THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CONVERSATIONAL NARRATIVE:
A Methodological Contribution to Linguistic Discourse Analysis via Conversational Analysis

by
ROGER WILLSON SPIELMANN

B.A., Warner Pacific College, 1976
M.A., University of Texas, Arlington, 1977

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Sociology)

We accept this dissertation as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

October 1984

© Roger Willson Spielmann, 1984
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Sociology

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date Oct. 18, 1984
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines stories told in natural conversation with an interest in discovering and describing social features of conversational discourse. Sociology has begun to develop a strong interest in narrative structures, and this interest parallels the current interest in discourse and seeks to make the sociological enterprise of conversational analysis relevant to discourse analysis, particularly in relation to narrative.

The data for this study were collected over a period of four years (1979-83). Approximately 19 hours of tape-recorded conversations recorded in a variety of situations were collected. After a lengthy period of listening to the tapes, instances where stories are told were isolated and transcribed, and structural features of prefacings, tellings, and responses were subjected to formal analysis. The analytical techniques used in this study were first developed by Harvey Sacks and his students. The contribution of this study is to provide the discourse analyst with a set of well-defined discovery procedures for describing ethnographic features which influence discourse. The ethnographic interest has two distinctive features; (1) it is oriented to members' practices, and (2) it is 'micro' in character, oriented to a close reading of interactions in context.
In the analytical chapters (3-6), the thesis explores how characters may be formulated in the narratives and what kinds of interactional work gets done (Chapter 3), the interactional importance of collateral information in narrative telling sequences (Chapter 4), how narratives get generated from prior ongoing talk (Chapter 5), and narrative response types and preferences (Chapter 6). Throughout the thesis an interest is maintained in relating the findings of the study with current findings in discourse analysis. The thesis concludes with a chapter summarising its original contribution and relating the methodology and findings of the study to recent methodologies and findings in discourse analysis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................. ix

CHAPTER ONE: LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS ........ 1

Introductory Remarks ............................................. 1
Scope of the Study ............................................... 7

LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ............................. 10
Bloomfield, Chomsky, and Beyond ............................ 12
Assumptions About Language in Linguistic Discourse Analysis ..................... 16
Discourse Types .................................................. 18
Monologue and Repartee ....................................... 23
Linguistic Pragmatics ........................................... 26

CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS ..................................... 28
The Goffman Factor .............................................. 29
Ethnomethodology ............................................... 35
Sacksian Analysis ................................................ 38
Differences Between Conversational Analysis and Linguistic Discourse Analysis .... 40

METHODOLOGY ...................................................... 46
Conclusion ......................................................... 48
CHAPTER FIVE: PRE-NARRATIVE SEQUENCING AS AN INTERACTIONAL RESOURCE .................. 163

A Linguistic Treatment of Pre-Narrative Sequencing ....... 164
A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Pre-Narrative Sequencing....................... 168
The Sequencing Problem ........................................... 177
Solution to the Sequencing Problem ......................... 185
Pre-Narrative Resources ........................................... 195
Conclusion ......................................................... 204

CHAPTER SIX: NARRATIVE RESPONSE PREFERENCES ......................... 209

A Linguistic Treatment of Recipient Responses .......... 210
A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Recipient Responses ....................... 215
Action Chains ....................................................... 216
Acceptance Response Procedures .................................. 224
Dispreferred Response Procedures ............................. 233
Conclusion ......................................................... 246

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................ 251

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................... 260

APPENDIX I .............................................................. 270
APPENDIX II ............................................................. 273

vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the production of any work of this type one incurs many debts of gratitude, far more than can be recognized in the Acknowledgements. I wish to express my indebtedness to the following people, among many who contributed to making this dissertation possible.

The advice and assistance of my advisor, Roy Turner, deserve special attention. He helped me to grasp what I consider to be basic concepts related to the study of conversational interaction, and he had an effect both direct and prominent on the shape of this study.

I wish to offer a special thanks to J.V. Powell, from whom I acquired an interdisciplinary perspective which is important to this study. I consider him to be a model of the spirit of open, critical, and penetrating inquiry. His life, as a scholar and as a personal friend, has been exemplary to me, and his investment of time, thought, and care in my development as a scholar is deeply appreciated. I consider him a friend in the deepest sense of the word.

I am grateful to those who also invested in me and in this study: to Elvi Whittaker for her willingness to remain on my committee from start to finish; to Holly Gardner for her friendship and expertise as a student of live conversation; to my friends Jim Weisenburg, Steve Congdon, Doug Wagoner, and David Aleguire, all of whom contributed either directly or indirectly to this study.
Finally, my wife, Ruth, deserves special mention for her love, encouragement, and personal sacrifices over the past few years. It is a tribute to her that we survived this process intact and, hopefully, better prepared for the future as a couple. Her insights into discourse contributed greatly to the development of my thinking. She is a model to me of the integration of intellectual and spiritual commitment which is highly admired, but rarely attained.
This is a study of some features of discourse via conversational analysis. The topic for this study came about as a result of listening to many hours of recorded conversations, examining transcripts, and talking with colleagues. There were many 'false starts'. I first became interested in the topic of conversational storytelling out of a broader interest in locating and describing interactional methods and procedures which people use in carrying out their everyday business. At some point particular features of stories started to jump out at me, and my interests became more focused. First, I discovered that many of the features of narratives treated by linguists interested in discourse could also be treated by conversational analysis, and treated differently. Secondly, there seemed to be an important dimension missing from linguistic discourse studies, a dimension recognized as important by linguists but basically neglected. That dimension has to do with ethnographic and interactional concerns in discourse. Finally, I began to search out and describe that dimension in relation to previous studies in linguistic discourse analysis.

The research procedures employed in this study were aimed at the discovery of members' methods and practices which seem to go beyond our member intuitions and understandings of conversational work. In the analytical chapters it seemed reasonable to suggest that the sorts of things going on when someone generates a narrative in live
conversation are not things that we could say we 'already knew' or that were in the first place explicitly known. That is, in no way can it be claimed that I merely started out with something I already knew about narratives and then refined and elaborated it. Rather, my research procedures were aimed at the discovery of non-intuitive observations and understandings of conversational work. These procedures have implications for findings which concern a conversationalist's "skill" or "work." Further, I took it as a study policy that any claim to have located and adequately described a feature of narratives be interactionally substantiated, derived from actual conversational transcripts. I attempted to show that located features were available to be oriented to by participants.

I believe that the import of this study is that it contributes to the growing body of literature in linguistic discourse analysis as well as to the current research being carried out by students of live conversation committed to locating and describing the organization of conversational interaction as the technical accomplishment of members involved in the everyday activity of 'talking together'. As such, this study may be seen to be interdisciplinary. The exact nature of its contribution to linguistic discourse analysis and conversational analysis is made clear in Chapter 1.

This study regards conversation as an essentially interactional activity. I focused on the sequential emergence of one conversational activity from turn-by-turn talk, structural features of telling sequences, response sequences, and formulating characters, all in the context of narratives told in live conversation. The meaning and relevance of locating and describing features of narratives is not a
matter to be determined merely by examining the particulars of some recounting. It is perhaps better conceived as a social activity that is interactionally achieved, negotiated in and through the particulars of a situation. It is hoped that this study can be seen to have laid the groundwork for locating and describing the features of this interactional work in one conversational activity.

While the substantive focus of this study is on the phenomenon of narratives, my major concern has not been merely to describe in detail the workings of an activity. Rather, my aim has been to recommend the importance of investigating a commonplace activity of everyday life under the auspices of an analytical apparatus which seeks to treat everyday activities as the accomplishment of members. I believe that in this study a sociological framework begins to emerge from a detailed study of conversational interaction, a framework characterized by a set of descriptions of narrators' and recipients' methods and procedures for understanding and sustaining the ongoing interaction. I have pointed to a treatment of one conversational activity that exposes and takes as its central topic the practice of members participating as a matter of everyday concern in its production and recognition. It is hoped that the importance of this study is informed by the fact that such research treats as its topic of inquiry an activity of social life that is generally taken-for-granted by people, and not merely that it makes accessible to formal inquiry the achieved character of everyday life.
Introductory Remarks

In recent years, sociology has developed a strong interest in language, as witness the growth of sociolinguistics with its various theoretical and methodological approaches. Sociologists who study in detail the conventional ways in which people interact with one another commonly demonstrate this concern (Goffman, 1955, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1981; Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1972, 1974, 1978; Schegloff, 1972; Jefferson, 1978; Turner, 1970, 1972, 1976). At the same time, linguistics has come to share a sense that a joint venture may be necessary, and has looked towards sociology and anthropology. Within sociology there has been considerable research into the structure of conversation, and this parallels linguistic interest in discourse. Nevertheless, the actual contact between sociology and linguistics has been small, in part because of the specialist training in both disciplines.

There have been some recent attempts by sociologists to integrate linguistics with sociology (Cicourel, 1974; Grimshaw, 1981; Gumperz, 1982; Goffman, 1981). For the most part, however, these attempts have ended up as an attack on linguistic formalisms and the absence of an ethnographic dimension from linguistic analyses. The former is a
matter of taste, the latter perhaps more substantive. However, I believe that a more fruitful dialogue can be established between the two disciplines, and I bring my training in both disciplines, sociology and linguistics, to this study.

In the preceding paragraph I noted that there seems to be an ethnographic dimension missing from much of linguistics. Throughout studies in linguistic discourse analysis there is a recognition that this is, indeed, a weakness and that there is something needed to be picked up on from the sociological perspective. Linguists are perhaps more aware than sociologists of the need to integrate, that there is something lacking from their repertoire of analytical tools. There are, in fact, a number of invitations which have been extended from the linguistic community to sociology. For example, in *The Grammar of Discourse* (1983), Robert Longacre ends the chapter on repartee with the comment:

All that we have written here needs eventually to be supplemented by and compared with the current research into the nature of live conversation (1983:75).

Larry Jones (1983), too, writes about the need for a broader linguistic vision which encompasses the social sciences. He writes:

One of the new frontiers of linguistics, discourse analysis, is in fact a part of a larger frontier, the study of how people think and how they express their thoughts... In exploring this new territory, the discourse linguist...who chooses to remain close to his own linguistic...border will be, I believe, infinitely the poorer (p.137).
Another linguist, Wilbur Pickering, brings the issue of interdisciplinary integration in linguistic discourse analysis to the forefront of current linguistic concern. He writes:

While I insist that situation and culture are part of the prior context upon which given information [in a discourse] may be based, I freely confess that I do not know how to handle it (1979:170).

and,

I am entering a plea that more linguists recognize both the legitimacy and necessity of grappling with the role of situation and culture in discourse analysis (1979:170).

This study is intended to be one step towards the integration of linguistic discourse analysis with sociology in general, and conversational analysis in particular, and may, in part, be seen as a response to an invitation.

Linguistics has much to offer the sociologist interested in the analysis of discourse, and later in this chapter I describe a key area of contribution from linguistics to sociology. Sociology, too, has much to offer the linguist interested in discourse, and it is my hope that this thesis responds to the "need" mentioned by Longacre by making a methodological and theoretical contribution to linguistic discourse analysis.

Some of the issues arising in linguistic discourse analysis are issues which have been attended to for some time in sociology. For example, one issue in discourse analysis is the need to distinguish
between the linguistic forms of utterances and the actions they perform in discourse (McTear, 1979). In the section on conversational analysis in Chapter 2, we see how the issue has been quite powerfully treated in sociology. Another issue is how form and function need to be analytically integrated in order to show their interdependence (Pickering, 1978; Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983). This issue has to do with the way in which utterances and the actions they perform are related sequentially to one another in a cohesive text. The issue as formulated by sociology focuses on interactional abilities rather than just linguistic abilities. It is my thesis, in response to the invitation, that a sociological treatment of live conversational data has much to offer the discourse linguist in terms of methodology as well as theory. Perhaps the most effective way to make clear what is meant by this is to provide the reader with an overview of the material covered in this thesis.

In Chapter 1, a general overview of linguistic discourse analysis is presented. In this overview, while pointing out what I consider to be the major strands of discourse analysis, I focus my attention on one group, the text grammarians, specifically following the school of discourse analysis which features Robert Longacre as the most recognizable head and including Linda Jones, Larry Jones, and Wilbur Pickering, to name but a few. In my review of this school of discourse analysis I focus on the basic issues, particularly in relation to the analysis of narratives. I then make the bridge between linguistic discourse analysis and conversational analysis, and show the similarities and differences between these two analytical perspectives.
In Chapter 2, I review the literature related to conversational storytelling. The data for this study is confined to conversational storytelling, and the general format is to provide the reader with a linguistic treatment of a discourse feature and then show how that feature might be handled from a sociological perspective using conversational analysis. The value and limitations of each distinctive treatment are shown. In so doing, I present analyses which are in themselves a contribution to the field of conversational analysis. That is to say, in the analytical chapters I do not merely extend linguistic discourse analysis but show how the issues are transformed in theoretically interesting ways.

Chapter 3 begins the analytical section, which is the heart of the thesis. In this chapter, I examine first mention character formulations when story characters are first mentioned in narratives, by presenting a linguistic treatment of first mention character reference and then turning to a conversational analysis treatment of the same issue. In this chapter (3) and the next (4), I give a linguistic discourse analysis treatment of formulating character and the use of collateral information in narratives told in Algonquin, a language in which I am currently working. The treatment I give to narratives in Algonquin is, in itself, a contribution to the discourse literature. Among the phenomena given special attention in my conversational analysis treatment of formulating character in English narratives are ways in which characters may be formulated, formulation preferences, and the possibility of a reversal of preferences in a certain genre of narrative.
Chapter 4 investigates the analytical concept of collateral information—information within a storytelling which, instead of telling about what did happen, tells about what did not happen. The same analytical format is applied; first presenting a linguistic treatment of the issue and then turning to a conversational analysis treatment of the same issue. Special attention is focused on the interactional work which gets done by a storyteller who inserts collateral information into a narrative.

In Chapter 5, I examine sequencing concerns in linguistic discourse analysis followed by a treatment of those same concerns by conversational analysis, again restricting the latter analysis to pre-narrative sequencing. Issues include how narratives emerge from turn-by-turn talk and the use of trigger utterances.

Chapter 6 investigates recipient response preferences which are treated in linguistic discourse analysis as a feature of repartee or the notional (deep) structure of dialogue. In a linguistic treatment of repartee the need for the ethnographic dimension is perhaps the most noticeable. In this chapter attention is focused on action chains, acceptance response procedures, and dispreferred response procedures in conversational storytelling.

In Chapter 7, I conclude the study with an examination of the methodological and theoretical contributions to linguistic discourse analysis via conversational analysis. Each analytical chapter investigates a particular phenomenon treated by those linguists involved in discourse analysis in relation to the treatment of the same phenomenon by a sociologist doing conversational analysis. An
investigation of the ways in which these issues are dealt with in conversational analysis serves to make visible some of the constitutive features of discourse, as well as revealing many intricate, finely coordinated processes which occur with them.

Scope of the Study

The data for this study were collected over a period of four years (1979-1983). I collected over 19 hours of tape-recorded conversations. I wish to thank David Aleguir for giving me some of his conversational tapes which are included in the corpus of data. Both the tapes given to me and the ones I collected were recorded in a variety of situations. After a lengthy period of listening to these conversations, I began to isolate instances where narratives were told. In re-listening to these instances and transcribing them, I began to notice structural features of prefacings, tellings, and responses. In this study I subject some of those features to formal analysis.

Earlier I said that this study is intended as a contribution to linguistic discourse analysis by providing the discourse linguist with a set of discovery procedures for explicating ethnographic and cultural features which influence live discourse. I refer to the 'ethnographic dimension' throughout this study, and I want the reader to know from the outset what I mean by 'ethnography'. In a general sense, I use the term 'ethnography' to refer to the work of describing a culture. Ethnographic research typically follows a general pattern; the researcher visits a culture other than his or her own, spends time in close contact with everyday behaviour, makes observations, asks
questions, and so on, all of which leads to an account or description of the culture. In this study I build upon and depart from a traditional definition of 'ethnography'. This traditional use is exemplified by James Spradley (1979). He writes:

The essential core of ethnography is [the] concern with the meaning of actions and events to the people we seek to understand. Some of these meanings are directly expressed in language; many are taken for granted and communicated only indirectly through word and action. But in every society people make constant use of these complex meaning systems to organize their behavior, to understand themselves and others, and to make sense out of the world in which they live. These systems of meaning constitute their culture; ethnography always implies a theory of culture (p.5).

My understanding of 'culture', what ethnography seeks to describe, is derived from Garfinkel (1967) and clarified by Peter Eglin (1978). He writes:

Members' knowledge—culture—is methodological, or knowledge how, where the 'how' is interpretational. Members know their society as methods of (pre-reflectively) interpreting its objects, where those methods or methodologies are language games, such as conversation, and their settings. Insofar as such methodological games comprise typical reasons, motives, and intentions (in addition to ways of assigning sense and reference), then far from being mental events, properties or states, these are instead interactional 'states' through and through (p.16).

In relation to describing features of one's own culture from a sociological point of view, Roy Turner (1974) makes some interesting claims. He writes:
Sociologists must (and do) employ their expertise in employing and recognizing methodological procedures for accomplishing activities...[and that] the task of the sociologist in analyzing naturally occurring scenes is not to deny his competence but to explicate it...Such explication provides for a cumulative enterprise, in that the uncovering of members' procedures for doing activities permits us both to replicate our original data and to generate new instances that fellow members will find recognizable (p.214).

The contribution of this study is to provide the discourse linguist with a set of well-defined discovery procedures for discovering and describing ethnographic features which have a bearing on discourse in the form of categories useful in formal analysis. It is my thesis that discourse linguists are currently looking outside the boundary of their discipline for these discovery procedures, and that conversational analysis has what the discourse linguist is looking for. My own ethnographic interest has two distinctive features; (1) it is oriented to member practices (see Eglin's quote, above), and (2) it is 'micro' in character, meaning that my analysis is not oriented to overall or general behavioural patterns, but to a close reading of interactions in context. My analysis offers the discourse linguist more than just insightful examples, and the raison d'être of this thesis is based on a felt need in linguistic discourse analysis (recall the comments by Longacre, Jones, and Pickering cited earlier in this chapter).

**LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

I want to begin by making clear exactly what I mean when I refer to 'linguistic discourse analysis'. Recall that this study is a
methodological and theoretical contribution to discourse analysis from a sociological perspective. In any spoken text there are three levels of organization which I recognize as basic to linguistic analysis: (1) phonology, (2) grammar, (3) and discourse. The structure in each of these levels can be expressed in terms of small units combining to form larger units. Within phonology and grammar—the traditional concerns of descriptive linguistics—the labels and structure of the units are well established. Within discourse analysis, however, very little has been agreed upon between the major traditions of discourse analysis. There are no agreed labels and few agreed structures.

When reading about discourse analysis in the linguistic literature I get the impression that there are not 'models' of discourse analysis as much as perspectives based upon differing assumptions about language. The assumptions may be derived from grammatical models of language, but a distinct discourse 'model' is a rarity. Wilbur Pickering, in A Framework for Discourse Analysis (1979), suggests that "discourse analysis is a means to get at, discriminate, and describe all of the factors that contribute to the abstraction, or total meaning, evoked by a spoken (or written) discourse of whatever size" (p.8). In his perspective, discourse analysis aims to discover and describe as nearly a complete roster as possible of the factors that may reasonably be expected to contribute to the abstraction that a discourse is designed to evoke. In his study, as in most of the other studies cited in this chapter, there is no mention of a discourse 'model', but there are numerous mentions of how the analyst views language. In Robert Longacre's discourse perspective he writes that he has "borrowed extensively bits and
pieces from the linguistics everywhere" (1977a:24), while maintaining that his view of language is still "tagmemic". Joseph Grimes, too, while allowing that "the generalizations I make...relate to the family of theories currently known as generative semantics" (1975:30), never bothers to specify what any of those theories in the 'family' are. My conclusion is that linguistic discourse analysis cannot be so much identified with models or theories as with an attempt to provide the necessary descriptive work in order to better understand how the above-sentence level structural features in language work. Thus, while I refer to two different traditions in discourse analysis, I do not believe that discourse analysts are, generally speaking, tied to theoretical models. On the contrary, discourse analyses which I have read seem to be following more in the steps of the descriptive linguistics of the Bloomfieldian tradition, while examining structures beyond the sentence level. Perhaps one reason for the lack of models and theories in linguistic discourse analysis is related to the difficulty of saying anything powerful at the discourse level without some way of formalizing interactional properties.

Through the rest of this chapter I will first review the progression from Bloomfield to Chomsky, and from Chomsky to discourse analysis. Secondly, I will discuss what I consider to be the most fruitful tradition of discourse analysis, the school headed by Robert Longacre. In Chapter 2, I will examine some of the discourse analyses of narrative which feature the analysis of live conversation.
Bloomfield, Chomsky, and Beyond

Until recently, the early 1970's, discourse received very little attention by linguists and sociolinguists. In the next few paragraphs I want to distinguish the different lines of development of ideas leading to current discourse study in linguistics. What follows is a brief history from Leonard Bloomfield to current discourse analysis.

In the 1930's, Bloomfield limited his grammatical analysis to the sentence as the largest unit of description. Bloomfield, along with Franz Boaz and Edward Sapir, represents an important line of development from structural linguistics to current discourse study.* In his brilliant book Language (1933), he defined the "sentence" as, "an independent form, not included in any larger (complex) linguistic form" (p.170). The inhibiting nature of Bloomfield's definition, however, discouraged later linguists in the structuralist tradition from attempting to analyze linguistic levels beyond the sentence. This is not meant to be a severe criticism. As Grimes (1975) notes:

Restriction of a field is essential for any kind of scientific thinking. If someone wishes to focus on what happens within certain bounds, anyone else who accepts the rules of the game has to agree to those bounds...At the time Bloomfield wrote, sticking to the sentence was probably the wisest thing he could have done (p.3).

Thus, Bloomfield is seen as an important trend setter, but from Bloomfield the structuralist tradition is but one trend. During the post-Bloomfieldian era, linguists with few exceptions continued to describe the grammar of a language only up to the level of the sentence. In the early 1960's, however, H.A. Gleason allowed for the importance of supra-sentence grammars but held that their practical
delineation was impossible to undertake at the time. In 1970, Zellig Harris stressed that linguistic analysis had not gone beyond the level of the sentence and that linguistic methodology up to that time had not pursued a description of the structural relations between sentences. Even earlier, Harris had published an article called "Discourse Analysis" (1952) in which he attempted to work out a formal method for the analysis of connected speech. But his attempts to encourage linguists to address the need for discourse analysis were not greeted with particular enthusiasm. And as recently as 1977, Malcolm Coulthard claimed that "it may well be that any purely formal analysis above the rank of sentence is impossible" (p.3). He did admit, however, that to be successful, analysis beyond the sentence level can only be described in semantic terms.

The emphasis on sentence grammars in linguistics was widely promoted by the transformational-generative model of grammar, the second line of development in my thinking, as developed by Noam Chomsky (1965), which assigns structural descriptions to individual sentences by a systematic application of a set of rules. And, though Chomsky and others have since refined this model and departed from it, descriptions seldom consider structure beyond the sentence level.

According to Chomsky, language is a formal system which includes an underlying system (deep structure) and a system of rules and processes for creating forms on the surface structure. Especially in his *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965), this formal system is considered to exist apart from any actual language utterance on the part of the native speaker of the language. Chomsky claims that both
the deep structure and the rules and processes for deriving the surface structure are a part of what a native speaker 'knows' about his or her language. Linguistic analysis in the transformational-generative tradition, then, consists of attempting to reconstruct the character of the underlying structure and discovering and specifying the derivation process (basically, the rules), between the deep structure and the surface structure.

Part of a speaker's capacity to generate new sentences is based on the speaker's ability to say the same things in different ways. For example, I can say, "The Cubs won the World Series". By rearranging a few words I can convey the same thing by saying, "The World Series was won by the Cubs". These two sentences share the same deep structure but different surface structures. Chomsky suggests that we are able to make sense out of sentences because the context in which they are produced enables us to look beyond the surface structure to the deep structure from which the sentences are generated. Furthermore, he was explicit in restricting his interest to the formal aspects of language (syntax) and that this restriction is necessary in order to extend the scope of a description of grammar.

One should take note that the Chomskyan tradition by no means represents the total family of theories that are both generative and transformational. Sociolinguistics has ventured into discourse analysis almost by accident. William Labov (1967) began to combine the structural analysis of speech with sociological sampling techniques and showed how linguistic variables could be related to social variables. Gumperz (1982) suggests that within the past few years a new sociolinguistic approach to discourse has developed, an
approach which distinguishes between individual variations and social variability. Studies by Hymes (1972), Blom and Gumperz (1972), Sankoff and Cedergren (1976), Ervin-Tripp and Mitchell-Kernan (1977), Sankoff (1980), Green and Wallat (1981), and Gumperz (1982), to name but a few, represent the attempt by sociolinguists to "account for the communicative functions of linguistic variability and for its relation to speakers' goals without reference to untestable functionalist assumptions about conformity or nonconformance to closed systems of norms" (Gumperz, 1982:29).

With this brief historical outline of developments in linguistics and sociolinguistics I have attempted to distinguish the important lines of development of ideas which have lead to an interest in discourse. Gumperz (1982) perhaps sums up best the point of departure from descriptive linguistics to discourse analysis. He writes:

We must draw a distinction between meaning, i.e. context free semantic information obtained through analysis, in which linguistic data are treated as texts, which can be coded in words and listed in dictionaries, on the one hand, and interpretation...Interpretation always depends on information conveyed through multiple levels or channels of signalling, and involves inferences based on linguistic features that from the perspective of text based analysis count as marginal, or semantically insignificant (p.207).

The way I visualize linguistic discourse analysis in this study is as an attempt to extend the procedures and analytical categories used in descriptive linguistics beyond the unit of the sentence. The essential procedures used are; (1) the isolation of a set of basic syntactic categories or units of discourse for analysis, (2) the
stating of a set of rules which differentiate coherent discourses from ill-formed or incoherent discourses, and (3) taking a text (sometimes constructed by the analyst) and giving an analysis of all the structural features of the discourse. These basic procedures are used by the text grammarians, under which I classify Longacre and his students, as opposed to those who base their work on speech act theory. The work of the former has basically been neglected by sociology, while the work of the latter has been severely criticized as being fundamentally misconceived (Turner, 1975; Gardner, 1982; Levinson, 1983). In this study, my concern is with the work being done by text grammarians, specifically Longacre and his students, and with making linguistic discourse analysis sociologically relevant. From this point on, when I refer to 'linguistic discourse analysis', I am referring to the work of the text grammarians following Longacre.

Assumptions About Language in Linguistic Discourse Analysis

I now turn to a discussion of assumptions about language in discourse analysis. The assumptions of the text grammarian for example, are different from those of the speech act theorist. According to the text grammarian, we can say most about language by filtering out two different things: the decisions a speaker can make regarding what and what not to say, and the structures that are available to the speaker for implementing the results of those decisions in a way that communicates with another person (Grimes, 1975, 1978; Gavin, 1980). Grimes refers to these decisions which the speaker makes, and the relations between them, as the underlying formational structure or the semantic structure (1975). The
relation between this underlying structure and the speech forms that are uttered is called the transformation.

One assumption shared by both the text grammarians and the speech act theorists is that, in everyday life, we all use different types of speech in different circumstances. A public schoolteacher, for example, will adopt one kind of speech when being interviewed for a job and a different type when relaxing with friends over a beer. We say most of what we say in strings of sentences, but not just random strings. There are features of language which may constrain later utterances in relation to earlier ones, and large scale structures within which individual utterances play their parts (Grimes, 1975, 1978; Longacre, 1983).

Not only do we use different types of speech in different circumstances, but we may have marked reactions when a discourse type is used inappropriately. For example, we may inwardly chuckle at the lady who addresses a pet as if it were a child, or at the army officer who talks to everyone with an authoritative voice. The relevant factors in such situations are the relationship between the speaker and the one being spoken to, and the nature of the message. Linguists doing discourse studies are interested in explicating and describing discourse 'types', e.g. if a speaker is exhorting a hearer to do something, certain discourse types or forms will be appropriate. If one is arguing, instructing, or passing on information, other types will be more fitting.
Discourse Types

What are some examples of 'discourse types' in the linguistic discourse literature? Longacre has been at the forefront of recent discourse analysis and contends that there are six major discourse types: narrative, procedural, hortatory, explanatory, argumentative, and conversation (1976, 1983). Narrative discourse recounts a series of events usually ordered chronologically and in the past tense. Procedural discourse is designed to give instructions as to the accomplishing of some task or achieving of an object. Hortatory discourse attempts to influence conduct while explanatory discourse seeks to provide information required in particular circumstances, and often does so by providing detailed descriptions. Argumentative discourse tries to prove something to a hearer and tends to exhibit frequent contrast between two opposing ideas. Conversational discourse takes place between two or more people. Oddly, although Longacre expresses interest in this last discourse type, his analysis is generally limited to the other five and relies mainly on edited texts. In each of his last two books, however, he refers to the work of Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson and others involved in the venture of conversational analysis as something that is lacking in linguistic discourse analysis and which should be pursued. We shall return to this issue momentarily.

A linguist brings his own distinctive mode of reasoning to bear on his perspective of 'language'. Generally speaking, the discourse analyst sees distinctiveness and contextual influence, constituency, and matching of complex relations, and tries to generalize about them. In his 1975 book The Thread of Discourse, Joseph Grimes attempts to
show the sorts of things a linguist could find out by looking beyond sentences. He divides discourse into six areas, which correspond to the six parts of his *Papers on Discourse* (1978). First, there are studies on morphology where certain morphological information is shown to tie in with the total structure of discourse. Some morphological categories add information about the specific lexical items to which they are attached while others indicate syntactic constructions and agreement. In "Nchimburu Narrative Events in Time", for example, Norman Price concludes that in the Nchimburu language personal narrative has three time-oriented parts: first, the narrator gives the narration in a time setting, then relates a sequence of events, and ends up by relating the whole back to the present time.

The second area of discourse study in Grimes' 1978 book deals with reference, focused mainly on pronominalization. The studies show that there appear to be two distinct strategies that languages use for establishing and maintaining reference. Some strategies work the same way as in English, where the reference of one word is normally taken from the nearest candidate word before it. Other languages manage reference in terms of a thematic policy in which one reference is distinguished from other references when introduced, and a special set of terms refer to it no matter how many other things have been mentioned more recently.

The third area of discourse analysis in these studies show that some languages have a clear-cut distinction among kinds of discourses, such as discussed earlier between explanatory, hortatory, argumentative, etc. A fourth area demonstrates how some discourses
are full of particle words that mean nothing in themselves, but which act as pointers to discourse structure when considered in a larger context. In many Algonquian languages (in which I work) there exists a related phenomenon. In the fifth area of discourse analysis according to Grimes, a systematic repetition pattern called 'linkage' is used either to join together two consecutive sentences within a paragraph or to show the boundary between paragraphs. Finally, the sixth area is composed of a miscellany of other linguistic signals which turn out to be simple to explain using discourse contexts and difficult to explain without them.

Longacre insists that it is impossible to achieve a correct grammatical analysis of a language without accounting for its discourse level features. In a recent lecture (1980), Longacre maintains that discourse analysis used to be regarded as an option for the linguist in supplementing the description of lower levels (word, phrase, clause). He contends that it is now understood by most linguists that all work on the lower levels is lacking in perspective and considered inadequate when the higher level of discourse has not been analyzed. He asks, "How can one describe the verb morphology of a language when one cannot predict where one uses a given verb form?", and, "How can one describe a transitive clause in terms of what is obligatory and what is optional when the conditions for optionality are not specified?" Longacre contends that the answers to these questions require a discourse perspective. Thus, discourse analysis is no longer considered to be a luxury for the linguist but a necessity.

Despite this history of neglect for structures beyond the
sentence, linguists are now attempting to do analyses at the discourse level. A major assumption of those linguists currently working on discourse is that different parts of discourse communicate different kinds of information (Grimes, 1978; Freedle, 1979; Hurtig, 1977; Longacre, 1982). For example, the distinction between different kinds of information in narrative discourse can be broken down into various analytical units. Narratives are characterized by having well-separated participants and having the "telling matching the time". That is, the sequence in which events are told matches the sequence in which the events actually happened.

In this section I want to distinguish my assumptions from those of linguists pursuing discourse studies while contrasting discourse analysis with conversational analysis. In a recent edition of *Notes on Linguistics* (No. 20, October, 1981), a discourse questionnaire was published which gives the reader an idea of the questions asked by discourse analysts when examining a particular discourse. First, we will look at discourse types in the questionnaire and then consider the material relating to the analysis of stories which will provide a point for contrasting conversational analysis with linguistic discourse analysis.

In the 'discourse types' section of the questionnaire, the first question has to do with what discourse types can be grammatically distinguished in the language being analyzed: e.g., procedural—how something is done; descriptive—what something is like; hortatory—what someone should do and commands to do things; argumentative—how someone persuades or makes a point; and conversation—how people
utilize interactional strategies. The next questions relate to each discourse type. For example, what features distinguish one type from another? When is a particular discourse type used? As for other aspects of discourse, the questions include: when should pronouns be used, and when should titles or names be used? How often are names used? When should 'the' be used? As for event reference, is there a way of marking an event to show that it has been previously mentioned? Is there a way of marking an event to show that it was expected? How often are conjunctions like 'and' and 'then' used? How often are logical conjunctions used? All of these considerations relate to the kinds of things that linguists doing discourse analysis are looking for.

In relation to the discourse analysis of 'stories', which is of specific interest to us in this study, the linguist doing discourse analysis seeks to discover and describe how speakers sign-on and sign-off to their audiences, how speakers make side comments in their stories and where, how characters are introduced, how major and minor characters are differentiated, where background information most often occurs, how story action is introduced, how the end of the action is signalled, and how conclusions are done. There are various other considerations when analyzing stories from a linguistic discourse perspective, but it is hoped that the reader is sufficiently informed from the above as to what questions a linguist might ask about a story text. Thus, we can see that the discourse linguist is seeking to explicate and describe a formula for a complete story, the difference between written and spoken forms, and possible options available to speakers when telling a story.
Monologue and Repartee

Those linguists working on discourse analysis have tended to analyze it as monologue and to ignore the fact that an interactional perspective might also be appropriate for written (and spoken) discourse. Longacre stands out as one who has attempted a linguistic treatment of repartee, or the notional (deep) structure of dialogue (Longacre, 1983). He writes:

One of the most intricate problems in discourse analysis is that concerning the relation of dialogue to monologue. The viewpoint taken here is that the two are related but somewhat autonomous structures (1983:43).

Longacre goes on to describe the units of dialogue as: utterance, exchange, dialogue paragraph, and dialogue or dramatic discourse, such as conversation. He posits the units of monologue as: morpheme, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, and discourse (1983). In relating these two types of discourse structures he writes:

The utterance is the unit bounded by what a single speaker says. As such, it is the unit which is relevant to turn-taking, repair, and other concerns of the student of live interaction (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1978; Schegloff, 1979). The utterance can be of any monologue size unit from morpheme to discourse... There are dialogue discourses (conversation, drama) and there are monologue discourses (1983:43).

From Longacre we can begin to gain an appreciation of the concerns of linguistic discourse analysis and one crucial area which differentiates Longacre's approach from other linguistic approaches.
Even Longacre admits, however, that his studies do not deal with live conversation and sees this as a weakness of discourse analysis. He writes:

We content ourselves...with material that is a step or two removed from live conversation, i.e. reported or composed conversation as it occurs in oral or written texts (1983:44).

It is evident that not all discourses are of the same sort. The six major types of discourse as posited by Longacre all differ in more or less obvious ways. There are, however, similarities between the six types. In that one of the first tasks of the discourse linguist is to classify discourse types and describe the notional and surface structures of discourse types, classifications need to include both broad classifications and also more delicate specification of discourse types. Longacre writes:

The classification [of discourse types] needs... to allow for the differences between notional (deep or semantic structures) and surface structures...In brief, notional structures of discourse relate more clearly to the overall purpose of the discourse, while surface structures have to do more with a discourse's formal characteristics (1983:3).

In The Grammar of Discourse (1983), Longacre continues the progression of thought he began in An Anatomy of Speech Notions (1976). In the former he proposes that all kinds of discourses can be classified along two basic parameters: (1) contingent temporal succession, and (2) agent orientation. The first has to do with the description of a framework of sequential succession in which what is
reported in a discourse is contingent on previous events or doings. Agent orientation has to do with the identification of agent reference running through a discourse. He writes:

These two parameters intersect so as to give us a four-way classification of discourse types: Narrative discourse...is plus in respect to both parameters. Procedural discourse...is plus in respect to contingent succession (the steps of a procedure are ordered) but minus in respect to agent orientation (attention is on what is done or made, not on who does it). Behavioral discourse...is minus in regard to contingent succession but plus in regard to agent orientation (it deals with how people did or should behave). Expository discourse is minus in respect to both parameters (1983:3).

Longacre is the first to admit that the two parameters of contingent temporal succession and agent orientation are too broad to be of much use to the discourse linguist. Thus, he posits another parameter, projection, which has to do with a situation or action which is contemplated or anticipated but not realized. For example, taking the discourse type NARRATIVE, which is of special interest to this study, narrative as a broad category can be further classified into prophecy, which is plus projection, and storytelling, which is minus projection in that the events are represented as having already taken place.

Finally, Longacre posits one more parameter: tension. Tension has to do with how a discourse reflects a struggle or polarization of some sort. This fourth parameter is of particular interest to this study in that it is relevant to all genres of narrative discourse.
Earlier I said that linguists interested in the analysis of discourse have tended to neglect the ethnographic dimension in their studies. In *Pragmatic Aspects of English Text Structure* (1983), Larry Jones begins to rectify this situation. Jones is a linguist working within the Longacre school of discourse analysis and his recent study focuses linguistic attention on one important dimension of the communication situation: the "message-sender's" assumptions regarding the "message-receiver". In so doing, he contexts the study by examining the effects of such assumptions on the grammatical and semantic structure of written texts. He is representative, I believe, of the Longacre school of analysis which has sensed the need for including an ethnographic dimension when doing discourse analysis.

Jones' study demonstrates that a linguistic treatment of hearer/reader background knowledge and speaker/author assumptions about that knowledge is possible. The study is a contribution to the pragmatics of discourse, and has much to offer the sociologist interested in discourse. Jones provides a theoretical base for the study of pragmatic aspects of English discourse structure by offering a system for categorizing types of communication situations that affect the structure of discourse differently. He writes:

In recent years various linguists have developed systems for the classification of discourses in order to account for structural differences between various texts... However, there is increasing evidence that some additional classificatory scheme is needed to account for structural differences in utterances that stem from the communication situation in which they occur. For example, the frequency and complexity of
explanatory comments in the context of an utterance is affected by whether that utterance is constructed in a face-to-face situation or not (1983:9-10).

Jones suggests some relatively new methodological tools for the analysis of discourse. One such contribution has to do with the isolation of author comments as a group for special study. Also, in his analysis of explanatory comments within a discourse, he proposes the principle that the knowledge assumed to be unknown to a reader can be explained in terms of knowledge assumed to be known to him or her, which goes a long way toward explaining the how of author assumptions. Finally, his study suggests some of the factors which control the occurrence and distribution of demonstratives and extraposition utterances in discourse. He writes:

The discovery of the functions of various syntactic constructions (such as the functions of modifiers and particular sentence types) is a crucial task of discourse analysis (1983:117).

Jones' study is one of the first coming from a linguistic perspective which analyzes discourse with an interest in getting at pragmatic considerations, and such a study should be required reading for the sociologist interested in discourse analysis. There are, however, some basic limitations to Jones' study, which he points out himself, and which are common in linguistic discourse analysis. Foremost, the data for the study is composed of edited texts only, thus he chooses not to examine natural conversation or live discourse. One reason for this limitation is, I believe, that this is an area in which the linguist analyzing discourse lacks the methodological tools. Recall that Longacre (1983) admits as much. And Jones writes:
It seems to me that the grammatical and semantic structures of a written text may be influenced more markedly by author assumptions due to the absence of feedback in the communication situation (1983:3).

Certainly this is an area in which sociology has much to offer, and this thesis is one attempt to provide the discourse linguist with a methodology for treating live conversation and an inclusion of the ethnographic dimension in discourse analysis.

CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS

Whereas Longacre and his colleagues begin with a conception of a text as a unit superordinate to linguistic structures and require that this organization be explicated, conversational analysis begins not with linguistic structure but with the notion of live discourse as expressive of members' competence, and proposes that members' actions and utterances are features of the socially organized settings of their use. For example, words do not have unchanging meanings at all times or on all occasions of their use. Rather, what they mean on any particular occasion of use requires the taken-for-granted analytical work on the part of members. This work is usually done in taken-for-granted, unexamined ways, and it is the task of the conversational analyst to discover and describe this work.

Earlier I said that sociology has offered different perspectives on the social world and that sociologists who study interaction are becoming increasingly interested in the analysis of natural conversation aimed at the discovery of members' methods and practices
used in conversation. I reviewed what I consider to be two major
traditions in linguistics for analyzing discourse and focused on the
approach of Robert Longacre and his students. Linguistic discourse
analysis has much to offer students of live conversation. One such
area of contribution relates to how conversationalists make use of
linguistic units in turn-taking. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson
write:

How projection of unit-types is accomplished,
which allows such "no-gap" starts by next
speakers, is an important question on which
we have been working. It seems to us an area
to which linguists can make major contribu-
tions. Our characterization in the rules,
and in the subsequent discussion, leaves the
matter of how projection is done open (1978:51,
emphasizes mine).

In reviewing for the reader the methodology and theory of
conversational analysis, I begin with a discussion of Erving Goffman,
Harold Garfinkel and ethnomethodology, after which I offer the reader
my thoughts on what I consider to be the similarities and differences
between linguistic discourse analysis and conversational analysis.

The Goffman Factor

Erving Goffman is perhaps the best-known of the sociologists
engaged in seeking to provide a systematic conceptual scheme for the
observation and analysis of the organization of social interaction.
In this chapter we will examine a key concept of Goffman's, 'face-
work,' and propose that, if what Goffman says about 'face-work' is
correct, his observations have implications for conversational
structures which deserve further investigation.
While I do not endeavor to provide a thorough review of Goffman, I do wish to highlight some aspects of his writings, particularly in relation to some interactional features which we will examine further in the analytic chapters. Of immediate importance to us is Goffman's paper, "On Face-work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction" (1955). In this paper Goffman proposes that a person initially establishes his or her role in an interaction; that is, a person presents a specific 'face'. A person may be said to be 'in face' or to 'maintain face' whenever that person presents an internally consistent 'face' that is accepted and supported by others in the interaction. The person who presents an inconsistent or inappropriate 'face', on the other hand, may be considered to be 'out of face'. Goffman writes:

A person who can maintain face in the current situation is someone who abstained from certain actions in the past that would have been difficult to face up to later (1967:7).

and,

A person may be said to be 'out of face' when he participates in a contact with others without having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are expected to take (1967:8).

Goffman uses the term 'face-work' to describe the actions taken by a person to repair his or her image by avoiding or correcting situations that threaten the 'face' that a person wants to project. There seems to be a tendency, too, not only to protect one's own 'face' but to protect others' 'face' as well. A typical example would be when someone trips over a doorstep, thus momentarily losing 'face', not only will that person try to cover up the clumsiness as much as possible, but others may pretend not to have noticed. Goffman feels
that such 'face-saving' is an essential force holding interaction together.

Throughout some of Goffman's later works the initial concept of 'face-work' is built upon and refined. When reading Stigma (1963), Interaction Ritual (1967), Relations in Public (1971), and to some degree Frame Analysis (1974), the reader is struck with the recurring theme of the importance of 'face-work'. One particular feature which stands out in Goffman's writings, and which is of interest to us in the analysis of stories told in the course of naturally-occurring conversation, is that 'face-work' techniques are not limited to the one who is 'out of face'. Goffman writes:

> Just as the member of any group is expected to have self-respect, so also he is expected to sustain a standard of considerateness; he is expected to go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face of others present, and he is expected to do this willingly and spontaneously because of emotional identifi­cation with the others and their feelings. In consequence, he is disinclined to witness the defacement of [the] other (1967:10).

But is this true? If so, how do we know? It is at this point that we can recognize the lack of substantial empirical 'provings of possibilities' in Goffman's writings. In the analytical chapters a major concern will be to examine these claims by drawing from the resource of natural conversation. In all of Goffman's writings there is a convincing 'ring of truth' to what he says. But can his conclusions be empirically substantiated? While in no way taking away from the importance of Goffman's work, I will be involved in grounding the findings of this study in naturally-occurring interaction. In Chapter 3, for example, I show that the above claim by Goffman can be
corroborated empirically. In some storytelling situations, at least, story recipients can be shown to be obliged to sustain a standard of considerateness and that people will utilize techniques to save the feelings and face of others in interactional situations.

Pursuing Goffman a bit further, recall that he provides in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) a summary of much of the work that has been done in the area of the 'self' as a social entity up to that time. Goffman often employs a metaphor to examine the ways in which people make self-definitions observable to one another as a matter of course: consider ordinary life as being like life on a stage. Particularly in *Presentation of Self*, Goffman presents his 'person' as an actor on the stage having the problem of presenting himself to the audience as the relevant character in the 'play'. Goffman maintains that we convince our audiences, those people with whom we interact, that we are who we are, and what we take ourselves to be, in the same sort of way. There is, of course, much more to Goffman's 'dramaturgical' approach. However, for our purposes we will presuppose that the reader is familiar enough with Goffman's work that we need not delve into it much further. The importance of this body of work will become more apparent in the analytic chapters.

To reiterate, in Goffman's terms a person does not merely go about his or her everyday business, but goes about it constrained to sustain a certain image of that person's 'self' in the eyes of others. This 'face-work' is continuously necessary in that local circumstances will invariably reflect upon a person, and these circumstances will vary unexpectedly. Thus, an individual constantly employs techniques
to defend one's image of the 'self' when circumstances warrant it. In such instances, people may find themselves in a position where one's image of his or her 'self' is at variance with what is being projected via, e.g. the telling of a story in conversation.

In *Forms of Talk* (1981), Goffman makes statements which have implications for linguistic analysis and which are of interest to my concerns in this study. In the article "Response Cries" found in *Forms of Talk*, he questions the possibility of applying linguistic structural analysis to conversation. In the article he discusses some types of utterances which are difficult to fit into the understanding of speaker-hearer as proposed in conversational analysis.

Throughout the course of a conversational encounter members ought to sustain involvement in what is being said and to make sure that no long periods of time pass where no one or more than one is taking a conversational 'turn' (Sacks, Shegloff, Jefferson, 1978). Even when no talk is taking place in a conversational encounter, however, the conversationalists can still be in what Goffman calls a "state of talk" (Goffman, 1981:130). He writes:

> Once one assumes that an encounter will have features of its own...then it becomes plain that any cross-sectional perspective, any instantaneous slice focusing on talking, not a talk, necessarily misses important features. Certain issues, such as the work done in summonings, the factor of topicality, the building up of an information state known to be common to the participants...seem especially dependent on the question of the unit as a whole (1983: 130-131).

Goffman's thesis is that a cross-sectional analysis of conversational interaction, examining "moments of talk", neglects the real
interactional character of a "state of talk". The concept of a "state of talk" is important to my understanding of how to go about analyzing live conversation. In his article "Radio Talk" (1981), Goffman begins to further define this "state of talk". He writes:

The underlying framework of talk production is less a matter of phrase repertoire than frame space. A speaker's budget of standard utterances can be divided into function classes, each class providing expressions through which he can exhibit an alignment he takes to the events at hand, a footing, a combination of production format and participation status (1981:325).

While in a "state of talk", then, conversationalists are able to deal with whatever occurs in the conversation, whatever direction it may take, by sustaining or changing footing. As I show in the analytical chapters, conversationalists will show a preference for selecting that footing or stance which provides the least self-threatening position under the circumstances, or, as Goffman puts it, "the most defensible alignment he can muster" (1981:325).

All of which leads us to the following 'problem': Goffman and, as we will see, Garfinkel and ethnomethodology, attend to the ethnographic dimension of conversational interaction, an aspect which is left out in linguistic discourse analysis but still considered by some discourse linguists to be of vital importance (recall the 'invitation' from Longacre, which I cited earlier, that linguistic discourse analyses need to be supplemented by those doing research into live conversation). However, Goffman, Garfinkel, and ethnomethodology have, in turn, neglected relevant findings in linguistic discourse analysis and their studies lack the precision and
detail provided by linguistics. How, then, can the gap be filled? It is my thesis that this gap can be bridged by turning to conversational analysis in order to provide the discourse linguist with a methodology for dealing with the first type of discourse analysis, NARRATIVE.

Before returning to this 'problem', though, I will first examine the contribution of Harold Garfinkel to the ethnographic and interactional dimension of discourse by providing the reader with a characterization of ethnomethodology.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Harold Garfinkel's initial policy statement (Studies in Ethnomethodology, 1967) was concerned with the study of members' methods of practical, common sense reasoning and takes as its point of departure the Schutzian notion of the experience of the world of everyday life. Garfinkel suggests that members' everyday activities are made recognizable and commonplace by virtue of the methods by which members produce and categorize these everyday activities and events for what they are. That is, the events in our daily lives make sense to us because of the ways in which we simultaneously produce and conceptualize them. Through our work of making sense of our world, a common social world is accomplished and we make it clear what it is we are doing, e.g. telling a story, asking a question, making a promise, or whatever. By using the same methods of sense-making, members can handle such things as misunderstandings or disagreements by making it clear that, for example, we don't know what someone is talking about, or that we do not agree with them, etc. In
effect, Garfinkel suggests that members have to accomplish or achieve their social world and that the events in our daily lives as societal members make sense to us because of the ways we simultaneously produce and perceive them. Turner, following Garfinkel, writes:

Members provide for the recognition of 'what they are doing' by invoking culturally provided resources (1970:187), and that,

activities are to be elucidated as the features oriented to by members in doing and recognizing activities, and assessing their appropriateness (1970:187).

The studies initiated by Garfinkel give primacy to locating and describing the competence and knowledge of social members, the taken-for-granted assumptions which delimit a member's interpretation of experience. He writes:

The activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making those scenes 'account-able' (1967:1).

Garfinkel makes the point that people do not necessarily separate the circumstances of social events from their descriptions of what those events are. Here we touch upon a fundamental concept of Garfinkel's program statement. When Garfinkel talks about 'reflexivity' in his writings he is referring to this embedding of circumstances in descriptions or accounts, and of accounts coming from within circumstances of social events and social arrangements. We may say, then, that the methods under examination are part of all sense-making so that an attempt to locate and describe them is itself a new
waiting-to-be-analyzed instance or procedure. For the most part, though, members use these procedures or methods in taken-for-granted, unformulated, and unexamined ways. The social world is 'out there' somewhere for most people, something 'objective'. The social world is rarely viewed as a concerted accomplishment, a product, or an outcome of the use of commonly used members' methods. It is the task of the ethnomethodologist to locate and describe these methods.

Language provides us with a vehicle for understanding and dealing with the complexities of human life. It is our primary medium for communicating with one another. We use it to settle our differences and ventilate our feelings, to tell about our experiences and to pass on our culture's stories. As such, language can become a complicated and elaborate tool. One of the basic considerations in the study of practical reasoning revolves around members' use of everyday talk. Garfinkel's interest in something like 'talk' becomes apparent by noting his view of language as a means for accomplishing social order. Building upon Garfinkel, D. Lawrence Weider (1974) writes:

One important method of accomplishing a setting's accountability...is the member's use of the idea of rule-governed conduct in talking about their own affairs among one another (p.34).

Garfinkel's interest in talk is not merely in the use of language as a means for reporting on social activity, but rather in how language is employed to accomplish social order as a feature of social reality. His concern is with the methods members use to carry out the activities of everyday life and the varied practices by which people make recognizable to others that their activities are rational, that
the ways in which people continually and consistently account for what they do are rational and ordinary. This accounting is directly related to conversation in that people do many things by talking about them.

**SACKSIAN ANALYSIS**

This analysis of talk, this 'conversational analysis', has been the most successful avenue of ethnomethodological research. The work which has done the most in making talk into a topic for study has been that produced by Harvey Sacks and those influenced by him. 'Conversational analysis' was developed and refined by the late Harvey Sacks beginning in the early 1960's and continues on through his students (e.g. Schegloff, Jefferson, Turner, Ryave, Schenkein, Pomerantz, and Goldberg, among others). Although the analysis of natural conversation has received increased attention recently in other disciplines (i.e. linguistics, anthropology, education), Sacksian conversational analysis seems to have become the most accessible and tightly-knit school, mostly due to its unique focus of attention: interaction.

Sacks' earliest interest was concerned with the phenomenon of description. It may be taken that in and through their talk people are continually describing their social world to one another. Anything and everything is describable: things people have done or want to do, events they have seen or not seen, attitudes, motivations, states of mind, feelings, and so on. Sacks interlocks quite nicely with Garfinkel by implying that it would not be misleading to think of the
'social world' as constituted by its ability to describe itself. It becomes obvious that description is a basic constituent of our everyday activities.

Two major issues of a sociolinguistic nature have received attention from Sacks; (1) membership categories of speakers-hearers, in which the attempt is made to go beyond the surface analysis of talk by proposing a linkage between members' language categories and how members 'do description' and accomplish activities; and, (2) the sequential organization of conversation. According to Sacks, people are seen as using social knowledge and practical, common sense reasoning in three ways: (a) to recognize and make recognizable conversational utterances as possible instances of things like stories, etc.; (b) to accomplish conversational activities such as gaining a turn at speaking, closing a conversation, and so forth; and, (c) to 'do' a vast number of activities such as joking, promising, criticizing, complaining, etc. The studies carried out by Sacks in the exploration of the orderliness of conversation suggest that the accomplished character of the organization of talk stands up to formal analysis.

Sacks made it explicit that his concern was with social interaction, with conversation offering the best opportunity for its study. Schegloff and Sacks write:

This work [of conversational analysis] is part of a program of work undertaken...to explore the possibility of achieving a naturalistic observational discipline that could deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, empirically, and formally...Our attention has been focused
on conversational materials; suffice it to say, this is not because of a special interest in language, or any theoretical primacy we accord conversation...but in the ways in which any actions accomplished in conversation require reference to the properties and organization of conversation for understanding and analysis, both by participants and by professional investigators (1974:233-234).

Among the many interactional tasks performed in conversation to which Sacks pays attention are the following: the adjacency-pair phenomenon, the organization of topics in conversation, pronouns as transform operations, reference and ordinary understandings, the preference for 'recipient design' in storytelling, the analysis of puns, the technical features of joke-telling, and many more.

Differences Between Conversational Analysis and Linguistic Discourse Analysis

In this section I want to narrow down the differences and similarities between linguistic discourse analysis in the text grammarian school of Longacre and conversational analysis following the work of Harvey Sacks and his students. Generally, linguistic discourse analysis is an attempt to extend the techniques and analytical categories in descriptive linguistics to the analysis of units beyond the sentence. The basic procedures employed are; (1) the isolation of a set of basic categories or units of discourse for analysis, (2) the discovery and description of as nearly a complete roster as possible of the factors that may reasonably be expected to contribute to the function of the discourse, and (3) the formulation
of a set of rules related to the function of individual discourse types. Other features of linguistic discourse analysis which I mentioned earlier include: (a) the tendency to take one or two written texts and to attempt to give an in-depth analysis of all of the features in that 'type' of text, and (b) an appeal to intuition about, for example, what is a coherent or well-formed discourse and what is not.

In contrast, conversational analysis following the work of Sacks and his students is an empirical approach to discourse analysis which seeks to avoid premature theory construction and which uses a basically inductive methodology: attempting to discover and describe recurring patterns in many naturally occurring conversations. The emphasis in conversational analysis is on what can actually be found to occur in discourse, not on what one would guess to be odd or acceptable if it were to occur. Also, there is a tendency in conversational analysis not to base one's analysis on one or two conversational texts, but to examine many texts from live conversation in order to discover the systematic properties of the sequential organization of talk, and the ways in which utterances are designed to manage such sequences in conversational interaction. Finally, in place of the discourse linguist's use of rules, conversational analysis places emphasis on the interactional and inferential consequences of the choices made between alternative utterances.

The focus of Sacksian conversational analysis, then, is quite different from that of linguistic discourse analysis. Those engaged in discourse analysis from a linguistic perspective define their task
as the identification of 'discourse types' which are abstracted from edited texts leading to general structural regularities (Longacre, 1976, 1983; Markels, 1981; Jones, 1983; Gavin, 1980). Conversational analysts approach language phenomena from a different perspective than the discourse linguist. In conversational analysis the object of study is not focused on the competence of a speaker to produce grammatical sentences or well-formed discourse in his or her language. While conversational analysts recognize that persons acquire and require that ability, attention is not focused on language but on activities accomplished via language. Instead of developing a model of language use and a language user, conversational analysts seek to explicate and describe interactional abilities.

In linguistic discourse analysis attention is focused upon the linguistic structures located in a discourse, while conversational analysis seeks to locate and describe interactional structures in conversation, seeking to construct machineries or 'simplest systematics' which provide for how it is that conversational activities get accomplished. Social interaction is to a large extent verbal interaction. Orderly features of talk may be located and described—not merely linguistic features but interactional ones. We are not, after all, dealing with a deterministic unfolding of conversation. It is not, for example, like pulling the trigger on a gun and noting the wholly predictable unfolding that takes place. Students of Sacks would agree that there are orderly and conventional relations between utterance types, and that the task of the analyst is to discover those relations and elucidate them. That task includes finding when these relations are ignored, rejected, thrown back on the
speaker, and so on. For example, one common feature of conversation is that questions deserve answers. When we recognize this as a feature of conversation, however, we have to remember that many times questions are not followed by answers. Nevertheless, the structures located in conversational interaction should be able to take care of that as well. In one sense that is the task of the discovering of structures, not to predict that, for example, 95% of the time questions will be followed by answers, but to provide for what becomes available in conversation for whatever can happen. Furthermore, conversational analysis does not try to predict what persons can say, or what kinds of moods they are in. No constraints can be put on what a person can or cannot say. The aim of conversational analysis is not intended to give one an expertise in 'understanding' a discourse. It is not intended to find out 'what was really meant' in a conversation. Conversational analysis is intended to do provings of possibilities, to show that what seems to be going on in a conversation is a possibility, and where that takes some kind of proof.

Conversational analysis attends to the analysis of understandings of talk by attempting to demonstrate how 'understandings' may be located in the talk itself. In effect, no additional information is needed. Turner (1970) has shown that every utterance in conversation has a social-organizational feature attached to it that other members can orient to and pick up on. Insofar as intentions, motives, and meaning get realized through a reliance upon these social-organizational features, then the following may be argued: what goes on in peoples' minds gets realized, to a large extent, through conversation or talk, even though this realization might not be
recognized by the members themselves.

Insofar as discourse analysis is concerned with explicating discourse features by rules which attest to a member's competence in communicating, a major methodological difference exists between conversational analysis and discourse analysis. Recall that discourse analysts seek to discover and describe a complete roster of factors which contribute to the communicative purpose of a particular discourse type. Conversational analysts, however, as Schegloff notes, are concerned with "finding a set of formal practices through which a world of particular specific scenes...is accomplished and exhibited" (1972:117). This is confirmed by Turner:

The kind of analysis we must pursue as students of conversational order is directed to the construction of an apparatus which is usable on materials other than the data it initially handles (1976:233).

It pays, too, to note the scope and limitations of conversational analysis—what it is and is not intended to handle. Conversational analysis is not, after all, trying to construct a methodology for figuring out 'what was meant' in a particular conversation. It is not interested in locating and describing formal cognitive features of language or in contributing to purely linguistic grammars or engaging in macro-level language debates. What conversational analysis does seek to do is to provide insight into the interactional character of talk, something which is basically neglected by discourse analysts in the text grammarian school of analysis but which is recognized as important and recommended for further study (c.f. Longacre, 1983; Jones, 1983; Pickering, 1979).
There are, however, some similarities between linguistic discourse analysis and conversational analysis. In some discourse models, for example, discourse functions apply not only to the meaning of a contexted utterance but also to the other utterances in the discourse, and how utterances may precede, follow, and relate to each other. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) suggest that questions can fulfill various functions in discourse, e.g. to make a slot for a response, and that discourse acts may be viewed as moves which can either be initiating or responding. There is a parallel here with Sacks' work with adjacency-pairs (1967; 1972), where the first pair-part provides for the second pair-part. In such instances the lack of a second pair-part would be noticeable. Yet the similarities between discourse analysis and conversational analysis remain minimal. As Schegloff and Sacks tell us:

Finding an utterance to be an answer, to be accomplishing answering, cannot be achieved by reference to phonological, syntactic, semantic, or logical features of the utterance itself, but only by consulting its sequential placement, e.g. its placement after a question (1973:299).

In a similar vein, Eglin (1978) writes:

Conversational analysis is prior to semantics and syntax; that is, that the sense and reference of an utterance part is dependent upon what action the utterance is performing (p.18).

Furthermore, Turner (1970) argued years ago that utterances cannot "be treated as reports or descriptions without reference to the interactional location of the utterance in question" (p.173).

To reiterate, conversational analysis builds upon Garfinkel's
initial formulation of ethnomethodology (1967) by holding to the view that social structures are achieved, sustained, and displayed in and through interaction. Conversational analysts are interested in how language is employed to accomplish social order as a feature of social reality. In a narrower sense, this interest has to do with how people continually and consistently account for what they do and how they display their activities as rational and ordinary. This accounting relates to talk in that people do many things by talking about them. Upon analysis it is claimed that talk exhibits many orderly features, not so much features of language as features of interaction.

METHODOLOGY

Recall that the purpose of my dissertation is to provide the discourse linguist with a set of discovery procedures for treating the first type of discourse as posited by Longacre, NARRATIVE. This dissertation is not a substantive conversational analysis piece, but methodological with respect to making conversational analysis relevant to linguistic discourse analysis. Earlier I said that the focus of my dissertation will be on interactional and ethnographic features of NARRATIVE in live conversation, which I refer to as STORYTELLING. Before proceeding to the analytical chapters I want to outline the methodology which is central to conversational analysis and then conclude this chapter with my assumptions about conversational interaction in general and about narrative specifically.
The methodology which I use in this study is basic to conversational analysis. The two basic methods used in conversational analysis investigation are:

(1) Examining conversational transcripts in order to discover recurring patterns and describing the systematic properties of those patterns. Conversational analysis attempts to locate some particular organization and isolate its systematic features by demonstrating participants' orientation to those features, and

(2) Discovering what problems the explicated organization solves and what problems it raises. That is, what implications does it have for the existence of further solutions to further problems.

In this study, I used the above methodology as follows: listening to and transcribing the conversational tapes, searching transcripts for recurring patterns, locating a particular conversational organization, discovering the systematic features of that organization, and describing its formal properties by demonstrating the participants' orientation to those properties. In my analysis, members' procedures employed in conversational interaction and researchers' methods for discovering those procedures can be described in terms of three kinds of orientations: (1) recipient design, (2) membership analysis, and (3) activity analysis, each of which I discuss in detail in the analytical chapters.
The above paragraph implies a recommendation as to how to begin searching for solutions to the issues formulated in the analytic chapters. This recommendation is that when analyzing a conversation one ought to begin by examining and comparing recordings and transcripts of natural conversation in order to locate and describe the 'how' of telling and listening. The stories subjected to formal analysis in this study are drawn from a corpus of about 250 stories captured on tape. From these stories I searched for recurring patterns in order to discover and describe the systematic properties of the organization of conversational narrative, the sequential organization of conversation relating to narratives told in live conversation, and the ways in which utterances are designed to manage such sequences.

Conclusion

Linguistic discourse analysis has much to offer the sociologist interested in the study of discourse. For the most part, however, sociology has been somewhat negligent in appropriating the contributions of linguistic discourse analysis, particularly the work of Longacre and his students. Often the sociologist interested in discourse builds up a 'straw-man' image of linguistic discourse analysis and proceeds to dismiss linguistic findings on that basis. In the recent study of John Gumperz (1982), he makes the quite valid argument that:

There is a need for a sociolinguistic theory which accounts for the communicative functions of linguistic variability and for its relation to speakers' goals without reference to un-
testable functionalist assumptions about conformity or nonconformance to closed systems of norms. Since speaking is interacting, such a theory must ultimately draw its basic postulates from what we know about interaction (1982:29).

There is an interactional, ethnographic dimension missing from much of the work being done in linguistic discourse analysis which sociology is equipped to deal with and this study offers the discourse linguist a methodology for dealing with the discourse type NARRATIVE, with respect to making conversational analysis relevant to linguistic discourse analysis. In making a methodological and theoretical contribution to linguistic discourse analysis, this study responds to an invitation from linguistics for help. If it were the case that discourse linguists were not concerned with an interactional treatment of the issues dealt with in their analyses, then such a contribution would not be considered necessary. I find, however, the opposite to be true. Discourse linguists are interested in the ethnographic dimension, but lack the analytical tools for dealing with interactional and ethnographic concerns in discourse. Earlier in the chapter I noted that there is a gap between the descriptive analyses on discourse being carried out in linguistics and the ethnographic dimension of discourse as treated in sociology. This study attempts to fill that gap by offering conversational analysis as a methodological and analytical tool to the discourse linguist.

Following my introductory remarks I set out to review the line of progression from descriptive linguistics to discourse analysis. I noted major approaches to studying discourse from a linguistic perspective; (1) text grammar, and (2) speech-act theory. I then
focused on one perspective from the former; following the analytical perspective of Robert Longacre and his students. I believe that this school of linguistic discourse analysis is the most productive and one that recognizes the need for an ethnographic dimension with a concern for interaction. Throughout the analytical chapters (3-6) I will return to this discourse perspective by providing a linguistic treatment of a feature of discourse and then offering an alternative treatment of the same feature via conversational analysis. Then I traced the line of progression from Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel and ethnomethodology to conversational analysis, after which I compared and contrasted the analytical perspective of linguistic discourse analysis with the perspective of conversational analysis. My purpose in doing this was to show the need for including an ethnographic dimension into linguistic discourse analysis, a need that is already recognized by those linguists in the Longacre school of discourse analysis. In the next chapter, I focus on previous studies of narrative in the linguistic and sociological literature.
Tagmemic theory, basically, begins with the assumption that there is "an analogy between a particular society, as a whole, and a language" (Pike, 1967:643). The analogy has five components: (1) the structure of each can be detected only by observing individuals and groups interacting, (2) each language or society is relatively independent of other languages and societies, although "there may be fruitful contact between different languages by way of bilinguals, and contact between societies through individuals bi-socially oriented" (Pike, 1967:643), (3) both kinds of structures are relatively stable, (4) the structure of a particular society comprises a set of relationships in a network, and (5) components of the social structure, including language, are structured in three modes. The three modes are; the feature mode, the manifestation mode, and the distribution mode. Pike's version of tagmemic theory can be summarized, then, in two main ideas. The first is that behavior can be described from both the emic and the etic viewpoints, and, secondly, social components are trimodally structured (Pike, 1967).

For example, Toba (1978) shows that in the Khaling language (Eastern Nepal) participant focus distinguishes event oriented narratives from participant oriented narratives. Participant focus is a kind of identification that identifies participants with regard to their importance in the narrative. In Khaling, participants' focal or nonfocal status may be signalled by the use of noun phrases and pronominalization. In the Kaje language (Nigeria) a storyteller may use a specific pronoun in the verb phrase to refer to any one of several third person referents (McKinney, 1978).

Lakoff (1971) initially pointed out that in situations where the speaker wishes the hearer to do something, English uses modal 'will', 'may', 'might', or 'should' attached to the main verb to obtain a certain degree of politeness. Morton (1978) found that in the Parji language (India) speakers use five different performative articles for the sole purpose of informing hearers about the speaker's attitude to his or her hearer and to the information that is being given.

For example, in many languages there seem to be 'cohesion markers' which occur in certain clauses. They are cohesive in the sense that they may refer to things that have been said earlier in a narrative. At the same time they provide a point of departure for the next set of utterances or the next paragraph, if one is analyzing an edited text (Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Jones, 1977; Strahm, 1978).
For example, Marlene Schulze demonstrates how rhetorical questions are used to organize discourse in the Sunwar (Nepal) language. One kind of rhetorical question is used to capture or recapture the hearer's attention. Another kind of rhetorical question is used for identifying characters, events, or settings and to impress on the hearer some specific attribute of these.

In his 1977 article, "A Discourse Manifesto", Longacre writes:

> It seems to me there is more at stake than simply the fact that discourse perspective is needed to round out linguistic analysis on any level, and that this discourse analysis is an area of growing interest within the field as a whole (p.27).

From the beginning, Garfinkel's major concern was to focus on the 'background expectancies' of situations which makes interaction possible and which makes social reality an ongoing accomplishment (1967). People do hundreds of things every day, and these things are viewed by Garfinkel as practical accomplishments which deserve as much attention by social scientists as are more extraordinary phenomena.

Garfinkel assumes that the social world is constantly being created by people and that this continuous creation is not a problem for them. That is to say, through their use of taken-for-granted, common sense knowledge about how the world works and how people can manage their affairs in acceptable ways, members of a society can be seen to be creating the society. He writes that his studies are:

> ...directed to the tasks of learning how members' actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstances, commonsense knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning analyzable; and of discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical commonsense actions 'from within' actual settings as ongoing accomplishments of those settings (1969:viii).

For those social scientists interested in studying the everyday world, Garfinkel's program suggests that everywhere one looks one can see people going about their ordinary business performing familiar, unremarkable activities, and that these activities are the very crux of the social world. In that the ability of people to successfully perform these activities in collaboration with others is what makes the social world possible, one ought to take these practical actions and examine them for how they are accomplished (1967).
As Garfinkel suggests, not only societal members, but also sociologists, linguists, or anyone, operate in this manner. In this way anyone can derive 'objective', general statements about the social world.

Those analysts following the Sacksian tradition study what people say, the accounts they give, in order to discover how the structural features of situations are produced and maintained in a manner which 'makes sense' to participants.

Simply put, the concern of the conversational analyst is with the methods people use to carry out the activities of everyday life and the practices by which they convey to others that their activities are rational and ordinary. The crux of the matter is that people do many things by talking about them (Turner, 1970).

Sacks et al. write in relation to turn-taking:

While understanding of other turn's talk are displayed to coparticipants, they are available as well to professional analysts, who are thereby afforded a proof criterion...for the analysis of what a turn's talk is occupied with. Since it is the parties' understandings of prior turn's talk that is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is their understandings that are wanted for analysis. The display of those understandings in the talk in subsequent turns affords a resource for the analysis of prior turns, and a proof procedure for the professional analyses of prior turns, resources intrinsic to the data themselves (1978:45).

This points to a major difference between conversational analysis and discourse analysis from a sociolinguistic perspective as well. Gumperz (1982) writes:

We must draw a basic distinction between meaning...and interpretation, i.e. the situated assessment of intent (p.207).

Surely we can agree with Gumperz that the content of meaning is situational, that meaning is generated in a situation and is reflexively reinforced in talk. Although Gumperz is not from either
the linguistic discourse school or conversational analysis, his contribution to sociolinguistic theory and methodology has helped shape my own perspective on language over the years.

15

I especially want to thank David Aleguire for making some of his tapes available to me. During 1975-1976, Aleguire tape-recorded conversations in a variety of informal settings. I have 19 hours of tape-recorded conversations. Besides those given to me by Aleguire, I recorded various friends and family members in informal settings. My own recordings, about 5 hours worth, were recorded between 1979-1983.
CHAPTER 2: CONVERSATIONAL STORYTELLING

Much of the recent interest in storytelling and story grammars was originally sparked by the structural analysis of folktales in anthropological circles. It seems natural to first mention the pioneering monograph on the structure of Russian fairytales by V. Propp (1968, originally published in 1928). He isolated 31 narrative categories or functions such as departure, struggle, return, and villainy. He described a 'function' as "an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of action" (1968:21). Propp claimed that functions served as constant categories or elements of a tale which are independent of the specific characters or circumstances in which they are found.

Studies in Narrative

In mentioning Propp and others we are discussing storytelling which differs from narration in which we are interested, in that Propp treats stories which were not told in the course of natural conversation. There are elements, however, in some of the works which have been important to developments in conversational analysis. B. Colby (1973) built upon and departed from the work of Propp in analyzing Inuit folktales and introduced the notion of a grammar of stories marked by sequence and selection rules. Propp had presented a sequence of functions which could be discovered in folktales but his analysis could not account for the numerous exceptions to the normal
sequence. In contrast, Colby's analysis had some generative power. However, the generative capacity of his analysis was limited to validating the genuineness of basic narrative units. Thus, both Propp and Colby represent an attempt to develop a functional methodology for analyzing story structures, but neither, in my mind, were very successful due to the limitations of their respective goals.

Recent research in linguistic discourse analysis has tried to develop 'story grammars', analyses which provide for the underlying structure of simple stories and the implications of such structures for comprehension and recall (Rumelhart, 1975; Thorndyke, 1977; Mandler, 1978; Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Stein and Glenn, 1979). In each of these studies the focus is on an analysis of higher level organizational structures in stories. For example, Thorndyke (1977) attempted to show that stories have a suprasentential structure which listeners are sensitive to. I said in the last chapter that discourse analysts working from a generative semantic perspective are concerned with explicating and describing these beyond-the-sentence features, and the studies mentioned here attest to that goal. However, we wish to emphasize that these studies are concerned only with language competence and not interactional abilities.

I want to mention the work of two other researchers before moving on to the analysis of stories told in natural conversation. W. Kintsch and T.A. van Dijk (1978) have argued that an analysis of propositions within a story ('proposition' referring to the meaning of a sentence), does not adequately explain important elements of discourse structure, such as an individual's ability to summarize a
text. Kintsch and van Dijk take it as their goal to be able to account for the features which establish a text as a coherent whole and allow it to be defined in terms of discourse topics. Of interest to us is that Kintsch and van Dijk have suggested that people who hear a story, or read a story, hear/read it with a certain world-view or set of expectations about the story's structure. According to Kintsch (1977), stories are formed as a sequence of episodes, each of which consists of an exposition, a complication, and a resolution. He claims, further, that listeners segment the stories they hear into story categories which involves both formal linguistic cues and those offered by the content of the story. A formal cue could be something like "now" or "well", or connectors such as "but", "however", and "so" that connect whole story categories rather than single sentences. In a recent article, van Dijk (1982) treats episodes as semantic units of discourse, represented in the surface structure by paragraphs, generally with clear boundary markers in both spoken and written language. An episode of a discourse is considered by van Dijk to be a sequence of related propositions that may be subsumed under some larger theme. For example, any change of time, place, participants, or events generally indicates a new episode.

The following differ in that the stories they analyzed in their research are drawn from natural conversation. William Labov and J. Waletsky (1966), using 'story' as an analytic unit, investigated stories told in conversation and demonstrated that stories can be found to be composed of formal properties. Janet Eisner (1975) attempted the ambitious project of accounting for the constraints placed on oral narratives by the social context and the narrator's
involvement. She claims that "it is the narrator's involvement in the narrative which determines the kinds of narratives produced" (1975:v) and that there are four kinds of oral narrative: uninvolved report, vicarious experience, personal experience, and group experience or story. In relation to conversational storytelling, of interest to us in this study is Eisner's attention given to the process of selection and re-ordering of events through which the storyteller transforms the original event into the narrated event. By making these transformations a storyteller can cue the hearer to the point of the story. In terms of discourse features, Eisner discusses the uses and forms of reported speech within the structure of a story and concludes that storytellers are resourceful language users who shape language and its structure to fit their telling situations. She at times comes close to describing interactional abilities, but seems to be constrained by her intent to discover grammatical features within stories.

Kenneth Gavin (1980) also works toward the construction of a 'grammar of stories' and proposes that story grammars operate on the premise that they can provide the correct interpretation for any well-formed story. His concern is two-fold: (1) what are the basic units of story structure, and (2) how do they relate to a grammar of sentences? Again, note that the concerns of those doing discourse analysis, even on stories told in natural conversation, are different than those within the Sacksian tradition. I said earlier, for example, that conversational analysts are not trying to interpret 'what was really meant' in a conversation. I do find it interesting, however, that Gavin claims consistent use of at least a rudimentary
story structure at all age levels.

The last group of writers I discuss come closest, in my mind, to the interests of those doing conversational analysis from a Sacksian perspective. Nessa Wolfson (1976, 1978) builds upon the work on narrative by Labov to report on the use of the conversational historical present tense in conversational storytelling. The conversational historical present tense may substitute for the simple past tense in conversational storytelling and is referentially equivalent to the past tense when used in this way. Wolfson suggests that the conversational historical present tense occurs only in a specific type of story which she calls a "performed story" and contains features such as dialogue, asides, motions and gestures, and repetition. She refers to this kind of story as a "structured performance" in which the switching between past and present tenses does the work of organizing the narrative by setting off one act sequence from another. The use of the conversational historical present tense is a good example of a discourse feature which may be found in stories told in natural conversation as opposed to edited texts or folktales. Wolfson demonstrates that it is the storyteller who is obliged to make the choice of whether or not to use the conversational historical present tense as a means of organizing a story and where in the story to make the tense switches. In a recent article Wolfson claimed that the alternation between the conversational historical present tense and other tenses in a storytelling is a "performance feature which functions along with the other features in this set to give structure and drama to the story being performed" (1978:217).
Livia Polanyi (1979) takes a different approach to stories told in the course of natural conversation and claims that what stories can be 'about' is culturally constrained, that a story told in conversation ought to have as its 'point' only culturally salient material considered by cultural members to be self-evidently important. Stories may also be changed in the course of telling as tellers and hearers negotiate for what a story will be agreed upon to have been about. She claims, further, that in our culture the structure of a story is composed of devices which "may be either integrated into the telling of the story itself or included in comments made by the narrator from outside the frame of the story" (1979:209). She considers a 'device' to be a type of statement which acts from outside the story to indicate that a certain part of the story contains information crucial to understanding why the story was told. Labov (1972) and Longacre (1976) use 'device' in the same way, to refer to the use of reported speech, repetition of key words or phrases, increased use of modifiers, and so forth (e.g. a statement such as, 'Get this, this is the funny part'). According to Polanyi, in our culture there is usually more than one device present in a story, and more than one piece of information is highlighted. Her research focuses upon examining stories told in conversation with an interest in understanding how stories can tell something of the values and culture of a people.

None of the studies discussed thus far, however, are concerned with interactional abilities but with language competence, with the possible exceptions of Wolfson and Polanyi. Even these, though, have
little to offer in terms of understanding interactional abilities. Although Wolfson and Polanyi, and to a lesser degree Labov, seek to draw a relationship between storytelling and cultural knowledge, there is a puzzling equivocation in their use of the term 'cultural knowledge'. First, the term is sometimes used to refer to typified members' experiences and, secondly, it is used as the 'knowing how' of accomplishing activities such as telling stories. As Sacks (1978) has noted, both aspects are often intricately connected. For example, the topic of a story (first aspect) is related to the topical organization of the conversation in which the story is told (second aspect). However, the distinction between the two aspects must be maintained. A story may serve to transmit 'typical experiences' and thus play a part in socialization (Spielmann, 1981). This aspect is 'knowing that'. The second aspect, 'knowing how', is independent of the particular 'that' that is being told.

To reiterate, the writers discussed above show little interest in storytelling as an interactional activity, but focus instead on story structure and/or the relationship between storytelling and cultural knowledge. I now wish to examine the work of Sacks and those who have analyzed stories told in natural conversation from a Sacksian perspective.

Sacksian Studies in Conversational Storytelling

Harvey Sacks began examining stories told in conversation in the late sixties and his work is well represented in his unpublished 8 lectures from the Fall of 1970 and the Spring of 1971. In one of his lectures edited by Gail Jefferson and published posthumously,
Sacks begins with the some basic features of stories in our culture, that they are ways of packaging experiences and that stories characteristically report an experience in which the teller figures. The story is often organized around the teller's circumstances (1978:259). Then Sacks' concerns turn to interaction. He writes:

Not only does teller figure in the story, and figure with the story organized around his circumstances, but it's pretty much teller's business to tell the story with respect to its import for him, and it is his involvement in it that provides for the story's telling. That is, teller can tell it to someone who knows and cares about him, and maybe recipient can tell it to someone who also knows and cares about the initial teller, but it goes very little further than that (1978:261).

