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Political stability and political culture : a comparative study of the USSR and Poland Skrobacki, Waldemar Andrzej 1986

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POLITICAL STABILITY AND POLITICAL CULTURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE USSR AND POLAND by WALDEMAR ANDRZEJ SKROBACKI M.A. (Honours), U n i v e r s i t y of Wroclav/ A THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE REQUIREMENTS MASTER PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF FOR THE DEGREE OF OF ARTS i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the re q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 1986 (c) by Waldemar Andrzej Skrobacki In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head o f my department o r by h i s or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f ^ o l t T l CQL Sc rc rVC t r The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y DE-6 (3/81) ABSTRACT T h i s study i s a comparative a n a l y s i s o f the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f Poland and the USSR. These two c o u n t r i e s , v e r y s i m i l a r i n many r e s p e c t s , a r e a t the same t i m e f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t i n terms o f p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . On the one s i d e , t h e r e i s the S o v i e t U n i o n — o n e o f the most p o l i t i c a l l y s t a b l e c o u n t r i e s i n the contemporary world. On the o t h e r s i d e , t h e r e i s Poland, which p e r i o d i c a l l y e x p e r i e n c e s s y s t e m i c p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s . D e s p i t e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s i m i l a r i t i e s , i t i s hard t o imagine two more d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i n terms o f p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . The main argument o f t h i s case study i s t h a t s t a b i l i t y , a v e r y complex problem, depends l a r g e l y on i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s . One o f the most i m p o r t a n t o f these c o n d i t i o n s i s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . T h i s concept i s d e f i n e d as the p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s , b e l i e f s , e x p e c t a t i o n s , knowledge, and p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the s o c i e t y . T h i s study compares the o f f i c i a l and dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s o f Poland and the S o v i e t Union. The main argument i s t h a t the congruence between the o f f i c i a l and the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e e x p l a i n s much o f the s t a b i l i t y o f the USSR. In the case o f Poland, the l a c k o f congruence c o n t r i b u t e s t o s y s t e m i c p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y . TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i i i MOTTOS i v Chapter I . INTRODUCTION 1 I I . CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 12 I I I . RUSSIAN AND SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE 29 1. R u s s i a n P o l i t i c a l T r a d i t i o n 35 2. R u s s i a n P o l i t i c a l V a l u e s , B e l i e f s and Symbols 40 3. R u s s i a n P o l i t i c a l Knowledge, E x p e c t a t i o n s and Be h a v i o r 45 4. The O f f i c i a l R u s s i a n P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e 58 5. The Contemporary Dominant P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e o f the Russians 60 Values and B e l i e f s 61 P o l i t i c a l Knowledge, E x p e c t a t i o n s and Behavior . . . 66 6. C o n c l u d i n g Remarks About R u s s i a n P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e . . 67 IV. POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE 74 1. P o l i s h P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e B e f o r e the Communist R e v o l u t i o n 76 2. P o l i s h V a l u e s , B e l i e f s and Symbols . . . . 80 3. P o l i s h P o l i t i c a l Knowledge, E x p e c t a t i o n s and Be h a v i o r 89 4. The P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e A f t e r the Communist Takeover . . 99 5. The O f f i c i a l P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e 101 6. The Contemporary Dominant P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e 105 Values and B e l i e f s 106 7. Contemporary P o l i s h P o l i t i c a l E x p e c t a t i o n s , Knowledge and Behaviour 114 8. C o n c l u d i n g Remarks About P o l i s h P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e . . . 118 V. CONCLUSION 122 FOOTNOTES 128 BIBLIOGRAPHY 144 i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i ke to thank Dr. Paul Marantz for his kind and i n c i -sive assistance in the preparation of this thesis and for his support throughout the year. I would also acknowledge the generous in te l l ec -tual support of Dr. Robert Jackson and Dr. Ph i l ip Resnick, as well as a l l my teachers at the University of Br i t i sh Columbia. I thank them a l l . They have a l l been more helpful than they can know. I would also l i ke to acknowledge the financial support of the University for a teaching assistantship in the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science for the academic year 1985-1986. John Deelman, who made the technical necessities of this thesis easier, deserves thanks. I would also l i ke to express my warm thanks to my dearest friends, Kim and Michael Meade. Their friendship i s priceless and their help inconceivable. To my wife Malgosia for tolerating me during this year, I dedicate this thesis. iv " P o l i t i c a l systems and systems of l e g i s l a t i o n vary w i t h the l o c a l s i t u a t i o n and the temper of the i n h a b i t a n t s . " - Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The S o c i a l Contract (New York: C a r l t o n House, n.d.), p. 41. "Governments vary as the d i s p o s i t i o n s of men vary, and there must be as many of the one as of the other. For we cannot suppose that s t a t e s are made of 'old and rock' and not out of the human natures which are i n them." - P l a t o , The Republic i n The Works of P l a t o (New York: D i a l Press, n.d.), p. 445. v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The problem of p o l i t i c a l s t ab i l i t y in communist countries seems to be overlooked by p o l i t i c a l scientists . Every year brings an incredible number of new books and ar t ic les dedicated to the communist world. Despite the richness of the p o l i t i c a l science l i terature on communist countries, there i s re la t ively l i t t l e said about their s t ab i l i ty . This i s a rather surprising fact. P o l i t i c a l s t ab i l i t y i s a very important issue which profoundlly differentiates communist countries from one another. On one side, there i s the Soviet Union which i s tremendously stable. For centuries autocracy, force and collectivism have been constant features of the Russian/Soviet p o l i t i c a l system. On the other side, there i s Poland which has been extremely unstable by almost any c r i t e r i a . In i t s short forty-year history of communist rule, People's Poland has gone through six very serious p o l i t i c a l crises (1948, 1956, 1968, 1970, 1 976, 1 980-81). In other words, p o l i t i c a l s t ab i l i t y i s one of the most conspic-uous and important differences among communist countries. Therefore, i t ought to be more interesting to students of communism, and i t i s quite amazing that we do not have many comparative studies of commu-n i s t s t ab i l i t y . Furthermore, i t seems that this i s almost a classic topic for 2 comparative p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . Here we have two c o u n t r i e s w i t h numerous s i m i l a r i t i e s . They have very s i m i l a r , sometimes even iden-t i c a l , i n s t i t u t i o n s : the same systemic r o l e of the communist party, the same ideology, a common p o l i t i c a l center and hundreds of other commonalities. But de s p i t e the s i m i l a r i t i e s , these two c o u n t r i e s are the a n t i t h e s i s of each other i n terms of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . This seems t o be a paradox. The purpose of t h i s study i s to analyze t h i s "paradox." In other words, I w i l l analyze the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of communist c o u n t r i e s u s i n g Poland and the So v i e t Union as two case stu d i e s . This task i s not easy, and i t may even be c o n t r o v e r s i a l . How-ever, i t i s worthwhile t o analyze the s t a b i l i t y of communist c o u n t r i e s no matter how d i f f i c u l t and c o n t r o v e r s i a l such an a n a l y s i s may be. The problem of the s t a b i l i t y of Sovi e t b l o c c o u n t r i e s i s very impor-t a n t f o r a b e t t e r understanding of them. Therefore the s t u d i e s of communist s t a b i l i t y must be pursued. I t seems t h a t a s i n e qua non f o r such a study i s the n e c e s s i t y to see the d i f f e r e n c e s between communist c o u n t r i e s . This i s a neces-sary s t a r t i n g p o i n t , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t s t u d i e s i n comparative communism o f t e n focus on s i m i l a r i t i e s r a t h e r than d i f f e r e n c e s . This focus may be a reason why there are few t h e o r i e s on the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of communist c o u n t r i e s . S t a b i l i t y i s o f t e n assumed as a given. The few st u d i e s which have been done u s u a l l y t r e a t s t a b i l i t y as a f u n c t i o n of co e r c i o n and fear. Quite simply, the assumption i s tha t a l l the Sovie t b l o c c o u n t r i e s are the same, t h a t there are no important d i f f e r e n c e s between them and th a t a l l are e q u a l l y s t a b l e . 3 In t h i s view, huge systems of r e p r e s s i o n f o r c e the obedience of the people who otherwise would challenge the regimes. A consequence of such reasoning i s t o s h i f t a t t e n t i o n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n s of communist c o u n t r i e s t o the e x c l u s i o n of other f a c t o r s . I f a l l these c o u n t r i e s are pure d i c t a t o r s h i p s , then what makes them s t a b l e are t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s and the t e r r o r e x e r c i s e d by the regimes. This i s one reason why we have co u n t l e s s , o f t e n very elaborate, analyses of the governing communist p a r t i e s . The Soviet Party, f o r instance, i s analyzed i n i n c r e d i b l e d e t a i l . Each aspect of i t s a c t i v -i t i e s and i t s s t r u c t u r e have been examined i n every p o s s i b l e way. The same can be s a i d about the KGB, which i s probably the most analyzed p o l i c e f o r c e i n the world. This emphasis on d i c t a t o r s h i p , w i t h a paramount importance placed on i n s t i t u t i o n s , leads to another c o n v i c t i o n , namely t h a t i n every communist country there i s i n v a r i a b l y a huge gap between the r u l e r s and the r u l e d . I f the t e r r o r a p p l i e d by the regimes upon the governed was weaker, and i f the i n s t i t u t i o n s of t e r r o r were l e s s e f f i c i e n t , the regimes would be q u i c k l y overthrown. This i s what makes communist systems s t a b l e . Yet t h i s view a l s o sees them as p o t e n t i a l l y unstable. The e f f i c a c y of the p o l i c e , the p a r t y and the s t a t e organs guarantee s t a b i l i t y . People are b u l l i e d and persecuted, and t h e r e f o r e obedient. But yet they hate t h e i r r u l e r s and that i s why, sooner or l a t e r , they disobey, r e b e l and the communist regimes w i l l c o l l a p s e . At t h i s p o i n t i t i s important to s t r e s s t h a t I do not t h i n k t h a t these assumptions are completely erroneous or t h a t the scenarios are impossible. But I do t h i n k t h a t they are an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , 4 and t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o understanding communist c o u n t r i e s i s l i m i t e d . I n s t i t u t i o n s are important and undoubtedly the KGB and i t s branches i n the s a t e l l i t e c o u n t r i e s c o n t r i b u t e t o the s t a b i l i t y of these regimes. However, i n s t i t u t i o n s are not the only important f a c t o r of s t a b i l i t y . Emphasis on i n s t i t u t i o n s a l s o shows us only the s i m i l a r i t i e s between communist c o u n t r i e s . But there are a l s o d i f f e r -ences between them and these d i f f e r e n c e s are very important. Those who s t r e s s i n s t i t u t i o n s and the r o l e of t e r r o r based on ideology i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s o f t e n favour the t o t a l i t a r i a n model. The strengths and weaknesses of t h i s model w i l l be discussed and analyzed i n chapter three. A l s o i n chapter three the modernization theory w i l l be discussed. This theory s t r e s s e s the existence of a gap between the a u t o c r a t i c a u t h o r i t i e s and s o c i e t i e s which are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p o l i -t i c a l needs s i m i l a r t o those of Western s o c i e t i e s . Because these two t h e o r i e s w i l l be analyzed i n the t h i r d chapter, here, I would l i k e t o s t r e s s t h a t the t o t a l i t a r i a n model has h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d communist stu d i e s . The i n f l u e n c e of t h i s model a l s o helps t o create the impres-s i o n t h a t a l l communist c o u n t r i e s are very s i m i l a r . And i f there are any d i f f e r e n c e s among them, they are of l i t t l e importance. I t w i l l be argued i n t h i s study t h a t there are, i n many r e s -pects, huge d i f f e r e n c e s among communist c o u n t r i e s . These d i f f e r e n c e s are of c r u c i a l p o l i t i c a l importance. One of the most important d i f -ferences i s that of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . Furthermore, i n the case of the USSR and Poland, t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s not only a quantative one. This i s f i r s t and foremost a q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e . In other words, the d i f f e r e n c e between the s t a b i l i t y of the Sovi e t Union and the 5 i n s t a b i l i t y of Poland centers on not only the degree of s t a b i l i t y / i n s t a b i l i t y . In Poland i n s t a b i l i t y i s system-threatening. I t i s not a l a c k of popular support f o r p o l i t i c i a n s o r f o r p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n . In t h a t country there i s a l a c k of support f o r the regime as a whole. The Warsaw regime sim p l y l a c k s l e g i t i m a c y . Max Weber w r i t e s : A c t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y s o c i a l a c t i o n which i n v o l v e s s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , may be o r i e n t e d by the a c t o r s t o a b e l i e f ( v o r s t e l l u n g ) i n the exis t e n c e of a ' l e g i t i m a t e order.'^ F u r t h e r , enumerating the types of l e g i t i m a c y , Weber says t h a t : The l e g i t i m a c y of an order may be guaranteed or upheld i n two p r i n c i p a l ways: (1) from pu r e l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d motives, which may i n t u r n be (a) purely a f f e c t u a l , c o n s i s t i n g i n an em o t i o n a l l y determined l o y a l t y ; o r (b) may d e r i v e from a r a t i o n a l b e l i e f i n the absolute v a l i d i t y of the order as an expression of u l t i m a t e values, whether they be moral, a e s t h e t i c or any other type;" or (c) may o r i g i n a t e i n r e l i g i o u s a t t i t u d e s , through the b e l i e f i n the dependence of some c o n d i t i o n of r e l i g i o u s s a l v a t i o n on conformity w i t h the order; (2) a l s o or e n t i r e l y by s e l f - i n t e r e s t , t h a t i s , through expectations of s p e c i f i c u l t e r i o r consequences, but consequences which are, t o be sure, of a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d . In other words, Weber says t h a t i n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s the b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of a l e g i t i m a t e order i s very important and t h a t the sources of t h i s b e l i e f are based on emotions and/or on concrete i n t e r e s t s . A very s i m i l a r p o i n t of view i s presented by Rigby who says: A system i s ' l e g i t i m a t e ' i n s o f a r as the compliance of the r u l e d w i t h the demands of t h e i r r u l e r s i s governed by a b e l i e f t h a t t h e grounds on wh i c h demands a r e i s s u e d a r e v a l i d . . . . The grounds of l e g i t i m a c y are d i v e r s e : T r a d i t i o n a l r u l e s of succession, e l e c t i o n by a m a j o r i t y o r according t o some other accepted formula, demonstration of h e r o i c or superhuman powers, e t c . 3 We can ask what e l s e can be added t o the Rigby l i s t of the grounds of l e g i t i m a c y . What e l s e makes the people b e l i e v e t h a t the 6 orders given by t h e i r r u l e r s are l e g i t i m a t e and t h e r e f o r e should be c a r r i e d out? What makes a p o l i t i c a l order a system of a u t h o r i t y , a system which i s not e x c l u s i v e l y based on naked f o r c e , but on a combin-a t i o n of l e g i t i m a c y and force. Weber says that there are three sources: 1) l e g a l - r a t i o n a l grounds, based on a b e l i e f of the people t h a t those who are i n power should be obeyed because the law says so; 2) t r a d i t i o n a l grounds, based on a b e l i e f i n the s a n c t i t y of immemo-r i a l t r a d i t i o n which holds that those i n power must be obeyed; and 3) c h a r i s m a t i c grounds based on b e l i e f t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r person who w i e l d s power has to be obeyed because of some e x t r a o r d i n a r y v i r t u e s possessed by the person.^ In other words, we have three i d e a l types of a u t h o r i t y : l e g a l -r a t i o n a l , t r a d i t i o n a l and c h a r i s m a t i c . These are, of course, i d e a l types. In the r e a l world of p o l i t i c s they may e x i s t i n various com-b i n a t i o n s , and there are many d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements on which these types of a u t h o r i t y may be based. However, the l i n k bet-ween l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements i s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , d e f i n e d as the b e l i e f s , values, symbols, p o l i t i c a l knowledge, p o l i t i c a l e x pectations, and behaviour pa t t e r n s of the c i t i z e n s . For inst a n c e , Rigby's example of " e l e c t i o n by a m a j o r i t y " must be l i n k e d w i t h a b e l i e f t h a t the d e c i s i o n s of a m a j o r i t y become law, and t h a t each law has t o be obeyed. L i k e w i s e , a b e l i e f i n the r e g u l a t o r y r o l e of law has t o be l i n k e d t o a b e l i e f t h a t the power of the r u l e r should not be e x c l u s i v e l y based on force. These b e l i e f s are based on t r a d i -t i o n s which are c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l values i n the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . P o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , then, i s a very important element of l e g i t i -7 macy. Chapter two w i l l introduce the concepts of o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e (i.e., t h a t promoted by the regime) and dominant or t r a d i -t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the m a j o r i t y of a s o c i e t y . As t h i s study of the S o v i e t Union and Poland w i l l argue, l e g i t i m a c y i n communist c o u n t r i e s r e q u i r e s a congruence between the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e and the dominant or t r a d i t i o n a l one. The l e g i t i m a c y of a p o l i t i c a l system i s a b a s i s of i t s s t a b i l i -ty. I f the system i s l e g i t i m a t e , t h i s enormously c o n t r i b u t e s t o the maintenance of i t s s t a b i l i t y . This statement i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of any p o l i t i c a l system, i n c l u d i n g communist systems. Connor very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out t h a t " i t s s t a b i l i t y [the S o v i e t Union] i s rooted i n h i s t o r y and based on elements of p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y and p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t i v e -ness."^ Having e s t a b l i s h e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , l e g i t i m a c y and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , we can f o l l o w Rakowska-Harmstone who suggests that i n an a n a l y s i s of communist c o u n t r i e s we should take i n t o account p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n a d d i t i o n t o t r a d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s , such as i n s t i t u t i o n s or ideology, i n the study of communist regimes. She says t h a t "each [communist] country's s p e c i f i c environment . . . i n c l u d e s o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s such as s i z e and sources as w e l l as sub-j e c t i v e p a t t e r n s of values, a t t i t u d e s , s t r u c t u r e s , and behaviour char-a c t e r i s t i c of a p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . " ^ Indeed, she i s r i g h t . P o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s a very important element i n an analy-s i s of communist co u n t r i e s . As I have suggested, p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e plays a very important r o l e i n p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . P o l i t i c a l c u l -t u r e , or the congruence between the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e and the dominant 8 c u l t u r e , ensures the regime l e g i t i m a c y and, through t h i s , p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . E c k s t e i n w r i t e s : Government w i l l be s t a b l e i f (1) s o c i a l a u t h o r i t y p a t t e r n s are i d e n t i c a l w i t h the governmental p a t t e r n , or (2) they c o n s t i t u t e a graduated p a t t e r n i n a proper segmentation of s o c i e t y , or (3) a high degree of resemblance e x i s t s i n patterns adjacent t o government and one f i n d s throughout the more d i s t a n t segments a marked departure from f u n c t i o n a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e p a t t e r n s f o r the sake of i m i t a t i n g the governmental p a t t e r n or extensive i m i t a -t i o n of the government p a t t e r n i n r i t u a l p r a c t i c e s . 7 In other words, according t o E c k s t e i n , p o l i t i c a l systems w i l l be s t a b l e i f i n s t i t u t i o n s are i n harmony w i t h the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the vast m a j o r i t y of the c i t i z e n s . Samuel Huntington very a c c u r a t e l y observes t h a t i n s t a b i l i t y occurs when channels of access to a p o l i t i c a l system have not been e s t a b l i s h e d and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n a r a t e p r o p o r t i o n a l t o the popu-l a r . demand f o r t h i s access. I t seems t h a t a very important f a c t o r which determines t h i s demand i s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . I f the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the m a j o r i t y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a high demand f o r p o l i t i -c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and i n s t i t u t i o n s do not f a c i l i t a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , then the system becomes p o l i t i c a l l y unstable. Moreover, i f the regime a f t e r the r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s demand does nothing t o e s t a b l i s h proper i n s t i t u t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , then, the regime becomes i l l e g i m a t e and the system c h r o n i c a l l y unstable. As chapter four on Poland w i l l argue, the high demand f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n — c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of P o l i s h dominant c u l t u r e — i s not met by the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the contemporary P o l i s h system. Fur-thermore, the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e promotes a model of p a r t i c i p a t i o n which i s e n t i r e l y i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the dominant c u l t u r e . This produces a la c k of l e g i t i m a c y f o r the regime and constant i n s t a b i l i t y i n the 9 p o l i t i c a l system. In the case of Russia the s i t u a t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t . The l a c k of i n s t i t u t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not cause i n s t a b i l i t y . As i t w i l l be argued i n chapter three on Russia, t h i s p o l i t i c a l c u l -t u r e does not create a high demand f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Therefore l a c k of f r e e e l e c t i o n s or c o m p e t i t i v e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a -t i o n s are not necessary t o Soviet p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . With Huntington's general p r i n c i p l e about s t a b i l i t y i n mind, we can say t h a t i f the demand f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s very low (as i n the So v i e t Union), then channels of access t o the p o l i t i c a l system do not have t o be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n order t o s t a b i l i z e the system. Using the terminology proposed by E c k s t e i n , we can say t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l Russian p a t t e r n s of u n l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y are a c c u r a t e l y expressed by the s t r u c t u r e of the S o v i e t government and i t s patterns of e x e r c i s i n g power. Put another way, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Soviet system and t h e i r performance are i n agreement w i t h the p o l i t i c a l expectations of the c i t i z e n s and t h e i r n o t i o n of a u t h o r i t y . This agreement c o n t r i -butes enormously t o p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n the USSR. In other words, the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e can be a very u s e f u l instrument f o r examining the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of communist co u n t r i e s . The s t r e n g t h of t h i s concept i s that i t takes i n t o account concrete s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of s t a b i l i t y . P o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i s a very complex problem. However, the most important f a c t o r s of s t a b i l i t y are those which are r e l a t e d t o the s o c i e t y and i t s charac-t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s . I f the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the p o l i t i c a l system and the methods of e x e r c i s i n g power are compatible w i t h the expectations 10 of the v ast m a j o r i t y of a s o c i e t y and i t s p r e v a i l i n g n o t i o n of author-i t y , then the system w i l l be s t a b l e s i n c e the regime i s l e g i t i m a t e . In t h i s sense, the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e can make a great c o n t r i b u t i o n to a general theory on p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y s i n c e i t enables us t o examine t h i s c o m p a t i b i l i t y i n any p o l i t i c a l system. CHAPTER I I CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES This chapter examines the conceptual and methodological i s s u e s which are of importance f o r a comparative study of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n the Sovi e t Union and Poland. The d i s c u s s i o n focuses on the d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , together w i t h a review of the p o l i t i c a l s cience l i t e r a t u r e on i t s strengths and weaknesses. Another p a r t of t h i s chapter examines how the concept has been used i n the USSR and Poland, where i t i s very popular w i t h the a u t h o r i t i e s . The concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e has a long h i s t o r y . In the words of G a b r i e l Almond "something l i k e a n o t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e has been around as long as men have spoken and w r i t t e n about p o l i -t i c s . ^ According t o Almond the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s t s t o use the concept were P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e . And among those who developed the concept were M a c h i a v e l l i , Montesquieu, Rousseau and T o c q u e v i l l e . Almond p o i n t s out many sources which have i n f l u e n c e d the concept, such as the enlightenment and l i b e r a l views, European s o c i o l o g y (Pareto and Weber), s o c i a l psychology (Lipman and Dewey) and psychoanthropology 1 o (Freud, M a l i n o w s k i , Margaret Mead and L a s w e l l ) . The concept was e x t e n s i v e l y developed i n the 1960s. In 1963 one of the most important books was published on p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , The C i v i c C u l t u r e by Almond and Verba. 1 1 In t h i s book the two authors 12 examined the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the United States, the United Kingdom, Mexico, West Germany and I t a l y . They pointed out t h a t a s i n e  quo non f o r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i s c i v i c c u l t u r e , the a n t i t h e s i s of a u t h o r i t a r i a n c u l t u r e . C i v i c c u l t u r e i s a mixture of c o n t r a d i c t o r y ideas h e l d by the p u b l i c and i n v o l v e s both p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the acceptance of a u t h o r i t y . In other words, i n a t y p i c a l c i v i c c u l t u r e there should be both o p p o s i t i o n t o the regime and support f o r i t . Almond and Verba argue t h a t only a mixture of these two c o n t r a d i c t o r y a t t i t u d e s creates c o n d i t i o n s f o r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . They a l s o pre-sented a typology of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s . According t o them, there are three pure forms of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e : p a r o c h i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i l l i t e r a t e people who are almost e n t i r e l y uninvolved i n the p o l i t i c a l system; p a r t i c i p a t i v e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c of modern democratic i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s where people are p o l i t i -c a l l y a c t i v e and w e l l informed; and between these two types, a t h i r d t y p e — s u b j e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . This type i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p a r t l y i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s where some groups ( f o r instance, business-men) are i n v o l v e d i n p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s , but most people are passive 1 ? subj e c t s . In a book w r i t t e n w i t h P o w e l l , Almond says t h a t an i d e a l type of the democratic i n d u s t r i a l model of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s composed of s i x t y percent p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h i r t y percent s u b j e c t s , and ten percent of p a r c h o c i a l s . The a n t i t h e s i s of t h i s model, the p r e i n d u s t r i a l model w i t h p a r o c h i a l i s m as the main type of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , c o n s i s t s only of f i v e percent p a r t i c i p a n t s , f o r t y percent subjects and f i f t y - f i v e percent p a r o c h i a l s . In the i n between model, the a u t h o r i t a r i a n 13 model, the proportions are as f o l l o w s : ten percent p a r t i c i p a n t s , 1 "3 s i x t y percent subjects and t h i r t y percent p a r o c h i a l s . There are many d e f i n i t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The main d i f f e r e n c e between them concerns the scope of the concept. Generally speaking, there are those who use the concept i n the narrower sense which excludes p o l i t i c a l behavior as p a r t of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , w h i l e others i n c l u d e i t i n the d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . This i s the broader sense of the concept. Almond and Powell d e f i n e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n the narrower sense and say that p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s "the s t a t e of a t t i t u d e s , b e l i e f s and f e e l i n g s about p o l i t i c s c urrent i n a 1 A n a t i o n a t a given time.' S i m i l a r l y , Huntington and Dominguez d e f i n e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as a concept composed of "the e m p i r i c a l b e l i e f s about exp r e s s i v e p o l i t i c a l symbols and values and other o r i e n t a t i o n s of the members of s o c i e t y toward p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t s . " 1 ^ Brown, i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c a l Change i n Communist Countries, uses the concept i n the narrower sense. He w r i t e s t h a t p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e w i l l be understood as the s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n of h i s t o r y and p o l i t i c s , the fundamental b e l i e f s and values, the f o c i of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and l o y a l t y and the p o l i t i c a l knowledge and expectations which are the product of the s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l experience of nations and groups. A broader understanding of the concept i s used by Paul. He de f i n e s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as "the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of values, symbols, and a t t i t u d i n a l and behavioural p a t t e r n s u n d e r l y i n g the p o l i t i c s of a 1 7 s o c i e t y . 1 Fagen i n h i s book on the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of Cuba a l s o uses the term i n i t s broader context, saying t h a t he p r e f e r s what he c a l l s an a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l approach t o the concept because "anthro-14 p o l o g i s t s [are] i n t e r e s t e d i n planned change [and they] do not l i m i t t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n of c u l t u r e t o p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s ; they i n c l u d e patterned ways of l i f e and a c t i o n as w e l l as the s t a t e s of mind that s u s t a i n and c o n d i t i o n these p a t t e r n s . " 1 8 White, who wrote the only book-length study on the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of Russia and the USSR, de f i n e s t h a t term i n t h i s way: " P o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e may be defi n e d as the a t t i t u d i n a l and behavioural m a t r i x w i t h i n which the p o l i t i c a l system i s located." 1 ^  There are many c r i t i c i s m s of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e concept which have been made. One i s t h a t the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e approach deals w i t h s u b j e c t i v e values and b e l i e f s , and because of t h e i r sub-j e c t i v e character there i s a danger of presenting them i n a l e s s s c i e n t i f i c and more i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c manner. Therefore the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s a j o u r n a l i s t i c r a t h e r than a s c i e n t i f i c concept. Another c r i t i c i s m of c u l t u r a l s t u d i e s can be found i n the w r i t i n g s of Barr i n g t o n Moore. For him, " C u l t u r a l values do not des-cend from heaven t o i n f l u e n c e the course of h i s t o r y . " ^ These values are s i m p l y d e r i v e d from i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s which shape them d i r e c t l y . Moore very s t r o n g l y emphasizes the su p e r i o r r o l e of i n s t i -t u t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s and says t h a t c u l t u r e plays a l e s s important r o l e . He w r i t e s : To maintain and t r a n s m i t a value system, human beings are punched, b u l l i e d , sent t o j a i l , thrown i n t o c o n c e n t r a t i o n camps, c a j o l e d , b r i b e d , made i n t o heroes, encouraged t o read newspapers, stood up agai n s t a w a l l and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology. In other words, according t o Moore, the degree of co e r c i o n a p p l i e d by the a u t h o r i t i e s or the v i c e s of human nature caused by 15 m a t e r i a l d e s i r e s are more r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the shape of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e than h i s t o r i c a l experience or values i n h e r i t e d from the past and t r a n s m i t t e d from generation t o generation. Undoubtedly, we can f i n d many examples i n the h i s t o r y of mankind which confirm t h i s i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n , f o r example, Nazism i n Germany. A l s o , without question, one can f i n d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the p o l i t i c a l system and i n t e r e s t s as s t i m u l i of human behaviour. However, we can a l s o f i n d many examples where even complex and s o p h i s t i c a t e d systems of c o e r c i o n and h i g h l y developed systems of p r i v i l e g e , such as a huge system of b r i b e r y , d i d not change the c u l t u r a l values of the m a j o r i t y of the people. An example i s the case of Poland as w i l l be argued i n c h a p t e r four. Here, I would l i k e t o d i s c u s s the strengths and weaknesses of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e approach. Merkl says that there are three advantages to t h i s approach. F i r s t , " p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s capable of e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n and d i s p r o o f , u n l i k e the p l a t o n i c search f o r the only true ideology or f o r the 'true nature' or 'essence' of au-t h o r i t y , l e g i t i m a c y , l i b e r t y or a given n a t i o n a l character." Second-l y , Merkl w r i t e s t h a t t h i s approach "can c l e a r l y demonstrate the changes l i k e l y , over a p e r i o d of time, i n p o p u l a r l y h e l d notions of a u t h o r i t y , l i b e r t y , or i d e n t i t y . " F i n a l l y , " p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a l l o w s us t o i n t e g r a t e these v a r i o u s , separate, and i s o l a t e d concepts [about a u t h o r i t y , l i b e r t y , l e g i t i m a c y , etc. ] i n t o our models of the p o l i t i c a l system. . . ."22 I agree w i t h Merkl on h i s e v a l u a t i o n . A l l t h e o r e t i c a l con-s i d e r a t i o n s of l i b e r t y , l e g i t i m a c y , a u t h o r i t y , etc. ought t o be 16 " t e s t e d " i n the r e a l p o l i t i c a l system i f they are to help us t o understand r e a l p o l i t i c a l processes. And the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ap-proach help us do t h i s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , we should be aware t h a t a p o l i t i c a l system i s a dynamic e n t i t y and i t s elements are i n m u l t i -l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h one another and these r e l a t i o n s are i n f l u e n c e d by many thi n g s i n c l u d i n g our b e l i e f s and values. For instance, the r o l e of the law courts i n the system i s determined not only by l e g a l r u l e s , but a l s o by our pe r c e p t i o n of law and th a t p e r c e p t i o n i s de t e r -mined by our values, b e l i e f s and p o l i t i c a l symbols. The p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e approach i s very dynamic. This dynamism i s caused by the f a c t t h a t the approach takes i n t o account the p o s s i b i l i t y of change i n values and b e l i e f s . Dynamism a l s o r e s u l t s from the assumption t h a t the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of a n a t i o n i s not u n i t e d and homogeneous. I a l s o accept Merkl's p o i n t on the s c i e n t i f i c c h a racter of the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . I have already mentioned the p o i n t r a i s e d by the c r i t i c s of the concept concerning i t s j o u r n a l i s t i c nature. For example, McAuley suggests t h a t because the concept de a l s w i t h s u b j e c t i v e values which are d i f f i c u l t t o analyze o b j e c t i v e l y , the whole concept i s d i f f i c u l t t o apply i n any s c i e n t i f i c p o l i t i c a l analy-s i s . As an example, she r e f e r s t o the many d i f f e r e n t and sometimes c o n t r a d i c t o r y p e r s p e c t i v e s on "the S o v i e t man." For inst a n c e , she c i t e s the o p i n i o n of Bahro who argues t h a t the o f f i c i a l image of the new s o c i a l i s t man i s t h a t of a s e l f i s h consumer and possessor, whereas S z e l e n y i suggests t h a t the o f f i c i a l image i s th a t of a w e l l educated member of the upper-middle c l a s s i n any advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . In her p r e s e n t a t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s , McAuley i m p l i e s t h a t 17 any a n a l y s i s must be s u b j e c t i v e and t h e r e f o r e j o u r n a l i s t i c s i n c e i t i s b i a s e d by the f e e l i n g s o f those who a n a l y z e communism and the S o v i e t Union. She w r i t e s : "There i s a whole w o r l d t o c h a r t here, f u l l o f p e r i l s f o r t h e unwary. . . ."23 C e r t a i n l y , McAuley i s r i g h t t h a t t h e r e a r e many p e r i l s a w a i t i n g those who a p p l y t h e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e concept. Of course, i t i s always p o s s i b l e t o s l i p i n t o j o u r n a l i s m and McAuley i s r i g h t when she p o i n t s out t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o a n a l y z e s u b j e c t i v e c a t e g o r i e s l i k e v a l u e s , b e l i e f s , symbols, e t c . i n a s c i e n t i f i c way. However, I agree w i t h M e r k l t h a t these c a t e g o r i e s can be examined and e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i e d . Survey r e s e a r c h i s a good way t o do t h i s , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t some r e s e a r c h e r s may use t h i s methodology i n a s u b j e c t i v e , non-s c i e n t i f i c way. However, t h i s i s not a problem i n t r i n s i c t o the concept, but r a t h e r a c r i t i c i s m o f p a r t i c u l a r methodologies employed by some r e s e a r c h e r s . The s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e methods have been d i s c u s s e d e l s e w h e r e . 