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The budget, the President and the 97th Congress Berlin, Peter 1986

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THE  BUDGET, THE PRESIDENT  A N D T H E 97TH  CONGRESS  by PETER  A  THESIS THE  SUBMITTED  BERLIN  IN PARTIAL  REQUIREMENTS FOR MASTER  OF  FULFILMENT  THE DEGREE  OF  ARTS  in THE  FACULTY  OF GRADUATE  Department  We  accept  this thesis  to the  THE  of Political  as  required  UNIVERSITY  © Peter  Science  conforming  standard  OF BRITISH  December  STUDIES  1986  Berlin,  1986  COLUMBIA  OF  In  presenting  degree  at  this  the  thesis  in  University of  partial  fulfilment  of  of  department publication  this or of  thesis for by  his  or  her  representatives.  The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3  for  an advanced  Library shall make  it  agree that permission for extensive  It  this thesis for financial gain shall not  Department  DE-6(3/81)  that the  scholarly purposes may be  permission.  Date  requirements  British Columbia, I agree  freely available for reference and study. I further copying  the  is  granted  by the  understood  that  head  of  copying  my or  be allowed without my written  ABSTRACT This  thesis  1982.  In  looks at 1981,  despite  Democratic  majority  the  House.  White  second pose third  first  several  It  difference  is  is  an  a  attempts, between  tries  to  what  made  opposition the  i n the  of  House  the  voted  however,  they  narrative  of  97th  Congress  economic through  refused  to  a  in  1981  and  committees  and  the  budget  pass  is  a  account  of  about  those  statistical first,  to  the  the  events  theoretical  events  analysis identify  of  and nine  those  of  a  drawn  budget  those  literature also  on  suggest  House  roll  these  marginal  switch sides.  presidential  two the  some calls  Representaitives  P r e s i d e n t i a l v i c t o r y i n 1981 and frustration  explain what them  actions  up  by  drawn  to  blueprint.  questions  chapter  years.  1982,  chapter  chapter  the  leadership, In  President Reagan's  The  House budgetary  supporters  subject  The which  answers. over  who  i n 1982. had  years.  The  the  two  made  the  Second, it  in common  and  T A B L E OF  CONTENTS  Abstract Chapter  Chapter  Chapter  ii I. A T A L E O F T W O B U D G E T S A . C a l e n d a r 1981 and F i s c a l 1982 1. R e a g a n ' s goals 2. T h e e a r l y t r i u m p h s 3. The F i r s t B u d g e t Vote 4. T o t a l V i c t o r y for the President 5. T h e T a x C u t 6. A u t u m n : the second round of cuts B . The 1983 B u d g e t 1. S p r i n g : N o F i r s t Budget Resolution 2. The F i r s t Budget Resolution 3. S u m m e r and F a l l 1982: Congress Budget 4. V e t o O v e r r i d e C . 1982, The T i d e T u r n s II. T H E O R I E S O F C O N G R E S S I O N A L V O T I N G A . Introduction B . The E l e c t o r a l Connection C. Other Legislative Goals 1. M a x i m i z e r s and M a i n t a i n e r s 2. H o m e s t y l e s D . Coalition b u i l d i n g E . Conclusions  Fails  BEHAVIOUR  III. A N A L Y S I S O F D A T A A . Introduction 1. T h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Strategy B . The V a r i a b l e s 1. Dependent V a r i a b l e s , The N i n e Roll Calls 2. The Independent V a r i a b l e s C . Expectations D . A glance at the r a w d a t a 1. T h e D e m o c r a t s 2. The Republicans E . The R o l l C a l l s 1. G r a m m - L a t t a I 2. G r a m m - L a t t a II 3. The T a x C u t 4. T h e A u t u m n C u t s 5. T h e O a k a r A m e n d m e n t 6. L a t t a Budget Substitute 7. T a x Increases 8. The Veto O v e r r i d e 9. J o b s A p p r o p r i a t i o n s F . The O v e r a l l P a t t e r n iii  to  1 1 1 4 6 9 12 15 19 19 23 Produce a 28 30 31 33 33 33 37 38 39 44 48 51 51 52 53 53 58 61 62 62 65 66 66 68 69 71 72 73 75 77 78 79  1. Constituency variables a. Northern Republicans b. Southern Democrats 2. Committees G. Conclusions  iv  80 81 82 84 85  C H A P T E R I. A T A L E O F TWO  A.  CALENDAR  In  1981 AND  1 9 8 1 , the  first  sweeping  budgetary  to  their  steer  they  were  They  were  year  and  able  able  to  to  particularly  seemed  the  to  coalition the a  could  next year majority  some of  w i l l contribute  to a n  second  chapter  derives  from  hypotheses votes  over the  this  and  in  who  a  sufficient voted that  and  an  against  they  had  to  the  hypotheses.  In  of  on the  statistical analysis of nine two  series of  the  but  House.  conservative  own  forged  a  party.  It  conservative  forseeable  future.  But  leaving h i m without  why  events  literature  of  pass  and  in  their  defected  unable were  of  theoretical  course of the  number  his  budgets.  they  of how Congress decided to  account  a  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n able  Democratic majority  Representatives  the  in a  the  the  advisors  House  enjoyed  Republican-controlled Senate  erstwhile supporters  explanatory  used  was  Congressional politics for the  the  with  discusses  the  Democrats,  understanding  starts  past  because  his  these  N o t only  through  them  dominate  them  are  cuts  Southern  votes  of  paper  Congress.  of R e a g a n ' s  understanding  This  push  President  which  in  tax  do  Democrats,  1982  of his presidency, Ronald Reagan  victories  budget  also  FISCAL  BUDGETS  An  changed  sides  vote.  1981  and  1982.  The  Congressional  voting  and  the of the  third  chapter  key budget  those  and  tax  years.  1. Reagan's goals. Federal all  politics  his  energy  fundamental priorities.  1981  on  in  wanted  Reagan  r e v o l v e d around  forcing  change  He  expenditure.  in  Congress  budgetary to  cut  was  a a  U.S.  reason  increase  For  this  in government  to  policy.  taxes,  accept The  balance  what new  the  as was  Reagan  President  budget,  'trickle down effect'  revenue.  a  cut  and  had  1  would  budget  lead,  would  to  be  three  increase  fiscal  military  the sluggish  p a r a d o x i c a l l y , to lead  to  a  was convinced  which would stimulate  i n taxes  A balanced  concentrated  perceived  believer i n 'supply side economies'. H e  that this would produce economy.  economic policy  a  fall  in  an the  A interest  rate  stimulate  (a  the  belief  not  unique  to  the  economy.  The  healthy  economy  TALE  OF TWO BUDGETS  supply-siders) would  be  which  able  would  to  / 2  further  sustain  a  very  high level of m i l i t a r y expenditure.  Many them  become  anaemic in  Presidents  shadow  spite  of  majority  in  barrier  to  elections and  bogged  what  presidency  lost  bold  of  listen  argued  to  the  total  a  only  to  see  compromised  and  Senate,  appeared  the  to  continued  represent  demanded.  seats  in  the  overtures  by to  But  House the  enable  Democratic  an  insuperable  i n the  to  the  November Republicans  media,  found  enough  him  start  building  to  majority.  economy would pick  balanced  his  emerge  that i f Congress co-operated the  schemes  that deliberative institution. A n d ,  communicator' his  new  finally  entered  thirty  'great  'bipartisan'  be  that  and  which  conquest  had  to  tax cuts,  would  Congress  Representatives  the  prepared  back-dated  budget  of  with  of undiluted victory R e a g a n  dubbed  he called a  office  documents  Democrats  The President his  in  House kind  Reagan,  Democrats  down  Republican  the  the  entered  of the  the  the  have  by  1983.  political  It  success  is in  and  passed  up b y the  end  the  abiding  1981  exposed  his budget of 1981 and  irony the  of  and the  Reagan's  poverty  of  his  economics.  There playing  can  to  be  little doubt  win. He  did so  that  to  Reagan  the  extent  policy. B y doing this he raised the repeat  in  matters.  subsequent Indeed,  if  years. Reagan  He  leader  congressional  could  wished  action  that  to  in  not  position-taking: he  l a r g e l y ignored other  level w h i c h  dedicate  attend  to  to spend  1981  not j u s t he  stakes to a  Presidential responsibilty he would have  Reviewing  was  he  more  any  of  less time  Republican  areas of  could not hope  energy the on the  Senator  to  other  was  to  economic areas  of  budget.  and  majority  H o w a r d B a k e r declared,  Men and w o m e n m a y disagree on the policies adopted by Congress and by this administration, but almost no-one, I think,  this will  A  TALE  OF TWO BUDGETS  dispute the proposition that this Congress has made changes i n the public policy of this nation t h a n decades.  / 3  more fundamental a n y Congress i n  1  These  'changes'  Congress. the  were  Some  brought  of the  reconciliation b i l l ,  taxation and  What  really  Congress  i n the  offered  by  Baker  adopt the  to  expenditure,  encouraged  to  the  was  viewed  Congress  had  acted and  and  assumptions  in  to  of the  remarkable  Congressional  budgetary  were  masterminded  adopt  Reagan's  It  right  used  the  cut  magnitude  was his  that  the  President  must  seemed  It  a  have  domestic  of  budget,  in  order  to  improve  the  was  a  move  away  from  to  those  reasonable  in  the  before.  persuaded  opposed  sea-change  had  shifts  occurred  (as  they  the  had  assumptions  signalling  with  Republican  party  supporters  believed,  his  together a  in  from  Some  of  bill  the  way  to the  budgetary  process.  increase  military  to  'climate' the  for  capital  priorities  the  plans  administration's  but  forged by the  Budget  the  the  and  made  Democrats. the  of A m e r i c a n  The  to replace  It  was,  liberalism  of  David the  committees  Committee  put  procedure  and  the  of the  the  dramatic  A c t to take  Budget  up  of  director,  reconciliation  President  for  most  committees.  when  alliance was  conservative  the future  and  spending  S t o c k m a n used  replacement  to innovative use  1974 Budget Reform  House  o w n . The with  also due  of M a n a g e m e n t  the  budget  logical  coalition a n d it represented  1981 was  provisions of the  forward in a  i n to to,  as  Office  alliance of Representatives  budget,  session. These involved major  of such  expectations to  by  away  proposals  1981  process.  initiative  the  political  success  legislative  their  changes  taxes  who  to  the end of the  1981  Stockman,  refused  in  economic liberals.  Reagan's  coups  victories  the continuing  but  investment.  major  'bidding w a r ' over tax legislation, and  the  cut  of  resolution, on  of  and  series  first budget  the  events  a  in votes: on the  his economic model and  economy  formation  by  C o n g r e s s i o n a l Budget Office).  see  expenditure,  being  victories were  appropriations i n December at in  into  Democrats'  entire  Reagan the  House and  New  his Deal  politics.  N o r m a n O r n s t e i n , ' A s s e s s i n g Reagan's F i r s t Y e a r ' i n , O r n s t e i n ed, President and Congress: Assessing Reagan's First Year (Washington D . C : A m e r i c a n E n t e r p r i s e Institute, 1982.) 1  A Although year  was  The  House  proved  for  a  a  major  this  House  rendered  almost  OF TWO BUDGETS  12 m o n t h s  impotent  by  its legacy the  bitter  divisions on  was  forced  to s w a l l o w the  President's  budget  great  shock  to  legislative  system.  fiscal  a  w i n n i n g coalition lasted j u s t  TALE  organs  while,  momentum  almost  rendered  the  its  effect  delicate  seized  up  incapable was  and  of  not  to  the  action.  hand  House  When  power  whole i n In  the  straight  following  the  budget.  1981 and  1982  budgetary  / 4  some  this  of  mechanism  was,  Reagan  'revolution'  back  the  to  its  lost  Democratic  hierarchy.  2. The early t r i u m p h s The new President he addressed cut  $41.4  Carter  Congress  billion  the  called  officially  and announced  from  previous  the  expenditure  By  the  Congress a  of  sum  for  March  almost  identical to  President  scored  another  which the  Committee were  based  come  Money  submitted  the  'truly  needy'  24 per cent  to  32 per  cent.  cuts  the  had  climbed to  President's  full  $48.6  88-10  on  the  victory  when,  on  the  more  sanguine  the  economic  his  theories  of the  by  Economist would  3  budget  while  4  budget  proposals  billion.  Senate  second  of A p r i l .  seventh,  the  to  passed  the  prognostications  favoured  to  President  The  cent  sent  by  what  for  when  Congress  from  41 per  Reagan  1981  H e asked  to  significant  the  uninterrupted  encouraged Senate balanced  the  Budget  success  right-wingers Committee  budget  to  voted  Republicans  of  Reagan's  want 12-8  even to  Armstrong  ' L e t The Budget Battle B e g i n ' , Ibid. • Ibid. 3  per  request  February  cent  voted to adopt on  proposals.  all  2  18th  The  Senate  of the O M B  White  House  over  may  have  predictions of their o w n C B O .  The  2  services. 37  on the  spending  would  when  proposed  budget  Budget  1982  social  would go from  plans  his budget  cuts  grow from  tenth  the  fiscal The  Deal'  not be cut. It would arms  the  fall.  'post-New  unveiled his  The  reject  budgetary more. the  (Colo.),  Economist,  On  strategy the  ninth  President's Grassley  2 1 . 2 . 8 1 , p.  budget,  (Iowa), 21.  of  April with  and  the three  Symms  A (Idaho) v o t i n g w i t h the  But purity,  the  conservative  not  OF TWO BUDGETS  / 5  Democrats.  r i g h t - w i n g , even i f they  were  5  TALE  going to  Republicans  were  beginning to  doubt  sabotage his legislation. T h e  toeing  the  line,  passed  the  Reagan's  Senate  as  ideological  a whole, w i t h  Reagan-supported  fiscal  1982  resolution.  On  the  budget,  19th  of A p r i l  proposed  different  from  told L o y o l a  by  the  the  their  House  chairman  administration's  by  Budget Jim  Committee  Jones  17 votes  endorsed  (Okla.)  to  which  13. H e n r y  U n i v e r s i t y students that the Jones alternative  a  was  Reuss  Democratic significantly  (Dem. Wise.)  was:  a pale and somewhat more human i m i t a t i o n of the Republican p r o g r a m - a little tougher on the fat cats, a little easier on the t h i n cats; a n d a bit more responsible about the deficit. I n short, an i m p r o v e m e n t , i f h a r d l y a call to the b a r r i c a d e s . 6  President  Reagan,  resolved him  not  from  By  the  late  Congress,  Recovery  were  first  any  had  already  bridges  over  set the  his  heart  allegedly  on  small  total gulf  victory  that  separated  the  leader  running 8  approval budget  recuperating  Tip O'Neill five  to  one  (Dem. M a s s . ) i n favour  Maclean's  reported  rating  a  in  plan was  President  that  national  enhanced  by  was  estimated  of the  Reagan's  opinion the  ecstatically  poll.  that  received letters  W h i t e House's economic 9  economic  The upturn  policies impetus which  6  7  8  9  by  from  'Economic had for  a the  occurred  q u a r t e r of 1981.  E v e n before R e a g a n took office Representative J a c k K e m p (R. N . Y . ) convinced the administration would renege on the promised three year 30 cent t a x cut he favored. The Economist 7.1.81, pp.27-31. ' B o l l W e e v i l s of A Political Breed' Maclean's 11.5.81, p . 4 1 . R e a g a n h a d s u r v i v e d an assasination attempt on the 30th of M a r c h . ' R e a g a n T a k e s C o n t r o l A g a i n ' The Economist 2.5.81, pp. 23-4 11.5.81 5  and  Democrats.  when  Program'.  thirds  the  House  April,  administration in  build  majority  7  constituents  two  to  however,  was per  A It in  was  the  House,  without  the  with  were  of the  particular  issue  hope  Texas  for the  The  CDF he  amongst  others,  read  the  'Conservative to  be  is about  a  members  had  co-operated  Budget, When  election r e t u r n s . '  1  to  per  their Ways  chided  and for  are  Means his  and  actions  Democrats  'boll-weevils', The  informal  I campaigned  Democrats,  early  allocated  budget  (Dem. Tex.) said,  conservative  and  forty  economics.  platform  unexpected  requests  over  majority  their  nick-named  W . Stenholm  'we  Democratic passing  were  Reagan's  i n the  an  of  Forum',  said,  is a t u r n  of the  there  cent of the  Hance,  OF TWO BUDGETS / 6  chance  Gramm  Charles  found  with  spite  Democratic  85  Kent  in  good  sympathetic  80 to  Democrat,  the  that,  had  C D F Representative  conservatives. the  clear  addition to P h i l  Democratic p a r t y  January  fiscal  In  assumed  organiser  Another  increasingly administration  compromise.  associated who  becoming  TALE  but  direction.'  ally  1  in  important  'this  on.'  the  only  1  O'Neill.  In  positions  on,  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committees, by  liberals  he  1 0  said  to  'let  them  professor  who  2  3. T h e F i r s t Budget Vote One  of  the  C D F appointees  represented the the  House  Budget  Committee, budget  Democratic  and  to t r y  Reagan May  to  members  Committee.  were  launched  a  Gramm  and  i n the  House.  in  the  G r a m m gained a position on  r a n k i n g Republican on the  But,  since  their  I  White  for  House  the  budget for the  the  an  before Jones where  debate on  the  official  the  he  1  1  1  2  on floor  Budget  supported  defeated the as  by  the  budget an  was  amendent  Budget Committee  vote  budget.  on He  attempted  T h e ' B o l l W e e v i l s ' Bore I n ' Newsweek 1 1 . 5 . 8 1 , p.24. Ibid. I n the 1980 election R e a g a n h a d w o n 72 per H a n c e ' s district. US News & World Report 2 2 . 6 . 8 1 , p . 6 6 . Ibid. 1 0  administration  G r a m m - L a t t a I was  lobbying effort  Gramm-Latta  Congress  the  ex-economics  f o r m a l l y sponsored  reintroduce  major  an  of H o u s t o n , T e x a s .  Committee. to  Gramm,  to substitute it, in its entirety,  substitute of  and  on  able  Phil  of Ohio,  Committee  majority  they  suburbs  Delbert L a t t a  i n the  'open',  northern  was  the met to  bill.  seventh  of  over  sixty  charm  them  '  cent  of  the  vote  in  A and  gave  Centre  them  box  u s i n g the  Presidential cuff-links.  tickets  November  that  this  was  O'Neill's when  the  fighting,  well  an  have  what  7  at  And is  of  the on a  in  line.  time.  Kennedy  aides  Wavering  tour  of  were  was  the  Republicans  endorsement  passes  7  they  in  the  could  give  'there is no  question  country.' "  O'Neill's  the  1  to show his own lack of lobbying effort  the 1  Houses  Presidential  history  building  this  1 8  both  the  feeling  asked f o r . '  White House's  a hint of relief?) said  was  tour  the  to b a n a l details w h i c h  House  intended  Reagan  'There  he's  White  been  Easter  1  of  OF TWO BUDGETS /  Meanwhile White  G O P itself  lobbying i n  strategy  fight.'  because;  President  and  gave  attention  withdrawal  greatest  on  the  (with perhaps  light. While  to  keep  elections  discreet  not  to  the  O'Neill  3  might  better  leader  1  is  hyperbole a  with  1982  constituents.  in  hallmark  threatened  also  w a v e r i n g Democrats.  m i x t u r e of serious politics and  administration's were  to  He  TALE  6  up  political  Antipodes. He  said  'I  he  felt  occasion among  1 5  the  momentum  Time  drew  know  when  their  American  was  the  attention to  fight  no  people  O ' N e i l l consoled h i m s e l f w i t h  House  plans  to and  point  in  to  give  the  of  revenge.  J u s t w a i t until middle A m e r i c a finds out w h a t happened w i t h these budget cuts. A m I going to get some Republican scalps down the road? Y o u bet I a m . 1  US  News  up  on  may  the  raised a more  9  interesting  question.  Democratic plan in advance,  be t h a t the  demoralisation,  or  then  If,  as  why  it appears, did Reagan  White House could not be sure of the it m a y  be  the  case  that  extent  legislative inertia  H o u s e pressure carried the bill through to a roll  O'Neill force of the rather  had  the  given  vote?  It  Democrats' than  White  call.  ' H o w R e a g a n Wooed Congress' US News & World Report 18.7.81, p. 17. US News noted that Congressmen had now voted to restore the W h i t e H o u s e yacht, deemed a n unnecessary l u x u r y by C a r t e r , and suggested they did so because they fancied being lobbied while sailing r o m a n t i c a l l y w i t h R e a g a n on the Potomac. 'Reagan's B i g W i n ' Time 18.5.81, p.8. Time 11.5.81 p.14. Op. Cit. 18.5.81.pp.8-10 and 11. Ibid. p.9. Ibid. ' T i p O ' N e i l l O n The Ropes' Time 18.5.81, p.9.  T  3  1  4  1  5  1  6  1  7  1  8  1 9  A But  there  observers  2  coalition,  0  two  other  argued  that  Reagan  presumably  their  support  them  and  the  are  for  the  by  the  President's  look like  the  attitude  personality  to,  of  trying  'Boll  the  of  worth  so  to  a  permanent  declare  He may  have  ideology the  leaders,  Reagan  were  in a  intense  no  secret  was  impressed b y neither  On  the  the  one  proposed  the  Republicans as  Budget first  seventh  Democrats  particularly  of  they  Reagan's  May  the  the  House  resolution.  78-20. T w o d a y s  requiring  them  the  of M a y , only six d a y s  budget  first  budget  Quarterly,  and to  on  make  reform  act  $36  resolution,  kept  up  the  in  House)  had  2  0  1  had  on  O'Neill,  badly  totalled  up  the  B y the  their  the  e.g. U.S. News 1 8 . 7 . 8 1 . Congressional Quarterly Almanac  cuts  15th  American  that  plan  O'Neill  rather  than  voted  with  G r a m m - L a t t a I for  to  its  version  the by  authorising the  12th  the  words  the the 1982  committee  of J u n e .  On  specified i n  the  completed approval of the in  of  agreement on fiscal  of M a y deadline  of  fiscal  1982  Congressional  1  12th  of J u n e ,  committees reports. made  1981,  Reagan  approved  reached  'drawn',  blueprint.'  to  fighting in a  i n particular  to substitute Senate  Congress  2  i n the  or for  wanted  Sixty-three Democrats  instructions  twenty-nine  completed  the  i n additional cuts  was  for,  represent or  caricatured  and  approved  conferees  after  pace.  one of the  2  billion  making  his policies nor his intellectual powers.  12th  later  which  all but  Committees  the  timetable,  reports, the  get  257-176  reconciliation  'to R o n a l d Reagan's  Congress  House  On  targets  1974  not  charm,  voted  spending  21st  did  consistently  by its o w n B u d g e t committee.  Committee  resolution  that  vote  between  dislike  a pair of old, feuding, I r i s h w i d o w s , or two I r i s h drunks  was  call  believed that  media It  'bipartisan'  roll  them.  bar.  some  his coalition.  motivated by an  their  First,  create a visible division  strengthen  liberal  noting.  humiliate as  and  OF TWO BUDGETS / 8  create  Weevils'  is t h a t R e a g a n ,  some  to  policies and  'losers' would  either  O'Neill  explanations  Democratic party.  T h e second a r g u m e n t adversarial  was  forcing the  rest of the  Democrats  plausible  TALE  By by  p.247.  the  the  (fourteen the  17th  deadline for i n the  Senate,  of J u n e  committees  committee  the  in their  fifteen Budget  chambers  A and  reported  $37.3 billion  The  the  resulting  reconciliation packages.  enthusiastic.  House  The  reaction  2 3  'congressional  backsliding  Stockman  had  been  ordered  to  make  cuts  i n Medicare, Medicaid,  and  larger  i n the  undermine  some  foodstamps  but  before  end of the was  said  The  House  the  / 9  resolution included  i n the  House  House  bill  was  to  was  not  very-  committees  made  2  the  painful  an  business  as  example usual.' "  The they  aid to education, welfare, child n u t r i t i o n , food  stamps  for  budget.  example  they  necessitating  Democrats  The  emergency  remained  had  cuts  smaller  2  they  of  2  made  Bank's  manner,  conditions of entitlement.  the  2  H o u s e , had tried to distribute the  least  cuts:  year  reports  cuts  return  Export-Import  not the  committee  the  a  in the  proposed  that  the  found  and  Democrat-controlled committees  cuts  to  administration  'unconscionable.'  problem  OF TWO BUDGETS  in cuts.  White  the  TALE  They  5  had  had  cut  money  the  would  appropriations.  sceptical  also  tried  to  budget then  run  out  of  the  Part  2 6  of  Reagan's  to substitute  a budget  for  economic  assumptions.  4. Total Victory for the President On in  the  2 6 t h of J u n e  the  the  House  preceded the  by  a  series  passage  straight  either/or  different  parts  Republicans were voters  217-211  W h i t e House, G r a m m - L a t t a II, for the  Committee and derived from  was  voted  and  the  work of the  of G O P victories on  of a  rule  which  vote.  The  Democrats  of  the  budget;  m a k i n g , rather  made  their than  resolution sponsored  the had  favoured  them  cuts  votes.  substitution  strategy  lobbyists by s a y i n g individual  the  was  of  most  was  important  G r a m m - L a t t a II  a  six  independent  votes  on  to  expose  cuts  the  to escape  were  The  up  Budget  spending committees. T h i s vote  procedural  allow  by  drawn  from  inseparable  the the  c r i t i c i s m of  p a r t s of a  larger  A b o u t 4,000 pages worth of output, w h i c h is as good a n indication of h o w w o r k the committees had done as any. ' B i g Battles on T w o F r o n t s ' Time Magazine 29.6.81, p. 15. Quoted without source i n , 'Block G r a n t s : Categorically N o . ' The Economist 2 0 . 6 . 8 1 , p.22. Time 29.6.81. p. 14. ' H e Got W h a t He W a n t e d ' Time 6.7.81, p.10. The Economist 2 0 . 6 . 8 1 . 2  2  2  3  2  4  2  5  2  6  A  TALE  OF TWO BUDGETS  /  10  package.  Gramm-Latta was of  an  II was  increase  cuts,  i n cuts  The  phoned  interview  made  with  it  the  as  many  The  $37.8 to  Southern sugar  by  was  of this  fuel.  trio  which  Reagan  promise h i m w h a t  he  Presidential  House committees  was  OMB  Stockman.  and  David  energetic  Century  3  at 1  the  'Hogs  to  give  really  Newsweek  put  fed.'  t h r o w n out  was  Stockman  who  cost  $2  (La.) who  votes  The  Capitol  six  committee  way  also  asked  half asked  an  hour  afterwards  At  of  of a budget members  work  the  that  it  the  talk  per  billion on  three  key  opposition to One  3 0  modification of and  before  away the  i f this  from  vote  meant  to his  3 2  by  drafted  he  spent  year.  for  to  infamous  $10  phoned drop  House  time  was  was his r e p l y .  weeks  to  it in his  save  billion  by  while  time  2 8  administration would  i n favour  total  i n L o s Angeles,  estimated to  that  absolute  lobbying  him  supposed  B r e a u x was  meant  result  in the  Plaza  morning of the  ' N o , but it c a n be rented,'  victory  of  S t o c k m a n later  9  deal  utilities to s w i t c h to coal and gas  Breaux wanted.  