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Party cohesion in the early post-Confederation period Eggleston, Stephen David 1988

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PARTY COHESION IN THE EARLY POST-CONFEDERATION PERIOD By STEPHEN DAVID EGGLESTON B . A . , The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FuTFILIMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1988 ® Stephen David Eggleston, 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/81) i i ) ABSTRACT This paper c r i t i c a l l y re-examines the long held b e l i e f that parties i n the f i r s t decade a f t e r Confederation were rather loose c o a l i t i o n s of pr o v i n c i a l and ethnic factions, and that they were, on the whole, rather undisciplined. Tak-ing as the focus for c r i t i c i s m Escott Reid's work during the 1930's on the development of national parties in Canada, th i s paper f i r s t presents h i s arguments (and of those who accept his t h e s i s ) ; following t h i s perusal, the paper turns to the creation and examination of an "alternative t h e s i s " , one which argues that parties in the early post-Confederation period were, i n fa c t , f a i r l y cohesive. Unlike most other work done in t h i s area, t h i s paper i s based largely upon an analysis of empirical evidence. The core of this paper l i e s in a comprehensive examination of the individual and c o l l e c t i v e voting behaviour of a l l M.P.'s on a l l d i v i s i o n s recorded during each of the f i r s t three parliaments (1867-1872; 1872-1874; 1874-1878). By undertaking such an examination i t i s possible to discern p r e c i s e l y the degree to which parties were, or were not, f a i r l y cohesive voting blocs. In addition to examining the ove r a l l loyalty of M.P.'s to th e i r party leader, a number of highly s a l i e n t and c r i t i c a l issues have been singled out for further examination. The findings of t h i s paper prove quite i n t e r e s t i n g . Con-trary to orthodox opinion, we find that the two parties were, in f a c t , f a i r l y cohesive voting blocs even as early as 1867. The main core of Reid's thesis having been c r i t i c a l l y re-examined (and somewhat disproved) the writer turns to a i i i ) c r i t i q u e of several of Reid's other arguments. While the arguments presented by the writer are largely of a specu-l a t i v e nature, t h e i r intended purpose i s merely to present alternatives to those presented by Reid, and to show that there may be other explanations for the supposed tightening up of party lines a f t e r 1878. i v ) TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract 1 1) L i s t o f Tables v) Aeknowledement • . v i i ) INTRODUCTION • -CHAPTER I - THE ARGUMENTS 7 CHAPTER II - THE FIRST PARLIAMENT: 1867-1872 28 The Conservatives 30 The L i b e r a l s . . . 36 The "Others" 43 CHAPTER III - THE SECOND PARLIAMENT: 1872-1874 47 The Conservatives 48. The Liberals 49 The "Others" 51 CHAPTER IV - THE THIRD PARLIAMENT: 1874-1878 54 The Conservatives 55 The Liberals 59 The "Others". . 64 CONCLUSIONS .63 APPENDIX A. . . . 74 APPENDIX B 79 APPENDIX C 84 APPENDIX D. 86 BIBLIOGRAPHY 88 v) LIST OF TABLES TABLE 2 .1 - LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS 30 TABLE 2.2 - LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES DURIN THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE PACIFIC RAILWAY 32 TABLE 2.3 - LOYALTY OF'ALL CONSERVATIVES DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY ACT 33 TABLE 2.4 - LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES DURIN THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE NEW BRUNSWICK. SCHOOL LAW 34 TABLE 2.5 - LOYALTY OF CONSERVATIVE CABINET MINISTERS DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT 35 TABLE 2.6 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS.... 37 TABLE 2.7 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURIN THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT 38 TABLE 2.8 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING DUAL REPRESENTATION 38 TABLE 2.9 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE REPORT IN OF DEBATES 39 TABLE 2.10 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA ACT 40 TABLE 2.11 - LOYALTY OF FRENCH CANADIAN LIBERALS FROM QUEBEC TO DORION DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT 41 TABLE 2.12 - LOYALTY OF LIBERALS FROM ONTARIO AND QUEBEC TO BLAKE DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT 4 2 TABLE 2.13 - LOYALTY OF FUTURE CABINET MINISTERS TO MACKENZIE DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT 42 TABLE 2.14 - LOYALTY OF ALL "OTHERS" DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS.... 44 TABLE 3.1 - LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES DURIN THE SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS.... 49 LIST OF TABLES (CONT.) TABLE 3.2 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS.... 50 TABLE 3.3 - LOYALTY OF ALL "OTHERS" DURING THE SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS.... 51 TABLE 4.1 - LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS 56 TABLE 4.2 - LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING RAILWAYS 57 TABLE 4.3 - LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY 58 TABLE 4.4 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS 60 TABLE 4.5 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY 60 TABLE 4.6 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA REBELLION 61 TABLE 4.7 - LOYALTY OF CABINET MINISTERS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS 62 TABLE 4.8 - LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT TO BLAKE 63 TABLE 4.9 - LOYALTY OF ALL "OTHERS" DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS 64 v i i ) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Special thanks must be extended to Professor Richard Johnston, for without his time, help and immeasurable patience this paper may never have been completed. Professor Johnston must also be thanked for allowing me to use his t h i r d parliament f i l e , thereby saving myself countless hours of tedious and mind-numbing work pouring over the House of Commons Journals and House of Commons Debates c o l l e c t i n g records of M.P.'s voting behaviour. 1 INTRODUCTION "The f a t a l tendency of mankind to leave o f f thinking about a thing when i t i s no longer doubtful, i s the cause of h a l f t h e i r e r r o r s . " (J.S. M i l l ) Since at l e a s t the 1930's, when Escott Reid wrote h i s seminal work on the evolution of national p a r t i e s i n Canada, conventional wisdom has maintained that party d i s c i p l i n e i n the f i r s t decade or so a f t e r Confederation was extremely weak. Unfortunately, few academics have troubled themselves with challenging the v e r a c i t y of t h i s argument; a l l too frequently a state of u n d i s c i p l i n e d p a r t i e s i s taken as a given and forms the basis f o r the writer's ensuing arguments. Some academics appear, to accept Reid's major arguments and then work to formu-l a t e a d d i t i o n a l arguments to buttress h i s claims regarding the state of party d i s c i p l i n e i n the early post-Confederation period. When an argument has held sway over men's imaginations as long as Reid's thesis has, i t i s imperative t h a t & a dissenting opinion be heard, f o r otherwise we s l i d e into a state of i n t e l -l e c t u a l decrepitude, accepting that argument as an unassailable t r u t h , and (to paraphrase M i l l ) l o s i n g sight of the f a c t u a l foundations upon which the s a i d argument r e s t s . Herein l i e s the p r i n c i p a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h i s paper and the a l t e r n a t i v e perspective which w i l l be put f o r t h . To be c e r t a i n , a couple of writers have attempted to chal-lenge the p r e v a i l i n g orthodoxy regarding the state of party 2 cohesion i n the years immediately following Confederation.*'" In p a r t i c u l a r , P.G. Cornell, i n his examination of the party system i n the province of Canada i n the years between 184 0 and 1867, provides evidence which would support a claim that the p o l i t i c a l parties i n the post-Confederation era were substan-t i a l l y more cohesive than i s commonly assumed. By combining Cornell's work with a vari e t y of other h i s t o r i c a l facts one can rea d i l y piece together an argument to challenge those who claim that p o l i t i c a l p arties i n the f i r s t decade afte r Confederation were nothing more than loose, undisciplined conglomerations of pr o v i n c i a l and/or ethnic factions. Lamentably, a l l too l i t t l e work of an empirical nature has been done concerning the state of party cohesion i n thi s early period of Canadian history. The main core of t h i s paper, therefore, w i l l focus on f i l l i n g t h i s gap i n our knowledge. By undertaking a comprehensive examination of how M.P.'s — both i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y — voted on recorded d i v i s i o n s , and by c o r r e l a t i n g each member's voting record with his nominal party a f f i l i a t i o n and the province he represented, i t i s pos-s i b l e to determine p r e c i s e l y the extent to which M.P.'s d i s -played l o y a l t y to the party they i d e n t i f i e d with and the degree to which t h e i r l o y a l t i e s lay elsewhere (for example, with a sectional leader or ethnic group). In examining the actual voting behaviour of M.P.'s over the course of the f i r s t three parliaments, one discovers that, somewhat contrary to expectations, both the L i b e r a l and Conser-vative parties exhibited a remarkable degree of cohesion — espec i a l l y i f one takes into consideration the turbulent nature 3 of the times, the plethora of conditions inim i c a l to co-oper-ation between M.P.'s from the d i f f e r e n t sections of the country, the r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t character of parliamentary l i f e i n t h i s early period and a host of other factors which would seem to make Reid's thesis a l l the more tenable. As w i l l be shown, how-ever, not only were the two parties far more cohesive than Reid's work would lead one to expect, but much of the "loose-ness" that we do f i n d i n the cohesiveness of the two parties i s more apparent than r e a l . Much of the so-called "looseness" one observes i n the two parties was primarily the r e s u l t of: i) the undisciplined behaviour of many of the M.P.'s from the Maritimes (especially among L i b e r a l ranks), and i i ) the nature of the great questions of the day, many of which d i r e c t l y touched upon problems of French-English r e l a t i o n s , and conse-quently, often produced s p l i t s within parties s t r i c t l y along ethnic l i n e s (prime examples are those questions regarding the New Brunswick School Law, the terms of Manitoba's union with Canada and the l a t e r question of how to deal with the provoc-ateurs behind the Manitoba Rebellion). In addition, a great many questions d i r e c t l y affected l o c a l i n t e r e s t s , and given the context of the times M.P.'s were v i r t u a l l y obliged to put these in t e r e s t s ahead of party unity. While the foregoing argument rings somewhat apologetic, the point to be made here i s that a l l too often we are apt to examine h i s t o r i c a l matters through present-day lenses; hence, when examining the state of party cohesion i n the years immediately following Confederation (and for that matter, before i t ) , we tend to judge the cohesiveness 4 of the parties by modern standards, a l l but oblivious to the unique h i s t o r i c a l circumstances of the time which render l a t e twentieth century conceptions of party cohesion v i r t u a l l y meaningless. In any event, given the p r e v a i l i n g consensus regarding the state of party cohesion i n the decade immediately following Confederation — one which views the parties as l i t t l e more than loose a l l i a n c e s of p r o v i n c i a l and ethnic factions — and given a l l the forces working to make party cohesion e s p e c i a l l y d i f -f i c u l t to achieve (at least by modern-day standards), one i s struck by the degree to which the two parties, even as early as 1867, were act u a l l y capable of acting as cohesive units when i t came time to vote on important p o l i c y matters i n the House of Commons. Unlike most other work done on parties and party cohesion i n the early post-Confederation era, the basis of t h i s paper l i e s i n the examination and analysis of empirical evidence. In p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s paper w i l l encompass a comprehensive exam-ination of how a l l M.P.'s voted on a l l d i v i s i o n s throughout the f i r s t three parliaments (1867-1872; 1872-1874; 1874-1878). 2 Furthermore, since c e r t a i n questions were of p a r t i c u l a r impor-tance to the government of the day, a look w i l l be taken at several of these questions, a n t i c i p a t i n g that M.P.'s w i l l exhibit greater cohesiveness to t h e i r party on these c r u c i a l questions than they did on the whole ( i t being recognized that 5 given the norms of the day, s t r i c t party " d i s c i p l i n e " was not required, or even expected, on a wide range of minor questions). Such a comprehensive investigation into the i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e voting patterns of M.P.'s w i l l also provide the basis for a re-examination of several other long held b e l i e f s respect-ing the nature of party l i f e i n the 1860's and 1870's. . Before proceeding with t h i s examination, however, i t i s f i r s t necessary to outline the arguments which provide the i n s p i r a t i o n for t h i s paper. Hence, the following chapter w i l l o utline the two contending viewpoints: the f i r s t -- representing orthodox opinion — which maintains that party cohesion i n the early post-Confederation period was very loose; the second — and the one which w i l l be argued here i s more correct -- which holds instead that the two major parties were, even as early as 1867, f a i r l y stable and cohesive voting blocs. In addition, a number of subsidiary facts and arguments w i l l be presented which help buttress the claims of each side i n t h i s debate; t h i s w i l l be done primarily to shed some light: on the h i s t o r i c a l context i n which parties operated during t h i s period. 