community viability, whereas the influx and use of government funds substantially reduced its effectiveness as a leadership tool. Federation leaders moved from a team-like cooperation based on solid interaction between levels to a service centre approach which built administrative barriers. In fact, in using government funds, cooperation became disjointed as a more administratively-oriented Federation leadership became increasingly differentiated from local organisations and saw less need for cooperative ventures.

Early on, cooperation facilitated contact, rooted definition in the community, and encouraged active member recruitment and effective group management. Cooperation through a service centre approach, however, hindered the effectiveness of Federation leadership. The pursuit of contact was reduced to meeting local
representatives at regular intervals via the Federation's representative structures. Attempts to define the interest community brought ambiguous results as Franco-Columbians appeared to share inconclusive and often conflicting views of the Federation. Member recruitment became essentially a local responsibility. Yet, group management was again facilitated, because Federation leaders could engage local authorities from a position of administrative superiority.

In Chapter 8, we saw that Federation leaders became more politically active with the arrival of government funds, yet undermined the effectiveness of their leadership in the process. They increasingly tied their actions to political events and the government process, using political advocacy in three ways.

First, they justified their mandate as the Franco-Columbian spokesperson, attempting to enhance the Federation's worth to BC francophones. Seen as a private Federation domain, however, FFC leaders could not enhance community mobilisation in political affairs. As a result, political advocacy actually reduced possibilities for contact and member recruitment.

Second, FFC leaders tried to use political advocacy as a group management tool in order to guarantee community survival. In the process, however, group management focussed more on group-government relations and the availability of government funds than as a means to ensure community viability.

Third, Federation leaders saw political advocacy as a means
to define the Franco-Columbian community as part of a broad French Canadian minority society. Aided by federal government language policy which espoused a provincialized vision of French Canada, they actively pursued the definition of a "Franco-Columbian" community. Participating in a national francophone minority network further entrenched the provincial nature of its political advocacy as leaders contributed a Franco-Columbian voice to national issues. However, the reluctance of the BC government to recognise francophones as an Official Language Minority outside the broad national (i.e. Quebec vs. Canada) framework, made it extremely difficult for Federation leaders to sell their definition to Franco-Columbians.

9.3. Nature of Federation Leadership

We have seen the broad contributing factors to Federation leadership, and how Federation leaders used these factors to design leadership strategies aimed at the development of a viable francophone community in British Columbia. We have also underlined several of the changes brought to Federation leadership because of government funding. Hence, what kind of leadership resulted? Our analysis highlights three major characteristics.

First, Federation leadership is "separated" from the organisational network due to a functional differentiation
between local organisations and Federation central offices. In essence, activities undertaken by the Federation are more numerous, more complex, and more varied than those pursued at the local level. As such, Federation leaders operate within a functional framework (goals, methods) different from local authorities, one which can and has produced significantly different procedural and conceptual perspectives on the nature of the Franco-Columbian community.

Overall, this differentiation divides the organisational network such that Federation leadership is frustrated in its efforts to build Franco-Columbian solidarity and community spirit. The results of their activities do not always seep down into the motors of the local organisational network. Ambiguity surrounding its usefulness to Franco-Columbians and its roles vis-a-vis the local organisational network confirms the "distance" built-up between the Federation and the Franco-Columbian community.

Second, Federation leadership is also intimately linked with and caught up in federal government language policies. Dramatic changes to the Franco-Columbian organisational network and to Federation activities occurred largely due to policy developments and financial support originating at the federal level. Federation leaders viewed federal support as a boon to Franco-Columbians, and accepted the Federation's perceived role as a policy instrument of the Secretary of State. Federal
policymakers claimed that infrastructural developments would bring stronger communities, so Federation leaders decided to expand the Franco-Columbian organisational network with the aid of government funds. They developed an internal bureaucracy which seemed to reflect government priorities for organisational growth instead of a well-defined plan based on community needs. Federation bureaucracy modelled federal government bureaucracy, with Federation leaders focussing more attention there than at the community level.

