PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: Canadian Approaches to the Nuclear World, 1978-84 By Mary Lorraine Goldie B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1981 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1988 © Mary Lorraine Goldie, 1988 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. 1 further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/81) ABSTRACT ii The timeframe of 1978-1984, a period of critical importance in the development of the nuclear world, sets the boundaries for this analysis of Canadian nuclear arms control policy. The situation brought about by increasing hostility between the superpowers, and changes in doctrine and advances in technology that facilitated nuclear war-fighting scenarios, was extremely grave. Therefore it would seem appropriate for Canada, in its traditional role as mediator and middlepower devoted to easing the danger of world conflagration, to have taken an active stand in its nuclear arms control diplomacy. Such was not the case, as bureaucratic politics, cybernetic decision-making, and cognitive dissonance made adherence to the status quo, or minimal rhetorical changes, the order of the day. While that changed towards the end of the period under examination, there remained little substantive modification of policy, despite the growing threat of nuclear disaster. Four examples of Canadian nuclear arms control policy are examined with the aid of official government documents and appropriate commentary from a variety of analysts. Canadian arms control policy at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, the controversy over the question of testing the American Air-Launched Cruise Missile in Canada, and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's personal peace initiative provide a wealth of information that is used to illustrate the struggle of bureaucratic politics versus rational decision-making. Some of the more influential theoretical and structural difficulties within the foreign policy-making process in Canada that posed real impediments to comprehensive analytical decision-making are presented. These problems are outlined in order to provide a framework for the analysis of the four policy situations. In the first three cases, the iii decision-making indicates the predominance of the bureaucracy's cybernetic conduct. In the last instance, the attempts of the Prime Minister to impose rational/analytical decision-making on the policy process caused him to actively circumvent the bureaucracy within Canada, but he was bested by external forces. The thesis of this monograph is that Canadian nuclear arms control policy for much of this period was reactive, limited to well-crafted rhetoric, and oblivious to the changing nature of the strategic environment. The reasons for this policy behavior may be traced to external constraints imposed by the dynamics of the international system, the nonrationality of the nuclear world, and the weakness of Canada's influence vis-a-vis the superpowers. As well, the importance of not alienating the United States by too forceful a criticism was an essential consideration in the policy process due to the many issues of contention that already existed between Canada and the United States, and the vulnerablity of Canada in economic terms to the negative reactions of its North American neighbour. When the Prime Minister did try to set policy and actively change the nuclear world via his personal peace initiative, the same factors and forces proved to be his undoing. In addition, the reactions on the international scene by some of the more powerful Western players indicate that Canada did not have the credibility to attempt such an influential role in the nuclear world. This response may have been prompted by Canada's minimal defence spending in recent years, or it may well have been the fate of a middlepower trying to exert influence in areas where the other nations were loathe to accept it. TABLE OF CONTENTS iv Page ABSTRACT ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT vi CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER II: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CANADIAN ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND CANADIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE NUCLEAR WORLD 10 The Development of Strategic Environment (11); The Development of the Policy Environment (14); Trudeaus Early Attitude Towards the Nuclear World (23); The Nuclear Arms Race (27). CHAPTER III: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS 32 The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Ottawa (33); Problems of Rational' Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: Some Theoretical Considerations (44); Problems of Rational' Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: Structural Considerations (56); Decision-making and the Forging of Canadian Arms Control Policy (60). CHAPTER IV: ARMS CONTROL DIPLOMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSIONS ON DISARMAMENT 66 Canadian Arms Control Policy at the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (68); The Intervening Years: 1979-1981 (80); Canadian Ar ms Control Policy at the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (93). V CHAPTER V: CANADIAN ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND THE CRUISE MISSILE TESTS: AN EXERCISE IN PRIORITY MANAGEMENT 106 The Multi-Faceted Cruise Missile: Nuclear War-Fighting Weapon, Arms Control Bargaining Chip, or Reassurance for NATO? (109); Theoretical Aspects of the ALCM Testing Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making (117); Structural Aspects of the Decision to Test the ALCM: An Analysis of Policy-Making (123); The Prime Minister and the Cruise Missile: The Difficulties for A Rational Man in the Nuclear World (137); Canada and the ALCM Tests: The Defensive Motivations of the Policy and Their Legacy (147). CHAPTER VI: THE PRIME MINISTERS PEACE INITIATIVE 156 Crisis-Inspired Activism (156); The Policy Development of the Peace Initiative (162); The Attempted Implementation of the Initiative (166); The Superpower's Response (183); The Prime Minister and the Peace Initiative: The Attempted Reassertion of Rational Analysis (192); The Initiative in Retrospect (200). CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON CANADIAN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICIES CITATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY GLOSSARY 212 224 302 317 vl This work could not have been completed without the consistent support, unfailing encouragement and true generosity of my dear parents, Michael and Lorraine Goldie, and my husband, Matthew Colclough. Many of my friends are also due thanks. My advisor, Douglas Ross, showed both great patience and unending willingness to aid me in the long process that has culminated in this thesis. Paul Marantz and Lynda Erickson were helpful in their suggestions and most gracious in their final reading of this paper. To all of them. I owe a debt that words alone cannot describe, for they helped me to accomplish something that I often doubted I could do. But this weighty tome is finally finished and I dedicate it with love and great affection to them all. And, as well, to Violet Colclough and Margaret Goldie — whose memories will never dim. 1 Chapter I: INTRODUCTION This monograph evaluates Canadian nuclear arms control policy between 1978 and 1984. Selected examples of the governments statements, actions, rationales, and motivations in the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, the controversy over the decision to test the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and Prime Minister Trudeau's personal peace initiative are examined. The thesis of this work is that during the period under review Canadian policy-makers regarded the issues of nuclear arms control as important and deserving of the governments consideration and energy, but not to the point where they would interfere with the government's pursuit of other objectives, or where their promotion would cause friction either within the nation, or between Canada and valued allies. The government's arms control policies were riddled with anomalies and contradictions as alliance demands, economic considerations, lack of independent strategic analysis, and an absence of widespread public interest took their toll. Furthermore, the advent of Ronald Reagan's presidency put serious restrictions on the range of possible arms control policies that Canada could advocate without causing a dangerous security policy rift with the United States.1 The change in the attitude and decision-making of the Prime Minister, as he grew more and more concerned about the dangers of nuclear catastrophe, will be contrasted with that of the bureaucracy, which was much less inclined to consider policy modifications, and much less open to perceptual change on nuclear questions. This dissertation assesses Trudeau's influence on the official Canadian treatment of a variety of nuclear arms 2 control issues, and demonstrates how the nuclear world forced an evolution of his rational/analytical model of decision-making.2 The personal priority that Pierre Elliott Trudeau gave to nuclear arms control between 1978 and 1984 went through several stages, beginning with his sagacious "suffocation" speech to the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, and culminating with his own "peace initiative" from September 1983 through February 1984. His efforts did not result in any tangible successes and his personal attempt to bring about some basic melioration of superpower tension came too late in his political career. His failure to make arms control a consistent priority throughout his term in office ensured that there was little institutional apparatus in place to support his crisis initiative of 1983-84. In light of Canada's limited influence in the nuclear world and the inherent restrictions on choosing a truly rational policy, it is debatable just how successful any Canadian arms control policy could be. Chapter II sketches the background or context that influenced the development of Canada's nuclear arms control policy. The deteriorating atmosphere of the international arena gave a major impetus to Trudeaus interest in nuclear arms control policy.^ Pierre Trudeaus growing involvement in the nuclear world is recounted in detail and set in the context of the superpowers' nuclear arms race dynamics. Chapter III outlines some of the major theoretical and structural problems of Canada's foreign policy decision-making. Subsequent chapters use this information to explain the interaction of Prime Minister Trudeau, the Canadian policy-making elite, and the nuclear world. Several decision-making theories and the difficulties caused by misperception and differing rationales are interpreted in this chapter to further a 3 comprehension of the concepts and perceptions that drove both Canadian foreign policy-making and the arms race. In order to understand the environment that shapes foreign policy, the sources of influence and their relative strength will be described. Chapter III also analyzes the formulation of foreign policy regarding specific issues of nuclear arms control, and how the decisions pertinent to this area are made. The question is raised whether rational decision-making is even possible given the competing restrictions on the policy-makers" time, consideration, and political loyalties, and the demands due to personal bias and bureaucratic influences.4 In addition, the irrationality inherent in the nuclear world may inhibit the development of appropriate policies.^ Chapter IV examines Prime Minister Trudeau's suggestions for arms control at the first and second United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, and includes a survey of, and official commentary on, related events during the intervening years. When these statements are compared with official actions, it becomes apparent that the government was willing to supply the appropriate rhetoric, yet allowed bureaucratic momentum and incremental decision-making in arms control to continued Canada's noncontroversial diplomatic work and its policy suggestions were always well within the modest confines of what was deemed to be appropriate behavior, in light of Canada's minor status in the nuclear world. As the danger accelerated and the superpowers' strained relationship grew ever more acrimonious, Prime Minister Trudeau focused on the issue and became more personally involved in the policy-making process. The tension created between Trudeau's desire for fully rational decision-making and the somewhat irrational demands of the nuclear world is apparent in his explanations supporting the testing of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, 4 which is examined in Chapter V. The bureaucracy's natural tendency towards either maintaining the status quo or "disjointed incrementalism" is evident in the decision-making regarding this policy7 However, there were the first glimmers of an attempt by some policy-makers to deal more comprehensively with the extraordinary demands of the nuclear world. This process, which may be described by the term "mixed scanning", was used to a greater extent in the decision-making involved in the peace initiative.^ In both the controversy over the Cruise missile tests, and the peace initiative, which is examined in Chapter VI, Trudeau used his personal power to support his policy goals. However, due to external developments, the nature of those goals and his method of pursuing them changed.9 While the divisive issue of the Cruise tests involved bureaucratic politics, Trudeaus peace initiative saw the reassertion of a modified rational actor or analytical style of decision-making, with elements of innovation that had hitherto been missing in Canadian arms control policy. While the actions of Trudeau and his policy-makers may be criticized, one must not forget that Canadian attempts at arms control have met with fragmented domestic and international support. The Canadian electorate has never indicated that such attempts should be given priority over such considerations as economic prosperity, employment, the cohesion of the Western Alliance, and the perceived demands of national security.*** Nuclear arms control was only one of many difficult issues on which the Canadian government had to develop policy. The optimal arms control policy had to be successful without deleterious consequences to the other issues on the governments agenda. Formulating substantive arms control policies that were acceptable to all was difficult. The common ground was limited to vague generalities while the middle road was narrow, hemmed in 5 by demands for comprehensive verification, exact parity, and ideological conversions. One of the difficulties in assessing the Canadian Government's attitude towards arms control is that the rhetoric found in official statements and speeches is often overly optimistic or effusive. While that is understandable in light of the need to maintain political support for the government's stance, it does not facilitate comprehension of the actual attitude of the policymakers.11 Their long-term intentions, as opposed to their stated goals, are often far from clear. It may well be that the long-term views were never fully developed. The vagaries of the political world do not facilitate planning very far in advance. Due to the nature of the nuclear world, where ongoing changes in technology and superpower politics cause numerous fluctuations in content and attitudes, Canadian arms control policy was often more reactive than trend-setting. It is difficult to include all possible influential variables regarding the formulation of Canadian arms control policy. Various restrictions must be taken into consideration when approaching any topic as complex and convoluted as this one. There are certain points that may be considered relevant to an examination of this area, but due to the limited nature of this analysis, they are beyond the scope of this study. Both these exclusions and a number of generalizations have been made in the interests of brevity.^ In formulating Canadian arms control policy after 1979, two obvious points had to be considered. The growing militaristic mood of the American public was epitomized by the widespread support for Ronald Reagan. The new President's policies guaranteed an inhospitable climate for any arms control suggestions that did not coincide with American thinking. Innovative ideas would not meet with favour if they were based on a different analysis 6 of the superpowers' relationship. Given the close economic ties between Canada and the US, it had to be a priority of the government to avoid any policies that might cause a backlash. *3 There were many issues of contention between Canada and its American neighbour during the period under examination. The problem of the nuclear arms race was by no means the only one facing the Canadian Government.14 The pressures moderating Canadian arms control policies were not restricted to phenomena that were easily dealt with. The Reagan Administration has been characterized by a hostile attitude towards arms control, in that old treaties are rigorously examined for flaws, and any new accords are subjected to a variety of stringent requirements.^ Any external attempts to alleviate this attitude had to be very diplomatic, or risk making the situation worse. It is necessary to look far beyond Canadian borders and Canadian domestic influences if one is to understand what Canadian arms control initiatives must take into consideration. For instance, Canadian membership in NATO connotes support for its official policy of "flexible response', which requires that NATO retain the option of responding to a conventional attack in Europe with nuclear weapons. The Canadian Government cannot advocate a "no first use" stance regarding nuclear weapons without directly disowning the Alliance's strategic policy. This is but one of many examples of the external constraints influencing Canadian arms control initiatives and official attitudes. Because this essay is an examination and evaluation of Canadian responses to policies, politics and crises of the nuclear world in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an effort has been made to put Canadian nuclear arms control actions in context. This effort requires some understanding and 7 explanation of the superpower nuclear rivalry, which in turn requires some degree of familiarity with American strategic doctrine and weaponry. Thus this thesis will explore the convoluted rationales that structure the nuclear world, and the technological and political developments that dictate arms control. American strategic doctrine continues to be a matter of heated debate. The United States' stated deterrence policy for years has been Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, although it did not theoretically become a reality until strategic parity Was achieved in the early 1970s, and both sides had the supposed ability to respond to any nuclear attack in kind, creating such destruction in retaliation as to make the initial move valueless. In such a counter-value attack, the aggressor's population is targeted, as it is vulnerable and equated with having an irreplaceable value. This targeting response to an all-out first strike makes sense since most of the enemy's silos and airfields would be empty. The stand-off of mutually hostage populations was reinforced in 1972 by a limitation on anti-ballistic missile defence. The basis for this policy is that the threat of retaliation should preclude any rational leader from ordering a nuclear attack. The difficulty in understanding and rationally responding to the nuclear world is most apparent when one considers recent revelations from requests under the United States Freedom of Information Act. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, actual strategic targeting in the United States has "always contained a wide variety of targets, including military targets, and that flexibility and an ability to control the escalation process have been official requirements" for well over two decades.^ This dichotomy between declaratory and actual US nuclear war plans supports the conclusion that a major characteristic of the nuclear world is schizophrenia, in light of the 8 catastrophic risks of extermination inherent in the nuclear arsenals. For a variety of reasons, the strategy of MAD has been the subject of controversy over the years, and critics of this strategy actually gained ascendency with the advent of the Reagan administration. These critics believe that present and future technological advances in strategic weaponry, combined with a growing Soviet armament, have undercut the logic of MAD. They question the credibility of MAD and in so doing doubt its deterrent value. They advocate a counterforce targeting strategy to cripple the Soviet military, political and industrial capabilities. It requires the appearance of being able to actually use the weapons in a limited, "defensive "war. ^ Depending on the view of the proponent, this is to give credibility through flexibility to the retaliation threat or to prepare for the inevitable clash with the Soviet Union. There are numerous indications that American strategic policy is being shaped by a belief that a nuclear war-fighting and winning capability is a necessary attribute in today's world. Just what that policy is and what it legitimizes in the way of force structuring and utilization has serious consequences for the stability of world order. Mutual assured destruction, no matter how unappealing to the morality of some and the military aspirations of others, should be the guiding rationale for nuclear strategy. The nature of nuclear weaponry makes the practice of planning policy scenarios for limited nuclear usage dangerous in that it may minimize the decision-makers' perceptions of the terrible consequences of any nuclear exchange. Counterforce strategy, accompanied by weapons of great accuracy, speed and lower explosive yield, makes nuclear war both more thinkable and more possible. The reality of a nightmarish holocaust is transformed into an illusory strategic policy choice. It is too risky to assume that a nuclear war can be kept limited.^ The 9 arms race is driven by a strategy that demands that one always strive for advantage, and sees the barriers to better war-fighting weaponry as technological challenges to be overcome. When the vast waste of money and human effort expended on counterforce strategy is added to these considerations, that strategy is shown to be as flawed as it is dangerous. The dilemma of what to do should deterrence fail would be better resolved by the use of arms control to minimize the danger of instability caused by the arms race rather than by attempts to develop limited nuclear options. 19 When deterrence depends on ever more sophisticated war-fighting options, far-reaching arms control policies are not facilitated. Comprehensive arms control can limit the competition and channel the rivalry into less dangerous weaponry, force postures, and strategies. The purpose of arms control should be to reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons usage by structuring, restraining, and legislating what weapons are acceptable to maintain the balance of terror that is deterrence.20 Through bilateral cooperation in arms control, the superpowers can moderate and direct their relationship so that the arms race is limited, crisis stability achieved and deterrence maintained. Seen in this light, it is a worthy objective of Canadian foreign policy to further that process. As this paper progresses, it will become apparent that the theoretical and structural problems of policy-making are such that they alone may be sufficient to confound a rational policy process. When the demands of deterrence and the politics of the nuclear world are added, rational decision-making in arms control seems almost impossible. 10 Chapter II: The Historical Context of Canadian Arms Control Policy, and Canadian Perceptions of the Nuclear World In order to understand Canadian arms control policy between 1978 and 1984, some historical context is necessary. For the purposes of this paper, the terms "strategic environment" and "policy environment" are used to describe the conditions which influenced the political and strategic choices regarding arms control. The strategic environment was affected by mutual superpower misperceptions, the inherent technological impetus behind the arms race, and the expanding nuclear world, in that nuclear weapons were "used" to further a variety of political and strategic aims. The policy environment was influenced by a number of factors, many of them developments within Canada that had an impact on the way arms control policy was formulated, the issues that were taken into consideration, and the manner in which pertinent analysis was conducted. Both environments are inextricably linked in their influence on Canadian arms control policy, but they are described separately here to ensure a clear picture of their distinctive effects. Various Canadian writers assert that Canada is in a unique position because it deliberately chose in the early days of the nuclear world to forego the building of nuclear weapons, despite the fact that it was a leader in the development of nuclear technology. Canada was involved in the Manhattan Project and much of the initial British nuclear research took place at the Chalk River reseach facilities in Ontario. Canadian uranium was used in the first nuclear bombs and vast amounts of uranium were produced for subsequent American and British bombs. i l This involvement gave Canada a status apart from that of the other nonnuclear nations. In 1946, Canada joined the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the United Nations' Atomic Energy Commission, and was subsequently given a seat at all the multilateral arms control and disarmament conferences.1 However powerless, Canada was a partner in the development of the nuclear world. Canada's involvement in NATO and NORAD was, and is, important for Canadian arms control policy-making.2 Arms control may be influenced by what happens in these two security organizations, as the perceptions and corresponding measures taken within these fora are often the catalysts for new weapons.^ The Development of the Strategic Environment Due to its close ties to, and dependency upon, other nations, the nature of the international environment has always been very important to Canada. The 1949 establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was valued for a number of reasons. Not only did it codify the requirements for global stability and security for Canada in light of the Soviet threat, but its multilateral nature was perceived as a way to offset the uneven bilateral relationship on the North American continent4 In the immediate post-war period, the Canadian government had been most uneasy about American plans for a continuation of their large presence in the Canadian north.^ The American military's recommendation for the speedy construction of an air defence system was deemed by the then Prime Minister and several of his advisors to be unnecessarily ambitious, but they were not opposed to limited collaboration.^ As will be noted in the section on the policy environment, there were 12 differences of opinion between members of the policy-making elite in the United States and Canada about the nature of the Soviet threat. Many in Canada believed that the American view was unduly pessimistic.^ However. one analyst's focus on the Canadians' political attempts to use the military interpretation of that threat for their own purposes reveals important aspects of the strategic environment. The liberal-internationalists had used anti-communism as a domestic weapon to secure consent to what was hoped to be a form of collective security within a broader framework of a stable international order and a more liberal world economy. What they got was a anti-Soviet alliance under American domination; a reconstructed world economy in which Canada became ever more dependent on its powerful and wealthy neighbour; and a world rigidly bifurcated between two bellicose superpowers armed with nuclear weapons, leaving a more and more problematic role for middlepowers like Canada with an interest in peace.** Both the maintenance of NATO's collective security and the United States' leadership in the nuclear world became influential considerations in the making of Canada's foreign and defence policy. Their importance was heightened by a variety of developments beyond Canada's control. Geography made Canadian participation in the early stages of American continental defence planning unavoidable, although it was not always a given that the method would be determined primarily by the United States.^ However, a variety of technological and political developments changed the strategic environment and ensured Canada's inability to act independently in this area.*® Canadian participation with the United States in continental defence led to a tradition of joint efforts that combined military interaction with a common perception of the threat. 13 After the US lost its monopoly in nuclear weapons, Canada joined its southern neighbour in building first the Pinetree Line, a string of air defence radar stations along their mutual border, and then the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in northern Canada.11 The air defence forces of the two countries worked in close cooperation yet remained under separate commands. Yet, as David Cox points out, the implications of these developments in terms of strategic ramifications were not always appreciated by the Canadians. In the two years prior to the formation of NORAD, both Parliament and the Department of External Affairs "appeared quite unaware or uninformed of the military plans and doctrines of which continental air defence was a part."12 The 1958 formation of the North American Air Defence Command, an integrated command and control defensive system for the continent under a US commander-in-chief, was due to a number of assumptions based on the belief that the advent of Soviet strategic airpower posed a grave threat to North America. These assumptions included the recognition that participation in continental defence was the best way to maintain Canadian sovereignty, and that the most effective defence required an integrated apporach.1^ Historically, Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD was inevitable. The experience of the second World War, the nature of a feared future war, concepts of the threat, geopolitical rationales, and American nuclear leadership led inexorably to a perception that these alliances were the most sensible options. Current participation is valuable in that it enhances political and strategic influence to a degree, while the existence of like-minded moderates in NATO can work to offset an overwhelming American domination. The cost-sharing element of the defence burden and 14 the assurances afforded to national sovereignty are not benefits to be taken lightly. The access to decision-making that membership affords varies according to the nature of the topic, and the analyst. Participation in these alliances should not affect Canadian arms control objectives negatively, yet the political need to maintain the unity of the alliance and the military's loyalty to the transgovernmental nature of these organizations has had grave implications for Canadian policy-making. The Development of the Policy Environment There are varying interpretations regarding how willingly the Canadian decision-making! elite accepted the implicit American influence in their policy environment as the Cold War began to gather impetus.14 However, as two commentators on this debate have pointed out, the policy elite's attitudes were only part of the equation. Canada's postwar foreign policy orientation as a Western ally was virtually determined by a large number of realities—the rigid bipolar structure of the postwar system, geographical fact, its wartime and earlier historical linkages, its political and economic structure and by public attitudes. ^ For a variety of reasons, Canada's defence policy incorporated a general acceptance of the American interpretation of the nuclear world, and a corresponding adherence to their prescriptions on how best to contain the nuclear threat.1** However, Canada did not condone or support the use of the nuclear threat by the United States, believing this to be a dangerous policy.1^ The policy environment went through a variety of changes as external and internal factors exerted different influences. In order to understand past Canadian priorities and perceptions regarding arms control, 15 Michael Tucker's classification of activist and conservative phases in Canadian arms control efforts is helpful. From 1947 to 1959, and from 1963 to 1968, the conservative trend was dominant, characterized by a degree of realistic pessimism regarding the chances of successful disarmament. Thus the strategies of deterrence and flexible response enunciated by NATO, and the defensive promise of NORAD, were seen as crucial. Arms control was to be supported only in tandem with the Allies, whose security was not to be compromised by unilateral Canadian diplomatic efforts.18 The periods 1959-1963 and 1968-1978 were eras of activist behavior both within multilateral forums, and with other nonnuclear states in order to promote concrete, substantive, albeit still fairly limited, arms control agreements. Tucker believes that the accompanying idealistic revulsion regarding nuclear weapons was due to a moral antipathy towards the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, and a fear that the very tenuous balance of terror was at great risk due to ongoing technical and political developments. Between 1978-1984, this fear was fed by the development of nuclear weapons that were theoretically well-suited for fighting a war.19 Tucker sees three basic determinants of behavior variation during the periods he examines. He lists these as: the existence of "activist spokesmen at the senior political and diplomatic levels"; the "availability of technological or legal expertise, or economic power, to strengthen activist diplomacy"; and the "nature of the international diplomatic environment [defined by the scope for] Canadian manoevrability and the particular arms control issue under debate."20 The Canadian policy environment and arms control efforts were often overtaken or shaped by developments in the strategic environment. Attempts to chart an independent course were moderated by the belief that 16 alliance membership was necessary21 The reasons for and methods of joining the alliances established acceptable patterns of policy-making. The subsequent respective demands of NATO and NORAD had important impacts on the decision-makers' control over Canadian behavior when it interacted with those demands. The multilateral nature of the NATO alliance was attractive to the Canadian policy-makers for a number of reasons.22 Accordingly, the responsibilities of being an alliance member made themselves felt in a variety of circumstances over the years. The manner in which NATO, and to a greater extent NORAD, were entered into established an acceptable standard of executive action in such matters. The intergovernmental discussions regarding NATO, described by Lester Pearson as a "highly important change in Canadian foreign policy", were kept a secret from the Cabinet for seven months 2^ While the need for secrecy may well have been legitimate, it is interesting that this excluded much of the Canadian government. The demands of national security were heightened by the perceptions of the Soviet threat24 The discussions behind the building of the integrated early warning radar system in the early 1950s were mostly between American and Canadian military officials, and the ensuing recommendations were adopted by executive action within Canada. All the agreements were announced in Parliament, with no debate on the actual policy, despite its serious implications and great cost to the taxpayer.2^ Such precedent-setting, both in terms of the minimal Canadian political input into such major policy decisions, and the acceptance of American strategic planning, had important implications for future independent policy analysis and action. The creation of NORAD in the late 1950s was accomplished with a 17 similar lack of public knowledge or Parliamentary input. Diefenbaker made the decision himself and only then informed the Cabinet26 The subsequent Parliamentary debate on NORAD was held one month after the executive agreement had been established by an exchange of diplomatic notes. It is apparent that no one "grasped that air defence might be seen as a vital part of a war-fighting doctrine".2'' Since the use of Canadian territory was an important requirement in the early warning phase of defence against the Soviet bomber forces, Canada was of apparently equal value in the NORAD system. In theory, Canada was to be consulted on all matters involving NORAD. However, the issuance of orders, without the knowledge of the Canadian Government, that placed the American forces in NORAD on alert as the Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head gives some indication that Canada did not, and may not, have the special status imagined. The issue of Canadian political control and sovereignty within NORAD was raised when the Canadian military followed its American counterpart's lead by going on alert some 42 hours before the Diefenbaker government authorized such action.28 The differences in Canadian and American perceptions of the world and the resulting variations in their attitudes towards political and military solutions were brought into sharp relief by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Prime Minister Diefenbaker was very cautious about accepting the American analysis of the situation as he at first believed the US was overreacting.29 Matters were not helped by the fact that all high level communication was limited to the military level 3° In retrospect, one Canadian commentator believes the lack of consultation is easily explained. "(lit was assumed that the Canadian government, as a political-military unit, would view its national security interests as identical to those of the United States and would 18 therefore act to safeguard them by automatically supporting the American position"?* Diefenbaker's initial reluctance to act led to his proposal for a neutral inspection team and the delay in giving unequivocal support to the alert of the Canadian contingent in NORAD. Canada also denied permission for nuclear-equipped American squadrons to enter Canada, or for the squadrons based in Canada to be nuclear-armed.^2 The Cuban controversy focused attention on more than the potential limits to Canadian power in NORAD during a crisis. The impotence of Canada's unarmed nuclear weapons systems and the unresolved problems regarding their "nuclearization" was brought clearly to the fore of the government's agenda. The Diefenbaker Government's decision in 1959 to replace the Canadian Avro Arrow interceptor programme with the American Bomarc A anti-bomber missile had been the first step in a chain of policy decisions that eventually highlighted Canada's inability to control the strategic environment's effects on its policy-making. The weapons systems had been originally accepted "without full cabinet consideration or understanding of the nuclear implications, primarily as a consequence of the close relations between the Canadian and American bureaucracies."^ The cancellation of the Avro Arrow program also negated the opportunity for a high technology defence industry in Canada and set the stage for a deeper convergence of Canadian and American strategic perceptions induced by a fuller integration of the defence production bases of the two countries. The policy controversy that arose over whether Canada should "go nuclear" in the early 1960s is a good example of how the demands of the nuclear world can impinge on Canadian policy-making to the point that independent action is close to impossible, in light of the potential costs of 19 such behavior. Peyton Lyon argues that the controversy weakened Canada's international standing, had serious negative effects on North'American relations, caused a Cabinet crisis for the Prime Minister, and was the focal point in the 1963 elections which saw the defeat of the established government.