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Emotion, object and justification Strickling, Bonnelle Lewis 1983

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EMOTION, OBJECT AND JUSTIFICATION by BONNELLE LEWIS STRICKLING B.A., Ohio University, 1964 M.A., The University of Iowa, 1971 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Philosophy) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1983 Bonnelle Lewis S t r i c k l i n g © I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e h e a d o f my d e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 1956 Main Mall V a n c o u v e r , Canada V6T 1Y3 )E-6 (3/81) ABSTRACT The subject of this thesis i s the emotion-object re l a t ionsh ip and the problem of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of emotions as i t bears on the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p . In order to analyse the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p , we must f i r s t have a concept of emotion. To develop such a concept, we w i l l examine the poss ible const i tuent or constituents of such a concept, asking both whether each could be the only const i tuent and whether each could be a cons t i tuent , of the concept of emotion. The constituents are f ee l ing , behavior, and b e l i e f . Fee l ing cannot be the only const i tuent of emotions because there are not enough d i s t i n c t feel ings to account for the number of emotions we seem to have. Furthermore, views such as Hume's involve the claim that these feel ings are i n c o r r i g i b l e , and this i s f a l s e . We are often confused about our f e e l i n g s . The Schachter-Singer study indicates that, though feel ings are not the means by which we i d e n t i f y emotions, nevertheless we w i l l not c la im to have an emotion unless we experience some f e e l i n g . Behavior too f a i l s as the sole const i tuent of the concept of emotion, since there are not enough consis tent behavior patterns with which to ident i fy emotions. However, again, we w i l l want to say that sometimes behavior does play a part i n emotions. F i n a l l y , b e l i e f s cannot be the only const i tuent of the concept of emotion s ince, i f Schachter and Singer are r i gh t , we w i l l not c a l l something an emotion without the presence of f e e l i n g . But be l ie f s can allow us to account for the number of emotions we have, and do seem to be present i n i i every emotion. These be l i e f s are evaluative b e l i e f s , be l i e f s that indicate that we have assessed some s i tua t ion or person i n the l i g h t of our standards for the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of our various desires for a f f ec t ion , meaningful work, aesthet ic excellence and so on. The notion of an object for emotions can emphasize e i ther the fact that emotions are content fu l , or that they have causal t ies to the world. That i s , we can e i ther ta lk about objects i n terms of the be l i e f s involved in emotions, or we can talk about them' from the standpoint of the responsive hence r e l a t i o n a l character of emotions. Since we can e a s i l y ta lk about the contentful feature of emotions without u t i l i z i n g the notion of an object , and s ince the common sense notion of an object is something i n the world, i t i s this sense of object that w i l l be considered. If we conjoin the notion of an object with each const i tuent of an emotion, we can see that be l i e f s are the only const i tuent of that concept that can take an ob ject . However, many things can go wrong with our be l i e f s about ob ject s . We make not only i so l a ted mistakes about the features of objects , but also systematic ones, as i n the case of pre judices , neuroses and psychoses, and the various areas of anxiety that ex i s t i n most of our l i v e s . Thus we must take this into con-s idera t ion when construct ing a p ic ture of the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p , accounting both for cases where the be l i e f s involved are completely c o r r e c t , and cases where mistake occurs . We w i l l say that, in cases of mistake, when the most c r u c i a l features of the object are present in the b e l i e f , such as spatio-temporal l o c a t i o n , and other basic phys ica l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , we w i l l say that the emotion has an object , but the emotion i s u n j u s t i f i e d . If grosser mistakes are present, we w i l l say both that the emotion has no object and i s not j u s t i f i e d . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT 1 i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v i PREFACE v i i INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 FEELINGS 3 Part 1 Hume 3 Part 2 James 14 Footnotes to Chapter 1 22 CHAPTER 2 BEHAVIOR 23 Part 1 Skinner 23 Part 2 Tolman 27 Part 3 Possible patterns of behavior - a r e v i s i o n i s t view . . . . . . . . . . 30 Footnotes to Chapter 2 36 CHAPTER 3 BELIEFS 37 Part 1 A proposal on the connection of emotion and b e l i e f . 37 Part 2 B e l i e f s as individuators 39 Part 3 B e l i e f s and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of emotion 42 Part 4 More l i g h t 47 Part 5 B e l i e f s and desires 50 Part 6 Desires: the basis for evaluation 52 Part 7 Desires and aesthetic emotions 53 Part 8 Evaluation 55 Part 9 Picking out evaluative b e l i e f s 64 Part 10 Other theories about b e l i e f : Bedford and Gordon . . 66 Part 11 The concept of an emotion: a summary and some exceptions 71 Part 12 The causal story: l i m i t a t i o n s and speculations . . 80 Part 13 Two categories of emotion and some exceptions . . . 82 Footnotes to Chapter 3 86 CHAPTER 4 EMOTION AND OBJECT 88 Part 1 Which component takes the object? 91 Part 2 The winner 96 Footnotes to Chapter 4 98 i v Page CHAPTER 5 JUSTIFICATION 99 Part 1 The j u s t i f i e d element i n emotion 99 Part 2 J u s t i f i c a t i o n of emotions 101 Part 3 Cognitive background for emotional response . . . . 109 Part 4 Some thoughts on unconscious b e l i e f s 116 Part 5 Epistemic process 120 Part 6 D i f f i c u l t i e s i n and because of the p o l i c y of inquiry 125 Part 7 Mistakes and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . . 132 Footnotes to Chapter 5 135 CHAPTER 6 EMOTION AND OBJECT REVISITED 136 Part 1 The legitimacy of a causal analysis 136 Part 2 The d e s i r a b i l i t y of a causal analysis 143 Part 3 At l a s t 146 Part 4 Some d i f f i c u l t cases - emotions about the future and past 157 Part 5 Theoretical c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 159 Footnotes to Chapter 6 164 SOURCES CONSULTED 165 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many peop le have been h e l p f u l i n p r e p a r i n g t h i s t h e s i s ; some have been e s p e c i a l l y h e l p f u l . I want to thank J o n a t h a n Bennet t f o r p a t i e n c e and h e l p -f u l n e s s beyond the c a l l of d u t y ; Don Brown, f o r h i s e n t h u s i a s t i c i n t e r e s t and encouragement ; and R i c h a r d L i n d l e y f o r s e v e r a l u s e f u l p r e l i m i n a r y d i s c u s s i o n s . E a r l W i n k l e r and P e t e r Remnant have made h e l p f u l s u g g e s t i o n s , and R i c h a r d S i k o r a has k i n d l y o f f e r e d h i s d i s c e r n i n g t h e o r e t i c a l sense to good e f f e c t . Susan W e n d e l l and Greg F u l l e r have g i v e n me i n v a l u a b l e p e r s o n a l s u p p o r t . F i n a l l y , I want to expres s my g r a t i t u d e to Warren R u c h t i , f o r e n c o u r a g i n g me to b e g i n ; and to my s i s t e r L y n n , who never doubted t h a t t h i s was a l l w o r t h w h i l e . v i Preface Since I completed the research for this thesis, several works on the subject of emotion have appeared. I wish to mention three that I found p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g . Amelie Rorty's excellent anthology Explaining  Emotions contains a wide range of papers that are a l l worth serious consider-atio n . Agnes Heller's A Theory of Feelings presents an interesting Marxist a l t e r n a t i v e to the more usual views. F i n a l l y , William Lyons' Emotion i s a splendid work, providing a thorough survey of the existing views and developing a view which, happily, coincides with several of my major con-clusions i n this thesis. v i i 1 INTRODUCTION In this paper, I intend to construct both a concept of occurrent emotion and a causal account of the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p . Like J . R . S . Wi l son , whose causal account has been extremely h e l p f u l , I am most concerned with the way i n which emotions are connected to the world. This connection i s of spec ia l in te re s t because of the nature of emotions: emotions are responses, and, as such, i t i s important to see what they are responses t o . The best way to give an account of the emotion-object re l a t ionsh ip is to f i r s t construct a concept of emotion, then see what feature or features of an emotion could permit i t to take an ob jec t . I t i s important to s tar t with a common sense notion of object ; attempts to begin an account of the emotion-object r e l a t ionsh ip i n terms of , e . g . , grammatical objects , are bound to come to g r i e f , s ince they presuppose some other kind of object that the grammati-c a l object somehow r e f l e c t s . I have discussed the question of j u s t i f i c a t i o n at length because the number of un ju s t i f i ed emotions i s great ly underestimated and, in turn, the importance of this fact to the question of the emotion-object re la t ionship is underestimated as w e l l . There are a subs tant ia l number of questions about j u s t i f i c a t i o n to which I have not addressed myself at a l l , since they are not relevant here . In terms of procedure, I w i l l begin with the concept of emotion. I w i l l consider three poss ible const i tuents : f ee l ing , behavior, and b e l i e f . I w i l l ask f i r s t , whether each one could be the sole constituent of a concept of emotion, next whether each one could be one const i tuent of a concept of emotion. F i n a l l y , I w i l l d i s t ingu i sh between a constituent of an emotion as 2 opposed to other mental states such as thinking, and the constitutents of s p e c i f i c emotions, such as fear or gratitude. Having constructed a concept of emotion, I w i l l go on to consider which constituent or constituents of the concept of emotion could enable i t to take an object; and f i n a l l y , with the help of some considerations about j u s t i f i c a t i o n , w i l l construct a causal account of the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p . 3 CHAPTER I FEELINGS In our considerat ion of emotion as const i tuted e n t i r e l y by fee l ings , we w i l l ask two quest ions : (a) Could emotions be ju s t feelings and nothing more? (b) I f i t i s not the case that emotions are feel ings and nothing more, ought the concept of emotion to include feel ings? Both David Hume and Wil l i am James have made major contr ibut ions to the fee l ing theory, and we w i l l consider the i r views here as representat ive . Part 1; Hume Hume speaks of both emotions and passions; the difference is not c l e a r . He uses the terms "emotion" as opposed to "passion" in formal ly , sometimes using them as i f they denoted d i f f e ren t s tates , sometimes using them as though the l a t t e r were a species of the former. For examples of each use, consider the fo l lowing , t y p i c a l of the many instances of both that occur throughout the T r e a t i s e : And as the impressions of r e f l e x i o n , v i z , passions desires and e m o t i o n . . . 1 In this passage, Hume seems to d i s t ingu i sh between passions and emotions, but consider the next two passages: Secondary, or r e f l e c t i v e impressions are such as proceed from some of these o r i g i n a l ones, e i ther immediate or by the i n t e r p o s i t i o n of i t s idea . Of the f i r s t kind are a l l the impressions of the senses, and a l l bodi ly pains and pleasures : Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them. What we commonly understand by passion i s a v io lent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or e v i l i s 4 presented, or any object , which, by the o r i g i n a l formation of our f a c u l t i e s , i s f i t t e d to excite an a p p e t i t e . 3 These two uses occur throughout the Treat i se without any evident preference for one at the expense of the other; since he names spec i f i c passions, but not s p e c i f i c emotions, a possible so lu t ion might be that only cer ta in emotions, the ones s p e c i f i c a l l y named such as love, hatred, pride and h u m i l i t y , are passions, and the rest are emotions. However, the frequent use of these terms as synomonous, plus the fact that Hume is not at a l l forthcoming about the dif ference between passions and emotions when he speaks of them i n conjunction rather than as synonymous, seems to be to i n v i t e the treatment of passions and emotions as having the same nature, at least for the purpose of d i scover ing what const i tutes a passion or emotion. Hume's view about passions or emotions i s that they are fee l ings , in the sense that they are experiences each of which has a unique character , indescr ibable but recognizable by the person having them; and they are i n c o r r i g i b l e . To examine his view i n more d e t a i l , l e t us examine his theory of impressions. For Hume, the mind contains two kinds of things : impressions and ideas . The di f ference between impressions and ideas l i e s i n the vividness of each: . . . i n the degrees of force and l i v e l i n e s s with which they s t r ike upon the mind.^ Impressions are h ighly v i v i d , while ideas are less so. Emotions or passions are impressions. There i s , however, more than one kind of impression. They can be e i ther simple or. complex; simple impressions " . . . a d m i t of no d i s t i n c t i o n nor s e p a r a t i o n . . . " ^ while complex impressions have d i s t ingui shable par t s . Both simple and complex impressions can be further d iv ided into impressions of sensation and impressions of r e f l e c t i o n . 5 Impressions of sensation ar i se " . . . i n the soul o r i g i n a l l y , from unknown c a u s e s . . . " ^ , while impressions of r e f l e c t i o n are impressions of desire or aversion caused by ideas l e f t by impressions of sensat ion. Passions or emotions are for the most part simple impressions of r e f l e c t i o n , though the mixed emotions are, of course, complex. However, even mixed emotions, while conta ining const i tuents i n the sense that there i s more than one emotion or passion present, contain only one kind of const i tuent ; that i s , mixed or unmixed, passions or emotions are const i tuted only by impressions of r e f l e c t i o n and not, e . g . , be l i e f s or b i t s of behavior. Furthermore, each passion i s unique and indef inable except through an account of the causal condit ions under which i t a r i se s : The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, ' t i s impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, g ive a just d e f i n i t i o n of them, or indeed of any of the pass ions. The utmost we can pretend to i s a de scr ip t ion of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them. . .^ And f i n a l l y , they are i n c o r r i g i b l e : For since a l l actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessar i ly appear i n every p a r t i c u l a r what they are, and be what they appear. Every thing that enters the mind, being i n r e a l i t y as the percept ion, ' t i s impossible any thing shou'd to f e e l i n g appear d i f f e r e n t . This were to suppose, that even where we are most int imate ly conscious, we might be m i s t a k e n . ® Thus, though we may sometimes have mixed emotions, and emotions may sometimes be transformed into each other or even by synthesis produce an e n t i r e l y new one, nevertheless we cannot be wrong about which emotion or emotions we are exper iencing . To think we experience gr ie f and to experience gr ie f are one i n the same. / 6 There are two quite straightforward and f a t a l objections to Hume's view. One challenges the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y thesis, the other Hume's claim that emotions or passions are simple i n that they have only one kind of constituent. Let us take them in order. It i s false that we can never err about how we f e e l . Consider the following example: I am talking to my f r i e n d Mary about the break-up of my marriage. When she asks me how I f e e l about discovering that Charles has been involved for years with the woman who l i v e s i n the apartment above us, I reply that I f e e l rather sorry for Charles, since he has had to sneak around so frequently i n the past years. I notice Mary's sceptical look; l a t e r , going over the conversation in my mind, I remember that both my hands and teeth were clenched a good deal of the time, and I begin to suspect that what I f e e l i s not compassion but anger. I c a l l Mary and t e l l her I was wrong -r e a l l y I am very angry at Charles and Mrs. Feldkamp. Not only does Mary find this plausible, which she would ce r t a i n l y not do i f Hume's view were true and she were not hopelessly muddled about emotions, she believes me immediately. Hume's view cannot account for this sort of mistake, which occurs frequently enough to be s i g n i f i c a n t . Further, that this mistake can be and i s made, and, perhaps more important, that i t can be r e c t i f i e d by appeals to, e.g., behavior, i s important for seeing that Hume's view i s inadequate i n the sense that passions or emotions are not represented as containing enough d i f f e r e n t kinds of constituents. To see this d i f f i c u l t y more c l e a r l y , consider the following example: a woman who has a severely disturbed c h i l d i s advised by her doctor and other members of her family to put this c h i l d i n an i n s t i t u t i o n . Though'the mother can see the wisdom of t h i s , at the same time she loves the c h i l d and fears i t w i l l not be well-treated, that the workers 7 i n the i n s t i t u t i o n w i l l no t take the t r o u b l e to f u l f i l l the a p p a r e n t l y t r i v i a l s p e c i a l r e q u e s t s t h a t the c h i l d takes so s e r i o u s l y - a p a r t i c u l a r s t u f f e d a n i m a l to s l e e p w i t h , a lways p u t t i n g the l e f t shoe on f i r s t . At the same t i m e , she may be v e r y angry w i t h the c h i l d f o r c a u s i n g so much d i s r u p t i o n i n the home, f o r f o r c i n g her a t t e n t i o n away from the o t h e r c h i l d r e n and her h u s b a n d . She may a l s o f e e l g u i l t y about a l l o f t h i s . Such a p e r s o n might p l a u s i b l y say a t the t ime t h a t , w h i l e she knows h e r s e l f to be i n some e m o t i o n a l s t a t e , she i s confused and does not know which e m o t i o n a l s t a t e . Of ten s t r e s s o r a new s i t u a t i o n can produce t h i s k i n d of e m o t i o n a l t u r m o i l . One i s aware of a g r e a t d e a l o f moving and s h i f t i n g i n s i d e , bu t cannot p u t a name to o n e ' s c o n d i t i o n . T h i s i s a d i f f i c u l t y f o r t h e Humean v i e w b e c a u s e , on Hume's v i e w , such a p e r s o n has no reason to say t h a t she i s i n an e m o t i o n a l s t a t e a t a l l . F o r Hume, emotions are on a par w i t h a l l o t h e r s e n s a t i o n s , s e n s a t i o n s such as c o l o r o r sound , i n t h a t they are a l l i m p r e s s i o n s a n d , from the s t a n d p o i n t o f k i n d s of c o n s t i t u t e n t s , s i m p l e . T h u s , there i s no way to d i s t i n g u i s h an emot ion from the o t h e r i m p r e s s i o n s e x c e p t by means of the r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s unique c h a r a c t e r . F o r Hume, the u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r s e r v e s two p u r p o s e s : i t enab le s us to d i s t i n g u i s h one emot ion from a n o t h e r , and i t enab le s us to d i s t i n g u i s h emotions from o t h e r m e n t a l s t a t e s by b e i n g a b l e to i d e n t i f y i n d i v i d u a l e m o t i o n s . Thus we c a n ' t know we a re h a v i n g an emot ion w i t h o u t knowing which one , s i n c e i t i s knowing which one t h a t a l l o w s us to say we are h a v i n g an emotion a t a l l . There i s , o f c o u r s e , the c a u s a l s t o r y to which we may a p p e a l , but t h i s i s n o t a f e a t u r e o f the emot ion i t s e l f . A g a i n , the u s u a l way one i d e n t f i e s o n e ' s s t a t e as e m o t i o n a l even though one d o e s n ' t know which emot ion one has i s by means o f o t h e r c o n s t i t u t e n t s of e m o t i o n , such as c e r t a i n b e l i e f s or b e h a v i o r . T h i s , 8 a g a i n , i m p l i e s a m u l t i p l e c o n s t i t u e n t v iew of e m o t i o n , which would be u n -a c c e p t a b l e to Hume. A n o t h e r e x t r e m e l y s u g g e s t i v e l i n e of argument a g a i n s t the view t h a t emot ions a re f e e l i n g s i s the one mounted by S t a n l e y S c h a c h t e r and Jerome S i n g e r i n t h e i r paper " C o g n i t i v e , S o c i a l and P h y s i o l o g i c a l D e t e r m i n a n t s of g E m o t i o n a l S t a t e s " . Though S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r ' s paper i s d i r e c t e d m a i n l y a t views such as W i l l i a m J ames ' , i n which the c l a i m i s made t h a t emot ions are c o n s t i t u t e d by unique p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y caused f e e l i n g s , n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e i r arguments s t i l l o f f e r a means o f r e s i s t a n c e t o Hume's v i e w . F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e I w i l l argue t h a t James' v iew i s not n e a r l y so s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d as i s o f t e n supposed , I p r e f e r to o f f e r i t a t t h i s p o i n t r a t h e r than p r o p o s i n g i t as a r e j e c t i o n of a v iew which i t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r t h a t James h o l d s . S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r o f f e r the h y p o t h e s i s t h a t we do not i n f a c t i d e n t i f y our emotions v i a t h e i r f e l t q u a l i t i e s . R a t h e r , we c a l l c e r t a i n s t a t e s o f p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x c i t a t i o n emot ion because they o c c u r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h , and are i n t e r p r e t e d by means o f , c o g n i t i v e s t a t e s . Thus i f I walk down a dark a l l e y and meet a man w i t h a gun , I have bo th a p h y s i o l o g i c a l response and a s e t of c o g n i t i o n s based on my g e n e r a l knowledge of such s i t u a t i o n s - o f the purpose o f someone's l u r k i n g i n a da rk a l l e y , o f the f u n c t i o n of g u n s . To show t h a t we do n o t i d e n t i f y our emot ions b y means of t h e i r f e l t q u a l i t i e s a l o n e , S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r d e s i g n e d an exper iment i n which the p h y s i o l o g i c a l s e n s a t i o n s a l o n e were p r o d u c e d w i t h d r u g s . The s u b j e c t s were i n f l u e n c e d by by means of the expre s sed e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s of o t h e r s , and l a t e r asked to r e p o r t on t h e i r f e e l i n g s . In s u p p o r t of s u p p o s i n g such a p rocedure to show a n y t h i n g about e m o t i o n s , S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r c i t e s t u d i e s i n which i t has 9 been shown that, far from there being unique feeling states for each emotion, there are a very limited number of fee l i n g states plus other elements. Schachter and Singer are interested i n j u s t what these elements might be, as well as the way i n which they are acquired. The former w i l l be of more i n t e r e s t to us than the l a t t e r . Schachter and Singer divided the subjects into two groups. One group was injected with epinephrin (a form of adrenalin) while the other was injec t e d with a placebo. Both groups were told they had been injected with "Suproxin". The subjects i n the group that was injected with epinephrine were further divided into three groups. The f i r s t group was told that sometimes the "Suproxin" had the side-effects that are i n fact the si d e - e f f e c t s of epinephrine: pounding heart, shaking, flushed face. The second group was told that the i n j e c t i o n was mild and harmless, with no side e f f e c t s . A t h i r d group was told that side effects such as itching, numb feet or s l i g h t headache might occur, side effects which are not i n fact associated with epinephrine. A l l the members of the group that received the placebo were told that the i n j e c t i o n was mild, harmless and without side e f f e c t s . Thus one group, accurately informed about side-effects (c a l l e d by Schachter and Singer "epinephrine informed"), had a plausible explanation for the ph y s i o l o g i c a l arousal that took place, while the group that lacked information ("epinephrine ignorant") asnd the group that had i n c o r r e c t information about side effects ("epinephrine misinformed") had no such explanation a v a i l a b l e . The subjects were then isolated and each was asked to f i l l out a questionnaire. Soon each subject was joined by a confederate of the experimenters' (called a "stooge" by Schachter and Singer) masquerading as j u s t another subject. The stooge then performed one of two pre-planned 10 routines, either beginning with an expression of mild i r r i t a t i o n with the questions on the questionnaire and terminating with an expression of rage, or beginning with c h i l d l i k e p l a y f u l a c t i v i t y and ending with an expression of what Schachter and Singer c a l l e d "euphoria" - great cheerfulness and joie de v i v r e . Afterwards, upon being questioned about their states, the group that had an explanation, the epinephrine informed, did not tend to a t t r i b u t e emotions to themselves at a l l ; they simply accepted the explanation of their states that had been offered to them at the beginning of the experiment, and were not swayed by the stooges. On the other hand, the epinephrine ignorant and the epinephrine misinformed tended on the whole to describe themselves as being i n the emotional state expressed by the stooges who joined them. The placebo injected experienced few feelings and were i n general less i n c l i n e d to a t t r i b u t e emotional states to themselves than those who were injected with epinephrine. Thus, not only were the epinephrine ignorant and the epinephrine misinformed i n c l i n e d to attribute p a r t i c u l a r emotional states, such as anger and euphoria, to themselves as a result of acquiring a cognitive component but, at a more basic l e v e l , they were w i l l i n g to i d e n t i f y themselves as being i n an emotional state only i f the cognitive component was present. The results from the placebo-injected group suggest i n their turn that, while the cognitive component induces i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of oneself as being i n an emotional state when added to a feeling stage, the feeling state i s also required, necessary though not s u f f i c i e n t . What does a l l this suggest? Quite a number of things. F i r s t , i t i s i n -teresting to note just how suggestible the drugged subjects are. Perhaps this i s a function of the drug i n the sense that the drug affects the s o l i d i t y of normal ego boundaries and makes people more influenceable, but i t is also a 11 f u n c t i o n of the drug i n the sense t h a t the drug produces f e e l i n g s f o r w h i c h , i n some c a s e s , t h e r e i s no e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s i n t u r n sugges t s t h a t , when we have s t r o n g p h y s i o l o g i c a l f e e l i n g s f o r which there i s no e x p l a n a t i o n , we e a r n e s t l y seek an e x p l a n a t i o n . S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r b e l i e v e t h a t the e x p l a n a t i o n we a c c e p t i s a f u n c t i o n of two t h i n g s : f i r s t we a s s o c i a t e these p h y s i o l o g i c a l f e e l i n g s w i t h h a v i n g e m o t i o n s , and second we tend to i d e n t i f y our e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s by means of the e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s of the peop le around u s . T h a t we do the l a t t e r i s p a r t l y a r e s u l t o f the former - i f we d i d not a s s o c i a t e f e e l i n g s w i t h emot ions we might j u s t d i agnose o u r s e l v e s as coming down w i t h the f l u when we have these m y s t e r i o u s f e e l i n g s and l eave i t a t t h a t . But because we do a s s o c i a t e these f e e l i n g s w i t h e m o t i o n s , we b e g i n , so to speak, to l o o k f o r the m i s s i n g component - we seek a c o g n i t i v e c o n t e x t f o r these f e e l i n g s . S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r l eave us w i t h a good many q u e s t i o n s about the e x a c t n a t u r e o f the c o g n i t i v e component . For example i t seems t h a t the c o g n i t i v e component c o u l d i n c l u d e b o t h a