6 ENDNOTES TO INTRODUCTION For the balance of t h i s paper the term "party cohesion" w i l l be used i n preference to the term "party d i s c i p l i n e " . In t h i s writer's eyes, the two terms are not exactly synonymous. The l a t t e r term would seem to indicate some sort of formal and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d (and presumably effective) means of "whipping" party members into l i n e , while the former term merely implies that the party i s able to — generally speaking — act as a cohesive unit, agreeing on, and voting upon, questions as an organized unit. Since the exact role and e f f i c a c y of the party whip, and the function of caucus meetings i n t h i s period remains somewhat c r y p t i c , the writer has chosen to use the more general term "party cohesion", where possible, throughout t h i s paper. It should be noted, however, that due to the p e c u l i a r l y sectarian nature of the question, a l l d i v i s i o n s concerning divorce have been excluded i n c a l c u l a t i n g aggregate l e v e l s of party cohesion (in the f i r s t parliament there were nine such d i v i s i o n s out of a t o t a l of 266; i n the short-lived second parliament there were s i x d i v i s i o n s concerning divorces out of a t o t a l of 39 d i v i s i o n s ; during the t h i r d parliament there were 19 d i v i s i o n s taken on private divorces out of a t o t a l of 127 d i v i s i o n s ) . A l l of these d i v i s i o n s have been excluded since a l l of them c l e a r l y cut across party l i n e s and s p l i t s t r i c t l y — with v i r t u a l l y no exceptions — on Catholic - non-Catholic l i n e s . CHAPTER I - THE ARGUMENTS "There are some countries so huge that the d i f f e r e n t populations inhabiting them, although united under the same sovereignty, have [ p a r t i e s ] . In such cases the various factions of the same people do not, s t r i c t l y speaking, form parties but di s -t i n c t nations... But v.'hen there are d i f f e r -ences between the c i t i z e n s concerning matters of equal importance to a i l parts of the country, such for instance as the general p r i n c i p l e s of government, then what I r e a l l y c a l l parties take shape." (Alexis de Tocqueviile) In this chapter the two sides of the debate w i l l be outlined. The f i r s t -- largely based on the early work of Escott Reid in the 1930's -- c l e a r l y represents main-stream opinion and ce r t a i n l y has the force of much other h i s t o r i c a l evidence to support i t s v a l i d i t y . The contending opinion -- perhaps voiced most cogently by P.G. Cornell --has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been less well-received, and c e r t a i n l y represents a sketchier and less well-articulated view-point. Nonetheless, Cornell's argument can also be but-tressed by h i s t o r i c a l facts, and more importantly, i t i s based on a comprehensive examination of M.P.'s voting habits (unlike the work of Reid). E s s e n t i a l l y , the "Reid thesis'" holds that between 1867 and 1878 the Conservative and Lib e r a l parties were unstable a l l i a n c e s of pr o v i n c i a l and ethnic factions, the members of each faction owing l i t t l e allegiance to the recognized national party leader, and acting wholly in accordance with 8 the wishes of the .leader of that p r o v i n c i a l or ethnic faction ^ (one would thus-, suspect, for instance, that French-Canadian Liberals from Quebec would follow Dorion b l i n d l y or that a l l Nova Scotian M.P.'s would vote in accordance with the; wishes of Howe). The Conservative party, for i t s part, was primarily an a l l i a n c e of four elements: i ) a group led by Alexander Gait and backed by Montreal's commercial i n t e r e s t s , i i ) the French-Canadian majority in Canada East (Quebec), i i i ) a group of United Empire Loyalists in Canada West (Ontario), 2 and iv) a number.of moderate reformers from Ontario. These same groups had provided the basis of the L i b e r a l -Conservative party i n the pre-Confederation era and con-tinued to be the cornerstone of the party once Confedera-tion had been achieved. S i m i l a r l y , the Liberal party was an a l l i a n c e o f sectional groups, the Quebec based "Rouge" element led by A.A. Dorion, and the "Grits" o f Ontario (led p r i o r to Confederation by George Brown) who tended to follow the leadership of Alexander Mackenzie. With Confederation accomplished, two new elements were introduced to national party p o l i t i c s in Canada. The Nova Scotian contingent was led by Joseph Howe and a l l but one (Charles Tupper) had run as "anti-Confederates,4 dedicated to the repeal of Confederation. Despite the v i t r i o l i c denunciations of Confederation emanating from this group, J.M. Beck calculates that "20 of the 21 Nova Scotian M.P.'s normally supported the Conservatives during the f i r s t parliament. The si t u a t i o n i n New Brunswick was some-9 what more complex, with approximately one-half of the elected members supportive of Confederation and the other half h o s t i l e -- at least p u b l i c l y -- to the scheme. As a consequence there was not a single leader of the New Bruns-wick group, but rather two or more: the anti-confederates seemingly led by A.J. Smith, and the supporters of Confed-eration r a l l y i n g around S.L. T i l l e y . It has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been assumed that the New Brunswick contingent was composed mostly of " m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s " ^ (a term used to describe those M.P.'s who would normally support the government in exchange for personal advantage or some government project benefit-ting t h e i r constituency), as many whose nominal party a f f i l i a t i o n was L i b e r a l , or none, consistently supported the government. Whatever the fa c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s present, i t would appear, even in Reid's analysis, that the Conservatives at least had a basis on which to bu i l d a strong national party. The L i b e r a l s , however, would appear to have been a party i n name only. Whereas the Conservatives were able to achieve some measure of cohesion -- p a r t i c u l a r l y within the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party -- based largely on the long standing relat i o n s h i p between Macdonald and Car-t i e r , the Liberal party had no such foundations, and hence, was e s p e c i a l l y prone t i intense i n t e r - f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e . The G r i t and Rouge wings of the party were openly suspicious and d i s t r u s t f u l of one another; not even Maritime Liberals -- ensconced as they were in a perception of the G r i t s as a s e l f i s h Ontario party -- co-operated with their counterparts 10 7 from Ontario p r i o r to 1874. To make matters a i l that much worse, the Ontario wing of the party was unable to unite behind any one leader. Even after coming to power i n 1874, a number of Liberals remained opposed to Mackenzie's lead-ership, believing instead that Edward Elake deserved to be the leader of the party.' Blake himself did nothing to quell t h i s movement -- and indeed, may have encouraged i t -- and his continued movement in and out of the cabinet was a constant source of f r i c t i o n within the party, and may-well have been one reason why no Prime Minister, in Beck's words, "had greater d i f f i c u l t y in keeping a cabinet together 9 than Mackenzie. ' Wherein l i e s the root cause of the loose state of party cohesion in t h i s early period? According to Reid and those who accept his analysis, the primary reasons for the weak state of party cohesion in t h i s early period were the practices of .deferred e l e c t i o n s , whereby the government was able to hold elections f i r s t in "safe seats", thereby giving the appearance that they were on their way to a landslide v i c t o r y , and by so doing, possibly swing the vote in t h e i r favour in c l o s e l y contested constituencies, and the practice of open•voting. Such practices allowed the govern-ment some modicum c f control over the outcomes of el e c t o r a l contests, and the greater t h i s c o n t r o l , the less the need there was for strong party organizations. ""^  Presumably, without strong party organizations and the formal mechanisms for c o n t r o l l i n g and influencing the behaviour of M.P.'s -- and for applying sanctions where necessary -- the i n d i v i -11 dual M.P. was much freer to follow his conscience (or what-ever else) than i s possible in our day and age. In any event, the a b o l i t i o n of both these practices p r i o r to the e l e c t i o n of 1878 forced both of the parties -- almost spontaneously according to Reid -- to act i n a more cohesive and " d i s c i p l i n e d " manner. Despite appearing somewhat s i m p l i s t i c , Reid's arguments have been accepted almost unquestioned and have continued to represent the viewpoint of the vast majority of academ-i c s . Reid's arguments, however, are lent more c r e d i b i l i t y by a large body of "circumstantial" evidence; that i s , there are h i s t o r i c a l facts which, while not conclusive, would seem to buttress the main arguments of those who believe that parties i n the f i r s t decade after Confederation were rather uncohesive voting blocs. In understanding why parties i n this early era could have been quite uncohesive, one must look at the actual composition of the House of Commons, the character of p a r l -iamentary l i f e and the rules guiding M.P.'s behaviour. Roman March, in p a r t i c u l a r , makes much of the fact that a s i g n i f i c a n t proportion of M.P.'s in th i s period were local "notables" (in 1867 notables comprised approximately 20% of the House). Owing t h e i r e l e c t i o n not to the party whose banner they ran under, but rather to the p o s i t i o n , influence and respect they enjoyed within t h e i r local communities, these notables were r e l a t i v e l y free to vote as they wished when the House divided. ""'""'Combined with the fact that elections were often fought on rather parochial issues and not on matters of national concern (hence the grounds for the Liberal's decision not to choose a national leader going into -- or for some time after -- the 1867 e l e c t i o n ) , these M.P.'s may have been more inclin e d to protect the interests o f . t h e i r constituency than those of their party. Further evidence to support the argument that party cohesion was weak during the f i r s t three Parliaments i s provided by an examination of the number of M.P.'s elected by acclamation in the elections of 1867, 1872, 1874 and 1878. In 1867, 1872 and 1874 there were 46, 52 and 55 1 o acclamations respectively. In 1878 there were only 11. As acclamations are evidence of weak national (and local) party organizations, 1"J i t i s reasonable to argue that p r i o r to 1878 true national party organizations were a l l but non-existent, and thi s -- as already noted -- severely circum-scribes the party's a b i l i t y to i n s t i t u t e some formal mechan-isms of control over the behaviour of i t s M.P.'s. In accord-ance with Reid's argument, the dramatic drop in acclamations in 1878 would seem to suggest that party organizations --and therefore, party cohesion -- became much stronger following the el e c t i o n of 1878. While the above arguments help explain why M.P.'s in this early age were i n a stronger position to assert their autonomy than i s the case i n the late twentieth century, they provide only a p a r t i a l explanation for why M.P.'s may actually have done so. Yet more intr i g u i n g arguments may be created by taking a cursory glance at the nature of pa r i -13 iamentary l i f e and the norms which guided M.P.'s behaviour in t h i s period. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s necessary to consider the precise meaning of "responsible government" in th i s early period. It could well be argued that the concept of responsible government was quite d i f f e r e n t i n the middle 1800's than i t now i s in the late twentieth century. Whereas the term i s now considered to mean that the government i s responsible to Parliament (and i f defeated, must resign), Norman Ward notes that at the time of Confederation respon-s i b l e government was "a r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l i s t i c concept: mimisters were i n charge of everything...and therefore 1 A responsible for what they did." If such was indeed the case there would be l i t t l e more imperative for M.P.'s to behave l o y a l l y to t h e i r party leader than there currently i s for members of the U.S. Congress. While Ward's remark, in i t s proper context, appears a l i t t l e f l i p p a n t , there may well be an element of truth in i t . Clearly the meaning of responsible government was not as r e s t r i c t i v e in t h i s early period as i t has now become. To support such a conviction one need only look at the number of times the Conservatives were actually defeated on recorded d i v i s i o n s between 1867 and 1874. As Forsey notes, there were at least twelve times during the course of the f i r s t parliament where the govern-ment could not muster a majority on d i v i s i o n ; ^ moreover, several of these government defeats came on amendments proposed by members of the government i t s e l f . ^ Further evidence to support the contention that twentieth century conceptions of responsible government are at l e a s t partly inappropriate i n considering the concept during the middle 1800's comes from an examination of the party system in B r i t a i n during the same time period. While i t i s recognized that B r i t a i n has had a long t r a d i t i o n of responsible government., between 1847 and 1867 the pre-e x i s t i n g configuration of p o l i t i c a l parties f e l l apart and 17 governments were being defeated quite regularly. When one considers that t h i s same period witnessed the b a t t l e for, and achievement of, representative government in Canada and the acknowledgement of the p r i n c i p l e of responsible govern-ment, i t should come as no surprise that in seeking to emulate B r i t i s h models, the concept of responsible; govern-ment i n Canada (and the party system engendered by the same) emerged in the rather imperfect form as i t then existed in B r i t a i n . In addition, the character of parliamentary l i f e was r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t in the early post-Confederation period than i t now i s . In the f i r s t place, private members' l e g i s -l a t i o n constituted a s i g n i f i c a n t proportion of a l l b i l l s introduced and were frequently given as much consideration 18 as government b i l l s . Presumably, where such private members l e g i s l a t i o n did not c o n f l i c t with the government's established agenda (and even on occasion where i t d i d ) , M.P.'s, government and opposition a l i k e , were freer to vote with t h e i r conscience than they were on matters con-cerning established government p o l i c y . While such may seem somewhat incongruous to observers f a m i l i a r only with the s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g in the late twentieth century, one 15 needs to take account of the i n t e l l e c t u a l environment that existed in the mid- to latter-1800's. By the 1860's most of the Western world (and B r i t a i n i n par t i c u l a r ) was in the midst of the " l i b e r a l enlightenment", a period i n which debate, discussion and man's r a t i o n a l i t y were seen as capable of solving any and a l l of society's most pressing concerns. In such an environment the House of Commons became the primary forum for debate and discussion. As March notes, debates were actually listened to i n the early post-Confederation parliaments and often proved capable of making or changing M.P.'s minds on important public • 19 questions. One might also conjure up a number of other explan-ations for the supposed weakness of party cohesion in thi s early period. For instance, given that Canada was a newly born country, one might expect that many of the public questions considered, debated and voted upon were of an importance and stature almost incomprehensible to observers of Canadian p o l i t i c s i n the late twentieth century. The creation of a national economy, the l i n k i n g of a l l regions of the country with a national transportation system, the establishment of a national system of banking and currency and the mitigation of ethnic c o n f l i c t s were a l l issues of such a magnitude -- issues which so c r u c i a l l y affected personal, ethnic, l o c a l and pr o v i n c i a l interests -- that intra-party schisms become re a d i l y understandable. F i n a l l y , impediments to the establishment of high levels of party cohesion were v i r t u a l l y inherent i n the 16 scope and magnitude of the Confederation scheme. As George Brown (who eventually became one of the most eloquent and powerful spokesmen in favour of Confederation) noted in 1858, "there i s no communications at present between the various sections to j u s t i f y a p o l i t i c a l union. •'" Such arguments were echoed by Maritime anti-Confederates through-out the 1860's, and with some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , for even at the time of Confederation there was l i t t l e commercial, l e t alone s o c i a l , r e l a t i o n s between the colonies of Canada and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Indeed, the maritimes and Canada more resembled "two d i s t i n c t countries with d i f f e r e n t out-looks and d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s [and] even d i f f e r e n t cus-toms than three geograpnically contiguous white B r i t i s h colonies requiring only a formal "contract" to unite them as one Dominion. Hence, one can r e a d i l y appreciate how d i f f i c u l t co-operation between those M.P.'s from the Mari-times and those from central Canada must have been in the early post-Confederation period. The above presentation of circumstantial h i s t o r i c a l evidence i s intended to strengthen the arguments of Reid and others, and by so doing, make i t a l l that much clearer just what the b a r r i e r s were