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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Not-for-profit agencies and privatization Terpenning, Greg Eldon 1989

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NOT-FOR-PROFIT AGENCIES AND PRIVATIZATION By GREG ELDON TERPENNING B.S.W., The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1988 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK We accept th i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1989 0 Greg Eldon Terpenning, 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. ^ . S o c i a l Work Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date June 28, 1989 DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of p r o v i n c i a l government p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s on voluntary organizations that provide personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver. A va r i e t y of key personnel i n each of six very diverse agencies are interviewed, and the data from -these interviews i s then q u a l i t a t i v e l y analyzed. The data suggests that: (1) organizations which are perceived to v o l u n t a r i l y a l t e r t h e i r mission i n response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n experience i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n , (2) dependence on contracting can pose a threat to the fundamental operating p r i n c i p l e s of an organization i f those p r i n c i p l e s do not conform to a bureaucratic i d e a l , (3) there i s a wide range of opinion within the voluntary sector regarding the motives of the p r o v i n c i a l government for pursuing p r i v a t i z a t i o n , that these opinions have both a descriptive and a p r e s c r i p t i v e function, and therefore r e l a t e to differences i n the response of individual agencies to p r i v a t i z a t i o n , (4) that contracting alone i s not an e f f e c t i v e means for an agency to meet the additional demands that r e s u l t from the reduction and elimination of public services, (5) that competition has generally increased throughout the voluntary sector as a r e s u l t of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , (6) that p r i v a t i z a t i o n has resulted i n gaps i n service which i t has become the de facto r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the voluntary sector to address, and (7) that the decision-making structure of an organization i s the most constant determining factor i n regard to which opinion of government motivation w i l l guide an agency's response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n . Concerns raised by professional associations and researchers i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l work regarding the p o t e n t i a l negative implications of p r i v a t i z a t i o n for voluntary organizations are p a r t i a l l y supported by t h i s study. A theory of the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations i s generated from the data. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract page i i L i s t of Tables i x Acknowledgement x CHAPTER ONE PRIVATIZATION: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME A. Introduction 1 B. A New Game: Changing the Pattern of History 6 C. New Rules: Changing Ideology 16 D. Playing the New Game 22 Notes to Chapter One 26 CHAPTER TWO PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICS: BEYOND THE RULE BOOK A. Schisms Between Policy and Ideology 41 B. Five Different Ways to Play the P r i v a t i z a t i o n Game 48 (1) The Neoconservatism Theory 49 (2) The Populism Theory 50 (3) The Popularity Theory 58 (4) The Paternalism Theory 67 (5) The Patronage Theory 70 Notes to Chapter Two 74 CHAPTER THREE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATIZATION: THE ISSUES TO BE RESEARCHED A. The Purpose of the Research 79 V B. The Case Studies page 83 C. Comparing the Case Studies 88 D. Generalizing from the Findings 92 Notes to Chapter Three 97 CHAPTER FOUR THE RESEARCH DESIGN: A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS A. The Rationale for Qua l i t a t i v e Methodology 99 B. The Selection of Interview Subjects 102 C. Data C o l l e c t i o n 112 D. Data Analysis 118 E. E t h i c a l Issues 126 Notes to Chapter Four 128 CHAPTER FIVE SIX CASE STUDIES A. Expansion Through Contracting: Agency A 133 (1) Background 133 (2) The Effects F e l t , and the Agency's Response.. 136 (3) The Rationale for the Response 144 B. Maintaining Independence: Agency B 148 (1) Background 148 (2) The Effects F e l t , and the Agency's Response.. 151 (3) The Rationale for the Response 156 C. Resisting Compromise: Agency C 158 (1) Background 158 (2) The Effects F e l t , and the Agency's Response.. 159 (3) The Rationale for the Response 164 v i D. P r i v a t i z a t i o n as Liberation: Agency D page 166 (1) Background 166 (2) The E f f e c t s F e l t , and the Agency's Response.. 167 (3) The Rationale for the Response 174 E. The Best Defense... Agency E 177 (1) Background 17 7 (2) The E f f e c t s F e l t , and the Agency's Response.. 181 (3) The Rationale for the Response 185 F. The Phoenix: Agency F 188 (1) Background 188 (2) The E f f e c t s F e l t , and the Agency's Response.. 189 (3) The Rationale for the Response 196 Notes to Chapter Five 197 CHAPTER SIX DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS A. Seven Dimensions of Change 201 (1) The Organization's Mission and Values 201 (2) The Organization - Public Sector Relationship 204 (3) The Role and values of Individuals 206 (4) The F i n a n c i a l Resources of the Agency 214 (5) Inter-organizational Relations 216 (6) The Agency's Service to Cl i e n t s 219 (7) Organizational Structure 222 B. Comparison of Findings to Concerns Raised i n the Li t e r a t u r e 226 v i i C. A Theory of the Impact of P r i v a t i z a t i o n on Voluntary Organizations that Provide Personal Social Services i n Vancouver page 231 D. Conclusion 236 Notes to Chapter Six 241 BIBLIOGRAPHY 243 APPENDIX A. Correspondence 256 (1) Contact Letter to Senior Administrators 256 (2) Contact Letter to Line Staff and P o l i c y -makers 259 (3) Follow-up Letter to A l l Interview Subjects... 261 B. Interview Consent Form 265 C. Interview Guide 266 (1) F i r s t Draft of the Interview Guide 266 (2) F i n a l Draft of the Interview Guide 267 D. Ethics Forms 272 E. Data Coding Example 280 F. Sorting Matrix Indicating Numbers of Summary Codes by Agency, Interview Subject, B.S.P. Code, and Dimension 286 G. L i s t of Codes Indicating Operating Theory of P r i v a t i z a t i o n Held by Interview Subjects 288 (1) Agency A 289 (2) Agency B 292 V l l l (3) Agency C page 295 (4) Agency D 298 (5) Agency E 300 (6) Agency F 302 H. L i s t of Summary Codes by Agency, Interview Subject, and Major Question Area, Indicating B.S.P. Code, Dimension, and Theory of P r i v a t i z a t i o n 305 (1) Agency A 306 (2) Agency B 322 (3) Agency C 335 (4) Agency D 342 (5) Agency E 351 (6) Agency F 363 ix LIST OF TABLES Table I Diver s i t y of Agencies Sampled page 106 Table II Subjects' Operating Theories of P r i v a t i z a t i o n 211 Table III Sorting Matrix for Codes 287 X ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to express my thanks to the nineteen people who were interviewed for t h i s study, and to Christiane McNiven and John Crane. Without t h e i r contribution of time and insight, the creation of t h i s thesis would have been impossible. I would also l i k e to thank Debbie Erickson for consistently being patient, supportive, and understanding throughout the long and sometimes pa i n f u l process of constructing t h i s work, and Kendra - for reminding me that none of t h i s i s r e a l l y so important that i t couldn't wait u n t i l a f t e r a game of hide-and-seek. CHAPTER ONE PRIVATIZATION: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME A. Introduction On July 27, 1983, I spent the f i r s t hour at the o f f i c e reading the morning newspaper. I was not l o a f i n g - I was attempting to divine my own future, that of the agency which employed me, and the future of i t s c l i e n t s . Judging from my observations of my boss and co-workers at the time, and discussions with other non-government s o c i a l workers since then, I was not alone. A l l over Vancouver, perhaps a l l over the province, the s t a f f , management, and volunteers of not-f o r - p r o f i t s o c i a l service agencies were peering into t h e i r various c r y s t a l b a l l s , attempting to conjure from the facts and opinions presented there a v i s i o n of the new r e a l i t y the headlines proclaimed. They were hoping to f i n d some pattern that would allow them to predict how the news would a f f e c t them, and what they should do about i t . The news was that the government had altered, through a r e d u c t i o n i n f i s c a l spending and a p o l i c y c a l l e d ' p r i v a t i z a t i o n ' , the rules of the s o c i a l services game. On July 26, 1983, Grace McCarthy, then Minister of Human Resources (since r e t i t l e d the Ministry of Social Services and Housing, or M.S.S.H.) announced cuts to her ministry t o t a l l i n g $16 m i l l i o n , and the elimination or transfer to the private sector of a wide variety of programmes.* The largely unwritten, and sometimes bewildering, rules which had governed the partnership of the public and private sector, and t h e i r respective roles i n the provision of services to address s o c i a l problems, no longer applied. Discerning the new rules of the game required an understanding of what the government was doing, and why. It i s l i k e l y that others were equally interested, since they had an equal, or even greater, stake i n the game. However, the impact of the news on government employees, the users of s o c i a l services, and many other groups i n society, w i l l only be of secondary i n t e r e s t to t h i s t h e s i s . To give a l l those affected t h e i r due attention would require a far more comprehensive study than has been possible here, given the constraints of time and resources. In the s i x years since the Social Credit government brought down i t s ' R e s t r a i n t ' budget the process of in t e r p r e t i n g what the government i s doing has continued, but a c l e a r p a t t e r n i n t h e i r p o l i c i e s , and t h e r e f o r e understanding of them by those who are affected by them, has proved elusive. The purpose of t h i s thesis i s to describe the e f f e c t of p r o v i n c i a l government p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s on voluntary organizations which provide personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver, to define the factors involved i n producing that e f f e c t , and to generate a theory explaining the choices made by those organizations regarding such p o l i c i e s . The experiences of key personnel from a va r i e t y of n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies, and t h e i r perspectives of government p o l i c y , w i l l be d e s c r i b e d and compared. I t i s hoped t h a t t h i s s tudy w i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the impact o f p r i v a t i z a t i o n on the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s f i e l d g e n e r a l l y , and on n o t - f o r - p r o f i t o r g a n i z a t i o n s s p e c i f i c a l l y , and w i l l be o f use t o such o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n a s s e s s i n g the c o u r s e o f a c t i o n t h e y have taken i n response t o government p r i v a t i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s , and i n d e t e r m i n i n g what c o u r s e o f a c t i o n they might t a k e n e x t . T h i s work i s compr ised of s i x c h a p t e r s . T h i s c h a p t e r d raws upon e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e t o p r o v i d e a b a s i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p r i v a t i z a t i o n as i t r e l a t e s t o the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s f i e l d , and v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I t i s found t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom d e f i n e s p r i v a t i z a t i o n as a means f o r governments committed t o n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e i d e o l o g y t o a c h i e v e t h e i r economic and s o c i a l g o a l s . 2 T h i s i s c o n s i d e r e d i m p o r t a n t because such an assumpt ion has bo th a d e s c r i p t i v e and a p r e s c r i p t i v e f u n c t i o n - i t sugges ts t h a t key d e c i s i o n -making p e r s o n n e l i n v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s can p r e d i c t the nex t l o g i c a l s t e p i n government p o l i c y , and how i t w i l l a f f e c t t h e i r a g e n c y . The second c h a p t e r examines the p r o v i n c i a l government 's mot ives f o r p r i v a t i z a t i o n . An a n a l y s i s o f a wide range o f e x i s t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n on the economic and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s o f the S o c i a l C r e d i t government b r i n g s i n t o q u e s t i o n the assumpt ion t h a t i d e o l o g y i s t h e i r p r i m a r y c o n c e r n i n p o l i c y f o r m a t i o n . Four a d d i t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s o f the p r o v i n c i a l government 's mot ives are suggested. Chapter Three u t i l i z e s the information and analyses provided i n the f i r s t two chapters to i d e n t i f y the questions of concern to t h i s study. Does the experience of personnel i n voluntary organizations that provide personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver support the concerns expressed i n the l i t e r a t u r e regarding the varied negative implications of p r i v a t i z a t i o n for those agencies? To what degree have those personnel recognized and exercised control over the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on t h e i r organization, and what factors have influenced the actions taken by those personnel i n guiding the response of those agencies to p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s ? The fourth chapter d e t a i l s the methods chosen for answering those questions. Throughout the design, c o l l e c t i o n , and analysis stages of t h i s study, the problem has been to re t a i n the complexity of data drawn from a v a r i e t y of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a range of v o l u n t a r y organizations, and which describe a spectrum of personal and organizational factors i n r e l a t i o n to p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y , while also s t r u c t u r i n g the research i n order to allow comparisons to be made between i n d i v i d u a l subjects, and a g e n c i e s , and t h e i r experience of the process of p r i v a t i z a t i o n . Chapter Five presents the findings of the research as s i x case studies. The l a s t chapter provides an analysis and comparison of the findings, relates them to the issues raised i n the f i r s t two chapters of t h i s t h e s i s , and o f f e r s a theory regarding the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations. That theory i n t e r - r e l a t e s choices made by the agencies studied i n areas where d i s c r e t i o n has been possible, c e r t a i n variables within those organizations, and the perceptions of the government's motivation f o r p r i v a t i z a t i o n held by t h e i r key personnel. Terms that w i l l be i n common use i n t h i s thesis d i f f e r i n meaning between contexts and authors, and i t i s therefore necessary to supply the d e f i n i t i o n s which w i l l apply here. Le Grand and Robinson (1985) define p r i v a t i z a t i o n as the reduction or elimination of state provision, subsidy, or r e g u l a t i o n of service, and by l o g i c a l extension, the introduction of the market, another form of state a c t i v i t y , or voluntary a c t i v i t y , as a replacement for the service i n whole ( i f the service was eliminated), or i n part ( i f the service was reduced). 3 The voluntary sector includes both, "...organized forms of s o c i a l endeavour carried out by non-p r o f i t s o c i e t i e s . . . " , and informal systems of helping and sharing between r e l a t i v e s and friends (Rekart, 1987).^ The private sector includes both the voluntary sector and commercial or proprietary e n t i t i e s ; i n d i v i d u a l s or companies whose purpose i s to reap p r o f i t s (the market). The pr i v a t e sector i s distinguished from the public (state or government) sector, which i s composed of statutory organizations. S o c i a l services are defined by the Joint Committee of the So c i a l Planning and Research Council of B.C., and the United Way of the Lower Mainland (1980), as: "...the range of programs undertaken to meet the needs of i n d i v i d u a l s , families, and communities, including education, health care, income support and supplementation, public housing, and personal s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . " 5 Personal s o c i a l s e r v i c e s are those required to: "...compliment, supplement or subs t i t u t e f o r services and care rendered by families or friends on an i n d i v i d u a l basis . . . and (which) are to d i f f e r i n g degrees supportive, sustaining and int e g r a t i v e . " ^ B. A New Game: Changing the Pattern of History The announcement made by Grace McCarthy on July 26, 1983 went beyond a simple adjustment of resource a l l o c a t i o n . Its symbolic implications were enormous. To better understand those implications, one must view the actions of the government i n an h i s t o r i c a l context. It stands to reason that s o c i a l needs have always been met by the private sector - i n i t i a l l y by informal systems such as families, and eventually by increasingly structured systems such as markets and r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . The intervention of western governments i n addressing s o c i a l needs i s a r e l a t i v e l y recent phenomenon. The h i s t o r y of public provision of s o c i a l services can be traced back to the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, and the f i r s t example of p r i v a t i z a t i o n to the repeal of that statute (and consequent reliance of the indigent on charity) i n 1834. 7 In the late nineteenth century, i n response to the burgeoning s o c i a l problems r e s u l t i n g from the i n d u s t r i a l revolution, a variety of s o c i a l reform movements arose i n Europe and North America. Though these movements i n i t i a l l y concentrated on addressing issues of poverty through private means, t h e i r e f f o r t s won the i n t e r e s t of academics and p o l i t i c i a n s seeking alternatives to both the l a i s s e z - f a i r e market and socialism, and they won the sympathy of the media and the electorate, and thus they moved i r r e s i s t i b l y toward the public sphere. 8 In Canada, p r i o r to World War II, governments began to assume a role i n the provision of s o c i a l services through a v a r i e t y of new p r o v i n c i a l and federal programmes, most of which were based on demonstrated need, and many of which continued to be delivered by the voluntary agencies which had arisen out of the reform movements of the previous century.^ The Depression and World War II brought together two themes which combined to characterize the post World War II welfare state: the notion that government has a s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and the perception of the need for a strong central government.^ u Though voluntary agencies continued to provide service i n the welfare state, they were quickly dwarfed by government agencies which were developed to d e l i v e r new statutory services, many of which were universal, and hence required large-scale, c e n t r a l i z e d , delivery systems.H However, voluntary organizations also benefitted from the development of the welfare state, since i n many cases the government perceived an advantage i n u t i l i z i n g n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies to d e l i v e r some new s e r v i c e s , and subsidy to such organizations was consequently increased. For example, i n B r i t i s h Columbia, during the b r i e f reign of the N.D.P. government (1972 to 1975), expenditures on s o c i a l services more than doubled, and grants to voluntary s o c i a l service agencies increased from $243,678 to $9.3 m i l l i o n . ^ In July of 1983, the h i s t o r i c trend toward the expansion of public involvement i n s o c i a l services i n B r i t i s h Columbia was reversed. The Ministry of Human Resources f i r e d 599 regular, f u l l - t i m e s t a f f (90% of whom worked d i r e c t l y with children), and terminated a v a r i e t y of programmes, most notably in-school c h i l d care counsellors, youth workers (who dealt with runaways and pros t i t u t e s i n Vancouver's downtown core), family support workers (who worked with families i n c r i s i s ) , and c h i l d abuse teams (which provided consultation to s t a f f involved i n complex cases, most often i n v o l v i n g sexual abuse). The 165 s t a f f of over 20 group homes were l a i d o f f and the homes were contracted out. The estimated $16 m i l l i o n savings amounted to 16% of the $102 m i l l i o n family and childrens' services budget.^ The cuts included a 20% reduction i n Community Projects grants - which were awarded to voluntary organizations to provide services to seniors, youth, f a m i l i e s , immigrants and other groups. In the s o c i a l services f i e l d i n B r i t i s h Columbia, p r i v a t i z a t i o n may have been rendered conceptually inseparable from a reduction i n f i s c a l expenditure, and the i d e o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l e f o r th a t reduction, by the timing of i t s introduction as a major p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e . On July 7, 1983, the Social Credit government of William Bennett introduced i t s 'Restraint' budget, which included, along with twenty-six pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n designed to reduce the s i z e of the public sector and the regulatory powers of government over the private market, a pledge to t r a n s f e r to the p r i v a t e sector a variety of services deemed to be outside the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of government. 1 5 E.W. Harrison and M.G. Gosse ( 1986), two s e n i o r p r o v i n c i a l government bureaucrats, demonstrate the conceptual i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of 'Restraint' and p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n t h i s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the government's actions: "Faced with the harsh r e a l i t y of d e c l i n i n g p r o v i n c i a l revenues and ever expanding demands for government services, a newly re-elected S o c i a l Credit Government i n B r i t i s h Columbia, i n mid 1983, imposed an unprecedented period of r e s t r a i n t on government m i n i s t r i e s , boards, commissions and crown corporations... Three broad objectives were established for t h i s program of r e s t r a i n t : 1. to reduce the o v e r a l l cost of government services to taxpayers of B r i t i s h Columbia; 2. to reduce the number of persons employed d i r e c t l y by government (an o v e r a l l target reduction of 25 percent was announced) 3. to increase e f f i c i e n c y and effectiveness by turning over to the private sector those services that might better be provided by the p r i v a t e sector."* 6 I m p l i c i t i n t h i s r a t i o n a l e i s a d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n as a p o l i c y which takes place at a single point i n time, which has as i t s goal the reduction of public expenditure ( s i n c e i n c r e a s i n g e f f i c i e n c y suggests the production of the same goods and services at reduced cost), and which i s a part of a larger set of p o l i c i e s directed toward the same goal. In short, p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s a 'Restraint' measure. Le Grand and Robinson's d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n (see page 5) suggests something quite d i f f e r e n t - that 'Restraint' i s a p r i v a t i z a t i o n measure. This view i s based on the case that the end r e s u l t of the reduction or elimination of p u b l i c services (even i f the stated intent of the government i s simply to reduce i t s expenditures) i s an increased r e l i a n c e on the private sector. According to t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , a reduction of public involvement i n the provision, subsidy or regulation of services may take place at a single point i n time, but p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s a p o l i c y maintained by government far beyond that point through i t s r e f u s a l t o a c c e p t the d e f i n i t i o n of the s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of government which l e g i t i m a t e d the development of the welfare state. Using Le Grand and Robinson's d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , Marilyn Callahan, and Christiane McNiven (1988) have i d e n t i f i e d seven i n i t i a t i v e s used by the p r o v i n c i a l government to pursue p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n the c h i l d welfare f i e l d : "1. Cancelling the provision of non-statutory services. 2. Reducing the provision of some statutory services through bureaucratic disentitlement. 3. Contracting new and e x i s t i n g statutory services to nonprofit and f o r - p r o f i t organizations. 4. T r a n s f e r r i n g government services to other j u r i s d i c t i o n s . 11 5. Reduc ing s u b s i d y t o the p r i v a t e s e c t o r f o r non -s t a t u t o r y p r e v e n t i v e - t y p e s e r v i c e s . 6. I n c r e a s i n g u s e r f e e s . 7. Ref ra in ing the na tu re of f a m i l y and c h i l d r e n ' s problems so t h a t t h e i r s o l u t i o n l i e s m a i n l y o u t s i d e o f the government m i n i s t r y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e s o r o u t s i d e o f government e n t i r e l y . " 1 7 Simply t e r m i n a t i n g s e r v i c e s i s p r i v a t i z a t i o n because i t may be assumed t h a t i f t h o s e s e r v i c e s t r u l y met a need , and t h e i r f u n c t i o n s a r e no l o n g e r p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h t h e government , t h a t someone, be they p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s , f a m i l i e s , v o l u n t a r y o r p r o p r i e t a r y a g e n c i e s (which compose the p r i v a t e s e c t o r ) , w i l l somehow r e s p o n d t o meet the need . F o r example , w i t h o u t the F a m i l y Suppor t programme, a p a r e n t who i s h a v i n g prob lems c o p i n g w i t h a c r i s i s i n the f a m i l y may seek out f r i e n d s o r f a m i l y f o r h e l p , o r may t u r n t o a d o c t o r , a p s y c h o l o g i s t , a s o c i a l worker i n p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e , o r a v o l u n t a r y o r p r o p r i e t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n i f she i s a b l e t o pay a u s e r f e e - thus making the s o l u t i o n a p r i v a t e one , r a t h e r than a p u b l i c o n e . Somewhat s i m i l a r t o t e r m i n a t i n g s e r v i c e s , r e d u c i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n o f some s e r v i c e s i s i n d i r e c t p r i v a t i z a t i o n because i t s r e s u l t i s the f a i l u r e t o f u l l y meet s o c i a l needs - wh ich means a market i s c r e a t e d , and o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r (or a l t e r n a t e l y , demands on) the p r i v a t e s e c t o r t o meet t h o s e n e e d s . To u n d e r s t a n d Le Grand and R o b i n s o n ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and the e l a b o r a t i o n of i t i n the c o n t e x t o f t h i s p r o v i n c e , one must move beyond the commonly-he ld v iew t h a t p r i v a t i z a t i o n and c o n t r a c t i n g a r e synonymous.A" These measures have been broadly recognized as having s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s . Organized labour, the media, professional groups, and academics, throughout Canada and i n B r i t i s h Columbia have, for much of t h i s decade, expressed concerns about the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of s o c i a l services i n t h i s and other provinces. Public sector unions have perceived p r i v a t i z a t i o n as motivated by ideology, not e f f i c i e n c y , as an attack on working people, organized labour and the welfare state, as the importation of 'alien' p o l i c i e s from the United States and Great B r i t a i n , and as a form of patronage - a means for government to buy the support of Big Business. x^ The Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) stated that the intent of 'Restraint' was to convert the province into a " f a s c i s t " state: a, "...bastion of ultraconservatism. " 2 ° of p r i v a t i z a t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y i t was asserted that, "The many s o c i a l services that are being reduced are also being l e f t to profit-seekers i n the private sector to replace. " 2 1 The B.C. Federation of Labour also condemned p r i v a t i z a t i o n , suggesting that the p o l i c y was based on the examples set by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and s t a t i n g : "The Social Credit government i s committed to the goal of p r i v a t i z a t i o n for i d e o l o g i c a l reasons along with no regard for effectiveness, appropriateness or consensus. It seems l i k e l y they w i l l be interested only i n the operational d e f i n i t i o n of 'successful' p r i v a t i z a t i o n generally subscribed to by t h e F r a s e r I n s t i t u t e - t h a t o f p r o f i t a b i l i t y . " 2 2 Editors and columnists i n the province's three major newspapers have repeatedly suggested that by p r i v a t i z i n g c h i l d welfare services the government has reduced society's a b i l i t y to care f o r needy children, and that while the impact on i n d i v i d u a l l i v e s has been great, the impact on a l l of society, i n terms of both d o l l a r s and l o s t p o t e n t i a l , w i l l be greater s t i l l . ^ 3 P r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s of s o c i a l workers have expressed the b e l i e f that the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of s o c i a l services has been pursued with l i t t l e p ublic input, that i t has no proven benefit i n terms of enhancing the q u a l i t y or quantity of present services or reducing costs ( b e l i e v i n g increased i n e f f i c i e n c y to be more l i k e l y , considering the lack of standards for both the s e l e c t i o n of contract recip i e n t s and monitoring of services), and that i t i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n increased inequity - the development of a two-t i e r e d s o c i a l service system.24 Rati o n a l i z i n g the Canadian Association of S o c i a l Worker's p o s i t i o n on p r i v a t i z a t i o n , E r i c a Bell-Lowther (1988) also i d e n t i f i e s what she believes to be the economic and s o c i a l agenda of the proponents of p r i v a t i z a t i o n : "...the i n t e r e s t group currently most vocal i n promoting ' p r i v a t i z a t i o n ' i s the neoconservatives, who argue t h a t the welfare s t a t e c r e a t e s dependency, undermines personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , d i s t o r t s i n c e n t i v e s , s t i f l e s entrepreneurship, hinders the operation of labor markets and serves the i n t e r e s t of bureaucrats and professionals ...there has been a s h i f t from the l i b e r a l a ssumptions of e q u a l r i g h t s , w elfare and d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e to the neoconservative tenets of economic individualism, s o c i a l Darwinism, and the deregulation of business." 