Sacks goes on to suggest that the recipient of a story ought to display his or her understanding of the story with some kind of utterance which does 'story understanding'. One form of displaying understanding could be an 'appreciation' utterance, e.g. 'That must have been funny to see'. Another form of displaying understanding could involve recipient in telling a second story in which the recipient has an experience similar to the original storyteller's (Sacks, 1970, Lecture 5; Ryave, 1978). In the same article, Sacks mentions that a story ought to be fitted into the ongoing conversation, so that stories may be seen to be carefully placed (c.f. Jefferson, 1978; Gardner and Spielmann, 1980).

In relation to the organization of stories told in conversation, Sacks points out that one important thing that is noticeable about stories is that people design large parts of their stories for various
interactional and recipient-designed purposes, and it often turns out that people don't realize that they are doing that designing. It seems that people are generally unaware that they are designing their stories or that they are engaging in delicate and subtle interaction. They just do it, and more often than not they do it in an extremely economical fashion. One thing, then, about stories is that they usually have an organized economy without any specific knowledge on the part of the teller that that is what is being done. Sacks writes:

> Then a story comes off and it has an observedly marked organization to it... and the very teller can be struck by that. What the teller may say is, 'Wow, how elegantly organized my story was!' which he can only say by virtue of the fact that he had no idea that he had organized it. Now the argument goes: that the economical organization of a story is for some purpose (1971:3:23).

In examining the sequential aspects of story forms Sacks suggests that storytelling is composed of three serially ordered and adjacently placed types of sequences: (1) the preface sequence, (2) the telling sequence, and (3) the response sequence. Our concern with the features of risky or dangerous disclosure stories will have us focusing on all three sequences.

Jefferson (1978) demonstrates how a series of conversational utterances can be sequentially analyzed as parts of a 'storytelling' with the talk being used to engage conversational co-participants as story recipients "and to negotiate whether, and how, the story will be told, whether it is completed or in progress, and what...it will have amounted to as a conversational event" (p.237). She locates two
features of stories which are integrated with turn-by-turn talk: (1) stories are 'locally occasioned' in that they emerge from turn-by-turn talk, and (2) upon completion stories re-engage turn-by-turn talk. She writes:

The local occasioning of a story by ongoing turn-by-turn talk can have two discrete aspects; (a) a story is 'triggered' in the course of talk, and (b) a story is methodically introduced into turn-by-turn talk (1978:220).

Jefferson builds here upon Sacks' ideas about how stories get told with a sensitivity to the local conversational contexts within which they are told. One thing about storytellings is that they involve shifts in the state of talk from turn-by-turn talk to storytelling and then back to turn-by-turn talk.

Storytelling in conversation properly begins with what Sacks calls a 'preface sequence'. He suggests that:

The preface can take a minimal length of two turns, the first involving talk by the intending teller and the second by an intended recipient (1974:340).

For example,

(1) A: Did I tell you what happened to me in Mexico last month?

(2) B: No, what happened?

This minimal sequence begins with A, the intending teller, producing an utterance (1) that does the work of offering to tell a story. Then B, in utterance (2), responds to A's initial offer with an answer to A's question and, in turn, produces a relevant 'acceptance' of A's offer to tell a story. Sacks suggests that if an offer to tell a
story is followed by an utterance by the intended recipient which accepts/rejects the story offer, then:

The preface sequence can take a minimal length, be two turns long, and thereafter the telling sequence can be undertaken, intending teller reacquiring the floor for that project (1974:341).

It seems reasonable to suggest that, since we can have a minimal preface sequence, a preface sequence may be expanded beyond its minimal form. Sacks (1974) argues that the source for this type of expansion often involves the intended story recipient making use of the initial utterance of offering a story to either reject or somehow delay the telling.

(3) A: Did I tell you what happened to me in Mexico last month?

(4) B: Listen, I'd like to hear about it but I'm really in a rush.

Note in this sequence A offers to tell a story and B responds to A's offer with an utterance (4) which does the work of rejecting or delaying the telling of the story. A story is offered but the telling is delayed. 13

Once a story has been prefaced and accepted, the teller may proceed directly to the telling. Although the preface and response parts will necessarily involve some conversational sequencing, the actual telling carries no such obligation and place for the story recipient to talk within the course of the telling need not be provided by the teller. The telling can then take a minimum of one
teller turn. It is common, however, for story recipients to talk 14 within the telling sequence. Sacks suggests one reason for this:

Since responses to stories require an understanding of them and can reveal the failure thereof, a recipient who feels a failure in the story's course and can intrude to seek clarification is motivated to do so because he can thereby be aided in avoiding a misresponse (1974:345).

Goffman (1974) agrees that a story, as a replaying, will usually "be something that listeners can emphatically insert themselves into, vicariously re-experiencing what took place" (p.504). Also, when a member is engaged in a storytelling, that member is presenting to the story recipient a version of something that actually happened. Goffman suggests that when a person is engaging in the activity of storytelling,

The means [the teller] employs [to tell the story] may be intrinsically theatrical, not because he necessarily exaggerates or follows a script, but because he may have to engage in some-thing that is a dramatization...to replay it (1974:504).

Ryave (1978) points out that the actual telling of a story, the recounting portion, "is notable for its particular delineation of some event, usually requiring a number of utterances tied together by some developing course of action" (p.127). He pays some attention to how a series of stories gets generated by suggesting that the relationship between two or more stories told in succession involves more than mere sequential adjacency. That is, people telling second stories ought to display a relationship of significance between their story and the one(s) told before theirs. He notes that one procedure for displaying
a relationship of significance is to organize the second story through the use of a significance statement.

Goffman (1981), too, notes that a storytelling requires the storyteller to embed in his or her own utterances the utterances and actions of the characters in the story. As for the telling aspect on a storytelling occasion, he writes:

The teller is likely to break narrative frame at strategic junctures: to recap for new listeners, to provide...encouragement to listeners to wait for the punch line, or gratuitous characterizations of various protagonists in the tale; or to backtrack a correction for any felt failure to sustain narrative requirements such as contextual detail, proper temporal sequencing, dramatic build-up, and so forth (1981:152).

Finally, story endings are, in most cases, also accompanied by response sequences which act to close the storytelling. There are a number of techniques available to people for responding to a story. One such technique is 'story appreciation'.

(5) A: [STORY] and then I got out of there fast!

(6) B: Gee, that must have been a scary experience.

In this sequence A produces a typical story closing in utterance (5) and B responds in (6) with an utterance that accomplishes 'story appreciation'. As Goffman suggests, whenever a member is engaged in talk "what his listeners are obliged to do is to show some kind of audience appreciation" (1974:503). This type of device is indicative of the various ways available to members for responding to a story.

One thing to notice is that, along with the production of a
storytelling, there are certain story-bound activities: preface sequences, response sequences, the reporting of some event or events, and the 'local occasioning' of stories in that they emerge from turn-by-turn talk (Jefferson, 1978). That is, the activity of storytelling provides for the propriety and expectations of these activities, so as to be both cause and consequence of the activity. This observation is demonstrable in that members can, in fact, terminate a story in the midst of its telling, or be interrupted by hearers. The production procedures inherent in the 'how' of storytelling, then, provide the resources by which members are able to recognize that other members are involved in the activity. To wit, that something is recognizable as a 'storytelling' depends on members displaying the activity as a 'storytelling'.

Production and Recognition in Conversational Storytelling

The ideas about storytelling developed in this study have their roots in the intuitive understanding of what it means to 'tell a story'. People seem to be capable of managing the tasks involved in telling stories. In fact, it appears evident that telling stories is not much of a problem for most people. They just tell them. It requires no complicated forethought for its successful achievement and it can be attempted without much thought to failure. Most of us tell and listen to many stories every day without ever really thinking about it. There is, however, a kind of problem involved nevertheless. That is: how is it done? The 'problem' is an analytic one: what is the nature of the work routinely executed by people telling stories?
Recall that this study is not 'about' storytelling but the methods, the ways, the procedures involved in the telling and understanding of everyday conversation, with a focus on storytelling as the concerted accomplishment of members (anyone sharing mastery of a natural language and a common culture) involving themselves as a matter of everyday occurrence in the production and recognition of stories. One thing we will make clear is that members rely on an elaborate collection of methods in the accomplishment of storytelling. Our interests will involve us in an examination of some members' methods for the production and recognition of storytelling as an ongoing, situated accomplishment. The notions of 'production' and 'recognition' are invoked to underline the fact that doing storytelling involves co-conversationalists both in doing the activity (production) and in orienting to the activity (recognition). Our interest in the production and recognition of storytelling is informed by the fact that members, in the midst of telling stories, attend to these dimensions of the phenomenon. In fact, that attention has interactional consequences for the problem of storytelling, as does the lack of such attention. A fundamental concept which we are dealing with is that the world is a world of work (Garfinkel, 1967). That something is, for example, a 'storytelling', depends upon it being produced and recognized as such. It is evident that this production must be continually and consistently available and accountable. Being involved in an activity such as storytelling also provides for a set of constraints and instructions. These constraints and instructions, some of which we will be considering in the ensuing chapters, in turn provide for the basis of the doing and seeing.
(production and recognition) of the activity of storytelling. In short, it takes some interactional work to successfully achieve a 'storytelling'. Our general question then becomes: how do members routinely go about producing a storytelling?

What I am saying is that the activity of storytelling is a members' accomplishment, both in its production and in its recognition. A storytelling is, after all, an interactional activity. That is to say, the achievement of a 'storytelling' rests upon such factors as time, place, and other people, and there are proper and expectable occasions for a story to be told in the midst of ongoing conversation (Ryave, 1978; Jefferson, 1978). This observation makes it clear that in a consideration of recognition work for factors such as time, place, and other people, it is available for people to see and account for an activity such as storytelling without having to, for example, ask them in an interview if it really is a 'storytelling'. Further, it seems reasonable to suggest that the activity of storytelling cannot be randomly done anytime, anywhere, or with anybody. This raises another general question: what are the features that are provided by a setting and invoked by conversationalists in order to recognize the conventionality of storytelling?

One thing I wish to focus some attention on in the analytic chapters (3-6) is the use of membership categories for the establishment of who can expectedly be involved in a storytelling with whom and how that consideration may reveal interactional features of the activity (Sacks, 1972a; 1978). In the review of linguistic discourse analysis and the review of research on narrative in the last
chapter I examined instances which demonstrated that people do, in fact, attend to the actuality that certain categorial incumbencies provide for the occasion of storytellings, so that recognition work can be part of the interactional character of a storytelling. This in turn provides for the recognizability of a storytelling as based upon other factors, such as the availability or properness of some category set.

**Conclusion**

The reader can begin to see the delicacy of the kind of analytic work in which I am involved when I attempt to locate and describe the features of an activity. In conversational storytelling the noticing of potential categorial incumbencies among conversationalists may involve quite focused attention to the progressively-revealed setting in which the activity is taking place. I take it that the analysis of narratives must be sensitive in its treatment of these member attentions. As Harvey Sacks tells us:

> What one ought to seek to build is an apparatus which will provide for how it is that any activities, which members do in such a way as to be recognizable to such as members, are done, and done recognizably. Such an apparatus will, of course, have to generate and provide for the recognizability of more than just possible descriptions (1972:332).

I have already noted that the primary focus of this study is to concentrate on and attempt to locate and describe those features which are built into narratives told in natural conversation and which
members must be assumed to consult in order to make sense of such stories. Roy Turner (1972) writes:

I take it as absolutely fundamental in the analysis of conversational transcripts that the analyst shall explicate not (or not only) the syntactic properties of utterances and their relations, but primarily such procedures for displaying or invoking social-organizational features as participants must be assumed to employ in constructing their own and 'processing' others' utterances (p.453).

This study necessarily presupposes a basic knowledge of conversational analysis in general and the work of Harvey Sacks in particular. With regard to the former, I focused attention on the literature, published and unpublished, produced over the past ten years or so. As for the latter, I concentrated primarily on the work of Sacks on storytelling. In examining the literature I made it a point to focus attention upon some of the ways which people who are telling stories have at their disposal for sustaining and protecting the ongoing interaction when a story gets generated.

The next chapter begins the analytical section of this study (Chapters 3-6). I examine first mention character references in narratives, first presenting a linguistic discourse analysis treatment of the phenomenon, followed by a conversational analysis treatment of the same issue.
Researchers from a variety of disciplines are interested in stories and story structure. The following are some of the group who deal with the formal aspect of narratives: Propp (1928), Dundes (1962), Greimas (1971), van Dijk (1972), Lakoff (1972), Pike and Pike (1977), Rumelhart (1978), and Gavin (1980), to name but a few.

I think it interesting that investigators of story structure have typically relied on their intuitive impressions in arriving at the formal categories which are used as the basic analytic elements of their grammars, such as Oolby (1973), Stein and Glenn (1977), Kintsch and Green (1978).

In an article by Rumelhart (1977), for example, he described a process of understanding a narrative as equivalent to selecting a story schema, verifying its correspondence to the narrative unit, and determining whether it gives an adequate account of the story or text.

She writes:

The basic theoretical point is that in the study of the conversational historical present one sees a perfect example of the relationship between linguistic structure and language use. The methodological consequence of [this study] is that it is only through the study of language use that one may fully analyze the linguistic structure, just as one must understand the linguistic structure in order to uncover the rules of its use (p.215).

What I think is important here is not necessarily the use of the conversational historical present tense, but the shift between tenses (c.f. Spielmann and Gardner, 1979).

For Polanyi, a story is defined as the "linguistic encoding of past experience in order to explain something about, or by means of, the events or states described" (p.208).

Polanyi takes a more or less linguistic discourse approach in her study by claiming that stories contain three kinds of information, each one acting to contextualize the other: temporal information...
(Sacks' "canonical" form), descriptive information, and evaluative information.

8

Much of the work by Sacks on storytelling is in the form of unpublished lectures (Spring 1970, lectures 1-8, and Fall 1971, lectures 1-16).

9

In a Spring 1970 lecture (#1), Sacks makes the point that people monitor scenes for their storyable possibilities. That is, one can be involved in some activity in which one can determine at the time of the activity that it could later be told as a story.

10

Simply put, there are ways for storytellers to build into their stories a requirement for listening to them and for instructing story recipients about what is going to be told about and what interest it may have for recipient (Spring 1970, lecture 2).

11

Surely it would take some work by a story recipient to achieve a second story, work which would be grounded in paying attention to the first story, and then using this attention to build a second story which relates to the first story.

12

Ryave notes that the meaning and relevance of a description of an event in story form is not "a pregiven matter to be analytically determined solely by inspecting the particulars of some recounting, but is itself best conceived as a social activity that is interactionally negotiated and managed in and through the emerging particulars of a situation" (1978:130).

13

A related point: one way to get a story started is to announce a time or place, e.g. 'One night', or 'Once when I went to Quebec'. Such a preface leaves little doubt that a story is forthcoming.

14

Sacks suggests that one way a story can be seen as orderly is that it is specifically intended by the teller that recipient may join in. That is, one sort of orderliness in a storytelling is that a story recipient may talk at various points in a storytelling, the recipient talk oriented to recognizing that a story is being told (Lecture 2, Spring 1970).

15

By 'story' I mean, following Sacks, the telling of some event(s) in natural conversation. Alan Ryave (1978) suggests that this should be taken to mean the telling of some event or events in more than one utterance. He writes:
When I speak of the 'telling of a story in conversation' I have in mind not only the utterances of the storyteller, but also the comments made in the course of a story presentation by those who are the recipients of the story (1978:131).

Ryave claims that this sort of teller-recipient interaction during the course of a storytelling can affect the in-progress unfolding of the story, thus potentially affecting the sense that a series of utterances might obtain. Further, he suggests that a distinguishing feature between stories told in conversation as opposed to, for example, stories told in performance situations, is that recipients may comment during the telling. This feature affirms the sense in which storytelling in conversation can be seen to be an interactional accomplishment.

It should be noted, however, that these methods are employed by members in taken for granted, unformulated, and unexamined ways. For most people the social world is 'out there', 'given', and 'objective'. It is generally not viewed as a product, an outcome of standardly available members' methods (cf. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970).

Garfinkel (1967) proposes that the events in our everyday lives make sense to us because of the ways we simultaneously produce and perceive them, that the familiar events and commonplace scenes of our lives are recognizably familiar by virtue of the methods by which people produce and recognize these events and scenes for what they are.

Simply put, this routine, unproblematic, and unformulated attention to everyday events is the product of sense-making work on our part. Through our methods for doing this sense-making work we accomplish a common social world (Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970).

The idea here is not new, but is derived from Garfinkel (1967) and stated succinctly by Eglin (1978), that is, that members' knowledge of their society, that is 'culture', is methodological rather than substantive. Eglin writes:

Members use the location of a cultural particular—person, event, utterance—to decide upon its sense, or assign it a definite sense...By location I mean positioning or placement in a variety of contexts or settings, ecological, temporal, sequential, organizational, occasional (1978:1).
Here the notion of 'indexicality' arises. For example, words do not have unchanging meanings at all times, on all occasions of their use. Thus people have to 'repair' indexicality by producing descriptions or 'glosses' which provide listeners with the resources for understanding 'what's happening' in the interaction, e.g. that a story is being told (Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). Garfinkel's use of 'indexicality' draws attention to the occasioned nature of everyday social situations and stresses the particular nature of each and every social happening and event.

In his 1972 paper, 'An Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology', Sacks analyzes calls to a suicide prevention center and claims that the materials elicited are, "some collections of membership categories" (p.31). By "categorization device" he means:

That collection of membership categories
that may be applied to some population...
so as to provide, by the use of some rules
for application, for the pairing of at least
a population member and a categorization
device member. A device is then a collection
plus rules of application (p.32).

Simply put, the basic concept used in Sacks' analysis is identity or 'category'. For any person, there is a large number of categories for 'correctly' describing that person. For example, the reader may be describable as a 'man' or 'woman', a 'son' or 'daughter', a 'blonde', a 'rock and roll fan', 'middle-aged', a 'sociologist' or 'anthropologist' and so on. A key issue in Sacksian analysis, then, is how members can methodically select an appropriate category on a particular occasion. Furthermore, members methodically select a single category from a group of related categories. Such a group is known as a Membership Categorization Device (MCD), a collection of categories which 'go together' in the sense that when a category from a certain device is correctly applied to a person, it can be heard to exclude them from being identified with some other category from the same device.

Sacks' earliest work on the social organization of talk was concerned with the phenomenon of description; that is, in their talk people are continually and consistently describing their social world to one another (1963, 1967). Thus, people may describe such things as events they have seen, things they have done, their feelings, attitudes, opinions, and so forth. We may regard descriptions, then, as a basic feature of all of our everyday activities. The whole point of Garfinkel's notion of 'reflexivity' is that our everyday activities are 'accountable phenomena', and that, through the ways in which we do everyday activities, the activities provide for the describability of our social world (Garfinkel, 1967).
This chapter examines character formulations in narrative discourse with an interest in discovering and describing first mention references techniques and preferences. In the first part of this chapter I present a treatment of character formulations as found in the linguistic discourse analysis literature relating to NARRATIVE. After demonstrating to the reader how character formulations may be handled by linguistic discourse analysis, I examine the same phenomenon from the perspective of conversational analysis. At the end of this chapter I relate the two different analyses and show how the methodology used in conversational analysis is useful to the discourse linguist.

A Linguistic Discourse Treatment of Formulating Character

There are a number of studies in the linguistic discourse literature which have offered analytical treatments of formulating character in narratives (Jones, 1983; Schram and Jones, 1979; Maibaum, 1978; Markels, 1981; Caughley, 1978; Toba, 1978; Newman, 1978). Most of these studies have to do with formulating character in languages other than English, although Jones (1983) focuses exclusively on English and Longacre (1983) offers some comments on participant identification in English narratives. In this section I first examine the findings in the former group, featuring non-English narratives.
In her article, "Participants in Jirel Narrative" (1978), Anita Maibaum demonstrates how participants in Jirel narratives are identified. The first character in Jirel narratives is introduced in the main setting and is usually the main character of the story as far as the plot is concerned, or what the story is about. The character may be introduced by a noun, a noun phrase, or a proper name. Maibaum gives various examples from Jirel of grammatical features which she considers requisite to character formulation. For example, when a character is introduced in a narrative the indefinite -jyik, meaning "a certain" or "one" is always included, e.g. "Mi gamma-jyik wot-a-kwa-lo" (person old-female-certain be-past-stative-report) "there was an old lady". In narratives with only one participant (character), that participant also has to be reidentified at story end (in written texts, in the last paragraph).

In his article, "Participant Orientation In Longuda Folk Tales" (1978), John Newman concludes that, when characters are formulated in narratives, "a title construction is usually used at the beginning of the discourse to introduce the character by name" (p.95). The narrative's main character is formulated in a subject noun phrase by name together with the neutral pronoun a, meaning "third person singular subject". He gives an example from a narrative folk tale about Rabbit and Hyena: Ayu a kasama bwautha hamatha, n silgin. Gwabarwa a sinlalama binma a sikama", (Rabbit he search-past-focus skins good, he split-past-distributive. Time of festival their it close-past-focus), which translates, "The rabbit looked for the good skins, which he then cut up. At that time it was the time of their festival."
In the Algonquin language, first mention character references in narrative discourse may be in the form of proper names, nouns, or noun phrases. However, Algonquin is different from English in that first reference to a character will normally come before the verb, provided the narrative information is new to the recipient(s) as distinguished from, i.e. legends, which are usually well-known to recipient(s). Subsequent character references come after the verb. Note the following examples from my Algonquin materials.

Text 27: Papidan Dac
Pikogan Mazinahigan
22 January 1982

27.1 Nigodin ikwe owidjiwagoban odabinodijijiman
27.1 One time a woman she-went-with-him her-child-obv

(ogwizisan) kidji nda odewewadj oseesikak
(her son-obv) in-order-that they go-to visit with her-older-brother

aa ikwe. 27.2 Mi dac aa oseesan aa that woman. 27.2 That's why then that older-brother-obv that

ikwe nabewikoban acidj kitci mididogoban. 27.3 Nabe dac
woman was-a-man and really he-was-big. 27.3 Man then

ogi inan ini abinodijijan: "Pijan ooma,
he-said-to-him that child-obv: "Come here,

kiga takonin." 27.4 Mi dac aa ockinawes
fut I-hold-you-on-my-knee." 27."That's why then that boy

ogi nakwetawan ini naben, "Kawin tawatesinon
he-answered-him that man-obv, "Not there-is-room-neg

kidji ki takonijian,
oza
in-order-that +ki you-hold-me-on-your-knee, because

ki kitci misad aja tagwan...."
your big stomach already is there...."
Text 29: Papidan
Pikogan Mazinahigan
29 Feb. 1982

29.1 Niwidjitajikemagan odaian kitci opiwawiwan,
29.1 My neighbour his dog-obv really he-is-hairy,

kawin kikendjigadesinon adi e tagwanig octigwan acidj adi
not it-is-known-neg where +conj it-is his-head and where

e tagwanig ozo. 29.2 Kitci wedan mega
+conj it-is tail. 29.2 Really easy because

kidji kikenimadj. 29.3 Wikobidaw ozo, kicpin dac
in-order-that you-know-him. 29.3 Pull-it tail, if then

magwamuk, mi ii octigwan....
he-bites-you, that's what that one head.....

Text 24: Makwa Adisokan
Anna Mowatt
February, 1982

24.1 Makwa e adisokanaganiwidj. 24.2 Kitci weckadj
24.1 Bear +conj story-is-told. 24.2 Really long-ago

kokom ki widamage ega e minocig
old-lady +past told not +conj it-is-good

makwa pawanadj. 24.3 Nopamig tajikewagoban
bear he-dreams-about-him. 4.3 In the bush they-were-staying

weckadj kokom acidj dac nabe acidj owidigemagan anawe
long-ago old lady and then man and his spouse that

nabe. 24.4 Kegapitc nigodin e kijebawagag ikido aawe
man. 24.4 After awhile once +conj it-is-morning said that

nabe, "o, (ni) kitci minwendam e kijebawagam anawe man, "oh, I'm really happy +conj it-is-morning. Oh, bear

nibawana." ikido aawe nabe. 24.5 "o" ikido
I-dreamed-about-him." said that man. 24.5 "oh" said

dac kokom, "kiga wiwisin ii then old-lady, "You fut will be hungry that

ka inabadaman. Kawin minocisinon
+conj-past you-dream-it. Not it-is-good-neg
ka pawanadj makwa" ikido aawe
+conj-past you-dream-about-it bear" said that

kitci kokom. 24.6 "An dac win ii" ikido dac aawe
really old-lady. 24.6 "Why not" said then that

nabe. 24.7 Minawadj dac ikido aawe kitci kokom,
man. 24.7 Again then said that really old-lady,

"kikikendan na? Makwa kawin wisinisi kabe pibon. Mi eta
"Do you know? Bear not he-eats-neg all winter. Only

niba. Mi dac ii ega minocig makwa
he-sleeps. That's why then that not(conj) it-is-good bear

pawanadj." you-dream-about-him." [Story continues]

In Text 27, for example, note that the main character, "ikwe" (a
woman), is mentioned before the verb in 27.1, as is "nabe" (a man) in
27.3. Also, the demonstrative "aa" (that one) is never used in first
mention reference, but only in subsequent references, as in 27.4 "aa
ockinawes" (that young man), and in 27.1, "aa ikwe" (that woman) after
the woman had already been introduced. In text 29, the first
character, "niwidjitajikemagan odaian" (my neighbor's dog), is
mentioned before the verb in 29.1 and after the verb in subsequent
references. In text 24, considering 24.1 an utterance about what the
story is 'about', 24.2 contains the initial character formulation,"kokom" (an old lady), before the verb, "ki widamage" (+past-tell).

Recall that I said earlier that, in Algonquin narratives, first
mention character references usually occur before the verb with
subsequent references normally occurring after the verb, as in the
following.
28.1 Pejik awiag teban weckadj.
One person exist-past long time ago.

28.2 Kitci mane wisiniwagoban aa anicinabe...
Really a lot he-was-eating that Indian...

After first mention character reference in Algonquin, subsequent references normally occur after the verb, as in 28. First, the character is initially introduced, "pejik awiag" (somebody), in 28.1. Then in 28.2, and throughout the rest of the text, the subsequent references occur following the verb, i.e. "wisiniwagoban" (he was eating) "aa anicinabe" (that guy). There seem to be, however, some exceptions which may be explained in terms of hierarchy and whether or not the character is a main character or minor character. With regard to the former, there seems to be a hierarchy of importance in Algonquin, with people being regarded as more important than animals, and animals more important than things. It appears that the first mention reference procedure only occurs before the verb in the case of people and that the reference procedure is reversed in the case of animals, the first mention occurring after the verb with lower hierarchical characters. Consider the following.

Text 23: Kokokoo acitc Pibwanazi
Pikogan Mazinaigan
22 Kenositc Kisis, 1982

23.1 Kagwedjimakaniwagoban kokokoo acitc pibwanazi,
They-were-asked owl and night-hawk
"Awenen kin ke odawesizimian ani pimadizian?"
Who you +conj-fut your-animal how you-live

inagamiwagoban kokoo acitec pibwanazi...
they-said-to-them owl and night-hawk [story continues]

Text 33: Nabemik Anicinabewigoban
Pikogan Mazinaigan
Part 1, February 19, 1982

33.1 Nigodin pabamosegoban nopimig amik.
One time he-was-walking-around bush a beaver.

33.2 Ikwewan dac ini ka mikawadjin...
woman-obv then that one +conj-past found-him...

[Story continues]

Note in both instances that the animal characters are placed after the verb in first mention position, e.g. 33.1 where "amik (beaver) is first referred to after the verb "pabamosegoban" (he was walking around), and 23.1, where two animal characters, "kokokoo" (owl) and "pibwanazi" (night-hawk) are introduced following the verb "kakwedjimakaniwagoban" (They were asked), a reversed position in relation to people characters. The hierarchy of importance is a feature of Algonquin which acts as a window to the Algonquin world-view, but which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Furthermore, Algonquin narratives fall back on at least one basic kind of background information: conventional role expectations which are invoked when characters are named. That is, a set of general role expectations are attached to a character. In Algonquin legends, for example, names of animal characters may carry the real-world information about their size, habits, and environment. Also, names may connote conventional cultural evaluations of the participants, associating them with such characteristics as, e.g. cleverness vs.
stupidity, quickness vs. slowness, or with expectations about the role in the legend that the character can be expected to play. In Algonquin, "wagoc" (fox) can always be expected to be the trickster or hero, and "pijiw" (lynx) to be the one who gets tricked or the villain.

My purpose in drawing from my Algonquin materials is to show how first mention references in narrative discourse may be treated from a linguistic perspective. A full-blown linguistic discourse treatment of first mention reference in Algonquin would, of course, be much more comprehensive. It is hoped, however, that the reader can begin to see how the discovery of the functions of various syntactic constructions is a crucial task of linguistic discourse analysis. Thus, to have associated with first mention character references certain syntactic constructions, such as first mention character reference distribution in relation to predication, to my knowledge is a contribution squarely in line with one of the chief aims of discourse study.

In the paragraphs above I have given a brief glimpse of the kind of treatment that discourse linguists give character identification in non-English narratives. Throughout these discourse studies there are recurring themes of interest: introducing main characters, maintaining reference to the main character, introducing secondary characters, reidentification of characters, sequential mention of characters, and so on. Recall that I said in the first chapter that a basic difference between linguistic discourse analysis and conversational analysis is that the former deals almost exclusively with edited texts, usually written texts such as written stories,
folktales, etc., while the latter deals with unedited texts from live conversation. Still, recognizing that live conversation is an important discourse consideration, discourse studies often attempt to relate the findings from edited, written texts to features of conversation. For example, Caughley (1978), following his analysis of formulating character in Chepang, writes:

Conversation, which occupies a major part of narratives, is also important in identifying participants. It is not possible to outline the complete identificational system for conversation here, but the use of kinship terms and vocatives is an explicit though indirect way of identifying participants (1978:173).

These discourse studies are linguistically relevant and help to provide a complete understanding of how written and spoken discourse "works" in the languages under investigation. I now want to examine studies in English which have direct relevance to this study.

In recent years several discourse linguists have come to the conclusion that the first reference to a character in a narrative discourse differs from most of the subsequent references to that character (Schram and Jones, 1979; Jones, 1983). In Pragmatic Aspects of English Text Structure (1983), Larry Jones examines the relations in English discourse between the form of first mention character formulations and speaker/author assumptions. He writes:

The various ways in which [a character] can be mentioned for the first time in a discourse is shown to correlate with different assumptions on the author's [or speaker's] part regarding the reader's [or hearer's] prior knowledge of the [character] (1983:49).
In his study, Jones examines four grammatical features of first mention references in English narratives: (1) definite articles, (2) indefinite articles, (3) possessive pronouns, and (4) proper names. The use of the definite article in formulating character in English indicates that the character is in the hearer's foregrounded frame, that is, that the character is in sight or otherwise known to be the referent e.g. "The guy over there was walking across the street and then suddenly started turning cartwheels. He was almost hit by a car." The indefinite article indicates that the character is not in the hearer's foregrounded frame, e.g. "Then a guy in a clown suit rushes over to him and helps him across". The use of a possessive pronoun in formulating character functions the same as the definite article. That is, a possessive pronoun before a character reference indicates that the speaker/author assumes that the character is part of the hearer's/reader's understanding of the narrative, e.g. "His partner came along and stopped traffic until they were safely across." The use of proper names when formulating character, which is of specific interest to me in this chapter, indicates that the narrative contains all the necessary features of the character associated with the name.

The reader unfamiliar with studies in linguistic discourse analysis can begin to get a feel for what discourse analysts are trying to do. Recall that Pickering sees discourse analysis as a means to discover and describe all of the linguistic features that contribute to the total meaning of a discourse (1979:8). I now want to further examine Jones' treatment of proper names in relation to formulating character in narratives.
First, Jones makes it clear that the use of proper names when formulating character in narratives function differently than formulations containing nouns or pronouns (1983:61). He writes:

The linguistic status of proper names has been hotly debated among the various philosophers of language. The aspect of proper names which interests us here is the fact that "proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer" (Searle, 1958:96). That is, the characteristics of a person...are intimately associated with the name of that person. A name, by itself, has only limited meaning to us unless we can associate with that name a person having certain characteristics. Likewise, the first mention use of a name...can only communicate to the [hearer] if he is able to associate with that name a person who has certain characteristics (1983:61-62).

Jones is making the basic premise that the use of a proper name when formulating character in narratives assumes that the hearer is expected to discern all the characteristics of the named person which are necessary for understanding the story/narrative. In keeping with this premise a storyteller ought to make explicit those characteristics that the hearer needs to know. Furthermore, Jones makes the point that a storyteller may leave implicit or unmentioned those characteristics associated with a name that the storyteller already assumes are understood by the hearer.

There is, then, a sense of some kind of function related to formulating character in linguistic discourse analysis. That is, linguists interested in the study of discourse do recognize the importance of understanding how characters may be formulated in narratives. And Jones specifies the functions of first mention character references, namely; (1) formulating characters by name
indicates that the narrative contains all the necessary features of the character associated with the name, or (2) indicates that the hearer/reader knows all or some of the necessary features already. These are claims which are analytically interesting and which provide the discourse analyst with a beginning for examining one aspect of the pragmatic knowledge of English-speaking authors/storytellers.

In his analysis, Jones describes the relations between the form of first mention character references and narrator assumptions, and the various ways in which a character can be formulated in a discourse as related to the different assumptions on the narrator's part regarding the hearer's prior knowledge of the character. His study is invaluable as a contribution to a roster of linguistic features necessary for understanding how this aspect of discourse 'works' in English. Another contribution of Jones' study is the application of a discourse orientation to the study of first mention character references. Most studies in linguistics of formulating character have dealt with individual sentences. The notion that all the assumptions implied in a discourse about formulating character can be discovered and described, assumptions which give an impression of the author's estimate of his or her reader's knowledge about the characters in the narrative, is an idea not previously attended to in linguistic analysis.

However, even a cursory reading of Jones' analysis would indicate that there is much more to the issue of formulating character than he begins to uncover. Furthermore, the assumption is made that the way characters are formulated in written, edited texts is the same
as in live conversation. He writes:

I anticipate that the analysis of cues and of first mention [character] references in general will apply to oral conversational analysis, as well as to written texts as I have done here (1983:73).

This would be nice, but is it true? In the following section I provide the reader with a conversational analysis treatment of formulating character in narratives from live conversation. In the analysis I show how a treatment of formulating character from actual conversation discovers features of formulating character which are thus far unformulated in linguistic discourse analysis, and provides the discourse linguist with a methodology for explicating the ethnographic and interactional dimension of this feature of narrative.

A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Formulating Character

For the discourse linguist there is an interest in tying features of a discourse type to distinctions already made within linguistics. That is to say, the linguist interested in the study of discourse seeks to discover and describe the functions of various syntactic constructions (such as the functions of modifiers and particular sentence types), and considers such discovery and description as a key task of discourse analysis (Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983; Pickering, 1979). For example, in relation to the discourse type NARRATIVE, Jones' analysis of author comments vis-a-vis certain syntactic constructions in English (such as the distribution of definite and indefinite articles when formulating character in written texts), provides us with an example of the discourse linguist's task.
There is, however, a deeper issue involved, and it is at this point that conversational analysis may be seen as a valuable tool for the discourse linguist. Rather than seeking to tie discourse features to already existing categories in linguistics, such as when Jones ties first mention character references to existing syntactic features such as definite and indefinite articles, possessive pronouns, and so forth, conversational analysis goes about the discovery task much differently. Conversational analysis starts with interactional issues and categories, then examines what possibilities can be embodied, e.g. by definite articles, possessive pronouns, proper names or whatever. So then, for some purposes, definite articles and proper names may be interchangeable, but before such a claim can be made we have to first understand their interactional function. If we begin our discourse analysis with existing linguistic features such as articles, pronouns, and names, as our basic analytical categories, we neglect the basic notion that speaker decisions can be embodied in more than one way. Conversational analysis starts with interactional properties, e.g. what speaker assumes hearer knows, and thus is able to embody speaker decisions in a variety of ways. For example, in narrative discourse, one might say, "So this guy who lives across the street came to help out", or "So Tony came over to help out", depending on what the narrator knows the story recipient knows. But we do not have the opportunity to discover these kinds of discourse features if we start with articles, pronouns, and proper names as our master categories.

Certainly there is a recipient design to written texts as well as to live conversation. A feature such as recipient design is important
in the analysis of, e.g. narratives. But linguistic discourse analysis seems to want to treat such ethnographic considerations as something to be added on to linguistics. In conversational analysis, different analytical categories are proposed, categories relevant to written materials as well as to live conversation. Certainly it cannot be the case that linguistic discourse analysis is good enough for written texts, but that one needs an ethnographic dimension for analyzing conversation. On the contrary, ethnographic considerations are important in the analysis of written texts as well. There is an ethnography of writing just as there is an ethnography of speech.

There is a puzzling equivocality in the linguistic discourse analysis literature in relation to this issue. Recall Longacre's claim that "all that we have written here needs eventually to be supplemented by...the current research into the nature of live conversation" (1983:75). On the one hand, it seems that the discourse linguist is saying, in effect, "We'll analyze the data using linguistic categories, and you analyze the data using ethnographic categories, then we'll integrate the two." But, as Sacks (1978) has noted, both aspects are intricately connected. In relation to recipient design in written materials, for example, a category such as 'genre' may be important. If one were to pick up a book of fables and open it to any page and read, "Fox went down to the house," one would make sense out of that sentence differently than if it were a sentence in a detective novel. As a sentence in a fable, "Fox" is understood by almost any reader as an animal and not, e.g. "Mr. Foz the mailman," or whatever. If one were to open a detective novel to any page and read, "The Inspector nodded approvingly," one would know that "The
Inspector" is certainly not a food inspector but a police investigator. How is it known? By our common sense understanding of what we call 'genre'. Thus a category such as 'genre' is important in the analysis of written texts. The discourse linguist also invokes the category of 'genre', but its use usually refers to its own analytical typology, e.g. distinguishing parables and riddles from ordinary narratives. I am using 'genre' in this chapter to refer to literary form which readers recognize and select, e.g. detective stories, romances, fairytales, etc. Hence, my use of 'genre' refers to a set of expectations which a reader can employ in order to make a text intelligible.

In this study, conversational analysis is not presented as something that can be 'added on' to some linguistic analysis, but is presented such that the discourse linguist may want to reconsider the notion of what is relevant as an analytical category, and may wish to consider discarding some linguistic categories for the purpose at hand. Such a claim is not as radical as it may sound and is, in fact, being seriously considered by some of the more prominent discourse linguists. Recall Pickering's comment; "I am entering a plea that more linguists recognize both the legitimacy and necessity of grappling with the role of situation and culture in discourse analysis. Only by grappling with the problem will solutions be forthcoming" (1979:170). This study offers the discourse linguist a methodology for analyzing discourse, a methodology which is built upon situational, cultural, and interactional factors.
Thus far we have seen that linguists interested in discourse analysis provide one kind of treatment of formulating character in narrative. We saw in the last section that discourse linguists are looking for patterns of character references in narratives and that some analytically interesting claims are made, claims which may be of interest to the sociologist interested in discourse in that they provide clues for further analysis. The claims made by linguists interested in discourse are, however, quite different from the considerations which seem to govern live conversation. One cannot merely extrapolate, and in this section I show how the issue of formulating character gets transformed in theoretically interesting ways in conversational analysis.

I begin a conversational analysis treatment of formulating character in storytelling by first examining how characters get formulated in conversation. Then I compare how characters get formulated in conversation with a description of how characters may be formulated in conversational storytelling situations. Finally, I examine one genre of narrative in which formulation preferences may be reversed.

Formulating Character in Conversation

Sacks and Schegloff (1979) note that, in conversation, persons referring to other persons use two preferences, (1) minimization, involving the use of a single reference form, and (2) recipient design, involving the preference for 'recognitionals' (names). They write:
For reference to any person, there is a large set of reference forms that can do the work of referring to that one (e.g. he, Joe, a guy, my uncle, someone, Harry's cousin, the dentist, the man who came to dinner, etc.). Reference forms are combinable, and on some occasions are used in combination. But massively in conversation, references in reference occasions are accomplished by the use of a single reference form (1979:16-17).

The specification of the preference for minimization in referring to other people in conversation goes like this: on occasions when reference is to be done, it should preferably be done with a single reference form. The specification of the preference for recipient design when referring to people goes like this: if they are possible, prefer recognitionals. One thing Sacks and Schegloff point out in reference to this preference is that names may be used because (a) the person referred to may be known by the hearer, and/or (b) the speaker may wish to refer to the person later on in the conversation. Furthermore, they suggest an organization for dealing with when recognition is in doubt. Thus, there is an ordering of the preferences, that being, persons have a preference for achieving recognition over using a non-recognitional reference form.

