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The social organization of conversational narrative : a methodological contribution to linguistic discourse… Spielmann, Roger Willson 1984

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THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CONVERSATIONAL NARRATIVE: A Methodological Contribution to Linguistic Discourse Analysis via Conversational Analysis by ROGER WILLSON SPIELMANN B.A., Warner Pacific College, 1976 M.A., University of Texas, Arlington, 1977 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FU^TJJLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Sociology) We accept this dissertation as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1984 /(S) Roger Willson Spielmann, 1984 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb ia , 1 a g r e e that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f C 10 Q-y The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date O C T . 1 my ABSTRACT This thesis examines stories bold i n natural conversation with an interest in discovering and describing social features of conversational discourse. Sociology has begun to develop a strong interest in narrative structures, and this interest paral lels the current interest i n discourse and seeks to make the sociological enterprise of conversational analysis relevant to discourse analysis, part icular ly in relat ion to narrative. The data for this study were collected over a period of four years (1979-83). Approximately 19 hours of tape-recorded conversations recorded in a variety of situations were collected. After a lengthy period of l istening to the tapes, instances where stories are told were isolated and transcribed, and structural features of prefacings, t e l l ings , and responses were subjected to formal analysis. The analytical techniques used in this study were f i r s t developed by Harvey Sacks and his students. The contribution of this study i s to provide the discourse analyst with a set of well-defined discovery procedures for describing ethnographic features which influence discourse. The ethnographic interest has two dis t inct ive features; (1) i t i s oriented to members' practices, and (2) i t i s 'micro' i n character, oriented to a close reading of interactions in context. i i In the analytical chapters (3-6), the thesis explores how characters may be formulated in the narratives and what kinds of interactional work gets done (Chapter 3), the interactional importance of collateral information in narrative telling sequences (Chapter 4), how narratives get generated from prior ongoing talk (Chapter 5), and narrative response types and preferences (Chapter 6). Throughout the thesis an interest is maintained in relating the findings of the study with current findings in discourse analysis. The thesis concludes with a chapter summarising i t s original contribution and relating the methodology and findings of the study to recent methodologies and findings in discourse analysis. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v^ix CHAPTER ONE: LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS 1 Introductory Remarks 1 Scope of the Study 7 LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 10 Bloomfield, Chomsky, and Beyond 12 Assumptions About Language in Linguistic Discourse Analysis 16 Discourse Types 18 Monologue and Repartee 23 Linguistic Pragmatics 26 CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS 28 The Goffman Factor 29 Ethnomethodology 35 Sacksian Analysis 38 Differences Between Conversational Analysis and Linguistic Discourse Analysis 40 METHODOLOGY 46 Conclusion 48 iv CHAPTER TTO: CONVERSATIONAL STORYTELLING 55 Studies in Narrative 55 Sacksian Studies in Conversational Storytelling 61 Production and Recognition in Conversational Storytelling...68 Conclusion 71 CHAPTER THREE: FIRST MENTION CHARACTER REFERENCES IN NARRATIVE DISCOURSE 77 A Linguistic Treatment of Formulating Character 77 A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Formulating Character 89 Formulating Character in Conversation 93 Formulating Character in Conversational Storytelling 95 Non-Recognitional Reference Procedures 97 Non-Recognitionals as Recognitionals 106 Recognitional Reference Procedures I l l Conclusion 118 CHAPTER FOUR: COLLATERAL INFORMATION IN NARRATIVES 124 A Linguistic Treatment of Collateral 125 A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Collateral 133 Alternative Activity Assessment Procedures.. 139 Activity Assessment as an Interactional Resource 148 Conclusion 157 v CHAPTER FIVE: PRE-NARRATIVE SEQUENCING AS AN INTERACTIONAL RESOURCE 163 A Linguistic Treatment of Pre-Narrative Sequencing 164 A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Pre-Narrative Sequencing 168 The Sequencing Problem. 177 Solution to the Sequencing Problem 185 Pre-Narrative Resources 195 Conclusion 204 CHAPTER SIX: NARRATIVE RESPONSE PREFERENCES 209 A Linguistic Treatment of Recipient Responses 210 A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Recipient Responses 215 Action Chains 216 Acceptance Response Procedures 224 Dispreferred Response Procedures 233 Conclusion 246 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS 251 BIBLIOGRAPHY 260 APPENDIX 1 270 APPENDIX II 273 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the production of any work of t h i s type one incurs many debts of gra t i tude , far more than can be recognized i n the Acknowledgements. I wish to express my indebtedness to the fol lowing people, among many who contributed to making t h i s d i s se r t a t ion poss ib le . The advice and assistance of my advisor , Roy Turner, deserve spec ia l a t t en t ion . He helped me to grasp what I consider to be basic concepts re lated to the study of conversational i n t e r a c t i o n , and he had an ef fect both d i r e c t and prominent on the shape of t h i s study. I wish to o f fer a specia l thanks to J . V . Powel l , frcm whom I acquired an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y perspective which i s important to t h i s study. I consider him to be a model of the s p i r i t of open, c r i t i c a l , and penetrating i n q u i r y . His l i f e , as a scholar and as a personal f r i e n d , has been exemplary to me, and h i s investment of time, thought, and care i n my development as a scholar i s deeply appreciated. I consider him a fr iend i n the deepest sense of the word. I am grate fu l to those who also invested i n me and i n t h i s study: to E l v i Whittaker for her wi l l ingness to remain on my committee frcm s t a r t to f i n i s h ; to H o l l y Gardner for her fr iendship and expertise as a student of l i v e conversation; to my friends Jim Weisenburg, Steve Congdon, Doug Wagoner, and David Alegu i re , a l l of whom contributed e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to t h i s study. v i i Finally, my wife, Ruth, deserves special mention for her love, encouragement, and personal sacrifices over the past few years. It i s a tribute to her that we survived this process intact and, hopefully, better prepared for the future as a couple. Her insights into discourse contributed greatly to the development of my thinking. She is a model to me of the integration of intellectual and spiritual commitment which i s highly admired, but rarely attained. v i i i PREFACE This is a study of some features of discourse via conversational analysis. The topic for this study came about as a result of listening to many hours of recorded conversations, examining transcripts, and talking with colleagues. There were many 'false starts'. I f i r s t became interested in the topic of conversational storytelling out of a broader interest in locating and describing interactional methods and procedures which people use in carrying out their everyday business. At some point particular features of stories started to jump out at me, and my interests became more focused. First, I discovered that many of the features of narratives treated by linguists interested in discourse could also be treated by conversational analysis, and treated differently. Secondly, there seemed to be an important dimension missing from linguistic discourse studies, a dimension recognized as important by linguists but basically neglected. That dimension has to do with ethnographic and interactional concerns in discourse. Finally, I began to search out and describe that dimension in relation to previous studies in linguistic discourse analysis. The research procedures employed in this study were aimed at the discovery of members' methods and practices which seem to go beyond our member intuitions and understandings of conversational work. In the analytical chapters i t seemed reasonable to suggest that the sorts of things going on when someone generates a narrative in live i x conversation are not things that we could say we 'already knew' or th a t were i n the f i r s t place e x p l i c i t l y known. That i s , i n no way can i t be claimed that I merely s t a r t e d out with something I already knew about n a r r a t i v e s and then r e f i n e d and elaborated i t . Rather, my research procedures were aimed a t the discovery o f n o n - i n t u i t i v e observations and understandings o f conversational work. These procedures have implications f o r f i n d i n g s which concern a c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t ' s " s k i l l " or "work." Further, I took i t as a study p o l i c y that any c l a i m t o have located and adequately described a feature o f n a r r a t i v e s be i n t e r a c t i o n a l l y substantiated, derived from a c t u a l conversational t r a n s c r i p t s . I attempted t o show that located features were a v a i l a b l e t o be oriented t o by p a r t i c i p a n t s . I b e l i e v e t h a t the import o f t h i s study i s t h a t i t contributes t o the growing body o f l i t e r a t u r e i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s as w e l l as t o the current research being c a r r i e d out by students o f l i v e conversation committed t o l o c a t i n g and d e s c r i b i n g the organization o f conversational i n t e r a c t i o n as the t e c h n i c a l accomplishment o f members involved i n the everyday a c t i v i t y o f 'talking together'. As such, t h i s study may be seen t o be i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y . The exact nature o f i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s and conversational a n a l y s i s i s made c l e a r i n Chapter 1. This study regards conversation as an e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . I focused on the sequential emergence o f one conversational a c t i v i t y from turn-by-turn t a l k , s t r u c t u r a l features o f t e l l i n g sequences, response sequences, and formulating characters, a l l i n the context o f narratives t o l d i n l i v e conversation. The meaning and relevance o f l o c a t i n g and d e s c r i b i n g features o f narratives i s not a x matter to be determined merely by examining the particulars of some recounting. It is perhaps better conceived as a social activity that is interactionally achieved, negotiated in and through the particulars of a situation. It is hoped that this study can be seen to have laid the groundwork for locating and describing the features of this interactional work in one conversational activity. While the substantive focus of this study is on the phenomenon of narratives, my major concern has not been merely to describe in detail the workings of an activity. Rather, my aim has been to recommend the importance of investigating a commonplace activity of everyday l i f e under the auspices of an analytical apparatus which seeks to treat everyday activities as the accomplishment of members. I believe that in this study a sociological framework begins to emerge from a detailed study of conversational interaction, a framework characterized by a set of descriptions of narrators' and recipients' methods and procedures for understanding and sustaining the ongoing interaction. I have pointed to a treatment of one conversational activity that exposes and takes as its central topic the practice of members participating as a matter of everyday concern in its production and recognition. It is hoped that the importance of this study is informed by the fact that such research treats as its topic of inquiry an activity of social l i f e that is generally taken-for-granted by people, and not merely that i t makes accessible to formal inquiry the achieved character of everyday l i f e . xi CHAPTER 1: LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS Introductory Remarks In recent years, sociology has developed a strong in te re s t i n language, as witness the growth o f s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s w i t h i t s various t h e o r e t i c a l and methodological approaches. Soc io log i s t s who study i n d e t a i l the conventional ways i n which people in te rac t w i t h one another commonly demonstrate t h i s concern (Goffman, 1955, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1981; Gar f i r ike l , 1967; Sacks, 1972, 1974, 1978; Schegloff, 1972; Jef ferson, 1978; Turner, 1970, 1972, 1976). At the same time, l i n g u i s t i c s has come t o share a sense that a j o i n t venture may be necessary, and has looked towards sociology and anthropology. Within sociology there has been considerable research i n t o the structure o f conversation, and t h i s p a r a l l e l s l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r e s t i n discourse. Nevertheless, the ac tua l contact between sociology and l i n g u i s t i c s has been smal l , i n par t because o f the s p e c i a l i s t t r a i n i n g i n both d i s c i p l i n e s . There have been some recent attempts by soc io log i s t s t o integrate l i n g u i s t i c s w i t h sociology (Cicoure l , 1974; Grimshaw, 1981; Gumperz, 1982; Goffman, 1981). For the most par t , however, these attempts have ended up as an attack on l i n g u i s t i c formalisms and the absence o f an ethnographic dimension from l i n g u i s t i c analyses. The former i s a 1 matter of taste, the latter perhaps more substantive. However, I believe that a more fruitful dialogue can be established between the two disciplines, and I bring my training in both disciplines, sociology and linguistics, to this study. In the preceding paragraph I noted that there seems to be an ethnographic dimension missing from much of linguistics. Throughout studies in linguistic discourse analysis there is a recognition that this is, indeed, a weakness and that there is something needed to be picked up on from the sociological perspective. Linguists are perhaps more aware than sociologists of the need to integrate, that there is something lacking from their repertoire of analytical tools. There are, in fact, a number of invitations which have been extended from the linguistic community to sociology. For example, in The Grammar of  Discourse (1983), Robert Longacre ends the chapter on repartee with the conroent: M l that we have written here needs eventually to be supplemented by and compared with the current research into the nature of live conversation (1983:75). Larry Jones (1983), too, writes about the need for a broader linguistic vision which encompasses the social sciences. He writes: One of the new frontiers of linguistics, discourse analysis, is in fact a part of a larger frontier, the study of how people think and how they express their thoughts... In exploring this new territory, the dis-course linguist...who chooses to remain close to his own linguistic...border will be, I believe, infinitely the poorer (p. 137). 2 Another l i n g u i s t , Wilbur P i cker ing , brings the issue o f i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y in tegra t ion i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s to the forefront of current l i n g u i s t i c concern. He w r i t e s : While I i n s i s t that s i t u a t i o n and cu l ture are par t o f the p r i o r context upon which given information [ i n a discourse] may be based, I f r e e l y confess that I do not know how to handle i t (1979:170). and, I am entering a p lea that more l i n g u i s t s rec-ognize both the legit imacy and necessity o f grappling w i t h the ro l e o f s i t u a t i o n and cul ture i n discourse analys i s (1979:170). This study i s intended to be one step towards the integrat ion of l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s wi th sociology i n general , and conversational analys i s i n p a r t i c u l a r , and may, i n par t , be seen as a response t o an i n v i t a t i o n . L i n g u i s t i c s has much to o f fer the s o c i o l o g i s t interested i n the analys i s o f discourse, and l a t e r i n t h i s chapter I describe a key area o f contr ibut ion from l i n g u i s t i c s to sociology. Sociology, too, has much t o o f fer the l i n g u i s t interested i n discourse, and i t i s my hope that t h i s thes i s responds to the "need" mentioned by Longacre by making a methodological and t h e o r e t i c a l contr ibut ion to l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s . Some of the issues a r i s i n g i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analysis are issues which have been attended to for some time i n sociology. For example, one issue i n discourse analys is i s the need to d i s t ingu i sh 3 between the linguistic forms of utterances and the actions they perform in discourse (McTear, 1979). In the section on conversational analysis in Chapter 2, we see how the issue has been quite powerfully treated in sociology. /Another issue is how form and function need to be analytically integrated in order to show their interdependence (Pickering, 1978; Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983). This issue has to do with the way in which utterances and the actions they perform are related sequentially to one another in a cohesive text. The issue as formulated by sociology focuses on interactional abilities rather than just linguistic abilities. It is my thesis, in response to the invitation, that a sociological treatment of live conversational data has much to offer the discourse linguist in terms of methodology as well as theory. Perhaps the most effective way to make clear what is meant by this is to provide the reader with an overview of the material covered in this thesis. In Chapter 1, a general overview of linguistic discourse analysis is presented. In this overview, while pointing out what I consider to be the major strands of discourse analysis, I focus my attention on one group, the text grammarians, specifically following the school of discourse analysis which features Robert Longacre as the most recognizable head and including Linda Jones, Larry Jones, and Wilbur Pickering, to name but a few. In my review of this school of discourse analysis I focus on the basic issues, particularly in relation to the analysis of narratives. I then make the bridge between linguistic discourse a n a l y s i s and conversational analysis, and show the similarities and differences between these two analytical perspectives. 4 In Chapter 2, I review the l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t e d t o conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g . The data f o r t h i s study i s confined t o conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g , and the general format i s t o provide the reader with a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f a discourse feature and then show how that feature might be handled from a s o c i o l o g i c a l perspective using conversational a n a l y s i s . The value and l i m i t a t i o n s o f each d i s t i n c t i v e treatment are shown. In so doing, I present analyses which are i n themselves a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the f i e l d o f conversational a n a l y s i s . That i s t o say, i n the a n a l y t i c a l chapters I do not merely extend l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s but show how the issues are transformed i n t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g ways. Chapter 3 begins the a n a l y t i c a l section, which i s the heart o f the t h e s i s . In t h i s chapter, I examine f i r s t mention character formulations when sto r y characters are f i r s t mentioned i n nar r a t i v e s , by presenting a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f f i r s t mention character reference and then turning t o a conversational a n a l y s i s treatment o f the same i s s u e . In t h i s chapter (3) and the next (4), I give a l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s treatment o f formulating character and the use o f c o l l a t e r a l information i n narratives t o l d i n Algonquin, a language i n which I am c u r r e n t l y working. The treatment I give t o na r r a t i v e s i n Algonquin i s , i n i t s e l f , a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the discourse l i t e r a t u r e . Among the phenomena given s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n i n my conversational a n a l y s i s treatment o f formulating character i n E n g l i s h n a r r a t i v e s are ways i n which characters may be formulated, formulation preferences, and the p o s s i b l i t y o f a r e v e r s a l o f preferences i n a c e r t a i n genre o f n a r r a t i v e . 5 Chapter 4 investigates the a n a l y t i c a l concept o f c o l l a t e r a l i n f o r m a t i o n — i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g which, instead o f t e l l i n g about what d i d happen, t e l l s about what d i d not happen. The same a n a l y t i c a l format i s applied; f i r s t presenting a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f the issue and then turning t o a conversational a n a l y s i s treatment o f the same iss u e . S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n i s focused on the i n t e r a c t i o n a l work which gets done by a s t o r y t e l l e r who i n s e r t s c o l l a t e r a l information i n t o a n a r r a t i v e . In Chapter 5, I examine sequencing concerns i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s followed by a treatment o f those same concerns by conversational a n a l y s i s , again r e s t r i c t i n g the l a t t e r a n a l y s i s t o pre-n a r r a t i v e sequencing. Issues include how n a r r a t i v e s emerge from t u r n -by-turn t a l k and the use o f t r i g g e r utterances. Chapter 6 i n v e s t i g a t e s r e c i p i e n t response preferences which are treated i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s as a feature o f repartee or the n o t i o n a l (deep) structure o f dialogue. In a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f repartee the need f o r the ethnographic dimension i s perhaps the most noticeable. In t h i s chapter a t t e n t i o n i s focused on a c t i o n chains, acceptance response procedures, and d i s p r e f erred response procedures i n conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g . In Chapter 7, I conclude the study with an examination o f the methodological and t h e o r e t i c a l contributions t o l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s v i a conversational a n a l y s i s . Each a n a l y t i c a l chapter i n v e s t i g a t e s a p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon treated by those l i n g u i s t s involved i n discourse a n a l y s i s i n r e l a t i o n t o the treatment o f the same phenomenon by a s o c i o l o g i s t doing conversational a n a l y s i s . An 6 investigation of the ways in which these issues are dealt with in conversational analysis serves to make visible some of the constitutive features of discourse, as well as revealing many intricate, finely coordinated processes which occur with them. Scope of the Study The data for this study were collected over a period of four years (1979-1983). I collected over 19 hours of tape-recorded conversations. I wish to thank David Meguire for giving me some of his conversational tapes which are included in the corpus of data. Both the tapes given to me and the ones I collected were recorded in a variety of situations. /After a lengthy period of listening to these conversations, I began to isolate instances where narratives were told. In re-listening to these instances and transcribing them, I began to notice structural features of prefacings, tellings, and responses. In this study I subject some of those features to formal analysis. Earlier I said that this study is intended as a contribution to linguistic discourse analysis by providing the discourse linguist with a set of discovery procedures for explicating ethnographic and cultural features which influence live discourse. I refer to the 'ethnographic dimension' throughout this study, and I want the reader to know from the outset what I mean by ' ethnography'. In a general sense, I use the term 'ethnography' to refer to the work of describing a culture. Ethnographic research typically follows a general pattern; the researcher visits a culture other than his or her own, spends time in close contact with everyday behaviour, makes observations, asks 7 questions, and so on, a l l of which leads to an account or description of the culture. In this study I build upon and depart from a traditional definition of 'ethnography'. This traditional use is exemplified by James Spradley (1979). He writes: The essential core of ethnography is [the] concern with the meaning of actions and events to the people we seek to understand. Seme of these meanings are directly expressed in lang-uage; many are taken for granted and communi-cated only indirectly through word and action. But in every society people make constant use of these complex meaning systems to organize their behavior, to understand themselves and others, and to make sense out of the world in which they live. These systems of meaning constitute their culture; ethnography always implies a theory of culture (p.5). My understanding of 'culture', what ethnography describe, is derived from Garfinkel (1967) and clarified Eglin (1978). He writes: Members' knowledge—culture—is methodological, or knowledge how, where the 'how' is interpre-tational. Members know their society as methods of (pre-reflectively) interpreting its objects, where those methods or methodologies are lang-uage games, such as conversation, and their set-tings. Insofar as such methodological games comprise typical reasons, motives, and intentions (in addition to ways of assigning sense and ref-erence), then far from being mental events, pro-perties or states, these are instead interactional 'states' through and through (p.16). In relation to describing features of one's own culture from a sociological point of view, Roy Turner (1974) makes some interesting claims. He writes: seeks to by Peter 8 Soc io log i s t s must (and do) employ t h e i r ex-per t i s e i n employing and recognizing methodological procedures for accomplishing a c t i v i t i e s . . . [ a n d that ] the task o f the s o c i o l o g i s t i n analyzing n a t u r a l l y occurring scenes i s not to deny h i s competence but to expl ica te i t . . . S u c h ex-p l i c a t i o n provides for a cumulative enterpr i se , i n that the uncovering o f members' procedures for doing a c t i v i t i e s permits us both t o r e p l i c a t e our o r i g i n a l data and t o generate new instances that f e l low members w i l l f i n d recognizable (p.214). The contr ibut ion o f t h i s study i s t o provide the discourse l i n g u i s t w i t h a set o f wel l-def ined discovery procedures fo r discovering and descr ibing ethnographic features which have a bearing on discourse i n the form o f categories useful i n formal ana ly s i s . I t i s my thes i s that discourse l i n g u i s t s are current ly looking outside the boundary o f t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e for these discovery procedures, and that conversational analys i s has what the discourse l i n g u i s t i s looking f o r . My own ethnographic in te re s t has two d i s t i n c t i v e features; (1) i t i s or iented t o member pract ices (see E g l i n ' s quote, above), and (2) i t i s 'micro' i n character, meaning that my analys i s i s not or iented t o o v e r a l l or general behavioural patterns , but t o a close reading o f in terac t ions i n context. My analys i s of fers the discourse l i n g u i s t more than jus t i n s i g h t f u l examples, and the ra i son  d 'e t re o f t h i s thes i s i s based on a f e l t need i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s ( r e c a l l the comments by Longacre, Jones, and P icker ing c i t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter) . LINGUISTIC DISCCURSE ANALYSIS I want t o begin by making c l ea r exact ly what I mean when I re fer to ' l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s ' . Reca l l that t h i s study i s a 9 methodological and t h e o r e t i c a l contr ibut ion t o discourse analys i s from a s o c i o l o g i c a l perspective. In any spoken tex t there are three l e v e l s o f organizat ion which I recognize as bas ic to l i n g u i s t i c ana ly s i s : (1) phonology, (2) grammar, (3) and discourse. The structure i n each o f these l e v e l s can be expressed i n terms o f small un i t s combining t o form larger u n i t s . With in phonology and grammar—the t r a d i t i o n a l concerns o f de scr ip t ive l i n g u i s t i c s — t h e l abe l s and structure o f the un i t s are w e l l es tabl i shed. Within discourse ana lys i s , however, very l i t t l e has been agreed upon between the major t r a d i t i o n s o f discourse ana lys i s . There are no agreed labe l s and few agreed s tructures . When reading about discourse analys i s i n the l i n g u i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e I get the impression that there are not 'models' o f discourse analys i s as much as perspectives based upon d i f f e r i n g assumptions about language. The assumptions may be derived from grammatical models of language, but a d i s t i n c t discourse 'model' i s a r a r i t y . Wilbur P icker ing , i n A Framework for Discourse Analys i s (1979), suggests that "discourse analys i s i s a means to get a t , d i scr iminate , and describe a l l o f the factors that contribute to the abstract ion, or t o t a l meaning, evoked by a spoken (or wri t ten) discourse of whatever s i z e " (p .8) . In h i s perspective, discourse analys i s aims t o discover and describe as nearly a complete ros ter as poss ib le o f the factors that may reasonably be expected t o contribute to the abs tract ion that a discourse i s designed to evoke. In h i s study, as i n most o f the other studies c i t e d i n t h i s chapter, there i s no mention o f a discourse 'model' , but there are numerous mentions o f how the analyst views language. In Robert Longacre's discourse perspective he wri tes that he has "borrowed extensively b i t s and 10 pieces from the l i n g u i s t i c s everywhere" (1977a:24), whi le iriaintaining 1 that h i s view o f language i s s t i l l "tagmemic". Joseph Grimes, too, whi le a l lowing that "the general izat ions I make.. . r e l a t e to the family o f theories cur rent ly known as generative semantics" (1975:30), never bothers t o specify what any o f those theories i n the ' f ami ly ' are . My conclusion i s that l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s cannot be so much i d e n t i f i e d w i t h models or theories as wi th an attempt to provide the necessary descr ip t ive work i n order to bet ter understand how the above-sentence l e v e l s t r u c t u r a l features i n language work. Thus, while I r e fe r to two d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s i n discourse ana lys i s , I do not be l ieve that discourse analysts are, general ly speaking, t i e d t o t h e o r e t i c a l models. On the contrary, discourse analyses which I have read seem t o be fo l lowing more i n the steps o f the descr ip t ive l i n g u i s t i c s o f the Bloomfieldian t r a d i t i o n , while examining structures beyond the sentence l e v e l . Perhaps one reason for the lack o f models and theories i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s i s re la ted to the d i f f i c u l t y o f saying anything powerful at the discourse l e v e l without seme way o f formal iz ing i n t e r a c t i o n a l propert ie s . Through the re s t of t h i s chapter I w i l l f i r s t review the progression frcm Blcomfield t o Chomsky, and frcm Chomsky t o discourse ana ly s i s . Secondly, I w i l l discuss what I consider t o be the most f r u i t f u l t r a d i t i o n o f discourse ana lys i s , the school headed by Robert Longacre. In Chapter 2, I w i l l examine some o f the discourse analyses o f narra t ive which feature the analys i s o f l i v e conversation. 11 Bloomfield, Chomsky, and Beyond Until recently, the early 1970's, discourse received very l i t t l e attention by linguists and sociolinguists. In the next few paragraphs I want to distinguish the different lines of development of ideas leading to current discourse study in linguistics. What follows is a brief history from Leonard Bloomfield to current discourse analysis. In the 1930's, Bloomfield limited his grammatical analysis to the sentence as the largest unit of description. Bloomfield, along with Franz Boaz and Edward Sapir, represents an important line of development from structural linguistics to current discourse study* In his brilliant book Language (1933), he defined the "sentence" as, "an independent form, not included in any larger (complex) linguistic form" (p.170). The inhibiting nature of Bloomfield's definition, however, discouraged later linguists in the structuralist tradition from attempting to analyze linguistic levels beyond the sentence. This is not meant to be a severe criticism. As Grimes (1975) notes: Restriction of a field is essential for any kind of scientific thinking. If some-one wishes to focus on what happens within certain bounds, anyone else who accepts the rules of the game has to agree to those bounds...At the time Bloomfield wrote, stick-ing to the sentence was probably the wisest thing he could have done (p.3). Thus, Bloomfield is seen as an important trend setter, but from Bloomfield the structuralist tradition is but one trend. During the post-Bloomfieldian era, linguists with few exceptions continued to describe the grammar of a language only up to the level of the sentence. In the early 1960's, however, H.A. Gleason allowed for the importance of supra-sentence grammars but held that their practical 12 de l inea t ion was impossible t o undertake at the t ime. In 1970, Z e l l i g Harr i s stressed that l i n g u i s t i c analys i s had not gone beyond the l e v e l o f the sentence and that l i n g u i s t i c methodology up t o that time had not pursued a descr ip t ion o f the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s between sentences. Even e a r l i e r , Harr i s had published an a r t i c l e c a l l e d "Discourse Ana ly s i s " (1952) i n which he attempted t o work out a formal method for the analys i s o f connected speech. But h i s attempts to encourage l i n g u i s t s t o address the need for discourse analys i s were not greeted w i t h p a r t i c u l a r enthusiasm. And as recent ly as 1977, Malcolm Coulthard claimed that " i t may w e l l be that any purely formal analys i s above the rank o f sentence i s impossible" (p .3) . He d i d admit, however, that to be successful , analys i s beyond the sentence l e v e l can only be described i n semantic terms. The emphasis on sentence grammars i n l i n g u i s t i c s was widely promoted by the transformational-generative model o f grammar, the second l i n e o f development i n my tJ i ir iking, as developed by Noam Chomsky (1965), which assigns s t r u c t u r a l descr ipt ions to i n d i v i d u a l sentences by a systematic app l i ca t ion o f a set o f r u l e s . And, though Chomsky and others have since re f ined t h i s model and departed from i t , descr ipt ions seldom consider structure beyond the sentence l e v e l . According t o Chomsky, language i s a formal system which includes an underlying system (deep structure) and a system o f ru les and processes for creat ing forms on the surface s t ructure . E spec i a l ly i n h i s Aspects o f the Theory o f Syntax (1965), t h i s formal system i s considered t o e x i s t apart from any actua l language utterance on the par t o f the nat ive speaker o f the language. Chomsky claims that both 13 the deep structure and the rules and processes for der iv ing the surface s tructure are a par t o f what a nat ive speaker 'knows' about h i s or her language. L i n g u i s t i c analys i s i n the transformational-generative t r a d i t i o n , then, consis ts o f attempting to reconstruct the character o f the underlying structure and discovering and speci fying the der iva t ion process (ba s i ca l ly , the r u l e s ) , between the deep structure and the surface s t ructure . Part o f a speaker's capacity to generate new sentences i s based on the speaker's a b i l i t y t o say the same things i n d i f f e r e n t ways. For example, I can say, "The Cubs won the World Ser ie s " . By rearranging a few words I can convey the same th ing by saying, "The World Series was won by the Cubs". These two sentences share the same deep structure but d i f f e r e n t surface s t ructures . Chomsky suggests that we are able t o make sense out o f sentences because the context i n which they are produced enables us to look beyond the surface structure t o the deep structure from which the sentences are generated. Furthermore, he was e x p l i c i t i n r e s t r i c t i n g h i s i n t e r e s t t o the formal aspects o f language (syntax) and that t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n i s necessary i n order t o extend the scope o f a descr ip t ion o f grammar. One should take note that the Chomskyan t r a d i t i o n by no means represents the t o t a l family o f theories that are both generative and transformational . S o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s has ventured i n t o discourse analys i s almost by accident. W i l l i a m Labov (1967) began to combine the s t r u c t u r a l analys is o f speech w i t h s o c i o l o g i c a l sampling techniques and showed how l i n g u i s t i c var iab les could be re la ted t o s o c i a l v a r i a b l e s . Gumperz (1982) suggests that w i t h i n the past few years a new s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c approach t o discourse has developed, an 14 approach which distinguishes between individual variations and social variability. Studies by Hymes (1972), Blom and Gumperz (1972), Sankoff and Cedergren (1976), Ervin-Tripp and Mitche11-Kernan (1977), Sankoff (1980), Green and Wallat (1981), and Gumperz (1982), to name but a few, represent the attempt by sociolinguists to "account for the communicative functions of linguistic variability and for its relation to speakers' goals without reference to untestable functionalist assumptions about conformity or noncomformance to closed systems of norms" (Gumperz, 1982:29). With this brief historical outline of developments in linguistics and sociolinguistics I have attempted to distinguish the important lines of development of ideas which have lead to an interest in discourse. Gumperz (1982) perhaps sums up best the point of departure from descriptive linguistics to discourse analysis. He writes: We must draw a distinction between meaning, i.e. context free semantic information ob-tained through analysis, in which linguistic data are treated as texts, which can be coded in words and listed in dictionaries, on the one hand, and interpretation...Interpretation always depends on information conveyed through multiple levels or channels of signalling, and involves inferences based on linguistic features that from the perspective of text based analysis count as marginal, or semantically insignifi-cant (p.207). The way I visualize linguistic discourse analysis in this study is as an attempt to extend the procedures and analytical categories used in descriptive linguistics beyond the unit of the sentence. The essential procedures used are; (1) the isolation of a set of basic syntactic categories or units of discourse for analysis, (2) the 15 stating of a set of rules which differentiate coherent discourses from ill-formed or incoherent discourses, and (3) taking a text (sometimes constructed by the analyst) and giving an analysis of a l l the structural features of the discourse. These basic procedures are used by the text grammarians, under which I classify Longacre and his students, as opposed to those who base their work on speech act  theory. The work of the former has basically been neglected by sociology, while the work of the latter has been severely criticized as being fundamentally misconceived (Turner, 1975; Gardner, 1982; Levinson, 1983). In this study, my concern is with the work being done by text grammarians, specifically Longacre and his students, and -#ithmaking .linguistic discourse analysis sociologically relevant. From this point on, when I refer to 'linguistic discourse analysis', I am referring to the work of the text grammarians following Longacre. /Assumptions About Language in Linguistic Discourse Analysis I now turn to a discussion of assumptions about language in discourse analysis. The assumptions of the text grammarian for example, are different from those of the speech act theorist. According to the text grammarian, we can say most about language by filtering out two different things: the decisions a speaker can make regarding what and what not to say, and the structures that are available to the speaker for implementing the results of those decisions in a way that communicates with another person (Grimes, 1975, 1978; Gavin, 1980). Grimes refers to these decisions which the speaker makes, and the relations between them, as the underlying formational structure or the semantic structure (1975). The 16 r e l a t i o n between t h i s underlying structure and the speech forms that are uttered, i s c a l l e d the transformation. One assumption shared by both the t e x t grammarians and the speech act theor i s t s i s that , i n everyday l i f e , we a l l use d i f f e r e n t types o f speech i n d i f f e ren t circumstances. A pub l i c schoolteacher, for example, w i l l adopt one k i n d o f speech when being interviewed for a job and a d i f f e rent type when re lax ing w i t h fr iends over a beer. We say most o f what we say i n s t r ings o f sentences, but not jus t random s t r i n g s . There are features o f language which may constra in l a t e r utterances i n r e l a t i o n t o e a r l i e r ones, and large scale structures w i t h i n which i n d i v i d u a l utterances p lay t h e i r parts (Grimes, 1975, 1978; Longacre, 1983). Not only do we use d i f f e rent types of speech i n d i f f e rent circumstances, but we may have marked reactions when a discourse type i s used inappropr ia te ly . For example, we may inwardly chuckle a t the lady who addresses a pet as i f i t were a c h i l d , o r a t the army o f f i c e r who t a l k s to everyone w i t h an author i t a t ive vo i ce . The relevant factors i n such s i tua t ions are the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the speaker and the one being spoken t o , and the nature o f the message. L ingu i s t s doing discourse studies are interes ted i n e x p l i c a t i n g and descr ibing discourse ' types ' , e .g . i f a speaker i s exhorting a hearer to do something, c e r t a i n discourse types or forms w i l l be appropriate. I f one i s arguing, i n s t r u c t i n g , or passing on information, other types w i l l be more f i t t i n g . 17 Discourse Types What are some examples o f 'discourse types' i n the l i n g u i s t i c discourse l i t e r a t u r e ? Longacre has been a t the forefront o f recent discourse analys i s and contends that there are s i x major discourse types: narra t ive , procedural , hortatory, explanatory, argumentative, and conversation (1976, 1983). Narrat ive discourse recounts a ser ies of events usua l ly ordered chronolog ica l ly and i n the past tense. Procedural discourse i s designed to give ins t ruc t ions as to the accomplishing o f some task or achieving o f an object . Hortatory discourse attempts t o influence conduct while explanatory discourse seeks to provide information required i n p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, and often does so by providing de ta i l ed descr ip t ions . Argumentative discourse t r i e s t o prove something t o a hearer and tends t o e x h i b i t frequent contrast between two opposing ideas . Conversational discourse takes place between two or more people. Oddly, although Longacre expresses in te re s t i n t h i s l a s t discourse type, h i s analys i s i s general ly l i m i t e d t o the other f i v e and r e l i e s mainly on edited t e x t s . i n each o f h i s l a s t two books, however, he refers to the work o f Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson and others involved i n the venture o f conversational analys i s as something that i s l acking i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and which should be pursued. We s h a l l return t o t h i s issue momentarily. A l i n g u i s t brings h i s own d i s t i n c t i v e mode of reasoning t o bear on h i s perspective o f ' language'. Generally speaking, the discourse analyst sees d i s t inc t ivenes s and contextual inf luence, constituency, and matching o f complex r e l a t i o n s , and t r i e s t o general ize about them. In h i s 1975 book The Thread o f Discourse, Joseph Grimes attempts to 18 show the sorts o f things a l i n g u i s t could f i n d out by looking beyond sentences. He d iv ides discourse i n t o s i x areas, which correspond t o the s i x parts of h i s Papers on Discourse (1978). F i r s t , there are studies on morphology where c e r t a i n morphological information i s shown t o t i e i n w i t h the t o t a l s tructure o f discourse. Some morphological categories add information about the s p e c i f i c l e x i c a l items to which they are attached whi le others ind ica te syntact ic constructions and agreement. In "Nchimburu Narrat ive Events i n Time", for example, Norman Pr i ce concludes that i n the Nchimburu language personal narra t ive has three t ime-oriented p a r t s : f i r s t , the narrator gives the narra t ion i n a time se t t ing , then re la tes a sequence o f events, and ends up by r e l a t i n g the whole back t o the present t ime. The second area o f discourse study i n Grimes' 1978 book deals w i t h reference, focused mainly on pronominal izat ion. The studies show that there appear t o be two d i s t i n c t s trategies that languages use for e s tab l i sh ing and maintaining reference. Some strategies work the same way as i n Eng l i sh , where the reference o f one word i s normally taken from the nearest candidate word before i t . Other languages manage reference i n terms o f a thematic p o l i c y i n which one reference i s d i s t inguished from other references when introduced, and a spec ia l set o f terms re fe r to i t no matter how many other things have been 2 mentioned more recent ly . The t h i r d area o f discourse analys i s i n these studies show that some languages have a c lear-cut d i s t i n c t i o n among kinds o f discourses, such as discussed e a r l i e r between explanatory, hortatory, argumentative, e t c . A fourth area demonstrates how some discourses 19 are f u l l of particle words that mean nothing in themselves, but which act as pointers to discourse structure when considered in a larger 3 context. In many Algonquian languages (in which I work) there exists a related phenomenon. In the fi f t h area of discourse analysis according to Grimes, a systematic repetition pattern called 'linkage' is used either to join together two consecutive sentences within a 4 paragraph or to show the boundary between paragraphs. Finally, the sixth area is composed of a miscellany of other linguistic signals which turn out to be simple to explain using discourse contexts and 5 difficult to explain without them. Longacre insists that i t is impossible to achieve a correct grarimatical analysis of a language without accounting for its discourse level features. In a recent lecture (1980), Longacre maintains that discourse analysis used to be regarded as an option for the linguist in supplementing the description of lower levels (word, phrase, clause). He contends that i t is now understood by most linguists that a l l work on the lower levels is lacking in perspective and considered inadequate when the higher level of discourse has not been analyzed. He asks, "How can one describe the verb morphology of a language when one cannot predict where one uses a given verb form?", and, "How can one describe a transitive clause in terms of what is obligatory and what is optional when the conditions for optionality are not specified?" Longacre contends that the answers to these questions require a discourse perspective. Thus, discourse analysis is no longer considered to be a luxury for the linguist but a 6 necessity. Despite this history of neglect for structures beyond the 20 sentence, linguists are now attempting to do analyses at the discourse level. A major assumption of those linguists currently working on discourse is that different parts of discourse communicate different kinds of information (Grimes, 1978; Freedle, 1979; Hurtig, 1977; Longacre, 1982). For example, the distinction between different kinds of information in narrative discourse can be broken down into various analytical units. Narratives are characterized by having well-separated participants and having the "telling matching the time". That is, the sequence in which events are told matches the sequence in which the events actually happened. In this section I want to distinguish my assumptions from those of linguists pursuing discourse studies while contrasting discourse analysis with conversational analysis. In a recent edition of Notes  on Linguistics (No. 20, October, 1981), a discourse questionnaire was published which gives the reader an idea of the questions asked by discourse analysts when examining a particular discourse. First, we will look at discourse types in the questionnaire and then consider the material relating to the analysis of stories which will provide a point for contrasting conversational analysis with linguistic discourse analysis. In the 'discourse types' section of the questionnaire, the fir s t question has to do with what discourse types can be grammatically distinguished in the language being analyzed: e.g., procedural—how something is done; descriptive—what something is like; hortatory— what someone should do and commands to do things; argumentative—how someone persuades or makes a point; and conversation—how people 21 u t i l i z e i n t e r a c t i o n a l s t ra teg ies . The next questions r e l a t e t o each discourse type. For example, what features d i s t i n g u i s h one type from another? When i s a p a r t i c u l a r discourse type used? As for other aspects o f discourse, the questions inc lude : when should pronouns be used, and when should t i t l e s or names be used? How often are names used? When should ' the ' be used? As for event reference, i s there a way o f marking an event t o show that i t has been previous ly mentioned? Is there a way o f marking an event t o show that i t was expected? How often are conjunctions l i k e 'and' and 'then' used? How often are l o g i c a l conjunctions used? A l l o f these considerations r e l a t e to the kinds o f things that l i n g u i s t s doing discourse analys i s are looking f o r . In r e l a t i o n t o the discourse analys i s o f ' s t o r i e s ' , which i s o f s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t t o us i n t h i s study, the l i n g u i s t doing discourse analys i s seeks t o discover and describe how speakers sign-on and s i gn-o f f to t h e i r audiences, how speakers make side oomments i n t h e i r s to r i e s and where, how characters are introduced, how major and minor characters are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , where background information most often occurs, how story ac t ion i s introduced, how the end o f the ac t ion i s s i gna l l ed , and how conclusions are done. There are various other considerations when analyzing s tor ie s from a l i n g u i s t i c discourse perspective, but i t i s hoped that the reader i s s u f f i c i e n t l y informed from the above as t o what questions a l i n g u i s t might ask about a s tory t e x t . Thus, we can see that the discourse l i n g u i s t i s seeking to expl ica te and describe a formula for a complete s tory, the dif ference between w r i t t e n and spoken forms, and poss ible options ava i l ab le to speakers when t e l l i n g a s tory . 22 Monologue and Repartee Those l i n g u i s t s working on discourse analys i s have tended to analyze i t as monologue and t o ignore the fac t that an i n t e r a c t i o n a l perspective might a l so be appropriate for w r i t t e n (and spoken) discourse. Longacre stands out as one who has attempted a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f repartee, or the not iona l (deep) structure o f dialogue (Longacre, 1983). He w r i t e s : One of the most i n t r i c a t e problems i n discourse analys i s i s that concerning the r e l a t i o n o f dialogue t o monologue. The viewpoint taken here i s that the two are re la ted but somewhat autonomous structures (1983:43). Longacre goes on t o describe the uni t s of dialogue as: utterance, exchange, dialogue paragraph, and dialogue or dramatic discourse, such as conversation. He pos i t s the uni t s o f monologue as: morpheme, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, and discourse (1983). In r e l a t i n g these two types o f discourse structures he w r i t e s : The utterance i s the u n i t bounded by what a s ing le speaker says. /As such, i t i s the u n i t which i s relevant t o turn-taking , r epa i r , and other concerns o f the student o f l i v e i n t e r a c t i o n (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jef ferson, 1978; Schegloff, 1979). The utterance can be o f any monologue s i z e u n i t from morpheme t o d i s cour se . . . There are dialogue discourses (conversation, drama) and there are monologue discourses (1983:43). From Longacre we can begin t o gain an appreciat ion of the concerns o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and one c r u c i a l area which d i f f e rent i a te s Longacre's approach from other l i n g u i s t i c approaches. 