2 5 C i t i n g i s s u e s of s o c i a l j u s t i c e , the Vancouver Elementary School Administrators' Association has repeatedly c a l l e d f o r the re-introduction of the preventive c h i l d welfare services which were eliminated i n 1983.26 Though there i s a greater range of perspectives on the i s s u e among academics, compared to the other groups mentioned, the l i t e r a t u r e reviewed by t h i s writer indicates that only a minority accept the view that the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of s o c i a l services w i l l enhance the e f f i c i e n c y of t h e i r d e l i v e r y , and i t appears that most i d e n t i f y p r i v a t i z a t i o n as the pursuit of an ideological agenda.2? Much of our understanding of both neoconservatism and p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n the p r o v i n c i a l context rests on analyses of them from other contexts. Writers c r i t i c a l of p r i v a t i z a t i o n include Le Grand and Robinson (1985), who describe the B r i t i s h experience i n an attempt to provide greater c l a r i t y on the issue than that offered by, " . . . s i m p l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c . " 2 8 Despite that, they i n i t i a t e discussion of the issue by i d e n t i f y i n g p r i v a t i z a t i o n s t r i c t l y as a manifestation of n e o c l a s s i c a l economics: "Since 1979, the government's commitment to a private market philosophy has lead to a series of proposals or decisions designed to replace the 'welfare state* systems of c o l l e c t i v e provision and finance with more privatized systems."^ 9 A s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s i s drawn from the American experience. Mimi Abramovitz (1986) states: 15 "...placing public tasks i n private hands i s one way the Reagan Administration i s restructuring the welfare state. Since 1981 i t has been part of a broad strategy to cope with the economic c r i s i s , one that includes reduced taxes, domestic program c u t s , and the t r a n s f e r of s o c i a l welfare r e s p o n s i b i l i t y from the federal government to that of the s t a t e s . " 3 0 The pattern i s continued i n Canada. A l l a n Moscovitch (1986) provides t h i s analysis of the o r i g i n and meaning of p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n the s o c i a l services f i e l d : "The search f o r c o s t - c o n t r o l techniques has intersected with capi t a l ' s renewed search f o r p r o f i t a b l e opportunities, and with ' l a i s s e z - f a i r e ' ideology to produce the strategy of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , the private and primarily commercial provision of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . " 3 1 Bringing a s i m i l a r view of the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of s o c i a l services into the pr o v i n c i a l context, Roop Seebaran (1983) observed: "When over a score of fraud investigators are retained i n regional o f f i c e s of the Ministry of Human Resources across the province, i n preference to services that prevent c h i l d abuse, one r e a l i z e s that i t i s not economic but p o l i t i c a l and id e o l o g i c a l values that are at the root of the change. " 32 Reaction to p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s was not e n t i r e l y negative, and l i k e i t s opponents, the majority of the proponents of p r i v a t i z a t i o n judged i t i n terms of i t s id e o l o g i c a l basis, enhancement of e f f i c i e n c y , or p o t e n t i a l savings. E.W. Harrison and M.G. Gosse accept at face value the benefit of a smaller public sector, cost reductions associated with contracting out, and the greater e f f i c i e n c y of the private sector, compared to the public s e c t o r . 3 3 In the U.S., Whitcomb and Miskiewicz (1982) perceive s i m i l a r advantages, and add a fourth advantage o f p r i v a t i z a t i o n : freedom from legal and i n s t i t u t i o n a l b a r r i e r s . 3 ^ i n the U.K., K. Ascher (1987) concludes that p r i v a t i z a t i o n has reduced what he i d e n t i f i e s as the trend toward i n e f f i c i e n c y produced by the presence of trade u n i o n s . 3 5 In addition, he observes that p r i v a t i z a t i o n proceeds most smoothly where i t i s not perceived as i d e o l o g i c a l l y or p o l i t i c a l l y based, but efficiency-based. 3 ^ C. New Rules: Changing Ideology It i s apparent that many of those who attack or support the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of s o c i a l services do so on the basis of t h e i r perception of the i d e o l o g i c a l agenda i t represents. To understand the arguments they present, and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of such assumptions for voluntary organizations, requires ( i n addition to an awareness of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l context) an understanding of the i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s which supported the development of the welfare state, and those p r i n c i p l e s which, for the past decade, have supported i t s destruction. Throughout the 'eighties we i n Canada have witnessed considerable debate over the future of the welfare state. Its founders and defenders, larg e l y l i b e r a l s and proponents of s o c i a l democracy, have argued that i t i s necessary for the state (via a variety of public and private i n s t i t u t i o n s ) to intervene to address, through d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c e r t a i n income, 17 goods and services, the universal r i s k s to i n d i v i d u a l s and groups of c i t i z e n s experienced as a r e s u l t of the operation of the free market i n an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t y . 3 7 Its attackers have been both Marxists and neoconservatives. Marxists have argued that the welfare state simply papers-over the gl a r i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s that e x i s t i n the c a p i t a l i s t society, and acts to s t a b i l i z e and maintain a fundamentally unjust system. 3 8 Neoconservatives have argued that the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the welfare state act to unjus t l y s t r i p some individuals of t h e i r property (thus v i o l a t i n g t h e i r r i g h t s ) , ostensibly to r e d i s t r i b u t e i t to other i n d i v i d u a l s deemed less fortunate (though t h i s may not i n fact happen), which impinges on the free market, and thus i t s p o t e n t i a l to provide for a l l (including the poor), thereby encouraging dependence on the s t a t e . 3 9 Though there are no clear winners i n the debate i t would seem that a majority of the electorate have been w i l l i n g to support those who have i d e n t i f i e d themselves as either conservatives or supporters of the free market, and who have engaged i n c r i t i c i s m of the welfare state along the l i n e s of those embracing neoconservative values and ne o - c l a s s i c a l economic p r i n c i p l e s . Though i t i s very l i k e l y that no p o l i t i c a l party i n Canada represents any 'pure' i d e o l o g i c a l hue, i t i s apparent that both the Progressive Conservative party i n Ottawa and the Social Credit party i n V i c t o r i a have to some degree been pursuing p o l i c i e s e i t h e r founded i n or influenced by neoconservative t h e o r y . 4 0 Neoconservative theory may be better described as a network of theories connected and founded upon ne o c l a s s i c a l economics. Its p r i n c i p l e s are described by a v a r i e t y of authors. Though some variance of opinion does e x i s t , there i s a f a i r degree of agreement between proponents of neoconservatism, and i t i s possible to understand i t s fundamentals by describing the opinions of only a few t h e o r i s t s . The basic unit of neoconservatism i s the i n d i v i d u a l . The i n d i v i d u a l i s deemed to have c e r t a i n natural r i g h t s , defined as, "...permissions to do something, and obligations on others not to i n t e r f e r e . " 4 1 Property i s treated as an extension of the i n d i v i d u a l , and therefore protection of the individual's r i g h t to dispose of his or her r i g h t f u l property on an open market, free from coercion, i s synonymous with protection of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and freedoms. This provides the basis for the s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y of any government adhering to neoconservative theory. According to Robert Nozick (1974), the coercive power of the state i s l i m i t e d by the moral supremacy of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . 4 2 Neoconservatives would therefore l i m i t the state to a watch-dog r o l e , described by Nozick as a 'minimal' state: "...a minimal state, limited to the narrow function of p r o t e c t i o n against f o r c e , t h e f t , fraud, enforcement of c o n t r a c t s , and so on, i s j u s t i f i e d . . . a n y more extensive state w i l l v i o l a t e persons' rights not to be forced to do c e r t a i n things, and i s unjustified...the state may not use i t s coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some c i t i z e n s to a i d others..." 4* A free market i s therefore the only legitimate system f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income, goods and services. Intervention by the state i n the market i n order to achieve what i t deems to be a more desirable pattern of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s considered an i n j u s t i c e - Nozick states: "The complete p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e would say simply that a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s just i f everyone i s e n t i t l e d to the holdings they possess under the d i s t r i b u t i o n . 1 , 4 4 From t h i s perspective, entitlement i s achieved by just exchange involving the free choice of i n d i v i d u a l s to dispose of property they r i g h t f u l l y own and to acquire, without the use of coercion, property r i g h t f u l l y owned by others. The pattern of d i s t r i b u t i o n i n society i s achieved by a series of such exchanges (euphemistically described as the ' i n v i s i b l e hand' of the free market). 4 5 In c o n t r a s t to i d e o l o g i e s which suggest t h a t intervention i n the market i s necessary i n order to protect the basic rights of i n d i v i d u a l s or to maintain t h e i r d i g n i t y , neoconservatives view the state as the threat to i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , and the market as t h e i r protector. Milton Friedman (1962) notes: "The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c feature of action through p o l i t i c a l channels i s that i t tends to require or enforce s u b s t a n t i a l conformity. The great advantage of the market, on the other hand, i s that i t permits wide d i v e r s i t y . It i s , i n p o l i t i c a l terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as i t were, for the color of t i e he wants and get i t ; he does not have to see what color the majority wants and then, i f he i s i n the minority, submit." 4 6 20 A government which bases i t s p o l i c i e s on neoconservative p r i n c i p l e s would therefore seek to dismantle the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the welfare state, since t h e i r e f f e c t i s to a l t e r , or d i s t o r t r the d i s t r i b u t i o n that would otherwise occur without any intervention i n the market. It follows that such governments would replace those i n s t i t u t i o n s with (or allow them to be natur a l l y replaced by) the market - and by l o g i c a l elaboration, p r i v a t i z a t i o n might therefore be interpreted as the means chosen to achieve t h i s end. Friedman (1973) e n v i s i o n s a neoconservative Utopia, a world i n which i n d i v i d u a l s : "...have a wide variety of a l t e r n a t i v e s . You want pluralism, m u l t i p l i c i t y of choice. When you get down to small units of government, you have i t . If you don't l i k e what one town does, and you can't change i t , you move to another town. You have competition among towns for the provision of services. No reason you shouldn't. On the whole, the formal r e s t r i c t i o n s on government a c t i v i t y should be most severe at the federal l e v e l , less so at the state l e v e l and least of a l l at the l o c a l l e v e l . " 4 7 F.A. Hayek (1978) agrees that i n such a world, state services would be possible, so long as: "1. government does not claim a monopoly and new methods of rendering services through the market (for example, i n some now covered by s o c i a l insurance) are not prevented; 2. the means are raised by taxation on uniform p r i n c i p l e s and t a x a t i o n i s not used as an instrument for the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of income; and, 3. the wants s a t i s f i e d are c o l l e c t i v e wants of the community as a whole and not merely the c o l l e c t i v e wants of p a r t i c u l a r groups." 4 8 In short, i f government i s to do anything (beyond i t s 21 watch-dog role) by way of provision of services, i t i s deemed best provided by the lowest l e v e l of government possible, must serve the whole community within the government's j u r i s d i c t i o n (as opposed to special i n t e r e s t groups within i t ) , and only i f i t mimics the market as much as possible and does not i n t e r f e r e with the market beyond entering i t as another p o t e n t i a l s e l l e r of service. This i s the l i m i t of state a c t i v i t y which can be expected of governments committed to neoconservative theory and n e o c l a s s i c a l economic p r i n c i p l e s . The case could be made that the p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s described by Callahan and McNiven (see page 10 and 11) have conformed to the neoconservative p r i n c i p l e s of non-intervention (termination of intervention) i n areas deemed private (and thereby support for the private market), of service provision at the l o c a l l e v e l (as a s e l l e r of service on the market) when intervention must take place, and of just exchange. The view that the p r i v a t i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s of the Social Credit government i n B r i t i s h Columbia have been founded on the p r i n c i p l e s of neoconservative theory, and are a means to achieve the government's i d e o l o g i c a l goals, has great relevance to voluntary organizations. Such a view allows us not only to describe what the government has been doing, and why they have been doing i t , but i t also permits us to speculate about what future p o l i c i e s might be expected, and where the government i s leading the province. The personnel within n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies ( i f they believe that the government's agenda i s based pr i m a r i l y on neoconservatism) cannot ignore the implications of the abandonment of f i n a n c i a l and regulatory intervention by the minimal state i n the private sector, both for t h e i r organization, and t h e i r c l i e n t s . However, i t i s apparent that there i s not complete agreement between neoconservative ideology and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y . This point w i l l be considered i n greater depth i n Chapter Two. D. Playing the New Game What i s communicated i n the l i t e r a t u r e which deals s p e c i f i c a l l y with the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations which provide s o c i a l services i s both the complexity of the topic, and the present tendency of writers to make broad g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . 4 9 As a f a i r l y representative summary of what i s i n the l i t e r a t u r e , and example of the indicated problems with the present l e v e l of awareness about the issue, t h i s statement from the Canadian Association of So c i a l Workers (C.A.S.W.) i s i l l u s t r a t i v e : "The l i t e r a t u r e on the p o l i t i c a l economy of p r i v a t i z a t i o n and voluntary organizations documents the changes that have taken place i n voluntary agencies i n the U.S. which have been forced to become more opportunistic, entrepreneurial and p o l i t i c a l i n order to survive. Major changes have taken place i n t h e i r organizational environment. There i s an increasing reliance on government funds t i e d to s p e c i f i c services rather than to general operating grants. Agency resources are reallocated to securing government contracts and t a i l o r i n g services to tenders requested by governments. This re s u l t s i n the loss of many advantages of voluntary organizations: t h e i r f l e x i b i l i t y , innovativeness, a b i l i t y t o promote c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n and advocacy and s o c i a l reform roles Given t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the po t e n t i a l impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations, and the suggestion of the goals of neoconservatism provided i n t h i s chapter, the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of n o t - f o r - p r o f i t s o c i a l service agencies i n the implementation of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n p o l i c y i n i t s e l f i s a phenomenon worth studying. If one accepts the d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n provided by E.W. Harrison and M.G. Gosse (that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s a means to reduce costs), i t i s apparent that such p o l i c i e s are of some benefit to voluntary organizations. Rekart (1987) reports i n her study of n o t - f o r - p r o f i t s o c i a l service agencies i n B r i t i s h Columbia that, largely as a r e s u l t of increased contracting, the budgets of such organizations have increased appreciably since 1983. 5 1 One might conclude that the reason voluntary organizations have not followed the example of hard-line opposition set by labour, professional associations, and other groups i s simply that none of those other groups stood to benefit f i n a n c i a l l y by p r i v a t i z a t i o n , while n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies did. Though there may be some truth to t h i s explanation, i t i s both t r i t e , and too s i m p l i s t i c . It does not explain differences between organizations i n t h e i r response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n , i t assumes t h a t f i n a n c i a l g a i n w i l l always supercede o t h e r considerations i n determining the actions of n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies, and i t defines p r i v a t i z a t i o n as contracting alone. If one accepts Le Grand and Robinson's d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and the l i s t of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s provided by Callahan and McNiven, one can see that p r i v a t i z a t i o n has been a mixed blessing for voluntary agencies. This i s evident when one considers a var i e t y of p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s i n concert. The pote n t i a l r e s u l t of the termination and reduction of services, contracting, reduction of subsidy (through Community Grants) to nonprofit agencies, the increase i n user fees, and reframing of s o c i a l problems, on voluntary organizations may have been to simultaneously increase the breadth and depth of service demands, increase funds to meet a narrow range of needs i d e n t i f i e d by the government (and to attach these to s p e c i f i c methods f o r meeting needs and accounting for those funds), while decreasing funds available for discretionary use by the agency. 5 2 Rekart and others suggest that the response of voluntary organizations has been to increase demands on charitable funders for more discretionary money (with l i t t l e success, since charitable funding has been stable since 1983), to seek (and compete for) more f l e x i b l e funding through fun d r a i s i n g , to generate more revenue through introducing or increasing user fees, and to compete for more c o n t r a c t s with a l l l e v e l s of government. 5 3 Perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the Ministry of Human Resources also chose i n July 1983 to change i t s contracting procedure from one which has been termed the 'partnership' model to one c a l l e d the 'market' model - the l a t t e r i n v o l v i n g bidding, payment by unit cost or fix e d fee, single-year contracts, and being designed f o r use with both proprietary and voluntary organizations (where the former had involved negotiation over proposals, cost-reimbursement, multi-year contracts and was prim a r i l y designed for n o t - f o r - p r o f i t a g e n c i e s ) . 5 4 The l i t e r a t u r e suggests that for voluntary organizations i n B.C., p r i v a t i z a t i o n has meant being thrust almost overnight into an environment characterized by market forces (supply-and-demand, competition for charitable and government funds, the impact of cost on consumption, etc.), a reduction i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to independently address the s o c i a l problems they i d e n t i f y , and an increase i n t h e i r dependence on, and control by, the p r o v i n c i a l government. While i t may be f a i r to say that accepting new p r o v i n c i a l contracts may have proven of some benefit to some voluntary organizations, i t may have also have created many problems. More generally, the impact of those p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s over which not-f o r - p r o f i t agencies have had no control (the elimination of non-statutory public services, or the reduction of subsidy to the voluntary sector, for instance) have very l i k e l y created problems for them, and i t would be premature to conclude that the f i n a n c i a l benefits of contracting have outweighed the problems created by p r i v a t i z a t i o n . In considering the future i n the context of the conventional wisdom regarding the i d e o l o g i c a l basis for p r i v a t i z a t i o n , i t would be equally premature to conclude that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s l i k e l y to be good for the voluntary sector. Discovering what the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations which provide s o c i a l services has been i s the point of t h i s thesis, and the research study undertaken to determine what that impact has been w i l l be described i n Chapters Three through Six. Examining the assumptions which support the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l government p o l i c y as i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated (which may guide the personnel of voluntary organizations i n either opposing p r i v a t i z a t i o n , or p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n i t through contracting) w i l l be the exercise i n Chapter Two. Notes to Chapter One 1. Seebaran, R., "Social Services i n B.C.: The Axe F a l l s " , i n The Social Worker, Vol. 51, No. 3, F a l l , 1983, p. 89. 2. Though often used, ideology i s a poorly-defined term. For the purpose of t h i s study, ideology i s defined as the complex of extant ideas which define the r e c i p r o c a l rights and duties of the i n d i v i d u a l and the state. Coughlin, R.M., Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Po l i c y , University of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1980, p. 5. 3. Le Grand, J., and Robinson, R., " P r i v a t i z a t i o n and the Welfare State: An Introduction", i n P r i v a t i z a t i o n and the  Welfare State, J . Le Grand and R. Robinson, ed.s, George A l l e n and Unwin, London, 1985, pp. 3-6. 4. Rekart, J., Voluntary Sector Social Services i n the 19801s., F i n a l Draft #2, S.P.A.R.C. of B.C., Vancouver, September, 1987, p. 3. The terms 'non-profit', 'not-for-profit', and 'voluntary', 27 when used to d e s c r i b e o r g a n i z a t i o n s are, f o r the purposes of t h i s paper, used as though they were synonymous. Some might argue t h a t an agency which employs p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f i s not t r u l y v o l u n t a r y . T h i s i s suggested by more than one i n t e r v i e w s u b j e c t i n t h i s study. The counter argument, and the d e f i n i t i o n which a p p l i e s i n t h i s t h e s i s , i s t h a t so long as such o r g a n i z a t i o n s are governed by a Board of D i r e c t o r s composed p r i m a r i l y of v o l u n t e e r s (some i n c l u d e government a p p o i n t e e s ) , they a r e v o l u n t a r y . The term n o t - f o r - p r o f i t has r e c e n t l y begun t o r e p l a c e n o n - p r o f i t , a p p a r e n t l y i n acknowledgement of the f a c t t h a t many, i f not most, o r g a n i z a t i o n s do make a p r o f i t - t h a t i s , t h e i r annual income exceeds t h e i r expenditures more o f t e n than not. The case f o r the newer term i s t h a t i t more a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e s the f i n a n c i a l o b j e c t i v e s of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and s t i l l p ermits them to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from f o r - p r o f i t a g encies ( a l s o r e f e r r e d to as commercial, p r o p r i e t a r y or market e n t i t i e s i n t h i s t h e s i s ) . 5. U n i t e d Way S.P.A.R. / S.P.A.R.C. J o i n t Committee, An  H i s t o r i c a l and Contemporary Review of the F i n a n c i n g of S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, I l l u s t r a t i n g the Roles o f the  P r i v a t e and P u b l i c S e c t o r s i n Funding and D e l i v e r i n g These  S e r v i c e s , S.P.A.R.C. of B.C., Vancouver, September, 1980, p. 2. 6. i b i d . , p. 2. 7. Tobin, A.G., The F a r e w e l l State, keynote address t o the Conference on P r i v a t i z a t i o n and the P u b l i c T r u s t , Vancouver, May, 1984, p. 8, and 15. 8. B r i g g s , A., and McCartney, A., Toynbee H a l l , Routledge and Kegan Pa u l , Boston, 1984. Davis, A., Spearheads f o r Reform, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , New York, 1967. Guest, D., The Emergence of S o c i a l S e c u r i t y i n Canada, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1980. Parker, Mrs. G. Cameron, (nee Miss A. E t h e l Dodds), Canadian  Settlements, address presented to the N a t i o n a l Settlement Conference, Toronto, 1924. 9. Examples of new s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n c l u d e a v a r i e t y of p r o v i n c i a l w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n programmes, mothers' pensions, and p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e , and f e d e r a l i n i t i a t i v e s such as the development of the Department of H e a l t h (1919), p r o v i s i o n of grants f o r housing (1919), the development of the C o u n c i l on C h i l d Welfare (1920), unemployment r e l i e f g r a n t s to the p r o v i n c e s (1921), o l d age pensions (1927), and 28 war veterans' allowances (1928). Guest, D., 1980, pp. 39-103. 10. Tobin, A.G., 1984, p. 21. 11. Examples of these new s o c i a l programmes include National Health grants (1948), Allowances for the B l i n d (1951), Allowances for the Disabled (1954), the National Housing Act, (1954), the Unemployment Assistance Act (1956), the creation of a Youth Allowances plan i n 1964, the Canada and Quebec Pension plans i n 1965, the creation of the Guaranteed Income Supplement i n 1966, the Medical Care Act of 1966, and the Canada Assistance Plan (1967). Guest, D., 1980, pp. 145-165. 12. MacDonald, J.A., P r i v a t i z a t i o n and Social Services i n  B r i t i s h Columbia - An Examination of the Issues i n Legal and  H i s t o r i c a l Perspective, June, 1984, (paper delivered to the S.P.A.R.C. Conference on P r i v a t i z a t i o n and the Public Trust, Vancouver, May, 1984) p. 5. Callahan, M., and McNiven, C , " B r i t i s h Columbia", Chapter Two i n , P r i v a t i z a t i o n and P r o v i n c i a l Social Services i n  Canada, J.S. Ismael and Y. Vaillancourt, ed.s, University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, 1988, p. 16. 13. Callahan, M., "The Human Costs of 'Restraint", i n The New  Reality - The P o l i t i c s of Restraint i n B r i t i s h Columbia, W. Magnusson et a l . , ed.s, New Star Books, Vancouver, 1984, pp. 227-228. 14. Seebaran, R., 1983, p. 90. 15. L e g i s l a t i o n accompanying the 'Restraint' budget included a number of measures to weaken organized labour i n the pu b l i c sector, the elimination of rent controls, the o f f i c e of the Rentalsman, the Human Rights Branch and the Human Rights Commission, and the reduction of employment standards, regulations governing Crown corporations, and the powers of Regional D i s t r i c t s - a l l of which could be viewed as enhancing the freedom of the private market. Callahan, M., 1984, p. 227. Redish, A., "Social Policy and 'Restraint' i n B r i t i s h Columbia", i n Restraining the Economy, Robert C. A l l e n and Gideon Rosenbluth, ed.s, New Star Books, Vancouver, 1986, p. 153. 29 Seebaran, R., p. 89. 16. Harrison, E.W., and Gosse, M.G., " P r i v a t i z a t i o n : A Restraint I n i t i a t i v e " , i n Canadian Journal of Criminology, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1986, p. 185. 17. Callahan, M., and McNiven, C , 1988, pp. 19-26. 