Ultimately, financial ties to the federal government generated a vicious dependency circle whereby the continued existence of an active Federation and a viable Franco-Columbian community was automatically linked to the availability of government funding. Leadership, then, became defined as the Federation's ability to master its relations with government for the benefit of the Federation. Undoubtedly, many benefits accrued to Franco-Columbians from this relationship. Yet, concern for political recognition, language rights, and a variety of administrative services, overshadowed its primary and fundamental goal: to enhance local community activities and thereby promote the development of a viable francophone community in British Columbia. This was achieved, if at all, largely as a "by-product" of access to government policy and financial support.
Last, Federation leadership was internally-born, but not many steps were taken to develop its distinctly British Columbian roots. In its formative years, Federation action locally was intimately tied to outside contacts with, and a strong belief in, the broad French Canadian society, notably the Quebec homeland. Rare, however, were statements made about Franco-Columbians as an integral part of British Columbian society. Very little effort was put into heightening interest in or knowledge of the historical, social, cultural, and economic foundations of BC francophones as British Columbians. Only recently have Federation leaders begun to focus more energies in the BC arena. The lateness of a distinctly provincially-oriented political strategy attests to this externally-focussed perspective of Federation leadership.

9.4. Interest Group Leadership and Government Funding

From this examination of the impact of federal government funding on the effectiveness of FFC leadership, we can make some general statements concerning the effects of government funding on interest group leadership functions.

First, government funding can modify the way interest group leaders exercise each individual function to such an extent that it jeopardizes the overall effectiveness of their leadership. Generally speaking, contact is made less frequent, less direct, and less community oriented. As government-funded policy agents

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well-ensconced in bureaucratic structures, interest group leaders appear to depend too heavily on their representative bodies to remain "in touch" with the interest community. This places much responsibility for community solidarity on a relatively small number of organisation representatives who meet infrequently, and who, according to our analysis, are otherwise inactive participants in a centralised bureaucratic structure. In fact, this dependency on structures seems to encourage an indirect "paper factory" contact which leaders use to validate their mandate as community representatives. The production of studies, reports, and briefs for community consumption tends to overshadow the creation of activities which would enliven a broad community spirit.

The influx of government funds seems to have an ambiguous effect on the interest group's ability to define itself and the interest community. Though definition is enhanced by the authority granted interest group leaders as policy agents, it is less evident that leaders are able to filter their definition down to the interest community. It appears that community members either do not understand or grasp the definition which emerges from professional reports, or they do not accept the shifts in parameters which occur once leaders become policy agents. In many ways, the overarching definition of the community may encompass government objectives rather than being systematically
derived from the interest community itself. For this reason, the bureaucratic approach does not always reflect the priorities espoused by the community.

Without question, the arrival of government funds to interest group coffers allows leaders to offer increased benefits to members, and to encourage participation in the organisational network. On the other hand, member recruitment through community activities appears to be less important to leaders than building up and managing the administrative machinery for group-government relations. Interest group leaders tend to believe that their actions and services alone will generate commitment to the interest group. However, the opposite can easily occur as leaders pay less attention to recruitment thereby failing to convince members of the relevance of their activities.

Government funding appears, however, to facilitate group management, because it helps create a centralized administrative machine, managed by a competent professional staff responsible for a wide range of activities which leave little doubt as to the viability of the organisational network. Intra-group unity can suffer, nonetheless, when questions arise over the "type" of interest group desired or over the centralisation of power. Moreover, government funding may shift group management away from a focus on group survival and towards a concern for organisation survival. If this occurs, group management will function in isolation of the interest community and thus build a distance
between leaders and members which hinders effective leadership.

Second, as government-funded policy agents, interest group leaders seem to be more successful in performing the group management and definition functions than the contact and recruitment functions. This clearly reflects the increased bureaucratization of interest group activities needed to implement and respond to government-defined policy guidelines. Yet, the separation of functions into two distinct categories, one more bureaucratic, the other more community-oriented, reduces the overall effectiveness of interest group leadership insofar as the objective of community viability may become distorted if leaders give priority to one or the other category.