23 Even Longacre admits, however, that h i s studies do not deal w i t h l i v e conversation and sees t h i s as a weakness o f discourse ana lys i s . He w r i t e s : We content o u r s e l v e s . . . w i t h mater ia l that i s a step or two removed from l i v e con-versat ion, i . e . reported or composed con-versa t ion as i t occurs i n o r a l or w r i t t e n texts (1983:44). I t i s evident that not a l l discourses are o f the same s o r t . The s i x major types o f discourse as pos i ted by Longacre a l l d i f f e r i n more or less obvious ways. There are, however, s i m i l a r i t i e s between the s i x types. In that one o f the f i r s t tasks o f the discourse l i n g u i s t i s to c l a s s i f y discourse types and describe the not iona l and surface structures o f discourse types, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s need to include both broad c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and a l so more de l i ca te s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f discourse types. Longacre w r i t e s : The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n [of discourse types] needs. . . t o a l low for the dif ferences between not iona l (deep or semantic structures) and surface s t ruc-t u r e s . . . I n b r i e f , not iona l s tructures o f discourse r e l a t e more c l e a r l y to the o v e r a l l purpose o f the discourse, whi le surface structures have t o do more w i t h a discourse 's formal character-i s t i c s (1983:3). In The Grammar o f Discourse (1983), Longacre continues the progression o f thought he began i n An Anatomy o f Speech Notions (1976). I n the former he proposes that a l l kinds o f discourses can be c l a s s i f i e d along two bas ic parameters: (1) contingent temporal succession, and (2) agent o r i e n t a t i o n . The f i r s t has to do w i t h the descr ip t ion o f a framework o f sequential succession i n which what i s 24 reported in a discourse is contingent on previous events or doings. Agent orientation has to do with the identification of agent reference running through a discourse. He writes: These two parameters intersect so as to give us a four-way classification of discourse types: Narrative discourse...is plus in respect to both parameters. Procedural dis-course ...is plus in respect to contingent succession (the steps of a procedure are ordered) but minus in respect to agent or-ientation (attention is on what is done or made, not on who does i t ) . Behavioral dis-course... i s minus in regard to contingent succession but plus in regard to agent or-ientation (it deals with how people did or should behave). Expository discourse is minus in respect to both parameters (1983:3). Longacre is the f i r s t to admit that the two parameters of contingent temporal succession and agent orientation are too broad to be of much use to the discourse linguist. Thus, he posits another parameter, projection, which has to do with a situation or action which is contemplated or anticipated but not realized. For example, taking the discourse type NARRATIVE, which is of special interest to this study, narrative as a broad category can be further classified into prophecy, which is plus projection, and storytelling, which is minus projection in that the events are represented as having already taken place. Finally, Longacre posits one more parameter: tension. Tension has to do with how a discourse reflects a struggle or polarization of some sort. This fourth parameter is of particular interest to this study in that i t is relevant to a l l genres of narrative discourse. 25 L i n g u i s t i c Pragmatics E a r l i e r I sa id that l i n g u i s t s interested i n the analys i s o f discourse have tended t o neglect the ethnographic dimension i n t h e i r s tudies . In Pragmatic Aspects o f Engl i sh Text Structure (1983), Larry Jones begins to r e c t i f y t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Jones i s a l i n g u i s t working w i t h i n the Longacre school o f discourse analys is and h i s recent study focuses l i n g u i s t i c a t tent ion on one important dimension o f the communication s i t u a t i o n : the "message-sender's" assumptions regarding the "message-receiver". In so doing, he contexts the study by examining the ef fects o f such assumptions on the grammatical and semantic s tructure of w r i t t e n t e x t s . He i s representative, I be l i eve , o f the Longacre school o f analys i s which has sensed the need for inc lud ing an ethnographic dimension when doing discourse ana ly s i s . Jones' study demonstrates that a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f hearer/reader background knowledge and speaker/author assumptions about that knowledge i s pos s ib le . The study i s a contr ibut ion t o the pragmatics o f discourse, and has much to o f fer the s o c i o l o g i s t interes ted i n discourse. Jones provides a t h e o r e t i c a l base for the study o f pragmatic aspects o f Eng l i sh discourse structure by o f fe r ing a system for categoriz ing types o f ccranunication s i tua t ions that a f f ec t the s tructure o f discourse d i f f e r e n t l y . He w r i t e s : In recent years various l i n g u i s t s have de-veloped systems for the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f discourses i n order to account for s t ruc-t u r a l dif ferences between various t e x t s . . . However, there i s increasing evidence that some add i t iona l c l a s s i f i c a t o r y scheme i s needed t o account for s t r u c t u r a l differences i n utterances that stem from the communica-t i o n s i t u a t i o n i n which they occur. For example, the frequency and complexity o f 26 explanatory comments i n the context of an utterance i s affected by whether that u t t e r -ance i s constructed i n a face-to-face s i t u -a t ion or not (1983:9-10). Jones suggests some r e l a t i v e l y new methodological too l s for the analys i s o f discourse. One such contr ibut ion has t o do w i t h the i s o l a t i o n o f author comments as a group for spec ia l study. A l s o , i n h i s ana lys i s o f explanatory comments w i t h i n a discourse, he proposes the p r i n c i p l e that the knowledge assumed t o be unknown to a reader can be explained i n terms o f knowledge assumed to be known t o him or her , which goes a long way toward expla ining the how of author assumptions. F i n a l l y , h i s study suggests some o f the factors which cont ro l the occurrence and d i s t r i b t u i o n of demonstratives and extrapos i t ion utterances i n discourse. He w r i t e s : The discovery o f the functions o f various syntact ic constructions (such as the functions o f modif iers and p a r t i c u l a r sentence types) i s a c r u c i a l task o f discourse analys i s (1983:117). Jones' study i s one o f the f i r s t coming from a l i n g u i s t i c perspective which analyzes discourse w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n ge t t ing a t pragmatic considerations, and such a study should be required reading for the s o c i o l o g i s t interes ted i n discourse ana lys i s . There are, however, some bas ic l i m i t a t i o n s to Jones' study, which he points out himsel f , and which are common i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s . Foremost, the data for the study i s composed o f edited texts only , thus he chooses not to examine natura l conversation or l i v e discourse. One reason for t h i s l i m i t a t i o n i s , I be l i eve , that t h i s i s an area i n which the l i n g u i s t analyzing discourse lacks the methodological t o o l s . R e c a l l that Longacre (1983) admits as much. And Jones w r i t e s : 27 I t seems to me that the grammatical and semantic structures o f a w r i t t e n text may be influenced more markedly by author assumptions due to the absence o f feedback i n the conraunication s i t u a t i o n (1983:3). C e r t a i n l y t h i s i s an area i n which sociology has much t o o f f e r , and t h i s thes i s i s one attempt to provide the discourse l i n g u i s t w i t h a methodology for t r ea t ing l i v e conversation and an i n c l u s i o n o f the ethnographic dimension i n discourse ana ly s i s . CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS Whereas Longacre and h i s colleagues begin w i t h a conception o f a t ex t as a u n i t superordinate to l i n g u i s t i c structures and require that t h i s organizat ion be expl ica ted , conversational analys i s begins not w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s tructure but w i t h the notion o f l i v e discourse as expressive o f members' competence, and proposes that members' act ions and utterances are features of the s o c i a l l y organized set t ings o f t h e i r use. For example, words do not have unchanging meanings a t a l l times or on a l l occasions o f t h e i r use. Rather, what they mean on any p a r t i c u l a r occasion o f use requires the taken-f or-granted a n a l y t i c a l work on the par t o f members. This work i s usua l ly done i n taken-f o r -granted, unexamined ways, and i t i s the task of the conversational analyst t o discover and describe t h i s work. E a r l i e r I sa id that sociology has offered d i f f e rent perspectives on the s o c i a l world and that soc io log i s t s who study i n t e r a c t i o n are becoming increas ing ly interested i n the analys i s o f natura l conversation aimed a t the discovery o f members' methods and pract ices 28 used in conversation. I reviewed what I consider to be two major traditions in linguistics for analyzing discourse and focused on the approach of Robert Longacre and his students. Linguistic discourse analysis has much to offer students of live conversation. One such area of contribution relates to how conversationalists make use of linguistic units in turn-taking. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson write: How projection of unit-types is acccomplished, which allows such "no-gap" starts by next speakers, is an important question on which we have been working. It seems to us an area to which linguists can make major contribu-tions. Our characterization in the rules, and in the subsequent discussion, leaves the matter of how projection is done open (1978:51, emphases itdne). In reviewing for the reader the methodology and theory of conversational analysis, I begin with a discussion of Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel and ethnomethodology, after which I offer the reader my thoughts on what I consider to be the similarities and differences between linguistic discourse analysis and conversational analysis. The Goffman Factor Erving Goffman is perhaps the best-known of the sociologists engaged in seeking to provide a systematic conceptual scheme for the observation and analysis of the organization of social interaction. In this chapter we will examine a key concept of Goffman's, 'face-work, ' and propose that, i f what Goffman says about 'face-work' is correct, his observations have implications for conversational structures which deserve further investigation. 29 While I do not endeavor t o provide a thorough review o f Goffman, I do wish t o highlight some aspects • • of his w r i t i n g s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n t o some i n t e r a c t i o n a l features which we w i l l examine further i n the a n a l y t i c chapters. Of immediate importance t o us i s Goffman1 s paper, "On Face-work: An Analys i s o f R i t u a l Elements i n Soc i a l In terac t ion" (1955). In t h i s paper Goffman proposes that a person i n i t i a l l y establishes h i s or her r o l e i n an i n t e r a c t i o n ; that i s , a person presents a s p e c i f i c ' f a c e ' . A person may be sa id t o be ' i n face' or t o 'maintain face' whenever that person presents an i n t e r n a l l y consistent ' face ' that i s accepted and supported by others i n the i n t e r a c t i o n . The person who presents an inconsis tent or inappropriate ' f ace ' , on the other hand, may be considered to be 'out o f f a c e ' . Goffman w r i t e s : A person who can maintain face i n the cur-rent s i t u a t i o n i s someone who abstained from c e r t a i n act ions i n the past that would have been d i f f i c u l t t o face up t o l a t e r (1967:7). and, A person may be sa id t o be 'out o f face' when he pa r t i c ipa te s i n a contact w i t h others w i t h -out having ready a l i n e o f the k i n d par t i c ipant s i n such s i tua t ions are expected to take (1967:8). Goffman uses the term 'face-work' to describe the act ions taken by a person t o repa i r h i s or her image by avoiding or correct ing s i tua t ions that threaten the ' face ' that a person wants to pro jec t . There seems to be a tendency, too, not only to protect one's own ' face ' but t o protect others ' ' face' as w e l l . A t y p i c a l example would be when someone t r i p s over a doorstep, thus momentarily lo s ing ' f ace ' , not only w i l l that person t r y to cover up the clumsiness as much as poss ib le , but others may pretend not t o have not iced . Goffman feels 30 that such ' face-saving' i s an e s sent i a l force holding i n t e r a c t i o n together. Throughout some o f Goffman"s l a t e r works the i n i t i a l concept o f 'face-work' i s b u i l t upon and re f ined . When reading Stigma (1963), In terac t ion R i t u a l (1967), Relat ions i n Pub l i c (1971), and t o some degree Frame Ana lys i s (1974), the reader i s struck w i t h the recurr ing theme of the importance o f ' face-work'. One p a r t i c u l a r feature which stands out i n Goffman's w r i t i n g s , and which i s o f i n t e r e s t t o us i n the analys i s o f s to r i e s t o l d i n the course o f natura l ly-occurr ing conversation, i s that 'face-work' techniques are not l i m i t e d t o the one who i s 'out o f f a c e ' . Goffman w r i t e s : Jus t as the member o f any group i s expected t o have se l f - respect , so a l so he i s expected t o susta in a standard o f considerateness; he i s expected to go to c e r t a i n lengths to save the feel ings and the face o f others present, and he i s expected t o do t h i s w i l l i n g l y and spontaneously because o f emotional i d e n t i f i -ca t ion w i t h the others and t h e i r f ee l ings . In consequence, he i s d i s i n c l i n e d t o witness the defacement o f [the] other (1967:10). But i s t h i s true? I f so, how do we know? I t i s a t t h i s po int that we can recognize the lack o f subs tant ia l empir ica l 'provings o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' i n Goffman's w r i t i n g s . I n the a n a l y t i c a l chapters a major concern w i l l be t o examine these claims by drawing from the resource o f na tura l conversation. In a l l o f Goffman's w r i t i n g s there i s a convincing ' r i n g o f t r u t h ' to what he says. But can h i s conclusions be e m p i r i c a l l y substantiated? While i n no way tak ing away from the importance o f Goffman's work, I w i l l be involved i n grounding the f indings o f t h i s study i n natura l ly-occurr ing i n t e r a c t i o n . In Chapter 3, for example, I show that the above c la im by Goffman can be 31 corroborated e m p i r i c a l l y . In some s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n s , a t l ea s t , s tory rec ip i en t s can be shown t o be obl iged t o susta in a standard o f considerateness and that people w i l l u t i l i z e techniques to save the fee l ings and face o f others i n i n t e r a c t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s . Pursuing Goffman a b i t further , r e c a l l that he provides i n The  Presentation o f S e l f i n Everyday L i f e (1959) a summary o f much o f the work that has been done i n the area o f the ' s e l f as a s o c i a l e n t i t y up t o that t ime. Goffman often employs a metaphor t o examine the ways i n which people make s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n s observable t o one another as a matter o f course: consider ordinary l i f e as being l i k e l i f e on a stage. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n Presentation o f Se l f , Goffman presents h i s 'person' as an actor on the stage having the problem o f presenting himsel f to the audience as the relevant character i n the ' p l a y ' . Goffman maintains that we convince our audiences, those people w i t h whom we i n t e r a c t , that we are. who we are, and what we take ourselves to be, i n the same sort o f way. There i s , o f course, much more to Goffman's 'dramaturgical ' approach. However, for our purposes we w i l l presuppose that the reader i s f a m i l i a r enough w i t h Goffman's work that we need not delve i n t o i t much fur ther . The importance of t h i s body o f work w i l l become more apparent i n the a n a l y t i c chapters. To r e i t e r a t e , i n Goffman's terms a person does not merely go about h i s or her everyday business, but goes about i t constrained to susta in a c e r t a i n image of that person's ' s e l f i n the eyes of others . This ' face-work' i s continuously necessary i n that l o c a l circumstances w i l l i n v a r i a b l y r e f l e c t upon a person, and these circumstances w i l l vary unexpectedly. Thus, an i n d i v i d u a l constantly employs techniques 32 to defend one's image o f the ' s e l f when circumstances warrant i t . In such instances, people may f i n d themselves i n a p o s i t i o n where one's linage o f h i s or her ' s e l f i s at variance w i t h what i s being projected v i a , e .g . the t e l l i n g of a s tory i n conversation. In Forms o f Talk (1981), Goffman makes statements which have impl ica t ions for l i n g u i s t i c analys i s and which are o f i n t e r e s t to my concerns i n t h i s study. In the a r t i c l e "Response Cr ie s " found i n Forms o f Talk , he questions the p o s s i b i l i t y o f applying l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r a l analys i s to conversation. In the a r t i c l e he discusses some types o f utterances which are d i f f i c u l t t o f i t i n t o the understanding o f speaker-hearer as proposed i n conversational ana ly s i s . Throughout the course o f a conversational encounter members ought t o susta in involvement i n what i s being sa id and to make sure that no long periods o f time pass where no one or more than one i s taking a conversational ' t u r n ' (Sacks, Shegloff, Jef ferson, 1978). Even when no t a l k i s taking place i n a conversational encounter, however, the conversat ional i s t s can s t i l l be i n what Goffman c a l l s a "state of t a l k " (Goffman, 1981:130). He w r i t e s : Once one assumes that an encounter w i l l have features o f i t s own. . . then i t becomes p l a i n that any cross-sect ional perspective, any instantaneous s l i c e focusing on t a l k i n g , not a t a l k , necessar i ly misses important features. Cer ta in issues, such as the work done i n summon-ings , the factor o f t o p i c a l i t y , the b u i l d i n g up o f an information state known to be common to the par t i c ipant s . . . s eem e s p e c i a l l y dependent on the question o f the u n i t as a whole (1983: 130-131). Goffman's thes i s i s that a cross-sect ional analys i s o f conversational i n t e r a c t i o n , examining "moments o f t a l k " , neglects the r e a l 33 i n t e r a c t i o n a l character o f a "state o f t a l k " . The concept o f a "state of t a l k " i s important t o my understanding o f how t o go about analyzing l i v e conversation. In h i s a r t i c l e "Radio Talk" (1981), Goffman begins t o further define t h i s "state o f t a l k " . He w r i t e s : The underlying framework o f t a l k production i s l e s s a matter o f phrase reper to i re than frame space. A speaker's budget o f standard utterances can be d iv ided i n t o function c lasses , each c lass providing expressions through which he can e x h i b i t an alignment he takes t o the events at hand, a foot ing , a combination o f production format and p a r t -i c i p a t i o n status (1981:325). While i n a "state o f t a l k " , then, conversat ional i s t s are able to deal w i t h whatever occurs i n the conversation, whatever d i r e c t i o n i t may take, by susta ining or changing foot ing . As I show i n the a n a l y t i c a l chapters, conversat ional i s t s w i l l show a preference for se lec t ing that foot ing or stance which provides the l ea s t se l f - threatening p o s i t i o n under the circumstances, o r , as Goffman puts i t , "the most defensible alignment he can muster" (1981:325). A l l o f which leads us t o the fo l lowing 'problem': Goffman and, as we w i l l see, Gar f inke l and ethnaxiethodology, attend t o the ethnographic dimension o f conversational i n t e r a c t i o n , an aspect which i s l e f t out i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s but s t i l l considered by some discourse l i n g u i s t s t o be of v i t a l importance ( r e c a l l the ' i n v i t a t i o n ' from Longacre, which I c i t e d e a r l i e r , that l i n g u i s t i c discourse analyses need to be supplemented by those doing research i n t o l i v e conversation). However, Goffman, G a r f i n k e l , and ethnomethodology have, i n t u r n , neglected relevant f indings i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and t h e i r studies lack the p r e c i s i o n and 34 d e t a i l provided by l i n g u i s t i c s . How, then, can the gap be f i l l e d ? I t i s my thes i s that t h i s gap can be bridged by turning t o conversational ana lys i s i n order t o provide the discourse l i n g u i s t w i t h a methodology for deal ing w i t h the f i r s t type o f discourse ana lys i s , NARRATIVE. Before returning t o t h i s 'problem', though, I w i l l f i r s t examine the contr ibut ion o f Harold Gar f inke l t o the ethnographic and i n t e r a c t i o n a l dimension o f discourse by providing the reader w i t h a character iza t ion o f ethncmetliodology. ETHNCMETH0DCO3GY Harold G a r f i n k e l ' s i n i t i a l p o l i c y statement (Studies i n Etlmcniethodology, 1967) was concerned w i t h the study o f members' methods o f p r a c t i c a l , common sense reasoning and takes as i t s po int o f departure the Schutzean not ion of the experience of the world of 7 everyday l i f e . G a r f i n k e l suggests that members' everyday a c t i v i t i e s are made recognizable and commonplace by v i r t u e o f the methods by which members produce and categorize these everyday a c t i v i t i e s and 8 events for what they are . That i s , the events i n our d a i l y l i v e s make sense t o us because o f the ways i n which we simultaneously produce and conceptualize them. Through our work o f making sense o f our world, a common s o c i a l world i s accomplished and we make i t c l ea r what i t i s we are doing, e .g . t e l l i n g a s tory, asking a question, making a premise, or whatever. By using the same methods o f sense-making, members can handle such things as misunderstandings or disagreements by making i t c l e a r that , for example, we don't know what someone i s t a l k i n g about, or that we do not agree w i t h them, e tc . In 35 e f fec t , Gar f inke l suggests that members have t o accomplish or achieve t h e i r s o c i a l world and that the events i n our d a i l y l i v e s as s o c i e t a l members make sense t o us because o f the ways we simultaneously produce 9 and perceive them. Turner, fo l lowing G a r f i n k e l , w r i t e s : Members provide for the recognit ion o f 'what they are doing' by invoking c u l -t u r a l l y provided resources (1970:187), and that , a c t i v i t i e s are t o be e lucidated as the features or iented to by members i n doing and recognizing a c t i v i t i e s , and assessing t h e i r appropriateness (1970:187). The studies i n i t i a t e d by Gar f inke l give primacy to loca t ing and descr ibing the competence and knowledge o f s o c i a l members, the taken-for-granted assumptions which d e l i m i t a member's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f experience. He w r i t e s : The a c t i v i t i e s whereby members produce and manage set t ings o f organized everyday af-f a i r s are i d e n t i c a l w i t h members' procedures for making those scenes 'account-able' (1967:1). Gar f inke l makes the po int that people do not necessar i ly separate the circumstances o f s o c i a l events from t h e i r descr ipt ions o f what those events are . Here we touch upon a fundamental concept o f G a r f i n k e l ' s program statement. When Gar f inke l t a l k s about ' r e f l e x i v i t y ' i n h i s wr i t ing s he i s r e f e r r i n g t o t h i s embedding o f circumstances i n descr ipt ions or accounts, and o f accounts coming from w i t h i n circumstances o f s o c i a l events and s o c i a l arrangements. We may say, then, that the methods under examination are par t o f a l l sense-making so that an attempt to locate and describe them i s i t s e l f a new 36 10 waiting-to-be-analyzed instance or procedure. For the most par t , though, members use these procedures or methods i n taken-for-granted, unformulated, and unexairdned ways. The s o c i a l world i s 'out there ' somewhere for most people, something ' o b j e c t i v e ' . The s o c i a l world i s r a r e l y viewed as a concerted accomplishment, a product, or an outcome o f the use o f commonly used members' methods. I t i s the task o f the ethncmethodologist t o locate and describe these methods. Language provides us w i t h a vehic le for understanding and deal ing w i t h the complexities o f human l i f e . I t i s our primary medium for communicating w i t h one another. We use i t t o s e t t l e our differences and v e n t i l a t e our fee l ings , t o t e l l about our experiences and t o pass on our c u l t u r e ' s s t o r i e s . As such, language can become a complicated and elaborate t o o l . One o f the bas ic considerations i n the study o f p r a c t i c a l reasoning revolves around members' use o f everyday t a l k . G a r f i n k e l ' s i n t e r e s t i n something l i k e ' t a l k ' becomes apparent by noting h i s view o f language as a means for accomplishing s o c i a l order. B u i l d i n g upon G a r f i n k e l , D. Lawrence Weider (1974) w r i t e s : One important method o f accomplishing a s e t t i n g ' s a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . . . i s the member's use o f the idea o f rule-governed conduct i n t a l k i n g about t h e i r own a f f a i r s among one another (p.34). G a r f i n k e l ' s in te re s t i n t a l k i s not merely i n the use o f language as a means for report ing on s o c i a l a c t i v i t y , but rather i n how language i s employed t o accomplish s o c i a l order as a feature o f s o c i a l r e a l i t y . His concern i s w i t h the methods members use to carry out the a c t i v i t i e s of everyday l i f e and the var ied pract ices by which people make recognizable t o others that t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s are r a t i o n a l , that 37 the ways i n which people cont inua l ly and cons i s tent ly account for what they do are r a t i o n a l and ordinary . This accounting i s d i r e c t l y r e l a ted t o conversation i n that people do many things by t a l k i n g about them. SACKSIAN ANALYSIS This analys i s o f t a l k , t h i s 'conversational a n a l y s i s ' , has been the most successful avenue o f ethncmethodological research. The work which has done the most i n making t a l k i n t o a top ic for study has been that produced by Harvey Sacks and those influenced by him. 'Conversational ana lys i s ' was developed and re f ined by the l a t e Harvey Sacks beginning i n the ear ly 1960's and continues on through h i s students (e .g . Schegloff , Jef ferson, Turner, Ryave, Schenkein, Pomerantz, and Goldberg, among others ) . Although the analys i s o f natura l conversation has received increased a t tent ion recent ly i n other d i s c i p l i n e s ( i . e . l i n g u i s t i c s , anthropology, education), Sacksian conversational analys i s seems t o have become the most access ible and t i g h t l y - k n i t school, mostly due to i t s unique focus o f 11 a t t e n t i o n : i n t e r a c t i o n . Sacks' e a r l i e s t i n t e r e s t was concerned w i t h the phenomenon of d e s c r i p t i o n . I t may be taken that i n and through t h e i r t a l k people are c o n t i n u a l l y descr ibing t h e i r s o c i a l world t o one another. Anything and everything i s descr ibable : things people have done or want to do, events they have seen or not seen, a t t i tudes , motivations, states o f mind, fee l ings , and so on. Sacks i n t e r l o c k s qui te n i c e l y w i t h Gar f inke l by implying that i t would not be misleading to th ink o f the 38 ' s o c i a l wor ld ' as const i tuted by i t s a b i l i t y to describe i t s e l f . I t becomes obvious that descr ip t ion i s a bas ic const i tuent o f our everyday a c t i v i t i e s . Two major issues o f a s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c nature have received a t tent ion frcm Sacks; (1) membership categories o f speakers-hearers, i n which the attempt i s made t o go beyond the surface analys i s o f t a l k by proposing a l inkage between members' language categories and how members 'do de sc r ip t ion ' and accomplish a c t i v i t i e s ; and, (2) the sequential organizat ion o f conversation. According to Sacks, people are seen as using s o c i a l knowledge and p r a c t i c a l , common sense reasoning i n three ways: (a) to recognize and make recognizable conversational utterances as poss ib le instances o f things l i k e s t o r i e s , e t c . ; (b) t o accomplish conversational a c t i v i t i e s such as gaining a turn a t speaking, c lo s ing a conversation, and so f o r t h ; and, (c) to 'do* a vast number o f a c t i v i t i e s such as joking , premising, c r i t i c i z i n g , complaining, e t c . The studies c a r r i e d out by Sacks i n the explorat ion o f the order l iness o f conversation suggest that the accomplished character o f the organizat ion o f t a l k stands up t o formal ana ly s i s . Sacks made i t e x p l i c i t that h i s concern was w i t h s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , w i t h conversation o f f e r ing the best opportunity for i t s study. Schegloff and Sacks w r i t e : This work [of conversational analys i s ] i s par t o f a program o f work undertaken. . . to explore the p o s s i b i l i t y o f achieving a n a t u r a l i s t i c observational d i s c i p l i n e that could deal w i t h the d e t a i l s o f s o c i a l act ion(s) r igorous ly , e m p i r i c a l l y , and formal ly . . .Our a t tent ion has been focused 39 on conversational materials; suffice i t to say, this is not because of a special in-terest in language, or any theoretical primacy we accord conversation.. .but in the ways in which any actions accomplished in conversation require reference to the pro-perties and organization of conversation for understanding and analysis, both by parti-cipants and by professional investigators (1974:233-234). /Among the many interactional tasks performed in conversation to which Sacks pays attention are the following: the adjacency-pair phenomenon, the organization of topics in conversation, pronouns as transform operations, reference and ordinary understandings, the preference for 'recipient design' in storytelling, the analysis of puns, the technical features of joke-telling, and many more. Differences Between Conversational Analysis  and Linguistic Discourse Analysis In this section I want to narrow down the differences and similarities between linguistic discourse analysis in the text grammarian school of Longacre and conversational analysis following the work of Harvey Sacks and his students. Generally, linguistic discourse analysis is an attempt to extend the techniques and analytical categories in descriptive linguistics to the analysis of units beyond the sentence. The basic procedures employed are; (1) the isolation of a set of basic categories or units of discourse for analysis, (2) the discovery and description of as nearly a complete roster as possible of the factors that may reasonably be expected to contribute to the function of the discourse, and (3) the formulation 40 of a set o f ru le s re la ted t o the function o f i n d i v i d u a l discourse types. Other features o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s which I mentioned e a r l i e r inc lude ; (a) the tendency t o take one or two w r i t t e n texts and to attempt to g ive an in-depth analys i s o f a l l o f the features i n that ' type' of t ex t , and (b) an appeal t o i n t u i t i o n about, for example, what i s a coherent or well-formed discourse and what i s not . In contrast , conversational analys i s fo l lowing the work o f Sacks and h i s students i s an empir ica l approach to discourse analys i s which seeks t o avoid premature theory construct ion and which uses a b a s i c a l l y induct ive methodology; attempting t o discover and describe recurr ing patterns i n many n a t u r a l l y occurring conversations. The emphasis i n conversational analys i s i s on what can a c t u a l l y be found t o occur i n discourse, not on what one would guess t o be odd or acceptable i f i t were to occur. A l s o , there i s a tendency i n conversational analys i s not t o base one1 s analys i s on one or two conversational tex t s , but to examine many texts from l i v e conversation i n order t o discover the systematic propert ies o f the sequential organizat ion o f t a l k , and the ways i n which utterances are designed to manage such sequences i n conversational i n t e r a c t i o n . F i n a l l y , i n place o f the discourse l i n g u i s t ' s use o f ru l e s , conversational analys i s places emphasis on the i n t e r a c t i o n a l and i n f e r e n t i a l consequences o f the choices made between a l t e rna t ive utterances. The focus o f Sacksian conversational ana lys i s , then, i s qui te d i f f e r e n t from that o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s . Those engaged i n discourse analys i s from a l i n g u i s t i c perspective define t h e i r task 41 as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f 'discourse types' which are abstracted from edited texts leading t o general s t r u c t u r a l r e g u l a r i t i e s (Longacre, 1976, 1983; Markels, 1981; Jones, 1983; Gavin, 1980). Conversational analysts approach language phenomena from a d i f f e r e n t perspective than the discourse l i n g u i s t . In conversational analys i s the object o f study i s not focused on the competence o f a speaker t o produce grammatical sentences or well-formed discourse i n h i s or her language. While conversational analysts recognize that persons acquire and require that a b i l i t y , a t tent ion i s not focused on language but on a c t i v i t i e s accomplished v i a language. Instead o f developing a model o f language use and a language user, conversational analysts seek t o expl ica te and describe i n t e r a c t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s . In l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s a t tent ion i s focused upon the l i n g u i s t i c structures located i n a discourse, whi le conversational analys i s seeks to locate and describe i n t e r a c t i o n a l s tructures i n conversation, seeking t o construct machineries or ' s implest systematics' which provide for how i t i s that conversational a c t i v i t i e s get accomplished. S o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i s t o a large extent verbal i n t e r a c t i o n . Orderly features o f t a l k may be located and described—not merely l i n g u i s t i c features but i n t e r a c t i o n a l ones. We are not, a f ter a l l , deal ing w i t h a determini s t ic unfolding o f conversation. I t i s not, for example, l i k e p u l l i n g the t r i g g e r on a gun and noting the wholly predictable unfolding that takes p lace . Students o f Sacks would agree that there are order ly and conventional r e l a t i o n s between utterance types, and that the task o f the analyst i s 12 to discover those r e l a t i o n s and e lucidate them. That task includes f inding when these r e l a t i o n s are ignored, re jected, thrown back on the 42 speaker, and so on. For example, one common feature o f conversation i s that questions deserve answers. When we recognize t h i s as a feature o f conversation, however, we have t o remember that many times questions are not followed by answers. Nevertheless, the structures located i n conversational i n t e r a c t i o n should be able t o take care o f that as w e l l . In one sense that i s the task o f the discovering o f s t ructures , not t o p red ic t that , for example, 95% of the time questions w i l l be followed by answers, but t o provide for what becomes ava i l ab le i n conversation for whatever can happen. Furthermore, conversational analys i s does not t r y t o p red ic t what persons can say, or what kinds o f moods they are i n . No constraints can be put on what a person can or cannot say. The aim o f conversational analys i s i s not intended t o give one an expertise i n 'understanding' a discourse. I t i s not intended t o f i n d out 'what was r e a l l y meant' i n a conversation. Conversational analys i s i s intended t o do provings o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s , to show that what seems t o be going on i n a conversation i s a 13 p o s s i b i l i t y , and where that takes some k i n d o f proof . Conversational analys i s attends t o the analys i s o f understandings o f t a l k by attempting t o demonstrate how 'understandings' may be located i n the t a l k i t s e l f . In e f fec t , no add i t iona l information i s needed. Turner (1970) has shown that every utterance i n conversation has a soc ia l -organiza t iona l feature attached t o i t that other members can o r i e n t t o and p i c k up on. Insofar as intent ions , motives, and meaning get r e a l i z e d through a re l i ance upon these s o c i a l -organizat ional features, then the fol lowing may be argued: what goes on i n peoples' minds gets r e a l i z e d , t o a large extent, through conversation or t a l k , even though t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n might not be 43 14 recognized by the members themselves. Insofar as discourse analys i s i s concerned w i t h exp l i ca t ing discourse features by ru le s which a t t e s t to a member's competence i n communicating, a major methodological dif ference ex i s t s between conversational ana lys i s and discourse ana lys i s . R e c a l l that discourse analysts seek t o discover and describe a complete ros ter o f factors which contribute t o the communicative purpose of a p a r t i c u l a r discourse type. Conversational analysts , however, as Schegloff notes, are concerned w i t h " f i n d i n g a set o f formal pract ices through which a world o f p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i f i c scenes . . . i s accomplished and exhib i ted" (1972:117). This i s confirmed by Turner: The k i n d o f analys i s we must pursue as students o f conversational order i s d i -rected t o the construct ion o f an apparatus which i s usable on mater ia l s other than the data i t i n i t i a l l y handles (1976:233). I t pays, too, t o note the scope and l i m i t a t i o n s o f conversational analysis—what i t i s and i s not intended t o handle. Conversational analys i s i s not, a f te r a l l , t r y i n g to construct a methodology for f i gur ing out 'what was meant' i n a p a r t i c u l a r conversation. I t i s not interes ted i n loca t ing and descr ib ing formal cognit ive features o f language or i n contr ibut ing t o purely l i n g u i s t i c grammars or engaging i n macro-level language debates. What conversational analys i s does seek t o do i s t o provide in s ight i n t o the i n t e r a c t i o n a l character o f t a l k , something which i s b a s i c a l l y neglected by discourse analysts i n the t e x t grammarian school o f analys i s but which i s recognized as important and recommended for further study ( c f . Longacre, 1983; Jones, 1983; P i c k e r i n g , 1979). 44 There are, however, seme s i m i l a r i t i e s between l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and conversational ana lys i s . In seme discourse models, for example, discourse functions apply not only to the meaning o f a contexted utterance but a l so t o the other utterances i n the discourse, and how utterances may precede, fo l low, and r e l a t e t o each other . S i n c l a i r and Coulthard (1975) suggest that questions can f u l f i l l various functions i n discourse, e .g . to make a s l o t for a response, and that discourse acts may be viewed as moves which can e i ther be i n i t i a t i n g or responding. There i s a p a r a l l e l here w i t h Sacks' work w i t h adjacency-pairs (1967; 1972), where the f i r s t p a i r -par t provides for the second p a i r - p a r t . In such instances the lack o f a second pa i r -par t would be not iceable . Yet the s i m i l a r i t i e s between discourse analys i s and conversational analys i s remain minimal. /As Schegloff and Sacks t e l l us: Finding an utterance t o be an answer, t o be accomplishing answering, cannot be achieved by reference t o phonological , syntac t i c , semantic, or l o g i c a l features o f the utterance i t s e l f , but only by consul t ing i t s sequential placement, e .g . i t s placement a f ter a question (1973:299). In a s i m i l a r v e i n , E g l i n (1978) w r i t e s : Conversational analys i s i s p r i o r t o semantics and syntax; that i s , that the sense and reference o f an utterance par t i s dependent upon what ac t ion the utterance i s performing (p. 18). Furthermore, Turner (1970) argued years ago that utterances cannot "be treated as reports or descr ipt ions without reference t o the i n t e r a c t i o n a l l o c a t i o n o f the utterance i n question" (p.173). To r e i t e r a t e , conversational analys i s b u i l d s upon G a r f i n k e l ' s 45 i n i t i a l formulation of ethncmethodology (1967) by holding to the view that s o c i a l structures are achieved, sustained, and displayed i n and through i n t e r a c t i o n . Conversational analysts are interested i n how language i s employed to accomplish s o c i a l order as a feature of s o c i a l r e a l i t y , i n a narrower sense, th i s in teres t has to do with how people cont inua l ly and cons i s tent ly account for what they do and how they d i sp lay t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s as r a t i o n a l and ordinary. This accounting re la tes to t a l k i n that people do many things by t a l k i n g about them. Upon analys i s i t i s claimed that t a l k exhib i t s many orderly features, not so much features of language as features of i n t e r r a c t i o n . METHODOLOGY R e c a l l that the purpose of my d i s s e r t a t i o n i s to provide the discourse l i n g u i s t with a set of discovery procedures for treat ing the f i r s t type of discourse as posited by Longacre, NARRATIVE. This d i s s e r t a t ion i s not a substantive conversational analys i s p iece , but methodological with respect to making conversational analys is relevant to l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s . E a r l i e r I said that the focus of my d i s s e r t a t i o n w i l l be on in terac t iona l and ethnographic features of NARRATIVE i n l i v e conversation, which I re fer to as STORYTELLING. Before proceeding to the a n a l y t i c a l chapters I want to o u t l i n e the methodology which i s centra l to conversational analys i s and then conclude t h i s chapter w i t h my assumptions about conversational in terac t ion i n general and about narrat ive s p e c i f i c a l l y . 46 The methodology which I use i n t h i s study i s basic to conversational ana lys i s . The two basic methods used i n conversational analys i s inves t iga t ion are: (1) Examining conversational t ranscr ip t s i n order to discover recurr ing patterns and describing the systematic properties of those patterns . Conversational analys is attempts to locate some p a r t i c u l a r organization and i so l a te i t s systematic features by demonstrating p a r t i c i p a n t s ' o r i enta t ion to those features, and (2) Discovering what problems the explicated organizat ion solves and what problems i t r a i s e s . That i s , what implicat ions does i t have for the existence of further solut ions to further problems. In t h i s study, I used the above methodology as fo l lows : l i s t e n i n g to and t ranscr ib ing the conversational tapes, searching t ranscr ip t s for recurring patterns , locat ing a p a r t i c u l a r conversational organizat ion , discovering the systematic features of that organizat ion, and describing i t s formal properties by demonstrating the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' o r i enta t ion to those propert ie s . In my ana ly s i s , members' procedures employed i n conversational in te rac t ion and researchers' methods for discovering those procedures can be described i n terms of three kinds of o r i en ta t ions : (1) r ec ip ient design, (2) membership ana lys i s , and (3) a c t i v i t y ana lys i s , each of which I discuss i n d e t a i l i n the a n a l y t i c a l chapters. 47 The above paragraph implies a recommendation as t o how to begin searching for solut ions t o the issues formulated i n the a n a l y t i c chapters. This recommendation i s that when analyzing a conversation one ought to begin by examining and comparing recordings and t r a n s c r i p t s o f natura l conversation i n order t o locate and describe the 'how' o f t e l l i n g and l i s t e n i n g . The s tor ie s subjected to formal analys i s i n t h i s study are drawn from a corpus o f about 250 s tor ie s 15 captured on tape. From these s to r i e s I searched for recurr ing patterns i n order t o discover and describe the systematic propert ies o f the organizat ion o f conversational nar ra t ive , the sequential organizat ion o f conversation r e l a t i n g t o narrat ives t o l d i n l i v e conversation, and the ways i n which utterances are designed t o manage such sequences. Conclusion L i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s has much t o o f fer the soc io log i s t interes ted i n the study o f discourse. For the most par t , however, sociology has been somewhat negligent i n appropriat ing the contr ibut ions o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the work o f Longacre and h i s students. Often the soc io log i s t interested i n discourse b u i l d s up a ' straw-man' image o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and proceeds t o dismiss l i n g u i s t i c f indings on that ba s i s . In the recent study of John Gumperz (1982), he makes the qui te v a l i d argument t h a t : There i s a need for a s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c theory which accounts for the communicative functions o f l i n g u i s t i c v a r i a b i l i t y and for i t s r e l a t i o n t o speakers' goals without reference t o un-48 tes table f u n c t i o n a l i s t assumptions about con-formity or noncomformance to closed systems o f norms. Since speaking i s i n t e r a c t i n g , such a theory must u l t imate ly draw i t s bas ic postulates from what we know about i n t e r a c t i o n (1982:29). There i s an i n t e r a c t i o n a l , ethnographic dimension missing from much o f the work being done i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s which sociology i s equipped to deal w i t h and t h i s study of fers the discourse l i n g u i s t a methodology for deal ing w i t h the discourse type NARRATIVE, w i t h respect to making conversational analys i s relevant t o l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana ly s i s . In making a methodological and t h e o r e t i c a l contr ibut ion t o l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s , t h i s study responds t o an i n v i t a t i o n from l i n g u i s t i c s for h e l p . I f i t were the case that discourse l i n g u i s t s were not concerned w i t h an i n t e r a c t i o n a l treatment o f the issues dea l t w i t h i n t h e i r analyses, then such a contr ibut ion would not be considered necessary. I f i n d , however, the opposite to be t r u e . Discourse l i n g u i s t s are interested i n the ethnographic dimension, but lack the a n a l y t i c a l too l s for deal ing w i t h i n t e r a c t i o n a l and ethnographic concerns i n discourse. E a r l i e r i n the chapter I noted that there i s a gap between the descr ip t ive analyses on discourse being c a r r i e d out i n l i n g u i s t i c s and the ethnographic dimension o f discourse as treated i n sociology. This study attempts t o f i l l that gap by o f f e r ing conversational analys i s as a methodological and a n a l y t i c a l t o o l t o the discourse l i n g u i s t . Fol lowing my introductory remarks I set out to review the l i n e o f progression from descr ip t ive l i n g u i s t i c s t o discourse ana lys i s . I noted major approaches to studying discourse from a l i n g u i s t i c perspective; (1) t ex t grammar, and (2) speech-act theory. I then 49 focused on one perspective frcm the former; fo l lowing the a n a l y t i c a l perspective o f Robert Longacre and h i s students. I be l ieve that t h i s school o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s i s the most productive and one that recognizes the need for an ethnographic dimension w i t h a concern for i n t e r a c t i o n . Throughout the a n a l y t i c a l chapters ( 3 - 6 ) I w i l l re turn to t h i s discourse perspective by providing a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f a feature of discourse and then o f fe r ing an a l t e rna t ive treatment o f the same feature v i a conversational ana ly s i s . Then I traced the l i n e o f progression from Erving Goffman, Harold Gar f inke l and ethnomethodology t o conversational ana lys i s , a f ter which I compared and contrasted the a n a l y t i c a l perspective o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s w i t h the perspective o f conversational ana lys i s . My purpose i n doing t h i s was to show the need for inc lud ing an ethnographic dimension i n t o l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s , a need that i s already recognized by those l i n g u i s t s i n the Longacre school of discourse ana ly s i s . In the next chapter, I focus on previous studies o f narra t ive i n the l i n g u i s t i c and s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . 50 Footnotes: Chapter 1_ 1 Tagmemic theory, b a s i c a l l y , begins w i t h the assumption that there i s "an analogy between a p a r t i c u l a r society , as a whole, and a language" (Pike, 1967:643). The analogy has f i v e components: (1) the s tructure o f each can be detected only by observing ind iv idua l s and groups i n t e r a c t i n g , (2) each language or soc iety i s r e l a t i v e l y independent o f other languages and soc ie t i e s , although "there may be f r u i t f u l contact between d i f f e ren t languages by way o f b i l i n g u a l s , and contact between soc ie t ie s through i n d i v i d u a l s b i - s o c i a l l y or iented" (Pike, 1967:643), (3) both kinds o f structures are r e l a t i v e l y s table , (4) the s tructure o f a p a r t i c u l a r society comprises a set o f re l a t ionsh ips i n a network, and (5) components o f the s o c i a l s t ructure , inc lud ing language, are structured i n three modes. The three modes are; the feature mode, the manifestation mode, and the d i s t r i b u t i o n mode. P i k e ' s vers ion o f tagmemic theory can be summarized, then, i n two main ideas . The f i r s t i s that behavior can be described from both the emic and the e t i c viewpoints, and, secondly, s o c i a l components are t r imoda l ly structured (Pike, 1967). 2 For example, Toba (1978) shows that i n the Khaling language (Eastern Nepal) p a r t i c i p a n t focus dis t inguishes event oriented narrat ives from p a r t i c i p a n t or iented narra t ives . Pa r t i c ipan t focus i s a k i n d o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n that i d e n t i f i e s par t i c ipant s w i t h regard t o t h e i r importance i n the nar ra t ive . In Khal ing , p a r t i c i p a n t s ' foca l or nonfocal status may be s i gna l l ed by the use of noun phrases and pronominal izat ion. In the Kaje language (Nigeria) a s t o r y t e l l e r may use a s p e c i f i c pronoun i n the verb phrase t o re fe r to any one o f several t h i r d person referents (McKinney, 1978). 3 Lakoff (1971) i n i t i a l l y pointed out that i n s i tuat ions where the speaker wishes the hearer to do something, Engl i sh uses modal ' w i l l ' , 'may', 'might ' , or 'should' attached to the main verb t o obtain a c e r t a i n degree o f po l i tenes s . Morton (1978) found that i n the P a r j i language (India) speakers use f i v e d i f f e rent performative a r t i c l e s for the sole purpose o f informing hearers about the speaker's a t t i tude to h i s or her hearer and t o the information that i s being g iven. 4 For example, i n many languages there seem to be 'cohesion markers' which occur i n c e r t a i n clauses. They are cohesive i n the sense that they may re fe r to things that have been sa id e a r l i e r i n a nar ra t ive . A t the same time they provide a po int o f departure for the next set o f utterances or the next paragraph, i f one i s analyzing an edited tex t (Hal l iday and Hasan, 1976; Jones, 1977; Strahm, 1978). 51 5 For example, Marlene Schulze demonstrates how r h e t o r i c a l questions are used t o organize discourse i n the Sunwar (Nepal) language. One k i n d of r h e t o r i c a l question i s used t o capture or recapture the hearer ' s a t t en t ion . Another k i n d o f r h e t o r i c a l question i s used for i d e n t i f y i n g characters, events, or set t ings and to impress on the hearer some s p e c i f i c a t t r i b u t e o f these. 6 In h i s 1977 a r t i c l e , "A Discourse Manifesto" , Longacre w r i t e s : I t seems to me there i s more a t stake than simply the fact that discourse per-spective i s needed t o round out l i n g u i s t i c analys i s on any l e v e l , and that t h i s [ d i s -course analys i s ] i s an area o f growing i n t e r e s t w i t h i n the f i e l d as a whole (p. 27). 7 From the beginning, G a r f i n k e l ' s major concern was to focus on the 'background expectancies' o f s i tua t ions which makes i n t e r a c t i o n poss ib le and which makes s o c i a l r e a l i t y an ongoing accomplishment (1967). People do hundreds o f things every day, and these things are viewed by Gar f inke l as p r a c t i c a l accomplishments which deserve as much a t tent ion by s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s as are more extraordinary phenomena. 8 G a r f i n k e l assumes that the s o c i a l world i s constantly being created by people and that t h i s continuous creat ion i s not a problem for them. That i s to say, through t h e i r use o f taken-for-granted, ccmmon sense knowledge about how the world works and how people can manage t h e i r a f f a i r s i n acceptable ways, members o f a society can be seen to be creat ing the soc ie ty . He wr i te s that h i s studies are : . . . d i r e c t e d to the tasks o f learning how members'actual, ordinary a c t i v i t i e s cons i s t o f methods to make p r a c t i c a l ac t ions , prac-t i c a l circumstances, commonsense [ s i c ] know-ledge of s o c i a l s t ructures , and p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l reasoning analyzable; and o f discovering the formal propert ies o f common-place , p r a c t i c a l commonsense [ s i c ] act ions 'from w i t h i n ' actual set t ings as ongoing ac-complishments o f those set t ings ( 1 9 6 9 : v i i i ) . 9 For those s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s interested i n studying the everyday world, G a r f i n k e l ' s program suggests that everywhere one looks one can see people going about t h e i r ordinary business performing f a m i l i a r , unremarkable a c t i v i t i e s , and that these a c t i v i t i e s are the very crux o f the s o c i a l wor ld . In that the a b i l i t y o f people t o successful ly perform these a c t i v i t i e s i n co l l abora t ion w i t h others i s what makes the s o c i a l world pos s ib le , one ought to take these p r a c t i c a l actions and examine them for how they are accomplished (1967). 