c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n and b e l i e f s o f some s o r t about o n e ' s immediate s i t u a t i o n . I t i s not c l e a r to what e x t e n t our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of our s t a t e s as emot ions i s the r e s u l t o f our a s s o c i a t i n g c e r t a i n b e l i e f s w i t h b e i n g i n a c e r t a i n e m o t i o n a l s t a t e , a s t a t e tha t u s u a l l y i n c l u d e s the f e e l i n g s we are e x p e r i e n c i n g , or whether we i d e n t i f y our s t a t e s as emotions because we b e l i e v e t h a t f e e l i n g s t a t e s t h a t are caused by c e r t a i n c o g n i t i v e components are e m o t i o n s . These are not m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e t h e o r -i e s , b u t they are d i f f e r e n t . F u r t h e r , we never d i s c o v e r j u s t what they have i n mind when they speak of the c o g n i t i v e component as based on knowledge . As we have s e e n , the c o g n i t i v e component a c q u i r e d when the s u b j e c t s were a lone w i t h the s t o o g e s , w h i l e i t i n v o l v e d knowledge i n the sense t h a t one r e q u i r e s knowledge to under s t and the l anguage , i n t e r p r e t someone's tone of v o i c e and 12 so on, d id not express only appl icat ions of factual knowledge, but responses to knowledge. For example, one of the stooge's i n c i t i n g remarks in the sequence of remarks that end i n an expression of rage, i s ( re fer r ing to an item on the questionnaire) "This r e a l l y i r r i t a t e s me. I t ' s none of their business how much my father makes."'''0 This remark involves not only knowledge of the item on the quest ionnaire , but also an evaluation of the mater ia l i n the quest ionnaire . This evaluative element seems important in emotions, but i s never mentioned i n the discuss ion of the cognit ive element. However, for a l l i t s f a u l t s , the Schachter-Singer study does suggest very s trongly that emotions are not consituted ju s t by f ee l ings . Even though he analys i s of the cogni t ive element s t i l l needs to be performed, they have shown that having feel ings is not, so to speak, se l f -explanatory . If we have some cognit ive mater ia l , such as a causal explanation of the feel ings in p h y s i o l o g i c a l terms, that may sa t i s fy us (though of course i t may not, depending on the circumstances - i f one's c loses t fr iend had died at the same time one was aware of haivng a v i o l e n t attack of the f l u , i t would undoubtedly be extremely d i f f i c u l t to sort out which feel ings belonged to which cogni t ive content) . But i f we have feel ings and no explanation, and i f those feel ings are feel ings we can associate with certa in emotions we w i l l often a t t r ibu te emotions to ourselves on this bas i s . Schachter and Singer are i n c l i n e d to bel ieve that cognit ive content is largely acquired by means of our perception of the cognit ive content of others , but one need not bel ieve th i s to bel ieve that the cognit ive i s important i n the concept of emotion. Further , the data gathered by questioning the placebo-injected subjects suggests that we w i l l not i d e n t i f y ourselves as being i n emotional states unless some fee l ing i s present - the placebo-injected subjects were 1 3 exposed to the stooges to exactly the same extent as the epinephrine-injected subjects. In the end, what Schachter and Singer suggest as a general view i s that emotions are complex; that i s , they have more than one kind of constituent, and at least two of these are some cognitive component and f e e l i n g s . It might be objected at this point that the Schachter-Singer study leaves Hume untouched: naturally the subjects did not i d e n t i f y t h e i r feelings as emotions purely on the grounds of their f e l t q u a l i t i e s , because they weren't emotions. On Hume's view, each emotion has a unique f e l t q u a l i t y , and the feelings produced by epinephrine were not those f e e l i n g s . This, however, does not account for the propensity of the subjects to i d e n t i f y their states as emotions when cognitive content was added. Would we do well to follow Schachter and Singer and c a l l the feel i n g that occurs i n emotion the experience of physiological change? I think not. It would simplify our ways of talking about feelings a great deal, but i t would also be a highly speculative claim. Schachter and Singer themselves did not claim that the feelings involved were measured or e n t i r e l y l o c a l i z e d i n some part of the body, though they refer to other experiments in which the a c t i v i t y of the viscera are measured. The d i f f i c u l t y i s that there are many fee l i n g s , e s p e c i a l l y the subtle and elusive ones such as ones that are involved in certain types of nostalgia, or feelings of f a m i l i a r i t y , that do not lend themselves to the claim that a l l the feelings involved in emotions are the experience of physiological change, because they are not easy to locate i n the way a tight stomach or the tension in a clenched jaw i s easy to locate. At the same time there i s a feeling component. Confusion arises on this point, I suspect, because the d i s t i n c t i o n between saying that something 14 i s a f e e l i n g when i t has a l o c a l i z a b l e p h y s i o l o g i c a l cause on the one hand , and s a y i n g t h a t something i s a f e e l i n g because i t i s e x p e r i e n c e d on the o t h e r , i s no t drawn s h a r p l y enough. S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r b e l i e v e t h a t a l l e x p e r i e n c e d f e e l i n g has a p h y s i o l o g i c a l c a u s e , but one does not need t o b e l i e v e t h i s to make the c l a i m t h a t emotions i n v o l v e p h y s i o l o g i c a l f e e l i n g s . E v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s f e l t i s f e l t p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y , there i s no o t h e r way t o f e e l t h i n g s . I f one f e e l s n o s t a l g i c , o r i s i n some s i t u a t i o n t h a t f e e l s f a m i l i a r , these are both e x p e r i e n c e d p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y , though not i n the c r u d e way i n which one f e e l s g a s t r i c d i s t u r b a n c e , and not w i t h an o b v i o u s p h y s i o l o g i c a l c a u s e . C e r t a i n l y some emotions i n v o l v e v e r y complex and s u b t l e f e e l i n g s , though by no means a l l o r even mos t . N e v e r t h e l e s s S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r seem to me to be making an i m p o r t a n t and fundamenta l p o i n t , though t h e y a r e a l s o making a p o i n t about c a u s a l i t y , which we need not embrace . I w i l l have more to say about the c o m p l e x i t y o f e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s i n C h a p t e r 3, P a r t 4 . P a r t 2 : W i l l i a m James W i l l i a m James s e t s out h i s v iew on emotions i n Chapte r XXV o f The P r i n c i p l e s o f P s y c h o l o g y T h i s v iew i s u s u a l l y taken to c e n t e r around the arguments i n f a v o r of the c l a i m t h a t emotions are p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y caused and e x p e r i e n c e d f e e l i n g s , and n o t h i n g more . The f o l l o w i n g two passages t y p i f y the u s u a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of James' p o s i t i o n : I f we adopt the t h e o r y of f e e l i n g as b o d i l y s e n s a t i o n , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the emotions w i t h ' p u r e f e e l i n g ' r educes to W i l l i a m James' p o s i t i o n t h a t an emotion i s t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h s e n s a t i o n s of b o d i l y changes which make emot ion an upse t o r d i s t u r b e d s t a t e . 2 For James the e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t an emotion i s an  awareness of b o d i l y changes as they o c c u r . There i s 15 a s i t u a t i o n which a rouses b o d i l y changes r e f l e x i v e l y . The awareness of these changes c o n s t i t u t e s c o n s c i o u s e m o t i o n . 1 3 However, consensus n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , James' v iew i s not b e s t under s tood by d e s c r i b i n g i t i n t h i s way. Perhaps i t would be be s t to say t h a t James has b o t h an e x p l i c i t and an i m p l i c i t v i e w . The e x p l i c i t v iew i s the one d e s c r i b e d by A l s t o n and Young, though some a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n i s needed t o put the view i n i t s p r o p e r c o n t e x t . The i m p l i c i t v iew i s n e v e r worked o u t , o n l y s u g g e s t e d , because James was w o r k i n g w i t h an a p p a r e n t l y unexamined a s s u m p t i o n about the n a t u r e o f emotions t h a t , one s u s p e c t s , p r e v e n t e d him from u t i l i z i n g h i s own p o t e n t i a l l y u s e f u l and o r i g i n a l v i e w . F i r s t o f a l l , i t i s i m p o r t a n t to have c l e a r l y i n mind e x a c t l y what James i s a r g u i n g both i n f avor of and , i n t h i s case e s p e c i a l l y , a g a i n s t . James does want to argue t h a t emotions are f e e l i n g s , and he does b e l i e v e tha t the e x p e r i e n c e of emot ion i s the e x p e r i e n c e of s e n s a t i o n s caused by p h y s i o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t y . However, he never argues s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i n f avor o f the view t h a t emotions have o n l y one c o n s t i t u e n t and t h a t c o n s t i t u e n t i s f e e l i n g . R a t h e r , he sees h i s opponent as someone who b e l i e v e s tha t emotions are f e e l i n g s , but n o n - p h y s i c a l f e e l i n g s - - s p i r i t u a l or menta l r a t h e r than p h y s i c a l : I have thus f a i r l y propounded what seems to me the most f r u i t f u l way of c o n c e i v i n g of the e m o t i o n s . . . The o n l y way c o e r c i v e l y to d i s p r o v e i t . . w o u l d be to take some e m o t i o n , and then e x h i b i t q u a l i t i e s o f f e e l i n g i n i t which s h o u l d be d e m o n s t r a b l y a d d i t i o n a l to a l l those which c o u l d p o s s i b l y be d e r i v e d from the organs a f f e c t e d a t the t i m e . But to d e t e c t w i t h c e r t a i n t y such p u r e l y s p i r i t u a l q u a l i t i e s of f e e l i n g would be a t a s k beyond human power . We have , as p r o f e s s o r Lange s a y s , a b s o l u t e l y no immediate c r i t e r i o n by which to d i s t i n g u i s h between s p i r i t u a l and c o r p o r e a l f e e l i n g s ; a n d , I may add , the more we sharpen our i n s t r o s p e c t i o n , the more l o c a l i z e d a l l our q u a l i t i e s o f f e e l i n g b e c o m e . . . 1 4 16 What he does not argue for, but seems to assume, i s that emotions are f e e l i n g s . That i s , he seems to regard as uncontroversial the claim that emotions are feelings of some kind, and never offers a f u l l dress argument against the view that emotions could have constituents other than fe e l i n g , such as b e l i e f s or behavior. He does argue against the view that p h y s i o l o g i c a l experiences are somehow attached to a s p i r i t u a l experience, that there are two separate constituents, the l a t t e r causing the former: Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions* i s that the mental perception of some excites the mental a f f e c t i o n c a l l e d the emotion, and that this l a t t e r state of mind gives r i s e to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, i s that the bodily changes, follow d i r e c t l y the  perception of the exciting fact, and that our f e e l - ing of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. 1^ But even here, i t i s a question of one fe e l i n g causing another and not, e.g., a thought causing a f e e l i n g . James' argument for his claim has two main constituents: f i r s t , that his findings in previous chapters show that the perception of objects causes bodily changes and that each one of these changes is f e l t , and, second, that a thought-experiment i n which we try to imagine emotions without bodily sensations leaves no "mind-stuff" as James c a l l s i t , no mental material from which emotions are constituted but rather leaves only a "cold and neutral 1 6 state of i n t e l l e c t u a l perception." With respect to the f i r s t claim, there i s obviously a good deal of work s t i l l to be done here, but i t seems plausible as long as one i s c a r e f u l to state i t as the claim that everything we notice (in some extended sense of "notice") causes change which is *James distinguishes between coarser and subtler emotions. The d i s t i n c t i o n is i r r e l e v a n t to the view expressed above by James: his general claim about emotions holds equally for both sorts of emotion. 17 a d d i t i o n a l to the physiological changes involved in perception i t s e l f . However, certain d i f f i c u l t i e s arise i f James means his claim that emotions are feelings to be a general theory of emotion, able to account for not only the causes and nature of f e e l i n g , but also to account for the way in which we d i s t i n g u i s h one emotion from another. There are emotions that, from a purely sensational view, are indistinguishable which we nevertheless do i d e n t i f y and d i s t i n g u i s h between or among. For example, consider anger and resentment. In both of these emotions, one may experienced increased heart rate, tightening jaw muscles and so on. But while i n anger one feels hard done by, in resentment one feels u n f a i r l y hard done by, and i t i s this difference that enables us to make the d i s t i n c t i o n . Or consider one of James' own i l l u s t r a t i o n s , g r i e f as described by C. Lange. In Lange's description of the t y p i c a l physiological constituent of g r i e f he mentions a feeling of weariness, a f e e l i n g of oppression, of cold, the drying of mucous membranes with the exception of eyes, since crying and the subsequent red and swollen face are also t y p i c a l . This i s c e r t a i n l y a v i v i d picture of physiological changes often found when someone i s unhappy, but there are many forms of happiness of which grief i s only one. Grief has s p e c i f i c a l l y to do with the b e l i e f that one has l o s t someone of great value, whereas other forms of sadness, such as extreme depression, deep regret or melancholy, may have to do not with the loss of some person, but with a general sense that l i f e i s n ' t going well, believing the past to have great value and the future none, believ i n g oneself to be worthless and l i f e not to be worth l i v i n g - views expressed in the b e l i e f s through which we distinguish these emotions from each other. One possible move for James here might seem to be to say that, whether we can give complete physiological descriptions or not, nevertheless 18 we can f e e l the d i f f e r e n c e s and our emotions are i n d i v i d u a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e because they are e x p e r i e n t i a l l y d i s t i n c t - i n s h o r t , he might take a v e r s i o n o f Hume's p o s i t i o n on t h i s p o i n t . T h i s move i s r u l e d out by the f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e : . . a n y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the emotions i s seen to be as t r u e and as ' n a t u r a l ' as any o t h e r , i f i t o n l y s e r v e s some p u r p o s e ' and such a q u e s t i o n as "What i s the ' r e a l ' o r ' t y p i c a l ' e x p r e s s i o n of anger , o r f e a r ? " i s seen to have no o b j e c t i v e meaning a t a l l . I n s t e a d o f i t we now have the q u e s t i o n as to how any g i v e n ' e x p r e s s i o n * of anger or f e a r may have come to e x i s t ' and t h a t i s a r e a l q u e s t i o n of p h y s i o l o g i c a l mechanics on the one hand , and o f h i s t o r y on the o t h e r . . . 1 ^ C l e a r l y , i f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of emot ions i s as f l e x i b l e as t h i s , the emot ions have no s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r t h a t we can r e c o g n i z e i m m e d i a t e l y as g r i e f , r e s e n t m e n t , and so o n . More d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e f o r James ' f e e l i n g view when we look a t the v a r i e d p h y s i o l o g i c a l changes James mentions i n h i s examples : c r y i n g , l a u g h i n g , f l u s h i n g o f the f a c e , d i l a t i o n of n o s t r i l s , s t r i k i n g o u t . James a p p a r e n t l y count s both v o l u n t a r y and i n v o l u n t a r y b e h a v i o r as r e l e v a n t p h y s i o l o g i c a l change ' t h i s does not f i t w e l l w i t h h i s c l a i m t h a t the b o d i l y changes i n v o l v e d i n emotions are r e f l e x i v e . Perhaps c e r t a i n r e f l e x i v e b o d i l y changes e v e n t u a l l y g i v e r i s e to some i n c l i n a t i o n to v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n , b u t v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n i s not i t s e l f a r e f l e x . W i t h r e s p e c t to the s e c o ° n d e lement i n h i s argument, the t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t he i n v i t e s us to p e r f o r m , James argues t h a t , i f we imag ine some emot ion e n t i r e l y w i t h o u t p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p e r i e n c e s , we w i l l be l e f t w i t h o n l y t h o u g h t s , and no s p e c i a l menta l c o n s t i t u e n t out of which e m o t i o n a l f e e l i n g c o u l d be c o n s t i t u t e d : " I f we f a n c y some s t r o n g e m o t i o n , and then t r y to  a b s t r a c t from our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of i t a l l the f e e l i n g s  o f i t s b o d i l y symptoms, we f i n d we have n o t h i n g l e f t 19 behind, no ' m i n d - s t u f f out of which the emotion can be cons t i tu ted , and that a cold and neutral state of i n t e l l e c t u a l perception i s a l l the remains." What one thinks about this claim of James' depends on what one supposes him to be arguing aga inst . Obviously he i s not arguing about the probable absence of ideas as a re su l t of subtract ion of f ee l ing , since ideas remain a f ter the experiment i s formed. Rather, he seems to be arguing that there is no other sort of fee l ing than p h y s i o l o g i c a l fee l ing i n emotions. But even supposing hi s c laim to be true, supposing that the absence of f ee l ing would lead us to deny that we were having emotions but rather were having thoughts of some sor t , we s t i l l have only the claim that phys io log ica l fee l ing i s c r u c i a l to emotion. We s t i l l must deal with the results o f James1 f a i lure to address himself to the more general question of what const i tutes an emotion. However, a l l need not be l o s t ; l e t us look at what we might make of James' view using only the constituents he gives us. B a s i c a l l y , we have two claims, one of which he argues for , one that const i tutes an assumption on which this argument i s based. He argues that emotions are phys io log i ca l feel ings and nothing else based on the assumption that emotions are some sort of f ee l ing and nothing e l s e . He also offers a number of examples of the sort of phys io log i ca l experience he means, i n c l u d i n g both voluntary and involuntary behavior . He offers us the thought experiment, which leaves us with i n t e l l e c t u a l perception and ( in passages a d d i t i o n a l to the one offered) moral judgment when phys io log i ca l experience i s taken away. If we do not al low James his assumption that emotions are fee l ings of some kind and at the same time give f u l l c r e d i t to his claim that without f e e l i n g , we would have no emotions, we have a p o t e n t i a l l y promising mul t icons t i tuent view. After a l l , i t i s the question of the metaphysical 20 nature of the cause of emotional f e e l i n g that r e a l l y interests James - he c l e a r l y has no objection to saying that thoughts and b e l i e f s can occur at the same time as these feelings and, furthermore, the feelings themselves are c l a s s i f i e d as such only i n a very expanded sense. The only argument James ever offers i n favor of the view that emotions must be feelings of some sort i s an argument by implication, given the claim i n the following passage: "Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions thus shade imperceptively into each other. Every object that excites and i n s t i n c t excites and 19 emotion as well. James' view that emotions are l i k e i n s t i n c t s , that both are reflexive and involuntary, implies that they could be constituted by only the sort of thing that could be appropriately described as r e f l e x i v e . This l i m i t s the constituents of emotion to involuntary behavior or physiological change -reflexiveness i n this sense i s not a term much i n use about thoughts. However, since he himself offers examples of feeling that i s voluntary behavior, one might suppose that he does not have a p a r t i c u l a r l y hard line on this question. And even i f he does, there are good reasons to r e j e c t the view that emotions must be constituted only by f e e l i n g s . On the other hand, i t may well be true that we are not w i l l i n g to i d e n t i f y ourselves as being an emotional state without f e e l i n g experienced p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y , i f not unambigously p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y caused: consider the results of the Schachter-Singer study. Thus we can construct what we might c a l l the r e v i s i o n i s t James: emotions involve feelings, i n the sense that the presence of feelings can be seen as a necessary though not s u f f i c i e n t condition for our a t t r i b u t i n g emotions to ourselves. At the same time, feelings alone cannot allow us to i d e n t i f y and distinguish among a l l the emotions that, in our ordinary l i v e s , 21 we seem to be able to. James himself mentions thoughts, moral judgment, and voluntary behavior as elements that may occur at the same time as emotional f e e l i n g ; these additional elements can be seen as potential constituents of emotion. More w i l l be said about both i n Chapters 2 and 3. 22 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I 1. David Hume, A Treat ise of Human Nature ed. L . A . Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Oxford Univer s i ty Press , 1967), p .8 . 2. I b i d . , p . 275. 3. I b i d . , p . 437. 4. I b i d . , p . 1. 5. I b i d . , p . 2. 6. I b i d . , p . 8. 7. I b i d . , p . 277. 8. I b i d . , p . 190. 9. Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer , "Cogn i t ive , S o c i a l , and P h y s i o l o g i c a l Determinants of Emotional State" , Phys io log i ca l  Review 69, (Sept. 1962): 379-399. 10. I b i d . , p . 385. 11. Wil l iam James, P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, 2 V o l s . , (New York: Dover P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1950). 12. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, r e p r i n t ed. 1972, s . v . "Emotion and F e e l i n g " , by Wil l iam P. Al s ton , p . 484. 13. Paul Thomas Young, Emotion in Man and Animal, (Huntington, New York: Robert E . Krieger Publ i sh ing Company, 1973), p . 261. 14. James, P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, 2:455. 15. I b i d . , p . 448. 16. I b i d . , p . 451. 17. I b i d . , p . 454. 18. I b i d . , p . 451. 19. I b i d . , p . 443. 23 CHAPTER 2 BEHAVIOR There are two main questions we want to ask i n our consideration of behavior (a) Could a behaviorist view do j u s t i c e to the concept of emotion, and (b) i f not, does behavior come into the concept of emotion i n any way? In order to answer (a), I w i l l o f f e r two d i f f e r e n t behaviorist accounts, those of B.F. Skinner and E.C Tolman. I have chosen these two behaviorists because they represent two sorts of behaviorism, and each one represents an aspect of possible behaviorist accounts that I wish to bring out. Skinner c a l l s himself a " r a d i c a l " behaviorist, while Tolman represents the more usual view. I w i l l argue that while neither of these views w i l l serve our purposes, this does not mean that behavior does not enter into emotions at a l l . In Part 3, I w i l l discuss (b). I w i l l argue that some kinds of behavior often do enter into emotions, though not always. I w i l l further argue that there are several d i f f e r e n t sorts of a c t i v i t i e s that can count as the relevent behavior, and that this w i l l make any account of emotions that includes behavior more complex then any account that includes the view that some p a r t i c u l a r pattern of behavior t y p i f i e s or i s always a constituent of emotions. Part 1: B.F. Skinner B.F. Skinner c a l l s his position r a d i c a l behaviorism, since he does not deny the r e a l i t y of inner events, but only denies that they have any place i n causal explanations of behavior. Though the aspect of his view mainly 24 concerned with emotions as causes of behavior i s not d i r e c t l y relevent to our present concerns, s t i l l we must mention i t as i t comes into and i s in fact the occasion of his views on emotion. For Skinner emotions are inner events of a p a r t i c u l a r kind: feelings, which for him are the experience of physiological change. While he has no objection to our saying we have fee l i n g s , he strongly objects to our giving them any extra-physical status or a t t r i b u t i n g causal significance to them: "The position can be stated as follows: what i s f e l t or in t r o s p e c t i v e l y observed i s not some nonphysical world of consciousness, mind, or mental l i f e , but the observer's own body. This does not mean, as I s h a l l show l a t e r , that introspection i s a kind of physiological research, nor does i t mean (and this i s the heart of the argument) that what are f e l t or introspectively observed are the causes of behavior." Skinner does not argue for this view of emotions, in the sense that he does not ac t i v e l y consider the p o s s i b i l i t y that emotions might be better defined as something other than, or more complex than, feelings. But he does claim that we can translate statements about emotions as causes into statements about observable causal conditions: "An organism behaves as i t does because of i t s current structure, but most of this i s out of reach of introspection. At the moment we must content ourselves, as the methodological behaviorist i n s i s t s , with a person's genetic and environmental h i s t o r i e s . What are intros p e c t i v e l y observed are ce r t a i n c o l l a t e r a l products of those h i s t o r i e s . Does this mean that Skinner believes that a l l statements about emotion can be translated, without residue, into statements about behavior? No. F i r s t of a l l , emotions are feelings. Second, even i f one wanted to translate our unexamined statements about feelings into statements about behavior, i t could not be done without changing the meaning. Skinner believes that many of our statements about emotion and other inner causes, p a r t i c u l a r l y as 25 causes of b e h a v i o r , embody a k i n d of w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g t h a t i s m i s l e a d i n g , a n d , n a t u r a l l y , ought to be l e f t o u t : "The e x t r a o r d i n a r y a p p e a l o f i n n e r causes and the accompanying n e g l e c t o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l h i s t o r i e s and c u r r e n t s e t t i n g must be due to more than a l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e . I s u g g e s t tha t i t has the a p p e a l of the a r c a n e , the o c c u l t , the h e r m e t i c , the m a g i c a l - - the se m y s t e r i e s which have h e l d so i m p o r t a n t a p o s i t i o n i n the h i s t o r y of human t h o u g h t . I t i s the a p p e a l o f an a p p a r e n t l y i n e x p l i c a b l e power, i n a w o r l d which seems to l i e beyond the senses and the r e a c h of r e a s o n . I t i s the a p p e a l s t i l l en joyed by a s t r o l o g y , numero logy , p a r a p s y c h o l o g y and p s y c h i c a l r e s e a r c h . " Thus he does not b e l i e v e t h a t s t a tement s about b e h a v i o r and p h y s i o l o g y are a l l we do mean by s ta tements about i n n e r causes of b e h a v i o r ; r a t h e r he t h i n k s t h a t i s a l l we ought to mean: "The e x p l o r a t i o n of the e m o t i o n a l and m o t i v a t i o n a l l i f e of the mind has been d e s c r i b e d as one of the g r e a t ach ievements i n the h i s t o r y of human t h o u g h t , bu t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t i t has been one of the g r e a t d i s a s t e r s . In i t s s e a r c h f o r i n t e r n a l e x p l a n a t i o n , suppor ted by the f a l s e sense of cause a s s o c i a t e d w i t h f e e l i n g s and i n t r o s p e c t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n s , m e n t a l i s m has obscured the e n v i r o n m e n t a l a n t e c e d e n t s which would have l e d to a much 4 more e f f e c t i v e a n a l y s i s . . . " I t i s u s e f u l here to n o t i c e t h a t S k i n n e r ' s opponent seems to be someone v e r y much l i k e Hume, who h o l d s t h a t emot ion i s f e e l i n g b u t f e e l i n g i n some e x t r a - p h y s i c a l s e n s e . In f a c t h i s v iew v e r y much resembles W i l l i a m J a m e s ' . James too wanted to argue t h a t emot ions are f e e l i n g s , and f e e l i n g s are p h y s i o l o g i c a l . L e a v i n g a s i d e f o r the moment my proposed r e v i s i o n of James' v iew there a r e , as we have s e e n , good reasons to r e j e c t the view t h a t emot ions are f e e l i n g s . Wi th r e s p e c t to the v iew t h a t c e r t a i n b e h a v i o r can be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the f e e l i n g s t h a t S k i n n e r c l a i m s c o n s t i t u t e e m o t i o n s , I w i l l a rgue i n P a r t s 2 and 3 t h a t i t w i l l be e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to show t h a t any p a t t e r n or p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r c h a r a c t e r i z e s or i s any more than one o f several behavioral patterns that are not s t r u c t u r a l l y s i m i l a r . This d i f f i c u l t y i s p a r t i c u l a r l y acute in Skinner ' s case, since he does not attempt to make precise the notion of behavior i n use. He offers examples i n which behavior i s character ized by i t s terminating with the achievement of a goal , and behavior patterns that simply have names; such as waving one's arms. There are so many possible ways to behave when one i s in an emotional s tate , some e n t i r e l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c , some with no apparent connection to one's s t a te , some with purposes and some without, some that we would be hard to put to describe i n any coherent way at a l l * , that an analysis l i k e Skinner 's must f a i l because, insofar as i t depends on the claim that cer ta in patterns of behavior corre la te with cer ta in fee l ings , i t f a i l s to account for our experience. As I w i l l argue at some length in Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter,the dif ferences among emotions often l i e i n the dif ferences among the associated be l i e f s rather than behavior pat terns . Again, consider the i dif ference between anger and resentment. Some possible behaviors might e a s i l y be i d e n t i c a l : shaking one's f i s t , u t ter ing threats , attempting in general to do harm. The di f ference l i e s in the associated b e l i e f s : i n resentment, one believes that one has been badly treated and u n f a i r l y * For example, consider the fol lowing passages from Eudora Welty's "June R e c i t a l " : "As she struggled, her round face seemed stretched wider than i t was long by a fee l ing that f a i l ed to match the fee l ing of everybody e l s e . It was not the same as sorrow. Miss Eckhart, a stranger to their cemetary, where none of her people lay , pushed forward with her u n s t y l i s h , winter purse swinging on her arm, and began to nod her head - sharply , to one side and then the o t h e r . . . Her vigorous nods . . . inreasing i n urgency. It was the way she nodded at pupi l s to bring up their rythm, helping out the metronome." 