THE SOVIET UNION AS A RATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY STATE:

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

The influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology on Soviet foreign policy is examined. Any relationship that exists is not a simple one. It is misleading to speak of "the" impact of Soviet ideology as if it constituted one simple variable. The ideology is made up of different components which have profoundly different impacts on Soviet foreign policy. In addition, many other variables besides ideology influence Soviet foreign behavior in complex and sometimes subtle ways.

In this essay I suggest a theoretical framework for the study of Soviet foreign policy that takes into account the complex interaction between ideology and other important variables. The failure of the national interest approach and the power politics approach in explaining certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy demonstrates the utility of a broader approach that includes ideology as a variable.

A framework that views the Soviet Union as a "rational-revolutionary" state is presented that points out the dualistic character of Soviet foreign policy. On the one hand, Soviet foreign policy is driven by considerations of power and national interests and, on the other by ideological considerations. Clearly, these various considerations clash at times and often Soviet policy-makers have to choose between an ideological and a non-ideological policy.
At the most basic level, Soviet Marxism-Leninism influences and shapes the perceptual and conceptual world of leaders who are socialized like other Soviet citizens. Ideology also plays a role in legitimizing Soviet one-party rule domestically. While it is probably impossible to estimate which of the two factors—belief in the ideological tenets or self-serving use of ideology to maintain power and privilege—is the more important, this study suggests that both play a significant role in Soviet policy formulation.

Foreign policy was found to be less ideological than most aspects of Soviet politics. Since Soviet leaders cannot manipulate international variables to the same extent as domestic ones an ideological "blueprint" is impossible. However, ideology places certain limitation on what may be considered 'feasible' foreign policy choices for the Soviet leadership.

It was found that ideology leads to power-damaging policies in two classes of actions: (1) the actual implementation and maintenance of policy intimately tied to the ends envisioned by the ideology and (2) actions that are undertaken to defend the doctrine-based legitimacy of the leadership. The ideological revisions that have often been interpreted as a betrayal of Soviet revolutionary interests are seen to be a purging of spurious and non-relevant elements from Marxism-Leninism.

The conceptual framework presented in this essay demonstrates that ideology cannot be dismissed as a significant operational variable in Soviet international
behavior. It often influences the form and content of Soviet foreign policy decisions. However, the framework also points out that Soviet policy is not dictated solely by ideological imperatives.
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Those politicians of the revolutionary class who are unable "to maneuver, to compromise" in order to avoid an obviously disadvantageous battle are good for nothing.

V.I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder. 1

INTRODUCTION

The question of the relationship between ideology and Soviet foreign policy is an extremely perplexing one. The study of the motivational role of ideology in influencing political behavior in general is one of the most difficult areas of social science. 2 In the case of the Soviet Union, learned opinion varies from assertions that ideology is merely used as post facto rationalization of policy motivated by more basic considerations of power or national interests to claims that ideology acts as a decisive independent or semi-dependent variable in influencing political behavior. (See Appendix I for a short survey of representative views on this question.) As Rita Kelly and Frederic Fleron note:

...every Communist "specialist" has an answer to this vital question of the motivational role of Communist ideology and seeks to justify it usually by pointing to certain actions in the past which conformed to his interpretation of the motivational role of Communist ideology. 3

Many of those who analyze the relationship between ideology and foreign policy tend to look at the question in more or less absolute terms. This often leads to overstated hypotheses in which ideology either determines most of Soviet foreign policy or else has negligible influence. It
is easy then to select and interpret facts in order to support one's particular view. As Alfred G. Meyer writes:

For either hypothesis, there is a good deal of supporting evidence. At the same time, neither is subject to convincing verification: it is impossible to state firmly that any policy being pursued is or is not in accord with the ideology... 4

The question often posed is whether ideology makes the Soviet Union "more aggressive" than non-ideological nations. However, as Michael Sullivan has pointed out, to lump all the numerous behaviors of nations along a "simple conflict-to-cooperation continuum... tends to cancel out the true differences among countries."5 This observation holds most true for those writers who study the incidence of Soviet involvement in major armed conflict and, finding no statistically significant difference between the Soviet Union and other states, conclude that Soviet Marxism-Leninism has no influence on their behavior in international relations. At the other extreme, one finds those who argue that the Soviet Union, driven by its Communist ideology, is unavoidably and dangerously expansionist.6

To compound the problem, the general definition of ideology has escaped consensus. Depending on whether one accepts a broader or more narrow definition the answer one gives to the problem can vary considerably. In this essay, ideology will be taken to mean much more than official doctrine. David Joravsky puts forward this definition:
When we call a belief ideological, we are saying at least three things about it: although it is unverified or unverifiable, it is accepted as verified by a particular group, because it performs social functions for that group.7

Zbigniew Brzezinski adds a very important aspect to the definition in the Soviet case when he notes that "the ideology is both a set of conscious assumptions and purposes and part of the total historical, social, and personal background of the Soviet leaders..."8 Scholars have often concentrated on the 'conscious assumptions' or doctrine of the ideology and overlooked the influence of the indirect and often unacknowledged aspects of ideology that make up the latter part of Brzezinski's definition. It is misleading to speak of "the" impact of Soviet ideology as if it constituted one simple variable. The ideology itself, as we shall see, is made up of different components which have profoundly different impacts on foreign policy.

Clearly, any relationship that exists is not a simple causal one but is related to other variables influencing Soviet foreign behavior in a complex and sometimes subtle way. To get a complete understanding many different levels of foreign behavior must be looked at, including: communication with other countries, character of alliance formation, exchange of information and trade, sanctions against other countries (frequency and type), frequency and level of military conflict, and behavior following intervention (length of occupation, reluctance to withdraw, etc.). The level of ideological motivation may vary greatly
from one context to another. It should be mentioned here that while a theoretical model for the study of Soviet foreign policy will be suggested in this essay, there will be no attempt to present a comprehensive empirical study of Soviet behavior in international relations. While such a study is outside the scope of this essay, the theoretical model presented here may aid such future empirical studies.

While I believe that a study of ideological influence is crucial for a full understanding of Soviet behavior, current research suggests that Soviet foreign policy is not as cohesive, purposive, and non-malleable as is often thought. Many recent works suggest that it is appreciably more voluntaristic and highly reactive. Robert Daniels points out that, "foreign policy is one of the least ideological aspects of Soviet politics, in reality if not in words." Clearly the Soviet leaders cannot manipulate international variables to the same extent as domestic ones, a fact which in itself makes an ideological "blueprint" impossible. Sullivan writes that studies of the system dynamics of international relations show that "a great deal of international behavior can be understood without considering these individual-level elements". The assumption is that, like other states, the Soviet Union often behaves as a function of the position it occupies in the international system. While these observations are undoubtedly true and must be taken into consideration, they cannot explain certain aspects of Soviet behavior that seem amenable solely to an ideological interpretation.
Yet, despite the initial plausibility of the hypothesis that ideology does influence Soviet foreign policy on many different levels, political scientists have been reluctant lately to devote much serious time to the study of the relationship. The likelihood that hypotheses about the relationship cannot be rigorously tested (a specially acute dilemma in the case of the Soviet Union due to the closed nature of its society) is certainly an important factor in explaining this reluctance. As Adam B. Ulam noted, a study of the relationship can only "suggest a certain range of problems and characteristics of Russian policies. It cannot... sketch an 'unavoidable' pattern of development of Soviet policies..." In other words, the best we can hope for is informed speculation on how ideology influences perceptions, inclinations and predispositions that have a bearing on foreign policy. An additional qualification comes from the fact that these inclinations are again affected by contact with reality. This inherent vagueness has had, as Alfred Meyer points out, the following effect:

the empirical bent of contemporary social science impels many of us to leave such obstreperous material alone and turn to more quantifiable and researachable problems.

Kelly and Fleron note that the importance attributed to the ideological influence on Soviet foreign policy varies greatly depending on one's field of specialization in the social sciences. Political scientists and Kremlinologists tend to dismiss ideology as a major motivating force in favor of more pragmatic or power political considerations.
This clear variation between the approaches of the different disciplines suggests that, in order to make sense of complex phenomena, scholars often emphasize certain variables while others, perhaps equally important but more difficult to access, are overlooked. However, as Kelly and Fleron write, "scarcity of data concerning relevant variables does not justify sloppy methodology or [their] exclusion..." 18

An additional reason that serious scholars have shied away from this study has been that strong anti-Communist rhetoric masquerading as "scientific" analysis of Soviet ideology has driven the study into disrepute. However, I believe that this reason should, on the contrary, be a stimulus for joining the debate in order to bring the purported influences of ideology back from the implausible extremes to their actual dimensions.

Keeping all of the above considerations and complications in mind, I will attempt in this essay to construct a theoretical framework for the study of the impact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy. In Part one of this essay I will review the two leading approaches to the study of Soviet foreign policy behavior that do not consider ideology as a major operational variable: the National Interest Approach and the Power Politics Approach. The explanatory and predictive strengths of these approaches will be looked at but at the same time I will point out their inability to explain certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy. This overview of the two approaches will demonstrate the utility of a broader approach that includes ideology as
a variable.

In Part Two of the essay, the rational-revolutionary explanation of Soviet foreign policy will be presented. Section I of this part will illustrate how ideology places certain limitations on what may be considered 'feasible' foreign policy choices for the Soviet leadership. In Section II the 'dualistic' character of Soviet foreign policy will be explained - i.e. how it can be characterized as simultaneously being 'rational' and 'revolutionary' - two concepts usually considered mutually exclusive.

In Part Three of the essay I will examine the rational-revolutionary explanation of Soviet foreign policy in greater depth by looking at the characteristics of Soviet ideology. Following a study of both the philosophical and doctrinal components of the ideology and their varying influence on the foreign policy, I will examine the specific ways in which the ideology influences the Soviet leadership. In this section, I will try to establish the plausibility of the view that ideology does indeed influence the perceptions of people in power and that these ideological perceptions are translated into concrete foreign policy choices.

Following this, I will look at the complex relationship between Soviet domestic and foreign politics. The role ideology plays in legitimizing the Soviet leadership will be studied as part of our rational-revolutionary model.