52 10 As Gar f inke l suggests, not only s o c i e t a l members, but a l so soc io log i s t s , l i n g u i s t s , o r anyone, operate i n t h i s manner. In t h i s way anyone can derive ' o b j e c t i v e ' , general statements about the s o c i a l wor ld . 11 Those analysts fo l lowing the Sacksian t r a d i t i o n study what people say, the accounts they g ive , i n order to discover how the s t r u c t u r a l features o f s i tua t ions are produced, and maintained i n a manner which 'makes sense' to p a r t i c i p a n t s . 12 Simply put, the concern o f the conversational analyst i s w i t h the methods people use to carry out the a c t i v i t i e s o f everyday l i f e and the pract ices by which they convey t o others that t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s are r a t i o n a l and ordinary . The crux o f the matter i s that people do many things by t a l k i n g about them (Turner, 1970). 13 Sacks et a l . wr i t e i n r e l a t i o n t o turn- tak ing : While understanding o f other t u r n ' s t a l k are displayed to copart ic ipants , they are ava i l ab le as w e l l to profess ional analysts , who are there-by afforded a proof c r i t e r i o n . . . f o r the analys i s o f what a t u r n ' s t a l k i s occupied w i t h . Since i t i s the p a r t i e s ' understandings o f p r i o r tu rn ' s t a l k that i s relevant to t h e i r construct ion o f next turns , i t i s t h e i r understandings that are wanted for ana ly s i s . The d i sp l ay o f those under-standings i n the t a l k i n subsequent turns affords a resource fo r the analys i s o f p r i o r turns , and a proof procedure for the profess ional analyses o f p r i o r turns , resources i n t r i n s i c to the data them-selves (1978:45). 14 This points to a major difference between conversational analys i s and discourse analys i s frcm a s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c perspective as w e l l . Gumperz (1982) w r i t e s : We must draw a bas ic d i s t i n c t i o n between meaning...and in te rpre ta t ion , i . e . the s i tuated assessment o f in tent (p.207). Surely we can agree wi th Gumperz that the content of meaning i s s i t u a t i o n a l , that meaning i s generated i n a s i t u a t i o n and i s r e f l e x i v e l y re inforced i n t a l k . Although Gumperz i s not from e i ther 53 the l i n g u i s t i c discourse school or conversational ana lys i s , h i s contr ibut ion t o s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c theory and methodology has helped shape my own perspective on language over the years . 15 I e spec i a l ly want t o thank David Aleguire for making some o f h i s tapes ava i l ab le to me. During 1975-1976, Aleguire tape-recorded conversations i n a v a r i e t y o f informal se t t ings . I have 19 hours o f tape-recorded conversations. Besides those given to me by Aleguire , I recorded various fr iends and family members i n informal se t t ings . My own recordings, about 5 hours worth, were recorded between 1979-1983. 54 CHAPTER 2: CONVERSATIONAL STORYTELLING Much of the recent interest in storytelling and story grammars was originally sparked by the structural analysis of folktales in 1 anthropological circles. It seems natural to f i r s t mention the pioneering monograph on the structure of Russian fairytales by V. Propp (1968, originally published in 1928). He isolated 31 narrative categories or functions such as departure, struggle, return, and villainy. He described a 'function' as "an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of action" (1968:21). Propp claimed that functions served as constant categories or elements of a tale which are independent of the specific characters or circumstances in which they are found. Studies in Narrative In mentioning Propp and others we are discussing storytelling which differs from narration in which we are interested, i n that Propp treats stories which were not told in the course of natural conversation. There are elements, however, in some of the works which have been important to developments in conversational analysis. B. Colby (1973) built upon and departed from the work of Propp in analyzing Inuit folktales and introduced the notion of a grammar of stories marked by sequence and selection rules. Propp had presented a sequence of functions which could be discovered in folktales but his analysis could not account for the numerous exceptions to the normal 55 sequence. In contrast , Colby's analys i s had some generative power. However, the generative capacity o f h i s analys i s was l i m i t e d to 2 v a l i d a t i n g the genuineness o f bas ic narrat ive u n i t s . Thus, both Propp and Colby represent an attempt t o develop a funct ional methodology for analyzing s tory s tructures , but nei ther , i n my mind, were very successful due t o the l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e i r respective goals . Recent research i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s has t r i e d t o develop ' s tory grammars', analyses which provide for the underlying s tructure o f simple s tor i e s and the impl ica t ions o f such structures for comprehension and r e c a l l (Rumelhart, 1975; Thorndyke, 1977; Mandler, 1978; Mandler and Johnson, 1977; S te in and Glenn, 1979). In each o f these studies the focus i s on an analys i s o f higher l e v e l 3 organizat ional structures i n s t o r i e s . For example, Thorndyke (1977) attempted to show that s tor i e s have a suprasentential s tructure which l i s t e n e r s are sens i t ive t o . I s a id i n the l a s t chapter that discourse analysts working from a generative semantic perspective are concerned w i t h e x p l i c a t i n g and descr ibing these beyond-the-sentence features, and the studies mentioned here a t t e s t to that goa l . However, we wish to emphasize that these studies are concerned only wi th language competence and not i n t e r a c t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s . I want to mention the work of two other researchers before moving on to the analys i s of s tor ie s t o l d i n natura l conversation. w. Kint sch and T .A . van D i j k (1978) have argued that an analys i s of proposi t ions w i t h i n a s tory ( 'propos i t ion ' r e f e r r ing to the meaning o f a sentence), does not adequately expla in important elements o f discourse s t ructure , such as an i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b i l i t y to summarize a 56 t e x t . K int sch and van D i j k take i t as t h e i r goal t o be able to account for the features which e s t ab l i sh a tex t as a coherent whole and a l low i t t o be defined i n terms o f discourse t o p i c s . Of in te re s t t o us i s that Kint sch and van D i j k have suggested that people who hear a s tory , or read a s tory, hear/read i t wi th a c e r t a i n world-view or set o f expectations about the s to ry ' s s t ructure . According to Kintsch (1977), s to r i e s are formed as a sequence o f episodes, each o f which consis t s o f an expos i t ion, a complication, and a r e s o l u t i o n . He claims, fur ther , that l i s t e n e r s segment the s tor ie s they hear i n t o s tory categories which involves both formal l i n g u i s t i c cues and those offered by the content o f the s tory . A formal cue could be something l i k e "now" or " w e l l " , or connectors such as "but" , "however", and "so" that connect whole s tory categories rather than s ing le sentences. In a recent a r t i c l e , van Di jk (1982) t reat s episodes as semantic uni t s o f discourse, represented i n the surface s tructure by paragraphs, general ly w i t h c l ea r boundary markers i n both spoken and w r i t t e n language. An episode o f a discourse i s considered by van D i j k to be a sequence of re la ted proposi t ions that may be subsumed under some larger theme. For example, any change o f time, place, p a r t i c i p a n t s , or events general ly indicates a new episode. The following d i f f e r i n that the s tor ie s they analyzed i n t h e i r research are drawn from natura l conversation. W i l l i a m Labov and J . Waletsky (1966), using ' s tory ' as an ana ly t i c u n i t , invest igated s tor ie s t o l d i n conversation and demonstrated that s tor ie s can be found t o be composed o f formal propert ie s . Janet Eisner (1975) attempted the ambitious pro jec t o f accounting for the constraints placed on o r a l narrat ives by the s o c i a l context and the narra tor ' s 57 involvement. She claims that " i t i s the nar ra tor ' s involvement i n the narra t ive which determines the kinds o f narrat ives produced" (1975:v) and that there are four kinds o f o r a l nar ra t ive : uninvolved report , v i ca r ious experience, personal experience, and group experience or s tory . In r e l a t i o n t o conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g , o f i n t e r e s t to us i n t h i s study i s E i sner ' s a t tent ion given to the process o f se lec t ion and re-ordering o f events through which the s t o r y t e l l e r transforms the o r i g i n a l event i n t o the narrated event. By making these transformations a s t o r y t e l l e r can cue the hearer t o the po int o f the s tory . In terms o f discourse features, Eisner discusses the uses and forms o f reported speech w i t h i n the s tructure o f a s tory and concludes that s t o r y t e l l e r s are resourceful language users who shape language and i t s s tructure to f i t t h e i r t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n s . She at times comes close t o descr ibing i n t e r a c t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s , but seems t o be constrained by her in tent to discover grammatical features w i t h i n s t o r i e s . Kenneth Gavin (1980) a l so works toward the construction o f a 'grammar o f s t o r i e s ' and proposes that s tory grammars operate on the premise that they can provide the correct in te rpre ta t ion for any w e l l -formed s tory . His concern i s two-fo ld : (1) what are the bas ic uni t s o f s tory s t ructure , and (2) how do they re l a te t o a grammar o f sentences? Again, note that the concerns o f those doing discourse ana lys i s , even on s tor ie s t o l d i n natura l conversation, are d i f f e rent than those w i t h i n the Sacksian t r a d i t i o n . I sa id e a r l i e r , for example, that conversational analysts are not t r y i n g to in te rpre t 'what was r e a l l y meant' i n a conversation. I do f i n d i t i n t e r e s t i n g , however, that Gavin claims consistent use of at l ea s t a rudimentary 58 s tory s tructure a t a l l age l e v e l s . The l a s t group of w r i t e r s I discuss come c loses t , i n my mind, t o the in te re s t s o f those doing conversational analys i s from a Sacksian perspect ive . Nessa Wolfson (1976, 1978) b u i l d s upon the work on narra t ive by Labov to report on the use o f the conversational 4 h i s t o r i c a l present tense i n conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g . The conversational h i s t o r i c a l present tense may subst i tute for the simple past tense i n conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g and i s r e f e r e n t i a l l y equivalent to the past tense when used i n t h i s way. Wolfson suggests that the conversational h i s t o r i c a l present tense occurs only i n a s p e c i f i c type o f s tory which she c a l l s a "performed story" and contains features such as dialogue, asides, motions and gestures, and r e p e t i t i o n . She refers to t h i s k i n d o f s tory as a "structured performance" i n which the switching between past and present tenses does the work o f organizing the narrat ive by se t t ing o f f one act 5 sequence from another. The use o f the conversational h i s t o r i c a l present tense i s a good example o f a discourse feature which may be found i n s tor ie s t o l d i n natura l conversation as opposed to edited texts or f o l k t a l e s . Wolfson demonstrates that i t i s the s t o r y t e l l e r who i s obl iged t o make the choice o f whether or not t o use the conversational h i s t o r i c a l present tense as a means o f organizing a s tory and where i n the s tory to make the tense switches. In a recent a r t i c l e Wolf son claimed that the a l t e rna t ion between the conversational h i s t o r i c a l present tense and other tenses i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g i s a "performance feature which functions along wi th the other features i n t h i s set to g ive structure and drama t o the s tory being performed" (1978:217). 59 L i v i a Polanyi (1979) takes a d i f f e rent approach to s tor ie s t o l d i n the course of natura l conversation and claims that what s tor i e s can be 'about' i s c u l t u r a l l y constrained, that a s tory t o l d i n conversation ought to have as i t s ' po in t ' only c u l t u r a l l y s a l i e n t mater ia l considered by c u l t u r a l members to be s e l f - e v i d e n t l y 6 important. S tor ies may a l so be changed i n the course o f t e l l i n g as t e l l e r s and hearers negotiate for what a s tory w i l l be agreed upon t o have been about. She cla ims, further , that i n our cul ture the structure o f a s tory i s composed o f devices which "may be e i t h e r integrated i n t o the t e l l i n g o f the s tory i t s e l f or included i n corrraents made by the narrator frcm outside the frame o f the s tory" (1979:209). She considers a 'device' to be a type o f statement which acts from outside the s tory to ind ica te that a c e r t a i n par t o f the s tory contains information c r u c i a l t o understanding why the s tory was t o l d . Labov (1972) and Longacre (1976) use 'device ' i n the same way, t o re fer to the use o f reported speech, r e p e t i t i o n o f key words or phrases, increased use o f modif iers , and so fo r th (e .g . a statement such as, 'Get t h i s , t h i s i s the funny p a r t ' ) . /According to Po lany i , i n our cu l ture there i s u sua l ly more than one device present i n a 7 s tory, and more than one piece o f information i s h igh l i gh ted . Her research focuses upon examining s tor ie s t o l d i n conversation w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n understanding how s tor ie s can t e l l something o f the values and cu l ture o f a people. None o f the studies discussed thus far , however, are concerned w i t h i n t e r a c t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s but w i t h language competence, w i t h the poss ible exceptions o f Wolfson and P o l a n y i . Even these, though, have 60 l i t t l e t o o f fer i n terms of understanding i n t e r a c t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s . Although Wolfson and Po lanyi , and to a les ser degree Labov, seek to draw a r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t o r y t e l l i n g and c u l t u r a l knowledge, there i s a puzz l ing equivoca l i ty i n t h e i r use o f the term ' c u l t u r a l knowledge'. F i r s t , the term i s scmetimes used t o re fe r t o t y p i f i e d members' experiences and, secondly, i t i s used as the 'knowing how' o f acxxarcplishing a c t i v i t i e s such as t e l l i n g s t o r i e s . As Sacks (1978) has noted, both aspects are often i n t r i c a t e l y connected. For example, the top ic o f a s tory ( f i r s t aspect) i s re la ted t o the t o p i c a l organizat ion o f the conversation i n which the story i s t o l d (second aspect) . However, the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two aspects must be main-ta ined. A s tory may serve to transmit ' t y p i c a l experiences' and thus p l ay a par t i n s o c i a l i z a t i o n (Spielmann, 1981). This aspect i s 'knowing t h a t ' . The second aspect, 'knowing how', i s independent o f the p a r t i c u l a r ' tha t ' that i s being t o l d . To r e i t e r a t e , the w r i t e r s discussed above show l i t t l e in te re s t i n s t o r y t e l l i n g as an i n t e r a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , but focus instead on s tory structure and/or the r e l a t i onsh ip between s t o r y t e l l i n g and c u l t u r a l knowledge. I now wish to examine the work o f Sacks and those who have analyzed s tor ie s t o l d i n natura l conversation from a Sacksian perspect ive. Sacksian Studies i n Conversational S t o r y t e l l i n g Harvey Sacks began examining s tor ie s t o l d i n conversation i n the l a t e s i x t i e s and h i s work i s w e l l represented i n h i s unpublished 8 lectures from the F a l l of 1970 and the Spring of 1971. In one o f h i s lectures edited by G a i l Jefferson and published posthumously, 61 Sacks begins w i t h the seme bas ic features o f s tor ie s i n our cu l ture , that they are ways o f packaging experiences and that s tor ie s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y report an experience i n which the t e l l e r f i gures . The s tory i s often organized around the t e l l e r ' s circumstances 9 (1978:259). Then Sacks' concerns turn t o i n t e r a c t i o n . He w r i t e s : Not only does t e l l e r f igure i n the s tory , and f igure w i t h the s tory organized around h i s circumstances, but i t ' s p re t ty much t e l l e r ' s business to t e l l the s tory w i t h r e -spect t o i t s import for him, and i t i s h i s involvement i n i t that provides for the s t o r y ' s t e l l i n g . That i s , t e l l e r can t e l l i t t o some-one who knows and cares about him, and maybe r e c i p i e n t can t e l l i t to someone who a l so knows and cares about the i n i t i a l t e l l e r , but i t goes very l i t t l e further than that (1978:261). Sacks goes on t o suggest that the r e c i p i e n t o f a s tory ought t o d i sp l ay h i s or her understanding o f the s tory wi th some k ind o f 10 utterance which does ' s tory understanding'. One form o f d i sp lay ing understanding could be an 'appreciat ion' utterance, e .g . 'That must have been funny t o see ' . Another form o f d i sp lay ing understanding could involve r e c i p i e n t i n t e l l i n g a second story i n which the r e c i p i e n t has an experience s i m i l a r to the o r i g i n a l s t o r y t e l l e r ' s 11 (Sacks, 1970, Lecture 5; Ryave, 1978). In the same a r t i c l e , Sacks mentions that a s tory ought to be f i t t e d i n t o the ongoing conversation, so that s tor i e s may be seen to be c a r e f u l l y placed ( c f . Jef ferson, 1978; Gardner and Spielmann, 1980). In r e l a t i o n to the organizat ion o f s tor i e s t o l d i n conversation, Sacks points out that one important thing that i s noticeable about s tor ie s i s that people design large parts o f t h e i r s to r i e s for various 62 i n t e r a c t i o n a l and recipient-designed purposes, and i t often turns out that people don't r e a l i z e that they are doing that designing. I t seems that people are general ly unaware that they are designing t h e i r s to r i e s or that they are engaging i n de l i ca te and subtle i n t e r a c t i o n . They ju s t do i t , and more often than not they do i t i n an extremely economical fashion. One th ing , then, about s tor i e s i s that they usua l ly have an organized economy without any s p e c i f i c knowledge on the par t o f the t e l l e r that that i s what i s being done. Sacks w r i t e s : Then a s tory comes o f f and i t has an observedly marked organizat ion t o i t . . . and the very t e l l e r can be struck by that . What the t e l l e r may say i s , 'Wow, how elegantly organized my story was l ' which he can only say by v i r t u e o f the fact that he had no idea that he had organized, i t . Now the argument goes: tha t the economical organizat ion of a s tory i s for some purpose (1971:3:23). In examining the sequential aspects o f s tory forms Sacks suggests that s t o r y t e l l i n g i s composed o f three s e r i a l l y ordered and adjacently placed types o f sequences: (1) the preface sequence, (2) the t e l l i n g sequence, and (3) the response sequence. Our concern w i t h the features of r i s k y or dangerous d i sc losure s tor ie s w i l l have us focusing on a l l three sequences. Jef ferson (1978) demonstrates how a ser ies o f conversational utterances can be sequent ia l ly analyzed as parts o f a ' s t o r y t e l l i n g ' w i t h the t a l k being used t o engage conversational co-part ic ipants as s tory rec ip i en t s "and to negotiate whether, and how, the s tory w i l l be t o l d , whether i t i s completed or i n progress, and w h a t . . . i t w i l l have amounted to as a conversational event" (p.237). She locates two 63 features o f s tor ie s which are integrated w i t h turn-by-turn t a l k : (1) s to r i e s are ' l o c a l l y occasioned' i n that they emerge from turn-by-turn t a l k , and (2) upon completion s tor ie s re-engage turn-by-turn t a l k . She w r i t e s : The l o c a l occasioning o f a s tory by ongoing turn-by-turn t a l k can have two d i scre te aspects; (a) a s tory i s ' t r iggered ' i n the course o f t a l k , and (b) a s tory i s methodically introduced i n t o turn-by-turn t a l k (1978:220). Jef ferson b u i l d s here upon Sacks' ideas about how s tor ie s get t o l d w i t h a s e n s i t i v i t y t o the l o c a l conversational contexts w i t h i n which they are t o l d . One thing about s t o r y t e l l i n g s i s that they involve s h i f t s i n the state of t a l k from turn-by-turn t a l k to s t o r y t e l l i n g and then back to turn-by-turn t a l k . S t o r y t e l l i n g i n conversation properly begins w i t h what Sacks c a l l s a 'preface sequence'. He suggests tha t ; The preface can take a minimal length o f two turns , the f i r s t invo lv ing t a l k by the intending t e l l e r and the second by an intended r e c i p i e n t (1974:340). For example, (1) A : Did I t e l l you what happened t o me i n Mexico l a s t month? (2) B: No, what happened? This minimal sequence begins w i t h A, the intending t e l l e r , producing an utterance (1) that does the work o f o f f e r ing t o t e l l a s tory . Then B, i n utterance (2), responds to A ' s i n i t i a l o f fer wi th an answer to A ' s question and, i n tu rn , produces a relevant 'acceptance' o f A ' s o f f e r to t e l l a s tory . Sacks suggests that i f an o f fer t o t e l l a 64 story is followed by an utterance by the intended recipient which accepts/rejects the story offer, then: The preface sequence can take a rrdnimal length, be two turns long, and thereafter the telling sequence can be undertaken, intending teller reacquiring the floor for that project (1974:341). It seems reasonable to suggest that, since we can have a minimal preface sequence, a preface sequence may be expanded beyond its minimal form. Sacks (1974) argues that the source for this type of expansion often involves the intended story recipient making use of the i n i t i a l utterance of offering a story to either reject or somehow delay the telling. (3) A: Did I t e l l you what happened to me in Mexico last month? (4) B: Listen, I'd like to hear about i t but I'm really in a rush. Note in this sequence A offers to t e l l a story and B responds to A's offer with an utterance (4) which does the work of rejecting or delaying the telling of the story. A story is offered but the telling is delayed. ^  ' '• ~ ... : Once a story has been prefaced and accepted, the teller may proceed directly to the telling. Although the preface and response parts wi l l necessarily involve some conversational sequencing, the actual telling carries no such obligation and place for the story recipient to talk within the course of the telling need not be provided by the teller. The telling can then take a minimum of one 65 t e l l e r t u r n . I t i s common, however, for s tory rec ip ient s t o t a l k 14 w i t h i n the t e l l i n g sequence. Sacks suggests one reason for t h i s : Since responses t o s tor i e s require an understanding o f them and can reveal the f a i l u r e thereof, a r e c i p i e n t who fee l s a f a i l u r e i n the s to ry ' s course and can intrude to seek c l a r i f i c a t i o n i s motiva-ted t o do so because he can thereby be aided i n avoiding a misresponse (1974:345). Goffman (1974) agrees that a s tory, as a replaying , w i l l u sua l ly "be seme-thing that l i s t e n e r s can emphatically i n s e r t themselves i n t o , v i c a r i o u s l y re-experiencing what took place" (p.504). /Also, when a member i s engaged i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g , that member i s presenting t o the s tory r e c i p i e n t a vers ion o f something that a c t u a l l y happened. Goffman suggests that when a person i s engaging i n the a c t i v i t y o f s t o r y t e l l i n g , The means [the t e l l e r ] employs [ to t e l l the s tory] may be i n t r i n s i c a l l y t h e a t r i c a l , not because he necessar i ly exaggerates or follows a s c r i p t , but because he may have t o engage i n some-thing that i s a d ramat i za t ion . . . t o replay i t (1974:504). Ryave (1978) points out that the ac tua l t e l l i n g o f a s tory , the recounting p o r t i o n , " i s notable for i t s p a r t i c u l a r de l ineat ion o f some event, usua l ly requ i r ing a number o f utterances t i e d together by some developing course o f ac t ion" (p. 127). He pays some a t tent ion to how a ser ies o f s to r i e s gets generated by suggesting that the re l a t ionsh ip between two or more s tor ie s t o l d i n succession involves more than mere sequential adjacency. That i s , people t e l l i n g second s tor ie s ought t o d i sp lay a r e l a t i onsh ip o f s igni f icance between t h e i r s tory and the one(s) t o l d before t h e i r s . He notes that one procedure for d i sp lay ing 66 a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s igni f icance i s t o organize the second s tory through the use of a s ign i f i cance statement. Goffman (1981), too, notes that a s t o r y t e l l i n g requires the s t o r y t e l l e r t o embed i n h i s or her own utterances the utterances and act ions o f the characters i n the s tory . As for the t e l l i n g aspect on a s t o r y t e l l i n g occasion, he w r i t e s : The t e l l e r i s l i k e l y t o break narra t ive frame a t s t ra teg ic junctures : to recap for new l i s t e n -ers , t o provide...encouragement t o l i s t e n e r s to wai t for the punch l i n e , or gratuitous character-i z a t i o n s o f various protagonists i n the t a l e ; o r t o backtrack a correc t ion for any f e l t f a i l u r e t o susta in narra t ive requirements such as context-ua l d e t a i l , proper temporal sequencing, dramatic bu i ld-up , and so f o r t h (1981:152). F i n a l l y , s tory endings are, i n most cases, a l so accompanied by response sequences which act t o close the s t o r y t e l l i n g . There are a number o f techniques ava i l ab le t o people for responding to a s tory . One such technique i s ' s tory apprec i a t ion ' . (5) A : [STORY] and then I got out o f there fa s t ! (6) B: Gee, that must have been a scary experience. In t h i s sequence A produces a t y p i c a l s tory c los ing i n utterance (5) and B responds i n (6) w i t h an utterance that accomplishes ' s tory a p p r e c i a t i o n ' . As Goffman suggests, whenever a member i s engaged i n t a l k "what h i s l i s t e n e r s are obl iged to do i s to show some k ind o f audience appreciat ion" (1974:503). This type o f device i s i n d i c a t i v e of the various ways ava i l ab le to members for responding to a s tory . One th ing t o not ice i s that , along w i t h the production o f a 67 s t o r y t e l l i n g , there are c e r t a i n story-bound a c t i v i t i e s : preface sequences, response sequences, the report ing o f seme event or events, and the 1 l o c a l occasioning' of s tor ie s i n that they emerge from t u r n -by- turn t a l k (Jefferson, 1978). That i s , the a c t i v i t y o f s t o r y t e l l i n g provides fo r the propr ie ty and expectations o f these a c t i v i t i e s , so as to be both cause and consequence o f the a c t i v i t y . This observation i s demonstrable i n that members can, i n f ac t , terminate a s tory i n the midst o f i t s t e l l i n g , or be interrupted by hearers . The production procedures inherent i n the 'how' of s t o r y t e l l i n g , then, provide the resources by which members are able t o recognize that other members are involved i n the a c t i v i t y . To w i t , that something i s recognizable as a ' s t o r y t e l l i n g 1 depends on members d i sp lay ing the a c t i v i t y as a ' s t o r y t e l l i n g ' . Production and Recognition i n Conversational S t o r y t e l l i n g The ideas about s t o r y t e l l i n g developed i n t h i s study have t h e i r roots i n the i n t u i t i v e understanding o f what i t means to ' t e l l a 15 s tory ' . People seem to be capable o f managing the tasks involved i n t e l l i n g s t o r i e s . I n fac t , i t appears evident that t e l l i n g s tor i e s i s not much o f a problem for most people. They ju s t t e l l them. I t requires no complicated forethought for i t s successful achievement and i t can be attempted without much thought t o f a i l u r e . Most o f us t e l l and l i s t e n to many s tor ie s every day without ever r e a l l y th ink ing about i t . There i s , however, a k i n d o f problem involved nevertheless. That i s : how i s i t done? The 'problem' i s an a n a l y t i c one: what i s the nature o f the work rout ine ly executed by people t e l l i n g s tor ies? 68 R e c a l l that t h i s study i s not 'about' s t o r y t e l l i n g but the methods, the ways, the procedures involved i n the t e l l i n g and understanding o f everyday conversation, w i t h a focus on s t o r y t e l l i n g as the concerted accomplishment o f members (anyone sharing mastery o f a natura l language and a cornmon culture) invo lv ing themselves as a matter o f everyday occurrence i n the production and recognit ion o f 16 s t o r i e s . One th ing we w i l l make c l ea r i s that members r e l y on an elaborate c o l l e c t i o n o f methods i n the accomplishment o f s t o r y t e l l i n g . Our in tere s t s w i l l involve us i n an examination o f some members' methods for the production and recognit ion o f s t o r y t e l l i n g as an 17 ongoing, s i tuated acccmplishment. The notions o f 'production' and ' recogni t ion ' are invoked to underline the fac t that doing s tory-t e l l i n g involves co-conversat ional i s ts both i n doing the a c t i v i t y (production) and i n o r i e n t i n g to the a c t i v i t y ( recognit ion) . Our i n t e r e s t i n the production and recognit ion o f s t o r y t e l l i n g i s informed by the fac t that members, i n the midst o f t e l l i n g s t o r i e s , attend t o these dimensions o f the phenomenon. In fac t , that a t tent ion has i n t e r a c t i o n a l consequences for the problem o f s t o r y t e l l i n g , as does 18 the lack o f such a t t e n t i o n . A fundamental concept which we are deal ing w i t h i s that the world i s a world o f work (Garf inkel , 1967). That something i s , for example, a ' s t o r y t e l l i n g ' , depends upon i t being produced and recognized as such. I t i s evident that t h i s production must be cont inua l ly and cons i s tent ly ava i l ab le and accountable. Being involved i n an a c t i v i t y such as s t o r y t e l l i n g a l so provides for a set o f constraints and i n s t r u c t i o n s . These constraints and i n s t r u c t i o n s , some o f which we w i l l be considering i n the ensuing chapters, i n turn provide for the basis of the doing and seeing 69 19 (production and recognit ion) o f the a c t i v i t y o f s t o r y t e l l i n g . In short , i t takes some i n t e r a c t i o n a l work t o success ful ly achieve a ' s t o r y t e l l i n g ' . Our general question then becomes: how do members r o u t i n e l y go about producing a s t o r y t e l l i n g ? What I am saying i s that the a c t i v i t y o f s t o r y t e l l i n g i s a members' accomplishment, both i n i t s production and i n i t s recogni t ion . A s t o r y t e l l i n g i s , a f t e r a l l , an i n t e r a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . That i s t o say, the achievement o f a ' s t o r y t e l l i n g ' rests upon such factors as time, p lace , and other people, and there are proper and expectable occasions for a s tory to be t o l d i n the midst o f ongoing conversation (Ryave, 1978; Jefferson, 1978). This observation makes i t c l ea r that i n a considerat ion o f recognit ion work for factors such as time, place, and other people, i t i s ava i l ab le for people t o see and account for an a c t i v i t y such as s t o r y t e l l i n g without having to , for example, ask them i n an interview i f i t r e a l l y i s a 20 ' s t o r y t e l l i n g ' . Further , i t seems reasonable t o suggest that the a c t i v i t y o f s t o r y t e l l i n g cannot be randomly done anytime, anywhere, or w i t h anybody. This ra i ses another general quest ion: what are the features that are provided by a s e t t ing and invoked by conversat ional i s t s i n order t o recognize the conventional i ty o f s t o r y t e l l i n g ? One th ing I wish to focus some a t tent ion on i n the ana ly t i c chapters (3-6) i s the use o f membership categories for the establishment o f who can expectedly be involved i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g w i t h whom and how that considerat ion may reveal i n t e r a c t i o n a l features o f the a c t i v i t y (Sacks, 1972a; 1978). In the review o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and the review o f research on narrat ive i n the l a s t 70 chapter I examined instances which demonstrated that people do, i n fac t , attend t o the a c t u a l i t y that c e r t a i n ca tegor ia l incumbencies provide for the occasion o f s t o r y t e l l i n g s , so that recognit ion work can be par t o f the i n t e r a c t i o n a l character o f a s t o r y t e l l i n g . This i n turn provides for the r e c o g n i z a b i l i t y o f a s t o r y t e l l i n g as based upon other fac tors , such as the a v a i l a b i l i t y or properness o f some category 21 set . Conclusion The reader can begin t o see the de l i cacy o f the k i n d o f a n a l y t i c work i n which I am involved when I attempt to locate and describe the features o f an a c t i v i t y . In conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g the n o t i c i n g of p o t e n t i a l ca tegor ia l incumbencies among conversat ional i s t s may involve qui te focused a t tent ion t o the progressively-revealed se t t ing i n which the a c t i v i t y i s t ak ing place . I take i t that the analys i s o f narrat ives must be sens i t ive i n i t s treatment of these member a t tent ions . As Harvey Sacks t e l l s us: What one ought to seek t o b u i l d i s an apparatus which w i l l provide for how i t i s that any a c t i v i t i e s , which members do i n such a way as t o be recognizable to such as members, are done, and done recognizably. Such an apparatus w i l l , o f course, have t o generate and provide for the recog-n i z a b i l i t y o f more than jus t poss ib le descr ipt ions (1972:332). I have already noted that the primary focus o f t h i s study i s to concentrate on and attempt t o locate and describe those features which are b u i l t i n t o narrat ives t o l d i n natura l conversation and which 71 members must be assumed to consult i n order to make sense o f such s t o r i e s . Roy Turner (1972) w r i t e s : I take i t as absolutely fundamental i n the analys i s o f conversational t r anscr ip t s that the analyst s h a l l exp l ica te not (or not only) the syntact ic propert ies o f utterances and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , but p r i m a r i l y such procedures for d i sp lay ing or invoking soc ia l -organiza t iona l features as par t i c ipant s must be assumed t o employ i n constructing t h e i r own and 'processing' others' utterances (p.453). This study necessar i ly presupposes a basic knowledge o f conversational analys i s i n general and the work o f Harvey Sacks i n 22 p a r t i c u l a r . With regard t o the former, I focused a t tent ion on the l i t e r a t u r e , published and unpublished, produced over the past ten years or so. As for the l a t t e r , I concentrated p r i m a r i l y on the work o f Sacks on s t o r y t e l l i n g . In examining the l i t e r a t u r e I made i t a po int t o focus a t tent ion upon some o f the ways which people who are t e l l i n g s tor i e s have a t t h e i r d i sposa l for susteining and protect ing the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n when a s tory gets generated. The next chapter begins the a n a l y t i c a l sect ion o f t h i s study (Chapters 3-6). I examine f i r s t mention character references i n narra t ives , f i r s t presenting a l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s treatment o f the phenomenon, followed by a conversational analys i s treatment o f the same i s sue . 72 NOTES: CHAPTER 2 1 Researchers frcm a v a r i e t y o f d i s c i p l i n e s are interested i n s tor i e s and s tory s t ructure . The fo l lowing are some o f the group who deal w i t h the formal aspect o f narra t ives : Propp (1928), Dundes (1962), Greimas (1971), van D i j k (1972), Lakoff (1972), Pike and Pike (1977), Rumelhart (1978), and Gavin (1980), to name but a few. 2 I th ink i t in te re s t ing that invest igators o f s tory structure have t y p i c a l l y r e l i e d on t h e i r i n t u i t i v e impressions i n a r r i v i n g a t the formal categories which are used as the bas ic a n a l y t i c elements o f t h e i r grammars, such as Colby (1973), S te in and Glenn (1977), K int sch and Green (1978). 3 In an a r t i c l e by Rumelhart (1977), for example, he described a process o f understanding a narra t ive as equivalent to se lec t ing a s tory schema, v e r i f y i n g i t s correspondence to the narrat ive u n i t , and determining whether i t gives an adequate account o f the s tory or t e x t . 4 She w r i t e s : The bas ic t h e o r e t i c a l po int i s that i n the study o f the conversational h i s t o r i c a l present one sees a perfect example o f the r e l a t i onsh ip between l i n g -u i s t i c s tructure and language use. The methodo-l o g i c a l consequence o f [ t h i s study] i s that i t i s only through the study o f language use that one may f u l l y analyze the l i n g u i s t i c s t ructure , ju s t as one must understand the l i n g u i s t i c s tructure i n order t o uncover the ru le s o f i t s use (p.215). 5 What I th ink i s important here i s not necessar i ly the use o f the conversational h i s t o r i c a l present tense, but the s h i f t between tenses ( c . f . Spielmann and Gardner, 1979). 6 For Po lany i , a s tory i s defined as the " l i n g u i s t i c encoding o f past experience i n order t o expla in something about, or by means o f , the events or states described" (p.208). 7 Polanyi takes a more or less l i n g u i s t i c discourse approach i n her study by c la iming that s tor ie s contain three kinds o f information, each one act ing t o contextual ize the other : temporal information 73 (Sacks' "canonical" form), descr ip t ive information, and evaluative information. 8 Much o f the work by Sacks on s t o r y t e l l i n g i s i n the form o f un-published lectures (Spring 1970, lectures 1-8, and F a l l 1971, lectures 1-16). 9 In a Spring 1970 lec ture (#1), Sacks makes the po int that people monitor scenes for t h e i r storyable p o s s i b i l i t i e s . That i s , one can be involved i n some a c t i v i t y i n which one can determine a t the time o f the a c t i v i t y that i t could l a t e r be t o l d as a s tory . 10 Simply put , there are ways for s t o r y t e l l e r s t o b u i l d i n t o t h e i r s to r i e s a requirement for l i s t e n i n g t o them and for i n s t r u c t i n g story rec ip ient s about what i s going t o be t o l d about and what i n t e r e s t i t may have for r e c i p i e n t (Spring 1970, lecture 2 ) . 11 Surely i t would take some work by a s tory r ec ip i en t t o achieve a second s tory , work which would be grounded i n paying a t tent ion t o the f i r s t s tory , and then using t h i s a t tent ion t o b u i l d a second story which re la te s to the f i r s t s tory . 12 Ryave notes that the meaning and relevance o f a descr ip t ion o f an event i n story form i s not "a pregiven matter to be a n a l y t i c a l l y determined s o l e l y by inspect ing the p a r t i c u l a r s of some recounting, but i s i t s e l f best conceived as a s o c i a l a c t i v i t y that i s i n t e r a c t i o n a l l y negotiated and managed i n and through the emerging p a r t i c u l a r s o f a s i t u a t i o n " (1978:130). 13 A re la ted p o i n t : one way to get a s tory s tarted i s to announce a time or place , e .g . 'One n i g h t ' , o r 'Once when I went to Quebec'. Such a preface leaves l i t t l e doubt that a s tory i s forli icoming. 14 Sacks suggests that one way a s tory can be seen as order ly i s that i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y intended by the t e l l e r that r ec ip i en t may j o i n i n . That i s , one sort o f order l iness i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g i s that a s tory r e c i p i e n t may t a l k a t various points i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g , the r e c i p i e n t t a l k or iented to recognizing that a s tory i s being t o l d (Lecture 2, Spring 1970). 15 By ' s tory ' I mean, fo l lowing Sacks, the t e l l i n g o f some event(s) i n natura l conversation. Alan Ryave (1978) suggests that t h i s should be taken t o mean the t e l l i n g o f some event or events i n more than one utterance. He w r i t e s : 74 When I speak o f the ' t e l l i n g o f a s tory i n conversation' I have i n mind not only the utterances o f the s t o r y t e l l e r , but a l so the ccrtments made i n the course o f a s tory pre-sentation by those who are the rec ip ient s o f the story (1978:131). Ryave claims that t h i s sor t o f t e l l e r - r e c i p i e n t i n t e r a c t i o n during the course o f a s t o r y t e l l i n g can a f fect the in-progress unfolding of the s tory, thus p o t e n t i a l l y a f fect ing the sense that a ser ies of utterances might obta in . Further, he suggests that a d i s t ingu i sh ing feature between s tor ie s t o l d i n conversation as opposed t o , for example, s to r i e s t o l d i n performance s i tua t ions , i s that rec ip ient s may comment during the t e l l i n g . This feature aff irms the sense i n which s t o r y t e l l i n g i n conversation can be seen t o be an i n t e r a c t i o n a l accomplishment. 16 I t should be noted, however, that these methods are employed by members i n taken for granted, unformulated, and unexamined ways. For most people the s o c i a l world i s 'out t h e r e ' , ' g i v e n ' , and ' o b j e c t i v e ' . I t i s general ly not viewed as a product, an outcome o f standardly ava i l ab le members' methods ( c f . Gar f inke l and Sacks, 1970). 17 Gar f inke l (1967) proposes that the events i n our everyday l i v e s make sense t o us because o f the ways we simultaneously produce and perceive them, that the f a m i l i a r events and commonplace scenes o f our l i v e s are recognizably f a m i l i a r by v i r t u e o f the methods by which people produce and recognize these events and scenes for what they are . 18 Simply put, t h i s rout ine , unproblematic, and unformulated a t tent ion t o everyday events i s the product of sense-making work on our p a r t . Through our methods for doing t h i s sense-making work we accomplish a common s o c i a l world (Gar f inkel , 1967; Gar f inke l and Sacks, 1970). 19 The idea here i s not new, but i s derived from Gar f inke l (1967) and stated s u c c i n c t l y by E g l i n (1978), that i s , that members' knowledge o f t h e i r soc iety , that i s ' c u l t u r e ' , i s methodological rather than substantive. E g l i n w r i t e s : Members use the loca t ion of a c u l t u r a l part icular—person, event, utterance— t o decide upon i t s sense, or assign i t a d e f i n i t e sense. . .By loca t ion I mean pos i t i on ing or placement i n a v a r i e t y o f contexts or se t t ings , e co log i ca l , temporal, sequentia l , organizat iona l , occasional (1978:1). 75 20 Here the not ion o f ' i n d e x i c a l i t y ' a r i s e s . For example, words do not have unchanging meanings a t a l l times, on a l l occasions o f t h e i r use. Thus people have t o ' r epa i r ' i n d e x i c a l i t y by producing descr ipt ions or 'glosses ' which provide l i s t e n e r s w i t h the resources for understanding 'what's happening' i n the i n t e r a c t i o n , e .g . that a s tory i s being t o l d (Garf inkel , 1967; Gar f inke l and Sacks, 1970). G a r f i n k e l ' s use o f ' i n d e x i c a l i t y ' draws a t tent ion t o the occasioned nature o f everyday s o c i a l s i tua t ions and stresses the p a r t i c u l a r nature o f each and every s o c i a l happening and event. 21 In h i s 1972 paper, 'An Invest igat ion o f the U s a b i l i t y o f Conversational Data for Doing Socio logy ' , Sacks analyzes c a l l s to a su ic ide prevention center and claims that the materia ls e l i c i t e d are, "some c o l l e c t i o n s o f membership categories" (p.31). By "categorizat ion device" he means: That c o l l e c t i o n o f membership categories that may be appl ied t o some p o p u l a t i o n . . . so as to provide, by the use o f some rules for a p p l i c a t i o n , for the p a i r i n g o f a t l eas t a population member and a categor izat ion device member. A device i s then a c o l l e c t i o n plus ru les o f app l i ca t ion (p.32). Simply put, the bas ic concept used i n Sacks' analys is i s i d e n t i t y or 'category ' . For any person, there i s a large number o f categories for ' c o r r e c t l y ' descr ibing that person. For example, the reader may be describable as a 'man' or 'woman', a ' son' or 'daughter' , a 'b londe ' , a 'rock and r o l l f a n ' , 'middle-aged', a ' s o c i o l o g i s t ' or 'anthropologist ' and so on. A key issue i n Sacksian analys i s , then, i s how members can methodical ly se lect an appropriate category on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion. Furthermore, members methodically se lect a s ing le category from a group o f re la ted categories . Such a group i s known as a Membership Categorization Device (MCD), a c o l l e c t i o n o f categories which 'go together' i n the sense that when a category from a c e r t a i n device i s c o r r e c t l y appl ied t o a person, i t can be heard to exclude them from being i d e n t i f i e d w i t h some other category from the same device. 22 Sacks' e a r l i e s t work on the s o c i a l organizat ion o f t a l k was concerned w i t h the phenomenon o f de sc r ip t ion ; that i s , i n t h e i r t a l k people are cont inua l ly and cons i s tent ly descr ibing t h e i r s o c i a l world to one another (1963, 1967). Thus, people may describe such things as events they have seen, things they have done, t h e i r fee l ings , a t t i tudes , opinions , and so f o r t h . We may regard descr ipt ions , then, as a bas ic feature o f a l l o f our everyday a c t i v i t i e s . The whole po int of G a r f i n k e l ' s not ion of ' r e f l e x i v i t y ' i s that our everyday a c t i v i t i e s are 'accountable phenomena', and that , through the ways i n which we do everyday a c t i v i t i e s , the a c t i v i t i e s provide for the d e s c r i b a b i l i t y o f our s o c i a l world (Gar f inke l , 1967). 76 CHAPTER 3: FIRST MENTION CHARACTER REFERENCES IN NARRATIVE DISCOURSE This chapter examines character formulations i n narrat ive discourse w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n discovering and descr ibing f i r s t mention references techniques and preferences. In the f i r s t par t o f t h i s chapter I present a treatment o f character formulations as found i n the l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i n g t o NARRATIVE. A f t e r demonstrating t o the reader how character formulations may be handled by l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s , I examine the same phenomenon from the perspective o f conversational ana ly s i s . At the end o f t h i s chapter I r e l a te the two d i f f e ren t analyses and show how the methodology used i n conversational analys i s i s useful t o the discourse l i n g u i s t . A L i n g u i s t i c Discourse Treatment o f Formulating Character There are a number o f studies i n the l i n g u i s t i c discourse l i t e r a t u r e which have offered a n a l y t i c a l treatments o f formulating character i n narrat ives (Jones, 1983; Schram and Jones, 1979; Maibaum, 1978; Markels, 1981; Caughley, 1978; Toba, 1978; Newman, 1978). Most o f these studies have to do wi th formulating character i n languages other than Engl i sh , although Jones (1983) focuses exc lus ive ly on Engl i sh and Longacre (1983) of fers some comments on pa r t i c ipant i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n Engl i sh narra t ives . In t h i s sect ion I f i r s t examine the f indings i n the former group, featuring non-English nar ra t ive s . 77 In her article, "Participants in J i r e l Narrative" (1978), /Anita Maibaum demonstrates how participants in Ji r e l narratives are identified. The fi r s t character in J i r e l narratives is introduced in the main setting and is usually the main character of the story as far as the plot is concerned, or what the story is about. The character may be introduced by a noun, a noun phrase, or a proper name. Maibaum gives various examples from J i r e l of grammatical features which she considers requisite to character formulation. For example, when a character is introduced in a narrative the indefinite -jyik, meaning "a certain" or "one" is always included, e.g. "Mi gamma-jyik wot-a-kwa-lo" (person old-female-certain be-past-stative-report) "there was an old lady". In narratives with only one participant (character), that participant also has to be reidentified at story end (in written texts, in the last paragraph). In his article, "Participant Orientation In Longuda Folk Tales" (1978), John Newman concludes that, when characters are formulated in narratives, "a t i t l e construction is usually used at the beginning of the discourse to introduce the character by name" (p.95). The narrative's main character is formulated in a subject noun phrase by name together with the neutral pronoun a, meaning "third person singular subject". He gives an example from a narrative folk tale about Rabbit and Hyena: Ayu a kasama bwautha hamatha, n silgin. Gwabarwa a sinlalama binma a sikama", (Rabbit he search-past-focus skins good, he split-past-distributive. Time of festival their i t close-past-focus), which translates, "The rabbit looked for the good skins, which he then cut up. At that time i t was the time of their festival." 78 In the Algonquin language, f i r s t mention character references i n narra t ive discourse may be i n the form o f proper names, nouns, or noun phrases. However, Algonquin i s d i f f e rent from Engl i sh i n that f i r s t reference to a character w i l l normally cone before the verb, provided the narra t ive information i s new to the rec ip ient ( s ) as d i s t inguished from, i . e . legends, which are usua l ly well-known t o r e c i p i e n t ( s ) . Subsequent character references come a f ter the verb. Note the 1 fo l lowing examples from my Algonquin mater ia l s . Text 27: Papidan Dac Pikogan Mazinahigan 22 January 1982 27.1 Nigodin ikwe owidjiwagoban odabinodj i j iman 27.1 One time a woman she-went-^with-him her-chi ld-obv (ogwizisan) k i d j i nda odewewadj oseesikak (her son-obv) in-order- that they go-to v i s i t w i t h her-older-brother aa ikwe. 27.2 Mi dac aa oseesan aa that woman. 27.2 That 's why then that older-brother-obv that ikwe nabewikoban a c i d j k i t c i mididogoban. 27.3 Nabe dac woman was-a-man and r e a l l y he-was-big. 27.3 Man then o g i inan i n i ab inod j i j an : " P i j a n ooma, he-said-to-him that chi ld-obv : "Come here, k i g a t akon in . " 27.4 Mi dac aa ockinawes fut I-hold-you-on-my-knee." 27 . 'That ' s why then that boy o g i nakwetawan i n i naben, "Kawin tawatesinon he-answered-him that man-obv, "Not there-is-room-neg k i d j i k i t a k o n i j i a n , oza in-order- that +ki you-hold-me-on-your-knee, because k i k i t c i misad a j a tagwan. . . " your b i g stomach already i s t h e r e . . . . " 79 Text 29: Papidan Pikogan Mazinahigan 29 Feb. 1982 29.1 Niwidjitajxkemagan odaian k i t c i opiwawiwan, 29.1 My neighbour his dog-obv really he-is-hairy, kawin kikendjigadesinon adi e tagwanig octigwan acidj adi not it-is-known-neg where +conj i t - i s his-head and where e tagwanig ozo. 29.2 Kitci wedan mega +conj i t - i s t a i l . 29.2 Really easy because kidji kikenimadj. 29.3 Wikobidaw ozo, kicpin dac in-order-that you-know-him. 29.3 Pull-it t a i l , i f then magwamiJc, mi i i octigwan.... he-bites-you, that's what that one head Text 24: Makwa Adisokan Anna Mowatt February, 1982 24.1 Makwa e adisokanaganiwidj. 24.2 Kitci weckadj 24.1 Bear +conj story-is-told. 24.2 Really long-ago kokcm ki widamage ega e minocig old-lady +past told not +conj it-is-good makwa pawanadj. 24.3 Nopamig ta j ikewagoban bear he-dreams-about-him. 4.3 In the bush they-were-staying weckadj kokcm acidj dac nabe acidj owidigemagan anawe long-ago old lady and then man and his spouse that nabe. 24.4 Kegapitc nigodin e kijebawagag ikido aawe man. 24.4 After awhile once +conj it-is-morning said that nabe, "o, (ni) ki t c i nunwendam man, "oh, I'm really happy nibawana." ikido aawe I-dreamed-about-him." said that e kijebawagan. o, makwa -fconj it-is-morning. Oh, bear nabe. 24.5 "o" ikido man. 24.5 "oh" said dac kokom, "kiga wiwisin i i then old-lady, "You fut will be hungry that ka inabadaman. Kawin nunocisinon +conj-past you-dream-it. Not it-is-good-neg 80 ka pawanadj makwa" i k i d o aawe +conj-past you-drearn-about-it bear" sa id that k i t c i kokcm. 24.6 "An dac win i i " i k i d o dac aawe r e a l l y o ld- l ady . 24.6 "Why not" sa id then that nabe. 24.7 Minawadj dac i k i d o aawe k i t c i kokom, man. 24.7 Again then sa id that r e a l l y o ld- lady , "kikikendan na? Makwa kawin w i s i n i s i kabe pibon. Mi eta "Do you know? Bear not he-eats-neg a l l winter . Only n iba . Mi dac i i ega minocig makwa he-sleeps. That ' s why then that not (con j ) i t - i s - g o o d bear pawanadj." you-dream-about-him." [Story continues] In Text 27, for example, note that the main character, "ikwe" (a woman), i s mentioned before the verb i n 27.1, as i s "nabe" (a man) i n 27.3. A l so , the demonstrative "aa" (that one) i s never used i n f i r s t mention reference, but only i n subsequent references, as i n 27.4 "aa ockinawes" (that young man), and i n 27.1, "aa ikwe" (that woman) a f te r the woman had already been introduced. In t ex t 29, the f i r s t character, "niwidjitaj ikemagan odaian" (my neighbor's dog), i s mentioned before the verb i n 29.1 and a f te r the verb i n subsequent references. In tex t 24, considering 24.1 an utterance about what the s tory i s 'about ' , 24.2 contains the i n i t i a l character formulation, "kokom" (an o l d l ady) , before the verb, " k i widamage" (+past- te l l ) . Reca l l that I sa id e a r l i e r that , i n Algonquin narra t ives , f i r s t mention character references usua l ly occur before the verb w i t h subsequent references normally occurring a f ter the verb, as i n the fo l lowing . 