POLITICAL STABILITY AND POLITICAL CULTURE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE USSR AND POLAND

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This study is a comparative analysis of the political stability of Poland and the USSR.

These two countries, very similar in many respects, are at the same time fundamentally different in terms of political stability. On the one side, there is the Soviet Union—one of the most politically stable countries in the contemporary world. On the other side, there is Poland, which periodically experiences systemic political crises. Despite institutional similarities, it is hard to imagine two more different countries in terms of political stability.

The main argument of this case study is that stability, a very complex problem, depends largely on internal conditions. One of the most important of these conditions is political culture. This concept is defined as the political values, beliefs, expectations, knowledge, and patterns of behavior characteristic of the society. This study compares the official and dominant political cultures of Poland and the Soviet Union.

The main argument is that the congruence between the official and the dominant political culture explains much of the stability of the USSR. In the case of Poland, the lack of congruence contributes to systemic political instability.
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To my wife Malgosia for tolerating me during this year, I dedicate this thesis.
"Political systems and systems of legislation vary with the local situation and the temper of the inhabitants."


"Governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and there must be as many of the one as of the other. For we cannot suppose that states are made of 'old and rock' and not out of the human natures which are in them."

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The problem of political stability in communist countries seems to be overlooked by political scientists. Every year brings an incredible number of new books and articles dedicated to the communist world. Despite the richness of the political science literature on communist countries, there is relatively little said about their stability. This is a rather surprising fact.

Political stability is a very important issue which profoundly differentiates communist countries from one another. On one side, there is the Soviet Union which is tremendously stable. For centuries autocracy, force and collectivism have been constant features of the Russian/Soviet political system. On the other side, there is Poland which has been extremely unstable by almost any criteria. In its short forty-year history of communist rule, People's Poland has gone through six very serious political crises (1948, 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980-81).

In other words, political stability is one of the most conspicuous and important differences among communist countries. Therefore, it ought to be more interesting to students of communism, and it is quite amazing that we do not have many comparative studies of communist stability.

Furthermore, it seems that this is almost a classic topic for
comparative political analysis. Here we have two countries with numerous similarities. They have very similar, sometimes even identical, institutions: the same systemic role of the communist party, the same ideology, a common political center and hundreds of other commonalities. But despite the similarities, these two countries are the antithesis of each other in terms of political stability. This seems to be a paradox.

The purpose of this study is to analyze this "paradox." In other words, I will analyze the political stability of communist countries using Poland and the Soviet Union as two case studies.

This task is not easy, and it may even be controversial. However, it is worthwhile to analyze the stability of communist countries no matter how difficult and controversial such an analysis may be. The problem of the stability of Soviet bloc countries is very important for a better understanding of them. Therefore the studies of communist stability must be pursued.

It seems that a *sine qua non* for such a study is the necessity to see the differences between communist countries. This is a necessary starting point, despite the fact that studies in comparative communism often focus on similarities rather than differences. This focus may be a reason why there are few theories on the political stability of communist countries. Stability is often assumed as a given. The few studies which have been done usually treat stability as a function of coercion and fear. Quite simply, the assumption is that *all* the Soviet bloc countries are *the same*, that there are no important differences between them and that all are equally stable.
In this view, huge systems of repression force the obedience of the people who otherwise would challenge the regimes.

A consequence of such reasoning is to shift attention to the institutions of communist countries to the exclusion of other factors. If all these countries are pure dictatorships, then what makes them stable are their institutions and the terror exercised by the regimes. This is one reason why we have countless, often very elaborate, analyses of the governing communist parties. The Soviet Party, for instance, is analyzed in incredible detail. Each aspect of its activities and its structure have been examined in every possible way. The same can be said about the KGB, which is probably the most analyzed police force in the world.

This emphasis on dictatorship, with a paramount importance placed on institutions, leads to another conviction, namely that in every communist country there is invariably a huge gap between the rulers and the ruled. If the terror applied by the regimes upon the governed was weaker, and if the institutions of terror were less efficient, the regimes would be quickly overthrown. This is what makes communist systems stable. Yet this view also sees them as potentially unstable. The efficacy of the police, the party and the state organs guarantee stability. People are bullied and persecuted, and therefore obedient. But yet they hate their rulers and that is why, sooner or later, they disobey, rebel and the communist regimes will collapse.

At this point it is important to stress that I do not think that these assumptions are completely erroneous or that the scenarios are impossible. But I do think that they are an oversimplification,
and their contribution to understanding communist countries is limited. Institutions are important and undoubtedly the KGB and its branches in the satellite countries contribute to the stability of these regimes. However, institutions are not the only important factor of stability. Emphasis on institutions also shows us only the similarities between communist countries. But there are also differences between them and these differences are very important.

Those who stress institutions and the role of terror based on ideology in their analysis often favour the totalitarian model. The strengths and weaknesses of this model will be discussed and analyzed in chapter three. Also in chapter three the modernization theory will be discussed. This theory stresses the existence of a gap between the autocratic authorities and societies which are characterized by political needs similar to those of Western societies. Because these two theories will be analyzed in the third chapter, here, I would like to stress that the totalitarian model has heavily influenced communist studies. The influence of this model also helps to create the impression that all communist countries are very similar. And if there are any differences among them, they are of little importance.

It will be argued in this study that there are, in many respects, huge differences among communist countries. These differences are of crucial political importance. One of the most important differences is that of political stability. Furthermore, in the case of the USSR and Poland, this difference is not only a quantitative one. This is first and foremost a qualitative difference. In other words, the difference between the stability of the Soviet Union and the
instability of Poland centers on not only the degree of stability/instability. In Poland instability is system-threatening. It is not a lack of popular support for politicians or for particular political decision. In that country there is a lack of support for the regime as a whole. The Warsaw regime simply lacks legitimacy. Max Weber writes:

Action, especially social action which involves social relationship, may be oriented by the actors to a belief (\textit{vorstellung}) in the existence of a 'legitimate order.'\footnote{1}

Further, enumerating the types of legitimacy, Weber says that:

The legitimacy of an order may be guaranteed or upheld in two principal ways: (1) from purely disinterested motives, which may in turn be (a) purely affectual, consisting in an emotionally determined loyalty; or (b) may derive from a rational belief in the absolute validity of the order as an expression of ultimate values, whether they be moral, aesthetic or any other type; or (c) may originate in religious attitudes, through the belief in the dependence of some condition of religious salvation on conformity with the order; (2) also or entirely by self-interest, that is, through expectations of specific ulterior consequences, but consequences which are, to be sure, of a particular kind.\footnote{2}

In other words, Weber says that in social relationships the belief in the existence of a legitimate order is very important and that the sources of this belief are based on emotions and/or on concrete interests. A very similar point of view is presented by Rigby who says:

A system is 'legitimate' insofar as the compliance of the ruled with the demands of their rulers is governed by a belief that the grounds on which demands are issued are valid.... The grounds of legitimacy are diverse: Traditional rules of succession, election by a majority or according to some other accepted formula, demonstration of heroic or superhuman powers, etc.\footnote{3}

We can ask what else can be added to the Rigby list of the grounds of legitimacy. What else makes the people believe that the
orders given by their rulers are legitimate and therefore should be carried out? What makes a political order a system of authority, a system which is not exclusively based on naked force, but on a combination of legitimacy and force. Weber says that there are three sources: 1) legal-rational grounds, based on a belief of the people that those who are in power should be obeyed because the law says so; 2) traditional grounds, based on a belief in the sanctity of immemorial tradition which holds that those in power must be obeyed; and 3) charismatic grounds based on belief that a particular person who wields power has to be obeyed because of some extraordinary virtues possessed by the person.4

In other words, we have three ideal types of authority: legal-rational, traditional and charismatic. These are, of course, ideal types. In the real world of politics they may exist in various combinations, and there are many different institutional arrangements on which these types of authority may be based. However, the link between legitimate authority and institutional arrangements is political culture, defined as the beliefs, values, symbols, political knowledge, political expectations, and behaviour patterns of the citizens. For instance, Rigby's example of "election by a majority" must be linked with a belief that the decisions of a majority become law, and that each law has to be obeyed. Likewise, a belief in the regulatory role of law has to be linked to a belief that the power of the ruler should not be exclusively based on force. These beliefs are based on traditions which are central political values in the political culture.

Political culture, then, is a very important element of legiti-
macy. Chapter two will introduce the concepts of official political culture (i.e., that promoted by the regime) and dominant or traditional political culture which is characteristic of the majority of a society. As this study of the Soviet Union and Poland will argue, legitimacy in communist countries requires a congruence between the official culture and the dominant or traditional one.

The legitimacy of a political system is a basis of its stability. If the system is legitimate, this enormously contributes to the maintenance of its stability. This statement is characteristic of any political system, including communist systems. Connor very rightly points out that "its stability [the Soviet Union] is rooted in history and based on elements of political legitimacy and practical effectiveness."\(^5\)

Having established the relationship between political culture, legitimacy and political stability, we can follow Rakowska-Harmstone who suggests that in an analysis of communist countries we should take into account political culture in addition to traditional factors, such as institutions or ideology, in the study of communist regimes. She says that "each [communist] country's specific environment . . . includes objective factors such as size and sources as well as subjective patterns of values, attitudes, structures, and behaviour characteristic of a particular national political culture."\(^6\) Indeed, she is right. Political culture is a very important element in an analysis of communist countries. As I have suggested, political culture plays a very important role in political stability. Political culture, or the congruence between the official culture and the dominant
culture, ensures the regime legitimacy and, through this, political stability. Eckstein writes:

Government will be stable if (1) social authority patterns are identical with the governmental pattern, or (2) they constitute a graduated pattern in a proper segmentation of society, or (3) a high degree of resemblance exists in patterns adjacent to government and one finds throughout the more distant segments a marked departure from functionally appropriate patterns for the sake of imitating the governmental pattern or extensive imitation of the government pattern in ritual practices. In other words, according to Eckstein, political systems will be stable if institutions are in harmony with the political culture of the vast majority of the citizens.

Samuel Huntington very accurately observes that instability occurs when channels of access to a political system have not been established and institutionalized in a rate proportional to the popular demand for this access. It seems that a very important factor which determines this demand is political culture. If the political culture of the majority is characterized by a high demand for political participation, and institutions do not facilitate participation, then the system becomes politically unstable. Moreover, if the regime after the recognition of this demand does nothing to establish proper institutions of political participation, then, the regime becomes illegitimate and the system chronically unstable.

As chapter four on Poland will argue, the high demand for political participation—characteristic of Polish dominant culture—is not met by the institutions of the contemporary Polish system. Furthermore, the official culture promotes a model of participation which is entirely in opposition to the dominant culture. This produces a lack of legitimacy for the regime and constant instability in the
In the case of Russia the situation is different. The lack of institutions of political participation does not cause instability. As it will be argued in chapter three on Russia, this political culture does not create a high demand for political participation. Therefore lack of free elections or competitive political organizations are not necessary to Soviet political stability. With Huntington's general principle about stability in mind, we can say that if the demand for political participation is very low (as in the Soviet Union), then channels of access to the political system do not have to be institutionalized in order to stabilize the system. Using the terminology proposed by Eckstein, we can say that traditional Russian patterns of unlimited authority are accurately expressed by the structure of the Soviet government and its patterns of exercising power. Put another way, the institutions of the Soviet system and their performance are in agreement with the political expectations of the citizens and their notion of authority. This agreement contributes enormously to political stability in the USSR.

In other words, the concept of political culture can be a very useful instrument for examining the political stability of communist countries. The strength of this concept is that it takes into account concrete socio-political conditions of stability. Political stability is a very complex problem. However, the most important factors of stability are those which are related to the society and its characteristic features. If the institutions of the political system and the methods of exercising power are compatible with the expectations
of the vast majority of a society and its prevailing notion of author-
ity, then the system will be stable since the regime is legitimate.
In this sense, the concept of political culture can make a great
contribution to a general theory on political stability since it
enables us to examine this compatibility in any political system.
CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

This chapter examines the conceptual and methodological issues which are of importance for a comparative study of political culture in the Soviet Union and Poland. The discussion focuses on the definition of political culture, together with a review of the political science literature on its strengths and weaknesses. Another part of this chapter examines how the concept has been used in the USSR and Poland, where it is very popular with the authorities.

The concept of political culture has a long history. In the words of Gabriel Almond "something like a notion of political culture has been around as long as men have spoken and written about politics." According to Almond the first political analysts to use the concept were Plato and Aristotle. And among those who developed the concept were Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Tocqueville. Almond points out many sources which have influenced the concept, such as the enlightenment and liberal views, European sociology (Pareto and Weber), social psychology (Lipman and Dewey) and psychoanthropology (Freud, Malinowski, Margaret Mead and Laswell).

The concept was extensively developed in the 1960s. In 1963 one of the most important books was published on political culture, *The Civic Culture* by Almond and Verba. In this book the two authors
examined the political culture of the United States, the United Kingdom, Mexico, West Germany and Italy. They pointed out that a *sine quo non* for political stability is civic culture, the antithesis of authoritarian culture. Civic culture is a mixture of contradictory ideas held by the public and involves both participation and the acceptance of authority. In other words, in a typical civic culture there should be both opposition to the regime and support for it. Almond and Verba argue that only a mixture of these two contradictory attitudes creates conditions for political stability. They also presented a typology of political cultures. According to them, there are three pure forms of political culture: parochial political culture characteristic of illiterate people who are almost entirely uninvolved in the political system; participative political culture characteristic of modern democratic industrial countries where people are politically active and well informed; and between these two types, a third type--subjective political culture. This type is characteristic of partly industrial countries where some groups (for instance, businessmen) are involved in political issues, but most people are passive subjects.\(^{12}\)

In a book written with Powell, Almond says that an ideal type of the democratic industrial model of political culture is composed of sixty percent participants, thirty percent subjects, and ten percent of parochials. The antithesis of this model, the preindustrial model with parochialism as the main type of political culture, consists only of five percent participants, forty percent subjects and fifty-five percent parochials. In the in between model, the authoritarian
model, the proportions are as follows: ten percent participants, sixty percent subjects and thirty percent parochials.¹³

There are many definitions of political culture. The main difference between them concerns the scope of the concept. Generally speaking, there are those who use the concept in the narrower sense which excludes political behavior as part of political culture, while others include it in the definition of political culture. This is the broader sense of the concept. Almond and Powell define political culture in the narrower sense and say that political culture is "the state of attitudes, beliefs and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time."¹⁴ Similarly, Huntington and Dominguez define political culture as a concept composed of "the empirical beliefs about expressive political symbols and values and other orientations of the members of society toward political objects."¹⁵ Brown, in his introduction to Political Culture and Political Change in Communist Countries, uses the concept in the narrower sense. He writes that political culture

will be understood as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups.¹⁶

A broader understanding of the concept is used by Paul. He defines political culture as "the configuration of values, symbols, and attitudinal and behavioural patterns underlying the politics of a society."¹⁷ Fagen in his book on the political culture of Cuba also uses the term in its broader context, saying that he prefers what he calls an anthropological approach to the concept because "anthro-
Pologists [are] interested in planned change [and they] do not limit their definition of culture to psychological variables; they include patterned ways of life and action as well as the states of mind that sustain and condition these patterns."\(^{18}\) White, who wrote the only book-length study on the political culture of Russia and the USSR, defines that term in this way: "Political culture may be defined as the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located."\(^{19}\)

There are many criticisms of the political culture concept which have been made. One is that the political culture approach deals with subjective values and beliefs, and because of their subjective character there is a danger of presenting them in a less scientific and more impressionistic manner. Therefore the concept of political culture is a journalistic rather than a scientific concept.

Another criticism of cultural studies can be found in the writings of Barrington Moore. For him, "Cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history."\(^{20}\) These values are simply derived from institutions and interests which shape them directly. Moore very strongly emphasizes the superior role of institutions and interests and says that culture plays a less important role. He writes:

To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology.\(^{21}\)

In other words, according to Moore, the degree of coercion applied by the authorities or the vices of human nature caused by
material desires are more responsible for the shape of political culture than historical experience or values inherited from the past and transmitted from generation to generation. Undoubtedly, we can find many examples in the history of mankind which confirm this interpretation, for example, Nazism in Germany. Also, without question, one can find the significance of institutions in the political system and interests as stimuli of human behaviour. However, we can also find many examples where even complex and sophisticated systems of coercion and highly developed systems of privilege, such as a huge system of bribery, did not change the cultural values of the majority of the people. An example is the case of Poland as will be argued in chapter four.

Here, I would like to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the political culture approach. Merkl says that there are three advantages to this approach. First, "political culture is capable of empirical verification and disproof, unlike the platonic search for the only true ideology or for the 'true nature' or 'essence' of authority, legitimacy, liberty or a given national character." Secondly, Merkl writes that this approach "can clearly demonstrate the changes likely, over a period of time, in popularly held notions of authority, liberty, or identity." Finally, "political culture allows us to integrate these various, separate, and isolated concepts [about authority, liberty, legitimacy, etc.] into our models of the political system. . . ."22

I agree with Merkl on his evaluation. All theoretical considerations of liberty, legitimacy, authority, etc. ought to be
"tested" in the real political system if they are to help us to understand real political processes. And the political culture approach help us do this. Additionally, we should be aware that a political system is a dynamic entity and its elements are in multilateral relations with one another and these relations are influenced by many things including our beliefs and values. For instance, the role of the law courts in the system is determined not only by legal rules, but also by our perception of law and that perception is determined by our values, beliefs and political symbols. The political culture approach is very dynamic. This dynamism is caused by the fact that the approach takes into account the possibility of change in values and beliefs. Dynamism also results from the assumption that the political culture of a nation is not united and homogeneous.

I also accept Merkl's point on the scientific character of the concept of political culture. I have already mentioned the point raised by the critics of the concept concerning its journalistic nature. For example, McAuley suggests that because the concept deals with subjective values which are difficult to analyze objectively, the whole concept is difficult to apply in any scientific political analysis. As an example, she refers to the many different and sometimes contradictory perspectives on "the Soviet man." For instance, she cites the opinion of Bahro who argues that the official image of the new socialist man is that of a selfish consumer and possessor, whereas Szelenyi suggests that the official image is that of a well educated member of the upper-middle class in any advanced industrial society. In her presentation of the different perspectives, McAuley implies that
any analysis must be subjective and therefore journalistic since it is biased by the feelings of those who analyze communism and the Soviet Union. She writes: "There is a whole world to chart here, full of perils for the unwary. . . ."23

Certainly, McAuley is right that there are many perils awaiting those who apply the political culture concept. Of course, it is always possible to slip into journalism and McAuley is right when she points out that it is difficult to analyze subjective categories like values, beliefs, symbols, etc. in a scientific way. However, I agree with Merkl that these categories can be examined and empirically verified. Survey research is a good way to do this, despite the fact that some researchers may use this methodology in a subjective, non-scientific way. However, this is not a problem intrinsic to the concept, but rather a criticism of particular methodologies employed by some researchers.

