NOT-FOR-PROFIT AGENCIES AND PRIVATIZATION

By

GREG ELDON TERPENNING

B.S.W., The University of British Columbia, 1988

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK

We accept this thesis as conforming

to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

June 1989

© Greg Eldon Terpenning, 1989
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Social Work

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date June 28, 1989
ABSTRACT

This study examines the impact of provincial government privatization initiatives on voluntary organizations that provide personal social services in Vancouver. A variety of key personnel in each of six very diverse agencies are interviewed, and the data from these interviews is then qualitatively analyzed. The data suggests that: (1) organizations which are perceived to voluntarily alter their mission in response to privatization experience internal division, (2) dependence on contracting can pose a threat to the fundamental operating principles of an organization if those principles do not conform to a bureaucratic ideal, (3) there is a wide range of opinion within the voluntary sector regarding the motives of the provincial government for pursuing privatization, that these opinions have both a descriptive and a prescriptive function, and therefore relate to differences in the response of individual agencies to privatization, (4) that contracting alone is not an effective means for an agency to meet the additional demands that result from the reduction and elimination of public services, (5) that competition has generally increased throughout the voluntary sector as a result of privatization, (6) that privatization has resulted in gaps in service which it has become the de facto responsibility of the voluntary sector to address, and (7) that the decision-making structure of an organization is the most constant determining factor in
regard to which opinion of government motivation will guide an agency's response to privatization. Concerns raised by professional associations and researchers in the field of social work regarding the potential negative implications of privatization for voluntary organizations are partially supported by this study. A theory of the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations is generated from the data.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.................................................................page ii
List of Tables............................................................ ix
Acknowledgement.......................................................... x

## CHAPTER ONE

PRIVATIZATION: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

A. Introduction.......................................................... 1
B. A New Game: Changing the Pattern of History.............. 6
C. New Rules: Changing Ideology................................. 16
D. Playing the New Game............................................. 22
   Notes to Chapter One............................................. 26

## CHAPTER TWO

PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICS: BEYOND THE RULE BOOK

A. Schisms Between Policy and Ideology.................... 41
B. Five Different Ways to Play the Privatization Game........ 48
   (1) The Neoconservatism Theory....................... 49
   (2) The Populism Theory............................... 50
   (3) The Popularity Theory............................. 58
   (4) The Paternalism Theory......................... 67
   (5) The Patronage Theory............................ 70
   Notes to Chapter Two.................................. 74

## CHAPTER THREE

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATIZATION:
   THE ISSUES TO BE RESEARCHED

A. The Purpose of the Research................................. 79
B. The Case Studies...........................................page 83
C. Comparing the Case Studies.............................. 88
D. Generalizing from the Findings.......................... 92
   Notes to Chapter Three................................. 97

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESEARCH DESIGN: A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS
A. The Rationale for Qualitative Methodology............ 99
B. The Selection of Interview Subjects.................... 102
C. Data Collection........................................... 112
D. Data Analysis............................................. 118
E. Ethical Issues............................................ 126
   Notes to Chapter Four................................. 128

CHAPTER FIVE

SIX CASE STUDIES
A. Expansion Through Contracting: Agency A............. 133
   (1) Background............................................ 133
   (2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response..... 136
   (3) The Rationale for the Response.................... 144
B. Maintaining Independence: Agency B.................... 148
   (1) Background............................................ 148
   (2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response... 151
   (3) The Rationale for the Response.................... 156
C. Resisting Compromise: Agency C......................... 158
   (1) Background............................................ 158
   (2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response... 159
   (3) The Rationale for the Response.................... 164
D. Privatization as Liberation: Agency D..............page 166
(1) Background.............................................. 166
(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response.. 167
(3) The Rationale for the Response............... 174
E. The Best Defense... Agency E......................... 177
(1) Background.............................................. 177
(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response.. 181
(3) The Rationale for the Response............... 185
F. The Phoenix: Agency F................................. 188
(1) Background.............................................. 188
(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response.. 189
(3) The Rationale for the Response............... 196
Notes to Chapter Five.................................... 197

CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS
A. Seven Dimensions of Change......................... 201
(1) The Organization's Mission and Values........... 201
(2) The Organization - Public Sector Relationship 204
(3) The Role and values of Individuals.............. 206
(4) The Financial Resources of the Agency.......... 214
(5) Inter-organizational Relations.................... 216
(6) The Agency's Service to Clients.................. 219
(7) Organizational Structure......................... 222
B. Comparison of Findings to Concerns Raised in the Literature................................. 226
C. A Theory of the Impact of Privatization on Voluntary Organizations that Provide Personal Social Services in Vancouver..............page 231
D. Conclusion................................................. 236
Notes to Chapter Six........................... 241

BIBLIOGRAPHY

................................................................. 243

APPENDIX

A. Correspondence................................. 256
(1) Contact Letter to Senior Administrators...... 256
(2) Contact Letter to Line Staff and Policy-makers.............................. 259
(3) Follow-up Letter to All Interview Subjects... 261
B. Interview Consent Form......................... 265
C. Interview Guide................................. 266
(1) First Draft of the Interview Guide............. 266
(2) Final Draft of the Interview Guide............. 267
D. Ethics Forms........................................ 272
E. Data Coding Example............................ 280
F. Sorting Matrix Indicating Numbers of Summary Codes by Agency, Interview Subject, B.S.P. Code, and Dimension................................. 286
G. List of Codes Indicating Operating Theory of Privatization Held by Interview Subjects......... 288
(1) Agency A.............................................. 289
(2) Agency B.............................................. 292
(3) Agency C.................................page 295
(4) Agency D................................. 298
(5) Agency E................................. 300
(6) Agency F................................. 302

H. List of Summary Codes by Agency, Interview Subject, and Major Question Area, Indicating B.S.P. Code, Dimension, and Theory of Privatization.............................. 305
(1) Agency A................................. 306
(2) Agency B................................. 322
(3) Agency C................................. 335
(4) Agency D................................. 342
(5) Agency E................................. 351
(6) Agency F................................. 363
LIST OF TABLES

Table I
Diversity of Agencies Sampled........................................page 106

Table II
Subjects' Operating Theories of Privatization.............. 211

Table III
Sorting Matrix for Codes............................................. 287
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my thanks to the nineteen people who were interviewed for this study, and to Christiane McNiven and John Crane. Without their contribution of time and insight, the creation of this thesis would have been impossible. I would also like to thank Debbie Erickson for consistently being patient, supportive, and understanding throughout the long and sometimes painful process of constructing this work, and Kendra - for reminding me that none of this is really so important that it couldn't wait until after a game of hide-and-seek.
CHAPTER ONE

PRIVATIZATION: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

A. Introduction

On July 27, 1983, I spent the first hour at the office reading the morning newspaper. I was not loafing - I was attempting to divine my own future, that of the agency which employed me, and the future of its clients. Judging from my observations of my boss and co-workers at the time, and discussions with other non-government social workers since then, I was not alone. All over Vancouver, perhaps all over the province, the staff, management, and volunteers of not-for-profit social service agencies were peering into their various crystal balls, attempting to conjure from the facts and opinions presented there a vision of the new reality the headlines proclaimed. They were hoping to find some pattern that would allow them to predict how the news would affect them, and what they should do about it.

The news was that the government had altered, through a reduction in fiscal spending and a policy called 'privatization', the rules of the social services game. On July 26, 1983, Grace McCarthy, then Minister of Human Resources (since retitled the Ministry of Social Services and Housing, or M.S.S.H.) announced cuts to her ministry totalling $16 million, and the elimination or transfer to the private sector of a wide variety of programmes.¹ The largely unwritten, and sometimes bewildering, rules which had
governed the partnership of the public and private sector, and their respective roles in the provision of services to address social problems, no longer applied. Discerning the new rules of the game required an understanding of what the government was doing, and why. It is likely that others were equally interested, since they had an equal, or even greater, stake in the game. However, the impact of the news on government employees, the users of social services, and many other groups in society, will only be of secondary interest to this thesis. To give all those affected their due attention would require a far more comprehensive study than has been possible here, given the constraints of time and resources.

In the six years since the Social Credit government brought down its 'Restraint' budget the process of interpreting what the government is doing has continued, but a clear pattern in their policies, and therefore understanding of them by those who are affected by them, has proved elusive. The purpose of this thesis is to describe the effect of provincial government privatization initiatives on voluntary organizations which provide personal social services in Vancouver, to define the factors involved in producing that effect, and to generate a theory explaining the choices made by those organizations regarding such policies. The experiences of key personnel from a variety of not-for-profit agencies, and their perspectives of government
policy, will be described and compared. It is hoped that this study will contribute to an understanding of the impact of privatization on the social services field generally, and on not-for-profit organizations specifically, and will be of use to such organizations in assessing the course of action they have taken in response to government privatization policies, and in determining what course of action they might take next.

This work is comprised of six chapters. This chapter draws upon existing literature to provide a basic understanding of privatization as it relates to the social services field, and voluntary organizations. It is found that conventional wisdom defines privatization as a means for governments committed to neoconservative ideology to achieve their economic and social goals. This is considered important because such an assumption has both a descriptive and a prescriptive function - it suggests that key decision-making personnel in voluntary organizations can predict the next logical step in government policy, and how it will affect their agency. The second chapter examines the provincial government's motives for privatization. An analysis of a wide range of existing information on the economic and social policies of the Social Credit government brings into question the assumption that ideology is their primary concern in policy formation. Four additional perspectives of the provincial government's motives are
suggested. Chapter Three utilizes the information and analyses provided in the first two chapters to identify the questions of concern to this study. Does the experience of personnel in voluntary organizations that provide personal social services in Vancouver support the concerns expressed in the literature regarding the varied negative implications of privatization for those agencies? To what degree have those personnel recognized and exercised control over the impact of privatization on their organization, and what factors have influenced the actions taken by those personnel in guiding the response of those agencies to provincial privatization initiatives? The fourth chapter details the methods chosen for answering those questions. Throughout the design, collection, and analysis stages of this study, the problem has been to retain the complexity of data drawn from a variety of individuals in a range of voluntary organizations, and which describe a spectrum of personal and organizational factors in relation to provincial policy, while also structuring the research in order to allow comparisons to be made between individual subjects, and agencies, and their experience of the process of privatization. Chapter Five presents the findings of the research as six case studies. The last chapter provides an analysis and comparison of the findings, relates them to the issues raised in the first two chapters of this thesis, and offers a theory regarding the impact of privatization on
voluntary organizations. That theory inter-relates choices made by the agencies studied in areas where discretion has been possible, certain variables within those organizations, and the perceptions of the government's motivation for privatization held by their key personnel.

Terms that will be in common use in this thesis differ in meaning between contexts and authors, and it is therefore necessary to supply the definitions which will apply here. Le Grand and Robinson (1985) define privatization as the reduction or elimination of state provision, subsidy, or regulation of service, and by logical extension, the introduction of the market, another form of state activity, or voluntary activity, as a replacement for the service in whole (if the service was eliminated), or in part (if the service was reduced). The voluntary sector includes both, "...organized forms of social endeavour carried out by non-profit societies...", and informal systems of helping and sharing between relatives and friends (Rekart, 1987). The private sector includes both the voluntary sector and commercial or proprietary entities; individuals or companies whose purpose is to reap profits (the market). The private sector is distinguished from the public (state or government) sector, which is composed of statutory organizations. Social services are defined by the Joint Committee of the Social Planning and Research Council of B.C., and the United Way of the Lower Mainland (1980), as:
"...the range of programs undertaken to meet the needs of individuals, families, and communities, including education, health care, income support and supplementation, public housing, and personal social services."^5

Personal social services are those required to:

"...compliment, supplement or substitute for services and care rendered by families or friends on an individual basis ... and (which) are to differing degrees supportive, sustaining and integrative."^6

B. A New Game: Changing the Pattern of History

The announcement made by Grace McCarthy on July 26, 1983 went beyond a simple adjustment of resource allocation. Its symbolic implications were enormous. To better understand those implications, one must view the actions of the government in an historical context.

It stands to reason that social needs have always been met by the private sector - initially by informal systems such as families, and eventually by increasingly structured systems such as markets and religious institutions. The intervention of western governments in addressing social needs is a relatively recent phenomenon. The history of public provision of social services can be traced back to the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, and the first example of privatization to the repeal of that statute (and consequent reliance of the indigent on charity) in 1834.\textsuperscript{7} In the late nineteenth century, in response to the burgeoning social problems resulting from the industrial revolution, a variety
of social reform movements arose in Europe and North America. Though these movements initially concentrated on addressing issues of poverty through private means, their efforts won the interest of academics and politicians seeking alternatives to both the laissez-faire market and socialism, and they won the sympathy of the media and the electorate, and thus they moved irresistibly toward the public sphere.\(^8\) In Canada, prior to World War II, governments began to assume a role in the provision of social services through a variety of new provincial and federal programmes, most of which were based on demonstrated need, and many of which continued to be delivered by the voluntary agencies which had arisen out of the reform movements of the previous century.\(^9\) The Depression and World War II brought together two themes which combined to characterize the post World War II welfare state: the notion that government has a social responsibility, and the perception of the need for a strong central government.\(^10\) Though voluntary agencies continued to provide service in the welfare state, they were quickly dwarfed by government agencies which were developed to deliver new statutory services, many of which were universal, and hence required large-scale, centralized, delivery systems.\(^11\) However, voluntary organizations also benefitted from the development of the welfare state, since in many cases the government perceived an advantage in utilizing not-for-profit agencies to deliver some new services, and subsidy to such
organizations was consequently increased. For example, in British Columbia, during the brief reign of the N.D.P. government (1972 to 1975), expenditures on social services more than doubled, and grants to voluntary social service agencies increased from $243,678 to $9.3 million.\textsuperscript{12}

In July of 1983, the historic trend toward the expansion of public involvement in social services in British Columbia was reversed. The Ministry of Human Resources fired 599 regular, full-time staff (90% of whom worked directly with children), and terminated a variety of programmes, most notably in-school child care counsellors, youth workers (who dealt with runaways and prostitutes in Vancouver's downtown core), family support workers (who worked with families in crisis), and child abuse teams (which provided consultation to staff involved in complex cases, most often involving sexual abuse). The 165 staff of over 20 group homes were laid off and the homes were contracted out. The estimated $16 million savings amounted to 16% of the $102 million family and children's services budget.\textsuperscript{13} The cuts included a 20% reduction in Community Projects grants - which were awarded to voluntary organizations to provide services to seniors, youth, families, immigrants and other groups.\textsuperscript{14}

In the social services field in British Columbia, privatization may have been rendered conceptually inseparable from a reduction in fiscal expenditure, and the ideological rationale for that reduction, by the timing of its
introduction as a major policy initiative. On July 7, 1983, the Social Credit government of William Bennett introduced its 'Restraint' budget, which included, along with twenty-six pieces of legislation designed to reduce the size of the public sector and the regulatory powers of government over the private market, a pledge to transfer to the private sector a variety of services deemed to be outside the responsibility of government.15 E.W. Harrison and M.G. Gosse (1986), two senior provincial government bureaucrats, demonstrate the conceptual inseparability of 'Restraint' and privatization in this rationalization of the government's actions:

"Faced with the harsh reality of declining provincial revenues and ever expanding demands for government services, a newly re-elected Social Credit Government in British Columbia, in mid 1983, imposed an unprecedented period of restraint on government ministries, boards, commissions and crown corporations...Three broad objectives were established for this program of restraint:

1. to reduce the overall cost of government services to taxpayers of British Columbia;

2. to reduce the number of persons employed directly by government (an overall target reduction of 25 percent was announced)

3. to increase efficiency and effectiveness by turning over to the private sector those services that might better be provided by the private sector."16

Implicit in this rationale is a definition of privatization as a policy which takes place at a single point in time, which has as its goal the reduction of public expenditure (since increasing efficiency suggests the
production of the same goods and services at reduced cost), and which is a part of a larger set of policies directed toward the same goal. In short, privatization is a 'Restrainment' measure. Le Grand and Robinson's definition of privatization (see page 5) suggests something quite different - that 'Restrainment' is a privatization measure. This view is based on the case that the end result of the reduction or elimination of public services (even if the stated intent of the government is simply to reduce its expenditures) is an increased reliance on the private sector. According to this definition, a reduction of public involvement in the provision, subsidy or regulation of services may take place at a single point in time, but privatization is a policy maintained by government far beyond that point through its refusal to accept the definition of the social responsibilities of government which legitimated the development of the welfare state. Using Le Grand and Robinson's definition of privatization, Marilyn Callahan, and Christiane McNiven (1988) have identified seven initiatives used by the provincial government to pursue privatization in the child welfare field:

1. Cancelling the provision of non-statutory services.
2. Reducing the provision of some statutory services through bureaucratic disentitlement.
3. Contracting new and existing statutory services to nonprofit and for-profit organizations.
4. Transferring government services to other jurisdictions.
5. Reducing subsidy to the private sector for non-statutory preventive-type services.

6. Increasing user fees.

7. Reframing the nature of family and children's problems so that their solution lies mainly outside of the government ministry responsible for social services or outside of government entirely.¹⁷

Simply terminating services is privatization because it may be assumed that if those services truly met a need, and their functions are no longer provided through the government, that someone, be they private individuals, families, voluntary or proprietary agencies (which compose the private sector), will somehow respond to meet the need. For example, without the Family Support programme, a parent who is having problems coping with a crisis in the family may seek out friends or family for help, or may turn to a doctor, a psychologist, a social worker in private practice, or a voluntary or proprietary organization if she is able to pay a user fee - thus making the solution a private one, rather than a public one. Somewhat similar to terminating services, reducing the provision of some services is indirect privatization because its result is the failure to fully meet social needs - which means a market is created, and opportunities for (or alternately, demands on) the private sector to meet those needs. To understand Le Grand and Robinson's definition of privatization, and the elaboration of it in the context of this province, one must move beyond the commonly-held view that privatization and contracting are
These measures have been broadly recognized as having serious implications. Organized labour, the media, professional groups, and academics, throughout Canada and in British Columbia have, for much of this decade, expressed concerns about the privatization of social services in this and other provinces.

Public sector unions have perceived privatization as motivated by ideology, not efficiency, as an attack on working people, organized labour and the welfare state, as the importation of 'alien' policies from the United States and Great Britain, and as a form of patronage - a means for government to buy the support of Big Business. The Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) stated that the intent of 'Restraint' was to convert the province into a "fascist" state: a, "...bastion of ultraconservatism." Of privatization specifically it was asserted that, "The many social services that are being reduced are also being left to profit-seekers in the private sector to replace." The B.C. Federation of Labour also condemned privatization, suggesting that the policy was based on the examples set by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and stating:

"The Social Credit government is committed to the goal of privatization for ideological reasons along with no regard for effectiveness, appropriateness or consensus. It seems likely they will be interested only in the operational definition of 'successful' privatization generally subscribed to by the Fraser Institute - that of profitability."
Editors and columnists in the province's three major newspapers have repeatedly suggested that by privatizing child welfare services the government has reduced society's ability to care for needy children, and that while the impact on individual lives has been great, the impact on all of society, in terms of both dollars and lost potential, will be greater still.23

Professional associations of social workers have expressed the belief that the privatization of social services has been pursued with little public input, that it has no proven benefit in terms of enhancing the quality or quantity of present services or reducing costs (believing increased inefficiency to be more likely, considering the lack of standards for both the selection of contract recipients and monitoring of services), and that it is likely to result in increased inequity - the development of a two-tiered social service system.24 Rationalizing the Canadian Association of Social Worker's position on privatization, Erica Bell-Lowther (1988) also identifies what she believes to be the economic and social agenda of the proponents of privatization:

"...the interest group currently most vocal in promoting 'privatization' is the neoconservatives, who argue that the welfare state creates dependency, undermines personal responsibility, distorts incentives, stifles entrepreneurship, hinders the operation of labor markets and serves the interest of bureaucrats and professionals ...there has been a shift from the liberal assumptions of equal rights, welfare and distributive justice to the neoconservative tenets
of economic individualism, social Darwinism, and the deregulation of business."\textsuperscript{25}

Citing issues of social justice, the Vancouver Elementary School Administrators' Association has repeatedly called for the re-introduction of the preventive child welfare services which were eliminated in 1983.\textsuperscript{26}

Though there is a greater range of perspectives on the issue among academics, compared to the other groups mentioned, the literature reviewed by this writer indicates that only a minority accept the view that the privatization of social services will enhance the efficiency of their delivery, and it appears that most identify privatization as the pursuit of an ideological agenda.\textsuperscript{27} Much of our understanding of both neoconservatism and privatization in the provincial context rests on analyses of them from other contexts. Writers critical of privatization include Le Grand and Robinson (1985), who describe the British experience in an attempt to provide greater clarity on the issue than that offered by, "...simplistic political rhetoric."\textsuperscript{28} Despite that, they initiate discussion of the issue by identifying privatization strictly as a manifestation of neoclassical economics:

"Since 1979, the government's commitment to a private market philosophy has lead to a series of proposals or decisions designed to replace the 'welfare state' systems of collective provision and finance with more privatized systems."\textsuperscript{29}

A similar analysis is drawn from the American experience. Mimi Abramovitz (1986) states:
"...placing public tasks in private hands is one way the Reagan Administration is restructuring the welfare state. Since 1981 it has been part of a broad strategy to cope with the economic crisis, one that includes reduced taxes, domestic program cuts, and the transfer of social welfare responsibility from the federal government to that of the states."{30}

The pattern is continued in Canada. Allan Moscovitch (1986) provides this analysis of the origin and meaning of privatization in the social services field:

"The search for cost-control techniques has intersected with capital's renewed search for profitable opportunities, and with 'laissez-faire' ideology to produce the strategy of privatization, the private and primarily commercial provision of social services."{31}

Bringing a similar view of the privatization of social services into the provincial context, Roop Seebaran (1983) observed:

"When over a score of fraud investigators are retained in regional offices of the Ministry of Human Resources across the province, in preference to services that prevent child abuse, one realizes that it is not economic but political and ideological values that are at the root of the change."{32}

Reaction to privatization initiatives was not entirely negative, and like its opponents, the majority of the proponents of privatization judged it in terms of its ideological basis, enhancement of efficiency, or potential savings. E.W. Harrison and M.G. Gosse accept at face value the benefit of a smaller public sector, cost reductions associated with contracting out, and the greater efficiency of the private sector, compared to the public sector.{33} In
the U.S., Whitcomb and Miskiewicz (1982) perceive similar advantages, and add a fourth advantage of privatization: freedom from legal and institutional barriers. In the U.K., K. Ascher (1987) concludes that privatization has reduced what he identifies as the trend toward inefficiency produced by the presence of trade unions. In addition, he observes that privatization proceeds most smoothly where it is not perceived as ideologically or politically based, but efficiency-based.

C. New Rules: Changing Ideology

It is apparent that many of those who attack or support the privatization of social services do so on the basis of their perception of the ideological agenda it represents. To understand the arguments they present, and the significance of such assumptions for voluntary organizations, requires (in addition to an awareness of their historical context) an understanding of the ideological principles which supported the development of the welfare state, and those principles which, for the past decade, have supported its destruction.

Throughout the 'eighties we in Canada have witnessed considerable debate over the future of the welfare state. Its founders and defenders, largely liberals and proponents of social democracy, have argued that it is necessary for the state (via a variety of public and private institutions) to intervene to address, through distribution of certain income,
goods and services, the universal risks to individuals and groups of citizens experienced as a result of the operation of the free market in an industrialized society.\textsuperscript{37} Its attackers have been both Marxists and neoconservatives. Marxists have argued that the welfare state simply papers-over the glaring inequalities that exist in the capitalist society, and acts to stabilize and maintain a fundamentally unjust system.\textsuperscript{38} Neoconservatives have argued that the institutions of the welfare state act to unjustly strip some individuals of their property (thus violating their rights), ostensibly to redistribute it to other individuals deemed less fortunate (though this may not in fact happen), which impinges on the free market, and thus its potential to provide for all (including the poor), thereby encouraging dependence on the state.\textsuperscript{39}

Though there are no clear winners in the debate it would seem that a majority of the electorate have been willing to support those who have identified themselves as either conservatives or supporters of the free market, and who have engaged in criticism of the welfare state along the lines of those embracing neoconservative values and neo-classical economic principles. Though it is very likely that no political party in Canada represents any 'pure' ideological hue, it is apparent that both the Progressive Conservative party in Ottawa and the Social Credit party in Victoria have to some degree been pursuing policies either founded in or
influenced by neoconservative theory. 40

Neoconservative theory may be better described as a network of theories connected and founded upon neoclassical economics. Its principles are described by a variety of authors. Though some variance of opinion does exist, there is a fair degree of agreement between proponents of neoconservatism, and it is possible to understand its fundamentals by describing the opinions of only a few theorists. The basic unit of neoconservatism is the individual. The individual is deemed to have certain natural rights, defined as, "...permissions to do something, and obligations on others not to interfere." 41 Property is treated as an extension of the individual, and therefore protection of the individual's right to dispose of his or her rightful property on an open market, free from coercion, is synonymous with protection of individual rights and freedoms. This provides the basis for the social and economic policy of any government adhering to neoconservative theory. According to Robert Nozick (1974), the coercive power of the state is limited by the moral supremacy of individual rights. 42 Neoconservatives would therefore limit the state to a watch-dog role, described by Nozick as a 'minimal' state:

"...a minimal state, limited to the narrow function of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified...any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified...the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others..." 43
A free market is therefore the only legitimate system for the distribution of income, goods and services. Intervention by the state in the market in order to achieve what it deems to be a more desirable pattern of distribution is considered an injustice - Nozick states:

"The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution."\textsuperscript{44}

From this perspective, entitlement is achieved by just exchange involving the free choice of individuals to dispose of property they rightfully own and to acquire, without the use of coercion, property rightfully owned by others. The pattern of distribution in society is achieved by a series of such exchanges (euphemistically described as the 'invisible hand' of the free market).\textsuperscript{45}

In contrast to ideologies which suggest that intervention in the market is necessary in order to protect the basic rights of individuals or to maintain their dignity, neoconservatives view the state as the threat to individual rights, and the market as their protector. Milton Friedman (1962) notes:

"The characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to require or enforce substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market, on the other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the color of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit."\textsuperscript{46}
A government which bases its policies on neoconservative principles would therefore seek to dismantle the institutions of the welfare state, since their effect is to alter, or distort, the distribution that would otherwise occur without any intervention in the market. It follows that such governments would replace those institutions with (or allow them to be naturally replaced by) the market—and by logical elaboration, privatization might therefore be interpreted as the means chosen to achieve this end. Friedman (1973) envisions a neoconservative Utopia, a world in which individuals:

"...have a wide variety of alternatives. You want pluralism, multiplicity of choice. When you get down to small units of government, you have it. If you don't like what one town does, and you can't change it, you move to another town. You have competition among towns for the provision of services. No reason you shouldn't. On the whole, the formal restrictions on government activity should be most severe at the federal level, less so at the state level and least of all at the local level."47

F.A. Hayek (1978) agrees that in such a world, state services would be possible, so long as:

"1. government does not claim a monopoly and new methods of rendering services through the market (for example, in some now covered by social insurance) are not prevented;

2. the means are raised by taxation on uniform principles and taxation is not used as an instrument for the redistribution of income; and,

3. the wants satisfied are collective wants of the community as a whole and not merely the collective wants of particular groups."48

In short, if government is to do anything (beyond its
watch-dog role) by way of provision of services, it is deemed best provided by the lowest level of government possible, must serve the whole community within the government's jurisdiction (as opposed to special interest groups within it), and only if it mimics the market as much as possible and does not interfere with the market beyond entering it as another potential seller of service. This is the limit of state activity which can be expected of governments committed to neoconservative theory and neoclassical economic principles.

The case could be made that the privatization initiatives described by Callahan and McNiven (see page 10 and 11) have conformed to the neoconservative principles of non-intervention (termination of intervention) in areas deemed private (and thereby support for the private market), of service provision at the local level (as a seller of service on the market) when intervention must take place, and of just exchange.

The view that the privatization policies of the Social Credit government in British Columbia have been founded on the principles of neoconservative theory, and are a means to achieve the government's ideological goals, has great relevance to voluntary organizations. Such a view allows us not only to describe what the government has been doing, and why they have been doing it, but it also permits us to speculate about what future policies might be expected, and
where the government is leading the province. The personnel within not-for-profit agencies (if they believe that the government's agenda is based primarily on neoconservatism) cannot ignore the implications of the abandonment of financial and regulatory intervention by the minimal state in the private sector, both for their organization, and their clients. However, it is apparent that there is not complete agreement between neoconservative ideology and provincial policy. This point will be considered in greater depth in Chapter Two.

D. Playing the New Game

What is communicated in the literature which deals specifically with the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations which provide social services is both the complexity of the topic, and the present tendency of writers to make broad generalizations. As a fairly representative summary of what is in the literature, and example of the indicated problems with the present level of awareness about the issue, this statement from the Canadian Association of Social Workers (C.A.S.W.) is illustrative:

"The literature on the political economy of privatization and voluntary organizations documents the changes that have taken place in voluntary agencies in the U.S. which have been forced to become more opportunistic, entrepreneurial and political in order to survive. Major changes have taken place in their organizational environment. There is an increasing reliance on government funds tied to specific services rather than to general operating grants. Agency resources are reallocated
to securing government contracts and tailoring services to tenders requested by governments. This results in the loss of many advantages of voluntary organizations: their flexibility, innovativeness, ability to promote citizen participation and advocacy and social reform roles.\textsuperscript{50}

Given this description of the potential impact of privatization on voluntary organizations, and the suggestion of the goals of neoconservatism provided in this chapter, the participation of not-for-profit social service agencies in the implementation of provincial privatization policy in itself is a phenomenon worth studying.

If one accepts the definition of privatization provided by E.W. Harrison and M.G. Gosse (that privatization is a means to reduce costs), it is apparent that such policies are of some benefit to voluntary organizations. Rekart (1987) reports in her study of not-for-profit social service agencies in British Columbia that, largely as a result of increased contracting, the budgets of such organizations have increased appreciably since 1983.\textsuperscript{51} One might conclude that the reason voluntary organizations have not followed the example of hard-line opposition set by labour, professional associations, and other groups is simply that none of those other groups stood to benefit financially by privatization, while not-for-profit agencies did. Though there may be some truth to this explanation, it is both trite, and too simplistic. It does not explain differences between organizations in their response to privatization, it assumes that financial gain will always supercede other
considerations in determining the actions of not-for-profit agencies, and it defines privatization as contracting alone.

If one accepts Le Grand and Robinson's definition of privatization, and the list of provincial privatization initiatives provided by Callahan and McNiven, one can see that privatization has been a mixed blessing for voluntary agencies. This is evident when one considers a variety of privatization initiatives in concert. The potential result of the termination and reduction of services, contracting, reduction of subsidy (through Community Grants) to nonprofit agencies, the increase in user fees, and reframing of social problems, on voluntary organizations may have been to simultaneously increase the breadth and depth of service demands, increase funds to meet a narrow range of needs identified by the government (and to attach these to specific methods for meeting needs and accounting for those funds), while decreasing funds available for discretionary use by the agency.\textsuperscript{52} Rekart and others suggest that the response of voluntary organizations has been to increase demands on charitable funders for more discretionary money (with little success, since charitable funding has been stable since 1983), to seek (and compete for) more flexible funding through fundraising, to generate more revenue through introducing or increasing user fees, and to compete for more contracts with all levels of government.\textsuperscript{53} Perhaps significantly, the Ministry of Human Resources also chose in
July 1983 to change its contracting procedure from one which has been termed the 'partnership' model to one called the 'market' model - the latter involving bidding, payment by unit cost or fixed fee, single-year contracts, and being designed for use with both proprietary and voluntary organizations (where the former had involved negotiation over proposals, cost-reimbursement, multi-year contracts and was primarily designed for not-for-profit agencies).

The literature suggests that for voluntary organizations in B.C., privatization has meant being thrust almost overnight into an environment characterized by market forces (supply-and-demand, competition for charitable and government funds, the impact of cost on consumption, etc.), a reduction in their ability to independently address the social problems they identify, and an increase in their dependence on, and control by, the provincial government. While it may be fair to say that accepting new provincial contracts may have proven of some benefit to some voluntary organizations, it may have also have created many problems. More generally, the impact of those privatization initiatives over which not-for-profit agencies have had no control (the elimination of non-statutory public services, or the reduction of subsidy to the voluntary sector, for instance) have very likely created problems for them, and it would be premature to conclude that the financial benefits of contracting have outweighed the problems created by privatization. In considering the future
in the context of the conventional wisdom regarding the ideological basis for privatization, it would be equally premature to conclude that privatization is likely to be good for the voluntary sector. Discovering what the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations which provide social services has been is the point of this thesis, and the research study undertaken to determine what that impact has been will be described in Chapters Three through Six. Examining the assumptions which support the interpretation of provincial government policy as ideologically motivated (which may guide the personnel of voluntary organizations in either opposing privatization, or participating in it through contracting) will be the exercise in Chapter Two.

Notes to Chapter One


2. Though often used, ideology is a poorly-defined term. For the purpose of this study, ideology is defined as the complex of extant ideas which define the reciprocal rights and duties of the individual and the state.


The terms 'non-profit', 'not-for-profit', and 'voluntary',
when used to describe organizations are, for the purposes of this paper, used as though they were synonymous. Some might argue that an agency which employs professional staff is not truly voluntary. This is suggested by more than one interview subject in this study. The counter argument, and the definition which applies in this thesis, is that so long as such organizations are governed by a Board of Directors composed primarily of volunteers (some include government appointees), they are voluntary. The term not-for-profit has recently begun to replace non-profit, apparently in acknowledgement of the fact that many, if not most, organizations do make a profit - that is, their annual income exceeds their expenditures more often than not. The case for the newer term is that it more accurately describes the financial objectives of these organizations, and still permits them to be distinguished from for-profit agencies (also referred to as commercial, proprietary or market entities in this thesis).


6. ibid., p. 2.


Parker, Mrs. G. Cameron, (nee Miss A. Ethel Dodds), Canadian Settlements, address presented to the National Settlement Conference, Toronto, 1924.

9. Examples of new social services include a variety of provincial workers' compensation programmes, mothers' pensions, and public assistance, and federal initiatives such as the development of the Department of Health (1919), provision of grants for housing (1919), the development of the Council on Child Welfare (1920), unemployment relief grants to the provinces (1921), old age pensions (1927), and
war veterans' allowances (1928).


11. Examples of these new social programmes include National Health grants (1948), Allowances for the Blind (1951), Allowances for the Disabled (1954), the National Housing Act (1954), the Unemployment Assistance Act (1956), the creation of a Youth Allowances plan in 1964, the Canada and Quebec Pension plans in 1965, the creation of the Guaranteed Income Supplement in 1966, the Medical Care Act of 1966, and the Canada Assistance Plan (1967).


15. Legislation accompanying the 'Restraint' budget included a number of measures to weaken organized labour in the public sector, the elimination of rent controls, the office of the Rentalsman, the Human Rights Branch and the Human Rights Commission, and the reduction of employment standards, regulations governing Crown corporations, and the powers of Regional Districts - all of which could be viewed as enhancing the freedom of the private market.


Seebaran, R., p. 89.


18. Those who have identified privatization almost exclusively as contracting include:


B.C. Federation of Labour, _Privatization Report #1_,


Council for Public Services, Privatization is Not for You, Trade Union Research Bureau, Vancouver, 1987 (brochure).


21. ibid., p. 6.


23. Examples include:


Vancouver Province, "Abuse 'Epidemic' calls for changes", June 2, 1985, p. 32.


Vancouver Province, "Just when should MHR intervene?", October 11, 1985, p. 38.
Vancouver Province, "Socreds slapped on child welfare", October 23, 1985, p. 3.

Vancouver Province, "Our kids are suffering", October 19, 1986, p. 4.


Alcock, S., The Impact of Privatization on Standards of Practice, a draft discussion document prepared for the B.C.A.S.W., October, 1988.


Vancouver Schools Administrators' Association (Elementary), Children in Crisis, A Brief to the Government of British Columbia, October, 1986.

27. PRIVATIZATION IS INEFFICIENT
Those who do not accept the efficiency arguments for privatizing social services include:


PRIVATIZATION IS NEOCONSERVATISM
Those who do not accept the efficiency arguments for privatizing social services and who view privatization as ideologically motivated include:


Tobin, A.G., 1984

**PRIVATIZATION MAY BE EFFICIENT**

Those who accept the efficiency arguments for privatizing social services include:


29. ibid., p. 1.
36. ibid., p. 268.
37. This is an extremely simplified version of the argument in favour of the welfare state. The concept of universal risk and the argument that what is involved is the non-market distribution of income, goods and services is described in:


The perspectives of liberalism and social democracy are not identical, but both ideologies have provided a rational defence of the welfare state. An example of the ideas that underlie the liberal argument for state intervention, and which may guide its institutions is:

"...it is the notion of freedom in its 'positive' sense that is at the heart of the demands for national or social self-direction which animate the most powerful and morally just public movements of our time...not to recognize this is to misunderstand the most vital facts and ideas of our age. But equally it seems to me that the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false."


An example of the ideas that underlie the social democratic argument for state intervention, and which may guide its institutions is:

"We have to show the world a society in which all relationships, fundamental principles, and laws flow directly from moral ethics, and from them alone. Ethical demands would determine all calculations: how to bring up children, what to prepare them for, to what purpose the work of grown-ups should be directed, and how their leisure should be occupied." (Shulubin, in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward, as quoted by:)


To generally differentiate the two, liberalism would concentrate more on pluralism and equality of opportunity, while social democracy would concentrate more on collectivity and equality of outcome.

38. Marxists, unlike liberals or social democrats, would not support state intervention in a capitalist market, they would eliminate the market, and restructure society in order to achieve greater equality of distribution. A description of the Marxist argument is provided by Susan McDaniel and Ben
Agger:

"Marxists, who believe that inequality is endemic to capitalism and can be eliminated under socialism believe that piecemeal efforts to redistribute wealth through such measures as progressive taxation will be no more than cosmetic...the vast proliferation of agencies to deal with deviance, crime and urban problems creates a welfare and planning establishment that, in spite of its good intentions, may further frustrate the aspirations of those whom it is trying to help in the first place...'helping professionals' like doctors and social workers are really agents of capitalism, who, in effect, try to cover over glaring inequalities in the urban scene so that the economic system may continue to function...[Marxists] take the radical position that to eradicate urban problems of this kind it will be necessary to overturn the whole economic system that tends to create a chasm between rich and poor."


39. In essence, neoconservative critics of the welfare state argue that its redistributive functions pose a threat to individual rights (including rights of property), that it places an unbearable burden on the market, and that it is inefficient and inconsistent by nature:

"Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So far reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do...

The major objection to speaking of everyone having a right to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these 'rights' require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these..."


"You have everybody screaming that we ought to have new, bigger, more generous government programs. Where are we going to raise the money? Tax business. But business corporations can't pay any taxes. A corporate executive may sign the check, but where does he get the money? From his stockholders or from his customers or from his
employees.

The great scandal of our times, in my opinion, is government expenditure on higher schooling. There is no other program so perverse in its distributional effects. In the great state of California, which has one of the most extensive public higher education systems in the country, over 50 percent of the students at the colleges and universities come from the top 25 percent of the families by income. Five percent come from the bottom 25 percent...that's a system under which the people from Watts send to college the children from Beverly Hills.

If someone on welfare finds a job and gets off welfare, and then the job disappears - as so many marginal jobs do - its going to take him some time to go through all the red tape to get back onto the program. This discourages job seeking..."


40. Examples of policies which might be interpreted as based in neoconservative theory include the pursuit of the Free Trade Agreement by Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government in Ottawa (the stated purpose of which is to eliminate barriers to international commerce - though this may be at the cost of Canada's social programmes), and the plan for the development of 'special enterprise zones' by William Vander Zalm's Social Credit government in Victoria. The latter would eliminate or reduce government controls imposed on the owners of business (through pollution-control and employment standards, etc.), in the interest of promoting investment in export-oriented manufacturing by foreign firms, and the consequent job-creation potential.


42. ibid., p. 10.

43. ibid., p. ix.

44. ibid., p. 151.

45. ibid., p. 18 and 151.


47. Friedman, M., 1983, p. 57.


52. The increase in service demands on non-profit agencies following the changes introduced by the provincial government is documented in:

The problems experienced by voluntary agencies with contracts include the provision through them of a lower level of funding than might be provided if the same service were offered through the public sector, their focus on a narrow range of crisis-oriented, remedial programs (as opposed to the much broader range of preventive programs), and the laborious and time-consuming demands on the nonprofit agency as a result of the contracting process and the expectations of government for recording and financial accountability - in short, the bureaucratization of the agency.

The discretionary power of voluntary agencies over provincial grants was considered by administrators of those agencies sampled by Josephine Rekart in her 1987 study, to be much greater than federal funding, municipal grants, or provincial contracts. Only United Way funds and those raised by the agency were considered more flexible (and only by a small margin). Easily the least flexible funds were deemed to be from provincial contracts. It was also found that (as a result of the changes introduced in July 1983 - cuts to Community Grants and the transfer of some services, via contracting, to the private sector) that grant funding to these agencies had decreased, while contract funding from the province had significantly increased. To some degree, the loss of provincial grant money, and its replacement by provincial contract funds represents an impingement on the
autonomy of voluntary agencies.

Rekart, J., 1987, p. 34 and 49.

53. The increasing demand on the United Way for more general and special-project funds, increased competition in the area of fundraising, and the increase in user fees charged by voluntary agencies in the lower mainland, since 1983, is documented in:


Josephine Rekart found in those agencies sampled that charitable funding had not significantly increased since 1983, but that independent fundraising by those agencies had. In addition, many agencies (46.6%) had initiated user fees, or (39.7%) increased user fees. Over 76 percent had increased the number of provincial government contracts - the most common method cited for increasing revenue. Seventy percent had increased their federal funding and sixty percent had increased their municipal funding.

Rekart, J., 1987, p. 34 and 51.

54. "The government has shifted from a negotiation system to a tendered bid system for contracting and has begun to consider proposals from private business."

Perryman, G., 1984, p. 5.

The terms and definitions used to describe the two contract systems are provided by:

CHAPTER TWO

PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICS: BEYOND THE RULE BOOK

A. Schisms Between Policy and Ideology

The purpose of this chapter is to examine alternatives to the view that ideology is the primary motivator for the privatization policies of the provincial government, and to consider the implications of this for the voluntary sector.

Chapter One identified privatization as a provincial policy likely to result in significant changes to society, to the field of social services, and to voluntary organizations which provide social services. It was argued that privatization is most often viewed as a means for the achievement of the social and economic goals of neoconservatism, and that such an ideological interpretation of privatization had both a descriptive and a predictive function. However, it was noted that the policies of the Social Credit government of British Columbia are not completely compatible with neoconservative theory. If differences between theory and practice exist, this would suggest that ideology alone cannot explain the actions of the government. If other objectives compete with (or even supercede) the goals of neoconservatism, those other objectives may be recognized by personnel in not-for-profit agencies and may therefore guide their response to the government's privatization initiatives. To determine whether or not there are schisms between neoconservative theory and
the policies and practices of the Social Credit government in British Columbia, it is necessary to re-examine, and provide an ideological analysis of, what the government has done. This chapter will provide that re-examination, present four alternative explanations for the government's motivation for privatization, define the policy goals inherent in those explanations, and suggest how voluntary organizations might respond (or may be responding) to those policy goals.

The proponents of privatization laud it as a 'Free Enterprise' initiative, and its opponents label it an attack on organized labour and the welfare state. In the drama of polarized debate it appears that significant facts and alternate perspectives may be overlooked if they do not readily add to the argument of either side. Policy analysts are not immune to these forces. As demonstrated in Chapter One, much of the existing literature begins by identifying privatization as motivated by ideology, efficiency arguments, the need for government to reduce its spending (or its deficit), or some combination of these inter-connected rationales - the nexus of which is neoconservatism and its rise in terms of both political power and public acceptance. With emphasis varying according to the motive(s) identified for some specific government's decision to pursue privatization, authors operating from the assumption that privatization is spawned from neoconservatism proceed to undermine or support that government's decision to alter its
role in the funding, provision or regulation of social services. More often than not these arguments appear to be an extremely thin veil covering the writer's ideology.

Attackers of privatization may claim or intimate that the subsidy, provision, and regulation of social services almost exclusively through the market is the goal of these governments, and justly caution that this would lead to needless suffering, since the market has already been proven unable to address the types of externalities which the welfare state was able to address (though not eliminate).¹ They cannot explain why the goal hasn't been achieved. The analyses of both the defenders and attackers of privatization-as-neoconservatism generally fail to address one important question. Why have these neoconservative governments retained any significant role in social services at all? Such a role contradicts the tenets of neoconservatism - which assert that the market is the preferred medium for the distribution of income, goods and services.

It might almost seem that neither the government of William Bennett, nor the government of William Vander Zalm have actively attempted to achieve the goals of neoconservatism at all - in fact, the latter might be accused of reversing (to a minor degree) some of the 'progress' may by the former toward those goals. Jonathan Kesselman (1986) notes that Social Credit economic policy differs from
neoconservative theory in that it seems to embrace the idea that policies favorable to business (a special interest group) are desirable, and less sophisticated than neoconservative theory because it ignores the realities of market failures (see Hayek's description of appropriate state limits on page 20). Despite the rhetoric of reduced government spending which was to occur as a result of cuts and transfers to the private sector (and which can be equated with both a reduction in coercive taxation and the intervention of the state in the market), Redish, Rosenbluth and Schworm (1986) report that there was actually a 9.4 percent increase in public expenditure in British Columbia in 1983/84. Plans for the decentralization of the provincial government (which might be rationalized as an extension of neoconservative views on the proper distribution of power between local, regional and national governments) were announced in 1987, and promptly shelved.

Changes in the social services field in B.C. have been significant, but the welfare state remains. This may in part be because changes in many areas would be complicated by the need for joint federal - provincial co-operation. No province can make unilateral changes to the Canada Assistance Plan, or the Canada Health Act, and therefore it cannot be claimed that continued existence of these pillars of the welfare state in British Columbia represents an anomaly in the ideology of the Social Credit government (although the
fact that the federal Progressive Conservative government retains them, and also claims a neoconservative orientation, may represent an anomaly). However, much of the social policy in this province is within the power of the Social Credit government to control, and in these areas there have been developments as uncharacteristic of neoconservatism as those cited in economic policy. One example might be the recent introduction of the $20 million Family Initiatives programme, which includes measures to encourage adoption (as opposed to abortion), and to prepare young people for marriage. A second example is Family Advancement - a component of Family Initiatives. This programme was introduced following a lengthy public debate over the growing number of school children whose families were too poor to properly feed them, and is designed to place social workers in inner-city schools. A third example is the influx of money into the Drug and Alcohol Branch of the Ministry of Labour.

None of these services, nor their costs, can be rationalized as necessary, according to neoconservative theory. In fact, neoconservative theory would provide a rationale for the elimination (not the introduction) of these programmes. Placing social workers in inner-city schools might be criticized by neoconservatives both as use of tax dollars for redistributive purposes (transfers in kind), and as serving a special-interest group, rather than the whole
community. To abuse drugs or alcohol, or have an abortion, involves moral judgements which neoconservatives should argue is a private, not a public, matter (though in the case of an abortion, this might depend on an interpretation of when a fetus is considered an individual with his or her own rights).

These developments take place in the context of an incomplete neoconservative social policy agenda. Despite 'Restraint', public money continues to be channeled toward such ideologically indefensible items as Camp Fees ($364,857 in 1986/87), Community Projects ($5,175,291 in 1986/87), and Christmas Supplementary Allowances ($5,989,020 in 1986/87). This suggests that there is more guiding the Social Credit political agenda than neoconservative theory alone. In some ways it might almost appear as though ideology is not the government's primary consideration in policy formation.

Such a suggestion could hardly be described as a radical interpretation of B.C. politics, or even as original. Interpretations of privatization which assume that it is not ideologically motivated abound, or seem to require little effort on the part of the analyst to arrive at. For instance, it has already been noted that labour has described privatization as a means for the government to buy the support of business (see page 12). To provide another example, it might seem logical to conclude that Christmas Supplementary Allowances have not been cut because to do so
might be very unpopular with the electorate - the media would be very likely to cast the Premier in the role of Scrooge.

Both conclusions rest on an implicit set of beliefs about why and how the government is pursuing privatization, what they are attempting to achieve, and what the limits of privatization will be. Both conclusions may be held in addition to, or instead of, the interpretation that the government's policies are ideologically motivated, but neither can be explained through that interpretation alone. Neither patronage nor popularity are an inherent part of neoconservative theory. Gordon Hearn (1958) describes a theory as, "...an internally consistent body of verifiable hypotheses." These two conclusions may therefore be described as semi-articulated theories of privatization, and may be added to the previously-described, and more thoroughly articulated, theory that privatization is motivated by neoconservative ideology. Two questions arise. Are there other semi-articulated, extant theories of government motivation that also lie outside of the ideological theory of privatization, and if so, what are they? Are such theories recognized by key decision-making personnel in voluntary organizations, and if so, how have they shaped the agency's response to privatization initiatives (and therefore, via contracting or policy decisions made by the agency, acted as a covariant in determining the impact of privatization on the organization)? Before the second question can be answered
alternatives to the theory that privatization is motivated by neoconservatism must be identified and articulated.