to the creation of t i g h t l y cohesive p a r t i e s . While v i r t u a l l y a l l writers on the era seem to view the uncohesive nature of the parties as somehow anachronistic -- and even dysfunctional -- i n a parliament-ary system, given the evidence presented above one might be almost astonished to fi n d any modicum of party cohesion whatsoever. Surely the impediments to creating cohesive 17 parties p r i o r to 1878 were great: the lack of o f f i c i a l party organizations, the r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t rules which governed parliamentary l i f e , B r i t i s h structures and norms (whose examples Canadians so pedantically t r i e d to imitate), the lack of communications between the d i f f e r e n t sections of the new nation and the enormity of the l e g i s l a t i o n under consideration in these f i r s t few years -- added to the lack of simultaneous elections and the secret b a l l o t -- would c e r t a i n l y seem to make Reid's thesis a l l the more cre d i b l e . In the l i g h t of such overwhelming evidence one would appear to be trying to argue the impossible i n taking Reid (and a l l orthodox opinion) to task. Nonetheless, there i s a slim body of ex i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e which does just t h i s ; moreover, just as there i s a body of circumstantial evidence with which to buttress Reid's t h e s i s , there i s also evidence to support claims that, even as early as 1867, the two parties had achieved a measure of cohesion unsuspected by Reid and others. The main proponent of t h i s "alternative thesis" i s P.G. C o r n e l l . To be c e r t a i n , Cornell's work examines the state of the party system in the years p r i o r to Confedera-t i o n . Nonetheless, the core of his argument c e r t a i n l y provides the basis from which one can begin to attack the v a l i d i t y of Reid's arguments. Unfortunately, Cornell's work does not seem to have instigated much further invest-i g a t i o n , and thus, the range of arguments opposing the Reid thesis may appear to be rather slim. Cornell's thesis i s based largely on an examination of 18 the individual and c o l l e c t i v e voting patterns of the Legis-l a t i v e Assembly of Canada in the years p r i o r to Confedera-t i o n . Cornell argues that there was a noticeable tightening up of party l i n e s i n the decade preceding Confederation. While admitting that there s t i l l remained a large measure of looseness, Cornell maintains that the conventions of parliamentary l i f e and the existence of the two dominant p o l i t i c a l parties provided a s u f f i c i e n t force to bring most members together into f a i r l y consistent and i d e n t i f i a b l e voting blocs ( p a r t i c u l a r l y on questions of c r i t i c a l impor-tance). 22 in support of his contentions, Cornell notes that on those c r u c i a l d i v i s i o n s which involved the l i f e of a government, fewer members were missing from the d i v i s i o n r o i l s and an ever larger proportion came to support either the government or opposition with a great deal of consis-tency. Moreover, the supporters of the government and opposition r e a l l y did not change from one parliament to another ( or for that matter, over the course of a single parliament ), as an examination of the behaviour of i n d i v i -dual members throughout their careers in the Le g i s l a t i v e Assembly reveals "a very large degree of consistency and continuity on the part of individual members and of the groups of members acting as p o l i t i c a l parties."24 By the eighth parliament (1863), according to Cornell, the two parties were well defined and quite cohesive voting blocs. Indeed, Cornell argues that the high degree of continuity i n the membership of the Le g i s l a t i v e Assembly between the seventh and eighth parliaments provides "clear evidence of the firmness of party organization achieved by th i s time." Perhaps Cornell's most intriguing argument, however, concerns the i n a b i l i t y of the Liberal-Reformers or the Liberal-Conservatives to sustain a majority in the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly following the e l e c t i o n of 1863. While i t i s frequently assumed that the " p o l i t i c a l deadlock" which existed provides the most conclusive evidence of the weak state of party cohesion i n t h i s period, Cornell takes a diametrically opposed po s i t i o n . Indeed, the p o l i t i c a l deadlock exhibits just how c l e a r l y drawn party l i n e s had become. So evenly matched were the two parties i n terms of s i t t i n g members (apparently.62 members each), and so consistent were these members in t h e i r voting habits, that i t was the votes of a small handful of independents -- six at most -- which produced the frequent defeats encountered by governments in t h i s period. Based as i t i s on a. thorough examination of M.P. 's voting behaviour, Cornell's argument would c e r t a i n l y seem to be worthy of serious consideration. If there i s any v a l i d i t y to h i s assertions i t may well be expected that the two parties continued on as f a i r l y cohesive units once Confed-eration had been achieved. Unfortunately, even less of the kind of work undertaken by Cornell has been done on the early post-Confederation period. The only research of t h i s sort to be found i s thay done by Norman Ward in h i s work The Public Purse. Looking at the f i r s t session of the f i r s t post-Confederation parliament (1867-1868), Ward notes that on t h i r t y substantive d i v i s i o n s on which Macdonald and 20 Mackenzie were opposed, 91 members opposed Macdonald f i v e times or l e s s , and 47 opposed Mackenzie f i v e times or less (this out of a t o t a l House of Commons membership of 180). Unfortunately, and despite the apparent significance of his f i n d i n g . Ward chose not to pursue t h i s point much further, except to note that "Macdonald's working majority was c l e a r l y a stable one and distinguished from the M.P.'s who supported Mackenzie." ^ The circumstantial h i s t o r i c a l evidence to support the argument that the two parties were indeed rather cohesive voting blocs i s lamentably scarce, and tends on the whole only to provide evidence of the cohesiveness of the Conserva-tive party. Nonetheless, in support of such an argument one may look to S i r Francis Hircks' re-entry into Canadian p o l i -t i c a l l i f e . His appointment as Minister of Finance purportedly produced a f a i r amount of dissension within the Conservative party, with Richard Cartwright attempting to lead a caucus revolt (Alexander Gait also found Kincks' appointment rather d i s t a s t e f u l , and by a l l accounts a great deal of personal antipathy existed between Hincks and Joseph Howe). The fact that Cartwright's e f f o r t s went nowhere, however, represents a major instance of Macdonald's a b i l i t y to impose " d i s c i p l i n e " 29 on the party when and where i t was necessary. S i m i l a r l y , in 1871, and with Macdonald on vacation, Car t i e r was forced to deal with serious dissension within the party over the terms of union -with B.C. Apparently threatening d i s s o l u t i o n of the House (among other things), C a r t i e r suc-c e s s f u l l y put an end to this s p l i t i n party ranks and the terms of union were ca r r i e d and enacted in toto. At another le v e l one should not be surprised to find a reasonably high le v e l of cohesion within the two p a r t i e s , at least within the Ontario and Quebec wings, as many of the M.P.'s elected i n 1867 had been members of the old L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, and hence, were fa m i l i a r with one another and had had many years of experience working with one another. The Conservative party, as Donald Creighton writes, was p a r t i c -u l a r l y capable of acting as a cohesive unit, for: " . . . i t was simply the L i b e r a l Conservative party of the old province of Canada, which had already proved i t s marvellous capacity to assimilate the repugnant and to reconcile the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . 31 F i n a l l y , in support of the argument that the two parties may have been quite cohesive, with many loyal members, one may consider the vigour with which elections were fought. As Gordon Stewart notes, foreign observers of Canadian p o l i -t i c s were astounded by the v i t r i o l i c character of the rhetoric (parties frequently referred to one another as "enemies") and the intensity and fury with which electioneering took 32 place. While i t i s possible that the rhetoric of the time may not have been matched by genuine expressions of party loyalty in the House of Commons, i t would nevertheless seem plausible to argue that most candidates f e l t some r e a l attach-ment to the party whose banner they ran under, and might therefore be expected to behave i n a loyal fashion once they entered the House of Commons. While the above arguments prove nothing on t h e i r own. 22 they do give one reason to pause and reconsider the entire question of just how cohesive parties were in the early post-Confederation period. In order to properly answer t h i s ques-tion the approach taken in t h i s paper (as in Cornell's work) w i l l be to undertake a comprehensive examination of how a l l M.P.'s voted on a l l d i v i s i o n s (excluding those concerning private divorce b i l l s ) during the l i f e of each of the f i r s t three parliaments. Before embarking on this examination, however, a couple of "technical" problems need to be resolved. In the f i r s t place, what do we mean when we say an M.P. (given the context of the times) i s displaying loyalty to his party or behaving in a d i s c i p l i n e d manner? In order to determine when an M.P. i s behaving in such a manner i t i s necessary to set a "threshold" at which point one can say the M.P. i s displaying a consider-able measure of party loyalty (as measured by the percentage of the time the M.P. votes in accordance with his party's leader). For the purposes of t h i s paper, this threshold has been set at 8 0 % . That i s , where an M.P. votes in accordance with one or the other of the two party leaders 80% of the time or more, i t becomes plausible to argue that the M.P. i s exhi-b i t i n g a considerable degree of l o y a l t y to that party. While i t i s recognized that the threshold set i s somewhat a r b i t r a r y , i t can be readily j u s t i f i e d . F i r s t l y , and as already noted, the concept of responsible government was not nearly as res-t r i c t i v e as i t has now become, and hence, M.P.!s were much freer to vote as t h e i r conscience -- and not party a f f i l i a t i o n -- d ictated, even on matters d i r e c t l y concerning government 23 p o l i c y . Secondly, the r e l a t i v e l y large number of d i v i s i o n s taken on private member's b i l l s were held v i r t u a l l y as "free votes", again freeing M.P.'s from the need to vote in accord-33 ance with their party leader." In addition, many issues were of such a nature as to cut across party lines due to th e i r d i r e c t bearing on matters of ethnic/minority r i g h t s . Hence, on matters respecting the terms of union with Manitoba and the New Brunswick School Act, for instance, we might expect rather high levels of party defection, p a r t i c u l a r l y among Libe r a l ranks. F i n a l l y , Ward's cursory glance at the cohesive-ness of the two parties during the f i r s t parliament sets some-thing of an example to be adopted in any examination of party cohesiveness in t h i s early period. Hence, in using as a threshold an M.P.'s voting contrary to one or the other of the party leaders f i v e times in 30 substantive d i v i s i o n s (and this overlooking the fact that most M.P.'s were absent for at least a couple of these d i v i s i o n s ) . Ward implies that voting in accordance with one's party leader 83.3% of the time or more indicates a substantial measure of party loyalty on the part of the individual M.P. Taking a l l these factors into consider-ation a threshold of 80% seems e n t i r e l y reasonable. The second technical problem to be resolved involves the question of what we mean when we employ the terms "minister-i a l i s t " and "loose f i s h " . Most writers use the two terms interchangeably, although the precise meaning they impute to the terms i s often ambiguous. Hence, what i s proposed for the purposes of this paper i s a c l a r i f i c a t i o n -- and something of a r e d e f i n i t i o n -- of the two terms, one which attributes to 24 each term meanings which are quite l o g i c a l from a semantic point of view. Therefore, the term m i n i s t e r i a l i s t w i l l be employed in t h i s paper to describe those M.P.'s who regularly supported the government despite running as independents or as candidates of the party forming the opposition. The term loose f i s h , rather than being used synonymously, w i l l instead be applied to those M.P.'s who refused to support either party r e g u l a r l y , and who instead appeared to vote in an almost random fashion. In bringing t h i s chapter to a close a f i n a l comment i s neede to preface the following three chapters. In analyzing party cohesiveness a f i v e f o l d typology of member loyalty has been set up to delineate members into groups according to the percentage of the time they voted (on the whole and on p a r t i c -ular issues) in a l i k e manner with t h e i r party leader. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n employed in the following chapters runs as follows: those voting with their party leader 80% of the time or more w i l l be characterized as s o l i d party men, behaving in a highly loyal manner; those voting with the leader of their party 65-80% of the time w i l l be considered as moderately loyal party supporters; those voting with the leader of one or the other of the two party leaders between 35 and 65% of the time w i l l be c l a s s i f i e d as loose f i s h (as defined above); M.P.'s who followed t h e i r party leader only 20-35% of the time w i l l comprise the fourth class and w i l l be considered to be moderately loyal supporters of the other party; and l a s t l y , the term m i n i s t e r i a l i s t w i l l be applied to those opposition M.P.'s who followed t h e i r nominal party leader 20% of the time or l e s s , and to those " n o n - a f f i l i a t e d " M.P.'s who voted witn the government 80% of the time or more. A l l n o n - a f f i l i a t e d (or "Other") M.P.'s can be c l a s s i f i e d simply as strong or moderate supporters of the government or opposition, as loose f i s h or as m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s . ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I 1 Escott Reid; "The Rise of National Parties i n Canada", in H.G. Thorburn (Ed.) Party P o l i t i c s in Canada; pp.16-18 2 G.M. Hougham; "The Background and Development of National Part i e s " , in H.G. Thorburn (Ed.) Par~ty P o l i t i c s i n Canada; pp.2-3 3 S.P. Regenstreif; The Liberal Party of Canada; pp.299-300 4 For the purposes of t h i s paper, however, most of these members have been categorized -- where possible -- according to t h e i r p r i o r party a f f i l i a t i o n s . M.P.'s have been cate-gorized as Liberals, Conservatives or Others on the basis of information gathered from the Library of Parliament's History  of the Federal E l e c t o r a l Ridings: 1867-1980. 5 J.M. Beck; Pendulum of Power; p.17 6 i b i d ; p.8 7 i b i d ; p.19 8 R.M. Stamp; "J.D. Edgar and the Libera l Party: 1867-1896, in Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review; June 1964; p.98 9 Beck; op.cit.; p.30 10 Reid; op.cit.; p.15 11 Roman March; The Myth of Parliament; p.2 12 Beck; op.cit.; p.30 13 March; op.cit.; p.16 26 14 Norman Ward; ''Responsible Government: An Introduction", in Journal of Canadian Studies; Summer 1979; p.3. One may also r e c a l l John A. Macdonald remarking that "[wjhenever an o f f i c e i s vacant i t belongs to the party supporting the government... responsible government cannot be car r i e d on any other p r i n c i p l e . " 15 In f a c t , the research undertaken for this paper indicates that the government was actually defeated 23 times; t h i s represents f u l l y 9% of a l l recorded d i v i s i o n s during the f i r s t parliament. During the second parliament the Conservatives were defeated f i v e times on 33 di v i s i o n s (excluding those concerning divorce). 