In Part Four of the essay, I will point out expected long-term tendencies of Soviet foreign policy based on the
rational-revolutionary model. I will look at both the ideological-revolutionary tendencies and the ideologically derived rational tendencies of Soviet foreign policy. Using this analysis I will project some specific limits to what may be considered 'feasible' foreign policy choices for the Soviet Union.

This theoretical part of the essay will be followed by a study of how ideology affects concrete foreign policy decisions. In this part I will apply the rational-revolutionary model to the Soviet approach towards detente, Eastern Europe, preferred regimes, and perceptions of Soviet power projection capabilities.

I will conclude the essay with a case study of the Soviet view of the United States. The rational-revolutionary model will be applied to this analysis to demonstrate how Soviet perceptions are influenced by ideological considerations.

In the conclusion of the essay, I will summarize all the main points that have been made and also list the major non-ideological variables that influence Soviet foreign policy.
PART ONE:
LEADING APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

I. The National Interest School:

One approach to explaining the foreign policy of states has been to attempt an explanation in non-doctrinal terms. If this succeeds relatively well, it is often concluded that ideology plays no decisive role in shaping foreign policies. The most common of these approaches attempts to explain foreign policy in terms of power politics and/or national interests.

The national interest school believes that the "state's most vital needs," which include "self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being" are the "fundamental objective and ultimate determinant that guides the decision makers of a state in making foreign policy." The problem with this approach, Sullivan points out, is that "to argue that states act because 'their national interest is at stake' may be valid, but almost solely by definition... If a state acts in a given situation... logically some interest is at stake..." Samuel Sharp demonstrates the ambiguity of this approach when he argues that it does not matter what outsiders might objectively feel Soviet national interests are, but that "as the term is defined here, the only view that matters is that held by the Soviet leaders."
Clearly, such a definition is tautological and avoids the real question of what determines different interpretations of national interests.\textsuperscript{22}

II. Power Politics School:

Similar problems afflict power political interpretations. As Donald Zagoria argues, to say that foreign policy is simply a matter of power politics is to assume incorrectly that power exists in some "pure" form unrelated to ideas.\textsuperscript{23} Power considerations tell us little about tactics and purposes. Sullivan correctly states that "it would be fallacious to equate the great interest in power with the assertion that power thereby 'explains' nation-state behavior."\textsuperscript{24} Power politics can tell us little about what the Soviet Union is going to do if it invades a country (e.g., how long will it remain, what will it do to secure its power), how it views its 'sphere of influence', how it will react to attempted defections from that sphere, which type of ally it prefers most and which least, etc., etc. Clearly the Soviet response to these situations will differ from other states, and ideology plays an important part in the explanation.

However, despite their shortcomings, it would be wrong to think that these approaches lack explanatory power. V. V. Aspaturian, in his book, \textit{Power & Process in Soviet Foreign Policy}, argues in line with the power politics approach that the "maximization of possible diplomatic gains in the
non-communist world dictated a minimization and dilution of the ideological content of Soviet foreign policy. "25

Certainly this observation at least partially explains the dramatic change from the initial Soviet eagerness to promote world revolution to the more orthodox diplomatic style they adopted soon after. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that this does not mean ideology was abandoned or even truly 'diluted'. Soviet "zigzags", in Bertram Wolfe's words, "were meant to circumvent impassable ravines, not renounce the climb."26 We will examine the question of whether there has been an erosion of Soviet ideology more fully later in the essay.
PART TWO

THE RATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

I. Limitations on Soviet Foreign Policy:

Sharp points to an important way that power affects the behavior of the Soviet Union:

The persistence of the enemy image and the drive for "unlimited power" may well be present in the minds of the Soviet leaders, but the history of future years will be shaped, not by this admittedly unfriendly view of the outside world, but by what the Soviet leaders are persuaded or compelled to do... by their desire for survival and appraisal of the limits of the feasible.27

While we may argue that the Soviet leaders' pursuit of power may be conditioned by their ideological 'spectacles,' we certainly must agree that they are 'realistic' in the sense Sharp suggests. Often they have played the power game as well and as cautiously as any others. However, I would suggest, the term 'feasible' in the Soviet context carries an extra connotation. In addition to considerations of power, Soviet policy is limited by also having to be feasible ideologically. I am suggesting that a foreign policy that cannot plausibly be explained and justified in Marxist-Leninist terms will not be seriously considered by Soviet leaders. It would have dramatic repercussions on the legitimacy of the leadership both domestically and among the Socialist camp.
The implications of this hypothesis are: while power political considerations and systemic constraints do exclude a significant part (though not all) of the ideological program from Soviet foreign policy, ideological considerations make it equally difficult for the Soviet leaders simply to abandon their "revolutionary aspirations" or even consistently and cynically to manipulate them in the service of "pragmatic" foreign policy. The range of choices between the two non-feasible extremes still allows, as we will see, for a foreign policy that can properly be called "ideologically motivated".

II. The Dualism of Soviet Foreign Policy:

If the hypothesis presented above is supported, it follows that the usual formulation of the problem, as being a question of explaining Soviet foreign policy exclusively in terms of power politics and national interests or, on the other hand, exclusively in ideological terms, is incorrect. If the pursuit of power and national interests is seen as a question of survival, which is undoubtedly the supreme obligation of a nation, then power politics will be a factor in shaping the foreign policy of even the most ideological state. This is especially true of Soviet Marxist-Leninists for whom, as V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank note, "it is not a question of theory or power: for them that theory is most truly marxist which contributes most to the acquisition and maintenance of power and 'national interests'...
Marxism-Leninism is all about power politics. While the ideology "does not prescribe any particular course of action for any particular situation" and is thus perfectly compatible with the power political approach, it "supplies the ends," which make it distinct from a pure power political approach.

This 'dual' character of Soviet Marxism-Leninism suggests that it may be most beneficial to view Soviet foreign policy as the policy of, what we can call, a "rational-revolutionary state." This characterization runs against conventional wisdom in that it is usually assumed that the concepts 'rational' (in the power political sense of maximizing gains) and 'revolutionary' (i.e., ideological) are mutually exclusive. For example, John Herz writes:

... ideological and political power motivations can be distinguished only if it can be shown that (a) the pursuit of power and national interest was, at least at times, subordinated to a power-damaging ideological policy, and (b) the conduct of foreign policy in peace and conduct of war reveal the specific impact of ideology, distinguishing it from that conducted by normal powers.30

Arguing along the same line, R.N. Carew Hunt proposes "inefficiency" as an "index of ideology".31 Again, the impact of ideology is seen as something that often weakens rather than strengthens the country.32 In a similar way, Herbert Dinerstein writes that ideology has made Soviet foreign policy less rational.33

While there is certainly a relationship between ideology and a lack of cost-benefit analysis, I submit that it is not manifest in Soviet foreign policy to any greater
degree than is normal for other states, with the exception of two classes of actions: (1) the actual implementation and maintenance of policy intimately tied to the ends envisioned by their ideology and (2) actions that are undertaken to defend the doctrine-based legitimacy of the leadership.

Once we grant the "non-rational" assumptions and goals of the ideology, any number of rational paths to the attainment of "world-wide communism" are permitted. The main examples Hunt provides of Soviet inefficiency; 1) reluctance to implement rational economic reform domestically, and 2) the imposition of state socialist economies in East Europe belong to the first class of actions: i.e., are actual implementations of the ends of the ideology. The second class of actions reflect the indirect effects of the implementation of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet domestic context and are more difficult to discern. They will be discussed in Part IV of this essay.

The framework of the 'rational-revolutionary' state that is being suggested, is able to accommodate the compromises, alliances and zig zags that have often been interpreted as a betrayal of Soviet revolutionary interests. If we keep in mind how the Soviet Union, seen as a "rational revolutionary state" seeking to promote its own brand of Communism abroad, would act, given a realistic appraisal of its power capabilities and the systemic constraints inherent in international relations, I believe that we may get an accurate picture of many of the major forces motivating

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Soviet foreign policy.

It should also be noted that the dualism of Soviet foreign policy that we are talking about here is roughly equivalent to the distinction the Soviets themselves make between state and party interests. While Trotsky and other early Soviet leaders saw diplomacy as basically a revolutionary activity, this approach was amended by subsequent leaders to the much more useful one that placed the two activities (i.e., revolutionary activities and proper state-to-state relations) in separate classes. This dichotomy also explains the simultaneous (and seemingly inconsistent) existence of organizations dedicated to these separate classes of activity: the Party with its related organizations dedicated to proletarian internationalism and the diplomatic corps that maintains regular relations with other states and operates from the Foreign Ministry.  

Before we look at the possible applications of this dualistic view, it is necessary to examine some of the specific characteristics of Soviet ideology and the means by which they become operational factors in foreign policy.
PART III. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY

I. SOVIET MARXISM-LENINISM

Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that a distinction should be made between three aspects of the ideology: (1) its philosophical component, (2) its doctrinal component, and (3) its action program. He elaborates further that "the philosophical parts involve the a priori assumptions which form the foundation stone of the ideology." These aspects are most resistant to change and are "essentially dogmatic." The doctrinal parts refer to such things as "historical laws and phases" which are "historically contingent concepts of a strategic character." Brzezinski writes, the action program,

... derived from the doctrinal principles which in turn are grounded on the philosophical assumptions, involves the purposeful process of fulfillment of that which is held to be immanent. It can change if need be, and the success of the change in itself establishes a new contingent truth.

These different levels that Brzezinski alludes to suggest that Soviet ideology should not be equated solely with Marxist theory, although it is clear they are thoroughly meshed with each other. Marxist theory is most evident in the philosophical component which can be said to consist of the following:

1) Dialectical materialism; which includes the belief that matter is all that exists, that reality is in
essence dialectical (i.e., that it changes through the clash of contradictions) and that the nature of that reality is intelligible through the discovery of universal laws. (This philosophical outlook leads to the view that even in the social sciences, it is possible not only to produce a taxonomic classification of the data, but also to explain relationships, predict future occurrences of variables and relationships and even to influence and/or manipulate their occurrence.)

2) Historical materialism; which consists of the application of dialectical laws to man and society and leads to the view that the triumph of Communism is a historical inevitability and that the CPSU, as the vanguard of mankind, will help bring about this consummation of history. (Brzezinski does not include this second set of beliefs in the philosophical component of the ideology but I feel that they stand apart from the doctrinal component since they cannot be viewed as historically contingent due to their central legitimizing role for the leadership.)

