PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU
AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:

Canadian Approaches
to the Nuclear World, 1978-84

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Political Science

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
August 1988
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The timeframe of 1978-1984, a period of critical importance in the development of the nuclear world, sets the boundaries for this analysis of Canadian nuclear arms control policy. The situation brought about by increasing hostility between the superpowers, and changes in doctrine and advances in technology that facilitated nuclear war-fighting scenarios, was extremely grave. Therefore it would seem appropriate for Canada, in its traditional role as mediator and middlepower devoted to easing the danger of world conflagration, to have taken an active stand in its nuclear arms control diplomacy. Such was not the case, as bureaucratic politics, cybernetic decision-making, and cognitive dissonance made adherence to the status quo, or minimal rhetorical changes, the order of the day. While that changed towards the end of the period under examination, there remained little substantive modification of policy, despite the growing threat of nuclear disaster.

Four examples of Canadian nuclear arms control policy are examined with the aid of official government documents and appropriate commentary from a variety of analysts. Canadian arms control policy at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, the controversy over the question of testing the American Air-Launched Cruise Missile in Canada, and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's personal peace initiative provide a wealth of information that is used to illustrate the struggle of bureaucratic politics versus rational decision-making.

Some of the more influential theoretical and structural difficulties within the foreign policy-making process in Canada that posed real impediments to comprehensive analytical decision-making are presented. These problems are outlined in order to provide a framework for the analysis of the four policy situations. In the first three cases, the
decision-making indicates the predominance of the bureaucracy's cybernetic conduct. In the last instance, the attempts of the Prime Minister to impose rational/analytical decision-making on the policy process caused him to actively circumvent the bureaucracy within Canada, but he was bested by external forces.

The thesis of this monograph is that Canadian nuclear arms control policy for much of this period was reactive, limited to well-crafted rhetoric, and oblivious to the changing nature of the strategic environment. The reasons for this policy behavior may be traced to external constraints imposed by the dynamics of the international system, the nonrationality of the nuclear world, and the weakness of Canada's influence vis-a-vis the superpowers. As well, the importance of not alienating the United States by too forceful a criticism was an essential consideration in the policy process due to the many issues of contention that already existed between Canada and the United States, and the vulnerability of Canada in economic terms to the negative reactions of its North American neighbour. When the Prime Minister did try to set policy and actively change the nuclear world via his personal peace initiative, the same factors and forces proved to be his undoing. In addition, the reactions on the international scene by some of the more powerful Western players indicate that Canada did not have the credibility to attempt such an influential role in the nuclear world. This response may have been prompted by Canada's minimal defence spending in recent years, or it may well have been the fate of a middlepower trying to exert influence in areas where the other nations were loathe to accept it.
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This work could not have been completed without the consistent support, unfailing encouragement and true generosity of my dear parents, Michael and Lorraine Goldie, and my husband, Matthew Colclough. Many of my friends are also due thanks. My advisor, Douglas Ross, showed both great patience and unending willingness to aid me in the long process that has culminated in this thesis. Paul Marantz and Lynda Erickson were helpful in their suggestions and most gracious in their final reading of this paper. To all of them, I owe a debt that words alone cannot describe, for they helped me to accomplish something that I often doubted I could do. But this weighty tome is finally finished and I dedicate it with love and great affection to them all. And, as well, to Violet Colclough and Margaret Goldie -- whose memories will never dim.
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION

This monograph evaluates Canadian nuclear arms control policy between 1978 and 1984. Selected examples of the government's statements, actions, rationales, and motivations in the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, the controversy over the decision to test the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and Prime Minister Trudeau's personal peace initiative are examined.

The thesis of this work is that during the period under review Canadian policy-makers regarded the issues of nuclear arms control as important and deserving of the government's consideration and energy, but not to the point where they would interfere with the government's pursuit of other objectives, or where their promotion would cause friction either within the nation, or between Canada and valued allies. The government's arms control policies were riddled with anomalies and contradictions as alliance demands, economic considerations, lack of independent strategic analysis, and an absence of widespread public interest took their toll. Furthermore, the advent of Ronald Reagan's presidency put serious restrictions on the range of possible arms control policies that Canada could advocate without causing a dangerous security policy rift with the United States.1

The change in the attitude and decision-making of the Prime Minister, as he grew more and more concerned about the dangers of nuclear catastrophe, will be contrasted with that of the bureaucracy, which was much less inclined to consider policy modifications, and much less open to perceptual change on nuclear questions. This dissertation assesses Trudeau's influence on the official Canadian treatment of a variety of nuclear arms
control issues, and demonstrates how the nuclear world forced an evolution of his rational/analytical model of decision-making.\textsuperscript{2}

The personal priority that Pierre Elliott Trudeau gave to nuclear arms control between 1978 and 1984 went through several stages, beginning with his sagacious "suffocation" speech to the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, and culminating with his own "peace initiative" from September 1983 through February 1984. His efforts did not result in any tangible successes and his personal attempt to bring about some basic melioration of superpower tension came too late in his political career. His failure to make arms control a consistent priority throughout his term in office ensured that there was little institutional apparatus in place to support his crisis initiative of 1983-84. In light of Canada's limited influence in the nuclear world and the inherent restrictions on choosing a truly rational policy, it is debatable just how successful any Canadian arms control policy could be.

Chapter II sketches the background or context that influenced the development of Canada's nuclear arms control policy. The deteriorating atmosphere of the international arena gave a major impetus to Trudeau's interest in nuclear arms control policy.\textsuperscript{3} Pierre Trudeau's growing involvement in the nuclear world is recounted in detail and set in the context of the superpowers' nuclear arms race dynamics.

Chapter III outlines some of the major theoretical and structural problems of Canada's foreign policy decision-making. Subsequent chapters use this information to explain the interaction of Prime Minister Trudeau, the Canadian policy-making elite, and the nuclear world. Several decision-making theories and the difficulties caused by misperception and differing rationales are interpreted in this chapter to further a
comprehension of the concepts and perceptions that drove both Canadian foreign policy-making and the arms race. In order to understand the environment that shapes foreign policy, the sources of influence and their relative strength will be described. Chapter III also analyzes the formulation of foreign policy regarding specific issues of nuclear arms control, and how the decisions pertinent to this area are made. The question is raised whether rational decision-making is even possible given the competing restrictions on the policy-makers’ time, consideration, and political loyalties, and the demands due to personal bias and bureaucratic influences. In addition, the irrationality inherent in the nuclear world may inhibit the development of appropriate policies.

Chapter IV examines Prime Minister Trudeau’s suggestions for arms control at the first and second United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, and includes a survey of, and official commentary on, related events during the intervening years. When these statements are compared with official actions, it becomes apparent that the government was willing to supply the appropriate rhetoric, yet allowed bureaucratic momentum and incremental decision-making in arms control to continue. Canada’s noncontroversial diplomatic work and its policy suggestions were always well within the modest confines of what was deemed to be appropriate behavior, in light of Canada’s minor status in the nuclear world.

As the danger accelerated and the superpowers’ strained relationship grew ever more acrimonious, Prime Minister Trudeau focused on the issue and became more personally involved in the policy-making process. The tension created between Trudeau’s desire for fully rational decision-making and the somewhat irrational demands of the nuclear world is apparent in his explanations supporting the testing of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile,
which is examined in Chapter V. The bureaucracy's natural tendency towards either maintaining the status quo or "disjointed incrementalism" is evident in the decision-making regarding this policy.\textsuperscript{7} However, there were the first glimmers of an attempt by some policy-makers to deal more comprehensively with the extraordinary demands of the nuclear world. This process, which may be described by the term "mixed scanning", was used to a greater extent in the decision-making involved in the peace initiative.\textsuperscript{8}

In both the controversy over the Cruise missile tests, and the peace initiative, which is examined in Chapter VI, Trudeau used his personal power to support his policy goals. However, due to external developments, the nature of those goals and his method of pursuing them changed.\textsuperscript{9} While the divisive issue of the Cruise tests involved bureaucratic politics, Trudeau's peace initiative saw the reassertion of a modified rational actor or analytical style of decision-making, with elements of innovation that had hitherto been missing in Canadian arms control policy.

While the actions of Trudeau and his policy-makers may be criticized, one must not forget that Canadian attempts at arms control have met with fragmented domestic and international support. The Canadian electorate has never indicated that such attempts should be given priority over such considerations as economic prosperity, employment, the cohesion of the Western Alliance, and the perceived demands of national security.\textsuperscript{10}

Nuclear arms control was only one of many difficult issues on which the Canadian government had to develop policy. The optimal arms control policy had to be successful without deleterious consequences to the other issues on the government's agenda. Formulating substantive arms control policies that were acceptable to all was difficult. The common ground was limited to vague generalities while the middle road was narrow, hemmed in
by demands for comprehensive verification, exact parity, and ideological conversions.

One of the difficulties in assessing the Canadian Government's attitude towards arms control is that the rhetoric found in official statements and speeches is often overly optimistic or effusive. While that is understandable in light of the need to maintain political support for the government's stance, it does not facilitate comprehension of the actual attitude of the policymakers. Their long-term intentions, as opposed to their stated goals, are often far from clear. It may well be that the long-term views were never fully developed. The vagaries of the political world do not facilitate planning very far in advance. Due to the nature of the nuclear world, where ongoing changes in technology and superpower politics cause numerous fluctuations in content and attitudes, Canadian arms control policy was often more reactive than trend-setting.

It is difficult to include all possible influential variables regarding the formulation of Canadian arms control policy. Various restrictions must be taken into consideration when approaching any topic as complex and convoluted as this one. There are certain points that may be considered relevant to an examination of this area, but due to the limited nature of this analysis, they are beyond the scope of this study. Both these exclusions and a number of generalizations have been made in the interests of brevity.

In formulating Canadian arms control policy after 1979, two obvious points had to be considered. The growing militaristic mood of the American public was epitomized by the widespread support for Ronald Reagan. The new President's policies guaranteed an inhospitable climate for any arms control suggestions that did not coincide with American thinking. Innovative ideas would not meet with favour if they were based on a different analysis
of the superpowers' relationship. Given the close economic ties between Canada and the US, it had to be a priority of the government to avoid any policies that might cause a backlash. \(^{13}\) There were many issues of contention between Canada and its American neighbour during the period under examination. The problem of the nuclear arms race was by no means the only one facing the Canadian Government. \(^{14}\)

The pressures moderating Canadian arms control policies were not restricted to phenomena that were easily dealt with. The Reagan Administration has been characterized by a hostile attitude towards arms control, in that old treaties are rigorously examined for flaws, and any new accords are subjected to a variety of stringent requirements. \(^{15}\) Any external attempts to alleviate this attitude had to be very diplomatic, or risk making the situation worse.

It is necessary to look far beyond Canadian borders and Canadian domestic influences if one is to understand what Canadian arms control initiatives must take into consideration. For instance, Canadian membership in NATO connotes support for its official policy of "flexible response", which requires that NATO retain the option of responding to a conventional attack in Europe with nuclear weapons. The Canadian Government cannot advocate a "no first use" stance regarding nuclear weapons without directly disowning the Alliance's strategic policy. This is but one of many examples of the external constraints influencing Canadian arms control initiatives and official attitudes.

Because this essay is an examination and evaluation of Canadian responses to policies, politics and crises of the nuclear world in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an effort has been made to put Canadian nuclear arms control actions in context. This effort requires some understanding and
explanation of the superpower nuclear rivalry, which in turn requires some degree of familiarity with American strategic doctrine and weaponry. Thus this thesis will explore the convoluted rationales that structure the nuclear world, and the technological and political developments that dictate arms control.

American strategic doctrine continues to be a matter of heated debate. The United States' stated deterrence policy for years has been Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, although it did not theoretically become a reality until strategic parity was achieved in the early 1970s, and both sides had the supposed ability to respond to any nuclear attack in kind, creating such destruction in retaliation as to make the initial move valueless. In such a counter-value attack, the aggressor's population is targeted, as it is vulnerable and equated with having an irreplaceable value. This targeting response to an all-out first strike makes sense since most of the enemy's silos and airfields would be empty. The stand-off of mutually hostage populations was reinforced in 1972 by a limitation on anti-ballistic missile defence. The basis for this policy is that the threat of retaliation should preclude any rational leader from ordering a nuclear attack.

The difficulty in understanding and rationally responding to the nuclear world is most apparent when one considers recent revelations from requests under the United States Freedom of Information Act. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, actual strategic targeting in the United States has "always contained a wide variety of targets, including military targets, and that flexibility and an ability to control the escalation process have been official requirements" for well over two decades. This dichotomy between declaratory and actual US nuclear war plans supports the conclusion that a major characteristic of the nuclear world is schizophrenia, in light of the
catastrophic risks of extermination inherent in the nuclear arsenals. For a variety of reasons, the strategy of MAD has been the subject of controversy over the years, and critics of this strategy actually gained ascendancy with the advent of the Reagan administration. These critics believe that present and future technological advances in strategic weaponry, combined with a growing Soviet armament, have undercut the logic of MAD. They question the credibility of MAD and in so doing doubt its deterrent value. They advocate a counterforce targeting strategy to cripple the Soviet military, political and industrial capabilities. It requires the appearance of being able to actually use the weapons in a limited, "defensive" war.\textsuperscript{17} Depending on the view of the proponent, this is to give credibility through flexibility to the retaliation threat or to prepare for the inevitable clash with the Soviet Union. There are numerous indications that American strategic policy is being shaped by a belief that a nuclear war-fighting and winning capability is a necessary attribute in today's world. Just what that policy is and what it legitimizes in the way of force structuring and utilization has serious consequences for the stability of world order.

Mutual assured destruction, no matter how unappealing to the morality of some and the military aspirations of others, should be the guiding rationale for nuclear strategy. The nature of nuclear weaponry makes the practice of planning policy scenarios for limited nuclear usage dangerous in that it may minimize the decision-makers' perceptions of the terrible consequences of any nuclear exchange. Counterforce strategy, accompanied by weapons of great accuracy, speed and lower explosive yield, makes nuclear war both more thinkable and more possible. The reality of a nightmarish holocaust is transformed into an illusory strategic policy choice. It is too risky to assume that a nuclear war can be kept limited.\textsuperscript{18} The
arms race is driven by a strategy that demands that one always strive for advantage, and sees the barriers to better war-fighting weaponry as technological challenges to be overcome. When the vast waste of money and human effort expended on counterforce strategy is added to these considerations, that strategy is shown to be as flawed as it is dangerous.

The dilemma of what to do should deterrence fail would be better resolved by the use of arms control to minimize the danger of instability caused by the arms race rather than by attempts to develop limited nuclear options. When deterrence depends on ever more sophisticated war-fighting options, far-reaching arms control policies are not facilitated. Comprehensive arms control can limit the competition and channel the rivalry into less dangerous weaponry, force postures, and strategies.

The purpose of arms control should be to reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons usage by structuring, restraining, and legislating what weapons are acceptable to maintain the balance of terror that is deterrence. Through bilateral cooperation in arms control, the superpowers can moderate and direct their relationship so that the arms race is limited, crisis stability achieved and deterrence maintained. Seen in this light, it is a worthy objective of Canadian foreign policy to further that process.

As this paper progresses, it will become apparent that the theoretical and structural problems of policy-making are such that they alone may be sufficient to confound a rational policy process. When the demands of deterrence and the politics of the nuclear world are added, rational decision-making in arms control seems almost impossible.
Chapter II: The Historical Context of Canadian Arms Control Policy, and Canadian Perceptions of the Nuclear World

In order to understand Canadian arms control policy between 1978 and 1984, some historical context is necessary. For the purposes of this paper, the terms "strategic environment" and "policy environment" are used to describe the conditions which influenced the political and strategic choices regarding arms control. The strategic environment was affected by mutual superpower misperceptions, the inherent technological impetus behind the arms race, and the expanding nuclear world, in that nuclear weapons were "used" to further a variety of political and strategic aims. The policy environment was influenced by a number of factors, many of them developments within Canada that had an impact on the way arms control policy was formulated, the issues that were taken into consideration, and the manner in which pertinent analysis was conducted. Both environments are inextricably linked in their influence on Canadian arms control policy, but they are described separately here to ensure a clear picture of their distinctive effects.

Various Canadian writers assert that Canada is in a unique position because it deliberately chose in the early days of the nuclear world to forego the building of nuclear weapons, despite the fact that it was a leader in the development of nuclear technology. Canada was involved in the Manhattan Project and much of the initial British nuclear research took place at the Chalk River research facilities in Ontario. Canadian uranium was used in the first nuclear bombs and vast amounts of uranium were produced for subsequent American and British bombs.
This involvement gave Canada a status apart from that of the other nonnuclear nations. In 1946, Canada joined the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the United Nations' Atomic Energy Commission, and was subsequently given a seat at all the multilateral arms control and disarmament conferences. However powerless, Canada was a partner in the development of the nuclear world.

Canada's involvement in NATO and NORAD was, and is, important for Canadian arms control policy-making. Arms control may be influenced by what happens in these two security organizations, as the perceptions and corresponding measures taken within these fora are often the catalysts for new weapons.

The Development of the Strategic Environment

Due to its close ties to, and dependency upon, other nations, the nature of the international environment has always been very important to Canada. The 1949 establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was valued for a number of reasons. Not only did it codify the requirements for global stability and security for Canada in light of the Soviet threat, but its multilateral nature was perceived as a way to offset the uneven bilateral relationship on the North American continent.

In the immediate post-war period, the Canadian government had been most uneasy about American plans for a continuation of their large presence in the Canadian north. The American military's recommendation for the speedy construction of an air defence system was deemed by the then Prime Minister and several of his advisors to be unnecessarily ambitious, but they were not opposed to limited collaboration.

As will be noted in the section on the policy environment, there were
differences of opinion between members of the policy-making elite in the United States and Canada about the nature of the Soviet threat. Many in Canada believed that the American view was unduly pessimistic. However, one analyst’s focus on the Canadians’ political attempts to use the military interpretation of that threat for their own purposes reveals important aspects of the strategic environment.

The liberal-internationalists had used anti-communism as a domestic weapon to secure consent to what was hoped to be a form of collective security within a broader framework of a stable international order and a more liberal world economy. What they got was an anti-Soviet alliance under American domination; a reconstructed world economy in which Canada became ever more dependent on its powerful and wealthy neighbour; and a world rigidly bifurcated between two bellicose superpowers armed with nuclear weapons, leaving a more and more problematic role for middlepowers like Canada with an interest in peace.

Both the maintenance of NATO’s collective security and the United States’ leadership in the nuclear world became influential considerations in the making of Canada’s foreign and defence policy. Their importance was heightened by a variety of developments beyond Canada’s control.

Geography made Canadian participation in the early stages of American continental defence planning unavoidable, although it was not always a given that the method would be determined primarily by the United States. However, a variety of technological and political developments changed the strategic environment and ensured Canada’s inability to act independently in this area. Canadian participation with the United States in continental defence led to a tradition of joint efforts that combined military interaction with a common perception of the threat.
After the US lost its monopoly in nuclear weapons, Canada joined its southern neighbour in building first the Pinetree Line, a string of air defence radar stations along their mutual border, and then the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in northern Canada.\textsuperscript{11} The air defence forces of the two countries worked in close cooperation yet remained under separate commands. Yet, as David Cox points out, the implications of these developments in terms of strategic ramifications were not always appreciated by the Canadians. In the two years prior to the formation of NORAD, both Parliament and the Department of External Affairs "appeared quite unaware or uninformed of the military plans and doctrines of which continental air defence was a part."\textsuperscript{12}

The 1958 formation of the North American Air Defence Command, an integrated command and control defensive system for the continent under a US commander-in-chief, was due to a number of assumptions based on the belief that the advent of Soviet strategic airpower posed a grave threat to North America. These assumptions included the recognition that participation in continental defence was the best way to maintain Canadian sovereignty, and that the most effective defence required an integrated approach.\textsuperscript{13}

Historically, Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD was inevitable. The experience of the second World War, the nature of a feared future war, concepts of the threat, geopolitical rationales, and American nuclear leadership led inexorably to a perception that these alliances were the most sensible options. Current participation is valuable in that it enhances political and strategic influence to a degree, while the existence of like-minded moderates in NATO can work to offset an overwhelming American domination. The cost-sharing element of the defence burden and
the assurances afforded to national sovereignty are not benefits to be taken lightly. The access to decision-making that membership affords varies according to the nature of the topic, and the analyst. Participation in these alliances should not affect Canadian arms control objectives negatively, yet the political need to maintain the unity of the alliance and the military's loyalty to the transgovernmental nature of these organizations has had grave implications for Canadian policy-making.

**The Development of the Policy Environment**

There are varying interpretations regarding how willingly the Canadian decision-making elite accepted the implicit American influence in their policy environment as the Cold War began to gather impetus. However, as two commentators on this debate have pointed out, the policy elite's attitudes were only part of the equation.

Canada's postwar foreign policy orientation as a Western ally was virtually determined by a large number of realities—the rigid bipolar structure of the postwar system, geographical fact, its wartime and earlier historical linkages, its political and economic structure and by public attitudes. For a variety of reasons, Canada's defence policy incorporated a general acceptance of the American interpretation of the nuclear world, and a corresponding adherence to their prescriptions on how best to contain the nuclear threat. However, Canada did not condone or support the use of the nuclear threat by the United States, believing this to be a dangerous policy.

The policy environment went through a variety of changes as external and internal factors exerted different influences. In order to understand past Canadian priorities and perceptions regarding arms control,
Michael Tucker's classification of activist and conservative phases in Canadian arms control efforts is helpful. From 1947 to 1959, and from 1963 to 1968, the conservative trend was dominant, characterized by a degree of realistic pessimism regarding the chances of successful disarmament. Thus the strategies of deterrence and flexible response enunciated by NATO, and the defensive promise of NORAD, were seen as crucial. Arms control was to be supported only in tandem with the Allies, whose security was not to be compromised by unilateral Canadian diplomatic efforts. The periods 1959-1963 and 1968-1978 were eras of activist behavior both within multilateral forums, and with other nonnuclear states in order to promote concrete, substantive, albeit still fairly limited, arms control agreements. Tucker believes that the accompanying idealistic revulsion regarding nuclear weapons was due to a moral antipathy towards the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, and a fear that the very tenuous balance of terror was at great risk due to ongoing technical and political developments. Between 1978-1984, this fear was fed by the development of nuclear weapons that were theoretically well-suited for fighting a war.

Tucker sees three basic determinants of behavior variation during the periods he examines. He lists these as: the existence of "activist spokesmen at the senior political and diplomatic levels"; the "availability of technological or legal expertise, or economic power, to strengthen activist diplomacy"; and the "nature of the international diplomatic environment [defined by the scope for] Canadian manoeuvrability and the particular arms control issue under debate."

The Canadian policy environment and arms control efforts were often overtaken or shaped by developments in the strategic environment. Attempts to chart an independent course were moderated by the belief that
alliance membership was necessary. The reasons for and methods of joining the alliances established acceptable patterns of policy-making. The subsequent respective demands of NATO and NORAD had important impacts on the decision-makers' control over Canadian behavior when it interacted with those demands.

The multilateral nature of the NATO alliance was attractive to the Canadian policy-makers for a number of reasons. Accordingly, the responsibilities of being an alliance member made themselves felt in a variety of circumstances over the years. The manner in which NATO, and to a greater extent NORAD, were entered into established an acceptable standard of executive action in such matters. The intergovernmental discussions regarding NATO, described by Lester Pearson as a "highly important change in Canadian foreign policy", were kept a secret from the Cabinet for seven months. While the need for secrecy may well have been legitimate, it is interesting that this excluded much of the Canadian government. The demands of national security were heightened by the perceptions of the Soviet threat.

The discussions behind the building of the integrated early warning radar system in the early 1950s were mostly between American and Canadian military officials, and the ensuing recommendations were adopted by executive action within Canada. All the agreements were announced in Parliament, with no debate on the actual policy, despite its serious implications and great cost to the taxpayer. Such precedent-setting, both in terms of the minimal Canadian political input into such major policy decisions, and the acceptance of American strategic planning, had important implications for future independent policy analysis and action.

The creation of NORAD in the late 1950's was accomplished with a
similar lack of public knowledge or Parliamentary input. Diefenbaker made
the decision himself and only then informed the Cabinet. The subsequent
Parliamentary debate on NORAD was held one month after the executive
agreement had been established by an exchange of diplomatic notes. It is
apparent that no one "grasped that air defence might be seen as a vital part
of a war-fighting doctrine".

Since the use of Canadian territory was an important requirement in
the early warning phase of defence against the Soviet bomber forces, Canada
was of apparently equal value in the NORAD system. In theory, Canada was
to be consulted on all matters involving NORAD. However, the issuance of
orders, without the knowledge of the Canadian Government, that placed the
American forces in NORAD on alert as the Cuban Missile Crisis came to a head
gives some indication that Canada did not, and may not, have the special
status imagined. The issue of Canadian political control and sovereignty
within NORAD was raised when the Canadian military followed its American
counterpart's lead by going on alert some 42 hours before the Diefenbaker
government authorized such action.

The differences in Canadian and American perceptions of the world
and the resulting variations in their attitudes towards political and military
solutions were brought into sharp relief by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Prime
Minister Diefenbaker was very cautious about accepting the American
analysis of the situation as he at first believed the US was overreacting.
Matters were not helped by the fact that all high level communication was
limited to the military level. In retrospect, one Canadian commentator
believes the lack of consultation is easily explained. "It was assumed that
the Canadian government, as a political-military unit, would view its national
security interests as identical to those of the United States and would
therefore act to safeguard them by automatically supporting the American position. Diefenbaker's initial reluctance to act led to his proposal for a neutral inspection team and the delay in giving unequivocal support to the alert of the Canadian contingent in NORAD. Canada also denied permission for nuclear-equipped American squadrons to enter Canada, or for the squadrons based in Canada to be nuclear-armed.

The Cuban controversy focused attention on more than the potential limits to Canadian power in NORAD during a crisis. The impotence of Canada's unarmed nuclear weapons systems and the unresolved problems regarding their "nuclearization" was brought clearly to the fore of the government's agenda.

The Diefenbaker Government's decision in 1959 to replace the Canadian Avro Arrow interceptor programme with the American Bomarc A anti-bomber missile had been the first step in a chain of policy decisions that eventually highlighted Canada's inability to control the strategic environment's effects on its policy-making. The weapons systems had been originally accepted "without full cabinet consideration or understanding of the nuclear implications, primarily as a consequence of the close relations between the Canadian and American bureaucracies." The cancellation of the Avro Arrow program also negated the opportunity for a high technology defence industry in Canada and set the stage for a deeper convergence of Canadian and American strategic perceptions induced by a fuller integration of the defence production bases of the two countries.

The policy controversy that arose over whether Canada should "go nuclear" in the early 1960s is a good example of how the demands of the nuclear world can impinge on Canadian policy-making to the point that independent action is close to impossible, in light of the potential costs of
such behavior. Peyton Lyon argues that the controversy weakened Canada's international standing, had serious negative effects on North American relations, caused a Cabinet crisis for the Prime Minister, and was the focal point in the 1963 elections which saw the defeat of the established government. The controversy hinged on whether or not Canada should accept nuclear ammunition, under the control of the United States, for four nuclear weapons systems which the government had already obtained or had on order for the Canadian forces in Europe and the anti-bomber defenses in Canada. The dispute was partly technical; most military authorities were agreed about the necessity for nuclear weapons but some had doubts about the efficiency...or the usefulness and appropriateness of the military roles which Canada had undertaken.

Other problems included the effects on national sovereignty of joint control, especially in light of the already large "domination" of the United States in Canadian cultural and economic spheres. Some, like the External Affairs Minister Howard Green, expressed reservations due to a belief that Canada's reputation as a champion of disarmament would be compromised.

David Cox points out that External Affairs' custom of deferring to the military expertise of the Department of National Defence ensured that the latter's interpretation of the best weaponry would prevail. Given the strong commitment of the Royal Canadian Air Force to supporting and cooperating with the Pentagon in air defence, it is no surprise that the political pitfalls inherent in these decisions were not of paramount importance to the Canadian military. The Bomarc A missiles were designed for use with either a conventional or nuclear warhead but the Bomarc B, which the government had promised to acquire in due time, were not dual capable. In his memoirs, the Prime Minister asserted that he had believed that he had
retained the option to use only conventional warheads. The government also acquired three other weapons systems for its alliance duties: the Honest John missiles, and the CF-104 Starfighters, both developed for use with nuclear capabilities. The Starfighter changed the role of the Canadian air division in Europe from defence to a tactical nuclear strike-reconnaissance mission, although it was not a sensible move. The Government also agreed to acquire CF 101 Voodoo planes for the RCAF squadrons in NORAD. While nuclear-armed at the American bases, they came equipped to Canada with conventional weapons. Many experts believed that they could only obtain maximum efficiency with nuclear weapons.

The Liberal Party had echoed the Conservative Government's opposition to nuclear weapons in Canada until early 1963. After much hesitating, and contradictory messages, Lester Pearson reversed his stand and said that Canada must honour its commitments and accept nuclear warheads for the weapons. He was influenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis and the growing public attitude that defence policy on nuclear weapons had to be clarified. In addition, fears of economic repercussions from the US were growing in business circles. Pearson asserted that failure to make a "full contribution" to the common defence of the western alliance would make Canada's voice and influence in the cause of world peace "negligible". International, domestic and economic pressures forced the Liberals to develop a new perception of the nuclear world.

In 1963, Diefenbaker refused to arm the weapons systems with nuclear warheads, despite strong pressure from the United States and the NATO allies, the Liberal Opposition, and a Cabinet coalition led by his Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister's refusal resulted in some heavy-handed American attempts to force his decision. The final blow
came when the Minister of National Defence resigned and the government was defeated on a vote of non-confidence.

It is difficult to know what motivated Diefenbaker in this particularly tortuous policy process. His initial inattentiveness had led him to acquire weapons that had to be nuclear-armed, a fact which he apparently did not realize until it was politically too late to change the agreement with the United States. The real reluctance of Diefenbaker to allow Canada to "go nuclear" may have been enhanced by the animosity between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister, but his subsequent difficulties in managing the problematical issue were compounded by the clash between his priorities and what was viable in terms of the domestic constituency.

The Liberals won the ensuing election, albeit by a narrow margin, stressing the importance of Canada first honouring its commitments, and only then examining the possibility of revising the nuclear aspect. Opposition from the New Democratic Party and some small yet concerned groups within the public continued, but the government proceeded to acquire the nuclear weapons.

David Cox's study of the relevant decision-making leads him to condemn "the failure of political awareness". The Government was made to "appear ineffective and unable to determine its own policy", as prior policy decisions and equipment choices had been made without a thorough study of their likely involvement with, and effects on, the strategic environment.  

Several analysts have pointed out that the tradition of having someone else do their strategic analysis is "ingrained in the Canadian military", as first the British and then the Americans played dominant roles in determining the threat to, and subsequent response of, Canada.

Alliance responsibilities, technological impetus, inadequate or biased
analysis, bureaucratic politics, and the demands of the nuclear world left Canada confused and to a large extent powerless. Such pressures eroded Canada's ability to make decisions without regard for external pressures and were felt throughout Canada's short history in the nuclear world. The success of the factors that led to nuclear-armed Canadian forces should be remembered, as the rationale used would have echoes of influence between 1978 and 1984.

As with NORAD, the 1959 and 1963 Defence Production Sharing Agreements (DPSA) between the US and Canada were preceded by little non-governmental input, although they were to have long-term effects on the Canadian economy and military interests. Their economic ramifications became considerations in the policy environment and led to inadvertent involvement in some of the more controversial aspects of American military strategy. Through these arrangements, Canadian defence industries are guaranteed access to the American defence market and the tariffs of the Buy America Act are not applicable. Furthermore, Canadian firms are allowed access to pertinent classified material and may apply for American research and development grants. Stephen Clarkson describes the arrangements as part of the bargain that the United States was willing to make, in return for Canadian acquiescence to the American lead in continental defence planning.

While Canadian involvement in the DPSA was initially seen as an astute move from an economic view, and "an opportunity to recapture some of the high-tech jobs in the aerospace industry", it was not without cost, as Ernie Regehr and Mel Watkins have pointed out. The United States agreed to open their military market to Canada due to their firm belief that "integration of the military industries of the two countries would ultimately
serve the interests of policy integration." Such integration imposes restrictions on Canadian arms control policy, as tacit agreement with the overall nuclear strategy of the US is linked with the economic health of the Canadian military industry. The DPSA has resulted in Canada being the source of some of the components of the American nuclear arsenal. In fact, the Canadian taxpayer is actually involved in funding some of these efforts through grants to these companies.

The strategic and policy environments have had important long-term effects on the potential for developing Canadian arms control priorities and Canada's place in the nuclear world. An in-depth analysis of the policy environment in terms of the sources of input and the actual policy-making process will be discussed in Chapter III.

Trudeau's Early Attitude Towards the Nuclear World

In 1963, Pierre Elliott Trudeau had been infuriated by Lester Pearson's abrupt change in nuclear policy. He saw this action as both a betrayal of Liberal beliefs, and as an indication of American meddling in Canadian affairs.

The 1968 election of the Liberals under Pierre Elliott Trudeau seemed to herald a new era in Canadian politics, as the charismatic prime minister challenged the country to seek a new destiny. In the early years of the Trudeau era, Canada pursued several aims at the multilateral Geneva arms control negotiations. According to George Ignatieff, the Canadian representative then, these included the search for a compromise between the proposals of the superpowers, the identification of arms control issues that could be guaranteed a responsive audience, and the use of the discussions and the United Nations General Assembly to educate the public
and create support for a cessation of the arms race.\textsuperscript{55}

Trudeau reversed Pearson’s policy in 1969 when he announced that Canada would pursue a reduced, nonnuclear role in NATO. To that end, he scheduled the phasing out of the nuclear weapons systems that the Canadian Armed Forces had under their control and halved Canadian forces in Europe. In 1972, in line with Trudeau’s directive, the Starfighters were relieved of their nuclear mission. By the early 1970’s, the only Canadian nuclear weapons were those on board the Voodoo CF-101 interceptors as part of Canada’s contribution to NORAD.

The Prime Minister’s plan to reduce Canadian forces in Europe was met with alarm there. The extent of Canadian involvement in NATO is relevant in an assessment of the European reception to their arms control policies. Canada’s military representation in Europe has declined since 1970 and the impact of this change has been a matter of some contention. Some have said that Canada is shirking its responsibilities, with a resulting decline of influence within the Alliance. Others maintain that Canadian defence spending would be better allocated towards protecting the country’s sovereignty, and that the fairly small Canadian contingent in Europe is an adequate symbol of its willingness to honour its treaty obligations, if necessary. In light of past experience, Canada’s ability to promote its policies of arms control may well be influenced by the regard in which the country is held by its allies.\textsuperscript{56}

The linkage that often limits the attempts at arms control may be clearly demonstrated by a closer look at this issue. In 1972 Trudeau saw the so-called “Third Option” as a means of curtailing American involvement in the Canadian economy. Instead of preserving the status quo or allowing Canadian and American ties to become even closer, the government
proposed "a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability." In 1974, official attempts were made to strengthen Canadian economic links with Europe and be "differentiated" from the US. These attempts failed, in part, because the European adherence to the trade rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was so strong. However, West Germany made it very clear that it would not even consider such an idea without a stronger military commitment from Canada. In the mid 1970's, Canada "rediscovered the importance of alliance membership in pursuit of the Third Option", and set about trying to re-establish its credibility with its allies.

In October 1969, Trudeau had opened the debate on national policy with a statement that personified his personal optimism.

No single international activity rates higher priority in the opinion of this government than the pursuit of effective arms control and arms limitation agreements. Canada refuses to submit without protest to the present nuclear hegemony.

In 1970, the White Paper on Foreign Policy was issued with the intent of outlining the priorities and future plans of Trudeau's new regime. The White Paper asserted that the Government had "no illusions about the limitations of its capacity to exert decisive or even weighty influence in consultations or negotiations involving the great powers." However, it stated clearly that both Canadian ideas and views would be promoted in discussions concerning global peace and security. While these expressions of concern seemed to promise an activist approach, the declaratory policy was not backed up with substantive action. The White Paper urged greater attention to the economic aspects of external relations, like trade, and thus changed the middlepower, quiet diplomacy focus of Pearson's era to a
The 1971 Defence White Paper stated that "the only major military threat to Canada" was "a catastrophic war between the super powers". The best way to prevent such a war was the maintenance of "a system of stable mutual deterrence" by way of the military alliances and collective security arrangements in which Canada participated.

The foreign policy and defence reviews were the first indications that Trudeau was hoping to incorporate his belief in the values of policy reform, structural innovation and rationality into the decision-making process. He seemed to think that the problems in these areas could be diminished as long as one had the proper systems in place and general priority pronouncements as guidelines. This insular view discounted the overwhelming influences of the external world, and its apparent premise that all that Canada's external relations needed was good management and rational guidance ignored the anarchical nature of the international system and the powerful irrationality of the nuclear world. Trudeau's great confidence in both his leadership skills and Canadian abilities to triumph over adversity was apparent in the White Papers' statements regarding Canada's potential power. However, ten years after he first took office as Prime Minister his optimism had declined due to numerous failures to translate his theories into practise.

Canadian arms control policies had to contend with a major problem in the late seventies and early eighties when the system of stable mutual deterrence and military alliances was threatened by a variety of technological and political developments. Discussions where Canadian views could be promoted became increasingly polarized as the superpowers and their respective allies drew further apart on issues of arms control and
perceptions of each other's intentions.

The Nuclear Arms Race

Canadian arms control suggestions and policies cannot be assessed or developed without regard for the constraints of the external world. The superpower rivalry may be traced to a number of different causes and exacerbating pressures. The nuclear arms race is only the most serious manifestation of the many-faceted competitive relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Perhaps if the strain caused by this area of rivalry was alleviated, an overall improvement in relations would result. Unfortunately, the considerations that drive this antagonistic interaction are not easily moderated, and the inherent distrust between these nuclear giants makes nuclear arms control very problematical. In addition, their differing technological strengths, strategic doctrines, and military priorities make any common ground on which to even discuss arms control rare.

Within the United States, such factors as the military-industrial complex, the scientific-technical complex, ideologically-inspired fear, technological momentum, a belief in the need to continually enhance deterrence, and inter-service competition all work to promote the continuing arms race. While it is harder to surmise which factors are influential in the Soviet Union, it is fair to state that some of the same forces are behind their arms build-up.

It is the combination of theory racing to promote and rationalize acquisition, and research and development expanding to fill the gaps in capability that worst-case analysis can identify that gives each superpower two legs to arms-race with.64

John Steinbruner encapsulates one of the enduring hindrances to arms control when he notes that the "preferred moment for compromise has been different for each country." Historically, the major decisions regarding the
superpower's respective nuclear weapons have been "out of phase", as they take a decade or more for full implementation. These decisions, each made at different times, have "encouraged a sequential interaction between their respective weapon programs." The fundamental differences between the superpowers lead to differences in their perspectives on arms control, the requirements of a stable deterrence, and the possibility of mutual trust.

When assessing the atmosphere in which Canadian arms control policies operated, it is important to remember that the SALT Treaty of 1972 caused a lot of dissent over the nature of Soviet goals, the value of arms control, the requirements of verification and the overall role of nuclear weapons. Progress in arms control is often impeded by the fundamental issue of compliance, which is affected by subjective judgement. Thus the same evidence can lead to different conclusions, depending on one's view.

Towards the end of the 1970s, there was growing concern within the United States that detente had been used by the Soviet Union to further its own agenda. Various calculations deemed the nuclear balance to be shifting in favour of the USSR, as the continued deployment of increasingly accurate and very powerful ground-based Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles were seen as endangering the survivability of their American counterparts. The modernization of the Soviet air defence system caused concern regarding the abilities of the aging American B-52 bombers to penetrate Soviet airspace, as the strategy of counter-force targeting required. The MIRVing of the Soviet missiles greatly narrowed the American lead in number of warheads. In addition, the Soviet Union began to deploy a new mobile intermediate range missile in Europe, the SS-20, for which NATO had no exact equivalent. All these developments were seen as cause for alarm, the degree of which depended on the bias of the analyst.
The American response to these problems included an enhanced nuclear war-fighting strategy, facilitated by technological developments in weapons that for the first time seemed to make fighting and winning a nuclear war a plausible policy choice.\textsuperscript{68}

The doctrine of counterforce or military installation targeting had evolved over the years due to the perceptions of some strategic planners that the credibility of the American deterrence was undermined by the doubt that the US would respond to a limited attack with the whole strength of its massive nuclear might. The efficacy of the theory of mutual assured destruction was in doubt so the military moved, both in its weapon choices and its declaratory strategy, to a nuclear war fighting stance to enhance deterrence. The doctrine of limited nuclear options, announced in 1974, theoretically gave the US the ability to respond in a controlled manner to any level of hostility.\textsuperscript{69} Presidential Directive 59, implemented by Jimmy Carter in 1980, was meant to further enhance the credibility of the American war fighting deterrent.\textsuperscript{70}

The 1980 Presidential election brought many changes with it. Reagan's platform had called for the fiscal 1981 military budget to almost double by 1985.\textsuperscript{71} The Reagan Administration became diligent in its revising of American strategy regarding nuclear war. In order to guarantee the safety of America and its allies, and to maintain the credibility of American threats of nuclear force, Reagan believed that superiority in nuclear weapons was necessary.

In October 1981, the new President announced his plans to acquire the means by which to make the war-winning strategy a plausible reality. The strategic modernization program involved continuing the cruise missile programs, building 100 B-1 bombers, deploying 100 MX missiles, improving command,
control, and communications systems, pushing ahead with the Trident submarine program and development of a larger, more accurate, and longer-range Trident-II (D-5) missile, placing cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships, and expanding the US defences against nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{72}

Reagan's plans were essential components in his National Security Decision Document 13, which went beyond PD-59 to require that the US have the ability to "prevail" in a "protracted" nuclear war.\textsuperscript{73} Plans to enhance anti-submarine warfare, anti-satellite warfare, ballistic missile defence and the hardening and dispersal of "Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence" (C\textsuperscript{3}I) facilities were also critical means of ensuring US warfighting abilities over an extended period.\textsuperscript{74} One of the most important developments, in terms of sending an ambiguous message to the Soviet Union, was the decision to deploy the very accurate, extremely lethal MX missile in vulnerable fixed silos. As Douglas Ross notes, this addition to the US strategic arsenal could plausibly be perceived as "a very strong first-strike counterforce option vis-a-vis most of the Soviet Union's land-based systems."\textsuperscript{75}

Between 1980 and 1984, it was widely recognized that the Reagan Administration found the Soviet Union antithetical to the frame of reference that structured the White House's view of international relations. Thus trust, an essential requirement for developing a politically acceptable arms control regime, was almost impossible to develop. Reagan described the Soviet Union as "the evil empire" and his Government systematically accused the Soviets of arms control violations.\textsuperscript{76}

Reagan's views on the Soviet Union were shared by many people in his government. Many of the top officials in the State Department, the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency belong, with the President, to the anti-Soviet Committee on the Present Danger
President Ronald Reagan used much of the CPD's material in his decision-making on nuclear policy. The Committee is forthright in its opinion that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted in any way and that arms control policies based on parity are dangerous. The President was enamoured with the idea that the US had to negotiate from a position of strength and his massive rearmament program was deemed a vital prerequisite. The Soviet Union did not share Ronald Reagan's view of America's weakness, and thus interpreted his actions as threatening and hostile. The situation fed the arms race and helped doom attempts at arms control to failure.

From this brief overview it is apparent both that the initial formulation and any subsequent success of Canadian arms control policy depended on a vast array of considerations, many of which the decision-makers in the policy process did not control. The development of the strategic and policy environments as described above made Canadian involvement in the nuclear world inevitable. Due to a variety of factors, the tradition of following the American lead was established.

Despite Prime Minister Trudeau's stated wishes to the contrary at the inception of his political career, Canadian defence and foreign policy regarding the nuclear world has been mainly reactive. The few attempts to chart an innovative course will be investigated in Chapters IV, V and VI. Chapter III will set the parameters for that analysis with an examination of the structure of the foreign policy-making process and a portrayal of the flaws and difficulties therein.
CHAPTER III: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS

This chapter will focus on the components of foreign policy decision-making in Canada, the influences on the process, and several models of decision-making which may be used to explain the formulation of the arms control policies under consideration in this paper. The following three chapters will describe the actual policies and where possible, explain important decision-making events using the concepts discussed in this chapter.

The following portrayal of the Canadian foreign policy process designates the main inputs that influence the policy process.¹ Inherent constraints on 'rationality' abound, as this study will demonstrate. Misperception and miscalculation occur with surprising regularity. One of the key questions addressed in this study is whether blame should be focussed on bureaucratic actors and lacunae, or on the person of the Prime Minister, given his widely acknowledged centrality in decision-making. A cursory review of some of the major theoretical interpretations of the Canadian foreign policy decision-making process is thus essential.

Rational or analytical models of decision-making emphasize the role of the individual in policy calculations and ultimate choice. The bureaucratic politics approach examines individual behavior in its organizational role context. Both of these frameworks have special relevance for this study. The models are presented to test the effectiveness in accounting for the origins, evolution, and ultimately the demise of Canadian arms control. Elements of other decision-making theories are used when their explanatory value merits inclusion.
In order to identify the various influential components involved in the formulation of Canadian arms control policies, a synthesis of a variety of political analysts' views on the actual policy-making process is presented below.

The Foreign Policy-Making Process In Ottawa

While external restrictions limit Canadian foreign policy, including the policy elite's attitude towards nuclear arms control, the relative freedom from internal restraints that the government enjoys in its policy-making means that it has latitude within those limits. The opportunity for innovative policy is curtailed by the dynamics of the external nuclear world which created the dilemmas of arms control in the first place.

While an exhaustive examination of all the actors involved in the foreign policy-making process is not the intent of this chapter, an effort is made to identify those sources of influence considered to have an decisive role in the process. Depending on the importance and nature of the issue, such an examination reveals the primary influence of the Prime Minister, the lesser roles of Cabinet, Parliament and the bureaucracy, and the still more remote impact of forces external to the government on either the consideration of the policy or the climate in which the policy was made.

Prime Minister Trudeau's predominant authority over the foreign policy-making process rested upon the wide variety of powers inherent in his office. Not only did he appoint ministers, but he also structured "the upper echelons of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus". He had control over the schedule and agenda of the Cabinet. The need for Cabinet consensus and his position as the final arbiter in any policy conflict ensured that his authority was well-entrenched.
His pre-eminence was also aided by external factors, like “the prevalence of summit diplomacy as a means of contemporary statecraft”. Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s forceful personality and his interest in international affairs ensured that when he was concerned about a particular issue, he used all the formal power he had.

His restructuring of the general direction and actual apparatus of the foreign policy process left his imprint on foreign policy. One of Trudeau’s first moves after being elected in 1968 was to conduct an extensive review of Canadian foreign policy. This exercise resulted in the 1970 publication of *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, which reordered the priorities for Canadian foreign policy, in the interests of making it more responsive to "national interests". However, since the White Paper enunciated very broad, general outlines for policy priorities, as opposed to specific directives, it could be interpreted to support a variety of not always mutually supportive policies.

Trudeau had great confidence in his own abilities and was determined to break new ground in the process as well as in the content of Canadian foreign policy. In his first years in office, he had definite views on the need for a more realistic, pragmatic approach to policy-making that would facilitate a greater degree of rationality as well as implementation of his own carefully developed priorities. In order to bring about such a shift in the policy process, it was necessary for Trudeau to believe that "Canadian foreign policy could be purposive in its design and implementation, rather than reactive to international events and commitments." Given the limited nature of Canadian power to shape events in the international sphere, especially in the area of nuclear arms control, such a presumption was an inherent weakness in Trudeau’s policy reform. The difficulties in expecting rationality in policy-making will be discussed later, but for now, it
is sufficient to say that they were, and are, myriad in nature.

Trudeau recognized that structural changes were needed to implement his plans to change the philosophy and psychology of Canadian foreign policy-making. As Bruce Thordarson has pointed out, the new Prime Minister was "wary of the civil service and impatient with Parliament".\textsuperscript{11} He perceived the bureaucracy as wielding too much power in the policy process at the expense of Cabinet.\textsuperscript{12} He thus brought in reforms and innovations that did much to strengthen his direct influence in the policy-making process. For example, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO), responsible for giving Trudeau political advice and policy analysis respectively, were enlarged and strengthened early in his first term, and their influence continued to increase over the years.\textsuperscript{13}

Such structural reforms did not always result in increased quality of advice. John Kirton posits that Trudeau's continual tinkering with the structure of the process, first strengthening the PCO and the PMO's abilities to deal with international affairs, and then developing the Department of External Affairs (DEA) as a central policy agency of the government, increased his level of involvement and influence in the formulation of policy.\textsuperscript{14} However, Stephen Clarkson asserts that the PCO had no capacity for strategic analysis of either foreign policy or Canadian-American relations, and that the PMO's policy advisory role declined after 1978.\textsuperscript{15} DEA's responsibility as a central agency was, in theory, to analyze international issues, consider competing policy aims and then provide the other departments with clear "policy and priority guidance".\textsuperscript{16} However, as William Dobell points out, DEA's ability to coordinate and manage all aspects of the policies that impinged on Canada's external relations was severely limited by its inability to penalize any departments that did not heed its
In the early 1980s, a move was made to further enhance Trudeau's power when the institutional structure of DEA was expanded to include the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC), thereby giving "greater priority to economic matters in the development of foreign policy". This reform integrated the political and economic aspects of foreign policy so that all functions of Canada's international relations were handled by the one department that was traditionally the Prime Minister's personal fiefdom. Yet once again, the theory did not lead to quite the reality envisaged, as morale sank, and confusion reigned in the enlarged department. As the new DEA was responsible for promoting both arms control and the Canadian defence industry, there were some unavoidable conflicts of interest.

There are several reasons why Trudeau failed to fully realize his aspirations for greater rationality in decision-making and policy formulation. The government's uncertainty about its specific goals meant that departments were not provided with explicit direction. Events, either of an international or domestic nature, often caused the government to develop ad hoc responses that negated any longer-term plans. The nature of the political game necessitated a degree of freedom in policy-making for individual ministers to ensure their continued support and personal success. Last but not least, federal-provincial relations made "a coherent national blueprint for action in any policy field...almost utopian".

According to Kim Nossal, the two members of Cabinet most involved in foreign policy, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), are the most influential forces in foreign policy decision-making. The influence of the SSEA no doubt changed over time, as different personalities caused variations in personal power and
fluctuations in the level of interest given any one issue.\textsuperscript{24}

The Cabinet does occupy the central position in both deciding policy priorities, and in the actual formulation and implementation of foreign policy. However, each member has his "own parochial perceptions and priorities, shaped by their portfolios, the demands of their electoral and regional constituencies, the imperatives of their relations with their department officials and their own ambitions within Cabinet".\textsuperscript{25} These factors are compounded by the "hierarchy of influence and effectiveness" within the members of the Cabinet, due to their relationship with the Prime Minister and their respective power vis-a-vis their other colleagues.\textsuperscript{26} The tradition of Cabinet secrecy makes it difficult to ascertain how influential individual ministers were in the period under examination here, while the custom of Cabinet solidarity ensures that any differences over policy were kept from public view.