27 treated, while one need not believe one has been u n f a i r l y treated, but only badly treated, to be angry. This suggests that we i d e n t i f y emoitions i n some way other than by behavior. Even i f we say that, for Skinner, emotions are f e e l i n g and behavior i n that some behavior correlates with f e l t physiological states, this problem s t i l l e x i s t s . Part 2; Tolman E.C. Tolman, i n his book Purposive Behavior i n Animals and Men, presents us with a picture of emotion i n which emotions are constituted by patterns of behavior and the feelings connected with that behavior. These patterns can be characterized as behavior whose purpose (determined by the res u l t s of the behavior) i s to bring about certain physiological states, such as the s a t i a t i o n of hunger or the absence of pain, and behavior whose purposes "show" that the organism has "evaluated" the stimuli i n certain ways, by the choice of more and more e f f i c i e n t means through which the purpose may be achieved. Emotions have a character which i s determined by what sort of good or bad consequences one's patterns of behavior demonstrate one to be approaching or avoiding. The kind of behavior Tolman has in mind becomes clearer i n the following passages: Thus fear ... i s distinguished and named, primarily, by virtue of i t s being (i) an avoidance of the physiological disturbance of pain or injury, plus ( i i ) an expectation that the way to avoid such pain or i n j u r y i s by escaping from the sign-object i n question. S i m i l a r l y , rage would be distinguished by virtue of i t s being ( i ) an avoidance of the phys i o l o g i c a l disturbance of blocking or interference, plus ( i i ) an expectation that the way to avoid such blocking i s to destroy the sign-object i n question.^ The feelings involved are the feelings that either occur during the behavior 28 _ due to p h y s i o l o g i c a l change , o r t h a t o c c u r i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h i s b e h a v i o r , a g a i n due to p h y s i o l o g i c a l c h a n g e . We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t f e e l i n g t h e o r i e s have t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s . But the d i f f i c u l t i e s posed by the s t a t u s of f e e l i n g s i n To lman ' s theory a r e c o n n e c t e d to more fundamenta l p r o b l e m s , problems c o n c e r n i n g T o l m a n ' s c l a i m t h a t there are c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o r . I t i s o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y o c c u r i n b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n s t h a t f e e l i n g s have a p l a c e i n T o l m a n ' s v i e w . L e t u s , t h e n , c o n s i d e r these more b a s i c p r o b l e m s . My main c r i t i c i s m i s t h i s : i n o r d e r to make good t h i s p o s i t i o n , we w i l l have to e n l a r g e our d e f i n i t i o n s of the purposes c l a i m e d to be e x h i b i t e d , s u c h as ' i n t e n t i o n to d e s t r o y ' i n anger so enormous ly t h a t they have v i r t u a l l y no m e a n i n g . C o n s i d e r anger (Tolman does not d i s t i n g u i s h between rage and a n g e r ) . Sometimes when someone i s a n g r y , she does p h y s i c a l l y a t t a c k those w i t h whom she i s a n g r y . In a d d i t i o n , some peop le a t t a c k o t h e r s v e r b a l l y , i n t e n d i n g to cause p s y c h o l o g i c a l damage. Sometimes, however, one s i m p l y l e a v e s the room. In t h i s c a s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f one i s r e a l l y a n g r y , such an a c t i o n seems to i n d i c a t e the d e s i r e to a v o i d d e s t r o y i n g o r harming those w i t h whom one i s a n g r y . S i n c e Tolman has no c r i t e r i o n fo r a c t i n g on someth ing o t h e r than a c t u a l l y d o i n g s o , i . e . , he does not t a l k about " s u p p r e s s e d " purposes o r " s u b s t i t u t e " a c t i o n s - t h i s s o r t of a c t i o n would seem to c o n s t i t u t e an e x c e p t i o n , and o c c u r s f r e q u e n t l y enough to be s i g n i f i c a n t . A t t h i s p o i n t , an i n g e n i o u s T o l m a n i t e might answer t h a t l e a v i n g the room i s a way of a f f e c t i n g the p e r s o n w i t h whom one i s angry - i f I want to l e a v e the room, I want to d e p r i v e you of my company, and to want to do so i s to want to d e s t r o y your peace of mind , sense of contentment i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p , e t c . But a g a i n , t h i s seems a l o n g way from Tolman ' s sense o f 29 " d e s t r o y " which has to do w i t h r e n d e r i n g something i n c a p a b l e o f f u r t h e r p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l a c t i o n . Making someone unhappy or u n c o m f o r t a b l e by l e a v i n g the room i s e x t r e m e l y u n l i k e l y to r e n d e r him i n c a p a b l e of f u r t h e r p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l a c t i o n , and i n f a c t i n c r e a s e s the danger o f p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l a c t i o n , s i n c e we may now have someone who may be bo th i n the mood t o a t t a c k and f r u s t r a t e d of an o b j e c t . A t t h i s p o i n t , the b e h a v i o r i s t might say t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n s need r e v i s i o n , b u t t h a t the r e v i s e d d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l name a 0 s e t of b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n s . For example , the b e h a v i o r i s t might say t h a t , though one c o u l d not say t h a t a l l the b e h a v i o r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h anger c o u l d be s a i d to have a d e s t r u c t i v e p u r p o s e , i t c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as b e h a v i o r which i s d e s i g n e d to somehow e l i m i n a t e the s t i m u l u s , whether by d e s t r o y i n g i t o r removing o n e s e l f f rom i t s p r e s e n c e . And perhaps t h i s i s s o . But i f i t i s , what i s there to d i s t i n g u i s h anger f rom, s a y , f e a r , which a l s o i n v o l v e s b e h a v i o r d e s i g n e d t o e l i m i n a t e the s t i m u l u s , whether by f i g h t o r f l i g h t ? W h i l e i t does seem to be p o s s i b l e to make some v e r y g e n e r a l remarks about the a p p r e n t purpose o f b e h a v i o r - one can say f a i r l y c o n f i d e n t l y t h a t some b e h a v i o r i s meant to a v o i d and some to approach - t h i s i s by no means enough, such as the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d d i s t i n c t i o n between anger and r e s e n t m e n t , based on the p r e s e n c e of a b e l i e f about f a i r n e s s i n one which i s no t p r e s e n t i n the o t h e r . I f t h i s s o r t o f b e h a v i o r i s t v iew o f f e r s an i m p o v r i s h e d p i c t u r e of our e m o t i o n a l l i v e s by e l i m i n a t i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s among emot ions , the t h e o r y ought to be r e j e c t e d . There i s ano ther o b j e c t i o n t h a t can be o f f e r e d h e r e , an o b j e c t i o n to T o l m a n ' s c l a i m t h a t the b e h a v i o r i n v o l v e d i n emotions has as i t s purpose an e f f e c t on the s t i m u l u s . C o n s i d e r J a c k , who has had a p a r t i c u l a r l y 30 f r u s t r a t i n g d a y . No s i n g l e f r u s t r a t i n g happening has been e n r a g i n g , b u t s e v e r a l taken t o g e t h e r have produced i n J a c k a r e a l l y f u r i o u s s t a t e . As Jack i s d r i v i n g back t o Richmond a f t e r a h a r d day a t the s t o c k exchange, he s u d d e n l y r e a l i z e s t h a t he f e e l s v e r y angry , and even r e a l i z e s why. He s t r o n g l y wishes t o , e x p r e s s t h i s f e e l i n g and do something to r e l i e v e the t i g h t n e s s i n h i s c h e s t . J a ck b e g i n s to scream a t the top o f h i s l u n g s , s a y i n g e x a c t l y how t e r r i b l e , how aggrava ted he fee l s ' , a n d , a few minute s l a t e r , does i n d e e d f e e l much b e t t e r . H i s b e h a v i o r i s not d e s i g n e d to a f f e c t the s t i m u l i . The s t i m u l i are such t h i n g s as r i s i n g g o l d p r i c e s , the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f the s t o c k m a r k e t , h i s new woman t r a i n e e , s t r a i g h t out of the Wharton S c h o o l a n d , he s u s p e c t s , f a r more i n t e l l i g e n t than h i m s e l f . H i s b e h a v i o r i s p u r e l y e x p r e s s i v e . One cannot say t h a t t h i s b e h a v i o r i s j u s t a s u b s t i t u t e f o r a c t i n g on the s t i m u l u s , because he does not want to a c t on g o l d p r i c e s , the s t o c k market or h i s new t r a i n e e . None of these t h i n g s a l o n e , or even t o g e t h e r , makes h im want to d e s t r o y them. He has s i m p l y a c c u m u l a t e d too much minor i r r i t a t i o n . Quite a l o t o f b e h a v i o r t h a t one a s s o c i a t e s w i t h n e g a t i v e emot ion - the u t t e r i n g of e x p l e t i v e s i n a l o u d tone o f v o i c e , s lamming d o o r s , c r u m p l i n g o n e ' s f i f t h d r a f t i n t o a t i n y b a l l - i s no t p u r p o s i v e i n T o l m a n ' s s e n s e . I t i s n o t d e s i g n e d to a f f e c t the s t i m u l u s , b u t a way o f d e a l i n g w i t h f e e l i n g s o f a g g r a v a t i o n and d e s i g n e d e n t i r e l y f o r o n e ' s own b e n e f i t . P a r t 3; P o s s i b l e p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o r - R e v i s i o n i s t V i e w Suppose we agree t h a t Tolman i s wrong, and t h a t b e h a v i o r does not e x h i b i t a s u f f i c i e n t l y u n i f o r m p a t t e r n of purposes so t h a t we can d i s t i n g u i s h among e m o t i o n s . Does t h i s mean t h a t there are no p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r a t a l l 31 a s s o c i a t e d w i t h emot ions? S u r e l y t h e r e i s some sense i n which b e h a v i o r c o u l d be p a r t o f a c o n c e p t o f e m o t i o n . F o r example , would we not say t h a t some b e h a v i o r can c o n s t i t u t e one of the c r i t e r i a f o r the p re sence of an emotion? I f we would be w i l l i n g to say t h i s , what s o r t o f b e h a v i o r would i t be? L e t us b e g i n by a s k i n g what k i n d of b e h a v i o r a l e v i d e n c e s t r o n g l y i n c l i n e s us to say t h a t someone has an e m o t i o n . Keep ing i n mind our o b j e c t i o n s t o T o l m a n ' s a c c o u n t we can e x c l u d e p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r which e x h i b i t p a r t i c u l a r purposes as the s o l e c a n d i d a t e . But perhaps there are o t h e r p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o r t h a t , t aken t o g e t h e r , c o u l d be seen as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f some e m o t i o n s , and there i s no r ea son t h a t one of these c o u l d n o t be p u r p o s i v e b e h a v i o r . L e t us l ook a t some of these p a t t e r n s . Some p e o p l e have some p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o r t h a t are p e c u l i a r to them and through w h i c h , i f they f e e l confused about t h e i r own s t a t e s , they may a t t r i b u t e emot ions to t h e m s e l v e s . For example , i f I am f e e l i n g a g i t a t e d , c o n f u s e d , and a t the same time n o t i c e t h a t I am m a n i f e s t i n g a s t r o n g tendency t o e a t e v e r y t h i n g I can ge t my hands o n , I may c o n c l u d e from p a s t e x p e r i e n c e t h a t I am angry b u t j u s t d o n ' t want to admit i t to m y s e l f . In a d d i t i o n , we o f t e n a t t r i b u t e emotions to o t h e r s on the b a s i s o f i n d u c t i v e e v i d e n c e ga ined from o u r s e l v e s or them. For example , I may t h i n k t h a t , s i n c e I behave i n c e r t a i n ways when I am a n g r y , you behave i n the same ways . Or I may know you w e l l enough to know t h a t , whenever your f o o t s t a r t s to tap , you are becoming r e a l l y f u r i o u s . In some c a s e s , we would u n h e s i t a t i n g l y a t t r i b u t e anger to someone, even an unknown someone, on the b a s i s of b e h a v i o r . I f her face i s c o n t o r t e d and she i s pounding her f i s t on the t a b l e and s h o u t i n g (and not making a p o l i t i c a l s p e e c h ) , we would u n h e s i t a t i n g l y say t h a t she i s a n g r y . However, we cannot always g e n e r a l i z e so e a s i l y , f o r i t seems t r u e to say that, given the r i g h t story, any behavior could be an expression of any emotion. For example, we generally think of a slap on the face as behavior associated with anger, and of a f r i e n d l y kiss as an indication of a f f e c t i o n . But consider two f o o t b a l l players, slapping each other hard to show they're r e a l l y tough guys, but c l e a r l y understanding between them that this i s a show of a f f e c t i o n between two men who are a f r a i d of being though ' s o f t ' . And consider the episode i n the t e l e v i s i o n s e r i a l " A l l i n the Family" i n which Sammy Davis, J r . gives Archie Bunker, the arch-bigot, a resounding k i s s . I t i s quite clear that the kiss i s an act which springs from anger and the desire for revenge, and as such, an ingenious move. Many more examples l i k e these can be produced, and they undercut the view that, even i f we remove the requirement that behavior be purposive i n a certain set of ways, and even though there may be both what we think of as " t y p i c a l " expressions of emotion, such as scowling and pounding the table, and/or patterns that are regular though i d i o s y n c r a t i c , i t i s also the case that there are a l l sorts of behaviors that are emphatically non-typical and impossible to c l a s s i f y i n their i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y . A somewhat more promising area, from the standpoint of general application, i s the area of f a c i a l expressions, tone of voice, bodily postures and so on. Psychotherapists often form hypotheses on the basis of observing these behavioral features. But not enough i s known about the correlations between, e.g., tones of voice and emotional state. Does i t usually mean someone i s angry i f she speaks i n a high, tight voice? Is someone who holds her body very r i g i d l y usually frightened? The answer to these questions often seems to be yes, and i f there should turn out to be high degrees of c o r r e l a t i o n i n these kinds of cases, perhaps patterns of 33 muscle t e n s i o n s are c o n n e c t e d w i t h e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s . However, no t enough i s known. Some b e h a v i o r c o u l d be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y c a l l e d manners o f b e h a v i o r . What i s most o b v i o u s l y t r u e about s a y i n g t h a t n o t every emot ion i n v o l v e s a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f b e h a v i o r i s t h a t s p e c i f i c k i n d s o f b e h a v i o r , such as s lamming d o o r s , t h r o w i n g t h i n g s , k i c k i n g the dog, e t c . do not always o c c u r , o r t h a t b e h a v i o r cannot i n g e n e r a l be j u s t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as h a v i n g a c e r t a i n purpose or s e t o f p u r p o s e s . I f we assume t h a t there may be some p a t t e r n or p a t t e r n s i n b e h a v i o r , we may be a b l e to a c c o u n t f o r d e v i a t i o n from a p a t t e r n or s e t o f p a t t e r n s by t a k i n g i n t o account the f a c t t h a t some p e o p l e have h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d a b i l i t i e s to c o n t r o l t h e i r i n c l i n a t i o n s or d e s i r e to do the t h i n g s t h a t would e x h i b i t p a t t e r n . I n s t e a d , they do o t h e r t h i n g s , s u c h as s i t t i n g t i g h t - l i p p e d , c l e n c h i n g t h e i r f i s t s , o r s i m p l y l e a v i n g the s i t u a t i o n t h a t has p roduced the a n g e r . In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s t r u e t h a t some p e o p l e c o n t r o l the b e h a v i o r they e x h i b i t a t the time of the a c t u a l i n c i d e n t t h a t has caused the i n n e r s t a t e i n which they f i n d t h e m s e l v e s . For example , i f I am such a p e r s o n , and someone says something to me t h a t I c o n s i d e r i n s u l t i n g , I may not l o u d l y announced t h a t I am a n g r y , or pound on the t a b l e w i t h my f i s t . I may s i m p l y g r i t my t e e t h and walk out of the d o o r . I may, however , when I am a l o n e , mut ter to m y s e l f , stamp my f e e t , e t c . Or I may n o t even do t h a t . I may c o n t i n u e to g r i t my t e e t h , and s i m p l y s i t t e n s e l y r e a d i n g a newspaper . Sometimes c e r t a i n ways o f d o i n g t h i n g s are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c e r t a i n e m o t i o n s . T h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n o r d i n a r y language by the use of a d v e r b i a l emot ion words , e . g . , "She s a d l y walked away. " "He a n g r i l y pu t down h i s b o o k " . There appear to be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ways of p e r f o r m i n g any a c t t h a t i s 34 often i n d i c a t i v e of certain occurent inner states. For example, i f I am angry I may not do some p a r t i c u l a r thing or things, such as door-slamming or foot stamping, but whatever my a c t i v i t y , I do i t with unusual force: I may snap my newspaper, slam plates down on a table, answer questions abruptly, be unusually impatient with can openers that don't work, and so on. One might object that this does not involve any r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between what i s done and how i t i s done, that a l l my examples can be seen as "whats" rather than "hows". That i s , instead of plate slamming being an instance of putting a plate down v i o l e n t l y , plate slamming i s a p a r t i c u l a r b i t of behavior, and the same i s true of newspaper snapping, can opener r a t t l i n g , etc. As far as this objection goes, i t i s true. But i t seems to me to be a matter of choosing one's descriptions most u s e f u l l y . If we adopt my view, we get a pattern, not a l i s t . If we j u s t say that plate-slamming i s a s p e c i f i c kind of behavior, then we have yet another item for the interminable l i s t of kinds of behavior that could express emotion. Furthermore, to just say that plate-slamming and newspaper snapping are s p e c i f i c kinds of behavior i s to ignore an important feature that they have i n common, and which can provide us with an explanation of why these things are done i n apparently counter-productive ways. After a l l , i t takes considerably more energy, and i s much more dangerous to the plates, to slam them down on the table, ad the same i s true of snapping newspapers. This behavior cannot be explained by c i t i n g the usual purposes of these a c t i v i t i e s - getting the table ready for dinner and finding out the hockey scores. But i t can be explained by c i t i n g the connection of manners of behavior with emotion: "She's slamming the plates because she's angry." 35 And f i n a l l y , c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g b e h a v i o r a l phenomena: o f t e n , when someone i s angry , she f i n d s r e l a t i v e l y s u b t l e ways, such as i n s u l t i n g looks or " a c c i d e n t a l " pushes and shoves to do i n d i r e c t l y what she would l i k e to do d i r e c t l y . But sometimes , i n s t e a d , she t i g h t e n s her muscles and p r e v e n t s h e r s e l f from d o i n g a n y t h i n g . T h i s sugges t s t h a t , a t l e a s t i n some ca se s , we would t a l k about " p r i m a r y " and " s e c o n d a r y " b e h a v i o r . The p r i m a r y b e h a v i o r i s the b e h a v i o r t h a t i s o r d i n a r i l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the emot ion ( i f a n y ) , the s e c o n d a r y i s the i n h i b i t i n g b e h a v i o r . T h i s p i c t u r e seems e s p e c i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to anger and g r i e f . These examples sugge s t t h a t , under some c o n d i t i o n s , some k i n d s of b e h a v i o r may be c o n s i s t e n t l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h c e r t a i n e m o t i o n s , though t h i s may o f t e n be e n t i r e l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c . But we must beware of making too much o f t h i s s o r t o f e v i d e n c e : i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g and i n f o r m a t i v e to n o t i c e t h a t , when b o t h p h i l o s o p h e r s and p s y c h o l o g i s t s speak of b e h a v i o r a l components of e m o t i o n s , the examples most f r e q u e n t l y used are examples of anger and g r i e f , o r o f g r e a t j o y and l o v e . These examples are p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p e a l i n g because they are ones i n which the emotions i n v o l v e d are o f t e n p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n s p i c u o u s i n t h e i r spontaneous e x p r e s s i o n . But c o n s i d e r emotions such as awe, a e s t h e t i c b l i s s , r e l i g i o u s t r a n s c e n d e n c e . There are no t y p i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t come to mind f o r such e m o t i o n s , as w e l l as the many o t h e r complex and s u b t l e e m o t i o n s , emot ions which o f t e n have no names, t h a t one e x p e r i e n c e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h o t h e r s , works o f a r t and the i n f i n i t e , n o t to ment ion o n e ' s work, o n e ' s dog or o n e ' s g r a n d m o t h e r ' s c h i n a . Thus we must c o n c l u d e modes t ly t h a t w h i l e i n some cases b e h a v i o r comes i n t o emot ion i n some t y p i c a l ways, there i s a g r e a t d e a l o f unknown t e r r i t o r y here as w e l l . 36 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2 1 . B.F. Skinner, About Behaviorism, (New York:Vintage Books for Random House, 1976), p. 19. 2. Ibid., p. 16. 3. Ibid., p. 178. 4. Ibid., p. 182. 5. Eudora Welty, "June R e c i t a l " i n the Collected Stories of Eudora Welty, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), p. 299. 6. Edward Chace Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men, (N.p.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967). 7. Ibid., p. 267. 37 CHAPTER 3 BELIEFS P a r t 1; A p r o p o s a l on the c o n n e c t i o n of emot ion and b e l i e f I t i s not so much t h a t the emot ion r e s t r i c t s the o b j e c t or the b e l i e f s about the o b j e c t . Rather i t i s t h a t the o b j e c t , o r the b e l i e f s about the o b j e c t , r e s t r i c t s the e m o t i o n . T h a t i s , what e m o t i o n I can f e e l towards an i t e m i n the w o r l d i s r e s t r i c t e d by what I t ake to be t r u e o f t h a t i t e m . ^ . . . w e are not a f r a i d o f x u n l e s s we take x to be dangerous ; we are not angry a t x u n l e s s we take x t o be a c t i n g c o n t r a r y to something we want; we do not have remorse over h a v i n g done x u n l e s s we r e g a r d i t as u n -f o r t u n a t e t h a t we d i d x; we are not g r i e f s t r i c k e n over x u n l e s s we see x as the l o s s o f something we wanted v e r y much; we do not have p i t y f o r x u n l e s s we take x t o be i n an u n d e s i r a b l e s t a t e . . . 2 W i l s o n and A l s t o n expre s s a v iew w h i c h , when deve loped a t g r e a t e r l e n g t h and i n more d e t a i l , I b e l i e v e to be c o r r e c t . For W i l s o n and A l s t o n there i s a c o n c e p t u a l c o n n e c t i o n between h a v i n g an emotion w i t h an o b j e c t , and h a v i n g a b e l i e f about t h a t o b j e c t . No b e l i e f , no e m o t i o n * . T h i s seems to me to be t r u e , and not a c c i d e n t a l l y . That i s , i t i s t rue because , i n g e n e r a l , b e l i e f s o f a c e r t a i n k i n d are i n d e e d the c o n s t i t u e n t s , perhaps the i most i m p o r t a n t c o n s t i t u e n t s , of e m o t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t p a r t i c u l a r emotions and p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s have t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i s i t s e l f an i n d i c a t i o n o f a deeper c o n n e c t i o n , shown by the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of some s t a t e as an emot ion as opposed to, e . g . , a s e n s a t i o n , * I t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t no b e l i e f , no o b j e c t . But t h a t i s not the p o i n t here f o r e i t h e r W i l s o n o r A l s t o n . The i s s u e i s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and l i m i t i n g o f d i s t i n c t e m o t i o n s . 