

PARTY COHESION IN THE EARLY POST-CONFEDERATION
PERIOD

By

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ABSTRACT

This paper critically re-examines the long held belief that parties in the first decade after Confederation were rather loose coalitions of provincial and ethnic factions, and that they were, on the whole, rather undisciplined. Taking as the focus for criticism Escott Reid's work during the 1930's on the development of national parties in Canada, this paper first presents his arguments (and of those who accept his thesis); following this perusal, the paper turns to the creation and examination of an "alternative thesis", one which argues that parties in the early post-Confederation period were, in fact, fairly cohesive.

Unlike most other work done in this area, this paper is based largely upon an analysis of empirical evidence. The core of this paper lies in a comprehensive examination of the individual and collective voting behaviour of all M.P.'s on all divisions recorded during each of the first three parliaments (1867-1872; 1872-1874; 1874-1878). By undertaking such an examination it is possible to discern precisely the degree to which parties were, or were not, fairly cohesive voting blocs. In addition to examining the overall loyalty of M.P.'s to their party leader, a number of highly salient and critical issues have been singled out for further examination.

The findings of this paper prove quite interesting. Contrary to orthodox opinion, we find that the two parties were, in fact, fairly cohesive voting blocs even as early as 1867. The main core of Reid's thesis having been critically re-examined (and somewhat disproved) the writer turns to a

critique of several of Reid's other arguments. While the arguments presented by the writer are largely of a speculative nature, their intended purpose is merely to present alternatives to those presented by Reid, and to show that there may be other explanations for the supposed tightening up of party lines after 1878.

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INTRODUCTION

"The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors."

(J.S. Mill)

Since at least the 1930's, when Escott Reid wrote his seminal work on the evolution of national parties in Canada, conventional wisdom has maintained that party discipline in the first decade or so after Confederation was extremely weak. Unfortunately, few academics have troubled themselves with challenging the veracity of this argument; all too frequently a state of undisciplined parties is taken as a given and forms the basis for the writer's ensuing arguments. Some academics appear to accept Reid's major arguments and then work to formulate additional arguments to buttress his claims regarding the state of party discipline in the early post-Confederation period. When an argument has held sway over men's imaginations as long as Reid's thesis has, it is imperative that a dissenting opinion be heard, for otherwise we slide into a state of intellectual decrepitude, accepting that argument as an unassailable truth, and (to paraphrase Mill) losing sight of the factual foundations upon which the said argument rests. Herein lies the principal justification for this paper and the alternative perspective which will be put forth.

To be certain, a couple of writers have attempted to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy regarding the state of party

cohesion in the years immediately following Confederation.¹ In particular, P.G. Cornell, in his examination of the party system in the province of Canada in the years between 1840 and 1867, provides evidence which would support a claim that the political parties in the post-Confederation era were substantially more cohesive than is commonly assumed. By combining Cornell's work with a variety of other historical facts one can readily piece together an argument to challenge those who claim that political parties in the first decade after Confederation were nothing more than loose, undisciplined conglomerations of provincial and/or ethnic factions.

Lamentably, all too little work of an empirical nature has been done concerning the state of party cohesion in this early period of Canadian history. The main core of this paper, therefore, will focus on filling this gap in our knowledge. By undertaking a comprehensive examination of how M.P.'s -- both individually and collectively -- voted on recorded divisions, and by correlating each member's voting record with his nominal party affiliation and the province he represented, it is possible to determine precisely the extent to which M.P.'s displayed loyalty to the party they identified with and the degree to which their loyalties lay elsewhere (for example, with a sectional leader or ethnic group).

In examining the actual voting behaviour of M.P.'s over the course of the first three parliaments, one discovers that, somewhat contrary to expectations, both the Liberal and Conservative parties exhibited a remarkable degree of cohesion -- especially if one takes into consideration the turbulent nature

of the times, the plethora of conditions inimical to co-operation between M.P.'s from the different sections of the country, the radically different character of parliamentary life in this early period and a host of other factors which would seem to make Reid's thesis all the more tenable. As will be shown, however, not only were the two parties far more cohesive than Reid's work would lead one to expect, but much of the "looseness" that we do find in the cohesiveness of the two parties is more apparent than real. Much of the so-called "looseness" one observes in the two parties was primarily the result of:

i) the undisciplined behaviour of many of the M.P.'s from the Maritimes (especially among Liberal ranks), and ii) the nature of the great questions of the day, many of which directly touched upon problems of French-English relations, and consequently, often produced splits within parties strictly along ethnic lines (prime examples are those questions regarding the New Brunswick School Law, the terms of Manitoba's union with Canada and the later question of how to deal with the provocateurs behind the Manitoba Rebellion). In addition, a great many questions directly affected local interests, and given the context of the times M.P.'s were virtually obliged to put these interests ahead of party unity. While the foregoing argument rings somewhat apologetic, the point to be made here is that all too often we are apt to examine historical matters through present-day lenses; hence, when examining the state of party cohesion in the years immediately following Confederation (and for that matter, before it), we tend to judge the cohesiveness

of the parties by modern standards, all but oblivious to the unique historical circumstances of the time which render late twentieth century conceptions of party cohesion virtually meaningless.

In any event, given the prevailing consensus regarding the state of party cohesion in the decade immediately following Confederation -- one which views the parties as little more than loose alliances of provincial and ethnic factions -- and given all the forces working to make party cohesion especially difficult to achieve (at least by modern-day standards), one is struck by the degree to which the two parties, even as early as 1867, were actually capable of acting as cohesive units when it came time to vote on important policy matters in the House of Commons.

Unlike most other work done on parties and party cohesion in the early post-Confederation era, the basis of this paper lies in the examination and analysis of empirical evidence. In particular, this paper will encompass a comprehensive examination of how all M.P.'s voted on all divisions throughout the first three parliaments (1867-1872; 1872-1874; 1874-1878).² Furthermore, since certain questions were of particular importance to the government of the day, a look will be taken at several of these questions, anticipating that M.P.'s will exhibit greater cohesiveness to their party on these crucial questions than they did on the whole (it being recognized that

given the norms of the day, strict party "discipline" was not required, or even expected, on a wide range of minor questions). Such a comprehensive investigation into the individual and collective voting patterns of M.P.'s will also provide the basis for a re-examination of several other long held beliefs respecting the nature of party life in the 1860's and 1870's.

Before proceeding with this examination, however, it is first necessary to outline the arguments which provide the inspiration for this paper. Hence, the following chapter will outline the two contending viewpoints: the first -- representing orthodox opinion -- which maintains that party cohesion in the early post-Confederation period was very loose; the second -- and the one which will be argued here is more correct -- which holds instead that the two major parties were, even as early as 1867, fairly stable and cohesive voting blocs. In addition, a number of subsidiary facts and arguments will be presented which help buttress the claims of each side in this debate; this will be done primarily to shed some light on the historical context in which parties operated during this period.

ENDNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

¹ For the balance of this paper the term "party cohesion" will be used in preference to the term "party discipline". In this writer's eyes, the two terms are not exactly synonymous. The latter term would seem to indicate some sort of formal and institutionalized (and presumably effective) means of "whipping" party members into line, while the former term merely implies that the party is able to -- generally speaking -- act as a cohesive unit, agreeing on, and voting upon, questions as an organized unit. Since the exact role and efficacy of the party whip, and the function of caucus meetings in this period remains somewhat cryptic, the writer has chosen to use the more general term "party cohesion", where possible, throughout this paper.

² It should be noted, however, that due to the peculiarly sectarian nature of the question, all divisions concerning divorce have been excluded in calculating aggregate levels of party cohesion (in the first parliament there were nine such divisions out of a total of 266; in the short-lived second parliament there were six divisions concerning divorces out of a total of 39 divisions; during the third parliament there were 19 divisions taken on private divorces out of a total of 127 divisions). All of these divisions have been excluded since all of them clearly cut across party lines and split strictly -- with virtually no exceptions -- on Catholic - non-Catholic lines.

CHAPTER I - THE ARGUMENTS

"There are some countries so huge that the different populations inhabiting them, although united under the same sovereignty, have [parties]. In such cases the various factions of the same people do not, strictly speaking, form parties but distinct nations...But when there are differences between the citizens concerning matters of equal importance to all parts of the country, such for instance as the general principles of government, then what I really call parties take shape."

(Alexis de Tocqueville)

In this chapter the two sides of the debate will be outlined. The first -- largely based on the early work of Escott Reid in the 1930's -- clearly represents mainstream opinion and certainly has the force of much other historical evidence to support its validity. The contending opinion -- perhaps voiced most cogently by P.G. Cornell -- has traditionally been less well-received, and certainly represents a sketchier and less well-articulated viewpoint. Nonetheless, Cornell's argument can also be buttressed by historical facts, and more importantly, it is based on a comprehensive examination of M.P.'s voting habits (unlike the work of Reid).

Essentially, the "Reid thesis" holds that between 1867 and 1878 the Conservative and Liberal parties were unstable alliances of provincial and ethnic factions, the members of each faction owing little allegiance to the recognized national party leader, and acting wholly in accordance with

the wishes of the leader of that provincial or ethnic faction ¹ (one would thus suspect, for instance, that French-Canadian Liberals from Quebec would follow Dorion blindly or that all Nova Scotian M.P.'s would vote in accordance with the wishes of Howe).

The Conservative party, for its part, was primarily an alliance of four elements: i) a group led by Alexander Galt and backed by Montreal's commercial interests, ii) the French-Canadian majority in Canada East (Quebec), iii) a group of United Empire Loyalists in Canada West (Ontario), and iv) a number of moderate reformers from Ontario.²

These same groups had provided the basis of the Liberal-Conservative party in the pre-Confederation era and continued to be the cornerstone of the party once Confederation had been achieved. Similarly, the Liberal party was an alliance of sectional groups, the Quebec based "Rouge" element led by A.A. Dorion, and the "Grits" of Ontario (led prior to Confederation by George Brown) who tended to follow the leadership of Alexander Mackenzie.³

With Confederation accomplished, two new elements were introduced to national party politics in Canada. The Nova Scotian contingent was led by Joseph Howe and all but one (Charles Tupper) had run as "anti-Confederates,"⁴ dedicated to the repeal of Confederation. Despite the vitriolic denunciations of Confederation emanating from this group, J.M. Beck calculates that 20 of the 21 Nova Scotian M.P.'s normally supported the Conservatives during the first parliament.⁵ The situation in New Brunswick was some-

what more complex, with approximately one-half of the elected members supportive of Confederation and the other half hostile -- at least publicly -- to the scheme. As a consequence there was not a single leader of the New Brunswick group, but rather two or more: the anti-confederates seemingly led by A.J. Smith, and the supporters of Confederation rallying around S.L. Tilley. It has traditionally been assumed that the New Brunswick contingent was composed mostly of "ministerialists" ⁶ (a term used to describe those M.P.'s who would normally support the government in exchange for personal advantage or some government project benefiting their constituency), as many whose nominal party affiliation was Liberal, or none, consistently supported the government.

Whatever the factional divisions present, it would appear, even in Reid's analysis, that the Conservatives at least had a basis on which to build a strong national party. The Liberals, however, would appear to have been a party in name only. Whereas the Conservatives were able to achieve some measure of cohesion -- particularly within the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party -- based largely on the long standing relationship between Macdonald and Cartier, the Liberal party had no such foundations, and hence, was especially prone to intense inter-factional strife. The Grit and Rouge wings of the party were openly suspicious and distrustful of one another; not even Maritime Liberals -- ensconced as they were in a perception of the Grits as a selfish Ontario party -- co-operated with their counterparts

from Ontario prior to 1874.⁷ To make matters all that much worse, the Ontario wing of the party was unable to unite behind any one leader. Even after coming to power in 1874, a number of Liberals remained opposed to Mackenzie's leadership, believing instead that Edward Blake deserved to be the leader of the party.⁸ Blake himself did nothing to quell this movement -- and indeed, may have encouraged it -- and his continued movement in and out of the cabinet was a constant source of friction within the party, and may well have been one reason why no Prime Minister, in Beck's words, "had greater difficulty in keeping a cabinet together than Mackenzie." ⁹

Wherein lies the root cause of the loose state of party cohesion in this early period? According to Reid and those who accept his analysis, the primary reasons for the weak state of party cohesion in this early period were the practices of deferred elections, whereby the government was able to hold elections first in "safe seats", thereby giving the appearance that they were on their way to a landslide victory, and by so doing, possibly swing the vote in their favour in closely contested constituencies, and the practice of open voting. Such practices allowed the government some modicum of control over the outcomes of electoral contests, and the greater this control, the less the need there was for strong party organizations.¹⁰ Presumably, without strong party organizations and the formal mechanisms for controlling and influencing the behaviour of M.P.'s -- and for applying sanctions where necessary -- the indivi-

dual M.P. was much freer to follow his conscience (or whatever else) than is possible in our day and age. In any event, the abolition of both these practices prior to the election of 1878 forced both of the parties -- almost spontaneously according to Reid -- to act in a more cohesive and "disciplined" manner.