The strengths and weaknesses of social science methods have been discussed elsewhere.24 However, there is one methodological problem which is important here. This is well described by Verba, who notes: "Though there are over one hundred autonomous nations from which a sample could be drawn, not all are available for research. . . ."25 In other words, in addition to the methodological problems discussed above, there is the additional problem of finding research opportunities because of the closed nature of some of these societies. In many of these countries we do not have access to the results of new social science surveys. This is particularly true of the USSR. The few studies which are available have never examined the
attitudes of Soviet citizens towards authority per se or towards any member of the government. We also cannot be sure whether those which have been published have been "corrected" in order to make them more suitable for the purposes of Soviet propaganda. In addition, we also do not know what methods were used for conducting these surveys, and therefore we cannot know about methodological mistakes which might have been made by Soviet researchers. Inaccurate reporting of research findings is quite possible in a country where social sciences are mistrusted by the authorities, who treat them more as a propaganda tool than an objective source of information about social processes.\(^{26}\)

However, the problem of getting information from surveys—one of the basic sources of our knowledge about political culture—does not mean that the concept should be abandoned in the study of Soviet politics and government. Nor can we blame the concept as such for the difficulty of obtaining empirical confirmation. Getty in the introduction to his book about the Great Purges of the 1930s writes about the difficulties which face historians who study the history of the USSR. There is a lack of original documents on the purges since all Soviet archives are closed and their documents unaccessible. Also there are few reliable personal accounts, memoirs, etc., because Russian politicians generally do not publish this sort of material.\(^{27}\)

Despite these and many other problems, however, no one proposes that we cease historical research on the USSR, and no one blames the discipline of history for this state of affairs. And like historians who found other sources of information about the USSR, those who attempt to apply the concept of political culture have developed other sources
such as the programs of the political movements of Russia and the Soviet Union, works of Russian and Soviet intellectuals, surveys conducted among former Soviet citizens, accounts given by foreigners who lived in the Soviet Union for a long period of time, etc. Getty writes: "It is of course, not possible to avoid guessing...." And he is right, particularly in the case of the USSR—a country still in many respects closed to foreigners. We have to be somewhat speculative if we want to pursue the study of this important country.

Here, I should also stress the fact that not all communist countries have the same problems with social science surveys. In the case of Poland, there are many reliable surveys. They have been conducted at different periods of time and examine different social matters. Also the methods of conducting these surveys do not raise the same reservations among Western specialists. Due to the importance of the sources of information, the analysis of the components of the political culture of the Russians (chapter three) and the Poles (chapter four) will be preceded by a short discussion of the sources used.

Limitations of the sources of information available in the communist countries creates an additional problem for the application of the concept of political culture. I have already presented the broader and narrower understandings of political culture. It seems that in the case of communist countries it is necessary to use the broader understanding of political culture because we do not have many scientific surveys which would show us the beliefs of the citizens, their attitudes toward politics and their perceptions. We must use
the broader understanding of the concept. By examining the political behavior of the citizens of communist countries we can find behavioral patterns. These patterns are an integral part of political culture and at the same time are, to a certain degree, determined by the values, beliefs, political knowledge and expectations of the citizens. In other words, if we cannot rely on surveys, then we have to find a substitute source of information--namely, the political behavior of the citizens. And that is why the author of this study will keep in mind the definition of political culture proposed by White.

Now we can ask whether it is still worthwhile to apply this concept to communist countries. First, I have to note that political culture, despite its weaknesses and problems with sources of information, can make a great contribution to the study of comparative communism. The institutional approach can show us similarities among communist countries. But it cannot reveal much about the differences between them. And unquestionably there are differences between Eastern bloc countries. Very often these differences are fundamental and politically very significant. For instance, how do we explain the tremendous political stability of Russia and the USSR and the great political instability of Poland? We cannot find an answer to this question by studying, for example, the parliaments of the two countries. Also, when we compare the role and structure of the communist parties of the Soviet Union and Poland we will not find an answer to this problem of communist stability.

Only by addressing the question of political culture can we explain why the Soviet Union has been extremely stable, while Poland
has been highly unstable. In order to fully understand communist countries and their politics, we have to understand not only the similarities among them, but also the differences. And we cannot afford not to understand these countries comprehensively. They are too important in the contemporary world.

The political culture approach seems to be a logical step which should be combined with the institutional approach if we want a full picture of communist countries. For instance, if we only compare the institutions of socialization in communist countries, we may mistakenly conclude that all the citizens of communist countries are convinced supporters of the ideology—except, of course, the dissidents. However, if we use the political culture approach, we can ask how many of the values and perceptions promoted by the systems of socialization are actually internalized by the citizens. Is there a difference between the official values and the values which dominate the majority of the people? What are the political consequences for the state if there is a lack of congruence between the official values and the dominant values of the people?

It seems that in the context of communist countries it is especially worthwhile to draw a distinction between the official political culture and the dominant political culture. Generally speaking, in communist countries the official political culture embraces the values, beliefs, symbols, expectations, and behavioral patterns which are promoted by the authorities. The dominant political culture means the culture which is actually represented by the vast majority of the nation. The distinction between these two
types of political culture is appropriate in Eastern Europe because of the origin of communism with the Red Army. The internal pro-communist forces were weak, and without the support of the Soviet troops it would not have been possible to establish communist rule. The Red Army, then, imposed the ideology and the organizational patterns of political institutions, together with the notion of authority and the concept of the status and role of the citizen. These elements were new in most Eastern European countries. In this sense, it is justified to say that in the case of these countries there was a revolutionary break in their traditions and political cultures. As will be argued in chapter three, the Russians did not have to internalize a radical new departure in their political culture because of the strong similarities with the pre-revolutionary political culture. However, in the case of Poland the official political culture imposed by the Red Army and implemented by the Polish communist regime was fundamentally different from Polish traditional culture. At least at the beginning of the communist revolution there was a huge disharmony between the new, official political culture and the traditional culture. At the present time the degree to which the official culture has been internalized varies from one country to another in Eastern Europe. For the political scientist interested in political culture, this is one of the most important differences which distinguish East European communist countries.

Archie Brown, who introduces the distinction between official and dominant political cultures, writes: "To speak of the official political culture of a society is almost always an oversimplifica-
tion--justifiable only if it is a conscious oversimplification." Certainly he is right. We should be aware that we may face a situation where there is no difference between the official and the dominant political cultures, i.e., where there is a relatively unified political culture, or where there is a fragmented political culture and it is impossible to distinguish a dominant political culture. Also, there may be a dichotomous division where the official and the dominant political cultures are equally popular among the people. However, for an analysis of the political cultures of communist countries the distinction between the official and the dominant political cultures seems to be justified. As I have just argued, in the context of communist countries we can use the concepts of the official and the dominant political cultures as very useful analytical categories to help us examine and understand the differences between communist countries.

Additionally, differences between the official and dominant political cultures can also be viewed as a difference between the Soviet institutional patterns and the local realities. In other words, the distinction between these two categories does not only mean the difference between the degree of internalization of the official culture by the population of each country, but also the degree of acceptance and implementation of particular institutional patterns. The greater the degree of internalization, the greater the acceptance of, say, the position of the Communist Party in the polity. The greater the acceptance, the easier for the local authorities to introduce more and more Soviet institutional patterns. In sum, therefore,
we can say that these two analytical categories—the official and dominant cultures—are very useful in the context of communist countries.

Having established the meaning and significance of the official and dominant political cultures, we can present the analytical framework of this study. We have to answer the question of how to operationalize the concept of political culture. Brown proposes to analyze four elements of political culture: previous political experience; values and fundamental beliefs; foci of identification and loyalty; and finally, political knowledge and expectations.32

I am indebted to Brown. In this study I will analyze Russian and Polish political cultures in a way which is very similar to that of Brown. My analytical framework is composed of three elements: political traditions inherited from the past; the main political values, beliefs and symbols; and political knowledge, expectations, and behavioral patterns.

The first element embraces historical and institutional patterns of the state, the traditional scope of government, and the status of the individual. This element of political culture seems to be very important. A Soviet writer says that "The past is never dead. It is not even a past."33 And an American political scientist writes: "... Political understanding always requires historical understanding. ... It is true that inadequate historical analysis leads to inadequate political analysis."34

The second element contains values and beliefs concerning egalitarianism, collectivism, liberty, civil rights, the position of the
individual, the origin and the role of political authority, social security and paternalism.

And the third element includes the political knowledge of citizens, their political activity and expectations concerning the state, and the expectations of the authorities concerning the behavior of citizens.

Within the analytical framework presented above we can find many features which distinguish communist countries from one another. For instance, as will be argued in chapter 3, a very strong attachment to collectivism is one of the most characteristic features of the Russians, whereas the Poles traditionally favour individualism. Our knowledge about these feature can lead us to important observations. The analysis of the political culture of the Russians can show us the high degree of citizens' acceptance of the Soviet regime. The Soviet regime, then, is not only based on coercion, but also on popular acceptance. This popular acceptance is based on the fact that the Soviet regime has a strong continuity with the past. It is deeply anchored in the Russian political tradition and therefore the regime fits the political mentality of the people. The harmony between the past and present is one of the most important conditions which makes the Soviet system politically very stable.

In the case of Poland the great disharmony between the past and present, between the official and dominant political cultures, makes the system very unstable. To make the Polish political system stable, it is necessary either to make the regime more compatible with political traditions, or to change the dominant political culture so that it
is at least similar to the official one. The change of the dominant political culture would mean a change in mass political behavior and eventually general support for the official political culture.

Of course, the Warsaw regime wants to replace the dominant traditional Polish political culture with the official culture. Why? First and foremost, adherence to Soviet Marxism, which is the basis for the official culture, legitimates the regime which was brought and established by Soviet outsiders. Also, the Russians will not allow any significant Polonization of the official culture of the Warsaw regime. The adherence to Soviet Marxism means maintaining loyalty or servility to the Soviet regime.

The possibility of changing the behavior of citizens and gaining from them significant political support makes the concept of political culture very attractive to the authorities in countries where there is a very significant cleavage between the official and the dominant culture. That is why the political culture concept in its social engineering aspect is so alluring for the Polish authorities who have sponsored research on the culture for many years. The first research of this kind was conducted in the second half of the 1950s, at a time when the regime began to look for popular support and to rely less on coercion.\(^{35}\)

Since that time there have been many attempts to determine what are the main features of Polish political culture, what causes their longevity and how to change them. The Polish sociologist Szczepanski writes:

It is important to overcome the traditional individualism and anarchical inclinations that proved to be so fatal in the
eighteenth century and still could not be eradicated. . . . To teach Poles the democratic discipline of that kind existing in highly developed Western democracies will require very able and highly skilled political elites. . . . The transformation of the Polish society into a well-ordered and law-abiding nation will require more time and educational effort. . . . 36

The conclusion that the Poles are not mature enough and therefore cannot live in a fully democratic society seems to be a very useful form of justification for the policies of the regime. Very often when the authorities introduce a harsh new law restricting civil rights, the political culture is usually treated as an excuse for that decision. For instance, Jaruzelski, in a speech given after the imposition of Martial Law in Poland, called the Solidarity period one more example of the "Polish anarchic soul" and justified the State of Emergency as an absolutely necessary decision "made in a country where nothing can be done in common effort." 37

In the Soviet Union the political culture concept is less popular, and until the beginning of the 1980s there were only a few books dedicated to political culture. 38 Also, the term was very rarely used. This situation was caused by the Soviet claim that the 1917 revolution changed society profoundly and that from the revolution on there has been nothing but a new Soviet society entirely shaped by Marxism-Leninism. One of the first scholars to introduce the term "political culture" into Soviet literature was Burlatskii, who said:

In Soviet literature the term "political culture" becomes more and more popular. Political culture in our opinion, embraces the level of the political knowledge of different social classes and strata as well as individuals about authority and politics and related to this knowledge the degree of the political activity of the society. Political culture should, undoubtedly, become an object of scientific research since it
[political culture] influences the effectiveness of the decisions made by the authority and the degree of their acceptance.  

In this definition the instrumental usage of the concept is noticeable. It seems that the political culture concept was absorbed by Soviet social sciences as one more useful instrument of authority. In the Soviet context, however, the practical aspect of this concept does not mean an attempt to change the dominant culture, since there is no great difference between official and dominant cultures. Rather the intent is to preserve and protect it from foreign influence.

The instrumental aspect of the concept is very strongly emphasized by the authors of *Kratkii Politicheskii Slovar* [The Concise Political Dictionary]. This dictionary says that political culture embraces "the level and character of political knowledge, evaluations and actions of the citizens as well as the content and quality of social values, traditions and norms regulating political relations." In the last part of that definition the authors enumerate the functions of political culture: educational—which shows what should be the political values of socialist society; regulative—which shows how the citizens should behave politically; and defensive—which is to protect the political values of socialism. And these three functions seem to be the main interest of Soviet researchers in the concept of political culture.
CHAPTER III

RUSSIAN AND SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE

This chapter examines Russian and Soviet political culture. The aim will be to describe the way political culture contributes to the extraordinary stability of this polity. The key factor promoting stability which this chapter identifies is the historical continuity between Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union. As will be argued, this continuity legitimates the Soviet regime and makes the official political culture congruent with that of the vast majority of Russians.

There are two major parts to this chapter. The first part will deal with the traditional values, beliefs, symbols and behavioral patterns of the Russians. The second part describes Soviet political culture. This will examine both the official culture and the dominant political culture.

As T. H. Rigby has pointed out, one of the most puzzling features of Soviet reality is the persistence of continuity with prerevolutionary politics. This continuity provides the Soviet regime with much of its legitimacy. Rigby writes:

Force is an element in any political system and its crucial role both in establishing and maintaining the Soviet regime scarcely needs demonstrating. However, in most systems the compliance of the population with the demands of their rulers depends not only on the threat or actuality of coercion but also on a measure, at least, of belief in the 'legitimacy' of such demands, and I would claim that the Soviet Union is no
exception to this. In other words we are dealing here with a system of authority, and not just of power. What Rigby calls "authority" is one of the most conspicuous features of the Soviet system, that is, the link with the prerevolutionary system. While examining the USSR we have to take into account not only the bare force that the Soviet leadership has used to maintain its power, but also the authority upon which that power is based.

Rigby's first point about the continuity between Czarist Russia and Soviet Russia is more convincing than his second point about the importance of authority. It seems that until de-Stalinization the prevailing model of the Soviet political system was based on one premise: terror, not authority, as the central method of exercising power.

This is the main assumption of the totalitarian model, which analyzed the USSR "as a system of rule for realizing total intentions under modern political and technical conditions." According to Arendt, the essence of totalitarianism is total terror. These two descriptions of totalitarianism are so broad that very often this term was used, or rather abused, by political scientists, politicians and propagandists.

In the Eastern bloc totalitarianism is described as a characteristic of the bourgeois state, particularly of the imperialist stage of capitalism. In the West there has been a tendency to use the term "totalitarianism" to describe the communist countries per se, without seeing the differences existing between them.

It is not my purpose to analyze the totalitarian model in
detail. However, since this concept has so heavily influenced many students of communism, it is worthwhile to point out the weaknesses and strengths of this model. Also, because the political culture perspective differs in many aspects from the totalitarian point of view, it is essential to present the main assumptions of totalitarianism.

The weakness of the totalitarian model is its broad scope which often erodes its scientific value in favour of a Cold War connotation. In addition, one can argue that the concept lacks dynamism because it assumes there have been no significant changes in the Soviet system since the time of Stalin. Its static character is pointed out, for example, by Perlmutter who rejects totalitarianism as a concept which "does not explain the dynamics of either its structures or its system." Totalitarianism is simply out of date. Although the concept may have explained the reality of the Soviet Union under Stalin, it has now lost its analytical power because of the many changes in the nature of the Soviet system. Brzezinski, one of the creators of the totalitarian model, accepts this criticism. He says: "If the word 'totalitarianism' evokes too much passion--it is meant to define a particular phase in the system/society relationship in which that society is in almost complete subordination to the state." In other words, totalitarianism is just a model for the analysis of a particular phase in the Soviet Union's history. And when the phase was over, the model can no longer be used successfully.

The construction of the model is also a problem. According to the definition proposed by Brzezinski and Friedrich, totalitarianism is a system composed of an ideology covering all aspects of life to
which each citizen is obliged to adhere, a single mass party with an almighty leader, mass terror supporting the party and its leader, a monopoly of the means of communication, a weapons monopoly and a centrally directed economy.\textsuperscript{52}

A full analysis of the many critiques of the Brzezinski-Friedrich definition would lead to an unproductive digression. Yet, critics have pointed out that some of the features of totalitarianism exist in democratic countries (such as a monopoly of weapons). And all of these features can be found elsewhere with differences of degree, not of kind. Schapiro proposes, then, a different definition of totalitarianism. He says that Brzezinski and Friedrich confuse the characteristic features of totalitarianism and the instruments of rule, therefore, it is better to describe a totalitarian system as characterized by five features: the leader; the subjugation of the legal order; control over private morality; continuous mobilization; and legitimacy based on mass support. Schapiro suggests three instruments of totalitarianism: ideology, party, and state.\textsuperscript{53}

Schapiro's proposition does not heavily emphasize the role of the state and its institutions. In contrast, Brzezinski and Friedrich enumerate the functions of the state performed through its monopolies, but say nothing about the problem of the legitimacy of totalitarian authority. Is the government based only on mass terror? Are there any other elements except repression in the relations between those who govern and those who are governed? We cannot find answers to these and other questions using the approach of Brzezinski and Friedrich. They rely too heavily on institutions, looking at them as
if they were the only elements of politics.

This point is particularly important for the comparative analysis of communist countries. A strong emphasis on formal institutions makes impossible any comparisons of these countries. In other words, by exclusively comparing institutions we may mistakenly conclude that all communist countries are the same since their institutions are the same or very similar. However, despite great similarities among, say, communist parliaments, there are also great differences between these countries. By no means can we say that, for example, Hungary and Bulgaria are the same or that the differences between them are of no importance.

And finally, there is one more problem. The totalitarian model overestimates the efficiency of totalitarian regimes. Aron, for example, enumerates five features of totalitarianism: a one-party system; an ever present ideology; the state's monopoly on the means of coercion and persuasion; subjugation of economic and professional activities to the state; and police and ideological terrorism. He says that "the phenomenon [totalitarianism] is complete when all these elements are fully achieved." In his opinion, totalitarianism in the USSR was achieved in the thirties and late forties. If this is true, we have to assume that Stalin's dictatorship, based exclusively on coercion and ideology, was absolutely perfect—without any, even the slightest, element of chaos. But the evidence we have today shows something different. Even Fainsod, who seems to accept the totalitarian model, calls the Soviet system, after detailed analysis of the Smolensk Archive, "inefficient totalitarianism."
Schapiro very rightly points out that "the myth of efficiency" of Hitler's and Stalin's regimes is "one of the hardest to kill." And it seems that this myth is sustained by the totalitarian concept because it relies so heavily on formal institutions. My criticism is that the totalitarian model places too much stress on institutions, with a tendency to treat all communist countries identically. In fact, its powerful insights can be successfully applied only to the past history of the USSR.

In chapter two I proposed a method of operationalizing the concept of political culture. Therefore, the part of this chapter dedicated exclusively to Russian political culture will be divided into the following analytic categories: political experience inherited from the past, the main political values, beliefs and symbols, political knowledge, expectations and behavioral patterns. I will also use two additional analytic categories: the traditional or dominant political culture and the official political culture. These two categories, as was argued in chapter two and will be further developed in chapter four, seem to be very useful in the case of communist countries.

I must point out that I will deal only with the political culture of the Russians. This is so for at least two reasons. First, the Russians are the dominant nation within the USSR and therefore their political culture plays a more important role than that of, say, the Kazakhs. Furthermore, Russian political culture is better described and analyzed by Western scholars since sociological surveys of other nations of the USSR are largely unavailable, and I would be
forced to be completely speculative. Thus the concept of political culture would lose its analytical and scientific character.

1. RUSSIAN POLITICAL TRADITION

"Soviet politics cannot be separated from Russian history," writes Brzezinski, and many agree with him. One can say that Brzezinski's observation is true of any nation. But in the case of Russia this statement is especially valid since that country has been largely isolated from foreign influence for many centuries with only short and inconsequential breaks.

The state of isolation causes xenophobia and it helps to create a peculiar concept of the political when the fear of foreign invasion and the notion of an enemy waiting for any opportunity to attack are central to the perception of politics. This perception of politics has a tremendous impact upon the concept of the state and notion of political power in Soviet domestic relations. Fear of the enemy becomes a very important element of life. Since only a strong center of power can successfully defend the nation against its enemies, everything and everybody must be subjected to the center. Vernadsky very rightly points out that in the Czardom of Moscow "All classes of the nation from top to bottom, except for the slaves, were bound to the service of the state."