Third, government funding also appears to affect the relationships between leadership functions. As contact becomes less frequent and more indirect, interest group leaders tend to be less successful at member recruitment, largely because potential members are unaware of the benefits of group membership. With fewer members, and less relevant interest group activity, leadership definition may not correspond to or reflect the interest community. This raises serious questions as to the legitimacy of leadership, and can create additional obstacles to contact and recruitment. Definition problems can also hinder group unity and organisational survival. Debates over the nature of the group and its orientation may so divide the interest
community that group management is irreversibly damaged.

In general, then, government funding acts as a major catalyst to changes in leadership functions by modifying relationships between interest group leaders and their interest community. Largely, it would seem, a division of leadership functions occurs once leaders become government policy agents in charge of a vast bureaucratic organisation paid for by government funds. As policy agents, leaders gravitate towards government and can thereby lose touch with their intermediary role vis-a-vis the interest community, and hence undermine the objective of community viability.

9.5. Reflections

We have used this case study to explore the impact of the State funding on interest group activity. In so doing, we have brought out a number of interesting points which focus more generally on the relationship between interest groups and the State. In this last section, we highlight a few of the more important questions which can be raised from of our analysis.

A number of caveats need to be underlined before we proceed with our more general discussion. First, the relationship established here between government funding and changes in leadership functions is not a simple bi-variate relationship. Whereas our analysis has attempted to establish a clear link between these two variables, many other factors may help explain
the results we noted, for example, leader personalities, nature of the interest community, or specific political events and issues. We must, therefore, guard against interpreting our conclusions too broadly.

Second, though we consider the possible "effects" of government "funding" within a particular policy framework, we do not draw conclusions about the policy itself. Our decision not to do so stems from an interest in the policy community rather than the policy. A more extensive analysis of policy goals and objectives would have placed our study within a different analytical framework permitting more general comments about a particular State policy, but would have possibly hidden our concern for the interest group.

Third, we have made only indirect reference to the larger "politics of language" question which is directly related to our analysis. Had we chosen to situate the analysis more specifically within that framework, our study would have asked more directly how francophone minorities fit into the national debate on Canadian unity. Decidedly an interesting question for any Canadian political scientist, but one we consciously left for another time.

Last, it is useful at this juncture to reflect on the great tendency of academic analyses to shed only negative light on the subject of inquiry. In fact, from even a cursory reading of
these conclusions, one is led to conclude that federal government funding is more a curse than a blessing to interest group activity. Further, one may draw out questions concerning the value of governments using the public purse to support ethno-linguistic groups for goals related to some broad conceptualisation of a national identity. Some could deduce that the "community" we have considered does not even exist, and that therefore the whole idea of government funding is a colossal waste of government monies. We should not, however, be blind to the organisational growth in the Franco-Columbian community and thus to the real benefits accrued to BC francophones as a result of federal government policies. Nor can we ignore the generally positive thrust and reception of these policies in Canadian society. Many things could be corrected in the way they have been implemented, and we have suggested a few possible directions in these pages. We should not reject outright, however, the continued value of government funding. It is therefore important to keep in mind that "critical analysis", the very meat of academe, does not always bring out the more positive aspects of a particular subject of inquiry.

With these caveats behind us, there are essentially six components to our reflections on the State-interest group relationship.

First, we suggest that the State can undermine the link established between an interest group organisation and its
interest community. Indeed, Federation leadership may have assured the viability of a centralised organisational network which has given presence to things French in British Columbia, but this result is not necessarily appreciated or shared by the majority of Franco-Columbians. It would appear on the contrary that the Federation's policy role actually draws energies away from community activities and towards more political cum external activities. A balance may need to be established whereby policy is focussed more on the local organisational network and community activities than on bureaucracy and politics.

In the same vein, our analysis suggests that communities need more than organisational leadership to grow and/or survive. They may be a reflection of their organisational network as Breton suggests, but this does not necessarily mean that a community ceases to exist if its organisational leadership is somehow "separated" from it. On the contrary, an interest community can subsist while waiting for the appropriate way to express itself.