Trudeau believed that his predecessor's decision-making process had been flawed due to the inappropriate subordination of foreign policy to the exigencies of Canada's defence relations. A reformed, improved thoroughly supported Cabinet committee system was capable, he believed, of carrying out such overall evaluative activities in an optimally rational way. Trudeau therefore tried to create a policy forum which would consider all foreign and domestic goals, the external pressures and actors seeking to influence Canadian policy, and the inevitable policy trade-offs.\textsuperscript{27} Trudeau thought the process had "lacked a proper rational foundation which could be used to reconcile the diverse policy components".\textsuperscript{28}

In response, Trudeau introduced a new Cabinet committee system in 1969, with the intention of increasing the involvement of the ministers in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{29} The reforms were also meant to facilitate
better management of the bureaucracy and greater coherence in policy planning.\textsuperscript{30} It is interesting to note the differences between the theoretical plan for the system and what actually transpired. The Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence (CCEPD) was responsible for autonomous decisions in foreign affairs; these decisions were then made known to all other Cabinet ministers. Only in the event of opposing views was the particular issue discussed in the weekly plenary Cabinet meeting. Thus, in theory, "collegial participation" in foreign policy-making was encouraged.\textsuperscript{31} However, Stephen Clarkson points out that since the Prime Minister usually decided foreign policy, the CCEPD was "poorly attended and considered to be of little political significance".\textsuperscript{32} The combination of the Prime Minister's arrogation of power, and the electorate's general lack of interest in foreign and defence policy, led to a similar disinterest on the part of many politicians.

The Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning made the really critical decisions in running the government and making policy. Although it established the priority of each policy in the government's plans and dealt with the most urgent policy decisions, power was still effectively maintained by the Prime Minister, who chaired this committee.\textsuperscript{33} Political realities dictated that foreign policy was often the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Crises usually required timely responses, either to the electorate via the media or in the form of actual policy statements. The need for speedy action did not allow adequate time to follow the elaborate rational policy-making process that Trudeau advocated. In addition, the other members of Cabinet, each with their own portfolio to attend to, did not always have the time or the inclination to learn all the intricacies inherent in most foreign policy
In theory, Parliament is supposed to be the vehicle by which public opinion is transmitted to the executive through the elected Members of Parliament (MP). This clearly is not the case today. Nor is other conventional mythology accurate in positing that public opinion nurtures competing political parties, and then elects a variety of representatives who authoritatively act for the common good. Such views are more fairytale than fair assessment. Political leaders and appointed officials are not "passive receptors of clues from the public but instead shape and mold public opinion". In practice, Parliamentary participation in the making of foreign policy is hindered both by the secrecy and expertise considered to be essential in dealings regarding national security and interstate diplomacy, and the executive's control over decision-making. Since Parliament does not have to be involved in the negotiation or ratification of international executive agreements, it does not have the constitutional power to intercede in the policy process except when required to pass specific legislation. The input of individual MPs is constrained as they do not usually have large research staffs or access to sources of independent expertise, and therefore they cannot possibly comprehend all the complexities of the issues.

David Taras argues against dismissing Parliament's role as minimal; its influence, while hard to measure, is of some consequence. He notes a number of variables that may be leading to a more active role for Parliament in foreign policy. Changes in the international system in the 1970s resulted in external issues impinging on domestic well-being to a far greater extent and made the public much more concerned about foreign policy. Domestic interest groups are much more active now in lobbying for their foreign policy preferences, while at the same time the MPs are recognizing the
potential of these groups as campaign contributors and conduits to various blocs of voters. However, Taras acknowledges that control of the actual policy-making process remains firmly under the authority of the executive. He argues that Parliament has a "crucial role as a legitimizing institution" and cites the value of Question Period for its promotion of alternate views and confrontations of official policy.

There are means by which MPs participate in policy-making but the weight of their input, compared to the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, is minor. One such method of direct participation is through the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND). Each time it is directed to examine a particular issue, its mandate and terms of reference are set by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence, and the party leaders in the House of Commons. It is comprised of members from all parties, in proportion to the number of MPs that each has. Party loyalty usually means there is agreement along party lines in SCEAND. While it can request any witness to appear before it and subpoena relevant papers and documents, in the final analysis its power is limited to recommendations. Since the government often disregarded SCEAND's advice, its influence in the policy-making process was limited.

It is interesting to note that between 1980-84 there were lengthy waiting lists of MPs within each party who wanted to sit on SCEAND, as it was considered one of the "most prestigious committees on the Hill". However, former SSEA Mitchell Sharp has dismissed SCEAND consultations as "a harmless outlet" for groups who want to have input into foreign policy. They gain the impression that they are wielding influence but the government's attitude towards SCEAND reports minimizes their input.

A detailed assessment of the bureaucracy's input during the period
under examination is hampered as its influence, while widespread, is difficult to trace. However, the power of this source in the policy process should not be minimized. Given Trudeau’s propensity for Cabinet shuffles, the bureaucrats who ran the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence (DND) were more often the constant factors in the policy-making process than their respective ministers. The bureaucracy’s power resulted from their access to privileged information which gave them the authority to advocate possible policy options. It was their opinions and biases that formed the description of the possible ramifications and contradictions of each policy. While the bureaucracy’s role is advisory, the fact that they synthesize and “package” the pertinent information gives them influence.

Nossal asserts that the bureaucracy’s influence in foreign policy-making is actually quite substantial because it handles the day-to-day business. While the politicians set the general objectives and articulate the broad ideals of the state in international affairs, it is left to the bureaucracy to deal with the “tactical” demands for making policy. Since Canadian foreign policy is largely determined by “short-term considerations”, the bureaucracy has de facto control over much of the policy.46

The bureaucracy is not a unitary actor as there are many internal divisions. For instance, DEA, DND and ITC may well have had different ideas on what trade-offs in foreign policy were permissible based on their respective mandates. The actual policy-making process is affected by the interplay of bureaucratic politics, with the accompanying departmental rivalries, contradictions in perceived goals, and competitive means of interaction.47

Trudeau’s reforms were aimed at increasing the rationality of foreign
policy-making, and involved opening the policy process to a wide variety of new participants, including the provinces, interest groups and "attentive publics". However, their involvement did not translate into power or influence. In 1978, Trudeau described his theory of "participatory democracy" as a means by which public values and interests would be heard in the policy process, but he asserted that participation did not mean partaking in decisions. Bruce Thordarson believes that the tone of Trudeau's speeches and writings indicate that his theory was based more on "a desire to interest and educate Canadians", rather than on any thought that their input would actually determine policy.

Special interest groups and public opinion have some input into the policy-making process but the weight of their influence, like that of the economic factor, varies with the issue and the relative strengths of the other sources of input. The media's role in the process fluctuates. Its special power determines more what the public thinks about rather than how it should think.

It has been suggested that the major changes in the policy process and the structural reforms enacted by Trudeau were made with the intent of imposing "financial self-discipline" on the governing process. While there is controversy about this point, it is widely accepted that the element of economics or budgetary considerations plays some role in the policy-making process.

Structural aspects of the bilateral relationship made it necessary for Canada to carefully consider the wishes of its southern neighbour in the course of its foreign policy decision-making. The Defence Industry Productivity Program (DIPP) and the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) are two government programs that facilitate Canadian participation
in projects for the American military market. The DIPP is a federal system of grants meant to aid the Canadian defence industry by allowing it to bid competitively for projects. Through the DPSA, the relevant parts of the Canadian industrial workforce are allowed access to the US military marketplace through "the supply of component parts to US-designed and built major weapons systems". In 1963, a provision was put into force that required that the long-term military trade between the two countries be kept in rough balance. Continental cooperation in defence policy made both Canadian military planning and the Canadian defence industry more dependent on the American lead in strategic matters. Canada had to structure its military plans in a way that accommodated the acquisition of American products.

It has been pointed out that this assistance to the arms industry has caused a certain contradiction within government policy, with its stated intent of trying to curtail new weapons systems. This potential conflict is further enhanced by the fact that some of the DIPP grants depend on "their full pay-off on repeat contracts and, consequently, on extensive deployment of the weapons systems in question", or in other words, an escalation of the arms race.

These economic influences were only part of the many external factors that had to be considered in the structuring of Canadian arms control policy. This sketch of the foreign policy-making process illustrates that during the period in question, there were a wide variety of formal and informal sources of input, with varying degrees of influence. Both the Prime Minister and the bureaucracy were influential in foreign policy decision-making, depending on the nature of the policy and the extent to which it interested the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister tried to entrench his influence and values by
imposing rational decision-making processes on the structure of the policy-making system. Trudeau’s reforms of the structural aspects were motivated by his belief that an infusion of rationality would result in the process giving better performance and results. Unfortunately, the nature of politics and international relations undermines prospects for the successful inclusion of rationality in the foreign policy-making process. The specific theoretical and structural impediments will be discussed below.

**Problems of ‘Rational’ Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: Some Theoretical Considerations**

An analysis of decision-making involves numerous questions that are seemingly unanswerable in any certain terms. The central question pertaining to the definition of, and limits to rationality itself has been addressed by numerous authors. The roles of perception and misperception, cognitive dissonance, varying degrees of mental receptivity and so forth, have all been explored intensively in the foreign policy literature. Little if anything of predictive value has been deduced. Yet there is much of value to be gained from some of the theorists in this field regarding the influences and motivations in policy formulation.

An overview of their theories is helpful in formulating a framework for the analysis of the arms control policies discussed in this paper. In light of this paper’s attempt to assess the policies in terms of bureaucratic momentum or Prime Ministerial initiative, some of these theories explore the individual level of analysis, while others assess organizational influences. Thus the appropriateness of examining motivations, psychological impetus, rationality and perceptions are all mentioned in the following pages, and are intended to provide some direction for the later examination of the actual
policies. This theoretical discussion illustrates some of the limitations inherent in any attempt to explain the sources and evolution for Canadian arms control policy.

In order to appreciate the constraints and influences that affect the decision-maker, some idea of his particular frame of reference is helpful. As Richard Snyder, one of the first analysts to concentrate on decision-making has noted, the prime analytical objective is "the recreation of the world" of the decision-makers as they perceive it. While not an easy task, such an attempt facilitates a more objective interpretation. The decision-makers' "definition of the situation", which depends on their "perception, choice and interpretation", influences what particular course of action will be chosen. The pertinent questions that must be answered to flesh out this framework include ascertaining what the decision-makers see as relevant; assessing how the relevant factors are inter-related; defining those compromises that are deemed allowable; and finally, exploring how the various competing demands on the decision-makers are balanced. The wants and needs that are deemed to be involved, how and what goals are defined, and how action is decided upon, are thought to be fitting and effective means with which to reconstruct "the actors' orientations to actions".

Unfortunately, this paradigm demands so many details that it is difficult to apply to an actual situation. While the researcher would certainly get a better idea of the rationale for the policy choices if these directives were followed, the restrictions on time and energy make such a meticulous effort unlikely. Bearing these criticisms in mind, the following chapters will use elements of this classic decision-making framework to guide their analysis of the arms control policies.

While the details demanded by Snyder seem comprehensive, other
theorists see his model as inadequate. James Rosenau has criticized the "theoretical emptiness" of Snyder because no weight is "given to the many sectors of the decision-maker's experience", and no "hypotheses are offered about the transformations of situations nor about the relations of decisions made and the decision in the making". Since the decision-maker's perceptions are influenced by his life experiences, which in turn are influenced by his personality, some consideration must be given to factors other than those noted by Snyder. Rosenau believes that a study of "decisional phenomena" is inadequate as the sole basis for "if-then" propositions about politics. Any comprehensive examination "must include and interrelate variables pertaining to the targets of decisions, the actors taking them and the relationship between the targets and the actions". The very scale of the effort advocated by Rosenau makes such an analysis impossible, but these suggested guidelines do give some indication of what details may be necessary for an understanding both of how decisions are made and what motivates the decision-maker.

As well as the difficulties noted above, there are inherent problems in presupposing that Trudeau's personality was largely influential in his decision-making in the realm of foreign policy and arms control. Not only may that be a false assumption, but there are methodological problems in using the individual level of analysis in this instance. For example, it is very difficult to measure personality characteristics accurately, and "systemic evidence linking personality characteristics to international affairs or trends in decision-making is sorely lacking" in any case.

There are two critically important barriers to adding a psychological dimension to the decision-making approach. Specifically, there is little scientific data on Trudeau's personality, and more generally, there is no
connection between how early development may have possibly influenced "later attributes and behavior" and actual foreign policy decision-making. While the psychological approach is valuable for insights, it is difficult to analyze foreign policy actions solely on the evidence available from this research.

The role of rationality is of central importance in any evaluation of foreign policy decision-making. As mentioned earlier, Trudeau was determined that this factor would have an important influence in his government's policy-making. Indeed, he saw comprehensive rationality as the ideal in decision-making. How he dealt with misperceptions, cognitive dissonance, and the different types of rationality that stem from the variety of geo-political perspectives in the international forum has not been fully explored.

Cognitive dissonance is an important element in Steinbruner's cognitive paradigm. He asserts that the mind actively but subjectively controls uncertainty through false or flawed generalization, as well as restriction of incoming information to only that material which will support the pre-established expectations. In doing so, individuals rely on belief systems that are to a greater or lesser degree quite "independent of evidence from the empirical world". When used in a post-decisional context, cognitive dissonance involves a process wherein "people rearrange their beliefs" to support their actions.

Many analysts would argue that it is neither realistic nor of any theoretical or research value to take as a given that the decision-maker will follow a rational approach or base his policy choice on rational assumptions. There are a number of different descriptions of rational decision-making. John Steinbruner prefers the term "analytic" paradigm to the "rational"
model as he believes it is more indicative of real-world mental logic. He states that such a process ideally would: break down the decision problem to the major components; be characterized by limited value integration; involve efforts to estimate possible outcomes; and see pertinent new information producing "appropriate subjective adjustments".

Various hypotheses have been generated to explain the fact that decision-makers frequently do not follow a rational path, as defined above. As Steinbruner points out, "the rational theory assumes such sophisticated processing of information that it strains credulity to impute such procedures to real decision-makers". Factual constraints are imposed by the immense structural complexity of the international system, and to a lesser degree, that of the domestic political scene. Whether conflicting values, misperceptions, the convoluted nature of bureaucratic politics, or an inaccurate response to the demands of these and other factors undermines rationality depends on the analyst's view. This problem is compounded by the fact that human frailty may well lead to mistaken estimations and erroneous perceptions in the decision-making process.

Anyone attempting to understand the motivation, rationale, and impetus behind decisions in policy-making would do well to consider the admonitions of one of the earliest writers to criticize the pervasive assumption that rational consideration guides decision-making. Herbert Simon elucidated his ideas on the inherent restrictions of rationality in his behaviour alternative model. "Instead of beginning with what the decision-maker wants to achieve or with values...begin with the fact that he is at any moment faced with a large number of behavior alternatives". Thus a decision is basically a selection of a satisfactory alternative, or a compromise. This realization moves any analysis of a decision away from a
simplistic and often misleading calculation based on a maximization of apparent values. Not only is it impossible to correctly assign values to the decision-maker, but if one thinks in terms of means and ends, it is more than difficult to guess all the means and ends the policy-maker in question considered in the course of formulating that policy.

Another critic of the rational actor model is Charles Lindblom. He points out that decision-makers are often responsible for identifying and defining the problem. Even if such steps have already been taken by the bureaucracy, the same chance of error applies. "Misdefined problems" can easily lead to policy failures. He also points out that the information necessary to assess all policy choices and their respective consequences is simply not available, especially in the world of political policy-making, where time is often of the essence.75

Lindblom posits the alternate model of "disjointed incrementalism", which is "policy-making through small or incremental moves on particular problems rather than a comprehensive reform system". Incrementalism involves simplification through omission, policies that satisfy immediate demands and suffice for the time being, and a recognition that politically feasible policies are those that are only "marginally different from what has gone before". All of the possible ramifications are not evaluated but the policy is chosen so that it "leaves open the possibility of doing better in a subsequent effort". Any delay in deciding on policy is seen as a benefit as it allows time to clarify problems and judge whether action must really be taken.76

As will be illustrated in Chapter IV, Lindblom's model applies to the decision-making that resulted in Canadian policy at UNSSOD I and II. To a lesser extent, it also describes certain aspects of the decision-making that led
to the decision to test the ALCM (a process examined in Chapter V). Amitai Etzioni's theory of "mixed scanning" may further an understanding of the decision-making process behind Trudeau's peace initiative, and to a much lesser extent it is useful in analyzing the Cruise policy. Etzioni sees incrementalism as too limited, in that it cannot explain those clearly demonstrable occasions when fundamental analytical review of policy occurs.

At such points, the scanning or review of alternatives is mixed in the sense that only a few aspects of a problem and only a few alternatives are selected for intensive analysis. According to Etzioni, this fundamental review process occurs when there is rapid change in a society or when a crisis occurs because of prolonged neglect or mistaken treatment of a problem.77

Elements of Etzioni's conditions can be seen in the policy processes regarding both the ALCM and the peace initiative decisions. The fundamental review and the ensuing conflict within the government was revealed in the detailed yet flawed rationale given to support the ALCM testing, and by the obvious misgivings with the status quo that Trudeau's initiative represented.78

When trying to assess the role of rationality, one should consider that there are different kinds of rationality guiding the respective forces in the policy process. For instance, bureaucratic rationality "emphasizes efficiency and systemic approaches, depends on maximum amounts of quantifiable information and demands concrete objectives and clear directions", while political rationality "emphasizes the provision of maximum satisfaction for voters in the relatively short run, utilizes information which makes many bureaucrats uneasy and thrives on flexible objectives".79

These observations seem to point to an apparent impasse for any
adequate theory of decision-making. Herbert Simon responded with a proposal for an alternative model which mirrors the reality of the industrial world. The solution is predicated upon the use of organizations, where the division of labour and provision of multiple bases of thought reduces "decisional problems to manageable proportions". His theory about the organizational model was applied to considerations of bureaucratic input into the policy process.

Graham Allison's seminal work on "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" details the limitations and inaccuracies of analyses that rely solely on the traditional "rational actor" model and turns to the role of the bureaucracy. An interpretation that sees government as a "conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations", and foreign policy as the output of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior is useful for some decisions.

According to Allison, these decisions may be explained by locating the organization actors and noting their procedures. He asserts that while government leaders can substantially disturb the behavior of these organizations, they can not substantially control them.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison proposes the "government/bureaucratic politics" model as the best explanatory device. According to this model, players who lead the various organizations act according to diverse conceptions of "national, organizational, and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pushing and hauling that is politics." Their different interests lead to different preferences on various issues and thus governmental behavior can best be understood not as organizational outputs but rather as the "outcomes of bargaining games." Usually the resulting policies are distinct from what
anyone intended: the result of "compromise, coalition, competition and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue." Allison depicts the procedural limits, inter-agency rivalry, and bureaucratic intragovernment bargaining, but notes that personality, along with parochial perceptions, are "irreducible pieces of the policy blend". His models expand the horizons of inquiry and encourage alternative methods of analyzing the influences on government decision-makers.

Kim Nossal believes that Allison's last model is applicable to Canadian federal politics but stipulates that the parliamentary system's structural differences, compared to that of the United States, will have "a substantial impact on both the tone of bureaucratic politics and the effects of bureaucratic politics on policy outcomes." Nossal makes the model applicable to Canada by emphasizing the actual interaction between players, as opposed to its conflictual nature.

John Steinbruner uses his cybernetic theory of decision to expand on the role of organizational politics and the use of standard operating procedures (SOPs). He suggests that an alternate way of analyzing decision-making must "reflect the central role played by highly structured feedback cycles that confine the decision process" within limits determined by the information used and the responses considered. It is necessary for the decision-maker to simplify the incredibly complex world in order to define a workable problem. Decision-making in this model is organized around "short-cycle information feedback and the elimination of uncertainty" by means of "highly focused attention and highly programed response". Thus the cybernetic decision-maker uses only highly specific information input, suitable to the limited procedures he can perform. He does not pay attention to value conflicts between competing objectives.
Instead, he breaks such problems into separate decision processes and operates at any one time solely in terms of a single objective with a single expected outcome. When he is confronted with real conflicts between objectives, he would "tend to perceive two problems and oscillate between single-minded pursuit of each of the conflicting objectives."

Steinbruner uses cognitive theory to enhance the applicability of the cybernetics paradigm. He emphasizes that decision-makers seek subjective resolution of uncertainty, and thus both limit information input to that which will bolster their point of view, and indulge in inconsistency management. According to Steinbruner, "the principles of cognitive theory explain how problem structures are set up within which cybernetics mechanisms can operate."

These ideas are helpful in an attempt to appreciate the role of the bureaucracy in Canadian arms control decision-making, and the forces at work behind the policies presented at the UNSSODs and the impetus that led to the decision to test the ALCM.

There are many problems in foreign policy decision-making. The comprehensive explanatory value of any theory or model is limited because it is an invalid generalization to say that foreign policy consists of "conscious, isolatable decisions". Non-decisional activity like organizational inertia and bureaucratic drift is often very influential. The concept of non-decisions, while difficult to research, should be noted, if only to indicate the limitations imposed on a really thorough analysis of any policy. "At any given time there are thousands of demands being made upon governments [and] only a small portion receive active, serious attention from policy-makers". An incrementalist approach may be the only way in which policy-makers create some form of order out of this chaos.

In a valuable contribution, Miriam Steiner calls for an expansion of the
concept of nonrationality in the formulation and analysis of decisions. She queries the comprehensibility of the causality aspects and structural uncertainty of the foreign policy environment. In an effort to make her analysis more complete, she posits that the conceptualization of the decision-making process must include an awareness of nonrational aspects.

Steiner notes that the rationalistic world view stresses "order, clarity, empiricism and logical analysis", while the nonrationalistic world view emphasizes "novelty, incongruity, intuition and subjective awareness". She then points out an important and interesting conundrum. Steiner recognizes that almost all analysts of foreign policy decisions today believe that good decision-making requires subordination of intuition and feeling to a rationalistic approach. The problem lies in the "inevitable contradiction" between this prescription and their view of the foreign policy arena "as ambiguous, fluid and shot through with subjective elements".

It may well be true that if a decision-maker tries to respond rationally to a nonrational world, one will only choose an optimal course by luck, and more often than not may make the wrong choice due to an incorrect or incomplete rationale. The rationality in decision-making is bounded because it is impossible to consider all alternatives or to foresee probable consequences. There are numerous examples in the nuclear world of decisions that have had unforeseen implications due to problems of comprehension and perception.

Robert Jervis also criticizes the assumption that rationality plays an overarching role in decision-making. Like Steinbruner, Jervis argues that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that decision-makers search extensively, revise accordingly, conduct a "cost-benefit analysis", and then choose the best alternative available. This idea ignores cognitive constraints
and the problem of misperception in decision-making. These two factors ensure a simplified view that discounts discrepant information and overlooks the fact that evidence consistent with the decision-maker's view may also support other views. No attempt is made to understand how the other actors' different backgrounds may affect their actions and perceptions. Thus the opposing states' organizational centricity and hostility level are often misconstrued.\textsuperscript{102} The complexity of the policy environment encourages the decision-makers to rely on preexisting images and beliefs when assimilating new or ambiguous information. The contradictory information is subconsciously misinterpreted to make it fit with their original view. The "other's view of the world" is not taken into consideration. They never imagine that their own perception might be flawed, since overconfidence in one's cognitive abilities is very common.\textsuperscript{103}

Jervis asserts that important differences in policy preferences are due to differences in decision-makers' perceptions of their environment, and the important divergences "between reality and shared or common perceptions".\textsuperscript{104} A central question in his work is whether or not a person is able to perceive accurately enough to predict what others will do or foresee what a particular policy's affects will be.\textsuperscript{105}

Many analysts consider the effects of stress to be a critical influence on the perceptions involved in decision-making. Richard Snyder and James Robinson believe that a limited number of values are emphasized under such conditions, regardless of what may be actually known about various ramifications.\textsuperscript{106} Irving Janis' work on group decision-making under stress reveals that a variety of pressures develop to simplify thought processes and ensure a unified response.\textsuperscript{107}

Three of the four arms control situations examined in this thesis could
not be categorized as classical cases of crisis decision-making because there were not the grave restrictions on time that crisis imposes. However, the pressing need to come to terms with the complexities of the nuclear world meant that stress was involved. In the case of the peace initiative, time was of the essence. The Prime Minister was moved to unprecedented action by what he saw as the swiftly-escalating potential for disaster in the nuclear world.

From this brief overview of some of the theoretical problems in foreign policy decision-making, it would be appropriate to conclude that a final policy decision is fraught with both organizational pitfalls and cognitive/perceptual dilemmas. When one adds the possible structural flaws that plague policy-making, the difficulties of the process are magnified.

Problems of 'Rational' Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: Structural Considerations

In 1978, Denis Stairs noted that recent events were forcing the government to consider a much wider variety of issues in its foreign policy decision-making. The demands of international politics had expanded to include such diverse concerns as the energy shortage, pollution, the drain on natural resources, and the starving millions in the Third World. These rapidly growing and seemingly intractable problems challenged the abilities of both the government and the policy-making process. The expanding number and variety of government agencies and departments dealing with each issue made a comprehensive approach difficult and the ever-increasing number of technical details that had to be considered exacerbated each dilemma's already complex nature. Difficulties in predicting long and short-term implications, and any unknown side-effects, made policy
planning problematical.\textsuperscript{110}

This situation resulted in difficulties for the government not only at the managerial and technical levels, but also at what Stairs terms "the level of principle".\textsuperscript{111} While the need for long-term global policies was increasingly apparent, the liberal-democratic model required that the immediate interests of one's constituents be served.\textsuperscript{112} These different demands caused an unresolvable tension in foreign policy-making in general, and decision-making in particular.

Stairs believes that Canada's foreign policy problems are "too large and too complex to develop clearly-defined policy responses", and substantive suggestions, even if possible, are too politically risky. Thus the policy often offers only rhetorical directives.\textsuperscript{113}

Stairs also identifies what he sees as the methodological problems for policy-making that are inherent in this new complexity. Prior to the recent explosion of crucial issues on the international scene, foreign policy had been "the product of the rational calculations of identifiable office-holders".\textsuperscript{114} While the previous discussion on rational decision-making raises doubts about the accuracy of this point, his conclusion is valid. Stairs asserts that the proliferation of major problems has caused much of foreign policy to become the output of an "inertial process", after many compromises in many conflicting committees with no one being entirely responsible for the end product.\textsuperscript{115} This aptly describes incrementalist policy-making. The necessity of reconciling intra-government, domestic and constituency conflicts of interests further plagued the policy process with structural problems.

Kim Nossal's interpretation of the bureaucratic politics model in Canadian politics illustrates the interplay of these different interests. Its
basic premise is that policy is the result of interchange between players...[and]...when any two players look at an issue, their views as to the best outcome, or how to best achieve goals will differ. Policy-making positions are filled by players who have parochial interests they attempt to further (often at the expense of some broader notion of the national interest).\textsuperscript{116}

Nossal sees the resolution of the differing viewpoints, at both the bureaucratic and ministerial levels, as the integral focus of the bureaucratic politics model. He cites literature in Canadian public administration and public policy to establish his point that policy is not determined by rational choice but rather by "a process of bargaining and compromise at both the bureaucratic and ministerial levels".\textsuperscript{117} The resolution or compromise that is eventually forwarded to, and endorsed by Cabinet, makes policy.

Nossal argues that the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model is facilitated by the recent change in the nature of Canadian foreign policy problems, as noted earlier by Stairs. Furthermore, he identifies four changes Trudeau made in the "structure and process" of policy-making that help make the Allison model appropriate.

The central agencies of the government acquired a more active, and...a more powerful role in the policy process...The domestication of foreign policy and the internationalization of domestic departments...[means that]...more and more policy issues are discussed by a proliferation of standing and ad hoc interdepartmental committees. At the ministerial level, [Cabinet] committees...were restructured...for...greater involvement in policy development and decision-making, curbing the tendency evident in previous years for the Secretary of State for External Affairs to dominate cabinet-level foreign policy discussions. At the intersection of the bureaucratic and ministerial levels...the Trudeau government introduced the practise of having senior civil servants participate in Cabinet committee deliberations.\textsuperscript{118}

Nossal outlines the features of the Canadian foreign policy-making
system that make the bureaucratic politics model appropriate for an analysis of Canadian foreign policy decision-making. The characteristics include: 1) the functional overlap of the mandates and jurisdictions of different program departments on most issues requires bargaining; 2) the premium placed on coordination of policy necessitates trade-offs, compromises and rearranged priorities; 3) the cohesiveness of the senior civil service enhances chances of competition with politicians; 4) the shift in the focal point of formal decision-making to the Cabinet committees allows the senior bureaucrats in attendance regular input and more authority; and 5) the increased importance of provincial players heightens the potential for even more conflict. However, he stresses that "friendly competition" rather than conflict best describes the policy process in Ottawa.

Trudeau's goal of rational policy-making remained elusive. No matter how he changed the "structure and process", the nature of politics and the nature of the problems, especially in strategic nuclear policy-making, defeated him. As William Baugh notes, the ambiguity of the nuclear situation is caused by a number of problems: the lack of agreement regarding methods of measurement between or within governments; ambiguous doctrines of usage exacerbated by problems caused by technology and methodology; and serious divergences over the political meaning/use of present and envisioned weapons. An arms control policy must address problems that involve a myriad of technical, political, ideological and strategic rationales and details. In light of both the theoretical and structural problems of foreign policy decision-making discussed earlier, the government's rhetoric, as exemplified in their standard amorphous policy suggestions on how to deal with the nuclear quandary, is understandable.
Decision-Making and the Forging of Canadian Arms Control Policy

The present nuclear dilemma of the world is not the rational way to obtain an objective, be it peace or the avoidance of war. While it has been pointed out that rationality does not always occupy the primary position in policy formulation that some might wish, its role in arms control policy is worthy of exploration. The mainly elusive logic of the nuclear world creates problems of political management in that rational thought is not always applicable. Roy Menninger terms this situation the "Rationality Paradox", as nuclear strategy creates a "make-believe world", where more weapons are equated with more strength and more safety, despite the accompanying increase in crisis instability and the arms race.

This situation is aggravated when the theoretical dilemmas are combined with the inherent structural problems of the nuclear world. The incredibly destructive power of nuclear weapons makes the prospect of using them irrational, but Menninger's rationality paradox means that arms control is the only alternative to the threats essential to deterrence. The use of nuclear weapons is threatened to ensure their non-use, but the ever-advancing technological developments mean that the requirements of effective deterrence are always changing.

Arms control decision-making is affected by the enduring and very basic differences in the superpowers' political systems, their respective perceptions and security positions, and their resulting policy prescriptions. These difficulties are intensified by the fact that each superpower's strategic decision-making process is very different in both their structure and their results.

The Soviet Union initiates major decisions by establishing general military doctrines and by adopting planning
assumptions; the implications are then imposed reasonably systematically on the details of weapons acquisition, operational posture and diplomatic positions. The system operates, as it were, deductively. In contrast, the United States requires widespread political consensus in order to make authoritative decisions and does not readily achieve this regarding doctrinal abstractions. The US system makes very specific decisions and leaves open their broader implications for subsequent interpretation and political discussion. The US decision-making process operates inductively and at any given time displays substantial internal inconsistencies representing unresolved political issues.

Problems in arms control policy-making have also been caused by attempts to link progress in arms control with success in moderating other areas of superpower rivalry. Some see linkage as necessary in order to protect all aspects of national security, but others doubt that arms control can be linked to a change in the politics of the Soviet Union.

Arms control can be used to limit especially threatening weapons, discourage worst-case planning, moderate the pace of the arms race and enhance superpower cooperation. Without mutual trust, strategic policy must include calculations of what is theoretically available and possible in military terms, using a worst case scenario of the enemy's intentions. The enemy's intent is deduced from their estimated capabilities and official statements which can lead to flawed calculations. The former is often more a result of luck in technical innovation than carefully planned advances while the latter has a variety of roles to play and is not always reliable.

Arms control requires a mutual recognition that successful conflict analysis, management and resolution necessitate an understanding of the goals, ambitions and fears of the other side. Arms control does not have to be seen in terms of a "zero-sum game". Decision-making in arms control is
unduly influenced by the negative problems caused by faulty perceptions. The interrelationships between doctrine, power, technological developments, economic pressures, public attitudes, the effects of individual leaders and bureaucratic politics can cause almost insurmountable hurdles.¹²⁸

Each superpower, to varying degrees, has domestic and international audiences whose view of its attempts are very important to the continuing legitimacy of democracy or communism.¹²⁹ In addition, the perceptions each superpower has of the other are crucial in both the initial formulation of the arms control suggestions and any further modification or compromise. Since superpower relations are not in a coherent, stable framework, the mutual perceptions vary with the vagaries of politics. The process of arms control needs an organizing structure but such an apparatus has not been developed due to a lack of trust or consistent political support.

The four examples of Canadian arms control policies under examination here share several common flaws. Several potentially constructive ideas were not elaborated on or embodied as policy priorities. The power of bureaucratic politics was usually effective in limiting policy changes to a process of incremental policy modification. This situation was caused by a number of factors. This study argues that the most important reasons were the Canadian policy-makers' inadequate grasp of the ramifications of various developments in the international security arena, their paralysis in the face of the United States' negative attitude towards arms control and the Soviet Union, and fears of economic retaliation if Canada was too critical of American strategy and weapons procurements.

The substantial limitations on Canadian influence and credibility as a real player in the nuclear arms control decision-making game may have had a dampening influence on any imaginative policy-maker. The Atlantic
Council has described a "chief psychological problem for Canadians" as due to their not being "in a position to have an effective input into global military and security decisions". Widespread American influence in analytical, strategic, geo-political and economic terms facilitated and encouraged Canadian dependency upon the US.

Using the indices of a study done by the Research Programme in Strategic Studies at York University in early 1982, the Canadian Government could be classified as consistently supportive of a moderate arms control approach to the important issues of that time. Thus it saw the Soviet threat as real but not immediately threatening and believed in the deterrent value of the threat of mutually assured destruction. Defence preparations were needed to accompany attempts at arms control. The policy-makers believed that incremental solutions in policy options would be best and were sceptical of unilateral initiatives.

Arms control policy suggestions must also consider the other allies' policy demands, the domestic bureaucratic, political and electoral forces, and the nebulous and contradictory perceptions of the threat and the enemy that each of these groups entertain. All of these concerns made arms control policy-making in this period a problematic enterprise. The specifics of these assertions will be expanded upon in the next three chapters.

If the Canadian goal was to influence the US towards nuclear arms restraint, the moderation of tension and the promotion of productive arms control negotiations, the course had to be well-charted and the diplomatic and political access afforded as an ally used effectively. How the issue of arms control fit into the overall foreign policy agenda was dictated both by the urgency of the particular issue and the demands of the other foreign policy matters that had to be considered and duly decided upon by the
The Prime Minister's influence in the foreign policy-making process was by and large not constant or reliable enough to moderate the bureaucracy's tendency to maintain the status quo or limit changes to incremental shifts. His reforms of the structure and process were intended to facilitate rational decision-making but there were too many competing considerations and uncertainties in the formulation of Canada's arms control policies to allow the necessary analytical assessment of all the factors and potential outcomes. The problems due to misperceptions and constrained cognition heightened the difficulties caused by the nonrational demands of the nuclear world.\textsuperscript{133}

This sketch of the foreign policy-making process and all its flaws has set the stage for the next section of the paper. The analysis will use this chapter's information to guide the examination of the arms control policies. The decision-making models will be used as aids in an interpretation of the factors that led to the particular policy in question.

The following three chapters will be devoted to an analysis of four examples of Canadian arms control policy. These examples facilitate a chronological assessment of Pierre Elliott Trudeau's developing interest in arms control. Chapter IV focuses on the Prime Minister's policy suggestions at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, and includes a brief survey of the four intervening years, when many issues of grave importance occurred in the nuclear world. Chapter V assesses the Government's attempts to combine a supportive stance for arms control with the decision to test the Air-Launched Cruise Missile. Prime Minister Trudeau's personal peace initiative will be examined in Chapter VI.

While non-official commentary will be cited, primary sources such as
government statements and speeches provide much of the basis for the analysis of Trudeau's leadership and his government's actions regarding these issues. Chapter III's portrayal of the influences on and the structure of the policy-making process will be referred to when appropriate, especially in terms of explaining some of the many contradictions between the stated intent of these policies and actual government behavior. Where clearly ascertainable, the decision-making processes that produced the particular policies under consideration will be scrutinized. To account for particular policies, goal formulation, trade-off relationships between various disparate objectives and subsequent policy compromises will be described in detail. The actual decision-making problems specific to these arms control policies will be addressed using various elements of the decision-making theories outlined in Chapter III.

Events and forces in both the international and domestic environments will be mentioned where appropriate to illustrate the contextual framework that these policies were situated in. Evolving contexts produced changing policy-making constraints that the formulat...
CHAPTER IV: ARMS CONTROL DIPLOMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSIONS ON DISARMAMENT

The United Nations has long been supported by Canada as a forum in which the philosophy of internationalism, a mainstay of Canadian foreign policy, could be pursued. As Kim Nossal points out, since World War II Canada has accepted "the validity of the argument that peace is indivisible: that the fate of any one state and the peace of the international system as a whole are inexorably interconnected." Thus the multilateralism of the UN was seen as a crucial means of defusing the tensions that can erupt into war. However, Nossal also identifies the rivalry between the superpowers as an integral part of the driving forces behind Canada's external relations. Within this context, NORAD, NATO, and "a concomitant anti-communism and anti-Sovietism" were essential aspects of Canadian internationalism.

Thus the relevant bureaucratic actors who formulated Canadian policy for the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament were influenced by a standard operating procedure that precluded any policy suggestions that did not fit into this frame of reference. This latter point will be expanded upon below but a critical assumption of this paper is that inherent restrictions like "grooved thinking" were much more influential than generally realized. John Steinbruner states that this organizational routine characteristically occurs in organizations that have existed for some time, and "at an organizational level where the range of problem is narrow in the sense that the decision maker does not often encounter problems which do not readily fall into a small number of basic types." Those decision-makers who "repeatedly encounter complex decision problems and have the inescapable responsibility of taking some action develop these highly stable patterns of reaction." The actual decisions are "taken on very narrow
grounds and are determined by the execution of well-established decision rules.\textsuperscript{3}

The suffocation strategy that the Prime Minister enunciated at UNSSOD I had to overcome structural restrictions as well as these inherent limitations. It may be argued that since Trudeau had neglected "the craft of Canadian diplomacy", this powerful resource could not be brought to bear in support of the strategy.\textsuperscript{4} In addition, the coherence of the Alliance and the perception that public criticism of American strategy might well cause adverse effects in other areas of bilateral cooperation and contention took precedence over any promotion of the policies elaborated at the UNSSODs. This reality necessitated a clear conception of priorities and goals, and a willingness to compromise on the part of the foreign policy-making establishment.

At UNSSOD II, the rivalry between the superpowers was even more pronounced due to a number of ideological and strategic factors. In addition, Canadian-American relations were strained over a variety of issues, due in no small part to the very different personal philosophies of Pierre Trudeau and Ronald Reagan. As a result, Canada had even less room to maneuver in any promotion of its arms control policies. The policy-makers saw the immediate goal of maintaining good bilateral relations with the United States, and all that that entailed, as taking precedence over the very desirable but much less achievable goal of nuclear arms control.

Since the Canadian Government refused to give the issue of suffocating the arms race a position of priority and ongoing support on the Government's agenda, there was very little high-level follow-up to the ideas presented in the UN arms control sessions. As will be shown below, the gaps between official rhetoric and actual government action, while no doubt due to a realistic assessment of the limits to Canadian power, were far too wide to
make the leap between worthwhile suggestions and concrete supportive action.

**Canadian Arms Control Policy at the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament**

From a Canadian perspective, the highlight of the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) was the speech that the Prime Minister gave on May 26, 1978.\(^5\) It was the first time that he had appeared before the United Nations, and his address seemed to indicate a new Canadian interest regarding the need for a more activist approach to controlling the nuclear arms race. The Prime Minister eloquently expressed his concern with the "lagging process of disarmament".\(^6\) He proposed a variety of arms control techniques which together would result in a comprehensive strategy to first curb, and then literally suffocate the arms race. The proposals included: a comprehensive test ban; a ban on the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems.\(^7\)

While Canada had long supported the idea of a comprehensive test ban, and had been active in developing full-scope safeguards to ensure that fissionable material used in nuclear energy would be restricted to that end, the suggestion to ban flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles was an innovative venture for the Canadian arms control polity. The idea of curtailing military spending was not a novel one but it needed support, as world military spending in 1978 had reached an annual sum of $400 billion.\(^8\)

Trudeau stated that "a climate of confidence" was an essential prerequisite to first transcending "the harsher realities of divergent
ideologies" and then developing "the links of a co-operation based on common interests and concerns."\(^9\) He defined the threat to this goal as the development of new weapons systems which have "the risk of unbalancing the existing security equation".\(^10\) With perspicacity, he outlined the essential dilemma caused by the technological impetus behind the arms race.

The new technologies can require a decade or more to take a weapons system from research and development to production and eventual deployment. What this means is that the national policies are pre-empted for long periods ahead. It also complicates the task of the foreign-policy-maker because of the difficulty of inferring current intentions from military postures that may be the result of decisions taken a decade earlier....In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policy-making. There is also a high risk that new weapons systems will revive concerns about a disarming first-strike capability; or that they will tend to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare; or that they will increase problems of verification.\(^11\)

Trudeau's speech pinpointed the problematic nature of nuclear politics very accurately. The political process of arms control does not facilitate a comprehension of what future technological breakthroughs should be restricted, and as a result is frequently insufficient or stymied. Another major dilemma is that as the weapons' research and development programs proceed, they garner bureaucratic supporters and funds that develop vested interests in their unchecked progress. It can be very difficult for arms control advocates to either foresee possible developments that should be headed off, or to encourage public opposition to an as yet unknown weapon.\(^12\)

The result often is that the weapons program is all too
well-entrenched before it is widely opposed. The incentives to arm include: the technological impetus; the fear that someone else will exploit a possible advantage if not forestalled; success in any given area usually leads to more development; the status and diplomatic strength attached to weaponry; and the fact that continued arming may serve the interests of the military-industrial complex. William Baugh describes the disincentives to disarm with the aid of the prisoner’s dilemma. "Since the fear of possible loss in an unmatched arms reduction is likely to appear more perilous than the dangers inherent in continuing the status quo, a minimax player (who seeks to avoid the worst thing that could happen) will choose not to disarm." Comprehensive arms control requires better communication and trust-building and an acceptance that mutual cooperation is more desirable than the status quo.

Trudeau touched on a wide range of other issues in his speech. It was apparent from some of his remarks that he had appraised NATO conventional wisdom regarding the nuclear world, but he was not critical of NATO rationale. He noted, for example, that the idea of a commitment to non-first-use of nuclear weapons "is difficult to dismiss because it would give expression and authority to a widely-shared perception of international morality". But he then cautioned that it would be a mistake to allow declarations of good intent to divert attention from the real issues of disarmament, such as the reductions of armed forces and weaponry. With the same hint of cautious ambiguity towards the merits of the nuclear rationale, he noted the inadequacies of the concept of deterrence for genuine world security.

The focal point that the Canadian suffocation strategy was based on is legitimate and well worth exploring as it has been demonstrated numerous times that the arms race is fueled in large part by the results coming out of
the weapons laboratories.\textsuperscript{16} However, the Canadian attempt to address the issue of how to stop the technological impetus of the arms race was handicapped by the enormity of the problems of the nuclear world, Canada’s limited power, and the government’s unwillingness to make the suffocation strategy an issue of priority in all pertinent policy-making.

The reception received by the "Suffocation Speech" was moderate for a variety of reasons. Neither leader of the two superpowers was at UNSSOD I; there was minimal press coverage in the Western media; and Trudeau did not directly address the concerns of a large part of the audience. The non-aligned nations of the world had been lobbying for a major conference on disarmament for years. The desperate poverty in their countries focussed their concerns on the possible links between disarmament and accelerated economic development. However, Canada and many of the industrialized countries believed that disarmament and development were "two distinct objectives", with no direct relation to one another.\textsuperscript{17}

Just prior to the Special Session, the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs described what Canadian goals should be at the forum. It is apparent from Mr. Skinner’s remarks that official Canadian ambitions were of a much more vague, albeit conciliatory nature than the specific suggestions of the suffocation strategy seemed to indicate. He said that Canada’s fundamental objective at UNSSOD I was to find the lowest common denominator of agreement to offset the voting power of the non-aligned nations, as they might develop "unrealistic deadlines or objectives" which would, in turn, cause the military powers and nuclear states to either abstain or cast negative votes.\textsuperscript{18} Canada wanted the Special Session to develop a step by step approach, as that could lead to "tangible results through negotiations in the next three to five years."\textsuperscript{19} The major task of the Canadian contingent
was to try to "encourage a rededication of the international community to non-proliferation, as embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty", especially since the Canadian ability to influence the superpowers' discussions on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was recognized as being indirect and marginal at best.  

While the Prime Minister acknowledged Canada's interest in upholding the NPT, his suffocation strategy was not echoed in the remarks of this senior level bureaucrat. The divergence could be an indication of a bureaucratic, conservative attachment to maintaining the status quo or an example of cybernetic decision-making, in contrast to the Prime Minister's belief that a departure from the norm was the only rational, analytical course of action. As John Steinbruner notes, "information-processing operations within the [cybernetic] paradigm do not proceed in active pursuit of conceptual change but rather operate to keep such change within reasonably narrow limits". In terms of the actual policy-making, an incrementalist approach best describes the Canadian arms control policy at this time. According to Charles Lindblom, such small policy moves are facilitated by information processing that simplifies through omission, and establishes policies that are best in the short term without addressing the comprehensive long term aspects.  

Like the External Affairs bureaucrat, Trudeau realized there were inherent limitations on policy options. This explains to some extent the discrepancy between official rhetoric and the policy actually pursued. Thus while the Prime Minister described the arms race as a "latent source of world catastrophe" and expressed concern over the complexity of finding "the magic formula of equal security by placing limits on what are quite often disparate weapons systems", he recognized the constraints and dictates of realpolitik. One of the most obvious demonstrations of the forces
moving in an opposite direction to UNSSOD I was the concomitant session of a NATO summit meeting, which announced agreement on a long-term weapons expansion program.24

Trudeau's summation of what UNSSOD I's goals should be revealed that he was very much aware of the limitations on any possible achievements. The Prime Minister advocated "a reasonable concensus on broad objectives and....a plan of action for the next few years."25 This repetition of the bureaucrat's view indicates that for all the suggested policy innovations in the suffocation speech, Trudeau himself was willing to accept the incrementalist pattern of slow-moving change at best, or the maintenance of the status quo if need be.

If measured by these limited expectations, Canada was not wholly unsuccessful. The Canadian proposals were not pushed aside in the attempt to reach consensus on an official concluding statement. The Final Document of UNSSOD I passed on to "the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs....for further and thorough study" the proposals that the assembly deemed worthy of such effort. The list included the "proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation."26 The Final Document itself reiterated some of the ideas embodied in the Prime Minister's address. It called for the "cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems", and the "cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes." It also called for "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all states within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process" and urged a "gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis."27 However, much of the Final Document's impact was diluted by the fact that it had to limit many of its points to suggestions, as opposed to resolutions, in order to avoid open
disagreement among the delegates.

While the decision-making process that led to the Suffocation Speech is hard to trace, it is known that the Department of External Affairs established "a group of consultant experts" at the end of 1977 to aid in preparing Canadian policy for UNSSOD I. The Canadian delegation to the Special Session consisted of regular diplomatic representatives, parliamentary observers, and five consultants drawn from outside the Government. One of those consultants, Professor Albert Legault, said that the policy statement delivered by the Prime Minister was "based on many intra-, inter- and para-departmental consultations...prepared with the greatest of care, reflecting a variety of opinions." He noted that while the consultations were carried out on a national scale, more forceful proposals might have resulted if Canada had consulted its allies, the neutral powers, and the Third World nations more closely. There is little in government sources or literature in the public domain to indicate the content or nature of these consultations.

Klaus Goldschlag, described as one of DEA's "most brilliant officers", actually wrote the suffocation speech. At that time, Trudeau was not as involved nor apparently as concerned over this issue as he was to become in the ensuing years. While no doubt he approved the speech prior to giving it, at that stage he was content to speak eloquently without matching the rhetoric with substantive policy. While the speech's analysis of the nuclear dilemma was insightful and accurate, it was more in the realm of detached commentary rather than an actual directive. The government did not subsequently act to incorporate any of its tenets as a basis for Canadian behavior in the nuclear world. While Canada did not have a seat at the superpowers' negotiating table, it failed to make the suffocation strategy a focal point for Canadian policy at the Conference on Disarmament, or a guide
for Canadian voting at the United Nations. Other considerations were the real priorities, and will be detailed below.

To be fair, the decision-making behind Canadian policy at UNSSOD I was most likely based on a realistic acknowledgement of the limits to Canadian power and was influenced by the belief, a legacy from the period of detente, that the superpowers could manage the arms race if they would only, once again, establish cordial relations. The traditional Canadian respect for the cohesion of its alliances lay behind the suggestive, rather than demanding, tone of Trudeau's speech and meant that considerations of what would be acceptable to that audience triumphed over any inclusion of Third World demands. Any querying of the guiding rationales of the nuclear world was kept to a few polite musings, as explicit criticism would be most impolitic. It is also fair to say that the weakness of strategic analysis in Canada ensured that there was not the expertise available in the policy-making circles to furnish a well-founded critique, even if the government had been willing to take that risky path. In 1978, priority was given to the demands of being a loyal ally, which entailed staunch support for whatever nuclear policies were deemed best by the experts. The technological momentum was identified as the primary dilemma, thus neatly avoiding the fact that political choices, and hence the people who made them, were also responsible for the state of superpower relations and for the lack of trust that coloured the perceptions on both sides of the arms race.

The decision to restrict Canadian arms control policy suggestions at UNSSOD I to that forum was also influenced by the politics within the Canadian government. Its competing bureaucratic forces with their differing world views and the continuing excessive attention to structural tinkering did not facilitate the development of a coherent advocacy group. From the following anecdote, one may get an indication of the divergence of opinions
on arms control within the Government, and the subsequent contradictory sources of input into the policy process. In his address to the Special Session, the Prime Minister commended President Carter's "farsighted postponement of a decision to produce" the enhanced-radiation warhead. At the same time, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Department of National Defence announced that "the enhanced-radiation warheads would be a positive addition to NATO's nuclear inventory."