B. Five Different Ways to Play the Privatization Game

In re-examining the literature, and utilizing sources beyond those described in Chapter One, it is possible to define four alternative theories of privatization, in addition to the theory that privatization is motivated by neoconservatism. These five perspectives are termed the Neoconservatism, Populism, Popularity, Paternalism, and Patronage theories of privatization, and are described below. Interpretations beyond those discovered may exist, and the articulation of these five theories may be justly criticised as both subjective, and speculative. Whether or not the hypotheses contained within these theories can be verified is an unanswered question. Whether or not the subjects interviewed in this study consider them to be verified will be addressed in Chapters Five and Six. For the moment, practical considerations of verification will be put aside.

An additional limit on these theories is their general application. It seems likely that they will be relevant only within the context described - the privatization of social services in British Columbia. However, it is necessary that these alternative theories be articulated in order to move beyond the limits which would be placed on this study if
conventional wisdom was to prevail, and privatization was to be interpreted simply as a means for achieving neoconservative ends.

(1) The Neoconservatism Theory

Despite the arguments presented here to the contrary, many still believe that the Social Credit government is in large part adhering to the neoconservative agenda, and it is simply a matter of time before it is completed. This is the privatization-as-neoconservatism analysis earlier described, and its central hypotheses are that neoconservative social and economic values are the primary, if not exclusive, motivator of the government in the formation of its social and economic policies, and that those policies are directed toward the achievement of a minimal state. Government politicians are viewed as committed ideologues. It is a re-assertion of the intent of the government to pursue 'Free Enterprise' to its logical conclusion; the neoconservative Utopia. It is advanced by both sides in the debate, as when Premier Vander Zalm repeats throughout the government's presentation of 'Phase I' of privatization, that 'Phase II' will be even bigger and better, or when John Shields, President of the B.C. Government Employees Union, states that:

"...the government is philosophically committed to dismantling the public sector and its only a matter of political expediency and practical application before they can accomplish it."\(^8\)

Though neither side in the debate seems to acknowledge
the anomalies that have been previously described, it is assumed that this theory explains the apparent incompatibility of neoconservative theory and some government policies as minor aberrations, and not significant trends or indicators. As suggested by a variety of sources in Chapter One, a considerable body of evidence is used by those who support this theory to verify its hypotheses.

As previously stated, there would only be short-term advantages to the voluntary sector in playing the privatization game by these rules, since in the long run, privatization would mean most agencies, and their clients, would be abandoned by the government.

(2) The Populism Theory

The case presented by this theory is that the point of the Social Credit government's privatization policies have been exactly as they indicated, to return control of the economy to the private sector. If both the government and the electorate believe the private sector and 'the people' to be synonymous, then privatization may be argued to be populist, not neoconservative. The central hypotheses of the populism theory are that privatization has been motivated by the will of the majority of the electorate, has been pursued to further their interests, and may be altered or abandoned according to their sentiment. Government politicians are seen as representatives elected by and from the mainstream of the population, who apply the values of those constituents
toward their betterment, and against established, self-interested elites.

The suggestion that Social Credit is the political arm of a grassroots social movement has tremendous implications for politics generally in British Columbia, for our understanding of privatization, and for voluntary organizations in particular. Such a suggestion comes both from David Mitchell, in his book *Succession* (1987) and from Robert Lapper, in his study *Populism in British Columbia Politics* (1981).9

Mitchell describes the political ascension of William Vander Zalm as, "...a remaking of B.C.'s political elite, and a return to the province's tradition of flamboyant, populist leadership."10 In his view, the Social Credit party has consistently struggled with, "...the forces of the establishment."11 The establishment in the case of W.A.C. Bennett was Big Business (who objected to W.A.C's nationalization of railways, ferries and utilities). Big Labour, as the Solidarity movement, fought William Bennett over 'Restraint' (though the younger Bennett is seen as less of a champion of 'the common man' than his father or his successor). William Vander Zalm is seen to have taken on both Big Labour (through Bills 19 and 20), and Big Business (through his rejection of ties with Howe Street, and a higher rake-off of lumber revenues).12 The N.D.P. is seen as:

"...the defender of the status quo in Canada, an integral part of the welfare state establishment
and firmly aligned with the highly conservative forces of trade unionism."

Populism is inextricably bound together with neoconservatism in Mitchell's view - suggesting that neoconservatism is either a popular movement in itself, or that in British Columbia a popular movement cannot be other than neoconservative. There is some logic to this. It might be argued that the world view reflected in neoclassical economics is that of the small businessman - the foot-soldier of populism. Arguments against such an interpretation will be presented below. W.A.C. Bennett is described as a genuine, if right wing, champion of the people. Premier Vander Zalm is said to have restored the populism of W.A.C. Bennett and maintained, even strengthened, the neoconservative thrusts of William Bennett. The logic of a political party that can hail one leader as a champion of the people for taking businesses away from the private sector, and hail another leader as a champion of the people for giving those same businesses back to the private sector, is explained by Robert Lapper.

Lapper defines populism as:

"...a set of beliefs rooted in economic insecurity, which are opposed to concentrations of wealth and power and favor the return of wealth and power to individuals. This return must, however, be accomplished within the existing economic system, and without massive government intervention." 

According to Lapper, populism originated in agrarian and labour revolts in the American mid-west, and in Russia in the
late nineteenth century, as a reaction to the inability of the small provider to control his economic fortune. "It thrives in areas vulnerable to economic fluctuations." Ernesto Laclau (1977) postulates that populism, "...arises in a specific ideological domain: that constituted by the double articulation of political discourse." Other contributing factors identified by Laclau include schisms in the fabric of a society, such as those caused by a pronounced division between urban and rural populations, or a clear division of the population by race or cultural background. In short, British Columbia has many attributes which would contribute to making populism a significant force in its politics.

As promising as the ideal of a government committed to 'the people', as opposed to 'the elite' may sound, Lapper warns:

"Populism lacks a positive programme of reform because, while it assaults capitalist modernization for concentrating property and power, and believes that some form of government intervention is necessary to counteract this concentration, it cannot accept a government which has the power to do this, because it would ultimately only replace an economic elite with a government elite, and accomplish nothing for the small producer. There is therefore a cognitive tension within populism—a tension which is often suppressed in populist rhetoric which will usually concentrate its fervor on the evils of either 'Big Business' or 'Big Government'. But the tension is constantly evident in the inability of the populist, when faced with the choice, to accept either one as an alternative." Lapper, Laclau, and other writers on populism, including Boyte (1986), Zimmerman (1986), Kuttner (1987), and Boyte,
Booth and Max (1986), all agree that populism spans the ideological spectrum (though each perceive it as particularly suited to their own beliefs, be those neoconservative, liberal, social democratic or Marxist). It follows that in British Columbia there may be two ideologies competing for the title of champion of the people - neoconservatives (the Social Credit Party), and social democrats (the N.D.P.). Rhetoric which may have been interpreted as based in neoconservatism (attacks on Big Labour or Big Government), or as socialism (attacks on Big Business) may be seen primarily as efforts by the two parties to influence the electorate's perception of who holds power. This is suggested by Lapper when he observes that the brief N.D.P. stint in office from 1972 to 1975 was begun by the perception of the public that the Social Credit party had become too cozy with Big Business, and ended when the public reacted against what was perceived as the N.D.P.'s creation of Big Government.

The theory that populism (the attack by the electorate on what it perceives as a self-interested elite - combined with a constantly changing definition of that elite based on the public's perception of who holds power), and not ideology, has been the dominant force in B.C. politics holds rich promise for a re-interpretation of privatization, and its implications for voluntary organizations.

The fact that both the New Democratic government, when they were in power, and the Social Credit government, have
supported the delivery of social services by not-for-profit agencies may be explained as efforts at empowerment of the people. The possibility that privatization may be a means for empowerment is suggested by Kramer (1981), whose study of public/private sector delivery in a variety of countries lead to his producing a continuum to represent the diversity. At one end of the continuum is 'reprivatization' (almost exclusive reliance on the market), followed by 'empowerment' (primary reliance on the voluntary sector), 'pragmatic partnership' (government funding and provider pluralism), 'governmental operation' (primary provision by the state), and finishing at 'nationalization' (total provision by the state). Whether or not funding, regulating, and providing social services exclusively through the voluntary sector actually empowers the populace is a debatable point. To have power may require adequate funding, and protective regulations, which may obviate the participation of the public sector. However, use of this model may shed some light on the role of voluntary organizations in the government's plan to privatize social services.

One may observe that in this province the changes announced in July of 1983 reflect a movement from pragmatic partnership toward the reprivatization end of the scale (which, as previously suggested, should cause alarm), but in many (though not all) areas of social services, the movement has stopped at the paradigm characterized by delivery by the
voluntary sector - empowerment. Assuming that the government is not pro-market, but anti-elite, may better explain the use of not-for-profit agencies for contracting. Volunteerism has often been associated with neoconservatism. It is equally compatible with populism. In some cases, such as the Family Advancement programme, the movement has not even taken the province as far as full voluntary sector provision of social services - though delivery is provided by the voluntary sector, funding is provided by the public sector. Populism may also serve to explain the circumstances surrounding the development of the Family Advancement programme. The agenda of a populist government is set by public sentiment. It would follow that if the Social Credit government is populist that it would respond to the hungry kids problem. In addition, it would do so in a way that avoided the support of elites (presently identified as public sector unions), and gives power and control to 'the people'. However, the next theory of privatization to be presented in this chapter provides a different explanation of the origins of the Family Advancement programme.

Voluntary organizations, if they accept the Populism theory and wish to influence or reap the benefits of government policy, must divest themselves of apparent self-interest and any aura of elitism - they must represent, or represent themselves as, the grassroots. Organizations which fail to influence the government may attempt to influence the
electorate, and then allow the electorate to influence the government for them. Those wishing to influence the electorate must not only divest themselves of any apparent elitist qualities, but also of any extreme value positions beyond what can be easily rationalized as 'common sense', since as Lapper notes, populism is not value oriented, "...it does not seek fundamental changes to values and norms which govern social conduct, and has no real urge to remake society."24 If popular sentiment is in fact the primary motivator of the government, this 'lowest common denominator' quality may balance any advantage to the voluntary sector which may result from having a populist government in office. Organizations which serve groups outside the mainstream may be completely ignored by the government. Populism can include religious fundamentalist elements, as well as androcentric and ethnocentric elements. Professionalism may suffer directly by being associated with elitism, or indirectly through the populist distrust of academia.25 No matter how important a role an agency fulfills, if it lacks grassroots support, it may be at risk of losing its public funding.

What this theory fails to explain is how the Social Credit government, with its widely-publicized ties to Big Business, manages to remain the underdog in the eyes of the electorate. If one accepts this theory, then it seems only a matter of time before this perception of the party by the
electorate, and the government, change.

(3) The Popularity Theory

The central hypotheses of this theory are that the government will do anything it can towards the achievement of the neoconservative Utopia, so long as it does not threaten their re-election, and that it will do anything necessary, including a complete reversal of policy from the direction set by neoconservative theory, to ensure their re-election. Government politicians are seen as either spineless power-mongers, or as clever manipulators of public opinion. The basic argument is that the government is as interested in being re-elected as it is in achieving its ideological goals. Obviously achieving those goals rests on being re-elected, while the reverse is not necessarily true. This should not be confused with the Populism theory, which views the will of the people as the primary consideration of government, and privatization as the will of (and for the good of) the people. According to this theory the government's primary consideration in pursuing privatization is its ideological agenda, and the only thing that will interfere with that agenda is the threat of being removed from office. This theory might be more aptly defined as what happens when the concepts of neoconservatism meet the practice of politics.

This theory was advanced by Michael Harcourt, the leader of the opposition, following the presentation of the budget on March 30, 1989:
"Its really with an eye on the polls that they (constructed the budget). This Social Credit government can see the polls, they can see their unpopularity."26

An associated hypothesis is that since public support for privatization would determine the extent to which it is pursued, Utopia would have to be sold to the public, and its achievement would have to wait until the public bought it. Verification for this hypothesis is not difficult to find. Both William Bennett and William Vander Zalm have spent large amounts of taxpayers' money both on opinion polls and on public information campaigns, despite the promise by Vander Zalm not to do so once in office.27

This argument can be used to explain not only why certain policies which are compatible with neoconservative ideology have not been pursued, but also why other policies which are incompatible with neoconservative ideology have been pursued. Avoiding unpopularity, maintaining popularity, and regaining popularity involve different means, but have similar ends.

Maintaining popularity may involve what Green and Sutcliffe (1987) describe as the 'political business cycle'-which amounts to the government using demand management to stimulate the economy in order to ensure their re-election.28 By using demand management, 'Restraint', and privatization simultaneously the policies of the Social Credit government become ideologically incomprehensible - a hybrid of Keynesian and neoclassical economics. This may be reflected in the
recent budget, which is balanced (in accordance with neoclassical principles), but also includes measures such as the Housing Action Plan - intended support the development of affordable housing (and which neoconservatives should criticize as unjustified intervention by the state in the market). The confused nature of such hybrid policies (described as, "...yo-yo economics..." by Glen Clark, N.D.P. finance critic) has been another point upon which the Social Credit government has been criticized. Not surprisingly, as such measures act to stimulate the economy, the throne speech and budget were accompanied by speculation that an election would shortly be called - despite the fact that the present government has only been in office for three years. Premier Vander Zalm unwittingly supported the case that the Social Credit government deliberately manipulates the economy for its own political gain by suggesting, following the budget speech, that he may call an election.

Regaining popularity, or saving face, can also involve the use of polls, or a less scientific measure of overt public displeasure. The development of the Family Advancement programme may be an example of the latter. On July 26, 1983, when Grace McCarthy announced the cutbacks in the M.H.R., one of the services to be terminated without replacement was the Family Support worker programme. Established in 1978, the programme served about 5000 children per month and was designed to keep 'at-risk' families
together - to avoid family breakdown and apprehension of children. The programme's 259 school-based workers were labeled as 'redundant' and laid off. This action was compatible with the principles of neoconservatism. However, it became apparent that it was not compatible with public opinion.

On June 2, 1985, after a series of highly publicized incidents of M.H.R. mismanagement of child abuse cases, a Vancouver Province editorial suggested that the cutbacks in 1983, "...have probably made things worse.", and specifically mentioned the lack of Family Support workers. On October 10, 1985, the Vancouver Province reported that Grace McCarthy responded to N.D.P. demands for a review of the child welfare system by suggesting that families and the community are to blame for kids going bad, and should take responsibility for those kids. The following day the Province editorial replied that the ministry's lack of preventive programmes resulted in more damage being done to kids before intervention by the M.H.R., and that the government had the responsibility to provide preventive (and particularly school-based) services. On October 17, 1985, Marilyn Callahan, Director of the University of Victoria School of Social Work, published an article in the Victoria Times-Colonist, criticizing B.C.'s child welfare services and specifically citing the Family Support programme as effective, efficient, and much needed. The next day,
Callahan followed this up with a call for a public inquiry into child welfare - which made the front page of the same paper. On October 23, 1985, Brian Wharf, Dean of the Faculty of Human and Social Development of the University of Victoria, published an article in the Victoria Times-Colonist, criticizing the lack of preventive child welfare programmes in B.C., and once again cited the loss of the Family Support programme as part of the problem. Criticism by these academics was picked up by the Vancouver Sun and the Vancouver Province. On October 29, 1985, the Vancouver Sun published a letter from Alastair Fraser, President of the Vancouver Schools Administrators Association, calling on the government to reinstate Family Support workers and other preventive services - and graphically describing the plight of the many children who needed, but no longer had access to, such programmes. Almost a year later this same association submitted a brief to the government, repeating the same request, with the same rationale. Again, both major papers in Vancouver picked up the story. Perhaps significantly, in December of 1986 Premier Vander Zalm announced that there would be a review of child and family services, though Andrew Armitage, who was Superintendent of Child and Family Services at the time, later stated that, "There was no real review being done." An additional hypothesis may be that for governments concerned with their popularity, substance is secondary to appearance.
Throughout 1987 and well into 1988 the public became aware, via the media, of the development of what has been termed the 'hungry kids' problem. Though details were lacking, (and the ministry denied the veracity of the claims) it seemed that income assistance rates had fallen so far behind what families needed to support themselves, that in some inner-city neighborhoods, parents were sending their children to school without breakfast, and often without lunch - simply because they could not afford to buy the necessary food. The publication of the Vancouver Elementary School Administrators' position paper on inner-city schools in January of 1988 helped to link the economic and academic issues involved and to further legitimate and focus public attention on the issue. On February 1, 1988, in what might be considered a reply to the school administrators, Claude Richmond, Minister of Social Services and Housing, indicated that families, and not the government, were responsible for feeding their children, that income assistance rates were adequate, and that no money for school meal programmes would be forthcoming from the government for the reason cited above, and because such programmes would simply breed dependence. This statement can stand as an example of neoconservative values, analysis and policy-making. If ideology was the prime motivator of the government, this is the position they would have held. However, the argument advanced here is that the long and very public nature of the
debate on the issue obviated some further action, since it was likely (if not actually known by some unpublished government poll) that public sympathy lay with the children, and the government's position might therefore be highly unpopular. The government therefore introduced the Family Advancement programme, and touted it as an effective and responsible way to address the hungry kids problem (while simultaneously responding to the equally public criticisms of child welfare services - thus killing two birds with one stone). 48

Though ministry officials initially denied that Family Advancement had any relationship to the terminated Family Support programme, even the M.S.S.H. press release announcing its creation ("Minister Announces new Family Support Workers") betrays the connection. 49

Within the Popularity theory, one of three hypotheses may explain the development of the Family Advancement programme:

(a) the Bennett government misjudged the popularity for advancing the neoconservative agenda to the point of cutting programmes for needy children, and the Vander Zalm government attempted to correct that error, or;

(b) the popularity of programmes for needy children changed between July 1983 and April 1988, and the Vander Zalm government simply adjusted its policy to that shift in public opinion, or;
(c) the Bennett government was less interested in adapting policy according to what is popular, and took a risk in such cuts, while the Vander Zalm government is taking fewer risks in the name of ideology.

Using the development of the Family Advancement programme as an example, it is possible to project how voluntary organizations might manipulate the process of policy development in their favour. The first interpretation would lead those interested in influencing government policy to ensure that the government is fully aware of public opinion during the policy-making process. Not-for-profit agencies would attempt to impress upon the government the popularity of their cause, or the extent of public sympathy for their client population. This would necessitate the development of mechanisms for consultation with the public sector. The second interpretation would lead those organizations interested in influencing government policy to attempt to make changes in public opinion through public information campaigns and use of the media. However, there would very likely be some risk to the agency in this activity. Unlike a populist government, a government concerned about its popularity might deem efforts to influence the public as interfering with their political agenda, and they may be antagonized as a result. Voluntary organizations which depend on provincial funds may discover that appeals to the media can result in a financial backlash.
The third interpretation accepts either of the previous two methods of influencing the government, but suggests that they were ineffective prior to the point where William Vander Zalm took office - that popularity was a secondary concern of William Bennett.

This theory provides an explanation for why the government has not, in the process of privatizing social services, followed its laissez-faire ideology and simply dumped all non-statutory services - allowing the market to pick up what it will. The example provided in the Family Advancement programme should explain why the government has re-introduced some services, and possibly why it has retained others. This may also provide an alternative to the Populism theory in explaining the use of voluntary, and not proprietary, agencies in the delivery of many (though certainly not all) contracted services - there may be a perception that the public would object to some services being offered for profit.50

If one accepts the Popularity theory, the apparent ability of organizations to influence government policy, and the likelihood that public opinion may act to protect the social services from drastic cuts in funding, may appear to hold some advantage for voluntary organizations. However, like the Populism theory, some organizations are likely to suffer with a government committed to its own popularity in office. Agencies which serve client groups which are not
popular may not only be ignored by government, but they may actually be attacked by the government - if their cause is perceived to be so unpopular that the government feels it can score political points through such an attack. Funding for all services is likely to follow fads - to be based on public whim, rather than demonstrated need. Efforts at raising public consciousness about social problems, even if conducted strictly in the interest of the clients, may be misperceived by government, and result in repercussions. This may force voluntary organizations, and awareness of social issues, out of the public arena.

What the Popularity theory fails to adequately explain is why the Social Credit party continues to be re-elected by the people of British Columbia. The rhetoric of the party is market-oriented, and it is elected at least in part on the basis of that rhetoric. Yet its major conflicts with the people of B.C., according to this theory, result from the Social Credit government's attempts to act on that rhetoric.

(4) The Paternalism Theory

The central hypotheses of this theory are that the Social Credit party represents a ruling elite, and the policies of the government, including privatization, are an attempt to favour that elite, and maintain its power. The elite are viewed as primarily educated, middle-aged, affluent, white males who occupy positions of power in business, and government. Government politicians are viewed
as a part of that elite, and as committed to advancing the interests of the 'old boys club'. This view is very nearly the opposite to that provided in the Populism theory. Like the Popularity theory, it incorporates neoconservatism as a partial explanation for government policies, but in this case privatization is a means to strengthen the market, which is the domain of the elite. The elite maintain their control over the economy and society primarily through the market, though social services are also used as a means of social control.

Peter George (1985) has advanced an alternative to the one-dimensional model of welfare ideologies, and suggested that conservatism has its collectivist element as much as socialism has its anti-collectivist element.51 The one-dimensional model is often represented as a continuum running from 'anti-collectivist', through 'reluctant collectivist', and 'Fabian socialist' to 'Marxist' — although a variety of other terms (such as conservative, liberal and social democrat) are often substituted for these. Generally, those analytic frameworks in use have proponents of the free market at one end of a scale, and collectivists at the other.52 George suggests a two-dimensional model, composed of two intersecting continuums; the first (titled Reason and Individualism) stretching from laissez-faire liberalism through support for a mixed economy, to full public ownership or collectivization of the means of production; the second
(titled Community and Sentiment) stretching from communism to conservatism - or from fraternity through to hierarchy.\textsuperscript{53} In application, such a model explains the social policy developments identified, and allows us to describe them as 'noblesse oblige' - "...the predominantly paternalist approach to social policy and the social services provided by a corporate professional elite."\textsuperscript{54} This assumes that the social policy direction evident in the development of programmes such as Family Initiatives is inherently pro-state, even if that state involvement is at arm's length - initiation, control and funding of social programmes through the public sector, but delivery through the private sector. It is the interpretation of privatization, and most particularly of contracting to voluntary agencies, that is the key issue here. The Paternalism theory interprets the delivery of social programmes by voluntary agencies as economic and ideological window-dressing on the attempt by the government to exercise social control. This would also mean that there is a rift between the social policy and the economic policy of Social Credit - since the former is inherently pro-state, while the latter is apparently anti-state (as evidenced by the degree of real and permanent divesture in crown corporations and other public activities).\textsuperscript{55}

Those voluntary organizations which accept the Paternalism theory, and which intend to influence the
formation or revision of social policy in their favour, should avoid being identified as the 'grassroots', and should instead identify their agency, as professional (on the assumption that there is an elitist quality to professionalism, and this may be deemed by the government to imbue the organization with credibility). Existing and proposed services for which the agency seeks public funding should be presented as serving a social control function. In addition, the membership of the Board of Directors of such organizations should include those who travel in the same social and economic circles as government politicians, and senior government bureaucrats - in order to identify the organization as part of 'the club'.

This theory provides an adequate explanation for the increase in funding to Drug and Alcohol programmes, but fails to explain why some services have been structured in order to transfer control of them to the voluntary sector. Once again, the example is the Family Advancement programme. Though some have identified this programme as an exercise in social control it would appear that in its implementation, government control is minimal.56

(5) The Patronage Theory

The central hypotheses of this theory are that the Social Credit government has no intention of achieving a minimal state, and that a truly free market would not serve the interests of the special interest groups and individuals
who have been the financial supporters and allies of the Social Credit government. It follows that privatization and fiscal restraint have been and will be pursued only to the extent that they are good for business generally, and good for the businesses of a select few in particular. An associated hypothesis of this theory is that many supporters of the government would never survive financially without the help of the public sector. Government politicians are viewed as likely to practice a questionable degree of favoritism, be utterly corrupt, or anything in between. This theory is similar to the Paternalism theory, but differs in the degree (perhaps best expressed as the dollar amount) of favoritism shown by the government to certain individuals and industries, and who is favored. Those on the receiving end of patronage need not be considered a part of an elite. Patronage is also similar to the Popularity theory, since this is what is most often bought with public money. However, the buying that is involved in the Patronage theory is more blatant. This may be the most cynical of possible theories, and may reflect the post-Nixon era of trust of politicians generally.

The Patronage theory lies unspoken within Kesselman's observation that Social Credit policy tends differ from neoconservative theory in that it favors business (see page 43-44). It runs as a theme through much of the opposition party's criticism of the government, as when Michael Harcourt
Could it be that this government doesn't want anyone to know what they've done with our forests? Could it be that our forests are just another sweet deal for your friends and Socred insiders?"\textsuperscript{57}

This possibility is also suggested by neoconservative theorists, such as Hayek (1978) who cautions that one inevitable outcome of unlimited government is that a political party, "...homing to achieve and maintain power will have little choice but to use its powers to buy the support of particular groups."\textsuperscript{58}

A key hypothesis of this theory is that privatization is a means of buying, or rewarding, loyalty to the government. This is a concern raised by a number of critics of privatization, including DeHoog (1984), the National Union of Provincial Government Employees (1986), the Alberta Association of Social Workers (1986), and Terrel and Kramer (1984).\textsuperscript{59} The implications of this for voluntary organizations are significant.

If one accepts the Patronage theory, agencies which wish to maintain or expand their funding must be seen as supporters of the government. As with the Popularity theory, public advocacy on behalf of clients would be minimized, if not eliminated - and public awareness of social issues would suffer. However, Patronage goes beyond that. In order to be rewarded, public statements made by the agency would have to include praise for the actions of the government. As with the Paternalism theory, it would be to the advantage of any
agency to have on its Board of Directors those who are acquainted with government politicians and senior bureaucrats. Again, beyond that, Board members would have to engage in bartering of the agency's political position with their associates in government in order to secure funds. Agencies without such connections (or which refuse to engage in such political manoeuvering), or which serve populations, or operate in political constituencies, considered 'unfriendly' by the government, would receive minimal financial support, if any.

What this hypothesis fails to account for are those actions of the government where the beneficiaries of policy are generally not, historically or potentially, the supporters of Social Credit - such as those low-income families served by the Family Advancement programme.

The purpose of this chapter has been to examine alternatives to the belief that the privatization of social services in British Columbia is motivated by, and directed toward the goals of, neoconservatism. Four alternatives to that theory have been described, and their implications for voluntary organizations have been discussed. This exercise has been necessitated by the general lack of existing analysis of privatization beyond its identification as a phenomenon of ideology, and the belief that a broader analysis will contribute to this study, and to an understanding of the impact of provincial privatization
initiatives on voluntary organizations. A major thrust of the analysis has been that the identification of privatization as rooted in neoconservative ideology represents a simplistic rendering of the issues, and fails to take into account certain factors which are specific to this province, and which could broadly be described as its social, political and economic context.

Notes to Chapter Two


5. Estimations of the amount of funding involved will not be available until the publication of the Ministry of Labour's Annual Report for 1988/89. However, in separate interviews, two of the participants in this study indicated that significant new funding for drug and alcohol treatment has unexpectedly appeared.


Lapper, R., *Populism in British Columbia Politics*, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C., June 10, 1981 (working paper).


11. ibid., pp. 52-53.

12. ibid., p. 53.

13. ibid., p. 52.

14. ibid., p. 52.

15. ibid., p. 53.


17. ibid., p. 5.


25. Distrust of, or even contempt for, the institutions of higher education (and those in them) is truly populist - it is evidenced by both business and labour.


29. Vancouver Province, "This is budget day", March 30, 1989, p. 6.


34. Vancouver Province, "Abuse 'epidemic' calls for changes", June 2, 1985, p. 32.


36. Vancouver Province, "Just when should MHR intervene?", October 11, 1985, p. 38.


42. Vancouver Schools Administrators Association (Elementary), Children in Crisis, October, 1986. (a brief to the government of British Columbia)


Vancouver Province, "Our kids are suffering", October 19, 1986, p. 4.


49. Weatherbe, S., 1988, p. 41.


50. This was suggested as a reason for government selection of contractors in the Booz-Allen study (1971).


52. ibid., p. 38.

53. ibid., p. 43.

54. ibid., p. 44.


CHAPTER THREE

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATIZATION:

THE ISSUES TO BE RESEARCHED

A. The Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the issues that the research study will address, to define the questions which those issues raise (and which the study will attempt to answer), and to lay the conceptual foundation necessary for understanding the research design.

It is assumed that the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations providing personal social services cannot be described as a simple cause-and-effect relationship. The literature suggests that privatization involves a variety of government initiatives which may have either direct or indirect effects on such agencies (see Callahan and McNiven's list of privatization initiatives on page 10 and 11). Voluntary organizations have a degree of discretion in how they may respond to each of those initiatives, and their effects. For example, a reduction in the provision of statutory services through bureaucratic disentitlement may result in more people turning to a specific not-for-profit agency for a service they no longer have easy access to. The organization would have little control over this increase in client demand - a direct effect of privatization. However, it would have considerable discretion over how it responded to that increase in client
demand. The agency might simply start a waiting list, or seek additional resources to meet the demand (for instance, through charitable funders, casino or lottery income, or application for government grants), or might make a statement of protest regarding the government initiative to the public, via the media. The possible responses are almost unlimited— as are their repercussions for the agency. Any of these choices might have a significant impact on the agency, and that impact could be described as an indirect effect of bureaucratic disentitlement — one over which the organization exercised some discretion. In the case of contracting, the degree to which the agency can control the direct effect of the initiative through its own discretion is extremely high — the organization is ostensibly free to bid on the contract or ignore the offer to tender. The potential range of variables which govern the choices made by the agency in response to the government's privatization initiatives, and the role those choices play in determining how privatization affects the agency, mean that no study can arrive at a simple cause-effect explanation of the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations.

Two alternate objectives are more feasible. The first is to document those changes that have occurred in those voluntary organizations which participate in this study, and which are directly or indirectly related to privatization. The second is to examine the choices made by voluntary
organizations in those areas of effect over which they have been able to exercise some discretion. Both are necessary steps toward generating a theory regarding the factors which determine an agency's actions in response to provincial privatization initiatives. This study is directed toward answering two questions. The first is concerned with the general implications of privatization for not-for-profit social service agencies:

Does the experience of personnel in voluntary organizations which provide personal social services in Vancouver support the concerns expressed in the literature regarding the varied negative implications of privatization for those agencies?

The second focuses on those contextual factors which may have lead certain organizations to differ from others in response to privatization generally, or in response to specific initiatives or their effects:

To what degree have key decision-making personnel within voluntary organizations which provide personal social services in Vancouver recognized and exercised control over the impact of provincial privatization initiatives on their agency, and what factors have influenced the decisions made by those personnel in guiding the response of those agencies to those government policies?
This study therefore has two components - a series of case studies wherein the unique situation and experience of each agency is described, and a comparison of those case studies toward the identification of common experiences and factors relating to the impact of privatization on the voluntary sector generally. The case study component is intended to address one inadequacy of the literature - its tendency to over-generalize. Variations in the circumstances of individual agencies are generally not considered. Descriptions of the impact of privatization on the entire voluntary sector may be of little utility to those individual organizations which comprise it. To be of utility to the personnel of voluntary organizations, this study must address the issues which are most relevant to them. It is assumed that many of these issues are situational, and can be identified through a case study approach.

In order to have any relevance beyond specific settings, and in order to address the concerns expressed in the literature regarding the potential negative implications of privatization for voluntary organizations, it is necessary to seek any general principles which may apply, and to articulate them if they exist - to generalize to some extent. The extent to which one may be able to generalize from this study is discussed in the fourth section of this chapter. However, before one can generalize, one must consider the specific.
B. The Case Studies

It is assumed that the impact of privatization on a voluntary organization would likely involve some sort of interplay between specific government policies, the nature of the agency and its services, its circumstances, and the decision-making references of its key personnel. One deficit of the literature seems to be its lack of attention to the orientation of decision-makers in voluntary organizations. The suggestion by the C.A.S.W. that agencies are 'forced' to become more opportunistic, entrepreneurial or political in response to privatization (see page 22) seems an anthropomorphism without merit. People make the decisions and take the actions which are referred to, and the variables which lead them to those choices may be unique to those individuals, those organizations, or both. Thus the conceptual orientation and values of decision-makers in an organization are seen as a significant factor in determining how privatization will affect the agency.

One study found which does address the relationship between the values of individual decision-makers in voluntary organizations, and the response of those organizations to government policy, contains serious flaws. A critical analysis of that study may help demonstrate why this study will consider both the personal and organizational contexts within which decisions regarding privatization are made.

William Epstein (1988) provides an appealing analysis of
the relationship between the values of key decision-makers within not-for-profit agencies, government policies, and the response of those agencies to those policies. Epstein interviewed twenty-two administrators of voluntary social service organizations in New York and determined that their social attitudes, and those of their Boards, were in narrow conformity with the conservative values of the current national administration.² He concludes that such agencies fulfill an ideological role, as well as a service role, and have accordingly ignored great and growing social needs. By extension of this one might conclude that the ideology of an agency's administrators determines its response to government policy - and hence the impact of privatization on the organization.

However, Epstein neglects the contexts of both the agencies and the individuals in his study. He does not address the financial state of the agencies. A lack of funds is an equally likely explanation for not addressing social needs. He states that the agencies he studied have 'ignored' the social needs he identifies, yet he has neglected to define the missions of those agencies, and relate them to those needs. Could an agency committed to serving the physically challenged be accused of 'ignoring' the plight of the homeless? He also does not address the position of those organizations in the social services network around them. An agency which is committed to meeting a broadly felt social
need, but serves only a tiny fraction of the potential population in an urban area, might be criticized for ignoring the rest, unless there is a much larger organization mandated to serve that same population in that same area.

Epstein also does not address the administrators' perceptions of government policy, merely their values in relation to his perception of the ideological foundation of government policy. These distinctions are important. As was indicated in Chapter Two, policy and ideology are not synonymous. How one interprets policy may determine the decisions one makes in response to it, and it is very possible to interpret the policies of governments widely acknowledged as pursuing a neoconservative agenda, as other than neoconservative. Epstein has assumed that the administrators he studied were playing the game according to neoconservative rules, and interpreted their actions accordingly. He does not consider the possibility that the values of the administrators were not dictating their actions so much as their perceptions of the rules of the game they were playing, nor does he consider options to labeling U.S. federal social policy as conservative.

Epstein also assumes that the values of the administrator can be efficiently translated into both policy (the domain of the Board), and practice (the domain of the staff) - but fails to describe the organizational structures which would operationalize the administrator's values. An
organization's decision-making structure may act as a conductor or a resistor of the administrator's values. Depending on both the formal structures, and informal practices or 'culture' of the organization, the administrator may have a great deal of control over what an agency does, or very little. The truly significant decisions may be made at the Board level, or through staff management teams. The organizations in question may even have been worker collectives. Unless the organizational structure is defined, the relationship between the values of the administrator and the actions of the agency is doubtful. Epstein also assumes that the administrators' opinions of the values of their Board members are accurate. To be able to understand the positions of specific groups within voluntary organizations requires that they be addressed directly. To fail to do so assumes administrator omniscience. Given the potential that the staff, the Board, or both, may have a significant role in the decision-making process of an organization, it follows that they, in addition to the administrator, should be directly included in any study of the actions of the agency as a whole.

This study will attempt to arrive at an understanding of the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations which provide personal social services by examining the contexts within which those organizations have responded to provincial initiatives, as well as the qualities of the individuals
within each organization. The degree to which individuals have influence on the decisions made by the organization is seen to be a function of the decision-making structure. The qualities of individuals which may have some bearing on the actions taken by the agency are likely to be too numerous, and too variable, to describe or account for. While it is possible to fairly succinctly describe those characteristics which may be used to define and differentiate agencies, such is not the case with individuals. However, two factors operating on the individual level are of particular interest. The first is the ideological orientation of individuals, since much of the literature suggests that support for, or opposition to, privatization rests fundamentally on its valuation on ideological grounds. This is Epstein's explanation for why certain individuals take certain actions. The second is the individual's belief about the government's motivation for privatization, as indicated either by their assumptions or consciously-held theories (including, but not necessarily limited to, those described in Chapter Two). The assumption is that the perceived rules of the game are a primary determinant of how it is played. This incorporates, but goes beyond, the ideological explanation, and connects the experience and reasoning of individuals with their actions.

The methods employed in pursuing case studies vary widely. If it were the sole intent of this research project
to present a series of such studies, and not to make comparisons between each agency and the individuals within them, it would be quite feasible to employ a different method in each agency, and to adapt the means used for gathering and analyzing data to the unique circumstances of each organization. Altering the methods used to suit each case might result in a more comprehensive, in-depth view of each situation. However, one might not be able to see the forest for the trees. It is the intent of this study to make comparisons, and to seek experiences and principles which might generally apply. That goal requires elaboration, as it places limits on the methods utilized in the case studies, and there are implications to be considered any time one attempts to generalize from the specific.

C. Comparing the Case Studies

In order to discover which effects of, and responses to, privatization are common to the not-for-profit agencies participating in this study, it is necessary to compare the findings of each case, or sampling unit, to the others. There is a clear difference between this process and generalizing from the findings of this study to other, similar, voluntary organizations which are not a part of this study. The issues associated with generalizing to a larger population will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
While employing uniform methods in the collection and analysis of data for all cases is not necessarily a prerequisite for their comparison, it does facilitate their comparison, and this study therefore employs (with a fair degree of consistency), similar means for developing each case study. One goal of the design is to maintain consistency in the choice of the source of information on each participating agency. Epstein very likely chose the administrators of the organizations he studied on the assumption that they would have more of an overview than line staff (whose awareness of the issues of the agency may extend only to the boundaries of the service they provide), or Board members (whose knowledge of the daily operations of the agency may be limited). Whether or not this was Epstein's reasoning, it does fit with the researcher's own experience of the range of awareness of personnel at various functional levels within voluntary organizations. However, the limitations of utilizing administrators as the sole source of information on an organization, and the need to include the perspectives of both the Board and the staff in any study of the actions of the agency as a whole, have already been described. It follows that for each participating agency, this study will utilize a minimum of three sources of information - the administrator, a Board member, and a staff member. This is similar to what Norman Denzin termed 'Triangulation' - sampling to gain a variety of vantage
points on the object of study. In this case, the vantage points themselves are considered a part of the object under study, and each is viewed not only from their own perspective, but also from the perspectives of the other two sources of information. The use of similar sources of information in each participating agency is of little value in facilitating comparisons between organizations unless the information requested from each source is also similar.

A variety of factors of interest to this study have already been identified in the analysis of the Epstein study. These include the values of both the individual and the organization, the structure of the organization, changes in the organization which may be related to privatization (and those that may not), the inter-organizational field, as well as the individual's perception of provincial policies and the relationship of the public and voluntary sectors. In order to facilitate the comparison of these factors between the agencies studied, information on each of them needs to be consistently gathered from each agency. In order to do this, each factor must be broken down into a series of questions. Those questions comprise the research instrument which will facilitate the collection of data in each agency (and which will be discussed further in Chapter Four).

In addition to the use of consistent sources of information in each agency studied, and the use of a standardized research instrument, comparisons between
agencies are facilitated by the use of common goals (and therefore methods) of data analysis. It is the intention of this study to arrive at a theory of the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations by exploring the dimensions of change which have taken place, in those agencies studied, in response to those initiatives identified by Callahan and McNiven. This suggests not one, but two analytic paradigms, as they are identified by Barney Glaser (1978) - the dimensional model, and the Basic Social Processes (B.S.P.) model. The dimensional model allows the researcher to map out the issues discovered in the data, and is most appropriate in cases where there has been little previous study that might allow a researcher to identify from the outset of the research what those issues might be. It is considered appropriate here because, despite the existence of a fair amount of literature on the subject of privatization and voluntary organizations, there has been little study to address the assumptions inherent in that literature. Unfortunately, the dimensional model tends to present those issues it discovers as static. The B.S.P. model allows the researcher to track the process of change that is discovered in the data, and is appropriate in cases (such as that presented by this study) where it can be assumed that change has taken place, and where understanding that change is a goal of the research. However, use of this model assumes that there is some awareness of what issues are changing.
The analytic paradigm chosen for this study is therefore something of a hybrid of the dimensional and B.S.P. models. In the process of analyzing the information gathered from each agency, equal weight is given to identifying the dimension of change, as well as the process of change, suggested by the data. The application of this model will be more fully discussed in Chapter Four.

The effects of, and responses to, privatization which are common to all agencies in the study may be described as 'general' in that they generally apply to the participating voluntary organizations. However, what is common to the agencies studied may not necessarily be common to voluntary social service organizations generally.

D. Generalizing from the Findings

There would be fewer questions regarding the general application of the findings of this study if it involved a survey of all not-for-profit agencies which provide social services in British Columbia. It would be quite valid to make observations of the general impact of provincial privatization initiatives on such organizations, based on experiences which were found to be common. Unfortunately, the resources available for this study prohibit such a survey. The common alternative in such cases is to take a random sample of the population (which would be defined as all voluntary social service organizations in B.C.).
However, the nature of this study does not absolutely demand that the participating agencies be drawn by random sample. The primary purpose of the study is to generate a theory regarding the effects of privatization on voluntary organizations, and their response to those effects. This study is exploratory in nature. The deficit identified in the literature is a lack of exploration of the implications of privatization for voluntary organizations, and a lack of explanations for their actions. The problem is that there is little by way of theory which might explain what has occurred, or why it has occurred. The solution is to build theory. The disciplines of theory-building and theory-testing differ. This provides a degree of freedom to this study in its methods of exploration.

In considering the generation of a theory, one should project the limits of that theory. The population of interest to this study was reduced from all voluntary social service organizations in British Columbia to voluntary organizations which provide personal social services in Vancouver. Two rationales support this choice of the potential population to which the theory generated by this study may apply. It is the researcher's subjective impression that there have historically been regional variations in the division of public and voluntary responsibility for the provision of social services (which restrict the degree to which one can generalize about the
implications of privatization to certain areas of the province). It is therefore deemed best to geographically limit the potential application of the theory generated. In addition, changes in the provision of personal social services are perceived by the researcher to be of greater interest to practicing social workers and the profession generally since such changes have a more immediate effect on them than changes in other areas, such as health, or education (though, obviously, they are closely connected). Even this reduction leaves a potential population numbering in the hundreds.  

The number of agencies from that population which might participate in this study is small. It is not only methodologically acceptable, but actually of advantage to this study that they be selected by other than a random sample. Using multiple sources of information in each case necessitates spending considerable time collecting and analyzing the data from participating organizations. The limit on the total time allotted for this study means only a few agencies can be included. Though a small random sample might seem in this case to be the logical solution to this problem, such a sample might not further the interests of this study. A hypothetical example may illustrate this. There are many daycares which operate as not-for-profit organizations. Let us suppose that they total one third of all the voluntary organizations in Vancouver. The total
number of organizations which can be included in this study is six. If two of the organizations drawn through a random sample are daycares, this can be said to be representative of the population. However, it must be questioned whether or not the inclusion of the second daycare is an advantage to the study. Will the information gathered from the second daycare be sufficiently different from the first to warrant its inclusion? What new information might be left untapped as a result of the second daycare 'squeezing out' an organization of a very different nature than those which are included in the study, and which might provide information of more immediate utility for the generation of theory? With such a small sample, it is questionable whether or not the findings of the study would be representative of the population, even if the composition of the participating agencies approximated the composition of the population.

Ultimately, one must question the utility of random sampling for the purpose of generating theory. Theoretical sampling of the type described by Glaser and Strauss (and applied in this study) has a more proven track record in this regard - as evidenced by Darwin, and his choice of the Galapagos islands for his study. The goal of drawing a representative sample has therefore been abandoned. In order to achieve its objective, this study will look for information to support the theory-building process where it appears likely that it can be found. Without a survey or
random sample the findings of this study should not be generalized to the identified population - though this study may build a theory which might (at some point in the future) be tested for its application to that population, using those means.

It follows that if the agencies participating in this study have not been chosen randomly, that some other criteria for their selection has been utilized. The premise supporting the selection of voluntary organizations for this study is that the greater their diversity, the greater the possible range of the effects of, and response to, privatization. Diversity has been conceptualized as a wide variation between agencies in terms of their size (as indicated by both budgets and membership), years of operation, community served, primary funding source, and the researcher's subjective impression of their evident value base (their position on a continuum seen as stretching from conservative to radical). A broad range of the effects of, and response to, privatization in the agencies studied is considered necessary in order to maximize the potential that the theory generated by this study may have general application for the identified population, but by no means guarantees that it will.

This chapter has provided the rationale for the researcher's choices regarding the issues to be addressed by this study, the participating agencies, sources of
information within them, and decisions affecting the design of the research instrument and the analytic model to be employed. These rationales act as a conceptual foundation for the research design. The next chapter will describe the adaptations to that foundation which have been necessary in order to build this research project upon it.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. The degree to which an agency is actually 'free' to pursue or ignore an offer to tender may vary. Privatization, as the reduction of subsidy to the voluntary sector, could possibly have placed some voluntary organizations in a precarious financial situation. They may therefore feel impelled to bid on contracts they might otherwise have ignored - in order to secure sufficient funds for their survival. Privatization might be conceptualized as a policy set that not only introduces increased contracting into the voluntary sector, but also alters the climate of that sector to one wherein the government has the advantage in that contracting. This view of the tactics of the provincial government is compatible with either the Paternalism theory of privatization (since its effect is greater control of an agency by both the government and the market), or the Neoconservatism theory. In the latter case, one might note the connection between the manipulation of the voluntary sector, and the response of neoconservative theorist Robert Nozick to the suggestion that a worker accepting a wage is not really a voluntary exchange, since choice is limited. He replies that the exchange is voluntary, since others acted within their rights, even if they did not provide the worker with a more palatable alternative.


4. ibid., pp. 74-75.
5. This was the method chosen by Josephine Rekart (1987) for her recent study of voluntary social service organizations in B.C. Even this method does not guarantee that the findings of a study can be generalized to the whole population, since it is possible (as was the case in Rekart's study) that some organizations will fail to, or refuse to, participate. Some agencies would therefore not be represented in the findings, and it would be erroneous to state that generalizations based on those findings could, without reservation, be applied to the whole population.


7. This is readily apparent if one scans the 'Red Book' - the directory of social services agencies in the Vancouver area. Information Services Vancouver, *Directory of Services*, Vancouver, 1988.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESEARCH DESIGN: A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS

A. The Rationale for Qualitative Methodology

This chapter will describe the methods in use in the collection and analysis of data in this study. Much of the rationale for the use of these methods is provided in the previous chapter, and the results of their use will be provided in the next chapter. Designing the research is defined as a process, rather than as the creation of a plan at a single point in time. In order to understand much of the research design, a description of, and rationale for, the methodological orientation of the study is necessary.

Qualitative methodology has been chosen in large measure because through it a researcher is able to gather and analyze information describing the variables in the contexts of the sources of the data without being required to pre-judge the parameters of those contexts, or the nature of those variables.

In Theoretical Sensitivity, Barney G. Glaser states that the mandate of the researcher engaged in a pursuit of grounded theory is, "...to remain open to what is actually happening."¹ This imperative legitimates qualitative analysis, and has acted as a maxim in the design of this study. Without this imperative, any theory generated out of the qualitative process (which in this case includes gathering data through interviews utilizing open-ended
questions, coding indicators from that data, grouping those codes, and analyzing those groupings) may be invalidated—justly rejected because it was not founded on what was happening, but on what the researcher chose to see was happening. A priori or logically deducted hypotheses held by the researcher must be placed aside in order for the data to tell its story. Thus the process of analysis will be directed toward richly multi-variate, 'dense', information.

The problem facing this researcher in attempting to gauge the impact of provincial privatization initiatives on voluntary organizations providing personal social services in Vancouver has been to capture the dizzying array of variables existing in such agencies, and to make some sense of how such policies have affected them.

Anselm Strauss (1987), also stresses that the validity of a theory rests on the complexity of the data and its analysis:

"The basic question facing us is how to capture the complexity of reality (phenomena) we study, and how to make convincing sense of it...making sense of complex data means three things...both the complex interpretations and the data collection are guided by successively evolving interpretations made during the course of the study...a theory, to avoid simplistic rendering of the phenomena under study, must be conceptually dense - there are many concepts and many linkages between them...It is necessary to do detailed, intensive, microscopic examination of the data in order to bring out the amazing complexity of what lies in, behind, and beyond those data."2

In design, data collection, and data analysis, the researcher was conscious of the complexity of the interface
between voluntary agencies and provincial policy, and the necessity to avoid prematurely 'closing out' variables that may have some significant role in determining what effects privatization has on those organizations, and how the personnel in those agencies have responded to those effects.

A comparison to quantitative methodology may help illustrate the advantages of qualitative techniques for this study. It would be necessary in a quantitative study to specify variables intended for measurement (the ideology of those interviewed for example) and to develop some device (such as the intersecting continuaums described by Peter George - see page 68) with which to measure it. This may result in a multitude of problems. There may be no agreement between subjects regarding the meaning of the terms used to define their ideological orientation, and yet the findings would have to be interpreted as though there were. A subject may wish to respond using a term not provided by the researcher (identifying herself as a 'feminist', for instance), and thus be corralled into responding in the researcher's, and not her own, terms. Perhaps even worse than either of these scenarios, the variable chosen for measurement may not even be of relevance to the participants in the study, and may therefore be injected by the researcher into any theory generated from the study regardless of its meaning for the subjects of the research. Unlike quantitative analysis, where the weight given a variable may
be determined by the researcher long before the research ever begins, qualitative methodology requires that variables 'earn' their way into any theory — by a demonstration of their significance to the theory.³ This aspect of qualitative methodology is considered of great importance to the incorporation of a hypothesis regarding the motivation of personnel in voluntary organizations for their response to privatization initiatives, into the theory regarding the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations which this study is intended to build. It is suggested in Epstein's study (see page 83-84) that the ideological orientation of personnel determine their response to government policy. It is suggested in this study that the actions of personnel may relate to their perception of the government's motivation for privatization. However, qualitative methodology demands that the variable 'operating theory of government's motive(s) for privatization' (as a quality of the individuals in this study), be demonstrated as relevant via the data, not via the questions the researcher chooses to ask. This will be discussed further in the section of this chapter devoted to data analysis.