the  which  Breaux  great  was  the  programme  encouraged  vote could be bought:  The  that  John  2  II It  a  possible  the  adjustments.'  promise  was  called  as  bill  bout  at  is w h e n , as  Democrats.  a  key victories. T h e  made.  on the  7  speeches  Southern  support,  subsidies  2  Gramm-Latta  to  it  staying  Monthly,  and  supporters'  Senate  another  billion  Democrats  price  member  Atlantic  the  assumptions  This  'considerations  incentives  oil  who  potential defectors.  called  the  preceded  Reagan,  Reagan  $ 3 7 . 8 billion. I n addition to raising the  resembled  and  were  of the  19 D e m o c r a t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  Republicans  the  cuts  votes  administration.  of  to  G r a m m - L a t t a II  distributed those  more  one  the  specialist  entirely b y  traditionally take  pride  the in  Time loc. cit. 6 . 7 . 8 1 . The Atlantic Monthly, N o v . 8 1 . ' Reagan's S w e e t T r i u m p h ' Newsweek 6.7.81, p.18. ' H o w L o n g C a n R e a g a n ' s Coalition L a s t ? ' Business Week 13.7.81. p . 9 9 . W h a t Business Week calls 'sugar price support' Time (6.7.81.) calls 'federal loans to sugar producers. ' Time 6.7.81. Business Week 1 3 . 7 . 8 1 . inter alia. 2  7  2  8  2  9  3 0  3  1  3  2  A their work and were u n h a p p y put  in  the  place  of  the  TALE  OF TWO BUDGETS  at h a v i n g it a l l rejected,  Budget  Committee  /  especially since w h a t  resolution  was  a  sloppy  11 was  piece  of  legislation.  Commonweal, for  in a  partisan  attack  on  the  vote,  reserved  its  greatest  scorn  Stockman's work:  T h e y voted for a 'document' that w a s really a collection of over five hundred mostly unnumbered pages and h a n d w r i t t e n notes, full of pen and pencil deletions that abolished entire programs and gave duplicate authority for others, m u c h of it w i t h far-reaching implications t h a t could not be discussed or debated because the content was unknown. 3  Indeed,  Time  document's  3  implied that R e a g a n himself h a d only the  contents.  It m a y  seem  vaguest  petty  to carp  over the  appearance  of a bill,  the President wanted Congress to pass a piece of legislation had  not  affront  seen,  into  which  they  of horror  of  O M B analyst had  podium  to  stories  present  Latta...discovered  Head  requested Start  altogether. deletions  3  the  3  by  not been the  no  input,  the  In  this  A  case  document.  relates left  out  any  President  and  programme the  for  the  name  3  5  3  6  3  7  the  mistakes blind  fact  they was  money  been  a  scruffy  were was  later  originally  was  phone  for bilingual  to be  he)  rather 3  left  genuine, found  out  deleted  the  '...Delbert  education: than  the  Furthermore  6  out  of  the  whereas to  a  number  ' O n his w a y to  5  accidentally out  and  that  (and  melodramatically,  'June 26: A D a y i n the Life of Congress' Commonweal "6.7.81. Newsweek 6.7.81. ' T h i s M a y H u r t a L i t t l e ' 13.7.81, p.8 Ibid.  3  3  approved b y . . . S e n a t e . '  had  the  which which  it $85 million  accident turned  were  The  one p a g e .  Time  m i s t a k e n l y made  supposed  programme  had  and  but  h u m i l i a t i o n for t h e m . T h e r e  deleted from  bill'  drafters  school-leaver  7  observers  intentional. 3  had  s u r r o u n d i n g the  he pencilled i n a s u m , but million  had  to their institutional pride, w a s further  string an  knowledge of  34  have  altogether,  31.7.81, p.427.  he  $157 the bill some been and  A then,  in  section  the  only.  which  be  'The back  leader'  thing  happened  in  part  'there's  of  On  3  'not  fair  the the  soldiers of  on  the  July,  widespread  29th package  for  250  were  the  crowed  break  happy;  among 4  unnamed  one for  Republican  we'll  be  the  over  his  aren't  going  'Republican  staff  (R.  said  4 1  Bill  Fransel  Republicans  58  that  and  sub-committees  Senate bills.  Congressional Q u a r t e r l y  of cuts i n the  in  12  Minn.)  Conservative  2  from  House  that  They  /  funding  happily  today.  A n d an  so  claimed  mishmash  part  - it's w i n n i n g . '  conferees  what  a  reinserted  programme,  O'Neill  3 8  their 0  been  education  his  made  OF TWO BUDGETS  had  such  policies for u s . '  between on  is  resentment  w r i t i n g a l l our  differences  an  - ever.'*  anymore  loyal  of  'this  party  dollars  to  Reagan  9  House,  another.  Democrats  amount  15th  the  not  Reagan  America.'  a l l the  are  agreement  but  in Tip O'Neill's  a  out  told  Conservative  not  Democrats  one  had  said it's  But  most  similar  Michel  victory,  work  reached  cut  laughing-stock  to  that  A  was  leader  document  TALE  They  called 'The  history of C o n g r e s s . '  4  convened reached  to  Final  deepest  and  3  5. The Tax C u t Meanwhile, The  conventional  promise, to  4  next  8  9  4  0  4  1  4  2  4  3  4  4  '  tax  wisdom  therefore  that  cut  the  that  proposal  was  that  the  electorate  was  this  proposal was  keener  advancing was  steadily  Reagan's  most  through  Congress.  popular  campaign  would easily pass. Interestingly on  eliminating the  it  deficit than  began on  tax  of  the  4  The  3  and  appear  cuts.  3  Reagan's  administration  three  years,  wanted  a  10 per  w h i c h w o u l d apparently  cent income tax decrease i n each work out  at  The G O P ' s H i d d e n A g e n d a ' Newsweek 13.7.81, p.22. Time 6.7.81. Newsweek 6 . 7 . 8 1 . Ibid. Business Week 13.7.81. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1981, p.257. col.2. See infra pp. 109-111.  23  per  cent overall. The  A Ways  and M e a n s Committee's  two years,  skewed to favour  sides  became  then  the  tax  bill  Democrats  Boll  relief  had  the  conceded'  upped  that  $13.1  billion.  to  twelve votes  What differences  addition  (Dem. and  'it's  a  on  billion  the  Democrats the  Ways war,'  before  4  Reagan  Representatives."  never  did was  D e m o c r a t and  the  questions  would  settle  his  try  to  whom  6  7  The  two  won  with  whatever  proposed  it  $6.1  chairman  the to  two $1.1  oppose  and  to  the  financial  for  nothing  incentives  he  less  dangled  by  than  before  when  forty-eight  cost  to  billion  buy  in  tax  D a n Rostenkowski,  together billion  for  Committee and  offered  each  of  the  the  cuts,  were  how  and  not  much  the  final  great.  They  the  tax  cuts  another  total  particular  victory.  In  Congressmen,  he  a 22 minute television pitch.  television  appeal  Democrats  seen.'" normal  7  Telegrammes  rate  Hall  a  great  success.  O'Neill  faced defeat because of ' a telephone  and  K y . ) reported Sam  was  ran  came 12-1  receiving  (Dem.  Tex.)  into in  516 32  in  the  support calls one  of  i n one hour  said  the  post  office  the  President.  day,  Bo  immediately  p.20  next  blitz like this  Washington  " 'Bidding W a r F o r T a x V o t e s ' Newsweek 3.8.81, " Ibid. " ' Y e a s 2 3 8 - N a y s 195' Time 10.8.81, p . 2 8 . 5  over  6  to  to  President July  P r e s i d e n t i a l proposals  of  a year.  Democrat-controlled  added came  of  pay  Means  and  5  the  spread  13  parties.  originally  and  cent  $50,000  29th  their  calculated t h a t this  of concerned  between  House  had  15 per  which  willingness to  Senate  bidding  Newsweek  President  that the  the  The  a  for  /  biased.  The  never  bidding w a r ,  238-195  displayed  votes.  m a i n l y on  The  made  again  $7.1  the  would be  a  House  oil i n d u s t r y .  'freely  centered  in  OF TWO BUDGETS  incomes under  and one Republican voting against  Weevils'  for  the  proposal w a s  those w i t h  embroiled  passed  Reagan the  original  TALE  Ginn after  morning  nation  at  ten  Carroll  has  times  Hubbard  (Dem.  Ga.)  the  speech;  600, all  A three  were  running  A  characteristic show  in  Reagan Texas  bill.  But  of the  many  surrendered  William don't 'saving  any  our  Neely  Gramm's  to tax  Lewis,  came  after  the  local  said  not the  1  that  his  when  Congressman  he  Ralph  'Boll  that  Weevils'  they  supported  were  not  the  a  radio (Dem.  turncoats  Reagan  and  tax  had  not  K e n H o l l a n d said:  'I've And  destroying  been  preaching  Marvin it.'  5 2  Democratic chair  changes  before  and  then  0  Leath  A n even of Brazos  this  philosophy  explained more  the  defiant  County  a l l along,  so  'defectors' tone  (which l a y  was  I  were struck  within  Phil  constituency):  the  congressman the  14 was  Hall  the  5  at  mail  called  I t h i n k a lot of us here take some pride that P h i l has s o m e t h i n g of a national figure who gets on the nightly n e w s .  Again  /  cut.  5  5  reported  vote  D e m o c r a t s had been for such along and plagiarized t h e m .  defection.'  party,  Hance  OF TWO BUDGETS  9  congratulate  adamant  C h a p p e l l (Fla.)  see  4  touch  independence.  We Southern R e a g a n came  A n d Kent  8  self-designated  were  their  4  of R e a g a n .  for v o t i n g for the  Thirty-one  by  defectors.  50-1 i n favour  phone-in Tex.)  potential  TALE  White  House  Richard  victory.  One  did  Gephardt of  little  to  hide  its  (Mo.) remembered  Reagan's  political  happiness, in  advisors,  1982  as  become 3  which 'sheer  L y n Nofziger,  Democratic pleasure'  predicted  5  4  that  'Rest i n Peace, N e w D e a l . ' Newsweek 10.8.81, p. 16. ' The ' B o l l W e e v i l s ' - . . . W h o . . . W h a t . . . W h y . ' US News & World Report 17.8.81, p.36. US News 1 7 . 8 . 8 1 . Ibid. Ibid. US News ' H o w a M a v e r i c k L a w m a k e r Goes O v e r B a c k H o m e ' 17.8.81, p . 3 7 . infra. 'The 1983 Budget' 4  8  4  9  5  0  5  1  5  2  5  3  5  4  A the Republicans ' w i l l be i n power for the  Reagan 13th  of  signed  August,  government  schedule,  in in  the  second  the  provision  resolution.  become  budget  Washington  for  And  its  problems for the  5  'an  end  resolution should  so,  however,  resolution  other  words  according recess  century.'  5  to  /  15  5  into  law  excessive  on  the  growth  in  taxing.'  which  had,  OF TWO BUDGETS  reconciliation bill  signalled  budget  second  August  year.'  the  reconciliation process,  Congress  binding. I n  rest of the  and  resolution  The  i f no  resolution.  it  first  second  that  bill  that  the  September.  the  tax  and government  speaking,  overturned  the  saying  bureaucracy  Strictly  would  both  TALE  to  non-binding  be  passed,  therefore,  included  was  there  is  in  passed  was  no  thinking  it  had  the  need  be  to  the  be  used  on  reconciliation bill  the to  first  produce  Quarterly,  taken  can  according should  then  Congressional  and  care  resolution a  second  'Congress  of  its  left  economic  6  6. Autumn: the second r o u n d of cuts. By  the  end  reacting  of  as  the  the  President  September  the  quotes  unnamed  an  summer  recess  and  his  W h i t e House was  it  advisors  aide  rate of g r o w t h , and  that further  needed,  even  the  Pentagon  was  Reagan  asked  his  advisors  ways  from  fiscal  would c l e a r l y be larger  than  they  agreed  taken  to  this at  20  government  5  5  5  6  5  7  5  8  1  $74  no  billion  rate  and  action w a s per debt  cent would  had  that  the  economy  was  hoped.  By  the  first  week  cuts.  The  Economist  apparently  further  who said t h a t because  expected  budget  clear  openly t a l k i n g about  White House  for  was  cuts  longer  of $ 1 0  billion  'sacrosanct'.  5  to  trim  $15  billion  years  1983  and  1984  had expected. appease because  shrink or that the  Wall its  5  8  Both  Street,  The  which  inhabitants  economy w o u l d  US News 'The ' B o l l W e e v i l s . " 17.8.81. CQ Almanac p.267 col 1. A President i n the H a n d s of the M o n e y - M e n . 2 1 . 9 . 8 1 , p.44.  slower  than  to  billion  were  from to  $15  to  Time  fiscal  1982  deficits  which  the  offset  Economist  and  Time  had  the  prime  did recover.  '12.9.81,  in  of the  According  7  not  p.23  kept not  believe  the  A If  these  budget cuts  were  to be  resolution. O n the  totaling  $13  billion  more.  The  Senate  billion  managed Hill  cuts  to  were  get j u s t  made  then  Congress  13th of September and  for  an  $4  billion  sceptical. Senator  in total  Howard  The  President  termed and  'phase  $3 billion  made two'  to  the  that  promptly  agreed  would  in  October. human  services,  bill  was never  it  defeated  9  6  0  6  1  6  2  and  Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.  There  have  me  to  beat  the  a  been  which  to  the  the  cuts  While  'budget'  Even  appeal  involved  to be  bring  in  request. his  $3  Reagan  allies on  start cuts  billion  the  of  what  he  i n further  cuts  of  the  was  vote  sixth  and  6  prepared  allowance  fiscal  $87.2m  the  year  on  in  to  Reagan  the  over-worked the  first  labor,  Committee,  the  White  did  not  compromise  undoubtedly  House.  a  who  could  Regula's  Reagan's  defeat  for  of  health,  R e g u l a (R. Ohio) proposed  Means  do  deferments.  by  by  it was  not  Nevertheless  1  together  new for  sent B a k e r s c u r r y i n g  am  backing o f f . '  cobbled  O n the  proposed  vote,  behalf  and 'I  in cost of l i v i n g  Ways  this  on  $13  told h i m that  hastily  proposed  the  168-249.  them.  his  further  If we cut another $ 1 0 billion w i l l just come back and ask  television  Reagan  education bill.  include  from  to  for  by closing tax loop-holes.  appear  again  recommitted  h a v i n g lost  strategy.  5  to  of  rejected  the Republicans were u n h a p p y  0  had  One  be  minute  to drop proposed cuts  order  6 2  redraft  6  package  Stockman,  this  Time  Congress  second  B a k e r asked h i m :  of his programme,  W h i t e House.  anything  The  thirty  asked  to pass a  16  9  i n increased revenue  A c c o r d i n g to up  a  have  appropriations  committee  W h a t the hell difference does it make? or $ 1 5 billion the financial c o m m u n i t y for another $15 billion c u t . 5  in  cuts  OF TWO BUDGETS /  would  Reagan  increase  appropriations  TALE  that then  proposal record  of  his economic  The be  defeat  traced  to  reminiscent  several  of  understanding They  could  year,  Reagan  take  of this  the of  not  have  Furthermore,  was  one  as  'A  President  Things Monthly Stockman.  In  his  chorus 6  The  of the  change  of  and  also  showed  sympathy  for  lack  six d a y s  of  other  look  up  for  budget  director  he  he  speech  voices  needed  article  4  conviction that  to ask  the  of  the  Federal day.  based  proposed did  5  3  6  4  what  cuts. he  Ibid. Op. Cit.  used He  of the  fiscal would  work, he  committees  another  he and  without money  threatened  wanted.  to  B y means  we  to back  down  characterised  his  haven't  full  had  why  billion more i n cuts.  interviews  with  David  a  series  disarming  (an  and  keep  seen  have  of  were  of  force  on  of this  of a l l for  less  than  admission  (again  to  frankness  them,  the  little  political  next  would  when  cheerfully  year).  November. this  was  administration's  straightforward  Democrats  i n the  for  B u t on the  (theoretically)  20th  left  the  theoretically) closed it down for Congress  vetoing tactic  and  good, guesses, that nobody  disagreed  one  this b r i n k s m a n s h i p  be  must  on  they  vetoed  not  right  Atlantic  continuing resolution  President  always  The  displayed  that  whenever  Government  Reagan  -  Congressional  November  members.  November  been  voted  of  In  had  Congress  Congress  lack  administration.  - worst  throw i n his face  its  can too  not recovered, otherwise  for $ 1 6  and  with  a  17  far  legislation w h i c h  that  economy h a d  would  dealing  was  start  President  protesting  sure  'Reaganomics'  was  the  figures  with  the  of  must  a lot of his  relations  whole package,  strategy  before  piece  sense i n a d m i t t i n g that that  it  of  drafted  television  an  6  a  badly  B u t , clearly, the  3  not  printed  rout  to B a k e r that  would not have  did  or  when,  another  H i s insistence  economic r e c o v e r y . ' the  happy  President's  example.  opponents  the  indecisiveness;  OF TWO BUDGETS /  work to enact.  the  to wear.  as  TALE  dramatic  workings  been  them  well  The  Carter  Congress's  sent  as  influences. old  a lot of e x t r a  begun  proposal,  A  the  to  a  pass $4 billion of his  stop-gap President  resolutions was  able  until to  they dictate  A terms.  A n d , according to  Time  6  this is w h a t  5  TALE  OF TWO BUDGETS  /  18  happened:  R e a g a n ' s lieutenants...conferred only w i t h Republican leaders and did not so m u c h negotiate as tell them w h a t the President would and would not accept. Moreover Congress gave R e a g a n power w i t h i n broad limits to take the $4 billion out of whatever programs he chose. 6  The  House  the  first  cuts. On  budget  They the  they  Budget  were  programme  the  the  the  by 6  its  fifteen  Senate  not  the  Because  7  House  committees of  than to  accede  206-200  that  had done  December  bills  which  had  Reagan's  demands  until  eighth  the  the  a  was,  the  first  new said  by  set  (by late  reaffirm  for of  Congressional  Quarterly,  Reagan  neglected  work  Since  appropriations,  had  N o v e m b e r , fourteen  completed  further  December.  resolution. of  President  House also passed  funded  of N o v e m b e r to  reaffirm  encouraged  committees so) the  to  passing  resolution  Senate,  12th  House to  of  appropriations  spending  on the  the  process  the  on new  agreed  bill  voted  programme,  feet  eleventh  the  House in  had  rather  report  already  'meaningless'. dragging  resolution  did  tenth  Committee  6  while  been out  only  of  eight  a continuing resolution on programmes  until  March  budget  finally  1982.  So, emerged Reagan law final  the  at  last,  from set  the  barely  Congress. While  the  seal on a year  appropriations  surrender  noticed outside  of the  bills  and  Washington  tired ' l a w m a k e r s '  of almost  the  bulk  of a  crawled home  uninterrupted  triumphs  continuing resolution w h i c h  for by  seemed  Christmas  s i g n i n g into to  mark  the  legislative branch.  ' L o o k i n g B a c k on a Budget Coup' Time 11.1.82, p. 14. Op. Cit. ' T h e l a w requires that before a session of Congress can adjourn the second budget resolution must be i n place. There should be no confusion about the fact t h a t this... second budget resolution w i l l take us through the Fiscal year, meeting the spending targets and revenue targets as outlined therein... the fact is t h a t this is the only w a y we could reach a n agreement,' said Jones opening the debate ( Congressional Record vol 127 part 23 p.30592) and L a t t a agreed,'there is no question that we will have a t h i r d budget resolution... we are at the closing days of this session...we do not have the time or the economic Figures...for a full-blown review of the budget.' ( op. cit. p. 30593.) 6  5  6  6  6  7  A  TALE  OF TWO BUDGETS  /  19  B. THE 1983 BUDGET  1. S p r i n g : N o F i r s t B u d g e t In  1981  Reagan  able  to  that  i f he got  it  claim  had  every  had  his  way  vote  as  a  v e r y little  came to generating  coalition the  drifted  House.  leadership.  The  expectations received  other  like  the  across  liberal  did  the  did not  to avoid i f the  want  At  the  see  $55.9  billion  deficit  deficit  would  be  $ 9 8 . 6 billion for the  soared  was  the  when  down  fiscal y e a r  he  had  the  to  difficult 6  8  6  9  was to  i n reducing inflation being see  raised  how  ' N o T i m e to Retreat' Ibid.  from  the Time  year  seem  $91.5 6  billion,  were  people  to  that  President's  created  Weevils  had  continue.  But  to take  treatment.  in  Democratic have  to  for  granted,  His rightwing  would  difficult  and a l l his supporters  wanted  not.  containing provisions for  administration from  their  estimates  latest  s e v e r a l good reasons  his  the  (which  when  a the  estimate  of  8  that  had  be  be  a budget to  the  The Boll  able  similar  been  majority of votes  diluted, w h i c h  According  there  he  less  wanted  of the  behind  been  had  did no better  in  wanted  least  consolation could  a  fulfilled.  had  programme  1982.  Congress  government  at  promised, b u t w h i c h it had  predicted  cuts  be  to be appeased,  after  a l l the  fall  presumably  unexpected recession; secondly the  to enact  only  command  not  President  were originally expected to fall  so  could  plan.  President explained that  had  his  previous  Congress w i t h  reduction  brought  vote, or  his opponents  to  the  Moths,  he h a d  first R e a g a n presented  The  of  G y p s y M o t h s were  economy to recover as  ability  They  Gypsy to  1982  automatically  which  votes  Republican  In  every  wanted,  his  actions  House  whose  he  not  considerations.  groups  supporters  the  they  almost  of their o w n . E n o u g h members  destroy  President's  special  now  of w h a t  to  on  victory.  a budget  away  But  Resolution  policies  would  reduce  w h y the it. F i r s t  unexpectedly high interest debt  15.2.82, p.12  and  finally  incomes were  crossing a  administration  rates  there (which  w a s reduced); thirdly the failure of  requested; meant  deficit  could  higher claim  tax to  the  success  of  rising less fast threshold). have  been  6 9  the and  It  is  entirely  A  /  20  responsible for a drop i n inflation  w h i c h occurred d u r i n g its first three months  in  office.  supporters  Furthermore,  prepared of  while R e a g a n  to believe that  Reagan's  budget,  an  the  unco-operative  audience  TALE  outside  Congress  OF TWO BUDGETS  Washington might  have  was  the  on  Capitol  Hill  was  indeed  hostile.  to blame  would  have  for  been  been failure  reluctant  to  agree.  The Michel  reaction  from  Congress  said shortly after  the  President  revealed  Republican  his plans  minority  leader  that,  There is close to no chance that Reagan's budget w i l l Republicans would vote for it. I k n o w of no o n e .  pass.  Very  few  7 0  By  early  budget.  March  the  'Suggest  President  something  and  He  did, however,  tax  cut were non-negotiable.  T h e President By  mid-March  Newsweek,  not  magic $ 1 0 0 hit  billion  higher  difficult  to  they  Congress wildly  1  7  2  7  3  7  w r o n g even  it  fiscal  The  fiscal  before  5  on  his  told Congressional l e a d e r s .  where  he  Economist  Congress  and  billion. saying  the  7  1  $91.6  billion  was  reported a  $91  billion.  same  week  be  The  3  it  might  that  $101.9 eighth  getting that  go  over  billion  approach  his  p.17  for  would  7  5  $10.4 It  They  is  were  was  working;  to  w i n over  hope 1982  budgetary  the  predictions,  deficit,  numbers.  Reagan  predictions  to consider  revised  it  of F e b r u a r y .  his  his  H o w could  economic  7  deficit also looked like  on the  suggested  began  as  indicated  Reagan  made  $96.4  1982  Reagan  consistently  if  compromise  1983 deficit would  Stockman  forecasts, by  be  increasingly inaccurate.  beliefs  to  m i l i t a r y budget  would  quoted  that predicted  also  his  that the  A n d the  economic  wondering  the  it,' he  ' A L i n e d r a w n i n the D i r t ' Time 2 2 . 2 . 8 2 . ' A Budget that w i l l B a r e l y Budge' Time 11.3.82, Ibid. ' P l a y i n g it Cool on F r o z e n Ice. ' 2 2 . 3 . 8 2 , p.34 " ' R e a g a n V e r s u s the F i s c a l 5' 22.3.82, p . 3 0 . ' T o K i l l A M o n s t e r ' 17.4.82, p . 4 3 .  7  7  ft  optimistic, and  were to  outdone, 7  that  look at  have  2  In early A p r i l  than  avoid  clear 7  predicted  mark.  'favourable'  consistently  0  be  twelve figures. on  7  Time to  it  c l e a r l y going to  we'll  had predicted  billion  based  but  make  was  that  proposals  were for  A the  next  there  C B O , allegedly  conventional OMB,  were  free  was  other,  from  assumptions,  which  been  struggling  with  the  Stockman  had  no idea how meaningful  differences  their  Reagan  be  figures  $81.8  April  billion.  of  March  private talks  that  were  Reagan's similar  President,  / 6  7  7  8  /  21  sessions  with  O'Neill  300  per  had  White  use  the  repeal  CBO  the the  prevailed  Time,  social  disappointingly not an  Monthly,  CBO's  that  day  Chief  in  said  the  O M B said  House's  figures,  normally  upon  L o c . Cit. ' S t u m b l i n g to a S h o w d o w n ' Time 2 6 . 4 . 8 2 , p.14. 'In Quest of P a x R e a g a n o m i c a ' Newsweek 3.5.82,  a  good  budget  had  sent  began  a  J.  Baker.  The  and  the  down  on  O.  Democrats bogged  benefit go  unproductive  almost messianic  and  harsh  of  O'Neill's On  the  with  the  marked  the  talk  and  25th  series  cutbacks.  faith i n the  p.20.  the  8  1981 tax cut and  to  At  they  became  to  given  7  it  not u n t i l the  House  security  6  was  of Staff  They  7  when,  White  President's  of p a r t of his  finally was  for the  corners.  was  'has  comical  1985,  the  'supply-side'  Atlantic  The  accepted  Republicans,  of  said that R e a g a n  The  more  than  W h y should it do so again?  House  subject  negotiations.  mark and  mildly  in  had  On  the  meeting  far  used  the  cent.  deficit  to  action.  three  to consider the on  to  to deal w i t h it. It  Senate  the  had  of power h a d s w u n g i n W a s h i n g t o n .  take  with  occupying  Their of  to  become  o w n staff.  available.  their models generated.  to  Congress  predictors  'trickle-down'  admitted  billion  agreed  nearer  numbers  by  $240  1981  balance  began  triangular,  April  break-down  7  they  intransigence  President.  the  the  began  itself i n a reluctance  refusal  of  a  In  7  freely  Congressional leaders  negotiating  Administration  28th  the  manifested  7  untested  differed  Administration  indicator of how far  them  two  to those of its  the  T h e dislike  produce  consistently  were  the  predictions  would  as opposed of  as  between  deficit  budget  would  end  when,  accurate,  ideological influences,  had  they  The  consistently  and  even  had  more  partisan  theorems  April,  OF TWO BUDGETS  year?  Furthermore The  TALE  criticism  of  the  viability of his  A economic p r o g r a m . '  After Committee chamber  resolution, 1981 his  the  President's  came  with  a  up  Budget  17-12,  the  in  a  President's  budget  original  budget  that  Committee vote  through  party  found  its  lines  But  this  the  / 22  and  Budget  which  the  for the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  with  of  Phil  had  time  Senate  acceptable  version  legislative t r i u m p h  Congress.  