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The Soviet Union as a rational-revolutionary state : a conceptual framework for studying the impact… Gavanski, Ogden 1986

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S O V I E T U N I O N AS A RAT I O N A L - R E V O L U T I O N A R Y S T A T E A C O N C E P T U A L FRAMEWORK FOR S T U D Y I N G THE IMPACT OF I D E O L O G Y ON S O V I E T F O R E I G N P O L I C Y By OGDEN G A V A N S K I B . A . ( H o n s . ) . T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f A l b e r t a , 1983 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE R E Q U I R E M E N T S FOR THE D E G R E E OF M A S T E R OF A R T S i n T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g to t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 6 © O g d e n G a v a n s k i , 1 9 8 6 In presenting t h i s thes is i n p a r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibra ry s h a l l make i t f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thes is for schola r ly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her representat ives. I t i s understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permission. Department of POLITICAL- SGte /Oc :^ The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date i i 3fe-^_(3/81) ABSTRACT The i n f l u e n c e of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ideology on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s examined. Any r e l a t i o n s h i p that e x i s t s i s not a simple one. I t i s misl e a d i n g to speak of "the" impact of Soviet ideology as i f i t c o n s t i t u t e d one simple v a r i a b l e . The ideology i s make up of d i f f e r e n t components which have profoundly d i f f e r e n t impacts on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . In a d d i t i o n , many other v a r i a b l e s besides ideology i n f l u e n c e Soviet f o r e i g n behavior i n complex and sometimes s u b t l e ways . In t h i s essay I suggest a t h e o r e t i c a l framework f o r the study of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y that takes i n t o account the complex i n t e r a c t i o n between ideology and other important v a r i a b l e s . The f a i l u r e of the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t approach and the power p o l i t i c s approach i n e x p l a i n i n g c e r t a i n aspects of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y demonstrates the u t i l i t y of a broader approach that i n c l u d e s ideology as a v a r i a b l e . A framework that views the Soviet Union as a " r a t i o n a l -r e v o l u t i o n a r y " s t a t e i s presented that points out the d u a l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . On the one hand, Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s dr i v e n by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of power and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and, on the other by i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . C l e a r l y , these va r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c l a s h at times and often Soviet policy-makers have to choose between an i d e o l o g i c a l and a n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y . i i i At the most b a s i c l e v e l , Soviet Marxism-Leninism i n f l u e n c e s and shapes the p e r c e p t u a l and conceptual world of leaders who are s o c i a l i z e d l i k e other Soviet c i t i z e n s . Ideology also plays a r o l e i n l e g i t i m i z i n g Soviet one-party r u l e d o m e s t i c a l l y . While i t i s probably impossible to estimate which of the two f a c t o r s — b e l i e f i n the i d e o l o g i c a l tenets or s e l f - s e r v i n g use of ideology to maintain power and p r i v i l e g e — i s the more important, t h i s study suggests that both play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n Soviet p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . F o r e i g n p o l i c y was found to be l e s s i d e o l o g i c a l than most aspects of Soviet p o l i t i c s . Since Soviet leaders cannot manipulate i n t e r n a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s to the same extent as domestic ones an i d e o l o g i c a l " b l u e p r i n t " i s i m p o s s i b l e . However, ideology places c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n on what may be considered ' f e a s i b l e ' f o r e i g n p o l i c y choices f o r the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p . I t was found that ideology leads to power-damaging p o l i c i e s i n two c l a s s e s of a c t i o n s : (1) the a c t u a l implementation and maintenance of p o l i c y i n t i m a t e l y t i e d to the ends env i s i o n e d by the ideology and (2) a c t i o n s that are undertaken to defend the doctrine-based l e g i t i m a c y of the l e a d e r s h i p . The i d e o l o g i c a l r e v i s i o n s that have o f t e n been i n t e r p r e t e d as a b e t r a y a l of Soviet r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n t e r e s t s are seen to be a purging of spurious and non-relevant elements from Marxism-Leninism. The conceptual framework presented i n t h i s essay demonstrates that ideology cannot be dismissed as a s i g n i f i c a n t o p e r a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e i n Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l i v behavior. I t o f t e n i n f l u e n c e s the form and content of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . However, the framework a l s o points out that Soviet p o l i c y i s not d i c t a t e d s o l e l y by i d e o l o g i c a l imperatives. v TABLE OF CONTENTS AUTHORIZATION FORM i i ABSTRACT i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS v i LIST OF FIGURES v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT i x INTRODUCTION x PART ONE: LEADING APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY I. N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t School 1 I I . Power P o l i t i c s School 2 PART TWO: THE RATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY I. L i m i t a t i o n s on Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y 4 I I . The Dualism of Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y 5 PART THREE: CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY I. S o v iet Marxism-Leninism 9 a) The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Component 12 b) The D o c t r i n a l Component 13 I I . The I n d i v i d u a l L e v e l of A n a l y s i s 14 I I I . Ideology and Domestic P o l i t i c s 18 PART FOUR: EXPECTED GENERAL LONG-TERM TENDENCIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON THE RATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION I. I d e o l o g i c a l - R e v o l u t i o n a r y Tendencies 23 I I . I d e o l o g i c a l l y Derived R a t i o n a l Tendencies ... 25 v i PART FIVE: HOW IDEOLOGY AFFECTS CONCRETE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS I. Detente 28 I I . E a s t e r n Europe 35 I I I . P r e f e r r e d Regimes 39 PART SIX: A CASE STUDY IN SOVIET PERCEPTIONS I. The Inf l u e n c e of Ideology on the Soviet View of the United States 43 CONCLUSION 56 FOOTNOTES 63 REFERENCES 71 APPENDIX 76 v i i LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE # Page 1. "From Ideology to For e i g n P o l i c y " 21 2. " L i m i t s of Soviet Domestic P o l i c y " 34 3. "Regimes P r e f e r r e d by the Soviet Union" 39 v i i i Acknowledgments I am very g r a t e f u l to P r o f e s s o r Paul Marantz f o r h i s encouragement, patience and guidance as t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r . I also wish to thank the members of the t h e s i s committee, P r o f e s s o r Kal H o l s t i and P r o f e s s o r Pete Chamberlain, f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l suggestions. i x Those p o l i t i c i a n s of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y c l a s s who are unable "to maneuver, to compromise" in order to avoid an o b v i o u s l y disadvan-tageous b a t t l e are good for nothing. V.I. L e n i n , "Left-Wing" Communism: An I n f a n t i l e D i s o r d e r . 1 INTRODUCTION The question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i d e o l o g y and Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s an extremely p e r p l e x i n g one. The study of the m o t i v a t i o n a l r o l e of ideology i n i n f l u e n c i n g p o l i t i c a l behavior i n general i s one of the most d i f f i c u l t 2 areas of s o c i a l s c i e n c e . In the case of the Soviet Union, learned o p i n i o n v a r i e s from a s s e r t i o n s that ideology i s merely used as post f a c t o r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of p o l i c y motivated by more b a s i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of power or n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s to claims that i d e o l o g y acts as a d e c i s i v e independent or semi-dependent v a r i a b l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g p o l i t i c a l behavior. (See Appendix I f o r a short survey of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e views on t h i s question.) As R i t a K e l l y and F r e d e r i c F l e r o n note: ...every Communist " s p e c i a l i s t " has an answer to t h i s v i t a l q uestion of the m o t i v a t i o n a l r o l e of Communist ideology and seeks to j u s t i f y i t u s u a l l y by p o i n t i n g to c e r t a i n a c t i o n s i n the past which conformed to h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the m o t i v a t i o n a l r o l e of Communist ideo l o g y . 3 Many of those who analyze the r e l a t i o n s h i p between ideology and f o r e i g n p o l i c y tend to look at the question i n more or l e s s absolute terms. This o f t e n leads to o v e r s t a t e d hypotheses i n which ideology e i t h e r determines most of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y or e l s e has n e g l i g i b l e i n f l u e n c e . I t x i s easy then to s e l e c t and i n t e r p r e t f a c t s i n order to support one's p a r t i c u l a r view. As A l f r e d G. Meyer w r i t e s : For e i t h e r hypothesis, there i s a good deal of supporting evidence. At the same time, n e i t h e r i s subject to c o n v i n c i n g v e r i f i c a t i o n : i t i s impossible to s t a t e f i r m l y that any p o l i c y being pursued i s or i s not i n accord with the i d e o l o g y . . . 4 The question often posed i s whether ideology makes the Soviet Union "more ag g r e s s i v e " than n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l n a t i o n s . However, as Michael S u l l i v a n has pointed out, to lump a l l the numerous behaviors of nations along a "simple c o n f 1 i c t - t o - c o o p e r a t i o n continuum... tends to c a n c e l out the true d i f f e r e n c e s among countries.""' This o b s e r v a t i o n holds most true f o r those w r i t e r s who study the i n c i d e n c e of Soviet involvement i n major armed c o n f l i c t and, f i n d i n g no s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the Soviet Union and other s t a t e s , conclude that Soviet Marxism-Leninism has no i n f l u e n c e on t h e i r behavior i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . At the other extreme, one f i n d s those who argue that the Soviet Union, d r i v e n by i t s Communist id e o l o g y , i s unavoidably and dangerously • • , 6 expans 1 0 m s t . To compound the problem, the general d e f i n i t i o n of ideology has escaped consensus. Depending on whether one accepts a broader or more narrow d e f i n i t i o n the answer one gives to the problem can vary c o n s i d e r a b l y . In t h i s essay, ideology w i l l be taken to mean much more than o f f i c i a l d o c t r i n e . David Joravsky puts forward t h i s d e f i n i t i o n : x i When we c a l l a b e l i e f i d e o l o g i c a l , we are saying at l e a s t three things about i t : although i t i s u n v e r i f i e d or u n v e r i f i a b l e , i t i s accepted as v e r i f i e d by a p a r t i c u l a r group, because i t performs s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s f o r that group.7 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i adds a very important aspect to the d e f i n i t i o n i n the Soviet case when he notes that "the ideology i s both a set of conscious assumptions and purposes and part of the t o t a l h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i a l , and personal g background of the Soviet l e a d e r s . . . " Scholars have of t e n concentrated on the 'conscious assumptions' or d o c t r i n e of the ideology and overlooked the i n f l u e n c e of the i n d i r e c t and o f t e n unacknowledged aspects of ideology that make up the l a t t e r part of B r z e z i n s k i ' s d e f i n i t i o n . I t i s misleading to speak of "the" impact of Soviet ideology as i f i t c o n s t i t u t e d one simple v a r i a b l e . The ideology i t s e l f , as we s h a l l see, i s made up of d i f f e r e n t components which have profoundly d i f f e r e n t impacts on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . C l e a r l y , any r e l a t i o n s h i p that e x i s t s i s not a simple causal one but i s r e l a t e d to other v a r i a b l e s i n f l u e n c i n g Soviet f o r e i g n behavior i n a complex and sometimes subtle way. To get a complete understanding many d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of f o r e i g n behavior must be looked a t, i n c l u d i n g : communication with other c o u n t r i e s , character of a l l i a n c e formation, exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n and trade, sanctions against other c o u n t r i e s (frequency and type), frequency and l e v e l of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t , and behavior f o l l o w i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n ( l e n g t h of occupation, r e l u c t a n c e to withdraw, e t c . ) . The l e v e l of i d e o l o g i c a l m o t i v a t i o n may vary g r e a t l y x i i from one context to another. I t should be mentioned here that while a t h e o r e t i c a l model for the study of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y w i l l be suggested i n t h i s essay, there w i l l be no attempt to present a comprehensive e m p i r i c a l study of Soviet behavior i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . While such a study i s outside the scope of t h i s essay, the t h e o r e t i c a l model presented here may a i d such fu t u r e e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s . While I b e l i e v e that a study of i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e i s c r u c i a l f o r a f u l l understanding of Soviet behavior, current research suggests that Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s not as cohesive, purposive, and non-malleable as i s o f t e n 9 thought. Many recent works suggest that i t i s a p p r e c i a b l y more v o l u n t a r i s t i c and h i g h l y r e a c t i v e . ^ Robert D a n i e l s points out that, " f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s one of the l e a s t i d e o l o g i c a l aspects of Soviet p o l i t i c s , i n r e a l i t y i f not i n w o r d s . C l e a r l y the Soviet leaders cannot manipulate i n t e r n a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s to the same extent as domestic ones, a f a c t which i n i t s e l f makes an i d e o l o g i c a l " b l u e p r i n t " impossible. S u l l i v a n writes that s t u d i e s of the system dynamics of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s show that "a great deal of i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior can be understood without 12 c o n s i d e r i n g these i n d i v i d u a l - l e v e l elements". The assumption i s that, l i k e other s t a t e s , the Soviet Union of t e n behaves as a f u n c t i o n of the p o s i t i o n i t occupies i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. While these observations are undoubtedly true and must be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , they cannot e x p l a i n c e r t a i n aspects of Soviet behavior that seem amenable s o l e l y to an i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . x i i i Yet, d e s p i t e the i n i t i a l p l a u s i b i l i t y of the hypothesis that ideology does i n f l u e n c e Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y on many d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have been r e l u c t a n t l a t e l y to devote much se r i o u s time to the study of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . The l i k e l i h o o d that hypotheses about the r e l a t i o n s h i p cannot be r i g o r o u s l y tested (a s p e c i a l l y acute dilemma i n the case of the Soviet Union due to the c l o s e d nature of i t s s o c i e t y ) i s c e r t a i n l y an important f a c t o r i n 14 e x p l a i n i n g t h i s r e l u c t a n c e . As Adam B. Ulam noted, a study of the r e l a t i o n s h i p can only "suggest a c e r t a i n range of problems and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Russian p o l i c i e s . I t cannot... sketch an 'unavoidable' p a t t e r n of development of Soviet p o l i c i e s . . . " ^ ^ In other words, the best we can hope for i s informed s p e c u l a t i o n on how ideology i n f l u e n c e s p e r c e p t i o n s , i n c l i n a t i o n s and p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s that have a bearing on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . An a d d i t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n comes from the f a c t that these i n c l i n a t i o n s are again a f f e c t e d by contact with r e a l i t y . This inherent vagueness has had, as A l f r e d Meyer poin t s out, the f o l l o w i n g e f f e c t : the e m p i r i c a l bent of contemporary s o c i a l science impels many of us to leave such obstreperous m a t e r i a l alone and turn to more q u a n t i f i a b l e and researchable problems.16 K e l l y and F l e r o n note that the importance a t t r i b u t e d to the i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y v a r i e s g r e a t l y depending on one's f i e l d of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s and K r e m l i n o l o g i s t s tend to dismiss ideology as a major motivating f o r c e i n favor of more pragmatic or power p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . ^ x i v This c l e a r v a r i a t i o n between the approaches of the d i f f e r e n t d i s c i p l i n e s suggests that, i n order to make sense of complex phenomena, s c h o l a r s often emphasize c e r t a i n v a r i a b l e s while others, perhaps e q u a l l y important but more d i f f i c u l t to access, are overlooked. However, as K e l l y and F l e r o n w r i t e , " s c a r c i t y of data concerning r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e s does not 18 j u s t i f y sloppy methodology or [ t h e i r ] e x c l u s i o n . . . " An a d d i t i o n a l reason that s e r i o u s s c h o l a r s have shied away from t h i s study has been that strong anti-Communist r h e t o r i c masquerading as " s c i e n t i f i c " a n a l y s i s of S o v i e t i d e o l o g y has d r i v e n the study i n t o d i s r e p u t e . However, I b e l i e v e that t h i s reason should, on the c o n t r a r y , be a stimulus for j o i n i n g the debate i n order to b r i n g the purported i n f l u e n c e s of ideology back from the i m p l a u s i b l e extremes to t h e i r a c t u a l dimensions. Keeping a l l of the above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and complications i n mind, I w i l l attempt i n t h i s essay to c o n s t r u c t a t h e o r e t i c a l framework for the study of the impact of ideology on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . In Part one of t h i s essay I w i l l review the two l e a d i n g approaches to the study of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y behavior that do not consider ideology as a major o p e r a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e : the N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t Approach and the Power P o l i t i c s Approach. The explanatory and p r e d i c t i v e strengths of these approaches w i l l be looked at but at the same time I w i l l point out t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to e x p l a i n c e r t a i n aspects of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . This overview of the two approaches w i l l demonstrate the u t i l i t y of a broader approach that i n c l u d e s ideology as xv a v a r i a b l e . In Part Two of the essay, the r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y w i l l be presented. S e c t i o n I of t h i s part w i l l i l l u s t r a t e how i d e o l o g y places c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s on what may be considered ' f e a s i b l e ' f o r e i g n p o l i c y choices f o r the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p . In S e c t i o n II the ' d u a l i s t i c ' c h a r a c t e r of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y w i l l be explained - i . e . how i t can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as simultaneously being ' r a t i o n