18. Those who have i d e n t i f i e d p r i v a t i z a t i o n almost exclusively as contracting include: Alberta Association of Social Workers, Alberta Association  of Social workers Position Paper on the Alberta Government  P o l i c y of P r i v a t i z i n g P u b l i c S o c i a l S e r v i c e s (The  Commercialization of Caring), a b r i e f submitted to the Ministers of Alberta Social Services and Alberta Occupational and Community Health, and the Members of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, 1986. Ascher, K., The P o l i t i c s of P r i v a t i z a t i o n - Contracting Out  Public Services, St. Martins Press, New York, 1987. DeHoog, R.H., Contracting Out for Human Services - Economic,  P o l i t i c a l and Organizational Perspectives, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984. F e r r i s , J., and Graddy, E., "Contracting Out: For What? With Whom?", i n Public Administration Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, July-August, 1986, pp. 332-344. Kettner, P.M., and Martin, L.L., "Making Decisions about Purchase of Service Contracting", i n Public Welfare, Vol. 44, No. 4, F a l l , 1986, pp. 30-37. Perryman, G., P r i v a t i z a t i o n - What Does i t Mean?, May, 1984. (paper delivered to the S.P.A.R.C. Conference on P r i v a t i z a t i o n and the Public Trust, Vancouver, May, 1984) Steward-Wood, D.L., P r i v a t i z a t i o n - Purchase of Service  Contracting with Voluntary Agencies, U.B.C., Faculty of Graduate Studies, School of S o c i a l Work, 1985.(unpublished major paper) Sul l i v a n , H.J., " P r i v a t i z a t i o n of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights", i n Public Administration  Raaw, Vd, 47, Kx 6, H » J K U B ; 1937, ffi 45H57. 19. B.C. Federation of Labour, Background and P o s i t i o n Paper  on P r i v a t i z a t i o n , Vancouver, 1986. B.C. F e d e r a t i o n of Labour, P r i v a t i z a t i o n Report #1, 30 Vancouver, November 10, 1987. B.C. F e d e r a t i o n of Labour, P r i v a t i z a t i o n Report #2, Vancouver, November 27, 1987. B.C. F e d e r a t i o n of Labour, P r i v a t i z a t i o n Report #3, Vancouver, December 10, 1987. B r i t i s h Columbia P o l i t i c s and Policy. "Interview with John Shields, President of the B.C.G.E.U.", Vol. 1, No. 12, January, 1988. Council for Public Services, P r i v a t i z a t i o n i s Not f o r You, Trade Union Research Bureau, Vancouver, 1987 (brochure). Errington, G., and Finn, E., "Blood Bath i n B.C.", i n The  Facts. Vol. 5, No. 8, October, 1983, pp. 5-8. Katz, L., "Contracting Out", i n The Facts, Vol. 4, No. 2, February, 1982, pp. 4-6. National Union of P r o v i n c i a l Government Employees, Government  for Sale: P r i v a t i z a t i o n of the Public Sector, N.U.P.G.E., June, 1986 (background paper). Rae, R., "The P r i v a t i z a t i o n Binge", i n The Facts, V o l . 8, No. 4, July-August, 1986, pp. 34-37. Rose, J., "Volunteerism and Unionism", i n The Facts, Vol. 8, No. 5, September-October, 1985, pp. 13-15. 20. Errington, E., and Finn, G., 1983, p. 5. 21. i b i d . , p. 6. 22. B.C. Federation of Labour, 1986, p. 1-2. 23. Examples include: Callahan, M., "Six Steps to Counter Neglect of Needy Children", V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, V i c t o r i a , October 17, 1985. Vancouver Province, "Abuse 'Epidemic' c a l l s f o r changes", June 2, 1985, p. 32. Vancouver Province, "Not MHR's f a u l t " , October 10, 1985, p. 10. Vancouver Province, "Just when should MHR intervene?", October 11, 1985, p. 38. Vancouver Province, "Socreds slapped on c h i l d welfare", October 23, 1985, p. 3. Vancouver Province, "Our kids are s u f f e r i n g " , October 19, 1986, p. 4. Vancouver Sun, "Researchers slam B.C. c h i l d welfare", October 23, 1985, p. A2. Vancouver Sun, "Administrators renew demands for return of c h i l d care workers", October 8, 1986, p. A8. Vancouver Sun, " F i r e d o f f i c i a l raps services f o r children", May 26, 1987, pp. A1-A2. Vancouver Sun, "Word.is out: cutback i n s o c i a l workers on the way", March 17, 1988, p. B3. V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, "Public inquiry into B.C. c h i l d welfare urged", October 18, 1985, p. B l . Wharf, B., " C r i s i s - o n l y c h i l d care: Expensive and i n e f f e c t i v e " , V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, V i c t o r i a , October 23, 1985. 24. A.A.S.W. Alberta Association of S o c i a l Workers' Position  Paper on the Alberta Government P o l i c y of P r i v a t i z i n g Public  Social Services, a b r i e f submitted to the Ministers of A l b e r t a S o c i a l S e r v i c e s and Alberta Occupational and Community Health, and the Members of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, June 25, 1986. A. A.S.W., In Whose Interest?, A P o s i t i o n Paper on the Alberta Government Cutbacks i n Human Services, June 5, 1987. Alcock, S., The Impact of P r i v a t i z a t i o n on Standards of  Practice, a d r a f t discussion document prepared for the B. C.A.S.W., October, 1988. Canadian Association of Social Workers, The P r i v a t i z a t i o n of  Personal Social Services, Position Paper, June, 1988. MacDonald, J., and Karpoff, J., P r i v a t i z a t i o n and Child  Welfare Services i n B r i t i s h Columbia - A Proposed Pol i c y for  the B.C. A s s o c i a t i o n of S o c i a l Workers, B.C.A.S.W. (discussion paper) 25. Bell-Lowther, E., " P r i v a t i z a t i o n - Increasing Government E f f i c i e n c y or Dismantling the Welfare State?", i n The Social  Worker. Vol. 56, No. 3, F a l l , 1988, p. 102. 32 26. F r a s e r , A., " C a l l o u s cutbacks hurt children with problems", l e t t e r to the Editor, Vancouver Sun, P a c i f i c Press, Vancouver, October 29, 1985, p. A5. Vancouver Elementary School Administrators' Association, Inner City Schools, P r i n c i p a l s ' P o s i t i o n Paper, January, 1988. Vancouver Schools Administrators' Association (Elementary), Children i n C r i s i s , A Brief to the Government of B r i t i s h Columbia, October, 1986. 27. PRIVATIZATION IS INEFFICIENT Those who do not accept the e f f i c i e n c y arguments for p r i v a t i z i n g s o c i a l services include: Horton, R.D., "Expenditures, Services and Public Management", i n Public Administration Review, Vol. 47, No. 5, September-October, 1987, pp. 378-384. Wineberg, R.J., " P u l l i n g Together or Tearing Apart", i n Public Welfare, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer, 1984, pp. 26-30. PRIVATIZATION IS NEOCONSERVATISM Those who do not accept the e f f i c i e n c y arguments for p r i v a t i z i n g s o c i a l services and who view p r i v a t i z a t i o n as i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated include: Abramovitz, M., "The P r i v a t i z a t i o n of the Welfare State: A Review", i n S o c i a l Work, Vol. 31, No. 4, July-August, 1986, pp. 257-264. Anstrom, D, et a l . , "Can the Private Sector Take up the Slack?", i n Public Welfare, Vol. 40, No. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 5-7. Bell-Lowther, E., 1988, pp. 101-104. Callahan, M., 1984, pp. 227-241. Calvert, J., " P r i v a t i z a t i o n : Another 13 Letter Word for P r o f i t s " , i n Perception, Vol. 9, No. 2, November-December, 1985, pp. 31. DeHoog, R.H., Contracting Out f o r Human Services - Economic,  P o l i t i c a l and Organizational Perspectives, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984. Epstein, W.M., "Our Town': A Case Study of Ideology and the Private Social Welfare Sector", i n Journal of Sociology and  Social Work, Vol. 25, No. 3, September, 1988, pp. 101-110. 33 G i l b e r t , N., "The Commercialization of Social Welfare", i n The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1985, pp. 365-376. Hurl, L., "Pr i v a t i z e d Social Service Systems: Lessons from Ontario Children's Services", i n Canadian Public P o l i c y , Vol. 10, No. 4, 1984, pp. 395-405. Hurl, L., " P r i v a t i z a t i o n of S o c i a l Services: Time to Move the Debate Along", i n Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1986, pp. 507-512. Kesselman, J.R., "Should B r i t i s h Columbia Pursue Mini-e f f i c i e n c y or Soc i a l E f f i c i e n c y ? " , i n Restraining the  Economy, Robert C. A l l e n and Gideon Rosenbluth, ed., B.C. Economic Pol i c y I n s t i t u t e , New Star Books, Vancouver, 1986, pp. 80-95. Langford, J.W., "The Question of Quangos: Quasi Public Service Organizations i n B r i t i s h Columbia", i n Canadian  Public Administration, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter, 1983, pp. 563-576. Le Grand, J., and Robinson, R., 1985. McCready, D., "Pr i v a t i z e d Social Service Systems: Are There Any J u s t i f i c a t i o n s ? " , i n Canadian Public Policy, V o l . 12, No. 1, 1986, pp. 253-257. Moscovitch, A., "The Rise and Decline of the Canadian Welfare State", i n Perception, Vol. 6, No. 2, November-December, 1982, pp. 26-28. Moscovitch, A., "The Welfare State Since 1975", i n Journal of  Canadian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer, 1986, pp. 77-94. Redish, A., 1986, pp. 152-169. Seebaran, R., 1983, pp. 89-91. Starr, P., The Limits of P r i v a t i z a t i o n , Economic P o l i c y I n s t i t u t e , Washington, 1987. Tobin, A.G., 1984 PRIVATIZATION MAY BE EFFICIENT Those who accept the e f f i c i e n c y arguments for p r i v a t i z i n g s o c i a l services include: Bloch, M.H., and Rubenstein, H., "Paying f o r Service: What do C l i n i c a l Social Workers Believe?", i n Journal of Social  Service Research, Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer, 1986, pp. 21-35. 34 F e r r i s , J . , and Graddy, E., "Contracting Out: For What? With Whom?", i n Public Administration Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, July-August, 1986, pp. 332-344. Gibleman, M., "Are C l i e n t s Served Better When Services are Purchased?", i n Public Welfare, Vol. 39, No. 4, F a l l , 1981, pp. 27-33. Harrison, E.W., and Gosse, M.G., 1986, pp. 185-193. Kammerman, S.B., "The New Mixed Economy of Welfare: Public and Private", i n Soc i a l Work, Vol. 28, No. 1, January-February, 1983, pp. 5-10. Kettner, P.M., and Martin, L.L., "Making Decisions About Purchase of Service Contracting", i n Public Welfare, Vol. 44, No. 4, F a l l , 1986, pp. 30-37. Kolderie, E., "The Two Different Concepts of P r i v a t i z a t i o n " , i n PAR, Vol. 46, No. 4, July-August, 1986, pp. 285-291. Straussman, J.D., "More Bang for Fewer Bucks? Or How Local Governments Can Rediscover the Potentials (and P i t f a l l s ) of the Market", i n Public Administration Review, Vol. 41, Special Issue, January, 1981, pp. 150-158. Te r r e l , P., and Kramer, R.M., 1984, pp. 31-37. Whitcomb, C.A., and Miskiewicz, M.K., "Tapping New Resources", i n Public Welfare, Vol. 40, No. 1, Winter, 1982, pp. 16-22. 28. Le Grand, J, and Robinson, R., 1985, p. 15. 29. i b i d . , p. 1. 30. Abramovitz, M., 1986, p. 257. 31. Moscovitch, A., 1986, p. 87. 32. Seebaran, R., 1983, p. 91. 33. Harrison, E.W., and Gosse, M.G., 1986, p. 186. 34. Whitcomb, C.A., and Miskiewicz, M.K., 1982, p. 19. 35. Ascher, K., 1987, p. 259. 36. i b i d . , p. 268. 35 37. This i s an extremely s i m p l i f i e d version of the argument i n favour of the welfare state. The concept of universal r i s k and the argument that what i s involved i s the non-market d i s t r i b u t i o n of income, goods and services i s described i n : Guest, D., 1980, pp. 1-3, and 113. The perspectives of l i b e r a l i s m and s o c i a l democracy are not i d e n t i c a l , but both ideologies have provided a r a t i o n a l defence of the welfare state. An example of the ideas that underlie the l i b e r a l argument for state intervention, and which may guide i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s i s : " . . . i t i s the notion of freedom i n i t s 'positive' sense that i s at the heart of the demands for national or s o c i a l s e l f - d i r e c t i o n which animate the most powerful and morally just public movements of our time...not to recognize t h i s i s to misunderstand the most v i t a l f a cts and ideas of our age. But equally i t seems to me that the b e l i e f that some single formula can i n p r i n c i p l e be found whereby a l l the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously r e a l i z e d i s demonstrably f a l s e . " B e r l i n , I.,"Two Concepts of Liberty", i n Four Essays on  L i b e r t y f Oxford University Press, New York, 1962, p. 169. An example of the ideas that underlie the s o c i a l democratic argument for state intervention, and which may guide i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s i s : "We have to show the world a society i n which a l l relationships, fundamental p r i n c i p l e s , and laws flow d i r e c t l y from moral ethics, and from them alone. E t h i c a l demands would determine a l l c a l c u l a t i o n s : how to bring up children, what to prepare them for, to what purpose the work of grown-ups should be directed, and how t h e i r l e i s u r e should be occupied." (Shulubin, i n Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward, as quoted by:) Titmuss, R.M., The G i f t Relationship, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., London, 1970, p. 208. To g e n e r a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e the two, l i b e r a l i s m would concentrate more on pluralism and equality of opportunity, while s o c i a l democracy would concentrate more on c o l l e c t i v i t y and equality of outcome. 38. Marxists, unlike l i b e r a l s or s o c i a l democrats, would not support state intervention i n a c a p i t a l i s t market, they would eliminate the market, and restructure society i n order to achieve greater equality of d i s t r i b u t i o n . A description of the Marxist argument i s provided by Susan McDaniel and Ben 36 Agger: "Marxists, who believe that inequality i s endemic to capitalism and can be eliminated under socialism believe that piecemeal e f f o r t s to r e d i s t r i b u t e wealth through such measures as progressive taxation w i l l be no more than cosmetic...the vast p r o l i f e r a t i o n of agencies to deal with deviance, crime and urban problems creates a welfare and planning establishment that, i n spite of i t s good intentions, may further f r u s t r a t e the aspirations of those whom i t i s t r y i n g to help i n the f i r s t place...'helping professionals' l i k e doctors and s o c i a l workers are r e a l l y agents of capitalism, who, i n e f f e c t , t r y to cover over glaring i n e q u a l i t i e s i n the urban scene so that the economic system may continue to function...[Marxists] take the r a d i c a l p o s i t i o n that to eradicate urban problems of t h i s kind i t w i l l be necessary to overturn the whole economic system that tends to create a chasm between r i c h and poor." McDaniel, S.A., and Agger, B., Social Problems Through  C o n f l i c t and Order, Addison-Wesley Publishers, Don M i l l s , Ontario, 1982, p. 189. 39. In essence, neoconservative c r i t i c s of the welfare state argue that i t s r e d i s t r i b u t i v e functions pose a threat to i n d i v i d u a l rights (including rights of property), that i t places an unbearable burden on the market, and that i t i s i n e f f i c i e n t and inconsistent by nature: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without v i o l a t i n g t h e i r r i g h t s ) . So far reaching are these r i g h t s that they r a i s e the question of what, i f anything, the state and i t s o f f i c i a l s may do... The major objection to speaking of everyone having a r i g h t to various things such as equality of opportunity, l i f e , and so on, and enforcing t h i s r i g h t , i s that these 'rights' require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rig h t s and entitlements over these..." Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1974, p. i x , and 238. "You have everybody screaming that we ought to have new, bigger, more generous government programs. Where are we going to rai s e the money? Tax business. But business corporations can't pay any taxes. A corporate executive may sign the check, but where does he get the money? From his stockholders or from his customers or from his 37 employees. The great scandal of our times, i n my opinion, i s government expenditure on higher schooling. There i s no other program so perverse i n i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n a l e f f e c t s . In the great state of C a l i f o r n i a , which has one of the most extensive public higher education systems i n the country, over 50 percent of the students at the colleges and u n i v e r s i t i e s come from the top 25 percent of the families by income. Five percent come from the bottom 25 percent...that's a system under which the people from Watts send to college the children from Beverly H i l l s . If someone on welfare finds a job and gets o f f welfare, and then the job disappears - as so many marginal jobs do - i t s going to take him some time to go through a l l the red tape to get back onto the program. This discourages job seeking..." Friedman, M., "Playboy Interview, February, 1973", i n Bright  Promises, Dismal Performance, W.R. A l l e n , ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, New York, 1983, pp. 45, and 72-75. 40. Examples of p o l i c i e s which might be interpreted as based i n neoconservative theory include the pursuit of the Free Trade Agreement by Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government i n Ottawa (the stated purpose of which i s to eliminate b a r r i e r s to international commerce - though t h i s may be at the cost of Canada' s s o c i a l programmes), and the plan for the development of 'special enterprise zones' by William Vander Zalm's Social Credit government i n V i c t o r i a . The l a t t e r would eliminate or reduce government controls imposed on the owners of business (through p o l l u t i o n - c o n t r o l and employment standards, e t c . ) , i n the i n t e r e s t of promoting investment i n export-oriented manufacturing by foreign firms, and the consequent job-creation p o t e n t i a l . C.U.P.E., "Free Trade F a l l a c i e s " , i n The Facts, Vol. 8, No. 4, July-August, 1986, p. 8. Donaldson, D., and Maund, J., "Does B.C. Need Special Enterprise Zones?", i n Restraining the Economy, Robert C. A l l e n and Gideon Rosenbluth, ed.s, New Star Books, Vancouver, 1986, pp. 297-298. Drover, G., "Social P o l i c y and Free Trade: Determinants of Harmonization", i n Community A f f a i r s . Vol. 4, No. 2, December, 1987, p. 3. Foley, J., "Free Trade: A Social Disservice", i n S o c i a l Work  Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 4, September, 1988, pp. 4-5. 38 Hunsley, T., "Free Trade: The Soc i a l P o l i c y Debate", i n Social Development Overview, Vol. 5, No. 4 , Summer, 1988, p. 1. 41. Nozick, R., 1974, p. 92. 42. i b i d . , p. 10. 43. i b i d . , p. i x . 44. i b i d . , p. 151. 45. i b i d . , p. 18 and 151. 46. Friedman, M., Capitalism and Freedom, Unive r s i t y of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 15. 47. Friedman, M., 1983, p. 57. 48. Hayek, F.A., New Studies i n Philosophy, P o l i t i c s ,  Economics and the History of Ideas, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, p. 88. 49. F r e i l e r , C , "Human Services f o r P r o f i t : Issues and Trends", i n Soc i a l Infopac, Vol. 3, No. 6, The Soc i a l Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, December, 1984, pp. 1-6. Perryman, G., 1984. Perryman, G., Impacts of Restraint - The B.C. Experience, June, 198 6 ( p r e s e n t a t i o n to the National Voluntary Organization Seminar, Toronto, June, 1986). Rekart, J ., 1987. Shostack, A.L., and Campagna, G.P., "Financing Group Homes", i n Public Welfare. Vol. 45, No. 4, F a l l , 1987, pp. 38-42. Stewart-Wood, D.L., P r i v a t i z a t i o n - Purchase of Service  Contracting with Voluntary Agencies, U.B.C., Faculty of Graduate Studies, School of Social Work, 1985 (unpublished major paper). T e r r e l , P., and Kramer, R.M., 1984, pp. 31-37. United Way, S.P.A.R. / S.P.A.R.C. J o i n t Committee, An  H i s t o r i c a l and Contemporary Review of the Financing of Social  Services i n B r i t i s h Columbia, I l l u s t r a t i n g the Roles of the  Private and Public Sectors i n Funding and Del i v e r i n g These  Services, S.P.A.R.C. of B.C., Vancouver, September, 1980. 39 U n i t e d Way S.P.A.R. / S.P.A.R.C. J o i n t C ommittee, P u b l i c  F u n d i n g P o l i c i e s and p r o c e d u r e s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a : A  Summary o f S p e c i f i c P r o b l e m s E x p e r i e n c e d b y V o l u n t a r y  A g e n c i e s i n t h e S o c i a l S e r v i c e s S e c t o r , S.P.A.R.C. o f B.C., V a n c o u v e r , September, 1980. 50. C a n a d i a n A s s o c i a t i o n o f S o c i a l W o r k e r s , 1988, p . 8. 51. R e k a r t , J . , 1987, pp. 66-67. 52. The i n c r e a s e i n s e r v i c e demands o n n o n - p r o f i t a g e n c i e s f o l l o w i n g t h e c h a n g e s i n t r o d u c e d by t h e p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n m e n t i s d ocumented i n : The U n i t e d Way o f t h e Lower M a i n l a n d S t r a t e g i c P l a n n i n g Committee, The Lower M a i n l a n d i n t h e 1980's, An E n v i r o n m e n t a l  S c a n , The U n i t e d Way o f t h e Lower M a i n l a n d , V a n c o u v e r , 1985, p. 14. The p r o b l e m s e x p e r i e n c e d by v o l u n t a r y a g e n c i e s w i t h c o n t r a c t s i n c l u d e t h e p r o v i s i o n t h r o u g h them o f a l o w e r l e v e l o f f u n d i n g t h a n m i g h t be p r o v i d e d i f t h e same s e r v i c e were o f f e r e d t h r o u g h t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r , t h e i r f o c u s o n a n a r r o w r a n g e o f c r i s i s - o r i e n t e d , r e m e d i a l p r o g r a m s ( a s o p p o s e d t o t h e much b r o a d e r r a n g e o f p r e v e n t i v e p r o g r a m s ) , a n d t h e l a b o r i o u s and t i m e - c o n s u m i n g demands o n t h e n o n p r o f i t a g e n c y as a r e s u l t o f t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p r o c e s s a n d t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f g o v ernment f o r r e c o r d i n g and f i n a n c i a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y - i n s h o r t , t h e b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n o f t h e a g e n c y . U n i t e d Way S.P.A.R./S.P.A.R.C. J o i n t Committee, P u b l i c  F u n d i n g P o l i c i e s a n d P r o c e d u r e s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a : A  Summary o f P r o b l e m s E x p e r i e n c e d by V o l u n t a r y A g e n c i e s i n t h e S o c i a l S e r v i c e s S e c t o r , S.P.A.R.C. o f B.C., V a n c o u v e r , September, 1980, pp. 4-9. The d i s c r e t i o n a r y power o f v o l u n t a r y a g e n c i e s o v e r p r o v i n c i a l g r a n t s was c o n s i d e r e d by a d m i n i s t r a t o r s o f t h o s e a g e n c i e s s a m p l e d b y J o s e p h i n e R e k a r t i n h e r 1987 s t u d y , t o be much g r e a t e r t h a n f e d e r a l f u n d i n g , m u n i c i p a l g r a n t s , o r p r o v i n c i a l c o n t r a c t s . O n l y U n i t e d Way f u n d s a n d t h o s e r a i s e d b y t h e a g e n c y were c o n s i d e r e d more f l e x i b l e ( a n d o n l y b y ' a s m a l l m a r g i n ) . E a s i l y t h e l e a s t f l e x i b l e f u n d s were deemed t o be f r o m p r o v i n c i a l c o n t r a c t s . I t was a l s o f o u n d t h a t ( a s a r e s u l t o f t h e c h a n g e s i n t r o d u c e d i n J u l y 1983 - c u t s t o Community G r a n t s and t h e t r a n s f e r o f some s e r v i c e s , v i a c o n t r a c t i n g , t o t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r ) t h a t g r a n t f u n d i n g t o t h e s e a g e n c i e s h a d d e c r e a s e d , w h i l e c o n t r a c t f u n d i n g f r o m t h e p r o v i n c e h a d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d . To some d e g r e e , t h e l o s s o f p r o v i n c i a l g r a n t money, a n d i t s r e p l a c e m e n t b y p r o v i n c i a l c o n t r a c t f u n d s r e p r e s e n t s a n impingement o n t h e 40 autonomy of voluntary agencies. Rekart, J., 1987, p. 34 and 49. 53. The increasing demand on the United Way for more general and special-project funds, increased competition i n the area of fundraising, and the increase i n user fees charged by voluntary agencies i n the lower mainland, since 1983, i s documented i n : United Way of the Lower Mainland Strategic Planning Committee, 1985, p. 17. Josephine Rekart found i n those agencies sampled that charitable funding had not s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased since 1983, but that independent fundraising by those agencies had. In addition, many agencies (46.6%) had i n i t i a t e d user fees, or (39.7%) increased user fees. Over 76 percent had increased the number of p r o v i n c i a l government contracts - the most common method c i t e d f or increasing revenue. Seventy percent had increased t h e i r federal funding and s i x t y percent had increased t h e i r municipal funding. Rekart, J ., 1987, p. 34 and 51. 54. "The government has s h i f t e d from a negotiation system to a tendered b i d system for contracting and has begun to consider proposals from private business." Perryman, G., 1984, p. 5. The terms and d e f i n i t i o n s used to describe the two contract systems are provided by: Kettner, P.M., and Martin, L.L., 1986, p. 37. 41 CHAPTER TWO PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICS: BEYOND THE RULE BOOK  A. Schisms Between P o l i c y and Ideology The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to examine al t e r n a t i v e s to the view that ideology i s the primary motivator for the p r i v a t i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s of the p r o v i n c i a l government, and to consider the implications of t h i s for the voluntary sector. Chapter One i d e n t i f i e d p r i v a t i z a t i o n as a p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n s i g n i f i c a n t changes to society, to the f i e l d of s o c i a l services, and to voluntary organizations which p r o v i d e s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . It was argued that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s most often viewed as a means for the achievement of the s o c i a l and economic goals of neoconservatism, and that such an i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n had both a d e s c r i p t i v e and a pr e d i c t i v e function. However, i t was noted that the p o l i c i e s of the S o c i a l C r e d i t government of B r i t i s h Columbia are not completely compatible with neoconservative theory. If differences between theory and pra c t i c e e x i s t , t h i s would suggest that ideology alone cannot explain the actions of the government. If other objectives compete with (or even supercede) the goals of neoconservatism, those other objectives may be recognized by personnel i n n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies and may therefore guide t h e i r response to the government's p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s . To determine whether or not there are schisms between neoconservative theory and the p o l i c i e s and practices of the Social Credit government i n B r i t i s h Columbia, i t i s necessary to re-examine, and provide an i d e o l o g i c a l analysis of, what the government has done. This chapter w i l l provide that re-examination, present four a l t e r n a t i v e explanations for the government's motivation for p r i v a t i z a t i o n , define the p o l i c y goals inherent i n those explanations, and suggest how voluntary organizations might respond (or may be responding) to those p o l i c y goals. The proponents of p r i v a t i z a t i o n laud i t as a 'Free Enterprise' i n i t i a t i v e , and i t s opponents label i t an attack on organized labour and the welfare state. In the drama of polarized debate i t appears that s i g n i f i c a n t facts and alternate perspectives may be overlooked i f they do not re a d i l y add to the argument of eithe r side. P o l i c y analysts are not immune to these forces. As demonstrated i n Chapter One, much of the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e begins by i d e n t i f y i n g p r i v a t i z a t i o n as motivated by ideology, e f f i c i e n c y arguments, the need for government to reduce i t s spending (or i t s d e f i c i t ) , or some combination of these inter-connected rationales - the nexus of which i s neoconservatism and i t s r i s e i n terms of both p o l i t i c a l power and public acceptance. With emphasis varying according to the motive(s) i d e n t i f i e d f o r some s p e c i f i c government's d e c i s i o n to pursue p r i v a t i z a t i o n , authors operating from the assumption that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s spawned from neoconservatism proceed to undermine or support that government's decision to a l t e r i t s r o l e i n the funding, provision or regulation of s o c i a l services. More often than not these arguments appear to be an extremely t h i n v e i l covering the writer's ideology. Attackers of p r i v a t i z a t i o n may claim or intimate that the subsidy, provision, and regulation of s o c i a l services almost exclu s i v e l y through the market i s the goal of these governments, and j u s t l y caution that t h i s would lead to needless s u f f e r i n g , since the market has already been proven unable to address the types of e x t e r n a l i t i e s which the welfare state was able to address (though not e l i m i n a t e ) . 1 They cannot explain why the goal hasn't been achieved. The a n a l y s e s of both the d e f e n d e r s and at t a c k e r s of privatization-as-neoconservatism generally f a i l to address one important question. Why have these neoconservative governments retained any s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n s o c i a l services a t a l l ? Such a r o l e c o n t r a d i c t s the tenets of neoconservatism - which assert that the market i s the preferred medium for the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income, goods and services. It might almost seem that neither the government of William Bennett, nor the government of William Vander Zalm have a c t i v e l y attempted t o achieve the goals of neoconservatism at a l l - i n f a c t , the l a t t e r might be accused of reversing (to a minor degree) some of the 'progress' may by the former toward those goals. Jonathan Kesselman (1986) notes that Social Credit economic p o l i c y d i f f e r s from neoconservative theory i n that i t seems to embrace the idea that p o l i c i e s favorable to business (a special i n t e r e s t group) a re d e s i r a b l e , and l e s s s o p h i s t i c a t e d than neoconservative theory because i t ignores the r e a l i t i e s of market f a i l u r e s (see Hayek's desc r i p t i o n of appropriate state l i m i t s on page 20). 