B. The Selection of Interview Subjects

In order to understand the selection of interview subjects for this study, it is necessary to first describe the process of selecting the participating agencies. Six
voluntary organizations were chosen for this study. This is deemed to be the maximum number possible, given the time necessary to achieve the stated goal of gathering data from personnel at three functional levels within each participating organization, and the limits of the time and resources available for this study. Each agency selected provides personal social services. All are located in or principally serve Vancouver (or an area of it). The rationale for their selection is their diversity (as defined in Chapter Three). The use of diversity as a criteria in the selection of these agencies is a form of 'theoretical sampling', as described by Glaser and Strauss (1967). While it was hoped that all the agencies initially selected would agree to participate, the potential that some might decline was anticipated, and this proved to be true.

The administrator of one of the six voluntary organizations initially approached indicated that the demands on the agency's staff were already too great, that they were overburdened with tasks not related to direct service, and that the time necessary for them to participate in interviews for research purposes was therefore not available. This creates a greater problem for a study which selects its participants based on the relationship (in this case the diversity) of various factors defining them than it might for a study whose participants are chosen by random sample. If a subject picked at random refuses to participate (and if it is
required that the researcher find a replacement), it may be possible to simply pick another at random - to replace the declining card in the deck and draw again, so to speak. However, the choice of the agencies in this study makes it more analogous to a house of cards. Any agency which declined would have to be replaced with a similar agency in order to maintain the diversity of the group. The replacement agency would have to fill a gap in the spectrum of participants in terms of its size, years in operation, primary funding source, community served, and apparent value-base.

The agency which declined to participate is relatively small (but growing rapidly), less than ten years old, funded primarily through municipal and provincial contracts, serves a population defined by age in the urban core of Vancouver, and is perceived by the researcher to be relatively high-profile, and fairly anti-establishment. This agency was intended to act (along with two others) as a counter-weight for several large, relatively old, financially stable, mainstream organizations in the group, to bring a new target population to the study, and to balance the tendency of the group to serve large geographic areas. Its rejection of the offer to join in the study necessitated a further set of steps in the process of theoretical sampling.

Four other agencies were approached, one after the other. After three additional rejections (each involving
reasons similar to those defined by the administrator of the first agency to decline to participate), the fourth accepted. However, with each successive rejection it was necessary to compromise or alter some characteristic in the potential replacement agency. No identical replacement agency existed, and as fairly similar organizations also refused, those approached became increasingly different from the first. It may be of interest to this study that the agency which eventually replaced the first is larger, older, has more stable funding, serves a larger geographic area, is less radical in nature, has a lower public profile, and appears to place more value in academic credentials than the organization initially chosen. Still, the replacement agency is fairly new, and fairly small, relative to the other participating organizations, and does bring an otherwise untapped target population to the study.

The newer, smaller organizations which were approached voluntarily excluded themselves from this study, perhaps due to the low value placed on the process or product of academic pursuits, and because they are engaged in a struggle for survival - which leaves little time for participation in a research project. Though new, small, and relatively radical organizations did participate in this study, the extreme of that scale is not represented. For a comparison of the participating agencies, see Table I on page 106. In the interest of maintaining the anonymity of participants,
agencies are identified by large-case letter.

Table I
Diversity of Agencies Sampled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BUDGET (in $,000's)</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL SERVICE BUDGET</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in $,000's)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION (in $,000's)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>13,640</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION (% of Total)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVINCIAL CONTRIBUTION (in $,000's)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>13,640</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVINCIAL CONTRIBUTION (% of Total)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVINCIAL CONTRIBUTION (% of Gov't)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMBERSHIP</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION SERVED</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>women</td>
<td>victims of crime</td>
<td>disabled adults</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERVED</td>
<td>Vancouver area</td>
<td>lower mainland</td>
<td>lower mainland</td>
<td>all of B.C.</td>
<td>East Vancouver</td>
<td>lower mainland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEARS OF OPERATION</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35 (5 as NGO)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14 (5 as NGO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was expected that the decision to interview one person at each of three functional levels within each agency (policy-making, administration, and direct service) would be more difficult to operationalize than the decision regarding which agencies to include in the study. It was known at the time of the initial selection of the participating agencies that there are variations in their organizational structures. In most, a simple three-tiered system does not exist. Differences in each organization therefore dictate differences in the choice of interview subjects within them.

In addition, the method of contacting each selected agency, and the personnel within them, results in a minor loss of researcher control over the choice of interview subject.

Initial contact in each agency was made via a letter to the senior administrator - with two exceptions (Agency C and D), which are discussed below. The letter describes the goals of this study, and requests that the administrator personally participate and identify two other persons (a policy-maker and a direct-service provider) who might also be willing to participate (see Appendix A). Thus in each agency, the selection of subjects beyond the person initially contacted involves some degree of negotiation with the contact person, and could result in the incorporation of that person's bias into the selection of interview subjects. There is the potential that the recommendations of the contact person regarding who should be interviewed may be
based on what they believe that interview subject will say. There is only one overt example of this, and contrary to what one might expect, its intent was not to guide the researcher toward a subject who might support the opinions of the contact person, or provide a perspective of the agency which might be unrealistically positive. In Agency A, the senior administrator recommended that a staff person from a specific programme area be interviewed. There was a stated expectation that the opinions of those staff would differ from those of the senior administrator, and that such a difference may be of interest to this study. Though more covert attempts at guidance may have been commonplace, in all cases the rationale for the selection of those interviewed has been satisfactory to the researcher, and any bias in their selection should be attributed to the researcher, not the initial contact person in each agency.

The size of an organization is a factor in the choice of interview subjects in several cases. Three large organizations in the study (Agencies A, B, and D) have a five-tiered structure. In accordance with the principles of theoretical sampling, the selection of the functional levels to be included from these organizations is based on the researcher's perception of the scope of awareness at each level - those deemed likely to have some unique perspective to offer to this study have been interviewed.

In Agency A and B the five levels are Board, Executive
Director, department or service Directors, programme Coordinators, and line staff. In the case of Agency A, a service Director is not interviewed, nor is a line staff member. In addition to a Board member, and the Executive Director, a Coordinator is selected. Though the plan to sample at three levels in each organization would seem to dictate that a line staff member be interviewed, the Coordinator is seen to be a better choice - in large part because that person's extensive direct service experience in the agency makes it possible that the perspectives of both middle-management and line staff may be covered by one interview. In Agency B a Board member, the Executive Director, a departmental Director, and a Coordinator are interviewed - the latter resulting from the same circumstance as cited for the inclusion of the Coordinator in Agency A.

In Agency D the five levels are Board, Executive Director, Administrator, departmental Directors, and line staff (with some middle-managers in some departments). Sampling at all levels in Agency D would be a poor decision because the size of the organization, and its predominantly health-focused mandate, would very likely preclude the productive participation of a Board member in discussions concerning personal social services. The Board members of that organization are responsible for two hospitals with a combined budget of almost thirty million dollars, and the likelihood of them being familiar with the impact of
privatization on the Social Services Department (with only four staff) in one of those facilities seems remote. A similar rationale mitigates against the participation of the Executive Director. In addition, the division of responsibilities in the organization places some control over policy in the hands of the Administrator (with the senior managers of the facility), allowing a single interview to address the issues of both policy-making and administration. Therefore only a line social worker, the Director of the Social Services department, and the hospital Administrator are included. This is the first of two cases where the initial contact letter was not sent to the senior administrator - in this case it was sent to the Director of Social Services.

It was known at the time of its selection that Agency C is operated as a co-operative, and that this would mean that the assumption of hierarchical order inherent in the three-tiered model employed in this study would not apply. However, it is apparent that some differentiation of function exists within the organization, and that there is an element of hierarchy in this differentiation. Those sampled in Agency C are categorized at two functional levels - a combination administrator/line staff/policy-maker (the paid staff), and a line staff/administrator (volunteer). This division is based on the suggestion from one subject that there is a type of informal stratification within the co-
operative. The contact letter in this case was addressed to the co-operative.

Only Agencies E and F conform to the three-tiered model envisioned in Chapter Three. In these two organizations, a direct service provider, administrator, and policy-maker are interviewed. Though the variations in the choice of interview subjects between organizations may appear conceptually awkward, it is not really a problem. The point of sampling at three levels is to overcome several of the pitfalls noted in William Epstein's study - to avoid accepting a single perspective of the agency as correct. This, and more, is accomplished with the modified model. Part of the intent of the design of the study is to allow comparisons to be made between agencies. This design also allows comparisons to be made between functional levels. It might appear that the modification of the three-tiered model precludes comparisons - that while comparisons of Board members to Board members (for example) might be legitimate, comparisons of hospital Administrators to co-operative members to Board members is not. To this argument Glaser and Strauss reply:

"To be sure, these rules of comparability are important when accurate evidence is the goal, but they hinder the generation of theory, in which 'non-comparability' of groups is irrelevant. They prevent the use of a much wider range of groups for developing properties of categories. Such a range, necessary for the categories' fullest possible development, is achieved by comparing any groups, irrespective of differences or similarities, as long as the data apply to a similar category or
property."^5

Comparisons are valid so long as the categories to which the data apply are consistent. This principle provides an explanation for much of the development and application of the research instruments - the contact letters and the interview guide.

C. Data Collection

Categories of interest are clearly identified in the contact letters, and in the interview guide (see Appendices A and C). As the central issue of the research is privatization, and both the literature and the researcher's experience suggest that a variety of definitions exist for the term, Callahan and McNiven's description of the seven privatization initiatives undertaken in the child welfare field by the provincial government are included in the contact letters (see page 10 and 11). These letters are supplied to all interview subjects at the point when their participation is sought, and again, during the interview.

While it was assumed, prior to the data collection phase, that some sort of common language in discussing privatization would be necessary, it was believed that the inclusion of a formal definition of privatization might result in 'closing' the range of discussion of the topic to that definition. One goal of the study may be described as determining how voluntary agencies define privatization-
which would make the provision of a definition at the outset more a hindrance than a help. Callahan and McNiven's description is seen to have the advantage of being very broad, of avoiding the sense of finality and ideological bias inherent in some formal definitions, and of utilizing concrete examples of social policy, and thus enhancing its relevance for interview subjects. The inclusion of the seven initiatives in the contact letters was based partly on the researcher's perception that in the field the term privatization is synonymous with contracting. This raised a concern that without such a broad description provided to the interview subjects, discussion may be restricted to that sub-category of privatization, and the study would devolve into an investigation into the impact of contracting on voluntary organizations.

Though it can be assumed that the inclusion of Callahan and McNiven's description of privatization has some impact on the findings, the nature of its effect is unclear. Though the majority of interview subjects confine themselves to the parameters of privatization defined in the contact letters, there are exceptions. The Board member interviewed in Agency E provides a possible additional provincial privatization initiative - the alteration of regulations controlling casinos and lotteries in order to make funds from these sources more accessible to voluntary organizations. Another is suggested by the Coordinator in Agency A - the cessation
of programme development by the provincial government. This suggests that, at least for some, the provision of the description does not inhibit independent thinking about the topic area. The fact that most interview subjects offer their own definitions of privatization suggests that the provision of the description may not have altered the regnant interpretations of privatization held by those in the field. This subject will be covered in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six. Though the provision of Callahan and McNiven's description of provincial privatization initiatives may be an imperfect solution to the problem of how to focus the interviews without overly restricting them, it does elicit discussion of areas beyond contracting, and identify to the interview subjects the parameters of the area of interest of the researcher, and that is its primary intent.

The interview guide is designed to gather data on the subjects' perception of the relevance of each of the seven privatization initiatives to the agency, and the impact on the agency of each initiative they identify as relevant. In addition, the instrument includes questions intended to gather information on a variety of organizational factors, and the personal values and perceptions of the interview subjects (for reasons stated in Chapter Three).

Pre-testing of the research instrument took place in two phases, and eventually produced the third (and final) draft of the interview guide (see Appendix C). A variety of
problems were identified in the instrument after the first phase of pre-testing. Several questions were re-drafted to be more open, or clearer, and one redundant question was dropped. As a result of the first phase of pre-testing, subsequent drafts of the interview guide also include numbers, clarifiers, and follow-up 'probes' for each major question, as well as a section of closed questions intended to provide a description of the agency (and utilized to differentiate them in Table I), and the interview subject.

Following the second phase of pre-testing, a variety of minor alterations were made to the open and closed questions, several new probes were included, and it was decided to initiate each interview with a brief description of the study and the interview, and a reiteration of the subject's control over the process.

The third draft of the interview guide includes six major open-ended questions, with a clarifier and one or more probes following each of those six questions. This format follows what Patton (1980) terms a 'standardized open-ended interview'. The strengths of such an instrument are described by Patton as comparability of responses, facilitation of organization and analysis of the data, and the documentation of the instrument, which can then be evaluated. The weaknesses of the instrument are its lack of flexibility and the limited 'naturalness' of the questions, resulting from the standardized wording of questions. These
weaknesses were immediately evident when the third draft of the interview guide was put to use. Therefore from the beginning of the first interview, and in all subsequent interviews, the instrument was used more as a reference, with questions put to subjects closely approximating (but not precisely duplicating) those detailed in the guide. This format more closely approximates what Patton describes as the 'interview guide approach' - again, with some variation. In all but two interviews, the researcher retained the sequence of questions as they appear in the third draft of the interview guide. In most cases the transition between questions is quite natural - in fact, in many cases the response of subjects to one question lead logically to the next, making the provision of the next question in the sequence appear unforced, even conversational. In the two interviews in which the sequence is changed, this involves a simple reversal of the order of two major questions: that relating to organizational change, and that relating to the inter-organizational field. This was done because the respondent's answer to the previous question (on organizational structure) lead naturally to the latter topic, instead of the former. A final variation on the interview guide approach is the inclusion of a few totally unplanned probes in several interviews. Again, these arose naturally, and in all cases in response to some unexpected reply of the interview subject. For example, the suggestion by the
administrator of Agency A that a three-hundred percent increase in the organization's budget since 1981 could not be entirely attributed to privatization (since the agency would have expanded anyway) provoked the probe, "How would you have expanded your budget without privatization?" Such exchanges are typical of the least structured type of interview format described by Patton; the informal conversational interview. The advantage of this format is that questions are more relevant, and better matched to individuals and circumstances, though it can result in problems relating to the disparity of data. In short, though the research instrument designed for the study (and provided in Appendix C) indicates considerable structure, the type of interview actually in use is a hybrid of three differing types, and is less rigidly structured. Though the creation of this hybrid may raise some minor problems related to comparability, it has the advantage of enhancing the richness and complexity of the data.

Comparability is assumed to be adequately retained by the consistent use of questions from the third draft of the interview guide (despite some variation in the wording and sequencing of those questions), and by consistent categorization of the data gathered through those questions in the analytic phase of the study.12
D. Data Analysis

It was assumed prior to the start of the process of data analysis that comparisons of data grouped by question would require too many categories of analysis (since the interview guide contains twenty questions), would be inconsistent between subjects (since some were asked 'spur-of-the-moment' probes which were not addressed to others), and would be of questionable theoretical value. The point of grouping codes is to apply a framework in order to make sense of the data and thus generate theory. Therefore, grouping data and codes according to the questions in the third draft of the interview guide would be tantamount to saying that the theory is inherent in the questions - which would make the data redundant. The plan (as described in Chapter Three) is to analyze the data by coding it, and grouping those codes into categories defining the changes taking place in the organization. Even before analysis was begun it was known that those categories would have to be consistent between all participating agencies (to facilitate their comparison), and identifying the nature of them would have to await an examination of the data.

It was immediately apparent during the interviews (and evident during coding and memoing) that the information provided by the interview subjects describes a complex interactive process between a variety of facets of the organization, factors inherent in the decision-making
process of its personnel, and the effect on the agency of external variables (including provincial privatization initiatives). Complex issues necessitate complex codes. Glaser describes codes generated for an intensive care unit in a hospital as 'social loss', and 'attention'. It is assumed that, to avoid being cryptic, these would necessarily be accompanied by complex and exacting memos. In this study the researcher has chosen to be more graphic in his coding, and thus longer, more complex, and more numerous codes are generated. Examples are, "Competition for existing funding increasing", "The agency's presentation of itself as interested in contracting resulted in a response by government", and "Perception that universal access obviates most delivery by government." It could be argued that what has been generated out of the data in this study are not technically what Glaser and Strauss (1967) would describe as codes at all. What has been generated here might better be described as simple summarizing phrases - though for the purpose of this study the term 'code' will continue to be used. See Appendix E for an example of how these codes have been drawn from the data provided by the interviews, and Appendix H for a complete list of the codes generated in this study.

This divergence from the literature on qualitative methodology should not cause concern. As Strauss (1987) notes, the methods described in the literature should be
considered rules of thumb, not rules. In addition, it is evident that although the exact method of coding used in this study may differ from what is in the literature, it is evident that it fulfills the same function. Strauss indicates that coding:

"...(1) both follows upon and leads to generative questions; (2) fractures the data, thus freeing the researcher from descriptions and forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction; (3) is the pivotal operation for moving toward the discovery of a core category or categories; and so (4) moves toward ultimate integration of the entire analysis; as well as (5) yields the desired conceptual density (i.e. relationships among the codes and the development of each)."

In total, the seventeen interviews in this study generate 1207 codes, although this figure may be misleading in terms of the diversity this represents. As one goal of the study is a comparison of the perspectives of differing functional levels, as well as differing agencies, the researcher has chosen to code some similar responses twice, if they are offered by two different interview subjects—thus facilitating tracking of agreement between subjects when it occurs.

In the maelstrom of issues, opinions, and experiences offered in the data, the most clear pattern is temporal. It is apparent that respondents are describing the way things were, the problems encountered and resolved during the period immediately following the 'Restraint' budget of July, 1983, and the way things are now. Memos written during first-order coding helped to build a model defining these three phases,
and within which the vast majority of the data could be easily categorized. The first stage in the model covers a long period prior to July 1983, in which the history, traditions, and 'culture' of the agency (the pre-privatization status quo outside the agency, and the fundamental values of the interview subjects) are described. Based on impressions the researcher picked up during the interviews, this phase is titled 'Order' - reflecting the sense of nostalgia, and preference for the stability of this period that lay within the descriptions. The second stage covers the period between July 1983 and a rather vague point at which the sense of disorder following the 'Restraint' budget began to dissipate. This period is accordingly titled 'Chaos'. Though its beginning is clear, in many cases its end is not - but those codes which reflect present disorder, even if that disorder seems to extend directly from July 1983, are not categorized as a part of 'Chaos', but are grouped within the third phase: 'New Order'. The third phase is intended to represent the present status quo, whether or not stability has returned. The second and third phases of the model contain the interview subjects' perceptions of the impact of privatization on their agency, descriptions of the agency's response to privatization, the opinion of the subjects regarding the effectiveness of that response, and their rationale for that opinion. It seems apparent from the data that whatever new order exists is
somewhat tenuous, and yet the interview subjects have to varying degrees come to terms with privatization - they feel they now understand its properties.

It seems possible that in order to cope with chaos, we must form a theory about it, however incomplete, subjective, or tentative that theory might be. The third phase, New Order, contains the interview subjects' theories about privatization. However, in most cases these theories are merely implicit, and both the factors which have lead to the development of the theory and the implications of the theory for each agency (if the theory is used as an operating guide for the actions of that interview subject, in their role) are undefined. Providing further definition is one function of the second paradigm in use in the analytic process - the dimensional model.

Seven topic categories which could be treated extra-temporally, and which include factors describing the effects of, and response to, privatization in all agencies sampled (as well as the perspectives, opinions, and rationale of the various interview subjects), repeatedly arose during the interview and coding process. These categories are the mission and values of the agency, the role and values of the interview subject and other individuals (and small groups, such as the staff of a certain programme, or a committee of the Board) in the organization, the agency's financial resources, the agency's services, the organizational
structure of the agency, the organization's relationship to other agencies in the private sector, and the organization's relationship to the public sector (including bureaucrats and politicians, and the government as a service-provider and funder). The codes are categorized according to these seven dimensions, and according to the three stages of privatization, making the context of each organization, and changes in that context, more comprehensible. In addition, this model facilitates the comparison of those contexts and changes between agencies, and the comparison of the opinions of individual interview subjects (given that the source of each code, as agency and interview subject, is retained throughout the analytic process). For a graphic example of how the codes are broken down by subject, agency, dimension, and stage, see Table III in Appendix F.

Capturing the process of the development of the issues and opinions is accomplished through use of the Basic Social Processes (B.S.P.) model of analysis (applied here as the three phases described in the data). Identifying and elaborating upon the various factors involved in those issues and opinions is accomplished through use of the dimensional model (the seven topic categories drawn from the data). The two steps allow the complexity of the issues under study to be retained, while also placing the information drawn from the data in a pattern that makes it more comprehensible. Both are described as paradigms of theoretical coding by
Barney Glaser (1978), and though it is not suggested that they be used together, neither is it stated that they should not be.16

While this analytic model allows us to identify, track changes in, and compare (between both subjects and agencies) the issues of interest to this study, it alone cannot generate a theory of the impact of privatization on voluntary organizations which provide personal social services in Vancouver. To do so requires a further, integrating process - the interpretation of the data toward the identification of a core category. According to Strauss, a core category defines:

"Which dimensions, distinctions, categories, linkages are 'most important,' most salient-which, in short, are the core of the evolving theory..."17

This interpretation does not take place following the coding and categorization of the data, but during those processes, and they are as much affected by a search for a core category as the search for a core category is affected by them. Throughout this thesis it has been suggested that a variety of issues, and the relationships between them, are relevant to this study, and may have some implications for the theory which it may generate. It is argued that what happens to an agency as a result of provincial privatization initiatives involves the development of a variety of factors over time (the stages and dimensions in the analytic model), and is to some degree within the power of the agency to
control (and differs according to differing initiatives), that such control is exercised by individuals or small groups in each agency (in accordance with the internal structure of the organization which imbues those individuals or small groups with that control), and that those individuals or small groups exercise such control on the basis of some subjective rationale. It follows that the core category of interest to this study is the rationale (used by those in key decision-making positions in voluntary organizations) for the agency's response to privatization in those areas of effect over which the agency can exercise some discretion. It is assumed that their rationale is based on their interpretation of the goals of the provincial government in pursuing privatization, and that their interpretation has evolved according to their experience of the privatization process. Thus, as the interpretation of the government's motive for privatization held by the interview subjects may interact with each identified dimension of interest, and changes in that dimension over time, that interpretation is deemed to be the core category.

The next chapter will present the six case studies which have been created through the use of the methods described in this chapter. Chapter Six will compare and analyze those case studies. However, before presenting the findings of this study, two additional, and related, issues must be addressed - how the data has been verified, and how the
anonymity of the participants has been maintained.

**E. Ethical Issues**

That this thesis will not identify by name either the individual interview subjects or the participating agencies is a promise that was made to participants prior to each interview, and which has been kept (see the Interview Consent Form in Appendix B). Unfortunately, this promise falls short of a guarantee of anonymity, or ensuring that all information remains confidential. Several problems make such a guarantee impossible. The majority of the interview subjects have been referred to the researcher by the senior administrator in their organization - meaning that at least one other person knows of their participation (for a description of the process of contacting interview subjects see page 107 through 111). It is likely that any person in a given agency who is aware that this research has taken place in their organization will be able to identify from the description of the positions of those interviewed, the identity of the participants. It is even possible that a person who is familiar with the service network in Vancouver might be able to identify some of the participating agencies (and hence some of the interview subjects) simply by the descriptions of them that are provided. To thwart this the researcher might have avoided describing the agencies involved in this study, except that this would defeat an important goal of this
study, to put the impact of privatization into context, and would mean that the findings would have to be presented in a vacuum. Instead, an alternative solution has been found.

The 1207 codes generated by the data were divided according to the interview subject which is their source. A follow-up letter to all participants was then sent out - each letter containing the codes generated from that source (see Appendix A). The interview subjects were asked to check their codes for accuracy, to indicate which codes, if any, they felt would compromise them or their agency, and to provide that information to the researcher. As the findings are based upon these codes, it follows that if they are both accurate and deemed by the subjects not to compromise them, then the presentation of the findings is ethically sound. As a result of this tactic, a minority of interview subjects have requested changes be made to their codes. Less than a dozen codes have been altered in the interest of either accuracy, or maintaining the anonymity or confidences of participants. Most changes are minor, though several codes were very badly written, and the misinterpretations which might have occurred if they had not been re-written might have had quite serious consequences.

To summarize, remaining open to what is actually happening in the field has necessitated a process of problem solving, the constant intent of which has been to retain the complexity of the issues to be researched, and yet to
organize those issues in a manner that will enhance our understanding of them. That the nature of the issues under study is complex is self-evident. The methods chosen for data collection have been an attempt to retain the complex nature of the field, and the concerns of those in the field through the inclusion of diverse agencies, sampling at various functional levels within those agencies, and the use of an interview format that combines the advantages of structure with a degree of flexibility. The methods chosen for data analysis have been directed toward retaining the complexity of the data while placing it in a framework that will facilitate our making interpretations from it.

Notes to Chapter Four


6. note the range of bias and the sense of immutability of the following definitions of privatization:

"...an administrative approach to the conduct of public business...a theory of political economy and the responsibilities of government."

"...an exercise in symbolism, it signals the government's intention to respond to the challenges of change by strengthening the market at the expense of the state."


"...the action of making something private, or giving control of something to the private sector of the economy which has been controlled in the public sector."


7. The first phase of pre-testing involved two subjects (one a staff member, the other a Board member of a voluntary organization - both of whom were previously known by the researcher), and took place on January 11th and 12th, 1989. These problems were identified:

* a lack of consistency in responding to requests for clarification of questions,

* two questions proved to be closed - in both pretests subjects replied with a simple "yes" or "no", despite the interviewer's intent to elicit a more expansive response,

* a lack of guidelines for follow-up questions (or 'probes') in the event that the response to an open question by the interviewer fails to include an issue deemed to be of significant interest,

* several questions were unclear as written,

* one question was redundant,

* the lack of identifying numbers for each question made it difficult for the interviewer to reconstruct the interview from his notes, or associate data with specific questions.

8. The section of closed questions on the organization is intended to document, and therefore be better able to demonstrate, that the organizations chosen are alike in that they are non-profit agencies providing personal social services in Vancouver, but diverse in terms of size, years of
operation, community served, and primary funding source. Demonstrating that the agencies sampled are diverse is considered essential to the proposition that the theory generated by this study may apply to all voluntary organizations which provide personal social services in Vancouver, and should be tested for its application to that population.

As previously stated, control of who is interviewed may lie outside of the researcher, and it was perceived as possible, at the time that the interview guide was drafted, that while the agencies chosen may vary greatly, the characteristics of those interviewed might not. For example, if a subgroup such as administrators share a variety of perceptions and values, one might ask if it is because such are the common perceptions of administrators of voluntary agencies, or is it because they all happened to be caucasians between the age of 35 and 55 - or both? The closed questions on the subjects are intended to address this issue.

9. A second pair of pretest interviews, utilizing the second draft of the interview guide, were conducted on Jan. 25, 1989. The subjects were, once again, both previously known by the interviewer. One subject is a staff member of a large voluntary organization almost entirely funded by the provincial government, while the other is a Board member of the same small organization with which the previous two pretest subjects had been associated. The process of improving the research instrument was also enhanced by the comments of the thesis committee. The resulting changes to the third draft of the interview guide (see Appendix C) are:

* A minor alteration of the wording of one question in Part 1 (the closed questions), and the addition of a question in that section to determine how long the subject had been in their present position (since some subjects may have had a variety of positions in the organization),

* The alteration of questions 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, and the addition of a further question (2.1.5) to allow subjects more flexibility in describing their values and those of the agency, and still address the issue of the political orientation of the agency,

* The alteration of clarifier 2.2.2 to differentiate the concepts of power, authority and responsibility - thus allowing the subject to address issues of power more broadly,

* The alteration of question 2.4.1 to include relationships between agencies, programs or personnel, (as opposed to between organizations in the second draft), since one pretest
subject had indicated that some problems possibly associated with privatization are, in fact, more a result of the personal weaknesses of certain individuals in the organization. It may be possible that individuals are blamed for problems which might actually result from privatization - this re-wording is intended to raise these 'personal' issues if they exist.

* The inclusion of a probe (2.5.3) to determine whether any other government policies (in addition to, or instead of, those listed by Callahan and McNiven) might be having some significant impact on the organization. In one of the pretest interviews, one subject initially indicated that none of the policies described had any relevance to the organization - though this assertion was subsequently reversed.

Based on a degree of confusion expressed by one subject in the second phase of pre-testing, an additional change in the interview format was made. It was decided to begin each interview with a brief outline of what will be asked of the subject, who the information is for, how it will be handled (stressing confidentiality), and the purpose of collecting the information. In addition, each agency sampled will be offered a copy of the final draft of the thesis - hopefully a fair exchange for the time and effort contributed by the participants.


11. The data utilized in this study was collected through a series of seventeen interviews conducted between Jan. 27, and May 4, 1989.

12. Aside from the minor variations previously noted, there is only one significant deviation from the pattern above. In Agency C, the co-operative, only one interview was conducted - with three interview subjects present. This is the chosen means of participation of that organization, and makes sense within the context of the collectivist values which drive it. Unfortunately, with three persons responding to each question, it was apparent to the researcher that the interview would run over the time available, and the it was therefore decided to 'skip' a major question area - that relating to organizational change (2.3 in the third draft of the interview guide). The suggestion that we meet again to complete the interview was rejected - logistically the first (and only) interview with these subjects had been difficult to arrange, and therefore no second interview was scheduled. This might be seen to seriously compromise the study if it is assumed that the process of data analysis involves
comparisons of responses to specific questions between respondents. This would create a 'gap' in Agency C, since no data is available for comparison of the answer of that question between agencies. However, as the next section of this chapter shall demonstrate, the analytic process this study utilizes serves to reduce any negative effect of dropping one major question area from the analysis of data from one agency. There is no question that the responses to the missing question from those interviewed in Agency C would contribute to the study, but their absence is not a serious threat to the feasibility of generating theory from the data.


15. ibid., pp. 55-56.


CHAPTER FIVE
SIX CASE STUDIES

The purpose of this chapter is to present the six case studies which have been developed through the use of the methods described in Chapter Four. The issues addressed in each study cover the seven topic areas identified in the data (arrived at through use of the dimensional analytic model). The description of the development of those issues, and attempts to address them, cover the three phases identified in the data (arrived at through use of the B.S.P. analytic model). In addition, each case study will include a presentation of the unique concerns and opinions expressed by each interview subject in that agency. In the following chapter the case studies will be compared - similarities and differences in the experiences, actions, and perspectives of the participating organizations and interview subjects will be described and discussed, and the implications of these findings for the potential population of this study will be presented.

A. Expansion Through Contracting: Agency A

(1) Background

Founded before the Depression, this organization has a rich history of proactive community leadership in meeting the needs of individuals and families in Vancouver. It is perceived by both those within the agency, and the service
network around it, as a mainstream, 'establishment' organization. It is committed to the principle that families are the basic unit of society, and therefore that better-functioning families will mean a healthier society. In order to help families function better it has, throughout its history, stressed professionalism in service delivery. Professionalism is defined as the application, by staff, of the skills, knowledge, and values acquired through education and training. It follows that the direct service staff of Agency A all have substantial post-secondary academic credentials, and specialize in addressing specific problem areas, or in the provision of service to specific target groups, or both.

While the agency has always concentrated on maintaining a high level of expertise in its staff, and thereby provided high quality service, it has not placed an equal emphasis on maintaining a broad base of support in the non-professional community. Agency A is not a grassroots organization. The lack of grassroots support is an issue which does not appear to cause universal concern within the organization, though both the Executive Director and the Board have taken actions which would indicate that they view it as a real or potential problem for the agency. There have been efforts to make the composition of the Board more representative of the general population, and the senior administrator has attempted to incorporate small, struggling, grassroots organizations into
Agency A.

The fundamental mission of Agency A appears to have been untouched by privatization, though there have been some fairly recent changes in the organization's goals. It would be erroneous to state that those changes result from privatization, although it is fair to say that, to a large degree, their achievement is a result of privatization. It is suggested by one subject that privatization has carried the organization beyond its goals. In 1981 (two years before the provincial government's privatization policies might have been a factor in the decision-making process of voluntary organizations) the Board of Agency A decided to increase its funding base through securing the financial resources necessary to provide a broader range of services to a wider population. Though the mission of the organization is still to serve families, the definition of families (and therefore the mission of the agency) has expanded. This decision was a response to the financial difficulties the agency was experiencing at the time - which were in part a result of the separation from the organization of one of its most prosperous branches (which at the point of separation began independently serving its own geographic area). It may be important to note (particularly in the discussion of the agency's organizational structure, below) that the separation of the branch from Agency A involved, in addition to the financial loss, a fair amount of internal strife,
characterized by questions of centralized versus decentralized control over the organization.

If privatization had not been initiated as government policy in July 1983, the expansion of the agency would likely have been pursued through entrepreneurial means - the entrance of Agency A into more commercialized and competitive service markets within its broadened mandate. It seems likely that such expansion would have resulted in a less dramatic increase in the size of the organization, and might have significantly altered the nature of its services (as a result of the need to adapt to market forces). However, the provincial government's interest in contracting services to not-for-profit agencies has acted as an enabler for the organization to achieve its goal of expansion without moving toward an almost entirely market-driven model of service provision. There is no agreement within the organization as to whether or not competition for contracts has, in whole or in part, replaced the competition of the free market.

(2) The Effects Felt and the Agency's Response

Between 1981 and 1989 the total annual budget of Agency A increased from $600,000 to over three million dollars. Though public funding had always been a part of its budget, the expansion of the organization increased the proportion of the total revenue coming from government. Seventy-six percent ($2.5 million) of the total annual budget is public money, and eighty percent of that ($2 million) comes from the
provincial government - primarily through contracts. This increase in the financial resources of the agency has, in large measure, enabled it to reverse the deficit which prompted its decision to expand (through charging administrative fees to its contracts - allowing a variety of core costs to be covered). In addition, contracting has resulted in the organization serving a wide variety of new client populations. However, the method chosen for the expansion of the agency has resulted in four problems.

Though the Executive Director and the Board member interviewed do not agree, the direct-service provider suggests that the diversity of the contracts accepted by Agency A, has carried the organization beyond its mandate of serving families, into undefined territory. This is perceived as a problem because it may result in the diffusion of the organization's identity. This in turn can result in the loss of a sense of common purpose, or esprit d'corps, amongst its staff (a reduction in their commitment to the mission of the agency), as well as confusion both inside and outside the agency regarding its place in the social services network around it.

There is more general agreement on the other three problems associated with the expansion of the agency by contracting. As the agency has expanded, there have been changes in its hierarchical structure. Lines of accountability and communication have become more vertical,
and more formalized. An additional level of middle-management was added. It is acknowledged by all subjects interviewed that this process has been difficult for the staff of those programmes which have been operated by Agency A since before its expansion. The Board member interviewed, and Executive Director, maintain that this change has been necessary in order to centralize control over the organization (based on the judgement that the organizational confusion which can characterize decentralized control may have contributed to the separation of the branch of the agency in 1981), and to ensure the kind of financial and professional accountability necessary to administer, and maintain the quality of, the new contracted services. In addition, the Executive Director acknowledges a personal preference for this organizational structure and leadership style. This is in sharp contrast to the more horizontal decision-making structure and collaborative style which were employed by the previous Executive Director (who lead the organization up until shortly after the separation of the branch agency in 1981). The problem, judging from information provided by the line staff person interviewed, is that some employees may feel that this structure has been developed at their expense - that it equates to an uncompensated loss of their control over their working environment. It is suggested that there is a dissonance between the inherent collectivist values of social work, and
the stratification of decision-making in Agency A. Under the present system, some staff have even avoided taking advantage of those opportunities when their input has been invited. The result is tension between the staff and management of the organization - exacerbated by the perceived diffusion of the agency's identity, and exemplified by conflicts over issues associated with the operation of the organizational structure (such as the dispute over increasing user-fees, below).

The third problem involves the dilemma created when an organization dedicated to its clients, and having for much of its history performed a social reform role on their behalf (through advocating for changes in government policy, or improvements in public services), finds itself to some degree dependent on government funding. The extent of Agency A's dependence on the public sector is an issue over which there is no apparent agreement between those interviewed-although all indicated that the organization is neither totally independent of, nor totally dependent on, the government. There is also no agreement on the degree to which the agency has restricted its efforts to advocate for its clients as a result of its dependence. Such a restriction would stem from a perception that advocating for changes to public social policy may lead to retribution from the government (in the form of non-renewal of contracts, or even 'blacklisting' the organization). The Executive Director cautions that the cost an agency pays for publicly
criticizing the government is its contracts. The direct
service provider observes that while the agency has acted as
an advocate, this has not been pursued as often as some staff
feel it has been needed. The Board member interviewed
suggests that the interests of the organization may be
furthered if it co-operates with the government's agenda.
Though it seems likely that the agency's need for continued
funding through provincial contracts has implications for how
often (and how vociferously) it acts as a public advocate for
its clients, it is unclear just how much this has acted to
control what the organization has done. Some efforts at
publicly addressing social issues have been successfully
undertaken, though these have made no mention of government
policy. This could be interpreted as evidence that the
organization has sold a part of its social reform role for
the contract money it receives, or simply as evidence that,
even as an advocate, Agency A is (as it always has been)
very much a part of the establishment.

A final problem associated with the expansion of the
agency is the apparent inability of contracting alone to meet
the financial needs of the organization. Alternately, this
problem could be framed as the organization's need to have
more funds over which it has autonomous control, or its need
to reduce its dependency on government (by generating more
funds of its own). The search for scarce funds, coupled with
the need to maintain the flow of present funding, have meant
that Board members have adopted a more direct role in raising supplementary funds, and in lobbying politicians and senior government bureaucrats who control the awarding and renewal of contracts. The special skills, personal background, and time which those undertaking these tasks must have has contributed to an increasing problem in the composition of the membership of the Board of Directors - it is becoming less representative of the general population (which the agency serves), and more representative of an economic and social elite (who are more likely to have the needed skills, background and time). As stated, this problem is being addressed, yet it is in one sense a problem which has been intentionally created. While both the Board and the Executive Director have been actively striving to make the spectrum of those responsible for policy-making more representative (primarily geographically, and ethnically), they also both acknowledge the advantage of including on the Board certain members from higher social and business strata, and those with connections in government. The Board's composition, and its fundraising activities, are also a concern to staff. The line worker interviewed suggests that though it may be effective, personal lobbying may result in the political positioning of the agency (which all agree is, and must remain, a non-partisan organization), is very likely an inefficient way to connect society's resources with its real needs, and has the potential to be ethically
questionable.

Several of the problems experienced within Agency A as a result of its expansion through contracting are exemplified by a fairly recent dispute over the decision to increase user fees in one of its non-contracted programmes. Though the policy maker and senior administrator identify the decision to increase fees as having been made at the Board level, it is clear that the line staff person interviewed perceives the decision as having been the Executive Director's, and it is possible that this opinion is shared by many staff. Given the centralized structure of the agency, and the Board's reliance on the senior administrator for information and guidance, it seems likely that what in fact occurred was the acceptance by the Board of a recommendation from the Executive Director for a partial solution to a problem which both the Board and Executive Director had previously identified as serious - the agency's need for more funds which it could autonomously allocate. The Executive Director invited the staff to offer their perspectives on the implications of the increase, but made it clear that the final decision on the issue would be the Board's. The staff strongly objected to the increase, though in their objection there were overtones of opposition to the decision-making structure itself (the request for their input may have appeared to be tokenism), and the perceived ideological basis of the decision - which may have been interpreted as a
further step toward a market model of delivery, a capitulation to the government's refusal to take responsibility for properly financing social services (demonstrated by turning that responsibility over to clients, instead of demanding that the government accept responsibility), and perhaps even as evidence of the change in the ideological bias of the Board (which might be perceived to result from its increasingly elitist nature, and the associations of its members with politicians and senior bureaucrats). In short, the debate was charged with far more than the relatively simple question of the impact of an increase in cost on consumption. In the end, the fees were increased.

The two advantages (reversal of the deficit, and new, broader services), and four problems (identity diffusion, staff-management tension, threat to the advocacy role, and the need for supplementary funds) identified can all be described as the indirect effects of contracting - a provincial privatization initiative over which the organization has exercised some control (through the discretion of its personnel). Some privatization initiatives affected the agency more directly. Both the senior administrator and line staff person indicate that since the reduction or elimination of public services in 1983, client demand has increased. Inappropriate referrals, a result of a lack of alternate resources, are not uncommon. However, in
Agency A, the most significant issues associated with privatization involve contracting, and the ramifications of using contracts as a means to expand the agency. While the decision to expand was the Board's, and cannot be linked with privatization, the choice of the means to expand, and control over the process of expansion have rested in large part on the decision-making orientation of the Executive Director—the result of the centralization of authority in the organization.

(3) The Rationale for the Response

A simplistic assumption would be that the Executive Director is ideologically conservative, and that this has therefore contributed to the decision of the agency to advance both the privatization policies of the government (also simplistically viewed as ideologically motivated), and its own financial needs, through pursuing contracts. This assumption would be compatible with William Epstein's (1988) conclusions, but is incompatible with the data provided by the subjects from this organization. The senior administrator's belief system reflects a hybrid of Fabian socialism ('social justice' and 'collective provision'), as well as a commitment to professional goals (such as local responsiveness to social needs, and academic qualifications for service-providers). An alternate explanation of the choices made by the Executive Director, and therefore of the actions taken by the agency, may be found in an examination
of the senior administrator's understanding of the rules governing the new relationship of the organization and the public sector - the provincial government's motives for privatizing social services.

The Executive Director's answer to question 2.6.1 in the interview guide ("What do you think is the government's motive in pursuing these policies - what are they trying to achieve?") indicates a firm belief that public social policy is best explained as a manifestation of the populist orientation of government politicians - and by extension, their role as the representatives of a predominantly conservative mainstream. However, an examination of the data provided by the Executive Director suggests a far broader understanding of the variety of motives the government may have, and includes the Popularity, Neoconservatism, Paternalism, and Patronage theories of privatization (as described in Chapter Two), in addition to two other hypotheses which have not been previously defined in this study.

Despite the diversity, it is clear that the senior administrator considers the populist sentiments of the Social Credit government, as well as their concern over their popularity, to be the two crucial factors which combine to explain what the government has done, and why it has done it. This provides a credible explanation for a number of actions of the Executive Director, and the agency. The use of
contracts as a means for expansion is compatible with the belief that the goal of privatization is not the abandonment of state responsibility for social services, but a means to empower the private sector. The efforts to incorporate grassroots organizations can be understood as an attempt to balance the professionalism of the organization (which may give what the agency does a ring of elitism - a death knell under a populist government). The caution expressed by the Executive Director regarding the potential implications of public advocacy is justified if one accepts that the government views entering the public arena as synonymous with entering the political arena.

The decision-making orientations of the Board and the staff are also of interest, as they appear to have played a role in the process of problem creation and resolution which has accompanied expansion. If one accepts the views of the policy-maker and the direct service provider as fairly representative of the stratum from which they are drawn within Agency A (although statistically there is no justification for this, they both identified some of their opinions as shared by many in their respective groups), the decrease in organizational cohesiveness which seems to have accompanied expansion becomes more comprehensible. In their answers to question 2.6.1 both interview subjects identify privatization as primarily motivated by neoconservative ideology - and all similarity between their views ends there.
The Board member is a self-described conservative who perceives privatization as motivated by more than just ideology - it is seen as necessitating the use of personal contacts in the process of deciding on the allocation of public resources, toward the maintenance of a paternal role for the government in regard to how it addresses social needs. As with the Executive Director, the data provided by the policy-maker interviewed suggests a broad understanding of the rules of the game, and touches on all of the theories presented in Chapter Two, and more. However, the central theme of the Board member's view is most compatible with the Paternalism theory - and is not entirely incompatible with the subject's own values. It is possible that the staff's perception of that compatibility has, in part, sparked some of the conflict between them and the management of Agency A.

The staff person interviewed is a self-described socialist who perceives privatization as a move by the government toward the abandonment of its financial and moral responsibility to address social needs, and secondarily as a means for politicians to buy friends and popular support. Privatization and the changes in the organizational structure of the agency are perceived as inextricably linked - the change in the structure would have been unnecessary without the expansion of the agency, and the expansion of the agency would have been minimal without the opportunity provided by privatization. Both the increase in the hierarchy of the
agency and privatization are seen as antithetical to the mission of the agency, and the tenets of professional social work. If these views are widespread amongst the staff, it would help to explain the apparent ideological overtones to their opposition to the increase in user-fees.

Privatization has had a significant impact on Agency A, though it is likely that its effects would have been minimal without the active participation of the organization in the process of privatizing social services (through contracting). Contracting has facilitated the achievement of many of the agency's goals, and has created a variety of problems with which it has had to cope. Judging by the data provided by the three subjects interviewed in the organization, the agency is still some distance from solving those problems, since there is little consensus regarding their nature. What is common to all three subjects interviewed in Agency A is that their actions have been toward the protection of their organization - its mission and values as they perceive them, as well as its programmes, and the people they serve. The differences between the subjects are their perceptions of what the organization needs to be protected from.

B. Maintaining Independence: Agency B

(1) Background

This organization is the oldest sampled, and may have the highest public profile. It has provided services to
women and their children since before the turn of the century. As the role of women in society has changed, so has Agency B - sometimes as a leader of that change, and sometimes as a follower. The present mission of the organization (which appears to be unaltered in the wake of privatization) is to strive for the empowerment of women. Toward that end it provides a range of social services (operated on a not-for-profit basis), as well as a variety of profit-making services (which are operated in a competitive market). The purpose of the organization is not to make a profit, but to provide the services which women need - those which make a profit subsidize those which cannot. The social service staff of the agency are feminists - defined as persons committed to advancing women to a position of economic and social equality with men. However, within the network of organizations serving women, Agency B is perceived as fairly conservative. The agency has always employed both volunteers and professionals - the nature of the service being the prime determinant of which is used. Agency B also has the broadest community base (as indicated by the numbers of its members) of all the agencies sampled - it can be equally well described as both grassroots, and professional.

There is general agreement amongst those interviewed in Agency B that one of the most significant recent changes in the organization was the replacement of its senior administrator, two years prior to this study. The previous
Executive Director occupied that position for a very long period, had a social work background, and utilized a more collaborative model of decision-making than the present Executive Director. The present Executive Director's leadership style places more emphasis on hierarchical order, though there has been no structural alteration of the organization, and it is evident that considerable collaboration and communication amongst the Board and senior managers continues. However, one interview subject suggested that the contrast in style has caused a considerable reaction amongst staff in Agency B, and may have been a factor in a significant amount of turnover amongst senior staff in the past two years.

The new senior administrator's background is in business, and at one point in the past, in municipal politics outside of the Vancouver area. The Executive Director believes in individualism, free enterprise, entrepreneurialism, and feminism. This subject's personal opposition to collectivist ideas is mitigated by a desire to achieve certain goals for women, which are perceived to obviate the participation of the public sector. Privatization is considered a good idea which has been badly mishandled by the provincial government. The senior administrator believes in volunteerism, and addressing social problems through voluntary means (as opposed to coercive means such as taxation). Though this is seen as one goal of
privatization, the government's high-handed avoidance of consultation in its implementation, and its evident disregard for its responsibility to properly ensure the provision of certain services (such as daycare - a necessity for the creation and maintenance of a level playing field in the future operation of the market), mean that these policies hold little promise for women, or Agency B. Government politicians are viewed as ideologues, and many of their policies as paternalistic. The Executive Director's view is compatible with the Neoconservatism and Paternalism theories of privatization, and also incorporates elements of the Popularity theory and one additional hypothesis not otherwise described in this study. In considering the impact of privatization on Agency B, the change in senior administrators (long after the provincial policy changes wrought in July, 1983), the increased use of hierarchy by the new person in that position (which tends to increase the control the Executive Director has over the organization), and the perspective of privatization held by the new senior administrator combine to provide a credible explanation for how the organization has responded to privatization.

(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response

Following the 'Restraint' budget and the implementation of privatization by the provincial government in 1983, there was a dramatic increase in the demand on Agency B's non-contracted, non-profit social services. Resources for single
mothers and women on welfare seemed to disappear overnight. Agency B experienced an influx of more severe cases, involving client needs beyond the capacity of its staff or programmes to address, at the same time as the caseloads of its workers increased. Stress and burnout amongst the social services staff became an increasing problem. In addition, the previously-existing referral networks (for clients which were beyond the agency's means to serve) broke down - in large part because government services and workers which had been a part of that system were either terminated, or too overloaded to continue to function effectively. Re-establishing the referral and resource network through consultation and co-operation with other agencies (primarily in the voluntary sector) has been an ongoing process for the past six years.

In response to these direct effects of privatization, Agency B increased the numbers of its direct service staff providing individual counselling and group work. This in turn lead to a further issue which needed to be addressed. The additional staff required to meet the demand created by privatization resulted in increased expenditure on social services, with no concomitant increase in revenue. Even in a financially healthy organization such as Agency B the balance between the red and the black can be delicate, and the chosen response to privatization therefore contributed to the decision to seek additional money through supplementary
fundraising.