^4 The controversy hinged on whether or not Canada should accept nuclear ammunition, under the control of the United States, for four nuclear weapons systems which the government had already obtained or had on order for the Canadian forces in Europe and the anti-bomber defenses in Canada. The dispute was partly technical; most military authorities were agreed about the necessity for nuclear weapons but some had doubts about the efficiency...or the usefulness and appropriateness of the military roles which Canada had undertaken.^ Other problems included the effects on national sovereignty of joint control, especially in light of the already large "domination" of the United States in Canadian cultural and economic spheres 36 Some, like the External Affairs Minister Howard Green, expressed reservations due to a belief that Canada's reputation as a champion of disarmament would be compromised.^ ^ David Cox points out that External Affairs' custom of deferring to the military expertise of the Department of National Defence ensured that the latter's interpretation of the best weaponry would prevail. Given the strong commitment of the Royal Canadian Air Force to supporting and cooperating with the Pentagon in air defence, it is no surprise that the political pitfalls inherent in these decisions were not of paramount importance to the Canadian military.^8 The Bomarc A missiles were designed for use with either a conventional or nuclear warhead but the Bomarc B, which the government had promised to acquire in due time, were not dual capable. In his memoirs, the Prime Minister asserted that he had believed that he had 20 retained the option to use only conventional warheads .39 The government also acquired three other weapons systems for its alliance duties: the Honest John missiles, and the CF-104 Starfighters, both developed for use with nuclear capabilities. The Starfighter changed the role of the Canadian air division in Europe from defence to a tactical nuclear strike-reconnaissance mission, although it was not a sensible move 4® The Government also agreed to acquire CF 101 Voodooo planes for the RCAF squadrons in NORAD. While nuclear-armed at the American bases, they came equipped to Canada with conventional weapons. Many experts believed that they could only obtain maximum efficiency with nuclear weapons.41 The Liberal Party had echoed the Conservative Government's opposition to nuclear weapons in Canada until early 1963. After much hesitating, and contradictory messages, Lester Pearson reversed his stand and said that Canada must honour its commitments and accept nuclear warheads for the weapons. He was influenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis and the growing public attitude that defence policy on nuclear weapons had to be clarified 4 2 In addition, fears of economic repercussions from the US were growing in business circles 4^ Pearson asserted that failure to make a "full contribution" to the common defence of the western alliance would make Canada's voice and influence in the cause of world peace "negligible"44 International, domestic and economic pressures forced the Liberals to develop a new perception of the nuclear world. In 1963, Diefenbaker refused to arm the weapons systems with nuclear warheads, despite strong pressure from the United States and the NATO allies, the Liberal Opposition, and a Cabinet coalition led by his Minister of Defence4^ The Prime Minister's refusal resulted in some heavy-handed American attempts to force his decision.46 The final blow 21 came when the Minister of National Defence resigned and the government was defeated on a vote of non-confidence. It is difficult to know what motivated Diefenbaker in this particularly tortuous policy process. His initial inattentiveness had led him to acquire weapons that had to be nuclear-armed, a fact which he apparently did not realize until it was politically too late to change the agreement with the United States. The real reluctance of Diefenbaker to allow Canada to "go nuclear" may have been enhanced by the animosity between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister, but his subsequent difficulties in managing the problematical issue were compounded by the clash between his priorities and what was viable in terms of the domestic constituency. The Liberals won the ensuing election, albeit by a narrow margin, stressing the importance of Canada first honouring its commitments, and only then examining the possibility of revising the nuclear aspect. Opposition from the New Democratic Party and some small yet concerned groups within the public continued, but the government proceeded to acquire the nuclear weapons. David Cox's study of the relevant decision-making leads him to condemn "the failure of political awareness'. The Government was made to "appear ineffective and unable to determine its own policy", as prior policy decisions and equipment choices had been made without a thorough study of their likely involvement with, and effects on, the strategic environment.4^ Several analysts have pointed out that the tradition of having someone else do their strategic analysis is "ingrained in the Canadian military", as first the British and then the Americans played dominant roles in determining the threat to, and subsequent response of. Canada 4 8 Alliance responsibilities, technological impetus, inadequate or biased 22 analysis, bureaucratic politics, and the demands of the nuclear world left Canada confused and to a large extent powerless. Such pressures eroded Canada's ability to make decisions without regard for external pressures and were felt throughout Canada's short history in the nuclear world. The success of the factors that led to nuclear-armed Canadian forces should be remembered, as the rationale used would have echoes of influence between 1978 and 1984. As with NORAD, the 1959 and 1963 Defence Production Sharing Agreements (DPSA) between the US and Canada were preceded by little non-governmental input, although they were to have long-term effects on the Canadian economy and military interests. Their economic ramifications became considerations in the policy environment and led to inadvertent involvement in some of the more controversial aspects of American military strategy 4 9 Through these arrangements, Canadian defence industries are guaranteed access to the American defence market and the tariffs of the Buy America Act are not applicable. Furthermore, Canadian firms are allowed access to pertinent classified material and may apply for American research and development grants. Stephen Clarkson describes the arrangements as part of the bargain that the United States was willing to make, in return for Canadian acquiescence to the American lead in continental defence planning.^ While Canadian involvement in the DPSA was initially seen as an astute move from an economic view, and "an opportunity to recapture some of the high-tech jobs in the aerospace industry", it was not without cost, as Ernie Regehr and Mel Watkins have pointed out. The United States agreed to open their military market to Canada due to their firm belief that "integration of the military industries of the two countries would ultimately 23 serve the interests of policy integration."^ Such integration imposes restrictions on Canadian arms control policy, as tacit agreement with the overall nuclear strategy of the US is linked with the economic health of the Canadian military industry. The OPSA has resulted in Canada being the source of some of the components of the American nuclear arsenal ^2 In fact, the Canadian taxpayer is actually involved in funding some of these efforts through grants to these companies.^ ^ The strategic and policy environments have had important long-term effects on the potential for developing Canadian arms control priorities and Canada's place in the nuclear world. An in-depth analysis of the policy environment in terms of the sources of input and the actual policy-making process will be discussed in Chapter III. Trudeau's Early Attitude Towards the Nuclear World In 1963, Pierre Elliott Trudeau had been infuriated by Lester Pearson's abrupt change in nuclear policy. He saw this action as both a betrayal of Liberal beliefs, and as an indication of American meddling in Canadian affairs.^4 The 1968 election of the Liberals under Pierre Elliott Trudeau seemed to herald a new era in Canadian politics, as the charismatic prime minister challenged the country to seek a new destiny. In the early years of the Trudeau era, Canada pursued several aims at the mutlilateral Geneva arms control negotiations. According to George Ignatieff, the Canadian representative then, these included the search for a compromise between the proposals of the superpowers, the identification of arms control issues that could be guaranteed a responsive audience, and the use of the discussions and the United Nations General Assembly to educate the public 24 and create support for a cessation of the arms race.^ Trudeau reversed Pearsons policy in 1969 when he announced that Canada would pursue a reduced, nonnuclear role in NATO. To that end, he scheduled the phasing out of the nuclear weapons systems that the Canadian Armed Forces had under their control and halved Canadian forces in Europe. In 1972, in line with Trudeaus directive, the Starfighters were relieved of their nuclear mission. By the early 1970s, the only Canadian nuclear weapons were those on board the Voodoo CF-101 interceptors as part of Canada's contribution to NORAD. The Prime Minister's plan to reduce Canadian forces in Europe was met with alarm there. The extent of Canadian involvement in NATO is relevant in an assessment of the European reception to their arms control policies. Canada's military representation in Europe has declined since 1970 and the impact of this change has been a matter of some contention. Some have said that Canada is shirking its responsibilities, with a resulting decline of influence within the Alliance. Others maintain that Canadian defence spending would be better allocated towards protecting the country's sovereignty, and that the fairly small Canadian contingent in Europe is an adequate symbol of its willingness to honour its treaty obligations, if necessary. In light of past experience, Canada's ability to promote its policies of arms control may well be influenced by the regard in which the country is held by its allies The linkage that often limits the attempts at arms control may be clearly demonstrated by a closer look at this issue. In 1972 Trudeau saw the so-called "Third Option" as a means of curtailing American involvement in the Canadian economy. Instead of preserving the status quo or allowing Canadian and American ties to become even closer, the government 25 proposed 'a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability."^ In 1974, official attempts were made to strengthen Canadian economic links with Europe and be "differentiated" from the US. These attempts failed, in part, because the European adherence to the trade rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was so strong. However, West Germany made it very clear that it would not even consider such an idea without a stronger military commitment from Canada.^8 In the mid 1970s, Canada "rediscovered the importance of alliance membership in pursuit of the Third Option", and set about trying to re-establish its credibility with its allies In October 1969, Trudeau had opened the debate on national policy with a statement that personified his personal optimism. No single international activity rates higher priority in the opinion of this government than the pursuit of effective arms control and arms limitation agreements. Canada refuses to submit without protest to the present nuclear hegemony.60 In 1970, the White Paper on Foreign Policy was issued with the intent of outlining the priorities and future plans of Trudeau's new regime. The White Paper asserted that the Government had "no illusions about the limitations of its capacity to exert decisive or even weighty influence in consultations or negotiations involving the great powers."61 However, it stated clearly that both Canadian ideas and views would be promoted in discussions concerning global peace and security. While these expressions of concern seemed to promise an activist approach, the declaratory policy was not backed up with substantive action. The White Paper urged greater attention to the economic aspects of external relations, like trade, and thus changed the middlepower, quiet diplomacy focus of Pearson's era to a 26 philosophy based more on economic growth and cost-effectiveness. The 1971 Defence White Paper stated that "the only major military threat to Canada" was "a catastrophic war between the super powers". The best way to prevent such a war was the maintenance of "a system of stable mutual deterrence" by way of the military alliances and collective security arrangements in which Canada participated.62 The foreign policy and defence reviews were the first indications that Trudeau was hoping to incorporate his belief in the values of policy reform, structural innovation and rationality into the decision-making process. He seemed to think that the problems in these areas could be diminished as long as one had the proper systems in place and general priority pronouncements as guidelines. This insular view discounted the overwhelming influences of the external world, and its apparent premise that all that Canada's external relations needed was good management and rational guidance ignored the anarchical nature of the international system and the powerful irrationality of the nuclear world. Trudeaus great confidence in both his leadership skills and Canadian abilities to triumph over adversity was apparent in the White Papers' statements regarding Canada's potential power. However, ten years after he first took office as Prime Minister his optimism had declined due to numerous failures to translate his theories into practise.6 ^ Canadian arms control policies had to contend with a major problem in the late seventies and early eighties when the system of stable mutual deterrence and military alliances was threatened by a variety of technological and political developments. Discussions where Canadian views could be promoted became increasingly polarized as the superpowers and their respective allies drew further apart on issues of arms control and 27 perceptions of each other's intentions. The Nuclear Arms Race Canadian arms control suggestions and policies cannot be assessed or developed without regard for the constraints of the external world. The superpower rivalry may be traced to a number of different causes and exacerbating pressures. The nuclear arms race is only the most serious manifestation of the many-faceted competitive relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Perhaps if the strain caused by this area of rivalry was alleviated, an overall improvement in relations would result. Unfortunately, the considerations that drive this antagonistic interaction are not easily moderated, and the inherent distrust between these nuclear giants makes nuclear arms control very problematical. In addition, their differing technological strengths, strategic doctrines, and military priorities make any common ground on which to even discuss arms control rare. Within the United States, such factors as the military-industrial complex, the scientific-technical complex, ideologically-inspired fear, technological momentum, a belief in the need to continually enhance deterrence, and inter-service competition all work to promote the continuing arms race. While it is harder to surmise which factors are influential in the Soviet Union, it is fair to state that some of the same forces are behind their arms build-up. It is the combination of theory racing to promote and rationalize acquisition, and research and development expanding to fill the gaps in capability that worst-case analysis can identify that gives each superpower two legs to arms-race with.64 John Steinbruner encapsulates one of the enduring hindrances to arms control when he notes that the "preferred moment for compromise has been different for each country." Historically, the major decisions regarding the 28 superpower's respective nuclear weapons have been "out of phase", as they take a decade or more for full implementation. These decisions, each made at different times, have "encouraged a sequential interaction between their respective weapon programs."^ The fundamental differences between the superpowers lead to differences in their perspectives on arms control, the requirements of a stable deterrence, and the possibility of mutual trust. When assessing the atmosphere in which Canadian arms control policies operated, it is important to remember that the SALT Treaty of 1972 caused a lot of dissent over the nature of Soviet goals, the value of arms control, the requirements of verification and the overall role of nuclear weapons. Progress in arms control is often impeded by the fundamental issue of compliance, which is affected by subjective judgement. Thus the same evidence can lead to different conclusions, depending on ones view.66 Towards the end of the 1970s, there was growing concern within the United States that detente had been used by the Soviet Union to further its own agenda. Various calculations deemed the nuclear balance to be shifting in favour of the USSR, as the continued deployment of increasingly accurate and very powerful ground-based Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles were seen as endangering the survivability of their American counterparts. The modernization of the Soviet air defence system caused concern regarding the abilities of the aging American 8-52 bombers to penetrate Soviet airspace, as the strategy of counter-force targeting required. The MIR Ving of the Soviet missiles greatly narrowed the American lead in number of warheads. In addition, the Soviet Union began to deploy a new mobile intermediate range missile in Europe, the SS-20. for which NATO had no exact equivalent. All these developments were seen as cause for alarm, the degree of which depended on the bias of the analyst6^ 29 The American response to these problems included an enhanced nuclear war-fighting strategy, facilitated by technological developments in weapons that for the first time seemed to make fighting and winning a nuclear war a plausible policy choice 6 8 The doctrine of counterforce or military installation targeting had evolved over the years due to the perceptions of some strategic planners that the credibility of the American deterrence was undermined by the doubt that the US would respond to a limited attack with the whole strength of its massive nuclear might. The efficacy of the theory of mutual assured destruction was in doubt so the military moved, both in its weapon choices and its declaratory strategy, to a nuclear war fighting stance to enhance deterrence. The doctrine of limited nuclear options, announced in 1974, theoretically gave the US the ability to respond in a controlled manner to any level of hostility 6 9 Presidential Directive 59, implemented by Jimmy Carter in 1980. was meant to further enhance the credibility of the American war fighting deterrent/0 The 1980 Presidential election brought many changes with it. Reagan's platform had called for the fiscal 1981 military budget to almost double by 1985.71 The Reagan Administration became diligent in its revising of American strategy regarding nuclear war. In order to guarantee the safety of America and its allies, and to maintain the credibility of American threats of nuclear force, Reagan believed that superiority in nuclear weapons was necessary. In October 1981, the new President announced his plans to acquire the means by which to make the war-winning strategy a plausible reality. The strategic modernization program involved continuing the cruise missile programs, building 100 B-l bombers, deploying 100 MX missiles, improving command, 30 control, and communications systems, pushing ahead with the Trident submarine program and development of a larger, more accurate, and longer-range Trident-II (D-5) missile, placing cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships, and expanding the US defences against nuclear weapons/2 Reagan's plans were essential components in his National Security Decision Document 13, which went beyond PD-59 to require that the US have the ability to "prevail" in a "protracted" nuclear war73 Plans to enhance anti-submarine warfare, anti-satellite warfare, ballistic missile defence and the hardening and dispersal of "Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence" (C3I) facilities were also critical means of ensuring US warfighting abilities over an extended period/4 One of the most important developments, in terms of sending an ambiguous message to the Soviet Union, was the decision to deploy the very accurate, extremely lethal MX missile in vulnerable fixed silos. As Douglas Ross notes, this addition to the US strategic arsenal could plausibly be perceived as "a very strong first-strike counterforce option vis-a-vis most of the Soviet Union's land-based systems. Between 1980 and 1984, it was widely recognized that the Reagan Administration found the Soviet Union antithetical to the frame of reference that structured the White House's view of international relations. Thus trust, an essential requirement for developing a politically acceptable arms control regime, was almost impossible to develop. Reagan described the Soviet Union as "the evil empire" and his Government systematically accused the Soviets of arms control violations/6 Reagan's views on the Soviet Union were shared by many people in his government. Many of the top officials in the State Department, the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency belong, with the President, to the anti-Soviet Committee on the Present Danger 31 (CPD).77 President Ronald Reagan used much of the CPD's material in his decision-making on nuclear policy. The Committee is forthright in its opinion that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted in any way and that arms control policies based on parity are dangerous. The President was enamoured with the idea that the US had to negotiate from a position of strength and his massive rearmament program was deemed a vital prerequisite.78 The Soviet Union did not share Ronald Reagan's view of Americas weakness, and thus interpreted his actions as threatening and hostile. The situation fed the arms race and helped doom attempts at arms control to failure. From this brief overview it is apparent both that the initial formulation and any subsequent success of Canadian arms control policy depended on a vast array of considerations, many of which the decision-makers in the policy process did not control. The development of the strategic and policy environments as described above made Canadian involvement in the nuclear world inevitable. Due to a variety of factors, the tradition of following the American lead was established. Despite Prime Minister Trudeau's stated wishes to the contrary at the inception of his political career, Canadian defence and foreign policy regarding the nuclear world has been mainly reactive. The few attempts to chart an innovative course will be investigated in Chapters IV, V and VI. Chapter III will set the parameters for that analysis with an examination of the structure of the foreign policy-making process and a portrayal of the flaws and difficulties therein. CHAPTER III: 32 FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS This chapter will focus on the components of foreign policy decision-making in Canada, the influences on the process, and several models of decision-making which may be used to explain the formulation of the arms control policies under consideration in this paper. The following three chapters will describe the actual policies and where possible, explain important decision-making events using the concepts discussed in this chapter. The following portrayal of the Canadian foreign policy process designates the main inputs that influence the policy process.1 Inherent constraints on rationality' abound, as this study will demonstrate. Misperception and miscalculation occur with surprising regularity. One of the key questions addressed in this study is whether blame should be focussed on bureaucratic actors and lacunae, or on the person of the Prime Minister, given his widely acknowledged centrality in decision-making. A cursory review of some of the major theoretical interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy decision-making process is thus essential. Rational or analytical models of decision-making emphasize the role of the individual in policy calculations and ultimate choice. The bureaucratic politics approach examines individual behavior in its organizational role context. Both of these frameworks have special relevance for this study. The models are presented to test the effectiveness in accounting for the origins, evolution, and ultimately the demise of Canadian arms control. Elements of other decision-making theories are used when their explanatory value merits inclusion. 33 In order to identify the various influential components involved in the formulation of Canadian arms control policies, a synthesis of a variety of political analysts' views on the actual policy-making process is presented below. The Foreign Policy-Making Process In Ottawa While external restrictions limit Canadian foreign policy, including the policy elite's attitude towards nuclear arms control, the relative freedom from internal restraints that the government enjoys in its policy-making means that it has latitude within those limits.2 The opportunity for innovative policy is curtailed by the dynamics of the external nuclear world which created the dilemmas of arms control in the first placed While an exhaustive examination of all the actors involved in the foreign policy-making process is not the intent of this chapter, an effort is made to identify those sources of influence considered to have an decisive role in the process.4 Depending on the importance and nature of the issue, such an examination reveals the primary influence of the Prime Minister, the lesser roles of Cabinet, Parliament and the bureaucracy, and the still more remote impact of forces external to the government on either the consideration of the policy or the climate in which the policy was made. Prime Minister Trudeau's predominant authority over the foreign policy-making process rested upon the wide variety of powers inherent in his office. Not only did he appoint ministers, but he also structured "the upper echelons of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus'.^ He had control over the schedule and agenda of the Cabinet. The need for Cabinet consensus and his position as the final arbiter in any policy conflict ensured that his authority was well-entrenched. 34 His pre-eminence was also aided by external factors, like "the prevalence of summit diplomacy as a means of contemporary statecraft"6 Pierre Elliott Trudeaus forceful personality and his interest in international affairs ensured that when he was concerned about a particular issue, he used all the formal power he had.7 His restructuring of the general direction and actual apparatus of the foreign policy process left his imprint on foreign policy. One of Trudeau s first moves after being elected in 1968 was to conduct an extensive review of Canadian foreign policy. This exercise resulted in the 1970 publication of Foreign Policy for Canadians, which reordered the priorities for Canadian foreign policy, in the interests of making it more responsive to "national interestsHowever, since the White Paper enunciated very broad, general outlines for policy priorities, as opposed to specific directives, it could be interpreted to support a variety of not always mutually supportive policies. Trudeau had great confidence in his own abilities and was determined to break new ground in the process as well as in the content of Canadian foreign policy. In his first years in office, he had definite views on the need for a more realistic, pragmatic approach to policy-making that would facilitate a greater degree of rationality as well as implementation of his own carefully developed priorities.9 In order to bring about such a shift in the policy process, it was necessary for Trudeau to believe that "Canadian foreign policy could be purposive in its design and implementation, rather than reactive to international events and commitments".10 Given the limited nature of Canadian power to shape events in the international sphere, especially in the area of nuclear arms control, such a presumption was an inherent weakness in Trudeaus policy reform. The difficulties in expecting rationality in policy-making will be discussed later, but for now, it 35 is sufficient to say that they were, and are, myriad in nature. Trudeau recognized that structural changes were needed to implement his plans to change the philosophy and psychology of Canadian foreign policy-making. As Bruce Thordarson has pointed out, the new Prime Minister was "wary of the civil service and impatient with Parliament".11 He perceived the bureaucracy as wielding too much power in the policy process at the expense of Cabinet.12 He thus brought in reforms and innovations that did much to strengthen his direct influence in the policy-making process. For example, the Prime Ministers Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO), responsible for giving Trudeau political advice and policy analysis respectively, were enlarged and strengthened early in his first term, and their influence continued to increase over the years. ^ Such structural reforms did not always result in increased quality of advice. John Kirton posits that Trudeau's continual tinkering with the structure of the process, first strengthening the PCO and the PMO's abilities to deal with international affairs, and then developing the Department of External Affairs (DEA) as a central policy agency of the government, increased his level of involvement and influence in the formulation of policy.14 However, Stephen Clarkson asserts that the PCO had no capacity for strategic analysis of either foreign policy or Canadian-American relations, and that the PMO's policy advisory role declined after 1 9 7 D E A ' s responsibility as a central agency was, in theory, to analyze international issues, consider competing policy aims and then provide the other departments with clear "policy and priority guidance".16 However, as William Dobell points out, DEA's ability to coordinate and manage all aspects of the policies that impinged on Canada's external relations was severely limited by its inability to penalize any departments that did not heed its 36 directions.17 In the early 1980s, a move was made to further enhance Trudeaus power when the institutional structure of DEA was expanded to include the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC), thereby giving "greater priority to economic matters in the development of foreign policy".18 This reform integrated the political and economic aspects of foreign policy so that all functions of Canada's international relations were handled by the one department that was traditionally the Prime Minister's personal fiefdom.19 Yet once again, the theory did not lead to quite the reality envisaged, as morale sank, and confusion reigned in the enlarged department.20 As the new DEA was responsible for promoting both arms control and the Canadian defence industry, there were some unavoidable conflicts of interest21 There are several reasons why Trudeau failed to fully realize his aspirations for greater rationality in decision-making and policy formulation. The government's uncertainty about its specific goals meant that departments were not provided with explicit direction. Events, either of an international or domestic nature, often caused the government to develop ad hoc responses that negated any longer-term plans. The nature of the political game necessitated a degree of freedom in policy-making for individual ministers to ensure their continued support and personal success. Last but not least, federal-provincial relations made "a coherent national blueprint for action in any policy field...almost Utopian".22 According to Kim Nossal, the two members of Cabinet most involved in foreign policy, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), are the most influential forces in foreign policy decision-making 2 3 The influence of the SSEA no doubt changed over time, as different personalities caused variations in personal power and 37 fluctuations in the level of interest given any one issue 2 4 The Cabinet does occupy the central position in both deciding policy priorities, and in the actual formulation and implementation of foreign policy. However, each member has his "own parochial perceptions and priorities, shaped by their portfolios, the demands of their electoral and regional constituencies, the imperatives of their relations with their department officials and their own ambitions within Cabinet".2^ These factors are compounded by the "hierarchy of influence and effectiveness" within the members of the Cabinet, due to their relationship with the Prime Minister and their respective power vis-a-vis their other colleagues.26 The tradition of Cabinet secrecy makes it difficult to ascertain how influential individual ministers were in the period under examination here, while the custom of Cabinet solidarity ensures that any differences over policy were kept from public view. Trudeau believed that his predecessor's decision-making process had been flawed due to the inappropriate subordination of foreign policy to the exigencies of Canada's defence relations. A reformed, improved thoroughly supported Cabinet committee system was capable, he believed, of carrying out such overall evaluative activites in an optimally rational way. Trudeau therefore tried to create a policy forum which would consider all foreign and domestic goals, the external pressures and actors seeking to influence Canadian policy, and the inevitable policy trade-offs.27 Trudeau thought the process had "lacked a proper rational foundation which could be used to reconcile the diverse policy components"28 In response, Trudeau introduced a new Cabinet committee system in 1969, with the intention of increasing the involvement of the ministers in the decision-making process.29 The reforms were also meant to facilitate 38 better management of the bureaucracy and greater coherence in policy planning ^ ° It is interesting to note the differences between the theoretical plan for the system and what actually transpired. The Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence (CCEPD) was responsible for autonomous decisions in foreign affairs; these decisions were then made known to all other Cabinet ministers. Only in the event of opposing views was the particular issue discussed in the weekly plenary Cabinet meeting. Thus, in theory, "collegial participation" in foreign policy-making was encouraged .3* However, Stephen Clarkson points out that since the Prime Minister usually decided foreign policy, the CCEPD was "poorly attended and considered to be of little political significance"?2 The combination of the Prime Minister's arrogation of power, and the electorate's general lack of interest in foreign and defence policy, led to a similar disinterest on the part of many politicians. The Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning made the really critical decisions in running the government and making policy. Although it established the priority of each policy in the government's plans and dealt with the most urgent policy decisions, power was still effectively maintained by the Prime Minister, who chaired this committee.^ Political realities dictated that foreign policy was often the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Crises usually required timely responses, either to the electorate via the media or in the form of actual policy statements. The need for speedy action did not allow adequate time to follow the elaborate rational policy-making process that Trudeau advocated. In addition, the other members of Cabinet, each with their own portfolio to attend to. did not always have the time or the inclination to learn all the intricacies inherent in most foreign policy 39 decisions34 In theory, Parliament is supposed to be the vehicle by which public opinion is transmitted to the executive through the elected Members of Parliament (MP). This clearly is not the case today. Nor is other conventional mythology accurate in positing that public opinion nurtures competing political parties, and then elects a variety of representatives who authoritatively act for the common good. Such views are more fairytale than fair assessment. Political leaders and appointed officials are not "passive receptors of clues from the public but instead shape and mold public opinion'.3^ In practice, Parliamentary participation in the making of foreign policy is hindered both by the secrecy and expertise considered to be essential in dealings regarding national security and interstate diplomacy, and the executive's control over decision-making. Since Parliament does not have to be involved in the negotiation or ratification of international executive agreements, it does not have the constitutional power to intercede in the policy process except when required to pass specific legislation. The input of individual MPs is constrained as they do not usually have large research staffs or access to sources of independent expertise, and therefore they cannot possibly comprehend all the complexities of the issues.36 David Taras argues against dismissing Parliament's role as minimal; its influence, while hard to measure, is of some consequence. He notes a number of variables that may be leading to a more active role for Parliament in foreign policy. Changes in the international system in the 1970s resulted in external issues impinging on domestic well-being to a far greater extent and made the public much more concerned about foreign policy 3 7 Domestic interest groups are much more active now in lobbying for their foreign policy preferences, while at the same time the MPs are recognizing the 40 potential of these groups as campaign contributors and conduits to various blocs of votersHowever, Taras acknowledges that control of the actual policy-making process remains firmly under the authority of the executiveHe argues that Parliament has a "crucial role as a legitimizing institution" and cites the value of Question Period for its promotion of alternate views and confrontations of official policy 4 0 There are means by which MPs participate in policy-making but the weight of their input, compared to the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, is minor. One such method of direct participation is through the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND). Each time it is directed to examine a particular issue, its mandate and terms of reference are set by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence, and the party leaders in the House of Commons.41 It is comprised of members from all parties, in proportion to the number of MPs that each has. Party loyalty usually means there is agreement along party lines in SCEAND.42 While it can request any witness to appear before it and subpoena relevant papers and documents, in the final analysis its power is limited to recommendations.4^ Since the government often disregarded SCEAND's advice, its influence in the policy-making process was limited. It is interesting to note that between 1980-84 there were lengthy waiting lists of MPs within each party who wanted to sit on SCEAND, as it was considered one of the "most prestigious committees on the Hill".44 However, former SSEA Mitchell Sharp has dismissed SCEAND consultations as "a harmless outlet"' for groups who want to have input into foreign policy. They gain the impression that they are wielding influence but the government's attitude towards SCEAND reports minimizes their input4^ A detailed assessment of the bureaucracy's input during the period 41 under examination is hampered as its influence, while widespread, is difficult to trace. However, the power of this source in the policy process should not be minimized. Given Trudeaus propensity for Cabinet shuffles, the bureaucrats who ran the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence (DND) were more often the constant factors in the policy-making process than their respective ministers. The bureaucracy's power resulted from their access to privileged information which gave them the authority to advocate possible policy options. It was their opinions and biases that formed the description of the possible ramifications and contradictions of each policy. While the bureaucracy's role is advisory, the fact that they synthesize and "package" the pertinent information gives them influence. Nossal asserts that the bureaucracy's influence in foreign policy-making is actually quite substantial because it handles the day-to-day business. While the politicians set the general objectives and articulate the broad ideals of the state in international affairs, it is left to the bureaucracy to deal with the "tactical" demands for making policy. Since Canadian foreign policy is largely determined by "short-term considerations", the bureaucracy has de facto control over much of the policy.46 The bureaucracy is not a unitary actor as there are many internal divisions. For instance, DEA, DND and ITC may well have had different ideas on what trade-offs in foreign policy were permissible based on their respective mandates. The actual policy-making process is affected by the interplay of bureaucratic politics, with the accompanying departmental rivalries, contradictions in perceived goals, and competitive means of interaction.47 Trudeau s reforms were aimed at increasing the rationality of foreign 42 policy-making, and involved opening the policy process to a wide variety of new participants, including the provinces, interest groups and "attentive publics"48 However, their involvement did not translate into power or influence.49 In 1978, Trudeau described his theory of "participatory democracy" as a means by which public values and interests would be heard in the policy process, but he asserted that participation did not mean partaking in decisions.