2 4 However, t h e r e i s one m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem which i s i m p o r t a n t here. T h i s i s w e l l d e s c r i b e d by Verba, who notes: "Though t h e r e a r e over one hundred autonomous n a t i o n s from which a sample c o u l d be drawn, not a l l a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r r e -search. . . . " Z 3 In o t h e r words, i n a d d i t i o n t o the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems d i s c u s s e d above, t h e r e i s the a d d i t i o n a l problem o f f i n d i n g r e s e a r c h o p p o r t u n i t i e s because o f t h e c l o s e d n a t u r e o f some o f t h e s e s o c i e t i e s . In many o f t h e s e c o u n t r i e s we do not have a c c e s s t o the r e s u l t s o f new s o c i a l s c i e n c e surveys. T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f the USSR. The few s t u d i e s which a r e a v a i l a b l e have never examined the 18 a t t i t u d e s of Soviet c i t i z e n s towards a u t h o r i t y per se or towards any member of the government. We a l s o cannot be sure whether those which have been publ i s h e d have been "corrected" i n order t o make them more s u i t a b l e f o r the purposes of Sovi e t propaganda. In a d d i t i o n , we a l s o do not know what methods were used f o r conducting these surveys, and th e r e f o r e we cannot know about methodological mistakes which might have been made by Sovi e t researchers. Inaccurate r e p o r t i n g of r e -search f i n d i n g s i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e i n a country where s o c i a l sciences are m i s t r u s t e d by the a u t h o r i t i e s , who t r e a t them more as a propaganda t o o l than an o b j e c t i v e source of i n f o r m a t i o n about s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s . ^ However, the problem of g e t t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from s u r v e y s — o n e of the b a s i c sources of our knowledge about p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e — d o e s not mean t h a t the concept should be abandoned i n the study of So v i e t p o l i t i c s and government. Nor can we blame the concept as such f o r the d i f f i c u l t y of o b t a i n i n g e m p i r i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n . Getty i n the i n t r o -d u c t i o n t o h i s book about the Great Purges of the 1930s w r i t e s about the d i f f i c u l t i e s which face h i s t o r i a n s who study the h i s t o r y of the USSR. There i s a l a c k of o r i g i n a l documents on the purges s i n c e a l l S o v i e t a r c h i v e s are c l o s e d and t h e i r documents unaccessible. A l s o there are few r e l i a b l e personal accounts, memoirs, etc., because Russian p o l i t i c i a n s g e n e r a l l y do not p u b l i s h t h i s s o r t of m a t e r i a l . ^ Despite these and many other problems, however, no one proposes t h a t we cease h i s t o r i c a l research on the USSR, and no one blames the d i s c i -p l i n e of h i s t o r y f o r t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s . And l i k e h i s t o r i a n s who found other sources of i n f o r m a t i o n about the USSR, those who attempt t o apply the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e have developed other sources 19 such as the programs of the p o l i t i c a l movements of Russia and the S o v i e t Union, works of Russian and S o v i e t i n t e l l e c t u a l s , surveys conducted among former S o v i e t c i t i z e n s , accounts given by f o r e i g n e r s who l i v e d i n the S o v i e t Union f o r a long p e r i o d of time, etc. Getty w r i t e s : " I t i s of c o u r s e , not p o s s i b l e t o a v o i d g u e s s i n g . . . ."28 And he i s r i g h t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of the USSR—a country s t i l l i n many respects c l o s e d t o f o r e i g n e r s . We have to be somewhat specu-l a t i v e i f we want t o pursue the study of t h i s important country. Here, I should a l s o s t r e s s the f a c t t h a t not a l l communist c o u n t r i e s have the same problems w i t h s o c i a l science surveys. In the case of Poland, there are many r e l i a b l e surveys. They have been conducted a t d i f f e r e n t periods of time and examine d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l matters. A l s o the methods of conducting these surveys do not r a i s e the same r e s e r v a t i o n s among Western s p e c i a l i s t s . 2 ^ Due t o the import-ance of the sources of i n f o r m a t i o n , the a n a l y s i s of the components of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Russians (chapter three) and the Poles (chapter four) w i l l be preceded by a short d i s c u s s i o n of the sources used. L i m i t a t i o n s of the sources of i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n the communist c o u n t r i e s creates an a d d i t i o n a l problem f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . I have already presented the broader and narrower understandings of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . I t seems th a t i n the case of communist c o u n t r i e s i t i s necessary t o use the broader understanding of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e because we do not have many s c i e n t i f i c surveys which would show us the b e l i e f s of the c i t i z e n s , t h e i r a t t i t u d e s toward p o l i t i c s and t h e i r perceptions. We must use 20 the broader understanding of the concept. By examining the p o l i t i c a l behavior of the c i t i z e n s of communist c o u n t r i e s we can f i n d b e h a v i o r a l patterns. These patterns are an i n t e g r a l p a r t of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and a t the same time are, t o a c e r t a i n degree, determined by the values, b e l i e f s , p o l i t i c a l knowledge and expectations of the c i t i z e n s . In other words, i f we cannot r e l y on surveys, then we have t o f i n d a s u b s t i t u t e source of i n f o r m a t i o n — n a m e l y , the p o l i t i c a l behavior of the c i t i z e n s . And t h a t i s why the author of t h i s study w i l l keep i n mind the d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e proposed by White. Now we can ask whether i t i s s t i l l worthwhile t o apply t h i s concept t o communist c o u n t r i e s . F i r s t , I have t o note t h a t p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , d e s p i t e i t s weaknesses and problems w i t h sources of informa-t i o n , can make a great c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the study of comparative commu-nism. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l approach can show us s i m i l a r i t i e s among communist c o u n t r i e s . But i t cannot r e v e a l much about the d i f f e r e n c e s between them. And unquestionably there are d i f f e r e n c e s between Eastern b l o c c o u n t r i e s . Very o f t e n these d i f f e r e n c e s are fundamental and p o l i t i c a l l y very s i g n i f i c a n t . For ins t a n c e , how do we e x p l a i n the tremendous p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of Russia and the USSR and the great p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y of Poland? We cannot f i n d an answer to t h i s q uestion by studying, f o r example, the parliaments of the two coun-t r i e s . A l s o , when we compare the r o l e and s t r u c t u r e of the communist p a r t i e s of the Soviet Union and Poland we w i l l not f i n d an answer t o t h i s problem of communist s t a b i l i t y . Only by addressing the question of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e can we e x p l a i n why the Soviet Union has been extremely s t a b l e , w h i l e Poland 21 has been h i g h l y unstable. I n order t o f u l l y understand communist c o u n t r i e s and t h e i r p o l i t i c s , we have t o understand not only the s i m i -l a r i t i e s among them, but a l s o the d i f f e r e n c e s . And we cannot a f f o r d not t o understand these c o u n t r i e s comprehensively. They are too important i n the contemporary world. The p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e approach seems t o be a l o g i c a l step which should be combined w i t h the i n s t i t u t i o n a l approach i f we want a f u l l p i c t u r e of communist c o u n t r i e s . For ins t a n c e , i f we only compare the i n s t i t u t i o n s of s o c i a l i z a t i o n i n communist c o u n t r i e s , we may mistaken-l y conclude t h a t a l l the c i t i z e n s of communist c o u n t r i e s are convinced supporters of the i d e o l o g y — e x c e p t , of course, the d i s s i d e n t s . How-ever, i f we use the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e approach, we can ask how many of the values and perceptions promoted by the systems of s o c i a l i z a t i o n are a c t u a l l y i n t e r n a l i z e d by the c i t i z e n s . Is there a d i f f e r e n c e between the o f f i c i a l values and the values which dominate the m a j o r i t y of the people? What are the p o l i t i c a l consequences f o r the s t a t e i f there i s a l a c k of congruence between the o f f i c i a l values and the dominant values of the people? I t seems t h a t i n the context of communist c o u n t r i e s i t i s e s p e c i a l l y worthwhile t o draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . G enerally speaking, i n communist c o u n t r i e s the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e em-braces the values, b e l i e f s , symbols, expectations, and b e h a v i o r a l p a t t e r n s which are promoted by the a u t h o r i t i e s . The dominant p o l i t i -c a l c u l t u r e means the c u l t u r e which i s a c t u a l l y represented by the vast m a j o r i t y of the nation. u The d i s t i n c t i o n between these two 22 types of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n Eastern Europe because of the o r i g i n of communism w i t h the Red Army. The i n t e r n a l pro-communist f o r c e s were weak, and without the support of the S o v i e t troops i t would not have been p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h communist r u l e . The Red Army, then, imposed the ideology and the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , together w i t h the n o t i o n of a u t h o r i t y and the concept of the status and r o l e of the c i t i z e n . These elements were new i n most Eastern European c o u n t r i e s . In t h i s sense, i t i s j u s t i -f i e d t o say t h a t i n the case of these c o u n t r i e s there was a r e v o l u -t i o n a r y break i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s . As w i l l be argued i n chapter three, the Russians d i d not have t o i n t e r n a l i z e a r a d i c a l new departure i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e because of the strong s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . However, i n the case of Poland the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e imposed by the Red Army and implemented by the P o l i s h communist regime was fundamen-t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from P o l i s h t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r e . At l e a s t a t the beginning of the communist r e v o l u t i o n there was a huge disharmony between the new, o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the t r a d i t i o n a l c u l -ture. At the present time the degree t o which the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e has been i n t e r n a l i z e d v a r i e s from one country to another i n Eastern Europe. For the p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t i n t e r e s t e d i n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , t h i s i s one of the most important d i f f e r e n c e s which d i s t i n g u i s h East European communist c o u n t r i e s . A r c h i e Brown, who introduces the d i s t i n c t i o n between o f f i c i a l and dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s , w r i t e s : "To speak of the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of a s o c i e t y i s almost always an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a -23 31 t i o n — j u s t i f i a b l e only i f i t i s a conscious o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . " C e r t a i n l y he i s r i g h t . We should be aware t h a t we may face a s i t u a t i o n where there i s no d i f f e r e n c e between the o f f i c i a l and the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s , i.e., where there i s a r e l a t i v e l y u n i f i e d p o l i t i -c a l c u l t u r e , or where there i s a fragmented p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h a dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . A l s o , there may be a dichotomous d i v i s i o n where the o f f i c i a l and the domi-nant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s are e q u a l l y popular among the people. How-ever, f o r an a n a l y s i s of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s of communist c o u n t r i e s the d i s t i n c t i o n between the o f f i c i a l and the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l -t u r e s seems t o be j u s t i f i e d . As I have j u s t argued, i n the context of communist c o u n t r i e s we can use the concepts of the o f f i c i a l and the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s as very u s e f u l a n a l y t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s t o help us examine and understand the d i f f e r e n c e s between communist c o u n t r i e s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , d i f f e r e n c e s between the o f f i c i a l and dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s can a l s o be viewed as a d i f f e r e n c e between the S o v i e t i n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t t e r n s and the l o c a l r e a l i t i e s . In other words, the d i s t i n c t i o n between these two c a t e g o r i e s does not only mean the d i f f e r e n c e between the degree of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e by the p o p u l a t i o n of each country, but a l s o the degree of acceptance and implementation of p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l patterns. The g r e a t e r the degree of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , the g r e a t e r the acceptance of, say, the p o s i t i o n of the Communist Party i n the p o l i t y . The g r e a t e r the acceptance, the e a s i e r f o r the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to i n t r o -duce more and more Sovi e t i n s t i t u t i o n a l patterns. In sum, t h e r e f o r e , 2 4 we can say t h a t these two a n a l y t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s — t h e o f f i c i a l and dominant c u l t u r e s — a r e very u s e f u l i n the context of communist coun-t r i e s . Having e s t a b l i s h e d the meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e of the o f f i c i a l and dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s , we can present the a n a l y t i c a l frame-work of t h i s study. We have t o answer the question of how t o opera-t i o n a l i z e the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Brown proposes t o analyze four elements of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e : previous p o l i t i c a l experience; values and fundamental b e l i e f s ; f o c i of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and l o y a l t y ; and f i n a l l y , p o l i t i c a l knowledge and expectations.-^ I am indebted t o Brown. In t h i s study I w i l l analyze Russian and P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s i n a way which i s very s i m i l a r to t h a t of Brown. My a n a l y t i c a l framework i s composed of three elements: p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s i n h e r i t e d from the past; the main p o l i t i c a l values, b e l i e f s and symbols; and p o l i t i c a l knowledge, expectations, and b e h a v i o r a l patterns. The f i r s t element embraces h i s t o r i c a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of the s t a t e , the t r a d i t i o n a l scope of government, and the s t a t u s of the i n d i v i d u a l . This element of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e seems t o be very important. A Soviet w r i t e r says t h a t "The past i s never dead. I t i s not even a past."-^ And an American p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t w r i t e s : ". . . P o l i t i c a l understanding always r e q u i r e s h i s t o r i c a l understanding. . . . I t i s true t h a t inadequate h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s leads to inadequate p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . " - ^ The second element contains values and b e l i e f s concerning e g a l -i t a r i a n i s m , c o l l e c t i v i s m , l i b e r t y , c i v i l r i g h t s , the p o s i t i o n of the 25 i n d i v i d u a l , the o r i g i n and the r o l e of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , s o c i a l s e c u r i t y and paternalism. And the t h i r d element i n c l u d e s the p o l i t i c a l knowledge of c i t i z e n s , t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and expectations concerning the s t a t e , and the expectations of the a u t h o r i t i e s concerning the behavior of c i t i z e n s . W i t h i n the a n a l y t i c a l framework presented above we can f i n d many features which d i s t i n g u i s h communist c o u n t r i e s from one another. For i n s t a n c e , as w i l l be argued i n chapter 3, a very strong attachment to c o l l e c t i v i s m i s one of the most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s of the Russians, whereas the Poles t r a d i t i o n a l l y favour i n d i v i d u a l i s m . Our knowledge about these f e a t u r e can l e a d us to important observations. The a n a l y s i s of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Russians can show us the h i g h degree of c i t i z e n s ' acceptance of the Soviet regime. The S o v i e t regime, then, i s not only based on c o e r c i o n , but a l s o on popular acceptance. This popular acceptance i s based on the f a c t t h a t the So v i e t regime has a strong c o n t i n u i t y w i t h the past. I t i s deeply anchored i n the Russian p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n and t h e r e f o r e the regime f i t s the p o l i t i c a l m e n t a l i t y of the people. The harmony between the past and present i s one of the most important c o n d i t i o n s which makes the S o v i e t system p o l i t i c a l l y very s t a b l e . In the case of Poland the great disharmony between the past and present, between the o f f i c i a l and dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s , makes the system very unstable. To make the P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l system s t a b l e , i t i s necessary e i t h e r t o make the regime more compatible w i t h p o l i t i -c a l t r a d i t i o n s , o r t o change the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e so t h at i t 26 i s a t l e a s t s i m i l a r t o the o f f i c i a l one. The change of the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e would mean a change i n mass p o l i t i c a l behavior and e v e n t u a l l y general support f o r the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Of course, the Warsaw regime wants t o replace the dominant t r a d i t i o n a l P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e w i t h the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e . Why? F i r s t and foremost, adherence t o S o v i e t Marxism, which i s the b a s i s f o r the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e , l e g i t i m a t e s the regime which was brought and e s t a b l i s h e d by Sovi e t o u t s i d e r s . A l s o , the Russians w i l l not a l l o w any s i g n i f i c a n t P o l o n i z a t i o n of the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e of the Warsaw regime. The adherence t o Soviet Marxism means m a i n t a i n i n g l o y a l t y or s e r v i l i t y t o the Soviet regime. The p o s s i b i l i t y of changing the behavior of c i t i z e n s and g a i n -ing from them s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l support makes the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e very a t t r a c t i v e t o the a u t h o r i t i e s i n c o u n t r i e s where there i s a very s i g n i f i c a n t cleavage between the o f f i c i a l and the dominant c u l t u r e . That i s why the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e concept i n i t s s o c i a l engineering aspect i s so a l l u r i n g f o r the P o l i s h a u t h o r i -t i e s who have sponsored research on the c u l t u r e f o r many years. The f i r s t research of t h i s k i n d was conducted i n the second h a l f of the 1950s, a t a time when the regime began t o look f o r popular support and to r e l y l e s s on coercion. Since that time there have been many attempts t o determine what are the main features of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , what causes t h e i r l o n g e v i t y and how t o change them. The P o l i s h s o c i o l o g i s t Szczepanski w r i t e s : I t i s important t o overcome the t r a d i t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m and a n a r c h i c a l i n c l i n a t i o n s t h a t proved t o be so f a t a l i n the 27 eighteenth century and s t i l l could not be eradicated. . . . To teach Poles the democratic d i s c i p l i n e of t h a t k i n d e x i s t i n g i n h i g h l y developed Western democracies w i l l r e q u i r e very a b l e and h i g h l y s k i l l e d p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s . . . . The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the P o l i s h s o c i e t y i n t o a w e l l - o r d e r e d and law-abiding n a t i o n w i l l r e q u i r e more time and ed u c a t i o n a l e f f o r t . . . . The c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the Poles are not mature enough and ther e -f o r e cannot l i v e i n a f u l l y democratic s o c i e t y seems t o be a very u s e f u l form of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p o l i c i e s of the regime. Very o f t e n when the a u t h o r i t i e s introduce a harsh new law r e s t r i c t i n g c i v i l r i g h t s , the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s u s u a l l y t r e a t e d as an excuse f o r t h a t d e c i s i o n . For instance, J a r u z e l s k i , i n a speech given a f t e r the i m p o s i t i o n of M a r t i a l Law i n Poland, c a l l e d the S o l i d a r i t y p e r i o d one more example of the " P o l i s h anarchic s o u l " and j u s t i f i e d the State of Emergency as an a b s o l u t e l y necessary d e c i s i o n "made i n a country where nothing can be done i n common e f f o r t . " ^ 7 In the Soviet Union the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e concept i s l e s s popular, and u n t i l the beginning of the 1980s there were only a few books dedicated t o p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . A l s o , the term was very r a r e l y used. This s i t u a t i o n was caused by the Soviet c l a i m t h a t the 1917 r e v o l u t i o n changed s o c i e t y profoundly and th a t from the r e v o l u -t i o n on there has been nothing but a new Soviet s o c i e t y e n t i r e l y shaped by Marxism-Leninism. One of the f i r s t s c h o l a r s t o introduce the term " p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e " i n t o S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e was B u r l a t s k i i , who s a i d : In S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e the term " p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e " becomes more and more popular. P o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n our op i n i o n , embraces the l e v e l of the p o l i t i c a l knowledge of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l c l a s s e s and s t r a t a as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l s about a u t h o r i t y and p o l i t i c s and r e l a t e d t o t h i s knowledge the degree of the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of the s o c i e t y . P o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e should, undoubtedly, become an o b j e c t of s c i e n t i f i c research s i n c e i t 28 [ p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ] i n f l u e n c e s the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the d e c i s i o n s made by the a u t h o r i t y and the degree of t h e i r acceptance.^9 In t h i s d e f i n i t i o n the i n s t r u m e n t a l usage of the concept i s n o t i c e a b l e . I t seems t h a t the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e concept was absorbed by S o v i e t s o c i a l sciences as one more u s e f u l instrument of a u t h o r i t y . In the Sov i e t context, however, the p r a c t i c a l aspect of t h i s concept does not mean an attempt to change the dominant c u l t u r e , s i n c e there i s no great d i f f e r e n c e between o f f i c i a l and dominant c u l t u r e s . Rather the i n t e n t i s t o preserve and p r o t e c t i t from f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e . The i n s t r u m e n t a l aspect of the concept i s very s t r o n g l y empha-s i z e d by the authors of K r a t k i i P o l i t i c h e s k i i Slovar [The Concise P o l i t i c a l D i c t i o n a r y ] . This d i c t i o n a r y says t h a t p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e embraces "the l e v e l and character of p o l i t i c a l knowledge, e v a l u a t i o n s and a c t i o n s of the c i t i z e n s as w e l l as the content and q u a l i t y of s o c i a l values, t r a d i t i o n s and norms r e g u l a t i n g p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s . In the l a s t p art of t h a t d e f i n i t i o n the authors enumerate the func-t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e : e d u c a t i o n a l — w h i c h shows what should be the p o l i t i c a l values of s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y ; r e g u l a t i v e — w h i c h shows how the c i t i z e n s should behave p o l i t i c a l l y ; and d e f e n s i v e — w h i c h i s t o p r o t e c t the p o l i t i c a l values of s o c i a l i s m . ^ And these three func-t i o n s seem t o be the main i n t e r e s t of Sov i e t researchers i n the con-cept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . CHAPTER I I I RUSSIAN AND SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE This chapter examines Russian and S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The aim w i l l be to d e s c r i b e the way p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e c o n t r i b u t e s t o the e x t r a o r d i n a r y s t a b i l i t y of t h i s p o l i t y . The key f a c t o r promoting s t a b i l i t y which t h i s chapter i d e n t i f i e s i s the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y between C z a r i s t Russia and the S o v i e t Union. As w i l l be argued, t h i s c o n t i n u i t y l e g i t i m i z e s the S o v i e t regime and makes the o f f i c i a l p o l i -t i c a l c u l t u r e congruent w i t h t h a t of the v a s t m a j o r i t y of Russians. There are two major p a r t s t o t h i s chapter. The f i r s t p a r t w i l l d e a l w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l v a lues, b e l i e f s , symbols and b e h a v i o r a l patterns of the Russians. The second p a r t describes Soviet p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . This w i l l examine both the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e and the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . As T. H. Rigby has pointed out, one of the most p u z z l i n g f e a -tures of S o v i e t r e a l i t y i s the p e r s i s t e n c e of c o n t i n u i t y w i t h prerevo-l u t i o n a r y p o l i t i c s . ^ This c o n t i n u i t y provides the S o v i e t regime w i t h much of i t s l e g i t i m a c y . Rigby w r i t e s : Force i s an element i n any p o l i t i c a l system and i t s c r u c i a l r o l e both i n e s t a b l i s h i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g the Soviet regime s c a r c e l y needs demonstrating. However, i n most systems the compliance of the p o p u l a t i o n w i t h the demands of t h e i r r u l e r s depends not only on the t h r e a t or a c t u a l i t y of c o e r c i o n but a l s o on a measure, at l e a s t , of b e l i e f i n the 'legitimacy' of such demands, and I would c l a i m t h a t the Soviet Union i s no 3 0 exception t o t h i s . In other words we are d e a l i n g here w i t h a system of a u t h o r i t y , and not j u s t of power. 4^ What Rigby c a l l s " a u t h o r i t y " i s one of the most conspicuous f e a t u r e s of the Sov i e t system, t h a t i s , the l i n k w i t h the p r e r e v o l u t i o n a r y system. While examining the USSR we have t o take i n t o account not only the bare f o r c e t h a t the Sov i e t l e a d e r s h i p has used t o maintain i t s power, but a l s o the a u t h o r i t y upon which t h a t power i s based. Rigby's f i r s t p o i n t about the c o n t i n u i t y between C z a r i s t Russia and Sov i e t Russia i s more con v i n c i n g than h i s second p o i n t about the importance of a u t h o r i t y . I t seems t h a t u n t i l d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n the p r e v a i l i n g model of the Soviet p o l i t i c a l system was based on one premise: t e r r o r , not a u t h o r i t y , as the c e n t r a l method of e x e r c i s i n g power. This i s the main assumption of the t o t a l i t a r i a n model, which analyzed the USSR "as a system of r u l e f o r r e a l i z i n g t o t a l i n t e n t i o n s under modern p o l i t i c a l and t e c h n i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . " 4 4 According t o Arendt, the essence of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s t o t a l t e r r o r . 4 - ' These two d e s c r i p t i o n s of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m are so broad t h a t very o f t e n t h i s term was used, or r a t h e r abused, by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , p o l i t i c i a n s and propagandists. In the Eastern b l o c t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s described as a charac-t e r i s t i c of the bourgeois s t a t e , p a r t i c u l a r l y of the i m p e r i a l i s t stage 4 ft of c a p i t a l i s m . In the West there has been a tendency t o use the term " t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m " to d e s c r i b e the communist c o u n t r i e s per se, without seeing the d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t i n g between them. 4 7 I t i s not my purpose t o analyze the t o t a l i t a r i a n model i n 31 d e t a i l . However, s i n c e t h i s concept has so h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d many students of communism, i t i s worthwhile to p o i n t out the weaknesses and strengths of t h i s model. A l s o , because the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e per-s p e c t i v e d i f f e r s i n many aspects from the t o t a l i t a r i a n p o i n t of view, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o present the main assumptions of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . The weakness of the t o t a l i t a r i a n model i s i t s broad scope which o f t e n erodes i t s s c i e n t i f i c value i n favour of a Cold War connota-4fi t i o n . ° In a d d i t i o n , one can argue t h a t the concept l a c k s dynamism because i t assumes there have been no s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the Sovie t system s i n c e the time of S t a l i n . I t s s t a t i c c h a racter i s pointed out, f o r example, by P e r l m u t t e r who r e j e c t s t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m as a concept which "does not e x p l a i n the dynamics of e i t h e r i t s s t r u c -t u r e s or i t s system." 4 9 T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s simply out of date. Although the concept may have explained the r e a l i t y of the Sovi e t Union under S t a l i n , i t has now l o s t i t s a n a l y t i c a l power because of the many changes i n the nature of the So v i e t s ystem.^ B r z e z i n s k i , one of the c r e a t o r s of the t o t a l i t a r i a n model, accepts t h i s c r i t i c i s m . He says: " I f the word ' t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m ' evokes too much p a s s i o n — i t i s meant to de f i n e a p a r t i c u l a r phase i n the system/society r e l a t i o n -s h i p i n which that s o c i e t y i s i n almost complete sub o r d i n a t i o n t o the s t a t e . In other words, t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s j u s t a model f o r the a n a l y s i s of a p a r t i c u l a r phase i n the Sovi e t Union's h i s t o r y . And when the phase was over, the model can no longer be used s u c c e s s f u l l y . The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the model i s a l s o a problem. According to the d e f i n i t i o n proposed by B r z e z i n s k i and F r i e d r i c h , t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s a system composed of an ideology covering a l l aspects of l i f e t o 32 which each c i t i z e n i s o b l i g e d t o adhere, a s i n g l e mass pa r t y w i t h an almighty leader, mass t e r r o r supporting the pa r t y and i t s leader, a monopoly of the means of communication, a weapons monopoly and a c e n t r a l l y d i r e c t e d economy.^2 A f u l l a n a l y s i s of the many c r i t i q u e s of the B r z e z i n s k i -F r i e d r i c h d e f i n i t i o n would l e a d t o an unproductive d i g r e s s i o n . Yet, c r i t i c s have pointed out t h a t some of the features of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m e x i s t i n democratic c o u n t r i e s (such as a monopoly of weapons). And a l l of these features can be found elsewhere w i t h d i f f e r e n c e s of degree, not of kind. Schapiro proposes, then, a d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . He says t h a t B r z e z i n s k i and F r i e d r i c h confuse the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m and the instruments of r u l e , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s b e t t e r t o d e s c r i b e a t o t a l i t a r i a n system as c h a r a c t e r i z e d by f i v e f e a t u r e s : the leader; the subjugation of the l e g a l order; c o n t r o l over p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y ; continuous m o b i l i z a t i o n ; and l e g i t i m a c y based on mass support. Schapiro suggests three i n s t r u -ments of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m : ideology, party, and s t a t e . ^ Schapiro's p r o p o s i t i o n does not h e a v i l y emphasize the r o l e of the s t a t e and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . In c o n t r a s t , B r z e z i n s k i and F r i e d r i c h enumerate the f u n c t i o n s of the s t a t e performed through i t s monopolies, but say nothing about the problem of the l e g i t i m a c y of t o t a l i t a r i a n a u t h o r i t y . Is the government based only on mass t e r r o r ? Are there any other elements except r e p r e s s i o n i n the r e l a t i o n s between those who govern and those who are governed? We cannot f i n d answers t o these and other questions u s i n g the approach of B r z e z i n s k i and F r i e d r i c h . They r e l y too h e a v i l y on i n s t i t u t i o n s , l o o k i n g a t them as 33 i f they were the only elements of p o l i t i c s . This p o i n t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important f o r the comparative analy-s i s of communist c o u n t r i e s . A strong emphasis on formal i n s t i t u t i o n s makes i m p o s s i b l e any comparisons of these c o u n t r i e s . I n other words, by e x c l u s i v e l y comparing i n s t i t u t i o n s we may mistakenly conclude t h a t a l l communist c o u n t r i e s are the same sin c e t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s are the same or very s i m i l a r . However, d e s p i t e great s i m i l a r i t i e s among, say, communist p a r l i a m e n t s , there are a l s o great d i f f e r e n c e s between these c o u n t r i e s . By no means can we say t h a t , f o r example, Hungary and B u l g a r i a are the same or t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s between them are of no importance. And f i n a l l y , there i s one more problem. The t o t a l i t a r i a n model overestimates the e f f i c i e n c y of t o t a l i t a r i a n regimes. Aron, f o r exam-p l e , enumerates f i v e f e a t u r e s of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m : a one-party system; an ever present ideology; the state's monopoly on the means of coer-c i o n and persuasion; subjugation of economic and p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i -t i e s t o the s t a t e ; and p o l i c e and i d e o l o g i c a l t e r r o r i s m . He says t h a t "the phenomenon [ t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m ] i s complete when a l l these elements are f u l l y achieved."