A historical event that plays a significant role in the history of Russia and dominates its course is the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. Szamuely, the Hungarian-born English historian, says that "The Mongol concept of society was based on the unqualified
submission of all to the absolute, unlimited power of the Khan."60 And Vernadsky adds "This principle [of submission] was in the course of time impressed thoroughly upon the Russian people."61 The Mongol invasion was a turning point in Russian history.

Along with the coming of the Mongols, the institutions of popular representation called Veche gradually disappeared from the political life of Russia.62 Although in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was the Zemskii Sobor, an institution that resembled a parliamentary body to some degree, it never played an important role since it was "an expedient necessary for the state until such time as it could afford an adequate bureaucratic apparatus."63 Szamuely adds that the Zemskii Sobor never became anything more than a tool in the hands of government."64

Until the beginning of the twentieth century Russia was altogether devoid of any representative institutions. The first attempt to create a parliamentary body was during the 1905-06 revolution, when the Duma was organized. Formally it was a powerful body that had the right to enact and amend legislation, dismiss ministers, consider the budget of the state, and so on. In fact, however, the Duma was very limited in its activity. Levin in a very detailed study on the Dumas notes that the government did its best to limit the powers of the Duma by, for instance, restricting the reporting of Duma meetings or limiting the number of political parties.65

The Czar remained the centerpiece of the system. He could, for example, dissolve the Duma or reject any bill prepared by that body. Russia remained a country ruled by a single person whose power was
practically unlimited.

The power of the Czars was strengthened not only by the lack of democratic institutions, but also by the attitudes of the subjects toward the Czars. This popular attitude is reflected in Russian proverbs, such as "We have one God in the sky and one Czar on earth." Or "God was, God is and God will be; Czar was, Czar is and Czar will be."66

As we see, the Czar was not only a ruler, he was something more. He was God on earth. That perception of the Czar implies a very personal attitude towards him (he was not just an institutional element of the state) and a highly emotional involvement (God's and the Czar's nature cannot be explained with rational categories). The divine nature of the Czar was fused with the state in its relations with the subjects (not citizens).

According to the authors of The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, a turning point in the history of Russia was the adoption of the first Russian Code of Laws (Ulozhenie) in 1649. The authors write that "From that day begins the period of the Polizeistaat [Police State] in Russia."67 Technically this is correct, but it was not new. The Ulozhenie adopted shortly after the Times of Troubles was just a logical consequence of a highly personal and emotional perception of the Czar.68 The essence of the Ulozhenie was the principle that every individual belonged first of all to the state.69 And since the Czar—an earthly God—stood above the state then every individual belonged to the Czar.

I have already mentioned the impact of the Mongol invasion on
Russia. A slavist, Nicholas Trubetskoy, says that "The Russians inherited their empire from Chingis-Khan." And Seton-Watson adds that "If there is one single factor which dominates the course of Russian history, at any rate since the Tatar [Mongol] conquest, it is the principle of autocracy." That is why we should rather say that the Ulozhenie was a legal confirmation of the already deeply rooted in the Oriental attitude towards the monarchy and the state.

The deific character of the Czar had to be rationalized and through this additionally strengthened. Therefore the Church played an especially important role in Russia. The church, like all other institutions, was denied any autonomous role and was fully subjected to the Czar. But among the instruments of the Czar, it became one of the most important institutions. The church, which had everyday contact with the subjects, had to show that the concept of a ruler works and that it was the only possible and optimal model for Russia.

The imperial aspirations of Moscow were strengthened by the Russian church. In 1510 the monk Philoteus wrote:

Know then, O pious Tsar, that all the orthodox realms have converged in thy single empire. Thou art the only Tsar of the Christians in all the universe. . . . Observe and harken, O pious Tsar. All the Christian empires have converged in thy single one, that two Romes have fallen, but the third stands, and no fourth can ever be. Thy Christian empire shall fall to no one.

In other words, Philoteus says that the Czar is the guarantor of Russia's power. The role of the Czar determines the scope of his government. I have already mentioned the role of the church. The church received money from the state and was supervised by the Holy Synod, whose membership was decided by the Czar.
The role of all other organizations in Russian society was very similar to that of the church. For instance, until the 1905-06 revolution, all trade unions were forbidden by law. After that revolution trade unions were legalized, but remained under the scrutiny of the Czar and his officials. No organization could be formed without the consent of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The censorship system covered virtually all aspects of intellectual life. The "preventive" type of censorship limited what was written. According to the 1882 Censorship Act, any newspaper which published something that was considered subversive had to submit each issue to the censor before its publication. A special state body composed of the ministers of education, justice and interior could dissolve any newspaper under the charge of treason.

A very significant fact is the timing of censorship legislation. It was introduced at the time when liberalism, with its main postulates of the political rights of individuals and a very limited role of the state, was the dominant political philosophy in Europe. In Russia, however, liberalism had almost no impact on the role of the state. Quite the contrary, the Czar significantly increased his powers and the state became even more powerful than ever before.

In the second part of the nineteenth century, the Russian government introduced many new institutions that gave it a tighter control over the population. For example in 1860 the state bank was founded. The bank was responsible for financing all kinds of entrepreneurial activity. However, the main criterion applied by the bank was of a political nature. It was impossible to get a loan from
the bank, even for the most economically effective investment, without the political acceptability of the borrower.

The government controlled almost all aspects of economic activity. It granted lucrative contracts and imposed tariffs and was itself a considerable entrepreneur. The government owned many mines, oilfields and almost the entire railway system. It was also a landlord with a special category of workers called "state peasants." Margaret Miller observes: "The predominant activity of the state in every sphere of economic life, not only as an administrator but as an actual undertaker of the various processes involved was a central fact of Russian economic life." The great scope of governmental control over the economy reduced the incentive of individual entrepreneurs. Therefore the view of Richard Pipes, following Max Weber, seems to be justified when he suggests that weak capitalism in Russia was an element strengthening Russian autocracy.

2. RUSSIAN POLITICAL VALUES, BELIEFS AND SYMBOLS

A study of Russian political values, beliefs and symbols is difficult because there is not a great deal of good information on which to base an analysis. The Soviet government does not allow the publication of many works on Russian society. Studies which are available today are often not completely reliable. Often those published abroad are subjective. However, there are a few books written by foreigners who visited Russia. One good example is The Journals of the Marquis de Custine. However, none of these books are of the stature and significance of a study like Tocqueville's Democracy in America.
Despite all these problems, there is a great deal of agreement among specialists on Russian values and beliefs. Many of them conclude their observations with a statement that the Russians are unable to conceive of democracy as it is described by Western political writers. This seems to be accurate, as will be shown.

First, we should briefly examine political movements in Russia. Doing so we can discover the scope and nature of Russian political thought. The political programs of those movements were anchored in the traditional values of the society, therefore their analysis can tell us a great deal about the Russian political mentality.

The revolt of the Decembrists is usually treated as the beginning of modern political movements in Russia. The Decembrists wanted to overthrow the Czar and introduce a republic. However, only a minority of them wanted a limited government, an elected legislature and civil rights. The majority wanted a strong, highly centralized government, since they thought only strong power could guarantee social justice. As two American historians say, many of those who shouted "constitution" during the revolt did so because they thought that "constitution" was Prince Constantine's wife and the latter was seen by them as the best successor to Czar Alexander.79

Schapiro says that the ideas of the Decembrists "foreshadowed the characteristic features of the views of their successors."80 I cannot fully agree with Schapiro. It seems that the Decembrists were rather typically Russian in their concept of a strong state. Therefore, the Decembrists were an example of continuity in the Russian tradition. However, on the other hand, it was the first movement
which broke from the tradition of obedience to authority by wanting to overthrow the Czar. And in this sense Schapiro is right.

The political movements which followed the Decembrists emphasized social justice as their primary goal, especially the populist movement Narodnichestvo. One of the fathers of that movement, N. G. Chernyshevsky, believed that political freedom can never be implemented without economic equality. Also the Land and Liberty movement (Zemlia i Volia) called for social revolution, egalitarianism, nationalization of land, significantly without saying anything about civil rights and political freedoms. The members of these movements did not pay attention to political rights, limitation of political power, elections and the role of individuals. Always a group, a community (obschina) was the focus of Russian political and intellectual activists.

The most important social group was the peasants. For example, P. L. Lavrov, a proponent of Russian populism, believed that the revolution would come from the village. The importance of the peasants was a logical consequence of Russian economic development. In a country with very weak capitalism, peasants were the dominant social group. The program of Russian political movements reflected the position of the peasants. Assuming that the leaders of these movements wanted to gain political support among the Russians, they had to include in their programs those values which were widely accepted by the Russian peasants. The main feature of Russian reality criticized by the nineteenth century movements in Russia was the social and economic misery of the peasants. According to the programs
of these movements, a new post-revolutionary Russia was to ensure the welfare of the people (i.e., the peasants). Their welfare was usually described with egalitarian and collectivist categories. Such a vision was again a logical consequence of the social development of the Russian village. The Russian peasant lived in the commune (mir), where he shared the agricultural land with other members of the mir. The mir performed many functions such as the collection of taxes or the dispatch of recruits for the army. The word mir means in Russian "world." And it was exactly the world for Russian peasants. The village community, as T. Szamuely suggests referring to Chicherin, the Russian historian, was "Created, if not on the direct initiative of the state, then at least with its encouragement, to ensure the orderly payment of tyaglo (taxes)."

But in addition to its economic significance, the mir strengthened Russian collectivism, which was treated as the only valuable model of social life. The belief in the indispensability of collective effort was conferred by everyday life in the commune. Living in the mir gave the Russian peasant-serf a feeling of security. Of course, being a member of the commune, the peasant sublimated his own individuality. He had to mingle with the others if he wanted to share the common fate.

That is why the movements of the nineteenth century did not reject collectivism and egalitarianism. The appeal of these two elements was too strong for the Russians to be ruled out. And if the movements were to gain any significant political support, they had to incorporate these elements into their programs.
The most revolutionary element in the programs of Russian populism was the overthrow of the Czar. In the Russian context that demand was too revolutionary, and this is a reason why populism was supported mainly among Russian intellectuals, not the peasants. For the Russian peasant disobedience to the Czar was inconceivable. Why?

First of all, for the Russian peasants the Czar (Bat'ushka) was not responsible for their misery. The Gospodiny (lords) were responsible. For instance the main target of Razin's rebels (the so-called peasant war of 1667-1671) were the Boyars who were accused of being traitors to the Czar because they did not want to improve the lives of the people. Field very rightly observes that "in its simplest and most common expression, popular monarchism took the form of the adage 'the Tsar wants it, but the Boyars resist.' 'It', of course, was justice, or tax relief or a redistribution of land--whatever the Narod [the people] most wanted." The myth of "good authority" and a "just Czar" has been noted also by Avrich, Cherniavsky and White.

It seems that the just Czar myth has not lost its validity and, as will be further developed, is still an important element of Russian (and Soviet) political culture. The just Bat'ushka is simply a reflection of the Russian disposition to perceive political authority in personalized and idealized terms. Any Czar is not only supposed to be a just and wise ruler, but must truly be just and wise. This is so by definition because he is a Czar. The Czar is the father of his people, and a father cannot be vicious and stupid. This is an axiom which need not be proven for the Russians. Many Russian folk tales show fathers as the ideal to follow.
In other words, the belief in the perfection of authority seems to be a firmly rooted element of political culture. That is why I do not agree with Mary McAuley who suggests, after Field, that the just Czar myth was used as a rationale by the peasants for their radical demands. And it was used "to appeal for leniency on the grounds of having honestly believed that they were acting as the Tsar had wished." The longevity of this myth and its presence in the political culture of the Soviet Union, as I will argue, shows that the myth is a cultural element rather than a tool of political expediency.

In sum, the traditional beliefs and values of the Russians can be characterized as follows: 1) a very strong belief in power--only a strong government using force can rule effectively and justly; 2) a high degree of personalization of political authority--the just Czar myth, the conviction that the Czar (or authority) is perfect and wise and therefore is always right; 3) a strong belief in the effectiveness myth, the conviction that the Czar (or authority) is perfect and wise and therefore is always right; 4) a strong belief in the effectiveness of collective efforts--collectivism is a value which has to be protected and maintained if life is to be safe; 5) a belief in the inferiority and unimportance of the individual as such.

These traditional values and beliefs influence the political behavior and expectations of the Russian people.

3. RUSSIAN POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, EXPECTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR

I have already presented a brief history of Russia's political institutions. The general conclusion was that the Russian experience
with representative democracy was very limited. That situation was held to create a particular type of political behaviour. The main feature of that behaviour was political passivity. The 1905 Revolution can illustrate this passivity. With the exception of the new industrial centers, such as Petersburg, Moscow, Don and Odessa, the rest of the country was practically peaceful. Another example is the October Manifesto of 1905. In this Manifesto the Emperor granted fundamental political rights such as freedom of speech. The nation did not celebrate that event. Also the people did not protest when the first Duma was dissolved. And although the members of the first Duma did appeal to the nation to resist its dissolution, there was virtually no resistance among the people. The Russians did not care about the fate of their first constitutional experiment. Levin says that electors to the third Duma thrust letters, passports, insurance policies and many other things into the ballot boxes, but not the voting slips. During the revolution a Russian soldier told the British Ambassador that Russia must be a republic but with a good Czar as its head.

These facts show us the political indifference of the Russians. For instance, Gogol in his Revizor vividly portrayed the typical Russian peasants as conservative, superstitious, obsequious and bullied individuals who were interested only in gaining food. Food and other "material" needs were the only aims in which the peasants were interested. Their revolts in the seventeenth century and the political unrest in the Russian villages of the nineteenth century were carried out under the banner of social justice. The desire to live in
a state of social equality and justice was of utmost priority for the Russian peasants.

That attitude was coherent with their paternalistic image of state. The just Bat'ushka had to guarantee welfare for his children. Let us repeat, political rights were not important. The most important task for the authority was to guarantee the welfare of the people. That is what the Czar and state were for. Not freedom of speech (since the authority is always right) nor free elections, but a surety of a full stomach was the main political goal of the Russian peasant.

While analyzing the programs of the Russian political movements, I said that these programs did not raise the question of political freedoms. Also due to the passiveness of the Russians, the authors of those programs did not take into account the possibility of making any revolution "from below." Szamuely observes "the doctrine of a . . . revolution from below was a startling innovation in Russian political thought. It had been held by neither the Decembrists nor Herzen. . . . The first great Russian revolutionary realist [Chernyshevsky], had no illusions about the ability of the downtrodden, illiterate, superstitious, peasant mass to effect a genuine transformation of the political, social and economic scene." And Szamuely quotes Chernyshevsky who wrote "the mass of population knows nothing and cares about nothing except its material advantages."91

Chernyshevsky, who is often seen as a forerunner of Lenin, was not the only one who described the Russians in this manner. For instance, another great Russian, Dostoievsky, complained about the Russian attitude towards the ruler: "We Russians possess two dreadful
powers . . . the unity, the spiritual indivisibility of the millions of our people, and their closest communion with the monarch.\textsuperscript{92} That communion was among the reasons why Chernyshevsky described the Russians so pessimistically. Ulam says:

It is difficult for the modern reader to understand why mutiny was not a frequent occurrence in the Russian army of the period [the nineteenth century]. The soldier was conscripted for twenty-five years; the slightest infraction of discipline, fault in deportment, or a misstep during the endless parades and drills could lead to his being whipped. It was a common practice for officers to supplement their meager salaries by diverting into their pockets some of the money allotted for their soldier's subsistence. Still, in the vast majority of cases, the Russian soldier endured the ordeal and indignities of his everyday existence with the resignation and submissiveness inherited from generations of his peasant ancestors.\textsuperscript{93}

Ulam observes another important feature of Russian political culture, namely, resignation. Even if the peasants were aware of the fact that their everyday life might have been better and happier, they usually accepted their fate. A conviction about the unavoidability of destiny determined the behaviour of the Russians. This feeling was characteristic not only of the peasants but of the gentry as well. A typical character which frequently occurred in the nineteenth century Russian literature is described, after Goncharov as the "superfluous man." This man is incapable of engaging in effective action. The reason for such an attitude is the belief that nothing can be changed. A typical example of the superfluous man was the titular hero of Ivan Goncharov's \textit{Oblomov} published in 1859. Oblomov was a man who spent his day lying in bed and thinking about what he would do if he were to get up.

Erlich says that the superfluous man may be treated as a
national archetype, and he quotes Dobrolyubov, the Russian critic, who analyzed the superfluous man as an affliction peculiar to Russia and the by-product of serfdom. Another example of very strong determinism is the philosophy of Tolstoy, as argued by Berlin in his beautiful essay dedicated to that great Russian.

Summa summarum, the traditional political culture of Russia was composed of a very strong personal attachment to political authority, a paternalistic concept of the state, a powerful desire to live in an all encompassing welfare state, a very strong element of determinism, political indifference, no emphasis on political democracy, and political obsequiousness.

The above characterization of Russian political culture is rejected by McAuley, who sees a whole array of other behaviour, opinions and beliefs. There was peasant individualism as well as collectivism, strong anarchist notions against any 'state', repeated demands for and attempts to introduce representative institutions, criticism of censorship, religious sects practising autonomy, generals complaining bitterly of the lack of nationalist and religious feelings among the troops . . . [and what was inherited by the Bolsheviks] was a most extraordinary, rich, jumbled and contradictory set of political perceptions.

McAuley's criticism is correct in that there was diversity in Russian political life. But she seems to erroneously assume that this diversity means that we cannot generalize about what was the dominant political culture. Much of what McAuley describes as a whole array of other behavior, opinions and beliefs was on the periphery of Russian political culture. In addition, as I argued in the case of Russian populism, that periphery was heavily "contaminated" by the dominant peasant beliefs and values.
Another frequent mistake is the assumption that the Bolshevik Revolution introduced a completely new era in the history of Russia, and—in terms of political culture—began a new cultural type. This is an error. As we will show later, this mistake is caused by an understanding of revolution as if it were a one-dimensional event. However, revolution is multifaceted. As Neumann says, revolution is a "fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of a social order thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development." In other words, revolution is a major break on four levels: political, social, economic and cultural. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the Russian Revolution on all these levels. However, the cultural level is particularly important because this study is concerned with the development of Russian/Soviet political culture.

Revolution on the cultural level in Russia can be divided into five stages. The first stage began in 1905 and lasted until 1917. Brzezinski says that "the late Romanov period was a period of decay, of gradual weakening of the hold of the state over society." It was a period of many changes in the state and in society, including a decay of the traditional political culture when traditional values and symbols were eroded. We may say that this was a period of cultural flux. It included the introduction of parliamentarism within the old political framework. This occurred with the consent of the Czar. It is important to note that this took place much later in Russia than in other Western countries, as Table I shows.

The second stage (roughly 1917 - 1921) encompasses the October
Revolution and War Communism. During this stage there was a retreat from parliamentarism towards a highly centralized government. In terms of political culture it was a time when many main features of the traditional political culture were again promoted (for example, a very strong notion of collectivism).

The third stage (1922-1927) was that of the NEP program and

**TABLE I**

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<th>Country</th>
<th>First Constitutional Regime</th>
<th>First Suffrage</th>
<th>First Parliamentary Regime</th>
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<td>Poland</td>
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its gradual withdrawal. During this stage the Kremlin relaxed the centralization of its power and a less autocratic pattern was promoted.

During the fourth stage (1928-1931) there were again very strong trends toward centralism. At this stage, though, in comparison to the second stage, there was significant pressure to continue the
communist revolution from below, as Fitzpatrick convincingly argues in her noteworthy treatment of this period of Russian history. At this time a new phenomenon appeared on the Russian political stage, namely "revolution from below." This was a symptom of fundamental changes in Russian political culture which might have challenged the status quo. In the context of political passivity which characterized the traditional political culture, this was extremely significant. As Fitzpatrick very rightly points out, the anti-bureaucratic drive of the dissatisfied people often verged on an attack on established authority per se.