It should be noted that the preferences for minimization and recipient design in the domain of conversational storytelling have expression specific to other domains as well. As for the preference for the use of recognitionals, they are commonly used when the speaker supposes that the hearer may know the person being referred to, as evidenced by the use of names. The point is this: there are a large number of reference terms available for any possible referent,
nonrecognition and recognition forms which are available to any speaker for any referent. We find, too, that there is a heavy use of first names when people refer to other people in conversation which we take as evidence for a preference for the use of recognitionals (cf. Sacks and Schegloff, 1979). Names are not only used when the person being referred to is known to the hearer. They may also be used initially when the hearer does not know the person whom the speaker is referring to. In such cases the name may be used for interactional purposes, as we will see from the transcripts, thereby arming the hearer with the resources they may thereafter be required to have in order to make sense of what is being said.

One example of a typical preference rule may be found in noting how it seems to be a preferred practice to answer the telephone of a store with the name of the store. If one were to call Sears or The Bay and they were to answer, 'Hello?', then you would have to do some work to find out if you had called the right place. It could take two or more conversational 'turns' to accomplish what could be done in one 'turn' were the person to answer the phone with 'Sears', or 'The Bay'. That's not to say that there is any 'natural constraint' or some such thing on the answerer, but there seems to be a preference rule for organizational phone answering: answer with the organization's name.  

Formulating Character in Conversational Storytelling

Storytellers are faced with a number of tasks when formulating characters in their stories (see the next page for what is meant by a 'formulation'), tasks which involve getting characters in and out of their stories, preserving them throughout the telling, and so on. The
tasks involved require careful teller attention and management in order to get those tasks accomplished.

When we speak of a storyteller's task of formulating character, we mean the issue of how people are appropriately identified in talk. The problem of formulating character is this: for any person to which reference is made, there is a set of terms each of which may be a correct way of referring to that person. On an actual occasion of its use, however, not any member of the set is appropriate. How is it, then, that on particular occasions of use some reference term from the set is selected and other terms are rejected? Alternative descriptions make up a collection from which a choice is made when the person involved is referred to in conversation. The choice of a particular reference term is not made arbitrarily because, for any item from the collection, one can imagine circumstances in which it would not be heard as a proper way of identifying the person in question. For example, someone could be membershipped as a 'wife', 'lawyer', 'the lady next door', 'neighbor', or whatever. We refer to the selection of a description from a collection of possibly correct ones as a 'formulation'. The term 'collection' is not meant to imply a finite list of terms, and our analysis is not concerned with trying to specify what other formulations might be used in other contexts. Rather, the analysis we develop in this chapter is aimed at discovering and describing the methods which storytellers telling stories use in selecting appropriate character descriptions.

In a minimal sense, character references in storytelling instruct recipients to attend to such matters as (a) what the story may be
'about', (b) who will be doing what to whom, and (c) how the characters introduced will figure into the story. Character formulations figure into the story-as-a-whole and, from examining a number of character formulations, we can construct a technical version of how character introductions may be organized and how they might have a bearing on the ongoing interaction.

In this chapter, then, I examine a number of stories told in natural conversation with an interest in explicating and describing the reference organization for formulating story characters. I first examine how character formulations are done in all kinds of stories told in conversation before turning my attention to the interactional work which gets done by the way characters are formulated in a particular genre of narratives. I deal primarily with the following questions: what kinds of preference rules are operating when storytellers formulate story characters? Are there subclasses of recognitionals? Of non-recognitionals? When do recognitionals occur following non-recognitionals? Finally, is there an ordering to such combinations?

NON-RECOGNITIONAL REFERENCE PROCEDURES

Note in the following storytelling fragments how storytellers introduce their story characters not unlike Sacks and Schegloff describe for referring to other persons in conversation, using a single reference form. First, using non-recognitionals.
A: Well, there's another little one that happened on the first day. There was this guy that's about your height... 

B: When do you play this week? 

A: We're sposed to play Doherty's Thursday and then Saturday it's Ginger's Sexy Sauna

B: They have a team? 

A: Yeah, but it must be made up of clients, there's, I doubt there's any guys working there

B: Yeah

A: Man, I wonder what goes on in one of those places?

B: Yeah, I went to one once

A: Nooooooo!

B: Yeah, it wasn't my idea, I was with a guy from work 'n we went out for a few beers 'n, I dunno, we decided to go to a movie, but we passed this massage place 'n he said he always wanted to try one so I ended up going with him. I know it was wrong, but

A: So what was it like?

B: It was no big deal really...

Louise: One night I was with this guy that I liked a real lot an' uhh we had come back from the show, we had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile 'n we were gonna park. An' I can't stand a car, 'n he has a small car
Ken: Mm hm

Louise: So we walked to the back, 'n we just went into the back house, 'n we stayed there half the night (1.0) we didn't go to bed with each other, but it was so comfortable 'n so nice

Ken: Mm hm

Louise: Y'know? There's everything perfect

(I-5)

A: I had been working like crazy for about a week 'n a half 'n I had a day off comin' 'n I was wiped out, just absolutely dead and desperate for this day off. The morning of the day off my boss called me. Sick, right? [STORY]

(II-2)

P: ..but I've had two experiences, one with a girl who I met in a bar and talked to for awhile...
.
.
.
...So I went, okay, give it a chance, 'n the chance came last week and, uhh this girl, well, the girl that I was going out with that you felt that I felt guilty about...

(II-3)

J: One time I was drivin' home from the movies 'n I was drivin' because my boyfriend smashed up his car [STORY]

(III-3)

A: ..'n it starts out with, with a little chart to illustrate uhhh the experimental method (1.0) 'n the chart shows uhhhm, those who do marijuana on one axis 'n memory on the other, right? Okay?
D: ((laughs))

A: So, some guy puts up his hand [STORY] -------

(IV-3)

B: So what was, what was your uhhh tupperware party all about?

A: Oh, it was kinda fun

B: What happened there?

A: (1.0) well, first of all, okay, there was a lady there that kinda, a ----

A: tupperware dealer that takes charge of the party [STORY]

(IV-4)

B: So what was the deal?

A: Well, this fellow was doing this ----

We have it available from these fragments to locate the use of minimal non-recognitionals; e.g. "this guy", "a girl", "my boyfriend", "this girl", "some guy", "a lady", and so on. In all of these examples the storyteller follows the preference for minimization in introducing story characters. Further, we can see that the characters in the stories are introduced by non-recognitional forms. The singular feature of the reference terms used in the above fragments is that, from the recipients' point of view, they could refer to almost anyone. I noted earlier in this chapter that, in conversation, the use of the non-recognitional form does the work of instructing recipients not to search for the identity of the character. In most cases this may be due to the teller's assumption that the recipient does not know the referred-to character, the assumption that the story
recipient does not need to know the character's identity in order to understand the story, or because the storyteller did not know the story character's identity either.

In IX-1 and I-2, we have it available to notice that the respective storytellers employ non-recognitional reference forms when formulating story characters. The storytellers in these transcripts are, foremost, instructing their recipients not to search for the identity of the other people in their stories. The reader may recall when I examined instances of the use of recognitionals in storytelling situations earlier in this chapter that when a recognitional was employed the recipient was instructed to try to find from it the identity of the person being referred to. When storytellers employed non-recognitionals the recipient was instructed not to try to find out who is being referred to.

I note later on in this chapter that storytellers design character formulations by reference to story recipients, where I find storytellers employing terms such as "my boyfriend" or "my boss" by reference to themselves and the story recipients. That constitutes one kind of evidence for the recipient design of identification selection, materials from which a case may be made by locating combinations of pronouns and relational terms. In I-2, however, as in IX-1, the term selected, "this guy", instructs the story recipient that the storyteller is referring to someone that the recipient need not try to find out the identity of, the main reasons being that the storyteller assumes the story recipient does not know the character being referred to or does not need to know.
There is, however, a deeper issue here: if one is going to employ a non-recognitional form in a storytelling, how does a storyteller go about choosing one particular non-recognitional over another non-recognitional? Earlier in this chapter I located different kinds of non-recognitions. When a storyteller chooses to formulate a character with a non-recognitional form, then, there are a number of options to choose from. Storytellers can do quite different things with recognitions and non-recognitions, and different kinds of interactional work get done by choosing one kind of non-recognitional over another.

Returning to I-2, the reader may recall that the other person in Louise's story is formulated as "this guy that I liked a real lot". Note that there seems to be somewhat of a 'risk' in Louise telling her story. The 'risk' arises from the abandoning of 'parking' as an accepted way, as seen by teenagers, for teenagers to negotiate sex in favor of going to an unchaperoned house, which may be seen as an 'adult' way or location for negotiating sex. It is this part of Louise's story that could be construed by Ken as risky and potentially threaten Louise's face. By formulating the character as "this guy that I liked a real lot", Louise informs Ken that there was an affectional relationship with the guy. In formulating the character as such, the formulation ties 'what happened' with 'who it happened with' in a way which has an obvious relationship to the topic of the story—reporting on a date and the occurrence of sex on the date. By formulating the guy she was with as "this guy that I liked a real lot", then, Louise informs Ken that there was an affectional relationship between her and the guy which provides grounds for the
recipient, Ken, to understand the business of the story. It's not as though she was telling about going out with just any guy, but she liked him "a real lot." She thus informs Ken by her character formulation that what she was willing to do on that occasion with the guy she liked a real lot is not something that he should suppose she would do on any occasion with just anyone.

Furthermore, she was under no constraint to characterize the guy she was with as someone she really liked. That is, that she liked the guy a lot is not a feature of the course-of-events in her story. Her formulation of the guy she was with as "this guy I liked a real lot" locates a condition for her doing what she did. The way she formulates her date also has much to do with the person she's telling the story to—a fellow teenager and a male. Thus, her character formulation does the work of protecting her 'face' by delimiting the implications of 'what happened'. It was not something she would do with just anyone, thus she ought not be accused of being a 'loose girl' or available to Ken (or one of Ken's friends) to do the same thing with. Just as telling about 'what didn't happen' helps to defuse a dispreferred response, as we saw in the last chapter, so can formulating the guy she was with as "this guy that I liked a real lot" help to build a defensive design into her story. It isn't, after all, like he was just "this guy" or "some guy I met in a bar". "This guy that I liked a real lot" provides a possible way of seeing 'what happened' precisely by way of seeing who was involved. The character formulated as such may be used as grounds for the recipient to see Louise and "this guy" as people who would do just what they did. The combination of the way she formulates her date and the telling about
'what didn't happen' goes a long way in providing the necessary resources for the recipient to do his part in sustaining and protecting the ongoing interaction and insuring that Louise is allowed to save 'face'.

I said earlier that "a guy from work" is an identification which is recipient designed in the sense that it proceeds from the claim that the person being referred to is presumably not known by the story recipient. Further, such a non-recognitional formulation instructs the story recipient not to try to find out who it is. What we want to try to find out now is how the storyteller, B, went about choosing the formulation "a guy from work". As features of "a guy from work", we have it available to see that the person is identified as a male, and that there is a categorial relationship in the sense that "from work" binds them together. These features have an apparent relation to the business of the story, a leisure activity that began as having a couple of beers together (a normal 'after work' activity for many people), which sets up the more focused characterization of deciding to go to a movie together. The story is told in such a fashion as to relate 'what happened' with 'who it happened with'. B did not undertake the project of going to a massage parlor by himself, and the activity is presented as something that, in all likelihood, would not have happened had it not been for the "guy from work".

We can begin to see from the above character formulations that we may have some grounds for expanding upon the organization of non-recognitional character references. For example, compare the character formulations in Set A with those in Set B.
Set A

(I-2)
L: One night (1.0) I was with this guy -------- that I liked a real lot [STORY]

(I-4)
A: There was this guy that's about -------- your height [STORY]

(III-3)
A: So, some guy puts up his hand [STORY] --------

(IV-3)
A: well, first of all, okay, there was this lady there [STORY] --------

Set B

(I-5)
A: The morning of my day off, my boss -------- called me [STORY]

(II-2)
P: Yeah, 'n when I was in grade eleven or grade twelve I guess, one of the teachers at the school [STORY] --------

(II-3)
J: One time I was drivin' home from the movies 'n I was drivin' because my boyfriend smashed up his car [STORY] --------

(V-1)
B: I remember one time we tried to skip out of PE, me and Carol, and she, the teacher, came into [STORY] --------
In Set A (I-4, III-3, and IV-3), we find the use of non-recognitionals with gender built into them. It is not so much an issue of identifying characters as male and female but that there is no categorial relationship between the storyteller and the story characters. In set B, however, the story characters are introduced by some kind of categorical relationship: "my boss", "my boyfriend", "the teacher", and so on. We can begin to see that there may be different uses for non-recognitionals. Almost all reference terms are non-recognitiononal, and there are surely many ways of organizing reference terms which do not turn on the fact that they are non-recognitiononal. One thing we want to look at is: can a non-recognitional reference term be used to do the work of a recognitional?

NON-RECOGNITIONALS AS RECOGNITIONALS

The reader is encouraged to examine the following transcripts before proceeding to the ensuing analysis.

(I-5)

A: Well, there's another little one that happened on (1) the first day [STORY]

A: Anyway, I had been working like crazy for (3.0) about a week and a half, 'n I had a day off coming, 'n I was wiped right out, jus absolutely dead, 'n desperate for this day off. The morning of the day off, my boss called me. Sick, right? He says, "You gotta go in", he says, "because, because in the pen the teachers have to also be jailers, like we got the key 'n we gotta open the place, y'know (1.0)
D: Didn't somebody else have to be responsible? (30)

A: Well, it's actually works—it actually works well because we didn't allow bars in the university area so that made it really good, but it also meant that if you're the only guy there, you're sittin' there with fifty inmates and you got the key out, so I wasn't—y'know, I wasn't feeling very secure at all

D: yeah

So anyway I go wandering in, on this, on this (52) pick up the key at the front gate, pick up the mail, go through all those gates, pick up the main key 'n this is a—this is a big mother, y'know that's a huge thing, that fits in a huge lock with a big metal tag on it, y'know, you might as well wear a neon sign that says, "I'm carrying the key" (simultaneous laughter) so, so I go in. open up the place, start the coffee, right? Sitting there just shitting my drawers, they start to troop in, right? "Where's Clark?" "Clark's sick today", right? "Oh good, we got this guy today" (hehe) So, here I am, 'n Clark had said over the phone, he said, "Y'know, it's really important to get to know the guys", so [STORY]

P: One thing I did get to—exposed to since I saw (1) you last was a book called Linda Goodman's Sun Signs or something like that 'n it's a [astrology]

D: yeah

P: Yeah, 'n when I was in grade eleven or grade (5) twelve I guess, one of the teachers at the school he di—he didn't like me very much, but he in­vited me to see this lecture at the planetarium that was put on for people on the school board, it was a private lecture but I was one of the students that was invited to this, 'n it was a (1.0) thing to basically refute any, any of the validity of astrology, so I've always carried that with me, there we go carrying things with you, so (15)

D: yeah

P: so I've always felt a little bit (2.0) y'know, weird feelings about people who come out with "What sign are you?" 'n all of a sudden you— they're completely turned off an' walk away (20)
(1.0) but I've had two experiences, one with a girl who I met in a bar and I talked to for awhile 'n all of a sudden she came up to me and told me that I was a pisces on the cusp of aquarius 'n I didn't know what she meant but as it turned out (25) I am, so I went, "Okay, give it a chance", 'n the chance came last week and, uhh, this girl, well, the girl that I was going out with that you felt that I felt guilty about, she read me, she read me a part in the book about the pisces male, who I is, (30) and uhh god, it was just so right on, parts of it, 'n one part of it was that I'm not the kind of person who confides in people and yet I love people confiding in me [hummm] [so [STORY CONTINUES]]

In I-5, A relies upon his 'employer-employee' relationship with one character in the story who ends up getting introduced as "my boss", later being transformed into a recognitional, "Clark". One thing that Sacks and Schegloff (1979) note in relation to the preference for the use of recognitionals in conversation, is that they found a heavy reliance on names, usually first names. In conversational storytelling there seems to be a similar preference when the storyteller is formulating character. In I-5, for example, I 'hear' A saying something like, "The morning of my day off my boss, who you don't know, called me". Then later on in the telling when his boss is again referred to he is referred to as "Clark". So we find that A transforms "my boss" into "Clark", thus employing his boss's name when he found that he could. That is, A has set it up for the hearer, D, to have the resources available to tie the later recognitional "Clark" to the earlier non-recognitional "my boss". A could have, after all, referred to his boss by category again, i.e. "They start to troop in, right? Where's your boss? He's sick today", 108
or something like that. One issue in such a case would be: if A had made his story audience say, "Where's your boss?", would not the story recipient have it available to hear this as the teller's substitution made to accommodate him as recipient? In I-5, A finds that he is able to use "Clark" at this point in the telling because he has provided the resources for D to tie the name "Clark" to the earlier reference to "my boss".

There is another issue here. Recipients must be relied on, to some extent, to be able to perform transforms on recognitionals in order to locate explanatory category memberships. Even when names are used, recipients need to be able to perform transforms on them to find what category membership is explanatory of what is being said. If, for example, I were to tell a story about something my wife did to someone who knows my wife and used her name when referring to her, it is by virtue of the fact that the person I am telling the story to can transform my wife's name, 'Ruth', into the category membership 'my wife' that the recipient can see why it is I'm telling the story or how it is she did what she did. Even when names are used, then, recipients have to be able to perform transforms on them in order to see what the explanatory membership is that is being invoked.

In the conversational fragments presented thus far, we can begin to see different kinds of non-recognitionals by, (1) gender, i.e. "this guy", "a lady", (2) relationship categorials, i.e. "my boss", "my boyfriend", (3) profession categorials, "the teacher", and (4) anyone, i.e. "someone". We may now reformulate the issue as: is there a preference ordering to the different kinds of non-recognitionals?
We may begin to answer the above question by suggesting that, in I-5, A selected a categorial term preceded by the pre-categorial marker "my" because it was the categorial "boss" on which the story turns. In II-3, we find J selecting a relationship categorial, "boyfriend", which is also preceded by the pre-categorial marker "my". As in I-5, J's story turns on the relationship rather than on the person's identity. After all, J was stopped by the policeman for engaging in a category-bound activity between 'boyfriend-girlfriend', namely, sitting very close to each other in a car, which provides for referring to him as "my boyfriend". It may well be that in conversational storytelling there is a preference for the use of a non-recognitional expressing a category membership between teller and story character when that teller-character relationship is generative of the story.

Note, too, that J does not simply tell her story recipient that she was out driving with a "friend" or "a guy", although she could presumably have selected a reference term from a number of different identities from the different kinds of non-recognitions. Or she could have used his name. That is to say, J's identification is not randomly selected from a set of possible reference terms, and it is not from disinterest or indifference that a reference term in a storytelling is selected. Rather, in relation to deciding upon how to formulate a story character, the relevance of the term selected may be considered to be provided by the storytelling occasion.

Thus far I have identified and begun to describe different kinds of non-recognitions and have suggested that any kind of non-recognitional may take preference over the use of a name when the non-
recognitional term is crucial to the telling of the story. In the next section I describe the organization for the use of recognitionals when initially formulating story characters.

RECOGNITIONAL REFERENCE PROCEDURES

We now turn to instances where story characters are introduced by name.

(II-1)
C: He [Rob] was just—we went to this—you remember Ewen Pitt, did you, yeah well [STORY]

(III-1)
A: ...Two days later I got a phone call at eleven o'clock at night from a guy by—he said his name was Steve Dogood [STORY]

(III-5)
A: Yeah, I went to have lunch with Bev 'n we had a long talk [STORY]

(IV-1)
B: David, you know Pat's David, he uhhh like you know how kids are [STORY]

(V-1)
A: There was a substitute teacher when Turner was away [STORY]

(V-2)
J: Good ole Perks, I was going by there again today, he always sits there in
his office [STORY]

(V-4)

A: So we were visiting the Prudential building (1.0) 'n we were walking out, I think it was just Dan and me 'n [STORY]

These fragments deserve further comment. In II-1, C chooses to use a recognitional with an accompanying upward intonational contour, such as is commonly used when formulating a question, "You remember Ewen Pitt, did you?" Sacks and Schegloff (1979) demonstrate that the use of this kind of recognitional attempt or 'try marker' argues for the preference for use of recognitionals in conversation. However, this does not mean that recognitionals are selected by tellers only in those cases where it is assumed that the story recipients may know the referred-to character and that non-recognitionals are used only when the storyteller believes that the hearers don't know the referred-to character. As the following fragments demonstrate, a storyteller's character formulation is more complex than this.

(II-2)

P: ...'n the chance came last week and, uhh this girl, well, the girl that I was going out with that you felt that I felt guilty about, she [STORY]

(III-2)

A: Two days later I got a phone call at eleven o'clock at night from a guy by—he said his name was Steve Dogood, 'n I said [STORY]

In III-2, we find that A formulates a story character with a
combination of a non-recognitional, "this guy", followed by the character's name, standard fare for recognitionals. There seem to be telling occasions in which it is advantageous for the storyteller to employ a recognitional reference form even when the storyteller may know that the story recipient does not know the person being referred to. Then we find that the name may be an important part of the telling. In III-2, we see that A's use of a name following a non-recognitional tells the recipient something about how A heard the name at the time of the event, that he was incredulous that a guy named "Dogood" would be offering him a job at a correctional institute. It's part of the story. So the use of a name here is not just a way of getting the character into the story as a recognizable, but its use figures as a part of the story itself, a part which may have been lost if A had merely used a non-recognitional form, i.e. "Some guy from U Vic called me". Another issue here is that it would be quite a different character formulation if A had said, "So Steve Dogood from U Vic called me". It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that such a formulation would invite B to search for who "Steve Dogood" is, assuming that he is a person known to the recipient.

There is something else happening in these instances which we have touched upon but which we have not yet described. That is, CHARACTER FORMULATION PREFERENCES MAY BE USED IN COMBINATION, BUT NOT JUST ANY COMBINATION. The above, III-2, shows the use of a non-recognitional reference form followed by a recognitional form, yet the formulation remains 'non-recognitional' in that the person is formulated as "this guy" and remains essentially a formulation which could relate to anyone as far as the story recipient is concerned. He
just happens to have a funny name in relation to the job he was offering A, and that name figures in the story itself. The above example also offers a hint that there are cases when a recognitional may be followed by a non-recognitional. The following hypothetical example is surely plausible.

A: Yesterday Steve Congdon, I don't think you know the guy, and I were on our way to the Cubs game when [STORY]

Recipient determining whether a formulation is non-recognitional or recognitional, then, can only be achieved by considering the interactional location of the formulation in question in the talk. Whereas, for example, we may consider the above hypothetical example to be a combination of a recognitional followed by a non-recognitional which stands as a non-recognitional character formulation, the following would certainly be constituted as the same combination and heard as an instance of a recognitional in that the teller instructs the hearer to search for the identity of "the guy with the patch", who we take it A assumes recipient should recognize.

A: So Doug Wagoner, y'know, the guy with the patch? He met us at the ballpark and offered to [STORY]

One kind of common thing that happens when formulating character in conversational storytelling situations is when a storyteller will think that the recipient knows who the teller is going to introduce into the story. Then it's common to find the use of a 'try marker' in which the storyteller refers to a name as a recognitional with a
question added, e.g. "You remember Ewen Pitt, did you?" or, "y'know, the guy with the patch?" One thing that becomes evident from our materials is that the 'try marker' organization supports the preference organization for the use of names over non-recognionals—if recognition is possible, try to achieve it.

Earlier I examined some instances of stories told in conversation in which the storyteller selected a recognitional not because the teller assumed that the story recipient knew the character being introduced, but because the character's name figured as a part of the story itself. In the following example, note how the storyteller formulates the character with a non-recognitional form, "this dude", when the character, as it turns out later in the telling, is known by the story recipients all along, and the storyteller knew that they knew him when teller formulated him as "this dude".

(VI-3)

K: The best player I ever saw, man, this dude brought his own cheering section from Philly, man, and I never even heard of him. Before the game they started screamin', 'Jesus, Black Jesus! Black Jesus!' I thought, who was this dude? He was about six-three and the first play of the game he got a rebound on the defensive end of the court and started spinnin', man, he spun four times! Now he's ninety feet from the hoop and this dude is spinnin'! Well, on the fourth spin he throws the ball in a hook motion, it bounced at mid-court and then it just rose, and there was a guy at the other end runnin' full speed and he caught it in stride and laid it in. A full-court bounce pass! After I saw that I could understand all the 'Black Jesus' stuff. I didn't find out the dude's real name until way later. it was Earl Monroe!
In such cases where the name of the character being introduced figures in the story itself, then the storyteller may choose to select the non-preferred form depending upon recognitional availability at the time of the episode being recounted. We hear it that K didn't introduce "this dude" as "Earl Monroe" when initially formulating the character in the story because at the time of the episode K didn't know it was Earl Monroe. Such an organization figures in the story itself, i.e. "I'm not telling you his name at the start because I didn't know it then either".

Earlier, in II-2, we found the storyteller employing a non-recognitional form in formulating a story character who the recipient knows about by previous reference. I want to concentrate on one formulation, "this girl, well, the girl that I was going out with that you felt that I felt guilty about". One thing that is happening here is that P is talking about two experiences, the first being about "a girl who I met in a bar", and the second about "this girl" that "read me a part in the book about the pisces male". However, in the latter formulation P uses a modification device so that "this girl" gets transformed into "the girl that I was going out with that you felt that I felt guilty about". The modification organization acts as a repairing technique whereby a storyteller may correct himself. We take it that it is a common experience in conversation for a speaker to 'suddenly remember' something that is relevant to the ongoing interaction. In this instance it appears that P at first figured that D didn't know the person P formulated as "this girl". P suddenly remembers that he had, in fact, referred to "this girl" before to D,
either earlier in the conversation or at some other time. Thus he finds it possible to refer to "this girl" in relation to that earlier formulation. P makes use, then, of an earlier statement to D in order to tie a story character to a previous incident. Thus we are provided with another instance which supports the preference rule: if recognition is possible, try to achieve it.

Earlier I said that character formulations are expandable, subject to combination and/or accumulation. We have already seen how reference to a story character may include a combination of terms, e.g. "this dude"—"Earl Monroe", "my boss"—"Clark", and so on. We have also noted how identities may be accumulated wherein a reference form is followed by other information. Up to this point in the chapter I have been examining formulation preferences in conversational storytelling and describing subclasses of recognitionals and non-recognitionals. For storytellers facing the task of introducing characters into their stories we find a preference for the use of recognitionals. There is also an organization for the preference for recognitionals when the recognitional figures as part of the story, as in III-2, with the use of "Steve Dogood". I am proposing, then, that there are preference rules operating in relation to character formulations in conversational storytelling and that there is an ordering to the different kinds of non-recognitionals. Further, the formulation of persons in stories follows the same kind of ordering and logic as it does in conversation in general. Thus far my contribution turns on (1) expanding upon Sacks and Schegloff's earlier work on reference to persons in conversation, and (2) beginning the development of a description of formulating character in
CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have examined first mention character references as treated in linguistic discourse analysis and then provided the reader with a conversational analysis treatment of the same phenomenon. I suggested that the analysis offered by linguists interested in discourse features lays the foundation for more in-depth analysis which includes a concern for features of interaction as well as features of language. I traced the line of progression from first mention character references as they work in conversation according to Sacks and Schegloff (1979), to the methods storytellers use to formulate character in narratives.

When a story gets generated in natural conversation, some formulation of other characters may have to be offered. Earlier in this chapter I located two preferences for performing this task: recognitionals and non-recognitionals. I claimed that the preference for minimization and recipient design in formulating characters in narrative discourse have expression to other domains as well. I noted, further, that first mention character references in narrative discourse instruct narrative recipients to attend to such matters as (a) what the story may be 'about', (b) who will be doing what to whom, and (c) how the character(s) will figure into the story. I discovered the preference rules operating in first mention character references
in narrative discourse, I described some sub-classes of non-recognitionals, and I claimed that there is an ordering to combinations.

The significance of this chapter lies in its integration of linguistic discourse discoveries with findings from conversational analysis vis-a-vis first mention character references in narrative discourse. For the linguist interested in the study of discourse, there is an interest in tying features of narrative discourse to analytical categories already made in linguistics, e.g. indefinite articles, possessive pronouns, proper names, and so on. But in conversational analysis, the issues are formulated in interactional terms, with an interest in tying features of narrative discourse to interactional categories, e.g. what speaker assumes hearer already knows based on categorial membership. So then, conversational analysis starts with interactional properties and can thus embody speaker decisions in more than one way, e.g. choosing "the guy across the street" or "Tony", depending on what speaker knows hearer knows, something we would not learn if we started with an analysis of definite articles or proper names.

My analysis of first mention character reference in narrative has offered several contributions to the larger study of discourse structure. What seems the most obvious methodological contribution is the isolation of storytellers' character formulations in live conversation as a group for special study. The study of narratives in live conversation seems to me to offer insights into discourse structures which are obscured or neglected when analyzing edited texts. That the transformations in narrative discourse from the
narrative itself to membership categories can be taken together and analyzed in terms of their reflection of a storyteller's strategy is, as far as I can tell from the discourse literature, a new idea, and one which I would assume will prove especially valuable in the study of the pragmatic influence in live storytelling.

Secondly, by indicating various procedures used to formulate character in narratives, this chapter suggests an informal methodology for discovering and describing such procedures. This methodology can be described in terms of three kinds of orientation; (1) recipient design, in that a storyteller's character formulation ought to cater to the story recipient(s), (2) membership analysis, in that storytellers ought to take into account the member categorizations which members make of themselves and their recipients, and (3) activity analysis, in that people ought to produce recognizable topics in their talk in and through formulations of characters, objects, and events. The strongest orientation in Sacksian conversational analysis deals with 'membership categories', and this chapter relies heavily on explicating and describing common repertoires of personal identifications and the rules of their use. By recognizing the types of devices which frequently mark character formulations in narratives, one can quickly identify parts of a storytelling which are potentially character formulations.

A number of linguists interested in the study of discourse have freely admitted that current linguistic discourse analysis has tended to neglect ethnographic considerations, situation, and culture in their analyses. In recent studies (Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983), some
linguists have attempted to treat ethnographic considerations as something to be added on to existing linguistic categories. Conversational analysis claims that doing discourse analysis may mean changing one's notion of what is relevant. Surely it is not the case that ethnography is needed for conversational analysis but not for discourse analysis. Certainly there is an ethnography of written texts as surely as there is an ethnography of conversation, and I have claimed as much in this chapter by suggesting an alternative methodology with categories useful in formal analysis for discovering and describing discourse structures.

In the next chapter I examine another feature of discourse which is treated in linguistic discourse analysis—COLLATERAL INFORMATION. After reviewing a linguistic discourse treatment of COLLATERAL INFORMATION, I show how the same feature can be treated by using different analytical categories in conversational analysis.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1 I wish to thank my wife, Ruth Spielmann, for sharing her insights with me on how characters may be formulated in Algonquin narratives.

2 Schegloff (1979) notes that an organizational self-identification, e.g. The Bay, indicates that identification is relevant. The point here is that recognition may not be important, even with the possible use of a nonrecognitional self-identification by name, e.g. "Mr. Brown speaking", while identification is.

3 Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) argue that a member has it available to treat some part of a conversation as "an occasion to describe that conversation, to explain it, or characterize it,...or furnish the gist of it" (p.350). In their terminology, a conversationalist may use some part of a conversation as an occasion to "formulate" the conversation. Our interest in this chapter is to focus on some instances in which the formulation of characters in Class II storytellings builds into the achievement of conversational order and which does some interactional work.

4 Sacks and Schegloff (1979) write:

A nonrecognitional having been done, recipient may find from other sources provided in the talk that he might know the referred-to, while seeing that the speaker need not have supposed that he would. He may then seek to confirm his suspicion by offering the name or by asking for it, characteristically offering some basis for independently knowing the referred-to, as in the following:

B: Wh-what is yer friend's name? Cuz my son lives in Sherman Oaks.
A: Uh Wenzel
B: (Mh-mh) no. And uh, if she uh
A: She lives on Hartzuk

B: No, I don't even know that street

In our materials we find that first names are not just used when they are known. They may also be used at an introductory formulation for reference to at a later time. A name, then, when not known by recipient, may provide the recipient with the resources that the recipient may need later on in a story to keep track of already-referred-to characters. As Sacks and Schegloff (1979) write:

The strength of the preference...involve[s] not only maximum exploitation of the use of recognitionals consistent with some current state of "if possible", but...involve[s] as well an interest in expanding the scope of possibility (p.17).

A pre-categorial marker usually makes it available for the recipient to search the relationship boundaries for possible recognition. That is, the use of a pre-categorial like 'my' makes it available for recipients to search for identities.

As for the 'try-marker' feature, Sacks and Schegloff (1979) note that:

The existence and common use of such a form...bears on a consideration of the concurrence of the preferences for minimization and recipient design...Since the try-marker engenders a sequence, involving at least recipient's assertion of recognition...the try-marker is evidence for the preference for recognitionals being stronger than the preference for minimization (p.19).
When narratives are told in conversation, some of the information included may not necessarily be part of the course-of-action in the narrative, but may stand outside of the course-of-action reporting. Grimes (1975) refers to this kind of information as BACKGROUND. Much of this BACKGROUND information is used to clarify a narrative and to explain other information in the narrative. These explanations or accounts often involve things that the narrator feels need to be clarified in order to avoid recipient misunderstanding.

One kind of thing that happens to stories told in conversation is that their recipients may perform transforms on them, transforms employed to figure out the sense of what they have been told (Sharrock and Turner, 1978). In effect, when a story gets told it follows that the story recipient may have to do some 'figuring out' of the story in order to get the sense of it, to understand what went on and why it was told. It is this kind of 'potential transform operation' which may place a storyteller in jeopardy by leading to a possible dispreferred recipient response. In this chapter, I describe a conversational method by which possible recipient transforms on a narrative told in live conversation, which could lead to a dispreferred recipient response, may be defused within the structure of the telling sequence of the narrative. The analysis is directed towards producing an understanding of how storytellers attend to a teller's 'problem': how to protect against a possible dispreferred
response at story completion by building a defense mechanism into the
telling sequence so as to sustain and protect the ongoing interaction.
Specifically, this chapter examines instances where narrators tell
about things that did not happen (termed COLLATERAL information in the
linguistic discourse literature) in narratives which contain 'risky'
information. In such stories the analytical issues are well-defined
and perhaps more readily grasped.

A Linguistic Treatment of Collateral

Earlier I said that linguistics has much to offer the sociologist
interested in the analysis of discourse. Some issues arising in
sociology have been treated for some time in linguistic discourse
analysis. It's treatment of collateral information in discourse is
one of those issues. Joseph Grimes, in The Thread of Discourse
(1975), was one of the first to describe collateral information in
narratives. Some information in a narrative, instead of telling about
what happened in the story, tells about what did not happen. Grimes
notes that the main function of collateral information is to set off
what actually does happen in a narrative with what might have
happened. One example he uses is from a Saramaccan text in a story
about a canoe trip that ended when the canoe capsized in the rapids.
One part of the narrative is as follows.

The canoe overturned. The father didn't die,
the mother didn't die, the children didn't die.
Instead, they all escaped to land.

Grimes writes about the use of collateral information in this
narrative, "By telling what did not happen to the participants, [the
narrator] throws their escape into relief" (1975:64). He then attempts to describe a roster of the grammatical forms associated with collateral information.

ADVERSATIVES are a form of negation in Grimes' roster that imply parallel but disjoint action. His example, "They brought pickles but we brought mustard," implies, "They did not bring mustard and we did not bring pickles." ADVERSATIVES can also imply that the speaker assumes the hearer to have inferred something that is plausible but that did not in fact happen. His example, "We arrived late but were received immediately," implies, "I, the speaker, think that you, the hearer, must expect that if we were to arrive late the logical thing would be for our reception to be postponed. Contrary to your expectation, we were received immediately."

In the Algonquin language, we can see how collateral information in a non-English narrative might be treated. In the following story, note the three instances of collateral information (see Appendix for a complete transcript).

Text 20: Moz Adisokan

20.1 Abitibi sagaigan nigi odji nisa nimozom.
20.2 +conj we-were-driving-by in the canoe my father
20.3 Female-moose, first I +past see-him.
20.4 Mi dac kawin nid odji kagwe packiziwasi, oza
20.5 E abanabiag...
really there-were-branches.

126
In the first instance of collateral information (20.4), the narrator gives an account for why he didn't immediately try to shoot...
the moose he saw in the forest, "Mi dac kawin nidodji kagwe packiziwasi, osa kitci sagakwaban" (That's why I didn't try to shoot him, [because] there were too many branches [in my way]). In 20.17, we find another utterance containing collateral information, "Ka ega dac wi tebwetasi" (So then he didn't want to believe me). Then in 20.23 we find a third instance of collateral information in the narrative, "Kawin nidodji kibahagosi" (He didn't throw me in jail [lock me up]). In Algonquin, as in many languages, utterances constructed with negatives almost always contain collateral information. One reason for this, a reason which places emphasis on the function of COLLATERAL as viewed from a discourse linguist's perspective, is that collateral information can be useful as a highlighting device. In Algonquin, events that do not take place have significance only in relation to what actually does happen in a narrative. Collateral information in Algonquin narratives contributes to a highlighting effect by focusing recipient attention on what else might happen in the place of what did not happen.

In English, QUESTIONS are often used for indicating collateral information and can be treated with regard to the information they presuppose or assume vis-a-vis what they inquire about. Grimes writes:

When did John get here? presupposes that John did get here, so that the area of uncertainty is restricted to the time of his arrival. When did you stop beating your wife? is more complex; it assumes that you have a wife, that there was a time when you beat her, and that there was a time after which you no longer beat her. The question is directed toward ascertaining that time. The presuppositions in a question are almost like conditions laid down by the speaker for the hearer to give an acceptable answer.
If the hearer accepts the presuppositions, then he can give the missing information that is required; if not, he is in a bind (1975:66).

According to Grimes, then, collateral information relates non-events to events and, by providing a range of non-events that might take place, heightens the significance of what actually happens. Furthermore, collateral information has the effect of anticipating what is likely to happen in a narrative when the alternatives are spelled out in advance. Grimes notes that, in this respect, "collateral information is not very different from foreshadowing" (p.65).

In *The Grammar of Discourse* (1983), Longacre begins to expand upon the notion of collateral information. In analyzing structural features of narratives, Longacre divides narratives into seven parts with regard to notional (deep) structure; (1) Exposition—where background information of time, place and participants is given, (2) Inciting Moment—when the planned and predictable is broken up in some manner, (3) Developing Conflict—in which the situation intensifies, or deteriorates, depending on one's viewpoint, (4) Climax—where everything comes to a head, (5) Denouement—a crucial event happens which makes resolution possible, (6) Final Suspense—which works out the details of the resolution, and (7) Conclusion—which brings the story to some sort of end. Each notional part of discourse corresponds with narrative surface structures, e.g. Inciting Moment (deep structure) with Pre-peak Episode (surface structure). Not all narratives contain all seven parts, but a well-developed narrative is likely to have many or all of them since each part contributes to the success of the narrative.
In describing main line versus supportive material in discourse, Longacre makes the claim that, "it is impossible to make structural distinctions among discourse types without taking [supportive material] into account" (p.14). He cites Grimes as having already made the distinction between types of information in which a distinction is made between events and non-events (collateral). The example of collateral information which he uses in discussing supportive material is a passage from Mark Twain.

In a minute a third slave was struggling in the air. It was dreadful. I turned away my head for a moment, and when I turned back I missed the King! They were blindfolding him! I was paralyzed; I couldn't move, I was choking, my tongue was petrified. They finished blindfolding him, they led him under the rope. I couldn't shake off that clinging impotence. But when I saw them put the noose around his neck, then everything let go in me and I made a spring to the rescue—and as I made it I shot one more glance abroad—by George! here they came, a-titting!—five hundred mailed and belted knights on bicycles! (1964:240).