38 by means of the presence of a p a r t i c u l a r sort of b e l i e f . Thus we have two separate but connected tasks before us: the discovery of the connection between p a r t i c u l a r be l i e f s and p a r t i c u l a r emotions, and the discovery of the connection of be l ie f s of a cer ta in kind (to be spec i f ied la ter i n the course of our invest igat ions) and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of some state as an emotion rather than some other state , i n p a r t i c u l a r a sensat ion. Let us now look b r i e f l y at the appropriate methods for answering each of these quest ions. F i r s t of a l l , for procedural reasons we must note that there i s both a conceptual and an empir ica l component involved i n discovering whether s p e c i f i c emotions involve spec i f i c b e l i e f s . However, i n order to answer the empir i ca l quest ion, we must already have some concept of emotion operating: I can ' t say whether each case of being angry involves be l iev ing myself to be hard done by unless I a lready have some concept of anger by means of which to se lec t the examples. Of course I w i l l want to say more about the empir ica l quest ion, and w i l l before I f i n i s h . But I must r e l y on usage as a means of launching an enquiry . If i t does turn out that there are d i f f e rent be l i e f s for each emotion, then we w i l l have a way of d i s t ingu i sh ing emotions from each other: we can d i s t ingu i sh them by means of the various b e l i e f s . The second question i s the more d i f f i c u l t question; i s there any reason to suppose that be l i e f s are indeed a c r u c i a l aspect of the concept of emotion. It i s e s p e c i a l l y important to be c lear about what w i l l count as an answer to this quest ion. How could we t e l l whether emotions always involve some sort of be l i e f ? Again, we must r e l y on an already-act ive concept of emotion, though this time i t i s emotion and not par t i cu la r emotions that i s at i s sue . We do seem to have such a concept, by means of which we d i s t i n g u i s h emotions from other s t a te s . And one feature of this concept i s 39 that there are many d i f f e ren t emotions. Given the concept, they a l l have a s t ructure in common, nevertheless they are var ious . And whatever our .theory about what makes an emotion an emotion, i t must be able to account for t h i s f ea ture . The main d i f f i c u l t i e s with both the fee l ing theories of emotion and the behavior i s t theories i s that , on these views, such var ie ty cannot be accounted f o r . Feelings are not s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n c t from each other to account for these d i f ferences , and behavioral patterns are not cons i s tent enough to form the basis for making these d i s t i n c t i o n s . This suggests that there must be some other way to account for the di f ferences , some other element by means of which we d i s t i n g u i s h emotions from each other . Thus, one way to t e l l whether be l ie f s are part of emotions is to see whether be l i e f s must be present in p a r t i c u l a r emotions and whether they could allow us to account for the number of emotions there seem to be. Let us now look at these two questions i n an order of the appropriateness of which w i l l become, I hope, s e l f - e v i d e n t . Part 2: Be l ie f s as indiv iduators I t i s uncontrovers ia l ly the case that there is a conceptual connection between p a r t i c u l a r be l i e f s and p a r t i c u l a r emotions. That this so can most e a s i l y be seen by looking at the resul t s of denying i t . Suppose I c la im to be a f r a i d , and at the same time claim not to believe myself or someone with whom I f e e l in t imate ly connected to be i n danger. Having made sure I understand the language, you would be j u s t i f i e d in having quite serious reservat ions about my t ruthfu lnes s . This same sort of thing i s true of emotions such as a f f e c t i o n , grat i tude , resentment, anger - the emotions that consi tute the bulk of our d a i l y emotional experience. It i s also true 40 of the more ( s t a t i s t i c a l l y ) unusual emotions, such as extreme aesthetic b l i s s aesthetic distaste, and the emotions that are tied to a particular sort of appreciation of s t y l e , whether personal or aesthetic. If I t e l l you that I was p o s i t i v e l y ravished by Verdi's "Otello", i t would be otiose to ask me whether I found i t p a r t i c u l a r l y sensually bea u t i f u l , and i f I say I f i n d Satie's music simultaneously amusing and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y d e l i g h t f u l , you would not need to ask me whether I thought i t witty. There may be more than one b e l i e f tied to an emotion - for example, when I feel affectionate towards someone, I may believe that he i s endearingly c h i l d l i k e , touchingly attentive and considerate, warm and f r i e n d l y , and so on. These b e l i e f s have i n common that they are positive assessments of someone's personal q u a l i t i e s with respect to my personal preferences i n certain areas of human behavior. I f , rather than centering on someone's treatment of me, my b e l i e f s centered on a po s i t i v e assessment of his treatment of others with respect to l i v i n g up to moral p r i n c i p l e s , the emotion would be moral admiration or respect. (There i s at least one emotion, awe, which w i l l be discussed later, that seems to include quite d i f f e r e n t kinds of b e l i e f s which must occur conjointly, but this i s unusual.) We can advance our case by looking at what seems to me to be a t y p i c a l case of emotional uncertainty: Jack and I l i v e d together for several years, and I broke off the r e l a t i o n s h i p . Recently, we have been seeing each other j u s t as "friends"; I f i n d these encounters trying, but am unable to decide to stop doing i t once and for a l l . Whenever I spend an evening with him, I return home i n an emotional muddle, a muddle based on my i n a b i l i t y to decide how I f e e l , even though I am convinced that i t i s an emotional state of some sort I'm i n - I t r y to decide, using various methods. For example, I examine my physical state: my stomach i s upset, my muscles are t i g h t . But t h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t e i t h e r w i t h anger o r w i t h r e s i s t i n g the p a i n t h a t accompanies a deep f e e l i n g o f p i t y or r e g r e t . Examining my b e h a v i o r , I f i n d m y s e l f sometimes a v o i d i n g him c o m p l e t e l y w h i l e a t o t h e r t imes I want to see h i m . But b o t h of these b e h a v i o r s are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h w a n t i n g to a v o i d a n g e r - p r o v o k i n g or p i t y - e v o k i n g s i t u a t i o n o r , on the o t h e r h a n d , want ing to be w i t h someone i n o r d e r to l e t him know how angry one i s , or to know b e t t e r what h i s needs are so t h a t one can h e l p . In s h o r t , n e i t h e r the e x p e r i e n c e d p h y s i o l o g i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e nor the b e h a v i o r i n v o l v e d can h e l p me d e c i d e which e m o t i o n I f e e l . Of c o u r s e , there i s always the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t I f e e l s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t e l y , b u t the p rob lem s t i l l a r i s e s : I d o n ' t know which i s w h i c h . S i n c e n e i t h e r p e r c e p t i o n o f p h y s i o l o g i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e nor b e h a v i o r w i l l enab le me to d e c i d e which emot ion or emot ions I am h a v i n g , ' I must t u r n to some o t h e r method: I must c o n s u l t my b e l i e f s . Most o f us have had the e x p e r i e n c e of b e i n g u n c e r t a i n about our e m o t i o n s ; we wonder whether we are i n l o v e , angry r a t h e r than s a d . When we t r y to c l a r i f y our f e e l i n g s , we most o f t e n f i n d o u r s e l v e s examin ing our thoughts w i t h an eye to b r i n g i n g i n b e l i e f s : do I l o v e x? I t h i n k h e ' s handsome, he has a l l the major v i r t u e s , h e ' s u s u a l l y e x c e l l e n t and i n t e l l i g e n t company, I f i n d h i s t a s t e i n mus i c c o n g e n i a l and h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n e n t r a n c i n g . C o n s i d e r i n g a l l of these b e l i e f s t o g e t h e r b r i n g s to my a t t e n t i o n t h a t I am d e v e l o p i n g the complex b e l i e f c o n c e r n i n g the e x t r a o r d i n a r y d e s i r a b i l i t y of someone's company, h i s / h e r s u p e r i o r a t t r a c t i v e n e s s (not n e c e s s a r i l y or even u s u a l l y from an o b j e c t i v e s t a n d p o i n t ) and s p e c i a l e m o t i o n a l l i n k to m y s e l f t h a t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of l o v e . I d i s c o v e r t h a t I have these b e l i e f s by b r i n g i n g to my mind the s o r t s o f thoughts I have when I 'm w i t h x t h a t might be r e l e v e n t to my i n q u i r y . 42 Or suppose I'm trying to decide which of two emotions I have, a more complex task: am I f i l l e d with pity or rage? I begin to inspect my thoughts, not i c i n g s p e c i a l l y when I have thoughts about x's character that have to do with his being unpleasant or i n s u l t i n g on the one hand, hard done by or luckless on the other - I t r y to discover what my b e l i e f s are. Consider, too, the evidence provided by the now-familiar pair, anger and resentment. They can e a s i l y involve roughly the same feelings and behavior; the difference between them l i e s i n the b e l i e f . In anger, one simply believes oneself to be hard done by, while i n resentment, one believes oneself to be u n f a i r l y hard done by. The same sort of thing can be said of af f e c t i o n and admiration, sadness and g r i e f . ' The members of these pairs cannot be distinguished unless we bring in b e l i e f s . A l l of this strongly suggests that b e l i e f s provide the means for distinguishing among emotions, a means that i s provided neither by fee l i n g nor by behavior. And i f this i s so, b e l i e f s also provide us with the means for accounting for the great number of emotions we attribute to ourselves. Part 3: Beliefs and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of emotion At the end of Part 1, I suggested that two ways to t e l l whether b e l i e f s are a c r u c i a l part of emotions were to see whether b e l i e f s must be present in p a r t i c u l a r emotions and whether they could allow us to account for the number of emotions there are. Part 2 strongly suggests that they are and they can. Thus we can say tentat i v e l y that to have a bel i e f i s a c r u c i a l part of having an emotion. However, we cannot see just how c r u c i a l b e l i e f s are to emotions u n t i l we look at an example where the issue i s not j u s t which emotion one i s having, but whether one i s having an emotion at a l l . To this 43 e n d , c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g example : I emerge from a f a c u l t y meet ing f e e l i n g p h y s i c a l l y u n c o m f o r t a b l e , w i t h odd s t r a i n e d f e e l i n g s i n my arms and l e g s , and an u p s e t s tomach . A t f i r s t I a sk m y s e l f whether I m i g h t not be g e t t i n g the f l u , a genuine p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h w i n t e r a p p r o a c h i n g accompanied by the u s u a l wet f e e t and d r a f t s . I go home a n d , when I g e t t h e r e , I f i n d m y s e l f d i s p l a y i n g a tendency to s lam doors and p a n s . A g a i n I wonder i f perhaps I 'm n o t coming down w i t h something u n t i l I a l s o n o t i c e t h a t my thoughts keep i n v o l u n t a r i l y wander ing back to the f a c u l t y m e e t i n g , c l u s t e r i n g around the u n a t t r a c t i v e per formance o f one of my c o l l e a g u e s - one of those men who t h i n k s i t ' s a l l r i g h t to make s e x i s t j okes as l ong as he keeps a s s u r i n g one t h a t some of h i s b e s t f r i e n d s are women. A f t e r a s h o r t w h i l e , I b e g i n to take my own thoughts s e r i o u s l y , and I r e a l i z e t h a t i n f a c t I f e e l so odd and am d o i n g e v e r y t h i n g w i t h such e x c e s s i v e f o r c e because I am angry - I f e e l i n s u l t e d by my c o l l e a g u e ' s r e m a r k s . I a l s o r e a l i z e t h a t I have k e p t the r e l e v e n t b e l i e f from m y s e l f because I know i n my h e a r t t h a t , once I am c o n s c i o u s o f h a v i n g the b e l i e f about b e i n g i n s u l t e d , I am go ing to have t o f ace the f a c t t h a t I am f u r i o u s , t h a t I h a v e n ' t r e a l l y " g o t t e n used" to the f r e e - f l o a t i n g sex i sm i n the w o r l d as I t h o u g h t I had , which i n t u r n provokes some d i s t u r b i n g r e f l e c t i o n s (which I would j u s t as soon a v o i d ) about b e i n g i n the p o s i t i o n of b e i n g a j u n i o r f a c u l t y member on temporary appointment who i s u n l i k e l y to be a b l e to g e t away w i t h much l o u d moral i n d i g n a t i o n a t f a c u l t y m e e t i n g s . C l e a r l y i n t h i s c a s e , i t i s the p re sence of b e l i e f t h a t , so to speak , c r y s t a l l i z e s my v a r i e d e x p e r i e n c e s and b e h a v i o r i n t o an e m o t i o n . I t i s when I r e a l i z e t h a t from my p o i n t o f v iew I have been t r e a t e d c r u d e l y , n a s t i l y , and d i s r e s p e c t f u l l y t h a t I b e g i n to f e e l angry , t h a t I c a n e x p l a i n why I seem to be unable to c l o s e a door w i t h o u t slamming i t . F u r t h e r m o r e , 44 the very fa c t that I have chosen at some le v e l to deceive myself by keeping the relevent b e l i e f from myself (instead of, for example, preventing myself from noticing how p h y s i c a l l y odd I feel) i s an indication that at some l e v e l I know.quite well what part b e l i e f plays i n emotion. Consider, also, the emotions, e s p e c i a l l y the more subtle and complex ones, that have no names. For example, there i s the emotion that involves one's acceptance of l i f e ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s and at the same time the conviction that one's e f f o r t s are worthwhile, together with strong but d i f f i c u l t to describe f e e l i n g s . Or consider the following complex and unnameable emotion: ... t h i s beauty, this exquisite beauty, and the tears f i l l e d his eyes as he looked at the smoke words languishing and melting in the sky and bestowing upon him, in their inexhaustible charity and laughing goodness, one shape after another of unimagineable beauty and s i g n a l l i n g t h e i r intention to provide him, for nothing, for ever, for looking merely, with beauty, more beauty! Tears ran down his cheeks. ^  This emotion seems to be partly gratitude, p a r t l y aesthetic pleasure, p a r t l y some sort of mystical experience. It has no name, though i t certainly seems to be an emotion. We can i d e n t i f y i t as such by the presence of certain b e l i e f s , which supplement the feelings and behavior present: that something i s b e a u t i f u l , that something i s charitable and good, added to one of the most common behavioral components of emotion, tears and, by implication, f e e l i n g , since the use of the.words "languishing" and "melting" seem to imply those feelings on the part of the subject. I suggest that, i f we knew only of the crying and the feelings of melting and languishing, we would be reluctant to c a l l this an emotion, and would be l i k e l y to ascribe the behavior and feelings to some physiological disturbance: drunkenness, perhaps. (Though of course drunkenness i t s e l f does not, as we a l l know, preclude the genuine experience of emotion.) 45 When we ask whether b e l i e f s are a component o f e m o t i o n , we can a l s o see t h i s as a q u e s t i o n about the c o n s t i t u t e n t s of emot ion as opposed to s e n s a t i o n s o r f e e l i n g s a l o n e . Anthony K e n n y 4 , whose views we w i l l d i s c u s s l a t e r , was e x t r e m e l y concerned about t h i s q u e s t i o n . I f i t i s t r u e , as i t seems to be , t h a t b e l i e f s are a c r u c i a l component o f e m o t i o n s , t h e i r p re sence w i l l enab le us to d i s t i n g u i s h between emot ions and s e n s a t i o n s . Emotions i n v o l v e b e l i e f s , w h i l e s e n s a t i o n s do n o t . That i s to s ay , b e l i e f s are an e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t of s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g an e m o t i o n , w h i l e they are not an e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t o f s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g a s e n s a t i o n . Of c o u r s e , one may have thoughts or b e l i e f s w h i l e one i s h a v i n g a s e n s a t i o n , and i t may even be a t h o u g h t or b e l i e f about the s e n s a t i o n . But the absence of such thoughts or b e l i e f s w i l l not damage the c r e d e n t i a l s of c e r t a i n t i n g l e s or b u r n i n g s as s e n s a t i o n s . However, i n the case o f e m o t i o n s , the b e l i e f s i n v o l v e d are c r u c i a l . W i t h o u t them, whatever f e e l i n g s one has c o u l d as e a s i l y be symptoms o f the f l u , and the b e h a v i o r would be ambiguous . The b e l i e f s i n v o l v e d are the i n d i v i d u a t o r s , and whatever f e e l i n g s or b e h a v i o r are c o n n e c t e d w i t h those b e l i e f s ( i n ways to be d i s c u s s e d a t g r e a t l e n g t h ) a re the ones t h a t are p a r t o f the e m o t i o n . T h a t b e l i e f s are c r u c i a l f o r the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l emotions g i v e s them c o n s i d e r a b l e impor tance i n the c o n c e p t of e m o t i o n . S i n c e the c o n c e p t o f emot ion must i n c l u d e the f e a t u r e s common to e m o t i o n s , and s i n c e t h i s f e a t u r e , the n e c e s s a r y pre sence of b e l i e f s i n o r d e r to i n d i v i d u a t e e m o t i o n s , i s common to e m o t i o n s , we w i l l want to i n c l u d e i t i n the g e n e r a l c o n c e p t of e m o t i o n . Does t h i s mean t h a t e v e r y emot ion must have a b e l i e f o f the r e q u i s i t e k i n d ? C l e a r l y , the p r e s e n c e of b e l i e f s i s n e c e s s a r y fo r i n d i v i d u a t i o n ; however, i t may be o b j e c t e d t h a t some e m o t i o n s , such as 46 v i o l e n t rage or intense passions of various kinds seem, from a purely exper i en t i a l standpoint, not to have much cognit ive content. Here "not much" i s the key. There i s no doubt that i n some emotions, b e l i e f s are considerably less prominent than others . I t may well be that sometimes I am much more aware of the phys io log i ca l upheaval taking place than my evaluative b e l i e f or b e l i e f s . But there i s no reason to suppose that fee l ing destroys reason; no matter how angry I am, i f asked I w i l l be able to say why, unless I am confused about my own states or am i n the grip of an unconscious emotion. On the other hand, i n some emotions the evaluative component may be extremely prominent and the fee l ing and behavioral ( i f any) much l e s s . I f I f ind myself deeply moved by Spinoza's views on the human cond i t ion , I w i l l undoubtedly have i n mind very complex evaluat ions , and the fee l ing component 5 w i l l be somewhat less prominent. One of the consequences of this view i s that , i f emotions involve b e l i e f s , and be l i e f s involve concepts, then having emotions depends on being able to have at l ea s t some concepts. That i s , i f I cannot have the concept of being treated u n f a i r l y , then I cannot fee l r e s e n t f u l . And, i f we assume that having a great many concepts involve speaking a language, we seem to be committed to the view that, where there i s no language, there i s no resentment, aesthet ic joy and so on. Though I am i n c l i n e d to say that this jus t i s the case, i t i s , I think, preferable to remain agnost ic . One wants to remain agnostic here from ignorance rather than phi losophica l cowardice, ignorance i n the fol lowing sense: while i t i s poss ible to imagine some being behaving i n a way that would lead us to bel ieve that she i s angry, i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to imagine anyone's being able to communicate, n o n - l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , some set of be l i e f s such as those expressed i n the 47 pas sage from M r s . D a l l o w a y . A n d , s i n c e t h i s i s the c a s e , one s i m p l y d o e s n ' t know whether i t i s p o s s i b l e to have c e r t a i n concep t s n o n - l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , thus c e r t a i n b e l i e f s . G i v e n the b e h a v i o r i s t l i t e r a t u r e , i n which o n l y a few emot ions are a t t r i b u t e d to an ima l s through t h e i r b e h a v i o r , we can say t h a t , i n the case of a n i m a l s , we tend not to b e l i e v e t h a t they have emotions o t h e r than the ones f o r which f i r m b e h a v i o r a l c r i t e r i a have been s e t . S i n c e f i r m b e h a v i o r a l c r i t e r i a have been s e t o n l y f o r emotions such as rage and a sense o f s a t i s f a c t i o n , emot ions where there i s o b v i o u s c o n s i s t e n t b e h a v i o r such as t h r o w i n g o n e s e l f a g a i n s t the bar s o f a cage or c e a s i n g to e a t , v e r y few emotions are a t t r i b u t e d to a n i m a l s . Thus the most we can say i s t h a t the more complex the b e l i e f s , the l e s s l i k e l y a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e i n g i s to be • a b l e to communicate them, thus the l e s s l i k e l y i t i s t h a t we can know them. P a r t 4 : More L i g h t Our d i s c u s s i o n on b e l i e f s i n c l u d e d examples o f the t e c h n i q u e s one sometimes uses f o r c l a r i f y i n g e m o t i o n a l c o n f u s i o n . We have seen how e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t b e l i e f s are f o r e m o t i o n s , we can see why d i s c o v e r i n g them i s h e l p f u l . We have been a b l e to e x p l a i n a phenomenon connec ted w i t h e m o t i o n a l c o n f u s i o n : we are sometimes r e l u c t a n t to a t t r i b u t e emotions t o o u r s e l v e s a t a l l u n l e s s we know what our b e l i e f s a r e . One may be e x p e r i e n c i n g d i s t u r b i n g p h y s i o l o g i c a l change , and e x h i b i t i n g b e h a v i o r t h a t s u r p r i s e s even o n e s e l f and , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t may never c r o s s o n e ' s mind t h a t one i s i n an e m o t i o n a l s t a t e u n l e s s one becomes c l e a r l y aware of the r e l e v a n t b e l i e f s . In l i g h t o f t h i s , I s u g g e s t t h a t i n cases where peop le seem c o n v i n c e d t h a t they are i n some e m o t i o n a l s t a t e , such as i n the example on p . 40 , b u t seem u n c l e a r about t h e i r b e l i e f s , i t i s because these cases 48 s u f f i c i e n t l y resemble complete cases, cases where be l ie f s are present to cause one to associate these cases with the other more complete cases. Perhaps the context i s the same - perhaps one f e l t the same way the l a s t time one heard a speech by Jack Horner or attended the CPA. Perhaps the same people are invo lved . But whatever the cue, there i s an associat ion of these cases with the others, and through this a s soc ia t ion , an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of one 1 s s t a te . F i n a l l y , an account of another puzzl ing phenomenon. I t may seem, j u s t from an e x p e r i e n t i a l standpoint, that be l i e f s do not individuate emotions because the feel ings involved seem so int imate ly associated with the be l i e f s that i t i s almost as i f there are as many d i f f e rent feelings as b e l i e f s . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of people who have a great many aesthetic experiences, which often tend to be more complex, from the standpoint of b e l i e f s , than resentment or a f f e c t i o n . Such people may be tempted to say that i t i s a l l very well to say that feel ings do not ind iv idua te , nevertheless one's experience i s of unique, though sometimes, e lu s ive , f e e l i n g s . I have a great deal of sympathy with this ob jec t ion , but I think i t can be met without adding to our theory. Let us begin by reminding ourselves that emotions are, among other things, states of consciousness, and being conscious i s a noisy business . At any given moment of consciousness, not only are there the components of whatever the center of one's a t tent ion happens to be at the time but a great many other thoughts and memories, plus various images ( in some cases - some people claim to have no images at a l l ) . Even i f I am f i l l e d with resentment and have the appropriate b e l i e f , s t i l l I have various thoughts and images i n the background - my grocery l i s t , the dream I had l a s t night , and so on. And, i n cases where my emotions concern 49 m a t t e r s v e r y i m p o r t a n t to me, such as the s t a t e of my m a r r i a g e or the death o f one of my p a r e n t s , t h e r e are a g r e a t many a s s o c i a t i o n s and memories t h a t a r e a t t a c h e d , so to speak , to the r e l e v a n t b e l i e f s . For example , suppose I am f e e l i n g g r i e f about my m o t h e r ' s d e a t h . When I t h i n k of her f u n e r a l , and have the b e l i e f t h a t I w i l l miss her a g r e a t d e a l , I f i n d a t t a c h e d to my thought s o f her v a r i o u s a s s o c i a t i o n s - images o f myse l f as a c h i l d , o f b i r t h d a y s and h o l i d a y s , s i t t i n g on her l a p , and so o n . These images and thoughts are accompanied o f t e n n o t by d i s t i n c t f e e l i n g s , b u t by f l u c t u a t i o n s i n f e e l i n g . I may f e e l more and l e s s t i g h t n e s s i n my s tomach, p a i n i n my s o l a r p l e x u s , e t c . , as w e l l as the s u b t l e r and l e s s d i s t i n c t l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y l o c a t a b l e f e e l i n g s . A l l o f t h i s s e t s up a v e r y complex s t a t e of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . In the case of a e s t h e t i c e m o t i o n s , the s i t u a t i o n i s even more c o m p l i c a t e d . Suppose one i s l i s t e n i n g to D i e W a l k i i r e . When Wotan says f a r e w e l l t o B r u n n h i l d e , one has b e l i e f s no t o n l y about the events i n the o p e r a , b u t a s s o c i a t e d b e l i e f s about f a t h e r - d a u g h t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , m u s i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s o f such a s i t u a t i o n , o t h e r h e a r i n g s o f D i e Walku're, v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f myth , and so o n . Thus i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t peop le sometimes b e l i e v e themse lves to have unique f e e l i n g s t a t e s . In f a c t , the s i t u a t i o n i s so complex , o n e ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s so f i l l e d w i t h b e l i e f s and f e e l i n g s t h a t i t becomes d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y between thought and f e e l i n g . But we ought not to confuse t h i s c o m p l e x i t y w i t h unique f e e l i n g s t a t e s , f o r , as we have seen , t h i s v iew i s m i s t a k e n : Schachte r and S i n g e r argue t h a t there are no unique f e e l i n g s t a t e s , and I have argued t h a t emot ions are n o t c h a r a c t e r i z e d by unique f e e l i n g s t a t e s . 50 Part 5: Be l i e f s and desires Suppose we say that be l i e f s are a c r u c i a l component i n emotion. How far does this take us toward a general theory of emotion? It takes us a very short way. We do not yet know what sorts of be l ie f s they are, nor do we know what the i r r e l a t i onsh ip i s to the rest of the components of emotion. Both of these questions w i l l be taken up i n th i s s e c t i o n . So far i n Chapter 3, I have discussed be l ie f s as a component of emotion. I have argued that the conceptual l i n k between be l i e f s and emotions i s an i n d i c a t i o n that be l ie f s are c r u c i a l components of emotions. I have given examples, but have not yet talked i n any d e t a i l about what types of b e l i e f s these b e l i e f s are . The fol lowing passage from Wil l i am Al s ton ' s "Emotion and Fee l ing " w i l l be he lp fu l in se t t ing the stage for this d i scus s ion ; Al s ton ' s charac ter iza t ion of the be l ie f s involved i n emotion i s s t ra ightforward, and can form a basis for the development of a thorough-going account: . . . l e t us standardize our terminology for the cognit ive f ac to r . Many theoris t s employ terms l i k e ' judgment', ' a p p r a i s a l ' , or ' e v a l u a t i o n ' . These can be mis-leading i f they are taken to imply a conscious formulation of a judgment; a f ter a l l , one can be frightened by something without having time to say to oneself , 'That i s dangerous.' On this count, terms l i k e 'apprehension' or ' r e c o g n i t i o n ' are pre ferab le . Perhaps the most judic ious choice would be 'perceive x as . . . ' or 'take x to b e . . . ' , with the under-standing that ' perce ive ' i s being used i n a wide sense which is not r e s t r i c t e d to sense data, but can involve memory b e l i e f , and i n t e l l e c t u a l r e a l i -zat ion as w e l l . For a general character iza t ion of what the subject of an emotion takes x to be, we have s l ipped into the terms ' d e s i r a b l e ' and 'undes i rable ' . These seem preferable to the more t r a d i t i o n a l contrast of 'good' and ' e v i l ' , which today has too narrow a conotat ion, or such terms as ' b e n e f i c i a l ' and 'harmfu l ' , which are not s u f f i c i e n t l y w i d e . . . Since the term 'eva luat ion ' can be used for taking something to be desirable or 51 undesirable, we s h a l l henceforth refer to this factor as a perceptual evaluation of something, or to be s t i l l more concise, simply an evaluation of something.