2 Despite the rhetoric of reduced government spending which was to occur as a r e s u l t of cuts and transfers to the private sector (and which can be equated with both a reduction i n coercive taxation and the intervention of the state i n the market), Redish, Rosenbluth and Schworm (1986) report that there was ac t u a l l y a 9.4 percent increase i n public expenditure i n B r i t i s h Columbia i n 1983/84.3 Plans f o r the decentralization of the p r o v i n c i a l government (which might be r a t i o n a l i z e d as an extension of neoconservative views on the proper d i s t r i b u t i o n of power between l o c a l , regional and national governments) were announced i n 1987, and promptly shelved. Changes i n the s o c i a l services f i e l d i n B.C. have been s i g n i f i c a n t , but the welfare state remains. This may i n part be because changes i n many areas would be complicated by the need f o r jo i n t federal - p r o v i n c i a l co-operation. No province can make u n i l a t e r a l changes to the Canada Assistance  Plan, or the Canada Health Act, and therefore i t cannot be claimed that continued existence of these p i l l a r s of the welfare state i n B r i t i s h Columbia represents an anomaly i n the ideology of the Social Credit government (although the f a c t that the federal Progressive Conservative government retains them, and also claims a neoconservative orientation, may represent an anomaly). However, much of the s o c i a l p o l i c y i n t h i s province i s within the power of the Social Credit government to control, and i n these areas there have been developments as uncharacteristic of neoconservatism as those c i t e d i n economic p o l i c y . One example might be the recent introduction of the $20 m i l l i o n Family I n i t i a t i v e s programme, which includes measures to encourage adoption (as opposed to abortion), and to prepare young people for marriage. A second example i s Family Advancement - a component of Family I n i t i a t i v e s . This programme was introduced following a lengthy public debate over the growing number of school children whose families were too poor to properly feed them, and i s designed to place s o c i a l workers i n i n n e r - c i t y schools. 4 A t h i r d example i s the i n f l u x of money into the Drug and Alcohol Branch of the Ministry of Labour. 5 None of these services, nor t h e i r costs, can be r a t i o n a l i z e d as necessary, according to neoconservative theory. In 1'fact, neoconservative theory would provide a r a t i o n a l e for the elimination (not the introduction) of these programmes. Placing s o c i a l workers i n in n e r - c i t y schools might be c r i t i c i z e d by neoconservatives both as use of tax d o l l a r s for r e d i s t r i b u t i v e purposes (transfers i n kind), and as serving a s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t group, rather than the whole community. To abuse drugs or alcohol, or have an abortion, involves moral judgements which neoconservatives should argue i s a private, not a p u b l i c , matter (though i n the case of an abortion, t h i s might depend on an interpretation of when a fetus i s considered an i n d i v i d u a l with his or her own rights) . These developments take place i n the context of an incomplete neoconservative s o c i a l p o l i c y agenda. Despite 'Restraint 1, public money continues to be channeled toward such i d e o l o g i c a l l y indefensible items as Camp Fees ($364,857 i n 1986/87), Community Projects ($5,175,291 i n 1986/87), and Christmas Supplementary Allowances ($5,989,020 i n 1986/87). 6 This suggests that there i s more guiding the Social Credit p o l i t i c a l agenda than neoconservative theory alone. In some ways i t might almost appear as though ideology i s not the government's primary consideration i n policy formation. Such a suggestion could hardly be described as a r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of B.C. p o l i t i c s , or even as o r i g i n a l . Interpretations of p r i v a t i z a t i o n which assume that i t i s not i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated abound, or seem to require l i t t l e e f f o r t on the part of the analyst to a r r i v e at. For i n s t a n c e , i t has already been noted that labour has described p r i v a t i z a t i o n as a means for the government to buy the support of business (see page 12). To provide another example, i t might seem l o g i c a l to conclude that Christmas Supplementary Allowances have not been cut because to do so might be very unpopular with the electorate - the media would be very l i k e l y to cast the Premier i n the role of Scrooge. Both conclusions rest on an i m p l i c i t set of b e l i e f s about why and how the government i s pursuing p r i v a t i z a t i o n , what they are attempting to achieve, and what the l i m i t s of p r i v a t i z a t i o n w i l l be. Both conclusions may be held i n addition to, or instead of, the interpretation that the government's p o l i c i e s are i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated, but neither can be explained through that interpretation alone. Neither patronage nor popularity are an inherent part of neoconservative theory. Gordon Hearn (1958) describes a theory as, "... an i n t e r n a l l y consistent body of v e r i f i a b l e hypotheses." 7 These two conclusions may therefore be described as semi-articulated theories of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and may be added to the previously-described, and more thoroughly a r t i c u l a t e d , theory that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s motivated by neoconservative ideology. Two questions a r i s e . Are there other s e m i - a r t i c u l a t e d , extant theories of government motivation that also l i e outside of the ide o l o g i c a l theory of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and i f so, what are they? Are such theories recognized by key decision-making personnel i n voluntary organizations, and i f so, how have they shaped the agency's response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s (and therefore, v i a contracting or p o l i c y decisions made by the agency, acted as a covariant i n determining the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on the organization)? Before the second question can be answered (through the research p r o j e c t w i t h i n t h i s t h e s i s ) , alternatives to the theory that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s motivated by neoconservatism must be i d e n t i f i e d and a r t i c u l a t e d . B. Five D i f f e r e n t Ways to Play the P r i v a t i z a t i o n Game In re-examining the l i t e r a t u r e , and u t i l i z i n g sources beyond those described i n Chapter One, i t i s possible to d e f i n e four a l t e r n a t i v e theories of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , i n addition to the theory that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s motivated by neoconservatism. These f i v e perspectives are termed the Neoconservatism, Populism, Popularity, Paternalism, and Patronage theories of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and are described below. Interpretations beyond those discovered may e x i s t , and the a r t i c u l a t i o n of these f i v e theories may be j u s t l y c r i t i c i s e d as both subjective, and speculative. Whether or not the hypotheses contained within these theories can be v e r i f i e d i s an unanswered question. Whether or not the subjects interviewed i n t h i s study consider them to be v e r i f i e d w i l l be addressed i n Chapters Five and Six. For the moment, p r a c t i c a l considerations of v e r i f i c a t i o n w i l l be put aside. An additional l i m i t on these theories i s t h e i r general applic a t i o n . It seems l i k e l y that they w i l l be relevant only within the context described - the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of s o c i a l services i n B r i t i s h Columbia. However, i t i s necessary that these a l t e r n a t i v e theories be a r t i c u l a t e d i n order to move beyond the l i m i t s which would be placed on t h i s study i f conventional wisdom was to p r e v a i l , and p r i v a t i z a t i o n was to be i n t e r p r e t e d s i m p l y as a means f o r a c h i e v i n g neoconservative ends. (1) The Neoconservatism Theory Despite the arguments presented here to the contrary, many s t i l l believe that the Social Credit government i s i n large part adhering to the neoconservative agenda, and i t i s simply a matter of time before i t i s completed. This i s the privatization-as-neoconservatism analysis e a r l i e r described, and i t s central hypotheses are that neoconservative s o c i a l and economic values are the primary, i f not exclusive, motivator of the government i n the formation of i t s s o c i a l and economic p o l i c i e s , and that those p o l i c i e s are directed toward the achievement of a minimal state. , Government p o l i t i c i a n s are viewed as committed ideologues. It i s a re-assertion of the intent of the government to pursue 'Free Enterprise' to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion; the neoconservative Utopia. It i s advanced by both sides i n the debate, as when Premier Vander Zalm repeats throughout the government's presentation of 'Phase I' of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , that 'Phase II' w i l l be even bigger and better, or when John Shields, President of the B.C. Government Employees Union, states that: "...the government i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y committed to dismantling the public sector and i t s only a matter of p o l i t i c a l expediency and p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n before they can accomplish i t . " 8 Though neither side i n the debate seems to acknowledge the anomalies that have been previously described, i t i s assumed t h a t t h i s t h e o r y e x p l a i n s the a p p a r e n t inco m p a t i b i l i t y of neoconservative theory and some government p o l i c i e s as minor abberations, and not s i g n i f i c a n t trends or indicat o r s . As suggested by a variety of sources i n Chapter One, a considerable body of evidence i s used by those who support t h i s theory to v e r i f y i t s hypotheses. As previously stated, there would only be short-term advantages to the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i n p l a y i n g the p r i v a t i z a t i o n game by these rules, since i n the long run, p r i v a t i z a t i o n would mean most agencies, and t h e i r c l i e n t s , would be abandoned by the government. (2) The Populism Theory The case presented by t h i s theory i s that the point of the Social Credit government's p r i v a t i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s have been exactly as they indicated, to return control of the economy to the private sector. If both the government and the electorate believe the private sector and 'the people' to be synonymous, then p r i v a t i z a t i o n may be argued to be populist, not neoconservative. The central hypotheses of the populism theory are that p r i v a t i z a t i o n has been motivated by the w i l l of the majority of the electorate, has been pursued to further t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and may be alte r e d or abandoned according to t h e i r sentiment. Government p o l i t i c i a n s are seen as representatives elected by and from the mainstream of the population, who apply the values of those constituents toward t h e i r betterment, and against established, s e l f -interested e l i t e s . The suggestion that S o c i a l Credit i s the p o l i t i c a l arm of a grassroots s o c i a l movement has tremendous implications f o r p o l i t i c s , g e n e r a l l y i n B r i t i s h Columbia, for our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and f o r v o l u n t a r y organizations i n p a r t i c u l a r . Such a suggestion comes both from David M i t c h e l l , i n his book Succession (1987) and from Robert Lapper, i n his study Populism i n B r i t i s h Columbia  P o l i t i c s (1981). 9 M i t c h e l l describes the p o l i t i c a l ascension of William Vander Zalm-as, "...a remaking of B.C.'s p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , and a return to the province's t r a d i t i o n of flamboyant, populist l e a d e r s h i p . " 1 0 In his view, the Social Credit party has c o n s i s t e n t l y s t r u g g l e d with, "...the f o r c e s of the establishment." 1 1 The establishment i n the case of W.A.C. Bennett was B i g Business (who objected to W.A.Cs nat i o n a l i z a t i o n of railways, f e r r i e s and u t i l i t i e s ) . Big Labour, as the S o l i d a r i t y movement, fought William Bennett over 'Restraint' (though the younger Bennett i s seen as less of a champion of 'the common man' than his father or his successor). William Vander Zalm i s seen to have taken on both Big Labour (through B i l l s 19 and 20), and Big Business (through his re j e c t i o n of t i e s with Howe Street, and a higher rake-off of lumber revenues). 1 2 The N.D.P. i s seen as: "...the defender of the status quo i n Canada, an int e g r a l part of the welfare state establishment and f i r m l y aligned with the highly conservative forces of trade unionism." 1 3 P o p u l i s m i s i n e x t r i c a b l y bound t o g e t h e r with neoconservatism i n M i t c h e l l ' s view - suggesting that neoconservatism i s either a popular movement i n i t s e l f , or that i n B r i t i s h Columbia a popular movement cannot be other than neoconservative. There i s some l o g i c to t h i s . It might be argued that the world view r e f l e c t e d i n neocl a s s i c a l economics i s that of the small businessman - the f o o t - s o l d i e r of populism. Arguments against such an interp r e t a t i o n w i l l be presented below. W.A.C. Bennett i s described as a genuine, i f ri g h t wing, champion of the pe o p l e . 1 4 Premier Vander Zalm i s said to have restored the populism of W.A.C. B e n n e t t and m a i n t a i n e d , even s t r e n g t h e n e d , the neoconservative thrusts of William Bennett. 1 5 The l o g i c of a p o l i t i c a l party that can h a i l one leader as a champion of the people for taking businesses away from the private sector, and h a i l another leader as a champion of the people for giving those same businesses back to the private sector, i s explained by Robert Lapper. . • Lapper defines populism as: "...a set of b e l i e f s rooted i n economic insecurity, which are opposed to concentrations of wealth and power and favor the return of wealth and power to i n d i v i d u a l s . This return must, however, be accomplished within, the e x i s t i n g economic system, and without massive government intervention." 1*^ According to Lapper, populism originated i n agrarian and labour revolts i n the American mid-west, and i n Russia i n the l a t e nineteenth century, as a reaction to the i n a b i l i t y of the small provider to control his economic fortune. " I t thrives i n areas vulnerable to economic f l u c t u a t i o n s . " 1 7 Ernesto Laclau (1977) postulates that populism, "...arises i n a s p e c i f i c i d e o l o g i c a l domain: that constituted by the double a r t i c u l a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . " 1 8 Other contributing factors i d e n t i f i e d by Laclau include schisms i n the f a b r i c of a society, such as those caused by a pronounced d i v i s i o n between urban and r u r a l populations, or a clear d i v i s i o n of the population by race or c u l t u r a l background. In short, B r i t i s h Columbia has many attr i b u t e s which would contribute to making populism a s i g n i f i c a n t force i n i t s p o l i t i c s . As promising as the i d e a l of a government committed to 'the people', as opposed to 'the e l i t e ' may sound, Lapper warns: "Populism lacks a p o s i t i v e programme of reform because, while i t assaults c a p i t a l i s t modernization for concentrating property and power, and believes that some form of government intervention i s necessary to counteract t h i s concentration, i t cannot accept a government which has the power to do t h i s , because i t would ultimately only replace an economic e l i t e with a government e l i t e , and accomplish nothing for the small producer. There i s therefore a cognitive tension within populism-a tension which i s often suppressed i n populist rhetoric which w i l l usually concentrate i t s fervor on the e v i l s of either 'Big Business' or "Big Government'. But the tension i s constantly evident i n the i n a b i l i t y of the populist, when faced with the c h o i c e , t o a c c e p t e i t h e r one as an al t e r n a t i v e . "•19 Lapper, Laclau, and other writers on populism, including Boyte (1986), Zimmerman (1986), Kuttner (1987), and Boyte, 54 Booth and Max (1986), a l l agree that populism spans the i d e o l o g i c a l spectrum (though each perceive i t as p a r t i c u l a r l y suited to t h e i r own b e l i e f s , be those neoconservative, l i b e r a l , s o c i a l democratic or M a r x i s t ) . 2 0 It follows that i n B r i t i s h Columbia there may be two ideologies competing for the t i t l e of champion of the people - neoconservatives (the Soci a l Credit Party), and s o c i a l democrats (the N.D.P.). Rhetoric which may have been interpreted as based i n neoconservatism (attacks on Big Labour or Big Government), or as socialism (attacks on Big Business) may be seen primarily as e f f o r t s by the two parties to influence the electorate's perception of who holds power. This i s suggested by Lapper when he observes that the b r i e f N.D.P. s t i n t i n o f f i c e from 1972 to 1975 was begun by the perception of the public that the S o c i a l Credit party had become too cozy with Big Business, and ended when the public reacted against what was perceived as the N.D.P.'s creation of Big Government. 2 1 The theory that populism (the attack by the electorate on what i t perceives as a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d e l i t e - combined with a constantly changing d e f i n i t i o n of that e l i t e based on the public's perception of who holds power), and not ideology, has been the dominant force i n B.C. p o l i t i c s holds r i c h promise for a r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and i t s implications for voluntary organizations. The f a c t that both the New Democratic government, when they were i n power, and the Social Credit government, have supported the delivery of s o c i a l services by n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies may be explained as e f f o r t s at empowerment of the pe o p l e . 2 2 The p o s s i b i l i t y that p r i v a t i z a t i o n may be a means for empowerment i s suggested by Kramer (1981), whose study of public/private sector d e l i v e r y i n a va r i e t y of countries lead to his producing a continuum to represent the d i v e r s i t y . At one end of the continuum i s 'rep r i v a t i z a t i o n ' (almost exclusive reliance on the market), followed by 'empowerment' (primary reliance on the voluntary sector), 'pragmatic partnership' (government funding and provider pluralism), 'governmental operation' (primary provision by the state), and f i n i s h i n g at 'nationalization' ( t o t a l provision by the s t a t e ) . 2 3 Whether or not funding, regulating, and providing s o c i a l services exclusively through the voluntary sector a c t u a l l y empowers the populace i s a debatable point. To have power may r e q u i r e adequate funding, and p r o t e c t i v e regulations, which may obviate the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the public sector. However, use of t h i s model may shed some l i g h t on the role of voluntary organizations i n the government's plan to p r i v a t i z e s o c i a l services. One may observe that i n t h i s province the changes announced i n July of 1983 r e f l e c t a movement from pragmatic partnership toward the r e p r i v a t i z a t i o n end of the scale (which, as previously suggested, should cause alarm), but i n many (though not a l l ) areas of s o c i a l services, the movement has stopped at the paradigm characterized by delivery by the voluntary sector - empowerment. Assuming that the government i s not pro-market, but a n t i - e l i t e , may better explain the use of n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies for contracting. Volunteerism has often been associated with neoconservatism. It i s equally compatible with populism. In some cases, such as the Family Advancement programme, the movement has not even taken the province as far as f u l l voluntary sector provision of s o c i a l services - though delivery i s provided by the voluntary sector, funding i s provided by the public sector. Populism may also serve to explain the circumstances surrounding the development of the Family Advancement programme. The agenda of a populist government i s set by public sentiment. It would follow that i f the Social Credit government i s populist that i t would respond to the hungry kids problem. In addition, i t would do so i n a way that avoided the support of e l i t e s (presently i d e n t i f i e d as public sector unions), and gives power and control to 'the people'. However, the next theory of p r i v a t i z a t i o n to be presented i n t h i s chapter provides a d i f f e r e n t explanation of the origins of the Family Advancement programme. Voluntary organizations, i f they accept the Populism theory and wish to influence or reap the benefits of government po l i c y , must divest themselves of apparent s e l f -i n t e r e s t and any aura of e l i t i s m - they must represent, or represent themselves as, the grassroots. Organizations which f a i l to influence the government may attempt to influence the electorate, and then allow the electorate to influence the government for them. Those wishing to influence the electorate must not only divest themselves of any apparent e l i t i s t q u a l i t i e s , but also of any extreme value positions beyond what can be e a s i l y r a t i o n a l i z e d as 'common sense', since as Lapper notes, populism i s not value oriented, " . . . i t does not seek fundamental changes to values and norms which govern s o c i a l conduct, and has no r e a l urge to remake society."24 i f popular sentiment i s i n fac t the primary motivator of the government, th i s 'lowest common denominator' qu a l i t y may balance any advantage to the voluntary sector which may r e s u l t from having a populist government i n o f f i c e . Organizations which serve groups outside the mainstream may be completely ignored by the government. Populism can in c l u d e r e l i g i o u s fundamentalist elements, as well as androcentric and ethnocentric elements. Professionalism may s u f f e r d i r e c t l y by being associated with e l i t i s m , or i n d i r e c t l y through the populist d i s t r u s t of academia. 2 5 No matter how important a role an agency f u l f i l l s , i f i t lacks grassroots support, i t may be at r i s k of losing i t s public funding. What t h i s theory f a i l s to explain i s how the Social Credit government, with i t s widely-publicized t i e s to Big Business, manages to remain the underdog i n the eyes of the electorate. If one accepts t h i s theory, then i t seems only a matter of time before t h i s perception of the party by the electorate, and the government, change. (3) The Popularity Theory The central hypotheses of t h i s theory are that the government w i l l do anything i t can towards the achievement of the neoconservative Utopia, so long as i t does not threaten t h e i r re-election, and that i t w i l l do anything necessary, i n c l u d i n g a complete reversal of p o l i c y from the d i r e c t i o n set by neoconservative theory, to ensure t h e i r r e - e l e c t i o n . Government p o l i t i c i a n s are seen as either spineless power-mongers, or as clever manipulators of public opinion. The basic argument i s that the government i s as interested i n being re-elected as i t i s i n achieving i t s ide o l o g i c a l goals. Obviously achieving those goals rests on being re-elected, while the reverse i s not necessarily true. This should not be confused with the Populism theory, which views the w i l l of the people as the primary consideration of government, and p r i v a t i z a t i o n as the w i l l of (and for the good of) the people. According to t h i s theory the government's primary consideration i n pursuing p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s i t s i d e o l o g i c a l agenda, and the only thing that w i l l i n t e r f e r e with that agenda i s the threat of being removed from o f f i c e . This theory might be more aptly defined as what happens when the concepts of neoconservatism meet the practice of p o l i t i c s . This theory was advanced by Michael Harcourt, the leader of the opposition, following the presentation of the budget on March 30, 1989: "Its r e a l l y with an eye on the p o l l s that they (constructed the budget). This Social Credit government can see the p o l l s , they can see t h e i r u n popularity." 2 6 An associated hypothesis i s that since public support for p r i v a t i z a t i o n would determine the extent to which i t i s pursued, Utopia would have to be sold to the public, and i t s achievement would have to wait u n t i l the public bought i t . V e r i f i c a t i o n for t h i s hypothesis i s not d i f f i c u l t to f i n d . Both William Bennett and William Vander Zalm have spent large amounts of taxpayers' money both on opinion p o l l s and on public information campaigns, despite the promise by Vander Zalm not to do so once i n o f f i c e . 2 7 This argument can be used to explain not only why cer t a i n p o l i c i e s which are compatible with neoconservative ideology have not been pursued, but also why other p o l i c i e s which are incompatible with neoconservative ideology have been pursued. Avoiding unpopularity, maintaining popularity, and regaining popularity involve d i f f e r e n t means, but have si m i l a r ends. Maintaining popularity may involve what Green and S u t c l i f f e (1987) describe as the ' p o l i t i c a l business cycle'-which amounts to the government using demand management to stimulate the economy i n order to ensure th e i r r e - e l e c t i o n . 2 8 By using demand management, 'Restraint', and p r i v a t i z a t i o n simultaneously the p o l i c i e s of the Social Credit government become i d e o l o g i c a l l y incomprehensible - a hybrid of Keynesian and neoclassical economics. This may be r e f l e c t e d i n the recent budget, which i s balanced ( i n accordance with ne o c l a s s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s ) , but also includes measures such as the Housing Action Plan - intended support the development of a f f o r d a b l e housing (and which neoconservatives. should c r i t i c i z e as u n j u s t i f i e d intervention by the state i n the market). 2 9 The confused nature of such hybrid p o l i c i e s (described as, "...yo-yo economics..." by Glen Clark, N.D.P. finance c r i t i c ) has been another point upon which the Social Credit government has been c r i t i c i z e d . 3 0 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , as such measures act to stimulate the economy, the throne speech and budget were accompanied by speculation that an e l e c t i o n would shortly be c a l l e d - despite the fact that the present government has only been i n o f f i c e for three y e a r s . 3 1 Premier Vander Zalm unwittingly supported the case that the Social Credit government d e l i b e r a t e l y manipulates the economy for i t s own p o l i t i c a l gain by suggesting, following the budget speech, that he may c a l l an e l e c t i o n . 3 2 Regaining popularity, or saving face, can also involve the use of p o l l s , or a less s c i e n t i f i c measure of overt p u b l i c d i s p l e a s u r e . The development of the Family Advancement programme may be an example of the l a t t e r . On July 26, 1983, when Grace McCarthy announced the cutbacks i n the M.H.R., one of the services to be terminated without replacement was the Family Support worker programme. Established i n 1978, the programme served about 5000 children per month and was designed to keep 'at-risk' families together - to avoid family breakdown and apprehension of children. The programme's 259 school-based workers were labeled as 'redundant' and l a i d o f f . 3 3 This action was compatible with the p r i n c i p l e s of neoconservatism. However, i t became apparent that i t was not compatible with public opinion. On June 2, 1985, after a series of highly publ i c i z e d incidents of M.H.R. mismanagement of c h i l d abuse cases, a Vancouver Province e d i t o r i a l suggested that the cutbacks i n 1983, "..have probably made things worse.", and s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned the lack of Family Support workers. 3 4 On October 10, 1985, the Vancouver Province reported that Grace McCarthy responded to N.D.P. demands for a review of the c h i l d welfare system by suggesting that f a m i l i e s and the community are to blame for kids going bad, and should take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for those k i d s . 3 5 The following day the Province e d i t o r i a l r e p l i e d that the ministry's lack of preventive programmes r e s u l t e d i n more damage bein g done to kids before intervention by the M.H.R., and that the government had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to provide preventive (and p a r t i c u l a r l y school-based) s e r v i c e s . 3 6 On October 17, 1985, Marilyn Callahan, Director of the Univer s i t y of V i c t o r i a School of Social Work, published an a r t i c l e i n the V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, c r i t i c i z i n g B.C.'s c h i l d welfare services and s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t i n g the Family Support programme as ef f e c t i v e , e f f i c i e n t , and much needed. 3 7 The next day, Callahan followed t h i s up with a c a l l for a public inquiry into c h i l d welfare - which made the front page of the same paper. 