20-0,  easy p a r t  passed  along  greatest  budget  Reagan  91-7. This was clearly the  House  OF TWO BUDGETS  9  rejecting  passed  The  7  TALE  first  Gramm  been  the  the  the  auguries  budget  abstaining.  way  he  were  In  steered  much  less  favourable.  The Even  previous year  those  Reagan  who  disagreed  had  and his policies seemed  'Congress was a  R e a g a n had  gift  for  offered been  a miracle cure for the  unwilling  to have  and  such great  awed by a President who claimed  persuading  the  public.'  But  8 0  to  mandate  patient  embraced  faith  the  for  cure  his  prescription,  suggested  by  his  opponents.  Newsweek,  Presidential approval,  had  fallen  to 52 per cent b y J a n u a r y  The  same  poll revealed that i n the  cut  in military  33  per  cent  40  per  cent.  the  second part of the  more the  with  9  8  0  8  1  to  45  Congress.  the  24.4.82. Ibid. 'The G O P ' s  per  Seventy  President when  occasions  7  spending as  the  cent,  per  cent  tax  which  cuts  had  had,  1982, and  way support  for  per  then  to  the  and  54 per  predicted doom and and  people  F e u d ' 15.3.82, p.24.  not to  mean  a  poll  cent  had  of  the  lost their they  had  published i n  in  March  1981,  45 per cent i n M a r c h . those  deficit  had  were  who s a w grown  held  from  steady  prepared  to  a  at  forego  said R e a g a n should compromise  have  disaster. will  said,  and  spite  to have  n o n - m i l i t a r y cuts  cent  A s Time  in  of 1982  of A m e r i c a n s said they  he  Family  60  to reduce  M o r e o v e r , people m a y  year,  did  According  been  8 1  previous  this  first three months  best  while  though  because  for change  President's diagnosis, neither recovered nor died. V o t e r s seemed enthusiastic  resist  public support.  a  the  unable  ailing economy.  been  less  He had only  w i l l i n g to cried  write  or  'wolf  listen on  phone  to four  their  A  TALE  OF TWO BUDGETS  /  23  worn  off  in  insofar  as  he  Congressmen so often.  If  Reagan's  Congress. could  lustre  votes,  T h e y believed he paranoia Mo.).  faded  with  the  voters,  it  had  T h e D e m o c r a t i c leadership, of course, respected  command  8  had  about  had  but  they  i n some  what  he's  were  reluctant  to  up  to,'  said  h i m only  contemplate  w a y double-crossed them  really  also  in  deals  with  1981. 'There's  Representative  him. a  Gephardt  real  (Dem.  2  And  to  back  unchanging operating  facts  at  somewhere  up of  71.1 per between  the  its  first  these  the cent  Three  designated  'category  'category  of  to  of  The  the  Economist  and the 8  President  were  the  factories  were  unemployment rate  was  3  Resolution H o u s e adopted a unique rule of extreme debate.  these B'.  A ' plans  According  10 per cent for A p r i l .  resolution  considered.  perceptions  of capacity i n M a r c h  2 2 n d of M a y the budget  changed  economy.  9 and  2. T h e F i r s t Budget On  all  were  The  were  to  be  Seven judged  other  four  considered  different to  be  were first,  budget  major called and  plans  plans,  the  were  and  'category  then  complexity for to  these  A'.  other  be were  The  four  three  plans  would be considered.  The the  three  'category  administration  B ' bills  position,  the  were  the  Aspin  or  M i c h e l - L a t t a plan, w h i c h 'moderate/bipartisan'  sponsored b y B u d g e t committee Democrats and some of  northern  plan, Budget  the  Republicans h a d official  Committee.  work This  of  called the  last  themselves  Chairman was  the  and bill  - and the which  'Gypsy the  plan,  Moths'  which  - as  a  was group  Jones/Budget Committee  Democratic the  was closest to  majority  Democratic  on  the  leadership  'In Quest of a P a x R e a g a n o m i c a ' Newsweek 3.5.82, p.20. ' T h e Budget: A n Irresistible U r g e to Spend' 22.5.82, p.26. The Economist is suspiciously inconsistent i n its choice of economic indicators. There m a y be good reasons for this. B u t , it could also be that, once they have noted inflation and unemployment, they select those w h i c h most unambiguously support whatever point they are t r y i n g to m a k e . 8  2  8  3  A supported. caucus,  The  the  four  Miller  category  (Dem.  'A'  Calif.)  Repub. Calif.) balanced budget  were  rule  allowed eight  separate  day  debate  that  ended  early  saw  Reagan's  first  in  the  major  budget  could not pass a counter-proposal  The the  rule  most  Post  participate  The  according  complex  Washington  makeshift  was,  in  'I  intent  of  budget  rule  year  of the  the  intent  1974  this  way  to pass a n y budget  The voted  rule,  on  House  first  to  moved  on  leadership proposed  however,  took by J o h n  to  the  seriously.  budget  damage  the  of  time  May. the  24  Black (both plan.  defeated  28th  called the  8  7  the  in 8  the The  4  Democrats  would  midst of the  unexpected small,  peculiar  one  opportunity  the in  suffer severe  'to  i f the  the  fight A  the  members  to  it  still  a  (Gramm-Latta  II)  is  such  a  House  failed  class  between a  as  the  complex  political  8  A  of supporters  bills,  6  well  avoid the  The  8  as  economic s l u m p . '  bands  told  overnight.'  concocting  Post,  vocal,  California  but  Constitution  consequences.  of  for  year  chairman,  Boiling  8 5  S t o c k m a n budget  three-cornered  However, a  but  Committee  House.  last  Washington  Democrats  Rules  of last y e a r  motive  H . Rousselot,  be  same  the  than  His  their  the  more  act.'  had  placate  in  wrote  i n the  to  the  the  who  the  of  at  Boiling,  much  the  had  said  by  Rosselot/Dannmeyer  plans  morning  of those  was,  public relations disaster  budget  adopted  is  repair  budget  year  ever  year's  Boiling  forward  Obey ( D e m . Wise.) ' l i b e r a l '  defeat;  Richard  there  Y o u can't  previous  to  this  put  /  of their o w n .  rule  think  shaping  process.  'distortion  budget  OF TWO BUDGETS  budget,  proposal and the  unique  debate  one  'pay-as-you-go'  This five  a  bills  TALE  the  to  and  find  a  8  type  were  before  the  bills  the  balanced  budget  R e p u b l i c a n , did s u r p r i s i n g l y well.  It  " After the seven A and B budgets had been defeated the H o u s e went back to the original, unamended, Budget Committee proposal and defeated that for good measure. Washington Post, 27.5.82, p. A 1 3 . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 8  8  5  8  6  8  7  8  8  A was  beaten  humbled  only  and  instead  helped defeat  The  242-182.  the  at  the  the  class  group  i n Congress  gang  of  resolved to It  was  Senate  was  that  come  to  had  Republican else's' echo  level  that  a  bill  came  versus  for  at  total  that  9  9  0  end  almost  the  same  aide  involved for pass  had  bulk too  their  the  were  expenditure of the  in  votes  for  small  granted.  bows. The  Republican  all  Republican  m u c h to the  leadership's  8  So  strategy  leadership's  of the  similar  previous  figures  their  to  the  week.  own  bills  budget  The  expenditure  figures  Figures are  an  no  phonier  again,  the  extent  to  9 0  but that  difference total  had  House  unnamed  to a senior House R e p u b l i c a n . indicate,  other  them up. W h e n asked how the  palatable, 'Our  9  any  very  of the  his  amendment bill.  as  The  some  proposed  Oakar  defence but  by  the  when dubbed)  a Budget'  by M a r y  amendment  Representatives  substituting $4.85 billion  quickly  'Does A n y o n e have Ibid.  and  added  more  lie.'  Democrat  or,  were  8  a  vote,  Republicans  votes  Senate  than  anybody  These  remarks  which  ideological  economic facts.  butter  to  of  the  unnamed  of  amendment  defeat  the  taking  their  at  'they  interview  earmarked  from  Republicans who  pandering  resolution was  these,  defeat  It  was  over  the  w h e n they  the  battleships.  whose  Medicare  formed  M o t h s and  This  used  arrived  blamed  leadership  and  closer to passing than  49-43,  less  an  the  emboldened  security  w a r n i n g shot  considerations determined  Ohio)  far  25  bill.  they  Stockman's  Michel  Republicans  G O P defectors  drawn  believed they  precipitate  billion  retorted  had  social  Gypsy  192-235.  replied  of  They  passed,  while  Republicans  53  send  helped  $15  the  liberal  defeated  the  c o m p l a i n i n g about  and  Michel-Latta  still  conservative  Rousselot bill  M i c h e l - L a t t a budget  The  the  proposals.  vacillating  backfired.  left  high  three  they  B  OF TWO BUDGETS /  Rousselot bill.  support  unhappy  This  TALE  bill. 62 voted  Not  Rose  was  put  it:  a  'Yellow  the  Democrats  Jackets'  'present'  Time 31.5.81, p.28.  the  (as  effect  for a  guns versus similar  expected  the was  (Dem.  straight  grannies  i n M e d i c a r e outlays even  Oakar  the  conservative to  rally  the  A Democrats succeed  and  switched Kemp, the  and  liberal  in  their  the  last  votes  persisted  said  to  with  Yellow Jacket  But,  Republicans. 60  became  seconds  'nays'  their  It  of  although  protest  and  Mickey  Edwards  than  doing t h i s . '  administration months  Washington  had  been  that  trying  to  set  9  in  such  a  Democrats  if  their  Afterwards  pass  Michel  added  to  told  remove  significant  each  bill.  the  ability  Committee's  actions.  and  made  decided  to  Committee turf  9  9  1  2  9  3  9  4  of  it  had,  other  Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Congressional.  for  of This  the  until  the  This  Almanac  amendment the  to  to  Michel  called  proposals,  'doing  9 1  class  B  country  than for  is  conventional  W h i t e House  increasingly wisdom  not  support  a  m i l i t a r y expenditure  a  of  (Republican, G e o r g i a ) .  would  bill  Jack  bill.  the  cut  Jackets  including  amendment.  26  might  Yellow  some,  stunt.'  /  unacceptable  a  budget  to  pass  by  Jamie  Whitten,  bill  and  it  the 3  which  increase  and wanted  s l i g h t l y amended  9  in  to  Republican would  have  see one. to  4  Whitten's  have  force  1981, taken  Quarterly  9  Budget  expenditure  committees.  as  of  would to  and  the  hand,  proposed  effect the  other  that  amendent,  The  itself  rather  right.'  of  three  change  still found the  colleagues  impossible  exceed  not  said N e w t G i n g r i c h  way  budget  'move several degrees to the  Another  voted  to  Republicans, on the  amended  could  did  Michel-Latta  accommodate  Medicaid. B u t most they  51  the  Some Republicans felt t h a t the  2  out  political establishment,'  Conservative  vote  (Oklahoma) of the  was b e t r a y i n g t h e m b y supporting the  recent  that  the 11  OF TWO BUDGETS  clear  revolt 'a typical Y o u n g R e p u b l i c a n  nothing is better  'An  TALE  the  Committee removed  to all  committees  suggested care  amendment  not  deference  in to be  had  1982, p. 193  teeth  back  the  first  seen  limited  col.2.  would  review the  into  his  have  been  was to  Appropriations  from reconciliation line  resolution.  to be its  (Dem. Miss.)  if  they  The  Budget  encroaching on  effectiveness  had  but  the had  A allowed of  it to  the  because  avoid m a k i n g powerful enemies.  previous  year,  the  were  bills  not to allow the  The  proposals.  'Right  What  now  Aspin.  9  forty-six  billion.)  it  Means  strategy  move  only  compromise into  out  a  out  each  there to  futile  determination year.  of  68  of the  different  three  major  of d a z z l i n g cunning  marathon pass  legislative  the  27  events  ultimately  previous  two  for  to the  Whitten's  tactics of the  separately  a  were  signalled  were  turned  votes  could  it  through  not  the  by  the  Budget 202-225  Delbert  Latta,  deficit of  estimated  a  $116  above,  and  the  Congressional  dubious  on  the  by  the  stalemate.  Lord's prayer,'  said  a  plan  accounting methods  from  below, used  while  were  the the  adopted  an  their  billion,  new  the  shortfall. T h e  other  Quarterly  But  219-206  $99.27  billion  proposed  tenth.  Republicans defecting  a  is  Committee  passed  for  budget  amended  same  day,  respective the  one  difference politically  lower  with  parties. that  is  the  the  important  crucial  figure  to keep  GOP  $100  twice  budget  but below  9 6  to  Democrats in  the  defeated  called  came  that  he  5  for  be  had  of J u n e  (The  that  themselves  6  to  and fifteen  total  mark.  On  voted  got the  was  passed  one  When  9  plan  had  explained  9  It  Democrats  because  and  be  Committee  proposed  budget  $100  the  amendments  amendments  appeared  seventh  resolution,  billion  had  to  you haven't  House.  Senate  Oakar  had  Rules  the  the  This  defeated,  the  reacting  /  5  On to  and  which  Democrat-run  all  although  OF TWO BUDGETS  Whitten was  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to repeat the  Whitten  amendments  and  TALE  such  a  acting  on  the  consistently refused knot  that  to concede  one  get  to  a  produce  Dan  of their tax  contained  to m a k e  chairman  appeared them  instructions  the  in  the  necessary  Rostenkowski  bill  the  cuts. had  T h e y tied  to  adopt  constitutional prerogatives  proposal t h a t had  a  chance  Ways  a  because  of m a k i n g  House.  2 3 r d of J u n e ,  nearly  ' C h a o s A p l e n t y but no Budget' Congressional Quarterly Almanac  six weeks  after  the  Time 7.6.82, p.22. (1982) p. 195. col. 1.  15th  of M a y deadline,  the  A Conference  Committee  finally  finished  with  TALE  the  OF TWO BUDGETS /  first  budget  resolution  for  28  fiscal  1983.  3. S u m m e r a n d F a l l 1982: Congress F a i l s to P r o d u c e a Budget. Now  the  various  committees  filling i n the  details  Inflation  jumped  over  the  out'.  Committee  and  'let's  and  a  understand. 9  had  started  the  Senate tacked  The by  Medicaid, passed  The  the  cent 9  in  But  7  the  to  go  May  (it  had  Reagan  budget  about  tax  a  increase,  fiscal  the and  7  9  8  1 0 0  the  business  of  1983  per  cent  by  was  Conference  deficit of over  President I don't  3  recession  passed  said  want  was  as  had  Senate were  Equity  not breaking  and  50-47  Fiscal  to  his  people  not  raising  also  i n the  and  no  taxes, savings  Democrats  going to c o m m i t  wanted  0  large  $100  cabinet:  saying that  reported  reconciliation bills. the  first  Responsibility A c t  w i t h convention  welfare, with  two  Committee  provisions designed  loopholes,  on  and  to  1982.'  raise  and  $98.3  make  bonds  billion  cuts  of  it.  cardinal  original bill.  i n extra $17.5  1983  This  bill  legislation when  end of the  between  supporting  Congress's  the  The  strictly speaking,  i n i t i a t i n g fiscal onto  On  of these which  of  H o u s e . Therefore,  reconciliation package  i n a n election y e a r . '  House  work  a minor budget bill  contained tax  started  was  s i n and  and  revenue  billion 1985.  because, vote  on  for  It  Time a  tax  renounced  its  0  nothing  to  do  with  the  bill  'Reaganomics on the Ropes' Newsweek 5.7.82, p . 3 1 . ' A Tense Truce i n the Budget B a t t l e . ' Maclean's 28.6.82, "Newsweek 5.7.82. ' B i t i n g the Budget Bullet' 2.8.82, p . 2 0 .  9  the  averaged  said  resolution  allowed for  Senate F i n a n c e  'Tax  Medicare,  said, they increase  though  a v e r y large tax  closing  months).  billion  had  9  life  package  per  W e ' r e not changing course,  Congress  entitled:  10  houses  resolutions.  by R e a g a n  $20.9  13th of J u l y the  they  over  Even  8  both  budget  seven  backed  Meanwhile  it  9  for  we might b e . '  the  to  previous  'bottoming  billion  of the  in  and  p.24.  A primacy the  in fiscal  Senate  when it voted  bill to Conference.  motion  while  product  of  voting  matters  137 the  to  help  the  Ways  TWO  208-197 on  the  28th  Democrats  and  60  Democrats  desire  to  spare  for a tax increase in an  need  OF  164  Republicans Democrats'  TALE  and  44  Means  of July  Republicans  themselves  the  Committee  to send  supported  opposed it. This was  election year but it was  and  B U D G E T S / 29  the  partly  embarrassment  a of  also the result of the  escape  from  a  potentially  Means  Committee  disastrous internal deadlock.  After on  the  numerous  found  $5.9  the  15th  just  under  bulk  planned  On  $11  Republican  had  been  the  of July  caucus.  member,  13th  to push  drawn  a  up  that  specified.  the  day  of  On  Democrat  tax-increase package  the  the Senate  the  hand.  that they  proposal  in  still  with a few  to the  cahoots  (N.Y), the ranking Republican in his Committee and  corporation tax. The  next  they  101  as increased taxes for oil companies, a tax on tips and  The  of July  sleights  for cuts and  made.  Rostenkowski presented had  accounting  complained  for the cuts they had  Rostenkowski  the  met  short of the target. But,  increases and  the tax increase proposals just passed by such  dollars  to get the Republicans  21st  Conable  tax  Committee  to blame the GOP  Democratic Barber  from  for it. On  had  found ways to bring that total up to  billion, only half a billion came  and  'cuts': half of what the bill  behind closed doors and  total  a  Ways  to pay  billion dollars in Medicare  that  Rousselot,  proposal passed, the  occasions to find ways  they met  of  strategy  Latta  with  it resembled  added wrinkles  a tightening up of  Democrats hated it.  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  rejected  their  chairman's  proposal. Already, according to the Congressional Quarterly, some Democrats were toying  with  embarrassing course with 1  0  1  0  1  2  the idea of going directly impasse.  of action  102  On  the  to conference  28th  to his Committee. They  the Democrat majority, one  of  July  voted  in order to get out of this Rostenkowski  for it. Four  of them, Conable  (N.Y.), from  CQ Weekly Report Vol 40, No 29, 17.7.1982, pl696, col 3. Op. Cit. Vol 40, No 30, 24.7.82, p.1749, col 3.  proposed  that  Republicans  voted  the North  East.  A One D e m o c r a t committeeman, T h e y presented  the  Rostenkowski would  lead  O ' N e i l l was  proposal to the  said that  to  James  political  any  Shannon  to draft  severely  m u c h less defensive:  he  and it  the  /  30  Republicans.  passed.  a tax-increase  reducing  wanted  OF TWO BUDGETS  (Mass), voted with  H o u s e t h a t day  attempt  chaos,  TALE  chances  to e m b a r r a s s  of  bill i n the passage.  1 0  House Tip  3  Reagan:  I w a n t h i m to use that s m i l e y countenance, that sweet-talking voice of his, and be as h a r d k n u c k l e d w i t h the Republicans as he has been along the line. H o w can a D e m o c r a t vote for a tax increase w i t h opponents h a m m e r i n g y o u to death, unless the President is right out there. " 1 0  Gephardt and  voiced  sheer  doubt  similar  pain,  that  as  senior  sentiments;  there House  was  'I  sheer  Democrats  want  there  pleasure bore  a  last deep  to  be  year.'  Presidential There  1 0 5  grudge  for  their  leadership  can  be  little  humiliation in  1981.  T h e second reconciliation bill passed bills  conference  included  larger  total  on  the  savings than  18th  expected  (entitled the  O m n i b u s Reconciliation A c t of  of  August.  Between  them  to  amount  to  billion  $130  the  $125.5  billion  requested  July  Reagan  vetoed  an  in  the  the  1982)  two reconciliation  over  three  original  years,  a  reconciliation  instructions.  4. Veto  Override  On  24th  the  current raise  year.  an  extra  billion  onto  which  members  bill  1  0  1  0  1  0  to  of The  bill  $4.9  had  billion  it i n emergency  repeal  of Congress a  long  started for  5  as  would  forgotten  a  be  a  $3,000  allowed to  provision  Newsweek  of  supplemental  routine  fiscal-1982 budget.  h o u s i n g aid and  ' A N o - F i n g e r p r i n t s T a x Bill* " Ibid. Ibid.  3  the  life  emergency  a  9.8.82,  supplemental  p. 16  for  designed  the to  The  House  had  added  cap  on the  tax  deductions  claim. 1978  bill  They  law  also  requiring  amended a  $3  the  balanced  A budget  by  1981. The veto was  The next identical  to the  sustained  On bill,  day  the  the  veto on the  the  it a due  including  $5  the  human  the  Senate followed  argued, that  appearing  to  what  original  of  The  nervous  days  when  cost  1  0  and  been  called  left  bill,  which  out.  The  veto  was  House  G O P was  Week about  w i t h d r a w a l of an  the  W h i t e House had to beat fractious  by  health,  federal  pay  appropriations  education,  301-117,  veto  and  than  media  the  was  the  be  cost  disagreed.  buster'  that  would  the  labour,  next  day  overturned  but  of not  Newsweek $1.5  endorsement  was  1 0 8  vetoing  and  pointed  out  billion  Republican  upcoming e l e c t i o n s ;  electoral  for  supplemental for  his  better  said  billion  supplemental  defecting).  knew  'budget  emergency  $6.16  billion  the  other a  billion  general  $0.8  rejected  The  6  Business  7  supplemental  contained  and  of losing was  President  the  $14.2  bill  October  agriculture  give ground.  request.  how  the  buster'.  a  plausibly, that R e a g a n  1 0  31  day.  housing p l a n had  suit, 60-30 (21 Republicans  the  the  same  emergency  vetoed  services. The House  calculated  that  for  another  that the  President  first  billion  the  OF TWO BUDGETS /  13th of J u l y .  'budget  and  Time  vetoed  first except  28th  calling  increases  Reagan  sustained  TALE  under  defections a far  one  cry  of the  his  showed from  chief  the  sticks  Republicans into line.  C. 1982, THE TIDE TURNS The  second  year  of  Reagan's  presidency,  frustrating  lame-duck session, saw  no further  Democrat  leadership  to  momentum successes  and were,  unable  to  theory.  Instead  1  0  1 0 7  1 0 8  pass  to  were  stop  them  however, a  budget  1982  able  saw  passing  almost that the  a  budget  start  the of  a  ended  smashing  deprive  entirely was  which  Reagan i n the  triumphs and  because  coherent  product to  a  his  allies  for of  'business  "You can't w i n them a l l ' Time 2 0 . 9 . 8 2 . ' R e a g a n ' s F i r s t Defeat' Newsweek 20.9.82, p.24. ' T h e Recession U n n e r v e s the G O P ' Business Week 18.10.82,  particularly  for R e a g a n .  Reaganomic  negative  return  with  as  their  mould. Their  they a  of  The  too  were  macroeconomic usual'  6  p.40.  as  the  committees process.  re-established  Even  their  equilibrium  if  they  were  management  they  was  able  to meet  p a r t i c u l a r needs of m e m b e r s  the  The  alliance w h i c h  of  the  century  a  rebellion  leadership  was  and their  kept  a year.  the  It  controlled.  over  the  chambers,  the  the  1974 allow  various and  way  interests  all  to  R e a g a n had m a n a g e d  settled  too  down  act  was  and  was to  an  a  everybody, including a few nods  its  is  of  to  the  a  of  encouraging party  a  the  ruminative  body  digestive  Ways  organs  and  Means  producing its  final  Representatives,  barter  their  with  votes  for  is produced.  to  overrule  weak  to  impose  a  structure  sectional interests,  make  severe  which  but  it work. F o r one  legislative  'business-as-usual'  to the  rest  majority  various  groups  for  short-circuiting  spending,  attempt to  economic  Congress into an almost p a r l i a m e n t a r y  case  produce  too  the  involved  chance  budget  considerations timid  or  budgetary  of  President  Committee) before  the  acceptable  to t r a n s f o r m  1982  It  Senate  Conference  have  Reform  macro-economic  in  the  and  tool  32  tradition of u s i n g it  against  legislation in  Representatives,  w a y an  Committee was  of  House  protect  Budget  reaction  piece  the  /  constituencies.  considering legislation. Congress  same  a  had involved the  it  for  as  of  Republicans i n power  system  system  control  time-honoured  the  Along  system  the  OF TWO BUDGETS  budget  and  considerations. T h a t  The  to  the  Representatives  Budget Committees  Budget  use  of  and  would  have  their  majority  two  The  to  lasted less t h a n  (the  sectional  return  and  the  chews  bills.  to  to  TALE  by  long-established which  unable  A  indigestion  budget  with  year  system.  before  the  something  President which he had to make  the  the  for best  of.  The  difference  painful  compromises  Representatives nearly In  between  a l l the  on  was  a  sides  remained  but  some  were  votes  to  identify  revealing  to  chart  they,  1982  crushing  both  order  why  of  the  the  the  important  courses  and not others,  Presidential handful safely  at  victories  of  votes.  anchor  of The  with  of these  in  Congressional  marginal  voters  bobbed so far on the political  and tides.  and  the  majority  of  parties  for  their  tossed back and forth between currents  1981  the  two  sides.  politics  it  will  to  to  discover  try  be  CHAPTER  A.  II.  THEORIES  OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING  INTRODUCTION  Scholars  attempting to explain  w h y Representatives  broadly,  two types  There  only  of answer.  consideration  argue  that,  while  non-constituency among the  Pure  is  the  important,  voters  that  diligently enough  pattern  theorists,  discover by  they  or  trust  are  allow first  them  done enough to guarantee that, vote  group  in  pursuit  of theorists  of a  the  a  Morris measure  'home  explaining  concern is  in  want.  of  style'.  their  always they  not  votes  they  may  roll  calls.  on individual  THE  Representatives  that  have vote  be  to  given  to  ways  in  Fenno  casework  able  Fiorina  to  earn  says  that  believe t h e y  the  luxury  Finally,  Representatives  i t is  have  of c a s t i n g there  but,  is  a  instead,  House.  CONNECTION  'Vote your district first,' said speaker  Some  is  suggest  i f they  allow themselves  B.  voters.  vote  attend  the creation of effective legislative coalitions i n the  forget  Electoral  If  legislative goal of theirs.  who concentrate  The  independence.  they  by  theses.  electoral  reelection but,  may  swayed  scope  Both  who  1982, especially  in  More  Fiorina.  on  Congress  be  and  the  others  w a y Representatives  leeway on House  secondary  ELECTORAL  are  can  Mayhew  offered,  re-election is  there  1981  David  constituents and  a  some  and  votes  do have  that  Representatives  example  their  develop  at  who argue  to understand  develop  skilled  to  Representatives'  can  they  w i l l provide a test for these  Fenno  can  vote as  themselves  of the  for  what  Richard  Representatives  argues  are  that i n order  to  Representatives which  allow  motives. The  argue  those  Representatives  constituency  necessary  are  m a r g i n a l Representatives,  Connection,  a  BEHAVIOUR.  