Despite appearing somewhat simplistic, Reid's arguments have been accepted almost unquestioned and have continued to represent the viewpoint of the vast majority of academics. Reid's arguments, however, are lent more credibility by a large body of "circumstantial" evidence; that is, there are historical facts which, while not conclusive, would seem to buttress the main arguments of those who believe that parties in the first decade after Confederation were rather uncohesive voting blocs.

In understanding why parties in this early era could have been quite uncohesive, one must look at the actual composition of the House of Commons, the character of parliamentary life and the rules guiding M.P.'s behaviour. Roman March, in particular, makes much of the fact that a significant proportion of M.P.'s in this period were local "notables" (in 1867 notables comprised approximately 20% of the House). Owing their election not to the party whose banner they ran under, but rather to the position, influence and respect they enjoyed within their local communities, these notables were relatively free to vote as they wished when the House divided.¹¹ Combined with the fact that

elections were often fought on rather parochial issues and not on matters of national concern (hence the grounds for the Liberal's decision not to choose a national leader going into -- or for some time after -- the 1867 election), these M.P.'s may have been more inclined to protect the interests of their constituency than those of their party.

Further evidence to support the argument that party cohesion was weak during the first three Parliaments is provided by an examination of the number of M.P.'s elected by acclamation in the elections of 1867, 1872, 1874 and 1878. In 1867, 1872 and 1874 there were 46, 52 and 55 acclamations respectively. In 1878 there were only 11.¹² As acclamations are evidence of weak national (and local) party organizations,¹³ it is reasonable to argue that prior to 1878 true national party organizations were all but non-existent, and this -- as already noted -- severely circumscribes the party's ability to institute some formal mechanisms of control over the behaviour of its M.P.'s. In accordance with Reid's argument, the dramatic drop in acclamations in 1878 would seem to suggest that party organizations -- and therefore, party cohesion -- became much stronger following the election of 1878.

While the above arguments help explain why M.P.'s in this early age were in a stronger position to assert their autonomy than is the case in the late twentieth century, they provide only a partial explanation for why M.P.'s may actually have done so. Yet more intriguing arguments may be created by taking a cursory glance at the nature of parl-

liamentary life and the norms which guided M.P.'s behaviour in this period. In particular, it is necessary to consider the precise meaning of "responsible government" in this early period. It could well be argued that the concept of responsible government was quite different in the middle 1800's than it now is in the late twentieth century. Whereas the term is now considered to mean that the government is responsible to Parliament (and if defeated, must resign), Norman Ward notes that at the time of Confederation responsible government was "a relatively simplistic concept: ministers were in charge of everything...and therefore responsible for what they did." ¹⁴ If such was indeed the case there would be little more imperative for M.P.'s to behave loyally to their party leader than there currently is for members of the U.S. Congress. While Ward's remark, in its proper context, appears a little flippant, there may well be an element of truth in it. Clearly the meaning of responsible government was not as restrictive in this early period as it has now become. To support such a conviction one need only look at the number of times the Conservatives were actually defeated on recorded divisions between 1867 and 1874. As Forsey notes, there were at least twelve times during the course of the first parliament where the government could not muster a majority on division;¹⁵ moreover, several of these government defeats came on amendments proposed by members of the government itself.¹⁶

Further evidence to support the contention that twentieth century conceptions of responsible government

are at least partly inappropriate in considering the concept during the middle 1800's comes from an examination of the party system in Britain during the same time period. While it is recognized that Britain has had a long tradition of responsible government, between 1847 and 1867 the pre-existing configuration of political parties fell apart and governments were being defeated quite regularly.¹⁷ When one considers that this same period witnessed the battle for, and achievement of, representative government in Canada and the acknowledgement of the principle of responsible government, it should come as no surprise that in seeking to emulate British models, the concept of responsible government in Canada (and the party system engendered by the same) emerged in the rather imperfect form as it then existed in Britain.

In addition, the character of parliamentary life was radically different in the early post-Confederation period than it now is. In the first place, private members' legislation constituted a significant proportion of all bills introduced and were frequently given as much consideration as government bills.¹⁸ Presumably, where such private members legislation did not conflict with the government's established agenda (and even on occasion where it did), M.P.'s, government and opposition alike, were freer to vote with their conscience than they were on matters concerning established government policy. While such may seem somewhat incongruous to observers familiar only with the situation prevailing in the late twentieth century, one

needs to take account of the intellectual environment that existed in the mid- to latter-1800's. By the 1860's most of the Western world (and Britain in particular) was in the midst of the "liberal enlightenment", a period in which debate, discussion and man's rationality were seen as capable of solving any and all of society's most pressing concerns. In such an environment the House of Commons became the primary forum for debate and discussion. As March notes, debates were actually listened to in the early post-Confederation parliaments and often proved capable of making or changing M.P.'s minds on important public questions.¹⁹

One might also conjure up a number of other explanations for the supposed weakness of party cohesion in this early period. For instance, given that Canada was a newly born country, one might expect that many of the public questions considered, debated and voted upon were of an importance and stature almost incomprehensible to observers of Canadian politics in the late twentieth century. The creation of a national economy, the linking of all regions of the country with a national transportation system, the establishment of a national system of banking and currency and the mitigation of ethnic conflicts were all issues of such a magnitude -- issues which so crucially affected personal, ethnic, local and provincial interests -- that intra-party schisms become readily understandable.

Finally, impediments to the establishment of high levels of party cohesion were virtually inherent in the

scope and magnitude of the Confederation scheme. As George Brown (who eventually became one of the most eloquent and powerful spokesmen in favour of Confederation) noted in 1858, "there is no communications at present between the various sections to justify a political union."²⁰ Such arguments were echoed by Maritime anti-Confederates throughout the 1860's, and with some justification, for even at the time of Confederation there was little commercial, let alone social, relations between the colonies of Canada and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Indeed, the maritimes and Canada more resembled "two distinct countries with different outlooks and different policies [and] even different customs"²¹ than three geographically contiguous white British colonies requiring only a formal "contract" to unite them as one Dominion. Hence, one can readily appreciate how difficult co-operation between those M.P.'s from the Maritimes and those from central Canada must have been in the early post-Confederation period.

The above presentation of circumstantial historical evidence is intended to strengthen the arguments of Reid and others, and by so doing, make it all that much clearer just what the barriers were to the creation of tightly cohesive parties. While virtually all writers on the era seem to view the uncohesive nature of the parties as somehow anachronistic -- and even dysfunctional -- in a parliamentary system, given the evidence presented above one might be almost astonished to find any modicum of party cohesion whatsoever. Surely the impediments to creating cohesive

parties prior to 1878 were great: the lack of official party organizations, the radically different rules which governed parliamentary life, British structures and norms (whose examples Canadians so pedantically tried to imitate), the lack of communications between the different sections of the new nation and the enormity of the legislation under consideration in these first few years -- added to the lack of simultaneous elections and the secret ballot -- would certainly seem to make Reid's thesis all the more credible.

In the light of such overwhelming evidence one would appear to be trying to argue the impossible in taking Reid (and all orthodox opinion) to task. Nonetheless, there is a slim body of existing literature which does just this; moreover, just as there is a body of circumstantial evidence with which to buttress Reid's thesis, there is also evidence to support claims that, even as early as 1867, the two parties had achieved a measure of cohesion unsuspected by Reid and others.

The main proponent of this "alternative thesis" is P.G. Cornell. To be certain, Cornell's work examines the state of the party system in the years prior to Confederation. Nonetheless, the core of his argument certainly provides the basis from which one can begin to attack the validity of Reid's arguments. Unfortunately, Cornell's work does not seem to have instigated much further investigation, and thus, the range of arguments opposing the Reid thesis may appear to be rather slim.

Cornell's thesis is based largely on an examination of

the individual and collective voting patterns of the Legislative Assembly of Canada in the years prior to Confederation. Cornell argues that there was a noticeable tightening up of party lines in the decade preceding Confederation. While admitting that there still remained a large measure of looseness, Cornell maintains that the conventions of parliamentary life and the existence of the two dominant political parties provided a sufficient force to bring most members together into fairly consistent and identifiable voting blocs (particularly on questions of critical importance).²² In support of his contentions, Cornell notes that on those crucial divisions which involved the life of a government, fewer members were missing from the division rolls and an ever larger proportion came to support either the government or opposition with a great deal of consistency. Moreover, the supporters of the government and opposition really did not change from one parliament to another (or for that matter, over the course of a single parliament), as an examination of the behaviour of individual members throughout their careers in the Legislative Assembly reveals "a very large degree of consistency and continuity on the part of individual members and of the groups of members acting as political parties."²⁴

By the eighth parliament (1863), according to Cornell, the two parties were well defined and quite cohesive voting blocs. Indeed, Cornell argues that the high degree of continuity in the membership of the Legislative Assembly between the seventh and eighth parliaments provides "clear

evidence of the firmness of party organization achieved by this time."²⁵ Perhaps Cornell's most intriguing argument, however, concerns the inability of the Liberal-Reformers or the Liberal-Conservatives to sustain a majority in the Legislative Assembly following the election of 1863. While it is frequently assumed that the "political deadlock" which existed provides the most conclusive evidence of the weak state of party cohesion in this period, Cornell takes a diametrically opposed position. Indeed, the political deadlock exhibits just how clearly drawn party lines had become.²⁶ So evenly matched were the two parties in terms of sitting members (apparently 62 members each), and so consistent were these members in their voting habits, that it was the votes of a small handful of independents -- six at most -- which produced the frequent defeats encountered by governments in this period.

Based as it is on a thorough examination of M.P.'s voting behaviour, Cornell's argument would certainly seem to be worthy of serious consideration. If there is any validity to his assertions it may well be expected that the two parties continued on as fairly cohesive units once Confederation had been achieved. Unfortunately, even less of the kind of work undertaken by Cornell has been done on the early post-Confederation period. The only research of this sort to be found is that done by Norman Ward in his work The Public Purse. Looking at the first session of the first post-Confederation parliament (1867-1868), Ward notes that on thirty substantive divisions on which Macdonald and

Mackenzie were opposed, 91 members opposed Macdonald five times or less, and 47 opposed Mackenzie five times or less ²⁷ (this out of a total House of Commons membership of 180). Unfortunately, and despite the apparent significance of his finding, Ward chose not to pursue this point much further, except to note that "Macdonald's working majority was clearly a stable one and distinguished from the M.P.'s who supported Mackenzie." ²⁸

The circumstantial historical evidence to support the argument that the two parties were indeed rather cohesive voting blocs is lamentably scarce, and tends on the whole only to provide evidence of the cohesiveness of the Conservative party. Nonetheless, in support of such an argument one may look to Sir Francis Hincks' re-entry into Canadian political life. His appointment as Minister of Finance purportedly produced a fair amount of dissension within the Conservative party, with Richard Cartwright attempting to lead a caucus revolt (Alexander Galt also found Hincks' appointment rather distasteful, and by all accounts a great deal of personal antipathy existed between Hincks and Joseph Howe). The fact that Cartwright's efforts went nowhere, however, represents a major instance of Macdonald's ability to impose "discipline" on the party when and where it was necessary. ²⁹

Similarly, in 1871, and with Macdonald on vacation, Cartier was forced to deal with serious dissension within the party over the terms of union with B.C. Apparently threatening dissolution of the House (among other things), Cartier successfully put an end to this split in party ranks and the

terms of union were carried and enacted in toto.³⁰

At another level one should not be surprised to find a reasonably high level of cohesion within the two parties, at least within the Ontario and Quebec wings, as many of the M.P.'s elected in 1867 had been members of the old Legislative Assembly, and hence, were familiar with one another and had had many years of experience working with one another. The Conservative party, as Donald Creighton writes, was particularly capable of acting as a cohesive unit, for:

"...it was simply the Liberal Conservative party of the old province of Canada, which had already proved its marvellous capacity to assimilate the repugnant and to reconcile the irreconcilable. 31

Finally, in support of the argument that the two parties may have been quite cohesive, with many loyal members, one may consider the vigour with which elections were fought. As Gordon Stewart notes, foreign observers of Canadian politics were astounded by the vitriolic character of the rhetoric (parties frequently referred to one another as "enemies") and the intensity and fury with which electioneering took place.³² While it is possible that the rhetoric of the time may not have been matched by genuine expressions of party loyalty in the House of Commons, it would nevertheless seem plausible to argue that most candidates felt some real attachment to the party whose banner they ran under, and might therefore be expected to behave in a loyal fashion once they entered the House of Commons.

