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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at House budgetary actions in the 97th Congress in 1981 and 1982. In 1981, despite the opposition of the economic committees and the Democratic majority leadership, the House voted through a budget drawn up by the White House. In 1982, however, they refused to pass a budget drawn to President Reagan's blueprint.

The first chapter is a narrative of the events of those two years. The second chapter is an account of the theoretical literature on the subject which pose several questions about those events and also suggest some answers. The third chapter is a statistical analysis of nine House roll calls over the two years. It attempts, first, to identify those Representatives who made the difference between Presidential victory in 1981 and frustration in 1982. Second, it tries to explain what these marginal presidential supporters had in common and what made them switch sides.
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CHAPTER I. A TALE OF TWO BUDGETS

A. CALENDAR 1981 AND FISCAL 1982

In 1981, the first year of his presidency, Ronald Reagan enjoyed a series of sweeping budgetary victories in Congress. Not only was the Administration able to steer their budget and tax cuts through the Republican-controlled Senate but they were also able to push them past the Democratic majority in the House. They were able to do this because a sufficient number of conservative Democrats, particularly Southern Democrats, voted against their own party. It seemed to the President and his advisors that they had forged a conservative coalition which could dominate Congressional politics for the foreseeable future. But the next year some of Reagan's erstwhile supporters defected leaving him without a majority of votes in the House and unable to pass his budgets. An understanding of who these Representatives were and why they changed sides will contribute to an understanding of how Congress decided to vote.

This paper starts with an account of the events of 1981 and 1982. The second chapter discusses the theoretical literature on Congressional voting and derives from them explanatory hypotheses. In the third chapter those hypotheses are used in a statistical analysis of nine of the key budget and tax votes over the course of the two years.

1. Reagan's goals.
Federal politics in 1981 revolved around economic policy as Reagan concentrated all his energy on forcing Congress to accept what was perceived to be a fundamental change in budgetary policy. The new President had three fiscal priorities. He wanted to cut taxes, balance the budget, and increase military expenditure. Reagan was a believer in 'supply side economics'. He was convinced that this would produce a 'trickle down effect' which would stimulate the sluggish U.S. economy. For this reason a cut in taxes would lead, paradoxically, to an increase in government revenue. A balanced budget would lead to a fall in the
interest rate (a belief not unique to the supply-siders) which would further stimulate the economy. The healthy economy would be able to sustain a very high level of military expenditure.

Many Presidents have entered office with bold new schemes only to see them become bogged down in Congress and finally emerge a compromised and anaemic shadow of the documents which entered that deliberative institution. And, in spite of the Republican conquest of the Senate, the continued Democratic majority in the House of Representatives appeared to represent an insuperable barrier to the kind of undiluted victory Reagan demanded. But in the November elections the Democrats had lost thirty seats in the House to the Republicans and Reagan, dubbed the 'great communicator' by the media, found enough Democrats prepared to listen to his overtures to enable him to start building what he called a 'bipartisan' majority.

The President argued that if Congress co-operated and passed his budget and his back-dated tax cuts, the economy would pick up by the end of 1981 and the budget would be balanced by 1983. It is the abiding irony of Reagan's presidency that his total political success in 1981 exposed the poverty of his economics.

There can be little doubt that Reagan was not just position-taking: he was playing to win. He did so to the extent that he largely ignored other areas of policy. By doing this he raised the stakes to a level which he could not hope to repeat in subsequent years. He could not dedicate more energy to economic matters. Indeed, if Reagan wished to attend to any of the other areas of Presidential responsibility he would have to spend less time on the budget.

Reviewing congressional action in 1981 Republican Senator and majority leader Howard Baker declared,

Men and women may disagree on the policies adopted by this Congress and by this administration, but almost no-one, I think, will
dispute the proposition that this Congress has made more fundamental changes in the public policy of this nation than any Congress in decades.¹

These 'changes' were brought into being by a series of major victories in Congress. Some of the victories were in votes: on the first budget resolution, on the reconciliation bill, in the 'bidding war' over tax legislation, and the continuing appropriations in December at the end of the session. These involved major shifts in taxation and expenditure, but changes of such magnitude had occurred before. What really encouraged the political right was that the President persuaded Congress to adopt his economic model and his assumptions (as opposed to those offered by the Congressional Budget Office). It must have seemed reasonable to Baker to see the events of 1981 as signalling a sea-change in the way the economy was viewed and the expectations they had of the budgetary process. Congress had acted in 1981 to cut the domestic budget, to increase military expenditure, and to cut taxes in order to improve the 'climate' for capital formation and investment. It was a move away from the priorities and assumptions of the economic liberals.

Reagan's remarkable success in 1981 was also due to innovative use of the Congressional budgetary process. Some of the administration's most dramatic coups were masterminded by Office of Management and Budget director, David Stockman, who used the provisions of the 1974 Budget Reform Act to take the legislative initiative away from the House spending committees. The committees refused to adopt Reagan's budget plans but when the Budget Committee put their proposals forward in a bill Stockman used the reconciliation procedure and the alliance of Representatives forged by the President to replace the Democrats' budget, in toto, with his own. The alliance was made up of the entire House Republican party together with conservative Democrats. It was, Reagan and his supporters believed, a logical replacement for the liberalism of the New Deal coalition and it represented the future of American politics.

Although this winning coalition lasted just 12 months its legacy the following year was a House rendered almost impotent by bitter divisions on the budget. The House was forced to swallow the President's budget whole in 1981 and this proved a great shock to its delicate legislative system. In 1982 some of its major fiscal organs almost seized up and the House budgetary mechanism was, for a while, rendered incapable of action. When the Reagan 'revolution' lost momentum the effect was not to hand power straight back to the Democratic hierarchy.

2. The early triumphs

The new President officially unveiled his plans on the 18th February 1981 when he addressed Congress and announced his budget proposals. He asked Congress to cut $41.4 billion from the fiscal 1982 spending request submitted by President Carter the previous fall. The cuts would all come from what The Economist called the 'post-New Deal' social services. Money for the 'truly needy' would not be cut. It would grow from 37 per cent to 41 per cent of the budget while arms expenditure would go from 24 per cent to 32 per cent.

By the tenth of March when Reagan sent his full budget proposals to Congress the sum for proposed cuts had climbed to $48.6 billion. Senate passed a budget almost identical to the President's 88-10 on the second of April. The President scored another significant victory when, on the seventh, the Senate Budget Committee voted to adopt the more sanguine prognostications of the OMB which were based on the economic theories favoured by the White House over the predictions of their own CBO.

The uninterrupted success of Reagan's budgetary strategy may have encouraged the right-wingers to want even more. On the ninth of April the Senate Budget Committee voted 12-8 to reject the President's budget, with three balanced budget Republicans Armstrong (Colo.), Grassley (Iowa), and Symms

2 'Let The Budget Battle Begin', The Economist, 21.2.81, p. 21.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
But the right-wing, even if they were beginning to doubt Reagan's ideological purity, were not going to sabotage his legislation. The Senate as a whole, with conservative Republicans toeing the line, passed the Reagan-supported fiscal 1982 resolution.

On the 19th of April the House Budget Committee endorsed a Democratic budget, proposed by their chairman Jim Jones (Okla.) which was significantly different from the administration's by 17 votes to 13. Henry Reuss (Dem. Wisc.) told Loyola University students that the Jones alternative was:

a pale and somewhat more human imitation of the Republican program - a little tougher on the fat cats, a little easier on the thin cats; and a bit more responsible about the deficit. In short, an improvement, if hardly a call to the barricades.

President Reagan, however, had already set his heart on total victory and resolved not to build any bridges over the allegedly small gulf that separated him from the House Democrats.

By late April, when the recuperating President was ecstatically received by Congress, majority leader Tip O'Neill (Dem. Mass.) estimated that letters from constituents were running five to one in favour of the White House's 'Economic Recovery Program'. Maclean's reported that Reagan's economic policies had a two thirds approval rating in a national opinion poll. The impetus for the administration budget plan was enhanced by the economic upturn which occurred in the first quarter of 1981.

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5 Even before Reagan took office Representative Jack Kemp (R. N.Y.) was convinced the administration would renege on the promised three year 30 per cent tax cut he favored. The Economist 7.1.81, pp.27-31.
6 'Boll Weevils of A Political Breed' Maclean's 11.5.81, p.41.
7 Reagan had survived an assassination attempt on the 30th of March.
8 'Reagan Takes Control Again' The Economist 2.5.81, pp. 23-4
9 11.5.81
It was becoming increasingly clear that, in spite of the Democratic majority in the House, the administration had a good chance of passing their budget without compromise. In addition to Phil Gramm there were over forty Democrats associated with the 'Conservative Democratic Forum', nick-named 'boll-weevils', who were assumed to be sympathetic to Reagan's economics. The informal organiser of the CDF Representative Charles W. Stenholm (Dem. Tex.) said, 'this particular issue is about 80 to 85 per cent of the platform I campaigned on.'\textsuperscript{10} Another Texas Democrat, Kent Hance, said, 'we are Democrats, but the only hope for the Democratic party is a turn in the conservative direction.'\textsuperscript{11}

The CDF members had found an unexpected early ally in O'Neill. In January he co-operated with their requests and allocated important positions on, amongst others, the Budget, Ways and Means and Appropriations Committees, to fiscal conservatives. When chided for his actions by liberals he said 'let them read the election returns.'\textsuperscript{12}

3. The First Budget Vote
One of the CDF appointees was Phil Gramm, an ex-economics professor who represented the northern suburbs of Houston, Texas. Gramm gained a position on the House Budget Committee. Gramm and the ranking Republican on the Budget Committee, Delbert Latta of Ohio, formally sponsored an administration supported budget in the Committee and in the House. Gramm-Latta I was defeated by the Democratic majority on Committee. But, since the debate on the budget was 'open', they were able to reintroduce their budget on the floor as an amendent and to try to substitute it, in its entirety, for the official Budget Committee bill.

Reagan launched a major lobbying effort before the vote on the seventh of May to substitute Gramm-Latta I for the Jones budget. He met over sixty members of Congress in the White House where he attempted to charm them.

\textsuperscript{10} The 'Boll Weevils' Bore In' Newsweek 11.5.81, p.24.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid. In the 1980 election Reagan had won 72 per cent of the vote in Hance's district. US News & World Report 22.6.81, p.66.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
and gave them Presidential cuff-links. He also gave the White House's Kennedy Centre box tickets to wavering Democrats. Meanwhile White Houses aides were using the mixture of serious politics and attention to banal details which was the administration's hallmark to keep the GOP itself in line. Wavering Republicans were threatened with the withdrawal of both Presidential endorsement in the November 1982 elections and White House tour passes they could give constituents. O'Neill (with perhaps a hint of relief?) said 'there is no question that this is the greatest lobbying in the history of the country.' O'Neill's hyperbole might well have been intended to show his own lack of lobbying effort in a better light. While Reagan was building up political momentum the House leader was on an Easter tour of the Antipodes. Time drew attention to O'Neill's discreet strategy at the time. He said 'I know when to fight and when not to fight.' And on this occasion he felt their was no point in fighting, because; 'There is a feeling among the American people to give the President what he's asked for.' O'Neill consoled himself with plans of revenge.

Just wait until middle America finds out what happened with these budget cuts. Am I going to get some Republican scalps down the road? You bet I am.

US News raised a more interesting question. If, as it appears, O'Neill had given up on the Democratic plan in advance, then why did Reagan force the vote? It may be that the White House could not be sure of the extent of the Democrats' demoralisation, or it may be the case that legislative inertia rather than White House pressure carried the bill through to a roll call.

13 'How Reagan Wooed Congress' US News & World Report 18.7.81, p.17. US News noted that Congressmen had now voted to restore the White House yacht, deemed an unnecessary luxury by Carter, and suggested they did so because they fancied being lobbied while sailing romantically with Reagan on the Potomac.
14 'Reagan's Big Win' Time 18.5.81, p.8.
15 Time 11.5.81 p.14.
16 Op. Cit. 18.5.81.pp.8-10 and 11.
17 Ibid. p.9.
18 Ibid.
19 'Tip O'Neill On The Ropes' Time 18.5.81, p.9.
But there are two other plausible explanations worth noting. First, some observers argued that Reagan was trying to create a permanent 'bipartisan' coalition, presumably by forcing the 'Boll Weevils' to declare in a roll call vote their support for the President's policies and so create a visible division between them and the rest of the Democratic party. He may have believed that making the Democrats look like 'losers' would strengthen his coalition.

The second argument is that Reagan, motivated by an intense dislike for, or adversarial attitude to, either the liberal ideology the Democrats represent or for the personality of some of their leaders, particularly O'Neill, badly wanted to humiliate them. O'Neill and Reagan were consistently caricatured in the American media as a pair of old, feuding, Irish widows, or two Irish drunks fighting in a bar. It was no secret that they did not get on and in particular that O'Neill was impressed by neither Reagan's charm, his policies nor his intellectual powers.

On the seventh of May the House approved the Reagan plan rather than the one proposed by its own Budget committee. Sixty-three Democrats voted with the Republicans as the House voted 257-176 to substitute Gramm-Latta I for the Budget Committee resolution. On the 12th Senate approved its version of the first resolution 78-20. Two days later conferees reached agreement on fiscal 1982 spending targets and on reconciliation instructions to the authorising committee requiring them to make $36 billion in additional cuts by the 12th of June. On the 21st of May, only six days after the 15th of May deadline specified in the 1974 budget reform act timetable, Congress completed approval of the fiscal 1982 first budget resolution, which was 'drawn', in the words of Congressional Quarterly, 'to Ronald Reagan's blueprint.'

Congress kept up the pace. By the 12th of June, the deadline for committee reports, all but one of the twenty-nine committees (fourteen in the Senate, fifteen in the House) had completed their reports. By the 17th of June the Budget Committees had totalled up the cuts made by the committees in their chambers.

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20 e.g. U.S. News 18.7.81.
and reported the resulting reconciliation packages. The House resolution included $37.3 billion in cuts.

The White House reaction to the committee reports was not very enthusiastic. The administration found the cuts the House committees made 'unconscionable.' Stockman said the House bill was an example of 'congressional backsliding and a return to business as usual.' The Democrat-controlled committees in the House, had tried to distribute the cuts they had been ordered to make in the least painful manner, they had made smaller cuts in Medicare, Medicaid, aid to education, welfare, child nutrition, food stamps and larger cuts in the Export-Import Bank's budget. They had also tried to undermine some proposed cuts: for example they had cut the budget for foodstamps but not the conditions of entitlement. The money would then run out before the end of the year necessitating emergency appropriations. Part of the problem was that the Democrats remained sceptical of Reagan's economic assumptions.

4. Total Victory for the President
On the 26th of June the House voted 217-211 to substitute a budget drawn up in the White House, Gramm-Latta II, for the resolution sponsored by the Budget Committee and derived from the work of the spending committees. This vote was preceded by a series of GOP victories on procedural votes. The most important was the passage of a rule which made the substitution of Gramm-Latta II a straight either/or vote. The Democrats had favoured six independent votes on different parts of the budget; their strategy was to expose the cuts the Republicans were making, rather than allow them to escape from the criticism of voters and lobbyists by saying individual cuts were inseparable parts of a larger

2 About 4,000 pages worth of output, which is as good an indication of how work the committees had done as any. 'Big Battles on Two Fronts' Time Magazine 29.6.81, p.15.
2 3 Quoted without source in, 'Block Grants: Categorically No.' The Economist 20.6.81, p.22.
2 5 'He Got What He Wanted' Time 6.7.81, p.10.
2 6 The Economist 20.6.81.
Gramm-Latta II was one of the Reagan supporters' key victories. The result was an increase in cuts to $37.8 billion. In addition to raising the absolute total of cuts, Gramm-Latta II resembled the Senate bill a great deal in the way it distributed those cuts and the assumptions it made.

The votes were preceded by another bout of energetic lobbying by the administration. Reagan, who was staying at the Century Plaza in Los Angeles, phoned 19 Democrat Representatives[^7] on the morning of the votes while House Republicans made as many speeches as possible to give him time to talk to more potential defectors. This is when, as Stockman later put it in his infamous interview with The Atlantic Monthly, the 'Hogs really fed.'[^8] At the time he called it 'considerations and adjustments.'[^9] Newsweek estimated that $10 billion of the $37.8 billion Gramm-Latta II was supposed to save was spent on incentives to Southern Democrats. It was Stockman who phoned three key Southern Democrats to promise that the administration would drop opposition to sugar price support, a programme which cost $2 billion per year.[^10] One member of this trio was John Breaux (La.) who also asked for modification of the subsidies which encouraged utilities to switch to coal and gas and away from oil fuel. Reagan called Breaux at the Capitol half an hour before the vote to promise him what he wanted.[^11] Breaux was asked afterwards if this meant his vote could be bought: 'No, but it can be rented,' was his reply.[^12]

The Presidential victory meant that six weeks of work by the specialist House committees was thrown out in favour of a budget drafted entirely by the OMB and David Stockman. The committee members traditionally take pride in

[^7]: *Time* loc. cit. 6.7.81.
[^8]: *The Atlantic Monthly*, Nov. 81.
[^9]: Reagan's Sweet Triumph' *Newsweek* 6.7.81, p.18.
[^12]: *Business Week* 13.7.81. *inter alia.*
their work and were unhappy at having it all rejected, especially since what was put in the place of the Budget Committee resolution was a sloppy piece of legislation.