While the issue of nuclear arms control was a concern of the Canadian government in 1978, it was deemed too structurally complicated, too politically obtuse and too removed from their direct authority to merit more than a demonstration of support. While this support did translate into continued involvement in multilateral attempts to address arms control problems, it did not mean that Canada would assume a more activist position on any particular issue. However, the electoral support for the general concepts of peace and the avoidance of nuclear war did merit public relations procedures.

At the conclusion of the Special Session, the Secretary of State for External Affairs told Parliament that he had "started a new mechanism in Canada and the department to deal with disarmament questions." Two weeks later the creation of a Office of the Advisor on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs was announced. Geoffrey Pearson, a career diplomat and the son of Canada's most widely hailed peace-maker, was to be the principal adviser on disarmament policy. Pearson was directly responsible for: strengthening Canada's role in the multilateral arms negotiations; encouraging research and public education regarding disarmament; and ascertaining how the decisions of UNSSOD I were being furthered. While this office was later upgraded to ambassador, the lack of financial and political support for this position indicates that the government's priorities
were elsewhere. In light of the analysis of the policy-making in Chapter III, it should come as no surprise that the input of both the advisor/ambassador and his Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs was peripheral.

Criticisms of the suffocation strategy occurred more in retrospect than at the time, as its very nature required time to pass before the results could be judged. In 1981, Michael Tucker stated that the Canadian focus on technical solutions to arms control problems tended to "preclude or overshadow" the needed measures to influence the political decisions behind the strategy choices and weapons procurement. In 1982, the former Director of Disarmament Affairs at the UN Secretariat, Canadian William Epstein, criticized the Government for moving its interests in arms control and disarmament "not just to the back burner but right off the stove." David Cox noted that there was "little or no translation of general purpose and declaration into specific policies and no fruitful confrontation of the difficulties and costs which an independent initiative would pose." NDP External Affairs critic Pauline Jewett argued in 1983 that a close examination of the events following the Special Session belied the Government's apparent new priority regarding arms control and disarmament. She cited as evidence for her contention the following important points.

Although the advisor for disarmament was upgraded to ambassador, his "office bears no comparison in size or resources to even one of the specialized strategic or arms advisory divisions" of the Department of National Defence. The lack of consultation or consideration of the suggestions generated by the Ambassador's Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs had put it in "open revolt" with the DEA and the Liberal government. The strategy of suffocation, as such, was not presented at any conferences where Canada had official status, nor were any governmental
studies done to further the strategy, nor was the strategy incorporated into
the civil service’s agenda.\textsuperscript{40} Michael Wallace, while acknowledging that the
strategy was “extremely well-researched, far-sighted....and essentially
correct in both diagnosis and remedy”, censured the government for not
fighting for the proposals in NATO and NORAD forums.\textsuperscript{41} A year later, John
Lamb stated that Trudeau’s suggestions were flawed as they “lacked
substantive coherence, the backing of a political concensus” between DEA
and DND, and sustained public support.\textsuperscript{42}

Official rhetoric can be quite misleading if taken too literally. Despite
the criticisms noted above, the 1980 Speech from the Throne seemed to
indicate ongoing concerted action, as it asserted that the government “must
continue its strategy to suffocate the deadly growth in the nuclear arsenals
of the world....and seek to rally others to a cause that is no less than human
survival on this planet.”\textsuperscript{43} However, any action was marked by the
continuation of the status quo, in that the government limited its policy to
the traditional support for the Western Alliance’s stance. The relevant
bureaucracies within the government apparatus, such as those which
formulated policy for the multilateral arms control fora and those which
participated in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, continued on as if the
suffocation strategy had been little more than an aberration.

In 1981, Michael Tucker asserted that the conservative trend in
Canadian arms control policy-making had been encouraged by the bleak
prospects for superpower agreement. This sentiment was exacerbated by

a feeling that it is neither desirable nor productive for a
responsible ally and member of a Western negotiating team
to move in advance of its allies on issues bearing directly
upon their security.\textsuperscript{44}

Although the suffocation strategy was never promoted in its entirety,
the Canadian Government did co-sponsor resolutions at the UN General Assemblies over the next few years that, amongst other things, urged the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to pursue discussions about the viability of negotiations on halting the production of fissionable material for weapons, and called for a comprehensive test ban (CTB). Canada also supported resolutions urging a decrease in military spending and the prevention of any further nuclear weapons proliferation. However, the credibility of many of the resolutions in the UN and the CD is impugned by the various partisan positions and resulting apparently contradictory votes that are adopted within these forum.\footnote{In addition, the resolutions and negotiations from these sources can only be declamatory or exploratory without the concrete political backing of both superpowers. The demands of the international scene relegated the stated intent of Canadian arms control policy, as enunciated at UNSSOD I, to a position of rhetoric at best, and at worst, to one of hypocrisy.}[46]

It is difficult to know whether the lack of public support for the suffocation strategy contributed to the government's apathy, or whether the failure on the government's part to put its policy into action resulted in the electorate's disinterest. While the public does not have much power in the arms control process, expressions of concern may well influence the government to manage a policy differently in an attempt to alleviate the electorate's anxiety about an issue.

In 1977, one year before UNSSOD I, the issue of arms control/disarmament did not even merit inclusion in a table documenting the topics of the Canadian public's correspondence with External Affairs.\footnote{In 1979, the DEA employed Goldfarb Consultants to conduct a survey to ascertain, among other things, the foreign policy issues that were regarded as being of primary and secondary importance to the Canadian populace.}
96% of the respondents identified the oceans and proper management of the fisheries as the number one primary interest; 92% rated trade and tariff issues in second place; and 89% put UN peacekeeping forces as the third most important issue. Arms control and the reduction of the arms race was rated by 82% of the respondents as the most important secondary foreign policy interest for Canada. Over a period of ten years, three Canadian Gallup polls asked the question, "Are the chances of nuclear war breaking out greater or less great than they were 10 years ago?" In 1971, approximately 17% of those polled said the chances were greater; in 1975, 33% said greater; and in 1982, 59% of those Canadians asked replied that the chances of nuclear war breaking out were now greater than ten years earlier. In 1982, 90% of Canadians surveyed in a study for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs were pessimistic about the prospects of arms control. Obviously the issue was becoming more of a concern to the public. Why was this evolution in opinion occurring and how was the Canadian government responding?

The Intervening Years: 1979-1981

The period between the two UNSSODs was so tumultuous that the government was hard put to maintain even a semblance of equanimity. Prime Minister Trudeau and his government were unable to focus their energies on promoting the strategy of suffocation due to a number of demands on both the domestic and international fronts. However, it is unlikely that such an emphasis was ever their intention. After ten years in power, they knew all too well that the ideal was rarely possible, long-term goals were often sacrificed for short-term results, and that compromises were essential in maintaining politically viable policies, be they in the field of arms control, economic relations or in any of the myriad areas that
demanded constant management.

The years between UNSSOD I in 1978 and UNSSOD II in 1982 saw many changes in the domestic and international frames of reference for the Liberal government. Their commitment to arms control was stated several times in those intervening years but the rhetoric was unaccompanied by concerted and structured efforts to make arms control a priority. While Canada continued to be active in procedural matters like compiling a compendium of past proposals on verification for the Conference on Disarmament, or supporting general and often amorphous arms control goals in the United Nations, the urgency and specificity that the suffocation strategy had hinted at was gone. Other, more immediately compelling events commanded the attention of Trudeau and his government.

On the domestic front, there were a variety of issues that required policy formulation and action. A few are mentioned here to indicate the demanding agenda of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the Liberal Party. Their political fortunes had shifted as the Progressive Conservatives formed the Government from June 1979 to February 1980, while the accompanying elections took their toll on the public and politicians alike. The contentious sovereignty-association referendum took place in Quebec in May 1980. Widespread economic problems during this period demanded both immediate and long-term comprehensive policies, a near-impossible accomplishment at the best of times. In the spring of 1982, the Prime Minister and his government were very involved with the repatriation of the Canadian constitution and the new Charter of Rights. All of these events demanded that care be given to nurturing federal-provincial relations, a difficult task considering the wide range of interests and goals of the ten provinces.

Considerations of state also included a variety of defence-related
issues, notably the NORAD treaty's periodic review in May 1980. The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence was charged with examining that issue. Ten months later the treaty was renewed, and a measure of the official preoccupation with other priorities may be seen in the fact that the name was changed to North American Aerospace Defence Treaty, and the clause that ensured Canada would not be involved in active ballistic missile defence was dropped, without any Parliamentary or public debate. In October 1980, the government received the Americans' first request regarding the testing of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). In the spring of 1982, Canada agreed in principle to allow flight-tests of the ALCM in Alberta, although this news was kept out of the public domain until much later.

In December 1981, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence was asked to prepare a report for the government on "security and disarmament" in light of the second UNSSOD in mid-1982. The subsequent hearings led six members of the committee to issue a minority report which asserted that the official report was gravely deficient in its analysis of the effects of the arms race, and in its recommendations for government action. 50

This limited overview of the important domestic policy issues within Canada demonstrates that the government had a very full agenda. However, the external world also provided a plethora of concerns that had to be addressed.

Between 1979 and 1981, Canadian considerations and actions were influenced by a wide variety of events in the international field. Some had direct implications for Canadian policy while others influenced the international atmosphere, and hence the environment in which Canadian policy was made. On the economic front, the world experienced a severe
recession. On the political scene, while regional tensions continued to cause sporadic wars, two events had particularly grave consequences for morale in Western countries. In November 1979, the Iranian revolutionaries in Tehran took the members of the American embassy hostage, and the next month the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, lending renewed credence to fears of communist expansionism. In the wake of the Afghanistan invasion, the SALT II ratification process in Congress was suspended and relations between East and West plunged to a new low.\(^1\) The resulting trauma for the American public did much to encourage an assertively militaristic and conservative attitude, which, in turn, helped bring Ronald Reagan to power in late 1980.

According to Strobe Talbott, the Soviet Union believed that the arms control agreements reached in the 1970's were positive in that the USSR had achieved parity with the United States, while the Reagan Administration saw them in negative terms, citing them as responsible for the loss of American nuclear superiority. Such divergences in perceptions were all too common in superpower relations and their ramifications for arms control were costly. The new Administration saw arms control as a way "to dictate to the USSR an entirely new sort of arsenal, one more to American liking and one that required that the Soviet Union scrap their latest, most cost-effective, most powerful and most highly valued weapons."\(^2\) Rod Byers' analysis of Soviet-American relations in 1981-2 revealed a widening "perceptual gap" with respect to the optimal method of maintaining a stable nuclear deterrent. He specified three areas where differing perceptions had a real impact: strategic doctrine; the current strategic balance and any resulting vulnerabilities; and whether each superpower's moves were aiding or detracting from deterrence stability. The impact of new technology was felt in all three areas.\(^3\)
Thus developments on the arms control front were not promising. In December 1979, the NATO countries adopted the Two Track policy. It called for the deployment of 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles to begin in 1983, if the Soviet Union could not be persuaded to remove their new theatre weapons, the SS-20 missiles. The Soviet and NATO initial decisions to deploy new long-range theatre nuclear forces seemed valid and essential in light of their respective interpretations of the strategic situation. However, there were key differences in their perspectives and methods of assessment. When the INF (intermediate nuclear forces) negotiations began in late 1981, the respective positions of the two superpowers did not bode well for a speedy agreement.

Success in other arms control matters was not imminent. The negotiations for a comprehensive test ban (CTB), long a Canadian priority, were deadlocked over the issue of verification. The politics of the nuclear world ensured that even very comprehensive verification would not suffice, in light of the atmosphere of mistrust between the superpowers.

In addition to these problems, no agreement could be reached on the prerequisites for continuing strategic arms control discussions until mid-1982. While the superpowers were adhering to the provisions of SALT II, the fact that the U.S. had not ratified it meant that any further deterioration in bilateral relations could easily result in those guidelines being discarded.

As if these external problems were not enough cause for concern, the superpowers' domestic programs cast long shadows over their tenuous relationship. The Reagan Administration's military build-up, long-term strategic goals and fierce anti-Communist rhetoric were a threatening combination in the eyes of the Soviet Union. The apparently imminent Soviet crackdown on Polish activists in 1981 and the reimposed restraints on
Jewish emigration renewed American frustrations regarding their limited powers of restraining and influencing the U.S.S.R. American aid to Afghan rebels and Soviet support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were yet two more examples of the wealth of opportunity for indirect superpower clashes.

In the area of American nuclear strategy, there was a development that was to have grave implications for the stability of the nuclear world. Jimmy Carter issued Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy", on July 25, 1980. It was the culmination of several studies on a variety of aspects of the American nuclear weapons program and followed several memorandums and reviews of nuclear targeting policy. Among other points, PD-59 "required the USA to develop the capability to fight a protracted nuclear war." While the Carter Administration emphasized that PD-59 "does not assume that the United States can win a limited nuclear war, nor does it intend or pretend to enable the US to do so", a secret document of the Reagan Administration leaked in 1982 specified that their policy goal is "to prevail in a protracted nuclear war". The demands of deterrence, due to a wide-ranging variety of technical and political developments, seemed to make such a move necessary and rational but the destabilizing requirements of such a policy could only fuel the arms race and superpower tensions.

In October 1981, the American Secretary of Defense outlined the plans for the strategic nuclear modernization program. The administration committed itself to develop and deploy: the B-1 bomber armed with Air-Launched Cruise Missiles; huge new submarines with the counterforce-capable Trident II D-5 warhead; a force of attack submarines (SSNs); the MX ICBM, in existing hardened silos; an updated strategic defence system with advanced radar, F-15 fighters and other special hardware; an anti-satellite system; and a larger civil defence program.
It is unclear how cognizant the Liberal government was of the shift in American strategic doctrine and the accompanying downplaying of arms control that the Reagan victory heralded. Little changed in the Canadian attitude regarding the acceptability of American leadership in the nuclear world. While this may have been partly due to a realization that it would be politically risky to challenge the American strategy, the more likely reason is that the Canadian government was pre-occupied with more immediately tangible worries about relations with its powerful southern neighbour, and did not realize the full meaning of these developments.

In 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig told Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan that he was increasingly concerned that "our two countries are heading towards a confrontation" and termed the situation as "urgent and extremely serious." In September of that year, shortly after Reagan and Trudeau had unsuccessfully discussed the National Energy Program, the US Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs warned that Canadian energy and investment policies might lead to American retaliation and spoke of "risks of irreparable damage to the bilateral relationship." The time was certainly not propitious for Canadian criticism of an issue as integral to the Reagan ideology as defense concerns.

Furthermore, the scarcity of skilled strategic analysts in the Department of External Affairs meant that there were no expert bureaucratic critics to make well-founded discussion of these shifts a priority. Indeed, it seems that the SSEA himself was not getting adequate information. He was interviewed in late 1980 about the official position regarding the MX missile. He described it as too recent a development to merit a position yet. He noted that "instant answers" were difficult as the "enormous technical complexity" meant that it would take "a long time to figure out the technical, and military and moral aspects." Any analysis from the Department of National
Defence was not without its own inherent bias. The then Deputy Minister for National Defence has described the Soviet Union as an "implacable, extremely well-armed enemy", who would "use their nuclear weapons without hesitation."

George Lindsey, the chief of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence (ORAE) has asserted that devoting "the main thrust of the United Nations toward the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers is likely to do little more than irritate them."

The official Canadian view of the nuclear world and arms control during this period is exemplified by several speeches given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1980, 1981 and early 1982. In mid-1980, Mark MacGuigan firmly rejected what he called the recently "fashionable" assumption that arms control efforts had come to "a complete halt", and assured his audience that the government "does not share this pessimism."

The reasons for some of that pessimism have been noted above, but he was careful to avoid delving too deeply into any specific area. While he did voice support for the "fully justifiable" INF modernization program, MacGuigan maintained the government's customary avoidance of issue-oriented controversy, and did not address the specific fears regarding the nature of those particular new weapons or their destabilizing qualities.

He described the "three-cornered foundation" on which "real security rests": deterrence, arms control, and "the mechanisms and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes."

His description of Canada's priorities in arms control indicates the limitations the government felt on its influence, and the accompanying need to maintain a supportive yet noncontroversial profile. He asserted that Canada should: "encourage the continuation" of the SALT process; "promote the realization" of a comprehensive test ban; "assist in the preparation" of a
ban on chemical weapons; "promote the evolution" of a non-proliferation regime; "participate actively" in negotiations to reduce conventional weapons; and "strive, step by step, to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states."  

Despite his exaggeration about Canadian participation in multilateral arms control attempts, Mr. MacGuigan was not unaware of some of the reasons for the failure of the arms control policies that Canada supported. He candidly acknowledged that the reactions of the nuclear weapons states had been "less than enthusiastic" to the suggestions contained in the speech of his Prime Minister at UNSSOD I. He noted that there was strong opposition both to the proposed ban on fissionable material for weapons purposes and, "pending further progress in the SALT negotiations", to any halt to the flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles. Citing the "current international situation" as the reason for the lack of progress on a CTB or a reduction in military spending, MacGuigan diplomatically avoided open criticism of any specific country.

While MacGuigan expressed some apprehension about the Canadian tradition of "accepting without question the terms of the debate" as it is conducted in the US or in Europe, his desire for independent analysis did not lead to concrete policy changes. He floated the idea of "an autonomous association for arms control and disarmament", and gave support to his Department "encouraging research and stimulating public information activities", but his speech was restrained in terms of advocating anything really innovative. He stated that the government would retain its right to speak out when "the pace is too slow or the agenda too narrow", but gave no indication of how such a judgement would be made or what Canada would say.
As the date for the planned INF deployments approached, large segments of the general public in Europe and North America became more knowledgeable and consequently more agitated about the growing dangers of the arms race. The NATO countries met their demands for a freeze on the arms race or the adoption of a policy of "no first use" with stern refusals, and reprimands that the uninformed public did not understand the needs of Western security. The Canadian electorate was not as vocal as certain elements in the United States or in those countries which were scheduled for deployments of the missiles but, as noted earlier, there were some indications that public concern over the nuclear arms race was beginning to gather momentum in Canada. Drawing on the results of some polls conducted just prior to UNSSOD II, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs concluded that while some Canadians saw greater military strength as the key to greater security, many more wanted a decrease in the numbers of weapons in the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. In addition, there was an interesting shift from a previous tendency to blame the Soviet Union more than the United States for the lack of progress in arms control and the sorry state of East-West relations to one that faulted both superpowers.\(^75\)

Such public concern and the potential for rifts in NATO were not to the liking of the Canadian government. In June 1981 during a two-day debate on foreign policy in the House of Commons, the External Affairs Minister stressed the coherence in Canadian foreign policy and evoked an image of an active and concerned policy-making elite. The themes of "working for peace and security and safeguarding sovereignty and independence" were deemed "fundamental to everything else", as was the strength of the alliances.\(^76\)

Canadian security policy in the past 30 years has been based on deterrence of war through collective defence represented by participation in NATO and NORAD....verifiable
This representation does not indicate any recognition of the fact that the situation over the past thirty years had been qualitatively altered by the changes in nuclear weapons technology. However, the Minister did hint at the political problems that might have deterred the Canadians from any in-depth analysis of current US nuclear strategy. While the reference was in the context of general bilateral relations, it describes problems that would apply to any area where there was a difference of opinion between the United States and Canada.

There is a difficulty sometimes in the United States to grasp that different policy methods are used in Canada, despite the similarities which exist, because our respective experiences and structures are in some ways different. In order to minimize the friction in the relationship, therefore, a premium must be placed on explaining policy approaches to one another as effectively as possible.

The Prime Minister also spoke during the debate on foreign policy. He expressed some personal philosophical thoughts on global issues but did not identify any novel ways of handling these problems. "All the great problems of the world are interrelated: the problems of East and West, North and South, of energy, nuclear proliferation, refugees, sporadic outbursts of violence and war - all of these form a complex web of cause and effect." Instead, he described the INF deployments as "the policy of reinforcing NATO's defence preparedness" and characterized stability in Europe as dependent upon "the maintenance of cohesion and strength through NATO." He seemed to be in complete agreement with American policy and any perceptual bias it might have. An inherent aspect in the American perception was that the threat to Europe from the Soviet Union's SS-20s was not offset to any extent by the independent British and French forces, the
latter's planned modernization, or the forward-based American nuclear weapons. Yet there was a difference between the perceptions of Canada and the United States regarding the crucial concept of nuclear parity. In early 1982, the Secretary for External Affairs appeared before SCEAND and stated that there was "approximate parity at the strategic nuclear level" between the superpowers. This assertion was in marked contrast to Ronald Reagan's views and those of many members of his Administration. Throughout his campaign, Reagan had warned of an imminent threat from Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and in October 1981, the President asserted that the Soviet Union had "a superiority at sea". Early in 1982 he stated that the United States had been "unilaterally disarming" in all previous arms negotiations. The President claimed that "on balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority". The White House was loathe to recognize that the asymmetrical nature of the superpowers' forces meant that "bean-counting" was not an accurate method of measuring their respective strengths.

With minimal analysis, the Canadian government would have realized that this disparity between its perception of the nuclear balance and that of the Reagan Administration meant that the two views of the nuclear world were in conflict. However, there was no attempt to challenge the perception of nuclear balance as presented by the United States or to promote a different policy approach. As noted above, the state of bilateral relations was parlous enough, and there were a wealth of other pressing concerns to occupy the attention of Trudeau and his government.

Canada could ill afford to alienate its most important trading partner. The Prime Minister noted in the fall of 1981 that "an essential dimension" of Canadian foreign policy was economic development, including the priority of
bilateral trade. An indication of this priority was the restructuring of the DEA in January 1982 to accommodate trade promotion and the economic dimensions of Canadian foreign policy.

In summation, this period between the two UN Special Sessions on Disarmament was marked by official Canadian rhetoric in support of the general issue of arms control, but no acknowledgement in any concrete policy terms that the nuclear world was rapidly changing, and that the arms control arena was in even more disarray than when UNSSOD I had been convened. The grave challenges to established doctrine that the Reagan Administration was facilitating both by its shift in strategic thinking and the encouragement of new technology were either not heeded, or not recognized as such.

Canadian arms control policy decision-making during this period is best described using the bureaucratic politics model, with some aid from the cybernetic paradigm. There was a strong attachment to the status quo and the established patterns of policy behavior. Any indications that the external variables which had set the pattern for the standard operating procedure in the past were changing were either ignored or interpreted in such a way that there was no need for a change in policy. According to the cybernetic paradigm, information that contradicts the established perception is ignored for as long as possible, while organizational patterns and vested interests limit the information that does get to the top of the organization. The changes that did occur were minimal, limited to the realm of official rhetoric and may be described as "disjointed incrementalism".

It may have been impossible for the Canadian government to formulate specific criticisms, even if it had so wished, in light of its limited capacity for independent strategic analysis. Furthermore, such criticism could or would have been deflected by the claim that national or alliance
security demanded a continuation of the situation. The fact that there were already outstanding issues of concern between Canada and the US that showed little promise of speedy resolution would also have acted to discourage negative appraisals.88

In light of the superpower tensions, it was no surprise that UNSSOD II met with even less success than its predecessor, despite the desperate need for action on the arms control front. It should also come as no surprise that the Canadian policy there was circumspect. It did not depart from the role of a good ally, although there were indications in the Prime Minister’s speech that he was growing more and more disillusioned with the status quo and felt that innovative policy was needed to break the impasse in arms control.

**Canadian Arms Control Policy at the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament**

Canada’s interpretation of the international scene at the time of UNSSOD II was influenced by a number of internal and external circumstances. The problems between Canada and the United States were grave enough that the utmost care had to be taken in order not to exacerbate the tension; a difficult task considering some of the issues and personalities involved. Prime Minister Trudeau and the Reagan Administration differed sharply in their prescriptions on many topics, including international relations.

In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig described linkage as “a fact of life,” while less than a year later the Prime Minister took pains to explain that as the only threat from the Soviet Union was military, nonmilitary objectives should not be linked to disarmament.89 In an address to the British House of Commons on June 8, just as UNSSOD II began, President Reagan described his vision of the future, one that would “leave
Marxism-Leninism on the ashheap of history. This was a far cry from Trudeau's urging a week later that each superpower accept the legitimate security interests of the other.

Crisis such as the Falklands war, the ongoing civil wars with superpower involvement in Central America, and the powderkeg tensions in the Middle East had widespread effects and offered ample reason to believe that a solution to the world's problems could be a long time coming. In varying degrees, these factors had an effect on the Canadian decision-makers' perceptions of policy options and what compromises were necessary. The need to establish priorities for various competing demands made their work theoretically more difficult, but the use of a standard operating procedure that characterized the UN as a forum more for well-intentioned rhetoric than substantive policy, and the custom of following the American lead in arms control policy, simplified their dilemma.

The unpleasant fact that Reagan's rhetoric was backed up by some very dangerous innovations in nuclear weaponry and strategy was apparently ignored, or perceived using "inferences of transformation" --- or as they are commonly known --- acts of wishful thinking. For example, in February 1982, Caspar Weinberger made his report to Congress on the upcoming fiscal year. In describing the major purposes of the American nuclear forces, the Secretary of Defense included the need to "impose termination of a major war - on terms favourable to the United States and our allies - even if nuclear weapons have to be used - and in particular to deter escalation in the level of hostilities" as well as negate any nuclear blackmail attempts on the part of the Soviet Union.

Just before UNSSOD II, The New York Times reported that the classified document "Fiscal Year 1984-88 Defense Guidance" recommended a protracted nuclear war strategy that would enable American nuclear forces
to "prevail and be able to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States." On June 4, Weinberger acknowledged the plan but took great care to explain that the strategic ability of fighting a protracted nuclear war was only to deter an attack from the USSR. Such a capability has the inherent condition of requiring superiority and hints at the usability of the nuclear forces. It is certainly not conducive to crisis stability or mutual trust.

Theodore Draper's criticism of the new strategy went to the very essence of its flawed nature.

A program of nuclear deterrence could stop at some point deemed necessary to make a nuclear attack mutually impracticable or irrational: a nuclear war-fighting program has no such recognizable stopping point, for it requires open-ended preparations in behalf of a war which has no rational boundary and whose nature cannot be foreseen.

There was no indication that Canadian policy-makers felt these revelations merited a change in their approach. The combination of Weinberger's policy statement and the nuclear hardware acquisitions program announced late in the previous year should have prompted some reassessment of the American nuclear rationale, but the Canadian preparations for UNSSOD II were not affected.

There were some sources of input into the policy-making process that did necessitate a slight change in the following of the standard operating procedure, although in the end they had little effect on the actual policy presented at UNSSOD II. The difference in the lead-up to this Special Session, as opposed to that in 1978, was that the general public was much more aware of the gravity of the nuclear danger and the number of well-informed Canadian experts who were voicing a critical view of the status quo had increased substantially.
These two points were in part responsible for the House of Commons instructing the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in December 1981 "to examine security and disarmament issues with specific attention to Canada's participation" in UNSSOD II. The report was to be tabled by April of the next year, "so that Parliament could have an effective voice in national policy-making in the period preceding the Special Session". In reality, despite a wide variety of well-crafted presentations that argued against embracing the American view of the nuclear world, and any maintenance of Canada's traditional acquiescence to that lead, there was little perceptible change in policy.

In fact, the conservative analysis of the world as epitomized by the Reagan administration's bleak view of the Soviet Union and the dismal chances for arms control was echoed in some official testimony before SCEAND. While many informed analysts would disagree with the Minister of National Defence's commentary, Gilles Lamontagne expressed doubts that the threat of nuclear war had increased in recent years. George Lindsey of ORAE went so far as to suggest that even a full-scale nuclear war might not be completely catastrophic.

The lack of influence that has traditionally characterized SCEAND reports was mentioned in Chapter III. This particular report was further undercut by the dissension of six MPs, representing all three parties, who issued a Minority Report which was sharply critical of official Canadian policy. Their actions were prompted in large part by the March 1982 leaking and subsequent confirmation of a story that the Cabinet had agreed in principle to the testing of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile over Canadian territory. However, their criticism also focused on "grave deficiencies" in the Majority Report's analysis and proposals for action. The latter fall far short of the realistic, strong initiatives Canada could take to halt the
headlong race to oblivion." The dissenters advocated a nuclear freeze, no ALCM testing, a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons, which would directly contradict NATO policy, and the devotion of one-tenth of one percent of the defence budget to disarmament efforts, as proposed by the Secretary-General at UNSSOD I. None of the above were incorporated into official policy. Even the Majority Report's recommendations were acted upon only when they conformed to existing policy.

In February 1982, York University's conference on UNSSOD II drew together more than forty experts to deliberate on what Canadian policy should be at the UN forum. Many of the factors that were pertinent in the decision-making behind Canada's UNSSOD II policy were echoed in the discussions. There was not much optimism regarding the potential for success on any of the major issues. As two of the conference organizers noted, the "potential of the major powers to minimize the issues for debate or to use certain issues to gain diplomatic advantage does not bode well."

An interesting outcome of the conference was the categorization of the three attitudinal profiles within Canada regarding arms control. According to their criteria, Prime Minister Trudeau combined perceptual factors and policy proposals from across the spectrum: the "disarmers"' views that linkage was inappropriate for any arms talks; the "moderates"' assessment of UNSSOD II that no substantive developments were possible in the current climate but efforts must be made; and the "sceptical arms controllers"' belief that Canadian policy at UNSSOD II should not endanger national security interests. Official divergences along these lines may be extrapolated from policy statements and bureaucratic postions. The inaction in Canadian arms control up to this point was due, inter alia, to the widespread predilection for the status quo, or to change of an incremental nature only. This natural bureaucratic tendency was exacerbated by the complexity and
unknown ramifications inherent in this issue.

In the period leading up to UNSSOD II there were indications of an evolution in Pierre Trudeau's perceptions of the nuclear world. In the two months prior to the Special Session, the Prime Minister spoke more eloquently and with more clarity on the issue of arms control than he ever had before. It may well be that he was influenced by American statements on nuclear policy. Trudeau's predisposition for rational decision-making may have made him less prone to block out information that required a change in perceptions than the bureaucracy, with its narrowly constrained information inputs and tendency to simplify the complexity of the world.

In an annual review of 1982, Roderick Byers noted that Trudeau's world view was "somewhat at variance with that of his ministers and senior officials."

In May 1982, Trudeau addressed a graduating class at Notre Dame University in Indiana with outspoken fervour about "the need for greater understanding between East and West." While he stressed that the suffocation strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally, he also voiced grave misgivings over the state of arms control. He expressed worry about the deployment of SS-20s in Eastern Europe and "about statements in the United States about the 'survivability' of nuclear war, about 'demonstration explosions' and 'first strike scenarios'."

On June 10, at the NATO summit meeting in Bonn, Trudeau's normal diplomacy disappeared as he characterized the final communique as being "cooked and pre-cooked", full of cliches and "weasel words". He went on to say "there is no exchange, there is no deepening of the consensus within the Alliance....nobody has a chance to say why did you say that? and where did you get this idea? and what makes you think that?" Trudeau lamented the fact that very rigid time constraints allowed no real
communication. In a revealing comment, he noted that "the organization's bureaucracies" imposed "the party line" because they liked the fact that no exchange invariably meant "no chance of discord".\footnote{116}

Despite these manifestations of his growing misgivings with the nuclear world, Trudeau was not yet willing to risk Canadian interests for the doubtful benefits that might accrue from a more activist Canadian arms control policy. As will be shown in Chapter VI, it was not until the fall of 1983 that he was able to reconcile the competing priorities of meeting the challenge posed by the deteriorating superpower relationship and the demands of the Canadian national interest. It is illuminating that his response at that time was personal in nature and bypassed the normal channels of bureaucratic policy-making.

UNSSOD II was held from June 7 to July 10, 1982. The Canadian delegation was made up of the Prime Minister, the Ambassador for Disarmament Arthur Menzies, a variety of civil servants, nineteen parliamentary observers, and fifteen representatives from nongovernmental organizations and universities.\footnote{117} The inclusion of the last two groups reveals that the issue was both more politically salient than in 1978, and that the government was at pains to make it appear that it was more receptive to the concerns of certain elements of the electorate. However, the power to influence policy was not part of the privilege of accompanying the official envoys.

Prime Minister Trudeau's address on June 18 to the assembly was sombre, as he noted that the four years since the last UNSSOD had witnessed "little progress" in arms control.\footnote{118} He reiterated the suffocation strategy but stressed that it had never been "meant to be applied unilaterally", nor was it in competition with current or future negotiations.\footnote{119} The former comment was no doubt in response to the criticisms that had been made
within Canada regarding the government's failure to promote the strategy. The latter comment indicates a recognition of the fact that the major nuclear powers had not supported the main points. In proposing that the strategy be "enfolded into a more general policy of stabilization", Trudeau stressed that the aim of inhibiting the development of new weapons systems should be combined with the West's negotiating goals of "qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels." ¹²⁰ Linking the Canadian strategy with the ongoing superpower arms control negotiations was necessary in order to legitimize the Canadian contribution and assure its acceptance by the United States, as it was crucial that the Americans perceived any Canadian suggestions as complementary to their own efforts. One Canadian analyst saw this as an indication that there was some fear that "the strategy might constitute an overload on....the tenuous understanding between the two superpowers that they will continue with arms control dialogues at all." ¹²¹

In light of future developments, it is interesting to note that the Prime Minister expressed concern over the prospects of "highly destabilizing" anti-satellite or anti-missile laser systems and urged immediate action to foreclose "the prospect of space wars". ¹²² His advisors were obviously well-versed in the potential of some of the new technology. As in 1978, he identified the problem of technological innovation outpacing arms control negotiation. ¹²³

The Prime Minister diplomatically avoided any direct criticism of President Reagan's military buildup with its accompanying huge outlays of capital, but he did subtly criticize any attempts to achieve unilateral security since the only result was "everyone else feeling insecure". ¹²⁴ He urged that the legitimate interests of both sides be considered. "Only measures that increase mutual security are likely to offer a way out of the present
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paralysis. In particular, the two superpowers must start with the recognition that each has strategic interests and the strength to protect those interests." Presenting such an analysis was not without risk, as part of the Reagan rationale was that the Soviet Union was a "pirate" nation and as such had no legitimate rights on the world scene.

Trudeau asserted that the allocation of increased funds in Canada for arms control and disarmament would facilitate full Canadian participation in the international seismic data exchange, which was a crucial part of the international verification regime necessary for a comprehensive test ban treaty. In addition, he promised to substantially increase Canadian research in verification. Canadian expertise in this area offered a viable way of contributing to an effective arms control regime and was in itself a valid effort, yet such work would be all to naught if the superpowers could not first agree on the structure of effective arms control.

There was indirect criticism regarding the verification problems blocking a CTB. "I sometimes wonder whether we realize the immensity of the leap we have made; and whether a certain reluctance in accepting the rigours of verification is not an insufferable anachronism." Another mild but definite rebuke was given as he described the responsibilities of the superpowers. "They must give their undivided attention to negotiations to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weaponry and should not deviate from that central objective by imposing political preconditions."

Despite the change in his rhetoric, there was no indication of a real shift in Trudeau's priorities as he endorsed the continuation of NATO's refusal to embrace a no-first-use policy. He was obviously not swayed by the arguments of four very experienced American statesmen who had earlier advocated a revision of this nuclear strategy. What was different was the rationale he used in an intellectual "end-run" around the implied
threat inherent in NATO's first use of nuclear weapons policy.

However the Charter lays down that there shall be no use of force - any force. This law binds all of us, I can see no need to re-enact the Charter. In fact, I can see enormous pitfalls in trying to diminish the Charter in one of its central affirmations by seeking to set an order of precedence among the various manifestations of the use of force. The real problem before us is how to break the arms spiral.130

As David Cox notes, this "legalistic response" did not address the real issue and was obfuscating in the extreme. He further criticized Trudeau's "foreign policy performance" for the marked "gap between rhetoric and commitment".131

There were a variety of generally negative appraisals of UNSSOD II. Shortly afterwards, William Barton, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN from 1972 to 1980, lauded the international forum for providing an opportunity for the nations of the world "to articulate their desire for peace and to try to agree on mechanisms to negotiate measures of disarmament and arms control."132 But he also noted the limitations caused by both the lack of a common purpose, and a failure to commit resources. The result was a continuation of the arms race as if the Special Session had never happened.133

Less than a month had passed before the External Affairs Minister addressed the failure of UNSSOD II by urging Canadians to "be grateful that it was held at all in spite of an exceedingly unpropitious international atmosphere."134 In highlighting the positive outcomes, he had to resort to praising the fact that the viability of the UN system had been preserved for future deliberations since the nonaligned nations had chosen not to "devalue the system". He maintained that he had hope for the future because "the superpowers themselves want to avoid moving in the direction of nuclear
confrontation and can see their national interests being served by agreements."

It is difficult to interpret the External Affairs Minister's remarks as anything other than wishful thinking. Unanimous support could not be achieved for another Comprehensive Program of Disarmament at the conclusion of UNSSOD II. None of the Canadian proposals won universal support. The lack of any progress since UNSSOD I, the non-appearance of any new initiatives at UNSSOD II, and the exchange of harsh invectives and the failure to communicate on the part of the superpowers at the latter did not bode well. It may have been that Mark MacGuigan was hopeful due to the announcement, made just before UNSSOD II, that the superpowers had agreed to hold strategic arms control talks. It is not known how aware he was of the many existing disagreements about the nature, scope and content of these talks, but a lack of knowledge about these matters may explain his misplaced optimism.

On the other hand, it may have been yet one more attempt on the part of Canadian officials to diffuse bilateral tensions between the North American neighbours. According to Stephen Clarkson, the US had made their displeasure over FIRA, the NEP and the need for concessions in these areas the focus of the relationship.

The problems between the two countries were such that they overshadowed all interaction. After a pattern of conciliatory behavior on the part of Canada, it seemed that at least one member of Trudeau's Cabinet had been pushed too far. In August 1982, Mark MacGuigan briefed reporters in Washington after his meeting with Secretary of State George Schultz. He noted the "particularly large number of stresses" between their two countries and placed most of the blame on the United States. He emphasized that Canada had valid reason to follow its national interests, and asserted
that Canada could not be expected to change its policies and "fundamental orientations" just because different perceptions had arisen in the United States. While this was one of the strongest negative opinions voiced about the chauvinistic attitude that the United States often displayed towards Canada, there was ample evidence that, as in the field of arms control, McGuigan's criticism was rare and not accompanied by any change in policy. As will be examined in the next chapter, the Canadian government was more wont to accede to American policies and perceptions than to challenge them.

In early 1982, Pierre Trudeau asserted that "Canada believes in the importance of ideas and values as influencing the events in the world, rather than in armies and the nuclear forces of the superpowers." This perceptual dilemma was at the heart of the problem that Canada and all like-minded nations faced. Protestations of good intentions and the desire for an end to the spiraling arms race were to no avail as long as the political will to implement substantive arms control policies was lacking on the part of the real players in the nuclear game.

The two UNSSODs and the years in between were characterized by Canadian arms control policies that were, in large part, closely in accord with the demands of the Western Alliance. The Prime Minister did not match his rhetoric with substantive actions, nor did he evoke "public support for his distinctive version of an enlightened foreign policy." The qualitative and quantitative changes in nuclear strategy and weaponry on the part of the United States did not have an obvious impact on Canadian arms control policy. There were some indications that the Prime Minister was trying to come to terms with the demands of being a good ally and his growing perception that the superpower relationship was edging ever closer to a dangerous confrontation. However, they came late in this period and did not
have any apparent impact on actual policy.

The next chapter's examination of the controversy over the decision to test the ALCM reveals the wealth of competing perceptions and priorities that the decision-making elite in Ottawa had to contend with. In addition, it illustrates the difficulty that a country of Canada's status has in balancing vague, albeit well-intentioned notions of participating in the nuclear world in a moderating way, with specific, external demands that may be interpreted as both stabilizing and destabilizing.
On July 15, 1983, after several years of confusing rhetoric, the Secretary of State for External Affairs clarified that Canada had finally agreed to allow the testing of the United States' Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in Canada. The statement was made when Parliament was not in session, but Allan MacEachen's announcement was not unexpected. The deliberately low-key presentation and careful timing typified the government's attitude towards this divisive issue. For as long as possible, the discussions regarding the weapons testing agreement had been kept secret. When information leaked out, the government chose to deny and obfuscate at every turn. Finally, in February 1983, an 'umbrella' testing arrangement was announced. It was very clear then to the informed public that the way had been cleared for ALCM tests in Canada. Many believed that the July 15th announcement merely formalized what had been implicitly decided long before.

The politics behind the decision to test the ALCM are at once bewildering in their complexity and surprisingly clear in their origins. While the Prime Minister and the Department of External Affairs were not eager to involve Canada too closely in the nuclear world, they eventually realized that external considerations made testing the ALCM unavoidable. The Department of National Defence never shared their hesitation, largely because it fully supported the development of Cruise technology, and any part it might have therein. DND's handling of much of the negotiations, the perceptions of alliance demands (vis-a-vis Europe and the United States), the limited avenues for independent Canadian action, and an inability to transcend the nuclear world left the government with no other option than
to assent to the American request.

This chapter will identify the external influences of the strategic environment that led to the request that Canada allow the tests of the ALCM, and the effects of that request on the policy environment within Canada. Both the psychological dilemmas in the decision-making and the structure of the actual policy-making are explored. The necessity of agreeing to the testing of the ALCM exemplifies the difficulty in applying rational/analytical decision-making to the nuclear world.\(^2\) As the policy develops, it is possible to trace Prime Minister Trudeau's evolving recognition of this reality.

The theoretical and structural aspects of the policy-making process will be examined using the framework laid out in Chapter III. The examination of the theoretical aspects looks at the role of rationality in the policy-making and the influence of perceptions in defining pertinent goals. Several decision-making models are used to facilitate an understanding of the impetus behind the various aspects of the policy-making process.

The presentation of the structural aspects focuses on the actual development of the policy and includes an assessment of the various sources of input into the policy process. Thus the respective involvement of the Prime Minister, the Department of External Affairs, the Department of National Defence, the Cabinet, Parliament, public opinion, and the media will all be examined.\(^3\) Economic factors were influential both in terms of general repercussions of a refusal, and the Defence Production Sharing Agreement and the Defence Industry Productivity Programme's partial funding of the contract to build the guidance systems for Cruise missiles.\(^4\) However, the government was careful not to mention economics in any explanation of their decision.\(^5\)

This analysis will show that DND, the Prime Minister, and DEA, in that order, were the most influential elements in the policy process. The Cabinet,
Parliament, public opinion and the media were actors only in the final stages of the policy process, and their impact was felt more by the Prime Minister than by the two bureaucracies. This chapter will also depict the relevant considerations for each locus of decision-making and illuminate why certain compromises were deemed necessary.

The examination of the incremental policy-making will show that for much of the time the only people who knew what was going on were those directly involved. When details did leak out in early March of 1982, negative commentary developed quickly. The immediate response was muted but within a fairly short period of time, both the attentive public and concerned politicians began to focus on the issue.

Any reassessment by the government was limited since they clearly felt that they had no other option than to agree to the testing of the ALCM. Any revision focused more on the level of policy management and presentation than on any real changes in the standard operating procedure (SOP). However, the cumulative effects of the abbreviated scanning of the limited alternatives had a hand in the evolution of the Prime Minister's attitude towards the nuclear world and arms control, and will be detailed below.

The pattern of decision-making shifted with the growing involvement of the Prime Minister, who tried to impose his personal emphasis on rationality onto the policy-making situation. His attempts to infuse the process with an analytical perspective were foiled by contradictory and competitive interpretations of the optimal goals and their acceptable costs, amidst the nonrationality of the nuclear world.
The Multi-Faceted Cruise Missile: Nuclear War-Fighting Weapon, Arms Control Bargaining Chip, or Reassurance for NATO?

The ambiguity of the Cruise missile's impact on the nuclear world is crucial to the arguments both commending and condemning the government's action. It is possible to launch a Cruise missile from air (ALCM), land (GLCM) and sea/submarine (SLCM), but there are important differences in the implications of each platform. The ALCM has been described as stabilizing in that a 'sneak' attack is improbable because large numbers would be seen or heard. Thus Soviet air defence, especially their "look-down, shoot-down" capability, could detect the attack. In addition, their launch platforms are comparatively slow bombers which can be seen by satellites and radar. The GLCMs' deployment with the very fast Pershing II missiles is destabilizing since it poses problems for the Soviets in terms of premature response to ambiguous warnings of attack. In crisis, there would be a serious risk of very early efforts at preemptive suppression of perceived US strategic decapitation abilities on the Pershing II. The SLCMs encapsulate the contradictory, two-edged aspect of the nuclear world. Their hard-to-detect platforms (SSNs) and the extreme difficulty of detecting SLCM launches make them both stabilizing, in terms of guaranteeing a second strike retaliatory force, and destabilizing in that proliferation of such unverifiable weapons enhances command and control decapitation abilities and exacerbates difficulties in arms control. Large scale nuclear SLCMs on forward-based submarines will constitute an important adjunct to the decapitation strike potential in soon-to-be deployed Trident II SLBMs.9

There are numerous questions regarding the meaning of this nuclear weapons system. Is the Cruise missile in any of its three manifestations an essential part of the Reagan goal of negotiating with the Russians from a position of strength? While the accuracy may be more a technological
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evolution than a predetermined development, it can now facilitate extended
deterrence and, in the opinion of some commentators, move nuclear
diplomacy beyond passive deterrence to active intimidation. Was the
ground-launched Cruise missile a proper response to the Soviet deployment
of SS-20s in Europe? Was allowing the testing of the air-launched version
an inherent part of Canada’s responsibilities to NATO, as the Prime Minister
claimed? If the latter were true, the Canadian government’s decision to test
the ALCM was a pragmatic reaction to an unavoidable need to express
tangible support for the Alliance’s attempts to counter the growing Soviet
threat. On the other hand, the small size, radar-evading skills, comparatively
high yield and accuracy of the Cruise make it difficult to verify and a
possible counterforce or war-fighting weapon, two qualities that inhibit arms
control and erode deterrent stability.

The Cruise missile may be a qualitative and destabilizing escalation of
the arms race, and Canadian acquiescence to the tests a direct contradiction
of the government’s expressed interest in a stable strategic balance.

Although deployments of ALCM will undoubtedly enhance
the overall retaliatory capability...such weapons are very
much a potential threat to a stable balance of nuclear power.
Their utility is clear in contingency planning for crisis
preemption strikes, or still worse, premeditated disarming
attack, when used in conjunction with SLBMs, ICBMs and
Europe-based IRBMs.

However, a refusal to allow the testing of the ALCM would not
necessarily modify American plans for deployment. This reality made the
value of a strong stance against the tests uncertain, especially since the
chances of a negative American reaction were very high. Commentary from
1985 reveals that the focal point of the debate remained unresolved.
Refusal to allow the tests could lead to “the very real risk of making
Washington....quite unreceptive to Canadian advice and pressure on other, perhaps more important, issues.\textsuperscript{14}

Cruise technology was developed before a strategic purpose was assigned to it.\textsuperscript{15} Even now the ALCM's strategic role is one of "considerable ambiguity"\textsuperscript{16}. The attributes of the Cruise missile are worthy of attention, since they make the system unlike any other. It is approximately eighteen feet long and more akin to a pilotless aircraft than a ballistic missile. Its TERCOM (Terrain Contour Matching) guidance system is an on-board computer which can correct deviations in flight.\textsuperscript{17} It is very accurate and carries a 200 kiloton warhead.\textsuperscript{18}

According to Richard Betts, "coincidental advances" in turbo-fan engines, small warheads and improved cartography techniques around 1970 made the development of the modern Cruise possible.\textsuperscript{19} However, in the early part of the decade the Cruise program was somewhat directionless and underfinanced.\textsuperscript{20}

The superpowers signed the SALT I treaty in 1972. The Americans' failure to limit Soviet naval Cruise missiles fostered a response that is typical in superpower relations.\textsuperscript{21} Shortly after the SALT I treaty, the Department of Defense requested funds for a Cruise missile development and deployment program.\textsuperscript{22} It was believed in the Pentagon that the USSR would not give up their naval Cruise missiles unless the Americans had an equivalent weapon.\textsuperscript{23} The Cruise missile program was also perceived as having a dual purpose. It could be used as a bargaining chip to limit Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, and as "inexpensive force multipliers" to offset Soviet naval strength.\textsuperscript{24}

Another impetus for the development of the Cruise missile program stemmed from the longstanding belief that the President of the United States had to have a variety of responses to choose from in the event of nuclear
attack. This belief gained momentum with the advent of strategic parity in the early 1970s, which necessitated the development of more flexible options in order to control the escalation of a strategic nuclear exchange. After research by the American defence establishment, National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 was signed by Richard Nixon in January 1974. It called for the formulation of plans "for limited employment options which enable the United States to conduct selected nuclear options."^25 The characteristics of the Cruise missile make it suitable for this policy.

The value of the ALCM increased exponentially when Jimmy Carter cancelled the B-1 bomber in 1977. It offered a perfect means of enhancing the survivability of the aging B-52s, since its technology allowed these platforms to 'stand off' from the target and thus be less vulnerable to sophisticated Soviet air defence.^26 When the Soviet Union refused in SALT II to reduce their ICBMs in order to get concessions on American Cruise missiles, the Americans saw the Cruise as a means both to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in ICBMs and to demonstrate to "domestic and foreign audiences that the US had a 'counter' to the Soviet advantage."^27 Thus deployment went ahead, prompted by "strategic logic...[and]...the politics of perception."^28

In July 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger issued a new Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP-82) which was used to develop a new Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP) for the American strategic arsenal. The choices under this SIOP included Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs). They would, respectively, allow "the selective destruction of fixed enemy military or industrial targets", and the destruction of "the leading elements of an attacking force."^29 The Cruise missile's attributes made it the ideal perpetrator of these particular nuclear weapons employment plans.
NSDM-242 had stressed that "the fundamental mission of US nuclear forces is to deter nuclear war and plans for the employment of US nuclear forces would support this mission." The development and deployment of the various versions of the Cruise, in tandem with the planned modernization of the US strategic forces, was accompanied by American rhetoric about the possibilities of limited nuclear war fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war. It all must have appeared extremely provocative to the Soviet Union.

In 1983, the Pentagon's plans included the deployment of about 3000 ALCMs on bases across the US, 4000 SLCMs on ships and submarines, and 464 GLCMs in Europe. In the same year, it was proposed that there be a temporary moratorium until the new advanced Cruise, with far greater range, reduced radar detectability, greater maneuverability and accuracy, was ready. The story of the Cruise missile is a common one in the nuclear world. A technological development leads to a new weapon, which affects the strategic reality. Some response is deemed necessary, so the weapon is often incorporated into doctrine and force planning. The resulting political and military perceptions create and perpetuate the value of the new weapon.