16 c f . Eugene Forsey; "Government Defeats in the Canadian House of Commons", i n Canadian Journal of Economics and  P o l i t i c a l Science; 1963 17 T.A. Hockin; "Flexible and Structured Parliamentarism From 1848 to Contemporary Party Government", i n Journal of  Canadian Studies; Summer 1979; p.8 18 March; op.cit.; p.55 19 i b i d ; p.55 20 J.S. Martell; "Intercolonial Communications - 1840-67", in Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review; June 1955; p.60 21 i b i d ; p.51 22 P.G. Cornell; "The Alignment of P o l i t i c a l Groups i n the United Province of Canada, 1854-1864", in Canadian H i s t o r i c a l  Review; March 1949; p.23 23 P.G. Cornell; The Alignment of P o l i t i c a l Groups i n Canada:  1841-1867; p.65 24 i b i d ; p.67 25 i b i d ; p.54 26 i b i d ; p.65 27 Norman Ward; The Public Purse; p.49 28 i b i d ; p.49 29 R.O. Macfarlane; "The Appointment of S i r Francis Hincks as Minister of Finance in 1869", in Canadian H i s t o r i c a l  Review; September 1939; p.22 30 W.L. Morton; The C r i t i c a l Years; p.248 31 D.G. Creighton; Dominion of the North; p.324 27 32 Gordon Stewart; The Origins of Canadian P o l i t i c s ; p.89 33 Evidence of both these points i s best t y p i f i e d by the fact that during the course of the f i r s t parliament, Mackenzie (or i f Mackenzie was absent, Blake) voted with the government no fewer than 49 times -- approximately 20% of the time. During the t h i r d parliament, Macdonald voted with the govern-ment at least 26 times -- f u l l y 25% of the time! Such behav-iour would be almost unthinkable i n the present day and age. 28 CHAPTER II - THE FIRST PARLIAMENT: 1867-1872 "I believe that agreat party i s a r i s i n g of moderate men. there are many men who think a l i k e about the future of B r i t i s h America who have been hitherto divided by their p o l i t i c a l antecedents. A l l t h i s ought to be forgotten now, and I hope that men, whatever t h e i r antecedents, who think a l i k e , w i l l act together. This i s the true and only p r i n c i p l e of party." (John A. Macdonald) The f i r s t general election saw 180 M.P.'s returned from the four provinces then constituting the C a n a d i a n nation. Of these 180 M.P.'s, 100 have been la b e l l e d as Conservatives, 73 as Liberals and 7 as "Others". The addition of the prov-inces of Manitoba and B.C. saw another five Conservatives, three Liberals and one Other added to these figures. Includ-i n g by-elections, there were in a l l 124 Conservatives, 83 Liberals and ten Others elected to parliament between 1867 a n d 1872. However, as w i l l be noted throughout this and subsequent chapters, "nominal" party labels are somewhat misleading when one examines the actual loyalty of M.P.'s to one or the other of the two party leaders. In " r e a l " terms, there were act u a l l y 126 M.P.'s who can be termed very or moderately loyal to Macdonald, 60 who were very or moderately loyal to Mackenzie and 32 loose f i s h . Analysis of M.P.'s behaviour during the course of the f i r s t parliament reveals many other things of great i n t e r e s t . Certainly Reid's thesis has some v a l i d i t y , for the over a l l levels of party cohesion evident during the f i r s t parliament were not remarkably high -- by modern standards -- for either 29 party; e s p e c i a l l y notable i s the d i s i n c l i n a t i o n of most Mari-time Liberals to vote with their counterparts from central Canada. Moreover, the Quebec wing of the Liberal party was, on the whole, only moderately loyal to Mackenzie (who w i l l be used as a proxy for a party leader i n thi s chapter). While none of the above i s p a r t i c u l a r l y surprising from the per-spective of the Reid thesi s , there are a number of other find-ings which would seem to f l y in the face of the arguments presented by Reid. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Conservative party as a whole, and the Ontario wing of the Liberal party, exhibit a degree of party cohesion that appears thoroughly incongruous with what one would expect given the arguments presented by Reid. Yet more remarkable are the even higher leve l s of cohe-sion we fin d for both parties on a number of highly s a l i e n t and c r u c i a l issues. Furthermore, the idea that each party was e f f e c t i v e l y l i t t l e more than a c o a l i t i o n of pr o v i n c i a l and ethnic factions would appear highly dubious. F i n a l l y , the argument that the Libera l party ( i n p a r t i c u l a r the Ontario wing of the party) was riven by a s p l i t between those who favoured Blake, and those who favoured Mackenzie, as leader of the party -- while undoubtedly having some foundation --i s not apparent from an examination of the voting behaviour of Liberal M.P.'s. The balance of t h i s and subsequent chapters w i l l be con-sumed by an examination of the voting behavior of a l l M.P.'s. For the sake of s i m p l i c i t y and ease of examination, each party s h a l l be treated in i s o l a t i o n , with a separate section of each chapter devoted to analyzing the behaviour of those M.P.'s 30 who were not a f f i l i a t e d -- at least in name -- with either of Che two major p a r t i e s . THE CONSERVATIVES Looking at Table 2.1, i t i s re a d i l y apparent just how-cohesive the Conservative party was, even as early as 1867. A l l of the four major wings of the party show average levels of l o y a l t y in excess of 80%, with majorities from each prov-ince voting with Macdonald over 80% of the time. TABLE 2.1 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (257 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0- 20 Avg. N Ontario 34 9 9 0 0 81. 9 52 Quebec 41 12 1 1 0 85.4 55 N.B. 4 0 -« A. 0 0 86. 0 5 N. S. 4 i 2 0 0 80. 5 7 Manitoba 1 0 1 0 0 76. 8 2 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 99.2 3 TOTALS 87 22 14 1 0 83. 9 124 To c l a r i f y the figures shown in the table (and a l l those tables which follow) a few words may be necessary. The columns to the r i g h t of each province contain figures showing the number of M.P.'s from each province who voted with the party leader (in t h i s case Macdonald) the percentage of the time shown above that figure in the uppermost row. For instance, the table reveals that 34 of 52 Conservative M.P.'s from Ontario followed Macdonald 80% of the time or more; and on average, Conservatives from Ontario were loyal to macdonald 81.9% of the time. The bottom-most row sums up the t o t a l s . Thus 87 of 124 Conservatives were loyal to Macdonald 80% of the time ox- more, and on the. whole, the average Conserva-t i v e M.P. followed Macdonald 83.9% of the time (the figures in the second to l a s t column we w i l l c a l l the index of loy-a l t y " ) . While there were 14 loose f i s h among Conservative ranks (and one M.P. who ran as a Conservative, but who can be c l a s s i f i e d as a moderately strong supporter of the opposition L i b e r a l s ) , Table 2.1 c l e a r l y shows that there was a remarkable degree of cohesion within Conservative party ranks. More remarkable s t i l l are the levels of cohesion shown by the party over a number of c r u c i a l questions d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g to government p o l i c y . For the sake of brevity, only a couple of tables w i l l be presented here; however, b r i e f reference w i l l be made to other issues which produced s i m i l a r findings. Railway po l i c y was ce r t a i n l y one of the most important questions dealt with by the f i r s t parliament, and the construc-tion of the Intercolonial and P a c i f i c Railway were high --i f not supreme -- on the government's l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s . As Table 2.2 shows, 97 of 105 Conservative M.P.'s voting on questions involving the construction of the P a c i f i c Railway supported the government 80% of the time or more, producing an o v e r a l l index of loy a l t y of almost 95%. The loy a l t y index for questions concerning the Intercolonial was somewhat lower at 89.5%, with the Ontario wing of the party appearing to have the most reservations about t h i s element of government poli c y . TABLE 2.2 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE PACIFIC RAILWAY (11 DIVISIONS) % of time loval to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0--20 Avg • N Ontario 38 3 0 0 90. 6 44 Quebec 45 0 1 0 0 98. 4 46 N.E. 4 0 1 0 0 88. 6 5 N.S. 5 0 0 0 0 100 5 Manitoba 2 0 0 0 0 92. 9 2 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100 3 TOTALS 97 3 5 0 0 94. 7 105 Other issues which were highly important and which produced loyalty indexes in the 90% plus range were: supply (17 votes; 89.5%), the renegotiation of the subsidy to Nova Scotia (12 votes; 92.3%), dual representation (8 votes; 93.7%), the modification of e l e c t o r a l boundaries and e l e c t o r a l laws (10 votes; 92.7%) and the Treaty of Washington (4 votes; 95.5%). In addition, there were several other issues (banking, customs, defence, the independence of parliament and the terms of union with both Manitoba and B.C) on which the overall index of lo y a l t y for the Conservative party was greater than 80% but less than 89% (a number of these and other tables can be found in Appendix A). Hence, i t i s quite manifest that the Conser-vatives could behave i n a highly cohesive manner when votes were taken on questions which might conceivably constitute 33 votes of "confidence" in the government. With the above i n mind, one i s almost led to wonder where the assertion that the Conservatives were not a very cohesive group came from. The answer l i e s in the examination of a number of issues which did, i n f a c t , produce c l e a r d i v i -sions within the party. As Table 2.3 reveals, votes taken on b i l l s concerning the insolvency laes witnessed very low levels of party l o y a l t y , with less than 50% of Conservatives present for some or a l l of these d i v i s i o n s supporting Macdonald 80% of the time or more. TABLE 2.3 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY LAWS (12 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg N Ontario 21 3 10 8 8 59. 5 50 Quebec 21 -* 12 5 10 58. 6 49 N.B. 5 0 0 0 0 93. 6 5 N.S. 4 1 0 0 2 70. 0 7 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 ± 50. 0 2 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100 3 TOTALS 55 5 22 13 21 62. 2 116 However, the very fact that the government was defeated on 8 of these 12 d i v i s i o n s reveals something very s i g n i f i c a n t about what were considered to constitute votes of confidence in these early days. Without much fear of bringing down the government, Conservative M.P.'s were r e l a t i v e l y free to vote 34 as they chose on a great many d i v i s i o n s . A si m i l a r argument can be made for those other issues (notably, the reporting and publishing of debates; see Table A. .13 in Appendix A) which saw very low levels of party cohesion within the governing party. In addition, there were a number of issues which so d i r e c t l y concerned questions of language or ethnic r i g h t s that one would not expect, even i n our day and age, absolute party cohesion on these d i v i s i o n s . Table 2.4 presents the figures for one such issue, the New Brunswick School Act (which aimed at diminishing the ri g h t s of the Francophone minority in that province). TABLE 2.4 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'s DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE NEW BRUNSWICK SCHOOL ACT (14 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 35 2 1 0 1 94. 4 39 Quebec 14 6 1 13 5 58. 5 39 N.B. 3 0 0 1 0 83. 3 4 N. S. 3 0 1 • 0 1 70. 0 5 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 1 50.0 2 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100 3 TOTALS 59 8 3 14 8 76. 6 92 It may also be noted that d i v i s i o n s taken on the Manitoba Act (see Table A.11 i n Appendix A) produced a s i m i l a r i n t r a -party schism along provincial/ethnic l i n e s , despite an overall index of loyalty of 81.3%. (this rather high figure i s due to 35 the almost unanimous support given the government by the Quebec wing of the party on a l l of these d i v i s i o n s ) . One l a s t table for the Conservatives i s worth a look at here. Table 2.5 records the loyalty of only those Conserva-ti v e M.P.'s who found t h e i r way into Macdonald's cabinet in either the f i r s t or second parliament (or both). One might well suspect that a cabinet post (or even the expectation of one) would demand from an M.P. a higher degree of loy a l t y than was otherwise required from the ordinary backbencher. TABLE 2.5 LOYALTY OF M.P.'S WHO WERE MEMBERS OF MACDONALD'S FIRST OR SECOND CABINET (257 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 ©-£20 Avg. N Ontario 6 1 1 0 n. \j 85.7 8 Quebec 7 0 1 0 0 90. 6 8 N.B. 1 0 0 0 0 99. 6 1 N.S. 2 0 0 0 0 96. 9 2 TOTALS 16 1 2 0 0 89. 7 19 M.P.'s who were given a cabinet post i n the second parliament, but not in the f i r s t there were only three), have been included here to examine whether expectation of a cabinet post might actu a l l y have led an M.P. to behave more l o y a l l y and/or whether Macdonald was i n c l i n e d to include i n his second cabinet only those backbenchers who had proven very loyal i n the f i r s t parliament. As i s rea d i l y apparent from an examination of Table 2.5, those M.P.'s recruited to the cabinet by Macdonald proved to be e s p e c i a l l y strong supporters of the government. Only three cabinet ministers (Gait, Cartwright and McDougall) proved less than very loyal to Macdonald, and of these three, Cartwright had been a very loyal supporter of the government up u n t i l Hincks' entry into the ministry."'" Apart from these three, those M.P.'s given places in Macdonald's cabinet displayed an extremely high degree of loyalty to Macdonald and the party as a whole, seldom witholding t h e i r support. THE LIBERALS In turning now to alook at the Liberal party, the c r u c i a l question to be examined i s whether a party seemingly fractured in every conceivable manner was capable of achieving any modicum of cohesiveness whatsoever. While i t would be absurd to suppose that the Liberals could achieve anything c l o s e l y approximating the cohesiveness of the Conservatives, i t i s not u n r e a l i s t i c to assume that p a r t i c u l a r issues could have proven able to c r y s t a l l i z e a l l the opposition forces into a cohesive voting bloc. Given Reid's work the figures shown in Table 2.6 are not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g . Nonetheless, some of the figures are inter-esting. In p a r t i c u l a r , i n comparing Tables 2.1 and 2.6 one notes that the Ontario wing of the Lib e r a l party scores almost as high on the loy a l t y index as does the Ontario wing of the Conservative party. Unfortunately, the same c e r t a i n l y cannot be said of Quebec Liberals; more s t r i k i n g yet i s the d i s i n -c l i n a t i o n of Maritime Liberals to follow the (as yet unac-claimed) leader of t h e i r party. M.P.'s from B.C. who were t e c h n i c a l l y Liberals c l e a r l y represent the m i n i s t e r i a l i s t element in the f i r s t parliament. TABLE 2.6 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (257 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie. 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 23 10 1 2 0 81.4 36 Quebec 3 14 2 2 0 69.0 21 N.B. 0 4 7 2 0 55.2 1 O A. O N.S. 0 0 7 3 0 41. 3 10 B.C. 0 0 0 0 3 16.2 3 TOTALS 26 28 17 9 3 67.0 83 As we saw with the Conservatives, however, an examination of L i b e r a l M.P.'s voting habits across a l l d i v i s i o n s does not t e l l the whole story. While the Liberals never exhibited the degree of cohesion exhibited by the Conservatives, there were a number of issues around which most Liberals r a l l i e d , a l b e i t , with the general exception of maritime Li b e r a l s . Hence, average measures of party l o y a l t y appear somewhat low for the Libe r a l s , despite the fact that on many occasions Liberals from Ontario and Quebec were more or less united behind t h e i r party leader. Tables 2.7 and 2.8, respectively, examine how members of the L i b e r a l party voted on questions involving the indepen-dence of parliament (that i s , c o n f l i c t of interest guidelines) and dual representation -- two issues which were very near to the hearts of most L i b e r a l s . Aside from the remarkably high levels of loyalty displayed by Li b e r a l M.P.'s from Quebec and 38 Ontario, what i s notable about these two issues (and a few oth-ers) i s that Libe r a l M.P.'s from one or both of the Maritime provinces also followed Mackenzie with a much greater than usual frequency. TABLE 2.7 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT (5 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 31 0 2 0 0 96.4 33 Quebec 17 0 2 0 0 92. 