*Commonweal*, in a partisan attack on the vote, reserved its greatest scorn for Stockman's work:

They voted for a 'document' that was really a collection of over five hundred mostly unnumbered pages and handwritten notes, full of pen and pencil deletions that abolished entire programs and gave duplicate authority for others, much of it with far-reaching implications that could not be discussed or debated because the content was unknown.\(^3\)\(^3\)

Indeed, *Time* implied that Reagan himself had only the vaguest knowledge of the document's contents.\(^3\)\(^4\)

It may seem petty to carp over the appearance of a bill, but the fact that the President wanted Congress to pass a piece of legislation which they (and he) had not seen, into which they had had no input, and which was a scruffy affront to their institutional pride, was further humiliation for them. There was a string of horror stories surrounding the document. The name and phone number of an OMB analyst had not been deleted from one page.\(^3\)\(^5\) 'On his way to the podium to present the bill' relates *Time* melodramatically, '...Delbert Latta...discovered the drafters had left out any money for bilingual education: he pencilled in a sum, but mistakenly made it $85 million rather than the $157 million requested by the President and approved by...Senate.'\(^3\)\(^6\) Furthermore the Head Start school-leaver programme had been accidentally left out of the bill altogether.\(^3\)\(^7\) In this case the accident turned out to be genuine, whereas some deletions observers supposed were mistakes were later found out to have been intentional. A programme for the blind was originally deleted altogether, and

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\(^3\)\(^3\) 'June 26: A Day in the Life of Congress' *Commonweal* 31.7.81, p.427.
\(^3\)\(^4\) 6.7.81.
\(^3\)\(^5\) *Newsweek* 6.7.81.
\(^3\)\(^6\) 'This May Hurt a Little' 13.7.81, p.8
\(^3\)\(^7\) *Ibid.*
then, in the document that reached the House, had been reinserted in one section only. A similar thing happened to an education programme, funding for which was cut in one part but not another.\textsuperscript{38} O'Neill claimed that Republican leader Michel had told Reagan 'this is such a mishmash we'll be the laughing-stock of America.'\textsuperscript{39} Reagan for his part crowed happily over his victory, 'The Conservative Democrats made their break today. They aren't going to be back in Tip O'Neill's party - ever.'\textsuperscript{40} And an unnamed 'Republican staff leader' said it's 'not dollars anymore - it's winning.'\textsuperscript{41}

But not all the loyal soldiers were so happy; Bill Fransel (R. Minn.) said 'there's a fair amount of resentment among Republicans that Conservative Democrats are writing all our policies for us.'\textsuperscript{42}

On the 15th of July, 250 conferees from 58 sub-committees convened to work out the differences between the House and Senate bills. They reached final agreement on the 29th on what Congressional Quarterly called 'The deepest and most widespread package of cuts in the history of Congress.'\textsuperscript{43}

5. The Tax Cut
Meanwhile, Reagan's tax cut proposal was advancing steadily through Congress. The conventional wisdom was that this was Reagan's most popular campaign promise, and therefore that the proposal would easily pass. Interestingly it began to appear that the electorate was keener on eliminating the deficit than on tax cuts.\textsuperscript{44}

The administration wanted a 10 per cent income tax decrease in each of the next three years, which would apparently work out at 23 per cent overall. The
Ways and Means Committee's original proposal was for 15 per cent spread over two years, skewed to favour those with incomes under $50,000 a year. The two sides then became embroiled in a bidding war, which the President won when the tax bill passed the House 238-195 on the 29th of July with forty-eight Democrats and one Republican voting against their parties.

Reagan had again displayed a willingness to pay whatever it cost to buy the Boll Weevils' votes. The Senate had originally proposed $6.1 billion in tax relief for the oil industry. House Ways and Means chairman Dan Rostenkowski, 'freely conceded' 'it's a bidding war,'\(^5\) and his Democrat-controlled Committee upped that to $7.1 billion before Reagan added the two together and offered $13.1 billion. *Newsweek* calculated that this came to $1.1 billion for each of the twelve votes of concerned Representatives.\(^6\)

What the Democrats never did was to try to oppose the cuts, and the final differences between the Democrat and Presidential proposals were not great. They centered mainly on the questions of to whom and by how much the tax cuts would be biased.

The President would settle for nothing less than another total victory. In addition to the financial incentives he dangled before particular Congressmen, he made a 22 minute television pitch.

The television appeal was a great success. O'Neill said the next morning that the Democrats faced defeat because of 'a telephone blitz like this nation has never seen.'\(^7\) Telegrammes came into the Washington post office at ten times the normal rate and ran 12-1 in support of the President. Carroll Hubbard (Dem. Ky.) reported receiving 516 calls in one day, Bo Ginn (Dem. Ga.) 600, and Sam Hall (Dem. Tex.) 32 in one hour immediately after the speech; all

\(^5\) 'Bidding War For Tax Votes' *Newsweek* 3.8.81, p.20
\(^6\) Ibid.  
\(^7\) 'Yeas 238-Nays 195' *Time* 10.8.81, p.28.
three were potential defectors. And Kent Hance reported that his mail was running 50-1 in favour of Reagan.

A characteristic Reagan touch came after the vote when he called a radio phone-in show in Texas to congratulate local Congressman Ralph Hall (Dem. Tex.) for voting for the tax cut.

Thirty-one of the self-designated 'Boll Weevils' supported the the Reagan tax bill. But many were adamant that they were not turncoats and had not surrendered their independence. Ken Holland said:

We Southern Democrats had been for such changes before and then Reagan came along and plagiarized them.

William Chappell (Fla.) said 'I've been preaching this philosophy all along, so I don't see any defection.' And Marvin Leath explained the 'defectors' were 'saving our party, not destroying it.' An even more defiant tone was struck by Neely Lewis, the Democratic chair of Brazos County (which lay within Phil Gramm's constituency):

I think a lot of us here take some pride that Phil has become something of a national figure who gets on the nightly news.

Again the White House did little to hide its happiness, which Democratic congressman Richard Gephardt (Mo.) remembered in 1982 as 'sheer pleasure' at the victory. One of Reagan's political advisors, Lyn Nofziger, predicted that

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48 'Rest in Peace, New Deal.' *Newsweek* 10.8.81, p.16.
49 The 'Boll Weevils' ...Who...What...Why.' *US News & World Report* 17.8.81, p.36.
50 *US News* 17.8.81.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
54 infra. 'The 1983 Budget'
the Republicans 'will be in power for the rest of the century.'

Reagan signed both the tax bill and the reconciliation bill into law on the 13th of August, saying that it signalled 'an end to excessive growth in government bureaucracy and government taxing.'

Strictly speaking, the first budget resolution is non-binding and can be overturned in the second resolution which should be passed, according to the schedule, in September. The reconciliation process, therefore, should be used on the second resolution. Congress had, however, included in the reconciliation bill the provision that if no second resolution was passed then the first resolution would become binding. In other words there was no need to produce a second budget resolution. And so, according to Congressional Quarterly, 'Congress left Washington for its August recess thinking it had taken care of its economic problems for the year.'

6. Autumn: the second round of cuts.
By the end of the summer recess it was clear that the economy was not reacting as the President and his advisors had hoped. By the first week in September the White House was openly talking about further cuts. The Economist quotes an unnamed White House aide who said that because of the slower than expected rate of growth, and that further cuts of $10 billion to $15 billion were needed, even the Pentagon was no longer 'sacrosanct'. According to Time Reagan asked his advisors for ways to trim $15 billion from the fiscal 1982 budget and $74 billion from fiscal years 1983 and 1984 to offset deficits which would clearly be larger than they had expected. Both The Economist and Time agreed this action was taken to appease Wall Street, which had kept the prime rate at 20 per cent apparently because its inhabitants did not believe the government debt would shrink or that the economy would recover.

References:
55 US News 'The 'Boll Weevils.' 17.8.81.
56 CQ Almanac p.267 col 1.
57 A President in the Hands of the Money-Men. '12.9.81, p.23
58 21.9.81, p.44.
If these cuts were to be made then Congress would have to pass a second budget resolution. On the 13th of September Reagan asked Congress for further cuts totaling $13 billion and for an increase in appropriations to bring in $3 billion more. The Senate appropriations committee rejected his request. Reagan managed to get just $4 billion in total cuts from them. Even his allies on the Hill were sceptical. Senator Howard Baker asked him:

What the hell difference does it make? If we cut another $10 billion or $15 billion the financial community will just come back and ask for another $15 billion cut.\(^5\)\(^9\)

The President made a thirty minute television appeal on behalf of what he termed 'phase two' of his programme, which involved $13 billion in further cuts and $3 billion in increased revenue by closing tax loop-holes.

According to *Time*\(^6\)\(^0\) the Republicans were unhappy and sent Baker scurrying up to the White House. There Reagan told him that 'I am not prepared to do anything that would have me appear to be backing off.'\(^6\)\(^1\) Nevertheless Reagan promptly agreed to drop proposed cuts in cost of living allowance deferments.

The package had again been hastily cobbled together by the over-worked Stockman, in order to beat the start of the new fiscal year on the first of October.\(^6\)\(^2\) One of the proposed cuts was for $87.2m in the labor, health, human services, and education bill. On the sixth Regula (R. Ohio) proposed that this bill be recommitted to the Ways and Means Committee, who could then redraft it to include the cuts proposed by the White House. Regula's proposal was defeated 168-249. While this vote did not compromise Reagan's record of never having lost a 'budget' vote, it was undoubtedly a defeat for his economic strategy.

\(^5\)\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^6\)\(^0\) Ibid.
\(^6\)\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^6\)\(^2\) Ibid.
The defeat of this proposal, as well as the rout of the whole package, can be traced to several influences. The dramatic change of strategy was far too reminiscent of the old Carter indecisiveness; and it also showed a lack of understanding of Congress's workings or a lack of sympathy for its members. They could not have been happy when, six days before the start of the fiscal year, Reagan sent them another badly drafted piece of legislation which would take a lot of extra work to enact.

Furthermore, the President's conviction that he was always right must have begun to wear. His insistence to Baker that he must not be seen to back down was one example. In his television speech the President characterised his opponents as 'A chorus of other voices protesting that we haven't had full economic recovery.' But, clearly, the economy had not recovered, otherwise why the President would not have needed to ask for $16 billion more in cuts.

Things did not look up for the administration. In November The Atlantic Monthly printed an article based on a series of interviews with David Stockman. The budget director displayed disarming frankness and little political sense in admitting that a lot of his figures were good guesses, that nobody was sure that 'Reaganomics' would work, and - worst of all for the administration's relations with Congress - that he had been less than straightforward when dealing with Congressional committees (an admission Democrats would cheerfully throw in his face whenever he and they disagreed in the next year).

Congress voted another continuing resolution for November. But on the 20th of November the President vetoed one of them, this (theoretically) left the Federal Government without money and (again theoretically) closed it down for a day. Reagan used this brinksmanship to force Congress to pass $4 billion of his proposed cuts. He threatened to keep on vetoing stop-gap resolutions until they did what he wanted. By means of this tactic the President was able to dictate

83 Ibid.
64 Op. Cit.
terms. And, according to Time\textsuperscript{5} this is what happened:

Reagan's lieutenants...conferred only with Republican leaders and did not so much negotiate as tell them what the President would and would not accept. Moreover Congress gave Reagan power within broad limits to take the $4 billion out of whatever programs he chose.\textsuperscript{6}  

The House Budget Committee had agreed on the 12th of November to reaffirm the first budget resolution rather than accede to Reagan's demands for further cuts. They did not report the bill to the House until the eighth of December. On the tenth the House voted 206-200 to reaffirm the first resolution. Since they were already in the process of passing a new set of appropriations, programme by programme, that resolution was, said Congressional Quarterly, 'meaningless'.\textsuperscript{6,7} Because the Senate, encouraged by President Reagan had been dragging its feet on new appropriations bills (by late November, fourteen out of the fifteen House spending committees had completed work while only eight Senate committees had done so) the House also passed a continuing resolution on the eleventh of December which funded the neglected programmes until March 1982.

So, at last, barely noticed outside Washington the bulk of a budget finally emerged from Congress. While the tired 'lawmakers' crawled home for Christmas Reagan set the seal on a year of almost uninterrupted triumphs by signing into law the appropriations bills and continuing resolution which seemed to mark the final surrender of the legislative branch.

\textsuperscript{5,5} 'Looking Back on a Budget Coup' Time 11.1.82, p.14.  
\textsuperscript{6,6} Op. Cit.  
\textsuperscript{6,7} 'The law requires that before a session of Congress can adjourn the second budget resolution must be in place. There should be no confusion about the fact that this... second budget resolution will take us through the fiscal year, meeting the spending targets and revenue targets as outlined therein... the fact is that this is the only way we could reach an agreement,' said Jones opening the debate (Congressional Record vol 127 part 23 p.30592) and Latta agreed,'there is no question that we will have a third budget resolution... we are at the closing days of this session...we do not have the time or the economic figures...for a full-blown review of the budget.' (op. cit. p. 30593.)
B. THE 1983 BUDGET

1. Spring: No First Budget Resolution
In 1981 Reagan had had his way on almost every vote, or at least had been able to claim every vote as a victory. In 1982 his only consolation could be that if he got very little of what he wanted, his opponents did no better when it came to generating a budget of their own. Enough members of the President's coalition drifted away to destroy his ability to command a majority of votes in the House. But they did not automatically fall in behind the Democratic leadership. The President's actions of the previous year seem to have created expectations across the House which could not be fulfilled. The Boll Weevils had received special considerations. They presumably wanted that to continue. But now other groups whose votes the President had been able to take for granted, like the liberal Republican Gypsy Moths, wanted similar treatment. His rightwing supporters did not want to see the programme diluted, which would be difficult to avoid if the Gypsy Moths were to be appeased, and all his supporters wanted the economy to recover as he had promised, but which it had not.

At first Reagan presented Congress with a budget containing provisions for a $55.9 billion deficit reduction plan. According to administration estimates the deficit would be brought down to $91.5 billion, from their latest estimate of $98.6 billion for the fiscal year 1982.68

The President explained that there were several good reasons why the deficit had soared when he had predicted that his policies would reduce it. First there was the unexpected recession; secondly the unexpectedly high interest rates (which were originally expected to fall after the debt was reduced); thirdly the failure of Congress to enact all the cuts he had requested; and finally the success of the government in reducing inflation (which meant incomes were rising less fast and so less was being raised from people crossing a higher tax threshold).69 It is difficult to see how the administration could claim to have been entirely

68 'No Time to Retreat' *Time* 15.2.82, p.12
responsible for a drop in inflation which occurred during its first three months in
office. Furthermore, while Reagan supporters outside Washington might have been
prepared to believe that an unco-operative Congress was to blame for the failure
of Reagan's budget, the audience on Capitol Hill would have been reluctant to
agree.

The reaction from Congress was indeed hostile. Republican minority leader
Michel said shortly after the President revealed his plans that,

There is close to no chance that Reagan's budget will pass. Very few
Republicans would vote for it. I know of no one.\(^7\)

By early March the President was clearly going to have to compromise on his
budget. 'Suggest something and we'll look at it,' he told Congressional leaders.\(^7\)
He did, however, make it clear that the military budget and the $91.6 billion
tax cut were non-negotiable.\(^7\)

The President had predicted that the fiscal 1983 deficit would be $91 billion.
By mid-March \textit{Time} predicted it would be $96.4 billion.\(^7\) The same week
\textit{Newsweek}, not to be outdone, quoted Stockman as saying it might go over the
magic $100 billion mark.\(^7\) And the fiscal 1982 deficit also looked like it would
hit twelve figures. In early April \textit{The Economist} reported that revised predictions,
based on 'favourable' economic forecasts, indicated a $101.9 billion deficit, $10.4
billion higher than that predicted by Reagan on the eighth of February.\(^7\) It is
difficult to avoid wondering where Reagan was getting his numbers. They were
consistently optimistic, and consistently suggested that his approach was working;
but they were also increasingly inaccurate. How could Reagan hope to win over
Congress to his beliefs if he made economic predictions for 1982 that were
wildly wrong even before Congress began to consider his budgetary proposals for

\(^7\) 'A Line drawn in the Dirt' \textit{Time} 22.2.82.
\(^7\) 'A Budget that will Barely Budge' \textit{Time} 11.3.82, p.17
\(^7\) \textit{Ibid}.
\(^7\) 'Playing it Cool on Frozen Ice.' 22.3.82, p.34
\(^7\) 'Reagan Versus the Fiscal 5' 22.3.82, p.30.
\(^7\) 'To Kill A Monster' 17.4.82, p.43.
the next year?

Furthermore there were other, more consistently accurate, predictors available. The CBO, allegedly free from partisan ideological influences, had used far more conventional assumptions, and had been consistently nearer the mark than the OMB, which was struggling with the untested 'trickle-down' and 'supply-side' theorems even when, as Stockman had freely admitted to The Atlantic Monthly, they had no idea how meaningful were the numbers their models generated.\footnote{Loc. Cit.} \footnote{7 'Stumbling to a Showdown' Time 26.4.82, p.14.} \footnote{7 'In Quest of Pax Reaganomica' Newsweek 3.5.82, p.20.}

The differences between the two began to become mildly comical when, in April, their deficit predictions differed by 300 per cent. The CBO said the Reagan budget would produce a $240 billion deficit in 1985, the OMB said it would be $81.8 billion.\footnote{7} In 1981 Congress had accepted the White House's figures as opposed to those of its own staff. Why should it do so again? At the end of April the Administration agreed to use the CBO's figures, a good indicator of how far the balance of power had swung in Washington.\footnote{8}

The dislike the Congressional leaders had for the President's budget had sent them manifested itself in a reluctance to deal with it. It was not until the 25th of March that they began to take action. On that day they began a series of private negotiating sessions with White House Chief of Staff J. O. Baker. The talks were triangular, with Senate Republicans, House Democrats and the Administration occupying the three corners. They became bogged down on Reagan's refusal to consider the repeal of part of his 1981 tax cut and O'Neill's similar intransigence on the subject of social security benefit cutbacks. On the 28th of April O'Neill was finally prevailed upon to go and talk with the President. Their meeting was disappointingly unproductive and marked the break-down of negotiations. Time, not normally given to harsh criticism of the President, said that Reagan 'has an almost messianic faith in the viability of his
economic program.'