An essential aspect of the Canadian government's rationale for testing the ALCM was that it was part of Canada's responsibilities to NATO. This linkage was best explained by the Department of National Defence. In their words, "NATO strategy is to preserve security through deterrence." Such deterrence requires a clear commitment to common defence "through close political and strategic coordination among its members". For deterrence to work, conventional forces, nuclear forces based in Europe and intercontinental strategic nuclear forces based in the United States must be "inalienably joined". Therefore, a contribution to any element of the
"triad" is a contribution to the total security of the West.\textsuperscript{35}

The linkage between testing the ALCM in Canada and European alliance commitments was not so well explained by Prime Minister Trudeau or the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA). They insisted on linking possible success in the INF negotiations with the termination of Canada's responsibility to test the ALCM.\textsuperscript{36} It was never clearly explained why a change in the situation of the GLCMs in Europe would affect Canadian testing, when the ALCM was part of the North American Strategic Air Command (SAC) and not affected by any INF arms control. In fact, this purported connection was illusory considering their disparate strategic roles.

However, the relationship between the GLCM and the American nuclear arsenal was much clearer. The political need for a visible link between the US and Europe was expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. He feared that the advent of strategic parity between the superpowers meant that the US would not risk its own incineration over Europe, and thus Europe was vulnerable to the threat of nuclear blackmail from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{37} The Soviet deployment of the MIRVed, mobile, and very accurate SS-20s added fuel to such fears.\textsuperscript{38}

In 1979, NATO decided on a "Two Track" policy. The INF deployment was planned as both a means of reassurance to the Europeans and a warning to the Soviets.\textsuperscript{39} At the same time, arms control negotiations were proposed in order that the Cruise and Pershing IIIs might be used as bargaining chips to get reductions in Soviet weaponry.\textsuperscript{40}

When NATO made the decision to pursue both arms control negotiations and the INF deployment, it was assumed that negotiations would begin as soon as possible, especially since past experience in arms control had shown that such deliberations were often ponderous. However, the INF talks did not even begin until November 30, 1981, which left just
two years until the scheduled deployment.

In order to understand why Canada agreed to the testing of the ALCM by citing the need to reassure NATO, it is necessary to gain some familiarity with NATO's "Two Track" decision. As noted, a major problem lies in the rationale for this policy choice. Since Europe is armed with tactical and theatre-based weapons, and long-range SLBMs, the imbalance created by the SS-20s is only meaningful in military terms if the US refuses to treat a conventional Soviet attack on Europe as an attack on themselves. That would require the Soviet Union to gamble that Europe is not an integral part of American security. The primary use of the INF deployment is psychological, both in terms of easing European fears about the decoupling of their security from the American nuclear guarantee, and in the sending of a clear message to the Soviet Union that arms control must proceed on American terms, if the threat to the Soviet Union was to be contained.

The disparities in the respective assessments of NATO and Soviet INF strength were due to their different geostrategic concerns, force structures, and ideological views of each other's goals. The resulting subjective interpretation of the balance of strategic forces led to threatening perceptions for both sides.

The many reasons for the INF deployment and the testing of the ALCM confused a clear analysis of the pertinent factors and any accompanying assessment of their merits. Some of the more commonly cited justifications for the INF deployment have been noted earlier. Others range from the potential value of the counterforce INF missiles in strategic warfighting terms, to the advantages inherent in any deployment that forces the Soviet Union to build expensive defences.

There are distinct differences in strategic purpose between the Cruise missile destined to be deployed in Europe and the version that was to be
tested in Canada. While potentially more warranted in the political sense, the GLCM deployment in Western Europe was destabilizing. The pressure on the Soviets to preempt in crisis could only be increased given the poor survivability of the GLCM force. ALCMs are not quite as damaging to crisis instability and arms race instability as are Tomahawk missiles in either GLCM or SLCM modes because they are based in North America on accountable 'platforms'. The Canadian government's insistence on linking the NATO GLCM and the SAC ALCM added much unnecessary confusion to the debate over testing in Canada, especially since the 1983 deployments in Europe would precede the 1984 tests.

Canada's involvement with the ALCM tests was due in part to geopolitical realities. As with the DEW Line and NORAD, the suitability of Canada's territory made involvement all too natural. In this case, both the position and the nature of Canadian territory made it especially appropriate. As well, the fact that SAC had assigned the ALCM to the defence of North America made Canadian involvement strategically sensible.

The government's 'carelessness' with the crucial facts regarding the reasons why Canada was going to allow the ALCM tests obfuscated the debate and inhibited clearheaded criticism. The confusion and controversy within the political sphere was repeated in the general public. There were those in the country who believed that the tests and all that they signified enhanced the chance the Cruise missile would be used. They were, of course, diametrically opposed to those who believed that tests and modernization ensured a stable deterrence and that any weakness in the alliance was detrimental to the security of all. The role of perceptions, and the resulting impression of a rational policy, were of great importance to this debate.
Theoretical Aspects of the ALCM Testing Policy: An Analysis of Decision-making

The relevant factors that had to be considered regarding the Cruise missile were enough to daunt any policy-maker. The impact both in terms of the strategic balance and the INF situation, the need to support NATO's "Two Track" decision, the troubled bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States, and the difficulty in managing the public protest against Canada's involvement were some of the considerations for the policy-makers. Each of these issues will be discussed in detail below.

The history of bilateral defence policy decision-making between the two countries facilitated a decision-making process that may best be described using the cybernetic paradigm, since much of the complexity in the decision-making was made tolerable by the use of standard operating procedures. John Steinbruner's cybernetic paradigm is applicable in several ways, especially since it describes the narrowly constrained range of the potential policy decisions perceived by the Canadian decision-makers. For instance, only information that arrived from an acceptable source was considered. The pre-programmed standard operating patterns were activated with little assessment of the potential uniqueness of this situation, and were not changed until a major crisis forced adjustment. Even then, the policy change was limited to incremental shifts. Bureaucratic politics, with its vested interests vying for power and achievement, was more responsible for these changes than any deliberate outcome evaluation by the decision-maker.46

The manner in which the many competing demands were dealt with is best explained with reference to cognitive theory. Cognitive theory is used by Steinbruner to enhance the applicability of the cybernetic paradigm.
Since simplicity and stability are essential to the functioning of the human mind, unconscious processes act at all times to ensure that these goals are met. Once major belief systems are established, information and empirical evidence that may challenge them are rigorously filtered out so as not to cause inconsistency.\textsuperscript{47}

The psychologically negative results from uncertainty in the decision-making on Canadian ALCM policy were alleviated by ignoring information which did not fit in with the established perceptions of the Soviet Union and alliance responsibilities. Any major restructuring of values and beliefs was opposed. According to cognitive theory, there would have been a general tendency to see the decision-making problems in simple terms, facilitated by severely restricting the conceptualization of values and possible outcomes.\textsuperscript{48} The use of negative images, a powerful tool in cognitive management, was influential in negating the consideration of an alternative policy to ALCM testing. The government gave dire warnings about the consequences for alliance unity and any continued sheltering under the nuclear umbrella if the tests were not agreed to by Canada.\textsuperscript{49}

The Cruise missile's controversial nature, and the interplay of bureaucratic politics within Canada, enhanced the variety of interpretations regarding its implications.\textsuperscript{50} A cybernetic approach to the controversial issues limited the impact of the diverse interpretations within the policy process and ensured that the cognitive principles of simplicity and consistency were maintained. The confusion arose when the narrowly constrained information feedback channels became overloaded. As different groups within the policy process acted according to different perceptions and schedules, numerous contradictory and nonsequential messages went back into the system and out to the public. The political scrutiny and public attention forced a revision of policy, but only at the level of policy
management.

Amitai Etzioni's model is applicable in some measure here as he notes that a fundamental policy review can be caused by, inter alia, "prolonged neglect" or "mistaken treatment of a problem". The first condition was met when the government's unwillingness to finalize the policy on the tests resulted in a lengthy period of indecision and societal confusion. Differing perceptions of the strategic and policy arenas resulted in a variety of different definitions of the best policy, and how to pursue it. The second factor arose when the government gave contradictory rationales for Canada's involvement in ALCM testing.

Bureaucratic politics were ensured due to the involvement of both DND and DEA, with their different priorities and functions. The Department of National Defence's close involvement with the "transgovernmental" authority of Strategic Air Command in issues regarding North American defence further enhanced the interplay of bureaucratic politics. Graham Allison's model states that the players who lead the various organizations act according to diverse perceptions of "national, organizational, and personal goals, making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pushing and hauling that is politics."

Cruise technology caused inherent perceptual problems in that it is possible, as noted earlier, to interpret it as either a destabilizing innovation or a fortuitous and appropriate development. Not surprisingly, there were vacillations and differences regarding why the ALCM should be tested in Canada. The nature of the Soviet threat, the proper approach to arms control, and the use of weapons as bargaining chips were all issues of contention.

DND's publicly distributed information in support of testing included a selective, skewed and very menacing description of Soviet capabilities, but it
neglected to point out that the Soviet Cruise did not have the revolutionary TERCOM guidance system.\textsuperscript{54} The DEA literature did not gloss over the threat imposed by the SS-20s, but stressed that the tests were an alliance responsibility since the "Two Track" decision was the answer to fears expressed by "several Western European governments."\textsuperscript{55}

The differences in their particular frames of reference may be seen in the "background notes" that each department published with regard to the ALCM tests. The reasons given for the government's linkage of the ALCM and the GLCM is much more coherently explained in the DND paper, while the DEA paper makes little attempt to clarify the connection, although that issue was an ongoing source of contention.\textsuperscript{56} While they each described Canadian security policy in similar terms, their differing priorities were indicated when DEA's addendum to the goal of "working for the peaceful settlement of disputes" was excluded by DND. DEA asserted that this priority should include working for "the removal of the underlying political, economic and social causes of international tension."\textsuperscript{57}

Paul McRae was one of the few Liberal MPs who was publicly very concerned about ALCM testing. In May of 1983, after much interaction with the two departments, he was forced to conclude that the vast majority of the information and analysis used by DND and DEA on arms control and strategic thinking was either from the Pentagon or the Pentagon via NATO.\textsuperscript{58} This perceptual bias of the Canadian Departments both facilitated their support for the American request and encouraged premature cognitive closure, which Robert Jervis identifies as a major cause of institutional inertia.\textsuperscript{59}

Disjointed incrementalism characterized the policy process in the first years of discussions and negotiations, as slow but steady progress was made on the issue of ALCM tests in Canada. The military, the primary actors during these first years, proceeded on a bilateral level using a SOP that led to
the development of the policy as they saw fit.\textsuperscript{60} That standard operating procedure resulted in the Cruise testing negotiations being handled in a manner similar to those that resulted in the DEW Line and NORAD. In those two instances of policy-making, both Parliament and the Department of External Affairs had been largely excluded in the bilateral military planning.\textsuperscript{61} The SOP was dependent on geopolitical perceptions of reality and a belief that the ALCM tests were merely a more sophisticated aspect of the tradition of North American joint defence.

The fact that the initial negotiations were restricted to the military bureaucracy in Canada and the US raises some interesting points regarding the control exercised by this group of decision-makers. Their longstanding tradition of bilateral cooperation was based on a commitment to similar ideals and goals, aided by harmony in their perceptions of the Soviet threat and the optimal response. Whether the Canadian military felt more of an alliance to their opposites in Strategic Air Command than to the comparatively uninformed politicians at home is a moot point. Major General Roy Sturgess has described the relationship between the two military forces in a most illuminating way.

\begin{quote}
We continually work with our American brethren....We have developed essentially a corporate interface with U.S. commanders, and our relationship with the air force is probably the closest. Regardless of the ups and downs in the political relationship, the military just grinds along.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

Comprehensive analytical behavior is most unlikely in decision-making, due to a number of factors.\textsuperscript{63} In the specific instance of the ALCM testing policy, such an ideal process was hampered by a variety of limitations.

The Prime Minister saw a rational foundation for the testing policy as a worthy goal, but there were inherent complications that he could not
reconcile. How could the decision to allow the testing of the ALCM be made using an analytical process when the rationale for its strategic value was ambiguous and subjective? Its very existence was due more to technological momentum and bureaucratic politics than political need or strategic necessity.

It was impossible to process and weigh all of the pertinent information, even if the barriers of cognitive restrictions could have been removed. Instead of goals, the Prime Minister was faced with a choice of narrowly constrained behavior alternatives. Any calculation of the possible policy outcome was confused by the contradictory reasons given for the deployment of the GLCM and the tests of the ALCM. Limited value integration was impossible for these reasons, as well as the nature of the different and conflicting values involved and the restraints imposed on decision-making by the nonrational nuclear world.

The added element of nonrationality in the foreign policy arena further stymied Trudeau's efforts. Miriam Steiner notes that in the nonrationalistic world, "[a]mbiguity and paradox are not puzzles that can be solved once and for all; they are part of 'the nature of things'." Nonrationality is especially applicable in describing the nuclear world, with its deceptive appearances, incomplete information, unprovable propositions and misleading ambiguities.

Trudeau emphasized the tests as part of Canada's responsibility to the NATO alliance. "The Cruise missile is intended to form part of the deterrent forces upon which North America and other NATO countries depend for security. A unilateral move on Canada's part to prevent testing of the Cruise missile in Canada would prejudice our obligations to the NATO Alliance and, moreover, would do nothing to further disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union."
Trudeau’s apparent need to resolve a number of value conflicts would not be shared by the cybernetic decision-maker, since the latter oscillates between two or more demands in singleminded pursuit of each. The political considerations and potential economic costs of refusal, the implications of the Cruise missile in strategic terms and for arms control, and the need to manage the domestic audience resulted in diverse considerations for Trudeau and difficulties in meeting all demands. The cybernetic decision-maker, on the other hand, does not heed value conflicts between competing objectives. Instead, he breaks such problems into separate decision processes and operates at any one time solely in terms of a single objective with a single expected outcome.

Due to the manner and length of the policy process, it may be accurate to hypothesize that Pierre Trudeau and the Department of External Affairs used cognitive dissonance in a post-decisional context. They rearranged their beliefs to support and coincide with their actions after the policy was established. The Department of National Defence used cognitive closure before and during the process in that they restricted information to only that which would support their established view.

The Federal government agreed to allow the testing of the ALCM due to a number of divergent considerations. The influential factors in the decision-making process included actual and perceived pressure from the US and the European allies respectively, the need to maintain the status quo in strategic perceptions, problems of insufficient independent analysis, and the fact that the policy itself was made incrementally.

Structural Aspects of the Decision to Test the ALCM: An Analysis of Policy-Making

A number of the structural aspects behind this policy process made
acceptance of the American request the most likely course of action for the Canadian government. Factors that led to a hospitable policy environment for the ALCM tests included the need to avoid anything that would make the very poor bilateral relations between Canada and the US any worse. Trade-offs, compromises and rearranged priorities were required due to bureaucratic politics, extraneous political considerations, and the nebulous strategic implications involved in this issue. The belief that Canadian testing of the ALCM could be used as a means to gain influence in other areas that the Prime Minister viewed as valuable was not seen as a consideration by DND or DEA.

How the respective decision-makers defined the goals of the policy depended on their priorities, and the constraints imposed by bounded rationality. An avid proponent of the status quo or limited incremental policy moves would advocate limiting or avoiding possible negative repercussions by satisficing US demands and Alliance needs.

As Miriam Steiner points out, bounded rationality can lead to a "negative form of satisficing, which assigns priority to the avoidance of errors as opposed to the achievement of positive goals." Many of the different participants in the policy process wanted to maintain or enhance Canadian influence and prestige, both internally and externally, yet they advocated different ways of doing so. Negative interpretations of the impact of Cruise missiles made it difficult to both allay public fears, and portray the agreement to test the ALCM as the best policy choice.

This section will evaluate the input of the various bureaucratic sources of influence, especially that of the Department of National Defence and the Department of External Affairs. The influence of the Cabinet, Parliament, the media, public opinion and certain economic factors will be noted where appropriate. Several external events that may have influenced
the context in which the policy was considered will be mentioned. The growing involvement of the Prime Minister is examined in further detail in the next section, which is devoted to a perusal of the incompatibility of his analytical style of policy-making and the nuclear world.

Since many in the Canadian government considered the testing of weapons the military's area of expertise, their handling of the policy seemed appropriate. The politicians did get involved once much of the groundwork had been laid, although it is likely that this was initially prompted more by protocol than a belief that this agreement merited special attention. When it became obvious that the political fallout was potentially dangerous, the Department of External Affairs and the Prime Minister assumed more authority.

Much of the information regarding the evolution of the policy process was not generally known until mid-1983, when DND released a memo on "The Historic Rationale for the US Request". Many of the more revealing details did not emerge until 1984 when The Montreal Gazette obtained more than 500 pages of Cruise-related documentation under the Access to Information Act.79 The news story in the Gazette accurately describes much of the policy management as a deliberate "plan to shape public opinion and defuse opposition...[via]...a tightly coordinated public relations strategy."80 The chronological process depicted below indicates how advanced the policy was before Parliament or the Canadian public was even aware of its existence.

In August 1978, research and development officials of the US and Canadian defence departments met to discuss the possibility of cooperating on testing the ALCM in Canada, as its climate and geography were better-suited than in the US.81 Subsequent meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense discussed the actual testing arrangements.82 In late 1979,
SAC formally presented DND with the first testing proposal. A year later, the Pentagon's senior scientist, Dr. William Perry, mentioned to the press that Canada could provide useful testing space.  

In August 1980, the DND Director of Continental Policy wrote a memo that indicates the care with which the policy was developed. He recommended that the American request to test the ALCM in Canada be dealt with separately from the overall testing agreement since the "potential benefits to Canada are not so clear." A few days later, a senior research and development official in DND cabled the Pentagon to urge substantial revisions to the proposed overall testing agreement to "make clear the benefits to Canada."  

In the fall of 1980, President Jimmy Carter approached the Canadian government with a formal proposal. By this time, DND was aware "that politically sensitive issues would undoubtedly occur in this program." The Pentagon thoughtfully offered to brief any "skeptical individuals...within other Canadian government agencies", if the need arose. On April 15, 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger visited Ottawa and presented the ALCM testing request to the Minister for National Defence (MND), Gilles Lamontagne.  

In October 1981, the more powerful Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, chaired by the Prime Minister, discussed the issue and approved the negotiation of a framework for a weapons testing arrangement. Nothing is known about the content of these discussions, or whether the Cabinet was divided at this early date over the wisdom of allowing the testing of the ALCM. The priority of maintaining good relations with Washington was a major consideration in this preliminary decision. It is interesting, although not surprising, that
Parliament was not involved at all in the policy-making until much later in the process.

In December of 1981, newly-elected President Ronald Reagan wrote the Prime Minister proposing that the ALCM be tested under the framework arrangement. Reagan had made clear both in his campaign and by some statements and policy decisions early in his presidency that he was determined to shift the course of American nuclear politics. Both his open animosity to the Soviet Union and his avowed dedication to expanding and modernizing the US strategic arsenal were clear indications that he would brook no interference from the Western allies vis-a-vis his handling of the Soviet Union.94

If viewed solely in terms of the many issues of outstanding concern between Canada and the US, and the importance that Reagan attached to the upgrading of American nuclear weapons, the Prime Minister’s response was the most rational choice. He suggested that the SSEA "negotiate and conclude" an agreement in principle.95

In March 1982, after a leak from the Pentagon, the news about the secret negotiations on Canada’s testing of the ALCM was published.96 Shortly thereafter, the Department of External Affairs sent cables to Canadian embassies outlining the appropriate response to any assertions that the tests would contradict the Prime Minister’s strategy of suffocation.97

The newspaper story coincided with the SCEAND hearings on security and disarmament. Prior to the revelations about the cruise negotiations, the Minister for National Defence Gilles Lamontagne had told SCEAND that there was no inconsistency between "contributions to the maintenance of the Western Alliance of forces sufficient to deter aggression, and if necessary, to defend the NATO area" and "our commitment to a vigorous arms control policy."98 Tory MP Douglas Roche subsequently accused both the MND and
the SSEA "of deceiving the Standing Committee" with an edited presentation of the government's arms control goals, since they had excluded the Prime Minister's call in 1978 for a ban on the flight testing of new delivery systems. He also mentioned that Litton Systems Canada had received a government subsidy to build a part for the Cruise but he did not explore the potential ramifications this might have on the policy environment for the ALCM testing decision.99

On April 2 1982, both the SCEAND Majority and Minority Reports were tabled. The split had been caused by divergences of opinion on a number of issues. The revelation of the ALCM testing negotiations further exacerbated the debate over the best way for Canada to promote arms control. The Majority Report addressed the ALCM controversy in an elliptical way by urging that a ban on flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles be included in the strategic arms negotiations. They did not think Canada should act unilaterally in this matter.100 The Minority Report was characteristically more outspoken and described the Cruise missile as "patently attack-oriented" and said that Canada was risking "its credibility as a voice for peace" by allowing tests.101

The government was determined to keep the forces opposing the tests as off balance as possible and it was most unwilling to state clearly just how advanced the decision-making process was. However, it seems as if not all members of the government understood this policy of deception.

Shortly after the newspaper story came out about the ongoing negotiations, Mark MacGuigan defended the missile testing as Canada's responsibility to NATO.102 In response to a query from the NDP in April of 1982, the External Affairs Minister told the House that the negotiations were continuing for "a framework agreement under which various kinds of arms tests will be able to be established under joint Canadian-US control, tests
which may take place on Canadian territory”. He claimed that the “sub-agreement....which would authorize tests of the Cruise Missile....will not be going forward....before UNSSOD II.”103 A few days later he told the House that Cabinet had accepted President Carter's request to test the ALCM.104 His honesty was not appreciated by Trudeau, who later termed the SSEA's comments mistakes or misunderstandings, after he had replaced him with Allan MacEachen in September 1982.105

The divisions within the country over the possibility of ALCM tests escalated with public protests in April and May.106 The NDP proposed five motions in the House of Commons that ALCM tests be refused but these demonstrations did little more than show that there was opposition.107 They certainly did not moderate the government's behavior, although the protests prompted the government to take more care in its management of the issue.

The government was not forthcoming about the possible directions of the policy, which was an astute move politically because the opposition was put in the situation of fighting with shadows. In late April, the Prime Minister was asked whether he had decided if the ALCM application under the umbrella testing agreement would be accepted. Trudeau knew full well that the opposition could not rally the general public without a definite commitment on the part of the government. Procrastination and obfuscation could only benefit the government as it would give them more time to convince the public of the wisdom of their final policy choice. It would also ensure that a certain proportion of the public would grow weary of the issue and thus when the actual decision was announced, it would be 'old news' and no longer as controversial. Deftly avoiding the actual question, Trudeau replied:

We have enough real questions to deal with that we have
not decided in advance that if an application were made we would necessarily agree...The United States is now developing a mode of defence that is meant to be an answer to...the 300 newly deployed SS-20s of the Soviet Union...But I concede right away that this is the direction, and...the reason, I presume, why the United States wants us to get on with the umbrella agreement.¹⁰⁸

The Prime Minister's management of the decision-making regarding the testing policy was hampered throughout by external developments.¹⁰⁹ Due to the leak from the Pentagon, the government was forced to deal with the issue long before they had planned. In October 1982, with a similar lack of regard for the Canadian government's obvious desire to keep as much information as possible from the public realm, the US Department of Defense announced that the six month old talks regarding the ALCM tests were finished. With little diplomatic forethought, they added that Washington was awaiting Canada's final assent and the signing of the agreement was expected within weeks.¹¹⁰ It is not known whether these were deliberate attempts to precipitate a Canadian decision, but they certainly complicated the handling of the policy process.

Despite an assertion by the SSEA in late October that public demonstrations would not halt Cruise testing, the concerned public continued its efforts to influence the government.¹¹¹ While the general electorate was not yet actively protesting the possibility of ALCM tests in Canada, the peace movement and other informed members of the public were taking action. In November 1982, 15,000 people demonstrated in Ottawa against the Cruise tests, and there were other protest rallies across the country.¹¹²

Just as the minimal information which filtered out to the public made analysis and an appropriate response difficult, the Parliamentary debate on this contentious issue was hampered by the fact that there was limited communication of the pertinent details. The Liberals skilfully deflected
criticism by responding with erroneous or misleading replies. During much of the policy debate within the House of Commons, the Prime Minister showed his clear disdain for those who disagreed with him. He used tactics that were at worst, very close to being misrepresentations of the truth, and, at best, misleading and uncooperative. It is unclear whether his handling of the issue was due to the arrogance that many have criticized him for, or a belief that his use of the testing to further other policy goals would be undermined by the opposition's involvement.\textsuperscript{113}

In January of 1983, public opinion was against the tests, with 52% opposed and 37% in favour.\textsuperscript{114} If the government could get the support of the 11% that did not express an opinion, and win over some of the opposition, a majority of the Canadian population would be in support of their decision. Apparently, this is exactly what they set out to do, with careful management of the revelations concerning the policy and the active involvement of the Prime Minister when he believed the potential results merited the effort. As Nossal notes, as long as the division within society on the cruise issue continued, and undercut the electorate's potential power, the government could "rationalize its choice."\textsuperscript{115}

By this time, refusing to allow the tests was not an option, even if that had been the government's wish.\textsuperscript{116} An internal DEA memo in early February stated that "a negative decision now would have much more negative consequences than it would have had 15 months ago" and raised the spectre of an economic backlash if the agreement did not go ahead\textsuperscript{117}

On February 10, 1983, SSEA Allan MacEachen and MND Gilles Lamontagne announced the "Agreement with the United States of America on Test and Evaluation of US Defense Systems in Canada". The undertakings in accordance with this agreement were to be known as "The Canada/US Test and Evaluation Program" or CANUSTEP.\textsuperscript{118} Their joint statement was a
deliberate public relations effort to emphasize that the agreement had a dual value both as defence and foreign policy. The agreement did not commit Canada to test the ALCM. In fact, a DEA press release specified that Canada could refuse any proposal made under the so-called umbrella accord. However, the press release added that a formal proposal to test the ALCM was expected and carefully explained that "such testing is linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament".

During the next few months there was continued agitation both within the House on the part of the NDP and within the segment of the populace that was concerned about the negative implications of the cruise missile. The government continued its careful management of the policy process, with its major focus being the alleviation of concerns regarding the reasons for the tests. However, the confusion remained about whether or not the government would irrevocably commit Canada to the testing of the ALCM. This was due in large part to the Prime Minister's claims that Canadian acquiescence depended on American arms control behavior.

Since the initial justification had been that the tests were Canada's duty to the Alliance, the attempt to use them as a Canadian bargaining chip seemed strangely at odds with previous policy. The Prime Minister was probably very much aware that Canada had to allow the ALCM tests, or risk grave consequences. The attempt at linkage never had a chance, since the Americans knew the Canadians were bluffing. His last minute attempt to use his agreement to the testing request as leverage may have been Trudeau's way of making the best of a bad situation. In any case, it was a symbolic gesture since the Americans were not prone to accepting external modifications of their arms control stance.

The Prime Minister had several meetings with Vice President George
Bush in March and April. It is unknown whether he actually thought that he could influence the United States, especially in light of the hostile attitude expressed by the Reagan administration to arms control and the Soviet Union. It would be in character for the Prime Minister to believe that a rational argument could moderate the American position but he could not have been unaware of the odds against changing their perceptions vis a vis the need for decisive action against the SS-20s. His behavior must have appeared somewhat confused to Bush, since Trudeau told him that "[y]ou may get some benefit from our testing the Cruise if we do, but it is not to help you; it is because the Europeans have asked us to do this for them." However, the Vice-President was surely aware that the European governments had made no formal request, although it is safe to assume that they expected this minimal contribution from Canada. Bush may not have realized the domestic political impetus behind the Prime Minister's comments, since he expressed uncertainty over the reasons for anti-Cruise agitation in Canada.

In both late March and early June, the Prime Minister told Parliament that progress in Geneva would affect the decision to test the ALCM. As was later pointed out by the NDP, the mid-July announcement of the testing agreement did not allow time for any fair assessment of the talks. However, the Prime Minister's remarks served their purpose in that they misled the public that there was a chance that the tests would not be agreed to. If they were, the Prime Minister seemed to be saying, it was really much more due to external forces over which Canada had little control than any desire on the part of the government to be involved with the Cruise missile. The curious linking of the INF negotiations with the ALCM was made with the obvious purpose of political management.

The government mustered a variety of sources and reasons in its
defence of ALCM tests. In March 1983, Gilles Lamontagne wrote a letter to all MPs and senators regarding an acceptance by Canada of the ALCM tests. He asserted that they "will help to ensure that the Cruise missile can do what it is claimed to be capable of doing: that this element of the NATO deterrent is, in short, credible." He appealed to Canada's traditional loyalty to its European allies when he noted that "the flight-testing...would be a modest but important demonstration of our will to act in concert with our NATO allies for a common cause." He also indicated the larger ramifications of the tests when he asserted that Canada "must be prepared to accept the responsibilities as well as the benefits that flow from this partnership." 

In May, the MND announced he was launching an information campaign to counter the efforts of the anti-cruise forces. 

On May 9 1983, in a move almost unprecedented in his political career, the Prime Minister sent an "Open Letter "to all Canadians, which was published in the major newspapers across the country. In it he carefully explained his reasons for the government's involvement with the ALCM. It was an astute political move because the one-sided nature of the communication allowed him to structure his comments as he saw fit, without the need to deal with any rebuttals.

In fact, much of the letter was more manipulation than a true representation of the actual debate. Trudeau asserted that the Canadian protesters were anti-American and hypocritical since they were not protesting against the SS-20s. He said they were willing to shelter under the American nuclear deterrent, but were not responsible enough to bear any of the burden. He neglected to point out that it was the whole concept of the ever-escalating arms race and the destabilizing aspects of the Cruise missile that the protesters were condemning. It was a similar distortion to say the protesters were anti-American since there were many activists in the US
who were agitating against the nuclear politics of their government. As Liberal MP Paul McRae wrote in a reply to the Prime Minister, the notion of a bilateral freeze had been supported in the American Congress. However, the Prime Minister was no doubt aware that the President was strongly opposed to a freeze.

The day after his Open Letter, Trudeau responded to Ed Broadbent's criticisms by repeating to the House that the government had no position on Cruise missile testing. "There is no support for the testing of the Cruise. It has not been asked of us and therefore we haven't given an answer."

While that may have been technically accurate, it merely avoided the larger issue and was indicative of the Prime Minister's disregard for the legitimacy of parliamentary comment and its involvement in policy-making.

On June 14, 1983, the day after the Americans formally requested permission to test the ALCM under the CANUSTEP agreement, there was much debate in Parliament and a vote was taken after the leader of the NDP introduced a non-confidence motion. The vote was 213-34 not to oppose tests. However, as the former Conservative SSEA stated, the actual CANUSTEP agreement was "never examined because it has not been referred to Parliament, it has not been debated in Parliament or Committee, [and] we have no access to it in this way."

In late June 1983, public opinion was proving receptive to the Liberals' management of the cruise testing controversy. In comparison to six months earlier, the opposition had dropped to 44%, while the approval rating had climbed to 48%. Only 8% expressed no opinion. Although their numbers had declined, those who opposed the tests rose to meet the challenge of the government's final policy decision with ingenuity and determination.

On July 15, 1983, the SSEA and the MND announced the signing of the
agreement to test the ALCM, which would allow four to six test flights over a five year period starting January 1984. SSEA MacEachen said that the most important factor in approving the tests was "the security of Canada and the peace of the world". Once again the link with the INF arms control talks was made: Ottawa would only review the decision if "substantial, concrete progress" was made in the Geneva negotiations.137

When MacEachen asserted that Canada's democratic freedoms and security are "[i]ndivisible and must not be split off from that of the Western Alliance", he ensured support for the ALCM tests from many people who had hitherto been confused about the details of the controversy. Since many Canadians believed that Alliance unity was of the utmost importance, the case against testing was undermined when he added that Canada could only have an influence on the arms control position of the West by contributing to the security of the Alliance and supporting the Two-Track policy. The lure of influencing the Americans was a clever ploy to reassure those who had trepidations about the real intentions of the US regarding arms control.138

In August of 1983, the Liberals held a so-called "think-tank" meeting on foreign policy. At this meeting, Alan MacEachen reasserted that the decision to test could not be reversed. He claimed that the preservation of Canada's democratic way of life could not be separated from the security of the United States. In a foreshadowing of the rationale for the Prime Minister's peace initiative, he added that the East-West dialogue had to involve more than just the two superpowers. "The other countries, including Canada, ought to be there influencing one and influencing the other in directions which are useful and productive."139

The most influential sources of input into the policy process differed in their justifications for the ALCM tests. The decision-making styles of each grew more complex with the increasing attempts to make the arguments as
sophisticated and universally appealing as possible. DND had encouraged the tests simply as a responsibility to NATO and a necessary reaction to the Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{140} DEA was less prone to emphasize the impetus of the threat than the value of the response.\textsuperscript{141}

When the Prime Minister tried to apply an analytical approach to the ALCM controversy, his rationalizations became quite convoluted. On two separate occasions in early 1982, he claimed that the West must be able to meet the Soviet Union "gun for gun", and urged a recognition of the USSR as a "great power".\textsuperscript{142} His later attempt to use the testing agreement to influence American behavior did not make political sense nor did his tendentious prediction that a Canadian refusal would require withdrawal from NATO.\textsuperscript{143}

These last two incidents were prompted by Trudeau's perceptions of effective policy management, both in terms of his domestic audience and getting the most benefit possible out of testing the ALCM. However, his attempts to moderate the Americans' zero-sum view of the INF situation also indicate that he was unable to accept the reality of Canada's limited power in the nonrational nuclear world. Many Canadians pointed out that his argument that a refusal to test would necessitate withdrawal from NATO was flawed.\textsuperscript{144} The testing arrangement was bilateral and more than a peripheral link between the ALCM and NATO was yet to be established.

\textbf{The Prime Minister and the Cruise Missile: The Difficulties for A Rational Man in the Nuclear World}

Pierre Elliott Trudeau saw the decision to accede to testing as the best possible under the circumstances, especially since he believed the testing might give him leverage to change US policy. He knew that a refusal would be detrimental to Alliance relations and bilateral relations with the United
States. The Prime Minister may have tried to be as rational as possible in his decision-making on the ALCM tests, but his linking of successful INF negotiations with Canada's freedom to refuse ALCM tests showed that his analysis was flawed. From the Pentagon's perspective, ALCM force modernization was a strategic priority that was essential in order to maintain the effectiveness of Strategic Air Command for intercontinental missions. Such modernization was viewed wholly independently of security issues and force deployments in Western Europe.

The Prime Minister's determination to get the most benefit possible out of agreeing to the ALCM tests led to his public hesitation in admitting the likelihood that Canada would allow the testing no matter what the outcome in Geneva. He knew that the policy process was too far advanced, and there was too much at stake, to risk the displeasure of the Americans. Consequently, his attempts to influence the Americans were noteworthy more for their policy management for domestic consumption than by their nonexistent impact on American negotiating terms.

A limited cost/benefit analysis of the ALCM request led the Prime Minister to the conclusion that the tests were valuable in terms of gaining, or maintaining, US and NATO support. Ruptures in both Canada's relations with the United States and Alliance unity would have negative effects on the Canadian economy and, in turn, Trudeau's domestic base of support. The Liberals were already experiencing enough trouble in the polls, as the Conservatives were ahead of them by 25%.145

While the Prime Minister devoted much effort to allaying public opposition, he also procrastinated in meeting that challenge due to other priorities and goals.146 While by no means unimportant, the least immediate of them was the placating of those Canadians who opposed the ALCM testing. That was just one of a number of competing demands that
made compromises necessary. In terms of his perceptions of Cruise missiles, the compromises were facilitated by ignoring or misperceiving some of the negative assessments of their strategic implications.

It may well be that the Prime Minister attempted to confront these value tradeoffs squarely and in so doing found the complexity of the issue overwhelming. In May of 1983, his "Open Letter to all Canadians" revealed his indecision regarding the right measure of morality in perceiving the nuclear world. "It is simplistic to ignore the real, complex and often immoral world to which our moral choices must apply". He said the decision "to join our NATO partners in adopting a policy of strength in reaction to the Soviet Union" was made "not without anguish or full awareness of the risk." He argued that positions that were too complex regarding arms control led to paralysis, while too simple a view led to self-deception. In defending his stance to the leader of the NDP, his analytical approach caused him to attempt a limited value integration regarding the INF deployments. He stated that it was "not illogical to use the possibility of the deployments to get the Soviet Union to withdraw some or all of its SS-20s", but he pointed out that the argument "rests on whether the SS-20s were necessary or whether they are just an escalation by the Soviets." Perceptions in the nuclear world varied according to subjective interpretations of superpower behavior, and Trudeau was apparently not sure that the West's view of the SS-20s was accurate. However, twice in the six months previously, Andropov had proposed reductions in the SS-20s, so Trudeau rationalized that the danger posed by deploying the GLCM and the Pershing II was worth the result for arms control.

A year before, he had been more optimistic and prone to outspoken rhetoric aimed at redirecting US priorities. He took the opportunity of addressing the convocation ceremonies at an American university to urge
that the US moderate its war-like statements and realize that the growing
divisions within the Alliance were due to the superpowers' failure to achieve
progress in arms control. 151

In March 1983, Trudeau was much more circumspect in urging George
Bush to be receptive to the possibility of compromise in Geneva. 152 He was
a master of quiet diplomacy as he stated the obvious. He subsequently told
the House that he had reaffirmed Canada's commitment to the "two-track"
policy whilst pointing out that the zero option might be ideal but
unrealizable. 153 But the Canadians were already on record as supporting
the American stance in Geneva, so they had no means of effectively
pressuring the US to moderate its position. The 'stick' of promising to make
the decision to test the ALCM dependent on the success of the Geneva arms
control negotiations was illusory, since the 'carrot' of maintaining good
alliance relations and support for the US was more for the benefit of Canada
than the US. In addition, the Prime Minister himself had said that "those
who oppose the Cruise testing in Canada are really asking us to renege on a
NATO commitment made by the Europeans to the North American
partners." 154 He certainly could not renege on that commitment himself,
and thus the bluster about linking approval for the tests to progress in
superpower arms negotiations was just that. In saying that he wanted to
find out "who is most responsible" for the lack of progress in arms control
talks, he was playing to the domestic audience that had valid fears about the
loose talk in the US about limited nuclear war. 155

Trudeau later attempted once again to publicly motivate and
moderate the American position on arms control. His changing style may
well have done more harm to his credibility than a more discreet approach.
But such an approach would not have served his domestic need to appear in
control of the ALCM testing decision, or eased his conscience. As well, he had
not had any success in the past with that attitude.

Many external considerations affected the conduct of the Prime Minister in his diplomatic overtures to the United States. He realized there were limits to attempts at leverage. In late April of 1983, Pierre Trudeau went to Washington to meet with the President and George Bush. At the time of his meeting, the main topic of conversation in the American capitol was Reagan's renewed appeal to Congress for more funding to combat communism in Central America.\(^1\) In Ottawa the previous week Trudeau had voiced his objections to US interference in Central America.\(^2\) He had to decide whether to try to sway the US' policy on Central America, the INF talks, or his longstanding goal of a more equitable economic footing for the Third World. Thus it was necessary to engage in priority reshuffling, which led to some interesting management of the Prime Minister's rhetoric.

On April 28 Pierre Trudeau met with Ronald Reagan to plan for the Williamsburg economic summit. Afterwards, Trudeau said that he had urged Reagan to arrange a summit with Andropov because "time is running out not only politically for him and perhaps others but it is running out in terms of the future of humanity."\(^3\) Then the Prime Minister said he believed the Americans were "determined to seek ways to find a lasting peace."\(^4\) The way was cleared for Trudeau to agree to test the ALCM without apparently compromising his arms control priorities. He had somehow determined that it was not the United States that was "most responsible" for the lack of progress in arms control, but he did not divulge how he had reached that decision.

Trudeau believed that enlightened self-interest would lead to the most optimal resolution of the world's problems.\(^5\) The desire to influence the United States and the heads of the NATO alliance at the Williamsburg Summit both in terms of arms control and economic aid to the Third World
helped make the trade-off of allowing the ALCM tests seem like a worthwhile price to pay. The problem was that the tests were not seen in this light by the United States or the other powers. To them Canada was merely fulfilling its alliance duties, not garnering extra credits.

In marked contrast to his diplomatic tone in Washington, the Prime Minister was much more outspoken to the Canadian press about his misgivings and ambivalence towards the US. The contradictory picture that emerges reveals a man torn between a growing realization of his limited influence, and his belief that 'rational' decision-making had to prevail if the survival of humanity were to be ensured.

Two weeks after his return from the US, Trudeau gave a rare personal interview to The Toronto Star, and expressed his disagreement with much of the United States' anti-Soviet policies. In sharp contrast to his Open Letter of a few days previous, with its emphasis on the need to respond to the heavily armed and totalitarian Soviet Union, Trudeau urged a recognition of the USSR as a great power and an acceptance of Soviet spheres of influence. He argued that there was some justification for public fears that President Reagan was warlike or so hostile that he could not be trusted. He criticized the Americans' antagonistic attitude towards their Soviet counterpart, and disagreed with one of Reagan's policy goals: "I do not believe that those in or around the United States administration who think that we can put pressure on the Soviets and assist at the disintegration of the Soviet empire by economic force...are realistic." He termed Reagan administration suggestions that the US could win a nuclear war "pretty absurd...Whether you win or not is, in a sense, secondary. The point is that we want to avoid a nuclear war." With regards to nuclear issues, "the United States should be dialoguing with the Soviet Union and not treating them as a criminal people."
He claimed that most of the European governments were in tune with Canadian perceptions that the Soviet Union merited great power status. Unlike the United States, they believed that the threat from the USSR was restricted to the military sphere, and thus the Soviets should not be treated "as pariahs or outlaws in the world community." 165

Trudeau was accurate in pointing out the different attitudes between the US and the Allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. There had been great dissension within the Alliance over the US decision to embargo the supplies and technology for the construction of the USSR natural gas pipeline to Europe in mid-1982. Widespread economic difficulties coupled with continuing high US interest rates, the ongoing rift between the US and Europe over steel trade, and growing signs of Congressional protectionism did not bode well for Alliance unity. The Prime Minister's decision to allow the testing of the ALCM should be seen against this backdrop, and the developments chronicled below.

In the months leading up to these comments, there were several important developments in the strategic environment. In late March the President had announced plans for his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The apparent willingness of the United States to embark on a costly policy that would both undermine the ABM Treaty, and call into question the existing grounds for deterrence, was yet another indication that the US believed it had the right to act unilaterally in the nuclear world.

It is unknown what the Prime Minister thought of SDI at this time, but he had tried to forestall an arms race in outer space at UNSSOD II. The advent of SDI may have made the ALCM tests seem even more of a necessary price to pay in order to maintain Canadian input in US strategic planning and arms control. However, as Paul Buteux points out, the US has always been dominant in determining nuclear strategy and arms control. In
many cases "alliance consultation has amounted to no more than the United States informing its allies of policies that it wished to undertake and seeking ex post facto endorsement of them." The animosity expressed by the Prime Minister in the Star interview may have been prompted by a growing realization of the limits on Canada's power and his personal influence. In early May, the US Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for Defense told Canadian reporters that Canada was "an essential partner in the Americans' race for military supremacy over the Soviets." Ron Stivers also said that the Soviet Union was too far-advanced to halt the space arms race, and that the US would only consider arms control treaties on space weapons if they were compatible with "national security interests". He said the Prime Minister's suggestion to UNSSOD II for an international treaty to halt the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons had been "well-intentioned but unrealistic."

In mid-May the House of Representatives defence appropriations subcommittee and the Senate appropriations committee voted to free $560 million for development and flight testing of the 10-warhead MX ICBM, after the President had promised to modify US arms control proposals. In an interesting example of the constrained, bounded logics of the nuclear world, Reagan urged support for the MX in order to both upgrade the American arsenal and use it as a bargaining chip to force Soviet concessions in arms control. In lobbying for the MX, Reagan told a group of business executives that it was necessary to build up the American arsenal in order to pressure the Soviets to reduce. The Williamsburg summit took place at the end of May. Although the conference was supposed to be devoted to economic matters, Pierre Trudeau insisted on some consideration being given to arms control issues. He sought a more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union and the final summit
communique included, at Canada's urging, a pledge of the leaders to devote their "full political resources to reducing the threat of war." He had limited success in moderating the rhetoric but realpolitik prevailed in the strategic arena. The Prime Minister's suggestions that the British and French nuclear forces be included in the INF negotiations were not appreciated. In fact, the communique specified that "attempts to divide the West by proposing inclusion of the deterrent forces of the third countries, such as those of France and the United Kingdom, will fail." Trudeau had hoped for a less pointed communique in order to facilitate more constructive discussions with the USSR. But at a press conference on May 30, he described its messages in the best possible light. To Moscow, the message was "there will be deployment in December unless you negotiate seriously." The message to Canadians was that NATO was negotiating for arms control in a serious way.

Immediately after the summit the Prime Minister said he expected "very specific proposals [at Geneva] before the end of December" which would determine the course of the INF deployment and whether Canada would test the ALCM. However, only nineteen days later the US government formally requested Canada's permission to test the ALCM. Since the Americans wanted the first test to take place in early 1984, there was no time to allow for Trudeau's artificial linkage. The ALCM tests were never dependent upon the resolution of the INF discussions, but it had never been so obvious before.

Irving Janis and Leon Mann posit some interesting theories on defensive avoidance and decisional conflict that may be applicable to the Prime Minister's behavior. Prior to the final request to test the ALCM, Trudeau had already used two out of the three forms of defensive avoidance in decision-making. He had procrastinated and shifted the responsibility for
the decision on to external forces that were beyond his control. The need to arrive at a final decision prompted the Prime Minister to engage in bolstering, the final form of defensive avoidance.

Bolstering occurs when the policy-maker has lost hope of finding an altogether satisfactory policy option and is unable to postpone a decision or foist the responsibility for it onto someone else. Instead he commits himself to the least objectionable alternative and proceeds to exaggerate its positive consequences or minimize its negative ones.174

The course of the debate and decision-making in the policy process had an obvious impact on the Prime Minister. Trudeau's failed attempt to apply analytical decision-making to the controversial testing issue encouraged his evolving assessment and growing concerns regarding the nuclear world. A number of reasons have been given as to why it is doubtful that Trudeau could have chosen not to test the ALCM. These limitations were all too apparent when he tried to link the tests with policy options of his choice.

It is doubtful that Canada was even marginally influential regarding the eventual changes in the Americans' INF stance. Trudeau's goals of moderating American involvement in Central America and ensuring the transfer of funds to the underdeveloped world were, respectively, too antithetical and far-removed from the Reagan agenda to be attainable.

In November 1983, a noted Canadian analyst cited a number of factors upon which Canadian influence in Washington depends, including "the availability of other NATO members for joint representations made to the American executive branch". Canada must be willing "to contribute financially towards alternative preferred strategic approaches when they differ from American thinking". In addition, Canada should realize that the domestic interplay within Washington "between the supporters of
unilateralist geopolitical strategies to world politics and the advocates of a coalition-oriented approach to national security" will determine their receptivity to allied concerns.\textsuperscript{175}

The knowledge Pierre Elliott Trudeau gained over the course of this policy process led him to be more out-spoken in his criticism and attempts to influence the Reagan administration. His growing doubts about the rationality of the nuclear world led him to embark on his personal peace initiative, which is examined in the next chapter. Although he did not heed the advice noted above, his great personal self-assurance gave him faith in his ability to inject a modicum of rationality into the escalating animosity in superpower relations.

\textbf{Canada and the ALCM Tests: the Defensive Motivations of the Policy and Their Legacy}

There were many interpretations as to why Trudeau was willing to involve Canada more directly in the machinations of the nuclear world when he had previously prided himself on Canada's aloofness. Many of them share the common theme that this policy decision was motivated by the Canadian government's defensive reaction to a number of perceived threats.

Kim Nossal states that the move was meant "to induce the administration of President Ronald Reagan to abandon its antipathy towards what was seen in Washington as 'economic nationalist' policies introduced after the 1980 elections."\textsuperscript{176} The decision to test the ALCM had a "major symbolic cost" for the Trudeau government, in light of its stated devotion to nuclear arms control. However, there is no indication in the Americans' subsequent behaviour that the policy-makers in Washington saw the agreement as meriting "reciprocal concessionary behaviour."\textsuperscript{177}

Douglas Ross posits that "the perceived need for sustaining credibility
in Washington" best explains the decision. Unfortunately, the policy on the ALCM "partially legitimizes the deployment of an inherently destabilizing weapon technology and contradicts the expressed philosophy behind the strategy of suffocation". But as he points out, "[p]olicy contradictions are frequently the norm for lesser states in alliance with great powers. Influence when it does occur takes place on the margin of the great power's decision-making." 178

The method of the actual policy-making on the decision to allow ALCM testing resulted in incremental moves that eventually led to an irrevocable stance. Richard Gwyn termed the tests the price of "avoiding a diplomatic gaffe". He asserts that in 1981, "the Trudeau government effectively agreed to test the missiles...without...thinking through the consequences." 179 In light of the many issues of bilateral friction around this time, it is not surprising that the policy options were perceived as narrowly constrained.

The desire to influence or gain favour with the US did not mean that the protestations of loyalty to the Alliance were artificial. Canada feared divisions within the Alliance that would leave it without counterweights in its international relations. But it was wary of raising the ire of the Europeans for other reasons as well. A Canadian refusal to test the ALCM would have hurt its credibility within NATO and incurred even more resentment about Canada's supposed shirking of its financial responsibilities. 180

There were other indications that a refusal to test the ALCM would have detrimental consequences for Canada. At a NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in April 1983, Caspar Weinberger and NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns acknowledged Canada's approving of the umbrella agreement as a contribution to NATO solidarity. 181 Any denial of the testing of the ALCM under that umbrella agreement becomes, by inference, a
damaging policy to the Alliance.

Adam Bromke and Kim Nossal are critical of the government's shallow analysis regarding the implications of the ALCM testing. The government's initial nonchalant position over cruise-missile testing stemmed from not having thought through the strategic implications of this new weapon. Since the NATO decision in 1979, Ottawa comforted itself with the erroneous view that Canada could support the deployment...in Europe without actually having more to do with it than accepting Litton's defence contract for the cruise missile inertial guidance system.  

Bromke and Nossal state that "initially the Canadian government had little understanding of what it was getting into: it still does not seem to grasp fully the consequences of this new situation." The dependence on the Pentagon's analysis limited the chances that the government would have an alternate conception of the strategic implications. In addition, the close cooperation between DND and their American counterpart, as revealed in the documents acquired by The Montreal Gazette, ensured that only supportive interpretations influenced the policy process.

The decision to test the ALCM demanded that certain compromises be made. The government managed the truth so that compromise would not be seen as change, a weakness in the political sphere. Thus the specific conflict with the suffocation speech's proposed ban on flight-testing was never mentioned. In more general terms, the government said the suffocation strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally. Despite Canada's traditional emphasis on verification in the Conference on Disarmament, there were no Canadian protests about the problems posed by the Cruise missiles for this area.