While the above arguments prove nothing on their own,

they do give one reason to pause and reconsider the entire question of just how cohesive parties were in the early post-Confederation period. In order to properly answer this question the approach taken in this paper (as in Cornell's work) will be to undertake a comprehensive examination of how all M.P.'s voted on all divisions (excluding those concerning private divorce bills) during the life of each of the first three parliaments.

Before embarking on this examination, however, a couple of "technical" problems need to be resolved. In the first place, what do we mean when we say an M.P. (given the context of the times) is displaying loyalty to his party or behaving in a disciplined manner? In order to determine when an M.P. is behaving in such a manner it is necessary to set a "threshold" at which point one can say the M.P. is displaying a considerable measure of party loyalty (as measured by the percentage of the time the M.P. votes in accordance with his party's leader). For the purposes of this paper, this threshold has been set at 80%. That is, where an M.P. votes in accordance with one or the other of the two party leaders 80% of the time or more, it becomes plausible to argue that the M.P. is exhibiting a considerable degree of loyalty to that party. While it is recognized that the threshold set is somewhat arbitrary, it can be readily justified. Firstly, and as already noted, the concept of responsible government was not nearly as restrictive as it has now become, and hence, M.P.'s were much freer to vote as their conscience -- and not party affiliation -- dictated, even on matters directly concerning government

policy. Secondly, the relatively large number of divisions taken on private member's bills were held virtually as "free votes", again freeing M.P.'s from the need to vote in accordance with their party leader.³³ In addition, many issues were of such a nature as to cut across party lines due to their direct bearing on matters of ethnic/minority rights. Hence, on matters respecting the terms of union with Manitoba and the New Brunswick School Act, for instance, we might expect rather high levels of party defection, particularly among Liberal ranks. Finally, Ward's cursory glance at the cohesiveness of the two parties during the first parliament sets something of an example to be adopted in any examination of party cohesiveness in this early period. Hence, in using as a threshold an M.P.'s voting contrary to one or the other of the party leaders five times in 30 substantive divisions (and this overlooking the fact that most M.P.'s were absent for at least a couple of these divisions), Ward implies that voting in accordance with one's party leader 83.3% of the time or more indicates a substantial measure of party loyalty on the part of the individual M.P. Taking all these factors into consideration a threshold of 80% seems entirely reasonable.

The second technical problem to be resolved involves the question of what we mean when we employ the terms "ministerialist" and "loose fish". Most writers use the two terms interchangeably, although the precise meaning they impute to the terms is often ambiguous. Hence, what is proposed for the purposes of this paper is a clarification -- and something of a redefinition -- of the two terms, one which attributes to

each term meanings which are quite logical from a semantic point of view. Therefore, the term ministerialist will be employed in this paper to describe those M.P.'s who regularly supported the government despite running as independents or as candidates of the party forming the opposition. The term loose fish, rather than being used synonymously, will instead be applied to those M.P.'s who refused to support either party regularly, and who instead appeared to vote in an almost random fashion.

In bringing this chapter to a close a final comment is needed to preface the following three chapters. In analyzing party cohesiveness a fivefold typology of member loyalty has been set up to delineate members into groups according to the percentage of the time they voted (on the whole and on particular issues) in a like manner with their party leader. The classification employed in the following chapters runs as follows: those voting with their party leader 80% of the time or more will be characterized as solid party men, behaving in a highly loyal manner; those voting with the leader of their party 65-80% of the time will be considered as moderately loyal party supporters; those voting with the leader of one or the other of the two party leaders between 35 and 65% of the time will be classified as loose fish (as defined above); M.P.'s who followed their party leader only 20-35% of the time will comprise the fourth class and will be considered to be moderately loyal supporters of the other party; and lastly, the term ministerialist will be applied to those opposition

M.P.'s who followed their nominal party leader 20% of the time or less, and to those "non-affiliated" M.P.'s who voted with the government 80% of the time or more. All non-affiliated (or "Other") M.P.'s can be classified simply as strong or moderate supporters of the government or opposition, as loose fish or as ministerialists.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 Escott Reid; "The Rise of National Parties in Canada", in H.G. Thorburn (Ed.) Party Politics in Canada; pp.16-18

2 G.M. Hougham; "The Background and Development of National Parties", in H.G. Thorburn (Ed.) Party Politics in Canada; pp.2-3

3 S.P. Regenstreif; The Liberal Party of Canada; pp.299-300

4 For the purposes of this paper, however, most of these members have been categorized -- where possible -- according to their prior party affiliations. M.P.'s have been categorized as Liberals, Conservatives or Others on the basis of information gathered from the Library of Parliament's History of the Federal Electoral Ridings: 1867-1980.

5 J.M. Beck; Pendulum of Power; p.17

6 ibid; p.8

7 ibid; p.19

8 R.M. Stamp; "J.D. Edgar and the Liberal Party: 1867-1896, in Canadian Historical Review; June 1964; p.98

9 Beck; op.cit.; p.30

10 Reid; op.cit.; p.15

11 Roman March; The Myth of Parliament; p.2

12 Beck; op.cit.; p.30

13 March; op.cit.; p.16

14 Norman Ward; "Responsible Government: An Introduction", in Journal of Canadian Studies; Summer 1979; p.3. One may also recall John A. Macdonald remarking that "[w]henver an office is vacant it belongs to the party supporting the government... responsible government cannot be carried on any other principle."

15 In fact, the research undertaken for this paper indicates that the government was actually defeated 23 times; this represents fully 9% of all recorded divisions during the first parliament. During the second parliament the Conservatives were defeated five times on 33 divisions (excluding those concerning divorce).

16 cf. Eugene Forsey; "Government Defeats in the Canadian House of Commons", in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science; 1963

17 T.A. Hockin; "Flexible and Structured Parliamentarism From 1848 to Contemporary Party Government", in Journal of Canadian Studies; Summer 1979; p.8

18 March; op.cit.; p.55

19 ibid; p.55

20 J.S. Martell; "Intercolonial Communications - 1840-67", in Canadian Historical Review; June 1955; p.60

21 ibid; p.51

22 P.G. Cornell; "The Alignment of Political Groups in the United Province of Canada, 1854-1864", in Canadian Historical Review; March 1949; p.23

23 P.G. Cornell; The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada: 1841-1867; p.65

24 ibid; p.67

25 ibid; p.54

26 ibid; p.65

27 Norman Ward; The Public Purse; p.49

28 ibid; p.49

29 R.O. Macfarlane; "The Appointment of Sir Francis Hincks as Minister of Finance in 1869", in Canadian Historical Review; September 1939; p.22

30 W.L. Morton; The Critical Years; p.248

31 D.G. Creighton; Dominion of the North; p.324

32 Gordon Stewart; The Origins of Canadian Politics; p.89

33 Evidence of both these points is best typified by the fact that during the course of the first parliament, Mackenzie (or if Mackenzie was absent, Blake) voted with the government no fewer than 49 times -- approximately 20% of the time. During the third parliament, Macdonald voted with the government at least 26 times -- fully 25% of the time! Such behaviour would be almost unthinkable in the present day and age.

CHAPTER II - THE FIRST PARLIAMENT: 1867-1872

"I believe that a great party is arising of moderate men. there are many men who think alike about the future of British America who have been hitherto divided by their political antecedents. All this ought to be forgotten now, and I hope that men, whatever their antecedents, who think alike, will act together. This is the true and only principle of party."

(John A. Macdonald)

The first general election saw 180 M.P.'s returned from the four provinces then constituting the Canadian nation. Of these 180 M.P.'s, 100 have been labelled as Conservatives, 73 as Liberals and 7 as "Others". The addition of the provinces of Manitoba and B.C. saw another five Conservatives, three Liberals and one Other added to these figures. Including by-elections, there were in all 124 Conservatives, 83 Liberals and ten Others elected to parliament between 1867 and 1872. However, as will be noted throughout this and subsequent chapters, "nominal" party labels are somewhat misleading when one examines the actual loyalty of M.P.'s to one or the other of the two party leaders. In "real" terms, there were actually 126 M.P.'s who can be termed very or moderately loyal to Macdonald, 60 who were very or moderately loyal to Mackenzie and 32 loose fish.

Analysis of M.P.'s behaviour during the course of the first parliament reveals many other things of great interest. Certainly Reid's thesis has some validity, for the overall levels of party cohesion evident during the first parliament were not remarkably high -- by modern standards -- for either

party; especially notable is the disinclination of most Maritime Liberals to vote with their counterparts from central Canada. Moreover, the Quebec wing of the Liberal party was, on the whole, only moderately loyal to Mackenzie (who will be used as a proxy for a party leader in this chapter). While none of the above is particularly surprising from the perspective of the Reid thesis, there are a number of other findings which would seem to fly in the face of the arguments presented by Reid. Specifically, the Conservative party as a whole, and the Ontario wing of the Liberal party, exhibit a degree of party cohesion that appears thoroughly incongruous with what one would expect given the arguments presented by Reid. Yet more remarkable are the even higher levels of cohesion we find for both parties on a number of highly salient and crucial issues. Furthermore, the idea that each party was effectively little more than a coalition of provincial and ethnic factions would appear highly dubious. Finally, the argument that the Liberal party (in particular the Ontario wing of the party) was riven by a split between those who favoured Blake, and those who favoured Mackenzie, as leader of the party -- while undoubtedly having some foundation -- is not apparent from an examination of the voting behaviour of Liberal M.P.'s.

The balance of this and subsequent chapters will be consumed by an examination of the voting behavior of all M.P.'s. For the sake of simplicity and ease of examination, each party shall be treated in isolation, with a separate section of each chapter devoted to analyzing the behaviour of those M.P.'s

who were not affiliated -- at least in name -- with either of the two major parties.

THE CONSERVATIVES

Looking at Table 2.1, it is readily apparent just how cohesive the Conservative party was, even as early as 1867. All of the four major wings of the party show average levels of loyalty in excess of 80%, with majorities from each province voting with Macdonald over 80% of the time.

TABLE 2.1
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE
FIRST PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (257 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	34	9	9	0	0	81.9	52
Quebec	41	12	1	1	0	85.4	55
N.B.	4	0	1	0	0	86.0	5
N.S.	4	1	2	0	0	80.5	7
Manitoba	1	0	1	0	0	76.8	2
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	99.2	3
TOTALS	87	22	14	1	0	83.9	124

To clarify the figures shown in the table (and all those tables which follow) a few words may be necessary. The columns to the right of each province contain figures showing the number of M.P.'s from each province who voted with the party leader (in this case Macdonald) the percentage of the time shown above that figure in the uppermost row. For instance,

the table reveals that 34 of 52 Conservative M.P.'s from Ontario followed Macdonald 80% of the time or more; and on average, Conservatives from Ontario were loyal to Macdonald 81.9% of the time. The bottom-most row sums up the totals. Thus 87 of 124 Conservatives were loyal to Macdonald 80% of the time or more, and on the whole, the average Conservative M.P. followed Macdonald 83.9% of the time (the figures in the second to last column we will call the index of loyalty"). While there were 14 loose fish among Conservative ranks (and one M.P. who ran as a Conservative, but who can be classified as a moderately strong supporter of the opposition Liberals), Table 2.1 clearly shows that there was a remarkable degree of cohesion within Conservative party ranks.

More remarkable still are the levels of cohesion shown by the party over a number of crucial questions directly relating to government policy. For the sake of brevity, only a couple of tables will be presented here; however, brief reference will be made to other issues which produced similar findings.