After rejecting the President's original budget 20-0, the Senate Budget Committee came up with a budget that Reagan found acceptable and which the chamber passed 91-7. This was clearly the easy part for the administration.

The House Budget Committee passed its version of the first budget resolution, 17-12, in a vote along party lines with Phil Gramm abstaining. In 1981 the President's greatest legislative triumph had been the way he steered his budget through Congress. But this time the auguries were much less favourable.

The previous year Reagan had offered a miracle cure for the ailing economy. Even those who disagreed had been unwilling and unable to resist because Reagan and his policies seemed to have such great public support. As Time said, 'Congress was awed by a President who claimed a mandate for change and had a gift for persuading the public.' But the patient had, in spite of the President's diagnosis, neither recovered nor died. Voters seemed to have lost their enthusiastic faith for his prescription, though this did not mean they had embraced the cure suggested by his opponents. According to a poll published in Newsweek, Presidential approval, which had been 60 per cent in March 1981, had fallen to 52 per cent by January 1982, and then to 45 per cent in March. The same poll revealed that in the first three months of 1982 those who saw a cut in military spending as the best way to reduce the deficit had grown from 33 per cent to 45 per cent, while support for non-military cuts held steady at 40 per cent. Seventy per cent of Americans said they were prepared to forego the second part of the tax cuts and 54 per cent said Reagan should compromise more with Congress. Moreover, people may have been less willing to listen to the President when he predicted doom and disaster. He had cried 'wolf' on four occasions the previous year, and people will only write or phone their

\[7^3 24.4.82.\]
\[8^0 Ibid.\]
\[8^1 'The GOP's Family Feud' 15.3.82, p.24.\]
Congressmen so often.

If Reagan's lustre had faded with the voters, it had also worn off in Congress. The Democratic leadership, of course, respected him only insofar as he could command votes, but they were reluctant to contemplate deals with him. They believed he had in some way double-crossed them in 1981. 'There's a real paranoia about what he's really up to,' said Representative Gephardt (Dem. Mo.).

And to back up all these changed perceptions of the President were the unchanging facts of the economy. According to The Economist factories were operating at 71.1 per cent of capacity in March and the unemployment rate was somewhere between 9 and 10 per cent for April.

2. The First Budget Resolution

On the 22nd of May the House adopted a unique rule of extreme complexity for its first budget resolution debate. Seven different budget plans were to be considered. Three of these were judged to be major plans, and these were designated 'category B'. The other four were called 'category A'. The four 'category A' plans were to be considered first, and then the other three plans would be considered.

The three 'category B' bills were the Michel-Latta plan, which was closest to the administration position, the Aspin or 'moderate/bipartisan' plan, which was sponsored by Budget committee Democrats and some 'Gypsy Moths' - as a group of northern Republicans had called themselves - and the Jones/Budget Committee plan, the official work of the Chairman and the Democratic majority on the Budget Committee. This last was the bill which the Democratic leadership

82 'In Quest of a Pax Reaganomica' Newsweek 3.5.82, p.20.
83 'The Budget: An Irresistible Urge to Spend' 22.5.82, p.26. The Economist is suspiciously inconsistent in its choice of economic indicators. There may be good reasons for this. But, it could also be that, once they have noted inflation and unemployment, they select those which most unambiguously support whatever point they are trying to make.
supported. The four category 'A' bills were one put forward by the Black caucus, the Miller (Dem. Calif.) 'pay-as-you-go' budget, Rosselot/Dannmeyer (both Repub. Calif.) balanced budget proposal and the Obey (Dem. Wisc.) 'liberal' plan.

This unique rule allowed eight separate budget plans to be defeated in the five day debate that ended in the early morning of the 28th of May. The debate saw Reagan's first major budget defeat; at the same time the Democrats could not pass a counter-proposal of their own.

The rule was, according to Richard Bolling, the Rules Committee chairman, the most complex budget rule ever adopted in the House. Bolling told the Washington Post 'I think there is much more opportunity for members to participate in shaping this year's budget than last year but it is still a makeshift process. You can't repair the damage of last year overnight.'

The previous year Bolling had called the Stockman budget (Gramm-Latta II) a 'distortion of the intent of those who wrote the Constitution as well as the intent of the 1974 budget act.' His motive in concocting such a complex budget rule this year was, said the Washington Post, 'to avoid the political and public relations disaster the Democrats would suffer if the House failed to find a way to pass any budget in the midst of the severe economic slump.'

The rule, however, had unexpected consequences. The class A type were voted on first to placate their small, but vocal, bands of supporters before the House moved on to the peculiar three-cornered fight between the bills the leadership took seriously. However, one of the A bills, a balanced budget proposed by John H. Rousselot, a California Republican, did surprisingly well. It

8 After the seven A and B budgets had been defeated the House went back to the original, unamended, Budget Committee proposal and defeated that for good measure.
8 Washington Post, 27.5.82, p. A13.
8 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
was beaten only 242-182. This left the conservative Republicans far from humbled and instead complaining about the 53 GOP defectors whose votes had helped defeat the Rousselot bill.

The support the Rousselot bill had drawn emboldened Republicans who were unhappy at the high level of social security and Medicare expenditure in all three class B proposals. They believed they formed the bulk of the Republican group in Congress and that the leadership was pandering too much to the small gang of vacillating liberal Gypsy Moths and taking their votes for granted. So they resolved to send a warning shot over their leadership's bows. The strategy backfired. It helped precipitate the defeat of the Republican leadership's own Michel-Latta budget bill.

The Michel-Latta bill came closer to passing than any of the other bills but was still defeated 192-235. This resolution was very similar to the budget that the Senate had passed, 49-43, at the end of the previous week. The difference was that while they used almost the same figures their expenditure total had come to $15 billion less when they added them up. When asked how the House Republicans arrived at these, more palatable, figures an unnamed Senate Republican replied that 'they lie.' "Our figures are no phonier than anybody else's' retorted an unnamed aide to a senior House Republican. These remarks echo Stockman's interview and indicate, again, the extent to which ideological considerations determined economic facts.

Michel blamed a Democrat amendment proposed by Mary Rose Oakar (Dem. Ohio) for the defeat of his bill. The Oakar amendment was a straight guns versus butter vote, or, as some Representatives put it: grannies versus battleships. It involved substituting $4.85 billion in Medicare outlays for a similar total earmarked for defence by the bill. Not even the Democrats expected the amendment to pass but when 62 'Yellow Jackets' (as the conservative Republicans were quickly dubbed) voted 'present' the effect was to rally the

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89 'Does Anyone have a Budget' *Time* 31.5.81, p.28.
90 Ibid.
Democrats and liberal Republicans. It became clear that the amendment might succeed and in the last 60 seconds of the vote 51 of the Yellow Jackets switched their votes to 'nays' although 11 did not and some, including Jack Kemp, persisted with their protest and voted for the amendment. Michel called the Yellow Jacket revolt 'a typical Young Republican stunt.'

But, said Mickey Edwards (Oklahoma) of the three class B proposals, 'doing nothing is better than doing this.' Some Republicans felt that the White House was betraying them by supporting the Michel-Latta bill.

'An administration that set out to change the country is increasingly in recent months trying to accommodate itself to the conventional wisdom of the Washington political establishment,' said Newt Gingrich (Republican, Georgia).

Conservative Republicans, on the other hand, would not support a bill which had been amended in such a way as to cut military expenditure and increase Medicaid. But most Democrats still found the bill unacceptable and wanted to see if they could pass their budget rather than a slightly amended Republican one. Afterwards Michel told colleagues that for a budget to pass it would have to 'move several degrees to the right.'

Another significant amendment, proposed by Jamie Whitten, (Dem. Miss.) was added to each bill. The effect of Whitten's amendment would have been to remove the ability of the Budget Committee to review his Appropriations Committee's actions. This would have removed all the teeth from reconciliation and made it impossible to force the committees back into line if they had decided to exceed the expenditure suggested in the first resolution. The Budget Committee had, until 1981, taken care not to be seen to be encroaching on the turf of other committees. This deference had limited its effectiveness but had

\[9^1\] Ibid.
\[9^2\] Ibid.
\[9^3\] Ibid.
allowed it to avoid making powerful enemies. Whitten was reacting to the events of the previous year, and although the amendments were ultimately futile because the bills were all defeated, the move signalled Whitten's determination not to allow the administration to repeat the tactics of the previous year.

The Whitten and Oakar amendments were only two out of 68 different amendments which had to be voted for separately for each of the three major proposals. What had appeared to be a compromise of dazzling cunning by the Democrat-run Rules Committee had turned into a marathon legislative stalemate. 'Right now you haven't got the votes out there to pass the Lord's prayer,' said Aspin.9 5

On the seventh of June the Budget Committee proposed a new budget plan to the House. It was defeated 202-225 on the tenth. But an amended GOP resolution, proposed by Delbert Latta, passed 219-206 the same day, with forty-six Democrats and fifteen Republicans defecting from their respective parties. This budget plan called for a deficit of $99.27 billion, while the one that the Senate had passed estimated a $116 billion shortfall. The difference is important because one total is above, and the other below, the politically crucial $100 billion mark. (The Congressional Quarterly used the lower figure twice but explained that dubious accounting methods were adopted to keep the budget below $100 billion.)9 6

When it came to acting on the instructions contained in the bill the Ways and Means Democrats consistently refused to make the necessary cuts. They tied themselves in such a knot that chairman Dan Rostenkowski had to adopt a strategy that appeared to concede one of their constitutional prerogatives because he could not get them to produce a tax proposal that had a chance of making it through the House.

On the 23rd of June, nearly six weeks after the 15th of May deadline, the

95 'Chaos Aplenty but no Budget' Time 7.6.82, p.22.
Conference Committee finally finished with the first budget resolution for fiscal 1983.

3. **Summer and Fall 1982: Congress Fails to Produce a Budget.**

Now the various committees in both houses had to go about the business of filling in the details of the budget resolutions.

Inflation jumped to over 10 per cent in May (it had averaged 3 per cent over the previous seven months). But Reagan said the recession was 'bottoming out'. Even though the budget resolution passed by Conference Committee and backed by Reagan allowed for a fiscal 1983 deficit of over $100 billion and for a $20.9 billion tax increase, the President said to his cabinet: 'let's understand. We're not changing course, and I don't want people saying that we might be.'

Meanwhile Congress had started work on two large reconciliation bills. On the 13th of July the Senate Finance Committee reported the first of these which they entitled: the 'Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.' The bill had started life as a minor budget bill in the House. Therefore, strictly speaking, the Senate was not breaking with convention and initiating fiscal legislation when it tacked a very large tax reconciliation package onto the end of the original bill. The package contained provisions designed to raise $98.3 billion in extra revenue by closing tax loopholes, raising taxes, and make cuts of $17.5 billion on Medicaid, Medicare, welfare, and savings bonds between 1983 and 1985. It passed Senate 50-47 with no Democrats supporting it. This was because, *Time* said, they were not going to commit Congress's cardinal sin and vote for a tax increase in an election year.

The House also wanted nothing to do with the bill and renounced its

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97 'Reaganomics on the Ropes' *Newsweek* 5.7.82, p.31.
99 *Newsweek* 5.7.82.
100 'Biting the Budget Bullet' 2.8.82, p.20.
primacy in fiscal matters when it voted 208-197 on the 28th of July to send the Senate bill to Conference. 164 Democrats and 44 Republicans supported the motion while 137 Republicans and 60 Democrats opposed it. This was partly a product of the Democrats' desire to spare themselves the embarrassment of voting for a tax increase in an election year but it was also the result of the need to help the Ways and Means Committee escape from a potentially disastrous internal deadlock.

After the Latta proposal passed, the Ways and Means Committee had met on numerous occasions to find ways to pay for it. On the 13th of July they found $5.9 billion dollars in Medicare 'cuts': half of what the bill specified. On the 15th they met behind closed doors and found ways to bring that total up to just under $11 billion, only half a billion dollars short of the target. But, the bulk of that total came from tax increases and accounting sleights of hand. Rousselot, a Republican Committee member, complained that the Democrat strategy had been to get the Republicans to push for cuts and that they still planned to blame the GOP for the cuts they had made. 101

On the 21st of July Rostenkowski presented a tax-increase package to the Democratic caucus. Rostenkowski had drawn up the proposal in cahoots with Barber Conable (N.Y), the ranking Republican in his Committee and it resembled the tax increase proposals just passed by the Senate with a few added wrinkles such as increased taxes for oil companies, a tax on tips and a tightening up of corporation tax. The Democrats hated it.

The next day the Ways and Means Committee rejected their chairman's proposal. Already, according to the Congressional Quarterly, some Democrats were toying with the idea of going directly to conference in order to get out of this embarrassing impasse. 102 On the 28th of July Rostenkowski proposed that course of action to his Committee. They voted for it. Four Republicans voted with the Democrat majority, one of them, Conable (N.Y.), from the North East.  

One Democrat committeeman, James Shannon (Mass), voted with the Republicans. They presented the proposal to the House that day and it passed.

Rostenkowski said that any attempt to draft a tax-increase bill in the House would lead to political chaos, severely reducing chances of passage.\textsuperscript{103} Tip O'Neill was much less defensive: he wanted to embarrass Reagan:

I want him to use that smiley countenance, that sweet-talking voice of his, and be as hard knuckled with the Republicans as he has been along the line. How can a Democrat vote for a tax increase with opponents hammering you to death, unless the President is right out there.\textsuperscript{104}

Gephardt voiced similar sentiments; 'I want there to be Presidential leadership and sheer pain, as there was sheer pleasure last year.'\textsuperscript{105} There can be little doubt that senior House Democrats bore a deep grudge for their humiliation in 1981.

The second reconciliation bill (entitled the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1982) passed conference on the 18th of August. Between them the two reconciliation bills included savings expected to amount to $130 billion over three years, a larger total than the $125.5 billion requested in the original reconciliation instructions.

4. Veto Override

On the 24th of July Reagan vetoed an emergency supplemental bill for the current year. The bill had started life as a routine supplemental designed to raise an extra $4.9 billion for the fiscal-1982 budget. The House had added $3 billion onto it in emergency housing aid and a $3,000 cap on the tax deductions which members of Congress would be allowed to claim. They also amended the bill to repeal a long forgotten provision of a 1978 law requiring a balanced

\textsuperscript{103} 'A No-Fingerprints Tax Bill' \textit{Newsweek} 9.8.82, p.16
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
budget by 1981. The veto was sustained the same day.

The next day Reagan vetoed another emergency supplemental bill, which was identical to the first except that the housing plan had been left out. The House sustained the veto on the 13th of July.

On the 28th the President vetoed a $14.2 billion emergency supplemental bill, calling it a 'budget buster'. The bill contained $6.16 billion for federal pay increases due the first of October and general supplemental appropriations including $5 billion for agriculture and $0.8 billion for health, education, labour, and human services. The House rejected the veto by 301-117, and the next day the Senate followed suit, 60-30 (21 Republicans defecting).

*Time* argued, plausibly, that Reagan knew his veto would be overturned but calculated that the cost of losing was better than the cost of not vetoing and appearing to give ground. The other media disagreed. *Newsweek* pointed out that what the President called a 'budget buster' was $1.5 billion under his original request. *Business Week* said that the Republican defections showed how nervous the GOP was about the upcoming elections; a far cry from the days when withdrawal of an electoral endorsement was one of the chief sticks the White House had to beat fractious Republicans into line.

**C. 1982, THE TIDE TURNS**

The second year of Reagan's presidency, which ended with a particularly frustrating lame-duck session, saw no further smashing triumphs for Reagan. The Democrat leadership were able to deprive Reagan and his allies of their momentum and to stop them passing a budget in the Reaganomic mould. Their successes were, however, almost entirely negative because for they too were unable to pass a budget that was the coherent product of a macroeconomic theory. Instead 1982 saw the start of a return to 'business as usual' as the

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106 'You can't win them all' *Time* 20.9.82.
108 'The Recession Unnerves the GOP' *Business Week* 18.10.82, p.40.
committees re-established their equilibrium and their control of the budgetary process. Even if they were unable to use the budget as a tool of economic management they was able to return to the time-honoured tradition of using it to meet the particular needs of members and their constituencies.

The alliance which was to have kept the Republicans in power for the rest of the century lasted less than a year. It had involved the President encouraging a rebellion by the majority of Representatives against the majority party leadership and the system it controlled. It involved short-circuiting the long-established system for considering legislation. Congress is a ruminative body which chews over the same piece of legislation in its various digestive organs (the two chambers, the various House and Senate spending, Ways and Means and Budget Committees and the Conference Committee) before producing its final bills. Along the way all Representatives, or groups of Representatives, with sectional interests to protect have the chance to barter their votes for considerations. That way an acceptable budget is produced.