^ ® Bruce Thordarson believes that the tone of Trudeau s speeches and writings indicate that his theory was based more on "a desire to interest and educate Canadians", rather than on any thought that their input would actually determine policy^ Special interest groups and public opinion have some input into the policy-making process but the weight of their influence, like that of the economic factor, varies with the issue and the relative strengths of the other sources of input ^2 The media's role in the process fluctuates. Its special power determines more what the public thinks about rather than how it should think 53 It has been suggested that the major changes in the policy process and the structural reforms enacted by Trudeau were made with the intent of imposing "financial self-discipline" on the governing process.^4 While there is controversy about this point, it is widely accepted that the element of economics or budgetary considerations plays some role in the policy-making process.^ Structural aspects of the bilateral relationship made it necessary for Canada to carefully consider the wishes of its southern neighbour in the course of its foreign policy decision-making. The Defence Industry Productivity Program (DIPP) and the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) are two government programs that facilitate Canadian participation 43 in projects for the American military market. The DIPP is a federal system of grants meant to aid the Canadian defence industry by allowing it to bid competitively for projects. Through the DPSA, the relevant parts of the Canadian industrial workforce are allowed access to the US military marketplace through "the supply of component parts to US-designed and built major weapons systems'.^6 In 1963, a provision was put into force that required that the long-term military trade between the two countries be kept in rough balance. Continental cooperation in defence policy made both Canadian military planning and the Canadian defence industry more dependent on the American lead in strategic matters. Canada had to structure its military plans in a way that accommodated the acquisition of American products.^7 It has been pointed out that this assistance to the arms industry has caused a certain contradiction within government policy, with its stated intent of trying to curtail new weapons systems.^8 This potential conflict is further enhanced by the fact that some of the DIPP grants depend on "their full pay-off on repeat contracts and, consequently, on extensive deployment of the weapons systems in question", or in other words, an escalation of the arms race These economic influences were only part of the many external factors that had to be considered in the structuring of Canadian arms control policy. This sketch of the foreign policy-making process illustrates that during the period in question, there were a wide variety of formal and informal sources of input, with varying degrees of influence. Both the Prime Minister and the bureaucracy were influential in foreign policy decision-making, depending on the nature of the policy and the extent to which it interested the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister tried to entrench his influence and values by 44 imposing rational decision-making processes on the structure of the policy-making system. Trudeaus reforms of the structural aspects were motivated by his belief that an infusion of rationality would result in the process giving better performance and results. Unfortunately, the nature of politics and international relations undermines prospects for the successful inclusion of rationality in the foreign policy-making process. The specific theoretical and structural impediments will be discussed below. Problems of Rational' Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: Some Theoretical Considerations An analysis of decision-making involves numerous questions that are seemingly unanswerable in any certain terms. The central question pertaining to the definition of, and limits to rationality itself has been addressed by numerous authors. The roles of perception and misperception, cognitive dissonance, varying degrees of mental receptivity and so forth, have all been explored intensively in the foreign policy literature.60 Little if anything of predictive value has been deduced. Yet there is much of value to be gained from some of the theorists in this field regarding the influences and motivations in policy formulation.61 An overview of their theories is helpful in formulating a framework for the analysis of the arms control policies discussed in this paper. In light of this paper's attempt to assess the policies in terms of bureaucratic momentum or Prime Ministerial initiative, some of these theories explore the individual level of analysis, while others assess organizational influences. Thus the appropriateness of examining motivations, psychological impetus, rationality and perceptions are all mentioned in the following pages, and are intended to provide some direction for the later examination of the actual 45 policies. This theoretical discussion illustrates some of the limitations inherent in any attempt to explain the sources and evolution for Canadian arms control policy. In order to appreciate the constraints and influences that affect the decision-maker, some idea of his particular frame of reference is helpful. As Richard Snyder, one of the first analysts to concentrate on decision-making has noted, the prime analytical objective is "the recreation of the world" of the decision-makers as they perceive it. While not an easy task, such an attempt facilitates a more objective interpretation62 The decision-makers' "definition of the situation", which depends on their "perception, choice and interpretation", influences what particular course of action will be chosen. The pertinent questions that must be answered to flesh out this framework include ascertaining what the decision-makers see as relevant; assessing how the relevant factors are inter-related; defining those compromises that are deemed allowable; and finally, exploring how the various competing demands on the decision-makers are balanced. The wants and needs that are deemed to be involved, how and what goals are defined, and how action is decided upon, are thought to be fitting and effective means with which to reconstruct "the actors' orientations to actions Unfortunately, this paradigm demands so many details that it is difficult to apply to an actual situation. While the researcher would certainly get a better idea of the rationale for the policy choices if these directives were followed, the restrictions on time and energy make such a meticulous effort unlikely. Bearing these criticisms in mind, the following chapters will use elements of this classic decision-making framework to guide their analysis of the arms control policies. While the details demanded by Snyder seem comprehensive, other 46 theorists see his model as inadequate. James Rosenau has criticized the "theoretical emptiness" of Snyder because no weight is "given to the many sectors of the decision-maker's experience", and no "hypotheses are offered about the transformations of situations nor about the relations of decisions made and the decision in the making".64 Since the decision-maker's perceptions are influenced by his life experiences, which in turn are influenced by his personality, some consideration must be given to factors other than those noted by Snyder. Rosenau believes that a study of "decisional phenomena" is inadequate as the sole basis for "if-then" propositions about politics. Any comprehensive examination "must include and interrelate variables pertaining to the targets of decisions, the actors taking them and the relationship between the targets and the actions".6^ The very scale of the effort advocated by Rosenau makes such an analysis impossible, but these suggested guidelines do give some indication of what details may be necessary for an understanding both of how decisions are made and what motivates the decision-maker. As well as the difficulties noted above, there are inherent problems in presupposing that Trudeau's personality was largely influential in his decision-making in the realm of foreign policy and arms control. Not only may that be a false assumption, but there are methodological problems in using the individual level of analysis in this instance. For example, it is very difficult to measure personality characteristics accurately, and "systemic evidence linking personality characteristics to international affairs or trends in decision-making is sorely lacking" in any case.66 There are two critically important barriers to adding a psychological dimension to the decision-making approach. Specifically, there is little scientific data on Trudeau's personality, and more generally, there is no 47 connection between how early development may have possibly influenced "later attributes and behavior" and actual foreign policy decision-making 6 7 While the psychological approach is valuable for insights, it is difficult to analyze foreign policy actions solely on the evidence available from this research. The role of rationality is of central importance in any evaluation of foreign policy decision-making. As mentioned earlier, Trudeau was determined that this factor would have an important influence in his government's policy-making. Indeed, he saw comprehensive rationality as the ideal in decision-making. How he dealt with misperceptions, cognitive dissonance, and the different types of rationality that stem from the variety of geo-political perspectives in the international forum has not been fully explored. Cognitive dissonance is an important element in Steinbruner's cognitive paradigm. He asserts that the mind actively but subjectively controls uncertainty through false or flawed generalization, as well as restriction of incoming information to only that material which will support the pre-established expectations. In doing so, individuals rely on belief systems that are to a greater or lesser degree quite "independent of evidence from the empirical world".68 When used in a post-decisional context, cognitive dissonance involves a process wherein "people rearrange their beliefs" to support their actions.69 Many analysts would argue that it is neither realistic nor of any theoretical or research value to take as a given that the decision-maker will follow a rational approach or base his policy choice on rational assumptions. There are a number of different descriptions of rational decision-making. John Steinbruner prefers the term "analytic" paradigm to the "rational" 48 model as he believes it is more indicative of real-world mental logic.70 He states that such a process ideally would: break down the decision problem to the major components; be characterized by limited value integration; involve efforts to estimate possible outcomes; and see pertinent new information producing "appropriate subjective adjustments".71 Various hypotheses have been generated to explain the fact that decision-makers frequently do not follow a rational path, as defined above. As Steinbruner points out, "the rational theory assumes such sophisticated processing of information that it strains credulity to impute such procedures to real decision-makers"72 Factual constraints are imposed by the immense structural complexity of the international system, and to a lesser degree, that of the domestic political scene. Whether conflicting values, misperceptions, the convoluted nature of bureaucratic politics, or an inaccurate response to the demands of these and other factors undermines rationality depends on the analysts view.73 This problem is compounded by the fact that human frailty may well lead to mistaken estimations and erroneous perceptions in the decision-making process. Anyone attempting to understand the motivation, rationale, and impetus behind decisions in policy-making would do well to consider the admonitions of one of the earliest writers to criticize the pervasive assumption that rational consideration guides decision-making. Herbert Simon elucidated his ideas on the inherent restrictions of rationality in his behaviour alternative model. "Instead of beginning with what the decision-maker wants to achieve or with values...begin with the fact that he is at any moment faced with a large number of behavior alternatives".74 Thus a decision is basically a selection of a satisfactory alternative, or a compromise. This realization moves any analysis of a decision away from a 49 simplistic and often misleading calculation based on a maximization of apparent values. Not only is it impossible to correctly assign values to the decision-maker, but if one thinks in terms of means and ends, it is more than difficult to guess ail the means and ends the policy-maker in question considered in the course of formulating that policy. Another critic of the rational actor model is Charles Lindblom. He points out that decision-makers are often responsible for identifying and defining the problem. Even if such steps have already been taken by the bureaucracy, the same chance of error applies. "Misdefined problems" can easily lead to policy failures. He also points out that the information necessary to assess all policy choices and their respective consequences is simply not available, especially in the world of political policy-making, where time is often of the essence.7^ Lindblom posits the alternate model of "disjointed incrementalism", which is "policy-making through small or incremental moves on particular problems rather than a comprehensive reform system". Incrementalism involves simplification through omission, policies that satisfy immediate demands and suffice for the time being, and a recognition that politically feasible policies are those that are only "marginally different from what has gone before". All of the possible ramifications are not evaluated but the policy is chosen so that it "leaves open the possibility of doing better in a subsequent effort". Any delay in deciding on policy is seen as a benefit as it allows time to clarify problems and judge whether action must really be taken.76 As will be illustrated in Chapter IV, Lindblom s model applies to the decision-making that resulted in Canadian policy at UNSSOD I and II. To a lesser extent, it also describes certain aspects of the decision-making that led 50 to the decision to test the ALCM (a process examined in Chapter V). Amitai Etzioni's theory of "mixed scanning" may further an understanding of the decision-making process behind Trudeaus peace initiative, and to a much lesser extent it is useful in analyzing the Cruise policy. Etzioni sees incrementalism as too limited, in that it cannot explain those clearly demonstrable occasions when fundamental analytical review of policy occurs. At such points, the scanning or review of alternatives is mixed in the sense that only a few aspects of a problem and only a few alternatives are selected for intensive analysis. According to Etzioni, this fundamental review process occurs when there is rapid change in a society or when a crisis occurs because of prolonged neglect or mistaken treatment of a problem.77 Elements of Etzioni's conditions can be seen in the policy processes regarding both the ALCM and the peace initiative decisions. The fundamental review and the ensuing conflict within the government was revealed in the detailed yet flawed rationale given to support the ALCM testing, and by the obvious misgivings with the status quo that Trudeau's initiative represented 7 8 When trying to assess the role of rationality, one should consider that there are different kinds of rationality guiding the respective forces in the policy process. For instance, bureaucratic rationality "emphasizes efficiency and systemic approaches, depends on maximum amounts of quantifiable information and demands concrete objectives and clear directions", while political rationality "emphasizes the provision of maximum satisfaction for voters in the relatively short run, utilizes information which makes many bureaucrats uneasy and thrives on flexible objectives"79 These observations seem to point to an apparent impasse for any 51 adequate theory of decision-making. Herbert Simon responded with a proposal for an alternative model which mirrors the reality of the industrial world. The solution is predicated upon the use of organizations, where the division of labour and provision of multiple bases of thought reduces "decisional problems to manageable proportions".80 His theory about the organizational model was applied to considerations of bureaucratic input into the policy process. Graham Allison's seminal work on "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" details the limitations and inaccuracies of analyses that rely solely on the traditional "rational actor" model and turns to the role of the bureaucracy. An interpretation that sees government as a "conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations", and foreign policy as the output of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior is useful for some decisions.81 According to Allison, these decisions may be explained by locating the organization actors and noting their procedures.82 He asserts that while government leaders can substantially disturb the behavior of these organizations, they can not substantially control them.8^ In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison proposes the "government/bureaucratic politics" model as the best explanatory device. According to this model, players who lead the various organizations act according to diverse conceptions of "national, organizational, and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pushing and hauling that is politics."84 Their different interests lead to different preferences on various issues and thus governmental behavior can best be understood not as organizational outputs but rather as the "outcomes of bargaining games."8^ Usually the resulting policies are distinct from what 52 anyone intended: the result of "compromise, coalition, competition and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue."86 Allison depicts the procedural limits, inter-agency rivalry, and bureaucratic intragovernment bargaining, but notes that personality, along with parochial perceptions, are "irreducible pieces of the policy blend".87 His models expand the horizons of inquiry and encourage alternative methods of analyzing the influences on government decision-makers. Kim Nossal believes that Allisons last model is applicable to Canadian federal politics but stipulates that the parliamentary systems structural differences, compared to that of the United States, will have "a substantial impact on both the tone of bureaucratic politics and the effects of bureaucratic politics on policy outcomes."88 Nossal makes the model applicable to Canada by emphasizing the actual interaction between players, as opposed to its conflictual nature.89 John Steinbruner uses his cybernetic theory of decision to expand on the role of organizational politics and the use of standard operating procedures (SOPs). He suggests that an alternate way of analyzing decision-making must "reflect the central role played by highly structured feedback cycles that confine the decision process" within limits determined by the information used and the responses considered 9 0 It is necessary for the decision-maker to simplify the incredibly complex world in order to define a workable problem. Decision-making in this model is organized around "short-cycle information feedback and the elimination of uncertainty" by means of "highly focused attention and highly programed response".91 Thus the cybernetic decision-maker uses only highly specific information input, suitable to the limited procedures he can perform.92 He does not pay attention to value conflicts between competing objectives. 53 Instead, he breaks such problems Into separate decision processes and operates at any one time solely in terms of a single objective with a single expected outcome9^ When he is confronted with real conflicts between objectives, he would "tend to perceive two problems and oscillate between single-minded pursuit of each of the conflicting objectives,"94 Steinbruner uses cognitive theory to enhance the applicability of the cybernetics paradigm.9-* He emphasizes that decision-makers seek subjective resolution of uncertainty, and thus both limit information input to that which will bolster their point of view, and indulge in inconsistency management.96 According to Steinbruner, "the principles of cognitive theory explain how problem structures are set up within which cybernetics mechanisms can operate."97 These ideas are helpful in an attempt to appreciate the role of the bureaucracy in Canadian arms control decision-making, and the forces at work behind the policies presented at the UNSSODs and the impetus that led to the decision to test the ALCM. There are many problems in foreign policy decision-making. The comprehensive explanatory value of any theory or model is limited because it is an invalid generalization to say that foreign policy consists of "conscious, isolatable decisions". Non-decisional activity like organizational inertia and bureaucratic drift is often very influential. The concept of non-decisions, while difficult to research, should be noted, if only to indicate the limitations imposed on a really thorough analysis of any policy. "At any given time there are thousands of demands being made upon governments [and] only a small portion receive active, serious attention from policy-makers".98 An incrementalist approach may be the only way in which policy-makers create some form of order out of this chaos. In a valuable contribution, Miriam Steiner calls for an expansion of the 54 concept of nonrationality in the formulation and analysis of decisions. She queries the comprehensibility of the causality aspects and structural uncertainty of the foreign policy environment. In an effort to make her analysis more complete, she posits that the conceptualization of the decision-making process must include an awareness of nonrational aspects. Steiner notes that the rationalistic world view stresses "order, clarity, empiricism and logical analysis", while the nonrationalistic world view emphasizes "novelty, incongruity, intuition and subjective awareness".99 She then points out an important and interesting conundrum. Steiner recognizes that almost all analysts of foreign policy decisions today believe that good decision-making requires subordination of intuition and feeling to a rationalistic approach. The problem lies in the "inevitable contradiction" between this prescription and their view of the foreign policy arena "as ambiguous, fluid and shot through with subjective elements".100 It may well be true that if a decision-maker tries to respond rationally to a nonrational world, one will only choose an optimal course by luck, and more often than not may make the wrong choice due to an incorrect or incomplete rationale. The rationality in decision-making is bounded because it is impossible to consider all alternatives or to foresee probable consequences. There are numerous examples in the nuclear world of decisions that have had unforeseen implications due to problems of comprehension and perception.101 Robert Jervis also criticizes the assumption that rationality plays an overarching role in decision-making. Like Steinbruner, Jervis argues that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that decision-makers search extensively, revise accordingly, conduct a "cost-benefit analysis", and then choose the best alternative available. This idea ignores cognitive constraints 55 and the problem of misperception in decision-making. These two factors ensure a simplified view that discounts discrepant information and overlooks the fact that evidence consistent with the decision-maker's view may also support other views. No attempt is made to understand how the other actors' different backgrounds may affect their actions and perceptions. Thus the opposing states' organizational centricity and hostility level are often misconstrued.102 The complexity of the policy environment encourages the decision-makers to rely on preexisting images and beliefs when assimilating new or ambiguous information. The contradictory information is subconsciously misinterpreted to make it fit with their original view. The "other's view of the world" is not taken into consideration. They never imagine that their own perception might be flawed, since overconfidence in one's cognitive abilities is very common.103 Jervis asserts that important differences in policy preferences are due to differences in decision-makers' perceptions of their environment, and the important divergences "between reality and shared or common perceptions".104 A central question in his work is whether or not a person is able to perceive accurately enough to predict what others will do or foresee what a particular policy's affects will be.10^ Many analysts consider the effects of stress to be a critical influence on the perceptions involved in decision-making. Richard Snyder and James Robinson believe that a limited number of values are emphasized under such conditions, regardless of what may be actually known about various ramifications.106 Irving Janis' work on group decision-making under stress reveals that a variety of pressures develop to simplify thought processes and ensure a unified response.107 Three of the four arms control situations examined in this thesis could 56 not be categorized as classical cases of crisis decision-making because there were not the grave restrictions on time that crisis imposes. However, the pressing need to come to terms with the complexities of the nuclear world meant that stress was involved.108 In the case of the peace initiative, time was of the essence. The Prime Minister was moved to unprecedented action by what he saw as the swiftly-escalating potential for disaster in the nuclear world. From this brief overview of some of the theoretical problems in foreign policy decision-making, it would be appropriate to conclude that a final policy decision is fraught with both organizational pitfalls and cognitive/perceptual dilemmas. When one adds the possible structural flaws that plague policy-making, the difficulties of the process are magnified. Problems of Rational' Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: Structural Considerations In 1978, Denis Stairs noted that recent events were forcing the government to consider a much wider variety of issues in its foreign policy decision-making. The demands of international politics had expanded to include such diverse concerns as the energy shortage, pollution, the drain on natural resources, and the starving millions in the Third World.109 These rapidly growing and seemingly intractable problems challenged the abilities of both the government and the policy-making process. The expanding number and variety of government agencies and departments dealing with each issue made a comprehensive approach difficult and the ever-increasing number of technical details that had to be considered exacerbated each dilemmas already complex nature. Difficulties in predicting long and short-term implications, and any unknown side-effects, made policy 57 planning problematical.110 This situation resulted in difficulties for the government not only at the managerial and technical levels, but also at what Stairs terms "the level of principle".111 While the need for long-term global policies was increasingly apparent, the liberal-democratic model required that the immediate interests of one's constituents be served.112 These different demands caused an unresolvable tension in foreign policy-making in general, and decision-making in particular. Stairs believes that Canada's foreign policy problems are "too large and too complex to develop clearly-defined policy responses", and substantive suggestions, even if possible, are too politically risky. Thus the policy often offers only rhetorical directives.1 ^ Stairs also identifies what he sees as the methodological problems for policy-making that are inherent in this new complexity. Prior to the recent explosion of crucial issues on the international scene, foreign policy had been "the product of the rational calculations of identifiable office-holders".114 While the previous discussion on rational decision-making raises doubts about the accuracy of this point, his conclusion is valid. Stairs asserts that the proliferation of major problems has caused much of foreign policy to become the output of an "inertial process", after many compromises in many conflicting committees with no one being entirely responsible for the end product.11 ^ This aptly describes incrementalist policy-making. The necessity of reconciling intra-government, domestic and constituency conflicts of interests further plagued the policy process with structural problems. Kim Nossal's interpretation of the bureaucratic politics model in Canadian politics illustrates the interplay of these different interests. Its 58 basic premise is that policy is the result of interchange between players...(and]...when any two players look at an issue, their views as to the best outcome, or how to best achieve goals will differ. Policy-making positions are filled by players who have parochial interests they attempt to further (often at the expense of some broader notion of the national interest).116 Nossal sees the resolution of the differing viewpoints, at both the bureaucratic and ministerial levels, as the integral focus of the bureaucratic politics model. He cites literature in Canadian public administration and public policy to establish his point that policy is not determined by rational choice but rather by "a process of bargaining and compromise at both the bureaucratic and ministerial levels".117 The resolution or compromise that is eventually forwarded to, and endorsed by Cabinet, makes policy. Nossal argues that the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model is facilitated by the recent change in the nature of Canadian foreign policy problems, as noted earlier by Stairs. Furthermore, he identifies four changes Trudeau made in the "structure and process" of policy-making that help make the Allison model appropriate. The central agencies of the government acquired a more active, and...a more powerful role in the policy process...The domestication of foreign policy and the internationalization of domestic departments..!means that]...more and more policy issues are discussed by a proliferation of standing and ad hoc interdepartmental committees. At the ministerial level, [Cabinet] committees...were restructured..Jor...greater involvement in policy development and decision-making, curbing the tendency evident in previous years for the Secretary of State for External Affairs to dominate cabinet-level foreign policy discussions. At the intersection of the bureaucratic and ministerial levels...the Trudeau government introduced the practise of having senior civil servants participate in Cabinet committee deliberations.118 Nossal outlines the features of the Canadian foreign policy-making 59 system that make the bureaucratic politics model appropriate for an analysis of Canadian foreign policy decision-making. The characteristics include: 1) the functional overlap of the mandates and jurisdictions of different program departments on most issues requires bargaining; 2) the premium placed on coordination of policy necessitates trade-offs, compromises and rearranged priorities; 3) the cohesiveness of the senior civil service enhances chances of competition with politicians; 4) the shift in the focal point of formal decision-making to the Cabinet committees allows the senior bureaucrats in attendance regular input and more authority; and 5) the increased importance of provincial players heightens the potential for even more conflict.119 However, he stresses that "friendly competition" rather than conflict best describes the policy process in Ottawa.120 Trudeau's goal of rational policy-making remained elusive. No matter how he changed the "structure and process", the nature of politics and the nature of the problems, especially in strategic nuclear policy-making, defeated him. As William Baugh notes, the ambiguity of the nuclear situation is caused by a number of problems: the lack of agreement regarding methods of measurement between or within governments; ambiguous doctrines of usage exacerbated by problems caused by technology and methodology; and serious divergences over the political meaning/use of present and envisioned weapons.121 An arms control policy must address problems that involve a myriad of technical, political, ideological and strategic rationales and details. In light of both the theoretical and structural problems of foreign policy decision-making discussed earlier, the government's rhetoric, as exemplified in their standard amorphous policy suggestions on how to deal with the nuclear quandary, is understandable. 