** I t w i l l be h e l p f u l to c l a r i f y two points in the foregoing, both having to do with terminology. F i r s t , we must be very c a r e f u l with the formulation "perceive x as desirable or undesirable", since "perceive" here i s used, as Alston says, to characterize experiences ranging from having sense-data to remembering. We must be care f u l because i t i s important to keep i n mind that in fact this "perceiving" can be, in part, the possession and use of a highly complex set of b e l i e f s . We do not want to minimize the role played by thought and evaluation. I suspect that Alston chose "perceive" p a r t l y in order to do j u s t i c e to f i r s t - p e r s o n experience; sometimes, especially with very strong emotions, we do seem for example to see someone's bad intentions towards us i n his face, even though he may look quite ordinary to others. It seems to me more useful i n talking about this component of emotion to use the term " b e l i e f s " rather than "perception", and I w i l l do so hereafter. Second, Alston says we need not be conscious of formulating a judgment, since we may not have time for r e f l e c t i o n . This is c e r t a i n l y true in cases of, say, fear of an attacking bear. But i t i s also true that many of these evaluations take place below the l e v e l of consciousness even i f one has a great deal of time for r e f l e c t i o n . Large numbers of our emotions have to do with our personal relationships, and our evaluations of other people as, e.g., possible friends, are often performed at such a deep level that they seem completely i n t u i t i v e ; one i s only conscious of an emotional p u l l , or unusual f e e l i n g of i n t e r e s t , associated with rather vague and simple b e l i e f s 52 concerning, e.g., "attractiveness". It i s misleading to suppose that, i f only we had enough time, a l l our evaluations would be conscious. F i n a l l y , a word of caution about "evaluation": there i s a temptation, when faced with the word "evaluation", to suppose that whatever evaluation i s going on i s from a moral or aesthetic standpoint, since these are familiar values. But evaluation can take place from the standpoint of any desire or goal. Thus, when we talk about evaluation, we w i l l be talking about some kind of measuring or appraising i n terms of something desired. I w i l l use "evaluation" and "assessment", interchangeably. A l l this w i l l become clearer below. Part 6 : Desires: the basis for evaluation Emotions occur when something matters to us. If I become angry or hurt when Charles i s unkind to me, i t i s a clear i n d i c a t i o n that his affection or at least his concern for my feelings i s important to me. Depending on who we are, i t i s of great importance to us that we have creative work, material security, aesthetic experiences, goodwill, physical beauty, a happy and loving family l i f e , and probably a great many other things. That i s to say, we care about these things. "Care" here i s contrasted to in d i f f e r e n c e . Our caring about kindness, material security, creative work, etc., can be explained i n terms of our having very strong desires for these things. People often express these desires verbally i n , for example, explanation of their actions. Furthermore, talking i n terms of desires helps us explain emotional response because i t introduces, by implication, the notion of s a t i s f a c t i o n . We can t e l l that the thoughts we have about love, material security and c r e a t i v i t y are desires and not j u s t speculations, etc., by 53 noting that they can be s a t i s f i e d . Richard Wollheim d i f f e r e n t i a t e s desires from sensations i n the following way, which also applies to d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g desires from any other kind of mental a c t i v i t y : In the case of a sensation, there are two possible outcomes. The sensation p e r s i s t s , or i t ceases. In the case of a desire, there are three outcomes. The desire p e r s i s t s , i t ceases, or i t i s s a t i s f i e d . The thi r d p o s s i b i l i t y i s opened up, I claim, by the e s s e n t i a l association of a desire with a thought, so that what matches the thought s a t i s f i e s the desire. This does not mean that, i f one desires something, one knows what w i l l s a t i s f y one's desires, for one might not know that associated thought. Indeed, i t might be that i t i s only when the desire i s s a t i s f i e d that one knows what one desired... v S i m i l a r l y , a man may come to know what he wants to say only when he finds the words for i t ; which does not mean that he makes do with, or that he merely does not look beyond those words. 'That was what I was looking for a l l the time' can be used to mark a discovery.® When we actually have love, are engaged i n creative a c t i v i t y , have material security, we f e e l s a t i s f i e d . I t i s not j u s t that the thoughts about these things p e r s i s t or stop, or that we find some way to make them stop. And i f we do not have these things, we f e e l , i n various ways, d i s s a t i s f i e d . We f e e l frustrated or, i f we are refused or rejected by others, we feel resentful or angry. Part 7: Desires and aesthetic emotions One may say: i t i s a l l very well to connect the emotions we experience i n human relationships with desires, and even the emotions we experience when we suffer career setbacks or successes, but what about aesthetic emotions? Would one want to say that people have a desire or desires for aesthetic experience, and that when aesthetic emotions occur this desire or these desires are being f u l f i l l e d ? This i s a d i f f i c u l t objection to answer j u s t 54 because t h e r e i s so much l e s s e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e here than i n the case o f the emot ions t h a t take p l a c e i n p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . A g r e a t many p e o p l e , even i n t e l l i g e n t and s o p h i s t i c a t e d p e o p l e , spend l i t t l e t ime on the a r t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e are some s u g g e s t i v e t h i n g s t h a t can be s a i d . F i r s t , a f e e l i n g o f enormous g r a t i f i c a t i o n and s a t i s f a c t i o n i s common-i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e s . For example, sometimes one f i n d s works not o n l y b e a u t i f u l bu t somehow i l l u m i n a t i n g , and f e e l s a k i n d o f c l e a r -headed p l e a s u r e t o g e t h e r w i t h h a v i n g v a r i o u s s u b t l e and complex b e l i e f s , and an u n d e r l y i n g f e e l i n g o f g r e a t s a t i s f a c t i o n . T h i s f e e l i n g o f s a t i s f a c t i o n i s so p e r v a s i v e i n a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e t h a t one i s i n c l i n e d to t h i n k t h a t , as i n p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e r e are d e s i r e s i n v o l v e d . In f a c t , I s t r o n g l y s u s p e c t t h a t i t i s the u n f a m i l i a r i t y of a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e , and the r e s u l t a n t l a c k of f a m i l i a r t e r m i n o l o g y , such as " a n g e r " , " g r a t i t u d e " , e t c . , t h a t makes the c o n n e c t i o n between a e s t h e t i c emotions and d e s i r e s appear t e n u o u s . I f we do i d e n t i f y the d e s i r e s v i a the s a t i s f a c t i o n s , a e s t h e t i c d e s i r e s are e x t r e m e l y complex , perhaps even more complex than the d e s i r e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h human r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In the case o f m u s i c , f o r example , there i s the s a t i s f a c t i o n h a v i n g to do w i t h f o r m a l q u a l i t i e s , s a t i s f a c t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from e x p r e s s i o n or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s , s a t i s f a c t i o n s h a v i n g to do w i t h h e a r i n g c e r t a i n sounds . There are even some who c l a i m to f e e l s a t i s f i e d by a m u s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of some v iew of the w o r l d . However, there i s no reason t h a t t h i s s h o u l d not be so , t h a t a e s t h e t i c d e s i r e s s h o u l d not a t l e a s t be a t l e a s t as complex, i f not more than d e s i r e s h a v i n g to do w i t h human r e l a t i o n s h i p s . There i s one s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n about a e s t h e t i c e m o t i o n s : there i s a whole range of emotions t h a t have to do w i t h p e o p l e ' s i n t e n t i o n s towards us 55 and how we wish to be treated that w i l l not appear among aesthetic emotions. For example, even i f I very much d i s l i k e some of Bruckner's works, and fin d them i r r i t a t i n g l y d erivative, I am not angry with Bruckner for writing them, and I am not angry with his music since i n the ordinary way, I am only angry with human agents about whose intentions towards me and/or whose part I take to be bad. Writing music I d i s l i k e does not constitute bad intentions towards me, perhaps no intentions towards me or any one at a l l . However, again, the fact that aesthetic emotions d i f f e r from the emotions involved in personal relationships i n that they are, so to speak, one-sided, seems no reason to say that their structure i s any d i f f e r e n t from the emotions involved i n personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s . y 0 Part 8: Evaluation Given what I have said about the connection between emotions and desire, we can now begin to see what Alston means when he says: For a general characterization of what the subject of an emotion takes x to be, we have slipped into the terms 'desirable' and 'undesirable'. We can also begin to see why he c a l l s this process "evaluation". If having some emotions rather than other i s related to the extent to which our desires are f u l f i l l e d or f a i l to be f u l f i l l e d , then i t seems natural to characterize the b e l i e f element as perceiving something or someone as desirable or undesirable. We w i l l i n fact seem our relationships to other people or states of a f f a i r s i n terms of these desires. Furthermore, we can see why Alston might want to use the term "evaluation", since i f we have b e l i e f s about the extent to which our desires are f u l f i l l e d or u n f u l f i l l e d , we must arriv e at these b e l i e f s by comparing what we have to what we want or, to put 56 i t ano ther way, by measur ing what we have i n terms of what we want . These wants w i l l , o f c o u r s e , v a r y from p e r s o n to p e r s o n , w i t h r e s p e c t to how much we want something as opposed to something e l s e . For example , a g r e a t many of my d e s i r e s may f i t i n t o the c a t e g o r y " d e s i r e f o r a f f e c t i o n and f r i e n d s h i p " , w h i l e r e l a t i v e l y few of my d e s i r e s may f i t i n t o the c a t e g o r y " d e s i r e f o r m a t e r i a l s e c u r i t y " . Some p e o p l e seem to want a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e s more than a n y t h i n g , some peop le want i n t e l l e c t u a l p u r s u i t s , and most o f us want some s o r t o f mora l o r d e r . I t d o e s n ' t mat ter which d e s i r e s are i n q u e s t i o n . As l o n g as t h i s compar ing o r measur ing i s t a k i n g p l a c e , we have e v a l u a t i o n . We now need to ask e x a c t l y what p a r t of t h i s e v a l u a t i o n p l a y s i n e m o t i o n s , and how the b e l i e f s t h a t I have argued are components of emotions are r e l a t e d to e v a l u a t i o n . There are three main e lements i n e v a l u a t i o n : (1) my b e l i e f s about the f a c t s - which i s a c t u a l l y h a p p e n i n g , how someone i s b e h a v i n g , what h e r / h i s i n t e n t i o n s are (2) w h i c h d e s i r e s o f mine a p p l y to the s i t u a t i o n , the c r i t e r i a fo r t h e i r b e i n g f u l f i l l e d , and my b e l i e f s about what s o r t s o f b e h a v i o r , i n t e n t i o n s , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f works o f a r t , a n d / o r s t a t e s of a f f a i r s i n the w o r l d count as f u l f i l l i n g these c r i t e r i a . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h between my c r i t e r i a f o r the f u l f i l l i n g o f my d e s i r e s and my b e l i e f s about which b e h a v i o r , i n t e n t i o n s , e t c . , c o u n t as f u l f i l l i n g them, f o r p e o p l e may have i d e n t i c a l views about the former and w i d e l y v a r y i n g views about the l a t t e r . For example , you and I may both have as c r i t e r i a f o r f u l f i l l i n g our d e s i r e s f o r good w i l l t h a t o t h e r p e o p l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y our n e a r e s t and d e a r e s t , t r e a t us w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Yet you may b e l i e v e t h a t i t counts as t r e a t i n g someone w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n to i n t e r r u p t her work i n o r d e r to t e l l her t h a t there i s an opera on t e l e v i s i o n , and I may c o n s i d e r i t 57 t e r r i b l y inconsiderate and f l y into a rage. What we count as considerate, kind, f a i r , etc., has a great deal to do wilih. our ind i v i d u a l psychological h i s t o r i e s , our tastes and preferences. Disagreements between people about what f u l f i l l s these c r i t e r i a often cause great damage to re l a t i o n s h i p s , j u s t because each person believes his/her c r i t e r i a to be conspicuously correct, or even the only reasonable ones. "But I thought you liked opera - I thought you'd be pleased!" "Can't you see I'm working and don't want to be interrupted?" This d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l turn out to be extremely important when we talk about j u s t i f i c a t i o n . (3) the product of the evaluation - the b e l i e f which I have that i s actually part of an occurrent emotion, such as "I am i n serious danger", "I consider your behavior i n s u l t i n g " , "What a lovely and harmonically i n t e r e s t i n g passage." This product i s the r e s u l t of the application of my c r i t e r i a for f u l f i l l i n g my desires and b e l i e f s about what counts as meeting these c r i t e r i a , to my b e l i e f s about and interpretations of the f a c t s . That I l i s t these things i n order does not mean that they happen, temporally, i n order, though of course the product of the evaluation does, of necessity, occur after the application of the c r i t e r i a to the b e l i e f s about events. What I want to emphasize i s that we already have the desires, with the c r i t e r i a attached, i f we think of these desires as general or d i s p o s i t i o n a l , or, i f we think of, e.g., "the desire for goodwill" as a complex of p a r t i c u l a r desires, the desire i s , i n connection with events i n the world, what activates the whole process. For example suppose I am attending, unwillingly, a departmental lunch, but my mind i s r e a l l y on my work. I manage to make p o l i t e conversation during lunch, but I am r e a l l y thinking of my work a l l the while. I am l i s t e n i n g to what's being said in a 58 h a l f - h e a r t e d way, and I hear one of my c o l l e a g u e s say to me "Why d o n ' t you d r e s s up more f o r t e a c h i n g ? I c a n ' t under s t and why a l l women d o n ' t wear d r e s s e s to work - i t improves the s c e n e r y so m u c h . " O r d i n a r i l y , t h i s s o r t o f remark f a i l s s e v e r e l y to meet my c r i t e r i a f o r what counts as o r d i n a r y g o o d w i l l . However, I am so p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h my work t h a t I d o n ' t even b o t h e r t o answer and i n f a c t I d o n ' t even f e e l p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s u l t e d s i m p l y because , a t the moment, my mind i s a lmos t c o m p l e t e l y e l s e w h e r e . My d e s i r e f o r g o o d w i l l i s n ' t v e r y a c t i v e a t the moment, s i n c e t h e r e ' s o n l y room i n my mind f o r a c e r t a i n amount o f a c t i v i t y a t any g i v e n t i m e . In t h i s s ense , the v a r i o u s d e s i r e s a c t i v i a t e the p r o c e s s by b e i n g o p e r a t i v e a t the t i m e . I f I go to a p a r t y w i t h the expres s i n t e n t o f meet ing e l i g i b l e men, and the e l i g i b l e men whom I c o n s i d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c a n d i d a t e s t r e a t me i n a manner t h a t f a i l s to meet my s t andards f o r what count s as g o o d w i l l , t h e n I w i l l p r o b a b l y be h u r t or a n g r y . But i f my mind i s on ray work and I go to the p a r t y under p r o t e s t , w i t h no i n t e r e s t i n men e l i g i b l e or o t h e r w i s e , I w i l l p r o b a b l y be i n d i f f e r e n t . I f the d e s i r e i s p r e s e n t , the c r i t e r i a are a l s o p r e s e n t , and i f n o t , n o t . I f I am i n the p r o c e s s of chang ing my mind about the c r i t e r i a , o r am u n c e r t a i n about my d e s i r e s , I may have to a c t u a l l y t h i n k about whether my f e e l i n g s are h u r t , b u t t h i s i s f a i r l y u n u s u a l . T h i s i s , of c o u r s e , an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . U s u a l l y more than one d e s i r e i s a c t i v e , s i n c e l i f e i s c o m p l i c a t e d and d e s i r e s are many. I o f f e r these examples fo r the sake o f making the p o i n t t h a t i t i s the d e s i r e s t h a t p a r t l y de termine t h a t the p r o c e s s t akes p l a c e , and do not o c c u r a f t e r the b e l i e f s about b e h a v i o r , i n t e n t i o n s , and so o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , a l l t h i s happens v e r y q u i c k l y and o f t e n a t a s e m i - c o n s c i o u s l e v e l . My e v a l u a t i o n s are r a r e l y l a b o r i o u s p r o c e s s e s whose e v e r y s t e p I c a n observe u n l e s s I am a t t e m p t i n g to r e t r a c e my 59 evaluative steps. C l e a r l y , not every element of this process i s present in an occurent emotion. Only the l a s t element - the b e l i e f that i s yielded by the a p p l i c a t i o n of of the c r i t e r i a , i s present. We w i l l return to these elements when we discuss j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I t might be objected here that, in some cases, the b e l i e f s we seem to have when we have emotions are not evaluative at a l l ; they do not seem to have any element that could only have been yielded by some evaluation. For example, suppose someone walks up to me and h i t s me squarely on the jaw. The b e l i e f that I have, insofar as the b e l i e f is that thought which I have in my mind, i s j u s t "You h i t me!", and this does not contain any element of evaluation. However, i f we examine the thought c a r e f u l l y , we w i l l see that i t i s r e a l l y a kind of shorthand for an extremely complex set of b e l i e f s that might be something l i k e the following: "You h i t me and I am outraged at your u n c i v i l i z e d and unpleasant behavior", which is c l e a r l y evaluative in the r e q u i s i t e manner. Another possible exception i s emotional experience connected with music. It has been suggested to me that emotional experience connected with music need contain no evaluations and often does not, though of course people who think a great deal about music may apply some l a t e r . Perhaps there are two components to musical experience: a basic component, which is constituted by completely non-cognitive feeling responses to music, and an acquired or secondary component, which i s constituted by the kinds of emotional responses that occur as a r e s u l t of c u l t i v a t i o n of one's music sense, increase i n musical knowledge and appreciation, and so on. On this 60 view, f e e l i n g i s a kind of primitive response to music and evaluation may be completely absent. I cannot refute this view, but I am not sympathetic to i t , for several reasons. However, l e t us f i r s t examine the evidence most favorable to t h i s p o s i t i o n . Possibly the most persuasive evidence i s the phenomenological character of the experience. Musical experience especially i s often composed more dominantly of f e e l i n g than of b e l i e f . Furthermore, music offers quite a d i f f e r e n t realm of emotional experience than, for example, l i t e r a t u r e . Though both music and painting o f f e r non-verbal realms of experience, the i n i t i a l impact of music i s more powerful, more pervasive. From Shakespeare to Nabokov writers and thinkers have remarked on the immediate and powerful emotional effects of music. Music does not seem to require the same amount of cognitive a c t i v i t y to have a strong e f f e c t as do l i t e r a t u r e and painting; i t seems to work d i r e c t l y on the l i s t e n e r i n some way. This prominent feature of musical experience seems to me to provide evidence for speculation that one's response to music i s fundamentally a response of feeling, though cognitive factors may l a t e r enter i n and complicate the experience. Perhaps sounds have a unique a f f e c t on human beings, and perhaps certain sounds have ce r t a i n very d e f i n i t e e f f e c t s . On the other hand, i t i s undeniable that one's emotional responses to music gain complexity and even depth of fee l i n g with the widening of one's understanding of music, both from r e p e t i t i o n and from r e f l e c t i o n , at least i n the case of great music. One grows to love Schubert's great C-Major Symphony i n part simply be hearing i t often. (Though of course the very opposite may well happen i n the case of music that i s not of such high q u a l i t y . Some popular music contains so l i t t l e i n the way of invention that l i s t e n i n g to i t once a l l the way through i s barely tolerable.) Presumably this i s because one cannot very well hear such a complex work thoroughly at one s i t t i n g , and one's awareness of i t s beauties increases as one notices more and more. Interestingly, one does seem to hear more and more and not j u s t d i f f e r e n t things each time. One can also increase both the range and in t e n s i t y of emotional response to music by learning more about i t , which also seems to cause one to notice more. In both these elements there i s a strong cognitive evaluative element. In the case of hearing a work often, one's responses become more intense and complex because more music i s "getting through", we notice more and more about the work cumulatively. In the case of learning more about music, the same sort of thing goes on: more and more "gets through", so that one appreciates not only the sound quality, but the arrangements and patterns of sound. In neither case i s i t simply a case of appreciating the complexity of pattern or the cleverness of the composer -one l i t e r a l l y hears something d i f f e r e n t i f one can hear longer musical phrases and can t e l l the difference between music with balanced phrasing, subtleties produced through dynamics rather than tampering with tempi, and music that i s played, one might say, note by note, with inappropriate rubato. A l l of these elements require a high degree of cognitive a c t i v i t y both before and during the musical experience. Of course the cognitive a c t i v i t y before and the cognitive a c t i v i t y during w i l l be of a rather d i f f e r e n t order, since the cognitive a c t i v i t y before i s preparation, while the cognitive a c t i v i t y during i s part of an emotional experience, with i t s attendent spontaneity and f e e l i n g . Nevertheless cognitive a c t i v i t y does take place, the new emotions do involve evaluations and these emotions ,are not d i f f e r e n t i n kind from the emotions f e l t when f i r s t encountering a work - they are ju s t as 62 f e e l i n g - l a d e n , j u s t as a p p a r e n t l y spontaneous , d i f f e r e n t o n l y i n t h a t there w i l l be more of them and some of them w i l l be c o n s i d e r a b l y more p r o f o u n d . There i s no d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e i r s t a t u s as e m o t i o n s , the l a t t e r are not "more i n t e l l e c t u a l " than the f o r m e r . And s i n c e t h i s i s the c a s e , I cannot see any g r o u n d f o r s a y i n g , a t l e a s t any e x p e r i e n t i a l g r o u n d , t h a t emotions i n v o l v e d i n m u s i c a l e x p e r i e n c e do not have c o g n i t i v e c o n t e n t . In P a r t 3 of t h i s c h a p t e r , I p o i n t e d o u t t h a t emotions t h a t i n v o l v e a v e r y i n t e n s e f e e l i n g component may seem to be a l l f e e l i n g because the i n t e n s i t y of the f e e l i n g i s a d i s t r a c t i o n . But t h a t s i m p l y r e f l e c t s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of emotions i n g e n e r a l - t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n i n the i n t e n s i t y and n o t i c e a b l e n e s s o f the v a r i o u s c o n s t i t u e n t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f one p i c t u r e s emotions as b e i n g c o n s i d e r a b l y more l i k e b e i n g swept o f f o n e ' s f e e t w i t h f e e l i n g than I have s k e t c h e d h e r e , some b e l i e f s must be p r e s e n t . What must be m i s s i n g i s not a l l b e l i e f of any k i n d , bu t o n l y e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f . In o r d e r to have an e m o t i o n about s o m e t h i n g , one must f i r s t be p a y i n g a t t e n t i o n to i t . I f , f o r example , I have a s e r i e s of s t r o n g emotions about T r i s t a n and I s o l d e , I must a t l e a s t n o t i c e the m u s i c . I f I am to have no e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s , what I must do i s n o t i c e the music and then have f e e l i n g , bu t per form no e v a l u a t i o n s . I s u g g e s t t h a t , even i n ca ses where peop le t h i n k they o n l y n o t i c e and do not e v a l u a t e , y e t have s t r o n g f e e l i n g s , the e v a l u a t i o n s l i p s i n t h r o u g h the n o t i c i n g - i f we were to d e s c r i b e our e x p e r i e n c e s , the d e s c r i p t i o n would i n c l u d e e v a l u a t i v e t e r m i n o l o g y . C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g passage from B . H . H a g g i n ' s 35 Years of M u s i c : . . . w e hear music which t e l l s us of the s u b l i m i t y o f human f o r g i v e n e s s - mus ic w h i c h , a f t e r what has come b e f o r e , i s o v e r w h e l m i n g . And i t becomes even more overwhelming when i t i s taken up s o f t l y by the o t h e r s and i s c a r r i e d to a p o i n t of s u p e r -e a r t h l y r e l i g i o u s e x a l t a t i o n . " 1 ^ 63 I t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t for a music l i s t e n e r to describe her/his responses to music without using evaluative language in the description, and I think i t i s exactly this sort of thing that Alston had in mind in a passage in Part 5 of this chapter, i n which he characterizes evaluative b e l i e f s as "perceiving x as ..." or "taking x to be We do experience music as sublime, transcendently be a u t i f u l , u p l i f t i n g and so on, and a l l of this i s highly evaluative. One reason the presence of evaluation seems p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to me i s that, when we are interested enough to r e c a l l even the most action packed and unreflective sequence of consciousness, i t nearly always turns out to be much more densely packed with both b e l i e f and evaluation than we had thought at the time. The other has to do with memory. When we remember extremely intense emotional experiences, we tend to remember the cognitive content much more c l e a r l y than the fe e l i n g content. I suspect that, were i t the case that some emotions lacked evaluations, we would not be able to remember them at a l l e a s i l y , since without cognitive content, the rest i s quite d i f f i c u l t to remember. Consider the d i f f i c u l t y one has anyway in remembering l i t e r a l l y how something f e l t - even the most intense and all-encompassing feelings are often forgotten, while the cognitive content remains i n t a c t . Many women claim that they forget the pains of c h i l d b i r t h i n between the b i r t h of each c h i l d , and we often have dreams in which we have acute but strange feelings which we can hardly r e c a l l upon awakening, a problem created at least partly by the unfamiliar conceptual schemes involved, which are themselves d i f f i c u l t to remember. Being able to remember a f e e l i n g has a great deal to do with being able to remember how things were, how you saw the world at the time. I suspect that, i f some emotions contained no evaluative b e l i e f s , we would scarcely be able to remember them 64 a t a l l and indeed i t seems to be true that the stronger the f e e l i n g content i s and the less evaluative b e l i e f dominates, the more d i f f i c u l t emotions are to remember. ( I t i s of course possible to have very strong feelings and very complex cognitive content.) It i s interesting to note that often, when people recount some intensely feeling-laden emotional response, saying " I ' l l never forget