Longacre notes that in this paragraph some course-of-action events (what happened) are reported along with some supportive material (non-events). After delineating the main line material in the discourse (events), he describes the other clauses in the paragraph which have a supportive function. These clauses are excluded from the course-of-action (event-line) analysis, even though this information supports the course-of-action. He then comments on one clause which contains collateral information, the clause being, "I couldn't shake off that clinging impotence", by saying, "Grimes calls this collateral" (1982:16).
Larry Jones attends to the treatment of COLLATERAL in his examination of the pragmatics of author comments in narrative discourse. He contends that, by the author comments of a discourse, the analyst is able to discover and describe many of the assumptions the author of that text made concerning his or her intended reader and the topic of the discourse.

Wilbur Pickering treats collateral under the heading of PROMINENCE. He begins by saying, "we can only perceive something if it stands out from its background" (1979:40), and that there seems to be a problem of terminology in linguistics with regard to PROMINENCE. Some linguists use the terms "topic", "focus", "theme", and "emphasis" in the linguistic literature with broad ranges of overlap and confusion. He chooses to use the use of PROMINENCE offered by Kathleen Callow (1974). She writes:

The term prominence...refers to any device which gives certain events, participants, or objects more significance than others in the same context (p.50).

In linguistic discourse analysis, it is recognized that the feature of STRATEGY is also important. STRATEGY, according to Pickering, reflects "a basic characteristic of communication and of most human behavior: it has a purpose" (1979:70). This comment relates to an assumption made by most discourse linguists; namely, a speaker or author ought to follow the Gricean Cooperative Principle. That is to say, a speaker or author ought to try to be meaningful in his or communication. Writers like Grice (1975), Gordon and Lakoff (1975), and Sadock (1978), have been concerned with the notion of conversational implicature, or, the way that hearers can conclude a
lot of implicit information on the basis of what a speaker says. George Huttar (1982), gives the following example to illustrate a treatment of conversational implicature.

A: I'm out of gas.
B: There's a garage around the corner.

Huttar argues that, because garages are thought by members of A's and B's culture to be places where you can get gas where you need it, the above pair of utterances "hang together". If B did not believe that, he might be guilty of ignoring Grice's maxim: 'Be Relevant'. STRATEGY relates to the use of collateral information in discourse in that collateral has to do with the specific selection of information in a narrative about what did not happen, which is influenced by such factors as the speaker's judgment as to what knowledge his or her hearer's share, the topic of the narrative, and what the speaker is trying to communicate. These considerations begin to pay some attention to the ethnographic dimension in linguistic discourse analysis, an area which, I said earlier, is painfully missing from linguistic discourse studies. Even when attempting to attend to the ethnographic dimension, then, discourse linguists are usually bound by edited texts. Written, edited texts have recognized conventions that distinguish them from conversation. Thus, in written texts there will necessarily be a different distribution between the two. For example, Martha Duff (1973) describes contrastive features of written and oral texts. She writes:

A characteristic feature of the written text is that it shows clearer organization than the oral text. This is because the author has had
time to plan the development of the story which results in the lack of...hesitation words...and abnormal ordering of words and sentences due to afterthought (p.2).

I said earlier that there is an ethnography of writing as surely as there is an ethnography of speaking, but that linguistic discourse analysis has tended to neglect ethnographic considerations in written texts. The discourse linguist Pickering formulates this problem in linguistic discourse analysis very succinctly.

While I insist that situation and culture are part of the prior context upon which given information [in a narrative] may be based, I freely confess that I do not know how to handle it (1979:170).

And this is the crux of the matter in linguistic discourse analysis and in its treatment of a feature such as COLLATERAL: the recognition of the lack of the contextual factor, but not knowing how to handle it. Pickering concludes:

I am entering a plea that more linguists recognize both the legitimacy and necessity of grappling with the role of situation and culture in discourse analysis (1979:170).

A CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS TREATMENT OF COLLATERAL

In linguistic discourse analysis there seems to be a notion that narratives can be analyzed as if they were self-contained speech units. Lacking in the discourse literature on narrative is a consideration of why people would want to generate a narrative in the
first place. This is not a small matter, for without such a consideration the discourse analyst lacks a theory of conversation which would lead one to make the ethnographic connection between the social function of telling about past experiences with the purpose(s) of members engaged in conversational interaction. Certainly narratives in live conversation cannot be adequately analyzed without taking into account the fit between the generated narrative and the conversation in which it is embedded.

In conversational analysis, our understanding of narrative structures is expanded by making the connection between narratives and the surrounding conversation via the use of social identities. The issue of social identity is important in sociology. In the last chapter I said that any one person can have a number of social identities that can be applied to that person at any one time. For example, someone could be identified as a "wife", "lawyer", "the lady next door", "neighbor", or whatever, and that the related-ness between identity categories that 'go together', e.g. "employer-employee", is a major interactional resource in the construction and sustaining of social order. In relation to narratives told in live conversation, they are more than mere displays of verbal skill. Rather, narratives can be used in a number of interactional ways, e.g. presenting oneself as a certain kind of person, offering advice, and so on.

In examining my materials it became noticeable that in many stories the storyteller not only tells about the events which transpired, the course-of-action, but they also tell about what did not happen, which is referred to by discourse linguists as COLLATERAL, embedded in the course-of-action sequence. As my point of departure,
consider the following.

(I-2)

Louise: One night (1.0) I was with this guy that I liked a real lot, an uhh (3.0) we had come back from the show, we had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile 'n we were gonna park. An' I can't stand a car, 'n he has a small car

Ken: Mm hm

Louise: So we walked to the back, 'n we just went into the back house 'n we stayed there half the night (1.0) we didn't go to bed with each other but, it was so comfortable 'n so nice

Ken: Mm hm

Louise: Y'know? there's everything perfect

Note in the above sequence that Louise brings the story recipient, Ken, to a point of decision in the course-of-action sequence at which point possibilities are investigated which set apart what actually happened from what might have happened. She does this twice in the story, "'n we were gonna park", and, "we didn't go to bed with each other". Further, we can see from the transcript how including this collateral information in the narrative may predict actions that might or might not take place later on in the story. That kind of organization has the effect of setting up alternatives to what eventually gets to be done. As linguistic discourse studies have shown, at a point in a story where the storyteller includes collateral information, the fact that 'what did not happen' is mentioned makes 'what happened' in a story stand out. In I-2, Louise would be telling a different kind of story if she had not included collateral
information in her narrative. The following is Louise's story without the collateral information.

Louise: One night I was with this guy that I liked a real lot, an' uh we had come back from the show, we had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile, so we walked back to the house, an' we just stayed in the back house half the night. It was so comfortable 'n so nice.

By including collateral information and telling about 'what didn't happen', a storyteller may relate non-events to course-of-action events, the provision of such non-event alternatives heightening some significant aspect of 'what happened'. There's some work being done in I-2 by telling about what didn't happen as a prelude to what did. And we can see that the story sounds quite a bit different without those alternatives. Comparing the transcript with the hypothetical transcript above, it's as if Louise comes across as two different kinds of people. Further, it's not like providing grounds for merely not doing something, i.e. "We were gonna take our car to the Cubs game but it was snowing so we ended up taking the bus". What kind of work gets done then? To this end I analyze the following stories in order to demonstrate and describe the nature of a storyteller's assessment of alternative activities on disclosure storytelling occasions, after which I spell out in some detail a teller procedure for including collateral information in a narrative as a means of assessing alternative activities.

(IX-1)

B: When do you play this week?
A: We're sposed to play Doherty's Thursday and then Saturday it's Ginger's Sexy Sauna

B: They have a team?

A: Yeah, but it must be made up of clients—there's, I doubt there's any guys working there

B: Yeah

A: Man, I wonder what goes on in one of those places?

B: Yeah, I went to one once

[  
A: Noooooooool

[  
B: Yeah, it wasn't my idea, I was with a guy from work 'n we went out for a few beers 'n, I dunno, we decided to go see a movie, but we passed this massage place 'n he said he always wanted to try one so I ended up going with him. I know it was wrong but

[  
A: So what was it like?

B: It was no big deal really, this girl came in wearin' cutoffs but no top and proceeded to give me the treatment, the full treatment,

[  
A: I'd be too embarrassed to go to one of those places

B: Yeah, it was different, I wouldn't do it again

A: I heard Ginger's is gonna have to close down because of its location...

(I-2)

Louise: One night (1.0) I was with this guy that I liked a real lot, an' uhhh (3.0) we had come back from the show, we had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile, 'n we were gonna park. An' I can't stand a car, 'n he has a small car

Ken: Mm hm

Louise: So we walked to the back, 'n we just went into the back house 'n we stayed
there half the night (1.0) we didn't go to bed with each other but, it was so comfortable and so nice

Ken: Mm hm

Louise: Y'know, there's everything perfect

Some stories told in conversation involve risk-taking, and there are ways of dealing with 'risk'. I said earlier that stories containing risk-taking sequences help us to better grasp the analytical issues being discussed in this chapter. One problem for storytellers on certain storytelling occasions is not necessarily that the story recipient may openly express shock or dismay in the response sequence or that the recipient may go away and tell someone else, but that an interactional trouble may arise. Thus, any kind of storyteller 'defense' on such occasions which is built into the structure of the story as part of the telling sequence is directed to the possibility of a dispreferred response at story end. We may characterize the teller's defensive posture in the structure of a narrative which contains some risk-taking as being oriented to the short-term interactional concern. The danger of including 'risky' information in a narrative lies not only in the possibility of changes in the teller-recipient relationship, reputation, gossip, and so on, but in the possible collapse of the ongoing interaction. How is the interaction sustained and protected on such occasions? What methods are available to a storyteller for defusing a possible dispreferred recipient response at story end by attending to that possibility in the telling sequence?
ALTERNATIVE ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES

In analyzing the above transcripts note that the sorts of relationships between telling about 'what happened' and telling about 'what didn't happen' are analytically interesting. Appreciation for these relationships becomes apparent by taking note of what is happening in these stories. First, in both stories the storytellers are recounting rather personal experiences. They are somewhat dangerous sequences. Second, in both stories the storyteller is implicated as a principal character. Finally, it can be observed that each story displays a related topical orientation, namely, to events of a sexual nature. Further, by telling their stories the storytellers are opening themselves up to possible conversational troubles in relation to sustaining and protecting the ongoing interaction. Recall that in this chapter I am seeking to locate and describe how storytellers may employ collateral information in their narratives in order to solve the problem of how someone telling a disclosure story orients to the 'risky' nature of the story so as to transform the results of that orientation into the work of eliciting a preferred response from the story recipient, thus sustaining and protecting the ongoing interaction.

Implied in the formulated problem is the beginning of a recommendation as to how to begin to search for a solution. One kind of obvious feature of the stories I investigate in this chapter is that the storyteller includes collateral information in the narrative, which tells about what did not happen during the recounting of the course-of-action, which tells about what did happen. Let us note
these cases.

(IX-1)

B: I was with this guy from work 'n we went out for a few beers 'n, I dunno, we decided to go to a movie ——— but we passed this [STORY]

(I-2)

Louise: One night (1.0) I was with this guy that I liked a real lot an' uhh (3.0) we had come back from the show, we had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile, 'n we were gonna park... ———

...

Louise: ...'n we stayed there half the night (1.0) we didn't go to bed with each other but, it was so comfortable...

From the above story fragments we may note that in some stories the storyteller may choose to tell about 'what didn't happen'. We may begin to see the import of this observation by noticing that in many stories the storyteller may tell exclusively about 'what did happen'. Recall that the stories in the last chapter, for the most part, did not contain collateral information. We have it available to see, then, that someone involved in telling a story may or may not choose to tell about what did not happen. In the case of the former we might ask: why would someone in the midst of telling a story tell about something that did not happen? What kinds of interactional work get done when a storyteller tells about what did not happen? How can there be a place in a story for something that didn't happen? After all, conversations are full of people telling about what they did or what happened to them. I trust that these preliminary questions will
lead us to deeper issues.

Up to this point I have suggested simply that it is not unusual to find instances of storytelling in conversation in which the teller includes collateral information and tells about something that did not take place. A more important observation, however, and one that Sacks made clear in his original analysis of Louise's story in his lectures, is that not only is 'what didn't happen' told about in some instances, but this recounting of 'what didn't happen' is positioned in the stories in my materials as alternative to what did happen, so that this collateral information is presented as a rejected alternative. In pursuing this observation we may first note that in "Tactics for Determining Persons' Resources for Depicting, Contriving, and Describing Behavioral Episodes" (1972), Sheldon Twer investigates how people make sense out of observable sights in which other people are apparently active. He presents an example from natural conversation which demonstrates how certain occurrences display that an activity can indicate its own nature, what kind of activity it is, oriented to an observational 'problem': how do people go about making sense of a witnessed activity? He presents the following conversational fragment which gives us an idea of the kind of work people must be assumed to engage in in order to 'make sense' of an everyday activity. The people in the conversation are involved in making sense of a cartoon.

(Twer: 4.57-4.62)

M: huh oh in this eh ((whispers))...in this eh caricature there's—there's this troop uh of Boy Scouts—uh there's four of them and their scoutmaster and what it is it's a paper drive

C: Mmm
M: An hehehe the funny thing about it is that
they're all in back of the ah the truck
with all the magazines and uh he's ( )

C: en all

M: the stuff and instead of working they're
huh reading comics

What Twer gets at in this example is a structure which he refers
to as 'Instead of A, B', which we will characterize as 'assessing
alternatives'. He goes on to note that the terms 'working' and
'reading' occupy positions A and B in the utterance. These positions
are structured by the 'instead of' as in 'Instead of A', A being
filled by a class of possible activities, B being filled by a class of
activities which may be seen as alternatives to the activities in class
A. Not only do they stand as alternative activities but they can also
stand together. That is, it seems reasonable to suggest that the A
and B activities chosen by M in Twer's example shows that things can
be classified together, that names of activities can be classified as
a group, one feature being that they can stand as alternatives in the
'Instead of A, B' structure. He writes:

People hold expectations that persons en-
gaged in interaction are constantly notice-
ing, figuring out observables, and perform-
ing actions that are in accord with what
they 'see'. Certain occurrences demonstrate
that a behaviour can indicate that its [sic]
behavior oriented to an observation 'problem'
whose nature and solution are at least inferentially available to witnesses of the
behaviour (1972:342).

The point for the reader to notice here is that people who
describe their activities in conversational interaction, such as
happens in storytelling situations, have criteria for choosing one action rather than another action, or one action as an alternative to another action. Furthermore, actions can be made to belong where they occur in descriptions. Twer refers to these positions of descriptions as 'action spots' and suggests that people describing their activities can know, find, or suggest provisions for that activity's occurrence. These 'action spots' are characteristically filled by things that 'have happened'. Twer attempts to describe some facilities people have for describing an activity and at least partially knowing what the description will tell, how it will inform, and what it will 'mean' to a recipient.

In that Twer's interest is particularly concerned with occasions in which people talk about 'behavioral episodes', there is a natural relation to conversational storytelling as one such occasion. He proposes that the analysis of such descriptions permits a formulation of a set of features of behaviour that people apparently attend to when they try to 'make sense' of such descriptions.

With the above comments in mind, let us return to Louise's story in I-2. We have it available to see that Louise uses a variation of Twer's assessment of alternatives structure (Instead of A, B). Note, first, that, intuitively, other choices of activities for A, what did not happen, would not make the same kind of sense as 'parking'. That is, the A choice of 'parking' is not merely chosen at random but is chosen as an alternative to what ended up getting done, 'going to the back house'. Implied here is the notion that when someone uses such a structure there exist some kind of criteria for choosing one activity.
as an alternative to another. Twer refers to B, 'what is being done',
as an 'action spot'. For example, to answer the question, 'What are
they doing?' the notion of 'doing' which is invoked in the above
examples from natural conversation provides us with materials for
beginning to search for a solution to the 'problem' I formulated
earlier. How so?

In the materials I am drawing from in this chapter, I-2 and IX-1,
one alternative activity is accepted and another rejected. The reader
has it available to see that a structure similar to Twer's 'Instead of
A, B' structure is being employed, with an additional constraint. In
I-2 and IX-1, the constraint provides for the question: why is an
alternative activity presented? In I-2 and IX-1, alternatives are
assessed. Not only are alternatives assessed at the time of the event
but they are reported as assessed at the time of the telling. In his
lectures, Sacks maintained that if an event is alternative to another
that does not necessarily mean that the other is alternative to it.
That is, while Louise in I-2 reports 'going to the back house' as
alternative to 'parking', and B in IX-1 reports going to a massage
parlour as alternative to going to a movie, if Louise had gone
'parking' and B and the guy he was with had gone to a movie, it would
indeed have been odd to report that these activities were done as
alternatives to 'going to the back house' and 'going to a massage
parlour'. And this is the crux of the matter. Contained within this
observation is a potential solution to the formulated 'problem', and
with it we will be able to begin to technicalize some of the
interactional work which gets done when a storyteller includes
collateral information in his or her story.
Let us first suppose that in I-2 and IX-1 the storytellers had not included collateral information, that is, left out the parts about 'what didn't happen'. Then it would be available for the respective story recipients to interpret the stories as stories about how the storytellers are the kind of people who would normally do what they were telling about. Louise, for example, could be viewed as the kind of teenager who would normally use an unchaperoned house in order to engage in sexual activities. Both Louise and Ken are seventeen years old. In I-2, then with the inclusion of 'what didn't happen' Louise contributes a defensive design to her story about going to an unchaperoned house with her boyfriend. As Sacks noted in his analysis, Louise can anticipate that Ken might think of her as the kind of girl who might normally participate in an adult sexual situation. After all, that's what makes the story kind of 'risky' in the first place, that the normal place for teenagers to negotiate sex (i.e. a car), was abandoned in favor of an adult place. Thus Louise makes sure she attends to the defensive design of her story in order to inform Ken that 'what happened' was spontaneous and unplanned and not something she would normally and regularly do. Further, the sexual aspect of the activity is somewhat minimized in that she was with "this guy that I liked a real lot". That is perhaps a lot different than formulating him as "a guy I know" or "a friend" or "this guy", which would make it available for Ken to think that she isn't choosy about who she engages in sexual situations with. As it is, the way Louise positions 'what didn't happen' she makes it clear to Ken that she would normally utilize the normal place for teenagers to negotiate sex, in a parked car, but that due to extenuating
circumstances this one time she happened to have abandoned the normal place for teenagers to negotiate sex and opted for an 'adult' place. By telling about 'what didn't happen', then, she informs the story recipient that alternatives were assessed, thus providing recipient with resources for interpreting her actions as being something she would not normally do, and this work gets done by orienting to local teenage standards.

Furthermore, the reader has it available to notice in the transcript of I-2 that Louise tells about another activity that 'didn't happen', another piece of collateral information. Having told about going to "the back house", she goes on to say, "we didn't go to bed with each other", another instance of the use of collateral information which Louise feels needs to be made explicit. Ken could, after all, assume that they had gone to bed except for Louise's statement to the contrary. If Louise had not included this instance of 'what didn't happen', Ken might have thought, "If she would do that, what else would she do?" In effect, Louise knows that what she is telling about may be considered to be somewhat abnormal behaviour for a teenager for reasons we examined earlier. Thus, she embeds in her recounting of 'what happened' two instances of collateral information, that is, 'what didn't happen'. What we have, then, are some technical resources put into operation in order to isolate a particular occurrence of 'abnormal' behaviour by teenage standards, e.g. that sexual activity was negotiated in an abnormal place for teenagers. These resources provide the story recipient with a rather sharp specification of what kinds of terms Louise has for such a project, that by her having gone to 'the back house' for engaging in
sexual activity, yet not going to bed with her boyfriend, and that they had originally considered employing the normal place for teenagers to negotiate sex—in a parked car. These resources, too, lend credibility to Louise's defensive design to her story in that, by telling about 'what didn't happen', she can perhaps ward off any negative recipient inferences which could be drawn from the specific event that she is telling about.

As a prelude to the next section, let us now render B's story in IX-1 as problematic by imagining what his story would be like if he had left out 'what didn't happen', an assessment of alternative activities, a decision to abandon one project in favor of another. The first thing we may note is that A would have it available to assume that attending a massage parlour is not necessarily an unusual activity for B to participate in. That's one kind of way that A could 'make sense' of B's story. We can begin to justify this observation by consulting Turner and Sharrock (1978). They write:

One of the fates of stories...is that their recipients may perform transforms on them, either in retellings or 'interpretively', that is, in figuring out for themselves the sense of what they have been told (p. 187).

and,

We assume nevertheless the possibility of transforms constrain tellers and that they may employ devices intended to constrain the reworkings that their tellings may undergo (p. 187).

In this chapter I am seeking to locate and describe one of those 'devices' available to storytellers to direct a recipient's
interpretive work, the recipient's 'making sense' of what happened in the story and what the story is about. In IX-1, for example, by telling about 'what didn't happen', B instructs A via the temporal organization of the story that there was a rejected alternative to 'what happened'. Then, one constraint placed on a recipient's interpretive work is that the recipient has no available resources for interpreting 'what happened' as something that is normal for the storyteller. On the contrary, by employing the assessment of alternatives device, the recipient is clearly instructed to interpret 'what happened' as something distinctly unusual and not something that the storyteller would normally do.

ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT AS AN INTERACTIONAL RESOURCE

Thus far I have noted that storytellers sometimes include collateral information in their narratives, telling about 'what didn't happen' as alternative to something that did happen. However, the other, if it happens, would generally not be presented as an alternative to the first. In 1-2, Louise presents 'parking' as a rejected alternative and 'going to the back house' as an alternative which fills the 'action spot' in her story. In IX-1 B presents 'going to a movie' as a rejected alternative and 'going to a massage parlour' as an alternative which fills the 'action spot' in B's story. Both 'going to the back house' and 'going to a massage parlour' are accepted alternatives. Our question becomes: what interactional work is getting done by the storytellers' alternative activity assessments?

In 1-2, what it was Louise and her boyfriend eventually got to
do, they did by being somehow diverted or derailed from a prescribed course of activity, the category-bound activity of 'parking', that would have been a natural course of activity for teenagers to take. What they ultimately did, which is what makes for the 'risky' status of Louise's story, was something that came about by virtue of their being derailed from something else. A 'natural' course of activity was proposed, 'parking', in the proper sequential slot, after having gone to a movie on a date, and that project gets derailed. The project of negotiating sex had already been oriented to by Louise and her boyfriend, "'n we were gonna park". One feature of Louise's activity assessment which we want to pay closer attention to is its spontaneous nature. There is an innocence implied in Louise's alternative activity assessment, an innocence linked with the spontaneous nature of what she and her boyfriend ended up doing.

I said earlier that Louise's dislike for parking in a 'small car' generally would not have been sufficient reason to derail them from their project of negotiating sex, except that it turns out there is another way to go about completing the project, an alternative location. Further, the status of such a project would not normally be delimited except under severe and extenuating circumstances. After all, in our society we can count on the ingenuity of teenagers who wish to explore their sexuality. It just so happens that in our culture a car is generally the most accessible location for teenagers to negotiate sex. That is not to say that a sweeping claim may be made such as: All teenagers will always find a place to negotiate sex. It is to say, however, that for those involved in the exploration of sexual intimacies together, the teenager usually has a 'problem':
where to do it so as not to get 'caught'? We take it that it is just such a consideration, the fear of 'getting caught', which has contributed to the activity of 'parking' becoming a category-bound activity among teenagers.

Another consideration is that a feature such as spontaneity in the course-of-action sequence in a story can imply an innocence, e.g. 'I didn't think about it beforehand, I just did it'. In I-2, the story recipient could surely relate to that spontaneous giving-in to internal impulse, to temptation, in light of the circumstances. Certainly it would seem odd to consider abandonment of the project as a viable alternative. Given the available alternatives it would seem reasonable to another teenager to choose the alternative of an unchaperoned house for furthering the ongoing project. Further, the alternative activity is presented as having been 'successful', "it was so comfortable, 'n so nice".

In IX-1 a similar structure can be located by which B presents 'going to a massage parlour' as an alternative to 'going to a movie'. This 'assessment of alternatives' structure instructs A to see that the 'B' activity was a spontaneous, unplanned alternative to the 'A' activity. After all, B could have told about how after work he went with a guy from work for a couple of beers and then went to the massage parlour. And depending on who he's telling the story to, it would not necessarily be a risky story. If he were to tell the story to, say, another guy at work it could be something like a 'bragging' story. What clues the storyteller and analyst alike that it is a narrative which contains risky information is the way the recipient displays that it is a risky sequence by interjections throughout the
telling and the response sequence. By using the 'assessing alternatives' structure, then, a storyteller can instruct a story recipient that what happened occurred as an alternative to 'what didn't happen'. The structure provides for the recipient to see that alternatives were assessed. It would, after all, be quite a different story if B had said something like, 'The guy I was with wanted to go to a movie but I talked him into going to a massage parlour instead'. As it is, B instructs A to see that one alternative was rejected and another accepted. One thing B makes clear by employing the structure is that it was not a common practice to leave work, have a couple of beers and then head for the massage parlour, just as Louise instructs Ken in I-2 to see that her 'going to the back house' with her boyfriend was not her 'normal' location for negotiating sex.

The reader has it available to notice, further, a related feature of B's defensive design, where B says, "we had a few beers". Surely the story recipient has it available to orient to such a statement to infer that what one does after a "few beers" (with possible alcoholic impairment of judgment), might not be something one would normally do. The statement, then, "we had a few beers", also has some power, especially when combined with the work that is done by telling about 'what didn't happen'.

In a general sense I have confined my interests in this chapter to one possible feature of narratives; the assessment of alternative activities in a specified storytelling environment as part of a storyteller's defensive design. The risk oriented to in both I-2 and IX-1 has to do with the storyteller engaging in a questionable
activity, 'questionable' according to standards oriented to by storyteller and story recipient. I have built upon a general procedure, originally located by Sacks in his lectures, employable by a storyteller for building a defensive design into the telling sequence: tell about 'what didn't happen' prior to 'what did happen'. This general procedure provides for the story recipient to see the rejected alternative as a 'normal' activity and the accepted alternative as the 'abnormal' activity. A corollary to this procedure is: if one hears a volunteered risky story containing an assessment of alternative activities, where that assessment differentiates between 'normal' and 'abnormal' activities, then hear that assessment as constituting at least part of the storyteller's defensive posture.

One way that one can get this work done is by informing the story recipient that alternatives were concertedly assessed and that it was a conscious decision leading to the achievement of the original project. In I-2, for example, the activity of negotiating sex was not abandoned, only that one location was chosen over another. It was that alternative location which was 'abnormal' for a teenager. One of the consequences of including collateral information in a narrative is that the storyteller can show, within the telling sequence, that 'what happened' was innocent and spontaneous and that the recipient ought not to make a big deal of it.

In our society it seems that people engaged in interaction seek to create and sustain a comfortable environment for the interaction. As Goffman notes, "To conduct one's self comfortably in interaction and to be flustered are directly opposed" (1967:101). I noted earlier in this chapter that recipients of stories ought to do some work to
protect and sustain the ongoing interaction when the interaction is threatened. The storyteller, too, ought to contribute to this maintenance work. In our society, to be embarrassed or uncomfortable in interaction may be seen by others as evidence of weakness, moral guilt, or defeat. In storytelling situations we have seen that recipients wish to avoid placing people telling disclosure stories in that position. Goffman writes:

Poise plays an important role in communication, for it guarantees that those present will not fail to play their parts in interaction but will continue as long as they are in one another’s presence (1967:104).

Furthermore,

Embarrassment has to do with unfulfilled expectations...Given their social identities and the setting,...participants will sense what sort of conduct ought to be maintained as the appropriate thing (1967:105).

Thus far I have suggested that, in I-2, the general project is not abandoned and the assessment of alternatives turns on such features as location and manner. The 'assessing alternatives' structure can also be employed by storytellers to focus on project abandonment in favor of a different project. In IX-1, the assessment of alternative activities relates directly to this issue. One project is abandoned in favor of another project. In IX-1, the risky nature of B's story revolves around an orientation to the abandoning of one alternative activity in favor of another. In B's case, it turns out that the accepted alternative is considered to be 'abnormal' by A as seen in his interjection, 'Nooooo!' when B first begins to tell about
going to a massage parlour. The employment of the 'assessing alternatives' structure by B within the telling sequence after A's interjection provides for the story recipient to see that the storyteller is aligned with the expectation that it was something B should not have done, that those in a given category should not only support a categorial norm but should also realize it, and that the assessment of alternative activities indicates that and how that realization was temporarily abandoned. The 'assessing alternatives' structure employed within the telling sequence of a story does the work of prefiguring one possible recipient question in such situations: what were the conditions of availability for the rejected alternative and the accepted activity? One answer would be that the 'assessing alternatives' structure can do the work of defusing a possible dispreferred recipient response at story completion by prefiguring a recipient's response and answering before the response sequence the recipient's question of how it came to be that the storyteller would engage in an 'abnormal' or 'risky' activity. In IX-1, for example, if B had told a story about going to a massage parlour in which it was displayed as a 'normal' activity for him to engage in, he would be isolating himself as someone who would normally participate in an activity regarded by story recipient as 'abnormal'. This is perhaps the crux of the matter. An alternative activity assessment may turn on a concerted decision, where there is a design to 'what happened', or the assessment may instruct the story recipient of the fortuitous nature of the activity. The general procedure, then, makes it available for the storyteller to indicate to the story recipient that the storyteller knows what is a 'normal' activity, which can then be used to specifically locate 'what happened' in the
story as something distinctly 'abnormal' and unusual.

Now I want to transact a kind of analytical shift by seeking to technicalize the inner workings of the procedure located in I-2 and IX-1. First, recall that this general procedure employed by storytellers for structuring assessments of alternative activities takes on a conventionally used frame: Instead of A, B. Further, with regard to the activities in the structure 'Instead of A, B', I noted that the 'A' slot is filled by a class of possible activities with the 'B' slot filled by a class of activities which may be seen to be alternative to 'A'. It is available to anyone in our society to perceive an activity as occurring quite incidentally, something happening alongside the unfolding course-of-action but not purposefully engineered to affect the outcome of the activity. In my materials the reader has it available to see that the alternative assessment is formally related to alternative projects or to alternative methodologies. In I-2, for example, the project of negotiating sex is not abandoned but modified. Then the assessment operation assesses methodologies for successful achievement of main projects. That assessment also differentiates sub-activities as components of an original project.

(I-2)

Project: negotiating sex

Alternative 1: parking

Alternative 2: using an unchaperoned house

The alternative assessment in I-2 relates to a class of possible
locations rather than a class of possible projects. Note, too, that relative to the project there are designed aspects of possible alternative location choices. One example of such design is the concerted decision to seek an alternative location for completing the project of negotiating sex. No hint of coercion is specified, and the accomplishment of the project is based on a concerted decision as opposed to being fortuitous.

In IX-1, we see a different story contingency. The assessment of alternatives relates directly to projects rather than to locations. Whereas in I-2 locations are assessed, in IX-1 projects are assessed.

(IX-1)
Project 1: going to a movie
Project 2: attending a massage parlour

Note in IX-1 the implication of alternative features not found in I-2. First, the implication of coercion, "So I ended up going with him", as opposed to being strictly voluntary. Second, the fortuitous nature of the arising of Project 2, "We passed this massage place", in contrast with the concerted decision in I-2, "So we walked to the back, 'n we just went into the back house". Finally, and the major difference between the two contingencies in the stories, the original project in IX-1 of 'going to a movie' is abandoned in favor of a different project altogether. In I-2, we noticed that the original project was never abandoned, only the original location. By explicating these features I have begun to describe an organization for assessing alternative activities in narratives told in
conversation and the kind of defensive work that gets done for a storyteller in relation to protecting and sustaining a storyteller's 'face' as well as the ongoing interaction. The general procedure of incorporating collateral information into the telling sequence offers a possible solution to one storyteller problem: how to inform story recipient that the storyteller knows what is a 'normal' activity, which can then be used to specifically locate 'what happened' in a story as something distinctly 'abnormal'.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I examine COLLATERAL information in narrative discourse as treated in linguistic discourse analysis followed by a conversational analysis treatment. In the linguistic discourse treatment, it seems that narratives are analyzed as self-contained units rather than as activities embedded in a natural context, i.e. live conversation. In my conversational analysis treatment of COLLATERAL I make use of social identities and membership categories which testify to the fact that narratives and features of narratives are social activities, and my analysis stresses the social nature of narratives.

The significance of this chapter relates to the integration of conversational analysis with the linguistic study of collateral information in narrative discourse. I am claiming that there are discovery procedures in conversational analysis which can be effectively applied to the study of narrative discourse. These
methodological procedures, characterized below, illuminate the issues with which this chapter began.

I located and described instances from naturally occurring conversation where a storyteller tells not only about the events which transpired but also about what did not transpire. When a storyteller tells about 'what didn't happen' in the telling sequence (COLLATERAL), I isolated those instances when collateral information acts as an assessment of alternative activities. I noted some similarities and differences between a storyteller's assessment of alternative activities and Twer's 'Instead of Activity A, Activity B' structure. In building upon and departing from Twer, I claimed that people describing past activities in story form in conversational interaction often give accounts for why one activity was chosen over another activity and that these accounts are reflected in storytellers' descriptions of what did and did not take place.

This chapter offers several contributions to the larger study of discourse considerations. Perhaps the most beneficial contribution is the isolation of alternative assessment activity procedures as a group for special study. The discovery and description of alternative assessment activity procedures provides the discourse analyst with a category useful in formal analysis.

The second contribution of this chapter is that, by indicating various devices available to storytellers for making assessments of alternative activities in narratives, a methodology is offered for identifying activity assessments in narrative discourse via constituent features. The methodology offers a helpful starting point
in the analysis of collateral information and categories useful in formal analysis.

Thirdly, this chapter contributes to the sociology of interaction by supporting a number of Goffman's claims vis-a-vis 'facework'. From the transcripts I discovered a general procedure available to people telling stories for building a defensive design into the telling sequence so as to protect and sustain that person's 'face' and the ongoing interaction. The general procedure relates to a storyteller telling about assessing possible activities, telling about 'what didn't happen' prior to telling about 'what happened'. I showed how this procedure provides for a recipient of a story to hear 'what didn't happen' as a recognizably 'normal' activity and 'what happened' as a recognizably 'abnormal' activity. I formulated a hearer's maxim in relation to the procedure: if you hear a story containing a description of 'what didn't happen' (collateral information) prior to the telling of 'what happened', where the former is a recognizably normal activity and the latter recognizably abnormal, then hear that assessment of alternative activities as a storyteller's attempt to protect and sustain his or her 'face'.

In the next chapter I examine pre-narrative sequencing in live conversation as a resource in the generation of a narrative. I use the same analytical procedure as is used this chapter, first offering a linguistic discourse treatment of narrative sequencing concerns followed by a conversational analysis treatment of the same phenomenon.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1
Sharrock and Turner (1978) write:

One of the fates of stories, narratives, and anecdotes is that their recipients may perform transforms on them, either in later retellings or 'interpretively,' that is, in figuring out for themselves the sense of what they have been told (p.187).

2
In their paper, 'On a Conversational Environment for Equivocality' (1978), Sharrock and Turner suggest that storytellers can find possible recipient transforms foreseeable. When such possible transforms are foreseeable, a storyteller has it available to engage in interactional work in order to protect their tellings against a transform which could fill the slot of a dispreferred response. They write:

Recipient can recast the part teller assigns himself in the telling, with the result that the whole narrative undergoes a 'shift' so as to 'tell a different story'; and an assessment that the remarks are equivocal can motivate recipient to operate the transform. Thus 'complaints' can undergo such a shift, so as to yield a story now focused on complainant, and complained-againsts can correspondingly appear in this version as victims (p.187).

3
For example, recipient 'challenge' to a storyteller's version of 'what happened' can lead to such a collapse. Consider the following.

A: [STORY] Anyway, I couldn't help myself, she forced me into it.
B: Sounds to me like you only have yourself to blame
A: Well, fuck it, if you don't believe me

[A turns and leaves]

Certainly everyone has been in such a situation, where the interaction 'breaks off' with hard feelings on both sides.
Goffman (1971) offers a clue to the workings of a 'defensive design' in alternative activity assessments when he writes:

When the world immediately around the individual portends nothing out of the ordinary, when the world appears to allow him to continue his routines,...we can say that he will sense that appearances are 'natural' or 'normal'. For the individual, then, normal appearances mean that it is safe and sound to continue on with the activity at hand...[but] when the [individual] senses that something is unnatural or wrong, that something is up, he is sensing a sudden opportunity or threat in his current situation (p.239).

Turner (1976) makes an interesting related point:

It cannot be overemphasized that the sociologist does not stand to his conversational data as Sherlock Holmes stands to the clues which eventually lead him to a reconstruction of the crime. Our aim is to say, in effect, here are some methodological ways for producing and understanding the data, ways available to the participants themselves. It is true that as analysts we have no apparatus which will yield an incorrigible reading of a conversational exchange; but that we have no such apparatus is not in the normal sense an admission of failure, for the production of incorrigible readings is not the goal of such an exploration of the systematics of talk and interaction (p.253).

I follow Goffman in his use of 'design' in interactional encounters. He writes:

If [someone] arranges to meet a friend in a particular crowded bar at 12:45 the next afternoon, and according to the bar clock he sees his friend approaching a minute after the appointed time, then I count as designed the fact of the co-occurrence of the two individuals at that place at that time. And I count as undesigned the fact that the bar was there that day...that particular other
persons were present, and that the sun rose that morning...Although these latter elements in the situation affect the individual and his design,...these elements are largely indifferent to whether or not he in particular carries out his design (1971:310-311).
CHAPTER 5: PRE-NARRATIVE SEQUENCING AS AN INTERACTIONAL RESOURCE

In the first chapter I said that one of the more relevant problems currently being attended to in linguistic discourse analysis is that concerning the relation between dialogue and monologue. Longacre (1983) is one of the first linguists interested in discourse who takes the view that the two are related but somewhat autonomous structures. He classifies the units of monologue as: morpheme, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, and discourse. The units of dialogue are: utterance, exchange, dialogue paragraph, and dialogue or discourse. In relating the two types of structures, Longacre defines the 'utterance' as the unit bounded by what a single speaker says. As such, Longacre writes that the 'utterance' "is the unit which is relevant to turn-taking, repair, and other concerns of the student of live conversation" (1983:43, emphases mine). Longacre begins to treat pre-narrative sequencing when he examines the 'exchange'. He writes:

An exchange—e.g. a question and answer—can involve interplay of various size units, for example, a sentence-size question can be answered by a single morpheme e.g., "No!" or by a whole discourse, e.g., by a narrative: "Well, here's what happened yesterday" (p.43).

Longacre touches on an issue which is in the realm of interest to the discourse linguist but which is heretofore unformulated and unanalyzed: how narratives get generated from pre-narrative discourse.
It is one of those issues which the discourse linguist is hoping can be treated by students of live conversation and then integrated with research into dialogue currently being carried out in linguistics. Recall that Longacre and other discourse linguists have offered the invitation to students of live conversation to contribute to studies being done in linguistic discourse analysis (Longacre, 1983; Jones, 1983; Huttar, 1982).

A Linguistic Treatment of Pre-Narrative Sequencing

Contrary to popular opinion among sociologists, linguists interested in the study of discourse have begun to examine conversational structures. Longacre is at the forefront of this development. He writes:

We must not underestimate the importance of dialogue to the structure of language. How, for example, can we ever explain so-called minor or fragmentary sentences that Bloomfield and others have catalogued aside from recourse to dialogue? From one point of view, sentences such as the following are defective: "In the kitchen", "Yesterday", "Yes"; but as answers to questions in the context of dialogue, they are in no sense anomalous (1983:43-44).

Longacre goes on to make the plea to linguists interested in discourse that the importance of studying dialogue is not merely that it helps to explain a few apparent anomalies, but that dialogue ought to be viewed as a basic function of language: conversational exchange between people in communication.

In current linguistics, it is fashionable to describe the whole range of linguistic phenomena in terms of predicate relations (Longacre, 1983; Jones, 1977; Jones, 1983; Grimes, 1975; Pickering,
1979). From this viewpoint, almost every grammatical relation is a predication. But, as Longacre points out, if linguists are to describe all linguistic relations as predications, one must assume that there is an abstract predicate (which Longacre terms Repartee), whose two components are the question and the answer. He provides the following example which relates directly to pre-narrative discourse sequencing:

A: What did you do all morning?

B: Oh, I went downtown, shopped for two hours, spent an hour at the hairdresser's, and finally had lunch at Kresge's.