60 Decision-Making and the Forging of Canadian Arms Control Policy The present nuclear dilemma of the world is not the rational way to obtain an objective, be it peace or the avoidance of war. 1 2 2 While it has been pointed out that rationality does not always occupy the primary position in policy formulation that some might wish, its role in arms control policy is worthy of exploration. The mainly elusive logic of the nuclear world creates problems of political management in that rational thought is not always applicable. Roy Menninger terms this situation the "Rationality Paradox", as nuclear strategy creates a "make-believe world", where more weapons are equated with more strength and more safety, despite the accompanying increase in crisis instability and the arms race.12^ This situation is aggravated when the theoretical dilemmas are combined with the inherent structural problems of the nuclear world. The incredibly destructive power of nuclear weapons makes the prospect of using them irrational, but Menninger s rationality paradox means that arms control is the only alternative to the threats essential to deterrence. The use of nuclear weapons is threatened to ensure their non-use, but the ever-advancing technological developments mean that the requirements of effective deterrence are always changing.124 Arms control decision-making is affected by the enduring and very basic differences in the superpowers' political systems, their respective perceptions and security positions, and their resulting policy prescriptions.12^ These difficulties are intensified by the fact that each superpower's strategic decision-making process is very different in both their structure and their results. The Soviet Union initiates major decisions by establishing general military doctrines and by adopting planning 61 assumptions; the implications are then imposed reasonably systematically on the details of weapons acquisition, operational posture and diplomatic positions. The system operates, as it were, deductively. In contrast, the United States requires widespread political concensus in order to make authoritative decisions and does not readily achieve this regarding doctrinal abstractions. The US system makes very specific decisions and leaves open their broader implications for subsequent interpretation and political discussion. The US decision-making process operates inductively and at any given time displays substantial internal inconsistencies representing unresolved political issues.126 Problems in arms control policy-making have also been caused by attempts to link progress in arms control with success in moderating other areas of superpower rivalry. Some see linkage as necessary in order to protect all aspects of national security, but others doubt that arms control can be linked to a change in the politics of the Soviet Union.127 Arms control can be used to limit especially threatening weapons, discourage worst-case planning, moderate the pace of the arms race and enhance superpower cooperation. Without mutual trust, strategic policy must include calculations of what is theoretically available and possible in military terms, using a worst case scenario of the enemy's intentions. The enemy's intent is deduced from their estimated capabilities and official statements which can lead to flawed calculations. The former is often more a result of luck in technical innovation than carefully planned advances while the latter has a variety of roles to play and is not always reliable. Arms control requires a mutual recognition that successful conflict analysis, management and resolution necessitate an understanding of the goals, ambitions and fears of the other side. Arms control does not have to be seen in terms of a "zero-sum game". Decision-making in arms control is 62 unduly influenced by the negative problems caused by faulty perceptions. The interrelationships between doctrine, power, technological developments, economic pressures, public attitudes, the effects of individual leaders and bureaucratic politics can cause almost insurmountable hurdles.128 Each superpower, to varying degrees, has domestic and international audiences whose view of its attempts are very important to the continuing legitimacy of democracy or communism.129 In addition, the perceptions each superpower has of the other are crucial in both the initial formulation of the arms control suggestions and any further modification or compromise. Since superpower relations are not in a coherent, stable framework, the mutual perceptions vary with the vagaries of politics. The process of arms control needs an organizing structure but such an apparatus has not been developed due to a lack of trust or consistent political support. The four examples of Canadian arms control policies under examination here share several common flaws. Several potentially constructive ideas were not elaborated on or embodied as policy priorities. The power of bureaucratic politics was usually effective in limiting policy changes to a process of incremental policy modification. This situation was caused by a number of factors. This study argues that the most important reasons were the Canadian policy-makers' inadequate grasp of the ramifications of various developments in the international security arena, their paralysis in the face of the United States' negative attitude towards arms control and the Soviet Union, and fears of economic retaliation if Canada was too critical of American strategy and weapons procurements. The substantial limitations on Canadian influence and credibility as a real player in the nuclear arms control decision-making game may have had a dampening influence on any imaginative policy-maker. The Atlantic 63 Council has described a "chief psychological problem for Canadians" as due to their not being "in a position to have an effective input into global military and security decisions".130 Widespread American influence in analytical, strategic, geo-political and economic terms facilitated and encouraged Canadian dependency upon the US.131 Using the indices of a study done by the Research Programme in Strategic Studies at York University in early 1982. the Canadian Government could be classified as consistently supportive of a moderate arms control approach to the important issues of that time. Thus it saw the Soviet threat as real but not immediately threatening and believed in the deterrent value of the threat of mutually assured destruction. Defence preparations were needed to accompany attempts at arms control. The policy-makers believed that incremental solutions in policy options would be best and were sceptical of unilateral initiatives.132 Arms control policy suggestions must also consider the other allies' policy demands, the domestic bureaucratic, political and electoral forces, and the nebulous and contradictory perceptions of the threat and the enemy that each of these groups entertain. All of these concerns made arms control policy-making in this period a problematic enterprise. The specifics of these assertions will be expanded upon in the next three chapters. If the Canadian goal was to influence the US towards nuclear arms restraint, the moderation of tension and the promotion of productive arms control negotiations, the course had to be well-charted and the diplomatic and political access afforded as an ally used effectively. How the issue of arms control fit into the overall foreign policy agenda was dictated both by the urgency of the particular issue and the demands of the other foreign policy matters that had to be considered and duly decided upon by the 64 government. The Prime Minister's influence in the foreign policy-making process was by and large not constant or reliable enough to moderate the bureaucracy's tendency to maintain the status quo or limit changes to incrementalist shifts. His reforms of the structure and process were intended to facilitate rational decision-making but there were too many competing considerations and uncertainties in the formulation of Canada's arms control policies to allow the necessary analytical assessment of all the factors and potential outcomes. The problems due to misperceptions and constrained cognition heightened the difficulties caused by the nonrational demands of the nuclear world.133 This sketch of the foreign policy-making process and all its flaws has set the stage for the next section of the paper. The analysis will use this chapter's information to guide the examination of the arms control policies. The decision-making models will be used as aids in an interpretation of the factors that led to the particular policy in question. The following three chapters will be devoted to an analysis of four examples of Canadian arms control policy. These examples facilitate a chronological assessment of Pierre Elliott Trudeaus developing interest in arms control. Chapter IV focuses on the Prime Minister's policy suggestions at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, and includes a brief survey of the four intervening years, when many issues of grave importance occurred in the nuclear world. Chapter V assesses the Government's attempts to combine a supportive stance for arms control with the decision to test the Air-Launched Cruise Missile. Prime Minister Trudeaus personal peace initiative will be examined in Chapter VI. While non-official commentary will be cited, primary sources such as 65 government statements and speeches provide much of the basis for the analysis of Trudeaus leadership and his governments actions regarding these issues. Chapter Ill's portrayal of the influences on and the structure of the policy-making process will be referred to when appropriate, especially in terms of explaining some of the many contradictions between the stated intent of these policies and actual government behavior. Where clearly ascertainable, the decision-making processes that produced the particular policies under consideration will be scrutinized. To account for particular policies, goal formulation, trade-off relationships between various disparate objectives and subsequent policy compromises will be described in detail. The actual decision-making problems specific to these arms control policies will be addressed using various elements of the decision-making theories outlined in Chapter III. Events and forces in both the international and domestic environments will be mentioned where appropriate to illustrate the contextual framework that these policies were situated in. Evolving contexts produced changing policy-making constraints that the formuiators of Canadian arms control policies had to acknowledge and accommodate. 66 CHAPTER IV: ARMS CONTROL DIPLOMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSIONS ON DISARMAMENT The United Nations has long been supported by Canada as a forum in which the philosophy of internationalism, a mainstay of Canadian foreign policy, could be pursued. As Kim Nosssal points out, since World War II Canada has accepted "the validity of the argument that peace is indivisible: that the fate of any one state and the peace of the international system as a whole are inexorably interconnected."1 Thus the multilateralism of the UN was seen as a crucial means of defusing the tensions that can erupt into war. However, Nossai also identifies the rivalry between the superpowers as an integral part of the driving forces behind Canada's external relations. Within this context, NORAD, NATO, and "a concomitant anti-communism and anti-Sovietism" were essential aspects of Canadian internationalism.2 Thus the relevant bureaucratic actors who formulated Canadian policy for the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament were influenced by a standard operating procedure that precluded any policy suggestions that did not fit into this frame of reference. This latter point will be expanded upon below but a critical assumption of this paper is that inherent restrictions like "grooved thinking" were much more influential than generally realized. John Steinbruner states that this organizational routine characteristically occurs in organizations that have existed for some time, and "at an organizational level where the range of problem is narrow in the sense that the decision maker does not often encounter problems which do not readily fall into a small number of basic types." Those decision-makers who "repeatedly encounter complex decision problems and have the inescapable responsibility of taking some action develop these highly stable patterns of reaction." The actual decisions are "taken on very narrow 67 grounds and are determined by the execution of well-established decision rules.'3 The suffocation strategy that the Prime Minister enunciated at UNSSOD I had to overcome structural restrictions as well as these inherent limitations. It may be argued that since Trudeau had neglected "the craft of Canadian diplomacy", this powerful resource could not be brought to bear in support of the strategy.4 In addition, the coherence of the Alliance and the perception that public criticism of American strategy might well cause adverse effects in other areas of bilateral cooperation and contention took precedence over any promotion of the policies elaborated at the UNSSODs. This reality necessitated a clear conception of priorities and goals, and a willingness to compromise on the part of the foreign policy-making establishment. At UNSSOD II, the rivalry between the superpowers was even more pronounced due to a number of ideological and strategic factors. In addition, Canadian-American relations were strained over a variety of issues, due in no small part to the very different personal philosophies of Pierre Trudeau and Ronald Reagan. As a result, Canada had even less room to maneuver in any promotion of its arms control policies. The policy-makers saw the immediate goal of maintaining good bilateral relations with the United States, and all that that entailed, as taking precedence over the very desirable but much less achievable goal of nuclear arms control. Since the Canadian Government refused to give the issue of suffocating the arms race a position of priority and ongoing support on the Government's agenda, there was very little high-level follow-up to the ideas presented in the UN arms control sessions. As will be shown below, the gaps between official rhetoric and actual government action, while no doubt due to a realistic assessment of the limits to Canadian power, were far too wide to 68 make the leap between worthwhile suggestions and concrete supportive action. Canadian Arms Control Policy at the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament From a Canadian perspective, the highlight of the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) was the speech that the Prime Minister gave on May 26,1978.3 jt w a s t n e f jr s t xime that he had appeared before the United Nations, and his address seemed to indicate a new Canadian interest regarding the need for a more activist approach to controlling the nuclear arms race. The Prime Minister eloquently expressed his concern with the "lagging process of disarmament".6 He proposed a variety of arms control techniques which together would result in a comprehensive strategy to first curb, and then literally suffocate the arms race. The proposals included: a comprehensive test ban; a ban on the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems.7 While Canada had long supported the idea of a comprehensive test ban, and had been active in developing full-scope safeguards to ensure that fissionable material used in nuclear energy would be restricted to that end, the suggestion to ban flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles was an innovative venture for the Canadian arms control polity. The idea of curtailing military spending was not a novel one but it needed support, as world military spending in 1978 had reached an annual sum of $400 billion.8 Trudeau stated that "a climate of confidence" was an essential prerequisite to first transcending "the harsher realities of divergent 69 ideologies" and then developing "the links of a co-operation based on common interests and concerns."9 He defined the threat to this goal as the development of new weapons systems which have "the risk of unbalancing the existing security equation".10 With perspicacity, he outlined the essential dilemma caused by the technological impetus behind the arms race. The new technologies can require a decade or more to take a weapons system from research and development to production and eventual deployment. What this means is that the national policies are pre-empted for long periods ahead. It also complicates the task of the foreign-policy-maker because of the difficulty of inferring current intentions from military postures that may be the result of decisions taken a decade earlier....In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policy-making. There is also a high risk that new weapons systems will revive concerns about a disarming first-strike capability; or that they will tend to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare; or that they will increase problems of verification.11 Trudeau's speech pinpointed the problematic nature of nuclear politics very accurately. The political process of arms control does not facilitate a comprehension of what future technological breakthroughs should be restricted, and as a result is frequently insufficient or stymied. Another major dilemma is that as the weapons' research and development programs proceed, they garner bureaucratic supporters and funds that develop vested interests in their unchecked progress. It can be very difficult for arms control advocates to either foresee possible developments that should be headed off, or to encourage public opposition to an as yet unknown 12 weapon.1 *• The result often is that the weapons program is all too 70 well-entrenched before it is widely opposed. The incentives to arm include: the technological impetus; the fear that someone else will exploit a possible advantage if not forestalled; success in any given area usually leads to more development; the status and diplomatic strength attached to weaponry; and the fact that continued arming may serve the interests of the military-industrial complex. William Baugh describes the disincentives to disarm with the aid of the prisoner's dilemma. "Since the fear of possible loss in an unmatched arms reduction is likely to appear more perilous than the dangers inherent in continuing the status quo, a minimax player (who seeks to avoid the worst thing that could happen) will choose not to disarm."1 ^ Comprehensive arms control requires better communication and trust-building and an acceptance that mutual cooperation is more desireable than the status quo. Trudeau touched on a wide range of other issues in his speech. It was apparent from some of his remarks that he had appraised NATO conventional wisdom regarding the nuclear world, but he was not critical of NATO rationale. He noted, for example, that the idea of a commitment to non-first-use of nuclear weapons "is difficult to dismiss because it would give expression and authority to a widely-shared perception of international morality". But he then cautioned that it would be a mistake to allow declarations of good intent to divert attention from the real issues of disarmament, such as the reductions of armed forces and weaponry.14 With the same hint of cautious ambiguity towards the merits of the nuclear rationale, he noted the inadequacies of the concept of deterrence for genuine world security.1 ^ The focal point that the Canadian suffocation strategy was based on is legitimate and well worth exploring as it has been demonstrated numerous times that the arms race is fueled in large part by the results coming out of ?<:*-. 71 the weapons laboratories.16 However, the Canadian attempt to address the issue of how to stop the technological impetus of the arms race was handicapped by the enormity of the problems of the nuclear world, Canada's limited power, and the government's unwillingness to make the suffocation strategy an issue of priority in all pertinent policy-making. The reception received by the "Suffocation Speech" was moderate for a variety of reasons. Neither leader of the two superpowers was at UNSSOD I; there was minimal press coverage in the Western media; and Trudeau did not directly address the concerns of a large part of the audience. The non-aligned nations of the world had been lobbying for a major conference on disarmament for years. The desperate poverty in their countries focussed their concerns on the possible links between disarmament and accelerated economic development. However, Canada and many of the industrialized countries believed that disarmament and development were "two distinct objectives", with no direct relation to one another.17 Just prior to the Special Session, the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs described what Canadian goals should be at the forum. It is apparent from Mr. Skinner's remarks that official Canadian ambitions were of a much more vague, albeit conciliatory nature than the specific suggestions of the suffocation strategy seemed to indicate. He said that Canada's fundamental objective at UNSSOD I was to find the lowest common denominator of agreement to offset the voting power of the non-aligned nations, as they might develop "unrealistic deadlines or objectives" which would, in turn, cause the military powers and nuclear states to either abstain or cast negative votes.18 Canada wanted the Special Session to develop a step by step approach, as that could lead to "tangible results through negotiations in the next three to five years."19 The major task of the Canadian contingent was to try to "encourage a rededication of the international community to non-proliferation, as embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty", especially since the Canadian ability to influence the superpowers' discussions on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was recognized as being indirect and marginal at best20 While the Prime Minister acknowledged Canada's interest in upholding the NPT, his suffocation strategy was not echoed in the remarks of this senior level bureaucrat. The divergence could be an indication of a bureaucratic, conservative attachment to maintaining the status quo or an example of cybernetic decision-making, in contrast to the Prime Minister's belief that a departure from the norm was the only rational, analytical course of action. As John Steinbruner notes, "information-processing operations within the (cybernetic] paradigm do not proceed in active pursuit of conceptual change but rather operate to keep such change within reasonably narrow limits"2* In terms of the actual policy-making, an incrementalist approach best describes the Canadian arms control policy at this time. According to Charles Lindblom, such small policy moves are facilitated by information processing that simplifies through omission, and establishes policies that are best in the short term without addressing the comprehensive long term aspects.22 Like the External Affairs bureaucrat, Trudeau realized there were inherent limitations on policy options. This explains to some extent the discrepancy between official rhetoric and the policy actually pursued. Thus while the Prime Minister described the arms race as a "latent source of world catastrophe" and expressed concern over the complexity of finding "the magic formula of equal security by placing limits on what are quite often disparate weapons systems", he recognized the constraints and dictates of realpolitik23 One of the most obvious demonstrations of the forces 73 moving in an opposite direction to UNSSODI was the concomitant session of a NATO summit meeting, which announced agreement on a long-term weapons expansion program.24 Trudeau's summation of what UNSSOD Is goals should be revealed that he was very much aware of the limitations on any possible achievements. The Prime Minister advocated "a reasonable concensus on broad objectives and....a plan of action for the next few years."2^ This repetition of the bureaucrat's view indicates that for all the suggested policy innovations in the suffocation speech, Trudeau himself was willing to accept the incrementalist pattern of slow-moving change at best, or the maintenance of the status quo if need be. If measured by these limited expectations, Canada was not wholly unsuccessful. The Canadian proposals were not pushed aside in the attempt to reach consensus on an official concluding statement. The Final Document of UNSSOD I passed on to "the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs....for further and thorough study" the proposals that the assembly deemed worthy of such effort. The list included the "proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation"26 The Final Document itself reiterated some of the ideas embodied in the Prime Minister's address. It called for the "cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems", and the "cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes." It also called for "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all states within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process" and urged a "gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis."27 However, much of the Final Document's impact was diluted by the fact that it had to limit many of its points to suggestions, as opposed to resolutions, in order to avoid open 74 ... disagreement among the delegates. While the decision-making process that led to the Suffocation Speech is hard to trace, it is known that the Department of External Affairs established "a group of consultant experts" at the end of 1977 to aid in preparing Canadian policy for UNSSOD I.28 The Canadian delegation to the Special Session consisted of regular diplomatic representatives, parliamentary observers, and five consultants drawn from outside the Government. One of those consultants, Professor Albert Legault. said that the policy statement delivered by the Prime Minister was "based on many intra-, inter- and para-departmental consultations....prepared with the greatest of care, reflecting a variety of opinions."29 He noted that while the consultations were carried out on a national scale, more forceful proposals might have resulted if Canada had consulted its allies, the neutral powers, and the Third World nations more closely.30 There is little in government sources or literature in the public domain to indicate the content or nature of these consultations. Klaus Goldschlag, described as one of DBAs "most brilliant officers", actually wrote the suffocation speech3* At that time, Trudeau was not as involved nor apparently as concerned over this issue as he was to become in the ensuing years. While no doubt he approved the speech prior to giving it, at that stage he was content to speak eloquently without matching the rhetoric with substantive policy. While the speech's analysis of the nuclear dilemma was insightful and accurate, it was more in the realm of detached commentary rather than an actual directive. The government did not subsequently act to incorporate any of its tenets as a basis for Canadian behavior in the nuclear world. While Canada did not have a seat at the superpowers' negotiating table, it failed to make the suffocation strategy a focal point for Canadian policy at the Conference on Disarmament, or a guide 75 for Canadian voting at the United Nations. Other considerations were the real priorities, and will be detailed below. To be fair, the decision-making behind Canadian policy at UNSSOD I was most likely based on a realistic acknowledgement of the limits to Canadian power and was influenced by the belief, a legacy from the period of detente, that the superpowers could manage the arms race if they would only, once again, establish cordial relations. The traditional Canadian respect for the cohesion of its alliances lay behind the suggestive, rather than demanding, tone of Trudeau's speech and meant that considerations of what would be acceptable to that audience triumphed over any inclusion of Third World demands. Any querying of the guiding rationales of the nuclear world was kept to a few polite musings, as explicit criticism would be most impolitic. It is also fair to say that the weakness of strategic analysis in Canada ensured that there was not the expertise available in the policy-making circles to furnish a well-founded critique, even if the government had been willing to take that risky path. In 1978, priority was given to the demands of being a loyal ally, which entailed staunch support for whatever nuclear policies were deemed best by the experts. The technological momentum was identified as the primary dilemma, thus neatly avoiding the fact that political choices, and hence the people who made them, were also responsible for the state of superpower relations and for the lack of trust that coloured the perceptions on both sides of the arms race. The decision to restrict Canadian arms control policy suggestions at UNSSOD I to that forum was also influenced by the politics within the Canadian government. Its competing bureaucratic forces with their differing world views and the continuing excessive attention to structural tinkering did not facilitate the development of a coherent advocacy group. From the following anecdote, one may get an indication of the divergence of opinions 76 on arms control within the Government, and the subsequent contradictory sources of input into the policy process. In his address to the Special Session, the Prime Minister commended President Carter's "farsighted postponement of a decision to produce" the enhanced-radiation warhead 3 2 At the same time, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Department of National Defence announced that "the enhanced-radiation warheads would be a positive addition to NATO's nuclear inventory."33 While the issue of nuclear arms control was a concern of the Canadian government in 1978, it was deemed too structurally complicated, too politically obtuse and too removed from their direct authority to merit more than a demonstration of support. While this support did translate into continued involvement in multilateral attempts to address arms control problems, it did not mean that Canada would assume a more activist position on any particular issue. However, the electoral support for the general concepts of peace and the avoidance of nuclear war did merit public relations procedures. At the conclusion of the Special Session, the Secretary of State for External Affairs told Parliament that he had "started a new mechanism in Canada and the department to deal with disarmament questions."34 Two weeks later the creation of a Office of the Advisor on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs was announced. Geoffrey Pearson, a career diplomat and the son of Canada's most widely hailed peace-maker, was to be the principal adviser on disarmament policy. Pearson was directly responsible for: strengthening Canada's role in the multilateral arms negotiations; encouraging research and public education regarding disarmament; and ascertaining how the decisions of UNSSOD I were being furthered.35 While this office was later upgraded to ambassador, the lack of financial and political support for this position indicates that the government's priorities 77 were elsewhereIn light of the analysis of the policy-making in Chapter III, it should come as no surprise that the input of both the advisor/ambassador and his Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs was peripheral. Criticisms of the suffocation strategy occurred more in retrospect than at the time, as its very nature required time to pass before the results could be judged. In 1981, Michael Tucker stated that the Canadian focus on technical solutions to arms control problems tended to "preclude or overshadow" the needed measures to influence the political decisions behind the strategy choices and weapons procurement?7 In 1982. the former Director of Disarmament Affairs at the UN Secretariat, Canadian William Epstein, criticized the Government for moving its interests in arms control and disarmament "not just to the back burner but right off the stove. David Cox noted that there was "little or no translation of general purpose and declaration into specific policies and no fruitful confrontation of the difficulties and costs which an independent initiative would pose."^9 NDP External Affairs critic Pauline Jewett argued in 1983 that a close examination of the events following the Special Session belied the Government's apparent new priority regarding arms control and disarmament. She cited as evidence for her contention the following important points. Although the advisor for disarmament was upgraded to ambassador, his "office bears no comparison in size or resources to even one of the specialized strategic or arms advisory divisions" of the Department of National Defence. The lack of consultation or consideration of the suggestions generated by the Ambassadors Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs had put it in "open revolt" with the DEA and the Liberal government. The strategy of suffocation, as such, was not presented at any conferences where Canada had official status, nor were any governmental studies done to further the strategy, nor was the strategy incorporated into the civil services agenda.40 Michael Wallace, while acknowledging that the strategy was "extremely well-researched, far-sighted....and essentially correct in both diagnosis and remedy", censured the government for not fighting for the proposals in NATO and NORAD forums.41 A year later, John Lamb stated that Trudeau's suggestions were flawed as they "lacked substantive coherence, the backing of a political concensus" between DEA and DND, and sustained public support42 Official rhetoric can be quite misleading if taken too literally. Despite the criticisms noted above, the 1980 Speech from the Throne seemed to indicate ongoing concerted action, as it asserted that the government "must continue its strategy to suffocate the deadly growth in the nuclear arsenals of the world....and seek to rally others to a cause that is no less than human survival on this planet."4^ However, any action was marked by the continuation of the status quo, in that the government limited its policy to the traditional support for the Western Alliance's stance. The relevant bureaucracies within the government apparatus, such as those which formulated policy for the multilateral arms control for a and those which participated in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, continued on as if the suffocation strategy had been little more than an aberration. In 1981, Michael Tucker asserted that the conservative trend in Canadian arms control policy-making had been encouraged by the bleak prospects for superpower agreement. This sentiment was exacerbated by a feeling that it is neither desirable nor productive for a responsible ally and member of a Western negotiating team to move in advance of its allies on issues bearing directly upon their security 4 4 Although the suffocation strategy was never promoted in its entirety, 79 the Canadian Government did co-sponsor resolutions at the UN General Assemblies over the next few years that, amongst other things, urged the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to pursue discussions about the viability of negotiations on halting the production of fissionable material for weapons, and called for a comprehensive test ban (CTB). Canada also supported resolutions urging a decrease in military spending and the prevention of any further nuclear weapons proliferation. However, the credibility of many of the resolutions in the UN and the CD is impugned by • the various partisan positions and resulting apparently contradictory votes that are adopted within these forum.4^ In addition, the resolutions and negotiations from these sources can only be declamatory or exploratory without the concrete political backing of both superpowers. The demands of the international scene relegated the stated intent of Canadian arms control policy, as enunciated at UNSSOD I, to a position of rhetoric at best, and at worst, to one of hypocrisy 4 6 It is difficult to know whether the lack of public support for the suffocation strategy contributed to the government's apathy, or whether the failure on the government's part to put its policy into action resulted in the electorate's disinterest. While the public does not have much power in the arms control process, expressions of concern may well influence the government to manage a policy differently in an attempt to alleviate the electorate's anxiety about an issue. In 1977, one year before UNSSOD I, the issue of arms control/disarmament did not even merit inclusion in a table documenting the topics of the Canadian public's correspondence with External Affairs.47 In 1979, the DEA employed Goldfarb Consultants to conduct a survey to ascertain, among other things, the foreign policy issues that were regarded as being of primary and secondary importance to the Canadian populace. 60 . . 96% of the respondents identified the oceans and proper management of the fisheries as the number one primary interest: 92% rated trade and tariff issues in second place; and 89% put UN peacekeeping forces as the third most important issue. Arms control and the reduction of the arms race was rated by 82% of the respondents as the most important secondary foreign policy interest for Canada.48 Over a period of ten years, three Canadian Gallup polls asked the question, "Are the chances of nuclear war breaking out greater or less great than they were 10 years ago?" In 1971, approximately 17% of those polled said the chances were greater; in 1975,33% said greater; and in 1982, 59% of those Canadians asked replied that the chances of nuclear war breaking out were now greater than ten years earlier. In 1982, 90% of Canadians surveyed in a study for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs were pessimistic about the prospects of arms control.49 Obviously the issue was becoming more of a concern to the public. Why was this evolution in opinion occurring and how was the Canadian government responding? The Intervening Years; 1979-1981 The period between the two UNSSODs was so tumultuous that the government was hard put to maintain even a semblance of equanimity. Prime Minister Trudeau and his government were unable to focus their energies on promoting the strategy of suffocation due to a number of demands on both the domestic and international fronts. However, it is unlikely that such an emphasis was ever their intention. After ten years in power, they knew all too well that the ideal was rarely possible, long-term goals were often sacrificed for short-term results, and that compromises were essential in maintaining politically viable policies, be they in the field of arms control, economic relations or in any of the myriad areas that 81 demanded constant management. The years between UNSSOD I in 1978 and UNSSOD II in 1982 saw many changes in the domestic and international frames of reference for the Liberal government. Their commitment to arms control was stated several times in those intervening years but the rhetoric was unaccompanied by concerted and structured efforts to make arms control a priority. While Canada continued to be active in procedural matters like compiling a compendium of past proposals on verification for the Conference on Disarmament, or supporting general and often amorphous arms control goals in the United Nations, the urgency and specificity that the suffocation strategy had hinted at was gone. Other, more immediately compelling events commanded the attention of Trudeau and his government. On the domestic front, there were a variety of issues that required policy formulation and action. A few are mentioned here to indicate the demanding agenda of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the Liberal Party. Their political fortunes had shifted as the Progressive Conservatives formed the Government from June 1979 to February 1980, while the accompanying elections took their toll on the public and politicians alike. The contentious sovereignty-association referendum took place in Quebec in May 1980. Widespread economic problems during this period demanded both immediate and long-term comprehensive policies, a near-impossible accomplishment at the best of times. In the spring of 1982, the Prime Minister and his government were very involved with the repatriation of the Canadian constitution and the new Charter of Rights. All of these events demanded that care be given to nurturing federal-provincial relations, a difficult task considering the wide range of interests and goals of the ten provinces. Considerations of state also included a variety of defence-related 02 issues, notably the NORAD treaty's periodic review in May 1980. The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence was charged with examining that issue. Ten months later the treaty was renewed, and a measure of the official preoccupation with other priorities may be seen in the fact that the name was changed to North American Aerospace Defence Treaty, and the clause that ensured Canada would not be involved in active ballistic missile defence was dropped, without any Parliamentary or public debate. In October 1980, the government received the Americans' first request regarding the testing of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). In the spring of 1982. Canada agreed in principle to allow flight-tests of the ALCM in Alberta, although this news was kept out of the public domain until much later. In December 1981, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence was asked to prepare a report for the government on "security and disarmament" in light of the second UNSSOD in mid-1982. The subsequent hearings led six members of the committee to issue a minority report which asserted that the official report was gravely deficient in its analysis of the effects of the arms race, and in its recommendations for government action.^ This limited overview of the important domestic policy issues within Canada demonstrates that the government had a very full agenda. However, the external world also provided a plethora of concerns that had to be addressed. Between 1979 and 1981, Canadian considerations and actions were influenced by a wide variety of events in the international field. Some had direct implications for Canadian policy while others influenced the international atmosphere, and hence the environment in which Canadian policy was made. On the economic front, the world experienced a severe 83 recession. On the political scene, while regional tensions continued to cause sporadic wars, two events had particularly grave consequences for morale in Western countries. In November 1979, the Iranian revolutionaries in Tehran took the members of the American embassy hostage, and the next month the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, lending renewed credence to fears of communist expansionism. In the wake of the Afghanistan invasion, the SALT II ratification process in Congress was suspended and relations between East and West plunged to a new low.^1 The resulting trauma for the American public did much to encourage an assertively militaristic and conservative attitude, which, in turn, helped bring Ronald Reagan to power in late 1980. According to Strobe Talbott, the Soviet Union believed that the arms control agreements reached in the 1970s were positive in that the USSR had achieved parity with the United States, while the Reagan Administration saw them in negative terms, citing them as responsible for the loss of American nuclear superiority. Such divergences in perceptions were all too common in superpower relations and their ramifications for arms control were costly. The new Administration saw arms control as a way "to dictate to the USSR an entirely new sort of arsenal, one more to American liking and one that required that the Soviet Union scrap their latest, most cost-effective, most powerful and most highly valued weapons."^2 Rod Byers' analysis of Soviet-American relations in 1981-2 revealed a widening "perceptual gap" with respect to the optimal method of maintaining a stable nuclear deterrent He specified three areas where differing perceptions had a real impact strategic doctrine; the current strategic balance and any resulting vulnerabilities; and whether each superpower's moves were aiding or detracting from deterrence stability. The impact of new technology was felt in all three areas? 