The 1974 Budget Reform act was an attempt to impose a structure which would allow macro-economic considerations to overrule sectional interests, but the Budget Committee was too timid and too weak to make it work. For one year Reagan had managed to transform Congress into an almost parliamentary system. The reaction in 1982 was a case of severe legislative indigestion before the system settled down to produce a 'business-as-usual' budget with something for everybody, including a few nods to the President which he had to make the best of.

The difference between the crushing Presidential victories of 1981 and the painful compromises of 1982 was a handful of votes. The majority of Representatives on both sides remained safely at anchor with their parties for nearly all the votes but some were tossed back and forth between the two sides. In order to identify the important currents in Congressional politics it will be revealing to chart the courses of these marginal voters and to try to discover why they, and not others, bobbed so far on the political tides.
CHAPTER II. THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOUR.

A. INTRODUCTION

Scholars attempting to explain why Representatives vote as they do have offered, broadly, two types of answer. There are those who argue that re-election is the only consideration Representatives allow themselves and there are others who argue that, while the voters are important, Representatives can be swayed by non-constituency motives. The pattern of the votes in 1981 and 1982, especially among the marginal Representatives, will provide a test for these theses.

Pure constituency theorists, for example David Mayhew in *The Electoral Connection*, argue that in order to understand the way Representatives vote it is necessary is to discover what their constituents want. More scope is given to Representatives by Richard Fenno and Morris Fiorina. Both suggest ways in which Representatives can develop a measure of electoral independence. Fenno argues that they can develop a 'home style'. If they attend to casework diligently or are skilled at explaining their votes they may be able to earn enough trust to allow them some leeway on House roll calls. Fiorina says that Representatives' first concern is always reelection but, if they believe they have done enough to guarantee that, they may allow themselves the luxury of casting a vote in pursuit of a secondary legislative goal of theirs. Finally, there is a group of theorists who concentrate not on individual Representatives but, instead, on the creation of effective legislative coalitions in the House.

B. THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION

'Vote your district first,' said speaker Sam Rayburn, and few modern writers on Congress forget that every two years Representatives must answer to their voters. Some have gone so far as to argue that when we want to know why Representatives vote as they do we need only look at the desires of their constituents.

David Mayhew lays out this extreme position clearly in *The Electoral
Here he creates a model of congressional behaviour very similar to the type used by economists discussing the perfect market.

I shall conjure up a vision of congressmen as single-minded seekers of re-election, see what kinds of activity that goal implies, and then speculate about how congressmen and women so motivated are likely to go about building and sustaining legislative institutions and making policy...^2

Mayhew suggests four advantages of this emphasis on re-election as a goal. First, 'it fits political reality rather well.'^3 Second, it 'spotlights...directly...men...(not) parties and pressure groups (which are)...analytic phantoms.'^4 Third, the 're-election quest establishes an accountability relationship with the electorate.'^5 This means that the goal of re-election enjoys 'putative empirical primacy,'^6 or, in other words, 'it has to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that has to be achieved over and over again if other ends are to be entertained.'^7 And fourth, 'politics is best studied as a struggle among men to gain...power and (of) the consequences of that struggle.'^8 Mayhew rejects the notion that in any assembly a minimum winning coalition will always form, ensuring the winners each receive the largest possible slice of the cake and the losers as little as possible. Mayhew employs the traditional arguments concerning the weakness of parties in Congress, and adds that: '...the satisfaction of electoral needs requires remarkably little zero-sum competition among members.'^9 'So we are left with 535 men and women, rather than two parties, as the units to be examined.'^10

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2 *The Electoral Connection* pp. 5-6.
3 Ibid. p.6.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. p.17.
7 Ibid. p.16.
8 Ibid. p.17.
9 Ibid. p.83.
10 Ibid. p.27.
But these conditions obtain only while there is pork to be distributed; when the vote is on building a dam here, a factory there, or supporting the price of some crop, then the cost to the members not directly involved is quite small when compared to the benefits for the few Representatives who stand to gain.

According to Mayhew's figures Representatives who ignore constituency considerations and spend too much time and energy on national issues are not investing their capital wisely in the electoral market place and will receive a poorer return in votes than they might otherwise have. While only a third of the variance in partisan percentages in House elections is due to national factors, over half, says Mayhew, is local. So, marginal Representatives, who must try to gain the support of every possible voter, ought to be more likely to be district-oriented or 'delegates' than non-marginal members. But, all Representatives have had close shaves at one time or another during their electoral careers and it may be that a non-marginal is 'safe' precisely because the Representative always keeps the need for re-election foremost in his or her mind when voting. (In fact it is not quite true that all members of Congress have had a close shave at one time or another. But, as Fenno's Home Style reveals, they all tend to think they are in constant danger of a close shave,\textsuperscript{11} which, given the purposes of the argument, comes to the same thing.)

A logical consequence of seeing Congress as an institution in which legislative effectiveness is completely subservient to members' re-election goals is to argue that legislation itself is of no great interest to members. Mayhew says, 'Particularized benefits aside...congressmen have less stake in winning victories than they normally appear to have.'\textsuperscript{12}

Thus,

\textbf{to put too much into mobilization would be to misallocate resources.}
\textbf{For members who make the motions or carry the bills there may be}

\textsuperscript{11}Fenno, R. \textit{Home style} (Boston: Little, Brown 1978.)
a value in winning, but how much value?...Would Senators (Hatfield and McGovern)... have been any less esteemed by their followers if their anti-war amendment had won rather than lost?\footnote{Ibid. p.117.}

How can the 1981 and 1982 budgets be accounted for in terms of this kind of argument? The success of the Reagan administration in obtaining majorities in Congress can be explained either as the result of the particularized rewards the budget offered or as a side effect of position-taking by Representatives.

Certainly there was an element of good, old-fashioned vote buying in the 1981 votes on reconciliation and the tax cut when the administration promised some Southern Democrats concessions on sugar, cotton, and oil. The next year a group of Northern Republicans tried the same manoeuvre. They called themselves the 'Gypsy Moths' and attempted to barter their votes for benefits such as heating oil subsidies which would provide special concessions for their constituents.

Mayhew concentrates on the relationship between Representatives and the particular interests of their constituents. For the politicians the important thing is to be seen to be doing what the constituents want. If the constituents do not get the legislation that they want passed then the Representative can explain that they did their best but were betrayed by the inequities of the system. They would have been legislatively successful, they might say, as Reagan did in 1982, if Congress were not dominated by members preoccupied with their own self-interest. This is a point Fenno develops. He points out that while 90 per cent of Representatives are re-elected, Congress as a whole usually receives no better than a 25 per cent approval rating. The rating for Congress as a body is, he adds, highest when it is passing Presidential legislation, as it was in 1981.\footnote{Richard Fenno If, as Ralph Nader says, Congress is a Broken Branch, then how Come we Love our Congressmen so much? in Norman Ornstein ed., Congress in Change (New York: Praeger, 1975.)}

This means that one popular strategy among candidates is to run for
Congress by running against it.\textsuperscript{15} This, presumably, applies not only to members of Congress. Reagan's presidential campaign in 1980 was in part a campaign against big Federal government. The difference between a President and a Representative is that the former would be expected to follow through on a promise to do something about the way Washington worked.

Fenno's argument raises the question of Representatives developing presentational styles. This is an issue irrelevant to the main thrust of Mayhew's argument so we will return to it later. In *The Electoral Connection* Mayhew is quite clear that the voting behaviour of Representatives can be understood almost entirely in terms of their desire for reelection. In order to explain the votes in 1981 and 1982 we must look mainly for the local benefits each roll call offered, if there are none then the attitudes of constituents to national issues will have provided Representatives with their voting cues. Perhaps the change in the type of budget votes, from the general in 1981 to the particular in 1982 was a result of a desire by Representatives to return to work that would yield a greater marginal return come the election. Nevertheless, says Mayhew, whether the votes had national or local content, we need look no further than the constituents for the entire explanation of Congressional action.

C. OTHER LEGISLATIVE GOALS

While Mayhew's theory is coherent, logical, and elegantly simple it does jar with the accounts Representatives gave of their own actions during 1981 and 1982. There are other writers who give primacy to the need for reelection but describe how Representatives may be able to pursue, some of the time, other legislative goals. This section will look at two such writers. The first is Fiorina who argues that certain Representatives may be able to vote independently some of the time. The second is Richard Fenno who argues that votes in Congress are only part of a Representative's overall 'home style' and that what counts on a vote is not what constituents want, but how Representatives think they can explain, or avoid having to explain, their vote back home.

\textsuperscript{15}c.f. *Home style*
1. Maximizers and Maintainers

Fiorina divides Representatives into two types: maximizers and maintainers.\(^6\) The maximizers always have re-election as their first goal in any action they take. The maintainers also have re-election as their main goal, but are aware that they do not need every possible vote they could gain to win. For them, under certain circumstances, the extra votes an action might bring them will have less utility than the other goals they might satisfy by risking those votes. The maintainers are those Representatives with large majorities who feel safe (which is a feeling, Fenno suggests in *Home style*, that few congressmen or women actually allow themselves).\(^7\) According to Fiorina’s statistics, 33 per cent are maximizers and the rest are maintainers.\(^8\) The other goals members may hold include: legislative influence, policy, prestige, party loyalty, and higher office.\(^9\) These would all be lost, the argument runs, if the Representative were to lose the next election. Representatives, therefore, will always start their legislative careers as maximizers and will only act on their secondary preferences so long as they can still maintain their chances of reelection at a safe level.

Fiorina also divides constituencies into two types: homogeneous and heterogeneous. He goes on to argue that maintainers always come from homogeneous districts and that heterogeneous districts are always represented by maximizers. This is because homogeneous districts tend to be safe and heterogeneous ones marginal. A Representative from a highly heterogeneous district can never hope to win by much. But for one from a homogeneous district it is all or nothing:

> It may be that the great bulk of congressmen achieve reelection precisely because they vote optimally.\(^{20}\)

Fiorina argues that the fact that voters are ignorant does not mean that

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\(^{16}\) Morris P. Fiorina, *Representative, Roll Calls, and Constituencies* (Lexington, 1974)

\(^{17}\) op. cit.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Fiorina, op. cit. p.35.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
Representatives are not electorally accountable: 'what counts is the potential damage of a vote.' Every time Representatives record a vote in a roll call they give a hostage to the future. Each vote could be that fatal misstep which is exploited by a small group of interested constituents to bring about electoral disaster. The possibility that somebody at home might be watching and could make an issue out of it is enough to force the member of Congress to pay close attention to the desires of his or her constituents in every roll call vote. The survival routine of all Representatives must be to ask themselves before every action 'will I offend anybody or lose any votes?' When they have calculated the potential damage, they may decide that it is bearable.

Fiorina adopts another micro-economic argument when he argues that Representatives can never foresee the future and therefore must act in every case as if this vote is their last. They must assume that if this vote alienates their constituents they may not be given the opportunity to redeem themselves. There will be patterns to Representatives' voting behavior, but these are due to the make up of their constituencies.

This explanation rules out the possibility that the Republican defectors on Michel-Latta, for example, knew they would have another chance to pass a budget when they dragged down their party's proposal. But the Yellow Jackets seem to have picked that vote as the time to signal a warning to their leadership not to take their votes for granted. Indeed the budget is particularly well suited to strategic voting because, unlike any other area of legislation, Congress is obliged to pass a budget every year.

2. Homestyles
Fiorina arrives at his theory deductively whereas Fenno approaches the problem inductively. Fenno spent eight years trailing 18 politicians round the country. While Fiorina believes that, logically, Representatives must treat every vote as their last Fenno argues that, in practice, they do not. Reelection is, at almost

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21 Fiorina, op. cit.
22 Ibid.
all times, their primary goal but, first, they can win the approval of their voters in other ways and, second, provided their representatives do not cast a string of unpopular votes, constituents are usually happy to let them act as 'trustees'. Fenno quotes the three of his Representatives from the most 'issue-oriented' districts as saying their constituents have little idea of how their Representatives voted on the vast majority of roll calls. 'People don't care about my votes,' said one. 'They are indifferent. It's amazing to me.'

Fenno's data suggests that Fiorina is wrong to argue that even though voters consistently display a very low level of political knowledge, Representatives must still act on the assumption that political enemies will make the maximum capital out of every vote. He says that most Representatives believe that no one roll call will cost them the election.

Fenno argues that roll call votes account for only a part of Representatives' standing back home. Representatives also win approval by attending to casework, making themselves visible to voters through the media and personal appearances, by winning their share of pork barrel and by climbing to positions of power, status and high visibility in Washington. Which of these they choose to concentrate on depends on their home style but once they have the trust of their constituents they earn a certain amount of flexibility on roll calls.

Fenno quotes a congressional adage that 'if you've got to explain you're in trouble' but argues that, since Representatives may have to defend any given roll call, what matters is not how they voted but how they can explain the vote. It would, however, be a mistake to expect those explanations to be of a very sophisticated kind. Most constituents are ignorant of the way Washington works and, says Fenno, Representatives are generally happy to keep them that way. They rarely go out of their way to educate voters on the obscure ways of Congress and concentrate instead on contrasting their performance with the corrupt ways of the institution and the bulk of the rest of its members.

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23 *Home style* p. 142.
Although Fenno does not spell the point out in *Home style*, the way Congress conducts its business means that some votes are less visible, without being less effective, to constituents than are others. It may be easier to avoid the scrutiny of constituents on a voice vote than on a roll call because the latter is recorded. The extent to which any given vote is procedural or substantive will also affect the way the vote is viewed by Representatives. If they wish to take positions they will do so on substantive votes; if they wish to block legislation they can do so on procedural votes. When, in 1982, the House was trying to avoid becoming associated with an unpopular tax bill, they voted for a confusingly worded procedural motion which let the Senate take the full blame. Representatives like to hide their less seemly work in procedural votes, which, though arcane, may well have substantive effects. The whole process by which the House avoided voting on the budget in 1982 was so tied up in complex procedural votes that outsiders might well have found it difficult to comprehend. This was precisely the intention of the Democratic leadership. In 1981, on the other hand, they had been unable to escape the three unambiguous blockbuster votes. Fenno suggests, however, that voters have a limited attention span and a limited supply of political passion. When Reagan tried to rouse them for a fourth time in the fall of 1981 they failed to respond.

Fenno also deals with the question of changes in the attitudes, styles and, consequently, voting behaviour of Representatives as they gain seniority. Fenno opens *Home style* with an account of a congressman returning to his constituency fresh from the glamorous legislative wheeler-dealing of Washington where he had just resisted a personal telephone appeal from the President. Now he had to return to handing out shopping bags to constituents. Many veteran politicians become frustrated with the demands of constituency work. Often they have attained positions of power in Congress and they believe they serve the country as a whole best when they have a degree of freedom from the myopic desires of their own constituents. They believe that the more independent members of Congress are, the better the legislation they can pass. There are a variety of reasons why more senior members come to think this way. As almost all the

power in Congress is directly related to length of continuous service, (the plum committee and sub-committee chairs, the House and party leadership, and so on), senior members have less incentive to spend much time on their constituents' demands. Furthermore, more senior members tend to identify their personal prestige with that of the institution. This is partly because more of what the institution does is either their work or the work of close friends, and partly because they become 'socialized' to the values of Congress. They may also become weary of the constant struggle to maximize votes. They may lose their enthusiasm for the tiring trips to the constituency every weekend and the endless mental alertness it takes to ensure that they 'maximize' on every vote. Furthermore, Representatives can develop a home style based on their role as statesmen and power-brokers, telling their constituents that they can do more for them than a rookie ever could and that their position reflects well on the whole constituency.

The attitude of the more senior members is expressed by Fenno in *Home style*. It was re-articulated in 1982 in *Time* as part of its feature on the budget 'battle'. *Time* presented a pessimistic view of the younger generation of Representatives. It quotes Jim Wright:

(T)he moral stamina in terms of basic integrity and guts has declined. Members are much more concerned about image than substance.

And an anonymous senior House member agrees that being able to resist the folks back home is a laudable character trait.

The new breed are scared of their shadows. They want to do what is immediately popular rather than what will work.

This explains why the quest for pork-barrel is sometimes set aside by members.

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2 c.f. *Home style*
2 6 *Time* 26.4.82. loc. cit.
2 7 Ibid.
2 8 Ibid.
as their committees attempt to preserve their reputation for highly qualified non-partisan work and for their effectiveness in pushing measures through Congress.²⁹

In the light of this, the use of the reconciliation process in 1981 is highly striking. The spending and tax committees were all 'rolled', that is their budget proposals were overturned, as the President took the decision-making away from them. Part of Reagan's failure the following year comes from the determination of the committees to protect their 'turf'. Offended institutional pride may explain the decline in the support which Reagan enjoyed in the House between 1981 and 1982. Some of those who voted with the President and against the system in 1981 might have done so as a result of a sense of crisis or of powerful pressure from their constituents. Without such strong motives they went back to supporting the system in 1982 and merely maintaining Reagan's new right coalition was not sufficient to persuade them to rebel again.

Representatives, then, are drawn, for a variety of reasons, to vote with their committees. What is more they are more likely to vote with their committees if they are more senior members. They have become absorbed into the House seniority system and are rewarded with power and status and a feeling of responsibility. Furthermore, as Kenneth Shepsle demonstrates,³⁰ there is a hierarchy among committees. This is partly because some committees do more important and conspicuous work and partly because some committees yield more potential for looking after the interests of the folk back home. And, as Phil Gramm found out, on committee appointments the party giveth and the party taketh away. In 1981 we might expect members of committees, especially more senior Democrat members of high status committees, to be more inclined than their fellows to resist perceived electoral opinion and to defend their committees.