a l ' and ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' - two concepts u s u a l l y considered mutually e x c l u s i v e . In Part Three of the essay I w i l l examine the r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n greater depth by l o o k i n g at the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Soviet i d e o l o g y . F o l l o w i n g a study of both the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and d o c t r i n a l components of the ideology and t h e i r v a r y i n g i n f l u e n c e on the f o r e i g n p o l i c y , I w i l l examine the s p e c i f i c ways i n which the ideology i n f l u e n c e s the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p . In t h i s s e c t i o n , I w i l l t r y to e s t a b l i s h the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the view that ideology does indeed i n f l u e n c e the perceptions of people i n power and that these i d e o l o g i c a l perceptions are t r a n s l a t e d i n t o concrete f o r e i g n p o l i c y c h o i c e s . F o l l o w i n g t h i s , I w i l l look at the complex r e l a t i o n s h i p between Soviet domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i t i c s . The r o l e ideology plays i n l e g i t i m i z i n g the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p w i l l be studied as part of our r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y model. In Part Four of the essay, I w i l l point out expected long-term tendencies of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y based on the x v i i r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y model. I w i l l look at both the i d e o l o g i c a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y tendencies and the i d e o l o g i c a l l y d e r i v e d r a t i o n a l tendencies of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Using t h i s a n a l y s i s I w i l l p r o j e c t some s p e c i f i c l i m i t s to what may be considered ' f e a s i b l e ' f o r e i g n p o l i c y choices f o r the Soviet Union. This t h e o r e t i c a l part of the essay w i l l be followed by a study of how ideology a f f e c t s concrete f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . In t h i s part I w i l l apply the r a t i o n a l -r e v o l u t i o n a r y model to the S o v i e t approach towards detente, Eastern Europe, p r e f e r r e d regimes, and perceptions of Soviet power p r o j e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s . I w i l l conclude the essay with a case study of the Soviet view of the United S t a t e s . The r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y model w i l l be a p p l i e d to t h i s a n a l y s i s to demonstrate how Soviet perceptions are i n f l u e n c e d by i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . In the c o n c l u s i o n of the essay, I w i l l summarize a l l the main points that have been made and also l i s t the major n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s that i n f l u e n c e Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . x v i i PART ONE: LEADING APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR I. The N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t School: One approach to e x p l a i n i n g the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of s t a t e s has been to attempt an e x p l a n a t i o n i n n o n - d o c t r i n a l terms. If t h i s succeeds r e l a t i v e l y w e l l , i t i s o f t e n concluded that ideology plays no d e c i s i v e r o l e i n shaping f o r e i g n 18 p o l i c i e s . The most common of these approaches attempts to e x p l a i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n terms of power p o l i t i c s and/or n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . The n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t school b e l i e v e s that the " s t a t e ' s most v i t a l needs," which i n c l u d e " s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , independence, t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y , and economic w e l l - b e i n g " are the "fundamental o b j e c t i v e and u l t i m a t e determinant that guides the d e c i s i o n makers of a 19 state i n making f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " The problem with t h i s approach, S u l l i v a n points out, i s that "to argue that s t a t e s act because ' t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i s at stake' may be v a l i d , but almost s o l e l y by d e f i n i t i o n . . . I f a s t a t e acts i n a given s i t u a t i o n . . . l o g i c a l l y some i n t e r e s t i s at ..2 0 stake... Samuel Sharp demonstrates the ambiguity of t h i s approach when he argues that i t does not matter what o u t s i d e r s might o b j e c t i v e l y f e e l Soviet n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s are, but that "as the term i s defined here, the only view 2 1 that matters i s that held by the Soviet l e a d e r s . ' -1-C l e a r l y , such a d e f i n i t i o n i s t a u t o l o g i c a l r e a l question of what determines d i f f e r e n t 22 of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . and avoids the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s I I . Power P o l i t i c s School: S i m i l a r problems a f f l i c t power p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . As Donald Zagoria argues, to say that f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s simply a matter of power p o l i t i c s i s to assume i n c o r r e c t l y that power e x i s t s i n some "pure" form 23 u n r e l a t e d to id e a s . Power c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t e l l us l i t t l e about t a c t i c s and purposes. S u l l i v a n c o r r e c t l y s t a t e s that " i t would be f a l l a c i o u s to equate the great i n t e r e s t i n power with the a s s e r t i o n that power thereby ' e x p l a i n s ' 2 4 n a t i o n - s t a t e behavior." Power p o l i t i c s can t e l l us l i t t l e about what the Soviet Union i s going to do i f i t invades a country (e.g., how long w i l l i t remain, what w i l l i t do to secure i t s power), how i t views i t s 'sphere of i n f l u e n c e ' , how i t w i l l r e a ct to attempted d e f e c t i o n s from that sphere, which type of a l l y i t p r e f e r s most and which l e a s t , e t c . , e t c . C l e a r l y the Soviet response to these s i t u a t i o n s w i l l d i f f e r from other s t a t e s , and ideology plays an important part i n the e x p l a n a t i o n . However, d e s p i t e t h e i r shortcomings, i t would be wrong to think that these approaches lack explanatory power. V. V. As p a t u r i a n , i n h i s book, Power & Process i n So v i e t F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , argues i n l i n e with the power p o l i t i c s approach that the "maximization of p o s s i b l e d i p l o m a t i c gains i n the - 2 -non-communist world d i c t a t e d a m i n i m i z a t i o n and d i l u t i o n of 2 5 the i d e o l o g i c a l content of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . C e r t a i n l y t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n s the dramatic change from the i n i t i a l Soviet eagerness to promote world r e v o l u t i o n to the more orthodox d i p l o m a t i c s t y l e they adopted soon a f t e r . At the same time, i t should be kept i n mind that t h i s does not mean ideology was abandoned or even t r u l y ' d i l u t e d ' . Soviet " z i g z a g s " , i n Bertram Wolfe's words, "were meant to circumvent impassable r a v i n e s , not renounce 2 6 the climb." We w i l l examine the question of whether there has been an e r o s i o n of Soviet ideology more f u l l y l a t e r i n the essay. - 3 -PART TWO THE RATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY I. L i m i t a t i o n s on Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y : Sharp points to an important way that power a f f e c t s the behavior of the Soviet Union: The p e r s i s t e n c e of the enemy image and the d r i v e for " u n l i m i t e d power" may w e l l be present i n the minds of the Soviet l e a d e r s , but the h i s t o r y of futu r e years w i l l be shaped, not by t h i s admittedly u n f r i e n d l y view of the outside world, but by what the So v i e t leaders are persuaded or  compelled to do... by t h e i r d e s i r e f o r s u r v i v a l and a p p r a i s a l of the l i m i t s of the f e a s i b l e . 2 7 While we may argue that the Soviet l e a d e r s ' p u r s u i t of power may be c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l ' s p e c t a c l e s , ' we c e r t a i n l y must agree that they are ' r e a l i s t i c ' i n the sense Sharp suggests. Often they have played the power game as w e l l and as c a u t i o u s l y as any ot h e r s . However, I would suggest, the term ' f e a s i b l e ' i n the Soviet context c a r r i e s an extra c o n n o t a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of power, Soviet p o l i c y i s l i m i t e d by also having to be f e a s i b l e i d e o l o g i c a l l y . I am suggesting that a f o r e i g n p o l i c y that cannot p l a u s i b l y be explained and j u s t i f i e d i n M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t terms w i l l not be s e r i o u s l y considered by Soviet l e a d e r s . I t would have dramatic r e p e r c u s s i o n s on the l e g i t i m a c y of the l e a d e r s h i p both d o m e s t i c a l l y and among the S o c i a l i s t camp. -4-The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s hypothesis are: while power p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and systemic c o n s t r a i n t s do exclude a s i g n i f i c a n t part (though not a l l ) of the i d e o l o g i c a l program from Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s make i t e q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r the Soviet leaders simply to abandon t h e i r " r e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p i r a t i o n s " or even c o n s i s t e n t l y and c y n i c a l l y to manipulate them i n the s e r v i c e of "pragmatic" f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The range of choices between the two n o n - f e a s i b l e extremes s t i l l a l lows, as we w i l l see, f o r a f o r e i g n p o l i c y that can p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d " i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated". I I . The Dualism of Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y : I f the hypothesis presented above i s supported, i t fol l o w s that the usual f o r m u l a t i o n of the problem, as being a question of e x p l a i n i n g Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y e x c l u s i v e l y i n terms of power p o l i t i c s and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s or, on the other hand, e x c l u s i v e l y i n i d e o l o g i c a l terms, i s i n c o r r e c t . I f the p u r s u i t of power and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i s seen as a question of s u r v i v a l , which i s undoubtedly the supreme o b l i g a t i o n of a n a t i o n , then power p o l i t i c s w i l l be a f a c t o r i n shaping the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of even the most i d e o l o g i c a l s t a t e . This i s e s p e c i a l l y true of Soviet M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s for whom, as V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank note, " i t i s not a question of theory o_r power: f o r them that theory i s most t r u l y marxist which c o n t r i b u t e s most to the a c q u i s i t i o n and maintenance of power and ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ' . . . - 5 -Marxism-Leninism i s a l l about power p o l i t i c s . " While the ideology "does not p r e s c r i b e any p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n for any p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n " and i s thus p e r f e c t l y compatible with the power p o l i t i c a l approach, i t " s u p p l i e s 2 9 the ends, which make i t d i s t i n c t from a pure power p o l i t i c a l approach. This 'dual' c h a r a c t e r of Soviet Marxism-Leninism suggests that i t may be most b e n e f i c i a l to view Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y as the p o l i c y of, what we can c a l l , a " r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a t e . " T h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n runs against c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom i n that i t i s u s u a l l y assumed that the concepts ' r a t i o n a l ' ( i n the power p o l i t i c a l sense of maximizing gains) and ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' ( i . e . , i d e o l o g i c a l ) are mutually e x c l u s i v e . For example, John Herz w r i t e s : ... i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l power motivations can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d only i f i t can be shown that (a) the p u r s u i t of power and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t was, at l e a s t at times, subordinated to a power-damaging i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y , and (b)the conduct of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n peace and conduct of war r e v e a l the s p e c i f i c impact of ideology, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t from that conducted by normal powers.30 Arguing along the same l i n e , R.N. Carew Hunt proposes 31 " i n e f f i c i e n c y " as an "index of id e o l o g y " . Again, the impact of ideology i s seen as something that o f t e n weakens 32 rather than strengthens the country. In a s i m i l a r way, Herbert D i n e r s t e i n writes that ideology has made So v i e t 33 f o r e i g n p o l i c y l e s s r a t i o n a l . While there i s c e r t a i n l y a r e l a t i o n s h i p between ideology and a lack of c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s , I submit that i t i s not manifest i n Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y to any grea t e r -6-degree than i s normal f o r other s t a t e s , with the exception of two c l a s s e s of a c t i o n s : (1) the a c t u a l implementation and maintenance of p o l i c y i n t i m a t e l y t i e d to the ends envisioned by t h e i r i d eology and (2) a c t i o n s that are undertaken to defend the doctrine-based l e g i t i m a c y of the l e a d e r s h i p . Once we grant the " n o n - r a t i o n a l " assumptions and goals of the ideology, any number of r a t i o n a l paths to the attainment of "world-wide communism" are permitted. The main examples Hunt provides of Soviet i n e f f i c i e n c y ; 1) r e l u c t a n c e to implement r a t i o n a l economic reform d o m e s t i c a l l y , and 2) 34 the i m p o s i t i o n of s t a t e s o c i a l i s t economies i n East Europe belong to the f i r s t c l a s s of a c t i o n s : i . e . , are a c t u a l implementations of the ends of the i d e o l o g y . The second c l a s s of a c t i o n s r e f l e c t the i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s of the implementation of Marxism-Leninism i n the Soviet domestic context and are more d i f f i c u l t to d i s c e r n . They w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n Part IV of t h i s essay. The framework of the ' r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' s t a t e that i s being suggested, i s able to accommodate the compromises, a l l i a n c e s and z i g zags that have o f t e n been i n t e r p r e t e d as a b e t r a y a l of Soviet r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n t e r e s t s . I f we keep i n mind how the Soviet Union, seen as a " r a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a t e " seeking to promote i t s own brand of Communism abroad, would act, given a r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l of i t s power c a p a b i l i t i e s and the systemic c o n s t r a i n t s inherent i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , I b e l i e v e that we may get an accurate p i c t u r e of many of the major forces m o t i v a t i n g -7-Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I t should a l s o be noted that the dualism of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y that we are t a l k i n g about here i s roughly e q u i v a l e n t to the d i s t i n c t i o n the S o v i e t s themselves make between state and party i n t e r e s t s . While Trotsky and other e a r l y Soviet leaders saw diplomacy as b a s i c a l l y a r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y , t h i s approach was amended by subsequent leaders to the much more u s e f u l one that placed the two a c t i v i t i e s ( i . e . , r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t i e s and proper s t a t e - t o - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s ) i n separate c l a s s e s . This dichotomy also e x p l a i n s the simultaneous (and seemingly i n c o n s i s t e n t ) e x i s t e n c e of o r g a n i z a t i o n s dedicated to these separate c l a s s e s of a c t i v i t y : the Party with i t s r e l a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s dedicated to p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m and the d i p l o m a t i c corps that maintains r e g u l a r r e l a t i o n s with 35 other s t a t e s and operates from the Foreign M i n i s t r y . Before we look at the p o s s i b l e a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s d u a l i s t i c view, i t i s necessary to examine some of the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Soviet ideology and the means by which they become o p e r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . - 8 -PART I I I . CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY I. SOVIET MARXISM-LENINISM Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i points out that a d i s t i n c t i o n should be made between three aspects of the ideology: (1) i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l component, ( 2 ) i t s d o c t r i n a l component, and (3) i t s a c t i o n program. He e l a b o r a t e s f u r t h e r that "the p h i l o s o p h i c a l parts i n v o l v e the a p r i o r i assumptions which 3 6 form the foundation stone of the i d e o l o g y . " These aspects are most r e s i s t e n t to change and are " e s s e n t i a l l y 37 dogmatic . The d o c t r i n a l parts r e f e r to such things as " h i s t o r i c a l laws and phases" which are " h i s t o r i c a l l y 3 8 contingent concepts of a s t r a t e g i c c h a r a c t e r " . B r z e z i n s k i w r i t e s , the a c t i o n program, . .. derived from the d o c t r i n a l p r i n c i p l e s which i n turn are grounded on the p h i l o s o p h i c a l assumptions, i n v o l v e s the p u r p o s e f u l process of f u l f i l l m e n t of that which i s held to be immanent. It can change i f need be, and the success of the change i n i t s e l f e s t a b l i s h e s a new contingent truth. 3 9 These d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s that B r z e z i n s k i a l l u d e s to suggest that Soviet i d e o l o g y should not be equated s o l e l y with Marxist theory, although i t i s c l e a r they are thoroughly meshed with each other. Marxist theory i s most evident i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l component which can be s a i d to c o n s i s t of the f o l l o w i n g : 1) D i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ; which i n c l u d e s the b e l i e f that matter i s a l l that e x i s t s , that r e a l i t y i s i n - 9 -essence d i a l e c t i c a l ( i . e . , that i t changes through the c l a s h of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ) and that the nature of that r e a l i t y i s i n t e l l i g i b l e through the d i s c o v e r y of u n i v e r s a l laws. (This p h i l o s o p h i c a l outlook leads to the view that even i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , i t i s p o s s i b l e not only to produce a taxonomic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the data, but a l s o to e x p l a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s , p r e d i c t f u t u r e occurrences of v a r i a b l e s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s and even to 40 i n f l u e n c e and/or manipulate t h e i r occurrence.) 