Railway policy was certainly one of the most important questions dealt with by the first parliament, and the construction of the Intercolonial and Pacific Railway were high -- if not supreme -- on the government's list of priorities. As Table 2.2 shows, 97 of 105 Conservative M.P.'s voting on questions involving the construction of the Pacific Railway supported the government 80% of the time or more, producing an overall index of loyalty of almost 95%. The loyalty index for questions concerning the Intercolonial was somewhat lower at 89.5%, with the Ontario wing of the party appearing to have

the most reservations about this element of government policy.

TABLE 2.2
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE PACIFIC RAILWAY
(11 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of time loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	38	3	3	0	0	90.6	44
Quebec	45	0	1	0	0	98.4	46
N.E.	4	0	1	0	0	88.6	5
N.S.	5	0	0	0	0	100	5
Manitoba	2	0	0	0	0	92.9	2
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100	3
TOTALS	97	3	5	0	0	94.7	105

Other issues which were highly important and which produced loyalty indexes in the 90% plus range were: supply (17 votes; 89.5%), the renegotiation of the subsidy to Nova Scotia (12 votes; 92.3%), dual representation (8 votes; 93.7%), the modification of electoral boundaries and electoral laws (10 votes; 92.7%) and the Treaty of Washington (4 votes; 95.5%). In addition, there were several other issues (banking, customs, defence, the independence of parliament and the terms of union with both Manitoba and B.C) on which the overall index of loyalty for the Conservative party was greater than 80% but less than 89% (a number of these and other tables can be found in Appendix A). Hence, it is quite manifest that the Conservatives could behave in a highly cohesive manner when votes were taken on questions which might conceivably constitute

votes of "confidence" in the government.

With the above in mind, one is almost led to wonder where the assertion that the Conservatives were not a very cohesive group came from. The answer lies in the examination of a number of issues which did, in fact, produce clear divisions within the party. As Table 2.3 reveals, votes taken on bills concerning the insolvency laws witnessed very low levels of party loyalty, with less than 50% of Conservatives present for some or all of these divisions supporting Macdonald 80% of the time or more.

TABLE 2.3
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY LAWS
(12 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	21	3	10	8	8	59.5	50
Quebec	21	1	12	5	10	58.8	49
N.B.	5	0	0	0	0	93.6	5
N.S.	4	1	0	0	2	70.0	7
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	1	50.0	2
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100	3
TOTALS	55	5	22	13	21	62.2	116

However, the very fact that the government was defeated on 8 of these 12 divisions reveals something very significant about what were considered to constitute votes of confidence in these early days. Without much fear of bringing down the government, Conservative M.P.'s were relatively free to vote

as they chose on a great many divisions. A similar argument can be made for those other issues (notably, the reporting and publishing of debates; see Table A.13 in Appendix A) which saw very low levels of party cohesion within the governing party.

In addition, there were a number of issues which so directly concerned questions of language or ethnic rights that one would not expect, even in our day and age, absolute party cohesion on these divisions. Table 2.4 presents the figures for one such issue, the New Brunswick School Act (which aimed at diminishing the rights of the Francophone minority in that province).

TABLE 2.4
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'s DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE NEW BRUNSWICK
SCHOOL ACT (14 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>						
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20	Avg.	N
Ontario	35	2	1	0	1	94.4	39
Quebec	14	6	1	13	5	58.5	39
N.B.	3	0	0	1	0	83.3	4
N.S.	3	0	1	0	1	70.0	5
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	1	50.0	2
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100	3
TOTALS	59	8	3	14	8	76.6	92

It may also be noted that divisions taken on the Manitoba Act (see Table A.11 in Appendix A) produced a similar intra-party schism along provincial/ethnic lines, despite an overall index of loyalty of 81.3% (this rather high figure is due to

the almost unanimous support given the government by the Quebec wing of the party on all of these divisions).

One last table for the Conservatives is worth a look at here. Table 2.5 records the loyalty of only those Conservative M.P.'s who found their way into Macdonald's cabinet in either the first or second parliament (or both). One might well suspect that a cabinet post (or even the expectation of one) would demand from an M.P. a higher degree of loyalty than was otherwise required from the ordinary backbencher.

TABLE 2.5
LOYALTY OF M.P.'S WHO WERE MEMBERS OF
MACDONALD'S FIRST OR SECOND CABINET (257 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	6	1	1	0	0	85.7	8
Quebec	7	0	1	0	0	90.6	8
N.B.	1	0	0	0	0	99.6	1
N.S.	2	0	0	0	0	96.9	2
TOTALS	16	1	2	0	0	89.7	19

M.P.'s who were given a cabinet post in the second parliament, but not in the first (there were only three), have been included here to examine whether expectation of a cabinet post might actually have led an M.P. to behave more loyally and/or whether Macdonald was inclined to include in his second cabinet only those backbenchers who had proven very loyal in the first parliament.

As is readily apparent from an examination of Table 2.5, those M.P.'s recruited to the cabinet by Macdonald proved to

be especially strong supporters of the government. Only three cabinet ministers (Galt, Cartwright and McDougall) proved less than very loyal to Macdonald, and of these three, Cartwright had been a very loyal supporter of the government up until Hincks' entry into the ministry.¹ Apart from these three, those M.P.'s given places in Macdonald's cabinet displayed an extremely high degree of loyalty to Macdonald and the party as a whole, seldom withholding their support.

THE LIBERALS

In turning now to a look at the Liberal party, the crucial question to be examined is whether a party seemingly fractured in every conceivable manner was capable of achieving any modicum of cohesiveness whatsoever. While it would be absurd to suppose that the Liberals could achieve anything closely approximating the cohesiveness of the Conservatives, it is not unrealistic to assume that particular issues could have proven able to crystallize all the opposition forces into a cohesive voting bloc.

Given Reid's work the figures shown in Table 2.6 are not at all surprising. Nonetheless, some of the figures are interesting. In particular, in comparing Tables 2.1 and 2.6 one notes that the Ontario wing of the Liberal party scores almost as high on the loyalty index as does the Ontario wing of the Conservative party. Unfortunately, the same certainly cannot be said of Quebec Liberals; more striking yet is the disinclination of Maritime Liberals to follow the (as yet unclaimed) leader of their party. M.P.'s from B.C. who were

technically Liberals clearly represent the ministerialist element in the first parliament.

TABLE 2.6
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (257 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	23	10	1	2	0	81.4	36
Quebec	3	14	2	2	0	69.0	21
N.B.	0	4	7	2	0	55.2	13
N.S.	0	0	7	3	0	41.3	10
B.C.	0	0	0	0	3	16.2	3
TOTALS	26	28	17	9	3	67.0	83

As we saw with the Conservatives, however, an examination of Liberal M.P.'s voting habits across all divisions does not tell the whole story. While the Liberals never exhibited the degree of cohesion exhibited by the Conservatives, there were a number of issues around which most Liberals rallied, albeit, with the general exception of maritime Liberals. Hence, average measures of party loyalty appear somewhat low for the Liberals, despite the fact that on many occasions Liberals from Ontario and Quebec were more or less united behind their party leader.

Tables 2.7 and 2.8, respectively, examine how members of the Liberal party voted on questions involving the independence of parliament (that is, conflict of interest guidelines) and dual representation -- two issues which were very near to the hearts of most Liberals. Aside from the remarkably high levels of loyalty displayed by Liberal M.P.'s from Quebec and

Ontario, what is notable about these two issues (and a few others) is that Liberal M.P.'s from one or both of the Maritime provinces also followed Mackenzie with a much greater than usual frequency.

TABLE 2.7
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF
PARLIAMENT (5 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Ontario	31	0	2	0	0	96.4	33
Quebec	17	0	2	0	0	92.6	19
N.B.	3	2	2	0	1	67.7	8
N.S.	1	0	2	0	6	22.2	9
B.C.	0	0	0	0	2	0.0	2
TOTALS	52	2	8	0	9	80.0	71

TABLE 2.8
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING
DUAL REPRESENTATION (8 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Ontario	30	2	0	0	2	90.0	34
Quebec	18	1	0	0	1	93.3	20
N.B.	7	1	1	0	1	81.1	10
N.S.	4	1	3	0	2	62.4	10
B.C.	0	0	0	1	2	8.3	3
TOTALS	59	5	4	1	8	82.9	77

In addition to the two issues examined above, Liberals from Ontario and Quebec also exhibited a very high degree of cohesiveness on divisions involving the subsidy to Nova Scotia, the terms of union with B.C. and the Treaty of Washington (see Appendix B for these and other tables). In addition, divisions concerning the issues of defence, customs and the insolvency act also tended to bring Liberals from all parts of the country together with a much greater than normal frequency. As with the Conservatives, however, there were a number of issues which produced a rather low index of loyalty for all wings of the party, and therefore, the party as a whole. In particular, divisions concerning the reporting and publishing of debates produced rather haphazard voting patterns among Liberal M.P.'s. Table 2.9 illustrates this point most succinctly.

TABLE 2.9
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE REPORTING
OF DEBATES (6 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Ontario	5	1	10	12	7	44.6	35
Quebec	11	2	5	2	1	70.2	21
N.B.	5	2	2	1	3	58.8	13
N.S.	4	2	3	0	0	77.0	9
B.C.	0	0	0	0	1	0.0	1
TOTALS	25	7	20	15	12	56.9	79

Not unexpectedly, there were also a number of issues which produced serious intra-party rifts. As with the Conser-

vatives, questions concerning the Manitoba Act and the New Brunswick School Act proved the most fractious. Table 2.10 summarizes the voting behaviour of Liberal M.P.'s on the question of Manitoba's union with Canada, and illustrates quite vividly just how divisive questions concerning minority rights were in this early period.

TABLE 2.10
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.' DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA
ACT (14 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Ontario	26	0	1	0	0	91.8	27
Quebec	0	0	0	0	14	10.6	16
N.B.	2	0	0	0	2	50.0	4
N.S.	0	1	0	1	3	25.2	5
TOTALS	28	1	1	3	19	57.2	52

A couple of other arguments regarding the cohesiveness of the Liberal party need to be dealt with here. In particular, by examining M.P.'s voting records we can determine whether Quebec Liberals (led by A.A. Dorion) genuinely deserve to be distinguished as a faction. Secondly, the belief that there was a rift in the party between those who favoured Mackenzie, and those who preferred Blake, as leader of the Liberal party, can be put to the test by an examination of the voting behaviour of Liberal M.P.'s.

Table 2.11 summarizes the voting behaviour of all French Canadian Liberal M.P.'s from Quebec on those divisions which

saw Dorion opposing Mackenzie, or Blake if Mackenzie was absent from parliament. The evidence would suggest that this contingent of M.P.'s clearly deserves the title of "faction", with these M.P.'s remaining loyal to Dorion over 85% of the time. While such a finding would seem to indicate a major rift between the two major wings of the Liberal party, it should be noted that Dorion himself voted with Mackenzie (or Blake if Mackenzie was absent) almost 80% of the time. Moreover, Dorion held no pretensions to the leadership of the Liberal party, insisting instead that a member from Ontario should be chosen as leader (Dorion apparently favoured Mackenzie).²

TABLE 2.11
LOYALTY OF FRENCH CANADIAN LIBERALS FROM QUEBEC TO
DORION DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT (39 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Dorion</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Quebec	12	3	0	0	0	85.2	15

In contrast, rumours of a fractious Blake wing would appear somewhat questionable. While there may have been those who favoured policies (especially regarding imperial relations) espoused by Blake, very few chose to oppose Mackenzie in favour of Blake when called upon to vote. Table 2.12 summarizes these findings, and shows that there were only 2 Liberals from central Canada who can be classified as very loyal to Blake. Only M.P.'s from Ontario and Quebec have been examined here because (as has been seen) the overall levels of loyalty shown by Maritime M.P.'s were very low, and thus examining their behaviour on these divisions would show misleadingly

high levels of loyalty to Blake.

TABLE 2.12
LOYALTY OF ONTARIO AND QUEBEC LIBERALS
TO BLAKE DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT (13 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Blake</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Ontario	1	1	9	11	12	32.1	33
Quebec	1	3	2	6	9	31.6	21
TOTALS	2	4	11	17	21	31.9	54

Finally, it is of some curiosity to see if those M.P.'s who were part of Mackenzie's cabinet in the third parliament (and who were also M.P.'s during the first parliament) exhibited a greater degree of loyalty to Mackenzie than the average M.P. As Table 2.13 reveals this was indeed the case. While the three M.P.'s from the Maritimes showed no more loyalty to Mackenzie than did other Liberals from that part of the country, the eight M.P.'s from Ontario and Quebec were clearly much more loyal than the majority of Liberal M.P.'s from these two provinces.