81 Text 28: Waboz Adisokan Anna Mowatt January, 1982 28.1 Pejik awiag teban weckadj. One person exist-past long time ago. 28.2 Kitci mane wisiniwagoban aa anicinabe... Really a lot he-was-eating that Indian... After f i r s t mention character reference in Algonquin, subsequent references normally occur after the verb, as in 28. First, the character is i n i t i a l l y introduced, "pejik awiag" (somebody), in 28.1. Then in 28.2, and throughout the rest of the text, the subsequent references occur following the verb, i.e. "wisiniwagoban" (he was eating) "aa anicinabe" (that guy). There seem to be, however, seme exceptions which may be explained in terms of hierarchy and whether or not the character is a main character or minor character. With regard to the former, there seems to be a hierarchy of importance in Algonquin, with people being regarded as more important than animals, and animals more important than things. It appears that the first mention reference procedure only occurs before the verb in the case of people and that the reference procedure is reversed in the case of animals, the fir s t mention occurring after the verb with lower hierarchical characters. Consider the following. Text 23: Kokokoo acitc Pibwanazi Pikogan Mazinaigan 22 Kenositc Kisis, 1982 23.1 Kagwedjimakaniwagoban kokokoo acitc pibwanazi, They-^were-asked owl and night-hawk "Awenen kin ke odawesizimian ani pimadizian?" 82 Who you +conj-fut your-animal how you- l ive inagamiwagoban kokooo a c i t c p ibwanaz i . . . they-said-to-them owl and night-hawk [s tory continues] Text 33: Nabemik Anicinabewigoban Pikogan Mazinaigan Part 1, February 19, 1982 33.1 Nigodin pabamosegoban nopimig amik. One time he^was-walking-around bush a beaver 33.2 Ikwewan dac i n i ka mikawadj in . . . woman-obv then that one +conj-past found-him.. . [Story continues] Note i n both instances that the animal characters are placed a f ter the verb i n f i r s t mention p o s i t i o n , e .g . 33.1 where "amik (beaver) i s f i r s t referred t o a f te r the verb "pabamosegoban" (he was walking around), and 23.1, where two animal characters, "kokokoo" (owl) and "pibwanazi" (night-hawk) are introduced fo l lowing the verb "kakwedjimakaniwagoban" (They were asked), a reversed p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o people characters . The hierarchy of importance i s a feature o f Algonquin which acts as a window to the Algonquin world-view, but which i s beyond the scope o f t h i s chapter. Furthermore, Algonquin narrat ives f a l l back on at l ea s t one bas ic k i n d o f background information: conventional r o l e expectations which are invoked when characters are named. That i s , a set o f general r o l e expectations are attached to a character. In Algonquin legends, for example, names o f animal characters may carry the rea l -wor ld information about t h e i r s i z e , hab i t s , and environment. A l s o , names may connote conventional c u l t u r a l evaluations o f the pa r t i c ipant s , associat ing them wi th such charac te r i s t i c s as, e .g . cleverness v s . 83 s t u p i d i t y , quickness v s . slowness, or w i t h expectations about the r o l e i n the legend that the character can be expected to p l a y . In Algonquin, "wagoc" (fox) can always be expected t o be the t r i c k s t e r or hero, and " p i j i w " (lynx) to be the one who gets t r i c k e d or the v i l l a i n . My purpose i n drawing from my Algonquin materials i s to show how f i r s t mention references i n narrat ive discourse may be treated from a l i n g u i s t i c perspect ive. A fu l l -b lown l i n g u i s t i c discourse treatment o f f i r s t mention reference i n Algonquin would, o f course, be much more comprehensive. I t i s hoped, however, that the reader can begin t o see how the discovery o f the functions o f various syntact ic constructions i s a c r u c i a l task of l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana ly s i s . Thus, to have associated w i t h f i r s t mention character references c e r t a i n syntact ic construct ions , such as f i r s t mention character reference d i s t r i b u t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o pred ica t ion , to my knowledge i s a contr ibut ion squarely i n l i n e w i t h one o f the c h i e f aims o f discourse study. In the paragraphs above I have given a b r i e f glimpse o f the k ind o f treatment that discourse l i n g u i s t s give character i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n non-English nar ra t ive s . Throughout these discourse studies there are recurr ing themes o f i n t e r e s t : introducing main characters, maintaining reference to the main character, introducing secondary J characters , r e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f characters, sequential mention o f characters, and so on. R e c a l l that I s a id i n the f i r s t chapter that a basic dif ference between l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and conversational analys i s i s that the former deals almost exc lus ive ly wi th edited t ex t s , usua l ly w r i t t e n texts such as w r i t t e n s t o r i e s , 84 f o l k t a l e s , e t c . , whi le the l a t t e r deals w i t h unedited texts from l i v e conversation. S t i l l , recognizing that l i v e conversation i s an important discourse considerat ion, discourse studies often attempt t o r e l a t e the f indings from edited, w r i t t e n texts to features o f conversation. For example, Caughley (1978), fo l lowing h i s analys i s of formulating character i n Chepang, w r i t e s : Conversation, which occupies a major par t o f narra t ives , i s a l so important i n i d e n t i f y i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s . I t i s not poss ible t o o u t l i n e the complete i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a l system for con-versat ion here, but the use of k i n s h i p terms and vocatives i s an e x p l i c i t though i n d i r e c t way o f i d e n t i f y i n g par t i c ipant s (1978:173). These discourse studies are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y relevant and help to provide a complete understanding o f how w r i t t e n and spoken discourse "works" i n the languages under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I now want t o examine studies i n Engl i sh which have d i r e c t relevance to t h i s study. In recent years several discourse l i n g u i s t s have come to the conclusion that the f i r s t reference t o a character i n a narra t ive discourse d i f f e r s frcm most o f the subsequent references to that character (Schram and Jones, 1979; Jones, 1983). In Pragmatic Aspects  o f Engl i sh Text Structure (1983), Larry Jones examines the re l a t ions i n Eng l i sh discourse between the form o f f i r s t mention character formulations and speaker/author assumptions. He w r i t e s : The various ways i n which Ca character] can be mentioned for the f i r s t time i n a discourse i s shown to corre la te w i t h d i f f e rent assumpr-t ions on the author's [or speaker's] part regarding the reader's [or hearer ' s ] p r i o r knowledge o f the [character] (1983:49). 85 In h i s study, Jones examines four grammatical features o f f i r s t mention references i n Engl i sh narra t ives : (1) d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s , (2) i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s , (3) possessive pronouns, and (4) proper names. The use o f the d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e i n formulating character i n Engl i sh indicates that the character i s i n the hearer ' s foregrounded frame, that i s , that the character i s i n s ight or otherwise known t o be the referent e .g . "The guy over there was walking across the s treet and then suddenly s tarted turning cartwheels. He was almost h i t by a c a r . " The i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e indicates that the character i s not i n the hearer ' s foregrounded frame, e .g . "Then a guy i n a clown s u i t rushes over t o him and helps him across" . The use o f a possessive pronoun i n formulating character functions the same as the d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e . That i s , a possessive pronoun before a character reference indicates that the speaker/author assumes that the character i s par t of the hearer ' s /reader ' s understanding o f the narra t ive , e .g . "His partner came along and stopped t r a f f i c u n t i l they were sa fe ly across . " The use o f proper names when formulating character, which i s o f s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t to me i n t h i s chapter, indicates that the narra t ive contains a l l the necessary features o f the character associated w i t h the name. The reader unfamil iar w i t h studies i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s can begin to get a f e e l for what discourse analysts are t r y i n g t o do. R e c a l l that Picker ing sees discourse analys i s as a means to discover and describe a l l o f the l i n g u i s t i c features that contribute t o the t o t a l meaning o f a discourse (1979:8). I now want to further examine Jones' treatment o f proper names i n r e l a t i o n t o formulating character i n narra t ives . 86 F i r s t , Jones makes i t clear that the use of proper names when formulating character i n narratives function differently than formulations containing nouns or pronouns (1983:61). He writes: The l i n g u i s t i c status of proper names has been hotly debated among the various philosophers of language...The aspect of proper names which i n -terests us here i s the fact that "proper names are lo g i c a l l y connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer" (Searle, 1958:96). That i s , the characteristics of a person...are intimately associated with the name of that person. A name, by i t s e l f , has only limited meaning to us unless we can associate with that name a person having certain characteristics. Likewise, the f i r s t mention use of a name...can only communicate to the [hearer] i f he i s able to associate with that name a person who has certain characteris-t i c s (1983:61-62). Jones i s making the basic premise that the use of a proper name when formulating character i n narratives assumes that the hearer i s expected to discern a l l the characteristics of the named person which are necessary for understanding the story/narrative. In keeping with this premise a storyteller ought to make ex p l i c i t those characteristics that the hearer needs to know. Furthermore, Jones makes the point that a storyteller may leave implicit or unmentioned those characteristics associated with a name that the storyteller already assumes are understood by the hearer. There i s , then, a sense of some kind of function related to formulating character i n li n g u i s t i c discourse analysis. That i s , linguists interested i n the study of discourse do recognize the importance of understanding how characters may be formulated i n narratives. And Jones specifies the functions of f i r s t mention character references, namely; (1) formulating characters by name 87 i n d i c a t e s that the n a r r a t i v e contains a l l the necessary features o f the character associated with the name, or (2) in d i c a t e s t h a t the hearer/reader knows a l l or some o f the necessary features already. These are claims which are a n a l y t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g and which provide the discourse analyst with a beginning f o r examining one aspect o f the pragmatic knowledge o f English-speaking a u t h o r s / s t o r y t e l l e r s . In h i s a n a l y s i s , Jones describes the r e l a t i o n s between the form o f f i r s t mention character references and narrator assumptions, and the various ways i n which a character can be formulated i n a discourse as r e l a t e d t o the d i f f e r e n t assumptions on the narrator's p a r t regarding the hearer's p r i o r knowledge o f the character. His study i s invaluable as a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a r o s t e r o f l i n g u i s t i c features necessary f o r understanding how t h i s aspect o f discourse 'works' i n Engl i s h . Another c o n t r i b u t i o n of Jones' study i s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f a discourse o r i e n t a t i o n t o the study o f f i r s t mention character references. Most studies i n l i n g u i s t i c s o f formulating character have d e a l t with i n d i v i d u a l sentences. The notion t h a t a l l the assumptions implied i n a discourse about formulating character can be discovered and described, assumptions which give an impression o f the author's estimate o f h i s or her reader's knowledge about the characters i n the nar r a t i v e , i s an idea not pr e v i o u s l y attended t o i n l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s . However, even a cursory reading o f Jones' a n a l y s i s would i n d i c a t e that there i s much more t o the issue o f formulating character than he begins t o uncover. Furthermore, the assumption i s made that the way characters are formulated i n written, e d i t e d t e x t s i s the same 88 as i n l i v e conversation. He w r i t e s : I an t i c ipa te that the analys i s o f cues and o f f i r s t mention [character] references i n general w i l l apply to o r a l conversational ana lys i s , as w e l l as to w r i t t e n texts as I have done here (1983:73). This would be n i c e , but i s i t true? In the fo l lowing sect ion I provide the reader wi th a conversational analys i s treatment o f formulating character i n narrat ives from l i v e conversation. In the analys i s I show how a treatment o f formulating character from actua l conversation discovers features o f formulating character which are thus f a r unformulated i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s , and provides the discourse l i n g u i s t w i t h a methodology for exp l i ca t ing the ethnographic and i n t e r a c t i o n a l dimension o f t h i s feature o f nar ra t ive . A Conversational Analys i s Treatment o f Formulating Character For the discourse l i n g u i s t there i s an i n t e r e s t i n ty ing features o f a discourse type t o d i s t i n c t i o n s already made w i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c s . That i s to say, the l i n g u i s t interes ted i n the study o f discourse seeks to discover and describe the functions o f various syntact ic constructions (such as the functions o f modifiers and p a r t i c u l a r sentence types) , and considers such discovery and descr ip t ion as a key task o f discourse analys i s (Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983; P i cker ing , 1979). For example, i n r e l a t i o n t o the discourse type NARRATIVE, Jones' analys i s o f author comments v i s - a - v i s c e r t a i n syntact ic constructions i n Engl i sh (such as the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f d e f i n i t e and i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s when formulating character i n w r i t t e n t e x t s ) , provides us w i t h an example o f the discourse l i n g u i s t ' s task. 89 There i s , however, a deeper issue involved, and i t i s at t h i s po int that conversational analys i s may be seen as a valuable t o o l for the discourse l i n g u i s t . Rather than seeking to t i e discourse features t o already e x i s t i n g categories i n l i n g u i s t i c s , such as when Jones t i e s f i r s t mention character references to e x i s t i n g syntact ic features such as d e f i n i t e and i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s , possessive pronouns, and so f o r t h , conversational analys i s goes about the discovery task much d i f f e r e n t l y . Conversational analys i s s t a r t s w i t h i n t e r a c t i o n a l issues and categories , then examines what p o s s i b i l i t i e s can be embodied, e .g . by d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s , possessive pronouns, proper names or whatever. So then, for some purposes, d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s and proper names may be interchangeable, but before such a c la im can be made we have t o f i r s t understand t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n a l funct ion . I f we begin our discourse analys i s w i t h e x i s t i n g l i n g u i s t i c features such as a r t i c l e s , pronouns, and names, as our bas ic a n a l y t i c a l categories , we neglect the bas ic not ion that speaker decis ions can be embodied i n more than one way. Conversational analys i s s t a r t s w i t h i n t e r a c t i o n a l propert ies , e .g . what speaker assumes hearer knows, and thus i s able t o embody speaker decis ions i n a v a r i e t y o f ways. For example, i n narrat ive discourse, one might say, "So t h i s guy who l i v e s across the s t reet came t o help out" , or "So Tony came over t o he lp out" , depending on what the narrator knows the s tory r e c i p i e n t knows. But we do not have the opportunity t o discover these kinds o f discourse features i f we s t a r t w i t h a r t i c l e s , pronouns, and proper names as our master categories . C e r t a i n l y there i s a r ec ip i en t design to w r i t t e n texts as w e l l as to l i v e conversation. A feature such as r e c i p i e n t design i s important 90 i n the analys i s o f , e .g . narra t ives . But l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s seems to want t o t r ea t such ethnographic considerations as something t o be added on t o l i n g u i s t i c s . In conversational ana lys i s , d i f f e r e n t a n a l y t i c a l categories are proposed, categories relevant t o w r i t t e n mater ia l s as w e l l as t o l i v e conversation. C e r t a i n l y i t cannot be the case that l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s i s good enough for w r i t t e n t ex t s , but that one needs an ethnographic dimension for analyzing conversation. On the contrary, ethnographic considerations are important i n the analys i s o f w r i t t e n texts as w e l l . There i s an ethnography o f w r i t i n g jus t as there i s an ethnography o f speech. There i s a puzz l ing equ ivoca l i ty i n the l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s l i t e r a t u r e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s i s sue . Reca l l Longacre's c la im that " a l l that we have w r i t t e n here needs eventual ly to be supplemented b y . . . t h e current research i n t o the nature o f l i v e conversation" (1983:75). On the one hand, i t seems that the discourse l i n g u i s t i s saying, i n e f fect , " W e ' l l analyze the data using l i n g u i s t i c categories , and you analyze the data using ethnographic categories , then w e ' l l integrate the two." But, as Sacks (1978) has noted, both aspects are i n t r i c a t e l y connected. In r e l a t i o n to r e c i p i e n t design i n w r i t t e n mater ia l s , for example, a category such as 'genre' may be important. I f one were t o p i ck up a book o f fables and open i t t o any page and read, "Fox went down to the house," one would make sense out o f that sentence d i f f e r e n t l y than i f i twere a sentence i n a detect ive nove l . /As a sentence i n a fable , "Fox" i s understood by almost any reader as an animal and not , e .g . "Mr. Pox the mailman," or whatever. I f one were to open a detective novel t o any page and read, "The Inspector nodded approvingly , " one would know that "The 91 Inspector" i s c e r t a i n l y not a food inspector but a p o l i c e inves t i ga tor . How i s i t known? By our common sense understanding o f what we c a l l 1 genre ' . Thus a category such as 1 genre1 i s important i n the analys i s o f w r i t t e n t e x t s . The discourse l i n g u i s t a l so invokes the category o f ' genre' , but i t s . use usua l ly re fers to i t s own a n a l y t i c a l typology, e .g . d i s t ingu i sh ing parables and r i d d l e s from ordinary nar ra t ive s . I am using 'genre' i n t h i s chapter to re fer to l i t e r a r y form which readers recognize and se lect , e .g . detect ive s t o r i e s , romances, f a i r y t a l e s , e t c . Hence, my use of 'genre' re fers to a set o f expectations which a reader can employ i n order to make a t e x t i n t e l l i g i b l e . In t h i s study, conversational analys i s i s not presented as something that can be 'added on' t o some l i n g u i s t i c ana lys i s , but i s presented such that the discourse l i n g u i s t may want t o reconsider the notion o f what i s re levant as an a n a l y t i c a l category, and may wish t o consider discarding some l i n g u i s t i c categories for the purpose a t hand. Such a c l a im i s not as r a d i c a l as i t may sound and i s , i n f ac t , being ser ious ly considered by some o f the more prominent discourse l i n g u i s t s . Reca l l P i c ker ing ' s comment; " I am entering a p lea that more l i n g u i s t s recognize both the legi t imacy and necessity o f grappling w i t h the r o l e o f s i t u a t i o n and cu l ture i n discourse ana ly s i s . Only by grappling wi th the problem w i l l so lut ions be forthcoming" (1979:170). This study of fers the discourse l i n g u i s t a methodology for analyzing discourse, a methodology which i s b u i l t upon s i t u a t i o n a l , c u l t u r a l , and i n t e r a c t i o n a l factors . 92 Thus far we have seen that l i n g u i s t s interested i n discourse analys i s provide one k ind o f treatment o f formulating character i n n a r r a t i v e . We saw i n the l a s t sect ion that discourse l i n g u i s t s are looking for patterns o f character references i n narrat ives and that some a n a l y t i c a l l y in te re s t ing claims are made, claims which may be o f i n t e r e s t to the s o c i o l o g i s t interes ted i n discourse i n that they provide clues for further ana ly s i s . The claims made by l i n g u i s t s interes ted i n discourse are, however, quite d i f f e ren t from the considerations which seem t o govern l i v e conversation. One cannot merely extrapolate, and i n t h i s sect ion I show how the issue o f formulating character gets transformed i n t h e o r e t i c a l l y in te re s t ing ways i n conversational ana ly s i s . I begin a conversational analys i s treatment o f formulating character i n s t o r y t e l l i n g by f i r s t examining how characters get formulated i n conversation. Then I compare how characters get formulated i n conversation w i t h a descr ip t ion o f how characters may be formulated i n conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , I examine one genre o f narrat ive i n which formulation preferences may be reversed. Formulating Character i n Conversation Sacks and Schegloff (1979) note tha t , i n conversation, persons r e f e r r i n g t o other persons use two preferences, (1) minimizat ion, invo lv ing the use o f a s ing le reference form, and (2) r e c i p i e n t design, invo lv ing the preference for ' recogni t iona l s ' (names). They w r i t e : 93 For reference t o any person, there i s a large set o f reference forms that can do the work o f r e f e r r i n g t o that one (e .g . he, Joe, a guy, my uncle, someone, Harry ' s cousin, the dent i s t , the man who came t o dinner, e t c . ) . Reference forms are combinable, and on seme occasions are used i n combination. But massively i n conversation, references i n reference oc-casions are accomplished by the use o f a s ing le reference form (1979:16-17). The s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the preference for minimization i n r e f e r r ing to other people i n conversation goes l i k e t h i s : on occasions when reference i s t o be done, i t should preferably be done w i t h a s ing le reference form. The s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the preference for r e c i p i e n t design when r e f e r r i n g t o people goes l i k e t h i s : i f they are poss ib le , prefer recogni t iona l s . One thing Sacks and Schegloff po int out i n reference t o t h i s preference i s that names may be used because (a) the person referred to may be known by the hearer, and/or (b) the speaker may wish to re fe r to the person l a t e r on i n the conversation. Furthermore, they suggest an organizat ion for deal ing w i t h when recognit ion i s i n doubt. Thus, there i s an ordering o f the preferences, that being, persons have a preference for achieving recognit ion over using a non-recognit ional reference form. I t should be noted that the preferences for ndnimization and rec ip i en t design i n the domain of conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g have expression s p e c i f i c t o other domains as w e l l . As for the preference for the use o f recogni t iona l s , they are commonly used when the speaker supposes that the hearer may know the person being referred to , as evidenced by the use o f names. The point i s t h i s : there are a large number o f reference terms ava i l ab le for any poss ible referent , 94 nonrecxxjnitional and recogni t iona l forms which are ava i l ab le to any speaker for any re ferent . We f i n d , too, that there i s a heavy use o f f i r s t names when people re fer t o other people i n conversation which we take as evidence for a preference for the use o f recognit ionals (c f . Sacks and Schegloff, 1979). Names are not only used when the person being re ferred t o i s know t o the hearer. They may a l so be used i n i t i a l l y when the hearer does not know the person whom the speaker i s r e f e r r i n g t o . In such cases the name may be used for i n t e r a c t i o n a l purposes, as we w i l l see from the t r a n s c r i p t s , thereby arming the hearer w i t h the resources they may thereafter be required t o have i n order t o make sense o f what i s being s a i d . One example o f a t y p i c a l preference r u l e may be found i n noting how i t seems to be a preferred prac t i ce t o answer the telephone of a store w i t h the name o f the s tore . I f one were t o c a l l Sears or The Bay and they were to answer, ' H e l l o ? ' , then you would have t o do some work t o f i n d out i f you had c a l l e d the r i g h t p lace . I t could take two or more conversational ' turns ' to accomplish what could be done i n one ' t u r n ' were the person t o answer the phone w i t h 'Sears ' , o r 'The Bay ' . That 's not t o say that there i s any 'natura l cons t ra int ' or some such th ing on the answerer, but there seems t o be a preference r u l e for 2 organizat ional phone answering: answer w i t h the organizat ion ' s name. Formulating Character i n Conversational S t o r y t e l l i n g S t o r y t e l l e r s are faced w i t h a number o f tasks when formulating characters i n t h e i r s to r i e s (see the next page for what i s meant by a ' fo rmula t ion ' ) , tasks which involve gett ing characters i n and out o f t h e i r s t o r i e s , preserving them throughout the t e l l i n g , and so on. The 95 tasks involved require care fu l t e l l e r a t tent ion and management i n order t o get those tasks accomplished. When we speak o f a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s task o f formulating character, we mean the issue o f how people are appropriately i d e n t i f i e d i n t a l k . The problem o f formulating character i s t h i s : for any person t o which reference i s made, there i s a set o f terms each o f which may be a correct way o f r e f e r r i n g to that person. On an actua l occasion o f i t s use, however, not any member o f the set i s appropriate. How i s i t , then, that on p a r t i c u l a r occasions o f use seme reference term from the set i s selected and other terms are rejected? A l t e r n a t i v e descr ipt ions make up a c o l l e c t i o n from which a choice i s made when the person involved i s referred t o i n conversation. The choice o f a p a r t i c u l a r reference term i s not made a r b i t r a r i l y because, for any item from the c o l l e c t i o n , one can imagine circumstances i n which i t would not be heard as a proper way o f i d e n t i f y i n g the person i n quest ion. For example, someone could be membershipped as a ' w i f e ' , ' l awyer ' , 'the lady next door ' , 'neighbor ' , or whatever. We re fer t o the se l ec t ion o f a descr ip t ion from a c o l l e c t i o n of poss ib ly correct ones as a ' f o rmula t ion ' . The term ' c o l l e c t i o n ' i s not meant t o imply a f i n i t e l i s t o f terms, and our analys i s i s not concerned w i t h t r y i n g t o specify what other formulations might be used i n other contexts . Rather, the analys i s we develop i n t h i s chapter i s aimed a t discovering and describing the methods which s t o r y t e l l e r s t e l l i n g s tor i e s use i n se lec t ing appropriate character descr ipt ions . In a minimal sense, character references i n s t o r y t e l l i n g i n s t r u c t rec ip ient s to attend t o such matters as (a) what the story may be 96 'about', (b) who will be doing what to whom, and (c) how the characters introduced will figure into the story. Character formulations figure into the story-as-a-whole and, frcm examining a number of character formulations, we can construct a technical version of how character introductions may be organized and how they might 3 have a bearing on the ongoing interaction. In this chapter, then, I examine a number of stories told in natural conversation with an interest in explicating and describing the reference organization for formulating story characters. I first exaniine how character formulations are done in a l l kinds of stories told in conversation before turning my attention to the interactional work which gets done by the way characters are formulated in a particular genre of narratives. I deal primarily with the following questions: what kinds of preference rules are operating when storytellers formulate story characters? Are there subclasses of recognitionals? Of non-recognitionals? When do recognitionals occur following non-recognitionals? Finally, is there an ordering to such cxDmbinations? NQN-RECOGNITIONAL REFERENCE PROCEDURES Note in the following storytelling fragments how storytellers introduce their story characters not unlike Sacks and Schegloff describe for referring to other persons in conversation, using a single reference form. First, using non-recognitionals. 97 (1-4) A : W e l l , there ' s another l i t t l e one that happened on the f i r s t day. There was t h i s guy t h a t ' s about your h e i g h t . . . • B: When do you p lay t h i s week? (1) A : We're sposed to p lay Doherty's Thursday and then Saturday i t ' s Ginger 's Sexy Sauna B: They have a team? (5) A : Yeah, but i t must be made up o f c l i e n t s , there ' s , I doubt there ' s any guys working there B: Yeah A : Man, I wonder what goes on i n (10) one o f those places? B: Yeah, I went t o one once C A : Noooooool L" B: Yeah, i t wasn't my idea , I was w i t h a guy (15) — from work ' n we went out for a few beers ' n , I dunno, we decided to go t o a movie, but we passed t h i s massage place ' n he sa id he always wanted to t r y one so I ended (20) up going w i t h him. I know i t was wrong, but [ A : So what was i t l i k e ? B: I t was no b i g deal r e a l l y . . . (1-2) Louise : One night (1.0) I was w i t h t h i s guy (1) that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t an' uhh (3.0) we had come back from the show, we had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile ' n we were gonna park. An' I can ' t (5) stand a car , ' n he has a small car 98 Ken: Mm hm Louise : So we walked to the back, ' n we ju s t went i n t o the back house, 'n we (10) staved there h a l f the night (1.0) we d i d n ' t go to bed w i t h each other, but i t was so comfortable ' n so nice Ken: Mm hm Louise : Y'know? There's everything perfect (15) (1-5) A : I had been working l i k e crazy for (3.0) about a week ' n a h a l f ' n I had a day o f f comin' 'n I was wiped out , jus t absolutely dead and desperate for t h i s day o f f . The morning o f the day o f f my boss c a l l e d me. S ick , r ight? [STORY] ( H - 2 ) P : . . . b u t I 've had two experiences, one w i t h a g i r l who I met i n a bar and ta lked t o for a w h i l e . . . . . . So I went, okay, give i t a chance, ' n the chance came l a s t week and, uhh t h i s g i r l , w e l l , the g i r l that I was going out w i t h that you f e l t that I f e l t g u i l t y about . . . (H-3 ) J : One time I was d r i v i n ' home from the movies 'n I was d r i v i n ' because my boyfriend smashed up h i s car [STORY] (III-3) A: . . . ' n i t s t a r t s out w i t h , wi th a l i t t l e chart to i l l u s t r a t e uhhh the experimental method (1.0) 'n the chart shows uhhhm, those who do marijuana on one axis 'n memory on the other, r i ght ? Okay? 99 D: ((laughs)) A: So, some guy puts up h i s hand [STORY] (IV-3) B: So what was, what was your uhhh tupperware party a l l about? A: Oh, i t was kinda fun B: What happened there? A: (1.0) w e l l , f i r s t o f a l l , okay, there was a lady there t h a t kinda, a tupperware dealer t h a t takes charge o f the pa r t y [STORY] (IV-4) B: So what was the deal? A: Well, t h i s f e l l o w was doing t h i s experiment We have i t a v a i l a b l e from these fragments t o locate the use o f minimal non-recognitionals; e.g. " t h i s guy", "a g i r l " , "my boyfriend", " t h i s g i r l " , "some guy", "a lady", and so on. In a l l o f these examples the s t o r y t e l l e r follows the preference f o r itiinimization i n introducing s t o r y characters. Further, we can see that the characters i n the s t o r i e s are introduced by non-recognitional forms. The si n g u l a r feature o f the reference terms used i n the above fragments i s that, from the r e c i p i e n t s ' p o i n t o f view, they could r e f e r t o almost anyone. I noted e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter that, i n conversation, the use o f the non-recognitional form does the work o f i n s t r u c t i n g r e c i p i e n t s not t o search f o r the i d e n t i t y o f the character. In most cases t h i s may be due t o the t e l l e r ' s assumption th a t the r e c i p i e n t does not know the r e f erred-to character, the assumption t h a t the s t o r y 100 rec ip i en t does not need t o know the character 1 s i d e n t i t y i n order t o understand the s tory , or because the s t o r y t e l l e r d i d not know the 4 s tory character ' s i d e n t i t y e i t h e r . In IX-1 and 1-2, we have i t ava i l ab le to not ice that the respective s t o r y t e l l e r s employ non-recognitional reference forms when formulating s tory characters . The s t o r y t e l l e r s i n these t ranscr ip t s are, foremost, i n s t r u c t i n g t h e i r r ec ip ient s not to search for the i d e n t i t y o f the other people i n t h e i r s t o r i e s . The reader may r e c a l l when I examined instances o f the use o f recognit ionals i n s t o r y t e l l i n g s i tua t ions e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter that when a recogni t iona l was employed the r e c i p i e n t was ins t ructed t o t r y to f i n d from i t the i d e n t i t y o f the person being referred t o . When s t o r y t e l l e r s employed non-reoognitionals the r e c i p i e n t was ins t ructed not t o t r y t o f i n d out who i s being re ferred t o . I note l a t e r on i n t h i s chapter that s t o r y t e l l e r s design character formulations by reference to story rec ip i en t s , where I f i n d s t o r y t e l l e r s employing terms such as "my boyfr iend" or "my boss" by reference to themselves and the s tory r e c i p i e n t s . That const i tutes one k i n d o f evidence for the r e c i p i e n t design o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n se lec t ion , mater ia l s from which a case may be made by loca t ing combinations o f pronouns and r e l a t i o n a l terms. In 1-2, however, as i n IX-1, the term selected, " t h i s guy", in s t ruc t s the s tory r e c i p i e n t that the s t o r y t e l l e r i s r e f e r r ing t o someone that the r ec ip i en t need not t r y to f i n d out the i d e n t i t y of , the main reasons being that the s t o r y t e l l e r assumes the s tory r ec ip i en t does not know the character being re ferred t o or does not need t o know. 101 There i s , however, a deeper issue here : i f one i s going t o employ a non-recognit ional form i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g , how does a s t o r y t e l l e r go about choosing one p a r t i c u l a r non-recognitional over another non-recognit ional? E a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter I located d i f f e r e n t kinds o f non-recognit ionals . When a s t o r y t e l l e r chooses t o formulate a character w i t h a non-recognit ional form, then, there are a number o f options to choose from. S t o r y t e l l e r s can do qui te d i f f e ren t things w i t h recognit ionals and non-recognitionals , and d i f f e r e n t kinds o f i n t e r a c t i o n a l work get done by choosing one k i n d o f non-recognitional over another. Returning t o 1-2, the reader may r e c a l l that the other person i n Louise ' s s tory i s formulated as " t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t " . Note that there seems t o be somewhat o f a ' r i s k ' i n Louise t e l l i n g her s tory . The ' r i s k ' a r i ses from the abandoning o f 'parking ' as an accepted way, as seen by teenagers, for teenagers to negotiate sex i n favor o f going t o an unchaperoned house, which may be seen as an ' adu l t ' way or l o c a t i o n for negotiat ing sex. I t i s t h i s par t o f Louise ' s s tory that could be construed by Ken as r i s k y and p o t e n t i a l l y threaten Loui se ' s face. By formulating the character as " t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t " , Louise informs Ken that there was an a f f e c t i o n a l r e l a t i onsh ip w i t h the guy. In formulating the character as such, the formulation t i e s 'what happened' wi th 'who i t happened w i t h ' i n a way which has an obvious r e l a t ionsh ip t o the top ic o f the s tory—report ing on a date and the occurrence o f sex on the date. By formulating the guy she was w i t h as " t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t " , then, Louise informs Ken that there was an a f f e c t i o n a l r e l a t i onsh ip between her and the guy which provides grounds for the 102 r e c i p i e n t , Ken, to understand the business o f the s tory . I t ' s not as though she was t e l l i n g about going out w i t h ju s t any guy, but she l i k e d him "a r e a l l o t . " She thus informs Ken by her character formulation that what she was w i l l i n g t o do on that occasion w i t h the guy she l i k e d a r e a l l o t i s not something that he should suppose she would do on any occasion w i t h ju s t anyone. Furthermore, she was under no constra int to characterize the guy she was w i t h as someone she r e a l l y l i k e d . That i s , that she l i k e d the guy a l o t i s not a feature o f the course-of-events i n her s tory . Her formulation o f the guy she was w i t h as " t h i s guy I l i k e d a r e a l l o t " locates a condi t ion for her doing what she d i d . The way she formulates her date a l so has much t o do w i t h the person she's t e l l i n g the s tory to—a fe l low teenager and a male. Thus, her character formulation does the work o f protect ing her ' face' by d e l i m i t i n g the impl ica t ions o f 'what happened' . I t was not something she would do w i t h ju s t anyone, thus she ought not be accused o f being a ' loose g i r l ' or ava i l ab le t o Ken (or one o f Ken's fr iends) to do the same thing w i t h . Jus t as t e l l i n g about 'what d i d n ' t happen' helps t o defuse a d ispreferred response, as we saw i n the l a s t chapter, so can formulating the guy she was w i t h as " t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t " he lp to b u i l d a defensive design i n t o her s tory . I t i s n ' t , a f t e r a l l , l i k e he was jus t " t h i s guy" or "some guy I met i n a bar " . "This guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t " provides a poss ible way o f seeing 'what happened' p r e c i s e l y by way o f seeing who was involved . The character formulated as such may be used as grounds for the r e c i p i e n t t o see Louise and " t h i s guy" as people who would do ju s t what they d i d . The combination o f the way she formulates her date and the t e l l i n g about 103 'what d i d n ' t happen' goes a long way i n providing the necessary resources for the r ec ip i en t to do h i s par t i n sustaining and protec t ing the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n and insur ing that Louise i s allowed t o save ' f a c e ' . I sa id e a r l i e r that "a guy from work" i s an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n which i s r e c i p i e n t designed i n the sense that i t proceeds from the c la im that the person being referred, to i s presumably not known by the s tory r e c i p i e n t . Further, such a non-recognit ional formulation i n s t r u c t s the s tory r e c i p i e n t not t o t r y t o f i n d out who i t i s . What we want t o t r y to f i n d out now i s how the s t o r y t e l l e r , B, went about choosing the formulation "a guy from work". As features o f "a guy from work", we have i t ava i l ab le to see that the person i s i d e n t i f i e d as a male, and that there i s a ca tegor ia l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the sense that "from work" binds them together. These features have an apparent r e l a t i o n to the business of the s tory , a l e i s u r e a c t i v i t y that began as having a couple o f beers together (a normal ' a f te r work' a c t i v i t y for many people) , which sets up the more focused character izat ion o f deciding to go t o a movie together. The s tory i s t o l d i n such a fashion as t o re l a te 'what happened' w i t h 'who i t happened w i t h ' . B d id not undertake the pro jec t o f going t o a massage par lo r by himself , and the a c t i v i t y i s presented as something tha t , i n a l l l i k l i h o o d , would not have happened had i t not been for the "guy from work". We can begin t o see from the above character formulations that we may have some grounds for expanding upon the organizat ion o f non-recogni t iona l character references. For example, compare the character formulations i n Set A w i t h those i n Set B. 104 Set A (1-2) L : One night (1.0) I was w i t h t h i s guy — that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t [STORY] (1-4) A : There was t h i s guy t h a t ' s about your height [STORY] ( H I - 3 ) A : So, some guy puts up h i s hand [STORY] (IV-3) A : w e l l , f i r s t o f a l l , okay, there was t h i s lady there [STORY] Set B (1-5) A : The morning o f my day o f f , my boss c a l l e d me [STORY] (II-2) P: Yeah, ' n when I was i n grade eleven or grade twelve I guess, one o f the teachers a t the school [STORY] — (II-3) J : One time I was d r i v i n ' home from the movies 'n I was d r i v i n ' because my boyfriend smashed up h i s car [STORY] (V-1) B: I remember one time we t r i e d t o sk ip out of PE, me and Caro l , and she, the teacher, came i n t o [STORY] 105 In Set A (1^4, I I I - 3 , and IV-3) , we f i n d the use o f non-recognit ionals w i t h gender b u i l t i n t o them. I t i s not so much an issue o f i d e n t i f y i n g characters as male and female but that there i s no ca tegor ia l r e l a t ionsh ip between the s t o r y t e l l e r and the s tory characters . In set B, however, the s tory characters are introduced by some k i n d o f ca tegor ica l r e l a t i o n s h i p : "my boss", "my boyfr iend" , "the teacher", and so on. We can begin t o see that there may be d i f f e rent uses for non-recognit ionals . Almost a l l reference terms are non-recogn i t iona l , and there are sure ly many ways of organizing reference terms which do not turn on the fac t that they are non-recognit ional . One th ing we want t o look at i s : can a non-recognitional reference term be used t o do the work o f a recognit ional? NON-RECOGNITIONALS AS RECOGNITONALS The reader i s encouraged t o examine the fol lowing t r anscr ip t s before proceeding t o the ensuing ana ly s i s . (1-5) A: W e l l , there ' s another l i t t l e one that happened on (1) the f i r s t day [STORY] • A : Anyway, I had been working l i k e crazy for (3.0) about a week and a h a l f , 'n I had a day o f f coming, 'n I was wiped r i g h t out , jus absolutely dead, ' n desperate for t h i s day o f f . The morning o f the day o f f , my boss c a l l e d me. S ick , r i ght ? He says, "You gotta go i n " , he says, "because, because i n the pen the teachers have to a l so be j a i l e r s , l i k e we got the key ' n we gotta open the place , y'know (1.0) 106 D: D i d n ' t somebody else have t o be responsible? (30) A : W e l l , i t ' s a c t u a l l y works—it a c t u a l l y works w e l l because we d i d n ' t a l low bars i n the u n i v e r s i t y area so that made i t r e a l l y good, but i t a l so meant that i f you 're the only guy there, you're s i t t i n ' there w i t h f i f t y inmates and you got the key out, so I wasn't—y'know, I wasn't f ee l ing very secure at a l l c D: yeah So anyway I go wandering i n , on t h i s , on t h i s (52) p i c k up the key at the f ront gate, p i ck up the m a i l , go through a l l those gates, p i ck up the main key ' n t h i s i s a—this i s a b i g mother, y'know t h a t ' s a huge th ing , that f i t s i n a huge lock w i t h a b i g metal tag on i t , y'know, you might as w e l l wear a neon s ign that says, " I 'm carrying the key" (simultaneous laughter) so, so I go i n . open up the p lace , s t a r t the coffee, r i ght ? S i t t i n g (60) there ju s t s h i t t i n g my drawers, they s t a r t t o troop i n , r i gh t ? "Where's C lark? " " C l a r k ' s s i ck today", r i ght ? "Oh good, we got t h i s guy today" (hehe) So, here I am, ' n Clark had sa id over the phone, he sa id , "Y'know, i t ' s r e a l l y important t o get t o know the guys", so [STORY] (II-2) P: One th ing I d i d get to—exposed t o since I saw (1) you l a s t was a book c a l l e d Linda Goodman's Sun  Signs or something l i k e that ' n i t ' s a [ D: astrology P: Yeah, ' n when I was i n grade eleven or grade (5) twelve I guess, one o f the teachers a t the school he di—he d i d n ' t l i k e me very much, but he i n -v i t e d me t o see t h i s lecture at the planetarium that was put on for people on the school board, i t was a pr iva te lecture but I was one o f the (10) students that was i n v i t e d t o t h i s , ' n i t was a (1.0) th ing t o b a s i c a l l y refute any, any o f the v a l i d i t y o f astrology, so I 've always c a r r i e d that w i t h me, there we go carry ing things w i t h you, so (15) C D: yeah [ P : so I 've always f e l t a l i t t l e b i t (2.0) y'know, weird feel ings about people who come out w i t h "What s ign are you?" 'n a l l o f a sudden you— they ' re completely turned o f f an' walk away (20) 107 (1.0) but I 've had two experiences, one w i t h a g i r l who I met i n a bar and I ta lked t o for awhile 'n a l l o f a sudden she came up to me and t o l d me that I was a pisces on the cusp o f aquarius 'n I d i d n ' t know what she meant but as i t turned out (25) I am, so I went, "Okay, g ive i t a chance", ' n the chance came l a s t week and, uhh, t h i s g i r l , w e l l , the g i r l that I was going out wi th that you f e l t that I f e l t g u i l t y about, she read me, she read me a par t i n the book about the pisces male, who I i s , (30) and uhh god, i t was ju s t so r i g h t on, parts o f i t , 'n one par t o f i t was that I'm not the k i n d o f person who confides i n people and yet I love people conf id ing i n me [ D: hmmmm [ P: SO [STORY CONTINUES] In 1-5, A r e l i e s upon h i s •employer-employee' r e l a t ionsh ip w i t h one character i n the s tory who ends up get t ing introduced as "my boss", l a t e r being transformed i n t o a recogn i t iona l , " C l a r k " . One th ing that Sacks and Schegloff (1979) note i n r e l a t i o n to the preference for the use o f recognit ionals i n conversation, i s that they found a heavy re l i ance on names, usua l ly f i r s t names. In conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g there seems to be a s i m i l a r preference when the s t o r y t e l l e r i s formulating character. In 1-5, for example, I 'hear' A saying something l i k e , "The morning o f my day o f f my boss, who you don' t know, c a l l e d me". Then l a t e r on i n the t e l l i n g when h i s boss i s again referred t o he i s referred to as " C l a r k " . So we f i n d that A transforms "my boss" i n t o " C l a r k " , thus employing h i s boss's name when he found that he could . That i s , A has set i t up for the hearer, D, to have the resources ava i l ab le to t i e the l a t e r recogni t iona l "C lark" t o the e a r l i e r non-recognitional "my boss". A could have, a f te r a l l , re ferred t o h i s boss by category again, i . e . "They s t a r t t o troop i n , r i ght ? Where's your boss? He's s i c k today", 108 or something l i k e t h a t . One issue i n such a case would be: i f A had made h i s s tory audience say, "Where's your boss?", would not the s tory r e c i p i e n t have i t ava i l ab le t o hear t h i s as the t e l l e r ' s subs t i tu t ion made t o accrarmodate him as rec ip ient? In 1-5, A f inds that he i s able t o use "Clark" a t t h i s po int i n the t e l l i n g because he has provided the resources for D t o t i e the name "Clark" t o the e a r l i e r reference 5 t o "my boss" . There i s another issue here. Recipients must be r e l i e d on, t o some extent, t o be able t o perform transforms on recognit ionals i n order t o locate explanatory category memberships. Even when names are used, r ec ip i en t s need t o be able t o perform transforms on them to f i n d what category membership i s explanatory o f what i s being s a i d . I f , for example, I were t o t e l l a s tory about something my wife d i d t o someone who knows my wife and used her name when r e f e r r i n g t o her , i t i s by v i r t u e o f the fact that the person I am t e l l i n g the s tory t o can transform my w i f e ' s name, 'Ruth ' , i n t o the category membership 'my w i f e ' that the r e c i p i e n t can see why i t i s I 'm t e l l i n g the story or how i t i s she d i d what she d i d . Even when names are used, then, r ec ip ient s have to be able t o perform transforms on them i n order t o see what the explanatory membership i s that i s being invoked. In the conversational fragments presented thus f a r , we can begin to see d i f f e ren t k inds of non-recognitionals by, (1) gender, i . e . " t h i s guy", "a l ady" , (2) r e l a t i onsh ip categor ia l s , i . e . "my boss", "my boyfr iend" , (3) profession ca tegor ia l s , "the teacher", and (4) anyone, i . e . "someone". We may now reformulate the issue as: i s there a preference ordering t o the d i f f e rent kinds of non-recognitionals? 