2) H i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ; which c o n s i s t s of the a p p l i c a t i o n of d i a l e c t i c a l laws to man and s o c i e t y and leads to the view that the triumph of Communism i s a h i s t o r i c a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y and that the CPSU, as the vanguard of mankind, w i l l help b r i n g about t h i s consummation of h i s t o r y . ( B r z e z i n s k i does not i n c l u d e t h i s second set of b e l i e f s i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l component of the ideology but I f e e l that they stand apart from the d o c t r i n a l component since they cannot be viewed as h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent due to t h e i r c e n t r a l l e g i t i m i z i n g r o l e f o r the l e a d e r s h i p . ) One hypothesis that emerges from research Kal H o l s t i has done on the concept of " r o l e " may be i n c l u d e d i n our a n a l y s i s here. He suggests that i f a country has a l a r g e number of well-developed r o l e p e r c e p t i o n s , i t w i l l tend -10-towards greater a c t i v i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l systems or subsys t e r n s . ^ I t i s c l e a r from our a n a l y s i s that Marxism-Leninism s u p p l i e s many such r o l e perceptions f o r the Soviet Union i n c l u d i n g : vanguard of the p r o l e t a r i a t , l e a d i n g i n t e r p r e t e r of r e a l i t y and mover of h i s t o r y , primary a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t 42 agent , leader and defender of the s o c i a l i s t b l o c , e t c . Such perceptions l e g i t i m i z e greater Soviet involvement i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . However, not a l l components of the Soviet Ideology have o p e r a t i o n a l v a l u e . As Richard Lowenthal has noted: ... there i s any amount of h i s t o r i c a l evidence to show that the r u l e s have been a l t e r e d again and again to f i t the p r a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n s ex post f a c t o . Moreover, there are vast parts of the Communist i d e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e , such as the s c h o l a s t i c refinements of " d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m " or the labor theory of value, that i n t h e i r nature are so remote from the p r a c t i c a l matters to be decided that t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot p o s s i b l y a f f e c t p o l i c y decisions.43 Lowenthal's a n a l y s i s points out how malleable aspects of o f f i c i a l d o c t r i n e are. This i s important to note f o r i t points out that claims l i k e Richard Pipes's that an a n a l y s i s of m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e "proves" that the Soviet Union b e l i e v e s i t can f i g h t and win an a l l out nuclear war should be viewed 44 with s c e p t i c i s m . The m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e that he r e f e r s to c e r t a i n l y does not have o p e r a t i o n a l value In contemporary Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y where the dangers of nuclear war are c l e a r l y understood. As we have noted, Soviet behavior i s not prone to a lack of c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s when a n a l y z i n g such important f a c t o r s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s as nuclear war. -11-However, i t would a l s o be wrong to conclude, as upon observing t h i s d o c t r i n a l f l e x i b i l i t y , that Soviet ideology i s simply a c y n i c a l sham. many have the whole of a) The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Component of Soviet Ideology I t i s from the p h i l o s o p h i c a l component of the ideology that the b e l i e f i n the s c i e n t i f i c status of Marxism-Leninism stems. This c l a i m — t h a t only the Party has the key to the dis c o v e r y of the s o c i a l laws of development, the one " s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h " — l e g i t i m i z e s the Party as sole i n t e r p r e t e r of r e a l i t y . P a r a d o x i c a l l y perhaps, t h i s t i e s i n with the r e l i g i o u s - l i k e c h a r a c t e r of Soviet ideology that many sc h o l a r s have noted and which a l s o a r i s e s from the 45 p h i l o s o p h i c a l component. As Adam B. Ulam w r i t e s , t h i s aspect of the ideology serves an important f u n c t i o n as a "symbol and q u a s i - r e l i g i o n g i v i n g i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s the sense that they are moving forward with the f o r c e s of h i s t o r y and that the success of t h e i r s t a t e i s p r e d i c a t e d upon the t r u t h of the d o c t r i n e . T h e philosophy s u p p l i e s what Bertram Wolfe has described as a "myth-affirmed w i l l to 4 7 a c t i o n . " I t s continued v i t a l i t y and relevance even i n the face of the f a i l u r e of i t s assumptions about c a p i t a l i s m i s due, as Ulam point s out, to the " n a t u r a l i n t r a n s i g e n c e of r e l i g i o u s m i l l e n a r i a n movements to purely r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e f a c t s . -12-b) The D o c t r i n a l Component of Soviet Ideology The d o c t r i n a l component of Soviet ideology i s seen as 49 the bridge between dogma and a c t i o n . While i t i s f l e x i b l e i n the long term, i t i s r i g i d at any one time. Changes i n d o c t r i n e (with a p o s s i b l e time lag) correspond to changes i n " r e a l i t y , h i s t o r i c a l experience, growth of Soviet power, e t c . " ^ However, changes do not n e c e s s a r i l y s i g n i f y an abandonment or " e r o s i o n " of ideology as many Western s c h o l a r s f e e l but r a t h e r represent m o d i f i c a t i o n s that c o n s t a n t l y r e i n v i g o r a t e the Ideology by keeping i t up to date. Through hi s research i n t o the question of i d e o l o g i c a l e r o s i o n , Joseph Bochenski has demonstrated that i d e o l o g i c a l r e v i s i o n can c r e d i b l y be i n t e r p r e t e d as a p u r i f i c a t i o n of Marxism-Leninism from spurious and n o n s e n s i c a l elements. As examples of such necessary changes i n d o c t r i n e , we can c i t e Khrushchev's i n n o v a t i o n s : separate paths to s o c i a l i s m are p o s s i b l e , p e a c e f u l coexistence with the c a p i t a l i s t s i s p o s s i b l e , i m p e r i a l i s t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are not as s e r i o u s as p r e v i o u s l y thought, wars are no longer i n e v i t a b l e . Although i n i t i a l l y r e a c t i v e to v a r i o u s e x t e r n a l changes and pressures, such changes can become o p e r a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s . As W i l l i a m Zimmermann w r i t e s , " i n any p o l i t i c a l process t a c t i c a l statements and formulations o f t e n have a curio u s way of becoming, over time, the r e a l , i . e . , o p e r a t i o n a l , 5 2 p o s i t i o n of groups." This o b s e r v a t i o n points to the c r u c i a l l i n k between d o c t r i n e and a c t i o n . I f the d o c t r i n e underwent frequent change, i t would soon be regarded as mere -13-propaganda. At the same time, r e t a i n i n g obsolete d o c t r i n e that cannot be acted upon, would have the same e f f e c t . As Paul Marantz w r i t e s : D o c t r i n a l i n n o v a t i o n s are not introduced l i g h t l y out of momentary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . D o c t r i n a l change i s l i n k e d to fundamental transformations i n the conceptual framework the Soviet leaders employ i n attempting to p e r c e i v e , order, and comprehend the co m p l e x i t i e s of the p o l i t i c a l world.53 Thus, d o c t r i n e i s important i n i t s r o l e as a l i n k to a c t i o n and can serve as an i n d i c a t o r of the l i m i t s of f e a s i b l e p o l i c y that were hypothesized i n Part two of t h i s essay. These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the ideology i n themselves (as we s h a l l see l a t e r ) exert a d i r e c t e f f e c t on a c t u a l Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . However, to understand the f u l l impact ideology has i n the Soviet context, we must look at the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s on which i t a f f e c t s perceptions i n the Soviet Union and how these perceptions are t r a n s l a t e d i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s . I I . The I n d i v i d u a l L e v e l of A n a l y s i s When we speak of the impact of Soviet ideology, we are r e f e r r i n g to the manifold i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t i n f l u e n c e s of Soviet Marxism-Leninism on Soviet p o l i t i c a l behavior. One of the premises of t h i s essay i s that "domestic sources of f o r e i g n p o l i c y are no l e s s c r u c i a l to i t s content and conduct than are the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s toward -14-which i t i s d i r e c t e d . " 5 4 The view that ideology can and does have an impact on f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s p a r t l y based on the assumption that the decision-maker can have r e a l i n f l u e n c e over the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment and that h i s " b e l i e f system" i s important i n determining the way that t h i s i n f l u e n c e i s manifested, i . e . , i s r e a l i n i t s consequences. That t h i s i s not an untenable p o s i t i o n a p r i o r i has been amply demonstrated by the impact of the C h r i s t i a n and Muslim creeds over many c e n t u r i e s and more r e c e n t l y H i t l e r ' s Germany. At the most b a s i c l e v e l , the ideology i n f l u e n c e s the world view of i n d i v i d u a l Soviet c i t i z e n s i n c l u d i n g l e a d e r s . Some western s c h o l a r s ( f o r example, Richard Lowenthal) doubt that r a t i o n a l people, such as the Soviet leaders s u r e l y are, a c t u a l l y b e l i e v e i n the o f f i c i a l M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t i d e o l o g y . However, Alexander George s t r e s s e s that "many s c i e n t i f i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d s c h o l a r s ... i n f l u e n c e d by p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s of c o g n i t i o n , have been struck by the r o l e that the s u b j e c t i v e perceptions and b e l i e f s of leaders play i n t h e i r decision-making i n c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s . " 5 5 He adds that "the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of a na t i o n addresses i t s e l f not to the e x t e r n a l world, as i s commonly s t a t e d , but rather to 'the image of the e x t e r n a l world' that i s i n the minds of 5 6 those who make f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " B r z e z i n s k i has s t r e s s e d that, to dismiss the i n f l u e n c e of ideology on the p o l i t i c a l conduct of Soviet l e a d e r s , one would have to assume: -15-that i t i s p o s s i b l e to b u i l d up a large o r g a n i z a t i o n o s t e n s i b l y dedicated to c e r t a i n e x p l i c i t o b j e c t i v e s , i n which i n d i v i d u a l s are promoted on the basi s both of t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l a b i l i t y and t h e i r demonstrable i d e o l o g i c a l d e d i c a t i o n both i n which an inner sanctum operates, makes d e c i s i o n s with a complete d i s r e g a r d of the i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of the movement, indeed remains immune to the constant pressures f o r i d e o l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and c y n i c a l l y d i s r e g a r d s the o f f i c i a l creed.57 Kubalkova and Cruickshank point out that d e s p i t e the "unusual awareness i n Western research of processes of p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i z a t i o n o p e r a t i v e i n the Soviet Union" there i s a "somewhat cas u a l assumption that the f o r e i g n policy-makers are completely immune or i n some way exempt 5 8 from the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process." The power of s o c i a l i z a t i o n i s und e r l i n e d by A l f r e d Meyer when he reminds us that "ideology i s the language of p o l i t i c s i n the USSR... [ I t ] serves as the frame of referenc e f o r a l l i n d i v i d u a l s i n ..5 9 the s o c i e t y . " Soviet l e a d e r s , i n Bertram Wolfe's words, "were born i n the ambience of t h e i r ideology, l i k e a f i s h i n water, and educated i n that i d e o l o g y ' s tenets and - u "60 techniques. Those who i n s i s t that Marxism-Leninism cannot i n f l u e n c e a t t i t u d e s to any great extent due to i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and amb i g u i t i e s , overlook the f a c t that every b e l i e f system i n i t s unique way serves to apprehend some aspects of r e a l i t y at the same time as i t obscures othe r s . Kubalkova and Cruickshank point out that one of the dangers of s u b j e c t i n g Soviet ideology to "hasty Western i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " i s that "notions torn out of the c l o s e - k n i t context of -16-Marxism-Leninism are not always ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ' when viewed 6 1 w i t h i n the framework of [the] ide o l o g y where they belong." In a d d i t i o n , i t i s simply i n c o r r e c t to say that Marxism-Leninism does not o f f e r i n s i g h t i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Ulam points out that Soviet ideology has f o s t e r e d an "unusual s e n s i t i v i t y to economic and s o c i a l development i n s t a t e s p l a y i n g a major r o l e i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . . . It has endowed the Russian p o l i c y makers with a degree of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n about i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s surpassing the 6 2 old p l a t i t u d e s of the d i p l o m a t i c a r t . . . " In other words, i t s "relevance" i s e a s i l y demonstrated. C l e a r l y then, ideology can serve as a guide to o r i e n t Soviet c i t i z e n s and leaders and shape the standards and norms a p p l i e d to f o r e i g n p o l i c y . However, the problem l i e s i n the f a c t that the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l of a n a l y s i s , d e s p i t e i t s extensive explanatory powers, has l i t t l e p r e d i c t i v e value. Even i f i t i s acknowledged that ideology i n f l u e n c e s the world view of Soviet l e a d e r s , t h i s does not help us a n t i c i p a t e S o v i e t f o r e i g n behavior. We should remind ourselves again that f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s co n d i t i o n e d as much by systemic and s i t u a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as by p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s i n f l u e n c i n g d e c i s i o n maker s. We have e s t a b l i s h e d the important f a c t that Soviet l e a d e r s ' b e l i e f s about the world are probably i n f l u e n c e d by M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t i d e o l o g y which i m p l i e s that the goals, methods, e t c . , of the ideology mean something f o r them and w i l l be pursued i f p o s s i b l e . However, we must look to a -17-d i f f e r e n t l e v e l of a n a l y s i s to d i s t i n g u i s h the h i e r a r c h y and r e l a t i o n s h i p between the various elements of the i d e o l o g y . I I I . Ideology and Domestic P o l i t i c s One of the apparent paradoxes of the Soviet Union i s the f a c t that at the same time i t espouses an i d e o l o g y of world r e v o l u t i o n , d o m e s t i c a l l y i t i s one of the most st a t u s - q u o - o r i e n t e d powers i n the world. This s i t u a t i o n can be explained by l o o k i n g at the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the CPSU, M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ideology and Soviet h i s t o r y . There are two major ways that Marxism-Leninism i n i t i a l l y shaped the domestic p o l i t i c a l s t u c t u r e i n the Soviet Union: (1) A c h i e v i n g the Marxist program of a v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y overthrow of the e x i s t i n g regime i n order to implement Communist r u l e demanded a c e n t r a l i z e d and h i g h l y d i s c i p l i n e d party; (2) Implementation of a nationwide 6 3 planned economy, which the i d e o l o g y c a l l e d f o r , n e c e s s i t a t e d the p e r p e t u a t i o n of Party c e n t r a l i s m and heavy-handed r u l e i n order to implement the d r a s t i c and 64 often unpopular measures t h i s reform e n t a i l e d . In both of these cases, ideology was used to j u s t i f y the r i g h t of the Party to act i n a p u r p o s e f u l way. As Hunt points out, the type of c o l l e c t i v e s o c i e t y that was e s t a b l i s h e d i n the Soviet Union then determined the 6 5 c h a r a c t e r of the i d e o l o g y . The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s were s t i l l d e r i v e d from r e v o l u t i o n a r y Marxism. However, an a d d i t i o n a l l e v e l of o p e r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s came i n t o being when the -18-inner l o g i c of Marxism-Leninism was combined with the " l o g i c 6 6 of one party r u l e . " The l e g i t i m i z i n g f u n c t i o n that Marxism-Leninism f u l f i l l e d created an unusual s i t u a t i o n , a Catch-22. As Kubalkova and Cruickshank note, the r e p u d i a t i o n of the ideology would e n t a i l the r e p u d i a t i o n of the Party and the l e a d e r s h i p whose l e g i t i m a c y r e s t s on that i d e o l o g y . ^ Underscoring the complexity of the Soviet system, Ulam w r i t e s : " I f ideology becomes d e c o r a t i v e and meaningless... where, i n the l a s t r e s o r t , w i l l be the r a t i o n a l e f o r the t o t a l i t a r i a n system, f o r the assumed omnipotence and omniscience of the highest c o u n c i l s of the 6 8 Communist P a r t y ? " The M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t c l a i m to " s c i e n t i f i c " s t a t u s leads the party to r e s i s t independent groupings of power that could challenge i t s a u t h o r i t y as the sole i n t e r p r e t e r of r e a l i t y . However, the i n s i s t e n c e on c e n t r a l c o n t r o l , as we have already noted, i s economically i n e f f i c i e n t . The r e l u c t a n c e of the l e a d e r s h i p to undertake l a r g e - s c a l e i n t e r n a l reforms i s due to the f a c t that i t has a vested i n t e r e s t i n maintaining the ideology at two l e v e l s : F i r s t , as we saw e a r l i e r , the b e l i e f system provides a sense of t h e i r inner worth and e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; and second, t h e i r p r e s t i g e , power and the attendant b e n e f i t s r e s t on the continued e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the id e o l o g y i n l e g i t i m i z i n g t h e i r r u l e . Which of these two motives i s stronger i s impossible to evaluate a c c u r a t e l y . However, i t seems reasonable to b e l i e v e that they both exert a profound i n f l u e n c e on the Soviet d e c i s i o n to perpetuate the id e o l o g y -19-as more than mere window d r e s s i n g . Our a n a l y s i s of the impact of ideology on detente i n s e c t i o n I of Part F i v e w i l l look at t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i n more d e t a i l . In the l a s t few decades, Soviet f o r e i g n and domestic p o l i c y have become i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . As an example, B r z e z i n s k i notes that d i v e r s i t y i n ideology among S o c i a l i s t s t a t e s "threatens the domestic l e g i t i m a c y of [the] Soviet ideology by denying i t s c e n t r a l c l a i m — t h a t i s , i t s u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y — w h i c h i s used as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for i t s domestic a p p l i c a t i o n . " ^ This suggests that there w i l l always be a need to "prove" Marxism-Leninism's u n i v e r s a l - m i s s i o n a r y r e l e v a n c e . In t h i s f a c t l i e s the gr e a t e s t dilemma of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Due to the perceived Soviet r o l e as leader of the S o c i a l i s t camp, the party's domestic r o l e , and the l e a d e r s h i p ' s wish to achieve i t s i d e o l o g i c a l program, constant pressures are exerted that c l a s h with the power r e a l i t i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Perhaps we are best able to summarize the i n f l u e n c e that the r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y model of the Soviet Union a t t r i b u t e s to ideology i n schematic form. The path through which ideology i n f l u e n c e s Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure 1 below: - 2 0 -(I) (ii) (in) (IV) (V) MARXIST-LENINIST PHILOSOPHY & DOCTRINE INFLUENCES PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIALIZED LEADERS, "ALSO LEGITIMIZES POWER OF LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE IS DILUTED BY SUCH FACTORS AS: LEADER'S \PERSONALITY, RIVALRY UBETWEEN * COMPETING DOMESTIC GROUPS WHO HOLD CONFLICTING VIEWS, ETC... IDEOLOGICAL POLICY THAT EMERGES DILUTED BY: SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, ACTUAL >POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES, RATIONAL ANALYSIS OF PROBABLE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED POLITICAL DECISION, NUCLEAR AGE, ETC. FROM IDEOLOGY TO FOREIGN POLICY FIGURE 1. Square (I) represents the ideology with a l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s we have analyzed. Square ( I I ) represents the i n f l u e n c e of ideology at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l on the l e a d e r s h i p . Square ( I I I ) l i s t s some of the n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l domestic f a c t o r s that might d i m