²⁹Fenno mentions this his detailed account of the work of the Appropriations committees in *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
³⁰Kenneth A. Shepsle *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 1978)
D. COALITION BUILDING

So far we have talked of roll calls as occurrences independent of each other. Indeed Fiorina argued that this was the only way to view votes. Furthermore, we have hardly discussed the role of the parties even though the budget battles of 1981 and 1982 were often discussed in terms of Republicans against Democrats and when we move on to the analysis of the data we shall divide Representatives up by party.

One reason for this is that the works of some of the constituency theorists (i.e. Mayhew and Fenno) are a deliberate attempt to reintroduce the voters into Congressional literature from which they had almost vanished. The rest of the chapter will concentrate on the type of literature which talks about parties rather than voters and the moods of Congress rather than the moods of the electorate. One of the preoccupations of writers in the 1960s was how it was that Congress could be so reluctant to pass certain types of 'ideological' legislation for long periods and then suddenly go on a reformist binge as it did in Roosevelt's first years and again after Johnson was elected in 1964. Although Reagan's agenda was conservative the events of 1981 are in many ways similar to those of 1932 and 1964. Mayhew, in Party Loyalty has tackled the problem as have, inter alia, Randall Ripley and David Brady.

Mayhew concentrates on coalition-building in Party Loyalty and argues that, 'a Congressman dispatched to Washington to guard the interests of a district cannot do the guarding by himself. It takes the votes of as many as 218 Congressmen to authorize...a bill...' So members must form a coalition if they want to have anything pass through Congress.

The most important and longest lived 'dominant coalition' of modern American history was Roosevelt's New Deal coalition. Mayhew argues that the Democrats were much more legislatively successful than the Republicans between 1932 and the mid-sixties because the Democratic party in Congress was

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David R. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty among Congressmen; the difference between Democrats and Republicans; 1947-62.* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 1966)
'inclusive' while the Republican party at the time was 'exclusive'. What this means is that 'House Democratic leaders persistently championed, and Republicans persistently opposed the programs of their interested members.'

The 'party loyalty' of members of the Democratic party was a quid pro quo service rendered by members of one interest group for members of another who would later return the favour. Each supported legislation that benefited their allies but did little harm to their own constituents. The Republicans characterised the Democratic Party as a 'gravy train'. The Democrats, for their part, argued that 'the summation of the programs of various party elements constituted the national interest.' But, as Mayhew points out, the spending on which the alliance rested 'was obviously fitting to a party wedded to the ideology of welfare liberalism.'

The Democrats' 'New Deal Coalition', therefore, worked because a series of special interest groups, none of which, alone, constituted a majority, supported each other in voting. The Republicans, who represented the tax-payer of small-town 'middle' America, could only watch in helpless frustration, unable to enter any counter bids.

But, argues Mayhew, this does not mean that they had to become New Dealers in order to stand a chance of passing legislation.

It may be that 'inclusive' compromise is the hallmark of a dominant party rather than a welfarist one, that the best way to build a majority party in America is to impress upon the electorate issues which make 'inclusive' legislation possible.

A 'dominant' party (n.b. not a 'majority' party) has to be able to offer particularized benefits to enough interest groups to be able to deliver a majority

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32 Ibid. p.40
33 Ibid. p.15.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. p.159.
of votes over a sufficient period for everyone to receive their reciprocal rewards. A coalition has a certain period of grace, because congressmen and women can hope to 'impress upon the electorate' the possibility of inclusive legislation.

The success of the Reagan budget in 1981 could, in the light of this argument, be explained in two different ways. Either the traditional constituency of the Republicans had grown so large that exclusive legislation was now possible, or the Republicans had at last managed to find a formula for putting together an inclusive coalition.

The Reagan budget was presented as part of an attempt to balance the government's books, as a move toward fiscal responsibility after the spendthrift days of New Deal/Great Society Democratic control. Insofar as this was its object, the budget was then clearly in the tradition of the policies espoused by the Republican minority/opposition during the years of Democrat control. If a majority of Representatives supported it, it could be because a majority of their constituents now held that belief, or might have become susceptible to having that view impressed upon them. Or it may be that the new budgetary process, and particularly reconciliation which Reagan used tellingly in 1981, has made it possible to pre-empt budget log-rolling, a characteristic of inclusive coalitions.

This is what Reagan's election campaign might have led us to expect. One of the characteristics of inclusive coalitions is that they spend money and enlarge federal government. Indeed, over the past 50 years this has become the accepted norm for congressional behaviour. Congress had rarely managed to cut taxes in that period and had not been able to turn the budget into a macro-economic tool. When Reagan ran on a ticket which promised a balanced budget and a tax cut he was running for Washington by running against the inclusive coalition which dominated Congress.

The coalition which voted through Reagan's budget triumphs in 1981 did, however, bear some of the hallmarks of an inclusive coalition. It may have been that some Representatives supported the President's budget not because they
believed his economic strategy would work but because their constituencies stood to benefit financially from increased military spending or from a relaxation of the laws governing mineral extractions. What proved really damaging to the President's budget hopes in 1982, was the Administration's willingness to exchange quite specific fiscal inducements for Boll Weevil votes on key roll calls in 1981.

One explanation for the bursts of legislation which characterise 'new coalitions' (Roosevelt's New Deal, the 'Great Society' promoted by Johnson and Reagan's 'bipartisan coalition', for example) is that a long period of ideological gestation is needed. Congress and the electorate must be familiarized with a profound change in political thinking and persuaded that this is 'an idea whose time has come.' Sundquist, for instance, argues that the Great Society programmes were all the product of such a period of gestation. Because Representatives know a bill will be defeated does not mean that they do not plan to have it passed in the future. Paul Craig Roberts argues that 'supply-side economics won its spurs in the congressional process' in 1977 when Rousselot introduced to the House the first tax cut bill inspired by supply side theory. The bill, known as Kemp-Roth, even though it was heavily defeated by the old guard in the House, still served to awaken Representatives to the truth of supply-side theory.

Ripley argues that there are two features which parties forming a majority for the first time, after a long period in opposition, tend to display. The first is comparatively strong party discipline; the second is a willingness to innovate. Both of these were features of Republican action on the Hill in 1981. One of the reasons for the loss of impetus the Republicans suffered in 1982 was the decline of the very high level of party loyalty they enjoyed in 1981.

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Similarly Brady argues that, when a realignment occurs in American politics, a marked increase in the correlation between party loyalty and issue voting will follow elections in which the voters have been offered an unusually pronounced ideological choice by the parties' election platforms. A further upshot of this will be that the House Appropriations Committee will, for a while, become more partisan and less consensual which will weaken the chances of its bills passing. The Reagan 'revolution' differs from the cases Brady studies because it was not accompanied by a change in control of the House. As a result a large-scale change in the membership of committees did not occur. Even so there was, in 1981, an increase in ideological behaviour particularly from junior members like Gramm. Furthermore the heightened ideological awareness of 1981 and 1982 led to an increase in the perception that the committees were producing politically partisan work. What had previously been an acceptable part of the status quo was now another manifestation of 'business as usual.' Which was one of the things the Reagan 'revolution' intended to change.

The 1980 election certainly bears out Brady's argument that a realignment is preceded by an election in which the parties offer the voters a genuine ideological choice. Furthermore, the behaviour of the GOP in 1981 and the nature of the programme they supported supports his description of post-realignment politics. The failure of the Democratic party to play their role correctly is a product of the unusual circumstances. It may be worth bearing in mind, however, Brady's caution that the idea of realignment has become part of the Washington folklore. It is quite clear that Reagan and his advisors believed they were shaping a new dominant coalition.

E. CONCLUSIONS
The small numbers of institutional theories examined here suggest several answers to the question of why Reagan's budget fared less well in 1982 than in 1981. The most significant thing about the answers is what they all have in

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common. They all might be taken to predict that Reagan and the House Republicans would enjoy less success in 1982 than in 1981.

The two years this paper deals with, 1981 and 1982, repeat the pattern of events in periods after an election in which a significant change in the balance of political power has occurred. It seems that such elections are followed by brief periods of unusually high legislative success by the new dominant party. The party unity or the sense of purpose evaporates after a while and Congress returns to business as usual, which is what happened in 1982, albeit much more rapidly than in the Johnson or Roosevelt years. The fact, however, that this kind of change has occurred before is hardly an explanation of why the change occurred.

From here the paper will go on to a detailed analysis of the voting behaviour of the House of Representatives over nine key budget votes in 1981 and 1982. It is already clear that a change of some kind took place in the House between those years because it passed dramatically different budgets in those two years. The change was brought about by the movement of some marginal Representatives out of the Presidential camp. The theoretical literature offers two types of explanation of this shift. These explanations will be used as tools for handling the data and will in turn be tested by the results they produce.

If the polar constituency theorists are right, then the explanation will lie entirely with the constituents. Their wishes, or the wishes of some of them, or their wishes as perceived by Representatives will have been the only things Representatives considered as they cast their votes in 1981 and 1982. When testing the votes in the light of the theoretical literature we might expect none of the non-constituency variables to show any significant score. The non-constituency variables that can be quantified and which seem, reading the accounts of the events of 1981 and 1982 and the theoretical literature, to be plausible explanatory candidates might include members' seniority, their committee membership, the status of those committees and their seniority on them. If,
constituencies being equal, these variables do seem to have an effect on the way Representatives vote then this will suggest the picture painted by Mayhew in *The Electoral Connection* is missing a crucial dimension.
CHAPTER III. ANALYSIS OF DATA

A. INTRODUCTION
Why should almost the same body of politicians pass a budget drawn to an ideological blueprint one year and then reject another, drawn to the same blueprint, 12 months later? The theoretical literature has suggested, broadly, two types of explanation. There are those who explain the behaviour of Representatives as entirely constituency-oriented and those who argue that non-constituency influences can contribute significantly when Representatives decide how to vote. The data analysed in this chapter can be broken down into the same categories. If the polar constituency theorists are correct then the entire explanation of the ebb and flow of Reagan's support in the House will lie in the constituencies. But the possible influence of Committee membership and of House seniority will also be assessed to see if institutional considerations do sway Representatives.

The account of events in Chapter One does suggest that there was a contextual shift over the course of the two years. The atmosphere in which the Representatives prepared the budget changed. In the first half of 1981 they could barely avoid public scrutiny whereas in 1982 they found themselves in the comforting gloom of the obscure legislative byways of Congress. Furthermore, the intensity of public support for the President's economic policy had waned, which would lead one to expect, under any of the theories, a shift away from policymaking in accordance with the ideological goals of the President and a return to 'business as usual' be that serving the local interests of the constituency, or the goals of political status, or some other objective.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the key economic votes over the two years focussing on the Representatives whose movement from one camp to the other brought triumph for the President in 1981 and frustration in 1982. We will examine those marginal presidential supporters in the light of

1Where membership changed during the congress both Representatives from a constituency are excluded from the calculations.
institutional and constituency variables while keeping in mind always the changes that occurred in the political context.

1. The Presidential Strategy

In 1981 the President adopted a strategy of trying to reduce the budget and tax issues to a series of all-encompassing set-piece votes. He was entirely successful on two scores: he was able both to stage-manage those votes and to win them. This was because the approach played to the President's strengths. It allowed him to exploit his momentum and to avoid becoming bogged down in a legislative war of attrition with the Democratic House and committee leadership. Most importantly, he was able, at key moments, to use his immense popularity and charisma to charm susceptible members of Congress and to mobilise public opinion (i.e. the sum of all Representatives' constituents) through television speeches. This is clearly an approach that works best when used sparingly.

The key to the President's budgetary success in 1981 lay in his ability to command a majority of the votes in the House. Even though the GOP were in the minority they were able to seize the legislative initiative on the budget and concentrate their fire on the three major votes because they maintained party discipline while sufficient Democrats defected to give them a majority. Reagan was able to exploit that majority to force the Democratic House and committee leadership to swallow his programme.

In the fall of 1981 Reagan started to lose ground. Democrats began to drift back to their party and Republicans began to break ranks. Together these marginal Reaganites were sufficient in numbers to deprive him of a winning coalition and leave his policies with only enough support for, at best, a standoff. The minority of Representatives who switched from supporting the President to opposing him meant the difference between the total victory of his policies in one year and their defeat the next. They, then, are the interesting Congressmen and women. Who were they and why did they switch?
The question these votes raise is: in what ways do the marginal Representatives, that is those who vote against their party, resemble each other and differ from their loyal fellow party members? There is an obvious geographical answer to this. The bulk of Democrat defectors came from Southern, Border, or Sunbelt states. A disproportionate number of Republican defectors came from the North East. But, even within these areas there were large numbers of Representatives who remained loyal to their party, so the original question must be asked again within those regions.

B. THE VARIABLES

1. Dependent Variables, The Nine Roll Calls
Reagan's success or failure is here measured over nine of the key budget and tax votes over the two years. The first criterion for the selection of votes was that they had to deal unambiguously with meta or macro-budgetary topics. This means that specific policy areas were excluded, for example: military spending on which Reagan took positions in eight votes in 1981 and 18 in 1982. To keep the ideological assumptions simple votes were selected so that they shared, as far as possible, an identical ideological subtext.

Where possible, votes were chosen on which the President took a position. This presented no problem in 1981 when Reagan took a position on 15 votes which meet the criteria. But in 1982 he took a stance on just two meta-budgetary votes. In both years there were around half a dozen votes which did not quite meet the criteria. And, in 1982, there were eight votes on supplementary appropriations for fiscal 1982. These last kind are votes which imply shortfalls in the budgetary work done the previous year. Since the budget being patched up was Reagan's he had a stake in these votes which he had not had in 1981 when Congress was topping-up the last Carter budget.

Some of the votes selected to represent the 'presidential budget position' in 1982 do not precisely fit the criteria of selection or they were votes on which
the President took no official position, and thus a position has to be imputed to him. The paucity of ideal roll calls in 1982 makes this inevitable.

The second, and more important, implication of the change in the types of roll calls in 1982 is that it calls into question the descriptive innocence of the votes. If we read the roll calls as pure measures of Congressional opinion and compare the percentage of members who voted for the presidential position in 1981 and those who did the following year, we may easily be misled. We must bear in mind the decline in support for the President's point of view which the votes describe also led to changes in the way that the budget was moved through Congress and the way in which votes were allowed to occur on the way. The President's opponents were more often able to formulate the votes in such a way as to ensure that presidential support would decline.

The President cannot just snap his fingers and set the agenda for Congress. He needs a great deal of support within that body in order to have his way. The fact that the votes in 1982 are of a different character from those in 1981 is already an indication that the pendulum has begun to swing away from Reagan, making it more difficult for him to determine the agenda and to force the kind of votes which were tailored to his strengths.

One of the indications of the extent to which Presidents have the initiative is how often they take a formal position before a vote in Congress. Sometimes position-taking may be forced on Presidents: if a policy with which they are closely identified is threatened or their veto is being overturned then they cannot pretend they are indifferent to the outcome so must take a public stance if so doing may reduce their chances of defeat. If, on the other hand, the vote is on a bill produced by a group within the House, the President might plausibly refuse to endorse it rather than be tarnished by its defeat. One of the differences between 1981 and 1982 was that, in 1982, the Republican budget proposals that reached the floor of the House were markedly different from the original White House proposals, a second was that they had more chance of being defeated. For those reasons a prudent President would feel less inclined to
back them publicly.

In 1981 the President was able to ride roughshod over the spending committees and the Budget and the Ways and Means Committees. Indeed David Stockman's great strategic coup was to find a way to bypass the Democratic grandees on these committees. In the first half of 1981 Reagan held the Republican party and a significant number of Conservative Democrats in thrall. As his grip weakened so the committees which traditionally controlled the budget process were able to begin to reassert themselves. One sign of this change was the behind the scenes horsetrading between the House and the White House, another was the move to piecemeal fiscal action on the floor.

The four roll calls selected to represent 1981 were, in chronological order: on Gramm-Latta I HCRes115 (May 7, see above, pp.6-9); on Gramm-Latta II, HR3982 (26 June, see above, pp.9-12); the big tax-cut vote, HR4242 (29 July, see above, pp.12-13); and the vote on Reagan's proposed second round of cuts, HR4560 (6 October, see above, pp.15-18).

The five 1982 votes selected are: the 'Oakar Amendment', HCRes345 (27 May, see above, pp.23-26); the Latta alternative to the Reagan budget, HCRes352 (10 June, see above, pp.27); the tax reconciliation vote, HR4961 (22 July, see above, pp.28-30); the veto override on the emergency supplemental bill HR6863 (28 August, see above, pp.30-31); and a vote in the lame-duck session that Reagan called, one of a slew of continuing appropriations - this one on moving money out of job creation, (HJRes631) (defeated in December, see above, p.32).

The first three votes in 1981 are self-explanatory; they are the three block-buster votes around which the Reagan strategy revolved. The first two, Gramm-Latta I (HCRes115) and Gramm-Latta II (HR3982) were all embracing budget packages. The third was the Tax Cut (HR4242). The fourth 1981 vote (HR4560) marked Reagan's attempt to use the same methods to persuade Congress to accept his second round of cuts in the fall.
The five 1982 votes are of a different nature. This reflects the change in the balance of power over the two years and the bizarre contortions that the Democratic leadership put the House through to produce a workable budget acceptable to a majority of the unusually polarised Representatives.