109 We may begin t o answer the above question by suggesting that , i n 1-5, A selected a ca tegor ia l term preceded by the pre-categor ia l marker "my" because i t was the ca tegor ia l "boss" on which the s tory 6 tu rns . In II-3, we f i n d J se lec t ing a r e l a t ionsh ip ca tegor i a l , "boyfr iend" , which i s a l so preceded by the pre-categor ia l marker "my". As i n 1-5, J ' s s tory turns on the re l a t ionsh ip rather than on the person's i d e n t i t y . A f t e r a l l , J was stopped by the policeman for engaging i n a category-bound a c t i v i t y between ' b o y f r i e n d - g i r l f r i e n d ' , namely, s i t t i n g very c lose t o each other i n a car , which provides for r e f e r r i n g to him as "my boyfr iend" . I t may w e l l be that i n conversat ional s t o r y t e l l i n g there i s a preference for the use o f a non-recognit ional expressing a category membership between t e l l e r and s tory character when that t e l l e r - c h a r a c t e r r e l a t i onsh ip i s generative o f the s tory . Note, too, that J does not simply t e l l her s tory r e c i p i e n t that she was out d r i v i n g w i t h a " f r i e n d " or "a guy", although she could presumably have selected a reference term from a number of d i f f e rent i d e n t i t i e s from the d i f f e r e n t kinds o f non-recognit ionals . Or she could have used h i s name. That i s t o say, J ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s not randomly selected from a set o f poss ib le reference terms, and i t i s not from d i s i n t e r e s t or indi f ference that a reference term i n a s t o r y t e l l i n g i s se lected. Rather, i n r e l a t i o n to deciding upon how t o formulate a s tory character, the relevance o f the term selected may be considered to be provided by the s t o r y t e l l i n g occasion. Thus far I have i d e n t i f i e d and begun t o describe d i f f e rent kinds of non-recognitionals and have suggested that any k i n d of non-recogni t iona l may take preference over the use of a name when the non-110 r e c o g n i t i o n a l term i s c r u c i a l t o the t e l l i n g o f the story. In the next section I describe the organization f o r the use o f r e c o g n i t i o n a l s when i n i t i a l l y formulating s t o r y characters. RECOGNITIONS REFERENCE PROCEDURES We now t u r n t o instances where s t o r y characters are introduced by name. ( I I - D C: He [Rob] was jus t — w e went t o t h i s — y o u remember Ewen P i t t , d i d you, yeah w e l l [STORY] ( I I I - D A: ...Two days l a t e r I got a phone c a l l a t eleven o'clock a t night from a guy b y — h e s a i d h i s name was Steve Dogood [STORY] (III-5) A: Yeah, I went t o have lunch with Bev 'n we had a long t a l k [STORY] (IV-1) B: David, you know Pat's David, he uhhh l i k e you know how k i d s are [STORY] (V-1) A: There was a s u b s t i t u t e teacher when Turner was away [STORY] (V-2) J : Good o l e Perks, I was going by there again today, he always s i t s there i n 111 h i s o f f i c e [STORY] (V-4) A : So we were v i s i t i n g the Prudentia l b u i l d i n g (1.0) 'n we were walking out , I th ink i t was ju s t Dan and me ' n [STORY] These fragments deserve further comment. In I I - l , C chooses to use a recogni t iona l w i t h an accompanying upward in tonat iona l contour, such as i s commonly used when formulating a question, "You remember Ewen P i t t , d i d you?" Sacks and Schegloff (1979) demonstrate that the use o f t h i s k i n d o f recogni t iona l attempt or ' t r y marker' argues for the preference for use o f recognit ionals i n conversation. However, t h i s does not mean that recognit ionals are selected by t e l l e r s only i n those cases where i t i s assumed that the s tory rec ip ient s may know the referred-to character and that non-recognitionals are used only when the s t o r y t e l l e r bel ieves that the hearers don' t know the referred-to character. As the fo l lowing fragments demonstrate, a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s character formulation i s more complex than t h i s . ( H - 2 ) P : . . . ' n the chance came l a s t week and, uhh t h i s g i r l , w e l l , the g i r l that I * was going out w i t h that you f e l t that I f e l t g u i l t y about, she [STORY] ( H I - 2 ) A : Two days l a t e r I got a phone c a l l a t eleven o 'c lock a t n ight from a guy by—he sa id h i s name was Steve Dogcod, * 'n I s a id [STORY] In I I I - 2 , we f i n d that A formulates a s tory character w i t h a 112 ccrnbination o f a non-recognitional, " t h i s guy", followed by the character's name, standard fare f o r r e c o g n i t i o n a l s . There seem t o be t e l l i n g occasions i n which i t i s advantageous f o r the s t o r y t e l l e r t o employ a r e c o g n i t i o n a l reference form even when the s t o r y t e l l e r may know t h a t the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t does not know the person being r e f e r r e d t o . Then we f i n d that the name may be an important p a r t o f the t e l l i n g . In III-2, we see that A's use o f a name following a non-r e c o g n i t i o n a l t e l l s the r e c i p i e n t something about how A heard the name at the time o f the event, that he was incredulous that a guy named "Dogcod" would be o f f e r i n g him a job a t a c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i t u t e . I t ' s p a r t o f the story. So the use o f a name here i s not j u s t a way o f g e t t i n g the character i n t o the stor y as a recognizable, but i t s use figu r e s as a p a r t o f the s t o r y i t s e l f , a p a r t which may have been l o s t i f A had merely used a non-recognitional form, i . e . "Some guy from U V i c c a l l e d me". Another issue here i s that i t would be quite a d i f f e r e n t character formulation i f A had s a i d , "So Steve Dogood from U V i c c a l l e d me". I t seems reasonable t o suggest, then, that such a formulation would i n v i t e B t o search f o r who " Steve Dogood" i s , assuming tha t he i s a person known t o the r e c i p i e n t . There i s something e l s e happening i n these instances which we have touched upon but which we have not yet described. That i s , CHARACTER FORMULATION PREFERENCES MAY BE USED IN COMBINATION, BUT NOT JUST ANY COMBINATION. The above, III-2, shows the use o f a non-re c o g n i t i o n a l reference form followed by a r e c o g n i t i o n a l form, y et the formulation remains 'non-recognitional' i n t h a t the person i s formulated as " t h i s guy" and remains e s s e n t i a l l y a formulation which could r e l a t e t o anyone as f a r as the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t i s concerned. He 113 jus t happens to have a funny name i n r e l a t i o n t o the job he was o f f e r ing A, and that name f igures i n the s tory i t s e l f . The above example a l so of fers a h i n t that there are oases when a recogni t iona l may be followed by a non-recognit ional . The fo l lowing hypothet ica l example i s sure ly p l a u s i b l e . A : Yesterday Steve Congdon, I don' t th ink you know the guy, and I were on our way t o the Cubs game when [STORY] Recipient determining whether a formulation i s non-recognitional or recogni t iona l , then, can only be achieved by considering the i n t e r a c t i o n a l loca t ion o f the formulation i n question i n the t a l k . Whereas, for example, we may consider the above hypothet ica l example t o be a combination o f a recogni t iona l followed by a non-recognitional which stands as a non-recognitional character formulation, the fo l lowing would c e r t a i n l y be const i tuted as the same combination and heard as an instance o f a recogni t iona l i n that the t e l l e r i n s t r u c t s the hearer t o search for the i d e n t i t y o f "the guy w i t h the patch" , who we take i t A assumes r e c i p i e n t should recognize. A : So Doug Wagoner, y'know, the guy w i t h the patch? he met us a t the ba l lpark and offered to [STORY] One k i n d o f common th ing that happens when formulating character i n conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g s i tua t ions i s when a s t o r y t e l l e r w i l l th ink that the r ec ip i en t knows who the t e l l e r i s going t o introduce i n t o the s tory . Then i t ' s common t o f i n d the use o f a ' t r y marker' i n which the s t o r y t e l l e r refers to a name as a recogni t iona l w i t h a B.4 question added, e.g. "You remember Ewen P i t t , d i d you?" or, "y'know, the guy with the patch?" One thing that becomes evident frcm our materi a l s i s that the ' t r y marker' organization supports the preference organization f o r the use o f names over n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n a l s — 7 i f r e c o g n i t i o n i s po s s i b l e , t r y t o achieve i t . E a r l i e r I examined some instances o f s t o r i e s t o l d i n conversation i n which the s t o r y t e l l e r s e l e c ted a r e c o g n i t i o n a l not because the t e l l e r assumed tha t the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t knew the character being introduced, but because the character's name f i g u r e d as a p a r t o f the st o r y i t s e l f . In the following example, note how the s t o r y t e l l e r formulates the character with a non-recognitional form, " t h i s dude", when the character, as i t turns out l a t e r i n the t e l l i n g , i s known by the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t s a l l along, and the s t o r y t e l l e r knew that they knew him when t e l l e r formulated him as " t h i s dude". (VT-3) K: The best player I ever saw, man, t h i s dude brought h i s own cheering s e c t i o n from P h i l l y , man, and I never even heard o f him. Before the game they s t a r t e d screamin', 'Jesus, Black Jesus1 Black Jesus1' I thought, who was t h i s dude? He was about six-three and the f i r s t p l a y o f the game he got a rebound on the defensive end o f the court and s t a r t e d spinnin', man, he spun four times 1 Now he's ninety f e e t from the hoop and t h i s dude i s spinnin'1 Well, on the fourth s p i n he throws the b a l l i n a hook motion, i t bounced a t mid-court and then i t j u s t rose, and there was a guy a t the other end runnin' f u l l speed and he caught i t i n s t r i d e and l a i d i t i n . A f u l l - c o u r t bounce passI A f t e r I saw that I could understand a l l the 'Black Jesus' s t u f f . I didn't f i n d out the dude's r e a l name u n t i l way l a t e r . i t was E a r l Monroe1 115 In such cases where the name o f the character being introduced f i g u r e s i n the s t o r y i t s e l f , then the s t o r y t e l l e r may choose t o s e l e c t the non-preferred form depending upon r e c o g n i t i o n a l a v a i l a b i l i t y a t the time o f the episode being recounted. We hear i t that K didn't introduce " t h i s dude" as " E a r l Monroe" when i n i t i a l l y formulating the character i n the stor y because a t the time o f the episode K didn't know i t was E a r l Monroe. Such an organization f i g u r e s i n the s t o r y i t s e l f , i . e . "I'm not t e l l i n g you h i s name a t the s t a r t because I didn't know i t then e i t h e r " . E a r l i e r , i n II-2, we found the s t o r y t e l l e r employing a non-r e c o g n i t i o n a l form i n formulating a sto r y character who the r e c i p i e n t knows about by previous reference. I want t o concentrate cn one formulation, " t h i s g i r l , w e l l , the g i r l that I was going out with th a t you f e l t t h a t I f e l t g u i l t y about". One th i n g that i s happening here i s that P i s t a l k i n g about two experiences, the f i r s t being about "a g i r l who I met i n a bar", and the second about " t h i s g i r l " t h a t "read me a p a r t i n the book about the p i s c e s male". However, i n the l a t t e r formulation P uses a modi f i c a t i o n device so that " t h i s g i r l " gets transformed i n t o "the g i r l t h a t I was going out with th a t you f e l t t hat I f e l t g u i l t y about". The modif i c a t i o n organization acts as a r e p a i r i n g technique whereby a s t o r y t e l l e r may c o r r e c t himself. We take i t that i t i s a common experience i n conversation f o r a speaker to ' suddenly remember' something tha t i s relevant t o the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . In t h i s instance i t appears tha t P a t f i r s t f i g u r e d t h a t D d i d n ' t know the person P formulated as " t h i s g i r l " . P suddenly remembers t h a t he had, i n f a c t , r e f e r r e d t o " t h i s g i r l " before t o D, 116 e i ther e a r l i e r i n the conversation or a t some other t ime. Thus he f inds i t poss ib le t o re fe r t o " t h i s g i r l " i n r e l a t i o n t o that e a r l i e r formulat ion. P makes use, then, o f an e a r l i e r statement t o D i n order t o t i e a s tory character t o a previous inc ident . Thus we are provided w i t h another instance which supports the preference r u l e : i f recogni t ion i s poss ib le , t r y t o achieve i t . E a r l i e r I sa id that character formulations are expandable, subject t o combination and/or accumulation. We have already seen how reference t o a s tory character may include a combination o f terms, e .g . " t h i s dude"—"Earl Monroe", "my boss"—"Clark" , and so on. We have a l so noted how i d e n t i t i e s may be accumulated wherein a reference form i s followed by other information. Up t o t h i s po int i n the chapter I have been examining formulation preferences i n conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g and descr ibing subclasses o f recogni t ional s and non-recognit ionals . For s t o r y t e l l e r s facing the task o f introducing characters i n t o t h e i r s tor ie s we f i n d a preference for the use o f recogni t iona l s . There i s a l so an organizat ion for the preference for recognit ionals when the recogni t iona l f igures as par t of the s tory , as i n II1-2, wi th the use o f "Steve Dogood". I am proposing, then, that there are preference ru les operating i n r e l a t i o n t o character formulations i n conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g and that there i s an ordering t o the d i f f e r e n t kinds o f non-recognit ionals . Further , the formulation o f persons i n s tor ie s fol lows the same k i n d o f ordering and l o g i c as i t does i n conversation i n general . Thus far my contr ibut ion turns on (1) expanding upon Sacks and S c h e g l o f f s e a r l i e r work on reference to persons i n conversation, and (2) beginning the development o f a descr ip t ion o f formulating character i n 117 conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g . In so doing I have noted that there are grounds for two preferences for s t o r y t e l l e r s i n formulating character and an organizat ion which each can mobi l i ze . CONCLUSION In t h i s chapter I have examined f i r s t mention character references as treated i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s and then provided the reader w i t h a conversational analys i s treatment o f the same phenomenon. I suggested that the analys i s offered by l i n g u i s t s interes ted i n discourse features lays the foundation for more in-depth analys i s which includes a concern for features o f i n t e r a c t i o n as w e l l as features o f language. I traced the l i n e o f progression from f i r s t mention character references as they work i n conversation according t o Sacks and Schegloff (1979), t o the methods s t o r y t e l l e r s use to formulate character i n narra t ives . When a s tory gets generated i n natura l conversation, seme formulation o f other characters may have t o be of fered . E a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter I located two preferences for performing t h i s task: recognit ionals and non-recognit ionals . I claimed that the preference for nujiimization and r e c i p i e n t design i n formulating characters i n narra t ive discourse have expression t o other domains as w e l l . I noted, fur ther , that f i r s t mention character references i n narrat ive discourse i n s t r u c t narrat ive rec ip ient s t o attend t o such matters as (a) what the s tory may be 'about ' , (b) who w i l l be doing what t o whom, and (c) how the character(s) w i l l f igure i n t o the s tory . I discovered the preference ru les operating i n f i r s t mention character references 118 i n narrat ive discourse, I described some sub-classes of non-recogni t iona l s , and I claimed that there i s an ordering t o combinations. The s igni f icance o f t h i s chapter l i e s i n i t s in tegra t ion of l i n g u i s t i c discourse discover ies w i t h f indings frcm conversational analys i s v i s - a - v i s f i r s t mention character references i n narrat ive discourse . For the l i n g u i s t interested i n the study of discourse, there i s an in te re s t i n t y i n g features o f narrat ive discourse t o a n a l y t i c a l categories already made i n l i n g u i s t i c s , e .g . i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s , possessive pronouns, proper names, and so on. But i n conversational ana lys i s , the issues are formulated i n i n t e r a c t i o n a l terms, w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n t y i n g features o f narra t ive discourse t o i n t e r a c t i o n a l categories, e .g . what speaker assumes hearer already knows based on ca tegor ia l membership. So then, conversational ana lys i s s tar t s w i t h i n t e r a c t i o n a l propert ies and can thus embody speaker decis ions i n more than one way, e .g . choosing "the guy across the s t ree t " or "Tony", depending on what speaker knows hearer knows, something we would not learn i f we s tarted w i t h an an lys i s o f d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e s or proper names. My analys i s o f f i r s t mention character reference i n narra t ive has offered several contr ibut ions t o the larger study o f discourse s t ructure . What seems the most obvious methodological contr ibut ion i s the i s o l a t i o n o f s t o r y t e l l e r s ' character formulations i n l i v e conversation as a group for spec ia l study. The study o f narrat ives i n l i v e conversation seems to me t o o f f e r ins ight s i n t o discourse structures which are obscured or neglected when analyzing edited t ex t s . That the transformations i n narrat ive discourse from the 119 narra t ive i t s e l f t o membership categories can be taken together and analyzed i n terms o f t h e i r r e f l e c t i o n o f a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s strategy i s , as f a r as I can t e l l from the discourse l i t e r a t u r e , a new idea, and one which I would assume w i l l prove e spec ia l ly valuable i n the study o f the pragmatic influence i n l i v e s t o r y t e l l i n g . Secondly, by ind ica t ing various procedures used t o formulate character i n narra t ives , t h i s chapter suggests an informal methodology for d iscovering and descr ib ing such procedures. This methodology can be described i n terms o f three kinds o f o r i e n t a t i o n ; (1) r ec ip i en t design, i n that a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s character formulation ought to cater t o the s tory r e c i p i e n t ( s ) , (2) membership ana lys i s , i n that s t o r y t e l l e r s ought t o take i n t o account the member categorizat ions which members make o f themselves and t h e i r r e c i p i e n t s , and (3) a c t i v i t y ana lys i s , i n that people ought t o produce recognizable topics i n t h e i r t a l k i n and through formulations o f characters, objects , and events. The strongest o r i e n t a t i o n i n Sacksian conversational analys i s deals w i t h 'membership ca tegor ies ' , and t h i s chapter r e l i e s heav i ly on e x p l i c a t i n g and descr ib ing common repertoires o f personal i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s and the ru les o f t h e i r use. By recognizing the types o f devices which frequently mark character formulations i n narra t ives , one can q u i c k l y i d e n t i f y parts o f a s t o r y t e l l i n g which are p o t e n t i a l l y character formulations. A number o f l i n g u i s t s interested i n the study o f discourse have f ree ly admitted that current l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s has tended to neglect ethnographic considerations, s i t u a t i o n , and cu l ture i n t h e i r analyses. In recent studies (Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983), some 120 l i n g u i s t s have attempted to t rea t ethnographic considerations as something to be added on to e x i s t i n g l i n g u i s t i c categories . Conversational analys i s claims that doing discourse analys i s may mean changing one's not ion o f what i s re levant . Surely i t i s not the case that ethnography i s needed for conversational analys i s but not for discourse a n a l y s i s . Cer ta in ly there i s an ethnography o f w r i t t e n texts as sure ly as there i s an ethnography o f conversation, and I have claimed as much i n t h i s chapter by suggesting an a l t e rna t ive methodology w i t h categories useful i n formal analys i s for discovering and descr ib ing discourse s tructures . In the next chapter I examine another feature o f discourse which i s treated i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analysis—COLLATERAL INFORMATION. A f t e r reviewing a l i n g u i s t i c discourse treatment o f COLLATERAL INFORMATION, I show how the same feature can be treated by using d i f f e ren t a n a l y t i c a l categories i n conversational a n a l y s i s . 121 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1 I wish t o thank my wi fe , Ruth Spielmann, for sharing her ins ight s w i t h me on how characters may be formulated i n Algonquin nar ra t ive s . 2 Schegloff (1979) notes that an organizat ional s e l f -i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , e .g . The Bay, indicates that i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s re levant . The po int here i s that recognit ion may not be important, even w i t h the poss ib le use o f a nonrecognitional s e l f -i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by name, e .g . "Mr. Brown speaking", whi le i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s . 3 Gar f inke l and Sacks (1970) argue that a member has i t ava i l ab le t o t r e a t some part o f a conversation as "an occasion t o describe that conversation, t o expla in i t , or characterize i t , . . .or furni sh the g i s t o f i t " (p.35Q). In t h e i r terminology, a conversa t ional i s t may use some part o f a conversation as an occasion t o "formulate" the conversation. Our in te re s t i n t h i s chapter i s to focus on some instances i n which the formulation o f characters i n Class I I s t o r y t e l l i n g s b u i l d s i n t o the achievement o f conversational order and which does some i n t e r a c t i o n a l work. 4 Sacks and Schegloff (1979) w r i t e : A nonrecognitional having been done, r e -c i p i e n t may f i n d from other sources pro-vided i n the t a l k that he might know the r e f erred-to , whi le seeing that the speaker need not have supposed that he would. He may then seek to confirm h i s suspicion by o f f e r ing the name or by asking for i t , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y o f fe r ing some basis for independently knowing the referred-to , as i n the fo l lowing : B: Wh-what i s yer f r i e n d ' s name? Cuz my son l i v e s i n Sherman Oaks. A : Uh Wenzel B: (Mh-mh) no. And uh, i f she uh 122 A : She l i v e s on Hartzuk B: No, I don' t even know that s t reet 5 In our mater ia l s we f i n d that f i r s t names are not ju s t used when they are known. They may a l so be used a t an introductory formulation for reference t o a t a l a t e r t ime. A name, then, when not known by r e c i p i e n t , may provide the r e c i p i e n t w i t h the resources that the r e c i p i e n t may need l a t e r on i n a s tory t o keep t rack o f a lready-referred-to characters . As Sacks and Schegloff (1979) w r i t e : The strength o f the pre ference . . . involve[ s ] not only maximum e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the use o f recognit ionals consistent w i t h seme current state o f " i f pos s ib le " , b u t . . . i n v o l v e [ s ] as w e l l an i n t e r e s t i n expanding the scope o f p o s s i b i l i t y (p. 17). 6 A pre-categor ia l marker usua l ly makes i t ava i l ab le for the r e c i p i e n t t o search the r e l a t i o n s h i p boundaries for poss ib le recogni t ion . That i s , the use o f a pre-categor ia l l i k e 'my' makes i t ava i l ab le for rec ip ient s t o search for i d e n t i t i e s . 7 As for the ' try-marker' feature, Sacks and Schegloff (1979) note tha t : The existence and cemmon use of such a form.. .bears on a considerat ion o f the concurrence o f the preferences for minim-i z a t i o n and r e c i p i e n t des ign . . . S ince the try-marker engenders a sequence, invo lv ing a t l ea s t r e c i p i e n t ' s assert ion of recog-n i t i o n . . . the try-marker i s evidence for the preference for recognit ionals being stronger than the preference for nunimization (p. 19). 123 CHAPTER 4: COLLATERAL INFORMATION IN NARRATIVES When narrat ives are t o l d i n conversation, some o f the information included may not necessar i ly be par t o f the course-of-action i n the nar ra t ive , but may stand outside o f the course-of-action repor t ing . Grimes (1975) refers t o t h i s k i n d o f information as BACKGROUND. Much o f t h i s BACKGROUND information i s used t o c l a r i f y a narra t ive and t o expla in other information i n the nar ra t ive . These explanations or accounts often involve things that the narrator fee l s need t o be c l a r i f i e d i n order to avoid r e c i p i e n t misunderstanding. One k i n d o f th ing that happens to s tor ie s t o l d i n conversation i s that t h e i r r ec ip ient s may perform transforms on them, transforms employed t o f igure out the sense o f what they have been t o l d (Sharrock and Turner, 1978). In e f fec t , when a s tory gets t o l d i t follows that the s tory r e c i p i e n t may have t o do some ' f i g u r i n g out ' o f the s tory i n order t o get the sense o f i t , t o understand what went on and why i t 1 was t o l d . I t i s t h i s k i n d o f ' p o t e n t i a l transform operat ion' which may place a s t o r y t e l l e r i n jeopardy by leading to a poss ib le d i spre f erred r e c i p i e n t response. In t h i s chapter, I describe a conversational method by which poss ib le r e c i p i e n t transforms on a narra t ive t o l d i n l i v e conversation, which could lead t o a d i spre f erred r e c i p i e n t response, may be defused w i t h i n the structure o f the t e l l i n g sequence of the nar ra t ive . The analys i s i s d i rec ted towards producing an understanding o f how s t o r y t e l l e r s attend t o a t e l l e r ' s 'problem': how to protect against a poss ib le dispreferred 124 response a t s tory completion by b u i l d i n g a defense mechanism i n t o the t e l l i n g sequence so as t o susta in and protect the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s chapter examines instances where narrators t e l l about things that d i d not happen (termed COLLATERAL information i n the l i n g u i s t i c discourse l i t e r a t u r e ) i n narrat ives which contain ' r i s k y ' information. In such s tor ie s the a n a l y t i c a l issues are wel l -def ined and perhaps more r e a d i l y grasped. A L i n g u i s t i c Treatment o f C o l l a t e r a l E a r l i e r I sa id that l i n g u i s t i c s has much t o o f f e r the s o c i o l o g i s t interes ted i n the analys i s o f discourse. Some issues a r i s i n g i n sociology have been treated for some time i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana ly s i s . I t ' s treatment o f c o l l a t e r a l information i n discourse i s one o f those i s sues . Joseph Grimes, i n The Thread o f Discourse (1975), was one of the f i r s t t o describe c o l l a t e r a l informationn i n nar ra t ive s . Some information i n a narra t ive , instead o f t e l l i n g about what happened i n the s tory , t e l l s about what d i d not happen. Grimes notes that the main function o f c o l l a t e r a l information i s t o set o f f what a c t u a l l y does happen i n a narrat ive w i t h what might have happened. One example he uses i s from a Saramaccan tex t i n a s tory about a canoe t r i p that ended when the canoe capsized i n the rap ids . One par t o f the narra t ive i s as fo l lows . The canoe overturned. The father d i d n ' t d i e , the mother d i d n ' t d i e , the c h i l d r e n d i d n ' t d i e . Instead, they a l l escaped to land. Grimes wr i te s about the use of c o l l a t e r a l information i n t h i s nar ra t ive , "By t e l l i n g what d i d not happen t o the pa r t i c ipant s , [the 125 narrator] throws their escape into relief" (1975:64). He then attempts to describe a roster of the grammatical forms associated with collateral information. ADVERSATIVES are a form of negation in Grimes' roster that imply parallel but disjoint action. His example, "They brought pickles but we brought mustard," implies, "They did not bring mustard and we did not bring pickles." /ADVERSATIVES can also imply that the speaker assumes the hearer to have inferred something that is plausible but that did not in fact happen. His example, "We arrived late but were received immediately," implies, "I, the speaker, think that you, the hearer, must expect that i f we were to arrive late the logical thing would be for our reception to be postponed. Contrary to your expectation, we were received immediately." In the Algonquin language, we can see how collateral information in a non-English narrative might be treated. In the following story, note the three instances of collateral information (see Appendix for a complete transcript). Text 20: Moz Adisokan 20.1 Abitibi sagaigan nigi odji nisa nimozom. 20.1 Abitibi lake I +past came kill-him my moose. 20.2 E mibizowagiban tcimanikag nibapam 20.2 +oonj we-^were-driving-by in the canoe my father e widjiwag. 20.3 Onidjani, nitam nigi wabama. •fconj I-am-^th-him. 20.3 Female-moose, fi r s t I +past see-him. 20.4 Mi dac kawin nid odji kagwe packiziwasi, oza 20.4 That's why then not I came try shoot-him-neg, because kit c i sagakwaban. 20.5 E abanabiag... really there-were-branches. 20.5 +conj we-look-back... 126 nidigcmin. 20.15 Kawin k i d inendagozisi t h e y - t e l l - u s . 20.15 Not you-are-allowed-neg k i d j i n i s a d j noz. 20.16 N i g i kagwe widamawa ocma in-order-that y o u - k i l l - h i m moose. 20.16 I +past t r y t e l l - h i m here e i j i anokiwag a c i t c dac n i d inendagozinan +conj thus we-trap and then I-am-allowed k i d j i nisag nimozom. 20.17 Ka ega dac in-order-that I - k i l l - h i m my moose. 20.17 Not then wi tebwetasi. 20.18 Mi dac kakina packiziganan want he-believe-me-neg. 20.18 That's why then a l l guns o g i odapinanan, podadjigan, a c i t c wasakonendj igan, +past he-took-them, moose-call, and l i g h t s , kakina o g i pozitonawa odabanikag. 20.19 Panima everything +past they-loaded-them in-the-car. 20.19 Have-to dac n i g i kiwebizcmin minawadj ka i j i pagodjinakeag then we-excl +past go-back again +conj-past thus we-load-him k i d j i wabadaag, a d i ka i j i n i s a i a g moz in-order-that we-show-hLm where +conj-past thus we-kill-him moose nibapam ninawid. 20.20 Ogi pozitonawa okadan, kakina my father u s - e x c l . 20.20 they +past loaded-them legs, every kegon. 20.21 Kawin kegon od o d j i ickonasinawa. 20.22 th i n g . 20.21 Nothing they comes leave-it-behind. 20.22 Mi ka i j i madj idowadj i n . 20.23 Cochrane That's why +conj-past thus they-took-it-away. 20.23 Cochrane panima n i g i i j i w i n i g o g . 20.24 Kawin have-to I +past they-take-me. 20.24 Not n i d o d j i kibahogosi. 20.25 Kegad n i g i kibaogo he came lock-me-me-up-neg. 20.25 Almost he +past lock-me-up panima ega dac n i g i o j i b i odizonan have-to not(conj) then I +past sig n k i d j i sagaaman... in-oder-that I - l e a v e - i t . . . In the f i r s t instance o f c o l l a t e r a l information (20.4), the narrator gives an account f o r why he didn't immediately t r y t o shoot 127 the moose he saw i n the forest , "Mi dac kawin n i d o d j i kagwe pack iz iwas i , osa k i t c i sagakwaban" (That's why I d i d n ' t t r y to shoot him, [because] there were too many branches [ i n my way]). In 20.17, we f i n d another utterance containing c o l l a t e r a l information, "Ka ega dac w i tebwetasi" (So then he d i d n ' t want t o be l ieve me). Then i n 20.23 we f i n d a t h i r d instance o f c o l l a t e r a l information i n the nar ra t ive , "Kawin n i d o d j i kibahagosi" (He d i d n ' t throw me i n j a i l [ lock me up]) . In Mgonquin, as i n many languages, utterances constructed w i t h negatives almost always contain c o l l a t e r a l information. One reason for t h i s , a reason which places emphasis on the function o f COLLATERAL as viewed from a discourse l i n g u i s t ' s perspective, i s that c o l l a t e r a l information can be useful as a h i g h l i g h t i n g device . In Algonquin, events that do not take place have s ign i f i cance only i n r e l a t i o n t o what a c t u a l l y does happen i n a n a r r a t i v e . C o l l a t e r a l information i n Algonquin narrat ives contributes to a h i g h l i g h t i n g e f fect by focusing r e c i p i e n t a t tent ion on what e l se might happen i n the place o f what d id not happen. In Eng l i sh , QUESTIONS are of ten used for i n d i c a t i n g c o l l a t e r a l information and can be treated w i t h regard t o the information they presuppose or assume v i s - a - v i s what they inquire about. Grimes w r i t e s : When d i d John get here? presupposes that John d i d get here, so that the area o f uncertainty i s r e s t r i c t e d to the time o f h i s a r r i v a l . When d i d you  stop beating your wife? i s more complex; i t assumes that you have a wi f e , that there was a time when you beat her , and that there was a time a f ter which you no longer beat her . The question i s d i rec ted toward ascerta ining that t ime. The presuppositions i n a question are almost l i k e condit ions l a i d down by the speaker for the hearer to give an acceptable answer. 128 I f the hearer accepts the presuppositions, then he can give the missing information that i s required; i f not , he i s i n a bind (1975:66). /According to Grimes, then, c o l l a t e r a l information re la te s non-events t o events and, by providing a range o f non-events that might take place , heightens the s igni f icance o f what a c t u a l l y happens. Furthermore, c o l l a t e r a l information has the e f fec t o f a n t i c i p a t i n g what i s l i k e l y t o happen i n a narra t ive when the a l ternat ives are spe l led out i n advance. Grimes notes that , i n t h i s respect, " c o l l a t e r a l information i s not very d i f f e r e n t from foreshadowing" (p.65). In The Grammar o f Discourse (1983), Longacre begins t o expand upon the not ion o f c o l l a t e r a l information. In analyzing s t r u c t u r a l features o f narra t ives , Longacre d iv ides narrat ives i n t o seven parts w i t h regard t o not iona l (deep) s t ructure ; (1) Exposition—where background information o f time, place and par t i c ipant s i s given, (2) I n c i t i n g Moment—when the planned and predictable i s broken up i n some manner, (3) Developing C o n f l i c t — i n which the s i t u a t i o n i n t e n s i f i e s , or deter iorates , depending on one's viewpoint, (4) Climax—where everything comes t o a head, (5) Denouement—a c r u c i a l event happens which makes re so lut ion poss ib le , (6) F i n a l Suspense—which works out the d e t a i l s o f the re so lu t ion , and (7) Conclusion—which brings the s tory to some sort o f end. Each not ional part of discourse corresponds w i t h narra t ive surface s tructures , e .g . I n c i t i n g Moment (deep structure) wi th Pre-peak Episode (surface s t ruc ture ) . Not a l l narrat ives contain a l l seven part s , but a well-developed narrat ive i s l i k e l y to have many or a l l o f them since each part contributes to the success o f the nar ra t ive . 129 In descr ibing main l i n e versus supportive mater ia l i n discourse, Longacre makes the c l a im that , " i t i s impossible to make s t r u c t u r a l d i s t i n c t i o n s among discourse types without taking [supportive mater ia l ] i n t o account" (p.14). He c i t e s Grimes as having already made the d i s t i n c t i o n between types of information i n which a d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between events and non-events ( c o l l a t e r a l ) . The example o f c o l l a t e r a l information which he uses i n discuss ing supportive mater ia l i s a passage from Mark Twain. In a minute a t h i r d slave was s truggl ing i n the a i r . I t was dreadful . I turned away my head for a moment, and when I turned back I missed the Kingl They were b l i n d f o l d i n g himl I was paralyzed; I cou ldn ' t move, I was choking, my tongue was p e t r i -f i e d . They f in i shed b l i n d f o l d i n g him, they l e d him under the rope. I couldn ' t shake o f f that c l i n g i n g impotence. But when I saw them put the noose around h i s neck, then everything l e t go i n me and I made a spring t o the rescue—and as I made i t I shot one more glance abroad—by George 1 here they came, a - t i t l i n g 1 — f i v e hundred mailed and bel ted knights on b i cyc l e s I (1964:240). Longacre notes that i n t h i s paragraph some course-of-action events (what happened) are reported along w i t h seme supportive mater ia l (non-events). A f t e r de l ineat ing the main l i n e mater ia l i n the discourse (events), he describes the other clauses i n the paragraph which have a supportive funct ion. These clauses are excluded frcm the course-of-action (event-l ine) ana lys i s , even though t h i s information supports the course-of-act ion. He then comments on one clause which contains c o l l a t e r a l information, the clause being, " I cou ldn ' t shake o f f that c l i n g i n g impotence", by saying, "Grimes c a l l s t h i s c o l l a t e r a l " (1982:16). 130 Larry Jones attends to the treatment o f COLLATERAL i n h i s examination o f the pragmatics o f author comments i n narrat ive discourse . He contends tha t , by the author comments o f a discourse, the analyst i s able t o discover and describe many o f the assumptions the author o f that t e x t made concerning h i s or her intended reader and the t o p i c o f the discourse. Wilbur P icker ing t reat s c o l l a t e r a l under the heading o f PROMINENCE. He begins by saying, "we can only perceive something i f i t stands out from i t s background" (1979:40), and that there seems t o be a problem o f terminology i n l i n g u i s t i c s w i t h regard to PROMINENCE. Some l i n g u i s t s use the terms " t o p i c " , " focus" , "theme", and "emphasis" i n the l i n g u i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e wi th broad ranges o f overlap and confusion. He chooses to use the use o f PROMINENCE offered by Kathleen Callow (1974). She w r i t e s : The term prominence. . .refers t o any device which gives c e r t a i n events, pa r t i c ipant s , or objects more s ign i f i cance than others i n the same context (p.50). In l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s , i t i s recognized that the feature o f STRATEGY i s a l so important. STRATEGY, according t o P i c k e r i n g , r e f l e c t s "a basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f communication and o f most human behavior: i t has a purpose" (1979:70). This comment re la te s to an assumption made by most discourse l i n g u i s t s ; namely, a speaker or author ought t o fo l low the Gricean Cooperative P r i n c i p l e . That i s t o say, a speaker or author ought to t r y t o be meaningful i n h i s or communication. Writers l i k e Gr ice (1975), Gordon and Lakoff (1975), and Sadock (1978), have been concerned w i t h the not ion o f conversational impl icature , o r , the way that hearers can conclude a 131 l o t o f i m p l i c i t information on the basis o f what a speaker says. George Huttar (1982), gives the fo l lowing example to i l l u s t r a t e a treatment o f conversational impl ica ture . A : I 'm out o f gas. B: There's a garage around the corner. Huttar argues that , because garages are thought by members o f A ' s and B's cu l ture t o be places where you can get gas where you need i t , the above p a i r o f utterances "hang together" . I f B d i d not be l ieve that , he might be g u i l t y o f ignoring G r i c e ' s maxim: 'Be Relevant ' . STRATEGY re la te s t o the use o f c o l l a t e r a l information i n discourse i n that c o l l a t e r a l has to do w i t h the s p e c i f i c s e l ec t ion o f information i n a narra t ive about what d i d not happen, which i s influenced by such factors as the speaker's judgment as t o what knowledge h i s or her hearer ' s share, the t o p i c o f the narra t ive , and what the speaker i s t r y i n g to communicate. These considerations begin to pay some a t tent ion t o the ethnographic dimension i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse ana lys i s , an area which, I sa id e a r l i e r , i s p a i n f u l l y missing frcm l i n g u i s t i c discourse s tudies . Even when attempting t o attend to the ethnographic dimension, then, discourse l i n g u i s t s are usua l ly bound by edited t e x t s . Wri t ten , edited texts have recognized conventions that d i s t i n g u i s h them from conversation. Thus, i n w r i t t e n texts there w i l l necessar i ly be a d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n between the two. For example, Martha Duff (1973) describes contrast ive features o f w r i t t e n and o r a l t e x t s . She w r i t e s : A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c feature of the w r i t t e n t e x t i s that i t shows c learer organizat ion than the o r a l t e x t . This i s because the author has had 132 time to plan the development of the story which results in the lack of...hesitation words...and abnormal ordering of words and sentences due to afterthought (p. 2). I said earlier that there is an ethnography of writing as surely as there is an ethnography of speaking, but that linguistic discourse analysis has tended to neglect ethnographic considerations in written texts. The discourse linguist Pickering formulates this problem in linguistic discourse analysis very succinctly. While I insist that situation and culture are part of the prior context upon which given in-formation [in a narrative] may be based, I freely confess that I do not know how to handle i t (1979:170). And this is the crux of the matter in linguistic discourse analysis and in its treatment of a feature such as COLLATERAL: the recognition of the lack of the contextual factor, but not knowing how to handle i t . Pickering concludes: I am entering a plea that more linguists rec-ognize both the legitimacy and necessity of grappling with the role of situation and culture in discourse analysis (1979:170). A CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS TREATMENT OF COLLATERAL In linguistic discourse analysis there seems to be a notion that narratives can be analyzed as i f they were self-contained speech units. Lacking in the discourse literature on narrative is a consideration of why people would want to generate a narrative in the 133 f i r s t place. This is not a small matter, for without such a consideration the discourse analyst lacks a theory of conversation which would lead one to make the ethnographic connection between the social function of telling about past experiences with the purpose(s) of members engaged in conversational interaction. Certainly narratives in live conversation cannot be adequately analyzed without taking into account the f i t between the generated narrative and the conversation in which i t is embedded. In conversational analysis, our understanding of narrative structures is expanded by making the connection between narratives and the surrounding conversation via the use of social identities. The issue of social identity is important in sociology. In the last chapter I said that any one person can have a number of social identities that can be applied to that person at any one time. For example, someone could be identified as a "wife", "lawyer", "the lady next door", "neighbor", or whatever, and that the related-ness between identity categories that 'go together', e.g. "employer-employee", is a major interactional resource in the construction and sustaining of social order. In relation to narratives told in live conversation, they are more than mere displays of verbal s k i l l . Rather, narratives can be used in a number of interactional ways, e.g. presenting oneself as a certain kind of person, offering advice, and so on. In examining my materials i t became noticeable that in many stories the storyteller not only tells about the events which transpired, the course-of-action, but they also t e l l about what did not happen, which is referred to by discourse linguists as COLLATERAL, embedded in the course-of-action sequence. As my point of departure, 1 3 4 consider the fo l lowing . (1-2) Louise : One night (1.0) I was w i t h t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t , an uhh (3.0) we had come back from the show, we had gone t o the Ash Grove for awhile 'n we were gonna park. An' I can ' t stand a car , ' n he has a small car Ken: Mm hm Louise : So we walked t o the back, ' n we jus t went i n t o the back house 'n we stayed there h a l f the night (1.0) we d i d n ' t go to bed w i t h each other but , i t was so comfortable ' n so n ice Ken: Mm hm Louise : Y'know? there ' s everything perfect Note i n the above sequence that Louise brings the s tory r e c i p i e n t , Ken, t o a point o f dec i s ion i n the course-of-action sequence a t which po int p o s s i b i l i t i e s are invest igated which set apart what a c t u a l l y happened frcm what might have happened. She does t h i s twice i n the s tory , " ' n we were gonna park" , and, "we d i d n ' t go to bed w i t h each o ther " . Further , we can see from the t r a n s c r i p t how inc lud ing t h i s c o l l a t e r a l information i n the narrat ive may p r e d i c t actions that might or might not take place l a t e r on i n the s tory . That k i n d o f organizat ion has the e f fect o f s e t t ing up a l ternat ives t o what eventual ly gets t o be done. As l i n g u i s t i c discourse studies have shown, a t a po int i n a s tory where the s t o r y t e l l e r includes c o l l a t e r a l information, the fact that 'what d i d not happen' i s mentioned makes 'what happened' i n a s tory stand out . In 1-2, Louise would be t e l l i n g a d i f f e ren t k i n d of s tory i f she had not included c o l l a t e r a l 135 information i n her nar ra t ive . The fo l lowing i s Louise ' s s tory without the c o l l a t e r a l information. Louise : One night I was w i t h t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t , an uhh we had come back frcm the show, we had gone t o the Ash Grove for awhile, so we walked back to the house, an' we ju s t stayed i n the back house h a l f the n i g h t . I t was so comfortable ' n so n i c e . By inc lud ing c o l l a t e r a l information and t e l l i n g about 'what d i d n ' t happen', a s t o r y t e l l e r may re l a t e non-events t o course-of-ac t ion events, the prov i s ion o f such non-event a l ternat ives heightening some s i g n i f i c a n t aspect o f 'what happened'. There's some work being done i n 1-2 by t e l l i n g about what d i d n ' t happen as a prelude t o what d i d . And we can see that the s tory sounds qui te a b i t d i f f e r e n t without those a l t e r n a t ive s . Comparing the t r a n s c r i p t w i t h the hypothet ica l t r a n s c r i p t above, i t ' s as i f Louise comes across as two d i f f e r e n t kinds o f people. Further, i t ' s not l i k e provid ing grounds for merely not doing something, i . e . "We were gonna take our car t o the Cubs game but i t was snowing so we ended up taking the bus" . What k i n d o f work gets done then? To t h i s end I analyze the fo l lowing s tor ie s i n order t o demonstrate and describe the nature o f a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s assessment o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s on di sc losure s t o r y t e l l i n g occasions, a f ter which I s p e l l out i n some d e t a i l a t e l l e r procedure for inc lud ing c o l l a t e r a l information i n a narrat ive as a means o f assessing a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s . (IX-1) B: When do you p lay t h i s week? 136 A : We're sposed t o p lay Doherty's Thursday and then Saturday i t ' s Ginger 's Sexy Sauna B: They have a team? A : Yeah, but i t must be made up of c l i e n t s — there ' s , I doubt there ' s any guys working there B: Yeah A : Man, I wonder what goes on i n one of those places? B: Yeah, I went to one once c A : Nboooooool [ B: Yeah, i t wasn't my idea , I was w i t h a guy from work 'n we went out for a few beers ' n , I dunno, we decided t o go see a movie, but we passed t h i s massage place ' n he sa id he always wanted t o t r y one so I ended up going w i t h him. I know i t was wrong but I A : So what was i t l i k e ? B: I t was no b i g deal r e a l l y , t h i s g i r l came i n wearin' cutof f s but no top and proceeded t o give me the treatment, the f u l l treatment, C A : I th ink I ' d be too embarrassed t o go t o one o f those places B: Yeah, i t was d i f f e r e n t , I wouldn't do i t again A : I heard Ginger 's i s gonna have to c lose down because o f i t s l o c a t i o n . . . (1-2) Louise : One night (1.0) I was w i t h t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t , an' uhhh (3.0) we had come back from the show, we had gone t o the Ash Grove for awhile , ' n we were gonna park. An' I can ' t stand a car , ' n he has a small car Ken: Mm hm Louise : So we walked t o the back, ' n we jus t went i n t o the back house ' n we stayed 137 there h a l f the night (1.0) we d i d n ' t go t o bed w i t h each other but , i t was so comfortable and so nice Ken: Mm hm Louise : Y'know, there ' s everything perfect Some s tor ie s t o l d i n conversation involve r i s k - t a k i n g , and there are ways o f deal ing w i t h ' r i s k ' . I sa id e a r l i e r that s tor ie s containing r i s k - t a k i n g sequences help us to better grasp the a n a l y t i c a l issues being discussed i n t h i s chapter. One problem for s t o r y t e l l e r s on c e r t a i n s t o r y t e l l i n g occasions i s not necessar i ly that the s tory r e c i p i e n t may openly express shock or dismay i n the response sequence or that the r e c i p i e n t may go away and t e l l someone e l se , but that an i n t e r a c t i o n a l trouble may a r i s e . Thus, any k i n d o f s t o r y t e l l e r 'defense' on such occasions which i s b u i l t i n t o the structure o f the s tory as par t o f the t e l l i n g sequence i s d i rec ted t o 2 the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d i spre f erred response a t s tory end. We may characterize the t e l l e r ' s defensive posture i n the structure o f a narra t ive which contains some r i s k - t a k i n g as being oriented t o the short-term i n t e r a c t i o n a l concern. The danger o f inc luding ' r i s k y ' information i n a narra t ive l i e s not only i n the p o s s i b i l i t y o f changes i n the t e l l e r - r e c i p i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p , reputat ion, gossip, and so on, 3 but i n the poss ib le col lapse o f the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . How i s the i n t e r a c t i o n sustained and protected on such occasions? What methods are ava i l ab le t o a s t o r y t e l l e r for defusing a poss ible dispreferred r e c i p i e n t response at s tory end by attending t o that p o s s i b i l i t y i n the t e l l i n g sequence? 138 ALTERNATIVE ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES In analyzing the above t r ansc r ip t s note that the sorts o f re l a t ionsh ips between t e l l i n g about 'what happened' and t e l l i n g about 'what d i d n ' t happen' are a n a l y t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g . Appreciat ion for these re la t ionships becomes apparent by taking note o f what i s happening i n these s t o r i e s . F i r s t , i n both s tor ie s the s t o r y t e l l e r s are recounting rather personal experiences. They are somewhat dangerous sequences. Second, i n both s tor ie s the s t o r y t e l l e r i s impl icated as a p r i n c i p a l character. F i n a l l y , i t can be observed that each s tory d i sp lays a re l a ted t o p i c a l o r i en ta t ion , namely, t o events of a sexual nature. Further, by t e l l i n g t h e i r s to r i e s the s t o r y t e l l e r s are opening themselves up to poss ible conversational troubles i n r e l a t i o n to sustaining and protect ing the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . Reca l l that i n t h i s chapter I am seeking to locate and describe how s t o r y t e l l e r s may employ c o l l a t e r a l information i n t h e i r narrat ives i n order t o solve the problem o f how someone t e l l i n g a d i sc losure s tory or ient s t o the ' r i s k y ' nature o f the s tory so as t o transform the r e s u l t s o f that o r i e n t a t i o n i n t o the work o f e l i c i t i n g a preferred response frcm the s tory r e c i p i e n t , thus sustaining and protec t ing the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . Implied i n the formulated problem i s the beginning o f a recommendation as t o how t o begin t o search for a s o l u t i o n . One k i n d o f obvious feature o f the s tor i e s I invest igate i n t h i s chapter i s that the s t o r y t e l l e r includes c o l l a t e r a l information i n the narra t ive , which t e l l s about what d i d not happen during the recounting o f the course-of-act ion, which t e l l s about what d i d happen. Let us note 1 3 9 these cases. (IX-1) B: I was w i t h t h i s guy from work ' n we went out for a few beers ' n , I dunno, we decided t o go t o a movie but we passed t h i s [STORY] (1-2) Louise : One night (1.0) I was w i t h t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t an' uhh (3.0) we had come back from the show, we had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile, 'n we were gonna p a r k . . . Louise : . . . ' n we stayed there h a l f the night (1.0) we d i d n ' t go to bed w i t h each other but , i t was so comfortable . . . From the above s tory fragments we may note that i n some s tor ie s the s t o r y t e l l e r may choose t o t e l l about 'what d i d n ' t happen'. We may begin t o see the import o f t h i s observation by n o t i c i n g that i n many s tor ie s the s t o r y t e l l e r may t e l l exc lu s ive ly about 'what d i d happen'. Reca l l that the s tor i e s i n the l a s t chapter, for the most part , d i d not contain c o l l a t e r a l information. We have i t ava i lab le t o see, then, that someone involved i n t e l l i n g a s tory may or may not choose t o t e l l about what d i d not happen. In the case o f the former we might ask: why would someone i n the midst o f t e l l i n g a s tory t e l l about something that d i d not happen? What kinds o f i n t e r a c t i o n a l work get done when a s t o r y t e l l e r t e l l s about what d i d not happen? How can there be a place i n a s tory for something that d i d n ' t happen? A f t e r a l l , conversations are f u l l o f people t e l l i n g about what they d i d or what happened t o them. I t r u s t that these pre l iminary questions w i l l 140 lead us t o deeper i ssues . Up t o t h i s po int I have suggested sinrply that i t i s not unusual t o f i n d instances o f s t o r y t e l l i n g i n conversation i n which the t e l l e r includes c o l l a t e r a l information and t e l l s about something that d i d not take p lace . A more important observation, however, and one that Sacks made c l e a r i n h i s o r i g i n a l analys is o f Louise ' s s tory i n h i s l ec tures , i s that not only i s 'what d i d n ' t happen' t o l d about i n some instances, but t h i s recounting o f 'what d i d n ' t happen' i s pos i t ioned i n the s tor ie s i n my mater ia l s as a l t e rna t ive t o what d i d happen, so that t h i s c o l l a t e r a l information i s presented as a re jected a l t e r n a t i v e . In pursuing t h i s observation we may f i r s t note that i n "Tact ics for Determining Persons' Resources for Depict ing , Contr iv ing , and Describing Behavioral Episodes" (1972), Sheldon Twer invest igates how people make sense out o f observable s ights i n which other people are apparently a c t i v e . He presents an example from natura l conversation which demonstrates how c e r t a i n occurrences d i sp lay that an a c t i v i t y can ind ica te i t s own nature, what k i n d o f a c t i v i t y i t i s , or iented t o an observational 'problem': how do people go about making sense o f a witnessed a c t i v i t y ? He presents the fo l lowing conversational fragment which gives us an idea o f the k i n d o f work people must be assumed to engage i n i n order t o 'make sense' o f an everyday a c t i v i t y . The people i n the conversation are involved i n making sense o f a cartoon. (Twer: 4.57-4.62) M: huh oh i n t h i s eh ( ( w h i s p e r s ) ) . . . i n t h i s eh car icature there ' s—there ' s t h i s troop uh o f Boy Scouts—uh there ' s four o f them and t h e i r scoutmaster and what i t i s i t ' s a paper dr ive C: Mhmm 141 M: An hehehe the funny th ing about i t i s that they ' re a l l i n back o f the ah the truck w i t h a l l the magazines and uh he ' s ( ) C: en a l l M: the s t u f f and instead o f working they ' re huh reading comics What Twer gets at i n t h i s example i s a s tructure which he refers to as 'Instead o f A, B ' , which we w i l l characterize as 'assessing a l t e r n a t i v e s ' . He goes on t o note that the terms 'working' and 'reading' occupy pos i t ions A and B i n the utterance. These pos i t ions are structured by the ' instead o f as i n 'Instead o f A ' , A being f i l l e d by a c las s o f poss ib le a c t i v i t i e s , B being f i l l e d by a c las s o f act iv i t ies which may be seen as a l te rnat ives t o the a c t i v i t i e s i n c lass A . Not only do they stand as a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s but they can a l so stand together. That i s , i t seems reasonable t o suggest that the A and B a c t i v i t i e s chosen by M i n Twer's example shows that things can be c l a s s i f i e d together, that names o f a c t i v i t i e s can be c l a s s i f i e d as a group, one feature being that they can stand as a l te rnat ives i n the 'Instead o f A, B' s t ructure . He w r i t e s : People ho ld expectations that persons en-gaged i n i n t e r a c t i o n are constantly n o t i c -i n g , f i g u r i n g out observables, and perform-ing act ions that are i n accord w i t h what they ' see ' . Cer ta in occurrences demonstrate that a behaviour can ind ica te that i t s [ s i c ] behavior or iented t o an observation 'problem' whose nature and so lu t ion are at l eas t i n -fer e n t i a l l y ava i l ab le to witnesses o f the behaviour (1972:342). po int for the reader t o not ice here i s that people who t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n conversational i n t e r a c t i o n , such as The describe 142 happens i n s t o r y t e l l i n g s i tua t ions , have c r i t e r i a for choosing one a c t i o n rather than another ac t ion , or one ac t ion as an a l t e rna t ive t o another a c t i o n . Furthermore, actions can be made t o belong where they occur i n descr ip t ions . Twer refers t o these pos i t ions o f descr ipt ions as ' a c t ion spots' and suggests that people descr ibing t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s can know, f i n d , o r suggest provis ions for that a c t i v i t y ' s occurrence. These ' ac t ion spots' are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y f i l l e d by things that 'have happened'. Twer attempts t o describe some f a c i l i t i e s people have for descr ibing an a c t i v i t y and at l ea s t p a r t i a l l y knowing what the descr ip t ion w i l l t e l l , how i t w i l l inform, and what i t w i l l 'mean' to a r e c i p i e n t . In that Twer's i n t e r e s t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned w i t h occasions i n which people t a l k about 'behavioral episodes' , there i s a na tura l r e l a t i o n t o conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g as one such occasion. He proposes that the analys i s o f such descr ipt ions permits a formulation of a set o f features o f behaviour that people apparently attend t o when they t r y t o 'make sense' o f such descr ip t ions . With the above comments i n mind, l e t us re turn t o Louise ' s s tory i n 1-2. We have i t ava i l ab le t o see that Louise uses a v a r i a t i o n o f Twer's assessment o f a l te rnat ives s tructure (Instead o f A, B ) . Note, f i r s t , that , i n t u i t i v e l y , other choices o f a c t i v i t i e s for A, what d i d not happen, would not make the same k i n d of sense as ' p a r k i n g ' . That i s , the A choice o f 'parking ' i s not merely chosen a t random but i s chosen as an a l t e rna t ive t o what ended up get t ing done, 'going t o the back house' . Implied here i s the not ion that when someone uses such a s tructure there e x i s t some k i n d o f c r i t e r i a for choosing one a c t i v i t y 143 as an a l t e rna t ive t o another. Twer refers to B, 'what i s being done', as an ' a c t i o n spot ' . For example, to answer the question, 'What are they doing?' the not ion o f 'doing' which i s invoked i n the above examples from natura l conversation provides us wi th materia ls for beginning t o search for a so lu t ion t o the 'problem' I formulated e a r l i e r . How so? In the mater ia l s I am drawing from i n t h i s chapter, 1-2 and IX-1 , one a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t y i s accepted and another re jected . The reader has i t ava i l ab le to see that a s tructure s i m i l a r t o Twer's 'Instead o f A, B' s tructure i s being employed, w i t h an add i t iona l cons t ra in t . In 1-2 and IX-1 , the constra int provides for the quest ion: why i s an a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t y presented? In 1-2 and IX-1 , a l te rnat ives are assessed. Not only are a l te rna t ives assessed a t the time o f the event but they are reported as assessed a t the time o f the t e l l i n g . In h i s l ec tures . Sacks maintained that i f an event i s a l t e rna t ive t o another that does not necessar i ly mean that the other i s a l t e rna t ive t o i t . That i s , whi le Louise i n 1-2 reports 'going t o the back house' as a l t e rna t ive t o ' p a r k i n g ' , and B i n IX-1 reports going to a massage parlour as a l t e rna t ive t o going t o a movie, i f Louise had gone 'parking ' and B and the guy he was w i t h had gone t o a movie, i t would indeed have been odd t o report that these a c t i v i t i e s were done as a l te rnat ives to 'going t o the back house' and 'going to a massage p a r l o u r ' . And t h i s i s the crux o f the matter. Contained w i t h i n t h i s observation i s a p o t e n t i a l so lu t ion t o the formulated 'problem', and w i t h i t we w i l l be able to begin to t echnica l i ze some o f the i n t e r a c t i o n a l work which gets done when a s t o r y t e l l e r includes c o l l a t e r a l information i n h i s or her s tory . 