i n i s h the i d e o l o g i c a l pressures. Square (IV) represents the i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y that would emerge i f not f o r the a t t e n u a t i n g i n f l u e n c e of the f a c t o r s l i s t e d i n square (V). The o p e r a t i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e s u l t s from the i n t e r a c t i o n of the contents of squares (IV) and (V) and al s o depends on how t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n i n f l u e n c e s the contents of square ( I I I ) and the perceptions formed i n square ( I I ) . For example, the u n s u c c e s s f u l / s u c c e s s f u l a p p l i c a t i o n of a f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n may change the balance of power between competing -21-domestic groups and thus lead to a d i f f e r e n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y emphasis with a gr e a t e r or l e s s e r i d e o l o g i c a l component. This new approach would then be a p p l i e d i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, e t c . -22-PART FOUR. EXPECTED GENERAL LONG-TERM TENDENCIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON THE RATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION The ambiguity r e s u l t i n g from the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s we have discu s s e d creates a f o r e i g n p o l i c y which attempts to be both r a t i o n a l (from the power p o l i t i c a l view) and r e v o l u t i o n a r y ( i d e o l o g i c a l ) i n order to s a t i s f y the c o n s t r a i n t s noted above. This has r e s u l t e d i n a number of general tendencies that I b e l i e v e w i l l continue to c h a r a c t e r i z e Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the fo r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . I. I d e o l o g i c a l - R e v o l u t i o n a r y Tendencies The f i r s t set of tendencies stems from the o r i g i n a l Marxist Weltanschauung which r e j e c t s the L i b e r a l n o t i o n of harmony of i n t e r e s t s and tends to see world development i n terms of 'unavoidable' s t r u g g l e . I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s are not seen as a "game" but as an intense c o n f l i c t . T h i s world view stems from Marxist d i a l e c t i c s which see a l l m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y changing through the c l a s h of a n t a g o n i s t i c c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and from Marxist h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m which per c e i v e s progress through d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l stages. I t leads to the f o l l o w i n g more s p e c i f i c approaches towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s : - 2 3 -a perceived h o s t i l e dichotomy between the two major socio-economic s y s t e m s ^ i s r e f l e c t e d i n the "two camps" d o c t r i n e . The c e n t r a l opponent i s not perceived as l i m i t e d or temporary. a tendency to view i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s as a zero-sum s i t u a t i o n i n which there i s a slow but constant strengthening of the " p r o g r e s s i v e " h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s to the detriment of " r e a c t i o n a r y " ones. Even though there may be temporary set-backs, the eventual v i c t o r y of S o c i a l i s m i s not i n doubt. This tendency stems from the c h i l i a s t i c element i n Marxism-Leninism . r e l a t e d to "b" i s the f e e l i n g that a l l ground gained by the p r o g r e s s i v e s o c i a l i s t f o r c e s must be preserved. This p e r t a i n s p r i m a r i l y to the s e c u r i t y of the Soviet Union and i t s East European s a t e l l i t e s but a l s o a p p l i e s anywhere e l s e that a pro-Soviet s o c i a l i s t regime i s i n s t a l l e d . The l o s s of such gains would threaten the i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f i n h i s t o r i c a l progress which stands at the core of Marxism-Leninism and a l s o of Party l e g i t i m a c y . while there i s an acceptance of the need to adjust to p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l phases, there -24-i s a l s o a c o n t i n u i t y i n perceived purpose. T h i s leads to the view that phases l i k e detente cannot be seen as " t r u e " long-term s t a b i l i t y 72 which preclude f u r t h e r h i s t o r i c a l change. In t h i s sense, compromises are not seen as ends i n themselves, as they o f t e n are by n a t i o n s , but ..73 as means to "higher ends". I I . I d e o l o g i c a l l y Derived R a t i o n a l Tendencies The second set of tendencies i s t i e d to the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ' s c l a i m that t h e i r ideology i s s c i e n t i f i c , and i t also stems from Marxian d i a l e c t i c s . This view, that r e a l i t y i s i n t e l l i g i b l e through the di s c o v e r y of the "laws" of s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l development, has l e d to the f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y : a) i t i s i n t e n s e l y concerned with the nature of world change and such questions as: Who i s our major opponent?, What are the best ways to achieve our i d e o l o g i c a l goals? What i s the nature of the present h i s t o r i c a l phase and i n which d i r e c t i o n i s i t 74 evolving? This component of the ideology leads to a s o p h i s t i c a t e d awareness of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and economic f o r c e s and of the connection between i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic p o l i t i c s . -25-b) i n order to decide when the most p r o p i t i o u s moment for i n t e r v e n t i o n on behalf of h i s t o r i c a l development a r r i v e s , there i s a tremendous e f f o r t to d i s c o v e r the " c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s " between the c a p i t a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t camps. The emphasis placed on t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n i n f l u e n c e s S o v i e t d e c i s i o n s concerning f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n s , wars, e t c . ^ When i t i s f e l t that the c o r r e l a t i o n i s unfavorable to t h e i r s i d e , any form of adventurism i s avoided due to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a "setback" f o r S o c i a l i s m . T h i s has l e d , i n the past to a cautious Soviet p r o f i l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . c) there i s a tendency to approach present problems on the b a s i s of p r e v i o u s l y s u c c e s s f u l a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i a g n o s e s . ^ This i s due to the b e l i e f that Soviet M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s do indeed have a s p e c i a l s c i e n t i f i c understanding of the h i s t o r i c a l process. I t w i l l be n o t i c e d that the f i r s t set of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s make up the " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " component i n our framework of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The second set, while a l s o " i d e o l o g i c a l " , leads to r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l s of power r e l a t i o n s and makes up the " r a t i o n a l " component of So v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . However, i t should be made c l e a r that these are p r i m a r i l y a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s and i n r e a l i t y the two sets of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are interwoven and oft e n i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . For example, i f the c o r r e l a t i o n of forces - 2 6 -i s f e l t to be unfavorable fo r a c t i o n , the b e l i e f that time i s on t h e i r side due to " i n e v i t a b l e " h i s t o r i c a l progress, i n j e c t s a p a s s i v e - d e t e r m i n i s t i c outlook. (The concept of c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s , which i s the base of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y ' r e a l i s m ' i s a c t u a l l y a very i d e o l o g i c a l concept since i t i s used as an i n d i c a t o r of the i n e v i t a b l e a r r i v a l of world s o c i a l i s m as p r e d i c t e d by Marxist h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . ) In a d d i t i o n , the cautious and r a t i o n a l avoidance of adventure and extreme r i s k i s a l s o due to the fear of the e f f e c t a "setback" would have on the b e l i e f i n the p r o g r e s s i o n of h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s . The important point being made here i s that i d e o l o g y i s an i n t e g r a l component of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y even i n s i t u a t i o n s where adherence to the s t r i c t n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and power p o l i t i c s school might only p e r c e i v e p o l i c y that aims at the 'maximization of g a i n s . ' Having i s o l a t e d the i d e o l o g i c a l m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e s that act upon Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y decision-making, i t s t i l l remains to be seen i f our model can be a p p l i e d s u c c e s s f u l l y . The way i n which the v a r i o u s elements that we have discu s s e d combine and i n t e r a c t with each other i s probably best demonstrated by l o o k i n g at a c t u a l examples of past and present Soviet a c t i v i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . -27-PART FIVE: HOW IDEOLOGY AFFECTS CONCRETE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS. I. Detente The example of detente i s very r e l e v a n t i n e x p l a i n i n g the dynamics of t h i s process. Khrushchev's d o c t r i n a l changes, upon c o n s o l i d a t i o n of h i s power, were e s s e n t i a l l y due to the r e a l i z a t i o n that a l l - o u t m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e against c a p i t a l i s m was a s e l f - d e f e a t i n g method of spreading communism. However, we must ask why the commitments to the i d e o l o g i c a l s t r u g g l e and other l e s s e r means of spreading communism were a l s o not abandoned? The answer i s to be found i n the f a c t that d o c t r i n a l change can only go so f a r before the danger of a true e r o s i o n of ideology and the spread of d i s i n t e g r a t i v e opinions threatens the very foundation of Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . There are c e r t a i n mechanisms i n s t i t u t e d i n the Soviet domestic p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e that act to prevent any p o s s i b l e major e r o s i o n of ideology which we w i l l look at now. S o v i e t M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t d o c t r i n e speaks to two audiences, the West, for which many of Khrushchev's peace pronouncements were intended, and the domestic audience and the S o c i a l i s t camp. Let us consider the second, more important audience. The change i n d o c t r i n e was due to the f a c t that some correspondence between the d o c t r i n e and the r e a l i t y of S o viet a c t i o n s has to e x i s t . Otherwise, as was - 2 8 -noted e a r l i e r , d o c t r i n e l o s e s a l l relevance with the r e s u l t that the ideology i s damaged. This i m p l i e s that the regime must e v e n t u a l l y act on the d o c t r i n e or renounce i t . For example, the f a c t that Khrushchev did not renounce a l l r e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p i r a t i o n s suggests that the l e a d e r s h i p f e l t a l i m i t to the i d e o l o g i c a l backpeddling was reached. I would even suggest that Khrushchev had overstepped the boundary i n the sense that he s t r e s s e d the t r u l y p e aceful and long term statu s of p e a c e f u l coexistence r a t h e r than i t s r o l e i n f u r t h e r i n g the spread of Communism. When Khrushchev l e f t the l e a d e r s h i p , Soviet spokesmen pointed out the dangers of emphasizing p e a c e f u l coexistence to the detriment of other 7 8 aspects of the i d e o l o g i c a l program. Regarding the r e l a t i o n s h i p between d o c t r i n e and a c t i o n , i t i s important to note that through Brezhnev's r u l e there was a "complete lack of i n n o v a t i o n " i n d o c t r i n e . T h i s stands i n sharp c o n t r a s t to Khrushchev's " a c t i v e process of . 7 9 d o c t r i n a l reform" and r e i n f o r c e s the view that d o c t r i n a l change i s i n t i m a t e l y t i e d to a c t u a l perceptions of S o v i e t leaders and t h e i r approach to Soviet p o l i c y . I f t h i s were not the case and d o c t r i n e had no relevance, Soviet i d e o l o g i s t s could have continued the innovations i n i t i a t e d during Khrushchev's r u l e even a f t e r h i s removal. The more a c t i v e r o l e that the Soviet Union took i n the t h i r d world a f t e r Khrushchev corresponds to a more i d e o l o g i c a l l y balanced f o r e i g n p o l i c y that attempted to address more e q u a l l y the many v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the Soviet Union. This new emphasis under Brezhnev i n d i c a t e s that there - 2 9 -was a perceived need to demonstrate s o c i a l i s m ' s ' p r o g r e s s i v e ' r o l e i n world a f f a i r s . As Mark N. Katz w r i t e s : While wars of n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n have always been of i n t e r e s t to the Soviet Union, they held a d e f i n i t e l y s u b s i d i a r y place i n Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y through the mid-1960's. During the Brezhnev era, though, Soviet i n t e r e s t and involvement i n T h i r d World c o n f l i c t s has evolved i n t o one of the most c e n t r a l and a c t i v e aspects of Soviet f o r e i g n and m i l i t a r y p o l i c y . 8 0 This development f i t s i n w e l l with the hypothesis that there i s a c e r t a i n l i m i t to how f a r Soviet leaders can go i n i g n o r i n g i d e o l o g y . There appear to be l i m i t s on how f a r the Party's l e g i t i m i z i n g r o l e as the 'vanguard' of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement may be allowed to d e t e r i o r a t e before i t i s forced to "prove" i t s c r e d e n t i a l s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena. For example, Marantz points out that one of the reasons f o r downplaying p e a c e f u l coexistence at the same time as p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m was upgraded was the wish of the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p to "undercut Chinese and T h i r d World charges of Soviet-American c o l l u s i o n and to avoid 81 i d e o l o g i c a l d e m o b i l i z a t i o n at home." C l e a r l y , the Soviet p o s i t i o n as leader of the S o c i a l i s t camp was being threatened by the questionable i d e o l o g i c a l c o r r e c t n e s s of detente. However, could i t not be claimed that Soviet a c t i o n s of the Brezhnev perio d were due merely to i t s emerging super-power status r a t h e r than to any i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ? This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would f i t i n t o the power p o l i t i c a l / n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l view. The true d i f f e r e n c e , as noted e a r l i e r , between Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l -30-f o r e i g n p o l i c y and n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y , i s not i n the i n c i d e n c e of aggression; the Soviet Union plays the power game l i k e others. However, the m o t i v a t i o n for Soviet a c t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t ; and the m o t i v a t i o n i s derived from the l o g i c of Marxism-Leninism combined with the l o g i c of a one-party s t a t e . One aspect of detente o f f e r s an e x c e l l e n t i l l u s t r a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Soviet domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i t i c s that i s c e n t r a l to the r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y model. A number of s c h o l a r s have noted a connection between 8 2 detente and domestic r e p r e s s i o n i n the Soviet Union. Because the h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d CPSU r e l i e s , i n great p a r t , on Marxism-Leninism to l e g i t i m i z e i t s e l f , i t must continue to propagate the atmosphere of h o s t i l i t y towards the bourgeois world which has served as a weapon to d i v e r t a t t e n t i o n from the i n t e r n a l "unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of power 8 3 and wealth." The l e a d e r s h i p f e a r s that, any " s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n access to i n f o r m a t i o n about Western l i f e - e s p e c i a l l y about goods and s e r v i c e s , but a l s o , and f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l s , c r u c i a l l y , about personal freedoms and c i v i l l i b e r t i e s - tends to a c t i v a t e l a t e n t d i s c o n t e n t and even d i s s e n t among independent minded Soviet c i t i z e n s . 8 4 This f e a r , t r i g g e r e d by the r e l a x a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s , suggests that i n t e r n a l r e p r e s s i o n i s an i n e v i t a b l e concomitant of the p o l i c y of detente. Robert Horn, a l s o noting t h i s , w r i t e s : The Soviet regime c l e a r l y f e a r s the p e n e t r a t i o n of outside i n f l u e n c e s i n t o Soviet s o c i e t y and the e r o s i o n of the CPSU's c o n t r o l . As long as f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s d e a l t with the United States and West Germany as s t i l l - d a n g e r o u s aggressors, t h i s -31-i n t e r n a l danger was not seen as acute. I t has been aggravated, however, by detente, by new agreements, summits, and the obvious cooperation between the USSR and such a n t a g o n i s t s . 85 If t h i s i s a basic dynamic of Soviet s o c i e t y , i t i s hard to see how even a long term r e l a x a t i o n w i l l f a c i l i t a t e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . Many s c h o l a r s have noted that one of the reasons that the Soviet regime was eager to enter i n t o the process of detente was that they were "faced with the choice of undertaking l a r g e - s c a l e i n t e r n a l reforms or going abroad 8 6 f o r a s s i s t a n c e . " Again, i t should be noted that i n t e r n a l reforms were avoided because of t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n with l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . Leonard Schapiro notes that the economic reform of 1965 which, f o r the sake of e f f i c i e n c y , l i b e r a t e d manufacturing managers from the c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l of the s t a t e , soon ran Into d i f f i c u l t i e s . He w r i t e s : The main o p p o s i t i o n to i t came from the Communist party, which feared that d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of economic c o n t r o l might lead to d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l - and thus i m p e r i l the t r a d i t i o n a l g r i p of the party on the l i f e of the country.87 The c r u c i a l r o l e of Marxism-Leninism as a t o o l f o r l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of the l e a d e r s h i p has created a s i t u a t i o n where the ideology cannot be repudiated without t h r e a t e n i n g the r e p u d i a t i o n of the l e a d e r s h i p i t s e l f . One of the main uses of ideology, as we have seen, has been as a t o o l to prevent independent c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of power i n the Soviet Union, and since a l l p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n i n the Soviet Union has to be phrased i n terms of Marxism-Leninism, the co n s e r v a t i v e s have a powerful and c o n s t a n t l y a v a i l a b l e weapon at t h e i r d i s p o s a l f o r l i m i t i n g "bourgeois" reform. - 3 2 -The fundamental s t r u g g l e — b e t w e e n economic reformers and i d e o l o g i c a l d o g m a t i s t s — c r e a t e s an i n t e r n a l dynamic s i m i l a r to the one that d e l i n e a t e s the boundaries of ' f e a s i b l e ' f o r e i g n p o l i c y . While e x t e r n a l l y the l i m i t a t i o n s are imposed by power c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and systemic v a r i a b l e s o p e r a t i n g i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system on the one hand and domestic pressures to "demonstrate" the relevance of Soviet ideology on the other, the i n t e r n a l dynamics are powered by the need to decrease r e p r e s s i o n i n order to improve economic e f f i c i e n c y on the one hand and the need to maintain r e p r e s s i o n i n order to combat p l u r a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l tendencies on the other. As we noted e a r l i e r , the party operates on the premise that whatever keeps the monopoly of power i n t a c t i s the p r e f e r r e d p o l i c y . I t i s c l e a r that S t a l i n ' s t e r r o r i s t i c methods were very harmful to party i n t e r e s t s . As Richard Lowenthal w r i t e s , Khrushchev, i n h i s " s e c r e t " speech: ...denounced S t a l i n ' s d o c t r i n e of the sharpening c l a s s s t r u g g l e with the advance of s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n as dangerous nonsense, c a l c u l a t e d to lead to the mutual sla u g h t e r of l o y a l Communists a f t e r the r e a l c l a s s enemy had long been l i q u i d a t e d . T h i s statement a f f o r d s the master clue to the puzzle of why Khrushchev made the speech: I t was a "peace o f f e r i n g " to the l e a d i n g s t r a t a of the regime i n the Party machine, army, and managerial bureaucracy a l i k e - a response to t h e i r pressure f o r g r e a t e r personal s e c u r i t y . 