One hypothesis that emerges from research Kal Holsti has done on the concept of "role" may be included in our analysis here. He suggests that if a country has a large number of well-developed role perceptions, it will tend
towards greater activity in international systems or subsystems.41

It is clear from our analysis that Marxism-Leninism supplies many such role perceptions for the Soviet Union including: vanguard of the proletariat, leading interpreter of reality and mover of history, primary anti-imperialist agent42, leader and defender of the socialist bloc, etc. Such perceptions legitimize greater Soviet involvement in international affairs.

However, not all components of the Soviet ideology have operational value. As Richard Lowenthal has noted:

... there is any amount of historical evidence to show that the rules have been altered again and again to fit the practical decisions ex post facto. Moreover, there are vast parts of the Communist ideological structure, such as the scholastic refinements of "dialectical materialism" or the labor theory of value, that in their nature are so remote from the practical matters to be decided that their interpretation cannot possibly affect policy decisions.43

Lowenthal's analysis points out how malleable aspects of official doctrine are. This is important to note for it points out that claims like Richard Pipes's that an analysis of military doctrine "proves" that the Soviet Union believes it can fight and win an all out nuclear war should be viewed with scepticism.44 The military doctrine that he refers to certainly does not have operational value in contemporary Soviet foreign policy where the dangers of nuclear war are clearly understood. As we have noted, Soviet behavior is not prone to a lack of cost-benefit analysis when analyzing such important factors in international relations as nuclear war.
However, it would also be wrong to conclude, as many have upon observing this doctrinal flexibility, that the whole of Soviet ideology is simply a cynical sham.

a) The Philosophical Component of Soviet Ideology

It is from the philosophical component of the ideology that the belief in the scientific status of Marxism-Leninism stems. This claim—that only the Party has the key to the discovery of the social laws of development, the one "scientific truth"—legitimizes the Party as sole interpreter of reality. Paradoxically perhaps, this ties in with the religious-like character of Soviet ideology that many scholars have noted and which also arises from the philosophical component. As Adam B. Ulam writes, this aspect of the ideology serves an important function as a "symbol and quasi-religion giving its practitioners the sense that they are moving forward with the forces of history and that the success of their state is predicated upon the truth of the doctrine." The philosophy supplies what Bertram Wolfe has described as a "myth-affirmed will to action." Its continued vitality and relevance even in the face of the failure of its assumptions about capitalism is due, as Ulam points out, to the "natural intransigence of religious millenarian movements to purely rational objective facts."
b) The Doctrinal Component of Soviet Ideology

The doctrinal component of Soviet ideology is seen as the bridge between dogma and action.\(^{49}\) While it is flexible in the long term, it is rigid at any one time. Changes in doctrine (with a possible time lag) correspond to changes in "reality, historical experience, growth of Soviet power, etc."\(^{50}\) However, changes do not necessarily signify an abandonment or "erosion" of ideology as many Western scholars feel but rather represent modifications that constantly reinvigorate the ideology by keeping it up to date. Through his research into the question of ideological erosion, Joseph Bochenski has demonstrated that ideological revision can credibly be interpreted as a purification of Marxism-Leninism from spurious and nonsensical elements.\(^{51}\)

As examples of such necessary changes in doctrine, we can cite Khrushchev's innovations: separate paths to socialism are possible, peaceful coexistence with the capitalists is possible, imperialist contradictions are not as serious as previously thought, wars are no longer inevitable. Although initially reactive to various external changes and pressures, such changes can become operational variables. As William Zimmermann writes, "in any political process tactical statements and formulations often have a curious way of becoming, over time, the _real_, i.e., operational, position of groups."\(^{52}\) This observation points to the crucial link between doctrine and action. If the doctrine underwent frequent change, it would soon be regarded as mere
propaganda. At the same time, retaining obsolete doctrine that cannot be acted upon, would have the same effect. As Paul Marantz writes:

Doctrinal innovations are not introduced lightly out of momentary considerations. Doctrinal change is linked to fundamental transformations in the conceptual framework the Soviet leaders employ in attempting to perceive, order, and comprehend the complexities of the political world.53

Thus, doctrine is important in its role as a link to action and can serve as an indicator of the limits of feasible policy that were hypothesized in Part two of this essay.

These characteristics of the ideology in themselves (as we shall see later) exert a direct effect on actual Soviet foreign policy. However, to understand the full impact ideology has in the Soviet context, we must look at the different levels on which it affects perceptions in the Soviet Union and how these perceptions are translated into operational foreign policy positions.

II. The Individual Level of Analysis

When we speak of the impact of Soviet ideology, we are referring to the manifold implicit and explicit influences of Soviet Marxism-Leninism on Soviet political behavior.

One of the premises of this essay is that "domestic sources of foreign policy are no less crucial to its content and conduct than are the international situations toward
which it is directed." The view that ideology can and does have an impact on foreign policy is partly based on the assumption that the decision-maker can have real influence over the international environment and that his "belief system" is important in determining the way that this influence is manifested, i.e., is real in its consequences. That this is not an untenable position a priori has been amply demonstrated by the impact of the Christian and Muslim creeds over many centuries and more recently Hitler's Germany.

At the most basic level, the ideology influences the world view of individual Soviet citizens including leaders. Some western scholars (for example, Richard Lowenthal) doubt that rational people, such as the Soviet leaders surely are, actually believe in the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, Alexander George stresses that "many scientifically-oriented scholars ... influenced by psychological theories of cognition, have been struck by the role that the subjective perceptions and beliefs of leaders play in their decision-making in conflict situations." He adds that "the foreign policy of a nation addresses itself not to the external world, as is commonly stated, but rather to 'the image of the external world' that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy." Brzezinski has stressed that, to dismiss the influence of ideology on the political conduct of Soviet leaders, one would have to assume:
that it is possible to build up a large organization ostensibly dedicated to certain explicit objectives, in which individuals are promoted on the basis both of their professional ability and their demonstrable ideological dedication both in which an inner sanctum operates, makes decisions with a complete disregard of the ideological principles of the movement, indeed remains immune to the constant pressures for ideological justification, and cynically disregards the official creed.  

Kubalkova and Cruickshank point out that despite the "unusual awareness in Western research of processes of political socialization operative in the Soviet Union" there is a "somewhat casual assumption that the foreign policy-makers are completely immune or in some way exempt from the socialization process." The power of socialization is underlined by Alfred Meyer when he reminds us that "ideology is the language of politics in the USSR... [It] serves as the frame of reference for all individuals in the society." Soviet leaders, in Bertram Wolfe's words, "were born in the ambience of their ideology, like a fish in water, and educated in that ideology's tenets and techniques."  

Those who insist that Marxism-Leninism cannot influence attitudes to any great extent due to its contradictions and ambiguities, overlook the fact that every belief system in its unique way serves to apprehend some aspects of reality at the same time as it obscures others. Kubalkova and Cruickshank point out that one of the dangers of subjecting Soviet ideology to "hasty Western interpretation" is that "notions torn out of the close-knit context of
Marxism-Leninism are not always 'contradictions' when viewed within the framework of [the] ideology where they belong.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, it is simply incorrect to say that Marxism-Leninism does not offer insight into international relations. Ulam points out that Soviet ideology has fostered an "unusual sensitivity to economic and social development in states playing a major role in international relations... It has endowed the Russian policy makers with a degree of sophistication about international relations surpassing the old platitudes of the diplomatic art..."\textsuperscript{62} In other words, its "relevance" is easily demonstrated.

Clearly then, ideology can serve as a guide to orient Soviet citizens and leaders and shape the standards and norms applied to foreign policy. However, the problem lies in the fact that the individual level of analysis, despite its extensive explanatory powers, has little predictive value. Even if it is acknowledged that ideology influences the world view of Soviet leaders, this does not help us anticipate Soviet foreign behavior. We should remind ourselves again that foreign policy is conditioned as much by systemic and situational variables of the international system as by psychological variables influencing decision makers.

We have established the important fact that Soviet leaders' beliefs about the world are probably influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology which implies that the goals, methods, etc., of the ideology mean something for them and will be pursued if possible. However, we must look to a
different level of analysis to distinguish the hierarchy and relationship between the various elements of the ideology.

III. Ideology and Domestic Politics

One of the apparent paradoxes of the Soviet Union is the fact that at the same time it espouses an ideology of world revolution, domestically it is one of the most status-quo-oriented powers in the world. This situation can be explained by looking at the relationship between the CPSU, Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet history.

There are two major ways that Marxism-Leninism initially shaped the domestic political structure in the Soviet Union: (1) Achieving the Marxist program of a violent revolutionary overthrow of the existing regime in order to implement Communist rule demanded a centralized and highly disciplined party; (2) Implementation of a nationwide planned economy, which the ideology called for, necessitated the perpetuation of Party centralism and heavy-handed rule in order to implement the drastic and often unpopular measures this reform entailed.

In both of these cases, ideology was used to justify the right of the Party to act in a purposeful way. As Hunt points out, the type of collective society that was established in the Soviet Union then determined the character of the ideology. The basic principles were still derived from revolutionary Marxism. However, an additional level of operational principles came into being when the
inner logic of Marxism-Leninism was combined with the "logic of one party rule." The legitimizing function that Marxism-Leninism fulfilled created an unusual situation, a Catch-22. As Kubalkova and Cruickshank note, the repudiation of the ideology would entail the repudiation of the Party and the leadership whose legitimacy rests on that ideology. Underscoring the complexity of the Soviet system, Ulam writes: "If ideology becomes decorative and meaningless... where, in the last resort, will be the rationale for the totalitarian system, for the assumed omnipotence and omniscience of the highest councils of the Communist Party?"

The Marxist-Leninist claim to "scientific" status leads the party to resist independent groupings of power that could challenge its authority as the sole interpreter of reality. However, the insistence on central control, as we have already noted, is economically inefficient.

The reluctance of the leadership to undertake large-scale internal reforms is due to the fact that it has a vested interest in maintaining the ideology at two levels: First, as we saw earlier, the belief system provides a sense of their inner worth and effectiveness; and second, their prestige, power and the attendant benefits rest on the continued effectiveness of the ideology in legitimizing their rule. Which of these two motives is stronger is impossible to evaluate accurately. However, it seems reasonable to believe that they both exert a profound influence on the Soviet decision to perpetuate the ideology
as more than mere window dressing. Our analysis of the impact of ideology on detente in section I of Part Five will look at this relationship in more detail.