Second, severing the link between organisation and community can hinder the State's ability to pursue effective policy action. If group leaders no longer effectively represent their communities, they are very often less than adequate State policy agents. In fact, interest group organisations may very well represent artificial structures created by government funding,
and thus leaders receive scant recognition from the interest community for their incumbency. This gap between leaders and community questions the raison d'etre for government funding of the organisation.

However, once the State begins funding interest groups, it may become extremely difficult for it to withdraw financial support from their leaders. Curiously, the State cannot easily dismantle its funding policies without awakening the interest community from its slumber in support of its leadership, thereby temporarily re-establishing the organisation-community link which justified government funding in the first place. Paradoxically, then, the State can become a prisoner of its own actions when it funds interest groups and uses them as policy agents.

Third, our study has flipped the coin of most interest group analyses which see government bureaucracies becoming prisoners of the "big interests". As political actors, we have asked, do interest groups become "captured" through the appeal of government funding? What does it mean to be "captured"? In Chapter 2, we noted that Pross' interest group typology assumes a steady institutional progression from less to more organised groups with parallel increases in political activity. Our analysis revealed an interest group which willingly, and perhaps unknowingly, skipped certain stages in Pross' continuum due to the lure of government funds. The most important of these missed stages was that of a publicity-oriented political pressure group.
By using interest groups as policy agents, it seems that the State can encourage interest group leaders to pursue certain paths within the bureaucratic process and thereby reduce the possibility of public critique. In this way, interest groups are as much political "servants" useful for the State to manage or control the social agenda as they are societal actors attempting to achieve goals for a particular subset of society.

Fourth, in the specific case of French Canadian minorities, whose very survival as language communities seemed to hang in the balance of State action, we can ask: Has the federal government attained any of its objectives through its use of interest groups as policy agents? Federal government policy did concentrate on the "structural" visibility and viability of francophone minorities as a means to guarantee the socio-cultural survival of their communities. In addition, this policy is situated within a larger framework of goals which promote linguistic duality and national unity and which need special voicing in English-speaking Canada.

In the first instance, Secretary of State funding has certainly succeeded in building up and maintaining an extensive and expansive organisational network of francophone associations. Interestingly, however, it does not appear that the "viability" or "vitality" of francophone communities (measured by assimilation rates, size of population, "Frenchness" of
community), as defined and supported by federal government language policies, has been enhanced all that much since the late 1960s.

On the other hand, Ottawa's objective to promote bilingualism in the majority society through OLMOs has been comparatively more successful. In British Columbia, for example, francophone organisations have helped to initiate French immersion programmes for which there is an ever-increasing demand. Moreover, even though the provincial government is more aware now than ever before of demands for French language services, it appears to be more willing to act to enhance bilingualism amongst anglophones than to reinforce the weak foundations of the Franco-Columbian community. It is therefore important to ask whether the federal government and its association-instruments are working within an analytical framework which permits the emergence of a French Canadian community spirit amongst provincial francophone minorities, or are they more interested in merely politicising language issues in the majority society? If so, their government policy agents become little more than para-public institutions working indirectly for their populations in view of satisfying the broader goals of political leaders.

Fifth, we have shown that federal government efforts to address Quebec-Canada issues brought French Canadian minorities more clearly into the mainstream of the dualist paradigm of
Canadian politics. What this means for interpreting French-English relations is all the more significant when we realise that Quebec no longer holds a monopoly on the French fact in Canada.

Politically, French Canadians in Quebec do carry significantly more weight than those outside Quebec due mainly to their large numbers and the fact that they control government institutions. It is nevertheless important that the francophone minority voice has been heard and given notice in the Meech Lake Accord. This speaks much to their role as political actors in the Canadian community. Still, it is possible to see a divergence of opinion within "French Canada" writ large on a number of issues affecting the Canadian polity. For example, in the past, Quebec independence divided Québécois and francophones outside Quebec; more recently, reactions to the Meech Lake accord showed francophone minorities unhappy with rights which appear to guarantee nothing more than a protection of the status quo. Significantly, this highlighted the political differences in French Canada based on a majority-minority distinction.