that day what they begin by describing i s not the remarkable fee l i n g they had, but what else was going on - they give a con-text, a s i t u a t i o n where certain sorts of evaluations ("I'd never seen such a large bear i n my l i f e - I thought we were done for ...") are understandable, hence also the feelings that accompanied them. Thus, I r e j e c t the view that musical emotions can lack evaluative content, but, since my arguments are speculative rather than conclusive, since many people seem convinced that this i s so, and since there are e x p e r i e n t i a l grounds for taking such a view seriously, I am w i l l i n g to designate i t as a possible (the only) exception to the general theory I outline here. Part 9: Picking out evaluative b e l i e f s There are a great many b e l i e f s present i n the mind at any one time. How can we pick out the one that i s a constituent of an occurrent emotion? F i r s t of a l l , as we have seen, the b e l i e f must be evaluative. Second, i t must occur i n concert with fe e l i n g and sometimes behavior. If one has a completely j u s t i f i e d emotion, i n which r e a l i t y triumphs over wishful thinking, this complex w i l l vary with the presence or absence of the object. I f , I am very angry with Charles, my anger w i l l increase i n his presence and diminish i n his absence, unless I am thinking about him i n his absence, i n 65 which case i t w i l l r e c u r . However, t h i s i s not t rue o f u n j u s t i f i e d e m o t i o n s , i n which one may have a number o f f a l s e b e l i e f s t h a t are untouched by r e a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Some of these emotions e i t h e r have no o b j e c t , o r have an o b j e c t o n l y t e n u o u s l y , t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t va ry w i t h i t s absence or p r e s e n c e . In cases l i k e t h e s e , they come and go w i t h the pre sence of c e r t a i n f a n t a s i e s . I f one has s e v e r a l e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s , one may a l s o be ab le to p i c k out the r e l e v e n t e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f by the e x t e n t to which t h i s b e l i e f tends to crowd o u t o t h e r b e l i e f s and by the i n t e n s i t y w i t h which one h o l d s to i t . The e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s t h a t are c o n s t i t u e n t s o f o c c u r r e n t emotions v e r y o f t e n draw o n e ' s a t t e n t i o n a g a i n and a g a i n , e s p e c i a l l y i n the case of very s t r o n g e m o t i o n s . However, one can o n l y say " v e r y o f t e n " , because the e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s t h a t are c o n s t i t u e n t s o f m i l d emot ions - minor annoyances , lukewarm a f f e c t i o n s , a re n e i t h e r so p o w e r f u l nor so p e r s i s t e n t , so t h a t p i c k i n g them o u t i s e n t i r e l y a mat te r of t h e i r b e i n g p a r t of a complex t h a t v a r i e s w i t h e i t h e r an o b j e c t or f a n t a s y . In cases o f extreme e m o t i o n a l c o n f u s i o n , where one s t r o n g l y su spec t s t h a t the c o n f u s i o n i s due to o n e ' s h a v i n g more than one e m o t i o n , there may be two e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s compet ing f o r o n e ' s a t t e n t i o n , or i t may be d i f f i c u l t to see any e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s c l e a r l y because of o n e ' s confused s t a t e . In ca se s l i k e t h e s e , we have the o p t i o n s of s i m p l y w a i t i n g out our c o n f u s i o n , h o p i n g to be a b l e to see more c l e a r l y , or we may ask o u r s e l v e s q u e s t i o n s aimed a t c o n n e c t i n g our p r e s e n t s t a t e w i t h o t h e r s t h a t o c c u r r e d i n s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r to the p r e s e n t one, s t a t e s t h a t we were ab le to s o r t o u t . We can c o n n e c t the p a s t w i t h the p r e s e n t , and make some good guesses about o n e ' s e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s now. For example , I may remember t h a t the l a s t t i m e I saw 66 my father's best friend, the one he used to stay out a l l night drinking with but who also helped send me to university, I f e l t the same confusion I f e e l now, upon seeing him again. I had this same sense of warring emotions, and I i n f e r from t h i s , and from the thoughts I am able to notice that I have the same evaluative b e l i e f s now that I d i d then: I s t i l l believe that Edward hurt our family for purely s e l f i s h pleasures, that he was i n d i f f e r e n t to our s u f f e r i n g , and at the same time, I also s t i l l believe that he acted far beyond both the c a l l of duty and what I deserved, considering the way I'd treated him, i n paying most of my t u i t i o n for u niversity. In short, I am s t i l l extremely angry, and s t i l l extremely g r a t e f u l . Of course, none of these methods i s foolproof. Connecting the past with the present, both in the way just discussed and in general using cases where evaluative be l i e f and the other constituents that make up an occurrent emotion were extremely clear , where one was i n no doubt at a l l , to illuminate more complex and/or more d i f f i c u l t cases i s both a useful and a general p r a c t i c e . But there is no p r i n c i p l e of picking out the relevent evaluative beliefs except by specifying a certain causal process, the one already mentioned: the b e l i e f s must be evaluative as a r e s u l t of a p a r t i c u l a r sort of evaluative process which is activated by desires. We can specify that they vary with the rest of the constituents of an occurrent emotion, but this is not available to immediate inspection, only over time. Part 10: Other theories about b e l i e f : Bedford and Gordon Now that we have the foundation of an analysis of the b e l i e f component, we are in a position to see the value of other theories of b e l i e f which, 67 while they cannot provide a complete account, nevertheless bring out cer ta in points about the b e l i e f component. I have i n mind p a r t i c u l a r l y E r r o l Bedford's views i n his paper "Emot ion" 1 1 and Robert Gordon's views i n 1 2 "Emotions and Knowledge". Let us begin with Bedford's views. Bedford takes the pos i t i on that , when we use emotion words, we are not report ing f e e l i n g s . Rather: . . . emot ion words form part of the vocabulary of appra i sa l and c r i t i c i s m , and a number of them belong to the more s p e c i f i c language of moral c r i t i c i s m . Normally, the verbs i n the ir f i r s t person use imply the speaker's assessment of something, and i n the i r third-person use carry an impl i ca t ion about an assessment by the person they refer t o . 1 ^ . . . i t would be a mistake to imagine that the primary function of these statements i s to communicate psychologica l f ac t s . Their p r i n c i p l e functions are j u d i c i a l not informative, and when they are informative, i t i s often not merely psycholog ica l information that they g i v e . 1 4 For Bedford, to say such things as "I envy Schnabel's technique" and "I f ee l ashamed about i t now" i s not to say that I have cer ta in fee l ings , but to pra i se Schnabel, to admit r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , or offer "a plea i n m i t i g a t i o n " . 1 " ' If I am r i g h t about the evaluative process, we can see not that Bedford i s r i g h t , but how he might have come to have this view, and the extent to which this i s a correct view about one aspect of having emotions. Beford bel ieves that (1) there i s a conceptual t ie between the use of emotion words and having cer ta in b e l i e f s - no envy without the b e l i e f that someone i s good at something, no shame without the be l i e f that one is 6 8 responsible and (2) that b e l i e f s incorporate a value judgement (assuming that "admission of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " includes "admission of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that one i s to blame", which I think i s clear from the context). Furthermore, when we use emotion words, as Bedford puts i t , the ordinary "conversational point" of doing so i s to communicate these b e l i e f s , rather than to name a f e e l i n g . I t i s c e r t a i n l y true that sometimes the ordinary conversational point of our using certain emotion words, such as envy, i s to communicate a value judgment rather than report a f e e l i n g . This i s not, however always or even usually the case. It i s only the case when value judgments are the subject at issue. One can e a s i l y imagine two pianis t s discussing contemporary North American piano teaching methods versus older European methods and one saying that, while technical v i r t u o s i t y and austerity are a l l very well, one nevertheless envies a technique such as Schnabel's which combines passion and v i r t u o s i t y . Bedford would say, quite c o r r e c t l y , that i n such a case i t i s not one's experiences that are at issue here, but Schnabel's technique and i t s excellence - the speaker i s empahsizing just how good she thinks Schnabel i s . However, this remark w i l l only work for emphasizing j u s t how good one thinks Schnabel i s i f the sentence o r d i n a r i l y has to do with the state of the speaker. Using Bedford's notion of "ordinary conversational point" the ordinary conversational point of remarks about envy i s to communicate something about the state of the one said to be envious; the conversational point of the remark about Schnabel i s to communicate something about Schnabel by c i t i n g him as the cause of the state the term "envy" o r d i n a r i l y conveys -Schnabel i s so good that one i s emotionally affected i n a par t i c u l a r way. Since the conversation i s about Schnabel and not oneself, one's own state i s 69 o f f e r e d o n l y as a d e v i c e f o r e m p h a s i s . A n d , from the p o i n t of v iew of the e v a l u a t i v e p r o c e s s , t h i s remark works as a way of p r a i s i n g Schnabe l as opposed to a s i m p l e remark about an e m o t i o n a l s t a t e because i t emphasizes the c r i t e r i a one has f o r c o u n t i n g something as f u l f i l l i n g o n e ' s d e s i r e s r a t h e r r a t h e r than b e l i e f s about whether or not o n e ' s d e s i r e s are f u l f i l l e d . In o r d e r to f e e l e n v y , I must b e l i e v e t h a t someone e l s e has someth ing I want v e r y much. In o r d e r f o r me to want whatever i t i s , I must b e l i e v e t h a t somthing has c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s - e . g . , i t must be e x t r e m e l y a t t r a c t i v e o r a d m i r a b l e o f i t s k i n d , perhaps a b e a u t i f u l l y p r e s e r v e d e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y home or a b r i l l i a n t p i a n o t e c h n i q u e t h a t enab le s one to p l a y a n y t h i n g from the most d i f f i c u l t L i s z t to s a r d o n i c S a t i e w i t h e q u a l s k i l l and p l a u s i b i l i t y . S i n c e c r i t e r i a f o r e v a l u a t i o n of s k i l l a re what ' s i n q u e s t i o n , i t i s c r i t e r i a and not my d e s i r e to see them f u l f i l l e d t h a t i s emphas i zed . We can see t h a t Bed ford r e a l i z e s q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t there i s an e v a l u a t i v e p r o c e s s . However, h i s d e s i r e to argue a g a i n s t a Humean "un ique s e n s a t i o n " v iew l eads him to emphasize e v a l u a t i o n a t the expense of the o t h e r components . We can v iew B e d f o r d ' s p o s i t i o n as a u s e f u l a d j u n c t to our b a s i c p o s i t i o n on e v a l u a t i o n , showing how the pre sence of the e v a l u a t i v e p r o c e s s e n a b l e s us to use what i s o r d i n a r i l y language about f e e l i n g s , b e l i e f s and sometimes b e h a v i o r to emphasize the c r i t e r i a f o r e m o t i o n a l re sponse r a t h e r than the re sponse i t s e l f . In h i s paper "Emot ions and K n o w l e d g e " , Rober t Gordon argues t h a t emot ions d i v i d e i n t o k n o w l e d g e - r e q u i r i n g and k n o w l e d g e - p r e c l u d i n g e m o t i o n s . Some e m o t i o n s , such as embarrassment , d e l i g h t , re sentment and a good many more, r e q u i r e t h a t one know whatever i t i s t h a t one i s embarrassed o r d e l i g h t e d about or r e s e n t f u l o f ; o t h e r e m o t i o n s , such as hope and w o r r y , 70 preclude knowledge that whatever one hopes for or i s worried about w i l l come to be. While i t does seem true that some emotions require that the person who has them feels certain about whatever the emotion i s about, and others, such as hope and worry, require uncertainty or doubt, we might well ask why knowledge should be required j u s t for having the emotions that require certainty rather than for j u s t i f y i n g them. And i t i s this strong p o s i t i o n , that knowledge rather than true b e l i e f i s required, that Gordon takes: I want to show in this b r i e f paper that is i s often what a person knows, as opposed to what he merely believes, that determines how his emotion i s to be ' 16 described. Gordon seems to me to have confused a good point about j u s t i f i c a t i o n with a good point about b e l i e f s : certain b e l i e f s are required for emotions, the i r truth for j u s t i f i c a t i o n of those emotions. A possible source of his d i f f i c u l t y seems to me to l i e in his being unclear about the difference between emotions as described by the subject as opposed to emotions as attributed by a th i r d person. Consider the following passage, and contrast i t to the passage quoted e a r l i e r : I t appears that, unless one knows or believes certain things, one cannot experience certain emotions at a l l . ' 1 ' 7 This passage occurs at the beginning of the paper, before he has settled firmly on knowledge and not b e l i e f as the requirement. Nevertheless, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the o r i g i n a l claim i s that one cannot experience c e r t a i n emotions without knowledge or b e l i e f , while in the preceding passage which occurs near the end of the paper, the issue i s the description of emotion, without reference to the describer as f i r s t or third person. This small discrepency, while perhaps not of great significance in i t s e l f , does suggest an important difference, from the standpoint of knowledge, in the 71 positions of f i r s t and th i r d person i n the a t t r i b u t i o n of emotions. If I believe that Charles i s seeing another woman (as well as evaluating that information i n a certain way) I w i l l be extremely jealous. If I discover l a t e r that I was wrong, I may cease to be jealous, but I w i l l continue to a t t r i b u t e jealousy to myself at a past time. However, someone describing my state while I am u n j u s t i f i a b l y jealous and knowing that i n fact my husband Charles i s the most f a i t h f u l of men, may not even think of ascribing jealousy to me. From a th i r d person standpoint, knowledge of the facts plays an important role i n what emotions we are w i l l i n g to ascribe to others, at least insofar as we assume they know the f a c t s . Because of this (among other things), we are wrong about the emotional states of others from time to time. However, this i n t e r e s t i n g feature of emotion-ascription i s quite d i f f e r e n t from the question of whether, as a haver of emotions, I am w i l l i n g to ascribe emotions to myself j u s t on the basis of my b e l i e f s , or whether I require knowledge. The unfortunate consequence of the knowledge requirement i s that, i f I ascribe an emotion to myself and I turn out to be wrong about the relevant facts - i f Charles turns out to be a paragon of f i d e l i t y , then I was wrong about my own emotional state - even though I believe myself to be neither confused nor s e l f deceived. Part 11: The concept of an emotion: a summary and some exceptions Having considered each candidate for inclusion i n the concept of emotion separately, l e t us now review our results and construct a concept. 72 (a) The summary We have considered three possible elements for inclusion i n the concept of emotion: f e e l i n g , behavior, and b e l i e f . I have argued that there i s no ph y s i o l o g i c a l change and i t s perception that i s t y p i c a l of emotions or unexplained (causally) f e e l i n g ; that i s , we neither define i n d i v i d u a l emotions i n terms of, nor correlate them with, particular patterns of physiological change and the perception of the patterns. However, we must not exclude f e e l i n g from the concept of emotion altogether. The Schachter-Singer study shows that though there are no d i s t i n c t i v e feeling patterns for each emotion nevertheless the participants in the study were reluctant to c a l l their state an emotion unless they experienced some feeling e s p e c i a l l y p h y s i o l o g i cal distrubance, and James can be taken as arguing i n favour of such a view. Thus we w i l l include feelings i n our concept of emotion; their presence w i l l d i s t i n g u i s h emotions from other kinds of mental a c t i v i t y . I have also argued that, though we can say that some behavior or manner of behavior i s t y p i c a l of some emotions, some people having some emotions, perhaps even many people and/or many emotions, we cannot say that there i s some behavior pattern, b i t of behavior, or manner of behavior that i s t y p i c a l of every emotion. In general, given the appropriate explanation, any behavior can be seen to be connected with any emotion. F i n a l l y , we have seen that b e l i e f s d i s t i n g u i s h emotions from sensations and i n d i v i d u a l emotions. Be l i e f s are the backbone of emotions, providing us with a basis of distinguishing among even emotions that have no names, and giving whatever behavior may be associated with emotion a context; this w i l l become clearer when we examine the emotion-object relationship. 73 Limiting our concept to occurrent emotions, we can now say the following: an emotion i s an occurrent state that includes feeling, some behavior, and b e l i e f s . The presence of feel i n g distinguishes emotions from other kinds of mental a c t i v i t i e s , the presence of b e l i e f s distinguishes emotions from sensations, and the character of these b e l i e f s individuates emotions. When a l l of these elements are present i n a certain causal r e l a t i o n , we have a paradigm case of an occurrent emotion. This causal r e l a t i o n w i l l be discussed i n Part 10. (b) The exceptions and some theoretical considerations The question of what to say about emotions that lack a constituent i s an important one not ju s t from the standpoint of theoretical c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , but also from the standpoint of dealing with an important feature of emotions: they involve constituents that have an existence independent of their occurrence i n emotions. Behavior, evaluative b e l i e f s and feelings a l l e x i s t whether or not they occur i n an emotion. They are in no way mutually dependent. Thus, i f one of the constituents i s missing, we must explain how we can j u s t i f y saying that what we have i s an incomplete emotion rather than a randomly co l l e c t e d pair of constituents. Of course, as I w i l l argue, one way to know how constituents are bound together i s to explain their causal connection. Unhappily, while this i s a useful idea t h e o r e t i c a l l y , i t i s n ' t much help from the standpoint of the person who actually has the emotion. It i s a very rare thing to experience i n oneself the causal sequences involved i n emotions s u f f i c i e n t l y slowly to observe a l l the causal links being made. Yet, without knowing with any certainty the causal links involved, we do often i d e n t i f y ourselves as being i n emotional states, or at least as 74 p r o v i s i o n a l l y b e i n g i n e m o t i o n a l s t a t e s , when a c o n s t i t u e n t i s m i s s i n g . How do we go about d o i n g t h i s ? L e t us f i r s t examine the i m p o r t of each m i s s i n g c o n s t i t u e n t . We have a l r e a d y argued t h a t i t i s not now p o s s i b l e to say t h a t some p a r t i c u l a r b i t or b i t s of b e h a v i o r are c o n s t i t u e n t s of each o c c u r r e n t e m o t i o n . However, I have a l s o argued t h a t there are a number of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of p o s s i b l e b e h a v i o r t h a t might be c o n s t i t u e n t s of e m o t i o n s , and t a k i n g them a l l t o g e t h e r , we w i l l t e n t a t i v e l y say t h a t v a r i o u s k i n d s o f b e h a v i o r v e r y o f t e n are c o n s t i t u e n t s of o c c u r r e n t e m o t i o n s . My r e l u c t a n c e to say more i s d i c t a t e d not by c o w a r d i c e , b u t by r e l a t i v e i g n o r a n c e , which seems to be g e n e r a l . I s u s p e c t t h a t one day i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e to e x p l a i n a g r e a t d e a l more about the c o n n e c t i o n s o f v a r i o u s s o r t s of b e h a v i o r wi th the o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n t s o f e m o t i o n , bu t i t i s not now p o s s i b l e . We r e a l l y d o n ' t know what the s i g n i f i c a n c e of m i s s i n g b i t s o f b e h a v i o r i s because we d o n ' t y e t know enough about how b e h a v i o r comes about i n any c a s e . Of c o u r s e , we know enough a t l e a s t about c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n to know t h a t i f someone i s d o i n g something o r d i n a r i l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t emot ion than one she c l a i m s to h a v e , we are e n t i t l e d to d o u b t . I f Jane c l a i m s to f e e l g r e a t g r i e f a t her h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h , y e t she spends her days shopping f o r new c l o t h e s , s p e n d i n g h i s money and s p a r k l i n g w i t h charming l a u g h t e r a t the jokes of handsome young men, one might w e l l wonder i f Jane i s be ing e n t i r e l y f r a n k . But w h i l e we might be w i l l i n g to g r a n t t h a t the b e h a v i o r connec ted w i t h the emot ion cannot always be c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d , and we may be f a i r l y l e n i e n t about what c r i t e r i a we a p p l y h e r e , such i s not the case e i t h e r w i t h f e e l i n g or w i t h e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f . Both f e e l i n g and e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f are c r u c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of e m o t i o n , and i f e i t h e r i s m i s s i n g s e r i o u s doubt i s c a s t . 75 I t appears to be the case t h a t we are more l i k e l y to p r o v i s i o n a l l y i d e n t i f y our i n c o m p l e t e s t a t e s as emot ions the more f a m i l i a r the s i t u a t i o n i s t o u s , and the b e t t e r we know o u r s e l v e s and o t h e r s . In g e n e r a l , peop le have q u i t e i n d i v i d u a l ways o f p r e v e n t i n g themselves from f e e l i n g emot ions they would p r e f e r n o t to f e e l . For some p e o p l e , f e e l i n g i s i n h i b i t e d and they f i n d themselves b e h a v i n g o d d l y and e v a l u a t i n g the s i t u a t i o n i n a c e r t a i n way, b u t h a v i n g "no f e e l i n g s " , a d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t i n i t s e l f i s a s i g n a l t h a t s o m e t h i n g i s h i d d e n , s i n c e we a l l have f e e l i n g s o f v a r i o u s s o r t s c o n s t a n t l y . Suppose , f o r example , I have a mee t ing w i t h my e s t r a n g e d husband to t a l k to him about d i v i d i n g up our mutual p o s s e s s i o n s . He, who has always c l a i m e d to be a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t , c o m p l a i n e d about our s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g and g e n e r a l l y made s u p e r c i l i o u s remarks about my e x p e n s i v e t a s t e s , has deve loped a p a s s i o n f o r p o s s e s s i o n s . In p a r t i c u l a r , he wants the most expens ive p i e c e s o f f u r n i t u r e and , the l a s t s t r a w , our b o o k s . S i n c e I know he d o e s n ' t open a book from one year to the n e x t , I s t r o n g l y (and c o r r e c t l y ) s u s p e c t t h a t he t h i n k s a b o o k l i n e d l i v i n g room w i t h b e a u t i f u l and c o n s p i c u o u s l y e x p e n s i v e f u r n i t u r e would g i v e him a good s t a r t on i m p r e s s i n g and s e d u c i n g as many young women as p o s s i b l e , h i s proneness to which was one of the causes o f our impend ing d i v o r c e . S i n c e I both r e a d c o n s t a n t l y and am q u i t e fond of our b o o k s , t h i s s t r i k e s me as r e a l l y i n i q u i t o u s on h i s p a r t . However, when I come home, I am n o t aware of any p a r t i c u l a r f e e l i n g s , except perhaps a f e e l i n g o f t e n s i o n , b u t o n l y a tendency to s lam down o b j e c t s and t h i n k about what a t h o r o u g h - g o i n g r a s c a l C h a r l e s r e a l l y i s . Knowing m y s e l f as I do , i t d o e s n ' t take l o n g f o r me to r e a l i z e t h a t I am s t i f l i n g some v e r y i n t e n s e f e e l i n g , and the minute I admit t h a t to m y s e l f , and s top h o l d i n g my b r e a t h , I become, p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y , a b s o l u t e l y f u r i o u s . The same s o r t of t h i n g h o l d s with missing b e l i e f s . Given the same example, I might return with feelings of general upset and restlessness, clenched teeth, and acid stomach and a tendency to be very c r i t i c a l of everyone who has the misfortune to come into contact with me. When asked i f my meeting with Charles went badly, I reply that I wasn't even thinking about Charles, but about the Russians i n Afghanistan. Again, i f I know myself well, I w i l l soon begin to be suspicious, consciously admit to myself my evaluations of Charles' behavior and become, paradigmatically, absolutely furious. My a b i l i t y to do this i n both these cases i s based on a great deal of self-knowledge, f a m i l i a r i t y with my own emotional patterns and, of course, a willingness to ask myself certain kinds of questions - I do, after a l l , want to know. Presumably I want to know because i t has proved to be more illuminating i n the past to assume that what I have i s an incomplete emotion of some kind rather than some b i t s of behavior and feel i n g or b e l i e f that are completely unconnected. However, i f this were the f i r s t time either of these states, had occurred, the process of getting myself to the point where a l l the constituents are present might take longer. I t might simply not occur to me that I am i n some sort of po t e n t i a l l y emotional state. It i s in this sort of case that i t seems most useful to speak of oneself as being i n an emotional state, because to do so one can assume a connectedness between or among the various states i n which one finds oneself. In addition, one can r e a l i s t i c a l l y expect oneself to have, momentarily, a paradigmatic occurrent emotion. We might want to c a l l these sorts of incomplete emotions provisional or potential emotions i f we wish to be precise . 77 The same sorts of considerations do not apply to what are sometimes c a l l e d "unconscious" emotions, cases i n which two of the elements are present but the t h i r d , much expected, refuses to appear. Often, we are w i l l i n g to say that we are i n some emotional state because we believe ourselves to understand why the missing element doesn't make i t s appearance, perhaps we are frightened by the idea of certain experiences, perhaps the emotion involves some b e l i e f s about things we'd just as soon not think about, very l i k e l y we are reluctant to experience certain kinds of pain. This sort of use seems to me to mark the other side of a borderline - there i s no firm b e l i e f here that the missing element w i l l soon manifest i t s e l f , perhaps even good reason to suppose that, even i f i t should, i t w i l l not be in the near future. We might wish to speak of ourselves as being i n emotional states to emphasize the importance of getting to the bottom of the missing element, or again, in order to give the experience a familiar kind of organization, rather than i t s being seen as a random c o l l e c t i o n of behavior, feelings or b e l i e f . We could specify this use as legitimate for the l a t t e r purpose, es p e c i a l l y , e.g., i n therapeutic contexts where i t i s important to emphasize the presence of emotional response, while at the same time making clear that we are not dealing with paradigm cases of occurrent emotion. F i n a l l y , there i s the case of music, where i t i s possible to argue that the emotions that are responses to music lack, i n their most basic form, an evaluative b e l i e f . This i s not a case of a missing element which w i l l soon be supplied. On this view, musical emotions need not have any evaluative b e l i e f - there i s something special about music that makes this constituent of emotion unnecessary. Here, we would simply have to make an exception for 78 music i n a way that we have not i n other cases where constituents are missing but expected. This brings us to the question of what type of theory this i s . There are two obvious p o s s i b i l i t i e s : an e s s e n t i a l i s t theory, where every element must be present, and a family resemblence theory where every element need not be present i n every case. It i s tempting to c l a s s i f y my view as an e s s e n t i a l i s t one, yet I am w i l l i n g to make exceptions for incomplete emotions and, somewhat reluct a n t l y , for the emotions involved in musical experiences. On the other hand, i t i s not possible to c l a s s i f y this view as a family resemblence theory. One of the major stumbling blocks to doing so i s the f a c t that each of the constituents of occurrent emotions has independent status outside i t s occurrence i n emotions. I t i s the presence of a l l the elements that creates a certainty that i t i s an emotion we are experiencing, not just a value judgment, behavioral i n c l i n a t i o n or i n t e s t i n a l upset. William Alston has argued that a theory of emotion must be a family resemblence theory, since a l l the elements are not present a l l the time. However, this characterization of family resemblence theory i s not the usual one: he argues that emotions with one constituent missing are not clear cases of emotion, and that what we need i s a theory that can admit both paradigm cases and cases that deviate to a certain extent from the paradigm: Thus the f u l l range of cases exhibits what Wittgenstein c a l l s 'family resemblences'. There i s a l i s t of t y p i c a l features, such that some are present i n a l l cases, no one feature i s present i n a l l cases, and the paradigm cases e x h i b i t a l l the f e a t u r e s . 