-^ In h i s o p i n i o n , t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i n the USSR was achieved i n the t h i r t i e s and l a t e f o r t i e s . I f t h i s i s t r u e , we have t o assume that S t a l i n ' s d i c t a t o r s h i p , based e x c l u s i v e l y on coer-c i o n and ideology, was a b s o l u t e l y p e r f e c t - - w i t h o u t any, even the s l i g h t e s t , element of chaos. But the evidence we have today shows something d i f f e r e n t . Even Fainsod, who seems to accept the t o t a l i t a r -i a n model, c a l l s the S o v i e t system, a f t e r d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the Smolensk A r c h i v e , " i n e f f i c i e n t t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . " " ^ 34 Schapiro very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out t h a t "the myth of e f f i c i e n c y " of H i t l e r ' s and S t a l i n ' s regimes i s "one of the hardest t o k i l l . " ^ 7 And i t seems t h a t t h i s myth i s sustained by the t o t a l i t a r i a n concept because i t r e l i e s so h e a v i l y on formal i n s t i t u t i o n s . My c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t the t o t a l i t a r i a n model places too much s t r e s s on i n s t i t u t i o n s , w i t h a tendency t o t r e a t a l l communist c o u n t r i e s i d e n t i c a l l y . In f a c t , i t s powerful i n s i g h t s can be s u c c e s s f u l l y a p p l i e d only to the past h i s t o r y of the USSR. In chapter two I proposed a method of o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Therefore, the p a r t of t h i s chapter dedicated e x c l u s i v e l y t o Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y t i c c a t e g o r i e s : p o l t i t i c a l experience i n h e r -i t e d from the past, the main p o l i t i c a l values, b e l i e f s and symbols, p o l i t i c a l knowledge, expectations and b e h a v i o r a l patterns. I w i l l a l s o use two a d d i t i o n a l a n a l y t i c c a t e g o r i e s : the t r a d i t i o n a l or dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . These two c a t e g o r i e s , as was argued i n chapter two and w i l l be f u r t h e r developed i n chapter four, seem t o be very u s e f u l i n the case of communist c o u n t r i e s . I must p o i n t out t h a t I w i l l d e a l only w i t h the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Russians. This i s so f o r a t l e a s t two reasons. F i r s t , the Russians are the dominant n a t i o n w i t h i n the USSR and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e plays a more important r o l e than t h a t of, say, the Kazakhs. Furthermore, Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s b e t t e r des-c r i b e d and analyzed by Western s c h o l a r s s i n c e s o c i o l o g i c a l surveys of other nations of the USSR are l a r g e l y u n a v a i l a b l e , and I would be 35 f o r c e d t o be completely s p e c u l a t i v e . Thus the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e would l o s e i t s a n a l y t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c character. 1. RUSSIAN POLITICAL TRADITION "Soviet p o l i t i c s cannot be separated from Russian h i s t o r y , " w r i t e s B r z e z i n s k i , and many agree w i t h h i m . 5 8 One can say t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s o b s e r v a t i o n i s t r u e of any nati o n . But i n the case of Russia t h i s statement i s e s p e c i a l l y v a l i d s i n c e t h a t country has been l a r g e l y i s o l a t e d from f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e f o r many c e n t u r i e s w i t h only short and i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l breaks. The s t a t e of i s o l a t i o n causes xenophobia and i t helps t o create a p e c u l i a r concept of the p o l i t i c a l when the f e a r of f o r e i g n i n v a s i o n and the n o t i o n of an enemy w a i t i n g f o r any opportunity t o a t t a c k are c e n t r a l t o the perception of p o l i t i c s . This perception of p o l i t i c s has a tremendous impact upon the concept of the s t a t e and no t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power i n Soviet domestic r e l a t i o n s . Fear of the enemy becomes a very important element of l i f e . Since only a strong center of power can s u c c e s s f u l l y defend the n a t i o n against i t s enemies, ev e r y t h i n g and everybody must be subjected t o the center. Vernadsky very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out t h a t i n the Czardom of Moscow " A l l c l a s s e s of the n a t i o n from top t o bottom, except f o r the s l a v e s , were bound to the s e r v i c e of the s t a t e . " 5 9 A h i s t o r i c a l event t h a t plays a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the h i s t o r y of Russia and dominates i t s course i s the Mongol i n v a s i o n i n the t h i r t e e n t h century. Szamuely, the Hungarian-born E n g l i s h h i s t o r i a n , says t h a t "The Mongol concept of s o c i e t y was based on the u n q u a l i f i e d 36 submission of a l l t o the absolute, u n l i m i t e d power of the Khan."60 And Vernadsky adds "This p r i n c i p l e [of submission] was i n the course of time impressed thoroughly upon the Russian p e o p l e / 1 ^ The Mongol i n v a s i o n was a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n Russian h i s t o r y . Along w i t h the coming of the Mongols, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of popular r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c a l l e d Veche g r a d u a l l y disappeared from the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of Russia. Although i n the s i x t e e n t h and seventeenth c e n t u r i e s there was the Zemskii Sobor, an i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t resembled a parli a m e n t a r y body t o some degree, i t never played an important r o l e s i n c e i t was "an expedient necessary f o r the s t a t e u n t i l such time as i t could a f f o r d an adequate b u r e a u c r a t i c apparatus."^ 3 Szamuely adds th a t the Zemskii Sobor never became anything more than a t o o l i n the hands of government."^ 4 U n t i l the beginning of the t w e n t i e t h century Russia was a l t o -gether devoid of any r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s . The f i r s t attempt t o c r e ate a parliamentary body was during the 1905-06 r e v o l u t i o n , when the Duma was organized. Formally i t was a powerful body t h a t had the r i g h t t o enact and amend l e g i s l a t i o n , d i s m i s s m i n i s t e r s , consider the budget of the s t a t e , and so on. In f a c t , however, the Duma was very l i m i t e d i n i t s a c t i v i t y . L e v i n i n a very d e t a i l e d study on the Dumas notes that the government d i d i t s best t o l i m i t the powers of the Duma by, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e s t r i c t i n g the r e p o r t i n g of Duma meetings or l i m -i t i n g the number of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The Czar remained the centerpiece of the system. He could, f o r example, d i s s o l v e the Duma or r e j e c t any b i l l prepared by t h a t body. Russia remained a country r u l e d by a s i n g l e person whose power was 37 p r a c t i c a l l y u n l i m i t e d . The power of the Czars was strengthened not only by the l a c k of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s , but a l s o by the a t t i t u d e s of the subjects toward the Czars. This popular a t t i t u d e i s r e f l e c t e d i n Russian proverbs, such as "We have one God i n the sky and one Czar on earth." Or "God was, God i s and God w i l l be; Czar was, Czar i s and Czar w i l l b e . " 6 6 As we see, the Czar was not only a r u l e r , he was something more. He was God on earth. That pe r c e p t i o n of the Czar i m p l i e s a very personal a t t i t u d e towards him (he was not j u s t an i n s t i t u t i o n a l element of the state) and a h i g h l y emotional involvement (God's and the Czar's nature cannot be explained w i t h r a t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s ) . The d i v i n e nature of the Czar was fused w i t h the s t a t e i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the subjects (not c i t i z e n s ) . According to the authors of The Cambridge Economic H i s t o r y of Europe, a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n the h i s t o r y of Russia was the adaption of the f i r s t Russian Code of Laws (Ulozhenie) i n 1649. The authors w r i t e t h a t "From t h a t day begins the p e r i o d of the P o l i z e i s t a a t [ P o l i c e 6 7 State] i n Russia." T e c h n i c a l l y t h i s i s c o r r e c t , but i t was not new. The Ulozhenie adopted s h o r t l y a f t e r the Times of Troubles was j u s t a l o g i c a l consequence of a h i g h l y personal and emotional p e r c e p t i o n of the C z a r . 6 8 The essence of the Ulozhenie was the p r i n c i p l e t h a t every i n d i v i d u a l belonged f i r s t of a l l t o the s t a t e . v And s i n c e the Czar--an e a r t h l y God—stood above the s t a t e then every i n d i v i d u a l belonged t o the Czar. I have already mentioned the impact of the Mongol i n v a s i o n on 38 Russia. A s l a v i s t , Nicholas Trubetskoy, says t h a t "The Russians i n h e r i t e d t h e i r empire from Chingis-Khan." 7^ And Seton-Watson adds th a t " I f there i s one s i n g l e f a c t o r which dominates the course of Russian h i s t o r y , a t any r a t e s i n c e the Tatar [Mongol] conquest, i t i s the p r i n c i p l e of autocracy." 7 1 That i s why we should r a t h e r say t h a t the Ulozhenie was a l e g a l c o n f i r m a t i o n of the already deeply rooted i n the O r i e n t a l a t t i t u d e towards the monarchy and the s t a t e . The d e i f i c c haracter of the Czar had t o be r a t i o n a l i z e d and through t h i s a d d i t i o n a l l y strengthened. Therefore the Church played an e s p e c i a l l y important r o l e i n Russia. The church, l i k e a l l other i n s t i t u t i o n s , was denied any autonomous r o l e and was f u l l y subjected to the Czar. But among the instruments of the Czar, i t became one of the most important i n s t i t u t i o n s . The church, which had everyday contact w i t h the s u b j e c t s , had to show t h a t the concept of a r u l e r works and t h a t i t was the only p o s s i b l e and o p t i m a l model f o r Russia. The i m p e r i a l a s p i r a t i o n s of Moscow were strengthened by the Russian church. In 1510 the monk P h i l o t e u s wrote: Know then, 0 pious Tsar, t h a t a l l the orthodox realms have converged i n thy s i n g l e empire. Thou a r t the only Tsar of the C h r i s t i a n s i n a l l the u n i v e r s e . . . . Observe and harken, 0 pious Tsar. A l l the C h r i s t i a n empires have converged i n thy s i n g l e one, that two Romes have f a l l e n , but the t h i r d stands, and no f o u r t h can ever be. Thy C h r i s t i a n empire s h a l l f a l l t o no one. In other words, P h i l o t e u s says that the Czar i s the guarantor of Russia's power. The r o l e of the Czar determines the scope of h i s government. I have already mentioned the r o l e of the church. The church r e c e i v e d money from the s t a t e and was supervised by the Holy Synod, whose membership was decided by the Czar. The r o l e of a l l other o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n Russian s o c i e t y was very s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the church. For instance, u n t i l the 1905-06 revo-l u t i o n , a l l trade unions were forbidden by law. A f t e r t h a t r e v o l u t i o n trade unions were l e g a l i z e d , but remained under the s c r u t i n y of the Czar and h i s o f f i c i a l s . No o r g a n i z a t i o n could be formed without the consent of the M i n i s t e r of I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s . The censorship system covered v i r t u a l l y a l l aspects of i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e . The "preventive" type of censorship l i m i t e d what was w r i t t e n . According t o the 1882 Censorship Act, any newspaper which published something t h a t was considered subversive had to submit each i s s u e t o the censor before i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . A s p e c i a l s t a t e body composed of the m i n i s t e r s of education, j u s t i c e and i n t e r i o r could d i s s o l v e any newspaper under the charge of treason. A very s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t i s the t i m i n g of censorship l e g i s l a -t i o n . I t was introduced a t the time when l i b e r a l i s m , w i t h i t s main p o s t u l a t e s of the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s and a very l i m i t e d r o l e of the s t a t e , was the dominant p o l i t i c a l philosophy i n Europe. In Russia, however, l i b e r a l i s m had almost no impact on the r o l e of the st a t e . Quite the contrary, the Czar s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased h i s powers and the s t a t e became even more powerful than ever before. In the second p a r t of the nineteenth century, the Russian gov-ernment introduced many new i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t gave i t a t i g h t e r con-t r o l over the population. For example i n 1860 the s t a t e bank was founded. The bank was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r f i n a n c i n g a l l kinds of e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a c t i v i t y . However, the main c r i t e r i o n a p p l i e d by the bank was of a p o l i t i c a l nature. I t was im p o s s i b l e t o get a loan from 40 the bank, even f o r the most economically e f f e c t i v e investment, without the p o l i t i c a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the borrower. The government c o n t r o l l e d almost a l l aspects of economic a c t i v -i t y . I t granted l u c r a t i v e c o n t r a c t s and imposed t a r i f f s and was i t s e l f a considerable entrepreneur. The government owned many mines, o i l f i e l d s and almost the e n t i r e r a i l w a y system. I t was a l s o a l a n d -l o r d w i t h a s p e c i a l category of workers c a l l e d " s t a t e peasants." 7 4 Margaret M i l l e r observes: "The predominant a c t i v i t y of the s t a t e i n every sphere of economic l i f e , not only as an a d m i n i s t r a t o r but as an a c t u a l undertaker of the v a r i o u s processes i n v o l v e d was a c e n t r a l f a c t of Russian economic l i f e . ' 3 The great scope of governmental c o n t r o l over the economy reduced the i n c e n t i v e of i n d i v i d u a l entrepreneurs. Therefore the view of Richard Pipes, f o l l o w i n g Max Weber, seems t o be j u s t i f i e d when he suggests t h a t weak c a p i t a l i s m i n Russia was an element strengthening Russian autocracy. 7^ 2. RUSSIAN POLITICAL VALUES, BELIEFS AND SYMBOLS A study of Russian p o l i t i c a l v a l ues, b e l i e f s and symbols i s d i f -f i c u l t because there i s not a great d e a l of good i n f o r m a t i o n on which to base an a n a l y s i s . The Soviet government does not a l l o w the p u b l i c a -t i o n of many works on Russian s o c i e t y . Studies which are a v a i l a b l e today are o f t e n not completely r e l i a b l e . Often those published abroad are s u b j e c t i v e . However, there are a few books w r i t t e n by f o r e i g n e r s who v i s i t e d Russia. One good example i s The Journals of the Marquis 77 de Custine. However, none of these books are of the s t a t u r e and s i g n i f i c a n c e of a study l i k e Tocqueville's Democracy i n America. 7^ 41 Despite a l l these problems, there i s a great d e a l of agreement among s p e c i a l i s t s on Russian values and b e l i e f s . Many of them con-clude t h e i r observations w i t h a statement t h a t the Russians are unable to conceive of democracy as i t i s d e s c r i b e d by Western p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r s . This seems to be accurate, as w i l l be shown. F i r s t , we should b r i e f l y examine p o l i t i c a l movements i n Russia. Doing so we can d i s c o v e r the scope and nature of Russian p o l i t i c a l thought. The p o l i t i c a l programs of those movements were anchored i n the t r a d i t i o n a l values of the s o c i e t y , t h e r e f o r e t h e i r a n a l y s i s can t e l l us a great d e a l about the Russian p o l i t i c a l m e n t a l i t y . The r e v o l t of the Decembrists i s u s u a l l y t r e a t e d as the begin-ning of modern p o l i t i c a l movements i n Russia. The Decembrists wanted to overthrow the Czar and introduce a r e p u b l i c . However, only a m i n o r i t y of them wanted a l i m i t e d government, an e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t u r e and c i v i l r i g h t s . The m a j o r i t y wanted a strong, h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d government, s i n c e they thought only strong power could guarantee s o c i a l j u s t i c e . As two American h i s t o r i a n s say, many of those who shouted " c o n s t i t u t i o n " d u r i n g the r e v o l t d i d so because they thought t h a t " c o n s t i t u t i o n " was P r i n c e Constantine's w i f e and the l a t t e r was 7 Q seen by them as the best successor to Czar Alexander. Schapiro says that the ideas of the Decembrists "foreshadowed the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s of the views of t h e i r successors." 8^ I cannot f u l l y agree w i t h Schapiro. I t seems t h a t the Decembrists were r a t h e r t y p i c a l l y Russian i n t h e i r concept of a strong s t a t e . There-f o r e , the Decembrists were an example of c o n t i n u i t y i n the Russian t r a d i t i o n . However, on the other hand, i t was the f i r s t movement 42 which broke from the t r a d i t i o n of obedience t o a u t h o r i t y by wanting t o overthrow the Czar. And i n t h i s sense Schapiro i s r i g h t . The p o l i t i c a l movements which f o l l o w e d the Decembrists empha-s i z e d s o c i a l j u s t i c e as t h e i r primary g o a l , e s p e c i a l l y the p o p u l i s t movement Narodnichestvo. One of the f a t h e r s of t h a t movement, N. G. Chernyshevsky, b e l i e v e d that p o l i t i c a l freedom can never be imple-mented without economic e q u a l i t y . ^ A l s o the Land and L i b e r t y move-ment (Zemlia i . V o l i a ) c a l l e d f o r s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n , e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of land, s i g n i f i c a n t l y without saying anything about c i v i l r i g h t s and p o l i t i c a l freedoms. The members of these movements d i d not pay a t t e n t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , l i m i t a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power, e l e c t i o n s and the r o l e of i n d i v i d u a l s . Always a group, a community (obschina) was the focus of Russian p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c -t u a l a c t i v i s t s . The most important s o c i a l group was the peasants. For example, P. L. Lavrov, a proponent of Russian populism, b e l i e v e d t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n would come from the v i l l a g e . ^ 2 The importance of the peasants was a l o g i c a l consequence of Russian economic development. In a country w i t h very weak c a p i t a l i s m , peasants were the dominant s o c i a l group. The program of Russian p o l i t i c a l movements r e f l e c t e d the p o s i t i o n of the peasants. Assuming t h a t the leaders of these movements wanted t o gain p o l i t i c a l support among the Russians, they had t o i n c l u d e i n t h e i r programs those values which were w i d e l y ac-cepted by the Russian peasants. The main fea t u r e of Russian r e a l i t y c r i t i c i z e d by the nineteenth century movements i n Russia was the s o c i a l and economic misery of the peasants. According t o the programs 43 of these movements, a new p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y Russia was t o ensure the w e l f a r e of the people ( i . e , the peasants). T h e i r w e l f a r e was u s u a l l y d e s c r i b e d w i t h e g a l i t a r i a n and c o l l e c t i v i s t categories. 8"^ Such a v i s i o n was again a l o g i c a l consequence of the s o c i a l development of the Russian v i l l a g e . The Russian peasant l i v e d i n the commune (mir), where he shared the a g r i c u l t u r a l land w i t h other mem-bers of the mir. The mir performed many f u n c t i o n s such as the c o l l e c -t i o n of taxes or the d i s p a t c h of r e c r u i t s f o r the army. The word mir means i n Russian "world." And i t was e x a c t l y the world f o r Russian peasants. The v i l l a g e community, as T. Szamuely suggests r e f e r r i n g t o Ch i c h e r i n , the Russian h i s t o r i a n , was "Created, i f not on the d i r e c t i n i t i a t i v e of the s t a t e , then a t l e a s t w i t h i t s encouragement, to ensure the o r d e r l y payment of t y a g l o ( t a x e s ) . " 8 4 But i n a d d i t i o n t o i t s economic s i g n i f i c a n c e , the mir s t r e n g t h -ened Russian c o l l e c t i v i s m , which was t r e a t e d as the only v a l u a b l e model of s o c i a l l i f e . The b e l i e f i n the i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y of c o l l e c -t i v e e f f o r t was conferred by everyday l i f e i n the commune. L i v i n g i n the m ir gave the Russian peasant-serf a f e e l i n g of s e c u r i t y . Of course, being a member of the commune, the peasant sublimated h i s own i n d i v i d u a l i t y . He had to mingle w i t h the others i f he wanted t o share the common f a t e . That i s why the movements of the nineteenth century d i d not r e j e c t c o l l e c t i v i s m and e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . The appeal of these two elements was too strong f o r the Russians t o be r u l e d out. And i f the movements were t o gain any s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l support, they had t o inco r p o r a t e these elements i n t o t h e i r programs. 44 The most r e v o l u t i o n a r y element i n the programs of Russian populism was the overthrow of the Czar. In the Russian context t h a t demand was too r e v o l u t i o n a r y , and t h i s i s a reason why populism was supported mainly among Russian i n t e l l e c t u a l s , not the peasants. For the Russian peasant disobedience t o the Czar was inconceivable. Why? F i r s t of a l l , f o r the Russian peasants the Czar (Bat'ushka) was not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r misery. The Gospodiny (lords) were respon-s i b l e . For instance the main t a r g e t of Razin's r e b e l s (the s o - c a l l e d peasant war of 1667-1671) were the Boyars who were accused of being t r a i t o r s t o the Czar because they d i d not want to improve the l i v e s of the people. F i e l d very r i g h t l y observes t h a t " i n i t s s i m p l e s t and most common expression, popular monarchism took the form of the adage 'the T s a r wants i t , but the Boyars r e s i s t . ' ' I t ' , o f c o u r s e , was j u s t i c e , or tax r e l i e f or a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of land — w h a t e v e r the Narod [the people] most wanted."*^ The myth of "good a u t h o r i t y " and a " j u s t Czar" has been noted a l s o by A v r i c h , Cherniavsky and White.^^ I t seems t h a t the j u s t Czar myth has not l o s t i t s v a l i d i t y and, as w i l l be f u r t h e r developed, i s s t i l l an important element of Russian (and Soviet) p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The j u s t Bat'ushka i s simply a r e f l e c t i o n of the Russian d i s p o s i t i o n t o perceive p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i n p e r s o n a l i z e d and i d e a l i z e d terms. Any Czar i s not only supposed t o be a j u s t and wise r u l e r , but must t r u l y be j u s t and wise. This i s so by d e f i n i t i o n because he i s a Czar. The Czar i s the f a t h e r of h i s people, and a f a t h e r cannot be v i c i o u s and st u p i d . This i s an axiom which need not be proven f o r the Russians. Many Russian f o l k t a l e s show f a t h e r s as the i d e a l t o f o l l o w . 45 In other words, the b e l i e f i n the p e r f e c t i o n of a u t h o r i t y seems to be a f i r m l y rooted element of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . That i s why I do not agree w i t h Mary McAuley who suggests, a f t e r F i e l d , t h a t the j u s t Czar myth was used as a r a t i o n a l e by the peasants f o r t h e i r r a d i c a l demands. And i t was used "to appeal f o r l e n i e n c y on the grounds of having honestly b e l i e v e d t h a t they were a c t i n g as the Tsar had wished." 0' The l o n g e v i t y of t h i s myth and i t s presence i n the p o l i t i -c a l c u l t u r e of the Soviet Union, as I w i l l argue, shows t h a t the myth i s a c u l t u r a l element r a t h e r than a t o o l of p o l i t i c a l expediency. In sum, the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s and values of the Russians can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as f o l l o w s : 1) a very strong b e l i e f i n p o w e r — o n l y a strong government using f o r c e can r u l e e f f e c t i v e l y and j u s t l y ; 2) a high degree of p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y — t h e j u s t Czar myth, the c o n v i c t i o n that the Czar (or a u t h o r i t y ) i s p e r f e c t and wise and t h e r e f o r e i s always r i g h t ; 3) a strong b e l i e f i n the e f f e c t i v e n e s s myth, the c o n v i c t i o n that the Czar (or a u t h o r i t y ) i s p e r f e c t and wise and t h e r e f o r e i s always r i g h t ; 4) a strong b e l i e f i n the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t s — c o l l e c t i v i s m i s a value which has t o be pro-t e c t e d and maintained i f l i f e i s to be safe; 5) a b e l i e f i n the i n f e r i o r i t y and unimportance of the i n d i v i d u a l as such. These t r a d i t i o n a l values and b e l i e f s i n f l u e n c e the p o l i t i c a l behavior and expectations of the Russian people. 3 . RUSSIAN POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, EXPECTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR I have already presented a b r i e f h i s t o r y of Russia's p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The general c o n c l u s i o n was that the Russian experience 46 w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy was very l i m i t e d . That s i t u a t i o n was he l d t o create a p a r t i c u l a r type of p o l i t i c a l behaviour. The main f e a t u r e of th a t behaviour was p o l i t i c a l p a s s i v i t y . The 1905 Revolu-t i o n can i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p a s s i v i t y . With the exception of the new i n d u s t r i a l c e n t e r s , such as Petersburg, Moscow, Don and Odessa, the r e s t of the country was p r a c t i c a l l y peaceful. Another example i s the October Manifesto of 1905. In t h i s Manifesto the Emperor granted fundamental p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s such as freedom of speech. The n a t i o n d i d not c e l e b r a t e t h a t event. A l s o the people d i d not p r o t e s t when the f i r s t Duma was d i s s o l v e d . And although the members of the f i r s t Duma d i d appeal t o the n a t i o n t o r e s i s t i t s d i s s o l u t i o n , there was v i r t u a l l y no r e s i s t e n c e among the p e o p l e . T h e Russians d i d not care about the f a t e of t h e i r f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experiment. L e v i n says t h a t e l e c t o r s t o the t h i r d Duma t h r u s t l e t t e r s , passports, insurance p o l i c i e s and many other t h i n g s i n t o the b a l l o t boxes, but not the on v o t i n g s l i p s . During the r e v o l u t i o n a Russian s o l d i e r t o l d the B r i t i s h Ambassador t h a t Russia must be a r e p u b l i c but w i t h a good Czar as i t s head.^ These f a c t s show us the p o l i t i c a l i n d i f f e r e n c e of the Russians. For i n s t a n c e , Gogol i n h i s Revizor v i v i d l y portrayed the t y p i c a l Russian peasants as conserv a t i v e , s u p e r s t i t i o u s , obsequious and b u l -l i e d i n d i v i d u a l s who were i n t e r e s t e d only i n g a i n i n g food. Food and other " m a t e r i a l " needs were the only aims i n which the peasants were i n t e r e s t e d . Their r e v o l t s i n the seventeenth century and the p o l i t i -c a l unrest i n the Russian v i l l a g e s of the nineteenth century were c a r r i e d out under the banner of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . The d e s i r e t o l i v e i n 47 a s t a t e of s o c i a l e q u a l i t y and j u s t i c e was of utmost p r i o r i t y f o r the R u s s i a n peasants. That a t t i t u d e was coherent w i t h t h e i r p a t e r n a l i s t i c image of s t a t e . The j u s t Bat'ushka had t o guarantee w e l f a r e f o r h i s c h i l d r e n . Let us repeat, p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s were not important. The most import-ant task f o r the a u t h o r i t y was t o guarantee the w e l f a r e of the people. That i s what the Czar and s t a t e were f o r . Not freedom of speech (since the a u t h o r i t y i s always r i g h t ) nor f r e e e l e c t i o n s , but a surety of a f u l l stomach was the main p o l i t i c a l goal of the Russian peasant. While a n a l y z i n g the programs of the Russian p o l i t i c a l move-ments, I s a i d t h a t these programs d i d not r a i s e the question of p o l i -t i c a l freedoms. A l s o due t o the passiveness of the Russians, the authors of those programs d i d not take i n t o account the p o s s i b i l i t y of making any r e v o l u t i o n "from below." Szamuely observes "the d o c t r i n e of a . . . r e v o l u t i o n from below was a s t a r t l i n g i n n o v a t i o n i n Russian p o l i t i c a l thought. I t had been h e l d by n e i t h e r the Decembrists nor Herzen. . . . The f i r s t great Russian r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e a l i s t [Chernyshevsky], had no i l l u s i o n s about the a b i l i t y of the downtrod-den, i l l i t e r a t e , s u p e r s t i t i o u s , peasant mass t o e f f e c t a genuine t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic scene." And Szamuely quotes Chernyshevsky who wrote "the mass of po p u l a t i o n knows nothing and cares about nothing except i t s m a t e r i a l advantages." 9 1 Chernyshevsky, who i s o f t e n seen as a forerunner of Lenin, was not the only one who described the Russians i n t h i s manner. For ins t a n c e , another great Russian, Dostoievsky, complained about the Russian a t t i t u d e towards the r u l e r : "We Russians possess two d r e a d f u l 48 powers . . . the u n i t y , the s p i r i t u a l i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of the m i l l i o n s of our people, and t h e i r c l o s e s t communion w i t h the monarch."^ 2 That communion was among the reasons why Chernyshevsky described the Russians so p e s s i m i s t i c a l l y . Ulam says: I t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r the modern reader t o understand why mutiny was not a frequent occurrence i n the Russian army of the p e r i o d [the nineteenth century]. The s o l d i e r was c o n s c r i p t e d f o r t w e n t y - f i v e years; the s l i g h t e s t i n f r a c t i o n of d i s c i p l i n e , f a u l t i n deportment, or a misstep d u r i n g the endless parades and d r i l l s could l e a d t o h i s being whipped. I t was a common p r a c t i c e f o r o f f i c e r s t o supplement t h e i r meager s a l a r i e s by d i v e r t i n g i n t o t h e i r pockets some of the money a l l o t e d f o r t h e i r s o l d i e r ' s subsistence. S t i l l , i n the vast m a j o r i t y of cases, the Russian s o l d i e r endured the or d e a l and i n d i g n i t i e s of h i s everyday e x i s t e n c e w i t h the r e s i g n a t i o n and submissiveness i n h e r i t e d from generations of h i s peasant ancestors. Ulam observes another important f e a t u r e of Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , namely, r e s i g n a t i o n . Even i f the peasants were aware of the f a c t t h a t t h e i r everyday l i f e might have been b e t t e r and happier, they u s u a l l y accepted t h e i r f a t e . A c o n v i c t i o n about the u n a v o i d a b i l i t y of d e s t i n y determined the behaviour of the Russians. This f e e l i n g was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c not only of the peasants but of the gentry as w e l l . A t y p i c a l c h a racter which f r e q u e n t l y occurred i n the nineteenth century Russian l i t e r a t u r e i s described, a f t e r Goncharov as the "superfluous man." This man i s incapable of engaging i n e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n . The reason f o r such an a t t i t u d e i s the b e l i e f t h a t nothing can be changed. A t y p i c a l example of the superfluous man was the t i t u l a r hero of Ivan Goncharov's Oblomov publ i s h e d i n 1859. Oblomov was a man who spent h i s day l y i n g i n bed and t h i n k i n g about what he would do i f he were to get up. E r l i c h says that the superfluous man may be t r e a t e d as a 49 n a t i o n a l archetype, and he quotes Dobrolyubov, the Russian c r i t i c , who analyzed the superfluous man as an a f f l i c t i o n p e c u l i a r t o Russia and the by-product of serfdom. 9 4 Another example of very strong d e t e r -minism i s the philosophy of Tolstoy, as argued by B e r l i n i n h i s beau-t i f u l essay dedicated t o t h a t great R u s s i a n . 9 5 Summa summarum, the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of Russia was composed of a very strong personal attachment to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , a p a t e r n a l i s t i c concept of the s t a t e , a powerful d e s i r e t o l i v e i n an a l l encompassing w e l f a r e s t a t e , a very strong element of determinism, p o l i t i c a l i n d i f f e r e n c e , no emphasis on p o l i t i c a l democracy, and p o l i t i -c a l obsequiousness. The above c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s r e j e c t e d by McAuley, who sees a whole array of other behaviour, opinions and b e l i e f s . There was peasant i n d i v i d u a l i s m as w e l l as c o l l e c t i v i s m , strong anar-c h i s t notions a g a i n s t any 'state 1, repeated demands f o r and attempts t o introduce r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s , c r i t i c i s m of censorship, r e l i g i o u s s e c t s p r a c t i s i n g autonomy,.generals com-p l a i n i n g b i t t e r l y of the l a c k of n a t i o n a l i s t and r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g s among the troops . . .. [and what was i n h e r i t e d by the B o l s h e v i k s ] was a most e x t r a o r d i n a r y , r i c h , jumbled and c o n t r a -d i c t o r y set of p o l i t i c a l p e r c e p t i o n s . 9 6 McAuley's c r i t i c i s m i s c o r r e c t i n that there was d i v e r s i t y i n Russian p o l i t i c a l l i f e . But she seems t o erroneously assume t h a t t h i s d i v e r -s i t y means t h a t we cannot g e n e r a l i z e about what was the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Much of what McAuley describes as a whole a r r a y of other behavior, opinions and b e l i e f s was on the periphery of Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . In a d d i t i o n , as I argued i n the case of Russian populism, t h a t periphery was h e a v i l y "contaminated" by the dominant peasant b e l i e f s and values. 50 Another frequent mistake i s the assumption t h a t the Bolshevik R e v o l u t i o n introduced a completely new era i n the h i s t o r y of Russia, a n d — i n terms of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e — b e g a n a new c u l t u r a l type. This i s an e r r o r . As we w i l l show l a t e r , t h i s mistake i s caused by an understanding of r e v o l u t i o n as i f i t were a one-dimensional event. However, r e v o l u t i o n i s m u l t i f a c e t e d . As Neumann says, r e v o l u t i o n i s a "fundamental change i n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , eco-nomic property c o n t r o l and the predominant myth of a s o c i a l order thus i n d i c a t i n g a major break i n the c o n t i n u i t y of development. 9^ In other words, r e v o l u t i o n i s a major break on four l e v e l s : p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , economic and c u l t u r a l . I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s study t o exa-mine the Russian Revolution on a l l these l e v e l s . However, the c u l -t u r a l l e v e l i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important because t h i s study i s concerned w i t h the development of Russian/Soviet p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . R e v o l u t i o n on the c u l t u r a l l e v e l i n Russia can be d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e stages. The f i r s t stage began i n 1905 and l a s t e d u n t i l 1917. B r z e z i n s k i says t h a t "the l a t e Romanov pe r i o d was a pe r i o d of decay, of gradual weakening of the ho l d of the s t a t e over s o c i e t y . " 9 8 I t was a p e r i o d of many changes i n the s t a t e and i n s o c i e t y , i n c l u d i n g a decay of the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e when t r a d i t i o n a l values and symbols were eroded. We may say that t h i s was a p e r i o d of c u l t u r a l f l u x . I t included the i n t r o d u c t i o n of parliamentarism w i t h i n the o l d p o l i t i c a l framework. This occurred w i t h the consent of the Czar. I t i s important t o note t h a t t h i s took place much l a t e r i n Russia than i n other Western c o u n t r i e s , as Table I shows. The second stage (roughly 1917 - 1921) encompasses the October 51 R e v o l u t i o n and War Communism. During t h i s stage there was a r e t r e a t from p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m towards a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d government. In terms of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i t was a time when many main features of the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e were again promoted ( f o r example, a very strong n o t i o n of c o l l e c t i v i s m ) . The t h i r d stage (1922-1927) was t h a t of the NEP program and TABLE I PARLIAMENTARISM IN EIGHT COUNTRIES F i r s t F i r s t F i r s t Country C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Suffrage Parliamentary Regime Regime Poland 1505 1573 1493 Great B r i t a i n 1 689 1 789 1 741 France 1787 1789 1789 Netherlands 1 796 1 796 1848 Sweden 1809 1809 1866 Spain 1812 1820 1863 Germany 1848 1824 1918 Russia 1 905 1905 1917 Source: Compiled by the author and based upon: A. Romberg (ed.) L e g i s l a t u r e s i n Comparative P e r s p e c t i v e (N.Y.: McKay Com., 1973), pp. 102 & 106; Stephen White, "Soviet P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e Reassessed" i n Ar c h i e Brown, ed., P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Communist Studies (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 69 & 70; Wladyslaw Kurkiewicz et a l . , Tysiac  l a t dziejow P o l s k i . [A Thousand Years of P o l i s h H i s t o r y ] (Warsaw: Ludowa S p o l d z i e l n i a Wydawnicza, 1974), p. 60 - 61 , 73. i t s gradual withdrawal. During t h i s stage the Kremlin r e l a x e d the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of i t s power and a l e s s a u t o c r a t i c p a t t e r n was pro-moted . During the f o u r t h stage (1928-1931) there were again very strong trends toward c e n t r a l i s m . At t h i s stage, though, i n comparison to the second stage, there was s i g n i f i c a n t pressure t o continue the 52 communist r e v o l u t i o n from below, as F i t z p a t r i c k c o n v i n c i n g l y argues i n her noteworthy treatment of t h i s p e r i o d of Russian h i s t o r y . " At t h i s time a new phenomenon appeared on the Russian p o l i t i c a l stage, namely " r e v o l u t i o n from below." This was a symptom of fundamental changes i n Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e which might have challenged the s t a t u s q u o . 