6 19 N.B. 3 2 2 0 1 67. 7 8 N.S. 1 0 o 0 6 22.2 9 B.C. 0 0 0 0 2 0.0 2 TOTALS 52 2 8 0 9 80. 0 71 TABLE 2.8 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING DUAL REPRESENTATION (8 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 30 2 0 0 2 90. 0 34 Quebec 18 i 0 0 1 93. 3 20 N.B. 7 1 1 0 1 81. 1 10 N.S. 4 1 3 0 2 62.4 10 B.C. 0 0 0 1 2 8.3 3 TOTALS 59 5 4 1 8 82. 9 77 39 In addition to the two issues examined above, Liberals from Ontario and Quebec also exhibited a very high degree of cohesiveness on d i v i s i o n s involving the subsidy to Nova Scotia, the terms of union with B.C. and the Treaty of Washington (see Appendix B for these and other t a b l e s ) . In addition, d i v i s i o n s concerning the issues of defence, customs and the insolvency act also tended to bring Liberals from a l l parts of the coun-try together with a much greater than normal frequency. As with the Conservatives, however, there were a number of issues which produced a rather low index of loyalty for a l l wings of the party, and therefore, the party as a whole. In p a r t i c u l a r , d i v i s i o n s concerning the reporting and publishing of debates produced rather haphazard voting patterns among Li b e r a l M.P.'s. Table 2.9 i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s point most s u c c i n c t l y . TABLE 2.9 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE REPORTING OF DEBATES (6 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 5 1 . 10 12 7 44. 6 35 Quebec 11 2 5 2 1 70. 2 21 N.B. 5 2 2 1 3 58. 8 13 N.S. 4 2 3 0 0 77. 0 9 B.C. 0 0 0 0 1 0.0 1 TOTALS 25 7 20 15 12 56. 9 79 Not unexpectedly, there were also a number of issues which produced serious intra-party r i f t s . As with the Conser-40 vatives, questions concerning the Manitoba Act and the New Brunswick School Act proved the most f r a c t i o u s . Table 2.10 summarizes the voting behaviour of Lib e r a l M.P.'s on the ques-tion of Manitoba's union with Canada, and i l l u s t r a t e s guite v i v i d l y just how d i v i s i v e questions concerning minority rights were i n t h i s early period. TABLE 2.10 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.' DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA ACT (14 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie  80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N 26 0 1 0 0 91.8 27 0 0 0 0 14 10.6 16 2 0 0 0 2 50.0 4 0 1 0 1 3 25.2 5 28 1 1 3 19 57.2 52 Ontario Quebec N.3. N.S. TOTALS A couple of other arguments regarding the cohesiveness of the Lib e r a l party need to be dealt with here. In p a r t i c u l a r , by examining M.P.'s voting records we can determine whether Quebec Liberals (led by A.A. Dorion) genuinely deserve to be distinguished as a f a c t i o n . Secondly, the b e l i e f that there was a r i f t in the party between those who favoured Mackenzie, and those who preferred Blake, as leader of the Lib e r a l party, can be put to the te s t by an examination of the voting beha-viour of Liberal M.P.'s. Table 2.11 summarizes the voting behaviour of a l l French Canadian Liberal M.P.'s from Quebec on those d i v i s i o n s which 41 saw Dorion opposing Mackenzie, or Blake i f Mackenzie was ab-sent from parliament. The evidence would suggest that this contingent of M.P.'s c l e a r l y deserves the t i t l e of "faction", with these M.P.'s remaining loyal to Dorion over 85% of the time. While such a finding would seem to indicate a major r i f t between the two major wings of the Libe r a l party, i t should be noted that Dorion himself voted with Mackenzie (or Blake i f Mackenzie was absent) almost 80% of the time. Moreover, Dorion held no pretensions to the leadership of the Liberal party, i n s i s t i n g instead that a member from Ontario should be 2 chosen as leader (Dorion apparently favoured Mackenzie). TABLE 2.11 LOYALTY OF FRENCH CANADIAN LIBERALS FROM QUEBEC TO DORION DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT (39 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Dorion  80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Quebec 12 3 0 0 0 85.2 15 In contrast, rumours of a fractio u s Blake wing would appear somewhat questionable. While there may have been those who favoured p o l i c i e s (especially regarding imperial relations) espoused by Blake, very few chose to oppose Mackenzie in favour of Blake when c a l l e d upon to vote. Table 2.12 summarizes these findings, and shows that there were only 2 Liberals from central canada who can be c l a s s i f i e d as very loyal to Blake. Only M.P.'s from Ontario and Quebec have been examined here because (as has been seen) the o v e r a l l levels of loyalty shown by Maritime M.P. *s were very low, and thus examining their behaviour on these d i v i s i o n s would show misleadingly 42 high l e v e l s of loyalty to Blake. TABLE 2.12 LOYALTY OF ONTARIO AND QUEBEC LIBERALS TO BLAKE DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT (13 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Blake 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 1 X 9 11 12 32.1 33 Quebec 1 3 .2 6 9 31. 6 21 TOTALS 2 4 11 17 21 31. 9 54 F i n a l l y , i t i s of some c u r i o s i t y to see i f those M.P.'s who were part of Mackenzie's cabinet in the t h i r d parliament (and who were also M.P.'s during the f i r s t parliament) exhib-ited a greater degree of loyalty to Mackenzie than the average M.P. As Table 2.13 reveals t h i s was indeed the case. While the three M.P.'s from the Maritimes showed no more loyalty to Mackenzie than did other Liberals from that part of the coun-tr y , the eight M.P.'s from Ontario and Quebec were c l e a r l y much more loyal than the majority of Libera l M.P.'s from these two provinces. TABLE 2.13 LOYALTY OF FUTURE CABINET MINISTERS TO MACKENZIE DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT (257 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 3 1 0 0 0 90.0 4 Quebec 2 2 0 0 0 83.4 4 N.B. 0 0 1 0 0 59.0 1 N.S. 0 0 2 0 0 36.5 2 TOTALS 5 3 3 0 0 75.1 11 43 While one may speculate that Mackenzie picked these M.P.'s as part of his cabinet on the basis of thei r p r i o r l o y a l t y , i t should also be recognized that many of these M.P.'s were acknowledged leaders of the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party-^ Nonetheless, the figures are interesting in t h e i r own r i g h t , and may in fact lead one to doubt yet further whether the Quebec wing of the party t r u l y constituted (as Reid maintains) a fac t i o n , as i t i s integral to the concept of a faction that the members of the faction are a l l but completely loyal to t h e i r f a c t i o n a l leaders; yet i t i s clear that most Libera l M.P.'s from Quebec voted contrary to thei r sectional leaders between 10 and 15% of the time. THE "OTHERS" Because of the small number of M.P.'s who have been c l a s s i f i e d as Others for the puposes of this paper, and for brevity's sake, only the table showing how these M.P.'s behaved across a l l d i v i s i o n s w i l l be presented here. In addi-t i o n , a b r i e f summation of other findings w i l l be presented. It should be noted that only ten M.P.'s have been c l a s s i f i e d as Others; while a much larger number actually ran as something other than Liberals or Conservatives (especially in the Mari-times), they have been grouped according to thei r p r i o r party a f f i l i a t i o n s (as reported in the Library of Parliament's History of the Federal E l e c t o r a l Ridings: 1867-1980. Table 2.14 presents the figures showing how these ten M.P.'s voted on a l l d i v i s i o n s during the course of the f i r s t parliament. For s i m p l i c i t y ' s sake, these M.P.'s index of loy-4 4 a l t y has been calculated as i t was for the Conservative party; that i s , the percentages expressed in the table rep-resent the percentage of the time these M.P.'s voted with the governmen t. TABLE 2.14 LOYALTY OF ALL "OTHERS" DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS ( 2 5 7 DIVISIONS) % of times voting with Macdonald 80-1.00 6 5 - 8 0 3 5 - 6 5 2 0 - 3 5 0 - 2 0 Avg. N Ontario 1 0 0 0 0 8 2 . 6 1 Quebec 0 J. 0 0 0 6 7 . 1 1 N.B. 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 . 7 1 N.S. 0 1 0 3 2 2 9 . 0 6 Mani toba 1 0 0 0 0 9 7 . 6 1 TOTALS 2 2 1 _L 3 2 4 6 . 2 1 0 As can be seen, t h i s group of M.P.'s i s d i f f i c u l t to characterize; two can be c l a s s i f i e d as m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s or very strong government supporters, two as moderately strong govern-ment supporters, one as a loose f i s h , three as moderately strong supporters of the opposition and two as very strong supporters of the opposition. On almost issues of major significance we fi n d s i m i l a r r e s u l t s , with the same M.P.'s -- for the most part --proving to be either supporters of the government or opposition. Only on four issues, the Treaty of Washington, the Manitoba Act, the B.C. Act and the insolvency act, do we find r e l a t i v e l y strong support for the government from a majority of these M.P.'s. 45 A l l in a l l , the evidence presented in thi s chapter gives one pause to wonder whether or not Reid's work captures the whole truth of the matter. Certainly both p a r t i e s , and espe-c i a l l y the Conservatives, were capable of behaving very cohes-ivel y when the House divided on questions c r i t i c a l to the government's agenda. Furthermore, the suggestion that each p r o v i n c i a l wing of the party represented a faction i s highly questionable. While i t i s arguable that the "Rouge" element of the L i b e r a l party may have constituted a factio n , the same can hardly be said f o r , say, the entire contingent of M.P.'s from Nova Scotia, who according to Reid were v i r t u a l l y a separate A p o l i t i c a l party. While Howe quickly became one of Macdonald's most loyal supporters, voting with Macdonald 98.5% of the time, i t i s evident from the preceding tables that many of his fellow M.P.'s from Nova Scotia were not prepared to follow him in supporting Macdonald wholeheartedly. In turning now to an examination of the second parliament i t w i l l be of p a r t i c u l a r interest to note i f the parties became more cohesive, and whether the number of loose f i s h and moderately strong supporters of each party declined as a proportion of a l l M.P.'s. It w i l l also be worth watching the behaviour of the Maritime contingent of M.P.'s to see i f they -- a f t e r f i v e years working with t h e i r central Canadian count-erparts -- were prepared to al i g n themselves more firmly with one or the other of the two p a r t i e s . Also, with c a r t i e r missing from parliament (he f e l l i l l and died without ever making i t to his seat in the House), and as i t was he who provided the "glue" which kept the Francophone and Anglophone elements of the party united, i t may well prove that the 46 index of loyalty for the Quebec wing of the party may drop noticeably. If t h i s i s not the case, then one may be in a position to argue that the "Bleus" too owed th e i r allegiance not s o l e l y to Ca r t i e r (as would be the case i f we were to argue that the Bleus were a faction) but to the national party leader and the party in general. ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER II 1 P r i o r to Hincks' appointment as Minister of Finance, Cart-wright had supported the government well over 90% of the time; from t h i s point on Cartwright became a loose f i s h , actually supporting the opposition 60% of the time. Gait, despite his standing within the party, had never proven to be a good party man; and McDougall, of course, had been one of those " c o a l i -t ion L i b e r a l s " who had heeded Macdonald's c a l l to j o i n him p r i o r to the e l e c t i o n of 1867. 2 S.P. Regehstreif; The Liberal Party of Canada: A P o l i t i c a l  Analysis; p.301. It should also be noted that, according to S e l l e r and B e l l o n i , one of the chief c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a faction i s that i t i s constantly competing with other elements within the party for power and influence. Hence, Dorion's b e l i e f that he should not even be considered for the leadership would seem to weaken the argument that the Rouges were properly a faction within the L i b e r a l party. Nonetheless, the behaviour of these 15 M.P.'s might indicate that they were more loyal to Dorion (their sectional leader) than they were to Mackenzie or the party as a whole. 3 Mackenzie's cabinet included Blake D. M i l l s and W. Ross from Ontario and Dorion, F. Geoffrion, T. Fournier and L.S. Hunt-ingdon from Quebec. 4 Reid; op.cit.; p.18 47 CHAPTER III - THE SECOND PARLIAMENT: 1872-1674 "Party i s a body of men united for promoting by th e i r j o i n t endeavours the national interest upon some p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e in which they are a l l agreed." (Edmund Burke) The general e l e c t i o n of 1872 saw 200 M.P.'s returned to the second parliament. Of these, 97 have been c l a s s i f i e d as Conservatives, 97 as Liberals and 6 as others. Subsequent by-elections added just one Conservative and one Libe r a l to these numbers.^ However, in real terms the Conservatives had a f a i r l y stable majority. Despite being defeated f i v e times on 33 non-divorce related d i v i s i o n s , the Conservatives had approximately 101 very loyal supporters to the Liberal's 78. These f i v e d i v i s i o n s aside, the Conservatives majority of 23 (or more) appears quite consistent on other d i v i s i o n s . Although the second parliament i s dated from 1872 to 1874, there was in fact only one session (in the spring of 1873) during which d i v i s i o n s were held. A f a l l s i t t i n g in the same year saw only a long-winded debate over the findings of the committee appointed to investigate the " P a c i f i c Scandal", culminating, of course, with a prema-ture d i s s o l u t i o n of Parliament. Despite the brevity of the second parliament, the find-ings that emerge would c e r t a i n l y seem to cast serious doubt upon the v a l i d i t y of the Reid t h e s i s . As w i l l be seen, both parties displayed very high levels of cohesiveness, the vast majority of M.P.'s displaying levels of loyalty that woxild r i v a l even those found today. Unfortunately, as there were 43 only 33 recorded d i v i s i o n s (on matters other than divorce) during the course of this parliament, there i s l i t t l e point in analyzing the degree of party cohesiveness on particular-issues as not even the most important questions of the day were brought to a vote enough times for the re s u l t s to prove conclusive. Hence, only three tables w i l l be presented in this chapter -- those showing the cohesiveness of the Conser-vatives, Liberals and Others across a l l d i v i s i o n s recorded in this period. Su f f i c e i t to say that the figures shown in these three tables are b a s i c a l l y the same as those we would see i f tables analyzing party cohesiveness on p a r t i c u l a r issues were also presented. Indeed, on most, important ques-tions (for example, supply, the P a c i f i c Railway and the Treaty of Washington) the leve l s of party cohesiveness were several points higher than they were across a l l d i v i s i o n s . THE CONSERVATIVES As Table 3.1 c l e a r l y reveals, the Conservative party's index of loyalty increased by over 8% points during the second parliament. Whereas only two-thirds of Conservative M.P.'s in the f i r s t parliament could be characterized as very l o y a l , the percentage exhibiting a very high degree of loyalty in the second parliament was almost 96%. Moreover, the number of loose f i s h among Conservative ranks was reduced to almost zero. P a r t i c u l a r l y notable i s the much greater willingness of Nova Scotian Conservatives to support the government --and t h i s despite Howe's early departure to serve as Lieu-tenant-Governor of his home province! It i s also of note that 49 the contingent of Conservative M.P.'s from Quebec remained extremely l o y a l , following Macdonald aiomost to the man, even though Cartier never made i t to his seat in the House. TABLE 3. 