What Agency B did **not** do in response to privatization is of equal interest to this study as what it did do. The organization did not seek contracts as a means of raising additional funds to off-set the increased costs of its social services. According to the Executive Director this represents a conscious policy of the organization - it is committed to reducing the amount of funding it receives from the government. This will not be accomplished by eliminating government-funded services, but by finding alternate (and primarily entrepreneurial) means for supporting them.

Agency B does receive funds from all three levels of government. This has, throughout most of its history, been a method used to provide services deemed by the organization to be necessary. However, it is agreed by all four subjects interviewed that no contract taken on before or since the province's move to privatize social services has been sought with the intent of raising money. Contracts are selected on the basis of the perceived need for the service they provide to the community, and their fit with the mission of the organization. The result of this attitude to the incorporation of publicly-funded services into the organization is twofold - Agency B has relatively few contracted services, and it is independent of the government.

In defense of its integrity, any agency might make similar claims regarding its contracting criteria, or its
independence. However, these claims might be called into question if the agency actually needs the income from contracts to support its core, or if the services provided through contracts dwarf those provided through the core budget. One might ask what would be left if the contracts are eliminated, if that would bear any resemblance to what the organization is with the contracts, and to what degree a commitment to maintain the income and services provided, or to receive additional needed funds, through contracts acts as a motivator for the actions of the agency (in addition to, or as opposed to, the mission of the organization in isolation). In the case of Agency B, independence can be demonstrated.

Government contributions total only thirteen percent of the total budget of Agency B. If they were totally eliminated, eighty-seven percent of the organization would remain. Provincial contributions account for only ten percent of the total budget, meaning that the organization's financial state is even less dependent on provincial funding specifically. However, this may be misleading in regard to the social services the agency provides. Public funds go toward the support of social services exclusively, and totals thirty-two percent of that department's budget. If government support was eliminated, one third of the social services budget would disappear, though this is still a small proportion, relative to the other agencies sampled (see Table
I). What may be most important to consider is the fact that other programmes operated by the organization are not dependent on the income brought in by its contract services. All subjects, and the dollar figures, agree - the core represents most of what the agency does, is the most important part of what the agency does, and is independent of the government.

An example cited by all four interview subjects graphically demonstrates the organization's policies regarding contracting. Shortly after July, 1983, the provincial government approached Agency B and requested that it take over a social service which was to be contracted to the private sector. The service was clearly within the bounds of the mission of the organization. After some preliminary investigations, the decision was made to accept the contract (though it is unclear if the decision was made by the previous Executive Director or by the Board). The decision was based in large part on the perception that the service might be eliminated if a sponsoring organization could not be found. Unfortunately, the contract brought with it a variety of unforeseen problems. Organized labour was clearly antagonized, and this created some difficulties for Agency B, but a far more serious and immediate issue was the reaction of the service's existing staff. They apparently resented the transfer of the service to the private sector generally, and to Agency B specifically (all interview
subjects suggest that the staff were radical feminists, and
that they reacted against what they perceived as the
conservative values of Agency B). The service eventually
came to be seen as unmanageable, and the contract was not
renewed by Agency B. Choosing not to renew a contract is an
extremely rare action for an organization - one which
requires not only that the agency have a clear vision of its
own goals and their operationalization, but also that it is
able to make decisions based on that vision without the
interference of its own financial needs.

(3) Rationale for the Response

The response of Agency B to privatization, at least over
the past two years, makes a great deal of sense when one
considers the perspective of the Executive Director. The
view that privatization is motivated by neoconservatism
should lead logically to an avoidance of contracting with
governments pursuing such policies toward the achievement of
their ideological goals - since responsibility for the
continuation of such funding is liable to be shed as the
government moves toward the minimal state. The practical
alternative of those with that view is to seek alternative
sources of funds which will foster the independence of the
organization. In this case the chosen alternatives have been
supplementary fundraising and profit-making ventures in
competitive markets - although, as the policy-maker
interviewed observes, this means the organization becomes
dependent on the market.

Though the turnover in staff previously noted may indicate that there was some internal disagreement over the Executive Director's vision of the public and private sector relationship, and the place of Agency B within that, there is a great deal of agreement between the data provided by the interview subjects. All but one identify privatization as motivated by neoconservative ideology. The administrator of Agency B's social services department, while acknowledging the ideological basis for much of what the Social Credit government has done, indicates that the apparent contradictions in their policies make their motives unclear—and specifically cites the introduction of the Family Initiatives programme as a contributor to this sense of policy chaos (see Chapter Two). All interview subjects also rank paternalistic motives as fairly high on the government's agenda.

In the case of Agency B, the primary impact of privatization has been, and continues to be, felt by those it serves. It cannot be said that since the organization has avoided contracting for as many services as possible for those clients it has done less than it might have done to address their needs - since it has not been in the power of the organization to dictate to the provincial government what contracts it will offer, and it has co-operated with other organizations which have chosen to take those contracts. The
actions of Agency B reflect the values of the organization and its personnel, the vision of privatization held by its senior administrator (and other individuals in key decision-making roles), its organizational structure (which allows that vision and those values to be operationalized), and a very unique economic situation (which provides a broad funding base uncharacteristic of most voluntary organizations).

C. Resisting Compromise: Agency C

(1) Background

The mission, decision-making structure, staffing, and values of this organization reflect its origins as a product of the women's movement. It is the newest agency sampled (having been founded in 1982), has the smallest total budget, and may be the most radical of the organizations in this study. The purpose of Agency C is to eradicate violence from the lives of women, and this is perceived by those interviewed as a part of a broader movement to empower women. It provides counselling and referral services to victims of rape and wife-battering, community education on the issues of violence against women, and acts to facilitate the involvement of women in the feminist movement. Agency C is operated as a co-operative - a structure which operationalizes the values of the people in the organization.

Collective decision-making is a logical extension of the
mission of the organization. This organizational structure reflects a collective opposition to systems which are the product of an androcentric society, to the social and economic domination of one gender by the other which is perpetuated by those systems, and to the violence which is a manifestation of that domination. Though there is division of function within the organization, formal stratification is avoided. This value extends even into the worker-client relationship - direct service staff and volunteers avoid creating an aura of professional expertise, which is seen to imbue the worker with special status. Clients are respected as equals. The fundamental values of Agency C result in a low priority being placed on the professional accreditation of its staff. Demonstrated skill, and a commitment to feminism and the mission of the organization, supercede formal education as the criteria for their selection. Agency C is a non-professional organization which retains close ties with the grassroots of the feminist movement.

(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response

One of the two staff interviewed indicates that the most profound effect of the privatization initiatives announced by Grace McCarthy on July 26, 1983 has been on the clients served by Agency C. The reduction or elimination of services for women generally, and for the victims of violence in particular, has significantly increased the numbers of clients being referred to, or requesting service from, the
organization. This has meant that the staff and volunteers of Agency C have had to cope with greater stress, and the organization has had to increase its efforts to recruit and train volunteers. Hoping to secure more resources in order to meet the increased demand, the organization has also increased its fundraising efforts, and recently contracted with a profit-making company to pursue this for them. In addition, privatization has had a negative impact on the service network. There has been increased competition between Agency C, and other organizations which provide similar services, to locate and secure scarce funds - though efforts to co-operate and co-ordinate services have continued, and have reduced the negative effects of competition on clients. However, much of the data provided by all interview subjects indicates that the organization has struggled with a far more difficult problem related to the provincial government's privatization policies - one which threatens the existence of Agency C.

Since its inception the primary funding source for Agency C has been provincial government contracts. At present, $96,000 (or eighty percent) of the total budget of $120,000 comes from that source alone. Though the result of this degree of dependence on government funding may be unclear in some organizations, the nature of Agency C makes its effect unmistakable. Contracting has threatened to bureaucratize the organization.
Weber envisioned bureaucracy as a rational order far superior to the systems of lineage, clans, chiefs, and big men which had previously governed society.\textsuperscript{11} According to Weber, to operate efficiently a bureaucratic system requires a hierarchical structure, rests on documentation, and is operated by professionals:

"...The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones...

...The management of the modern office is based upon written documentation...

...Office management, at least all specialized office management...usually presupposes thorough and expert training..."\textsuperscript{12}

The problem encountered by Agency C is the threat of a gradual erosion of its structure and its values (and thereby its mission) as a result of the pressure to conform which is exerted by the funding source upon which it is dependent. According to both staff interviewed, the policies of the provincial government, and the practices of its bureaucrats, make it difficult for the organization to operate as a collective and maintain its values regarding the worker-client relationship. It is apparent that the government would prefer Agency C to operate as a bureaucracy (to adopt a hierarchical system similar to its own), and abandon its commitment to guarding the privacy, and respecting the decisions, of those it serves.

In the contracting process, government bureaucrats make
demands that Agency C conform to their expectations regarding financial and service accountability. While there is no apparent problem regarding the rules of managing funds, to the government, service accountability includes documenting the names and other particulars of clients which have been served - which has been a consistent source of conflict with Agency C. In addition, it has been repeatedly suggested that the direct service personnel of the agency should encourage clients to report to the police - which the organization's workers have refused to do. Both expectations of government are based on values which could be described as inherent in the bureaucratic system (documentation and deference to authority), but conflict with the fundamental values of the agency. When this has been pointed out by the organization's personnel, the government has subtly suggested that the values of Agency C may cost them the contract - that less principled organizations may be willing to meet the government's expectations. This is perceived by the staff interviewed as putting pressure on Agency C to abandon its feminist values, and as evidence that the government's agenda in contracting services includes an effort to gain and maintain control by turning the leaders of potentially troublesome social movements into docile service-providers.

In addition, the government can stonewall efforts by the organization to provide public information services that are
based on a feminist perspective. Government approval for an educational project has been repeatedly postponed because it suggests that female victims of violence are not always well treated by the legal system. This is interpreted by the staff as evidence that government allocations are self-serving, and based more on its own needs (for control) than the needs of women.

The pressure to conform is not limited to the period of contract negotiation. It is not uncommon for government personnel to express impatience with, or disapproval of, the decision-making structure of the agency - they want to know who is 'in charge', or they suggest that the system is inefficient. Staff themselves have found that the increasing complexity of public bureaucracy makes it difficult to deal with government red tape unless decisions can be made more quickly than the organizational structure will allow (though none of the subjects would trade their system for a hierarchy). In addition, statistics which the organization provides to the government as a means of maintaining accountability have been questioned. These statistics frequently show much higher rates of violence against women than official public records (of reported rapes, assaults, etc.). It is subtly suggested by some in the public sector that Agency C might be inflating its figures because of its feminist orientation. The message is that if the organization was to report less violence against women, that
it would be perceived to have greater credibility - and might have a more stable funding base.

Data provided by the staff suggests that pressure to adopt a more bureaucratic system has been a problem in other organizations serving a similar population - and that as a result some of those organizations can only be nominally described as feminist. Both staff indicate that although Agency C has in large part resisted the pressures which may lead to its bureaucratization, that concessions have been made. They perceive the organization as being pulled irresistibly into the mainstream, slowly evolving toward a service-provider role. The volunteer interviewed questions whether such a movement would be entirely negative for the organization, or women generally.

(3) The Rationale for the Response

The perspective of the interview subjects regarding the government's motive for privatization follow logically from their experience in Agency C, and provide a credible explanation for the resistance of the organization to the pressures which have characterized its relationship with the provincial government. In response to question 2.6.1 in the interview guide, all three subjects indicate a belief that the government is attempting to pursue an ideological agenda through privatization. In addition, one of the staff identifies motives compatible with the Paternalism and Patronage theories (defined in Chapter Two), and the second
staff member provides an explanation not otherwise defined in this study (that the government is confused). A scan of the data of all three subjects indicates a consistent theme of paternalism in their perspectives of actions of the government. As such motives are diametrically opposed to the mission of the agency, and the values of the subjects personally (which are assumed to be fairly commonly held within the organization), it follows that the primary response of the agency has been to resist the process of compromise inherent in the bureaucratization of the organization - a threat resulting from the dependence of the organization on government contracts. This also suggests that bureaucratization is either a tool used by the government to control non-conformist organizations, or that bureaucracy is inherently a system based in patriarchal values.

The impact of privatization, in the form of contracting, was felt by Agency C at the time of its founding - a year before the 'Restraint' budget. Unlike some organizations, where the impact was felt suddenly, for Agency C it has been a constant pressure pushing the organization away from its own goals, and toward those of the government. In 1983 this problem was compounded by an increase in the numbers of clients needing service, and a deterioration in the service network. Though the efforts of the agency to address these additional problems has to some extent avoided their most
negative effects, the organization's dependence on provincial funds has not decreased, while at the same time, the apparent willingness of the government to use that dependence to its advantage seems to have increased.

D. Privatization as Liberation: Agency D

(1) Background

This agency was founded shortly after World War II, and was initially operated by the government as a hospital. In the 'Fifties and 'Sixties it was adapted to serve exclusively as a residence for the physically challenged. The services of the facility have always been primarily health-related, concentrating on providing the medical care necessary to ensure the well-being of its residents. However, as the concept of well-being evolved, the provision of personal social services by qualified, professional social workers became a part of the spectrum of services offered by Agency D. Social work remains a relatively minor facet of what the agency provides, as is reflected by the allocation of funds to the social services department. Though this organization has by far the largest total annual budget of all those sampled ($14 million), it has the second-smallest social services budget ($250,000).

During the period prior to 1983 the organization's values suited the prevailing concept of the needs and abilities of the handicapped, and the proper way to meet
those needs. The agency attempted to provide, within the facility, for everything the patients needed. The result of this was that those who came into the care of the organization had no need to develop their independence, or even to leave the facility and take part in the mainstream of society. Despite significant changes in the organization, some still perceive it as having the same values, and providing the same service as it did in that period.

(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response

The July 1983 announcement by the provincial government of its intent to privatize social services set in motion a process of negotiation that lead (in 1984) to the agency being transferred to the voluntary sector, via a contract with an established not-for-profit society which was, and still is, responsible for another facility.

The effect of privatization on this (now) voluntary organization has been profound. The change in the agency's relationship with the public sector has wrought direct changes in its organizational structure, and some problems in terms of its financial resources (which are increasingly an issue). More significantly, privatization has allowed Agency D to autonomously identify the values from which it will operate, and therefore to redefine its mission, adapt its services to that mission, and develop a new role in the network of organizations serving the physically challenged.

The transfer of the agency to the voluntary sector in
1984 meant that Agency D would no longer be directly accountable to the government, which obviated a redesign of the decision-making structure of the organization. Though the senior administrator of the agency is accountable to the Executive Director of the not-for-profit society which operates it, that umbrella organization permits a high degree of discretion in the methods of the facility's management. The structure which has been utilized over the past three years reflects the management style of the present senior administrator. It is not clear what structure was employed between 1984 and 1986. The system in use is described by that interview subject as a 'fairly flattened hierarchy'. The reason this structure was chosen is the senior administrator's perception that a completely horizontal structure results in difficulties related to the integration of ideas - and an awareness that the changes which would have to be made would require integration. The role of the senior administrator is seen to be to provide guidance and direction, and to facilitate the bringing together of good ideas.

The other two interview subjects (the Director of the Social Services department, and a line social worker who has been the Acting Director of that department) both express a high degree of satisfaction with the present organizational structure, describing it as promoting departmental and professional autonomy, and crediting the senior administrator
with increasing the efficiency of the organization through its implementation. The line social worker interviewed (the only subject employed prior to 1984) contrasts the present system with what is described as a rigidly hierarchical structure which existed prior to privatization - one which centralized the control of the agency in the position of the senior administrator, who was ultimately accountable to government. It is noted that the old system kept social workers in a perpetual bind regarding their role as advocates. As the lines of accountability and policy extended up into the government, line workers were never in a position where they could advocate for changes in government policies - since to do so would mean confronting their own employer. Since 1984, this problem has been removed (though the problem of advocating for changes in agency policy apparently remains). With the new system for communication and decision-making in place, the organization was able to address a variety of its own deficits, and incorporate new ideas and values regarding the services it provided.

The traditional medical approach to service provision stressed doing things for clients, not enhancing their ability to do things for themselves. In keeping with broad changes in society's attitude to the physically challenged, Agency D is now committed to bringing together skilled, professional resources toward maximizing the autonomy of those it serves. Though the management of the organization
has fairly universally adopted this new set of values regarding its purpose, and has created (in co-operation with clients and workers), a new mission statement based on the dual goal of maintaining professional standards of care and enhancing the independence of those it serves, it is clear that operationalizing these values presents some problems.

The social services administrator interviewed notes that any institution operates to some degree for the convenience of staff, and exists to organize disparate resources, and it is apparent that this factor has made it difficult to uniformly pursue the goal of enhancing client autonomy. All subjects note that a wide variety of decisions are made, and problems resolved, at the lowest level of the organization's hierarchy - the client and the direct care giver. The operational imperative at that level is more often expediency than the new mission of the agency, and altering the orientation of staff to conform to the goals of the organization has proven difficult. The senior administrator suggests that this may, in part, be a result of the personal and professional threat the new mission poses for some personnel - they have been told for years to do everything for residents, only to be told now that all the care they painstakingly provided may have actually harmed those they served (by denying them the right to be full and active members of society). As so much of what the agency does rests on the care provided to its clients, this inconsistent
follow-through on the direct-service level could be described as a serious impediment to the organization's pursuit of its goals.

At least for those from the Board level to the management level of the organization there is a perception that the achievement of its new goals requires efforts to alter more than just the immediate care that is given in the facility. The role of the organization in society is seen to be changing, and interest in advocacy and education is growing. The agency has an active out-patient ward, has either co-operated in or spearheaded efforts to create new resources to house and serve its target population, and has (with the leadership of the social services department) worked to make discharge of residents wishing to live in the community outside of the facility a very real possibility. In addition, Agency D has worked to create within it new resources which have been identified as needed by the community (such as specialized wards for under-served client groups). A common factor in the creation of all of these services has been a new and still developing role for the organization in the network of services for the physically-challenged. Internally (and increasingly, externally) Agency D is no longer thought of as simply a residence - it is a resource for the community (including individual physically-challenged persons, and organizations which serve them or advance their interests). It is likely that more work would
be done in co-operation with the community if the resources were available.

It is apparent that since privatization, securing needed funds has been a part of a growing number of issues related to the dependence of the agency on the government. The financial dependence of Agency D on the province is absolute. Ninety-seven percent of its budget is directly supplied by the government through the contract, and the remaining three percent is paid to the organization by its users as a result of government regulations. Initially, the government over-estimated the cost of operating the facility, resulting in a substantial surplus in its first year as a voluntary agency. However, since that time cost-estimates have been more accurate, and the province has supplied only what is needed. This raises a number of issues which to some extent define the degree to which the agency is still subordinate to government.

The agency is not in a position to bargain independently with its unionized employees, since there is no guarantee that the government will raise the level of its funding to allow for increases that may be granted by Agency D. This must call into question rhetoric which assumes that voluntary sector delivery is preferable to public sector delivery because it is more efficient - Agency D has little room to manoeuvre, and therefore cannot demonstrate any superior efficiency. In addition, who is responsible for the physical
site remains an unanswered question. The facility needs a new roof. Without one it cannot operate. It is unclear whether this is the responsibility of the government (since they have a statutory obligation to serve the residents), or Agency D (since they have a legally-contracted obligation to serve the residents). This dilemma may partly explain why the organization has recently hired a fundraiser. Efforts by Agency D to identify and address new needs in the community can sometimes be accomplished simply by co-operating with other organizations, but the new programmes which have been created by the organization require additional funds. At present, securing additional funds requires a long process of lobbying and negotiating with senior bureaucrats. Much of the evidence cited by interview subjects to demonstrate the liberating effects of privatization on Agency D involve its new role as an innovator and community developer. To a large degree, the role of Agency D as an innovator and community developer rests on the approval of those actions by the government, bringing into question the degree of autonomy which has been gained as a result of privatization. It is likely that the advances made by Agency D since 1984 are to some extent a result of capitalizing on the opportunities provided by privatization, coupled with changes in management (as the line social worker interviewed suggests), and changes in society's attitude to the physically-challenged (as the senior administrator suggests). The
latter factor is based on the perception that government policy has been adapted to changes in public sentiment.

(3) The Rationale for the Response

In response to question 2.6.1 all three interview subjects in Agency D indicate a belief that the privatization policies of the provincial government are a means to achieve neoconservative ends. However, a scan of all the data provided by each subject indicates that they have in common the perception of a connection between such policies and public opinion. The administrator of social services notes that the public profile of the physically challenged has been raised in the wake of the Rick Hanson 'Man-in-Motion' world tour, and that government support for this population may be motivated by a desire to enhance its own popularity. That same subject, and the line social worker interviewed, both suggest that the media seems to have an effect on government policy. These and other observations made by these two subjects are compatible with the Popularity theory of privatization described in Chapter Two. However, it is notable that Agency D has not pursued policies based on these perceptions — there has been little effort to seek media coverage of what the agency is doing. This suggests that another operating theory may be in use, and that control over what the agency does lies elsewhere.

The interview subjects agree that the management of the organization lies primarily with the senior management team,
composed of the senior administrator, and departmental Directors. If one accepts that the senior administrator provides the leadership for that team, an examination of that subject's perspective of the government's motive for privatization provides a credible explanation for the actions which have been taken by Agency D.

A scan of the data provided by the senior administrator indicates a belief that the grassroots, rather than the media, has a significant influence on the government. The public sector manipulates the media, rather than the other way around. There is a suggestion that at least part of the intent of government in contracting services (in addition to reducing expenditures and the size of the civil service) has been to empower the voluntary sector, and to encourage the autonomy of service-providers. These views are compatible with the Populism theory of privatization, and may explain the two major thrusts of the organization since privatization.

The organization has sought to adapt itself to the new popular opinion of the proper role of the physically challenged in society. To do otherwise, to hold onto tradition, would be to fly in the face of public sentiment—which may be viewed by the administrator as the primary motivator of the government regarding its decisions on the allocation of funds. Adapting the values of the organization may therefore be much more a matter of survival, than of
ethical evolution. In addition, the emphasis of Agency D on developing connections with grassroots organizations which serve the physically challenged also makes sense. With no grassroots of its own, Agency D must rely on the support of organizations which have that base in order for it to be legitimated in the eyes of the government.

Beyond contracting, the subjects interviewed identify a variety of issues which have resulted from privatization. The administrator of the social services department notes an increase in difficulty accessing needed services from the government as a result of reductions in funding and personnel. All three subjects note that government-initiated increases in user fees have resulted in hardships for that minority of residents who must pay such costs out-of-pocket. Though these problems should not be understated, it is clear that for Agency D the most significant impact of privatization has been its liberation from the constraints which had been placed upon it prior to its transfer to the voluntary sector. Equally clearly, Agency D is only relatively more autonomous than it was as a government agency, and its efforts to adapt its mission and services since being privatized have in large part reflected both its continued dependence on government, and a newly-acquired vulnerability as a non-government organization.
E. The Best Defense...Agency E

(1) Background

Founded in the halcyon days of social services, during the brief N.D.P. reign in the early 1970's, Agency E was initially intended to serve as a food co-op for a newly-built low-income housing project in Vancouver's East End. A short time later, the tenants of that project developed a voluntary society, which joined with the co-op to build a recreational facility which would house both organizations. The activities of the agency were primarily funded through a branch of the municipal government. From the outset it was apparent that the dividing line between recreational and social needs, and therefore between recreational and social services, was very largely an abstraction. As the mission of the agency (then and now) is to provide services and opportunities for local low-income persons which would otherwise be unavailable to them, and the Board has never evinced much respect for abstractions, the agency developed programmes intended to address both recreational and social needs. The line staff member interviewed for this study suggests that during this period, though the efforts of those responsible for Agency E were well-intentioned, and there was some growth, organizationally it was a mess. Attendance at Board meetings was low, and accountability was poor.

The municipal government apparently had the same perception, and in 1978, acted to remove some of the powers
from the Board by transferring those powers to a community association - thus incorporating a third decision-making body into an already complex organization. Though one might expect this to have resulted in chaos, it is apparent that the opposite effect was realized - the responsibilities of the Board were reduced to a manageable size, and the finances of the organization were placed in more experienced (and accountable) hands. In addition, this hybrid of decision-making groups allows Agency E to enjoy the advantages of a charity (receiving donations and other concessions via the voluntary Board), and a business (including wholesale purchase via the co-op), and to have the stability of close financial links with the municipal government. In the early 'Eighties two additional events took place which have helped Agency E develop its present organizational strength, financial stability, and its role in the community - the hiring of a new senior administrator, and privatization.

The new senior administrator has no formal social work training, did not inherit and has not developed an organizational structure intended to solidify this subject's control over the agency, and yet is credited by both other interview subjects (the Board member and the staff member) as having played a central role in the development of Agency E. Though the senior administrator does manage a system utilizing a fairly hierarchical structure (all agree that it is neither rigid nor formal), the belief system, and
consequent managerial style, of this subject result in the promotion of clear spheres of autonomy in the various functional levels of the organization. The staff member reports little or no interference in the provision of service, and respect for staff input into decision-making. The Board member interviewed identifies the parameters of the responsibilities of the Board in almost exactly the same terms as both the senior administrator and the staff person—and it is clear from these parameters that while the senior administrator has considerable autonomy, it is limited to specific areas.

The senior administrator believes in what is described as 'situational leadership' - a trust that persons in any position in the agency are the best judge of what needs to be done to effect positive change in the circumstances around them, and given the needed supports, in the best position to effect that change. As a result the decisions of the Board (rather than the opinions of the senior administrator) are considered what is best for the agency. The role of the senior administrator in regard to the Board is to supply information, to participate in the orientation of new members, and to strive to ensure that it is representative of the community (which all subjects agree it has become in the past few years).

Similarly, the role of the senior administrator in regard to staff is to ensure that they have at the time of
hiring, or receive, sufficient training to do their job, to act as a co-ordinator of their activities (through monthly meetings), and otherwise to allow them to do what they are paid to do. Much as with the Board, a high value is placed on having a staff that is representative of the community. While staff are expected to behave professionally, this is not deemed to necessitate formal education. As a result, Agency E has become a grassroots organization uniquely suited to its mission. The community is thoroughly represented within the agency, giving the organization a first-hand knowledge of the issues faced by those it serves, an immediate awareness of changes in the community's needs, and legitimating their dual role as advocate and service-provider for that community. Though the senior administrator acknowledges that such a system can lead to conflicts, these are perceived as healthy for the organization. All agree that there are no special interest groups within the people involved with Agency E - they are united by a common cause. It is apparent that to a very large degree that cause has been crystallised by the privatization policies of the provincial government.

Agency E does receive provincial funds, and has recently contracted with the provincial government to provide a service. However, the degree to which the agency has incorporated federal funds, and continues to rely on municipal funds, is far greater. Forty-two percent
($500,000) of the total budget of Agency E ($1,200,000) comes from the public sector, but only twelve percent ($150,000) comes from the provincial government specifically. The financial dependence of the agency on the province is therefore relatively minor. Unlike some organizations, where contracting and the problems associated with it have become a central issue, the intimate nature of the relationship between Agency E and those it serves means that the effect of privatization on the community has been, and continues to be, the major concern.

(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response

All three interview subjects agree that as a result of reductions in the provision of both statutory and non-statutory public services by both the Ministry of Social Services and Housing, and the Ministry of the Attorney General, that the quality of life of the people living in this community has seriously suffered. The effect of privatization on children has been particularly negative - to the point where they are endangered.

The staff person interviewed indicates that as a result of the lack of services and attention provided to children in care, that apprehension by M.S.S.H. now often amounts to a transfer of the role of the abuser from the parent to the state. An example is cited where a ministry social worker accused a parent of neglect because she did not know where her fourteen-year-old child was at eleven o'clock at night,
and yet this same worker became aware that one of her wards (of the same age) ran away from a group home, and yet made no effort to report the child as missing, and took no action for two days. In the worker's experience, when children run from group homes this can result in the ministry social worker simply giving up on the case, and returning the child to an abusive situation at home - with the rationale that the child is 'unworkable'. Such problems are seen to be the result of excessively large caseloads carried by ministry workers. One perceived reason why children run away from group or foster homes is that they are taken out of the community and placed in a completely foreign environment. There is not one bed for children in care in the local area. The lack of resources, and the unmanageable caseloads of ministry workers, are seen to be a result of efforts by the provincial government to reduce the cost of providing social services, and is based on the expectation that the voluntary sector will leap in to fill the gap in service.

All three interview subjects cite the shrinking mandate of M.S.S.H. as evidence that they expect someone else to shoulder the burden of responsibility for caring for children. The policy-maker interviewed notes that at present, the ministry does not consider children who never attend school (no matter what their age) and children who attempt suicide as outside their mandate - officially they are not 'at risk'. Years ago the ministry's mandate was
quite broad, and involved preventive work, family counselling, referral and service co-ordination, investigation of child abuse and neglect (and apprehension if necessary), and monitoring children in care. With the 'Restraint' programme, all preventive services were eliminated. In subsequent years the role of family counsellor was dropped—ministry workers began to describe themselves as 'case managers' (presuming that they would co-ordinate family counselling if someone else were willing or able to do it). More recently, they have ceased to call themselves case managers, and have indicated their sole responsibility is investigation, apprehension, and placement monitoring in situations of child abuse (leaving someone else to co-ordinate service delivery). According to those interviewed, government workers are spread so thin that more often than not the ministry is incapable of these functions—workers from Agency E have reported child abuse which has not been investigated, and have aided in monitoring and finding resources for children in care.

Agency E has responded to these problems in a variety of ways. Initially, as it became evident that some child abuse cases were being mismanaged, the senior manager complained to senior bureaucrats in the ministry. As this seemed to simply result in M.S.S.H. disciplining the workers involved (instead of providing them with the needed resources, or reducing their workload), the next complaints were addressed
to the Ombudsman for Children. It has now been made clear to
the ministry that all future incidents will be reported to
the Ombudsman. More recently, Agency E has been in the
vanguard of an effort by all social service agencies in the
north-east area of Vancouver to document the problems they
are having with M.S.S.H. In addition, it is apparent that
the organization is 'leaping in' to fill the gaps created by
the reduction of public services - though they have received
no funding, or even acknowledgement, from the provincial
government for doing so.

The three interview subjects view the privatization
policies of the provincial government as having their most
significant impact on the poor. The senior administrator
notes that there has been no 'Restraint' programme for the
middle-class. The Board member observes that the government
is attempting to reduce expenditures to those who most need
them, but continues to waste enormous sums on policies
favoring a business elite. The line staff person interviewed
has witnessed what is described as the criminalization of
poor children. A poor child steals food because he is
hungry. When caught, he is charged with theft - an event
based more on random chance than justice (many police
officers are either unfamiliar with, or simply fail to do the
paperwork necessary to charge young offenders). When
(because of language problems, lack of follow-through by
parents, or lack of familiarity with the systems of this
society) the child fails to appear on the charge, the problems of the child escalate. Eventually, the child is in serious trouble because he was hungry. This is perceived as evidence that the government does not recognize a disparity between the cultures of the rich and the poor in this province - which fosters policies which apply to the poor, but are based on the standards of the culture of the rich.

(3) The Rationale for the Response

The response of all three interview subjects to question 2.6.1 indicates the common perception that the privatization policies of the Social Credit government are based on neoconservative ideology, and are directed toward the achievement of neoconservative goals. However, a scan of all the data provided by each subject indicates some variance in perceptions. The Board member interviewed notes that the policies of the provincial government are most often (in addition to advancing the ideological agenda) equally directed toward advancing the interests of an economic elite - suggesting compatibility with the Paternalism theory of privatization described in Chapter Two. In addition, this subject makes observations compatible with the Patronage, and Popularity theories, and suggests one further hypothesis not otherwise covered in this study. The data provided by the staff member interviewed suggests, with fair consistency, the opinion that government politicians are ideologues - though it is also noted that in some cases the motives behind
privatization involve patronage more than values.

Though it is clear from the description of the organizational structure that the senior administrator is not singly in control of the organization (that the Board's creation of policy is fairly autonomously conducted, as is the staff's operationalization of that policy), that interview subject does maintain a fairly constant leadership role, and is delegated with the responsibility to act on behalf of the agency in a wide range of areas. It is therefore possible that this subject has played a greater role in determining the response of the agency to provincial privatization initiatives that the other subjects interviewed. A comparison of the operating theory of privatization held by this subject (and the logical response leading from that theory) with the actions of the organization support the conclusion that the perspective of the senior administrator has acted to guide the response of the agency to privatization.

An interpretation of the data provided by the senior administrator indicates a range of opinion which is compatible with (in addition to the Neoconservatism theory of the provincial government's motivation for privatization) the Populism theory of privatization. To a lesser degree, government motives compatible with the Paternalism theory are also perceived, in addition to one other hypothesis not otherwise mentioned in this study. A populist perspective of
the government's actions might explain the stress placed on connecting the organization with its grassroots, as well as the expectation that the government might make adaptations to its policies as a result of criticisms from the grassroots. In addition, if the agency has been acting in accordance with the senior administrator's operating theory of the provincial government's motivation for privatization, it might explain why little effort has been made to employ the media as a means of influencing government policy - efforts made to rally other organizations may be based on the perception that government responds to the mainstream, not the media.

Privatization has been a policy which has primarily affected the community served by Agency E, has had an overwhelmingly negative impact on the people in that community, and has therefore (despite some advantages resulting from the incorporation of contracted services into the organization), been resisted by the agency. That resistance has been predicated on the maxim that the best defense is a strong offense - and has been evidenced by the frequency and vehemence of the efforts of the organization to advocate for the people it serves. The fact that Agency E receives very little provincial funding, and therefore has little to lose if the government chooses to retaliate financially, may have contributed to the organization's choice of response to privatization.
F. The Phoenix: Agency D

(1) Background

This organization was founded in the mid-'Seventies as a joint project of all three levels of government. Its purpose is (as it has been since its inception) to provide the services identified as needed by a specific immigrant community (or more accurately, a network of very diverse communities), and to act as a bridge between that community and the mainstream culture in the lower mainland area. The organization has always placed a value on both unity and diversity - in order to function it has had to take a neutral position in regard to those factors which act to divide the various components of its community, and to concentrate on those issues which serve to unite them. Initially, funding for the agency came from the city of Vancouver, the province, and the federal government, and its administrators were seconded from the public sector. Throughout the latter half of the 1970's, both the administrators and the inter-governmental committee which governed Agency F were composed of professionals with extensive experience in serving the target community. Though all interview subjects agree that these managers did an excellent job, it is noteworthy that none of them were from the ethnic community being served. The same was not (and is not) true of the agency's direct-service staff. The agency has from the beginning acted in its hiring practices to include amongst its staff, persons
whose backgrounds represented the range of sub-communities served by the agency — though the administrators were Caucasian. This was altered in 1980, when one of the staff was hired as the Executive Director. This person has remained in that position since, and was interviewed for this study. This change in senior administrators may have had a significant effect on how the Agency F responded to privatization.

(2) The Effects Felt, and the Agency's Response

Two changes dramatically altered the nature of the organization in 1983. The first was the decision by the inter-governmental committee responsible for Agency F to transfer the organization to the voluntary sector by creating a not-for-profit society, and turning their responsibilities over to that Board. The second was the withdrawal of all provincial government financial support from the organization. Both changes are considered privatization initiatives — in the first the provincial government apparently played a significant role, in the second the decision was entirely the province's.

The transfer of the agency to the voluntary sector obviated a re-structuring of the organization. Though the staffing structure was kept intact, it was necessary to build a Board, and to define the responsibilities of that group. At first, both the responsibilities and the ethnic composition of the new Board remained similar to what they
had been prior to privatization. However, the policy-maker interviewed indicates that after a period of operating with this system, the community began to express interest in direct participation in the governing of the organization—
which (given the agency's commitment to diversity and unity, and its role as a bridge between the immigrant and mainstream cultures) proved to be a challenge, and which seems to have resulted in a metamorphosis of Agency F.

Given its role and values, the organization would not wish to deny the participation of the immigrant community on the Board, or exclude the mainstream community from the Board, and could not afford to allow one facet of the immigrant community to dominate the Board. The result is the creation of a Board which is deliberately composed of representatives of the various components of the immigrant community and the mainstream community—and which maintains that galaxy of representation as Board members come and go.

It would seem that this change in the Board was not only supported by the senior administrator and staff, but that they may have played a role equal to the community's in its transformation. Though it seems possible that the senior administrator may have had more control over the organization with a Board which did not represent the community (acting as both expert on daily operations and cultural issues), it is apparent that the Executive Director, and the staff person interviewed, actively advanced the cause of a representative
Board - which could only have hastened its development.

The changes which took place in the organizational structure served to tie Agency F closer to its grassroots, and to develop an agency which not only serves its community, but which acts as the most widely accepted representative of that total community in its inter-face with the mainstream culture. According to the Board member interviewed, the population served by the organization has a strong culturally-based belief in 'putting something back into the community', and Agency F began to act as a vehicle for that belief. In addition, the population served by the agency has grown - in terms of their numbers, their social and economic power, and their consciousness of their place as second-class citizens in this society. Agency F has served as a rallying point for those seeking to help, or the power to effect change (which comes from collective action), or the unity of the community, or equality.

The post-privatization rejuvenation of the agency has come about in large part as a result of the ascendancy of the Board in its role as vanguard of its community, and it therefore follows that within the organization, the Board has also taken a leadership role. Though in some organizations lip service may be paid to the 'final decision-making power' of the Board, it is clear that the senior administrator controls much of the process leading to those decisions, and therefore effectively governs the agency. In Agency F this
seems not to be the case - an interpretation of the data provided by the three interview subjects suggests that while the senior administrator has considerable power, that the Board is more actively and immediately involved in decision-making than may be the case elsewhere. The staff person indicates that the senior administrator, and the Board (in that order), are in charge of the organization. While the Board member interviewed acknowledges the key role played by the senior administrator, the informal nature of the organization's hierarchy (which sustains considerable Board-staff interaction), and references to the frequency of communication between the President and the Executive Director suggest that the Board plays an important role in management. The senior administrator perceives the Board to be in charge of the agency.

Prior to 1983, about half of Agency F's budget came from the provincial government. The withdrawal of this funding was rationalized by the provincial government as necessary in order to reduce its expenditures, and on the grounds that immigrants are not a provincial responsibility. None of the core staff were laid off - they apparently took pay cuts, accepted increased workloads, and continued. Soon after, the agency began to seek employment-related contracts from the federal government, and utilized these to expand services. In the past three years Agency F has been so successful at securing these contracts that its budget has almost tripled.
In addition, after two successful pilot projects (intended to
demonstrate the need for, and viability of, a service which
was identified as a priority by the community), the
organization has recently succeeded in re-introducing
provincial funding into the agency through a contracted
programme.

As a result of the organization's dependence on
government contracts to operate these services, several
problems have arisen. The core is presently dwarfed by the
contracts. Eighty percent ($600,000) of the total budget (of
$750,000) comes from the government - though only twenty-one
percent ($126,000) of the government contribution comes from
the province. The core of the organization is cash-starved-
the Executive Director is paid less than some contract
staff. In addition, both the staff person and the senior
administrator indicate that the federal government's
criteria for funding can, to some degree, conflict with what
the agency perceives as the need in the community - meaning
that some needs are only partly met by these services, and
others simply cannot be addressed. Though this suggests that
these contracts result in something other than the identified
needs of the community being met by Agency F, and that
therefore their incorporation may result in some conflict
with the organization's mission, it seems that the rationale
for their incorporation may out-rank the mission statement of
this or any agency - survival.17
It is clear that even as privatization resulted in a near-fatal blow to the core of Agency F, it also resulted in a significant increase in demand for those core services. As the expertise of the organization's workers, and the role of the agency in its community, came to be recognized by other organizations in the social services network, referrals increased. To some extent, Agency F became a 'dumping ground' for every troublesome case involving clients from its target community. Ironically, many of these cases have been referred by provincial social services employees, to the (core-funded) family workers of the organization - suggesting that without Agency F, probation officers and M.S.S.H. social workers could not do their jobs. Yet officially, the province maintains that supporting the agency is not their responsibility. Resources to meet this increased demand have remained static. This problem was made even worse by an additional problem stemming from privatization - a decrease in the effectiveness of the referral network.

All three interview subjects indicate that there has been some increase in competition between agencies since contracting became the primary means for them to provide services. Though Agency F continues to meet with other immigrant-serving organizations, it is clear that there is some tension. This is exacerbated by the inability of the various levels of government to decide on the means they will use to serve immigrants. These means vary from support for
those organizations (such as Agency F) which provide general services to a specific immigrant group, through support for those agencies which provide general services to all immigrant groups, to support for including immigrant workers in agencies which serve the general population.

In response to the problems which privatization created for the organization, there have been four solutions pursued by Agency F. In response to the stress placed on the referral network as a result of competition, there have been efforts to co-operate with other organizations, and to strengthen the bonds between them (since they are seen to share a common cause, and a common vulnerability to changes in government policy). There have been efforts to meet the service demands placed on the agency, from the community and through referrals from the public sector, through both new contracted services and existing programmes (since these actions are seen to solidify the service role of the agency and enhance its credibility in the eyes of the government). There has been an increased emphasis on the role of the Board to raise funds (to address the need for more core staff to meet increases in demand, and to provide better wages to those workers). Finally, Agency F has pursued the unification of the community through the creation of a representative Board (seen to provide the organization with 'more clout').
(3) The Rationale for the Response

These actions may be understood as a manifestation of the perceptions of the provincial government's motives for privatizing social services, which are held by key decision-makers within Agency F. The response of the three subjects to question 2.6.1 varies considerably. The policy maker cites potential motives that are compatible with the Populism theory of the provincial government's motivation for privatization, described in Chapter Two. The senior administrator's response is compatible with the Neoconservatism theory, and the line worker's response contains elements of both the Paternalism theory, and the Neoconservatism theory. What is common to all three subjects (and which may explain the sense of agency unity which characterizes this organization), is that a scan of all data provided by each suggests that they see the motives of the province as a hybrid of the Neoconservatism, Paternalism, and Popularity theories.

The Board member suggests that the immigrant community, by organizing, has gained a political voice, and sees this as a factor (along with the support for the service from unions and corporations, and agency credibility, which was demonstrated in the pilot project) to the decision of the province to provide a new contract service through Agency F. Both the senior administrator and the line worker interviewed suggest that it is only just dawning on both the Social
Credit government, and the population served by Agency F, that the immigrant community is large, has considerable financial resources, and is capable (if organized) of wielding considerable power— that immigrants have clout.

Privatization struck Agency F as a bolt of lightning strikes a tree. It lost half its funding and its status as a public sector agency. However, as a result of the dedication of its staff, and the support of its community, it experienced a rebirth. Since 1983 it has grown in terms of its total budget, and its role as a focal point for the concerns of the immigrant population it both serves and represents—to the point where now (though many problems continue to face the organization) it is stronger than it ever was, and perhaps stronger than it ever might have been had it remained in the public sector.

Notes to Chapter Five

1. This is an opinion expressed by the Executive Director alone. As this opinion is interpreted by the researcher as not conflicting with the data provided by the other two interview subjects in this agency, it is presented as though there is consensus on the issue it addresses. As a rule of thumb, the findings presented which do not identify the specific source of the data leading to those findings are an interpretation of the information given by all interview subjects in each agency. In most cases all, or most of, the subjects made similar observations on whatever issue is being presented. If an issue was not addressed by all subjects, the researcher has simply judged whether the interpretation being presented would conflict with any information provided by those which did not address the issue. If there is no apparent conflict, the issue is presented as though there is general consensus on it within the agency. If there may be conflict between the opinions and perspectives of the various
interview subjects within the organization, the issue is not presented as though there is consensus, but as an issue which is in question. If there is clear conflict, the parties in conflict are identified.

2. Agency A has to some degree extended itself into more commercial areas, and there is a mixture of opinion regarding the degree to which it has adapted to market forces amongst those interviewed. The point here is that without privatization, these changes might have been far more extensive than they have been.

3. It should be noted that this use of administrative fees is common to all not-for-profit organizations which contract with the public sector. Such fees are written into the contracts, and it can therefore be assumed that the government personnel responsible for negotiating them (and through them, the politicians in office) are aware of, and approve of, the awarding of such fees through the contracting process.

The term 'core' in this study is used to identify those services (and/or the financial resources which support them) which are perceived by each agency to be an intrinsic part of it, and the primary means for pursuing its mission, and to differentiate them from those services and funds which are to some degree extraneous - which could be lost without significant damage to the central purpose or programmes of the organization (and which are most often supported by contracts). Core funding is most often perceived as more stable than contract funding. How each agency defines its core varies, and can be an issue of considerable debate.

4. All three interview subjects cited a recent case where a member of the Board of Directors spent considerable time lobbying an acquaintance in a senior position in a provincial ministry for the renewal of a contract to provide service to a client population recently reclassified as outside of the government's sphere of responsibility. The contract was renewed.

5. The fees for service in Agency A are scaled according to the income of the client. The fee increases apply only to those clients at the high end of the income scale.

6. The Populism theory of privatization, as defined within this thesis, is presented on page 50.

7. For a complete list of the summary codes which are interpreted as indicating the interview subjects' operating theories of privatization, see Appendix G.
8. The view is that though contracting may have some (dubious) short-term advantages for the organization, as a component of an ideologically-motivated policy set, it cannot be in the best interests of Agency A.

9. However, some informal stratification does exist. The volunteer interviewed indicates that the staff are perceived as having more power because they generally have more information on the operation of the organization. This is rationalized by the staff as based on the choice of the volunteers to 'give up' their power. (see Chapter Four, section B).


13. The term physically challenged is most often used in this study because it avoids the stigma which may be attached to the terms 'physically handicapped', or 'physically disabled'. For the sake of clarity, the residents of Agency D are all young adults (aged 19 to 65 years old), and all are confined to wheelchairs or to bed as a result of a wide range of physical problems resulting from illness or injury.

14. In accordance with provincial government policy, the agency presently charges its residents approximately $20 per day. This charge is allowable under the Canada Health Act, as payment for room and board, rather than as a direct payment for medical costs (which have been disallowed by the federal government). This user-fee is termed 'co-insurance' for reasons which remain obscure. Most residents do not pay this fee out-of-pocket. Two-thirds of residents have their co-insurance paid for them by a variety of public and quasi-public institutions, including M.S.S.H., the W.C.B., I.C.B.C., or various pension plans. The remaining third of residents (or their families) provide the agency with a monthly cheque totalling about $600.

15. The control by the municipal funder over the community association is more extensive than its control over the Board.
16. Changes in the mandate of M.S.S.H. are seen as one way in which the ministry is attempting to reframe problems so that their solution lies outside of the responsibility of government — one of the seven privatization initiatives described by Callahan and McNiven (1988).

17. It is important to note that the issue of the potential alteration of the agency's mission as a result of the incorporation of contracts not specifically designed to meet needs identified by the agency as extant in the community is raised here by the researcher — none of the interview subjects addressed this.
CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The four sections of this chapter each have a separate objective. The purpose of the first section is to provide a comparison of the case studies presented in Chapter Five. This is presented according to the seven dimensions which have been identified in the data. The results of the use of the B.S.P. analytic model are inherent in this presentation, as it is through the use of this paradigm that changes in the seven dimensions can be recognized. The second section will compare the findings of this study to the concerns regarding the potential impact of privatization on voluntary organizations which were described in the literature reviewed in Chapter One. Based on these analyses, the next section will present a theory which may further define the impact of privatization on the target population under study. The final section will discuss the implications of that theory for decision-makers in voluntary organizations.

A. Seven Dimensions of Change

(1) The Organization's Mission and Values

Not all organizations sampled have experienced changes to their fundamental mission or values as a result of (or in relationship to) privatization. In Agency B, and Agency E there appears to be no change.

In Agency A there is little consensus on the degree of
change in the mission which contracting has wrought, and it would be simplistic to identify whatever change has occurred as a result of privatization (since the decision of the Board to expand predates the pursuit of privatization, and is based on a variety of factors not closely related to provincial policy). However, it would be fair to say that the expansion of the agency (and hence the question of the change in mission) is associated with privatization, since the means for expansion has been contracting, and it is possible that some of the staff believe that contracting has resulted in the diffusion of the organization's identity (and that this might not have been the case if Agency A had chosen a method of expansion which allowed more control of what service areas the organization expanded into). It would be equally fair to say that the question of the agency's mission has been a major contributor to disputes between Agency A's management and staff.

Agency C has also appears to have experienced some change to its mission as a result of privatization - both staff suggest it is becoming more 'mainstream'. There are two notable differences when this organization is compared to Agency A: the changes to the mission are considered by those in the organization to be imposed upon it by outside authority, and there has been little internal discord.

There has been a considerable transformation of the mission of Agency D - to the point of necessitating that the
organization draft a statement of what its new mission is. Though changes in the structure of the organization have been necessitated by privatization, the relationship between privatization and the change in Agency D's mission is less clearly of a cause-effect nature. However, the change in the mission is associated with privatization, as it is apparently widely perceived as the major advantage granted to the agency in order to balance the (primarily financial) disadvantages of privatization. Like Agency A, the change in mission is generally perceived as voluntarily assumed, and is related to internal staff-management conflict.