144 Let us f i r s t suppose that i n 1-2 and IX-1 the s t o r y t e l l e r s had not included c o l l a t e r a l information, that i s , l e f t out the parts about 'what d i d n ' t happen'. Then i t would be ava i l ab le for the respective s tory rec ip ient s t o in te rpre t the s tor i e s as s tor ie s about how the s t o r y t e l l e r s are the k i n d o f people who would normally do what they were t e l l i n g about. Louise, fo r example, could be viewed as the k ind o f teenager who would normally use an unchaperoned house i n order t o engage i n sexual a c t i v i t i e s . Both Louise and Ken are seventeen years o l d . In 1-2, then w i t h the i n c l u s i o n o f 'what d i d n ' t happen' Louise contributes a defensive design to her s tory about going t o an unchaperoned house w i t h her boyfr iend. As Sacks noted i n h i s ana lys i s , Louise can ant ic ipa te that Ken might think o f her as the k i n d o f g i r l who might normally p a r t i c i p a t e i n an adul t sexual s i t u a t i o n . Af te r a l l , t h a t ' s what makes the story k i n d o f ' r i s k y ' i n the f i r s t p lace , that the normal place for teenagers t o negotiate sex ( i . e . a ca r ) , was abandoned i n favor o f an adult p lace . Thus Louise makes sure she attends to the defensive design o f her s tory i n order to inform Ken that 'what happened' was spontaneous and unplanned and not something she would normally and regu la r ly do. Further , the sexual aspect o f the a c t i v i t y i s somewhat minimized i n that she was w i t h " t h i s guy that I l i k e d a r e a l l o t " . That i s perhaps a l o t d i f f e r e n t than formulating him as "a guy I know" or "a f r i e n d " or " t h i s guy", which would make i t ava i l ab le for Ken to th ink that she i s n ' t choosy about who she engages i n sexual s i tua t ions w i t h . As i t i s , the way Louise pos i t ions 'what d i d n ' t happen' she makes i t c l ea r to Ken that she would normally u t i l i z e the normal place for teenagers to negotiate sex, i n a parked car , but that due t o extenuating 145 circumstances t h i s one time she happened t o have abandoned the normal place for teenagers t o negotiate sex and opted for an ' adu l t ' p lace . By t e l l i n g about 'what d i d n ' t happen', then, she informs the s tory r e c i p i e n t that a l t e rna t ives were assessed, thus providing r e c i p i e n t w i t h resources for in te rpre t ing her act ions as being something she would not normally do, and t h i s work gets done by o r i e n t i n g to l o c a l teenage standards. Furthermore, the reader has i t ava i l ab le t o not ice i n the t r a n s c r i p t of 1-2 that Louise t e l l s about another a c t i v i t y that ' d i d n ' t happen', another piece o f c o l l a t e r a l information. Having t o l d about going to "the back house", she goes on to say, "we d i d n ' t go t o bed w i t h each other" , another instance o f the use o f c o l l a t e r a l information which Louise feels needs t o be made e x p l i c i t . Ken could, a f ter a l l , assume that they had gone t o bed except for Louise ' s statement t o the contrary. I f Louise had not included t h i s instance o f 'what d i d n ' t happen', Ken might have thought, " I f she would do that , what e lse would she do?" In e f fec t , Louise knows that what she i s t e l l i n g about may be considered t o be somewhat abnormal behaviour for a teenager for reasons we examined e a r l i e r . Thus, she embeds i n her recounting o f 'what happened' two instances o f c o l l a t e r a l information, that i s , 'what d i d n ' t happen'. What we have, then, are some technica l resources put i n t o operation i n order to i s o l a t e a p a r t i c u l a r occurrence o f 'abnormal' behaviour by teenage standards, e .g . that sexual a c t i v i t y was negotiated i n an abnormal place for teenagers. These resources provide the s tory r e c i p i e n t w i t h a rather sharp s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f what k inds o f terms Louise has for such a pro jec t , that by her having gone t o 'the back house' for engaging i n 146 sexual a c t i v i t y , yet not going t o bed w i t h her boyfr iend, and that they had o r i g i n a l l y considered employing the normal place for teenagers t o negotiate sex—in a parked ca r . These resources, too, lend c r e d i b i l i t y to Louise ' s defensive design t o her s tory i n that , by t e l l i n g about 'what d i d n ' t happen', she can perhaps ward o f f any negative r e c i p i e n t inferences which could be drawn from the s p e c i f i c event that she i s t e l l i n g about. As a prelude to the next sec t ion , l e t us now render B's s tory i n IX-1 as problematic by imagining what h i s s tory would be l i k e i f he had l e f t out 'what d i d n ' t happen', an assessment o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s , a dec i s ion t o abandon one pro jec t i n favor of another. The f i r s t th ing we may note i s that A would have i t ava i l ab le to assume that attending a massage par lour i s not necessar i ly an unusual a c t i v i t y for B t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n . That ' s one k i n d o f way that A could 'make sense' o f B's s tory . We can begin t o j u s t i f y t h i s observation by consult ing Turner and Sharrock (1978). They w r i t e : One o f the fates o f s t o r i e s . . . i s that t h e i r r ec ip ient s may perform transforms on them, e i t h e r i n r e t e l l i n g s or ' i n -t e r p r e t i v e l y ' , that i s , i n f i gur ing out for themselves the sense o f what they have been t o l d (p. 187). and, We assume nevertheless the p o s s i b i l i t y o f transforms constra in t e l l e r s and that they may employ devices intended to con-s t r a i n the reworkings that t h e i r t e l l i n g s may undergo (p. 187). In t h i s chapter I am seeking t o locate and describe one o f those 'devices ' ava i l ab le to s t o r y t e l l e r s to d i r e c t a r e c i p i e n t ' s 147 interpretive work, the recipient's 'making sense' of what happened in the story and what the story is about. In IX-1, for example, by telling about 'what didn't happen', B instructs A via the temporal organization of the story that there was a rejected alternative to 'what happened'. Then, one constraint placed on a recipient's interpretive work is that the recipient has no available resources for interpreting 'what happened' as something that is normal for the storyteller. On the contrary, by employing the assessment of alternatives device, the recipient is clearly instructed to interpret 'what happened' as something distinctly unusual and not something that the storyteller would normally do. ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT AS AN INTERACTIONAL RESOURCE Thus far I have noted that storytellers sometimes include collateral information in their narratives, telling about 'what didn't happen' as alternative to something that did happen. However, the other, i f i t happens, would generally not be presented as an alternative to the f i r s t . In 1-2, Louise presents 'parking' as a rejected alternative and 'going to the back house' as an alternative which f i l l s the 'action spot' in her story. In IX-1 B presents 'going to a movie' as a rejected alternative and 'going to a massage parlour' as an alternative which f i l l s the 'action spot' in B's story. Both 'going to the back house' and 'going to a massage parlour' are accepted alternatives. Our question becomes: what interactional work is getting done by the storytellers' alternative activity assessments? In 1-2, what i t was Louise and her boyfriend eventually got to 148 do, they d i d by being somehow d i v e r t e d br d e r a i l e d from a prescribed course o f a c t i v i t y , the category-bound a c t i v i t y o f 'parking', that would have been a nat u r a l course o f a c t i v i t y f o r teenagers t o take. What they u l t i m a t e l y d i d , which i s what makes f o r the 'risky' status o f Louise' s story, was something tha t came about by v i r t u e o f t h e i r being d e r a i l e d from something e l s e . A 'natural' course o f a c t i v i t y was proposed, 'parking', i n the proper sequential s l o t , a f t e r having gone t o a movie on a date, and that p r o j e c t gets d e r a i l e d . The p r o j e c t o f negotiating sex had already been oriented t o by Louise and her boyfriend, "'n we were gonna park". One feature o f Louise's a c t i v i t y assessment which we want t o pay c l o s e r a t t e n t i o n t o i s i t s spontaneous nature. There i s an innocence implied i n Louise's a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i v i t y assessment, an innocence l i n k e d with the spontaneous nature o f what she and her boyfriend ended up doing. I s a i d e a r l i e r t h a t Louise's d i s l i k e f o r parking i n a 'small car' gen e r a l l y would not have been s u f f i c i e n t reason t o d e r a i l them from t h e i r p r o j e c t o f negotiating sex, except that i t turns out there i s another way t o go about completing the project, an a l t e r n a t i v e l o c a t i o n . Further, the status o f such a p r o j e c t would not normally be del i m i t e d except under severe and extenuating circumstances. A f t e r a l l , i n our s o c i e t y we can count on the ingenuity o f teenagers who wish t o explore t h e i r s e x u a l i t y . I t j u s t so happens that i n our cul t u r e a car i s gene r a l l y the most a c c e s s i b l e l o c a t i o n f o r teenagers t o negotiate sex. That i s not t o say that a sweeping c l a i m may be made such as: A l l teenagers w i l l always f i n d a place t o negotiate sex. I t i s t o say, however, that f o r those involved i n the exploration o f sexual intimacies together, the teenager u s u a l l y has a 'problem': 149 where t o do i t so as not t o get 'caught'? We take i t that i t i s jus t such a considerat ion, the fear o f ' ge t t ing caught', which has contributed t o the a c t i v i t y o f 'parking' becoming a category-bound a c t i v i t y among teenagers. Another considerat ion i s that a feature such as spontaneity i n the course-of-act ion sequence i n a s tory can imply an innocence, e .g . ' I d i d n ' t th ink about i t beforehand, I ju s t d i d i t ' . In 1-2, the story r e c i p i e n t could sure ly r e l a t e to that spontaneous g i v i n g - i n t o i n t e r n a l impulse, t o temptation, i n l i g h t o f the circumstances. C e r t a i n l y i t would seem odd t o consider abandonment o f the pro jec t as a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e . Given the ava i l ab le a l te rnat ives i t would seem reasonable to another teenager to choose the a l t e rna t ive o f an unchaperoned house for furthering the ongoing p ro j ec t . Further , the a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t y i s presented as having been ' succes s fu l ' , " i t was so comfortable, ' n so n i c e " . In IX-1 a s i m i l a r s tructure can be located by which B presents 'going to a massage par lour ' as an a l t e rna t ive t o 'going to a movie ' . This 'assessment of a l t e rna t ive s ' s tructure in s t ruc t s A t o see that the 'B ' a c t i v i t y was a spontaneous, unplanned a l t e rna t ive t o the ' A ' a c t i v i t y . A f t e r a l l , B could have t o l d about how a f te r work he went w i t h a guy from work for a couple o f beers and then went t o the massage par lour . And depending on who he ' s t e l l i n g the s tory t o , i t would not necessar i ly be a r i s k y s tory . I f he were t o t e l l the story t o , say, another guy at work i t could be something l i k e a 'bragging' s tory . What clues the s t o r y t e l l e r and analyst a l i k e that i t i s a narra t ive which contains r i s k y information i s the way the r e c i p i e n t d i sp lays that i t i s a r i s k y sequence by i n t e r j e c t i o n s throughout the 150 t e l l i n g and the response sequence. By using the 'assessing a l t e r n a t i v e s ' s t ructure , then, a s t o r y t e l l e r can i n s t r u c t a s tory r e c i p i e n t that what happened occurred as an a l t e rna t ive t o 'what d i d n ' t happen'. The structure provides for the r e c i p i e n t t o see that a l t e rna t ives were assessed. I t would, a f te r a l l , be qui te a d i f f e rent s tory i f B had sa id something l i k e , 'The guy I was w i t h wanted to go to a movie but I t a lked him i n t o going t o a massage parlour i n s t e a d ' . As i t i s , B i n s t r u c t s A to see that one a l t e rna t ive was re jected and another accepted. One th ing B makes c lear by employing the structure i s that i t was not a common prac t i ce to leave work, have a couple o f beers and then head for the massage par lour , jus t as Louise in s t ruc t s Ken i n 1-2 to see that her 'going to the back house' w i t h her boyfriend was not her 'normal' l oca t ion for negotiat ing sex. The reader has i t ava i l ab le t o not i ce , further , a re l a ted feature o f B 's defensive design, where B says, "we had a few beers" . Surely the s tory r e c i p i e n t has i t ava i l ab le t o o r i e n t to such a statement t o i n f e r that what one does a f ter a "few beers" (with poss ib le a l c o h o l i c impairment o f judgment), might not be something one would normally do. The statement, then, "we had a few beers" , a l so has some power, e spec i a l ly when combined w i t h the work that i s done by t e l l i n g about 'what d i d n ' t happen'. In a general sense I have confined my interes t s i n t h i s chapter t o one poss ib le feature o f narrat ives ; the assessment o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s i n a spec i f i ed s t o r y t e l l i n g environment as par t o f a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s defensive design. The r i s k or iented t o i n both 1-2 and IX-1 has to do w i t h the s t o r y t e l l e r engaging i n a questionable 151 a c t i v i t y , 'questionable' according to standards or iented to by s t o r y t e l l e r and story r e c i p i e n t . I have b u i l t upon a general procedure, o r i g i n a l l y located by Sacks i n h i s lec tures , employable by a s t o r y t e l l e r for b u i l d i n g a defensive design i n t o the t e l l i n g sequence: t e l l about 'what d i d n ' t happen' p r i o r t o 'what d i d happen'. This general procedure provides for the story r e c i p i e n t t o see the re jected a l t e r n a t i v e as a 'normal' a c t i v i t y and the accepted a l t e rna t ive as the 'abnormal' a c t i v i t y . A c o r o l l a r y t o t h i s procedure i s : i f one hears a volunteered r i s k y s tory containing an assessment of a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s , where that assessment d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between 'normal' and 'abnormal' a c t i v i t i e s , then hear that assessment as c o n s t i t u t i n g a t l ea s t par t o f the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s defensive posture. One way that one can get t h i s work done i s by informing the s tory r e c i p i e n t that a l t e rna t ives were concertedly assessed and that i t was a conscious dec i s ion leading to the achievement of the o r i g i n a l p ro j ec t . In 1-2, for example, the a c t i v i t y o f negotiat ing sex was not abandoned, only that one loca t ion was chosen over another. I t was that a l t e rna t ive l o c a t i o n which was 'abnormal' for a teenager. One o f the consequences o f inc lud ing c o l l a t e r a l information i n a narrat ive i s that the s t o r y t e l l e r can show, w i t h i n the t e l l i n g sequence, that 'what happened' was innocent and spontaneous and that the r e c i p i e n t ought not to make a b i g deal o f i t . In our society i t seems that people engaged i n i n t e r a c t i o n seek to create and susta in a comfortable environment for the i n t e r a c t i o n . As Goffman notes, "To conduct one's s e l f comfortably i n i n t e r a c t i o n and to be f lus tered are d i r e c t l y opposed" (1967:101). I noted e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter that rec ip ient s of s to r i e s ought t o do some work to 152 protect and susta in the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n when the i n t e r a c t i o n i s threatened. The s t o r y t e l l e r , too, ought to contribute to t h i s maintenance work. In our soc iety , t o be embarrassed or uncomfortable i n i n t e r a c t i o n may be seen by others as evidence o f weakness, moral g u i l t , or defeat. In s t o r y t e l l i n g s i tua t ions we have seen that r ec ip i en t s wish to avoid p lac ing people t e l l i n g d i sc losure s tor ie s i n that p o s i t i o n . Goffman w r i t e s : Poise plays an important r o l e i n communi-ca t ion , fo r i t guarantees that those present w i l l not f a i l t o p lay t h e i r parts i n i n t e r -ac t ion but w i l l continue as long as they are i n one another's presence (1967:104). Furthermore, Embarrassment has t o do w i t h u n f u l f i l l e d expectat ions . . .Given t h e i r s o c i a l i d e n t i t i e s and the s e t t i n g , . . . p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l sense what sor t o f conduct ought to be main-ta ined as the appropriate th ing (1967:105). Thus far I have suggested tha t , i n 1-2, the general pro jec t i s not abandoned and the assessment o f a l te rnat ives turns on such features as l o c a t i o n and manner. The 'assessing a l t e rna t ive s ' s tructure can a l so be employed by s t o r y t e l l e r s t o focus on pro ject abandonment i n favor o f a d i f f e rent p ro j ec t . In IX-1, the assessment o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s re la tes d i r e c t l y t o t h i s i s sue . One pro ject i s abandoned i n favor o f another pro jec t . In IX-1, the r i s k y nature o f B ' s s tory revolves around an o r i e n t a t i o n t o the abandoning o f one a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i v i t y i n favor o f another. In B's case, i t turns out that the accepted a l t e rna t ive i s considered to be 'abnormal' by A as seen i n h i s i n t e r j e c t i o n , 'Noooool' when B f i r s t begins to t e l l about 153 going t o a massage par lour . The employment o f the ' assessing a l t e r n a t i v e s ' s tructure by B w i t h i n the t e l l i n g sequence a f ter A ' s i n t e r j e c t i o n provides for the s tory r ec ip i en t t o see that the s t o r y t e l l e r i s a l igned w i t h the expectation that i t was something B should not have done, that those i n a given category should not only support a ca tegor ia l norm but should a l so r e a l i z e i t , and that the assessment o f a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s indicates that and how that r e a l i z a t i o n was temporari ly abandoned. The 'assessing a l t e r n a t i v e s ' s tructure employed w i t h i n the t e l l i n g sequence o f a s tory does the work o f pre f igur ing one poss ible r e c i p i e n t question i n such s i t u a t i o n s : what were the condit ions o f a v a i l a b i l i t y for the re jected a l t e rna t ive and the accepted a c t i v i t y ? One answer would be that the 'assessing a l t e rna t ive s ' s tructure can do the work of defusing a poss ib le d i spreferred r e c i p i e n t response a t s tory completion by pre f igur ing a r e c i p i e n t ' s response and answering before the response sequence the r e c i p i e n t ' s question o f how i t came to be that the s t o r y t e l l e r would engage i n an 'abnormal' or ' r i s k y ' a c t i v i t y . In IX-1, for example, i f B had t o l d a s tory about going t o a massage par lour i n which i t was displayed as a 'normal' a c t i v i t y for him to engage i n , he would be i s o l a t i n g himsel f as someone who would normally p a r t i c i p a t e i n an a c t i v i t y regarded by s tory r ec ip i en t as 'abnormal' . This i s perhaps the crux o f the matter. An a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t y assessment may turn on a concerted dec i s ion , where there i s a design t o ' what happened', or the assessment may i n s t r u c t the s tory r e c i p i e n t 6 of the for tu i tous nature o f the a c t i v i t y . The general procedure, then, makes i t ava i l ab le for the s t o r y t e l l e r t o ind ica te t o the s tory r e c i p i e n t that the s t o r y t e l l e r knows what i s a 'normal' a c t i v i t y , which can then be used t o s p e c i f i c a l l y locate 'what happened' i n the 154 s tory as something d i s t i n c t l y 'abnormal' and unusual. Now I want t o transact a k i n d o f a n a l y t i c a l s h i f t by seeking t o t e c h n i c a l i z e the inner workings o f the procedure located i n 1-2 and I X - 1 . F i r s t , r e c a l l that t h i s general procedure employed by s t o r y t e l l e r s for s t ruc tur ing assessments o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s takes on a conventional ly used frame: Instead o f A, B. Further, w i t h regard t o the a c t i v i t i e s i n the s tructure 'Instead o f A, B ' , I noted that the ' A ' s l o t i s f i l l e d by a c lass o f poss ible a c t i v i t i e s w i t h the 'B' s l o t f i l l e d by a c la s s o f a c t i v i t i e s which may be seen t o be a l t e rna t ive t o ' A ' . I t i s ava i l ab le t o anyone i n our soc iety to perceive an a c t i v i t y as occurring qui te i n c i d e n t a l l y , something happening alongside the unfolding course-of-action but not purposeful ly engineered t o a f fect the outcome o f the a c t i v i t y . In my mater ia l s the reader has i t ava i l ab le t o see that the a l t e rna t ive assessment i s formally re l a ted to a l t e rna t ive pro jects or t o a l t e rna t ive methodologies. In 1-2, for example, the pro jec t o f negotiat ing sex i s not abandoned but modif ied. Then the assessment operation assesses methodologies for successful achievement o f main pro j ec t s . That assessment a l so d i f f e ren t i a t e s s u b - a c t i v i t i e s as components o f an o r i g i n a l p ro j ec t . (1-2) Pro jec t : negot iat ing sex Al te rna t ive 1: parking A l t e r n a t i v e 2: using an unchaperoned house The a l t e rna t ive assessment i n 1-2 re la tes to a c lass of poss ible 155 locat ions rather than a c lass o f poss ib le pro jec t s . Note, too, that r e l a t i v e t o the pro ject there are designed aspects o f poss ib le a l t e r n a t i v e loca t ion choices . One example o f such design i s the concerted dec i s ion t o seek an a l t e rna t ive l o c a t i o n for completing the pro jec t o f negotiat ing sex. No h i n t of coercion i s spec i f i ed , and the accomplishment o f the pro ject i s based on a concerted dec i s ion as opposed t o being f o r t u i t o u s . In IX-1 , we see a d i f f e rent s tory contingency. The assessment o f a l te rnat ives re la te s d i r e c t l y t o projects rather than to loca t ions . Whereas i n 1-2 locat ions are assessed, i n IX-1 projects are assessed. (IX-1) Pro ject 1: going t o a movie Project 2: attending a massage par lour Note i n IX-1 the i m p l i c a t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e features not found i n 1-2. F i r s t , the i m p l i c a t i o n o f coercion, "So I ended up going w i t h h im" , as opposed t o being s t r i c t l y voluntary . Second, the for tu i tous nature o f the a r i s i n g o f Pro ject 2, "We passed t h i s massage p lace" , i n contrast w i t h the concerted dec i s ion i n 1-2, "So we walked to the back, ' n we ju s t went i n t o the back house". F i n a l l y , and the major di f ference between the two contingencies i n the s t o r i e s , the o r i g i n a l pro jec t i n IX-1 o f 'going to a movie' i s abandoned i n favor o f a d i f f e rent pro jec t a l together . In 1-2, we noticed that the o r i g i n a l pro jec t was never abandoned, only the o r i g i n a l l o c a t i o n . By e x p l i c a t i n g these features I have begun t o describe an organizat ion for assessing a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s i n narrat ives t o l d i n 156 conversation and the k i n d o f defensive work that gets done for a s t o r y t e l l e r i n r e l a t i o n to protect ing and sustaining a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s ' face ' as w e l l as the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . The general procedure o f incorporat ing c o l l a t e r a l information i n t o the t e l l i n g sequence of fers a poss ib le so lu t ion t o one s t o r y t e l l e r problem: how to inform story r e c i p i e n t that the s t o r y t e l l e r knows what i s a 'normal' a c t i v i t y , which can then be used to s p e c i f i c a l l y locate 'what happened' i n a s tory as something d i s t i n c t l y ' abnormal'. CONCLUSION In t h i s chapter I examine COLLATERAL information i n narra t ive discourse as treated i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analys i s followed by a conversational analys i s treatment. In the l i n g u i s t i c discourse treatment, i t seems that narrat ives are analyzed as se l f-contained uni t s rather than as a c t i v i t i e s embedded i n a natura l context, i . e . l i v e conversation. In my conversational analys is treatment o f COLLATERAL I make use o f s o c i a l i d e n t i t i e s and membership categories which t e s t i f y t o the fact that narrat ives and features o f narrat ives are s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s , and my analys i s stresses the s o c i a l nature o f narra t ives . The s igni f icance o f t h i s chapter re la tes to the in tegra t ion o f conversational analys i s w i t h the l i n g u i s t i c study o f c o l l a t e r a l information i n narrat ive discourse. I am claiming that there are discovery procedures i n conversational analys i s which can be e f f e c t i v e l y appl ied t o the study of narrat ive discourse. These 157 methodolcxgical procedures, characterized below, i l lumina te the issues w i t h which t h i s chapter began. I located and described instances from n a t u r a l l y occurring conversation where a s t o r y t e l l e r t e l l s not only about the events which t ranspired but a l so about what d i d not t r ansp i re . When a s t o r y t e l l e r t e l l s about 'what d i d n ' t happen' i n the t e l l i n g sequence (COLLATERAL), I i s o l a t e d those instances when c o l l a t e r a l information acts as an assessment o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s . I noted some s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences between a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s assessment o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s and Twer's 'Instead o f A c t i v i t y A, A c t i v i t y B' s t ructure . In b u i l d i n g upon and departing from Twer, I claimed that people descr ib ing past a c t i v i t i e s i n story form i n conversational i n t e r a c t i o n often give accounts for why one a c t i v i t y was chosen over another a c t i v i t y and that these accounts are re f l ec ted i n s t o r y t e l l e r s ' descr ipt ions o f what d i d and d i d not take p lace . This chapter o f fers several contr ibut ions t o the larger study o f discourse considerat ions . Perhaps the most b e n e f i c i a l contr ibut ion i s the i s o l a t i o n o f a l t e rna t ive assessment a c t i v i t y procedures as a group for spec ia l study. The discovery and descr ip t ion o f a l t e rna t ive assessment a c t i v i t y procedures provides the discourse analyst w i t h a category useful i n formal ana ly s i s . The second contr ibut ion o f t h i s chapter i s that , by i n d i c a t i n g various devices ava i l ab le t o s t o r y t e l l e r s for making assessments o f a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s i n narra t ives , a methodology i s offered for i d e n t i f y i n g a c t i v i t y assessments i n narra t ive discourse v i a const i tuent features. The methodology of fers a h e l p f u l s t a r t i n g po int 158 i n the analys i s of c o l l a t e r a l information and categories useful i n formal ana lys i s . T h i r d l y , t h i s chapter contributes to the sociology o f i n t e r a c t i o n by supporting a number o f Goffman's claims v i s - a - v i s ' facework' . From the t r ansc r ip t s I discovered a general procedure ava i l ab le t o people t e l l i n g s tor ie s for b u i l d i n g a defensive design i n t o the t e l l i n g sequence so as to protect and susta in that person's ' face' and the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . The general procedure re la tes t o a s t o r y t e l l e r t e l l i n g about assessing poss ib le a c t i v i t i e s , t e l l i n g about 'what d i d n ' t happen' p r i o r t o t e l l i n g about 'what happened'. I showed how t h i s procedure provides for a r ec ip i en t o f a s tory t o hear 'what d i d n ' t happen' as a recognizably 'normal' a c t i v i t y and 'what happened' as a recognizably 'abnormal' a c t i v i t y . I formulated a hearer ' s maxim i n r e l a t i o n to the procedure: i f you hear a s tory containing a descr ip t ion o f 'what d i d n ' t happen' ( c o l l a t e r a l information) p r i o r t o the t e l l i n g o f 'what happened', where the former i s a recognizably normal a c t i v i t y and the l a t t e r recognizably abnormal, then hear that assessment o f a l t e rna t ive a c t i v i t i e s as a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s attempt t o protect and sustain h i s or her ' f a c e ' . In the next chapter I examine pre-narrat ive sequencing i n l i v e conversation as a resource i n the generation o f a na r ra t ive . I use the same a n a l y t i c a l procedure as i s used t h i s chapter, f i r s t o f fe r ing a l i n g u i s t i c discourse treatment o f narrat ive sequencing concerns followed by a conversational analys i s treatment of the same phenomenon. 159 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 1 Sharrock and Turner (1978) w r i t e : One o f the fates o f s t o r i e s , narrat ives , and anecdotes i s that t h e i r rec ip ient s may perform transforms on them, e i ther i n l a t e r r e t e l l i n g s or 1 i n t e r p r e t i v e l y , ' that i s , i n f i g u r i n g out for themselves the sense o f what they have been t o l d (p. 187). 2 In t h e i r paper, 'On a Conversational Environment for Equ ivoca l i ty ' (1978), Sharrock and Turner suggest that s t o r y t e l l e r s can f i n d poss ible r ec ip i en t transforms foreseeable. When such poss ib le transforms are foreseeable, a s t o r y t e l l e r has i t ava i l ab le t o engage i n i n t e r a c t i o n a l work i n order t o protect t h e i r t e l l i n g s against a transform which could f i l l the s l o t o f a d i spreferred response. They w r i t e : Recipient can recast the par t t e l l e r assigns himself i n the t e l l i n g , wi th the r e s u l t that the whole narrat ive undergoes a ' s h i f t ' so as t o ' t e l l a d i f f e r e n t s t o r y ' ; and an assess-ment that the remarks are equivocal can mot i -vate r e c i p i e n t t o operate the transform. Thus 'complaints' can undergo such a s h i f t , so as t o y i e l d a s tory now focused on complainant, and complained-againsts can correspondingly appear i n t h i s vers ion as v i c t ims (p.187). 3 For example, r e c i p i e n t 'challenge' to a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s vers ion o f 'what happened' can lead to such a co l lapse . Consider the fo l lowing . A : [STORY] Anyway, I couldn ' t he lp myself, she forced me i n t o i t . B: Sounds to me l i k e you only have your-s e l f t o blame A : W e l l , fuck i t , i f you don' t be l ieve me [A turns and leaves] C e r t a i n l y everyone has been i n such a s i t u a t i o n , where the i n t e r a c t i o n 'breaks o f f wi th hard feel ings on both s ides . 160 4 Goffman (1971) offers a clue to the workings of a 'defensive design' in alternative activity assessments when he writes: When the world immediately around the in-dividual portends nothing out of the ordi-nary, when the world appears to allow him to continue his routines,.. .we can say that he will sense that appearances are 'natural' or 'normal'. For the individual, then, normal appearances mean that i t is safe and sound to continue on with the activity at hand... [but] when the [individual] senses that some-thing is unnatural or wrong, that something is up, he is sensing a sudden opportunity or threat in his current situation (p.239). 5 Turner (1976) makes an interesting related point: It cannot be overemphasized that the socio-logist does not stand to his conversational data as Sherlock Holmes stands to the clues which eventually lead him to a reconstruction of the crime. Our aim is to say, in effect, here are some methodological ways for pro-ducing and understanding the data, ways avail-able to the participants themselves. It is true that as analysts we have no apparatus which will yield an incorrigible reading of a conversational exchange; but that we have no such apparatus is not in the normal sense an admission of failure, for the production of incorrigible readings is not the goal of such an exploration of the systematics of talk and interaction (p. 253). 6 I follow Goffman in his use of 'design' in interactional encounters. He writes: If [someone] arranges to meet a friend in a particular crowded bar at 12:45 the next afternoon, and according to the bar clock he sees his friend approaching a ininute after the appointed time, then I count as designed the fact of the co-occurrence of the two in-dividuals at that place at that time. And I count as undesigned the fact that the bar was there that day...that particular other 161 persons were present, and that the sun rose that morning. . .Although these l a t t e r elements i n the s i t u a t i o n a f fec t the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s des ign , . . . these elements are l a r g e l y i n -d i f f e rent to whether or not he i n p a r t i c u l a r ca r r i e s out h i s design (1971:310-311). 162 CHAPTER 5: PRE-NARRATIVE SEQUENCING AS AN INTERACTIONAL RESOURCE In the f i r s t chapter I s a i d that one o f the more relevant problems c u r r e n t l y being attended t o i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s i s that concerning the r e l a t i o n between dialogue and monologue. Longacre (1983) i s one o f the f i r s t l i n g u i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n discourse who takes the view that the two are r e l a t e d but somewhat autonomous structures. He c l a s s i f i e s the u n i t s o f monologue as: morpheme, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, and discourse. The u n i t s o f dialogue are: utterance, exchange, dialogue paragraph, and dialogue or discourse. In r e l a t i n g the two types o f structures, Longacre defines the 'utterance' as the u n i t bounded by what a s i n g l e speaker says. As such, Longacre writes t h a t the 'utterance' " i s the u n i t which i s relevant t o turn-taking, r e p a i r , and other concerns o f the student o f l i v e conversation" (1983:43, emphases mine). Longacre begins t o t r e a t pre-narrative sequencing when he examines the 'exchange'. He writes: An exchange—e.g. a question and answer—can i n -volve i n t e r p l a y o f various s i z e u n i t s , f o r example, a sentence-size question can be answered by a s i n g l e morpheme e.g., "Nol" or by a whole d i s -course, e.g., by a n a r r a t i v e : "Well, here's what happened yesterday" (p.43). Longacre touches on an issue which i s i n the realm o f i n t e r e s t t o the discourse l i n g u i s t but which i s heretofore unformulated and unanalyzed: how n a r r a t i v e s get generated from pre-narrative discourse. 163 I t i s one o f those issues which the discourse l i n g u i s t i s hoping can be treated by students o f l i v e conversation and then integrated with research i n t o dialogue c u r r e n t l y being c a r r i e d out i n l i n g u i s t i c s . R e c a l l that Longacre and other discourse l i n g u i s t s have o f f e r e d the i n v i t a t i o n t o students o f l i v e conversation t o contribute t o studies being done i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s (Longacre, 1983; Jones, 1983; Huttar, 1982). A L i n g u i s t i c Treatment o f Pre-Narrative Sequencing Contrary t o popular opinion among s o c i o l o g i s t s , l i n g u i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n the study o f discourse have begun t o examine conversational s t r u c t u r e s . Longacre i s a t the f o r e f r o n t o f t h i s development. He w r i t e s : We must not underestimate the importance o f dialogue t o the structure o f language. How, f o r example, can we ever explain s o - c a l l e d minor or fragmentary sent-ences tha t Bloomfield and others have catalogued aside from recourse t o dialogue? From one p o i n t o f view, sentences such as the following are d e f e c t i v e : "In the kitchen", "Yesterday", "Yes"; but as answers to questions i n the context o f dialogue, they are i n no sense anomalous (1983:43-44). Longacre goes on t o make the p l e a t o l i n g u i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n discourse that the importance o f studying dialogue i s not merely that i t helps t o explain a few apparent anomalies, but that dialogue ought t o be viewed as a b a s i c function o f language: conversational exchange between people i n communication. In current l i n g u i s t i c s , i t i s fashionable t o describe the whole range o f l i n g u i s t i c phenomena i n terms o f predicate r e l a t i o n s (Longacre, 1983; Jones, 1977; Jones, 1983; Grimes, 1975; Pickering, 164 1979). From t h i s viewpoint, almost every grammatioal r e l a t i o n i s a p r e d i c a t i o n . But, as Longacre points out, i f l i n g u i s t s are t o describe a l l l i n g u i s t i c r e l a t i o n s as predications, one must assume that there i s an a b s t r a c t predicate (which Longacre terms Repartee), whose two components are the question and the answer. He provides the following example which r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y t o pre-narrative discourse sequencing: A: What d i d you do a l l morning? B: Oh, I went downtown, shopped f o r two hours, spent an hour a t the h a i r d r e s s e r ' s , and f i n a l l y had lunch at Kresge's. Then, however, i f the term PREDICATION i s stretched t o include such d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s as found i n the above example, one r i s k s the danger o f c l a s s i f y i n g p redications taxonomically as t o those which involve speaker exchange and those which do not. Furthermore, from the above example, we have i t a v a i l a b l e t o see that Longacre i s recognizing t h a t n a r r a t i v e s do not ' j u s t happen' . That i s , i n l i v e conversation there i s u s u a l l y some pre-n a r r a t i v e t a l k from which a n a r r a t i v e gets generated. More than a decade ago Harvey Sacks focused on the contexted occurrence o f narratives t o l d i n conversation and concluded th a t n a r r a t i v e s are sequenced objects embedded i n the p a r t i c u l a r context i n which they are t o l d . I s a i d e a r l i e r t h a t Sacks claimed t h a t a n a r r a t i v e can involve a preface i n which a t e l l e r p r o j e c t s a forthcoming story, a next turn i n which a co-c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t can a l i g n him or h e r s e l f as a r e c i p i e n t t o the n a r r a t i v e , and a next turn i n which the t e l l e r produces the n a r r a t i v e . F i n a l l y , another turn s l o t opens up a t s t o r y end which gives the s t o r y 165 r e c i p i e n t an opportunity t o t a l k by reference to the s tory . L ingu i s t s interested i n discourse are beginning t o show an i n t e r e s t i n discourse sequencing, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n t o the generation o f narra t ives . There i s , however, a gap between a l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r e s t i n pre-narrat ive sequencing and how a narrat ive gets generated i n ongoing t a l k . Longacre provides the best treatment o f dialogue from a l i n g u i s t i c perspective that I have come across i n the l i n g u i s t i c discourse l i t e r a t u r e . In Longacre 1s treatment o f dialogue, or repartee, note that h i s treatment brings us to the waterhole but does not prod us i n t o d r i n k i n g . That i s t o say, while Longacre touches on the issue o f how a narra t ive may get generated i n h i s treatment of dialogue, as we saw i n the example "What d i d you do a l l morning?", he does not t r e a t pre-narrat ive discourse as a resource for get t ing a narrat ive generated. One reason for t h i s lack o f a t tent ion i s that i t i s not h i s purpose to examine pre-narrat ive discourse. However, i n h i s treatment o f dialogue he provides us w i t h an example o f one way a narrat ive may get generated: by being requested. C e r t a i n l y l i n g u i s t s interested i n discourse would agree that there must be more t o the issue than tha t . For example, how do we account for the appropriateness of a narrat ive i n discourse? This chapter examines pre-narrat ive sequencing i n l i v e conversation w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n discovering and describing how a narrat ive may get generated from mater ia l s provided i n pre-narrat ive discourse. Jus t as discourse l i n g u i s t s are interested i n the structure o f narra t ive discourse, c e r t a i n l y they are interested i n pre-narrat ive structures and the structures which f a c i l i t a t e the generation of a 166 n a r r a t i v e as w e l l . This chapter contributes t o the issue o f sequencing i n discourse by o f f e r i n g the discourse l i n g u i s t a methodology f o r examining pre-narrative discourse. The kinds o f structures I examine i n t h i s chapter w i l l be important t o future l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s and, i n accord with Longacre's i n v i t a t i o n , h e l p t o supplement and build-up the current research i n t o the r e l a t i o n between discourse sequencing and the a n a l y s i s o f n a r r a t i v e s . In t e x t grammarian l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s following Longacre and h i s students, there e x i s t s the assumption th a t there i s a set o f sequencing r u l e s which govern the sequential organization o f dialogue discourse (Longacre, 1976, 1983; Jones, 1983). This assumption acts as a motivating f a c t o r f o r l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s i n t h a t the discourse l i n g u i s t seeks t o reduce the problem o f discourse sequencing t o a set o f r u l e s governing dialogue. There i s a r e l a t e d c l a i m w i t h i n such an assumption, a c l a i m r e l a t i n g t o s y n t a c t i c cons t r a i n t s i n dialogue. Cases t o support such a c l a i m e m p i r i c a l l y are, however, d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d . A major reason f o r t h i s i s , I b e l i e v e , that sequences i n dialogue which may be considered d i s j o i n t e d or meaningless when analyzed i n i s o l a t i o n do occur frequently i n conversation. Sacks (1968) provides one such example. A: I have a fourteen year o l d son B: Well, that's a l l r i g h t A: I a l s o have a dog B: Oh, I'm s o r r y 167 Anaylzed i n i s o l a t i o n , t h i s dialogue may seem meaningless. However, when the above dialogue i s examined i n the context o f the conversation i n which i t took place, we have i t a v a i l a b l e t o see that the dialogue i s q u i t e n a t u r a l and e a s i l y understood. The dialogue i s taken from a conversation i n which A i s looking f o r an apartment t o rent and B i s the l a n d l o r d . A r a i s e s some p o s s i b l e f a c t o r s which may d i s q u a l i f y him f o r apartment r e n t a l . Thus, from the perspective o f conversational a n a l y s i s , we can question the b a s i c assumption i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s that d i s j o i n t e d or "meaningless" dialogue e x i s t s or can be predicted. Furthermore, I question whether sequencing c o n s t r a i n t s , what can or cannot be said, can be explained i n l i n g u i s t i c (syntactic) terms. As Sacks and others i n conversational a n a l y s i s have c l e a r l y shown, what makes an utterance following a question an "answer", f o r example, i s determined by i t s i n t e r a c t i o n a l l o c a t i o n (Sacks, 1968; Turner, 1970, 1976; E g l i n , 1976). Along with t h i s issue i s the somewhat discouraging development i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s where the dialogue m a t e r i a l i s oftentimes constructed from i n t u i t i o n and where the a n a l y s i s can be shown t o have obscured b a s i c features o f conversational organization, as my a n a l y s i s o f pre-narrative sequencing demonstrates. A Conversational Analysis Treatment o f Pre-Narrative Sequencing T e l l i n g s t o r i e s and l i s t e n i n g to s t o r i e s i s a commonplace feature o f our everyday experience. When producing a story, t e l l e r s are obliged t o d i s p l a y a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s t o r y being t o l d and the 168 p r i o r ongoing t a l k . A l s o , the system o f turn-taking rules for conversation which a l low everyone to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a conversation while preventing overlapping t a l k i s normally suspended on s t o r y t e l l i n g occasions t o a l low a s t o r y t e l l e r a longer turn (Sacks, 1978). The s tory i t s e l f , inc luding the d i sp lay o f r e l a t ionsh ip between the s tory and the p r i o r t a l k , should j u s t i f y that temporary 1 suspension. A s tory i s any recounting o f an event, and i s usua l ly longer than one utterance. A s t o r y t e l l i n g general ly contains a preface sequence, t e l l i n g sequence, and response sequence. In an inves t iga t ion of s to r i e s t o l d i n conversation, Jefferson (1978) demonstrates how s to r i e s may be ' t r iggered ' by immediately previous turn-by-turn t a l k . That i s , a word or an utterance i n a conversation may produce a sudden remembering of a s tory, and may be used by a conversat ional i s t to generate a s tory, that s tory bearing a r e l a t i o n s h i p to the p r i o r t a l k . A s tory may be methodical ly introduced i n t o turn-by-turn t a l k v i a i n t e r a c t i o n a l techniques which may be used by a p o t e n t i a l s t o r y t e l l e r t o show a r e l a t i onsh ip between the s tory and the p r i o r t a l k , thus accounting for the appropriateness o f the s to ry ' s t e l l i n g . Consider i n the fo l lowing conversational fragments how t h i s has been accomplished. Transcr ipt A (Jefferson, 1978:221) L o t t i : (hh)en so 'hh when Duane l e f t today we took o f f our s u i t s , y'know, ' n uh—Oh 'n she gave me the most beaut i fu l swimsuit you've ever seen i n your l i f e 169 Emma: Gave i t t o you? L o t t i : Yeah Emaa: Aww::: [ L o t t i : A twenny two d o l l a r one Emma: Well, you've given her a l o t i n your day L o t t i C L o t t i : I know i t . 