Then, however, if the term PREDICATION is stretched to include such different relations as found in the above example, one risks the danger of classifying predications taxonomically as to those which involve speaker exchange and those which do not. Furthermore, from the above example, we have it available to see that Longacre is recognizing that narratives do not 'just happen'. That is, in live conversation there is usually some pre-narrative talk from which a narrative gets generated. More than a decade ago Harvey Sacks focused on the contexted occurrence of narratives told in conversation and concluded that narratives are sequenced objects embedded in the particular context in which they are told. I said earlier that Sacks claimed that a narrative can involve a preface in which a teller projects a forthcoming story, a next turn in which a co-conversationalist can align him or herself as a recipient to the narrative, and a next turn in which the teller produces the narrative. Finally, another turn slot opens up at story end which gives the story
recipient an opportunity to talk by reference to the story.

Linguists interested in discourse are beginning to show an interest in discourse sequencing, particularly in relation to the generation of narratives. There is, however, a gap between a linguistic interest in pre-narrative sequencing and how a narrative gets generated in ongoing talk. Longacre provides the best treatment of dialogue from a linguistic perspective that I have come across in the linguistic discourse literature. In Longacre's treatment of dialogue, or repartee, note that his treatment brings us to the waterhole but does not prod us into drinking. That is to say, while Longacre touches on the issue of how a narrative may get generated in his treatment of dialogue, as we saw in the example "What did you do all morning?", he does not treat pre-narrative discourse as a resource for getting a narrative generated. One reason for this lack of attention is that it is not his purpose to examine pre-narrative discourse. However, in his treatment of dialogue he provides us with an example of one way a narrative may get generated: by being requested. Certainly linguists interested in discourse would agree that there must be more to the issue than that. For example, how do we account for the appropriateness of a narrative in discourse? This chapter examines pre-narrative sequencing in live conversation with an interest in discovering and describing how a narrative may get generated from materials provided in pre-narrative discourse.

Just as discourse linguists are interested in the structure of narrative discourse, certainly they are interested in pre-narrative structures and the structures which facilitate the generation of a
narrative as well. This chapter contributes to the issue of sequencing in discourse by offering the discourse linguist a methodology for examining pre-narrative discourse. The kinds of structures I examine in this chapter will be important to future linguistic discourse analysis and, in accord with Longacre's invitation, help to supplement and build-up the current research into the relation between discourse sequencing and the analysis of narratives.

In text grammarian linguistic discourse analysis following Longacre and his students, there exists the assumption that there is a set of sequencing rules which govern the sequential organization of dialogue discourse (Longacre, 1976, 1983; Jones, 1983). This assumption acts as a motivating factor for linguistic discourse analysis in that the discourse linguist seeks to reduce the problem of discourse sequencing to a set of rules governing dialogue. There is a related claim within such an assumption, a claim relating to syntactic constraints in dialogue. Cases to support such a claim empirically are, however, difficult to find. A major reason for this is, I believe, that sequences in dialogue which may be considered disjointed or meaningless when analyzed in isolation do occur frequently in conversation. Sacks (1968) provides one such example.

A: I have a fourteen year old son
B: Well, that's all right
A: I also have a dog
B: Oh, I'm sorry
Analyzed in isolation, this dialogue may seem meaningless. However, when the above dialogue is examined in the context of the conversation in which it took place, we have it available to see that the dialogue is quite natural and easily understood. The dialogue is taken from a conversation in which A is looking for an apartment to rent and B is the landlord. A raises some possible factors which may disqualify him for apartment rental. Thus, from the perspective of conversational analysis, we can question the basic assumption in linguistic discourse analysis that disjointed or "meaningless" dialogue exists or can be predicted.

Furthermore, I question whether sequencing constraints, what can or cannot be said, can be explained in linguistic (syntactic) terms. As Sacks and others in conversational analysis have clearly shown, what makes an utterance following a question an "answer", for example, is determined by its interactional location (Sacks, 1968; Turner, 1970, 1976; Eglin, 1976). Along with this issue is the somewhat discouraging development in linguistic discourse analysis where the dialogue material is oftentimes constructed from intuition and where the analysis can be shown to have obscured basic features of conversational organization, as my analysis of pre-narrative sequencing demonstrates.

A Conversational Analysis Treatment of Pre-Narrative Sequencing

Telling stories and listening to stories is a commonplace feature of our everyday experience. When producing a story, tellers are obliged to display a relationship between the story being told and the
prior ongoing talk. Also, the system of turn-taking rules for conversation which allow everyone to participate in a conversation while preventing overlapping talk is normally suspended on storytelling occasions to allow a storyteller a longer turn (Sacks, 1978). The story itself, including the display of relationship between the story and the prior talk, should justify that temporary suspension.

A story is any recounting of an event, and is usually longer than one utterance. A storytelling generally contains a preface sequence, telling sequence, and response sequence. In an investigation of stories told in conversation, Jefferson (1978) demonstrates how stories may be 'triggered' by immediately previous turn-by-turn talk. That is, a word or an utterance in a conversation may produce a sudden remembering of a story, and may be used by a conversationalist to generate a story, that story bearing a relationship to the prior talk. A story may be methodically introduced into turn-by-turn talk via interactional techniques which may be used by a potential storyteller to show a relationship between the story and the prior talk, thus accounting for the appropriateness of the story's telling. Consider in the following conversational fragments how this has been accomplished.

Transcript A
(Jefferson, 1978:221)

Lotti: (hh)en so 'hh when Duane left today we took off our suits, y'know, 'n uh—Oh 'n she gave me the most beautiful swimsuit you've ever seen in your life

169
Emma: Gave it to you?

Lotti: Yeah

Emma: Aww:::

Lotti: A twenty two dollar one

Emma: Well, you've given her a lot in your day Lotti

Lotti: I know it. 'N when we looked w-one at Walter Clark's you know wir we're gonna buy one cuz [STORY]

Transcript B

(Jefferson, 1978:221)

Roger: The cops don't do that, don't gimme that shit I live in the valley. (0.5)

Ken: The cops, over the hill. There's a place up in Mulholland where they've where they're building those housing projects?

Roger: Oh, have you ever taken them Mulholland time trials? uhh, you go up there with a girl, a buncha guys're up there 'n [STORY]

Transcript C

(Schenkein:1:7)

Ellen: To relax during this last illness, on top of the antibiotics

Ben: Well, on top of the cough medicine

Ellen: Yeah, and the cough medi—incidentally, did I tell you?

Ben: No

Ellen: That the d—he told us t'give uhh Snookie a third of a teaspoon of uhh cough medecine, Cheracol, is there a— Is there a cough medecine called Cheracol?

Bill: yeah
Ben: yeah

Ellen: uhh, we happen to have Vic's Forty Four [STORY]

In these examples we can see how various devices may be employed by a conversationalist to signal that the story-to-be-told is being generated out of the prior ongoing talk and is, in fact, a product of that talk. When I talk about a story getting 'triggered' I mean that something said at some point in a conversation can remind someone of a story. A 'trigger' word or utterance may be used by a prospective storyteller to methodically introduce the remembered story into the turn-by-turn talk. It is part of a prospective storyteller’s business to display a relationship between the story and the ongoing talk in order to justify the telling occasion. After all, in conversational interaction one does not generally toss stories into the flow of talk with reckless abandon. Rather, careful attention ought to be paid to the ongoing talk if one wishes to tell a story in the midst of that talk. Recall that Jefferson (1978) makes the claim that a story may be 'triggered' in the course of turn-by-turn talk. In the above fragments we can see her claim in operation. In Transcript B, the prior talk which triggers the story is about "a place up in Mulholland" in line (5) to which the prospective storyteller responds, "Oh, have you ever taken them Mulholland time trials?" in line (7). That sudden remembering provides an effective preface for the story. In Transcript C, the trigger word "cough medicine" in line (4) reminds Ellen of a story about when she gave her dog some cough medicine. In Transcript A, the trigger word is "swimsuits" in line (3) which reminds Lotti of a story about purchasing a swimsuit. Note, further,
that in transcripts B and C the trigger utterance is provided by the eventual recipients whereas in Transcript A the trigger utterance gets generated by the eventual storyteller.

The thing to remember about a 'trigger' word or utterance is that it provides a potential storyteller not only with the resources for telling a story in the course of turn-by-turn talk, but also provides the storyteller with the resources for displaying that the story had some prior talk as its source and may be considered to be a direct result of attention paid to that talk.

In the data to be focused upon here I will be setting up a problem from some conversational materials in which stories are told and then show some resources for solving the problem which may not be immediately available at first glance, yet which upon closer examination may be seen as available to the conversationalists. The stories I am using in this chapter contain some risk-taking sequences. I am using these stories because the issues I develop in this chapter are more clear-cut and easily grasped in such stories. The reader may want to read through the transcripts before reading the analytical section, otherwise the analysis may be difficult to follow. (A key to transcription conventions is found in Appendix I).

(IX-2)

W: Well, we're kinda tryin' to get the men's prayer breakfast going again. The thing got into kind of a rut again of just being kind of a social time, not really meeting anybody's needs, 'n I don't really get off on gettin' up early on a Saturday morning just to beat the—beat the bush, y'know,
with a bunch of guys

R: Yeah, I can dig that

W: I enjoy that, but, y'know
I don't necessarily enjoy doing it in a
restaurant, so, y'know, there's bars to
do that kind of thing in

((mutual laughter))

R: Maybe we should have a Friday night
meeting at Donkin's Pub

((mutual laughter))

W: Hey, listen, I'll tell you a funny story,
or I don't know if it's funny, it's weird,
but I went to the bank last week, I hadda
make a deposit, 'n I rode my bike because
the car was broke down, 'n there--the
drive-in teller was the only thing open

[]

R: yeah

W: 'n there's a big long line of cars about
five-thirty 'n I thought to myself, well
I'm not gonna stay here in line on this
stupid bicycle, I'm gonna wait a little
while, and (1.0) I thought, well what am
I gonna do? An' there's this tavern next
to the bank

[]

R: Oh, noooooool

[]

W: so I thought, I'll just
go in here, I'm sure it's got a pool table
all taverns got pool tables, 'n I went in
there and there were some pool tables so
I started shootin' a game of pool (2.0)
'n I'm minding my own business, I'm not
botherin' nobody, y'know

[]

R: yeah

[]

W: 'n, uhh, usually
people leave me alone, 'n I'm just, y'know,
'n all of a sudden out of the corner of my
eye, y'know, it's kinda dark in there, 'n
I see this guy standing there just starin'
at me. So I figure I'm just gonna ignore
him, y'know, if he's lookin' for trouble
he's gonna look somewhere else
R: ((laughs))

W: 'n he just doesn't go away. Finally I looked up at him, thought I'd smile or, y'know, maybe the guy was a space cadet or something.

[ R: ((laughs))

W: and, uhh, here it is, it's an old friend of mine, I haven't seen for years.

[ R: really!

W: yeah, Maggie 'n him went to school from kindergarten together, 'n I knew him from about eighth grade on 'n he's a believer 'n he's kinda fallen on rough times, he's been married and divorced twice 'n so we chatted for a little while 'n I invited him to come by the house someday. He'd been laid off his job 'n was kinda lonely so he came by then, ohh, about five days later.

[ R: yeah

W: he stayed about six hours, had dinner with us, chatted for awhile, 'n uhh, (1.0) y'know we got to talk about some spiritual things a little bit, he expressed an interest to go down to the church, they've got a single parents class, 'n through his two marriages he's had three children and uhh he just doesn't know what to do with himself, he doesn't think he'd fit into a church, so I told him about the single parents class and all the divorced people 'n he said he'd really like to try it out. Said he'd try to give us a call which he hasn't done yet, 'n maybe try to go down there.

[ R: yeah

W: so it had a positive effect, but I thought, "well, if I went to Pastor Bill and asked for counselling about a ministry in taverns, y'know, it wouldn't go over too good, here it was
kind of a weird deal, 'n I felt guilty about goin' in there to be honest with ya, I felt guilty comin' home and tellin' Maggie that, y'know, I ran into Mark Wagner today, well, where'd you do that? Well, in this tavern [

R: yeah ((laughs))

W: y'know? but that's kinda strange, so I figure uhhhh

R: Well, I think that's good

W: Well, I don't know, what are ya sposed to do, go in there and start handing out tracts?

R: Well, see if you can get a grant from the church to pay for your beer, y'know?

W: Develop my ministry? Yeah, right. Maybe I could start CBBMS, the Conservative Baptist Bar Mission Society

R: ((laughs))

W: The Conservative Baptist Beer Mission Society

R: Maybe you should ask Pastor Bill for ten minutes next Sunday night to outline your ministry

W: You think so? Maybe you should mention it in your next letter to him. But don't mention my name!

R: Just your initials

W: Yeah, right!

(VI-6)

A: Yeah, well, Jimmy Carter said he lusted for women in his heart 'n everyone got upset

B: Oh, so you subscribe to Playboy, huh?

A: Funnny, if I ever brought home a Playboy my wife would kill me
B: Do you (1.0) d'yu ever look at the covers (6) of girlie magazines?
A: I can't help but look, it's an occupational (8) hazard (9)
B: Well, I just happened to notice that Pent- (10) house is doing a three-part series on the (11) Jer--on Jerry Falwell
A: Oh, I didn't see that, (13) I'll have to pick one up hehe (14)
B: Oh yeah, y'know one time I went to the bush (15) with this guy 'n on our way back we stopped (16) at mileage fifty-seven, there's a cafe (17) there 'n there was a stripper there who was (18) dancin' at this guy's table (19)
A: I just lost my appetite (20)
B: What does that have to do with food? (21)
A: I just didn't know you went to such nice (22) places (23)
B: No, but, I didn't know there was a stripper (24) there, but I thought, how can she do that? (25)
A: Ask her, don't ask me (26)
B: I asked my wife when I got back how could (27) she do that, if I was a woman I think I'd (28) be too embarrassed (29)
B: When do you play this week? (1)
A: We're sposed to play Doherty's Thursday (2) and then Saturday it's Ginger's Sexy Sauna (3)
B: They have a team? (4)
A: Yeah, but it must be made up of clients-- (5) there's, I doubt there's any guys working (6) there (7)
B: Yeah (9)
A: Man, I wonder what goes on in one of those (10) places?
B: Yeah, I went to one once
[ (12)
A: Noooooo! (13)
B: yeah, it wasn't (14)
my idea, I was with a guy from work 'n we (15)
went out for a few beers 'n, I dunno, we (16)
decided to go to a movie, but we passed (17)
this massage place 'n he said he always (18)
wanted to try one so I ended up going with (19)
him. I know it was wrong but uhh (20)
]
A: So what was (21)
it like?
(22)
B: It was no big deal really, this girl came (23)
in wearin' cutoffs but no top and proceeded (24)
to give me the treatment—the full treat-
ment (26)
]
A: I think I'd be too embarrassed to go to (27)
one of those places (28)
B: Yeah, it was different. I wouldn't do it (29)
again (30)
A: I heard Ginger's is gonna have to close (31)
down because of it's location... (32)

THE SEQUENCING PROBLEM

I said earlier that the above transcripts contain what might be called 'risky' story sequences in which storytellers disclose personal things about themselves and what they did, e.g. IX-2, lines (29)-(34); VI-6, lines (15)-(19); IX-1, lines (12)-(20). Further, the relationships which exist between the topics of the conversations and the stories which are embedded in the conversations extend beyond their merely being sequentially adjacent. Our interest thus becomes
more focused: the study of the orders of relatedness between prior talk and the telling of story sequences which include risk-taking. I take it that the relationships to be discovered and described may not be immediately available from a first reading of the transcripts. They are to be discovered. Perhaps they are even beyond our intuition, although it is initially our intuition which gets us started on the road to discovery.

Our first question is the following: what makes the above story sequences 'risky'? We may begin to answer this by taking note of some of the elements of relatedness between the talk prior to the stories. A first reading of the transcripts shows that one kind of thing is happening in all of the conversational situations: the storyteller is disclosing information in story form which could potentially damage the relationship between teller and hearer. The storyteller in each situation is 'putting something on the line', disclosing something that could be taken as demonstrating character weakness. A recipient may also see that a storyteller is telling a 'dangerous' sequence with no structural constraint (see p. 184 for an example of a 'structural constraint'). The point to note here is that sometimes people tell risky stories when they don't have to. One thing I want to do, then, is to examine the talk which occurs prior to the telling of a story to see if there exists a relatedness between the prior talk and the stories which follow which may provide a clue as to discovering how it is they came to be told.

I said earlier that in each conversational fragment the embedded stories each display a potentially related topical orientation. In
IX-2 the current topic in the talk prior to the storytelling is about "bars" or "taverns" in a context of something we may initially characterize as 'doing good things in bad places'. In IX-1 the topical orientation becomes 'massage parlours' in the talk adjacent to the storytelling. In VI-6 the talk prior to B's story is about girlie magazines. Another related feature of the stories is that each storyteller is a principal character in the recounted events.

These observations in themselves tell us very little about the relatedness between narratives and prior ongoing talk. Yet they do suggest, as a starting point, that the interactional relationships between the two elements do not 'just happen', but are instead results of the respective conversationalists' careful management and attention. This claim may be justified in part by noting that the involved conversationalists would need to be listening to and analyzing the talk as it was proceeding in order for the prospective storytellers to make use of that ongoing talk for the purpose of generating a story in such a way that the import and relevance of the story may be traced by the recipient to the prior talk. In fact, a major claim of prior studies of conversational storytelling is that, when a story gets told, it is the storyteller's responsibility to assure that the story being told is being responsive to and has a definite observable relationship with the prior ongoing talk. Jefferson (1978) has a neat example which demonstrates how storyteller inattention to previous talk may result in a conversational 'trouble' for the co-conversationalists.
(Jefferson, 1978:229)

Dan: Alright, except that again, you're, you're using an example of maybe one or two individuals

Roger: Yes

Dan: Uh; m and saying well look what these people did. And the other idea is that most schizophrenics, most psychotics are not really able to produce much of anything

Roger: I'm not saying don't cure schi—I'm taking it as an individual case. I'm taking this individual and referring to only=

Dan: Mm hm, it's true

Roger: =this individual

Dan: 'S true, and I'm sure that his artwork uhm all you have to do is go over t' Brentwood and see some very interesting artwork, I find it interesting

Roger: Where at the hospital?

Dan: That's right

Ken: Yeah and you can also get into some of these millionaires' hou—homes. And they've bought, boughten some of these uh artworks from different places in the world? You can look at 'em and—I mean I don't know anything about art, I can't—I can't draw that well I can draw cars, 'n junk like this when I want to, but uhg go into some of these houses and they—it looks like somebody took a squirt-gun with paint in it an' just squirted it. Justa buncha lines goin' every which way an' 'Oh isn't that terrific?' 'Yeah, What is it?' y'know? 'Did your child have a good time when he was drawing that?' Whaddya mean that cost me—' y'know, hhh

Dan: See but the other al—alternative that you're giving me is to say well look, m—m—maybe uh maybe a person has to be sick in order to be able to see these things,

Roger: No this man
In this instance the story is oriented to by the recipients to be 'irrelevant' to the ongoing talk. Thus it is sequentially deleted. What happened is that the storyteller offered a story which did not 'fit' into the prior turn-by-turn talk. The topic is not art but schizophrenics. Ken's story appears to get triggered by Dan's reference to artwork as support for the potential creativity of schizophrenics. As such, Ken's story has no relation to the prior talk and, as is noticeable in the transcript, his story is ignored by Roger and Dan. There was no orientation, no display of a relationship, between Ken's story and the ongoing conversation. We can see, then, by examining conversational materials that the relationship between a story and previous talk ought to be routinely negotiated. The implication of this is that the generation of a story in conversation is not independent of the ongoing talk but is, rather, a product of that talk.

Gail Jefferson, in "Sequential Aspects of Storytelling" (1978), examines story beginnings and story endings and discovers two features by which a story can be seen to be embedded in turn-by-turn talk. She writes:

The occurrence of an utterance at a given moment is accountable, and a basic account is that a next utterance is produced by reference to the occurrence of a prior, that is, is occasioned by it...The local
occasioning of a story...can have two discreet aspects: (a) A story is "triggered" in the course of turn-by-turn talk...[and] (b) A story is methodically introduced into turn-by-turn talk. That is, techniques are used to display a relationship between the story and prior talk and thus account for, and propose the appropriateness of, the story's telling (1978:220).

With this orientation in mind, I formulate the 'problem' as follows: how does someone go about orienting to pre-narrative discourse so as to transform the results of that orientation in such a way that a narrative gets generated? I now turn to an investigation of the materials from which the 'problem' arises.

Before proceeding to the analysis, I want to briefly pursue a tangential question: why does anyone want to tell a story which contains risky information in the first place? As Goffman notes in a recent article, "How an individual in talk...can properly lead up to a revealing report has never been closely studied" (1983:46). In the materials under investigation all of the stories seem to be stories that could easily have been suppressed. How, then, did they come to get told? It's not that the storyteller may be found to be constrained to tell the story and that that must somehow be managed. Rather, even a cursory examination of the transcripts reveals that there are neither duress nor structural constraints to tell a story containing risk-taking sequences. Then why is it done?

In our culture we find that one way of establishing oneself in the favor of another is by telling something, disclosing information, which shows the other person that he or she is being trusted. One kind of thing that gets disclosed are 'risky' kinds of things, such as
telling a friend about your sexual relationship with your wife or about an unusual or embarrassing personal experience. I take it that in our culture intimate relationships or any kind of relationships between 'friends' must involve 'trust' to some degree. Thus, in examining our materials to discover and describe interactional sequences we cannot leave out these kinds of considerations from the interactional concerns operating in a segment of talk. With an issue like 'trust' a recipient has it available to go away from a conversation in which a 'risky' story was told not so much disposed to view the storyteller in a negative light as much as to say, "He's a good guy. We had a nice talk. He trusted me."

There is, however, a deeper issue involved. The more relevant issue is protecting the current interaction, and in this chapter my concern is with members' methods of sustaining interaction while attending to the sequencing 'problem'. For example, one important part of a conversationalist's work is to protect the current interaction, which may also contribute to some larger task, i.e. keeping a personal relationship going. But it is this deeper issue, the interactional issue, which concerns us here and which I want to treat separately in relation to pre-narrative sequencing in discourse.

Recall in Goffman's treatment of 'face-work' that, just as any person is expected to have self-respect, a person is also expected to have a certain considerateness or respect for others. That is to say, in our culture a person is expected to go to certain lengths to protect the feelings and face of those with whom that person interacts. Goffman suggests that this respect for others' face is
willing and spontaneous because of the emotional identification with others and their feelings. In his words, a person "...is disinclined to witness the defacement of others" (1967:10). He continues:

The combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants. This means that the line taken by each participant is usually allowed to prevail, and each participant is allowed to carry off the role he appears to have chosen for himself. A state where everyone temporarily accepts everyone else's line is established. This kind of mutual acceptance seems to be a basic structural feature of interaction, especially the interaction of face-to-face talk (1967:11, emphases mine).

I now want to return to the analytical issues. My analytical interest at this point is to inquire into the structural features that make possible the generation of a story containing risk-taking sequences from prior ongoing talk. One of the reasons for focusing analytical attention on stories containing risky sequences is that the pre-narrative sequencing issues are clear-cut and perhaps more easily grasped.

Sometimes there are circumstances which give a person little choice but to disclose risky or dangerous information in story form. In such situations there may be a problem of how to manage that. An example of a constraining feature built into a situation would be something like the following: A comes home at 4:00 a.m. and his wife, B, asks him, "Where have you been?" A is constrained to tell B about 'what happened'. Such a situation creates an environment for the
possible telling of a risky story. Note that, in such a situation, there's something backing up B's question. It's not as though B is merely asking A to tell her something potentially embarrassing, but that her question is locked into a social-organizational framework which allows B to ask such a question. Thus, there are occasions when stories get told because the teller is situationally constrained. I refer to that kind of telling as a Class I story: a story locked into a social-organizational framework, a narrative which gets generated out of a situational constraint.

But there is surely another class of stories as displayed in our materials—Class II stories—which are volunteered. They are not generated out of any structural, social-organizational constraint. I am proposing, then, two classes of stories which I am calling, for convenience, Class I and Class II. The 'problem' I formulated earlier is generated from Class II stories.

**Solution to the Sequencing Problem**

Earlier I said that the resources for a storyteller to tell a story are to be found in the prior adjacent talk. One way to begin to build upon this feature is by examining and comparing the contents of the prior talk and the following stories in order to discover the resources relating to the construction of this kind of story. For a story, any story, to be seen as being derived from and occasioned by prior talk, it must be constructed with attention to what is being
talked about. We can begin to see the intricacy of such member attention by examining the conversational materials presented earlier in the chapter. First, it should be noted that in the transcripts the stories stand alone. That is, they are not 'second' stories derived from any structural resources from a preceding story. Nor are they followed by 'second' stories, although there are no structural constraints which would inhibit any development of a series of stories. These stories are not preceded or followed by other stories. Thus we will have to look elsewhere for a solution to our formulated problem.

I have established that stories (a) normally emerge from turn-by-turn talk; that is, they are locally occasioned; and (b) prospective storytellers must pay careful attention to the ongoing talk in order to make a story 'fit' in with that talk. These are basic notions from Jefferson (1978) and Ryave (1978), respectively. I now want to build on this foundation as we search for a solution to the 'problem' formulated earlier: how does someone go about orienting to pre-narrative discourse so as to transform the results of that orientation in such a way that a story may be generated? With the problem thus formulated, let us return to IX-2. Specifically, consider the talk preceding W's story.

(IX-2)

W: Well, we're kinda trying to get the men's prayer breakfast going again. The thing got into kind of a rut again of just being kind of a social time, not really meeting anybody's needs, 'n I don't really get off on gettin' up early on a Saturday morning
just to beat the—beat the bush, y'know, with a bunch of guys

R: Yeah, I can dig that

W: I enjoy that, but, y'know, I don't necessarily enjoy doing it in a restaurant, so, y'know, there's bars to do that kind of thing in

((mutual laughter))

R: Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting at Donkin's Pub

((mutual laughter))

W: Hey, listen, I'll tell you a funny [STORY]

In this transcript we can see the attention being paid to the two issues (a and b), discussed in the previous paragraph. That is, W displays evidence of having paid careful attention to the ongoing talk, namely, his story is derived from the ongoing talk about having a prayer breakfast in a restaurant and the suggestion, albeit jokingly, of having a prayer meeting in a tavern. Furthermore, he manages to construct his story from materials provided in that talk. One implication of this attention is that W did not have it in mind to tell about how he happened to help a friend spiritually when the conversation got started. The story gets 'triggered' by the turn-by-turn talk. Note, first, that the topic in the prior talk goes beyond mere settings (i.e. banks, restaurants, etc.). That is, the topic appears to be in a state of flux from "prayer meetings" to "social gatherings" in "restaurants" and "bars" respectively. What actually is the talk about? I earlier characterized the pre-story talk in IX-2 as something like 'doing good things in bad places', for example, having a prayer meeting in a tavern. Further, W initiates the joking
about "bars" by talking about how "there's bars to do that kind of thing in", with "that kind of thing" referring back to "beating the bush with a bunch of guys". R then provides the actual resources for W's story in the very next utterance by combining two elements of the ongoing talk in order to extend the joking climate which has been created in the talk by saying, "Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting in Donkin's Pub". The humour turns on something which W and R would obviously consider 'good', having a prayer meeting, in an incongruent setting which may be referred to as 'bad', a bar or tavern. It's a story, then, that is both triggered and structured by the ongoing talk and what the talk is 'about'. After all, W could have invoked a vague setting such as a "restaurant" or some such neutral place for the recounting about how he happened to help a friend spiritually while waiting for the line of cars at the drive-in window at the bank to dwindle. But then he would not be utilizing the materials in the ongoing talk to generate a story which could then lead to a conversational trouble. That is, it would then be available to R to question the relatedness between W's story and the prior ongoing talk. The story wouldn't 'fit' into that talk. As it is, the story fits into the ongoing talk because it was relevant to that talk, and got generated out of it.

Note, too, that the story is not only preceded by the general topical characterization of 'doing good things in bad places' but it is also followed by the same characterization. That is, it's not as though W wants to tell R a story about how he happened to help a friend spiritually but there's the hazard of the turn-by-turn talk to
deal with. On the contrary, the story gets generated out of the very elements that make it a somewhat risky story to tell in the first place, out of talk about "prayer meetings", "taverns", and the joking about activities having their proper settings and the humour of considering violating those settings, about having a prayer meeting in a tavern. And this is the crux of the matter. Contained within this observation is the solution to the formulated problem, and with it we will be able to characterize the interactional work a storyteller can engage in when generating a risky or dangerous story from ongoing talk. The important thing to note here is that it is R's utterance, "Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting at Donkin's Pub" which triggers the story. We may say that R's utterance captures the essence of the ongoing talk in capsule form which then provides W with the resources for getting his story told, and not only the resources for getting it told but the impetus for getting it remembered in the first place. So R's utterance does the work of reminding W of a relevant story, albeit a risky one, while at the same time providing the necessary material for getting the story told. It's not the storyteller but the other who first makes a kind of risky comment, but does it as a joke. The specific point is that it is not W who first generates a risky suggestion, but R, albeit humorously.

Now we have a notion, derived from our initial intuition about stories, that is analytically interesting: people have it available to tell 'risky' stories when something 'risky' is already present in the ongoing talk. Since such a notion is derived from one transcript, we want to check and see if it is perhaps happening in other story transcripts. Then we can note with interactional interest whether or
not there is some risk already being taken in the ongoing talk, some 'danger in the air', which provides materials for the generation of the risky story which follows that talk. If, after all, we're looking at how a prospective storyteller is able to generate a story from resources provided in the prior turn-by-turn talk, and at the sequencing in how a story gets triggered, then it is surely of interactional import to discover if there was already some risk evident in the ongoing talk, some danger already 'in the air', at the precise moment at which a 'risky' story gets generated.

What I want to do now is to look at the other transcripts from the beginning of this chapter with an interest in discovering whether or not there is some kind of danger already 'in the air' prior to the telling of a 'risky' story. First, in VI-6.

(VI-6)

A: Yeah, well, Jimmy Carter said he lusted for women in his heart 'n everybody got upset

B: Oh, so you subscribe to Playboy, huh?

A: Funnny, if I ever brought home a Playboy my wife would kill me

B: Do you (I.O) d'yu ever look at the covers of girlie magazines?

A: I can't help but look, it's an occupational hazard

B: Well, I just happened to notice that \underline{Penthouse} is doing a three-part series on the Jer--on Jerry Falwell

A: Oh, I didn't see that, I'll have to pick one up hehe

B: Oh, yeah, y'know [STORY]
Two rather apparent features of the above conversation which we may note are the local occasioning of the story and that the story gets triggered in the course of turn-by-turn talk. As for the utterance that triggers the story, it appears that A's utterance, "Oh, I didn't see that, I'll have to pick one up", is similar to R's utterance in IX-2. That is, A suggests something kind of risky, something that he normally wouldn't do, in a humorous vein, and B responds with a risky disclosure story. Notice, too, that A is not saying that he wouldn't look at a *Playboy* magazine when he says, "...if I ever brought home a *Playboy* my wife would kill me". But one thing he is doing with that utterance is building the risk-sharing structure. If we take A's utterance straight, he is proposing to do something that might be forbidden. Note that in this utterance A is making a very male kind of statement. He's proposing to do something risky, but in a joking manner. What he ends up doing is making a comment and then undermining his own comment by joking about it. Then, his joking about it allows B to take his utterance either way, and B takes it in a rather serious way with the utterance, "Do you (1.0) d'yu ever look at the covers of girlie magazines?". It's as if A's utterance not only triggers B's story, but A's utterance provides for the acceptability of B's story. Up to that point the talk as a whole was a little risky, but then with A's utterance, "Oh, I didn't see that, I'll have to pick one up hehe", B has it available to notice that A is actively participating in the risky talk. B then picks up on that orientation to the risky talk on A's part and produces a story which is relevant to that orientation. So there is some kind of risk
'in the air' in the ongoing talk, a risk oriented to by both conversationalists and played with by both, which does the work of not only getting the story remembered but told. That is to say, the risk which has been introduced into a conversation can remind someone of a risky story. Not only can a conversationalist be reminded of a risky story, but the ongoing talk, with some kind of risk already present, provides the resources for someone to tell a risky story. One may, after all, be reminded of a story as a result of monitoring talk yet choose not to tell it or may have trouble introducing it into the flow of talk. In VI-6, however, B is not only provided with an opportunity for a story to get triggered as a result of monitoring the ongoing talk, he is also provided with an occasion for telling it. How so?

One feature of conversation upon which I am building is that it is not uncommon to find instances of storytelling in which a story is told in such a manner that it can be seen as being occasioned by and derived from the previous talk. In VI-6, for example, we can note that B's story gets generated from attention paid to the prior talk about lust, skin magazines like Playboy and Penthouse, and noticing contents. Further, we have it available to notice the joking nature of the responses to the mention or implication of both Playboy and Penthouse: "Oh, so you subscribe to Playboy, huh?" and "Oh, I didn't see that, I'll have to pick one up hehe". It's as if what A and B are talking about is seen by both to be somewhat risky. The risky nature of the talk is recognized, and that recognition is displayed to one another via joking about it. And, as we noted earlier, both A and B are actively and concertedly displaying their recognition of the
danger which is 'in the air' in the talk. It's not a case in which one is joking about it and the other is passive. After participant recognition and orientation to the risk present in the ongoing talk, then, B chooses to tell a somewhat risky story, a story which may be seen to be constructed from materials in the prior talk as well as from an orientation to the risky nature of the talk.

We can see the same thing happening in IX-1.

(IX-1)

B: When do you play this week?

A: We're sposed to play Doherty's Thursday and then Saturday it's Ginger's Sexy Sauna

B: They have a team?

A: Yeah, but it must be made up of clients, there's, I doubt there's any guys working there

B: Yeah

A: Man, I wonder what goes on in one of those places?

B: Yeah, I went to one once [STORY]

The important thing to note in IX-1 is that it is A's utterance, "Man, I wonder what goes on in one of those places", which triggers the story by B. We may say that A's utterance initiates the risky talk in the conversation to which B responds with a risky disclosure story. As in IX-2 and VI-6, it's not the prospective storyteller who first makes a kind of risky comment but the prospective story recipient. In each conversation I have so far noted the feature of risky talk in the turn-by-turn talk prior to the telling of the story.
I have also noted that the prospective story recipient provides the story trigger by orienting to the risky nature of the talk. Now let's take it a step further.

If we assume that the topic already 'in the air' in the turn-by-turn talk prior to the story may be characterized as a kind of 'testing of limits', then the story may be characterized as a crossing over the border of that limit being tested. That is, there is a point where risky talk becomes problematic with regard to protecting the interaction in a conversation. The generation of a risky story may be at that point. In IX-1, A begins to 'test the limits' by wondering out loud, "I wonder what goes on in one of those places?" An interest is shown, a normal yet somewhat risky interest, to which B responds with a risky disclosure story. That is, A tests the limits and B orients to that limit testing by taking it a step further, by 'crossing over' the limit, "Yeah, I went to one once". A provides B with the resources for telling his story by his wondering about what goes on inside a massage parlour. Investigation of the story which follows retrospectively informs A and B that B has crossed over into dangerous territory, that he is telling a somewhat dangerous sequence which got generated out of A's wondering, which did the work of getting the story triggered. One of the consequences of employing the trigger utterance is that the storyteller can show that the nature of the prior talk is being oriented to and that that orientation is generative of the story. We may think of this orientation to the nature of the ongoing talk and the use of it to generate a story as one kind of method which people have at their disposal for getting risky stories told.
Now we have a notion about one genre of narrative that is analytically interesting: people have it available to tell stories containing risky sequences when there is already some risk present in the ongoing talk. Further, we have discovered a general procedure employable by a storyteller for constructing a story that observably displays a relationship with the risk already present in some ongoing talk which organizes the story in terms of a display of that relationship. By this we mean that the storyteller can show that the story is orienting to the talk which preceded it. This display enables story recipients to hear that the story is embedded in the ongoing talk and not just the ongoing talk but the particular topical orientation that is 'in the air' in that talk. This display of orientation is a practice which requires further description.

When this procedure is being employed there are ways in which the storyteller can indicate to the story recipient that the procedure is being used. The telling of a story with risk-taking in it is, after all, a somewhat dangerous venture, in the sense that by its telling a story could negatively influence the relationship between storyteller and story recipient. Furthermore, the ongoing interaction may be disrupted and thus be in need of protection or repair. Thus a storyteller will normally build into a story containing risk-taking a defensive design for how it came to be that the activity being recounted was engaged in. Such tactics in IX-1, for example, include
the statements, "It wasn't my idea," and, "I know it was wrong". In IX-2 we find, "I felt guilty about going in there", and "I felt guilty comin' home and telling Maggie". By 'defensive design' I mean to imply that a storyteller can be aware of the riskiness of the story being told and that the storyteller is thus obliged to orient to the riskiness or danger of the story by seeking to build into the story certain features intended to protect and sustain the ongoing interaction and the storyteller's 'face'. Goffman suggests that face-saving actions often become habitual and standardized practices, the consequences of which may not be realized by the person who employs them. He writes;

> Each person, subculture, and society seems to have its own characteristic repertoire of face-saving practices. It is to this repertoire that people partly refer when they ask what a person or culture is "really" like. And yet the particular set of practices stressed by particular persons or groups seems to be drawn from a single logically coherent framework of possible practices. It is as if face, by its very nature, can be saved only in a certain number of ways, and as if each social grouping must make its selections from this single matrix of possibilities (1967:13).

By employing such tactics the storyteller can inform the story recipient to locate the story as having been generated out of the risk already present in the ongoing talk, and that that risk is being kept in mind and oriented to during the telling.

I began by observing a subclass of Class II stories which is analytically interesting, a subclass in which people have it available to tell stories when there is some kind of topical orientation already present in the ongoing talk. And this cannot be just any story but a
story which directly relates to the specific orientation, in this case 'risk', in the prior talk. The procedure which provides for stories getting generated from this orientation involves a storyteller making use of a trigger utterance to insert the story into the flow of the turn-by-turn talk. In the stories examined in this chapter (IX-2, VI-6, and IX-1), the stories get generated out of a limit testing utterance which acts as the story trigger. In IX-2, for example, W and R are discussing the current status of the men's prayer breakfast from their local church. W says something to the effect that the prayer breakfast has degenerated into a "socializing" time instead of a prayer time. He adds, "I enjoy that" socializing with the guys, "but, y'know, I don't necessarily enjoy doing it in a restaurant". Then he adds, jokingly, "y'know, there's bars to do that kind of thing in". The two indicators of the humorous nature of the utterance are; (1) the contrast between having a prayer meeting in a restaurant and hanging out with the guys at a tavern, and (2) mutual laughter. It would be difficult at this point in the conversation to begin his story after that utterance. So it's interactionally noteworthy to discover when the resources become available for W's story to get generated. It seems to require the next utterance, R's, "Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting at Donkin's Pub" to conclude the provision of resources for W's story and which does the work of triggering the story. Specifically, a climate has been established where it's acknowledged between R and W that something 'risky' can be joked about, talked about in a way other than straight. Even if it's only joking, at least 'joking' is other than 'straight'. After all, maybe the pastor wouldn't joke about it. And then W takes one step
beyond the joking, that is, he builds on the joking, by telling a somewhat 'risky' story. It is, then, the risk that is already 'in the air' which makes W's story tellable in the sequence of turn-by-turn talk. And not only is there some risk 'in the air' but that risk is being dealt with in a way other than 'straight'. That is, the risky nature of the turn-by-turn talk is being joked about, toyed with, providing a kind of built-in invitation for the generation of a 'risky' story about what is being joked about.

Recalling the initial formulation of the 'problem' of how a narrative gets generated from pre-narrative discourse, we are now in a position to appreciate the notion that certain interactional profits may be accrued by a storyteller taking the chance of volunteering a 'risky' story. It is the storyteller in Class II storytelling situations who has the obligation to indicate the interactional significance of the recounting, to show to story recipient how the story fits in with the prior ongoing talk by relating the story to something in that prior talk. How so?