1 8 There seem to me to be two d i f f i c u l t i e s with Alston's p o s i t i o n . F i r s t , assuming that i t i s Wittgenstein's notion of what constitutes family 79 r e s e m b l e n c e t h a t i s a t work h e r e , A l s t o n ' s p i c t u r e does not seem e x a c t l y l i k e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s . C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g passages from P h i l o s o p h i c a l 19 I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . I n s t e a d of p r o d u c i n g something common to a l l t h a t we c a l l l anguage , I am s a y i n g t h a t these phenomena have no one t h i n g i n common which makes us use the same word fo r a l l , - b u t t h a t they a r e on r e l a t e d t o each o t h e r i n many d i f f e r e n t ways . For i f you look a t them you w i l l no t see someth ing t h a t i s common to a l l , b u t s i m i l a r i t i e s , r e l a t i o n -s h i p s , and a whole s e r i e s o f them a t t h a t . ^ 1 I can t h i n k of no b e t t e r e x p r e s s i o n to c h a r a c t e r i z e these s i m i l a r i t i e s than ' f a m i l y r e s e m b l e n c e s ' ; b u i l d , f e a t u r e s , c o l o u r o f e y e s , g a i t , temperament, e t c . e t c . , o v e r l a p and c r i s s - c r o s s the same way. W i t t g e n s t e i n does not deny t h a t , g i v e n some c o n c e p t ( i n the above examples , the c o n c e p t o f a game) t h e r e may be cases t h a t have a l l the f e a t u r e s of the c o n c e p t , b u t he c l e a r l y b e l i e v e s t h i s to be n e i t h e r t y p i c a l nor n e c e s s a r y . The p o i n t o f h a v i n g a f a m i l y re semblence t h e o r y r a t h e r than an e s s e n t i a l i s t t h e o r y i s a t l e a s t p a r t l y to be a b l e to i n c l u d e some o therwi se i n c o m p l e t e examples as f u l l - b l o o d e d i n s t a n c e s o f the c o n c e p t i n q u e s t i o n r a t h e r than b o r d e r l i n e cases based on a p a r a d i g m . Some cases o f f a m i l y re semblence w i l l o f cour se have fewer o f the f e a t u r e s o f the c o n c e p t than o t h e r s . B u t , g i v e n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ABCD as the c o n s t i t u e n t s o f a c o n c e p t , i t i s e q u a l l y l e g i t i m a t e f o r some i n s t a n c e to have ABC, BC, ACD, AD, e t c . - e a c h of these i n s t a n c e s counts j u s t as f u l l y as b e i n g a case of t h a t c o n c e p t as the o t h e r s . A l s t o n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n i s much more l i k e an e s s e n t i a l i s t v iew which a l l o w s the odd b o r d e r l i n e c a s e . Second , though I do b e l i e v e t h a t some p o t e n t i a l emotions ought to be c o u n t e d as e m o t i o n s , I b e l i e v e t h i s s h o u l d be the case n o t j u s t because the i n s t a n c e c l o s e l y re sembles the paradigm but a l s o because the e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t 80 i t i m p l i c i t l y provides enables one to make sense out of otherwise randomly occurring elements, and because they w i l l , any minute, presumably become full-blooded occurrent emotions. Thus my view seems not to f i t comfortably into either the e s s e n t i a l i s t or family resemblence picture. On the one hand, while I am unwilling to c a l l borderline cases emotions except i n cases where that counts as an illuminating explanation and pr i n c i p l e of organization, which seems to exclude family resemblence theory, the fact that I am w i l l i n g to make an exception of music, and i n fact that I am w i l l i n g to make the spec i a l exceptions I make because of explanatory value would seem to exclude e s s e n t i a l i s t theory. Part 12: The causal story: l i m i t a t i o n s and speculations To say that the elements of the concept of an emotion occur i n concert i s not enough; one wants to know how they are connected. Ideally, from the standpoint of neatness and thoroughness, one would l i k e to say that the elements of an occurrent emotion are tied together by having a common causal genesis; b e l i e f s and desires i n the evaluative process cause the f i n a l individuating b e l i e f or b e l i e f s , these b e l i e f s cause, i n a complex way, some voluntary and involuntary behaviors, and a l l of these occurrences cause physiological change which i t s e l f causes, again i n a complex way, fee l i n g . Though the account of how b e l i e f s and desires connect causally with behavior i s indeed complex and c l e a r l y there are things that must be said here about the problematic connection between mind and body, we can s t i l l talk, with D. Davidson, about reasons for action. The account of the connection between physiological change and fe e l i n g presents no principled d i f f i c u l t y ; we can tal k about the connection between the various nervous systems and certain 81 kinds of experiences, and point out that feelings for which we now have no causal explanations are p h y s i o l o g i c a l . The real d i f f i c u l t i e s arise when one claims that b e l i e f s cause physiological change; one can say nothing here about reasons for action, and an explanation u t i l i z i n g e n t i r e l y p h y s i o l o g ical components i s not open to us. If we say that b e l i e f s cause physiological change, we covertly endorse the view that the mind/body relationship i s causal, without acknowledging the speculative nature of this claim. I do acknowledge the speculative nature of the claim. We must also ask ourselves about the importance of the inner causal chain's having a certain order. As sketched above, my view i s that b e l i e f comes f i r s t . However, there are some cases, for example the cases cited by the Schachter-Singer study, where people f i r s t have feelings then adopt cognitive content which seems consistent with the feeling, or which they find s a t i s f a c t o r y i n some way. Schachter and Singer's work makes the point that, i n the absence of some explanation, we eagerly seek to f i l l in what we perceive as a gap, indicating that these sensations generally come with either a physiological explanation or some sort of cognitive component. If we c a l l the r e s u l t of this search an emotion this means that there i s no single p r i n c i p l e of connection among the constituents of an emotion. In addition, there are cases such as music where there is' an argument to be made i n favor of f e e l i n g as the f i r s t element. The d i f f i c u l t y in producing some sort of rule l i e s i n the already-acknowledged speculative nature of any causal claim here. The most straightforward solution seems to me to c a l l states that have a l l the elements present, and in which the elements vary systematically, emotions. Curiously, even emotions such as the Schachter-Singer sort are l i k e l y to vary systematically, since the evaluative b e l i e f 82 a r r i v e d at through desire for an explanation for a mysterious fee l i n g w i l l probably fade when the fee l i n g fades. We can note the differences among these emotions by talking about j u s t i f i c a t i o n and d i f f i c u l t i e s about object-taking. Both the Schachter-Singer sort of emotion and music w i l l r a i s e problems when we speak of j u s t i f i c a t i o n since, even i f one's emotions are j u s t i f i e d i n the Schachter-Singer study, i t w i l l be by accident, and, i n the case of music, one cannot speak of the j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of f e e l i n g s . Both these questions w i l l be discussed at greater length i n Chapter 6. Part 13; Two categories of emotion and some exceptions Let us return b r i e f l y to Alston's picture of the results of evaluation, and the question of whether his categories are exhaustive. For a general characterization of what the subject of an emotion takes x to be, we have slipped into the terms 'desirable' and 'undesirable'. These seem preferable to the more t r a d i t i o n a l contrast of 'good' and ' e v i l ' , which today has too narrow a connotation, or such terms as ' b e n e f i c i a l ' and 23 'harmful', whxch are not s u f f i c i e n t l y wide. This way of characterizing emotion makes the assumption that emotions can be divided without s t r a i n into two categories. We ought at least to ask whether this i s so. At f i r s t glance, the two-value view seems to be the r i g h t one, p a r t i c u l a r l y as we have emphasized how emotions are connected with the f u l f i l m e n t or non-fulfilment of various desires. Certainly the emotions that are the most often involved i n human relationships lend themselves to t h i s sort of "pro-con" categorization. But there are emotions that do not f i t so ea s i l y into these categories. They are the emotions astonishment, surprise, 83 amazement, and , i n a d i f f e r e n t way from the f o r e g o i n g t h r e e , awe. L e t us l ook a t the d e f i n i t i o n s of these emot ions i n the O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y : A s t o n i s h m e n t . 4. M e n t a l d i s t u r b a n c e or e x c i t e -ment due to the sudden p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n y t h i n g u n l o o k e d f o r or u n a c c o u n t a b l e ; wonder t e m p o r a r i l y o v e r p o w e r i n g the mind ; a m a z e m e n t . 2 4 Amazement. 4. Overwhelming wonder, whether due t o mere s u r p r i s e or to a d m i r a t i o n . Wonder . I I . 7 . The emot ion e x c i t e d by the p e r -c e p t i o n of something n o v e l and u n e x p e c t e d , or i n e x p l i c a b l e ; a s t o n i s h m e n t m i n g l e d w i t h p e r p l e x i t y o r b e w i l d e r e d c u r i o s i t y . A l s o , the s t a t e o f mind i n which t h i s emot ion e x i s t s . S u r p r i s e . 4. The f e e l i n g or emot ion e x c i t e d by s o m e t h i n g u n e x p e c t e d , o r f o r which one i s u n p r e p a r e d . B . The f e e l i n g or menta l s t a t e , a k i n to a s t o n i s h m e n t and wonder, caused by an unexpected o c c u r r e n c e or c i r c u m s t a n c e , 2 7 Awe. 2. Dread mixed w i t h v e n e r a t i o n , r e v e r e n t i a l or r e s p e c t f u l f e a r ; the a t t i t u d e of a mind subdued t o p ro found r e v e r e n c e i n the pre sence of supreme a u t h o r i t y , m o r a l g r e a t n e s s or s u b l i m i t y , o r m y s t e r i o u s s a c r e d n e s s . 2 8 A s t o n i s h m e n t , wonder and s u r p r i s e are d e f i n e d c o n j o i n t l y i n terms o f t h e i r c a u s e s , the p r e s e n t a t i o n of something unexpected or u n e x p l a i n a b l e , and the s t a t e o f the i n d i v i d u a l - i . e . , u n p r e p a r e d n e s s . Amazement i s d e f i n e d i n terms of wonder, and of b e i n g s u r p r i s e d , which w i l l a l s o be e x p l a i n e d i n terms of i t s c a u s e , the p r e s e n t a t i o n of something unexpected or u n e x p l a i n a b l e . "Awe" i s d e f i n e d i n terms of both emotions and c a u s e s . In awe, we have a m i x t u r e o f " p r o " and " c o n " e m o t i o n s , d read and r e v e r e n c e , and of d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of c a u s e s , the pre sence of some s o r t of g rea tne s s o r a u t h o r i t y , e i t h e r s a c r e d or s e c u l a r . Assuming t h a t I am r i g h t i n s a y i n g t h a t the b e l i e f s t h a t are p r e s e n t i n emotions are y i e l d e d by an e v a l u a t i o n , we c o u l d see a s t o n i s h m e n t , wonder, s u r p r i s e and amazement as the e m o t i o n a l 84 r e s p o n s e s p r e s e n t when one s t r u g g l e s to p e r f o r m an e v a l u a t i o n and cannot because of an i n a b i l i t y to d e c i d e what the s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i s t h a t one i s a t t e m p t i n g to e v a l u a t e , o r as a r e s u l t o f no t h a v i n g enough c a t e g o r i e s w i t h which to a s ses s s o m e t h i n g . In the former s o r t of ca se , the e v a l u a t i v e p r o c e s s i s b l o c k e d from the v e r y b e g i n n i n g , and one s i m p l y f e e l s d i s o r i e n t e d . One d o e s n ' t know how to b e g i n to e v a l u a t e a s i t u a t i o n t h a t one cannot take i n because one i s too s t a r t l e d or c o n f u s e d . In the l a t t e r s o r t of c a s e , one has no d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the f a c t s b u t d o e s n ' t know what to make of them because they are so f a r o u t s i d e o n e ' s range of e x p e r i e n c e s . For example , imagine someone who has l e d a v e r y s h e l t e r e d , c o n v e n t i o n a l l i f e w a l k i n g i n t o a p a r t y where there i s a p s y c h d e l i c l i g h t show t a k i n g p l a c e . Everyone i s e x t r e m e l y h i g h on drugs and b e h a v i n g v e r y p e c u l i a r l y from the s t a n d p o i n t o f someone who has spent her l i f e g o i n g to c h u r c h p i c n i c s and tea p a r t i e s . Such a p e r s o n s i m p l y would not know what to make of a l l t h i s . I t i s not t h a t she d o e s n ' t know what event s are t a k i n g p l a c e , t h a t the peop le p r e s e n t are t a k i n g d r u g s , t h a t a r o c k band i s p l a y i n g u n u s u a l l y l o u d m u s i c . A l l o f t h i s i s p e r f e c t l y c l e a r to h e r . But she d o e s n ' t know whether the s i t u a t i o n i s d e s i r a b l e o r u n d e s i r a b l e because she has o n l y a few c a t e g o r i e s o f what counts as d e s i r a b l e , such as " d o i n g my d u t y " , " h e l p i n g o t h e r s " , " b e h a v i n g l i k e a l a d y " , e t c . , and what i s g o i n g on i n the new s i t u a t i o n d o e s n ' t f i t e a s i l y i n t o any of these c a t e g o r i e s . She j u s t d o e s n ' t know e i t h e r whether she d e s i r e s someth ing l i k e t h i s , o r even what " t h i s " i s . T h i s s t a t e may soon y i e l d to the v iew t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i s d e s i r a b l e or u n d e s i r a b l e , but a l l o c c u r r e n t emot ions are t r a n s i e n t s t a t e s . There _is an e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f p r e s e n t , f o r example , "Something v e r y p e c u l i a r i s go ing on h e r e . " 8 5 Awe i s in t e r e s t i n g i n a d i f f e r e n t way, in that i t seems to include both pro and con emotions. This in i t s e l f i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y s urprising; we often have emotional c o n f l i c t s in which we seem to be having both pro and con emotions simultaneously, though i n fact what we have are alternating emotions p u l l i n g us this way and that. What i s interesting about awe i s that i t is individuated by the conjunction of two b e l i e f s , one pro and one con: veneration and dread. Without this conjunction, one would not have awe, but veneration or dread. One i s not quite sure what to say here, except that, again, there i s the element of the unknown, as in "mysterious sacredness", but the emotion i t s e l f involves the b e l i e f s that something i s extremely worthwhile and at the same time dangerous. The fear may be present because the degree of worthiness i s so great that one might reasonably fear i t s power. With these exceptions, the two-value view seems to be the right one. 86 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1. J . R . S . Wilson, Emotion and Object , (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer s i ty Press , 1972), p . 101. 2. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Al s ton , p . 481. 3. V i r g i n i a Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway, ( N . p . : Hogarth Press , 1925; Penguin, 1964), p . 25. 5 . For an in te re s t ing discuss ion of this po int , see Jerome Neu, Emotion,  Thought and Therapy, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul , 1978), pp . 92-97. 6 . Encyclopedia of Philosophy, A l s ton , p . 481. 7. Richard Wollheim, "Thought and Pass ion" , Proceedings of the  A r i s t o t e l i a n Society , LXVIII (1967-68): 1-24. 8. I b i d . , p . 19. 9 . Encyclopedia of Philosophy, A l s t o n , p. 481. 10. B .H. Haggin, 35 Years of Music, (New York: Horizon Press, 1974), p . 46. 11. E r r o l Bedford, "Emotion", Essays in Ph i lo soph ica l Psychology, ed. Donald Gustavson, (Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday Anchor Press, 1964). 12. Robert Gordon, "Emotions and Knowledge", Journal of Philosophy, LXVI (1969): 408-413. 13. Bedford, "Emotion", p . 89. 14. I b i d . , p . 93. 15. I b i d . , p . 94. 16. Gordon, "Emotions and Knowledge", p . 409. 17. I b i d . , p . 408. 18. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, A l s ton , p . 486. 19. Ludwig Wittgenste in , Ph i lo soph ica l Invest igat ions , (Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell & Mott, 1968). 20. I b i d . , p . 31e. 87 21. Ibid., p. 313. 22. Ibid., p. 32e. 23. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Alston, p. 481. 24. ' The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 1971, s.v. "Astonishment". 25. Ibid., s.v. "Amazement". 26. Ibid., s.v. "Wonder". 27. Ibid., s.v. "Surprise". 28. Ibid., s.v. "Awe". 88 CHAPTER 4 EMOTION AND OBJECT There are two major accounts of the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p : Anthony Kenny's i n A c t i o n , Emotion and W i l l and J . R . S . Wilson's Emotion and Object . S tar t ing from the notion of an object as derived from the notion of a t r a n s i t i v e verb, Kenny character izes objects as i n t e n t i o n a l , and as conceptual ly connected to emotions. Further , Kenny introduces the notion of a formal object , which i s const i tuted by a set of c r i t e r i a for i d e n t i f y i n g what can count as an object of a p a r t i c u l a r emotion, e . g . , i t i s part of the concept of fear that the object of fear be seen as dangerous. For Kenny, that emotions have objects and causes where sensations need not have ob ject s , but do have causes, allows to d i s t i n g u i s h between emotions and sensations. We can test for the presence of objects by applying the following test for cogni t ive contents: i f I c la im to be x because p, and i n order to be x because p I must know or bel ieve that p , my condit ion has an object and hence i s an emotion. If not, I am having a sensat ion. Objects cannot be causes, since they are non-contingently connected to emotions, and causa l i ty i s a contingent connect ion. Wilson, on the other hand, i s l a rge ly concerned with the causal quest ion, and with the re l a t ionsh ip between emotion and object as a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a complex occurrent state of mind and something in the wor ld . Wilson does not deny that there i s a conceptual connection between an emotion and a cer ta in b e l i e f , but he does not bel ieve that we locate the object jus t by means of cognit ive f ac tor s . Rather, he believes that cogni t ive factors and causal factors con jo in t ly determine objects . The 8 9 f o l l o w i n g two passages from Emot ion and O b j e c t b r i e f l y summarize W i l s o n ' s p o s i t i o n : Those cases i n which an emot ion has an o b j e c t a re j u s t those cases i n which someone's c o n c e r n w i t h an i t em i n the w o r l d takes the form of f e e l i n g an emot ion towards i t as o b j e c t . . . 1 . . . i f h i s p r e s e n t s t a t e i s a response or r e a c t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r h a p p e n i n g , he must be i n t h a t s t a t e a t l e a s t p a r t l y because he obse rved or l e a r n t o f t h a t h a p p e n i n g . The ' b e c a u s e ' , I would c l a i m , i s a c a u s a l ' b e c a u s e . ' ^ Both o f these c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s are r o u g h , and both views w i l l be d i s c u s s e d a g a i n i n C h a p t e r s 5 and 6. However, we have enough m a t e r i a l t h a t see t h a t Kenny and W i l s o n have s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n about the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between emot ion and o b j e c t . I t h i n k these two views can e v e n t u a l l y be made h a r m o n i o u s , b u t b e f o r e any at tempts a t r e c a s t i n g are made, l e t us note t h a t they emphasize d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e , and use the n o t i o n of an o b j e c t to do s o . There are two main f e a t u r e s o f e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e t h a t can be b rought out by i n t r o d u c i n g the n o t i o n of an o b j e c t . F i r s t of a l l , there i s the f a c t t h a t emotions have c o g n i t i v e c o n t e n t : t h e y c o n t a i n thoughts and b e l i e f s about event s and p e r s o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , they c o n t a i n c e r t a i n k inds of b e l i e f s about event s and p e r s o n s . I t i s t h i s a s p e c t of e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s emphas ized b y K e n n y ' s n o t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s an o b j e c t . F o r Kenny, i t i s the p r e s e n c e of c o g n i t i v e c o n t e n t t h a t enab le s us to l o c a t e an o b j e c t and hence to l o c a t e an e m o t i o n , and the f o r m a l o b j e c t s set s the s t a n d a r d f o r what can c o u n t as an o b j e c t . Second , t h e r e i s the f a c t t h a t emotions are r e s p o n s e s . They do not o c c u r a r b i t r a r i l y or i n a vacuum, bu t p a r t l y as a r e s u l t o f the awareness o f c e r t a i n happenings i n the w o r l d . A t t e n t i o n to t h i s f e a t u r e of e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e emphasizes the connectednes s of emot ions 90 and the world and concentrates on exp l i ca t ing that connectedness. This i n turn can give r i s e to a causal view of objects , as i t does in Wilson's case. Is there some prima facie reason, unconnected with the i n t e r n a l consis tency of each, to prefer one approach to the other as an account of what i t i s to be an object? There seem to me to be two reasons for p re fe r r ing Wil son ' s sort of approach to Kenny's . F i r s t , insofar as "object" has a consis tent use, i t i s most often used to designate something i n the world . There i s a l so , however, a t h e o r e t i c a l reason. If we take Kenny's p o s i t i o n , that objects are i n t e n t i o n a l , we w i l l s t i l l have to offer an account of the connection of emotions to the world. The responsive character of emotions i s so conspicuous that any account that neglected i t , that neglected to ta lk about the connection between goings-on i n the world and occurrent emotions, would be ser ious ly flawed. And how w i l l we introduce these considerations? What language do we have i n which to discuss them? I suggest that object-language i s the most p laus ib le language to use. Furthermore, i t i s poss ible to describe Kenny's pos i t ion and the point he wishes to make without even mentioning the world "ob jec t " ; as we s h a l l see, he may wel l be better off without i t . If Kenny's pos i t ion can be re-descr ibed (with some necessary modif icat ions) without br inging in the notion of an object , this notion i s ava i lab le for an analysis of the connection between emotions and the wor ld . (At this point , this modified vers ion of Kenny's view is merely a promissory note, but i t i s one that w i l l be redeemed i n Chapter 5.) I want now to introduce the notion of an object as something in the world . This seems to me to be the common-sense notion of an object . In order to br ing out two features of objects which seem to me to be c e n t r a l , I 91 want to adopt two d e f i n i t i o n s from the Oxford English Dictionary, which I believe capture both aspects very well. Object. 3b. Something which on being seen excites a p a r t i c u l a r emotion, as admiration, horror, d i s -dain, commiseration, amusement. (4) That to which action, thought, or f e e l i n g i s directed.^ As we can see, each of these d e f i n i t i o n s emphasizes a d i f f e r e n t aspect of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between emotion and object where the object i s something i n the world. The f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n emphasizes the status of the object as e f f i c i e n t cause of the emotion. The second emphasizes the role of object as that which an emotion i s about: i t i s concerned with the connection between the world and the contentfulness of emotions, which are in this sense capable of being directed at something. Ideally, the concept of an object that we eventually adopt w i l l include a l l these features. In order to have a thorough look at which elements of an emotion could take an object, i t w i l l be both il l u m i n a t i n g and useful to conjoin each component of the concept of emotion with both d e f i n i t i o n s from the OED. The f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n w i l l hereafter be c a l l e d the causal d e f i n i t i o n , while the second w i l l be cal l e d the target d e f i n i t i o n . Part 1: Which component takes the object? The following p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be considered: 1. x is the object of change in physiological state. 2. x i s the object of f e e l i n g . 3 . x i s the object of voluntary behavior. 4. x i s the object of b e l i e f . 