In other words, the trends from below might have meant that after the revolution on the political and economic levels, the revolution on the cultural level was about to occur with its hard to predict consequences. We have to keep in mind that the new Soviet regime was not widely accepted by the population and lacked the mark of sanctification which so tremendously strengthened the power of the Czars. Red Russia went through many dangerous situations such as the interventions. However, it seems that we can say that the situation of the fourth stage was one of the most dangerous in terms of stability, and if it progressed it might have brought results of crucial importance for the future of Russia and the Bolsheviks. It may have been a reason why Stalin decided to begin the fifth stage (1931-1938), which includes the Great Purges.

In terms of the revolution on the cultural level, the fifth stage may be viewed as a counterrevolution. During this period Stalin reintroduced all the traditional features of Russian political cul-
ture. Again, blind obedience to the authority became the most desirable pattern of political behavior. That is why it seems to be worthwhile to consider the role of Marxism from a political culture perspective. There are analysts who assume that the official political culture of the Soviet regime is an exclusive product of the Bolshevik revolution and that this culture is in opposition to the political culture of the vast majority of Russians. For example, Gayle Durhem Hollander in her portrait of the new communist man strongly emphasizes the role of the party to which each citizen must be subjected, and she suggests that this subordination is caused by the totalitarian character of the ideology. Yet it seems that this subordination is congruent with traditional Russian political culture and not simply a product of totalitarianism.

The role of ideology is important since the latter is, like political culture, also partly composed of values and beliefs. Particularly in the case of the USSR, the role of Marxism has to be taken into account since the Soviet authorities claim to be the bearers of Marx's ideas. In the Soviet Union, Marxism was transformed from the original version, which was a philosophical system, into a set of empty phrases which now have to legitimate the regime and justify its decisions. In the context of political culture and revolution on the cultural level, Marxism was Russified and denuded of its revolutionary elements.

Many studies have traced the Soviet revision of Marxism. For instance, Lowenthal writes "The Marxian relation between bases and superstructure has been turned upside down. This is a fundamental
Stalinist revision of Marxism. In other words, what Stalin did was eliminate one of the most revolutionary elements of Marxism which was absolutely incapable of adjustment to the traditional Russian notion of political relations within the state. The active role of bases would have meant the diminished role of the state and its rulers. To apply the Marxian relation would have meant a fundamental change in Russia and its political culture.

Trotsky in *The Revolution Betrayed* writes of Stalin, "He is the personification of the bureaucracy." Trotsky is referring to the conservatism of Stalin. R. T. de George says, "Unlike Marx and Lenin, Stalin was neither philosophically inclined nor trained. . . . As head of the party he developed--or revised--the Marxist-Leninist heritage in the light of concrete circumstances--by practice more than theory."

Among many circumstances which had to be taken into account by Stalin, the highly practical politician, was the Russian perception of politics, traditional beliefs, etc.--or, in other words, Russian political culture. No matter what their evaluations and opinions about Stalin's rule, none of his biographers deny his practicality. Even those who follow Trotsky's opinions about Stalin as a mediocre revolutionary, such as Isaac Deutscher in his biography of Stalin, emphasize his practicality. A leading Soviet dissident, L. Kopelev, says "The most dangerous thing here [the Soviet Union] would be Marxism. Not just propaganda, not just slogans but Marxism as a system of historical analysis."

As we see, what unites Trotsky and Kopelev is their opinion
about the role of Marxism in the USSR. They both say that there is no real Marxism in Russia. This is hardly a surprising fact. The original version of Marxism means a general revolution. Keeping in mind the Neuman definition of revolution, we can say that the October Revolution was very limited and then, thanks to Stalin, it was eliminated in many aspects, including revolution on the cultural level. The Bolshevik takeover was undoubtedly a great change on the economic and social levels, but on the political and particularly on the cultural level there was little change. Brzezinski is absolutely right when he says:

Leninism in its political style and organizational form thus became—for all its sincere revolutionary content and obvious revolutionary social significance—a continuation of the dominant tradition rather than its termination. In terms of political tradition, the Duma-based provisional government was more revolutionary than Lenin's—though to repeat, on the plan of social relations, property relations and the role of classes, Leninism obviously meant a more profound and significant change. But on the level of politics, the provisional government, because of its democratic character, involved a sharper break with the past, a deeper discontinuity, than old Leninism.108

In my opinion, this is a correct evaluation of Marxism in the Soviet context. Lenin, when he took over, eliminated the most revolutionary elements of the original concept, for instance, the role of the base. Stalin, after strengthening his position in the party, eliminated altogether the revolutionary elements on the cultural level and almost entirely on the political level. What he left were the revolutionary elements in the economic and social contexts of the revolution and the phraseology. Bialer says that in comparison with Hitler, "Stalin's practice of personal dictatorship as well as the cult of the dictator had no ideological anchoring." He calls this
"another major weakness of Stalin's cult."\textsuperscript{109}

I do not think that it was a weakness, and I do not think that Stalin needed to anchor his cult ideologically. I have already presented the inherent element of Russian political culture—a cult of the ruler who is identified with Russia herself. The cult of leadership was a natural feature of the Russian perception of politics and therefore it was not necessary for Stalin to "justify," ideologically or otherwise, his leadership and the scope of his power. What Stalin needed was to revive the old Russian tradition, and he did.

The lack of an ideological anchor for Stalin's cult was not a weakness. Quite the contrary. His cult was anchored in the strongest possible way: it was anchored historically and culturally. (In Hitler's case, the \textit{Fuhrer} had to justify his cult since German politics was traditionally impersonal: first the state, then the Kaiser.) Stalin did the best thing: in order to stabilize the country, the regime and his personal position he had to get rid of the revolutionary element of Marxism.

In my classification of the revolutionary periods in the history of Russia/the Soviet Union, I have presented five stages. These stages identify the state of flux in Russian political culture at that time. That state was characterized by a fluctuation from liberalism to the War Communism type of society, from the attempts to change Russia and its political culture in the spirit of parliamentary democracy to the attempts to introduce utopian visions of social equality. In other words, there was a movement from one extreme to the other.

As a result of that state of affairs, there were first symptoms
of real changes in the traditional political culture, and eventually these changes might have caused even greater chaos than that of 1917. That is why the fifth stage may be called the return to tradition when all the new political ideas from either the left or from the right were eradicated and when all the traditional Russian values, beliefs and symbols and behavioral patterns were reimplemented and strengthened. Thus in the context of the revolution on its cultural level, we can treat Stalinism, at least in the fifth stage, as a process of resocialization, as a process of restoring the old, traditional political culture and the elimination of the cultural anarchy caused by the introduction of parliamentarism and then the collapse of Czardom.

The beginning of the fifth resocializing stage was in 1932. In this year, for instance, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers was accused of "revolutionary avant-guardism," and it was dissolved. This Association suspected the older generation in power of succumbing to the temptations of power, losing their revolutionary momentum and falling into bureaucratic lethargy. Fitzpatrick calls this "revolution from below." However, a good deal of manipulation may come from above. In any case, the result was that the authorities were to decide what was Marxist and revolutionary and therefore to be continued, and what was anti-Marxist and anti-revolutionary and to be discontinued.

In terms of political culture it was the beginning of the restoration of the traditional belief that only the authority knows what is right and what is wrong. Thus the scope of government again
became traditionally broad.

4. THE OFFICIAL RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The most comprehensive and authoritative presentation of the official political culture is the third programme of the CPSU adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961. In a section of the programme entitled "The Moral Code of the Builder of Communist Society" there is a list of the features of the "new Soviet man." According to this Code, the perfect citizen should love the socialist motherland and be dedicated to communism, should always keep in mind the fact that he works for the good of his country and society, should foster collective and comradely assistance, should be intolerant of dishonesty, should behave like a brother towards the other nations (peoples) of the Soviet Union and the workers and peoples of other countries. Another expression of the official political culture is the oath which has to be taken by each new member of the Pioneer organization which says, in the first place, that the Pioneer will love his motherland and the Communist Party and then that he will be friendly with the children of the world and will be a disciplined citizen who loves to work.

If we compare these two examples, we can say that the common point is the love of the country and subordination to the authority-party ("dedication to communism"). These can hardly be treated as an invention of the communists. In another example, in a standard book on scientific communism, we can read:

The Central Committee of our Party creates policies which express the common interests of our people. If there are any
ailments they are caused by some member of the apparatus. Those bureaucrats think that they are the authority, whereas they are only servants of the Party and the People. And our Party will do its best in order to eliminate those soulless bureaucrats because the chief task of the Party is the welfare of the people and peace on Earth.\footnote{13}

Lev Kopelev says that the official ideology

\ldots is an ideology of [an] authoritarian bureaucratic party \ldots, of superstate chauvinism, of unprincipled pragmatism in the interpretation of history, and economic or ethical questions. \ldots Authoritarianism, chauvinism and pragmatism—these are the integrally essential characteristics of the really dominant, conservative ideology while all the conventionally sacred (revolutionary, internationalist, democratic, socialist, humanistic and so on) formulae or even lengthy outpourings are in essence simply decorative trinkets purely external ritual relics, 'vestiges,' like the term 'comrade' or motto 'workers of the world unite.'\footnote{14}

Kopelev stresses authoritarianism, pragmatism and nationalism as the main features of the official ideology. And again these features can hardly be seen as a new creation of the Bolsheviks. The Program of the CPSU stresses the love of country and the Party. The oath of the Pioneers emphasizes the love of the country and discipline of citizens. The book on scientific communism says that the welfare of the people is the main task of the authorities, reviving the old myth about the just Czar who wants only the good of his people and not himself (the Czar or the Central Committee of the Party). But some of his Boyars are guilty of some defects in what would otherwise be excellent policies. The new elements in the official culture of the Soviet regime are technical words such as, for instance, revolution, proletariat, etc. The content of that culture reintroduced and established in the fifth stage is traditional.

Also the patterns of political behaviour of the rulers are very similar to those from the past. A Russian historian in a work first
published at the beginning of the twentieth century wrote:

To speak on behalf of the whole land was a habit of the Muscovite government. . . . The petition from 'people of all degrees' became a stereotyped formula with which they justified every important government action. . . . This official counterfeit of the people's will became a kind of political fiction, which has, in certain cases, continued to exist to this day.  

In light of the analysis I have presented above, this hardly requires further comment.

Brezhnev in his speech on the 1977 constitution said: "The Soviet people said 'Yes, this is the constitution which we have always wanted...'. In countless letters sent to the Party, the Soviet people warmly supported the policies of our Party and our new constitution." Chernenko in a speech delivered to the Supreme Soviet claimed:

On behalf of the Soviet people we recommend new directives for our cultural policy. The people absolutely abhor the bourgeois elements in Soviet culture. In thousands of letters sent to the central committee, they criticize some Soviet artists.

And Marshall Ustinov said in one of his speeches:

We, the Soviet people, we, the lovers of communism and peace will never allow the imperialists to wage a new war. We, the Soviet people, say categorically 'No' to the servants of world imperialism. In thousands of letters sent to the party, to the ministry of defence and to me personally, the Soviet people express their support for the foreign policy of our party. I thank them and I promise that we will always be realizing your wishes, dear comrades, dear Soviet people.

And so on.

5. THE CONTEMPORARY DOMINANT POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE RUSSIANS

Dealing with contemporary Russian political culture, we should be more comfortable since we have information about Soviet opinion
polls. However, it is worth pointing out that Soviet published polls never examine what citizens think about government or its members. That is why we have to use another important source of our knowledge about the dominant culture, namely, the studies conducted on former Soviet citizens now living outside the country.

The best account of the Soviet polls can be found in White's book *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*. A major study which thoroughly examines the results of polls conducted among Russian immigrants is a book written by Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*. This study, though published in the late 1950s, is still a valuable source of information. The validity of its conclusion was confirmed by a similar study conducted by White in the late 1970s.

In addition, we have important studies of Gitelman and Gidwitz conducted among Russian Jews. We can also use such sources of information as Soviet literature, particularly works written by Soviet dissidents, or accounts of Westerners who spent some time in Russia.

Values and Beliefs

First we need an answer to the question of the legitimacy of the Soviet government. By answering this question we can test the statement of Rigby concerning the system of authority quoted earlier in this chapter. This is an important problem because it can give us a valuable insight into the issue of political stability of the USSR.

Huntington suggests that "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government." In Czarist Russia, as I discussed above, the
vast scope of government activity was widely accepted and treated as a natural state of affairs. The same attitude characterizes contemporary Russian society. Among those interviewed by Inkeles and Bauer, only twenty-eight percent of ordinary workers and five percent of white collar workers wanted a restoration of capitalism. The others supported socialism, i.e., state ownership and control over the main sectors of the national economy.\textsuperscript{125}

These former Soviet citizens did not reject the idea of a Soviet-style state. Quite the contrary. They supported the state and its many prerogatives. The same attitude is observed by White in his studies conducted among Russian emigres in Israel. For example, more than eighty-six percent favoured state ownership, and one responded that "everything should be in the hands of the state."\textsuperscript{126}

Another traditional feature of Russian political culture was examined by Inkeles and Bauer when they asked what should be kept after the replacement of the Bolsheviks. About ninety-four percent chose the education and public health systems. Inkeles and Bauer write: "It is evident both from the quantitative data and qualitative impressions gathered from the personal interviews that the refuges most favour those aspects of the Soviet system which cater to their desire for welfare benefits."\textsuperscript{127} The traditional attitude towards the state was expressed by a student who said: "The state must look after its citizens. It must give them opportunity. It is not enough merely to provide material security. It must provide security of the person."\textsuperscript{128}
Along with support for the concept of the welfare state was support for various limitations to civil rights. More than sixty percent thought that limitations should be applied by the state for the good of the people. For example, "If the press publishes nothing but humorous stories, it will be not good for the people . . . [and] the government must make an effort to raise the level of the press so that the press will educate the people of the state." Gidwitz in her studies stresses the same attitudes of the Soviet Jews. When she asked her respondents what should be changed in the policies of the government of Israel, they answered that the government should discipline its citizens, restrict the activities of the Communist party and forbid selling Soviet propaganda. And a respondent of White said, "Criticism of the government must not be allowed."

All those surveys show the typical, traditional values and beliefs of the Russians, which are quite authoritarian. They have not been changed by the Soviet regime. Also the personalized style of politics is very well preserved in Soviet society. Inkeles and Bauer quote a Russian immigrant: "The system would not have been so bad. It depends on how the system is carried out. It depends on who 'is in the control'."

This is the essence of the political mentality of the Russians. People are important, not the institutions; the character of the leader is the most important element in the system, not legal limitations of his power. Politics is a result of the acts among people and institutions are only additional elements which can be easily changed by the ruler. Inkeles and Bauer write: "At least 40 per cent viewed
the unfortunate state of affairs in the Soviet Union as the responsibility of a particular leader or type of leadership."\(^{133}\) White says that many of his respondents told him that Stalin was poorly advised ("by fools") and that was the reason for all ailments of his regime.\(^{134}\)

Additionally, the leader and his government have to be active and control almost everything because the society is not politically mature enough to live in a fully democratic state. In many "letters to the editor" the Soviets criticize their fellow countrymen for being irresponsible and childish, and therefore the government, and first of all the ruler, must have broad prerogatives as a guarantee of social order. Smith quotes a Soviet citizen who praised Shevardnadze, then party chief in Georgia: "The new boss is tough. He likes order. He won't let the *speculanty* (speculators) get away with so much."\(^{135}\)

The extraordinary position of the ruler is very well illustrated by Ginzburg. She, for instance, writes about a prisoner in a labour camp who was sentenced to solitary compartment where he composed a poem dedicated to Stalin, "the giver of all good."\(^{136}\)

The perception of the role of the ruler, inherited from Czarist Russia, has not been changed by the Soviet regime. Quite the contrary, the cult of personality was an important element in the process of strengthening that perception. Khrushchev in his memoirs, when he wrote about Stalin's tenure and Lenin's opinion about his unsuitability for the position of general secretary, said: "The central committee gave no heed to Lenin's words and consequently the whole party was punished."\(^{137}\) In other words, Khrushchev recognized the leader's enormous role and exaggerated the party's dependency on him.
However, at the present time collective leadership is officially preferred. In order to make the death of the leader less dangerous collective leadership was introduced. This kind of leadership never dies.

However, the personalized pattern of authority is so deeply rooted in the Russians that it is difficult to eliminate it from the political system. A new general secretary usually stresses the importance of collective leadership at the beginning of his reign. Nevertheless, this is only temporary. After he strengthens his power, the personal pattern reemerges, (although never to the same degree as it existed under Stalin). And his portrait again hangs over the heads of the subjects.

White in his study of Soviet immigrants writes: "It was suggested that the regime derived a good deal of support and authority from its apparently growing influence in international affairs and from its firm and decisive domestic leadership compared with the weaknesses and vacillation of its western counterparts. ('The Soviet Union is striding ahead.')" 138

The love of Mat'ushka (Russia) and the conviction that the political system is highly effective have always been important. This was further strengthened by World War II when Stalin, the lucky politician, had a splendid occasion to prove that the system he reintroduced was the only proper one for Russia. Under the Czars Russia was a great power. After the war when Russia returned to this powerful position it seemed to mean that his system was justified.

In sum, the concept of the omniscient ruler preserves traditional
respect for a powerful authority, and it reinforces the conviction that citizens can do little but concur with that authority.

Political Knowledge, Expectations and Behavior

This part of the contemporary political culture of the Russians has absorbed almost all the novelties brought by the Bolsheviks. So far in this chapter I have stressed the historical continuity between Czarist political culture and Soviet political culture. Obviously, many new elements of Soviet life, for example, urbanization, have brought some changes to the traditional political culture. Undoubtedly, the political knowledge of the Russians has increased since the rate of illiteracy has been significantly reduced under the rule of the Bolsheviks. Now the Soviet people are better informed and better educated.

However, despite this fact, the Soviets have not become active citizens. White quotes a Soviet sociologist who conducted a survey in Taganrok and Saransk. According to the Soviet sociologist, thirty-five percent of those who attended political lectures did so because of "the party discipline," administrative pressure or a "feeling of duty or obligations."\(^{139}\) In other words, then, despite the efforts of the regime to gain more "active" support from the citizenry, political indifference is a stable element of Soviet political life. However, another Soviet survey shows that in comparison to the 1920s, when the average worker spent nine-tenths of his time dedicated to political education attending meetings (passive activity), in the 1960s the worker spent only three-tenths of the time on meetings and seven-tenths for more active participation (for instance, work in political
Those two surveys seem contradictory. On the one side there is indifference and apathy, whereas on the other there is a great deal of time spent on activity in political organizations (Party, Komsomol, etc.). These two surveys illustrate the paradox of social life in the USSR. Now, the state requires more "active support" and therefore the citizens support the state by attending the meetings and acting in the organizations. However, at the same time they do not expect to influence the decisions of the authorities and therefore their activities lack enthusiasm and are forced rather than willingly performed.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

To conclude, we can say that in the case of the Soviet Union the official political culture and its dominant political culture are in harmony. Both cultures are profoundly determined by the historical heritage of the USSR. This harmony creates agreement between the political culture and the institutions of the system. For instance, the traditional pattern of personalized politics is congruent with the Soviet type of leadership and the position of the general secretary in the system.