Recall that I am making the claim that a story may get generated out of some kind of topical orientation already present in pre-narrative discourse. It may be that something like a 'risky' story just 'slips out', an accidental telling inspired by the storyteller's orientation to the risk in the ongoing talk. There may, however, be another reason. After a story is told a story response slot opens up. That is, a basic tenet of conversational analysis is that a story's completion occasions its response sequence. Several different types of items can fill this slot, one of which may be a second story in
which the story recipient volunteers a story in which he was in a similar situation to the one the original storyteller was in the first story (Ryave, 1978). Someone may tell a 'risky' story, then, in order to generate further talk about a problem that the storyteller has reason to think might be shared with the recipient. Then, one way conversationalists can use their knowledge of the response slot is with the hope that the story recipient will generate further talk about the risky activity just recounted which might prove to be helpful to the storyteller. For example, returning for the moment to IX-1, certainly B's story about how he happened to go to a massage parlour may be considered to be a common dilemma under the rubric of doing something considered to be morally wrong. It may be the kind of dilemma which someone might want to talk to others about, and one way to do that may be realized by telling a story about the dilemma. If, for example, one were to engage in a morally questionable activity and the opportunity arises to tell a friend about it, one motivational factor may be that one wants to talk about it with someone who can be trusted in hope of finding a sympathetic ear or receiving help in dealing with guilt or a sense of personal failure or whatever. So then people may tell a Class II risky story in order to receive solutions to problems, or assuage guilt, or upgrade low self-esteem, or for any number of reasons. In IX-1 we get a glimpse of some possible motivational possibilities which may clue us in to the 'why' of a Class II story getting generated.

However, I am not seeking merely to give theoretical accreditation to the expertise of people telling stories in natural
conversation or to uncover their possible motivations for telling such stories. Rather, I am seeking to locate social-organizational structures in conversational interaction in order to gain access to structural details which are not immediately available to us. Furthermore, my analytical interests remain wedded to the issue of how a conversational analysis treatment of pre-narrative discourse is more rigorous than a linguistic discourse treatment. When something like a risky story gets generated we find that the storyteller ought to deal with the storyteller's 'problem' and the recipient with the recipient's 'problem'. In the next chapter, I take a closer look at these respective problems. Thus far we have determined how a story can get generated from some kind of topical orientation already present in the pre-narrative discourse. Now I want to transact a kind of analytical shift by technicalizing the procedure employed.

First, note the three-part structure of the general procedure I located in IX-1, VI-6, and IX-2.

(IX-2)

A: ...then Saturday it's Ginger's Sexy Sauna

B: They have a team?

A: Yeah, but it must be made up of clients, there's, I doubt there's any guys workin' there

B: Yeah

A: Man, I wonder what goes on in one of those places?

B: Yeah, I went to one once [STORY]
A: Yeah, well, Jimmy Carter said he lusted for women in his heart 'n everybody got upset.

B: Oh, so you subscribe to *Playboy*, huh?

A: Funny, if I ever brought home a *Playboy* my wife would kill me.

B: Do you d'yu ever look at the covers of girlie magazines?

A: I can't help but look, its an occupational hazard.

B: Well, I just happened to notice that *Penthouse* is doing a three-part series on the Jer—on Jerry Falwell.

[ ]

A: Oh, I didn't see that, I'll have to pick one up, hehe.

B: Oh yeah, y'know one time [STORY]

(IX-1)

W: ...I enjoy that, y'know, but I don't necessarily enjoy doing it in a restaurant, so, y'know, there's bars to do that kind of thing in. ((mutual laughter))

R: Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting at Donkin's pub. ((mutual laughter))

W: Hey, listen, I'll tell you [STORY]

We have in these instances sequences where the topic is oriented to by the conversationalists, followed by a kind of testing of limits which acts as the story trigger, from which the story begins to get generated. We can schematize the progress of the sequence as follows.
I. Topic Orientation

II. Trigger

III. Story Offer

Technically, this sequence can be described as containing two actions beyond the topic orientation (I), with the next-to-last action (II) providing for the availability of a story offer (III). So a Class II story can get generated out of some kind of topical orientation already present in ongoing talk, and that kind of structure can be seen to be composed of a minimum of three components.

One distinctive feature of the procedure is that, in IX-2 and VI-6, the risk 'in the air', the testing of limits, is done in a joking manner. It carries no hint of seriousness. That is, the trigger utterance (II) may be offered in a light, amusing manner and be accepted as such. Note, too, that the joking nature of the trigger utterances of R (in IX-2) and A (in VI-6) are not constructed at random but rather carefully contrasted with the risky nature of the prior ongoing talk. In IX-2, for example, the story trigger is composed of carefully managed contrastive humour. The talk is about getting a prayer meeting restarted and W contrasts the settings of "restaurants" and "taverns", each having their distinctive uses (a restaurant being a good place to have a prayer meeting, and a tavern or bar being a good place to socialize). Thus the resources are provided for R to integrate the two settings, suggesting in a joking vein that perhaps a "bar" would be a good place to have a prayer meeting. After R's utterance is oriented to as a joke as indicated by
mutual laughter, then W offers a story about helping someone he happened to meet in a bar.

This three-part action is very common. In my materials it occurs in a wide variety of storytelling environments. I have begun, then, to sketch a technical characterization of the generation of narratives from the resources available in the pre-narrative discourse. This has involved us in becoming alert to the feature of 'risky' talk in a conversation preceding the generation of a story containing risky information. The procedure for getting a story generated out of prior talk has much to do with the orientation by both the potential storyteller and the potential story recipient to the available resources in the pre-narrative discourse. Further, I noted that it is the potential story recipients who provide the necessary materials for the storytellers to get their stories told, and that work may be seen as a concerted accomplishment by the conversationalists. By locating the interactional resources available to prospective storytellers and recipients in our materials, with a focus on how stories which contain risk-taking sequences can get generated from some kind of risk being already present in some ongoing talk, I have begun to produce a detailed characterization of a general procedure for generating stories from materials already provided in the ongoing talk. In reflecting upon the underlying structural phenomena I have focused on sequential features of interaction and ways which people have to sustain ongoing interaction. The fact that a story gets generated from available resources in the pre-narrative discourse is remarkable in itself. Even more remarkable is to locate the progression of interaction which underlies that achievement.
CONCLUSION

It seems reasonable to turn to conversational analysis as an approach to dialogue that has the most to offer the discourse linguist in the way of substantial insight into dialogue sequencing. It appears to me that the analytical tools of the discourse linguist puts the analyst at a disadvantage (as they admit, c.f. Pickering, 1979; Jones, 1983; Longacre, 1983), when attempting to treat dialogue discourse with analytical categories imported from descriptive linguistics. That is, I do not view dialogue discourse, or conversation, as a structural product in the same way that a sentence is a product. Rather, I view dialogue as the outcome of the interaction of societal members, with the study of dialogue recommending a different methodology and different analytical categories when analyzing sentences, even though dialogue discourse is, at least in part, composed of linguistic units such as words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and so on.

In the course of this chapter I have provided materials for proposing the following theoretical characterizations: the sense and appropriateness of a story is not a pre-ordained matter that can be determined by merely examining the content of a story. Rather, the achievement of a story may be seen to be the result of members' careful attention to the ongoing talk and is realized via storyteller and recipient negotiation and administration emerging from an orientation to the riskiness present in a conversational situation. The analysis I have undertaken in this chapter is an attempt to
characterize some of the features of this interactional work in relation to a specific genre of narrative. In IX-1, VI-6, and IX-2 we have seen how stories may get generated from the transformation of resources in the prior ongoing talk. We have utilized our initial intuitive observations to move somewhere 'beyond intuition' and into non-intuitive analytical territory. For example, we initially noticed two classes of stories: those which are locked into a social-organization framework (Class I), and those which are volunteered (Class II). Upon closer examination of Class II stories I abstracted a subclass in which Class II stories are generated from an orientation to some 'risk' already 'in the air' in the ongoing talk. I characterized this procedure as providing a kind of built-in invitation to tell a story which discloses something personal about oneself in story form. I have analyzed these materials to display sensitivities that people disclosing something about themselves in story form exhibit with respect to the structurally related transformations between the story and the prior ongoing talk. I have attempted to demonstrate how people telling stories which contain risky information display an orientation to a 'testing of limits' and that their stories subsequently cross the borders of those limits. Finally, I hope that other analytical topics have been uncovered for further analysis.

This chapter suggests a methodology for analyzing dialogue sequences in discourse, particularly in relation to pre-narrative dialogue. By identifying sequencing procedures by which narratives may be introduced into ongoing discourse, I claim that pre-narrative
dialogue can be subject to formal analysis, and under such analysis can be found to have formal properties. The methodology used in this chapter suggests that the ethnographic dimension is important in a complete analysis of dialogue structures, an area which is recognized as lacking in linguistic discourse analyses. Linguists interested in the study of discourse have offered important insights into the discovery of the functions of various syntactic constructions in dialogue structures, and this kind of discovery is crucial to discourse analysis. This chapter has supplemented those studies by linguists by offering insights into the ethnographic and interactional character of pre-narrative dialogue. In the next chapter, both syntactic and ethnographic insights are integrated in the analysis of narrative recipient response preferences.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1

The turn-taking system is a system of rules which allow everyone to participate in the conversation while seeking to prevent overlapping talk (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974). When one speaker tells a story, the normal turn-taking system is temporarily suspended to allow the teller a longer turn (c.f. Gardner and Spielmann, 1980). The story itself should justify the suspension. Note, further, that any suspension of the turn-taking system creates an interactional 'problem': how do other conversationalists know when the system begins operating again? One function of the preface sequence is to provide recipient(s) with information about what it will take for the story to be over.

2

Garfinkel (1967) claims that members do not separate the circumstances of social events from their descriptions of what these events are.

3

In a recent article, Holly Gardner and I suggested that there are two aspects of a storytelling that a teller may be concerned with; (1) sifting through experiences in order to find an event that members of a common culture will find tellable, and (2) employing telling devices which allow story recipient(s) to appreciate the recounting. For example, a 'funny' story might go something like this:

"I saw a man walking down the street yesterday with his suit on backwards."

In this recounting, Gardner notes that the storyteller depends upon the fact that recipients would also find such an event funny given their knowledge about the proper way to wear suits (1980:180).

4

Sacks (1971) notes that when a conversation progresses well the talk drifts almost imperceptibly from one topic to another. Turns at talk ought to display the 'why' of the turn and the most common way of doing this work is by tying topically to what has gone before.
Mayers (1978) writes that, in our society:

Trust is a very important factor in interpersonal relationships. Because we cannot secure proof of the outcome of our behaviour, we must trust. A definition of trust then would be, the ability to risk yourself, to put yourself in the hands of another (p.2).

Goffman touches on this possibility by suggesting that a person has a version of self which that person wishes to maintain in the eyes of others. He continues:

Now if the individual should find himself appearing in a bad light...he may find himself suddenly alarmed by the situation...
It is clear that for the individual the maintenance of these personal standards is important not only as a means of carefully coping with routine difficulties, but also as a means of sustaining an image of himself to which he is attached (1971:278).
CHAPTER 6: NARRATIVE RESPONSE PREFERENCES

In this chapter I examine recipient response preferences following narratives in live conversation. Recipient responses are treated in linguistic discourse analysis as a feature of repartee or the notional (deep) structure of dialogue. Earlier I said that the linguistic discourse analysis view of sequencing in discourse is generally viewed as sentences strung together in much the same way that clauses within sentences can be conjoined with various kinds of connectives. In a linguistic treatment of repartee (dialogue), the need for an ethnographic dimension (including features of culture and situation in the analysis) is painfully missing. In linguistic discourse analysis attention is paid to response structures, i.e. question-answer. However, as Grimes (1975) notes:

The content of the second part is dependent upon the content of the first part to a great extent. How to express this interlocking seems to be beyond us (1975:212).

As an example of what I think Grimes is referring to, in the linguistic literature there is a treatment of the recipient rejection option in dialogue, and that option can surely be extended to narrative responses. But little attention is paid to how recipient rejection works or the different ways it gets done. Response types are identified and catalogued, but the related issues of how they get generated in live conversation and what they look like
and how they work in conversational interaction are neglected. This chapter follows the same pattern as the previous chapters by first providing the reader with a linguistic discourse treatment of recipient responses in dialogue. After that, I provide a conversational analysis treatment of recipient response preferences, focusing on response preferences to narratives told in live conversation. In so doing, I demonstrate how a conversational analysis methodology raises interesting issues which linguistic discourse analysis neglects. In my analysis, I do not merely extend a linguistic discourse analysis treatment of the issues, but show how the issues get transformed in theoretically interesting ways.

A Linguistic Discourse Treatment of Recipient Responses

Robert Longacre has recently provided a treatment of simple repartee which illustrates the kinds of issues attended to by linguists interested in the analysis of discourse structures. Earlier I said that linguistic discourse analysis has much to offer the sociologist interested in discourse and students of live conversation. I believe that sociologists interested in discourse are overlooking findings in linguistics which are relevant to our work and theoretically interesting. We could learn much from paying more attention to the studies currently being carried out on discourse by linguists. On the other hand, a sociological approach to discourse has much to offer the discourse linguist by handling subtle and significant features of interaction. But often sociological treatments of discourse lack the precision and detail of linguistic discourse analysis, and Longacre's recent study bears this out.
In his discussion of dialogue (or repartee), Longacre (1983) notes that the surface structure of a language contains a basic dialogue paragraph which may be characterized as beginning with an initiating utterance (IU). The initiating utterance encodes what Longacre refers to as three "notional units" (1983:48). These units are: question (Q), proposal (Pro), and remark (Rem). QUESTION signifies a solicitation of information. He writes:

A request may be made by asking concerning one of the presuppositions of request, i.e. we may say Have you a match? when we mean Please give me a match. Or we may say Is there any more salad down there at that end of the table? when we really mean Pass me the salad. All of these really are notional proposals rather than notional questions (1983:48).

Longacre's use of the term PROPOSAL includes such things as advice, suggestion, invitation, threat, command, and so on. In the surface structure of a language it may have a declarative structure, an imperative structure, or an interrogative structure. PROPOSAL is a call to action rather than a request for information. REMARK, then, indicates that a speaker is making a commentary or a declaration. It may be used, for example, as a request for an evaluation from the other conversationalist(s) to see if they agree or disagree with the observation of the first speaker. As I demonstrate later in this chapter, these comments have direct relevance to narrative analysis in discourse in relation to recipient response options.

Longacre claims that a simple dialogue concludes with another surface structure unit which he refers to as the "resolving utterance" (1983:49). The resolving utterance is usually generated by a second
speaker rather than by the first speaker and encodes three units of notional structure; ANSWER (A), RESPONSE (Res), and EVALUATION (Ev). ANSWER resolves the structure initiated as a question, RESPONSE resolves the structure initiated as a proposal, and EVALUATION resolves the structure initiated as a remark. Longacre writes:

The three underlying structures correspond to the three underlying structures which encode within the initiating utterance. This gives us three pairs of utterances: question-answer, proposal-response, remark-evaluation (1983:49).

Longacre's analysis leads him to conclude that we have it available to posit three simple dialogues in most languages such as follow.

A: What time is it? (IU,Q)
B: It's four o'clock. (RU,A)

A: Come over here. (IU,Pro)
B: Okay, I'm coming. (RU,Res)

A: The whole matter is absurd. (IU,Rem)
B: Yes, indeed. (Ru,Ev)

In addition, Longacre claims that simple dialogue may contain a terminating utterance (TU) which encodes two different kinds of deep or notional structures: acquiescence (Acq), and rejection (Rej). His analysis is designed to be relevant to response options in a variety of dialogue settings and would seem to be relevant to narrative responses. He claims as much in his discussion of complex repartee and breaks the ground for treating response preferences. He writes:
A complex dialogue results when the second speaker does not...accept the dialogue on the terms suggested by the first speaker. On the contrary, the second speaker wants to...moderate the force of the first speaker's utterance; he wants in some way to blunt its point (1983:51).

A second speaker can accomplish this by using what Longacre terms a CONTINUING UTTERANCE (CU) which appears between the initiating utterance and the resolving utterance. The CONTINUING UTTERANCE encodes three deep structures: counter-question, counter-proposal, and counter-remark. This structure can occur as a chain of continuing utterances and be of indeterminate length. Recall from the first chapter that Longacre claims that a dialogue can involve the interplay of various size units, including NARRATIVE. Then, his analysis of dialogue has immediate relevance to my narrative materials and provides us with a bridge for analyzing dialogue relations between narrators and narrative recipients. That being the case, there is certainly more to narrative responses than acceptance, rejection, and continuing utterances, although these features are important to us as we seek to discover and describe narrative response preferences and acceptance/rejection devices. Longacre, then, is one of the few linguists interested in discourse who has laid some of the necessary groundwork for the further exploration of response structures in discourse.

In Longacre's treatment of response types in dialogue there is still an ethnographic dimension missing from his analysis which, I believe, he would be the first to admit. I assume that is one reason for his invitation to students of live conversation to supplement his analysis. Recall that similar invitations are found in other
linguistic studies (Jones, 1983; Pickering, 1979; Grimes, 1978).

Recall that my thesis is directed toward a basic category of linguistic discourse analysis—text grammarians. In relation to response sequencing and a text grammarian treatment of responses, I said in the last chapter that I believe the linguistic discourse analysis position is weak. In live conversation, for example, the links between utterances cannot necessarily be paraphrased as sentential connectives, and sequences which discourse analysts may judge as being "ill-formed" when taken in isolation actually occur quite frequently. Recall the example from Sacks (1968).

A: I have a fourteen year old son
B: Well, that's all right
A: I also have a dog
B: Oh, I'm sorry

Such remarks and responses seem quite strange when taken in isolation, as I showed in the last chapter, but seem very natural when taken in the context of the actual conversation in which A is raising a series of possible disqualifications for apartment rental with the landlord, B. So then, a linguistic discourse analysis treatment of sequencing which suggests the existence of ill-formed sequences may be seriously questioned. In the next section I offer a conversational analysis treatment of response preferences, focusing on narrative responses.
In this section I want to spend some time examining how people respond when told a story. In examining story responses we encounter instances where the story response provides for the possibility of a conversational trouble, that is, where actual performances are discrepant from preferred performances. By a 'preferred' performance I mean that when a storyteller volunteers a story in the midst of ongoing conversation the preferred response at story end is one of 'acceptance'. That is to say, a story recipient ought to protect the current interaction by responding in such a way that the storyteller is informed that the response is designed to display understanding, commiseration, or empathy. However, as we shall see in the transcripts that follow, sometimes the story recipient's response deviates from the preferred or model response of 'acceptance'.

Upon the completion of a telling sequence a slot opens up for a response sequence. That is, a story's completion occasions its response sequence. Thus, upon receipt of a recognizable story completion the story recipient ought to display understanding of the story and to affiliate to the story by demonstrating the relevance of the story in further talk. Story 'appreciation' ought to be displayed, by which the story recipient informs the storyteller that he was, indeed, paying attention to the story as it was being told and that he was making sense of it. One way in which this can be accomplished is by the recipient telling a second story in which he was in a similar situation as the teller of the first story was in (Ryave, 1978). This informs the original storyteller that attention
was paid to his or her story and that it was 'appreciated'. I usually find in my materials, however, the recipient expressing story appreciation in terms of responding with what I am calling an 'acceptance' in the story response slot, the preferred response for reasons we shall examine later. However, sometimes the story recipient's response deviates from the preferred response of 'acceptance'. Closer examination of these 'rejection' responses or rebuffs shows that such responses may vary in severity and may in fact be quite intricately structured and locked into the social-organizational structure of the storytelling situation. In this chapter I am seeking to locate types of rebuffs, rejections, and semi-rejections with an interest in discovering and describing how storytellers and recipients in storytelling situations can sustain and protect the current, ongoing interaction. In so doing I examine a story recipient's two-fold 'problem': (1) to orient in the preferred manner to a storyteller's story, while (2) not necessarily condoning the recounted activity which the storyteller engaged in. A number of the transcripts we will be examining may be found in Chapter 3. Transcripts I-2 and VI-4 may be found in Appendix II. The reader may wish to review the transcripts before continuing with the analysis.

Action Chains

As a starting point I propose that responses to stories may be coordinated with an already existing structure in the conversational analysis literature. Typically, stories contain explanations or accounts, embedded in the telling sequence, which seek to inform the
story recipient how it came to be that the recounted activity was engaged in. One kind of system that connects story responses with a storyteller's motive explanation embedded in the storytelling sequence is what Anita Pomerantz (1978) has termed 'chained actions'. She characterizes an 'action chain' as a type of organization in which two related actions, Action 1 and Action 2, are linked such that the performing of Action 1 provides for the possibility of the performance of Action 2 as an appropriate next action. Using Pomerantz' example from compliments and compliment responses we can begin to see how these action chains work. One kind of action chain for compliments is:

A1: A compliments B
A2: B accepts/rejects the compliment

another being:

A1: A compliments B
A2: B agrees/disagrees with the compliment

She draws a distinction between chained actions and Sacks and Schegloff's 'adjacency pair' structure by stating:

With 'action chains' what is being proposed is that an Action 2, or 'second pair-part', is not a should but a may for recipient, that is, an option among several specifiable options (Pomerantz, 1978:110).

So then, with an action chain the second pair-part is not obligatory but optional, whereas in the adjacency-pair structure the second pair-part ought to be realized. Pomerantz considers the second
pair-part of an action chain to be one of a number of possibilities. There is a retrospective-prospective feature of the action chain which marks a difference between the action chain structure and the adjacency-pair structure. With the former, it is the production of an Action 1 which provides for the formulation of an Action 2. One consideration I am exploring is the possibility of preferences among potential Action 2's (hereafter referred to as 'A2', the second utterance in an action chain in story responses). Although these initial observations in themselves tell us very little about the relationships between story responses and possible response types, we may begin to justify these claims by investigating the materials presented earlier.

The reason for utilizing Pomerantz' work with action chains is that, in the process of examining my materials, it became apparent that there was a certain describable sequential orderliness in the response sequence. That order has much in common with the action chain concept. My analysis employs the action chain structure as a springboard for further discovery and description.

In the last chapter I claimed that a general procedure employable by a storyteller for constructing a story is to organize the story in terms of a display of orientation to some element of 'risk' already present in the ongoing prior talk. This display of orientation enables the story recipient to appreciate that the story is embedded in the ongoing conversation and that it got generated out of careful attention being paid to the provided resources. On the occasion of stories containing risk-taking, I showed in the last chapter that we have it available to notice the defensive design of such narratives.
Simply, we find that storytellers normally offer explanations and accounts for minimizing the gravity of having engaged in the recounted activity.

Earlier I said that upon completion of a story a response slot opens up, a slot which is occasioned by the story. The response slot is normally filled by some kind of 'story appreciation', where the story recipient orients to what is being told about and displays that orientation by generating talk at story end which does the work of informing the storyteller that the recipient paid attention to the story and that the recipient had made sense out of it, that it was understood. Note how story recipients display story appreciation in the following transcripts.

(I-6)

A: ...I was so scared that day, and I got through it, that its hard to imagine ever being that scared again. So that, that was a big turning point for me to have lived through that particular day

B: 'N it's probably better that you structured the morning than if you had tried to teach, because you might have been very uncomfortable.

(III-1)

G: ...'n then he did it a third time 'n I thought, 'okay' hehe so (1.0) that's how I got the job at the B.C. Pen

D: What did you feel, what did you say to yourself when you saw this bird, other than, 'well, far out'?

(IX-1)
B: ...so I ended up going with him. I know it was wrong, but

A: So what was it like? 

In these instances the story recipients orient to the stories being told by commenting on the story or asking questions about some part of the story. That is, the recipient ought to show the storyteller that he was paying attention to the story and trying to discover the import of the story. In the above examples we have it available to see two different types of fillers for the story appreciation slot: commentaries and questions. Certainly other kinds of things can fill the story appreciation slot, the point being that the story recipient ought to display to the storyteller that the story has been heard and made sense of, that the recipient was paying attention to the story. My interest in the story appreciation slot will become more apparent as I locate chained actions in storytelling situations in order to discover and describe how conversational interaction may be sustained, protected, and repaired.

'Story appreciation' is a general phenomenon which can be done in a number of ways and which has received considerable attention in the conversational analysis literature (Sacks; 1970, 1971, 1974, 1978; Jefferson, 1978; Ryave, 1978). Story appreciation can be composed of things like laughings, questions, commentaries, and so on. Anything which shows the storyteller that the recipient was listening to and trying to figure out the import of the story. Ryave (1978) demonstrates how 'second stories' can fill the story appreciation slot, stories in which the recipient of a first story then tells a
story in which the recipient is in a similar situation to that which the first storyteller was in. Jefferson (1978) shows how turn-by-turn talk is re-engaged by story recipient offering 'appreciation' at story completion. Some of her examples include appreciation done by questions, as we have seen in the above materials, which are observably occasioned by a prior utterance in the telling sequence and which itself implicates at least a next utterance, thereby insuring a formal return to turn-by-turn talk. Sacks initially developed the three-part storytelling sequences of preface, telling, and response in his lecture series on storytelling (1970-1971), and specified that the response sequence is normally composed of, among other options, an utterance which does 'appreciation'. Now I wish to build upon and eventually depart from the feature of story appreciation by examining action chain structures in storytelling situations.

To reiterate, a storytelling sequence's completion occasions its response sequence. Minimally, the response sequence consists of story appreciation. But recipients are not obligated to express story appreciation. In the last chapter I noted an instance where the story was considered to be 'irrelevant' to the ongoing talk and was thus ignored by the recipients. Another possibility is silence. One feature of story appreciations is that they are locally responsive, done on the completion of the last utterance of the storytelling and affiliated with last utterance. If done within an utterance, or within the telling sequence, story appreciation affiliates to the current state of development of the last utterance. One recipient concern is to have one's story appreciation locate what is being appreciated by being positioned immediately following the utterance.
the recipient wishes to affiliate with. Any delay can have the result that the appreciation utterance is aimed at something other than what it is intended for.

When talking about 'story appreciation' I mean that the story recipient displays an understanding of the story at story completion. Part of my interest in this chapter is to examine some of the ways in which recipients offer understandings as appreciations. One thing we may note is that, quite commonly, story appreciations may be accomplished with an Action 2 or 'A2', the second utterance in a action chain. Turning this around a bit, we may say that, examining the distribution in conversation of A2's, one characteristic place they occur is in the story appreciation position. Further, one characteristic use of an A2 in the story appreciation slot is to offer understanding of what the story was about. In relation to narratives, the A2 in the story appreciation position may be used to initiate rejection machinery or offer support to the teller in the form of an 'acceptance'. We have it available, then, to pursue the notion that an A2 may be used in the story appreciation slot and that it may stand in some methodical way to the form of the story, specifically, to an A1 in the telling sequence.

If we take it that an action chain can cross over the telling and response sequences, then we have it available to see Action 1 as taking place in the telling sequence and Action 2 taking place in the response sequence. Further, I should be required to show that an A2 is provided for by an A1 and that the A2 is placed adjacent to the A1. Consider the following.
In these examples we have it available to see that there are two things happening simultaneously: (1) the story appreciation slot is being filled, (2) it is being filled by an A2. That is, A2's may do the work of story appreciation when positioned in a story response sequence. In IX-2, W has done some work in accounting for his engaging in a risky activity, that accounting occurring in the telling sequence and acting as an Al which culminates in an assessment, "but that's kinda strange". The A2 is provided by R in the response sequence and is made up of a second assessment, "Well, I think that's good". That is, we can locate an organization in which two ordered actions, Action 1 and Action 2, are linked such that the performing of Action 1 provides for the possibility of Action 2. In VI-4 we see a similar structure. B provides an account (Al) for his actions in the telling sequence, "he made me so mad," to which A responds with a second assessment (A2), "Yeah, but that's crazy, man, you could've broke his neck!" In IX-2 the action chain consists of:

Al: W provides an account for having engaged in the recounted activity
A2: R accepts W’s account

In VI-4 the action chain consists of:

A1: B provides an account for having engaged in the recounted activity

A2: A rejects B’s account

Note in the above transcripts that an A2 may occur in the story appreciation slot. That is to say, one way of filling the story appreciation slot is by using an A2. One point I want to be quite clear on, though, is that the chained action structure, A1 and A2, is a separate phenomenon. One thing I wish to explore, then, is the interaction between the obligatoriness of a story appreciation (it is obligatory in the sense that a story recipient ought to produce story appreciation at story completion), and the optionality of the A2 part of a chained action. From the above fragments, note that story appreciation (which displays that the story recipient was indeed paying attention to what was being recounted), may be composed of an A2 to something occurring in the story which is not itself the story.

Acceptance Response Procedures

In the last section I said that an A2 may preempt that slot where the story appreciation would normally occur. I proposed that there may be occasions on which an A2 responds to an A1 in the telling sequence, where the only place to put that A2 also happens to be the place where there normally would have been story appreciation.
Further, I said that when an explanation or account is employed within the telling sequence of a narrative, a constraint system is constructed which the story recipient should attend to. One kind of constraint system which links a story recipient's response to the story with the defensive procedure employed by a storyteller may be uncovered by invoking the chained action structure for analysis. In the last section I characterized Pomerantz' development of 'chained actions' as an organization in which two ordered actions are linked such that the performing of the first action provides for the possibility for the performing of a second action as an appropriate next action. We may now formulate our 'problem' as follows: how does someone being told a story orient to a defensive procedure in the telling sequence so as to transform the results of that orientation into a preferred story response? With the formulation of the 'problem' arise at least two related problems, one for the story recipient and one for the storyteller. The recipient's problem has to do with sustaining and protecting the interaction with a preferred story response. If a recipient feels that the preferred 'acceptance' response is not possible, then the 'problem' becomes: how can the interaction be sustained? In the event of the possibility that a story recipient does not produce the preferred story response, then the storyteller's 'problem' becomes: how can the interaction be protected in light of a dispreferred story response? We can gain an appreciation for the kinds of issues involved in both the general problem and the two related problems by examining possible action chain structures in storytelling situations. One action chain, for example, consists of:
A1: A provides an account for having engaged in an activity

A2: B accepts/rejects A's account

In A2 we can see the possibility of a dispreferred response—that the story recipient may choose to contest or reject the elements comprising the teller's account or reasons for having engaged in the risky activity.

The preferred action chain for recipient responding to a Class II story is:

A1: A accounts for engaging in the recounted activity

A2: B accepts A's account

An 'acceptance' may be accomplished in one of two ways. One procedure—Type I—involves the story recipient in coordinating an activity appraisal with the teller's account. That is, recipient acceptance may be accomplished with an 'appraisal upgrade'. This variation involves the story recipient in upgrading the teller's assessment of 'what happened'. In IX-2 we can see an example of the Type I procedure.

(IX-2)

W: 'n there's a big long line of cars about five-thirty 'n I thought to myself, well I'm not gonna stay here in line on this stupid bicycle, I'm gonna wait a little while, and (1.0) I thought, well what am I gonna do? An' there's this tavern next to the bank
In R's last utterance in the above transcript he chooses to respond to W's account for having engaged in a risky activity in an accepting way which shows that he understands, or at least is trying to understand, how it is that W ended up helping a friend in a tavern. Subsequent to a storyteller's account, recipient appraisal upgrades regularly take the form of second assessments. A feature of a second assessment is that it recognizes the status of the storyteller's account while at the same time it does not focus on the 'riskiness' of the activity being accounted for. Further, if an assessment upgrade as a second assessment is to be considered as an A2, it should be performed in the recipient's next turn at talk following the completion of the story. Recall that an Al may be embodied in a single utterance or in a sequence of utterances, and that there may be intervening talk between the performance of an Al and an A2 which, as we said earlier, distinguishes an action chain from an adjacency pair.
It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that a recipient doing 'acceptance' recognizes the storyteller's Al as part of the story's defensive design and as an account that warrants a response, the preferred course of action being that it should be accepted as tenable and that is oriented to as a successful part of the storyteller's defensive design, and that with an 'acceptance' in the story appreciation slot the recipient may be seen to be agreeing with the storyteller's assessment of how to hear 'what happened'.

In the above paragraph I claimed that a major type of 'acceptance' response is one achieved with a second assessment which displays agreement with the storyteller's account. In IX-2, for example, a recipient upgrade in the form of a second assessment is, "Well, I think that's good", which agrees with the storyteller's assessment that he did the right thing in that circumstance. One feature of an upgrade as a second assessment is that it recognizes the 'risk' involved in the telling sequence without referring to the specifics of that 'risk'. It does not directly focus on the riskiness, although the appraisal upgrade may imply such an orientation. It does, however, assess the storyteller's account or assessment of his or her account, which provides us with evidence for suggesting that a story recipient's response may be the second pair-part of an action chain.

To reiterate, storytellers sometimes offer accounts as part of the defensive design of their stories in order to inform a story recipient how it came to be that the recounted activity was engaged in. Storytellers in such situations will often offer assessments of 'what happened', assessments which bear a relationship to the nature
of their accounts. In that the preferred recipient response type is that of 'acceptance', that work can be done by the recipient providing a second assessment which does the work of upgrading the storyteller's assessment vis-a-vis 'what happened' (I call this a Type I response).

The second variation—Type II—involves the story recipient in minimizing the 'riskiness' of the activity engaged in and recounted by the storyteller by not orienting to the storyteller's assessment of 'what happened'. I refer to this as 'risk neutralization'. Note two examples of the Type II procedure.

(I-2)

Louise: [STORY] we Didn't go to bed with each other, but it was so comfortable 'n so nice

Ken: Mm hmm

(IX-1)

B: [STORY] he always wanted to try one so I ended up going with him. I know it was wrong, but uhh

A: So what was it like?

In these instances the recipient instructs the storyteller to recognize that the riskiness is being minimized by the recipient, that it is being overlooked and ignored. Minimization machinery works to alleviate the recipient 'problem' of having to deal somehow with being told a risky story while at the same time sustaining and protecting the current interaction. When the Type II procedure is utilized the storyteller's 'problem' is simultaneously taken care of, and the current interaction protected. We have it available to see, then,
that both 'acceptance' procedures do the work of managing some potential conversational troubles by protecting the current interaction.

In our culture there is an obvious place for the Type I (appraisal upgrade) and Type II (risk neutralization) procedures. When a story gets generated which has some kind of defensive design built into the telling sequence which the story recipient should attend to, it behooves the recipient to inform the storyteller that the defensive work has been oriented to and that the teller's work is appreciated. By employing such acceptance procedures the storyteller and recipient work concertedly to sustain the current interaction. Another issue, although not our primary concern, is that the relationship the storyteller and recipient brought into the interaction may likewise be protected. That is, after all, one possible consequence of protecting the interaction. Thus the storyteller's defensive work and the recipient's 'acceptance' response may be seen as a coordinated effort which seeks to do the work of sustaining the interactional encounter.

In the first chapter I said that this study seeks to subject some of Goffman's claims concerning 'face-work', which have remained heretofore unsubstantiated, to empirical analysis. The above considerations provide us with an empirical basis which supports a number of Goffman's claims which have remained largely unproved in his writings. How so?

Recall in his paper, "On Face-Work" (1967), he refers to 'face-work' as:
...the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face...Thus poise is one important type of face-work, for through poise the person controls his embarrassment and hence the embarrassment that he and others might have over his embarrassment (pp. 12-13).

Further, Goffman talks about a person having two points of view: (1) a defensive orientation toward saving one's own face, and (2) a protective orientation towards saving the others' face. He writes:

Some practices will be primarily defensive and others primarily protective, although in general one may expect these two perspectives to be taken at the same time. In trying to save the face of others, the person must choose a tack that will not lead to loss of his own; in trying to save his own face, he must consider the loss of face that his actions may entail for others (p.14).

Both of these orientations are evident in IX-2, IX-1, and I-2. With regard to the former, the storytellers in these transcripts can be seen to be protecting their tellings against dispreferred recipient transforms by including in their tellings explanations and accounts for having participated in the recounted activities, which does the work of protecting and sustaining 'face' in the midst of a disclosure storytelling situation, e.g. IX-2, lines (25)-(39); IX-1, lines (14)-(20); and I-2, lines (1)-(6) and (8)-(11). With regard to the latter orientation, we find recipients attempting to protect and sustain storytellers' 'face', e.g. IX-2, lines (101) and (105)-(106); IX-1, lines (21)-(22). In our society people can be seen to be self-regulating participants in social encounters. One is taught to be
perceptive, to have feelings attached to self, to be considerate, tactful, and to have poise. Thus, we may speak of 'rules of interactional conduct'. Goffman talks about an 'interactional rule' as:

"...a guide for action, recommended not because it is pleasant, cheap, or effective, but because it is suitable... Infractions characteristically lead to feelings of uneasiness and to negative social sanctions. Rules of conduct infuse all areas of activity and are upheld in the name and honor of almost everything (pp.48-49).

and,

Rules of conduct impinge upon the individual in two general ways: directly, as obligations, establishing how he is morally constrained to conduct himself; indirectly, as expectations, establishing how others are morally bound to act in regard to him (p.49).

Goffman characterizes two basic features which are evident in the conversational interactions we are examining:

In general then, when a rule of conduct is broken we find that two individuals run the risk of becoming discredited: one with an obligation, who should have governed himself by the rule; the other with an expectation, who should have been treated in a particular way because of this governance. Both actor and recipient are threatened (p.51).

Thus far we have suggested only that 'acceptance' responses are A2 alternatives which are interrelated with a storyteller's assessment of 'what happened' and that they may occur in the story appreciation.
slot at story completion. When someone is a recipient of a story which contains a defensive design, the preferred response is one of dealing with the storyteller's defensive work built into the telling sequence in an accepting manner which instructs the storyteller that a safe environment has been concertedly established in which one may feel free to disclose 'risky' things. What we 'see' happening in the interactions under examination is that IX-2, IX-1, and I-2 contain acts of deference where the story recipients can be seen to be giving the storyteller the benefit of the doubt. This observation may begin to be substantiated by recalling the interactional value of the Type I and Type II procedures, where the story recipients can be seen to be protecting the storytellers' 'face'. Now I want to turn our attention to the dispreferred response, 'rejection', which retrospectively informs a storyteller that a safe environment for telling 'risky' things has not been established and that it will take some work to protect the current interaction. Both storyteller and story recipient ought to share the responsibility for dealing with the problem of how to manage a rejection response while working to protect the current interaction.

Dispreferred Response Sequences

The dispreferred response—rejection—may be accomplished with an utterance that does 'downgrading' of the storyteller's account or assessment of the risky activity recounted. In my materials I have two examples of what we may initially call a 'rejection' response.
(VI-6)

B: ...'n there was a stripper there who was dancin' at this guy's table
   [        
A: I just lost my appetite

B: What does that have to do with food?

A: I just didn't know you went to such nice _______ places

(VI-4)

A: ...in the head after he got tackled, he made me so mad

B: yeah, but that's crazy, man, you could've _______ broke his neck

As illustrations of rejections accomplished with downgrading, both of the above instances are noteworthy. The procedure may involve the story recipient in responding at story end with a possible alternative consequence resulting from the riskiness of the engaged-in activity as in VI-4. B orients to the riskiness in the story by offering a possible alternative consequence, "you could've broke his neck", which does the work of depreciating or downgrading A's account, "he made me so mad". This possible alternative consequence is structured according to 'what could have happened'. Further, B's suggested alternative consequence is preceded by an activity assessment, "that's crazy", which does the work of 'downgrading'. The assessment relates directly to 'what A did'. One recipient procedure for contending a storyteller's explanation for having engaged in a 'risky' activity, then, is via an utterance that downgrades the storyteller's explanatory work. That 'rejection' utterance may be made up of a combination of offering possible alternative consequences and/or an activity assessment which does the work of 'downgrading' the
storyteller's assessment of the recounted activity. By downgrading a storyteller's account or activity assessment the recipient responds directly to the 'risk' present in a story being told by expressing surprise that the teller would engage in such an activity. In IV-6, A tells about how he happened to go to a cafe where a stripper was performing. Upon receipt of such information in the story B breaks in with, "I just didn't know you went to such nice places". In this procedure the story recipient produces a downgrading assessment which affiliates with B's version of 'what happened'. In our culture it seems that a response expressing shock or surprise upon hearing a story containing risky information generally represents a disagreement in values (Mayers, 1978; Wahlroos, 1981). Thus such a response usually suggests that a value system may be in question—that is, that the two represented value systems may be in conflict. Certainly there is a tension in VI-6 resulting from B telling A about going to a cafe where a stripper was performing and A responding to that disclosure with a downgrading assessment, a response suggesting a value conflict. It is interactionally noteworthy to observe that tension in ongoing talk, a tension which the conversationalists must surely be orienting to. Now I want to transact an analytical shift by seeking to technicalize the procedure available to story recipients for doing 'rejecting'.