8 8 I t i s c l e a r then that Khrushchev's r e n u n c i a t i o n of S t a l i n ' s t e r r o r i s m need not be i n t e r p r e t e d as the s t a r t of a trend that n e c e s s a r i l y leads to l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . In f a c t , i t i s explained much b e t t e r as part of the dynamics of Soviet domestic p o l i t i c a l behavior shown i n Figure 2 below. - 3 3 -F i g u r e 2: L i m i t s of S o v i e t D o m e s t i c P o l i c y " P e r m a n e n t R e v o l u t i o n " U n d e r m i n e s P a r t y M o r a l e " and E f f i c i e n c y ^ BOUNDARIES OF P O S S I B L E [ V A R I A T I O N IN DOMESTIC POLICY sGIVEN PRESENT P O L I T I C A L STRUCTIIKE A L o w e r L e v e o f I n t e r n a l R e p r e s s i o n I n O r d e r To I m p r o v e E f f i c i e n c y o f E c o n o m y G r e y A r e a K h r u s h c h e v : s P l u r a l i s m /. r _ . _ v _ ^ _ G r e y A r e a d e r r a i n e s P a r t y ' s M o n o p o l y o f Power as w e l l as L e g i t i m a c y B a s e d , On M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m //A B a r r i n g any major i n t e r n a l upheaval, Soviet domestic p o l i c y w i l l o s c i l l a t e between the boundaries I have i n d i c a t e d . A r e t u r n to S t a l i n i s t t e r r o r i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y for i t i s counterproductive both from the economic standpoint and a l s o (and more importantly) f o r party s o l i d a r i t y . Two rough boundaries have been e s t a b l i s h e d that l i m i t the extent to which the l e a d e r s h i p can increase or decrease i n t e r n a l r e p r e s s i o n . It should be noted that there e x i s t "grey areas" between what i s acceptable and what i s unacceptable p o l i c y in t h i s sense. I have placed Khrushchev's p o l i c y of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n in t h i s grey area. However, i t i s c l e a r that, on balance, i t was f e l t to be - 3 4 -enough of a threat to the Party's domestic i n t e r e s t s that i t had to be abandoned. I t w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g to see the outcome of the newest attempted reforms by the new General S e c r e t a r y M i k h a i l Gorbachev. Although the extent of the reforms he i s i n t e n d i n g i s not yet completely apparent, i t seems that he has i n s t i t u t e d the mechanisms f o r changes that might be comparable to Khrushchev's e a r l i e r i n i t i a t i v e s and 8 9 might f a l l i n t o the "grey area" on our c h a r t . T h i s " i d e o l o g i c a l l y imposed" i n t e r n a l dynamic i s the reason that the Soviet one-party type of i n s t i t u t i o n a l p l u r a l i s m cannot be compared to the p l u r a l i s m of p o l y a r c h i e s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two trends -economic l i b e r a l i s m and c o n s e r v a t i v e c e n t r a l i s m - i s one of almost d i r e c t c o n f l i c t i n the Soviet system. I f one i s to be achieved, the other must be compromised. Keeping t h i s i n t e r n a l dynamic i n mind we can c l e a r l y see how true detente and completely u n r e s t r i c t e d s c i e n t i f i c and c u l t u r a l exchange with the West i s not f e a s i b l e i n the near f u t u r e . In t h i s way Soviet M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ideology c l e a r l y i n f l u e n c e s f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s regarding detente. I I . Soviet Ideology and E a s t e r n Europe The relevance of t h i s i n t e r n a l dynamic to f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s again i l l u s t r a t e d by a look at the Soviet approach towards i t s E a s t e r n European s a t e l l i t e s . The S oviet i n s i s t e n c e on the r a d i c a l i n t e r n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of s t a t e s - 3 5 -coming under i t s c o n t r o l i s c l e a r l y i d e o l o g i c a l i n o r i g i n . As B r z e z i n s k i notes: even i f . . . r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes i n Eastern Europe were merely the d e s i r e to strengthen Soviet power over the area and not to c o n s t r u c t Communism per se, the mere f a c t that the method of strengthening that power was conceived i n terms of l a r g e - s c a l e s o c i a l and economic changes showed the u n d e r l y i n g i d e o l o g i c a l b i a s . One can c e r t a i n l y argue that a more moderate program would have created much l e s s r e s i s t a n c e and hence would have f a v o r a b l y a f f e c t e d the Communist power s i t u a t i o n . The standard Communist answer - Communism i s not safe without c r e a t i n g a s o c i a l upheaval that uproots the e x i s t i n g i n t e r e s t groups - i n i t s e l f r e v e a l s an approach to problems of p o l i t i c a l power that i s s t r o n g l y tinged with i d e o l o g i c a l assumptions.90 This o b s e r v a t i o n also supports the view presented e a r l i e r that a lack of c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s o f t e n c h a r a c t e r i z e s Soviet p o l i c y that attempts to i d e o l o g y . The i d e o l o g i c a l impact i s the l e v e l of Soviet commitment of i n f l u e n c e . As we noted, the implement the ends of the evident again i f we look at to i t s East European sphere i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f In h i s t o r i c a l p r o g r e s s i o n makes the Soviet Union committed to 91 preventing a "setback" f o r Marxism-Leninism. Any unorthodoxy i n the S o c i a l i s t bloc i s seen as a grave threat As Leonard Schapiro w r i t e s : The events of 1968 i n Czechoslovakia provided a warning that the demand f o r economic reform -which i s how the Czech " s p r i n g " had begun - was only a step removed from the demand f o r p o l i t i c a l reform.92 Both economic and p o l i t i c a l reform i n a Soviet s a t e l l i t e would have domestic r e p e r c u s s i o n s that the S o v i e t s f e a r . This i s why p o l y c e n t r i s m i s an anathema to the Soviet leaders and p o i n t s to one of the i m p l i c a t i o n s ideology has -36-f o r S o v i e t f o r e i g n conduct: they w i l l not r e a d i l y give up any of t h e i r s a t e l l i t e s i n the way European c o u n t r i e s gave up t h e i r old c o l o n i a l empires. The Soviet stake i n mainta i n i n g i t s sphere of i n f l u e n c e goes f a r beyond anything n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s alone would demand. This e x p l a i n s the s i n g u l a r determination with which they q u e l l e d attempts at l i b e r a l i z a t i o n i n Hungary i n 1956 and i n Czechoslovakia i n 1968 and also the i n t r a n s i g e n c e of the Sino - S o v i e t r i f t and the break with Y u g o s l a v i a . The Soviet t o l e r a n c e of Yu g o s l a v i a ' s break from i t s sphere of i n f l u e n c e p o i n t s to some of the l i m i t s to an i d e o l o g i c a l program. The So v i e t s did not f o l l o w the same course of a c t i o n as i n Hungary and Czechoslovakia f o r a number of reasons. F i r s t , the Yugoslav People's Army was prepared f o r a c o n f r o n t a t i o n and would have been a formidable foe; second, Yu g o s l a v i a i s not contiguous to the Soviet Union and thus posed problems f o r an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o l i c y ; and t h i r d , B r i t a i n and the U.S. looked upon Yu g o s l a v i a as a very important country s t r a t e g i c a l l y that would provide Mediterranean ports to the Soviet s i f i t should f a l l under Moscowo' domination. C l e a r l y the S o v i e t s were not prepared to r i s k the p o s s i b i l i t y of a major c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r the sake of i d e o l o g i c a l u n i t y i n the S o c i a l i s t camp. The Khrushchevian d o c t r i n e of "separate paths to S o c i a l i s m " approved by the Twentieth Congress was an attempt to face the r e a l i t y of the e x i s t i n g d i v e r s i t y , but i t created a d d i t i o n a l problems f o r the Soviet l e a d e r s . -37-Khrushchev's experiment i l l u s t r a t e s one of the dilemmas of the Soviet system. As Lowenthal notes, S t a l i n ' s succesors disavowed him because they perceived "that r i g i d i n s i s t e n c e on S o v i e t hegemony might break up the u n i t y of the [ S o c i a l i s t ] camp even more q u i c k l y " than a p o l i c y of 93 p l u r a l i s m . However, Lowenthal adds that the Khrushchevian p o l i c y of p l u r a l i s m " p r e c i p i t a t e d the very c r i s i s of . 94 a u t h o r i t y he had f e a r e d . The "Brezhnev D o c t r i n e " and i t s o f f e r of " f r a t e r n a l a s s i s t a n c e " to S o c i a l i s t s t a t e s i l l u s t r a t e s a r e t u r n to a more balanced stance between the two p o s i t i o n s . This a n a l y s i s brings out one of the i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s of ideology on So v i e t p o l i c y . Because of the stake that the Party has i n i t s perceived p o s i t i o n as the vanguard of mankind which r e s t s on the assumption of the u n i v e r s a l i t y of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, d o c t r i n a l unorthodoxy i n both the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l contexts i s t h r e a t e n i n g to them. The Yugoslav independent v e r s i o n of Communism, the Chinese challenge to S o c i a l i s t d o c t r i n a l u n i t y , and even the P o l i s h S o l i d a r i t y movement can be compared to "the problem of 95 heresy i n the h i s t o r y of the C h r i s t i a n Church. We should r e c a l l that i n Church h i s t o r y h e r e t i c s were of t e n d e a l t with with much more f e r o c i t y than those of a d i f f e r e n t f a i t h . T h i s was due to the f a c t that the h e r e t i c , by remaining w i t h i n the f a i t h , undermined the l e g i t i m a c y of those who ru l e d the f a i t h . -38-I I I . P r e f e r r e d Regimes The Soviet a t t i t u d e towards i d e o l o g i c a l deviance has rat h e r unusual i m p l i c a t i o n s . I f we were to make a spectrum of the type of emerging regimes that the Soviet Union would l i k e to see i n the T h i r d World f o r example, i t would look l i k e F i g u r e 3 below: MOST FAVORED BY LEAST FAVORED BY SOVIETS SOVIETS Pro-Soviet Pro-Soviet Unaligned Unfriendly Unfriendly Communist Non-Communist Regime Non-Communist Communist Regime Regime Regime Regime Figure 3 Regimes Preferred by the Soviet Union This ranking i s due to the problems of orthodoxy which stem from the very nature of So v i e t ideology and the s t r u c t u r e of Soviet p o l i t i c s . That the Soviets fear u n f r i e n d l y Communist regimes more than u n f r i e n d l y non-Communist ones makes sense i n l i g h t of the d i f f e r e n t impact these have on the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l status of Soviet i d e o l o g y . An u n f r i e n d l y non-Communist regime i s an enemy that can be explained d o c t r i n a l l y . I t has even been suggested that an enemy image i s necessary f o r the s u r v i v a l of the Soviet regime. However, an u n f r i e n d l y Communist regime, as we have seen, poses severe i d e o l o g i c a l problems. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n throws v a l u a b l e l i g h t on a c r u c i a l - 3 9 -aspect of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t has u s u a l l y been i n t e r p r e t e d as a c o n f l i c t of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n which ideology served simply as a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . C e r t a i n l y , viewing the l e v e l of formal i d e o l o g y only, one i s l e d to conclude, as Kubalkova and Cruickshank do, that "the S o v i e t a t t i t u d e toward China" i s "the most b l a t a n t i n c o n s i s t e n c y of the Soviet model of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . H o w e v e r , i f we look at the c o n f l i c t i n l i g h t of both the d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t i m p l i c a t i o n s of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, i t makes great sense. The Chinese became a second center of an ideology that i s premised on the concept of one c e n t e r . This i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t added an e s p e c i a l l y i n s t r a n s i g e n t element to the d i f f e r e n c e s they may have had at the l e v e l of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . T h i s p o i n t s to the importance of l o o k i n g beyond o f f i c i a l Marxism-Leninism at the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that emerge from the combination of d o c t r i n e with the l o g i c of a one-party s t a t e . Soviet a c t i v i t y i n the T h i r d World has o f t e n been i n t e r p r e t e d as simple power p o l i t i c s . Based upon the f a c t that the S o v i e t s o f t e n do not support indigenous Communist groups and sometimes even support regimes which suppressed domestic Communism, i t i s concluded that the Soviet Union i s no longer t r u l y i n t e r e s t e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n and that ideology i s no longer r e l e v a n t as a guide to a c t i o n , being used s o l e l y for domestic power purposes. However, t h i s i s an i n c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . As a r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a t e the Soviet union performs a c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s to -40-see how f e a s i b l e any a c t i o n i s . C l e a r l y , i n some cases i t would not be i n the i n t e r e s t of the Soviet Union and i t s o v e r a l l r e v o l u t i o n a r y program a c t i v e l y to support c e r t a i n Communist groups. The l e a d e r s h i p would f i r s t weigh the impact such support would have on detente, the p o s s i b i l i t y of super-power c o n f l i c t , the p o s s i b i l i t y of counter-r e v o l u t i o n , the p o t e n t i a l d r a i n on Soviet economic and m i l i t a r y resources and other f a c t o r s . One of the major components of such a c a l c u l u s would be to determine where, on the spectrum represented i n F i g u r e 3 , the emerging regime would stand. Having experienced the heresy of p o l y c e n t r i s m , i t i s only n a t u r a l that the S o v i e t s want to be c a r e f u l i n t h i s r e s p e c t , and t h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e approach does not s i g n i f y an e r o s i o n of t h e i r commitment to i d e o l o g y . There has been an " e r o s i o n " of ideology i n the Soviet Union, as we have noted, i n the sense that the i n i t i a l d o c t r i n e of Marx and Lenin has been l a r g e l y r e v i s e d to save i t from obsolescence. However, i f " e r o s i o n " i s meant to s i g n i f y that the current d o c t r i n e espoused by Soviet spokesmen and the goal of c r e a t i n g a communist world no longer play an important part i n i n f l u e n c i n g Soviet behavior, t h i s t h e s i s , as we have seen, i s wrong. C e r t a i n l y , the r e v o l u t i o n a r y program of the Soviet Union i n the f i r s t decades of i t s e x i s t e n c e was much more dramatic and c a l l e d for d e c i s i v e a c t i o n i n order to achieve the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o a l s . However, as Richard Gregor points out, even Lenin, the q u i n t e s s e n t i a l ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' , improvised his program 97 to square with r e a l i t y a number of times. He adds that -41-none of those who comment on Lenin's " b e t r a y a l " of r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n t e r e s t s , "has attempted to e x p l a i n how the i n t e r e s t s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n would have 9 8 b e n e f i t t e d by the d e s t r u c t i o n of the Soviet regime." The s o - c a l l e d e r o s i o n of contemporary Soviet p o l i c y i s simply the c o n t i n u a t i o n of such " i m p r o v i z a t i o a " that seeks to preserve the relevance of Marxism-Leninism while a l s o a v o i d i n g any s i g n i f i c a n t weakening of Soviet power. -42-V. The Influence of Ideology on the Soviet View of the United S t a t e s . Many of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Soviet r a t i o n a l -r e v o l u t i o n a r y approach to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are we l l i l l u s t r a t e d i n an a n a l y s i s of the Soviet view of the country they perceive as t h e i r main a d v e r s a r y — t h e United S t a t e s . We have already seen that Soviet d o c t r i n e and i d e o l o g i c a l pronouncements are i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to a c t u a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . This being the case, the Soviet image of the U.S. holds great i n t e r e s t f o r the West f o r i t c l e a r l y has d i r e c t p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s . W r i t i n g from the U.S. p e r s p e c t i v e , Morton Schwartz emphasizes why the Soviet view of h i s country i s important to study: A great deal of what the Kremlin r u l e r s attempt to do, or not to do, r e s t s on t h e i r e s t i m a t i o n of how we w i l l behave. While t h e i r choices are undoubtedly i n f l u e n c e d by other f a c t o r s — e x t e r n a l circumstances, dangers, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i n t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s — t h e Soviet "image of America" has an important, o f t e n c r i t i c a l , bearing on the fo r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c y . 99 The question we must ask now i s : How much i n f l u e n c e does Marxism-Leninism have on Soviet perceptions of the U.S.? Is ideology an independent v a r i a b l e h e l p i n g determine Soviet perceptions? Conversely, i s i t used as a convenient source of images and language that i s needed f o r domestic j u s t i f i c a t i o n of views that are derived p r a g m a t i c a l l y rather than from Marxism-Leninism? Or i s the t r u t h to be found i n some combination of these two opposing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ? Perhaps the best way to determine t h i s i s to analyze c e r t a i n -43-s p e c i f i c S o v i e t perceptions of the U.S. I w i l l narrow the focus of t h i s a n a l y s i s to the f o l l o w i n g areas: 1) Soviet perceptions of the general nature of the East-West c o n f l i c t and the s h i f t i n g balance of world power ( c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s ) . 2) Changes i n the d o c t r i n e on the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war between the two major socio-economic systems ( i . e . , S o c i a l i s m and C a p i t a l i s m ) . 3) Soviet views on the b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and fundamental nature of the American p o l i t i c a l and economic system i n c l u d i n g analyses of i t s strengths and weaknesses. 4) Soviet analyses of the primary determinants and fundamental nature of U.S. a l l i a n c e p o l i c y and f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n g e n e r a l . 