1 (^ In the context of p o l i t i c a l p a s s i v i t y which c h a r a c t e r i z e d the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , t h i s was extremely s i g n i f i c a n t . As F i t z p a t r i c k very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out, the a n t i - b u r e a u c r a t i c d r i v e of the d i s s a t i s f i e d people o f t e n verged on an a t t a c k on e s t a b l i s h e d a u t h o r i t y per s e J ^ In other words, the trends from below might have meant t h a t a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n on the p o l i t i c a l and economic l e v e l s , the r e v o l u -t i o n on the c u l t u r a l l e v e l was about t o occur w i t h i t s hard t o p r e d i c t consequences. We have to keep i n mind that the new Soviet regime was not widely accepted by the po p u l a t i o n and lacked the mark of s a n c t i f i -c a t i o n which so tremendously strengthened the power of the Czars. Red Russia went through many dangerous s i t u a t i o n s such as the i n t e r v e n -t i o n s . However, i t seems t h a t we can say t h a t the s i t u a t i o n of the f o u r t h stage was one of the most dangerous i n terms of s t a b i l i t y , and i f i t progressed i t might have brought r e s u l t s of c r u c i a l importance f o r the f u t u r e of Russia and the Bolsheviks. I t may have been a reason why S t a l i n decided to begin the f i f t h stage (1931-1938), which i n c l u d e s the Great Purges. In terms of the r e v o l u t i o n on the c u l t u r a l l e v e l , the f i f t h stage may be viewed as a c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n . During t h i s p e r i o d S t a l i n r e i n t r o d u c e d a l l the t r a d i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s of Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l -53 ture. Again, b l i n d obedience t o the a u t h o r i t y became the most d e s i r -able p a t t e r n of p o l i t i c a l behavior. That i s why i t seems t o be worth-w h i l e to consider the r o l e of Marxism from a p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e per-s p e c t i v e . There are a n a l y s t s who assume t h a t the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Soviet regime i s an e x c l u s i v e product of the Bolshevik r e v o l u t i o n and t h a t t h i s c u l t u r e i s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the vast m a j o r i t y of Russians. For example, Gayle Durhem Hollander i n her p o r t r a i t of the new communist man s t r o n g l y emphasizes the r o l e of the p a r t y to which each c i t i z e n must be subjected, and she suggests t h a t t h i s s ubordination i s caused by the t o t a l i t a r i a n char-a c t e r of the i d e o l o g y . 1 0 2 Yet i t seems t h a t t h i s s u b o r d i n a t i o n i s congruent w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and not simply a product of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . The r o l e of ideology i s important s i n c e the l a t t e r i s , l i k e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , a l s o p a r t l y composed of values and b e l i e f s . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of the USSR, the r o l e of Marxism has t o be taken i n t o account s i n c e the S o v i e t a u t h o r i t i e s c l a i m t o be the bearers of Marx's ideas. In the S o v i e t Union, Marxism was transformed from the o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n , which was a p h i l o s o p h i c a l system, i n t o a set of empty phrases which now have t o l e g i t i m i z e the regime and j u s t i f y i t s d e c i s i o n s . In the context of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and r e v o l u t i o n on the c u l t u r a l l e v e l , Marxism was R u s s i f i e d and denuded of i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements. Many s t u d i e s have t r a c e d the S o v i e t r e v i s i o n of Marxism. For i n s t a n c e , Lowenthal w r i t e s "The Marxian r e l a t i o n between bases and s u p e r s t r u c t u r e has been turned upside down. This i s a fundamental 54 S t a l i n i s t r e v i s i o n of Marxism." 1 0 3 m other words, what S t a l i n d i d was e l i m i n a t e one of the most r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements of Marxism which was a b s o l u t e l y incapable of adjustment t o the t r a d i t i o n a l Russian n o t i o n of p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the s t a t e . The a c t i v e r o l e of bases would have meant the d i m i n i s h e d r o l e of the s t a t e and i t s r u l e r s . To apply the Marxian r e l a t i o n would have meant a fundamental change i n Russia and i t s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Trotsky i n The R e v o l u t i o n Betrayed w r i t e s of S t a l i n , "He i s the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of the bureaucracy." 1 0 4 Trotsky i s r e f e r r i n g t o the conservatism of S t a l i n . R. T. de George says, "Unlike Marx and Lenin, S t a l i n was n e i t h e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n c l i n e d nor t r a i n e d . . . . As head of the p a r t y he d e v e l o p e d — o r r e v i s e d — t h e M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t h e r i -tage i n the l i g h t of concrete c i r c u m s t a n c e s — b y p r a c t i c e more than t h e o r y . " 1 0 5 Among many circumstances which had t o be taken i n t o account by S t a l i n , the h i g h l y p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c i a n , was the Russian p e r c e p t i o n of p o l i t i c s , t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s , etc.--or, i n other words, Russian p o l i -t i c a l c u l t u r e . No matter what t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n s and opinions about S t a l i n ' s r u l e , none of h i s biographers deny h i s p r a c t i c a l i t y . Even those who f o l l o w Trotsky's opinions about S t a l i n as a mediocre r e v o l u -t i o n a r y , such as Isaac Deutscher i n h i s biography of S t a l i n , 1 0 6 empha-s i z e h i s p r a c t i c a l i t y . A l e a d i n g S o v i e t d i s s i d e n t , L. Kopelev, says "The most dangerous t h i n g here [the S o v i e t Union] would be Marxism. Not j u s t propaganda, not j u s t slogans but Marxism as a system of 1 n *7 h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s . " As we see, what u n i t e s Trotsky and Kopelev i s t h e i r o p i n i o n 55 about the r o l e of Marxism i n the USSR. They both say t h a t there i s no r e a l Marxism i n Russia. This i s h a r d l y a s u r p r i s i n g f a c t . The o r i g i -n a l v e r s i o n of Marxism means a general r e v o l u t i o n . Keeping i n mind the Neuman d e f i n i t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n , we can say t h a t the October Rev o l u t i o n was very l i m i t e d and then, thanks t o S t a l i n , i t was e l i m i -nated i n many aspects, i n c l u d i n g r e v o l u t i o n on the c u l t u r a l l e v e l . The B o l s k e v i k takeover was undoubtedly a great change on the economic and s o c i a l l e v e l s , but on the p o l i t i c a l and p a r t i c u l a r l y on the c u l -t u r a l l e v e l there was l i t t l e change. B r z e z i n s k i i s a b s o l u t e l y r i g h t when he says: Leninism i n i t s p o l i t i c a l s t y l e and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l form thus became—for a l l i t s s i n c e r e r e v o l u t i o n a r y content and obvious r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l s i g n f i c a n c e — a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the dominant t r a d i t i o n r a t h e r than i t s t e r m i n a t i o n . In terms of p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , the Duma-based p r o v i s i o n a l government was more r e v o l u t i o n a r y than Lenin's—though to repeat, on the p l a n of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , property r e l a t i o n s and the r o l e of c l a s s e s , Leninism o b v i o u s l y meant a more profound and s i g n i f i c a n t change. But on the l e v e l of p o l i t i c s , the p r o v i s i o n a l government, because of i t s democratic character, i n v o l v e d a sharper break w i t h the past, a deeper d i s c o n t i n u i t y , than o l d Leninism. 1 ^8 In my o p i n i o n , t h i s i s a c o r r e c t e v a l u a t i o n of Marxism i n the Soviet context. Lenin, when he took over, e l i m i n a t e d the most r e v o l u -t i o n a r y elements of the o r i g i n a l concept, f o r instance, the r o l e of the base. S t a l i n , a f t e r strengthening h i s p o s i t i o n i n the party, e l i m i n a t e d a l t o g e t h e r the r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements on the c u l t u r a l l e v e l and almost e n t i r e l y on the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . What he l e f t were the r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements i n the economic and s o c i a l contexts of the r e v o l u t i o n and the phraseology. B i a l e r says t h a t i n comparison w i t h H i t l e r , " S t a l i n ' s p r a c t i c e of personal d i c t a t o r s h i p as w e l l as the c u l t of the d i c t a t o r had no i d e o l o g i c a l anchoring." He c a l l s t h i s 56 "another major weakness of S t a l i n ' s cult."109 I do not t h i n k t h a t i t was a weakness, and I do not t h i n k t h a t S t a l i n needed t o anchor h i s c u l t i d e o l o g i c a l l y . I have already pre-sented the inherent element of Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e — a c u l t of the r u l e r who i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Russia h e r s e l f . The c u l t of l e a d e r -ship was a n a t u r a l f e a t u r e of the Russian perception of p o l i t i c s and th e r e f o r e i t was not necessary f o r S t a l i n t o " j u s t i f y , " i d e o l o g i c a l l y or otherwise, h i s l e a d e r s h i p and the scope of h i s power. What S t a l i n needed was t o r e v i v e the o l d Russian t r a d i t i o n , and he d i d . The l a c k of an i d e o l o g i c a l anchor f o r S t a l i n ' s c u l t was not a weakness. Quite the contrary. His c u l t was anchored i n the strongest p o s s i b l e way: i t was anchored h i s t o r i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y . (In H i t l e r ' s case, the Fuhrer had t o j u s t i f y h i s c u l t s i n c e German p o l i -t i c s was t r a d i t i o n a l l y impersonal: f i r s t the s t a t e , then the Kaiser.) S t a l i n d i d the best t h i n g : i n order t o s t a b i l i z e the country, the regime and h i s personal p o s i t i o n he had t o get r i d of the r e v o l u t i o n -ary element of Marxism. In my c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y periods i n the h i s -t o r y of Russia/the Soviet Union, I have presented f i v e stages. These stages i d e n t i f y the s t a t e of f l u x i n Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a t t h a t time. That s t a t e was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a f l u c t u a t i o n from l i b e r a l i s m t o the War Communism type of s o c i e t y , from the attempts t o change Russia and i t s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n the s p i r i t of parliamentary democ-racy t o the attempts t o introduce Utopian v i s i o n s of s o c i a l e q u a l i t y . In other words, there was a movement from one extreme t o the other. As a r e s u l t of t h a t s t a t e of a f f a i r s , there were f i r s t symptoms 57 of r e a l changes i n the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , and e v e n t u a l l y these changes might have caused even greater chaos than t h a t of 1 917. That i s why the f i f t h stage may be c a l l e d the r e t u r n t o t r a d i t i o n when a l l the new p o l i t i c a l ideas from e i t h e r the l e f t or from the r i g h t were e r a d i c a t e d and when a l l the t r a d i t i o n a l Russian values, b e l i e f s and symbols and b e h a v i o r a l patterns were reimplemented and s t r e n g t h -ened. Thus i n the context of the r e v o l u t i o n on i t s c u l t u r a l l e v e l , we can t r e a t S t a l i n i s m , at l e a s t i n the f i f t h stage, as a process of r e s o c i a l i z a t i o n , as a process of r e s t o r i n g the o l d , t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i -t i c a l c u l t u r e and the e l i m i n a t i o n of the c u l t u r a l anarchy caused by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of parl i a m e n t a r i s m and then the c o l l a p s e of Czardom. The beginning of the f i f t h r e s o c i a l i z i n g stage was i n 1932. In t h i s year, f o r instance, the Russian A s s o c i a t i o n of P r o l e t a r i a n W r i t e r s was accused of " r e v o l u t i o n a r y avant-guardism," and i t was d i s s o l v e d . This A s s o c i a t i o n suspected the o l d e r generation i n power of succumbing t o the temptations of power, l o s i n g t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y momentum and f a l l i n g i n t o b u r e a u c r a t i c lethargy. F i t z p a t r i c k c a l l s t h i s " r e v o l u t i o n from b e l o w . " 1 1 0 However, a good d e a l of manipulation may come from above. In any case, the r e s u l t was t h a t the a u t h o r i t i e s were t o decide what was M a r x i s t and r e v o l u t i o n a r y and t h e r e f o r e t o be continued, and what was a n t i - M a r x i s t and a n t i - r e v o l u t i o n a r y and t o be d i s cont i nued. In terms of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i t was the beginning of the r e s t o r a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f t h a t only the a u t h o r i t y knows what i s r i g h t and what i s wrong. Thus the scope of government again 58 became t r a d i t i o n a l l y broad. 4. THE OFFICIAL RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE The most comprehensive and a u t h o r i t a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s the t h i r d programme of the CPSU adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress i n 1961. In a s e c t i o n of the programme e n t i t l e d "The Moral Code of the B u i l d e r of Communist S o c i e t y " there i s a l i s t of the f e a t u res of the "new S o v i e t man." 1 1 1 According t o t h i s Code, the p e r f e c t c i t i z e n should love the s o c i a l i s t motherland and be dedicated t o communism, should always keep i n mind the f a c t t h a t he works f o r the good of h i s country and s o c i e t y , should f o s t e r c o l -l e c t i v e and comradely a s s i s t a n c e , should be i n t o l e r a n t of dishonesty, should behave l i k e a brother towards the other nations (peoples) of the S o v i e t Union and the workers and peoples of other c o u n t r i e s . Another expression of the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s the oath which has t o be taken by each new member of the Pioneer o r g a n i z a t i o n which says, i n the f i r s t place, t h a t the Pioneer w i l l love h i s motherland and the Communist Party and then that he w i l l be f r i e n d l y w i t h the c h i l d r e n of the world and w i l l be a d i s c i p l i n e d c i t i z e n who loves t o w o r k . 1 1 2 I f we compare these two examples, we can say t h a t the common po i n t i s the love of the country and subordination to the a u t h o r i t y -p a r t y ("dedication t o communism"). These can h a r d l y be t r e a t e d as an i n v e n t i o n of the communists. In another example, i n a standard book on s c i e n t i f i c communism, we can read: The C e n t r a l Committee of our Party creates p o l i c i e s which express the common i n t e r e s t s of our people. I f there are any 59 a i l m e n t s they are caused by some member of the apparatus. Those bureaucrats t h i n k t h a t they are the a u t h o r i t y , whereas they are only servants of the Party and the People. And our Party w i l l do i t s best i n order t o e l i m i n a t e those s o u l l e s s bureaucrats because the c h i e f task of the Party i s the wel-f a r e of t h e p e o p l e and peace on Earth. 3 Lev Kopelev says t h a t the o f f i c i a l ideology . . . i s an i d e o l o g y of [an] a u t h o r i t a r i a n b u r e a u c r a t i c p a r t y . . ., of superstate chauvinism, of u n p r i n c i p l e d pragmatism i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r y , and economic or e t h i c a l ques-t i o n s . . . . A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , chauvinism and pragmatism—these are the i n t e g r a l l y e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the r e a l l y dominant, conservative ideology w h i l e a l l the c o n v e n t i o n a l l y sacred ( r e v o l u t i o n a r y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , democratic, s o c i a l i s t , humanistic and so on) formulae or even lengthy outpourings are i n essence simply d e c o r a t i v e t r i n k e t s p u r e l y e x t e r n a l r i t u a l r e l i c s , 'vestiges.' l i k e the term 'comrade' or motto 'workers of the world unite'. Kopelev s t r e s s e s a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , pragmatism and n a t i o n a l i s m as the main features of the o f f i c i a l ideology. And again these f e a -t u r e s can har d l y be seen as a new c r e a t i o n of the Bolsheviks. The Program of the CPSU s t r e s s e s the love of country and the Party. The oath of the Pioneers emphasizes the love of the country and d i s c i p l i n e of c i t i z e n s . The book on s c i e n t i f i c communism says t h a t the w e l f a r e of the people i s the main task of the a u t h o r i t i e s , r e v i v i n g the o l d myth about the j u s t Czar who wants only the good of h i s people and not h i m s e l f (the Czar or the C e n t r a l Committee of the Party). But some of h i s Boyars are g u i l t y of some defects i n what would otherwise be e x c e l l e n t p o l i c i e s . The new elements i n the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e of the Sovie t regime are t e c h n i c a l words such as, f o r instance, r e v o l u t i o n , p r o l e t a r i a t , etc. The content of t h a t c u l t u r e reintroduced and estab-l i s h e d i n the f i f t h stage i s t r a d i t i o n a l . A l s o the patt e r n s of p o l i t i c a l behaviour of the r u l e r s are very s i m i l a r t o those from the past. A Russian h i s t o r i a n i n a work f i r s t 60 published a t the beginning of the t w e n t i e t h century wrote: To speak on behalf of the whole land was a h a b i t of the Muscovite government. . . . The p e t i t i o n from 'people of a l l degrees' became a stereotyped formula w i t h which they j u s t i f i e d every important government a c t i o n . . . . This o f f i c i a l c o u n t e r f e i t of the people's w i l l became a k i n d of p o l i t i c a l f i c t i o n , which has, i n c e r t a i n cases, continued t o e x i s t t o t h i s d a y . 1 1 5 In l i g h t of the a n a l y s i s I have presented above, t h i s h a r d l y r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r comment. Brezhnev i n h i s speech on the 1977 c o n s t i t u t i o n s a i d : "The Soviet people s a i d 'Yes, t h i s i s the c o n s t i t u t i o n which we have always wanted. . . .' I n c o u n t l e s s l e t t e r s s e n t t o the P a r t y , t h e S o v i e t people warmly supported the p o l i c i e s of our Party and our new c o n s t i -t u t i o n . " I D Chernenko i n a speech d e l i v e r e d t o the Supreme Soviet claimed: On behalf of the Soviet people we recommend new d i r e c t i v e s f o r our c u l t u r a l p o l i c y . The people a b s o l u t e l y abhor the bourgeois elements i n Sovie t c u l t u r e . In thousands of l e t t e r s sent t o the c e n t r a l committee, they c r i t i c i z e some Soviet a r t i s t s . '' And M a r s h a l l Ustinov s a i d i n one of h i s speeches: We, the Soviet people, we, the l o v e r s of communism and peace w i l l never a l l o w the i m p e r i a l i s t s t o wage a new war. We, the Soviet people, say c a t e g o r i c a l l y 'No' t o the servants of world i m p e r i a l i s m . In thousands of l e t t e r s sent t o the party, t o the m i n i s t r y of defence and t o me p e r s o n a l l y , the Sovie t people express t h e i r support f o r the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of our party. I thank them and I promise that we w i l l always be r e a l i z i n g your wishes, dear comrades, dear S o v i e t people. 1 8 And so on. 5. THE CONTEMPORARY DOMINANT POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE RUSSIANS Dealing w i t h contemporary Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , we should be more comfortable s i n c e we have i n f o r m a t i o n about Soviet o p i n i o n 61 p o l l s . However, i t i s worth p o i n t i n g out t h a t Soviet published p o l l s never examine what c i t i z e n s t h i n k about government or i t s members. That i s why we have to use another important source of our knowledge about the dominant c u l t u r e , namely, the s t u d i e s conducted on former Sovi e t c i t i z e n s now l i v i n g o u t s i d e the country. The best account of the So v i e t p o l l s can be found i n White's book P o l i t i c a l C ulture and Sovi e t P o l i t i c s J 1 ^  A major study which thoroughly examines the r e s u l t s of p o l l s conducted among Russian immigrants i s a book w r i t t e n by Inkeles and Bauer, The Sovi e t 1 00 C i t i z e n . ^ This study, though published i n the l a t e 1950s, i s s t i l l a va l u a b l e source of in f o r m a t i o n . The v a l i d i t y of i t s c o n c l u s i o n was confirmed by a s i m i l a r study conducted by White i n the l a t e 1970s. 1 2 1 In a d d i t i o n , we have important s t u d i e s of Gitelman and G i d w i t z con-1 00 ducted among Russian Jews.' " We can a l s o use such sources of informa-t i o n as Soviet l i t e r a t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y works w r i t t e n by Sovi e t d i s s i -dents, or accounts of Westerners who spent some time i n R u s s i a . 1 2 ^ Values and B e l i e f s F i r s t we need an answer t o the question of the l e g i t i m a c y of the S o v i e t government. By answering t h i s question we can t e s t the statement of Rigby concerning the system of a u t h o r i t y quoted e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter. This i s an important problem because i t can give us a v a l u a b l e i n s i g h t i n t o the i s s u e of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of the USSR. Huntington suggests t h a t "the most important p o l i t i c a l d i s t i n c -t i o n among c o u n t r i e s concerns not t h e i r form of government but t h e i r degree of government." 1 2 4 In C z a r i s t Russia, as I discussed above, the 62 vast scope of government a c t i v i t y was w i d e l y accepted and t r e a t e d as a n a t u r a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s . The same a t t i t u d e c h a r a c t e r i z e s contempor-ary Russian s o c i e t y . Among those i n t e r v i e w e d by Inkeles and Bauer, only twenty-eight percent of o r d i n a r y workers and f i v e percent of white c o l l a r workers wanted a r e s t o r a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m . The others supported s o c i a l i s m , i.e., s t a t e ownership and c o n t r o l over the main sect o r s of the n a t i o n a l economy. 1 2 5 These former Soviet c i t i z e n s d i d not r e j e c t the idea of a S o v i e t - s t y l e s t a t e . Quite the contrary. They supported the s t a t e and i t s many preroga t i v e s . The same a t t i t u d e i s observed by White i n h i s st u d i e s conducted among Russian emigres i n I s r a e l . For example, more than e i g h t y - s i x percent favoured s t a t e ownership, and one responded t h a t "everything should be i n the hands of the s t a t e . " 1 2 6 Another t r a d i t i o n a l f e a t u r e of Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e was examined by Inkeles and Bauer when they asked what should be kept a f t e r the replacement of the Bolsheviks. About n i n e t y - f o u r percent chose the education and p u b l i c h e a l t h systems. Inkeles and Bauer w r i t e : " I t i s evident both from the quantative data and q u a l i t a t i v e impressions gathered from the personal i n t e r v i e w s that the refuges most favour those aspects of the Soviet system which c a t e r to t h e i r d e s i r e f o r w e l f a r e b e n e f i t s . " 1 2 7 The t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e towards the s t a t e was expressed by a student who s a i d : "The s t a t e must look a f t e r i t s c i t i z e n s . I t must give them opportunity. I t i s not enough merely t o provide m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y . I t must provide s e c u r i t y of the per-s o n . " 1 2 8 63 Along w i t h support f o r the concept of the w e l f a r e s t a t e was support f o r v a r i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s t o c i v i l r i g h t s . More than s i x t y per cent thought that l i m i t a t i o n s should be a p p l i e d by the s t a t e f o r the good of the people. For example, " I f the press publishes nothing but humorous s t o r i e s , i t w i l l be not good f o r the people . . . [and] the government must make an e f f o r t t o r a i s e the l e v e l of the press so t h a t the press w i l l educate the people of the s t a t e . " 1 2 ^ G i d w i t z i n her s t u d i e s s t r e s s e s the same a t t i t u d e s of the Soviet Jews. When she asked her respondents what should be changed i n the p o l i c i e s of the government of I s r a e l , they answered t h a t the government should d i s c i -p l i n e i t s c i t i z e n s , r e s t r i c t the a c t i v i t i e s of the Communist pa r t y and f o r b i d s e l l i n g Soviet propaganda. 1 3 0 And a respondent of White s a i d , " C r i t i c i s m of the government must not be a l l o w e d . " 1 3 1 A l l those surveys show the t y p i c a l , t r a d i t i o n a l values and b e l i e f s of the Russians, which are q u i t e a u t h o r i t a r i a n . They have not been changed by the S o v i e t regime. A l s o the p e r s o n a l i z e d s t y l e of p o l i t i c s i s very w e l l preserved i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y . Inkeles and Bauer quote a Russian immigrant: "The system would not have been so bad. I t depends on how the system i s c a r r i e d out. I t depends on who ' i s i n the c o n t r o l ' . " 1 3 2 This i s the essence of the p o l i t i c a l m e n t a l i t y of the Russians. People are important, not the i n s t i t u t i o n s ; the character of the leader i s the most important element i n the system, not l e g a l l i m i t a -t i o n s of h i s power. P o l i t i c s i s a r e s u l t of the a c t s among people and i n s t i t u t i o n s are only a d d i t i o n a l elements which can be e a s i l y changed by the r u l e r . Inkeles and Bauer w r i t e : "At l e a s t 40 per cent viewed 64 the unfortunate state of affairs in the Soviet Union as the responsi-b i l i t y of a particular leader or type of leadership." 1 3 3 White says that many of his respondents told him that Stal in was poorly advised ("by fools") and that was the reason for a l l ailments of his regime. 1 3 Additionally, the leader and his government have to be active and control almost everything because the society i s not p o l i t i c a l l y mature enough to l i v e in a fu l ly democratic state. In many "letters to the editor" the Soviets c r i t i c i z e their fellow countrymen for being irresponsible and chi ldish, and therefore the government, and f i r s t of a l l the ruler, must have broad prerogatives as a guarantee of social order. Smith quotes a Soviet c i t i zen who praised Shevardnadze, then party chief in Georgia: "The new boss i s tough. He l ikes order. He won't le t the speculanty (speculators) get away with so much." 1 3 5 The extraordinary position of the ruler i s very well i l l u s -trated by Ginzburg. She, for instance, writes about a prisoner in a labour camp who was sentenced to sol i tary compartment where he com-posed a poem dedicated to Stal in , "the giver of a l l good." 1 3 6 The perception of the role of the ruler, inherited from Czarist Russia, has not been changed by the Soviet regime. Quite the con-trary, the cult of personality was an important element in the process of strengthening that perception. Khrushchev in his memoirs, when he wrote about Stalin's tenure and Lenin's opinion about his unsuit-a b i l i t y for the position of general secretary, said: "The central committee gave no heed to Lenin's words and consequently the whole party was punished." In other words, Khrushchev recognized the leader's enormous role and exaggerated the party's dependency on him. 65 However, a t the p r e s e n t t i m e c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p i s o f f i c i a l l y p r e f e r r e d . In o r d e r t o make the death o f the l e a d e r l e s s dangerous c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p was i n t r o d u c e d . T h i s k i n d o f l e a d e r -s h i p never d i e s . However, the p e r s o n a l i z e d p a t t e r n o f a u t h o r i t y i s so d e e p l y r o o t e d i n the Russians t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e l i m i n a t e i t from the p o l i t i c a l system. A new g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y u s u a l l y s t r e s s e s the impor-tance o f c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p a t the b e g i n n i n g o f h i s r e i g n . Never-t h e l e s s , t h i s i s o n l y temporary. A f t e r he strenghthens h i s power, the p e r s o n a l p a t t e r n reemerges, (although never t o the same degree as i t e x i s t e d under S t a l i n ) . And h i s p o r t r a i t a g a i n hangs over the heads o f the s u b j e c t s . White i n h i s study o f S o v i e t immigrants w r i t e s : " I t was suggested t h a t the regime d e r i v e d a good d e a l o f support and a u t h o r i t y from i t s a p p a r e n t l y growing i n f l u e n c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s and from i t s f i r m and d e c i s i v e d o m e s t i c l e a d e r s h i p compared w i t h the weaknesses and v a c i l l a t i o n o f i t s western c o u n t e r p a r t s . ('The S o v i e t U n i o n i s s t r i d i n g ahead.')" 1 ^ ® The l o v e o f Mat'ushka (Russia) and the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the p o l i t i c a l system i s h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e have always been important. T h i s was f u r t h e r s trengthened by World War I I when S t a l i n , the l u c k y p o l i -t i c i a n , had a s p l e n d i d o c c a s i o n t o prove t h a t the system he r e i n t r o -duced was the o n l y p r o p e r one f o r Ru s s i a . Under the Czars R u s s i a was a g r e a t power. A f t e r the war when R u s s i a r e t u r n e d t o t h i s p o w e r f u l p o s i t i o n i t seemed t o mean t h a t h i s system was j u s t i f i e d . In sum, the concept o f the o m n i s c i e n t r u l e r p r e s e r v e s t r a d i t i o n a l 66 respect f o r a powerful a u t h o r i t y , and i t r e i n f o r c e s the c o n v i c t i o n that c i t i z e n s can do l i t t l e but concur w i t h t h a t a u t h o r i t y . P o l i t i c a l Knowledge, Expectations and Behavior This p a r t of the contemporary p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Russians has absorbed almost a l l the n o v e l t i e s brought by the Bolsheviks. So f a r i n t h i s chapter I have s t r e s s e d the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y between C z a r i s t p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and Soviet p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Obviously, many new elements of S o v i e t l i f e , f o r example, u r b a n i z a t i o n , have brought some changes t o the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Undoubt-edly, the p o l i t i c a l knowledge of the Russians has increased s i n c e the r a t e of i l l i t e r a c y has been s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced under the r u l e of the Bolsheviks. Now the S o v i e t people are b e t t e r informed and b e t t e r educated. However, d e s p i t e t h i s f a c t , the S o v i e t s have not become a c t i v e c i t i z e n s . White quotes a Soviet s o c i o l o g i s t who conducted a survey i n Taganrok and Saransk. According t o the Soviet s o c i o l o g i s t , t h i r t y -f i v e percent of those who attended p o l i t i c a l l e c t u r e s d i d so because of "the party d i s c i p l i n e , " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e pressure or a " f e e l i n g of duty or o b l i g a t i o n s . " 1 3 9 In other words, then, d e s p i t e the e f f o r t s of the regime t o gain more " a c t i v e " support from the c i t i z e n r y , p o l i t i c a l i n d i f f e r e n c e i s a s t a b l e element of S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l l i f e . However, another S o v i e t survey shows t h a t i n comparison t o the 1920s, when the average worker spent nine-tenths of h i s time dedicated t o p o l i t i c a l education a t t e n d i n g meetings (passive a c t i v i t y ) , i n the 1960s the worker spent only three-tenths of the time on meetings and seven-tenths f o r more a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( f o r instance, work i n p o l i t i c a l 67 o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) . 1 4 0 Those two surveys seem c o n t r a d i c t o r y . On the one s i d e there i s i n d i f f e r e n c e and apathy, whereas on the other there i s a great deal of time spent on a c t i v i t y i n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s (Party, Komsomol, etc.). These two surveys i l l u s t r a t e the paradox of s o c i a l l i f e i n the USSR. Now, the s t a t e r e q u i r e s more " a c t i v e support" and t h e r e f o r e the c i t i z e n s support the s t a t e by a t t e n d i n g the meetings and a c t i n g i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n s . However, at the same time they do not expect t o i n f l u e n c e the d e c i s i o n s of the a u t h o r i t i e s and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r a c t i v i -t i e s l a c k enthusiasm and are f o r c e d r a t h e r than w i l l i n g l y performed. 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE To conclude, we can say t h a t i n the case of the S o v i e t Union the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and i t s dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e are i n harmony. Both c u l t u r e s are profoundly determined by the h i s t o r i c a l h e r i t a g e of the USSR. This harmony creates agreement between the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the system. For i n s t a n c e , the t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n of p e r s o n a l i z e d p o l i t i c s i s congruent w i t h the S o v i e t type of l e a d e r s h i p and the p o s i t i o n of the general s e c r e t a r y i n the system. For p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s who are i n t e r e s t e d i n the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , the case of the USSR i s e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g . This country shows the importance of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as a very important element which helps to maintain p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . In other words, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the p o l i t i c a l system are w e l l attuned to the p o l i t i c a l m e n t a l i t y of the Russians and v i c e versa. And t h i s 68 i s of great importance f o r the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of the country. The Russians do not need democratic r u l e s as a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r l i v i n g . Quite the contrary. Amalrik, the Sovi e t d i s s i d e n t w r i t e r , i n h i s account of So v i e t dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e says: I t h i n k t h a t any idea cannot be put i n p r a c t i c e as long as i t w i l l not be understood a t l e a s t by the m a j o r i t y of the nation . For the Russian people, whether due t o h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n o r any other reason, the idea of self-government and of e q u a l i t y before the l a w — a n d the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e l a t e d t o these i d e a s — i s almost e n t i r e l y incomprehensible. Even i n the pragmatic aspect of the idea of freedom, the average Russian perceives not the p o s s i b i l i t y of sec u r i n g a good l i f e f o r h i m s e l f , but the danger that someone c l e v e r e r than he w i l l l i v e comfortably a t h i s expense. The m a j o r i t y of the n a t i o n understands the very word 'freedom' as a synonym of the word 'anarchy' or the opportunity t o indulge w i t h impunity i n a n t i s o c i a l and danger-ous a c t i v i t y . Regarding the problem of r e s p e c t i n g the r i g h t s of an i n d i v i d u a l as such, the idea simply arouses bewilderment. One may respect power, a u t h o r i t y , i n t e l l e c t and education. But the idea t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l as such i s va l u a b l e i s f o r an average member of our n a t i o n more than p e c u l i a r . Inkeles and Bauer i n t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n say t h a t "the main out-l i n e s of the system seem t o enjoy the support of popular consen-s u s . " 1 4 2 In my op i n i o n t h i s i s the key t o an understanding of p o l i t i -c a l s t a b i l i t y of the Soviet Union. B i a l e r i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of s t a b i l i t y says t h a t " i t may w e l l be t h a t p a t e r n a l i s t i c and a u t o c r a t i c Russian t r a d i t i o n s r e i n f o r c e the process of [ s t a b i l i t y ] . . ." 1 4 3 In other words, we can say th a t t r a d i t i o n a l Russian non-democratic p o l i t -i c a l c u l t u r e helps t o s t a b i l i z e the contemporary non-democratic indus-t r i a l c o u n t r y . Almond says that a modern i n d u s t r i a l country always has a democratic p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 1 4 4 In the case of the USSR I have t o disagree w i t h him. The USSR i s undoubtedly an i n d u s t r i a l country. Many i n d i c e s of modernization ( f o r i n s t a n c e , the l e v e l of n a t i o n a l 69 income, the number of books and newspapers published annually and the number of students) show t h a t the USSR i s a modern country. According to Almond, a modern Sovi e t Union should have a modern p o l i t i c a l c u l -t u r e which means f o r him, among other t h i n g s , a democratic p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . As I have shown the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the USSR i s non-democratic. At t h i s p o i n t i t i s worth r e f l e c t i n g on the r e l a t i o n s h i p bet-ween p o l i t i c a l modernization and Russian/Soviet p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . P o l i t i c a l modernization t h e o r i s t s have long suggested t h a t moderniza-t i o n w i l l have an impact on a society's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . For inst a n c e , T a l c o t t Parsons i n a paper published i n 1964 says that com-munist s t a t e s must develop democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s along w i t h t h e i r socio-economic modernization or there w i l l be "general d e s t r u c t i o n or breakdown." 1 4 5 Deutsch a n a l y z i n g t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m argues t h a t because there i s the l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y of c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n making, the system can be very e a s i l y overloaded and "the answer t o t h i s problem i s d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . " 1 4 6 Overloading cannot be avoided even through an i n t r o d u c t i o n of u n i v e r s a l e l e c t r o n i c s u p e r v i s i o n because i t "would merely convert t h e i r output . . . i n t o a f l o o d of p a p e r . " 1 4 7 In a d d i -t i o n , the increase of the degree of education among i n d i v i d u a l s must " i n the long run c o n t r i b u t e t h e i r share toward the undermining of the t o t a l i t a r i a n r e g i m e . " 1 4 8 And t h a t i s why, according t o Deutsch, there w i l l be development of the Soviet system towards p l u r a l i z a t i o n and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . A l s o among some i n t e l l e c t u a l s l i v i n g i n communist c o u n t r i e s , there i s the same very o p t i m i s t i c tone. Bratkowski, one of the main f i g u r e s of the S o l i d a r i t y movement i n Poland says: "They 70 [the Russians] w i l l have t o change to become more democratic or they w i l l disappear."'' 4 9 I cannot subscribe t o these p o i n t s of view. There i s l i t t l e evidence that communist c o u n t r i e s w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y undergo democrati-z a t i o n and p l u r a l i z a t i o n . E s p e c i a l l y i n the case of the USSR, we cannot see any democratic changes. The " l i b e r a l " Gorbachev wants t o increase the e f f i c a c y of the n a t i o n a l economy through the inc r e a s e of the p r i c e of vodka. In my o p i n i o n , the modernization t h e o r i s t s wrongly assume that there must be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n between " t r a d i t i o n " and "modernity." Without a doubt there i s a l a c k of c o m p a t i b i l i t y between the two i n the case, f o r instance, of Iran under the A y a t o l l a h s . But i n the case of the USSR " t r a d i t i o n " and "modernity" are congruent. As White very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out, "many t r a d i t i o n a l and customary usages, i t i s c l e a r , need not n e c e s s a r i l y o b s t r u c t the process of s o c i a l and economic development; they may be compatible w i t h a developed as w e l l as w i t h a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l economy." 