every  gone as  so  two far  they  S a m Rayburn, and  years as  do  to we  Representatives argue need  that only  m o d e r n w r i t e r s on  must  when look  few  we at  answer  want the  to  desires  to know of  their why their  constituents.  David  Mayhew  lays  out  this  extreme  33  position  clearly  in  The  Electoral  THEORIES Connection.^ the  type  Here  used  he  OF CONGRESSIONAL  creates  a  b y economists  model  VOTING  of congressional  discussing the  perfect  BEHAVIOUR.  behaviour  very  /  similar  34 to  market.  I s h a l l conjure up a v is io n of congressmen as re-election, see w h a t kinds of activity that speculate about how congressmen and women to go about building and sustaining legislative policy...  single-minded seekers of goal implies, and then so motivated are likely institutions and m a k i n g  2  Mayhew  suggests  First,  'it  four  fits  advantages  of  political  reality  'spotlights...directly...men...(not) phantoms.' with  the  Third,  4  electorate.'  empirical  primacy,'  everyone,  the  are  to  notion  losers  the  as  of  needs  members.'  9  units  'So  to be  that  other  words,  has  to  any  (of)  be  the  assembly  each  receive  2  4  5  6  7  8  9  'it  achieved  the  largest  in  Congress,  examined.'  re-election  has  to  be  and  of that  535  possible the  men  and  a  goal.  Second,  it  are)... analytic  the  over  relationship  enjoys  again as  struggle.'  zero-sum women,  goal  i f other  a struggle  always cake  '...the  ends  rejects form,  and  the  concerning  satisfaction  competition  rather  than  of  among  Mayhew  8  slice of the  that:  'putative  proximate  traditional arguments  adds  little  as  accountability  of  and  remarkably with  (which  m i n i m u m w i n n i n g coalition w i l l  parties  left  an  3  goal  over  M a y h e w employs  are  well.'  'politics is best studied  two  of  among parties,  1 0  ' D a v i d M a y h e w The Electoral Connection 1974). The Electoral Connection pp. 5-6. Ibid. p.6. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 17. Ibid. p. 16. Ibid. p. 17. Ibid. p . 8 3 . ^°Ibid. p.27.  3  the  re-election  groups  establishes  consequences a  on  pressure  possible.  requires we  means  emphasis rather  and  quest  A n d fourth,  7  and  winners  weakness  the  in  little as  electoral  as  that  in  that  gain...power  ensuring  the  or,  6  goal  're-election This  5  to be e n t e r t a i n e d . '  men the  the  parties  this  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press  THEORIES But the  these  vote  some  conditions obtain  is on building  crop,  OF CONGRESSIONAL  then  the  a  only  dam  cost  to  here, the  when compared to the benefits  According  to  considerations  and  investing poorer the  their  return  Mayhew's spend  members  the  much  i n votes  than  they  of  time  the  district-oriented or have  had  may  always (In  to  it  purposes  the  is  they of the  need  not  than  one  for  quite  are  in  might  is  legislation  'Particularized  benefits  is  voter,  is  'safe'  that  all  B u t , as  of  be  Home close  great  to h a v e . '  1  will only  are receive  a  third  of  a  who m u s t  more  likely  But, all  to  to  be  Representatives  the mind  when  Congress  have  had  voting. a  1  which,  1  given  an  1  2  members' interest have  re-election to  less  goals  members. stake  in  is  to  argue  Mayhew  says,  winning  victories  2  Fenno,R. Home style (Boston: L i t t l e , B r o w n M a y h e w Op. Cit. pp. 117-8.  the  institution i n w h i c h legislative  to put too m u c h into mobilization would be to misallocate resources. F o r members who m a k e the motions or c a r r y the bills there m a y be  1  close  reveals, they a l l tend  Thus,  1  and  Representative  or her  shave,  try  electoral careers  Style  not  thing.)  of seeing Congress as to  of  constituency  to n a t i o n a l factors,  because  i n his  a  same  aside...congressmen  t h a n they n o r m a l l y appear  precisely  Fenno's  danger  no  While  small  to g a i n .  issues  and  d u r i n g their  members  comes to the  of  to  35  price of  quite  ignore  national  have.  ought  is  who s t a n d  place  non-marginal members.  completely subservient itself  involved  i n House elections is due  time or another  constant  on  market  otherwise  s u p p o r t i n g the  who  energy  re-election foremost  true  argument,  directly  /  distributed; w h e n  So, m a r g i n a l Representatives,  non-marginal  logical consequence  effectiveness that  a  at  and  electoral  possible  at one time or another.  think  A  that  keeps  fact  shave  'delegates'  close shaves be  is local.  every  not  BEHAVIOUR.  to be  or  Representatives  in  support  there,  figures  variance in p a r t i s a n percentages  gain  factory  is pork  few Representatives  wisely  Mayhew,  a  there  for the  capital  over half, says  it  too  while  VOTING  1978.)  THEORIES  OF CONGRESSIONAL  VOTING  BEHAVIOUR.  /  36  a value i n w i n n i n g , but how m u c h value?...Would Senators (Hatfield and M c G o v e r n ) . . . have been a n y less esteemed by their followers i f their a n t i - w a r a m e n d m e n t had won rather than l o s t ? 1  How  can  the  argument? Congress budget  1981  The can  some  Southern  group  on  the  was  an  as  Moths'  and  for i n terms in  result of the  of  the  good,  tax  when  concessions on sugar,  attempted  to  same  obtaining  the  maneouvre. their  vote  buying  administration  cotton, and  barter  majorities  concentrates  on  the  relationship  p a r t i c u l a r interests  of their constituents.  to  doing w h a t  be  get  seen  the  if  have  self-interest. of  better is,  been  they  legislatively  were This  not is  a  Representatives  than  he  that  did their best but  Congress  cent  be  legislation  that they would  to  a  adds,  25  per  highest  the  T h e y called  votes  want  for  when  then  the  were betrayed by the  by  benefits  Fenno  develops.  re-elected,  Congress  a p p r o v a l rating. it  is  passing  The  as  points  as  a  rating  Presidential  out  and  as  the  t h i n g is do  can  not  explain  system.  They  did in  1982,  their  own  Reagan with that  a  constituents.  Representative  preoccupied  He  such  constituents  inequities of the  members  the  themselves  important  If the  successful, they might say,  point  cent  want.  in  promised  Representatives  F o r the politicians the  passed  dominated  are  between  constituents  the  oil. The next year  heating oil subsidies w h i c h would provide special concessions for their  Mayhew  in  Representatives.  old-fashioned  cut  of this k i n d of  particularized r e w a r d s  of position-taking by  of N o r t h e r n R e p u b l i c a n s tried the 'Gypsy  accounted  administration  the  element  reconciliation and Democrats  be  Reagan  a side effect  there  votes  of  e x p l a i n e d either  offered or as  1981  1982 budgets  success  be  Certainly  the  and  3  while  90  per  whole  usually  receives  for  Congress  as  a  legislation, as  it  was  no  body in  1981. « 1  This  1  3  Ibid.  means  that  one  popular  strategy  among  is  to  run  for  p. 117.  * R i c h a r d F e n n o If, as R a l p h N a d e r says, Congress how Come we L o v e our Congressmen so much? Congress in Change ( N e w Y o r k : Praeger, 1975.) 1  candidates  is a B r o k e n B r a n c h , in N o r m a n Ornstein  then ed.,  THEORIES Congress  by  members  of  running  OF CONGRESSIONAL  against  Congress.  it.  Reagan's  .  1 5  This,  a  Representative  is  that  the  presumably,  presidential  c a m p a i g n against b i g F e d e r a l government. former  VOTING  campaign  BEHAVIOUR.  applies  in  1980  was  T h e difference between  would  be  expected  to  not  / 37  only in  to  part  a  a President and  follow  through  on  a  promise to do something about the w a y W a s h i n g t o n w o r k e d .  Fenno's  argument  raises  the  question  of  Representatives  presentational styles. T h i s is an issue i r r e l e v a n t to the argument  so  we  will  quite clear that the entirely  i n terms  1981 and if  there  are  of  greater the  of their  none  votes, a  then  desire  had  C. OTHER  accounts  There how  are  the  by  for reelection. I n for the  of M a y h e w ' s  Connection  order  general  in  come or  the  local  1981 to  to  to  Mayhew  Perhaps  to  the  return  to  we  need  each  the  the  change  particular work  look  in  that  says no  is  almost  votes i n  roll call offered,  n a t i o n a l issues  election. N e v e r t h e l e s s , content,  explain  local benefits  cues.  voting  Representatives  national  will  have  i n the  type  1982 would  Mayhew, further  was  a  yield  a  whether than  the  entire explanation of C o n g r e s s i o n a l action.  theory  GOALS is coherent, gave  logical, of their  a n d elegantly s i m p l e it does j a r own  actions  w r i t e r s who give p r i m a c y to the  Representatives  goals. This  Electoral  their  Representatives  other  The  of constituents  LEGISLATIVE  Mayhew's  In  attitudes  with  from  constituents for the  the  desire  the  marginal return  votes  While  it later.  thrust  voting behaviour of Representatives c a n be understood  Representatives  budget  result  to  1982 we m u s t look m a i n l y  provided of  return  main  developing  may  be  able  section w i l l look at  to pursue,  during  1981  and  with 1982.  need for reelection but describe  some  of the  two such w r i t e r s . T h e first  time,  other  is F i o r i n a  legislative  who argues  that certain Representatives m a y be able to vote independently some of the time. The  second  is R i c h a r d  Fenno  of a Representative's overall w h a t constituents  who  argues  that  votes  i n Congress  'home style' a n d t h a t w h a t  only  part  counts on a vote is not  want, but how Representatives think they  h a v i n g to explain, their vote back home.  are  c a n explain, or avoid  THEORIES  OF CONGRESSIONAL  VOTING  BEHAVIOUR.  /  38  1. Maximizers and Maintainers Fiorina The  divides  Representatives  maximizers  take.  The  that  maintainers  they  under  do  less  The  not  certain  have  always  utility  are  those  women  a c t u a l l y allow  to  a  the  is  feeling,  include: 1  9  lose  the  would next  legislative careers so long as  they  Fiorina  are  in  goal i n  main  could action  large  Home  goes  maintainers. policy,  to  might by  that  The  1 8  argument  maximizers.  This  and  is  ones never  constituencies to  that  argue  marginal. hope  to  will  act on their  A  two  that  maintainers districts districts  Representative by  much.  are  But  from for  one  safe  and  or cent  may higher  Representative  were  always  their  start  preferences  a safe  level.  homogeneous  always  a  feel  members  always  tend  votes.  33 per  secondary  types:  will  congressmen  loyalty,  i f the  them,  them  who  6  aware  r i s k i n g those  goals  party  runs,  into  homogeneous  win  are  bring  1  they  win. For  few  other  therefore,  heterogeneous  because  action  but  majorities  style,  prestige,  Representatives,  on  any  goal,  gain  m i g h t satisfy with  maintainers.  According to F i o r i n a ' s statistics,  7  influence,  divides  districts  can  they  an  m a x i m i z e r s and will only  homogeneous  district  rest  1  their  they  votes  first  and  can still m a i n t a i n their chances of reelection at  He  heterogeneous  suggests  a l l be lost, the  as  as  Representatives  election.  also  heterogenous.  goals  maximizers  their  vote  extra  other  legislative  These  the  themselves). the  types:  re-election  possible  Fenno  maximizers and  office.  have  every  than  two  re-election as  circumstances,  maintainers  hold  also  need  (which  are  have  into  represented  to  be  highly from  come  safe  and from by and  heterogeneous a  homogeneous  d i s t r i c t it is a l l or nothing:  It m a y be that the great bulk of precisely because they vote o p t i m a l l y .  congressmen  achieve  reelection  2 0  Fiorina  argues  that  the  fact  that  Morris R F i o r i n a , Representative, 1974) op. cit. Ibid. F i o r i n a , op. cit. p . 3 5 . Ibid. 1  6  1  7  1  8  1  9  2  0  voters Roll  are Calls,  ignorant and  does  not  Constituencies  mean  that  (Lexington,  THEORIES Representatives damage they is  of  are  a  vote.'  disaster. make  The  an  close  issue  adopts  if  alienates  this  for  budget  they  when  have  leadership well  suited  of his  never  will  not  be  record  could  home  force  or  counts  be  her  to  might  the  lose  be  in  fatal  misstep  of  ask  votes?'  / 39  potential  vote  a  roll  electoral  and  roll  could  to  call  themselves When  call which  Congress  i n every  to  any  the  watching  member  must  is  b r i n g about  be  constituents  or  a  that  constituents  at  to  anybody  pay vote.  before  they  have  argues  that  they m a y decide that it is bearable.  micro-economic foresee  is  vote  Representatives  offend  explanation  to  desires all  'what  BEHAVIOUR.  the  their  last.  they  may  patterns  argument  future  to  and  They  2 2  not  be  when  therefore  must  must  assume  given  the  Representatives'  he  that  act  in  if  this  opportunity  voting  every  to  vote  redeem  behavior, but  these  m a k e up of their constituencies.  Michel-Latta,  seem  enough  constituents  due to the  This  is  vote  There  Each  somebody  another  can  their  themselves.  it  VOTING  Representatives  of interested  that  of  I  accountable:  future.  potential damage,  Representatives as  the  time  group  of  'will  calculated the  case  out  routine  action  Fiorina  small  to  survival  every  to the  possibility  attention  The  a  electorally  Every  1  give a hostage  exploited b y  are  not 2  OF CONGRESSIONAL  rules  to  the  possibility  that  the  Republican  example,  knew  they  would  have  dragged  down  their  party's  proposal.  picked to  out  take  that  vote  as  the  their  votes  for  granted.  strategic  voting  because,  Congress is obliged to pass a budget e v e r y  time  another  to  Indeed  the  any  other  unlike  chance  But  signal  defectors  the  a  to  pass  Yellow  warning  budget  on a  Jackets to  their  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  area  of  legislation,  year.  2. Homestyles Fiorina  arrives  inductively. While their 2  1  2  2  Fenno  Fiorina last  Fiorina, Ibid.  at  theory  spent  believes  Fenno op.  his  cit.  argues  deductively whereas  eight  that, that,  years  logically, in  trailing  18  Fenno  politicians  Representatives  practice,  they  do  approaches  must  not.  round treat  the the  every  Reelection is, at  problem country. vote  as  almost  THEORIES all  times,  their  primary  voters  in  other  string  of  unpopular  'trustees'.  ways  Fenno  voted  votes,'  suggests  that  display the  said  a  vote.  cost t h e m  He the  Fenno standing  by  their  call,  what  would,  and, They  3  Home  let  have  little  It's  to  amazing  that  even  will  make  2  act  as  their  care  voters  a  most  about  Fenno's  data  consistently  must  maximum  believe that  cast  of how  3  40.  their  the  don't  me.'  though  the  not  them  idea  /  of  from  knowledge, Representatives  a  votes  to voters of pork  visibility  matters  on earn  in  account also  for only  the  and  Washington.  their  home  a certain amount  that  Fenno, go  and  is not how they a  Most  mistake  still  act  on  capital  out  of  no one  Representatives out  of the  142.  expect  of  their  are  way  instead  are  to on  part  roll  call  will  but  they  of flexibility  have  choose the  e x p l a i n you're  in  to defend  any  given  can explain the to  of the  Washington  way  be  of  generally  happy  to  keep  them  educate  voters  on  the  obscure  contrasting  institution and the bulk of the  their  rest of its  a  that  performance members.  roll  vote.  explanations  ignorant  to  calls.  may  those  power,  of  got  how they  of  trust  on roll  to  casework,  appearances,  they  ' i f you've have  to  positions  these  once  Representatives'  personal to  of  of  attending  and  climbing  Which  voted but  constituents  concentrate  style p.  to  media  by  style  adage  a  w i n approval b y  through  barrel  congressional  be  kind.  corrupt w a y s  to  'People  argues that, since Representatives  rarely  Congress  share  they  however,  says  visible  quotes  sophisticated  happy  do  Representatives  Representatives  Representatives  depends  constituents  trouble' b u t  approval  of roll calls.  argue  enemies  that roll call  high on  Fenno  2  that most  their  concentrate  to  the  representatives  constituents  majority  win  usually his  indifferent.  wrong  says  home.  and  is  political  themselves  status  vast  that  argues  winning  s a y i n g their  can  BEHAVIOUR.  election.  back  making  of  VOTING  their  are  three  ' T h e y are  they  provided  low level of political  assumption  every  as  Fiorina  very  the  on the  one.  first,  constituents  quotes  Representatives  but,  second,  votes,  districts  my  goal  and,  'issue-oriented'  OF CONGRESSIONAL  very works way.  ways with  It  of the  THEORIES Although Congress being the  Fenno  conducts  less  is  of  was  also  legislation trying  for  a  The  to take  to  spell  on  a  that  avoid  than  are  voice  vote  which  procedural  though  may  well  have  which  the  voting  on  span for  avoided votes was  also  consequently, opens  Home  fresh  from  just  voting  resisted  return  to  fall  with  an  out  positions of power  of  their  Congress reasons 2  with  when  the  constituents.  are,  the more  * Ibid, pp.xi-xii.  of  of  better senior  in  that  failed  tax  the  procedural  or  bill,  they  take  the  found  so  to  i n the  as  they  in  difficult  to  leadership.  In  unambiguous  limited  attention  have  They the  a  attitudes, gain  President.  styles  seniority.  and  legislation come  they  Now veteran  work.  Often  believe they  serve  of freedom  from  the  and, Fenno  the  more  independent  they  can  pass.  There  think  this  way.  are  he  had  had  they the  have  country desires  members a  to  politicians  myopic  that  to  he  Many  constituency  degree  believe  members  the 2  i n Congress  them  r e t u r n i n g to his constituency  constituents. * of  by  up  three a  tied  it  Democratic  have  votes,  whole process  have  the  full  to respond.  congressman  from  voted  R e a g a n tried to rouse  of changes  appeal  House  i n procedural  was  voters  because  1982, the  The  to escape  avoid  to  1982  the  Representatives  demands  they  own  why  question  shopping bags  attained  whole best  well  unable  however,  telephone  frustrated  a  might  to  votes; i f they w i s h  work  in  without  legislative wheeler-dealing of W a s h i n g t o n where  become  as  budget  intention  account of a  personal  handing  the  way  If  Senate  effects.  41  Representatives.  the  seemly  is  by  When,  let  substantive  h a d been  the  glamorous  a  less  vote  unpopular  which  of 1981 t h e y  behaviour  style w i t h the  an  easier call  /  the  visible,  be  roll  viewed  supply of political passion. W h e n  deals  a  given  is  with  their  the  suggests,  a fourth time i n the  Fenno  vote  outsiders  precisely  Fenno  and a limited  hide  that  other hand, they  votes.  on  any  motion  which,  blockbuster  than  style,  less  may  do so on substantive  to  1981, on the  It  will  like  This  others.  the  becoming associated  arcane,  are  way  Representatives  comprehend.  votes  BEHAVIOUR.  Home  the  blame.  procedural  some  in  can do so on procedural votes.  confusingly worded  complex  out  to  positions they  House  point  VOTING  extent  effect  they  the  means  constituents  constituents  will  they w i s h  not  business  to  recorded.  substantive  block  its  effective,  scrutiny  latter  does  OF CONGRESSIONAL  of  v a r i e t y of  A s almost  all  the  THEORIES power  in  Congress  committee senior  is directly related  and sub-committee  members  demands.  have  with  institution  that  does  is  become  become  weary  of the  enthusiasm  for the  alertness  Furthermore, statesmen them  more  their  work  'socialized' constant  party  much  members  tend  is  the  struggle  partly  the  work  values  to  BEHAVIOUR. /  of continuous  spend  or  to  VOTING  House and  to  senior  leadership,  time to  on  identify  close  m a x i m i z e votes.  it  takes  to  Representatives  a rookie ever  ensure  can  that  develop  a  telling their  could  and  that  more  senior  'maximize'  home  style  constituents their  and  that they  partly also  lose  their  the  every  on  the  may  may  on  position reflects  and  They  based  personal  of w h a t  friends,  they  plum  so on),  their  They  42  constituents'  more  Congress.  (the  and  their  because of  of  service,  tiring trips to the constituency every weekend  and power-brokers,  than  length  institution. T h i s  either  they  to  chairs, the incentive  of the  because  mental  less  Furthermore,  prestige  OF CONGRESSIONAL  endless vote.  their  2  5  role  as  c a n do more  for  well  on the  whole  constituency.  The style.  It  'battle'.  attitude was  of the  members  re-articulated in 1982 i n Time  Time  presented  Representatives.  2  6  a  pessimistic  It quotes  as  view  is part of  expressed  by  Fenno  in  Home  of its feature  on the  the  generation  younger  budget of  J i m Wright:  (T)he m o r a l s t a m i n a i n terms of basic integrity and guts has declined. M e m b e r s are m u c h more concerned about image than s u b s t a n c e . 2  And  an  anonymous  senior  House  member  folks back home is a laudable character  agrees  that  being  2  2 5  2  6  2  7  2  8  explains  w h y the  quest  cf. Home style Time 26.4.82. loc. cit. Ibid. Ibid.  for  to  resist  the  trait.  The new breed are scared of their shadows. T h e y is immediately popular rather t h a n w h a t w i l l w o r k .  This  able  7  pork-barrel is sometimes  want  to  set  aside  do  what  8  by  members  THEORIES as  their  committees  non-partisan Congress.  In  2  them.  spending  were  Part  of the  and  light of this,  The  proposals  attempt  to  use  of those  1981  might  have  from  supporting  their  BEHAVIOUR.  reputation  effectiveness  in  for  pushing  reconciliation process  the  were  President  the  following  their  'turf.  /  43  highly  qualified  measures  through  voted  so  with  as  in  then,  a  year  system  and  responsibility.  among  important  and  the  are  conspicuous  for  looking  Gramm  found  out,  taketh  away.  In  senior  Democrat  after on  1981  and  are  of  a  comes  from  we  more  rewarded as  strong  highly  is their  budget  the  against  of  This  the  is  and  high  have  status  vote  become and  Shepsle  because  of  of  in  powerful  went  Reagan's  back  new  the  their  absorbed status  some some  folk the  members  with  to vote w i t h  to  right  and  party  to  a  home.  be  their fellows to resist perceived electoral opinion and to defend  and  their  is  a  more  yield  more  the  especially  more  of  do  A n d , as  giveth  House  feeling  there  30  committees  of committees,  committees,  the  committees  back  their  committees i f  into  demonstrates,  because  appointments expect  to  power  partly  and  system  or  motives they  1981  to rebel again.  partly  interests  might  from  determination  the  crisis  maintaining  likely  with  Kenneth  work  of  and  sense  merely  They  committee  members  is  decision-making a w a y  President  W i t h o u t such  members.  committees.  potential  that  d r a w n , for a v a r i e t y of reasons,  they  Furthermore,  hierarchy  1981  Offended institutional pride m a y explain  result  1982  are  W h a t is more senior  the  in  w h i c h R e a g a n enjoyed i n the House between  constituents.  more  a l l 'rolled',  took  not sufficient to persuade t h e m  Representatives, committees.  as  who  system  of the  committees  failure  done  their  the  coalition was  tax  support  Some  seniority  the  protect  1982.  are  their  and  of Reagan's  decline i n the  they  preserve  for  overturned,  committees  pressure  to  VOTING  9  the  striking.  the  work  OF CONGRESSIONAL  inclined  Phil party more than  committees.  Fenno mentions this his detailed account of the work of the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s committees in The Power of the Purse (Boston: L i t t l e , B r o w n , 1966). K e n n e t h A . Shepsle The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle (Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s . 1978) 2  9  3  0  THEORIES  D. COALITION  BUILDING  So  talked  far  we  Indeed  have  Fiorina  we  have  of  1981  argued  Democrats  and  Representatives  One  that  when  we  reason  for  this  Congressional  literature  One  of  and  the  the  long periods first  years  agenda of  Congressman  to  the  a  to  votes.  even  though  the  terms  of  analysis  /  of each  view  44  other.  Furthermore, budget  battles  Republicans  of the  data  of the  constituency  w o r k s of some  they  type  of  attempt had  we  suddenly after  go on  a  Johnson events in  R a n d a l l Ripley  vanished.  which talks than  the  the  against  shall  1981 are  Party  Loyalty  and D a v i d  divide  as  in  1964.  has  1  voters rest  of  parties  of the  how  into the  rather  electorate.  it  was  that  it did i n Roosevelt's Although  ways  similar  tackled  the  Reagan's to  those  problem  as  Brady.  to W a s h i n g t o n to g u a r d  Loyalty  and  the  interests many  the  votes  of as  must  form  a  longest  lived  members  theorists  of 'ideological' legislation for  on coalition-building i n Party  So  was  in many 3  about  binge  elected  the The  moods  1960s  reformist  was  of  guarding by himself. It takes bill...'  in  reintroduce  almost  of literature  writers  to  to pass certain types  Mayhew,  dispatched  authorize...a  the  in  BEHAVIOUR.  independent  way  parties  deliberate  which  so reluctant  1964.  only  discussed  on  on the  M a y h e w concentrates  to  are  from  again  inter alia,  do the  move  conservative the  and  the  moods of Congress rather  then  and  was  1932  have,  and  occurrences  role of the often  preoccupations  Congress could be  as  was  is that  Fenno)  w i l l concentrate  voters  calls  VOTING  party.  and  than  the  were  up by  roll this  1982  (i.e. M a y h e w  chapter  of  hardly discussed and  OF CONGRESSIONAL  coalition  argues that,  of a district as  218  if they  'a  cannot  Congressmen want  to  have  a n y t h i n g pass through Congress.  