TABLE 2.13
LOYALTY OF FUTURE CABINET MINISTERS TO MACKENZIE
DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT (257 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Ontario	3	1	0	0	0	90.0	4
Quebec	2	2	0	0	0	83.4	4
N.B.	0	0	1	0	0	59.0	1
N.S.	0	0	2	0	0	36.5	2
TOTALS	5	3	3	0	0	75.1	11

While one may speculate that Mackenzie picked these M.P.'s as part of his cabinet on the basis of their prior loyalty, it should also be recognized that many of these M.P.'s were acknowledged leaders of the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party.³ Nonetheless, the figures are interesting in their own right, and may in fact lead one to doubt yet further whether the Quebec wing of the party truly constituted (as Reid maintains) a faction, as it is integral to the concept of a faction that the members of the faction are all but completely loyal to their factional leaders; yet it is clear that most Liberal M.P.'s from Quebec voted contrary to their sectional leaders between 10 and 15% of the time.

THE "OTHERS"

Because of the small number of M.P.'s who have been classified as Others for the puposes of this paper, and for brevity's sake, only the table showing how these M.P.'s behaved across all divisions will be presented here. In addition, a brief summation of other findings will be presented. It should be noted that only ten M.P.'s have been classified as Others; while a much larger number actually ran as something other than Liberals or Conservatives (especially in the Maritimes), they have been grouped according to their prior party affiliations (as reported in the Library of Parliament's History of the Federal Electoral Ridings: 1867-1980).

Table 2.14 presents the figures showing how these ten M.P.'s voted on all divisions during the course of the first parliament. For simplicity's sake, these M.P.'s index of loy-

alty has been calculated as it was for the Conservative party; that is, the percentages expressed in the table represent the percentage of the time these M.P.'s voted with the government.

TABLE 2.14
LOYALTY OF ALL "OTHERS" DURING THE FIRST
PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (257 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times voting with Macdonald</u>					<u>Avg.</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>80-100</u>	<u>65-80</u>	<u>35-65</u>	<u>20-35</u>	<u>0-20</u>		
Ontario	1	0	0	0	0	82.6	1
Quebec	0	1	0	0	0	67.1	1
N.B.	0	0	1	0	0	40.7	1
N.S.	0	1	0	3	2	29.0	6
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	97.6	1
TOTALS	2	2	1	3	2	46.2	10

As can be seen, this group of M.P.'s is difficult to characterize; two can be classified as ministerialists or very strong government supporters, two as moderately strong government supporters, one as a loosefish, three as moderately strong supporters of the opposition and two as very strong supporters of the opposition.

On almost issues of major significance we find similar results, with the same M.P.'s -- for the most part -- proving to be either supporters of the government or opposition. Only on four issues, the Treaty of Washington, the Manitoba Act, the B.C. Act and the insolvency act, do we find relatively strong support for the government from a majority of these M.P.'s.

All in all, the evidence presented in this chapter gives one pause to wonder whether or not Reid's work captures the whole truth of the matter. Certainly both parties, and especially the Conservatives, were capable of behaving very cohesively when the House divided on questions critical to the government's agenda. Furthermore, the suggestion that each provincial wing of the party represented a faction is highly questionable. While it is arguable that the "Rouge" element of the Liberal party may have constituted a faction, the same can hardly be said for, say, the entire contingent of M.P.'s from Nova Scotia, who according to Reid were virtually a separate political party.⁴ While Howe quickly became one of Macdonald's most loyal supporters, voting with Macdonald 98.5% of the time, it is evident from the preceding tables that many of his fellow M.P.'s from Nova Scotia were not prepared to follow him in supporting Macdonald wholeheartedly.

In turning now to an examination of the second parliament it will be of particular interest to note if the parties became more cohesive, and whether the number of loose fish and moderately strong supporters of each party declined as a proportion of all M.P.'s. It will also be worth watching the behaviour of the Maritime contingent of M.P.'s to see if they -- after five years working with their central Canadian counterparts -- were prepared to align themselves more firmly with one or the other of the two parties. Also, with Cartier missing from parliament (he fell ill and died without ever making it to his seat in the House), and as it was he who provided the "glue" which kept the Francophone and Anglophone elements of the party united, it may well prove that the

index of loyalty for the Quebec wing of the party may drop noticeably. If this is not the case, then one may be in a position to argue that the "Bleus" too owed their allegiance not solely to Cartier (as would be the case if we were to argue that the Bleus were a faction) but to the national party leader and the party in general.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 Prior to Hincks' appointment as Minister of Finance, Cartwright had supported the government well over 90% of the time; from this point on Cartwright became a loose fish, actually supporting the opposition 60% of the time. Galt, despite his standing within the party, had never proven to be a good party man; and McDougall, of course, had been one of those "coalition Liberals" who had heeded Macdonald's call to join him prior to the election of 1867.

2 S.P. Regenstreif; The Liberal Party of Canada: A Political Analysis; p.301. It should also be noted that, according to Beller and Belloni, one of the chief characteristics of a faction is that it is constantly competing with other elements within the party for power and influence. Hence, Dorion's belief that he should not even be considered for the leadership would seem to weaken the argument that the Rouges were properly a faction within the Liberal party. Nonetheless, the behaviour of these 15 M.P.'s might indicate that they were more loyal to Dorion (their sectional leader) than they were to Mackenzie or the party as a whole.

3 Mackenzie's cabinet included Blake D. Mills and W. Ross from Ontario and Dorion, F. Geoffrion, T. Fournier and L.S. Huntingdon from Quebec.

4 Reid; op.cit.; p.18

CHAPTER III - THE SECOND PARLIAMENT: 1872-1874

"Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed."

(Edmund Burke)

The general election of 1872 saw 200 M.P.'s returned to the second parliament. Of these, 97 have been classified as Conservatives, 97 as Liberals and 6 as others. Subsequent by-elections added just one Conservative and one Liberal to these numbers.¹ However, in real terms the Conservatives had a fairly stable majority. Despite being defeated five times on 33 non-divorce related divisions, the Conservatives had approximately 101 very loyal supporters to the Liberal's 78. These five divisions aside, the Conservatives majority of 23 (or more) appears quite consistent on other divisions.

Although the second parliament is dated from 1872 to 1874, there was in fact only one session (in the spring of 1873) during which divisions were held. A fall sitting in the same year saw only a long-winded debate over the findings of the committee appointed to investigate the "Pacific Scandal", culminating, of course, with a premature dissolution of Parliament.

Despite the brevity of the second parliament, the findings that emerge would certainly seem to cast serious doubt upon the validity of the Reid thesis. As will be seen, both parties displayed very high levels of cohesiveness, the vast majority of M.P.'s displaying levels of loyalty that would rival even those found today. Unfortunately, as there were

only 33 recorded divisions (on matters other than divorce) during the course of this parliament, there is little point in analyzing the degree of party cohesiveness on particular issues as not even the most important questions of the day were brought to a vote enough times for the results to prove conclusive. Hence, only three tables will be presented in this chapter -- those showing the cohesiveness of the Conservatives, Liberals and Others across all divisions recorded in this period. Suffice it to say that the figures shown in these three tables are basically the same as those we would see if tables analyzing party cohesiveness on particular issues were also presented. Indeed, on most important questions (for example, supply, the Pacific Railway and the Treaty of Washington) the levels of party cohesiveness were several points higher than they were across all divisions.

THE CONSERVATIVES

As Table 3.1 clearly reveals, the Conservative party's index of loyalty increased by over 8% points during the second parliament. Whereas only two-thirds of Conservative M.P.'s in the first parliament could be characterized as very loyal, the percentage exhibiting a very high degree of loyalty in the second parliament was almost 96%. Moreover, the number of loose fish among Conservative ranks was reduced to almost zero. Particularly notable is the much greater willingness of Nova Scotian Conservatives to support the government -- and this despite Howe's early departure to serve as Lieutenant-Governor of his home province! It is also of note that

the contingent of Conservative M.P.'s from Quebec remained extremely loyal, following Macdonald almost to the man, even though Cartier never made it to his seat in the House.

TABLE 3.1
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE
SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS
(33 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	37	0	0	0	1	92.4	38
Quebec	34	1	0	0	1	91.3	36
N.B.	5	0	1	0	0	87.6	6
N.S.	10	0	0	0	0	95.6	10
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	85.7	1
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100	3
TOTALS	90	1	1	0	2	92.1	94

THE LIBERALS

Dramatic as the figures for the Conservative party are, more striking still is the apparent transformation of the Liberal party (at least among the Quebec and Ontario wings of the party). While it was shown that during the first parliament the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party could act quite cohesively on particular issues, on the whole party cohesion was quite weak. Table 3.2 shows, however, that during the second parliament the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party were substantially in agreement and their members much more inclined to loyally follow Mackenzie. Indeed, of the 74 members from Ontario and Quebec, 71 can be placed in

the very loyal category (this compares with just 26 of 57 in the first parliament). Although the index of loyalty for Liberals from the Maritimes dropped marginally in the second parliament, it is noteworthy that at least three of these M.P.'s were willing to firmly align themselves with Mackenzie (as compared with none in the first parliament).

TABLE 3.2
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE SECOND
PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (33 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	47	0	0	1	0	95.7	47
Quebec	24	0	1	0	1	90.1	26
N.B.	2	1	2	2	0	53.5	7
N.S.	1	1	2	4	3	37.6	11
Manitoba	0	0	0	0	1	20.0	1
B.C.	0	0	0	0	2	14.7	2
TOTALS	74	2	5	7	7	81.8	95

Moreover, one sees an unmistakable tendency for these M.P.'s to choose one side or the other; whereas 14 of 23 Liberal M.P.'s from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia could be characterized as loose fish in the first parliament, only 4 of 18 Maritime Liberals fall into this category in the second parliament. M.P.'s from the West who were nominally Liberals continued to be -- as in the first parliament -- firm ministerialists.

THE "OTHERS"

A cursory examination of Table 3.3 reveals a number of interesting facts not only about the behaviour of these Others, but also about the nature of the second parliament as a whole.

TABLE 3.3
LOYALTY OF ALL "OTHERS" DURING THE
SECOND PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS
(33 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>						
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20	Avg.	N
Ontario	1	0	0	0	1	50.7	2
Quebec	1	0	0	0	0	92.3	1
N.B.	1	0	1	0	0	67.9	2
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	95.0	1
TOTALS	4	0	1	0	1	70.7	6

Firstly, it is clear that almost all of these Others (5 Of 6) chose to firmly support one or the other of the two parties, whereas in the first parliament these Others were scattered all over the continuum. Secondly, the second parliament saw a marked decrease in the number of Other M.P.'s (especially if one adds to the first parliament figures the 15 or so M.P.'s, mostly anti-Confederates, who were re-classified for the purposes of this paper) who ran under neither party banner. These two points might lead one to speculate that by the second parliament the two parties were sufficiently well organized and defined as to make it no longer advantageous for a candidate to run or act as an independent. To support such an argument, one can look at the behaviour of these

M.P.'s on a number of critical issues. While it has already been noted that these results would be somewhat inconclusive due to the small number of votes concerned, it is nonetheless interesting to note that on those divisions concerning issues such as the Pacific Railway, supply and the Treaty of Washington, we see an even clearer division of Other M.P.'s into Liberal and Conservative camps. Notably, these same issues also produced greater levels of cohesiveness among those members calling themselves either Liberals or Conservatives.

Evidence from the second parliament would certainly seem to lend a good deal of credence to an argument contending that the two parties in this early period were in fact fairly cohesive units. However, it is still hard to believe that an academic of the stature of Escott Reid could be so wrong. Perhaps the second parliament represents nothing more than an aberration. Perhaps (as Cornell argues with respect to the pre-Confederation era) the high levels of cohesiveness witnessed during the second parliament were induced by the very close results of the 1872 election. Perhaps, it may even be argued, the emerging revelations concerning the Pacific Scandal galvanized the two parties: the Liberals, smelling the downfall of the government, may have had a new incentive to behave cohesively; the Conservatives, for their part, aware that their hold on power was tenuous, may also have been forced -- even disciplined -- into behaving in a more cohesive manner.