In the last few decades, Soviet foreign and domestic policy have become increasingly interconnected. As an example, Brzezinski notes that diversity in ideology among Socialist states "threatens the domestic legitimacy of [the] Soviet ideology by denying its central claim—that is, its universal validity—which is used as a justification for its domestic application." This suggests that there will always be a need to "prove" Marxism-Leninism's universal-missionary relevance. In this fact lies the greatest dilemma of Soviet foreign policy. Due to the perceived Soviet role as leader of the Socialist camp, the party's domestic role, and the leadership's wish to achieve its ideological program, constant pressures are exerted that clash with the power realities of international relations.

Perhaps we are best able to summarize the influence that the rational-revolutionary model of the Soviet Union attributes to ideology in schematic form. The path through which ideology influences Soviet foreign policy is illustrated in Figure 1 below:
Square (I) represents the ideology with all the characteristics we have analyzed. Square (II) represents the influence of ideology at the individual level on the leadership. Square (III) lists some of the non-ideological domestic factors that might diminish the ideological pressures. Square (IV) represents the ideological policy that would emerge if not for the attenuating influence of the factors listed in square (V). The operational foreign policy results from the interaction of the contents of squares (IV) and (V) and also depends on how this interaction influences the contents of square (III) and the perceptions formed in square (II). For example, the unsuccessful/successful application of a foreign policy decision may change the balance of power between competing...
domestic groups and thus lead to a different foreign policy emphasis with a greater or lesser ideological component. This new approach would then be applied in the international arena, etc.
PART FOUR.
EXPECTED GENERAL LONG-TERM TENDENCIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON THE RATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION

The ambiguity resulting from the characteristics we have discussed creates a foreign policy which attempts to be both rational (from the power political view) and revolutionary (ideological) in order to satisfy the constraints noted above. This has resulted in a number of general tendencies that I believe will continue to characterize Soviet foreign policy in the foreseeable future.

I. Ideological-Revolutionary Tendencies

The first set of tendencies stems from the original Marxist Weltanschauung which rejects the Liberal notion of harmony of interests and tends to see world development in terms of 'unavoidable' struggle. International politics are not seen as a "game" but as an intense conflict. This world view stems from Marxist dialectics which see all material reality changing through the clash of antagonistic contradictions and from Marxist historical materialism which perceives progress through different historical stages. It leads to the following more specific approaches towards international relations:
a) a perceived hostile dichotomy between the two major socio-economic systems is reflected in the "two camps" doctrine. The central opponent is not perceived as limited or temporary.

b) a tendency to view international relations as a zero-sum situation in which there is a slow but constant strengthening of the "progressive" historical forces to the detriment of "reactionary" ones. Even though there may be temporary set-backs, the eventual victory of Socialism is not in doubt. This tendency stems from the chiliastic element in Marxism-Leninism.

c) related to "b" is the feeling that all ground gained by the progressive socialist forces must be preserved. This pertains primarily to the security of the Soviet Union and its East European satellites but also applies anywhere else that a pro-Soviet socialist regime is installed. The loss of such gains would threaten the ideological belief in historical progress which stands at the core of Marxism-Leninism and also of Party legitimacy.

d) while there is an acceptance of the need to adjust to particular historical phases, there
is also a continuity in perceived purpose. This leads to the view that phases like detente cannot be seen as "true" long-term stability which preclude further historical change. In this sense, compromises are not seen as ends in themselves, as they often are by nations, but as means to "higher ends".

II. Ideologically Derived Rational Tendencies

The second set of tendencies is tied to the Marxist-Leninist's claim that their ideology is scientific, and it also stems from Marxian dialectics. This view, that reality is intelligible through the discovery of the "laws" of social and historical development, has led to the following characteristics of Soviet foreign policy:

a) it is intensely concerned with the nature of world change and such questions as: Who is our major opponent?, What are the best ways to achieve our ideological goals? What is the nature of the present historical phase and in which direction is it evolving? This component of the ideology leads to a sophisticated awareness of relationships between political institutions and economic forces and of the connection between international and domestic politics.
b) in order to decide when the most propitious moment for intervention on behalf of historical development arrives, there is a tremendous effort to discover the "correlation of forces" between the capitalist and socialist camps. The emphasis placed on this correlation influences Soviet decisions concerning foreign interventions, wars, etc. When it is felt that the correlation is unfavorable to their side, any form of adventurism is avoided due to the possibility of a "setback" for Socialism. This has led, in the past to a cautious Soviet profile in international activity.

c) there is a tendency to approach present problems on the basis of previously successful authoritative diagnoses. This is due to the belief that Soviet Marxist-Leninists do indeed have a special scientific understanding of the historical process.

It will be noticed that the first set of characteristics make up the "revolutionary" component in our framework of Soviet foreign policy. The second set, while also "ideological", leads to realistic appraisals of power relations and makes up the "rational" component of Soviet foreign policy. However, it should be made clear that these are primarily analytical distinctions and in reality the two sets of characteristics are interwoven and often indistinguishable. For example, if the correlation of forces
is felt to be unfavorable for action, the belief that time is on their side due to "inevitable" historical progress, injects a passive-deterministic outlook. (The concept of correlation of forces, which is the base of Soviet foreign policy 'realism' is actually a very ideological concept since it is used as an indicator of the inevitable arrival of world socialism as predicted by Marxist historical materialism.) In addition, the cautious and rational avoidance of adventure and extreme risk is also due to the fear of the effect a "setback" would have on the belief in the progression of historical forces. The important point being made here is that ideology is an integral component of Soviet foreign policy even in situations where adherence to the strict national interests and power politics school might only perceive policy that aims at the 'maximization of gains.'

Having isolated the ideological motivating forces that act upon Soviet foreign policy decision-making, it still remains to be seen if our model can be applied successfully. The way in which the various elements that we have discussed combine and interact with each other is probably best demonstrated by looking at actual examples of past and present Soviet activity in international politics.
PART FIVE:
HOW IDEOLOGY AFFECTS CONCRETE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS.

I. Detente

The example of detente is very relevant in explaining the dynamics of this process. Khrushchev's doctrinal changes, upon consolidation of his power, were essentially due to the realization that all-out military struggle against capitalism was a self-defeating method of spreading communism. However, we must ask why the commitments to the ideological struggle and other lesser means of spreading communism were also not abandoned? The answer is to be found in the fact that doctrinal change can only go so far before the danger of a true erosion of ideology and the spread of disintegrative opinions threatens the very foundation of Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet political structure. There are certain mechanisms instituted in the Soviet domestic political structure that act to prevent any possible major erosion of ideology which we will look at now.

Soviet Marxist-Leninist doctrine speaks to two audiences, the West, for which many of Khrushchev's peace pronouncements were intended, and the domestic audience and the Socialist camp. Let us consider the second, more important audience. The change in doctrine was due to the fact that some correspondence between the doctrine and the reality of Soviet actions has to exist. Otherwise, as was
noted earlier, doctrine loses all relevance with the result that the ideology is damaged. This implies that the regime must eventually act on the doctrine or renounce it. For example, the fact that Khrushchev did not renounce all revolutionary aspirations suggests that the leadership felt a limit to the ideological backpeddling was reached. I would even suggest that Khrushchev had overstepped the boundary in the sense that he stressed the truly peaceful and long term status of peaceful coexistence rather than its role in furthering the spread of Communism. When Khrushchev left the leadership, Soviet spokesmen pointed out the dangers of emphasizing peaceful coexistence to the detriment of other aspects of the ideological program.\(^78\)

Regarding the relationship between doctrine and action, it is important to note that through Brezhnev's rule there was a "complete lack of innovation" in doctrine. This stands in sharp contrast to Khrushchev's "active process of doctrinal reform"\(^79\) and reinforces the view that doctrinal change is intimately tied to actual perceptions of Soviet leaders and their approach to Soviet policy. If this were not the case and doctrine had no relevance, Soviet ideologists could have continued the innovations initiated during Khrushchev's rule even after his removal.

The more active role that the Soviet Union took in the third world after Khrushchev corresponds to a more ideologically balanced foreign policy that attempted to address more equally the many vital interests of the Soviet Union. This new emphasis under Brezhnev indicates that there
was a perceived need to demonstrate socialism's
'progressive' role in world affairs. As Mark N. Katz writes:

While wars of national liberation have always been
of interest to the Soviet Union, they held a
definitely subsidiary place in Soviet foreign
policy through the mid-1960's. During the Brezhnev
era, though, Soviet interest and involvement in
Third World conflicts has evolved into one of the
most central and active aspects of Soviet foreign
and military policy.80

This development fits in well with the hypothesis that there
is a certain limit to how far Soviet leaders can go in
ignoring ideology. There appear to be limits on how far the
Party's legitimizing role as the 'vanguard' of the
revolutionary movement may be allowed to deteriorate before
it is forced to "prove" its credentials in the international
arena. For example, Marantz points out that one of the
reasons for downplaying peaceful coexistence at the same
time as proletarian internationalism was upgraded was the
wish of the Soviet leadership to "undercut Chinese and Third
World charges of Soviet-American collusion and to avoid
ideological demobilization at home."81 Clearly, the Soviet
position as leader of the Socialist camp was being
threatened by the questionable ideological correctness of
detente.

However, could it not be claimed that Soviet actions of
the Brezhnev period were due merely to its emerging
super-power status rather than to any ideological
considerations? This interpretation would fit into the power
political/national interests non-ideological view. The true
difference, as noted earlier, between Soviet ideological
foreign policy and non-ideological policy, is not in the incidence of aggression; the Soviet Union plays the power game like others. However, the motivation for Soviet action is different; and the motivation is derived from the logic of Marxism-Leninism combined with the logic of a one-party state.