For political scientists who are interested in the concept of political culture, the case of the USSR is especially interesting. This country shows the importance of political culture as a very important element which helps to maintain political stability. In other words, the institutions of the political system are well attuned to the political mentality of the Russians and vice versa. And this
is of great importance for the political stability of the country. The Russians do not need democratic rules as a necessary condition for living. Quite the contrary. Amalrik, the Soviet dissident writer, in his account of Soviet dominant political culture says:

I think that any idea cannot be put in practice as long as it will not be understood at least by the majority of the nation. For the Russian people, whether due to historical tradition or any other reason, the idea of self-government and of equality before the law—and the responsibility related to these ideas—is almost entirely incomprehensible. Even in the pragmatic aspect of the idea of freedom, the average Russian perceives not the possibility of securing a good life for himself, but the danger that someone cleverer than he will live comfortably at his expense. The majority of the nation understands the very word 'freedom' as a synonym of the word 'anarchy' or the opportunity to indulge with impunity in antisocial and dangerous activity. Regarding the problem of respecting the rights of an individual as such, the idea simply arouses bewilderment. One may respect power, authority, intellect and education. But the idea that an individual as such is valuable is for an average member of our nation more than peculiar.¹⁴¹

Inkeles and Bauer in their conclusion say that "the main outlines of the system seem to enjoy the support of popular consensus."¹⁴² In my opinion this is the key to an understanding of political stability of the Soviet Union. Bialer in his discussion of stability says that "it may well be that paternalistic and autocratic Russian traditions reinforce the process of [stability]..."¹⁴³ In other words, we can say that traditional Russian non-democratic political culture helps to stabilize the contemporary non-democratic industrial country.

Almond says that a modern industrial country always has a democratic political culture.¹⁴⁴ In the case of the USSR I have to disagree with him. The USSR is undoubtedly an industrial country. Many indices of modernization (for instance, the level of national
income, the number of books and newspapers published annually and the number of students) show that the USSR is a modern country. According to Almond, a modern Soviet Union should have a modern political culture which means for him, among other things, a democratic political culture. As I have shown the political culture of the USSR is non-democratic.

At this point it is worth reflecting on the relationship between political modernization and Russian/Soviet political culture. Political modernization theorists have long suggested that modernization will have an impact on a society's political culture. For instance, Talcott Parsons in a paper published in 1964 says that communist states must develop democratic institutions along with their socio-economic modernization or there will be "general destruction or breakdown."145 Deutsch analyzing totalitarianism argues that because there is the limited capacity of centralized decision making, the system can be very easily overloaded and "the answer to this problem is decentralization."146 Overloading cannot be avoided even through an introduction of universal electronic supervision because it "would merely convert their output . . . into a flood of paper."147 In addition, the increase of the degree of education among individuals must "in the long run contribute their share toward the undermining of the totalitarian regime."148 And that is why, according to Deutsch, there will be development of the Soviet system towards pluralization and disintegration. Also among some intellectuals living in communist countries, there is the same very optimistic tone. Bratkowski, one of the main figures of the Solidarity movement in Poland says: "They
[the Russians] will have to change to become more democratic or they will disappear.  

I cannot subscribe to these points of view. There is little evidence that communist countries will necessarily undergo democratization and pluralization. Especially in the case of the USSR, we cannot see any democratic changes. The "liberal" Gorbachev wants to increase the efficacy of the national economy through the increase of the price of vodka.

In my opinion, the modernization theorists wrongly assume that there must be a contradiction between "tradition" and "modernity." Without a doubt there is a lack of compatibility between the two in the case, for instance, of Iran under the Ayatollahs. But in the case of the USSR "tradition" and "modernity" are congruent. As White very rightly points out, "many traditional and customary usages, it is clear, need not necessarily obstruct the process of social and economic development; they may be compatible with a developed as well as with a pre-industrial economy."

Almond, one of the fathers of the modernization school, later changed his mind about the proposition that modernity inevitably leads to democracy. He said:

It should be clear that socioeconomic modernization and political development are not the same thing. The exposure of populations to modern technology and culture usually does make a secularizing influence. But the forces of economic and social change do not necessarily produce political development. . . . And, on the other hand, political development has sometimes taken place under conditions other than those of economic and social transformation."

His earlier view was that the pluralistic pressures of the modern economy and society will bring inevitable demands for a healthy,
educated, affluent society. He thought that Russian success in science, education, technology, economic productivity and national security will produce decentralization, and he "failed to see how these decentralizing, pluralistic tendencies can be reversed, or how their spread can be prevented."^152

There is another theory of political change in the USSR which should be mentioned in the context of the political culture perspective. This is the generation theory, which explains political change in the Soviet Union in terms of the change of generations. The coming generations exposed to foreign influence and disappointed with the conditions of life in Russia will gradually change the face of the country in the direction of liberalization. As evidence of this process, some writers point to the needs and desires of Soviet youth. They say that the new generations of Soviets have the same interests as the youngsters from the West. From time to time the official Soviet media also complain about the lack of ideological commitment among Soviet youth.

I again cannot agree with this theory. First of all, its authors assume that ideological commitment is required. As it is argued here, the Soviet type of Marxism is a conservative and bureaucratic set of instrumental rules and revolutionary cliches which does not have many features in common with the original theory. Therefore, the Soviet authorities do not require commitment to the ideology but, first and foremost, the obedience of citizens--and this obedience is under the guise of Marxism. In order to fulfill this end, the authorities have a huge system of indoctrination and a very effective mecha-
nism to strengthen obedience in exchange for getting different kinds of privileges.

We have no reliable information on "electoral" participation in the USSR. Official sources always claim nearly one hundred percent participation. This may or may not accurately describe Soviet electoral participation. However, even if it is correct, this does not necessarily mean that the regime has the wholehearted support of the entire population. What it does mean is that the regime is able to mobilize the people—including the new generations who are supposed to democratize the regime according to the generation theorists.

Even if young people dream about a Japanese stereo system and a visit to Paris, they first have to live in the Soviet Union and make sure that their lives will be as comfortable as possible. And if they really want to have a chance of getting the stereo and going to Paris, they have to obey orders and play by the rules dictated by the regime. Many young people join the party and almost all of them join the Komsomol. White presents the statistics which show that for each 1,000 people (including babies and senior citizens), 138 belong to the Komsomol. Taking into account the fact that one must be between fourteen and twenty-eight to belong to this organization, we can say that virtually all young people belong to Komsomol where the traditional features of the political culture are further strengthened.

There are also not many contacts for the young people with the outside world. Although there are more foreign tourists in the USSR today than twenty-five years ago, most of them are confined to
strictly limited itineraries. Much of the country is traditionally closed to any foreigners, including the citizens of other communist countries. In other words, the Soviet Union is a relatively closed society. As Brzezinski rightly points out, the "transfer of values and of procedures from one generation to another is likely to be more effective in a closed and highly bureaucratized system than in more open, pluralistic conditions." As contemporary Soviet political culture shows, this transfer is very effective.
CHAPTER IV

POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE

The political instability of the Polish system makes this country extraordinarily interesting for analysis. Poland is the only communist country which has gone through six acute political crises. Of these, two were of crucial importance. The 1956 crisis developed from the post-Stalinist "thaw" into a very serious systemic crisis. It was the first one which directly endangered the communist rule in Poland and introduced a peculiar feature of the Polish system--chronic instability. Since 1956 the country has experienced a series of political crises. Each of them contributed to the gradual increase of systemic instability.

The second especially important crisis occurred in 1980-81. This crisis brought about the Solidarity movement and undermined virtually every aspect of communist rule. After forty years of governing the Communist Party experienced a devastating political catastrophe. Without exaggeration we can say that the Solidarity period was one of the greatest political disasters which could happen to any communist government. The Polish seventeen months (August 1980 to December 1981) proved that the forty-year attempt of the Polish communists to capture the hearts and minds of the Poles has entirely failed. Eventually the communists had to conduct another takeover
very similar to the revolution in the 1940s which brought the regime to power. They had to use a great amount of force (Martial Law), and they virtually paralyzed the whole political life of the country. That is an amazing fact. What did they do during the first forty years of governance? Almost from the beginning they had a monopoly of power. As the only government of Poland, they had a tremendous opportunity to impose the political line which would guarantee their un­interrupted government. And they failed. Why? Undoubtedly, many economic and other decisions made by the government contributed to this failure. But there was something more. As will be argued in this chapter, the period crucial for the consolidation of communist rule in Eastern Europe, Stalinism, was significantly weaker in comparison to the USSR and other east European countries. This can be attributed to the strength and persistence of traditional Polish political culture.

Like chapter three, this chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first part is dedicated to the political and cultural past of Poland before the communist takeover. The second part examines Polish political culture after the communist revolution. This division seems to be justified because of the important break in Polish history with the events of 1944-1948. This not only created a new government, but it also brought about significant economic social and cultural changes. I argued in the second chapter for the value of analytically distinguishing the official political culture from the dominant or traditional political culture. As I will show, the case of Poland requires that we make this distinction because the dis-
harmony between Polish official political culture and that nation's dominant political culture makes this communist country so extraordinarily politically unstable, especially compared to the USSR.

Political stability is not the only difference between the USSR and Poland. We can also point to the availability of internal information. In this regard Poland is the antithesis of the Soviet Union. There have been many social science surveys which have examined Polish politics and society. Poland never was closed to foreigners, except for the short "Stalinist" break of 1948 - 1956. The Poles never were hermetically isolated from foreign influences. This openness has had an extremely important impact on Polish political culture.

1. POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE BEFORE THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

Religion has always been an important element in Polish political culture. Many historians stress the importance of the baptism of Poland's King Mieszko in 966, which led to the introduction of Roman Catholicism in Poland. It also linked the country with Latin political and cultural traditions. As Ash observes, "Poland thus became the easternmost bulwark of Latin Christiandom." And, as it will be argued, the feeling that Poland is a bastion of Western civilization has always been present in Polish political culture.

Unlike Russia, Poland almost from its beginning lacked a powerful central government. Jan Szczepanski calls this "a tradition in Polish political life." Indeed, he is right. From about the twelfth century, Polish rulers have been limited in their powers. In 1138 Poland was divided into five independently governed parts.
Although the ruler of Little Poland, Cracow, was to be superior to the others, his superiority was never exercised, and it was based on the principle *Primus Inter Pares*. In 1228 the Prince of Little Poland issued the first so-called privilegium. According to this act he agreed to issue "rightful and honest laws created in accordance with the advice of the clergy and gentry." In other words, 1228 was the beginning of an institutional limitation of the ruler's power.

Parallel to the institutional limitations on the King's power were legal guarantees of the rights of the individual which were introduced at this time. For example, in 1430 the principle of *Neminem Captivabimus Nisi Iure Victim* was adopted. This Polish "Charter of Rights" guaranteed personal protection from arbitrary arrest and stated "we will not imprison anyone without a lawful verdict."

By the beginning of the fifteenth century Poland, had a legal framework for parliamentary democracy. Legal rules accompanied political practice of that time. Toward the end of the fourteenth century the Polish gentry organized provincial diets called Sejmiki, which in Polish means small parliaments. In 1493, after a whole series of new privilegiums issued by the King, a national diet was organized. It was the beginning of the Sejm (Big Parliament) which became a permanent institution of Polish government, and it existed until the partition of Poland. The year 1493 was then the beginning of parliamen.tarism in Poland. The creation of the Sejm did not end the limitations imposed on the powers of Polish kings. In 1501 the King was regarded as the President of the Senate (the upper chamber of the Sejm), and in 1505 a constitutional act was adapted called *Nihil Novi*
(no innovations without our acceptance, i.e., of the gentry). This decreed that law-making was the sole right of the Sejm.

The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were a time when the powers of the King were significantly limited. The King could not issue new laws, levy new taxes or declare a war without the consent of the Sejm. The scope of the government was further limited when the principle of hereditary monarchy was abandoned. In 1573 a new political mechanism was introduced—the election of the King. From that time the kings of Poland were elected by the Sejm. Each new King had to swear on oath that he would obey the laws and would not aspire to increase his power above the Sejm.

Another significant development in the Polish political system was established five years after the first election of the King. In 1578 the Supreme Appelate Court was organized, in which the judges were elected by the gentry. This court was independent from the King who had no influence on the election of judges.\textsuperscript{164}

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Poland had moved from being a kingdom to a constitutional monarchy of the estates. This introduced the rule of law as one of the main principles of Polish political life. This is shown in a sixteenth century law book which says that the best political system is one in which ". . . both the King and the estates of the realm shall be subject to the law."\textsuperscript{165}

This illustrates how the Polish tradition was fundamentally different from that of Russia. In Poland the King had limited power. He was regarded as only an important servant of the country. His main task was to protect and defend the country and its laws. This was a
very important role. Poland was always connected with its laws.

Among the most important of them were those which guarded individual freedom and political rights. An English historian writes:

...On the eve of the Age of Absolutism elsewhere in Europe, this [Poland] was an extreme form of democracy. The noble citizens of the republic were to be its masters; the King was to be their servant. The King of Poland, in fact, was less of a limited monarch, like the kings of England or Sweden, and more of a manager under contract.

The supremacy of the Szlachta [the nobility], ... was evident no less in the social than in the political sphere. ... The Polish nobles of the sixteenth century had anticipated the ideals of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, and of the American Revolution of 1776; ... They were extreme devotees of individual freedom and civil liberty--for themselves. Like the slave-owning Fathers of the American Constitution, or the original inventors of democracy in Ancient Athens, they saw no contradiction between a political system based on liberties of the ruling estate and a social system based on the complete subjugation of the lower orders.¹⁶⁶

The strong stress on individualism and civil rights created a peculiar Polish democratic tradition--the right of any member of the Sejm to dissolve it and nullify all acts passed during the session. This right, called Liberum Veto ("I disapprove"), was created as one more instrument to limit the King's power as was used for the first time in 1652. Since that time the Liberum Veto was frequently abused, and it eventually caused constitutional paralysis. Many historians agree that the way in which the Liberum Veto was used created a situation in which Poland became powerless and vulnerable to foreign invasions, finally to be partitioned by its neighbours in 1795.¹⁶⁷ One of the last attempts to save Polish statehood was made on May 3, 1791, when a liberal constitution was passed. A Polish historian writes:

"The Polish constitution of May 3rd, 1791 was a bold attempt to reorganize a gentry in the spirit of the constitution of the United States
and the French declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. It abolished certain weaknesses which had until now paralyzed the state. 168

For example, in this constitution the Liberum Veto was to be annulled, the gentry was to be subject to taxation and the crown was again to be made hereditary. Although the constitution was never adopted because of the second partition of Poland in 1792, it is important to point out the significance of this constitution in terms of Polish political culture. At this time, Poland was in the midst of an extremely serious domestic and international crisis mainly caused by the lack of a strong central government. However, the authors of the constitution, instead of significantly increasing the power of the government, decided to introduce a very liberal political democracy. In other words, they still believed in democracy rather than dictatorship.

We can say, then, that the Polish political tradition is characterized by a strong attachment to democratic principles. Poland was never governed by a powerful, almighty ruler perceived in deific categories. Quite the contrary. In the Polish tradition there was a very strong tendency to limit and control the power of the King, who was treated as a potential tyrant. That is why he had to be constantly controlled.

2. POLISH VALUES, BELIEFS AND SYMBOLS

Individualism and political democracy were the most important values in Polish political culture. Reflection on the principles of
democracy became a constant subject of Polish political thinkers. As early as the fifteenth century, a Polish political treatise was published on the role of law in a modern state. In 1475 Jan Ostrorog, whom Milosz calls "Poland's first lay political writer," published the *Monumentum Pro Republicae Ordinatione* (On the Organization of the State) in which he argued for uniform law as a *sine qua non* of a just and democratic order. Ostrorog wrote: "Enacted laws are necessary in order that sentences may not be passed according to the whim of a single mind but according to the judgement of many persons." He also argued for the impartiality of judges.

Another Polish political writer, Andrej Frycz Modrzewski, in his work *De Republica Emendanda* (On the Reform of the State), which "is considered to be the first treatise in Europe to discuss problems of the state as a whole," appealed for the equality of all classes before the law and argued that "kings are established for the people and not the people for the kings."

Reflections on the role of law were connected with a concern about the position of the individual in the state and his rights. I have already mentioned that the freedom of the citizen was of utmost priority for the Poles. This freedom embraced all aspects of human life including freedom of religion. During the most severe time of the Roman Inquisition in Europe, there was an Act on the Equality of Rights for Protestants in Poland. In this Act we can read that:

> We, the Spiritual and Temporal Counselors, the Gentry and the other Estates of the one and indivisible Republic, from Old and New Poland, from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, etc.--and from the Cities of the Crown (declare): ... Whereas there is a great dissidence in affairs of the Christian religion within our country, and to prevent any sedition for this reason among
the people—like what we see clearly in other kingdoms—we promise each other, on behalf of ourselves and our descendants, for perpetuity, under oath and pledging our faith, honor and consciences, that we who are Dissidentes de Religione will keep peace between ourselves, and neither shed blood on account of differences of faith or kinds of churches, nor punish one another by confiscation of goods, deprivation of honour, imprisonment or exile. . . . 174

It is worthwhile to notice that this Act was issued in a country where Roman Catholicism was the official state religion and was treated as the most important link with the Western part of the continent.

An extremely important period for Polish political culture was the time when Poland disappeared as an independent country. After the third partition of the country in 1795 Poland was erased from the political map of Europe. It did not regain an independent status for more than a century until World War I. The nineteenth century was a period when the Poles tried to reestablish their state. It can be characterized as a time when many revolts and insurrections took place on Polish soil.

For political scientists who are interested in the concept of political culture, the nineteenth century history of Poland provides much information. We can analyze the many political movements organized in this century. Also nineteenth century Polish literature illustrates the main values and beliefs of the country. Milosz, analyzing the nineteenth century in Poland, writes: "Heroic insurrections, participation in revolutionary movements all over Europe, retaliative executions carried out by occupying powers, and deportations to Siberia unavoidably shaped the Polish mentality. These crucial events came at a time when modern nationalism was crystallizing under the impact of the French Revolution and German philosophy." 175
Under these circumstances the concept of Polishness gradually emerged. Adam Mickiewicz, one of the greatest Polish poets wrote about the nineteenth century of Europe and the essence of "Polishness":

Then the Kings, renouncing Christ, made new idols which they set up in the sight of the people. . . . So the kings made an idol for the French and called it HONOUR . . . made an idol for the Spaniards called POLITICAL POWER. . . . And for the English, their King made an idol called SEA POWER AND COMMERCE. . . . And for the Germans an idol was made called BROTSINN or PROSPERITY which was the same of Moloch. . . . And finally Poland said: 'Whosoever will come to me shall be free and equal, for I am FREEDOM.'

What differentiates the Poles from some other nations is their love of freedom. This opinion of Mickiewicz is compatible with the older Polish tradition which I have already discussed. The Liberum Veto was a caricature of the Polish fondness for an extreme form of democracy in which one member of the Sejm was able to dissolve the whole body.

The notion of freedom and democracy was connected to a belief in the great power of the individual. This belief is one of the most distinguishing features of Polish political culture. It was presented hundreds of times in Polish romantic literature (i.e. the literature of the first half of the nineteenth century). The most characteristic example of this belief can be found in Mickiewicz's Forefathers Part III when Konrad, the main hero of this poem, talks to God and demands the Lord "... give me the rule over souls so that I may make my country happy and astonish the whole world."

However, romantic individualism was not the only political stream of the nineteenth century. In the second part of this century
another stream in Polish political life appeared—positivism. The proponents of positivism tried to change Polish individualism. They argued that the Konrad-like belief in the power of the individual is useless because it cannot be put into practice. According to the positivists only a whole nation, not an individual can achieve independence of the country. Alexander Swietochowski, the father of Polish positivism, wrote: "... this [Polish] independence can result from the strengthening of our intellectual and material resources." In other words, the Poles should develop the national economy because it is the only way to get rich. And only a rich nation can become powerful enough to put significant pressure on those who partition Poland and eventually regain independence.

We can say that almost all important Polish political movements of the nineteenth century were inspired by romanticism, not positivism. Their programs emphasized the freedom of the individual, and the equality of all people before law, they saw political democracy as the best system for an independent Poland. Regaining independence was the main purpose of these movements, and therefore nationalism was also a strong element of Polish political culture. Davies very rightly points out:

In Eastern Europe, where the prevailing political environment has differed widely from that in the West, attitudes towards Nationalism have been very different. ... In this context, the adherents of the numerous national movements, whose ultimate goal of forming independent national states was fundamentally incompatible with the integrity of the empires must be counted among the revolutionary elements. ... They saw no contradiction whatsoever between nationalism and Democracy, preferring to view the one as the natural guarantor of the other.