5) Soviet expectations regarding future American p o l i t i c a l development and behavior. My a n a l y s i s i s based p r i m a r i l y on three sources: Morton Schwartz's S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of the United S t a t e s , John Lenczowski's S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of U.S. F o r e i g n P o l i c y , and Paul Marantz's "Changing Soviet Conceptions of East-West R e l a t i o n s . " One of the most important changes i n the Soviet view of the West i n general (and more s p e c i f i c a l l y the U.S.) has been a rather dramatic growth i n the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of Soviet s c h o l a r s h i p and i n t e r n a l debate. W i l l i a m Zimmerman's 1969 book Soviet P e r s p e c t i v e s on I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s  1956-1967 was one of the f i r s t Western s c h o l a r l y works to point out that during the Khrushchev years the r i g i d -44-dogmatism that c h a r a c t e r i z e d S t a l i n ' s world view was dropped and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s s p e c i a l i s t s i n the Soviet Union began to take a greater r o l e i n p o l i c y - p r e s c r i p t i o n . ^ <" ) This change to a much more s o p h i s t i c a t e d and r e a l i s t i c world view undoubtedly led to some of the f a r - r e a c h i n g d o c t r i n a l changes under Khrushchev. Outdated i d e o l o g i c a l concepts were dropped or a l t e r e d to correspond more c l o s e l y to r e a l i t y . Although we have already noted that under Brezhnev major i d e o l o g i c a l changes no longer occurred, t h i s does not mean that there was no f u r t h e r growth i n the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of the Soviet view of the West. Despite what some Western a n a l y s t s i n t e r p r e t e d as an i d e o l o g i c a l "hardening" under Brezhnev since no bold new i d e o l o g i c a l r e v i s i o n took place, Marantz notes that important middle l e v e l p r o p o s i t i o n s continued to be amended and r e v i s e d throughout Brezhnev's r u l e . He w r i t e s : There has been a development i n Soviet knowledge and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n concerning the process of f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n i n the West, the workings of C a p i t a l i s t economies, the r o l e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n and i n t e r e s t groups, and such.101 By most accounts, d e s p i t e some wavering back and f o r t h , the major i d e o l o g i c a l changes that occurred under Khrushchev were r e t a i n e d by h i s successors and the e a r l y s p e c u l a t i o n i s that Gorbachev seems poised to introduce new i d e o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n s that w i l l b ring Soviet p e r s p e c t i v e s c l o s e r to 102 Western ones. A l l these changes demonstrate that the S o v i e t s are not permanently t i e d to outdated i d e o l o g i c a l 103 dogma. However, the a c t u a l process of change and the -45-s p e c i f i c r o l e of ideology i n Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s best i l l u s t r a t e d by l o o k i n g at the concrete e v o l u t i o n of Soviet p e r s p e c t i v e s . U n d e r l i n i n g the dramatic c o n t r a s t between the S t a l i n i s t world view and the view that p r e v a i l e d a f t e r h i s death, Marantz w r i t e s : . . . i t i s easy to fo r g e t j u s t how sharply the post-S t a l i n conception of East-West r e l a t i o n s diverges from the view that p r e v a i l e d u n t i l 1953. The S t a l i n i s t framework f o r viewing East-West r e l a t i o n s was bleak i n the extreme, so much so that i t i s hard to imagine a view that could have been more negative, p e s s i m i s t i c , and f a t a l i s t i c . 104 In S t a l i n ' s time i t was almost i n c o n c e i v a b l e even to consider "the r e l a x a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s " since the Soviet leaders viewed i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s as a s t r i c t zero-sum game. The antagonists were the c a p i t a l i s t camp and the s o c i a l i s t camp which were locked i n a l i f e or death s t r u g g l e . ^ 5 As long as the American-led c a p i t a l i s t camp continued to e x i s t , world wars were i n e s c a p a b l e . C l e a r l y t h i s world view discounted any p o s s i b i l i t y of disarmament and would even consider a p o l i c y of detente as i l l u s o r y and dangerous, fo r the Soviet Union might loosen i t s v i g i l a n c e against the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s enemy. This approach to East-West r e l a t i o n s was d r a m a t i c a l l y changed with the ascendence of Khrushchev. At the Twentieth i Party Congress i n 1956, Khrushchev proclaimed that war was no longer i n e v i t a b l e between the s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t camps since the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s had s h i f t e d i n favor -46-of the f o r m e r . 1 0 7 At the Twenty-First Party Congress i n 1959 t h i s view was f u r t h e r developed. Marantz w r i t e s : ...Khrushchev c a r r i e d t h i s new p o s i t i o n one step f u r t h e r and provided a d d i t i o n a l ground for a more o p t i m i s t i c and openended view of the world. He proclaimed that i t was f u l l y p o s s i b l e , even while c a p i t a l i s m s t i l l e x i s t e d i n the West, to create an i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i n which world war would cease to be possible.108 I t was at the same Party Congress that Khrushchev introduced two other f a r - r e a c h i n g i n n o v a t i o n s . F i r s t , the " f i n a l " v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m had f i n a l l y been reached i n the Soviet Union; and second, the Soviet Union was no longer e n c i r c l e d by c a p i t a l i s m . T h e s e two r a d i c a l departures from S t a l i n i s t dogmatism s i g n i f i e d a new more co n f i d e n t approach 109 to East-West r e l a t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n to these c l e a r - c u t d o c t r i n a l i n n o v a t i o n s , other more su b t l e changes i n Soviet perceptions were taking p l a c e . In an e v o l u t i o n that continues even today, s i m p l i s t i c economic determinism was replaced by analyses that found " c o n t r a d i c t o r i n e s s and i n c o n s i s t e n c y " i n American policy. 1''" 0 As Soviet f a m i l i a r i t y with American p o l i t i c s grew, greater ambiguity was t o l e r a t e d i n d e s c r i b i n g American p o l i c i e s and p u r p o s e s . 1 1 1 Schwartz writes that although the U.S. i s s t i l l c onsidered to be "the main c u l p r i t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , " Soviet spokesmen o c c a s i o n a l l y h i n t 112 that " i t s a t t i t u d e s are i n some measure understandable." The i n f l u e n t i a l d i r e c t o r of the I n s t i t u t e of the USA and Canada, Georgi Arbatov even went so f a r as to suggest that Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l dogmatists may have provoked some of the -47-anti-communist f e e l i n g s i n the U.S. The question that i s r a i s e d i s whether these d o c t r i n a l innovations and c o n c i l i a t o r y statements should be i n t e r p r e t e d as simple t a c t i c a l manoevers to outwit the c l a s s enemy or rather as a r e f l e c t i o n of a true and dramatic reassessment of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s that emphasized a much more pragmatic approach? Had Soviet missionary z e a l a c t u a l l y been tempered so that more important i n t e r n a t i o n a l concerns could be addressed? Marantz suggests that the change i n the S o v i e t a t t i t u d e was genuine. He w r i t e s that under Khrushchev Soviet spokesmen now argued that a high l e v e l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n was u n d e s i r a b l e because i t i n c reased the danger of nuclear war, impeded r e v o l u t i o n by heightening r e p r e s s i o n w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t world, enhanced the p o l i t i c a l fortunes of b e l l i c o s e elements w i t h i n Western r u l i n g c i r c l e s , and f u e l l e d a w a s teful arms race.114 Such f a r ranging changes support the view that Khrushchev's innovations were not mere t a c t i c a l manoevers. Such momentous d o c t r i n a l changes s i g n i f i e d a genuine r e a p p r a i s a l of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n taking i n t o account the r e a l i t y of contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and the new v a r i a b l e that a f f e c t e d a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g — t h e danger of nuclear a n n i h i l a t i o n . I t was argued that t h i s new f a c t o r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s made i t imperative that the U.S. and the Soviet Union work together as the world's two superpowers to avoid and r e g u l a t e g l o b a l c o n f l i c t i n order to avoid a p o s s i b l y calamitous c o n f r o n t a t i o n . ^ ^ However, i t would have been d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y t h i s -48-new cooperation with the U.S. i f the L e n i n i s t - S t a l i n i s t image of the immutable c l a s s enemy p e r s i s t e d . Marantz notes that by 1960 the S o v i e t s had developed a new view of the U.S. decision-making process. They accepted a two-camp or two-tendencies view of the c a p i t a l i s t r u l i n g e l i t e i n the U.S.11*' According to t h i s view, two d i f f e r e n t f a c t i o n s of the U.S. c a p i t a l i s t r u l i n g c l a s s — o n e moderate one hawkish—were engaged i n a s t r u g g l e f o r u l t i m a t e power, and the Soviet Union could a i d the eventual triumph of the moderates through c a r e f u l l y thought-out p o l i c i e s . Even though the Soviet j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i r c o - o p e r a t i o n with the U.S. was couched i n Marxist a n a l y s i s using terms l i k e "exacerbating i n t e r n a l c a p i t a l i s t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , " the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the new approach were tremendous. Marantz w r i t e s , "Khrushchev was e l a b o r a t i n g f o r the f i r s t time i n Soviet h i s t o r y a c l e a r argument on behalf of long-term co-operation with the world's most powerful c a p i t a l i s t - . " 1 1 7 s t a t e . T h i s two-camp view of America has survived to the present almost unchanged. At the recent 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev stated that "we understand very w e l l that the i n t e r e s t s and goals not at a l l the same American people ... The changes i n have noted so f a r under Khrushchev were a l l part of the new d o c t r i n e of " p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e " which was expanded and imbued with new meaning a f t e r S t a l i n . Although the d o c t r i n e -49-of the m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l complex are as the i n t e r e s t s and goals of the ,118 Soviet approach and d o c t r i n e that we was r e f e r r e d to o c c a s i o n a l l y by e a r l y Soviet l e a d e r s , i t gained r e a l " o perative s i g n i f i c a n c e " only under Khrushchev . These d o c t r i n a l changes combined, present a very new approach to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s quite d i f f e r e n t from that of Lenin and S t a l i n . Marantz writes that, Under Khrushchev, the concept of genuine n e g o t i a t i o n and mutual compromise took on a whole new meaning and acquired a new l e g i t i m a c y . Compromise was viewed not as the product of temporary weakness but as an inescapable f e a t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s between sovereign s t a t e s . D i f f e r e n t s t a t e s unavoidably had d i f f e r e n t sets of i n t e r e s t s , and the only way they could p e a c e f u l l y e x i s t together was through a process of mutual give-and-take.120 This d e s c r i p t i o n of the new Soviet view of f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s demonstrates t h e i r understanding and t a c i t acceptance of the f a c t that s t a t e s had d i f f e r e n t " n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s " — a r ather dramatic departure from an orthodox c l a s s a n a l y s i s . Gorbachev has even taken t h i s development f u r t h e r by using the language of " n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t " p u b l i c l y . A r c h i e Brown notes that, " [ w ] h i l e the n o t i o n of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s has long been an i m p l i c i t part of Soviet l e a d e r s ' way of l o o k i n g at the world, Gorbachev's p u b l i c espousal of i t must have been d i s p l e a s i n g to the ..121 M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s . " However, the question s t i l l remains: Are these changes i n the language of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n i n d i c a t i v e of a " l e s s i d e o l o g i c a l " approach? Lenczowski i s s c e p t i c a l when he w r i t e s that one of the constant f e a t u r e s of "the o f f i c i a l S o v i e t l e x i c o n i s the use of words with -50-double meanings—each has a face value a p p r o p r i a t e f o r Western consumption and a s p e c i a l meaning f o r the Soviets ..122 themselves." He l i s t s " peaceful c o e x i s t e n c e , " "progress," " s e c u r i t y , " and " n o r m a l i z a t i o n " among such d e c e i t f u l concepts. He w r i t e s : I t may at f i r s t appear that these words conform to the p r a c t i c a l imperatives of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y , but to be e n t i r e l y " p r a c t i c a l , " they would have to posess an " o b j e c t i v e " meaning that they do not. Instead they have normative meanings that r e f l e c t the value system of Marxism-Leninism.123 Lenczowski b e l i e v e s that the face value that i s meant for Western consumption i s i n f a c t a t a c t i c a l device that the So v i e t s employ to pl a c a t e t h e i r c l a s s enemies while the normative meanings r e f l e c t the o p e r a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s 124 and perceptions of the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p . There are two observations to be made about Lenczowski's statements: F i r s t , he i s c o r r e c t i n p o i n t i n g out that ideology imposes a normative meaning to words that would be i n t e r p r e t e d quite d i f f e r e n t l y i n the West. In the Soviet Union such words have an ' o f f i c i a l ' meaning that they do not have i n the West. Soviet spokesmen of t e n take advantage of Western i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n dialogue with the West, but i n t e r n a l Soviet debate u t i l i z e s the i d e o l o g i c a l meaning. This can be viewed as a r e f l e c t i o n of the inherent dualism i n Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y that we noted i n Part two of t h i s essay. The second comment to be made i s that even i f t h i s dualism r e f l e c t s the true Soviet approach to East-West r e l a t i o n s , there has been n e v e r t h e l e s s a tremendous -51-e v o l u t i o n i n Soviet a t t i t u d e s from the S t a l i n i s t years to the present. The very f a c t that these terms have a more " p r a c t i c a l " meaning i n a d d i t i o n to the i d e o l o g i c a l normative meaning has vast f o r e i g n p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s . Those i n the Soviet Union who favor a more open and l e s s c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l p o l i c y towards the U.S. can r a t i o n a l i z e even a very moderate n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y of expanded trade, e t c . , using the more t r a d i t i o n a l M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t normative a n a l y s i s f o r domestic consumption. C l e a r l y , the double meanings do not n e c e s s a r i l y imply — as Lenczowski a r g u e s — t h a t the " o b j e c t i v e " meaning i s used simply to make key f o r e i g n p o l i c y concepts more p a l a t a b l e to the West. The changes i n a c t u a l Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y that took place at the same time as terms such as " p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e " and "mutual advantage" came to the f o r e f r o n t suggest, as Marantz argues, that the d o c t r i n a l a l t e r a t i o n s , "were not j u s t a matter of a b s t r a c t i d e o l o g y . On the c o n t r a r y , they had very r e a l consequences a f f e c t i n g the nature and texture of r e l a t i o n s 125 between the Soviet Union and the West." If our a n a l y s i s of changes i n Soviet perceptions of the U.S. i s sound and there has indeed been a dramatic e v o l u t i o n of b e l i e f s and o f f i c i a l d o c t r i n e , what r o l e , i f any, does ide o l o g y have i n determining Soviet perceptions and the r e s u l t a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y ? Lenczowski points out that no p o l i c y debates i n the Soviet Union can be argued " i n terms other than those which can be p l a u s i b l y described as 12 6 M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t . " Schwartz a l s o notes t h i s i n d i r e c t e f f e c t of ideology on Soviet perceptions of the U.S. when he - 5 2 -w r i t e s : "...the need to f i t a l l the d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n concerning t h i s country... i n t o an all-embracing M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t framework imposes a r i g i d i t y and u n i f o r m i t y on American p u b l i c l i f e which can only be regarded as, at 12 7 best, simple-minded." He i n t e r p r e t s t h i s perceived need to couch a l l debate i n i d e o l o g i c a l terms as p o l i t i c a l expediency on the part of a n a l y s t s who " l i v e i n a Soviet p o l i t i c a l universe [and] succeed (or f a i l ) according to the 12 8 r u l e s of the game which p r e v a i l i n Moscow...." The r u l e s of the game, according to Schwartz have been e s t a b l i s h e d to l e g i t i m i z e and j u s t i f y the l e a d e r s h i p ' s p o l i t i c a l power. In c o n t r a s t to Schwartz's b e l i e f that the Soviet e l i t e uses Marxism-Leninism p r i m a r i l y for s e l f - s e r v i n g power purposes, Lenczowski points out that the very pervasiveness of Soviet propaganda shapes and cannot help but a f f e c t "the people from whom the Sov i e t s r e c r u i t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and 129 c u l t u r a l e l i t e . E a r l i e r i n t h i s essay we e s t a b l i s h e d the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the p o s i t i o n that Soviet leaders may a c t u a l l y b e l i e v e the i d e o l o g i c a l tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Lenczowski r e i n f o r c e s t h i s p o s i t i o n by emphasizing that "one must remember that the communist world view i s an e n t i r e l y p l a u s i b l e one, even, one might say, a compelling one. A f t e r a l l , Marxism-Leninism has i n s p i r e d s e v e r a l mass movements and i t has captured the imagination of many a Western i n t e l l e c t u a l who was f r e e to chose from the open market of ..130 ideas. Up to t h i s point i n t h i s s e c t i o n of the essay we have concentrated on c h a r t i n g the changes i n Soviet perceptions -53-of the U.S. I t has been c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d that a more r e a l i s t i c and pragmatic view of the U.S. has evolved among Soviet decision-makers since the e a r l y 1960's. However, we have a l s o noted that almost a l l Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y concepts r e t a i n an i d e o l o g i c a l component: detente i s s t i l l l i n k e d to the eventual triumph of S o c i a l i s m over C a p i t a l i s m ; Soviet trade with the U.S. i s j u s t i f i e d i n that i t exacerbates i n t e r n a l c a p i t a l i s t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and w i l l thus speed up the v i c t o r y of S o c i a l i s m ; e t c . In a d d i t i o n to these concepts with a dual meaning, there are other Soviet concepts that are c l e a r l y i d e o l o g i c a l i n o r i g i n . The " c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e of L e n i n i s t d o c t r i n e " which assumes the immutable "predatory essence of i m p e r i a l i s m " continues to be 131 the orthodox Soviet view. The s t r u g g l e between the two s o c i a l systems i s s t i l l considered the b a s i c r e a l i t y of 132 i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Schwartz notes that the S o v i e t s continue to overestimate the r o l e of the business s e c t o r s i n 133 U.S. policy-making and that they s t i l l b e l i e v e that U.S. government p o l i c y i s almost always de f i n e d by c l a s s i n t e r e s t s . W h i l e a more benign a p p r a i s a l of American p o l i c i e s and purposes has evolved, the U.S. i s s t i l l seen as 135 the main i n s t i g a t o r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n . The "deepening c r i s i s " of U.S. c a p i t a l i s m i s c o n t i n u o u s l y e l a b o r a t e d on by Soviet A m e r i c a n i s t s , and the n o t i o n of a s h i f t i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s f a v o r i n g S o c i a l i s m i s a constant r e f r a i n . This b r i e f l i s t that demonstrates c o n t i n u i t y rather than change i n Soviet views poin t s to the s t i l l c o n s i d e r a b l e -54-i n f l u e n c e of ideology on perceptions of America. And p e r c e p t i o n s , as many observers have noted, are almost c e r t a i n l y c o r r e l a t e d to Soviet a t t i t u d e s . While a more r e a l i s t i c and s o p h i s t i c a t e d view of the U.S. has c e r t a i n l y evolved since the 1960's, i t appears that i t i s c i r c u m s c r i b e d by i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . While i t seems impossible to determine p r e c i s e l y whether id e o l o g y i s invoked most o f t e n i n order for the Soviet e l i t e to maintain i t s domestic power and l e g i t i m a c y or because Soviet leaders a c t u a l l y subscribe to the