The tests of the Cruise missile guidance system may obliquely benefit the GLCM deployed in Europe, and the DND rationale that the West's
deterrence is best served by strong forces everywhere is accurate. Yet there was a certain manipulation of the truth regarding the claim that the tests were for NATO. Since the tests were bilaterally arranged, the agreement could have been made under the auspices of NORAD. Instead, the 1951 NATO/SOFA treaty and the NATO Agreement on the Communication of Technical Information for Defense Purposes were used to emphasize the multilateral aspects of the policy and thus make it more domestically acceptable.\textsuperscript{186}

There were specific economic considerations in the ALCM testing decision which were different from the previously mentioned concerns about general economic repercussions. Their role is difficult to assess because the government never cited economics as being in any way influential in the decision. However, the following depiction of certain financial developments in bilateral relations illustrates that economic factors probably had a significant impact on decision-making. The potential for negative economic repercussions narrowed the options and emphasized the necessity of testing the ALCM.

Carol Giangrande asserts that Canada's production of the Cruise missile guidance system helped to finance the purchase of a new generation of fighter planes for Canada from the United States. Under the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, Canada signed a deal with the United States in 1980 to purchase 138 CF-18 fighter planes from McDonnell-Douglas, the firm from which Litton Systems Canada got the Cruise guidance system contract. The purchase agreement for the F-18 fighters was worth $5 billion. But when Ottawa negotiated this agreement, it also got a deal for $3.1 billion worth of work on both the F-18 and the Litton guidance system for the Cruise.\textsuperscript{187} In March 1982, an unnamed but relatively senior Pentagon official was quoted as saying that the offsets from the fighter plane contract
were more than repaid by the Canadian decision to allow the tests of the Cruise missile.\textsuperscript{188} Earlier that month it was revealed that Litton Systems Canada had been awarded an additional $60 million contract to supply LN-35 Inertial Navigation Systems to the Department of Defense, under the DPSA. The total value of the contract was now over $110 million.\textsuperscript{189}

The economic dimension of the Cruise missile in Canada increased the number of bureaucratic players in the policy-making on the ALCM tests. Through the Defence Industry Productivity Programme, administered by the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, $46.5 million in grants and interest-free loans were given to Litton to enable it to produce the TERCOM guidance system.\textsuperscript{190} This raises an interesting point about Canadian involvement in the arms race, since the greatest return on the invested Canadian tax dollars requires the deployment of as many missiles as possible.\textsuperscript{191}

The federal aid to Litton also involved the help of the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), a company owned by the federal Department of Supply and Services.\textsuperscript{192} The primary interest of these bureaucratic players would be that the best policy decision was made in terms of their economic priorities.

Just two days after a memo of understanding had been signed with the Defense Department as a preliminary to the formal request to test the ALCM in Canada, the US Administration announced that Canada would be denied access to a new $2 billion defense industry development program. A Pentagon source said that Canada had been given a "free ride" in the past on US military research and development projects.\textsuperscript{193} Testing the ALCM did not appear to have earned Canada immunity as the Reagan White House continued to change their traditional relationship.

In the past the Reagan Administration had intervened on behalf of
Canada to stop the protectionist plans of the Congress. Perhaps they were growing impatient with the tardiness of the policy-makers in Ottawa. If Canada's reliability as an ally was being questioned in Washington, no amount of effort could stem US protectionism.

The defensive motivations behind the government's ALCM policy decision were so influential that they were careless in examining the details. Feeling bound to agree, they did not look too closely at the possible legacies of their decision.

Paul McRae told his party leader that the agreement was setting the stage for Canada "to become a key player in the establishing of a whole new range of strategic weapons." Stephen Clarkson posits that one of the costs of such close involvement with the development of the American nuclear arsenal is that it may intrinsically mean adopting an "extreme Cold War strategy." In light of the "massive American rearmament program", David Cox queried the extent to which the Agreement "implicates Canada in the political debate which underlies American rearmament - namely, the debate about war-fighting doctrines."

The controversy over the ALCM makes it difficult to assess the implications of the Canadian agreement to test it. Whether all or any of the different launch modes of the Cruise missile are destabilizing, or what influence its technological aspects will have for arms control depends on the perceptions of the analyst. It may be stated with some certainty that the actual CANUSTEP agreement will have some interesting effects on Canada's involvement with the American military process.

CANUSTEP has a duration of five years, with an automatic renewal for another five years unless either country wishes to withdraw, which requires twelve month's notice. In terms of political control, the military once again reasserts its primacy, with the potential authority to waive Canadian law.
Each project arrangement is to be negotiated and concluded by the Defence Departments of each country. No provision is made for Cabinet involvement, debate in Parliament, or any role for External Affairs. Information to the public will be very limited or non-existent.  

David Cox points out that the decision-making power granted to DND is "a little puzzling":

DND is the agency most likely to be sympathetic to US requests by virtue of their common interests and involvement in a range of cooperative activities. Their enthusiasm for the joint enterprise of continental defence is most likely to blunt their sensitivity -- not sharp to begin with -- to the political implications and liabilities of specific programs.

As Flora MacDonald put it, the umbrella agreement "goes beyond anything that was ever perceived at the NATO discussions in 1979 or in connection with any other NATO obligations we may have. That puts us into an entirely different military relationship than we have ever had. It's a distinct departure from our foreign policy of the past." She believes that it puts Canada "in a very subservient position to the military power of the Pentagon." While it may not be applicable in the immediate term, CANUSTEP may facilitate Canada's unwitting support for a new strategic policy, or participation in an escalation of the arms race.

In terms of international political considerations, the increasing involvement with American military plans, accompanied by other bilateral developments, may lead to a perception that Canada is becoming more closely entwined with its southern neighbour. One can only speculate whether this will cause a diminution in Canada's independence in the eyes of the international community, and a corresponding belief that Canada's impartiality is compromised.

The day after the government announced its final decision, an
editorial appeared in The Toronto Star: "Cruise muffles our moral voice".

[T]he Canadian government has chosen to...weigh in on the American side in the game of nuclear bluff with the Soviets...But...after every manoeuvre we end up with more weapons, and further from our stated goal of arms control. By agreeing to test the cruise, however reluctantly, the Trudeau government has pushed the country into a far more active nuclear role...And...sharply diminished our credibility as a country dedicated to prodding the superpowers toward mutual arms reduction.  

The history of cooperation and support for NATO and bilateral defence made the tests a welcome obligation for DND. The Department of External Affairs was very much aware of the potential for economic retaliation and, like the Prime Minister, wanted to placate the United States. The hope that the tests would garner credits that Canada could use to promote its goals in arms control, the Third World or other issues of contention was, in large measure, limited to the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister was opposed to the zero-sum view of the superpower relationship that characterized the American stance and most likely did not want to test the ALCM. However, he reacted in a typically rational manner when he weighed the costly aspects of a refusal. He circumvented the impossibility of value integration (i.e., achieving a reconciliation of the contradictory goals of promoting Canadian-US harmony while encouraging progress in arms control) by ignoring most if not all of the negative interpretations and tried to make the tests worthwhile by using them as leverage. He was not discouraged by the fact that since the beginning of their dominance of global nuclear relations, "the initiative for change has lain almost exclusively with the United States."  

He was forced to his final policy decision by three factors: fear of
negative reactions from the US and Europe; the danger of damaging the already enfeebled continental relationship; and the weakening political base of the Liberal party in Canada. The latter was one of the main reasons for the ambivalent rhetoric, conflicting rationales and confused handling of the policy by Trudeau, who was unsure of what the country would tolerate and unsure of the implications of testing a new breed of nuclear weapon.

The Prime Minister's initiative, examined in the next chapter, was significantly affected by the knowledge he gained during the debate over the Cruise missile. His attempt to apply rational analysis in the decision-making on the ALCM tests was confounded both by the various political and economic factors that made Canadian acquiescence the only policy choice, and the complex nature of the nuclear world. The latter meant that despite the danger inherent in facilitating the difficult-to-verify cruise missile, Canada had to agree to the testing of the ALCM and to support the deployment of the GLCM in Europe. These policies were presented and perceived as essential requirements in the maintenance of deterrence and the cohesion of the Alliance. Their destabilizing potential in terms of worsened Soviet threat perceptions and serious erosion of the arms control process exemplified the paradoxical nature of the nuclear world. The initiative was Trudeau's response to this dilemma. Unlike the incremental, somewhat disorderly decision-making process that led to the Canadian policy on the ALCM, the Prime Minister embarked on his peace initiative determined to achieve his goal of innovative statesmanship and rational policy-making.
CHAPTER VI: THE PRIME MINISTER'S PEACE INITIATIVE

Crisis-Inspired Activism

The peace initiative, when considered as the final act in the sequence of arms control policies examined in this thesis, clearly signals a new sophistication in the Prime Minister's perceptions of policy requirements for the nuclear world. Trudeau, acting by and large as an individual, elite-level actor, succeeded in imposing rational/analytical decision-making within the narrow confines of the developmental stages of the initiative. Prime Minister Trudeau's efforts were certainly worthwhile. Few other middlepowers could contemplate such action. Against great odds, Trudeau's initiative was a courageous attempt to moderate superpower relations at a time of potentially fatal crisis.

However, once the initiative moved from the conceptual planning realm to the arduous, complex realities of the global stage, Trudeau was unable to maintain his control. The dependence of the initiative's progress on the dynamics and vagaries of the nuclear world and international circumstances confounded and eventually defeated his attempted assertion of rational decision-making.

Due to Canada's limited influence and the propensity of the superpowers to direct their relations as they alone saw fit, the restrictions on Trudeau were many. As one of his senior advisors noted in 1985:

there is one inescapable reality: Canada is not a major military power and does not possess any weapons of mass destruction. It can therefore be only an indirect contributor
Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s peace initiative was undertaken in September of 1983 and lasted until his resignation in the spring of 1984. Although international security relations have long been plagued by misperceptions, the superpowers’ inflammatory interpretations of each other’s motivations were particularly misguided at this time. As the initiative developed, circumstances in the international arena forced the Prime Minister to react in an ad hoc fashion that confounded his careful decision-making. Increasingly, his rhetoric betrayed his growing realization of, and frustration with, a dangerous paradox.

The Prime Minister was moved to action by a variety of circumstances that challenged his view of his global responsibility and led him to believe that a moderation of international tension was desperately needed. His perceptual shift was facilitated by certain external developments that were contributing to a growing hostility between the superpowers. In Trudeau’s view, there were indications of an increasingly dangerous trend. In light of the stalemated INF negotiations, it appeared that deployment would commence, as scheduled, in late 1983. The escalating intensity of superpower rhetoric was fueled by the shooting down of the Korean Air Lines jetliner over Soviet territory. As well, the domestic protests regarding the ALCM tests had made the nuclear arms race a topic of concern for many Canadians.

His experiences both at Western summits and in bilateral terms with the United States also encouraged Trudeau to develop a new attitude towards the immediate relevance of arms control. John Kirton cites the
disastrous Williamsburg summit of May 1983 as the "foundation" of Trudeau's peace venture. The summit communique originally stressed alliance solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat, and made no attempt to strike a conciliatory note with the Eastern bloc. After Trudeau's vehement interjection, the promise "to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war" was included. As well, the announcement by President Reagan in March 1983 of his plans for the Strategic Defence Initiative concerned Trudeau, who had suggested at UNSSOD II that a ban on weapons in outer space be an arms control priority.

Superpower relations were adversely affected by some of the most common occurrences in the nuclear world. These included: ideological misconceptions of the enemy; political efforts to use nuclear weapons to further various policy agendas; the engine of technological momentum; and preferences in strategic doctrine and force planning that encouraged worst-case perceptions. The resulting tensions and stimulus to the arms race could not be contained without a genuine effort on the part of all nations, particularly the two nuclear giants. Yet inexplicably, despite the widely acknowledged potential for great danger, united action to find a remedy seemed unattainable. No matter how threatening the tense relationship between the superpowers seemed, it was apparent that no other world leader was ready to take the first step to ease what Trudeau saw as "the ominous rhythm of crisis".

While Trudeau was not opposed to acting alone in the beginning, his continued solitude forced him to confront a daunting reality. His guiding precept that rationality could prevail if adequate effort was made was challenged by the apparent unwillingness of world leaders to undertake such
exertion. Trudeau eventually realized that the suggestions he was proposing to alleviate the crisis potential in superpower relations were incompatible with the paradox-laden international environment. Once Trudeau understood that there would be no real support from the nations that mattered, his comprehension of this apparently irrational situation fostered his growing disillusionment with established strategic doctrines, and the nuclear politics of the Western alliance.

It is arguably "rational" to take serious risks in pursuit of highly prized goals, hence the general acceptability of deterrence. However, the specific hazards imposed by the Americans' lack of compromise in the INF negotiations during 1983 and the Soviets' unconscionable behavior during the KAL crisis were simply far too great for any reasonable leader to endorse. Trudeau believed that the goals and behavior of each superpower had to be reassessed and modified in order to lessen the risks of uncontrollably escalating confrontation. 10

The validity of Trudeau's judgement in this regard is of course highly debatable, especially in light of the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty negotiations in December 1987. Nevertheless, it is both plausible and defensible to assert that US leaders were willing to run extraordinarily high risks of nuclear warfare in Europe in their effort to pressure Moscow to make concessions in the INF negotiations. It is also credible to assert that for many members of the Administration (for example Richard Perle, Fred Ikle or even so-called moderates such as Richard Burt) the NATO INF deployments were never meant to be prevented by successful negotiations. The GLCMs, and particularly the Pershing IIs, were meant to be deployed so as to intimidate Moscow through the new 'decapitation' option that the
Soviets feared was an intrinsic aspect of the Pershing IIIs' military mission.11

Trudeau saw the use of the "posture and rhetoric of an earlier wartime age" as both inadequate and inappropriate for the current crisis.12 Yet he did not know how to offset this conceptual baggage. He was not convinced that world leaders were able to analyze and comprehend "the complexities of an entirely new phase" in international relations.13

Trudeau's goal of injecting "high-level political energy into East-West relations to turn the trend-line of crisis" did not meet with the response it sought.14 As peripheral as Trudeau's innovative and noncontroversial suggestions were, they required too great a change in the status quo. He could not overcome a major problem: arms control as "an instrument of national security and international stability is not universally acclaimed".15

Trudeau's intention was to influence the environment of the superpower relationship so that the conflicting defence and foreign policy goals pursued by Washington and Moscow in the international arena could be greatly moderated. The initiative's aim was by necessity more general than specific: "to generate the political will and confidence necessary on both sides...to bring about a lowering of tensions and a general improvement of relations."16

The rational/analytical process used in the policy-making was a complex effort to integrate value trade-offs within the limited sphere of influence of a middle power. The multiplicity of contradictory goals within the international security realm could not be transcended by Canada, but it was hoped that it was possible to influence the superpowers -- especially the government of the United States. They alone could affect the strategic and policy environments, and thereby change the structure of their
Louis Delvoie was the leader of the initiative task force, and the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division in the Department of External Affairs. He avoided any unrealistic advocacy of large-scale arms control measures, but the goal of the task force was still ambitious. Delvoie said their aim was to establish the existence of common areas of interest that could provide a basis for the "resumption of the disrupted arms control negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union".

Since so much of Canadian policy management was based on Trudeau's personal interaction with different world leaders, one could surmise that he was ultimately responsible for its success or failure. But measuring the success or failure of the initiative is at best an ambiguous and uncertain exercise. Even a limited evaluation of Trudeau's role must consider the extenuating circumstances that affected the development of the policy environment, and their subsequent influence on the initiative. But since this is an analytical study, a comparison of the positive and negative aspects is useful and will be included in the assessment in the last section of this chapter.

The foundations of the peace initiative were based on policies that should have been acceptable. They were on the periphery of the arms control process and did not require any basic changes in the military-strategic status quo. The policy suggestions, which will be examined later, were innovative within the confines of acceptable Alliance behavior. Even the United States leadership in strategic doctrinal matters was left unchallenged. The most formidable arms control problems that divided the superpowers were not addressed, except in a rhetorical or
Despite the comparative modesty of Trudeau's agenda, his four months of shuttle diplomacy achieved little of import in any immediately discernible terms. The Prime Minister himself suggested in early December 1983 that his success or failure be judged in light of "future events over the next many, many months".21

The structural framework and progress of the peace initiative is depicted below. The chronological record of the initiative is used to structure the examination of the policy process. It includes relevant events and reactions that either furthered or impeded the initiative. Developments in the policy and strategic environments are noted where appropriate to illustrate the obstacles in the path of the initiative. The details of Trudeau's involvement both in terms of his personal decision-making and his attempt to use his analytical approach in the contradictory nuclear world will be examined next.22 In conclusion, some of the critical reactions and assessments of the initiative will be summarized.

The Policy Development of the Peace Initiative

Trudeau's use of rational analysis within the initiative's decision-making process was facilitated by his receptivity to alternate views. His pessimistic assessment of the potential danger meant that any cost-benefit estimate would lead to the same conclusion: critical or negative response to his personal diplomacy was worth the tradeoff of lessening the chances of potential nuclear annihilation. According to his frame of reference, it was eminently rational to seek an immediate means of offsetting that danger. At the same time, he knew that his methods would
have to be persuasive, diplomatic and viable so that they would not be dismissed out of hand.

Careful control was maintained by the Prime Minister over the domestic or 'internal' sources of influence on the policy process. His inability to control influential events at the international level forced him to be reactive and undermined his direction of the initiative. Since only a modified rationality was possible amidst this confusion, the decision-making behind the initiative had elements of mixed scanning process.23

On September 21, 1983, the Prime Minister called together a group of senior officials from the Department of External Affairs, the Department of National Defence, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Privy Council Office to discuss the state of East-West relations.24 He asked them to develop several policy options that would enable him to influence the "trend line" of the increasingly hostile superpower relationship, and the ever-escalating arms race. He was willing to travel extensively and expend as much personal effort as was necessary. His own plans for the future required that the initiative should culminate by the end of the year.25 These personal time constraints meant that the Prime Minister had to establish very specific policy priorities in his efforts.26

The initiative began with that first step of the Prime Minister. Its extraordinary conception and goals meant that the structuring and conduct of the policy process proceeded in a manner that was far from standard.27 The lack of a policy precedent facilitated the innovative aspects in the initial development of the initiative since there were no standard operating procedures to restrict the decision-making.

The inter-departmental representation at that September meeting
may have contributed, in some small measure, to an element of bureaucratic politics. However, this was offset by the time constraints and the nature of the issue, which led to a certain degree of crisis decision-making and unconventional behavior. Harald Von Riekhoff and John Sigler illustrate how the group deviated from standard practice in two ways. Using "unorthodox methods of communication", they interacted directly with the Prime Minister and his personal staff. Another unusual feature was the comparatively junior "level of authority that members of the task force occupied in the official hierarchy."

During late September, the task force worked on developing possible policy options. In the beginning of October, briefing books on more than twenty options were delivered to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence, and a steering committee of senior officials. In the preliminary stages of the policy process, the most difficult task was the setting of the initiative's agenda. Since the final roster of ideas had to be acceptable to all the NATO allies, there were some obvious exclusions. According to Michael Pearson, the son of one of the senior advisors in the initiative, the original suggestions included the possibility of focusing on a comprehensive test ban (CTB), an arms control regime for outer space, a nuclear freeze, and a joint NATO-Warsaw pact consultative process.

On October 7, Louis Delvoie accompanied Trudeau, Alan MacEachen, Jean-Jacques Blais and the steering committee to Meech Lake, where they were joined by a number of Canadian ambassadors, including those assigned to the United States, NATO and the recently retired ambassador to the Soviet Union. The policy proposals for the initiative was chosen at that meeting.
There was an attempt to keep the initial consideration of policy options open during the preliminary stages of the policy process. The choices for the task force and the Prime Minister were restricted by the fact that they knew a noncontroversial package of suggestions would have a much greater chance of success. Certain compromises were thus essential.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite the similarity of a bilateral freeze to the suffocation strategy, the fact that the CTB was a longstanding arms control priority of the Canadian government's, and Trudeau's urging at UNSSOD II of a ban on weapons in outer space, the need to avoid anything too polemical led to these ideas being set aside.\textsuperscript{34} The final choice from the variety of arms control ideas, and the various methods of garnering support for them, had to be noncontroversial or risk swift dismissal.\textsuperscript{35}

The proposals for policy options that were finally chosen thus involved ideas and suggestions that were meant to be both plausible and nonthreatening to either superpower's perception of its national security. The final list included: suggestions on how to precipitate movement at the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks on conventional weapons in Europe and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE); a meeting of the five nuclear powers in order to stop vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; and prohibitions on the development of high altitude anti-satellite weaponry (ASAT) and extremely mobile ICBMs.\textsuperscript{36}

It is difficult to trace the decision-making of the task force since it operated under conditions of tight secrecy. It was explained at the time that the mediation role envisaged by the Prime Minister was so fragile that it had to quietly "unfold step by step".\textsuperscript{37} At this stage, few people outside of the immediate policy-making circle knew which issues the initiative was going
to focus on.

The dynamics of personal interaction were very important in light of the initiative's attempts to influence entrenched perception. Due to the nature of the initiative, Trudeau's meetings with world leaders were most influential in deciding the fate of the Canadian initiative. In reaction, the policy process had to be flexible and the decision-makers innovative. Thus there was no planning for any extended period of time. With the exception of a few prearranged meetings, it was impossible to arrange the schedule of the proposed meetings between Trudeau and other world leaders, as they were to take place at the latter's convenience.\textsuperscript{38} The ad hoc nature of the policy developments was due to the extreme dependency of the initiative upon global reaction and the behavior of other nations.

In mid-October, once the basic framework of the initiative had been chosen, the Prime Minister presented the plan to a receptive Cabinet.\textsuperscript{39} Trudeau later noted the validity of the argument made by several of his cabinet colleagues. They reasoned that while the testing of the cruise missile had been the correct response for a NATO ally, such a position brought other responsibilities with it. Trudeau believed that one of those responsibilities was the "right to ask...[the NATO allies]...hard questions".\textsuperscript{40}

The Attempted Implementation of the Initiative

The next step depended on creating a receptive environment for the Canadian peace plan, so letters were sent to all of the NATO leaders explaining the initiative and requesting personal audiences.\textsuperscript{41} The Prime Minister's diplomatic experts had stressed that it was imperative he inform the NATO leaders prior to any public statement.\textsuperscript{42} If Trudeau could get the
strong support of the NATO allies, it would be in line with his theory that the best way to deal with certain policy situations is to create counterweights. The Americans and Russians, if willing to be influenced at all, would be much more receptive to multilateral pressure on the issue of international security relations than if Canada approached them alone.

In late October, the Prime Minister went to Europe. Just prior to his departure, he gave a speech at the University of Guelph's conference on "Strategies for Peace in a Nuclear Age". In view of the requirements of 'quiet diplomacy', Trudeau could not be precise about the details of his plan, but he spoke eloquently about the idea of the peace initiative.  

The speech was a tour de force of evocative rhetoric, philosophical illustrations, and a concise presentation of why immediate action was essential. The Prime Minister said he was deeply troubled: by an intellectual climate of acrimony and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a superpower relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over the machines of war.

Trudeau showed great understanding of the dilemmas that confronted him when he noted that "too often our knowledge and our judgements are true and false at the same time." He noted the paradox caused by the fact that nuclear arms control must be careful not to make the world safe for conventional war. Trudeau was most realistic about the contradictions caused by the superpowers' "radically different visions of political order, human values and social behavior". He deplored the fact that "any shred of trust or confidence...[or]...political craft and creativity" had vanished from
the East-West relationship.\(^{48}\) While he recognized that the superpowers were "not equals in any moral sense at all", he perceptively pointed out that "they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves, and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates."\(^{49}\)

In a hint of what was to become an increasing focus of criticism for Trudeau, he mused that "one of the most gaping self-inflicted wounds of this period...is...the unfortunate tendency for a discussion which starts off about East-West relations to wind up in the fratricide of West-West relations."\(^{50}\) Although he was careful to emphasize his firm commitment to NATO and the Two Track decision, he reiterated one of his persevering concerns.\(^{51}\) "It is almost as if the diversity, pluralism, and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through the Alliance, are not seen as appropriate within the Alliance."\(^{52}\)

At this point, he was fairly restrained in his criticisms of the contradictions he saw in NATO policy. The Prime Minister only abandoned his efforts to keep within the boundaries of what was deemed acceptable behavior and commentary after he saw that little heed was paid to his diplomatic innuendo.\(^{53}\)

To offset the threat that Trudeau saw hanging over the world, he advocated that NATO's Two Track approach be supplemented by a "third rail" of "high level political energy to speed the course of agreements."\(^{54}\) It was a clear allusion to what he perceived as the inadequacies of the West's approach to the INF. No specific details were given as to the content of the Prime Minister's plans, but he did describe several areas that he was going to explore. He asserted that Canada would work with its allies to ensure that
all of these goals were met.

In arguing for a new impetus at the MBFR negotiations on conventional weaponry in Europe, Trudeau maintained that there could be no success if they were not set in "a wider framework of East-West confidence and political will." He called for the upcoming Conference on Disarmament in Europe to be based on a "reciprocal acknowledgment of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue and a determined approach to crisis management." He also announced his plan to persuade the five nuclear powers to both establish global limits on their own nuclear arsenals, and stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In conjunction with the Guelph speech, a meeting of NATO's High-Level Group had taken place in Montebello, Quebec. The Western military planners discussed the impending INF deployment, and the number of obsolete battlefield nuclear weapons that could be dismantled without weakening the deterrent strength of NATO. Canadian defence officials' comments at the conference were strictly in conformity with NATO analysis. The potential for a damaging rift demanded that the status quo be preserved. The initiative's suggestions had to be modest so that the delicate equilibrium was maintained.

The reaction from the Montebello meeting was favourable to Trudeau's proposals, but it was noted that there was little new or hopeful in them. In grim foreshadowing of what was to be the attitude in Washington, the American Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in Ottawa shortly after the High Level Group recessed, declined to comment on the implications of the Guelph speech.

It was the first of a series of noncommittal responses from the United
States. Others ranged from minimally supportive to openly hostile. The State Department expressed their support for the Prime Minister's "sentiments" regarding "more constructive, stable East-West relations" but little else was said. No comment was made about the Prime Minister's assertion that he had discussed the issue with the President, perhaps because as later revealed, the President had not yet seen Trudeau's letter to him.\(^62\) Canadian diplomats somehow interpreted these reactions to mean that the American response was encouraging.\(^63\) Their deliberate attempt to present the initiative as prospering forced them to ignore or suppress evidence that indicated otherwise.

The media reaction in Canada to the Prime Minister's policy announcement was generally supportive of the idea but questioned his motives. There were varying appraisals of the Prime Minister's motivations, but many interpretations were somewhat cynical. One news analyst said that Trudeau was attempting both "to establish his right to seek entry into the highest level of international debate...[and] a crafty flanking maneouvre to limit resistance to such an idea."\(^64\) Other appraisals accused the Prime Minister of attempting to revive his political career under the banner of a peace crusade.\(^65\)

In addition to these negative appraisals and responses, various developments complicated the decision-making in the initiative. In late October, events in the international sphere exacerbated superpower tensions, thereby contributing to an inhospitable environment for peace proposals at this time.\(^66\)

Despite the many public, and no doubt equally numerous private assurances that the Canadian plan was not meant to detract from American
authority in the nuclear world, the reaction in the US government was
generally negative. Kenneth Dam, the Deputy Secretary of State, took issue
with Trudeau's premise that the superpowers lacked political will.\textsuperscript{67} External Affairs Minister Alan MacEachen hastened to assure Dam that the
initiative was in no way meant to interfere with the negotiations in Geneva
or the INF deployment.\textsuperscript{68}

Such obstacles and negative reactions made gaining the support of the
NATO allies even more essential. Trudeau's policy-making was predicated
on the belief that the superpowers might be swayed by multilateral pressure
and rational argument. The initial visit to Europe was made because Trudeau
thought that NATO support would give him more credibility and political
weight in the estimation of both superpowers, as well as China.\textsuperscript{69} The
European powers had to be informed and consulted because the initiative
was sailing in uncharted waters, as the Prime Minister called for "creative
radicalism", and the willingness to take risks and apply "new methods".\textsuperscript{70}

On November 8, Trudeau started his European visit in Paris. There
are conflicting reports as to the attitude in the Quai D'Orsay. Trudeau later
said that he thought Mitterand understood his proposition immediately, and
thus approved of the idea of a five-nation summit.\textsuperscript{71} In contrast, a French
Foreign Office aide told \textit{Maclean's} that Mitterand was upset by the
"vagueness" of the plan and questioned the wisdom of the timing. He feared
the Soviets might exploit the initiative to sow dissent within NATO over the
missile crisis.\textsuperscript{72} However, other French government sources said Mitterand
was upset because he had had his own peace plan and had not been able to
present it.\textsuperscript{73}

Germany and Italy were cordial to the idea of the initiative but they
were distracted by widespread domestic unrest as their citizens protested against the stationing of INF weapons on their territory.\textsuperscript{74} The Belgians and Dutch were approving but their limited power meant that their support was little more than symbolic.\textsuperscript{75}

The initial travel plans had excluded Britain since Trudeau had discussed matters of international security with Margaret Thatcher on her visit to Canada in September.\textsuperscript{76} At the last moment, she requested that he include a stop in London. Thatcher argued vehemently against his perception of the 'enemy', and was adamant that Trudeau should not trust the Russians, and so risk NATO solidarity.\textsuperscript{77}

On his return to Ottawa, Trudeau was optimistic and said he was "profoundly encouraged" by the NATO leaders' reactions. The Prime Minister claimed that he had "found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication - a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy."\textsuperscript{78} He was careful to specify that "refinement" in light of the NATO leaders' views was an important factor in the policy development.\textsuperscript{79}

While the European reception was generally polite, there was little support for one of Trudeau's structural goals. He had wanted the explicit involvement of other world leaders to sustain the momentum of the initiative after his own departure. However, the press reported that at least one briefing memo from the Department of External Affairs, based on reports from Canadian embassies in Europe, argued that reaction to the initiative was not enthusiastic.\textsuperscript{80} The official renderings of Trudeau's meetings with various world leaders continued to be vague but optimistic.

On November 13, in a speech to a Liberal fund-raising lunch in
Montreal, Trudeau divulged his plans for easing global tension. There was much criticism of the Prime Minister's method of informing the Canadian people of his plans. Many commentators saw it as an unfortunate choice in terms of propriety, while some saw it as a provocative politicization of his efforts for domestic purposes.

As with the Guelph speech, his rhetoric was elegant and inspired. Trudeau once again painted a sombre picture of an increasing "habit of aggression", in a world where nuclear weapons were proliferating amid "a superpower relationship charged with animosity." The Prime Minister said he wanted to inject a new impetus into the arms control process; a "global approach...to reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line."

The policy options suggested by Trudeau in his Guelph speech were presented in more detail and the influence of the NATO leaders' input was evident. He reassured the British, French and Chinese that there would be "no restraints which do not recognize their own national interests." The European leaders had made it clear to Trudeau that they feared the Soviet Union might use their advantage in conventional weapons in Europe as a form of leverage. Thus he urged renewed attempts at the MBFR talks to achieve a balance in reduced numbers of conventional forces in Europe. Trudeau refused to countenance the Progressive Conservative idea of establishing a "more reasonable balance" by allowing western nations to increase their conventional forces until they equaled those of the Warsaw Pact.

The nuclear nations were charged with strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and developing measures that would control
the qualitative aspects of the nuclear arms race. He suggested that in order to ensure that the Third World would forgo nuclear weapons, "a direct linkage" should be made between disarmament and development.

He argued that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe needed a jolt of political energy so that it would not get mired in the traditional "litigation about procedures or in the linguistics of technicality." Replacing the "nuclear accountants" with foreign ministers would encourage enhanced involvement on the part of all nations.

The suffocation strategy was echoed in the emphasis that stability would be an "elusive goal" if new technology was not controlled. A ban on high altitude anti-satellite weapons, restrictions on "excessive mobility" of ICBMs, and a requirement that future strategic weapons systems be fully verifiable were presented as means to ensure crisis stability and facilitate arms control.

Despite the Prime Minister's assurances that the initiative was well-received by all, there was still little comment from the United States. What there was was far from supportive. There is little doubt that the Departments of State and Defense felt it was a flawed, misguided plan, however well-intentioned. It was clear that some US officials thought it unbecoming for an ally to try to pressure Reagan into dealing with the Soviet Union. At a mid-November conference in New York City, American officials made extremely disparaging comments about the initiative. The unnamed State and Pentagon representatives dismissed Canada's potential as a catalyst for peace. They asserted that Canada lacked credibility in defence matters due to its poor contributions to NATO. The Pentagon and State Department officials went so far as to claim that certain unspecified,
supposedly bewildered European government officials had asked them for an explanation of the possible motivation behind Trudeau's mission. 96 Trudeau's response was characteristically blunt. "Pentagon people are not noteworthy for their concern for peace...[and]...were probably speaking for themselves and not their government." 97

On the domestic front, both the Conservative and NDP leaders responded to the Montreal speech with approval, but wanted more detail on the government's plans. 98 The Canadian public's reaction to the Prime Minister's efforts was predominantly positive, although there were a few indications that some Canadians felt other issues, such as unemployment and inflation, should also be addressed as priorities. 99

Developments in the policy and strategic environments had overwhelmed Canadian arms control ideas in the past. 100 The initiative was similarly handicapped by circumstances over which Trudeau had no control. The Canadian leader's attempts to moderate superpower hostility took place against a backdrop of pre-arranged events, the unfolding of which exacerbated the already tenuous international climate.

The day after Trudeau's speech in Montreal, the first ground-launched cruise missiles arrived in Britain. Once the INF negotiations failed, it was imperative that the deployment proceed so that there was no doubt regarding the willingness of NATO to adhere to the demands of deterrence. 101 No matter how much Trudeau may have feared that the deployment might increase superpower tensions, he refused to take a stance that could split the alliance. 102

Simultaneous developments in the United States illustrated all too well the difficulty of controlling the potentially adverse effects of events far
removed from Trudeau's sphere of influence. The day Trudeau had arrived in Paris, superpower tensions were fueled by the political process in Washington. The Senate passed a defence package that included funds for the MX missile and binary nerve gas weapons. Ten days later, Congress approved a $249.8 billion military appropriations bill for the 1984 fiscal year, which gave money to the MX and the B-1 bomber but not to nerve gas production. When these developments are seen in conjunction with the INF deployment, various other aspects of the strategic modernization program, and the implications for strategy and force planning contained in National Security Decision Directive 13, one cannot fault the Soviet Union for fearing the worst.

Trudeau continued on his personal diplomatic mission. His next stop was Japan, while en route to the Commonwealth Conference. Trudeau asked Prime Minister Nakasone to brief the Chinese Communist Party General Hu Yaobang on the Canadian plan during the latter's upcoming visit to Japan. Nakasone and Yaobang subsequently issued a joint communique in early December that stated the willingness of Japan and China to support the call "made by others" for peace throughout the world. In contrast to the intent of Trudeau's visit, President Reagan had visited Japan a week earlier to elicit a greater commitment to the defense of the Asia-Pacific region. Their different goals epitomize the disparity between the two leaders' views of the optimal method of maintaining peace.

For much of the initial stages of the initiative, there had been no official response from Moscow. The Soviet factor in the initiative's equation was the source of many problems for Trudeau. Andropov's ill-health led to a political vacuum in that there was no Soviet head of state with whom to
In early December, the Soviet embassy in Ottawa issued the first official commentary on the peace initiative. A political analyst for the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* wrote that the Soviet Union agreed to Trudeau's main idea, the need for political will, and was ready for "an exchange of opinion at the 'forum of the five'." It was one of the first indications that Moscow was even following the Canadian initiative. Such vague signals did not facilitate the planning of the course of the peace policy, especially since the "forum of the five" required Andropov's presence.

Trudeau was well-respected by the Chinese and Soviet leaders, so the granting of an audience to him was not extraordinary. However, due to the perceived need for immediate remedial action and the restrictions on the Prime Minister's timeframe, the pace of the initiative had to be forced. The diplomatic courtesy of sending a personal envoy to China and the USSR signaled the importance of the initiative and ensured direct communication of the Prime Minister's personal sentiments. In addition, the time gained by bypassing normal channels of communication was essential.

Meanwhile, Trudeau went to India for a week at the Commonwealth Conference. The conference had been a focal point for the task force. They knew that if the initiative had the backing of the European leaders, the Third World might agree to uphold the NPT. But as had happened throughout the term of the initiative, there were other pressing issues of concern on the agenda.

Richard Gwyn asserts that the Prime Minister's somewhat incoherent effort did not take advantage of the forum as it might have. The Commonwealth Secretary-General, Sir 'Sonny' Ramphal, was a long-time friend of Trudeau and thus gave him one of the three speaking opportunities
at the opening. Trudeau had rejected two draft speeches and opted for a more impromptu style. Trudeau may have felt that the issue was best addressed from the heart in a spontaneous fashion. He told the Commonwealth leaders that the "difference between the politician and the statesman is that the former worries about the next election whereas the latter is concerned with the next generation."

There were different reactions to Trudeau's peace initiative. Indira Gandhi initially expressed hope that the Conference would endorse Trudeau's proposals, as an end to the superpower stalemate was desperately needed. Yet she later refused to support either the idea of the five nuclear power meeting or the NPT. The Indian leader saw the latter as a "humiliation" which legalized the superiority of the nuclear powers over the rest of the world.

Margaret Thatcher was, not surprisingly, somewhat dismissive. She stressed that everyone was trying to "reduce East-West tensions", but since Moscow was not yet serious about arms control negotiations, the West must be vigilant. Her pessimism was no doubt prompted by her negative assessment of Soviet motivations. She did, however, agree that there was a need to remove sources of "misunderstanding that could lead to nuclear holocaust."

There was strong support from Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda. He proposed that Zambia, India and Australia consider sending a private delegation to the China, the US and the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister was responsive to the African leader's sentiment but diplomatically explained that as several of his proposals were formulated in terms of the NATO alliance, the involvement of non-members was not yet
appropriate.\textsuperscript{118}

After a private weekend retreat for the heads of the Commonwealth countries, the Goa Declaration on International Security was announced. While influenced by a Canadian draft of a disarmament declaration, it was much more moderate and less specific.\textsuperscript{119} But it did state that it was "imperative that the Soviet Union and the United States should summon up the political vision of a world in which their nations can live in peace." It called for "active political contact and communication among all the nuclear weapon powers", which was somewhat akin to Trudeau's proposal.\textsuperscript{120} The declaration echoed the rationale for Trudeau's policy when it stated that a "concerted effort is required to restore constructive dialogue to the conduct of East-West relations."\textsuperscript{121}

The Prime Minister was very pleased and called it "the first injection of political will in a massive sense."\textsuperscript{122} Yet from past experience he knew all too well the way well-meaning statements were reduced to powerless rhetoric if unaccompanied by substantive policy.\textsuperscript{123} He said he would be carefully monitoring how the Goa Declaration "filters through to the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact."\textsuperscript{124}

Developments in the nuclear world outpaced these ponderous diplomatic moves. On November 22, Andropov released a statement condemning the INF deployments. He vowed to retaliate by increasing the number of SLBMs aimed at the US.\textsuperscript{125} On November 23, the Soviets acted on their threat to leave the INF talks upon the beginning of the missile deployment. The next day the Kremlin announced that it would deploy missiles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.\textsuperscript{126} Such action was to be expected. At the end of November, the American government began
shipping the components for the Pershing IIs to West Germany. The Soviet Union feared that the INF deployment would give the United States the ability to disable the Soviet ICBMs and thus render the North American continent relatively safe from nuclear attack. Theoretically, the unused American strategic weapons could be used to blackmail the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration’s articulation of a war-waging military doctrine was seen by the Soviet Union “as a confirmation of a role for INF in a broader strategic design”.

A 1984 CIA document is purported to have stated that “the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing II has lowered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack.” The secret report indicated that such fears were possibly fueled by a growing American defense budget (scheduled to almost double the fiscal 1981 military budget by fiscal year 1985); new options in continental defense; upgraded US force readiness so that American military power could be directed around the globe; and the impending threat of a massive arms race in space. Michael McGwire asserts that these developments, combined with the avowed quest for American strategic superiority, a “general militarization of the international arena”, and a “massive ‘psychological’ attack” against the USSR, were responsible for the Soviet conclusion that the West, led by the United States, was set on destroying “socialism as a sociopolitical system.”

The initiative needed a life-sustaining injection to counter these negative developments. It came in the form of an invitation to go to Peking to meet Premier Zhao Ziyang. Richard Gwyn points out that “the invitation to go to Peking gave Trudeau credibility and momentum...It gave him information he could trade later with Ronald Reagan and perhaps Yuri
Andropov. It was one of the very few events in the external world that aided the initiative, albeit only in a peripheral way.

The Chinese were reluctant to endorse explicitly the five nation summit, but they did agree with the Prime Minister that multilateral pressure was needed to control the superpower-driven arms race. In terms of the policy process, the Prime Minister announced at the end of his meeting with the Chinese premier that "stage one" was over and the next stage would depend on whether it would be "worthwhile" to go to Moscow and Washington.

Reagan had apparently asked the Prime Minister to explain personally the initiative at some indeterminate future date and Andropov had suggested twice in the past year that Trudeau come to the Soviet Union. However, the Prime Minister specified that any trips would take place only after the upcoming NATO meeting in early December. He said that he did not want to go to Moscow unless he was sure that he could make progress, something that he would know more about after the NATO meeting.

There were indications that the Prime Minister was growing impatient with the pace of external events and the negligible support given his efforts.

In Kuwait, during the final press conference of his whirlwind 19-day, 8-nation tour, he bluntly questioned the validity of US perceptions of events in the nuclear world. He disagreed with Casper Weinberger's assertion that the Soviet Union would return to the negotiating table in a few months: "I have no evidence of that. I think it is entirely possible that they won't return." The frankness of this comment marked the beginning of his increasingly clear challenge to the United States' perception of East-West nuclear relations. The unspoken rule that Alliance strategy and US
leadership was not to be criticized had been heeded by Trudeau during much of his initiative. Eventually, his lack of success provoked him to risk the consequences and state what he saw as the truth.¹³⁶

On December 5, Trudeau arrived in Ottawa. He was greeted with the news that 85% of the Canadian public supported his efforts. As encouraging as that might seem, it is instructive to note that a full 65% of those supporters did not think the initiative could be effective.¹³⁷ On other fronts, the Liberal government was not doing so well, as the Conservatives were topping the Gallup poll with 50% of declared electoral support.¹³⁸

The day after his return to Canada, the long-awaited signal came that a meeting with Reagan was in the offing.¹³⁹ The Prime Minister had previously said that he would prefer to go to Moscow first but the illness of Yuri Andropov, absent from public view for more than three months, made that impossible.¹⁴⁰

On December 8, Alan MacEachen addressed the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. Two of the initiative’s suggestions were supported by the assembled officials. Agreement was reached to enhance the political dimension of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe through the presence of the participating countries’ foreign ministers. NATO also agreed to expedite its reply to the latest Soviet position at the MBFR talks.¹⁴¹ The meeting’s final declaration was somewhat akin to an olive branch, as the NATO allies urged the Warsaw Pact countries “to seize the opportunities we offer for a balanced and constructive relationship and for genuine detente”.¹⁴²

Trudeau was pleased with the results of the meeting in Brussels, and interpreted them to mean that there was growing support for his peace
proposals. He later reported to Parliament that the concluding statement was "replete with references for dialogue between East and West and the need not for superiority...but a balance in armaments. As well there were other indices...we realized that the other side had legitimate security interests which it was justified in protecting".  

143

The Superpowers' Response

In mid-December, the Prime Minister arrived in Washington for his meeting with the President amid stories that a senior member of the Administration had castigated the initiative as something akin to the efforts of erratic drug-using leftists.  

144 When asked about the earlier American criticisms of his initiative, the Prime Minister replied: "The kind of third-rate, third-level pipsqueaks who say I'm not allowed to participate in the peace process because we don't contribute enough to NATO - that's baloney".  

145 According to the Globe and Mail correspondent in Washington, the story was "part of a pattern of private and public comments by US foreign affairs and Defence Department officials who have derided Mr. Trudeau's peace effort since the Prime Minister launched it formally seven weeks ago".  

146

The long-awaited summit meeting between the Canadian and American leaders did not result in any concrete expressions of support for the initiative. The Prime Minister was careful to avoid a complicated discussion of foreign policy, since Trudeau was well aware that Reagan preferred to consider "the big picture" rather than intricate details. The 'Great Communicator' was more apt to set general directives and then delegate the actual policy formulation to the appropriate members of his
administration. Accordingly, Trudeau focused on how the United States could communicate its peaceful sentiments to the world.\textsuperscript{147} After the one hour meeting, the two leaders emerged for a very brief statement to reporters. The President spoke for a mere 45 seconds and said he shared Trudeau's concerns for peace and wished him "Godspeed" in his efforts. He did not respond to reporters' questions on whether he would attend any meeting of the five nuclear nations.\textsuperscript{148} Six months later, Reagan inexplicably announced that his reluctance to support the initiative stemmed from his fear of giving it "the kiss of death".\textsuperscript{149}

The Assistant Undersecretary of State for European and Canadian affairs subsequently described their interchange as "one of the most effective meetings I have ever witnessed in the Oval Office."\textsuperscript{150} Even if the President shared this opinion, it did not mean that the effects of Trudeau's efforts would be immediately apparent. Any moderation of Reagan's perceptions of the Soviet Union would be slow to manifest itself in strategic terms.

The Prime Minister overstated the degree of support evinced by Reagan for the initiative. Trudeau claimed that there had been "a complete change in a trend line" in nuclear thinking, as indicated by the President's earlier statements that the US was not seeking nuclear superiority, nor did he believe that a nuclear war could be won.\textsuperscript{151} It is difficult to ascertain whether Trudeau was responsible for the moderation in Reagan's rhetoric concerning 'the evil empire'. The President may have been equally influenced by the fact that 1984 was an election year.\textsuperscript{152}

The President's failure to endorse the five power summit may have caused the subsequent downgrading of that aspect of the peace initiative.\textsuperscript{153}
Allan Gotlieb, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, maintained that the initiative's diplomacy depended on "nuances", and any progress would only result from a "slow step-by-step process of incremental growth". The new year did not begin on a propitious note for international security relations. A growing modicum of support for the initiative was outweighed by destabilizing developments in superpower relations. In January 1984, Czechoslovakia reaffirmed its commitment to deploy Soviet SS-20s in an effort to counterbalance the new NATO missiles. The first new SS-22 intermediate range missile was seen in East Germany, in fulfillment of the Russians' promise to compensate for the INF deployment. The Eastern bloc allies argued that the new missiles were needed because the forward-based American aircraft carrier systems and submarines, and the planned modernization of the British and French nuclear arsenals, more than compensated for the SS-20s. As well, there was a 50% increase in Soviet SSBN deployments off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, as the USSR moved to counter what it saw as a dangerous imbalance in strategic terms due to the INF deployments.

Although the Prime Minister received a letter from Yuri Andropov assuring him that he did want to see him, no date was set for a trip to Moscow. The minimal advancement of the peace initiative and the pressure of his impending retirement prompted Canadian officials to refer delicately to the timing of "other considerations." A more promising occurrence was the unequivocal expression of support from Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang during his early January visit to Canada. He applauded Trudeau's efforts "to safeguard world peace, relax international tension and promote nuclear disarmament." Ziyang promised
to hold consultations with the Canadian government to "search for specific ways to realize these objectives." Although these candid statements of approval were appreciated, their results were not directly measurable.

In another gratifying development, Reagan's first major foreign policy address of 1984 contained some ideas that were very much akin to Trudeau's priorities. Reagan spoke of the "common interests" shared by the superpowers. The President said that there was "no rational alternative" to "credible deterrence and peaceful competition". If these last two goals were used to guide superpower relations, he believed that mutual areas of "constructive cooperation" might be found. The speech was not without the tinge of unreality that often seems to characterize political pronouncements about the nuclear world. Despite the many analysts that would beg to differ in light of some of the strategic implications of counterforce weaponry, the President claimed that since he had made America's deterrence more credible, the world was "a safer place".

A more tangible indication of the value of the initiative was the mid-January meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Both explicit and implicit goals of the initiative were fulfilled by the upgrading of the participation at the CDE to the foreign minister level. By its very nature, such a step meant that political communication would be improved for at least the duration of the January meeting.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs carried the message of the Canadian peace initiative to the opening session of the CDE. "The construction of an edifice of mutually reinforcing military and political confidence is an urgent necessity and one which will require the constant application of political will". MacEachen urged that the presence of the
foreign ministers not be limited to just the opening sessions. They should
"undertake to keep the progress of the conference under close
review...[and]...intervene at the political level whenever...necessary to ensure
forward movement".¹⁶⁴

Although the Soviet and American foreign ministers were able to meet
through the CDE forum, other events were perhaps more indicative of their
countries' continuing rivalry. Just prior to the meeting between George
Shultz and Andrei Gromyko, Ronald Reagan had authorized research and
development into his planned space-based ballistic missile defence.¹⁶⁵

In late January, the Prime Minister publicly expressed his reservations
regarding some of the more peculiar aspects of the nuclear world at a
conference in Davos, Switzerland. He gave voice to his doubts about the very
foundation of NATO's nuclear deterrence policy when he queried whether
the United States really would risk a nuclear war to save Europe from a
Soviet invasion.¹⁶⁶ The next section on the Prime Minister's attempted
reassertion of rational decision-making will examine this event in more
detail. His candour was yet another indication of his frustration with what
he perceived as the political duplicity and substantive irrationality involved
in nuclear issues.

Reactions both at home and abroad were largely negative.¹⁶⁷ The
American embassy in Ottawa quickly issued a statement which said that
Trudeau "has repeatedly expressed privately and publicly his full support
for NATO's strategy of deterrence".¹⁶⁸

In early February, the travels of the Prime Minister culminated in a
visit to three Eastern European countries. Trudeau later told the House of
Commons that that he had been given "pledges of cooperation to defuse
East-West tensions" from Czechoslovakian, East German and Romanian leaders. While in Romania, Trudeau made some more critical observations about the strategic underpinnings of NATO doctrine. Terming nuclear deterrence outdated "logic from another age", he called for a new approach to arms control.\footnote{170}

According to one Canadian observer, there was a growing feeling in Washington that serious bilateral negotiations on a number of contentious issues were best postponed until either Trudeau was replaced by a new Liberal leader, or the Canadian electorate made Brian Mulroney the next Prime Minister. The possibility that there would be a Canadian election in the same year as the 1984 presidential election was only one of the reasons for the cautious cessation of meaningful discussions. Many saw Trudeau's recent actions and comments in Davos and in the Eastern European countries as directly contradicting, or at least interfering with, American prescriptions for effective nuclear deterrence. As Charles Doran, director of the Centre for Canadian Studies at John Hopkins University noted, Trudeau's comments on strategic nuclear matters go "to the heart of things that are felt very deeply here in Washington. He's asking the policy elite to rethink their whole approach. Around this town I don't think there will be a great deal of sympathy for that view."\footnote{171}

Yuri Andropov died on the very day that Trudeau reported to the House of Commons on his initiative. The Prime Minister was guardedly optimistic, noting that "misperceptions and mistrust on both sides run deep...but I believe we are beginning to see signs of progress". Trudeau explained what had prompted him on his journey and while pledging allegiance to NATO said that Canada could not be a silent partner. As a result
of his round of consultations with global leaders, he presented ten points that he believed East and West would agree on. The first point of his decalogue was a rejection of the "nuclear war-winning strategies" that had surfaced in a number of quarters. The last was a rejection of scenarios for the political or economic collapse of the other side as a means of winning the struggle for security. The eight points in between addressed a variety of mutual interests pertaining to the avoidance of nuclear conflict. He promised that while his own involvement would continue the "initiative will also be taken forward by my cabinet colleagues, by our ambassadors abroad and by all Canadians who share our purposes." 