One aspect of detente offers an excellent illustration of the relationship between Soviet domestic and foreign politics that is central to the rational-revolutionary model. A number of scholars have noted a connection between detente and domestic repression in the Soviet Union. Because the highly centralized CPSU relies, in great part, on Marxism-Leninism to legitimize itself, it must continue to propagate the atmosphere of hostility towards the bourgeois world which has served as a weapon to divert attention from the internal "unequal distribution of power and wealth." The leadership fears that,

any "substantial increase in access to information about Western life - especially about goods and services, but also, and for intellectuals, crucially, about personal freedoms and civil liberties - tends to activate latent discontent and even dissent among independent minded Soviet citizens."

This fear, triggered by the relaxation of international tensions, suggests that internal repression is an inevitable concomitant of the policy of detente. Robert Horn, also noting this, writes:

The Soviet regime clearly fears the penetration of outside influences into Soviet society and the erosion of the CPSU's control. As long as foreign relations dealt with the United States and West Germany as still-dangerous aggressors, this

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internal danger was not seen as acute. It has been aggravated, however, by detente, by new agreements, summits, and the obvious cooperation between the USSR and such antagonists. 85

If this is a basic dynamic of Soviet society, it is hard to see how even a long term relaxation will facilitate liberalization. Many scholars have noted that one of the reasons that the Soviet regime was eager to enter into the process of detente was that they were "faced with the choice of undertaking large-scale internal reforms or going abroad for assistance." 86 Again, it should be noted that internal reforms were avoided because of their association with liberalization. Leonard Schapiro notes that the economic reform of 1965 which, for the sake of efficiency, liberated manufacturing managers from the centralized control of the state, soon ran into difficulties. He writes:

The main opposition to it came from the Communist party, which feared that decentralization of economic control might lead to decentralization of political control — and thus imperil the traditional grip of the party on the life of the country. 87

The crucial role of Marxism-Leninism as a tool for legitimization of the leadership has created a situation where the ideology cannot be repudiated without threatening the repudiation of the leadership itself. One of the main uses of ideology, as we have seen, has been as a tool to prevent independent concentrations of power in the Soviet Union, and since all policy discussion in the Soviet Union has to be phrased in terms of Marxism-Leninism, the conservatives have a powerful and constantly available weapon at their disposal for limiting "bourgeois" reform.
The fundamental struggle—between economic reformers and ideological dogmatists—creates an internal dynamic similar to the one that delineates the boundaries of 'feasible' foreign policy. While externally the limitations are imposed by power considerations and systemic variables operating in the international system on the one hand and domestic pressures to "demonstrate" the relevance of Soviet ideology on the other, the internal dynamics are powered by the need to decrease repression in order to improve economic efficiency on the one hand and the need to maintain repression in order to combat pluralistic political tendencies on the other.

As we noted earlier, the party operates on the premise that whatever keeps the monopoly of power intact is the preferred policy. It is clear that Stalin's terroristic methods were very harmful to party interests. As Richard Lowenthal writes, Khrushchev, in his "secret" speech:

...denounced Stalin's doctrine of the sharpening class struggle with the advance of socialist construction as dangerous nonsense, calculated to lead to the mutual slaughter of loyal Communists after the real class enemy had long been liquidated. This statement affords the master clue to the puzzle of why Khrushchev made the speech: It was a "peace offering" to the leading strata of the regime in the Party machine, army, and managerial bureaucracy alike - a response to their pressure for greater personal security.88

It is clear then that Khrushchev's renunciation of Stalin's terrorism need not be interpreted as the start of a trend that necessarily leads to liberalization. In fact, it is explained much better as part of the dynamics of Soviet domestic political behavior shown in Figure 2 below.

-33-
Barring any major internal upheaval, Soviet domestic policy will oscillate between the boundaries I have indicated. A return to Stalinist terror is highly unlikely for it is counterproductive both from the economic standpoint and also (and more importantly) for party solidarity.

Two rough boundaries have been established that limit the extent to which the leadership can increase or decrease internal repression. It should be noted that there exist "grey areas" between what is acceptable and what is unacceptable policy in this sense. I have placed Khrushchev's policy of liberalization in this grey area. However, it is clear that, on balance, it was felt to be
enough of a threat to the Party's domestic interests that it had to be abandoned. It will be interesting to see the outcome of the newest attempted reforms by the new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Although the extent of the reforms he is intending is not yet completely apparent, it seems that he has instituted the mechanisms for changes that might be comparable to Khrushchev's earlier initiatives and might fall into the "grey area" on our chart.89

This "ideologically imposed" internal dynamic is the reason that the Soviet one-party type of institutional pluralism cannot be compared to the pluralism of polyarchies. The relationship between the two trends - economic liberalism and conservative centralism - is one of almost direct conflict in the Soviet system. If one is to be achieved, the other must be compromised.

Keeping this internal dynamic in mind we can clearly see how true detente and completely unrestricted scientific and cultural exchange with the West is not feasible in the near future. In this way Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology clearly influences foreign policy decisions regarding detente.

II. Soviet Ideology and Eastern Europe

The relevance of this internal dynamic to foreign policy is again illustrated by a look at the Soviet approach towards its Eastern European satellites. The Soviet insistence on the radical internal reconstruction of states
coming under its control is clearly ideological in origin.

As Brzezinski notes:

even if... revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe were merely the desire to strengthen Soviet power over the area and not to construct Communism per se, the mere fact that the method of strengthening that power was conceived in terms of large-scale social and economic changes showed the underlying ideological bias. One can certainly argue that a more moderate program would have created much less resistance and hence would have favorably affected the Communist power situation. The standard Communist answer - Communism is not safe without creating a social upheaval that uproots the existing interest groups - in itself reveals an approach to problems of political power that is strongly tinged with ideological assumptions.90

This observation also supports the view presented earlier that a lack of cost-benefit analysis often characterizes Soviet policy that attempts to implement the ends of the ideology.

The ideological impact is evident again if we look at the level of Soviet commitment to its East European sphere of influence. As we noted, the ideological belief in historical progression makes the Soviet Union committed to preventing a "setback" for Marxism-Leninism.91 Any unorthodoxy in the Socialist bloc is seen as a grave threat. As Leonard Schapiro writes:

The events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia provided a warning that the demand for economic reform - which is how the Czech "spring" had begun - was only a step removed from the demand for political reform.92

Both economic and political reform in a Soviet satellite would have domestic repercussions that the Soviets fear. This is why polycentrism is an anathema to the Soviet leaders and points to one of the implications ideology has
for Soviet foreign conduct: they will not readily give up any of their satellites in the way European countries gave up their old colonial empires. The Soviet stake in maintaining its sphere of influence goes far beyond anything national interests alone would demand. This explains the singular determination with which they quelled attempts at liberalization in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and also the intransigence of the Sino-Soviet rift and the break with Yugoslavia.

The Soviet tolerance of Yugoslavia's break from its sphere of influence points to some of the limits to an ideological program. The Soviets did not follow the same course of action as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia for a number of reasons. First, the Yugoslav People's Army was prepared for a confrontation and would have been a formidable foe; second, Yugoslavia is not contiguous to the Soviet Union and thus posed problems for an interventionist policy; and third, Britain and the U.S. looked upon Yugoslavia as a very important country strategically that would provide Mediterranean ports to the Soviets if it should fall under Moscow's domination. Clearly the Soviets were not prepared to risk the possibility of a major confrontation for the sake of ideological unity in the Socialist camp.

The Khrushchevian doctrine of "separate paths to Socialism" approved by the Twentieth Congress was an attempt to face the reality of the existing diversity, but it created additional problems for the Soviet leaders.
Khrushchev's experiment illustrates one of the dilemmas of the Soviet system. As Lowenthal notes, Stalin's successors disavowed him because they perceived "that rigid insistence on Soviet hegemony might break up the unity of the [Socialist] camp even more quickly" than a policy of pluralism. However, Lowenthal adds that the Khrushchevian policy of pluralism "precipitated the very crisis of authority he had feared." The "Brezhnev Doctrine" and its offer of "fraternal assistance" to Socialist states illustrates a return to a more balanced stance between the two positions.

This analysis brings out one of the indirect effects of ideology on Soviet policy. Because of the stake that the Party has in its perceived position as the vanguard of mankind which rests on the assumption of the universality of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, doctrinal unorthodoxy in both the domestic and international contexts is threatening to them. The Yugoslav independent version of Communism, the Chinese challenge to Socialist doctrinal unity, and even the Polish Solidarity movement can be compared to "the problem of heresy in the history of the Christian Church." We should recall that in Church history heretics were often dealt with with much more ferocity than those of a different faith. This was due to the fact that the heretic, by remaining within the faith, undermined the legitimacy of those who ruled the faith.
III. Preferred Regimes

The Soviet attitude towards ideological deviance has rather unusual implications. If we were to make a spectrum of the type of emerging regimes that the Soviet Union would like to see in the Third World for example, it would look like Figure 3 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOST FAVORED BY SOVIETS</th>
<th>LEAST FAVORED BY SOVIETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Soviet Communist Regime</td>
<td>Pro-Soviet Non-Communist Regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This ranking is due to the problems of orthodoxy which stem from the very nature of Soviet ideology and the structure of Soviet politics. That the Soviets fear unfriendly Communist regimes more than unfriendly non-Communist ones makes sense in light of the different impact these have on the domestic and international status of Soviet ideology. An unfriendly non-Communist regime is an enemy that can be explained doctrinally. It has even been suggested that an enemy image is necessary for the survival of the Soviet regime. However, an unfriendly Communist regime, as we have seen, poses severe ideological problems.

This interpretation throws valuable light on a crucial
aspect of Soviet foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet conflict has usually been interpreted as a conflict of national interests in which ideology served simply as a rationalization. Certainly, viewing the level of formal ideology only, one is led to conclude, as Kubalkova and Cruickshank do, that "the Soviet attitude toward China" is "the most blatant inconsistency of the Soviet model of international relations." However, if we look at the conflict in light of both the direct and indirect implications of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, it makes great sense. The Chinese became a second center of an ideology that is premised on the concept of one center. This ideological conflict added an especially intransigent element to the differences they may have had at the level of national interests. This points to the importance of looking beyond official Marxism-Leninism at the characteristics that emerge from the combination of doctrine with the logic of a one-party state.