Whether the foregoing speculation has any basis in fact

or not is of a somewhat secondary importance. The fact remains that the vast majority of M.P.'s in the second parliament displayed a great deal of loyalty to one party or the other, and this in itself should give one reason enough to reconsider the validity of Reid's thesis. The question remains, however, as to whether this extraordinary degree of party cohesion continued into the third parliament or whether the third parliament witnessed a return to the somewhat looser alignment of M.P.'s we saw in the first parliament.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 It should be noted, however, that five Conservatives and two Liberals never took their seats in the House. Furthermore, while there were quite a few by-elections (15 or so) only two of those elected ever took their seats in the House. The tables that follow, therefore, exclude those M.P.'s who never took their seats in the House of Commons. Hence the explanation for the discrepancy between the numbers shown in the tables and those presented above.

CHAPTER IV - THE THIRD PARLIAMENT: 1874-1878

"Since deputies are elected to deliberate and decide on public affairs, the point of their election is that it is a choice of individuals on the strength of confidence felt in them...Hence their relation to their electors is not that of agents with a commission or specific instructions. A further bar to their being so is the fact that their assembly is meant as a living body in which all members deliberate in common and reciprocally instruct and convince each other."

(G.W.F. Hegel)

The third general election saw 205 M.P.'s returned from the (now) seven provinces making up the Canadian nation, the additional five M.P.'s coming from the newly created province of Prince Edward Island. Of these 205 M.P.'s, 117 have been labelled as Liberals, 76 as Conservatives and 12 as Others. Of the 50 or so by-elections held between 1874 and 1878, 40 of those returned took their seats in the House and were present for a good number of divisions; and of these 40 M.P.'s, 23 have been labelled as Liberals, 12 as Conservatives and five as Others. However, in real terms 151 of these 245 M.P.'s were very or moderately loyal supporters of Mackenzie; in contrast, only 74 can be considered very or moderately loyal supporters of Macdonald; in addition, there were 20 M.P.'s who can be characterized as loose fish.

A close examination of the third parliament reveals that the second parliament was indeed something of an aberration. The cohesiveness of the Conservatives was clearly shattered by their defeat at the polls. Undoubtedly the revelations of the committee investigating the Pacific Scandal also hurt Macdonald personally, for they cast doubt on his integrity

and may well have hampered his attempts to impose discipline on his party. In addition, we see a return to the situation prevailing in the first parliament insofar as the number of Others increased substantially. While the majority of them proved to be ministerialists, the rest of these Others were again scattered over the continuum. While these observations are not particularly surprising, it is noteworthy that the Liberals -- now in power -- continued to display a remarkable degree of cohesiveness. Undoubtedly part of the reason for this lies in the fact that the Liberals now constituted the government, and thus, required a greater degree of cohesiveness to operate effectively. Nonetheless, whereas the figures for the opposition party (now the Conservatives) and Others are in many respects similar to those we found in the first parliament, the index of loyalty for Liberal M.P.'s is notably higher than it was for the Conservatives between 1867 and 1872.

THE CONSERVATIVES

Without a doubt their electoral defeat, coupled with the findings of the commission appointed to investigate the Pacific Scandal, dealt a serious blow to the solidarity of the Conservative party. As Table 4.1 reveals, the overall index of loyalty for the Conservative was only marginally higher during the third parliament than it was for the Liberals during the first parliament; and in fact, the Ontario and Quebec wings of the Conservative party, taken together, were far less loyal to Macdonald than the same two wings of

the Liberal party had been to Mackenzie during the first parliament.

TABLE 4.1
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD
PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	11	17	2	2	1	73.6	33
Quebec	9	23	4	2	0	72.0	38
N.B.	1	2	0	1	0	63.9	4
N.S.	2	2	2	2	0	59.0	8
Manitoba	0	0	1	0	0	61.2	1
B.C.	1	1	0	0	0	79.0	2
P.E.I.	0	0	2	0	0	38.5	2
TOTALS	24	45	11	7	1	70.3	88

Looking at Table 4.1 two observations are particularly striking. First of all, one is taken by the precipitous decline (even by the standards of the first parliament) in the proportion of Conservative M.P.'s who can be classified as very loyal. A mere 24 of 88 Conservative M.P.'s (or 27.3%) felt compelled to follow Macdonald 80% of the time or more. Secondly, and perhaps as a by product of the above observation, the number of Conservative M.P.'s who can be classed as moderately loyal represent a clear majority of all Conservative M.P.'s.

Even more surprising is the Conservatives inability to prove any more cohesive on a wide range of important divisions. Just one example of the voting behaviour of Conserva-

tive M.P.'s on these issues is presented in Table 4.2 (for a number of other tables, see Appendix C).

TABLE 4.2
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING RAILWAYS
(24 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	10	14	4	0	3	67.4	31
Quebec	9	17	6	2	1	68.2	35
N.B.	1	1	1	0	1	58.7	4
N.S.	2	2	1	0	3	48.7	8
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	83.3	1
B.C.	1	0	1	0	0	70.2	2
P.E.I.	0	0	0	1	0	25.0	1
TOTALS	24	34	13	3	8	65.3	82

Questions concerning railways occupied a large proportion of the legislature's time, accounting for 24 of 108 non-divorce realated divisions. As can be seen, even an issue that was so integral to the Conservative's program in the first two parliaments failed to produce significantly high levels of party cohesion. Indeed, on this issue the index of loyalty for the party as a whole is a few points lower than it is for the party across all divisions. Similar results are evident across a number of other important issues.

There were in fact only two issues which produced significantly high indexes of loyalty for the Conservative party in this period. The new Brunswick School Law was voted upon only three times and the overall index of loyalty of 81.0%

on that issue was largely the result of the extreme loyalty shown by the Quebec wing of the party. As Table 4.3 indicates, divisions concerning questions of supply tended to bring Conservatives together more frequently than any other issue.

TABLE 4.3
LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY
(7 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	27	0	0	0	2	90.0	29
Quebec	22	8	2	0	0	85.9	32
N.B.	3	0	0	0	1	70.8	4
N.S.	3	2	0	0	2	61.9	7
Manitoba	0	0	0	1	0	33.3	1
B.C.	2	0	0	0	0	100	2
P.E.I.	0	0	1	0	0	50.0	1
TOTALS	57	10	3	1	5	83.7	76

Even so, the overall index of loyalty for the Conservatives on this issue of 83.7% is not particularly high. While it is recognized that high levels of cohesion are not demanded from opposition parties to the degree that they are from the governing party, the fact remains that during the first parliament even the Liberal party (at least the Ontario and Quebec wings) was frequently capable of acting more cohesively than were the Conservatives several years later.

THE LIBERALS

The behaviour of Liberal M.P.'s in the third parliament would certainly seem to destroy a good part of the Reid thesis. As Table 4.4 shows, the Liberal party continued to behave in a highly cohesive manner. While the loyalty of the Ontario and Quebec wings of the party waned somewhat (compared with the second parliament), the index of loyalty for the party as a whole increased markedly, due primarily to the overnight conversion of maritime Liberals to the Liberal cause. Whereas Liberal M.P.'s from the Maritimes had seemingly disavowed their nominal party affiliations in the previous two parliaments, the third parliament (as Reid also observed) saw almost all Maritime Liberals displaying an unmistakable willingness to work with and support their confreres from central Canada. Indeed, notwithstanding the handful of members from the West, the Nova Scotian contingent went from having the lowest index of loyalty as a group in the previous two parliaments to displaying the greatest loyalty of all the provincial groups. While four of the six Liberals from the West again refused to vote consistently with their party, the loyalty shown by the new group of M.P.'s from P.E.I. would seem to be almost as blind as was that of British Columbian M.P.'s to the Conservatives during the first parliament.

Unlike the Conservatives, there were a large number of major issues on which the Liberal party proved extraordinarily cohesive. Table 4.5, which examines Liberal voting beha-

viour on divisions concerning supply provides but one example.

TABLE 4.4
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD
PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	63	3	1	0	0	91.7	67
Quebec	28	7	4	0	0	83.2	39
N.B.	7	0	0	1	0	85.4	8
N.S.	15	0	0	0	0	94.5	15
Manitoba	1	0	0	1	0	56.8	2
B.C.	1	0	3	0	0	60.1	4
P.E.I.	5	0	0	0	0	93.5	5
TOTALS	120	10	8	2	0	87.9	140

TABLE 4.5
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD
PARLIAMENT ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY
(7 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	55	4	3	0	0	90.4	62
Quebec	34	1	1	0	0	96.2	36
N.B.	6	1	0	0	0	90.5	7
N.S.	11	1	0	0	0	96.5	12
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	100	1
B.C.	1	0	2	0	0	63.3	3
P.E.I.	4	0	0	0	0	100	4
TOTALS	112	7	6	0	0	92.4	125

As might be noted, the proportion (112 of 125) who fall into the very loyal category is marginally greater than the proportion who can be classified as such across all divisions. A number of other issues provide similar results (see Appendix D for several tables not contained in the text).

Clearly the Liberals were a rather strong and consistent voting bloc. Nonetheless, there were a couple of issues which saw the cohesiveness of the party greatly diminished, and one which actually produced a major intra-party rift. Table 4.6 summarizes the voting patterns of liberal M.P.'s on divisions concerning the Manitoba rebellion (many of these divisions were concerned with how the instigators and leaders of the rebellion should be dealt with).

TABLE 4.6
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT
ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE MANITOBA REBELLION
(10 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	64	3	0	0	0	97.0	67
Quebec	9	21	4	4	1	70.0	39
N.B.	7	1	0	0	0	95.8	8
N.S.	11	2	1	0	0	92.2	14
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	1	50.0	2
B.C.	2	0	1	1	0	68.7	4
P.E.I.	4	0	1	0	0	87.4	5
TOTALS	98	27	7	5	2	87.0	139

As can readily be discerned, Liberals from Ontario and most of the other provinces, excepting Quebec, provided over-

whelming support for the government's policy. Liberals from Quebec, however, sympathetic to the rebels and their cause, proved to be much less willing to follow mackenzie's lead on this issue. If we probe this question still further we find that there was even a split within the Quebec wing of the party, as seven of the nine M.P.'s from that province who proved very loyal to mackenzie on this issue were Anglophones (there were a total of 12 Anglophone Quebec Liberals present for some or all of the ten divisions taken on this issue).

As in the second chapter, it is again worth taking a look at the behaviour of those M.P.'s who comprised Mackenzie's cabinet.¹ As Table 4.7 shows, 17 of the 18 Liberals who at one time or another found their way into Mackenzie's cabinet fall into the very (very) loyal category, on the average following Mackenzie over 95% of the time. The one exception was A.A. Dorion, who was actually present for only eight divisions before accepting a government appointment to the Quebec bench.

TABLE 4.7
LOYALTY OF ALL CABINET MINISTERS DURING THE THIRD
PARLIAMENT ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	6	0	0	0	0	95.7	6
Quebec	5	1	0	0	0	91.4	6
N.B.	2	0	0	0	0	98.3	2
N.S.	3	0	0	0	0	99.2	3
P.E.I.	1	0	0	0	0	96.2	1
TOTALS	17	1	0	0	0	95.2	18

Finally, it is of some interest to examine whether or not a "Blake wing" ever materialized. As chapter Two has shown, such a wing was not in evidence between 1867 and 1872. However, as Table 4.8 would seem to indicate, such a rift in the party was beginning to open by the third parliament, although this rift was manifest primarily in the Ontario wing of the party.

TABLE 4.8
LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S DURING THE THIRD
PARLIAMENT TO BLAKE (7 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Blake					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	11	4	1	7	39	27.4	62
Quebec	0	2	1	2	29	10.5	34
N.B.	1	0	1	0	6	21.3	8
N.S.	0	0	0	1	11	5.4	12
B.C.	1	1	0	0	2	46.6	4
P.E.I.	0	0	0	0	4	3.6	4
TOTALS	13	7	3	10	91	20.1	124

During the third parliament Blake and mackenzie voted differently seven times; of those 62 Liberals from Ontario who were present for some or all of these divisions, 11 opposed Mackenzie and sided with Blake 80% of the time or more. Whether or not this small contingent of Ontario Liberals posed a serious challenge to Mackenzie's leadership is certainly open to question, for both the Ontario wing of the party and the other major wings of the party were, generally speaking, thoroughly loyal to Mackenzie.