1 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (33 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 37 0 0 0 1 92.4 38 Quebec 34 1 0 0 i 91. 3 36 N. B. 5 0 1 0 87. 6 6 N. S. 10 0 0 0 0 95.6 10 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 85.7 1 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100 3 TOTALS 90 1 1 0 2 92. 1 94 THE LIBERALS Dramatic as the figures for the Conservative party are, more s t r i k i n g s t i l l i s the apparent transformation of the Liberal party (at least among the Quebec and Ontario wings of the party). While i t was shown that during the f i r s t p a r l -iament the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party could act quite cohesively on p a r t i c u l a r issues, on the whole party cohesion was quite weak. Table 3.2 shows, however, that dur-ing the second parliament the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party were substantially in agreement and t h e i r members much more inclin e d to l o y a l l y follow Mackenzie. Indeed, of the 74 members from Ontario and Quebec, 71 can be placed in 50 the very loyal category (this compares with just 26 of 57 in the f i r s t parliament). Although the index of loyalty for Liberals from the Maritimes dropped marginally in the second parliament, i t i s noteworthy that at least three of these M.P.'s were w i l l i n g to firmly a l i g n themselves with Mac-kenzie ( as compared with none in the f i r s t parliament ). TABLE 3 . 2 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M. , P. 'S DURING THE SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (33 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenz ie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 47 0 0 1 0 95. 7 47 Quebec 24 0 1 0 1 90. 1 26 N.B. 2 I 2 2 0 53. 5 7 N.S. I 1 2 4 3 37. 6 11 Manitoba 0 0 0 0 1 20. 0 i B.C. 0 0 o Q 2 14. 7 2 TOTALS 74 2 5 7 7 8 1 . 8 95 Moreover, one sees an unmistakable tendency for these M.P.'s to choose one side or the other; whereas 14 of 23 L i b e r a l M.P.'s from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia could be charac-terized as loose f i s h i n the f i r s t parliament, only 4 of 18 Maritime Liberals f a l l into t h i s category in the second parliament. M.P.'s from the West who were nominally Liberals continued to be -- as i n the f i r s t parliament -- firm minis-t e r i a l i s t s . 51 THE "OTHERS" A cursory examination of Table 3.3 reveals a number of intereting facts not only about the behaviour of these Others, but also about the nature of the second parliament as a whole. TABLE 3.3 LOYALTY OF ALL "OTHERS" DURING THE SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (33 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 1 0 Q 0 1 50. 7 2 Quebec 1 0 0 0 0 92.3 1 N.B. 1 0 1 0 0 67. 9 2 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 95.0 1 TOTALS 4 0 1 0 1 70. 7 6 F i r s t l y , i t i s clear that almost a l l of these Others (5 Of 6) chose to firmly support one or the other of the two parties, whereas in the f i r s t parliament these Others were scattered a l l over the continuum. Secondly, the second parliament saw a marked decrease in the number of Other M.P.'s (especially i f one adds to the f i r s t parliament figures the 15 or so M.P.'s, mostly anti-Confederates, who were r e - c l a s s i f i e d for the purposes of t h i s paper) who ran under neither party banner. These two points might lead one to speculate that by the second parliament the two parties were s u f f i c i e n t l y well organized and defined as to make i t no longer advantageous for a candidate to run or act as an independent. To support such an argument, one can look at the behaviour of these 52 M.P.'s on a number of c r i t i c a l issues. While i t has already been noted that these r e s u l t s would be somewhat inconclusive due to the small number of votes concerned, i t i s nonetheless interesting to note that on those d i v i s i o n s concerning issues such as the P a c i f i c Railway, supply and the Treaty of Wash-ington, we see an even clearer d i v i s i o n of Other M.P.'s into Li b e r a l and Conservative camps. Notably, these same issues also produced greater levels of cohesiveness among those members c a l l i n g themselves either L i b e r a l s or Conservatives. Evidence from the second parliament would c e r t a i n l y seem to lend a good deal of credence to an argument contending that the two parties i n t h i s early period were in fact f a i r l y cohesive units. However, i t i s s t i l l hard to believe that an academic of the stature of Escott Reid could be so wrong. Perhaps the second parliament represents nothing more than an aberration. Perhaps (as Cornell argues with respect, to the pre-Confederation era) the high leve l s of cohesiveness witnes-sed during the second parliament were induced by the very close r e s u l t s of the 1872 e l e c t i o n . Perhaps, i t may even be argued, the emerging revelations concerning the P a c i f i c Scan-dal galvanized the two parties: the L i b e r a l s , smelling the downfall of the government, may have had a new incentive to behave cohesively; the Conservatives, for t h e i r part, aware that t h e i r hold on power was tenuous, may also have been forced -- even d i s c i p l i n e d -- into behaving in a more cohes-ive manner. Whether the foregoing speculation has any basis i n fact 53 or not i s of a somewhat secondary importance. The fact remains that the vast majority of M.P.'s i n the second parliament displayed a great deal of loyalty to one party or the other, and t h i s in i t s e l f should give one reason enough to reconsider the v a l i d i t y of Reid's th e s i s . The question remains, however, as to whether t h i s extraordinary degree of party cohesion continued into the t h i r d parliament or whether the t h i r d p a r l -iament witnessed a return to the somewhat looser alignment of M.P.'s we saw i n the f i r s t parliament. ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER III 1 i t should be noted, however, that f i v e Conservatives and two Lib e r a l s never took th e i r seats in the House. Furthermore, while there were quite a few by-elections (15 or so) only two of those elected ever took t h e i r seats in the House. The tables that follow, therefore, exclude those M.P.'s who never took t h e i r seats in the House of Commons. Hence the explana-tion for the discrepancy between the numbers shown in the tables and those presented above. 54 CHAPTER IV - THE THIRD PARLIAMENT: 1874-1678 "Since deputies are elected to deliberate and decide on public a f f a i r s , the point of their e l e c t i o n i s that i t i s a choice of individuals on the strength of confidence f e l t in them...Hence t h e i r r e l a t i o n to t h e i r electors i s not that of agents with a com-mission or s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s . A further bar to t h e i r being so i s the fact that their assembly i s meant as a l i v i n g body in which a l l members' deliberate in common and r e c i p r o c a l l y instruct and convince each other." (G.W.F. Hegel) The t h i r d general election saw 205 M.P.'s returned from the (now) seven provinces making up the Canadian nation, the additional f i v e M.P.'s coming from the newly created province of Prince Edward Island. Of these 205 M.P.'s, 117 have been labelled as L i b e r a l s , 76 as Conservatives and 12 as Others. Of the 50 or so by-elections held between 1874 and 1878, 40 of those returned took t h e i r seats in the House and were present for a good number of divi s i o n s ; and of these 40 M.P.'s, 23 have been labelled as L i b e r a l s , 12 as Conser-vatives and f i v e as Others. However, in real terms 151 of these 245 M.P.'s were very or moderately loyal supporters of Mackenzie; i n contrast, only 74 can be considered very or moderately loyal supporters of Macdonald;- in addition, there were 20 M.P.'s who can be characterized as loose f i s h . A close examination of the t h i r d parliament reveals that the second parliament was indeed something of an aberration. The cohesiveness of the Conservatives was c l e a r l y shattered by t h e i r defeat at the p o l l s . Undoubtedly the revelations of the committee investogating th e ^ P a c i f i c Scandal also.hurt Macdonald personally, for they cast c . ouDt on his i n t e g r i t y 55 and may well have hampered his attempts to impose d i s c i p l i n e on his party. In addition, we see a return to the s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g in the f i r s t parliament insofar as the number of Others increased s u b s t a n t i a l l y , while the majority of them proved to be m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s , the r e s t of these Others were again scattered over the continuum. While these observations are not p a r t i c u l a r l y s u r p r i s i n g , i t i s noteworthy that the Liberals -- now in power -- continued to display a remarkable degree of cohesiveness. Undoubtedly part of the reason for th i s l i e s in the fact that the Liberals now constituted the government, and thus, required a greater degree of cohesive-ness to operate e f f e c t i v e l y . Nonetheless, whereas the figures for the opposition party (now the Conservatives) and Others are i n many respects s i m i l a r to those we found in the f i r s t parliament, the index of loyalty for Liberal M.P.'s i s nota-bly higher than i t was for the Conservatives between 1867 and 1872. THE CONSERVATIVES Without a doubt t h e i r e l e c t o r a l defeat, coupled with the findings of the commission appointed to investigate the P a c i f i c Scandal, dealt a serious blow to the s o l i d a r i t y of the Conservative party. As Table 4 .1 reveals, the o v e r a l l index of loyalty for the Conservative was only marginally higher during the t h i r d parliament than i t was for the Liberals during the f i r s t parliament; and in f a c t , the Ontario and Quebec wings of the Conservative party, taken together, were far less loyal to Macdonald than the same two wings of 56 the L i b e r a l party had been to Mackenzie during the f i r s t parliament. TABLE 4.1 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 11 17 2 2 1 73.6 33 Quebec 9 23 4 2 0 72.0 38 N.B. 1 2 0 1 0 63. 9 4 N.S. 2 2 2 2 0 59. 0 8 Manitoba 0 0 1 0 0 61.2 1 B.C. X 1 0 0 0 79. 0 P.E.I. 0 0 2 0 0 38. 5 2 TOTALS 24 45 11 7 1 70. 3 88 Looking at Table 4.1 two observations are p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g . F i r s t of a l l , one i s taken by the precipitous decline (even by the standards of the f i r s t parliament) in the proportion of Conservative M.P.'s who can be c l a s s i f i e d as very l o y a l . A mere 24 of 88 Conservative M.P.'s (or 27.3%) f e l t compelled to follow Macdonald 80% of the time or more. Secondly, and perhaps as a by producy of the above observa-t i o n , the number of Conservative M.P.'s who can be classed as moderately loyal represent a clea r majority of a l l Con-servative M.P.'s. Even more surprising is the Conservatives i n a b i l i t y to prove any more cohesive on a wide range of important d i v i -sions. Just one example of the voting behaviour of Conserva-t i v e M.P.'s on these issues i s presented in Table 4.2 (for a number of other tables, see Appendix C). TABLE 4.2 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING RAILWAYS (24 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 10 14 4 0 3 67.4 31 Quebec 9 17 6 2 1 68. 2 35 N.B. 1 1 I 0 1 J L 58. 7 . f A M.S. 2 2 1 0 3 48.7 8 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 83.3 ± B,C, 1 0 1 0 0 70.2 2 P.E.I. 0 0 0 i 0 25.0 1 TOTALS 24 34 13 3 8 65. 3 82 Questions concerning railways occupied a large propor-ti o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s time, accounting for 24 of 108 non-divorce realated d i v i s i o n s . As can be seen, even an issue that was so integral to the Conservative's program in the f i r s t two parliaments f a i l e d to produce s i g n i f i c a n t l y high l e v e l s of party cohesion. Indeed, on th i s issue the index of l o y a l t y for the party as a whole i s a few points lower than i t i s for the party across a l l d i v i s i o n s . Similar r e s u l t s are evident across a number of other important issues. There were in fact only two issues which produced s i g -n i f i c a n t l y high indexes of loy a l t y for the Conservative party in t h i s period. The new Brunswick School Law was voted upon only three times and the ove r a l l index of loyalty of 81.0% 58 on that issue was largely the r e s u l t of the extreme loyalty shown by the Quebec wing of the party. As Table 4.3 indicates, d i v i s i o n s concerning questions of supply tended to bring Conservatives together more frequently than any other issue. ' ~ TABLE 4.3 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P."S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY (7 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 27 •0 0 0 2 90. 0 29 Quebec 22 - 8 2 0 0 85. 9 32 N.B. 3" •"0 •'" 0 0 1 70. 8 4 N.S. •j 2 0 0 2 61.9 7 Manitoba 0 0 0 1 0 33. 3 1 B.C. 2 0 0 0 0 100 2 P.E.I. 0 0 1 0 0 50.0 1 TOTALS 57 10 3 1 5 83.7 76 Even so, the ove r a l l index of l o y a l t y for the Conservatives on t h i s issue of 83.7% i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y high. While i t i s recognized that high lev e l s of cohesion are not demanded from opposition parties to the degree that they are from the governing party,..the fact remains that during the f i r s t p a r l -iament even the L i b e r a l party (at least the Ontario and Quebec wings) was frequently capable of acting more cohesively than were the Conservatives several years l a t e r . THE LIBERALS The behaviour of Libera l M.P.'s i n the th i r d parliament would c e r t a i n l y seem to destroy a good part of the Reid the-s i s . As Table 4.4 shows, the Liberal party continued to behave i n a highly cohesive manner. While the loyalty of the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party waned somewhat (compared with the second parliament), the index of loyalty for the party as a whole increased markedly, due primarily to the overnight conversion of maritime Liberals to the Li b e r a l cause. Whereas Li b e r a l M.P.'s from the Maritimes had seemingly disavowed t h e i r nominal party a f f i l i a t i o n s in the previous two parliaments, the t h i r d parliament (as Reid also observed) saw almost a l l Maritime Liberals displaying an unmistakable willingness to work with and support th e i r confreres from central Canada. Indeed, notwithstanding the handful of mem-bers from the West, the Nova Scotian contingent went from having the lowest index of loyalty as a group in the previous two parliaments to displaying the greatest loyalty of a l l the pro v i n c i a l groups. While four of the si x Liberals from the West again refused to vote consistently with t h e i r party, the l o y a l t y shown by the new group of M.P.'s from P.E.I, would seem to be almost as blind as was that of B r i t i s h Columbian M.P.'s to the Conservatives during the f i r s t parliament. Unlike the Conservatives, there were a large number of major issues on which the Liberal party proved extraordina-r i l y cohesive. Table 4.5, which examines Liberal voting beha-60 viour on di v i s i o n s concerning supply provides but one example. TABLE 4.4 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 63 3 1 0 0 91.7 67 Quebec 28 7 •4 0 0 83.2 39 N.B. 7 0 0 1 0 85.4 8 N.S. 15 0 0 0 0 94. 5 15 Manitoba l" 0 0 1 J. 0 56.8 2 B.C. 1 0 3 0 0 60. 1 4 P.E.I. 5 0 0 0 0 93.5 5 TOTALS 120 10 8 2 0 87. 9 140 TABLE 4.5 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY (7 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-•20 Avg • N Ontario 55 4 3 0 0 90. 4 62 Quebec 34 1 1 0 0 96. 2 36 N.B. 6 1 0 0 0 90. 5 7 N.S. 11 1 0 0 0 96. 5 12 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 100 1 B.C. 1 0 2 0 0 63. 3 3 P.E.I. 4 0 0 0 0 100 4 TOTALS 112 7 6 0 0 92. 