3 Thus developments on the arms control front were not promising. In December 1979, the NATO countries adopted the Two Track policy. It called for the deployment of 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles to begin in 1983, if the Soviet Union could not be persuaded to remove their new theatre weapons, the SS-20 missiles.^4 The Soviet and NATO initial decisions to deploy new long-range theatre nuclear forces seemed valid and essential in light of their respective interpretations of the strategic situation. However, there were key differences in their perspectives and methods of assessment. When the INF (intermediate nuclear forces) negotiations began in late 1981, the respective positions of the two superpowers did not bode well for a speedy agreement.55 Success in other arms control matters was not imminent. The negotiations for a comprehensive test ban (CTB), long a Canadian priority, were deadlocked over the issue of verification. The politics of the nuclear world ensured that even very comprehensive verification would not suffice, in light of the atmosphere of mistrust between the superpowers 56 In addition to these problems, no agreement could be reached on the prerequisites for continuing strategic arms control discussions until mid-1982. While the superpowers were adhering to the provisions of SALT II, the fact that the U.S. had not ratified it meant that any further deterioration in bilateral relations could easily result in those guidelines being discarded.5? As if these external problems were not enough cause for concern, the superpowers' domestic programs cast long shadows over their tenuous relationship. The Reagan Administration's military build-up. long-term strategic goals and fierce anti-Communist rhetoric were a threatening combination in the eyes of the Soviet Union. The apparently imminent Soviet crackdown on Polish activists in 1981 and the reimposed restraints on 85 Jewish emigration renewed American frustrations regarding their limited powers of restraining and influencing the U.S.S.R. American aid to Afghan rebels and Soviet support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were yet two more examples of the wealth of opportunity for indirect superpower clashes. In the area of American nuclear strategy, there was a development that was to have grave implications for the stability of the nuclear world. Jimmy Carter issued Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy", on July 25, 1980. It was the culmination of several studies on a variety of aspects of the American nuclear weapons program and followed several memorandums and reviews of nuclear targeting policy. Among other points, PD-59 "required the USA to develop the capability to fight a protracted nuclear war."^8 While the Carter Administration emphasized that PD-59 "does not assume that the United States can win a limited nuclear war, nor does it intend or pretend to enable the US to do so", a secret document of the Reagan Administration leaked in 1982 specified that their policy goal is "to prevail in a protracted nuclear war'*.59 The demands of deterrence, due to a wide-ranging variety of technical and political developments, seemed to make such a move necessary and rational but the destabilizing requirements of such a policy could only fuel the arms race and superpower tensions. In October 1981, the American Secretary of Defense outlined the plans for the strategic nuclear modernization program. The administration committed itself to develop and deploy: the B-I bomber armed with Air-Launched Cruise Missiles; huge new submarines with the counterforce-capable Trident II D-5 warhead; a force of attack submarines (SSNs); the MX ICBM, in existing hardened silos; an updated strategic defence system with advanced radar, F-I5 fighters and other special hardware; an anti-satellite system; and a larger civil defence program 6 0 86 It is unclear how cognizant the Liberal government was of the shift in American strategic doctrine and the accompanying downplaying of arms control that the Reagan victory heralded.61 Little changed in the Canadian attitude regarding the acceptability of American leadership in the nuclear world. While this may have been partly due to a realization that it would be politically risky to challenge the American strategy, the more likely reason is that the Canadian government was pre-occupied with more immediately tangible worries about relations with its powerful southern neighbour, and did not realize the full meaning of these developments. In 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig told Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan that he was increasingly concerned that "our two countries are heading towards a confrontation" and termed the situation as "urgent and extremely serious."62 In September of that year, shortly after Reagan and Trudeau had unsuccessfully discussed the National Energy Program, the US Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs warned that Canadian energy and investment policies might lead to American retaliation and spoke of "risks of irreparable damage to the bilateral relationship."63 The time was certainly not propitious for Canadian criticism of an issue as integral to the Reagan ideology as defense concerns. Furthermore, the scarcity of skilled strategic analysts in the Department of External Affairs meant that there were no expert bureaucratic critics to make well-founded discussion of these shifts a priority. Indeed, it seems that the SSEA himself was not getting adequate information. He was interviewed in late 1980 about the official position regarding the MX missile. He described it as too recent a development to merit a position yet. He noted that "instant answers" were difficult as the "enormous technical complexity" meant that it would take "a long time to figure out the technical, and military and moral aspects."64 Any analysis from the Department of National 87 Defence was not without its own inherent bias. The then Deputy Minister for National Defence has described the Soviet Union as an "implacable, extremely well-armed enemy", who would "use their nuclear weapons without hesitation."6^ George Lindsey, the chief of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence (ORAE) has asserted that devoting "the main thrust of the United Nations toward the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers is likely to do little more than irritate them."66 The official Canadian view of the nuclear world and arms control during this period is exemplified by several speeches given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1980, 1981 and early 1982. In mid-1980, Mark MacGuigan firmly rejected what he called the recently "fashionable" assumption that arms control efforts had come to "a complete halt", and assured his audience that the government "does not share this pessimism."67 The reasons for some of that pessimism have been noted above, but he was careful to avoid delving too deeply into any specific area. While he did voice support for the "fully justifiable" INF modernization program, MacGuigan maintained the governments customary avoidance of issue-oriented controversy, and did not address the specific fears regarding the nature of those particular new weapons or their destabilizing qualities.68 He described the "three-cornered foundation" on which "real security rests": deterrence, arms control, and "the mechanisms and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes"69 His description of Canada's priorities in arms control indicates the limitations the government felt on its influence, and the accompanying need to maintain a supportive yet noncontroversial profile. He asserted that Canada should: "encourage the continuation" of the SALT process; "promote the realization" of a comprehensive test ban; "assist in the preparation" of a 88 ban on chemical weapons; "promote the evolution" of a non-proliferation regime; "participate actively" in negotiations to reduce conventional weapons; and "strive, step by step, to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states."70 Despite his exaggeration about Canadian participation in multilateral arms control attempts, Mr. MacGuigan was not unaware of some of the reasons for the failure of the arms control policies that Canada supported. He candidly acknowledged that the reactions of the nuclear weapons states had been "less than enthusiastic" to the suggestions contained in the speech of his Prime Minister at UNSSOD I. He noted that there was strong opposition both to the proposed ban on fissionable material for weapons purposes and, "pending further progress in the SALT negotiations", to any halt to the flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles71 Citing the "current international situation" as the reason for the lack of progress on a CTB or a reduction in military spending, MacGuigan diplomatically avoided open criticism of any specific country. While MacGuigan expressed some apprehension about the Canadian tradition of "accepting without question the terms of the debate" as it is conducted in the US or in Europe, his desire for independent analysis did not lead to concrete policy changes.72 He floated the idea of "an autonomous association for arms control and disarmament", and gave support to his Department "encouraging research and stimulating public information activities", but his speech was restrained in terms of advocating anything really innovative 7 3 He stated that the government would retain its right to speak out when "the pace is too slow or the agenda too narrow", but gave no indication of how such a judgement would be made or what Canada would 74 say. 89 As the date for the planned INF deployments approached, large segments of the general public in Europe and North America became more knowledgeable and consequently more agitated about the growing dangers of the arms race. The NATO countries met their demands for a freeze on the arms race or the adoption of a policy of "no first use" with stern refusals, and reprimands that the uninformed public did not understand the needs of Western security. The Canadian electorate was not as vocal as certain elements in the United States or in those countries which were scheduled for deployments of the missiles but, as noted earlier, there were some indications that public concern over the nuclear arms race was beginning to gather momentum in Canada. Drawing on the results of some polls conducted just prior to UNSSOD II, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs concluded that while some Canadians saw greater military strength as the key to greater security, many more wanted a decrease in the numbers of weapons in the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. In addition, there was an interesting shift from a previous tendency to blame the Soviet Union more than the United States for the lack of progress in arms control and the sorry state of East-West relations to one that faulted both superpowers 7 5 Such public concern and the potential for rifts in NATO were not to the liking of the Canadian government In June 1981 during a two-day debate on foreign policy in the House of Commons, the External Affairs Minister stressed the coherence in Canadian foreign policy and evoked an image of an active and concerned policy-making elite. The themes of "working for peace and security and safeguarding sovereignty and independence" were deemed "fundamental to everything else", as was the strength of the alliances.76 Canadian security policy in the past 30 years has been based on....deterrence of war through collective defence represented by participation in NATO and NORAD....verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements and....mechanisms and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes/7 This representation does not indicate any recognition of the fact that the situation over the past thirty years had been qualitatively altered by the changes in nuclear weapons technology. However, the Minister did hint at the political problems that might have deterred the Canadians from any in-depth analysis of current US nuclear strategy. While the reference was in the context of general bilateral relations, it describes problems that would apply to any area where there was a difference of opinion between the United States and Canada. There is a difficulty sometimes in the United States to grasp that different policy methods are used in Canada, despite the similarities which exist, because our respective experiences and structures are in some ways different. In order to minimize the friction in the relationship, therefore, a premium must be placed on explaining policy approaches to one another as effectively as possible/8 The Prime Minister also spoke during the debate on foreign policy. He expressed some personal philosophical thoughts on global issues but did not identify any novel ways of handling these problems. "All the great problems of the world are interrelated: the problems of East and West, North and South, of energy, nuclear proliferation, refugees, sporadic outbursts of violence and war - all of these form a complex web of cause and effect."79 Instead, he described the INF deployments as "the policy of reinforcing NATO's defence preparedness" and characterized stability in Europe as dependent upon "the maintenance of cohesion and strength through NATO."80 He seemed to be in complete agreement with American policy and any perceptual bias it might have. An inherent aspect in the American perception was that the threat to Europe from the Soviet Union's SS-20s was not offset to any extent by the independent British and French forces, the 91 latter s planned modernization, or the forward-based American nuclear weapons.8* Yet there was a difference between the perceptions of Canada and the United States regarding the crucial concept of nuclear parity. In early 1982, the Secretary for External Affairs appeared before SCEAND and stated that there was "approximate parity at the strategic nuclear level" between the superpowers.82 This assertion was in marked contrast to Ronald Reagan's views and those of many members of his Administration. Throughout his campaign, Reagan had warned of an imminent threat from Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and in October 1981, the President asserted that the Soviet Union had "a superiority at sea"8^ Early in 1982 he stated that the United States had been "unilaterally disarming" in all previous arms negotiations84 The President claimed that "on balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority"8^ The White House was loathe to recognize that the asymmetrical nature of the superpowers' forces meant that "bean-counting" was not an accurate method of measuring their respective strengths.86 With minimal analysis, the Canadian government would have realized that this disparity between its perception of the nuclear balance and that of the Reagan Administration meant that the two views of the nuclear world were in conflict. However, there was no attempt to challenge the perception of nuclear balance as presented by the United States or to promote a different policy approach. As noted above, the state of bilateral relations was parlous enough, and there were a wealth of other pressing concerns to occupy the attention of Trudeau and his government. Canada could ill afford to alienate its most important trading partner. The Prime Minister noted in the fall of 1981 that "an essential dimension" of Canadian foreign policy was economic development, including the priority of bilateral trade. ' An indication of this priority was the restructuring of the DEA in January 1982 to accomodate trade promotion and the economic dimensions of Canadian foreign policy. In summation, this period between the two UN Special Sessions on Disarmament was marked by official Canadian rhetoric in support of the general issue of arms control, but no acknowledgement in any concrete policy terms that the nuclear world was rapidly changing, and that the arms control arena was in even more disarray than when UNSSOD I had been convened. The grave challenges to established doctrine that the Reagan Administration was facilitating both by its shift in strategic thinking and the encouragement of new technology were either not heeded, or not recognized as such. Canadian arms control policy decision-making during this period is best described using the bureaucratic politics model, with some aid from the cybernetic paradigm. There was a strong attachment to the status quo and the established patterns of policy behavior. Any indications that the external variables which had set the pattern for the standard operating procedure in the past were changing were either ignored or interpreted in such a way that there was no need for a change in policy. According to the cybernetic paradigm, information that contradicts the established perception is ignored for as long as possible, while organizational patterns and vested interests limit the information that does get to the top of the organization. The changes that did occur were minimal, limited to the realm of official rhetoric and may be described as "disjointed incrementalism". It may have been impossible for the Canadian government to formulate specific criticisms, even if it had so wished, in light of its limited capacity for independent strategic analysis. Furthermore, such criticism could or would have been deflected by the claim that national or alliance 93 security demanded a continuation of the situation. The fact that there were already outstanding issues of concern between Canada and the US that showed little promise of speedy resolution would also have acted to discourage negative appraisals 8 8 In light of the superpower tensions, it was no surprise that UNSSOD II met with even less success than its predecessor, despite the desperate need for action on the arms control front. It should also come as no surprise that the Canadian policy there was circumspect. It did not depart from the role of a good ally, although there were indications in the Prime Minister's speech that he was growing more and more disillusioned with the status quo and felt that innovative policy was needed to break the impasse in arms control. Canadian Arms Control Policy at the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament Canada's interpretation of the international scene at the time of UNSSOD II was influenced by a number of internal and external circumstances. The problems between Canada and the United States were grave enough that the utmost care had to be taken in order not to exacerbate the tension; a difficult task considering some of the issues and personalities involved. Prime Minister Trudeau and the Reagan Administration differed sharply in their prescriptions on many topics, including international relations. In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig described linkage as "a fact of life," while less than a year later the Prime Minister took pains to explain that as the only threat from the Soviet Union was military, nonmilitary objectives should not be linked to disarmament.89 In an address to the British House of Commons on June 8, just as UNSSOD II began. President Reagan described his vision of the future, one that would "leave Marxism-Leninism on the ashheap of history."90 This was a far cry from Trudeau's urging a week later that each superpower accept the legitimate security interests of the other 9 1 Crises such as the Falklands war, the ongoing civil wars with superpower involvement in Central America, and the powderkeg tensions in the Middle East had widespread effects and offered ample reason to believe that a solution to the world's problems could be a long time coming. In varying degrees, these factors had an effect on the Canadian decision-makers' perceptions of policy options and what compromises were necessary. The need to establish priorities for various competing demands made their work theoretically more difficult, but the use of a standard operating procedure that characterized the UN as a forum more for well-intentioned rhetoric than substantive policy, and the custom of following the American lead in arms control policy, simplified their dilemma. The unpleasant fact that Reagan's rhetoric was backed up by some very dangerous innovations in nuclear weaponry and strategy was apparently ignored, or perceived using "inferences of transformation" — or as they are commonly known — acts of wishful thinking.92 For example, in February 1982, Caspar Weinberger made his report to Congress on the upcoming fiscal year. In describing the major purposes of the American nuclear forces, the Secretary of Defense included the need to "impose termination of a major war - on terms favourable to the United States and our allies - even if nuclear weapons have to be used - and in particular to deter escalation in the level of hostilities" as well as negate any nuclear blackmail attempts on the part of the Soviet Union 9^ Just before UNSSOD II. The New York Times reported that the classified document "Fiscal Year 1984-88 Defense Guidance" recommended a protracted nuclear war strategy that would enable American nuclear forces 95 to "prevail and be able to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States."94 On June 4, Weinberger acknowledged the plan but took great care to explain that the strategic ability of fighting a protracted nuclear war was only to deter an attack from the USSR 95 Such a capability has the inherent condition of requiring superiority and hints at the usability of the nuclear forces. It is certainly not conducive to crisis stability or mutual trust. Theodore Draper's criticism of the new strategy went to the very essence of its flawed nature. A program of nuclear deterrence could stop at some point deemed necessary to make a nuclear attack mutually impracticable or irrational: a nuclear war-fighting program has no such recognizable stopping point, for it requires open-ended preparations in behalf of a war which has no rational boundary and whose nature cannot be foreseen 9 6 There was no indication that Canadian policy-makers felt these revelations merited a change in their approach. The combination of Weinbergers policy statement and the nuclear hardware acquisitions program announced late in the previous year should have prompted some reassessment of the American nuclear rationale, but the Canadian preparations for UNSSOD II were not affected. There were some sources of input into the policy-making process that did necessitate a slight change in the following of the standard operating procedure, although in the end they had little effect on the actual policy presented at UNSSOD II.97 The difference in the lead-up to this Special Session, as opposed to that in 1978, was that the general public was much more aware of the gravity of the nuclear danger and the number of well-informed Canadian experts who were voicing a critical view of the status quo had increased substantially. 96 These two points were in part responsible for the House of Commons instructing the Standing Comittee on External Affairs and National Defence in December 1981 "to examine security and disarmament issues with specific attention to Canada's participation" in UNSSOD I I9 8 The report was to be tabled by April of the next year, "so that Parliament could have an effective voice in national policy-making in the period preceding the Special Session"." In reality, despite a wide variety of well-crafted presentations that argued against embracing the American view of the nuclear world, and any maintenance of Canada's traditional acquiescence to that lead, there was little perceptible change in policy.100 In fact, the conservative analysis of the world as epitomized by the Reagan administration's bleak view of the Soviet Union and the dismal chances for arms control was echoed in some official testimony before SCEAND. While many informed analysts would disagree with the Minister of National Defence's commentary, Gilles Lamontagne expressed doubts that the threat of nuclear war had increased in recent years.101 George Lindsey of ORAE went so far as to suggest that even a full-scale nuclear war might not be completely catastrophic.102 The lack of influence that has traditionally characterized SCEAND reports was mentioned in Chapter III. This particular report was further undercut by the dissension of six MPs, representing all three parties, who issued a Minority Report which was sharply critical of official Canadian policy.103 Their actions were prompted in large part by the March 1982 leaking and subsequent confirmation of a story that the Cabinet had agreed in principle to the testing of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile over Canadian territory. However, their criticism also focussed on "grave deficiencies" in the Majority Report's analysis and proposals for action. "The latter fall far short of the realistic, strong initiatives Canada could take to halt the 97 headlong race to oblivion.'104 The dissenters advocated a nuclear freeze, no ALCM testing, a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons, which would directly contradict NATO policy, and the devotion of one-tenth of one percent of the defence budget to disarmament efforts, as proposed by the Secretary-General at UNSSOD I.10^ None of the above were incorporated into official policy. Even the Majority Report's recommendations were acted upon only when they conformed to existing policy.106 In February 1982, York University's conference on UNSSOD II drew together more than forty experts to deliberate on what Canadian policy should be at the UN forum. Many of the factors that were pertinent in the decision-making behind Canada's UNSSOD II policy were echoed in the discussions.107 There was not much optimism regarding the potential for success on any of the major issues. As two of the conference organizers noted, the "potential of the major powers to minimize the issues for debate or to use certain issues to gain diplomatic advantage does not bode well."108 An interesting outcome of the conference was the categorization of the three attitudinal profiles within Canada regarding arms control. According to their criteria, Prime Minister Trudeau combined perceptual factors and policy proposals from across the spectrum: the "disarmers"' views that linkage was inappropriate for any arms talks; the "moderates "assessment of UNSSOD II that no substantive developments were possible in the current climate but efforts must be made; and the "sceptical arms controllers'" belief that Canadian policy at UNSSOD II should not endanger national security interests.109 Official divergences along these lines may be extrapolated from policy statements and bureaucratic postions. The inaction in Canadian arms control up to this point was due, inter alia, to the widespread predilection for the status quo, or to change of an incremental nature only. This natural bureaucratic tendency was exacerbated by the complexity and 9% unknown ramifications inherent in this issue. In the period leading up to UNSSOD II there were indications of an evolution in Pierre Trudeau s perceptions of the nuclear world. In the two months prior to the Special Session, the Prime Minister spoke more eloquently and with more clarity on the issue of arms control than he ever had before. It may well be that he was influenced by American statements on nuclear policy. Trudeaus predisposition for rational decision-making may have made him less prone to block out information that required a change in perceptions than the bureaucracy, with its narrowly constrained information inputs and tendency to simplify the complexity of the world.*10 In an annual review of 1982, Roderick Byers noted that Trudeaus world view was "somewhat at variance with that of his ministers and senior officials."111 In May 1982, Trudeau addressed a graduating class at Notre Dame University in Indiana with outspoken fervour about "the need for greater understanding between East and West."112 While he stressed that the suffocation strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally, he also voiced grave misgivings over the state of arms control. He expressed worry about the deployment of SS-20s in Eastern Europe and "about statements in the United States about the survivability' of nuclear war, about 'demonstration explosions' and 'first strike scenarios'."113 On June 10, at the NATO summit meeting in Bonn. Trudeaus normal diplomacy disappeared as he characterized the final communique as being "cooked and pre-cooked", full of cliches and "weasel words".114 He went on to say "there is no exchange, there is no deepening of the consensus within the Alliance....nobody has a chance to say why did you say that? and where did you get this idea? and what makes you think that?"11^ Trudeau lamented the fact that very rigid time constraints allowed no real 99 communication. In a revealing comment, he noted that "the organization's bureaucracies" imposed "the party line" because they liked the fact that no exchange invariably meant "no chance of discord".116 Despite these manifestations of his growing misgivings with the nuclear world, Trudeau was not yet willing to risk Canadian interests for the doubtful benefits that might accrue from a more activist Canadian arms control policy. As will be shown in Chapter VI, it was not until the fall of 1983 that he was able to reconcile the competing priorities of meeting the challenge posed by the deteriorating superpower relationship and the demands of the Canadian national interest. It is illuminating that his response at that time was personal in nature and bypassed the normal channels of bureaucratic policy-making. UNSSOD II was held from June 7 to July 10, 1982. The Canadian delegation was made up of the Prime Minister, the Ambassador for Disarmament Arthur Menzies, a variety of civil servants, nineteen parliamentary observers, and fifteen representatives from nongovernmental organizations and universities.117 The inclusion of the last two groups reveals that the issue was both more politically salient than in 1978. and that the government was at pains to make it appear that it was more receptive to the concerns of certain elements of the electorate. However, the power to influence policy was not part of the privilege of accompanying the official envoys. Prime Minister Trudeau's address on June 18 to the assembly was sombre, as he noted that the four years since the last UNSSOD had witnessed "little progress" in arms control.118 He reiterated the suffocation strategy but stressed that it had never been "meant to be applied unilaterally", nor was it in competition with current or future negotiations.119 The former comment was no doubt in response to the criticisms that had been made ioo within Canada regarding the governments failure to promote the strategy. The latter comment indicates a recognition of the fact that the major nuclear powers had not supported the main points. In proposing that the strategy be "enfolded into a more general policy of stabilization". Trudeau stressed that the aim of inhibiting the development of new weapons systems should be combined with the Wests negotiating goals of "qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels."120 Linking the Canadian strategy with the ongoing superpower arms control negotiations was necessary in order to legitimize the Canadian contribution and assure its acceptance by the United States, as it was crucial that the Americans perceived any Canadian suggestions as complementary to their own efforts. One Canadian analyst saw this as an indication that there was some fear that "the strategy might constitute an overload on....the tenuous understanding between the two superpowers that they will continue with arms control dialogues at all."1 2 1 In light of future developments, it is interesting to note that the Prime Minister expressed concern over the prospects of "highly destabilizing" anti-satellite or anti-missile laser systems and urged immediate action to foreclose "the prospect of space wars".122 His advisors were obviously well-versed in the potential of some of the new technology. As in 1978. he identified the problem of technological innovation outpacing arms control negotiation.123 The Prime Minister diplomatically avoided any direct criticism of President Reagan's military buildup with its accompanying huge outlays of capital, but he did subtly criticize any attempts to achieve unilateral security since the only result was "everyone else feeling insecure".124 He urged that the legitimate interests of both sides be considered. "Only measures that increase mutual security are likely to offer a way out of the present 101 paralysis. In particular, the two superpowers must start with the recognition that each has strategic interests and the strength to protect those interests." 1 2^ Presenting such an analysis was not without risk, as part of the Reagan rationale was that the Soviet Union was a "pirate" nation and as such had no legitimate rights on the world scene. Trudeau asserted that the allocation of increased funds in Canada for arms control and disarmament would facilitate full Canadian participation in the international seismic data exchange, which was a crucial part of the international verification regime necessary for a comprehensive test ban treaty. In addition, he promised to substantially increase Canadian research in verification.126 Canadian expertise in this area offered a viable way of contributing to an effective arms control regime and was in itself a valid effort, yet such work would be all to naught if the superpowers could not first agree on the structure of effective arms control. There was indirect criticism regarding the verification problems blocking a CTB. "I sometimes wonder whether we realize the immensity of the leap we have made; and whether a certain reluctance in accepting the rigours of verification is not an insufferable anachronism."127 Another mild but definite rebuke was given as he described the responsibilities of the superpowers. They must give their undivided attention to negotiations to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weaponry and should not deviate from that central objective by imposing political preconditions."128 Despite the change in his rhetoric, there was no indication of a real shift in Trudeau's priorities as he endorsed the continuation of NATO's refusal to embrace a no-first-use policy. He was obviously not swayed by the arguments of four very experienced American statesmen who had earlier advocated a revision of this nuclear strategy.129 What was different was the rationale he used in an intellectual "end-run" around the implied . 102 . • threat inherent in NATO's first use of nuclear weapons policy. However the Charter lays down that there shall be no use of force - any force. This law binds all of us, I can see no need to re-enact the Charter. In fact, I can see enormous pitfalls in trying to diminish the Charter in one of its central affirmations by seeking to set an order of precedence among the various manifestations of the use of force. The real problem before us is how to break the arms spiral.*30 As David Cox notes, this "legalistic response" did not address the real isssue and was obfuscating in the extreme. He further criticized Trudeaus "foreign policy performance" for the marked "gap between rhetoric and commitment".*3* There were a variety of generally negative appraisals of UNSSOD II. Shortly afterwards, William Barton, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN from 1972 to 1980. lauded the international forum for providing an opportunity for the nations of the world "to articulate their desire for peace and to try to agree on mechanisms to negotiate measures of disarmament and arms control."*32 But he also noted the limitations caused by both the lack of a common purpose, and a failure to commit resources. The result was a continuation of the arms race as if the Special Session had never happened.*33 Less than a month had passed before the External Affairs Minister addressed the failure of UNSSOD II by urging Canadians to "be grateful that it was held at all in spite of an exceedingly unpropitious international atmosphere."*34 In highlighting the positive outcomes, he had to resort to praising the fact that the viability of the UN system had been preserved for future deliberations since the nonaligned nations had chosen not to "devalue the system". He maintained that he had hope for the future because "the superpowers themselves want to avoid moving in the direction of nuclear 103 confrontation and can see their national interests being served by agreements." It is difficult to interpret the External Affairs Minister's remarks as anything other than wishful thinking. Unanimous support could not be achieved for another Comprehensive Program of Disarmament at the conclusion of UNSSOD II. None of the Canadian proposals won universal support. The lack of any progress since UNSSOD I, the non-appearance of any new initiatives at UNSSOD II, and the exchange of harsh invectives and the failure to communicate on the part of the superpowers at the latter did not bode well.136 it may have been that Mark MacGuigan was hopeful due to the announcement, made just before UNSSOD II, that the superpowers had agreed to hold strategic arms control talks. It is not known how aware he was of the many existing disagreements about the nature, scope and content of these talks, but a lack of knowledge about these matters may explain his misplaced optimism. ^7 On the other hand, it may have been yet one more attempt on the part of Canadian officials to diffuse bilateral tensions between the North American neighbours. According to Stephen Clarkson, the US had made their displeasure over FIRA. the NEP and the need for concessions in these areas the focus of the relationship.1^ The problems between the two countries were such that they overshadowed all interaction. After a pattern of conciliatory behavior on the part of Canada, it seemed that at least one member of Trudeau's Cabinet had been pushed too far. In August 1982, Mark MacGuigan briefed reporters in Washington after his meeting with Secretary of State George Schultz. He noted the "particularly large number of stresses" between their two countries and placed most of the blame on the United States. He emphasized that Canada had valid reason to follow its national interests, and asserted i o 4 that Canada could not be expected to change its policies and "fundamental orientations" just because different perceptions had arisen in the United States.139 While this was one of the strongest negative opinions voiced about the chauvinistic attitude that the United States often displayed towards Canada, there was ample evidence that, as in the field of arms control, McGuigan's criticism was rare and not accompanied by any change in policy. As will be examined in the next chapter, the Canadian government was more wont to accede to American policies and perceptions than to challenge them. In early 1982. Pierre Trudeau asserted that "Canada believes in the importance of ideas and values as influencing the events in the world, rather than in armies and the nuclear forces of the superpowers."140 This perceptual dilemma was at the heart of the problem that Canada and all like-minded nations faced. Protestations of good intentions and the desire for an end to the spiraling arms race were to no avail as long as the political will to implement substantive arms control policies was lacking on the part of the real players in the nuclear game. The two UNSSODs and the years in between were characterized by Canadian arms control policies that were, in large part, closely in accord with the demands of the Western Alliance. The Prime Minister did not match his rhetoric with substantive actions, nor did he evoke "public support for his distinctive version of an enlightened foreign policy."141 The qualitative and quantitative changes in nuclear strategy and weaponry on the part of the United States did not have an obvious impact on Canadian arms control policy. There were some indications that the Prime Minister was trying to come to terms with the demands of being a good ally and his growing perception that the superpower relationship was edging ever closer to a dangerous confrontation. However, they came late in this period and did not 105 have any apparent impact on actual policy. The next chapter's examination of the controversy over the decision to test the ALCM" reveals the wealth of competing perceptions and priorities that the decision-making elite in Ottawa had to contend with. In addition, it illustrates the difficulty that a country of Canada's status has in balancing vague, albeit well-intentioned notions of participating in the nuclear world in a moderating way, with specific, external demands that may be interpreted as both stabilizing and destabilizing. 