The  most  important  American  history  was  Democrats  were  much  1932  and  the  and  Roosevelt's more  mid-sixties  New  legislatively because  D a v i d R . M a y h e w Party Loyalty Democrats and Republicans; 1947-62. 3  1  Deal  the  'dominant coalition.  successful  than  Democratic  coalition'  Mayhew the party  of  argues  Republicans in  modern that  the  between  Congress  was  among Congressmen; the difference between (Cambridge, M a s s : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1966)  THEORIES 'inclusive' means  while  is t h a t  the  Republican  'party  service  later  allies but the  loyalty'  rendered  would  by  Party  'the  as  w h i c h the  alliance rested  Democrats' interest  other  small-town enter  3  in  'was  'New  group  supported  train'. the  this  2  w a s a quid pro  legislation  quo  of another  who  benefited  their  that  The Republicans characterised  The  3 3  3  for members  programs  B u t , as  4  What  Democrats, of  Mayhew  for  various  their  party  points out,  the  part,  elements  spending on  obviously fitting to a p a r t y wedded to the ideology  Deal  none  voting.  Coalition',  of  The  'middle' A m e r i c a ,  argues  'exclusive'.  45  5  groups,  any counter  But,  of 3  was  Democratic p a r t y  o w n constituents.  'gravy  national interest.'  of welfare l i b e r a l i s m . '  each  their a  time  BEHAVIOUR. /  persistently championed, a n d Republicans  interest  Each  summation  the  special  to  the  of the  of one  favour.  harm  constituted  The  at  VOTING  of their interested m e m b e r s . '  of m e m b e r s  the  did little  that  programs  members  return  Democratic  argued  party  'House D e m o c r a t i c leaders  persistently opposed the  The  OF CONGRESSIONAL  which,  therefore,  alone,  Republicans, could  only  worked because  constituted  who  watch  a  majority,  represented  i n helpless  a  the  series  supported  tax-payer  frustration,  of  of  unable  to  bids.  Mayhew,  this  Dealers i n order to stand  does  a chance  not  mean  that  they  had  to  become  New  of passing legislation.  It m a y be t h a t ' i n c l u s i v e ' compromise is the h a l l m a r k of a dominant p a r t y r a t h e r t h a n a w e l f a r i s t one, that the best w a y to build a majority p a r t y i n A m e r i c a is to impress upon the electorate issues w h i c h m a k e 'inclusive' legislation possible. 3  A  'dominant'  particularized 3  2  3  3  3  4  3  5  3  6  Ibid. p.40 Ibid. p. 15. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 159.  party benefits  (n.b. to  not  enough  a  'majority'  interest  groups  6  party) to be  has  to  be  able  able to deliver a  to  offer  majority  THEORIES  OF CONGRESSIONAL  of votes over a sufficient period for everyone A  coalition  has  a  certain  period of grace,  hope to 'impress upon the  The  success  argument, of  the  be  of  or  together  an inclusive  the  government's  object, the  budget  was  as  a  budget  was  held  that  as  to  impressed  that  belief,  and  p a r t i c u l a r l y reconciliation  upon t h e m .  possible to pre-empt  fiscal  i n the  Reagan's  the  might  years  be  Reagan  Indeed, over the  had  not  been  was  now  putting  used  as  the  tellingly  a  was  its  espoused  by  control.  in  1 9 8 1 , has  might  have  past  50 y e a r s  to  had  turn  a  having process, made  to  expect.  spend m o n e y a n d  this has  rarely  the  led us  become  managed  budget  into  to a  the cut  it  Washington  by  against  the  One  enlarge accepted taxes  in  macro-economic  running  for  to  budgetary  cut  running  If  majority of their  susceptible new  the  spendthrift  this  Democrat  become  that  the  policies  because  balance  promised a balanced budget  was  this  a characteristic of inclusive coalitions.  Congress  able  to  tool. W h e n R e a g a n r a n on a ticket w h i c h he  can  of  f o r m u l a for  Insofar  of  be  have  election c a m p a i g n  congressional behaviour. and  a  attempt  control.  government.  period  light  legislation  tradition of the  O r it m a y  budget log-rolling,  an  federal  that  the  responsibility after  it, it could  or  which  of  characteristics of inclusive coalitions is that they  for  women  t r a d i t i o n a l constituency  find  of the  norm  and  legislation.  in  exclusive  part  Democratic  supported  view  is w h a t  could,  E i t h e r the  managed  toward  clearly  that  This  last  minority/opposition d u r i n g  now  reciprocal rewards.  congressmen  1981  ways.  presented  Society  then  of Representatives  constituents  in  large  at  move  Deal/Great  Republican  majority  so  their  possibility of inclusive  different  grown  B E H A V I O U R . / 46  coalition.  books,  New  the  had  the  to receive  because  budget  Republicans had  Reagan  of  Reagan  explained i n two  possible,  days  the  Republicans  The  electorate'  VOTING  and a  inclusive  tax  coalition  w h i c h dominated Congress.  The  coalition  however, bear that  some  which  some  voted  of the  Representatives  through  Reagan's  h a l l m a r k s of a n supported  the  budget  triumphs  inclusive coalition. It President's  budget  not  in may  1981  did,  have  been  because  they  THEORIES believed  his  to benefit laws  financially  governing  President's  strategy from  quite  would  increased  mineral  budget  exchange in  economic  OF CONGRESSIONAL work  in  specific fiscal  because  BEHAVIOUR.  /  constituencies  stood  their  47  m i l i t a r y spending or from a relaxation of the  extractions.  hopes  but  VOTING  What  1982,  was  inducements  proved the  for  really  damaging  Administration's  Boll  Weevil  votes  to  the  willingness  on  key  roll  to calls  1981.  One  explanation  coalitions'  (Roosevelt's  Reagan's  'bipartisan  gestation  is  profound time  change  has  Deal,  Congress  i n political  all  know it passed  economics  w o n its  introduced  to the  will  i n the  H o u s e the  in  still  served  is  that  electorate  be  long  must  a  defeated  does  this  C r a i g Roberts  congressional  process'  3  Great  that  1977  to  though  awaken  it was  heavily defeated  Representatives  to  the  whose  Because  they  do  not  'supply-side  when  by the  truth  a  Society  3 7  argues that in  8  with  idea  gestation.  mean  and  of ideological  'an  the  of  not  is  'new  Johnson  familiarized  that  period  by  period  be  that  argues  such  Paul  promoted a  persuaded  characterise  Rousselot  first tax cut bill inspired by supply side theory.  K e m p - R o t h , even  House,  of  which  Society'  instance,  future.  bill, k n o w n as the  the  for  i n the  spurs  example)  product  bill  legislation  'Great  t h i n k i n g and  the a  of  the  and  Sundquist,  were  Representatives  bursts  coalition', for  come.'  to have  the  New  needed.  programmes  plan  for  The  old guard  of supply-side  theory.  Ripley for is  the  argues  first  time,  comparatively  Both the  of these reasons  decline of the  that after  strong  were  for  there  the  a  two  features  which  parties  long period in opposition, tend  party  features loss  are  discipline; the  second  of Republican action  of impetus  v e r y h i g h level of p a r t y  the  is on  Republicans  a  forming a  to d i s p l a y .  3 9  majority The  willingness to  the  Hill  suffered  loyalty they enjoyed  in  1981.  in  1982  first  innovate. One was  of the  i n 1981.  See J a m e s h. S u n d q u i s t Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years ( W a s h i n g t o n D C : Brookings 1968). P a u l C r a i g Roberts The Supply Side Revolution (Cambridge, M a s s : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1984) pp. 6-7. R a n d a l l B . R i p l e y , Majority Leadership in Congress (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown 1969). 3  7  3  8  3  9  THEORIES Similarly a  marked  follow  Brady  argues that,  increase  elections  i n the  in  that  the  partisan passing." it  House  and  was  less  The  0  not  in  members and  like  1982  consensual  in the an  to  the  status  an  was one of the  The is  1980  preceded  ideological nature  the  E.  an  choice. the  is a  in  Reagan  in  the  programme  they  product of the  failure  W a s h i n g t o n folklore.  It  that  is quite  shaping a new dominant  House.  the  behaviour supported of the  the  the clear  an  result  from  junior  of  1981 were part Which  a  voters in  party  and  to  be  genuine and  the  description  of  play  their  role  w o r t h bearing i n  has his  a  1981  his  may  realignment  become  part of  advisors believed  coalition.  CONCLUSIONS  The  small  answers 1981.  numbers  to the  The  most  of  institutional  theories  question of w h y Reagan's significant  thing  about  budget the  examined fared  answers  here  less is  well  what  suggest in they  several  1982 than in a l l have  " David W . Brady ' A Reevaluation of R e a l i g n m e n t i n A m e r i c a n Evidence from the House of Representatives' American Political Science M a r c h 79 (1985) 28-50. 0  a  so there  usual.'  that  supports  Reagan  because  acceptable  as  the  idea of r e a l i g n m e n t that  a  bills  committees  GOP  Democratic  more  change.  offer  It  As  will  its  studies  the  argument  of  of  awareness  of 'business  parties  become  particularly  p r e v i o u s l y been  Brady's  of this  occur. E v e n  that  u n u s u a l circumstances.  B r a d y ' s caution  the  ideological  manifestation  which  upshot  Brady  perception  out  pronounced  cases  behaviour  had  unusually  chances  did not  politics,  voting will  while,  the  / 48  issue  a  'revolution' intended to  Furthermore,  The  an  for  the  heightened  the  another  election  politics.  however,  they were  the  and  A further  control of  work. W h a t  now  offered  of committees  election c e r t a i n l y bears  post-realignment  mind,  was  in  loyalty  will,  from  BEHAVIOUR.  occurs i n A m e r i c a n  weaken  ideological  increase  things the  by  of  correctly  in  partisan  quo  been  will  change  membership  increase  producing politically of  which  a  party  Committee  G r a m m . Furthermore  led  have  'revolution' differs by  VOTING  a realignment  election platforms.  Appropriations  accompanied  1981,  voters  parties'  Reagan  large-scale change was,  the  the  when  correlation between  which  ideological choice by be  OF CONGRESSIONAL  in  Politics: Review  THEORIES common.  They  all  Republicans w o u l d  The events of  two  enjoy  years  i n periods  of  party  has  or  rapidly kind  than  in  of change  predict  that  paper  with,  an  deals  1981  election in w h i c h  legislative  sense as  the has  to  i n 1982 than  high  the  returns to business  taken  VOTING  Reagan  and  of  success  purpose  1982, repeat  or  by  the  evaporates  Roosevelt  occurred before  new  after  years.  is h a r d l y  the  the  significant change  usual, which is what happened Johnson  /  49  House  i n 1981.  and  a  BEHAVIOUR.  occurred. It seems that such elections are  unusually  unity  be  less success  this after  political power  periods  might  OF CONGRESSIONAL  in the  while  brief  party.  and  The  Congress  i n 1982, albeit m u c h fact,  however,  explanation  of  balance  followed by  dominant a  The  an  pattern  of w h y  more  that  this  the  change  the  voting  occurred.  From  here  behaviour and  of  1982.  House those  the  the  It  House  is  between two  marginal  paper  years.  clear  years  The  two  tools  for  types  the  a  because  to  out  nine of  passed  will  in  key  some  about  shift.  analysis  kind  votes  took  in  place  different  1981  in  the  budgets  in  by  the  movement  of  camp.  The  theoretical  literature  These  turn  of  budget  dramatically  Presidential  of this  and  detailed  over  brought  of the  data  a  change  it  was  of explanation  handling  on  that  change  Representatives  offers  go  of Representatives  already those  will  explanations  be  tested  by  will the  be  some  used  results  as they  produce.  If  the  polar  constituency  theorists  with  the  constituents.  Their wishes,  wishes  as  perceived  entirely their  Representatives testing of  the  the  considered  votes  i n the  by as  non-constituency  variables  accounts  of  events  plausible  explanatory  membership,  the  the  they  that  of  can  1981  candidates  status  cast  or  to be  and might  those  their  then  wishes  will  have  votes  in  literature  show  any  quantified 1982  the  the  theoretical  variables  of  right,  Representatives  light of the  non-constituency  are  and  and  been  the  1981  and  we  might  which  seem,  theoretical  include members'  committees  of some  significant  and the  explanation  their  will  lie  of them,  or  only  things  1982.  When  expect  none  score.  The  reading  literature,  seniority, their seniority  on  to  the be  committee them.  If,  THEORIES constituencies  being equal, these variables do seem  Representatives The Electoral  OF CONGRESSIONAL  vote  then  Connection  this  will  suggest  the  VOTING  to have picture  is m i s s i n g a crucial d i m e n s i o n .  B E H A V I O U R . / 50  a n effect  painted  by  on the Mayhew  way in  CHAPTER  A.  III.  ANALYSIS  OF  DATA  INTRODUCTION  Why  should  almost  the  same  body  of  ideological  blueprint  one  year  and  then  blueprint,  12 months  types  of  later?  explanation. as  non-constituency  influences  how  to  same  vote.  entirely  The  categories.  data  If  e x p l a n a t i o n of the  reject  another,  those  who  B u t the  seniority  also  a  can contribute  polar  and  significantly  in this  chapter  constituency  budget  drawn  drawn  to  suggested,  explain  constituency-oriented  assessed  to  see  who  be  are  broken correct  institutional  of  argue  down then  that decide  into  the  support i n the House w i l l  if  same  behaviour  possible influence of Committee membership  be  the  an  broadly, two  the  those  to  w h e n Representatives  can  theorists  ebb and flow of Reagan's  constituencies. will  are  analysed  the  pass  The theoretical literature has  1  There  Representatives  politicians  the  entire  lie i n  and  considerations  the  of House do  sway  Representatives.  The  account  contextual  shift  Representatives barely  avoid  comforting intensity would  over  events the  public  of public one  policymaking to  in  Chapter  course of the  prepared the budget scrutiny  gloom of the  lead  return  of  in  support to  for  expect,  accordance  'business  as  The  in  1982  that  there  atmosphere  was  in which  first half of 1981 they  the be  of  economic policy the  ideological that  themselves  could  the  any  found  the  legislative b y w a y s of Congress. F u r t h e r m o r e , President's  they  a  the  under  usual'  two y e a r s .  suggest  in  the  with  does  changed. I n the  whereas  obscure  One  theories, goals  serving  the  of  a the  local  had shift  waned,  which  away  from  President  and  interests  a  of  the  over  the  constituency, or the goals of political status, or some other objective.  The  purpose  two  years  the  other  We  will  of this chapter  focussing on brought examine  the  triumph those  is to  analyse  Representatives for  the  marginal  President  the  whose in  presidential  W h e r e m e m b e r s h i p changed d u r i n g the congress constituency are excluded from the calculations. 1  51  key  economic votes  movement 1981  and  supporters both  from  one  frustration in  the  Representatives  camp in  to  1982.  light from  of a  ANALYSIS institutional  and  constituency  that occurred i n the  variables while  political  keeping in mind  OF DATA  always  the  / 52  changes  context.  1. The Presidential Strategy In  1981 the  issues on  to  two  a  was  him  to  war  (i.e.  speeches.  The  able  the  approach  key  he  was  to  charm  the  sum  a  to  the  m i n o r i t y they  concentrate  their  discipline  while  was  to  able  back  to  marginal coalition The  of  were  all  on  fall their  were  seize  three  the  use  and  successful  to w i n them.  strengths. bogged  It  committee  and  to  constituents)  in  a  leadership.  his immense  Congress  allowed  down  popularity  mobilise public  through  in  1981  television  l a y in his  though  the  ability  to  G O P were  in  legislative initiative on the  major  votes  defected  to  force  Republicans sufficient  policies w i t h  m i n o r i t y of Representatives  because  to  give  the  they  them  a  budget  maintained majority.  D e m o c r a t i c House  and  and party  Reagan  committee  next.  lose ground. Democrats began to  in  numbers  only  enough  who  switched  difference between  the  w o m e n . W h o were they  votes  and  House. Even  began  and their defeat  entirely  tax  programme.  and  the  to  success  party  his  House  of  to  leave  was  and  t h a t w o r k s best w h e n used sparingly.  i n the  majority  those  the budget  becoming  moments,  members  He  President's  avoid  of 1981 R e a g a n started  Reaganites and  key  Democrats  exploit that  to  budgetary  to  the  Representatives'  votes  the  to  Democratic  approach  able  sufficient  opposing h i m meant year  at  of the  fire  and  able,  votes.  stage-manage  susceptible  leadership to swallow his  the  of t r y i n g to reduce  played  the  President's  majority  to  with  T h i s is clearly an  command  In  both  momentum  of attrition  charisma  a strategy  was  his  importantly,  opinion  the  he  exploit  adopted  of all-encompassing set-piece  because  legislative  and  series  scores:  This  Most  President  T h e y , then,  and w h y did they  the are  break to  deprive  support from  ranks.  to  Together  him  these  a  winning  for, at best, a  standoff.  supporting  the  of  drift  President  to  total victory of his policies in one the  switch?  interesting Congressmen  and  ANALYSIS The  question  Representatives, and  differ  these  that  from  from  is those  their  geographical answer Border,  votes  is:  who vote  loyal  fellow  in  against party  to this. The bulk  what their  ways party,  members?  do  the  of D e m o c r a t defectors  each  is  came  the  North  E a s t . B u t , even who  remained  be asked again w i t h i n those  THE  within  loyal  these  to their  areas there party,  were  an  from  so the  large  original  53  marginal  resemble  There  /  other  obvious Southern,  or Sunbelt states. A disproportionate n u m b e r of Republican defectors  Representatives  B.  raise  OF DATA  came  numbers  question  of  must  regions.  VARIABLES  1. Dependent Variables, The Nine Roll Calls Reagan's  success  or  failure  is here  two years.  measured  tax  votes  over  the  The  that  they  had  to deal unambiguously w i t h  that specific policy areas were  which  Reagan  the as  positions  ideological assumptions  This  possible,  presented  which  meet  no the  votes  were  problem  in  criteria.  But  1981  imply  appropriations  shortfalls i n the  b e i n g patched up was had  for  budgetary  of the  do not  votes  in  and  selection of votes  was  macro-budgetary  1981  which  and  1982  he  there were And,  fiscal  in  18  in  selected  took  precisely fit the  represent  a  topics.  This  spending on  1982.  To  shared,  a  These the  the  there last  took  stance  keep  as  far  on  were  eight  kind  i n these votes  are  they  15  votes  just  two which  votes  votes  Since the  on  which budget  w h i c h he h a d  not  budget.  'presidential budget  criteria of selection or  position.  a dozen votes  previous year.  last C a r t e r  a  position on  a r o u n d half  topping-up the  to  President  took  1982,  1982.  work done  the  Reagan  Reagan's he had a stake  i n 1981 w h e n Congress was  Some 1982  criteria.  on  when  in  meet  supplementary  votes  chosen  did  the  budget  subtext.  votes. In both years  quite  or  the  key  simple votes were selected so that they  meta-budgetary not  meta  of the  excluded, for example: m i l i t a r y  i n eight  possible, an identical ideological  Where  nine  first criterion for  means  took  over  were  votes  position' i n on  which  ANALYSIS the  President took no official  him.  The paucity of ideal roll calls i n  The roll  second,  calls  votes.  If  compare  and  in  1982  is  we  read  the  the  bear  in m i n d  votes  the  also  way.  The  such  a w a y as  The is  a  already  an  deal  of the often  they  doing m a y  that  they may  be  are  reduce  their by  a  White  being defeated.  for  reached House  were  often  able  to  extent  to  or to  the  to  and  We  must  which was  the  moved  occur  on  the  the  votes  in  formulate  reasons  has  begun  determine  which  policy  have  his  way.  in  1981  away  from  those  swing  agenda  and  to  if  have  the  initiative  in Congress.  of the  so  If,  the  must  with  that,  House was  in  by  which  that  public  hand,  President its  1982,  were  a  other  the  tarnished  prudent  take  on the  House,  second  force  Sometimes they  veto is being overturned then they  outcome  a  to  Presidents  a  a  to  for Congress.  from  the  Presidents:  of defeat.  proposals,  agenda  in order  vote  their  floor  body  the  a  the  and  and set  position before  was  F o r those  allowed  of  strengths.  to  1982  the  budget  different character  him  be  1981  that  votes  that  of a  than  between that  the  rather  differences  easily be misled.  way  within  it  to  position in  the  group  endorse  presidential  in  pendulum  on  chances  to  the  point of view  within  the  forced  indifferent  for  President's  more  types  of Congressional opinion  the  his fingers  are  formal  is threatened  i n the  descriptive innocence of  we m a y  were tailored to his  a  change  for  which  snap  difficult  take  to be imputed  presidential support would decline.  that  which  voted  year,  were  indications of the  produced  proposals  in  of support  m a k i n g it more  pretend  original  way  opponents  indication  closely identified  refuse  the  votes i n 1982  k i n d of votes  bill  following  the  measures  who  / 54  this inevitable.  of the  question  pure  changes  a position has  implication  into  as  thus  1982 m a k e s  members  to  to ensure  great  position-taking  a  calls  calls  of  and  fact t h a t the  how  roll  led  President's  needs  One is  it  President cannot j u s t  Reagan, the  that  decline i n support  Congress  The  important,  who did the  describe  through  more  percentage  1981 and those  He  position, and  OF DATA  the  they  President would  plausibly  One  of  Republican  m a r k e d l y different had feel  i f so  vote is on  might  defeat.  cannot  stance  the  are  the  budget  from  the  chance  of  less inclined  to  more  ANALYSIS back them  In  1981  the  and  Stockman's  great  grandees  on  Republican  the  Budget  a  weakened  behind  the  was  the  coup  to begin  HR3982 see  above,  HR4560  to  see  June,  see  pp. 12-13);  see  called,  the  see one  veto  above, of a  The  first  block-buster  votes  Gramm-Latta budget  I  (HR4560)  marked  the  bypass  of  1981  spending  Indeed  the  David  Democratic  Reagan  held  Democrats  in  One  sign of this  House  1981 were, above,  and  budget  change  White  was  House,  floor.  i n chronological order:  pp.6-9);  big tax-cut  Reagan's  the  the  thrall.  traditionally controlled the  on  vote,  proposed  votes  around  the  and  Gramm-Latta HR4242  second  which  Reagan's  'Oakar Amendent', to  the  a  emergency vote  on II,  (29  July,  of  cuts,  round  1981 the  Reagan  i n the  budget,  HR4961  - this  strategy  bill  one  on  above,  Cut  ( H R 4 2 4 2 ) . The  use  the  i n the  same fall.  moving  money  p.32).  first  the  Congress to accept his second round of cuts  Reagan  The  (HR3982)  (28  that  revolved.  was  to  HR6863  the  II  attempt  above,  are  Gramm-Latta  (10  see  they  and  Tax  HCRes352  session  self-explanatory;  Reagan  (27 M a y ,  (22 J u l y ,  lame-duck  in December, see  are  HCRes345  supplemental  appropriations  (defeated  in  third  the  reconciliation vote,  on  (HJRes631)  The  to  Conservative  the  the  over  Committees.  action on the  see  on  of continuing  (HCResll5)  packages.  of  alternative  tax  override  three  half  themselves.  7,  are:  Latta  pp.30-31);  out of job creation,  way  which  pp.9-12);  selected  the  slew  a  between  vote  roughshod  Means  first  to represent  the  above, pp.27); the  pp. 28-30); August,  55  above, pp. 15-18).  1982 votes  pp.23-26);  and  find  the  reassert  above,  and  ride  number  (May  (6 October, see  above,  In  horsetrading  HCResll5  June,  T h e five  to  move to piecemeal fiscal  I  (26  was  committees  T h e four roll calls selected Gramm-Latta  to  Ways  significant  so the  scenes  able  the  committees.  and  able  was and  strategic  these  were  another  President  the  party  his grip  process  /  publicly.  committees  As  OF DATA  were  all  fourth  methods  two,  embracing 1981  to  three  vote  persuade  ANALYSIS The the  five  1982  balance  of power  Democratic  leadership  acceptable  On Latta  are  three  of the  budget  put  the  House  five  and  This  the  through  reflects  bizarre  to  1982  votes  (HR4961)  veto  normally,  simple majority  -- the and  and  overrides,  on,  is  two  the  change  in  that  the  contortions  produce  Oakar  a  workable  the  amendment  reconciliation  vote  a position. F u r t h e r m o r e , two of the  vote  is  nature.  / 56  budget  u n u s u a l l y polarised Representatives.  (HCRes352),  take  Representative  years  two  For  a  different  the  substitute  reconciliation  a  over  (HJRes631).  a  of  to a majority of the  President did not the  votes  OF DATA  like  needed  thirds  the  December  jobs  the  to w i n a  vote here,  one  third  rules  plus  the  (HR4961)  the  --  votes were procedural:  HR6863,  or  (HCRes345),  appropriations are  different:  vote where,  depending w h i c h  one  may  be  the  side  victory  target.  The  'Oakar  amendment'  highly complex and a  position w h e n  the  Oakar  proposals, wanted  the  supported brought  the  Latta  of  approach  of the  share  emerged to  the  Jackets  Reagan a  before It  is  in  the  middle  of  a  long,  a  of  vote  will  amendments  the  occur. to  the  Democratic caucus  reasonable  to  assume  opposed to the  In  the  case  various  was  that,  take  budget  unsure insofar  of  i f it as  liberal amendments  he  which  defeat.  proposal in  a  (HCRes352)  chaotic  placed in  buzzing  week  on  the  came  of budgetary  deliberative  1 9 8 1 . B y now the  round  the  nearer  honey  pot  to  passing t h a n  action  system  by  House was i n search  in  the  the  any  House:  a  all-or-nothing  teeming w i t h of a  of  small  disproportionate  spoils. T h e O a k a r vote flushed out the conservative Republican  to join  i n response  represented  night  President  fiscal  that  dozens  plan, Reagan was  stress  of insects  of  came  of budget votes. Presidents can only  advance  offered.  