One action chain for the dispreferred response to stories is:

A1: A accounts for having engaged in the recounted activity

A2: B rejects A's account
We have it available to see that the action chain for the dispreferred response may also be realized as:

Al: A assesses the riskiness of the recounted activity

A2: B disagrees with A's assessment by offering a second assessment

What I want to look into now is: how do story recipients initiate 'rejection' machinery, and how can the outcome of the initiation of the dispreferred response be negotiated by teller and recipient so as to sustain the current interaction?

It seems that upon receipt of a story a recipient who feels constrained to respond with the dispreferred response of 'rejection' still has options available. One of those options which I located in my materials shows the story recipient offering a 'rejection notice' which informs the storyteller of an intent-to-reject in the recipient's next 'turn' at talk. Then the storyteller, so informed, ought to do some kind of explanatory work in order to provide grounds for the recipient to terminate the rejection in his next 'turn'. Note this three-part structure of the procedure in VI-6 and VI-4.

(VI-6)

I. "I just didn't know you went to such nice places"

II. "No, but, I didn't know there was a stripper there, but I thought, how can she do that?"

III. "Ask her, don't ask me"

(VI-4)
I. "you could've broke his neck"

II. "He deserved it hehe"

III. "I'm just glad I played on your team"

In these fragments we have instances of story recipient instituting a 'rejection notice' (I) followed by teller explanation (II) which opens up the possibility for the recipient to abort or continue the rejection operation (III). The preferred action sequence for the dispreferred response is:

[RISKY STORY]

I. Notice of intent-to-reject

II. teller explanation

III. abortion of rejection operation

Technically this sequence can be described as containing two actions beyond the recipient's 'rejection notice' (I), with the teller's explanation (II) providing for the possibility for the recipient to abort the rejection operation (III). Note in III, however, there are options available. In VI-4, for example, we would perhaps be hasty in characterizing B's utterance, "I'm just glad I played on your team", as an utterance which does the work of aborting the rejection operation. Upon closer examination, it appears that B is continuing the rejection by 'downgrading', thus completing a dispreferred response. Now other issues are raised, one being how the dispreferred response is managed by a storyteller so as to sustain the current interaction, the other being the issue of available options.

As for the latter, we can see that there are possible options
throughout the structure. In (I) we have already noted that a storyteller's account may be accepted or rejected, acceptance being the preferred response and rejection the dispreferred. If a rejection notice is instituted, the storyteller has options in (II). That is, the storyteller doesn't have to try to explain his way out of trouble, one could, after all, ignore the rejection notice or challenge it, e.g. "Forget it, I shouldn't have told you in the first place". And, in (III), the recipient has the option of aborting the rejection operation or pursuing it to completion. So it's important to note what options are available in the sequence.

As for the former issue of how a storyteller can manage a dispreferred response while protecting the current interaction, we have it available to examine the interaction following the rejection response. In that a rejection response is the dispreferred response and in that story sequences containing rejections are difficult to capture on tape, it is understandable that I have but one example in my materials. Even that one example, however, may provide us with materials to make at least some preliminary observations on how that trouble may be managed so as to sustain the current interaction.

In VI-A, I characterized the sequence as being of the dispreferred variety: A rejects B's account by disagreeing with B's version of how 'what happened' was justified. A doesn't think it was justified. Immediately following the rejection sequence, then, B deals with the storyteller's 'problem' by dropping the topic and starting over. In effect, he leaves the rejection standing by ignoring it, thus paving the way to continue the turn-by-turn talk and sustaining the current interaction.
Faced with a dispreferred response, then, we can begin to get a sense of how that, too, may be managed by a storyteller so as to sustain the interaction. In that, in VI-4, the rejection goes unchallenged by teller, then we may characterize the interaction as follows: the storyteller tells a story, the recipient institutes a rejection notice upon story completion to which the storyteller responds with an explanation to try to defuse the rejection operation, which the recipient rejects by continuing on with the rejection operation. To deal with that sequential structure, the storyteller acquiesces by moving the conversation on to another topic, as opposed to pursuing the option of challenging the recipient's rejection, which could lead to a breakdown of the current interaction. So the interaction is sustained and protected, and we can begin to see how that may be concertedly accomplished in the environment of a dispreferred response.

Certainly in our society face-to-face interaction is constructed
in such a way as to make narratives told in live conversation prone to the kind of trouble considered in this chapter. That is, it seems that the generation of narratives in ongoing conversation will, at times, give rise to the need for a concerted effort between storyteller and story recipient for sustaining and protecting the ongoing interaction. The recipient's 'problem' has to do with working to protect the ongoing interaction which is potentially strained as a result of being recipient to certain narratives. The problematic situation for the storyteller is one of risking a rebuff or rejection on certain storytelling occasions. Storytelling occasions contain the features of being continuous and developmental, of a retrospective-prospective orientation to the nature of the recounted activity embedded in the ongoing interaction. The present state of the interaction on such an occasion is identical in meaning with the storytelling occasion as it has developed to that point of telling, in which teller retraction is virtually impossible and in which the storyteller may have to do some work to sustain the current interaction in light of the rejection option.

I said earlier that recipients of stories may display an initial rejection of a particular aspect of the story, that aspect normally being the riskiness of the activity which the teller participated in. Recipients may offer these initial rejections, which I refer to as 'rejection notices', by downgrading a storyteller's account or assessment of 'what happened'. I noted those instances in VI-6 and VI-4. While saying that recipients have it available to offer 'rejection notices', note that these are not strictly story rejections but notices of intent to reject. Appreciation of the kind of
attention such a story production might require can be obtained by examining the interactional results of employing such a procedure. In my materials the story recipient may orient to the teller's solution attempt by aborting the rejection operation, backing off from any further rejection pursuit, thus protecting the current interaction. Of course, the recipient has the option of pursuing the rejection operation to completion. The rejection notice, though, says, in effect, "This is a warning. I'm rather shocked that you would engage in such an activity and unless you tell me something to dispel that shock, I will have to respond negatively". Then the teller's move (II. in my dispreferred action sequence), instructs the recipient to orient to the notion that (a) it was not a normal activity for the teller to participate in, (b) there were extenuating circumstances, and/or (c) regret for participating is being exhibited. The recipient is interactionally 'off the hook' from pursuing the rejection operation to completion, an option which could potentially endanger the status of the current interaction. Given such an opportunity the recipient is normally obliged to terminate the rejection operation, the result being that the recipient not only terminates the rejection operation but carries this function to the point of becoming an 'intimate' with the storyteller, thereby lending credence to the notion that the storyteller's management of the telling of engaging in a risky activity is shared by the recipient. How so?

In our culture it seems that control of risky information about one another has a bearing on a relationship, especially among friends. A friendship implies time spent together, and the more time friends spend together the more chance there is that one will acquire
discrediting information about the other. As I suggested in the last chapter, every relationship obliges people to exchange an appropriate amount of intimate facts about self as evidence of 'trust', and such intimacy makes it available for friends to reveal discrediting information to each other or to feel guilty for not doing so. Some of my materials provide examples of the activity of revealing personal things about self to a friend in story form. In that the information is revealed in story form and in the midst of ongoing turn-by-turn talk, the recipient of the story is responsible for producing story appreciation, that production requiring careful monitoring of the storytelling. When story understanding is done with an A2 and when that A2 is the dispreferred response, then the recipient's termination of a 'rejection notice' is dependent upon the storyteller's orienting to that notice by attempting to defuse it via further explanation.

A recipient's rejection notice, then, constitutes a trouble for the storyteller. Upon receipt of a rejection notice the storyteller is faced with the problem of derailing the possibility of a rejection completion in recipient's next utterance. I said earlier that a storyteller has a standard and methodological procedure for derailing a rejection completion. One feature of this procedure may be characterized as follows: by prefiguring the rationale of the recipient's rejection notice and employing the next 'turn' to fill in explanatory information which the story recipient then has available to orient to as an attempt to derail the rebuff.

In responding to a rejection notice in a conversational storytelling situation, a storyteller may try to defuse the rejection
completion by disagreeing with the recipient's rejection notice.

Al: A offers a rejection notice
A2: B disagrees with A's notice

In such a situation A initially offers a disagreement to B's rejection notice, informing B that the rejection notice is perhaps unjustified. In VI-4, for example, in that B's rejection notice is structured according to 'what could have happened', A's disagreement utterance informs B that no matter what 'could have happened', the guy he kicked in the head "deserved it".

Storytellers who have received rejection notices may also display 'agreement' with those notices in order to derail a rejection completion in recipient's next 'turn'. One way to do 'agreement' is by informing the recipient that the storyteller feels the same way about 'what happened' as the recipient does, thus enabling the recipient to abort the rejection operation.

Al: A offers a rejection notice at story end
A2: B agrees with A's rejection notice

(VI-6)

A: I just didn't know you went to such nice places
B: No, but, I didn't know there was a stripper there, but I thought, how can she do that?

In responding to A's rejection notice B first offers an account for having engaged in the activity, an explanation which informs A of
the fortuitousness of having gone to a cafe where a stripper was performing. In the same turn, B 'agrees' with recipient sentiment as expressed in the rejection notice by exhibiting bewilderment as to a stripper's motivation by saying, 'But I thought, how can she do that?' By including such an utterance the storyteller shows that his opinion of the activity of going to a cafe where a stripper was performing coincides with the recipient's feeling about it as expressed in the rejection notice.

Recall in the last chapter that I invoked the feature of 'trust' as integral to the interaction between close friends. It seems reasonable to suggest that people who are friends and find themselves in situations where personal disclosure stories are being recounted will make a concerted effort to insure that the resultant tension in the situation is successfully managed, thus protecting the current interaction. Earlier I claimed that recipients of stories ought to be tactfully discrete in order to sustain the ongoing interaction. In IV-4 and VI-6, we have it available to see that the truth-value or logicality of the explanatory utterances, "He deserved it, hehe" in IV-4, and, "No, but, I didn't know there was a stripper there" in VI-6, is not normally at issue. On the contrary, in our society it may be recognized that, owing to the peculiar nature of knowledge about other people, relationships between friends necessarily turn on sometimes misguided and misleading premises about each other, that the social organization of 'friendship' rests partly on error, deception, and secrets. Thus, we find instances in my materials where a story gets told in a conversation between friends and where the story recipient employs a rejection notice at story completion followed by
the storyteller making an effort to derail the rejection operation by offering further explanation about 'what happened' which is designed to shed additional light on how it is that the teller came to be involved in the activity recounted. Then it is common to find the story recipient orienting to the teller's account by aborting the rejection operation.

Earlier in the chapter I said that recipient aborting of a rejection operation, as seen in VI-6 and VI-4, may be seen as an act of deference. What is meant by an 'act of deference'? Goffman writes that deference:

...refer[s] to that component of activity which functions as a...means by which appreciation is...conveyed to a recipient of this recipient, or of something of which this recipient is taken as a symbol, extension, or agent. These marks of devotion represent ways in which an actor celebrates and confirms his relationship to a recipient (1967:56-57).

Goffman makes the interesting point that individuals in interaction, particularly friends, "deserve" deference from each other. He writes:

The appreciation carried by an act of deference implies that the actor possesses a sentiment of regard for the recipient, often involving a general evaluation...Regard is something the individual constantly has for others, and knows enough about to feign on occasion; yet in having regard for someone, the individual is unable to specify in detail what in fact he has in mind (1967:58).

and,

The regard in which the actor holds the recipient need not be one of respectful awe; there are other kinds of regard that are
regularly expressed... A sentiment of regard that plays an important role in deference is that of affection and belongingness (p. 59).

In light of the above, one question which may be raised is: why would a story recipient on such an occasion even mobilize the rejection machinery in the first place, an operation which could endanger the ongoing interaction? Although such a question gets us sidetracked from the primary issue of formulating story response types, one major reason would seem to be in order to deal with one recipient 'problem' in such situations: to avoid condoning what may be considered by storyteller and recipient alike to have been a rather risky thing to have done, risky in the sense that both parties bring to the interaction some sense of 'right' and 'wrong' and where what was done and told about borders on the shared sense of being 'wrong'.

CONCLUSION

In linguistic discourse analysis, the assumption is that there is a set of sequencing rules which govern the sequential organization in dialogue discourse. This assumption makes a strong claim about the syntactic nature of sequential organization in discourse. When considering response types and preferences in discourse sequencing, it is the linguistic discourse analysis consideration of paired utterances, i.e. questions and answers, offers and acceptances (or rejections), which motivates the generation of sequencing rules. I am claiming, however, that live conversation is generally not constituted of pairs and that rules that do bind pairs are not of a syntactic nature but a contextual nature. Recall Pomerantz' conceptualization
of "action chains", where an A2 is not obligatory but an option among several specifiable options (1978:110). We find, then, that questions can be followed by partial answers, statements of ignorance, rejections of the presuppositions of the question, silence, or whatever. In conversational analysis, for example, what makes some utterance after a question seen to be an answer is not dependent merely on the nature of the utterance itself but also that it occurs after a question with a particular context. What I understand as "response", then, is a complex action identified by sequential location and topical coherence in relation to a previous action.

In this chapter I examined recipient responses to narratives told in live conversation with an interest in discovering and describing response types which are largely unformulated and unrecognized by speakers. I found that there appears to be a preference for recipients of narratives told in conversation to try to understand and sympathize with the storyteller's actions as recounted in the storytelling by showing 'acceptance' of a storyteller's account or explanation about 'what happened'. Both storytellers and story recipients are likely to make a concerted effort to protect and sustain the ongoing interaction, and this maintenance work can best be initiated by story recipient responding in an 'accepting' manner. I refer to this kind of response as a 'preferred' response. One procedure available to recipients for doing 'accepting' involves the recipient in 'upgrading' the storyteller's account or explanation for having participated in the recounted activity. Another procedure involves the recipient in informing the storyteller that a rejection response may be unavoidable and allowing the storyteller another turn.
to defuse the rejection operation. The use of a rejection notice informs the storyteller that his actions were perhaps inexcusable, while giving the storyteller a chance to provide further explanation in hopes that the recipient will then be able to abort the rejection machinery.

A second system is that of rejection. In the rejection operation, the recipient informs the storyteller that the recounted activity is being treated as unacceptable behaviour which cannot be condoned. In this procedure the recipient 'downgrades' the storyteller's account or explanation for having participated in the recounted activity. Both systems of 'acceptance' and 'rejection' can do the work of story appreciation by offering understandings of the story, which inform a storyteller that the recipient was paying attention to the story and trying to figure out the sense of it. I claimed, further, that second pair-parts of an action chain, A2's, are ideal objects to do understandings with, since they have an obvious way of being heard. That appropriate or obvious way of being heard involves hearing them in a specific way. In IX-2, VI-6, and VI-4 the responses can be heard as unequivocally 'accepting' or 'rejecting'. What is being accepted or rejected is a first pair-part, a storyteller's account or explanation of how it happened that the storyteller participated in the risky activity. The understanding itself needs to be understood by a storyteller, and one way it gets to be understood is by finding out what it refers to, as an A2 to a storyteller's A1. Positioning can be used to find that, positioning of an A2 right after an A1 being an obvious kind of solution. A2's, then, can be objects to understand with, their positioning central to
their usability. When used as understandings they can be employed in the position that story appreciations characteristically have upon completion of the story. I am claiming that this position is a specific environment for the occurrence of an A2.

This study of story recipient response procedures offers several contributions to the larger study of discourse structure. Perhaps the most important contribution is the isolation of narrative response types for special study. That there are response preferences operating in narrative discourse and procedures for implementing those response types is, as far as I can tell from the literature available on linguistic discourse analysis, a new idea, and one which may prove valuable in the study of the pragmatic influence in narrative discourse.
1
The reader may recall that our interests are focused upon analyzing interactions in order to determine the ways in which conversational rules structure both the meaning to those involved and the orderliness of the situation, in the structure of the orderliness of everyday life. We are claiming that structure and orderliness are synonymous.

2
In compliment responses, Pomerantz (1978) has demonstrated that acceptances and rejections are A2 alternatives "subsequent to a number of supportive actions" (p.83), including compliments.

3
Ryave (1978), building upon Sacks' notion that "speakers monitor their own talk" (1972), writes:

In order for stories to obtain this series-of-stories status, conversational participants would need to listen to and analyze an in-progress story in such a manner as to permit them, upon the completion of the present storyteller's story, to construct their own story utilizing the results of their prior analytic attention (p.121).

4
Sacks writes:

Recipient of a story has as one business to display his understanding of it...and/or to affiliate to it by showing its particular relevance to him (1978:261).
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The unifying thrust of this study has been the analysis of narrative structures in live conversation, with an interest in showing how a conversational analysis treatment of narrative features discovered by linguists interested in discourse yields the most substantial insights that have yet been gained into the nature of conversation. As such, this study responds to an invitation from discourse linguistics by providing a treatment of discourse features which supplements the findings in linguistics.

Two broad theoretical conclusions can be drawn from this study. First of all, this study contributes to the field of linguistic discourse analysis by offering analytical procedures for handling some important aspects of the discourse type NARRATIVE. In Chapter 1, I noted that the analytical techniques for dealing with NARRATIVE leave open questions about analyzing conversational interaction which cannot be answered by existing procedures in linguistic discourse analysis (Grimes, 1975; Longacre, 1983). The procedures utilized in this study provide the discourse linguist with a different analytical perspective for explicating and describing structural features of live discourse in relation to interaction and context.

Linguistic discourse analysis starts with discourse materials with an interest in providing as nearly a complete roster as possible of the factors that may be expected to contribute to the understanding
that a discourse is designed to evoke. However, they restrict themselves to linguistic categories and their "roster" thus remains limited. As I have shown, this limitation is beginning to be recognized by discourse linguists as they search for alternative methodologies so as to provide a complete roster of factors which contribute to the understanding of discourse. Those doing conversational analysis, in contrast, seek to construct an apparatus which explains discourse functions in relation to social features as well as linguistic features. In my analysis in this study, I construct an apparatus which moves away from linguistic categories to social categories, i.e. friendship, trust, risk, deference, etc., which truly seeks to provide as complete a roster as possible of the factors which contribute to the understanding of discourse, not merely linguistic factors but social factors. The features I discover and describe can be shown to be systematic, analytical and related to things like social identities, membership categories, and other social features. Every time I try to understand social reality and social interaction, I find myself tied to people's talk and actions. My focus in this study centers on how people make social reality as something "out there" observable to themselves and others through their talk and actions. This is what ethnomethodologists mean when social reality is referred to as "socially constructed". This conception of social reality deals with the process of how people experience the social world as factual. My focus in this study has been to discover and describe some of the work performed by people to generate and negotiate the sense of the objective reality of society and their social world.
I will begin by listing and summarizing the parts of this study that are original (to my knowledge), and thus represent a contribution to linguistic discourse analysis and conversational analysis, that is, to linguistics proper and the sociology of language. First, and foremost, is the framework itself. My purpose has been to respond to an invitation in linguistic discourse analysis by offering a methodological and theoretical contribution to linguistic discourse analysis via conversational analysis. I believe that linguistic discourse analysis is remiss in not working with texts from live conversation, and this study offers a strong empirical base for doing discourse analysis.

Next in importance, I believe, is the material presented in Chapters 3-6 which provide conversational analysis treatments of issues treated in linguistic discourse analysis. Conversational analysis satisfies my intuitions about language and conversational interaction in a way and to an extent that no other formulation has. I believe that linguistic discourse analysis is faced with a major conceptual difficulty, and this difficulty is recognized by those linguists leading the discourse revolution in linguistics (c.f. Pickering, 1979; Longacre, 1976, 1983; Jones, 1983). I find that the discourse analysis being done by Longacre and his students is refreshing and insightful as far as it goes. However, the analyses tend to obscure basic features of conversational organization, and this is regrettable. Thus, it seems reasonable to me to turn to conversational analysis as the approach that has the most to offer in the way of substantial insight into the nature of discourse. My critique of linguistic discourse analysis has focused on one basic
argument: that the methods and theoretical perspectives imported from mainstream linguistics seem to be inappropriate to the domain of live conversation. Moving from the study of sentences to texts to conversation involves quite different analytical procedures and methods, even though conversational interaction is, in part, composed of units that have some direct correspondence to linguistic units.

I will now work through the thesis from the beginning and mention the original elements as I come to them. My analysis of how characters are formulated in Algonquin narratives (Chapter 3) is new and contributes to discourse linguistics relating to the Algonquian language family, as does my analysis of collateral information in Algonquin narratives (Chapter 4).

The characterization of how characters are formulated in conversational storytelling is new, and follows the preference pattern demonstrated by Sacks and Schegloff (1979) for referring to people in conversational interaction: minimization and recipient design. My analysis of formulating character in narratives told in live conversation demonstrates; (1) that there are sub-categories of recognitionals and non-recognitionals, (2) that character formulation preferences may be used in combination, but not just any combination, and (3) that linguistic discourse analysis, by employing existing linguistic features such as articles, pronouns, and names as basic analytical categories, obscures the basic notion that narrator decisions vis-a-vis formulating character can be embodied in more than one way.

Although my analysis of collateral information in narratives owes
much to Grimes (1975), there are some original ingredients. The notion that collateral information can be reformulated in interactional terms, as an activity assessment procedure (Chapter 4), builds upon Sacks' original analysis and shows that our understanding of narrative structures is expanded by making the connection between narratives and the conversations in which they are embedded via the use of social identities.

My analysis of pre-narrative sequencing, which builds upon the work of Sacks and his students, is original in my discussion of topical orientation vis-a-vis stories which contain risky information and my expansion of the "trigger" concept, including limit-testing and the crossing of acceptable boundaries in the generation of a narrative in live conversation. Furthermore, the analysis offered in Chapter 5 acts as a response to an invitation in linguistic discourse analysis by contributing to the narrative analysis literature. As such, it critiques the linguistic discourse analysis approach to discourse sequencing by showing that sequencing constraints cannot be explained (only) in linguistic or syntactic terms. Rather, what makes an utterance following a question an "answer", for example, is determined by its interactional location. My analysis recommends a different methodology and different analytical categories for analyzing dialogue discourse than are currently being used in linguistic discourse analysis.

Finally, the analysis and discussion of narrative response types and preferences is new (Chapter 6); of special note is the claim that recipients who mobilize the rejection operation will typically begin
with a 'rejection notice' or intent-to-reject utterance which provides the narrator with a turn for avoiding an interactional trouble. I claimed, further, that the recipient aborting of a rejection operation may be seen to be an act of deference. I demonstrated that recipient 'acceptance' is the preferred response to a narrative told in live conversation and that one procedure for doing 'accepting' involves the recipient in 'upgrading' a narrator's account or explanation for having participated in the recounted activity.

One other purpose of this study has been to discover and describe structural features of interaction found in narratives in live conversation and to relate those findings to Goffman's concept of 'face-work'. I began by reviewing the face-work theme in Chapter 1. I then compared and contrasted two traditions of analyzing natural language: conversational analysis following Harvey Sacks, and linguistic discourse analysis following Longacre, Grimes, Pickering, and Jones, among others. I concluded that Sacksian conversational analysis differs considerably from linguistic discourse analysis, namely, that conversational analysis focuses attention on interactional abilities rather than on language competence. Instead of seeking to develop a model of language use, conversational analysis seeks to develop a model of interaction and the use of interactional rules. In Chapter 2, I presented a review of the literature within sociology and linguistics on conversational storytelling. I noted that recent research in linguistic discourse analysis has attempted to construct 'story grammars', analyses which provide for underlying structures in simple narratives. I reviewed briefly the work of Labov and Waletsky, Eisner, Polanyi, and Wolfson and their claim that
narratives can be found to contain formal properties. I then considered the storytelling literature from the Sacksian school of conversational analysis, in which the concern is with discovering and describing interactional abilities rather than language abilities.

Besides the theoretical conclusions mentioned above, I also propose some methodological conclusions in relation to my concern for providing empirical 'provings of possibilities' which give substance to various claims made by Goffman in relation to the concept of face-work. These interpretive principles essentially summarize the analyses presented in Chapters 3-6 of this study. The methodology I use in the analytical chapters is composed of formal discovery procedures, capable of successful application in all conversational circumstances. I said earlier, in Chapter 2 under the heading Methodology and Scope of the Study, that the methodology which is central to conversational analysis is three-fold: (1) recipient design, (2) membership analysis, and (3) activity analysis. This methodological concern points to the sociological nature of Sacksian conversational analysis. Sacks et al. write:

For the last half dozen years we have been engaged in research, using tape recordings of natural conversation, that has been increasingly directed to extracting, characterizing, and characterizing the interrelationships of, the various types of sequential organization operative in conversation. The disciplinary motivation for such work is sociological (1978:9).

Schenkein (1978), too, refers to the sociological nature of conversational analysis. He writes:

Since conversation is essentially an inter-
actional activity, our studies necessarily endeavor to offer systematic characterizations of the interaction conducted through conversation; the interactional basis of many of the things people do is taken for granted typically and rarely given rigorous sociological formulation, but in these studies, detailed observations on the interactional unfolding of conversation provide a foundation for the analyses...
The descriptions presented here offer promising movement towards an empirically based grammar of natural conversation (1978:2-3).

There is, further, more to this study than the technicalization of interactional sequences. The strongest orientation in Sacksian conversational analysis focuses on 'membership categories', and this study relies heavily on explicating and describing common repertoires of personal identifications and rules of their use. Admittedly, many studies in conversational analysis often go without showing interest in membership categories or any other meaningful ascriptions beyond the level of 'turns'. Conversational analysts should not merely be technicians, and this study has sought to avoid falling into the 'technician mentality' by focusing on the more important issue of categorization. Analysis of membership categories preserves the ethnomethodological interest in the 'observable-and-reportable', in the interpretive processes at work in conversational interaction.

For the most part, my research procedures were aimed at the discovery and description of non-intuitive features of conversational interaction. That is, the kinds of things uncovered by the analysis I did not in the first instance explicitly know. However, once I discovered a feature of interaction, I found that my intuition allowed me to see it as something familiar. I did not start with something I already knew about conversational interaction and refine it. Rather,
my initial intuition was used to lead me to deeper discoveries about conversational interaction, things that were not explicitly available to us when we started. Finally, it should be reiterated that I took it as a study policy that any claimed feature of conversation be interactionally substantiated. That is, any claim made in this study about the validity of a feature of interactional ability, that someone displayed creativity or competence, ought to have been demonstrated to be operating within the interactional setting under investigation.

I said earlier in this study that my concern has been to be suggestive rather than exhaustive in my treatment of narrative features. It follows that virtually every topic could be treated in greater detail. From my point of view, the major contribution to linguistic discourse analysis via conversational analysis lies in the analysis of what discourse linguists refer to as exophoric reference and implied information—information in the situation and culture that members treat as given. This study has claimed throughout that linguistic discourse analysis lacks the analytical perspective required for treating discourse structures which are embedded in live conversation and thus obscures the nature of conversational discourse. Recall, too, that this study may be seen to be, at least in part, a response to an invitation in linguistic discourse analysis to conversational analysis for help in forming an analytical perspective helpful for analyzing conversational discourse.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX I

DESCRIPTION OF THE CORPUS OF CONVERSATIONS
AND TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Appendix II contains transcripts of whole conversations and excerpts of some conversations. The stories used in the analysis are drawn from a corpus of transcribed conversations from a variety of settings. Many hours of tape-recorded conversations were given to me by David Aleguire. I particularly wish to express my thanks to him for making these tapes available, and to the people who agreed to sit in front of a tape recorder and talk. Some of the transcripts in Appendix II are excerpts. I personally recorded many hours of conversations with friends and family over the past four years. A few stories and story excerpts are derived from other researchers in conversational analysis and may be found in the published literature. Throughout this study I referred to each conversation by tape number, in Roman numerals, e.g. IV, followed by a number which I assigned to the conversation.
BASICALLY, I used the transcription conventions found in Jim Schenkein (ed.), Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction (1978), and devised by Gail Jefferson. The following are the conventions used in this study.

1. Overlapping utterances

When overlapping utterances do not start up simultaneously, I used a single left-hand bracket to show where one utterance overlapped with the previous utterance.

Tom: I used to smoke a lot
[C
Bob: He thinks he's real tough

2. Contiguous utterances

When there was no interval between adjacent utterances, I used an equal sign at the beginning of the second utterance.

Tom: I used to smoke a lot=
Bob: =he thinks he's real tough

3. Intervals within and between utterances

When intervals in the stream of talk occurred, such as pauses, I timed them in seconds.

A: One time I was (2.0) well, when I went to Quebec...
So I thought (1.0) how could she do that?

4. Transcriptionist doubt

When a word or phrase in the tape could not be clearly heard and its content was in doubt, I used parentheses.
5. Double parentheses are used to describe details of the conversational scene.

Jan: This is just delicious

((telephone rings))

Kim: I'll get it

or, various characterizations of the talk.

R: Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting at Donkin's Pub

((mutual laughter))

W: Hey, listen, I'll tell you a funny story...

6. Vertical ellipses indicate intervening turns at talking have been taken out of the fragment.

Bob: Well, I always say give it your all

.

.

.

Bob: And I always say give it everything
APPENDIX II: STORY TRANSCRIPTS

(Jefferson, 1978:221)

Lotti: (hh)en so 'hh when Duane left today
    we took off our suits, y'know, 'n
    uh--Oh 'n she gave me the most beautiful
    swimsuit you've ever seen in your life

Emma: Gave it to you?

Lotti: Yeah

Emma: Aww::::

Lotti: A twenny two dollar one

Emma: Well, you've given her a lot in your
day Lotti

Lotti: I know it. 'N when we looked w-one at
    Walter Clark's you know wir we're gonna
    buy one cuz [STORY]

(Jefferson, 1978:221)

Roger: The cops don't do that, don't gimme
    that shit I live in the valley.
(0.5)

Ken: The cops, over the hill. There's a
    place up in Mulholland where they've
    where they're building those housing
    projects?

Roger: Oh, have you ever taken them Mulholland
    time trials? uhh, you go up there with
    a girl, a buncha guys're up there 'n [STORY]

(Schenkein:I:7)

Ellen: To relax during this last illness, on
top of the antibiotics

Ben: Well, on top of the cough medicine
Ellen: Yeah, and the cough medicine--incidentally, did I tell you?

Ben: No

Ellen: That the d-he told us t'give uhh Snookie a third of a teaspoon of uhh cough medicine, Cheracol, is there a--

Is there a cough medicine called Cheracol?

Bill: yeah

Ben: yeah

Ellen: uhh, we happen to have Vic's Forty Four [STORY]

(IX-2)

W: Well, we're kinda tryin' to get the men's prayer breakfast going again. The thing got into kind of a rut again of just being kind of a social time, not really meeting anybody's needs, 'n I don't really get off on gettin' up early on a Saturday morning just to beat the--beat the bush, y'know, with a bunch of guys

R: Yeah, I can dig that

W: I enjoy that, but, y'know I don't necessarily enjoy doing it in a restaurant, so, y'know, there's bars to do that kind of thing in

((mutual laughter))

R: Maybe we should have a Friday night meeting at Donkin's Pub

((mutual laughter))

W: Hey, listen, I'll tell you a funny story, or I don't know if it's funny, it's weird, but I went to the bank last week, I hadda make a deposit, 'n I rode my bike because the car was broke down, 'n there--the drive-in teller was the only thing open

R: yeah

W: 'n there's a big long line of cars about five-thrity 'n I thought to myself, well
I'm not gonna stay here in line on this stupid bicycle, I'm gonna wait a little while, and (1.0) I thought, well what am I gonna do? An' there's this tavern next to the bank

R: Oh, noooooool

W: so I thought, I'll just go in here, I'm sure it's got a pool table all taverns got pool tables, 'n I went in there and there were some pool tables so I started shootin' a game of pool (2.0) 'n I'm minding my own business, I'm not botherin' nobody, y'know

R: yeah

W: 'n, uhh, usually people leave me alone, 'n I'm just, y'know, 'n all of a sudden out of the corner of my eye, y'know, it's kinda dark in there, 'n I see this guy standing there just starin' at me. So I figure I'm just gonna ignore him, y'know, if he's lookin' for trouble he's gonna look somewhere else

R: ((laughs))

W: 'n he just doesn't go away. Finally I looked up at him, thought I'd smile or, y'know, maybe the guy was a space cadet or something

R: ((laughs))

W: and, uhh, here it is, it's an old friend of mine, I haven't seen for years

R: really!

W: yeah, Maggie 'n him went to school from kindergarten together, 'n I knew him from about eighth grade on 'n he's a believer 'n he's kinda fallen on rough times, he's been married and divorced twice 'n so we chatted for a little while 'n I invited him to come by the house someday he'd been laid off his job 'n was kinda lonely so he came by then, ohh, about five days later

R: yeah

275
W: he stayed about six hours, had dinner with us, chatted for awhile, 'n uhh (70)
(1.0) y'know we got to talk about some spiritual things a little bit, he expressed (73)
an interest to go down to the church, (74) they've got a single parents class, 'n (75)
through his two marriages he's had three children and uhhh he just doesn't know (77)
what to do with himself, he doesn't think he'd fit into a church, so I told him about (79)
the single parents class and all the divorced people 'n he said he'd really like (81)
to try it out. Said he'd try to give us a call which he hasn't done yet, 'n maybe (83)
try to go down there (84)

R: yeah (85)

W: so it had a positive effect, but I thought, "well, if I went to Pastor Bill and asked for counselling (88)
about a ministry in taverns, y'know, it (89)

R: ((laughs)) (90)

W: wouldn't go over too good, here it was kind of a weird deal, 'n I felt guilty about goin' in there to be honest with (93)
ya, I felt guilty comin' home and tellin' Maggie that, y'know, I ran into Mark Wagner today, well, where'd you do that? (96)
Well, in this tavern (97)

R: yeah ((laughs)) (98)

W: y'know? but that's kinda strange, so I figure uhhhh (100)

R: Well, I think that's good (101)

W: Well, I don't know, what are ya sposed to do, go in there and start handing out tracts? (103)

R: Well, see if you can get a grant from the church to pay for your beer, y'know? (105)

W: Develop my ministry? Yeah, right. Maybe I could start CBBMS, the Conservative Baptist Bar Mission Society (109)

R: ((laughs)) (110)

W: The Conservative Baptist Beer Mission Society (112)
R: Maybe you should ask Pastor Bill for ten minutes next Sunday night to outline your ministry.

W: You think so? Maybe you should mention it in your next letter to him. But don't mention my name!

R: Just your initials.

W: Yeah, right!

(VI-6)

A: Yeah, well, Jimmy Carter said he lusted for women in his heart 'n everyone got upset.

B: Oh, so you subscribe to Playboy, huh?

A: Funny, if I ever brought home a Playboy my wife would kill me.

B: Do you d'yu ever look at the covers of girlie magazines?

A: I can't help but look, it's an occupational hazard.

B: Well, I just happened to notice that Penthouse is doing a three-part series on the Jerry Falwell... []

A: Oh, I didn't see that, I'll have to pick one up hehe.

B: Oh yeah, y'know one time I went to the bush with this guy 'n on our way back we stopped at mileage fifty-seven, there's a cafe there 'n there was a stripper there who was dancin' at this guy's table... []

A: I just lost my appetite.

B: What does that have to do with food?

A: I just didn't know you went to such nice places.

B: No, but, I didn't know there was a stripper there, but I thought, how can she do that?

A: Ask her, don't ask me.
B: I asked my wife when I got back how could she do that, if I was a woman I think I'd be too embarrassed.

B: When do you play this week?

A: We're sposed to play Doherty's Thursday and then Saturday it's Ginger's Sexy Sauna.

B: They have a team?

A: Yeah, but it must be made up of clients—there's, I doubt there's any guys working there.

B: Yeah

A: Man, I wonder what goes on in one of those places?

B: Yeah, I went to one once

A: Noooooo!

B: yeah, it wasn't my idea, I was with a guy from work 'n we went out for a few beers 'n, I dunno, we decided to go to a movie, but we passed this massage place 'n he said he always wanted to try one so I ended up going with him. I know it was wrong but uhh

A: So what was it like?

B: It was no big deal really, this girl came in wearin' cutoffs but no top and proceeded to give me the treatment—the full treatment.

A: I think I'd be too embarrassed to go to one of those places

B: Yeah, it was different. I wouldn't do it again

A: I heard Ginger's is gonna have to close down because of it's location...
Louise: One night (1.0) I was with this guy (1)
that I liked a real lot, an uhh (3.0) (2)
we had come back from the show, we (3)
had gone to the Ash Grove for awhile (4)
' n we were gonna park. An' I can't (5)
stand a car, ' n he has a small car (6)

Ken:  Mm hm (7)

Louise: So we walked to the back, ' n we just (8)
went into the back house, ' n we stayed (9)
there half the night (1.0) we didn't (10)
go to bed with each other, but it was (11)
so comfortable ' n so nice (12)

Ken:  Mm hm (13)

Louise: Y'know? There's everything perfect (14)

(I-6)

A:  ...I was so scared that day, and I got (1)
through it, that its hard to imagine (2)
ever being that scared again. So that, (3)
that was a big turning point for me to (4)
have lived through that particular day (5)

B:  'N its probably better that you structured (6)
the morning than if you had tried to (7)
teach, because you might have been very (8)
uncomfortable.

(III-1)

G:  ...'n then he did it a third time 'n I (1)
thought, 'okay' hehe so (1.0) thats how (2)
I got the job at the B.C. pen (3)

D:  What did you feel, what did you say to (4)
yourself when you saw this bird, other (5)
than, 'well, far out'?

(I-4)

279
A: Well, there's another little one that happened on the first day. There was this guy that's about your height...

(I-5)

A: I had been working like crazy for (3.0) about a week 'n a half 'n I had a day off comin' 'n I was wiped out, just absolutely dead and desperate for this day off. The morning of the day off my boss called me. Sick, right? [STORY]

(II-2)

P: ...but I've had two experiences, one with a girl who I met in a bar and talked to for awhile...

...So I went, okay, give it a chance, 'n the chance came last week and, uhh this girl, well, the girl that I was going out with that you felt that I felt guilty about...

(II-3)

J: One time I was drivin' home from the movies 'n I was drivin' because my boyfriend smashed up his car [STORY]

(III-3)

A: 'n it starts out with, with a little chart to illustrate uhhh the experimental method (1.0) 'n the chart shows uhhhm, those who do marijuana on one axis 'n memory on the other, right? Okay?

D: ((laughs))

A: So, some guy puts up his hand [STORY]

(IV-3)
B: So what was, what was your uhhh tupperware party all about?
A: Oh, it was kinda fun
B: What happened there?
A: (1.0) well, first of all, okay, there was a lady there that kinda, a tupperware dealer that takes charge of the party [STORY]

(IV-4)
B: So what was the deal?
A: Well, this fellow was doing this experiment

(I-4)
A: There was this guy that's about your height [STORY]

(I-5)
A: The morning of my day off, my boss called me [STORY]

(II-2)
P: Yeah, 'n when I was in grade eleven or grade twelve I guess, one of the teachers at the school [STORY]

(V-1)
B: I remember one time we tried to skip out of PE, me and Carol, and she, the teacher, came into [STORY]
C: He was just—we went to this—you remember Ewen Pitt, did you, yeah well [STORY]

A: ...Two days later I got a phone call at eleven o'clock at night from a guy by—he said his name was Steve Dogood [STORY]

A: Yeah, I went to have lunch with Bev 'n we had a long talk [STORY]

B: David, you know Pat's David, he uhh like you know how kids are [STORY]

A: There was a substitute teacher when Turner was away [STORY]

J: Good ole Perks, I was going by there again today, he always sits there in his office [STORY]

A: So we were visiting the Prudential building (1.0) 'n we were walking out, I think it was just Dan and me 'n [STORY]
P: ...'n the chance came last week and uhhh this girl, well the girl that I was going out with that you felt that I felt guilty about, she [STORY]

(VI-3)

K: The best player I ever saw, man, this dude brought his own cheering section from Philly, man, and I never even heard of him. Before the game they started screamin', 'Jesus, Black Jesus! Black Jesus!' I thought, who was this dude? He was about six-three and the first play of the game he got a rebound on the defensive end of the court and started spinnin', man, he spun four times! Now he's ninety feet from the hoop and this dude is spinnin'! Well, on the fourth spin he throws the ball in a hook motion, it bounced at mid-court and then it just rose, and there was a guy at the other end runnin' full speed and he caught it in stride and laid it in. A full-court bounce pass! After I saw that I could understand all the 'Black Jesus' stuff. I didn't find out the dude's real name until way later. it was Earl Monroe!