106 CHAPTER V: CANADIAN ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND THE CRUISE MISSILE TESTS: An Exercise in Priority Management On July 15, 1983, after several years of confusing rhetoric, the Secretary of State for External Affairs clarified that Canada had finally agreed to allow the testing of the United States' Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in Canada. The statement was made when Parliament was not in session, but Allan MacEachen's announcement was not unexpected. The deliberately low-key presentation and careful timing typified the government's attitude towards this divisive issue. For as long as possible, the discussions regarding the weapons testing agreement had been kept secret. When information leaked out, the government chose to deny and obfuscate at every turn. Finally, in February 1983. an 'umbrella' testing arrangement was announced. It was very clear then to the informed public that the way had been cleared for ALCM tests in Canada. Many believed that the July 15th announcement merely formalized what had been implicitly decided long before. The politics behind the decision to test the ALCM are at once bewildering in their complexity and surprisingly clear in their origins. While the Prime Minister and the Department of External Affairs were not eager to involve Canada too closely in the nuclear world, they eventually realized that external considerations made testing the ALCM unavoidable. The Department of National Defence never shared their hesitation, largely because it fully supported the development of Cruise technology, and any part it might have therein.1 DND's handling of much of the negotiations, the perceptions of alliance demands (vis-a-vis Europe and the United States), the limited avenues for independent Canadian action, and an inability to transcend the nuclear world left the government with no other option than 107 to assent to the American request. This chapter will identify the external influences of the strategic environment that led to the request that Canada allow the tests of the ALCM, and the effects of that request on the policy environment within Canada. Both the psychological dilemmas in the decision-making and the structure of the actual policy-making are explored. The necessity of agreeing to the testing of the ALCM exemplifies the difficulty in applying rational/analytical decision-making to the nuclear world 2 As the policy develops, it is possible to trace Prime Minister Trudeaus evolving recognition of this reality. The theoretical and structural aspects of the policy-making process will be examined using the framework laid out in Chapter III. The examination of the theoretical aspects looks at the role of rationality in the policy-making and the influence of perceptions in defining pertinent goals. Several decision-making models are used to facilitate an understanding of the impetus behind the various aspects of the policy-making process. The presentation of the structural aspects focuses on the actual development of the policy and includes an assessment of the various sources of input into the policy process. Thus the respective involvement of the Prime Minister, the Department of External Affairs, the Department of National Defence, the Cabinet, Parliament, public opinion, and the media will all be examined.3 Economic factors were influential both in terms of general repercussions of a refusal, and the Defence Production Sharing Agreement and the Defence Industry Productivity Progammes partial funding of the contract to build the guidance systems for Cruise missiles.4 However, the government was careful not to mention economics in any explanation of their decision This analysis will show that DND, the Prime Minister, and DEA, in that order, were the most influential elements in the policy process. The Cabinet, io6 Parliament, public opinion and the media were actors only in the final stages of the policy process, and their impact was felt more by the Prime Minister than by the two bureaucracies 6 This chapter will also depict the relevant considerations for each locus of decision-making and illuminate why certain compromises were deemed necessary. The examination of the incremental policy-making will show that for much of the time the only people who knew what was going on were those directly involved. When details did leak out in early March of 1982, negative commentary developed quickly 7 The immediate response was muted but within a fairly short period of time, both the attentive public and concerned politicians began to focus on the issue.8 Any reassessment by the government was limited since they clearly felt that they had no other option than to agree to the testing of the ALCM. Any revision focused more on the level of policy management and presentation than on any real changes in the standard operating procedure (SOP). However, the cumulative effects of the abbreviated scanning of the limited alternatives had a hand in the evolution of the Prime Ministers attitude towards the nuclear world and arms control, and will be detailed below. The pattern of decision-making shifted with the growing involvement of the Prime Minister, who tried to impose his personal emphasis on rationality onto the policy-making situation. His attempts to infuse the process with an analytical perspective were foiled by contradictory and competitive interpretations of the optimal goals and their acceptable costs, amidst the nonrationality of the nuclear world. 109 The Multi-Faceted Cruise Missile: Nuclear War-Fighting Weapon. Arms Control Bargaining Chip, or Reassurance for NATO? The ambiguity of the Cruise missiles impact on the nuclear world is crucial to the arguments both commending and condemning the government's action. It is possible to launch a Cruise missile from air (ALCM), land (GLCM) and sea/submarine (SLCM). but there are important differences in the implications of each platform. The ALCM has been described as stabilizing in that a sneak' attack is improbable because large numbers would be seen or heard. Thus Soviet air defence, especially their "look-down, shoot-down" capability, could detect the attack. In addition, their launch platforms are comparatively slow bombers which can be seen by satellites and radar. The GLCMs' deployment with the very fast Pershing II missiles is destabilizing since it poses problems for the Soviets in terms of premature response to ambiguous warnings of attack. In crisis, there would be a serious risk of very early efforts at preemptive suppression of perceived US strategic decapitation abilities on the Pershing II. The SLCMs encapsulate the contradictory, two-edged aspect of the nuclear world. Their hard-to-detect platforms (SSNs) and the extreme difficulty of detecting SLCM launches make them both stabilizing, in terms of guaranteeing a second strike retaliatory force, and destabilizing in that proliferation of such unverifiable weapons enhances command and control decapitation abilities and exacerbates difficulties in arms control. Large scale nuclear SLCMs on forward-based submarines will constitute an important adjunct to the decapitation strike potential in soon-to-be deployed Trident II SLBMs? There are numerous questions regarding the meaning of this nuclear weapons system. Is the Cruise missile in any of its three manifestations an essential part of the Reagan goal of negotiating with the Russians from a position of strength? While the accuracy may be more a technological 110 evolution than a predetermined development, it can now facilitate extended deterrence and, in the opinion of some commentators, move nuclear diplomacy beyond passive deterrence to active intimidation, Was the ground-launched Cruise missile a proper response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Europe?10 Was allowing the testing of the air-launched version an inherent part of Canada's responsibilities to NATO, as the Prime Minister claimed? If the latter were true, the Canadian government's decision to test the ALCM was a pragmatic reaction to an unavoidable need to express tangible support for the Alliance's attempts to counter the growing Soviet threat. On the other hand, the small size, radar-evading skills, comparatively high yield and accuracy of the Cruise make it difficult to verify and a possible counterforce or war-fighting weapon, two qualities that inhibit arms control and erode deterrent stability.11 The Cruise missile may be a qualitative and destabilizing escalation of the arms race, and Canadian acquiescence to the tests a direct contradiction of the goverment's expressed interest in a stable strategic balance. [AUthough deployments of ALCM will undoubtedly enhance the overall retaliatory capability....such weapons are very much a potential threat to a stable balance of nuclear power. Their utility is clear in contingency planning for crisis preemption strikes, or still worse, premeditated disarming attack, when used in conjunction with SLBMs, ICBMs and Europe-based IRBMs.12 However, a refusal to allow the testing of the ALCM would not necessarily modify American plans for deployment.13 This reality made the value of a strong stance against the tests uncertain, especially since the chances of a negative American reaction were very high. Commentary from 1985 reveals that the focal point of the debate remained unresolved. Refusal to allow the tests could lead to "the very real risk of making 111 Washington....quite unreceptive to Canadian advice and pressure on other, perhaps more important, issues."14 Cruise technology was developed before a strategic purpose was assigned to it.1^ Even now the ALCM's strategic role is one of "considerable ambiguity".16 The attributes of the Cruise missile are worthy of attention, since they make the system unlike any other. It is approximately eighteen feet long and more akin to a pilotless aircraft than a ballistic missile. Its TERCOM (Terrain Contour Matching) guidance system is an on-board computer which can correct deviations in flight.17 It is very accurate and carries a 200 kiloton warhead.18 According to Richard Betts, "coincidental advances'" in turbo-fan engines, small warheads and improved cartography techniques around 1970 made the development of the modern Cruise possible.19 However, in the early part of the decade the Cruise program was somewhat directionless and underfinanced.20 The superpowers signed the SALT I treaty in 1972. The Americans' failure to limit Soviet naval Cruise missiles fostered a response that is typical in superpower relations.21 Shortly after the SALT I treaty, the Department of Defense requested funds for a Cruise missile development and deployment program.22 It was believed in the Pentagon that the USSR would not give up their naval Cruise missiles unless the Americans had an equivalent weapon.2^ The Cruise missile program was also perceived as having a dual purpose. It could be used as a bargaining chip to limit Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, and as "inexpensive force multipliers" to offset Soviet naval strength.24 Another impetus for the development of the Cruise missile program stemmed from the longstanding belief that the President of the United States had to have a variety of responses to choose from in the event of nuclear 112 attack, This belief gained momentum with the advent of strategic parity in the early 1970s, which necessitated the development of more flexible options in order to control the escalation of a strategic nuclear exchange. After research by the American defence establishment, National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 was signed by Richard Nixon in January 1974. It called for the formulation of plans "for limited employment options which enable the United States to conduct selected nuclear options."2^ The characteristics of the Cruise missile make it suitable for this policy. The value of the ALCM increased exponentially when Jimmy Carter cancelled the B-l bomber in 1977. It offered a perfect means of enhancing the survivability of the aging B-52s, since its technology allowed these platforms to stand off from the target and thus be less vulnerable to sophisticated Soviet air defence.26 When the Soviet Union refused in SALT II to reduce their ICBMs in order to get concessions on American Cruise missiles, the Americans saw the Cruise as a means both to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in ICBMs and to demonstrate to "domestic and foreign audiences that the US had a counter' to the Soviet advantage."27 Thus deployment went ahead, prompted by "strategic logic..[and],..the politics of perception."28 In July 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger issued a new Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP-82) which was used to develop a new Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP) for the American strategic arsenal. The choices under this SIOP included Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs). They would, respectively, allow "the selective destruction of fixed enemy military or industrial targets", and the destruction of "the leading elements of an attacking force."29 The Cruise missile's attributes made it the ideal perpetrator of these particular nuclear weapons employment plans. 113 NSDM-242 had stressed that "(tine fundamental mission of US nuclear forces is to deter nuclear war and plans for the employment of US nuclear forces would support this mission.'3° The development and deployment of the various versions of the Cruise, in tandem with the planned modernization of the US strategic forces, was accompanied by American rhetoric about the possibilities of limited nuclear war fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war. It all must have appeared extremely provocative to the Soviet Union .31 In 1983, the Pentagons plans included the deployment of about 3000 ALCMs on bases across the US, 4000 SLCMs on ships and submarines, and 464 GLCMs in Europe 32 In the same year, it was proposed that there be a temporary moratorium until the new advanced Cruise, with far greater range, reduced radar detectability, greater maneuverability and accuracy, was ready.33 The story of the Cruise missile is a common one in the nuclear world. A technological development leads to a new weapon, which affects the strategic reality. Some response is deemed necessary, so the weapon is often incorporated into doctrine and force planning. The resulting political and military perceptions create and perpetuate the value of the new weapon. An essential aspect of the Canadian governments rationale for testing the ALCM was that it was part of Canada's responsibilities to NATO. This linkage was best explained by the Department of National Defence. In their words, "NATO strategy is to preserve security through deterrence." Such deterrence requires a clear commitment to common defence "through close political and strategic coordination among its members". For deterrence to work, conventional forces, nuclear forces based in Europe and intercontinental strategic nuclear forces based in the United States must be "inalienably joined".34 Therefore, a contribution to any element of the 114-"triad" is a contribution to the total security of the West35 The linkage between testing the ALCM in Canada and European alliance commitments was not so well explained by Prime Minister Trudeau or the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA). They insisted on linking possible success in the INF negotiations with the termination of Canada's responsibility to test the ALCM 3 6 It was never clearly explained why a change in the situation of the GLCMs in Europe would affect Canadian testing, when the ALCM was part of the North American Strategic Air Command (SAC) and not affected by any INF arms control. In fact, this purported connection was illusory considering their disparate strategic roles. However, the relationship between the GLCM and the American nuclear arsenal was much clearer. The political need for a visible link between the US and Europe was expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. He feared that the advent of strategic parity between the superpowers meant that the US would not risk its own incineration over Europe, and thus Europe was vulnerable to the threat of nuclear blackmail from the Soviet Union 3 7 The Soviet deployment of the MIRVed, mobile, and very accurate SS-20s added fuel to such fears.38 In 1979, NATO decided on a "Two Track" policy. The INF deployment was planned as both a means of reassurance to the Europeans and a warning to the Soviets.39 At the same time, arms control negotiations were proposed in order that the Cruise and Pershing lis might be used as bargaining chips to get reductions in Soviet weaponry 4 0 When NATO made the decision to pursue both arms control negotiations and the INF deployment, it was assumed that negotiations would begin as soon as possible, especially since past experience in arms control had shown that such deliberations were often ponderous. However, the INF talks did not even begin until November 30, 1981, which left just 115 two years until the scheduled deployment. In order to understand why Canada agreed to the testing of the ALCM by citing the need to reassure NATO, it is necessary to gain some familiarity with NATO's "Two Track" decision. As noted, a major problem lies in the rationale for this policy choice. Since Europe is armed with tactical and theatre-based weapons, and long-range SLBMs, the imbalance created by the SS-20s is only meaningful in military terms if the US refuses to treat a conventional Soviet attack on Europe as an attack on themselves. That would require the Soviet Union to gamble that Europe is not an integral part of American security.41 The primary use of the INF deployment is psychological, both in terms of easing European fears about the decoupling of their security from the American nuclear guarantee, and in the sending of a clear message to the Soviet Union that arms control must proceed on American terms, if the threat to the Soviet Union was to be contained. The disparities in the respective assessments of NATO and Soviet INF strength were due to their different geostrategic concerns, force structures, and ideological views of each other's goals.42 The resulting subjective interpretation of the balance of strategic forces led to threatening perceptions for both sides. The many reasons for the INF deployment and the testing of the ALCM confused a clear analysis of the pertinent factors and any accompanying assessment of their merits. Some of the more commonly cited justifications for the INF deployment have been noted earlier. Others range from the potential value of the counterforce INF missiles in strategic warfighting terms, to the advantages inherent in any deployment that forces the Soviet Union to build expensive defences 4^ There are distinct differences in strategic purpose between the Cruise missile destined to be deployed in Europe and the version that was to be 1 16 tested in Canada. While potentially more warranted in the political sense, the GLCM deployment in Western Europe was destabiliizing. The pressure on the Soviets to preempt in crisis could only be increased given the poor survivability of the GLCM force. ALCMs are not quite as damaging to crisis instability and arms race instability as are Tomahawk missiles in either GLCM or SLCM modes because they are based in North America on accountable platforms'. The Canadian government's insistence on linking the NATO GLCM and the SAC ALCM added much unnecessary confusion to the debate over testing in Canada, especially since the 1983 deployments in Europe would precede the 1984 tests. Canada's involvement with the ALCM tests was due in part to geopolitical realities. As with the DEW Line and NORAD, the suitability of Canada's territory made involvement all too natural. In this case, both the position and the nature of Canadian territory made it especially appropriate.44 As well, the fact that SAC had assigned the ALCM to the defence of North America made Canadian involvement strategically sensible. The government's carelessness' with the crucial facts regarding the reasons why Canada was going to allow the ALCM tests obfuscated the debate and inhibited clearheaded criticism. The confusion and controversy within the political sphere was repeated in the general public.4^ There were those in the country who believed that the tests and all that they signified enhanced the chance the Cruise missile would be used. They were, of course, diametrically opposed to those who believed that tests and modernization ensured a stable deterrence and that any weakness in the alliance was detrimental to the security of all. The role of perceptions, and the resulting impression of a rational policy, were of great importance to this debate. 117 Theoretical Aspects of the ALCM Testing Policy: An Analysis of Decision-making The relevant factors that had to be considered regarding the Cruise missile were enough to daunt any policy-maker. The impact both in terms of the strategic balance and the INF situation, the need to support NATO's "Two Track" decision, the troubled bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States, and the difficulty in managing the public protest against Canada's involvement were some of the considerations for the policy-makers. Each of these issues will be discussed in detail below. The history of bilateral defence policy decision-making between the two countries facilitated a decision-making process that may best be described using the cybernetic paradigm, since much of the complexity in the decision-making was made tolerable by the use of standard operating procedures. John Steinbruner s cybernetic paradigm is applicable in several ways, especially since it describes the narrowly constrained range of the potential policy decisions perceived by the Canadian decision-makers. For instance, only information that arrived from an acceptable source was considered. The pre-programmed standard operating patterns were activated with little assessment of the potential uniqueness of this situation, and were not changed until a major crisis forced adjustment. Even then, the policy change was limited to incremental shifts. Bureaucratic politics, with its vested interests vying for power and achievement, was more responsible for these changes than any deliberate outcome evaluation by the decision-maker.46 The manner in which the many competing demands were dealt with is best explained with reference to cognitive theory. Cognitive theory is used by Steinbruner to enhance the applicability of the cybernetic paradigm. .. Aim < .. Since simplicity and stability are essential to the functioning of the human mind, unconscious processes act at all times to ensure that these goals are met, Once major belief systems are established, information and empirical evidence that may challenge them are rigorously filtered out so as not to cause inconsistency.47 The psychologically negative results from uncertainty in the decision-making on Canadian ALCM policy were alleviated by ignoring information which did not fit in with the established perceptions of the Soviet Union and alliance responsibilities. Any major restructuring of values and beliefs was opposed. According to cognitive theory, there would have been a general tendency to see the decision-making problems in simple terms, facilitated by severely restricting the conceptualization of values and possible outcomes.48 The use of negative images, a powerful tool in cognitive management, was influential in negating the consideration of an alternative policy to ALCM testing. The government gave dire warnings about the consequences for alliance unity and any continued sheltering under the nuclear umbrella if the tests were not agreed to by Canada.49 The Cruise missiles controversial nature, and the interplay of bureaucratic politics within Canada, enhanced the variety of interpretations regarding its implications.^0 A cybernetic approach to the controversial issues limited the impact of the diverse interpretations within the policy process and ensured that the cognitive principles of simplicity and consistency were maintained. The confusion arose when the narrowly constrained information feedback channels became overloaded. As different groups within the policy process acted according to different perceptions and schedules, numerous contradictory and nonsequential messages went back into the system and out to the public. The political scrutiny and public attention forced a revision of policy, but only at the level of policy 1 19 management. Amitai Etzioni's model is applicable in some measure here as he notes that a fundamental policy review can be caused by, inter alia, "prolonged neglect" or "mistaken treatment of a problem".^ The first condition was met when the government's unwillingness to finalize the policy on the tests resulted in a lengthy period of indecision and societal confusion. Differing perceptions of the strategic and policy arenas resulted in a variety of different definitions of the best policy, and how to pursue it. The second factor arose when the government gave contradictory rationales for Canada's involvement in ALCM testing. Bureaucratic politics were ensured due to the involvement of both DND and DEA, with their different priorities and functions.^2 The Department of National Defence's close involvement with the "transgovernmental" authority of Strategic Air Command in issues regarding North American defence further enhanced the interplay of bureaucratic politics. Graham Allison's model states that the players who lead the various organizations act according to diverse perceptions of "national, organizational, and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pushing and hauling that is politics.'^ 3 Cruise technology caused inherent perceptual problems in that it is possible, as noted earlier, to interpret it as either a destabilizing innovation or a fortuitous and appropriate development. Not surprisingly, there were vacillations and differences regarding why the ALCM should be tested in Canada. The nature of the Soviet threat, the proper approach to arms control, and the use of weapons as bargaining chips were all issues of contention. DND's publicly distributed information in support of testing included a selective, skewed and very menacing description of Soviet capabilities, but it 1Z0 neglected to point out that the Soviet Cruise did not have the revolutionary TERCOM guidance system.^4 The DEA literature did not gloss over the threat imposed by the SS-20s. but stressed that the tests were an alliance responsibility since the "Two Track" decision was the answer to fears expressed by "several Western European governments."^ The differences in their particular frames of reference may be seen in the "background notes" that each department published with regard to the ALCM tests. The reasons given for the government's linkage of the ALCM and the GLCM is much more coherently explained in the DND paper, while the DEA paper makes little attempt to clarify the connection, although that issue was an ongoing source of contention.^6 While they each described Canadian security policy in similar terms, their differing priorities were indicated when DEA's addendum to the goal of "working for the peaceful settlement of disputes" was excluded by DND. DEA asserted that this priority should include working for "the removal of the underlying political, economic and social causes of international tension." ^7 Paul McRae was one of the few Liberal MPs who was publicly very concerned about ALCM testing. In May of 1983, after much interaction with the two departments, he was forced to conclude that the vast majority of the information and analysis used by DND and DEA on arms control and strategic thinking was either from the Pentagon or the Pentagon via NATO.-*8 This perceptional bias of the Canadian Departments both facilitated their support for the American request and encouraged premature cognitive closure, which Robert Jervis identifies as a major cause of institutional inertia.^9 Disjointed incrementalism characterized the policy process in the first years of discussions and negotiations, as slow but steady progress was made on the issue of ALCM tests in Canada. The military, the primary actors during these first years, proceeded on a bilateral level using a SOP that led to 121 the development of the policy as they saw f i t6 0 That standard operating procedure resulted in the Cruise testing negotiations being handled in a manner similar to those that resulted in the DEW Line and NORAD. In those two instances of policy-making, both Parliament and the Department of External Affairs had been largely excluded in the bilateral military planning 6* The SOP was dependent on geopolitical perceptions of reality and a belief that the ALCM tests were merely a more sophisticated aspect of the tradition of North American joint defence. The fact that the initial negotiations were restricted to the military bureaucracy in Canada and the US raises some interesting points regarding the control exercised by this group of decision-makers. Their longstanding tradition of bilateral cooperation was based on a commitment to similar ideals and goals, aided by harmony in their perceptions of the Soviet threat and the optimal response. Whether the Canadian military felt more of an alliance to their opposites in Strategic Air Command than to the comparatively uninformed politicians at home is a moot point. Major General Roy Sturgess has described the relationship between the two military forces in a most illuminating way. We continually work with our American brethren....We have developed essentially a corporate interface with U.S. commanders, and our relationship with the air force is probably the closest. Regardless of the ups and downs in the political relationship, the military just grinds along.62 Comprehensive analytical behavior is most unlikely in decision-making, due to a number of factors.6^ in the specific instance of the ALCM testing policy, such an ideal process was hampered by a variety of limitations. The Prime Minister saw a rational foundation for the testing policy as a worthy goal, but there were inherent complications that he could not 122 reconcile. How could the decision to allow the testing of the ALCM be made using an analytical process when the rationale for its strategic value was ambiguous and subjective?64 Its very existence was due more to technological momentum and bureaucratic politics than political need or strategic necessity. It was impossible to process and weigh all of the pertinent information, even if the barriers of cognitive restrictions could have been removed. Instead of goals, the Prime Minister was faced with a choice of narrowly constrained behavior alternatives. Any calculation of the possible policy outcome was confused by the contradictory reasons given for the deployment of the GLCM and the tests of the ALCM. Limited value integration was impossible for these reasons, as well as the nature of the different and conflicting values involved and the restraints imposed on decision-making by the nonrational nuclear world. The added element of nonrationality in the foreign policy arena further stymied Trudeaus efforts.6-* Miriam Steiner notes that in the nonrationalistic world, "[almbiguity and paradox are not puzzles that can be solved once and for all; they are part of the nature of things."66 Nonrationality is especially applicable in describing the nuclear world, with its deceptive appearances, incomplete information, unprovable propositions and misleading ambiguities 6 7 Trudeau emphasized the tests as part of Canada's responsibility to the NATO alliance. "The Cruise missile is intended to form part of the deterrent forces upon which North America and other NATO countries depend for security. A unilateral move on Canada's part to prevent testing of the Cruise missile in Canada would prejudice our obligations to the NATO Alliance and, moreover, would do nothing to further disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union."68 123 Trudeau's apparent need to resolve a number of value conflicts would not be shared by the cybernetic decision-maker, since the latter oscillates between two or more demands in singleminded pursuit of each.69 The political considerations and potential economic costs of refusal, the implications of the Cruise missile in strategic terms and for arms control, and the need to manage the domestic audience resulted in diverse considerations for Trudeau and difficulties in meeting all demands. The cybernetic decision-maker, on the other hand, does not heed value conflicts between competing objectives. Instead, he breaks such problems into separate decision processes and operates at any one time solely in terms of a single objective with a single expected outcome/0 Due to the manner and length of the policy process, it may be accurate to hypothesize that Pierre Trudeau and the Department of External Affairs used cognitive dissonance in a post-decisional context/1 They rearranged their beliefs to support and coincide with their actions after the policy was established. The Department of National Defence used cognitive closure before and during the process in that they restricted information to only that which would support their established view/2 The Federal government agreed to allow the testing of the ALCM due to a number of divergent considerations. The influential factors in the decision-making process included actual and perceived pressure from the US and the European allies respectively, the need to maintain the status quo in strategic perceptions, problems of insufficient independent analysis, and the fact that the policy itself was made incrementally. Structural Aspects of the Decision to Test the ALCM: An Analysis of Policy-Makine A number of the structural aspects behind this policy process made 12-4-acceptance of the American request the most likely course of action for the Canadian government. Factors that led to a hospitable policy environment for the ALCM tests included the need to avoid anything that would make the very poor bilateral relations between Canada and the US any worse.73 Trade-offs, compromises and rearranged priorities were required due to bureaucratic politics, extraneous political considerations, and the nebulous strategic implications involved in this issue. The belief that Canadian testing of the ALCM could be used as a means to gain influence in other areas that the Prime Minister viewed as valuable was not seen as a consideration by DND or DEA. How the respective decision-makers defined the goals of the policy depended on their priorities, and the constraints imposed by bounded rationality74 An avid proponent of the status quo or limited incremental policy moves would advocate limiting or avoiding possible negative repercussions by satisficing US demands and Alliance needs 7^ As Miriam Steiner points out, bounded rationality can lead to a "negative form of satisficing, which assigns priority to the avoidance of errors as opposed to the achievement of positive goals."76 Many of the different participants in the policy process wanted to maintain or enhance Canadian influence and prestige, both internally and externally, yet they advocated different ways of doing so.77 Negative interpretations of the impact of Cruise missiles made it difficult to both allay public fears, and portray the agreement to test the ALCM as the best policy choice.78 This section will evaluate the input of the various bureaucratic sources of influence, especially that of the Department of National Defence and the Department of External Affairs. The influence of the Cabinet, Parliament, the media, public opinion and certain economic factors will be noted where appropriate. Several external events that may have influenced 125 the context in which the policy was considered will be mentioned. The growing involvement of the Prime Minister is examined in further detail in the next section, which is devoted to a perusal of the incompatibility of his analytical style of policy-making and the nuclear world. Since many in the Canadian government considered the testing of weapons the military's area of expertise, their handling of the policy seemed appropriate. The politicians did get involved once much of the groundwork had been laid, although it is likely that this was initially prompted more by protocol than a belief that this agreement merited special attention. When it became obvious that the political fallout was potentially dangerous, the Department of External Affairs and the Prime Minister assumed more authority. Much of the information regarding the evolution of the policy process was not generally known until mid-1983, when DND released a memo on "The Historic Rationale for the US Request". Many of the more revealing details did not emerge until 1984 when The Montreal Gazette obtained more than 500 pages of Cruise-related documentation under the Access to Information Act79 The news story in the Gazette accurately describes much of the policy management as a deliberate "plan to shape public opinion and defuse opposition.JviaL.a tightly coordinated public relations strategy."80 The chronological process depicted below indicates how advanced the policy was before Parliament or the Canadian public was even aware of its existence. In August 1978, research and development officials of the US and Canadian defence departments met to discuss the possibility of cooperating on testing the ALCM in Canada, as its climate and geography were better-suited than in the US.81 Subsequent meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense discussed the actual testing arrangements.82 In late 1979, 126 SAC formally presented DND with the first testing proposal. A year later, the Pentagons senior scientist, Dr. William Perry, mentioned to the press that Canada could provide useful testing space.83 In August 1980, the DND Director of Continental Policy wrote a memo that indicates the care with which the policy was developed. He recommended that the American request to test the ALCM in Canada be dealt with separately from the overall testing agreement since the "potential benefits to Canada are not so clear."84 A few days later, a senior research and development official in DND cabled the Pentagon to urge substantial revisions to the proposed overall testing agreement to "make clear the benefits to Canada."8^ In the fall of 1980, President Jimmy Carter approached the Canadian government with a formal proposal.86 By this time, DND was aware "that politically sensitive issues would undoubtedly occur in this program."87 The Pentagon thoughtfully offered to brief any "skeptical individuals....within other Canadian government agencies", if the need arose.88 On April 15, 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger visited Ottawa and presented the ALCM testing request to the Minister for National Defence (MND), Gilles Lamontagne 8 9 In July 1981, the proposal was discussed in the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy.90 In October 1981, the more powerful Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, chaired by the Prime Minister, discussed the issue and approved the negotiation of a framework for a weapons testing arrangement.91 Nothing is known about the content of these discussions, or whether the Cabinet was divided at this early date over the wisdom of allowing the testing of the ALCM.92 The priority of maintaining good relations with Washington