The basic mission of Agency F has changed little—though the inclusion of some contracts (incorporated in order to expand the agency) may result in the delivery of service in a manner not entirely in accordance with the mission. There is some mismatch between the needs met by some of these services and the needs in the community. This makes Agency F and Agency A appear to be in similar circumstances—both have pursued expansion through contracting, and contracting itself may have subtly altered, or expanded, their mission. However, in Agency F there appears to be no internal division, or even debate, on this issue—whereas in Agency A it is a sore point. The difference may be that in Agency F there is consensus that expansion was necessary for survival. This may indicate a general feeling that there was little choice involved—it was contract (and take the
(2) The Organization - Public Sector Relationship

Three organizations (Agencies A, C, and D) are considerably, or almost completely, financially dependent on provincial government contracts. Three are not. Agencies B, E, and F all receive less than twenty-percent of their annual budget from the province (though this is not necessarily indicative of independence from the public sector - Agencies E and F receive a considerable portion of their income from the municipal and federal governments respectively).

In Agency A, dependency is a financial issue which is being addressed by financial means - through efforts to increase the funds available for autonomous allocation by the organization. Beyond finances, dependency is not a broad concern. There may be a relationship between the relationship of the organization to the public sector, and the nature of its organizational structure. Agency A is a professional organization with little or no grassroots base of its own. Internal order is formalized, hierarchical, and relies to some degree on documentation.

In Agency D, financial dependency on the government is an accepted fact. There is little concern regarding the implications of this for the agency beyond the question of how to meet some extraordinary expenses (such as a new roof-which may have contributed to the decision to hire a fundraiser). Like Agency A, this organization is
professional, has no grassroots base of its own, internal order is fairly formalized and hierarchical, and it relies to a great degree on documentation.

No interview subject from either Agency A or Agency D indicate any pressure on them to adapt their mission or their internal structure to conform to the expectations of the provincial ministries which fund them.

Agency C is not hierarchically structured, documentation is kept to a minimum (in part to maintain the confidentiality of information on clients), order is informal, it is non-professional, and is the service arm of a grassroots social movement. Each of these factors of the organization have been identified by the provincial body responsible for funding Agency C as requiring change. The changes which the government would like to see would move Agency C toward the type of bureaucratic system in use in Agencies A and D, and in the public sector. In order to motivate the organization to make the changes which it sees as necessary, the provincial government has proven willing to use the contract it has with Agency C as a carrot, and the financial dependency of the organization as a stick. Lately there seems to be more stick and less carrot. As a result of the indivisibility of what Agency C does, from why it does it, or how it does it, this places the organization in a 'no-win' situation - to take the contract under these conditions means a gradual abandonment of the values upon which the
entire organization is based, but to refuse to compromise is to risk losing the services which give the organization its immediate purpose for existing. Either way, Agency C, as it autonomously identifies itself, disappears.

The organizations in this study which are substantially financially dependent on the provincial government (receiving more than sixty percent of their total annual budget from that source) report two differing experiences of that relationship. Those with bureaucratic structures identify their relationship with the public sector as collegial, and issues between them as involving financial negotiation. That agency which does not have a bureaucratic structure identifies the relationship as, to some degree, adversarial—it has some qualities of a superordinate/subordinate relationship, with the government utilizing the dependency of the agency as a means to force it to gradually adapt toward a Weberian ideal.

(3) The Role and Values of Individuals

It must be judged from the data that the values, roles, and opinions of interview subjects have not, in themselves, undergone appreciable change. No interview subject indicated that he or she had a change of heart, or an opinion altered as a result of, or in relation to, privatization. Such a conclusion seems unlikely. The lack of data to identify the change process individuals may have gone through is interpreted as a shortcoming of the research instrument - no
question directly addressed such potential change. However, it is clear that the roles, values and opinions of individuals have been a major contributor to changes which have taken place in other dimensions.

There is no consistent relationship found between the ideological beliefs or values of interview subjects, and their actions in response to privatization. In some cases there appears to be a relationship. For example, the Board member of Agency A is a self-described conservative, and has been supportive of the agency's pursuit of contracts (which might be interpreted as an ideologically-based support for either government policy, or for privatization as a means to achieve neoconservative ends). However, the Executive Director of the same agency believes in some principles which are at the core of social democratic ideology, and has been an even greater proponent of the agency's expansion through contracting. Similarly, the staff in Agency C evidence considerable antipathy for the hierarchical and patriarchal system which funds them. One might conclude that their values would lead them to place a high priority on achieving their independence from such a system, but this seems not to be the case. A more consistent rationale for the actions of the interview subjects in response to privatization is found in their individual perceptions of the government's motives for these policies.

Each individual interviewed indicates a variety of
opinions regarding the provincial government's motives for pursuing the privatization of social services. By categorizing these opinions according to the five theories of privatization described in Chapter Two, and including a sixth, open-ended category (Other), it is apparent that no single theory is used by any individual (though two direct-service providers come close to this), that each hybrid of theories held by subjects does incorporate the belief that neoconservative theory plays some role in the decision-making process of the Social Credit government (though emphasis on this motive varies widely), and that the hypotheses which are described as a part of the theories in Chapter Two are not the only suppositions held by personnel in the voluntary sector.

The data indicates that a variety of additional hypotheses exist (and these have been classified as 'Other' - the sixth theory of the provincial government's motivation for privatization). Amongst these are two hypotheses which are advanced by more than one interview subject, and should therefore be mentioned as additions to those previously described. The administrators in Agencies A and E, both administrative staff in Agency B, and one staff person in Agency C suggest that the policies of the provincial government are simply confused - the government itself cannot decide on what it is doing, or why. This hypothesis is perhaps the most terrifying of those described in this study,
since the course of a rudderless ship cannot be predicted, and there is therefore no way for the voluntary sector to prepare itself or its clients for the future. The second new hypothesis is advanced by the staff persons interviewed in Agency A and F, by the Board member in Agency A, and by the administrator of Agency F - the government's policies are based either on misinformation, or a lack of information. At one extreme, this means that policy will change favorably if the government is given good, credible information. At the other extreme, this means that government politicians are simply stupid, and that it is hopeless to attempt to educate them.

The central hypotheses of the operating theories of privatization held by those in this study are that the provincial government:

(a) is pursuing an ideological agenda leading to the establishment of a minimal state,
(b) is motivated by mainstream public sentiment to attack established elites,
(c) is pursuing an ideological agenda to the degree that it is acceptable to the electorate,
(d) is pursuing an ideological agenda to maintain the domination of a social and economic elite,
(e) is pursuing an ideological agenda to the degree that this benefits its friends and supporters,
(f) is confused, and has no apparent policy goals,
(g) has based its policies on poor information. These theories have both a descriptive and a prescriptive function, and can be used to both explain and define the diversity of opinion extant within and between the organizations studied in regard to the meaning of privatization to the voluntary sector, where it is leading, and the best course of action to be taken by voluntary organizations (individually and collectively) in response to provincial privatization initiatives. In part (7) of this section, the relationship of those theories held by individuals to the actions of the agency as a whole will be discussed.

Table II (on page 211) provides a breakdown of the operating theories of privatization which are suggested by the data provided by each subject interviewed. Each agency sampled is identified by large case letter in the left-hand column. The subjects interviewed in each agency are defined as policy-makers (the Board members), administrators, or service providers. There are two columns for administrators. In Agencies B and D, the left-hand administrator's column contains the operating theories attributed to the senior administrators of those organizations, and the right-hand administrator's column, the operating theories of the subordinate administrator. In Agency C these columns contain the operating theories of the staff interviewed, and there is no hierarchical relationship
Table II - Subjects' Operating Theories of Privatization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY-MAKER</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATOR</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATOR</th>
<th>SERVICE PROVIDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>POPULISM</td>
<td>POPULARITY</td>
<td>Neocon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neocon.*</td>
<td>POPULARITY</td>
<td>NEOCON.</td>
<td>Patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patronage</td>
<td>OTHER PATERNALISM</td>
<td>PATRONAGE</td>
<td>Popularity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Neocon.</td>
<td>Other Patronalism</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularity</td>
<td>Other Populism</td>
<td>Neocon. Populism</td>
<td>Populism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populism</td>
<td>Neocon.</td>
<td>Neocon. Populism</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>Other Populism</td>
<td>Patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neocon.</td>
<td>Neocon. Populism</td>
<td>Populism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a non-standard abbreviation for Neoconservatism
between them. The operating theory of each subject which appears most often comes at the top of their individual list. Where frequency is equal, the order is alphabetical. The operating theory(s) of each subject which are suggested by their response to question 2.6.1 in the interview guide are underlined. The operating theories which are held by the subject(s) deemed (by an interpretation of the data provided by all those from each agency) to have the most immediate control over the agency are in large case letters.

A number of observations can be made from this table. Neoconservative ideology is by far the most commonly suggested government motive in subjects' responses to question 2.6.1 in the interview guide. However, it is less commonly the most frequently discussed motive. In combination the Populism, Popularity and Paternalism theories are almost as commonly cited. This may mean a number of things.

Subjects may have a variety of theories regarding the government's motives, which they willingly share, but do not trust to be the 'real' motives of government. When directly asked, they differ to the rationales they have heard offered by the province. Alternately, subjects may believe that the government is pursuing an ideological agenda, but may not differentiate the actions of the government from what is supposed to be done according to the tenets of that ideology - viewing patronage as an intrinsic part of neoconservatism
for instance (though clearly, the opposite is true). The interpretation used here is that as neoconservatism is a component of each of the theories described in Chapter Two, that it stands to reason it would be most frequently mentioned, and might be viewed as the core of the theory of choice of any subject. For example, an interview subject wishing to communicate the belief that government policy favors an economic elite (which would be compatible with the Paternalism theory) would have to mention neoconservative theory in making that case, and might view ideology as central to that theory, even if the perceived motives of government go well beyond that ideology.

Judging the Neoconservatism theory to be the core of many of the operating theories of the subjects, and examining Table II with that assumption, means that any apparent patterns arrived at by comparisons between or within functional levels of the subjects or the agencies sampled, very largely disappear. For example, it is interesting that all direct service providers most commonly cite motives compatible with the Neoconservatism theory to explain the government's pursuit of privatization, and uniformly give answers to question 2.6.1 which suggest the same. However, looking more closely, the volunteer in Agency C may not be indicating a belief that ideology is the primary motivator of government so much as paternalism. The staff person in Agency E may be suggesting the Patronage theory, rather than
the Neoconservatism theory.

Nonetheless, Table II graphically demonstrates that a wide range of opinion exists regarding the government's motives for privatizing social services, and as each theory dictates that fairly disparate actions ought to be taken in order to cope with, or capitalize on, provincial policy, it can serve to explain the apparent disunity within some individual agencies and the voluntary sector regarding what should be done in response to privatization.

(4) The Financial Resources of the Agency

Agencies A, E, and F report dramatic increases in total revenue since the provincial government initiated its privatization policies in 1983. However, only in Agency A have these increases been primarily from the province. Taking inflation into account, Agency A has increased its annual budget 300 percent as a result of contracting with the provincial government. Though both Agency E and Agency F have also enjoyed rapid financial growth, and have recently incorporated provincial contracts into their organizations, the lion's share of the new money coming into these agencies comes from either the federal or municipal governments.

Agencies B, C, and D report relatively more stability in their budgets, though it is clear that there has been some growth in B and D. Agency D has had some success in securing new funds - it has recently negotiated with the province to open a new ward. Agency B has recently negotiated a
municipal contract for a housing-related service. However, the impact of these additions on the total organization is small relative to the experience of Agency A, E, or F.

Though growth has occurred in most agencies sampled, it is important to note that all organizations in this study have either begun, or significantly increased, efforts to independently raise funds. In Agencies A, B, E, and F fundraising has become a key responsibility of the Board. Agency A is in the process of hiring a fundraiser, and Agency D has recently done so. In Agency C a profit-making company has been contracted to raise funds for the organization. Fundraising efforts are directed toward securing resources to cover capital costs, operating costs, or both. Agencies B, D, and E report significant need for extra money to cover capital costs (primarily related to maintaining, moving, or expanding their facilities). Agencies A, B, C, E, and F all report significant need for additional funds to cover operating costs - and in each case these organizations report a significant increase in client demand as a result of provincial privatization initiatives. Though an increase in demand from the clients of Agency D is not clearly evident, it is apparent that since the agency has been privatized that it has experienced an increase in demand from community-based organizations.

It is apparent that though privatization has meant an increase in the size of the budgets of some organizations
studied (as a result of contracting), that this increase cannot be equated with an increase in resources available to meet demand, or an increase in the financial security of the organization. Privatization has more commonly resulted in an increase in the service demands placed on the agencies studied. The increase in the efforts of all agencies studied to secure additional funds may be interpreted as evidence that, on balance, privatization has meant that the voluntary sector has been asked to do much more with a little more.

(5) Inter-organizational Relations

Three sources of inter-agency conflict are cited by interview subjects: competition for clients, competition for contracts, and competition in fundraising. Some types of competition may only be indirectly related to privatization.

Competition for clients can be categorized in two ways. In Agencies A and B the personal social services operated are differentiated as either 'market', or 'non-market'. Though market services appear to be bought and sold as a commodity, there appear to be few other features which distinguish them from non-market services - what is actually provided to clients by staff seems similar. Competition for clients in the market social services in these agencies is apparently an accepted fact, and pre-dates privatization (though it is possible that increases in competition can be associated with privatization). The second type of competition for clients is reported by Agencies C and F, and involves inter-agency
disputes over which organization (as an historic right, or as a result of demonstrated superior expertise) should be responsible for serving certain target populations. Such conflicts rarely occur through direct confrontation, and are more often acted out in discussions with funders, or neutral third agencies, though one way or another the agencies in dispute appear to be acutely aware of the issues between them. This type of competition for clients seems to be on the increase as a result of privatization, and is closely related to competition for contracts, and in fundraising—though it can also include competition for referrals, or competition for status and recognition.

Increasing competition for contracts is reported by Agencies A, C, and F, and involves the awareness of organizations bidding on tenders that they are in a market which favors the government. As the awarding of contracts is deemed to rest on a variety of factors (as is demonstrated by the range of operating theories of privatization suggested by interview subjects), this awareness can lead to a number of actions of the agency - the primary intent of which are to secure the contract. Whether or not an agency is actually slighted by another in the process of contract competition seems to be irrelevant - resentment and antagonism can occur in one agency simply as a result of the other being awarded a contract which they both sought. It follows that as privatization has resulted in an increase in contracting,
that increases in competition for contracts can be directly related to privatization.

Increasing competition in fundraising is reported by Agencies A, B, E, and F. This involves a dramatic increase in the numbers of agencies attempting to secure funds from sources whose resources have remained relatively stable (the pie is the same size, but there are many more agencies claiming a slice), and includes attempts by agencies to gain access to the limited number of sources of funds which have more recently come available - through lotteries and casinos. The size of the slice of pie an agency receives may be perceived to be related to status, and may cause resentment in those agencies which lose out. As increased efforts by voluntary organizations to secure supplementary funds are related to privatization, so increased competition in fundraising is also interpreted to be associated with privatization.

Changes in the inter-organizational field as a result of privatization have lead to two solutions - consultation, and incorporation. Agencies B, C, D, E, and F report that they have attempted to deal with either the potential for, or the existence of, increased inter-agency competition through regular consultation, and in some cases through collaborative efforts, with other voluntary organizations. Agencies B, D, and E report significant improvements in their relationships with those other agencies as a result.
Agency A and Agency B report that they have incorporated other small, struggling voluntary organizations into their agency - a means used to ensure the continuity of the service they provide. In all cases the take-over of these organizations has been amicable, and has not resulted in a significant increase in the size of the organization sampled. However, if one pessimistically views the future of the voluntary sector, the potential exists that increasing competition will mean that more and more agencies may become financially unviable, and the larger voluntary organizations may develop into 'mega-agencies'.

(6) The Agency's Service to Clients

That the reduction or elimination of provincial government services resulted in a increase in service demand on most of the agencies in this study has been previously mentioned. In addition, it has been argued that the increases in funding enjoyed by some agencies as a result of contracting have not been entirely capable of keeping pace with the increases in demand on them. Logically, this means that for the agencies in this study, privatization has resulted in a gap in service to clients.

The clients who fall into that gap are those who require services that lie between what the provincial government was responsible for (and capable of), providing before 1983, but which were reduced or eliminated, and those the voluntary sector now is responsible for, and capable of providing, and
which have been privatized - the gap is between what the public sector had and what the voluntary sector has.

Agencies A, B, D, E, and F indicate that they now regularly serve clients who, prior to the provincial government's decision to privatize social services, would have received service from the public sector. In the case of Agency D this is straightforward enough - responsibility for the clients this organization serves was simply directly transferred along with the agency.

Agencies A, B, E, and F report that clients with problems that might have once been addressed by public agencies either approach them independently, or are referred. The service gap is evidenced by the inability of the programmes provided by these organizations to meet the needs of some of these clients (particularly those with more severe problems), and the absence (or disappearance as a result of their elimination) of any appropriate resource to refer these clients to. In essence, privatization has meant that these organizations are left holding the bag. This has apparently been dealt with in a number of ways - but primarily through either accepting the case (and doing what can be done), rejecting the referral, contracting (or attempting to contract) for additional services, or raising additional funds to support core services. It is apparent that success at plugging gaps in service has been mixed, and a variety of interview subjects remark that their efforts to address these
needs have been rebuffed by the provincial government on the grounds that the public sector is not responsible for addressing the problems of those in the gap.

While the service gap is a serious issue which has directly resulted from privatization, and which it appears likely the voluntary sector will carry responsibility for addressing, its implications are fairly clear. However, Agencies E and F report an experience related to gaps in service which has implications for clients and the voluntary sector far beyond that described above. The staff from both organizations have found it necessary to provide services in the field of child protection which are entirely the present statutory responsibility of the provincial government to provide. Social workers from Agencies E and F have repeatedly (in response to an immediate and evident client need) provided unpaid support services to M.S.S.H. social workers, without which those government employees could not have accomplished their mandate to protect children. The worker in Agency F suggests an additional motive for lending such support - that it builds agency credibility in the eyes of the government. The implication is that privatization, in practice, is not even bounded by provincial legislation, and that by using the carrot of 'the best interests of the client', the suggestion that providing such supports may be positively viewed during contract negotiations, and its evident inability to do the job alone, the government may be
able to move the voluntary sector into a handmaiden role from which it may be impossible to extricate itself (without risk to clients and the financial viability of voluntary organizations).

(7) Organizational Structure

It is apparent that privatization has either directly resulted in, or is associated with, changes in the organizational structure of Agencies A, D, and F. However, the structures of Agencies B, C, and E have remained relatively unchanged. In addition, the changes which took place in Agencies A, D, and F are so different as to suggest that privatization per se has no consistent effect on organizational structure, and that other factors may have been more significant contributors to the changes which have taken place.

The changes in the systems of decision-making and accountability in Agencies D and F were obviated by their transfer from the public sector to the voluntary sector. The lines of accountability were re-routed to an existing and a new Board respectively. The hierarchy in Agency D, following privatization, was flattened. The hierarchy in Agency F appears to have remained relatively as it was - informal, and with minimal stratification.

The structure of Agency A, in contrast, has become more formalized, and more hierarchical - a new stratum of middle-management was added. Though it is apparent that this change
is related to privatization (through contracting), it cannot be viewed in isolation from the pre-privatization decision of the Board to expand, the mandate granted by that Board to its new Executive Director (to 'get its house in order' in the wake of internal conflict), and the preference of that senior administrator for a system with clear lines of accountability. The common denominator in each case where structural change has taken place is that the system now in use is that preferred by the present senior administrator.

Though no clear link is found between privatization and changes in the organizational structures of the agencies in this study, it is apparent that the system of power and authority in use in each agency has acted as the conductor enabling the person or group in charge of the organization to operationalize his, her, or their opinion of the best way for the agency to respond to privatization.

As previously argued, that opinion is based on a perception (or operating theory) of the provincial government's motivation for privatization, which has both a descriptive and a predictive function, and which therefore serves to prescribe certain actions for the organization. By comparing the response of the agency to privatization, to the actions prescribed in the operating theory held by the individual or group described by subjects as being in a position to manage the actions of the agency as a whole, it is possible to demonstrate the role of the organizational
structure in determining the impact of privatization on each agency.

In Agency A, all subjects agree that the Executive Director is in charge. The hierarchical structure of Agency A allows that subject considerable control over the agency. That subject's views of privatization suggest a blend of the Populism and Popularity theories - which define the government as pro-grassroots (its policies based in mainstream support and anti-elitism), defensive regarding its public image, and prepared to pursue its ideology only as far as the electorate will let it. Accordingly, the organization has expanded through contracting, avoided confrontational advocacy, and sought to incorporate grassroots groups.

In Agency B, the senior administrator is perceived as having centralized control through formalizing (to some degree) an existing hierarchy. That subject's views on government policies suggest the Neoconservatism and Paternalism theories - which view government policy as directed toward the abandonment of public sector responsibility for social services, and the advancement of an economic and social elite. Accordingly, the agency has avoided contracting, worked to achieve its independence, and advocated for women.

In Agency C the interview subjects identify the collective as the ultimate decision-maker. If the subject's collective views can be taken as representative of that
group, privatization is viewed as a means to perpetuate a patriarchal regime - which suggests the Paternalism theory. Accordingly, the agency has resisted efforts by the government to force bureaucratic conformity on the organization.

In Agency D, the subjects interviewed identify the senior administrator as playing a key leadership role through the facilitation of the senior management team. That subject's views of privatization are compatible with the Populism theory. Accordingly, the organization has adapted its mission and services to conform to popular sentiment, and sought connections with grassroots groups.

In Agency E spheres of influence are clearly divided between functional levels, though the senior administrator has the most immediate and consistent leadership role over the organization as a whole. That subject's views are compatible with the Neoconservatism and Populism theories. Accordingly, the agency has avoided dependence on provincial contracts, developed grassroots support for the organization, and fought cuts in government services through advocacy and work with other voluntary organizations.

In Agency E, the Board and the Executive Director are identified by the subjects interviewed as sharing responsibility for managing the organization (though the influence of latter subject is more immediate). Combined (if one accepts the perspective of the Board member as fairly
representative of that group), their views suggest the Neoconservatism, Paternalism, and Popularity theories. Accordingly, the agency has worked toward the development of more political clout for both itself and its community.

It has been found that the operating theory of the provincial government's motives for privatizing social services which will act to guide the response of an organization is that held by the person or group in the agency which is, through the formal structures defining the lines of authority and accountability in that organization, granted the legitimate power to act on behalf of the agency as a whole.

B. Comparison of Findings to Concerns Raised in the Literature

The C.A.S.W. (1988) position paper on the privatization of personal social services describes a number of potential problems which may arise for not-for-profit agencies as a result of privatization.4 It is stated that in the United States that such agencies have become, "...more opportunistic, entrepreneurial, and political...".5 The meaning of opportunistic is considered too vague for it to be gauged. It is found that one organization (Agency B) has become more entrepreneurial, but this is not (as the C.A.S.W. implies), an unavoidable response to privatization, but is based on the opinion of the new administrator of that
organization of the actions which would be in the best interests of the agency (which in turn is based on that subject's perspective of the government's motives - which is a variable, rather than a fixed response to privatization).

Though the exact meaning of 'more political' is unclear, it is apparent that several organizations have engaged in activities of a political, or quasi-political nature. The relationship of this to privatization varies. It is possible to argue that all actions of any organization in response to privatization are political - since they may either support or resist those policies. If one interprets the development of ties between the organization and government politicians and senior bureaucrats as becoming 'more political', then it is apparent that Agency A has become so. If striving to gain political clout for a community is considered 'more political', then Agency F has become so. If directly confronting the government with the problems which have resulted from privatization is considered 'more political', then Agency E has become so. Again, each of these cases involves variables which make these actions other than an inevitable consequence of privatization, and the actions themselves are so different as to make one question whether becoming 'more political' is good or bad.

The C.A.S.W. also suggests that voluntary organizations are developing a reliance on government funds tied to specific services. This may be the case in Agency A (which
appears to be dependent on provincial funds), and in Agencies E and F (in which may be dependent on federal or municipal funds). Agencies C and D appear to have been dependent from the outset. However, the concern of most of these organizations does not seem to be the presence of funds for specific services, but the absence of funds to support those services autonomously identified by the organization as needed by their community. Only in the case of Agency C is this dependence used by the government against the organization's interests. Agency B has refused to suffer such dependence.

The C.A.S.W. also suggests that resources are reallocated by voluntary organizations toward securing contracts and tailoring services to tenders. It seems possible that within Agencies A, C, D, and F, some tailoring of services has gone on. In Agency D this is an accepted fact - the organization is one giant contract, so it follows that what it does is what government wants it to. What is remarkable (and not mentioned by the C.A.S.W.) is that despite this, it has done much more. In Agencies A, C, and F, it is possible that some contract services provide a type of substitute for what the organization would like to provide, but have no other means to support. If the province evinced a little more trust in these organizations' capacity to identify the needs of the community more accurately than the government, then these services would be
more able to meet those needs. In the meantime, some contract services may be simply a compromise between providing what is needed, and providing nothing at all. The suggestion that staff time goes into securing contracts should be balanced with the observation that securing any type of funding requires staff time. However, both Agency C and Agency F report that the process of contracting is burdensome. What may be of greater relevance to the voluntary sector is the allocation of resources, staff and Board time into raising funds generally - which has apparently become more difficult for all organizations.

The C.A.S.W. also suggests that privatization results in the loss of the flexibility and innovativeness of voluntary organizations, and a reduction in their promotion of citizen participation, and social reform roles. While a loss of flexibility and ability to be innovative might have been experienced in Agencies A, B, C, and E (largely as a result of a reduction in funds which they are able to autonomously allocate), it is apparent that those organizations which were transferred from the public to the voluntary sector (Agencies D and F) have experienced an increase in these areas. It seems that only Agency A has experienced increased problems in promoting representative citizen participation. Agencies B and C do not indicate any additional problems in this area, and Agencies D, E, and F have increased representative citizen participation in their organizations, either as a
direct result of, or in association with, privatization. It is likely that advocacy presents a problem for those organizations which are dependent on provincial contracts, though the extent to which this has resulted in them altering or abandoning their social reform roles is unclear.

Rekart (1987) reports that there has been an overall increase in funding for voluntary organizations in British Columbia since 1983. This would appear to be supported by the findings of this study - only Agency C has remained fairly stable, while all other agencies sampled have increased their budgets (Agencies A and F have tripled their revenue). In addition, Rekart indicates that there has been an increase in fundraising, use of user fees, and competition for contracts in the voluntary sector. Each of these observations is supported by the findings of this study, though only Agency A indicates that it has increased user fees.

In summary, many of the concerns which were raised in the literature in Chapter One are supported by the findings of this study, though it is apparent that several of the predictions contained in the C.A.S.W. position paper are over-generalizations (such as an increase in entrepreneurialism), some miss the mark (such as reliance on government funds tied to specific services), and some appear to be inaccurate (such as a reduction in citizen participation).
C. A Theory of the Impact of Privatization on Voluntary Organizations Which Provide Personal Social Services in Vancouver

A major goal of this study is to generate a theory of the impact of privatization on the potential population identified. As previously stated, theory is an internally consistent body of verifiable hypotheses (see Chapter Two). It might be assumed that this would naturally lead to a series of formally-structured propositions requiring verification. However, as Strauss (1988) notes, there is an inherent contradiction in presenting theory generated out of qualitative analysis in the formal propositional form common to quantitative analysis:

"The discusional form of formulating theory gives a feeling of 'ever-developing' of the theory, allows it to become quite rich, complex, and dense, and makes its fit and relevance quite easy to comprehend. On the other hand, to state a theory in propositional form, except perhaps for a few scattered core propositions, would make it less complex, dense and rich, and more laborious to read. It would also tend by implications to 'freeze' the theory instead of giving the feeling of a need for continued development."

In accordance with the relevance of these observations to the process and product of this study, the theory presented here, and the hypotheses it contains, are presented in discusional form. The relative lack of emphasis in this presentation on formal hypotheses is appropriate to the methods employed to arrive at this theory, the complex nature of its component parts, and its present state of
development. As may be noted below, this form of presentation allows for propositions where there is strong evidence for them in the data, and also permits the presentation of predictive hypotheses, without making them appear to be offered as complete and substantiated to the researcher's full satisfaction.

Central to the theory is the evident diversity of opinion, in the voluntary sector, regarding privatization. Personnel in key decision-making roles in voluntary organizations hold diverse opinions regarding the implications of provincial privatization initiatives for their organization. These opinions are transformed into action through the structure of an organization.

An agency's response to privatization reflects an opinion of the government's motives for such policies, which most often is that held by an individual or group within it, and cannot therefore be interpreted as an organization's opinion, or collectively-held view. Thus dissent and internal conflict regarding that response may be invited. The opinion which will be used to guide an agency's response to privatization is that held by the person or group within the organization which is granted the legitimate authority to act for the agency as a whole, through the structures which define the decision-making process and lines of accountability within that organization. An agency's choice of response to privatization has a variety of implications
for its internal and external relationships.

The degree to which it is broadly perceived within an organization that the agency's response to privatization involves a decision by management to voluntarily change to the fundamental mission of the organization may determine whether or not internal division over the actions of the agency will result. It seems that those organizations which have been perceived by their personnel to voluntarily alter their mission in response to provincial privatization initiatives have also experienced internal conflict involving efforts by management to operationalize the new mission, and resistance from the staff to those efforts. In those cases where personnel have not perceived any change in the mission, or where change has been perceived to be the result of forces beyond the control of the organization, there has been no internal conflict resulting from, or associated with, privatization.

Privatization can result in the harmonization of the values of voluntary organizations with those of the government. The degree that an agency which contracts with the provincial government will experience pressure to adapt its mission, values, practices or structure is in direct proportion to the degree that those facets of the organization presently conform to a bureaucratic ideal. It is apparent that through contracting, an agency establishes a relationship with the public sector - which is structured as
a bureaucracy. It may be possible that the greater the amount of contracting, the greater the intimacy. Increased intimacy in the form of increased contracting may require that the two systems in inter-face be compatible. A lack of compatibility requires the harmonization of systems. If one accepts that voluntary agencies are generally smaller, and more flexible, than the public sector (and are generally the buyers in a seller's market), it becomes predictable who will bear the majority of the burden of change in the relationship. As all systems, and the structures and practices which define them, are ultimately value-based, this equates to a harmonization of values. It seems likely that at the root of the efforts of the public sector to force an organization to conform to a bureaucratic ideal lies a clash of values, and an attack by the public sector on factions which hold values that it views as inherently in opposition.

There is no apparent correlation between an increase in the financial stability of an organization and an increase in the amount of contracting that organization does with the provincial government. Contracting alone is an inadequate response by agencies to the increases in service demands which have been experienced as a result of the reduction or elimination of public services - contracts will not provide the financial resources necessary to meet that demand. Increases in the demands on voluntary organizations which have followed privatization have not been off-set by
increases in funding to the voluntary sector via provincial contracts or grants, and as a result not-for-profit organizations are turning to alternative sources of income, and apparently expending considerable time, energy, and even scarce funds, in order to do so.

The increase in competition experienced by an agency in its service network does not correlate exactly with an increase in the amount that agency contracts with the government. An agency's choice of whether or not to contract in response to privatization has implications for the degree of competition it experiences in the service network - but some increase in competition can be expected no matter what the decision. Privatization appears to have increased the frequency and severity of competitive activities between voluntary organizations, though competition for contracts is only one facet of those activities. The dynamics of the inter-organizational field have taken on characteristics of the marketplace. It is apparent that privatization has, on balance, resulted in a decrease in the cohesiveness of the voluntary sector - and that this lack of unity is of advantage to the provincial government. There is a more apparent correlation between the reduction of funds to the field of social services generally and an increase in competition.

This theory is consistent with the data provided by a variety of interview subjects in each of six very diverse
not-for-profit agencies which provide personal social services in Vancouver. It is untested beyond that group. Given the significance of this theory for decision-makers in voluntary organizations (see section D, below), its hypotheses should be tested further, through either a random sample or a survey-type study. As the parameters of the impact of privatization on such organizations are defined in this theory, it should be possible to break the hypotheses it contains down into measurable variables, and structure a follow-up study using statistical methods.

Several interview subjects indicate that they believe that the most significant impact of privatization has not been on voluntary organizations, but on the people they serve - on families, children, the poor, immigrants, and the physically challenged. That privatization has a variety of negative implications for the users of social services seems to be supported by much of the data. Further research should be conducted in this area.

C. Conclusion

There are a variety of conclusions regarding methodology which may be drawn from this study. The utility of using the diversity of the organizations as a criteria for their selection for study has been demonstrated. Each case study is unique, and yet there are elements common to them all. The advantage of examining the orientation of individuals
(beyond the superficial examination undertaken in studies such as Epstein's) toward identifying the basis for organizational behavior is evident. Equally, it is apparent that factors beyond the orientation of individuals must be incorporated in any study attempting to understand why an organization does what it does. Using this study as an example, it is apparent that an individual's perspective of the provincial government's motive for privatizing social services is a consistent factor in the process which determines how a voluntary organization will respond to such policies. Epstein suggested that it was possible to understand the actions of an organization as a manifestation of the ideological beliefs of its senior administrator. This study suggests that the actions of an agency cannot be understood without inter-relating the orientations of its personnel, mission, structure, values, financial situation, programmes, place in the service network around it, relationship to the public sector, and changes in each of these factors over time.

In order to capture the complex relationships of each of these factors, it has been necessary to employ complex methods for gathering and analyzing data. The small size of the sample may have contributed to the success of the study in doing so. A total of 1207 codes have been generated from only six agencies. It seems likely that the number of codes generated in a larger study would become completely unwieldy.
The methods chosen would be unlikely to yield the same success in a much larger sample.

This study has a variety of implications for those who are responsible for determining the course of action that will be taken by voluntary organizations.

Though decision-making bodies which are responsible for voluntary organizations may have little control over the direct effects of privatization (except in the choice of whether or not to accept contracts), and cannot control the experiences and opinions which may lead personnel to develop their individual operating theories of the government's motives for privatization, they may have some control over the indirect effects of privatization through their relationship with personnel, or their control over the organizational structure in use. It may be helpful for Boards, administrators and staff (or collectives), to discuss their perspectives of what the government is attempting to achieve through its privatization policies, and what the overall policy of the organization ought to be, based on those perspectives.

Those who are responsible for voluntary organizations should be aware that there is no 'correct' understanding of the meaning of privatization - that the course of action taken by an agency is based upon a subjective interpretation which may conflict with other interpretations. Decision-makers should be aware that acting on only one
interpretation may cause some minor friction within an organization, while altering the fundamental mission of the organization (or at least being perceived to do so) may result in some significant internal conflicts. Privatization may appear to provide a variety of opportunities to not-for-profit agencies - but one cost of capitalizing on those opportunities may be the sense of common cause which can unite the disparate groups and individuals which comprise a voluntary organization.

Those decision-makers who perceive advantages in contracting should be equally aware of its limits. A voluntary organization which, by choice, employs an organizational structure which does not conform to the bureaucratic model may find that increasing the amount it contracts with government, or maintaining a high degree of dependence on public funds, inevitably results in the compromise of those values which lead to the agency choosing a non-bureaucratic system.

Decision-makers should not look to contracts to solve the financial problems of their organization. Whether or not an agency pursues contracting, it may still be unable to adequately or appropriately meet the increased demand which has resulted from privatization, and judging by the widespread increase in fundraising, may not significantly improve the financial situation of the agency. Contracts may not be as lucrative a venture for the organization as they
Decision-makers should be aware that privatization, as it has been practiced by the Social Credit government, does not simply mean more contracting. Privatization has resulted in the creation of gaps in service, and the provincial government is not prepared to take responsibility for closing those gaps. Therefore, it is apparent that privatization is more than a re-structuring of the financial arrangements for the delivery of social services - it involves a transfer of responsibility for addressing social problems from the public to the private sector, and this has implications for society generally, and for the operating principles, purposes, structures, services and relationships of not-for-profit organizations to similar agencies, and to the public sector. Meeting the unmet needs which privatization has created appears to be accepted by the voluntary sector as its de facto responsibility, and it is possible that some sort of status (useful in negotiations with funders) accrues to those organizations which successfully close those gaps.

Decision-makers in voluntary organizations should be aware that, whether they like it or not, privatization has made the social services environment more competitive. Most agencies have responded to privatization by both increasing their efforts to maintain a competitive edge, and increasing their efforts to consult and join in collaborative efforts with other voluntary organizations. The result has been
mixed, though the worst effects of competition appear to have been avoided. The staff person in Agency F notes that the voluntary sector is still struggling toward being able to meet the real social needs of the communities of its various component agencies. Its inability to meet that goal is in large part the result of a lack of resources. Its lack of resources are in large part a result of its lack of unity—individual agencies play the game that keeps them apart. Its lack of unity is something within the power of the agencies in the voluntary sector to address, and until that is done, the communities will be the worse.

Notes to Chapter Six

1. It was demonstrated in Chapter Five that both Agency A and Agency F are heavily dependent on contracts, and have recently gone through rapid expansion (increasing their size threefold). Agency A has used provincial contracts to accomplish this. Agency F has used federal contracts. There appears to be considerable differences between contracts from these two levels of government, and the motivation of the government for offering these contracts is considered by the researcher to be significantly different, and therefore the distinction between the two levels of the public sector is made.

2. The list of summary codes which suggest the operating theories indicated is supplied in Appendix G.

3. What is represented by the order of presentation is the frequency that the researcher interpreted a summary code as suggesting a theory of privatization—this may not indicate the interview subject's main point, or primary operating theory.


5. ibid., p. 8.


8. The propositional form of hypothesis may be represented as:

"Construct A causes construct B for population X in condition Y."

"Behavior X or response Y is a valid indicator of construct A."

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Council for Public Services, Privatization is Not for You, Trade Union Research Bureau, Vancouver, 1987 (brochure)


Lapper, R., Populism in British Columbia Politics, University of Victoria, June 10, 1981. (working paper)

Lawrence, P.R., and Lorsch, J.W., Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action, Addison Wesley Publishing Co., Reading Massachusetts, 1969.


Offer, P., Privatizing Social Services, Carleton University, December, 1986. (unpublished major paper).


Parker, Mrs. G. Cameron (nee Miss A. Ethel Dodds), *Canadian Settlements*, Toronto, 1924. (address to the National Settlement Conference, Toronto, 1924).


Vancouver Province, "Abuse 'Epidemic' calls for changes", June 2, 1985, p. 32.


Vancouver Province, "Just when should MHR intervene?", October 11, 1985. p. 38.


Vancouver Province, "Our kids are suffering", October 19, 1986, p. 4.

Vancouver Province, "Socreds slapped on child welfare", October 23, 1985, p. 3.

Vancouver Province, "This is Budget Day", March 30, 1989, p. 6.

Vancouver Schools Administrators' Association, Children in Crisis, October, 1986. (a brief to the government of British Columbia).


Weatherbe, S., "Give These Guys a Little Respect", in Western Report, December 14, 1987, pp. 52-53.
Weatherbe, S., "Useful Advice - Or 'Stone Soup", in Western Report, June 20, 1988, p. 41.


been stated. There will be no trick questions. No detailed statistical or financial information on your agency will be required from you during the interview - the focus is on values, not numbers.

I thank you for giving this request your consideration. I look forward to speaking with you soon.

Sincerely,

__________________________
Greg Terpenning BSW
people said) drawn from all interviews. The master list will be included in the Appendix of the thesis. It would, in my opinion, be irresponsible to do so without some feedback from you. If I do not hear from you on or before May 31, 1989, I will assume I have your permission to place in the thesis the coded data from your interview as indicated in the enclosed list. However, if you are uncomfortable with this plan or any part of the list of interpretations from your interview, please contact me. I will be at home most of the day each weekday, and can usually be reached at home in the evenings if you would prefer not to call from the office.

If my initial interpretation of the data includes errors of fact, my conclusions will be inaccurate, and both your efforts and mine will have been in vain. Errors of fact must therefore be corrected. However, if my interpretation of what you said is factual, but seems to stress some factor in what you said that you might not give equal weight, this may reflect a difference in valuation, not an error of fact. I would be happy to discuss differences of valuation with you, but unlike errors of fact, I cannot guarantee that I will be willing to alter my interpretation based on your feedback—this would amount to my relinquishing control over the research process. An example of an error of fact would be if you told me that your agency had been considering hiring a fundraiser, but I had written a code that indicated your agency had actually hired a fundraiser. I would correct this immediately. An example of a difference of valuation might be if you indicated that you think government is acting according to the will of the majority of the electorate, and I interpreted this as a 'populist' view of government. I would be willing to discuss the interpretation, but discussion may or may not lead to re-interpretation. I am hopeful that there will be neither errors of fact nor significant differences of interpretation.

Though I intend to retain my control in areas of interpretation, I feel it would be unethical to do so in areas of confidentiality. You must be the judge of whether or not the summary codes as I have written them contain information which would compromise you or your agency. As you will note, neither you nor your organization are identified by name. As promised this will be consistent throughout the thesis. However, it is likely that you can clearly be identified by others in your agency—some may recognize your position, others may be aware that you participated either via the grape-vine, because you told them so, or because they actually facilitated your involvement in this project. Given that, if there is anything in any of these summary codes which you feel you would not want included, please indicate to me which codes require revision. An alternate code would be helpful. Though it will be
acknowledged in the thesis that the offer was made via this letter to make such revisions, which participants asked for revision, and which codes were revised, will not be indicated - thus this research should in no way result in any problem for any individual participant. In cases where the agency would be compromised I am equally willing to revise my codes, based on your judgement. As with errors of fact and differences of interpretation, I am hopeful that the content of these codes as they presently stand do not represent any potential breach of confidentiality, and will therefore not require revision.

The brackets [] following the summary codes contain the Basic Social Process (B.S.P.) stage to which the code is assigned, the dimension (or topic area) it addresses, and the operating theory of the provincial government's motivation for social policy (if any) which it reflects, in that order. These second-order coding categories are separated by a slash (/). The stages are differentiated as:

- Order - pre-privatization (a widely varying period),
- Chaos - privatization (following July, 1983),
- New Order - post-privatization (the present status-quo).

The dimensions, to which each summary code is assigned are differentiated as:

- org. mission - the organization's mission and values,
- org.- public sector - the relationship of the organization to the public sector,
- ind. role and values - the perceptions and functions of individuals and small groups in the agency,
- financial resources - the financial resources of the organization,
- inter-org. - inter-organizational relations,
- service to clients - the agency's service to clients,
- org. structure - the organizational structure of the agency.

If the summary code suggests the existence of an identifiable operating theory regarding the provincial government's motivation for privatizing social services, it is identified as:

- Neoconservatism - based in neoconservative ideology,
- Populism - based in popular anti-elitist sentiment,
- Popularity - manipulation to ensure re-election,
- Paternalism - rule by a corporate professional elite,
- Patronage - paying off friends and buying support.

(It should be noted that each theory incorporates to varying degrees the values and principles of neoconservatism)
My apologies for the length of this letter. I hope that by including the information that I have, you will be better able to judge what is in the enclosed list of summary codes, and to provide feedback if you feel it is necessary to do so. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Greg E. Terpenning BSW
C. Interview Guide

(1) First Draft of the Interview Guide

SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

* How would you describe what you do for this organization?
* Could you tell me how you came to find yourself in this position in this organization?
* Is there anything in your cultural or religious background that you feel contributes in any way to your work here?
* What has your formal education been, and how well has that prepared you for what you're doing here?
* How would you describe your personal political beliefs?
* How does this organization work...how do decisions get made...who makes them...how do problems get solved?
* What happens to this organization during periods of conflict or crisis?
* Who would you say is really in charge here? Why?
* If you were going to hang an ideological label on this organization, what would it be? What do you see as the fundamental principles embraced by this organization?
* How would you characterize this organization's relationships with other agencies which work in more or less the same area? How about funders? Clients?
* You've seen the list of government initiatives I'm particularly interested in talking about [see page one of the contact letter]...have any of these had any effect on what your organization does...how it operates...the people you serve...which initiatives, and what effect?
* Has your organization formed any particular policy in response to any of these initiatives? Do you think that's an appropriate response?
* What have the advantages and disadvantages of privatization been for this agency?
* Do you think the government should continue with this policy for social services? At what point do you imagine privatization will just have to stop?
* What would you describe as the best case and worst case scenario for the future of social services, and what do you think it would take to achieve the best case?
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Third Draft

1. Closed Questions

1.1 Description of the Organization

(only one subject per organization need respond in this section)

1.1.1 Name of Organization

1.1.2 Approximate size of budget in the last fiscal year

1.1.3 Approximate contribution of government to that budget

1.1.4 Approximate provincial portion of that contribution

1.1.5 Approximate number of members

1.1.6 Geographic area served

1.1.7 Population of concern

1.1.8 Year founded

1.2 Description of the Interviewee

1.2.1 Name

1.2.2 Age

1.2.3 Sex

1.2.4 Years in Canada

1.2.5 Ethno-cultural background

1.2.6 Academic Degrees

1.2.7 Title in organization

1.2.8 Primary responsibility

1.2.9 Years involved with organization

1.2.10 Years in present position
2. Standardized Open-ended Interview

2.1 Description and Comparison of Individual's and Organization's Values

2.1.1 I'm going to ask you what sounds like an incredibly simple question, but I'm sure you'll appreciate that its really quite complex: what do you like about [name of organization]? You see, I'm asking you to think about what your values are, to compare them to what you believe the values of this organization to be, and to describe to me the ways in which you think they're compatible.

2.1.2 [clarifier] I assume that much of what we individually do, many of our choices in life, are made according to our own values, that we all make judgements about what is right and what is wrong according to some set of principles - and I assume that we all have some conscious awareness of what those principles are. In a similar way, most voluntary organizations are founded on and operate according to some set of ideas or beliefs. I think I'd begin to get a picture of both you and [name of organization] if you were to tell me about the fundamental principles of this organization which you feel most positively about.

2.1.3 [probe] More generally, what principles do you feel most strongly about? I'm asking you to describe your own ideals - this could range anywhere from your political orientation to your religious beliefs - whatever you consider your own value system to be.

2.1.4 [probe] I'm also trying to get a clearer picture of the fundamental principles of [name of organization]. Try completing this sentence: [name of organization] is founded on the belief that...

2.1.5 [probe] Would you say that [name of organization] is aligned with any particular political orientation, and if so how would you describe that orientation?

2.1.6 [probe] In a minute I'll ask you about the nuts-and-bolts operations of [name of organization], but for now let me ask one more question about fundamental values. Another assumption I have is that no two people share exactly the same belief system, and therefore I suppose the same is true for any individual in relation to any organization. Could you describe to me any differences which you think exist when you compare your values with those of this organization (or the values of the majority in this organization)?
2.2 Description of Organizational Structure and Functioning

2.2.1 We've been talking about principles, but now I'd like to learn more about the practical side of how [name of organization] operates. I'd be interested to hear from you how this organization functions, both on a day-to-day basis, and during a crisis. What makes [name of organization] tick? How do conflicts arise, and how are they resolved? Who is really in charge here?

2.2.2 [clarifier] How would you characterize how responsibility, authority, and power are divided in [name of organization], and how does this contribute to both the ordinary operation of this organization and the way it responds to whatever problems it encounters?

2.3 Description and Valuation of Organizational Change

2.3.1 I think I'd understand [name of organization] better if I could get a picture of it over time. What changes have you noticed in [name of organization], in the time that you've been involved with this organization?

2.3.2 [clarifier] I'm assuming that change is inevitable in just about everything. What do you think have been the most significant changes in [name of organization] in the time you've been here? (I'm not intending to restrict your answer to any particular area such as policy, personnel, budget, etc. - I'd like to leave it up to you to decide what the most important changes have been.)

2.3.3 [probe] How do you account for [reflect the change described]?

2.4 Description and Valuation of Interorganizational Field

2.4.1 Have you noticed any changes during the time you've been involved with this organization in the relationship between [name of organization] and other agencies, programs or personnel providing similar services, or serving a similar population?

2.4.2 [clarifier] In the private sector there is no monopoly on service provision - so you usually have a variety of organizations trying to do similar things, or to serve a similar population in different ways. This could result in anything from close co-operation between agencies to intense competition. Have you noticed any change in the relationship between [name of organization] and other agencies doing the same thing, or potentially working with the same people?

2.4.3 [probe] How would you account for [reflect the change
2.5 Description and Valuation of the Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

2.5.1 In the contact letter I provided to you a list of provincial government policy initiatives which have been broadly defined as methods of privatizing social services. This list was developed by Marilyn Callahan and Chris McNiven - both are social policy analysts. [Produce list and define terms if necessary]. Which of these initiatives do you think directly or indirectly relates to [name of organization], and how would you describe what its effect has been here?

2.5.2 [clarifier] I assume that any of these government policies might have some kind of effect on voluntary agencies providing social services, but I don't assume that they have all affected all agencies in the same way, or whether the effect has been positive or negative. I'm asking you to identify which of these policies relates to what [name of organization] does, and to describe what its impact has been on this organization - any problems you've had to cope with or benefits you've enjoyed as a result.

2.5.3 [probe] What other provincial government policies, either new or long-standing, do you feel have had a significant impact on [name of organization] or what this organization is trying to do?

2.5.4 [probe] What policy or program changes in [name of organization] do you think have resulted from [name privatization initiative or other provincial policy identified by subject]?

2.5.5 [probe] What do you think [name of organization] should do in response to [name privatization initiative or other provincial policy identified by subject] that they have not already done?

2.6 Valuation of Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

2.6.1 What do you think is the government's motive in pursuing these policies - what are they trying to achieve?

2.6.2 [clarifier] Lets assume that the provincial government has some particular goal in mind when they implement policy changes. If you can deduce from these policies what that goal is, how would you describe it?

2.6.3 [probe] What is your opinion of that goal?
2.6.4 [probe] What do you think the role of government in relation to social services ought to be? What do you think the provincial government should be doing to ensure the well-being of the people of British Columbia?