Culturally, it is no longer sufficient to speak of one French Canada; there are really several French Canadas, depending on the conceptual lens one wears; a Quebec-non-Quebec division distinguishes French Canadians along majority-minority lines; the provincialisation of OLM activities hints at ten French Canadian
communities; regional groupings count at least four (French Canadians in the West, Franco-Ontarians, Québécois, and Acadians). Whether or not we can translate these differences into systematic and distinctive categories is not yet known; there is quite likely a good deal of overlap. Nonetheless, it does suggest that traditional lines between French Canada and English Canada may have to be adjusted to account for the effects of geography, political environment, and social situation.

Above all, we have addressed a virgin area of research. Even in French Canada, very little has been done to analyse the impact of federal government policies on French Canadian minorities, notwithstanding the more socio-demographic studies which seem to confirm their demise. We have suggested some new reasons why, in the case of one francophone minority, the decline of these communities has not been arrested despite federal government efforts in language policy. It seems only fitting to encourage an extension of our analysis to other provinces and, more importantly, to emphasize the necessity of going beyond the static demographic analyses to ask "why" and "how" francophone communities and their representative organisations function within the Canadian political community. Moreover, as a study of a federally-funded BC ethnic group, it would be helpful to pursue some comparative research to consider the possibility that "provincial societies" influence the activities of interest groups.

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On a theoretical level, more research is also clearly needed to examine the effects of government funding on a broader range of interest groups. We may begin to ask whether the impact of government funding noted in our analysis can be extended to those interest groups which have no real economic base. Our focus on an ethno-linguistic community brings to the fore a particular type of social organisation - limited in size and scope, lacking a solid financial base, and less politically-oriented. Elements of ethnic identity, and loyalties to some ideal of collective unity, may play a key role in circumscribing the nature of institutional development unlike that found in other interest group organisations. The kinds of institutions needed here are related to an intangible, symbolic "ethnic completeness", and serve to fulfil desires to preserve ethnic community values and a collective consciousness rooted in historical traditions. The "social impact", in terms of the redistribution of wealth or shifts in social power, appears comparatively smaller in these organisations than in labour unions, business organisations or women's groups. Is it easier, then, for the State to fund this type of organisation over others? Would larger, and more economically important groups experience similar changes? To respond to these questions, it would be helpful to go beyond the case of ethnic organisations to explore other types of interest groups. In this way, we could begin to re-evaluate the general
role of interest groups as social and political actors, and as intermediaries in the political process.

We have also posed some interesting questions about the nature of interest group organisations. Our analysis revealed that interest group leaders use a variety of strategies to impose their leadership on members, with varied success. In the process, however, leaders' activities seemed to confirm the distinction Kwawnick makes between leader goals for organisation survival and a broader set of interest group objectives. How does this distinction undermine the nature of interest group organisations? Does this tell us anything new about why members join interest groups? It would appear from our analysis that a separation of organisation and group can severely undermine the cohesion so badly needed for interest group survival. This line of thought should be pursued more fully so that its implications for interest group theory more generally can be understood.

In the end, there is cause for re-thinking the Canadian model of State-funded interest group organisations. Our research provides ample warning to policymakers and interest group leaders alike of the pitfalls of State funding. For French Canadian minority leaders in particular, we raise a caution flag, and suggest they re-examine how their relationship with government influences the nature of their community development activities.
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Moreau, Gérald (FCFCB Representative on the Conseil de la Vie Française en Amérique) to FFC Executive Committee. 29 October 1979. SHFC PO1.02.09.14.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Gosselin, Paul-Emile (Conseil de la Vie Française). 07 February 1963. SHFC PO1.05.07.20.01.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Gosselin, Paul-Emile (Conseil de la Vie Française). 03 July 1963. SHFC PO1.06.05.02.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Dagneau, G.H. (Director, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières, Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec). 29 November 1963. SHFC PO1.05.06.01.02.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Dagneau, G.H. (Director, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières, Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec). 27 January 1965. SHFC PO1.05.06.01.01.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Dagneau, G.H. (Director, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières, Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec). 27 October 1966. SHFC PO1.05.06.01.02.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Gosselin, Paul-Emile (Conseil de la Vie Française). 06 February 1967. SHFC PO1.05.07.20.01.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Dagneau, G.H. (Director, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières, Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec). 12 February 1968. SHFC PO1.05.06.01.03.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Dagneau, G.H. (Director, Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières, Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec). 09 August 1968. SHFC PO1.05.06.01.04.