3 8 On October 23, 1985, Brian Wharf, Dean of the Faculty of Human and Social Development of the University of V i c t o r i a , published an a r t i c l e i n the V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, c r i t i c i z i n g the lack of preventive c h i l d welfare programmes i n B.C., and once again c i t e d the loss of the Family Support programme as part of the problem. 3 9 C r i t i c i s m by these academics was picked up by the Vancouver Sun and the Vancouver P r o v i n c e . 4 0 On October 29, 1985, the Vancouver Sun published a l e t t e r from A l a s t a i r Fraser, President of the Vancouver Schools Administrators Association, c a l l i n g on the government to reinstate Family Support workers and other preventive services - and g r a p h i c a l l y describing the p l i g h t of the many children who needed, but no longer had access to, such programmes. 4 1 Almost a year l a t e r t h i s same association submitted a b r i e f to the government, repeating the same request, with the same r a t i o n a l e . 4 2 Again, both major papers i n Vancouver picked up the s t o r y . 4 3 Perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i n December of 1986 Premier Vander Zalm announced that there would be a review of c h i l d and family services, though Andrew Armitage, who was Superintendent of C h i l d and Family Services at the time, l a t e r stated that, "There was no r e a l review being done." 4 4 An a d d i t i o n a l hypothesis may be that for governments concerned with t h e i r popularity, substance i s secondary to appearance. Throughout 1987 and well into 1988 the public became aware, v i a the media, of the development of what has been termed the 'hungry kids'" problem. Though d e t a i l s were lacking, (and the ministry denied the veracity of the claims) i t seemed that income assistance rates had f a l l e n so f a r behind what fam i l i e s needed to support themselves, that i n some i n n e r - c i t y neighborhoods, parents were sending t h e i r children to school without breakfast, and often without lunch - simply because they could not afford to buy the necessary f o o d . 4 5 The p u b l i c a t i o n of the Vancouver Elementary School Administrators' p o s i t i o n paper on i n n e r - c i t y schools i n January of 1988 helped to l i n k the economic and academic issues involved and to further legitimate and focus public attention on the i s s u e . 4 6 On February 1, 1988, i n what might be considered a reply to the school administrators, Claude Richmond, Minister of Social Services and Housing, indicated that f a m i l i e s , and not the government, were responsible for feeding t h e i r children, that income assistance rates were adequate, and that no money for school meal programmes would be forthcoming from the government for the reason c i t e d above, and because such programmes would simply breed dependence. 4 7 This statement can stand as an example of neoconservative values, analysis and policy-making. If ideology was the prime motivator of the government, t h i s i s the p o s i t i o n they would have held. However, the argument advanced here i s that the long and very public nature of the debate on the issue obviated some further action, since i t was l i k e l y ( i f not a c t u a l l y known by some unpublished government p o l l ) that public sympathy lay with the children, and the government's p o s i t i o n might therefore be highly unpopular. The government therefore introduced the Family Advancement programme, and touted i t as an e f f e c t i v e and responsible way to address the hungry kids problem (while simultaneously responding to the equally public c r i t i c i s m s of c h i l d welfare services - thus k i l l i n g two birds with one s t o n e ) . 4 8 Though ministry o f f i c i a l s i n i t i a l l y denied that Family Advancement had any r e l a t i o n s h i p to the terminated Family Support programme, even the M.S.S.H. press r e l e a s e announcing i t s creation ("Minister Announces new Family Support Workers") betrays the connection. 4 9 Within the Popularity theory, one of three hypotheses may explain the development of the Family Advancement programme: (a) the Bennett government misjudged the popularity f o r advancing the neoconservative agenda to the point of cutting programmes for needy children, and the Vander Zalm government attempted to correct that error, or; (b) the popularity of programmes for needy childre n changed between July 1983 and A p r i l 1988, and the Vander Zalm government simply adjusted i t s p o l i c y to that s h i f t i n public opinion, or; (c) the Bennett government was less interested i n adapting p o l i c y according to what i s popular, and took a r i s k i n such cuts, while the Vander Zalm government i s taking fewer r i s k s i n the name of ideology. Using the development of the Family Advancement programme as an example, i t i s possible to project how voluntary organizations might manipulate the process of p o l i c y development i n t h e i r favour. The f i r s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would lead those interested i n influencing government p o l i c y to ensure that the government i s f u l l y aware of public opinion during the policy-making process. N o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies would attempt to impress upon the government the popularity of t h e i r cause, or the extent of public sympathy for t h e i r c l i e n t population. This would necessitate the development of mechanisms f o r consultation with the public s e c t o r . The second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would lead those organizations interested i n influencing government p o l i c y to attempt to make changes i n public opinion through public information campaigns and use of the media. However, there would very l i k e l y be some r i s k to the agency i n t h i s a c t i v i t y . Unlike a populist government, a government concerned about i t s popularity might deem e f f o r t s to influence the public as i n t e r f e r i n g with t h e i r p o l i t i c a l agenda, and they may be antagonized as a r e s u l t . Voluntary organizations which depend on p r o v i n c i a l funds may discover that appeals to the media can re s u l t i n a f i n a n c i a l backlash. The t h i r d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n accepts either of the previous two methods of influencing the government, but suggests that they were i n e f f e c t i v e p r i o r to the point where William Vander Zalm took o f f i c e - that popularity was a secondary concern of William Bennett. This theory provides an explanation for why the government has not, i n the process of p r i v a t i z i n g s o c i a l services, followed i t s l a i s s e z - f a i r e ideology and simply dumped a l l non-statutory services - allowing the market to pick up what i t w i l l . The example provided i n the Family Advancement programme should explain why the government has re-introduced some services, and possibly why i t has retained others. This may also provide an alternative to the Populism theory i n e x p l a i n i n g the use of voluntary, and not proprietary, agencies i n the delivery of many (though c e r t a i n l y not a l l ) contracted services - there may be a perception that the public would object to some services being offered for p r o f i t . 5 0 If one accepts the Popularity theory, the apparent a b i l i t y of organizations to influence government po l i c y , and the l i k e l i h o o d that public opinion may act to protect the s o c i a l services from d r a s t i c cuts i n funding, may appear to hold some advantage f o r voluntary organizations. However, l i k e the Populism theory, some organizations are l i k e l y to suff e r with a government committed to i t s own popularity i n o f f i c e . Agencies which serve c l i e n t groups which are not popular may not only be ignored by government, but they may a c t u a l l y be attacked by the government - i f t h e i r cause i s perceived to be so unpopular that the government feels i t can score p o l i t i c a l points through such an attack. Funding for a l l services i s l i k e l y to follow fads - to be based on public whim, rather than demonstrated need. E f f o r t s at r a i s i n g public consciousness about s o c i a l problems, even i f conducted s t r i c t l y i n the i n t e r e s t of the c l i e n t s , may be misperceived by government, and r e s u l t i n repercussions. This may force voluntary organizations, and awareness of s o c i a l issues, out of the p u b l i c arena. What the Popularity theory f a i l s to adequately explain i s why the Social Credit party continues to be re-elected by the people of B r i t i s h Columbia. The rhetoric of the party i s market-oriented, and i t i s elected at least i n part on the basis of that r h e t o r i c . Yet i t s major c o n f l i c t s with the people of B.C., according to t h i s theory, r e s u l t from the Social Credit government's attempts to act on that rhetoric. (4) The Paternalism Theory The central hypotheses of t h i s theory are that the Social Credit party represents a r u l i n g e l i t e , and the p o l i c i e s of the government, including p r i v a t i z a t i o n , are an attempt to favour that e l i t e , and maintain i t s power. The e l i t e are viewed as p r i m a r i l y educated, middle-aged, af f l u e n t , white males who occupy positions of power i n business, and government. Government p o l i t i c i a n s are viewed as a part of that e l i t e , and as committed to advancing the int e r e s t s of the 'old boys club' . This view i s very nearly the opposite to that provided i n the Populism theory. Like the Popularity theory, i t incorporates neoconservatism as a p a r t i a l explanation for government p o l i c i e s , but i n t h i s case p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s a means to strengthen the market, which i s the domain of the e l i t e . . The e l i t e maintain t h e i r control over the economy and society primarily through the market, though s o c i a l services are also used as a means of s o c i a l c o n t r o l . Peter George (1985) has advanced an alternative to the one-dimensional model of welfare ideologies, and suggested that conservatism has i t s c o l l e c t i v i s t element as much as socialism has i t s a n t i - c o l l e c t i v i s t element. 5 1 The one-dimensional model i s often represented as a continuum running from ' a n t i - c o l l e c t i v i s t ' , through 'reluctant c o l l e c t i v i s t ' , and 'Fabian s o c i a l i s t ' to 'Marxist' - although a va r i e t y of other terms (such as conservative, l i b e r a l and s o c i a l democrat) are often substituted f o r these. Generally, those a n a l y t i c frameworks i n use have proponents of the free market at one end of a scale, and c o l l e c t i v i s t s at the o t h e r . 5 2 George suggests a two-dimensional model, composed of two i n t e r s e c t i n g continuums; the f i r s t ( t i t l e d Reason and Indi v i d u a l i s m ) s t r e t c h i n g from l a i s s e z - f a i r e l i b e r a l i s m through support for a mixed economy, to f u l l public ownership or c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of the means of production; the second ( t i t l e d Community and Sentiment) stretching from communism to conservatism - or from f r a t e r n i t y through to h i e r a r c h y . 5 3 In application, such a model explains the s o c i a l p o l i c y developments i d e n t i f i e d , and allows us to describe them as 'noblesse o b l i g e ' - "...the predominantly p a t e r n a l i s t approach to s o c i a l p o l i c y and the s o c i a l services provided by a corporate professional e l i t e . " 5 4 This assumes that the s o c i a l p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n evident i n the development of programmes such as Family I n i t i a t i v e s i s inherently pro-state, even i f that state involvement i s at arm's length-i n i t i a t i o n , control and funding of s o c i a l programmes through the public sector, but delivery through the private sector. I t i s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and most p a r t i c u l a r l y of contracting to voluntary agencies, that i s the key issue here. The Paternalism theory interprets the d e l i v e r y of s o c i a l programmes by voluntary agencies as economic and i d e o l o g i c a l window-dressing on the attempt by the government to exercise s o c i a l control. This would also mean that there i s a r i f t between the s o c i a l p o l i c y and the economic p o l i c y of Social Credit - since the former i s inherently -pro-state, while the l a t t e r i s apparently a n t i -state (as evidenced by the degree of real and permanent d i v e s t u r e i n crown c o r p o r a t i o n s and other p u b l i c a c t i v i t i e s ) . 5 5 Those vo l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s which accept the Paternalism theory, and which intend to influence the formation or r e v i s i o n of s o c i a l p o l i c y i n t h e i r favour, should avoid being i d e n t i f i e d as the 'grassroots', and should instead i d e n t i f y t h e i r agency, as professional (on the assumption t h a t t h e r e i s an e l i t i s t q u a l i t y to professionalism, and t h i s may be deemed by the government to imbue the organization with c r e d i b i l i t y ) . E x i s t i n g and proposed services f o r which the agency seeks public funding should be presented as serving a s o c i a l control function. In addition, the membership of the Board of Directors of such organizations should include those who t r a v e l i n the same s o c i a l and economic c i r c l e s as government p o l i t i c i a n s , and senior government bureaucrats - i n order to i d e n t i f y the organization as part of 'the club'. This theory provides an adequate explanation f o r the increase i n funding to Drug and Alcohol programmes, but f a i l s to explain why some services have been structured i n order to transfer control of them to the voluntary sector. Once again, the example i s the Family Advancement programme. Though some have i d e n t i f i e d t h i s programme as an exercise i n s o c i a l control i t would appear that i n i t s implementation, government control i s minimal. 5 6 (5) The Patronage Theory The central hypotheses of t h i s theory are that the Social Credit government has no intention of achieving a minimal state, and that a t r u l y free market would not serve the interests of the special i n t e r e s t groups and i n d i v i d u a l s who have been the f i n a n c i a l supporters and a l l i e s , of the Soc i a l Credit government. It follows that p r i v a t i z a t i o n and f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t have been and w i l l be pursued only to the extent that they are good for business generally, and good for the businesses of a s e l e c t few i n p a r t i c u l a r . An associated hypothesis of t h i s theory i s that many supporters of the government would never survive f i n a n c i a l l y without the help of the public sector. Government p o l i t i c i a n s , are viewed as l i k e l y to practice a questionable degree of favoritism, be u t t e r l y corrupt, or anything i n between. This theory i s s i m i l a r to the Paternalism theory, but d i f f e r s i n the degree (perhaps best expressed as the d o l l a r amount) of favoritism shown by the government to c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s and indus t r i e s , and who i s favored. Those on the receiving end of patronage need not be considered a part of an e l i t e . Patronage i s also similar to the Popularity theory, since t h i s i s what i s most often bought with public money. However, the buying that i s involved i n the Patronage theory i s more blatant. This may be the most cynical of possible theories, and may r e f l e c t the post-Nixon era of t r u s t of p o l i t i c i a n s generally. The Patronage theory, l i e s unspoken within Kesselman's observation that Social Credit p o l i c y tends d i f f e r from neoconservative theory i n that i t favors business (see page 4 3 - 4 4 ) . It runs as a theme through much of the opposition party's c r i t i c i s m of the government, as when Michael Harcourt "Could i t be that t h i s government doesn't want anyone to know what they 've done with our forests? Could i t be that our forests are just another sweet deal for your friends and Socred i n s i d e r s ? " 5 7 This p o s s i b i l i t y i s also suggested by neoconservative t h e o r i s t s , such as Hayek (1978) who cautions that one i n e v i t a b l e outcome of unlimited government i s that a p o l i t i c a l party, "...hoping to achieve and maintain power w i l l have l i t t l e choice but to use i t s powers to buy the support of p a r t i c u l a r groups."5** A key hypothesis of t h i s theory i s that p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s a means of buying, or rewarding, l o y a l t y to the government. This i s a concern raised by a number of c r i t i c s of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , including DeHoog (1984), the National Union of P rovincial Government Employees (1986), the Alberta Association of Social Workers (1986), and Ter r e l and Kramer ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 5 9 The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s f o r v o l u n t a r y organizations are s i g n i f i c a n t . If one accepts the Patronage theory, agencies which wish to maintain or expand t h e i r funding must be seen as supporters of the government. As with the Popularity theory, public advocacy on behalf of c l i e n t s would be minimized, i f not eliminated - and public awareness of s o c i a l issues would su f f e r . However, Patronage goes beyond that. In order to be rewarded, public statements made by the agency would have to include praise for the actions of the government. As with the Paternalism theory, i t would be to the advantage of any agency to have on i t s Board of Directors those who are a c q u a i n t e d w i t h government p o l i t i c i a n s and s e n i o r bureaucrats. Again, beyond that, Board members would have to engage i n bartering of the agency's p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n with t h e i r associates i n government i n order to secure funds. Agencies without such connections (or which refuse to engage i n such p o l i t i c a l manoeuvering), or which serve populations, or o p e r a t e i n p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , considered ' u n f r i e n d l y ' by the government, would receive minimal f i n a n c i a l support, i f any. What t h i s hypothesis f a i l s to account for are those actions of the government where the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of p o l i c y are g e n e r a l l y not, h i s t o r i c a l l y or p o t e n t i a l l y , the supporters of Social Credit - such as those low-income families served by the Family Advancement programme. The purpose of t h i s chapter has been to examine alternatives to the b e l i e f that the p r i v a t i z a t i o n of s o c i a l services i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s motivated by, and directed toward the goals of, neoconservatism. Four alternatives to that theory have been described, and t h e i r implications for voluntary organizations have been discussed. This exercise has been necessitated by the general lack of e x i s t i n g analysis of p r i v a t i z a t i o n beyond i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as a phenomenon of ideology, and the b e l i e f that a broader a n a l y s i s w i l l c o n t r i b u t e to t h i s study, and to an understanding of the impact of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s on voluntary organizations. A major thrust of the a n a l y s i s has been that the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n as rooted i n neoconservative ideology represents a s i m p l i s t i c rendering of the issues, and f a i l s to take into account c e r t a i n factors which are s p e c i f i c to t h i s province, and which could broadly be described as i t s s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic context. Notes to Chapter Two 1. Guest, D., The Emergence of Social Security i n Canada, University of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1980, pp. 1-3. 2. Kesselman, J., "Should B r i t i s h Columbia Pursue Mini-E f f i c i e n c y or Social E f f i c i e n c y ? " , i n Restraining the  Economy, Robert C. A l l e n and Gideon Rosenbluth, ed., New Star Books, Vancouver, 1986, pp. 81-82. 3. Redish, A., Rosenbluth, G., and Schworm, W., "Provincial F i s c a l P o l i c i e s " , i n Restraining the Economy, Robert C. A l l e n and Gideon Rosenbluth, ed., New Star Books, Vancouver, 1986, p. 128. 4. Weatherbe, S., "Useful Advice - or 'Stone Soup", i n Western Report. June 20, 1988, p. 41. 5. Estimations of the amount of funding involved w i l l not be available u n t i l the publication of the Ministry of Labour's Annual Report f o r 1988/89. However, i n separate interviews, two of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s study indicated • that s i g n i f i c a n t new funding for drug and alcohol treatment has unexpectedly appeared. 6. M.S.S.H., S e r v i c e s f o r People. Ministry of Social Services and Housing Annual Report, 1986-87, V i c t o r i a , 1988, p. 42 and 65. 7. Hearn, G., Theory-Building i n Social Work. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1958, p. 1. 8. Twigg, J., "Going, Going, Gone", i n Equity, Vol. 5, No. 9, December, 1987, p. 28. B r i t i s h Columbia P o l i t i c s and Policy , "Interview with John Shields", Vol. 1, No. 12, January, 1988, p. 25. 9. Weatherbe, S. "Give These Guys a L i t t l e Respect", i n Western Report, December 14, 1987, p. 52. Lapper, R., Populism i n B r i t i s h Columbia P o l i t i c s , U n iversity of V i c t o r i a , V i c t o r i a , B.C., June 10, 1981 (working paper). 10. Weatherbe, S., 1987, p. 52. 11. i b i d . , pp. 52-53. 12. i b i d . , p. 53. 13. i b i d . , p. 52. 14. i b i d . , p. 52. 15. i b i d . , p. 53. 16. Lapper, R.,1981,p.5. 17. i b i d . , p. 5. 18. Laclau, E., P o l i t i c s and Ideology i n Marxist Theory, NLB, London, 1977, p. 194. 19. Lapper, R., 1981, pp. 6-7. 20. Lapper, R., 1981. Laclau, E., 1977. Boyte, H.C., "Beyond P o l i t i c s as Usual", i n The New Populism, Harry C. Boyte and Frank Riessman, ed., Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1986, pp. 3-15. Zimmerman, J.F., Parti c i p a t o r y Democracy, Praeger, New York, 1986. pp. v - v i . Kuttner, R., The L i f e of the Party, Viking, New York, 1987, pp. 151-152. Boyte, H.C., Booth, H., and Max, S., C i t i z e n Action and the  New American Populism, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1986, pp. ix-x. 76 21. Lapper, R., 1981, p. 12. 22. Callahan, M. , and McNiven, " B r i t i s h Columbia", Chapter Two i n P r i v a t i z a t i o n and P r o v i n c i a l Social Services i n  Canada, J.S. Ismael and Y. Vaillancourt, ed., University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, 1988, p. 16. 23. Rahn, S.L., and McCready, D.J., "Note on So c i a l Service Provision i n Canada", i n Canadian Public P o l i c y f Vol. 11, No. 3, 1985. pp. 625-627. 24. Lapper, R. , 1981, p. 6. 25. Di s t r u s t of, or even contempt for, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher education (and those i n them) i s t r u l y populist - i t i s evidenced by both business and labour. 26. Vancouver Sun, "Balanced blacktop budget not paved with tax breaks", March 31, 1989, p. A l . 27. Vancouver Sun, "Socred agenda lacks action, NDP argues", March 20, 1989, p. A8. Weatherbe, S., 1987, p. 53. 28. Green, F., and S u t c l i f f e , R., The P r o f i t System, Penguin Books, Markham, Ontario, 1987, pp. 276-277. 29. Vancouver Province, "This i s budget day", March 30, 1989, p. 6. 30. Vancouver Sun, March 31, 1989, p. A l . 31. Vancouver Province, "Good news' budget may spur ele c t i o n c a l l " , March 30, 1989, p. 48. 32. Vancouver Sun, March 31, 1989, p. A l . 33. Seebaran, R, "Social Services i n B.C.: The Axe F a l l s " , i n The Social Worker, Vol. 51, No. 3, F a l l , 1983, pp. 89-91. 34. Vancouver Province, "Abuse 'epidemic' c a l l s f o r changes", June 2, 1985, p. 32. 35. Vancouver Province, "Not MHR's f a u l t " , October 10, 1985, p. 10. 36. Vancouver Province, "Just when should MHR intervene?", October 11, 1985, p. 38. 37. Callahan, M., "Six steps to counter neglect of needy Children", i n the V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, October 17, 1985. 77 38. V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, "Public inquiry into B.C. c h i l d welfare urged", October 18, 1985, p. 1. 39. Wharf, B. , " C r i s i s - o n l y c h i l d care: expensive and i n e f f e c t i v e " , i n the V i c t o r i a Times-Colonist, October 23, 1985. 40. Vancouver Province, "Socreds slapped on c h i l d welfare", October 23, 1985, p. 3. Vancouver Sun, "Researchers slam c h i l d welfare", October 23, 1985, p. A2. 41. Vancouver Sun, "Callous cutbacks hurt children with problems", October 29, 1985, p. A5. 42. V a n c o u v e r S c h o o l s A d m i n i s t r a t o r s A s s o c i a t i o n (Elementary), Children i n C r i s i s , October, 1986. (a b r i e f to the government of B r i t i s h Columbia) 43. Vancouver Sun, "Administrators renew demand for return of c h i l d care workers", October 8, 1986, p. A8. Vancouver Province, "Our kids are suffering", October 19, 1986, p. 4. 44. Vancouver Sun, " F i r e d o f f i c i a l raps services for children", May 26, 1987, p. A1-A2. 45. Weatherbe, S., "Useful Advice - Or 'Stone Soup", i n Western Report, June 20, 1988, p. 41. 46. Vancouver Elementary School Administrators' Association, Inner-City Schools, P r i n c i p a l s ' Position Paper, January, 1988. 47. Ministry of Social Services and Housing, "Minister of Social Services and Housing Gives Government Position on Support for School Meals", News Release, Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, V i c t o r i a , Feb. 1, 1988. 48. Weatherbe, S., 1988, p. 41. 49. Weatherbe, S., 1988, p. 41. Ministry of Social Services and Housing, "Ministry Announces New Family Support Workers", News Release, Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, V i c t o r i a , A p r i l 12, 1988. 50. This was suggested as a reason for government sel e c t i o n of contractors i n the Booz-Allen study (1971). Kettner, P.M., and Martin, L.L., "Making Decisions about Purchase of Service Contracting", i n Public Welfare, Vol. 44, No. 4, F a l l , 1986, p. 31. 51. George, P., "Towards a Two-dimensional Analysis of Welfare Ideologies", i n Social P o l i c y and Administration, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring, 1985, pp. 33-45. 52. i b i d . , p. 38. 53. i b i d . , p. 43. 54. i b i d . , p. 44. 55. Twigg, J., 1987, p. 28-29. 56. Weatherbe, S., 1988, p. 41. 57. Vancouver Sun, March 20, 1989, p. A8. 58. Hayek, F.A., New Studies, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, p. 108. 59. DeHoog, R.H., Contracting Out for Human Services- Economic, P o l i t i c a l and Organizational Perspectives, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984, p. 12. A.A.S.W., Alberta Association of Social Workers' Position  Paper on the Alberta Government P o l i c y of P r i v a t i z i n g Public  Social Services (The Commercialization of Caring), a b r i e f submitted to the Ministers of Alberta Social Services and Alberta Occupational and Community Health, and the Members of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, June 25, 1986, p. 6. , National Union of Pr o v i n c i a l Government Employees, Government  for Sale - P r i v a t i z a t i o n of the Public Sector, June, 1986, p. 9. T e r r e l , P., and Kramer, R.M., "Contracting with Nonprofits", i n Public Welfare. Vol. 42, No. 1, Winter, 1984, p. 33. 79 CHAPTER THREE  VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATIZATION: THE ISSUES TO BE RESEARCHED  A. The Purpose of the Research The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to i d e n t i f y the issues t h a t the research study w i l l address, to define the questions which those issues r a i s e (and which the study w i l l attempt to answer), and to lay the conceptual foundation necessary for understanding the research design. It i s assumed that the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations providing personal s o c i a l services cannot be d e s c r i b e d as a s i m p l e cause-and-ef f e e t , r e l a t i o n s h i p . The l i t e r a t u r e suggests that p r i v a t i z a t i o n involves a variety of government i n i t i a t i v e s which may have either d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s on such agencies (see Callahan and McNiven's l i s t of p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s on page 10 and 11). Voluntary organizations have a degree of d i s c r e t i o n i n how they may respond to each of those i n i t i a t i v e s , and t h e i r e f f e c t s . For example, a reduction i n the provision of statutory services through bureaucratic disentitlement may r e s u l t i n more people turning to a s p e c i f i c n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agency for a service they no longer have easy access to. The organization would have l i t t l e control over t h i s increase i n c l i e n t demand - a d i r e c t e f f e c t of p r i v a t i z a t i o n . However, i t would have considerable d i s c r e t i o n over how i t responded to that increase i n c l i e n t demand. The agency might simply s t a r t a waiting l i s t , or seek a d d i t i o n a l resources to meet the demand (for instance, through charitable funders, casino or l o t t e r y income, or a p p l i c a t i o n for government grants), or might make a statement of protest regarding the government i n i t i a t i v e to the public, v i a the media. The possible responses are almost unlimited-as are t h e i r repercussions for the agency. Any of these choices might have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the agency, and that impact could be described as an i n d i r e c t e f f e c t of b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s e n t i t l e m e n t - one over which the organization exercised some d i s c r e t i o n . In the case of contracting, the degree to which the agency can control the d i r e c t e f f e c t of the i n i t i a t i v e through i t s own d i s c r e t i o n i s extremely high - the organization i s ostensibly free to b i d on the contract or ignore the o f f e r to tender. 