It was especially true in the Polish context. Poland, squeezed
between the German and Russian Empires, was fundamentally different from its powerful neighbours. With their tradition of elected Kings, limited government, the Liberum Veto principle, strong individualism and the worship of freedom, the Poles could not adapt themselves to the autocracy of Russia or Prussia. For them, having an independent state was an essential condition of democracy. In addition these two empires were the main actors of Poland's partitions.

This was a reason for very hostile feelings towards the occupying nations. Milosz writes "hatred for the main occupying power, Russia, inclined the Poles to interpret the conflict between the two countries as a struggle between the forces of light (democracy), on the one hand, and those of darkness (tyranny), on the other. Russia was not 'European'; it was 'Asiatic,' . . ."180

Also, the Polish-German feelings toward one another were very unfriendly. The Poles treated the Germans as soulless moneymakers without any respect for freedom and democratic rules. The Germans, on the other hand, treated the Poles as a nation of loafers with a super-inefficient economy, and therefore, as Frederick the Great, the Prussian King argued, Poland will not be "... conquered by weapons but consumed in peace in the manner of an artichoke, piece by piece."181

However, of the three countries which partitioned Poland (Prussia, Russia and Austria), Russian rulership was the most cruel and brutal. The Russian governors of the part of Poland which now belongs to Russia used terror as the main means of exercising power. Deportations to Siberia, strong Russification, censorship, etc., be-
came a part of the day-to-day life of the Poles. This situation created an even greater hatred towards "Asiatic" Russia. This hatred became an inseparable part of Polish political culture. Anti-Russian feelings were directed not only towards the Russians, but also towards ideas which originated from Russia. It may be an additional reason, besides Polish individualism, why the idea of collectivism was never popular among the Poles. Even Positivism, which is treated by communist historians as the cradle of Polish communism, never emphasized collectivism.

The main objective of nineteenth century Polish political movements was to reestablish an independent country. In order to achieve this end, the Poles participated in many democratic movements in Europe and tried to cooperate with any political force which might help to regain independence. For example, in 1797 a Polish Napoleonic legion was created. The Poles in this legion believed that Napoleon would assist in the creation of an independent Polish state in exchange for their fidelity. In 1807 the Duchy of Warsaw was created. This political entity had its own constitution and was protected by Napoleon. Its constitution was very Polish in that it recognized the peasants as free citizens, equal before the law. However, it did not give them the right to own the land.

None of the main Polish political movements of the nineteenth century stressed the idea of social egalitarianism. For example, during the November Rising of 1830, a new constitution for an independent Poland was prepared. Again, it was concentrated almost entirely on traditional issues. The constitution declared that the
government would be accountable to the Sejm and that Poland would be a
country of free people. The rising did not succeed, the constitution
was never put into practice, but it is a good example of the beliefs
and values of the Poles.

A consequence of the November rising was an increase of terror
applied by the Russians. This situation strengthened another feature
of Polish political culture—anti-Russian feelings. Davies writes
that the failure of the rising and the terror of the Russians "... 
triggered the first of many waves of Russophobia, which even effected
public opinion in England." We can imagine how this fueled hatred
for Russia in Poland. This feeling became a central feature of the
Polish political mentality.

The Poles were very active in political movements of Europe.
They took part in these movements under the slogan "for your freedom
and ours." This motto meant that the Poles had a moral obligation to
help whenever a nation fought for its freedom. In practice, however,
this slogan might be understood in this way, "Any enemy of Russia was
an ally of the Poles."

Polish individualism and Russophobia created another peculiar
feature of Polish political culture, namely, messianism. Milosz
writes "An old tendency to idealize "golden freedom" [i.e. the Liberum
Veto type of freedom], which had distinguished Poland from her neigh-
bours, the autocratic monarchies, underwent a mutation: Enormous
talents for self-pity were displayed, and Poland was presented as an
innocent victim suffering for the sins of humanity."185

In short, messianism can be summarized in this way: Poland,
this bastion of democracy, this ambassador of freedom, this rampart of Western civilization suffers from the hands of barbarian Russia. However, this martyrdom of Poland is not in vain. The Bible teaches that suffering paves the road to salvation. That is why Poland, despite her present status, should be happy. Being the Christ of nations, Poland will be rewarded, will regain independence and will make her people happy. Indeed, the more suffering, the greater the chance for reward.

This national megalomania and tendency to exaltation created a characteristic perception of politics. Politics was understood in highly impractical categories of morality. Rationality was almost entirely eliminated and recklessness became a virtue of political behaviour. Mickiewicz writing about the ideal type of a ruler for the Poles, said

[T]he spirit of the Polish nation indicates that no Pisistratus or Cromwell type will strike root in our soil. There is in the Polish nation a great, profound, universal sense of noble-mindedness honesty and sincerity.\(^{186}\)

In other words, in Poland, the efficiency of the government is not an important criterion for the people, and pragmatism is not considered to be a strength of the ruler. In this context, the numerous nineteenth century revolts of the Poles against the occupying powers were not surprising. The revolts were usually conducted at the worst moment and against all odds. They were always brutally thwarted, but nevertheless they became a recurring element of Polish history. All these unsuccessful revolts and uprisings were a result of the Polish conception of politics. Politics became a matter of irrationality, wishful thinking and dreams, and was perceived exclusively as a result
of the acts of an individual.

In sum, the main beliefs and values of the Poles can be characterized as follows: 1) a very strong belief in the power of the individual—a person should be considered one of the most important creators of politics; 2) a belief that limited power of rulers creates an optimal political system; 3) a belief that political democracy must be protected if life is to be comfortable and the government morally acceptable; 4) a strong belief that law is the best instrument to exercise power; and 5) an extremely strong anti-Russian attitude.

These beliefs and values influenced the political behaviour and expectations of the Poles.

3. POLISH POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, EXPECTATIONS AND BEHAVIOUR

I have shown that Poland has had much experience with political democracy. Unlike the Russians, the Poles were politically very active. Their attitude towards the government was based on the conviction that "the authorities cannot do everything that they would like to do."¹⁸⁷ This attitude caused much involvement of the gentry in politics. Each nobleman had the right to vote for the king and to be elected as the king. The whole political system of independent Poland before the last partition was based on the principle of self-government, in which hundreds of Sejmiki (local parliaments) were responsible for local matters.

This political life was well described by an Englishman who visited Poland in the sixteenth century. In his diary, the English traveller noted that "each nobleman can freely speak out. He need not
worry about any kind of political persecution and can say what he wishes."\(^{188}\) This approach to politics was exemplified when Polish King Sigmund III Vasa was told by one of his electors: "Be aware, Your Highness, that you were given the crown by the nation which has been living in freedom for centuries."\(^{189}\)

"Living in Freedom" was the greatest desire of the Poles. They expected the state to guarantee the freedom of its citizens. This was the main task of the authorities. Those who governed were to make sure that the citizens were not limited in their political rights. For example, after the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day in France, a Polish Huguenot said that in Poland such an event was inconceivable since the King was constantly controlled by his subjects.\(^{190}\)

The control of the King's powers originated from the conviction that any law must be approved by all citizens if it is to be treated as just and good. Davies very rightly observes that

It [this conviction] gave a strong sense of commitment to any consensus that has actually reached. It encouraged the nobleman to stand by his words, once given, and to defend his commitments as a matter of honour. This 'honourable' tradition of unanimity was a natural ally of the West European concept of liberal government by consent. It goes a long way to explaining why Poles in the nineteenth century instinctively rejected beneficial reforms when imposed 'from on high,' and why, having identified an injustice, they would fight against it to a man. Their critics call it a fanatical penchant for troublemaking; their admirers call it a fine sense of responsibility.\(^{191}\)

I have already presented the **Liberum Veto** tradition. Another very important mechanism for controlling the King was the Right of Resistance, also called "the Confederation Right." Whenever there was a breach of constitutional covenants the gentry had the right to form a confederation.\(^{192}\) Like the **Liberum Veto**, the confederation right
was used too often, and it finally resulted in a situation in which the King was deprived of almost all instruments of power. His government was weak. Especially in the second part of the eighteenth century, Poland was torn by factional battles and the country was in a constant state of anarchy. In other words, the ideas of limited government, political freedom and civil rights degenerated into the state of systemic anarchy in which no sound political or economic plan could be implemented.

This had an important impact on Polish political culture at the end of the eighteenth century. M. K. Sarbiewski, the Polish literary critic and poet, wrote

Somewhere else eloquence is the domain of writers and can be found in books, but in Poland this is the domain of the politicians. The Spaniard is, by his nature, a theologian, the Italian—a philosopher, the Frenchman—a poet, the German—a historian and the Pole—an orator.\(^{193}\)

Demagogy was an important feature of Polish political life. It influenced the political knowledge and behaviour of the Poles. The word "freedom" was repeated in many, often essentially different, situations, and it was usually to justify someone's behaviour and/or decisions. Numerous political factions and groups presented themselves as the defenders of freedom. Whether it was the Confederation of Bar or the Confederation of Targowica\(^{194}\), their members and supporters claimed to defend freedom and democracy. The nineteenth century preserved Polish political culture. Adherence to it meant maintaining the differences between the Poles and those who occupied Poland. In other words, Polish values, symbols, beliefs, etc. helped to resist the attempts of Russification and Germanization. As we will see, this
also applies to the twentieth century. After World War I Poland emerged as an independent country. The Sejm became one of the first political institutions organized in the independent Poland. However, again demagogy dominated the political life of that time. Hundreds of political parties and organizations were organized. For instance, in Warsaw alone there were twenty-one parties which participated in the first elections to the Sejm.195 Needless to say, all of them claimed to be defenders of democracy.

The first constitution of independent Poland (the so-called Little Constitution) introduced parliamentary democracy and it stated that "The Sejm is the sovereign and law-making power."196 The next constitution adopted by the first nationally elected Sejm in March 1921 stated

In the name of Almighty God!
We, the people of Poland, thanking Providence for freeing us from one and a half centuries of servitude, remembering with gratitude the bravery, endurance, and selfless struggles of past generations, which unceasingly devoted all their best energies to the cause of independence, adhering to the glorious tradition of the immortal constitution of 3 May, striving for the welfare of the whole, united and independent mother-country, and for her sovereign existence, might, security and social order. And desiring to ensure the development of all moral and material powers for the good of the whole of regenerated mankind and to ensure the equality of all citizens, respect for labour, all due rights and particularly the security of the state protection, we hereby proclaim and vote this Constitutional statute in the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Poland.197

This preamble to the March constitution expresses the traditional beliefs of the Poles. There is a belief in Poland's privileged position in her relations with God, who finally rewarded Poland by giving her independence in exchange for the suffering in the nineteenth century (messianism). The authors of this constitution praised
the past uprisings regardless of their reckless and costly failures. There is also a strong emphasis on democracy (the 3 May Constitution), political equality of the citizens and their civic rights.

Although during this time Poland stopped suffering for the whole of mankind once she regained independence, she nevertheless retained her messianistic role. Her independence was to help to create "the good of the whole mankind". The authors of the Constitution also did not change their perspective about Poland's role as the bastion of democracy and the rampart of Western civilization. Nothing changed and the country was still perceived as the barrier to Eastern barbarianism and communism. Independent Poland was to guarantee that Russian autocracy and communism would not spread over the continent. Thus, a very strong anti-Russian attitude, regardless whether it was Red or White Russia, has remained.

The first war waged by independent Poland was with Soviet Russia in 1920. There are many different evaluations of this war. Communist historians say that this war was caused by the Polish bourgeoisie who were scared of progressive forces in Russia.\textsuperscript{198} Polish historians in exile say that this war was waged to ensure the independence of Poland.\textsuperscript{199} Western historians say, for example, that "it was fought to maintain the independence of non-Russian areas of the former Tsarist empire."\textsuperscript{200}

No matter what the points of view of the historians, this war was unnecessary. Poland had extremely serious internal problems. It was a country composed of three parts, which for over one hundred years were attached to three different political units (Russia,
Prussia and Austria), and now they had to be re-integrated into one political unit. Poland had very serious economic problems. Her industrial base had to be rebuilt after the devastation of World War I. In this situation, from a pragmatic point of view, any offensive war was unjustified. Nevertheless, the 1920 Polish-Russian war occurred. In this context, this war can be viewed as a reflection of the hatred of the Poles towards Russia and as a reflection of the Polish perception of politics. Rational reasoning is not necessarily the starting point for political decisions. The eventual gratitude and admiration of the world for the nation which fought the barbarians for the freedom of the world is much more important than the costs of action. Fighting with Russia for the pleasure of a final victory was much more enticing than a boring process of rebuilding the national economy. This very unpractical attitude towards politics was also presented in internal relations.

I have already mentioned the enormous number of political groups and parties which participated in the first selections to the Sejm. One of the most characteristic features of the political life in Independent Poland was the existence of tens of political parties. Now, after regaining independence, political quarrels began. Within the first eight years of independence, there were more than a dozen cabinets. None of them were strong enough to implement any stable political line. When in 1926 Marshall Pilsudski decided to take over through a coup he justified his decision with reference to the instability of previous governments. He argued that this instability might create a situation similar to the eighteenth century when Poland was
partitioned. In a manifesto published in 1928 by Pilsudski's supporters, we find the following statements:

Poland must have a strong government which will be based on the Sejm as its constitutional basis. . . . The members of the parliament will have to pay greater attention to economic problems of our young state; they will have to strive for policies which help to increase economic productivity in all fields of the national economy. They will have to create these policies without any political or party prejudices. 

Therefore we can see the 1926 coup as an attempt to modify the political culture by introducing more pragmatism in political life.

The Pilsudski coup was very often presented by communist historians as the beginning of Polish fascism. Undoubtedly, the year 1926 began a new political system which was not parliamentary. However, the Pilsudski regime did not eliminate entirely the sovereignty of the Sejm, did not ban all political parties and did not subjugate the law courts. Although the Sejm was not as powerful as it had been before the 1926 coup because the majority of its members were directly subordinated to Pilsudski, it still remained a forum where the opposition could criticize the regime and its policies. In other words, the traditional attachment of the Poles to the institution of parliament as the symbol of democracy was respected. The Poles, then, had a legal possibility to criticize the authorities, and the traditional tendency, treated as a civic virtue, to oppose the government had its legal forum.

In short, Pilsudski took into account Polish political culture and its characteristics. By no means can this be said about the communist regime. As will be further argued, the communists did not pay any attention to the traditional political culture, and this is a
reason for the extraordinary political instability of Poland under communism.

To summarize, the traditional political culture of the Poles is fundamentally different from Russian political culture. The greatest difference is in the way the two nations perceive authority. The Russians look upon authority as the only source of wisdom. Authority is by definition sacrosanct, and its decisions are undisputable. The unlimited power of the government is a natural state of affairs. It has always been this way. Why? Because only the unlimited power of the ruler can guarantee social order. This order is conceived as a condition in which each person is secured by the state. The state is supposed to provide the basic conditions of life (i.e., food, shelter and defense of the borders). In exchange, the people make every effort to guard the interests of the state. In this context, individualism is eliminated almost altogether. Nothing is more important than the ruler, the state and the nation as a whole. Democracy as described by Western writers is incomprehensible and is identified with anarchy.

In the Polish context, the situation is quite the opposite. For the Poles, unlimited power is unacceptable. The notion of popular sovereignty is deeply rooted in Polish political culture. The first political institution which limited the power of the King appeared as early as the fifteenth century. At the same time an act was introduced which guaranteed that each citizen could not be arrested without a warrant issued by the court. In England, for example, the same act (the Habeas Corpus Act) was adopted more than two centuries later
Individualism was one of the most conspicuous features of Polish culture. What was really important in the political system was the individual. His position was to be guaranteed by his civil rights. His opinions had to be taken into account by the ruler. Otherwise, the system would degenerate into dictatorship. And this was perceived as an unnatural way to organize the state.

Another important feature of Polish culture was national megalomania. The baptism of Poland was the moment when Poles started to perceive themselves as the easternmost bastion of democracy and luminous ideas. However, this perception did not correlate with the position and political significance of the country. Instead of being an important power, as any bastion should be, Poland was in a constant decline beginning in the seventeenth century, and ending with the third and last partition.

This final result created great frustration for the Poles. On the one side, they still thought of themselves as being the rampart of Western civilization and democracy. On the other side, the country was occupied by dictatorships. That situation was understood as illogical since each dictatorship was to be, by definition, inferior and therefore weaker. This "paradox," when the weaker became stronger and the stronger became weaker, created Polish messianism and a peculiar perception of politics. This perception became an incredible mixture of wishful thinking, dreams, demands, pretences, emotions, morality and mysticism. As a result, some characteristic patterns of political behaviour were created.

These patterns can be described as follows:
1) Each citizen, if he is to be a good citizen, must be politically very active. To do otherwise would tempt the authorities to increase their prerogatives, leading to dictatorship.

2) Each ruler wants to be a tyrant. It is his nature. Therefore, constant opposition to the authorities is the best way to avoid tyranny.

3) The ruler must understand that his legitimacy depends on permanent control by the people. An illegitimate ruler must be rejected and fought.

4) But there is another condition of the legitimacy of the ruler. He must be Polish, because only a Pole can understand what democracy is all about. He cannot, for example, be a Russian because a Russian cannot understand democratic rules. Being Polish meant the ruler must be elected and accepted by the Poles. He did not need be born in Poland, he just had to understand the democratic culture of the Poles.

5) The law was to be the best instrument of the ruler's power. However, if the ruler ceased to be legitimate, or never was legitimate, then the law should not be obeyed and had to be opposed. An illegitimate ruler could not create legitimate laws. Even if the laws were pragmatic with positive economic results, they would have to be rejected as being illegitimate.

Rationality and pragmatism were less important elements of politics. Emotions were much more significant. For instance, if the Czar made the most effective reforms they would still have to be opposed because they came from the "wrong" source, namely Russia. Emotionalism held that Russia was not capable of good ideas. Analyz-
ing Polish history Ash writes:

The whistle-stop tour through ten centuries of history must serve to establish three points which are as important as they are basic: The Poles are an old European nation with an unquenchable thirst for freedom; freedom in Polish means, in the first place, national independence; the Polish national identity is historically defined in opposition to Russia. In the nineteenth century this opposition might be described as the clash of Polish democracy with Russian despotism, Polish individualism with Russian collectivism, Polish Catholicism with Russian orthodoxy. That was, in short, the political culture of the Poles before the communist takeover.

In the next part of this chapter I will analyze the political culture after the communist takeover, starting with the official political culture.

4. THE POLITICAL CULTURE AFTER THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER

In chapter one I argued that in the Polish case it is very useful to distinguish analytically between the official political culture and the traditional or dominant political culture. This is so because in Poland there is a great disharmony between these two political cultures. As will be argued here, this disharmony plays an extremely important systemic role.

The sharp incompatibility of the two political cultures makes Polish politics exceedingly unstable. This results because the regime lacks legitimacy and it is rejected by the vast majority of Polish society. This must be emphasized. I have already shown the importance of moral criteria and emotions in the Polish perception of politics. In this context rejection means something more than disagreement regarding particular decisions of the government. In Poland
the communist government is morally and emotionally disapproved of and therefore rejected entirely. What does this mean? This problem can be explained by using a comparison with Western countries.

In Western democracies citizens need not approve each decision of their government. They can disagree with a particular policy. This disagreement can lead to a change in electoral preference, and during the next election people may vote for a different party. However, by doing these things, citizens do not morally reject their government.

In Poland the situation is totally different. The disagreement between the government and the vast majority of citizens do not concern policy matters, but the legitimacy of the government itself. If the authorities adhere to the principles of Soviet Marxism while most citizens strongly support democratic values, then we can say the differences between them are irreconcilable. If the government promotes collectivism, autocracy and love for the traditional enemy, while the society sticks strongly to individualism, democracy and hates Russia, then the government cannot be accepted, and it cannot be stable.