4 125 61 As might be noted, the proportion (112 of 125) who f a l l into the very loyal category i s marginally greater than the prop-ortion who can be c l a s s i f i e d as such across a i l d i v i s i o n s . A number of other issues provide s i m i l a r results (see Appendix D for several tables not contained i n the t e x t ) . Clearly the Liberals were a rather strong and consistent voting bloc. Nonetheless, there were a couple of issues which saw the cohesiveness of the party greatly diminished, and one which actually produced a major intra-party r i f t . Table 4.6 summarizes the voting patterns of l i b e r a l M.P.'s on d i v i -sions concerning the Manitoba r e b e l l i o n (many of these d i v i -sions were concerned with how the insti g a t o r s and leaders of the r e b e l l i o n should be dealt with). TABLE 4.6 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA REBELLION (10 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie S0-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0- 20 Avg. N Ontario 64 0 0 0 97. 0 67 Quebec 9 21 4 4 i_ 70. 0 39 N.B. 7 1 0 0 0 95.8 8 N.S. 11 2 1 0 0 92. 2 14 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 1 50.0 2 B.C. 2 0 1 1 0 68. 7 4 P.E.I. 4 0 1 0 0 87.4 5 TOTALS 98 27 7 5 2 87.0 139 As can readily be discerned, Liberals from Ontario and most of the other provinces, excepting Quebec, provided over-62 whelming support for the government's po l i c y . L i b e r a l s from Quebec, however, sympathetic to the rebels and t h e i r cause, proved to be much less w i l l i n g to follow mackenzie's lead on t h i s issue. If we probe this question s t i l l further we fi n d that there was even a s p l i t within the Quebec wing of the party, as seven of the nine M.P.'s fromthat province who proved very loyal to mackenzie on t h i s issue were Anglophones (there were a t o t a l of 12 Anglophone Quebec Lib e r a l s present for some or a l l of the ten d i v i s i o n s taken on t h i s issue). As in the second chapter, i t i s again worth taking a look at the behaviour of those M.P.'s who comprised Mackenzie's cabinet."'' As Table 4.7 shows, 17 of the 18 Liberals who at one time or another found th e i r way into Mackenzie's cabinet f a i l into the very (very) loyal category, on the average f o l -lowing Mackenzie over 95% of the time. The one exception was A.A. Dorion, who was ac t u a l l y present for only eight d i v i s i o n s before accepting a government appointment to the Quebec bench. TABLE 4.7 LOYALTY OF ALL CABINET MINISTERS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 6 0 0 0 0 95.7 6 Quebec 5 1 0 0 0 91.4 6 N.B. 2 0 0 0 0 98.3 2 N.S. 3 0 0 0 0 99.2 3 P.E.I. 0 0 0 0 96. 2 1 TOTALS 17 1 0 0 0 95. 2 18 63 F i n a l l y , i t i s of some interest to examine whether or not a "Blake wing" ever materialized. As chapter Two has shown, such a wing was not in evidence between 1867 and 1872, However, as Table 4.8 would seem to indicate, such a r i f t i n the party was beginning to open by the t h i r d parliament, although th i s r i f t was manifest primarily in the Ontario wing of the party. TABLE 4.8 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT TO BLAKE (7 VOTES) % of times loyal to Blake 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario J. J. 4 1 7 39 27.4 62 Quebec 0 2 1 2 29 10.5 34 N.B. 1 0 1 0 6 21. 3 8 N.S. 0 0 0 1 11 5.4 12 B.C. 1 1 J. 0 0 2 46. 6 4 P.E.I. 0 0 0 0 4 3. 6 4 TOTALS 13 7 3 10 91 20. 1 124 During the t h i r d parliam ent Blake and mackenzie voted d i f f e r -ently seven times; of those 62 Liberals from Ontario who were present for some or a l l of these d i v i s i o n s , 11 opposed Mac-kenzie and sided with Blake 80% of the time or more. Whether or not t h i s small contingent of Ontario Liberals posed a ser-ious challenge to Mackenzie's leadership i s c e r t a i n l y open to question, for both the Ontario wing of the party and the other major wings of the party were, generally speaking, thoroughly loyal to Mackenzie. 64 THE "OTHERS" The f i r s t thing one may note in examining Table 4.9 i s the rather dramatic increase in the number of Others present in the t h i r d parliament. Compared with the second parliament there were almost three times as many Others elected to the t h i r d parliament. In the l a s t chapter i t was hypothesized that the decline in the number of Others may have been due to a b e l i e f on the part of candidates, i f not the voters, that there was no longer an advantage to be gained by running as (or electing) independent. Obviously the large number of Others elected to the t h i r d parliament renders the above hypothesis questionable. However, i t may well be possible that the t h i r d parliament saw such a dramatic increase i n Others due in part to the p a c i f i c Scandal, and the desire on the part of candidates and voters a l i k e to distance them-selves from the rampant "partyism" which pervaded p o l i t i c s in the f i r s t two parliaxents and the corruption which was seen by many as inherent in a system of party p o l i t i c s . TABLE 4.9 LOYALTY 0? ALL OTHERS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS) % of times loyal to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Avg. N Ontario 4 0 0 1 0 74. 9 5 Quebec 0 3 0 0 1 56. 7 4 N.B. 3 0 0 1 0 75.7 4 N.S. 2 0 0 0 0 93. 8 2 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 93.2 1 B.C. 0 0 1 0 0 63. 3 1 TOTALS 10 3 1 2 1 73.4 17 65 i t might well be the case that subsequent parliaments saw a return to the s i t u a t i o n where very few Others were elected. Unfortunately, such an examination of the fourth and f i f t h parliaments i s well beyond the scope of t h i s paper. For the sake of brevity, tables showing the voting behav-iour of these Others on p a r t i c u l a r issues have not been pres-ented here. Suffice i t to say that an analysis of the voting behaviour of these Others on p a r t i c u a l r issues reveals figures s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same as those i n Table 4.9. In a l l cases i t proves to be the same group of Others who provide consistent support for the government. Perhaps the most notable obser-vation one can draw from a look at table 4.9 i s that many of these Others aligned themselves with the governing L i b e r a l s , whereas in the second parliament most Others voted consistent-ly with the Conservatives (the figures for the f i r s t p a r l i a -ment, however, reveal no such cl e a r cut pattern). One might thus speculate that most others represent m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s in the purest sense of the word, supporting whichever party formed the government, i n exchange fo r some personal or local advantage. In bringing this chapter to a close i t i s again necessary to reconsider Reid's thesis in l i g h t of the empirical evidence presented here. In a l l fairness, Reid was correct on a number of points. F i r s t of a l l , i t i s clear that maritime Liberals did not unite behind the Liberal party and i t s leader u n t i l 1874. However, i t i s not at a l l cl e a r what brought about th i s party u n i f i c a t i o n . Perhaps Maritime M.P.'s were simply i n c l i n e d to behave as m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s . On the other hand, the growing tendency for a l l Liberals to follow Mackenzie -- i n -cluding those from the Maritimes and even the West -- may indicate the beginnings of a stronger national party organ-i z a t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t could be argued (at least for Lib-erals from Nova Scotia) that t h e i r l o y a l t y to Howe had former-ly kept these Liberals aligned with the then governing Conser-vatives. Howe's departure from national party p o l i t i c s might, therefore, have l e f t these M.P.'s free to r e - a l i g n themselves with Liberals from the rest of the country. F i n a l l y , i t may simply have taken several years for Maritime L i b e r a l s to shed the image they had b u i l t up of the G r i t s as a s e l f i s h Ontario party. Hence the explanation for the new-found willingness of Maritime Liberals to work with t h e i r central Canadian counterparts may l i e in the increased communication and con-tact Liberals from these two disparate regions enjoyed in the years following Confederation, and more importantly, once the necessary transportation l i n k s had been established. Surely numerous other explanations for the lo y a l t y of Maritime Liberals could be conjured up. Secondly, Table 4.8 indicates that some thing of a Blake wing did in fact e x i s t within at least the Ontario wing of the L i b e r a l party by the t h i r d parliament. However, the discord generated by t h i s handful of M.P.'s would appear to have been greatly exaggerated by Reid and those who accept, and elaborate upon, his th e s i s . While undoubtedly Blake did pose a problem for Mackenzie, an analysis of M.P.'s voting behaviour would suest that t h i s discord -- as in our own time -- was seldom manifest once L i b e r a l M.P.'s came to vote 67 in the House. Moreover, the argument that mackenzie had great trouble in keeping his cabinet together does not hold up well whe one considers the very high index of lo y a l t y we observed for members of the Libera l cabinet. The main point to be made here i s that while there i s some truth to be found in the Reid t h e s i s , his case has been greatly exaggerated. If one looked only at the arguments Reid presents, i t would be suspected that even in power the Libe r a l s were riven by discord and unable to act as a cohesive u n i t . The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that t h i s was c l e a r l y not the case. Indeed, i t may even be argued that Mackenzie and the other Libe r a l leaders were bet-ter able to impose d i s c i p l i n e on t h e i r party than was Macdon-ald, f or as has been noted, the Conservatives were defeated quite often while in power, whereas Mackenzie's government lo s t just one of 108 recorded d i v i s i o n s (and t h i s lone defeat came very early in the f i r s t session of the t h i r d parliament). ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER IV 1 A word of explanation for the exclusion of an equivalent table for the Conservatives i s needed here. Primarily, such a table was not presented because there were only seven Conser-vatives elected to the t h i r d parliament who had been members of e i t h e r of Macdonald's. two cabinets; moreover, the table i t s e l f was not of much int e r e s t , as a l l seven of these seven M.P.'s were -- not s u r p r i s i n l y -- very loyal to Macdonald (86.6% of the time on average). 68 CONCLUSIONS "But when a gentleman with great v i s i b l e emoluments abandons the party in which he has long acted, and t e l l s you i t i s because he proceeds upon his own judgement... he gives reasons which i t i s impossible to con-trovert, and discovers a character which i t i s impossible to mistake." (Edmund Burke) The primary purpose of t h i s paper has been to c r i t i c a l l y re-examine those arguments which maintain that party cohesion in the early pot-Confederation period was very loose. To achieve t h i s end the voting behaviour of a l l M.P.'s who sat in any or a l l of the f i r s t three parliaments has bee examined, and t h i s examination has shown that the v a l i d i t y of the Reid thesis -- despite i t s long-standing and widespread acceptance -- i s c e r t a i n l y open to question and deserves to be thour-oughly re-examined. This paper provides just a s t a r t i n point for such further analysis. While i t has been w i l l i n g l y acknowledged that a good deal of the Reid thesis i s at least p a r t l y v a l i d , a major concern of this paper has been to re-open a f i e l d of i n t e l -l e c t u a l inquiry that has for a l l too long been r e l a t i v e l y closed. The f i r s t chapter of t h i s paper presented as f a i r l y and as cogently as possible the arguments put forth by Reid and those who accept h i s thesis. In opposition to t h i s ortho-dox viewpoint, an "alternative thesis" was constructed, based l a r e l y on the arguments and work of a number of academics (most notably, P.G. C o r n e l l ) . While th i s alternative thesis would appear less convincing than that of Reid, t h i s d e f i -ciency can be attributed largely to the f a i l u r e of other 69 academics to seriously question the v a l i d i t y of Reid's work. Hence, a body of secondary work equivalent to that produced by those who accept the Reid thesis i s unavailable to the student of Canadian p o l i t i c s who wishes to challenge the seemingly unchallengeable. Therefore, i n order to argue that parties i n the early post-Confederation were in fact quite cohesive, i t has been necessary to look to primary sources (mainly the House of Commons Journals and the House of Commons  Debates). Chapters Two to Four summarized the fin d i n s drawn from these sources, and present, largely in tabular form, the voting behaviour of a l l M.F.'s for the eleven year period under study. The findings of t h i s paper give one good reason to ques-tion the v a l i d i t y of the Reid t h e s i s . Clearly both parties were able to demonstrate r e l a t i v e l y high degrees of cohesion even as early as the f i r s t parliament. While by modern stan-dai~ds the levels of cohesion achieved in thi s period are some-what unimpressive, one needs to have a stron sense of history in judging the cohesiveness of the two parties. In l i g h t of a l l the impediments to achieving absolute party cohesion in th i s period, one must consider the levels of party cohesion actually achieved in t h i s period as quite remarkable. Indeed, the s h o r t - l i v e d second parliament, while exceptional, provides evidence of levels of party cohesion which might even p a r a l l e l those preva i l i n g i n our day and age. Over a l l , i t i s apparent that the two parties were, even as early as 1867, f a i r l y cohesive and consistent voting blocs. Certainly each party did not need to "buy" votes or rebuild a new c o a l i t i o n of inter-70 ests from one d i v i s i o n to another as the Reid thesis might lead us to believe. Hence, the empirical evidence presented i n t h i s paper alone renders the cornerstone of Reid's work questionable. Several, other elements of Reid's work are also open to ques-t i o n , a l b e i t , the chaliene to these arguments comes more from circumstantial evidence and speculation than i t does from hard core and testable empirical evidence. As many of these secondary questions have been dealt with in one way or another in the preceding chapters, they w i l l not be reconsidered here. There are, however, a couple of other major elements of Reid's thesis which deserve some further attention. Reid e s s e n t i a l l y argues that the fourth and subsequent parliaments witnessed much higher levels of party cohesion due to the a b o l i t i o n of non-simultaneous elections and the i n s t i t u t i o n of the secret b a l l o t . One i s immediately led to question i f th i s was indeed the case and i f the reasons for higher leve l s of party cohesiveness are this simple. F i r s t l y , Reid himself notes that the "grosser" abuses of non-simul-taneous elections had been abolished by the e l e c t i o n of 1874. If t h i s was indeed the case (as a careful perusal of the House of Commons Journals reveals i t i s ) , then Reid's argument that reater party cohesiveness a f t e r 1878 was due p a r t l y to the introduction of simultaneous elections becomes curious indeed. If simultaneous elections were the norm -- at least in central and eastern Canada -- by 1874, then one would expect to see greater party cohesiveness not by the fourth parliament, but in the t h i r d . 