2.6.5 [probe] I guess that we all hope that government policy will somehow reflect those values we hold near and dear, but we know that this is not always the case. What do you think is the worst thing that this government is capable of implementing as policy in relation to social services?

2.6.6 [probe] How much influence do you think voluntary organizations presently have in the formation or revision of government social policy?

2.6.7 [probe] What do you think would have to change in order for the voluntary sector to make a greater contribution toward the formation or revision of government social policy?
D. Ethics Forms

The forms provided on the following pages are those submitted to the University of British Columbia Behavioral Sciences Screening Committee For Research and Other Studies Involving Human Subjects. These forms were submitted on Nov. 15, 1988, and the researcher was informed of their approval by that committee on Jan. 11, 1989.
Summary of methodology and procedures. (Must be typewritten in this space)

The study involves the qualitative analysis of data gathered through interviews with policy-makers, administrators and line workers in a variety of not-for-profit agencies providing personal social services.

Areas of particular interest which will be probed in the interviews are the personal context from which each subject makes his or her value judgements, the organizational environment, agency adaptation or adoption of policies, procedures or programs as a result of privatization and the subject's valuation of these changes, and the subject's vision of the future.

Interviews will be audio-taped and the researcher will take notes.

Following the interviews, specific phrases or passages of interest will be drawn from the tapes and coded in such a way as to retain their connections with the functional level of the subject, the subject's personal value-system, organizational environment, view of privatization, and connection with the other functional levels within the agency, and in order to compare these factors with other subjects. The achievement of the objectives of the study depend on what, if any, patterns that emerge as a result of this process.

Description of population

13 How many subjects will be used? 18 (3 subjects in each of 6 agencies)  
How many in the control group? N/A

14 Who is being recruited and what are the criteria for their selection?  
Administrators, policy-makers and staff in 6 voluntary agencies. The agencies were chosen for their diversity in size, years of operation, community served, primary funding source, public profile, evident value-base, and potential experience of the privatization process. Participation of an agency is based on the voluntary agreement of the administrator (first contacted by letter). Participation of subjects in the other two levels of responsibility is by suggestion of the administrator and the voluntary agreement of the subjects (they will be contacted by letter once they are identified as potential subjects by the administrator).
### 15. What subjects will be excluded from participation?

Only those who do not wish to participate.

### 16. How are the subjects being recruited? (If initial contact is by letter or if a recruitment notice is to be posted, attach a copy.) Note that UBC policy absolutely prohibits initial contact by telephone.

By letter – see attached.

### 17. If a control group is involved, and if their selection and/or recruitment differs from the above, provide details.

N/A

---

### PROJECT DETAILS

#### 18. Where will the project be conducted? (Room or area)

Interviews will be conducted in a place identified as convenient by the subject – in most cases this will likely be in an office within one of the agencies targeted. The only stipulation the researcher will make is that privacy must be possible.

#### 19. Who will actually conduct the study?

The Student: Greg E. Terpenning

#### 20. Will the group of subjects have any problems giving informed consent on their own behalf? Consider physical or mental condition, age, language, or other barriers.

None.

#### 21. If the subjects are not competent to give fully informed consent, who will consent on their behalf?

N/A

#### 22. What is known about the risks and benefits of the proposed research? Do you have additional opinions on this issue?

The only risk foreseeable is if a specific individual or a specific agency were identified as holding views that did not meet the approval of those around them, there might be some impact on their status in that environment. Confidentiality is therefore of paramount importance.
23 What discomfort or incapacity are the subjects likely to endure as a result of the experimental procedures?
None. Interviews will be stressful only to the extent that the issues cause any depth of feeling in the subject.

24 If monetary compensation is to be offered the subjects, provide details of amounts and payment schedules.
N/A

25 How much time will a subject have to dedicate to the project?
- Administrators - approximately 2 hours (1 hour interview and 1 hour contacting other potential subjects)
- Policy-makers and staff - approximately 1 hour (interview)

26 How much time will a member of the control group (if any) have to dedicate to the project?
N/A

DATA

27 Who will have access to the data?
The student and the faculty advisor only.

28 How will confidentiality of the data be maintained?
Interviews will be private and data will be coded. Tapes will be destroyed after the data has been processed. The student will not discuss or present in written form anything that might identify the subjects.

29 What are the plans for future use of the data (beyond that described in this protocol)? How and when will the data be destroyed?
Tapes and written records will be destroyed on or before September 1, 1989. The data will not be used for any purpose other than the research plan herein described.

30 Will any data which identifies individuals be available to persons or agencies outside the University?
No.
CHECKLISTS

31. Will your project use: (check)
   - Questionnaires (submit a copy)
   - Interviews (submit a sample of questions)
   - Observations (submit a brief description)
   - Tests (submit a brief description)

INFORMED CONSENT

32. Who will consent? (check)
   - Subject
   - Parent/Guardian
   - Agency Official(s)

In the case of projects carried out at other institutions, the Committee requires written proof that agency consent has been received. Please specify below:
   - Research carried out in a hospital - approval of hospital research or ethics committee.
   - Research carried out in a school - approval of School Board and/or Principal. (Exact requirements depend on individual school boards; check with faculty of Education Committee members for details).
   - Research carried out in a Provincial Health Agency - approval of Deputy Minister
   - Other, specify:

33. USC Policy requires written subject consent in all cases other than questionnaires which are completed by the subject. (See item #34 for consent requirements). Please check each item in the following list before submission of this form to ensure that the written consent form attached contains all necessary items.

   - Title of project
   - Identification of Investigators (including a telephone number)
   - Brief but complete description in lay language of the purpose of the project and all procedures to be carried out in which the subjects are involved
   - Assurance that identity of the subject will be kept confidential and description of how this will be accomplished
   - Statement of the total amount of time that will be required of a subject
   - Details of monetary compensation, if any, to be offered to subjects.
   - An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures to ensure that they are clearly understood by the subject and to provide debriefing if appropriate
   - A statement of the subject’s right to refuse to participate or withdraw at any time and a statement that withdrawal or refusal to participate will not jeopardize further treatment, medical care or influence class standing as applicable. NOTE: This statement must also appear on letters of initial contact
   - A place for signature of subject CONSENTING to participate in the research project, investigation or study.
   - A statement acknowledging receipt of a copy of the consent form including all attachments.
   - Parental consent forms must contain a statement of choice providing an option for refusal to participate. (e.g. “I consent/I do not consent to my child’s participation in this study.”)
34. Questionnaires should contain an introductory paragraph which includes the following information. Please check each item in the following list before submission of this form to insure that the introduction contains all necessary items.

- Identification of Investigators (including a telephone number)
- A brief summary that indicates the purpose of the project
- The benefits to be derived
- A full description of the procedures to be carried out in which the subjects are involved
- A statement of the subject's right to refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without jeopardizing further treatment, medical care or class standing as applicable

**NOTE:** This statement must also appear on explanatory letters involving questionnaires.

- The amount of time required of the subject must be stated
- The statement that if the questionnaire is completed it will be assumed that consent has been given
- Assurance that identity of the subject will be kept confidential and description of how this will be accomplished.
- For surveys circulated by mail submit a copy of the explanatory letter as well as a copy of the questionnaire

**ATTACHMENTS**

35. Check items attached to this submission if applicable. (Incomplete submissions will not be reviewed)

- Letter of Initial contact (Item 16)
- Advertisement for volunteer subjects (Item 16)
- Subject consent form (Item 33)
- Control group consent form (if different from above)
- Parent/guardian consent form (if different from above)
- Agency consent (Item 32)
- Questionnaires, tests, interviews, etc. (Item 31)
- Explanatory letter with questionnaire (Item 34)
- Other, specify:
E. Data Coding Example

The text beginning on the next page provides a demonstration of how the summary codes have been drawn from the data gathered through the interviews. This example is included only in order to indicate the method used, and does not include a transcription of all interviews.

The left-hand column contains a partial transcription from three interviews from one agency sampled. This is ordered according to the questions in the interview guide (see Appendix C), and by the functional level of the interview subject. The interview subject whose title appears in large-case letters is the individual indicated by a consensus of those interviewed in this organization as having the authority to act (and thereby operationalize his or her theories) in the interest of the agency as a whole. In order to maintain the anonymity of participants, all references identifying the organization, associated agencies, or individuals in them have been edited. The abbreviation 'org.' refers to the organization selected. The abbreviation 'ind.' refers to the individual interviewed.

The right-hand column contains the summary codes generated from the data in the left-hand column. In all cases these codes are placed directly opposite the indicators which suggest them.
Major Question 2.1.1
[ind./org. value congruence]
Policy-maker
I like the purpose of [org.];
the needs of families and
children are paramount - I
also like the organization; I
like the Executive Director;
I like the Board, and; I like
the way its run -
dedication to population
served
compatibility with other
individuals in agency
compatibility with
operational imperatives

ADMINISTRATOR
opportunity to use my social
work training and values in
an arena that required me not
to compromise them too much-
I've always said the social
worker had a value about
families - here was an agency
(with somewhat adequate
funding) and it wasn't
government - I didn't want to
work for government - given
the way things were going
this seemed like a good job -
it didn't have quite the
day-to-day survival feeling
that lots of other non-
profits have - and I had come
to the point in my career
where I was totally the
administrator type - I was
ready to be an Executive
Director, and I guess the new
part was learning to staff
Boards of Directors [probe
suggesting insight was
involved] well, I was very
involved with the Resource
Boards before and decided not
to go into the government
sector -
environment is conducive to
professional practice
profession-agency mission
value congruence

funding deemed adequate
public sector-personal
incompatibility

public sector cutbacks
foreseen

agency is stable, relative
to other non-profits
move up career ladder

new challenge

disillusioned by public
sector

Line Staff/Administrator
[org.] offers some important
services - I always wanted to
be a clinician, to be in
something like private
practice and to use my
clinical skills - this is an
alternative to private
agency meets significant
client need
permits actualization of
career goal
combines quality and
affordability
practice, and one that people can afford -

Probe 2.1.3
[personal value system]
Policy-maker
my background in social work would lead me to have a need to work with people in a helping kind of way - it doesn't stem from a strong Christian belief or a strong religious background - this kind of agency appeals to me a lot more than other kinds of voluntary Boards because that's why I went into social work - I don't know if my political views relate, because a lot of social workers vote N.D.P.; I don't - federally I'm a Conservative -

latent professionalism
noblesse oblige
belief in the family
individual and professional values ideologically distinct
political conservatism

ADMINISTRATOR
social justice - collective provision - local responsiveness in the delivery of service so that they are relevant, adequate and appropriate - I'm a bit of an elitist about training - that's another reason why this agency appealed; because it had a strong history of that [request for elaboration] I'm a bit of a bear about the need for training - in terms of skill and knowledge, but also the socialization of professional values; I really think that's the part I find most important - that's best delivered through professional training - but, I recognize that in the broader field that there's levels of training and different ways that people come into the field - I

social justice and collective provision
decentralization of service delivery
commitment to service relevance and adequacy
professionalism
agency commitment to professionalism

professionism is skills, knowledge and values

professionalism acquired through training

professional/agency elitism
professional territorialism
basically don't like people
calling themselves social
workers without professional
training

Line Staff/Administrator
I'm a socialist - I believe
that people should be equal
and that there some be equal
opportunities for them - and
our society has an obligation
to empower them and help them
reach their potential - I
believe in fairness and
democracy

Probe 2.1.4
[organizational value system]
Policy-maker
serves the needs of children
and families - a private
agency - historically its has
been able to take initiatives
and do things and be a kind
of a leader - I like the
programs we run; the
counselling program; all the
programs are terrific

ADMINISTRATOR
a broad family-serving agency
- responsive to the changing
needs of families and
individuals - well
functioning families are the
basic units of society - we
believe in advocacy on behalf
of the needs of families

Line Staff/Administrator
[org.] developed around
trying to fulfill certain
needs that governments
weren't fulfilling - and
they've traditionally been in
the forefront of developing
programs for problem kids-
that's what the traditional
role has been; I think its
changing now - privatization
has sure changed it - we're still in the forefront in some ways, I don't think that's our primary role anymore [request for clarification of present role] now it seems like [org.] is all over the place - we're picking up the pieces that the government is refusing to do - trying to get as many contracts as possible - it doesn't seem that its about a specific role anymore - to me there doesn't seem to be a lot of consistency in the kind of contract they pick up - so its about picking up contracts and getting bigger and having more money - to have a safety cushion or something - or maybe for some kinds of services its about developing an Empire or maybe they believe that they can do it better than anybody else - but it isn't anymore about being on the cutting edge [suggestion that the changes have not been the choice of the org.] probably not, but 'way back when they were somewhat in debt, so there was some natural reason to start doing this - it wasn't a big one, but there was some pressure from [charitable funder X] for them to do something about it -

Probe 2.1.5
[org. political alignment]
Policy-maker
No. [there is no alignment] non-aligned politically

ADMINISTRATOR
its very much seen as a mainline agency - its apolitical for sure - but its probably seen as an

program development no longer primary role
organizational identity becoming diffuse
picking up responsibilities refused by government
pursuit of contracts superceding pursuit of mission
agency role fracturing
mandate-contract incongruence
agglomeration partly motivated by financial insecurity
empire building
private sector efficiency a reason to capitalize on privatization

expansion was preceded by financial distress
organizational fiscal responsibility demanded by funder

perceived as a mainline, establishment agency
apolitical
establishment agency, if a social agency can ever be there - that's probably how its seen - we've been trying to move that a little, but that's probably how we'd be perceived - we're not grassroots, we haven't got a fantastic network of users of our service who rally to the cause - most of the people who come here would just as soon forget that time in history - its the model of a volunteer-lead kind of organization with professional staff, and some direct-service volunteers - which is not exactly a very vibrant tradition at all when I came here we never had that kind of tradition - [this type of org.] was really the cradle of social work practice; that's where it came from - we're terribly professional when you compare us to a neighbourhood, grassroots organization [interviewer acknowledgement of his own background in a neighbourhood house] - an interesting thing has happened about that usage of the term 'voluntary agency', it always meant the use of voluntary leadership, but somehow people transformed that into meaning you can man all the services with volunteers -

Line Staff/Administrator
not overly - at least not as any policy

despite recent changes, the agency retains its traditional image
agency lacks grassroots support

volunteerism in leadership /professionalism in service

increased use of volunteers

legitimation by history

professional elitism is not universal to voluntary agencies

redefinition of volunteerism to leadership and service provision

neo-volunteerism threatens professionalism

political alignment not overt
Agency, Interview Subject, B.S.P. Code and Dimension

Table III displays the sorting matrix for first-order codes drawn from the six agencies and categorized according to functional level of the interview subject (and source of the code), stage, and dimension. In the interest of confidentiality, agencies are identified only by large case letter, and the interview subjects are identified only by a small-case letter indicating their functional level:

(a): responsibility for policy-making
(b): responsibility for administration
(c): responsibility for direct service

Some subjects are responsible for more than one functional area, and have been accordingly identified with their primary function first, followed by their secondary function. If two subjects in the same agency have similar responsibilities they are differentiated as either (1) or (2) (which also identifies their hierarchical relationship), or as (x) or (y) (where no clear hierarchical relationship exists).

In order to fit the entire table on one page, Roman numerals were used in place of the titles of the seven dimensions, as follows:

I. The Organization's Mission and Values,
II. Organization - Public Sector Relations,
III. Individual Role and Values,
IV. The Financial Resources of the Agency,
V. Inter-organizational Relations,
VI. The Agency's Service to Clients,
VII. The Organization's Decision-making Structure.

The numbers within the boxes of the matrix indicate the number of summary codes which were categorized in that area. The table indicates the 'spread' of summary codes between the agencies and interview subjects, the stages under study (according to the B.S.P. model - Order, Chaos and New Order), and the topic areas (or dimensions) of interest. The table is supplied as a graphic representation of the categories in use in the analytic process, and to demonstrate that the summary codes drawn from the data did in fact cover the categories chosen by the researcher. By no means should comparisons between agencies, subjects, dimensions or stages be made solely on the basis of the number of codes in any box of this matrix. The nature of the research supports comparisons of the content of these boxes, not simply the number of summary codes each contains.

Table III - Sorting Matrix for Codes
Table III - Sorting Matrix for Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>cb</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b1</td>
<td>b2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Privatization Held by Interview Subjects

The following is a compilation of those summary codes which fall into the core category 'operating theory of the provincial government's motivation for privatization'. The list is drawn from the master list of 1207 summary codes provided in Appendix H, and can be associated with Table II in Chapter Five (which provides a summary of this list). The list divides the summary codes according to source (the interview subject who provided the data from which the code is drawn, and the agency from which that subject was selected), and by the operating theories which are suggested by the data. The six categories of operating theories in use in this list are:

- Neoconservatism: based in neoconservative ideology,
- Populism: based in popular anti-elitist sentiment,
- Popularity: manipulation to ensure re-election,
- Paternalism: rule by a corporate professional elite,
- Patronage: paying off friends and buying support,
- Other: describing a theory not defined above.

The range of categories describes each subject's theory of why the government is pursuing privatization. For each interview subject, the category with the most associated codes is presented first, the next-highest number of codes second, and so on. If two categories of theory have the same number of codes for any given subject, the sequencing is alphabetical. It should be noted that though frequency is of interest, it should not be interpreted here as a statistic—the process of arriving at the indicated frequency does not validate the assumption that the category with the most codes is an interview subject's 'primary theory'. It may simply have been raised more often in the interview.

Underlined codes identify those which were interpreted from the response to question 2.6.1 (directly addressing the issue of the government's motivation for privatization). If the title of an interview subject is in large-case letters, this indicates a consensus amongst subjects from that organization identifying that individual as having the authority to act (and thereby operationalize their theories) in the interest of the agency as a whole.

(1) Agency A
Policy-maker

Paternalism
113. increasing elitism of Board restricts regional representation
114. increasing elitism of Board restricts ethnic representation
110. agency began to woo major funders
229. agency is dependent on provincial funding
232. bureaucracy only penetrable by oligarchy
328. government should and does take a paternal role with families
361. perception of some value in use of personal contacts to influence government
362. perception of some value in compliance with the political agenda to influence government

Neoconservatism
306. primary government motive perceived as cost-reduction
309. tentative belief that private sector delivery is more efficient
319. perception of tremendous government waste
335. worst possible government action would be eliminating social assistance

Patronage
117. Board members expected to use social contacts to fundraise
230. securing funding now can involve individual to individual lobbying

Other
363. perception of some value in development of a factual case to influence government

Popularity
307. perception that reduced spending by government will lead to re-election

Populism
153. policy-making body striving to be representative

ADMINISTRATOR

Populism
176. elitism of agency prevents legitimate participation in social action
180. agency seeking grassroots legitimation by incorporation of smaller, struggling, groups
190. privatization based on populism, not conservatism
192. 'Restraint' viewed as a tactic to control Big Labour
200. senior administrator considers public delivery of service too bureaucratized
202. privatization defined as a transfer of service, not as an ideological agenda, or transfer of responsibility
262. perception of Vander Zalm's influence in creation of new programs
265. anticipation that privatization has run its course
266. suggestion that future new services will be publicly-funded, and privately provided
276. activism by mainstream agencies results from broad public consensus on social need
277. lack of public consensus on need strips agencies of power in contract negotiations
311. primary government motive perceived as control of public sector union and wages
332. negative public opinion regarding social services seen to result from backlash against unfair taxes
345. government motivation for privatization not perceived as commercialization
356. lack of consultation with formal organizations deemed typical of populist government
366. populist government perceived as anti-professional and anti-urban
369. perception that government policy lacks predictability

Popularity
191. image and income interdependent in perception of government motives for financial support
256. provincial rhetoric of reducing expenditure now conflicting with emerging contract programs
257. funding for social programs assured by the political business cycle
258. suggestion that privatization is neither motivated by, nor addresses, provincial financial distress
259. perception that those critical of the government will suffer financial penalties
261. creation of some new programs perceived as response to public pressure
287. the perceived cost of confronting the government on its policies: contracts
288. effective advocacy has to be done by an organization independent of public funds
294. public opposition to policy is considered, by government, to be political opposition
295. securing funds may now require political (but not public) leverage
339. perception that mandate and budget tightening has reached its limit in child welfare
344. public pressure deemed to prevent government commercialization of social services

Neoconservatism
252. all ministries tightened their mandates in order to cut spending
312. secondary government motive seen as reduction of salary costs through contract employment
336. worst possible government actions include lowering social assistance rates, tightening eligibility requirements and implementing Long Term Care user fees
337. government mandate constriction deemed a method of coping with funding inadequacy
340. assumption that future change in government policy will be toward areas where large savings are possible
343. existing regulation is in contract renewal

Other
133. senior administrator believes that credibility is commensurate with quantity of services provided
250. theory that the degree of compatibility with MSSH mandate determines the level of MSSH financial support

Paternalism
333. belief that social services are social stabilizers, and therefore indispensable to government
365. bureaucrats perceived as partly responsible for the lack of public-voluntary sector consultation

Patronage
193. contracts awarded by the provincial government through 'courting' select agencies

Line Staff/Administrator

Neoconservatism
47. picking up responsibilities refused by government
313. primary government motive perceived as cost-reduction
317. perception of government's ideological bias against collective responsibility for the welfare of the individual
346. worst possible action by government perceived to be presently proceeding in contracting to for-profit organizations
379. perception that contracting has increased competition, and thus prevented the formation of coalitions

Patronage
300. utilization of policy-makers' personal affiliations with government decision-makers in lobbying deemed inappropriate
301. personal lobbying is an inefficient means of directing resources to needs
302. personal lobbying of government, by the Board, positions the agency politically

Popularity
perception that cutting the size of government will lead to re-election

352. present government role seen as reactive, not proactive

Other

351. perception that government simply misunderstands the nature of social problems

Populism

348. perception that the populism of Vander Zalm is likely to promote commercialization

(2) Agency B

Policy-maker

Neoconservatism

412. government service reductions resulted in an increased demand on agency's non-contracted social services

420. privatization resulted in increased efforts to secure non-government funds

421. government motive for privatization perceived as deficit-reduction

422. privatization seen as shirking responsibility

427. worst possible government action would be reducing the welfare rate

Paternalism

416. inadequate subsidy of child care threatens daycare services

430. government presently has a 'closed door' policy regarding consultation

Patronage

407. government specifically asked agency to submit a bid on a contract

Popularity

424. acknowledgement that the electorate seem to approve of these policies

ADMINISTRATOR #1

Neoconservatism

446. agency operates' businesses, is becoming more entrepreneurial, and has independence from government as a goal

447. acceptance that government does not have a lot of money

491. government motive identified partly as permanent withdrawal from social services

498. government motive for privatization to reduce the size of government
though perceived goal of privatization viewed positively, methods of privatization viewed negatively
government methods seen to reflect lack of interest in consultation with the community - insensitive adherence to their own agenda
government seen to actually invite public hostility to policies in the methods chosen to privatize services

Paternalism
feels frustration over provincial subsidy to child care
privatization resulted in increased client demand and agency interest in using government resources to meet that demand
confrontational nature of voluntary sector contact with government blamed on the senior public sector personnel
experience indicates that voluntary sector can have a lot of clout with government - but this varies according to the perceived credibility of those speaking to government

Popularity
government motive identified partly as withdrawal from social services unless prompted to act by public outcry/advocacy
suggestion that government does respond if it is apparent that there is broad public consensus against policy

Other
changes in government policy appear confused - confusion seen to result from multiple motives for policy, and to cause a sense of chaos

Administrator #2

Neoconservatism
agency now acting to support statutory services, but receives no funding for that
service provision as a demonstration prior to government involvement now in doubt - government unlikely to provide funds
privatization is not a transfer of responsibility - it is a change in the government's perception of responsibility, rationalized as a gift to the private sector
privatization is an unwanted gift to the private sector - an arbitrary renegotiation of the public-private relationship
private sector has been left to deal with what the public sector has decided they don't want to do
the provincial government is no longer looked at as a source of funding for a service that is identified as needed by the community

Other
Introduction of Family Initiatives funding confuses the question of whether or not the government will fund services.

Apparent contradictions in policies make their motives unclear.

Cost-effectiveness as a doubtful explanation of privatization - costs often simply transferred within government.

Incentive effect of income assistance reductions doubtful - it increases dependence.

Perception that government policy lacks a knowledge-base, and that research is needed to define adequate resources.

Paternalism

Experience has demonstrated that reliance on voluntary sector to provide necessary level of service means clients are without options.

Government policy on daycare subsidy considered unrealistic.

Reduction of government responsibility for child protection considered 'philosophical'.

Patronage

Suggestion that some agencies inexplicably receive special treatment from government.

Populism

Fundamentalist and non-metropolitan nature of government would have to change for the voluntary sector to enjoy more influence.

Line Staff/Administrator

Neoconservatism

Emphasis on agency as a business results in increased pressure toward competition - primarily in non-social, 'market' services.

Inter-agency competition for fee-for-services has increased.

Sometimes co-operation can border on providing training - which then allows other agencies to run programmes in competition with Agency B.

Privatization identified as reframing the nature of problems so that their solution lies outside of government.

Privatization partly motivated by a desire to reduce the financial requirements of government to provide service, in order to reduce taxes.

Privatization partly motivated by a philosophical stance against assisting people.

Paternalism

Privatization has had a major impact on the economic situation of women with children - increasing their...
dependence on either men or the government
government cutbacks in the name of decreasing dependence
deeded 'a lie'
belief in teaching what is necessary for independence, rather than giving handouts - seen to differ from government policy
ultimately its 'every man for himself' - with an emphasis on 'man'
acknowledgement that on some Boards, the wealthy and socially connected may be used to give voluntary organizations more pull, and that this is effective
voluntary organizations generally seem to have little clout with government - except through back doors

Patronage

government has demonstrated no hesitancy to assist business through social and employment programmes

Popularity

in order for the voluntary sector to have more clout, agencies will have to risk their contracts and make public demands

(3) Agency C

Administrator/Line Staff/Policy-maker X

Paternalism

accommodating government expectations in order to ensure financial survival has resulted in some compromise of agency values
government expectations, and funding power, makes it difficult for agency to be truly feminist
other agencies providing parallel services have ceased to be truly feminist
increasingly complex public bureaucracy places pressure on agency to restructure hierarchically in order to effectively deal with 'red tape'
service organizations may compete to some degree, but are bound by a common vulnerability to government funding cuts and a common commitment to clients
this government is never going to give the funds necessary to meet social needs
government demand for accountability, including confidential records, is backed by a subtle threat to the financial survival of the agency
new government billing procedures suggest the eventual outcome of privatization will be services for profit, provided by professionals

Neoconservatism
'socialist' nature of collectives seen to be in fundamental opposition to government ideology

competition viewed as a natural phenomena of the environment

next step in privatization envisioned as introduction of user fees

privatization seen as support for the profit-making sector

Patronage

government motive for award of contracts suspect - they may be inclined to award according to agency compatibility with government values, and support of government

Popularity

attempt by agency to have government fund a community education project has been stonewalled - government is demanding that the agency not criticize the legal system

Administrator/Line Staff/Policy-maker Y

Paternalism

in the contracting process government funders make subtle demands that agency structure and values conform to their expectations

government demands for service accountability compromise agency values regarding client confidentiality/autonomy

funders and mainstream agencies 'fear' the radical, political nature of the agency

funders question the credibility of the agency as a result of its values - perceiving its perspective as 'tinged'

agency viability is ultimately dependent on services which are ultimately dependent on government

by retaining values, agency loses out on funding that could be accessed if greater compromise was chosen

agency winds up serving clients not covered or funded by contract because government does not recognize the need

government personnel expect someone to 'be in charge', and view the agency's structure as inefficient

the bureaucratic mind does not like equal power - it is a threat to their power, and they have a vested interest in perpetuating a hierarchical structure

accountability issues a tool used by bureaucrats to attack non-hierarchical organizational structures

problems arise when agency attempts to gain funding recognition for serving a population the government identifies as being served by another agency - public sector inflexibility

agency 'expects' inadequate funding, much as women 'expect' not to get what they want or need

there are conflicts between contracts, and the expectations connected with them, and the agency's values-
which might not be present if operating grants were provided
contracting allows the government the say over what orientation is used in intervention - they can eliminate feminist-based services by contracting elsewhere
government pressure to force victims to report is backed by subtle threats to the financial survival of the agency
statistics provided by agency which do not conform to government statistics are perceived to lack credibility - the agency's funding is threatened unless they conform
privatization is an attempt to professionalize the provision of services

Neoconservatism
community and feminist groups now hoping to independently raise sufficient funds to reduce or eliminate dependence on government
agency has hired a company to do a fundraising campaign for it - in return for a percentage of funds raised
agency seeking donations-in-kind from businesses
government motive for privatization partly 'Reaganomics', and partly an attempt to down-size and decentralize government
privatization seen as an attempt to avoid responsibility for paying union wages
quality of service and working conditions perceived to drop with the introduction of the profit motive

Other
government seen to be confused - to lack a comprehensible motive for policies

Populism
government policy also supported by traditional family and Christian values

Line Staff/Administrator

Neoconservatism
privatization seen to be motivated by a desire to 'balance the books'
'balancing the books' unheard of in 'have-not' provinces - concern over deficit a reflection of affluence

Paternalism
movement toward becoming a mainstream agency seen to both compromise the agency's values, and to potentially achieve some of its goals - through enhancing its credibility and hence expanding its services

(4) Agency D
ADMINISTRATOR/POLICY-MAKER

Populism
729. perception that government must be middle-of-the-road in order to get elected
764. Board now sees the organization's role as more than service-provision: its interest in advocacy and education is increasing, its role in society is growing
770. government funding for new services results partly from their perception of broad community support for the agency and the service
771. perception that government avoids cutting services which are supported by grassroots groups, and has in the past judged the wisdom of cutting service by the presence or lack of outcry from such groups
774. contracting allowed the agency to more autonomously define its role and identity

Neoconservatism
779. government motive for privatization seen, in part, as the reduction of the civil service
780. government motive for privatization seen to be, in part, to save money
781. belief that contracting does result in cost-savings

Popularity
782. in the case of this agency, government claims of reduction of public employment, and cost-reduction, were manipulations of the facts

Administrator

Popularity
816. in terms of the needs of the disabled, government wants to be seen as helping - it is valuable P.R.
819. government perceived to be restrained by public opinion from fully pursuing its agenda - changes in a variety of policy initiatives which have received media coverage reflect this
821. perception that voluntary organizations should use the media to make the needs of their clients and their own funding issues known - the government responds to public pressure

Neoconservatism
817. privatization seen to be motivated by conservative philosophy
818. best delivery system would incorporate public and private organizations - government should not abdicate all responsibility

Paternalism
government taking away pensions of resident clients through user fees described as 'paternalistic'- destructive to client independence
present level of user fees effectively makes residents wards of the state

Populism
voluntary organizations perceived to have significant influence - they reflect a public which is not government

Line Staff

Neoconservatism
primary motivation for privatization seen as cost-effectiveness
privatization perceived as giving responsibility to the private sector - because it is more efficient, and less bureaucratic
perception that it is reasonable to assume that the private sector is more efficient than government

Popularity
best method of influencing government seen as use of the media
perception that the government is 'a little hard to get to' - except via the media
some influence over government may result if agencies inform the media (and public) of their successes, and in that information, be sure to give the government a 'pat on the back'

Paternalism
government policies in combination create an incentive for the dissolution of marriages between resident clients and the spouses which financially support them- though this alone cannot explain the high client divorce rate
social assistance for the physically challenged is inadequate

Patronage
there is a risk that favoritism or nepotism may govern the awarding of contracts

(5) Agency E

Policy-maker

Paternalism
philosophy of right-wing governments seen to lead to the concentration of wealth and interest
right-wing government policies are seen as a response to powerful business lobby groups - but are not seen as corrupt
it is unconscionable that government policies presently favour an elite
acknowledgement that while the government is attempting to reduce expenditures to those who most need it, it is also wasting enormous sums on policies favoring a business elite
privatization in some industries has meant an increase in lobbying - for further policies favoring the new owners of the industries

Neoconservatism
privatization considered to be doing the right thing for the wrong reasons - government is motivated by cost savings
privatization as a cost-saving measure seen to be a failure - and inhumane, since it results in inadequate services for those in need
privatization interpreted as a philosophically motivated policy reflecting an international swing to the 'right'
worst possible social policy change perceived as reduction of income assistance to single mothers

Patronage
present Premier seen to be criticized by the 'old money' of his party because he is not supporting business interests, but his own interests
government media campaigns is one way that they try to buy the editorial silence of the media - through buying full-page ads and commercial time

Popularity
acknowledgement that public reaction caused a reversal of cuts to single mother's income assistance
organizations must be prepared to use the media to market social needs to the broader public - or bear part of the responsibility for whatever happens

Other
perception that government should be motivated to respond to voluntary organizations, because they have taken on what the government should be doing, and the government should feel guilty about that

ADMINISTRATOR

Neoconservatism
the Attorney General is badly understaffed, resulting in poor service to youth in particular - which means agency staff have to do the job government workers are supposed to do
Alcohol and Drug services are targeted on middle-class abusers - meaning agency staff wind up doing what government workers are supposed to do
public sector denial of responsibility leads to
elimination of a guaranteed social minimum - there is no mechanism to ensure that the private sector will provide eliminated services
989. tendering to the lowest bidder deemed ludicrous - it guarantees low service quality
990. statutory services should not be contracted, and children at risk should be served by M.S.S.H. - but the ministry constantly shrinks the definitions of these terms, and the agency picks up the slack each time they do
993. government motive for privatization perceived partly as an untested faith in private sector efficiency
998. privatization is philosophically motivated - a political commitment to supporting the private sector
1003. government seems to believe that those with the backbone to be entrepreneurs will succeed - policies are based on false assumptions regarding the relationship between motivation and self-sufficiency

Populism
1000. voluntary organizations can influence government by mobilizing the general population - unfortunately, the general population is presently uninterested in poverty (but the disabled are a popular concern)
1001. the poor often don't represent themselves - agencies and professionals do, but this has less impact on government
1004. observation that 'Restraint' has been a policy targeted on the most needy - there has been no 'Restraint' programme for the middle-class

Paternalism
956. giving those in the community the skills and resources to take control of their lives is what the agency does - which is made difficult by the degree to which the government controls clients' lives
988. new provincial contracted services identified as heavily value laden - anti-abortion

Other
997. government policy appears confused

Line Staff

Neoconservatism
1050. the motive for privatization is to save money
1051. generally, government policy is directed toward abdicating responsibility for addressing social needs
1053. M.S.S.H. mandate shrinks from preventive work and child protection to child protection case management
1054. M.S.S.H. mandate shrinks once again - they no longer do case management, they investigate, apprehend if necessary, and look after their wards - and experience suggests they cannot even manage that
Patronage
1058. perception that past employees of certain ministries receive special treatment in contract negotiations

(6) Agency F

Policy-maker

Popularity
1095. elimination of provincial funding to immigrant-serving agencies seen to result from at lack of political clout by such agencies in 1983
1097. perception that the immigrant community has gained a political voice, and hence the provincial government has responded with slightly more funding
1099. the squeaky wheel gets the grease

Paternalism
1096. perception that the provincial government did not attack programmes favoring their political friends to the same degree as those serving marginalized groups
1098. perception that the recent provision of a provincial contract to the agency resulted from a combination of agency credibility, and support from both unions and corporations

Neoconservatism
1094. privatization seen to be motivated primarily by a mistaken belief that cutting immediate costs is a good idea

Patronage
1101. perception that provincial policies favour business—because business financially supports the Social Credit party

Populism
1100. perception that the provincial government has a simplistic perspective of society—a result of a lack of education and ethnocentric attitudes in politicians

ADMINISTRATOR

Neoconservatism
1131. the withdrawal of funding by the provincial government in 1983 was rationalized as a result of the need to reduce fiscal spending, and the government's belief that they were not responsible for the services the agency provided
1138. cancellation of subsidy seen partly as economically motivated
1140. observation that privatization has been undertaken with no planning to ensure that if government will not be serving immigrants that somebody else will
1144. agency now regularly provides what amount to support
services for government - helping in any referred case involving the immigrant community, but receiving no recognition or funding for doing so

motivation for privatization perceived partly as cost-savings, partly as a denial of responsibility

Paternalism

cancellation of subsidy seen partly as a result of a lack of recognition of the important role played by immigrants in society

services provided are increasingly those demanded according to the criteria of government contracts - not those needed by clients

the agency's ability to act as advocates for individual clients is threatened by funding via contracts

perception that those in government are neither sensitive, nor of the grassroots

Popularity

perception that the agency with the highest profile gets the most funding tempts organizations to lobby, and use the media - to 'one-up' other agencies, and increase competition

the voluntary sector could have more influence with the government through lobbying, use of its clout, and by being vocal

Other

perception that government bureaucrats have no idea what is happening, or what is needed at the grassroots level - and are unresponsive when this is explained to them by the agency

Line Staff

Neoconservatism

complete elimination of provincial funding in 1983 was rationalized as financially necessary for the government, and accompanied by the statement that the agency served a population that was a federal responsibility

acknowledgement that there is some legitimacy to interpreting privatization as both a means for economic progress, and a transfer of responsibility to the community - as the government stated

privatization may be a transfer of responsibility to those who are not able to take full responsibility - fundraising is unlikely to provide enough to meet the community's needs

the philosophy of the government appears to be 'let everybody take care of themselves'

Paternalism

observation that, beyond the government's rationale, privatization resulted in cutbacks to social services - which
means demeaning people and making them more dependent. Though welfare and social services can result in some dependence, the kind of dependence that occurs without it is far more dehumanizing - and provincial policies support that dehumanizing dependence. Immigrants are second class citizens, and used to receiving, not demanding, so their organizations are likely to have little influence with government. Women in particular are ignored in the formation of government policy.

Other
The agency has taken only one provincial contract - and that only after there was a proven need for the service in the community. Provincial government acknowledgement of the agency's expertise via the awarding of a contract may have been related to the publication, by the agency, of a book on the issue addressed by the contract. Provincial cuts in 1983 deemed to be evidence that the government is culturally insensitive, and not aware of the real problems of immigrants.

Popularity
The voluntary sector should engage in self-education, learn the game that keeps agencies apart, and make an effort to unify their voices.
H. List of Summary Codes by Agency, Interview Subject, and Major Question Area, Indicating B.S.P. Code, Dimension, and Theory of Privatization

The summary codes in this list are categorized according to the agency and functional level of the interview subject who provided the data from which the code was drawn, and by the major sections of the interview guide (see Appendix C). As indicated in the interview guide, and as noted in Chapter Four, some major sections were covered by a combination of major question and both planned and spontaneous probes, however, only the major question areas are indicated here.

The brackets [ ] following the summary codes contain the Basic Social Process (B.S.P.) stage to which the code is assigned, the dimension (or topic area) it addresses, and the operating theory of the provincial government's motivation for privatization (if any) which it reflects, in that order. These second-order coding categories are separated by a slash (/). The stages are differentiated as:

Order: pre-privatization (a widely varying period),
Chaos: privatization (following July, 1983),
New Order: post-privatization (the present status-quo).

The dimensions, to which each summary code is assigned are differentiated by their abbreviated title:

org. mission: The Organization's Mission and Values,
org.- public sector: Organization - Public Sector Relations,
ind. role and values: Individual Role and Values,
financial resources: The Financial Resources of the Agency,
inter-org.: Inter-organizational Relations,
service to clients: The Agency's Service to Clients,
org. structure: The Organization's Decision-making Structure.

If the summary code suggests the existence of an identifiable operating theory regarding the provincial government's motivation for privatizing social services, it is identified as:

Neoconservatism: based in neoconservative ideology,
Populism: based in popular anti-elitist sentiment,
Popularity: manipulation to ensure re-election,
Paternalism: rule by a corporate professional elite,
Patronage: paying off friends and buying support.
Other: describing a theory not defined above

Underlined codes identify those which were interpreted
from the response to question 2.6.1 (directly addressing the issue of the government's motivation for privatization). If the title of an interview subject is in large-case letters, this indicates a consensus amongst subjects from that organization identifying that individual as having the authority to act (and thereby operationalize their theories) in the interest of the agency as a whole.

(1) Agency A
Policy-maker

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

1. dedication to population served [Chaos/ind. role and values]
2. compatibility with other individuals in agency [Order/ind. role and values]
3. compatibility with operational imperatives [New Order/ind. role and values]
16. latent professionalism [Order/ind. role and values]
17. noblesse oblige [Order/ind. role and values]
18. belief in the family [Order/ind. role and values]
19. individual and professional values ideologically distinct [Order/ind. role and values]
20. political conservatism [Order/ind. role and values]
34. client-need focused agency [Order/org. mission]
35. non-government [Order/org.- public sector]
36. agency provides proactive community leadership [Order/inter-org.]
37. service-oriented [Order/org. mission]
56. non-aligned politically [Order/org. mission]
68. organizational-individual value congruence is high [Order/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

92. senior administrator is the central control of the agency [Chaos/org. structure]
93. information flow vertical [Chaos/org. structure]
94. staff access to senior administrator through middle management [Chaos/org. structure]
95. Board functions through committee system [Order/org. structure]
96. senior administrator oversees all Board committees [Order/org. structure]
97. Board recognizes some over-guidance by senior administrator [Chaos/org. structure]
98. Board considering reclaiming some power from senior administrator [New Order/org. structure]
99. middle management participate at committee level
[Chaos/org. structure]
100. Policy makers initiated adoption of new fee schedule
[Chaos/financial resources]
101. Staff resisted new fee schedule [Chaos/ind. role and values]
102. Board insulated from staff dissatisfaction [Chaos/org. structure]
103. User fees increased [New Order/financial resources]
104. Rapid agency expansion problematic for staff [Chaos/org. mission]
105. Agency experienced rapid growth in a short period [Chaos/org. structure]
106. Board mandate primarily financial [Order/org. structure]
107. Policy maker perceives agency as selective in contract choice [Chaos/org. mission]
108. Contracting perceived as necessary by policy-makers [Order/financial resources]
109. Increase in fundraising commensurate with contracting [Chaos/financial resources]
110. Agency began to woo major funders [Chaos/financial resources/Patronage]
111. Fundraising has changed composition of Board [New Order/org. mission]
112. Supplementary fundraising increasing in importance [New Order/financial resources]
113. Increasing elitism of Board restricts regional representation [Chaos/org. mission/Paternalism]
114. Increasing elitism of Board restricts ethnic representation [Chaos/org. mission/Paternalism]
115. Fundraising now a core Board responsibility [New Order/ind. role and values]
116. Some potential Board members refuse to fundraise [Chaos/ind. role and values]
117. Board members expected to use social contacts to raise funds [Chaos/financial resources/Patronage]
118. (Yet to be hired) professional fundraiser expected to relieve Board of some tasks [New Order/financial resources]
119. Hiring a fundraiser is proving difficult [New Order/financial resources]
120. Fundraiser to be hired clearly to reduce demands on the Board [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.3 Organizational Change

150. Committee system fragments policy-makers' awareness [New Order/org. structure]
151. Program expansion is a major change [Chaos/service to clients]
152. Geographic expansion is a major change [Chaos/service to clients]
153. Policy-making body striving to be representative [New Order/org. mission/Populism]
2.4 Interorganizational Field

160. competition a factor in provision of some services [New Order/inter-org.]
161. policy-maker rejects the concept of inter-agency competition in social services [New Order/inter-org.]
162. inherent distinction - some services 'social', others 'market' [New Order/inter-org.]
163. competition for existing funding increasing [New Order/inter-org.]
164. changes in charitable funding increase competition [Chaos/inter-org.]
165. public relations intrinsically linked to fundraising [New Order/financial resources]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

225. contracting facilitated expansion [Chaos/org. mission]
226. positive implications of expansion outweigh the negative [Order/org. mission]
227. contracting amounts to the voluntary sector shouldering the government's responsibility [Chaos/org.- public sector]
228. surplus from contracts are used to cover core overhead [Chaos/financial resources]
229. agency is dependant on provincial funding [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
230. securing funding now can involve individual to individual lobbying [New Order/financial resources/Patronage]
231. personal lobbying for funds objectionable [New Order/ind. role and values]
232. bureaucracy only penetrable by oligarchy [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
233. fee increases linked to tight provincial fiscal policies [Chaos/financial resources]
234. fee increases applied only to high-income service users [New Order/financial resources]
235. universal access to service positively valued [Order/org. mission]
236. staff opposition was to fee increases for the affluent [Chaos/ind. role and values]
237. agency need is both for funds and autonomous control of them [New Order/financial resources]
238. fee increases alone cannot provide needed funds [New Order/financial resources]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

306. primary government motive perceived as cost-reduction [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
307. perception that reduced spending by government will lead
to re-election [Chaos/org.- public sector/Popularity]
308. acceptance that present government spending is too high [New Order/ind. role and values]
309. tentative belief that private sector delivery is more efficient [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
310. acceptance of privatization so long as the present social minimum is maintained [New Order/ind. role and values]
318. acknowledgement that efficiency consequences of privatization are unproven [New Order/org.- public sector]
319. perception of tremendous government waste [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]
328. government should and does take a paternal role with families [Order/ind. role and values/Paternalism]
329. government should be and is responsible to ensure functioning of human capital [Order/ind. role and values]
330. suggestion that the government should share the same mission as the agency [New Order/org.- public sector]
335. worst possible government action would be eliminating social assistance [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]
353. voluntary sector influence on provincial policy is unknown [New Order/org.- public sector]
360. effectiveness of any attempt to influence government considered doubtful [New Order/org.- public sector]
361. perception of some value in use of personal contacts to influence government [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
362. perception of some value in compliance with the political agenda to influence government [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
363. perception of some value in development of a factual case to influence government [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]

ADMINISTRATOR

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

4. environment is conducive to professional practice [Order/ind. roles and values]
5. profession-agency mission value congruence [Order/org. mission]
6. funding deemed adequate [Order/financial resources]
7. public sector-personal incompatibility [Order/ind. role and values]
8. public sector cutbacks foreseen [Order/ind. role and values]
9. agency is stable, relative to other non-profits [Order/inter-org.]
10. move up career ladder [Order/ind. role and values]
11. new challenge [Order/ind. role and values]
12. disillusioned by public sector [Order/ind. role and values]
21. social justice and collective provision [Order/ind. role and values]
22. decentralization of service delivery [Order/ind. role and values]
23. commitment to service relevance and adequacy [Order/service to clients]
24. professionalism [Order/ind. role and values]
25. agency commitment to professionalism [Order/org. mission]
26. professionalism is skills, knowledge and values [Order/ind. role and values]
27. professionalism acquired through training [Order/ind. role and values]
28. professional/agency elitism [Order/ org. mission]
29. professional territorialism [Order/ind. role and values]
38. definitional breadth [Order/org. mission]
39. responsive to the changing needs of clients [Order/org. mission]
40. serving society by serving the family [Order/org. mission]
41. pro-advocacy [New Order/org. mission]
47. perceived as a mainline, establishment agency [Order/inter-org.]
58. apolitical [Order/org. mission]
59. despite recent changes, the agency retains its traditional image [New Order/inter-org.]
60. agency lacks grassroots support [Order/org. mission]
61. volunteerism in leadership/professionalism in service [Order/org. mission]
62. increased use of volunteers [Chaos/service to clients]
63. legitimation by history [Order/org. mission]
64. professional elitism is not universal to voluntary agencies [Order/org. mission]
65. redefinition of volunteerism to leadership and service provision [Chaos/service to clients]
66. neo-volunteerism threatens professionalism [Chaos/org. mission]
69. problematic lack of awareness of policy-makers [Order/org. structure]
70. agency has recently adopted a new mission statement [New Order/org. mission]
71. agency values are taught by professionals to policy-makers [Order/org. mission]
72. do-gooder values inadequate [Order/org. mission]
73. service-provider myopia partializes mission [Order/org. mission]
74. practitioner awareness extends to program boundary [Order/org. structure]
75. agency cohesion lacking [New Order/org. structure]
76. cohesion requires common commitment to values [Order/org. mission]
77. independent role-definition by practitioners problematic [Chaos/ind. role and values]
78. friction between professional communities' values
problematic [Order/org. mission]
79.value is inherent in theory - conflicting theory brings value conflicts [Order/org. mission]
80.inherent differentiation of clinician and social worker [Order/org. mission]
81.staff identification with clinician's role problematic [Order/ind. role and values]
82.clinician's values invidious to social work [Order/ind. role and values]
83.role of staff determines role of agency [Order/org. mission]
84.role debate inherent in inner-agency conflict [Chaos/org. mission]
85.staff cues on their role dictated outside of agency [Order/ind. role and values]
86.image of social work profession declining [Chaos/org.-public sector]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

121.senior administrator firmly in management chair [Order/org. structure]
122.history dictates need for directive leadership [Order/org. structure]
123directive style of leadership personally suits administrator [Order/ind. role and values]
124.achievement of standards perceived to require hierarchy [Order/org. structure]
125.role confusion no longer problematic [Chaos/org. structure]
126.confusion between policy and practice continues [Chaos/org. structure]
127.Board responsible for policy and supplementary fundraising [Chaos/org. structure]
128.the cost of efficiency is fraternity [Chaos/org. mission]
129.hierarchy protects the staff from the Board [Chaos/org. structure]
130.Board mandated senior administrator to define and expand organization [Order/org. structure]
131.clinical focus perceived to exclude social action [Order/org. mission]
132.privatization an opportunity to reclaim advocacy role [Chaos/org. mission]
133.senior administrator believes that credibility is commensurate with quantity of services provided [Order/org.-public sector/Other]
134.past concentration on consultation with staff deemed inefficient [Order/org. structure]
135.Board assertion is rare and non-threatening to senior administrator [New Order/org. structure]
136.staff voluntarily disengage from organizational planning [New Order/org. structure]
137. acknowledgement that staff judge process of consultation as poor [New Order/org. structure]
138. acknowledgement that consultation process regarding fee increases was unsatisfactory to staff [New Order/org. structure]
139. the Board took the senior administrator's recommendation on fee structures [Chaos/org. structure]
140. the Board functions like a jury, not a government [Order/org. structure]
141. some challenges to the power of the senior administrator have been covert [New Order/org. structure]