On three of the five 1982 votes -- the Oakar amendment (HCRRes345), the Latta budget substitute (HCRRes352), and the reconciliation vote (HR4961) -- the President did not take a position. Furthermore, two of the votes were procedural: the reconciliation vote (HR4961) and the December jobs appropriations vote (HJRes631). For veto overrides, like HR6863, the rules are different: where, normally, a simple majority is needed to win a vote here, depending which side a Representative is on, two thirds or one third plus one may be the victory target.

The 'Oakar amendment' vote (HCRRes345) came in the middle of a long, highly complex and unpredictable series of budget votes. Presidents can only take a position when they know in advance that a vote will occur. In the case of the Oakar amendment, one of dozens of amendments to the various budget proposals, as late as the night before the Democratic caucus was unsure if it wanted the amendment offered. It is reasonable to assume that, insofar as he supported the Michel plan, Reagan was opposed to the liberal amendments which brought about its eventual defeat.

The Latta budget proposal (HCRRes352) came nearer to passing than any of the other seven bills in a chaotic week of budgetary action in the House: a reflection of the stress placed on the deliberative system by the all-or-nothing approach of the President in 1981. By now the House was teeming with small swarms of insects buzzing round the honey pot in search of a disproportionate share of the fiscal spoils. The Oakar vote flushed out the conservative Republican Yellow Jackets to join the liberal Republican Gypsy Moths who themselves had emerged in response to the Southern Democrat Boll Weevils. The Latta substitute to the Reagan budget amounted to a rejection of pure Reaganesianomics. But it represented a pragmatic attempt by the Republicans to keep the budget in the
mould cast by Gramm and Latta, with Reagan's blessing, the year before.

The Rostenkowski motion (HR4961) -- which sent the reconciliation package, complete with tax increase, directly to Conference Committee -- was another move which echoed the events of the year before. Where Reagan had been eager to share the kudos for the humiliation of the Democrats, he had no wish to share the embarrassment of the Congressional Republicans a full year later. Even though any blow to their prestige indirectly hurt him, there was no reason for him to go out of his way to share the indignity. The manoeuvre also reflected the turmoil within the Committee which was unable to agree to a tax package that both satisfied the demands of the first budget resolution and which Rostenkowski believed he could push through the House. So the renunciation of the Committee's traditional primacy in fiscal matters was the product of an unprecedented breakdown in the internal workings of the Committee.

In some cases a member of Congress may vote differently on a veto where only one third of the members need to vote together to stop the override. But, when a member knows that the vote will be very close, then there is no scope for playing games. The vote (on HR6863) was close and so becomes an unambiguous indication of support for the presidential position.

The final vote (HJRes631), in the lame-duck session after the 1982 election, was chosen to complete the cycle. It was one of several similar votes on different appropriations in that session which the President lost. While some members were not going to return in January, all the rest had recently been reminded of the nature of public opinion in their constituencies.

The nine votes were used as dichotomous dependent variables in a series of multivariate regressions which used a series variables, derived, in the main, from census data on constituencies or committee membership, as the independent variables.
2. The Independent Variables

The independent variables fall into two broad categories which reflect the two types of theoretical explanation: they are either institutional or constituency related.

Census and election data provided several constituency-related variables. A series of continuous variables were calculated from census data. Three work or class variables were used: percentage blue collar, percentage white collar and percentage farm worker. A fourth, service worker, was omitted to prevent the set totalling 100 per cent. Two residential variables, percentage urban and percentage suburban, were used; the missing variable in this was percentage rural. The percentage of Blacks in a constituency was added to the percentage of Japanese, Chinese, Hispanics, Filipinos and Native Americans where these totalled more than five per cent to produce a percentage non-white variable. The average income in a constituency was entered as a five-digit continuous variable expressing the dollar total.

Since the Reagan agenda involved across the board cuts in entitlement programmes it might be expected that an increase in the representation of those groups which benefit most from redistributive programmes would be related to opposition to cuts to those programmes. The variables which pick up the presence of those groups are percentage blue collar, percentage urban and percentage non-white.

The groups which might be expected to favour cuts in redistributive entitlement programmes (the constituent parts of the New Deal coalition), or the tax cuts and the reduction of the federal deficit which were parts of the the same policy package are white collar workers and suburban residents. The better-paid might be expected to support the President’s economic programme and if this is so the income variable will be positively related to support for the President.

\(^2\)The US census does not list ethnic groups, other than non-whites, where they represent less than five per cent of a District’s population.
As far as the constituency-related variables go this leaves only farm workers. Farmers were traditionally part of the New Deal coalition Reagan aimed to break up. Their response might be expected to be a measure of his success.

The final constituency-related variable was derived from the election returns over the last four elections. The percentages of the votes obtained by the candidate of the party of the 1980 winner were totalled and divided by four to give an average percentage over the four elections. The purpose of the variable was to try and identify the marginal and safe Representatives. If Fiorina is right the 'maintainers' will be drawn exclusively from the set of Representatives with a high score on this variable. We would expect maintainers to be better able to resist the tide of public support for the President's policies in 1981.

The most plausible of the institutional variables were dichotomous variables measuring membership of one of the three chief economic Committees: the Ways and Means, Budget and Appropriations Committees. These were the three committees most directly involved in the budget battles over the two years. For this reason, membership of each is used as a dichotomous variable. If members

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3 That is 1974-1980 because, in some states, there had been redistricting between the 1972 and 1974 elections.

4 Fiorina's thesis suggests that a consistently narrow margin of victory in a constituency -- a tradition of close elections -- indicates heterogeneity; but this may in fact not be the case. An attempt was made to create a variable which would measure homogeneity in constituencies. This variable was calculated by measuring the presence or absence of the four work-related variables, the three residential variables, percentage non-white and percentage white. This 'homogeneity' variable rarely had a significant impact in the regression analysis. This is probably due to the crude way in which it was constructed to fit into the regression. It was not anticipated in advance that it would produce any result one way or another; indeed Fiorina's theory cannot be taken to make any implied prediction that it would. Hence, nothing more will be said about this variable.

5 No attempt was made to allow for primary marginals who score well in the elections but still live in mortal fear of being turfed out by the voters. In some states, such as Louisiana the local eccentricities of the system mean that the primaries can be the real election. Since all Fiorina claims is that some big winners will be maintainers and the rest maximizers while all marginal Representatives will be maximizers the pattern, if there is one, should still appear.
are influenced by a desire to protect the interests of their committee then we might expect these variables to show up when that prestige is threatened or may be increased.

A fourth institutional variable measured Representatives' position on their highest-prestige committee. The variable was scaled from nought to 21 with 21 representing the chairman and nought a Representative without a committee appointment. The higher the Representatives' score on this scale the more senior they are on their committee. Perhaps Representatives who enjoy high seniority on highly coveted committees will be more tempted to vote their committee interests when they oppose those of the constituents. For Representatives who are, in Fiorina's terms, 'maintainers' senior committee positions might be one of the institutional considerations for which they will allow themselves the luxury of not 'maximizing' on some votes. In 1981, therefore, it might be expected that Representatives with a high score on the Committee seniority scale will be related to an ability or an inclination to resist the public clamour to support the President. The Committee seniority variable, then, is not an attribute of the committee but of the members, measuring their proximity to the chairmanship or the position of ranking minority member.

6 The committees were graded on an updated version of a scale measuring inter-committee transfers in Kenneth A. Shepsle Op. Cit. Table 6.11, p.131.
7 A variety of other institutional variables were tried but failed to yield many significant results. These included a series of variables based in one way or another on seniority. One was a continuous variable measuring seniority based on year of entry to Congress. There were also a series of dummy, or dichotomous, variables also based on year of entry picking up which Congressional 'Class' members belonged to. Finally, each Representatives highest-status committee was given a score based on Shepsle's calculations - op. cit. - running from 20 (Ways and Means or Rules) down to nought (no committee). None of these variables showed up well across the nine votes for Southern Democrats or across the six votes in which enough Northern Republicans defected to make them worth using in the final regression.
C. EXPECTATIONS

We would expect the data to display a clear pattern over the nine votes. As far as the institutional variables go we would expect membership of the three committees to show up when their committee’s turf, work, or prestige are threatened. We might expect them and the Committee seniority variable to show up either when the House budget system is under attack or when long-standing elements of the New Deal, which the Democratic leadership supported, were under attack. For this reason we might expect the committee variables to move through greater extremes than the constituency variables because where the President’s economic policy always had the same goals he, and his advisors, tried different legislative routes to their destination. If the committee Representatives are on is rolled they will react, when it is someone else’s committee they will react very little if at all, and if no one is being rolled then there will be no reaction.

The constituency variables, on the other hand, provide a consistent background to the votes. A group would, presumably, be hostile to welfare cuts which directly affected it at any time over the two years. One of the sets of underlying assumptions is that there is such a thing as a 'New Deal coalition', and that Reagan’s policies represent a direct assault on that coalition and the welfarist policies it stands for. We shall assume, furthermore, that some of the constituency variables pick up membership of that coalition. That is why, for the Democrats, we would expect the original defectors to come from constituencies in which the traditional beneficiaries of the New Deal were poorly represented. We would also expect those who returned to the fold to be those, among the defectors, who had the largest proportion of those groups among their constituents. Over the nine votes the results will offer a seriatim account of the relationship between the variables and a vote for or against the President. What should also emerge over the nine votes is a pattern of defection which will throw into contrast the behaviour of Representatives over the first three votes, the major presidential victories, and the last six as his budget campaign lost momentum.
The Republican party displayed an unusually high level of unity over the first three votes. On Gramm-Latta I all 190 Republicans in the House voted for the proposal. Only two defected for Gramm-Latta II and one for the Tax Cut. Because only three Republicans defected over the first three votes no calculations were made for the GOP for those votes and they become a baseline for expectations on the other six votes. Over these six we would expect that the likelihood of a Republican defecting would increase with an increase in the percentage constituents from groups which benefit by New Deal and Great Society programmes. We would expect Representatives from Northern, industrial and urban constituencies with high percentages of non-whites, blue collar workers and low average incomes to be the first to defect. The six votes will become a measure of the extent to which those expectations are fulfilled, vote by vote and in toto.

D. A GLANCE AT THE RAW DATA

1. The Democrats
Even a crude survey of the raw data indicates that the distribution of defections is more than a random phenomenon. In particular it suggests that the analysis of votes should adopt a regional focus. Democrat defectors were concentrated in the South and Republican defectors in the North.

On Gramm-Latta I 239 Democrats voted: 176 against but 63 for. On Gramm-Latta II 209 Democrats opposed the bill II but 29 supported it. It passed 217-211. On the Tax Cut vote 48 Democrats defected. The bulk of these defectors, in every vote, were from the South.

The fourth district of Ohio was unrepresented between the death of one Republican, Tennyson Guyer, on the 12th of April and the swearing-in of another, Michael Oxley, on the 21st of August. Eugene Atkinson of Pennsylvania defected to the Republicans in October after voting against the Democrat whip in two of the three big fiscal votes. These two brought the Republican total to 192. Charles Dougherty, Pennsylvania, and Claudine Schneider, Rhode Island.

James Jeffords (Vt.)

Here the 'South' is Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and
Of the 239 Democrats who voted on Gramm-Latta I 78 were from the South; that number included 46 of the 63 defectors. Of the 29 Gramm-Latta II defectors 26 were Southerners (the other three were Atkinson, James Santini, Nevada, and Bob Stump, Arizona). On the Tax Cut 36 of 48 defectors were Southerners; two more were Santini and Stump who defected on every vote. A total of 108 of the 137 Democrat votes cast with the Republicans in the three main budget votes came from Southerners. Stump and Santini accounted for six more between them, three Marylanders defected six times and Atkinson defected twice. The other defectors were: Jerry Patterson (Calif.); David Evans and Andrew Jacobs (Ind.); Donald Albosta (Mich.); Ken Young, Ike Skelton and Harold Volkmer (Mo.); and Tony Hall (Ohio), all once each on Gramm-Latta I; Dan Glickman (Kan.) on the Tax Cut and Thomas Luken and Ronald Mottl (Ohio); and Gus Yatron (Penn.) twice each, on the Tax Cut and on Gramm-Latta I. Because the defectors were concentrated in the South and in the Sun and Border states (including Maryland and Missouri) these were used exclusively in the multivariate regression.\(^1\)\(^2\) It is clear, however, from the data that the pattern is not identical for all these states. While a high proportion of Representatives from the Border states defected over the first three votes they were, in general, quick to return to the party fold.

A total of 101 of the 108 Southern Democrat pro-presidential votes over the first three roll calls in 1981 came from a hardcore of 39 Representatives who each defected at least twice. There were 23 Democrats who voted with the Republicans on each occasion and 25 who followed the party whip on each vote.

On the nine key budget votes studied over the two years no Democrat voted against the party on every occasion. Ten did so on eight occasions, five on seven occasions and nine did so six times. Only four of those Democrats missed

\(^{1}(\text{cont'd})\) Virginia. These are the states the CQ includes in its calculations as southern. As will be seen Representatives from Sun Belt and Border states also contributed a disproportionate number of the non-South defectors which is why Representatives from Arizona, Nevada, Maryland and Missouri were included in the multivariate regression as 'Southern Democrats'.

\(^{12}\) Regressions were also calculated for all Democrats and for Democrats from the other regions but failed to yield many significant results.
an opportunity to defect on the three major Republican victories in 1981. Three of them who vote with their party on Gramm-Latta II (the closest of those votes) and the fourth, John Breaux (Louisiana), stayed loyal on the Tax Cut.

Of these 15 had first been elected in 1974 or later; three were rookies and five in their second Congress. Ralph Hall of Texas, one of the rookies, had a majority of just 8,872. Earl Hutto of Florida had the next smallest margin of victory in 1980. He won by 43,890 and none of the others in this hardcore had majorities of less than 60,000. Six had been returned unopposed in 1980.

Of the 24 Southern Democrats who voted against their party on two or fewer occasions (not counting Wayne Dowdy of Mississippi who did not enter the House until July 1981); none were rookies, two were first elected in 1978, two in 1976 and seven in 1974. Of those Neale (N.C.) won by just 4,223 votes in 1980 and three more had victory margins of 33,000 or less. Nine were unopposed in 1980 as against five of the 'hardcore'. So there is no readily apparent predominance of very junior, very marginal or very safe Representatives on either side.

Two members of the hardcore were members of the Appropriations Committee, two were on Budget and one on Ways and Means, only one of the five had any seniority: William Chappell of Florida on Ways and Means.¹³

¹³ There were 11 Southerners on Appropriations, seven on Ways and Means and seven on Budget; giving the 79 Southern Democrats 25 appointments between them. In each case there was also a member from one of the four states included as 'southern' for the calculations. There were, on the other hand just five Republicans on Appropriations, two (Richard T. Shulze, Penn, and Barber Conable, NY,) on Budget and one (Bud Shuster, Penn,) on Ways and Means. So the 50 North-Eastern Republicans commanded just eight spots on the three committees.
2. The Republicans

Given that no Republicans defected on Gramm-Latta I the highest total of defections any Republican could score over the nine votes is eight. The three Republicans who defected on Gramm-Latta II or the Tax Cut (Schneider, Dougherty and Jeffords) all totalled six defections. Two more Republicans, Harold Hollenbeck and Christopher Smith (both N.J.) defected on five of the other six votes and 13 more Republicans did so on four occasions as the GOP began to lose its economic unanimity.

Nineteen of those 20 Representatives came from the North-East or Midwest. The solitary exception was Don Young the at-large Representative from Alaska. Of the 261 defections from the Republican position over the nine votes 207 came from delegates from North-Eastern or Midwestern states. The largest single Republican delegation, the 27 Representatives from California, broke ranks on just five occasions between them and no California Republican defected more than once. Judd Gregg, a rookie member of Congress for New Hampshire, toed the party line throughout, but six of the other eight New England Republicans each defected at least four times and the remaining two, Olympia Snowe and David Emery of Maine, defected three times each.

After California the six largest Republican delegations came from populous North-Eastern or Midwestern industrial states, and they provided the bulk of the defections. Out of the 17 New Yorkers 15 defected at least once and they totalled 32 votes against the party (of those, 25 were cast by the seven Republicans whose constituencies lay all or partly in New York City or bordered it). Eight of the 14 Republicans from Illinois defected a total of 14 times between them. All but one of the 13 Pennsylvanians defected at least once and they voted against the President 30 times in all (including twice by Atkinson as a Republican). There were 13 defections from eight of the 13 Ohioans. All seven New Jersey Republicans defected at least once, for a total of 23 defections. On the Great Plains, there were great variations between states. The four Kansas Republicans stayed loyal throughout while the three Iowans defected 11 times and three Nebraskans five times.
Because the GOP defectors were concentrated in the North East only those states\(^1\) were used in the multivariate regression.\(^5\)

**E. THE ROLL CALLS**

1. **Gramm-Latta I**

The President's campaign began in earnest in May with his victory on Gramm-Latta I (HCR15), which originated in the White House, a Republican substitute for the 1982 budget targets bill proposed by the Budget Committee. It called for cuts of $25.7 billion in the proposed outlays and substantial cuts in budget authority and revenues. The details of these cuts were to be worked out by the Budget Committee. The amendment passed 253-176 with 63 Democrats defecting.\(^6\)

Even though this bill would take control over the budget away from the Appropriations Committee and hand it instead to the Budget Committee it is not clear that we should expect that Committee's members to give their support, because the Budget Committee had always been very wary of treading on other, older, committees' turf. We would expect the the Appropriations Committee, which was being rolled, to be associated with opposition to the bill. Insofar as the bill represented an assault on the traditional House habit of deferring to committees we might expect membership of the Ways and Means Committee and the Committee seniority variable to be related to opposition.