1 The pot e n t i a l range of variables which govern the choices made by the agency i n response to the government's p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s , and the role those choices play i n determining how p r i v a t i z a t i o n a f f e c t s the agency, mean that no study can ar r i v e at a simple cause-effect explanation of the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations. Two alternate objectives are more f e a s i b l e . The f i r s t i s to document those changes that have occurred i n those voluntary organizations which p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s study, and which are d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y r elated to p r i v a t i z a t i o n . The second i s to examine the choices made by voluntary organizations i n those areas of e f f e c t over which they have been able to exercise some d i s c r e t i o n . Both are necessary steps toward generating a theory regarding the factors which determine an agency's actions i n response to p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s . This study i s directed toward answering two questions. The f i r s t i s concerned with the general implications of p r i v a t i z a t i o n for n o t - f o r - p r o f i t s o c i a l service agencies: Does the experience of personnel i n voluntary o r g a n i z a t i o n s which provide personal s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n Vancouver support the concerns expressed i n the l i t e r a t u r e regarding the varied negative implications of p r i v a t i z a t i o n for those agencies? The second focuses on those contextual factors which may have lead c e r t a i n organizations to d i f f e r from others i n response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n generally, or i n response to s p e c i f i c i n i t i a t i v e s or t h e i r e f f e c t s : To what degree have key decision-making personnel w i t h i n v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s which provide personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver recognized and exercised control over the impact of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s on t h e i r agency, and what factors have influenced the decisions made by those personnel i n g u i d i n g the response of those agencies to those government p o l i c i e s ? This study therefore has two components - a series of case studies wherein the unique s i t u a t i o n and experience of each agency i s described, and a comparison of those case studies toward the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of common experiences and factors r e l a t i n g to the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on the voluntary sector generally. The case study component i s intended to address one inadequacy of the l i t e r a t u r e - i t s tendency to over-generalize. Variations i n the circumstances of i n d i v i d u a l agencies are generally not considered. Descriptions of the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on the entire voluntary sector may be of l i t t l e u t i l i t y to those i n d i v i d u a l organizations which comprise i t . To be of u t i l i t y to the personnel of voluntary organizations, t h i s study must address the issues which are most relevant to them. It i s assumed that many of these issues are s i t u a t i o n a l , and can be i d e n t i f i e d through a case study approach. In order to have any relevance beyond s p e c i f i c settings, and i n order to address the concerns expressed i n the l i t e r a t u r e regarding the poten t i a l negative implications of p r i v a t i z a t i o n f or voluntary organizations, i t i s necessary to seek any .general p r i n c i p l e s which may apply, and to a r t i c u l a t e them i f they exi s t - to generalize to some extent. The extent to which one may be able to generalize from t h i s study i s discussed i n the fourth section of t h i s chapter. However, before one can generalize, one must consider the s p e c i f i c . B. The Case Studies It i s assumed that the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on a voluntary organization would l i k e l y involve some sort of interplay between s p e c i f i c government p o l i c i e s , the nature of the agency and i t s services, i t s circumstances, and the decision-making references of i t s key personnel. One d e f i c i t of the l i t e r a t u r e seems to be i t s lack of attention to the o r i e n t a t i o n of decision-makers i n voluntary organizations. The suggestion by the C.A.S.W. that agencies are 'forced' to become more opportunistic, entrepreneurial or p o l i t i c a l i n r e s p o n s e to p r i v a t i z a t i o n (see page 22) seems an anthropomorphism without merit. People make the decisions and take the actions which are referred to, and the variables which lead them to those choices may be unique to those i n d i v i d u a l s , those organizations, or both. Thus the conceptual orie n t a t i o n and values of decision-makers i n an organization are seen as a s i g n i f i c a n t factor i n determining how p r i v a t i z a t i o n w i l l a f f e c t the agency. One study found which does address the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the values of i n d i v i d u a l decision-makers i n voluntary organizations, and the response of those organizations to government p o l i c y , contains serious flaws. A c r i t i c a l analysis of that study may help demonstrate why t h i s study w i l l consider both the personal and organizational contexts within which decisions regarding p r i v a t i z a t i o n are made. William Epstein (1988) provides an appealing analysis of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the values of key decision-makers within n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies, government p o l i c i e s , and the response of those agencies to those p o l i c i e s . Epstein interviewed twenty-two administrators of voluntary s o c i a l service organizations i n New York and determined that t h e i r s o c i a l attitudes, and those of t h e i r Boards, were i n narrow conformity with the conservative values of the current national administration. 2 He concludes that such agencies f u l f i l l an i d e o l o g i c a l role, as well as a service r o l e , and have accordingly ignored great and growing s o c i a l needs. By extension of t h i s one might conclude that the ideology of an agency's a d m i n i s t r a t o r s determines i t s response to government p o l i c y - and hence the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on the organization. However, Epstein neglects the contexts of both the agencies and the individuals i n his study. He does not address the f i n a n c i a l state of the agencies. A lack of funds i s an egually l i k e l y explanation f o r not addressing s o c i a l needs. He states that the agencies he studied have 'ignored' the s o c i a l needs he i d e n t i f i e s , yet he has neglected to define the missions of those agencies, and r e l a t e them to those needs. Could an agency committed to serving the p h y s i c a l l y challenged be accused of 'ignoring' the p l i g h t of the homeless? He also does not address the p o s i t i o n of those organizations i n the s o c i a l services network around them. An agency which i s committed to meeting a broadly f e l t s o c i a l 85 need, but serves o n l y a t i n y f r a c t i o n of the p o t e n t i a l p o p u l a t i o n i n an urban area, might be c r i t i c i z e d f o r i g n o r i n g the r e s t , u n l e s s t h e r e i s a much l a r g e r o r g a n i z a t i o n mandated t o serve t h a t same p o p u l a t i o n i n t h a t same area. E p s t e i n a l s o does not address the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' p e r c e p t i o n s of government p o l i c y , merely t h e i r v a l u e s i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s p e r c e p t i o n o f the i d e o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of government p o l i c y . These d i s t i n c t i o n s are important. As was i n d i c a t e d i n Chapter Two, p o l i c y and i d e o l o g y a re not synonymous. How one i n t e r p r e t s p o l i c y may determine the d e c i s i o n s one makes i n response t o i t , and i t i s v e r y p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t the p o l i c i e s of governments w i d e l y acknowledged as p u r s u i n g a n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e agenda, as o t h e r t h a n n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e . E p s t e i n has assumed t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s he s t u d i e d were p l a y i n g the game a c c o r d i n g t o n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e r u l e s , and i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i r a c t i o n s a c c o r d i n g l y . He does not c o n s i d e r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the values of the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were not d i c t a t i n g t h e i r a c t i o n s so much as t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of the r u l e s of the game they were p l a y i n g , nor does he c o n s i d e r o p t i o n s t o l a b e l i n g U.S. f e d e r a l s o c i a l p o l i c y as c o n s e r v a t i v e . E p s t e i n a l s o assumes t h a t t h e v a l u e s o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r can be e f f i c i e n t l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o b o t h p o l i c y (the domain of the Board), and p r a c t i c e (the domain of the s t a f f ) - but f a i l s t o d e s c r i b e the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s which would o p e r a t i o n a l i z e the a d m i n i s t r a t o r ' s v a l u e s . An o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s decision-making structure may act as a conductor or a r e s i s t o r of the administrator's values. Depending on both the formal structures, and informal practices or 'culture' of the organization, the administrator may have a great deal of control over what an agency does, or very l i t t l e . The t r u l y s i g n i f i c a n t decisions may be made at the Board l e v e l , or through s t a f f management teams. The o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n may even have been worker c o l l e c t i v e s . Unless the organizational structure i s defined, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the values of the administrator and the actions of the agency i s doubtful. Epstein also assumes that the administrators' opinions of the values of t h e i r Board members are accurate. To be able to understand the positions of s p e c i f i c groups within voluntary organizations requires that they be addressed d i r e c t l y . To f a i l to do so assumes administrator omniscience. Given the p o t e n t i a l that the s t a f f , the Board, or both, may have a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n the decision-making process of an organization, i t follows that they, i n addition to the administrator, should be d i r e c t l y included i n any study of the actions of the agency as a whole. This study w i l l attempt to a r r i v e at an understanding of the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations which provide personal s o c i a l services by examining the contexts within which those organizations have responded to p r o v i n c i a l i n i t i a t i v e s , as well as the q u a l i t i e s of the individuals within each organization. The degree to which in d i v i d u a l s have influence on the decisions made by the organization i s seen to be a function of the decision-making structure. The q u a l i t i e s of ind i v i d u a l s which may have some bearing on the actions taken by the agency are l i k e l y to be too numerous, and too variable, to describe or account fo r . While i t i s possible to f a i r l y succinctly describe those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which may be used to define and d i f f e r e n t i a t e agencies, such i s not the case with i n d i v i d u a l s . However, two factors operating on the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . The f i r s t i s the id e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of ind i v i d u a l s , since much of the l i t e r a t u r e suggests that support for, or opposition to, p r i v a t i z a t i o n rests fundamentally on i t s v a l u a t i o n on i d e o l o g i c a l grounds. This i s Epstein's explanation for why certai n i n d i v i d u a l s take c e r t a i n actions. The second i s the individual's b e l i e f about the government's motivation for p r i v a t i z a t i o n , as indicated either by t h e i r assumptions or consciously-held theories (including, but not necessarily l i m i t e d to, those described i n Chapter Two). The assumption i s that the perceived rules of the game are a primary determinant of how i t i s played. This incorporates, but goes beyond, the i d e o l o g i c a l explanation, and connects the experience and reasoning of individuals with t h e i r actions. The methods employed i n pursuing case studies vary widely. If i t were the sole intent of t h i s research project to present a series of such studies, and not to make comparisons between each agency and the individuals within them, i t would be quite f e a s i b l e to employ a d i f f e r e n t method i n each agency, and to adapt the means used for gathering and a n a l y z i n g data to the unique circumstances of each organization. A l t e r i n g the methods used to su i t each case might r e s u l t i n a more comprehensive, in-depth view of each s i t u a t i o n . However, one might not be able to see the forest f o r the trees. It i s the intent of t h i s study to make comparisons, and to seek experiences and p r i n c i p l e s which might generally apply. That goal requires elaboration, as i t places l i m i t s on the methods u t i l i z e d i n the case studies, and there are implications to be considered any time one attempts to generalize from the s p e c i f i c . C. Comparing the Case Studies In order to discover which e f f e c t s of,, and responses to, p r i v a t i z a t i o n are common to the n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s study, i t i s necessary to compare the findings of each case, or sampling unit, to the others. There i s a clear difference between t h i s process and generalizing from- the findings of t h i s study to other, s i m i l a r , voluntary organizations which are not a part of t h i s study. The issues associated with generalizing to a larger population .will be discussed i n the f i n a l section of t h i s chapter. While employing uniform methods i n the c o l l e c t i o n and analysis of data for. a l l cases i s not necessarily a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r t h e i r comparison, i t does f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r comparison, and t h i s study therefore employs (with a f a i r degree of consistency), s i m i l a r means for developing each case study. One goal of the design i s to maintain consistency i n the choice of the source of information on each p a r t i c i p a t i n g agency. Epstein very l i k e l y chose the administrators of the organizations he studied on the assumption that they would have more of an overview than l i n e s t a f f (whose awareness of the issues of the agency may extend only to the boundaries of the service they provide), or Board members (whose knowledge of the d a i l y operations of the agency may be l i m i t e d ) . Whether or not t h i s was Epstein's reasoning, i t does f i t with the researcher's own experience of the range of awareness of personnel at various functional l e v e l s w i t h i n v o l u n t a r y organizations. However, the l i m i t a t i o n s of u t i l i z i n g administrators as the sole source of information on an organization, and the need to include the perspectives of both the Board and the s t a f f i n any study of the actions of the agency as a whole, have already been described. It follows that for each p a r t i c i p a t i n g agency, t h i s study w i l l u t i l i z e a minimum of three sources of information - the administrator, a Board member, and a s t a f f member. This i s s i m i l a r to what Norman Denzin termed 'Triangulation' - sampling to gain a v a r i e t y of vantage points on the object of study. -* In t h i s case, the vantage points themselves are considered a part of the object under study, and each i s viewed not only from t h e i r own perspective, but also from the perspectives of the other two sources of information; The use of similar sources of information i n each p a r t i c i p a t i n g agency i s of l i t t l e value i n f a c i l i t a t i n g comparisons between organizations unless the information requested from each source i s also si m i l a r . A v a r i e t y of factors of i n t e r e s t to t h i s study have already been i d e n t i f i e d i n the analysis of the Epstein study. These include the values of both the individual and the organization, the structure of the organization, changes i n the organization which may be r e l a t e d to p r i v a t i z a t i o n (and those that may not), the inter-organizational f i e l d , as well as the i n d i v i d u a l ' s perception of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s and the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the public and voluntary sectors. In order to f a c i l i t a t e the comparison of these factors between the agencies studied, information on each of them needs to be consistently gathered from each agency. In order to do t h i s , each fa c t o r must be broken down into a series of questions. Those questions comprise the research instrument which w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the c o l l e c t i o n of data i n each agency (and which w i l l be discussed further i n Chapter Four). In addition to the use of consistent sources of information i n each agency studied, and the use of a s t a n d a r d i z e d research instrument, comparisons between agencies are f a c i l i t a t e d by the use of common goals (and therefore methods) of data analysis. It i s the intention of t h i s study to ar r i v e at a theory . of the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations by exploring the dimensions of change which have taken place, i n those agencies s t u d i e d , i n response to those i n i t i a t i v e s i d e n t i f i e d by Callahan and McNiven, This suggests not one, but two a n a l y t i c paradigms, as they are i d e n t i f i e d by Barney Glaser (1978) - the dimensional model, and the Basic Social Processes (B.S.P.) model. 4 The dimensional model allows the researcher to map out the issues discovered i n the data, and i s most appropriate i n cases where there has been l i t t l e previous study that might allow a researcher to i d e n t i f y from the outset of the research what those issues might be. It i s considered appropriate here because, despite the existence of a f a i r amount of l i t e r a t u r e on the subject of p r i v a t i z a t i o n and voluntary organizations, there has been l i t t l e study to address the assumptions inherent i n that l i t e r a t u r e . Unfortunately, the dimensional model tends to present those issues i t discovers as s t a t i c . The B.S.P. model allows the researcher to track the process of change that i s discovered i n the data, and i s appropriate i n cases (such as that presented by t h i s study) where i t can be assumed that change has taken place, and where understanding that change i s a goal of the research. However, use of t h i s model assumes that there i s some awareness of what issues are changing. The a n a l y t i c paradigm chosen f o r t h i s study i s therefore something of a hybrid of the dimensional and B.S.P. models. In the process of analyzing the information gathered from each agency, equal weight i s given to i d e n t i f y i n g the dimension of change, as well as the process of change, suggested by the data. The a p p l i c a t i o n of this model w i l l be more f u l l y discussed i n Chapter Four. The e f f e c t s of, and responses to, p r i v a t i z a t i o n which are common to a l l agencies i n the study may be described as •general' i n that they generally apply to the p a r t i c i p a t i n g voluntary organizations. However, what i s common to the agencies studied may not necessarily be common to voluntary s o c i a l service organizations generally. D. Generalizing from the Findings There would be fewer questions regarding the general a p p l i c a t i o n of the findings of t h i s study i f i t involved a survey of a l l n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies which provide s o c i a l services i n B r i t i s h Columbia. 5 It would be quite v a l i d to make observations of the general impact of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s on such organizations, based on experiences which were found to be common. Unfortunately, the resources available f or t h i s study pr o h i b i t such a survey. The common al t e r n a t i v e i n such cases i s to take a random sample of the population (which would be defined as a l l voluntary s o c i a l service organizations i n B.C.). 6 However, the nature of t h i s study does not absolutely demand that the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies be drawn by random sample. The primary purpose of the study i s to generate a theory regarding the e f f e c t s of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations, and t h e i r response to those e f f e c t s . This study i s exploratory i n nature. The d e f i c i t i d e n t i f i e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e i s a lack of exploration of the implications of p r i v a t i z a t i o n for voluntary organizations, and a lack of explanations for t h e i r actions. The problem i s that there i s l i t t l e by way of theory which might explain what has occurred, or why i t has occurred. The solution i s to b u i l d theory. The d i s c i p l i n e s of theory-building and theory-t e s t i n g d i f f e r . This provides a degree of freedom to t h i s study i n i t s methods of exploration. In considering the generation of a theory, one should project the l i m i t s of that theory. The population of inter e s t to t h i s study was reduced from a l l voluntary s o c i a l service organizations i n B r i t i s h Columbia to voluntary organizations which provide personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver. Two rationales support t h i s choice of the po t e n t i a l population to which the theory generated by t h i s study may apply. It i s the researcher's subjective impression that there have h i s t o r i c a l l y been regional v a r i a t i o n s i n the d i v i s i o n of p u b l i c and voluntary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the provision of s o c i a l services (which r e s t r i c t the degree to which one can generalize about the implications of p r i v a t i z a t i o n to certain areas of the province). It i s therefore deemed best to geographically l i m i t the potential a p p l i c a t i o n of the theory generated. In addition, changes i n the provision of personal s o c i a l services are perceived by the researcher to be of greater i n t e r e s t to p r a c t i c i n g s o c i a l workers and the profession generally since such changes have a more immediate e f f e c t on them than changes i n other areas, such as health, or education (though, obviously, they are c l o s e l y connected). Even t h i s reduction leaves a p o t e n t i a l population numbering i n the hundreds . 7 The number of agencies from that population which might p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s study i s small. It i s not only methodologically acceptable, but a c t u a l l y of advantage to t h i s study that they be selected by other than a random sample. Using multiple sources of information i n each case n e c e s s i t a t e s spending considerable time c o l l e c t i n g and analyzing the data from p a r t i c i p a t i n g organizations. The l i m i t on the t o t a l time a l l o t t e d for t h i s study means only a few agencies can be included. Though a small random sample might seem i n t h i s case to be the l o g i c a l solution to t h i s problem, such a sample might not further the interests of t h i s study. A hypothetical example may i l l u s t r a t e t h i s . There are many daycares which operate as n o t - f o r - p r o f i t organizations. Let us suppose that they t o t a l one t h i r d of a l l the voluntary organizations i n Vancouver. The t o t a l number of organizations which can be included i n t h i s study i s s i x . If two of the organizations drawn through a random sample are daycares, t h i s can be said to be representative of the population. However, i t must be questioned whether or not the i n c l u s i o n of the second daycare i s an advantage to the study. W i l l the information gathered from the second daycare be s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the f i r s t to warrant i t s inclusion? What new information might be l e f t untapped as a r e s u l t of the second daycare 'squeezing out' an organization of a very d i f f e r e n t nature than those which are included i n the study, and which might provide information of more immediate u t i l i t y for the generation of theory? With such a small sample, i t i s questionable whether or not the findings of the study would be representative of the population, even i f the composition of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies approximated the composition of the population. Ultimately, one must question the u t i l i t y of random sampling for the purpose of generating theory. Theoretical sampling of the type described by Glaser and Strauss (and applied i n t h i s study) has a more proven track record i n t h i s regard - as evidenced by Darwin, and his choice of the Galapagos islands for his study. The goal of drawing a representative sample has therefore been abandoned. In order to achieve i t s o b j e c t i v e , t h i s study w i l l look for information to support the theory-building process where i t appears l i k e l y that i t can be found. Without a survey or random sample the findings of t h i s study should not be generalized to the i d e n t i f i e d population - though t h i s study may b u i l d a theory which might (at some point i n the future) be tested for i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to that population, using those means. It follows that i f the agencies p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s study have not been chosen randomly, that some other c r i t e r i a f o r t h e i r s e l e c t i o n has been u t i l i z e d . The premise supporting the s e l e c t i o n of voluntary organizations f o r t h i s study i s that the greater t h e i r d i v e r s i t y , the greater the p o s s i b l e range of the e f f e c t s of, and response to, p r i v a t i z a t i o n . D i v e r s i t y has been conceptualized as a wide v a r i a t i o n between agencies i n terms of t h e i r s i z e (as i n d i c a t e d by both budgets and membership), years of operation, community served, primary funding source, and the researcher's subjective impression of t h e i r evident value base (their p o s i t i o n on a continuum seen as stretching from conservative to r a d i c a l ) . A broad range of the e f f e c t s of, and response to, p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n the agencies studied i s considered necessary i n order to maximize the p o t e n t i a l that the theory generated by t h i s study may have general application for the i d e n t i f i e d population, but by no means guarantees that i t w i l l . This chapter has provided the rationale f o r the researcher's choices regarding the issues to be addressed by t h i s study, the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies, sources of information within them, and decisions a f f e c t i n g the design of the research instrument and the an a l y t i c model to be employed. These rationales act as a conceptual foundation for the research design. The next chapter w i l l describe the adaptations to that foundation which have been necessary i n order to b u i l d t h i s research project upon i t . Notes to Chapter Three 1. The degree to which an agency i s a c t u a l l y 'free' to pursue or ignore an o f f e r to tender may vary. P r i v a t i z a t i o n , as the reduction of subsidy to the voluntary sector, could possibly have placed some voluntary organizations i n a precarious f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n . They may therefore f e e l impelled to b i d on contracts they might otherwise have ignored - i n order to secure s u f f i c i e n t funds for t h e i r s u r v i v a l . P r i v a t i z a t i o n might be conceptualized as a p o l i c y set that not only introduces increased contracting into the voluntary sector, but also a l t e r s the climate of that sector to one wherein the government has the advantage i n that contracting. This view of the t a c t i c s of the p r o v i n c i a l government i s compatible with e i t h e r the Paternalism theory of p r i v a t i z a t i o n (since i t s e f f e c t i s greater control of an agency by both the government and the market), or the Neoconservatism theory. In the l a t t e r case, one might note the connection between the manipulation of the voluntary sector, and the response of neoconservative t h e o r i s t Robert Nozick to the suggestion that a worker accepting a wage i s not r e a l l y a voluntary exchange, since choice i s lim i t e d . He r e p l i e s that the exchange i s voluntary, since others acted within t h e i r r i g h t s , even i f they did not provide the worker with' a more palatable a l t e r n a t i v e . Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1974, p. 263. 2. Epstein, W.M., "Our Town *: A Case Study of Ideology and the Private Social Welfare Sector", in' Journal of Sociology  and S o c i a l Work, Vol. 25, No. 3, September, 1988, p. 101. 3. Glaser, B.G., Theoretical S e n s i t i v i t y , University of C a l i f o r n i a , San Francisco, 1978, p. 49. 4. i b i d . , pp. 74-75. 98 5. This was the method chosen by Josephine Rekart (1987) for her recent study of voluntary s o c i a l service organizations i n B.C. Even t h i s method does not guarantee that the findings of a study can be generalized to the whole population, since i t i s possible (as was the case i n Rekart's study) that some organizations w i l l f a i l to, or refuse to, p a r t i c i p a t e . Some agencies would therefore not be represented i n the findings, and i t would be erroneous to state that generalizations based on those findings could, without reservation, be applied to the whole population. 6. Kidder, L.H., and Judd, CM., Research Methods i n Social  R e l a t i o n s , F i f t h Edition, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Toronto, 1986, p. 73. 