2.3 Organizational Change

154. historic loss of geographic territory resulted in serious deficit [Order/financial resources]
155. decision to broaden mission predates privatization [Order/org. mission]
156. increased emphasis on fundraising predates privatization [Order/financial resources]
157. privatization accelerated the agency toward its goals [Chaos/org. mission]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

166. no 'bad' relationships with any outside organization [New Order/inter-org.]
167. relationships with some funders could be improved [New Order/financial resources]
168. better relationships with municipal funders outside Vancouver [New Order/org.- public sector]
169. senior administrator responsible for Board composition [New Order/org. structure]
170. policy-makers 'high profile', not grassroots [New Order/ind. role and values/Paternalism]
171. charitable funders also attempt to influence the agency [Order/financial resources]
172. charitable funder unsupportive of fee schedule change [Chaos/financial resources]
173. charitable funder and Board supportive of increased use of volunteers [Chaos/service to clients]
174. municipal funders were consulted during long-range planning [Chaos/org.- public sector]
175. generally, funders focus on accounting for funds, not service quality [Order/service to clients]
176. elitism of agency prevents legitimate participation in social action [Order/inter-org./Populism]
177. participation in social action difficult to rationalize to funders [Order/org. mission]
178. choices made by agency have been toward equilibrium [New Order/org. mission]
179. there have been modest increases in staff [New
Order/service to clients
180. agency seeking grassroots legitimation by incorporation of smaller, struggling, groups [Chaos/org. mission/Populism]
181. agency stability is a lure to struggling societies [New Order/inter-org.]
182. expansion goals extend to incorporating other organizations [Chaos/inter-org.]
183. goal to incorporate grassroots organizations deemed independent of privatization [Chaos/org. mission]
184. agency expansion motivated by decreased funding [Chaos/financial resources]
185. funding from charity and municipalities 'poor', from the province, 'lousy' [Chaos/financial resources]
186. 'Restraint' perceived by senior administrator as distinct from privatization [Chaos/org.-public sector]
187. 'Restraint' apparently did not result in a decrease in actual public expenditure [Chaos/org.-public sector]
188. generally, self interest prevented the voluntary sector from examining privatization [Chaos/financial resources]
189. fees charged to contracts help cover core administrative costs [Chaos/financial resources]
190. privatization based on populism, not conservatism [Chaos/org.-public sector/Populism]
191. image and income interdependent in perception of government motives for financial support [New Order/org.-public sector/Popularity]
192. 'Restraint' viewed as a tactic to control Big Labour [Chaos/org.-public sector/Populism]
193. contracts awarded by the provincial government through 'courting' select agencies [Chaos/org.-public sector/Patronage]
194. opposition to privatization by organized labour included a 'dirty list' of services [Chaos/org.-public sector]
195. criteria for contract acceptance includes established expertise [Chaos/org.-public sector]
196. staff consultation in contracting involved issues of unionization only [Chaos/org. structure]
197. organized labour had a strong negative reaction to efforts by established agencies to take contracts [Chaos/org.-public sector]
198. perception that the agency is a disinterested third-party in labour conflict resulting from privatization [Chaos/org.-public sector]
199. senior administrator's values supportive of organized labour [Order/ind. role and values]
200. senior administrator considers public delivery of service too bureaucratized [Order/org.-public sector/Populism]
201. senior administrator perceives no greater likelihood of service continuity through the public sector [Chaos/org.-public sector]
202. privatization defined as a transfer of service, not as an ideological agenda, or transfer of responsibility [Chaos/org.
203. historically there have been regional differences in the 'mixed economy' [Order/org.- public sector]
204. multiple service providers are an advantage to government [Order/inter-org.]
205. opposition to privatization was likely to be fruitless [Chaos/org.- public sector]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

239. privatization resulted in a greater demand for the agency's services [Chaos/service to clients]
240. privatization resulted in a general decline in the ability of social services to meet needs [Chaos/service to clients]
241. privatization resulted in an increase in the agency's rate of broadening service [Chaos/service to clients]
242. contracted services have historically been a part of the agency's service spectrum [Order/org.- public sector]
244. real dollar reduction in Community Grants made them inconsequential relative to the total budget [Chaos/financial resources]
245. Community Grant funding becomes symbolic - provides relatively little service [Chaos/service to clients]
246. Community Grant funding now more substantial [New Order/financial resources]
247. provincial funding an insignificant part of core service budget [Order/org.- public sector]
248. municipal funding to core service budget threatened by 'Restraint' [Chaos/org.- public sector]
249. historically poor provincial funding to core budget resulted in independence from MSSH policy [Order/org.- public sector]
250. theory that the degree of compatibility with MSSH mandate determines the level of MSSH financial support [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]
251. perception that the mission of this agency is very close to the mandate of MSSH [Order/org. mission]
252. all ministries tightened their mandates in order to cut spending [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
253. agency ill-equipped to serve some clients redefined as outside MSSH mandate [Chaos/service to clients]
254. expectation that MSSH should continue to serve those it served prior to redefining its mandate [Chaos/org.- public sector]
255. reduction of MSSH service through mandate-tightening predates privatization [Order/org.- public sector]
256. provincial rhetoric of reducing expenditure now conflicting with emerging contract programs [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
257. funding for social programs assured by the political business cycle [New Order/Org.- public sector/Popularity]
258. suggestion that privatization is neither motivated by, nor addresses, provincial financial distress [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]
259. perception that those critical of the government will suffer financial penalties [Chaos/org.- public sector/Popularity]
260. some new contracts are variations of previous public sector programs [New Order/org.- public sector]
261. creation of some new programs perceived as response to public pressure [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]
262. perception of Vander Zalm's influence in creation of new programs [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
263. historic superiority of public sector wages now in doubt [New Order/org.- public sector]
264. privatization is not addressing the inadequacies of present services - it is reinstating the inadequacies of the past [New Order/service to clients]
265. anticipation that privatization has run its course [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
266. suggestion that future new services will be publicly-funded, and privately provided [New order/org.- public sector/Populism]
267. privatization resulted in the degree of expansion, not expansion per se [Chaos/org. mission]
268. the agency's presentation of itself as interested in contracting resulted in a response by government [Chaos/org.- public sector]
269. privatization acted as enabler for expansion [Chaos/org. mission]
270. further rapid expansion not envisioned [New Order/org. mission]
271. without privatization, efforts to raise funds in competitive markets would have been expanded [Order/financial resources]
272. the agency was in no position to contribute to the opposition to privatization [Order/org.- public sector]
273. while individuals may have participated in coalitions against provincial policy, the agency did not [Chaos/ind. role and values]
274. protests made by the agency against privatization stopped short of confrontation [Chaos/org.- public sector]
275. agency culture dictates mainstream activism [Order/org. mission]
276. activism by mainstream agencies results from broad public consensus on social need [Order/org. mission/Populism]
277. lack of public consensus on need strips agencies of power in contract negotiations [Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
278. bureaucratic accountability of government negotiators roadblocks real exchange in the contracting process [Order/org.- public sector]
279. the agency is the core programs - the agency responds to their needs and threats to them - all else is ultimately extraneous [Order/service to clients]
280. advocacy is pursued in 'safe' issues the agency has practical experience with [New Order/org. mission]
281. it has not been demonstrated that advocacy changes anything [New Order/ind. role and values]
282. do the things you can agree to do [Order/org. mission]
283. though safe, mainstream issues cover a wide spectrum [Order/org. mission]
284. reclamation of the advocacy role involves a learning process for policy-makers [Chaos/ind. role and values]
285. core staff clinical bias seen to explain lack of pre-privatization pressure on policy-makers to be advocates [Order/ind. role and values]
286. contract staff perceived as more activist [Chaos/org. mission]
287. the perceived cost of confronting the government on its policies: contracts [Chaos/org.- public sector/Popularity]
288. effective advocacy has to be done by an organization independent of public funds [Order/org. mission/Popularity]
289. emotional load carried by some social issues results in conflict between personal and professional values [Chaos/ind. role and values]
290. the stakes are high once the government is confronted [Chaos/org.- public sector]
291. as jobs would be at risk, policy-makers would consult staff prior to confronting government [New Order/org. structure]
292. ultimately, the actions of the agency are determined by the values of its policy-makers [Order/ind. role and values]
293. perception that appeals to the public and appeals to the government are dichotomous [New Order/org.- public sector]
294. public opposition to policy is considered, by government, to be political opposition [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]
295. securing funds may now require political (but not public) leverage [New Order/financial resources/Popularity]
296. bringing resources to bear on social problems may require a new form of non-public activism: neo-advocacy [New Order/org. mission]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

311. primary government motive perceived as control of public sector union and wages [Chaos/org.- public sector/Populism]
312. secondary government motive seen as reduction of salary costs through contract employment [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
320. acknowledgement that the efficiency consequences of privatization are unproven [New Order/org.- public sector]
information to judge resource allocation is lacking [New Order/org.- public sector]
the class system perceived as a perpetual, irresolvable problem [Order/ind. role and values]
individualist cultural values seen as problematic [Order/ind. role and values]
conservatism perceived as nostalgia [Order/ind. role and values]
suggestion that funding should be provided federally, regulation provided provincially and service delivery provided locally [New Order/org.- public sector]
negative public opinion regarding social services seen to result from backlash against unfair taxes [Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
belief that social services are social stabilizers, and therefore indispensable to government [Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
worst possible government actions include lowering social assistance rates, tightening eligibility requirements and implementing Long Term Care user fees [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]
government mandate constriction deemed a method of coping with funding inadequacy [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
perception that overspending occurs in some areas of government, underspending in others [New Order/org.- public sector]
perception that mandate and budget tightening has reached its limit in child welfare [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
assumption that future change in government policy will be toward areas where large savings are possible [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
little difference perceived between a small business and a voluntary agency [Order/ind. role and values]
perception that business not excluded by present level of regulation [New Order/org.- public sector]
existing regulation is in contract renewal [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
public pressure deemed to prevent government commercialization of social services [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
government motivation for privatization not perceived as commercialization [Chaos/org.- public sector/Populism]
voluntary sector influence on provincial policy perceived as negligible [New Order/org.- public sector]
perception that consultation with provincial government generally lacking [New Order/org.- public sector]
lack of consultation with formal organizations deemed typical of populist government [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
government thought to perceive voluntary organizations as
self-interested [Order/org.- public sector]
364. less polarized political climate needed for voluntary sector to be able to influence the provincial government [New Order/org.- public sector]
365. bureaucrats perceived as partly responsible for the lack of public-voluntary sector consultation [Chaos/org.- public sector/ Paternalism]
366. populist government perceived as anti-professional and anti-urban [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
367. a long history of poor consultation with MSSH preceded privatization [Order/org.- public sector]
368. acknowledgement that the agency's actions are guided partly by self-interest [Order/org. mission]
369. perception that government policy lacks predictability [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
370. lack of consultation by MSSH perceived as primarily a structural problem with the Socred government [Order/org.- public sector]
371. perpetuation of problems in government social services blamed on incompetent Ministers [Order/org.- public sector]
372. inadequacy of MSSH seen to be a self-fulfilling prophesy [New Order/org.- public sector]
373. perception that the United Way is an inadequate forum for voluntary agencies' concerns [New Order/inter-org.]
374. perception that the development of a broader forum for voluntary organizations would be useful [New Order/inter-org.]
375. suggestion that it is in the nature of voluntary organizations to be interconnected [Order/inter-org.]

Line Staff/Administrator

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

13. agency meets significant client need [Order/service to clients]
14. permits actualization of career goal [Order/ind. role and values]
15. combines quality and affordability [Order/org. mission]
30. socialism [Order/ind. role and values]
31. equal opportunity [Order/ind. role and values]
32. societal obligation to empower people [Order/ind. role and values]
33. fairness and democracy [Order/ind. role and values]
42. agency developed to augment government [Order/org.- public sector]
43. traditional program developer role changing [Chaos/org. mission]
44. program developer role changed by privatization [New Order/org. mission/Paternalism]
45. program development no longer primary role [New order/org. mission]
46. Organizational identity becoming diffuse [New Order/org. structure]
47. Picking up responsibilities refused by government [Chaos/org.-public sector/Neoconservatism]
49. Agency role fracturing [New Order/org. mission]
50. Mandate-contract incongruence [Chaos/org. mission]
51. Agglomeration partly motivated by financial insecurity [Chaos/financial resources]
52. Empire building [Chaos/org. mission]
53. Private sector efficiency a reason to capitalize on privatization [Chaos/org.-public sector]
54. Expansion was preceded by financial distress [Order/financial resources]
55. Organizational fiscal responsibility demanded by funder [Order/financial resources]
56. Political alignment not overt [Order/org. mission]
57. Broad staff dissatisfaction with hierarchical model [Chaos/org. structure]
58. Staff oriented toward team, rather than hierarchical model [Order/ind. role and values]
59. Staff/administration power struggle over decision-making structure [Chaos/org. structure]
60. Hierarchy requires staff to lobby superiors [Chaos/org. structure]
61. Staff frustration with hierarchy chronic [New Order/org. structure]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

142. Staff conceptualize policy-makers as external [New Order/org. structure]
143. Senior administrator insulated from line staff [New Order/org. structure]
144. Line staff perceive senior staff meetings as the primary decision-making forum [New Order/org. structure]
145. Staff see hierarchical structure as antithetical to social services [New Order/org. structure]
146. Staff believe that the senior administrator runs the Board [New Order/org. structure]
147. Inter-program competition for funds problematic [New Order/org. structure]
148. Inner-agency conflicts include personality clashes [New Order/ind. role and values]
149. Staff view new fee structure as initiated by senior administrator [Chaos/financial resources]

2.3 Organizational Change

158. Loss of geographic territory and privatization considered the major changes in the last decade [New
Order/financial resources]  
159. organizational coping with internal division immediately preceded the response to privatization [Order/org. structure]  

2.4 Interorganizational Field  

206. privatization has increased the number of voluntary organizations [New Order/inter-org.]  
207. altering services means altering the place of the agency in the social service network [Chaos/inter-org.]  
208. awareness of what other agencies are doing is decreasing at the line level [New Order/inter-org.]  
209. lack of networking between agencies translates into poor referrals for clients [Chaos/service to clients]  
210. line staff perceive internal friction between programs [New Order/org. structure]  
211. internal conflict is primarily at the middle management level [New Order/org. structure]  
212. staff believe lack of access to senior administrator compounds internal conflict [New Order/org. structure]  
213. the solidification of the hierarchical model partly a result of expansion, which resulted from privatization [Chaos/org. structure]  
214. the first cost of hierarchy to line staff - loss of sense of common mission [Chaos/ind. role and values]  
215. senior administrator introduced middle-management level to organizational structure [Chaos/org. structure]  
216. line staff perceive hierarchy as the preferred solution of the senior administrator to the problem of expansion [Chaos/org. structure]  
217. the second cost of hierarchy to line staff: loss of zeal [Chaos/ind. role and values]  
218. the third cost of hierarchy to line staff: loss of information [Chaos/ind. role and values]  
219. line staff would prefer a consensus model of decision-making, not hierarchy [New Order/ind. role and values]  
220. previous senior administrator utilized worker consensus model [Order/org. structure]  
221. consensus model may have resulted in some inefficiency [Order/org. structure]  
222. consensus model possible because agency was small [Order/org. structure]  
223. staff expected that some decrease in staff consultation would accompany expansion [Order/org. structure]  
224. difference between expected and actual decrease in staff consultation seen as administrator's influence [Chaos/org. structure]  

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives  

297. government left development of new programs to the private sector [Chaos/org.- public sector]
298. pre-privatization advances in social services ended at privatization [Chaos/service to clients]
299. services delivered by non-profits suffer from lack of coordination [New Order/inter-org.]
300. utilization of policy-makers' personal affiliations with government decision-makers in lobbying deemed inappropriate [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]
301. personal lobbying is an inefficient means of directing resources to needs [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]
302. personal lobbying of government, by the Board, positions the agency politically [New Order/org. mission/Patronage]
303. contracts chosen by agency perceived as inconsistent with mandate [Chaos/org. mission]
304. contract-mandate inconsistencies result in a dissonance in identity [New Order/org. mission]
305. advocacy pursued by agency perceived as inadequate [Chaos/org. mission]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

313. primary government motive perceived as cost-reduction [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
314. acceptance that the private sector is more efficient [New Order/org.- public sector]
315. perception that cutting the size of government will lead to re-election [Chaos/org.- public sector/Popularity]
316. perception that reduction in government expenditure through privatization is marginal [Chaos/org.- public sector]
317. perception of government's ideological bias against collective responsibility for the welfare of the individual [Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
325. reduction in funding equals reduction in service quality and quantity [Chaos/service to clients]
326. privatization has resulted in a general reduction in funding for social services [New Order/org.- public sector]
327. efficiency in social services requires more than the present funding [New Order/financial resources]
334. government should develop a consistent, logical, accountable, province-wide structure similar to the VRB [New Order/org.- public sector]
346. worst possible action by government perceived to be presently proceeding in contracting to for-profit organizations [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]
347. commercialization seen to result in poorer service and working conditions [New Order/org.- public sector]
348. perception that the populism of Vander Zalm is likely to promote commercialization [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
349. belief that government should operate programs, and the voluntary sector should develop them [Order/org.- public
sector]
350. perception that universal access obviates most delivery by government [Order/org.-public sector]
351. perception that government simply misunderstands the nature of social problems [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]
352. present government role seen as reactive, not proactive [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]
358. voluntary sector influence on provincial policy perceived as negligible [New Order/org.- public sector]
359. present efforts of voluntary agencies to influence government perceived as ineffective [New Order/org.- public sector]
376. perception of present voluntary sector as disconnected [New Order/inter-org.]
377. senior administrator responsible for interagency liaison [New Order/inter-org.]
378. perception that the development of a broader forum for voluntary organizations would be useful [New Order/inter-org.]
379. perception that contracting has increased competition, and thus prevented the formation of coalitions [New Order/inter-org./Neoconservatism]

(2) Agency B

Policy-maker

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

380. mission is to strive for the empowerment of women [Order/org. mission]
381. organization's caring about women and children reflected in services [Order/service to clients]
382. participation as exchange between policy-maker and community [Order/ind. role and values]
383. political beliefs vary according to issues and government initiatives [Order/ind. role and values]
384. no strong religious convictions [Order/ind. role and values]
385. agency is non-partisan [Order/org. mission]
386. individual-agency value congruence is high [Order/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

387. Board sets policy [Order/org. structure]
388. senior administrator reports to Board [Order/org. structure]
389. staff run day-to-day operations of the agency [Order/org. structure]
390. a "traditional" non-profit structure [Order/org.
structure
391. structure perceived as effective [Order/ind. role and values]
392. staff directed by senior administrator through management team [Order/org. structure]
393. management team attends Board meetings [Order/org. structure]
394. common problems with staff not brought to Board [Order/org. structure]
395. some changes in problem-solving since hiring a new Executive Director [Chaos/org. structure]
396. the President and Executive Director are in charge [New Order/org. structure]

2.3 Organizational Change

397. most significant change has been retirement of previous senior administrator [New Order/ind. role and values]
398. change of Executive Director changes cultural context of agency [Chaos/org. structure]
399. second most significant issue has been the disposition of the physical site of the agency [New Order/financial resources]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

400. agency's non-social services are in a competitive market [Order/inter-org.]
401. change in demand and service is inherent in non-social market [Order/service to clients]
402. agency not dependent on government contracts [New Order/org.-public sector]
403. present surplus insufficient to fully fund present contracted services [New Order/financial resources]
404. non-social services provide agency with a degree of independence from government [Order/org.-public sector]
405. non-social services result in dependence on the market [Order/financial resources]
406. contracts are extraneous - not core services [Order/org.-public sector]
407. government specifically asked agency to submit a bid on a contract [Chaos/org.-public sector/Patronage]
408. contracts accepted deemed compatible with mission [Chaos/org. mission]
409. relations with other social service agencies deemed cooperative [New Order/inter-org.]
410. competition in fundraising between social service agencies increasing [Chaos/financial resources]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

411. privatization's major impact on users - particularly
single mothers and those on welfare [Chaos/service to clients]
412. government service reductions resulted in an increased demand on agency's non-contracted social services [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
413. contracting has resulted in both positive and negative effects for agency [New Order/org.- public sector]
414. experience with one contract was so negative that it was terminated [Chaos/org.- public sector]
415. difference between a successful and an unsuccessful contract is the administrative demand it places on the agency [New Order/org. structure]
416. inadequate subsidy of child care threatens daycare services [Chaos/financial resources/Paternalism]
417. privatization did not affect the agency mission [New Order/org. mission]
418. agency now more cautious about taking on more contract services [New Order/service to clients]
419. agency now more expert in contracting [New Order/org.- public sector]
420. privatization resulted in increased efforts to secure non-government funds [Chaos/financial resources/Neoconservatism]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

421. government motive for privatization perceived as deficit-reduction [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
422. privatization seen as shirking responsibility [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]
423. government should be responsible for maintaining an adequate social minimum [Order/ind. role and values]
424. acknowledgement that the electorate seem to approve of these policies [New Order/ind. role and values/Popularity]
425. government should provide more than the present social minimum [Order/ind. role and values]
426. voluntary agencies should augment government services and develop services [Order/org. mission]
427. worst possible government action would be reducing the welfare rate [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]
428. voluntary sector believed to have little influence on government [Order/org.- public sector]
429. voluntary sector seen to bear the brunt of government policy [Order/org.- public sector]
430. government presently has a 'closed door' policy regarding consultation [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
431. voluntary sector has little choice except to wait for government to seek consultation [New Order/org.- public sector]
2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

432. agency is flexible in finding resources and providing services [Order/org. mission]
433. belief in economic equality of women [Order/ind. role and values]
434. feels frustration over provincial subsidy to child care [New Order/financial resources/Paternalism]
435. individual-organization value congruence high [Order/ind. role and values]
436. agency believes that women are able to do anything they choose to do, are just as strong a force in society as men, and are to be valued [Order/org. mission]
437. agency values are reflected in its internal and external relationships; in everything it does [Order/org. mission]
438. society built on mutual support will be a better society [Order/org. mission]
439. values difficult to uniformly integrate into organization [Order/org. structure]
440. 'fairness' an agency-wide personnel policy [Order/org. structure]
441. agency oriented toward action, risk-taking, leadership [Order/org. mission]
442. personally liberal or right of centre [Order/ind. role and values]
443. belief in individualism, free enterprise, entrepreneurialism and feminism [Order/ind. role and values]
444. personal opposition to collective provision mitigated by desire to achieve certain goals for women, which presently necessitates use of government systems [Order/ind. role and values]
445. agency overtly apolitical [Order/org. mission]
446. agency operates businesses, is becoming more entrepreneurial, and has independence from government as a goal [New Order/org. mission/Neoconservatism]
447. acceptance that government does not have a lot of money [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
448. core not based on government funding [Order/financial resources]
449. occasional friction between personal values and those of 'radical' elements in the organization [Chaos/ind. role and values]
450. senior administrator responsible for clarifying agency values for Board members [Order/org. structure]
451. ultimately, survival is a value - risks taken cannot threaten the agency's survival [New Order/org. mission]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

452. members elect the Board, which hires the Executive Director and delegates responsibility for daily operations to
453. seven managers report to the senior administrator, and each has a Board 'partner' [Order/org. structure]
454. agency is a member of an national organization, which is a member of an international organization [Order/org. structure]
455. Board has three standing committees responsible for policy development, each with one staff member [Order/org. structure]
456. management meets twice monthly [Order/org. structure]
457. not a 'hands-on' manager [Order/ind. role and values]
458. some task-forces involve Board, staff and community members [Order/org. structure]
459. staff are able to act fairly independently within broad policy parameters set by the Board [Order/org. structure]
460. Board executive used to handle crises [Order/org. structure]
461. problems generally arise if Board not provided with enough information [Order/org. structure]
462. not a 'process person' [Order/ind. role and values]
463. change in Executive Directors resulted in a 'culture shock' [Chaos/ind. role and values]
464. previous Executive Director was a social worker - new Executive Director has a business background [Chaos/ind. role and values]
465. Board composition changing - ten new members incoming [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.3 Organizational Change

466. thirty-year change from organization run by women at home to organization run by women who work [Order/org. mission]
467. services, context, and orientation has changed as a result of changes in Board composition/women's role in society in the past thirty years [Order/org. mission]
468. women, and agency, have become smarter - business-wise [Order/org. mission]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

469. agency attempting to work more closely with other agencies, in both service and advocacy [New Order/inter-org.]
470. agency not seen by other women's organizations to be enough of a risk-taker, or radical [Order/inter-org.]
471. agency has attempted to demonstrate commitment to women's issues, and to avoid competition [Chaos/inter-org.]
472. connection with other agencies varies according to issues and populations served [New Order/inter-org.]
473. other struggling organizations encouraged to become a part of Agency B [Chaos/inter-org.]
474. incorporation of smaller organizations not considered 'empire building' [Chaos/inter-org.]
incorporation of smaller organizations not possible if it results in a deficit - agency's for-profit services already subsidizing social services [New Order/financial resources]

smaller organizations considering incorporation fear that Agency B will 'gobble them up' [Chaos/inter-org.]

one experience with a (since terminated) contract very negatively affected the agency's image in the women's community [Chaos/inter-org.]

a contract was cancelled due to poor quality, budget, and lack of administrative control [Chaos/org.- public sector]

agency perceived as more credible than some smaller, more radical organizations [New Order/inter-org.]

agency now more expert at contracting [New Order/org.- public sector]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

impact of privatization has been mixed [New Order/org.- public sector]

number of clients in need of service jumped significantly after government cutbacks [Chaos/org.- public sector]

number of counsellors and groups offered increased to meet demand caused by cutbacks [Chaos/service to clients]

needs that were new to the agency were identified by increasing numbers of new clients [Chaos/service to clients]

privatization resulted in increased client demand and agency interest in using government resources to meet that demand [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

escalation of social problems as a result of cutbacks brought new interest in fundraising to find resources to meet those needs [Chaos/financial resources/Neoconservatism]

'Restraint' and privatization resulted in systemic chaos - frustrating both staff and clients [Chaos/org.- public sector]

stress on staff increased as a result of increased demand for service [Chaos/service to clients]

staff 'toughened' to lack of government support in meeting demand [New Order/service to clients]

government motive identified partly as withdrawal from social services unless prompted to act by public outcry/advocacy [Chaos/org.- public sector/Popularity]

government motive identified partly as permanent withdrawal from social services [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

size of organization seen to inhibit uniform view of government motives for privatization [New Order/org.- public sector]

changes in government policy appear confused - confusion seen to result from multiple motives for policy, and to cause a sense of chaos [Chaos/org.- public sector/Other]

agency staff have attempted to support government workers suffering through the changes [New Order/org.- public sector]
strong belief in the competence and commitment of volunteer service-providers [Order/ind. role and values]
strong belief in the efficiency and moral supremacy of private sector, voluntary, delivery of services [Order/ind. role and values]
belief in voluntary action as exchange - a benefit to the giver, receiver, and the community [Order/ind. role and values]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

government motive for privatization to reduce the size of government [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
though perceived goal of privatization viewed positively, methods of privatization viewed negatively [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]
government methods seen to reflect lack of interest in consultation with the community - insensitive adherence to their own agenda [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
government seen to actually invite public hostility to policies in the methods chosen to privatize services [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
confrontational nature of voluntary sector contact with government blamed on the senior public sector personnel [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
government role should be to facilitate individual independence through provision of education, health services, and a guaranteed annual income [New Order/ind. role and values]
prevention seen as the key to successful public social and health services [New Order/ind. role and values].
experience indicates that voluntary sector can have a lot of clout with government - but this varies according to the perceived credibility of those speaking to government [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
organization of voluntary sector seen as appropriate on an issue-by-issue basis [New Order/inter-org.]
voluntary sector seen to suffer by internal debate [New Order/inter-org.]
suggestion that government does respond if it is apparent that there is broad public consensus against policy [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

Administrator #2

Individual's and Organization's Values

agency focus is on the potential of the individual, not their disadvantage [Order/org. mission]
agency utilizes helping-process model, not medical model [Order/service to clients]
511. belief that individuals are responsible for seeking their potential [Order/ind. role and values]
512. personal approach described as 'humanistic' [Order/ind. role and values]
513. belief in the value of group strength to make social change [Order/ind. role and values]
514. attraction to agency based on congruency between personal and organizational goal of change vis-a-vis sex roles [Order/ind. role and values]
515. agency values both the individual, and collective action [Order/org. mission]
516. agency values both volunteerism and professionalism [Order/org. mission]
517. agency believes fundamentally in the equality of individuals [Order/org. mission]
518. agency not aligned politically [Order/org. mission]
519. agency perceived as 'middle-of-the-road' - small 'c' conservative [Order/inter-org.]
520. agency's involvement in social issues indicative of the degree to which those issues affect the mainstream [Order/org. mission]
521. feels occasional frustration with non-political nature of organization [Order/ind. role and values]
522. perception of occasional conflict between organization's values and practice [Chaos/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

523. each programme area, and department head, functions fairly autonomously [Order/org. structure]
524. subject is 'in charge' in social service area [New Order/ind. role and values]
525. issues affecting the whole agency are addressed by management group, but really decided by the Executive Director [Order/org. structure]
526. Programme Co-ordinators also have freedom within their area - subject to supervision (primarily of budget) by department heads [Order/org. structure]
527. conflicts can arise as a result of autonomous actions of various departments and programmes [Order/org. structure]

2.3 Organizational Change

528. most significant organizational change was a result of the change of Executive Directors two years earlier [Chaos/ind. roles and values]
529. taking on new contracts an important change [Chaos/org.-public sector]
530. another change has been the increase in volume in counselling programme [Chaos/service to clients]
531. other agencies providing counselling have raised fees-causing additional demand on agency [Chaos/inter-org.]
532. Public mental health services mandate restrictions have resulted in more severe cases being handled by agency [Chaos/org.- public sector]
533. Referrals to government services have effectively ceased [New Order/org.- public sector]
534. New services contracted to other organizations may reduce demand on agency [New Order/org.- public sector]
535. Experience has demonstrated that reliance on voluntary sector to provide necessary level of service means clients are without options [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
536. Income from non-social services allows agency to meet more needs than would otherwise be possible [Chaos/financial resources]
537. M.S.S.H. reorganization has resulted in systemic confusion, reduction in resources, and an increase in agency's staff time [New Order/org.- public sector]
538. Agency now acting to support statutory services, but receives no funding for that [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
539. Reduction in government services means a reduction in preventive focus of agency's services [Chaos/org. mission]
540. Agency comments a fair amount on government social policy - particularly daycare [Chaos/org.- public sector]
541. Government policy on daycare subsidy considered unrealistic [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
542. Service provision as a demonstration prior to government involvement now in doubt - government unlikely to provide funds [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
543. Staff spend considerable time seeking funds [New Order/ind. role and values]
544. Privatization has not resulted in a 'huge' change in the agency [New Order/org. mission]
545. Due to diversity of, and control over, funding base, the agency is not as dependent as some on changes in government policy [Order/org.- public sector]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

546. Need to compete with other agencies reduced by stability of funding in Agency B [New Order/inter-org.]
547. Recognition that competition produces duplication - which is an inefficient use of limited resources [New Order/inter-org.]
548. There was some competition for Family Advancement funding [New Order/inter-org.]
549. Suggestion that some agencies inexplicably receive special treatment from government [New Order/inter-org./Patronage]
550. Perception of agency as service developer and advocate for change - not as a service-provider [Order/org. mission]
551. Perception that letting contracts to new, small, service-
specific agencies raises issues of service quality—government monitoring is financial only [New Order/inter-org.]

552. perception that privatization is liable to result in a general reduction in service quality [Chaos/inter-org.]

553. perception that the larger an organization, the greater the inefficiencies resulting from bureaucracy [Order/ind. role and values]

554. privatization is not a transfer of responsibility — it is a change in the government's perception of responsibility, rationalized as a gift to the private sector [New Order/org.—public sector/Neoconservatism]

555. privatization is an unwanted gift to the private sector—an arbitrary renegotiation of the public-private relationship [New Order/org.—public sector/Neoconservatism]

556. private sector has been left to deal with what the public sector has decided they don't want to do [New Order/org.—public sector/Neoconservatism]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

557. the provincial government is no longer looked at as a source of funding for a service that is identified as needed by the community [New Order/org.—public sector/Neoconservatism]

558. introduction of Family Initiatives funding confuses the question of whether or not the government will fund services [New Order/org.—public sector/Other]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

559. apparent contradictions in policies make their motives unclear [New Order/org.—public sector/Other]

560. cost-effectiveness a doubtful explanation of privatization — costs often simply transferred within government [New Order/org.—public sector/Other]

561. incentive effect of income assistance reductions doubtful— it increases dependence [New Order/org.—public sector/Other]

562. reduction of government responsibility for child protection considered 'philosophical' [Chaos.org.—public sector/Paternalism]

563. government policy should reflect the belief that given adequate resources, people are able to help themselves [New Order/ind. role and values]

564. perception that government policy lacks a knowledge-base, and that research is needed to define adequate resources [New Order/org.—public sector/Other]

565. all government programmes should be client-centered [New Order/ind. role and values]

566. responsibility should be shared by public and private
sectors - but the line between them needs redefinition [New Order/ind. role and values]
567. perception that the voluntary sector presently has little influence on public policy [New Order/org.- public sector]
568. fundamentalist and non-metropolitan nature of government would have to change for the voluntary sector to enjoy more influence [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]

Line Staff/Administrator

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

569. agency allows worker autonomy [Order/ind. role and values]
570. work allows pursuit of values that are personally important, such as human rights [Order/ind. role and values]
571. agency works for the empowerment of women [Order/org. mission]
572. individual-organization value congruency high, though some friction can occur as agency values are operationalized [Order/ind. role and values]
573. agency is non-aligned politically, and non-sectarian [Order/org. mission]
574. individuals in the social services department tend not to be conservative politically, though all alignments exist individually in the organization [Order/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

575. agency structure has become increasingly hierarchical [New Order/org. structure]
576. fewer people are involved in decision-making now - there is less consultation over the past five years [New Order/org. structure]
577. hierarchy has been addressed as an issue in the organization [New Order/org. structure]
578. staff turnover in the past three years has been high-partly a result of disagreements over the interpretation of the mission of the agency [Chaos/org. mission]
579. some have perceived hierarchy as antithetical to empowerment - creating a conflict in the organization [Chaos/org. structure]
580. values of Board members seen to ultimately determine structure of the agency - and as with all people, there may be some difference between their stated and 'real' values [Order/org. structure]
581. impending major turnover in Board membership may spell a change in operating values, and therefore in services, structure and agency direction [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.3 Organizational Change
582. most significant change has been the hiring of a new Executive Director [New Order/ind. role and values]
583. new senior administrator was hired without consultation with staff [Chaos/org. structure]
584. unavoidable change likely to result from change in administrators was compounded by significant differences in their personalities [Chaos/ind. role and values]
585. some staff turnover can be attributed to change in Executive Directors [Chaos/ind. role and values]
586. political alignment, and interpretation of organization's mission differed between Executive Directors [Chaos/ind. role and values]
587. Executive Directors differed in the ways they used the management staff and the Board [Chaos/org. structure]
588. the problems of staff turnover cannot simply be attributed to the change of senior administrators - but it was a factor [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

589. perception of both increasing competition and cooperation between agencies [New Order/inter-org.]
590. emphasis on agency as a business results in increased pressure toward competition - primarily in non-social, 'market' services [Chaos/inter-org./Neoconservatism]
591. efforts at case management and utilization of scarce resources indicate increased stress on co-operation [Chaos/inter-org.]
592. there have been increases in self-help kinds of groups, and co-ordination of them [New Order/inter-org.]
593. inter-agency co-operation and initiation of self-help groups do drain staff time when demand is simultaneously rising [Chaos/service to clients]
594. inter-agency competition for fee-for-services has increased [New Order/inter-org./Neoconservatism]
595. sometimes co-operation can border on providing training - which then allows other agencies to run programmes in competition with Agency B [New Order/inter-org./Neoconservatism]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

596. one example of contracting proved negative for agency and resulted in the termination of the contract [Chaos/org.-public sector]
597. contracted workers in one privatized programme resented being abandoned by government and resisted transfer to the agency - making management of the service unfeasible [Chaos/org.-public sector]
598. reaction to the 'conservative' image of the agency by staff of one privatized service was extreme - resulting in
its termination. [Chaos/org. mission]

599. acceptance of contract for one privatized programme drew agency into political/labour debate regarding the impact of privatization on the status of women [Chaos/org.- public sector]

600. perception that contracting out can have a destructive impact on services and the community - though this is not true in all cases [New Order/org.- public sector]

601. key to successful contract is the accountability of the service and its staff to the agency - which may depend on who developed the service and its accountability mechanisms [New Order/org.- public sector]

602. boycott was threatened by labour of any organizations accepting contracts [Chaos/org.- public sector]

603. government policy identified by unions as an attack on them [Chaos/org.- public sector]

604. privatization identified as reframing the nature of problems so that their solution lies outside of government [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

605. privatization has had a major impact on the economic situation of women with children - increasing their dependence on either men or the government [New Order/service to clients/Paternalism]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

606. government perceived to have a responsibility for ensuring the well-being of individuals through the provision of health, education, and social services [Order/ind. role and values]

607. in child welfare - the child is helped by helping the parents - seen to differ from government policy [Order/ind. role and values]

608. government cutbacks in the name of decreasing dependence deemed 'a lie' [New Order/ind. role and values/Paternalism]

609. status of women in B.C. acknowledged as good, relative to other parts of the world [New Order/ind. role and values]

610. belief in teaching what is necessary for independence, rather than giving handouts - seen to differ from government policy [New Order/ind. role and values/Paternalism]

611. privatization partly motivated by a desire to reduce the financial requirements of government to provide service, in order to reduce taxes [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

612. privatization partly motivated by a philosophical stance against assisting people [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

613. government has demonstrated no hesitancy to assist business through social and employment programmes [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]

614. ultimately its 'every man for himself' - with an emphasis
on 'man' [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
615. acknowledgement that on some Boards, the wealthy and socially connected may be used to give voluntary organizations more pull, and that this is effective [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
616. voluntary organizations generally seem to have little clout with government - except through back doors [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
617. in order for the voluntary sector to have more clout, agencies will have to risk their contracts and make public demands [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

(3) Agency C

Administrator/Line Staff/Policy-maker X

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

618. agency is feminist, and grassroots [Order/org. mission]
619. organization is non-hierarchical [Order/org. structure]
620. enjoys working exclusively with women - allows personal and professional growth and excludes hassles with men [Order/ind. role and values]
621. agency mission is to eradicate violence from the lives of women and children [Order/org. mission]
622. agency also provides community education on violence against women - based on the model of violence as a continuum [Order/service to clients]
623. agency opens the door to women interested in the women's movement [Order/org. mission]
624. structure of the agency stems from its values - unequal status is perceived negatively [Order/org. structure]
625. staff salaries are relatively good, compared to other jobs done by women [Order/financial resources]
626. agency moving toward the 'mainstream' [Chaos/org. mission]
627. accommodating government expectations in order to ensure financial survival has resulted in some compromise of agency values [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
628. provincial funders do not acknowledge agency as a part of a social movement - simply as a service-provider [Order/org.- public sector]
629. government expectations, and funding power, makes it difficult for agency to be truly feminist [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
630. other agencies providing parallel services have ceased to be truly feminist [Chaos/inter-org./Paternalism]
631. attempt by agency to have government fund a community education project has been stonewalled - government is demanding that the agency not criticize the legal system [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]
632. increasingly complex public bureaucracy places pressure
on agency to restructure hierarchically in order to effectively deal with 'red tape' [New Order/org. structure/Paternalism]

'socialist' nature of collectives seen to be in fundamental opposition to government ideology [Order/org.-public sector/Neoconservatism]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

perception that women who have more power are given that by others [Order/org. structure]
staff perceived as having more power because they have more information [Order/org. structure]
Board is perceived as having more power by the staff [Order/org. structure]
turnover of participants on committees means occasional difficulties managing the collective process [Chaos/org. structure]
occasional sense that a hierarchical system would be 'easier' - meetings can be lengthy and exasperating [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.3 Organizational Change

limited interview time did not permit coverage of this area

2.4 Interorganizational Field

service organizations do attempt to work co-operatively together [Chaos/inter-org.]
service organizations may compete to some degree, but are bound by a common vulnerability to government funding cuts and a common commitment to clients [New Order/inter-org./Paternalism]
competition viewed as a natural phenomena of the environment [New Order/inter-org./Neoconservatism]
this government is never going to give the funds necessary to meet social needs [New Order/org.-public sector/Paternalism]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

the service network is threatened by inadequate funding—only those able to find alternate sources will survive [New Order/financial resources]
government demand for accountability, including confidential records, is backed by a subtle threat to the financial survival of the agency [New Order/service to clients/Paternalism]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors
707. government motive for award of contracts suspect - they may be inclined to award according to agency compatibility with government values, and support of government [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]

708. next step in privatization envisioned as introduction of user fees [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

709. privatization seen as support for the profit-making sector [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

710. new government billing procedures suggest the eventual outcome of privatization will be services for profit, provided by professionals [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

Administrator/Line Staff/Policy-maker Y

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

634. an alternative to past employment in a hierarchical environment [Order/ind. role and values]

635. employment allows more positive use of skills [Order/ind. role and values]

636. working environment does not demand suppression of ideas [Order/org. mission]

637. sense of joining in common mission [Order/org. mission]

638. conflicts do exist between principles and practice, but the connection of the mission and structure of the agency demands that conflicts be addressed [Order/org. structure]

639. there has not been a significant conflict between individuals in the organization and its values [New Order/ind. role and values]

640. agency may be becoming more mainstream - more a social service agency that a feminist organization [New Order/org. mission]

641. provision of service to women is only a part of agency's mission [Order/org. mission]

642. agency mission is a part of a movement to empower women [Order/org. mission]

643. clients are viewed as no different than staff - clients are the experts regarding their own lives, and intervention follows accordingly [Order/service to clients]

644. social service agencies are viewed as aligned with society's institutions - issues of power and status are therefore ignored [Order/inter-org.]

645. in the contracting process government funders make subtle demands that agency structure and values conform to their expectations [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

646. government demands for service accountability compromise agency values regarding client confidentiality/autonomy [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

647. funders and mainstream agencies 'fear' the radical, political nature of the agency [Order/org.- public
sector/Paternalism]
648. funders question the credibility of the agency as a result of its values - perceiving its perspective as 'tinged' [Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
649. agency viability is ultimately dependent on services-which are ultimately dependent on government [Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
650. by retaining values, agency loses out on funding that could be accessed if greater compromise was chosen [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
651. agency winds up serving clients not covered or funded by contract because government does not recognize the need [Chaos/service to clients/Paternalism]
652. recent government reorganization thought likely to result in increased difficulty in securing contracts [New Order/financial resources]
653. government personnel expect someone to 'be in charge', and view the agency's structure as inefficient [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
654. the bureaucratic mind does not like equal power - it is a threat to their power, and they have a vested interest in perpetuating a hierarchical structure [Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
655. accountability issues a tool used by bureaucrats to attack non-hierarchical organizational structures [Chaos/org. structure/Paternalism]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

670. orientation to agency usually means an initial period of discomfort in expressing non-conformist views [Order/ind. role and values]
671. most decisions made in collective meetings - which allows views of all members to be heard [Order/org. structure]
672. committee system can 'bog down' and result in some feeling over-demanded of, and others feeling they have too little input [Order/org. structure]
673. flow of decision-making members through the agency is considered a natural pattern in the organization [New Order/org. structure]
674. nature of the work means workers need a lot of feedback-nature of the organizational structure is that such feedback is not always readily available [Order/org. structure]
675. collective meetings include both case discussion and policy and administration - those needing guidance in one or the other may occasionally feel they are given insufficient attention [Chaos/org. structure]
676. constant flow of volunteers through the agency means considerable time is spent by staff in orientation and the avoidance of the re-invention of the wheel [New Order/org. structure]
677. despite drawbacks of the collective system, it is still
preferred to hierarchy [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.3 Organizational Change

limited interview time did not permit coverage of this area

2.4 Interorganizational Field

685. competition for tight funding increasing between contracted service-providers [Chaos/inter-org.]
686. organizations compete for size of population served and type of problem addressed [Chaos/inter-org.]
687. feminist organizations which do not have government funding are critical of those which have - viewing them as having compromised their values [Order/inter-org.]
688. a degree of conflict over who serves which population viewed as a natural part of the evolution of the service network [New Order/inter-org.]
689. problems arise when agency attempts to gain funding recognition for serving a population the government identifies as being served by another agency - public sector inflexibility [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
690. there has been a significant increase in demand, a slight increase in staff, and a minor increase in funding [Chaos/service to clients]
691. agency 'expects' inadequate funding, much as women 'expect' not to get what they want or need [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
692. municipal funding has fewer strings attached than provincial funding [Order/financial resources]
693. private business has begun to provide funding [New Order/financial resources]
694. community and feminist groups now hoping to independently raise sufficient funds to reduce or eliminate dependence on government [New Order/financial resources/Neoconservatism]
695. agency has hired a company to do a fundraising campaign for it - in return for a percentage of funds raised [New Order/financial resources/Neoconservatism]
696. agency seeking donations-in-kind from businesses [New Order/financial resources/Neoconservatism]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

701. perhaps greatest impact of privatization has been on the clients - through withdrawal or non-provision of services [Chaos/service to clients]
702. government has made some suggestions that the agency use an employment preparation contract to augment staff [Chaos/org.- public sector]
703. there are conflicts between contracts, and the expectations connected with them, and the agency's values - which might not be present if operating grants were provided
[New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

704. contracting allows the government the say over what orientation is used in intervention - they can eliminate feminist-based services by contracting elsewhere [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

705. government pressure to force victims to report is backed by subtle threats to the financial survival of the agency [New Order/service to clients/Paternalism]

706. statistics provided by agency which do not conform to government statistics are perceived to lack credibility - the agency's funding is threatened unless they conform [New Order/org. mission/Paternalism]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

711. government seen to be confused - to lack a comprehensible motive for policies [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]

712. government motive for privatization partly 'Reaganomics', and partly an attempt to down-size and decentralize government [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

713. short-term savings resulting from government policies now proving to result in increased long-term costs [New Order/org.- public sector]

714. government policy also supported by traditional family and Christian values [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]

715. privatization seen as an attempt to avoid responsibility for paying union wages [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

716. quality of service and working conditions perceived to drop with the introduction of the profit motive [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

717. privatization is an attempt to professionalize the provision of services [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

Line Staff/Administrator

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

656. agency value base is feminist [Order/org. mission]

657. new experience of working in a collective, and exclusively with women [New Order/ind. role and values]

658. personal compatibility with individuals in the organization [New Order/ind. role and values]

659. compatibility of values with other individuals in the organization [New Order/ind. role and values]

660. participation provides a sense of doing something constructive toward meaningful goals [New Order/ind. role and values]

661. agency values communicated by staff and volunteers to new volunteers through training programme [Order/org. mission]
662. Volunteers must embrace feminist values in order to provide service [Order/ind. role and values]
663. Movement toward becoming a mainstream agency seen to both compromise the agency's values, and to potentially achieve some of its goals - through enhancing its credibility and hence expanding its services [New Order/org. mission/Paternalism]
664. Possibility that more women may be attracted if agency is not perceived as radical [New Order/org. mission]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

678. Though structure emphasizes equality, paid staff are perceived by volunteers as having more power than them [New Order/org. structure]
679. Individuals in the organization are expected to assert their views, but this can be an overwhelming prospect in the face of apparent value solidarity by the majority [Order/org. structure]
680. Avoidance by individuals of expressing opinion contrary to the perceived majority can be interpreted as individual (rather than systemic) failure [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.3 Organizational Change

Limited interview time did not permit coverage of this area

2.4 Interorganizational Field

697. Contact with other organizations in the women's movement initiated subject's interest in agency [New Order/inter-org.]
698. Suggestion that co-operation of groups identified as part of the movement remains effective, while co-operation of service providers in the field grows unsteady [Chaos/inter-org.]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

No response in this question area

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

718. Privatization seen to be motivated by a desire to 'balance the books' [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
719. 'Balancing the books' unheard of in 'have-not' provinces - concern over deficit a reflection of affluence [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
ADMINISTRATOR/POLICY-MAKER

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

720. agency provides subject with scope to make changes [Chaos/ind. role and values]
721. compatibility with other staff and clients [Chaos/ind. role and values]
722. agency an innovator in the network serving the handicapped [New Order/inter-org.]
723. agency a standard-setter in residential care of the handicapped [New Order/inter-org.]
724. agency believes in bringing together skilled, professional resources toward maximizing the autonomy of clients [New Order/org. mission]
725. agency is some distance from achieving the maximum autonomy of clients [New Order/service to clients]
726. subject a 'pragmatist' [Order/ind. role and values]
727. role is to provide guidance and direction, and to facilitate the bringing together of good ideas [New Order/ind. role and values]
728. politically 'middle-of-the-road' [Order/ind. role and values]
729. perception that government must be middle-of-the-road in order to get elected [Order/ind. role and values/Populism]
730. personal ideology includes 'left-of-centre' beliefs, and respect for individuality [Order/ind. role and values]
731. approach to inter-organizational relations based on the assumption of agency self-interest [Order/inter-org.]
732. perception that the mission of agencies will be compromised in the interest of survival [Order/inter-org.]
733. 'the intensity of the internal politics in an agency is inversely proportional to its ability to quantify its product' [Order/org. structure]
734. the most dramatic internal struggles take place when the stakes are all personal [Order/org. structure]
735. emphasis on this client population's autonomy fairly new for agency, and for society [New Order/org. mission]
736. traditional medical model approach to service provision stressed doing things for clients, not enhancing their ability to do things for themselves [Order/org. mission]
737. expectation that service change from providing care to enhancing autonomy threatens some agency personnel [Chaos/org. mission]
738. families of clients also adjusting to new directions in service provision to clients [Chaos/service to clients]
739. society stresses 'normalization' of clients [Chaos/org. mission]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning
four levels of formal structure within this facility: clients and direct care givers, direct care supervisors, department heads, and Administrator [Order/org. structure]

most agency-wide decisions made at the management team (department head and Administrator) level [New Order/org. structure]

Administrator reports to the Executive Director of the organization (who is also responsible for other facilities) who reports to the Board [Chaos/org. structure]

inner-facility communication fairly rapid [New Order/org. structure]

decision-making structure a fairly flattened hierarchy [New Order/org. structure]

problem with a horizontal decision-making structure seen as difficulty in integration [Order/ind. role and values]

doctors' autonomy increased as agency passed from government to private hands [Chaos/org. structure]

agency was operated by government until 1984 [Order/org.-public sector]

agency 'privatized' - transferred through a contract to an existing private society [Chaos/org.-public sector]

regarding the general direction of the agency, the Administrator in conjunction with the management team is 'in charge' of the agency [New Order/org. structure]

in terms of the day-to-day well-being of the residents, the direct-service providers are 'in charge' of the agency [New Order/org. structure]

subject believes in delegation of decision-making to lowest effective level in an organization - a maxim to be abandoned only in rare cases [Order/ind. role and values]

the most common friction in the agency is between staff and clients or their families - usually reflecting problems, as opposed to issues [New Order/service to clients]

Organizational Change

privatization was the main issue for the agency for a year after its transfer to the private sector [Chaos/org.-public sector]

privatizing the agency raised questions regarding the agency's negotiations with organized labour, and its budget-which to a minor extent are still unresolved [New Order/financial resources]

the agency's issues today are focused on adaptation and change [New Order/org. mission]

the Administrator is partly responsible for making adaptation an issue for the agency [New Order/ind. roles and values]

belief that the fundamental purpose of an organization is to survive [Order/org. mission]

belief that the only way for an organization to survive is to adapt [Order/ind. role and values]
agency in the process of adapting the agency's bureaucracy in order to individualize service to clients [New Order/service to clients]
there was a degree of suspicion within the agency that it would be 'swallowed up' by its new parent organization [Chaos/org.- public sector]
following privatization, the agency and its departments had to do some P.R. about its services, and their quality-government services and their masters like a low profile [Chaos/inter-org.]
agency was forced to redefine its identity following privatization [Chaos/org. mission]
likely that need for a new facility, and increasing similarity been Agency D and other agencies under the private society's umbrella, will result in an amalgamation of the agency with those other services [New Order/org. mission]
Board now sees the organization's role as more than service-provision: its interest in advocacy and education is increasing, its role in society is growing [New Order/org. mission/Populism]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

agency has made a conscious effort to build relationships with organizations serving similar populations [New Order/inter-org.]
there has been no inter-agency competition [New Order/inter-org.]
subject feels, given the economic and social climate, agencies cannot afford to compete - it is equated with disservice to clients [New Order/ind. role and values]
agency now commonly used as a resource by smaller, more grassroots organizations [New Order/inter-org.]
agency has repeatedly co-operated with other organizations in development of services [New Order/inter-org.]
government funding for new services results partly from their perception of broad community support for the agency and the service [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
perception that government avoids cutting services which are supported by grassroots groups, and has in the past judged the wisdom of cutting service by the presence or lack of outcry from such groups [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
relationship between the agency and the Ministry of Health (its primary funder) has been improving [New Order/org.- public sector]
civil servants perceived to be less 'up front' in B.C. than in other provinces [Chaos/org.- public sector]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives
contracting allowed the agency to more autonomously define its role and identity [Chaos/org.- public sector/Populism]

transfer to the private sector legitimized the agency's unique role in the service network [New Order/org.- public sector]

increases in user fees have made no difference for the majority of clients - for those paying out of pocket it has been onerous [New Order/org.- public sector]

despite hardships for many of those clients who pay fees out of pocket, the agency usually writes off only a small amount of unpaid debt annually [New Order/financial resources]

the user fee acts as a deterrent to those seeking financial independence (or simply extra income) through a job [New Order/org.- public sector]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

government motive for privatization seen, in part, as the reduction of the civil service [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

government motive for privatization seen to be, in part, to save money [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

belief that contracting does result in cost-savings [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]

in the case of this agency, government claims of reduction of public employment, and cost-reduction, were manipulations of the facts [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]

at the point of privatization, government did not know how much it really cost to run Agency D [Chaos/org.- public sector]

agency enjoyed a financial buffer - the result of overfunding the year following privatization, which was caused by poor government estimates of service costs [New Order/financial resources]

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

environment perceived as changing, and flexible [New Order/org. mission]

structure allows meaningful input into decisions at the senior management level [New Order/org. structure]

organization is committed to its management structure [New Order/org. structure]

ideologically a 'committed eclectic' [Order/ind. role and values]

personal commitment to client population [Order/ind. role
and values]
790. does not vote Social Credit [Order/ind. role and values]
791. agency now a resource for client population, whether they need residential care or support in the community [New Order/org. mission]
792. at its inception, the agency was simply a residence for the disabled [Order/org. mission]
793. agency committed to maximizing the independence of clients [New Order/org. mission]
794. agency non-aligned politically [Order/org. mission]
795. any institution operates for the convenience of the staff, and exists in order to organize disparate resources—these general operational imperatives result in constant dynamics [Order/org. structure]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

796. agency has two decision-making structures—administrative and day-to-day [New Order/org. structure]
797. administrative decision-making is participatory, and based on established or evolving goals and objectives [New Order/org. structure]
798. day-to-day decision-making is reactive, and sometimes is based on expedience rather than philosophy [New Order/org. structure]
799. unlike some other similar agencies, in this organization, the Director of the social services department is a member of the management team—and therefore has access to policy-making [New Order/org. structure]

2.3 Organizational Change

800. pre-privatization there was less pre-occupation with costs—though costs have always been a factor [Order/financial resources]
801. pre-privatization there was more federal funding available for programme development [Order/financial resources]
802. professionalism in social services has generally been increasing in health care [New Order/service to clients]
803. social services has a higher profile in health care now, compared to ten years ago [New Order/service to clients]
804. social work has been recognized in the health care field as helping clients and systems cope with the impact of technological change [New Order/service to clients]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

805. most health agencies have geographical 'turf'—which minimizes competition [Order/inter-org.]
806. there has been an increase in self-help organizations, and professionals have had to learn how to relate to them and
work with them [Chaos/inter-org.]