Paquette, Roméo (Liaison Officer, FCFCB) to Gosselin, Paul-Emile (Conseil de la Vie Française). 11 January 1969. SHFC PO1.05.07.20.01.

Préfontaine, J. René (Director, Social Action Branch, Secretary of State) to Albert, Roger (President, FFC). 30 December 1971. SHFC PO1.05.01.14.03.
Riou, Jean (Director-General, FFC) to FFC General Council. 28 March 1979. SHFC PO1.05.01.14.01.

St. Louis, Roger (Officer, Affaires de la francophonie hors Québec, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales du Québec) to Riou, Jean (Director-General, FFC). 10 September 1974. SHFC PO1.04.02.05.

Templeman, Ghislaine (Vice-President, Education Committee Officer, FFC) to Deshaies, Claudette (Secretary of State). 22 August 1981.

Interviews

Beck, Max. Former Regional Director, Social Action Directorate, Secretary of State, Pacific Region. July 1987.

Crossland, Josée. Former President, Club Bon Accueil de Powell River. 07 July 1986.


Gareau, Napoléon and Gareau, Amélie. Former FCFCB Executive Committee members, active locally in Maillardville with the Société Bi-culturelle and the Maillardville Scouts Troups. 21 July 1986.


Riou, Jean. Former Director-General, FFC. 25 June 1986.


APPENDIX 1 - FRANCOPHONE ORGANISATIONS DONATING FUNDS TO FFC

1951 Comité de la Survivance Permanente de Québec
1952 Société Saint-Jean Baptiste (Montréal)
1956 La Vie Française
   Club St-Laurent
   Idées en Marche
1957 La Vie Française
   Voyageurs de la Liaison Française
1958 Conseil de la Vie Française
1959 La Vie Française
1960 La Vie Française
1961 La Vie Française
   Société Saint-Jean Baptiste (Montréal)
1962 Conseil de Vie Française
1963 Centre Psychologique et Pédagogique
1964 Fraternité Française
   Association Canadienne des Educateurs de Langue Française
   Société Saint-Jean Baptiste (Montréal)
1965 Fraternité Française
1967 Conseil de la Vie Française
   Association Canadienne des Educateurs de Langue Française
   Fraternité Française
1968 Conseil de la Vie Française
1969 Les États-Généraux
1970 Conseil de la Vie Française
   Fédération des Canadiens-Français de l'Ouest
1971 Association Canadienne des Centres de Loisirs
   Association des Jeunesse Ontariennes Françaises
   Association Canadienne des Educateurs de Langue Française
   Fédération des Canadiens-Français de l'Ouest
1974 Conseil Canadien de Théâtre
APPENDIX 2 - EXAMPLES OF EXPENDITURES IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES

1945 - 1969

Administration

- banking operations, general office expenses
- publication costs
- Liaison Officer (after 1964)

Community Activities

- banquets, picnics, subscriptions
- Committee work - education, radio
- French prizes, donations

Institutional Support

- theatre groups

Federation Affairs

- Federation meetings (Annual General Assembly, Executive)
- delegate transportation to Annual General Assembly
- delegate expenses outside the province
1970 - 1985

Administration

- general office expenses
- personnel salaries (Secretary, Director-General)

Community Activities

- personnel salaries (research staff)
- special projects (Pacifete, Info-Accueil, Youth etc.)
- community development programmes
- public relations

Regional Activities

- personnel salaries (regional officers)
- community mobilisation in regions
- regional visits (president, Director-General)