Soviet activity in the Third World has often been interpreted as simple power politics. Based upon the fact that the Soviets often do not support indigenous Communist groups and sometimes even support regimes which suppressed domestic Communism, it is concluded that the Soviet Union is no longer truly interested in international revolution and that ideology is no longer relevant as a guide to action, being used solely for domestic power purposes. However, this is an incorrect interpretation. As a rational-revolutionary state the Soviet union performs a cost-benefit analysis to
see how feasible any action is. Clearly, in some cases it would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union and its overall revolutionary program actively to support certain Communist groups. The leadership would first weigh the impact such support would have on detente, the possibility of super-power conflict, the possibility of counter-revolution, the potential drain on Soviet economic and military resources and other factors. One of the major components of such a calculus would be to determine where, on the spectrum represented in Figure 3, the emerging regime would stand. Having experienced the heresy of polycentrism, it is only natural that the Soviets want to be careful in this respect, and this conservative approach does not signify an erosion of their commitment to ideology.

There has been an "erosion" of ideology in the Soviet Union, as we have noted, in the sense that the initial doctrine of Marx and Lenin has been largely revised to save it from obsolescence. However, if "erosion" is meant to signify that the current doctrine espoused by Soviet spokesmen and the goal of creating a communist world no longer play an important part in influencing Soviet behavior, this thesis, as we have seen, is wrong. Certainly, the revolutionary program of the Soviet Union in the first decades of its existence was much more dramatic and called for decisive action in order to achieve the revolutionary goals. However, as Richard Gregor points out, even Lenin, the quintessential 'revolutionary', improvised his program to square with reality a number of times. He adds that
none of those who comment on Lenin's "betrayal" of revolutionary interests, "has attempted to explain how the interests of the international revolution would have benefitted by the destruction of the Soviet regime." The so-called erosion of contemporary Soviet policy is simply the continuation of such "improvisation" that seeks to preserve the relevance of Marxism-Leninism while also avoiding any significant weakening of Soviet power.
V. The Influence of Ideology on the Soviet View of the United States.

Many of the characteristics of the Soviet rational-revolutionary approach to international relations are well illustrated in an analysis of the Soviet view of the country they perceive as their main adversary—the United States.

We have already seen that Soviet doctrine and ideological pronouncements are intimately related to actual foreign policy decisions. This being the case, the Soviet image of the U.S. holds great interest for the West for it clearly has direct policy implications. Writing from the U.S. perspective, Morton Schwartz emphasizes why the Soviet view of his country is important to study:

A great deal of what the Kremlin rulers attempt to do, or not to do, rests on their estimation of how we will behave. While their choices are undoubtedly influenced by other factors—external circumstances, dangers, opportunities, internal pressures—the Soviet "image of America" has an important, often critical, bearing on the formulation of policy. 99

The question we must ask now is: How much influence does Marxism-Leninism have on Soviet perceptions of the U.S.? Is ideology an independent variable helping determine Soviet perceptions? Conversely, is it used as a convenient source of images and language that is needed for domestic justification of views that are derived pragmatically rather than from Marxism-Leninism? Or is the truth to be found in some combination of these two opposing interpretations? Perhaps the best way to determine this is to analyze certain
specific Soviet perceptions of the U.S. I will narrow the focus of this analysis to the following areas:

1) Soviet perceptions of the general nature of the East-West conflict and the shifting balance of world power (correlation of forces).

2) Changes in the doctrine on the inevitability of war between the two major socio-economic systems (i.e., Socialism and Capitalism).

3) Soviet views on the basic characteristics and fundamental nature of the American political and economic system including analyses of its strengths and weaknesses.

4) Soviet analyses of the primary determinants and fundamental nature of U.S. alliance policy and foreign policy in general.

5) Soviet expectations regarding future American political development and behavior.


One of the most important changes in the Soviet view of the West in general (and more specifically the U.S.) has been a rather dramatic growth in the sophistication of Soviet scholarship and internal debate. William Zimmerman's 1969 book Soviet Perspectives on International Relations 1956-1967 was one of the first Western scholarly works to point out that during the Khrushchev years the rigid
dogmatism that characterized Stalin's world view was dropped and international relations specialists in the Soviet Union began to take a greater role in policy-prescription. This change to a much more sophisticated and realistic world view undoubtedly led to some of the far-reaching doctrinal changes under Khrushchev. Outdated ideological concepts were dropped or altered to correspond more closely to reality.

Although we have already noted that under Brezhnev major ideological changes no longer occurred, this does not mean that there was no further growth in the sophistication of the Soviet view of the West. Despite what some Western analysts interpreted as an ideological "hardening" under Brezhnev since no bold new ideological revision took place, Marantz notes that important middle level propositions continued to be amended and revised throughout Brezhnev's rule. He writes:

There has been a development in Soviet knowledge and sophistication concerning the process of foreign policy formulation in the West, the workings of Capitalist economies, the role of public opinion and interest groups, and such. By most accounts, despite some wavering back and forth, the major ideological changes that occurred under Khrushchev were retained by his successors and the early speculation is that Gorbachev seems poised to introduce new ideological innovations that will bring Soviet perspectives closer to Western ones. All these changes demonstrate that the Soviets are not permanently tied to outdated ideological dogma. However, the actual process of change and the
specific role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy is best illustrated by looking at the concrete evolution of Soviet perspectives.

Underlining the dramatic contrast between the Stalinist world view and the view that prevailed after his death, Marantz writes:

...it is easy to forget just how sharply the post-Stalin conception of East-West relations diverges from the view that prevailed until 1953. The Stalinist framework for viewing East-West relations was bleak in the extreme, so much so that it is hard to imagine a view that could have been more negative, pessimistic, and fatalistic.

In Stalin's time it was almost inconceivable even to consider "the relaxation of international tensions" since the Soviet leaders viewed international relations as a strict zero-sum game. The antagonists were the capitalist camp and the socialist camp which were locked in a life or death struggle.

As long as the American-led capitalist camp continued to exist, world wars were inescapable. Clearly this world view discounted any possibility of disarmament and would even consider a policy of detente as illusory and dangerous, for the Soviet Union might loosen its vigilance against the capitalist class enemy.

This approach to East-West relations was dramatically changed with the ascendance of Khrushchev. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev proclaimed that war was no longer inevitable between the socialist and capitalist camps since the correlation of forces had shifted in favor
of the former. At the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959 this view was further developed. Marantz writes:

...Khrushchev carried this new position one step further and provided additional ground for a more optimistic and open-ended view of the world. He proclaimed that it was fully possible, even while capitalism still existed in the West, to create an international system in which world war would cease to be possible.

It was at the same Party Congress that Khrushchev introduced two other far-reaching innovations. First, the "final" victory of socialism had finally been reached in the Soviet Union; and second, the Soviet Union was no longer encircled by capitalism. These two radical departures from Stalinist dogmatism signified a new more confident approach to East-West relations.

In addition to these clear-cut doctrinal innovations, other more subtle changes in Soviet perceptions were taking place. In an evolution that continues even today, simplistic economic determinism was replaced by analyses that found "contradictoriness and inconsistency" in American policy. As Soviet familiarity with American politics grew, greater ambiguity was tolerated in describing American policies and purposes. Schwartz writes that although the U.S. is still considered to be "the main culprit responsible for international tension," Soviet spokesmen occasionally hint that "its attitudes are in some measure understandable."
The influential director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Georgi Arbatov even went so far as to suggest that Soviet ideological dogmatists may have provoked some of the
anti-communist feelings in the U.S.\textsuperscript{113}

The question that is raised is whether these doctrinal innovations and conciliatory statements should be interpreted as simple tactical manoeuvres to outwit the class enemy or rather as a reflection of a true and dramatic reassessment of international relations that emphasized a much more pragmatic approach? Had Soviet missionary zeal actually been tempered so that more important international concerns could be addressed? Marantz suggests that the change in the Soviet attitude was genuine. He writes that under Khrushchev

Soviet spokesmen now argued that a high level of international tension was undesirable because it increased the danger of nuclear war, impeded revolution by heightening repression within the capitalist world, enhanced the political fortunes of bellicose elements within Western ruling circles, and fuelled a wasteful arms race.\textsuperscript{114}

Such far ranging changes support the view that Khrushchev's innovations were not mere tactical manoeuvres. Such momentous doctrinal changes signified a genuine reappraisal of the international situation taking into account the reality of contemporary international relations and the new variable that affected all foreign policy decision-making—the danger of nuclear annihilation. It was argued that this new factor in international relations made it imperative that the U.S. and the Soviet Union work together as the world's two superpowers to avoid and regulate global conflict in order to avoid a possibly calamitous confrontation.\textsuperscript{115}

However, it would have been difficult to justify this
new cooperation with the U.S. if the Leninist-Stalinist image of the immutable class enemy persisted. Marantz notes that by 1960 the Soviets had developed a new view of the U.S. decision-making process. They accepted a two-camp or two-tendencies view of the capitalist ruling elite in the U.S. According to this view, two different factions of the U.S. capitalist ruling class—one moderate one hawkish—were engaged in a struggle for ultimate power, and the Soviet Union could aid the eventual triumph of the moderates through carefully thought-out policies. Even though the Soviet justification for their co-operation with the U.S. was couched in Marxist analysis using terms like "exacerbating internal capitalist contradictions," the implications of the new approach were tremendous. Marantz writes, "Khrushchev was elaborating for the first time in Soviet history a clear argument on behalf of long-term co-operation with the world's most powerful capitalist state."117

This two-camp view of America has survived to the present almost unchanged. At the recent 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev stated that "we understand very well that the interests and goals of the military-industrial complex are not at all the same as the interests and goals of the American people ..."118

The changes in Soviet approach and doctrine that we have noted so far under Khrushchev were all part of the new doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" which was expanded and imbued with new meaning after Stalin. Although the doctrine
was referred to occasionally by early Soviet leaders, it
gained real "operative significance" only under
Khrushchev.\textsuperscript{119}

These doctrinal changes combined, present a very new
approach to international relations quite different from
that of Lenin and Stalin. Marantz writes that,

Under Khrushchev, the concept of genuine
negotiation and mutual compromise took on a whole
new meaning and acquired a new legitimacy.
Compromise was viewed not as the product of
temporary weakness but as an inescapable feature
of the relations between sovereign states.
Different states unavoidably had different sets of
interests, and the only way they could peacefully
exist together was through a process of mutual
give-and-take.\textsuperscript{120}