In addition, even if the government makes some decisions which are beneficial for the society, it is nevertheless rejected because it represents something which we defined earlier as non-Polish. That is why the successes of the communist regime, such as urbanization or the elimination of illiteracy, do not make this regime stable. As I have shown, in Poland emotions are far more important than pragmatism.
What does the official political culture look like? Here it is significant to say that one of the main targets of the regime is Polish individualism. In 1975, during the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party, the Prime Minister of Poland said:

While disseminating in Polish society the ideals of socialism, we will be constantly striving for the situation where the ideals will change political thinking and customs [of the Poles] and they will determine the whole behavior of the man and his attitudes regarding public activity and private life.204

Wojciech Jaruzelski, the present First Secretary of the party, who claims to have begun an entirely new era in the history of People's Poland, says that one of the most important objectives of the party is to shape a "modern political culture" which will embrace democratic traditions with a consciousness of the existing duties required by the state and which will eliminate Polish individualism.205

The attacks on individualism by the communist regime are hardly surprising. Soviet Marxism, mainly thanks to Stalin, is a continuation of the old Russian tradition of autocracy. Therefore, even the slightest element of individualism has to be eliminated. The internal roots of Polish communism, as I have already shown, were very weak. The communist regime in Poland was established by the Soviets, and the Red Army became one of the most important pillars of the communist regime in Poland. There is little doubt that the origins of Polish communism determine its face—and this face is Russian. Obviously then, Polish official culture is also Russian in nature. Therefore it promotes collectivism.
However, collectivism is not the only similarity between Polish official political culture and Soviet culture. The Warsaw regime also tries to create its own just Czar myth. In one of his speeches Jaruzelski said:

People evaluate socialism through the prism of everyday life. We [the Party] do not gain political support only by issuing declarations. The people have to know that the Party is on their side, that the Party wisely serves the people. If some workers work in terrible conditions and the soulless clerks do nothing to better these conditions, then the Party has to stand on the proletariat's side. Whenever there are problems, injustice and harm, the honest working Pole should know that the Party is his defender.²⁰⁶

Like an echo, the Polish ruler repeats the Russian/Soviet myth about a government which is always good, just and humane. Jaruzelski is not an exception. In 1975, during the Seventh Congress of the Party, Edward Gierek, then the First Secretary, said "The Party has to maintain the ties with the public opinion, reveal and nip social evil in the bud and punish soulless red-tapists."²⁰⁷ During each political crisis every First Secretary asserts that from this time on the Party will constantly control bureaucrats because the Party is just and good-hearted. Only some of its servants are sometimes callous.

Collectivism and the just Czar myth fly in the face of Polish political tradition. In a country where every ruler was treated as a tyrant in posse, and where opposition to authority was regarded as a civic virtue, the collectivist efforts of the Warsaw regime are hard to implement because they are strongly resisted by the people.

Similarly, another aspect of the official political culture always encounters resistance. Love for the USSR has little chance of acceptance in Poland. It goes against the Polish grain. I have
already discussed the extremely strong Russophobia of the Poles. The widespread hatred of Russia is one of the most conspicuous features of Polish political culture. This hatred is deeply rooted since it is a psychological compensation of the Poles for the partitions, the lack of sovereignty, the nineteenth century uprisings which were brutally suppressed, Russification, mass deportations to Siberia, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 and the 1939 invasion by the Red Army, and finally for communism which does not accord with Polish traditions and the Polish mentality. And it is a compensation for the communist regime itself which is perceived merely as an agency of the Kremlin. In other words, in a country where telling anti-Russian jokes is a national passtime, the officially promoted love of the USSR is a joke itself.

Yet official expressions of this love abound in the official political culture. For example, Article Six of the 1976 Polish Constitution states:

The Polish People's Republic in its policies
1) Takes into account the interests of the Polish Nation, its sovereignty, independence and security and the idea of peace and cooperation among nations.
2) Establishes links to the laudable traditions of solidarity with the forces of freedom and progress and strengthens the friendship and cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist countries.

It is hardly necessary to quote other official documents which attest to the friendship with the Soviet Union. There are literally thousands of them. Each expresses gratitude for freeing Poland from the Nazi occupation, for securing the safety of borders and for unselfish economic aid.

The members of the Warsaw government are certainly aware of the
strong anti-Russian attitudes. That is why they try to change these attitudes, not only with primitive indoctrination. They also try to explain relations with the Soviet Union with arguments about Polish raison d'etre. For example, in a speech given to the Central Committee in May 1982 Jaruzelski said:

The place of Poland in Europe and in the world is determined unequivocally and firmly. We are a socialist country which realizes its political, economic and defensive interests through the coalition unity of the Warsaw Treaty and through the partnership cooperation embraced in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.209

In a speech given in August 1983 he said:

In the time when Poland was delirious with anti-Soviet propaganda, when the military cemeteries of Soviet soldiers were profaned, and when our country was, in any respect, in a hopeless state of affairs [this is Jaruzelski's evaluation of the Solidarity period], the Soviet Union was helping us tremendously. And this help is still on the increase. For instance, in January 1981 the USSR granted four hundred and sixty-five million dollars not subject to repayment. In the same time we owe the Soviet Union almost four billion rubles and one billion dollars.210

In an interview given for Soviet television he declared:

The Polish-Soviet alliance was, is and will be the corner stone of the class and national interest of the Polish People's Republic. This was confirmed by the latest difficult years when the real friendship of the Soviet Union was many times proven to us, the Poles.211

However, even if we assume that there is really no other choice for Poland but friendship, cooperation and alliance with the Soviet Union, and even if we assume that Poland's geographical position does not allow an end to this relationship, these arguments are not convincing enough for the Poles. I again have to recall that rational thought about politics is not an important feature of Polish political culture, and emotions play a far more important role. When an emo-
tional argument is confronted with a rational one, the former usually prevails. Bloch very rightly points out that Polish history is composed of "emotions based on dreams," and therefore if one wants to understand it, one should be an artist--"the communicator of emotions"--rather than a historian.212

One cannot expect that the efforts by the regime to change the traditional political culture of the Poles will easily succeed. The gap between the official political culture and the dominant one is too wide to be overcome. That is why Polish official political culture, which is just a carbon copy of Russian culture, does not have much chance to flourish in Poland. First, the content of Russian culture is in fundamental opposition to Polish culture. Second, due to the history of the relations between these two nations, almost everything that originates in Russia is automatically rejected by the Poles.

Martin Malia in a 1983 article observed:

Anyone acquainted with the Poles cannot fail to be struck by their awesome historical memory. . . . The Poles live out their contemporary destiny as a part of history to a degree unparalleled elsewhere in Europe. There is indeed perhaps no more striking example of the primacy of national and cultural tradition over social or class consciousness than that of the Poles--unless it be that of the Jews.213

Malia's insight is a good introduction to the next part of this chapter which deals with the contemporary Polish dominant political culture, since an important element of it is the very strong historical consciousness.

6. THE CONTEMPORARY DOMINANT POLITICAL CULTURE

Earlier I described why the concept of political culture is
attractive to the Warsaw regime. The result of this is that there are many social science surveys which examine the dominant culture. For more than twenty years the Centre for Public Opinion (the Polish abbreviation is OBOP) has existed. During Martial Law another organization was created, the Governmental Centre for Public Opinion Research. Survey research has also been sponsored by Polish universities. In addition, there are countless reports by foreigners who lived in Poland for extended periods of time, and the writings of Polish dissidents. And, last but not least, there are the Polish political crises which are also excellent sources of information on the dominant culture. All of these sources will be used in the discussion of the dominant Polish political culture.

Values and Beliefs

Kolakowski in a 1978 article argues that national consciousness causes a decay of communism. He suggests that "It seems that national feelings, national revindication are now the main force which disintegrates and devours communism." This observation seems to be particularly valid in the Polish context. As I discussed above, there is a great difference between Russian and Polish political traditions. For the Poles, adherence to their past seems to be the guarantee to preserve the difference between their official and dominant political cultures. It therefore serves to preserve their national identity. Fostering this tradition, and transferring it from one generation to another helped Poland survive Russification and Germanization in the nineteenth century. It seems that the same mechanism works in People's Poland. The attempts to implement the official political
culture can be seen in many respects as comparable to nineteenth
century Russification. Then the main purpose was to change the Poles
thoroughly and make them loyal subjects of Russia. Now
the implementation of the official culture means the same thing—to
change the Polish nation, make it compatible with the Russians and
thereby make the people loyal subjects of People's Poland and the
Soviet empire.

Malia's observation can be tested with the sociological survey
conducted by Wiatr, Szostkiewicz and Gesek. These authors asked their
respondents what they regarded as the most glorious battles in Polish
history. According to the respondents, the most glorious battle in
World War II was the Battle of Monte Cassino waged by the Polish Army
under the command of the London government in exile. This was much
more popular than the Battle of Lenino conducted by a Polish Army
under the command of Moscow. This is not surprising, despite the fact
that the Lenino battle is much promoted by government propaganda and
school curriculums as the the most important battle in contemporary
Polish history. Malia's description of the "awesome historical mem-
ory" is simply a device to help preserve traditional Polish culture
and its values.

One of these values is democracy. However, to say that contem-
porary Poles approve of only one model of democracy would be an over-
simplification. In an analysis of contemporary political culture one
should remember that no matter how much the Poles resist the official
political culture, they are nevertheless exposed to it and undoubtedly
there is some influence of the official culture upon the dominant one.
This influence is noticeable in the findings of a 1978 survey conducted among young people by Olendzki. More than fifty percent of his respondents thought that Poland is not a democratic country. But when they asked what makes Poland undemocratic, only ten percent said that this is caused by the lack of opposition parties. David Mason, who quotes this survey, rightly concludes that this state of affairs is caused by the lack of experience with competitive political institutions.216

In this sense the communist regime has had some successes in its attempts to change the dominant culture. However, its success and influence are fragile and they are usually devastated during political crises. This effort to eliminate the traditional culture, especially during the last crisis involving the Solidarnosc movement, must be viewed as a total and complex catastrophe for the regime.

The agreements signed in August 1980 in the Gdansk and Szczecin shipyards are very important to an understanding of Solidarity because they determined the political direction of the movement and gave it the basis for legal existence.217 An integral part of the Gdansk agreement was a list of twenty-one demands made by the striking workers. These demands can be classified into two groups—seven political demands and fourteen economic demands. The political demands would have profoundly changed Polish communism if they had been put into practice. But even though they were never fully realized, they had a tremendous influence on the political culture of Poland. All the traditional features of the political culture were revived. Perhaps the most important impact was on the political participation of the
Poles. In the summer of 1980 political participation was very highly valued, and with an opportunity to participate it became the most important demand of the strikers.

This was the reason why the demand was put forward for the government "to accept free trade unions independent from the Party and employers as provided by the ILO [the International Labour Organization] Convention 87..."\(^{218}\) An independent union meant a competitive political organization and a challenge to the Party and its power. An independent union also meant a forum to criticize the Party and to pressure the decisions made by the authorities. It raised the old Polish belief in the necessity to control the government and to limit its powers. After forty years of communist rule and a constant attempt to change the dominant political culture and make the Poles think that the only acceptable pattern of political life is to obey submissively the orders of the infallible authority, the people showed no change in their traditional beliefs. Moreover, the demand that the rulers must be controlled was supported not only by the intellectuals, but also by the workers. After forty years of claiming and reiterating that the party represents the interests of the proletariat, the workers now wanted to have a new representative trade union. And the trade union was to be independent from the Party, the defender of the workers.

At this moment we can raise the question of communist legitimacy in Poland. The Party used to say that the basis of its legitimacy was the fact that it represented, carried out and defended the interests of the workers. But during the summer of 1980 the workers de-
cided to have a new defender. What then is the source of the legitimacy for the communist regime?

In a speech given on Christmas Eve of 1981 Jaruzelski, said that "On December the 13th [of 1981, the day Martial Law was imposed] there was no other choice but Martial Law." And on the day that the State of Emergency was imposed, he suggested that there was one last chance for the Poles to make order "in their house" by themselves. Does this mean that the basis of "legitimacy" is either the Polish United Workers' Party or an invasion by the Red Army and its aftermath? What else, besides this choice, can the communist regime offer the Poles? Democracy? A war with Russia? High standards of living? No. In 1973 Gierek promised one car for every family. A decade later the regime cannot provide even one pair of socks on each pair of feet.

Even the threat of repression by the People's Police or direct military intervention by the Kremlin is not enough to create a stable political system. Let us recall that the Poles have already survived the terror of the Czarist Okhrana (the Czarist Police), the Prussian secret police, and the Gestapo and the NKVD. Despite all odds they never gave up. They organized the reckless uprisings of the nineteenth century, and the Warsaw uprising of 1944 which was doomed from the beginning. The culturally-rooted praise for reckless bravery, political wishful thinking and dreams, and the traditional craving for democracy makes the present basis of communist legitimacy highly insufficient to keep the Poles obedient. And it does not stabilize the political system.
The strong influence of Solidarity on the Polish political culture is also noticeable in all surveys conducted after the strikes of the summer of 1980. Mason says that after these strikes "the workers really began to educate themselves in democracy, while at the same time trying to create an organization that would institutionalize it." For instance, in a survey conducted in November and December of 1980, more than seventy-two percent supported the idea of increasing the participation of non-party members in government and more than ninety-three percent wanted to increase societal control over the government. It is worthwhile to notice that the twelfth demand of the striking workers stated: "To introduce the principle by which leading and managing cadres are selected by virtue of their qualifications not their party affiliations...." The November-December 1980 survey and the twelfth demand of the strikers are another example of the traditional Polish belief that any government must be controlled and that the communist Nomenklatura can hardly be accepted by the Poles. Similarly, the system of privileges connected with the Nomenklatura is rejected by the majority of the society. In 1977 Kawecki conducted a survey of 12,000 college students. He asked his respondents to list the most preferable features of a good socio-political system. Sixty-one percent put "the equality of citizens" in first place. This is another traditional characteristic of Polish political culture, which was strongly revived by Solidarity. Marek Tarniewski, a dissident writer, says:

Those who talk about equality often have in mind the struggle with privileges or the limitation of privileges. Especially privileges sanctioned through legal or quasi-legal arrangements. This refers then to equality before the law. This is
the sense in Poland of the slogans of equality of access to leadership positions and the abolition of the institutions of
Nomenklatura.225

Mason correctly points out that equality has always been "near the top of the list of Polish values."226 For example, Jasinska-Kania cites a September 1980 OBOP poll. According to the result of this poll, equality and justice were the most preferred socio-political values.227 Taras and Korolkiewicz, for instance, cite a 1973 survey which pointed out that "nearly half of young respondents named large income differentials (even though based on qualifications obtained) as an undesirable feature."228 And then they conclude that "there is a dominant egalitarian norm which has been internalized by a large part of the society."229

I cannot subscribe to this view. It is true that the Gdansk workers demanded that the government abolish higher family allowance payments given to members of the security service and militia,230 but this does not mean economic egalitarianism. On the contrary, their objective was to erode one of the symptoms of the special privileged political position of the militia and security service. Therefore, it was an act of political egalitarianism. That is why what Korolkiewicz and Taras found as support for communist Uravnilovka (leveling) is, in fact, support for political equality.

This mistaken interpretation of economic egalitarianism leads Korolkiewicz and Taras to the conclusion that the Poles accept Soviet-style socialism.231 However, Adam Michnik, the prominent Polish dissident, suggests that if the Poles accept socialism, it is socialism with freedom, with citizens not subjects, with national identity, and
with Catholic morality."

Here we have two different interpretations. The main difference between them concerns the meaning of the term "socialism." Korolkiewicz and Taras tend to understand socialism in terms of Soviet practice, i.e., political and economic collectivism, autocracy and the almighty authority. Michnik understands this term as if he were a Swedish social democrat who approves civil rights, limited government, private and public ownership, and a free market economy supervised by the government. What is the model of socialism accepted by the Poles?

This can be seen by examining the attitudes of the Poles toward public versus private ownership. According to the results of Stefan Nowak's research done in 1980, the majority of Poles accept the nationalization of industry, economic planning and agrarian reforms. However, this does not mean that they disapprove of private ownership. A 1980 study conducted under the auspices of the Polish Academy of Sciences demonstrated that there is great support for private ownership. For example, almost eighty-four percent of the respondents supported the idea of private farms and only less than ten percent supported state farms. As we see, in terms of civil rights, egalitarianism and ownership, the Poles support the Swedish model of socialism rather than that of the USSR.

However, Mason suggests that the Soviet model can also be accepted at least in terms of collectivism. He writes that the Poles strongly support the spirit of community that Daniel Bell calls the "heart of socialism." To support his observation, he quotes a 1981 survey in which the author asked his respondents whether one should
always put the social interest ahead of one's own. Only nineteen percent said no, whereas almost seventy-four percent said yes. But again we should base our reasoning on the concrete socio-political situation. Support for altruistic attitudes does not always mean support for the Russian-type of collectivism. In a country where there is a huge gap between the rulers and the ruled, solidarity among the latter is quite understandable. It seems that in the politically hot and hectic days of 1981, the "yes" of the seventy-four percent should be understood as a form of solidarity with the rebellion. In 1981 many Poles thought they had a great chance to change their governors, to make them compatible with the Polish tradition. And they hoped to do so through the solidarity of the people. This was what Solidarnosc was about.

There is another way to examine the attitudes of the Poles toward socialism. This is by examining their political expectations. Are they willing to accept the idea that they must remain politically passive and involved in politics only to the extent strictly devised by the authorities? This would be a sign of acceptance for Soviet socialism. Or were their expectations based on the political activity of individuals? The following discussion deals with the political expectations of contemporary Poles, their political knowledge and behaviour.

7. CONTEMPORARY POLISH POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOR

It seems that the best way to analyze political expectations is to present the program of Polish oppositional political movements.
Again, as was the case in our discussion of Russian political culture, we can assume that if these movements gain significant political support from the people, they express popular beliefs and expectations. What do these programs express?

An answer can be found in a 1977 statement of the most influential oppositional movement, which stated:

The Social Self-Defense Committee (KOR) has the following aims:
1. To prevent persecution for political, ideological, religious or racial reasons and to help those who are persecuted for such reasons;
2. To oppose law violations and to help victims of injustice;
3. To fight for guarantees of civil rights and freedom;
4. To support all initiatives made in the cause of human and civil rights.237

Unlike the Russian movements, the KOR says nothing about social justice. The main issue for the movement is civil rights. The state is supposed to protect civil rights. That is what the state is for.

Thirteen years earlier, a group of Polish intellectuals sent a letter to the authorities in which they stressed the same issue. They stressed the right of criticism, free discussion and of honest information as indispensable elements of progress and necessary features of the modern state.238

Here "progress" means protection of civil rights, "modern state" means the state which protects civil rights, and "modern society" means a society which demands civil rights. The position of the citizen and his rights has been a constant concern of the Polish opposition. Demand two of the Gdansk workers called for the right to strike. The third demand said the government should "observe freedom of speech and the printed word, that is not to repress independent
publications and to make the mass media available to representatives of all groups and religions." But the most significant, in terms of political expectations and behaviour, was demand six which called upon the government:

To take genuine action to extricate the country from its state of crisis through (i) fully informing the public about the socio-economic situation, and (ii) enabling all social communities and sections to participate in the discussion about the reform programme.

The "modern and progressive state" guarantees political rights of its citizens. They, in exchange, take care of it, discuss its problems and find common solutions to solve them. Civic activity has always been a feature of Polish political culture. The Poles have usually been politically active. Solidarity with its almost ten million members is an excellent example of Polish political activity. Solidarity's need for participation is well expressed by Michnik, a leading activist of the movement, who wrote: "I belong to those who have been constantly criticizing the concept of clandestine activity . . . [of the opposition]." Michnik wants to act together with the society and together press for reforms. He is against the concept of revolution made by a group of the most conscious revolutionaries who act on behalf of passive and politically inexperienced society, as was the case in the Russian context. What a great difference in comparison to the Russian opposition movements!