1 5 0 Almond, one of the f a t h e r s of the modernization school, l a t e r changed h i s mind about the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t modernity i n e v i t a b l y leads to democracy. He s a i d : I t should be c l e a r t h a t socioeconomic modernization and p o l i t i -c a l development are not the same t h i n g . The exposure of popu-l a t i o n s t o modern technology and c u l t u r e u s u a l l y does make a s e c u l a r i z i n g i n f l u e n c e . But the f o r c e s of economic and s o c i a l change do not n e c e s s a r i l y produce p o l i t i c a l development. . . . And, on the other hand, p o l i t i c a l development has sometimes taken place under c o n d i t i o n s other than those of economic and s o c i a l transformation." 1 5 1 His e a r l i e r view was t h a t the p l u r a l i s t i c pressures of the modern economy and s o c i e t y w i l l b r i n g i n e v i t a b l e demands f o r a healthy, 71 educated, a f f l u e n t s o c i e t y . He thought t h a t Russian success i n s c i -ence, education, technology, economic p r o d u c t i v i t y and n a t i o n a l secu-r i t y w i l l produce d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , and he " f a i l f e d ] t o see how these d e c e n t r a l i z i n g , p l u r a l i s t i c tendencies can be reversed, or how t h e i r spread can be prevented." 1 ^ 2 There i s another theory of p o l i t i c a l change i n the USSR which should be mentioned i n the context of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e perspec-t i v e . This i s the generation theory, which e x p l a i n s p o l i t i c a l change i n the Sovi e t Union i n terms of the change of generations. The coming generations exposed t o f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e and disappointed w i t h the c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e i n Russia w i l l g r a d u a l l y change the face of the country i n the d i r e c t i o n of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . 1 5 3 As evidence of t h i s process, some w r i t e r s p o i n t t o the needs and d e s i r e s of Sovi e t youth. They say t h a t the new generations of S o v i e t s have the same i n t e r e s t s as the youngsters from the West. From time t o time the o f f i c i a l S o v i e t media a l s o complain about the l a c k of i d e o l o g i c a l commitment among Sovi e t youth. I again cannot agree w i t h t h i s theory. F i r s t of a l l , i t s authors assume t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l commitment i s required. As i t i s argued here, the Sovi e t type of Marxism i s a conservative and bureauc-r a t i c set of i n s t r u m e n t a l r u l e s and r e v o l u t i o n a r y c l i c h e s which does not have many fe a t u r e s i n common w i t h the o r i g i n a l theory. Therefore, the S o v i e t a u t h o r i t i e s do not r e q u i r e commitment t o the ideology but, f i r s t and foremost, the obedience of c i t i z e n s - - a n d t h i s obedience i s under the guise of Marxism. In order t o f u l f i l t h i s end, the a u t h o r i -t i e s have a huge system of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n and a very e f f e c t i v e mecha-72 nism t o strengthen obedience i n exchange f o r g e t t i n g d i f f e r e n t kinds of p r i v i l e g e s . We have no r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n on " e l e c t o r a l " p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the USSR. O f f i c i a l sources always c l a i m n e a r l y one hundred percent p a r t i c i p a t i o n . This may or may not a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e S o v i e t e l e c -t o r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . However, even i f i t i s c o r r e c t , t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t the regime has the wholehearted support of the e n t i r e population. What i t does mean i s that the regime i s able t o m o b i l i z e the p e o p l e — i n c l u d i n g the new generations who are supposed to democratize the regime according t o the generation t h e o r i s t s . Even i f young people dream about a Japanese stereo system and a v i s i t t o P a r i s 1 5 4 , they f i r s t have t o l i v e i n the S o v i e t Union and make sure t h a t t h e i r l i v e s w i l l be as comfortable as p o s s i b l e . And i f they r e a l l y want t o have a chance of g e t t i n g the stereo and going t o P a r i s , they have t o obey orders and p l a y by the r u l e s d i c t a t e d by the regime. Many young people j o i n the p a r t y and almost a l l of them j o i n the Komsomol. White presents the s t a t i s t i c s which show that f o r each 1,000 people ( i n c l u d i n g babies and s e n i o r c i t i z e n s ) , 138 belong t o the Komsomol. 1 5 5 Taking i n t o account the f a c t t h a t one must be between fourtheen and twenty-eight to belong t o t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , we can say t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l young people belong t o Komsomol where the t r a d i -t i o n a l f e a t u r e s of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e are f u r t h e r strengthened. There are a l s o not many contacts f o r the young people w i t h the o u t s i d e world. Although there are more f o r e i g n t o u r i s t s i n the USSR today than t w e n t y - f i v e years ago, most of them are confined t o 73 s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d i t i n e r a r i e s . Much of the country i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y c l o s e d t o any f o r e i g n e r s , i n c l u d i n g the c i t i z e n s of other communist c o u n t r i e s . In other words, the Sovi e t Union i s a r e l a t i v e l y c l o s e d s o c i e t y . As B r z e z i n s k i r i g h t l y p o i n t s out, the " t r a n s f e r of values and of procedures from one generation t o another i s l i k e l y t o be more e f f e c t i v e i n a closed and h i g h l y bureaucratized system than i n more open, p l u r a l i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s . " 1 5 6 As contemporary Sov i e t p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e shows, t h i s t r a n s f e r i s very e f f e c t i v e . CHAPTER IV POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE The p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y of the P o l i s h system makes t h i s country e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y i n t e r e s t i n g f o r a n a l y s i s . Poland i s the only communist country which has gone through s i x acute p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s . Of these, two were of c r u c i a l importance. The 1956 c r i s i s developed from the p o s t - S t a l i n i s t "thaw" i n t o a very s e r i o u s systemic c r i s i s . I t was the f i r s t one which d i r e c t l y endangered the communist r u l e i n Poland and introduced a p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e of the P o l i s h s y s t e m — c h r o n i c i n s t a b i l i t y . Since 1956 the country has experienced a s e r i e s of p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s . Each of them c o n t r i b u t e d t o the gradual i n c r e a s e of systemic i n s t a b i l i t y . The second e s p e c i a l l y important c r i s i s occurred i n 1980-81. This c r i s i s brought about the S o l i d a r i t y movement and undermined v i r t u a l l y every aspect of communist r u l e . A f t e r f o r t y years of gov-ern i n g the Communist Party experienced a d e v a s t a t i n g p o l i t i c a l c a t a s -trophe. Without exaggeration we can say t h a t the S o l i d a r i t y p e r i o d was one of the g r e a t e s t p o l i t i c a l d i s a s t e r s which could happen t o any communist government. The P o l i s h seventeen months (August 1 980 t o December 1981) proved t h a t the f o r t y - y e a r attempt of the P o l i s h commu-n i s t s t o capture the hearts and minds of the Poles has e n t i r e l y f a i l e d . E v e n t u a l l y the communists had t o conduct another takeover 75 very s i m i l a r t o the r e v o l u t i o n i n the 1940s which brought the regime to power. They had t o use a great amount of f o r c e ( M a r t i a l Law), and they v i r t u a l l y p a r alyzed the whole p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the country. That i s an amazing f a c t . What d i d they do during the f i r s t f o r t y years of governance? Almost from the beginning they had a monopoly of power. As the only government of Poland, they had a tremendous oppor-t u n i t y t o impose the p o l i t i c a l l i n e which would guarantee t h e i r un-i n t e r r u p t e d government. And they f a i l e d . Why? Undoubtedly, many economic and other d e c i s i o n s made by the government c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s f a i l u r e . But there was something more. As w i l l be argued i n t h i s chapter, the pe r i o d c r u c i a l f o r the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of communist r u l e i n Eastern Europe, S t a l i n i s m , was s i g n i f i c a n t l y weaker i n compar-i s o n t o the USSR and other east European c o u n t r i e s . This can be a t t r i b u t e d t o the strength and p e r s i s t e n c e of t r a d i t i o n a l P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . L i k e chapter three, t h i s chapter w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o two main part s . The f i r s t p a r t i s dedicated t o the p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l past of Poland before the communist takeover. The second p a r t examines P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a f t e r the communist r e v o l u t i o n . This d i v i -s i o n seems t o be j u s t i f i e d because of the important break i n P o l i s h h i s t o r y w i t h the events of 1 944-1 948. This not only created a new government, but i t a l s o brought about s i g n i f i c a n t economic s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l changes. I argued i n the second chapter f o r the value of a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e from the dominant or t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . As I w i l l show, the case of Poland r e q u i r e s t h a t we make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n because the d i s -76 harmony between P o l i s h o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and that nation's dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e makes t h i s communist country so e x t r a -o r d i n a r i l y p o l i t i c a l l y unstable, e s p e c i a l l y compared t o the USSR. P o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i s not the only d i f f e r e n c e between the USSR and Poland. We can a l s o p o i n t t o the a v a i l a b i l i t y of i n t e r n a l i n f o r -mation. In t h i s regard Poland i s the a n t i t h e s i s of the S o v i e t Union. There have been many s o c i a l science surveys which have examined P o l i s h p o l i t i c s and s o c i e t y . Poland never was c l o s e d t o f o r e i g n e r s , except f o r the short " S t a l i n i s t " break of 1948 - 1956. The Poles never were h e r m e t i c a l l y i s o l a t e d from f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e s . This openness has had an extremely important impact on P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 1. POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE BEFORE THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION R e l i g i o n has always been an important element i n P o l i s h p o l i t i -c a l c u l t u r e . Many h i s t o r i a n s s t r e s s the importance of the baptism of Poland's King Mieszko i n 9 6 6 , 1 5 7 which l e d t o the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Roman C a t h o l i c i s m i n Poland. I t a l s o l i n k e d the country w i t h L a t i n p o l i t i -c a l and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . As Ash observes, "Poland thus became the easternmost bulwark of L a t i n Christiandom." 1 And, as i t w i l l be argued, the f e e l i n g t h a t Poland i s a b a s t i o n of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n has always been present i n P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . U n l i k e Russia, Poland almost from i t s beginning lacked a power-f u l c e n t r a l government. Jan Szczepanski c a l l s t h i s "a t r a d i t i o n i n P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e . " 1 5 9 Indeed, he i s r i g h t . From about the t w e l f t h century, P o l i s h r u l e r s have been l i m i t e d i n t h e i r powers. In 1138 Poland was d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e independently governed p a r t s . 77 Although the r u l e r of L i t t l e Poland, Cracow, was t o be s u p e r i o r t o the others, h i s s u p e r i o r i t y was never e x e r c i s e d , and i t was based on the p r i n c i p l e Primus I n t e r Pares. In 1228 the P r i n c e of L i t t l e Poland i s s u e d the f i r s t s o - c a l l e d p r i v i l e g i u m . 1 6 0 According t o t h i s a c t he agreed t o i s s u e " r i g h t f u l and honest laws created i n accordance w i t h the advice of the c l e r g y and g e n t r y . " 1 6 1 In other words, 1228 was the beginning of an i n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n of the r u l e r ' s power. P a r a l l e l t o the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s on the King's power were l e g a l guarantees of the r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l which were introduced a t t h i s time. For example, i n 1430 the p r i n c i p l e of Neminem Captivabimus N i s i l u r e V i c t i m was adopted. This P o l i s h "Char-t e r of R i g h t s " guaranteed personal p r o t e c t i o n from a r b i t r a r y a r r e s t and s t a t e d "we w i l l not im p r i s o n anyone without a l a w f u l v e r d i c t . " 1 6 2 By the beginning of the f i f t e e n t h century Poland, had a l e g a l framework f o r parliamentary democracy. Legal r u l e s accompanied p o l i -t i c a l p r a c t i c e of t h a t time. Toward the end of the fourteenth century the P o l i s h gentry organized p r o v i n c i a l d i e t s c a l l e d S e j m i k i , which i n P o l i s h means s m a l l parliaments. In 1493, a f t e r a whole s e r i e s of new p r i v i l e g i u m s issued by the King, a n a t i o n a l d i e t was o r g a n i z e d . 1 6 3 I t was the beginning of the Sejm (Big Parliament) which became a perma-nent i n s t i t u t i o n of P o l i s h government, and i t e x i s t e d u n t i l the p a r t i -t i o n of Poland. The year 1493 was then the beginning of parliamen-t a r i s m i n Poland. The c r e a t i o n of the Sejm d i d not end the l i m i t a -t i o n s imposed on the powers of P o l i s h kings. In 1501 the King was regarded as the Preside n t of the Senate (the upper chamber of the Sejm), and i n 1505 a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a ct was adapted c a l l e d N i h i l Novi 78 (no innovations without our acceptance, i.e., of the gentry). This decreed t h a t law-making was the s o l e r i g h t of the Sejm. The f i f t e e n t h and s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s were a time when the powers of the King were s i g n i f i c a n t l y l i m i t e d . The King could not i s s u e new laws, l e v y new taxes or d e c l a r e a war without the consent of the Sejm. The scope of the government was f u r t h e r l i m i t e d when the p r i n c i p l e of h e r e d i t a r y monarchy was abandoned. In 1573 a new p o l i t i -c a l mechanism was i n t r o d u c e d — t h e e l e c t i o n of the King. From t h a t time the kings of Poland were e l e c t e d by the Sejm. Each new King had to swear on oath t h a t he would obey the laws and would not a s p i r e t o i n c r e a s e h i s power above the Sejm. Another s i g n i f i c a n t development i n the P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l system was e s t a b l i s h e d f i v e years a f t e r the f i r s t e l e c t i o n of the King. In 1578 the Supreme Appelate Court was organized, i n which the judges were e l e c t e d by the gentry. This court was independent from the King who had no i n f l u e n c e on the e l e c t i o n of j u d g e s . 1 6 4 During the f i f t e e n t h and s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s Poland had moved from being a kingdom to a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy of the e s t a t e s . This introduced the r u l e of law as one of the main p r i n c i p l e s of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e . This i s shown i n a s i x t e e n t h century law book which says that the best p o l i t i c a l system i s one i n which ". . . both the King and the e s t a t e s of the realm s h a l l be subject t o the l a w . " 1 6 5 This i l l u s t r a t e s how the P o l i s h t r a d i t i o n was fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of Russia. In Poland the King had l i m i t e d power. He was regarded as only an important servant of the country. His main task was to p r o t e c t and defend the country and i t s laws. This was a 79 very important r o l e . Poland was always connected w i t h i t s laws. Among the most important of them were those which guarded i n d i v i d u a l freedom and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . An E n g l i s h h i s t o r i a n w r i t e s : ... On the eve o f the Age o f A b s o l u t i s m e l s e w h e r e i n Europe, t h i s [Poland] was an extreme form of democracy. The noble c i t i z e n s of the r e p u b l i c were t o be i t s masters; the King was t o be t h e i r servant. The King of Poland, i n f a c t , was l e s s of a l i m i t e d monarch, l i k e the kings of England or Sweden, and more of a manager under contract. The supremacy of the S z l a c h t a [the n o b i l i t y ] , . . . was evident no l e s s i n the s o c i a l than i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere. . . . The P o l i s h n o b l e s of the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y had a n t i c i p a t e d the i d e a l s of the G l o r i o u s R e v o l u t i o n of 1688 i n England, and of the American R e v o l u t i o n of 1776; . . . They were extreme devotees of i n d i v i d u a l freedom and c i v i l l i b e r t y — f o r themselves. L i k e the slave-owning Fathers of the American C o n s t i t u t i o n , or the o r i g i n a l i n v e n t o r s of democracy i n Ancient Athens, they saw no c o n t r a d i c t i o n between a p o l i t i c a l system based on l i b e r t i e s of the r u l i n g e s t a t e and a s o c i a l system based on the complete subjugation of the lower orders. The strong s t r e s s on i n d i v i d u a l i s m and c i v i l r i g h t s created a p e c u l i a r P o l i s h democratic t r a d i t i o n — t h e r i g h t of any member of the Sejm t o d i s s o l v e i t and n u l l i f y a l l a c t s passed during the session. This r i g h t , c a l l e d Liberum Veto ("I disapprove"), was created as one more instrument t o l i m i t the King's power as was used f o r the f i r s t time i n 1 652. Since t h a t time the Liberum Veto was f r e q u e n t l y abused, and i t e v e n t u a l l y caused c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a r a l y s i s . Many h i s t o r i a n s agree t h a t the way i n which the Liberum Veto was used created a s i t u a -t i o n i n which Poland became powerless and v u l n e r a b l e t o f o r e i g n i n v a -s i o n s , f i n a l l y t o be p a r t i t i o n e d by i t s neighbours i n 1795. 1 6 7 One of the l a s t attempts t o save P o l i s h statehood was made on May 3, 1791, when a l i b e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n was passed. A P o l i s h h i s t o r i a n w r i t e s : "The P o l i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n of May 3rd, 1 791 was a bold attempt t o r e o r -ganize a gentry i n the s p i r i t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the United States 80 and the French d e c l a r a t i o n o f the Rights of Man and C i t i z e n . I t abo l i s h e d c e r t a i n weaknesses which had u n t i l now paralyzed the s t a t e . " 1 6 8 For example, i n t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n the Liberum Veto was t o be annuled, the gentry was to be subject t o t a x a t i o n and the crown was again t o be made he r e d i t a r y . Although the c o n s t i t u t i o n was never adopted because of the second p a r t i t i o n of Poland i n 1792, i t i s important t o p o i n t out the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n i n terms of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . At t h i s time, Poland was i n the midst of an extremely s e r i o u s domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s mainly caused by the l a c k of a strong c e n t r a l government. However, the authors of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , i n s t e a d of s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s i n g the power of the government, decided t o introduce a very l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l democracy. In other words, they s t i l l b e l i e v e d i n democracy r a t h e r than d i c t a t o r -s h i p . We can say, then, t h a t the P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n i s char-a c t e r i z e d by a strong attachment t o democratic p r i n c i p l e s . Poland was never governed by a powerful, almighty r u l e r perceived i n d e i f i c c a t e g o r i e s . Quite the contrary. In the P o l i s h t r a d i t i o n there was a very strong tendency t o l i m i t and c o n t r o l the power of the King, who was t r e a t e d as a p o t e n t i a l t y r a n t . That i s why he had t o be con-s t a n t l y c o n t r o l l e d . 2. POLISH VALUES, BELIEFS AND SYMBOLS I n d i v i d u a l i s m and p o l i t i c a l democracy were the most important values i n P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . R e f l e c t i o n on the p r i n c i p l e s of 81 democracy became a constant s u b j e c t of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s . As e a r l y as the f i f t e e n t h century, a P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l t r e a t i s e was pub-l i s h e d on the r o l e of law i n a modern s t a t e . In 1475 Jan Ostrorog, whom M i l o s z c a l l s "Poland's f i r s t l a y p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r , " 1 ^ p u b l i s h e d the Monumentum Pro Republicae Ordinatione (On the O r g a n i z a t i o n of the State) i n which he argued f o r uniform law as a sine qua non of a j u s t and democratic order. Ostrorog wrote: "Enacted laws are necessary i n order t h a t sentences may not be passed according to the whim of a s i n g l e mind but according t o the judgement of many persons." 1 7 0 He a l s o argued f o r the i m p a r t i a l i t y of judges. Another P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r , Andrej Frycz Modrzewski, i n h i s work De Republica Emendanda (On the Reform of the S t a t e ) , which " i s considered t o be the f i r s t t r e a t i s e i n Europe t o d i s c u s s problems of the s t a t e as a whole," 1 7 1 appealed f o r the e q u a l i t y of a l l c l a s s e s before the law and argued t h a t "kings are e s t a b l i s h e d f o r the people and not the people f o r the k i n g s . " 1 7 2 R e f l e c t i o n s on the r o l e of law were connected w i t h a concern about the p o s i t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l i n the s t a t e and h i s r i g h t s . I have already mentioned t h a t the freedom of the c i t i z e n was of utmost p r i o r i t y f o r the Poles. This freedom embraced a l l aspects of human l i f e i n c l u d i n g freedom of r e l i g i o n . During the most severe time of the Roman I n q u i s i t i o n i n Europe, there was an Act on the E q u a l i t y of Rights f o r P r o t e s t a n t s i n P o l a n d . 1 7 3 In t h i s Act we can read t h a t : We, the S p i r i t u a l and Temporal Counselors, the Gentry and the other E s t a t e s of the one and i n d i v i s i b l e Republic, from Old and New Poland, from the Grand Duchy of L i t h u a n i a , e t c . — a n d from the C i t i e s of the Crown ( d e c l a r e ) : . . . Whereas t h e r e i s a great d i s s i d e n c e i n a f f a i r s of the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n w i t h i n our country, and t o prevent any s e d i t i o n f o r t h i s reason among 82 the p e o p l e — l i k e what we see c l e a r l y i n other kingdoms—we promise each other, on behalf of ourselves and our descendants, f o r p e r p e t u i t y , under oath and pledging our f a i t h , honor and consciences, that we who are D i s s i d e n t e s de R e l i g i o n e w i l l keep peace between our s e l v e s , and n e i t h e r shed blood on account of d i f f e r e n c e s of f a i t h or kinds of churches, nor punish one another by c o n f i s c a t i o n of goods, d e p r i v a t i o n of honour, i m p r i s o n m e n t or e x i l e . . . ,1 7 4 I t i s worthwhile t o n o t i c e t h a t t h i s Act was issued i n a country where Roman C a t h o l i c i s m was the o f f i c i a l s t a t e r e l i g i o n and was t r e a t e d as the most important l i n k w i t h the Western p a r t of the continent. An extremely important p e r i o d f o r P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e was the time when Poland disappeared as an independent country. A f t e r the t h i r d p a r t i t i o n of the country i n 1 795 Poland was erased from the p o l i t i c a l map of Europe. I t d i d not r e g a i n an independent s t a t u s f o r more than a century u n t i l World War I. The nineteenth century was a p e r i o d when the Poles t r i e d t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e i r s t a t e . I t can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a time when many r e v o l t s and i n s u r r e c t i o n s took p l a c e on P o l i s h s o i l . For p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s who are i n t e r e s t e d i n the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , the nineteenth century h i s t o r y of Poland provides much in f o r m a t i o n . We can analyze the many p o l i t i c a l movements orga-n i z e d i n t h i s century. A l s o nineteenth century P o l i s h l i t e r a t u r e i l l u s t r a t e s the main values and b e l i e f s of the country. M i l o s z , ana-l y z i n g the nineteenth century i n Poland, w r i t e s : "Heroic i n s u r r e c -t i o n s , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements a l l over Europe, r e -t a l i a t i v e executions c a r r i e d out by occupying powers, and d e p o r t a t i o n s t o S i b e r i a unavoidably shaped the P o l i s h m e n t a l i t y . These c r u c i a l events came at a time when modern n a t i o n a l i s m was c r y s t a l l i z i n g under the impact of the French R e v o l u t i o n and German philosophy." 1 7 5 8 3 Under these circumstances the concept of Polishne s s g r a d u a l l y emerged. Adam M i c k i e w i c z , one of the g r e a t e s t P o l i s h poets wrote about the nineteenth century of Europe and the essence of " P o l i s h -ness": Then the Kings, renouncing C h r i s t , made new i d o l s which they s e t up i n the s i g h t o f the people. . . . So th e k i n g s made an i d o l f o r the Fr e n c h and c a l l e d i t HONOUR . . . made an i d o l f o r the Spaniards c a l l e d POLITICAL POWER. . . . And f o r the E n g l i s h , t h e i r King made an i d o l c a l l e d SEA POWER AND COMMERCE. .... And f o r t h e Germans an i d o l was made c a l l e d BROTSINN o r PROSPERITY which was the same of Moloch. . . . And f i n a l l y Poland s a i d : 'Whosoever w i l l come to me s h a l l be f r e e and equal, f o r I am FREEDOM.'176 What d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the Poles from some other nations i s t h e i r love of freedom. This o p i n i o n of M i c k i e w i c z i s compatible w i t h the o l d e r P o l i s h t r a d i t i o n which I have already discussed. The Liberum Veto was a c a r i c a t u r e of the P o l i s h fondness f o r an extreme form of democracy i n which one member of the Sejm was able t o d i s s o l v e the whole body. The n o t i o n of freedom and democracy was connected t o a b e l i e f i n the great power of the i n d i v i d u a l . This b e l i e f i s one of the most d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . I t was presented hundreds of times i n P o l i s h romantic l i t e r a t u r e (i.e. the l i t e r a t u r e of the f i r s t h a l f of the nineteenth century). The most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c example of t h i s b e l i e f can be found i n Mickiewicz's F o r e f a t h e r s P a r t  I I I when Konrad, the main hero of t h i s poem, t a l k s t o God and demands the L o r d ". . . g i v e me the r u l e o v er s o u l s so t h a t I may make my country happy and a s t o n i s h the whole w o r l d . " 1 7 7 However, romantic i n d i v i d u a l i s m was not the only p o l i t i c a l stream of the nineteenth century. In the second p a r t of t h i s century 8 4 another stream i n P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e a p p e a r e d — p o s i t i v i s m . The proponents of p o s i t i v i s m t r i e d t o change P o l i s h i n d i v i d u a l i s m . They argued t h a t the Konrad-like b e l i e f i n the power of the i n d i v i d u a l i s u s e l e s s because i t cannot be put i n t o p r a c t i c e . According t o the p o s i t i v i s t s only a whole n a t i o n , not an i n d i v i d u a l can achieve inde-pendence of the country. Alexander Swietochowski, the f a t h e r of P o l i s h p o s i t i v i s m , wrote: ". . . t h i s [ P o l i s h ] independence can r e s u l t from the strengthening of our i n t e l l e c t u a l and m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s . " 1 7 8 In other words, the Poles should develop the n a t i o n a l economy because i t i s the only way t o get r i c h . And only a r i c h n a t i o n can become powerful enough to put s i g n i f i c a n t pressure on those who p a r t i t i o n Poland and e v e n t u a l l y r e g a i n independence. We can say t h a t almost a l l important P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l movements of the nineteenth century were i n s p i r e d by romanticism, not p o s i t i v -ism. T h e i r programs emphasized the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l , and the e q u a l i t y of a l l people before law, they saw p o l i t i c a l democracy as the best system f o r an independent Poland. Regaining independence was the main purpose of these movements, and t h e r e f o r e n a t i o n a l i s m was a l s o a strong element of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Davies very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out: In Eastern Europe, where the p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l environment has d i f f e r e d w i d e l y from t h a t i n the West, a t t i t u d e s towards N a t i o n a l i s m have been very d i f f e r e n t . . . . In t h i s context, the adherents of the numerous n a t i o n a l movements, whose u l t i -mate goal of forming independent n a t i o n a l s t a t e s was fundamen-t a l l y i n compatible w i t h the i n t e g r i t y of the empires must be counted among the r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements. . . . They saw no c o n t r a d i c t i o n whatsoever between n a t i o n a l i s m and Democracy, p r e f e r r i n g t o view the one as the n a t u r a l guarantor of the o t h e r . 1 7 9 I t was e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n the P o l i s h context. Poland, squeezed 85 between the German and Russian Empires, was fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from i t s powerful neighbours. With t h e i r t r a d i t i o n of e l e c t e d Kings, l i m i t e d government, the Liberum Veto p r i n c i p l e , strong i n d i v i d u a l i s m and the worship of freedom, the Poles could not adapt themselves t o the autocracy of Russia or P r u s s i a . For them, having an independent s t a t e was an e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n of democracy. In a d d i t i o n these two empires were the main a c t o r s of Poland's p a r t i t i o n s . This was a reason f o r very h o s t i l e f e e l i n g s towards the occu-pying nations. M i l o s z w r i t e s "hatred f o r the main occupying power, Russia, i n c l i n e d the Poles to i n t e r p r e t the c o n f l i c t between the two c o u n t r i e s as a s t r u g g l e between the f o r c e s of l i g h t (democracy), on the one hand, and those of darkness (tyranny), on the other. Russia was not 'European'; i t was ' A s i a t i c , ' . . ."180 A l s o , the Polish-German f e e l i n g s toward one another were very u n f r i e n d l y . The Poles t r e a t e d the Germans as s o u l l e s s moneymakers without any respect f o r freedom and democratic r u l e s . The Germans, on the other hand, t r e a t e d the Poles as a n a t i o n of l o a f e r s w i t h a super-i n e f f i c i e n t economy, and t h e r e f o r e , as F r e d e r i c k the Great, the P r u s s i a n King argued, Poland w i l l not be ". . . conquered by weapons but consumed i n peace i n the manner of an a r t i c h o k e , piece by p i e c e . " 1 8 1 However, of the three c o u n t r i e s which p a r t i t i o n e d Poland ( P r u s s i a , Russia and A u s t r i a ) , Russian r u l e r s h i p was the most c r u e l and b r u t a l . The Russian governors of the p a r t of Poland which now belongs t o Russia used t e r r o r as the main means of e x e r c i s i n g power. Deportations t o S i b e r i a , strong R u s s i f i c a t i o n , censorship, etc., be-86 came a p a r t of the day-to-day l i f e of the Poles. This s i t u a t i o n c reated an even greater hatred towards " A s i a t i c " Russia. This hatred became an inseparable p a r t of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 1 8 2 A n t i -Russian f e e l i n g s were d i r e c t e d not only towards the Russians, but a l s o towards ideas which o r i g i n a t e d from Russia. I t may be an a d d i t i o n a l reason, besides P o l i s h i n d i v i d u a l i s m , why the idea of c o l l e c t i v i s m was never popular among the Poles. Even P o s i t i v i s m , which i s t r e a t e d by communist h i s t o r i a n s as the c r a d l e of P o l i s h communism, never empha-s i z e d c o l l e c t i v i s m . The main o b j e c t i v e of nineteenth century P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l move-ments was to r e e s t a b l i s h an independent country. In order t o achieve t h i s end, the Poles p a r t i c i p a t e d i n many democratic movements i n Europe and t r i e d t o cooperate w i t h any p o l i t i c a l f o r c e which might help t o r e g a i n independence. For example, i n 1797 a P o l i s h Napoleonic l e g i o n was created. The Poles i n t h i s l e g i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t Napoleon would a s s i s t i n the c r e a t i o n of an independent P o l i s h s t a t e i n ex-change f o r t h e i r f i d e l i t y . In 1807 the Duchy of Warsaw was created. This p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y had i t s own c o n s t i t u t i o n and was p r o t e c t e d by Napoleon. I t s c o n s t i t u t i o n was very P o l i s h i n t h at i t recognized the peasants as f r e e c i t i z e n s , equal before the law. However, i t d i d not g i v e them the r i g h t t o own the land. None of the main P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l movements of the nineteenth century s t r e s s e d the idea of s o c i a l e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . For example, du r i n g the November R i s i n g of 1830, a new c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r an inde-pendent Poland was p r e p a r e d . 1 8 3 Again, i t was concentrated almost e n t i r e l y on t r a d i t i o n a l i ssues. The c o n s t i t u t i o n declared t h a t the 87 government would be accountable t o the Sejm and t h a t Poland would be a country of f r e e people. The r i s i n g d i d not succeed, the c o n s t i t u t i o n was never put i n t o p r a c t i c e , but i t i s a good example of the b e l i e f s and values of the Poles. A consequence of the November r i s i n g was an increase of t e r r o r a p p l i e d by the Russians. This s i t u a t i o n strengthened another f e a t u r e of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e — a n t i - R u s s i a n f e e l i n g s . Davies w r i t e s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f the r i s i n g and t h e t e r r o r o f t h e R u s s i a n s ". . . t r i g g e r e d the f i r s t of many waves of Russophobia, which even e f f e c t e d p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n England." We can imagine how t h i s f u e l e d hatred f o r Russia i n Poland. This f e e l i n g became a c e n t r a l f e a t u r e of the P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l m e n t a l i t y . The Poles were very a c t i v e i n p o l i t i c a l movements of Europe. They took p a r t i n these movements under the slogan " f o r your freedom and ours." This motto meant t h a t the Poles had a moral o b l i g a t i o n to help whenever a n a t i o n fought f o r i t s freedom. In p r a c t i c e , however, t h i s slogan might be understood i n t h i s way, "Any enemy of Russia was an a l l y of the P o l e s . " P o l i s h i n d i v i d u a l i s m and Russophobia created another p e c u l i a r f e a t u r e of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , namely, messianism. M i l o s z w r i t e s "An o l d tendency t o i d e a l i z e "golden freedom" [i.e. the Liberum  Veto type of freedom], which had d i s t i n g u i s h e d Poland from her neigh-bours, the a u t o c r a t i c monarchies, underwent a mutation: Enormous t a l e n t s f o r s e l f - p i t y were d i s p l a y e d , and Poland was presented as an innocent v i c t i m s u f f e r i n g f o r the s i n s of humanity." 1 8 5 In short, messianism can be summarized i n t h i s way: Poland, 88 t h i s b a s t i o n of democracy, t h i s ambassador of freedom, t h i s rampart of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n s u f f e r s from the hands of b a r b a r i a n Russia. However, t h i s martyrdom of Poland i s not i n v a i n . The B i b l e teaches th a t s u f f e r i n g paves the road to s a l v a t i o n . That i s why Poland, d e s p i t e her present s t a t u s , should be happy. Being the C h r i s t of n a t i o n s , Poland w i l l be rewarded, w i l l r e g a i n independence and w i l l make her people happy. Indeed, the more s u f f e r i n g , the g r e a t e r the chance f o r reward. This n a t i o n a l megalomania and tendency to e x a l t a t i o n created a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p erception of p o l i t i c s . P o l i t i c s was understood i n h i g h l y i m p r a c t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s of m o r a l i t y . R a t i o n a l i t y was almost e n t i r e l y e l i m i n a t e d and r ecklessness became a v i r t u e of p o l i t i c a l behaviour. M i c k i e w i c z w r i t i n g about the i d e a l type of a r u l e r f o r the Poles, s a i d [T]he s p i r i t of the P o l i s h n a t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t no P i s i s t r a t u s or Cromwell type w i l l s t r i k e r o o t i n our s o i l . There i s i n the P o l i s h n a t i o n a great, profound, u n i v e r s a l sense of noble-mindedness honesty and s i n c e r i t y . 