bills  the  of the  Yellow  the  budget  seven  in  one  its eventual  reflection  swarms  as  Michel  about  other  know  amendment  the  The  they  late  (HCRes345)  unpredictable series  amendment, as  vote  the  to the  budget pragmatic  liberal  Republican  Gypsy  S o u t h e r n D e m o c r a t Boll  amounted  to  a  attempt  by  the  rejection  of  Moths  who  themselves  Weevils. The L a t t a pure  Republicans to  substitute  Reagananomics. keep  the  had  budget  But in  it the  ANALYSIS mould cast by G r a m m  The  and L a t t a , w i t h Reagan's  Rostenkowski motion  complete  with  tax  increase,  move which echoed the to  share  share  the  kudos  any  blow  to  him  to go out  the  turmoil  within  that  both  satisfied  Rostenkowski the  In  when  year  share  could  of the  a member playing  games.  was  final  chosen  in  different  appropriations  need  the  members  were  not  nine votes  multivariate census  data  variables.  on  another  no  year  was  to  agree  the  House.  matters  to  was  wish  later.  no  to  Even  reason  for  also  reflected  tax  package  a  resolution So  eager  and  which  the  r e n u n c i a t i o n of  the  product  of  an  (on  vote  will  vote differently on a  together  be  session  return  was  close  and  the  where  override. B u t ,  there  is no  so  scope  becomes  an  presidential position.  lame-duck session It  stop  v e r y close, then  HR6863)  cycle.  to  veto  was  one  which  the  in J a n u a r y ,  of  after  several  President  a l l the  rest  the  1982 election,  similar lost. had  votes  on  While  some  recently  been  of public opinion i n their constituencies.  were  regressions  had  manoeuvre  budget  fiscal  to  vote  that  going to  reminded of the nature  The  the  in  The  first  of Congress m a y  vote  complete  — was  he  h i m , there  unable  through  vote ( H J R e s 6 3 1 ) , i n the to  Democrats,  indignity. was  package,  W h e r e R e a g a n h a d been  hurt  the  unambiguous indication of support for the  The  the  57  before.  reconciliation  Committee  /  i n t e r n a l w o r k i n g s of the C o m m i t t e e .  members  The  of  primacy  knows that  of  the  push  breakdown i n the  third  before.  indirectly  demands  a member  the  year  Congressional Republicans a full  Committee w h i c h  the  sent  Conference  humiliation  to  traditional  some cases  one  of the  prestige  way  the  to  of the  believed he  unprecedented  for  the  their  of his  Committee's  only  for  -- w h i c h  directly  events  the embarrassment  though  (HR4961)  blessing, the  OF DATA  used  which  constituencies  as  dichotomous dependent  used a or  series  variables  in a  variables, derived, i n the  committee  membership,  as  the  series  main,  of  from  independent  ANALYSIS  OF DATA  /  58  2. The Independent V a r i a b l e s The  independent  types  of  variables  theoretical  fall  into  explanation:  two they  broad are  categories  either  which  reflect  institutional  or  the  two  constituency  related.  Census  and  election  series  of continuous  class  variables  percentage set  totalling  percentage rural.  more  per  cent.  five  income  expressing the  Since  Two  used;  presence  to of  percentage  The  per  cuts  service  collar,  percentage  worker,  residential  data.  was  white  omitted  variables,  missing  Three  to  percentage  variable  in  this  work  Filipinos to  and N a t i v e  or  collar  and  prevent  the  urban  and  was  produce was  a  A m e r i c a n s where  percentage  entered  as  a  non-white five-digit  A  percentage of  these totalled  variable.  continuous  The  2  variable  agenda expected  most to  involved that  from  those  groups  across  an  the  increase  board  i n the  cuts  are  percentage  entitlement  representation  redistributive programmes  programmes.  in  The  variables  blue  collar,  would  be  which  pick  percentage  of  those  related  to  up  the  urban  and  non-white.  which  programmes and  policy  the  package  m i g h t be  if  so  the  might (the  are  of  the  white  expected  income  be  expected  constituent  reduction  better-paid is  blue  census  variables.  total.  benefit  those  calculated from  the  constituency  Reagan  groups  entitlement  cent  dollar  cuts  constituency-related  of B l a c k s i n a constituency was added to the percentage  it m i g h t be  which  opposition  this  were  in a  the  programmes groups  fourth,  Chinese, H i s p a n i c s ,  than  same  A  100  were  several  percentage  worker.  T h e percentage  average  tax  used:  suburban,  Japanese,  provided  variables  were  farm  data  federal collar  to support  variable  parts  will  to  of the  deficit  workers the be  favour  in  New Deal  which and  were  redistributive  coalition), parts  suburban  President's positively  cuts  of  or  the  the  the  residents.  economic p r o g r a m m e  related  to  support  for  The and the  President. The U S census does not list ethnic groups, other than non-whites, represent less t h a n five per cent of a District's population 2  where  they  ANALYSIS As  far  Farmers break  the  were  final  the  traditionally  four  of the  give  an  average  was  to  try  right  the  with  a  able to resist  the  most  identify  reason,  on  plausible  Budget  most  this  variable.  drawn  the  of one and  was  four  marginal  be  to be  winner  the  will  4  of the  of  from  the  safe  We would for the  three  i n the is used  as  a  divided  expect  set  economic  battles  dichotomous  to  the  to  variable  be 1981.  Committees:  over  four  is  Representatives  dichotomous  These  the  Fiorina  policies i n  were  by  by  If  maintainers  President's  returns  of the  of  to  success.  obtained  purpose  the  aimed  election  Representatives.  Committees. budget  and  The  variables chief  the  / 59  workers.  Reagan  votes  totalled  exclusively from  Appropriations  of each  coalition  derived  elections.  and  only farm  a m e a s u r e of his  were  institutional  directly involved  Deal  percentages  1980  over the  of  membership  New  variable  tide of public support  membership  Means,  committees this  percentage  score  the  The  3  of the  'maintainers'  measuring  of  variables go this leaves  m i g h t be expected  elections.  party  and  high  The  part  constituency-related  last  candidate  and  constituency-related  up. T h e i r response  The over  as  OF DATA  were two  variable.  better 5  variables the  Ways  the  three  years. If  For  members  T h a t is 1974-1980 because, i n some states, there had been r e d i s t r i c t i n g between the 1972 and 1974 elections. F i o r i n a ' s thesis suggests that a consistently n a r r o w m a r g i n of v i c t o r y i n a constituency - a tradition of close elections - indicates heterogeneity, but this m a y i n fact not be the case. A n attempt was made to create a variable w h i c h would measure homogeneity i n constituencies. T h i s v a r i a b l e w a s calculated b y m e a s u r i n g the presence or absence of the four w o r k - r e l a t e d v a r i a b l e s , the three residential variables, percentage non-white and percentage white. This 'homogeneity' variable r a r e l y had a significant i m p a c t i n the regression a n a l y s i s . This is probably due to the crude w a y in w h i c h it was constructed to fit into the regression. It w a s not anticipated i n advance that it w o u l d produce a n y result one w a y or another; indeed F i o r i n a ' s theory cannot be t a k e n to m a k e a n y implied prediction that it would. Hence, nothing more w i l l be s a i d about this variable. N o attempt was made to allow for p r i m a r y m a r g i n a l s who score well i n the elections but still live i n m o r t a l fear of being turfed out b y the voters. In some states, such as L o u i s i a n a the local eccentricities of the s y s t e m m e a n that the primaries can be the real election. Since a l l F i o r i n a c l a i m s is t h a t some big winners will be maintainers and the rest maximizers while all marginal Representatives w i l l be m a x i m i z e r s the pattern, if there is one, should still appear. 3  4  5  ANALYSIS are  influenced  might may  by  expect be  A  a  desire  these  fourth  variables  institutional committee.  the  show  The  the  chairman  appointment.  The  higher  are  on their  highly  coveted  when  they  Fiorina's  interests  up  when  oppose  'maximizing'  on  Representatives to  President. committee  an 7  of their  that  committee  prestige  is  but  of  some  the  then  we  threatened  ability  high  or a n  Committee  of the  senior  In  tempted  score  seniority  on  will  the  scale  who enjoy  to vote their  or  it  Committee  variable,  m e a s u r i n g their  the then,  21  more  senior  high seniority on  might  might  their  committee  committee  allow themselves  to resist  the  on  21 w i t h a  Representatives  positions  therefore,  to  without  on this  For  committee  1981,  inclination  members,  score  position  nought  Representative  constituents.  for which they  votes. a  a  Representatives  be more  'maintainers'  Representatives' scaled from  Representatives'  will  those  with  The  nought  committee. Perhaps  committees  terms,  measured  variable was  and  the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l considerations  the  to  variable  6  representing  related  protect  / 60  increased.  highest-prestige  they  to  OF DATA  who  be  one  interests are,  in  of  the  the  luxury  be  expected  be  public clamour to support  the  not  p r o x i m i t y to  scale  that  will  is  seniority  of not  an  attribute  of  the  chairmanship  the or  position of r a n k i n g m i n o r i t y member.  T h e committees were graded on an updated version of a scale m e a s u r i n g inter-committee transfers i n K e n n e t h A . Shepsle Op. Cit. T a b l e 6.11, p. 131. A v a r i e t y of other institutional variables were tried but failed to yield m a n y significant results. These included a series of variables based i n one w a y or another on seniority. One was a continuous variable m e a s u r i n g seniority based on y e a r of e n t r y to Congress. There were also a series of d u m m y , or dichotomous, v a r i a b l e s also based on year of entry picking up w h i c h Congressional ' C l a s s ' m e m b e r s belonged to. F i n a l l y , each Representatives highest-status committee was given a score based on Shepsle's calculations - op. cit. - r u n n i n g from 20 ( W a y s and M e a n s or Rules) down to nought (no committee). N o n e of these variables showed up w e l l across the nine votes for Southern D e m o c r a t s or across the six votes i n w h i c h enough N o r t h e r n Republicans defected to m a k e t h e m w o r t h using in the final regression. 6  7  ANALYSIS  C.  OF DATA  /  61  EXPECTATIONS  We  would expect the data to d i s p l a y a clear pattern  as  the  institutional  variables  committees  to  show  threatened.  We  m i g h t expect  up either  when  elements  of  under  through  the  the  attack.  up  go  when  them  Deal,  extremes  the  system  the  different are  legislative routes  on  react  is rolled  very  little  they  to  will  i f at  react,  a l l , and  turf,  under  expect  of  or  same  or  the  three  prestige  are  committee variables  goals he, If  the  supported,  were  variables to  move  because  is  someone  i f no  one  is  being rolled  on  the  where  the  and his advisors, tried  committee  it  show  w h e n long-standing  leadership  the  destination.  when  work,  attack  constituency  their  membership  Democratic  President's economic policy a l w a y s h a d the  nine votes. A s far  C o m m i t t e e seniority variable to is  the  we m i g h t  than  expect  committee's  and  which  F o r this reason  would  their  House budget  New  greater  we  over the  else's  Representatives  committee  then  there  they will  will  be  no  reaction.  The  constituency  background which  to  votes.  directly affected  underlying and  the  variables,  welfarist  it at  assumptions  that  Reagan's policies  constituency  the  would  also  defectors, constituents.  policies  it  stands  would  expect who Over  those  had the  the  major  momentum.  contrast  the  presidential  two  a  thing  such  represent  a  direct  for. up  We  shall  the  original  returned  largest  years. as  a  on  the  nine  behaviour  N e w Deal to  results a  votes  to  the  that  vote is  were  of  will  of Representatives  victories, and  the  last  six  as  sets of coalition', and  the  of  the  T h a t is w h y , for  the  be  that  some  constituencies i n  those,  groups  a  among among  We the their  s e r i a t i m account of the  against  pattern  of the  cuts  poorly represented.  to  offer  welfare  coalition  from  those  for or a  One  consistent  ' N e w Deal  come  fold  a  hostile to  furthermore,  defectors  proportion  variables and the  be  assault  assume,  provide  membership of that coalition.  nine votes  over  emerge  the  is  who  the  should  into  over  t r a d i t i o n a l beneficiaries of the  the  throw  time  hand,  presumably,  there  expect  relationship between also  would,  any  is that  variables pick  Democrats, we which  A group  other  of  over his  the  President.  defection the  first  budget  What  which three  will votes,  campaign  lost  ANALYSIS The first  three  the Cut  Republican votes.  proposal. 1  calculations for  expectations  likelihood  of  percentage Society  two  only  were  made  and  low average  measure in  toto.  D.  A  for  defected  G O P for those  level  over  votes  of  benefit  expect  high  RAW  the  one  they  by  three  percentages  an  from  over  for  become  New  expectations  Tax  votes  no  a  baseline  expect t h a t increase  Deal  the  in  and  the  Great  Northern, industrial  T h e six votes are  the  the  of non-whites, blue collar  to defect.  / 62  House voted for  first  with  Representatives  first  unity  these six we would  which  would  and  9  and  groups  to which those  THE  II  increase  incomes to be the  AT  Gramm-Latta  would  from  We  extent  GLANCE  high  defecting  constituencies w i t h  of the  unusually  other six votes. Over  Republican  programmes.  urban  an  Republicans  for the  constituents  and  defected  three  on the  a  displayed  O n G r a m m - L a t t a I a l l 190 Republicans i n the  Only  8  Because  0  party  OF DATA  fulfilled,  will  workers  become  vote by vote  a  and  DATA  1. T h e D e m o c r a t s Even  a  crude  s u r v e y of the  is  more  than  of  votes  should adopt  the  a  random a  r a w data  phenomenon.  Gramm-Latta  Gramm-Latta passed  II  209  I  defectors,  239  Democrat  in the  North.  Democrats  voted:  Democrats  2 1 7 - 2 1 1 . O n the  In p a r t i c u l a r it  regional focus.  S o u t h a n d Republican defectors  On  indicates that the  opposed  T a x C u t vote  i n e v e r y vote, were from  the  the  176  48 Democrats South.  suggests  defectors  bill  1  distribution of defections  II  were  against but  that  29  defected.  the  analysis  concentrated  but  63  for.  supported The bulk  it.  in  On It  of these  1  T h e fourth district of Ohio was unrepresented between the death of one R e p u b l i c a n , T e n n y s o n G u y e r , on the 12th of A p r i l and the swearing-in of another, M i c h a e l O x l e y , on the 21st of A u g u s t . Eugene A t k i n s o n of P e n n s y l v a n i a defected to the Republicans in October after voting against the D e m o c r a t whip i n two of the three big fiscal votes. These two brought the Republican total to 192. C h a r l e s D o u g h e r t y , P e n n s y l v a n i a , and Claudine Schneider, Rhode Island J a m e s Jeffords (Vt.) H e r e the ' S o u t h ' is A l a b a m a , A r k a n s a s , F l o r i d a , Georgia, K e n t u c k y , L o u i s i a n a , M i s s i s s i p p i , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , O k l a h o m a , South C a r o l i n a , Tennessee, T e x a s and 8  9  1  1  0  1  ANALYSIS Of  the  South;  239  Democrats  t h a t number  defectors  26  Nevada,  and  included  were  Southerners;  two  total of  of the  main  budget  more  between  twice.  more  votes  The  them,  three  (Ind.);  Harold  Volkmer  (Mo.);  (Ohio);  and  (Kan.) Gus  and  exclusively that  the  Donald and on  the  each  Tax  against  the  (Ohio), and  identical  the  Border  roll  calls at  in  least  seven occasions and  on  states  defected  to the  party  1981 twice.  came  every  votes  i n the  and  Skelton  and  Ronald Cut  Mottl  and  a  were  hardcore 23  these  were  used  the  data  from  a high  first  nine did so six times.  did Only  of  39  Democrats the  studied over the Ten  on  South and i n the  however,  the  Evans  proportion of  three  votes  they  fold.  25 who followed  occasion.  defected  D e m o c r a t pro-presidential votes over  from  There  over  three  Atkinson  Tax  While  A  for six  and  Missouri)  states.  vote.  on G r a m m - L a t t a I;  the  is clear,  were  accounted  Ike  Luken  on  and  It  2  defectors  David  each  concentrated  a l l these  108 S o u t h e r n  nine key budget party  for  1  and  Young,  Thomas  the  Santini,  on every  (Calif.);  a l l once  Maryland  James  48  Santini  Ken  63  from  Republicans in the  and  each,  were  of  six times  (Mich.);  twice  (including  the  /  29 G r a m m - L a t t a II  defected  Patterson  Cut  defectors  Republicans on each occasion a n d  the  Hall  36  who  with  were  Atkinson,  Cut  Stump  Jerry  multivariate regression.  defected  On  cast  i n the  from  Tax  78  O f the  were  Stump  votes  (Penn.)  total of 101 of the three  and  Albosta  Tony  Yatron  is not  three  the  states  pattern  defectors.  Southerners.  were, i n general, quick to r e t u r n  first  On  Border  Representatives  A  63  other  were:  G r a m m - L a t t a I. Because the Sun  Gramm-Latta I  M a r y l a n d e r s defected  defectors  Jacobs  Glickman  (the  Santini  from  on  of the  Arizona).  were  came  other  voted  137 D e m o c r a t  Andrew  Dan  46  Southerners  Bob S t u m p ,  108  who  OF DATA  Representatives who  party  four  on  with  who the  whip on each vote.  two years  so  voted  the  eight  of those  no Democrat voted occasions,  five  on  Democrats missed  (cont'd) V i r g i n i a . These are the states the C Q includes i n its calculations as southern. A s will be seen Representatives from S u n B e l t and Border states also contributed a disproportionate n u m b e r of the non-South defectors which is w h y Representatives from A r i z o n a , N e v a d a , M a r y l a n d a n d M i s s o u r i were included in the m u l t i v a r i a t e regression as ' S o u t h e r n D e m o c r a t s ' . Regressions were also calculated for a l l D e m o c r a t s a n d for Democrats from the other regions but failed to yield m a n y significant results. 1  1  1  2  ANALYSIS an  opportunity  to defect  of  them  vote  votes)  and the  Of five  who  the  and  apparent  party  on  Republican victories i n  Gramm-Latta  elected i n Ralph  Hutto  Hall  1974  1981.  closest  of T e x a s ,  of F l o r i d a  had  the  Democrats  who  voted  of the  next  others  those  rookies  smallest i n this  their  of  and  rookies, h a d margin  hardcore  unopposed i n  against  Three  T a x Cut.  three were  one  1981); none  seven  in  1974.  more  1980  as  were  rookies, two  were  O f those  Neale  (N.C.)  victory  margins  of  had against  five  of  the  first  won by just 33,000  'hardcore'.  or  So  in  on  of very junior, very m a r g i n a l or v e r y safe  of had  two  is  two  votes  Nine no  or the  1978,  4,223  less.  there  a  1980.  party  elected  64  in  were readily  Representatives  side.  members  Committee, had  (the  or later;  60,000. S i x had been returned  predominance  either  II  /  (not counting W a y n e D o w d y of M i s s i s s i p p i who did not enter  three in  Two  five  Earl  Southern  July  and  unopposed  on  8,872.  24  until  1976  1980  Congress.  of less than  occasions  House  major  i n 1980. H e won by 43,890 and none of the  Of  in  second  of just  majorities  fewer  their  15 had first been  i n their  victory  with  three  fourth, J o h n B r e a u x (Louisiana), stayed loyal on the  these  majority  on the  OF DATA  two  any  were  of  the  hardcore  on Budget and  were one  members  on W a y s and  of  the  Appropriations  M e a n s , only  one  seniority: W i l l i a m C h a p p e l l of F l o r i d a on W a y s and M e a n s .  1  of  the  3  T h e r e were IT Southerners on A p p r o p r i a t i o n s , seven on W a y s and M e a n s and seven on Budget; giving the 79 Southern Democrats 25 appointments between t h e m . I n each case there was also a member from one of the four states included as 'southern' for the calculations. There were, on the other h a n d j u s t five Republicans on Appropriations, two (Richard T . Shulze, P e n n , and B a r b e r Conable, N Y , ) on Budget and one (Bud Shuster, Penn,) on W a y s and M e a n s . So the 50 N o r t h - E a s t e r n Republicans commanded just eight spots on the three committees. 1  3  ANALYSIS  OF DATA  /  65  total  of  2. T h e R e p u b l i c a n s Given  that  defections  no  any  Republicans  Republicans Republican  who  Dougherty  and  Hollenbeck  and  votes  13  and  could  defected  Jeffords)  on  score  on  Gramm-Latta  over  the  Gramm-Latta  nine  II  Smith  (both  on  four  the  highest  is  the  eight.  Tax  The  Cut  three  (Schneider,  T w o more Republicans, H a r o l d  N . J . ) defected  Republicans did so  I  votes  or  a l l totalled six defections.  Christopher more  defected  on five  occasions as  of the  the  other  six  G O P began  to  lose its economic u n a n i m i t y .  Nineteen The  of those  20  solitary exception  Of  the  from  261 defections delegates  Representatives  was from  from  occasions  once.  Judd  party  line  defected Emery  least  California  defections.  Out  of  votes  Republicans  whose  Eight  they a  the  them.  Jersey Great  and  six  17  against  stayed  at-large  N o r t h - E a s t or  Representative  Midwestern from  states.  California  eight  the  Republican  Yorkers  party  New England Olympia  (of  delegations  and  15  they  defected  those,  25  at  least  were  loyal  three N e b r a s k a n s five  13 defections  throughout times.  Illinois  30 times  great  and  than the  David  eight of the  once,  variations while  defected  a  populous  bulk  of  and  by  the  City  or  total  of  at  least  the  for  a  between three  the they  seven  bordered 14  times  once  and  i n a l l (including twice by A t k i n s o n  from  least  from  once  cast  13 P e n n s y l v a n i a n s defected  were  more  Snowe  provided the  one  there  on j u s t  Republicans each  came  from  at  single  N e w H a m p s h i r e , toed  Republicans  President  came  each.  i n d u s t r i a l states,  of the  207  largest  defected  constituencies l a y a l l or p a r t l y i n N e w Y o r k 14  Alaska.  broke r a n k s  Republican for  Midwest.  from  The  California,  r e m a i n i n g two,  largest  the  the  position over the nine votes  other  the  New  from  of Congress  six of the  Republicans defected Plains,  no  three times  the  the  or  member  times  A l l but  voted against  Republicans and  but  Republican). There were  New the  of  Republican  and  or M i d w e s t e r n  32  between  them rookie  four  the  27 Representatives  of M a i n e , defected  North-Eastern  it).  a  throughout,  at  After  totalled  between  Gregg,  the  Young  North-Eastern  Republican delegation, the five  Don  came  as  13 Ohioans. A l l seven  total of 23 states. Iowans  The  defections. four  defected  11  On  Kansas times  ANALYSIS Because states  1  the  were  4  G O P defectors  used  E. THE ROLL  i n the  were  concentrated  m u l t i v a r i a t e regression.  in the 1  North  OF DATA  /  East  those  only  66  5  CALLS  1. Gramm-Latta I The  President's  Gramm-Latta substitute called  by  I  cuts  Budget  defecting.  1  originated  targets bill  billion  revenues.  Committee.  earnest  in  the  The  The  though  Appropriations that  because the  this  bill  proposed  details  May  i n the  proposed  passed  with  White by  cuts  his  victory  House,  the  outlays  of these  amendment  we  should  expect  take  a  on  Republican  Budget C o m m i t t e e .  and  substantial  were  253-176  was  to be  being rolled,  represented  an  assault  we  expect  control  to  be  with  Committee's  members  always  very w a r y  associated  with  unambiguous  of  assault  on  and the  been  the  the  of  the  the  New  type Deal  Budget  cuts  worked  63  It in out  Democrats  Ways  of  away  from  C o m m i t t e e it is  to  give  their  not  support, other,  Appropriations Committee,  which  habit and  of treading  the  on  opposition to the  traditional House  membership  cuts  to the  budget  that  Committee seniority variable to be related  level  the  it instead  We would expect  on the  over  hand  Budget Committee had turf.  might  would  Committee and  older, committees'  The  in  6  Even  clear  and  in  which  1982 budget  of $25.7  authority  the  began  (HCResll5),  for the  for  budget  campaign  bill.  Insofar  of deferring Means  to  Committee  as  the  bill  committees and  the  were  an  to opposition.  cuts  and  so  envisioned  by  we  expect  would  the  bill the  New  Deal  M a i n e , N e w H a m p s h i r e , V e r m o n t , M a s s a c h u s e t t s , Rhode Island, Connecticut, N e w Y o r k , N e w Jersey, P e n n s y l v a n i a , D e l a w a r e and M a r y l a n d Regressions were also calculated for a l l Republicans and for the N o r t h E a s t and M i d w e s t together but they yielded little of significance. O n all roll calls a vote for the President's, or his imputed position, w a s scored ' 1 ' and a vote against that position was scored ' 0 ' . Therefore on each vote the score produced by the m u l t i v a r i a t e regression is a measure of the strength of the association between a variable and support for, or opposition to, the President. 1  4  1  5  1  6  ANALYSIS constituency  variables  to  be  related  implications  of Home  style is  that  on  procedural  votes  which  arcane  even  be  aware  procedural, economic  In cent  of.  it  Here  was  there  instead  opposition  Representatives their  was  a  to  no  to  have  might  hiding place. vote  on  bill.  One  not  67 the  of choice  understand,  N o t only  was  the  President's  the  /  of  greater freedom  constituents  high-profile  the  OF DATA  the  or  vote  not  entire  policy.  the  less  event, likely  Democrat,  as  to  but  Table  1 shows,  support  none  of  the  the  Budget  President  other  Committee members  on this  institutional  vote  than  variables  the  were  36.6  average  displayed  a  per  Southern significant  score.  