While in the Soviet Union for Andropov's funeral, Trudeau met with Konstantin Chernenko. The new leader encouraged the Prime Minister to pursue his initiative and praised its "usefulness and practicality". After his meeting, Trudeau said that "a political window of opportunity" had opened. He believed it was an appropriate "time to send signals and positive gestures".

According to the Prime Minister, "Chernenko showed no stridency or recriminations....he laid down no preconditions." He had only insisted that East-West talks should resume "as between equals" and not merely be "dialogue for the sake of dialogue."

The Americans also met with the new leader in the Kremlin. After a thirty minute meeting with Chernenko, Vice President George Bush said that they both agreed that superpower relations should be conducted "upon a more constructive path, in the interests of peace". Bush said that the meeting was "devoid of polemics."

Despite these indications that a thaw in superpower relations might be
at hand, domestic realities ensured that Pierre Trudeau was not at liberty to remain on the political scene. If he had chosen to remain in politics, it would have divided his party and lost the Liberals votes in the next election. On February 29, 1984, Trudeau announced his resignation.

Nothing of substance was done after this time on the initiative. In May, Trudeau was disappointed that his efforts could not sway the NDP to support a Government-sponsored parliamentary resolution on nuclear arms control. Their three proposed amendments were unacceptable to a loyal, middlepower member of NATO. The NDP wanted the resolution to abrogate the ALCM testing agreement; support a policy of no first use, in defiance of NATO policy; and ask the superpowers to seek a mutual freeze, followed by massive reductions. Trudeau had hoped that a widely supported resolution would call the attention of all nations to the points in his decalogue. Trudeau criticized the NDP for their action as the resolution would have been an "important facet" of the initiative.

With his resignation only weeks away, Trudeau wrote Reagan and Chernenko detailed letters about two aspects of his peace initiative. The proposals concerned verification of future nuclear weapons systems, and restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs. One commentator noted that the letters were akin to a 'tidying-up' effort, as the other aspects of the initiative were already designated to other forums. The five power meeting had been left with the Secretary General of the UN, the high altitude ASAT ban was to be proposed at the Conference on Disarmament, and a rejuvenation of the MBFR talks was being considered by the appropriate authorities.

In the final days of his term in office, Trudeau had one last opportunity to present his views of what rational behaviour should be in
light of the dangerously bifurcated international atmosphere. Trudeau said he planned to raise his initiative as "the first order of the day" at the upcoming economic summit in London. A senior advisor told reporters that the Prime Minister would ask Reagan's opinion on the veracity of Trudeau's decalogue of the superpowers' common interests. He was also interested in the President's response as to how they might move towards defusing international tensions. Ottawa officials stressed that the Prime Minister was not restarting his initiative, and that many of his initial goals were supported in a recent study of East-West relations by NATO.181

Unfortunately, the reception at the London summit was similar in spirit to that which had greeted the initiative. Trudeau's efforts to get the US to first acknowledge its partial responsibility for the dismal superpower relationship and then change its behavior caused him to be treated as the "odd man out".182 Innovative thinking and suggestions for novel approaches were no more acceptable at this time than they had been throughout the term of the initiative.

The structure and process of the peace initiative were overly influenced by negative events and nonsupportive attitudes in the strategic and policy environments. Unavoidable circumstances affected the initiative to its detriment. There was inadequate political will and thus the kind of substantive compromises that were necessary could not be agreed upon. The next section will illustrate Trudeau's growing frustrations with the irrationality in the nuclear world. His efforts were also thwarted by the anarchic international system and the predilection in international security relations for incremental policy-making.
The Prime Minister and the Peace Initiative: The Attempted Reassertion of Rational Analysis

Trudeau ventured on his personal arms control odyssey due to a combination of events on the international stage, experiences in his interactions with other world leaders, and his evolving understanding of the complexities of the nuclear world. Various events appeared to be contributing to a dangerous downward trend in international security relations. It seemed conceivable that either by accident or because misperceptions made no other option possible, the superpowers might one day soon go too far in their nuclear brinkmanship.

His efforts during the summer of 1983 to learn more about the problems of nuclear arms control facilitated his growing pessimism. Many of the sources of information that he consulted warned of the congruence of dangerous technology, ideologically biased misperceptions, and crisis instability. Trudeau's personal self-assurance, combined with the fact that no one else seemed willing to act, encouraged him to embark on his precedent-setting efforts. As the senior Western statesman, and with his political career coming to an end, Trudeau wanted to use the powers of his office to the greatest benefit.

There were varying assessments of Pierre Trudeau's motives but his indefatigable efforts to further the initiative convinced many that he had the best of intentions. One commentator, whilst noting a maturation in the Prime Minister's attitude, praised his sincerity and passion.

Unlike many earlier partisan and disreputable strategies, the initiative springs from the depths of his being. He is haunted and tortured by a nightmare, the nightmare of the threat to
humanity's survival on a tiny planet living under the nuclear sword of a modern Damocles.\textsuperscript{186}

Once he was inspired to take concrete action, the initiative was given the first priority in terms of Pierre Trudeau's time and energy. In giving it precedent over his many other responsibilities, he was able to moderate the policy environment and thus, in theory, aid his rational decision-making.\textsuperscript{187} Decreasing his work load and excluding some of the factors from the initial analysis facilitated the essential requirements for accurate cognition: simplicity and stability.\textsuperscript{188}

Trudeau's decision-making was not wholly analytical/rational due to a number of factors. The wide range of significant considerations made the cost-benefit assessment complex and uncertain. It was impossible to consider and synthesize all the relevant information. As well, the method of policy-making had to be ad hoc due to the variability of possible responses, and the influence of external factors over which Trudeau had no control. Even the modified rationality that the Prime Minister employed, in full awareness of these limitations, was eventually defeated by the external world. Charles Lindblom's description of the "successive limited comparison" model is appropriate for this situation. He posits that since means and ends are often intertwined, "the goals are often affected by the desirability of specific means." Thus the "best" policy is not the "one most able to realize the goal but rather the one the decision-makers feel they can agree on."\textsuperscript{189} In the case of the initiative, the policy choice had to be based on what Europe and the United States might agree to, as opposed to the most sensible policy in light of the gravity of the threat. It is possible to trace Trudeau's growing awareness of this discouraging fact.
His speeches and commentary throughout the course of the policy process reveal his initial enthusiasm, followed by a slow realization that the obstacles to success were probably insurmountable. Towards the end of the initiative, he became more and more outspoken in his denunciations of the irrationality of both the strategic doctrines of, and official actions by, the governments of the major nuclear powers.

When he set out on his initiative, it was with a definite air of cautious optimism. He was buoyed by a belief that rationality could prevail over the increasing potential for danger that he saw mounting around him. In Guelph, he averred that a "balanced and rational" approach, accompanied by "a degree of trust, a degree of belief in the good sense of mankind", could rectify the precarious imbalance in international relations. In his speech in Montreal, it was apparent that his confidence had been shaken. He asserted that he had "absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues". He was aware that the task he had set himself could well be defeated by the intrinsic paradoxes of the nuclear world. He noted that the impediments inherent in verifying arms control agreements often resulted in them being left to "nuclear accountants...who do not consider the political dimension". This in turn was confounded by the "fragility of political trust" and the "intellectually difficult" nature of the issues of contention, due to technological complexities and their destabilizing repercussions. The Prime Minister reiterated that success depended on the initiative being "global in scope and perspective", due to the "complex interlinkage" of superpower animosity on a variety of fronts. Despite his protestations to the contrary, it was later obvious that there was neither concerted or adequate support for his proposals in Europe. As a Globe and Mail editorial
concluded in February 1984, the Prime Minister encountered "a succession of open doors and closed minds."195

This irreconcilable truth may have been part of the stimulus behind the forthright criticisms made by Trudeau early in the new year. In addition to his pessimism, Trudeau was growing tired of his role. At the end of November he stated that he did not "want to be in the position of doing the running for the three[smaller] nuclear powers...I will not go there - to either Moscow or Washington - if it is to try and be a broker between the two."196 He was adamant that he would not be an intermediary.197 His impatience with the dilatory attitude of the other heads of state, combined with the superpowers' apparent disinterest, may have caused him to abandon one of the cardinal rules of middlepower quiet diplomacy. In early 1984, he expressed views that both challenged and criticized the status quo, and to make matters worse, he did so in public.

There were several occasions when the Prime Minister expressed his opinion of American perceptions and NATO doctrine in a manner far removed from the conventional Canadian deference in these matters. He told the editorial board of The New York Times that he was not inclined to accept the President's premise that, as of 1981, the Soviet Union had replaced strategic parity with Communist superiority.198 He may have been trying to spark a debate on issues he considered to be illogical, or he may merely have let his frustration get the upper hand. There is no doubt that he was weary of being, by and large, dismissed.

Shortly after Trudeau's blunt disclaimer of one of Reagan's major reasons for his multi-billion dollar strategic modernization program, the Prime Minister gained headline status in Canadian newspapers for his views
on strategic doctrine. At a European management forum in Davos Switzerland, Trudeau became embroiled in a confrontational exchange with first the US Deputy Secretary of State, and then a former prime minister of France. In the first instance, Trudeau argued that the much vaunted withdrawal of selected American nuclear weapons from Europe was illusory, as their retirement was due to their obsolescence, and the new weapons were "more effective and deadlier." He told Kenneth Dam that the introduction of the INF weapons, in terms of quality as opposed to quantity, more than compensated for the removal. The American official was incensed, and chastised the Prime Minister. In the second instance, Trudeau wondered aloud whether the United States would honour its commitment and risk "World War Three" to stop Europe from being over-run by a conventional Soviet attack. His "Jesuistic" musings provoked an acerbic rebuke from Raymond Barre, who said that such questions struck at the foundation of NATO's credibility and hence its strength.

In both cases, Trudeau's dilemma was the result of his failed attempts to impose his definition of rationality on the nuclear rivalry between the superpowers. In his view, the potential danger engendered by the choice of weapons, force planning and doctrine, made the validity of their deterrent value inadequate, or too serious a risk to take. His recognition of the contradictory motives, ambiguous tenets, competing rationales and opposing perceptions within the nuclear world made him query whether the emperor was indeed fully clothed. Although he only voiced a question that many had long pondered, his public doubting of the strategic mythology that was the underpinning of NATO's unity was intolerable.

Reactions varied. A member of the Department of National Defence
commented that Trudeau's questions were based on "the construction of a whole lot of logic and it's all very interesting but not terribly responsible when he does it in public." In contrast, Paul Warnke, the former chief US arms control negotiator, agreed with Trudeau's doubts regarding the plausibility of flexible response.

In February, although his report to Parliament sought to emphasize the positive developments and the potential for future betterment in East-West relations, his closing remarks hinted at the restrictions he had encountered and the resulting moderation of his initial aims. He promised that his efforts "to subject the science of war to the art of politics" would continue but stressed that, in the final analysis, it was the nuclear powers, especially the superpowers, who would determine the course of future events. He expressed a strong hope that history would survive, so that it might be able to say that the superpowers' "political judgement controlled their technological genius". Somewhat wistfully, he commented that he hoped that it would "be said of Canada... that we saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks;...and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war."

He re-emphasized another theme in this final public statement on the initiative. It was one that he had touched on with increasing frequency and vehemence. His criticisms focussed on the structure and content of NATO consultations, and the input of nations other than the United States into the determination of the safest conduct in the international security sphere. Although he acknowledged that NATO was "an alliance of democracies", he pointedly warned that "an alliance that fails to defend democracy in its councils will surely fail in its defence of democracy in the field." He
urged that the upcoming NATO review take into consideration "the full range of ideas...about international security and the effects of nuclear arms." Although many of the ideas were "uncomfortable, incompatible and awkward to examine....no conspiracy of silence would make them go away." He warned of the "differences of perceptions among alliance members; with European and North American perspectives, inconsistencies and ambiguities; with inchoate doubts and aspirations on each side of the Atlantic." There is no evidence that his words have been heeded.

The Prime Minister stepped down at the end of June. Several months later, he used his last opportunity in the spotlight to challenge the world to find a path towards peace. When Trudeau accepted the Albert Einstein Peace Prize in November 1984, he urged world leaders to pursue the "politics of peace" with more energy, as opposed to their customary "sporadic" concern with halting the threat of nuclear war. He asserted that the political leaders "will decide whether the possibility of nuclear war will be transformed into...a reality...And yet, they are the ones who are mostly absent from the discussions and attempted resolution." With a none too subtle reproach by inference, he urged that NATO be transformed "into a vital political alliance, as had been intended in the beginning."

He again criticized NATO meetings as forums merely for "heads of state to go through the tedious motions of reading speeches, drafted by others with the principal objective of not rocking the boat." He noted that although the annual economic summits were better venues for discussing the nuclear issue, the pressure to conform there was just as strong. To make matters worse, efforts at the Williamsburg and London summits to relay a message of peace to the USSR were seen as "giving
comfort to the Russions." He asserted that "any attempt to start a
discussion or to question the meaning of the communique - also drafted by
others before the meeting began - was met with stony embarrassment or
strong objection."

His personal experiences in policy-making sessions with the Western
world leaders led Trudeau to conclude that there was inadequate discussion
in NATO about issues of critical importance. There are elements of Irving
Janis' model of groupthink in the Prime Minister's description of the NATO
summits. Janis' study reveals that a variety of pressures develop to
simplify thought processes and ensure a unified response. If one considers
the inherent dangers of a 'first use' of nuclear weapons policy, or the
misplaced thrift in depending on comparatively inexpensive nuclear
weapons rather than conventional forces, it would appear that these policies
were made under limited circumstances in terms of rationality. The NATO
policies that were endorsed, or to use Trudeau's phrase, "rubberstamped" at
these meetings share observable similarities with the outcome of groupthink.
Janis reports the following factors are common in group decision-making
under stress: illusions of invulnerability which cause optimism and can lead
to taking extreme risks; collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount
warnings; an unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality;
stereotyped views of rivals/enemies; and pressure on any dissenting
(disloyal) member.

Trudeau may have long been annoyed by the implicit paradoxes of the
nuclear world and what he perceived as the obtuseness of some of the main
players and precepts. In late 1984, the former Prime Minister said he
believed Reagan personally was interested in arms control but queried
whether his advisors would facilitate progress in this area. As well, he hinted that perhaps the President was not able to discern the best policy choices. The Prime Minister repudiated the 1981 zero option and Reagan's 1982 START proposals as "non-starters", and claimed that the President believed he was "making a positive move" simply because that is what his advisors told him.216

The American response may be an indication as to why the Prime Minister was so careful for much of his time in office regarding criticisms of the strategic, doctrinal and arms control facets of the American approach to international security relations. The White House angrily asserted that NATO had been responsible for preserving the peace for more than thirty years and that it had "dealt regularly and intensively with questions of war and peace."217

The Initiative in Retrospect

At the very heart of the initiative was the belief that rational analytical decision-making was possible at the level of individual leadership. An essential aspect of Trudeau's effort was the assumption that the world could be reduced to five nuclear power leaders. In face-to-face summitry, he hoped, they would realize the benefits of lessening the rising tensions in the nuclear world. They would then consider a comprehensive number of policy options and their possible effects, and integrate the conflicting values and goals as much as possible. In turn, they would learn enough from the experience to ensure that a closer approximation to 'comprehensive policy rationality' would prevail in arms control and nuclear relations in the future.

But this hopeful hypothetical scenario was flawed. The controversial
issues in the nuclear world could not easily be reduced to simple elements that would converge in common goals. The various protagonists' perceptions were coloured by ideological biases, an awareness of technological asymmetries, and varying attitudes on possible political uses of nuclear might. The potential for global annihilation would seem to merit making the easing of international security tensions a priority, but the problems that plague attempts at rational decision-making inhibited the imposition of rational analysis in this case as well.

Midway through his initiative, the Prime Minister described his purpose as wanting to give "the political debate, the political input...a dynamic of its own. In other words the peace process will become part of our political preoccupations". He accurately identified such a development as the only rational and realistic way in which the technological momentum and military doctrine could be controlled by the more moderate elements of the superpower relationship.218

Trudeau was successful in bypassing the bureaucrats' incremental decision-making mode, but it took great effort and unconventional behaviour in the policy formulation. The need to consider the interests of NATO and the United States in the policy-making inhibited the task force's analysis of what was rationally needed. They sensibly attempted only what was feasible in terms of Canada's middle power status.219

Any assessment of the initiative should begin with the obvious but nonetheless important point that although the goals were limited in design and conception, the rather quixotic aim of the initiative was to precipitate a moderation of East-West tensions. In the objectives of the initiative, Kim Nossal identifies elements of Canada's "classic internationalist goals: the
reduction of tensions, an increased dialogue between the superpowers, and the search for compromise. Due to the confined nature of Canada's middlepower status, Trudeau saw himself as a catalyst, with limited powers and longevity. But despite these clear limits to Canadian influence, it is possible -- although not conclusively demonstrable -- that the initiative did moderate Soviet anxieties. This possibility will be explored below.

Given the bleak environment in which the initiative was mounted, the meagre and ambiguous results were not an insignificant achievement. The hindrances that eventually overwhelmed the ambitions of the initiative included the dismal state of the international climate; the widely divergent views of the two superpowers; the perceptions within NATO of Canada's limited role and power; the vulnerability of the Prime Minister's personal credentials for speaking on security issues; and the nature of the proposals. In terms of bilateral relations with the United States, a number of ongoing sources of friction had unsettled the relationship. After years of Canada trying to get action on the issue of acid rain, the Americans continued to propose studies. In the area of trade, threats of increased tariffs or quotas on Canadian exports to the US, notably steel and copper, were expected to increase due to pre-election pressure. The bilateral fisheries disputes continued on both coasts. Canadian fears regarding the Garrison Diversion project's effects on the ecosystem of Manitoba met with little sympathy from the Americans.

The difficulties in promoting the initiative were further confounded by the perceptions of the various world leaders. They were hesitant to explore any new dimension to mutual relationships because of the risk of being rebuffed or used.
One of the most tangible results of the initiative may be its effect on the strategic policy expertise in Canada.\textsuperscript{227} By ensuring that the quality of Canadian knowledge of strategic nuclear affairs would be improved, Trudeau hoped to further rational policy analysis in Canadian arms control policy-making. To this end, the 1983 Throne Speech announced the creation of the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security.\textsuperscript{228}

Some claims of success or influence seem feasible. Others are less so, as the possible links between the initiative and their inception are tenuous.

Harald Von Riekhoff and John Sigler argue that other statesmen also recognized the hazardous state of relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. The "distinction" of being the first to speak openly on this issue belongs to Trudeau, "but it is one thing to identify him as a man one step ahead of other world leaders and quite another and much more difficult task to determine the exact degree to which he acted as a catalyst in actually affecting the changing trend".\textsuperscript{229} They note that the White House was opposed to changing the representation at the CDE prior to Trudeau's suggestion, despite pressure from several of the NATO allies. Von Riekhoff and Sigler believe that Trudeau's influence may have "helped to tilt the balance".\textsuperscript{230} In turn, this led to the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and US Secretary of State George Shultz. Trudeau may also have been instrumental in generating movement within the MBFR forum, where a similar American intransigence had held sway, to reconsider the latest Soviet proposal in a more receptive manner. However, Michael Tucker alleges that in both Europe and Washington, it was thought that the "recent overtures to political accommodation...were in large measure the offspring of West German middlepower diplomacy".\textsuperscript{231}
Trudeau claimed some credit for the moderation of Ronald Reagan's "megaphone" rhetoric. In his State of the Union address in early 1984, Reagan softened his criticism of the Soviet Union and urged a return to negotiations and superpower "dialogue". However, it is difficult to know whether this was prompted by Trudeau or a new recognition by the 'Great Communicator' of what his audience wanted to hear. Like many of the possible effects of the Prime Minister's endeavor, it could have been due to other considerations, such as the upcoming 1984 Presidential elections. As well, the fact that Congress had already approved funding for much of Reagan's strategic modernization program meant that domestic support for a confrontationalist approach to the Soviet Union was no longer politically necessary to the same extent.

Another event that could be attributed to either Trudeau's efforts or other considerations was the final communique of the June 1984 London economic summit. It contained a pledge to "pursue the search for extended political dialogue and long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union and her allies", and was reportedly based on a draft circulated by Trudeau. However, the impetus could well have been the need to reassure domestic constituencies. Trudeau had hoped that the statement would also include a recognition that the goal of the West was nuclear parity and not superiority. But when Trudeau urged Reagan to do more, the President exploded, saying "Damn it Pierre, how the hell do you think I can get those guys back to the table?"

A more esoteric possible link may be made regarding a minimally publicized occurrence in the counterintelligence sphere. Oleg Gordievsky was a double agent inside the KGB who defected to the West in late 1984. In
1986, it was revealed that he had told debriefers in the West that between 1981 and 1983, there was a high-level intelligence alert amongst the KGB in Britain. They were ordered to gather all data that would enable the Soviet Union to prepare for an expected nuclear attack from the United States. This erroneous belief may well have been due to a combination of developments within the United States. A most threatening image was conjured up by, inter alia: the new administration's denigration of past arms control agreements; a vastly increased military budget; the development of new strategic counterforce-capable weapons including the MX ICBM, the Trident II D-5 SLBM, and the Pershing II IRBM; and lastly, some exceptionally harsh anti-communist invective not seen since the 1950's. At the end of 1983, the KGB alert was lifted without explanation. It may well have been due to an independent realization that no such attack was forthcoming, but a sympathetic analysis of Trudeau's initiative could plausibly posit that his efforts contributed to the easing of the Soviet Union's apprehensions.

There was no agreement on the five nuclear power summit nor on the banning of high altitude ASATs or mobile ICBMs. However, both Trudeau and the media expressed the view that the proposed summit was "meant only as a talking point...to kick off talks at meetings in foreign capitals." Trudeau went so far as to say that various aspects of the initiative were "all pretext, in a sense, to bring the superpowers back to the table." There were various criticisms made of different aspects of the initiative. Michael Tucker faults what he sees as the over-emphasis on "political will...to the exclusion of the legitimacy of the technical concepts of arms control." Another valid criticism is made of the pace demanded from the task force. Accordingly, there was little time to formulate the
options or to prepare support systems for their maintenance. This led, in the estimation of some, to poorly planned "policy prescriptions" which did not seem suitable vis-à-vis "Canadian skills and interests or the urgency attributed to the situation."239 There was concern expressed that blame was "attributed more or less evenly on both superpowers" and this position of "equidistance" was not appropriate in light of Canada's traditional commitments.240

In structural terms, critics asserted that Canadian influence had been eroded over the years by Trudeau's intermittent approach to the politics of international security.241 They add that success would have been more likely if other middlepowers had been involved, as the initiative was too unilateral.242 Diplomatic resources should have been used to measure support prior to the launching of the initiative.243 Little attempt was made to find allies in Washington among the politicians that did not support Reagan's arms control policies and those who might have acted as lobbyists for Trudeau's peace initiative were not approached.244

In a similar fashion, critics say that the non-aligned states were not pursued in the most effective way. Paradoxically, other considerations made such action impolitic. If Trudeau had linked a transfer of funds from military spending to development purposes, the initiative might have been taken up by these countries. However, it is not likely that such a move would have elicited much support from the developed world.

Other criticisms are even less valid. The "public relations mistake" of going to Europe without first explaining to journalists exactly what the Prime Minister was proposing was minimal in its impact. His failure to outline the leaders' reactions until he revealed the details at a partisan event was due
both to the demands of quiet diplomacy and a constrained schedule.\textsuperscript{245}

One of the more well-founded criticisms came from the NDP external affairs critic, Pauline Jewett. Her comment was legitimate in light of the Prime Minister's failure to make Canadian arms control a priority. "No matter how highly respected an individual might be in world councils, an individual's efforts are all for naught if his own government's policies and actions support the nuclear arms race".\textsuperscript{246}

Some might say that Pierre Elliott Trudeau came too late to his peace-making role. There is an element of truth in that comment. Who knows what would have happened if the Prime Minister had been able to continue in his efforts, or if Canada's credibility had been more firmly established. However, faulting his tardiness is less worthwhile than applauding his eventual temerity. He tried to change the trend line of crisis, and motivate the policy elites who determined superpower arms control. Escott Reid, a senior member of the Canadian delegation at the founding of NATO, draws an interesting analogy between Canadian efforts in 1945 and 1983. In each case, the goal was to restrain both superpowers. Reid states that Canada had the right and the duty in both cases to persuade the United States to "follow wise policies".\textsuperscript{247} "We were obsessed with the same problems that the Prime Minister is obsessed with".\textsuperscript{248} Bromke and Nossal concur and note that the initiative sought the same goal as Pearsonian diplomacy: "the spreading of calm, the encouragement of negotiation, the reduction of tension and the search for compromise between the superpowers.\textsuperscript{249}

Trudeau's failure to develop an infrastructure for the high-priority issue of arms control in the Canadian policy agenda was a major factor in the
initiative's demise. The demands and costs of the role that Trudeau wanted Canada to assume should have been addressed long before. Some analysts claim that the "aimless muddling through, the persistent indifference to the deterioration in East-West relations and the low priority given to foreign policy exacted a price...the evaporation of Canada's influence." If more defence spending was required to gain a more sympathetic audience, this route should have been explored.

If nothing else, the final legacy of the initiative should be a recognition of the need for a much more comprehensive approach throughout the policy-making process and structure, in order that arms control, and crisis management in the nuclear world, is made a priority. There are many decisions that can be made to benefit the cause of peace without being detrimental to the nation's interests. To be effective over the long term, it must be a sustained Canadian objective, as opposed to just one man's. The Prime Minister himself recognized this point; he told one of the first meetings of the task force that he should have started earlier. He subsequently acknowledged that "peace must be waged steadily." As well, the diplomatic corps, and the departments responsible for foreign and defence policy, should have been directed to regularly consult arms control specialists so that arms control could have been a part of the Canadian agenda in any forum that was deemed appropriate. In future, those specialists could be guided by the suggestion made by the Prime Minister in his last Throne Speech. He promised that "fresh ideas and new proposals, regardless of source, will be studied and promoted."

The evolution of the Prime Minister's attitude towards the nuclear world is most notable in his prescription on how best to wage peace in a
world that, within the last thirty-odd years, has seen 35 million people die in over 130 conflicts. He suggested that the United Nations Security Council, through judicious use of the veto, be used to control the threat of regional conflict when there was the danger of such conflict spreading to engulf the superpowers. The five nuclear powers should work to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially article six, which requires disarmament negotiations to be conducted in good faith. He listed a number of steps by which NATO could show its desire for peace and its political maturity: 1) once the respective forces of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were reduced to 900,000 each, NATO should adopt a policy of "no first use"; 2) to facilitate the troop reductions, the negotiators at the MBFR discussions should be urged to respond more positively to Soviet proposals made in 1983; 3) the United Nations should sponsor a five nuclear nations summit, and NATO should urge its members to attend; 4) the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems should be banned; and 5) NATO should announce a temporary moratorium on INF deployments in Europe, conditional upon a similar Soviet response, and negotiations on this issue should be resumed.

Future efforts by Canada, or any other middlepower, to influence the course of the superpowers' nuclear arms control behaviour would do well to remember that there are dues that must be paid prior to any such attempts. The Prime Minister believed that agreeing to test the ALCM in Canada earned him a right to ask questions, but the US and NATO saw it more as a responsibility to the Alliance to be fulfilled as a matter of course. There are limits to what influence Canada can expect to wield. It will always be at the margin of the real locus of activity, but it can be effective at the level.
There must be a clear recognition that arms control can facilitate a credible deterrence, encourage confidence-building measures and contribute to a verification regime that nurtures parity, compliance and trust. In the future, a careful analysis must be made of what the best arms control policies are in terms of Canada's middlepower status. Whatever policies are chosen, diplomatic effort and support must be ensured. An examination must be made of whether increased defence spending would garner more credibility, and appropriate action taken if necessary.

However, an element of realism is required. As noted by Pierre Trudeau in November 1984, there is a congenital obstacle to rational decision-making in strategic matters which is difficult to overcome. The topic is "esoteric", and the pertinent information is "voluminous" and "laced with contradictions." The inability of any government leader to both master the subject and discharge his other duties causes him to rely on others, which "means that the nuclear accountants...on both sides hold the world to ransom." 257

There is no way to measure with any certainty whether Trudeau did achieve any lessening of world tensions, as cause and effect in international relations is a nebulous exercise at best. However, the initiative was so innovative and inspired by such a noble quest that it would do well to stand as a model for future Canadian activities in times of similar crisis. Pierre Trudeau's final plea for sanity and "common sense" to prevail clearly depicts why his efforts were, in the end, a valuable and valiant endeavor.

This year we know that spring is no longer assured, that mankind now possesses the power to prevent all further springs, all opportunity, all life; the power to create a
permanent winter...a nuclear winter. In a world with untold riches to be discovered, with massive human wants yet to be alleviated, in this world...[there is]...explosive power so overwhelming...the use of only a small portion of it endangers the continued existence of life on this planet...[and would]... destroy the brilliant accomplishments of seven millenia of poets and architects, musicians and scholars, theologians and artists, destroy all God's handiwork...[and]...place in jeopardy the lives of five billion people.258

In these words, he encapsulates the enormity of the threat that drove him to undertake his peace mission. It also reveals that his vision of the world had been irrevocably changed by his exploration of international security in the nuclear age.
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON CANADIAN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

This thesis has illustrated that between 1978 and 1984, a variety of circumstances made it increasingly obvious that there was an objective need for a very high priority to be given to nuclear arms control. Yet for much of this period, the makers of Canadian foreign and defence policy tried to maintain the status quo, or confine any changes to either rhetorical or incremental modifications of existing policy.

In the opinion of the relevant bureaucrats, nuclear arms control was a worthwhile endeavor but its abstract and convoluted nature, and Canada's minimal influence in this area, ensured that Canadian policy would not be pursued at the cost of other more important priorities on the government's agenda. Any Canadian arms control suggestions had to be carefully presented and qualified in a manner that would accommodate the security interests of the European allies and, especially, those of the United States. Considerations such as Alliance unity or the well-being of the economic relationship with the United States regularly took precedence over Canada's stated arms control policy objectives.

The Canadian government's preoccupation with other priorities meant that the changes wrought by new technology, doctrinal modifications, and President Reagan's strategic modernization program were, if not unnoticed, then unattended to. Canadian foreign policy decision-makers failed to realize that the system of nuclear politics that had benefited Canada in the past was changing. Due to technological innovations, it was more feasible but no less dangerous to plan for the use of nuclear weapons in a limited context. Political changes in the White House brought to the fore ideologues who believed that
nuclear war was a policy option that had to be planned for. The major shifts in American strategic doctrine and force planning should have prompted a re-evaluation of the strategic and policy environments and subsequent adjustments to Canadian arms control policy. However, the dearth of independent sources of strategic analysis in Canada and the resulting dependence on American information and analysis, as well as the chronically shortsighted nature of political behavior, ensured that no such action was taken until the Prime Minister's peace initiative.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau's perceptions of the nuclear reality underwent an evolution during the period examined in this thesis. He had come to power at the beginning of detente, when world events seemed to promise better management of the superpower relationship. The Canadian involvement with the official recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China and the imminence of SALT I seemed to bode well for a future world characterized by more harmony. Trudeau approved the abandonment of Canada's nuclear contribution to the Alliance because of his firm belief that international security relations would soon be reshaped by widespread recognition of the inherent wisdom of pursuing peaceful co-existence and nuclear arms control. When such optimism proved misplaced, his revised logic led him to pursue multilateral efforts to stop the ever-intensifying nuclear arms race.

To a large degree, bureaucratic politics dictated the Canadian arms control policy suggestions at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament. Although thought-provoking in their insight, they were largely well-meaning rhetorical suggestions. They were indications of what would be desirable in the best of circumstances, but were not really intended or expected to be anything more than expressions of concern. The Canadian government was not confident, appropriately enough, of its ability to intervene directly in the course of the
nuclear arms race. The lack of actual policy commitment was due both to the declamatory and very public nature of the UNSSOD forums and to the fact that the specific issue was not then a high priority on the government's agenda. Nuclear arms control was a general objective. Financial support and political enthusiasm were allocated to the topic of arms control but never in substantial terms. Nuclear arms control was not a priority for the electorate until the controversy over the ALCM tests educated a large segment of the population on what had previously been an esoteric topic. Even then the understanding of the issues was clouded by conflicting interpretations.

Despite the very different circumstances between UNSSOD I in 1978 and UNSSOD II in 1982, government policy continued to rely on standard operating procedures that were grounded in the belief that the UN forums' influence was minimal. The Canadian bureaucracy was forced to engage in ever more elaborate rhetorical and cognitive deceptions in order to rationalize their enduring policy premise that the growing danger did not merit a change in the status quo.

The Prime Minister tried through the two UN Special Sessions On Disarmament to argue that alternative, less combative behavior was appropriate throughout the world. He was unsuccessful and events in international security politics minimized the value of Canada's suggestions. The failure of negotiation in the INF forum and the resulting impending deployment caused the superpower relationship to plunge to a new low. These events and Canada's involvement in the controversy over the testing of the ALCM were part of the impetus that moved Trudeau to act unilaterally in his peace initiative.

The decision to allow the tests and the Prime Minister's peace initiative were instances where specific aspects of the nuclear world led to the formulation of government policies that were neither in Canada's best interests
in the case of ALCM testing, nor very realistic or effective in the case of Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative. In both instances, government policy was influenced by Trudeau's perception of the role of rationality in the initial assessment and ensuing response to a problem. Trudeau believed that only rational decision-making, with its careful analysis, causal learning, and attempted value integration, could even begin to comprehend the reality of the horrors of a nuclear war, and thereby encourage serious multilateral efforts to decrease the threat. Unfortunately, as Albert Einstein is so often quoted as saying, the advent of nuclear weapons changed everything except mankind's ability to understand the new reality. Thus the human race, only dimly aware of its predicament, stumbles ever closer to its last crisis.

In the case of the ALCM testing, most of the initial discussion was limited to the American and Canadian official military elites who directed the development of the policy. For much of the decision-making process, the bureaucratic policy-makers ignored any information that would have required a change in their perceptions. No appraisal was made as to how the ALCM fit into the Administration's plans in light of their hostility towards the Soviet Union and the conservative White House's desire to regain clear strategic superiority. Thus the information that was given to the Canadian politicians encouraged a minimal readjustment of their perceptions of the status quo.

The Prime Minister only asserted his influence at a very late date in the ALCM policy process. Trudeau's involvement was prompted by his realization that the domestic reaction and public controversy within Canada necessitated some political damage control. The government's subsequent attempts to moderate the negative public reaction to the tests provides a clear example of how nuclear issues engender inconsistent policy outputs. The confusion often caused by nuclear weapons can be traced to the ease with which their roles can
be interpreted so as to support a number of different conceptions of reality. The debate over the significance of the ALCM tests in Canada revolved around two questions: first, whether an agreement was a necessary response to the increased Soviet threat and hence involvement in any way an unavoidable duty of a member of the Western alliance; and secondly, whether permitting the tests amounted to a tacit endorsement of an inherently destabilizing technology.

The problems in interpreting the ramifications of the ALCM were caused by the ambiguous nature of the doctrine and technology that structure the nuclear world. Cruise missiles were alternatively presented as a bargaining chip for arms control, reassurance to the European allies that their security was explicitly tied to the US nuclear arsenal, or as an adjunct to American nuclear war-fighting capabilities. While the last reason was abhorrent to many Canadians, the first two were acceptable and legitimate motives for Canadian participation. The tangled logic involved in rationalizing development and deployment of the Cruise missiles epitomizes the paradoxes implicit in nuclear doctrine.

Canadian policy choices with regard to ALCM testing were limited to a small number of alternatives. Perceptions of an ally's responsibility to NATO and the need to avoid aggravating the delicate bilateral relationship with the United States constrained the policy selection. Since the human mind dictates that stability and simplicity are the ideal in both policy and decision-making, any incongruous interpretations of the impact of Cruise technology were ignored. Major restructuring would have been necessary if the logic behind a refusal had prevailed.

When considered in a variety of contexts, the decision to allow the testing of the ALCM now seems unavoidable. Trudeau's pragmatic response was also prompted by the need to emphasize Alliance unity in light of the divisions
within NATO’s domestic constituencies over the deployment of the INF. For the Prime Minister, agreeing to the ALCM tests was part of Canada’s responsibility to NATO, but he also hoped to earn credibility and influence through his assent. However, the Prime Minister knew his leverage was limited since a refusal by Canada would not affect the strategic doctrine or force planning that had devised roles for the Cruise missiles. His recognition of this fact and the growing acrimony between the superpowers eventually influenced him to change his personal priorities and tactics.

Various external developments led Trudeau to believe that dangerous tensions in the international situation merited immediate and wholehearted remedial action. As well, his energy and personal commitment to his peace initiative may have been motivated in part by a desire to offset the essential powerlessness of Canada’s position as revealed by the ALCM affair.

In the instance of his personal peace diplomacy, specific policy actions were developed because the Prime Minister felt the international situation demanded an innovative approach. A fundamental review of what was accepted as conventional wisdom in the nuclear age was warranted by the increasing gap between rational policy choices and the demands for ever more accurate and deadly weaponry to fulfill the role envisioned by American nuclear counterforce strategists.

The Prime Minister’s peace initiative was predicated on his belief that the imposition of rational analytical reasoning could control the rising dangers in the nuclear world. Despite the failure, by and large, of his attempts to impose rational decision-making on the policy process within Canada, the Prime Minister seemed confident of his success in the initial stages of his personal diplomacy. His previous attempts to restructure and retool the policy-making apparatus in Canada had been defeated by bureaucratic politics, the
contradictions and complexity of many of the issues, and the deep constraints on rationality in decision-making due to the limitations of the human mind. He did not seem to fear a repetition of these negative influences on his initiative, perhaps because he was determined to maintain control of its conduct and development. In addition, he did not attempt a purely rational, completely comprehensive analysis and response to the problems of the nuclear world. His experience in politics and his growing understanding of the ambiguities and dilemmas within the realm of international security moderated his approach.

Mixed scanning of a limited number of behavior alternatives and a modified rationality were prompted by Trudeau's revamped and more realistic assessment of Canada's power and influence. The Prime Minister's efforts to create support for his policy proposals were to no avail because the realities of the international scene in late 1983 and early 1984, and the contradictions within the nuclear world, undermined the chances of any real accomplishment. His attempt to inspire the political will necessary to control tensions in the superpower relationship was based on his belief that the politicians must take responsibility, and try to control the more dangerous tendencies in strategic doctrine. He stressed the need to subdue military/technological imperatives to the dictates of rational behavior.

The country's tradition of internationalism made Trudeau's attempts to moderate superpower tensions and behaviour a typically Canadian effort. His attempted policy innovations were in large part due to his personal evolution. Trudeau was so moved to action by the perils of the nuclear reality that he set aside many of his other responsibilities as government leader. He devoted himself to mastering nuclear doctrine and logic. Once he appreciated the risk inherent in the machinations of counterforce nuclear strategy, he recognized the political duplicity and substantive irrationality that are a congenital aspect of
the nuclear reality. He felt compelled to wage peace with great urgency, but the paradoxes of nuclear doctrine and alliance strategy, enhanced by the unavoidable ambiguities of international relations, ideologically-inspired misperceptions, and Canada's own limited influence, confounded his efforts. The lack of support from other world leaders and the initiative's dependence on their reactions meant there was little tangible success.

Throughout the period under examination, Canadian arms control policy was affected by the atmosphere both within Canada and on the international scene. Compromises and noncontroversial policy suggestions were necessitated by a realistic assessment of the bilateral tensions in Canada's relationship with the US. The many other domestic and international affairs that needed immediate attention and the constraints posed by cybernetic policy-making, organizational artifice, and unavoidable cognitive/perceptual dilemmas within much of the government bureaucracy provided more than adequate means of ensuring that real innovation in this area did not occur. In addition, the technological impetus within nuclear weaponry research and development, the perceived need for the INF deployment, with its conflicting rationales and ramifications, and the latent barriers to rational analysis caused by convoluted theories of deterrence and limited nuclear options further restricted Canadian arms control policy.

The geopolitical situation that Canada found itself in eliminated any possibility that Canada would be able to analyze the problems of arms control from a detached point of view and then act on its objective findings. As well, this thesis has shown that even if such were the case, the issue of nuclear arms control would not often be considered in any but abstract terms. Foreign and defence policy is formulated in response to, inter alia, electoral demand, and usually short term preoccupations. The very nature of international security
relations meant that nuclear arms control, and the accompanying effort to moderate superpower hostility, had to be comprehensive and visionary. Without long-term planning, any arms control regime would be undermined by the fact that weapons development and acquisition is usually well ahead of the weapons being considered for arms control.

Unfortunately, the nature of politics works against the successful implementation of long-term views and plans. Far-reaching ideas are seldom fully developed due to the exigencies of meeting short-term and politically relevant demands. These restrictions are amplified by other factors, such as the unavoidable problems in decision-making, ranging from the constraints on accurate perception and cognition to the structural complexity of the actual policy-making process.

These problems are enhanced by the irresolvable conflict between the different modes of rationality in the political process. Both the ideal and the appropriate means of attaining the policy objective are influenced by the decision-maker’s initial belief system and biases. When these inherent obstacles to policy rationality are factored into the arena of nuclear arms control, the complexity and contradictions rise markedly.

The nuclear world is determined by paradoxical logic within a framework of illogic. Such a dichotomy highlights the essential nonrationality of the nuclear world. The nature of deterrence requires that strategic planning be based on worst case scenarios and interpretations of the enemy’s intent that may well be spurious. The nuclear weapons in each superpower’s arsenal must be primed to respond to the slightest provocation in order to ensure that the threat is of sufficient magnitude to deter adventurism. There is no evidence for many of the most important suppositions, yet unprovable propositions and incomplete information detract in no way from their apparent legitimacy in the
policy development of strategic doctrine. The nature of this ambiguity and its possible dangerous consequences makes the doctrine of deterrence inappropriate in light of the nuclear threat, but unavoidable due to the nature of the political threat. The strategic value of overkill depends on its psychological value because the whole concept of deterrence requires fear as an essential element of its success.

Strategic doctrine that calls for flexibility in nuclear war-fighting may very well raise the risk that specific counterforce strategies may be transformed into self-fulfilling prophecies, as warning times decrease and counterforce capabilities increase. Each side responds to what it perceives as the other's strategic doctrine, which was originally developed for purely hypothetical worst-case situations. Thus the nuclear "logic" crafts a self-reinforcing, self-perpetuating existence.

Ideologically inspired antipathy inhibits the communication between the superpowers. The peripheral status of Canada is inadequate to change this fact unless one or both of the superpowers is unusually open to persuasion to moderate its policies. In light of this reality, it is accurate to posit that Canadian foreign and defence policies may always have to be reactive. Thus the times when a Canadian initiative can influence the superpower relationship are likely to be rare, and must be husbanded.

Canadian arms control prescriptions should be grounded in an advocacy of the concept of mutual assured destruction and consciously try to encourage a move away from counterforce targeting options that stimulate war-fighting scenarios, doctrine and force planning. The limits on Canada as a middlepower might be minimized in a number of ways. Influence could be sought by developing a more effective presence in the Western alliance through a number of different paths. One way would be to work closely with other like-minded
powers. In order to strengthen Canadian qualifications and credibility on security issues, some increased defence spending may be necessary. Establishing areas of arms control and disarmament expertise in the tradition of functionalism would be a wise course of action. With due care and attention, clear guidelines within flexible boundaries should be specified to facilitate ongoing and concerted efforts in all appropriate arms control forums. The need to construct policies that are both acceptable to the European allies and the United States is one cost of belonging to NATO and NORAD, but membership also offers the opportunity to speak within those forums. The aim should be to make the Canadian voice one that is listened to.

This optimistic nostrum is, of course, too simplistic when Canada is faced with a President like Ronald Reagan, who was bent on military re-assertion and opposition to the Soviet Union in every facet of the superpower relationship. Prime Minister Trudeau was aware as early as 1981, after the summit in Bonn, how confrontational the United States was prepared to be with Ronald Reagan at the helm. The substantial limitations on Canada's independence and the tradition of following the United States' lead made it difficult to chart an independent course without repercussions.

Yet Canada should be ready to wield whatever influence it can, as the Reagan administration will pass and new relationships may be forged. In terms of defence spending, the government should choose one of two paths. It can expend the effort and concomitant funding necessary to establish a supportive infrastructure for an enlarged defence role within the NATO alliance. The intention would be to enhance its credibility and influence in the area of nuclear arms control in order to act in tandem with like-minded allies, who share similar priorities, interests and perspectives. Alternatively, the apparently minimal interest on the part of the most of the electorate in arms control and
defence issues might lead the government to scale down its defence spending and redirect those funds to other worthy efforts, be they foreign aid projects or domestic social programs.

In future, Canada would do well to prepare for other crisis situations so that informed Canadian expertise could serve to moderate hostile relations between the superpowers. Such preparation would entail a deliberate attempt to improve the calibre of strategic and arms control analysis within the Canadian government.

The current situation finds Canada with little influence in nuclear arms control. It may well be that the constraints on rational decision-making inherent in any policy process are amplified by the illogic of the nuclear world to the point where reasonable analysis is impossible. But as one can never be sure of such a conclusion, it is best to forge ahead with restrained optimism, tempered by a calculated appraisal of the optimal means of enhancing Canadian influence.

The unavoidable constraints on a middlepower's rational decision-making cannot be overcome completely. However, the fulfillment of the necessary commitments in terms of Alliance relations, wise policy management, and carefully specified goals could do much to ensure that Canada's voice, when raised selectively on arms control issues of great import, would be heard. The impact of Canadian diplomacy will depend to a great extent on the attitude of the major players in the nuclear world, but it should never be said that the effort was not made. The stakes are too high and the responsibility too great for Canada to do otherwise.
CHAPTER I: CITATIONS

1. The Reagan Administration's initially negative attitude towards arms control, their subsequent military build-up, and aggressive demands for Soviet concessions in arms control will be examined in detail later in this paper.

2. The term "nuclear world" is used throughout this paper to describe the events or circumstances brought about when nuclear weapons are used to further political and strategic goals via explicit threat articulation or other means of indirect signalling of aggressive intent. The nuclear world is influenced by technological innovations, decisions to develop and deploy a variety of weapons, and the ongoing dynamic of the superpowers' entwined international relations. More detail will be given about Trudeau's rational/analytical model of decision-making below. Rationality is conceived in terms of Graham Allision's criteria for rational action as well as John Steinbruner's precepts for decision-making that is in conformity with his 'analytic paradigm'. Allison's and Steinbruner's terminology will be discussed below.

3. A variety of ongoing events prior to 1978 set the scene for the worsening international relationship but it was many of the events in the years immediately following that made the superpower relationship even more tenuous. The factors included: the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; the collapse of the SALT II ratification process; the US nuclear build-up under the Reagan administration; the accelerating deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe, both in terms of the SS-20s and the Pershing IIs and Cruise; the deterioration of stability in the Middle East; various problems in each superpower's realm of influence, which the other sought to exploit; and various third party developments like the Iran-Iraq war that contributed an element of tension.

4. Rational decision-making is predicated on the belief that in the search for the best possible policy, all options are considered, the chances of their success weighed, and the benefits and costs of each are evaluated. In order to make the best decision, the policy-makers are open to new information and learning is an essential part of making the best choice. John Steinbruner's cybernetic theory of decision, examined in detail later in this work, suggests that "the decision process is organized around the problem of controlling inherent uncertainty by means of highly focused attention and highly programmed response". The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.86. Successful arms control negotiations require flexibility and an openness to a variety of interpretations of
weaponry and motivations.

5. Robert Jervis cites three modern obstacles to a completely rational policy: 1) the nuclear revolution means that each superpower is essentially vulnerable to the other; 2) the "lack of empirical evidence on many crucial propositions"; and 3) the "increasing role of doctrine and beliefs in creating reality". The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), p.22.

6. The details of these forces will be explained later.

7. The term "disjointed incrementalism" is from Charles Lindblom and refers to "policy-making through small or incremental moves on particular problems" with the result being very similar to what has gone before. Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, "The Theory and Practise of Public Policy-making in Canada", Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, 1982), pp.98-99. This concept will be expanded upon later.

8. Amitai Etzioni's "mixed scanning" model of policy-making may be used to better understand these two policy decisions in that, in varying degrees, they involved situations where the decision-makers were prepared to spend more time, personnel and effort due to the fundamental nature of these decisions. As cited in Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration, p.99. This concept will be expanded upon later.

9. An important distinction must be made regarding the respective values that Trudeau and the Canadian Government attached to nuclear peace, and nuclear arms control. A constant goal was the avoidance of nuclear war. That was seen as a critical requirement for the security of Canada and indeed, the planet, but the place of nuclear arms control in attaining that goal was not so clear. Many considerations were recognized as important in the arms control agenda, ranging from the maintenance of a stable deterrent and the need to "keep up with the Russians", to the limitations of Canadian influence on the superpowers' strategic planning. It was his perception of a very real threat to the nuclear peace that prompted Pierre Trudeau to act with personal urgency in his own diplomatic initiative.

10. As political viability is a constant factor in the formulation of policies, any critique must recognize that priorities set by a large percentage of the electorate are more likely to get the government's attention and action. While the majority of Canadians, according to the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, felt that there was a greater chance of nuclear war in 1979 than four years earlier, this did not directly translate into putting pressure on the government to increase its activism in promoting arms control. Don Munton, "The Canadian Winter of Nuclear Discontent", Current History, Vol. 83, No. 493, May 1984, p. 205. Many people felt that they did not have the
technical or political knowledge to recommend specific arms control policies, and thus trusted the government to do the best it could in such a complicated area. The public's attitude towards nuclear arms control will be examined in more detail in Chapter IV.

11. Another problem that stems from the government's use of rhetoric is that official statements carry a certain authority with them. Thus when they are misleading, their impact on perceptions and the consequent attitudes of both domestic and external audiences may be negative.