1 °° In other words, i n Poland, the e f f i c i e n c y of the government i s not an important c r i t e r i o n f o r the people, and pragmatism i s not con-si d e r e d t o be a s t r e n g t h of the r u l e r . In t h i s context, the numerous nineteenth century r e v o l t s of the Poles against the occupying powers were not s u r p r i s i n g . The r e v o l t s were u s u a l l y conducted at the worst moment and against a l l odds. They were always b r u t a l l y thwarted, but n evertheless they became a r e c u r r i n g element of P o l i s h h i s t o r y . A l l these unsuccessful r e v o l t s and u p r i s i n g s were a r e s u l t of the P o l i s h conception of p o l i t i c s . P o l i t i c s became a matter of i r r a t i o n a l i t y , w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g and dreams, and was perceived e x c l u s i v e l y as a r e s u l t 89 of the a c t s of an i n d i v i d u a l . In sum, the main b e l i e f s and values of the Poles can be charac-t e r i z e d as f o l l o w s : 1 ) a very strong b e l i e f i n the power of the i n d i v i d u a l — a person should be considered one of the most important c r e a t o r s of p o l i t i c s ; 2) a b e l i e f t h a t l i m i t e d power of r u l e r s creates an o p t i m a l p o l i t i c a l system; 3) a b e l i e f t h a t p o l i t i c a l democracy must be pro t e c t e d i f l i f e i s t o be comfortable and the government m o r a l l y acceptable; 4) a strong b e l i e f t h a t law i s the best instrument to e x e r c i s e power; and 5) an extremely strong a n t i - R u s s i a n a t t i t u d e . These b e l i e f s and values i n f l u e n c e d the p o l i t i c a l behaviour and expectations of the Poles. 3. POLISH POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, EXPECTATIONS AND BEHAVIOUR I have shown t h a t Poland has had much experience w i t h p o l i t i c a l democracy. U n l i k e the Russians, the Poles were p o l i t i c a l l y very a c t i v e . T h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the government was based on the con-v i c t i o n t h a t "the a u t h o r i t i e s cannot do everything t h a t they would 1 87 l i k e to do." This a t t i t u d e caused much involvement of the gentry i n p o l i t i c s . Each nobleman had the r i g h t t o vote f o r the k i n g and t o be e l e c t e d as the king. The whole p o l i t i c a l system of independent Poland before the l a s t p a r t i t i o n was based on the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f -government, i n which hundreds of S e j m i k i ( l o c a l parliaments) were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r l o c a l matters. This p o l i t i c a l l i f e was w e l l described by an Englishman who v i s i t e d Poland i n the s i x t e e n t h century. In h i s d i a r y , the E n g l i s h t r a v e l l e r noted t h a t "each nobleman can f r e e l y speak out. He need not 90 worry about any k i n d of p o l i t i c a l p e r s e c u t i o n and can say what he w i s h e s . " 1 8 8 This approach t o p o l i t i c s was e x e m p l i f i e d when P o l i s h King Sigmund I I I Vasa was t o l d by one of h i s e l e c t o r s : "Be aware, Your Highness, t h a t you were given the crown by the n a t i o n which has been l i v i n g i n freedom f o r c e n t u r i e s . " 1 8 ^ " L i v i n g i n Freedom" was the g r e a t e s t d e s i r e of the Poles. They expected the s t a t e t o guarantee the freedom of i t s c i t i z e n s . This was the main task of the a u t h o r i t i e s . Those who governed were t o make sure t h a t the c i t i z e n s were not l i m i t e d i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . For example, a f t e r the massacre of S a i n t Bartholomew's Day i n France, a P o l i s h Huguenot s a i d t h a t i n Poland such an event was i n c o n c e i v a b l e s i n c e the King was c o n s t a n t l y c o n t r o l l e d by h i s subjects. 1 The c o n t r o l of the King's powers o r i g i n a t e d from the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t any law must be approved by a l l c i t i z e n s i f i t i s t o be t r e a t e d as j u s t and good. Davies very r i g h t l y observes t h a t I t [ t h i s c o n v i c t i o n ] gave a strong sense of commitment t o any consensus t h a t has a c t u a l l y reached. I t encouraged the noble-man t o stand by h i s words, once given, and to defend h i s com-mitments as a matter of honour. This 'honourable' t r a d i t i o n of unanimity was a n a t u r a l a l l y of the West European concept of l i b e r a l government by consent. I t goes a long way to e x p l a i n -i n g why Poles i n the nineteenth century i n s t i n c t i v e l y r e j e c t e d b e n e f i c i a l reforms when imposed ' from on high,' and why, having i d e n t i f i e d an i n j u s t i c e , they would f i g h t a g a i n s t i t t o a man. Their c r i t i c s c a l l i t a f a n a t i c a l penchant f o r t r o u b l e -making; t h e i r admirers c a l l i t a f i n e sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ' y' I have alr e a d y presented the Liberum Veto t r a d i t i o n . Another very important mechanism f o r c o n t r o l l i n g the King was the Right of Resistance, a l s o c a l l e d "the Confederation Right." Whenever there was a breach of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l covenants the gentry had the r i g h t t o form a confederation. L i k e the Liberum Veto, the confederation r i g h t 91 was used too o f t e n , and i t f i n a l l y r e s u l t e d i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which the King was deprived of almost a l l instruments of power. His govern-ment was weak. E s p e c i a l l y i n the second p a r t of the eighteenth cen-t u r y , Poland was t o r n by f a c t i o n a l b a t t l e s and the country was i n a constant s t a t e of anarchy. In other words, the ideas of l i m i t e d government, p o l i t i c a l freedom and c i v i l r i g h t s degenerated i n t o the s t a t e of systemic anarchy i n which no sound p o l i t i c a l or economic p l a n could be implemented. This had an important impact on P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a t the end of the eighteenth century. M. K. S a r b i e w s k i , the P o l i s h l i t e r a r y c r i t i c and poet, wrote Somewhere e l s e eloquence i s the domain of w r i t e r s and can be found i n books, but i n Poland t h i s i s the domain of the p o l i t i -c i a n s . The Spaniard i s , by h i s nature, a t h e o l o g i a n , the I t a l i a n - - a philosopher, the Frenchman—a poet, the German—a h i s t o r i a n and the P o l e — a n o r a t o r J 9 3 Demagogy was an important f e a t u r e of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I t i n f l u e n c e d the p o l i t i c a l knowledge and behaviour of the Poles. The word "freedom" was repeated i n many, o f t e n e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t , s i t u a t i o n s , and i t was u s u a l l y t o j u s t i f y someone's behaviour and/or d e c i s i o n s . Numerous p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s and groups presented them-sel v e s as the defenders of freedom. Whether i t was the Confederation 1 Q.4 of Bar or the Confederation of Targowica , t h e i r members and support-ers claimed t o defend freedom and democracy. The nineteenth century preserved P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Adherence t o i t meant m a i n t a i n i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s between the Poles and those who occupied Poland. In other words, P o l i s h values, symbols, b e l i e f s , etc. helped t o r e s i s t the attempts of R u s s i f i c a t i o n and Germanization. As we w i l l see, t h i s 92 a l s o a p p l i e s t o the t w e n t i e t h century. A f t e r World War I Poland emerged as an independent country. The Sejm became one of the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s organized i n the independent Poland. However, again demagogy dominated the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of t h a t time. Hundreds of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s were organized. For i n s t a n c e , i n Warsaw alone there were twenty-one p a r t i e s which p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n s t o the Sejm. 1 9 5 Needless t o say, a l l of them claimed to be defenders of democracy. The f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n of independent Poland (the s o - c a l l e d L i t t l e C o n s t i t u t i o n ) introduced parliamentary democracy and i t s t a t e d t h a t "The Sejm i s the sovereign and law-making power."1 9 6 The next c o n s t i t u t i o n adopted by the f i r s t n a t i o n a l l y e l e c t e d Sejm i n March 1921 s t a t e d In the name of Almighty God! We, the people of Poland, thanking Providence f o r f r e e i n g us from one and a h a l f c e n t u r i e s of s e r v i t u d e , remembering w i t h g r a t i t u d e the bravery, endurance, and s e l f l e s s s t r u g g l e s of past generations, which unceasingly devoted a l l t h e i r best energies to the cause of independence, adhering t o the g l o r i o u s t r a d i t i o n of the immortal c o n s t i t u t i o n of 3 May, s t r i v i n g f o r the w e l f a r e of the whole, u n i t e d and independent mother-country, and f o r her sovereign e x i s t e n c e , might, s e c u r i t y and s o c i a l order. And d e s i r i n g t o ensure the development of a l l moral and m a t e r i a l powers f o r the good of the whole of regenerated mankind and t o ensure the e q u a l i t y of a l l c i t i z e n s , respect f o r labour, a l l due r i g h t s and p a r t i c u l a r l y the s e c u r i t y of the s t a t e p r o t e c t i o n , we hereby p r o c l a i m and vote t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u t e i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly of the Republic of Poland. 9 7 This preamble t o the March c o n s t i t u t i o n expresses the t r a d i -t i o n a l b e l i e f s of the Poles. There i s a b e l i e f i n Poland's p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n i n her r e l a t i o n s w i t h God, who f i n a l l y rewarded Poland by g i v i n g her independence i n exchange f o r the s u f f e r i n g i n the nine-teenth century (messianism). The authors of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n p r a i s e d 93 the past u p r i s i n g s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r r e c k l e s s and c o s t l y f a i l u r e s . There i s a l s o a strong emphasis on democracy (the 3 May C o n s t i t u t i o n ) , p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y of the c i t i z e n s and t h e i r c i v i c r i g h t s . Although d u r i n g t h i s time Poland stopped s u f f e r i n g f o r the whole of mankind once she regained independence, she nevertheless r e t a i n e d her m e s s i a n i s t i c r o l e . Her independence was t o help t o create "the good of the whole mankind". The authors of the C o n s t i t u -t i o n a l s o d i d not change t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e about Poland's r o l e as the b a s t i o n of democracy and the rampart of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n . Nothing changed and the country was s t i l l p erceived as the b a r r i e r t o Eastern barbarianism and communism. Independent Poland was t o guarantee t h a t Russian autocracy and communism would not spread over the continent. Thus, a very strong a n t i - R u s s i a n a t t i t u d e , r e g a r d l e s s whether i t was Red or White Russia, has remained. The f i r s t war waged by independent P o l a n d was w i t h S o v i e t R u s s i a i n 1 920. There a r e many d i f f e r e n t e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h i s war. Communist h i s t o r i a n s say t h a t t h i s war was caused by the P o l i s h bour-g e o i s e who were s c a r e d of p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s i n R u s s i a . 1 9 8 P o l i s h h i s t o r i a n s i n e x i l e say t hat t h i s war was waged to ensure the indepen-dence of P o l a n d . 1 " Western h i s t o r i a n s say, f o r example, t h a t " i t was fought t o maintain the independence of non-Russian areas of the former T s a r i s t e m p i r e . " 2 0 0 No matter what the p o i n t s of view of the h i s t o r i a n s , t h i s war was unnecessary. Poland had extremely s e r i o u s i n t e r n a l problems. I t was a country composed of three p a r t s , which f o r over one hundred years were attached t o three d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l u n i t s (Russia, 94 P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a ) , and now they had t o be r e - i n t e g r a t e d i n t o one p o l i t i c a l u n i t . Poland had very s e r i o u s economic problems. Her i n d u s t r i a l base had t o be r e b u i l t a f t e r the d e v a s t a t i o n of World War I. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , from a pragmatic p o i n t of view, any o f f e n s i v e war was u n j u s t i f i e d . Nevertheless, the 1920 P o l i s h - R u s s i a n war occur-red. In t h i s context, t h i s war can be viewed as a r e f l e c t i o n of the hatred of the Poles towards Russia and as a r e f l e c t i o n of the P o l i s h p e r c e p t i o n of p o l i t i c s . R a t i o n a l reasoning i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s . The eventual g r a t i t u d e and a d m i r a t i o n of the world f o r the n a t i o n which fought the barbarians f o r the freedom of the world i s much more important than the c o s t s of a c t i o n . F i g h t i n g w i t h Russia f o r the pleasure of a f i n a l v i c t o r y was much more e n t i c i n g than a b o r i n g process of r e b u i l d i n g the n a t i o n a l economy. This very u n p r a c t i c a l a t t i t u d e towards p o l i t i c s was a l s o presented i n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . I have already mentioned the enormous number of p o l i t i c a l groups and p a r t i e s which p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the f i r s t s e l e c t i o n s t o the Sejm. One of the most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s of the p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n Independent Poland was the e x i s t e n c e of tens of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Now, a f t e r r e g a i n i n g independence, p o l i t i c a l q u a r r e l s began. W i t h i n the f i r s t e i g h t years of independence, there were more than a dozen cabinets. None of them were strong enough t o implement any s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l l i n e . When i n 1926 M a r s h a l l P i l s u d s k i decided to take over through a coup he j u s t i f i e d h i s d e c i s i o n w i t h reference t o the i n s t a -b i l i t y of previous governments. He argued t h a t t h i s i n s t a b i l i t y might create a s i t u a t i o n s i m i l a r t o the eighteenth century when Poland was 95 p a r t i t i o n e d . In a manifesto published i n 1928 by P i l s u d s k i ' s sup-p o r t e r s , we f i n d the f o l l o w i n g statements: Poland must have a strong government which w i l l be based on the Sejm as i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s i s . . . . The members of the parliament w i l l have t o pay gr e a t e r a t t e n t i o n t o economic problems of our young s t a t e ; they w i l l have t o s t r i v e f o r p o l i c i e s which help t o increase economic p r o d u c t i v i t y i n a l l f i e l d s of the n a t i o n a l economy. They w i l l have t o create these p o l i c i e s without any p o l i t i c a l or party p r e j u d i c e s . u' Therefore we can see the 1926 coup as an attempt t o modify the p o l i t i -c a l c u l t u r e by i n t r o d u c i n g more pragmatism i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The P i l s u d s k i coup was very o f t e n presented by communist h i s t o -1926 began a new p o l i t i c a l system which was not parliamentary. How-ever, the P i l s u d s k i regime d i d not e l i m i n a t e e n t i r e l y the sovereignty of the Sejm, d i d not ban a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and d i d not subjugate the law courts. Although the Sejm was not as powerful as i t had been before the 1926 coup because the m a j o r i t y of i t s members were d i r e c t l y subordinated t o P i l s u d s k i , i t s t i l l remained a forum where the opposi-t i o n could c r i t i c i z e the regime and i t s p o l i c i e s . In other words, the t r a d i t i o n a l attachment of the Poles t o the i n s t i t u t i o n of parliament as the symbol of democracy was respected. The Poles, then, had a l e g a l p o s s i b i l i t y t o c r i t i c i z e the a u t h o r i t i e s , and the t r a d i t i o n a l tendency, t r e a t e d as a c i v i c v i r t u e , t o oppose the government had i t s l e g a l forum. In short, P i l s u d s k i took i n t o account P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . By no means can t h i s be s a i d about the communist regime. As w i l l be f u r t h e r argued, the communists d i d not pay any a t t e n t i o n t o the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , and t h i s i s a r i a n s as the beginning of P o l i s h fascism. 202 Undoubtedly, the year 96 reason f o r the e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y of Poland under communism. To summarize, the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Poles i s fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The g r e a t e s t d i f f e r e n c e i s i n the way the two nations perceive a u t h o r i t y . The Russians look upon a u t h o r i t y as the only source of wisdom. A u t h o r i t y i s by d e f i n i t i o n sacrosanct, and i t s d e c i s i o n s are undisputable. The u n l i m i t e d power of the government i s a n a t u r a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s . I t has always been t h i s way. Why? Because only the u n l i m i t e d power of the r u l e r can guarantee s o c i a l order. This order i s conceived as a c o n d i t i o n i n which each person i s secured by the s t a t e . The s t a t e i s supposed t o provide the b a s i c c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e (i.e., food, s h e l t e r and defense of the borders). In exchange, the people make every e f f o r t t o guard the i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e . In t h i s context, i n d i v i d -u a l i s m i s e l i m i n a t e d almost a l t o g e t h e r . Nothing i s more important than the r u l e r , the s t a t e and the n a t i o n as a whole. Democracy as described by Western w r i t e r s i s incomprehensible and i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h anarchy. In the P o l i s h context, the s i t u a t i o n i s q u i t e the opposite. For the Poles, u n l i m i t e d power i s unacceptable. The n o t i o n of popular sovereignty i s deeply rooted i n P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The f i r s t p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n which l i m i t e d the power of the King appeared as e a r l y as the f i f t e e n t h century. At the same time an act was i n t r o -duced which guaranteed t h a t each c i t i z e n could not be a r r e s t e d without a warrant issued by the court. In England, f o r example, the same a c t (the Habeas Corpus Act) was adopted more than two c e n t u r i e s l a t e r 97 (1688). I n d i v i d u a l i s m was one of the most conspicuous features of P o l i s h c u l t u r e . What was r e a l l y important i n the p o l i t i c a l system was the i n d i v i d u a l . His p o s i t i o n was t o be guaranteed by h i s c i v i l r i g h t s . His opinions had t o be taken i n t o account by the r u l e r . Otherwise, the system would degenerate i n t o d i c t a t o r s h i p . And t h i s was perceived as an unnatural way t o organize the s t a t e . Another important f e a t u r e of P o l i s h c u l t u r e was n a t i o n a l mega-lomania. The baptism of Poland was the moment when Poles s t a r t e d t o perceive themselves as the easternmost b a s t i o n of democracy and l u m i -nous i d e a s . However, t h i s p e r c e p t i o n d i d not c o r r e l a t e w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n and p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the country. Instead of being an important power, as any b a s t i o n should be, Poland was i n a constant d e c l i n e b e g i n n i n g i n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , and en d i n g w i t h t h e t h i r d and l a s t p a r t i t i o n . This f i n a l r e s u l t created great f r u s t r a t i o n f o r the Poles. On the one s i d e , they s t i l l thought of themselves as being the rampart of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n and democracy. On the other s i d e , the country was occupied by d i c t a t o r s h i p s . That s i t u a t i o n was understood as i l l o g i c a l s i n c e each d i c t a t o r s h i p was t o be, by d e f i n i t i o n , i n f e r i o r and t h e r e f o r e weaker. This "paradox," when the weaker became stronger and the stronger became weaker, created P o l i s h messianism and a pecu-l i a r p e r c e p t i o n of p o l i t i c s . This perception became an i n c r e d i b l e mixture of w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g , dreams, demands, pretences, emotions, m o r a l i t y and mysticism. As a r e s u l t , some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n s of p o l i t i c a l behaviour were created. These patterns can be descri b e d as f o l l o w s : 98 1) Each c i t i z e n , i f he i s t o be a good c i t i z e n , must be p o l i t i c a l l y very a c t i v e . To do otherwise would tempt the a u t h o r i t i e s t o increase t h e i r p r e r o g a t i v e s , l e a d i n g t o d i c t a t o r s h i p . 2) Each r u l e r wants t o be a t y r a n t . I t i s h i s nature. Therefore, constant o p p o s i t i o n t o the a u t h o r i t i e s i s the best way t o avoid t y r -anny . 3) The r u l e r must understand t h a t h i s l e g i t i m a c y depends on perma-nent c o n t r o l by the people. An i l l e g i t i m a t e r u l e r must be r e j e c t e d and fought. 4) But there i s another c o n d i t i o n of the l e g i t i m a c y of the r u l e r . He must be P o l i s h , because only a Pole can understand what democracy i s a l l about. He cannot, f o r example, be a Russian because a Russian cannot understand democratic r u l e s . Being P o l i s h meant the r u l e r must be e l e c t e d and accepted by the Poles. He d i d not need be born i n Poland, he j u s t had t o understand the democratic c u l t u r e of the Poles. 5) The law was t o be the best instrument of the r u l e r ' s power. However, i f the r u l e r ceased t o be l e g i t i m a t e , or never was l e g i t i -mate, then the law should not be obeyed and had t o be opposed. An i l l e g i t i m a t e r u l e r could not create l e g i t i m a t e laws. Even i f the laws were pragmatic w i t h p o s i t i v e economic r e s u l t s , they would have t o be r e j e c t e d as being i l l e g i t i m a t e . R a t i o n a l i t y and pragmatism were l e s s important elements of p o l i t i c s . Emotions were much more s i g n i f i c a n t . For i n s t a n c e , i f the Czar made the most e f f e c t i v e reforms they would s t i l l have t o be opposed because they came from the "wrong" source, namely Russia. Emotionalism h e l d t h a t Russia was not capable of good ideas. Analyz-99 i n g P o l i s h h i s t o r y Ash w r i t e s : The w h i s t l e - s t o p tour through ten c e n t u r i e s of h i s t o r y must serve to e s t a b l i s h three p o i n t s which are as important as they are b a s i c : The Poles are an o l d European n a t i o n w i t h an unquenchable t h i r s t f o r freedom; freedom i n P o l i s h means, i n the f i r s t p l ace, n a t i o n a l independence; the P o l i s h n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y i s h i s t o r i c a l l y d e f i n e d i n o p p o s i t i o n t o Russia. In the nineteenth century t h i s o p p o s i t i o n might be descri b e d as the c l a s h of P o l i s h democracy w i t h Russian despotism, P o l i s h i n d i v i d u a l i s m w i t h Russian c o l l e c t i v i s m , P o l i s h C a t h o l i c i s m w i t h Russian orthodoxy. That was, i n short, the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Poles before the communist takeover. In the next p a r t of t h i s chapter I w i l l analyze the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a f t e r the communist takeover, s t a r t i n g w i t h the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 4 . THE POLITICAL CULTURE AFTER THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER In chapter one I argued t h a t i n the P o l i s h case i t i s very u s e f u l t o d i s t i n g u i s h a n a l y t i c a l l y between the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the t r a d i t i o n a l or dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . This i s so because i n Poland there i s a great disharmony between these two p o l i -t i c a l c u l t u r e s . As w i l l be argued here, t h i s disharmony plays an extremely important systemic r o l e . The sharp i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of the two p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s makes P o l i s h p o l i t i c s exceedingly unstable. This r e s u l t s because the regime l a c k s l e g i t i m a c y and i t i s r e j e c t e d by the vast m a j o r i t y of P o l i s h s o c i e t y . This must be emphasized. I have already shown the impor-tance of moral c r i t e r i a and emotions i n the P o l i s h p e r c e p t i o n of p o l i t i c s . In t h i s context r e j e c t i o n means something more than d i s -agreement regarding p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n s of the government. In Poland 100 the communist government i s m o r a l l y and e m o t i o n a l l y disapproved of and th e r e f o r e r e j e c t e d e n t i r e l y . What does t h i s mean? This problem can be explained by using a comparison w i t h Western c o u n t r i e s . In Western democracies c i t i z e n s need not approve each d e c i s i o n of t h e i r government. They can disagree w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y . This disagreement can lead t o a change i n e l e c t o r a l preference, and during the next e l e c t i o n people may vote f o r a d i f f e r e n t party. How-ever, by doing these t h i n g s , c i t i z e n s do not m o r a l l y r e j e c t t h e i r government. In Poland the s i t u a t i o n i s t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t . The disagreement between the government and the vast m a j o r i t y of c i t i z e n s do not con-cern p o l i c y matters, but the l e g i t i m a c y of the government i t s e l f . I f the a u t h o r i t i e s adhere t o the p r i n c i p l e s of Soviet Marxism w h i l e most c i t i z e n s s t r o n g l y support democratic values, then we can say the d i f f e r e n c e s between them are i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . I f the government pro-motes c o l l e c t i v i s m , autocracy and love f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l enemy, w h i l e the s o c i e t y s t i c k s s t r o n g l y t o i n d i v i d u a l i s m , democracy and hates Russia, then the government cannot be accepted, and i t cannot be s t a b l e . In a d d i t i o n , even i f the government makes some d e c i s i o n s which are b e n e f i c i a l f o r the s o c i e t y , i t i s nevertheless r e j e c t e d because i t represents something which we defi n e d e a r l i e r as non-Polish. That i s why the successes of the communist regime, such as u r b a n i z a t i o n or the e l i m i n a t i o n of i l l i t e r a c y , do not make t h i s regime s t a b l e . As I have shown, i n Poland emotions are f a r more important than pragmatism. 101 5. THE OFFICIAL POLITICAL CULTURE What does the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e look l i k e ? Here i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o say t h a t one of the main t a r g e t s of the regime i s P o l i s h i n d i v i d u a l i s m . In 1975, d u r i n g the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party, the Prime M i n i s t e r of Poland s a i d : While d i s s e m i n a t i n g i n P o l i s h s o c i e t y the i d e a l s of s o c i a l i s m , we w i l l be c o n s t a n t l y s t r i v i n g f o r the s i t u a t i o n where the i d e a l s w i l l change p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g and customs [of the Poles] and they w i l l determine the whole behavior of the man and h i s a t t i t u d e s regarding p u b l i c a c t i v i t y and p r i v a t e l i f e . 2 0 4 Wojciech J a r u z e l s k i , the present F i r s t Secretary of the p a r t y , who c l a i m s t o have begun an e n t i r e l y new era i n the h i s t o r y of People's Poland, says t h a t one of the most important o b j e c t i v e s of the p a r t y i s t o shape a "modern p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e " which w i l l embrace democratic t r a d i t i o n s w i t h a consciousness of the e x i s t i n g d u t i e s r e q u i r e d by the s t a t e and which w i l l e l i m i n a t e P o l i s h i n d i v i d u a l -ism. 205 The a t t a c k s on i n d i v i d u a l i s m by the communist regime are h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g . Soviet Marxism, mainly thanks t o S t a l i n , i s a c ontinua-t i o n of the o l d Russian t r a d i t i o n of autocracy. Therefore, even the s l i g h t e s t element of i n d i v i d u a l i s m has t o be e l i m i n a t e d . The i n t e r n a l r o o t s of P o l i s h communism, as I have already shown, were very weak. The communist regime i n Poland was e s t a b l i s h e d by the S o v i e t s , and the Red Army became one of the most important p i l l a r s of the communist regime i n Poland. There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the o r i g i n s of P o l i s h communism determine i t s f a c e — a n d t h i s face i s Russian. Obviously then, P o l i s h o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e i s a l s o Russian i n nature. Therefore i t promotes c o l l e c t i v i s m . 102 However, c o l l e c t i v i s m i s not the only s i m i l a r i t y between P o l i s h o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and Soviet c u l t u r e . The Warsaw regime a l s o t r i e s t o create i t s own j u s t Czar myth. In one of h i s speeches J a r u z e l s k i s a i d : People evaluate s o c i a l i s m through the prism of everyday l i f e . We [the Party] do not gain p o l i t i c a l support only by i s s u i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s . The people have t o know that the Party i s on t h e i r s i d e , t h a t the Party w i s e l y serves the people. I f some workers work i n t e r r i b l e c o n d i t i o n s and the s o u l l e s s c l e r k s do nothing t o b e t t e r these c o n d i t i o n s , then the Party has to stand on the p r o l e t a r i a t ' s s ide. Whenever there are problems, i n j u s t i c e and harm, the honest working Pole should know t h a t the Party i s h i s defender. °" L i k e an echo, the P o l i s h r u l e r repeats the Russian/Soviet myth about a government which i s always good, j u s t and humane. J a r u z e l s k i i s not an exception. In 1975, during the Seventh Congress of the Party, Edward Gierek, then the F i r s t Secretary, s a i d "The Party has t o main t a i n the t i e s w i t h the p u b l i c o p i n i o n , r e v e a l and n i p s o c i a l e v i l i n the bud and punish s o u l l e s s r e d - t a p i s t s . " 2 0 7 During each p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s every F i r s t Secretary a s s e r t s t h a t from t h i s time on the Pa r t y w i l l c o n s t a n t l y c o n t r o l bureaucrats because the Party i s j u s t and good-hearted. Only some of i t s servants are sometimes c a l l o u s . C o l l e c t i v i s m and the j u s t Czar myth f l y i n the face of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n . In a country where every r u l e r was t r e a t e d as a t y r a n t i n posse, and where o p p o s i t i o n t o a u t h o r i t y was regarded as a c i v i c v i r t u e , the c o l l e c t i v i s t e f f o r t s of the Warsaw regime are hard to implement because they are s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d by the people. S i m i l a r l y , another aspect of the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e always encounters r e s i s t e n c e . Love f o r the USSR has l i t t l e chance of acceptance i n Poland. I t goes aga i n s t the P o l i s h g r a i n . I have 103 already discussed the extremely strong Russophobia of the Poles. The widespread hatred of Russia i s one of the most conspicuous features of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . This hatred i s deeply rooted s i n c e i t i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l compensation of the Poles f o r the p a r t i t i o n s , the l a c k of sovereignty, the nineteenth century u p r i s i n g s which were b r u t a l l y suppressed, R u s s i f i c a t i o n , mass deportations to S i b e r i a , the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 and the 1939 i n v a s i o n by the Red Army, and f i n a l l y f o r communism which does not accord w i t h P o l i s h t r a d i t i o n s and the P o l i s h m e n t a l i t y . And i t i s a compensation f o r the communist regime i t s e l f which i s perceived merely as an agency of the Kremlin. In other words, i n a country where t e l l i n g a n t i - R u s s i a n jokes i s a n a t i o n a l passtime, the o f f i c i a l l y promoted love of the USSR i s a joke i t s e l f . Yet o f f i c i a l expressions of t h i s love abound i n the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . For example, A r t i c l e S i x of the 1976 P o l i s h Con-s t i t u t i o n s t a t e s : The P o l i s h People's Republic i n i t s p o l i c i e s 1) Takes i n t o account the i n t e r e s t s of the P o l i s h Nation, i t s sovereignty, independence and s e c u r i t y and the idea of peace and cooperation among n a t i o n s . 2) E s t a b l i s h e s l i n k s t o the laudable t r a d i t i o n s of s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the f o r c e s of freedom and progress and strengthens the f r i e n d s h i p and cooperation w i t h the Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Republics and other s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . I t i s h a r d l y necessary t o quote other o f f i c i a l documents which a t t e s t to the f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the S o v i e t Union. There are l i t e r a l l y thou-sands of them. Each expresses g r a t i t u d e f o r f r e e i n g Poland from the Nazi occupation, f o r securing the s a f e t y of borders and f o r u n s e l f i s h economic a i d . The members of the Warsaw government are c e r t a i n l y aware of the 104 strong a n t i - R u s s i a n a t t i t u d e s . That i s why they t r y t o change these a t t i t u d e s , not only w i t h p r i m i t i v e i n d o c t r i n a t i o n . They a l s o t r y t o e x p l a i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union w i t h arguments about P o l i s h r a i s o n d'etre. For example, i n a speech given t o the C e n t r a l Committee i n May 1982 J a r u z e l s k i s a i d : The place of Poland i n Europe and i n the world i s determined u n e q u i v o c a l l y and f i r m l y . We are a s o c i a l i s t country which r e a l i z e s i t s p o l i t i c a l , economic and defensive i n t e r e s t s through the c o a l i t i o n u n i t y of the Warsaw Treaty and through the p a r t n e r s h i p cooperation embraced i n the Cou n c i l f o r Mutual Economic A s s i s t a n c e . 0 9 In a speech given i n August 1983 he s a i d : In the time when Poland was d e l i r i o u s w i t h a n t i - S o v i e t propaganda, when the m i l i t a r y cemetaries of Sovi e t s o l d i e r s were profaned, and when our country was, i n any respect, i n a hopeless s t a t e of a f f a i r s [ t h i s i s J a r u z e l s k i ' s e v a l u a t i o n of the S o l i d a r i t y p e r i o d ] , the So v i e t Union was h e l p i n g us tremendously. And t h i s h e lp i s s t i l l on the increase. For inst a n c e , i n January 1981 the USSR granted four hundred and s i x t y - f i v e m i l l i o n d o l l a r s not subject t o repayment. In the same time we owe the Sovi e t Union almost four b i l l i o n r u b l e s and one b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . 2 1 0 In an i n t e r v i e w given f o r Sovi e t t e l e v i s i o n he de c l a r e d : The P o l i s h - S o v i e t a l l i a n c e was, i s and w i l l be the corner stone of the c l a s s and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t of the P o l i s h People's Republic. This was confirmed by the l a t e s t d i f f i c u l t years when the r e a l f r i e n d s h i p of the Sovi e t Union was many times proven to us, the Poles. However, even i f we assume t h a t there i s r e a l l y no other choice f o r Poland but f r i e n d s h i p , cooperation and a l l i a n c e w i t h the Sovi e t Union, and even i f we assume that Poland's geographical p o s i t i o n does not a l l o w an end t o t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , these arguments are not con-v i n c i n g enough f o r the Poles. I again have t o r e c a l l t h a t r a t i o n a l thought about p o l i t i c s i s not an important f e a t u r e of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , and emotions p l a y a f a r more important r o l e . When an emo-105 t i o n a l argument i s confronted w i t h a r a t i o n a l one, the former u s u a l l y p r e v a i l s . Bloch very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out t h a t P o l i s h h i s t o r y i s com-posed of "emotions based on dreams," and t h e r e f o r e i f one wants to understand i t , one should be an a r t i s t — " t h e communicator of emo-t i o n s " — r a t h e r than a h i s t o r i a n . 2 1 2 One cannot expect t h a t the e f f o r t s by the regime t o change the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Poles w i l l e a s i l y succeed. The gap between the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the dominant one i s too wide t o be overcome. That i s why P o l i s h o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , which i s j u s t a carbon copy of Russian c u l t u r e , does not have much chance t o f l o u r i s h i n Poland. F i r s t , the content of Russian c u l t u r e i s i n fundamental o p p o s i t i o n t o P o l i s h c u l t u r e . Second, due t o the h i s t o r y of the r e l a t i o n s between these two nations, almost e v e r y t h i n g t h a t o r i g i n a t e s i n Russia i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e j e c t e d by the Poles. M a r t i n M a l i a i n a 1983 a r t i c l e observed: Anyone acquainted w i t h the Poles cannot f a i l t o be struc k by t h e i r awesome h i s t o r i c a l memory. . . . The Poles l i v e out t h e i r contemporary d e s t i n y as a pa r t of h i s t o r y t o a degree u n p a r a l l e l e d elsewhere i n Europe. There i s indeed perhaps no more s t r i k i n g example of the primacy of n a t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n over s o c i a l or c l a s s consciousness than t h a t of the P o l e s — u n l e s s i t be th a t of the Jews. 3 Malia's i n s i g h t i s a good i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the next p a r t of t h i s chap-t e r which deals w i t h the contemporary P o l i s h dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l -t u r e , s i n c e an important element of i t i s the very strong h i s t o r i c a l consciousness. 6. THE CONTEMPORARY DOMINANT POLITICAL CULTURE E a r l i e r I described why the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s 106 a t t r a c t i v e t o the Warsaw regime. The r e s u l t of t h i s i s t h a t there are many s o c i a l science surveys which examine the dominant c u l t u r e . For more than twenty years the Centre f o r P u b l i c Opinion (the P o l i s h a b b r e v i a t i o n i s OBOP) has e x i s t e d . During M a r t i a l Law another organ-i z a t i o n was created, the Governmental Centre f o r P u b l i c Opinion Research. Survey research has a l s o been sponsored by P o l i s h u n i v e r -s i t i e s . In a d d i t i o n , there are countless r e p o r t s by f o r e i g n e r s who l i v e d i n Poland f o r extended periods of time, and the w r i t i n g s of P o l i s h d i s s i d e n t s . And, l a s t but not l e a s t , there are the P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s which are a l s o e x c e l l e n t sources of i n f o r m a t i o n on the dominant c u l t u r e . A l l of these sources w i l l be used i n the d i s -c u s s i o n of the dominant P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Values and B e l i e f s Kolakowski i n a 1 978 a r t i c l e argues that n a t i o n a l consciousness causes a decay of communism. He suggests t h a t " I t seems t h a t n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s , n a t i o n a l r e v i n d i c a t i o n are now the main f o r c e which d i s i n -t e g r a t e s and devours c o m m u n i s m . H This observation seems t o be par-t i c u l a r l y v a l i d i n the P o l i s h context. As I discussed above, there i s a great d i f f e r e n c e between Russian and P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s . For the Poles, adherence t o t h e i r past seems t o be the guarantee t o preserve the d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r o f f i c i a l and dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s . I t t h e r e f o r e serves t o preserve t h e i r n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y . F o s t e r i n g t h i s t r a d i t i o n , and t r a n s f e r r i n g i t from one generation to another helped Poland s u r v i v e R u s s i f i c a t i o n and Germanization i n the nineteenth century. I t seems t h a t the same mechanism works i n People's Poland. The attempts t o implement the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l 107 c u l t u r e can be seen i n many respects as comparable t o nineteenth century R u s s i f i c a t i o n . Then the main purpose was t o change the Poles thoroughly and make them l o y a l s u b j e c t s of Russia. Now the implementation of the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e means the same t h i n g — t o change the P o l i s h n a t i o n , make i t compatible w i t h the Russians and thereby make the people l o y a l s u b j e c t s of People's Poland and the Sov i e t empire. Malia's observation can be t e s t e d w i t h the s o c i o l o g i c a l survey conducted by Wiatr, S z o s t k i e w i c z and Gesek. 