7. This i s r e a d i l y apparent i f one scans the 'Red Book' - the dire c t o r y of s o c i a l services agencies i n the Vancouver area. Information Services Vancouver, Directory of Services, Vancouver, 1988. CHAPTER FOUR  THE RESEARCH DESIGN: A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS  A. The Rationale for Q u a l i t a t i v e Methodology This chapter w i l l describe the methods i n use i n the c o l l e c t i o n and analysis of data i n t h i s study. Much of the rat i o n a l e for the use of these methods i s provided i n the previous chapter, and the r e s u l t s of t h e i r use w i l l be provided i n the next chapter. Designing the research i s defined as a process, rather than as the creation of a plan at a single point i n time. In order to understand much of the research design, a d e s c r i p t i o n of, and r a t i o n a l e f o r , the methodological o r i e n t a t i o n of the study i s necessary. Q u a l i t a t i v e methodology has been chosen i n large measure because through i t a researcher i s able to gather and analyze information describing the variables i n the contexts of the sources of the data without being required to pre-judge the parameters of those contexts, or the nature of those variables. In Theoretical S e n s i t i v i t y , Barney G. Glaser states that the mandate of the researcher engaged i n a pursuit of grounded theory i s , "...to remain open to what i s a c t u a l l y happening." 1 This imperative legitimates q u a l i t a t i v e analysis, and has acted as a maxim i n the design of t h i s study. Without t h i s imperative, any theory generated out of the q u a l i t a t i v e process (which i n t h i s case includes g a t h e r i n g data through interviews u t i l i z i n g open-ended 100 questions, coding indicators from that data, grouping those codes, and analyzing those groupings) may be invalidated-j u s t l y rejected because i t was not founded on what was happening, but on what the researcher chose to see was happening. A p r i o r i or l o g i c a l l y deducted hypotheses held by the researcher must be placed aside i n order for the data to t e l l i t s story. Thus the process of analysis w i l l be directed toward r i c h l y multi-variate, 'dense 1, information. The problem facing t h i s researcher i n attempting to gauge the impact of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s on voluntary organizations providing personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver has been to capture the dizzying array of variables e x i s t i n g i n such agencies, and to make some sense of how such p o l i c i e s have affected them. Anselm Strauss (1987), also stresses that the v a l i d i t y of a theory rests on the complexity of the data and i t s analysis: "The basic question facing us i s how to capture the complexity of r e a l i t y (phenomena) we study, and how to make convincing sense of it...making sense of complex data means three things,..both the complex interpretations and the data c o l l e c t i o n are guided by s u c c e s s i v e l y evolving interpretations made during the course of the study...a theory, to avoid s i m p l i s t i c rendering of the phenomena under study, must be conceptually dense - there are many concepts and many linkages between them...It i s necessary to do detailed, intensive, microscopic examination of the data i n order to bring out the amazing complexity of what l i e s i n , behind, and beyond those data." 2 In design, data c o l l e c t i o n , and data analysis, the researcher was conscious of the complexity of the interface 101 b e t w e e n v o l u n t a r y a g e n c i e s and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y , a n d t h e n e c e s s i t y t o . a v o i d p r e m a t u r e l y ' c l o s i n g o u t ' v a r i a b l e s t h a t may have some s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g what e f f e c t s p r i v a t i z a t i o n h as o n t h o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and how t h e p e r s o n n e l i n t h o s e a g e n c i e s have r e s p o n d e d t o t h o s e e f f e c t s . A c o m p a r i s o n t o q u a n t i t a t i v e m e t h o d o l o g y may h e l p i l l u s t r a t e t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f q u a l i t a t i v e t e c h n i q u e s f o r t h i s s t u d y . I t w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y i n a q u a n t i t a t i v e s t u d y t o s p e c i f y v a r i a b l e s i n t e n d e d f o r measurement ( t h e i d e o l o g y o f t h o s e i n t e r v i e w e d f o r example) and t o d e v e l o p some d e v i c e ( s u c h as t h e i n t e r s e c t i n g c o n t i n u u m s d e s c r i b e d b y P e t e r G e o r g e - s e e page 68) w i t h w h i c h t o measure i t . T h i s may r e s u l t i n a m u l t i t u d e o f p r o b l e m s . T h e r e may be no a g r e e m e n t between s u b j e c t s r e g a r d i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m s u s e d t o d e f i n e t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n , a n d y e t t h e f i n d i n g s w o u l d have t o be i n t e r p r e t e d as t h o u g h t h e r e were. A s u b j e c t may w i s h t o r e s p o n d u s i n g a t e r m n o t p r o v i d e d b y t h e r e s e a r c h e r ( i d e n t i f y i n g h e r s e l f a s a ' f e m i n i s t ' , f o r i n s t a n c e ) , a n d t h u s be c o r r a l l e d i n t o r e s p o n d i n g i n t h e r e s e a r c h e r ' s , a n d n o t h e r own, t e r m s . P e r h a p s e v e n w o r s e t h a n e i t h e r o f t h e s e s c e n a r i o s , t h e v a r i a b l e c h o s e n f o r measurement may n o t e v e n be o f r e l e v a n c e t o t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e s t u d y , a n d may t h e r e f o r e be i n j e c t e d by t h e r e s e a r c h e r i n t o any t h e o r y g e n e r a t e d f r o m t h e s t u d y r e g a r d l e s s o f i t s m e a n i n g f o r t h e s u b j e c t s o f t h e r e s e a r c h . U n l i k e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s , where t h e w e i g h t g i v e n a v a r i a b l e may 102 be determined by the researcher long before the research ever begins, q u a l i t a t i v e methodology requires that variables ' earn' t h e i r way into any theory - by a demonstration of t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e to the theory. 3 This aspect of q u a l i t a t i v e methodology i s considered of great importance to the incorporation of a hypothesis regarding the motivation of personnel i n voluntary organizations for t h e i r response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s , i n t o the theory regarding the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations which t h i s study i s intended to b u i l d . It i s suggested i n Epstein's study (see page 83-84) that the i d e o l o g i c a l orientation of personnel determine t h e i r response to government p o l i c y . It i s suggested i n t h i s study that the actions of personnel may r e l a t e to t h e i r perception of the government's motivation f o r p r i v a t i z a t i o n . However, q u a l i t a t i v e methodology demands that the v a r i a b l e 'operating theory of government's motive(s) for p r i v a t i z a t i o n ' (as a q u a l i t y of the individuals i n t h i s study), be demonstrated as relevant v i a the data, not v i a the questions the researcher chooses to ask. This w i l l be discussed further i n the section of t h i s chapter devoted to data an a l y s i s . B. The Selection of Interview Subjects In order to understand the s e l e c t i o n of interview subjects for t h i s study, i t i s necessary to f i r s t describe the process of s e l e c t i n g the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies. Six r 103 voluntary organizations were chosen for t h i s study. This i s deemed to be the maximum number possible, given the time necessary to achieve the stated goal of gathering data from p e r s o n n e l at t h r e e f u n c t i o n a l l e v e l s w i t h i n each p a r t i c i p a t i n g organization, and the l i m i t s of the time and resources available f o r t h i s study. Each agency selected provides personal s o c i a l services. A l l are located i n or p r i n c i p a l l y serve Vancouver (or an area of i t ) . The rationale for t h e i r s e l e c t i o n i s t h e i r d i v e r s i t y (as defined i n Chapter Three). The use of d i v e r s i t y as a c r i t e r i a i n the sele c t i o n of these agencies i s a form of 'theoretical sampling', as described by Glaser and Strauss (1967). 4 While i t was hoped that a l l the agencies i n i t i a l l y selected would agree to p a r t i c i p a t e , the p o t e n t i a l that some might decline was anticipated, and t h i s proved to be true. The a d m i n i s t r a t o r of one of the s i x voluntary organizations i n i t i a l l y approached indicated that the demands on the agency's s t a f f were already too great, that they were overburdened with tasks not rel a t e d to di r e c t service, and that the time necessary for them to pa r t i c i p a t e i n interviews for research purposes was therefore not available. This creates a greater problem f o r a study which selects i t s partic i p a n t s based on the r e l a t i o n s h i p (in t h i s case the d i v e r s i t y ) of various factors d e f i n i n g them than i t might for a study whose p a r t i c i p a n t s are chosen by random sample. If a subject picked at random refuses to part i c i p a t e (and i f i t i s 104 required that the researcher f i n d a replacement), i t may be possible to simply pick another at random - to replace the d e c l i n i n g card i n the deck and draw again, so to speak. However, the choice of the agencies i n t h i s study makes i t more analogous to a house of cards. Any agency which declined would have to be replaced with a similar agency i n order to maintain the d i v e r s i t y of the group. The replacement agency would have to f i l l a gap i n the spectrum of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n terms of i t s s i z e , years i n operation, primary funding source, community served, and apparent value-base. The agency which declined to p a r t i c i p a t e i s r e l a t i v e l y small (but growing r a p i d l y ) , less than ten years old, funded p r i m a r i l y through municipal and p r o v i n c i a l contracts, serves a population defined by age i n the urban core of Vancouver, and i s perceived by the researcher to be r e l a t i v e l y high-p r o f i l e , and f a i r l y anti-establishment. This agency was intended to act (along with two others) as a counter-weight fo r several large, r e l a t i v e l y old, f i n a n c i a l l y stable, mainstream organizations i n the group, to bring a new target population to the study, and to balance the tendency of the group to serve large geographic areas. Its r e j e c t i o n of the o f f e r to j o i n i n the study necessitated a further set of steps i n the process of t h e o r e t i c a l sampling. Four other agencies were approached, one a f t e r the other. Afte r three additional rejections (each involving reasons s i m i l a r to those defined by the administrator of the f i r s t agency to decline to p a r t i c i p a t e ) , the fourth accepted. However, with each successive r e j e c t i o n i t was necessary to compromise or a l t e r some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n the p o t e n t i a l replacement agency. No i d e n t i c a l replacement agency existed, and as f a i r l y s i m i l a r organizations also refused, those approached became increasingly d i f f e r e n t from the f i r s t . It may be of i n t e r e s t to t h i s study that the agency which eventually replaced the f i r s t i s larger, older, has more stable funding, serves a larger geographic area, i s less r a d i c a l i n nature, has a lower public p r o f i l e , and appears to p l a c e more value i n academic c r e d e n t i a l s than the organization i n i t i a l l y chosen. S t i l l , the replacement agency i s f a i r l y new, and f a i r l y small, r e l a t i v e to the other p a r t i c i p a t i n g organizations, and does bring an otherwise untapped target population to the study. The newer, smaller organizations which were approached v o l u n t a r i l y excluded themselves from t h i s study, perhaps due to the low value placed on the process or product of academic pursuits, and because they are engaged i n a struggle for s u r v i v a l - which leaves l i t t l e time for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a research project. Though new, small, and r e l a t i v e l y r a d i c a l organizations did p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s study, the extreme of that scale i s not represented. For a comparison of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies, see Table I on page 106. In the i n t e r e s t of maintaining the anonymity of participants, a g e n c i e s a r e i d e n t i f i e d b y l a r g e - c a s e l e t t e r . T a b l e I D i v e r s i t y o f A g e n c i e s S a m p l e d AGENCY A B C D E F TOTAL BUDGET ( i n $ , 0 0 0 * 3 ) 3,300 3, 700 120 14,000 1,200 750 SOCIAL SER-V I C E BUDGET ( i n $,000's) 3,300 1,500 120 250 1,200 750 GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION ( i n $,000's) 2,500 481 110 13,640 500 600 GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION (% o f T o t a l ) 76 13 92 97 42 80 PROVINCIAL CONTRIBUTION ( i n $,000•s) 2,000 356 96 13,640 150 126 PROVINCIAL CONTRIBUTION (% o f Total) 61 10 80 97 12 17 PROVINCIAL CONTRIBUTION (% o f G o v ' t ) 80 74 88 100 30 21 MEMBERSHIP 22 4500 100 15 2200 12 POPULATION SERVED g e n -e r a l women v i c t -i ms o f c r i m e d i s -a b l e d a d u l t s g e n -e r a l i m m i -g r a n t s GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERVED V a n -c o u v e r a r e a l o w e r m a i n -l a n d l o w e r m a i n -l a n d a l l o f B.C. E a s t V an-c o u v e r l o w e r m a i n -l a n d YEARS OF OPERATION 61 91 7 35 (5 a s NGO) 16 14 (5 a s NGO) 107 It was expected that the decision to interview one person at each of three functional levels within each agency (policy-making, administration, and d i r e c t service) would be more d i f f i c u l t to operationalize than the decision regarding which agencies to include i n the study. It was known at the time of the i n i t i a l s e l e c t i o n of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies that there are var i a t i o n s i n t h e i r organizational structures. In most, a simple three-tiered system does not e x i s t . D i f f e r e n c e s i n each o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e r e f o r e d i c t a t e differences i n the choice of interview subjects within them. In addition, the method of contacting each selected agency, and the personnel within them, results i n a minor loss of researcher control over the choice of interview subject. I n i t i a l contact i n each agency was made v i a a l e t t e r to the senior administrator - with two exceptions (Agency C and D), which are discussed below. The l e t t e r describes the goals of t h i s study, and requests that the administrator personally p a r t i c i p a t e and i d e n t i f y two other persons (a policy-maker and a d i r e c t - s e r v i c e provider) who might also be w i l l i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e (see Appendix A). Thus i n each agency, the s e l e c t i o n of subjects beyond the person i n i t i a l l y contacted involves some degree of negotiation with the contact person, and could r e s u l t i n the incorporation of that person's bias into the se l e c t i o n of interview subjects. There i s the po t e n t i a l that the recommendations of the contact person regarding who should be interviewed may be 1 0 8 based on what they believe that interview subject w i l l say. There i s only one overt example of t h i s , and contrary to what one might expect, i t s intent was not to guide the researcher toward a subject who might support the opinions of the contact person, or provide a perspective of the agency which might be u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y p o s i t i v e . In Agency A, the senior administrator recommended that a s t a f f person from a s p e c i f i c programme area be interviewed. There was a stated expectation that the opinions of those s t a f f would d i f f e r from those of the senior administrator, and that such a diff e r e n c e may be of interest to t h i s study. Though more covert attempts at guidance may have been commonplace, i n a l l cases the rationale for the s e l e c t i o n of those interviewed has been s a t i s f a c t o r y to the researcher, and any bias i n t h e i r s e l e c t i o n should be a t t r i b u t e d to the researcher, not the i n i t i a l contact person i n each agency. The s i z e of an organization i s a factor i n the choice of interview subjects i n several cases. Three large organizations i n the study (Agencies A, B, and D) have a f i v e - t i e r e d structure. In accordance with the p r i n c i p l e s of t h e o r e t i c a l sampling, the selection, of the functional lev e l s to be included from these organizations i s based on the researcher's perception of the scope of awareness at each l e v e l - those deemed l i k e l y to have some unique perspective to o f f e r to t h i s study have been interviewed. In Agency A and B the f i v e l e v e l s are Board, Executive 109 D i r e c t o r , department or s e r v i c e D i r e c t o r s , programme Coordinators, and l i n e s t a f f . In the case of Agency A, a service Director i s not interviewed, nor i s a l i n e s t a f f member. In addition to a Board member, and the Executive Director, a Coordinator i s selected. Though the plan to sample at three levels i n each organization would seem to dic t a t e that a l i n e s t a f f member be interviewed, the Coordinator i s seen to be a better choice - i n large part because that person's extensive d i r e c t service experience i n the agency makes i t possible that the perspectives of both middle-management and l i n e s t a f f may be covered by one interview. In Agency B a Board member, the Executive Director, a departmental Director, and a Coordinator are interviewed - the l a t t e r r e s u l t i n g from the same circumstance as c i t e d for the inc l u s i o n of the Coordinator i n Agency A. In Agency D the f i v e l e v e l s are Board, Executive Director, Administrator, departmental Directors, and l i n e s t a f f (with some middle-managers i n some departments). Sampling at a l l levels i n Agency D would be a poor decision because the siz e of the organization, and i t s predominantly health-focused mandate, would very l i k e l y preclude the productive p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a Board member i n discussions concerning personal s o c i a l services. The Board members of that organization are responsible f o r two hospitals with a combined budget of almost t h i r t y m i l l i o n d o l l a r s , and the l i k e l i h o o d of them being f a m i l i a r with the impact of 110 p r i v a t i z a t i o n on the Social Services Department (with only four s t a f f ) i n one of those f a c i l i t i e s , seems remote. A s i m i l a r rationale mitigates against the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Exe c u t i v e D i r e c t o r . In a d d i t i o n / the d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the organization places some control over p o l i c y i n the hands of the Administrator (with the senior managers of the f a c i l i t y ) , allowing a single interview to address the issues of both policy-making and administration. Therefore only a l i n e s o c i a l worker, the Director of the Soci a l Services department, and the hospital Administrator are included. This i s the f i r s t of two cases where the i n i t i a l contact l e t t e r was not sent to the senior administrator - i n t h i s case i t was sent to the Director of Soc i a l Services. It was known at the time of i t s selection that Agency C i s operated as a co-operative, and that t h i s would mean that the assumption of h i e r a r c h i c a l order inherent i n the three-t i e r e d model employed i n t h i s study would not apply. However, i t i s apparent that some d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of function e x i s t s within the organization, and that there i s an element of hierarchy i n t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Those sampled i n Agency C are categorized at two functional le v e l s - a combination administrator/line staff/policy-maker (the paid s t a f f ) , and a l i n e staff/administrator (volunteer). This d i v i s i o n i s based on the suggestion from one subject that there i s a type of informal s t r a t i f i c a t i o n within the co-I l l operative. The contact l e t t e r i n t h i s case was addressed to the co-operative. Only Agencies E and F conform to the three-tiered model envisioned i n Chapter Three. In these two organizations, a d i r e c t service provider, administrator, and policy-maker are interviewed. Though the va r i a t i o n s i n the choice of i n t e r v i e w s u b j e c t s between o r g a n i z a t i o n s may appear conceptually awkward, i t i s not r e a l l y a problem. The point of sampling at three levels i s to overcome several of the p i t f a l l s noted i n William Epstein's study - to avoid accepting a singl e perspective of the agency as correct. This, and more, i s accomplished with the modified model. Part of the intent of the design of the study i s to allow comparisons to be made between agencies. This design also allows comparisons to be made between functional l e v e l s . It might appear that the modification of the three-tiered model precludes comparisons - that while comparisons of Board members to Board members (for example) might be legitimate, comparisons of h o s p i t a l Administrators to co-operative members to Board members i s not. To t h i s argument Glaser and Strauss reply: "To be sure, these rules of comparability are important when accurate evidence i s the goal, but they hinder the generation of theory, i n which 'non-comparability' of groups i s i r r e l e v a n t . They prevent the use of a much wider range of groups for developing properties of catagories. Such a range, necessary for the catagories' f u l l e s t possible development, i s achieved by comparing any groups, i r r e s p e c t i v e of differences or s i m i l a r i t i e s , as long as the data apply to a s i m i l a r category or property." 3 Comparisons are v a l i d so long as the categories to which the data apply are consistent. This p r i n c i p l e provides an explanation for much of the development and application of the research instruments - the contact l e t t e r s and the interview guide. C. Data C o l l e c t i o n Catagories of in t e r e s t are c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d i n the contact l e t t e r s , and i n the interview guide (see Appendices A and C). As the c e n t r a l issue of the research i s p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and both the l i t e r a t u r e and the researcher's experience suggest that a v a r i e t y of d e f i n i t i o n s e x i s t f o r the term, Callahan and McNiven's description of the seven p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s undertaken i n the c h i l d welfare f i e l d by the p r o v i n c i a l government are included i n the contact l e t t e r s (see page 10 and 1 1 ) . These l e t t e r s are supplied to a l l interview subjects at the point when t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s sought, and again, during the interview. While i t was assumed, p r i o r to the data c o l l e c t i o n phase, that some sort of common language i n discussing p r i v a t i z a t i o n would be necessary, i t was believed that the i n c l u s i o n of a formal d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n might r e s u l t i n 'closing' the range of discussion of the topic to that d e f i n i t i o n . One goal of the study may be described as determining how voluntary agencies define p r i v a t i z a t i o n -which would make the provision of a d e f i n i t i o n at the outset more a hindrance than a help. Callahan and McNiven's de s c r i p t i o n i s seen to have the advantage of being very broad, of avoiding the sense of f i n a l i t y and i d e o l o g i c a l bias inherent i n some formal d e f i n i t i o n s , and of u t i l i z i n g concrete examples of s o c i a l p o l i c y , and thus enhancing i t s relevance f o r interview s u b j e c t s . 6 The i n c l u s i o n of the seven i n i t i a t i v e s i n the contact l e t t e r s was based p a r t l y on the researcher's perception that i n the f i e l d the term p r i v a t i z a t i o n i s synonymous with contracting. This raised a concern that without such a broad description provided to the interview subjects, discussion may be r e s t r i c t e d to that sub-category of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and the study would devolve into an i n v e s t i g a t i o n into the impact of contracting on voluntary organizations. Though i t can be assumed that the i n c l u s i o n of Callahan and McNiven's des c r i p t i o n of p r i v a t i z a t i o n has some impact on the findings, the nature of i t s e f f e c t i s unclear. Though the majority of interview subjects confine themselves to the parameters of p r i v a t i z a t i o n defined i n the contact l e t t e r s , there are exceptions. The Board member interviewed i n Agency E provides a possible a d d i t i o n a l p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e - the a l t e r a t i o n of regulations c o n t r o l l i n g casinos and l o t t e r i e s i n order to make funds from these sources more accessible to voluntary organizations. Another i s suggested by the Coordinator i n Agency A - the cessation 114 of programme development by the p r o v i n c i a l government. This suggests that, at least f o r some, the provision of the d e s c r i p t i o n does not i n h i b i t independent thinking about the top i c area. The fact that most interview subjects o f f e r t h e i r own d e f i n i t i o n s of p r i v a t i z a t i o n . suggests that the provision of the description may.not have altered the regnant interpretations of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , held by those i n the f i e l d . This subject w i l l be covered i n greater d e t a i l i n Chapters Five and Six. Though the provision of Callahan and McNiven's descr i p t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s may be an imperfect solution to the problem of how to focus the interviews without overly r e s t r i c t i n g them, i t does e l i c i t discussion of areas beyond contracting, and i d e n t i f y to the interview subjects the parameters of the area of i n t e r e s t of the researcher, and that i s i t s primary intent. The interview guide i s designed to gather data on the subjects' perception of the relevance of each of the seven p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s to the agency, and the impact on the agency of each i n i t i a t i v e they i d e n t i f y as relevant. In addition, the instrument includes questions intended to gather information on a v a r i e t y of organizational factors, and the personal values and perceptions of the interview subjects (for reasons stated i n Chapter Three). Pre-testing of the research instrument took place i n two phases, and eventually produced the t h i r d (and f i n a l ) d r a f t of the interview guide (see Appendix C). A variety of 115 problems were i d e n t i f i e d i n the instrument after the f i r s t phase of p r e - t e s t i n g . 7 Several guestions were re-drafted to be more open, or clearer, and one redundant question was dropped. As a r e s u l t of the f i r s t phase of pre-testing, subsequent drafts of the interview guide also include numbers, c l a r i f i e r s , and follow-up 'probes' for each major question, as well as a section of closed questions intended to provide a description of the agency (and u t i l i z e d to d i f f e r e n t i a t e them i n Table I ) , and the interview subject. 8 Following the second phase of pre-testing, a variety of minor a l t e r a t i o n s were made to the open and closed questions, several new probes were included, and i t was decided to i n i t i a t e each interview with a b r i e f description of the study and the interview, and a r e i t e r a t i o n of the subject's control over the process. 9 The t h i r d draft of the interview guide includes s i x major open-ended questions, with a c l a r i f i e r and one or more probes following each of those six questions. This format follows what Patton (1980) terms a 'standardized open-ended i n t e r v i e w ' . 1 0 . The strengths of such an instrument are d e s c r i b e d by Patton as c o m p a r a b i l i t y of responses, f a c i l i t a t i o n of organization and analysis of the data, and the documentation of the instrument, which can then be evaluated. The weaknesses of the instrument are i t s lack of f l e x i b i l i t y and the limited 'naturalness' of the questions, r e s u l t i n g from the standardized wording of questions. These weaknesses were immediately evident when the t h i r d d r a f t of the interview guide was put to u s e . 