807. the relationship of organizations serving the disabled has been marked by innovation, not competition [New Order/inter-org.]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

808. government reduction in funding and personnel means increased difficulty (marked by 'confusion') in securing needed appliances for the disabled [Chaos/org.- public sector]

809. funding for facility maintenance became a problem after privatization [Chaos/org.- public sector]

810. agency was a government service - now it's a non-profit [New Order/org.- public sector]

811. terms of reference of the agency's contract were defined by government [Chaos/org.- public sector]

812. government did subsidize voluntary organizations through the introduction of the Long Term Care programme in 1978 [Order/org.- public sector]

813. increases in user fees raise a value question for the agency - to what extent does the lack of, or burden of, user fees act as incentives or disincentives for institutionalization? [New Order/org.- public sector]

814. government taking away pensions of resident clients through user fees described as 'paternalistic' - destructive to client independence [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

815. present level of user fees effectively makes residents wards of the state [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

816. in terms of the needs of the disabled, government wants to be seen as helping - it is valuable P.R. [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

817. privatization seen to be motivated by conservative philosophy [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

818. best delivery system would incorporate public and private organizations - government should not abdicate all responsibility [Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]

819. government perceived to be restrained by public opinion from fully pursuing its agenda - changes in a variety of policy initiatives which have received media coverage reflect this [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

820. voluntary organizations perceived to have significant influence - they reflect a public which is not government [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]

821. perception that voluntary organizations should use the media to make the needs of their clients and their own
funding issues known - the government responds to public pressure [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

Line Staff

2.1 Individual’s and Organization’s Values

822. agency provides a home-like residence for disabled adults - looking after their needs [New Order/org. mission]
823. clients are given choices over their care - have a degree of control over their lives [New Order/service to clients]
824. subject would like to see clients have more choices over their care [New Order/ind. role and values]
825. clients are considered individuals with rights [New Order/org. mission]
826. service is designed to meet more than simply physical needs [New Order/service to clients]
827. subject prefers a holistic approach to service provision [Order/ind. role and values]
828. agency uses a team approach to service provision [New Order/service to clients]
829. team approach to service provision still unbalanced in favour of medical staff [New Order/org. structure]
830. belief in acceptance of and respect for individuals' self-determination [Order/ind. role and values]
831. the client is more important than the setting, or the staff [Order/ind. role and values]
832. agency provides comprehensive care over a continuum of need [New Order/org. mission]
833. agency wants clients to utilize the residence as a resource - not a last resort [New Order/org. mission]
834. agency is committed to a standard of medical care [New Order/org. mission]
835. agency mission supports team approach to service provision [New Order/org. structure]
836. open and honest communication is a maxim of the management team - which hopefully filters down throughout the system [New Order/org. mission]
837. there is no common ideology amongst individuals in the agency - there may be a pro/con split between managers and clients respectively in support for the ideology of the present provincial government [New Order/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

838. problems mostly arise between clients and direct care providers - and are commonly resolved on that level [Order/org. structure]
839. immediate supervisor of line staff handles most uncommon problems [Order/org. structure]
840. service teams do problem-solving less often than direct
...care providers and their supervisors [New Order/org.
istructure]
841. power-struggles can occur during problem-solving that has
gone beyond the level of the direct care providers and their
supervisors [New Order/org. structure]
842. problems involving the behaviour or rights of residents
are often the most difficult to resolve, both for the client
and the system [New Order/org. structure]
843. the direct care personnel and their supervisors possibly
hold the most power in the agency [New Order/org. structure]
844. clients have been able to organize and effectively
demand, or participate in, change in the agency [New
Order/org. structure]
845. agency has no control over some problems - such as staff
shortages caused by generally poor funding to health care
[New Order/org.- public sector]
846. agency is dependent on government for funding, and would
have little control in the face of another wave of cuts [New
Order/org.- public sector]

2.3 Organizational Change

847. privatization resulted in a decrease in rules and
regulations governing service, and an increase in
professional autonomy [Chaos/service to clients]
848. privatization brought increased flexibility in programme
expenditures [Chaos/financial resources]
849. with privatization, administration and control of budget
was decentralized to individual department heads, allowing
greater responsiveness to demand [Chaos/org. structure]
850. as a private agency, the organization is better able to
develop new services as need becomes apparent [Chaos/service
to clients]
851. as a worker in a private agency, subject is better able
to act as an advocate for clients - to address conflicts
between client need and government policy without having to
challenge her employer [Chaos/service to clients]
852. agency is not totally independent in setting policy-
many policies are still determined by government, and the
agency has no choice except to comply [Chaos/org.- public
sector]
853. government control of agency services through regulation
is increasing [New Order/org.- public sector]
854. agency has hired a P.R./fundraiser [New Order/financial
resources]
855. agency has recently looked at the cross-over of clinical
and operational decisions, and may initiate a process of
separating the two [New Order/org. structure]
856. following transfer to a private society there was some
turnover in senior management [Chaos/org. structure]
857. changes in union bargaining units meant that
privatization resulted in some disadvantage to workers
[Chaos/org. structure]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

858. agency has become more community-based - a result of changes in discharge policy, and the development of joint projects with other organizations [New Order/inter-org.]
859. regulations affecting who utilizes the agency under review with government [New Order/org.- public sector]
860. participation of individual social workers on Boards of community-based organizations contributes to connectedness to the community [New Order/inter-org.]
861. commitment of Administrator to community networking supports efforts to establish and maintain connections [New Order/ind. role and values]
862. connections with community groups in part a by-product of increased efforts to move willing clients into the community - which resulted from client demand and was spearheaded by social workers [Chaos/inter-org.]
863. increased resources in the community have enabled the agency to discharge more clients, and alter the role of the agency from 'last resort' to part of the resource network [New Order/inter-org.]
864. changes in agency reflect changes in society's attitude to the disabled [New Order/org. mission]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

865. agency perceived as a contracted, statutory service [New Order/org.- public sector]
866. increases in user fees have created hardship for that minority of clients paying for service out of pocket [New Order/service to clients]
867. several government policies in combination create an incentive for the dissolution of marriages between resident clients and the spouses which financially support them - though this alone cannot explain the high client divorce rate [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
868. social assistance for the physically challenged is inadequate [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
869. in being contracted to a pre-existing organization, the agency gained access to that organization's resources [Chaos/org.- public sector]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

870. primary motivation for privatization seen as cost-effectiveness [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
871. privatization perceived as giving responsibility to the private sector - because it is more efficient, and less bureaucratic [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
872. The perception that it is reasonable to assume that the private sector is more efficient than government [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]

873. There is a risk that favoritism or nepotism may govern the awarding of contracts [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]

874. Government should provide adequate funding for services, consult with service providers, and ensure accountability [New Order/ind. role and values]

875. Voluntary organizations should accept some responsibility for generating revenue for services [New Order/ind. role and values]

876. User fees are acceptable, but must be reasonable [New Order/ind. role and values]

877. The worst possible new government policy seen as privatizing child welfare services - assumed to result in a decrease in professional standards [New Order/ind. role and values]

878. The perception that government is uninterested in petitions [New Order/org.- public sector]

879. The best method of influencing government seen as use of the media [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

880. The perception that the government is 'a little hard to get to' - except via the media [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]


882. Some influence over government may result if agencies inform the media (and public) of their successes, and in that information, be sure to give the government a 'pat on the back' [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

(5) Agency E

Policy-maker

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

883. Agency works at the ground level - its strength is its grassroots nature [Order/org. mission]

884. Personnel, including Board, have a first-hand awareness of the issues of the client population [Order/ind. role and values]

885. The solid, grassroots nature of the agency makes it almost invulnerable to political manipulation [Order/org.- public sector]

886. Service-providers do not incorporate a lot of high level theory in service - it is pragmatic [Order/service to clients]

887. Despite 'grounded' nature of agency (which might be assumed to lack sophistication) it has proved very capable of managing, even expanding, its resources [New Order/financial
resources]
888.views society as small, interconnected, interdependent [Order/ind. role and values]
889.belief that social policy must connect with social and scientific theory, and economic realities, in order to provide what children need [Order/ind. role and values]
890.belief that provision of daycare is a less desirable social policy than provision of paid parental leave - since it threatens the parent-child bond [Order/ind. role and values]
891.society is not valuing children more as their numbers grow smaller - it is devaluing children, parents (meaning mothers mostly), and parenting [Order/ind. role and values]
892.ideology of service involves personal commitment to and involvement with clients - to the point of worker group/client group fusion [Order/service to clients]
893.fusion of worker and client groups leads to reduced objectivity, flouts conventional professional wisdom and results in effective, if risky, services [Order/service to clients]
894.the community's problems are well known because they are right on the surface, and impossible to ignore - which is seen as healthier than communities where problems are hidden [Order/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

895.senior administrator seen as the focal point of the organization's structure [New Order/org. structure]
896.senior administrator brings issues for resolution to the Board, though other staff often participate in Board meetings [Order/org. structure]
897.at need, client groups and municipal representatives also attend Board meetings [Order/org. structure]
898.problems most frequently dealt with by Agency E involve the impact of ineffective or inadequate service by other (mostly public) organizations on the agency's clients [New Order/org.- public sector]
899.organizations not as grounded in the community are occasionally criticized as ineffective - deemed to result from a lack of any grassroots connection [New Order/inter-org.]
900.several public and publicly-funded organizations criticized by the agency for almost exclusively serving middle-class populations - for failing to adapt service to conditions in this community [New Order/inter-org.]
901.internally, significant conflicts are rare [New Order/org. structure]
902.agency does not hire staff primarily on the basis of professional credentials - it hires out of its own community [Order/org. mission]
903.agency is a community organization, not a professional
organization [Order/org. mission]

2.3 Organizational Change

904. connection of agency to its community means demographic changes have significant impact [Order/org. mission]
905. demographics of community changing - Native Indians are leaving, and seniors are arriving [Chaos/org. mission]
906. agency has responded to changing demographics by adapting services [New Order/org. mission]
907. agency's facility has expanded dramatically [New Order/financial resources]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

908. the relationship between the agency and M.S.S.H. have degenerated somewhat - particularly since the latter's reorganization [New Order/org.- public sector]
909. agency and the local school are working on their relationship [New Order/inter-org.]
910. there has been notable improvement in the relationship between the agency and other organizations providing similar or parallel services [New Order/inter-org.]
911. agency was sought out by government to provide a contract programme - a result of its perceived credibility in serving the programme's target population [New Order/org.- public sector]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

912. both the agency and its clients are affected by reduction and elimination of either public sector services, or subsidy to the voluntary sector, contracting, and the refusal of government to acknowledge responsibility for solving social problems [Chaos/org.- public sector]
913. changes in provincial policy regarding lottery and casino funding for not-for-profit agencies seen as an additional privatization initiative [New Order/financial resources]
914. loss of preventive, non-statutory services has a severe negative impact on clients - the effectiveness of the entire child protection service is in doubt [Chaos/org.- public sector]
915. M.S.S.H. reorganization perceived as a form of bureaucratic disentitlement - clients find it difficult to access services [New Order/org.- public sector]
916. privatization and cutbacks mean residences for children in care are almost always outside the area - resulting in a dramatic disruption of the lives of victims of child abuse [Chaos/org.- public sector]
917. since reorganizing, M.S.S.H. ability to monitor at risk children has declined to a dangerously low level - and it is common for ministry workers to expect agency workers to help
them protect children [New Order/org.- public sector]
918. contracted services appeal to many professionals because (unlike in M.S.S.H.) they can have control of their caseload - which is tantamount to providing quality service [New Order/services to clients]
919. perception that there are inadequate controls by government on the quality of service provided by some agencies [New Order/org.- public sector]
920. some contract workers in some agencies can tend to be loose cannons in the system - seem to lack accountability for their behaviour as professionals [New Order/inter-org.]  
921. shrinking of M.S.S.H. mandate results in clients falling into newly created gaps - children who never go to school, or who attempt suicide are not considered by the ministry to be at risk [Chaos/service to clients]
922. the assumption that the poor commonly use public social services and are the largest user group of them considered fallacious [Order/service to clients]
923. agency willingness to hear issues of social needs of its clients is almost boundless - and often results in the application of monetary or staff resources [Order/org. mission]
924. privatization considered to be doing the right thing for the wrong reasons - government is motivated by cost savings [New Order/org.-public sector/Neoconservatism]
925. privatization as a cost-saving measure seen to be a failure - and inhumane, since it results in inadequate services for those in need [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

926. privatization interpreted as a philosophically motivated policy reflecting an international swing to the 'right' [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
927. philosophy of right-wing governments seen to lead to the concentration of wealth and interest [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
928. right-wing government policies are seen as a response to powerful business lobby groups - but are not seen as corrupt [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
929. present Premier seen to be criticized by the 'old money' of his party because he is not supporting business interests, but his own interests [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]
930. it is unconscionable that government policies presently favour an elite [New Order/ind. role and values/Paternalism]
931. perception that as a result of government policies our society is becoming a more dangerous place to be [New Order/ind. role and values]
932. public social policy should catch up with present
knowledge, focus on young people and the status of those who work with them, and address those problems that disenfranchise members of our society [New Order/ind. role and values]

933. worst possible social policy change perceived as reduction of income assistance to single mothers [New Order/ind. role and values/Neoconservatism]

934. acknowledgement that public reaction caused a reversal of cuts to single mother's income assistance [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

935. acknowledgement that while the government is attempting to reduce expenditures to those who most need it, it is also wasting enormous sums on policies favoring a business elite [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

936. privatization in some industries has meant an increase in lobbying - for further policies favoring the new owners of the industries [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

937. patronage may be an issue in privatization in some industries, but is unlikely in social services [New Order/org.- public sector]

938. perception that government should be motivated to respond to voluntary organizations, because they have taken on what the government should be doing, and the government should feel guilty about that [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]

939. privatization has exacerbated regional disparity in social services [New Order/org.- public sector]

940. whether or not voluntary organizations should have more say in government policy is an unresolved question [New Order/ind. role and values]

941. organizations must be prepared to use the media to market social needs to the broader public - or bear part of the responsibility for whatever happens [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

942. government media campaigns is one way that they try to buy the editorial silence of the media - through buying full-page ads and commercial time [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]

ADMINISTRATOR

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

943. staff and volunteers represent all segments of the community [Order/org. mission]

944. conflict within the agency is healthy, and a positive force [Order/org. structure]

945. agency does not value bureaucracy - which is reflected in its personnel [Order/org. structure]

946. belief in individual autonomy, so long as it does not impinge on other people's rights [Order/ind. role and values]

947. agency values representation of the community in all aspects of it - including its staff [Order/org. mission]
agency exists to provide services and opportunities for low-income persons in the community which would otherwise be unavailable to them [Order/org. mission]  
though hired from the community, staff are expected to, and trained to, act professionally (which does not necessarily require formal education) [Order/org. mission]  
to serve diverse groups in the community requires diverse staff - staff which represent the make-up of the community dissipate ethnocentric tendencies in service provision [Order/service to clients]  
agency is not aligned to formal political parties - though there is a general dislike for many of the present government's policies as a result of their negative impact on the community [Order/org. mission]  
subject has been careful to support opposition to government policy with facts - which has contributed to the agency maintaining its credibility [New Order/inter-org.]  
agency has worked with other organizations on particular issues - but never according to party lines [New Order/inter-org.]  
a common value amongst agency personnel would likely be a belief that people have a right to the best quality of life that they can possibly achieve, and the right to have a minimum standard guaranteed [Order/org. mission]  
agency can at times reflect the victim mentality that occurs in the community - with rights come responsibilities, and this can be ignored [Order/ind. role and values]  
giving those in the community the skills and resources to take control of their lives is what the agency does - which is made difficult by the degree to which the government controls clients' lives [Order/org. mission/Paternalism]  

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning  
agency has a fair degree of autonomy over its budget [Order/financial resources]  
three different groups control different aspects of the agency - a branch of the municipal government, a co-op (commercial) association, and a community Board [Order/org. structure]  
structure allows activity as a business and as a charity (and to enjoy the advantages of each) [Order/financial resources]  
senior administrator reports to all three governing bodies [Order/org. structure]  
Board develops policies and procedures, and allow staff a fair degree of autonomy in operating the agency within those guidelines [Order/org. structure]  
most policy issues addressed by the Board originate from the staff [Order/org. structure]  
Board is relatively free of special interest groups or individuals - resulting in relatively little bickering and
Considerable effort is put into Board orientation—provided by the senior administrator. The system is not as hierarchical as some—stratification is as necessary toward accountability, not power for power’s sake. Staff attend Board meetings, and sometimes express views contrary to the senior administrator's—which is seen by her as healthy. The senior administrator has an overview while staff perceptions are often programme-specific. Some areas, including staffing, are exclusively the senior administrator's territory (or delegated by her). Intrusion into these areas by the Board would cause serious conflict. Ultimately, the buck stops with the senior administrator. The belief in 'situational leadership'—a type of selective delegation of responsibility—is healthy. Staff meetings are monthly, and by department—meetings with middle managers occur more often—but a rule of thumb is to avoid meetings for meetings' sake.

2.3 Organizational Change

The most serious changes in the agency have occurred as a result in the reduction of the mandates and services of provincial ministries—primarily in M.S.S.H. The Attorney General is badly understaffed, resulting in poor service to youth in particular—which means agency staff have to do the job government workers are supposed to do. Alcohol and Drug services are targeted on middle-class abusers—meaning agency staff wind up doing what government workers are supposed to do. M.S.S.H. is failing to provide adequate protection of children, and what service they do provide is demeaning to clients, and designed to make access to service extremely difficult. Local agencies are in the process of documenting the problems they and their clients are having with M.S.S.H.

Attempts by the agency to draw the attention of M.S.S.H. to the problems have simply resulted in the ministry scapegoating its own staff. The system of care for children who have been apprehended has been seen as transferring the role of abuser from the parent to the state.
2.4 Interorganizational Field

979. agency has begun to do more networking, even with public sector agencies [New Order/inter-org.]
980. agency has made it clear to M.S.S.H. that the Ombudsman will be contacted any time a child's rights are violated [New Order/org.- public sector]
981. relations with other not-for-profit agencies fairly good - though there is some friction with politically-aligned agencies who view Agency E as acquiring power without the political commitment to use it [New Order/inter-org.]
982. municipality recently expanded the agency's geographic area - possibly because it had remained non-partisan [New Order/org. mission]
983. agency now working more closely with organizations serving ethnic groups [New Order/inter-org.]
984. some individuals and agencies have criticized Agency E- often for conflicting reasons [New Order/inter-org.]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

985. both the agency and its clients have been affected by reduction or elimination of public services and subsidy to the voluntary sector, by contracting, and by the denial of the government for responsibility for solving social problems [Chaos/org. public sector]
986. public sector denial of responsibility leads to elimination of a guaranteed social minimum - there is no mechanism to ensure that the private sector will provide eliminated services [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
987. privatization not itself a bad idea - but it has been conducted without a plan, without guarantees of service continuity, without accountability, with no control over quality [Chaos/org.- public sector]
988. new provincial contracted services identified as heavily value laden - anti-abortion [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]
989. tendering to the lowest bidder deemed ludicrous - it guarantees low service quality [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
990. statutory services should not be contracted, and children at risk should be served by M.S.S.H. - but the ministry constantly shrinks the definitions of these terms, and the agency picks up the slack each time they do [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
991. belief that commercial and voluntary agencies require different control systems - the profit motive can reduce service quality in the former, and lack of expertise can reduce service quality in the latter [New Order/ind. role and values]
992. perception that problems with contracting which existed
prior to the privatization wave are simply being re-created en mass [New Order/org.- public sector]
993. government motive for privatization perceived partly as an untested faith in private sector efficiency [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
994. observation that in some sectors, low-bid companies achieve a monopoly on service after being awarded the first contract, and are free to hold the public to ransom after that [New Order/org.- public sector]
995. prediction that contracted services will multiply to the point where co-ordination is impossible [New Order/org.- public sector]
996. M.S.S.H. seen as the only agency with real power to address some problems - but they are denying their responsibility to use it [New Order/org.- public sector]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

997. government policy appears confused [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]
998. privatization is philosophically motivated - a political commitment to supporting the private sector [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
999. neither the subject nor the public sector believe that cost-savings result from privatization [New Order/org.- public sector]
1000. voluntary organizations can influence government by mobilizing the general population - unfortunately, the general population is presently uninterested in poverty (but the disabled are a popular concern) [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
1001. the poor often don't represent themselves - agencies and professionals do, but this has less impact on government [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]
1002. question of whether or not voluntary agencies should have more influence on government is unresolved - individuals should have more influence [New Order/org.- public sector]
1003. government seems to believe that those with the backbone to be entrepreneurs will succeed - policies are based on false assumptions regarding the relationship between motivation and self-sufficiency [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]
1004. observation that 'Restraint' has been a policy targeted on the most needy - there has been no 'Restraint' programme for the middle-class [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]

Line Staff

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

1005. agency Board is from the community, knows the community,
is very active, energetic and responsive [New Order/org. mission]
1006. subject dislikes bureaucracy, and the disconnection between service provision and policy-making which results from it [Order/ind. role and values]
1007. subject has a commitment to work in less economically advantaged communities [Order/ind. role and values]
1008. subject likes the east end - its people, its issues, and its style in dealing with the establishment [Order/ind. role and values]
1009. agency believes in community involvement, working from the grassroots, and is unafraid of confrontation [Order/org. mission]
1010. the agency is governed by the politics of the people-it refuses to align itself with political parties [Order/org. mission]
1011. individual/organization value congruence is high [Order/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

1012. some departments are managed more effectively than others [New Order/org. structure]
1013. problems in management of some departments are being addressed [New Order/org. structure]
1014. problems in management of some departments an ongoing problem [Order/org. structure]
1015. power is divided, with only a few grey areas, between the senior administrator and the Board [New Order/org. structure]
1016. the organizational structure is effective in supporting the development and provision of services - the system works well [New Order/org. structure]
1017. the organizational structure provides workers with considerable autonomy, within broad parameters [Order/org. structure]
1018. initiative for change can come from workers, the senior administrator, or from the Board [New Order/org. structure]

2.3 Organizational Change

1019. physically, agency was very small [Order/financial resources]
1020. agency began expansion of physical site utilizing funds from a variety of sources [Chaos/financial resources]
1021. the agency's facility now matches its needs [New Order/financial resources]
1022. agency provided three primary services - two of which were fairly small, and served relatively small numbers [Order/service to clients]
1023. agency services began to expand as budgets increased and new sources of funds were tapped [Chaos/service to clients]
1024. services are now diverse, and serve far more clients—
staff size has doubled [New Order/service to clients]
1025. Board began to actively participate in fundraising
[Chaos/financial resources]
1026. Board has demonstrated its ability to raise a
considerable amount of money [New Order/financial resources]
1027. Board was ineffective and dysfunctional [Order/org.
structure]
1028. Board is now powerful and very active [New Order/org.
structure]
1029. agency now includes networking with other organizations
as part of its operational style [New Order/inter-org.]
1030. in the past, the agency did not purposefully seek
regular contact with organizations not directly serving the
immediate geographic community [Order/inter-org.]
1031. agency's mandate and services were largely recreational
[Order/mission]
1032. agency is now a social services centre—providing
counselling, crisis intervention and advocacy [New Order/mission]
1033. changes in the area are in large part due to the
philosophical direction of the Board and three or four senior
staff of the agency [New Order/mission]
1034. major changes in the agency have been facilitated by
active fundraising by the Board and senior administrator [New
Order/financial resources]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

1035. agency has moved into the downtown eastside service
network—and consequently the hardball politics of that
arena [New Order/inter-org.]
1036. agency is less aggressive than some downtown eastside
organizations [New Order/inter-org.]
1037. in some cases, co-operative efforts with other
organizations have been disappointing—some other
organizations did not carry their share of the load [New
Order/inter-org.]
1038. some hard feelings have built up with certain
organizations regarding specific issues [New Order/inter-
org.]
1039. generally, relations with other organizations are good—
it has a reputation for being open and sharing its resources
[New Order/inter-org.]
1040. the relationship between the agency and M.S.S.H. has
deteriorated in the last year and a half—the ministry has
repeatedly failed to provide appropriate or effective service
to the agency's clients [New Order/org.-public sector]
1041. local agencies are now co-operating in documenting the
problems in the ministry's services [New Order/inter-org.]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives
1042. Elimination of public services and reduction of subsidy to the voluntary sector for preventive services have a significant negative impact on the client population [Chaos/org.- public sector]

1043. Government is presently in the process of further reducing statutory services - making emergency services less accessible [New Order/org.- public sector]

1044. There are presently no beds for children in care in the community - resulting in children in care returning to the community, and the ministry then claiming they cannot keep the child in care because they run away [New Order/org.- public sector]

1045. The agency has done minimal contracting with the provincial government, and still receives some Community Grant money [New Order/financial resources]

1046. Ministry services now often amount to abuse and neglect of children by the state - and the agency is responsible for preventing that abuse and protecting the children [New Order/org.- public sector]

1047. Though poverty underlies most social problems in the community, government has consistently done what it can to make poverty worse [New Order/org.- public sector]

1048. The system is beginning to criminalize children for being poor - for stealing food, failure to appear in court on that charge, etc. [New Order/org.- public sector]

1049. Food programmes don't just help children make it through the school system - they can actually help keep them out of the criminal justice system [New Order/org.- public sector]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

1050. The motive for privatization is to save money [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

1051. Generally, government policy is directed toward abdicating responsibility for addressing social needs [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

1052. M.S.S.H. mandate had involved child protection and abuse prevention [Order/org.- public sector]

1053. M.S.S.H. mandate shrinks from preventive work and child protection to child protection case management [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

1054. M.S.S.H. mandate shrinks once again - they no longer do case management, they investigate, apprehend if necessary, and look after their wards - and experience suggests they cannot even manage that [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

1055. Government should either reinstate eliminated programmes, or privatize everything, including child protection [New Order/ind. role and values]

1056. Worst possible government policy change would be a cut
in health care coverage to children and families on income assistance [New Order/ind. role and values]
1057. perception that the voluntary sector has little influence on government - though this varies between ministries and the personnel within them [New Order/org.- public sector]
1058. perception that past employees of certain ministries receive special treatment in contract negotiations [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]
1059. government would have to decide to open up their purse strings before seriously listening to the voluntary sector - what the voluntary sector would say is fairly predictable [New Order/org.- public sector]

(6) Agency F
Policy-maker

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

1060. subject finds agency personnel dynamic [New Order/ind. role and values]
1061. agency believes in unity and diversity [Order/org. mission]
1062. the agency is committed to helping a wide variety of people in a variety of ways, much as extended family might have done in a previous period [Order/org. mission]
1063. agency is committed to responding to need identified by the community [Order/org. mission]
1064. subject believes first in never knowingly doing anything to hurt others - what goes around comes around [Order/ind. role and values]
1065. subject's culture has instilled a belief in putting something back into the community [Order/ind. role and values]
1066. subject believes in both free enterprise and compassion [Order/ind. role and values]
1067. belief in utilizing tax revenue to keep people out of poverty - the worst type of violence [Order/ind. role and values]
1068. individual/organizational value congruence high [Chaos/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

1069. the Board discusses an array of issues, generally presented by the Executive Director [New Order/org. structure]
1070. the Board has the ultimate say on any issue [New Order/org. structure]
1071. there are limits on any volunteer Board's time, and therefore on the depth of their knowledge of daily
organizational operations [Chaos/org. structure]
1072. the most important single person in the agency is the senior administrator [New Order/org. structure]
1073. the head of the Board also plays a key leadership role, and generally is more often present in the agency than other Board members [New Order/org. structure]
1074. agency hierarchy is fairly informal - staff may approach the head of the Board directly, without going through channels [New Order/org. structure]
1075. subject believes in accessible leadership [Order/ind. role and values]
1076. at different times, and regarding certain issues, the Board relies solely on the senior administrator to identify issues and supply options [New Order/org. structure]

2.3 Organizational Change

1077. the most significant change in the agency has been the recent threefold expansion of its budget and services [New Order/org. mission]
1078. expansion of services was preceded by a Board decision to concentrate on the employment and training needs of its clients [Chaos/org. mission]
1079. Board recognized a lack of employment services for immigrants, and the need for such programmes [Chaos/service to clients]
1080. agency now provides a variety of skills-training programmes [New Order/service to clients]
1081. despite the expansion of the agency, its structure is unchanged - as new services are brought in, co-ordinators for them are hired, but no middle-management level has been necessary [New Order/org. structure]
1082. after expansion, the development of a Board which represents the community has been the next most significant change [New Order/org. mission]
1083. the members of the Board did not reflect the composition of the community served by the agency [Order/org. mission]
1084. gradually, leaders carefully selected in order to maintain a balance from the community served were added to the Board [Chaos/org. mission]
1085. in comparing this agency's Board to those in similar agencies in other cities, it is remarkable for its stability [New Order/inter-org.]
1086. perception that remaining neutral, and remaining stable, have contributed to the agency being perceived as credible by the government, the community, and other organizations [New Order/org. mission]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

1087. perception that while most inter-action with other agencies is characterized by cooperation, there is some
competition [New Order/inter-org.]
1088.funders appear undecided about supporting immigrant-serving agencies, or supporting immigrant-serving workers in generalist agencies - which enhances the potential for inter-agency competition [New Order/inter-org.]
1089.perception that specialization of the agency (to a specific population), and the workers within it (to specific needs) is necessary to adequately address demand [New Order/service to clients]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

1090.belief that contracted services are of higher quality, and cost less, than publicly-provided services [New Order/ind. role and values]
1091.perception that the problem with services provided by government is the size of government bureaucracy - seen to make services unresponsive to demand, and inefficient [New Order/org.- public sector]
1092.the problem with contracts seen as a potential lack of continuity - neither agency nor clients can count on them being renewed [New Order/org.- public sector]
1093.perception that privatization by reducing or eliminating services is inefficient, as preventive services suffer first, and these avoid higher costs later on [New Order/org.- public sector]
1094.privatization seen to be motivated primarily by a mistaken belief that cutting immediate costs is a good idea [Chaos/org.-public sector/Neoconservatism]
1095.elimination of provincial funding to immigrant-serving agencies seen to result from at lack of political clout by such agencies in 1983 [Chaos/org.- public sector/Popularity]
1096.perception that the provincial government did not attack programmes favoring their political friends to the same degree as those serving marginalized groups [Chaos/org.-public sector/Paternalism]
1097.perception that the immigrant community has gained a political voice, and hence the provincial government has responded with slightly more funding [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]
1098.perception that the recent provision of a provincial contract to the agency resulted from a combination of agency credibility, and support from both unions and corporations [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

1099.the squeaky wheel gets the grease [New Order/org.-public sector/Popularity]
1100.perception that the provincial government has a simplistic perspective of society - a result of a lack of
education and ethnocentric attitudes in politicians [New Order/org.- public sector/Populism]

1101. perception that provincial policies favour business—because business financially supports the Social Credit party [New Order/org.- public sector/Patronage]

ADMINISTRATOR

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

1102. agency provides a wide range of services at a very practical level of human need [Order/service to clients]
1103. agency acts as a bridge between the immigrant community and the mainstream community [Order/org. mission]
1104. belief in objectivity, neutrality, and the unification of the community while retaining the integrity of its component parts [Order/ind. role and values]
1105. agency acts to support both the unity and diversity of the immigrant community — achieved through consistent objectivity [Order/org. mission]
1106. agency is 'grassroots' [Order/org. mission]
1107. agency is not aligned politically — it cannot practice partisan politics and still achieve its objective of unifying the diverse community it serves [Order/org. mission]
1108. individual and organizational value congruence is high [Order/ind. role and values]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

1109. senior administrator is accountable to the Board [Order/org. structure]
1110. composition of Board carefully created to reflect both the mainstream of the culture and the diversity of the immigrant community served — it is representative of the community without being elected by it [New Order/org. structure]
1111. staff are chosen to ensure representation of the major facets of the immigrant community [New Order/service to clients]
1112. in its mission, services, and structure the agency could be described as implementing the policy of mosaic — the philosophical approach to multi-culturalism supported by the federal government [New Order/org.- public sector]
1113. the agency is a microcosm of the problems of its community, and the solutions to them [New Order/org. structure]
1114. subject perceives the Board as having the most power [New Order/org. structure]
1115. agency's main problems stem from the lack of funding provided by government, and the lack of other resources for clients [New Order/financial resources]
1116. perception that government does not understand that
crisis prevention is more efficient than crisis intervention [New Order/org.- public sector]
1117. government funding criteria often conflicts with demonstrated community need [New Order/service to clients]
1118. agency staff time is too often consumed by pursuing funding in various government bureaucratic mazes [New Order/financial resources]
1119. perception that government bureaucrats have no idea what is happening, or what is needed at the grassroots level - and are unresponsive when this is explained to them by the agency [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]

2.3 Organizational Change

1120. the most significant change in the agency has been the rapid increase in services, resulting from short-term federal employment contracts [New Order/financial resources]
1121. agency took on several federal employment contracts to provide training for immigrants - particularly women and youth [Chaos/service to clients]
1122. agency budget almost tripled as a result of federal employment contracts [Chaos/financial resources]
1123. core budget remains 'starved' [New Order/financial resources]
1124. federal employment contracts provide little toward core needs [Chaos/financial resources]
1125. core staff are overburdened and paid less than contract staff [New Order/financial resources]
1126. agency was founded and originally operated by three levels of government responsible for addressing a spectrum of immigrant needs [Order/org.- public sector]
1127. administration of the agency was initially provided through staff seconded from government [Order/org. structure]
1128. funding was initially provided from municipal, provincial and federal coffers [Order/financial resources]
1129. in 1983 government decided that the agency should operate as a not-for-profit organization [Chaos/org.- public sector]
1130. in 1983, funding from municipal and federal levels continued, but provincial funding was withdrawn [Chaos/financial resources]
1131. the withdrawal of funding by the provincial government in 1983 was rationalized as a result of the need to reduce fiscal spending, and the government's belief that they were not responsible for the services the agency provided [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

1132. relations between organizations serving immigrants has been marked by increasing tensions - related to competition for scarce funding [New Order/inter-org.]
increased competition for funding was commensurate with the withdrawal of funding by the provincial government [Chaos/inter-org.]

agencies serving immigrants continue to meet monthly, though there is a reduced sense of a community of organizations [New Order/inter-org.]

division of levels of government, and ministries or departments within those levels, serves to negate efforts at co-ordination of service - exacerbating tensions between agencies serving immigrants [New Order/inter-org.]

perception that the agency with the highest profile gets the most funding tempts organizations to lobby, and use the media - to 'one-up' other agencies, and increase competition [New Order/inter-org./Popularity]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

the most significant privatization initiative has been the cancelling of subsidy to the organization by the provincial government in 1983 [New Order/org.- public sector]

cancellation of subsidy seen partly as economically motivated [Chaos/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

cancellation of subsidy seen partly as a result of a lack of recognition of the important role played by immigrants in society [Chaos/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

observation that privatization has been undertaken with no planning to ensure that if government will not be serving immigrants that somebody else will [Chaos/service to clients/Neoconservatism]

agency began a pilot project to provide alcohol and drug counselling [Chaos/org.- public sector]

alcohol and drug counselling project has now been recognized by the awarding of a provincial contract [New Order/org.- public sector]

agency became a 'dumping ground' - every case where public agencies could not handle the issues of this immigrant community was referred - but no funding for services rendered was provided [Chaos/org.- public sector]

agency now regularly provides what amount to support services for government - helping in any referred case involving the immigrant community, but receiving no recognition or funding for doing so [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

Board was 'low profile' - it engaged in little publicity or fundraising [Chaos/org. structure]

Board is now aware of the need for, and relationship of, P.R. and fundraising [New Order/financial resources]

emphasis and interest of Board members now turning away from services, toward fundraising [New Order/org. structure]

demands on the Board have become excessive, in terms of time and technical knowledge necessary to fulfill their role [New Order/ind. role and values]
services provided are increasingly those demanded according to the criteria of government contracts - not those needed by clients [New Order/service to clients/Paternalism]

agency focus is shifting from responding to the needs of the grassroots to survival [New Order/org. mission]

agency is at the threshold of change - now looking for more clout and more money [New Order/org. mission]

the agency's ability to act as advocates for individual clients is threatened by funding via contracts [New Order/org. mission/Paternalism]

poor funding creates pressure to lobby and fundraise [Chaos/financial resources]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

motivation for privatization perceived partly as cost-savings, partly as a denial of responsibility [New Order/org.- public sector/Neoconservatism]

subject rejects the government's denial of responsibility - on financial and ethical grounds [New Order/ind. role and values]

worst possible government action would be further cuts to social services [New Order/ind. role and values]

perception that the voluntary sector has no influence with the provincial government at all [New Order/org.- public sector]

the voluntary sector could have more influence with the government through lobbying, use of its clout, and by being vocal [New Order/org.- public sector/Popularity]

perception that those in government are neither sensitive, nor of the grassroots [New Order/org.- public sector/Paternalism]

Line Staff

2.1 Individual's and Organization's Values

agency has the ability to assess community need, and the flexibility to fulfill that need [Order/org. mission]

agency retains the ability to serve all of a very diverse community [Order/org. mission]

by remaining neutral the agency is able to create a sense of collectivity in a community that is often characterized by division and difference [Order/org. mission]

belief in individuality, independence and caring [Order/ind. role and values]

belief in each person being treated like everybody else - through accepting and being accepted by others [Order/ind. role and values]

belief in client autonomy [Order/ind. role and values]

the objective of the agency is to bridge the gap between
the immigrant community served and the more established community - to create harmony between them [Order/org. mission]

1167. agency attempts to help each client and community understand their identity, and that identity in the context of another culture [Order/org. mission]

1168. agency is neutral - avoids political alignment or other affiliations as a part of its fundamental philosophy [Order/org. mission]

1169. Board and staff represent diverse nature of the community served - which is intentionally achieved in order to bring unity to the agency and the community [New Order/org. mission]

1170. individual and organizational value congruence high [Order/ind. role and values]

1171. occasionally, the expectations of the community puts workers in a difficult position - workers can feel unprotected, over-demanded-of, and expected to be both advocate for clients and auxiliary to government [New Order/ind. role and values]

1172. both the agency and the workers are commonly used by government to support its services, but generally receive no financial or even professional recognition for this [New Order/org.- public sector]

1173. agency dependence on government contracts deemed a threat to service continuity, and may possibly result in a mismatch between community need and contract criteria [New Order/org.- public sector]

2.2 Organizational Structure and Functioning

1174. power is divided between the senior administrator, and the Board - in that order [New Order/org. structure]

1175. ultimately, the Board has the final say, but provides the senior administrator with a broad mandate [New Order/org. structure]

1176. the senior administrator may consult staff in making decisions, though this varies issue by issue [New Order/org. structure]

1177. structure changed dramatically as services expanded - less consultation with staff prior to decision-making [Chaos/org. structure]

1178. staff had a fair amount of input into decision-making when the agency was small [Order/org. structure]

1179. agency really has only three levels - staff, senior administrator, and Board [New Order/org. structure]

1180. all staff have easy access to the senior administrator - there is a hierarchy, but it is not rigid [New Order/org. structure]

1181. hierarchy of agency was more rigid prior to its being privatized [Order/org. structure]

1182. initially, the agency was run by three levels of
government, with non-immigrant administrators seconded from government to supervise staff who were immigrants - though administrators were very culturally sensitive [Order/org. structure]

1183. present senior administrator was hired prior to privatization, and was the first non-white person in that position [Order/ind. role and values]

1184. service expansion began shortly after the agency was privatized, and involved the use of federal employment contracts [Chaos/service to clients]

1185. contracting has resulted in staff specialization - where staff were once generalists [New Order/ind. role and values]

1186. core staff feel little security [New Order/financial resources]

2.3 Organizational Change

1187. most significant agency change may be the inclusion of the immigrant community served on the Board - it was all white, now it reflects both the mainstream community, and all aspects of the immigrant community [New Order/org. mission]

1188. impetus for Board representation of the community served came from the immigrant community [Chaos/org. mission]

2.4 Interorganizational Field

1189. there has been little change in the relationship between the agency and most other organizations [New Order/inter- org.]  

1190. there has been some increase in competition with some agencies as a result of contracting [New Order/inter-org.]

1191. confusion by differing levels of government over the mandate of several immigrant-serving agencies contributes to inter-agency competition and service duplication [Chaos/inter-org.]

1192. competition for much-needed funds interferes with the process of organizations settling, between themselves, who will serve which population [New Order/inter-org.]

1193. organizations which are competing for the same funding pie continue to work together [New Order/inter-org.]

2.5 Impact of Provincial Government Privatization Initiatives

1194. the agency has taken only one provincial contract - and that only after there was a proven need for the service in the community [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]

1195. provincial government acknowledgement of the agency's expertise via the awarding of a contract may have been related to the publication, by the agency, of a book on the issue addressed by the contract [New Order/org.- public sector/Other]

1196. initially, about half of the agency's funding came from
the provincial government [Order/financial resources]
1197. in 1983 all provincial funding was withdrawn - no staff were laid off, they simply doubled-up jobs [Chaos/financial resources]
1198. complete elimination of provincial funding in 1983 was rationalized as financially necessary for the government, and accompanied by the statement that the agency served a population that was a federal responsibility [Chaos/org.-public sector/Neoconservatism].
1199. provincial cuts in 1983 deemed to be evidence that the government is culturally insensitive, and not aware of the real problems of immigrants [Chaos/ind. role and values/Other]

2.6 Provincial Policy and the Relationship of the Public and Voluntary Sectors

1200. acknowledgement that there is some legitimacy to interpreting privatization as both a means for economic progress, and a transfer of responsibility to the community - as the government stated [New Order/org.-public sector/Neoconservatism]
1201. observation that, beyond the government's rationale, privatization resulted in cutbacks to social services - which means demeaning people and making them more dependent [New Order/org.-public sector/Paternalism]
1202. though welfare and social services can result in some dependence, the kind of dependence that occurs without it is far more dehumanizing - and provincial policies support that dehumanizing dependence [New Order/ind. role and values/Paternalism]
1203. privatization may be a transfer of responsibility to those who are not able to take full responsibility - fundraising is unlikely to provide enough to meet the community's needs [New Order/org.-public sector/Neoconservatism]
1204. the philosophy of the government appears to be 'let everybody take care of themselves' [New Order/org.-public sector/Paternalism]
1205. immigrants are second class citizens, and used to receiving, not demanding, so their organizations are likely to have little influence with government [New Order/org.-public sector/Paternalism]
1206. women in particular are ignored in the formation of government policy [New Order/org.-public sector/Paternalism]
1207. the voluntary sector should engage in self-education, learn the game that keeps agencies apart, and make an effort to unify their voices [New Order/inter-org./Popularity]