Political activity of a society is usually related to its political knowledge. The greater the knowledge, the greater the activity. The political knowledge of the Poles has been constantly examined by the authorities, the opposition and by the Western
specialists. For example, in 1963, Andrzej Sicinski, the Polish sociologist, conducted studies on the political knowledge and interest in politics of the Poles. He found that the Poles were very well informed. Jerzy Wiatr in one of his surveys found that the level of the political knowledge of his respondents was high. He asked inhabitants of six small cities to identify and match the name of seven renowned Polish and foreign politicians with the position held by them. Almost sixty percent correctly identified the Polish foreign minister and the UN general secretary, and almost twenty-eight percent correctly matched the name of the US defense secretary with his position. Wiatr concludes his study with a statement "In general this study . . . indicates a rather high level of political knowledge among Polish citizens."

The high level of political knowledge of the Poles is connected to the fact that the country has never been hermetically closed and isolated from foreign influence. Kolankiewicz and Taras rightly pointed out that "the Poles . . . are not deprived of sources of political information independent of the official line." There have been many newspapers which have fought with the party line (for example Po Prostu or Nowa Kultura). There is also Tygodnik Powszechny, which is a real oddity in the communist world. This weekly has been officially published for forty years and its editors have never concealed the fact that they oppose communism. An important role is also played by foreign radio programs (BBC, Radio Free Europe, Voice of America) and the fact that it is relatively easy to obtain a passport and travel abroad.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS ABOUT POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE

To conclude, we can say that in Poland there is great disharmony between the official political culture and the dominant political culture. This has had a tremendous impact on the legitimacy of the communist regime and its stability. Andrew Arato says that the Poles are a typical civil society which fights against the authoritarian state. He is correct. In the light of my analysis, we can say that the Poles are a civil society with political expectations and political needs which are not fulfilled by the authoritarian communist regime. In other words, the values, beliefs, symbols, expectations, and behavioural patterns, or, in short, the political culture of the majority of the society, is not compatible with that promoted by the communist regime. This discrepancy is of crucial importance for an understanding of the Polish political system and its stability.

In the Soviet Union, as I argued in chapter three, the gap between the official Soviet political culture and the traditional Russian culture has not been large. After a period of cultural flux, Stalin introduced a harsh process of resocialization which reduced this gap even further. This revived all the authoritarian features of traditional Russian political culture. This process of resocialization can be described as one aspect of Stalinism.

In Poland the gap was has been much wider. This meant that Stalinist socialization had a much more difficult task. This is of crucial importance. In Russia Stalinism aimed only at a revival of the traditional culture. In Poland Stalinism tried to introduce a completely new type political culture incompatible with the deeply
rooted traditional one. One could therefore argue that Stalinism in Poland required even more brutality than was used in the Soviet Union if it hoped to make the traditional political culture compatible with the new one.

However, Polish Stalinism was not as forceful as that which was implemented in Russia. Ascherson very rightly points out that in Poland, Stalinism lacked the determination and brutality of the Soviet example.\(^{246}\) Its scope was narrower than that in Russia. It did not cover all aspects of life. And most importantly, it did not change the traditional political culture. Wiatr in his evaluation of the sources of crises says that the communist regime in Poland has never succeeded in getting rid of the problems it had from the beginning of its rule.\(^{247}\) One of these problems was the opposition between the rulers and the ruled. That is why the 1956 crisis, the first crisis in People's Poland, was not the last one.

An example of the weakness of Stalinism is the Gomulka case. Władysław Gomulka was a dedicated Polish communist. During the Second World War he became the first secretary of the communist party in Poland. He remained in this position until 1948 when he was purged and accused of nationalism—one of the most serious sins in the communist catechism. "Nationalism" simply meant the lack of blind obedience to the Kremlin and Stalin. Yet despite this, Gomulka was not executed. This was a tremendous exception in the Soviet bloc at that time. Whereas "nationalists" in other communist countries were put to death (Xoxe in Albania, Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria, Slansky in Czechoslovakia), Gomulka's head was spared. Moreover, in 1956 he
returned to power, regained his position in the party and governed Poland until 1970.

One of the reasons for Gomulka's political comeback was his popularity among the Poles. This was based on the fact that he was persecuted by those who were perceived as obedient servants of the Kremlin, and whether Gomulka actually had the courage to say "no" to Stalin really did not matter. The important fact was that he was perceived as the man who dared to say "no" to Stalin and Russia.

The Gomulka case is an excellent example of the weakness of Polish Stalinism. In a country which was to be communist in the Stalinist style, the chief of the Communist Party returned to power mainly because he was labelled as being anti-Russian. This is a paradox. It is a product of the weakness of Polish Stalinism. In Russia, Gomulka would have been executed. Even Davies, who tends to stress the similarities between Poland and the USSR, admits that

... Stalinism never gained the same pitch of ferocity in Poland that it reined in neighbouring countries. The political trials did not develop into show trials or wholesale purges. The middle class and the intellectuals, though harassed, were not liquidated. The church was not suppressed. The peasants were not deported, nor driven to famine. Collectivization was slow and incomplete.

Certainly there were hundreds of similarities between Soviet and Polish Stalinism, such as a command economy, the monopoly power of the Communist Party, and forced collectivism. But the differences outweigh the similarities, especially in terms of political culture.

We may ask why Polish Stalinism was weaker? One explanation which is plausible, given our analysis, is the continued strength and persistence of traditional Polish political culture. Despite the
loyalty and determination of the Polish comrades, a high degree of coercive force does not have legitimacy in Polish political culture. This limited Stalinism and its impact on Polish politics, unlike the case of Russia.

In sum, the political culture of the majority of the people has not been changed. All the traditional features of it remain very well preserved. In a letter to the Polish ambassador, General de Gaulle wrote: "Mon Cher Ambassadeur. Pour vous pour la chere Pologne. Qui a, au fond, gagne la partie parce qu'elle est restee elle meme. Tous mes voeux les meilleurs du monde!"251
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Political stability is an important and fascinating topic for analysis. But it is not an easy one because stability is an enormously complex issue. There are many variables that must be taken into account, particularly in a comparative analysis.

Political stability is important for all political systems, but it is a very significant point of difference in the study of Soviet bloc communist countries. These countries are very similar, and they are often almost identical when examined in terms of political institutions or ideology. Moreover, the Soviet Union exercises leadership over its less powerful socialist neighbors. This can lead us to focus on the similarities between them, while often ignoring the differences because they are assumed to be of little or no significance. The result is that all Soviet bloc countries tend to be treated as a single unit and an analysis of the Soviet Union serves to explain all of them. Despite many institutional similarities, these countries are different and comparative political analysis must include this fact.

In the case of the Soviet Union and Poland, the most important point of difference is in terms of political stability. In fact, the Soviet Union and Poland are extreme cases in the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Union is one of the most stable countries in the contemporary
world. Poland, on the other hand, has been periodically torn by serious systemic political crises. As this study contends, this fundamental difference is difficult to explain by an institutional analysis.

The best explanation for Soviet stability and Polish instability can be found if we examine the comparative legitimacy of these two regimes. Generally speaking, the Soviet regime appears to be regarded as legitimate by large numbers of its citizens, whereas the Warsaw regime desperately lacks legitimacy. As was argued earlier, one of the most important factors of legitimacy and stability is political culture. The conclusion reached by this study is that a congruence between the official political culture and the traditional or dominant culture gives a regime legitimacy and stability.

In the case of the Soviet Union the congruence between the Soviet official political culture and the dominant culture of the Russians results from a strong historical continuity between the Soviet regime and Czarist Russia. As was argued, the Bolsheviks did not establish a new political culture in Russia. On the contrary, after a state of cultural flux, Stalin harshly and brutally reestablished and strengthened the main features of the traditional Russian political culture. The belief in the infallibility of the authorities, the traditional relations between the governors and the subjects, collectivism, a strong emphasis on economic egalitarianism and so on were reintroduced and confirmed as the main elements of political life and political culture. All of these were deeply rooted in the traditional political culture of the Russians, and their political
mentality was based on them. After the period of "storms and novelties" (1905-31), the old pattern of politics was reestablished. Once again the ruler would decide what was right and wrong. He took care of the security of the people and provided social equity. For their part, the people obeyed the ruler, carried out his orders and secured the interests of the state. In this traditional scheme of things, there was neither room nor need for political democracy, which was seen as causing anarchy, and civil rights which were regarded as unnecessary.

In other words, the political reality of Russia/the Soviet Union returned to the natural state of affairs. The ruler rules and the subjects obey. The ruler may use force, which is his exclusive prerogative, while the subjects bend themselves to accommodate to his will and accept the use of force against them. He guarantees their safety, they accept his rule. This is a natural state of affairs, according to the traditional political culture. In sum, he—the ruler (now called the General Secretary)—is legitimate, as is the entire political system. This largely accounts for the tremendous political stability of the Soviet Union.

Poland is quite the opposite. The Polish regime lacks legitimacy. The Polish official culture, primarily composed of elements characteristic of Russian culture, is incompatible with the political culture of the majority of Poles. As this study has shown, the lack of congruence between the official and the traditional Polish political culture is a reason why the majority of Poles view the Warsaw regime as a foreign imposition, with a status resembling that of an
occupying power. The Polish communist regime did not succeed in replacing the traditional political culture with the new official one. We can say, then, that the regime entirely failed to carry out the revolution on the cultural level. The official political culture is not internalized by the majority of the society. The dominant culture of the Poles is still the traditional one which sees the ruler as a tyrant by definition. Therefore the ruler must be constantly watched. Civil rights are crucially important. They are the main tools of political activity, which is treated as a natural state of affairs. In this view, the state is supposed to provide opportunities to perform civic activity. According to the dominant culture, the ruler must submit to the rule of law and the will of the citizens. This, in fact, is an important source of the ruler's legitimacy. If the ruler claims to be infallible, if he does not obey the law, and if he treats the law as an instrument of his power, then in the Polish context he is illegitimate and is rejected and fought against. In other words, the officially promoted collectivism, autocracy, and privileged position of the ruler are incompatible with traditional Polish individualism, democracy and a strong tendency to constantly control the authorities.

As we see, political culture is an extremely important factor which promotes political stability or instability. Harmony between the official culture and the political culture of the vast majority of the society tremendously contributes to stability. It also helps to legitimize the regime because it is seen as compatible with tradition and not a foreign imposition.
The political culture explanation of legitimacy and stability appears to be more convincing than others. For instance, Bialer suggests that the Soviet Union is stable because "the Soviet leaders and elites work hard to make the system stable."252 This leads Bialer to focus on the economic development of the USSR.

The Soviet leaders are not the only ones to work hard to make a political system stable. Most governments attempt to do so, including the Warsaw government. And one can say that by the indices of economic development in Poland from the 1950s to the 1970s the Polish polity should have been stable. But it is not.

This criticism of the economic explanation does not imply that I reject economic development as a factor in political stability altogether. Quite the contrary. The economic factor is important, and undoubtedly it helps to stabilize some political systems. Strong economic performance by the regime may even help to internalize the official political culture if the latter is different from the dominant one. It seems that in the case of West Germany, for example, the economic factor significantly contributed to the changes in the traditional culture of Germans.

However, economic development is not a decisive factor of stability. Political culture seems to be much more important. Harmony between the official culture and the dominant culture means historical continuity of the new regime with cultural traditions. As this study has argued, this makes the Soviet regime legitimate and the political system stable as the Bolsheviks represent continuity with old Russian political culture.
This is clearly not the case in Poland. Revolutions have achieved many things throughout history. But only a few have succeeded in transforming society at the cultural level, primarily because political culture is extremely difficult to change or replace. On this note I would like to end this study with a quotation from Tocqueville, who said of his study of democracy in the U.S.:

If I have hitherto failed in making the readers feel the important influence of the political experience, the habits, the opinions, (in short, the customs of the Americans upon the maintenance of their institutions), I have failed in the principal object of my work.253

And if I have not convinced my readers of the importance of political culture on the stability of the Soviet Union and the instability of Poland, I have also failed.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 127.


12 Ibid., pp. 16 - 29.


14 Ibid., p. 25.


21 Ibid.


28 Ibid., p. 7.


Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., pp. 16 - 18.


Ibid., p. 5.


After 1980 many books have been published on political culture. For instance see N. M. Keyzerov, Politicheskaya Kul'tura Socialisticheskogo Obshchestva [The Political Culture of Socialist Society] (Moscow: Politliteratura, 1982); N. Blinov, Y. Ozhegov and F. Shergi, Politicheskaya Kul'tura i Molodezh' [Political Culture and the Youth] (Moscow: Politliteratura, 1982); M. Lisenkov, Politicheskaya Kul'tura Sovietskogo Cheloveka [The Political Culture of the Soviet Man] (Moscow: Politliteratura, 1983); N. M. Keyzerov, Politicheskaya i Pravovaya Kul'tura: Metodologicheskie Problemi [Political and Legal Culture: Methodological Problems] (Moscow: Politliteratura, 1983).

My translation. I have used the Polish translation of the Burlatskii and Galkin book, Sociologia, Polityka, Stosunki Miedzynarodowe published in Warsaw in 1978. The quotation can be found on p. 50 of the original Russian edition: F. M. Burlatskii and A. A. Galkin, Sociologia, Politika, Mezhdunarodnyie Otnoshenia
[Sociology, Politics, International Relations] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyie Otnosheniia, 1974).


41Ibid.


48There is a difference between communism and fascism. For development of this point see, for example, H. J. Sapiro and B. R. Barber, "Counter-ideological uses of totalitarianism," Politics and Society I (1970), pp. 3-22; White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. 4.


50See, for instance, White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, pp. 3-4.


52Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 25.


54A very similar point is made by J. Azrael, "Varieties of De-Stalinization," in C. J. Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems


62Veche: a popular assembly that was a characteristic institution in Russia in the period between the tenth and fifteenth centuries. For a detailed account of the Veche see G. S. Kalinin and A. F. Goncharov, Istoria Gosudarstva i Prava SSSR [The History of the State and Law of the USSR] (Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia Literatura, 1972), pp. 390 - 400.


64Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, p. 55.


68The Time of Troubles embraces the turbulent events of 1606 - 1613 when there was no strong government in Moscow.

69Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, p. 53.

70Quoted in Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, pp. 389.


73 White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. 50.


82 Schapiro, Communist Party, p. 3.

83 Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 211.

84 Szamuely, Russian Tradition, p. 47.


88 Vernadsky, History of Russia, p. 282.


91 Szamuely, Russian Tradition, p. 219.


95 Berlin, Russian Thinkers, pp. 22 - 82.


100 Ibid., p. 18.

101 Ibid., p. 17. My emphasis.


110Fitzpatrick, Cultural Revolution, p. 29.


117Polityka (December 1982).

118Polityka (March 1984).

119White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, particularly chapter 5, pp. 84 - 113.


123Here undoubtedly some of the best accounts are those of Hedrick Smith, The Russians, rev. ed. (New York: Ballantine, 1984) and
D. Shipler, *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams*.


128Ibid., p. 238.

129Ibid., p. 248.


131White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, p. 103.


133Ibid., p. 253.


137In the so-called Testament of Lenin, he warned the Central Committee about Stalin as a man absolutely unsuitable for the position of General Secretary because of his autocracy. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, ed. E. Crankshaw (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 6.


139Ibid., p. 115.

140White, "USSR: Autocracy and Industrialism," p. 43.


See for example, Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics Today*, pp. 50 - 51.


Ibid., p. 324.

Ibid., p. 329.


For a brief account of the generation theory, see White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, p. 177 - 190.


See for example Roman Dybowski, *Poland in World Civilization* (New York: J. M. Barret, 1950), passim.


Privilegium was an act issued by the King in which he transferred some of his powers to the gentry.

Władysław Kurkiewicz et al., *Tysiąc lat dziejów Polski*. [A Thousand Years of Polish History] (Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia


Kurkiewicz et al., *Tysiac lat dziejow Polski*, p. 75.

Olszer *For Your Freedom and Ours*, p. 18.

Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe. A Short History of Poland* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 297 - 298. Poland, despite its monarchical system, was called *Rzeczpospolita Polska* (Polish Republic) in order to enhance the political rights of its citizens.

Especially during the second half of the eighteenth century, each session of the Sejm was disrupted by the abuse of the Liberum Veto and eventually there was no single act passed by the Parliament.


Milosz, *The History of Polish Literature*, p. 40. This work of Modrzewski was published in 1551.

The most severe Roman inquisition was in the sixties and seventies of the sixteenth century. The Polish act was issued in 1573.


178 Aleksander Swietochowski, Political Directions, quoted in Olszer, For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 123.

179 Davies, God's Playground, p. 5.

180 Milosz, The History of Polish Literature, p. 201.


182 For an excellent account of the Russian policies towards the Poles see Davies, God's Playground, pp. 93 - 105.

183 The November Rising was one of the biggest insurrections in the nineteenth century history of Poland. This Rising took place in the Russian part of Poland. For an account of this event see Davis, God's Playground, pp. 315 - 333.

184 Davis, God's Playground, p. 329.

185 Milosz, The History of Polish Literature, pp. 200 - 201.

186 Quoted in Olszer, For Your Freedom and Ours, pp. 85 - 86. Psistratus was a Greek tyrant who made possible Athen's preeminence in Greece.


188 This observation was made apparently by William Bruce and is quoted in C. Backivis, Szkice o kulturze staropolskiej. [Essays on the Culture of Old Poland] (Warsaw: PWN, 1975), p. 467.

189 Quoted in Tazbir, Kultura szlachecka w Polsce, p. 61.

190 Ibid., p. 66. The Saint Bartholomew's Day was a massacre of Huguenots (Protestants) conducted by Catholics in Paris 1572.

191 Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 335.

192 Ibid., p. 335.


194 The Confederation of Bar (1768 - 1772) was one of the first Polish uprisings against Russia. The Confederation of Targowica
(1792) was pro-Russian and was formed on the order of Catherina the Great.


**Ibid., p. 125.**

**Quoted in Davies, God's Playground, p. 402.**

**See, for example, Topolski, Dzieje Polski, p. 648.**

**See, for example, Pawel Zaremba, Historia Dwudziestolecia 1918 - 1939 [The History of the Twenty Years, 1918 - 1939], vol. 1 (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1981), pp. 161 - 229.**

**Davis, God's Playground, p. 396.**

**Quoted in Andrzej Garlicki, Od Maja do Brzescia [From the May Coup to the Brest Trial] (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1981), p. 177. My translation.**

**See, for example, Stefan Sieniawski, My pierwsza brygada [We, the First Brigade] (Warsaw: Iskry, 1966), passim.**

**Ash, The Polish Revolution, p. 3.**


**Ibid., p. 296. My translation.**


**Wojciech Jaruzelski, Przemowienia 1983, p. 236. My translation.**
211 Ibid., p. 284. My translation.


218 Ibid., p. 288.


220 Ibid., pp. 213–221.

221 Mason, Public Opinion, p. 72.

222 This survey is quoted in Mason, Public Opinion, p. 71.

223 Ascherson, Polish August, p. 294.


Ibid., p. 108.

Ascherson, Polish August, p. 294.

Kolankiewicz and Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?" p. 108.


Mason, Public Opinion, p. 76.

Ibid., p. 77.

Quoted in Olszer, For Your Freedom and Ours, p. 353.


Ascherson, Polish August, p. 200.

Ibid., p. 292.


Kolankiewicz and Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?", p. 115.

Ascherson, *Polish August*, p. 34.


Davies, *Heart of Europe*, p. 9.

For a very impressive list of the similarities between the Stalin system and the Polish system of 1948 - 1956 see *Ibid.*, pp. 6 - 10.


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