was a major consideration in this preliminary decision.93 It is interesting, although not surprising, that 127 Parliament was not involved at all in the policy-making until much later in the process. In December of 1981, newly-elected President Ronald Reagan wrote the Prime Minister proposing that the ALCM be tested under the framework arrangement. Reagan had made clear both in his campaign and by some statements and policy decisions early in his presidency that he was determined to shift the course of American nuclear politics. Both his open animosity to the Soviet Union and his avowed dedication to expanding and modernizing the US strategic arsenal were clear indications that he would brook no interference from the Western allies vis-a-vis his handling of the Soviet Union.94 If viewed solely in terms of the many issues of outstanding concern between Canada and the US, and the importance that Reagan attached to the upgrading of American nuclear weapons, the Prime Minister's response was the most rational choice. He suggested that the SSEA "negotiate and conclude" an agreement in principle.9^ In March 1982, after a leak from the Pentagon, the news about the secret negotiations on Canada's testing of the ALCM was published.96 Shortly thereafter, the Department of External Affairs sent cables to Canadian embassies outlining the appropriate response to any assertions that the tests would contradict the Prime Minister's strategy of suffocation 9 7 The newspaper story coincided with the SCEAND hearings on security and disarmament. Prior to the revelations about the cruise negotiations, the Minister for National Defence Gilles Lamontagne had told SCEAND that there was no inconsistency between "contributions to the maintenance of the Western Alliance of forces sufficient to deter aggression, and if necessary, to defend the NATO area" and "our commitment to a vigorous arms control policy."98 Tory MP Douglas Roche subsequently accused both the MND and 1 2 8 the SSEA "of deceiving the Standing Committee" with an edited presentation of the government's arms control goals, since they had excluded the Prime Minister's call in 1978 for a ban on the flight testing of new delivery systems. He also mentioned that Litton Systems Canada had received a government subsidy to build a part for the Cruise but he did not explore the potential ramifications this might have on the policy environment for the ALCM testing decision." On April 2 1982, both the SCEAND Majority and Minority Reports were tabled. The split had been caused by divergences of opinion on a number of issues. The revelation of the ALCM testing negotiations further exacerbated the debate over the best way for Canada to promote arms control. The Majority Report addressed the ALCM controversy in an elliptical way by urging that a ban on flight testing of new stategic delivery vehicles be included in the strategic arms negotiations. They did not think Canada should act unilaterally in this matter.100 The Minority Report was characteristically more outspoken and described the Cruise missile as "patently attack-oriented" and said that Canada was risking "its credibility as a voice for peace" by allowing tests.101 The government was determined to keep the forces opposing the tests as off balance as possible and it was most unwilling to state clearly just how advanced the decision-making process was. However, it seems as if not all members of the government understood this policy of deception. Shortly after the newspaper story came out about the ongoing negotiations, Mark MacGuigan defended the missile testing as Canada's responsibility to NATO.102 In response to a query from the NDP in April of 1982, the External Affairs Minister told the House that the negotiations were continuing for "a framework agreement under which various kinds of arms tests will be able to be established under joint Canadian-US control, tests 129 which may take place on Canadian territory". He claimed that the "sub-agreement....which would authorize tests of the Cruise Missile....will not be going forward....before UNSSOD II."10^ ^ few days later he told the House that Cabinet had accepted President Carters request to test the ALCM.104 His honesty was not appreciated by Trudeau, who later termed the SSEA's comments mistakes or misunderstandings, after he had replaced him with Allan MacEachen in September 1982.1 °^ The divisions within the country over the possibility of ALCM tests escalated with public protests in April and May.106 The NDP proposed five motions in the House of Commons that ALCM tests be refused but these demonstrations did little more than show that there was opposition.107 They certainly did not moderate the government's behavior, although the protests prompted the government to take more care in its management of the issue. The government was not forthcoming about the possible directions of the policy, which was an astute move politically because the opposition was put in the situation of fighting with shadows. In late April, the Prime Minister was asked whether he had decided if the ALCM application under the umbrella testing agreement would be accepted. Trudeau knew full well that the opposition could not rally the general public without a definite commitment on the part of the government. Procrastination and obfuscation could only benefit the government as it would give them more time to convince the public of the wisdom of their final policy choice. It would also ensure that a certain proportion of the public would grow weary of the issue and thus when the actual decision was announced, it would be 'old news' and no longer as controversial. Deftly avoiding the actual question, Trudeau replied: We have enough real questions to deal with that we have 130 not decided in advance that if an application were made we would necessarily agrec.The United States is now developing a mode of defence that is meant to be an answer tc.the 300 newly deployed SS-20s of the Soviet Union...But I concede right away that this is the direction, and...the reason, I presume, why the United States wants us to get on with the umbrella agreement.108 The Prime Minister's management of the decision-making regarding the testing policy was hampered throughout by external developments. 7 Due to the leak from the Pentagon, the government was forced to deal with the issue long before they had planned. In October 1982, with a similar lack of regard for the Canadian governments obvious desire to keep as much information as possible from the public realm, the US Department of Defense announced that the six month old talks regarding the ALCM tests were finished. With little diplomatic forethought, they added that Washington was awaiting Canada's final assent and the signing of the agreement was expected within weeks.110 It is not known whether these were deliberate attempts to precipitate a Canadian decision, but they certainly complicated the handling of the policy process. Despite an assertion by the SSEA in late October that public demonstrations would not halt Cruise testing, the concerned public continued its efforts to influence the government.111 While the general electorate was not yet actively protesting the possibility of ALCM tests in Canada, the peace movement and other informed members of the public were taking action. In November 1982, 15,000 people demonstrated in Ottawa against the Cruise tests, and there were other protest rallies across the country.112 Just as the minimal information which filtered out to the public made analysis and an appropriate response difficult, the Parliamentary debate on this contentious issue was hampered by the fact that there was limited communication of the pertinent details. The Liberals skilfully deflected 131 criticism by responding with erroneous or misleading replies. During much of the policy debate within the House of Commons, the Prime Minister showed his clear disdain for those who disagreed with him. He used tactics that were at worst, very close to being misrepresentations of the truth, and, at best, misleading and uncooperative. It is unclear whether his handling of the issue was due to the arrogance that many have criticized him for, or a belief that his use of the testing to further other policy goals would be undermined by the opposition's involvement.1 ^ In January of 1983, public opinion was against the tests, with 52% opposed and 37% in favour.114 If the government could get the support of the 11% that did not express an opinion, and win over some of the opposition, a majority of the Canadian population would be in support of their decision. Apparently, this is exactly what they set out to do, with careful management of the revelations concerning the policy and the active involvement of the Prime Minister when he believed the potential results merited the effort. As Nossal notes, as long as the division within society on the cruise issue continued, and undercut the electorates potential power, the government could "rationalize its choice."1 ^ By this time, refusing to allow the tests was not an option, even if that had been the government's wish.116 An internal DEA memo in early February stated that "a negative decision now would have much more negative consequences than it would have had 15 months ago" and raised the spectre of an economic backlash if the agreement did not go ahead117 On February 10, 1983, SSEA Allan MacEachen and MND Gilles Lamontagne announced the "Agreement with the United States of America on Test and Evaluation of US Defense Systems in Canada". The undertakings in accordance with this agreement were to be known as "The Canada/US Test and Evaluation Program" or CANUSTEP.118 Their joint statement was a 132 deliberate public relations effort to emphasize that the agreement had a dual value both as defence and foreign policy. The agreement did not commit Canada to test the ALCM. In fact, a DEA press release specified that Canada could refuse any proposal made under the so-called umbrella accord.119 However, the press release added that a formal proposal to test the ALCM was expected and carefully explained that "such testing is linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament"120 During the next few months there was continued agitiation both within the House on the part of the NDP and within the segment of the populace that was concerned about the negative implications of the cruise missile.121 The government continued its careful management of the policy process, with its major focus being the alleviation of concerns regarding the reasons for the tests. However, the confusion remained about whether or not the government would irrevocably commit Canada to the testing of the ALCM. This was due in large part to the Prime Minister's claims that Canadian acquiescence depended on American arms control behavior. Since the initial justification had been that the tests were Canada's duty to the Alliance, the attempt to use them as a Canadian bargaining chip seemed strangely at odds with previous policy. The Prime Minister was probably very much aware that Canada had to allow the ALCM tests, or risk grave consequences. The attempt at linkage never had a chance, since the Americans knew the Canadians were bluffing. His last minute attempt to use his agreement to the testing request as leverage may have been Trudeau's way of making the best of a bad situation. In any case, it was a symbolic gesture since the Americans were not prone to accepting external modifications of their arms control stance. The Prime Minister had several meetings with Vice President George 133 Bush in March and April. It is unknown whether he actually thought that he could influence the United States, especially in light of the hostile attitude expressed by the Reagan administration to arms control and the Soviet Union. It would be in character for the Prime Minister to believe that a rational argument could moderate the American position but he could not have been unaware of the odds against changing their perceptions vis a vis the need for decisive action against the SS-20s. His behavior must have appeared somewhat confused to Bush, since Trudeau told him that "[ylou may get some benefit from our testing the Cruise if we do, but it is not to help you; it is because the Europeans have asked us to do this for them." However, the Vice-President was surely aware that the European governments had made no formal request, although it is safe to assume that they expected this minimal contribution from Canada.122 Bush may not have realized the domestic political impetus behind the Prime Minister's comments, since he expressed uncertainty over the reasons for anti-Cruise agitation in Canada.12^ In both late March and early June, the Prime Minister told Parliament that progress in Geneva would affect the decision to test the ALCM. As was later pointed out by the NDP, the mid-July announcement of the testing agreement did not allow time for any fair assessment of the talks.124 However, the Prime Minister's remarks served their purpose in that they misled the public that there was a chance that the tests would not be agreed to. If they were, the Prime Minister seemed to be saying, it was really much more due to external forces over which Canada had little control than any desire on the part of the government to be involved with the Cruise missile. The curious linking of the INF negotiations with the ALCM was made with the obvious purpose of political management. The government mustered a variety of sources and reasons in its 134-defence of ALCM tests. In March 1983, Gilles Lamontagne wrote a letter to all MPs and senators regarding an acceptance by Canada of the ALCM tests. He asserted that they "will help to ensure that the Cruise missile can do what it is claimed to be capable of doing: that this element of the NATO deterrent is, in short, credible." He appealed to Canada's traditional loyalty to its European allies when he noted that "the flight-testing...would be a modest but important demonstration of our will to act in concert with our NATO allies for a common cause." He also indicated the larger ramifications of the tests when he asserted that Canada "must be prepared to accept the responsibilities as well as the benefits that flow from this partnership."12^ In May, the MND announced he was launching an information campaign to counter the efforts of the anti-cruise forces.126 On May 9 1983, in a move almost unprecedented in his political career, the Prime Minister sent an "Open Letter "to all Canadians, which was published in the major newspapers across the country.127 In it he carefully explained his reasons for the government's involvement with the ALCM. It was an astute political move because the one-sided nature of the communication allowed him to structure his comments as he saw fit, without the need to deal with any rebuttals. In fact, much of the letter was more manipulation than a true representation of the actual debate. Trudeau asserted that the Canadian protesters were anti-American and hypocritical since they were not protesting against the SS-20s. He said they were willing to shelter under the American nuclear deterrent, but were not responsible enough to bear any of the burden. He neglected to point out that it was the whole concept of the ever-escalating arms race and the destabilizing aspects of the Cruise missile that the protesters were condemning.128 It was a similar distortion to say the protesters were anti-American since there were many activists in the US 135 who were agitiating against the nuclear politics of their government. As Liberal MP Paul McRae wrote in a reply to the Prime Minister, the notion of a bilateral freeze had been supported in the American Congress.129 However, the Prime Minister was no doubt aware that the President was strongly opposed to a freeze.1^ The day after his Open Letter, Trudeau responded to Ed Broadbent's criticisms by repeating to the House that the government had no position on Cruise missile testing.1^1 "There is no support for the testing of the Cruise. It has not been asked of us and therefore we haven't given an answer." ^2 While that may have been technically accurate, it merely avoided the larger issue and was indicative of the Prime Minister's disregard for the legitimacy of parliamentary comment and its involvement in policy-making. On June 14, 1983, the day after the Americans formally requested permission to test the ALCM under the CANUSTEP agreement, there was much debate in Parliament and a vote was taken after the leader of the NDP introduced a non-confidence motion. The vote was 213-34 not to oppose tests. However, as the former Conservative SSEA stated, the actual CANUSTEP agreement was "never examined because it has not been referred to Parliament, it has not been debated in Parliament or Committee, [and] we have no access to it in this way.'^ In late June 1983, public opinion was proving receptive to the Liberals' management of the cruise testing controversy. In comparison to six months earlier, the opposition had dropped to 44%, while the approval rating had climbed to 48%. Only 8% expressed no opinion.1 ^ Although their numbers had declined, those who opposed the tests rose to meet the challenge of the government's final policy decision with ingenuity and determination.136 On July 15. 1983. the SSEA and the MND announced the signing of the 136 agreement to test the ALCM, which would allow four to six test flights over a five year period starting January 1984. SSEA MacEachen said that the most important factor in approving the tests was "the security of Canada and the peace of the world". Once again the link with the INF arms control talks was made: Ottawa would only review the decision if "substantial, concrete progress" was made in the Geneva negotiations.137 When MacEachen asserted that Canada's democratic freedoms and security are "[ilndivisible and must not be split off from that of the Western Alliance", he ensured support for the ALCM tests from many people who had hitherto been confused about the details of the controversy. Since many Canadians believed that Alliance unity was of the utmost importance, the case against testing was undermined when he added that Canada could only have an influence on the arms control position of the West by contributing to the security of the Alliance and supporting the Two-Track policy. The lure of influencing the Americans was a clever ploy to reassure those who had trepidations about the real intentions of the US regarding arms control.138 In August of 1983, the Liberals held a so-called "think-tank" meeting on foreign policy. At this meeting, Alan MacEachen reasserted that the decision to test could not be reversed. He claimed that the preservation of Canada's democratic way of life could not be separated from the security of the United States. In a foreshadowing of the rationale for the Prime Minister's peace initiative, he added that the East-West dialogue had to involve more than just the two superpowers. "The other countries, including Canada, ought to be there influencing one and influencing the other in directions which are useful and productive."139 The most influential sources of input into the policy process differed in their justifications for the ALCM tests. The decision-making styles of each grew more complex with the increasing attempts to make the arguments as 137 sophisticated and universally appealing as possible. DND had encouraged the tests simply as a responsibility to NATO and a necessary reaction to the Soviet threat.140 DEA was less prone to emphasize the impetus of the threat than the value of the response.141 When the Prime Minister tried to apply an analytical approach to the ALCM controversy, his rationalizations became quite convoluted. On two separate occasions in early 1982, he claimed that the West must be able to meet the Soviet Union "gun for gun", and urged a recognition of the USSR as a "great power".142 His later attempt to use the testing agreement to influence American behavior did not make political sense nor did his tendentious prediction that a Canadian refusal would require withdrawal from NATO.143 These last two incidents were prompted by Trudeau's perceptions of effective policy management, both in terms of his domestic audience and getting the most benefit possible out of testing the ALCM. However, his attempts to moderate the Americans' zero-sum view of the INF situation also indicate that he was unable to accept the reality of Canada's limited power in the nonrational nuclear world. Many Canadians pointed out that his argument that a refusal to test would necessitate withdrawal from NATO was flawed.144 The testing arrangement was bilateral and more than a peripheral link between the ALCM and NATO was yet to be established. The Prime Minister and the Cruise Missile: The Difficulties for A Rational Man in the Nuclear World Pierre Elliott Trudeau saw the decision to accede to testing as the best possible under the circumstances, especially since he believed the testing might give him leverage to change US policy. He knew that a refusal would be detrimental to Alliance relations and bilateral relations with the United 138 States. The Prime Minister may have tried to be as rational as possible in his decision-making on the ALCM tests, but his linking of successful INF negotiations with Canada's freedom to refuse ALCM tests showed that his analysis was flawed. From the Pentagons perspective, ALCM force modernization was a strategic priority that was essential in order to maintain the effectiveness of Strategic Air Command for intercontinental missions. Such modernization was viewed wholly independently of security issues and force deployments in Western Europe. The Prime Ministers determination to get the most benefit possible out of agreeing to the ALCM tests led to his public hesitation in admitting the likelihood that Canada would allow the testing no matter what the outcome in Geneva. He knew that the policy process was too far advanced, and there was too much at stake, to risk the displeasure of the Americans. Consequently, his attempts to influence the Americans were noteworthy more for their policy management for domestic consumption than by their nonexistent impact on American negotiating terms. A limited cost/benefit analysis of the ALCM request led the Prime Minister to the conclusion that the tests were valuable in terms of gaining, or maintaining, US and NATO support. Ruptures in both Canada's relations with the United States and Alliance unity would have negative effects on the Canadian economy and, in turn, Trudeaus domestic base of support. The Liberals were already experiencing enough trouble in the polls, as the Conservatives were ahead of them by 25%.14^ While the Prime Minister devoted much effort to allaying public opposition, he also procrastinated in meeting that challenge due to other priorities and goals.146 While by no means unimportant, the least immediate of them was the placating of those Canadians who opposed the ALCM testing. That was just one of a number of competing demands that 139 made compromises necessary. In terms of his perceptions of Cruise missiles, the compromises were facilitated by ignoring or misperceiving some of the negative assessments of their strategic implications. It may well be that the Prime Minister attempted to confront these value tradeoffs squarely and in so doing found the complexity of the issue overwhelming. In May of 1983. his "Open Letter to all Canadians" revealed his indecision regarding the right measure of morality in perceiving the nuclear world. Hit is simplistic to ignore the real, complex and often immoral world to which our moral choices must apply". He said the decision "to join our NATO partners in adopting a policy of strength in reaction to the Soviet Union" was made "not without anguish or full awareness of the risk."147 He argued that positions that were too complex regarding arms control led to paralysis, while too simple a view led to self-deception.148 In defending his stance to the leader of the NDP, his analytical approach caused him to attempt a limited value integration regarding the INF deployments. He stated that it was "not illogical to use the possibility of the deployments to get the Soviet Union to withdraw some or all of it SS-20s', but he pointed out that the argument "rests on whether the SS-20s were necessary or whether they are just an escalation by the Soviets."149 Perceptions in the nuclear world varied acccording to subjective interpretations of superpower behavior, and Trudeau was apparently not sure that the West's view of the SS-20s was accurate. However, twice in the six months previously, Andropov had proposed reductions in the SS-20s, so Trudeau rationalized that the danger posed by deploying the GLCM and the Pershing II was worth the result for arms control.15° A year before, he had been more optimistic and prone to outspoken rhetoric aimed at redirecting US priorities. He took the opportunity of addressing the convocation ceremonies at an American university to urge 140 that the US moderate its war-like statements and realize that the growing divisions within the Alliance were due to the superpowers' failure to achieve progress in arms control.^1 In March 1983, Trudeau was much more circumspect in urging George Bush to be receptive to the possibility of compromise in Geneva. *52 n e w a s a master of quiet diplomacy as he stated the obvious. He subsequently told the House that he had reaffirmed Canada's commitment to the "two-track" policy whilst pointing out that the zero option might be ideal but unrealizable.153 gut the Canadians were already on record as supporting the American stance in Geneva, so they had no means of effectively pressuring the US to moderate its position. The stick' of promising to make the decision to test the ALCM dependent on the success of the Geneva arms control negotiations was illusory, since the carrot' of maintaining good alliance relations and support for the US was more for the benefit of Canada than the US. In addition, the Prime Minister himself had said that "those who oppose the Cruise testing in Canada are really asking us to renege on a NATO commitment made by the Europeans to the North American partners."He certainly could not renege on that commitment himself, and thus the bluster about linking approval for the tests to progress in superpower arms negotiations was just that. In saying that he wanted to find out "who is most responsible" for the lack of progress in arms control talks, he was playing to the domestic audience that had valid fears about the loose talk in the US about limited nuclear war.155 Trudeau later attempted once again to publicly motivate and moderate the American position on arms control. His changing style may well have done more harm to his credibility than a more discreet approach. But such an approach would not have served his domestic need to appear in control of the ALCM testing decision, or eased his conscience. As well, he had M l not had any success in the past with that attitude. Many external considerations affected the conduct of the Prime Minister in his diplomatic overtures to the United States. He realized there were limits to attempts at leverage. In late April of 1983, Pierre Trudeau went to Washington to meet with the President and George Bush. At the time of his meeting, the main topic of conversation in the American capitol was Reagan's renewed appeal to Congress for more funding to combat communism in Central America.1^ In Ottawa the previous week Trudeau had voiced his objections to US interference in Central America.1^ He had to decide whether to try to sway the US' policy on Central America, the INF talks, or his longstanding goal of a more equitable economic footing for the Third World. Thus it was necessary to engage in priority reshuffling, which led to some interesting management of the Prime Minister's rhetoric. On April 28 Pierre Trudeau met with Ronald Reagan to plan for the Williamsburg economic summit. Afterwards. Trudeau said that he had urged Reagan to arrange a summit with Andropov because "time is running out not only politically for him and perhaps others but it is running out in terms of the future of humanity."^8 Then the Prime Minister said he believed the Americans were "determined to seek ways to find a lasting peace."^9 The way was cleared for Trudeau to agree to test the ALCM without apparently compromising his arms control priorities. He had somehow determined that it was not the United States that was "most responsible" for the lack of progress in arms control, but he did not divulge how he had reached that decision. Trudeau believed that enlightened self-interest would lead to the most optimal resolution of the world's problems.160 The desire to influence the United States and the heads of the NATO alliance at the Williamsburg Summit both in terms of arms control and economic aid to the Third World 142 helped make the trade-off of allowing the ALCM tests seem like a worthwhile price to pay.161 The problem was that the tests were not seen in this light by the United States or the other powers. To them Canada was merely fulfilling its alliance duties, not garnering extra credits. In marked contrast to his diplomatic tone in Washington, the Prime Minister was much more outspoken to the Canadian press about his misgivings and ambivalence towards the US. The contradictory picture that emerges reveals a man torn between a growing realization of his limited influence, and his belief that rational' decision-making had to prevail if the survival of humanity were to be ensured. Two weeks after his return from the US, Trudeau gave a rare personal interview to The Toronto Star, and expressed his disagreement with much of the United States' anti-Soviet policies. In sharp contrast to his Open Letter of a few days previous, with its emphasis on the need to respond to the heavily armed and totalitarian Soviet Union, Trudeau urged a recognition of the USSR as a great power and an acceptance of Soviet spheres of influence. He argued that there was some justification for public fears that President Reagan was warlike or so hostile that he could not be trusted. He criticized the Americans' antagonistic attitude towards their Soviet counterpart, and disagreed with one of Reagan's policy goals: "I do not believe that those in or around the United States administration who think that we can put pressure on the Soviets and assist at the disintegration of the Soviet empire by economic forcc.are realistic."162 He termed Reagan administration suggestions that the US could win a nuclear war "pretty absurd...Whether you win or not is, in a sense, secondary. The point is that we want to avoid a nuclear war." With regards to nuclear issues, "the United States should be dialoguing with the Soviet Union and not treating them as a criminal people."164 143 He claimed that most of the European governments were in tune with Canadian perceptions that the Soviet Union merited great power status. Unlike the United States, they believed that the threat from the USSR was restricted to the military sphere, and thus the Soviets should not be treated "as pariahs or outlaws in the world community."1^. Trudeau was accurate in pointing out the different attitudes between the US and the Allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. There had been great dissension within the Alliance over the US decision to embargo the supplies and technology for the construction of the USSR natural gas pipeline to Europe in mid-1982. Widespread economic difficulties coupled with continuing high US interest rates, the ongoing rift between the US and Europe over steel trade, and growing signs of Congressional protectionism did not bode well for Alliance unity. The Prime Minister's decision to allow the testing of the ALCM should be seen against this backdrop, and the developments chronicled below. In the months leading up to these comments, there were several important developments in the strategic environment. In late March the President had announced plans for his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The apparent willingness of the United States to embark on a costly policy that would both undermine the ADM Treaty, and call into question the existing grounds for deterrence, was yet another indication that the US believed it had the right to act unilaterally in the nuclear world. It is unknown what the Prime Minister thought of SDI at this time, but he had tried to forestall an arms race in outer space at UNSSOD II. The advent of SDI may have made the ALCM tests seem even more of a necessary price to pay in order to maintain Canadian input in US strategic planning and arms control. However, as Paul Buteux points out, the US has always been dominant in determining nuclear strategy and arms control. In 144 many cases "alliance consultation has amounted to no more than the United States informing its allies of policies that it wished to undertake and seeking ex post facto endorsement of them."166 The animosity expressed by the Prime Minister in the Star interview may have been prompted by a growing realization of the limits on Canada's power and his personal influence. In early May, the US Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for Defense told Canadian reporters that Canada was "an essential partner in the Americans' race for military supremacy over the Soviets." Ron Stivers also said that the Soviet Union was too far-advanced to halt the space arms race, and that the US would only consider arms control treaties on space weapons if they were compatible with "national security interests". He said the Prime Minister's suggestion to UNSSOD II for an international treaty to halt the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons had been "well-intentioned but unrealistic."167 In mid-May the House of Representatives defence appropriations subcommittee and the Senate appropriations committee voted to free $560 million for development and flight testing of the 10-warhead MX ICBM, after the President had promised to modify US arms control proposals. In an interesting example of the constrained, bounded logics of the nuclear world, Reagan urged support for the MX in order to both upgrade the American arsenal and use it as a bargaining chip to force Soviet concessions in arms control.168 In lobbying for the MX, Reagan told a group of business executives that it was necessary to build up the American arsenal in order to pressure the Soviets to reduce.169 The Williamsburg summit took place at the end of May. Although the conference was supposed to be devoted to economic matters, Pierre Trudeau insisted on some consideration being given to arms control issues. He sought a more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union and the final summit 145 communique included, at Canada's urging, a pledge of the leaders to devote their "full political resources to reducing the threat of war."170 He had limited success in moderating the rhetoric but realpolitik prevailed in the strategic arena. The Prime Minister's suggestions that the British and French nuclear forces be included in the INF negotiations were not appreciated. In fact, the communique specified that "attempts to divide the West by proposing inclusion of the deterrent forces of the third countries, such as those of France and the United Kingdom, will fail."1 7 1 Trudeau had hoped for a less pointed communique in order to facilitate more constructive discussions with the USSR. But at a press conference on May 30, he described its messages in the best possible light. To Moscow, the message was "there will be deployment in December unless you negotiate seriously." The message to Canadians was that NATO was negotiating for arms control in a serious way.172 Immediately after the summit the Prime Minister said he expected "very specific proposals [at Geneva) before the end of December" which would determine the course of the INF deployment and whether Canada would test the ALCM.173 However, only nineteen days later the US government formally requested Canada's permission to test the ALCM. Since the Americans wanted the first test to take place in early 1984, there was no time to allow for Trudeau's artificial linkage. The ALCM tests were never dependent upon the resolution of the INF discussions, but it had never been so obvious before. Irving Janis and Leon Mann posit some interesting theories on defensive avoidance and decisional conflict that may be applicable to the Prime Minister's behavior. Prior to the final request to test the ALCM, Trudeau had already used two out of the three forms of defensive avoidance in decision-making. He had procrastinated and shifted the responsibility for 146 the decision on to external forces that were beyond his control. The need to arrive at a final decision prompted the Prime Minister to engage in bolstering, the final form of defensive avoidance. Bolstering occurs when the policy-maker has lost hope of finding an altogether satisfactory policy option and is unable to postpone a decision or foist the responsibility for it onto someone else. Instead he commits himself to the least objectionable alternative and proceeds to exaggerate its . . . . . 174 positive consequences or minimize its negative ones.1'n The course of the debate and decision-making in the policy process had an obvious impact on the Prime Minister. Trudeaus failed attempt to apply analytical decison- making to the controversial testing issue encouraged his evolving assessment and growing concerns regarding the nuclear world. A number of reasons have been given as to why it is doubtful that Trudeau could have chosen not to test the ALCM. These limitations were all too apparent when he tried to link the tests with policy options of his choice. It is doubtful that Canada was even marginally influential regarding the eventual changes in the Americans' INF stance. Trudeaus goals of moderating American involvement in Central America and ensuring the transfer of funds to the underdeveloped world were, respectively, too antithetical and far-removed from the Reagan agenda to be attainable. In November 1983, a noted Canadian analyst cited a number of factors upon which Canadian influence in Washington depends, including "the availability of other NATO members for joint representations made to the American executive branch". Canada must be willing "to contribute financially towards alternative preferred strategic approaches when they differ from American thinking". In addition, Canada should realize that the domestic interplay within Washington "between the supporters of 147 unilateralist geopolitical strategies to world politics and the advocates of a coalition-oriented approach to national security" will determine their receptivity to allied concerns. 