Among significant. 0.7  the A  constituency  one  percentage  point  point  variables  increase  increase  in  in  only  the  the  the  percentage  percentage  chances  in  of its  a  non-white  constituency  Representative  was  brought  opposing  a the  President.  The  Budget  Committee  being  proposed  by  would  give the  Committee  created:  using  Phil  the  Gramm,  budget  a  rare  as  a  a  chance  committees  whose jurisdictions its  was  temporary  and  committee  they  Committee  (the  J.  its  growth  might chairman  Downey, N . Y . , )  were  be  a  surprise,  Committee  to perform  macro-economic  older  rotated,  seem  Budget  the  to  Committee  may  1974  commitment  Budget  score  had  been  members  very power of  power  than  on.  Three  Democratic  also on the  Okla.,  not  to  Richard  the  for  since to  bill if  which  its  offend  Indeed,  Budget  and  J i m Jones,  But,  the  and,  work  overlapped. the  all  member  the  tool.  careful  after  as  members Gephardt,  of of  passed, it  was  inception any  of  in the  membership  Committee  interests  was  had any  less other  the  Budget  M o . , and  Thomas  W a y s and M e a n s C o m m i t t e e .  1 7  ' I ' m continually r e m i n d i n g t h e m , ' D a n Rostenkowski said in 1982, 'that y o u ' l l be on that C o m m i t t e e for three or four years but then you're back on W a y s and M e a n s . ' (CQ Weekly Report V o l 40 N o 25 p l 4 4 8 col 3, 19.6.82.) 'If the Budget committees w a n t e d a n d were eager to take power they could take it,' said c h a i r m a n Jones, 'but it w o u l d be a short-term power grab that would result i n the long-term demise of the budget process.'( C Q 15 Aug 1981 pl465 1  7  ANALYSIS  OF DATA  /  68  2. Gramm-Latta II The  President's  stage  omnibus budget with  his  bill,  bout it  on  price  This  was  was  a  vote  up  a  second  triumph  G r a m m - L a t t a II ( H R 3 9 8 2 ) . R e a g a n  S t o c k m a n who  Los  made  Angeles  the  on  then  the  important  with  the  helped clinch  afternoon  promise  to  of  three  a  vote  on the  President's  to  replace  a  for  entire  policy,  which  involved  from  billion  broadly  New  w o r t h of spending  It passed  would  New  Deal  budget  drawn  up  by  the  expect  the  Deal/Great  House  way  would  doing  we would  expect  other  things  scores  President.  were  are  Committees  a  variables  which  reflect  of  the  strongly related  in every  House  bill  called  area  except  being  equal,  to  part  percentage  doubt,  of  there  rolled  were  oppose  the  point  is  who  benefit  and, second, the  'coalition' an  honour  attack  among  to  be  on  the  committee  C o m m i t t e e seniority score. W e  committees,  the  22.7  Appropriations  percentage  President  place move up the more  resistance 14  the  also represented  other  likely of,  to  first,  and  spending  more  average  likely,  Southern  17.6 percentage  points  C o m m i t t e e S e n i o r i t y scale  oppose  the  point  than  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committee were  reflection of the  being t h r o w n a w a y  are  groups  to opposition.  Committee  no  as  two  Budget  0.9  or  The bill  of the  and,  fall  Insofar  likely to do so. F o r each one  members  would  expect that to show up i n the  Democrats. M e m b e r s of the more  which  programmes,  things.  membership  Budget, to be most  Members  constituency  Society  to opposition to the of  cuts  It  217-211.  related  members  vote,  those produced by six spending committees.  for  We  the  substituting,  Stockman. This  defence.  victory  Democrats  committees w i t h a Reaganomic one d r a w n up by D a v i d $37.3  second  support.  en bloc, W h i t e House proposals was  set  of phonecalling from  although sugar  managers  the  Budget  committees  President.  These  and Appropriations whose  Democratic h i e r a r c h y i n general.  work  was  A N A L Y S I S OF The  D A T A / 69  strongest negative score among the constituency variables came from the  variable  measuring  increase in the  the  percentage of constituents living  in cities. A  percentage of urban residents in a constituency  one  point  brought a  0.5  percentage point increase in the likelihood of a Southern Democrat voting against the  President.  A  one  point  increase  meant a Southern Democrat was  0.6  in the  suburban  population  in a  district  percentage point more likely to oppose the  President.  On  this vote representatives were again put in the position of voting for or  against the President's entire economic policy and by  they did so after a media blitz  the President which inspired a barrage of letters, telegrammes and  calls  from  constituents. This  was  not  a  vote  on  which  telephone  Representatives  could  escape the attention of their constituents.  3. The  The  Tax  Tax  policy  Cut  Cut  but  pursued  (HR4242) was  one  with  the as  an  President much  ideologically distinct part of Reagan's economic  saw  zeal  as  as  his  leadership (represented  by  the Ways and  a  the  Tax  bidding war  cut of 23  before  per cent over two  that proposed by  The  Cut  central to his objectives and budgets.  the Democrats. The  and  the  he  Democratic  Means Committee) became embroiled in  passed. The  years  Reagan  which  which was  President's proposal larger and  was  for a  less progressive than  President's proposal passed 238-195.  vote involved another implicit attack on the New  Deal because the cuts  would have to be matched with cuts somewhere in the budget. It also offered all taxpayers  a  financial  variables  to  be  related  associated with higher the white  bonus. We to  might, therefore, expect the  opposition  income (the Tax  President  those  Deal  type  to  the  Cut  would have a regressive effect) like  collar percentage, the suburban percentage and  and  New  variables  the average income, to  be positively associated with presidential support.  We  might also expect all three committees to be  associated with opposition  ANALYSIS to the  President. T h e W a y s a n d  Committee  would  have  to  Means Committee was  make  the  Appropriations Committee would have  Indeed,  in  the  committees  were  Ways  Means  and  likelihood  of  percentage  more  likely  opposing  and  to  the  more  an  a  President. to  the  of  all  the  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committee  levels  three  than  percentage  Budget  oppose  new  the  / 70  Budget  and  the  items.  President  33.2  A  b e i n g rolled,  the  members  oppose  produced  likely  fit  to cut the line  Democratic  Committee  points  Democrat  South,  spending  OF DATA  their  point  Committee  bill  than  member  increase  The  in  was  average  32  fiscal  fellows.  member  the  was  major  the 26.6  Southern  percentage  points  more likely to do so.  None  of the  other  or  support  for the  an  explicit  attack  were be  on  a  as  many  the  New  Tax  Cut  of  theoretical  all  Reaganomics present  three  doubts  in  about  (doubts the  Deal  had  thought  to several, influences. F i r s t , members  significantly  in  constituency groups  either  supporters  was  related  of  not that  fiscal  the  Roberts  These  not  either  a  the and  Second,  doubts  which  were  perhaps  Although  the  T a x C u t vote  on  which  all  taxpayers  for  were  since  House may  been  in  also  be  due from  widespread element  and  favour  of  were senior  shared  President). A n d third, equally  II  Reagan  revealed,  staff,  have  and  reaction  side/trickle d o w n  White  the  cut,  there  not  may  could  negative  S t o c k m a n have  the  the  incentive  of the  supply  top  it. It  obscured. T h i s  conservative Democrats who otherwise supported of  Gramm-Latta I  major  was  strength  other  were  that  opposition to  T a x C u t was  m o v e d to resist  such  effect  the  of  Stockman, 18  been  way  committees.  wisdom as  the  were  there w a s  the  which,  minds  or  major  Congressional R e p u b l i c a n s .  bias  to  President on this vote. It m a y be t h a t the  and so those  that  variables  by  despite of  the  legislation.  another  vote  Reaganomics.  1  8  Op.  Cit.  Again  the  itself w a s  Representatives President  took  a  were every  substitute seen  to  amendment be  opportunity  voting to  it for  draw  represented or  against  the  public's  ANALYSIS attention  to  the  Congressman  fact  the  The  fall  vote  President  selected  to  and  tried for  represent  Education b i l l to the  were defeated  these  programmes, to  the  cuts  Southern  for  the  Members  members  to  as  of  vote of the  areas  increase  0.5  the  against other  were not significantly  two fiscal  of  likely collar  39  point more  i n the  likely  u r b a n population  variables  which  collar  residents  white  show and  income i n a constituency a  to  oppose  the  President.  there  of presidential support  from  than  entitlement  to opposition  population  was a  a  For 2.4  Southern  expect.  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committee President  cuts.  of the A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  constituency  white  is also as we would  the  redistributive  percentage  in average  point more  chance  to  President.  were  other  $ 1 , 0 0 0 increase  i n the  wanted  28 Democrats and  members  percentage  the  an  H e a l t h and H u m a n  instructions to m a k e  directly at  also expect  predicted. The  in  to  parties.  struck  were, the  of cuts.  cuts  N e w D e a l variables to be related  urban  increase  round  President  s i x t h of October w i t h  struck  1 percentage  point  point  the  P r e s i d e n t for each one point increase  D e m o c r a t . T h e latter  to  from  Democrats  was  percentage  likely  have  income. F o r each  percentage  their  proposed  of L a b o r , of  produced the bill to oppose the  constituency,  Representative each  support  second  concerned  Supporters  position. W e would  Southern  average  campaign  their respective  expect the  Democrats  to vote against  up  that  249-168 on the  we w o u l d  Committee w h i c h  their  their  previously unplanned  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committee with  would  President's  of  a  (HR4560).  Republicans v o t i n g a g a i n s t  As  to communicate  appropriations bill for the departments  r e c o m m i t the They  them  71  Cuts  the  $87.2 billion Services,  encourage  /  or w o m a n .  4. T h e A u t u m n In  and  OF DATA  with  were  30  other  Committees, which  more likely to do so than the  points  more  S o u t h e r n ' Democrats  while  were  percentage  not directly  average  threatened,  Southern Democrat.  ANALYSIS Although defections displayed  this  to  is  make  the it  first  vote  worthwhile  the  President  went  on  his  position on this vote. B u t the  his  supporters  the  were  tired  President though  had he  tried  had, that  the  rather  vote  to  than  think  a  they  budgetary be  could  process  Oakar  to  proposal  budget  that  came  defense  expenditure.  response  was  to  voting  up  vote was  sufficient  behaviour  Republican  no  variables  the  to  rally  Representatives  support  declared the  also a  This  on  a  or  was  to  budget  have  the  A  for  Perhaps  perhaps  they  fourth  time  that  year  issue  problem solved  encouraged  constituents.  that  support  the  fiscal  vote to r e c o m m i t a n  also  vote  popular  m u c h s m a l l e r this time.  their  public  it m i g h t  explain  try  economic policies.  summer,  bill  committees, Democratic  proposal, w h i c h , closest  It  to  for  the  appropriations  bill  the  Representatives  recomittal  envisioned cuts  and  will,  on  nor  of  them  had  any  h i e r a r c h y tacitly supported  own  bulk  of  that  May  27  with  71  President  hatched this  its chances  proposal, d r a w n  up  of the  Budget  Southern  i n the  by  Committee  Democrats.  the  attempt  the that would  We  the  slows  the  i n the  end,  money  by  and  would  64  no formal position  voted on.  of the  three  major  fiscal  However,  compromise the  Budget  be  to  cutting  the  Republican  complex vote that would  the  the  billion  Democrats  adopted  of  G O P budget  $4.85  amendment. to  defeat  the  added  the  w o r k of a n y  W e might expect, therefore,  among  amendment  The  the  for  1982, w a s  w a s one of a s t o r m of a m e n d m e n t s  not  membership  opposition  May  their parties.  was  contenders.  to late  obtained  being amended  their  responsible  The  228-196  leadership's bill a n d so damage which  up  largely  passing.  passed  voting against  this vote w h i c h  The  (HRes345) w a s  M e d i c a r e funding  Republicans  and  were  Amendment  on  the  to  without guaranteeing  outlays  in  their  television  his  whip  amend  amendment  Latta-Michel  on  there  made.  5. The Oakar The  analysing  writing  with  i n the  year. T h e fact  to  of  becoming disillusioned  even  which  / 72  a noteworthy score for N o r t h - E a s t e r n R e p u b l i c a n s .  Again  were  on  OF DATA  C o m m i t t e e , was  follow one  of  C o m m i t t e e seniority variable associated expect  with  presidential  Budget  Committee  A N A L Y S I S OF D A T A membership  to have  the same  constituency  variables all those  effect  among  Northern  Republicans.  measuring the presence of the New  / 73 Among  Deal groups  which benefit from Medicare ought to be related to presidential opposition.  As  expected Committee seniority is significant for Southern Democrats. A one  place move up the scale brings a 0.9 percentage point increase in opposition to the President.  Among  Southern  Democrats two constituency  variables show up. A  $1,000  increase i n the average income is related to a 11.4 percentage point rise in the likelihood  of presidential  opposition, which  variable. And, as might be expected,  fits  in with  the pattern  for that  a one point increase in the percentage of  white collar workers brought a 3.5 percentage point increase in the probability of support for the Republican  Among related  Northern  to support  position.  Republicans  membership  of the Budget  for the amendment (and opposition to the GOP  Members were 76 percentage points more likely to support other Northern  Committees  was  leadership).  the amendment than  Republicans. Members of the Ways and Means Committee, on the  other hand, were 58 percentage points more likely to oppose the amendment and vote with their leadership.  No this vote without  other  variables were significant for either group  of Representatives  on  which was the first on which the President was caught flatfooted and a clear position. This is partly because his economic policy had lost its  momentum but also partly because the House was safe from attention, obscuring the details of its actions in the most Byzantine  of rules.  6. Latta Budget Substitute The  House finally passed' a budget for fiscal 1983 on the tenth of June  when  they voted to replace the President's original budget, which had been sent to the floor by the Budget Committee, with one sponsored by the Republican  leadership.  ANALYSIS The  President took no formal  substitution  which  voting against  their  Although the  one  the  the  being  was  between  to  the  membership,  to  had  sent  clear  This  to  was  with  be  New  to  the  15  way  for  the  74  tacitly approved of the  Republicans and  to  more  moderate  46  Democrats  Budget  or  the  we  variables  the  Committee  Budget would  and  opposition  Republican  i n practise  a  case  Deal  related  a  House,  substitute  being  the  substitute  the  Republican  all  220-207  but  /  parties.  vote  used  follow.  Democrats  passed  President  was  would  was  position (on H C R e s 3 5 2 )  OF DATA  to  the  President's budget.  Committee expect  committee  budget  budget  The  choice  proposals  Budget  seniority  Republican  for  Committee  for  bill  that  Southern  (i.e.  to  the  President).  Members percentage Southern  of  the  points  Budget  more  Democrats.  percentage  points  Democrat.  For  Southern  Committee  likely  Ways  to  and  more likely each  Democrats  one  vote  place  were  oppose  Means  to  were, the  Table  with  1  Republican  Committee  increase  2.4  as  proposals  members,  the  G O P than  in  their  percentage  demonstrates,  other  were  average  Committee  points  than  however, the  29.4  31.5  Southern  Seniority  more  likely  to  urban  voters  was  score  oppose  the  President.  Among most the  Southern  influential  of  Democrats  the  percentage  constituency-related  variables.  u r b a n or suburban populations brought  chance collar  of  voting  population  against they  were  President both of w h i c h  For  Northern  the  are  bill. 2.8  of  For  a  0.6  each  A  point  points  scores consistent w i t h  Republicans, as  Table  2  shows,  a Representative  9.6  oppose  is  White  proposal,  which  more strongly associated meant  a  Northern  as  expected.  w i t h opposition to the  Republican  was  10.8  increase  either  point increase i n  increase  more  in  likely  in to  the  their  the  white  support  the  expectations.  percentage blue collar made the  point  percentage  one  percentage  one  again  a  one  point  increase  in  the  percentage points more likely to collar  constituents  G O P budget.  percentage  point  were  even  A one point increase more  likely  to  vote  ANALYSIS against other  the  budget,  which  is  not  what  we  might  expect  is  /  consistent  75 with  votes.  T h i s is the only occasion on w h i c h  Southern D e m o c r a t members  and  M e a n s Committee were substantially more likely  the  President's  House  to  would  be  any  produced  of eight and  the  intense  public  process  and  were  budgets  so. voted  y e a r before, pressure  left  the  the  from  for  at  the  last  the  best  bet  poor  Representatives  to those  leadership  that,  attempt, in  he  belief  the  House  to go back to  what  b l a m e the  the  President  wanted!  The  been  their  to  failure of  that  the  budget  the  Latta  answer  accompanied  himself salvage  from what  constituencies  and  be,  the  Pity  explain  President's budget  would  by  they  of legislative poker.  who still cared w h y , i n voting to throw out the  done  support  workable  distanced  i n this complicated game  who had  to  Ways  i n their o w n image.  now in  the  no  the  of the  average  after  resolution h a d  President,  Republican  t h a n the  worried  first budget  the  of his economic strategy  had  they  gave them scope to rework the budget  Where,  could  position. Perhaps  pass  proposals  the  but  OF DATA  presumably,  they to  m a c h i a v e l l i a n workings of the institution.  7. T a x Increases The  vote  to  send  a  Senate  most  bewildering move  July  28  for  yet  tax in  bill  the  directly to poker  Conference  game.  The  D a n Rostenkowski's motion ( H R 4 9 6 1 )  try  shuffle  I n a l l , 44 Republicans and 60 D e m o c r a t s voted against their parties. •  the  would  measure  greater which  expect  designed  members to save  of the their  face.  Committee seniority to support way  m i g h t lie.  the  interests  of  the  Ways  other  the  the  and  Senate  Means  We might  also  motion. A p a r t  committees  to  or  the  and  to the  Committee expect from  on  the  Republican  to  support  Democrats  that  the  Means  party.  President,  in and  and  a  the  themselves  Ways  for  onto  put  his  208-197  blame  increase  had  pull  voted  out  tax  fix they  House  was  Committee  We  of the  to  Committee  with  it is unclear  constituency  variables  A N A L Y S I S OF D A T A / 76 For  Southern  representative  Democrats  membership  of  Ways  36.1 percentage point more inclined  and  Means  to vote the party  made line  a  than  their fellows, which is as expected. Membership of the Budget Committee is also significant and is related to an increased 33.1  probability of voting the party line of  percentage point.  Among  Northern  percentage  point  more  Northern Republican  For variables  Republican  Southern  likely  members  to vote  of Ways  for the proposal  Budget Committee member voted  Democrats,  demonstrate  a  as can be  significant  and  seen  score.  were  whereas  43.7  the solitary  loyally.  in Table  An  Means  increase  1, two  constituency  in the  Democratic  percentage in the past four elections of one point brought a 1 percentage point increase  in support  for the party.  population made a Representative  A  one  point  increase  in the non-white  0.7 of a percentage point more likely to do so,  the latter may be interpreted either as a sign of the loyalty of Representatives from more heavily non-white districts to the party hierarchy or their desire for higher tax rates which might increase entitlements.  The  suburban and white collar variables showed up positively for Northern  Republicans.  For each  Representative increase, which  was  one  point  increase  0.5 of a percentage  point  is to be expected. For each  collar percentage a Representative  in the suburban more  likely  one point  population  a  to oppose the tax  increase  in the white  was 0.6 percentage point more likely to vote  the other way: for the tax increase.  The  strategy  which  Rostenkowski  adopted  had  the  disadvantage  compromising traditional privileges of the House of Representatives account for the unusually the  high proportion of very  senior House Democrat, Jamie Whitten  of  and this may  senior defectors. They included  (Miss.), who was the Appropriations  Committee chairman, and six of the eight Southern Democrats who defected on only one of the nine votes. Among those were Carl Perkins (Ky.) the Education and  Labor chairman and William Clay  (Dem. Mo.) a senior member of the Post  ANALYSIS Office  OF DATA  /  77  and C i v i l Service and E d u c a t i o n and L a b o r Committees.  The  constitutional  confusingly,  talked  still  sending  bulk  of voters.  sides  of the  significance  of the  them  to  House  That,  combined  the  which  was  with  the  Committee  was,  almost  with  Senate  allowed members  vote,  'disagreeing'  Conference  House, i n the  fiscal disaster  of  the  and  general  air  on  Senate  a  motion  amendments  certainly,  lost  the  whole manoeuvre  while on  of e m b a r r a s s m e n t  on P e n n s y l v a n i a A v e n u e about  to perform  which,  on  both  the  under  the  a  whole  veil.  8. The Veto Override Reagan's fiscal  heaviest  1982  The  supplemental  House  Republicans  budget  voted  defeat  for  their  the  would  opposition and the  expect  a l l the  overriding of his veto bill  the  New  also membership  (HR  override  parties.  position on this vote. He supported  We  the  appropriations  301-117  voting against  was  The  6863) with  of  preparing  its  the  13  President,  $14.2  28th  of  Democrats  naturally  billion August.  and  enough,  104  took  a  veto.  Deal-related  of the  variables  to  be  associated  with  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s and Budget C o m m i t t e e s  variable m e a s u r i n g Committee seniority because the  way  on  of a  legislation  and,  veto  substantively,  struck at  at  the  New  and  House  Deal-type  appropriations.  A 1.8  one  point increase  percentage  oppose with  the the  veto  for  Southern  one  Northern  percentage  percentage  percentage  in  the  which  other  override w h i c h is as  Among a  increase  override,  pattern  percentage made the  point  i n the  Democrats might be  point increase  rise i n the  in  the A 2.1  that  reverse  one  collar constituents  point  Southern  Democrats  of expectations increase  percentage points  in more  brought  but  the  would  consistent  white  likely  a  to  collar oppose  expected.  Republicans the point  likelihood  was  votes.  of blue  effect  the  is even  blue  likelihood  collar  more  robust  percentage  of opposing the  the  other  supports  President,  which  way, a  6.8 is i n  ANALYSIS accord w i t h collar  expectations.  workers  in a  of a  consistent  w i t h precedent  one  Northern  place  Representative likelihood  was  brought  brought  rather  in  than  for  the  rise  of  with  9.4  with  veto. 2.8  i n the  number  /  78  of white  percentage  point  increase  President,  again  this  in  is a  the score  expectations.  Committee  associated  a  a  R e p u b l i c a n opposing the  climb  of support  seniority  percentage point increase  constituency  likelihood  A  A one  OF DATA  seniority  a  1.3  Among  for  percentage  Northern  percentage  a  points  Southern  point  Democratic  increase  in  the  place  rise  of supporting  the  Republicans a  i n likelihood  one  veto.  Here, policy.  at  He  last, is a lost  badly  1982  roll call  perhaps  Maybe  s i m p l y a case of his c r y i n g  Some  Republicans  of  $5.4  veto  Republicans the  an  the  to  make  'budget  'wolf  Appropriations  for job  creation  They  backed  their  the  December  disliked  billion  Committee.  would  not  tried  vote on the an  buster'  once too  President's  issue  he  out  of  an  described  it  as.  often.  Appropriations  contained the  clearly  he  bill  9. J o b s  was  because  appropriations it was  that  w h i c h is a straight  bill.  The  with and  a  20  low  Democrats.  attempted  campaign  motion w a s  very  and  Committee  rejected  level  The  of  with  to  the  bill have  President  it  threat  215-191 by the  defections  (HJRes631)  on  which  recommitted  that  the  President  House on the  both  sides:  clearly indicated that  just he  to  14th seven  supported  motion.  We either  might  membership  membership of the  of  of the  resistance the  Budget  to  the  President's  Appropriations Committee  Committee  which  is  threat whose  responsible  to  be  bill for  associated it  the  was  with  or  overall  with shape  budget.  Members likely  expect  to  vote  of  the  for  the  Appropriations bill  than  Committee  other  Southern  were  40.2  Democrats  percentage and  point  members  more of  the  ANALYSIS Budget  Committee,  bills, were  In  which  is  responsible  the  South the to  percentage  the  non-whites  President.  produced  a  Among  membership urban  of  for  voters,  Representative  each  and  point urban  two by  vote  be seen  party  by  point  point  i n the  the  breaks  as  the  most  the  expected  increase  increase  in  in  of  a  chances  the  increase 8.8  blue  0.5  benefit  collar.  Democrats  was  be  The  increased  percentage  from fourth  4.6  point  percentage  point,  and  for  each  point  on  party  lines  percentage point.  others  President lost. T h e vote came  i n the  lame-duck session  It  clearly  also  than  traditional m i d - t e r m rejection of the  suggests  that  after  a l l the  turmoil  and  President's of the  past  routine of toeing,  line.  