'N when we looked w-one a t Walter Clark's you know wir we're gonna buy one cuz [STORY] Tr a n s c r i p t B (Jefferson,, 1978:221) Roger: The cops don't do that, don't gimme th a t s h i t I l i v e i n the v a l l e y . (0.5) Ken: The cops, over the h i l l . There's a place up i n Mulholland where they've where they're b u i l d i n g those housing projects? Roger: Oh, have you ever taken them Mulholland time t r i a l s ? uhh, you go up there with a g i r l , a buncha guys're up there 'n [STORY] Tr a n s c r i p t C (Schenkein:1:7) E l l e n : To rela x during t h i s l a s t i l l n e s s , on top o f the a n t i b i o t i c s [ Ben: Well, on top o f the cough medicine E l l e n : Yeah, and the cough m e d i c i — i n c i d e n t a l l y , d i d I t e l l you? Ben: No E l l e n : That the d-he t o l d us t'give uhh Snookie a t h i r d o f a teaspoon o f uhh cough medecine, Cheracol, i s there a — Is there a cough medecine c a l l e d Cheracol? [ B i l l : yeah 170 c Ben: yeah E l l e n : uhh, we happen t o have V i c ' s Forty Four [STORY] In these examples we can see how various devices may be employed by a conversa t ional i s t t o s i gna l that the s tory-to-be-to ld i s being generated out o f the p r i o r ongoing t a l k and i s , i n fac t , a product o f that t a l k . When I t a l k about a s tory get t ing ' t r iggered ' I mean that something sa id a t some point i n a conversation can remind someone o f a s tory . A ' t r i g g e r ' word or utterance may be used by a prospective s t o r y t e l l e r t o methodical ly introduce the remembered story i n t o the turn-by-turn t a l k . I t i s part of a prospective s t o r y t e l l e r ' s business to d i sp l ay a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the story and the ongoing t a l k i n order t o j u s t i f y the t e l l i n g occasion. Af te r a l l , i n conversational i n t e r a c t i o n one does not general ly toss s tor i e s i n t o the flow of t a l k w i t h reckless abandon. Rather, care fu l a t tent ion ought to be paid t o the ongoing t a l k i f one wishes t o t e l l a s tory i n the midst of that t a l k . R e c a l l that Jefferson (1978) makes the c la im that a s tory may be ' t r iggered ' i n the course o f turn-by-turn t a l k . In the above fragments we can see her c la im i n operat ion. In Transcr ipt B, the p r i o r t a l k which t r igger s the s tory i s about "a place up i n Mulholland" i n l i n e (5) to which the prospective s t o r y t e l l e r responds, "Oh, have you ever taken them Mulholland time t r i a l s ? " i n l i n e (7). That sudden remembering provides an e f f ec t ive preface for the s tory . In Transcr ipt C, the t r i g g e r word "cough medicine" i n l i n e (4) reminds E l l e n o f a s tory about when she gave her dog some cough medicine. In Transcr ipt A, the t r i gge r word i s "swimsuits" i n l i n e (3) which reminds L o t t i o f a s tory about purchasing a swimsuit. Note, fur ther , 171 that i n t r a n s c r i p t s B and C the t r i g g e r utterance i s provided by the eventual r e c i p i e n t s whereas i n T r a n s c r i p t A the t r i g g e r utterance gets generated by the eventual s t o r y t e l l e r . The thing t o remember about a 'trigger' word or utterance i s that i t provides a p o t e n t i a l s t o r y t e l l e r not only with the resources f o r t e l l i n g a s t o r y i n the course o f turn-by-turn t a l k , but a l s o provides the s t o r y t e l l e r with the resources f o r d i s p l a y i n g that the story had some p r i o r t a l k as i t s source and may be considered t o be a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f a t t e n t i o n p a i d t o that t a l k . In the data t o be focused upon here I w i l l be s e t t i n g up a problem from some conversational m a t e r i a l s i n which s t o r i e s are t o l d and then show some resources f o r so l v i n g the problem which may not be immediately a v a i l a b l e a t f i r s t glance, y e t which upon c l o s e r examination may be seen as a v a i l a b l e t o the c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t s . The s t o r i e s I am using i n t h i s chapter contain some r i s k - t a k i n g sequences. I am using these s t o r i e s because the issues I develop i n t h i s chapter are more c l e a r - c u t and e a s i l y grasped i n such s t o r i e s . The reader may want t o read through the t r a n s c r i p t s before reading the a n a l y t i c a l section, otherwise the a n a l y s i s may be d i f f i c u l t t o follow. (A key t o t r a n s c r i p t i o n conventions i s found i n Appendix I ) . (IX-2) W: Well, we're kinda t r y i n ' to get the men's prayer breakfast going again. The thing got i n t o k i n d o f a r u t again o f j u s t being k i n d o f a s o c i a l time, not r e a l l y meeting anybody's needs, 'n I don't r e a l l y get o f f on g e t t i n ' up e a r l y on a Saturday morning j u s t t o beat t h e — b e a t the bush, y'know, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 172 with a bunch of guys (8) R: Yeah, I can dig that (9) c W: I enjoy that, but, y'know (10) I don't necessarily enjoy doing i t in a (11) restaurant, so, y'know, there's bars to (12) do that kind of thing in (13) ((mutual laughter)) (14) R: Maybe we should have a Friday night (15) meeting at tonkin's Pub (16) ((mutual laughter)) (17) W: Hey, listen, I ' l l t e l l you a funny story, (18) or I don't know i f it's funny, it's weird, (19) but I went to the bank last week, I hadda (20) make a deposit, 'n I rode my bike because (21) the car was broke down, 1 n there—the (22) drive-in teller was the only thing open (23) C R: yeah (24) W: 'n there's a big long line of cars about (25) five-thirty 'n I thought to myself, well (26) I'm not gonna stay here in line on this (27) stupid bicycle, I'm gonna wait a l i t t l e (28) while, and (1.0) I thought, well what am (29) I gonna do? An' there's this tavern next (30) to the bank (31) [ R: Oh, nooocoo! (32) c W: so I thought, I ' l l just (33) go in here, I'm sure it's got a pool table (34) a l l taverns got pool tables, 'n I went in (35) there and there were some pool tables so (36) I started shootin' a game of pool (2.0) (37) 'n I'm minding my own business, I'm not (38) botherin' nobody, y'know (39) [ R: yeah (40) [ W: 'n, uhh, usually (41) people leave me alone, 'n I'm just, y'know, (42) 'n a l l of a sudden out of the corner of my (43) eye, y'know, it' s kinda dark in there, 'n (44) I see this guy standing there just starin' (45) at me. So I figure I'm just gonna ignore (46) him, y'know, i f he's lookin' for trouble (47) he's gonna look somewhere else (48) c 173 R: ((laughs)) (49) W: ' n he ju s t doesn't go away. F i n a l l y I (50) looked up at him, thought I ' d smile o r , (51) y'know, maybe the guy was a space cadet (52) or something (53) [ R: ((laughs)) (54) [ W: and, uhh, here i t i s , i t ' s (55) an o l d f r i end o f mine, I haven't seen for (56) years (57) c R: r e a l l y 1 (58) C W: yeah, Maggie ' n him went to school (59) from kindergarten together, 'n I knew him (60) from about eighth grade on ' n he ' s a (61) be l i ever ' n he ' s kinda f a l l e n on rough (62) times, he ' s been married and divorced twice (63) ' n so we chatted for a l i t t l e whi le 'n I (64) i n v i t e d him to come by the house someday (65) he 'd been l a i d o f f h i s job ' n was kinda (66) lone ly so he came by then, ohh, about f i v e (67) days l a t e r (68) C R: yeah (69) C W: he stayed about s i x hours, had (70) dinner w i t h us, chatted for awhile , ' n uhh (71) (1.0) y'know we got to t a l k about some (72) s p i r i t u a l things a l i t t l e b i t , he expressed (73) an i n t e r e s t to go down t o the church, (74) they've got a s ing le parents c l a s s , ' n (75) through h i s two marriages he ' s had three (76) c h i l d r e n and uhhh he jus t doesn't know (77) what t o do wi th himsel f , he doesn't th ink (78) he 'd f i t i n t o a church, so I t o l d him about (79) the s ing le parents c lass and a l l the (80) divorced people 'n he sa id he 'd r e a l l y l i k e (81) to t r y i t out . Said h e ' d t r y t o give us a (82) c a l l which he hasn ' t done ye t , ' n maybe (83) t r y to go down there (84) [ R: yeah (85) c W: so i t had a p o s i t i v e (86) e f fec t , but I thought, " w e l l , i f I went to (87) Pastor B i l l and asked for counsel l ing (88) about a min i s t ry i n taverns, y'know, i t (89) c R: ((laughs)) (90) W: wouldn't go over too good, here i t was (91) 174 k i n d o f a weird dea l , ' n I f e l t g u i l t y (92) about goin ' i n there to be honest w i t h (93) ya , I f e l t g u i l t y comin' home and t e l l i n ' (94) Maggie that , y'know, I ran i n t o Mark (95) Wagner today, w e l l , where'd you do that? (96) W e l l , i n t h i s tavern (97) [ R: yeah ((laughs)) (98) W: y'know? but t h a t ' s kinda strange, so I (99) f igure uhhh (100) [ R: W e l l , I th ink t h a t ' s good (101) W: W e l l , I don ' t know, what are ya sposed (102) to do, go i n there and s t a r t handing (103) out t rac t s ? (104) R: W e l l , see i f you can get a grant from the (105) church t o pay for your beer, y'know? (106) W: Develop my minis try? Yeah, r i g h t . Maybe (107) I could s t a r t CBBMS, the Conservative (108) Bapt i s t Bar Miss ion Society (109) c R: ((laughs)) (110) W: The Conservative Bapt i s t Beer Miss ion (111) Society (112) R: Maybe you should ask Pastor B i l l for ten (113) minutes next Sunday night t o o u t l i n e your (114) rninistry (115) W: You th ink so? Maybe you should mention i t (116) i n your next l e t t e r t o him. But don' t (117) mention my name! (118) R: Just your i n i t a l s (119) W: Yeah, r i g h t l (120) (VI-6) A : Yeah, w e l l , Jimmy Carter sa id he lusted for (1) women i n h i s heart 'n everyone got upset (2) B: Oh, so you subscribe to Playboy, huh? (3) A : Funnnny, i f I ever brought home a Playboy (4) my wife would k i l l me (5) 175 B: Do you (1.0) d 'yu ever look at the covers (6) o f g i r l i e magazines? (7) A : I c a n ' t he lp but look, i t ' s an occupational (8) hazard (9) B: W e l l , I ju s t happened t o not ice that Pent- (10) house i s doing a three-part ser ies on the (11) Jer—on J e r r y F a l w e l l (12) [ A : Oh, I d i d n ' t see tha t , (13) I ' l l have to p ick one up hehe (14) B: Oh yeah, y'know one time I went to the bush (15) w i t h t h i s guy 'n on our way back we stopped (16) at mileage f i f ty - seven , there ' s a cafe (17) there ' n there was a s t r ipper there who was (18) dancin' at t h i s guy's table (19) [ A : I ju s t l o s t my appetite (20) B: What does that have t o do w i t h food? (21) A: I jus t d i d n ' t know you went t o such nice (22) places (23) B: No, but , I d i d n ' t know there was a s t r ipper (24) there, but I thought, how can she do that? (25) A: Ask her , don ' t ask me (26) B: I asked my wife when I got back how could (27) she do tha t , i f I was a woman I th ink I ' d (28) be too embarrassed (29) (IX-1) B: When do you p lay t h i s week? (1) A : We're sposed t o p lay Doherty's Thursday (2) and then Saturday i t ' s Ginger 's Sexy Sauna (3) B: They have a team? (4) A : Yeah, but i t must be made up o f c l i e n t s — (5) there ' s , I doubt there ' s any guys working (6) there (7) B: Yeah (9) A: Man, I wonder what goes on i n one o f those (10) places? (11) 176 B: Yeah, I went to one once (12) c A: Noooooo! (13) [ B: yeah, i t wasn't (14) my idea, I was with a guy from work 'n we (15) went out for a few beers 'n, I dunno, we (16) decided to go to a movie, but we passed (17) this massage place 'n he said he always (18) wanted to try one so I ended up going with (19) him. I know i t was wrong but uhh (20) [ A: So what was (21) i t like? (22) B: It was no big deal really, this g i r l came (23) in wearin' cutoffs but no top and proceeded (24) to give me the treatment—the f u l l treat- (25) ment (26) c A: I think I'd be too embarrassed to go to (27) one of those places (28) B: Yeah, i t was different. I wouldn't do i t (29) again (30) A: I heard Ginger's is gonna have to close (31) down because of it's location... (32) THE SEQUENCING PROBLEM I said earlier that the above transcripts contain what might be called 'risky' story sequences in which storytellers disclose personal things about themselves and what they did, e.g. IX-2, lines (29)-(34); VI-6, lines (15)-(19); IX-1, lines (12)-(20). Further, the relationships which exist between the topics of the conversations and the stories which are embedded in the conversations extend beyond their merely being sequentially adjacent. Our interest thus becomes 177 more focused: the study of the orders of relatedness between prior talk and the telling of story sequences which include risk-taking. I take i t that the relationships to be discovered and described may not be immediately available from a f i r s t reading of the transcripts. They are to be discovered. Perhaps they are even beyond our intuition, although i t is i n i t i a l l y our intuition which gets us started on the road to discovery. Our f i r s t question is the following: what makes the above story sequences 'risky'? We may begin to answer this by taking note of seme of the elements of relatedness between the talk prior to the stories. A f i r s t reading of the transcripts shows that one kind of thing is happening in a l l of the conversational situations: the storyteller is disclosing information in story form which could potentially damage the relationship between teller and hearer. The storyteller in each situation is 'putting something on the line', disclosing something that could be taken as demonstrating character weakness. A recipient may also see that a storyteller is telling a 'dangerous' sequence with no structural constraint (see p. 184 for an example of a 'structural constraint'). The point to note here is that sometimes people t e l l risky stories when they don't have to. One thing I want to do, then, is to examine the talk which occurs prior to the telling of a story to see i f there exists a relatedness between the prior talk and the stories which follow which may provide a clue as to discovering how i t is they came to be told. I said earlier that in each conversational fragment the embedded stories each display a potentially related topical orientation. In 178 IX-2 the current top ic i n the t a l k p r i o r t o the s t o r y t e l l i n g i s about "bars" or "taverns" i n a context of something we may i n i t a l l y character ize as 1 doing good things i n bad p l a c e s ' . In IX-1 the t o p i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n becomes 'massage par lours ' i n the t a l k adjacent t o the s t o r y t e l l i n g . In VI-6 the t a l k p r i o r t o B's s tory i s about g i r l i e magazines. Another re la ted feature o f the s tor ie s i s that each s t o r y t e l l e r i s a p r i n c i p a l character i n the recounted events. These observations i n themselves t e l l us very l i t t l e about the relatedness between narrat ives and p r i o r ongoing t a l k . Yet they do suggest, as a s t a r t i n g po in t , that the i n t e r a c t i o n a l re l a t ionsh ips between the two elements do not ' j u s t happen', but are instead re su l t s o f the respective conversa t iona l i s t s ' ca re fu l management and a t t e n t i o n . This c la im may be j u s t i f i e d i n par t by noting that the involved conversat ional i s t s would need t o be l i s t e n i n g to and analyzing the t a l k as i t was proceeding i n order for the prospective s t o r y t e l l e r s to make use o f that ongoing t a l k for the purpose o f generating a s tory i n such a way that the import and relevance o f the s tory may be traced by the r e c i p i e n t t o the p r i o r t a l k . In fact , a major c la im o f p r i o r studies o f conversational s t o r y t e l l i n g i s tha t , when a s tory gets t o l d , i t i s the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o assure that the s tory being t o l d i s being responsive t o and has a 3 d e f i n i t e observable r e l a t i onsh ip wi th the p r i o r ongoing t a l k . Jefferson (1978) has a neat example which demonstrates how s t o r y t e l l e r ina t t en t ion t o previous t a l k may r e s u l t i n a conversational ' t roub le ' for the co-conversat ional i s t s . 179 (Jefferson, 1978:229) Dan: /Alright, except that again, you're, you're using an example of maybe one or two individuals Roger: Yes Dan: Uh;;m and saying well look what these people did. And the other idea is that most schizo-phrenics, most psychotics are not really able to produce much of anything c Roger: I'm not saying don't cure schi—I'm taking i t as an individual case. I'm taking this individual and referring to only= c Dan: Mm hm, it ' s true Roger: =this individual Dan: 'S true, and I'm sure that his artwork uhm a l l you have to do is go over t'Brentwood and see some very interesting artwork, I find i t interesting [ Roger: Where at the hospital? Dan: That's right Ken: Yeah and you can also get into some of these millionaires' hou—homes. And they've bought, boughten some of these uh artworks from different places in the world? You can look at 'em and—I mean I don't know anything about art, I can't-I can't draw that well I can draw cars, 1 n junk like this when I want to, but uhh go into some of these houses and they—it looks like somebody took a squirt-gun with paint in i t an' just squirted i t . Justa buncha lines goin' every which way an' 'Oh isn't that terrific?' 'Yeah, What is it?' y'know? 'Did your child have a good time when he was drawing that?' Whaddya mean that cost me-' y'know, hhh Dan: See but the other al—alternative that you're giving me is to say well look, m-m-maybe uh maybe a person has to be sick in order to be able to see these things, Roger: No this man 180 Dan: And I don't th ink Dan: And I don ' t th ink t h a t ' s true Roger: I don' t th ink so e i ther , but t h i s man. . . In t h i s instance the s tory i s or iented to by the rec ip ient s to be ' i r r e l e v a n t ' t o the ongoing t a l k . Thus i t i s sequent ia l ly deleted. What happened i s that the s t o r y t e l l e r offered a s tory which d i d not ' f i t ' i n t o the p r i o r turn-by-turn t a l k . The top ic i s not a r t but schizophrenics . Ken' s s tory appears to get t r iggered by Dan's reference t o artwork as support for the p o t e n t i a l c r e a t i v i t y o f schizophrenics . As such, Ken's s tory has no r e l a t i o n to the p r i o r t a l k and, as i s noticeable i n the t r a n s c r i p t , h i s s tory i s ignored by Roger and Dan. There was no o r i e n t a t i o n , no d i sp l ay o f a r e l a t i o n -ship , between Ken's s tory and the ongoing conversation. We can see, then, by examining conversational mater ia l s that the r e l a t i onsh ip between a story and previous t a l k ought to be rou t ine ly negotiated. The impl i ca t ion o f t h i s i s that the generation o f a s tory i n conversa-t i o n i s not independent o f the ongoing t a l k but i s , rather , a product 4 o f that t a l k . G a i l Jef ferson, i n "Sequential Aspects of S t o r y t e l l i n g " (1978), examines s tory beginnings and story endings and discovers two features by which a s tory can be seen t o be embedded i n turn-by-turn t a l k . She w r i t e s : The occurrence o f an utterance at a given moment i s accountable, and a bas ic account i s that a next utterance i s produced by reference to the occurrence o f a p r i o r , that i s , i s occasioned by i t . . . T h e l o c a l 181 occasioning of a story. . .can have two discreet aspects: (a) A story i s "triggered" i n the course of turn-by-turn ta lk . . . [and] (b) A story i s methodically introduced into turn-by-turn ta lk . That i s , tech-niques are used to display a relationship between the story and pr ior ta lk and thus account for, and pro-pose the appropriateness of, the story's t e l l i n g (1978:220). With this orientation i n mind, I formulate the 'problem' as follows: how does someone go about orienting to pre-narrative discourse so as to transform the results of that orientation i n such a way that a narrative gets generated? I now turn to an investigation of the materials from which the 'problem' arises . Before proceeding to the analysis, I want to br ie f ly pursue a tangential question: why does anyone want to t e l l a story which contains r isky information i n the f i r s t place? As Goffman notes i n a recent a r t i c l e , "How an individual i n t a l k . . . c a n properly lead up to a revealing report has never been closely studied" (1983:46). In the materials under investigation a l l o f the stories seem to be stories that could easi ly have been suppressed. How, then, did they come to get told? I t ' s not that the storytel ler may be found to be constrained to t e l l the story and that that must somehow be managed. Rather, even a cursory examination of the transcripts reveals that there are neither duress nor structural constraints to t e l l a story containing risk-taking sequences. Then why i s i t done? In our culture we find that one way of establishing oneself i n the favor of another i s by t e l l i n g something, disclosing information, 5 which shows the other person that he or she i s being trusted. One kind of thing that gets disclosed are ' r i sky ' kinds of things, such as 182 t e l l i n g a friend about your sexual relationship with your wife pr about an unusual or embarrassing personal experience. I take i t that i n our culture intimate relationships or any kind of relationships between 'friends' must involve 'trust' to some degree. Thus, i n examining our materials to discover and describe interactional sequences we cannot leave out these kinds of considerations from the interactional concerns operating i n a segment of talk. With an issue l i k e 'trust' a recipient has i t available to go away from a conversation i n which a 'risky' story was told not so much disposed to view the storyteller i n a negative lig h t as much as to say, "He's a good guy. We had a nice talk. He trusted me." There i s , however, a deeper issue involved. The more relevant issue i s protecting the current interaction, and i n this chapter my concern i s with members' methods of sustaining interaction while attending to the sequencing 'problem' . For example, one important part of a conversationalist's work i s to protect the current interaction, which may also contribute to some larger task, i.e. keeping a personal relationship going. But i t i s this deeper issue, the interactional issue, which concerns us here and which I want to treat separately i n relation to pre-narrative sequencing i n discourse. Recall i n Goffman's treatment of 'face-work' that, just as any person i s expected to have self-respect, a person i s also expected to have a certain considerateness or respect for others. That i s to say, i n our culture a person i s expected to go to certain lengths to protect the feelings and face of those with whom that person interacts. Goffman suggests that this respect for others' face i s 183 w i l l i n g and spontaneous because o f the emotional i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with others and t h e i r f e e l i n g s . In h i s words, a person " . . . i s d i s i n c l i n e d t o witness the defacement o f others" (1967:10). He continues: The combined e f f e c t o f the r u l e o f s e l f -respect and the r u l e o f considerateness i s t h a t the person tends t o conduct himself during an encounter so as t o maintain both h i s own face and the face o f the other p a r t i -c i p a n t s . T h i s means that the l i n e taken by each p a r t i c i p a n t i s u s u a l l y allowed t o p r e v a i l , and each p a r t i c i p a n t i s allowed t o c a r r y o f f the r o l e he appears t o have chosen f o r him-s e l f . A state where everyone temporarily accepts everyone e l s e ' s l i n e i s established. This k i n d o f mutual acceptance seems t o be a b a s i c s t r u c t u r a l feature o f i n t e r a c t i o n , es- p e c i a l l y the i n t e r a c t i o n o f face-to-face t a l k (1967:11, emphases mine). I now want t o return t o the a n a l y t i c a l i s s u e s . My a n a l y t i c a l i n t e r e s t a t t h i s p o i n t i s t o i n q u i r e i n t o the s t r u c t u r a l features that make p o s s i b l e the generation o f a s t o r y containing r i s k - t a k i n g sequences from p r i o r ongoing t a l k . One o f the reasons f o r focusing a n a l y t i c a l a t t e n t i o n on s t o r i e s containing r i s k y sequences i s that the p r e - n a r r a t i v e sequencing issues are c l e a r - c u t and perhaps more e a s i l y grasped. Sometimes there are circumstances which give a person l i t t l e choice but t o d i s c l o s e r i s k y or dangerous information i n s t o r y form. In such s i t u a t i o n s there may be a problem o f how t o manage tha t . An example o f a constraining feature b u i l t i n t o a s i t u a t i o n would be something l i k e the following: A comes home a t 4:00 a.m. and h i s wife, B, asks him, "Where have you been?" A i s constrained t o t e l l B about 'what happened'. Such a s i t u a t i o n creates an environment f o r the 184 p o s s i b l e t e l l i n g o f a r i s k y story. Note that, i n such a s i t u a t i o n , there's something backing up B's question. I t ' s not as though B i s merely asking A t o t e l l her something p o t e n t i a l l y embarrassing, but t h a t her question i s locked i n t o a s o c i a l - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l framework which allows B t o ask such a question. Thus, there are occasions when s t o r i e s get t o l d because the t e l l e r i s s i t u a t i o n a l l y constrained. I r e f e r t o t h a t k i n d o f t e l l i n g as a Class I story: a s t o r y locked i n t o a s o c i a l - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l framework, a n a r r a t i v e which gets generated out o f a s i t u a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t . But there i s s u r e l y another c l a s s o f s t o r i e s as displayed i n our m a t e r i a l s — C l a s s I I s t o r i e s — w h i c h are volunteered. They are not generated out o f any s t r u c t u r a l , s o c i a l - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t . I am proposing, then, two c l a s s e s o f s t o r i e s which I am c a l l i n g , f o r convenience, Class I and Class I I . The 'problem' I formulated e a r l i e r i s generated frcm Class I I s t o r i e s . S o l u t i o n t o the Sequencing Problem E a r l i e r I s a i d t h a t the resources f o r a s t o r y t e l l e r t o t e l l a s t o r y are t o be found i n the p r i o r adjacent t a l k . One way t o begin t o b u i l d upon t h i s feature i s by examining and comparing the contents o f the p r i o r t a l k and the following s t o r i e s i n order t o discover the resources r e l a t i n g t o the construction o f t h i s k i n d o f story. For a story, any story, t o be seen as being derived from and occasioned by p r i o r t a l k , i t must be constructed with a t t e n t i o n t o what i s being 185 ta lked about. We can begin t o see the i n t r i c a c y o f such member a t tent ion by examining the conversational mater ia l s presented e a r l i e r i n the chapter. F i r s t , i t should be noted that i n the t r ansc r ip t s the s to r i e s stand alone. That i s , they are not 'second' s to r i e s derived from any s t r u c t u r a l resources from a preceding s tory . Nor are they followed by 'second' s t o r i e s , although there are no s t r u c t u r a l constra ints which would i n h i b i t any development o f a ser ies o f s t o r i e s . These s tor i e s are not preceded or followed by other s t o r i e s . Thus we w i l l have t o look elsewhere for a so lu t ion t o our formulated problem. I have establ ished that s tor ie s (a) normally emerge from turn-by-turn t a l k ; that i s , they are l o c a l l y occasioned; and (b) prospective s t o r y t e l l e r s must pay carefu l a t tent ion t o the ongoing t a l k i n order to make a s tory ' f i t ' i n w i t h that t a l k . These are bas ic notions from Jefferson (1978) and Ryave (1978), re spect ive ly . I now want t o b u i l d on t h i s foundation as we search for a so lu t ion to the 'problem' formulated e a r l i e r : how does someone go about o r i en t ing t o pre-narra t ive discourse so as t o transform the re su l t s o f that o r i en ta t ion i n such a way that a s tory may be generated? With the problem thus formulated, l e t us re turn to IX-2 . S p e c i f i c a l l y , consider the t a l k preceding W's s tory . (rx-2) W: W e l l , we're kinda t r y i n g to get the men's prayer breakfast going again. The thing got i n t o k i n d o f a r u t again o f jus t being k i n d o f a s o c i a l time, not r e a l l y meeting anybody's needs, ' n I don ' t r e a l l y get o f f on g e t t i n ' up ear ly on a Saturday morning 186 j u s t t o beat t h e — b e a t the bush, y'know, with a bunch o f guys R: Yeah, I can d i g that c W: I enjoy that, but, y'know, I don't n e c e s s a r i l y enjoy doing i t i n a restaurant, so, y'know, there's bars t o do th a t k i n d o f t h i n g i n ((mutual laughter)) R: Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting at tonkin's Pub ((mutual laughter)) W: Hey, l i s t e n , I ' l l t e l l you a funny [STORY] In t h i s t r a n s c r i p t we can see the a t t e n t i o n being p a i d t o the two issues (a and b ) , discussed i n the previous paragraph. That i s , W di s p l a y s evidence o f having p a i d c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n t o the ongoing t a l k , namely, h i s stor y i s derived from the ongoing t a l k about having a prayer breakfast i n a restaurant and the suggestion, a l b e i t jokingly, o f having a prayer meeting i n a tavern. Furthermore, he manages t o construct h i s s t o r y from materials provided i n that t a l k . One i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s a t t e n t i o n i s that W d i d not have i t i n mind t o t e l l about how he happened t o hel p a f r i e n d s p i r i t u a l l y when the conversation got s t a r t e d . The stor y gets 'triggered' by the turn-by-turn t a l k . Note, f i r s t , that the t o p i c i n the p r i o r t a l k goes beyond mere s e t t i n g s ( i . e . banks, restaurants, e t c . ) . That i s , the t o p i c appears t o be i n a state o f f l u x from "prayer meetings" t o " s o c i a l gatherings" i n "restaurants" and "bars" r e s p e c t i v e l y . What a c t u a l l y i s the t a l k about? I e a r l i e r characterized the pre-story t a l k i n IX-2 as something l i k e 'doing good things i n bad places', f o r example, having a prayer meeting i n a tavern. Further, W i n i t i a t e s the joking 187 about "bars" by t a l k i n g about how "there ' s bars to do that k i n d o f th ing i n " , w i t h " that k i n d o f th ing " r e f e r r i n g back to "beating the bush w i t h a bunch of guys". R then provides the ac tua l resources for W's s tory i n the very next utterance by combining two elements of the ongoing t a l k i n order to extend the joking cl imate which has been created i n the t a l k by saying, "Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting i n Donkin's Pub". The humour turns on something which W and R would obviously consider 'good', having a prayer meeting, i n an incongruent se t t ing which may be referred to as 'bad ' , a bar or tavern. I t ' s a s tory , then, that i s both tr iggered and structured by the ongoing t a l k and what the t a l k i s 'about ' . A f t e r a l l , W could have invoked a vague se t t ing such as a "restaurant" or some such neutra l place for the recounting about how he happened t o help a f r i end s p i r i t u a l l y whi le wai t ing for the l i n e o f cars a t the d r i v e - i n window at the bank to dwindle. But then he would not be u t i l i z i n g the mater ia l s i n the ongoing t a l k to generate a s tory which could then lead t o a conversational t roub le . That i s , i t would then be ava i l ab le to R to question the relatedness between W's story and the p r i o r ongoing t a l k . The s tory wouldn't ' f i t ' i n t o that t a l k . As i t i s , the s tory f i t s i n t o the ongoing t a l k because i t was relevant t o that t a l k , and got generated out o f i t . Note, too, that the s tory i s not only preceded by the general t o p i c a l character iza t ion of 'doing good things i n bad places ' but i t i s a l so followed by the same charac ter iza t ion . That i s , i t ' s not as though W wants to t e l l R a s tory about how he happened to help a f r i end s p i r i t u a l l y but there ' s the hazard o f the turn-by-turn t a l k to 188 deal w i t h . On the contrary, the s tory gets generated out o f the very elements that make i t a somewhat r i s k y story t o t e l l i n the f i r s t p lace , out o f t a l k about "prayer meetings", " taverns" , and the joking about a c t i v i t i e s having t h e i r proper sett ings and the humour o f considering v i o l a t i n g those se t t ings , about having a prayer meeting i n a tavern. And t h i s i s the crux o f the matter. Contained w i t h i n t h i s observation i s the s o l u t i o n t o the formulated problem, and w i t h i t we w i l l be able to characterize the i n t e r a c t i o n a l work a s t o r y t e l l e r can engage i n when generating a r i s k y or dangerous s tory from ongoing t a l k . The important th ing t o note here i s that i t i s R's utterance, "Maybe we should have a Fr iday night meeting at Donkin's Pub" which t r igger s the s tory . We may say that R's utterance captures the essence o f the ongoing t a l k i n capsule form which then provides W w i t h the resources for ge t t ing h i s s tory t o l d , and not only the resources for ge t t ing i t t o l d but the impetus for get t ing i t remembered i n the f i r s t p lace . So R's utterance does the work o f reminding W of a relevant s tory , a l b e i t a r i s k y one, while a t the same time providing the necessary mater ia l for ge t t ing the s tory t o l d . I t ' s not the s t o r y t e l l e r but the other who f i r s t makes a k i n d o f r i s k y comment, but does i t as a joke. The s p e c i f i c po int i s that i t i s not W who f i r s t generates a r i s k y suggestion, but R, a l b e i t humorously. Now we have a not ion, derived from our i n i t i a l i n t u i t i o n about s t o r i e s , that i s a n a l y t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g : people have i t ava i l ab le t o t e l l ' r i s k y ' s to r i e s when something ' r i s k y ' i s already present i n the ongoing t a l k . Since such a not ion i s derived from one t r a n s c r i p t , we want t o check and see i f i t i s perhaps happening i n other s tory t r a n s c r i p t s . Then we can note w i t h i n t e r a c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t whether or 189 not there i s some r i s k already being taken i n the ongoing t a l k , some 1 danger i n the a i r 1 , which provides mater ia l s for the generation o f the r i s k y s tory which fol lows that t a l k . I f , a f ter a l l , we're looking a t how a prospective s t o r y t e l l e r i s able t o generate a s tory from resources provided i n the p r i o r turn-by-turn t a l k , and a t the sequencing i n how a s tory gets t r iggered, then i t i s surely of i n t e r a c t i o n a l import t o discover i f there was already some r i s k evident i n the ongoing t a l k , some danger already ' i n the a i r ' , a t the precise moment a t which a ' r i s k y ' s tory gets generated. What I want t o do now i s to look a t the other t r anscr ip t s from the beginning o f t h i s chapter w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n discovering whether or not there i s some k i n d o f danger already ' i n the a i r ' p r i o r t o the t e l l i n g o f a ' r i s k y ' s tory . F i r s t , i n V I - 6 . (VI-6) A : Yeah, w e l l , Jimmy Carter sa id he lusted for (1) women i n h i s heart 'n everybody got upset (2) B: Oh, so you subscribe t o Playboy, huh? (3) A : Funnnny, i f I ever brought home a Playboy my wife would k i l l me (4) (5) B: Do you (I.O) d 'yu ever look a t the covers o f g i r l i e magazines? (6) (7) A : I c a n ' t he lp but look, i t ' s an occupational (8) hazard (9) B: W e l l , I ju s t happened to not ice that Penthouse i s doing a three-part ser ies on the Jer—on J e r r y F a l w e l l (10) (11) (12) [ A : Oh, I d i d n ' t see tha t , I ' l l have t o p ick one up hehe (13) (14) B: Oh, yeah, y'know [STORY] (15) 190 Two rather apparent features o f the above conversation which we may note are the l o c a l occasioning o f the s tory and that the s tory gets t r iggered i n the course of turn-by-turn t a l k . As for the utterance that t r igger s the s tory , i t appears that A ' s utterance, "Oh, I d i d n ' t see that , I ' l l have t o p i ck one up", i s s i m i l a r to R's utterance i n IX-2 . That i s , A suggests something k ind o f r i s k y , something that he normally wouldn't do, i n a humorous v e i n , and B responds w i t h a r i s k y d i sc losure s tory . Not ice , too, that A i s not saying that he wouldn't look a t a Playboy magazine when he says, " . . . i f I ever brought home a Playboy my wife would k i l l me". But one th ing he i s doing w i t h that utterance i s b u i l d i n g the r i sk- shar ing s t ructure . I f we take A ' s utterance s t r a i g h t , he i s proposing t o do something that might be forbidden. Note that i n t h i s utterance A i s making a very male k i n d o f statement. He's proposing t o do something r i s k y , but i n a joking manner. What he ends up doing i s making a comment and then undermining h i s own comment by joking about i t . Then, h i s joking about i t allows B t o take h i s utterance e i ther way, and B takes i t i n a rather serious way w i t h the utterance, "Do you (1.0) d 'yu ever look a t the covers o f g i r l i e magazines?". I t ' s as i f A ' s utterance not only t r igger s B's s tory, but A ' s utterance provides for the a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f B's s tory . Up t o that po int the t a l k as a whole was a l i t t l e r i s k y , but then w i t h A ' s utterance, "Oh, I d i d n ' t see that , I ' l l have to p i ck one up hehe", B has i t ava i l ab le t o not ice that A i s a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the r i s k y t a l k . B then p icks up on that o r i e n t a t i o n to the r i s k y t a l k on A ' s par t and produces a s tory which i s relevant t o that o r i e n t a t i o n . So there i s some k i n d o f r i s k 191 ' i n the a i r ' i n the ongoing t a l k , a r i s k oriented t o by both c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t s and played with by both, which does the work o f not only g e t t i n g the s t o r y remembered but t o l d . That i s t o say, the r i s k which has been introduced i n t o a conversation can remind someone o f a r i s k y story. Not only can a c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t be reminded o f a r i s k y story, but the ongoing t a l k , with some kin d o f r i s k already present, provides the resources f o r someone t o t e l l a r i s k y story. One may, a f t e r a l l , be reminded o f a s t o r y as a r e s u l t o f monitoring t a l k yet choose not t o t e l l i t or may have trouble introducing i t i n t o the flow o f t a l k . In VT-6, however, B i s not only provided with an opportunity f o r a s t o r y t o get t r i g g e r e d as a r e s u l t o f monitoring the ongoing t a l k , he i s a l s o provided with an occasion f o r t e l l i n g i t . How so? One feature o f conversation upon which I am b u i l d i n g i s that i t i s not uncommon to f i n d instances o f s t o r y t e l l i n g i n which a s t o r y i s t o l d i n such a manner that i t can be seen as being occasioned by and derived from the previous t a l k . In VT-6, f o r example, we can note that B's s t o r y gets generated from a t t e n t i o n p a i d t o the p r i o r t a l k about l u s t , s k i n magazines l i k e Playboy and Penthouse, and n o t i c i n g contents. Further, we have i t a v a i l a b l e t o n o t i c e the joking nature o f the responses t o the mention or i m p l i c a t i o n o f both Playboy and Penthouse; "Oh, so you subscribe to Playboy, huh?" and "Oh, I didn't see that, I ' l l have t o p i c k one up hehe". I t ' s as i f what A and B are t a l k i n g about i s seen by both t o be somewhat r i s k y . The r i s k y nature o f the t a l k i s recognized, and t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n i s displayed t o one another v i a joking about i t . And, as we noted e a r l i e r , both A and B are a c t i v e l y and concertedly d i s p l a y i n g t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 192 danger which i s ' i n the a i r ' i n the t a l k . I t ' s not a case i n which one i s joking about i t and the other i s passive. A f t e r p a r t i c i p a n t r e c o g n i t i o n and o r i e n t a t i o n t o the r i s k present i n the ongoing t a l k , then, B chooses t o t e l l a somewhat r i s k y story, a s t o r y which may be seen t o be constructed from materials i n the p r i o r t a l k as w e l l as from an o r i e n t a t i o n t o the r i s k y nature o f the t a l k . We can see the same thing happening i n LX-1. (IX-1) B: When do you p l a y t h i s week? A: We're sposed t o p l a y Doherty's Thursday and then Saturday i t ' s Ginger's Sexy Sauna B: They have a team? A: Yeah, but i t must be made up o f c l i e n t s , there's, I doubt there's any guys working there B; Yeah A: Man, I wonder what goes on i n one o f those places? B: Yeah, I went t o one once [STORY] The important t h i n g t o note i n IX-1 i s t h a t i t i s A's utterance, "Man, I wonder what goes on i n one o f those places", which t r i g g e r s the s t o r y by B. We may say t h a t A's utterance i n i t i a t e s the r i s k y t a l k i n the conversation t o which B responds with a r i s k y d i s c l o s u r e story. As i n IX-2 and VI-6, i t ' s not the prospective s t o r y t e l l e r who f i r s t makes a k i n d o f r i s k y comment but the prospective s t o r y r e c i p i e n t . In each conversation I have so f a r noted the feature o f r i s k y t a l k i n the turn-by-turn t a l k p r i o r t o the t e l l i n g o f the story. 193 I have a l so noted that the prospective s tory r e c i p i e n t provides the story t r i g g e r by o r i e n t i n g t o the r i s k y nature o f the t a l k . Now l e t ' s take i t a step fur ther . I f we assume that the top ic already ' i n the a i r ' i n the turn-by-turn t a l k p r i o r t o the s tory may be characterized as a k i n d o f ' t e s t i n g o f l i m i t s ' , then the s tory may be characterized as a crossing over the border o f that l i m i t being tes ted . That i s , there i s a po int where r i s k y t a l k becomes problematic w i t h regard t o protect ing the i n t e r a c t i o n i n a conversation. The generation o f a r i s k y story may be 6 that p o i n t . In IX-1, A begins to ' t e s t the l i m i t s ' by wondering out loud, " I wonder what goes on i n one o f those places?" An in te re s t i s shown, a normal yet somewhat r i s k y i n t e r e s t , to which B responds w i t h a r i s k y d i sc losure s tory . That i s , A tes t s the l i m i t s and B or ients to that l i m i t t e s t ing by taking i t a step further , by 'cross ing over' the l i m i t , "Yeah, I went t o one once". A provides B w i t h the resources for t e l l i n g h i s s tory by h i s wondering about what goes on ins ide a massage par lour . Invest igat ion o f the s tory which follows re t rospec t ive ly informs A and B that B has crossed over i n t o dangerous t e r r i t o r y , that he i s t e l l i n g a somewhat dangerous sequence which got generated out o f A ' s wondering, which d i d the work o f get t ing the s tory t r iggered . One o f the consequences o f employing the t r i gge r utterance i s that the s t o r y t e l l e r can show that the nature o f the p r i o r t a l k i s being or iented to and that that o r i e n t a t i o n i s generative o f the s tory . We may th ink o f t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o the nature o f the ongoing t a l k and the use o f i t to generate a s tory as one k i n d o f method which people have at t h e i r d i sposa l for get t ing r i s k y s to r i e s t o l d . 194 Pre-Narrative Resources Now we have a notion about one genre o f na r r a t i v e t h a t i s a n a l y t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g : people have i t a v a i l a b l e t o t e l l s t o r i e s containing r i s k y sequences when there i s already some r i s k present i n the ongoing t a l k . Further, we have discovered a general procedure employable by a s t o r y t e l l e r f o r constructing a stor y t h a t observably d i s p l a y s a r e l a t i o n s h i p with the r i s k already present i n some ongoing t a l k which organizes the story i n terms o f a d i s p l a y o f that r e l a t i o n s h i p . By t h i s we mean that the s t o r y t e l l e r can show that the sto r y i s o r i e n t i n g t o the t a l k which preceded i t . This d i s p l a y enables st o r y r e c i p i e n t s t o hear tha t the story i s embedded i n the ongoing t a l k and not j u s t the ongoing t a l k but the p a r t i c u l a r t o p i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n that i s ' i n the a i r ' i n that t a l k . This d i s p l a y o f o r i e n t a t i o n i s a p r a c t i c e which requires f u r t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n . When t h i s procedure i s being employed there are ways i n which the s t o r y t e l l e r can i n d i c a t e t o the st o r y r e c i p i e n t that the procedure i s being used. The t e l l i n g o f a stor y with r i s k - t a k i n g i n i t i s , a f t e r a l l , a somewhat dangerous venture, i n the sense t h a t by i t s t e l l i n g a story could negatively influence the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t o r y t e l l e r and s t o r y r e c i p i e n t . Furthermore, the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n may be disrupted and thus be i n need o f p r o t e c t i o n or r e p a i r . Thus a s t o r y t e l l e r w i l l normally b u i l d i n t o a s t o r y containing r i s k - t a k i n g a defensive design f o r how i t came t o be that the a c t i v i t y being recounted was engaged i n . Such t a c t i c s i n LX-1, f o r example, include 195 the statements, " I t wasn't my idea," and, "I know i t was wrong". In IX-2 we f i n d , "I f e l t g u i l t y about going i n there", and "I f e l t g u i l t y ccmin' home and t e l l i n g Maggie". By 'defensive design' I mean t o imply tha t a s t o r y t e l l e r can be aware o f the r i s k i n e s s o f the story being t o l d and t h a t the s t o r y t e l l e r i s thus obliged t o o r i e n t t o the r i s k i n e s s o r danger o f the s t o r y by seeking t o b u i l d i n t o the story c e r t a i n features intended t o p r o t e c t and sustain the ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n and the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s 'face*. Goffman suggests that face-saving actions o f t e n become h a b i t u a l and standardized p r a c t i c e s , the consequences o f which may not be r e a l i z e d by the person who employs them. He writes; Each person, subculture, and s o c i e t y seems t o have i t s own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r e p e r t o i r e o f face-saving p r a c t i c e s . I t i s t o t h i s r e p e r t o i r e t h a t people p a r t l y r e f e r when they ask what a person or c u l t u r e i s " r e a l l y " l i k e . And y e t the p a r t i c u l a r set o f p r a c t i c e s stressed by p a r t i c u l a r persons or groups seems t o be drawn from a s i n g l e l o g i c a l l y coherent framework o f p o s s i b l e p r a c t i c e s . I t i s as i f face, by i t s very nature, can be saved only i n a c e r t a i n number o f ways, and as i f each s o c i a l grouping must make i t s s e l e c t i o n s from t h i s s i n g l e matrix o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s (1967:13). By employing such t a c t i c s the s t o r y t e l l e r can inform the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t t o locate the s t o r y as having been generated out o f the r i s k already present i n the ongoing t a l k , and t h a t t h a t r i s k i s being kept i n mind and o r i e n t e d t o during the t e l l i n g . I began by observing a subclass o f Class I I s t o r i e s which i s a n a l y t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g , a subclass i n which people have i t a v a i l a b l e t o t e l l s t o r i e s when there i s some kin d o f t o p i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n already present i n the ongoing t a l k . And t h i s cannot be j u s t any s t o r y but a 196 s t o r y which d i r e c t l y r e l a t e s t o the s p e c i f i c o r i e n t a t i o n , i n t h i s case ' r i s k ' , i n the p r i o r t a l k . The procedure which provides f o r s t o r i e s g e t t i n g generated from t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n involves a s t o r y t e l l e r making use o f a t r i g g e r utterance t o i n s e r t the s t o r y i n t o the flow o f the turn-by-turn t a l k . In the s t o r i e s examined i n t h i s chapter (IX-2, VI-6, and IX-1), the s t o r i e s get generated out o f a l i m i t t e s t i n g utterance which acts as the s t o r y t r i g g e r . In IX-2, f o r example, W and R are d i s c u s s i n g the current status o f the men's prayer breakfast frcm t h e i r l o c a l church. W says something t o the e f f e c t t h a t the prayer breakfast has degenerated i n t o a " s o c i a l i z i n g " time instead o f a prayer time. He adds, "I enjoy that" s o c i a l i z i n g with the guys, "but, y'know, I don't n e c e s s a r i l y enjoy doing i t i n a restaurant". Then he adds, jokingly, "y'know, there's bars t o do t h a t k i n d o f thing i n " . The two i n d i c a t o r s o f the humorous nature o f the utterance are; (1) the c o n t r a s t between having a prayer meeting i n a restaurant and hanging out with the guys a t a tavern, and (2) mutual laughter. I t would be d i f f i c u l t a t t h i s p o i n t i n the conversation t o begin h i s story a f t e r t h a t utterance. So i t ' s i n t e r a c t i o n a l l y noteworthy t o discover when the resources become a v a i l a b l e f o r W' s st o r y t o get generated. I t seems t o require the next utterance, R's, "Maybe we should have a F r i d a y night meeting a t Donkin's Pub" t o conclude the p r o v i s i o n o f resources f o r W' s story and which does the work o f t r i g g e r i n g the story. S p e c i f i c a l l y , a climate has been established where i t ' s acknowledged between R and W t h a t something 'risky' can be joked about, t a l k e d about i n a way other than s t r a i g h t . Even i f i t ' s only joking, a t l e a s t 'joking' i s other than ' s t r a i g h t ' . A f t e r a l l , maybe the pastor wouldn't joke about i t . And then W takes one step 197 beyond the joking, t h a t i s , he b u i l d s on the joking, by t e l l i n g a somewhat 'risky' story. I t i s , then, the r i s k t h a t i s already ' i n the a i r ' which makes W's stor y t e l l a b l e i n the sequence o f turn-by-turn t a l k . And not only i s there some r i s k ' i n the a i r ' but that r i s k i s being d e a l t with i n a way other than ' s t r a i g h t ' . That i s , the r i s k y nature o f the turn-by-turn t a l k i s being joked about, toyed with, p r o v i d i n g a k i n d o f b u i l t - i n i n v i t a t i o n f o r the generation o f a 'risky' s t o r y about what i s being joked about. R e c a l l i n g the i n i t i a l formulation o f the 'problem' o f how a na r r a t i v e gets generated from pre-narrative discourse, we are now i n a p o s i t i o n t o appreciate the notion t h a t c e r t a i n i n t e r a c t i o n a l p r o f i t s may be accrued by a s t o r y t e l l e r taking the chance o f volunteering a 'risky' story. I t i s the s t o r y t e l l e r i n Class I I s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n s who has the o b l i g a t i o n t o i n d i c a t e the i n t e r a c t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the recounting, t o show t o s t o r y r e c i p i e n t how the story f i t s i n with the p r i o r ongoing t a l k by r e l a t i n g the story t o something i n that p r i o r t a l k . How so? R e c a l l t h a t I am making the cla i m that a sto r y may get generated out o f seme kin d o f t o p i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n already present i n pre-n a r r a t i v e discourse. I t may be that something l i k e a 'risky' story j u s t ' s l i p s out', an a c c i d e n t a l t e l l i n g i n s p i r e d by the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s o r i e n t a t i o n t o the r i s k i n the onging t a l k . There may, however, be another reason. A f t e r a sto r y i s t o l d a sto r y response s l o t opens up. That i s , a b a s i c tenet o f conversational a n a l y s i s i s that a story's completion occasions i t s response sequence. Several d i f f e r e n t types o f items can f i l l t h i s s l o t , one o f which may be a second st o r y i n 198 which the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t volunteers a s t o r y i n which he was i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n t o the one the o r i g i n a l s t o r y t e l l e r was i n the f i r s t s t o r y (Ryave, 1978). Someone may t e l l a 'risky' story, then, i n order t o generate f u r t h e r t a l k about a problem that the s t o r y t e l l e r has reason t o think might be shared with the r e c i p i e n t . Then, one way c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t s can use t h e i r knowledge o f the response s l o t i s with the hope tha t the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t w i l l generate f u r t h e r t a l k about the r i s k y a c t i v i t y j u s t recounted which might prove t o be h e l p f u l t o the s t o r y t e l l e r . For example, returning f o r the moment t o IX-1, c e r t a i n l y B's s t o r y about how he happened t o go t o a massage parlour may be considered t o be a common dilemma under the r u b r i c o f doing something considered t o be morally wrong. I t may be the k i n d o f dilemma which someone might want t o t a l k t o others about, and one way to do that may be r e a l i z e d by t e l l i n g a s t o r y about the dilemma. I f , f o r example, one were t o engage i n a morally questionable a c t i v i t y and the opportunity a r i s e s t o t e l l a f r i e n d about i t , one motivational f a c t o r may be that one wants t o t a l k about i t with someone who can be t r u s t e d i n hope o f f i n d i n g a sympathetic ear or r e c e i v i n g help i n dealing with g u i l t or a sense o f personal f a i l u r e or whatever. So then people may t e l l a Class II r i s k y s t o r y i n order t o receive so l u t i o n s t o problems, or assuage g u i l t , or upgrade low self-esteem, or f o r any number o f reasons. In IX-1 we get a glimpse o f seme p o s s i b l e motivational p o s s i b i l i t i e s which may clue us i n t o the 'why' o f a Class I I s t o r y g e t t i n g generated. However, I am not seeking merely t o give t h e o r e t i c a l a c c r e d i t a t i o n t o the expertise o f people t e l l i n g s t o r i e s i n n a t u r a l 199 conversation or t o uncover t h e i r p o s s i b l e motivations f o r t e l l i n g such s t o r i e s . Rather, I am seeking to locate s o c i a l - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structures i n conversational i n t e r a c t i o n i n order t o gain access t o s t r u c t u r a l d e t a i l s which are not immediately a v a i l a b l e t o us. Furthermore, my a n a l y t i c a l i n t e r e s t s remain wedded t o the issue o f how a conversational a n a l y s i s treatment o f pre-narrative discourse i s more rigorous than a l i n g u i s t i c discourse treatment. When something l i k e a r i s k y s t o r y gets generated we f i n d that the s t o r y t e l l e r ought t o deal with the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s 'problem' and the r e c i p i e n t with the r e c i p i e n t ' s 'problem'. In the next chapter, I take a c l o s e r look a t these respective problems. Thus f a r we have determined how a s t o r y can get generated from some k i n d o f t o p i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n already present i n the pre-narrative discourse. Now I want t o transact a k i n d o f a n a l y t i c a l s h i f t by t e c h n i c a l i z i n g the procedure employed. F i r s t , note the three-part structure o f the general procedure I located i n IX-1, VT-6, and IX-2. (IX-2) A: ...then Saturday i t ' s Ginger's Sexy Sauna B: They have a team? A: Yeah, but i t must be made up o f c l i e n t s , there's, I doubt there's any guys workin' there B: Yeah A: Man, I wonder what goes on i n one o f those places? B: Yeah, I went t o one once [STORY] 200 (VI-6) A : Yeah, w e l l , Jimmy Carter sa id he lusted for women i n h i s heart 'n everybody got upset B: Oh, so you subscribe t o Playboy, huh? A : Funnnny, i f I ever brought home a Playboy my wife would k i l l me B: Do you (1.0) d 'yu ever look a t the covers o f g i r l i e magazines? A : I can ' t he lp but look, i t s an occupational hazard B: W e l l , I ju s t happened to not ice that Penthouse i s doing a three-part ser ies on the Jer—on Je r ry F a l w e l l C A : Oh, I d i d n ' t see that , I ' l l have t o p i ck one up, hehe B: Oh yeah, y'know one time [STORY] ( I X - 1 ) W: . . . I enjoy that , y'know, but I don ' t necessar i ly enjoy doing i t i n a restaurant, so, y'know, there ' s bars to do that k i n d o f th ing i n ((mutual laughter)) R: Maybe we should have a Fr iday night meeting at Donkin's pub ((mutual laughter)) W: Hey, l i s t e n , I ' l l t e l l you [STORY] We have i n these instances sequences where the top ic i s or iented t o by the conversa t iona l i s t s , followed by a k i n d o f t e s t ing o f l i m i t s which acts as the s tory t r i g g e r , from which the s tory begins to get generated. We can schematize the progress o f the sequence as fo l lows . 