This description of the new Soviet view of foreign
relations demonstrates their understanding and tacit
acceptance of the fact that states had different "national
interests"—a rather dramatic departure from an orthodox
class analysis. Gorbachev has even taken this development
further by using the language of "national interest"
publicly. Archie Brown notes that, "[w]hile the notion of
national interests has long been an implicit part of Soviet
leaders' way of looking at the world, Gorbachev's public
espousal of it must have been displeasing to the
Marxist-Leninist fundamentalists."\textsuperscript{121}

However, the question still remains: Are these changes
in the language of Soviet foreign policy formulation
indicative of a "less ideological" approach? Lenczowski is
sceptical when he writes that one of the constant features
of "the official Soviet lexicon is the use of words with
double meanings—each has a face value appropriate for Western consumption and a special meaning for the Soviets themselves.\textsuperscript{122} He lists "peaceful coexistence," "progress," "security," and "normalization" among such deceitful concepts. He writes:

It may at first appear that these words conform to the practical imperatives of Soviet foreign policy, but to be entirely "practical," they would have to possess an "objective" meaning that they do not. Instead they have normative meanings that reflect the value system of Marxism-Leninism.\textsuperscript{123}

Lenczowski believes that the face value that is meant for Western consumption is in fact a tactical device that the Soviets employ to placate their class enemies while the normative meanings reflect the operational political beliefs and perceptions of the Soviet leadership.\textsuperscript{124}

There are two observations to be made about Lenczowski's statements: First, he is correct in pointing out that ideology imposes a normative meaning to words that would be interpreted quite differently in the West. In the Soviet Union such words have an 'official' meaning that they do not have in the West. Soviet spokesmen often take advantage of Western interpretations in dialogue with the West, but internal Soviet debate utilizes the ideological meaning. This can be viewed as a reflection of the inherent dualism in Soviet foreign policy that we noted in Part two of this essay.

The second comment to be made is that even if this dualism reflects the true Soviet approach to East-West relations, there has been nevertheless a tremendous
evolution in Soviet attitudes from the Stalinist years to the present. The very fact that these terms have a more "practical" meaning in addition to the ideological normative meaning has vast foreign policy implications. Those in the Soviet Union who favor a more open and less confrontational policy towards the U.S. can rationalize even a very moderate non-ideological policy of expanded trade, etc., using the more traditional Marxist-Leninist normative analysis for domestic consumption. Clearly, the double meanings do not necessarily imply—as Lenczowski argues—that the "objective" meaning is used simply to make key foreign policy concepts more palatable to the West. The changes in actual Soviet foreign policy that took place at the same time as terms such as "peaceful coexistence" and "mutual advantage" came to the forefront suggest, as Marantz argues, that the doctrinal alterations, "were not just a matter of abstract ideology. On the contrary, they had very real consequences affecting the nature and texture of relations between the Soviet Union and the West." 125

If our analysis of changes in Soviet perceptions of the U.S. is sound and there has indeed been a dramatic evolution of beliefs and official doctrine, what role, if any, does ideology have in determining Soviet perceptions and the resultant foreign policy? Lenczowski points out that no policy debates in the Soviet Union can be argued "in terms other than those which can be plausibly described as Marxist-Leninist." 126 Schwartz also notes this indirect effect of ideology on Soviet perceptions of the U.S. when he
writes: "...the need to fit all the detailed information concerning this country... into an all-embracing Marxist-Leninist framework imposes a rigidity and uniformity on American public life which can only be regarded as, at best, simple-minded."

He interprets this perceived need to couch all debate in ideological terms as political expediency on the part of analysts who "live in a Soviet political universe [and] succeed (or fail) according to the rules of the game which prevail in Moscow...." The rules of the game, according to Schwartz have been established to legitimize and justify the leadership's political power.

In contrast to Schwartz's belief that the Soviet elite uses Marxism-Leninism primarily for self-serving power purposes, Lenczowski points out that the very pervasiveness of Soviet propaganda shapes and cannot help but affect "the people from whom the Soviets recruit their political and cultural elite." Earlier in this essay we established the plausibility of the position that Soviet leaders may actually believe the ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Lenczowski reinforces this position by emphasizing that "one must remember that the communist world view is an entirely plausible one, even, one might say, a compelling one. After all, Marxism-Leninism has inspired several mass movements and it has captured the imagination of many a Western intellectual who was free to chose from the open market of ideas."

Up to this point in this section of the essay we have concentrated on charting the changes in Soviet perceptions
of the U.S. It has been clearly established that a more realistic and pragmatic view of the U.S. has evolved among Soviet decision-makers since the early 1960's. However, we have also noted that almost all Soviet foreign policy concepts retain an ideological component: detente is still linked to the eventual triumph of Socialism over Capitalism; Soviet trade with the U.S. is justified in that it exacerbates internal capitalist contradictions and will thus speed up the victory of Socialism; etc. In addition to these concepts with a dual meaning, there are other Soviet concepts that are clearly ideological in origin. The "cardinal principle of Leninist doctrine" which assumes the immutable "predatory essence of imperialism" continues to be the orthodox Soviet view. The struggle between the two social systems is still considered the basic reality of international relations. Schwartz notes that the Soviets continue to overestimate the role of the business sectors in U.S. policy-making and that they still believe that U.S. government policy is almost always defined by class interests. While a more benign appraisal of American policies and purposes has evolved, the U.S. is still seen as the main instigator of international tension. The "deepening crisis" of U.S. capitalism is continuously elaborated on by Soviet Americanists, and the notion of a shift in the correlation of forces favoring Socialism is a constant refrain.

This brief list that demonstrates continuity rather than change in Soviet views points to the still considerable
influence of ideology on perceptions of America. And perceptions, as many observers have noted, are almost certainly correlated to Soviet attitudes.

While a more realistic and sophisticated view of the U.S. has certainly evolved since the 1960's, it appears that it is circumscribed by ideological considerations. While it seems impossible to determine precisely whether ideology is invoked most often in order for the Soviet elite to maintain its domestic power and legitimacy or because Soviet leaders actually subscribe to the Marxist-Leninist world view, our analysis of Soviet perceptions of the U.S. seems to indicate that both factors are at play.
CONCLUSION

A number of conclusions can be made on the basis of our analysis of the impact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy. Attempts to understand Soviet foreign policy solely on the basis of a national interest analysis often fail because they avoid the important question of what determines the unique Soviet interpretation of national interests. A power politics approach suffers from similar problems. Power does not exist in some "pure" form—it is always related to ideas that determine to a great degree a power-seeking state's tactics and purposes. In the Soviet context, these ideas are often derived from Marxism-Leninism.

An analysis of Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology goes a long way in improving our understanding of certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy that do not seem amenable to a national interest or power political analysis. While considerations of power impose certain limitations and restrictions on Soviet foreign policy, ideological considerations also often dictate the form and content of foreign policy decisions. Ideology often supplies the tactical means and envisioned ends of Soviet foreign policy—a characteristic which distinguishes it from a pure power political approach. Although the Soviets usually play the power politics game as well as non-Marxist states, ideology sometimes leads to a lack of cost-benefit analysis in foreign policy decisions. However, ideology leads to such potentially power-damaging policies primarily in two
situations: during the implementation and maintenance of the ends envisioned by Marxism-Leninism and when the actions are undertaken to defend the doctrine-based domestic power and legitimacy of the ruling elite.

Even if Soviet decision-makers might want to attempt to implement an ideological program, the ideological ideas would soon clash and compete with: 1) other more pragmatic domestic and international concerns, national interests and power considerations; 2) ideas that emanate from competing groups within the Soviet elite; and 3) constraints inherent in the international system.

The immediate impact of ideology is manifested on the level of individual policy-makers and political and cultural leaders in the Soviet Union. Since Marxism-Leninism provides the exclusive language of politics in the Soviet Union, it is safe to say that it influences and shapes the perceptual and conceptual world of leaders who are socialized like other Soviet citizens. In other words, they probably believe in the relevance of Marxism-Leninism and will pursue the methods and goals of the ideology if possible.

Due to the nature of Soviet one-party rule, ideology plays a legitimizing role for the leadership and is often invoked for this purpose. The relevance of the ideology must constantly be demonstrated so that Soviet citizens will continue to accept the authoritarian one-party regime as legitimate.

While it is probably impossible to estimate which of the two factors—belief in the ideological tenets on the one
hand or self-serving use of ideology to maintain power and privilege on the other—is the more important, it is safe to say that both play a significant role in Soviet foreign policy formulation.

An analysis of detente, Soviet attitudes towards Eastern Europe and other satellites, regimes preferred by the Soviets, and other concerns of Soviet foreign policy, demonstrates how some policies can best be interpreted as an attempt by Soviet leaders to implement a non-ideological policy while at the same time dealing with the ideologically imposed limitations of Marxism-Leninism. Other policies reflect the continuing relevance of ideology for Soviet decision-makers. Our study of Soviet perceptions of the U.S. illustrates this dynamic particularly well. There has been a clear evolution in Soviet attitudes since the early 1960's. Many of the orthodox Stalinist views have been discarded and a much more pragmatic approach to East-West relations has prevailed. The doctrines tied to the Soviet policy of detente and peaceful coexistence are examples of such changed perceptions.

However, despite the increased realism of Soviet perceptions and attitudes, the core of Soviet foreign policy continues to be conditioned by ideology. It appears that while the Soviets can purge the doctrinal component of the ideology of outdated and dangerous views, the philosophical core of the ideology is much more immutable to change. As examples of ideological continuity, we can list the following: Soviet leaders still consider the struggle
between socialism and capitalism as reflecting the fundamental nature of international relations; the U.S. is still considered to be the main instigator of international tensions due to its immutable capitalist nature; the decline of capitalism is still forecast and the shifting of the world correlation of forces in favor of socialism is often cited; while world war between capitalism and socialism is no longer considered inevitable, the sharp struggle between the two systems in political, ideological and economic spheres will continue, according to Soviet spokesmen. Clearly, all these fundamental world views are still a part of Soviet orthodoxy and are very ideological in nature. The dialectical nature of international relations in general is never questioned.