The level of cuts and the type of cuts envisioned by the bill were an unambiguous assault on the New Deal and so we would expect the New Deal

\(^1\)Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland

\(^5\)Regressions were also calculated for all Republicans and for the North East and Midwest together but they yielded little of significance.

\(^6\)On all roll calls a vote for the President's, or his imputed position, was scored '1' and a vote against that position was scored '0'. Therefore on each vote the score produced by the multivariate regression is a measure of the strength of the association between a variable and support for, or opposition to, the President.
constituency variables to be related to opposition to the bill. One of the implications of *Home style* is that Representatives have greater freedom of choice on arcane procedural votes which their constituents might not understand, or even be aware of. Here there was no hiding place. Not only was the vote not procedural, it was instead a high-profile vote on the President's entire economic policy.

In the event, as Table 1 shows, Budget Committee members were 36.6 per cent less likely to support the President on this vote than the average Southern Democrat, but none of the other institutional variables displayed a significant score.

Among the constituency variables only the percentage non-white was significant. A one point increase in the percentage in a constituency brought a 0.7 percentage point increase in the chances of its Representative opposing the President.

The Budget Committee score may seem a surprise, after all the bill was being proposed by Phil Gramm, a Budget Committee member and, if passed, would give the Committee a rare chance to perform the work for which it was created: using the budget as a macro-economic tool. But, since its inception in 1974 the Budget Committee had been very careful not to offend any of the older committees whose jurisdictions its power overlapped. Indeed, as membership was temporary and rotated, members of the Budget Committee had less commitment to its growth and power than to the interests of any other committee they might be on. Three Democratic members of the Budget Committee (the chairman Jim Jones, Okla., Richard Gephardt, Mo., and Thomas J. Downey, N.Y.,) were also on the Ways and Means Committee.¹⁷

¹⁷'T'm continually reminding them,' Dan Rostenkowski said in 1982, 'that you'll be on that Committee for three or four years but then you're back on Ways and Means.' *(CQ Weekly Report* Vol 40 No 25 p1448 col 3, 19.6.82.)

'If the Budget committees wanted and were eager to take power they could take it,' said chairman Jones, 'but it would be a short-term power grab that would result in the long-term demise of the budget process.' *(CQ 15 Aug 1981 p1465*
2. Gramm-Latta II

The President's stage managers set up a second triumph with the second omnibus budget bill, Gramm-Latta II (HR3982). Reagan then helped clinch victory with his bout of phonecally from Los Angeles on the afternoon of the vote, although it was Stockman who made the important promise to three Democrats on sugar price support.

This was a vote on the President's entire policy, which involved substituting, *en bloc*, White House proposals for those produced by six spending committees. It was a vote to replace a broadly New Deal budget drawn up by the House committees with a Reaganomic one drawn up by David Stockman. This bill called for $37.3 billion worth of spending cuts which would fall in every area except defence. It passed 217-211.

We would expect the constituency variables which reflect groups who benefit from New Deal/Great Society programmes, or are part of the 'coalition' to be related to opposition to the President. The bill also represented an attack on the House way of doing things. Insofar as there is honour among committee members we would expect that to show up in the Committee seniority score. We would expect membership of the two rolled committees, Appropriations and Budget, to be most strongly related to opposition.

Members of the Budget Committee were 22.7 percentage point more likely, other things being equal, to oppose the President than average Southern Democrats. Members of the Appropriations Committee were 17.6 percentage points more likely to do so. For each one place move up the Committee Seniority scale members were 0.9 percentage point more likely to oppose the President. These scores are a reflection of the resistance of, first, the Budget and Appropriations Committees and, no doubt, the 14 other spending committees whose work was being thrown away and, second, the Democratic hierarchy in general.

(cont’d) col 2)
The strongest negative score among the constituency variables came from the variable measuring the percentage of constituents living in cities. A one point increase in the percentage of urban residents in a constituency brought a 0.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a Southern Democrat voting against the President. A one point increase in the suburban population in a district meant a Southern Democrat was 0.6 percentage point more likely to oppose the President.

On this vote representatives were again put in the position of voting for or against the President's entire economic policy and they did so after a media blitz by the President which inspired a barrage of letters, telegrammes and telephone calls from constituents. This was not a vote on which Representatives could escape the attention of their constituents.

3. The Tax Cut

The Tax Cut (HR4242) was an ideologically distinct part of Reagan's economic policy but one the President saw as central to his objectives and which he pursued with as much zeal as his budgets. Reagan and the Democratic leadership (represented by the Ways and Means Committee) became embroiled in a bidding war before the Tax Cut passed. The President's proposal was for a cut of 23 per cent over two years which was larger and less progressive than that proposed by the Democrats. The President's proposal passed 238-195.

The vote involved another implicit attack on the New Deal because the cuts would have to be matched with cuts somewhere in the budget. It also offered all taxpayers a financial bonus. We might, therefore, expect the New Deal type variables to be related to opposition to the President and those variables associated with higher income (the Tax Cut would have a regressive effect) like the white collar percentage, the suburban percentage and the average income, to be positively associated with presidential support.

We might also expect all three committees to be associated with opposition
to the President. The Ways and Means Committee was being rolled, the Budget Committee would have to make the spending fit the new levels and the Appropriations Committee would have to cut the line items.

Indeed, in the South, Democratic members of all three major fiscal committees were more likely to oppose the President than their fellows. The Ways and Means Committee produced a 33.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of opposing the President. A Budget Committee member was 26.6 percentage points more likely to oppose the bill than the average Southern Democrat and an Appropriations Committee member was 32 percentage points more likely to do so.

None of the other variables was significantly related to either opposition to or support for the President on this vote. It may be that the Tax Cut was not an explicit attack on the New Deal in the way that Gramm-Latta I and II were and so those constituency groups were not moved to resist it. It may also be that either a Tax Cut had not been such a major incentive for Reagan supporters as many thought or that the effect was obscured. This could be due to several influences. First, there was the strength of the negative reaction from members of all three major fiscal committees. Second, there were widespread theoretical doubts about the wisdom of the supply side/trickle down element of Reaganomics (doubts which, as Roberts and Stockman have since revealed, were present in the minds of Stockman, other top White House staff, and senior Congressional Republicans.\(^1\)\(^8\) These were doubts which may have been shared by conservative Democrats who otherwise supported the President). And third, despite the bias of the cut, perhaps all taxpayers were equally in favour of the legislation.

Although the Tax Cut vote itself was a substitute amendment it represented another vote on which Representatives were seen to be voting for or against Reaganomics. Again the President took every opportunity to draw the public's

\(^{18}\) Op. Cit.
attention to the fact and encourage them to communicate their support to their Congressman or woman.

4. The Autumn Cuts
In the fall the President tried for a previously unplanned second round of cuts. The vote selected to represent that campaign concerned proposed cuts to an $87.2 billion appropriations bill for the departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (HR4560). Supporters of the President wanted to recommit the bill to the Appropriations Committee with instructions to make cuts. They were defeated 249-168 on the sixth of October with 28 Democrats and 39 Republicans voting against their respective parties.

As these cuts would have struck directly at redistributive entitlement programmes, we would expect the New Deal variables to be related to opposition to the President's position. We would also expect members of the Appropriations Committee which produced the bill to oppose the President.

Southern Democrats from urban areas were 0.5 percentage point more likely to vote against the President for each one point increase in the urban population of their constituency, as predicted. The other constituency variables which show up for Southern Democrats were the percentage of white collar residents and average income. For each $1,000 increase in average income in a constituency a Representative was 1 percentage point more likely to oppose the President. For each percentage point increase in the white collar population there was a 2.4 percentage point increase in the chance of presidential support from a Southern Democrat. The latter is also as we would expect.

Members of the Appropriations Committee were 30 percentage points more likely to vote against the President than with other Southern Democrats while members of the other two fiscal Committees, which were not directly threatened, were not significantly more likely to do so than the average Southern Democrat.
Although this is the first vote on which there were sufficient Republican defections to make it worthwhile analysing their voting behaviour no variables displayed a noteworthy score for North-Eastern Republicans.

Again the President went on television to try to rally popular support for his position on this vote. But the response was much smaller this time. Perhaps his supporters were tired of writing to their Representatives or perhaps they were becoming disillusioned with his economic policies. This was the fourth time the President had tried to whip up public support on a fiscal issue that year even though he had, in the summer, declared the budget problem solved for the year. The fact that the vote was also a vote to recommit an appropriations bill rather than a vote to amend it might also have encouraged the Representatives to think they could explain the vote to constituents. A recomittal slows the budgetary process without guaranteeing that the envisioned cuts will, in the end, be made.

5. The Oakar Amendment
The Oakar amendment (HRes345) was largely responsible for the defeat of the Latta-Michel budget proposal, which, up to late May 1982, was the GOP budget proposal that came closest to passing. The amendment added $4.85 billion to outlays on Medicare funding and obtained the bulk of that money by cutting defense expenditure. It passed 228-196 on May 27 with 71 Democrats and 64 Republicans voting against their parties. The President adopted no formal position on this vote which was one of a storm of amendments voted on.

The bill being amended was not the work of any of the three major fiscal committees, nor had any of them hatched the amendment. However, the Democratic hierarchy tacitly supported this attempt to compromise the Republican leadership's bill and so damage its chances in the complex vote that would follow in which their own proposal, drawn up by the Budget Committee, was one of the contenders. We might expect, therefore, that the Committee seniority variable and membership of the Budget Committee would be associated with presidential opposition among Southern Democrats. We would expect Budget Committee
membership to have the same effect among Northern Republicans. Among constituency variables all those measuring the presence of the New Deal groups which benefit from Medicare ought to be related to presidential opposition.

As expected Committee seniority is significant for Southern Democrats. A one place move up the scale brings a 0.9 percentage point increase in opposition to the President.

Among Southern Democrats two constituency variables show up. A $1,000 increase in the average income is related to a 11.4 percentage point rise in the likelihood of presidential opposition, which fits in with the pattern for that variable. And, as might be expected, a one point increase in the percentage of white collar workers brought a 3.5 percentage point increase in the probability of support for the Republican position.

Among Northern Republicans membership of the Budget Committees was related to support for the amendment (and opposition to the GOP leadership). Members were 76 percentage points more likely to support the amendment than other Northern Republicans. Members of the Ways and Means Committee, on the other hand, were 58 percentage points more likely to oppose the amendment and vote with their leadership.

No other variables were significant for either group of Representatives on this vote which was the first on which the President was caught flatfooted and without a clear position. This is partly because his economic policy had lost its momentum but also partly because the House was safe from attention, obscuring the details of its actions in the most Byzantine of rules.

6. Latta Budget Substitute
The House finally passed a budget for fiscal 1983 on the tenth of June when they voted to replace the President's original budget, which had been sent to the floor by the Budget Committee, with one sponsored by the Republican leadership.
The President took no formal position (on HCR352) but tacitly approved of the substitution which was passed 220-207 with 15 Republicans and 46 Democrats voting against their parties.

Although the vote was to substitute a more moderate Republican budget for the one the President had sent to the House, in practice the President's budget was being used to clear the way for a Budget Committee budget. The choice was between the Republican substitute or the Budget Committee proposals that would follow. This being the case we would expect Budget Committee membership, all the New Deal variables and committee seniority for Southern Democrats to be related to opposition to the Republican bill (i.e. to the President).

Members of the Budget Committee were, as Table 1 demonstrates, 29.4 percentage points more likely to oppose the Republican proposals than other Southern Democrats. Ways and Means Committee members, however, were 31.5 percentage points more likely to vote with the GOP than the average Southern Democrat. For each one place increase in their Committee Seniority score Southern Democrats were 2.4 percentage points more likely to oppose the President.

Among Southern Democrats the percentage of urban voters was again the most influential of constituency-related variables. A one point increase in either the urban or suburban populations brought a 0.6 percentage point increase in the chance of voting against the bill. For each one point increase in their white collar population they were 2.8 percentage points more likely to support the President both of which are scores consistent with expectations.

For Northern Republicans, as Table 2 shows, a one point increase in the percentage blue collar made a Representative 9.6 percentage points more likely to oppose the proposal, which is as expected. White collar constituents were even more strongly associated with opposition to the GOP budget. A one point increase meant a Northern Republican was 10.8 percentage point more likely to vote
against the budget, which is not what we might expect but is consistent with other votes.

This is the only occasion on which Southern Democrat members of the Ways and Means Committee were substantially more likely than the average to support the President's position. Perhaps they were worried that, after the failure of the House to pass any of eight budgets at the last attempt, no workable budget would be produced and so voted for the best bet in the belief that the Latta proposals gave them scope to rework the budget in their own image.

Where, the year before, the first budget resolution had been accompanied by intense public pressure from the President, now he distanced himself from the process and left the Republican leadership in the House to salvage what they could of his economic strategy in this complicated game of legislative poker. Pity the poor Representatives who had to go back to their constituencies and explain to those who still cared why, in voting to throw out the President's budget they had done what the President wanted! The answer would be, presumably, to blame the machiavellian workings of the institution.

7. Tax Increases
The vote to send a Senate tax bill directly to Conference Committee was the most bewildering move yet in the poker game. The House voted 208-197 on July 28 for Dan Rostenkowski's motion (HR4961) to pull his Ways and Means Committee out of the fix they had put themselves in and to try to shuffle the blame for a tax increase onto the President, the Senate and the Republican party. In all, 44 Republicans and 60 Democrats voted against their parties.

We would expect members of the Ways and Means Committee to support the measure designed to save their face. We might also expect Democrats with greater Committee seniority to support the motion. Apart from that it is unclear which way the interests of the other committees or the constituency variables might lie.
For Southern Democrats membership of Ways and Means made a representative 36.1 percentage point more inclined to vote the party line than their fellows, which is as expected. Membership of the Budget Committee is also significant and is related to an increased probability of voting the party line of 33.1 percentage point.

Among Northern Republican members of Ways and Means were 43.7 percentage point more likely to vote for the proposal whereas the solitary Northern Republican Budget Committee member voted loyalty.

For Southern Democrats, as can be seen in Table 1, two constituency variables demonstrate a significant score. An increase in the Democratic percentage in the past four elections of one point brought a 1 percentage point increase in support for the party. A one point increase in the non-white population made a Representative 0.7 of a percentage point more likely to do so, the latter may be interpreted either as a sign of the loyalty of Representatives from more heavily non-white districts to the party hierarchy or their desire for higher tax rates which might increase entitlements.

The suburban and white collar variables showed up positively for Northern Republicans. For each one point increase in the suburban population a Representative was 0.5 of a percentage point more likely to oppose the tax increase, which is to be expected. For each one point increase in the white collar percentage a Representative was 0.6 percentage point more likely to vote the other way: for the tax increase.

The strategy which Rostenkowski adopted had the disadvantage of compromising traditional privileges of the House of Representatives and this may account for the unusually high proportion of very senior defectors. They included the senior House Democrat, Jamie Whitten (Miss.), who was the Appropriations Committee chairman, and six of the eight Southern Democrats who defected on only one of the nine votes. Among those were Carl Perkins (Ky.) the Education and Labor chairman and William Clay (Dem. Mo.) a senior member of the Post
Office and Civil Service and Education and Labor Committees.

The constitutional significance of the vote, which was on a motion which, confusingly, talked of the House 'disagreeing' with the Senate amendments while still sending them to Conference Committee was, almost certainly, lost on the bulk of voters. That, combined with the general air of embarrassment on both sides of the House, in the Senate and on Pennsylvania Avenue about the whole fiscal disaster allowed members to perform the whole manoeuvre under a veil.

8. The Veto Override
Reagan's heaviest budget defeat was the overriding of his veto of a $14.2 billion fiscal 1982 supplemental appropriations bill (HR 6863) on the 28th of August. The House voted 301-117 for the override with 13 Democrats and 104 Republicans voting against their parties. The President, naturally enough, took a position on this vote. He supported the veto.

We would expect all the New Deal-related variables to be associated with opposition and also membership of the Appropriations and Budget Committees and the variable measuring Committee seniority because the veto struck at the House way of preparing its legislation and, substantively, at New Deal-type appropriations.

A one point increase in the percentage of blue collar constituents brought a 1.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood that Southern Democrats would oppose the veto override, which was the reverse of expectations but consistent with the pattern for other votes. A one point increase in the white collar percentage made Southern Democrats 2.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the override which is as might be expected.

Among Northern Republicans the effect is even more robust the other way, a one percentage point rise in the blue collar percentage supports a 6.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of opposing the President, which is in
accord with expectations. A one percentage point increase in the number of white collar workers in a constituency brought a 9.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a Northern Republican opposing the President, again this is a score consistent with precedent rather than with expectations.

A one place climb in Committee seniority for a Southern Democratic Representative was associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of support for the veto. Among Northern Republicans a one place rise seniority brought a rise of 2.8 percentage points in likelihood of supporting the veto.

Here, at last, is a 1982 roll call which is a straight vote on the President's policy. He lost badly perhaps because he tried to make an issue out of an appropriations bill that was clearly not the 'budget buster' he described it as. Maybe it was simply a case of his crying 'wolf' once too often.