1 1 Therefore from the beginning of the f i r s t interview, and i n a l l subsequent interviews, the instrument was used more as a reference, with questions put to subjects c l o s e l y approximating (but not p r e c i s e l y duplicating) those d e t a i l e d i n the guide. This format more cl o s e l y approximates what Patton describes as the 'interview guide approach' - again, with some v a r i a t i o n . In a l l but two interviews, the researcher retained the sequence of questions as they appear i n the t h i r d draft of the interview guide. In most cases the t r a n s i t i o n between questions i s quite natural - i n fact, i n many cases the response of subjects to one question lead l o g i c a l l y to the next, making the provision of the next question i n the sequence appear unforced, even conversational. In the two interviews i n which the sequence i s changed, th i s involves a simple reversal of the order of two major questions: that r e l a t i n g to organizational change, and that r e l a t i n g to the inter-organizational f i e l d . This was done because the r e s p o n d e n t ' s answer t o the p r e v i o u s q u e s t i o n (on organizational structure) lead naturally to the l a t t e r t o p i c , instead of the former. A f i n a l v a r i a t i o n on the interview guide approach i s the i n c l u s i o n of a few t o t a l l y unplanned probes i n several interviews. Again, these arose n a t u r a l l y , and i n a l l cases i n response to some unexpected reply of the interview subject. For example, the suggestion by the administrator of Agency A that a three-hundred percent increase i n the organization's budget since 1981 could not be e n t i r e l y a ttributed to p r i v a t i z a t i o n (since the agency would have expanded anyway) provoked the probe, "How would you have expanded your budget without p r i v a t i z a t i o n ? " Such exchanges are t y p i c a l of the l e a s t structured type of interview format described by Patton; the informal conversational interview. The advantage of t h i s format i s that questions are more r e l e v a n t , and b e t t e r matched t o i n d i v i d u a l s and circumstances, though i t can re s u l t i n problems r e l a t i n g to the d i s p a r i t y of data. In short, though the research instrument designed f o r the study (and provided i n Appendix C) indicates considerable structure, the type of interview a c t u a l l y i n use i s a hybrid of three d i f f e r i n g types, and i s less r i g i d l y structured. Though the creation of t h i s hybrid may r a i s e some minor problems related to comparability, i t has the advantage of enhancing the richness and complexity of the data. Comparability i s assumed to be adequately retained by the consistent use of questions from the t h i r d d r a f t of the interview guide (despite some v a r i a t i o n i n the wording and s e q u e n c i n g of those q u e s t i o n s ) , and by c o n s i s t e n t categorization of the data gathered through those questions i n the analytic phase of the s t u d y . 1 2 118 ; D. Data Analysis It was assumed p r i o r to the s t a r t of the process of data analysis that comparisons of data grouped by question would reguire too many catagories of analysis (since the interview guide contains twenty questions), would be inconsistent between subjects (since some were asked 'spur-of-the-moment' probes which were not addressed to others), and would be of questionable t h e o r e t i c a l value. The point of grouping codes i s to apply a framework i n order to make sense of the data and thus generate theory. Therefore, grouping data and codes according to the questions i n the t h i r d d r a f t of the interview guide would be tantamount to saying that the theory i s inherent i n the questions - which would make the data redundant. The plan (as described i n Chapter Three) i s to analyze the data by coding i t , and grouping those codes into c a t e g o r i e s d e f i n i n g the changes taking place i n the organization. Even before analysis was begun i t was known that those categories would have to be consistent between a l l p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies (to f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r comparison), and i d e n t i f y i n g the nature of them would have to await an examination of the data. It was immediately apparent during the interviews (and evident during coding and memoing) that the information provided by the interview subjects describes a complex in t e r a c t i v e process between a va r i e t y of facets of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , f a c t o r s inherent i n the decision-making 119 process of i t s personnel, and the e f f e c t on the agency of e x t e r n a l v a r i a b l e s ( i n c l u d i n g p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s ) . Complex issues necessitate complex codes. Glaser describes codes generated f o r an intensive care uni t i n a hospital as 'social l o s s ' , and ' a t t e n t i o n ' . 1 3 It i s assumed that, to avoid being c r y p t i c , these would necessarily be accompanied by complex and exacting memos. In t h i s study the researcher has chosen to be more graphic i n his coding, and thus longer, more complex, and more numerous codes are generated. Examples are, "Competition for e x i s t i n g funding i n c r e a s i n g " , "The agency's presentation of i t s e l f as i n t e r e s t e d i n c o n t r a c t i n g re s u l t e d i n a response by government", and "Perception that universal access obviates most delivery by government." I t could be argued that what has been generated out of the data i n t h i s study are riot t e c h n i c a l l y what Glaser and Strauss (1967) would describe as codes at a l l . What has been generated here might better be described as simple summarizing phrases - though f o r the purpose of t h i s study the term, 'code' w i l l continue to be used. See Appendix E for an example of how these codes have been drawn from the data provided by the interviews, and Appendix H for a complete l i s t of the codes generated i n t h i s study. This divergence from the l i t e r a t u r e on q u a l i t a t i v e methodology should not cause concern. As Strauss (1987) notes, the methods described i n the l i t e r a t u r e should be 120 considered rules of thumb, not r u l e s . 1 4 In addition, i t i s evident that although the exact method of coding used i n t h i s study may d i f f e r from what i s i n the l i t e r a t u r e , i t i s evident that i t f u l f i l l s the same function. Strauss indicates that coding: " . . . ( 1 ) both follows upon and leads to generative questions; (2) fractures the data, thus f r e e i n g the r e s e a r c h e r from d e s c r i p t i o n s and f o r c i n g interpretation to higher l e v e l s of abstraction; (3) i s the p i v o t a l operation f o r moving toward the discovery of a core category or catagories; and so (4) moves toward ultimate integration of the e n t i r e analysis; as well as (5) y i e l d s the desired conceptual density ( i e . relationships among the codes and the development of each)." 1J> In t o t a l , the seventeen interviews i n t h i s study generate 1207 codes, although t h i s figure may be misleading i n terms of the d i v e r s i t y t h i s represents. As one goal of the study i s a comparison of the perspectives of d i f f e r i n g functional l e v e l s , as well as d i f f e r i n g agencies, the researcher has chosen to code some si m i l a r responses twice, i f they are offered by two d i f f e r e n t interview subjects-thus f a c i l i t a t i n g tracking of agreement between subjects when i t occurs. In the maelstrom of issues, opinions, and experiences offered i n the data, the most clear pattern i s temporal. It i s apparent that respondents are describing the way things were, the problems encountered and resolved during the period immediately following the 'Restraint' budget of July, 1983, and the way things are now. Memos written during f i r s t - o r d e r coding helped to b u i l d a model defining these three phases, and within which the vast majority of the data could be e a s i l y categorized. The f i r s t stage i n the model covers a long period p r i o r to July 1983, i n which the history, t r a d i t i o n s , and ' c u l t u r e ' of the agency (the pre-p r i v a t i z a t i o n status quo outside the agency, and the fundamental values of the interview subjects) are described. Based on impressions the researcher picked up during the interviews, t h i s phase i s t i t l e d 'Order' - r e f l e c t i n g the sense of nostalgia, and preference for the s t a b i l i t y of t h i s period that lay within the descriptions. The second stage covers the period between July 1983 and a rather vague point at which the sense of disorder following the 'Restraint' budget began to d i s s i p a t e . This period i s accordingly t i t l e d 'Chaos'. Though i t s beginning i s clear, i n many cases i t s end i s not - but those codes which r e f l e c t present disorder, even i f that disorder seems to extend d i r e c t l y from July 1983, are not categorized as a part of 'Chaos', but are grouped within the t h i r d phase: 'New Order'. The t h i r d phase i s intended to represent the present status quo, whether or not s t a b i l i t y has returned. The second and t h i r d phases of the model c o n t a i n the interview subjects' perceptions of the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on t h e i r agency, descriptions of the agency's response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n , the opinion of the subjects regarding the effectiveness of that response, and t h e i r r ationale f o r that opinion . It seems apparent from the data that whatever new order exists i s 122 somewhat tenuous, and yet the interview subjects have to varying degrees come to terms with p r i v a t i z a t i o n - they f e e l they now understand i t s properties. It seems possible that i n order to cope with chaos, we must form a theory about i t , however incomplete, subjective, or tentative that theory might be. The t h i r d phase, New Order, contains the interview subjects' theories about p r i v a t i z a t i o n . However, in most cases these theories are merely i m p l i c i t , and both the factors which have lead to the development of the theory and the implications of the theory for each agency ( i f the theory i s used as an operating guide for the actions of that interview subject, i n t h e i r role) are undefined. Providing further d e f i n i t i o n i s one function of the second paradigm i n use i n the a n a l y t i c process - the dimensional model. Seven topic categories which could be treated extra-temporally, and which include factors describing the e f f e c t s of, and response to, p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n a l l agencies sampled (as well as the perspectives, opinions, and r a t i o n a l e of the various interview subjects), repeatedly arose during the interview and coding process. These catagories are the mission and values of the agency, the r o l e and values of the interview subject and other i n d i v i d u a l s (and small groups, such as the s t a f f of a c e r t a i n programme, or a committee of the Board) i n the organization, the agency's f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , the agency's s e r v i c e s , the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 123 structure of the agency, the organization's r e l a t i o n s h i p to other agencies i n the private sector, and the organization's r e l a t i o n s h i p to the public sector (including bureaucrats and p o l i t i c i a n s , and the government as a service-provider and funder). The codes are categorized according to these seven d i m e n s i o n s , and a c c o r d i n g to the three stages of p r i v a t i z a t i o n , making the context of each organization, and changes i n that context, more comprehensible. In addition, t h i s model f a c i l i t a t e s the comparison of those contexts and changes between agencies, and the comparison of the opinions of i n d i v i d u a l interview subjects (given that the source of each code, as agency and interview subject, i s retained throughout the a n a l y t i c process). For a graphic example of how the codes are broken down by subject, agency, dimension, and stage, see Table III i n Appendix F. Capturing the process of the development of the issues and opinions i s accomplished through use of the Basic Social Processes (B.S.P.) model of analysis (applied here as the three phases described i n the data). Identifying and elaborating upon the various factors involved i n those issues and opinions i s accomplished through use of the dimensional model (the seven topic categories drawn from the data). The two steps allow the complexity of the issues under study to be retained, while also placing the information drawn from the data i n a pattern that makes i t more comprehensible. Both are described as paradigms of theore t i c a l coding by Barney Glaser (1978), and though i t i s not suggested that they be used together, neither i s i t stated that they should not b e . 1 6 While t h i s a n a l y t i c model allows us to i d e n t i f y , track changes i n , and compare (between both subjects and agencies) the issues of i n t e r e s t to t h i s study, i t alone cannot generate a theory of the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n on voluntary organizations which provide personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver. To do so requires a further, integrating process - the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the data toward the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a core category. According to Strauss, a core category defines: "Which dimensions, d i s t i n c t i o n s , c a t e g o r i e s , linkages are 'most important,' most s a l i e n t -which, i n short, are the core of the evolving theory..." x 7 This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n does not take place following the coding and categorization of the data, but during those processes, and they are as much affected by a search for a core category as the search for a core category i s affected by them. Throughout t h i s thesis i t has been suggested that a var i e t y of issues, and the relationships between them, are relevant to t h i s study, and may have some implications for the theory which i t may generate. It i s argued that what happens to an agency as a r e s u l t of p r o v i n c i a l p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e s involves the development of a vari e t y of factors over time (the stages and dimensions i n the anal y t i c model), and i s to some degree Within the power of the agency to control (and d i f f e r s according to d i f f e r i n g i n i t i a t i v e s ) , that such control i s exercised by individuals or small groups i n each agency ( i n accordance with the in t e r n a l structure of the organization which imbues those individuals or small groups with that con t r o l ) , and that those individuals or small groups exercise such control on the basis of some subjective r a t i o n a l e . It follows that the core category of i n t e r e s t to t h i s study i s the rationale (used by those i n key decision-making positions i n voluntary organizations) f o r the agency's response to p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n those areas of e f f e c t over which the agency can exercise some d i s c r e t i o n . It i s assumed that t h e i r r a t i o n a l e i s based on t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the goals of the p r o v i n c i a l government i n pursuing p r i v a t i z a t i o n , and that t h e i r interpretation has evolved according to t h e i r experience of the p r i v a t i z a t i o n process. Thus, as the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the government's motive f o r p r i v a t i z a t i o n held by the interview subjects may in t e r a c t with each i d e n t i f i e d dimension of interest, and changes i n that dimension over time, that interpretation i s deemed to be the core category. The next chapter w i l l present the six case studies which have been created through the use of the methods described i n t h i s chapter. Chapter Six w i l l compare and analyze those case studies. However, before presenting the findings of t h i s study, two additional, and related, issues must be addressed - how the data has been v e r i f i e d , and how the 126 anonymity of the participants has been maintained. E. E t h i c a l Issues That t h i s thesis w i l l not i d e n t i f y by name either the in d i v i d u a l interview subjects or the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies i s a promise that was made to participants p r i o r to each interview, and which has been kept (see the Interview Consent Form i n Appendix B). Unfortunately, t h i s promise f a l l s short of a guarantee of anonymity, or ensuring that a l l information remains c o n f i d e n t i a l . Several problems make such a guarantee impossible. The majority of the interview'subjects have been referred to the researcher by the senior administrator i n t h e i r organization - meaning that at least one other person knows of t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n (for a description of the process of contacting interview subjects see page 107 through 111). It i s l i k e l y that any person i n a given agency who i s aware t h a t t h i s r e s e a rch has taken place i n t h e i r organization w i l l be able to i d e n t i f y from the description of the positions of those interviewed, the i d e n t i t y of the pa r t i c i p a n t s . It i s even possible that a person who i s f a m i l i a r with the service network i n Vancouver might be able to i d e n t i f y some of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies (and hence some of the interview subjects) simply by the descriptions of them that are provided. To thwart t h i s the researcher might have avoided describing the agencies involved i n t h i s study, except that t h i s would defeat an important goal of t h i s 127 study, to put the impact of p r i v a t i z a t i o n into context, and would mean that the findings would have to be presented i n a vacuum. Instead, an alt e r n a t i v e solution has been found. The 1207 codes generated by the data were divided according to the interview subject which i s t h e i r source. A follow-up l e t t e r to a l l part i c i p a n t s was then sent out - each l e t t e r containing the codes generated from that source (see Appendix A) . The interview subjects were asked to check t h e i r codes for accuracy, to indicate which codes, i f any, they f e l t would compromise them or t h e i r agency, and to provide that information to the researcher. As the findings are based upon these codes, i t follows that i f they are both accurate and deemed by the subjects not to compromise them, then the presentation of the findings i s e t h i c a l l y sound. As a r e s u l t of t h i s t a c t i c , a minority of interview subjects have requested changes be made to t h e i r codes. Less than a dozen codes have been alt e r e d i n the interest of eithe r accuracy, or maintaining the anonymity or confidences of par t i c i p a n t s . Most changes are minor, though several codes were very badly written, and the misinterpretations which might have occurred i f they had not been re-written might have had guite serious consequences. To summarize, remaining open to what i s a c t u a l l y happening i n the f i e l d has necessitated a process of problem solving , the constant intent of which has been to r e t a i n the complexity of the issues to be researched, and yet to 128 organize those issues i n a manner that w i l l enhance our understanding of them. That the nature of the issues under study i s complex i s self-evident. The methods chosen for data c o l l e c t i o n have been an attempt to r e t a i n the complex nature of the f i e l d , and the concerns of those i n the f i e l d through the i n c l u s i o n of diverse agencies, sampling- at various functional l e v e l s within those agencies, and the use of an interview format that combines the advantages of structure with a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y . The methods chosen for data analysis have been directed toward r e t a i n i n g the complexity of the data while placing i t i n a framework that w i l l f a c i l i t a t e our making interpretations from i t . Notes to Chapter Four 1. Glaser, B.G., Theoretical S e n s i t i v i t y . University of C a l i f o r n i a , San Francisco, 1978, p. 3. 2. Strauss, A.L., Qualitative Analysis for Social S c i e n t i s t s , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 10. 3. Strauss, A.L., 1987, p. 283. 4. Glaser, B.G., and Strauss, A.L., The Discovery of Grounded  Theory, Aldine Publishing, Chicago, 1967, p. 45. 5. Glaser, B.G., and Strauss, A.L., 1967, p. 51. 6. note the range of bias and the sense of immutability of the following d e f i n i t i o n s of p r i v a t i z a t i o n : "...an administrative approach to the conduct of public business...a theory of p o l i t i c a l economy and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of government." C a r r o l l , J.D., "Public Administration i n the Third Century of the Constitution: Supply-Side Management, P r i v a t i z a t i o n or Public Investment.", i n Public Administration Review, Vol. 129 47, No. 1, January-February, 1987, p. 108. "...an exercise i n symbolism, i t signals the government's intention to respond to the challenges of change by strengthening the market at the expense of the state." Kierans, T.E., " P r i v a t i z a t i o n , or Strengthening the Market at the Expense of the State", i n Papers on P r i v a t i z a t i o n , W.T. Stanbury and T.E. Kierans, ed., The Ins t i t u t e for Research on Public Policy, Montreal, 1985, p. x v i i i . "...the action of making something private, or giving control of something to the private sector of the economy which has been controlled i n the public sector." Walker, M., "Introduction", i n P r i v a t i z a t i o n Theory and  Practice, T.M. Ohashi and T.P. Roth, ed., The Fraser I n s t i t u t e , Vancouver, 1980, p. x v i i . 7. The f i r s t phase of pre-testing involved two subjects (one a s t a f f member, the other a Board member of a voluntary organization - both of whom were previously known by the researcher), and took place on January 11th and 12th, 1989. These problems were i d e n t i f i e d : * a lack of consistency i n responding to requests for c l a r i f i c a t i o n of questions, * two questions proved to be closed - i n both pretests subjects r e p l i e d with a simple "yes" or "no", despite the interviewer's intent to e l i c i t a more expansive response, * a lack of guidelines for follow-up questions (or 'probes') i n the event that the response to an open question by the interviewer f a i l s to include an issue deemed to be of s i g n i f i c a n t interest, * several questions were unclear as written, * one question was redundant, * the lack of i d e n t i f y i n g numbers f o r each question made i t d i f f i c u l t f or the interviewer to reconstruct the interview from his notes, or associate data with s p e c i f i c questions. 8. The section of closed questions on the organization i s intended to document, and therefore be better able to demonstrate, that the organizations chosen are a l i k e i n that they are non-profit agencies providing personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver, but diverse i n terms of size, years of 130 operation, community served, and primary funding source. Demonstrating that the agencies sampled are diverse i s considered essential to the proposition that the theory generated by t h i s study may apply to a l l voluntary organizations which provide personal s o c i a l services i n Vancouver, and should be tested for i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to that population. As previously stated, control of who i s interviewed may l i e outside of the researcher, and i t was perceived as possible, at the time that the interview guide was drafted, that while the agencies chosen may vary greatly, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of those interviewed might not. For example, i f a subgroup such as administrators share a v a r i e t y of perceptions and values, one might ask i f i t i s because such are the common perceptions of administrators of voluntary agencies, or i s i t because they a l l happened to be Caucasians between, the age of 35 and 55 - or both? The closed questions on the subjects are intended to address t h i s issue. 9. A second pair of pretest interviews, u t i l i z i n g the second dra f t of the interview guide, were conducted on Jan. 25, 1989. The subjects were, once again, both previously known by the interviewer. One subject i s a s t a f f member of a large v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n almost e n t i r e l y funded by the p r o v i n c i a l government, while the other i s a Board member of the same small organization with which the previous two pretest subjects had been associated. The process of improving the research instrument was also enhanced by the comments of the thesis committee. The r e s u l t i n g changes to the t h i r d draft of the interview guide (see Appendix C) are: * A minor a l t e r a t i o n of the wording of one question i n Part 1 (the closed questions), and the addition of a question i n that section to determine how long the subject had been i n t h e i r present position (since some subjects may have had a va r i e t y of positions i n the organization), * The a l t e r a t i o n of questions 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, and the addition of a further question (2.1.5) to allow subjects more f l e x i b i l i t y i n describing t h e i r values and those of the agency, and s t i l l address the issue of the p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of the agency, * The a l t e r a t i o n of c l a r i f i e r 2.2.2 to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the concepts of power, authority and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - thus allowing the subject to address issues of power more broadly, * The a l t e r a t i o n of question 2.4.1 to include relationships between agencies, programs or personnel, (as opposed to between organizations i n the second d r a f t ) , since one pretest 131 subject had indicated that some problems possibly associated with p r i v a t i z a t i o n are, i n f a c t , more a r e s u l t of the p e r s o n a l weaknesses of c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s i n the organization. It may be possible that i n d i v i d u a l s are blamed for problems which might a c t u a l l y r e s u l t from p r i v a t i z a t i o n -t h i s re-wording i s intended to r a i s e these 'personal' issues i f they e x i s t , * The i n c l u s i o n of a probe (2.5.3) to determine whether any other government p o l i c i e s ( i n addition to, or instead of, those l i s t e d by Callahan and McNiven) might be having some s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the organization. In one of the pretest interviews, one subject i n i t i a l l y indicated that none of the p o l i c i e s d e s c r i b e d had any relevance to the o r g a n i z a t i o n - though t h i s assertion was subsequently reversed, Based on a degree of confusion expressed by one subject i n the second phase of pre-testing, an additional change i n the interview format was made. It was decided to begin each interview with a b r i e f outline of what w i l l be asked of the subject, who the information i s f o r , how i t w i l l be handled (stressing c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ) , and the purpose of c o l l e c t i n g the information. In addition, each agency sampled w i l l be offered a copy of the f i n a l d r a f t of the thesis - hopefully a f a i r exchange for the time and e f f o r t contributed by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . 10. Patton, M.Q., Q u a l i t a t i v e Evaluation Methods, Sage, Beverly H i l l s , 1980, p. 206. 11. The.data u t i l i z e d i n t h i s study was c o l l e c t e d through a series of seventeen interviews conducted between Jan. 27, and May 4, 1989. 12. Aside from the minor variati o n s previously noted, there i s only one s i g n i f i c a n t deviation from the pattern above. In Agency C, the co-operative, only one interview was conducted - with three interview subjects present. This i s the chosen means of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of that organization, and makes sense within the context of the c o l l e c t i v i s t values which drive i t . Unfortunately, with three persons responding to each question, i t was apparent to the researcher that the interview would run over the time available, and the i t was therefore decided to 'skip' a major question area - that r e l a t i n g to organizational change (2.3 i n the t h i r d d r a f t of the interview guide). The suggestion that we meet again to complete the interview was rejected - l o g i s t i c a l l y the f i r s t (and only) interview with these subjects had been d i f f i c u l t to arrange, and therefore no second interview was scheduled. This might be seen to seriously compromise the study i f i t i s assumed that the process of data analysis involves 132 comparisons of responses to s p e c i f i c questions between respondents. This would create a 'gap' i n Agency C, since no data i s ava i l a b l e for comparison of the answer of that question between agencies. However, as the next section of t h i s chapter s h a l l demonstrate, the an a l y t i c process t h i s study u t i l i z e s serves to reduce any negative e f f e c t of dropping one major question area from the analysis of data from one agency. There i s no question that the responses to the missing question from those interviewed i n Agency C would contribute to the study, but t h e i r absence i s not a serious threat to the f e a s i b i l i t y of generating theory from the data. 13. Glaser, B.G., 1978, p. 55. 14. Strauss, A.L., 1987, p. 7. 15. i b i d . , pp. 55-56. 16. Glaser, B.G., 1978, p. 74-75. 17. Strauss, A.L., 1987, p. 18. 133 CHAPTER FIVE  SIX CASE STUDIES The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to present the six case studies. which have been developed through the use of the methods described i n Chapter Four. The issues addressed i n each study cover the seven topic areas i d e n t i f i e d i n the data (arrived at through use of the dimensional analytic model). The d e s c r i p t i o n of the development of those issues, and attempts to address them, cover the three, phases i d e n t i f i e d i n the data (arrived at through use of the B.S.P. analytic model). In addition, each case study w i l l include a presentation of the unique concerns and opinions expressed by each interview subject i n that agency. In the following chapter the case studies w i l l be compared - s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences i n the experiences, actions, and perspectives of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g organizations and interview subjects w i l l be described and discussed, and the implications of these findings f o r the potential population of t h i s study w i l l be presented. A. Expansion Through Contracting; Agency A (1) Background Founded before the Depression, t h i s organization has a r i c h h i s t o r y of proactive community leadership i n meeting the needs of individuals and families i n Vancouver. It i s perceived by both those within the agency, and the service 134 network around i t , as a mainstream, 'establishment' organization. It i s committed to the p r i n c i p l e that families are the basic unit of society, and therefore that better-functioning f a m i l i e s w i l l mean a healthier society. In order to help families function better i t has, throughout i t s h i s t o r y , s t r e s s e d professionalism i n service d e l i v e r y . Professionalism i s defined as the application, by s t a f f , of the s k i l l s , knowledge, and values acquired through ed