One very important conclusion is that Khrushchev's doctrinal innovations did indeed bring about a new emphasis in East-West relations in which the concepts of compromise and mutually advantageous policy agreements were accepted. This meant that in the short term at least, international relations were no longer viewed as a zero-sum game. However, as we have seen, the ideological concept of the ultimate victory of socialism over capitalism still gives Soviet foreign policy a zero-sum flavor over the long term. Although this long term optimism regarding socialist victory is probably not an operational variable in Soviet foreign policy decision-making, it is possible that it could be revived should the leadership feel that the correlation of forces has swung further in favor of socialism. As Schwartz
writes, "...the Kremlin leaders keep a careful eye on the strategic military balance. Should the military position of the United States seem to have been significantly weakened, the men in the Politburo may be emboldened to undergo a more adventurous policy course." 136

We have already seen that ideology is not the sole operational factor determining Soviet foreign policy. Some of the important non-ideological factors that have been identified in our study are reviewed below:

1) The personality of Soviet leaders plays an important role in policy development. For example, Khrushchev's doctrinal innovations and ideological optimism no doubt stemmed from his "impulsiveness, wishful-thinking and incautious experimentation."137 His too-eager acceptance of doctrinal innovation was seen by other party leaders as threatening to their power interests. Brezhnev was a more cautious, realistic and hard-headed pragmatist which no doubt explains the same characteristics of Soviet foreign policy during his leadership.138

2) Sometimes the national interests of the Soviet state clash with the dictates of ideology and clearly there is a give and take here. Gorbachev's new approach to the third world in which the Soviets sometimes prefer alliances with non-Marxist regimes rather than supporting Marxist regimes that are a drain on the Soviet economy demonstrates how national interests are often the overriding factor in determining foreign policy.139

3) Systemic variables and dynamics of the
international system clearly impose limitations on Soviet actions and can explain much of Soviet behavior without recourse to ideological variables. Considerations of power also influence Soviet foreign policy choices. In other words, the Soviet Union cannot act as it wants or as its unadulterated Marxist-Leninist ideology might dictate in the international arena since it is not omnipotent.

4) The national character and historical experience of the Russian people is another factor that also often has an impact on Soviet foreign policy. Soviet caution in international relations is often interpreted as stemming from a historically derived sense of insecurity in the Russian national character.

5) The reaction of other states to Soviet foreign policy initiatives has a profound influence on future Soviet actions. Soviet policy is seen to be much more voluntaristic and reactive to international pressures and influence than is often thought.

It is the interplay of these and other factors with ideological ones that in the final analysis determines Soviet foreign policy. It is an unkempt situation to say the least. However, in order to give a realistic account of Soviet behavior, one must take all these factors into account.

I believe that with the use of the framework suggested in this essay, it is possible to understand more fully Soviet foreign policy. If nothing else, the conceptual framework of the Soviet Union as a rational-revolutionary
state demonstrates that ideology cannot be dismissed as a significant operational variable in Soviet international behavior. On the other hand, the framework points out that Soviet policy is not dictated solely by ideological imperatives and that those who believe that the Soviet Union operates on the basis of an ideological blueprint have reason to reconsider their views.
FOOTNOTES


4 Meyer, op. cit., p. 275.


8 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 132


10 Ibid., p. 555.


13 Hoffman and Fleron, op. cit., p. 35.


16 Kelly & Fleron, op. cit.

17 Ibid., p. 194.


20 Sullivan, op. cit., p. 49.


23 Donald Zagoria, op. cit., p. 104.

24 Sullivan, op. cit., p. 158.


27 Sharp, op. cit., p. 133.


29 Ibid., p. 293.

30 John H. Herz, "Power Politics or Ideology? The Nazi Experience," in
Schwab, op. cit., p. 15.

31 R.N. Carew Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine," in Brumberg, op. cit.,
  p. 11.

32 Ibid.

33 Herbert Dinerstein, Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy (Baltimore: 


35 I am indebted to Professor Kal Holsti for pointing out this important 
  distinction.

36 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 489.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 3-5.

41 K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign 
  Policy," International Studies Quarterly 14 (September, 1970),

42 Ibid.

43 Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 29.

44 R. Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight & Win a Nuclear 
  War," Commentary (July 1977), pp.21-34.

45 If Marxism-Leninism is seen as a quasi-religion this fact is not
  paradoxical at all. Most religious doctrines also claim to possess the
  "truth."

46 Ulam, op. cit., p. 73.

47 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 169.

48 Ulam, op. cit., p. 73.

49 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 489.
50 George, op. cit., p. 188.


56 Ibid., p. 165.

57 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 388.

58 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., p. 80.


60 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 167.

61 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., p. 82.

62 Ulam, op. cit., p. 70.

63 Carew Hunt, (op. cit., p. 131.) points out that while Marx did not develop a concept of total planning, "he and Engels advocated the replacement of the 'anarchy' of social production" under capitalism by production to be carried out upon a "common plan though who was

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to do the planning was not explained." However, since the ideology in question is Marxism-Leninism, and Lenin made it clear very early that he intended to implement total planning, it seems right to include this feature as a reflection of Soviet ideology.

64 Hunt, op. cit.
65 Ibid. p. 6.

66 Lowenthal, (op. cit., p. 29.) claims that the only operational parts of the ideology are those that derive from the "logic of one-party rule". This view is important in acknowledging that power politics can have vastly different forms and that these forms are important and "ideological". However, I cannot agree with him that ideology is solely used as justification of the abuses of one-party rule. There is also, as we have noted, the "self-justification" aspect of ideology. The need of the Party to feel truly that it is the vanguard of history and the reinforcement of this concept through indoctrination and socialization makes it much more likely that they are not solely interested in power.

67 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., p. 236.
68 Ulam, op. cit., p. 75.
70 Ibid., p. 141.
71 Ibid., p. 140.
72 Ibid., p. 140.
73 Ibid., p. 140.
74 Ibid., pp. 137-8.
75 Ibid.
77 George, op. cit., p. 186.


83 Frederick C. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 124.

84 Ibid., p. 122.

85 R. Horn, op. cit., p. 11.


88 Richard Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 43.

89 See Archie Brown, "Change in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 64 No. 5 Summer 1986) and Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 64 No. 4 Spring 1986)

90 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 143.

91 We have seen that minor "setbacks" are acceptable to the Soviet leadership, however, they are concerned about setbacks that may cause
uncertainty about the inevitable triumph of socialism.


93 Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 38.

94 Ibid.

95 Schwab, op. cit., p. 62.

96 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., p. 213.


98 Ibid., p. 574.


102 See Fukuyama and Brown articles, op. cit.

103 Marantz, "Changing Soviet Perceptions," p. 239.

104 Ibid., p. 221.

105 Ibid., p. 223.

106 Ibid., pp. 222-223.


108 Ibid., p. 226.

109 Ibid., p. 226.


111 Ibid., p. 153.

112 Ibid., p. 155.

113 Ibid., p. 156.

115 Ibid., p. 228.


118 Brown, op. cit., p. 1061.


120 Ibid., p. 230.

121 Brown, op. cit., p. 1061.

122 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 270.

123 Ibid., p. 270.

124 Ibid., pp. 270-271.


126 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 22.

127 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 147.

128 Ibid., p. 148.

129 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 22.

130 Ibid., p. 23.

131 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 148.

132 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 266.

133 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 152.

134 Ibid., p. 151.

135 Ibid., p. 155.

136 Ibid., p. 166.


138 Ibid., pp. 235-236.

139 See Fukuyama, op. cit.
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Appendix 1

The literature on the influence of ideology on Soviet foreign policy is extensive and varied. The quality of the positions presented also varies considerably. The following short survey of the most influential positions does not pretend to be a comprehensive list but merely a guide to the major perspectives in the scholarly literature written in English. It also indicates the writings that I have consulted most extensively for this essay.

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power & Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967), presents the political realist position that sees ideology as primarily a rationalization of policy formulated on the basis of the imperatives of the struggle for power. Martin Wight, Power Politics (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), who also takes a power politics position, believes that revolutionary doctrines can transform international relations but that their influence never lasts more than two generations. Samuel L. Sharp, "National Interests: Key to Soviet Politics," in Abraham Brumberg (ed.) Russia Under Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), takes the position that ideology is not an operative variable in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy which can be understood solely in terms of Soviet national interests. Barrington Moore Jr., Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), writes that
while Soviet alliances are made on the basis of national interest, ideology may have a retarding or accelerating role in foreign policy decisions. Otto Pick, "Soviet Alliance Policies in Retrospect," in *International Journal* (Vol. XXII No. 4, Autumn 1977), concludes that ideological considerations are secondary to national interests in Soviet alliance formation. Robert V. Daniels, "Doctrine and Foreign Policy," in Eric P. Hoffmann & Frederic J. Fleron Jr. (eds.) *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Aladine Atherton, Inc., 1971), presents the view that while ideology is important domestically, in Soviet foreign policy it functions mainly as post-facto justification. Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), presents perhaps the major statement of the view that Soviet Communism can be explained in terms of historical continuity with pre-revolutionary Russia. In his book, Soviet totalitarianism is seen as simply a more despotic and total variant of the traditional semi-managerial system of despotic power. Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in the Soviet Union?" in Milorad M. Drachkovitch *Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World - Its Appeals and Paradoxes* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), argues that ideology has ceased to serve as a guide to action in the Soviet Union. He claims that through a series of domestic and external incidents in which ideological concepts clashed with reality, Soviet ideology was eroded away. Chester Bowles, "Is Communist Ideology Becoming Irrelevant?", *Foreign*
Affairs (Vol. 40 No. 3, July 1962), argues in a similar vein that indigenous forces, the pressure of events and pragmatic Soviet Policies have been eroding Communist ideology and are creating a "crisis of faith." William Zimmermann, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), writes that Soviet perceptions of international relations have gradually changed from their previously ideological categories so that now they are very similar to Western perceptions.

Of the writers that perceive a significant ideological impact on Soviet foreign policy Joseph M. Bochenski in Milorad M. Drachkovich, Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World - Its Appeals and Paradoxes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), sees the process of ideological revision simply as a purging of spurious and nonsensical elements from Soviet Marxism-Leninism and not as a decay of Marxism-Leninism viewed as a moral and metaphysical faith. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), notes that although the ideological impact as a whole is significant, the different components (philosophical, doctrinal and action program) influence the foreign policy to vastly different degrees. Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 41 No. 1, October 1962), and Adam B. Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), both detect more of a role for ideology than mere rationalization although they acknowledge it serves that