PATTERN laid  coalition.  though his p a r t y votes  variables  non-white population i n a constituency the  and  to  T h r e e of those  income.  with  likely  form.  of the  chapter  new  particularly  chance  any  electorate.  opening  Republican  non-white  was  a reaction to the  F. THE OVERALL  even  in  creation  down more  and large, the p a r t y  Reagan's  increase  the  the  years Representatives were settling down again to the easy  The  appropriations  job  non-whites,  voting  this is w h y the  may  one  bill i n its original  groups  blue collar the increase w a s  This  of  President.  the  each point increase the  shape  79  N o r t h e r n Republicans four constituency variables show significance. A l l  programmes:  of  a  percentage  were related to support for the  For  overall  variable again brought  Here  0.7  Representative opposing the  up  the  /  48.9 percentage point more likely to vote for it.  opposition  pick  for  OF DATA  on  1981  was  the  Southerners,  The  review  Democrat  who  was  the  In  the  majority.  out  of  three to the  drawn  to  he  tale  of  rise  a  series  fashioned  minority. key  the  He  votes  ensure  his  data  above  Reagan's  did this  and  by  policies has  and  by  holding  detaching enjoyed  in  of  President  of victories in the  suggested  coalition  decline  enough  the the  1981.  almost  By  the  all  the  Democrats,  support type  House  of end  of  the  Southern of  the  ANALYSIS year, on  however,  both  suggests were  that  sides  of  that  there  was  one  among  patterns:  of the  coalition  the  House. a  The  to dissolve. This  foregoing  pattern  to  Democrats  go,  defectors  were  disproportionately N e w D e a l pattern  does  characteristics the  begun  and  ones  are  one  not  the  resistance  to  the the  major  vote  other.  B y 1982  setpiece  the  ones  d o w n the  the  President  showdowns  line items and  period  the  was  war  President  to  rather,  far  from  roll  as  the  there  behaviour  constituency  constituencies  decisive back  to  80  calls  that  Southern Democrats that  /  movement  individual  or,  Representatives  with  the  same  constituency  the  party  but  President.  institutional local  fighting had  to  Republicans. T h e  come  seems  that d r a w  when  committees to a  it  s u p p o r t i n g the  President  among  due  hypothesis that, as  likely  but  was  of the  defections,  characteristics. F o r the  emerge,  that keep t h e m  Throughout  ground  not  more  analysis  these  N o r t h e r n R e p u b l i c a n s bears out the  variables  clear  had  OF DATA  variables  prerogatives against  altered the  are  opposition  the  up  associated  threatened. of  tone of the  of attrition. F r o m  one  with  On  every  committee  c a m p a i g n from  in a  series  or  grand  committee-room bunkers  i n dissipating his forces  a m y r i a d of amendments  show  they  of s k i r m i s h e s on  and procedural votes.  1. Constituency variables The  data  suggest  t h a t the  President  throughout  accounted  for  cannot,  purely  therefore,  two  are  the  mood of the  kinds  be  not unrelated.  readiest  and in  that  terms  the of  explained  behaviour  constituency  entirely  in  strongly to opposition to  of  Representatives  influences.  terms  The  were  changed always  to give themselves  the  but  also  of constituency  most  that  cannot  change  T h e constituency variables m a y be telling us  constituents  of constituency  and the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l variables are  members  up to the pull of the  be  voting  variables.  The  not j u s t  that  Representatives  reluctant  in  the  from  of the  committees.  certain coalition  ANALYSIS a. Northern The  /  81  Republicans  expectation  President's pattern  OF DATA  was  that  coalition  Representatives  as the  would  grow  more  likely  to  desert  the  N e w D e a l nature of their constituencies increased. The  displayed by N o r t h e r n Republicans over  the  six regressions  offers  support  to this hypothesis.  The are  three variables most  non-white,  percentage  blue  increase  collar,  i n the  unambiguously linked  to  and  cases,  urban.  number  Republican Representatives  be  in  Table  support for the vote  in  2.  The  Oakar  urban  final  vote in  amendment,  indicates  but  relationship  between  an  and  opposition to the  the  percentage  result  increase  was  President. T h i s  suburban  support four times, once significantly occasion to a significant degree. the in  same  pattern  mind  workers areas  that and  it  that  associated  with  of  areas  less  urban  strongly  suburban some  be  of the  negative  signs  for  the  next A  variable m e a s u r i n g  the  percentage  of  expected  that  related  t i p p i n g the to  It  scale  opposition  and  was  collar  to  sometimes  percentage  positively  the  in a  constituency  the  behaviour of  related  white  include  workers  cannot because  powerful,  to  presidential  twice, on  neither  been expected to d i s p l a y , at  variable  the  coalition.  is compounded b y  would  that  presidential support. are  New Deal  consistent,  might have  white  indicate first  so, and negatively so o n l y  percentage  (which  can  President.  of presidential opposition as  the  might  It  signs  support  white collar  This  President; as  the  surprise  variable.  the  made  for  the  i n the  constituents  a  the  workers, a group t r a d i t i o n a l l y associated w i t h the  counter-expectational  predicted,  and  farm  the  of  Deal  cuts,  similiar  displayed by  away  had  New  fall  very  was  ebbing  then  1 9 8 1 , the  the  as  collar  positive  This  pattern  an  had  three.  One  pattern  blue  for  and  less likely to vote w i t h  percentage  President) for the  1982, the  all  of non-white or  Northern seen  In  support  be the  a  that  than  of  distributed  be  more white  variable the  Bearing  blue  be  the  urban  variable.  number  will  would  President  collar  least,  in rural  likely collar  collar  to  be  residents  is consistently  percentage  white  collar is.  The  income  variable  was  related  to  opposition to  the  President  on  the  fall  ANALYSIS cuts  of  next  two  to  significant degree  a  move  1981,  but  and  in  the  not  to  a  significant degree.  positively related  opposite  on  to  one  It  presidential  of them.  direction to  was  almost  support  T h i s is a  the  New  Deal  variable  was  the  OF DATA  over  neutral  the  variable  variables,  next  we  would  and  that  /  82  over  the  three  and  expect  to  is w h a t  it  did.  The  final  percentage. where  constituency  W e expected  public  support  this to be related  for  him  was  to resistance  particularly  and d i s p l a y e d no r e a d i l y discernible  incumbent's  party's  to the  strong.  It  average  President  was  never  in cases significant  pattern.  b. Southern Democrats The  pattern  for  the  percentage non-white with  opposition to  last  votes  of the  consistently  Southern  Democrats  is  variable again performed  the  President,  nine,  associated  twice  as  can be seen  with  opposition  to  Over  third  the  nine  consistently the  New  votes  strongly  percentage  tendency  to  for their  votes.  In  blue  collar and  treetops after  opposition  collar.  1982,  as  white  a flood.  the  the  positively linked  support  collar scores 1  President,  however,  the  among  9  on  the  more  for  these  away out  from  at  linked  first  so  and  than  two  for  variables  more  strongly  and  consistently  is  well  as  to  there  is  a  stronger  President's  even  expected.  Democrats  collar as  to grow the  a l l as  Southern  percentage blue  over  the  position  the  like  a  row of  9  suburban  President  and  is  strongly  significantly so  on  two  B o t h variables are related to presidential opposition increase, the most problematic of the nine votes. 1  always  percentage is also  much  behave  Presidential support  stand  was  1. The u r b a n  President  drains  and  The  degree.  not,  to  problematic.  significant degree:  the  Furthermore  association w i t h  percentage to  for  more  expected  i n Table  variable does  support  white  nine  The  Deal  as  a  N o r t h e r n R e p u b l i c a n s , twice to a significant  The  much  associated  occasions.  just  once,  with  But,  as  with  on  the  tax  ANALYSIS the  percentage  over  time.  suggest  Unlike  that  return  non-white  to  as  the  the  at  as  the  rough  usual,'  The  survey  scores  Representatives themselves  as  of  southerner  to  town  voters  w i t h the  If  Southern  quite  sign  these was  it  of  a  variables  replaced  was  good  Representatives  change do a  slow  old  New  Deal  to  grab  what  out  by  not  above  suggested  in  and  the  President.  old south,  suburban which  always  What  as  Reagan's  p a r t i c u l a r l y quick  South,  were  that  much  that  to return to  the  suggest  that  variables often  like  readier  leaves  are  c o m m o n l y characterised  to  as  characterise  than  the  campaign  the  rural  average  and  'red  necks'  set  of  small sticking  it  explains  an  opposition.  another  increase If  the  in  counter-expectational  average  affluent  cities  income oppose  is  scores.  consistently  the  President  For  related  then  this  to is  logical.  The to  no  2 0  Democrats  presidential  is  and  replaced  a l l the  urban  South',  the  the  true  there  percentages  Border states were  cities  oppose  is  collar  what  data  the  'New  President.  this  the  from  from  that  the  for  the  blue  urban  / 83  constituents.  waned D e m o c r a t s from fold.  and  pork b a r r e l w i t h  they could for their  The  white  percentage  P r e s i d e n t i a l alliance c r u m b l e d  'business  backscratching  and  OF DATA  variable m e a s u r i n g the  support  readily  for  the  discernible  percentage  of  the  President pattern total  four  and  they  as  'red neck'  of the  times  never  population  constituencies i n w h i c h a refutation  percentage  are  to  which  of f a r m w o r k e r s and a  to  opposition  significant  farm  was  workers  most h e a v i l y represented,  four  degree. make  positively  related  times,  with  Given  the  up,  even  this need not be  no tiny  in  the  taken  theory.  M y impression, based on a s u r v e y of the r a w d a t a , is that the retirement belt along the G u l f coast of E a s t e r n L o u i s i a n a , A l a b a m a a n d F l o r i d a is also an area of P r e s i d e n t i a l support, i n those constituencies w h i c h did not have a Republican Representative. These too would be areas of low u r b a n and low suburban density and of below average income but w i t h a high proportion of people describing themselves as white collar.  2  0  ANALYSIS For with  Southern  Democrats  Presidential  significantly  but  the  support  once  six  to an  m a r g i n variable also oscillated. It was times  N o r t h e r n Republicans, it failed  is  that  marginality  non-existent as  Fenno  or  themselves  to be.  implies)  face  to  repeated  be  what  has  the  not  terror  Fiorina  have  is how  this  variable  marginal  not  of primaries. While the  offered like  the  anticipated  condemned  men,  to  support have  is  small  their  or  Perhaps,  Representatives  perceive  into  to  as  manner.  equanimity  analysis has  once  The implication  (and this is something  take  84  associated  times;  seek  i n a different  greater  did  us  /  Democrats,  predicted results.  to be measured  really counts  three  F o r Southern  encouraged  of reelection with  that  Representatives,  opposition  H e suggests that Representatives  m a r g i n a l i s i n g effects it  with  to deliver the  effect  t h a t it will  suggests,  and  almost negligible degree.  for  the  OF DATA  over  time.  account  Fiorina It  the  potential  not disproved the  the  idea  minds  more  ought  that  thesis  marginal  concentrated  on  their o w n m o r t a l i t y .  2. Committees The  prediction  volatile  than  related  to  case.  for  the  the  The  the  committee  constituency  interests  second  variables  variables  and,  of a committee  prediction  was  was,  on  that  first,  secondly, that a  the  given vote.  committee  Committee  seniority variable, would be closely related  President's  assault  out,  but  5 percent  and  Committee  Means Table  2  would would  This was  to general  be  more  be closely  certainly  the  particularly  the  opposition to  the  T h i s prediction was  born  scores  significant i n both  Table  shows,  1 demonstrates,  it  with  at  institutional variables. F o r  this happens w i t h  and for Committee seniority and happens  directions  membership  of  membership  at  least  Southern  of the  Ways  for N o r t h e r n Republicans,  the  Ways  and  Means  and  Committees.  Although there  they  variables,  of doing things.  level on a one-tailed test were  as  Budget  way  only variables to produce  Democrats,  as  House  they  less c l e a r l y so.  The the  on the  that  is  not  all a  the  single  institutional vote  variables  on which  are  all four  significant  i n either  on  group  several show  up  occasions together.  ANALYSIS There  are  even  directions. the  on  which  tax  however,  the  Southern  the  l o y a l t y to the  first  of the  other  vote and  the  vote  only  with  they  are  to  run  B u t , there  was  hierarchy m i g h t d e m a n d  no  support  latter  the  are  Democrats and  the  defect,  status  stands  variable  is  of  up  for  related  once significantly, expectation.  President,  votes  it is significant.  herd  the  unambiguous  opposing the  The  variables. The two  with  times,  different  to opposition to  seniority  R e p u b l i c a n s , where  in  / 85  significant degree.  of S o u t h e r n  institutional  twice and to opposition four  pattern.  pulling  presidential  13 percent the  For Northern  a  override. O n the  higher  likely  up  committee  associated  where  the  twice to  three  veto  turn  seniority is related  six votes,  is  less  support  unambiguous  committee  seniority  that  Democrats.  presidential  Democrats  any  is the  prediction  institutional variables  of the  increase  representatives,  no  each  Committee  awkward  so  on  is not true for  This,  where  F o r Southern  President  same  cases  OF DATA  to  there is  Sometimes  sometimes  it might  involve supporting h i m .  G.  CONCLUSIONS  Insofar  as  the  analysis  of  data  was  Congressional behaviour  it suggests  ignore  variables.  all  included  in  important the  institutional the  consideration  incidence  directly  calculations  the  case  directly e x p l a i n the  But,  the  The  fact that it occurred at  of the  two  Congressional  terms,  much  the  w a y the  spending Committee and  then  will  change  first  up  support.  throughout  way  Membership  years  When tend  the  nine  so  get  on  passes  the  with those  work  bills  either  turf  rally  than  House that  or  work  1982.  flag.  and  in  itself  was This  a  or  the fairly  an  pattern  to  committee  does  most  was not  1981  is  to  any 1982.  change.  year  in  highlighted by House lets  Ways  appropriations  is  fairly in  unusual  the  the  lightly  be  root of the  oddness  and  a  This  from  w o r k . I n general  Committee,  can  of a  the  House  on  committees  it  furthermore,  to  1981,  of p r e p a r i n g intact  three  is,  theories  would be w r o n g to  give a clue to the  with,  Appropriations the  There  competing  suggest  mood of the  a l l does  dealt  the  to  votes  House dealt w i t h its b u d g e t a r y  committees,  two  theorists  of  the  to  i n the  more  of  enough  Representatives.  members  test  t h a t constituency  shows  of committee  threatened  consistently  for  a  and  and  amended.  the  Means  tax There  bills are  ANALYSIS good  reasons  for  tasks  which  their  perhaps,  the  this.  parent  will  to  Stockman  did  the  overturned  the  entire  the  w i l l , or the  Brady, formation suggest  it  that  started  with  election  his  them  meant  the  right  could  president.  entire 1982  hands  of the  which  will  Democrats.  argues  that  encapsulates  what  One  individuals  the  thing,  home  back  1981 returns  as  want  unless  and  the  the  House  have  the  stamina,  task.  the  behaviour  of  Washington  the  elections, of the  lower deficit, first.  the  Senate  the  of 1981 sufficiently  but  The  The  was  first  press  whatever came  to  Republican  therefore  everyone a  despite  a  its committees, a  the  returned  but,  preconditions for  it  changes  although not had  or  returns  A n d those  voters  to  fever. it  House  changes.  come  Representative  other  which,  as  porkbarrel,  they  say  suggesting constituents  h a d become  himself,  in  the  realignment  r u n for Congress by r u n n i n g against  and  a  folks  a  House, and  d i l e m m a of the  government,  bad  David  congressional and presidential  of B r a d y ' s crucial  federal  is  when  in  economic  or,  fulfilled.  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committee  concerned,  turned  time,  Perhaps  members  the  the  nature.  state  86  goal-oriented  grip of N e w Coalition  in  /  1981,  did not  events  supporters  and  In  of  ideological  should  had  they  the  i n the  wanted  ability,  2 1  budget  accounts  disease  had left the  last w a s not  bloated  the  the  certain  to repeat the  revolts  lower taxes  They  of 30 seats, they  Fenno  to  tax  voters  agree  swing  deficit  Fenno.  provide  1981 convinced t h a t  lower expenditure,  Republican  both  says  alternatives  ideological  popular  perform  lacks  In  is of a n  to  whole  the  have been  out,  and  predisposed  in  the  writing  Mayhew  points  Kemp  in January  Nothing  of  House m a y  capital  the  a  committee budget.  and  Brady  by  perhaps  on  as  created  adequately,'  confidence i n the  the  as  incubated  meant  perfrom work  Ripley  that  the  chamber  are  of dominant coalitions which resemble  infection,  was  'Committees  OF DATA  a nationwide issue  spending far which,  otherwise.  as  better  committees. the  it  than  is  folks  the  role of  They  embody  back  home  are  what  the  interpreted  the  assumed,  Representatives  Congress.  is  wanted otherwise. The size of the and President R e a g a n claimed  to  federal  have  the  F e n n o , R . F . The Power of the Purse p.5. Fenno calculates that 90 percentage point of A p p r o p r i a t i o n s Committee recommendations are passed by the H o u s e . 2  1  ANALYSIS answer.  A  majority  solution  was  worth  this  issue  the  the  of  Representatives  t r y i n g or,  Reagan  had  that  run  seem  their  for  the  to  have  constituents  believed  wanted  P r e s i d e n c y by  OF DATA either,  them  / 87  that  to t r y  his  it. O n  running, implicitly,  against  House A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e .  The Over  Republicans showed a l l the  the  three  key  remained  loyal  Democrat  defectors  South  and  important major  to  the  (though  not  the  1981  and  came  at  the the  without  tax cost  and  The cuts  the  the  most  President i n order  the had  to  special  in  frequent  to agree to  be  sure  Reagan's  1981  South.  areas  considerations.  the  included few  by  were  But  The  areas:  defectors  of defectors  Deep  i n 1981.  traditionally liberal  t r a d i t i o n a l l y conservative  hard-core  from  of d a m a g i n g  any  defections  general  formed  from  for  the  Southern  in  junior  asking  from  The  2  but  who  extremely)  budget  2  members  Those  Representatives  precisely  Belt.  price for their defections. the  their  party  came  Sun  senior  figures.  votes  h a l l m a r k s of a new dominant party  were  not  a l l relatively  they  extracted  a  'special consideration' on  of a  majority. T h e  chances  of creating  victory  in  an 'exclusive'  coalition.  By  the  next  constituencies cases) to  defend  1981, or  have  had voted  from  and  reduce  the the  year also  in  their  h e a v i l y for  cutbacks. Reagan  They  budget  the  had and  that their constituents  tax  They  from  traditionally  T h e i r constituents 1980  missed  out  cuts  President i n  i n terms  were  in  President's  constituencies.  seniority or  Republicans  lesson.  Reagan  deficit. A n d the  industrialised  average  Northern  learnt  Republicans who deserted or  the  had  but  they  on the failed  also  were  neither  of committee  well  (in  most  had  local  interests  boodle that  was  going i n  the  economy  The  Northern  to  p o p u l a r i t y was 1982 tended  may  liberal  stimulate declining.  to come from  strikingly  membership.  suffering disproportionately from  above  more  urban  nor  below  T h e i r complaint  was  cutbacks.  A s Fenno points out there have been other times w h e n Southern Democrats and Republicans, united b y w h a t he calls 'economy moods', have allied to force cuts on the Democrat-controlled committees. In The Power of the Purse (pp,472-478) he discusses the events of 1 9 5 1 . 2  2  ANALYSIS What  most  damaged  the  realignment  w a s their  Stockman's  G r a m m - L a t t a II bill  that  he disqualified  legislation.  were just  through  because  stamp  with  difficulties the  a  temperature  Reagan  not be sustained  policies d i d not m e a n the as  economic usual'  remained.  second  i t came  state o f  to drafting  to help  year  p u s h his  a n d his policies  to the House  it does  were  no  they  were  came  That  a n d t a x bills  a n d the House  according to M a y h e w ,  that  committees  up  longer  committees  with.  have  to content  of  h a d such  i n 1 9 8 2 . T h e 1 9 8 0 election a n d at their  inability  B y the end o f 1982 the ideological  satisfying  process  w a s r e t u r n i n g to  the p a r t i c u l a r i z e d electoral  I f changing the direction of the economy w a s beyond  would  to  to accept,  T h e sense  is w h y the H o u s e  appropriations  best:  prepared  prepared  Congressional unease  as a macroeconomic tool.  h a d cooled  their re-election.  for a  long-term  Atlantic Monthly m e a n t  when  T h e alternative  campaign h a d reawakened  the members  to  a  T h e chaotic  h a d encouraged  of Representatives  producing appropriations  needs of its members. then  creating  the committees.  a n d his admissions  which  majority  what  to use the budget  of  / 88  so attractive.  'business  President's  what,  could  chances  as a plausible alternative  of crisis  Reagan's  unquestioningly, unease  to capture  not living up to expectations.  no longer appeared  rubber  himself  T h e sense  programme  Just  failure  Republicans'  OF DATA  themselves  with  trying  to  them  guarantee  Gramm Latta I Suburban  - .002  (.003)  1981 Gramm Tax L a t t a II Cuts  Fal 1 Cuts  Oakar Amendm'  .006* ( .003) .005* ( .003)  - .003  - .002  - .000  ( .003) - .002 ( .003)  ( .003) - .005* ( .002)  ( .003)  Latta GOP-Bud -.006* (.003)  Urban  - .003  B1ue col 1  ( .003) .009' ( .015)  .004 ( .015)  .008 .015) (  .001 .014) (  ( .003) .020 ( .015)  .009 ( 017)  .009 ( .017)  .01 1 ( .017)  .024 ( .017)  .035* ( .018)  .028* (.017)  .000 ( .025)  .022 ( .025) .008 ( .064)  .007 .025) (  - .004  .023 ( .025)  .013 (.025)  - .068  - .098  ( .064)  ( .062)  -.010 (.064)  - 004  .002 ( .004)  1 14* 066) ( - 005 ( 004) 001 ( 004) - 017*  .005 (.004)  - 013  ( .004) - .002  ( 010) - 332* ( 178)  ( .010) - .024 ( . 171 )  ( 01 1 ) 033 ( 183)  - 266  - . 145  . 176  ( 197) - 317*  ( . 150)  ( 152)  ( .189) - .301* ( . 147)  106 ( 203) 004 ( 156)  1 .316  2 224  1 . 346  318  (1 . 39) 0 . 169  (1 48) 0 164 1 340 94  White c o l Farm Wkr Income ($1000) Black Marg i n Com Sen  - 004  ( 070) - 007* ( 004) 005 ( .005) - 009  ( 011) W & Means - 038 ( 179) Budget  - 367*  Approps  ( 179) - 081 ( 153)  Constant  935  .001 ( .004) .006 ( .004) .014 ( .010) .093 ( .175) . 227 ( . 194)  ( 004) - 000 ( .004)  (1 .43) (1 46) (1 0 . 165 R2 0 208 0 F 1 752 1 . 329 1 N of Cases 92 93 For Pres 59% 33% *=P>.05 **=P>.01 Standard e r r o r s i n parentheses  44) 218 902 94 43%  ( .024)  - .002  1 . 353 92 30%  - .000  -  59%  -.006** (.003) .013 (.015)  .003 (.004)  1982 Tax Increase - .001  - .002  Jobs Approps - .002  ( .003) - .002 ( .003)  .002)  ( .003)  .000 .003)  - .OOO  - .014  .018*  ( .015) - .008 ( 018)  .011) .021 * .013)  - .017  .01 1 .018)  ( .025) - 079 ( 068) - 007  ( 005) - 010* ( 005)  -.024**  008  (.010) ( • 189)  ( 011) - 361* ( 184)  - . 294  - 331 *  ( . 197) - . 155  ( 199) - 125  ( • 152)  .315*  Veto Overr i de  .018 .047) .000 .003) .003 .003) .013* .008) . 158 .130)  ( .002) .003 .015) ( .001 ( .018) - .005 (.023) .030 ( 061 ) - 007* ( 005) 001 ( 004) - 002 ( 010) - 050 ( 170)  .033 .144)  - 232 - 402**  ( 156)  .076 .112)  - . 351  3 953  .428  1 558  ( 1 .43) 0. 247  (1 46) 0 206 1 603 86  2 . 190 92 46%  36%  (1 .06) 0 . 1 16 0 . 855 90 13%  ( 185) ( 157)  (1 44) O 151 1 430 89 27%  1981 Fal 1 Cuts Suburban  1982 Oakar Amendm't  Latta GOP-Bud - .002  Tax Veto Increase Overr i de .005*  .002  Jobs Approps - .002  .001  .001  ( .003) .000 ( .004)  ( .003) .004 ( .004)  ( .003) - .001 ( .004)  ( .003) .004 ( .003)  ( .003) - .003 ( .004)  Blue c o l 1 - .018  - .023  - .096*  - .037  - .068  ( .062) White c o l - .028 ( .071 )  ( .055) - .021  ( .056)  ( .049)  ( .053)  ( .038)  - . 108*  - .062  - .094  - .068**  Urban  Farm Wkr Income ($1000) Bl ack  .042 ( . 102) - .062  ( .123) - .022 ( .024)  Marg i n  .001 ( .009) Com Sen - .036* ( .023) W & Means . 179 . ( 330) Budget - . 138 ( . 352) Approps  - .099  ( .257)  Constant R2  3 .07 (5.. 42) 0.. 195  ( .063) .049 ( .089) .000 ( . 108) - .023 ( .021 ) - .003  ( .008) - .015  ( .021 ) . 579* .291) ( - . 756** ( .310) - . 148 ( . 226)  ( .002) - .089*  ( .064)  ( .055)  (.061 )  ( .043)  - .097  - .005  - .064  - .112*  ( .091 ) .000 ( .111)  ( .078) . 170* ( .090) - .003 ( .019) - .001 ( .007) - .028 ( .019) - .435* ( . 254) - . 544* ( . 270) - .215 ( .197)  ( .087) . 101 ( . 105)  ( .062) .01 1 ( .070) - .046*** ( .014) .002 ( .006) - .013 ( .014) Not i n Equat i on . 148 .169) (  - .029 ( .022) .001 ( .008) - .006 ( .021 ) .250 ( . 298) - . 230 (.317) - . 101 ( .232)  - .022  ( .02 1 ) - .005  (.008) .028 ( .020) . 185 . ( 283) - . 100  ( . 301 ) . 225  - . 125  ( .220)  ( . 163)  3 . 57  10.. 29  4 . 36  7 .97  8 . 92  (4 . 76) 0 . 326  (4..88) 0..274  (4 .21) 0 .412  (4 .63) 0 .272  (3 31) 0 .452  1 .. 15  2 . 48 45  1 .16 2 .04 48 50 50 For Pres 36% 52% 66% 73% *=P>.05 **=P>.01 ***=p>.001 on a o n e - t a i l e d t e s t Standard e r r o r s i n parentheses  F 0.. 745 N of Cases 50  ( .002) - .005*  1 . 49  50 28%  87%  


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