Institutional Support

- information centre
- cafe bazaar
- summer camps

Federation Affairs

- Federation meetings (A.G.A., General Council, Executive)
- delegate costs to conferences etc. outside province
APPENDIX 3 - EVOLUTION OF FEDERATION STRUCTURES, 1945-1985

A. 1945 - 1964

Local Associations → elected delegates → Annual General Assembly → elected officers → Executive Committee

(1956 - local chaplains)
(1962 - local presidents)

B. 1965 - 1971

Local Assocs. → elected delegates → Annual General Assembly → elected officers → Admin. Council → Executive Committee

local presidents

Secretariat

-437
C. 1972 - 1981

Local Associations → elected delegates → Annual General Assembly → elected officers → General Council → elected officers → Executive Committee

Regional Structures → elected officers → Secretariat

D. 1982 - 1985

Local Associations → elected pres. → Annual General Assembly → elected presidents → Presidents Council → elected officers → Secretariat

Administrative Role → Executive Committee
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François Coulombe
Raymond Ascencio
Roger Fournier
Françoise Mathieu
Harry Beauregard
Romeo Paquette
Huguette Lauzier
Jacques Bernard
Jean Marie Bergman
Jean-Pierre Paquette
Jean-Marc Audet
Doug Brown
Marie Thérèse Rioual
Thérèse Hammond
Emma Thibodeau
Paul Paradis
Mylene Brunet
Marc Van Den Borre
Jean Riou
Richard Cousineau
Jean-Guy Lalonde
Pierrette Paquette
Régine Bérubé
Jacques Baillaut
Régis Rodrigue
Janet Yensen
Marie Warzecha
Pierre-Claude Philoctete
Bernard Lévesque
Solange Goulet
Florence Lejeune
Louise Labrecque
Celine Zirnhelt
Gislaine Templeman
Charles Bouton
Danielle Barbeau
Charles Paris
Thérèse Côté
Gérald Vezina
Rosaire Tremblay
Guy-Gabriel Latendresse
Jean Aussant
Louise Merler
Gérard Tremblay
Annette Peterson
Joël Prévost
Raymond Michaud
Rene Cheloll
Marc Roy
Jean-Claude Arluisom
Jean Guertin
Lauraine Prevost
Guy Martin
Luc Maurice
Michel Martel
Anne-Marie-Ange Wauthy
Jacqueline Rutherford
Fro Renaud
Jack Ethier
Renée Trépanier
Suzanne Moreau
Yves Merzisen
Nicole Rhéault
Anne Pidgeon
Yvon Hineault
APPENDIX 5 - CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF INTERVIEWS

In deciding upon who to interview, I used a number of different criteria which had direct reference to the five broad dichotomies I established in reference to the Franco-Columbian community. (See Chapter 4.) They were:

- local versus Federation leaders
- Vancouver (centre) versus outside Vancouver (periphery)
- pre-government funding versus post government-funding
- permanent staff versus volunteers
- religion versus secular

Hence, I identified potential interview candidates according to their position on each of these criteria, and was successful in interviewing at least one person from each category. In addition to the formal interviews, I attended a number of official Federation activities (Annual General Assembly, President's Councils, Conferences) during which it was possible to engage in less formal discussions with participants who fit into a variety of these categories. Following is a list of people with whom I conducted formal interviews:
Max Beck, Former Regional Director, Social Action Directorate, Secretary of State, Pacific Region. July 1987.

Josée Crossland, Former President, Club Bon Accueil de Powell River. 07 July 1986.

Johanne Dufour, Secretary, Association Francophone de Campbell River. 27-28 June 1986.


Napoléon Gareau and Amélie Gareau, Former FCFCB Executive Committee members, active locally in Maillardville with the Societe Bi-culturelle and the Maillardville Scouts Troups. 21 July 1986.

Violette Gingras, Publicity Officer, FFC. 28 July 1986.

Father Godard, Blessed St. Sacrement Church, Vancouver. September 1987.


Jean Riou, Former Director-General, FFC. 25 June 1986.


François Savard, Political Officer, FFC. 24 October 1985.

Peggy Sigouin, Coordinator, Club Bon Accueil de Powell River. 07 July 1986.