71 It i s also noteworthy that four of the f i v e government defeats during the second parliament came on questions con-cerning elections and election procedures.''" While t h i s proves nothing on i t s own, i t might indicate that the government's a b i l i t y to control e l e c t i o n outcomes was becoming more d i f -f i c u l t and that as early the 1874 e l e c t i o n the two parties may have been conizant of the need to impose more rigourous controls on the i r members. F i n a l l y , even i f (for the sake of argument) both the secret b a l l o t and simultaneous elections were not introduced u n t i l the 1878 e l e c t i o n , are there not other explanations for the supposed dramatic increase in party cohesion which Reid claims secured in the fourth p a r l -iament? Returnin to an argument presented i n the f i r s t chap-ter, one which argued that party cohesion in B r i t a i n was also quite loose i n t h i s period, i t i s notable that by the late 1860's parties i n B r i t a i n had become much more cohesive. Epstein attributes t h i s phenomenon to two new circumstances: i ) the enlarement of the suffrage (due no doubt to the prov-isions of the 1867 Reform B i l l ) , and i i ) the increase in the importance of executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to Parliament. While the f i r s t of these causes has no real bearing on the Canadian s i t u a t i o n , the second, the increase in executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , c e r t a i n l y does -- es p e c i a l l y i f i t i s accepted that B r i t i s h examples tended to be emulated in Canada, notwithstanding something of a time l a g . In bringing t h i s paper to a close, i t might be worth re-evaluating whether or not the various wings of the two parties properly constituted f a c t i o n s . Undoubtedly Reid uses thi s term rather loosely; nonetheless, his meaning i s clear: 72 M.P.'s from the various provincial or ethnic groups owed th e i r loyalty f i r s t , and above a l l else, to the leader of th e i r sectional roup. While i t would appear that the Rouges, the Nova Scotians and even the Bleus might deserve to be c a l l e d factions during the f i r s t parliament, another explanation i s readily at hand. As noted in the f i r s t chapter, a great many questions considered i n the early parliaments d i r e c t l y a f f e c t -ed p r o v i n c i a l and l o c a l interests or ethnic/minority r i g h t s , and given the norms pre v a i l in in the House at the time, i t could well be argued that many M.P.'s voted t h e i r conscience on a great many d i v i s i o n s (for example, those concerning the New Brunswick School Law, the Manitoba Act and certa i n amendments to the t a r i f f and bank a c t s ) . As these questions tended to coincide with provincial and ethnic i n t e r e s t s , i t might well be that any factionalism was more apparent than r e a l , as the interests of a l l members of that p r o v i n c i a l or ethnic grouping would tend to be s i m i l a r -- with minor exceptions -- to those of that group's acknowledged leader. Hence, i t would appear that the members of a p r o v i n c i a l or ethnic group were exhibiting l o y a l t y to th e i r sectional leader. While i t i s also recognized that the above speculation i s open to challenge, i t s purpose, as with the rest of t h i s paper, has been simply to provide an alternative to the Reid thesis -- one which may open the door to a more thorough examination of t h i s period i n our p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y . This paper i s just the f i r s t step in such a direction; i t has prov-ided some rather compelling evidence to buttress arguments 73 which maintain that, contrary to orthodox opinion, p a r l i a -mentary parties in t h i s early period were in fact quite cohesive. Moreover, t h i s paper has questioned a number of Reid's other arguments. Although Reid's arguments appear quite l o g i c a l , so to do a number of arguments which take an opposite approach. At t h i s point a l l that i s ce r t a i n i s that very l i t t l e i s c e r t a i n . What i s needed to complement, and strengthen, the findings of t h i s paper -- or conversely, Reid's work -- i s an equally thorough examination of the fourth and f i f t h parliaments. Also needed i s an examination of how party caucuses operated, what the function and ef f i c a c y of party "whips" was, and, among other things, how national party organizations impacted upon the behaviour of the individual M.P. Only when these and other equally important questions have been s u f f i c i e n t l y answered can we be s a t i s f i e d (but hopefully not complacent) in the knowledge that we have done a l l that i s possible to uncover the mysteries which shroud our early, yet not so dista n t , p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y . ENDNOTES TO CONCLUSIONS 1 One of these votes, i n t e r e t i n g i y enough, came on second reading of a b i l l to i n s t i t u t e the secret b a l l o t ; another came on a d i v i s i o n concerning a "controverted election"; and two defeats came on d i v i s i o n s concerning the practice of dual representation, whereby an M.P. was also allowed to s i t (except in New Brunswick) as a member of his p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . 2 L.D. Epstein; P o l i t i c a l Parties in Western Democracies; p.320 APPENDIX A LOYALTY OF CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S  ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT A . l LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY (17 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total c Ontario 31 7 10 1 0 81.9 49 Quebec 49 2 0 0 0 96.2 51 N.B. 4 1 0 0 0 91.3 5 N.S. 6 1 0 0 0 93.2 7 Manitoba 1 1 0 0 0 83.3 2 B.C. 1 0 0 0 0 100.0 1 Totals 92 12 10 1 0 89.5 115 A.2 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INTERCOLONIAL R.R.(8 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total c Ontario 30 11 5 0 1 85.6 47 Quebec 39 8 1 0 0 92.4 48 N.B. 3 0 1 0 0 90.0 4 N.S. 6 1 0 0 0 95.2 7 Totals 78 20 7 0 1 89.5 106 75 A.3 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING BANKING (26 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total c Ontario 25 13 9 3 1 74.8 51 Quebec 46 4 3 2 0 87.3 55 N.B. 4 1 0 0 0 89.5 5 N.S. 2 3 1 0 1 68.1 7 Manitoba 0 1 0 0 0 75.0 1 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100.0 3 Totals 80 22 13 5 2 81.3 122 A.4 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE ACQUISITION OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES (5 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 39 0 5 2 1 89.1 47 Quebec 46 1 0 1 0 98.0 48 N.B. 3 0 0 1 0 86.7 5 N.S. 3 1 2 0 1 63.8 7 Manitoba 0 0 0 1 0 33.3 1 Totals 92 2 7 5 2 90.8 108 A.5 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE RE-ADJUSTMENT OF THE SUBSIDY TO NOVA SCOTIA (12 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Aye. Total c. Ontario 36 2 5 3 0 87.4 46 Quebec 48 0 0 1 0 97.9 49 N.B. 3 1 0 0 0 90.0 4 N.S. 5 1 1 0 0 86.2 7 Totals 92 4 6 4 0 92.3 106 76 A.6 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING CUSTOMS (30 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80 -100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0--20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 28 15 8 1 0 80.7 52 Quebec 36 9 7 0 1 83.0 53 N.B. 4 0 1 0 0 83.4 5 N.S. 4 1 2 0 0 77.0 7 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 83.3 1 B.C. 2 0 0 0 1 66.7 3 Totals 75 25 18 1 2 81.3 121 A.7 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P . 'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING DEFENSE (9 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 31 6 7 2 0 83.7 46 Quebec 37 4 4 0 1 90.4 46 N.B. 4 0 1 0 0 90.6 4 N.S. 2 0 0 1 1 58.3 4 Totals 73 10 12 3 2 86.0 100 A.8 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S--ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING DUAL REPRESENTATION (8 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total ca: Ontario 43 3 2 0 1 93.5 49 Quebec 45 3 2 0 0 95.5 50 N.B. 4 0 0 1 0 82.5 5 N.S. 5 0 0 0 0 93.8 5 Manitoba 0 0 1 0 0 50.0 1 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100.0 3 Totals 100 6 5 1 1 93.7 113 77 A.9 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF. PARLIAMENT (5 VOTES) % o f -times l o y a l -to Matjdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. T o t a l c O n t a r i o 30 2 5 4 .. 5 75.2 46 Quebec 34 3 2 r 0 92.3 40 N.B. 4 0 0 0 i 76.0 5 N.S. 4 0 0 0 --0 100.0 4 Ma n i t o b a 0 0 1 0 0 50.0 1 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100.0 3 T o t a l s 75 5 8 5 • • 6 83.7 99 A.10 LDYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING .THE TERMS OF UNION "WITH JB . C. (10 VOTES) % o f t i m e s l o y a l "to Macdonald 80 -100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-2D Ave. T o t a l c. O n t a r i o 33 3 0 0 5 86.6 41 Quebec 39 1 1 0 3 91.5 44 N.B. 4 0 0 0 1 80.0 5 N.S. 4 0 0 .0 0 97.5 4 M a n i t o b a 0 0 0 0 1 0.0 1 T o t a l s 80 4 1 0 10 88.1 95 A.11 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA ACT (14 VOTES) % o f t i m e s l o y a l t o Macdonald 80-100 65-.BQ ... 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. T o t a l c; O n t a r i o 19 2 3 6 7 64.7 37 Quebec 36 0 0 0 1 96.7 37 N.B. 3 0 0 0 1 75.4 4 N.S. 4 0 0. . 0 0 100.0 4 To-tals 62 2 •: •'- . 3 - 6 9 81.3 82 78 A.12 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS ON THE REPRESENTATION B I L L (10 VOTES) % o f t i m e s l o y a l t o Macdonald 80 -100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. T o t a l c O n t a r i o 43 0 0 0 1 94.2 44 Quebec 34 0 0 0 2 89.0 36 N.B. 3 0 0 0 0 100.0 3 N.S. 3 0 0 0 0 95.8 3 Ma n i t o b a 1 ' 0 0 0 0 100.0 1 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100.0 3 T o t a l s 87 0 0 0 3 92.7 90 A.13 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE REPORTING OF DEBATES (6 VOTES) % o f t i m e s l o y a l t o Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. T o t a l c, O n t a r i o 21 10 17 2 1 71. 5 51 Quebec 19 8 20 1 4 67.1 52 N.B. 3 0 2 0 0 74.0 5 N.S. 3 2 1 0 1 65.0 7 Mani t o b a 1 0 0 0 0 100.0 1 T o t a l s 47 20 40 3 6 69.5 116 79 APPENDIX B LOYALTY OF LIBERAL M.P.'S  ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT B.l LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY .P. 'S (17 ON VOTES) % Of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 27 1 5 0 1 82.9 34 Quebec 10 4 2 2 2 67.8 20 N.B. 1 1 4 0 4 39.8 10 N.S. 0 0 1 4 4 20.3 9 B.C. 0 0 0 0 2 0.0 2 Totals 38 6 12 6 13 63.4 75 B.2 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INTERCOLONIAL R.R. (8 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 15 13 4 0 3 73.1 35 Quebec 2 1 • 12 1 3 49.0 19 N.B. 1 2 2 0 8 29.3 13 N.S. 0 0 0 1 6 6.0 7 Totals 18 16 18 2 20 52.9 74 80 B.3 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE CPR (11 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 31 1 0 1 0 95.8 33 Quebec 0 9 8 1 1 60.6 19 N.B. 0 0 4 1 3 38.3 8 N.S. 0 0 1 3 4 19.4 8 B.C. 0 0 0 0 3 7.4 3 Totals 31 10 13 6 11 67.6 71 B.4 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M DIVISIONS CONCERNING BANKING :.p. *s O N (26 VOTES) % O f times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 23 6 6 1 0 79.3 36 Quebec 4 3 12 1 1 61.4 21 N.B. 3 1 4 3 0 55.9 11 N.S. 2 0 6 2 0 54. 5 10 B.C. 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 3 Totals 32 10 28 7 4 65.7 81 B. 5 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE ACQUISITION OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES (5 VOTES) % O f times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 31 1 1 0 2 91.6 35 Quebec 3 1 12 0 3 48.8 19 N.B. 7 0 4 0 0 80.0 11 N.S. 1 0 1 1 6 24.8 9 Totals 42 2 18 1 11 70.7 74 81 B.6 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE SUBSIDY TO NOVA SCOTIA (12 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 33 0 2 0 0 94.1 35 Quebec 16 0 1 2 0 86.0 19 N.B. 5 1 1 1 2 63.6 10 N.S. 0 0 1 3 4 20.8 8 Totals 54 1 5 6 6 79.6 72 B.7 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING CUSTOMS (30 VOTES) % O f times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 20 9 2 3 2 73.9 36 Quebec 17 2 0 0 2 84.6 21 N.B. 4 3 5 1 o 67.0 10 N.S. 5 2 2 1 0 74.2 10 B.C. 0 0 0 0 3 0.0 3 Totals 46 16 9 5 7 72.7 83 B. 8 LOYALTY OF ALL DIVISIONS CONCERNING LIBERALS ON DEFENSE (9 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 20 4 3 1 3 76.3 31 Quebec 10 3 1 0 2 79.6 16 N.B. 0 3 2 2 3 36.8 10 N.S. 3 1 1 0 0 82.5 5 Totals 33 11 7 3 8 71.3 62 82 B.9 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE TERMS OF UNION WITH B.C. (10 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 30 2 0 0 1 92.9 33 Quebec 18 0 0 0 1 92. 0 19 N.B. 5 0 0 0 2 71.4 7 N.S. 3 0 2 0 2 58.6 7 Totals 56 2 2 0 6 86.8 66 B.10 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON (4 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 30 0 0 2 1 92.7 33 Quebec 13 1 1 2 1 82.0 18 N.B. 3 1 0 2 3 47.2 9 N.S. 1 0 0 1 5 17.9 7 B.C. 0 0 0 0 3 0.0 3 Totals 47 2 1 7 13 72.6 70 B . l l LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON CONCERNING THE REPRESENTATION DIVISIONS BILL (10 VOTES) % Of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 28 0 0 0 2 91.6 30 Quebec 13 1 1 1 2 76.0 18 N.B. 1 1 1 0 2 45.2 5 N.S. 0 0 0 3 3 20.6 6 B.C. 0 0 0 3 7.9 3 Totals 42 2 2 4 12 72.4 62 B.12 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE NEW BRUNSWICK SCHOOL LAW (3 VOTES) % o f t i m e s l o y a l t o Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. T o t a l c O n t a r i o 22 8 1 0 0 89.8 31 Quebec 1 0 1 16 0 38.9 18 N.B. 6 0 0 0 2 75.0 8 N.S. 7 0 0 0 0 100.0 7 B.C. 3 0 0 0 0 100.0 3 T o t a l s 39 8 2 16 2 75.9 67 APPENDIX C LOYALTY OF CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON  A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT C.l LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA REBELLION (10 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 7 18 5 1 1 68.4 32 Quebec 8 5 16 2 2 64.6 33 N.B. 0 1 2 1 0 48.5 4 N.S. 0 2 2 3 0 47.7 7 Manitoba 0 0 1 0 0 42.0 1 B.C. 0 1 1 0 0 64.3 2 PEI 0 0 1 0 0 50.0 1 Totals 15 27 28 7 3 63.4 80 C.2 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON ALL DIVISIONS CONCERNING TARIFFS (17 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 19 8 3 1 2 75.6 33 Quebec 13 14 8 1 2 68.9 38 N.B. 1 1 1 0 1 55.6 4 N.S. 3 1 1 1 2 53.8 8 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 83.3 1 B.C. 2 0 0 0 0 82.3 2 PEI 0 0 0 0 2 18.3 2 Totals 39 24 13 3 9 68.7 88 85 C.3 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY ACT (14 VOTES % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35- 65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 11 6 11 1 1 67.7 30 Quebec 4 11 18 2 0 61.9 35 N.B. 2 0 2 0 0 69.0 4 N.S. 1 2 4 0 0 66.1 7 Manitoba 0 0 1 0 0 40.0 1 B.C. 0 1 1 0 0 60.6 2 PEI 0 0 1 0 0 53. 8 1 Totals 18 20 38 3 1 64.4 80 C.4 LOYALTY OF CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT (6 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Macdonald 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total Ontario 19 7 1 1 1 76.1 29 Quebec 17 10 2 3 2 72.7 34 N.B. 2 1 0 0 1 67.5 4 N.S. 3 2 0 0 2 62.1 7 Manitoba 0 0 0 1 0 33.3 1 B.C. 1 1 0 0 0 75.0 2 PEI 0 0 1 0 0 50.0 1 Totals 42 21 4 5 6 72.0 78 86 APPENDIX D LOYALTY OF LIBERAL M.P.'S  ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES  DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT D.l LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING RAILWAYS (24 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 57 5 3 0 0 91.3 65 Quebec 30 2 3 0 1 87.7 36 N.B. 7 0 0 0 1 83.0 8 N.S. 15 0 0 0 0 99.1 15 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 . 0 100.0 1 B.C. 0 0 4 0 0 59.0 4 PEI 5 0 0 0 0 98.9 6 Totals 115 7 10 0 2 90.1 134 D.2 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT (6 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0-20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 51 2 1 0 0 97.6 54 Quebec 25 1 0 0 3 87.1 29 N.B. 7 0 0 0 1 87.5 8 N.S. 13 0 0 0 0 100.0 13 B.C. 2 0 2 0 0 75.0 4 PEI 3 0 0 0 0 94.4 3 Totals 101 3 3 0 4 93.5 111 87 D.3 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY LAWS (14 VOTES) % of times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0' -20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 51 4 7 0 0 89.5 62 Quebec 25 3 7 0 0 85.1 35 N.B. 7 0 1 0 0 93.8 8 N.S. 11 2 o. 1 0 92.5 14 Manitoba 1 0 0 0 0 100.0 1 B.C. 1 2 0 1 0 64.2 4 PEI 5 0 0 0 0 98.0 5 Totals 101 11 15 2 0 88.5 129 D.4 LOYALTY OF ALL DIVISIONS CONCERNING LIBERALS TARIFFS ON (17 VOTES) % O f times l o y a l to Mackenzie 80-100 65-80 35-65 20-35 0 -20 Ave. Total cases Ontario 63 2 0 0 0 97.5 65 Quebec 26 8 2 1 0 83.4 37 N.B. 7 0 0 0 1 90.0 8 N.S. 15 0 0 0 0 97.6 15 Manitoba 1 0 1 0 0 80.0 2 B.C. 1 0 1 1 1 47.0 4 PEI 5 0 0 0 0 100.0 5 Totals 118 10 4 2 2 91.6 136 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bailey, A.G.; "The Basis and Persistance of Opposition to Confederation i n New Brunswick"; Canadian H i s t o r i c a l  Review; December 1942 Beck, J.M.; "Joseph Howe: Opportunist or Empire Builder?" 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