M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t world view, our a n a l y s i s of Soviet perceptions of the U.S. seems to i n d i c a t e that both f a c t o r s are at play. -55-CONCLUSION A number of co n c l u s i o n s can be made on the bas i s of our a n a l y s i s of the impact of ideology on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Attempts to understand Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y s o l e l y on the b a s i s of a n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t a n a l y s i s o f t e n f a i l because they avoid the important question of what determines the unique Soviet i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . A power p o l i t i c s approach s u f f e r s from s i m i l a r problems. Power does not e x i s t i n some "pure" f o r m — i t i s always r e l a t e d to ideas that determine to a great degree a power-seeking s t a t e ' s t a c t i c s and purposes. In the Soviet context, these ideas are oft e n derived from Marxism-Leninism. An a n a l y s i s of Soviet M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ideology goes a long way i n improving our understanding of c e r t a i n aspects of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y that do not seem amenable to a n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t or power p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . While c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of power impose c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s also often d i c t a t e the form and content of f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . Ideology o f t e n s u p p l i e s the t a c t i c a l means and envisioned ends of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y — a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t from a pure power p o l i t i c a l approach. Although the So v i e t s u s u a l l y play the power p o l i t i c s game as w e l l as non-Marxist s t a t e s , ideology sometimes leads to a lack of c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . However, ideology leads to such p o t e n t i a l l y power-damaging p o l i c i e s p r i m a r i l y i n two - 5 6 -s i t u a t i o n s : during the implementation and maintenance of the ends env i s i o n e d by Marxism-Leninism and when the a c t i o n s are undertaken to defend the doctrine-based domestic power and l e g i t i m a c y of the r u l i n g e l i t e . Even i f Soviet decision-makers might want to attempt to implement an i d e o l o g i c a l program, the i d e o l o g i c a l ideas would soon c l a s h and compete with: 1) other more pragmatic domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l concerns, n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and power c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; 2) ideas that emanate from competing groups w i t h i n the Soviet e l i t e ; and 3) c o n s t r a i n t s inherent i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. The immediate impact of i d e o l o g y i s manifested on the l e v e l of i n d i v i d u a l policy-makers and p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l l eaders i n the Soviet Union. Since Marxism-Leninism provides the e x c l u s i v e language of p o l i t i c s i n the Soviet Union, i t i s safe to say that i t i n f l u e n c e s and shapes the p e r c e p t u a l and conceptual world of leaders who are s o c i a l i z e d l i k e other Soviet c i t i z e n s . In other words, they probably b e l i e v e i n the relevance of Marxism-Leninism and w i l l pursue the methods and goals of the i d e o l o g y i f p o s s i b l e . Due to the nature of Soviet one-party r u l e , ideology plays a l e g i t i m i z i n g r o l e f o r the l e a d e r s h i p and i s o f t e n invoked fo r t h i s purpose. The relevance of the ideology must c o n s t a n t l y be demonstrated so that Soviet c i t i z e n s w i l l continue to accept the a u t h o r i t a r i a n one-party regime as l e g i t i m a t e . While i t i s probably impossible to estimate which of the two f a c t o r s — b e l i e f i n the i d e o l o g i c a l tenets on the one -57-hand or s e l f - s e r v i n g use of ide o l o g y to maintain power and p r i v i l e g e on the o t h e r — i s the more important, i t i s safe to say that both play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . An a n a l y s i s of detente, Soviet a t t i t u d e s towards E a s t e r n Europe and other s a t e l l i t e s , regimes p r e f e r r e d by the S o v i e t s , and other concerns of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y , demonstrates how some p o l i c i e s can best be i n t e r p r e t e d as an attempt by Soviet leaders to implement a n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i c y while at the same time d e a l i n g with the i d e o l o g i c a l l y imposed l i m i t a t i o n s of Marxism-Leninism. Other p o l i c i e s r e f l e c t the c o n t i n u i n g relevance of ideology f o r Soviet decision-makers. Our study of Soviet perceptions of the U.S. i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s dynamic p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l . There has been a c l e a r e v o l u t i o n i n Soviet a t t i t u d e s since the e a r l y 1960's. Many of the orthodox S t a l i n i s t views have been d i s c a r d e d and a much more pragmatic approach to East-West r e l a t i o n s has p r e v a i l e d . The d o c t r i n e s t i e d to the Soviet p o l i c y of detente and peaceful coexistence are examples of such changed p e r c e p t i o n s . However, des p i t e the inc r e a s e d r e a l i s m of Soviet perceptions and a t t i t u d e s , the core of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y continues to be co n d i t i o n e d by id e o l o g y . I t appears that while the So v i e t s can purge the d o c t r i n a l component of the ide o l o g y of outdated and dangerous views, the p h i l o s o p h i c a l core of the ideology i s much more immutable to change. As examples of i d e o l o g i c a l c o n t i n u i t y , we can l i s t the f o l l o w i n g : S oviet leaders s t i l l c onsider the s t r u g g l e - 5 8 -between s o c i a l i s m and c a p i t a l i s m as r e f l e c t i n g the fundamental nature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ; the U.S. i s s t i l l considered to be the main i n s t i g a t o r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l tensions due to I t s immutable c a p i t a l i s t nature; the d e c l i n e of c a p i t a l i s m i s s t i l l f o r e c a s t and the s h i f t i n g of the world c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i n favor of s o c i a l i s m i s o f t e n c i t e d ; while world war between c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m i s no longer considered i n e v i t a b l e , the sharp s t r u g g l e between the two systems i n p o l i t i c a l , i d e o l o g i c a l and economic spheres w i l l continue, according to Soviet spokesmen. C l e a r l y , a l l these fundamental world views are s t i l l a part of Soviet orthodoxy and are very i d e o l o g i c a l i n nature. The d i a l e c t i c a l nature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s In general i s never questioned. One very important c o n c l u s i o n i s that Khrushchev's d o c t r i n a l i n n o v a t i o n s did indeed b r i n g about a new emphasis i n East-West r e l a t i o n s i n which the concepts of compromise and mutually advantageous p o l i c y agreements were accepted. This meant that i n the short term at l e a s t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s were no longer viewed as a zero-sum game. However, as we have seen, the i d e o l o g i c a l concept of the u l t i m a t e v i c t o r y of s o c i a l i s m over c a p i t a l i s m s t i l l gives Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y a zero-sum f l a v o r over the long term. Although t h i s long term optimism regarding s o c i a l i s t v i c t o r y i s probably not an o p e r a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e i n Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y decison-making, i t i s p o s s i b l e that i t could be r e v i v e d should the l e a d e r s h i p f e e l that the c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s has swung f u r t h e r i n favor of s o c i a l i s m . As Schwartz - 5 9 -w r i t e s , "...the Kremlin leaders keep a c a r e f u l eye on the s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y balance. Should the m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n of the United States seem to have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y weakened, the men i n the P o l i t b u r o may be emboldened to undergo a more adventurous p o l i c y course." We have already seen that ideology i s not the sole o p e r a t i o n a l f a c t o r determining Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Some of the important n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s that have been i d e n t i f i e d i n our study are reviewed below: 1) The p e r s o n a l i t y of Soviet leaders plays an important r o l e i n p o l i c y development. For example, Khrushchev's d o c t r i n a l innovations and i d e o l o g i c a l optimism no doubt stemmed from h i s "impulsiveness, w i s h f u l - t h i n k i n g 13 7 and i n c a u t i o u s experimentation." His too-eager acceptance of d o c t r i n a l i n n o v a t i o n was seen by other party leaders as t h r e a t e n i n g to t h e i r power i n t e r e s t s . Brezhnev was a more ca u t i o u s , r e a l i s t i c and hard-headed pragmatist which no doubt exp l a i n s the same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Soviet f o r e i g n 138 p o l i c y during h i s l e a d e r s h i p . 2) Sometimes the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s of the Soviet s t a t e c l a s h with the d i c t a t e s of ideology and c l e a r l y there i s a give and take here. Gorbachev's new approach to the t h i r d world i n which the So v i e t s sometimes p r e f e r a l l i a n c e s with non-Marxist regimes rather than supporting Marxist regimes that are a d r a i n on the Soviet economy demonstrates how n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s are often the o v e r r i d i n g f a c t o r i n 139 determining f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 3) Systemic v a r i a b l e s and dynamics of the - 6 0 -i n t e r n a t i o n a l system c l e a r l y impose l i m i t a t i o n s on Soviet a c t i o n s and can e x p l a i n much of Soviet behavior without recourse to i d e o l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s . C o n s i d e r a t i o n s of power al s o i n f l u e n c e Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y c h o i c e s . In other words, the Soviet Union cannot act as i t wants or as i t s unadulterated M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t ideology might d i c t a t e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena since i t i s not omnipotent. 4) The n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r and h i s t o r i c a l experience of the Russian people i s another f a c t o r that a l s o o f t e n has an impact on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Soviet c a u t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s o f t e n i n t e r p r e t e d as stemming from a h i s t o r i c a l l y derived sense of i n s e c u r i t y i n the Russian n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . 5) The r e a c t i o n of other s t a t e s to Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s has a profound i n f l u e n c e on f u t u r e Soviet a c t i o n s . Soviet p o l i c y i s seen to be much more v o l u n t a r i s t i c and r e a c t i v e to i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressures and i n f l u e n c e than i s o f t e n thought. I t i s the i n t e r p l a y of these and other f a c t o r s with i d e o l o g i c a l ones that i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s determines Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I t i s an unkempt s i t u a t i o n to say the l e a s t . However, i n order to give a r e a l i s t i c account of Soviet behavior, one must take a l l these f a c t o r s i n t o account. I b e l i e v e that with the use of the framework suggested i n t h i s essay, i t i s p o s s i b l e to understand more f u l l y S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I f nothing e l s e , the conceptual framework of the Soviet Union as a r a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y - 6 1 -s t a t e demonstrates that ideology cannot be dismissed as a s i g n i f i c a n t o p e r a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e i n Soviet i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior. On the other hand, the framework points out that Soviet p o l i c y i s not d i c t a t e d s o l e l y by i d e o l o g i c a l imperatives and that those who b e l i e v e that the Soviet Union operates on the basis of an i d e o l o g i c a l b l u e p r i n t have reason to re c o n s i d e r t h e i r views. - 6 2 -FOOTNOTES 1 V.I. Lenin, quoted in Zbignew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in  Soviet P o l i t i c s . (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 1. 2 Alfred G. Meyer, "The Function of Ideology in the Soviet P o l i t i c a l System," Soviet Studies (Vol. XVII January 1966), p. 274. 3 Rita M. Kelly & Frederic J. Fleron Jr., in Erik P. Hoffmann & Frederick J. Fleron Jr., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971), p. 193. 4 Meyer, op. c i t . , p. 275. 5 Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence, (Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 365. 6 For example: Robert Conquest, "The Human Rights Issue," pp. 205-216 in James R. Schlesinger et a l . , eds. Defending America. (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 7 David Joravsky, "Soviet Ideology," Soviet Studies, (Vol. XVII No. 1, July, 1966), p. 3. 8 Brzezinski, op. c i t . , p. 132 9 William Zimmermann, "Rethinking Soviet Foreign Policy: Changing American Perspectives," International Journal, (Vol. XXV No. 3, Summer 1980), p. 562. 10 Ibid., p. 555. 11 Robert V. Daniels, "Doctrine and Foreign Policy," in Hoffmann & Fleron, op. c i t . , p. 157. 12 Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and  Evidence, p. 143. 13 Hoffman and Fleron, op. c i t . , p. 35. 14 Adam B. Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 89. 15 Meyer, op. c i t . , p. 274. 16 Kelly & Fleron, op. c i t . 17 Ibid., p. 194. 18 See for example: Donald Zagoria, "Ideology and Chinese Foreign Policy," in George Schwab (ed.), Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Global  Perspective (New York: Cyrco Press, 1978), pp. 103-116. 19 Jack C. Piano & Roy Octon (eds.), The International Relations  Dictionary. 3rd ed. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1982), p. 9. 20 Sullivan, op. c i t . , p. 49. 21 Samuel L. Sharp, "National Interests: Key to Soviet P o l i t i c s , " in Abraham Brumberg (ed.), Russia Under Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 26. 22 Richard Lowenthal, "The Logic of One-Party Rule, " in Brumberg, op. c i t . , p. 28. 23 Donald Zagoria, op. c i t . , p. 104. 24 Sullivan, op. c i t . , p. 158. 25 A.A. Aspaturian, Power and Process in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1971), p. 97. 26 Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 41 No. 1, October 1962), p. 166. 27 Sharp, op. c i t . , p. 133. 28 V. Kubalkova, & A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism & Theory of  International Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 292 29 Ibid., p. 293. 30 John H. Herz, "Power Politics or Ideology? The Nazi Experience," in - 6 4 -Schwab, op. c i t . , p. 15. 31 R.N. Carew Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine," in Brumberg, op. c i t . , p. 11. 32 Ibid. 33 Herbert Dinerstein, F i f t y Years of Soviet Foreign Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968). 34 Hunt, op. c i t . , pp. 11-13. 35 I am indebted to Professor Kal Holsti for pointing out this important distinction. 36 Brzezinski, op. c i t . , p. 489. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. c i t . , pp. 3-5. 41 K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 14 (September, 1970), p. 263 cited in Sullivan, op. c i t . , p. 138. 42 Ibid. 43 Lowenthal, op. c i t . , p. 29. 44 R. Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks i t Could Fight & Win a Nuclear War," Commentary (July 1977), pp.21-34. 45 If Marxism-Leninism Is seen as a quasi-religion this fact is not paradoxical at a l l . Most religious doctrines also claim to posess the "truth." 46 Ulam, op. c i t . , p. 73. 47 Wolfe, op. c i t . , p. 169. 48 Ulam, op. c i t . , p. 73. 49 Brzezinski, op. c i t . , p. 489. -65-50 George, op. c i t . , p. 188. 51 Joseph Bochenski, in Milorad M. Drachkovitch (ed.) Marxist  Ideology in the Contemporary World - Its Appeals and Paradoxes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). 52 William Zimmermann, Soviet Perspectives on International  Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), quoted in Paul Marantz, "American and Soviet Perceptions of Each Other's World Role: Some Methodological Considerations," p. 24. 53 Paul Marantz, "Prelude to Detente: Doctrinal Changes Under Khrushchev," International Studies Quarterly (Volume 19 No. 4, December 1975), p. 504. 54 James Rosenau, "Introduction," in James Rosenau (ed.), Domestic  Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 2 quotes in Hoffman and Fleron, op. c i t . , pp. 31-32. 55 Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Decision-Making," in Hoffmann & Fleron, op. c i t . , p. 166. 56 Ibid., p. 165. 57 Brzezinski, op. c i t . , p. 388. 58 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. c i t . , p. 80. 59 Meyer, op. c i t . , p. 276. 60 Wolfe, op. cit.,p. 167. 61 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. c i t . , p. 82. 62 Ulam, op. c i t . , p. 70. 63 Carew Hunt, (op. c i t . , p. 131.) points out that while Marx did not develop a concept of total planning, "he and Engels advocated the replacement of the 'anarchy' of social production" under capitalism by production to be carried out upon a "common plan though who was -66-to do the planning was not explained." However, since the ideology < in question is Marxism-Leninism, and Lenin made i t clear very early that he intended to implement total planning, i t seems right to include this feature as a reflection of Soviet ideology. 64 Hunt, op. c i t . 65 Ibid. p. 6. 66 Lowenthal, (op. c i t . , p. 29.) claims that the only operational parts of the ideology are those that derive from the "logic of one-party rule". This view is important in acknowledging that power politics can have vastly different forms and that these forms are important and "ideological". However, I cannot agree with him that ideology is solely used as justification of the abuses of one-party rule. There is also, as we have noted, the "self-j u s t i f i c a t i o n " aspect of ideology. The need of the Party to feel truly that i t is the vanguard of history and the reinforcement of this concept through indoctrination and socialization makes i t much more likely that they are not solely interested in power. 67 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. c i t . , p. 236. 68 Ulam, op. c i t . , p. 75. 69 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in in Soviet Poli t i c s (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 160. 70 Ibid., p. 141. 71 Ibid., p. 140. 72 Ibid., p. 140. 73 Ibid., p. 140. 74 Ibid., pp. 137-8. 75 Ibid. 76 P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 213. -67-77 George, op. c i t . , p. 186. 78 Paul Marantz, "Changing Soviet Conceptions of East-West relations," International Journal (Vol. XXXVII No. 2 Spring 1982), p. 234. 79 Paul Marantz, "American and Soviet Perceptions of Each Other's World Role: Some Methodological Considerations," (March 22, 1979), p. 24. 80 Mark N. Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 9. 81 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Conceptions," p. 236. 82 See for example: Frederick Barghoorn, Detente and the Democratic  Movement in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1976), Robert Horn, "Detente 'Myths' and Soviet Foreign Policy," in P. Potichnyj & J. Schapiro, (eds.), From Cold War to Detente (New York: Praeger, 1976), and Stephen F. Cohen in The Soviet Union Since Stalin (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980) 83 Frederick C. Barghoorn, op. c i t . , p. 124. 84 Ibid., p. 122. 85 R. Horn, op. c i t . , p. 11. 86 Ibid., p. 26. 87 Leonard Schapiro, "The Human Rights Issue," in James R. Schlesinger et. a l . , (eds.), Defending America (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 221. 88 Richard Lowenthal, op. c i t . , p. 43. 89 See Archie Brown, "Change in the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 64 No. 5 Summer 1986) and Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 64 No. 4 Spring 1986) 90 Brzezinski, op. c i t . , p. 143. 91 We have seen that minor "setbacks" are acceptable to the Soviet leadership, however, they are concerned about setbacks that may cause -68-uncertainty about the inevitable triumph of socialism. 