THE "OTHERS"

The first thing one may note in examining Table 4.9 is the rather dramatic increase in the number of Others present in the third parliament. Compared with the second parliament there were almost three times as many Others elected to the third parliament. In the last chapter it was hypothesized that the decline in the number of Others may have been due to a belief on the part of candidates, if not the voters, that there was no longer an advantage to be gained by running as (or electing) independent. Obviously the large number of Others elected to the third parliament renders the above hypothesis questionable. However, it may well be possible that the third parliament saw such a dramatic increase in Others due in part to the pacific Scandal, and the desire on the part of candidates and voters alike to distance themselves from the rampant "partyism" which pervaded politics in the first two parliaments and the corruption which was seen by many as inherent in a system of party politics.

TABLE 4.9
LOYALTY OF ALL OTHERS DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT
ACROSS ALL DIVISIONS (108 DIVISIONS)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Avg.	N
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	4	0	0	1	0	74.9	5
Quebec	0	3	0	0	1	56.7	4
N.B.	3	0	0	1	0	75.7	4
N.S.	2	0	0	0	0	93.8	2
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	93.2	1
B.C.	0	0	1	0	0	63.3	1
TOTALS	10	3	1	2	1	73.4	17

it might well be the case that subsequent parliaments saw a return to the situation where very few Others were elected. Unfortunately, such an examination of the fourth and fifth parliaments is well beyond the scope of this paper.

For the sake of brevity, tables showing the voting behaviour of these Others on particular issues have not been presented here. Suffice it to say that an analysis of the voting behaviour of these Others on particular issues reveals figures substantially the same as those in Table 4.9. In all cases it proves to be the same group of Others who provide consistent support for the government. Perhaps the most notable observation one can draw from a look at table 4.9 is that many of these Others aligned themselves with the governing Liberals, whereas in the second parliament most Others voted consistently with the Conservatives (the figures for the first parliament, however, reveal no such clear cut pattern). One might thus speculate that most others represent ministerialists in the purest sense of the word, supporting whichever party formed the government, in exchange for some personal or local advantage.

In bringing this chapter to a close it is again necessary to reconsider Reid's thesis in light of the empirical evidence presented here. In all fairness, Reid was correct on a number of points. First of all, it is clear that maritime Liberals did not unite behind the Liberal party and its leader until 1874. However, it is not at all clear what brought about this party unification. Perhaps Maritime M.P.'s were simply

inclined to behave as ministerialists. On the other hand, the growing tendency for all Liberals to follow Mackenzie -- including those from the Maritimes and even the West -- may indicate the beginnings of a stronger national party organization. Alternatively, it could be argued (at least for Liberals from Nova Scotia) that their loyalty to Howe had formerly kept these Liberals aligned with the then governing Conservatives. Howe's departure from national party politics might, therefore, have left these M.P.'s free to re-align themselves with Liberals from the rest of the country. Finally, it may simply have taken several years for Maritime Liberals to shed the image they had built up of the Grits as a selfish Ontario party. Hence the explanation for the new-found willingness of Maritime Liberals to work with their central Canadian counterparts may lie in the increased communication and contact Liberals from these two disparate regions enjoyed in the years following Confederation, and more importantly, once the necessary transportation links had been established. Surely numerous other explanations for the loyalty of Maritime Liberals could be conjured up.

Secondly, Table 4.8 indicates that some thing of a Blake wing did in fact exist within at least the Ontario wing of the Liberal party by the third parliament. However, the discord generated by this handful of M.P.'s would appear to have been greatly exaggerated by Reid and those who accept, and elaborate upon, his thesis. While undoubtedly Blake did pose a problem for Mackenzie, an analysis of M.P.'s voting behaviour would suggest that this discord -- as in our own time -- was seldom manifest once Liberal M.P.'s came to vote

in the House. Moreover, the argument that mackenzie had great trouble in keeping his cabinet together does not hold up well whe one considers the very high index of loyalty we observed for members of the Liberal cabinet.

The main point to be made here is that while there is some truth to be found in the Reid thesis, his case has been greatly exaggerated. If one looked only at the arguments Reid presents, it would be suspected that even in power the Liberals were riven by discord and unable to act as a cohesive unit. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that this was clearly not the case. Indeed, it may even be argued that Mackenzie and the other Liberal leaders were better able to impose discipline on their party than was Macdonald, for as has been noted, the Conservatives were defeated quite often while in power, whereas Mackenzie's government lost just one of 108 recorded divisions (and this lone defeat came very early in the first session of the third parliament).

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 A word of explanation for the exclusion of an equivalent table for the Conservatives is needed here. Primarily, such a table was not presented because there were only seven Conservatives elected to the third parliament who had been members of either of Macdonald's two cabinets; moreover, the table itself was not of much interest, as all seven of these seven M.P.'s were -- not surprisiny -- very loyal to Macdonald (86.6% of the time on average).

CONCLUSIONS

"But when a gentleman with great visible emoluments abandons the party in which he has long acted, and tells you it is because he proceeds upon his own judgement...he gives reasons which it is impossible to controvert, and discovers a character which it is impossible to mistake."

(Edmund Burke)

The primary purpose of this paper has been to critically re-examine those arguments which maintain that party cohesion in the early post-Confederation period was very loose. To achieve this end the voting behaviour of all M.P.'s who sat in any or all of the first three parliaments has been examined, and this examination has shown that the validity of the Reid thesis -- despite its long-standing and widespread acceptance -- is certainly open to question and deserves to be thoroughly re-examined. This paper provides just a starting point for such further analysis.

While it has been willingly acknowledged that a good deal of the Reid thesis is at least partly valid, a major concern of this paper has been to re-open a field of intellectual inquiry that has for all too long been relatively closed. The first chapter of this paper presented as fairly and as cogently as possible the arguments put forth by Reid and those who accept his thesis. In opposition to this orthodox viewpoint, an "alternative thesis" was constructed, based largely on the arguments and work of a number of academics (most notably, P.G. Cornell). While this alternative thesis would appear less convincing than that of Reid, this deficiency can be attributed largely to the failure of other

academics to seriously question the validity of Reid's work. Hence, a body of secondary work equivalent to that produced by those who accept the Reid thesis is unavailable to the student of Canadian politics who wishes to challenge the seemingly unchallengeable. Therefore, in order to argue that parties in the early post-Confederation were in fact quite cohesive, it has been necessary to look to primary sources (mainly the House of Commons Journals and the House of Commons Debates). Chapters Two to Four summarized the findings drawn from these sources, and present, largely in tabular form, the voting behaviour of all M.P.'s for the eleven year period under study.

The findings of this paper give one good reason to question the validity of the Reid thesis. Clearly both parties were able to demonstrate relatively high degrees of cohesion even as early as the first parliament. While by modern standards the levels of cohesion achieved in this period are somewhat unimpressive, one needs to have a strong sense of history in judging the cohesiveness of the two parties. In light of all the impediments to achieving absolute party cohesion in this period, one must consider the levels of party cohesion actually achieved in this period as quite remarkable. Indeed, the short-lived second parliament, while exceptional, provides evidence of levels of party cohesion which might even parallel those prevailing in our day and age. Overall, it is apparent that the two parties were, even as early as 1867, fairly cohesive and consistent voting blocs. Certainly each party did not need to "buy" votes or rebuild a new coalition of inter-

ests from one division to another as the Reid thesis might lead us to believe.

Hence, the empirical evidence presented in this paper alone renders the cornerstone of Reid's work questionable. Several other elements of Reid's work are also open to question, albeit, the challenge to these arguments comes more from circumstantial evidence and speculation than it does from hard core and testable empirical evidence. As many of these secondary questions have been dealt with in one way or another in the preceding chapters, they will not be reconsidered here. There are, however, a couple of other major elements of Reid's thesis which deserve some further attention.

Reid essentially argues that the fourth and subsequent parliaments witnessed much higher levels of party cohesion due to the abolition of non-simultaneous elections and the institution of the secret ballot. One is immediately led to question if this was indeed the case and if the reasons for higher levels of party cohesiveness are this simple. Firstly, Reid himself notes that the "grosser" abuses of non-simultaneous elections had been abolished by the election of 1874. If this was indeed the case (as a careful perusal of the House of Commons Journals reveals it is), then Reid's argument that reater party cohesiveness after 1878 was due partly to the introduction of simultaneous elections becomes curious indeed. If simultaneous elections were the norm -- at least in central and eastern Canada -- by 1874, then one would expect to see greater party cohesiveness not by the fourth parliament, but in the third.

It is also noteworthy that four of the five government defeats during the second parliament came on questions concerning elections and election procedures.¹ While this proves nothing on its own, it might indicate that the government's ability to control election outcomes was becoming more difficult and that as early as the 1874 election the two parties may have been conscious of the need to impose more rigorous controls on their members. Finally, even if (for the sake of argument) both the secret ballot and simultaneous elections were not introduced until the 1878 election, are there not other explanations for the supposed dramatic increase in party cohesion which Reid claims occurred in the fourth parliament? Return to an argument presented in the first chapter, one which argued that party cohesion in Britain was also quite loose in this period, it is notable that by the late 1860's parties in Britain had become much more cohesive. Epstein attributes this phenomenon to two new circumstances: i) the enlargement of the suffrage (due no doubt to the provisions of the 1867 Reform Bill), and ii) the increase in the importance of executive responsibility to Parliament.² While the first of these causes has no real bearing on the Canadian situation, the second, the increase in executive responsibility, certainly does -- especially if it is accepted that British examples tended to be emulated in Canada, notwithstanding something of a time lag.

In bringing this paper to a close, it might be worth re-evaluating whether or not the various wings of the two parties properly constituted factions. Undoubtedly Reid uses this term rather loosely; nonetheless, his meaning is clear:

M.P.'s from the various provincial or ethnic groups owed their loyalty first, and above all else, to the leader of their sectional group. While it would appear that the Rouges, the Nova Scotians and even the Bleus might deserve to be called factions during the first parliament, another explanation is readily at hand. As noted in the first chapter, a great many questions considered in the early parliaments directly affected provincial and local interests or ethnic/minority rights, and given the norms prevailing in the House at the time, it could well be argued that many M.P.'s voted their conscience on a great many divisions (for example, those concerning the New Brunswick School Law, the Manitoba Act and certain amendments to the tariff and bank acts). As these questions tended to coincide with provincial and ethnic interests, it might well be that any factionalism was more apparent than real, as the interests of all members of that provincial or ethnic grouping would tend to be similar -- with minor exceptions -- to those of that group's acknowledged leader. Hence, it would appear that the members of a provincial or ethnic group were exhibiting loyalty to their sectional leader.

While it is also recognized that the above speculation is open to challenge, its purpose, as with the rest of this paper, has been simply to provide an alternative to the Reid thesis -- one which may open the door to a more thorough examination of this period in our political history. This paper is just the first step in such a direction; it has provided some rather compelling evidence to buttress arguments

which maintain that, contrary to orthodox opinion, parliamentary parties in this early period were in fact quite cohesive. Moreover, this paper has questioned a number of Reid's other arguments. Although Reid's arguments appear quite logical, so to do a number of arguments which take an opposite approach. At this point all that is certain is that very little is certain. What is needed to complement, and strengthen, the findings of this paper -- or conversely, Reid's work -- is an equally thorough examination of the fourth and fifth parliaments. Also needed is an examination of how party caucuses operated, what the function and efficacy of party "whips" was, and, among other things, how national party organizations impacted upon the behaviour of the individual M.P. Only when these and other equally important questions have been sufficiently answered can we be satisfied (but hopefully not complacent) in the knowledge that we have done all that is possible to uncover the mysteries which shroud our early, yet not so distant, political history.

ENDNOTES TO CONCLUSIONS

1 One of these votes, interetingly enough, came on second reading of a bill to institute the secret ballot; another came on a division concerning a "controverted election"; and two defeats came on divisions concerning the practice of dual representation, whereby an M.P. was also allowed to sit (except in New Brunswick) as a member of his provincial legislature.