12. For example, how the pressures of the economic environment affected decisions regarding Canadian national security is not unimportant, but a detailed examination of this influence would result in too broad a focus for the purposes of this paper. Thus some mention of the import of economic considerations is included, but only as one of a variety of relevant factors. For the same reason, Canadian activity in non-nuclear arms control fora has been excluded, although Canada has been fairly active in this area. While it would be too time-consuming to detail all the domestic and international events that may have influenced the actions and attitudes being examined here, some effort has been made to note particularly influential events and their possible consequences.


14. Among other issues, there was contention over the Foreign Investment Review Agency, the National Energy Program, East coast fishing rights, the Garrison diversion project, and the issue of acid rain.

15. Richard Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, was confident that nuclear weapons could be stockpiled and their use threatened as a part of nuclear diplomacy without increasing the risk of nuclear war. Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p.13. Many members of the Reagan Administration belonged to the Committee on the Present Danger, a group that perceived arms control as a ruse that the Soviet Union had used to further their own agenda at the expense of American security. Scheer pp. 36-52.

included a wide range of types of targets - military forces, stockpiles, bases and installations; economic and industrial centres; political and administrative centres; and after 1950, the Soviet nuclear forces. Despite the frequent and sometimes quite radical changes in avowed US strategic policies and targeting doctrines over the past three decades, these four general target types or categories have remained remarkably resilient in US strategic nuclear war plans". p.4. This revelation raises the spectre of actually fighting a nuclear war, and with the recent advent of very accurate and thus counterforce capable weapons, these targeting plans take on a whole new dimension of possibility.

17. An interesting conundrum, and a destabilizing aspect of counterforce strategy is that a retaliatory strike would be against empty silos, so there would not be the same need for accuracy and speed. However, in an offensive strike, these qualities are essential.

18. Desmond Ball has addressed the difficulties of keeping a nuclear exchange controlled. Command and control facilities, even if not directly targeted, would be destroyed due to their proximity to military forces and sites, and the electromagnetic pulse would cause detrimental effects on communications even at a distance from the explosions. Even if attacks were limited to military facilities or essential supplies, they would cause very high casualties. The control of a nuclear war requires great mental flexibility by the decision-makers, a quality which is not facilitated by the decision-making structure of either superpower. The problems of communication caused by misperception in the US-USSR relationship would be exacerbated in a crisis. The public panic and antipathy towards the enemy in the event of war would encourage escalation. Finally, even limited strikes could have grave collateral effects due to the imprecision in measuring effects and the inaccuracy of some of the weapons. "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?", Adelphi Papers, No. 169, (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Autumn, 1981), especially pp.36-38.


20. While the term "arms control and disarmament" is often used in the political literature, most commentators would say that complete disarmament, or returning the nuclear genie to its bottle, is impossible. Disarmament per se is never the issue, except if one means a particular weapons system, mode of launching or area of deployment. Nuclear arms "control" is probably the best that mankind can hope for at this time.
CHAPTER II: CITATIONS

1. These conferences include the various incarnations of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the formulation and review conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the various UN-sponsored conferences on arms control and disarmament. Canada has had a strong tradition of involvement in these discussions of arms control. Since the superpowers limit their own substantive negotiations to a bilateral basis, it has long been Canadian policy to defer to the US in that sphere and to maintain a fairly high profile in the less productive multilateral arms control discussions. Some negotiations are trilateral, as in the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban, where the UK is also involved.

2. Canadian security in the modern age has been identified as being dependent upon both strong defensive measures and arms control. Louis Delvoie, "Canada's international security policy", International Perspectives, July/August, 1985, p.25.

3. Arms control and the strategic planning of NATO and NORAD are inextricably linked, although the stimulus of defence procurements of nuclear weapons systems may be a stronger influence than any consideration of arms control. John Steinbruner accurately points out the danger in the traditional custom of separately managing weapons acquisitions and diplomacy when global security demands a more holistic approach. "Arms Control: Crisis or Compromise", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 5, Summer 1985, pp.1047-49.


7. Escott Reid, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the head of the Political Division responsible for American and European matters, wrote a memo in August 1949. "The United States and the Soviet Union: A Study of the Possibility of War and Some of the Implications for Canadian Policy" cited both the superpowers as "expanding powers". Reid received a variety of commentary on his analysis, both supportive and critical. Many of the respondents voiced concerns regarding the growing American anti-communism. Donald Page and Donald Munton, "Canadian Images of the Cold War", International Journal, Summer 1977, pp. 585-595.


10. These developments included the Korean war, the accompanying exacerbation of anti-Communist sentiment, and the rise in the American defence budget. The development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, strategic bomber and ICBM capability also had implications for the long-term.

11. The 1954 decision to proceed with the DEW line was due to the perception that the Pinetree Line was too close to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases and the industrial centers of the US, and that the offensive capabilities of SAC should be expanded to enhance deterrence. Several thousand interceptor aircraft and nuclear-armed anti-aircraft missiles were incorporated in this plan. James Littleton, *Target Nation - Canada and the Western Intelligence Network* (Toronto: Lester Orpen Dennys Ltd., 1986), pp.79-81.

12. Cox, "Canada and NORAD", p.16.

13. Cox writes that the decision for joint air defence was that in name only since it was actually made by the Americans and merely required the cooperation of the Canadians. Cox, "Canada and NORAD", p.9. Kim Nossal asserts that Canadian governments have had to continue their involvement in NORAD as the alternatives make another policy choice impossible. Either the government would have to provide its own defence system, at astronomical costs, or it would have to accept the unpleasant prospect "that the United States would undertake defence measures in the Canadian north unilaterally, regularly violating Canadian sovereignty." *Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p.5.

14. Donald Page and Donald Munton reviewed a number of External Affairs documents from 1946-7. They assert that while the policy elite did see the Soviet Union as a threat, on the whole the policy-makers did not see Soviet policy "as inherently aggressive or as stemming primarily from communist ideology". There is some evidence that the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and
the Korean war changed that view. However, they do not note any modification of the Canadian view of the US at that time. The documents reveal "a strikingly wary and prescient assessment of the emerging problems with postwar American policy and of the dangers of American expansionism." "Canadian Images of the Cold War", p.599 and p. 604. This interpretation is in sharp contrast to R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein's assertion that while Canadian perceptions of the Soviets were largely influenced by American views, they only reinforced, not established, the anti-communist attitudes of the policy elite. As in Whitaker, The Cold War and the myth of liberal-internationalism, p.5.

16. One of the reasons is noted by Reg Whitaker, who illustrates how Canada was dependent on imported intelligence to a large extent. Over the long run, the practice "ensured that Canadian images of the 'threat' looked more and more suspiciously like the predominant US image." However, this should not be surprising since geography made any threat to the United States a threat to Canada. "More insidiously, this process of dependence promoted the growth within Canada of bureaucratic structures with vested interests in representing external security/intelligence agencies inside the Canadian policy process." Whitaker, The Cold War and the myth of liberal-internationalism, p.15.


19. The details of these developments are explored later in the paper.
21. For the details pertinent to NATO, see "Commentary on the Washington Paper of September 9, 1948, 6 December 1948 Department of External Affairs Files, 283(s) in Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, pp. 370-3. The technological and political impetus for NORAD has been described above.

22. See "Extracts From A Memorandum by L.B. Pearson for the Prime Minister, 1 June 1948" in Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, pp. 369-70.

23. Ibid. p.97


27. Ibid, p.18.


29. Ghent, "Canada, the US and the Cuban Missile Crisis", pp.160-162. Diefenbaker was "more flexible and pragmatic in dealing with Communist governments". However, other commentators would argue that Diefenbaker was prompted more by opportunistic and narrowly self-serving interests.

30. "At no time during the crisis did Kennedy get in touch with Diefenbaker, Rusk with Green or even McNamara with Harkness". Ghent, "Canada, the US and the Cuban Missile Crisis", p.173.

31. Ghent, "Canada, the US and the Cuban Missile Crisis", pp.182.


33. Lyon points to "economic and allied pressures, the assent of appropriate political counsel, poor civilian-military communication, and a general lack of ministerial interest in defence matters [as] factors contributing to quick cabinet acquiescence in what had seemed merely a series of technical decisions." *Ibid.*, p.249

34. Ibid., p.76.

35. Ibid., p.76.

36. Ibid., p.76.

37. Ibid., p.77.


40. Ibid., p.24. Since three of the five bases were in France, which did not allow the storage of nuclear weapons on their territory, all the weapons had to stored in Germany. "Rotating the Canadian squadrons through the German air fields promised to be an extraordinarily inefficient and dangerous arrangements". *Ibid.*, p.25. John Gellner argues that the lure of a nuclear role for the RCAF and the accompanying chance to enter the big league with the wielders of the nuclear weapons" caused DND to change the air role in Europe. "Strategic Analysis in Canada", *International Journal*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, Summer 1978 p.496.


42. Ibid., p.119. A December, 1962 poll showed 54% of the Canadian public felt their armed forces should have nuclear weapons. John Warnock, *Partner
43. Lyon, *Canada in World Affairs 1961-1963*, p. 123. Pearson was advised by his defence critic that the Americans would almost certainly "reduce or terminate" the DPSA, if Canada did not fulfill its nuclear role. Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth*, p.194.


46. See, for instance, SACEUR Lauris Norstad's press conference, and details about the American press release contradicting Diefenbaker in Ghent, "Did He Fall or Was He Pushed?" pp.252-4, and p. 262. Also see Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p.39.


49. For example, Canada supplied napalm to the Americans for use in the Vietnam war, and tax dollars helped to fund the guidance system for the forward deployed submarine launched cruise missile. The ramifications of this last point are examined in detail in chapter 3.


52. The nuclear weapons systems that have Canadian-made parts include the Cruise missile, the Lance missile launcher and the Poseidon and Trident submarines. Ernie Regehr "Canada and the US Nuclear Arsenal", in *Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race*, edited by Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum, (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co. 1983), pp.115-6.

53. Ibid., pp.113-4.


55. George Ignatieff was the Canadian representative to the multilateral

56. In 1974, Canada tried to establish "a contractual link with the European Community" to facilitate the Third Option. However, it was indicated to Canada that such a link would first require a more serious contribution to European defence. This was most influential in the subsequent purchase of $200 million worth of German Leopard tanks. Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge, p. 250. In the fall of 1983, senior American defence officials made negative comments about Trudeau's peace initiative lacking credibility due to Canada's "shameful cutbacks" in its contributions to NATO. Cited in "PM berates Pentagon critics", The Vancouver Sun, November 19, 1983.


60. As in Ignatieff, "Canadian Aims and Perspectives", pp. 696-7.


63. According to one of his biographers, Trudeau only discovered in the late 1970's that "most people are not rational...and that many political problems cannot be solved by any means." Richard Gwyn, The Northern Magus: Pierre Trudeau and Canadians (1968-1980), (Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 1980), p.50.

64. Elizabeth Young, "Hope springs eternal...", International Journal, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, Summer 1981, p. 420. Domestic forces in both countries have been influential in encouraging the arms race. The Joint Chiefs of Staff linked their support for the SALT I negotiations to the Nixon Administration
supporting the deployment of MIRV technology, and the acceleration of the Trident submarine program was "Kissinger's quid pro quo to the Joint Chiefs for supporting the Soviet edge in missile capability provided in SALT I." Lloyd Jensen, "Two years after Vladivostok is SALT worth its salt?" International Perspectives, January/February 1977, p.18. The Soviet military build-up since 1972 may have been the price the politicians had to pay for the Soviet military's acquiescence.


68. More detail on this strategy shift will be given in Chapter IV. Of particular interest to Canada, although this was not apparent at the time, was one of the weapons that the American military chose as a response to the perceived inequity. The low-flying, radar-evading, Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), which could be fired from B-52s off the shore of the USSR, was seen as a perfect way to foil the Soviet air defence capabilities.

69. See Ball, "The Development of the SIOP", p.16 for details on the development of limited nuclear options and regional nuclear options.

70. See Chapter IV, p. 85 for specific details.


76. In an address to the National Association of Evangelicals, in March 1983, the President said that the "sin and evil in the world" must be "opposed with all our might". He described Soviet communism as "the focus of evil in the modern world" and those who promote a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons ignore the "aggressive instincts of an evil empire." Anthony Lewis, "Onward Christian Soldiers", *The New York Times*, March 10, 1983.

77. The Committee on the Present Danger was set up in 1976 by the hawkish elements in the American political spectrum who believed that the Soviet Union was using arms control and detente as covers in their quest for world domination. For more details on the membership of the CPD and their methods see Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War*, pp.53-59.

78. In comparison, Pierre Elliott Trudeau believed that there was parity between the superpowers at the level of strategic weaponry, although he did support the deployment of the Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles in Europe to offset Soviet advantages in intermediate range weaponry. Trudeau was also much more prone to advocate the need to recognize the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The disparities between his views and those of Ronald Reagan will be detailed in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER III: CITATIONS

1. The main sources of influence were the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and its relevant committees and ministers, the respective bureaucracies of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence, and, to a much lesser degree, Parliament.

2. The external restrictions range from Canada's middle power status in the international arena, to its traditional following of the path set by its alliance partners, to its dependence on predominantly American analyses of the nuclear world. In the domestic realm, Kim Richard Nossal cautions against mistaking activity for influence, as many are active but they do not influence the actual policy. Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, 1985), pp.61-2.

3. As Prime Minister Trudeau pointed out in his address to UNSSOD I, the "technological impulse" that lies behind the development of nuclear weapons can pre-empt national policy for "long periods ahead." Canada, The Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches No. 78/7, "Disarmament: The Problem of Organizing the World Community", A Speech by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, May 26, 1978, p. 4.

4. For example, the impact of the Senate Committee on External Affairs is not seen as influential enough to merit inclusion.


6. Ibid., p.78.

7. Two analysts of the Canadian political policy-making process assert that Trudeau, while mercurial in his interest, was most influential when he wished to be. "On issues that were of strong personal interest to him or were deemed urgent, Prime Minister Trudeau could be aggressive and creative in leading cabinet to agreement on solutions." Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, 1982), p.113.


13. Bruce Thordarson notes that there was a 40% increase in the first year in the size of both the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office. Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, p. 86
15. Stephen Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis in the Canadian-American Relationship*. (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co. 1982), p.295. Thus the PCO's appraisal of all draft legislation prior to Cabinet scrutiny, in order "to ensure that the requisite co-ordination" had taken place and "the probable consequences assessed", was undermined by its lack of expertise in these areas. W. M. Dobell, "Is External Affairs a central agency? - a question of leadership controls", *International Perspectives*, May/June/July/August, 1979, pp.8-9.
18. According to the then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "the purpose is to ensure a greater measure of coherence in the management of Canada's international relations by making economic and trade considerations a more integral part of its overall foreign policy." Gordon Osbaldeston, "Reorganizing Canada's Department of External Affairs" *International Journal*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, Summer 1982, p. 454.
21. For example, in 1982 an interest-free loan of $120,000 was promised to Boeing Canada Ltd. under the Defence Industry Productivity Program (DIPP) if it won a contract to produce a component for the MX missile. Ernie Regehr, "Canada and the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal", *Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race*, edited by Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum, (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co. 1983), pp.114-5. The Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce is responsible for allocating the funds for the DIPP. For more information on this point, see Carol Giangrande, *The Nuclear North: The People, the Region and the Arms Race*. (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1983), p.179.
24. Assessing the effects on policy of continuity of personalities in a
particular position is rendered complex by Trudeau's many Cabinet reorganizations. John Kirton notes that Trudeau initially replaced Mitchell Sharp with Allan MacEachen, a "Trudeau loyalist", who was in turn replaced by Don Jamieson, "a more junior minister with a less independent political base." On his return to power in 1980, Trudeau appointed Mark MacGuigan, "a very junior and inexperienced minister and one thus heavily dependent on the prime minister for cabinet influence." In September 1982, Allan MacEachen, who "instinctively shared Trudeau's international values and judgements", was reinstated. Kirton, "Managing Canadian Foreign Policy", pp.18-19.


26. Ibid.
28. Ibid. p.270.
33. Ibid. The responsibilities of the Priorities and Planning Committee include: allocating the budgets to the standing committees; reviewing all committee decisions; and directly handling particularly important issues or those "which cut across the lines of responsibility of other committees". Richard J. Van Loon, "Kaleidoscope in Grey: The Policy Process in Ottawa", Canadian Politics in the 1980's, edited by Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, (Toronto: Methuen Publishers, 1981), p.297.

34. Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, p.112. This last point is especially valid when one considers the multitude of details that are involved in understanding nuclear policy calculations.
35. Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration p.90.
38. David Taras also notes that these groups are sources of expertise and information. Ibid. p.9.
39. Ibid. p.16
40. Ibid. p.6. This last point is especially relevant in the case of the debate
in the House on the Cruise missile testing arrangements.


42. An exception to this norm occurred in early 1982, when the committee tabled its Report on Security and Disarmament which had been ordered to help prepare for Canadian involvement in UNSSOD II. Six members of the committee, representing all three political parties, dissented with the final report and issued their own Minority Report. Their basic disagreement stemmed from their finding "grave deficiencies both in [the Report's] analysis of the effects of the nuclear arms race and in its proposals for action by the Canadian government." Pauline Jewett, Walter McLean, Paul McRae, Douglas Roche, and Terry Sargeant. "Security and Disarmament: A Minority Report", Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, edited by Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum, (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co. 1983), p.216.

43. Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy, pp.47-52. More details of these two reports are presented in Chapter IV. It is of value to this discussion to note that the Minority Report's suggestions were completely ignored, and the official report's recommendations were included in Canadian arms control policy for UNSSOD II only when they coincided with previous government policy, or were of an uncontroversial nature.

44. Taras, "From Bystander to Participant", p.11. One reason for this interest may be due to the fact that through its investigations and ensuing reports, SCEAND can provide a forum for new or different perspectives, and then focus attention on the need for innovative policy in a given area. Ibid, p.12.


46. Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, p.154. The exercise of this influence was criticized by Flora MacDonald, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the short-lived Conservative Government in 1979. In a public speech after she left office, she complained about the absence of policy options in briefs prepared by the bureaucracy, the overwhelming length of those briefs, and the very common last minute demands for ministerial approval. David Cox, "Leadership change and innovation in Canadian foreign policy: the Progressive Conservative government", International Journal, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, Autumn 1982, p.567.

47. The bureaucratic politics model will be explained in more detail later but at this point, it is sufficient to say that it renders depiction of the policy process more complex.


49. Ibid.

50. Ibid, pp.40-1.
51. Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy p.95.
52. Many lobby groups can have a say, but given the restrictions inherent in the nuclear world, perhaps the arms control lobbyists can influence only what is said publicly by government, rather than its actual conduct. The segment of the Canadian public that was active on this issue was quite vocal on the testing of the ALCM in Canada, but foreign policy has never been the primary focus for the Canadian electorate and thus it has not been a matter of great concern for the elected officials. The public uproar over the Bomarc was an exception until the controversy regarding the ALCM.
53. Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration p.90.
55. The electorate needs to have some justification of expenditure of taxpayers' dollars. In addition, the level of economic integration with the United States meant that Canada could not confront the US on an issue without anticipating possible adverse economic repercussions brought about by a rift in the relationship.
56. Ernie Regehr "Canada and the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal", p.112.
57. "As a result, Canada participates in the production of components for nuclear weapons systems in every category, from tactical to intermediate to strategic." Ibid, p.113.
58. The intent of the 1978 suffocation speech was to "halt the arms race in the laboratory " and thus deprive it of its "technological impulse". Canada, The Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches No. 78/7, pp.4-6. The contradiction was more implicit than explicit, since the suffocation strategy was not meant to be unilateral.
61. The various models make one "aware of the complexity of this process and the multiplicity of personal, political, institutional and cultural considerations" that shape decision-making. While no single "perspective provides a satisfactory explanation...each offers its own particular insights". Richard Ned Lebow "Cognitive Closure and Crisis Politics", International


65. Ibid.


70. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, p.27

71. Ibid, pp. 27-45.


73. For example, Richard Snyder is unsure whether wars result from a failure to consider carefully the various consequences of alternatives or whether they are due to the deliberate pursuit of objectives regardless of predictable consequences. Richard C. Snyder and James A. Robinson, "The Context Of National and International Decision-Making", Towards a General Research Strategy Related to the Problems of War and Peace, (New York: The Institute for International Order, 1961), p.49. John Mack illustrates the manner in which the same behavior will be interpreted in totally different ways depending on who the actor is. He demonstrates his point with reference to the two almost diametrically opposed camps among US military strategists and analysts: the thinkables and the unthinkables. The first group believes one should plan for the event of a nuclear war, while the second camp believes that a nuclear war would create such disaster that there is no point in planning for it. John E. Mack, "Psychosocial effects of the nuclear


75. Adie and Thomas, *Canadian Public Administration* p.97.


77. Ibid, p.100.

78. The mixed scanning that occurred within the ALCM context was prompted by unexpected pressures that had to be dealt with. The peace initiative was based on a fairly intensive mixed scanning process due to the perception that urgent action was needed but within the bounds of acceptable alliance behavior. Further explanation on how these theories are appropriate for the analysis of these particular policies will be given in chapters V and VI.


81. It should be noted that the use of Standard Operating Procedures means that any instances that are extraordinary "are often handled sluggishly or inappropriately". Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", p.702.

82. Ibid, p.698.

83. Ibid, p.698. "Each organization's propensities and routines can be disturbed by government leaders' intervention. Central direction and persistent control of organizational activity, however, is not possible." p.701. Allison notes that the Navy's desire to implement their perceived optimal response in the Cuban Missile Crisis prevailed over the wishes of the President. The Navy's blockade line was not moved, despite reports of such action. Ibid, p.706.

84. Ibid, p.707. Lawrence Freedman offers some insightful criticism of Allison's delineation of his models. He asserts that a lack of cohesion is not necessarily due to bureaucratic politics. Problems endemic to the management of the government apparatus and the design of value-maximizing policies combined with the fact that "competing options, each with their own costs and benefits", often forestall movement on a single rational policy. Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model", *International Affairs*, July 1976, p.438.


86. Ibid, p.708.


89. Details of Nossal's application of Allison's model to Canadian politics are in the next section's discussion of structural problems in decision-making.


93. Ibid. p. 116.

94. Ibid. p. 122.

95. Cognitive theory stresses the human mind's need for simplicity and consistency.


97. Ibid. p. 139.

98. Adie and Thomas, Canadian Public Administration p.89.


100. Ibid. p.392.

101. A good example is the INF, where the proclaimed military goal was to promote the deployment of the GLCM and Pershing II missiles as both a response to the Soviet SS-20s and as a bargaining chip to secure the removal of those missiles. This is at odds with the political goal in that the INF was needed as a means to assure the Europeans that there would be no decoupling of the American strategic arsenal from the defence of Europe. Strobe Talbott notes that Reagan's principal advisors treated the INF not as an exercise in arms control but in alliance management. Strobe Talbott, "Buildup and Breakdown" Foreign Affairs America and the World 1983, Vol.62, No.3, 1984, p.592.


105. Robert Jervis recommends maintaining an awareness of several possible alternative explanations to offset the questionable nature of the empirical evidence in the foreign policy-making field but this is difficult in the fast-paced policy environment. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p.178.


107. Janis reports the following are common in group decision-making
under stress: 1) illusions of invulnerability which cause optimism and can lead to taking extreme risks; 2) collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings; 3) an unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality; 4) stereotyped views of rivals/enemies; 5) pressure on any dissenting (disloyal) member; 6) self-censorship of deviations; 7) a shared illusion of unanimity; and 8) the emergence of self-appointed "mind guards" to protect the group from information that might be disruptive to their established view. Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink, (Houghton Mifflin Co. Ltd. Boston, 1972), pp.197-8.

108. In the case of the decision to test the ALCM, there was a need to reconcile or balance potentially incompatible external demands with internal policy considerations within a fairly short period of time.

109. Denis Stairs believes that previously only the traditional "high politics" issues influenced foreign policy decision-making. "Responsible government and foreign policy", p.26.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid. p.29.

112. Ibid. For example, if one accepts, for a moment, the untested premise that the US would retaliate on economic terms to any substantive Canadian criticism of American nuclear strategies, the government would have to believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. Such a belief would have to take into consideration the possibility that the short-term interests of the electorate, such as employment, might be jeopardized by taking a critical view of certain destabilizing American nuclear weapons, even if such a stance was taken in the interests of the long-term ideal of avoiding nuclear catastrophe.

113. Ibid. p.28.

114. Ibid. p.27


117. Ibid. p.616.

118. Ibid. p.618.

119. Ibid. pp.619-625

120. Ibid. p.626.


122. The problem that confounds rationality in strategic doctrine is that the consequences of any massive use of nuclear weapons make that use illogical, but deterrence requires that the will and ability to use the nuclear arsenal be apparent. Although each new technology may "enhance" deterrence, the combination of all the new technologies is most destabilizing and leads to
open-ended research, due to the fear of technological 'one-upmanship'. The logic of the nuclear world is irrational, in that the failure of deterrence could easily result in too great a cost. However, the whole situation is confounded by deterrence apparently being a necessity. The demands of deterrence on the scale that is present in the current world is dangerous. Under these circumstances, mutually verifiable arms control becomes the most rational move.


124. As one side develops greater accuracy and force in their missiles, the other side is forced to equal, if not better the changes, in order to ensure that the "balance of terror" remains symmetrical. These technological advances result in constantly faster delivery times of the missiles, to the point that any international crisis or a destabilization in the superpower relationship may cause an irretrievable accident.


128. Decision-making in arms control is also plagued by the need to accept some unsavoury truths: global peace can not be a finite goal, in that arms control efforts must be sustained and continuous and such efforts may be politically costly and must deal with legacies of past failures. Problems of verification, the difficulty of agreeing on acceptable methods to measure the asymmetrical force structures in the strategic nuclear balance, and the need to limit the technical opportunities of the other side all pose severe difficulties for the arms control policy-maker.

129. It is very difficult to maintain a balanced view of superpower attempts at arms control because it is difficult to know if a proposal is propaganda or a preliminary move prior to a concrete suggestion.

130. As cited in Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge, p.254.

131. The 1981 MacDonald Report on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
found that Canada relied on its allies for information with military and foreign policy implications, a state of affairs that led Canada to adopt their view and to participate in American policy even if that threatened East-West security. Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge, pp.266–7.

132. Byers, R.B. and Stanley C.M. Ing. "Approaches to Arms Limitations and Policy Preferences", Arms Limitations and the United Nations, edited by R.B. Byers and Stanley C. M. Ing (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), p.5. The authors of the study advocate linking national security requirements with all arms control suggestions to ensure a secure international environment. They recognize the difficulties inherent in choosing a policy option because of the variations in the decision-makers' threat perceptions. p.3.

133. The case that the nuclear world is nonrational is made in more detail in the conclusion to this paper. However, this premise is explored throughout the next three chapters' examination of Canadian arms control policy.
CHAPTER IV: CITATIONS


7. Ibid., pp.5-6.

8. This sum includes spending on conventional weaponry and personnel costs, as well as nuclear arms. In fact, some nuclear weapons, such as the air launched cruise missile, are comparatively inexpensive. However, the money spent on nuclear weapons is not unimportant, both in financial terms and in a symbolic sense. The parity in nuclear weapons may drive the superpowers’ rivalry at the conventional level. Large sums are spent on conventional weapons in the Third World, where they are often seen as both a symbol of power and prestige. In an illustration of the ever increasing arms race, world military spending was at a record $1,000 billion (US) in 1987.


10. Ibid., p.2

11. Ibid., pp.4-5.

12. Although the merits of cruise missiles were discussed in the early 1970’s, and the MX missile was a subject of debate for a decade before its deployment, by and large these discussions took place among specialists rather than in the public realm.


15. Ibid, p.5.

16. As US Senator Sam Nunn noted in 1985, "the cruise missile, the advanced technology bomber, the Trident submarine and the MX were all begun under [former presidents] Nixon, Ford or Carter." "Is Arms Control Obsolete?", *Harper's*, July 1985, p.44. William Baugh asserts that the "ongoing dynamic of scientific research and development dictates that a stream of new developments may be expected to challenge the ingenuity of political leaders in formulating controls and seems to predict that technological drift or creep will continue to overwhelm any attempts to freeze or forgo specific technologies". *The Politics of Nuclear Balance*: p.115


18. Ibid, p.34.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid, p.32.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid, p.3.


30. Ibid.


34. Epstein, "Canada's disarmament initiatives", p.4.
35. Ibid. The Advisor on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs has "less authority and influence than did the first holder of the original position from 1960-1968." The original Advisor had staff in both Ottawa and Geneva, and his policy suggestions could go to the highest level of government without being checked. According to the 1978 guidelines, his recommendations could be modified or over-ruled by the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and officials from the Department of National Defence. Thus they might never reach the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Members of Parliament or SCEAND. William Epstein, "Mounting international tensions underline need for disarmament", International Perspectives, March/April 1980, p.17.


44. Michael Tucker, "Canada and arms control", p.638.

45. If a resolution was considered to be too declamatory, or jeopardizing to NATO solidarity, or versus national security, Canada would vote against it or abstain even if it seemed to be a worthy cause. For example, in the fall of 1978, Canada and all the Nato allies voted against an Indian resolution that condemned the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity and
called for their prohibition. Epstein, "Canada's disarmament initiatives", p.6.


46. In October, 1980 the American government made its first request concerning the testing of the Cruise missile over Canadian territory, and the government did not reject it out of hand. For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter V.

47. Donald Page, "Does Don Jamieson read all those letters you write?", International Perspectives, May/June 1978, p.25.


51. Canada's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to take part in the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, cut off all official visits to the Soviet Union and put an embargo on its grain exports to the U.S.S.R.


54. The whole controversy over this deployment is much more intricate than represented here. The fear of decoupling prompted Alexander Haig to describe the deployments as "representing an effort to reinforce the linkage between our strategic forces in the United States and NATO's conventional and nuclear forces in Europe". R.B. Byers, "Soviet-American Strategic
The controversy over the INF deployments and Canadian attitudes towards this issue are discussed in more detail in Chapter V.


56. Canadian seismic experts had developed means of distinguishing nuclear tests from all but the smallest earthquakes. Robert Reford, "The U.N. Disarmament Conference and Canada", *International Perspectives*, July/August 1982, p.7. According to McGeorge Bundy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not support both a CTB and the SALT II treaty. James F. Leonard, "An Alternative Political Approach", *Nuclear Negotiations: Reassessing Arms Control Goals in US-Soviet Relations*, edited by Alan F. Neidle (Austin, Texas: The University of Texas at Austin, 1982), p.106. A further example of the dynamics of nuclear politics is that, according to some sources, the Trident and widespread MIRVing were the cost of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's support for SALT II. Lloyd Jensen, "Two years after Vladivostock is SALT worth its salt?", *International Perspectives*, January/February 1977, pp.18-19.

57. The MIRVed launcher ceiling under SALT II was set aside by the United States in the fall of 1986 with the deployment of its 131st ALCM-carrying B-52.


61. Eugene Rostow, the Reagan-appointed director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated that he would judge his success or failure not by treaties but by the consolidation of the alliances against the Soviet Union. Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p.86. His successor, Kenneth Adelman, told his confirmation hearings that arms control was a sham and that there were not any "negotiations on security or weaponry that have ever done any good". As cited in Eugene Carroll, "Current Arsenals: The Balance of Terror", Nuclear War: The Search for Solutions. (Vancouver: Physicians for Social Responsibility, 1985), p.50.


65. Comments made by former Deputy Minister of National Defence Buzz Nixon, on October 13, 1984 at "Deciding to Disarm", a Simon Fraser University Conference, October 13-14, 1984, Vancouver, B.C.


68. Ibid, p.2. The technology of the Pershing IIs is seen as potentially
dangerous due to their forward-based deployment which makes them a strategic weapon in Moscow's opinion, and their extreme speed and accuracy. They have a circular error probable (CEP) of 20-40 metres, and a range of 1667 kilometres. R. B. Byers and Michael Slack, "Alliance Issues", *The Canadian Strategic Review 1982*. (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 29.


73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.


77. Ibid.

78. Ibid, p.7.


80. Ibid.

81. The British and French modernization of their nuclear forces will result in those arsenals having more warheads than the SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s combined. The British Navy's acquisition of the Trident II warheads add another threat to the Soviet land-based ICBMs. For more information on this subject, see George M. Seignious III and Jonathan Paul Yates, "Europe's Nuclear Superpowers", *Foreign Policy*, No. 55, Summer 1984, pp. 40-53.


83. Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War*. p.68. There was widespread agreement among strategic analysts at that time that the U.S. Navy had superiority in submarines, antisubmarine warfare, aircraft
carriers and so on.

84. Ibid. p.158.


86. Desmond Ball stated in 1982 that while the U.S.S.R. had more delivery vehicles and megatonnage than the United States, the U.S. retained its fifty percent lead in warheads, which was the more valuable asset, since "after a certain point megatonnage becomes irrelevant". As cited in Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, p.161.


88. President Reagan and American business interests were very much against the NEP and the promised strengthening of FIRA. The US Senate refused to ratify the fisheries treaty signed by Carter and the issue of acid rain was basically ignored by the Americans. Adam Bromke and Kim Richard Nossal, "Tensions in Canada's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No.2, Winter 1983-4, pp.347-8. From February 1980 to October 1981, Trudeau had tried to get the Reagan administration to participate in the North-South dialogue and address the inequity between the North and South. Trudeau's attempts had met with failure at the Cancun summit. See Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, p.96.


92. "The strength of transformation beliefs in terms of cognitive theory derives from the fact that they protect the established belief structure from negative evidence and from the necessity which would otherwise arise of undergoing massive restructuring." New information is shut out so as not to disturb the cognitive principles of stability and simplicity. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, pp.117-8.

93. As cited in R.B. Byers, "Soviet-American Strategic Relations", p.7. Such a strategy requires "escalation dominance", or "superiority at every possible
level of conflict", as described by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group. "Because such superiority would shift the burden of risk of escalation onto the Soviets if they began a war, it is hoped that escalation would keep wars limited, if they occur, and would minimize their likelihood." Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Living with Nuclear Weapons. (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), pp.147-148.


95. Richard Halloran, "Weinberger Confirms New Strategy on Atom War", The New York Times, June 4, 1982. For a penetrating criticism of this rationale, see Louis Rene Beres, Myths and Realities: US Nuclear Strategy. Occasional Paper 32, (The Stanley Foundation, December 1982). "US second-strike counterforce strategy is based on the assumption that a Soviet first-strike would be limited. This is the case because if the Soviet first-strike was unlimited, this country’s retaliation would hit only empty silos...There is absolutely no reason why the Soviets would ever choose to launch a limited first-strike against the United States. It follows that our current search for increasing hard target kill capabilities may be geared to achieving a first strike capability against the Soviet Union." p.10.


97. In early 1982, Michael Tucker noted that while the ambassador and consultative group for disarmament facilitated direct communication with the government, "it has not had any perceptible effect to date on the problem of political commitment." Michael Tucker, "Canada and UNSSOD II", Arms Limitations and the United Nations, edited by R. B. Byers and C. M. Ing, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p.117.


99. Ibid.

100. Between January and April 1982, the hearings held 51 meetings, heard 50 witnesses, and were presented with more than 100 briefs. Canada, The Department of External Affairs, The Disarmament Bulletin, September 1982, p.3.


102. Ibid. p.35.

103. The MPs were Pauline Jewett, Walter Maclean, Douglas Roche, Bob Ogle, Paul McRae, and Terry Sergeant.


105. Ibid.

106. Thus their suggestions that a study on the effects of Canadian defence spending on the economy be made, including "the possible conversion of
Canadian industries to alternative product lines" garnered no official action. SCEAND, Report on Security, p.76.


112. Ibid. pp.20-1.

113. Ibid.


116. Ibid.


120. Ibid. p.9.

121. Michael Tucker, "Canada and UNSSOD II", p.121.
122. DEA, S and S, 82/10, "Technological Momentum", by Trudeau, p.10.
123. Ibid. p.3.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid. p.4.
126. Ibid. pp. 11-12.
127. Ibid. p.11.
128. Ibid. p.13.
129. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. MacNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982, pp. 753-768. These former statesmen have developed a thought-provoking critique of current Alliance policy and a convincing rationale for a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.
130. DEA, S and S, 82/10, "Technological Momentum", by Trudeau, p.2.
133. Ibid.
135. Ibid. p.2.
136. Ronald Reagan did not even comment on Brezhnev's no first use declaration, made a few days earlier via Andrei Gromyko. He devoted much of his speech to a condemnation of Soviet human rights violations and their military superiority and violence, while painting a glowing picture of America's history of advocating arms control. See Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, pp.176-9 for excerpts from both the Soviet and American addresses. Brezhnev asserted that American foreign policy was increasingly pervaded by "a spirit of militarism" which was breeding "all sorts of frenzied military doctrines". R.B. Byers, "Postscript: The Failure of UNSSOD II", Arms Limitations and the United Nations, edited by R. B. Byers and C. M. Ing, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p.125.
137. On May 9, 1982, President Reagan proposed a sixty percent cut in Soviet ICBMs. His proposed next step would require that the Soviets reduce their ballistic missile throw-weight to an "equal ceiling" with the United States. The USSR was far ahead in total throw-weight because of their reliance on large, land-based rockets. Strobe Talbott, "Buildup and Breakdown", Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1983, p.605. On June 3 the Soviet Union rejected the idea as damaging to their defensive capability. "Chronology", Foreign Affairs America and the World 1982, p.722.


CHAPTER V: CITATIONS

1. Despite DND's rhetorical support of arms control, their perceptions were much closer to the Pentagon's regarding the belief that no arms control was possible until American nuclear strength was reasserted.

2. Analytical decision-making, as defined by John Steinbruner, was inapplicable to the ALCM testing policy. It was impossible to weigh all possible alternatives and outcomes, or to reconcile the conflicting goals, due to the difficulty in determining the actual purpose of the Cruise, its implications, and hence the value of the tests. However, once the policy processed to the point of 'no return', and the contextual framework of American-Canadian relations made agreement the only feasible policy choice, the Prime Minister tried to be rational about the policy. Thus he attempted to integrate objectives in a trade-off relationship by linking progress in arms control with his acquiescence to the use of Canadian airspace.

3. For the purposes of this discussion, DND and DEA are represented as unified actors rather than focusing on their internal bureaucratic politics.

4. In passing, the possible relationship between offsets for the Canadian purchase of the F-18 fighter and ALCM tests will be assessed.

5. They knew that such rationale would not find favour, due to the traditional Canadian antipathy towards too much direct involvement with nuclear weapons.

6. The Prime Minister's growing attempts to challenge the negative assessments that prevailed in certain segments of each of these groups will be detailed below, as will be the effects of this difficult exercise on his own view of the nuclear world.


8. On April 2, the SCEAND Minority Report specified that Canada "should deny the United States permission to test the new Cruise Missile system". Pauline Jewett, Walter McLean, Paul McRae, Bob Ogle, Douglas Roche, and Terry Sargeant, "Security and Disarmament: A Minority Report", Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, edited by Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1983), p.220. Between March 22 and May 20, the NDP introduced six unsuccessful motions that called on the government to refuse to test the ALCM. Canada, Department of External Affairs,
9. This paper's use of the term "Cruise missile" should be taken to represent all three types, unless otherwise specified. An acknowledged expert resource on cruise missiles is Richard Betts, Cruise Missiles and U.S. Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1982).

10. There was a great deal of controversy on this point, which will be discussed later in this chapter. There was a basic schism in the perceptions of the superpowers that made any mutual agreement unlikely. For example, Raymond Garthoff asserts that the SS-20s were deployed for a number of valid reasons. The intermediate range SS-4s and SS-5s needed to be modernized. The Soviets needed to shift from variable range ballistic missiles, constrained under the SALT accords, to missiles that would meet the growing regional threat from Britain, France and China. The SS-16 ICBM was not going to be deployed so its production lines could be turned over to the mobile, solid-fueled, Mirved, accurate SS-20. The mobility of the SS-20 and its far smaller preparation time before launch made the weapon far more suitable for retaliatory counterforce strikes than the SS-4s and SS-5s, whose very vulnerability forced them into a first strike role. Raymond Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision", Survival. Vol.XXV, No.3, May/June 1983, p.112. On the other hand, President Reagan believes that the SS-20s facilitate "the ultimate Soviet goal" of forcing Europe to "accomodate Soviet interests on Soviet terms". President Ronald Reagan's address to the American Legion National Conference, February 22, 1983 in Survival. May/June 1983, Vol.XXV, No.3, p. 111.

11. In the words of a leading Canadian weekly magazine, the accuracy is such that it can fly between a goal post after a flight of 1500 miles. David MacFarlane, "In the Shadow of the Cruise", Saturday Night. Vol. 99, No. 12, December 1984, p. 20. The average miss distance of a cruise missile is said to be between 100 and 200 feet. Theoretically attainable levels of 10-20 feet are now mentioned in the open literature.


15. In the beginning, the Air Force and Navy "saw cruise missiles as challenging traditional missions and force structures". Lawrence Hagen,
Air-launched Cruise Missiles: Implications for Deterrence Stability, Arms Control and Canadian Security. The Department of National Defence, ORAE Project No.96134, October 1983, p.4. The Air Force preferred the new bomber, the B-1, while the Navy saw the SLCMS as threatening the pre-eminence of the carriers, and preferred submarine launched ballistic missiles. *Ibid.*, p.5.


17. It compares the preprogrammed route on maps made from satellite photos with the altimeter, which notes landmarks as they pass by, thus allowing the missile to hug the terrain, remain on course, and be undetected by air-defence systems.

18. It is about fifteen times as powerful as the one used to destroy Hiroshima. Its accuracy makes it capable of counterforce operations, although the missile's yield means that there would be considerable collateral damage.


21. A weapons system will be developed as a bargaining chip and will then gain a life of its own as a strategic mission is assigned to it. Some examples are the MX missile and, while President Reagan never saw his Strategic Defence Initiative in this light, others believed it could be a valuable bargaining chip.


23. However, there were distinct advantages to the American version. The Soviet naval Cruise missiles were short range and primitive compared to the TERCOM-guided version.


27. *Ibid.*, pp.5-6. It was not thought that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the Cruise missiles they were allowed under SALT II.


30. Ibid, p.73.
31. The Soviet Union may have perceived the GLCM as an important component of an American first-strike potential. The GLCMs would be used to 'mop up' Soviet air bases and industrial centres after the Pershing IIs eliminated the SS-20s and Soviet command, control and communication sites. See Barrett and Ross, "The Air-Launched Cruise Missile and Canadian Arms Control Policy", for Soviet worst-case assumptions concerning the use of ALCMs to eliminate those silos and launch command posts not destroyed by the preceding waves of SLBMs, IRBMs and ICBMs. pp.721-2.
34. The "continuum of deterrence" is intended to allow NATO to respond flexibly to Soviet or Warsaw Pact aggression.
35. All of these quotes are from Canada, The Department of National Defence, Cruise Missile Testing in Canada - Background Notes, Ottawa, 1983, p.2.
36. Even the seemingly obvious validity of testing because it was necessary was not quite as it seemed. By the time the first ALCM was to be tested in Canada, over 850 at $1.5 million each would have already been delivered to the US Air Force. The Boeing Company said that it had built 40 ALCM/ month since October, 1982, an unlikely risk to take with an untested system. In 1983, Boeing said that the ALCM has "passed every test with flying colors, including a thumbs-up flight test program". While the tests in Canada would no doubt assist its efficiency, Richard Gwyn pointed out the Cruise must be already considered trustworthy to have been deployed on submarines and B-52s. He also made the point that linking the tests to success in Geneva was confusing as ALCMs are quite separate. Richard Gwyn, "Cruise gets second testing thanks to Ottawa", The Toronto Star, July 17, 1983.
37. "The danger is not so much that Russia's missiles would actually be fired as that western Europe, fearing that they might be fired, would give the Russians what they wanted in that future crisis. That is usable nuclear superiority....The further the west slips away from a balance of power in Europe, the greater the possibility of war." "Welcome", The Economist, November 19,1983, p.14.
38. The discrepancies between perceptions and realities in the nuclear world make attempts to proceed logically most difficult. For example, it is necessary to ignore the fact that the SS-20s 150 kiloton warheads could not help but devastate the heavily urbanized and densely populated European continent, and the 300,000 American troops there. If that did not
immediately involve the American strategic forces in a retaliatory strike, the British and French would probably counter with their nuclear weapons. The risk of all or any American, British or French nuclear response is surely enough to deter Soviet adventurism.

39. The Soviet Union no doubt saw the GLCM and the Pershing-IIIs as threatening because their accuracy and power make them "silo busters", since they had a 200 kiloton warhead with a circular error probable (CEP) of 100-200 feet. Barrett and Ross, "The Air-Launched Cruise Missile and Canadian Arms Control Policy", p.722.

40. US Rear Admiral W. M. Locke, director of the Air Force-Navy Cruise Missile Project said that the Cruise will push the Soviet Union to the bargaining table to "perhaps unwind some of these weapons of war". As cited in Carol Giangrande, The Nuclear North: The People, the Regions and the Arms Race, (Toronto: House of Anasi Press, 1983), p.20.


42. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union was concerned about the nuclear weapons of Britain, France and China. The Americans refused to count the independent British and French nuclear assets or their own forward based aircraft carriers and submarines. The Soviets counted all of the above-mentioned systems and asserted that there was basic parity. They saw their advantage in intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as being offset by NATO's advantage in airplanes. Simon Lunn, "At Issue: Nuclear Modernization in Europe", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 38, No. 7, August-September 1982.

43. In US Military Posture F.Y.1984, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that "if deterrence fails," weapons like the Cruise and Pershing II would make it possible "to escalate the intensity of the conflict in a controlled manner". p.18. According to Captain Virginia Pribyla of the Pentagon, the efficiency of the Cruise will force the Soviet Union to spend $100 billion on defence. "It's our philosophy that it's better for the Soviets to be building air defence systems than other things". As cited in MacFarlane, "In the Shadow of the Cruise", Saturday Night, p. 20.

44. The testing range in northern Alberta is very similar to the Soviet terrain that the ALCM would fly over.

45. Those politicians who were vocal in their opposition to ALCM tests included the NDP's Ed Broadbent and Pauline Jewett, Liberal Paul McRae, and
Progressive Conservatives Walter Maclean and Douglas Roche. The last four MPS, along with NDP members Terry Sargeant and Bob Ogle, co-authored the SCEAND Minority Report in 1982.


49. In February 1983, Allan MacEachen described the consequences if Canada should refuse to test the ALCM. "Andropov has been skillful in his presentation of [arms control] proposals which appear attractive...[but]...the intention...is to give the least possible at these talks the more the NATO Alliance and public opinion in the democracies weaken." As cited in Canada, Department of External Affairs, *International Canada*, "The events of January and February 1983", *International Perspectives*, February/March, 1983, p.21. In May, the SSEA implied that bilateral relations with the United States could be deleteriously affected by the wrong decision. John Hay, "Testing the cruise: To defend or disarm?" *Macleans*, May 30, 1983, p.25. In late July, the Prime Minister said that overturning the agreement would leave Canada with no other choice than to withdraw from NATO. "Cruise protests may strike chord with PM: Pawley", *The Toronto Star*, July 22, 1983.

50. DEA and DND were the two major bureaucratic players. However, the Departments of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Regional Industrial Expansion, and Supply and Services were part of the policy environment due to their funding of Litton Systems Canada and that company's involvement with the Cruise missile. The ramifications of this situation will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.


52. There was, no doubt, an element of rivalry over the management of the ALCM testing policy. There was an ongoing competition between these two departments regarding the direction and control of the strategic aspects of Canadian foreign policy.

54. When queried about these discrepancies by a renegade Liberal MP, DND replied that "the public should already know what their own side has and is doing". Paul McRae, \textit{Reply to Mr. Trudeau's Open Letter}, May 20, 1983, p.15.


59. As cited in Lebow, "Cognitive Closure and Crisis Politics", p.57. Premature cognitive closure can occur when the policy-maker is confident in his expectations and thus makes a decision before sufficient information has been gathered and considered. All but the most unambiguous evidence is perceived as confirming "the wisdom of established policy and the images of reality upon which it is based". Thus it can take a long time before policy-makers realize they have made a mistake.

60. The structural aspects of the policy process are discussed below.


62. MacFarlane, "In the Shadow of the Cruise", p. 27.

63. See Chapter III, pp. 47-49.

64. Analytical decision-making ideally involves the consideration of all options and possible outcomes, a cost-benefit analysis, and value integration.


67. \textit{Ibid}.

68. Letter from the office of the Prime Minister to author, January 6, 1983.


70. \textit{Ibid}, p.116

71. Richard Ned Lebow notes that "the more difficult the decision, the greater the need to engage in postdecisional rationalization." Lebow,

72. This simple and not necessarily deliberate practice was facilitated by the fact that they depended on the Pentagon for most if not all of their information.

73. There were differences of opinion over several issues, including the National Energy Program, FIRA, the East Coast fisheries, acid rain, and how to best deal with the problems of Central America and East-West relations.

74. Bounded rationality is due to the constraints imposed by human limitations in gathering, processing, calculating and comparing information in decision-making. The idea was developed by Herbert Simon. As cited in Steiner, "The search for order in a disorderly world: worldviews and prescriptive decision paradigms", p.376.

75. Satisficing means "settling for the first acceptable option that comes along rather than struggling to find the optimal alternative". Miriam Steiner, "The search for order in a disorderly world: worldviews and prescriptive decision paradigms", p.376.

76. Ibid. p.377.

77. For instance, DND believed that Canada's reputation would best be served by being a willing partner to the tests. Any domestic opposition had to be dispelled before it threatened this goal. On the other hand, the Prime Minister wanted to also uphold Canada's reputation as a peacemaker, so he stressed to Canadians and the world that the tests were caused by forces that Canada could not control, although it would do its best to moderate them.

78. The decision to test the ALCM was seen as damaging to the strategy of suffocation because Cruise technology facilitated an escalation of the arms race and enhanced the dangers of a first strike.

79. Many records were withheld or sections deleted. The government cited the twenty year confidentiality of cabinet documents and possible harm to international or federal-provincial relations as justification. Robert Winters, "US plans 3 Cruise tests in Canada in '85" and "The Cruise: Secret files provide new data about the missile testing pact", The Montreal Gazette, August 18, 1984, pp. A-1 and A-4 respectively.


83. Don Sellar and John Walker, "US wants to test missile systems over Canada", *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 10, 1982 p.1 and 5. The US Air Force said the Canadian terrain was similar to that in the Soviet Union. There was apparently little understanding at the time of the possible implications such a statement had for Canadian involvement. Dr. Perry's remarks were not reported in Canada until the news story on the ALCM negotiations in 1982.


85. Ibid.


88. Ibid.


90. Canada, The Department of External Affairs, Defence Relations Bureau, *Canada-US Agreement*, p.1. As noted in Chapter III, this committee was not that powerful due to the predominance of the Prime Minister in directing Canadian foreign policy.


92. Harald von Riekoff and John Sigler assert that there were deep splits in the Cabinet over the testing but it is very difficult to get details on any dissension. "The Trudeau Peace Initiative: The Politics of Reversing the Arms Race", *Canada Among Nations 1984: A Time of Transition*, (Toronto: James Lorimar, 1985), p.54.