2 1 5 These authors asked t h e i r respondents what they regarded as the most g l o r i o u s b a t t l e s i n P o l i s h h i s t o r y . According t o the respondents, the most g l o r i o u s b a t t l e i n World War I I was the B a t t l e of Monte Cassino waged by the P o l i s h Army under the command of the London government i n e x i l e . This was much more popular than the B a t t l e of Lenino conducted by a P o l i s h Army under the command of Moscow. This i s not s u r p r i s i n g , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the Lenino b a t t l e i s much promoted by government propaganda and school c u r r i c u l u m s as the the most important b a t t l e i n contemporary P o l i s h h i s t o r y . Malia's d e s c r i p t i o n of the "awesome h i s t o r i c a l mem-ory" i s simply a device t o help preserve t r a d i t i o n a l P o l i s h c u l t u r e and i t s values. One of these values i s democracy. However, t o say t h a t contem-porary Poles approve of only one model of democracy would be an over-s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . In an a n a l y s i s of contemporary p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e one should remember t h a t no matter how much the Poles r e s i s t the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , they are nevertheless exposed t o i t and undoubtedly there i s some i n f l u e n c e of the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e upon the dominant one. 108 This i n f l u e n c e i s n o t i c e a b l e i n the f i n d i n g s of a 1978 survey conducted among young people by Olendzki. More than f i f t y percent of h i s respondents thought t h a t Poland i s not a democratic country. But when they asked what makes Poland undemocratic, only ten percent s a i d t h a t t h i s i s caused by the l a c k of o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . David Mason, who quotes t h i s survey, r i g h t l y concludes t h a t t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s caused by the l a c k of experience w i t h c o m p e t i t i v e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 2 1 6 In t h i s sense the communist regime has had some successes i n i t s attempts to change the dominant c u l t u r e . However, i t s success and i n f l u e n c e are f r a g i l e and they are u s u a l l y devastated d u r i n g p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s . This e f f o r t t o e l i m i n a t e the t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g the l a s t c r i s i s i n v o l v i n g the S o l i d a r n o s c movement, must be viewed as a t o t a l and complex catastrophe f o r the regime. The agreements signed i n August 1980 i n the Gdansk and Szezecin shipyards are very important t o an understanding of S o l i d a r i t y because they determined the p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n of the movement and gave i t 9 1 7 the b a s i s f o r l e g a l existence. An i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Gdansk agree-ment was a l i s t of twenty-one demands made by the s t r i k i n g workers. These demands can be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two groups—seven p o l i t i c a l demands and fourteen economic demands. The p o l i t i c a l demands would have profoundly changed P o l i s h communism i f they had been put i n t o p r a c t i c e . But even though they were never f u l l y r e a l i z e d , they had a tremendous i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of Poland. A l l the t r a d i t i o n a l f eatures of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e were revived. Perhaps the most important impact was on the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 109 Poles. In the summer of 1 980 p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n was very h i g h l y valued, and w i t h an opportunity t o p a r t i c i p a t e i t became the most important demand of the s t r i k e r s . This was the reason why the demand was put forward f o r the government "to accept f r e e trade unions independent from the Party and employers as provided by the ILO [the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour Organiza-t i o n ] Convention 87. . . ." An independent union meant a competi-t i v e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and a challenge t o the Party and i t s power. An independent union a l s o meant a forum t o c r i t i c i z e the Party and t o pressure the d e c i s i o n s made by the a u t h o r i t i e s . I t r a i s e d the o l d P o l i s h b e l i e f i n the n e c e s s i t y t o c o n t r o l the government and t o l i m i t i t s powers. A f t e r f o r t y years of communist r u l e and a constant attempt t o change the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and make the Poles t h i n k t h a t the only acceptable p a t t e r n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s t o obey su b m i s s i v e l y the orders of the i n f a l l i b l e a u t h o r i t y , the people showed no change i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s . Moreover, the demand t h a t the r u l e r s must be c o n t r o l l e d was supported not only by the i n t e l l e c t u a l s , but a l s o by the workers. A f t e r f o r t y years of c l a i m i n g and r e i t e r -a t i n g t h a t the party represents the i n t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t , the workers now wanted t o have a new r e p r e s e n t a t i v e trade union. And the trade union was t o be independent from the Party, the defender of the workers. At t h i s moment we can r a i s e the question of communist l e g i t i m a -cy i n Poland. The Party used to say t h a t the b a s i s of i t s l e g i t i m a c y was the f a c t t h a t i t represented, c a r r i e d out and defended the i n t e r -e s t s of the workers. But d u r i n g the summer of 1 980 the workers de-110 c i d e d t o have a new defender. What then i s the the source of the l e g i t i m a c y f o r the communist regime? In a speech given on Christmas Eve of 1981 J a r u z e l s k i , s a i d t h a t "On December the 13th [of 1981, the day M a r t i a l Law was imposed] there was no other choice but M a r t i a l Law." 2^ 9 And on the day t h a t the State of Emergency was imposed, he suggested t h a t there was one l a s t chance f o r the Poles t o make order " i n t h e i r house" by them-s e l v e s . 2 2 0 Does t h i s mean th a t the b a s i s of " l e g i t i m a c y " i s e i t h e r the P o l i s h United Workers' Party or an i n v a s i o n by the Red Army and i t s aftermath? What e l s e , besides t h i s choice, can the communist regime o f f e r the Poles? Democracy? A war w i t h Russia? High s t a n -dards of l i v i n g ? No. In 1973 Gierek promised one car f o r every f a m i l y . A decade l a t e r the regime cannot provide even one p a i r of socks on each p a i r of f e e t . Even the t h r e a t of r e p r e s s i o n by the People's P o l i c e or d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n by the K r e m l i n i s not enough t o create a s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l system. Let us r e c a l l t h a t the Poles have already s u r v i v e d the t e r r o r of the C z a r i s t Okhrana (the C z a r i s t P o l i c e ) , the P r u s s i a n s e c r e t p o l i c e , and the Gestapo and the NKVD. Despite a l l odds they never gave up. They organized the r e c k l e s s u p r i s i n g s of the nine-teenth century, and the Warsaw u p r i s i n g of 1944 which was doomed from the beginning. The c u l t u r a l l y - r o o t e d p r a i s e f o r r e c k l e s s bravery, p o l i t i c a l w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g and dreams, and the t r a d i t i o n a l c r a v i n g f o r democracy makes the present b a s i s of communist l e g i t i m a c y h i g h l y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o keep the Poles obedient. And i t does not s t a b i l i z e the p o l i t i c a l system. 111 The strong i n f l u e n c e of S o l i d a r i t y on the P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s a l s o n o t i c e a b l e i n a l l surveys conducted a f t e r the s t r i k e s of the summer of 1980. Mason says t h a t a f t e r these s t r i k e s "the workers r e a l l y began t o educate themselves i n democracy, w h i l e a t the same time t r y i n g t o create an o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t would i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e i t . " ^ z l For i n s t a n c e , i n a survey conducted i n November and December of 1980, more than seventy-two percent supported the idea of i n c r e a s i n g the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of non-party members i n government and more than n i n e t y - t h r e e percent wanted t o increase s o c i e t a l c o n t r o l over the TOO government. ^ I t i s worthwhile t o n o t i c e t h a t the t w e l f t h demand of the s t r i k i n g workers sta t e d : "To introduce the p r i n c i p l e by which l e a d i n g and managing cadres are s e l e c t e d by v i r t u e of t h e i r q u a l i f i c a -t i o n s not t h e i r p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n s . . . ."223 The November-December 1 980 survey and the t w e l f t h demand of the s t r i k e r s are another example of the t r a d i t i o n a l P o l i s h b e l i e f t h a t any government must be c o n t r o l l e d and that the communist Nomenklatura can h a r d l y be accepted by the Poles. S i m i l a r l y , the system of p r i v i l e g e s connected w i t h the Nomenklatura i s r e j e c t e d by the m a j o r i t y of the s o c i e t y . In 1977 Kawecki conducted a survey of 12,000 c o l l e g e students. He asked h i s respondents to l i s t the most p r e f e r a b l e f e a -t u r e s of a good s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l system. Sixty-one percent put "the e q u a l i t y of c i t i z e n s " i n f i r s t p l a c e . 2 2 4 This i s another t r a d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , which was s t r o n g l y r e v i v e d by S o l i d a r i t y . Marek Ta r n i e w s k i , a d i s s i d e n t w r i t e r , says: Those who t a l k about e q u a l i t y o f t e n have i n mind the s t r u g g l e w i t h p r i v i l e g e s or the l i m i t a t i o n of p r i v i l e g e s . E s p e c i a l l y p r i v i l e g e s sanctioned through l e g a l or q u a s i - l e g a l arrange-ments. This r e f e r s then t o e q u a l i t y before the law. This i s 112 the sense in Poland of the slogans of equality of access to leadership positions and the aboli t ion of the inst i tut ions of I O C Nomenklatura. ^ J Mason correctly points out that equality has always been "near the top of the l i s t of Polish values ." 2 2 6 For example, Jasinska-Kania cites a September 1 980 OBOP p o l l . According to the result of this p o l l , equality and justice were the most preferred soc io-pol i t i ca l values. Taras and Korolkiewicz, for instance, c i te a 1973 survey which pointed out that "nearly half of young respondents named large income differentials (even though based on qualifications obtained) as an undesirable feature." 2 2 8 And then they conclude that "there i s a dominant egalitarian norm which has been internalized by a large part of the soc ie ty . " 2 2 9 I cannot subscribe to this view. It i s true that the Gdansk workers demanded that the government abolish higher family allowance payments given to members of the security service and m i l i t i a , 2 3 0 but this does not mean economic egalitarianism. On the contrary, their objective was to erode one of the symptoms of the special privileged p o l i t i c a l position of the m i l i t i a and security service. Therefore, i t was an act of p o l i t i c a l egalitarianism. That i s why what Korolkiewcz and Taras found as support for communist Uravnilovka (leveling) i s , i n fact, support for p o l i t i c a l equality. This mistaken interpretation of economic egalitarianism leads Korolkiewicz and Taras to the conclusion that the Poles accept Soviet-style soc i a l i sm. 2 3 1 However, Adam Michnik, the prominent Polish d is -sident, suggests that i f the Poles accept socialism, i t i s socialism with freedom, with cit izens not subjects, with national identity, and 113 w i t h C a t h o l i c morality."232 Here we have two d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The main d i f f e r e n c e between them concerns the meaning of the term " s o c i a l i s m . " K o r o l k i e w i c z and Taras tend t o understand s o c i a l i s m i n terms of S o v i e t p r a c t i c e , i.e., p o l i t i c a l and economic c o l l e c t i v i s m , autocracy and the almighty a u t h o r i t y . Michnik understands t h i s term as i f he were a Swedish s o c i a l democrat who approves c i v i l r i g h t s , l i m i t e d government, p r i v a t e and p u b l i c ownership, and a f r e e market economy supervised by the government. What i s the model of s o c i a l i s m accepted by the Poles? This can be seen by examining the a t t i t u d e s of the Poles toward p u b l i c versus p r i v a t e ownership. According t o the r e s u l t s of Stefan Nowak's research done i n 1980, the m a j o r i t y of Poles accept the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of i n d u s t r y , economic planning and a g r a r i a n r e f o r m s . 2 3 3 However, t h i s does not mean t h a t they disapprove of p r i v a t e ownership. A 1 980 study conducted under the auspices of the P o l i s h Academy of Sciences demonstrated t h a t there i s great support f o r p r i v a t e ownership. For example, almost e i g h t y - f o u r percent of the respondents supported the idea of p r i v a t e farms and only l e s s than ten percent supported s t a t e farms. ^ As we see, i n terms of c i v i l r i g h t s , e g a l i t a r i a n i s m and ownership, the Poles support the Swedish model of s o c i a l i s m r a t h e r than t h a t of the USSR. However, Mason suggests that the S o v i e t model can a l s o be accepted a t l e a s t i n terms of c o l l e c t i v i s m . He w r i t e s t h a t the Poles s t r o n g l y support the s p i r i t of community t h a t Daniel B e l l c a l l s the "heart of s o c i a l i s m . " 2 3 5 To support h i s observation, he quotes a 1981 survey i n which the author asked h i s respondents whether one should 11 4 always put the s o c i a l i n t e r e s t ahead of one's own. Only nineteen percent s a i d no, whereas almost seventy-four percent s a i d y e s . 2 3 6 But again we should base our reasoning on the concrete s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . Support f o r a l t r u i s t i c a t t i t u d e s does not always mean support f o r the Russian-type of c o l l e c t i v i s m . In a country where there i s a huge gap between the r u l e r s and the r u l e d , s o l i d a r i t y among the l a t t e r i s q u i t e understandable. I t seems t h a t i n the p o l i t i c a l l y hot and h e c t i c days of 1981, the "yes" of the seventy-four percent should be understood as a form of s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the r e b e l l i o n . In 1981 many Poles thought they had a great chance t o change t h e i r gover-nors, t o make them compatible w i t h the P o l i s h t r a d i t i o n . And they hoped t o do so through the s o l i d a r i t y of the people. This was what Sol i d a r n o s c was about. There i s another way t o examine the a t t i t u d e s of the Poles toward s o c i a l i s m . This i s by examining t h e i r p o l i t i c a l expectations. Are they w i l l i n g t o accept the idea t h a t they must remain p o l i t i c a l l y p assive and i n v o l v e d i n p o l i t i c s o n l y t o the extent s t r i c t l y devised by the a u t h o r i t i e s ? This would be a s i g n of acceptance f o r Soviet s o c i a l i s m . Or were t h e i r expectations based on the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s ? The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n deals w i t h the p o l i t i c a l e xpectations of contemporary Poles, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l knowledge and behaviour. 7. CONTEMPORARY POLISH POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOR I t seems t h a t the best way t o analyze p o l i t i c a l expectations i s to present the program of P o l i s h o p p o s i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l movements. 115 Again, as was the case i n our d i s c u s s i o n of Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , we can assume t h a t i f these movements gain s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l support from the people, they express popular b e l i e f s and expecta-t i o n s . What do these programs express? An answer can be found i n a 1977 statement of the most i n f l u e n -t i a l o p p o s i t i o n a l movement, which s t a t e d : The S o c i a l Self-Defense Committee (KOR) has the f o l l o w i n g aims: 1. To prevent p e r s e c u t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , r e l i g i o u s or r a c i a l reasons and to help those who are persecuted f o r such reasons; 2. To oppose law v i o l a t i o n s and t o help v i c t i m s of i n j u s t i c e ; 3. To f i g h t f o r guarantees of c i v i l r i g h t s and freedom; 4. To support a l l i n i t i a t i v e s made i n the cause of human and c i v i l r i g h t s . 2 3 7 U n l i k e the Russian movements, the KOR says nothing about s o c i a l j u s t i c e . The main i s s u e f o r the movement i s c i v i l r i g h t s . The s t a t e i s supposed t o p r o t e c t c i v i l r i g h t s . That i s what the s t a t e i s f o r . T h i r t e e n years e a r l i e r , a group of P o l i s h i n t e l l e c t u a l s sent a l e t t e r t o the a u t h o r i t i e s i n which they s t r e s s e d the same issue. They s t r e s s e d the r i g h t of c r i t i c i s m , f r e e d i s c u s s i o n and of honest i n f o r -mation as indispensable elements of progress and necessary f e a t u r e s of the modern s t a t e . 2 3 8 Here "progress" means p r o t e c t i o n of c i v i l r i g h t s , "modern s t a t e " means the s t a t e which p r o t e c t s c i v i l r i g h t s , and "modern s o c i e t y " means a s o c i e t y which demands c i v i l r i g h t s . The p o s i t i o n of the c i t i z e n and h i s r i g h t s has been a constant concern of the P o l i s h o p p o s i t i o n . Demand two of the Gdansk workers c a l l e d f o r the r i g h t t o s t r i k e . The t h i r d demand s a i d the government should "observe freedom of speech and the p r i n t e d word, t h a t i s not t o repress independent 116 p u b l i c a t i o n s and t o make the mass media a v a i l a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a l l groups and r e l i g i o n s . " 2 3 9 But the most s i g n i f i c a n t , i n terms of p o l i t i c a l expectations and behaviour, was demand s i x which c a l l e d upon the government: To take genuine a c t i o n t o e x t r i c a t e the country from i t s s t a t e of c r i s i s through ( i ) f u l l y i n f o r m i n g the p u b l i c about the socio-economic s i t u a t i o n , and ( i i ) e n a b l i n g a l l s o c i a l communities and s e c t i o n s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the d i s c u s s i o n about the reform programme. The "modern and p r o g r e s s i v e s t a t e " guarantees p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s of i t s c i t i z e n s . They, i n exchange, take care of i t , d i s c u s s i t s problems and f i n d common s o l u t i o n s to s o l v e them. C i v i c a c t i v i t y has always been a f e a t u r e of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The Poles have u s u a l l y been p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e . S o l i d a r i t y w i t h i t s almost ten m i l l i o n members i s an e x c e l l e n t example of P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . S o l i d a r i t y ' s need f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s w e l l expressed by Michnik, a l e a d i n g a c t i v i s t of the movement, who wrote: "I belong t o those who have been c o n s t a n t l y c r i t i c i z i n g the concept of c l a n d e s t i n e a c t i v i -t y . . . [of the o p p o s i t i o n ] . " 2 4 1 Michnik wants t o a c t together w i t h the s o c i e t y and together press f o r reforms. He i s a g a i n s t the concept of r e v o l u t i o n made by a group of the most conscious r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s who a c t on behalf of p assive and p o l i t i c a l l y inexperienced s o c i e t y , as was the case i n the Russian context. What a great d i f f e r e n c e i n comparison t o the Russian o p p o s i t i o n movements! P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of a s o c i e t y i s u s u a l l y r e l a t e d t o i t s p o l i t i c a l knowledge. The greater the knowledge, the g r e a t e r the a c t i v i t y . The p o l i t i c a l knowledge of the Poles has been c o n s t a n t l y examined by the a u t h o r i t i e s , the o p p o s i t i o n and by the Western 117 s p e c i a l i s t s . For example, i n 1963, Andrzej S i c i n s k i , the P o l i s h s o c i o l o g i s t , conducted s t u d i e s on the p o l i t i c a l knowledge and i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c s of the Poles. He found t h a t the Poles were very w e l l informed. ^ J e r z y Wiatr i n one of h i s surveys found t h a t the l e v e l of the p o l i t i c a l knowledge of h i s respondents was high. He asked i n h a b i t a n t s of s i x s m a l l c i t i e s t o i d e n t i f y and match the name of seven renowned P o l i s h and f o r e i g n p o l i t i c i a n s w i t h the p o s i t i o n h e l d by them. Almost s i x t y percent c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d the P o l i s h f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r and the UN general s e c r e t a r y , and almost twenty-eight percent c o r r e c t l y matched the name of the US defense s e c r e t a r y w i t h h i s p o s i -t i o n . Wiatr concludes h i s study with,a statement "In general t h i s study . . . i n d i c a t e s a r a t h e r high l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l knowledge among P o l i s h c i t i z e n s . The high l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l knowledge of the Poles i s connected to the f a c t t h a t the country has never been h e r m e t i c a l l y c l o s e d and i s o l a t e d from f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e . Kolankiewicz and Taras r i g h t l y p o i n t e d out t h a t "the P o l e s . . . a r e not d e p r i v e d o f s o u r c e s o f p o l i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n independent of the o f f i c i a l l i n e . " 2 4 4 There have been many newspapers which have fought w i t h the pa r t y l i n e ( f o r example Po Prostu or Nowa Ku l t u r a ) . There i s a l s o Tygodnik  Powszechny, which i s a r e a l o d d i t y i n the communist world. This weekly has been o f f i c i a l l y p u blished f o r f o r t y years and i t s e d i t o r s have never concealed the f a c t t h a t they oppose communism. An impor-t a n t r o l e i s a l s o played by f o r e i g n r a d i o programs (BBC, Radio Free Europe, Voice of America) and the f a c t t h a t i t i s r e l a t i v e l y easy t o o b t a i n a passport and t r a v e l abroad. 118 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE To conclude, we can say t h a t i n Poland there i s great d i s -harmony between the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the dominant p o l i -t i c a l c u l t u r e . This has had a tremendous impact on the l e g i t i m a c y of the communist regime and i t s s t a b i l i t y . Andrew Arato says t h a t the Poles are a t y p i c a l c i v i l s o c i e t y which f i g h t s a gainst the a u t h o r i t a r -i a n s t a t e . J He i s c o r r e c t . In the l i g h t of my a n a l y s i s , we can say t h a t the Poles are a c i v i l s o c i e t y w i t h p o l i t i c a l expectations and p o l i t i c a l needs which are not f u l f i l l e d by the a u t h o r i t a r i a n communist regime. In other words, the values, b e l i e f s , symbols, expectations, and behavioural p a t t e r n s , or, i n short, the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the m a j o r i t y of the s o c i e t y , i s not compatible w i t h t h a t promoted by the communist regime. This discrepancy i s of c r u c i a l importance f o r an understanding of the P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l system and i t s s t a b i l i t y . In the S o v i e t Union, as I argued i n chapter three, the gap between the o f f i c i a l S oviet p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the t r a d i t i o n a l Russian c u l t u r e has not been lar g e . A f t e r a p e r i o d of c u l t u r a l f l u x , S t a l i n introduced a harsh process of r e s o c i a l i z a t i o n which reduced t h i s gap even f u r t h e r . This r e v i v e d a l l the a u t h o r i t a r i a n f e a t u r e s of t r a d i t i o n a l Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . This process of r e s o c i a l i z a -t i o n can be described as one aspect of S t a l i n i s m . In Poland the gap was has been much wider. This meant t h a t S t a l i n i s t s o c i a l i z a t i o n had a much more d i f f i c u l t task. This i s of c r u c i a l importance. In Russia S t a l i n i s m aimed only a t a r e v i v a l of the t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r e . In Poland S t a l i n i s m t r i e d t o introduce a completely new type p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e incompatible w i t h the deeply 119 rooted t r a d i t i o n a l one. One could t h e r e f o r e argue t h a t S t a l i n i s m i n Poland r e q u i r e d even more b r u t a l i t y than was used i n the S o v i e t Union i f i t hoped t o make the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e compatible w i t h the new one. However, P o l i s h S t a l i n i s m was not as f o r c e f u l as t h a t which was implemented i n Russia. Ascherson very r i g h t l y p o i n t s out t h a t i n Poland, S t a l i n i s m lacked the d e t e r m i n a t i o n and b r u t a l i t y of the Soviet example. I t s scope was narrower than t h a t i n Russia. I t d i d not cover a l l aspects of l i f e . And most i m p o r t a n t l y , i t d i d not change the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Wiatr i n h i s e v a l u a t i o n of the sources of c r i s e s says t h a t the communist regime i n Poland has never succeeded i n g e t t i n g r i d of the problems i t had from the beginning of i t s r u l e . One of these problems was the o p p o s i t i o n between the r u l e r s and the r u l e d . That i s why the 1956 c r i s i s , the f i r s t c r i s i s i n People's Poland, was not the l a s t one. An example of the weakness of S t a l i n i s m i s the Gomulka case. Wladyslaw Gomulka was a dedicated P o l i s h communist. During the Second World War he became the f i r s t s e c r e t a r y of the communist p a r t y i n Poland. He remained i n t h i s p o s i t i o n u n t i l 1948 when he was purged and accused of nationalism--one of the most se r i o u s s i n s i n the commu-n i s t catechism. "Nationalism" simply meant the l a c k of b l i n d obedi-ence t o the K r e m l i n and S t a l i n . Yet d e s p i t e t h i s , Gomulka was not executed. This was a tremendous exception i n the S o v i e t b l o c a t t h a t time. Whereas " n a t i o n a l i s t s " i n other communist c o u n t r i e s were put t o death (Xoxe i n A l b a n i a , Rajk i n Hungary, Kostov i n B u l g a r i a , Slansky i n Czechoslovakia), Gomulka's head was spared. Moreover, i n 1956 he 120 returned t o power, regained h i s p o s i t i o n i n the p a r t y and governed Poland u n t i l 1970. One of the reasons f o r Gomulka's p o l i t i c a l comeback was h i s p o p u l a r i t y among the Poles. This was based on the f a c t t h a t he was persecuted by those who were perceived as obedient servants of the Krem l i n , and whether Gomulka a c t u a l l y had the courage t o say "no" t o S t a l i n r e a l l y d i d not m a t t e r . 2 4 8 The important f a c t was t h a t he was perceived as the man who dared t o say "no" t o S t a l i n and Russia. The Gomulka case i s an e x c e l l e n t example of the weakness of P o l i s h S t a l i n i s m . In a country which was t o be communist i n the S t a l i n i s t s t y l e , the c h i e f of the Communist Party returned t o power mainly because he was l a b e l l e d as being a n t i - R u s s i a n . This i s a paradox. I t i s a product of the weakness of P o l i s h S t a l i n i s m . In Russia, Gomulka would have been executed. Even Davies, who tends t o s t r e s s the s i m i l a r i t i e s between Poland and the USSR, admits t h a t . . . S t a l i n i s m never gained the same p i t c h of f e r o c i t y i n Poland t h a t i t r e i n e d i n neighbouring c o u n t r i e s . The p o l i t i c a l t r i a l s d i d not develop i n t o show t r i a l s or wholesale purges. The middle c l a s s and the i n t e l l e c t u a l s , though harassed, were not l i q u i d a t e d . The church was not suppressed. The peasants were not deported, nor d r i v e n to famine. C o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n was slow and incomplete. C e r t a i n l y there were hundreds of s i m i l a r i t i e s between Sov i e t and P o l i s h S t a l i n i s m , such as a command economy, the monopoly power of the Communist Party, and for c e d c o l l e c t i v i s m 2 5 0 . But the d i f f e r e n c e s outweigh the s i m i l a r i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n terms of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . We may ask why P o l i s h S t a l i n i s m was weaker? One e x p l a n a t i o n which i s p l a u s i b l e , given our a n a l y s i s , i s the continued s t r e n g t h and p e r s i s t e n c e of t r a d i t i o n a l P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Despite the 121 l o y a l t y and determination of the P o l i s h comrades, a high degree of c o e r c i v e f o r c e does not have l e g i t i m a c y i n P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . This l i m i t e d S t a l i n i s m and i t s impact on P o l i s h p o l i t i c s , u n l i k e the case of Russia. In sum, the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the m a j o r i t y of the people has not been changed. A l l the t r a d i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s of i t remain very w e l l preserved. In a l e t t e r t o the P o l i s h ambassador, General de Gaulle wrote: "Mon Cher Ambassadeur. Pour vous pour l a chere Pologne. Qui a, au fond, gagne l a p a r t i e parce qu'elle e s t restee e l l e meme. Tous mes voeux l e s m e i l l e u r s du monde!" 2 5 1 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION P o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i s an important and f a s c i n a t i n g t o p i c f o r a n a l y s i s . But i t i s not an easy one because s t a b i l i t y i s an enor-mously complex issue. There are many v a r i a b l e s t h a t must be taken i n t o account, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a comparative a n a l y s i s . P o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i s important f o r a l l p o l i t i c a l systems, but i t i s a very s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e i n the study of Sovi e t b l o c communist c o u n t r i e s . These c o u n t r i e s are very s i m i l a r , and they are o f t e n almost i d e n t i c a l when examined i n terms of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i -t u t i o n s or ideology. Moreover, the Sovi e t Union e x e r c i s e s l e a d e r s h i p over i t s l e s s powerful s o c i a l i s t neighbors. This can lead us t o focus on the s i m i l a r i t i e s between them, w h i l e o f t e n i g n o r i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s because they are assumed t o be of l i t t l e or no s i g n i f i c a n c e . The r e s u l t i s t h a t a l l S o v i e t b l o c c o u n t r i e s tend t o be t r e a t e d as a s i n g l e u n i t and an a n a l y s i s of the Soviet Union serves t o e x p l a i n a l l of them. Despite many i n s t i t u t i o n a l s i m i l a r i t i e s , these c o u n t r i e s are d i f f e r e n t and comparative p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s must i n c l u d e t h i s f a c t . In the case of the Soviet Union and Poland, the most important p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e i s i n terms of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . In f a c t , the Sov i e t Union and Poland are extreme cases i n the Eastern bloc. The Sov i e t Union i s one of the most s t a b l e c o u n t r i e s i n the contemporary 123 world. Poland, on the other hand, has been p e r i o d i c a l l y t o r n by s e r i o u s systemic p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s . As t h i s study contends, t h i s fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i s d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n by an i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . The best e x p l a n a t i o n f o r S o v i e t s t a b i l i t y and P o l i s h i n s t a b i l -i t y can be found i f we examine the comparative l e g i t i m a c y of these two regimes. Generally speaking, the S o v i e t regime appears t o be regarded as l e g i t i m a t e by l a r g e numbers of i t s c i t i z e n s , whereas the Warsaw regime desperately l a c k s l e g i t i m a c y . As was argued e a r l i e r , one of the most important f a c t o r s of l e g i t i m a c y and s t a b i l i t y i s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The c o n c l u s i o n reached by t h i s study i s t h a t a congruence between the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the t r a d i t i o n a l or dominant c u l t u r e g ives a regime l e g i t i m a c y and s t a b i l i t y . In the case of the S o v i e t Union the congruence between the S o v i e t o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and the dominant c u l t u r e of the Russians r e s u l t s from a strong h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y between the S o v i e t regime and C z a r i s t Russia. As was argued, the Bolsheviks d i d not e s t a b l i s h a new p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i n Russia. On the contrary, a f t e r a s t a t e of c u l t u r a l f l u x , S t a l i n h a r s h l y and b r u t a l l y reestab-l i s h e d and strengthened the main fe a t u r e s of the t r a d i t i o n a l Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . The b e l i e f i n the i n f a l l i b i l i t y of the a u t h o r i -t i e s , the t r a d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s between the governors and the sub-j e c t s , c o l l e c t i v i s m , a strong emphasis on economic e g a l i t a r i a n i s m and so on were r e i n t r o d u c t e d and confirmed as the main elements of p o l i t i -c a l l i f e and p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . A l l of these were deeply rooted i n the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the Russians, and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 124 m e n t a l i t y was based on them. A f t e r the p e r i o d of "storms and n o v e l -t i e s " (1905-31), the o l d p a t t e r n of p o l i t i c s was r e e s t a b l i s h e d . Once again the r u l e r would decide what was r i g h t and wrong. He took care of the s e c u r i t y of the people and provided s o c i a l equity. For t h e i r p a r t , the people obeyed the r u l e r , c a r r i e d out h i s orders and secured the i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e . In t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l scheme of t h i n g s , there was n e i t h e r room nor need f o r p o l i t i c a l democracy, which was seen as causing anarchy, and c i v i l r i g h t s which were regarded as unnecessary. In other words, the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y of Russia/the Soviet Union returned t o the n a t u r a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s . The r u l e r r u l e s and the s u b j e c t s obey. The r u l e r may use f o r c e , which i s h i s e x c l u s i v e p r e r o g a t i v e , w h i l e the subjects bend themselves t o accommodate t o h i s w i l l and accept the use of f o r c e a g a i n s t them. He guarantees t h e i r s a f e t y , they accept h i s r u l e . This i s a n a t u r a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s , according t o the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . In sum, h e — t h e r u l e r (now c a l l e d the General S e c r e t a r y ) — i s l e g i t i m a t e , as i s the e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l system. This l a r g e l y accounts f o r the tremendous p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of the S o v i e t Union. Poland i s q u i t e the opposite. The P o l i s h regime l a c k s l e g i t i -macy. The P o l i s h o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e , p r i m a r i l y composed of elements c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Russian c u l t u r e , i s incompatible w i t h the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the m a j o r i t y of Poles. As t h i s study has shown, the l a c k of congruence between the o f f i c i a l and the t r a d i t i o n a l P o l i s h p o l i t i -c a l c u l t u r e i s a reason why the m a j o r i t y of Poles view the Warsaw regime as a f o r e i g n i m p o s i t i o n , w i t h a s t a t u s resembling t h a t of an 125 occupying power. The P o l i s h communist regime d i d not succeed i n r e p l a c i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e w i t h the new o f f i c i a l one. We can say, then, t h a t the regime e n t i r e l y f a i l e d t o c a r r y out the r e v o l u t i o n on the c u l t u r a l l e v e l . The o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s not i n t e r n a l i z e d by the m a j o r i t y of the s o c i e t y . The dominant c u l t u r e of the Poles i s s t i l l the t r a d i t i o n a l one which sees the r u l e r as a t y r a n t by d e f i n i t i o n . Therefore the r u l e r must be c o n s t a n t l y watched. C i v i l r i g h t s are c r u c i a l l y important. They are the main t o o l s of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , which i s t r e a t e d as a n a t u r a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s . In t h i s view, the s t a t e i s supposed t o provide o p p o r t u n i t i e s to per-form c i v i c a c t i v i t y . According to the dominant c u l t u r e , the r u l e r must submit to the r u l e of law and the w i l l of the c i t i z e n s . This, i n f a c t , i s an important source of the r u l e r ' s l e g i t i m a c y . I f the r u l e r c l a i m s t o be i n f a l l i b l e , i f he does not obey the law, and i f he t r e a t s the law as an instrument of h i s power, then i n the P o l i s h context he i s i l l e g i t i m a t e and i s r e j e c t e d and fought against. In other words, the o f f i c i a l l y promoted c o l l e c t i v i s m , autocracy, and p r i v i l e g e d p o s i -t i o n of the r u l e r are incompatible w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l P o l i s h i n d i v i d u a l -ism, democracy and a strong tendency t o c o n s t a n t l y c o n t r o l the author-i t e s . As we see, p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s an extremely important f a c t o r which promotes p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y or i n s t a b i l i t y . Harmony between the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e and the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the vast m a j o r i t y of the s o c i e t y tremendously c o n t r i b u t e s to s t a b i l i t y . I t a l s o helps t o l e g i t i m i z e the regime because i t i s seen as compatible w i t h t r a d i t i o n and not a f o r e i g n i m p o s i t i o n . 