2 L.D. Epstein; Political Parties in Western Democracies; p.320

APPENDIX A

LOYALTY OF CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S
ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES
DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT

A.1 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY (17 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	31	7	10	1	0	81.9	49
Quebec	49	2	0	0	0	96.2	51
N.B.	4	1	0	0	0	91.3	5
N.S.	6	1	0	0	0	93.2	7
Manitoba	1	1	0	0	0	83.3	2
B.C.	1	0	0	0	0	100.0	1
Totals	92	12	10	1	0	89.5	115

A.2 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE INTERCOLONIAL R.R. (8 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	30	11	5	0	1	85.6	47
Quebec	39	8	1	0	0	92.4	48
N.B.	3	0	1	0	0	90.0	4
N.S.	6	1	0	0	0	95.2	7
Totals	78	20	7	0	1	89.5	106

A.3 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S
ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING BANKING (26 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	25	13	9	3	1	74.8	51
Quebec	46	4	3	2	0	87.3	55
N.B.	4	1	0	0	0	89.5	5
N.S.	2	3	1	0	1	68.1	7
Manitoba	0	1	0	0	0	75.0	1
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100.0	3
Totals	80	22	13	5	2	81.3	122

A.4 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE ACQUISITION OF THE
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES (5 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	39	0	5	2	1	89.1	47
Quebec	46	1	0	1	0	98.0	48
N.B.	3	0	0	1	0	86.7	5
N.S.	3	1	2	0	1	63.8	7
Manitoba	0	0	0	1	0	33.3	1
Totals	92	2	7	5	2	90.8	108

A.5 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S
ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE RE-ADJUSTMENT
OF THE SUBSIDY TO NOVA SCOTIA (12 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	36	2	5	3	0	87.4	46
Quebec	48	0	0	1	0	97.9	49
N.B.	3	1	0	0	0	90.0	4
N.S.	5	1	1	0	0	86.2	7
Totals	92	4	6	4	0	92.3	106

A.6 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING CUSTOMS (30 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	28	15	8	1	0	80.7	52
Quebec	36	9	7	0	1	83.0	53
N.B.	4	0	1	0	0	83.4	5
N.S.	4	1	2	0	0	77.0	7
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	83.3	1
B.C.	2	0	0	0	1	66.7	3
Totals	75	25	18	1	2	81.3	121

A.7 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING DEFENSE (9 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	31	6	7	2	0	83.7	46
Quebec	37	4	4	0	1	90.4	46
N.B.	4	0	1	0	0	90.6	4
N.S.	2	0	0	1	1	58.3	4
Totals	73	10	12	3	2	86.0	100

A.8 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING DUAL REPRESENTATION (8 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	43	3	2	0	1	93.5	49
Quebec	45	3	2	0	0	95.5	50
N.B.	4	0	0	1	0	82.5	5
N.S.	5	0	0	0	0	93.8	5
Manitoba	0	0	1	0	0	50.0	1
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100.0	3
Totals	100	6	5	1	1	93.7	113

A.9 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT (5 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	30	2	5	4	5	75.2	46
Quebec	34	3	2	1	0	92.3	40
N.B.	4	0	0	0	1	76.0	5
N.S.	4	0	0	0	0	100.0	4
Manitoba	0	0	1	0	0	50.0	1
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100.0	3
Totals	75	5	8	5	6	83.7	99

A.10 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE TERMS OF UNION WITH B.C. (10 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	33	3	0	0	5	86.6	41
Quebec	39	1	1	0	3	91.5	44
N.B.	4	0	0	0	1	80.0	5
N.S.	4	0	0	0	0	97.5	4
Manitoba	0	0	0	0	1	0.0	1
Totals	80	4	1	0	10	88.1	95

A.11 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE MANITOBA ACT (14 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	19	2	3	6	7	64.7	37
Quebec	36	0	0	0	1	96.7	37
N.B.	3	0	0	0	1	75.4	4
N.S.	4	0	0	0	0	100.0	4
Totals	62	2	3	6	9	81.3	82

A.12 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
ON THE REPRESENTATION BILL (10 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	43	0	0	0	1	94.2	44
Quebec	34	0	0	0	2	89.0	36
N.B.	3	0	0	0	0	100.0	3
N.S.	3	0	0	0	0	95.8	3
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	100.0	1
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100.0	3
Totals	87	0	0	0	3	92.7	90

A.13 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE REPORTING OF DEBATES (6 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	21	10	17	2	1	71.5	51
Quebec	19	8	20	1	4	67.1	52
N.B.	3	0	2	0	0	74.0	5
N.S.	3	2	1	0	1	65.0	7
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	100.0	1
Totals	47	20	40	3	6	69.5	116

APPENDIX B

LOYALTY OF LIBERAL M.P.'S
ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES
DURING THE FIRST PARLIAMENT

B.1 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING SUPPLY (17 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	27	1	5	0	1	82.9	34
Quebec	10	4	2	2	2	67.8	20
N.B.	1	1	4	0	4	39.8	10
N.S.	0	0	1	4	4	20.3	9
B.C.	0	0	0	0	2	0.0	2
Totals	38	6	12	6	13	63.4	75

B.2 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE
INTERCOLONIAL R.R. (8 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	15	13	4	0	3	73.1	35
Quebec	2	1	12	1	3	49.0	19
N.B.	1	2	2	0	8	29.3	13
N.S.	0	0	0	1	6	6.0	7
Totals	18	16	18	2	20	52.9	74

B.3 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S
ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING THE CPR (11 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	31	1	0	1	0	95.8	33
Quebec	0	9	8	1	1	60.6	19
N.B.	0	0	4	1	3	38.3	8
N.S.	0	0	1	3	4	19.4	8
B.C.	0	0	0	0	3	7.4	3
Totals	31	10	13	6	11	67.6	71

B.4 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING BANKING (26 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	23	6	6	1	0	79.3	36
Quebec	4	3	12	1	1	61.4	21
N.B.	3	1	4	3	0	55.9	11
N.S.	2	0	6	2	0	54.5	10
B.C.	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	3
Totals	32	10	28	7	4	65.7	81

B.5 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE ACQUISITION OF
THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES (5 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	31	1	1	0	2	91.6	35
Quebec	3	1	12	0	3	48.8	19
N.B.	7	0	4	0	0	80.0	11
N.S.	1	0	1	1	6	24.8	9
Totals	42	2	18	1	11	70.7	74

B.6 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS CONCERNING
THE SUBSIDY TO NOVA SCOTIA (12 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	33	0	2	0	0	94.1	35
Quebec	16	0	1	2	0	86.0	19
N.B.	5	1	1	1	2	63.6	10
N.S.	0	0	1	3	4	20.8	8
Totals	54	1	5	6	6	79.6	72

B.7 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON
QUESTIONS CONCERNING CUSTOMS (30 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	20	9	2	3	2	73.9	36
Quebec	17	2	0	0	2	84.6	21
N.B.	4	3	5	1	0	67.0	10
N.S.	5	2	2	1	0	74.2	10
B.C.	0	0	0	0	3	0.0	3
Totals	46	16	9	5	7	72.7	83

B.8 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING DEFENSE (9 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	20	4	3	1	3	76.3	31
Quebec	10	3	1	0	2	79.6	16
N.B.	0	3	2	2	3	36.8	10
N.S.	3	1	1	0	0	82.5	5
Totals	33	11	7	3	8	71.3	62

B.9 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE TERMS OF UNION WITH B.C. (10 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	30	2	0	0	1	92.9	33
Quebec	18	0	0	0	1	92.0	19
N.B.	5	0	0	0	2	71.4	7
N.S.	3	0	2	0	2	58.6	7
Totals	56	2	2	0	6	86.8	66

B.10 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON (4 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	30	0	0	2	1	92.7	33
Quebec	13	1	1	2	1	82.0	18
N.B.	3	1	0	2	3	47.2	9
N.S.	1	0	0	1	5	17.9	7
B.C.	0	0	0	0	3	0.0	3
Totals	47	2	1	7	13	72.6	70

B.11 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE REPRESENTATION BILL (10 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	28	0	0	0	2	91.6	30
Quebec	13	1	1	1	2	76.0	18
N.B.	1	1	1	0	2	45.2	5
N.S.	0	0	0	3	3	20.6	6
B.C.	0	0	0	0	3	7.9	3
Totals	42	2	2	4	12	72.4	62

B.12 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE NEW BRUNSWICK SCHOOL LAW (3 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	22	8	1	0	0	89.8	31
Quebec	1	0	1	16	0	38.9	18
N.B.	6	0	0	0	2	75.0	8
N.S.	7	0	0	0	0	100.0	7
B.C.	3	0	0	0	0	100.0	3
Totals	39	8	2	16	2	75.9	67

APPENDIX C

LOYALTY OF CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON
A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES
DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT

C.1 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
 CONCERNING THE MANITOBA REBELLION (10 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	7	18	5	1	1	68.4	32
Quebec	8	5	16	2	2	64.6	33
N.B.	0	1	2	1	0	48.5	4
N.S.	0	2	2	3	0	47.7	7
Manitoba	0	0	1	0	0	42.0	1
B.C.	0	1	1	0	0	64.3	2
PEI	0	0	1	0	0	50.0	1
Totals	15	27	28	7	3	63.4	80

C.2 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON
 ALL DIVISIONS CONCERNING TARIFFS (17 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Macdonald</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	19	8	3	1	2	75.6	33
Quebec	13	14	8	1	2	68.9	38
N.B.	1	1	1	0	1	55.6	4
N.S.	3	1	1	1	2	53.8	8
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	83.3	1
B.C.	2	0	0	0	0	82.3	2
PEI	0	0	0	0	2	18.3	2
Totals	39	24	13	3	9	68.7	88

C.3 LOYALTY OF ALL CONSERVATIVES ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY ACT (14 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	11	6	11	1	1	67.7	30
Quebec	4	11	18	2	0	61.9	35
N.B.	2	0	2	0	0	69.0	4
N.S.	1	2	4	0	0	66.1	7
Manitoba	0	0	1	0	0	40.0	1
B.C.	0	1	1	0	0	60.6	2
PEI	0	0	1	0	0	53.8	1
Totals	18	20	38	3	1	64.4	80

C.4 LOYALTY OF CONSERVATIVE M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT
(6 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Macdonald					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	19	7	1	1	1	76.1	29
Quebec	17	10	2	3	2	72.7	34
N.B.	2	1	0	0	1	67.5	4
N.S.	3	2	0	0	2	62.1	7
Manitoba	0	0	0	1	0	33.3	1
B.C.	1	1	0	0	0	75.0	2
PEI	0	0	1	0	0	50.0	1
Totals	42	21	4	5	6	72.0	78

APPENDIX D

LOYALTY OF LIBERAL M.P.'S
ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES
DURING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT

D.1 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERAL M.P.'S ON DIVISIONS
 CONCERNING RAILWAYS (24 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	57	5	3	0	0	91.3	65
Quebec	30	2	3	0	1	87.7	36
N.B.	7	0	0	0	1	83.0	8
N.S.	15	0	0	0	0	99.1	15
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	100.0	1
B.C.	0	0	4	0	0	59.0	4
PEI	5	0	0	0	0	98.9	6
Totals	115	7	10	0	2	90.1	134

D.2 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS
 CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT
 (6 VOTES)

	<u>% of times loyal to Mackenzie</u>					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	51	2	1	0	0	97.6	54
Quebec	25	1	0	0	3	87.1	29
N.B.	7	0	0	0	1	87.5	8
N.S.	13	0	0	0	0	100.0	13
B.C.	2	0	2	0	0	75.0	4
PEI	3	0	0	0	0	94.4	3
Totals	101	3	3	0	4	93.5	111

D.3 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON DIVISIONS
CONCERNING THE INSOLVENCY LAWS (14 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	51	4	7	0	0	89.5	62
Quebec	25	3	7	0	0	85.1	35
N.B.	7	0	1	0	0	93.8	8
N.S.	11	2	0	1	0	92.5	14
Manitoba	1	0	0	0	0	100.0	1
B.C.	1	2	0	1	0	64.2	4
PEI	5	0	0	0	0	98.0	5
Totals	101	11	15	2	0	88.5	129

D.4 LOYALTY OF ALL LIBERALS ON
DIVISIONS CONCERNING TARIFFS (17 VOTES)

	% of times loyal to Mackenzie					Ave.	Total cases
	80-100	65-80	35-65	20-35	0-20		
Ontario	63	2	0	0	0	97.5	65
Quebec	26	8	2	1	0	83.4	37
N.B.	7	0	0	0	1	90.0	8
N.S.	15	0	0	0	0	97.6	15
Manitoba	1	0	1	0	0	80.0	2
B.C.	1	0	1	1	1	47.0	4
PEI	5	0	0	0	0	100.0	5
Totals	118	10	4	2	2	91.6	136

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