92 Leonard Schapiro, "The Human Rights Issue," in James R. Schlesinger et a l (eds.) Defending America (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 220. 93 Lowenthal, op. c i t . , p. 38. 94 Ibid. 95 Schwab, op. c i t . , p. 62. 96 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. c i t . , p. 213. 97 Richard Gregor, "Lenin, Revolution and Foreign Policy," International  Journal (Vol. XXII No. 4 Autumn 1966-67), p. 568. 98 Ibid., p. 574. 99 Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 1. 100 John Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy (London: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 16. 101 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 238. 102 See Fukuyama and Brown articles, op. c i t . 103 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 239. 104 Ibid., p. 221. 105 Ibid., p. 223. 106 Ibid., pp. 222-223. 107 Ibid., pp. 225-226. 108 Ibid., p. 226. 109 Ibid., p. 226. 110 Schwartz, op. c i t . , p 154. 111 Ibid., p. 153. 112 Ibid., p. 155. 113 Ibid., p. 156. 114 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 227. 115 Ibid., p. 228. 116 See Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 228, also Schwartz, op. c i t . , p. 153. 117 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 229. 118 Brown, op. c i t . , p. 1061. 119 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 230. 120 Ibid., p. 230. 121 Brown, op. c i t . , p. 1061. 122 Lenczowski, op. c i t . , p. 270. 123 Ibid., p. 270. 124 Ibid., pp. 270-271. 125 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 240. 126 Lenczowski, op. c i t . , p. 22. 127 Schwartz, op. c i t . , p. 147. 128 Ibid., p. 148. 129 Lenczowski, op. c i t . , p. 22. 130 Ibid., p. 23. 131 Schwartz, op. c i t . , p. 148. 132 Lenczowski, op. c i t . , p. 266. 133 Schwartz, op. c i t . , p. 152. 134 Ibid., p. 151. 135 Ibid., p. 155. 136 Ibid., p. 166. 137 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 236. 138 Ibid., pp. 235-236. 139 See Fukuyama, op. c i t . -70-R E F E R E N C E S A s p a t u r i a n , V.V. Power and Process i n Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y . Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1971. Barghoorn, F r e d e r i c k C. Detente and the Democratic Movement  i n the USSR. New York: The Free Press, 1976. B e l l , D a n i e l . "Ten Theories i n Search of R e a l i t y , " pp. 327-365 World P o l i t i c s , V o l . X No. 3, A p r i l 1958. "The End of Ideology," pp. 476-481 i n James A. Gould & W i l l i s M. T r u i t t (eds.) P o l i t i c a l I d e o l o g i e s . New York: Macmillan P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1973. Bowles, Chester. "Is Communist Ideology Becoming I r r e l e v a n t ? " , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 40 No. 3, J u l y 1962. Bromke, Adam. "Ideology and N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t i n Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " pp. 547-562 I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , V o l . XXII No. 4, Autumn 1967. Brown, A r c h i e . "Change i n the Soviet Union," pp. 1048-1065 Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 64 No. 5, Summer 1986. B r z e z i n s k i , Zbigniew K. Ideology and Power i n S o v i e t  P o l i t i c s . New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger , 1967 . The Soviet Block: U n i t y and C o n f l i c t . Cambridge Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967. Carew Hunt, R.N. "The Importance of D o c t r i n e , " pp. 5-15 i n Abraham Brumberg (ed.) Russia Under Khrushchev. New York: F r e d r i c k A. Praeger, 1962. Cohen, Stephen F. e t . a l . , ( e d s . ) , The Soviet Union Since  S t a l i n . Bloomington Indiana: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980. C o l t o n , Timothy J . The Dilemma of Reform i n the Soviet  Union. New York: C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 1984. D i n e r s t e i n , Herbert. F i f t y Years of S o v i e t F o r e i g n P o l i c y . B a l t i m o r e : John Hopkins Press, 1968. Drachkovitch, M i l o r a d M. (ed.) Marxist Ideology i n the  Contemporary World - I t s Appeals and Paradoxes. New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1966. F r i e d r i c h , C a r l J . (ed . ) T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1954. Fukuyama, F r a n c i s . "Gorbachev and the T h i r d World," pp. 715-731 F o r e i g n A f f a i r s V o l . 64 No. 4, Spring 1986. -71-References (contd.) Gaddis, J . "The R i s e , F a l l and Future of Detente," pp. 354-377 For e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 62 No. 2, Winter 1983-4. G a l l i e , W.B. P h i l o s o p h e r s of Peace and War. Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978. G a t i , C h a r l e s . "The S t a l i n i s t Legacy i n Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " pp. 279-304, i n Stephen F. Cohen et a l (eds.) The  S o v i e t Union Since S t a l i n . Bloomington Indiana: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980. Gehlen, Michael. The P o l i t i c s of Coexistence. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967. Gelman, H. "Soviet P o l i c y Towards China," pp. 165-174 Survey, Autumn/Winter 1983. 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Hyland, W i l l i a m G. "The USSR and Nuclear War," pp 41-77 i n Barry M. Blechman (ed.) R e t h i n k i n g the U.S. S t r a t e g i c  Posture: A Report from the Aspen Consortium on Arms C o n t r o l  and S e c u r i t y Issues. Cambridge, Mass.: B a l l i n g e r P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1982. Joravsky, David. "Soviet Ideology," pp. 2-15 Soviet S t u d i e s , V o l . XVIII No. 1, J u l y , 1966. Katz, Mark N. The T h i r d World i n S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Thought. London: Croom Helm, 1982. -72-References (contd.) Krasner, Stephen. Defending the N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978. Kubalkova, V. & Cruickshank, A.A. Marxism-Leninism and  Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Labedz, Leopold. "Ideology - The Fourth Stage," pp. 46-69 i n Abraham Brumberg (ed.) Russia Under Khrushchev. New York: F r e d r i c k A. Praeger, 1962. Lenczowski, John. S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of U.S. Fo r e i g n P o l i c y . London: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982. L i d e r , J u l i a n , The P o l i t i c a l and M i l i t a r y Laws of War; An  A n a l y s i s of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t Concepts. Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1979. Lowenthal, Richard. "The Logic of One-Party Rule," pp. 27-46 in Abraham Brumberg (ed. ) Russia Under Khrushchev. New York: F r e d r i c k A. Praeger, 1962. Maclntyre, A l a s d a i r . "The End of Ideology & the Ideology of the End of Ideology," pp. 482-488 i n James A. Gould & W i l l i s M. T r u i t t . P o l i t i c a l I d e o l o g i e s . New York: Macmillan P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1973. Marantz, Paul. "Prelude to Detente: D o c t r i n a l Changes Under Khrushchev," pp. 501-527 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Q u a r t e r l y , Volume 19 No. 4, December 1975. "American and Soviet P e r c e p t i o n s of Each Other's World Role: Some Methodological C o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " Presented at the Annual Meeting of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies A s s o c i a t i o n , Toronto, March 22, 1979. "Changing Soviet conceptions of East-West r e l a t i o n s , " pp. 220-240 I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , Volume XXXVII No. 2, Spring 1982. Meyer, A l f r e d G. "The Function of Ideology i n the Soviet P o l i t i c a l System," pp. 273-285 So v i e t S t u d i e s , V o l . XVII No. 3, January 1966. Moore, J r . B a r r i n g t o n . Soviet P o l i t i c s - The Dilemma of  Power• Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950. Morgenthau, Hans. P o l i t i c s Among Nations: The Struggle f o r  Power and Peace. 4th ed. New York: Knopf, 1967. Pic k , Otto. "Soviet A l l i a n c e P o l i c i e s i n Retrospect," pp. 576-592 I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , V o l . XXII No. 4, Autumn 1977. -73-References (contd.) Pipes, R. "Why the Soviet Union Thinks i t Could F i g h t & Win a Nuclear War," pp. 21-34 Commentary, J u l y 1977. Piano, Jack C. & Octon, Roy. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s  D i c t i o n a r y . 3rd ed. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1982. Schapiro, Leonard, "The Human Rights Issue," i n James R. S c h l e s i n g e r e t . a l . , (eds.) Defending America. New York: Basic Books, 1977) Schwab, George ed. Ideology and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : A G l o b a l  P e r s p e c t i v e . New York: Cyrco Press, Inc., 1978. Schwartz, Morton. S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1978. Sharp, Samuel L. " N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t s : Key to Soviet P o l i t i c s , " pp. 15-27 i n Abraham Brumberg (ed.) Russia Under  Khrushchev. New York: F r e d r i c k A. Praeger, 1962. Shulman, M a r s h a l l D. "U.S.-Soviet R e l a t i o n s and the C o n t r o l of Nuclear Weapons," pp 77-101 i n Barry M. Blechman (ed.) Rethinking the U.S. S t r a t e g i c Posture: A Report from the  Aspen Consortium on Arms C o n t r o l and S e c u r i t y I s s u e s . Cambridge, Mass.: B a l l i n g e r P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1982. S u l l i v a n , Michael P. I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s : Theories and  Evidence. Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Inc., 1976 . Tucker, Robert C The Soviet P o l i t i c a l Mind. New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1963. Ulam, Adam B. The New Face of S o v i e t T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963. Vernon, Graham D. ed. S o v i e t P e r c e p t i o n s of War and Peace. Washington, D.C.: N a t i o n a l Defense U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981. V i g o r , P.H. The Soviet View of War, Peace and N e u t r a l i t y . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the S t a t e , and War. New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1959. Wight, M a r t i n . Power P o l i t i c s . Middlesex: Penguin Books L t d . , 1978. W i t t f o g e l , K a r l A. O r i e n t a l Despotism: A Comparative Study  of T o t a l Power. New York: Vintage Books, 1957. -74-References (contd.) Wolfe, Bertram D. "Communist Ideology and Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " pp. 152-170 F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 41 No. 1, October 1962 . Za g o r i a , Donald S. "The S i n o - S o v i e t C o n f l i c t and the West," pp. 171-190 For e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 41 No. 1, October 1962. "Into the Breach: New Soviet A l l i a n c e s i n the T h i r d World," pp. 733-754 F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 57 No. 4, Spring 1979. "The Moscow-Beijing Detente," pp. 853-873 Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s , Spring 1983. Zimmermann, W i l l i a m . S o v i e t P e r s p e c t i v e s on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e l a t i o n s , 1956-1967. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969 . "Rethinking Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y : Changing American P e r s p e c t i v e s , " pp. 548-562 I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , V o l . XXXV No. 3, Summer 1980. -75-Appendix 1 The l i t e r a t u r e on the i n f l u e n c e of ideology on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s extensive and v a r i e d . The q u a l i t y of the p o s i t i o n s presented also v a r i e s c o n s i d e r a b l y . The f o l l o w i n g short survey of the most i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n s does not pretend to be a comprehensive l i s t but merely a guide to the major p e r s p e c t i v e s i n the s c h o l a r l y l i t e r a t u r e w r i t t e n i n E n g l i s h . I t a l s o i n d i c a t e s the w r i t i n g s that I have consulted most e x t e n s i v e l y f o r t h i s essay. Hans Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among Nations: The Struggle  f o r Power & Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967), presents the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t p o s i t i o n that sees ideology as p r i m a r i l y a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of p o l i c y formulated on the basis of the imperatives of the s t r u g g l e f o r power. Martin Wight, Power  P o l i t i c s (Middlesex: Penguin Books L t d . , 1978), who a l s o takes a power p o l i t i c s p o s i t i o n , b e l i e v e s that r e v o l u t i o n a r y d o c t r i n e s can transform i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s but that t h e i r i n f l u e n c e never l a s t s more than two ge n e r a t i o n s . Samuel L. Sharp, " N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t s : Key to Soviet P o l i t i c s , " i n Abraham Brumberg (ed.) Russia Under Khrushchev (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1962), takes the p o s i t i o n that ideology i s not an o p e r a t i v e v a r i a b l e i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y which can be understood s o l e l y i n terms of Soviet n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . B a r r i n g t o n Moore J r . , S o v i e t P o l i t i c s - The Dilemma of Power (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950), wr i t e s that -76-while Soviet a l l i a n c e s are made on the basis of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , ideology may have a r e t a r d i n g or a c c e l e r a t i n g r o l e i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . Otto P i c k , "Soviet A l l i a n c e P o l i c i e s i n R e t r o s p e c t , " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l ( V o l . XXII No. 4, Autumn 1977), concludes that i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are secondary to n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n Soviet a l l i a n c e formation. Robert V. D a n i e l s , "Doctrine and Foreign P o l i c y , " i n E r i c P. Hoffmann & F r e d e r i c J . F l e r o n J r . (eds.) The Conduct of Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y (Chicago: Aladine Atherton, Inc., 1971), presents the view that while ideology i s important d o m e s t i c a l l y , i n Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y i t f u n c t i o n s mainly as p o s t - f a c t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n . K a r l W i t t f o g e l , O r i e n t a l Despotism: A Comparative Study of T o t a l  Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), presents perhaps the major statement of the view that Soviet Communism can be explained i n terms of h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y with p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y R u s s i a . In h i s book, Soviet t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s seen as simply a more despotic and t o t a l v a r i a n t of the t r a d i t i o n a l semi-managerial system of d e s p o t i c power. D a n i e l B e l l , "The End of Ideology i n the Soviet Union?" i n M i l o r a d M. Drachkovitch Marxist Ideology  i n the Contemporary World - I t s Appeals and Paradoxes (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1966), argues that ideology has ceased to serve as a guide to a c t i o n i n the Soviet Union. He claims that through a s e r i e s of domestic and e x t e r n a l i n c i d e n t s i n which i d e o l o g i c a l concepts clashed with r e a l i t y , Soviet i d e o l o g y was eroded away. Chester Bowles, "Is Communist Ideology Becoming I r r e l e v a n t ? " , F o r e i g n -77-A f f a i r s ( V o l . 40 No. 3, J u l y 1962), argues i n a s i m i l a r vein that indigenous f o r c e s , the pressure of events and pragmatic S o v i e t P o l i c i e s have been eroding Communist ideology and are c r e a t i n g a " c r i s i s of f a i t h . " W i l l i a m Zimmermann, Soviet  P e r s p e c t i v e s on I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , 1956-1967 ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), wr i t e s that Soviet perceptions of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s have g r a d u a l l y changed from t h e i r p r e v i o u s l y i d e o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s so that now they are very s i m i l a r to Western p e r c e p t i o n s . Of the w r i t e r s that perceive a s i g n i f i c a n t i d e o l o g i c a l impact on Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y Joseph M. Bochenski i n M i l o r a d M. Drachkovich, Marxist Ideology i n the Contemporary  World - I t s Appeals and Paradoxes (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1966), sees the process of i d e o l o g i c a l r e v i s i o n simply as a purging of spurious and n o n s e n s i c a l elements from Soviet Marxism-Leninism and not as a decay of Marxism-Leninism viewed as a moral and metaphysical f a i t h . Zbigniew K. B r z e z i n s k i , Ideology and Power i n Soviet  P o l i t i c s (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1967), notes that , although the i d e o l o g i c a l impact as a whole i s s i g n i f i c a n t , the d i f f e r e n t components ( p h i l o s o p h i c a l , d o c t r i n a l and a c t i o n program) i n f l u e n c e the f o r e i g n p o l i c y to v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t degrees. Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign P o l i c y , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ( V o l . 41 No. 1, October 1962), and Adam B. Ulam, The New Face of S o v i e t  T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963), both detect more of a r o l e f o r ideology than mere r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n although they acknowledge i t serves that -78-f u n c t i o n a l s o . David Joravsky, "Soviet Ideology," S o v i e t  Studies ( V o l . XVII No. 1, J u l y 1966), points out that even when we t a l k of " p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s m " i n the Soviet Union, u n d e r l y i n g i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s determine i t s s p e c i f i c shape to a l a r g e extent. R. N. Carew Hunt, "The Importance of D o c t r i n e , " i n E r i c P. Hoffmann & F r e d e r i c k J . F l e r o n J r . , (eds.) The Conduct of Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y (Chicago: A l d i n e Atherton, 1971), argues that Soviet Marxist ideology has led the Soviet leaders to hold such a d i s t o r t e d view of the world that t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s markedly d i f f e r e n t from other s t a t e s . In h i s view, the Soviet Union o f t e n s a c r i f i c e s e f f i c i e n c y i n the name of ideo l o g y . Richard Lowenthal, "The Logic of One-Party Rule," i n I b i d . , w r i t e s that ideology i s important only when i t serves the s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n needs of Soviet one-party r u l e . P. H. V i g o r , The Soviet View of War,  Peace and N e u t r a l i t y (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), concludes h i s lengthy study of Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l theory by saying that i t exerts a profound i n f l u e n c e on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . V. Kubalkova & A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism  and Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s (London: Routledge & Kegan Pa u l , 1980), write that Marxism-Leninism provides a v a l i d t h e o r e t i c a l framework which gives Soviet policy-makers a v a l u a b l e p e r s p e c t i v e from which to study the world and formulate r a t i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . R. Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks i t Could F i g h t & Win a Nuclear War," Commentary ( J u l y 1977), represents the view that Soviet formal m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e o f t e n t r u l y expresses f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s . Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational -79-Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Decision-Making," and R i t a M. K e l l y & F r e d e r i c J . F l e r o n , J r . , " P e r s o n a l i t y , Behavior, and Communist Ideology," i n E r i c P. Hoffmann & F r e d e r i c k J . F l e r o n , J r . (eds.) The Conduct of Soviet F o r e i g n P o l i c y (Chicago: A l d i n e Atherton, 1971), b e l i e v e that i d e o l o g y can have a profound impact at l e a s t on the l e v e l of the b e l i e f systems ( o p e r a t i o n a l code) of the i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c y maker. Alex I n k e l e s , "The T o t a l i t a r i a n Mystique: Some Impressions of the Dynamics of T o t a l i t a r i a n S o c i e t y , " i n C a r l F r i e d r i c h (ed.) T o t a l i t a r i a n i s m (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1954), w r i t e s that the " t o t a l i t a r i a n l e a d e r " i s a s p e c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l type who s t r i v e s f o r power i n order to remake s o c i e t y . -80-

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