2 0 1 I. Topic O r i e n t a t i o n I I . T rigger I I I . Story O f f e r T e c h n i c a l l y , t h i s sequence can be described as containing two actions beyond the t o p i c o r i e n t a t i o n ( I ) , with the n e x t - t o - l a s t a c t i o n (II) providing f o r the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a s t o r y o f f e r ( I I I ) . So a Class I I story can get generated out o f sane kind o f t o p i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n already present i n ongoing t a l k , and t h a t k i n d o f structure can be seen t o be ccmposed o f a minimum o f three components. One d i s t i n c t i v e feature o f the procedure i s that, i n IX-2 and VI-6, the r i s k ' i n the a i r ' , the t e s t i n g o f l i m i t s , i s done i n a joking manner. I t c a r r i e s no h i n t o f seriousness. That i s , the t r i g g e r utterance (II) may be o f f e r e d i n a l i g h t , amusing manner and be accepted as such. Note, too, that the joking nature o f the t r i g g e r utterances o f R ( i n IX-2) and A ( i n VI-6) are not constructed a t random but rather c a r e f u l l y contrasted with the r i s k y nature o f the p r i o r ongoing t a l k . In IX-2, f o r example, the story t r i g g e r i s ccmposed o f c a r e f u l l y managed co n t r a s t i v e humour. The t a l k i s about g e t t i n g a prayer meeting r e s t a r t e d and W contrasts the s e t t i n g s o f "restaurants" and "taverns", each having t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e uses (a restaurant being a good place t o have a prayer meeting, and a tavern or bar being a good place t o s o c i a l i z e ) . Thus the resources are provided f o r R t o integrate the two settings, suggesting i n a joking v e i n t h a t perhaps a "bar" would be a good place t o have a prayer meeting. A f t e r R's utterance i s oriented t o as a joke as i n d i c a t e d by 202 mutual laughter, then W o f f e r s a s t o r y about helping someone he happened t o meet i n a bar. T h i s three-part a c t i o n i s very common. In my materials i t occurs i n a wide v a r i e t y o f s t o r y t e l l i n g environments. I have begun, then, t o sketch a t e c h n i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the generation o f n a r r a t i v e s from the resources a v a i l a b l e i n the pre-narrative discourse. This has involved us i n becoming a l e r t t o the feature o f 'risky' t a l k i n a conversation preceding the generation o f a story containing r i s k y information. The procedure f o r g e t t i n g a s t o r y generated out o f p r i o r t a l k has much t o do with the o r i e n t a t i o n by both the p o t e n t i a l s t o r y t e l l e r and the p o t e n t i a l s t o r y r e c i p i e n t t o the a v a i l a b l e resources i n the pre-narrative discourse. Further, I noted that i t i s the p o t e n t i a l s t o r y r e c i p i e n t s who provide the necessary materials f o r the s t o r y t e l l e r s t o get t h e i r s t o r i e s t o l d , and t h a t work may be seen as a concerted accomplishment by the c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t s . By l o c a t i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n a l resources a v a i l a b l e t o prospective s t o r y t e l l e r s and r e c i p i e n t s i n our materials, with a focus on how s t o r i e s which contain r i s k - t a k i n g sequences can get generated from some kin d o f r i s k being already present i n some ongoing t a l k , I have begun t o produce a d e t a i l e d c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f a general procedure f o r generating s t o r i e s from materials already provided i n the ongoing t a l k . In r e f l e c t i n g upon the underlying s t r u c t u r a l phenomena I have focused on sequential features o f i n t e r a c t i o n and ways which people have t o s u s t a i n ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . The f a c t that a s t o r y gets generated from a v a i l a b l e resources i n the pre-narrative discourse i s remarkable i n i t s e l f . Even more remarkable i s t o l o c a t e the progression o f i n t e r a c t i o n which underlies t h a t achievement. 203 CONCLUSION I t seems reasonable t o turn t o conversational a n a l y s i s as an approach t o dialogue th a t has the most t o o f f e r the discourse l i n g u i s t i n the way o f s u b s t a n t i a l i n s i g h t i n t o dialogue sequencing. I t appears t o me that the a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s o f the discourse l i n g u i s t puts the a n a l y s t a t a disadvantage (as they admit, c f . Pickering, 1979; Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983), when attempting t o t r e a t dialogue discourse with a n a l y t i c a l categories imported frcm d e s c r i p t i v e l i n g u i s t i c s . That i s , I do not view dialogue discourse, or conversation, as a s t r u c t u r a l product i n the same way that a sentence i s a product. Rather, I view dialogue as the outcome o f the i n t e r a c t i o n o f s o c i e t a l members, with the study o f dialogue reconmending a d i f f e r e n t methodology and d i f f e r e n t a n a l y t i c a l categories when analyzing sentences, even though dialogue discourse i s , a t l e a s t i n part, composed o f l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s such as words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and so on. In the course o f t h i s chapter I have provided materials f o r proposing the following t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s : the sense and appropriateness o f a stor y i s not a pre-ordained matter th a t can be determined by merely examining the content o f a story. Rather, the achievement o f a stor y may be seen t o be the r e s u l t o f members' c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n t o the ongoing t a l k and i s r e a l i z e d v i a s t o r y t e l l e r and r e c i p i e n t negotiation and administration emerging from an o r i e n t a t i o n t o the r i s k i n e s s present i n a conversational s i t u a t i o n . The a n a l y s i s I have undertaken i n t h i s chapter i s an attempt t o 204 characterize some o f the features o f t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n a l work i n r e l a t i o n t o a s p e c i f i c genre o f nar ra t ive . In IX-1 , VI-6 , and IX-2 we have seen how s tor ie s may get generated from the transformation o f resources i n the p r i o r ongoing t a l k . We have u t i l i z e d our i n i t i a l i n t u i t i v e observations to move somewhere 'beyond i n t u i t i o n ' and i n t o n o n - i n t u i t i v e a n a l y t i c a l t e r r i t o r y . For example, we i n i t a l l y noticed two classes of s t o r i e s : those which are locked i n t o a s o c i a l -organizat ion framework (Class I ) , and those which are volunteered (Class I I ) . Upon c loser examination o f Class I I s tor ie s I abstracted, a subclass i n which Class I I s to r i e s are generated from an o r i e n t a t i o n t o some ' r i s k ' already ' i n the a i r ' i n the ongoing t a l k . I characterized t h i s procedure as providing a k ind o f b u i l t - i n i n v i t a t i o n t o t e l l a s tory which disc loses something personal about oneself i n s tory form. I have analyzed these materia ls to d i sp lay s e n s i t i v i t i e s that people d i s c l o s i n g something about themselves i n s tory form e x h i b i t w i t h respect to the s t r u c t u r a l l y re l a ted transformations between the s tory and the p r i o r ongoing t a l k . I have attempted t o demonstrate how people t e l l i n g s tor ie s which contain r i s k y information d i sp l ay an o r i e n t a t i o n t o a ' t e s t i n g o f l i m i t s ' and that t h e i r s to r i e s subsequently cross the borders o f those l i m i t s . F i n a l l y , I hope that other a n a l y t i c a l topics have been uncovered for further ana lys i s . This chapter suggests a methodology for analyzing dialogue sequences i n discourse, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to pre-narrat ive dialogue. By i d e n t i f y i n g sequencing procedures by which narrat ives may be introduced i n t o ongoing discourse, I c l a im that pre-narrat ive 205 dialogue can be subject t o formal a n a l y s i s , and under such a n a l y s i s can be found t o have formal p r o p e r t i e s . The methodology used i n t h i s chapter suggests tha t the ethnographic dimension i s important i n a complete a n a l y s i s o f dialogue structures, an area which i s recognized as l a c k i n g i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse analyses. L i n g u i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n the study o f discourse have o f f e r e d important i n s i g h t s i n t o the discovery o f the functions o f various s y n t a c t i c constructions i n dialogue structures, and t h i s kind o f discovery i s c r u c i a l t o discourse a n a l y s i s . T h i s chapter has supplemented those studies by l i n g u i s t s by o f f e r i n g i n s i g h t s i n t o the ethnographic and i n t e r a c t i o n a l character o f pre-narrative dialogue. In the next chapter, both s y n t a c t i c and ethnographic i n s i g h t s are integrated i n the a n a l y s i s o f n a r r a t i v e r e c i p i e n t response preferences. 206 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 1 The tum-taking system i s a system o f r u l e s which allow everyone t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the conversation while seeking t o prevent overlapping t a l k (Sacks, Schegloff, and Je f f e r s o n , 1974). When one speaker t e l l s a story, the normal turn-taking system i s temporarily suspended t o allow the t e l l e r a longer turn ( c f . Gardner and Spielmann, 1980). The stor y i t s e l f should j u s t i f y the suspension. Note, further, that any suspension o f the turn-taking system creates an i n t e r a c t i o n a l 'problem': how do other c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t s know when the system begins operating again? One function o f the preface sequence i s t o provide r e c i p i e n t ( s ) with information about what i t w i l l take f o r the s t o r y t o be over. 2 G a r f i n k e l (1967) claims that members do not separate the circumstances o f s o c i a l events from t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s o f what these events are. 3 In a recent a r t i c l e , H o l l y Gardner and I suggested that there are two aspects o f a s t o r y t e l l i n g that a t e l l e r may be concerned with; (1) s i f t i n g through experiences i n order t o f i n d an event t h a t members o f a coirmon c u l t u r e w i l l f i n d t e l l a b l e , and (2) employing t e l l i n g devices which allow s t o r y r e c i p i e n t ( s ) t o appreciate the recounting, For example, a 'funny' st o r y might go something l i k e t h i s : "I saw a man walking down the s t r e e t yesterday with h i s s u i t on backwards." In t h i s recounting, Gardner notes t h a t the s t o r y t e l l e r depends upon the f a c t t h a t r e c i p i e n t s would a l s o f i n d such an event funny given t h e i r knowledge about the proper way t o wear s u i t s (1980:180). 4 Sacks (1971) notes that when a conversation progresses w e l l the t a l k d r i f t s almost imperceptibly from one t o p i c t o another. Turns a t t a l k ought t o d i s p l a y the 'why' o f the turn and the most common way o f doing t h i s work i s by t y i n g t o p i c a l l y t o what has gone before. 207 5 Mayers (1978) writes that, i n our s o c i e t y : T r u s t i s a very important f a c t o r i n i n t e r -personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Because we cannot secure proof o f the outcome o f our be-haviour, we must t r u s t . A d e f i n i t i o n o f t r u s t then would be, the a b i l i t y t o r i s k y o u r s e l f , t o put y o u r s e l f i n the hands o f another (p.2). 6 Goffman touches on t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y by suggesting t h a t a person has a v e r s i o n o f s e l f which th a t person wishes t o maintain i n the eyes o f others. He continues: Now i f the i n d i v i d u a l should f i n d himself appearing i n a bad l i g h t . . . h e may f i n d him-s e l f suddenly alarmed by the s i t u a t i o n . . . I t i s c l e a r t h a t f o r the i n d i v i d u a l the maintenance o f these personal standards i s important not only as a means o f c a r e f u l l y coping with routine d i f f i c u l t i e s , but a l s o as a means o f sustaining an image o f himself t o which he i s attached (1971:278). 208 CHAPTER 6: NARRATIVE RESPONSE PREFERENCES In t h i s chapter I examine r e c i p i e n t response preferences following n a r r a t i v e s i n l i v e conversation. Recipient responses are t r e a t e d i n l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s as a feature o f repartee or the n o t i o n a l (deep) structure o f dialogue. E a r l i e r I s a i d that the l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s view o f sequencing i n discourse i s g e n e r a l l y viewed as sentences strung together i n much the same way th a t clauses w i t h i n sentences can be conjoined with various kinds o f connectives. In a l i n g u i s t i c treatment o f repartee (dialogue), the need f o r an ethnographic dimension (including features o f c u l t u r e and s i t u a t i o n i n the analysis) i s p a i n f u l l y missing. In l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o response structures, i . e . question-answer. However, as Grimes (1975) notes: The content o f the second p a r t i s de-pendent upon the content o f the f i r s t p a r t t o a great extent. How t o express t h i s i n t e r l o c k i n g seems t o be beyond us (1975:212). As an example o f what I think Grimes i s r e f e r r i n g to, i n the l i n g u i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e there i s a treatment o f the r e c i p i e n t r e j e c t i o n option i n dialogue, and that option can s u r e l y be extended t o n a r r a t i v e responses. But l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o how r e c i p i e n t r e j e c t i o n works or the d i f f e r e n t ways i t gets done. Response types are i d e n t i f i e d and catalogued, but the r e l a t e d issues o f how they get generated i n l i v e conversation and what they look l i k e 209 and how they work i n conversational i n t e r a c t i o n are neglected. This chapter follows the same pattern as the previous chapters by f i r s t p r o v i d i n g the reader with a l i n g u i s t i c discourse treatment o f r e c i p i e n t responses i n dialogue. A f t e r that, I provide a conversational a n a l y s i s treatment o f r e c i p i e n t response preferences, focusing on response preferences t o na r r a t i v e s t o l d i n l i v e conversation. In so doing, I demonstrate how a conversational a n a l y s i s methodology r a i s e s i n t e r e s t i n g issues which l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s neglects. In my a n a l y s i s , I do not merely extend a l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s treatment o f the issues, but show how the issues get transformed i n t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g ways. A L i n g u i s t i c Discourse Treatment o f Recipient Responses Robert Longacre has r e c e n t l y provided a treatment o f simple repartee which i l l u s t r a t e s the kinds o f issues attended t o by l i n g u i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n the a n a l y s i s o f discourse structures. E a r l i e r I s a i d t h a t l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s has much t o o f f e r the s o c i o l o g i s t i n t e r e s t e d i n discourse and students o f l i v e conversation. I b e l i e v e that s o c i o l o g i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n discourse are overlooking f i n d i n g s i n l i n g u i s t i c s which are relevant to our work and t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g . We could l e a r n much from paying more a t t e n t i o n t o the studies c u r r e n t l y being c a r r i e d out on discourse by l i n g u i s t s . On the other hand, a s o c i o l o g i c a l approach t o discourse has much t o o f f e r the discourse l i n g u i s t by handling subtle and s i g n i f i c a n t features o f i n t e r a c t i o n . But o f t e n s o c i o l o g i c a l treatments o f discourse lack the p r e c i s i o n and d e t a i l o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s , and Longacre's recent study bears t h i s out. 210 In h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f dialogue (or repartee), Longacre (1983) notes t h a t the surface structure o f a language contains a b a s i c dialogue paragraph which may be characterized as beginning with an i n i t i a t i n g utterance (IU). The i n i t i a t i n g utterance encodes what Longacre r e f e r s t o as three "notional u n i t s " (1983:48). These u n i t s are; question (Q), proposal (Pro), and remark (Rem). QUESTION s i g n i f i e s a s o l i c i t a t i o n o f information. He wr i t e s : A request may be made by asking concerning one o f the presuppositions o f request, i . e . we may say Have you a match? when we mean Please give  me a match. Or we may say Is there any more  salad down there a t that end o f the table? when we r e a l l y mean Pass me the salad. A l l o f these r e a l l y are n o t i o n a l proposals rather than n o t i o n a l questions (1983:48). Longacre's use o f the term PROPOSAL includes such things as advice, suggestion, i n v i t a t i o n , threat, carmand, and so on. In the surface st r u c t u r e o f a language i t may have a d e c l a r a t i v e structure, an imperative structure, or an i n t e r r o g a t i v e s t r u c t u r e . PROPOSAL i s a c a l l t o a c t i o n rather than a request f o r information. REMARK, then, i n d i c a t e s that a speaker i s making a commentary or a d e c l a r a t i o n . I t may be used, f o r example, as a request f o r an evaluation from the other c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i s t ( s ) t o see i f they agree or disagree with the observation o f the f i r s t speaker. As I demonstrate l a t e r i n t h i s chapter, these comments have d i r e c t relevance t o n a r r a t i v e a n a l y s i s i n discourse i n r e l a t i o n t o r e c i p i e n t response options. Longacre claims t h a t a simple dialogue concludes with another surface s t r u c t u r e u n i t which he r e f e r s t o as the "resolving utterance" (1983:49). The r e s o l v i n g utterance i s u s u a l l y generated by a second 211 speaker rather than by the f i r s t speaker and encodes three u n i t s o f not i o n a l structure; ANSWER (A), RESPONSE (Res), and EVALUATION (Ev). ANSWER resolves the structure i n i t i a t e d as a question, RESPONSE resolves the structure i n i t i a t e d as a proposal, and EVALUATION resolves the structure i n i t i a t e d as a remark. Longacre w r i t e s : The three underlying structures correspond t o the three underlying structures which encode w i t h i n the i n i t i a t i n g utterance. This gives us three p a i r s o f utterances: question-answer, proposal-response, remark-evaluation (1983:49). Longacre's a n a l y s i s leads him t o conclude t h a t we have i t a v a i l a b l e t o p o s i t three simple dialogues i n most languages such as follow. A: What time i s i t ? (IU,Q) (1) B: I t ' s four o'clock. (RU,A) A: Come over here. (IU,Pro) (2) B: Okay, I'm coming. (RU,Res) A: The whole matter i s absurd. (IU,Rem) (3) B: Yes, indeed. (Ru,Ev) In addition, Longacre claims that simple dialogue may contain a terminating utterance (TU) which encodes two d i f f e r e n t kinds o f deep or n o t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s : acquiescence (Acq), and r e j e c t i o n (Rej). His ana l y s i s i s designed t o be relevant t o response options i n a v a r i e t y o f dialogue s e t t i n g s and would seem t o be relevant t o na r r a t i v e responses. He claims as much i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f complex repartee and breaks the ground f o r t r e a t i n g response preferences. He wr i t e s : 212 A cariplex dialogue r e s u l t s when the second speaker does not...accept the dialogue on the terms sug-gested by the f i r s t speaker. On the contrary, the second speaker wants to...moderate the force o f the f i r s t speaker's utterance; he wants i n some way to b l u n t i t s p o i n t (1983:51). A second speaker can accomplish t h i s by using what Longacre terms a CONTINUING UTTERANCE (CU) which appears between the i n i t i a t i n g utterance and the r e s o l v i n g utterance. The CONTINUING UTTERANCE encodes three deep structures: counter-question, counter-proposal, and counter-remark. This structure can occur as a chain o f continuing utterances and be o f indeterminate length. R e c a l l from the f i r s t chapter t h a t Longacre claims that a dialogue can involve the i n t e r p l a y of various s i z e u n i t s , i n c l u d i n g NARRATIVE. Then, h i s a n a l y s i s o f dialogue has immediate relevance t o my n a r r a t i v e materials and provides us with a bridge f o r analyzing dialogue r e l a t i o n s between narrators and n a r r a t i v e r e c i p i e n t s . That being the case, there i s c e r t a i n l y more t o n a r r a t i v e responses than acceptance, r e j e c t i o n , and continuing utterances, although these features are important t o us as we seek t o discover and describe n a r r a t i v e response preferences and acceptance/rejection devices. Longacre, then, i s one o f the few l i n g u i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n discourse who has l a i d some o f the necessary groundwork f o r the furth e r exploration o f response structures i n discourse. In Longacre's treatment o f response types i n dialogue there i s s t i l l an ethnographic dimension missing from h i s a n a l y s i s which, I be l i e v e , he would be the f i r s t t o admit. I assume that i s one reason f o r h i s i n v i t a t i o n t o students o f l i v e conversation t o supplement h i s a n a l y s i s . R e c a l l t h a t s i m i l a r i n v i t a t i o n s are found i n other 213 l i n g u i s t i c studies (Jones, 1983; Pickering, 1979; Grimes, 1978). R e c a l l that my t h e s i s i s d i r e c t e d toward a b a s i c category o f l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s — t e x t grammarians. In r e l a t i o n t o response sequencing and a t e x t grammarian treatment o f responses, I s a i d i n the l a s t chapter that I b e l i e v e the l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s p o s i t i o n i s weak. In l i v e conversation, f o r example, the l i n k s between utterances cannot n e c e s s a r i l y be paraphrased as s e n t e n t i a l connectives, and sequences which discourse analysts may judge as being " i l l - f o r m e d " when taken i n i s o l a t i o n a c t u a l l y occur q u i t e frequently. R e c a l l the example frcm Sacks (1968). A: I have a fourteen year o l d son B: Well, that's a l l r i g h t A: I a l s o have a dog B: Oh, I'm sorry Such remarks and responses seem q u i t e strange when taken i n i s o l a t i o n , as I showed i n the l a s t chapter, but seem very n a t u r a l when taken i n the context o f the a c t u a l conversation i n which A i s r a i s i n g a s e r i e s o f p o s s i b l e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r apartment r e n t a l with the landlord, B. So then, a l i n g u i s t i c discourse a n a l y s i s treatment o f sequencing which suggests the existence o f i l l - f o r m e d sequences may be s e r i o u s l y questioned. In the next s e c t i o n I o f f e r a conversational a n a l y s i s treatment o f response preferences, focusing on n a r r a t i v e responses. 214 A CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS TREATMENT OF RECIPIENT RESPONSES In t h i s s e c t i o n I want t o spend seme time examining how people respond when t o l d a story. In examining s t o r y responses we encounter instances where the stor y response provides f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a conversational trouble, that i s , where a c t u a l performances are discrepant from p r e f e r r e d performances. By a 'preferred' performance I mean that when a s t o r y t e l l e r volunteers a s t o r y i n the midst o f ongoing conversation the pr e f e r r e d response a t stor y end i s one o f 'acceptance'. That i s t o say, a s t o r y r e c i p i e n t ought t o p r o t e c t the current i n t e r a c t i o n by responding i n such a way that the s t o r y t e l l e r i s informed th a t the response i s designed t o d i s p l a y understanding, conrniseration, or empathy. However, as we s h a l l see i n the t r a n s c r i p t s that follow, sometimes the stor y r e c i p i e n t ' s response 1 deviates from the p r e f e r r e d or model response o f 'acceptance'. Upon the completion o f a t e l l i n g sequence a s l o t opens up f o r a response sequence. That i s , a story's completion occasions i t s response sequence. Thus, upon r e c e i p t o f a recognizable story completion the stor y r e c i p i e n t ought t o d i s p l a y understanding o f the st o r y and t o a f f i l i a t e t o the s t o r y by demonstrating the relevance o f the st o r y i n furth e r t a l k . Story 'appreciation' ought t o be displayed, by which the stor y r e c i p i e n t informs the s t o r y t e l l e r that he was, indeed, paying a t t e n t i o n t o the stor y as i t was being t o l d and th a t he was making sense o f i t . One way i n which t h i s can be accomplished i s by the r e c i p i e n t t e l l i n g a second story i n which he was i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n as the t e l l e r o f the f i r s t s t o r y was i n (Ryave, 1978). This informs the o r i g i n a l s t o r y t e l l e r that a t t e n t i o n 215 was p a i d t o h i s or her s t o r y and that i t was 'appreciated'. I u s u a l l y f i n d i n my materials, however, the r e c i p i e n t expressing story appreciation i n terms o f responding with what I am c a l l i n g an 'acceptance' i n the s t o r y response s l o t , the p r e f e r r e d response f o r reasons we s h a l l examine l a t e r . However, sometimes the story r e c i p i e n t ' s response deviates from the p r e f e r r e d response o f 'acceptance'. Closer examination o f these 'r e j e c t i o n ' responses or r e b u f f s shows that such responses may vary i n s e v e r i t y and may i n f a c t be q u i t e i n t r i c a t e l y structured and locked i n t o the s o c i a l -o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structure o f the s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n . In t h i s chapter I am seeking t o l o c a t e types o f rebuffs, r e j e c t i o n s , and semi-r e j e c t i o n s with an i n t e r e s t i n discovering and d e s c r i b i n g how s t o r y t e l l e r s and r e c i p i e n t s i n s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n s can s u s t a i n and p r o t e c t the current, ongoing i n t e r a c t i o n . In so doing I examine a s t o r y r e c i p i e n t ' s two-fold 'problem': (1) t o o r i e n t i n the p r e f e r r e d manner t o a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s story, while (2) not n e c c e s s a r i l y condoning the recounted a c t i v i t y which the s t o r y t e l l e r engaged i n . A number o f the t r a n s c r i p t s we w i l l be examining may be found i n Chapter 3. T r a n s c r i p t s 1-2 and VI-4 may be found i n Appendix I I . The reader may wish t o review the t r a n s c r i p t s before continuing with the a n a l y s i s . A c t i o n Chains As a s t a r t i n g p o i n t I propose that responses t o s t o r i e s may be coordinated with an already e x i s t i n g structure i n the conversational a n a l y s i s l i t e r a t u r e . T y p i c a l l y , s t o r i e s contain explanations or accounts, embedded i n the t e l l i n g sequence, which seek t o inform the 216 s t o r y r e c i p i e n t how i t came t o be that the recounted a c t i v i t y was engaged i n . One k i n d o f system that connects story responses with a s t o r y t e l l e r 1 s motive explanation embedded i n the s t o r y t e l l i n g sequence i s what Anita Pomerantz (1978) has termed 'chained a c t i o n s ' . She characterizes an 'action chain' as a type o f organization i n which two r e l a t e d actions, A c t i o n 1 and A c t i o n 2, are l i n k e d such that the performing o f A c t i o n 1 provides f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the performance o f A c t i o n 2 as an appropriate next a c t i o n . Using Pomerantz' example frcm compliments and compliment responses we can begin t o see how these a c t i o n chains work. One kin d o f a c t i o n chain f o r compliments i s : A l : A compliments B A2: B accepts/rejects the compliment another being: A l : A compliments B A2: B agrees/disagrees with the compliment She draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between chained actions and Sacks and S c h e g l o f f s 'adjacency p a i r ' structure by s t a t i n g : With 'action chains' what i s being proposed i s that an A c t i o n 2, or ' second p a i r - p a r t ' , i s not a should but a may f o r r e c i p i e n t , t h a t i s , an option among several s p e c i f i a b l e op-t i o n s (Pomerantz, 1978:110). So then, with an a c t i o n chain the second p a i r - p a r t i s not ob l i g a t o r y but o p t i o n a l , whereas i n the adjacency-pair structure the second p a i r - p a r t ought t o be r e a l i z e d . Pomerantz considers the second 217 p a i r - p a r t o f an a c t i o n chain t o be one o f a number o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s . There i s a retrospective-prospective feature o f the a c t i o n chain which marks a d i f f e r e n c e between the a c t i o n chain structure and the adjacency-pair structure. With the former, i t i s the production o f an 2 A c t i o n 1 which provides f o r the formulation o f an A c t i o n 2. One consideration I am exploring i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f preferences among p o t e n t i a l A c t i o n 2' s (hereafter r e f e r r e d t o as 'A2', the second utterance i n an a c t i o n chain i n s t o r y responses). Although these i n i t i a l observations i n themselves t e l l us very l i t t l e about the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t o r y responses and p o s s i b l e response types, we may begin to j u s t i f y these claims by i n v e s t i g a t i n g the materials presented e a r l i e r . The reason f o r u t i l i z i n g Pomerantz' work with a c t i o n chains i s that, i n the process o f examining my materials, i t became apparent that there was a c e r t a i n describable sequential o r d e r l i n e s s i n the response sequence. That order has much i n common with the a c t i o n chain concept. My a n a l y s i s employs the a c t i o n chain structure as a springboard f o r f u r t h e r discovery and d e s c r i p t i o n . In the l a s t chapter I claimed th a t a general procedure employable by a s t o r y t e l l e r f o r constructing a s t o r y i s t o organize the s t o r y i n terms o f a d i s p l a y o f o r i e n t a t i o n t o some element o f ' r i s k ' already present i n the ongoing p r i o r t a l k . This d i s p l a y o f o r i e n t a t i o n enables the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t t o appreciate t h a t the s t o r y i s embedded i n the ongoing conversation and t h a t i t got generated out o f c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n being p a i d t o the provided resources. On the occasion o f s t o r i e s containing r i s k - t a k i n g , I showed i n the l a s t chapter th a t we have i t a v a i l a b l e t o n o t i c e the defensive design o f such n a r r a t i v e s . 218 Simply, we f i n d that s t o r y t e l l e r s normally o f fer explanations and accounts for miriimizing the g rav i ty o f having engaged i n the recounted a c t i v i t y . E a r l i e r I sa id that upon completion o f a s tory a response s l o t opens up, a s l o t which i s occasioned by the s tory . The response s l o t i s normally f i l l e d by some k i n d o f ' s tory apprec ia t ion ' , where the s tory r e c i p i e n t or ient s to what i s being t o l d about and di sp lays that o r i e n t a t i o n by generating t a l k a t s tory end which does the work of informing the s t o r y t e l l e r that the r e c i p i e n t pa id a t tent ion t o the s tory and that the r e c i p i e n t had made sense out o f i t , that i t was understood. Note how story rec ip ient s d i sp lay s tory appreciat ion i n the fo l lowing t r a n s c r i p t s . (1-6) A : . . . I was so scared that day, and I got through i t , that i t s hard to imagine ever being that scared again. So tha t , that was a b i g turning po int for me t o have l i v e d through that p a r t i c u l a r day B: 'N i t ' s probably bet ter that you structured the morning than i f you had t r i e d to — teach, because you might have been very uncomfortable. ( I I I - l ) G: . . . ' n then he d i d i t a t h i r d time ' n I thought, 'okay' hehe so (I.O) t h a t ' s how I got the job a t the B .C. Pen D: What d i d you f e e l , what d i d you say t o yourse l f when you saw t h i s b i r d , other -than, ' w e l l , f a r out ' ? (LX-1) 219 B: . . . s o I ended up going w i t h him. I know i t was wrong, but c A : So what was i t l i k e ? In these instances the s tory rec ip ient s o r i e n t to the s tor ie s being t o l d by commenting on the s tory or asking questions about some part o f the s tory . That i s , the r ec ip i en t ought t o show the s t o r y t e l l e r that he was paying a t tent ion t o the s tory and t r y i n g to discover the import o f the s tory . I n the above examples we have i t ava i l ab le to see two d i f f e rent types o f f i l l e r s for the story appreciat ion s l o t : commentaries and questions. Cer t a in ly other kinds o f things can f i l l the s tory appreciat ion s l o t , the po int being that the s tory r e c i p i e n t ought t o d i sp lay t o the s t o r y t e l l e r that the story has been heard and made sense of , that the r ec ip i en t was paying a t tent ion t o the s tory . My i n t e r e s t i n the s tory appreciat ion s l o t w i l l become more apparent as I locate chained act ions i n s t o r y t e l l i n g s i tua t ions i n order to discover and describe how conversational i n t e r a c t i o n may be sustained, protected, and repaired . 'Story appreciat ion' i s a general phenomenon which can be done i n a number o f ways and which has received considerable a t tent ion i n the conversational analys i s l i t e r a t u r e (Sacks; 1970, 1971, 1974, 1978; Jef ferson, 1978; Ryave, 1978). Story appreciat ion can be ccmposed o f things l i k e laughings, questions, commentaries, and so on. Anything which shows the s t o r y t e l l e r that the r e c i p i e n t was l i s t e n i n g t o and t r y i n g t o f igure out the import o f the s tory . Ryave (1978) demonstrates how 'second s t o r i e s ' can f i l l the s tory appreciat ion s l o t , s to r i e s i n which the r e c i p i e n t o f a f i r s t s tory then t e l l s a 220 s t o r y i n which the r e c i p i e n t i s i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n t o t h a t which 3 the f i r s t s t o r y t e l l e r was i n . J e f f e r s o n (1978) shows how turn-by-turn t a l k i s re-engaged by s t o r y r e c i p i e n t o f f e r i n g 'appreciation' a t story completion. Some o f her examples include appreciation done by questions, as we have seen i n the above materials, which are observably occasioned by a p r i o r utterance i n the t e l l i n g sequence and which i t s e l f implicates a t l e a s t a next utterance, thereby i n s u r i n g a formal return to turn-by-turn t a l k . Sacks i n i t i a l l y developed the three-part s t o r y t e l l i n g sequences o f preface, t e l l i n g , and response i n h i s l e c t u r e s e r i e s on s t o r y t e l l i n g (1970-1971), and s p e c i f i e d t h a t the response sequence i s normally composed of, among other options, an utterance which does 'appreciation'. Now I wish to b u i l d upon and eventually depart from the feature o f s t o r y appreciation by examining a c t i o n chain structures i n s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n s . To r e i t e r a t e , a s t o r y t e l l i n g sequence's completion occasions i t s response sequence. Minimally, the response sequence c o n s i s t s o f s t o r y appreciation. But r e c i p i e n t s are not o b l i g a t e d t o express story appreciation. In the l a s t chapter I noted an instance where the s t o r y was considered to be ' i r r e l e v a n t ' to the ongoing t a l k and was thus ignored by the r e c i p i e n t s . Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s s i l e n c e . One feature o f story appreciations i s t h a t they are l o c a l l y responsive, done on the completion o f the l a s t utterance o f the s t o r y t e l l i n g and a f f i l i a t e d with l a s t utterance. I f done w i t h i n an utterance, or w i t h i n the t e l l i n g sequence, story appreciation a f f i l i a t e s to the current state o f development o f the l a s t utterance. One r e c i p i e n t concern i s to have one's sto r y appreciation locate what i s being appreciated by being p o s i t i o n e d immediately following the utterance 221 the r e c i p i e n t wishes t o a f f i l i a t e with. Any delay can have the r e s u l t that the appreciation utterance i s aimed a t something other than what i t i s intended f o r . When t a l k i n g about "story appreciation' I mean that the s t o r y 4 r e c i p i e n t d i s p l a y s an understanding o f the story a t story completion. Part o f my i n t e r e s t i n t h i s chapter i s t o examine some o f the ways i n which r e c i p i e n t s o f f e r understandings as appreciations. One thing we may note i s that, q u i t e commonly, stor y appreciations may be accomplished with an A c t i o n 2 o r 'A2', the second utterance i n a a c t i o n chain. Turning t h i s around a b i t , we may say that, examining the d i s t r i b u t i o n i n conversation o f A2's, one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c place they occur i s i n the s t o r y appreciation p o s i t i o n . Further, one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c use o f an A2 i n the s t o r y appreciation s l o t i s t o o f f e r understanding o f what the s t o r y was about. In r e l a t i o n t o n a r r a t i v e s , the A2 i n the s t o r y appreciation p o s i t i o n may be used t o i n i t i a t e r e j e c t i o n machinery or o f f e r support t o the t e l l e r i n the form o f an 'acceptance'. We have i t a v a i l a b l e , then, t o pursue the notion that an A2 may be used i n the s t o r y appreciation s l o t and that i t may stand i n some methodical way t o the form o f the story, s p e c i f i c a l l y , t o an A l i n the t e l l i n g sequence. I f we take i t t h a t an a c t i o n chain can cross over the t e l l i n g and response sequences, then we have i t a v a i l a b l e t o see A c t i o n 1 as taking place i n the t e l l i n g sequence and A c t i o n 2 taking place i n the response sequence. Further, I should be required t o show that an A2 i s provided f o r by an A l and that the A2 i s placed adjacent t o the A l . Consider the following. 222 (IX-2) W: [STORY] but that's kinda strange, so I f i g u r e uhhh [ R: Well, I think that's good (VI-4) B: [STORY] and kicked him r i g h t i n the head a f t e r he got tackled, he made me so mad [ A: Yeah, but that's crazy, man, you could've broke h i s neck! In these examples we have i t a v a i l a b l e t o see that there are two things happening simultaneously: (1) the stor y appreciation s l o t i s being f i l l e d , (2) i t i s being f i l l e d by an A2. That i s , A2's may do the work o f story appreciation when pos i t i o n e d i n a story response sequence. In IX-2, W has done some work i n accounting f o r h i s engaging i n a r i s k y a c t i v i t y , t h a t accounting occurring i n the t e l l i n g sequence and a c t i n g as an A l which culniinates i n an assessment, "but that's kinda strange". The A2 i s provided by R i n the response sequence and i s made up o f a second assessment, "Well, I think that's good". That i s , we can locate an organization i n which two ordered actions, A c t i o n 1 and Act i o n 2, are l i n k e d such that the performing o f Ac t i o n 1 provides f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f A c t i o n 2. In VT-4 we see a s i m i l a r s t r u c t u r e . B provides an account (Al) for h i s actions i n the t e l l i n g sequence, "he made me so mad," t o which A responds with a second assessment (A2), "Yeah, but that's crazy, man, you could've broke h i s neck!" In IX-2 the a c t i o n chain c o n s i s t s o f : A l : W provides an account f o r having engaged i n the recounted a c t i v i t y 223 A2: R accepts W's account In VT-4 the a c t i o n chain c o n s i s t s o f : A l : B provides an account f o r having engaged i n the recounted a c t i v i t y A2: A r e j e c t s B's account Note i n the above t r a n s c r i p t s that an A2 may occur i n the story appreciation s l o t . That i s t o say, one way o f f i l l i n g the story appreciation s l o t i s by using an A2. One p o i n t I want t o be quite c l e a r on, though, i s that the chained a c t i o n structure, A l and A2, i s a separate phenomenon. One th i n g I wish t o explore, then, i s the i n t e r a c t i o n between the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s o f a s t o r y appreciation ( i t i s o b l i g a t o r y i n the sense tha t a s t o r y r e c i p i e n t ought t o produce sto r y appreciation a t s t o r y completion), and the o p t i o n a l i t y o f the A2 p a r t o f a chained a c t i o n . From the above fragments, note that story appreciation (which d i s p l a y s t h a t the story r e c i p i e n t was indeed paying a t t e n t i o n t o what was being recounted), may be composed o f an A2 t o something occurring i n the s t o r y which i s not i t s e l f the story. Acceptance Response Procedures In the l a s t s e c t i o n I s a i d that an A2 may preempt that s l o t where the s t o r y appreciation would normally occur. I proposed that there may be occasions on which an A2 responds t o an A l i n the t e l l i n g sequence, where the only place t o put t h a t A2 a l s o happens t o be the place where there normally would have been s t o r y appreciation. 224 Further, I s a i d t h a t when an explanation or account i s employed wit h i n the t e l l i n g sequence o f a na r r a t i v e , a c o n s t r a i n t system i s constructed which the sto r y r e c i p i e n t should attend t o . One k i n d o f c o n s t r a i n t system which l i n k s a sto r y r e c i p i e n t ' s response t o the s t o r y with the defensive procedure employed by a s t o r y t e l l e r may be uncovered by invoking the chained a c t i o n structure f o r a n a l y s i s . In the l a s t s e c t i o n I characterized Pomerantz' development o f 'chained actions' as an organization i n which two ordered actions are l i n k e d such that the performing o f the f i r s t a c t i o n provides f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the performing o f a second a c t i o n as an appropriate next a c t i o n . We may now formulate our 'problem' as follows: how does someone being t o l d a s t o r y o r i e n t t o a defensive procedure i n the t e l l i n g sequence so as t o transform the r e s u l t s o f that o r i e n t a t i o n i n t o a p r e f e r r e d story response? With the formulation o f the 'problem' a r i s e a t l e a s t two r e l a t e d problems, one f o r the story r e c i p i e n t and one f o r the s t o r y t e l l e r . The r e c i p i e n t ' s problem has t o do with sustaining and p r o t e c t i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n with a p r e f e r r e d s t o r y response. I f a r e c i p i e n t f e e l s t h a t the pr e f e r r e d 'acceptance' response i s not p o s s i b l e , then the 'problem' becomes: how can the i n t e r a c t i o n be sustained? In the event o f the p o s s i b i l i t y that a st o r y r e c i p i e n t does not produce the p r e f e r r e d s t o r y response, then the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s 'problem' becomes: how can the i n t e r a c t i o n be protected i n l i g h t o f a d i s p r e f e r r e d s t o r y response? We can gain an appreciation f o r the kinds o f issues involved i n both the general problem and the two r e l a t e d problems by examining p o s s i b l e a c t i o n chain structures i n s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n s . One a c t i o n chain, f o r example, c o n s i s t s o f : 225 A l : A provides an account f o r having engaged i n an a c t i v i t y A2: B accepts/rejects A's account In A2 we can see the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d i s p r e f e r r e d r e s p o n s e — t h a t the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t may choose t o contest or r e j e c t the elements comprising the t e l l e r ' s account or reasons f o r having engaged i n the r i s k y a c t i v i t y . The p r e f e r r e d a c t i o n chain f o r r e c i p i e n t responding t o a Class II sto r y i s : A l : A accounts f o r engaging i n the recounted a c t i v i t y A2: B accepts A's account An 'acceptance' may be accomplished i n one o f two ways. One procedure—Type I — i n v o l v e s the st o r y r e c i p i e n t i n coordinating an a c t i v i t y a p p r a i s a l with the t e l l e r ' s account. That i s , r e c i p i e n t acceptance may be accomplished with an 'appraisal upgrade'. This v a r i a t i o n involves the st o r y r e c i p i e n t i n upgrading the t e l l e r ' s assessment o f 'what happened'. In IX-2 we can see an example o f the Type I procedure. (IX-2) W: 'n there's a b i g long l i n e o f cars about f i v e - t h i r t y 'n I thought t o myself, w e l l I'm not gonna stay here i n l i n e on t h i s s t u p i d b i c y c l e , I'm gonna wait a l i t t l e while, and (1.0) I thought, w e l l what am I gonna do? An' there's t h i s tavern next t o the bank (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) [ 226 R: Oh, ncooool (32) C W: So I thought, I ' l l j u s t (33) go i n here, I'm sure i t ' s got a pool t a b l e (34) a l l taverns got pool t a b l e s , 'n I went i n (35) there and there were some pool tables so (36) I s t a r t e d shootin' a game o f pool (2.0) (37) W: ...I f e l t g u i l t y comin' home and t e l l i n ' (94) Maggie that, y'know, I ran i n t o Mark (95) Wagner today, w e l l , where'd you do that? (96) Well, i n t h i s tavern (97) C R: yeah ((laughs)) (98) W: y'know? but that's kinda strange, so I (99) f i g u r e uhhh (100) C R: Well, I t h i n k that's good In R's l a s t utterance i n the above t r a n s c r i p t he chooses t o respond t o W's account f o r having engaged i n a r i s k y a c t i v i t y i n an accepting way which shows that he understands, o r a t l e a s t i s t r y i n g to understand, how i t i s t h a t W ended up helping a f r i e n d i n a tavern. Subsequent t o a s t o r y t e l l e r ' s account, r e c i p i e n t a p p r a i s a l upgrades r e g u l a r l y take the form o f second assessments. A feature o f a second assessment i s t h a t i t recognizes the status o f the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s account while a t the same time i t does not focus on the ' r i s k i n e s s ' o f the a c t i v i t y being accounted f o r . Further, i f an assessment upgrade as a second assessment i s t o be considered as an A2, i t should be performed i n the r e c i p i e n t ' s next turn a t t a l k following the completion o f the story. R e c a l l t h a t an A l may be embodied i n a s i n g l e utterance or i n a sequence o f utterances, and t h a t there may be intervening t a l k between the performance o f an A l and an A2 which, as we s a i d e a r l i e r , d i s t i n g u i s h e s an a c t i o n chain from an adjacency p a i r . 227 I t seems reasonable t o suggest, then, that a r e c i p i e n t doing 'acceptance' recognizes the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s A l as p a r t o f the story's defensive design and as an account th a t warrants a response, the p r e f e r r e d course o f a c t i o n being th a t i t should be accepted as tenable and th a t i s or i e n t e d t o as a successful p a r t o f the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s defensive design, and that with an 'acceptance' i n the story a p p r e c i a t i o n s l o t the r e c i p i e n t may be seen t o be agreeing with the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s assessment o f how t o hear 'what happened'. In the above paragraph I claimed that a major type o f 'acceptance' response i s one achieved with a second assessment which d i s p l a y s agreement with the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s account. In IX-2, f o r example, a r e c i p i e n t upgrade i n the form o f a second assessment i s , "Well, I think that's good", which agrees with the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s assessment that he d i d the r i g h t t h i n g i n that circumstance. One feature o f an upgrade as a second assessment i s that i t recognizes the ' r i s k ' involved i n the t e l l i n g sequence without r e f e r r i n g t o the s p e c i f i c s o f that ' r i s k ' . I t does not d i r e c t l y focus on the r i s k i n e s s , although the a p p r a i s a l upgrade may imply such an o r i e n t a t i o n . I t does, however, assess the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s account or assessment o f h i s or her account, which provides us with evidence f o r suggesting th a t a s t o r y r e c i p i e n t ' s response may be the second p a i r -p a r t o f an a c t i o n chain. To r e i t e r a t e , s t o r y t e l l e r s sometimes o f f e r accounts as p a r t o f the defensive design o f t h e i r s t o r i e s i n order to inform a st o r y r e c i p i e n t how i t came t o be that the recounted a c t i v i t y was engaged i n . S t o r y t e l l e r s i n such s i t u a t i o n s w i l l o f t e n o f f e r assessments o f 'what happened', assessments which bear a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the nature 228 o f t h e i r accounts. In t h a t the p r e f e r r e d r e c i p i e n t response type i s tha t o f 'acceptance', t h a t work can be done by the r e c i p i e n t providing a second assessment which does the work o f upgrading the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s assessment v i s - a - v i s 'what happened' (I c a l l t h i s a Type I response). The second v a r i a t i o n — T y p e I I — i n v o l v e s the s t o r y r e c i p i e n t i n minimizing the ' r i s k i n e s s ' o f the a c t i v i t y engaged i n and recounted by the s t o r y t e l l e r by not o r i e n t i n g t o the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s assessment o f 'what happened'. I r e f e r t o t h i s as ' r i s k n e u t r a l i z a t i o n ' . Note two examples o f the Type II procedure. (1-2) Louise: [STORY] we didn't go t o bed with each other, but i t was so comfort-able 1 n so nice Ken: Mm hmm (IX-1) B: [STORY] he always wanted t o t r y one so I ended up going with him. I know i t was wrong, but uhh [ A: So what was i t l i k e ? In these instances the r e c i p i e n t i n s t r u c t s the s t o r y t e l l e r t o recognize t h a t the r i s k i n e s s i s being minimized by the r e c i p i e n t , that i t i s being overlooked and ignored. Minimization machinery works t o a l l e v i a t e the r e c i p i e n t 'problem' o f having t o deal somehow with being t o l d a r i s k y s t o r y while a t the same time sustaining and p r o t e c t i n g the current i n t e r a c t i o n . When the Type II procedure i s u t i l i z e d the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s 'problem' i s simultaneously taken care of, and the current i n t e r a c t i o n protected. We have i t a v a i l a b l e t o see, then. 229 that both 'acceptance' procedures do the work o f managing some p o t e n t i a l conversational troubles by p r o t e c t i n g the current i n t e r a c t i o n . In our c u l t u r e there i s an obvious place f o r the Type I ( a p p r a i s a l upgrade) and Type II ( r i s k n e u t r a l i z a t i o n ) procedures. When a s t o r y gets generated which has some k i n d o f defensive design b u i l t i n t o the t e l l i n g sequence which the story r e c i p i e n t should attend to, i t behooves the r e c i p i e n t t o inform the s t o r y t e l l e r that the defensive work has been ori e n t e d t o and t h a t the t e l l e r ' s work i s appreciated. By employing such acceptance procedures the s t o r y t e l l e r and r e c i p i e n t work concertedly t o s u s t a i n the current i n t e r a c t i o n . Another issue, although not our primary concern, i s t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p the s t o r y t e l l e r and r e c i p i e n t brought i n t o the i n t e r a c t i o n may likewise be protected. That i s , a f t e r a l l , one p o s s i b l e consequence o f p r o t e c t i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n . Thus the s t o r y t e l l e r ' s defensive work and the r e c i p i e n t ' s 'acceptance' response may be seen as a coordinated e f f o r t which seeks t o do the work o f sustaining the i n t e r a c t i o n a l encounter. In the f i r s t chapter I s a i d t h a t t h i s study seeks t o subject seme o f Goffman's claims concerning 'face-work', which have remained heretofore unsubstantiated, t o e mp ir ic al a n a l y s i s . The above considerations provide us with an empirical b a s i s which supports a number o f Goffman's claims which have remained l a r g e l y unproved i n h i s w r i t i n g s . How so? R e c a l l i n h i s paper, "On Face-Work" (1967), he r e f e r s t o 'face-work' as: 230 ...the actions taken by a person t o make whatever he i s doing consistent with face...Thus poise i s one import-ant type o f face-^work, f o r through poise the person c o n t r o l s h i s embarrassment and hence the embarrassment that he and others might have over h i s embarrass-ment (pp. 12-13). Further, Goffman t a l k s about a person having two points o f view: (1) a defensive o r i e n t a t i o n toward saving one's own face, and (2) a p r o t e c t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n towards saving the others' face. He w r i t e s : Seme p r a c t i c e s w i l l be p r i m a r i l y de-fensive and others p r i m a r i l y p r o t e c t i v e , although i n general one may expect these two perspectives t o be taken a t the same time. In t r y i n g t o save the face o f others, the person must choose a tack tha t w i l l not lead t o l o s s o f h i s own; i n t r y i n g t o save h i s own face, he must consider the l o s s o f face t h a t h i s actions may e n t a i l f o r others (p.14). Both o f these o r i e n t a t i o n s are evident i n IX-2, IX-1, and 1-2. With regard t o the former, the s t o r y t e l l e r s i n these t r a n s c r i p t s can be seen t o be p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r t e l l i n g s against d i s p r e f e r r e d r e c i p i e n t transforms by i n c l u d i n g i n t h e i r t e l l i n g s explanations and accounts f o r having p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the recounted a c t i v i t i e s , which does the work o f p r o t e c t i n g and sustaining 'face' i n the midst o f a d i s c l o s u r e s t o r y t e l l i n g s i t u a t i o n , e.g. IX-2, l i n e s (25)-(39); IX-1, l i n e s (14)-(20); and 1-2, l i n e s ( l ) - ( 6 ) a n d • ( 8 ) - ( l l ) . With regard t o the l a t t e r o r i e n t a t i o n , we f i n d r e c i p i e n t s attempting t o pr o t e c t and sustain s t o r y t e l l e r s ' 'face', e.g. IX-2, l i n e s (101) and (105)-(106); IX-1, l i n e s (21)-(22). In our so c i e t y people can be seen t o be s e l f -r e g u l a t i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s i n