94. In May 1981, the President stated that the West will dismiss Communism "as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written." Strobe Talbott, *The Russians and Reagan*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 74. In October, Reagan announced his plans to develop and deploy the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarines, the MX ICBM and a host of other weapons.

96. Don Sellar, a Canadian journalist in Washington first heard of the Canadian government's commitment via a leak from a US Air Force officer in the Pentagon. When questions were asked in Ottawa, DEA officials and the Canadian embassy in Washington revealed that there was a set of negotiations on an umbrella agreement for weapons testing in Canada. A few days after this was revealed, it came out that the Trudeau cabinet had approved the general testing agreement in principle four months before. See Don Sellar and John Walker, "US wants missile systems over Canada", The Ottawa Citizen, March 10, 1982 and Don Sellar, "How Canada took the Cruise", The Vancouver Sun, March 10, 1983, p. 5.


99. Ibid.

100. "It is the Committee's hope that individual members of the North Atlantic Alliance will recognize the wisdom of not prejudging the outcome of negotiations and refrain from taking any measure to ban or restrict flight-testing before a firm multilateral agreement has been secured." Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Report on Security and Disarmament, Ninth Report to the House, April 1982, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1982, p. 77.


104. "The decision to go ahead with that has been taken. What is being held up is the implementation of the decision which has already been taken." Mark MacGuigan, Hansard, 1st session, 32nd parliament, April 29, 1982, p. 16741.


107. Ibid.

108. Hansard, 1st session, 32nd parliament, April 28, 1982 p.79:10

109. The details of some of these influential external developments are included in the next section's analysis of the Prime Minister's decision-making.


113. For example, the day before Trudeau was to meet with Vice President George Bush in March of 1983, the NDP external affairs critic urged him to tell the Americans "that, if in the future the government should refuse a request made to it to test the Cruise, such a refusal would in no way breach any of the government's commitments". Her request had been prompted by the American Ambassador's statement that a refusal would constitute a breach of Canada's commitments. As he was wont to do, the Prime Minister avoided the point of the statement and focussed on the fact that Cabinet approval was necessary for any tests and there had been no Cabinet agreement yet. Canada, The Department of External Affairs, International Canada, "The events of February/March 1983", International Perspectives, May/June 1983, p.2.


116. DEA had submitted a report to Cabinet early in the year that "painted a sombre picture of increasing conflict" with the United States. Clarkson, "Canada-US Relations and the Changing of the Guard in Ottawa", p.150.

117. The memo also said: "While it is difficult to indicate with any degree of certainty what the [US] Administration would do, there is no doubt that its disappointment would color the relationship [with Canada] in all its facets,


119. Ibid.


121. For example, there was a demonstration in Vancouver in April that attracted more than 65,000 protesters. Bromke and Nossal, "Tensions in Canada's Foreign Policy", p.341. The Conservatives were almost unanimous in their support for testing as an obligation to NATO, while stressing the need for arms control.


123. Trudeau told him that many Canadians, Liberals and members of the government found the proposed tests "a deep and serious issue". "Bantering Trudeau, Reagan meet", The Vancouver Sun, April 28, 1983, p. A20.

124. On June 1, 1983 Trudeau said: "I hope we will be hearing very specific proposals [at Geneva], rejected or accepted, before the end of December" and these talks will determine NATO's plans for deployment and Canada's decision to test. "Trudeau Deceit on Cruise and Geneva Talks". New Democratic Party News Release, July 15, 1983

125. As cited in Stanley C. M. Ing "Arms Limitation", p. 113.

126. Gilles Lamontagne said, "if we give out the proper information, I don't think the anti-cruise missile demonstrations will intensify". "Broadbent Urges a Stand By Refusing to Test Cruise", The Vancouver Sun, May 13, 1983.

127. Pierre Trudeau had written 'open letters' to the French-speaking members of Quebec during the sovereignty association crisis.

128. Trudeau's comments are somewhat curious considering his own unwillingness to share the financial burden of alliance defence. In a reply to the Prime Minister, Liberal MP Paul McRae asserted that the Soviet Union was not the target of public pressure since they already supported the idea of a mutual freeze. Paul McRae, Reply to Mr. Trudeau's Open Letter, pp.8-11.

129. 64% of Americans support the Kennedy-Hatfield proposal for a freeze on destabilizing weapons. This suggestion had 18 co-sponsors in the Senate, and a similar measure in the House had more than 100 co-sponsors. Paul McRae, Reply to Mr. Trudeau's Open Letter, pp.8-9. Ed Broadbent asked the Prime Minister whether he would call the 274 congressional representatives
who voted for a freeze, and the American and Canadian bishops who oppose the arms race anti-American. "Broadbent Urges a Stand By Refusing to Test Cruise", The Vancouver Sun, May 13, 1983.


131. On May 12, 1983, Ed Broadbent replied with his own 'open letter'. He termed Trudeau's argument that the INF deployments are necessary to counter the SS-20s a "dangerous delusion" as it implies acceptance of the idea of a limited nuclear war. "For Canadians to allow the cruise missile to be tested in this country is to sanction a step toward accepting the idea of a 'limited' nuclear war, which in itself can be a major step towards the nuclear holocaust". "Broadbent Urges a Stand By Refusing to Test Cruise", The Vancouver Sun, May 13, 1983.


136. On July 20, 1983, Operation Dismantle and 26 other peace organizations filed a suit in the Federal Court seeking a temporary injunction to stop testing. The Federal Government responded by seeking dismissal on the grounds that the suit was "frivolous and vexatious". In September, the Federal Court ruled against the government's plea for dismissal, on the grounds that the establishment of the Constitution and the Charter had reduced the powers of Parliament, making it answerable to the overriding provisions of the Constitution, as interpreted by the courts. The government appealed the decision and it went to the Federal Court of Appeals. This entire process was not on the cruise issue but rather on whether the courts had the right to hear the case. "Canada tests the Charter", The Peace Calendar, November 1983, p.3. In October, the Federal Court of Appeal reserved judgement on a move by the federal government to block the constitutional challenge that the lives, liberty and security of an anti-cruise coalition of peace, union and church groups were threatened by the tests. The
Vancouver Sun, October 13, 1983. In December, the Supreme Court decided to hear the constitutional challenge from the coalition in February. The Globe and Mail, December 13, 1983. On March 6, 1984 the Supreme Court rejected the application for an injunction to halt the tests and shortly after, the first test took place. MacFarlane, "In the Shadow of the Cruise", p. 20.


139. As cited in Bromke and Nossal, "Tensions in Canada's Foreign Policy", p.345.

140. "Although Canada has given up nuclear roles for its armed forces, it cannot dissociate itself from NATO's nuclear policies...[S]uch weapons are a necessary element of a valid Western and hence Canadian in its broadest sense, security policy". Canada, The Department of National Defence, Cruise Missile Testing in Canada - Background Notes, Ottawa, 1983, p. 4.

141. SSEA MacEachen said that the general weapons testing agreement and any sub-agreements were due to the "importance of unity among the Western allies." The Vancouver Province, p.A9 March 27, 1983.

142. Trudeau gave a news conference in Saskatoon. "Trudeau wants to show USSR West can meet it gun for gun." The Globe and Mail, March 20, 1982. He admitted that such a stance contradicted his suffocation strategy but said that the Soviet Union had done more than the United States to "increase nuclear terror". Canada, The Department of External Affairs, International Canada. "The events of April/May 1982" p. 18, International Perspectives, July/August, 1982.


144. There were many editorials and letters to the editor on this topic. Bromke and Nossal, "Tensions in Canada’s Foreign Policy", p. 345.

145. On May 18, it was reported that the Liberals had 27% of the committed voters in the polls, the NDP had 19%, and the Tories had 52%. "Is Canada really moving to the right?" The Toronto Star, May 18, 1983.

146. Thus his Open Letter of May 1983 was long overdue in light of the public outcry over the ALCM tests. By the week of his Open Letter, over 20,000 pieces of anti-cruise mail had been received by the Prime Minister's office since the controversy first gained public attention. John Hay, "Testing the cruise: to defend or disarm?", Maclean’s, May 30, 1983, p.24.

148. Ibid. p.2.
150. Ibid.
151. The Prime Minister explained that "fears are rooted in the perception that both sides may be prepared to contemplate using the ultimate weapon in order to achieve pre-eminence...nations arm out of fear for their security and will disarm only if they are convinced that the threat to their security is diminished." Canada, The Department of External Affairs, International Canada, "The events of April/May 1982", p.18, International Perspectives, July/August, 1982.
152. "If we can't get the other side to accept the zero option, we should be looking at something which is perhaps second best in terms of what is desirable. No arms are better than some arms. But if agreement is possible at a lower level of arms than what we have now, I think you would find us supporting it." As cited in Stanley C. M. Ing "Arms Limitation", p. 116.
156. Ibid.
157. On April 22, Trudeau told a news conference there were "major divergences" between the Canadian and American views on the best policy for Central America. Clarkson, "Canada-US Relations and the Changing of the Guard in Ottawa", p.159.
160. "Even the narrowest of Canadian interests is now vested in and vitally dependent upon the political, economic and environmental health and order of the globe." Canada, The Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches No.83/7, "Need for the Renewal of a Disciplined and Compassionate World Order", Address by the Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Ottawa, May 6, 1983, p.1.
161. Prior to the summit Trudeau had said that he was going to ask for $82 billion for the Third World. Jack Cahill, "A 'fireside' chat with Trudeau", The Toronto Star, May 14, 1983 p. B8.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid. This was in sharp contrast to the view expressed by Ronald Reagan just two months earlier, as noted in citation 94, from Strobe Talbott, The Russians and Reagan, p. 74.


168. "Missile Limits explored by U.S., Soviets", The Vancouver Province, May 18, 1983. Reagan also accused the Soviet Union of violating the Salt II accords with their testing of two new ICBMs, when the treaty allows only one.

169. "We are dangerously close to not having the deterrent that we need to keep the other fellow from using his, or at least using them for blackmail". "World is Heading for Holocaust: Reagan", The Vancouver Province, May 17, 1983. The INF talks resumed right around the same time. The latest Soviet proposal to count warheads rather than launchers was an important step but they still wanted British and French missiles to be included. The US remained firm in its refusal to allow separate and unlimited missiles to be targeted against the Far East, despite the Soviet perception that it should respond to the American military build-up around Japan, and the Chinese nuclear threat. "Soviet proposal could slow talks", The Vancouver Province, May 5, 1983.

170. Stanley C. M. Ing "Arms Limitation", p. 117.


172. Stanley C. M. Ing "Arms Limitation", p. 117.


177. Ibid.


179. Richard Gwyn, "Cruise gets second testing thanks to Ottawa", The
Toronto Star, July 17, 1983.

180. General W. Y. Smith, NATO's Chief of Staff said in 1980 that, "We don't think Canada's doing enough." Reported in Defence Newsletter, September 16-Oct 15,1980 and cited in David Cox, "Canadian-American military relations: some present trends and future possibilities", International Journal, Vol. XXXVI, No.1, Winter 1980/81, p.96. It was a myth that Canadians were not contributing enough money, considering the purchase of the Leopard tanks, the F-18A, improved capability on the Northern flank and the 12% increase in the capital expenditure budget for the Canadian Armed Forces. In April 1982, the US Ambassador to Canada Paul Robinson commented on "the unfortunate condition of the Canadian Armed Force relative to her NATO allies". Canada, The Department of External Affairs, International Canada, "The events of April/May 1982", International Perspectives, July/August 1982, p. 3.

181. As cited by Stanley Hudecki, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence in Hansard, April 11, 1983, p.24375. David Cox says that Canada's interest in the "solidarity and survival" of the Alliance and the danger of divisions within the Alliance over the decoupling issue made any other stand than support for the INF decision impossible. Thus Canada's "capacity for constructive influence within the alliance is exceedingly limited". Cox, "Canadian-American military relations: some present trends and future possibilities", p.96.


183. Ibid, p. 344. Bromke and Nossal assert that the ALCM will increase the "strategic significance" of the Canadian North, since both American and Soviet ALCMs will fly over that territory.

184. In August, after the final decision had been announced and with no public hearings or outside involvement, a DND spokesman affirmed the negligible environmental impact after "exhaustive technical assessment". This study was supposedly undertaken by Ottawa with DND directing Environment Canada in the study. However, it just adapted calculations from an 80 page US report regarding ALCM flights over Southern California. Peter Calamai, "Cruise study awaited despite earlier OK", The Vancouver Sun, August 9, 1983.

185. No doubt the rebuttal would be that the launch platforms for the ALCM have functionally related observable differences (FRODs) and are counted as having the maximum number possible. As adequate as this may be, it is more of a technical response than one that really addresses the problems of weapons proliferation.

186. NATO/SOFA means "Agreement between the Parties to NATO Regarding the Status of Their Forces". See Diplomatic Note Number 64.
Canadian Embassy in Washington, February 10, 1983, p.3. This structure emphasized the NATO component of the policy but there was no mention of sharing the information from the tests with the NATO allies.

187. This arrangement was one of the so-called "offset" orders between the two countries which made Canada's work on the Cruise guidance system a credit toward the purchase of the F-18s. Giangrande, The Nuclear North: The People, The Regions and the Arms Race, pp.26-7. Foreign corporations place contracts in Canada "to offset the employment and foreign exchange lost to Canada as a result of the external procurement of major defence equipment." William Dobell, "Defence procurement contracts and industrial offset packages", International Perspectives, January/February 1981, p.14.

188. His remarks were in response to the assertion that the Canadians had won $3 billion in industrial benefits from a fighter plane contract worth about $5 billion. "Don't worry about offsets. The Canadians are going to let us tests the GLCM in Canada." As cited in Don Sellar, "How Canada took the cruise", The Vancouver Sun, March 13, 1983, p.5.


192. "The CCC was set up to act as an agent for Canadian companies which supply goods to foreign governments and international agencies. Most CCC deals involve military supplies and...the US is the largest buyer." Giangrande, The Nuclear North: The People, The Regions and the Arms Race, p.26.


194. In the fall of 1982, Caspar Weinberger intervened to stop the passage of a Congressional bill that would have placed restrictions on American purchases of certain metals from foreign sources. The bill would have affected millions of dollars of Canadian military sales to the US. Ernie Regehr, "Cruise testing: an offer we can't refuse?" Ploughshares Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 4, March 1983, p.5.


199. Barrett and Ross assert that SAC bombers armed with ALCM will have a limited counterforce capability and thus "incite Soviet anxieties" about a US surprise attack. Barrett and Ross, "The Air-Launched Cruise Missile and Canadian Arms Control Policy", p.13.

200. Item 5 stipulates that under "unusual circumstances" the US Department of Defense may "request" Canadian authorities to "alleviate" any Canadian law that delays or makes the carrying out of the project difficult. See *Diplomatic Note Number 64*, Canadian Embassy in Washington, February 10, 1983, p.2.

201. Item 17 says that "the release of information to the public concerning any project under this Agreement shall require prior consultation and coordination between the appropriate U.S. and Canadian authorities". See *Diplomatic Note Number 64*, Canadian Embassy in Washington, February 10, 1983, p.3.


204. Ibid. p.2.

205. In 1987, close to 80% of Canadian exports went to the US. The advent of the Free Trade agreement will heighten the chances of such a perception.


207. However, a few have argued that Canada should link the testing with arms control, despite the obvious reluctance of the United States to be influenced in such a way. Prior to the final decision, Franklyn Griffiths asserted that "Canada should add an arms control precondition to its acceptance of U.S. ALCM testing. The precondition would be an American agreement to propose authentic ALCM limitation measures to the Soviets in the START talks before the year is out, and to consult with Canada in working out the proposals." Franklyn Griffiths, "Canada's role in START talks offstage but vital", *The Globe and Mail*, January 28, 1983. In more recent times, the case was made that ALCM testing be stopped if the US did not keep within the limits of SALT II.


209. The following poll results indicate that perhaps the Canadian people themselves were unsure of what they wanted. In August 1983, DND commissioned a telephone poll which was conducted between August 4-12th. 52% of those polled were opposed to the tests but 53% considered them a valid NATO obligation. 55% said the tests were a Canadian
responsibility to US, but 50% saw the tests as an escalation of the arms race. 52% said they would be an incentive for the Soviets to agree on limits on nuclear weapons. 44% said testing harms Canada's position as an international mediator, while 38% disagreed. There are no details on methodology or margin of error. "Cruise tests a conflict", The Vancouver Sun, December 13, 1983. A Southam news poll conducted in early September found that 41% of those polled supported testing while 38.5% opposed it. 18% were undecided or would not give an opinion and 2% gave qualified answers. Almost 1/3 cited responsibility to NATO or the US as the reason. "Balance shifts in favor of Cruise", The Vancouver Sun, October 7 1983. In the spring of 1984, a DEA-commissioned poll found 47% in favor of ALCM tests and 47% against. P. H. Chapin "The Canadian public and foreign policy", International Perspectives, January/February 1986, p. 1.
1. Prime Minister Trudeau changed from aloof observer, willing by and large, to let the bureaucracy maintain the status quo in the area of arms control and disarmament, to a man deeply involved on a personal level, trying to make changes before he relinquished the power of his office.

2. The term "elite level" refers to an elevated, highly influential level in the policy process. The rational/analytical model of decision-making is best described by John Steinbruner. He states that a decision is analytic if there is evidence of: at least limited value integration; an analysis and evaluation of alternative outcomes; and new information regarding the main points in the decision causes "appropriate subjective adjustments". The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.45.

3. The unavoidable limits imposed on a 'rational' leader of a middlepower in traversing the nuclear world were further complicated by the lingering illness and death of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and the fact that 1984 was an election year for President Reagan.

4. "Recognition of this fact is not a recipe for inaction but rather for espousing realistic rather than utopian proposals and developing coalitions with like-minded countries, especially allied countries, to increase the prospect of furthering those goals." Louis Delvoie, "Canada's international security policy", International Perspectives. July/August 1985, p. 27.

5. On September 1 1983, the KAL airplane was shot down without warning after it had ventured off course and into Soviet airspace, with a loss of 269 lives. See Canada, Department of External Affairs. "International Canada - The events of August and September 1983", supplement to International Perspectives, November/December, 1983, pp.10-13.

6. The possibility that Canada would not have to test the ALCM receded into the future with the INF stalemate. Over 50% of Canadians polled in the fall of 1983 said they believed that current East-West tensions could lead to war. Douglas Roche, "The machinery of peace", International Perspectives, November/December, 1985, p.15. In October 1983, a poll conducted by Decima Research found that 38% of Canadians cited "international affairs" as their major concern. Richard Gwyn points out that since the Cuban Missile crisis, the rating in recent polls for international affairs in this category was never more than 5%. Richard and Sandra Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", Saturday Night. May, 1984, p. 20.


10. Trudeau had been most upset by the revelations in early 1983 of the failure on the part of the Americans to endorse the "walk in the woods" arms proposal. See von Riekhoff and Sigler, "The Trudeau Peace Initiative", p. 54. As well, Trudeau was worried that the KAL incident might be an indication that the Soviet military was "edging beyond the reach of the political authorities". DEA, S and S. 83/18. "Reflections" by Trudeau, p. 7.


13. Ibid.


15. Another problem was that "the technical arrangements which underpin existing and proposed arms limitation agreements are not foolproof". Michael Tucker, "Trudeau and the politics of peace", International Perspectives, May/June 1984, p.9.

16. Delvoie, "Canada's international security policy", p.27.

17. The only way in which the trade-off relationship between important multiple goals can be eliminated is if the structure is changed. Under changed "rules", two or more goals that were formerly contradictory can be
synthesized. An example of such changed rules is the existence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The goals of protecting one's nuclear forces and citizenry, and the need for arms control of a destabilizing development, were synthesized once it was perceived by both superpowers that it was more destabilizing not to do so. Another example is the Standing Consultative Commission. It was established as a result of the SALT negotiations and was particularly successful between 1972 and 1979. This group provided a private forum where alleged violations could be discussed and clarified between the superpowers. It met the goal of ensuring that violations were challenged, without detriment to the goal of encouraging public support of the treaty. Michael Krepon, "Verifying Arms Control Treaties", Nuclear War: The Search for Solutions, edited by Dianne Demille and Thomas L. Perry, (Vancouver: Physicians for Social Responsibility, 1985), p. 192.

18. Delvoie, "Canada's international security policy", p.27.

19. Many external factors contributed to the policy-relevant atmosphere that the initiative operated in, including Andropov's illness, the US strategic modernization, and the ongoing bilateral disputes between Canada and the United States.

20. It was specified early in the policy process that there was no intention of any Canadian involvement in the INF or START negotiations.


22. The argument about the nonrationality of the nuclear world will be made in the last chapter.

23. The incrementalist element in the policy-making of the initiative was due to its dependence on the external environment. There are elements of mixed scanning in the decision-making because complete rationality was not possible. "Mixed scanning reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions and helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives...The mixed scanning model makes this dualism explicit by combining (a) high-order, fundamental policy-making processes which set basic directions and (b) incremental ones which prepare for fundamental decisions and work them out after they have been reached." Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed-Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision-Making", Public Administration Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 5. December 1967, p.385.

25. Trudeau was very specific on this last point, which made those involved realize that he was indeed planning to retire from politics. Christopher Young, "PM's peace movie still needs last reel", The Vancouver Sun, November 29, 1983.

26. Pierre Trudeau was expected to retire, although there was the inevitable speculation that he might continue in politics. Many Canadians felt that continuing would be most unwise and many expected a federal election within the year. But as Richard Van Loon notes, the major problem in establishing policy priorities is "information overload and not lack of data", so the time constraints worked directly against a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Richard J. Van Loon, "Kaleidoscope in Grey: The Policy Process in Ottawa", in Canadian Politics in the 1980's, edited by Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, (Toronto: Methuen Publishers, 1981), p.337.

27. A committee was struck, consisting of a small group of Canadian government officials who were conversant with arms control and defence policy from the Department of External Affairs, the Department of National Defence and the Privy Council Office. They were given the authority to second other people as need be. "PM's peace movie still needs last reel", Christopher Young, The Vancouver Sun, November 29, 1983.

28. "The task force functioned as an intimate eight-member team...Its nonhierarchical composition and homogeneity allowed the group to function effectively and consensually in the high-pressure situation dictated by the situation." von Riekhoff and Sigler, "The Trudeau Peace Initiative", p. 57.


32. Four advisors were subsequently identified as responsible for the main ideas of the initiative: Marcel Masse; Robert Fowler; Geoffrey Pearson, former Ambassador to Moscow; and to a lesser extent, Ivan Head, president of the International Development Research Agency. Richard Gwyn, "Trudeau's peace trip just might beat the odds", The Vancouver Sun, December 1, 1983.

34. The British and Americans could not reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the CTB in its trilateral forum. The March 1983 announcement of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative indicated that the Americans had already chosen space as their next strategic frontier. They would brook no interference in either sphere.


36. More detail will be given about the policy proposals later.

37. Comments made by Ralph Coleman, Trudeau's press secretary, as cited in "PM plans European visit in effort to get arms role", *The Vancouver Sun*, October 26, 1983. It was known that the task force met daily and that Trudeau spent some time every day considering matters of arms control and the easing of international tension.

38. The Commonwealth Conference in late November was a focal point around which meetings could be scheduled, as were the early December visits to Bangladesh, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

39. Trudeau enjoyed the support of his Cabinet, as several of his ministers felt strongly on the issue of nuclear arms control. Don Johnston, the Minister of Economic Development, had visited Moscow in the summer of 1983 and subsequently warned that "the world...teeters on the brink of nuclear annihilation." Bruce Hutchinson, "Trudeau's problem: a tight time frame", *The Vancouver Sun*, November 24, 1983. Gwyn says that Lloyd Axworthy and Charles Caccia opposed the cruise and thus were most supportive of the initiative. Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p. 23.

40. Trudeau asserted that those queries were, "in part, the birth" of the initiative. Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p. 22.

41. Christopher Young, "PM's peace movie still needs last reel", *The Vancouver Sun*, November 29, 1983.

42. Some foreign leaders may have seen the initiative as motivated by domestic political considerations, as the Liberals were rapidly losing electoral support. At the Commonwealth conference, one high-level British government official opined that the peace initiative was a re-election ploy on the part of the Prime Minister. "Peace bid draws mixed reviews" *The Vancouver Sun*, November 23, 1983.
43. Although it has been noted that "a mutual alienation had set in over the years" between Trudeau and the press, Trudeau was well aware of the value of media impressions on public opinion. Bromke and Nossal, "Trudeau rides the third rail", p. 60. In this instance there was careful handling of the media, who had been given reason to believe that they could anticipate a newsworthy story. An unusual pre-speech briefing was held for reporters, which also served as a way to deal with what one member of the task force described as a "very dense and long" speech. Roger Smith, "Special measures taken to get PM's message to media", *The Vancouver Sun*, October 27, 1983. This comment is interesting since the speech was not so much complex or dull as it was an lengthy and intelligent portrayal of the complicated world.

44. DEA, *S and S. 83/18*, "Reflections" by Trudeau, p. 2.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid. p. 3.
47. Ibid. p. 4.
48. Ibid. p. 5.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid. p. 3. Trudeau was more explicit on this point after he had retired from politics. See Don Oberdorfer, "Western Summits Deemed Shallow: Trudeau Hits NATO Chiefs", *The Washington Post*, November 14, 1984.
52. Ibid. p. 4.
53. When he did question the fundamental principles of Alliance strategy in January 1984, it was because he was provoked by the paradoxical irrationality of the nuclear world, where so much of deterrence may be a suicidal bluff. The remarks he made on this topic will be discussed in this chapter's section on "The Prime Minister and the Peace Initiative: The Attempted Reassertion of Rational Analysis."
55. Ibid. p. 3.
56. Ibid. p. 7.
57. Ibid. p. 8.
58. The HLG met on October 27-8, and was chaired by Richard Perle, the extremely conservative US Assistant Defense Secretary.
59. Speaking on the INF issue, the Canadian military told the press that the contrast between 1000 Soviet intermediate-range warheads and the very small independent France nuclear force made deployment imperative if the Soviet Union would not reduce its missiles. "NATO's planners air missile issue" *The Vancouver Sun*, October 27, 1983. There was no mention of the
Americans' forward-based nuclear forces on board Western carriers and submarines, or the independent European nuclear forces, although many less circumspect and more objective observers had long identified them, along with the initial SS-20 deployment, as exacerbating the confrontation in Europe between the superpowers. The resulting misperceptions stymied attempts at arms control in the INF forum and threatened to destroy the other tenuous arms control negotiations.

60. "East-West deadlock in need of help: PM", The Vancouver Sun, October 29, 1983.

61. When questioned further by reporters, he said he had not had time to read any newspaper accounts. Carl Mollins, "US gossip portrays PM as 'unstable'", The Globe and Mail, December 16, 1983.

62. "East-West deadlock in need of help: PM", The Vancouver Sun, October 29, 1983. The same article quotes Helmut Sonnenfeld, a top-ranking aide to Henry Kissinger while the latter was Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford. He noted Washington's aversion to self-appointed mediators because the superpowers "talk when they need to".

63. "Trudeau's peace trip expands", The Vancouver Sun, November 8, 1983.

64. Jamie Lamb, "The self-appointed peacemaker outlines the grand plan", The Vancouver Sun, October 28, 1983.

65. See David Van Praagh, "Trudeau Tries the Peace Issue", Business Week, November 14, 1983, p.66. "Trudeau is proposing world peace as a platform on which he and the Liberal Party could run at a time when his popularity is at an all time low." The very poor Liberal position in the polls could lead a cynical observer to the same conclusion.

66. These included the massacre of US and French troops in Lebanon, and the October 25, 1983 invasion of Grenada. The former heightened the powderkeg tensions of the Middle East and the determination of the Americans to meet force with force. The latter led to tensions within the Alliance, as there was disagreement over the Americans' willingness to use force and its unwillingness to inform its allies in advance of such actions. The Grenada invasion took place well after Trudeau had decided on his peace initiative but it confirmed his belief that the situation was perilous, as the Americans were clearly willing to act unilaterally to further their perceptions of international security.


68. As cited in Canada, Department of External Affairs. "International
Canada - The events of October/November 1983", supplement to International Perspectives, January/February 1984, p. 15.

69. Trudeau's task force hoped a consensus might prompt the superpowers to break the deadlock in arms control negotiations. "Trudeau's peace trip expands", The Vancouver Sun, November 8, 1983.

70. Trudeau was speaking to an audience of alumni celebrating the centennial of the University of Dalhousie's law school. "East-West deadlock in need of help: PM", The Vancouver Sun, October 29, 1983.


73. According to several analysts, it is not surprising that Mitterand supported the idea of the five nuclear nation summit. He proposed the idea in a speech to the United Nations in September 1983. However, he specified that a prerequisite would be a superpower agreement. As cited in Danford Middlemiss, editor, Defence Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 12, The Centre for Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, p. 3. and Miller, "Trudeau's peace crusade", p. 25.


75. The Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans praised the "excellent initiative". He thought that Trudeau, being neither American or European, had a special position of diplomacy as the INF deployment approached. Peter Lewis, "Trudeau's crusade for peace", Macleans, November 21, 1983, p. 37.

76. Margaret Thatcher visited Canada on September 25, 1983.


79. Ibid.

80. "Can Pierre Trudeau pull it off?" The Vancouver Sun, November, 21,
There had been a great deal of debate within the task force about the possible critical reactions to choosing this forum. His selection of venue was understandable in light of the severe time restrictions as it was the only available speaking opportunity scheduled. Trudeau was embarking on a three week trip in a few days. Christopher Young, "PM's peace movie still needs last reel", The Vancouver Sun, November 29, 1983.

Like much of the policy process, the Prime Minister maintained final say in the crafting of the speech. The Guelph speech and this one were written by the same speech writer, Peter Hancock of DEA, and then revised by the Prime Minister. Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid. pp. 3-4.

Byers, "Trudeau's Peace Initiative", p.4.

Ibid.


Ibid. p.3. This particular emphasis on linking disarmament and development was discarded.

Ibid. pp.3-6.

Ibid. pp.3-6. The call for a ban on high altitude ASATs was peripheral, albeit important, in that it called for a ban on a very destabilizing weapon not yet developed.

Officials of the task force were careful to play down the significance of the lack of response from President Reagan to Trudeau's letter by noting that Reagan was on official visits to Japan and South Korea. Aileen McCabe, "PM reveals 4-point plan for peace", The Vancouver Sun, November 14, 1983.

Miller, "Trudeau's peace crusade", p.25


Brian Butters, "Trudeau's questioning of US stance puzzling", The Vancouver Sun, February 2, 1984. This criticism was made despite a 12.9% increase in Canadian military spending of $7.8 billion, or 2% of Canada's GNP between 1982 and 1983. However, the majority of the other NATO countries' defence spending ranged from 3-7% of their GNP.

John Hay, "The Prime Minister's Mission", Macleans, November 28, 1983, p.36. Some of these comments may have been deliberate attempts to undermine his innovative policy-making.

"PM berates Pentagon critics", The Vancouver Sun, November 19, 1983.
98. Canada, Department of External Affairs. "International Canada - The events of October/November 1983", supplement to International Perspectives, January/February 1984, p.15. Opposition leader Brian Mulroney's initial response in October 1983 was to argue that the Soviet Union can not be influenced by "philosophical musings...our pride in Canada should not obscure the hard realities of superpower existence, nor should such pride give rise to illusions of influence beyond bounds that can only disappoint and confuse." John Walker, "PM hints at plan to ease tense world", The Vancouver Sun, October 28, 1983.

99. By early December, his office had received 548 supportive letters with only ten opposing his initiative. Carol Goar, "Ottawa assesses Trudeau's mission", Macleans, December 5, 1983, p.28. Also see Miller, "Trudeau's peace crusade", p. 26

100. The strategy of suffocation and Canada's less well-known work on verification at the Conference on Disarmament are two good examples. These policy suggestions were undermined by the refusal of the superpowers, due to political animosity and technological momentum, to halt the arms race or achieve a CTB.

101. NATO was following a procedure that had been established so that the nuclear game of bluff could not be called.


106. Cynthia Cannizzo cites Robert Ford's assertions that Andropov's health and doubts about Chernenko's ability to succeed him combined with "the nature of shared power in the Soviet Union" to lock the country "into a set pattern," since the leadership necessary to "break out of the spiralling tension was simply not there." Robert Ford was the Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union between 1964 and 1980. C.A. Cannizzo, "Canada between

107. As cited in "Through the Woods", The Vancouver Sun, December 1, 1983.

108. On November 20, Geoffrey Pearson, the then recently retired Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Gary Smith, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, flew to Beijing to brief the Chinese leadership on the initiative and to seek an immediate appointment for Trudeau. Two days later, they went to Moscow.

109. Besides the arms race, topics on the conference's agenda included the recent invasion of Grenada, increasing Third World poverty and the issue of Namibia's independence. "Trudeau arrives in India for summit", The Vancouver Sun, November 22, 1983.

110. Pierre Trudeau, Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi spoke at the opening of the Commonwealth Conference.

111. Gwyn notes a "puzzling and out-of-place reference to 'the anti-establishment bias' of the media". Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p.27.


113. Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p. 27. Gandhi's quarrel with Trudeau's suggestion that non-nuclear powers pledge their adherence to the principle of non-proliferation was based on her view that the nuclear powers were responsible for the arms race.

114. Thatcher stated that the five power meeting was not yet opportune, as the conference might well accomplish nothing. Christopher Young, "PM's peace initiative backed", The Vancouver Sun, November 24, 1983.

115. In an address to the Canadian Parliament in September 1983, Margaret Thatcher asserted that "the Soviet Union is engaged in a remorseless military buildup going far beyond the needs of defence and... is prepared to advance its aim by the use of force or by the threat of force." John Hay, "Thatchers' Cold War Crusade", Macleans, October 10, 1983, pp. 24-5.


117. Ibid. See also Christopher Young, "PM's peace initiative backed" The Vancouver Sun, November 24, 1983.
118. Christopher Young, "PM buoyed by Chinese", *The Vancouver Sun*, November 28, 1983.

119. Ramphal redrafted the initial Canadian proposal and shepherded it through the decision-making process at the conference. Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p. 27.

120. As cited in Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p. 27.


122. Christopher Young, "PM buoyed by Chinese", *The Vancouver Sun*, November 28, 1983.

123. Trudeau had worked hard to have the final communique from the Williamsburg summit specify the need to improve international relations but it had little effect.

124. "Gone about as far as I can, peacemaker Trudeau says", *The Vancouver Sun*, November 30, 1983.


129. Ibid. p. 305

130. "It ceased to be at best, a noble but futile gesture (or, at worst, a personal conceit and political gimmick) and became substantive, an exercise worth taking seriously". Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p. 20.

131. Christopher Young, "PM buoyed by Chinese", *The Vancouver Sun*, November 28, 1983.

132. "Frustrated Trudeau reports on talks", *The Vancouver Sun*, November 29, 1983. The Prime Minister speculated that the next stage of the effort could involve the participation of "a larger group of nations", possibly the United Nations or the Group of 77 non-aligned states.

133. Ibid.

134. After the Commonwealth Conference, the Prime Minister went on to prearranged business-related visits in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The President of the United Arab Emirates told Trudeau that he would be "recompensed by God, because what you have done has been for humanity." John Hay, "Trudeau waits for results", *Macleans*, December 12, 1983, p. 27.
135. Christopher Young, “Trudeau’s trip for peace ends”, The Vancouver Sun, December 5, 1983.
136. Trudeau was outspoken in Davos in January, at the final economic summit he attended in London in June, and when he accepted the Einstein award for Peace in late 1984. Details of these events will be provided later.
137. The poll was conducted by Allan Gregg’s Decima Research. Gwyn, “The Politics of Peace”, p. 28.
138. Ibid.
139. It was announced that several possible dates were being considered for a meeting between Trudeau and Reagan some time after mid-December. “PM planning journey to Washington” The Vancouver Sun, December 6, 1983. On December 10, it was announced that Trudeau was going to meet with President Reagan on December 15. John Gray, “Trudeau peace initiative is endorsed by Reagan”, The Globe and Mail, December 16, 1983.
140. “PM planning journey to Washington”, The Vancouver Sun, December 6, 1983.
142. As cited in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statement and Speeches No. 84/1. “No Time for Rhetoric in the Common Search for Peace”, Statement by the Hon. Allan MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, January 18, 1984, p. 2. (hereafter cited as DEA, S and S. 84/1, “No Time for Rhetoric”, by MacEachen.).
144. It was later revealed that Lawrence Eagleburger, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, had apparently made these comments during an off-the-record session with approximately 150-200 American officials, foreign affairs specialists and journalists. Carl Mollins, "PM's potshooter identified", The Vancouver Sun, December 21, 1983.
147. Kirton, "Trudeau and the diplomacy of peace", p. 5.
151. John Gray, "Trudeau peace initiative is endorsed by Reagan", The Globe and Mail, December 16, 1983. "It has been noted that later on the day of their meeting, the president gave an interview in which he promised not to use terms like 'evil empire' in referring to the Soviet Union lest they get the mistaken message that the United States had any aggressive intentions." von Riekhoff and Sigler, "The Trudeau Peace Initiative", p. 67. Such a change in rhetoric is valuable but not that meaningful when the strategies inherent in weapons like the Trident II D-5 warhead are considered. Ernie Regehr, "Nuclear Deterrence, War-Fighting and the Trudeau Initiative", Ploughshares Monitor, Vol. V, No. 1, March 1984, p.10.
152. In fact, White House advisors commented privately before Reagan's State of the Union address that it was intended to help dispell any image the public might have of the President as "warlike" or a "warmongerer". "World is safer, Reagan claims", The Vancouver Sun, January 16, 1984.
153. White House officials stated that the President did not want to meet with the other nuclear powers just for the sake of meeting. The idea of the five power meeting was in limbo without the endorsement of the Americans.
156. "Czechs back peace bid but missiles to remain", The Vancouver Sun, January 26, 1984.
157. In what may have been an attempt to reassert his authority, Andropov told Trudeau that he wanted to meet with him personally in the not-too-distant future. Christopher Young, "Andropov deflects Trudeau", The Vancouver Sun, January 19, 1984.
158. Ibid.


161. Ibid, p.130.

162. "[O]ur job here is to find ways of reassuring each other about what we intend to do, and more important, what we intend not to do." DEA, S and S, 84/1. "No Time for Rhetoric", by MacEachen, p. 2.

163. Ibid, p.4 "Only the re-establishment of political dialogue could break the spiral which impels states to redress perceived military imbalances, prompting their adversaries in turn to take counter-measures resulting in ever greater and increasingly unstable levels of arms". Ibid, p. 2.

164. Ibid, p. 4.


166. Trudeau made these comments January 28, 1984 at a panel discussion on international security of the European Management Forum in Davos, Switzerland. More details are given later in this chapter.

167. Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow at Georgetown University's Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said that "In terms of the alliance, Trudeau's statements are divisive, confusing, irritating and nonsensical but they are of absolutely no consequence because they are not backed up by anything real." As cited in James Bagnall, "Trudeau shook friends in Europe and meets puzzlement at home", The Financial Post, February 11, 1984. The Ottawa Citizen said that Trudeau had undermined his peace initiative with his remarks. January 30, 1984, p. 1.


172. DEA, S and S, 84/2. "Initiatives" by Trudeau. pp. 3-4. The ten points are as follows: "1) Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won. 2) Both
sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought. 3) Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack. 4) Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons. 5) Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management. 6) Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other. 7) Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost. 8) Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries - so-called horizontal proliferation. 9) Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests. 10) Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side." \textit{Ibid.} p.6.

173. The meeting was not arranged until the Prime Minister arrived in the Soviet Union. Prior to the meeting Canadian officials said they were unsure whether the new General Secretary would be ready for talks about the fundamental issues of Soviet foreign and defence policy, especially since he has had virtually no personal role in foreign affairs. John Gray, "Trudeau to extend Moscow visit for talks with new Soviet leader", \textit{The Globe and Mail}, February 14, 1984.


175. \textit{Ibid.} Trudeau suggested that NATO respond to the Soviet MBFR proposals of June 1983, and that the Soviets in turn respond positively.

176. \textit{Ibid.}


179. The Prime Minister regretted that they had proposed amendments that were unacceptable "to a majority of the members of the House of Commons" and to NATO. Charlotte Montgomery, "PM gives Broadbent a lecture on peace", \textit{The Globe and Mail}, May 18, 1984.

February 9, it was announced in the House that points of the initiative would be proposed to the Committee on Disarmament.


182. As cited in C.A. Cannizzo, "Canada between the Superpowers", p.43

183. Such events included the shooting down of the KAL jetliner on September 1, 1983, the stalemate in the INF negotiations, Margaret Thatcher's September visit to Canada and her expression of fierce anti-Communist rhetoric, and the increasing hostility between the superpowers on a wide range of issues.

184. Trudeau read a number of topical books and met with some of the most well-known contemporary critics of the nuclear world in the summer of 1983. The books he read included Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth, Thomas Powers' Thinking About the Next War, and The Harvard Nuclear Study Group's Living With Nuclear Weapons. Richard Gwyn says that Dr. Helen Caldicott of Physicians for Social Responsibility may have been the most influential person that Trudeau consulted. A senior official in the Trudeau government noted that Trudeau "mentions her name more often than that of any other person he's talked to on the subject." Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace", p. 23. According to Roddick Byers, Trudeau's consultations with Caldicott, Robert McNamara, General Bernard Rogers and the Harvard Nuclear Study Group did not so much influence the substance of the proposals as the "tone and approach". Byers, "Political Confidence-Building and Strategic Coherence", p.120.

185. One of his close advisors on the initiative pointed out the Prime Minister was very anxious not to follow the lead of many former statesmen, who urged substantive change only after they were out of office. Geoffrey Pearson, "Trudeau peace initiative reflections", International Perspectives, March/April 1985, p.3. Trudeau was more appropriate than someone like Swedish leader Olof Palme because Canada was a member of NATO and had entry into the Commonwealth forum as well.


187. The majority of other general government decisions were handled by his aides and ministers while he concentrated on the initiative.

188. As noted earlier, the constraints of acceptable alliance behaviour simplified the range of possible policy choices.

192. Ibid. p.6.
193. Ibid, pp. 6-7.
194. Ibid. p. 3
196. "Gone about as far as I can, peacemaker Trudeau says", The Vancouver Sun, November 30, 1983.
197. "I don't have the skills. I don't have the taste. I don't want to waste my time explaining each to the other...I don't have the talents of a diplomat". Richard Gwyn, "Man on mission talks peace", The Vancouver Sun, December 1, 1983.
200. Dam said it was important not to unconsciously "support the myth" of the American military build-up. Ibid.
201. "PM raises questions about US credibility, NATO plans", The Ottawa Citizen, January 31, 1984 p.10. Charles Lynch's column: "But when he starts articulating his inner doubts and using his well-known Jesuistic techniques to reduce the Western alliance to an absurdity, it is time he stopped talking for Canada." Ibid.
203. "It makes no sense that we'd have a strategic response to a conventional attack." "US unlikely to use A-weapons to thwart invasion, official says", The Globe and Mail, January 31, 1984.
204. DEA, S and S, 84/2. "Initiatives" by Trudeau, p.11.
205. Ibid, p. 10.
206. Ibid.
207. Ibid.


212. Trudeau, "World leaders must reassert primacy", p.11. "US disputes Trudeau remarks", The Globe and Mail, November 15, 1984. The former Canadian Chairman of NATO's military committee, Robert Falls, has written about decision-making in NATO, and gives credence to Trudeau's criticisms. Falls argues that the pressure on any head of state means that he/she does not always have the time to prepare adequately, so "expert staffs prepare comments and national positions...which are often read verbatim. These statements are often designed to evade the issues or to avoid making difficult decisions." Maurice Archdeacon and Robert Falls, "Decision Making in NATO", in Defending Europe: Options for Security, edited by Derek Paul, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p. 253.

213. Time constraints, the need to maintain unity despite many different interests, and the wide range of issues injects an element of group decision-making under stress into these forums.

214. Irving Janis, "Perspectives for the Future" in Victims of Groupthink, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1972), pp.197-8. George Lindsay, the former head of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE) of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian representative on NATO's Nuclear Planning Group has described those countries within NATO that disagree with certain policies as "nothing but a goddamn nuisance". He called these countries "footnote nations", as their disagreement meant that a footnote would be added to the policy specifying that agreement could not be reached. Comments made at a political science graduate students' seminar given at the University of British Columbia, February, 1987.

215. See Michel Vastel, "Trudeau on summitry", International Perspectives, November/December, 1982, pp. 10-12 for Trudeau's comments on the lack of discussion and exchange in NATO and Economic summits. Trudeau unsuccessfully tried to get Reagan to promise that discussion at the Williamsburg summit in May 1983 would be unstructured, without the bureaucratic handlers, or "Sherpas" as Trudeau described them, directing the

216. Trudeau said that he did not know if Ronald Reagan would be able to judge whether he was getting "the right advice or not". Dan Oberdorfer, "Western Summits Deemed Shallow: Trudeau Hits NATO Chiefs", Washington Post, November 14, 1984.


219. In a meeting on January 10, 1984 with the Third Track Committee which supports his initiative, Trudeau seemed "convinced that his full cooperation with NATO policy is absolutely required if he is to influence its other members". "Third track committee meets with Trudeau", The Peace Calendar, February 1984, p.3.


221. After a meeting on October 1 with the UN Secretary-General, Trudeau told reporters that while Canada could not interject itself into the superpower dialogue - or lack of it - he did think that, within the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Canada could help to "create a climate and a tone for exchanges that might have, indirectly, influence on the talks in Geneva". As cited in Canada, Department of External Affairs. "International Canada - The events of September/October 1983", supplement to International Perspectives, November/December 1983, p.8.


224. The West Coast salmon talks had broken off amid Canadian accusations of American intransigence. East Coast fishermen in the US were threatening trade action, as they asserted that Canadian government subsidies to Canadian fishermen were too high. Brian Butters, "Canada-US
talks 'on hold' as amity sours", The Vancouver Sun, February 7, 1984.


226. Trudeau noted the apprehensions expressed by Britain, France and China that his mission was to get them to reduce their armaments. In reality what he wanted was them "to put pressure on the superpowers to reduce their level of armaments to a level where it would be possible for the British, French and Chinese also to consider limiting or reducing theirs." Richard Gwyn, "Man on mission talks peace", The Vancouver Sun, December 1, 1983.

227. On October 20, 1983, Alan MacEachen announced the establishment of "an arms control and verification program" based in DEA, with startup funds of $500,000 which would be increased to $1 million next April. He also said that the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of DEA would get new people. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statement and Speeches No. 83/21, "Disarmament Week October 24-30", Statement by the Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, October 20, 1983, p2.

228. The Throne Speech, on December 7, 1983, announced the creation of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS). On April 16, 1984, legislation was introduced in the House to establish CIIPS. On June 28, the legislation received final Commons approval. Trudeau noted that "improving the climate among nations requires knowledge, creativity and a determination to find solutions." Canada, House of Commons Debates, 2nd Session, 32nd Parliament, December 7, 1983, p.2.


230. Ibid.

231. Tucker, "Trudeau and the politics of peace", p.10


235. Murray Marder, "Russia Expected US Attack says Gordievsky", The
Washington Post in The Manchester Guardian Weekly, August 17, 1986 pp.15-16. See McCgwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, as cited in footnotes 128 and 129 for information on Soviet attitudes between 1981-1983 that, when considered in context with this information on Gordievsky, illustrate how seriously the Soviet Union perceived the threat emanating from the United States.


237. "Part of Trudeau's peace plan 'pretext'", The Vancouver Sun, January 28, 1984.


239. As cited in Pearson, "Trudeau peace initiative reflections", p.3.

240. Ibid.

241. "Brief periods of activism in foreign policy were interspersed with longer periods of disinterest and consuming involvement in domestic affairs." Bromke and Nossal, "Trudeau rides the third rail", p. 4.

242. Ibid, pp. 4-5. Critics argued that Trudeau could have involved "like-minded" countries. However, since Trudeau refused to endorse any suggestions that were not acceptable to NATO, he was limited in what ideas and what countries he could involve. Thus he was unable to officially join the "Five-Continent Peace Initiative", which called on the nuclear weapons states, particularly the superpowers, to reverse the arms race by halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It was signed in May 1984, by President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India, President Miguel de la Madrid of Mexico, Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden, and President Julius Nyere of Tanzania. Trudeau said that he supported the thrust and intention of their statement, but could not be a signatory in light of Canada's commitment to NATO and the need for the INF deployment in Europe. Canada, Department of External Affairs. "International Canada - The events of April/May 1984", International Perspectives, July/August 1984, p.19.


245. At the time, an editorial in The Winnipeg Free Press said "This was an insensitive way to develop public understanding of his thinking on an issue
that brings thousands of Canadians out on Canadian streets and that causes schoolchildren to weep." As cited in Goar, "Ottawa assesses Trudeau's mission", p.28.

246. Ibid.


248. Ibid. As Roddick Byers observes, the initiative "constituted the most ambitious and concerted effort by any Canadian government to influence the state of East-West relations since Canadian involvement in the establishment of...NATO." Byers, "Political Confidence-Building and Strategic Coherence", p.116.


250. Ibid.

251. John Lamb of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament doubts that there is a correlation between increased defence spending and influence within the Alliance. He argues that the Americans are not prone to seeking outside counsel, especially when nuclear weapons are involved. Lamb, "Canada's Peace Initiative", p. 217

252. Gossage, Close to the Charisma, p. 255.


255. Trudeau, "World leaders must reassert primacy", p.12.

256. Ibid. p.13

257. Ibid. p. 11.

258. Ibid. p. 13.
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GLOSSARY

ALCM: Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ASAT: Anti-Satellite. Used to describe weapons that would destroy or disable satellites in orbit around Earth.
CANUSTEP: Canadian United States Test, Evaluation Programme. Umbrella agreement under which the ALCM is tested in Canada.
CCEPD: Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence
CDE: Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CPD: Committee on the Present Danger
CTB: Comprehensive Test Ban
DEA: Department of External Affairs
DIPP: Defence Industry Productivity Programme
DND: Department of National Defence
GLCM: Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF: Intermediate Nuclear Forces
IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ITC: Industry, Trade, and Commerce (Department of)
LNO: Limited Nuclear Option. Usage of nuclear weapons in a limited way to attain a set goal.
MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction. Theory of deterrence which rests upon the threat of retaliation to preclude enemy attack.
MBFR: Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. Arms control discussions aimed at reducing the conventional forces present in Europe.
MND: Minister of National Defence
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD: North American Aerospace Defence
NPT: Non Proliferation Treaty
RNO: Regional Nuclear Option. Use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict, with the intent of keeping the strife limited to that one area.
SAC: Supreme Allied Command
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Discussions on the strategic balance between the superpowers. Known as START under President Reagan.
SCEAND: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM: Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile
SOP: Standard Operating Procedure. Pattern used in bureaucratic and cybernetic decision-making to simplify and stabilize perceptions and policy-making.
SSEA: Secretary of State for External Affairs
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UNSSOD: United Nations Special Session on Disarmament