126 The p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e e x p l a n a t i o n of l e g i t i m a c y and s t a b i l i t y appears t o be more convincing than others. For instance, B i a l e r suggests t h a t the Soviet Union i s s t a b l e because "the Sov i e t leaders and e l i t e s work hard t o make the system s t a b l e . " 2 5 2 This leads B i a l e r t o focus on the economic development of the USSR. The Sov i e t leaders are not the only ones t o work hard t o make a p o l i t i c a l system s t a b l e . Most governments attempt t o do so, i n c l u d i n g the Warsaw government. And one can say t h a t by the i n d i c e s of eco-nomic development i n Poland from the 1950s t o the 1970s the P o l i s h p o l i t y should have been s t a b l e . But i t i s not. This c r i t i c i s m of the economic ex p l a n a t i o n does not imply t h a t I r e j e c t economic development as a f a c t o r i n p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y a l t o g e t h e r . Quite the contrary. The economic f a c t o r i s important, and undoubtedly i t helps to s t a b i l i z e some p o l i t i c a l systems. Strong economic performance by the regime may even help to i n t e r n a l i z e the o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i f the l a t t e r i s d i f f e r e n t from the domi-nant one. I t seems that i n the case of West Germany, f o r example, the economic f a c t o r s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o the changes i n the t r a d i -t i o n a l c u l t u r e of Germans. However, economic development i s not a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r of s t a b i l i t y . P o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e seems t o be much more important. Har-mony between the o f f i c i a l c u l t u r e and the dominant c u l t u r e means h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y of the new regime w i t h c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . As t h i s study has argued, t h i s makes the Sov i e t regime l e g i t i m a t e and the p o l i t i c a l system s t a b l e as the Bols h e v i k s represent c o n t i n u i t y w i t h o l d Russian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . 127 This i s c l e a r l y not the case i n Poland. Revolutions have achieved many thi n g s throughout h i s t o r y . But only a few have suc-ceeded i n tra n s f o r m i n g s o c i e t y a t the c u l t u r a l l e v e l , p r i m a r i l y because p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o change or replace. On t h i s note I would l i k e t o end t h i s study w i t h a quo t a t i o n from T o c q u e v i l l e , who s a i d of h i s study of democracy i n the U.S.: I f I have h i t h e r t o f a i l e d i n making the readers f e e l the impor-t a n t i n f l u e n c e of the p o l i t i c a l experience, the h a b i t s , the o p i n i o n s , ( i n short, the customs of the Americans upon the maintenance of t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s ) , I have f a i l e d i n the p r i n -c i p a l o b j e c t of my w o r k . 2 5 3 And i f I have not convinced my readers of the importance of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e on the s t a b i l i t y of the S o v i e t Union and the i n s t a b i l i t y of Poland, I have a l s o f a i l e d . FOOTNOTES 'Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 124. 2 I b i d . , p. 127. 3 T . H. Rigby, "A Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power and Policy in the Soviet Union," in T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, Authority Power and Policy in the USSR. Essays Dedicated to  Leonard Schapiro (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 10. 4Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 328. 5W. D. Connor, "Mass Expectations and Regime Performance," in The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer (Boulder: Westview, 1981), p. 156. °Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Perspectives for Change in  Communist Societies (Boulder: Westview, 1979), p. 7. 'Harry Eckstein, "Authority Relations and Government Perform-ance: A Theoretical Framework," Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies 2 (October 1 969), p. 321. °Samuel P. Huntington, "Po l i t i c a l Development and P o l i t i c a l Decay," World Po l i t i c s (April 1965), pp. 384 - 430. 9 Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Galbriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The  Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1980), p. 1. 1 0 I b i d . , p. 1 - 15. 11 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 1 2 I b i d . , pp. 16 - 29. 1 3 '-'Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. , Comparative  P o l i t i c s Today: A World View, 5th ed. (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1984), p. 50. 1 4 I b i d . , p. 25. 129 1^Samuel P. Huntington and J . I. Dominguez, " P o l i t i c a l Development," i n F. I. G r e e n s t e i n and N. W. Polsby, eds, Handbook o f  P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . I l l (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 47. 1 ^ A r c h i e Brown and J . Gray, eds., P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c a l  Change i n Communist S t a t e s , 2nd ed. (London: M a c m i l l a n , 1979), p. 1. 1 7 1 ' D a v i d W. P a u l , The C u l t u r a l L i m i t s o f R e v o l u t i o n a r y P o l i t i c s :  Change and C o n t i n u i t y i n S o c i a l i s t C z e c h o s l o v a k i a (London and New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979), p. 3. My emphasis. R i c h a r d R. Fagen, The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e i n  Cuba ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969), p. 5. 1 9 S t e p h e n White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and S o v i e t P o l i t i c s (London: M a c m i l l a n , 1 979), p. 1. 2 0 B a r r i n g t o n Moore, J r . , S o c i a l O r i g i n s o f D i c t a t o r s h i p and  Democracy: L o r d and Peasant i n t h e Making o f the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1 968), p. 486. 2 1 I b i d . P e t e r H. M e r k l , Modern Comparative P o l i t i c s (New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t & Winston, 1970), p. 157. 2^Mary McAuley, " P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Communist P o l i t i c s , " i n A. Brown, ed., P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Communist S t u d i e s (London: M a c m i l l a n , 1984), p. 36. 2 4 F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f the s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e methods see Ivan V a l l i e r , " E m p i r i c a l Comparisons o f S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e : Leads and Logs," i n Ivan V a l l i e r , ed., Compara- t i v e Methods i n S o c i o l o g y : Essays on Trends and A p p l i c a t i o n s (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1971), pp. 203 - 267. Sidney Verba, " C r o s s - N a t i o n a l Research: The Problem o f C r e d i b i l i t y , " i n Ivan V a l l i e r , ed., Comparative Methods i n S o c i o l o g y , p. 355. Fo r more on the r o l e and p o s i t i o n o f s o c i o l o g y i n the USSR see E. A. Weinberg, The Development o f S o c i o l o g y i n the S o v i e t Union (London: R o u t l e d g e & P a u l , 1 974), esp. pp. 1 08 - 112. 2 7 J . A rch Getty, The O r i g i n s o f the Great Purges: The S o v i e t  Communist P a r t y Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (London and New York: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985), pp. 1 - 9, esp. 4 - 7 . I b i d . , p. 7. 130 See f o r example J e r z y J. Wiatr, The C i v i c C u l t u r e From a M a r x i s t - S o c i o l o g i c a l Perspective?," i n Almond and Verba, eds., The C i v i c  C u l t u r e R e v i s i t e d , pp. 108 - 123; G. Kolankiewicz and R. Taras, "Poland: S o c i a l i s m f o r Everyman," i n Brown and Gray, e d s . , P o l i t i c a l  C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c a l Change i n Communist States, pp. 101 - 130; J. Szczepanski, ed., E m p i r i c a l Sociology i n Poland (Warsaw: P o l i s h S c i e n t i f i c P u b l i s h e r s , 1968), passim; P o l i s h Sociology (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1974), passim. o n J U Brown and Gray, eds., P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c a l  Change i n Communist States, p. 7 - 8. 3 1 I b i d . , p. 8. 3 2 I b i d . , pp. 16 - 18. 3 3 Y u r i T r i f o n o v quoted i n S. F. Cohen, Rethinking the Sovi e t  Experience: P o l i t i c s and H i s t o r y Since 1917 (New York and Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985), p. x. 3 4 I b i d . , p. 5. See J. J. Wiatr, S o c i o l o g i a Stosunkow P o l i t y c z n y c h [The Sociology of P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i o n s ] (Warsaw: PWN, 1977), pp. 309 - 350; D. S. Mason, P u b l i c Opinion and P o l i t i c a l Change i n Poland, 1980 - 1982 Cambridge and New York: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985), pp. 12 - 37. 3 6 J a n Szczepanski, P o l i s h S o c i e t y (New York: Random House, 1 970), p. 50. J / F o r the f u l l t e x t of the speech given on 25 January 1982 see W. J a r u z e l s k i , Przemowienia [Speeches] (Warsaw: Ksiazka I Wiedza, 1 983), pp. 226 - 262. 3 8 A f t e r 1980 many books have been published on p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . For instance see N. M. Keyzerov, P o l i t i c h e s k a y a Kul'tura  S o c i a l i s t i c h e s k o g o Obshchestva [The P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e of S o c i a l i s t S o c i e t y ] (Moscow: P o l i t l i t e r a t u r a , 1982); N. B l i n o v , Y. Ozhegov and F. Shergi, P o l i t i c h e s k a y a Kul'tura i Molodezh' [ P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and the Youth] (Moscow: P o l i t l i t e r a t u r a , 1982); M. Lisenkov, P o l i t i c h e s k a y a  Kul'tura Sovietskoqo Cheloveka [The P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e of the Sovi e t Man] (Moscow: P o l i t l i t e r a t u r a , 1983); N. M. Keyzerov, P o l i t i c h e s k a y a  i Pravovaya Kul'tura: Metodologicheskie Problemi [ P o l i t i c a l and Legal Culture: Methodological Problems] (Moscow: P o l i t l i t e r a t u r a , 1983). 3 9My t r a n s l a t i o n . I have used the P o l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n of the B u r l a t s k i i and G a l k i n book, S o c i o l o g i a , P o l i t y k a , Stosunki  Miedzynarodowe published i n Warsaw i n 1978. The qu o t a t i o n can be found on p. 50 of the o r i g i n a l Russian e d i t i o n : F. M. B u r l a t s k i i and A. A. G a l k i n , S o c i o l o g i a , P o l i t i k a , Mezhdunarodnyie Otnoshenia 131 [Sociology, P o l i t i c s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s ] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyie Otnosheniia, 1974). 4 0(Moscow: P o l i t l i t e r a t u r a , 1983), p. 252. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 4 1 I b i d . 4 2Thomas H. Rigby, "New L i g h t on the Sovie t E l i t e . " Problems of  Communism XXIII (November-December 1974), p. 44. 4 3 R i g b y , "A Conceptual Approach t o A u t h o r i t y , Power and P o l i t y i n t h e S o v i e t Union," p. 9. 4 4 C a r l J. F r i e d r i c h and Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , T o t a l i t a r i a n D i c t a t o r s h i p and Autocracy, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1 966), p. 17. 4 5Hannah Arendt, The O r i g i n s of T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m (New York: Harvest/HJB Book, 1973), p. 466. 4 6 " T o t a l i t a r i z m , " K r a t k i i P o l i t i c h e s k i i Slovar [The Concise P o l i t i c a l D i c t i o n a r y ] (Moscow: P o l i t i c h e s k a i a L i t e r a t u r a , 1983), p. 329. 4 7 F o r example, Richard F. Staar, Poland 1944 - 1962: The  S o v i e t i z a t i o n of a Captive People (Baton Rouge: L o u i s i a n a State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962), passim. 48 °There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between communism and fascism. For development of t h i s p o i n t see, f o r example, H. J. Sapiro and B. R. Barber, " C o u n t e r - i d e o l o g i c a l uses of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m , " P o l i t i c s  and S o c i e t y I (1970), pp. 3 - 22; White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Sovi e t  P o l i t i c s , p. 4. 40. ^Amos Per l m u t t e r , Modern A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m (New Haven and London: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981), p. 66. 5 0 S e e , f o r instance, White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Sovi e t  P o l i t i c s , pp. 3 - 4 . Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , "Soviet P o l i t i c s : From the Future t o the Past?" i n P. Cocks, ed., The Dynamics of Soviet P o l i t i c s (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976), p. 341. 5 2 F r i e d r i c h and B r z e z i n s k i , T o t a l i t a r i a n D i c t a t o r s h i p and A u t o c r a c y , p. 25. ^ L e o n a r d Schapiro, T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m (London: P a l l M a l l , 1972), pp. 20 and 45. 5 4 A very s i m i l a r p o i n t i s made by J. A z r a e l , " V a r i e t i e s of D e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n , " i n C. J. Johnson, ed., Change i n Communist Systems 1 32 (Stanford: Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970), pp. 135 - 136. 5 5Raymond Aron, Democracy and T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 194. My emphasis. 5 6 M e r l e Fainsod, Smolensk Under Sovet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1958), p. 450. Schapiro, T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m , p. 24. 5 8 B r z e z i n s k i , "Soviet P o l i t i c s , " p. 337. 5 9George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1953), p. 367. 6 0 T i b o r Szamuely, The Russian T r a d i t i o n (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1 974), p. 1 5. 6 1 George Vernadsky, A H i s t o r y of Russia (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944), p. 56. Veche: a popular assembly t h a t was a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n i n Russia i n the p e r i o d between the t e n t h and f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s . For a d e t a i l e d account of the Veche see G. S. K a l i n i n and A. F. Goncharov, I s t o r i a Gosudarstva i Prava SSSR [The H i s t o r y of the State and Law of the USSR] (Moscow: I u r i d i c h e s k a i i a L i t e r a t u r a , 1972), pp. 390 - 400. ^ R i c h a r d Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (London: Weindenfeld and Nicholson, 1974), p. 108. fi4Szamuely, The Russian T r a d i t i o n , p. 55. 6 5A. L e v i n , The Second Duma, 2nd ed. (Hamden: Archon Books, 1 963), p. 234. 66W. K. Sokolova, R o s y j s k i e P r z y s l o w i a i Opowiastki [Russian Proverbs and F o l k Tales] (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1976), pp. 63 and 78. 6 7The Cambridge Economic H i s t o r y of Europe, v o l . I (London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1941), p. 419. 6 8The Time of Troubles embraces the t u r b u l e n t events of 1606 -1613 when there was no strong government i n Moscow. 6 9Szamuely, The Russian T r a d i t i o n , p. 53. 7 0Quoted i n Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, pp. 389. 7 1 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801 -1917 (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), p. 10. 133 7 2 P . M i l i u k o v , Ocherki Po I s t o r i i K u l t u r y [Essays on the H i s t o r y of C u l t u r e ] , 3 rd ed., v o l . I l l (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1 909), pp. 22 - 23. Quoted i n Szamuely, The Russian T r a d i t i o n , p. 69. 7 3 W h i t e , P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and So v i e t P o l i t i c s , p. 50. 7 4 J. Blum, Lord and Peasant Russia: From Nineth t o Nine- teenth Century (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 477. 7 5M. M i l l e r , The Economic Development of Russia, 1905 - 1 914 (London, 1926), p. 191. Quoted i n White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and  Sovi e t P o l i t i c s , p. 51. 7 6 R i c h a r d Pipes, "Max Weber and Russia," World P o l i t i c s V I I (1 955), pp. 371 - 401 . 7 7 M a r q u i s de Custine, Journey f o r Our Time: The Jo u r n a l s of the  Marquis de Custine, trans, and ed. P.P. Kohler (London: Arthur Baker, 1953). 7 8 A l e x i s de T o c q u e v i l l e , Democracy i n America, 2 v o l s . (New York: Knopf, 1 945). 7 9R. R. Palmer and J. Colton, A H i s t o r y of the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 1 984), p. 455. 8 0 L e o n a r d Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Sov i e t Union (New York: Random, n.d.), p. 1. 8 1 I s a i a h B e r l i n , Russian Thinkers (London: Hogarth, 1978), pp. 21 0 - 238. °^Schapiro, Communist Party, p. 3. ^ B e r l i n , Russian Thinkers, p. 211. OA Szamuely, Russian T r a d i t i o n , p. 47. 8 5D. F i e l d , Rebels i n the Name of the Tsar (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1 976), p. 1 4. 8 6 P . A v r i c h , Russian Rebels 1600 - 1800 (London: Schocken, 1973), pp. 269 - 279; M. Cherniavsky, Tsar and People (New York: Random, 1969), pp. 83 - 84; White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and So v i e t  P o l i t i c s , p. 31. 8 7 M a r y McAuley, " P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Communist P o l i t i c s : One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," i n A. Brown, ed., P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e  and Communist Studies (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 19. 8 8Vernadsky, H i s t o r y of Russia, p. 282. 134 8 9A. L e v i n , T h i r d Duma (Hamden: Archon, 1973), p. 90. "Stephen White, "USSR: Autocracy and I n d u s t r i a l i s m , " i n A. Brown and J. Gray, eds., P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Change i n Communist  S t a t e s , 2nd ed. (London: M a c m i l l a n , 1 979), p. 29. Q1 •^Szamuely, Russian T r a d i t i o n , p. 219. 9 2 F . M. Dosteievsky, The Diary of a W r i t e r , v o l . 3, trans. B. B r a s o l (London: F i o d o r , 1949), p. 566. 9^Adam Ulam, Russia's F a i l e d Revolutions (New York: B a s i c , 1981 ), p. 21. 9 4 V i c t o r E r l i c h , ed., Twentieth Century Russian L i t e r a r y  C r i t i c i s m (New Haven and London: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975), p. 6. 9 5 B e r l i n , Russian Thinkers, pp. 22 - 82. 9 6McAuley, " P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Communist P o l i t i c s , " p. 17. 9 7 S . Neuman, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l C i v i l War," World P o l i t i c s I ( A p r i l 1 949), pp. 333 - 334, n. 1. 9 8 B r z e z i n s k i , "Soviet P o l i t i c s , " p. 340. " s h e i l a F i t z p a t r i c k , ed., C u l t u r a l R e volution, 1928 - 1931 (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978), pp. 8 - 4 1 . 1 0 0 I b i d . , p. 18. 101 u I b i d . , p. 17. My emphasis. 1 0 2G. D. Hollander, Soviet Information Networks (Washington: Center f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies, Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y , 1 977), p. 4. 1 0 3 R i c h a r d Lowenthal, " S t a l i n and Ideology," Soviet Survey ( J u l y -August 1 960), p. 33. 1 0 4 L e o n Trotsky, The R e v o l u t i o n Betrayed: What i s the Sov i e t  Union and Where i s i t Going? (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), p. 277. 1 0 5 R i c h a r d T. de George, Patterns of Sov i e t Thought (Ann Arbor: U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 184. 1 0 6 I s a a c Deutscher, S t a l i n : A P o l i t i c a l Biography, rev. ed. (Harmonds worth: Penguin, 1966). 1 0 7 D a v i d S h i p l e r , Russia: Broken I d o l s , Solemn Dreams (New York: Times Books, 1 983), p. 265. 135 1 0 8 B r z e z i n s k i , "Soviet P o l i t i c s , " p. 239. 1 0 9 S e w e r y n B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s Successors: Leadership, S t a b i l i t y ,  and Change i n the Sovi e t Union (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 980), p. 31. 110 w F i t z p a t r i c k , C u l t u r a l R e volution, p. 29. 111 I use the P o l i s h v e r s i o n of the programme published i n Kommunistyczne P a r t i e Swiata [Communist P a r t i e s of the World] (Warsaw: KIW, 1 978), pp. 374 - 378. 11? A. Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965), p. 79. JA. K. Kurylev e t a l . , Osnovi Nauchnovo Kommunizma [The P r i n c i p l e s of S c i e n t i f i c Communism] (Moscow: U n i v e r s i t y of Moscow P r e s s , 1 969), p. 427. 114 ^Lev Kopelev, "A L i e I s Conquered Only By Truth," i n Samizdat  R e g i s t e r I , ed. R. Medvedev (New York: N o r t o n , 1 977), p. 237. 11 s Kliuchevsky, Kurs Russkoi I s t o r i i [The Course of Russian H i s t o r y ] , v o l . 3 (Moscow: 1937), p. 143. Quoted i n Szamuely, Russian  T r a d i t i o n , p. 143. 1 1 ^ K o n s t y t u c j a Zwiazku Radzieckiego [The C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Sovie t Union] (Warsaw: KIW, 1978), pp. 8 - 9 . 1 1 7 P o l i t y k a (December 1982). 1 1 8 P o l i t y k a (March 1984). 119 ''^White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Sovi e t P o l i t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y c h a p t e r 5, pp. 84 - 113. 1 ?0 "•"Alex Inkeles and Raymon A. Bauer, The Soviet C i t i z e n : D a i l y  L i f e i n a T o t a l i t a r i a n Country (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1959), passim. 191 Stephen White, " C o n t i n u i t y and Change i n Sovi e t P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e : An Emigre Study," Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies XI (1978). 1 2 2 B e t s y G i d w i t z , "Problems of Adjustment of Sovi e t Jewish Emigres," Sov i e t Jewish A f f a i r s , no. 1 (1976); Z v i Gitelman, Sov i e t  Immigrants i n I s r a e l (New York: Knopf, 1972); Z v i Gitelman, "Soviet P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e : I n s i g h t s From Jewish Emigres," Sov i e t Studies XX (1977); Z v i Gitelman, "Recent Sov i e t Emigres and the Soviet P o l i t i c a l System: A P i l o t Study i n D e t r o i t , " S l a v i c and Sovi e t S e r i e s I I (1977). JHere undoubtedly some of the best accounts are those of Hedrick Smith, The Russians, rev. ed. (New York: B a l l a n t i n e , 1984) and 136 D. S h i p l e r , Russia: Broken I d o l s , Solemn Dreams. 1 94 '^  Samuel P. Huntington, P o l i t i c a l Order i n Changing S o c i e t i e s (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968), p. 1. 1 2 5 I n k e l e s and Bauer, The S o v i e t C i t i z e n , p. 243. 386. 387. 223. 1 2 6 W h i t e , " C o n t i n u i t y and Change i n S o v i e t P o l i t i c a l Culture," p. 1 97 1^ Inkeles and Bauer, The S o v i e t C i t i z e n , p. 236. 1 2 8 I b i d . , p. 238. 1 2 9 I b i d . , p. 248. G i d w i t z , "Problems of Adjustment of Soviet Emigres," p. 36. 1 3 1 White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and S o v i e t P o l i t i c s , p. 103. 1 3 2 I n k e l e s and Bauer, The S o v i e t C i t i z e n , p. 252. 1 3 3 I b i d . , p. 253. 1 3 4 W h i t e , " C o n t i n u i t y and Change i n Soviet P o l i t i c a l C ulture," p. 1 3 5 S m i t h , The Russians, p. 127. 1 3 6 E . Ginzburg, Into The Whirlwind (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 1 7^ In the s o - c a l l e d Testament of Lenin, he warned the C e n t r a l Committee about S t a l i n as a man a b s o l u t e l y u n s u i t a b l e f o r the p o s i t i o n of General Secretary because of h i s autocracy. See N i k i t a S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, ed. E. Crankshaw (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1970), p. 6. 1 3 8 W h i t e , P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and S o v i e t P o l i t i c s , p. 106. 1 3 9 I b i d . , p. 115. 1 4 0 W h i t e , "USSR: Autocracy and I n d u s t r i a l i s m , " p. 43. 1 41 ' Andrei Amalrik, Czy Zwiazek Sowiecki Przetrwa Do 1 984 Roku? [ W i l l the S o v i e t Union Survive U n t i l 1984?] ( P a r i s : I n s t y t u t L i t e r a c k i , 1 970), p. 30. 1 49 ^Inkeles and Bauer, The S o v i e t C i t i z e n , p. 397. 1 4 3 B i a l e r , S t a l i n ' s Successors, p. 193. 137 1 4 4 S e e f o r example, Almond and P o w e l l , Comparative P o l i t i c s  Today, pp. 50 - 51. 1 4 5 T a l c o t t Parsons, "Communism and the West: The Sociology of the C o n f l i c t , " i n A. E t z i o n i and E. E t z i o n i , eds., S o c i a l Change:  Patt e r n s and Consequences (New York: B a s i c , 1964), p. 398. 1 4 6 K a r l Deutsch, "Cracks i n the Monolith: P o s s i b i l i t i e s and Patterns of D i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n T o t a l i t a r i a n Systems," i n C a r l J. F r i e d r i c h , ed., T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m (New York: Gosset and Dunlap, 1964), p. 320. 1 4 7 I b i d . , p. 324. 1 4 8 I b i d . , p. 329. 1 4Q " S . Bratkowski, Nowe M o z l i w o s c i [New P o s s i b i l i t i e s ] (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1980), p. 4. 1 5 0 W h i t e , P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and So v i e t P o l i t i c s , p. 176. I J ' G a b r i e l A. Almond, P o l i t i c a l Development (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1 970), pp. 318 and 320. " ^ G a b r i e l A. Almond and G. Bingham, J r . P o w e l l , J r . , Comparative P o l i t i c s : System, Process and P o l i c y , 2nd ed. (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown 1 978), p. 21. 1 5 3 F o r a bj-ief account of the generation theory, see White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Sovi e t P o l i t i c s , p. 177 - 190. - 262. 1 5 4 S e e f o r example H. Smith, The Russians, chapter V I I , pp. 228 1 -^White, P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and Sovi e t P o l i t i c s , p. 88. 156 Z. B r z e z i n s k i , "Soviet P o l i t i c s , " p. 345. 1 5 7 S e e f o r example Roman Dybowski, Poland i n World C i v i l i z a t i o n (New York: J . M. B a r r e t , 1950), passim. 1 5 8 T i m o t h y Garton Ash, The P o l i s h R e volution (Falmouth, Corn-w a l l : Coronet Books, Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), p. 3. 1 5 9 J a n Szczepanski, P o l i s h S o c i e t y (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 8. 1 6 0 p r j v i i e g i u m was an a c t issued by the King i n which he t r a n s f e r e d some of h i s powers t o the gentry. 1 6 1 W l a d y s l a w Kurkiewicz e t a l . , T ysiac l a t dziejow P o l s k i . [A Thousand Years of P o l i s h H i s t o r y ] (Warsaw: Ludowa S p o l d z i e l n i a 138 Wydawnicza, 1974), p. 29. 1 6 2 Q u o t e d i n Krystyna M. O l s z e r , ed., For Your Freedom and Ours.  P o l i s h P rogressive S p i r i t from the 14th Century t o the Present. 2nd ed. enlarged (New York: F r e d e r i c k Ungar P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1981), p. 18. 1 6 3 F o r a i i s t - Q f these p r i v i l e g i u m s see J. T o p o l s k i , ed., D z i e j e  P o l s k i [A H i s t o r y of Poland] (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978), p. 206. 1 6 4 K u r k i e w i c z et a l . , Tysiac l a t dziejow P o l s k i , p. 75. 1 6 5 0 l s z e r For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 18. 1 6 6 N o r m a n rjavies, Heart of Europe. A Short H i s t o r y of Poland (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 297 - 298. Poland, d e s p i t e i t s monarchical system, was c a l l e d R z e c z p o s p o l i t a Polska ( P o l i s h Republic) i n order t o enhance the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s of i t s c i t i z e n s . 1 fi7 E s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g the second h a l f of the eighteenth century, each s e s s i o n of the Sejm was d i s r u p t e d by the abuse of the Liberum  Veto and e v e n t u a l l y there was no s i n g l e a c t passed by the Parliament. 1 6 o O l s z e r , For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 52. 1 6 9 C z e s l a w M i l o s z , The H i s t o r y of P o l i s h L i t e r a t u r e , 2nd ed. (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1983), p. 20. 1 70 O l s z e r , For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 24. 1 71 M i l o s z , The H i s t o r y of P o l i s h L i t e r a t u r e , p. 40. This work of Modrzewski was published i n 1551. 1 7 2 I b i d . 1 7 3 ^ ^ m o s - ( - severe Roman i n q u i s i t i o n was i n the s i x t i e s and seventies of the s i x t e e n t h century. The P o l i s h a c t was issued i n 1573. 1 7 4 0 l s z e r , For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 18 - 19. 1 7 5 M i l o s z , The H i s t o r y of P o l i s h L i t e r a t u r e , p. 200. 1 7 6Adam M i c k i e w i c z , K s i e g i narodu p o l s k i e g o i pielgrzymstwa  p o l s k i e g o [The Books of P o l i s h Nation and P o l i s h P i l g r i m a g e ] (Cracow, 1922), p. 53. f Quoted i n Norman Davies, God's Playground. A H i s t o r y  of Poland. Vol. I I 1795 to the Present (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 8 - 9 . 1 7 7 M a n f r e d K r i d l , A Survey of P o l i s h L i t e r a t u r e and C u l t u r e (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1956), p. 249. 139 1 7 8 A l e k s a n d e r Swietochowski, P o l i t i c a l D i r e c t i o n s , quoted i n Ol s z e r , For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 123. 1 7 9 D a v i e s , God's Playground, p. 5. 1 8 0 M i l o s z , The H i s t o r y of P o l i s h L i t e r a t u r e , p. 201. 1 8 1 Harry Kenneth Rosenthal, German and Pole. N a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t  and Modern Myth ( G a i n s v i l l e : U n i v e r s i t y Presses of F l o r i d a , 1976), p. 1 7. For an account of the o r i g i n s of German-Polish c o n f l i c t see I b i d . , esp. Chapter I , pp. 1 - 30. 1 R y °^For an e x c e l l e n t account of the Russian p o l i c i e s towards the Poles see Davies, God's Playground, pp. 93 - 105. 1 8 3 T j i e November R i s i n g was one of the biggest i n s u r r e c t i o n s i n the nineteenth century h i s t o r y of Poland. This R i s i n g took place i n the Russian part of Poland. For an account of t h i s event see Davis, God's Playground, pp. 315 - 333. 1 8 4 D a v i s , God's Playground, p. 329. 1 8 5 M i l o s z , The H i s t o r y of P o l i s h L i t e r a t u r e , pp. 200 - 201. 1 8 6 Q u o t e d i n Olsz e r , For Your Freedom and Ours, pp. 85 - 86. P s i s t r a t u s was a Greek t y r a n t who made p o s s i b l e Athen's preeminence i n Greece. 1 Pt 7 Janusz T a z b i r , K u l t u r a szlachecka w Polsce. Rozkwit-upadek- r e l i k t y . [The Cul t u r e of the N o b i l i t y i n Poland. Development, D e c l i n e , R e l i c t s ] (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1983), p. 59. 1 8 8 T h i s observation was made apparently by W i l l i a m Bruce and i s quoted i n C. B a c k i v i s , Szkice o k u l t u r z e s t a r o p o l s k i e j . [Essays on the C u l t u r e of Old Poland] (Warsaw: PWN, 1975), p. 467. 1 8 9 Q u o t e d i n T a z b i r , K u l t u r a szlachecka w Pol s c e , p. 61 . 1 9 0 I b i d . , p. 66. The Sa i n t Bartholomew's Day was a massacre of Huguenots (P r o t e s t a n t s ) conducted by C a t h o l i c s i n P a r i s 1572. Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 335. 1 9 2 I b i d . , p. 335. 1 9 3M. K. Sarbniewski, O p o e z j i doskonalej, c z y l i W e r g i l i u s z i  Homer [About P e r f e c t P o e t r y — V i r g i l and Homer] (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1954), pp. 100 - 101. Quoted i n T a z b i r , K u l t u r a szlachecka w Polsce, p. 69. 1 9 4 T h e Confederation of Bar (1768 - 1772) was one of the f i r s t P o l i s h u p r i s i n g s a g a i n s t Russia. The Confederation of Targowica 1 40 (1792) was pro-Russian and was formed on the order of Catherina the Great. 1 Q R JAndrzej A j n e n k i e l , Parlamentaryzm I I Rz e c z y p o s p o l i t e j [The Pa r l i a m e n t a r i s m of the Inter-War Poland] (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1975), p. 116. 1 9 6 I b i d . , p. 125. 1 9 7 ^'Quoted i n Davies, God s Playground, p. 402. 1 0 . 8 See, f o r example, T o p o l s k i , D z i e j e P o l s k i , p. 648. 1 9 9 S e e , f o r example, Pawel Zaremba, H i s t o r i a D w u dziestolecia  1918 - 1939 [The H i s t o r y of the Twenty Years, 1918 - 1939], v o l . 1 ( P a r i s : I n s t y t u t L i t e r a c k i , 1981), pp. 161 - 229. 2 0 0 D a v i s , God's Playground, p. 396. Quoted i n Andrzej G a r l i c k i , Od Maja do B r z e s c i a [From the May Coup t o the Brest T r i a l ] (Warsaw: C z y t e l n i k , 1981), p. 177. My t r a n s -l a t i o n . 2 0 2 S e e , f o r example, Stefan S i e n i a w s k i , My pierwsza brygada [We, the F i r s t Brigade] (Warsaw: I s k r y , 1966), passim. 2 0 3 A s h , The P o l i s h R e v o l u t i o n , p. 3. 2 0 4 P i o t r Jaroszewicz quoted i n V I I Zjazd P o l s k i e j Zjednoczonej  P a r t i i Robotniczej. Podstawowe m a t e r i a l y i dokumenty [The Seventh Congress of the P o l i s h United Workers Party. The B a s i c M a t e r i a l s and Documents] (Warsaw: KIW, 1975), p. 122. 2 0 5 W o j c i e c h J a r u z e l s k i , Przemowienia 1981 - 1982 [Speeches 1981 -1982] (Warsaw: KIW, 1983), p. 344. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 0 6 I b i d . , p. 296. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 0 7 E d w a r d Gierek, "Przemowienie na V I I Plenum Komitetu Centralnego PZPR, 6-7 l u t y 1971r," [The Speech on the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the C e n t r a l Committee of the PUWP, February 6 - 7, 1975] Nowe  Drogi ( S p e c i a l Issue, 1975), p. 36. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 0 8 K o n s t y t u c j a PRL [The C o n s t i t u t i o n of the PRL] (Warsaw: KIW, 1983), p. 10. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 0 9 W o j c i e c h J a r u z e l s k i , Przemowienia 1 981-1982, p. 191. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 1 0 W o j c i e c h J a r u z e l s k i , Przemowienia 1983, p. 236. My t r a n s -l a t i o n . 1 41 2 1 1 I b i d . , p. 284. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 1 2 A l r e d Bloch, The Red Poland: An Anthology of N a t i o n a l S e l f - P e r c e p t i o n (New York: Continuum, 1982). Quoted i n Czaykowski, "The Wide Focus on the 'Heart of Europe'," p. 13. 2 1 3 M a r t i n M a l i a , "Poland's E t e r n a l Return," The New York Review, September 29, 1983, p. 18. 2 1 4 L e s z e k Kolakowski, "Swiadomosc narodowa i r o z k l a d komunizmu [N a t i o n a l Consciousness and the Decay of Communism] i n 1 956 W  Dwadziescia l a t pozniej [1956—Twenty Years L a t e r ] (London: Aneks, 1978), p. 29. My t r a n s l a t i o n . 2 1 5 J . Gesek, S. S z o s t k i e w i c z and J. Wiatr, "Z badan o p i n i i spoleczenstwa o wojsku." Quoted i n Wiatr, "The C i v i c C u l t u r e From a M a r x i s t - S o c i o l o g i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , " p. 108. 2 1 6 M a s o n , P u b l i c Opinion and P o l i t i c a l Changes i n Poland, 1980 -1982, p. 69. 2 1 7 F o r a f u l l t e x t of the Gdansk and Szc z e c i n Agreements see Neal Ascherson, The P o l i s h August: The S e l f - L i m i t i n g R e v o l u t i o n (Harmonds-w o r t h and New York: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 284 - 299. 2 1 8 I b i d . , p. 288. 2 1 9 J a r u z e l s k i , Przemowienia 1981 - 1982, p. 223. 2 2 0 I b i d . , pp. 213 - 221. T i l Mason, P u b l i c Opinion, p. 72. poo This survey i s quoted i n Mason, P u b l i c Opinion, p. 71. 2 2 3 A s c h e r s o n , P o l i s h August, p. 294. 2 2 4 Z e n o n Kawecki, "Postawy swiatopogladowe i sp o l e c z n o - p o l i t y c z n e mlodziezy" [ A t t i t u d e s Connected w i t h Outlook on L i f e and Socio-p o l i t i c a l Problems C h a r a c t e r i s t i c of P o l i s h Young People] i n Zbigniew S u f i n , ed., Diagnozy spoleczne w o k r e s i e narastojacego kryzysu [ S o c i a l Diagneses i n the Time of Inc r e a s i n g C r i s i s ] (Warsaw: I n s t y t u t Podstawowych Problemow Marksizmu i Leninizmu, 1981), p. 120. 2 2 5 M a r e k Ta r n i e w s k i , Slownik p o l i t y c z n y [ P o l i t i c a l D i c t i o n a r y ] (Warsaw: GLOS, 1982), p. 14. 2 2 6Mason, P u b l i c Opinion, p. 62. 2 2 7 A l e k s a n d r a Jasinska-Kania, "National I n d e n t i t y and Images of World Society: The P o l i s h Case," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S o c i a l Science J o u r n a l 34 (1982), pp. 93-112. 108. 1 42 ^°George Kolankiewicz and Ray Taras, "Poland: S o c i a l i s m f o r Everyman?" i n Ar c h i e Brown and Jack Gray, eds., P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and  P o l i t i c a l Change i n Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 107. 2 2 9 I b i d . , p. 108. 2 3 0 A s c h e r s o n , P o l i s h August, p. 294. 231 ^"-"Kolankiewicz and Taras, "Poland: S o c i a l i s m f o r Everyman?" p. TOO ^-^Adam Michnik, Szanse p o l s k i e j demokracji. A r t y k u l y i eseje [The Chances f o r P o l i s h Democracy. A r t i c l e s and Essays] (London: Aneks, 1984), pp., 248 - 250. 2 3 3 S t e f a n Nowak, "Value System of the P o l i s h People," P o l i s h  S o c i o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , no. 2 (1980), pp. 5 - 1 9 . 2 3 4 P o l a c y '80. Wyniki badan ankietowch [The Poles of 1980. The Re s u l t s of S o c i o l o g i c a l Surveys] (Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1981), p. 94 Mason, P u b l i c Opinion, p. 76. 2 3 6 I b i d . , p. 77. 0-37 ^ J'Quoted i n O l s z e r , For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 353. 900 The l e t t e r of the t h i r t y - f o u r quoted i n Peter Raina, P o l i t i c a l  O p position i n Poland 1954 - 1977 (London: Poets and P a i n t e r s Press, 1978), p. 25. 9-30 ^•-^Ascherson, P o l i s h August, p. 200. 2 4 0 I b i d . , p. 292. 941 ^ 'Michnik, Szanse p o l s k i e j demokracji, p. 101. 949 ^ ^ A n d r z e j S i c i n s k i , "Peace and War i n P o l i s h P u b l i c Opinion", The P o l i s h S o c i o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n No. 2 (1967), pp. 25 - 40. 940 J e r z y J. Wiatr, "The C i v i c C u l t u r e from a M a r x i s t - S o c i o l o g i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e " i n G a b r i e l Almond and Sidney Verba The C i v i c C u l t u r e  R e v i s i t e d (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1980), p. 107. 115. 2 4 4 K o l a n k i e w i c z and Taras, "Poland: S o c i a l i s m f o r Everyman?", p. 2 4 5Andrew Arato, " C i v i l S o c i e t y Against the State", Telos, 47 (Spring 1981), pp. 23 - 48. 143 2 4 6 A s c h e r s o n , P o l i s h August, p. 34. 2 4 7 J e r z y J. Wiatr, "The Sources of C r i s e s " P o l i s h P e r s p e c t i v e s (1982: 4 ) , p. 18. 94fi For in s t a n c e , Peter Raina, Gomulka's Western biographer doubts t h a t he ever opposed the orders of S t a l i n . See Peter Raina Wladyslaw  Gomulka (London: P o l o n i a Book Fund L t d . , 1969), pp. 64 - 71. ^ ^Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 9. p e r ) J W F o r a very impressive l i s t of the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the S t a l i n system and the P o l i s h system of 1948 - 1956 see I b i d . , pp. 6 - 1 0 . 251 ii^y dear ambassador. For you and f o r dear Poland which, i n f a c t , has won t h i s b a t t l e because she remained h e r s e l f a l l my best i n the world wishes." DeGaulle wrote t h i s l e t t e r t o ambassador Gruszecki i n January 1, 1958. Quoted i n Jan Nowak (Zdzislaw J e z i o r a n s k i ) Polska P o z o s t a l a Soba [Poland remained h e r s e l f ] (London: P o l o n i a Book Fund, 1980), p. 7. 2 5 2 j 3 i a ] . e r / S t a l i n ' s Successors, p. 145. 2 5 3 r p o c , q u e v i ^ 2 . e , Democracy i n America, v o l . 1 , p. 272. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY A j n e n k i e l , Andrzej. 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