9. Jobs Appropriations
Some Republicans disliked an Appropriations Committee bill (HJRes631) which contained $5.4 billion for job creation and attempted to have it recommitted to the Committee. They backed their campaign with the threat that the President would veto the bill. The motion was rejected 215-191 by the House on the 14th of December with a very low level of defections on both sides: just seven Republicans and 20 Democrats. The President clearly indicated that he supported the motion.

We might expect resistance to the President's threat to be associated with either membership of the Appropriations Committee whose bill it was or with membership of the Budget Committee which is responsible for the overall shape of the budget.

Members of the Appropriations Committee were 40.2 percentage point more likely to vote for the bill than other Southern Democrats and members of the
Budget Committee, which is responsible for the overall shape of appropriations bills, were 48.9 percentage point more likely to vote for it.

In the South the non-whites variable again brought the expected increase in opposition to the President. Here a one point increase in the non-white percentage produced a 0.7 percentage point increase in the chance of a Representative opposing the President.

Among Northern Republicans four constituency variables show significance. All were related to support for the bill in its original form. Three of those variables pick up membership of the groups most likely to be benefit from job creation programmes: urban voters, non-whites, and blue collar. The fourth was income. For each point increase in the non-white population in a constituency the chances of the Representative voting with the Democrats increased 4.6 percentage point, for each point urban the increase was 0.5 percentage point and for each point blue collar the increase was 8.8 percentage point.

This vote breaks down more clearly than any of the others on party lines and this is why the President lost. The vote came in the lame-duck session and may be seen as a reaction to the traditional mid-term rejection of the President’s party by the electorate. It also suggests that after all the turmoil of the past two years Representatives were settling down again to the easy routine of toeing, by and large, the party line.

F. THE OVERALL PATTERN
The opening chapter laid out the tale of the rise and decline of President Reagan’s new coalition. In 1981 he fashioned a series of victories in the House even though his party was the minority. He did this by holding almost all the Republican votes on the three key votes and by detaching enough Democrats, particularly Southerners, to ensure his policies enjoyed the support of the majority. The review of the data above has suggested the type of Southern Democrat who was drawn to Reagan’s coalition in 1981. By the end of the
year, however, that coalition had begun to dissolve. This was due to movement on both sides of the House. The foregoing analysis of the individual roll calls suggests that there was a pattern to these defections, or, rather, that there were patterns: one among Democrats and one among Republicans. The behaviour of the Northern Republicans bears out the hypothesis that, as far as constituency variables go, defectors were more likely to come from constituencies with disproportionately New Deal characteristics. For the Southern Democrats the same clear pattern does not emerge, but it seems that the decisive constituency characteristics are not the ones that draw Representatives back to the party but the ones that keep them supporting the President.

Throughout the period the institutional variables show up associated with resistance to the President when local prerogatives are threatened. On every major vote the President was fighting against opposition of one committee or other. By 1982 the committees had altered the tone of the campaign from grand setpiece showdowns to a war of attrition. From the committee-room bunkers they ground down the President in dissipating his forces in a series of skirmishes on line items and a myriad of amendments and procedural votes.

1. Constituency variables
The data suggest that the institutional variables are strongly to opposition to the President throughout and that the behaviour of Representatives cannot be accounted for purely in terms of constituency influences. The change in voting cannot, therefore, be explained entirely in terms of constituency variables. The two are not unrelated. The constituency variables may be telling us not just that the mood of the constituents changed but also that Representatives from certain kinds of constituency were always the most reluctant members of the coalition and the readiest to give themselves up to the pull of the committees.
a. Northern Republicans

The expectation was that Representatives would grow more likely to desert the President's coalition as the New Deal nature of their constituencies increased. The pattern displayed by Northern Republicans over the six regressions offers support to this hypothesis.

The three variables most unambiguously linked to support for the New Deal are non-white, blue collar, and urban. In all cases, and as predicted, a percentage increase in the number of non-white or blue collar constituents made Northern Republican Representatives less likely to vote with the President; as can be seen in Table 2. The percentage urban had positive signs (which indicate support for the President) for the final vote in 1981, the fall cuts, and the first vote in 1982, the Oakar amendment, but then had negative signs for the next three. This pattern indicates an ebbing away of support for the President. A very similar pattern was displayed by the variable measuring the percentage of farm workers, a group traditionally associated with the New Deal coalition.

One counter-expectational result was the consistent, and sometimes powerful, relationship between an increase in the white collar percentage in a constituency and opposition to the President. This surprise is compounded by the behaviour of the percentage suburban variable. This was positively related to presidential support four times, once significantly so, and negatively so only twice, on neither occasion to a significant degree. It might have been expected to display, at least, the same pattern of presidential opposition as the white collar variable. Bearing in mind that the suburban percentage would include a number of blue collar workers and that some of the white collar workers will be distributed in rural areas it might be expected that that variable would be more likely to be associated with presidential support. It cannot be that the white collar residents of urban areas are tipping the scale because the urban variable is consistently less strongly related to opposition to the President than the percentage white collar is.

The income variable was related to opposition to the President on the fall
cuts of 1981, but not to a significant degree. It was almost neutral over the next two and positively related to presidential support over the next three and to a significant degree on one of them. This is a variable we would expect to move in the opposite direction to the New Deal variables, and that is what it did.

The final constituency variable was the incumbent's party's average percentage. We expected this to be related to resistance to the President in cases where public support for him was particularly strong. It was never significant and displayed no readily discernible pattern.

b. Southern Democrats
The pattern for the Southern Democrats is much more problematic. The percentage non-white variable again performed as expected and was always linked with opposition to the President, twice to a significant degree: on the first and last votes of the nine, as can be seen in Table 1. The urban percentage is also consistently associated with opposition to the President, much more so than for Northern Republicans, twice to a significant degree.

The third New Deal variable does not, however, behave at all as expected. Over the nine votes support for the President among Southern Democrats is consistently strongly positively linked to the percentage blue collar as well as to the percentage white collar. Furthermore for these two variables there is a tendency for their association with Presidential support to grow stronger over the nine votes. In 1982, as support drains away from the President's position the blue collar and white collar scores stand out even more strongly like a row of treetops after a flood.\(^\text{19}\)

The percentage suburban is strongly and consistently associated with opposition to the President and significantly so on two occasions. But, as with

\(^{19}\text{Both variables are related to presidential opposition just once, on the tax increase, the most problematic of the nine votes.}\)
the percentage non-white and percentage urban there is no sign of a change over time. Unlike the white and blue collar percentages these variables do not suggest that as the Presidential alliance crumbled and was replaced by a slow return to 'business as usual,' that what replaced it was good old New Deal backscratching at the pork barrel with all the Representatives out to grab what they could for their constituents.

The rough survey of the data above suggested that as Reagan's campaign waned Democrats from the Border states were particularly quick to return to the fold. The scores for the urban and suburban variables suggest that Representatives from cities in the South, which often like to characterise themselves as the 'New South', were always much readier than the average southerner to oppose the President. What that leaves are the rural and small town voters from the old south, commonly characterised as 'red necks' sticking with the President.20

If this is true it explains another counter-expectational set of scores. For Southern Democrats an increase in average income is consistently related to presidential opposition. If the affluent cities oppose the President then this is quite logical.

The variable measuring the percentage of farmworkers was positively related to support for the President four times and to opposition four times, with no readily discernible pattern and never to a significant degree. Given the tiny percentage of the total population which farm workers make up, even in the constituencies in which they are most heavily represented, this need not be taken as a refutation of the 'red neck' theory.

20My impression, based on a survey of the raw data, is that the retirement belt along the Gulf coast of Eastern Louisiana, Alabama and Florida is also an area of Presidential support, in those constituencies which did not have a Republican Representative. These too would be areas of low urban and low suburban density and of below average income but with a high proportion of people describing themselves as white collar.
For Southern Democrats the margin variable also oscillated. It was associated with Presidential support six times and with opposition three times; once significantly but once to an almost negligible degree. For Southern Democrats, as for Northern Republicans, it failed to deliver the predicted results. The implication is that the marginality effect Fiorina encouraged us to seek is small or non-existent or that it will have to be measured in a different manner. Perhaps, as Fenno suggests, what really counts is how marginal Representatives perceive themselves to be. He suggests that Representatives (and this is something Fiorina implies) face the terror of reelection with greater equanimity over time. It ought to be repeated that this variable did not take into account the potential marginalising effects of primaries. While the analysis has not disproved the thesis it has not offered the anticipated support to the idea that marginal Representatives, like condemned men, have their minds more concentrated on their own mortality.

2. Committees
The prediction for the committee variables was, first, that they would be more volatile than the constituency variables and, secondly, that they would be closely related to the interests of a committee on a given vote. This was certainly the case. The second prediction was that the committee variables, particularly the Committee seniority variable, would be closely related to general opposition to the President's assault on the House way of doing things. This prediction was born out, but less clearly so.

The only variables to produce scores significant in both directions at at least the 5 percent level on a one-tailed test were institutional variables. For Southern Democrats, as Table 1 demonstrates, this happens with membership of the Ways and Means Committee and for Committee seniority and for Northern Republicans, as Table 2 shows, it happens with membership of the Ways and Means and Budget Committees.

Although all the institutional variables are significant on several occasions there is not a single vote on which all four in either group show up together.
There are even cases where institutional variables turn up pulling in different directions. For Southern Democrats committee seniority is related to opposition to the President on each of the first six votes, twice to a significant degree. The same is not true for any of the other three committee variables. The two votes on which Committee seniority is associated with presidential support are the awkward tax increase vote and the veto override. On the latter it is significant. This, however, is the vote where only 13 percent of Southern Democrats defect, so the prediction that the higher the institutional seniority and status of representatives, the less likely they are to run with the herd stands up for Southern Democrats. For Northern Republicans, where the variable is related to presidential support twice and to opposition four times, once significantly, there is no unambiguous pattern. But, there was no unambiguous expectation. Sometimes loyalty to the hierarchy might demand opposing the President, sometimes it might involve supporting him.

G. CONCLUSIONS
Insofar as the analysis of data was a test of two competing theories on Congressional behaviour it suggests that constituency theorists would be wrong to ignore all institutional variables. Membership of the three House committees included in the calculations shows up enough to suggest that it can be an important consideration for Representatives. There is, furthermore, a pattern to the incidence of committee support. When the turf or work of a committee is directly threatened members will tend to rally to the flag. This was fairly consistently the case throughout the nine votes and in itself does not in any way directly explain the change in the mood of the House from 1981 to 1982. But, the fact that it occurred at all does give a clue to the root of the change.

The first of the two years dealt with, 1981, was a most unusual year in Congressional terms, much more so than 1982. This oddness is highlighted by the way the House dealt with its budgetary work. In general the House lets the spending committees, the Appropriations Committee, and the Ways and Means Committee get on with the work of preparing the appropriations and tax bills and then passes those bills either intact or fairly lightly amended. There are
good reasons for this. 'Committees are created to perform certain goal-oriented
tasks which their parent chamber as a whole lacks the ability, the time, or,
perhaps, the will to perform adequately,' says Fenno.\(^2\) In 1981, when David
Stockman did the work of writing the entire budget himself, the House
overturned the entire committee budget. In 1982 they did not have the stamina,
the will, or the confidence in the alternatives to repeat the task.

Brady, Ripley and Mayhew provide accounts of the behaviour of the
formation of dominant coalitions which resemble the events of 1981 sufficiently to
suggest that the House may have been in the grip of New Coalition fever. The
infection, as Brady points out, is of an ideological nature. Perhaps it was first
incubated by Kemp and his ideological supporters in the Washington press or
perhaps it started with popular tax revolts in state elections, but whatever it
was that predisposed them to the disease members of the House came to the
capital in January 1981 convinced that the congressional and presidential returns
in the election meant the voters wanted economic changes. And those changes
meant lower expenditure, lower taxes and a lower deficit, although not everyone
on the right could agree what should come first. The voters had returned a
Republican president. They had turned the Senate Republican but, despite a
swing of 30 seats, they had left the House, and therefore its committees, in the
hands of the Democrats. One of Brady's crucial preconditions for a realignment
which will last was not fulfilled.

Fenno argues that individuals run for Congress by running against Congress.
Nothing encapsulates the dilemma of the Representative better than the role of
the Appropriations Committee and the other spending committees. They embody
both bloated federal government, which, as far as the folks back home are
concerned, is a bad thing, and porkbarrel, which, it is assumed, is what the
folks back home want unless they say otherwise. Representatives interpreted the
1981 returns as suggesting constituents wanted otherwise. The size of the federal
deficit had become a nationwide issue and President Reagan claimed to have the

\(^2\)Fenno, R.F. *The Power of the Purse* p.5. Fenno calculates that 90 percentage
point of Appropriations Committee recommendations are passed by the House.
answer. A majority of Representatives seem to have believed either, that his solution was worth trying or, that their constituents wanted them to try it. On this issue the Reagan had run for the Presidency by running, implicitly, against the House Appropriations Committee.

The Republicans showed all the hallmarks of a new dominant party in 1981. Over the three key votes their Representatives from traditionally liberal areas remained loyal to the party without asking for any special considerations. The Democrat defectors came precisely from the traditionally conservative areas: the South and the Sun Belt.\textsuperscript{22} The Southern defections in 1981 included few by important senior members but in general the most frequent defectors were not major figures. Those who formed the hard-core of defectors were all relatively (though not extremely) junior and from the Deep South. But they extracted a price for their defections. The President had to agree to 'special consideration' on the budget and the tax cuts in order to be sure of a majority. The victory in 1981 came at the cost of damaging Reagan's chances of creating an 'exclusive' coalition.

By the next year the Northern Republicans from traditionally liberal constituencies had also learnt their lesson. Their constituents may well (in most cases) have voted heavily for Reagan in 1980 but they also had local interests to defend from cutbacks. They had missed out on the boodle that was going in 1981, and the Reagan budget and tax cuts had failed to stimulate the economy or reduce the deficit. And the President’s popularity was declining. The Northern Republicans who deserted the President in 1982 tended to come from more urban or industrialised constituencies. They were neither strikingly above nor below average in seniority or in terms of committee membership. Their complaint was that their constituents were suffering disproportionately from cutbacks.

\textsuperscript{22}As Fenno points out there have been other times when Southern Democrats and Republicans, united by what he calls 'economy moods', have allied to force cuts on the Democrat-controlled committees. In \textit{The Power of the Purse} (pp.472-478) he discusses the events of 1951.
What most damaged the Republicans' chances of creating a long-term realignment was their failure to capture the committees. The chaotic state of Stockman's Gramm-Latta II bill and his admissions to *Atlantic Monthly* meant that he disqualified himself as a plausible alternative when it came to drafting legislation. The sense of crisis which Reagan had encouraged to help push his programme through could not be sustained for a second year and his policies were just not living up to expectations. The alternative to the House committees no longer appeared so attractive.

Just because a majority of Representatives were no longer prepared to rubber stamp Reagan's policies did not mean that they were prepared to accept, unquestioningly, what the economic committees came up with. The sense of unease with 'business as usual' remained. That is why the House had such difficulties producing appropriations and tax bills in 1982. The 1980 election and the President's campaign had reawakened Congressional unease at their inability to use the budget as a macroeconomic tool. By the end of 1982 the ideological temperature had cooled and the House appropriations process was returning to what, according to Mayhew, it does best: satisfying the particularized electoral needs of its members. If changing the direction of the economy was beyond them then the members would have to content themselves with trying to guarantee their re-election.
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|                | Constant       | 1.316            | 2.224    | 1.346      | .318           | -.351         | 3.953       | .428         | 1.558        |
|                | (.146)         | (.143)           | (.144)   | (.139)     | (.148)         | (.143)        | (.146)      | (.146)       | (.144)       |
| R2             | 0.208          | 0.165            | 0.218    | 0.169      | 0.164          | 0.247         | 0.206       | 0.116        | 0.151        |
| F              | 1.752          | 1.329            | 1.902    | 1.353      | 1.340          | 2.190         | 1.603       | 0.855        | 1.430        |
| N of Cases     | 92             | 93               | 94       | 92         | 94             | 92            | 86          | 90           | 89           |
| For Pres       | 59%            | 33%              | 43%      | 30%        | 30%            | 59%           | 46%         | 36%          | 13%          |

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 1: Southern Democrats

**=P<.05  ***=P<.01
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<td>-.021</td>
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<td>.579*</td>
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|          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Constant | 3.07      | 3.57     | 10.29      | 4.36     | 7.97     | 8.92      |          |          |          | (5.42)    | (4.76)    | (4.88)    | (4.21)   | (4.63)   | (3.31)    |          |          |          |
| R2       | 0.195     | 0.326    | 0.274      | 0.412    | 0.272    | 0.452     |          |          |          | (0.195)   | (0.195)   | (0.195)   | (0.195) | (0.195) | (0.195)   |          |          |          |
| F        | 0.745     | 1.49     | 1.16       | 2.04     | 1.15     | 2.48      |          |          |          | (0.745)   | (0.745)   | (0.745)   | (0.745) | (0.745) | (0.745)   |          |          |          |
| N of Cases| 50        | 50       | 50         | 48       | 50       | 45        |          |          |          | (50)      | (50)      | (50)      | (50)    | (50)    | (50)      |          |          |          |
| For Pres | 52%       | 36%      | 66%        | 73%      | 28%      | 87%       |          |          |          | (52%)     | (36%)     | (66%)     | (73%)   | (28%)   | (87%)     |          |          |          |

**P>.05 ***P>.01 ****=P>.001 on a one-tailed test
Standard errors in parentheses