1 7^ The knowledge Pierre Elliott Trudeau gained over the course of this policy process led him to be more out-spoken in his criticism and attempts to influence the Reagan administration. His growing doubts about the rationality of the nuclear world led him to embark on his personal peace initiative, which is examined in the next chapter. Although he did not heed the advice noted above, his great personal self-assurance gave him faith in his ability to inject a modicum of rationality into the escalating animosity in superpower relations. Canada and the ALCM Tests: the Defensive Motivations of the Policy and Their Legacy There were many interpretations as to why Trudeau was willing to involve Canada more directly in the machinations of the nuclear world when he had previously prided himself on Canada's aloofness. Many of them share the common theme that this policy decision was motivated by the Canadian government's defensive reaction to a number of perceived threats. Kim Nossal states that the move was meant "to induce the administration of President Ronald Reagan to abandon its antipathy towards what was seen in Washington as economic nationalist' policies introduced after the 1980 elections."176 The decision to test the ALCM had a "major symbolic cost" for the Trudeau government, in light of its stated devotion to nuclear arms control. However, there is no indication in the Americans' subsequent behaviour that the policy-makers in Washington saw the agreement as meriting "reciprocal concessionary behaviour."177 Douglas Ross posits that "the perceived need for sustaining credibility 148 in Washington" best explains the decision. Unfortunately, the policy on the ALCM "partially legitimizes the deployment of an inherently destabilizing weapon technology and contradicts the expressed philosophy behind the strategy of suffocation". But as he points out, "[plolicy contradictions are frequently the norm for lesser states in alliance with great powers. Influence when it does occur takes place on the margin of the great power's decision-making."178 The method of the actual policy-making on the decision to allow ALCM testing resulted in incremental moves that eventually led to an irrevocable stance. Richard Gwyn termed the tests the price of "avoiding a diplomatic gaffe". He asserts that in 1981, "the Trudeau government effectively agreed to test the missiles...without...thinking through the consequences."179 In light of the many issues of bilateral friction around this time, it is not surprising that the policy options were perceived as narrowly constrained. The desire to influence or gain favour with the US did not mean that the protestations of loyalty to the Alliance were artificial. Canada feared divisions within the Alliance that would leave it without counterweights in its international relations. But it was wary of raising the ire of the Europeans for other reasons as well. A Canadian refusal to test the ALCM would have hurt its credibility within NATO and incurred even more resentment about Canada's supposed shirking of its financial responsibilities.180 There were other indications that a refusal to test the ALCM would have detrimental consequences for Canada. At a NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in April 1983. Caspar Weinberger and NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns acknowledged Canada's approving of the umbrella agreement as a contribution to NATO solidarity.181 Any denial of the testing of the ALCM under that umbrella agreement becomes, by inference, a 149 damaging policy to the Alliance. Adam Bromke and Kim Nossal are critical of the government's shallow analysis regarding the implications of the ALCM testing. The government's initial nonchalant position over cruise-missile testing stemmed from not having thought through the strategic implications of this new weapon. Since the NATO decision in 1979, Ottawa comforted itself with the erroneous view that Canada could support the deployment...in Europe without actually having more to do with it than accepting Litton's defence contract for the cruise missile inertial guidance system.182 Bromke and Nossal state that "initially the Canadian government had little understanding of what it was getting into: it still does not seem to grasp fully the consequences of this new situation."183 The dependence on the Pentagon's analysis limited the chances that the government would have an alternate conception of the strategic implications. In addition, the close cooperation between DND and their American counterpart, as revealed in the documents acquired by The Montreal Gazette, ensured that only supportive interpretations influenced the policy process.184 The decision to test the ALCM demanded that certain compromises be made. The government managed the truth so that compromise would not be seen as change, a weakness in the political sphere. Thus the specific conflict with the suffocation speech's proposed ban on flight-testing was never mentioned. In more general terms, the government said the suffocation strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally. Despite Canada's traditional emphasis on verification in the Conference on Disarmament, there were no Canadian protests about the problems posed by the Cruise missiles for this area.18^ The tests of the Cruise missile guidance system may obliquely benefit the GLCM deployed in Europe, and the DND rationale that the West's 150 deterrence is best served by strong forces everywhere is accurate. Yet there was a certain manipulation of the truth regarding the claim that the tests were for NATO. Since the tests were bilaterally arranged, the agreement could have been made under the auspices of NORAD. Instead, the 1951 NATO/SOFA treaty and the NATO Agreement on the Communication of Technical Information for Defense Purposes were used to emphasize the multilateral aspects of the policy and thus make it more domestically acceptable.186 There were specific economic considerations in the ALCM testing decision which were different from the previously mentioned concerns about general economic repercussions. Their role is difficult to assess because the government never cited economics as being in any way influential in the decision. However, the following depiction of certain financial developments in bilateral relations illustrates that economic factors probably had a significant impact on decision-making. The potential for negative economic repercussions narrowed the options and emphasized the necessity of testing the ALCM. Carol Giangrande asserts that Canada's production of the Cruise missile guidance system helped to finance the purchase of a new generation of fighter planes for Canada from the United States. Under the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, Canada signed a deal with the United States in 1980 to purchase 138 CF-18 fighter planes from McDonnell-Douglas, the firm from which Litton Systems Canada got the Cruise guidance system contract. The purchase agreement for the F-18 fighters was worth $5 billion. But when Ottawa negotiated this agreement, it also got a deal for $3.1 billion worth of work on both the F-18 and the Litton guidance system for the Cruise.187 In March 1982, an unnamed but relatively senior Pentagon official was quoted as saying that the offsets from the fighter plane contract 151 were more than repaid by the Canadian decision to allow the tests of the Cruise missile.188 Earlier that month it was revealed that Litton Systems Canada had been awarded an additional $60 million contract to supply LN-35 Inertial Navigation Systems to the Department of Defense, under the DPSA. The total value of the contract was now over $110 million.189 The economic dimension of the Cruise missile in Canada increased the number of bureaucratic players in the policy-making on the ALCM tests. Through the Defence Industry Productivity Programme, administered by the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, $46.5 million in grants and interest-free loans were given to Litton to enable it to produce the TERCOM guidance system.190 This raises an interesting point about Canadian involvement in the arms race, since the greatest return on the invested Canadian tax dollars requires the deployment of as many missiles as possible.191 The federal aid to Litton also involved the help of the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), a company owned by the federal Department of Supply and Services.192 The primary interest of these bureaucratic players would be that the best policy decision was made in terms of their economic priorities. Just two days after a memo of understanding had been signed with the Defense Department as a preliminary to the formal request to test the ALCM in Canada, the US Administration announced that Canada would be denied access to a new $2 billion defense industry development program. A Pentagon source said that Canada had been given a "free ride" in the past on US military reseach and development projects.193 Testing the ALCM did not appear to have earned Canada immunity as the Reagan White House continued to change their traditional relationship. In the past the Reagan Administration had intervened on behalf of 152 Canada to stop the protectionist plans of the Congress.194 Perhaps they were growing impatient with the tardiness of the policy-makers in Ottawa. If Canada's reliability as an ally was being questioned in Washington, no amount of effort could stem US protectionism.19^ The defensive motivations behind the government's ALCM policy decision were so influential that they were careless in examining the details. Feeling bound to agree, they did not look too closely at the possible legacies of their decision. Paul McRae told his party leader that the agreement was setting the stage for Canada "to become a key player in the establishing of a whole new range of strategic weapons."196 Stephen Clarkson posits that one of the costs of such close involvement with the development of the American nuclear arsenal is that it may intrinsically mean adopting an "extreme Cold War strategy."197 In light of the "massive American rearmament program", David Cox queried the extent to which the Agreement "implicates Canada in the political debate which underlies American rearmament - namely, the debate about war-fighting doctrines."198 The controversy over the ALCM makes it difficult to assess the implications of the Canadian agreement to test it. Whether all or any of the different launch modes of the Cruise missile are destabilizing, or what influence its technological aspects will have for arms control depends on the perceptions of the analyst.199 It may be stated with some certainty that the actual CANUSTEP agreement will have some interesting effects on Canada's involvement with the American military process. CANUSTEP has a duration of five years, with an automatic renewal for another five years unless either country wishes to withdraw, which requires twelve month's notice. In terms of political control, the military once again reasserts its primacy, with the potential authority to waive Canadian law 2 0 0 153 Each project arrangement is to be negotiated and concluded by the Defence Departments of each country. No provision is made for Cabinet involvement, debate in Parliament, or any role for External Affairs. Information to the public will be very limited or non-existent.201 David Cox points out that the decision-making power granted to DND is "a little puzzling": DND is the agency most likely to be sympathetic to US requests by virtue of their common interests and involvement in a range of cooperative activities. Their enthusiasm for the joint enterprise of continental defence is most likely to blunt their sensitivity — not sharp to begin with ~ to the political implications and liabilities of specific 202 programs. u* As Flora MacDonald put it, the umbrella agreement "goes beyond anything that was ever perceived at the NATO discussions in 1979 or in connection with any other NATO obligations we may have. That puts us into an entirely different military relationship than we have ever had. It's a distinct departure from our foreign policy of the past. "2 0 3 she believes that it puts Canada "in a very subservient position to the military power of the Pentagon."^0^ While it may not be applicable in the immediate term, CANUSTEP may facilitate Canada's unwitting support for a new strategic policy, or participation in an escalation of the arms race. In terms of international political considerations, the increasing involvement with American military plans, accompanied by other bilateral developments, may lead to a perception that Canada is becoming more closely entwined with its southern neighbour one c a n o njy speculate whether this will cause a dimunition in Canada's independence in the eyes of the international community, and a corresponding belief that Canada's impartiality is compromised. The day after the government announced its final decision, an 154 editorial appeared in The Toronto Star: "Cruise muffles our moral voice". ITJhe Canadian government has chosen to...weigh in on the American side in the game of nuclear bluff with the Soviets...But...after every manoeuvre we end up with more weapons, and further from our stated goal of arms control. By agreeing to test the cruise, however reluctantly, the Trudeau government has pushed the country into a far more active nuclear role...And...sharply diminished our credibility as a country dedicated to prodding the superpowers toward mutual arms reduction 2 0 6 The history of cooperation and support for NATO and bilateral defence made the tests a welcome obligation for DND. The Department of External Affairs was very much aware of the potential for economic retaliation and, like the Prime Minister, wanted to placate the United States. The hope that the tests would garner credits that Canada could use to promote its goals in arms control, the Third World or other issues of contention was, in large measure, limited to the Prime Minister.207 The Prime Minister was opposed to the zero-sum view of the superpower relationship that characterized the American stance and most likely did not want to test the ALCM. However, he reacted in a typically rational manner when he weighed the costly aspects of a refusal. He circumvented the impossibility of value integration (i.e., achieving a reconciliation of the contradictory goals of promoting Canadian-US harmony while encouraging progress in arms control) by ignoring most if not all of the negative interpretations and tried to make the tests worthwhile by using them as leverage. He was not discouraged by the fact that since the beginning of their dominance of global nuclear relations, "the initiative for change has lain almost exclusively with the United States."208 He was forced to his final policy decision by three factors: fear of 155 negative reactions from the US and Europe; the danger of damaging the already enfeebled continental relationship; and the weakening political base of the Liberal party in Canada. The latter was one of the main reasons for the ambivalent rhetoric, conflicting rationales and confused handling of the policy by Trudeau, who was unsure of what the country would tolerate and unsure of the implications of testing a new breed of nuclear weapon.209 The Prime Minister's initiative, examined in the next chapter, was significantly affected by the knowledge he gained during the debate over the Cruise missile. His attempt to apply rational analysis in the decision-making on the ALCM tests was confounded both by the various political and economic factors that made Canadian acquiescence the only policy choice, and the complex nature of the nuclear world. The latter meant that despite the danger inherent in facilitating the difficult-to-verify cruise missile, Canada had to agree to the testing of the ALCM and to support the deployment of the GLCM in Europe. These policies were presented and perceived as essential requirements in the maintenance of deterrence and the cohesion of the Alliance. Their destabilizing potential in terms of worsened Soviet threat perceptions and serious erosion of the arms control process exemplified the paradoxical nature of the nuclear world. The initiative was Trudeau's response to this dilemma. Unlike the incremental, somewhat disorderly decision-making process that led to the Canadian policy on the ALCM, the Prime Minister embarked on his peace initiative determined to achieve his goal of innovative statesmanship and rational policy-making. < 156 CHAPTER VI: THE PRIME MINISTER'S PEACE INITIATIVE Crisis-Insoired Activism The peace initiative, when considered as the final act in the sequence of arms control policies examined in this thesis, clearly signals a new sophistication in the Prime Minister's perceptions of policy requirements for the nuclear world.1 Trudeau, acting by and large as an individual, elite-level actor, succeeded in imposing rational/analytical decision-making within the narrow confines of the developmental stages of the initiative.2 Prime Minister Trudeaus efforts were certainly worthwhile. Few other middlepowers could contemplate such action. Against great odds, Trudeaus initiative was a courageous attempt to moderate superpower relations at a time of potentially fatal crisis. However, once the initiative moved from the conceptual planning realm to the arduous, complex realities of the global stage, Trudeau was unable to maintain his control. The dependence of the initiative's progress on the dynamics and vagaries of the nuclear world and international circumstances confounded and eventually defeated his attempted assertion of rational decision-making. Due to Canada's limited influence and the propensity of the superpowers to direct their relations as they alone saw fit, the restrictions on Trudeau were many.3 As one of his senior advisors noted in 1985: there is one inescapable reality: Canada is not a major military power and does not possess any weapons of mass destruction. It can therefore be only an indirect contributor 157 to the process of actually reducing or eliminating these types of weapons systems4 Pierre Elliott Trudeau's peace initiative was undertaken in September of 1983 and lasted until his resignation in the spring of 1984. Although international security relations have long been plagued by misperceptions, the superpowers' inflammatory interpretations of each others motivations were particularly misguided at this time. As the initiative developed, circumstances in the international arena forced the Prime Minister to react in an ad hoc fashion that confounded his careful decision-making. Increasingly, his rhetoric betrayed his growing realization of, and frustration with, a dangerous paradox. The Prime Minister was moved to action by a variety of circumstances that challenged his view of his global responsibility and led him to believe that a moderation of international tension was desperately needed. His perceptual shift was facilitated by certain external developments that were contributing to a growing hostility between the superpowers. In Trudeau's view, there were indications of an increasingly dangerous trend. In light of the stalemated INF negotiations, it appeared that deployment would commence, as scheduled, in late 1983. The escalating intensity of superpower rhetoric was fueled by the shooting down of the Korean Air Lines jetliner over Soviet territoryAs well, the domestic protests regarding the ALCM tests had made the nuclear arms race a topic of concern for many Canadians.6 His experiences both at Western summits and in bilateral terms with the United States also encouraged Trudeau to develop a new attitude towards the immediate relevance of arms control. John Kirton cites the 158 disastrous Williamsburg summit of May 1983 as the "foundation" of Trudeau's peace venture.7 The summit communique originally stressed alliance solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat, and made no attempt to strike a conciliatory note with the Eastern bloc. After Trudeau's vehement interjection, the promise "to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war" was included.8 As well, the announcement by President Reagan in March 1983 of his plans for the Strategic Defence Initiative concerned Trudeau, who had suggested at UNSSOD II that a ban on weapons in outer space be an arms control priority. Superpower relations were adversely affected by some of the most common occurrences in the nuclear world. These included: ideological misconceptions of the enemy; political efforts to use nuclear weapons to further various policy agendas; the engine of technological momentum; and preferences in strategic doctrine and force planning that encouraged worst-case perceptions. The resulting tensions and stimulus to the arms race could not be contained without a genuine effort on the part of all nations, particularly the two nuclear giants. Yet inexplicably, despite the widely acknowledged potential for great danger, united action to find a remedy seemed unattainable. No matter how threatening the tense relationship between the superpowers seemed, it was apparent that no other world leader was ready to take the first step to ease what Trudeau saw as "the ominous rhythm of crisis"? While Trudeau was not opposed to acting alone in the beginning, his continued solitude forced him to confront a daunting reality. His guiding precept that rationality could prevail if adequate effort was made was challenged by the apparent unwillingness of world leaders to undertake such exertion. Trudeau eventually realized that the suggestions he was proposing to alleviate the crisis potential in superpower relations were incompatible with the paradox-laden international environment. Once Trudeau understood that there would be no real support from the nations that mattered, his comprehension of this apparently irrational situation fostered his growing disillusionment with established strategic doctrines, and the nuclear politics of the Western alliance. It is arguably "rational" to take serious risks in pursuit of highly prized goals, hence the general acceptability of deterrence. However, the specific hazards imposed by the Americans' lack of compromise in the INF negotiations during 1983 and the Soviets' unconscionable behavior during the KAL crisis were simply far too great for any reasonable leader to endorse. Trudeau believed that the goals and behavior of each superpower had to be reassessed and modified in order to lessen the risks of uncontrollably escalating confrontation.10 The validity of Trudeaus judgement in this regard is of course highly debatable, especially in light of the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty negotiations in December 1987. Nevertheless, it is both plausible and defensible to assert that US leaders were willing to run extraordinarily high risks of nuclear warfare in Europe in their effort to pressure Moscow to make concessions in the INF negotiations. It is also credible to assert that for many members of the Administration (for example Richard Perle, Fred Ikle or even so-called moderates such as Richard Burt) the NATO INF deployments were never meant to be prevented by successful negotiations. The GLCMs, and particularly the Pershing Us, were meant to be deployed so as to iintimidate Moscow through the new decapitation' option that the 160 Soviets feared was an intrinsic aspect of the Pershing lis' military mission.11 Trudeau saw the use of the "posture and rhetoric of an earlier wartime age" as both inadequate and inappropriate for the current crisis.12 Yet he did not know how to offset this conceptual baggage. He was not convinced that world leaders were able to analyze and comprehend "the complexities of an entirely new phase" in international relations.13 Trudeau's goal of injecting "high-level political energy into East-West relations to turn the trend-line of crisis" did not meet with the response it sought.14 As peripheral as Trudeau's innovative and noncontroversial suggestions were, they required too great a change in the status quo. He could not overcome a major problem: arms control as "an instrument of national security and international stability is not universally acclaimed".15 Trudeau's intention was to influence the environment of the superpower relationship so that the conflicting defence and foreign policy goals pursued by Washington and Moscow in the international arena could be greatly moderated. The initiative's aim was by necessity more general than specific: "to generate the political will and confidence necessary on both sides...to bring about a lowering of tensions and a general improvement of relations."16 The rational/analytical process used in the policy-making was a complex effort to integrate value trade-offs within the limited sphere of influence of a middle power. The multiplicity of contradictory goals within the international security realm could not be transcended by Canada, but it was hoped that it was possible to influence the superpowers ~ especially the government of the United States. They alone could affect the strategic and policy environments, and thereby change the structure of their 161 relationship.17 Louis Delvoie was the leader of the initiative task force, and the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division in the Department of External Affairs. He avoided any unrealistic advocacy of large-scale arms control measures, but the goal of the task force was still ambitious. Delvoie said their aim was to establish the existence of common areas of interest that could provide a basis for the "resumption of the disrupted arms control negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union".18 Since so much of Canadian policy management was based on Trudeaus personal interaction with different world leaders, one could surmise that he was ultimately responsible for its success or failure. But measuring the success or failure of the initiative is at best an ambiguous and uncertain exercise. Even a limited evaluation of Trudeau s role must consider the extenuating circumstances that affected the development of the policy environment, and their subsequent influence on the initiative.19 But since this is an analytical study, a comparison of the positive and negative aspects is useful and will be included in the assessment in the last section of this chapter. The foundations of the peace initiative were based on policies that should have been acceptable. They were on the periphery of the arms control process and did not require any basic changes in the military-strategic status quo. The policy suggestions, which will be examined later, were innovative within the confines of acceptable Alliance behavior. Even the United States leadership in strategic doctrinal matters was left unchallenged. The most formidable arms control problems that divided the superpowers were not addressed, except in a rhetorical or 162 general sense 2 0 Despite the comparative modesty of Trudeau's agenda, his four months of shuttle diplomacy achieved little of import in any immediately discernible terms. The Prime Minister himself suggested in early December 1983 that his success or failure be judged in light of "future events over the next many, many months".2 * The structural framework and progress of the peace initiative is depicted below. The chronological record of the initiative is used to structure the examination of the policy process. It includes relevant events and reactions that either furthered or impeded the initiative. Developments in the policy and strategic environments are noted where appropriate to illustrate the obstacles in the path of the initiative. The details of Trudeau's involvement both in terms of his personal decision-making and his attempt to use his analytical approach in the contradictory nuclear world will be examined next.22 In conclusion, some of the critical reactions and assessments of the inititiative will be summarized. The Policy Development of the Peace Initiative Trudeau's use of rational analysis within the initiative's decision-making process was facilitated by his receptivity to alternate views. His pessimistic assessment of the potential danger meant that any cost-benefit estimate would lead to the same conclusion: critical or negative response to his personal diplomacy was worth the tradeoff of lessening the chances of potential nuclear annihilation. According to his frame of reference, it was eminently rational to seek an immediate means of offsetting that danger. At the same time, he knew that his methods would 163 have to be persuasive, diplomatic and viable so that they would not be dismissed out of hand. Careful control was maintained by the Prime Minister over the domestic or 'internal* sources of influence on the policy process. His inability to control influential events at the international level forced him to be reactive and undermined his direction of the initiative. Since only a modified rationality was possible amidst this confusion, the decision-making behind the initiative had elements of mixed scanning process.23 On September 21, 1983, the Prime Minister called together a group of senior officials from the Department of External Affairs, the Department of National Defence, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Privy Council Office to discuss the state of East-West relations.24 He asked them to develop several policy options that would enable him to influence the "trend line" of the increasingly hostile superpower relationship, and the ever-escalating arms race. He was willing to travel extensively and expend as much personal effort as was necessary. His own plans for the future required that the initiative should culminate by the end of the year 25 These personal time constraints meant that the Prime Minister had to establish very specific policy priorities in his efforts.26 The initiative began with that first step of the Prime Minister. Its extraordinary conception and goals meant that the structuring and conduct of the policy process proceeded in a manner that was far from standard.27 The lack of a policy precedent facilitated the innovative aspects in the initial development of the initiative since there were no standard operating procedures to restrict the decision-making. The inter-departmental representation at that September meeting 164 may have contributed, in some small measure, to an element of bureaucratic politics. However, this was offset by the time constraints and the nature of the issue, which led to a certain degree of crisis decision-making and unconventional behavior.28 Harald Von Riekhoff and John Sigler illustrate how the group deviated from standard practice in two ways. Using "unorthodox methods of communication", they interacted directly with the Prime Minister and his personal staff. Another unusual feature was the comparatively junior "level of authority that members of the task force occupied in the official hierarchy."29 During late September, the task force worked on developing possible policy options. In the beginning of October, briefing books on more than twenty options were delivered to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence, and a steering committee of senior officials30 In the preliminary stages of the policy process, the most difficult task was the setting of the initiatives agenda. Since the final roster of ideas had to be acceptable to all the NATO allies, there were some obvious exclusions. According to Michael Pearson, the son of one of the senior advisors in the initiative, the original suggestions included the possibility of focusing on a comprehensive test ban (CTB), an arms control regime for outer space, a nuclear freeze, and a joint NATO-Warsaw pact consultative process.3 * On October 7, Louis Delvoie accompanied Trudeau, Alan MacEachen, Jean-Jacques Blais and the steering committee to Meech Lake, where they were joined by a number of Canadian ambassadors, including those assigned to the United States, NATO and the recently retired ambassador to the Soviet Union.32 The policy proposals for the initiative was chosen at that meeting. 165 There was an attempt to keep the initial consideration of policy options open during the preliminary stages of the policy process. The choices for the task force and the Prime Minister were restricted by the fact that they knew a noncontroversial package of suggestions would have a much greater chance of success. Certain compromises were thus essential.33 Despite the similarity of a bilateral freeze to the suffocation strategy, the fact that the CTB was a longstanding arms control priority of the Canadian government's, and Trudeau's urging at UNSSOD II of a ban on weapons in outer space, the need to avoid anything too polemical led to these ideas being set aside.34 The final choice from the variety of arms control ideas, and the various methods of garnering support for them, had to be noncontroversial or risk swift dis missal.3 ^ The proposals for policy options that were finally chosen thus involved ideas and suggestions that were meant to be both plausible and nonthreatening to either superpower's perception of its national security. The final list included: suggestions on how to precipitate movement at the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks on conventional weapons in Europe and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE); a meeting of the five nuclear powers in order to stop vertical and horizental proliferation of nuclear weapons; and prohibitions on the development of high altitude anti-satellite weaponry (ASAT) and extremely mobile ICBMs.36 It is difficult to trace the decision-making of the task force since it operated under conditions of tight secrecy. It was explained at the time that the mediation role envisaged by the Prime Minister was so fragile that it had to quietly "unfold step by step".37 At this stage, few people outside of the immediate policy-making circle knew which issues the initiative was going 166 to focus on. The dynamics of personal interaction were very important in light of the initiative's attempts to influence entrenched perception. Due to the nature of the initiative, Trudeau's meetings with world leaders were most influential in deciding the fate of the Canadian initiative. In reaction, the policy process had to be flexible and the decision-makers innovative. Thus there was no planning for any extended period of time. With the exception of a few prearranged meetings, it was impossible to arrange the schedule of the proposed meetings between Trudeau and other world leaders, as they were to take place at the latter s convenience.38 The ad hoc nature of the policy developments was due to the extreme dependency of the initiative upon global reaction and the behavior of other nations. In mid-October, once the basic framework of the initiative had been chosen, the Prime Minister presented the plan to a receptive Cabinet.39 Trudeau later noted the validity of the argument made by several of his cabinet colleagues. They reasoned that while the testing of the cruise missile had been the correct response for a NATO ally, such a position brought other responsibilities with it. Trudeau believed that one of those responsibilities was the "right to ask...[the NATO allies]...hard questions"40 The Attempted Implementation of the Initiative The next step depended on creating a receptive environment for the Canadian peace plan, so letters were sent to all of the NATO leaders explaining the initiative and requesting personal audiences.41 The Prime Ministers diplomatic experts had stressed that it was imperative he inform the NATO leaders prior to any public statement.42 If Trudeau could get the 167 . strong support of the NATO allies, it would be in line with his theory that the best way to deal with certain policy situations is to create counterweights. The Americans and Russians, if willing to be influenced at all, would be much more receptive to multilateral pressure on the issue of international security relations than if Canada approached them alone. In late October, the Prime Minister went to Europe. Just prior to his departure, he gave a speech at the University of Guelph's conference on "Strategies for Peace in a Nuclear Age". In view of the requirements of quiet diplomacy", Trudeau could not be precise about the details of his plan, but he spoke eloquently about the idea of the peace initiative 4 3 The speech was a tour de force of evocative rhetoric, philosophical illustrations, and a concise presentation of why immediate action was essential. The Prime Minister said he was deeply troubled: by an intellectual climate of acrimony and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a superpower relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over the machines of war.44 Trudeau showed great understanding of the dilemmas that confronted him when he noted that "too often our knowledge and our judgements are true and false at the same time."4^ He noted the paradox caused by the fact that nuclear arms control must be careful not to make the wbrld safe for conventional war 4 6 Trudeau was most realistic about the contradictions caused by the superpowers' "radically different visions of political order, human values and social behavior"47 He deplored the fact that "any shred of trust or confidence...(or]...political craft and creativity" had vanished from 168 the East-West relationship.48 While he recognized that the superpowers were "not equals in any moral sense at all", he perceptively pointed out that "they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves, and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates."49 In a hint of what was to become an increasing focus of criticism for Trudeau, he mused that "one of the most gaping self-inflicted wounds of this period...is...the unfortunate tendency for a discussion which starts off about East-West relations to wind up in the fratricide of West-West relations. "5° Although he was careful to emphasize his firm commitment to NATO and the Two Track decision, he reiterated one of his persevering concerns?* "It is almost as if the diversity, pluralism, and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through the Alliance, are not seen as appropriate within the Alliance.'^2 At this point, he was fairly restrained in his criticisms of the contradictions he saw in NATO policy. The Prime Minister only abandoned his efforts to keep within the boundaries of what was deemed acceptable behavior and commentary after he saw that little heed was paid to his diplomatic innuendo.53 To offset the threat that Trudeau saw hanging over the world, he advocated that NATO's Two Track approach be supplemented by a "third rail" of "high level political energy to speed the course of agreements."^4 It was a clear allusion to what he perceived as the inadequacies of the West's approach to the INF. No specific details were given as to the content of the Prime Minister's plans, but he did describe several areas that he was going to explore. He asserted that Canada would work with its allies to ensure that , 169 . all of these goals were met. In arguing for a new impetus at the MBFR negotiations on conventional weaponry in Europe. Trudeau maintained that there could be no success if they were not set in "a wider framework of East-West confidence and political will. "55 He called for the upcoming Conference on Disarmament in Europe to be based on a "reciprocal acknowledgment of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue and a determined approach to crisis management. "5^ He also announced his plan to persuade the five nuclear powers to both establish global limits on their own nuclear arsenals, and stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons 57 In conjunction with the Guelph speech, a meeting of NATO's High-Level Group had taken place in Montebello. Quebec.58 The Western military planners discussed the impending INF deployment, and the number of obsolete battlefield nuclear weapons that could be dismantled without weakening the deterrent strength of NATO. Canadian defence officials' comments at the conference were strictly in conformity with NATO analysis.59 The potential for a damaging rift demanded that the status quo be preserved. The initiative's suggestions had to be modest so that the delicate equilibrium was maintained. The reaction from the Montebello meeting was favourable to Trudeaus proposals, but it was noted that there was little new or hopeful in them60 In grim foreshadowing of what was to be the attitude in Washington, the American Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in Ottawa shortly after the High Level Group recessed, declined to comment on the implications of the Guelph speech 6* It was the first of a series of noncommital responses from the United 170 States. Others ranged from minimally supportive to openly hostile. The State Department expressed their support for the Prime Minister's "sentiments" regarding "more constructive, stable East-West relations" but little else was said. No comment was made about the Prime Minister's assertion that he had discussed the issue with the President, perhaps because as later revealed, the President had not yet seen Trudeau's letter to him 6 2 Canadian diplomats somehow interpreted these reactions to mean that the American response was encouraging.63 their deliberate attempt to present the initiative as prospering forced them to ignore or su
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UBC Theses and Dissertations
Pierre Elliott Trudeau and nuclear arms control : Canadian approaches to the nuclear world, 1978-84 Goldie, Mary Lorraine 1988
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