92 F o r the sake of t h o r o u g h n e s s , (1) and (2) w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e l y , though the two t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t e the " f e e l i n g " component o f the c o n c e p t o f e m o t i o n , f e l t p h y s i o l o g i c a l change . (1) "x i s the o b j e c t o f change i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e . " The OED d e f i n i t i o n t h a t seems most p r o m i s i n g here i s the c a u s a l d e f i n i t i o n . I have a rgued t h a t p h y s i o l o g i c a l change does take p l a c e i n o c c u r r e n t e m o t i o n s , and , i f t h i s i s so , then whatever causes o c c u r r e n t emotions w i l l be c a u s a l l y c o n n e c t e d i n some way to p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e . But the d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t we do n o t know j u s t what does cause change i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e , though , as I have s a i d , we may s t r o n g l y s u s p e c t t h a t b e l i e f s can do s o . I f we d i d , we would be a b l e to s ay more p r e c i s e l y j u s t how change i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e f i t s i n t o the c o n c e p t o f o c c u r r e n t e m o t i o n s . The t a r g e t d e f i n i t i o n w i l l no t do h e r e , because there i s no sense i n w h i c h a change i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e c o u l d be d i r e c t e d a t a n y t h i n g . The t a r g e t d e f i n i t i o n seems to be u s i n g " d i r e c t e d " i n an e s s e n t i a l l y r e l a t i o n a l s e n s e , where there are two r e l a t a , one d i r e c t e d towards the o t h e r . Had the d e f i n i t i o n a l l o w e d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " d i r e c t e d towards a g o a l " i n the sense o f a c h i e v i n g some s t a t e or end , we might be ab l e to say t h a t from a b i o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , the body d i r e c t s p h y s i o l o g i c a l change a t p r e p a r i n g the body f o r a c t i o n or something of t h a t k i n d . But t h i s p r e p a r a t i o n i s d i r e c t e d towards b r i n g i n g some s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n t o b e i n g , r a t h e r than b e i n g d i r e c t e d a t something o t h e r than i t s e l f t h a t a l r e a d y e x i s t s . (2) "x i s the o b j e c t o f f e e l i n g . " Here the c a u s a l d e f i n i t i o n seems the most l i k e l y c a n d i d a t e : " x i s t h a t which e x c i t e s f e e l i n g s " , where " e x c i t e s " means " c a u s e s " . On the view I have p r e s e n t e d , what causes f e e l i n g s 93 i s p hysiological change. Thus physiological change i s the object of f e e l i n g . The target d e f i n i t i o n would not do because there seems to be no sense i n which a feel i n g could be directed towards anything. (3) "x i s the object of behavior". In this case, both the causal d e f i n i t i o n and the target d e f i n i t i o n could be appropriate. Using the causal d e f i n i t i o n , we w i l l say "x i s that which on being seen excites behavior: where, again, "excites" means "causes". What causes behavior upon being seen i s some event or state of a f f a i r s i n the world. If I run upon seeing a bear, the bear i s what I have seen or noticed that causes my behavior. Using the target d e f i n i t i o n , we w i l l say "x i s that to which voluntary behavior i s directed." This sounds promising, but we need to be careful here about what exactly i s meant by "directed". When we speak of behavior being directed, i t i s tempting, since behavior i s physical a c t i v i t y , to think of behavior as being "pointed" somehow i n a physical d i r e c t i o n . Thus, i f I shake my f i s t a t Charles, my behavior i s directed towards Charles since my f i s t i s pointed towards him. But suppose, though i t i s Charles with whom I am angry, I shake my f i s t at his mother, since I know i t w i l l annoy him no end i f I frighten her, and I wish to annoy him to no end. If we take "directed" to mean "physically directed" we w i l l then have to say that Charles' mother, who i s largely i r r e l e v a n t to my disagreement with Charles, i s the object of my behavior, since i t i s phy s i c a l l y directed at her. Further, there i s an obvious sense i n which my behavior i s directed not at Charles' mother, but at Charles. It i s Charles with whom I am angry, Charles whom I wish to annoy, and this suggests a notion of "directed" that has nothing to do with physical d i r e c t i o n . Rather, i t has to do with my b e l i e f s . 9 4 The b e l i e f s that are connected with my anger are about Charles - h i s i n s u l t i n g behavior, his i n v i t i n g his mother over for dinner on our anniversary. In this sense, my behavior i s directed only insofar as my b e l i e f s are directed. Now l e t us move on to the sort of voluntary behavior that has been characterized as "manners of behavior" rather than behavior i n the sense of s p e c i f i c actions. W i l l the notion of the object of behavior change using this concept of voluntary behavior? I think not. Using the causal d e f i n i t i o n , the same arguments apply here that were appropriate to particular b i t s of voluntary behavior. Using the target d e f i n i t i o n , i f we make the mistake of thinking of "directed" as "phy s i c a l l y directed", we w i l l have the same d i f f i c u l t i e s . Charles and I have had an argument and, instead of shaking my f i s t at him, I pretend there's nothing wrong and begin to set the table for dinner. However, instead of gently placing the plates on the table as i s my habit, I slam them down as hard as I can without breaking them. If we think of "directed" as physical d i r e c t i o n , we would have to conclude that the table i s the object of my behavior. But, insofar as I have anything in mind, i t i s Charles. Perhaps I want to frighten him, make him uncomfortable, l e t him know that the argument isn't over yet. If this i s so, then i t is ray b e l i e f s that are directed and that give my behavior whatever d i r e c t i o n i t has. Or I may have no intentions that include Charles' becoming aware of my fee l i n g s . I may simply be so angry with him that I have to do something, so I slam plates. Agains, insofar as my b e l i e f s are directed towards anything, they are directed towards Charles, for i t i s Charles with whom I am angry. ( 4 ) "X i s the object of b e l i e f " . Here both the causal d e f i n i t i o n and the target d e f i n i t i o n can be used. Let us begin with the causal d e f i n i t i o n . 95 I am angry with Charles, and I have the bel i e f "I consider that remark i n s u l t i n g " or "You insulted me". What is the cause of my b e l i e f ? It seems to me that a p e r f e c t l y straightforward sense of "cause" here i s "reason f o r " . What i s my reason for having such a b e l i e f ? There are two senses i n which I may have reasons for my b e l i e f : (a) I have certain evidence for my b e l i e f , and (b) I have a p a r t i c u l a r set of standards according to which c e r t a i n remarks count as i n s u l t i n g . Using (a), we could c l a r i f y the request for reasons by saying "Why do you believe that happened rather than something else?" Using (b), we could c l a r i f y the request for reasons by saying "Why does that count as an Insult rather than a compliment or a demand for i n f o r -mation?" The former request for c l a r i f i c a t i o n has to do with getting clear about what events took place, and the other has to do with j u s t i f y i n g evalua-ti o n of the facts given a p a r t i c u l a r set of standards. If I am asked for reasons for my b e l i e f i n the sense of getting clear about events, the reason for my b e l i e f and thus the cause i s the relevent event or events. Given my knowledge of the language, I believe that Charles made the remark he did because I heard him utter a sentence or series of sentences. If I am asked for the reasons for my b e l i e f i n the sense of j u s t i f y i n g my evaluation of Charles' remark, I w i l l say that the reason for my bel i e f i s that I consider remarks of that kind i n s u l t i n g because they cast aspersions on my i n t e l l i g e n -ce, sex, good looks, cooking or whatever, and my standards for i n s u l t include casting aspersions on these things. Or, If the question i s posed with an eye to finding out why I f i n d that p a r t i c u l a r remark i n s u l t i n g rather than t o t a l -l y inoffensive, I may reply that Charles knows that I am p a r t i c u l a r l y sensit-ive on the topics of my i n t e l l i g e n c e , sex, good looks, cooking, etc., and though i t may seem to be an inoffensive remark i t i s r e a l l y by my standards an 96 e s p e c i a l l y nasty i n s u l t . Thus, using the causal d e f i n i t i o n , the object of my b e l i e f s i s either events or a p a r t i c u l a r set of standards. Using the target d e f i n i t i o n , the object of my b e l i e f i s that towards which i t i s directed. The most natural sense of "directed" here i s "about". A b e l i e f i s directed towards that event or state of a f f a i r s that i t i s about. That this i s the most plausible interpretation i s reinforced by the reminder that, i n the target d e f i n i t i o n , an object i s defined not only as that towards which a thought or f e e l i n g i s directed, but also "the thing (or person) to which something i s done, or upon or about which something operates". Insofar as i t involves mental a c t i v i t y that upon or about which a b e l i e f operates, at l e a s t a conscious b e l i e f , can only be whatever i t i s about i n the world. If I believe that Charles insulted me, my b e l i e f i s an a c t i v i t y that revolves around Charles. Part 2: The winner I t i s clear from the foregoing discussion that there i s only one real candidate for object taking: b e l i e f . If we are to have a notion of object that takes into account both d e f i n i t i o n s only b e l i e f s w i l l do because, while the causal d e f i n i t i o n w i l l f i t with a l l the components, the target d e f i n i t i o n w i l l not. We have seen that, though i t may appear to be the case that behavior can be directed, such an appearance i s misleading. Behavior i s only directed insofar as the b e l i e f s that accompany i t are directed. Nor can p h y s i o l o g i c a l change or feelings be said to be directed. Only the b e l i e f that i s yielded by the evaluation process and which individuates emotions can be said to be directed. An object i s what this b e l i e f i s about, and i s i t s e f f i c i e n t cause. However, we are not yet ready to give a f u l l account of the 97 emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p . To see just how objects cause b e l i e f s , and the extent to which b e l i e f s , i n order to take objects, must be about them, we must f i r s t look at the problem of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of emotion. FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 Wilson, Emotion and Object, p. 7 3 . Ibid., p. 7 7 . Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Object". 99 CHAPTER 5 JUSTIFICATION The question of whether and how emotions can be said to j u s t i f i e d i s a substantial one, and I w i l l not attempt to treat every aspect of i t . Rather, I w i l l discuss only the parts of the question that w i l l have a bearing on the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p . Let us begin by looking at ju s t what we mean when we say an emotion i s j u s t i f i e d . Part 1; The j u s t i f i e d element of emotion Given our consideration of emotions so far, we can see that only one element of emotions i s a l i k e l y candidate for j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and that element i s b e l i e f . The following two d e f i n i t i o n s , selected from those appearing under " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " i n the Oxford English Dictionary w i l l be useful here: J u s t i f y . 3. To show (a person or action) to be just or i n the r i g h t . 6. To show or maintain the j u s t i c e or reasonableness of (action, claim, etc.); to adduce adequate grounds for; to define as ri g h t or proper. 1 Thus i f I attempt to j u s t i f y my emotions, I attempt to show that they are not wrong, mistaken or unreasonable or that they do not lack adequate grounds. But what i s i t about emotions that could be said to be j u s t i f i e d i n these senses? We have seen that emotions are complex, composed of perception of physiological change, other less explicable feelings, behavior, and b e l i e f s . I t makes no sense to speak of j u s t i f y i n g a physiological change, unless we mean by j u s t i f y "show the purpose of", which does not f i t the d e f i n i t i o n s offered above. Certainly i t makes no sense to speak of j u s t i f y i n g the perception of physiological change or other feelings unless there i s a 1 0 0 question of something more than percept ion, e . g . , one is accused of g iv ing too much at tent ion to pleasant feel ings on the grounds that to do so i s s i n f u l . And when we speak of perception of phys io log i ca l change or other f ee l ing s , we are speaking jus t of awareness of f ee l ing , not length or i n t e n s i t y of a t t e n t i o n . Various behaviors seem promising at f i r s t , but , as we have seen, they are not a consis tent component of emotions and, even i f they were, they seem e n t i r e l y separable. We have no d i f f i c u l t y with the question of whether my anger need be expressed i n par t i cu la r ways, e . g . , I might be e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d i n being very angry with someone for making a rude sex i s t remark, but e n t i r e l y un ju s t i f i ed i n p h y s i c a l l y attacking such a person. The absence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for my behavior does not af fect the j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of my emotion. This s trongly suggests that behavior cannot be the element whose j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s i n question when we seek to j u s t i f y emotions. This same object ion holds even for manners of behavior. You might be j u s t i f i a b l y del ighted to see me, but un jus t i f i ed in ending every gesture with a j o l l y f l o u r i s h , since your doing so i s f r ightening the baby. As was the case with ob ject- taking , we are l e f t with b e l i e f s . Since be l i e f s are the indiv iduators of pa r t i cu l a r emotions, i t i s easy to see why the i r being j u s t i f i e d or not is of great importance: when we have a change of these ind iv iduat ing b e l i e f s , we have a d i f f e rent emotion. Furthermore, b e l i e f s are the sorts of things for which one can have reasons, that one can support by c i t i n g facts , theor ies , p r i n c i p l e s , e t c . F i n a l l y we have seen that insofar as emotions have objects , they are objects of b e l i e f , and that the b e l i e f or be l i e f s are the product of an evaluative process . Thus, s ince problems connected with j u s t i f i c a t i o n are problems with b e l i e f s , and problems with be l i e f s can generate problems with object-taking we must 101 t a l k about the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of b e l i e f s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y the b e l i e f s involved i n the evaluative process, i n order to be able to give a complete account of the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p . Part 2: J u s t i f i c a t i o n of emotions S t r a t e g i c a l l y , i t w i l l be easiest to talk about j u s t i f i c a t i o n i f we approach i t from the point of view of u n j u s t i f i e d emotions. There are a good many things that can go wrong with emotions and, as we s h a l l see, they occur i n d i f f e r e n t places i n the evaluative process. Tracing these mistakes to th e i r origins can help to locate and demonstrate d i f f e r e n t senses of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . In order to do t h i s , we must discuss the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of desires as well as b e l i e f s . S t r i c t l y speaking, desires are not part of emotions but one of the conditions under which they occur. However, in order to consider the evaluative process thoroughly, we must take them into consideration. In my discussion of evaluation, I have said that evaluation has three elements: (1) b e l i e f s about what i s the case, (2) desires, and c r i t e r i a for having those desires f u l f i l l e d , which w i l l involve b e l i e f s and (3) the beli e f that i s yielded by the evaluation of (1) in terms of (2) . My discussion of j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i l l begin with an examination of what can go wrong in each state, and I w i l l take the stages i n order. (1) B e l i e f s about the f a c t s . One of the things that can go wrong with emotions that i s the simplest to locate i s a mistake about the f a c t s . My mistakes about the facts can be of two kinds: a mistake about events or a mistake in my interpretation of events, where "interpretation" covers b e l i e f s about someone's intentions, b e l i e f s about the signifiance of various f a c i a l 102 expressions, bodily positions, tones of voice, etc. Let us look at these two p o s s i b i l i t i e s . (a) Mistakes about the f a c t s . Sometimes I am just wrong about what i s actually happening. For example, I may have misheard someone or been misinformed i n some other way. Or I may connect b e l i e f s about the facts that are, by themselves, quite legitimate i n such a way as to produce a mistaken r e s u l t . For example, suppose I am camping i n the woods. I am very nervous about bears, and am l i s t e n i n g c a r e f u l l y to a l l the sounds I hear. Suddenly, I hear a great r u s t l i n g and bumping, and I immediately assume that a bear i s coming through the woods. I am t e r r i f i e d - I believe that I am in danger from a bear; I cower i n my tent a l l night. However, when I wake up i n the morning, I discover that a dead tree has f a l l e n down i n the night, which accounts for the r u s t l i n g and bumpings, and there i s no sign of a bear. I have made an e x i s t e n t i a l mistake, as the r e s u l t of an unwarranted inference ( from rustlings and bumpings to the presence of a bear. (b) Mistakes about i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Suppose I am having a d i s -cussion with someone about world p o l i t i c s . Just as I am explaining my view on the significance of recent developments i n the Middle East, the person to whom I am speaking curls his l i p i n a way that I i n t e r p r e t as a sneer. I believe that I have been insulted, since I believe that his sneer was d i r e c t -ed at my view. I become angry. However, i t turns out that this person has a nervous t i c . What I thought was a sneer was r e a l l y j ust an involuntary muscle contraction; my anger i s u n j u s t i f i e d . This i s a mistake about some-one's intentions; I have not made a mistake about the movement of the man's l i p - i t r e a l l y did c u r l , what I am mistaken about i s what he meant by that. 103 Usually, when someone curls his l i p i n a pa r t i c u l a r way, he intends that I take i t as an i n s u l t . Very often, b e l i e f s about someone's intentions can play an important role i n emotions. For example, when a c h i l d gives his mother a valentine, even though the valentine i t s e l f i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t i v e , the mother i s often deeply touched, because she realizes that the child°s intention was to do something he thought would please her.* I can also make a mistake about someone's attitude toward me because our c r i t e r i a d i f f e r , and I mistakenly assume that that sort of behavior means that the person i n question d i s l i k e s me, has no respect for my views, etc. (2) Desires and the c r i t e r i a for their being f u l f i l l e d . Let us f i r s t consider the desires themselves. (a) Desires. As I have argued e a r l i e r , emotions are responses to the events i n the world based on the extent to which these events count as f u l f i l l i n g one's desires. Thus to ask for j u s t i f i c a t i o n of desires i s to ask for j u s t i f i c a t i o n of emotions at a very deep l e v e l . One clear sense i n which one might be u n j u s t i f i e d i n choosing to emphasize and pursue one desire over another is the moral sense. From a * I t i s important to disti n g u i s h knowing or having b e l i e f s about someone's intentions from evaluation of someone's intentions. It i s sometimes easy to confuse the two; to do so i s to assume that human beings are a great deal more sensitive than i n fact we are. It i s quite possible to know someone0s intentions and be uninterested. For example, the relevent desire may not be present. Or we may be unable to take someone seriously: some people's attempt at i n s u l t are so feeble that i t ' s d i f f i c u l t to see them as anything but laughable. Or, we may be completely uninterested i n someone's intentions even though we know what they are, because she has d i s q u a l i f i e d herself from consideration as a candidate for human relationships. There are a good many ways in which one can so d i s q u a l i f y oneself; one may, for example, be under stress thus temporarily "not oneself", one may have been coerced, or worst of a l l , one may be so thoroughly neurotic, immoral, Immature, etc. that one is simply beyond consideration as an ordinary responsible human being. / 1 0 4 moral standpoint , a desire that has a moral component often ought to triumph over desires which do not . For example, most of us would agree that the des i re for the mater ia l wel l-being of others as well as one's s e l f is often a vers ion of the moral desire for the good of a l l , and that i t ought to be taken more se r ious ly than the des ire for many luxurious items for oneself and one's loved ones. Thus i t seems obvious that a r i c h i n d u s t r i a l i s t who feels resentment because someone t e l l s him i t is more important because morally r i g h t to provide welfare for the needy than to provide the tax breaks and C a d i l l a c s that he would prefer has an un ju s t i f i ed emotion. The desire to have one's mater ia l desires s a t i s f i e d not merely adequately but opulent ly ought not to take precedence over a desire containing a moral p r i n c i p l e : that the basic needs of people who have no resources at a l l should be supplied from the resources of people who have more than enough. However, once we leave such straightforward cases and take up the competition among moral de s i re s , or among desires a l l of which are concerned with purely p r e f e r e n t i a l matters, i t becomes more d i f f i c u l t to see how these choices could be said to be j u s t i f i e d or not . Suppose one i s t ry ing to decide between two moral values; i t is an important choice because these values, say honesty and kindness, could e a s i l y turn out to be mutually exclusive i n some cases. Assuming that the person in question i s conceptually well-equipped and has a c lear picture of the consequences of act ing on these values, there seems to be no way to j u s t i f y choosing one at the expense of the other unless as part of an already e x i s t i n g moral system, and thi s leaves us i n prec i se ly the same pos i t ion as when we s t a r t e d . If one believes that moral views are based only on reason, perhaps we could say that i t i s more reasonable to choose one rather than the other; t h i s , however, i s by no means obvious. The same sort of d i f f i c u l t y arises when trying to choose among desires that do not involve value, a t l e a s t not i n a moral or aesthetic sense. Suppose one i s trying to decide whether to spend more time on one's desires for professional achievement, time at home with one's family, or time on furthering one's general education. Assuming one i s not presently neglecting one's loved ones, t h i s i s purely a matter of preference. Clearly, one cannot, simultaneously, spend most of one's time working at one's books and a r t i c l e s , a great deal of time with one's nearest and dearest and a great deal of time at the l i b r a r y , discovering a l l the things one's always wanted to know about the sciences but hasn't had time to fin d out. One must choose, but assuming again that one i s well-informed about the results of one's choices and how to go about getting what one wants, there i s no obvious way involving either reason or morality to go about making such a choice, thus no sense i n which choosing one over the others could be said to be j u s t i f i e d or u n j u s t i f i e d . As we have seen, i t i s possible to say that the choice of one desire over another i s u n j u s t i f i e d i f in choosing, one makes some conceptual or factual mistake. But this only means that one's conceptual structure or decision-making procedure i s faulty; i t does not a f f e c t the j u s t i f i a b i l i t y or u n j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of the desires themselves. One would have to show that they could not be j u s t i f i e d . Another consideration about desires i s based on their limitations as inner events: c r i t i c i s m of desires seems to have the most force insofar as desires issue i n behavior. For example, we might say that one ought not to want large cars and enormous amounts of money because, given the state of the economy, what one would have to do to get them would be bad for us and others 106 i n the short term, and perpetuate a p a r t i c u l a r l y cruel form of capitalism i n the long term; or i f thwarting someone's desires for constant attention or goodwill issues i n violent behavior towards others, we might want to say that one ought not to have the desires. But i t seems more sensible to say that, whatever one's desires, one ought not to act greedily or h i t other people for not giving one what one wants. When desires are detached from behavior, they seem innocuous enough. Gabriele Taylor, i n her paper " J u s t i f y i n g The Emotions" 2, argues that there are cases i n which we could say that i t i s wrong not to have an emotion. The examples she gives are cases i n which one has a mistaken notion about one's own worth - one believes oneself so superior that no c r i t i c i s m from others can make one angry, or one believes oneself so i n f e r i o r that no amount of unfair c r i t i c i s m can make one angry. This suggests that, by the same token, i t might be wrong not to have certain emotions because one lacks the appropriate desires. For example, suppose someone has a l l the usual desires - desires for goodwill for h e r s e l f , material security, creative work - but lacks two desires: the desire for the well-being of others and the desire for a moral order. She i s completely uninterested i n how other people are treated, either by herself or others. As far as she i s concerned, the existence of other people i s acceptable as long as they don't get i n her way, but she couldn't care less what happens to them. If there are any such people, one wants i n t u i t i v e l y to say that i t i s wrong not to have the desires for the well-being of others and for a moral order, and, by implication, wrong not to have the emotions based on them, such as righteous indignation, compassion, and shame. But again, one suspects that the root of this objection i s that the lack of the desires for the well-being of others and a 107 moral order, hence the lack of righteous indignation, etc., leads to f a i l u r e to act on behalf of others when, given some set of moral p r i n c i p l e s , one ought to. Even having compassion for others can be seen as worthwhile because the knowledge that someone feels compassionate can a f f e c t one i n the same way that a "good deed" sometimes does: i t is consoling and cheering to believe that someone understands and cares that much for one. Were this not the case, compassion might not be considered such a worthwhile emotion. (b) C r i t e r i a . There are two main ways in which c r i t e r i a can go wrong: they can be based on i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence, or they can be i n t e r n a l l y conceptually inconsistent. Our c r i t e r i a for what counts as f u l f i l l i n g a desire involve both choos-ing among various d i f f e r e n t sorts of s a t i s f a c t i o n s , and deciding what is to count as a genuine case of that s a t i s f a c t i o n . For example, you and I may choose one of the same c r i t e r i a for the manifestation of goodwill: we agree that showing respect for others counts as showing goodwill. But we disagree about what counts as respect: I may believe that, i f I respect someone, I must always l i s t e n p a t i e n t l y to what she has to say, even though I consider i t mistaken, while you may believe that what r e a l l y counts as respect i s treating someone as an equal. When someone says something with which you disagree, you immediately l e t her know and explain why. You believe that people who behave in the way I prefer are patronizing. In general, the mistakes that are made in choice of s a t i s f a c t i o n and what counts as s a t i s f a c t i o n are d i f f e r e n t . When we choose to value respect over helpfulness as a manifestation of goodwill, we are in part making a decision that is based on observation. We have observed that, e.g., treating others with respect makes them much 108 h a p p i e r than g i v i n g a g r e a t d e a l o f a d v i c e , which many f i n d a n n o y i n g . Sometimes our o b s e r v a t i o n s are i n a d e q u a t e ; we e i t h e r have n o t got enough e v i d e n c e or have not go t enough of the r i g h t k i n d o f e v i d e n c e . I may s i m p l y n o t have o b s e r v e d c a r e f u l l y enough or g a t h e r e d enough examples , or perhaps I have made a m i s t a k e n a s sumpt ion about the e x t e n t to which one case i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a l l c a s e s ; I may m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e t h a t , s i n c e my c l o s e s t f r i e n d l i k e s to be t r e a t e d i n a c e r t a i n way, the same must be t rue of everyone e l s e . Or perhaps I have g a t h e r e d e v i d e n c e o n l y from peop le i n g e s t a l t t h e r a p y g r o u p s , and n o t from p e o p l e who are r e l i g i o u s i n the t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n s e n s e . In d e c i d i n g what w i l l c o u n t as s a t i s f a c t i o n , there i s c o n c e p t u a l m i s t a k e . When we d e c i d e to c o u n t hones ty r a t h e r than t o l e r a n c e of e r r o r as r e s p e c t , we are c h o o s i n g p a r t l y on the b a s i s of what c o u l d c o u n t as r e s p e c t . There are c o n c e p t u a l l i m i t s t h a t must be obse rved or we have not got a g e n u i n e case o f r e s p e c t . For example , suppose I c l a i m t h a t I r e s p e c t C h a r l e s , even though I c o n s t a n t l y b e l i t t l e h i m , am rude to him and r a r e l y ask h i s o p i n i o n about a n y t h i n g o f i m p o r t a n c e . When> asked i f I b e l i e v e t h i s b e h a v i o r count s as r e s p e c t because i t shows t h a t I b e l i e v e C h a r l e s to have the s o r t o f f o r m i d a b l y s t r o n g c h a r a c t e r t h a t can take abuse w i t h o u t f l i n c h i n g , I r e p l y t h a t I t h i n k n o t h i n g of the k i n d . R a t h e r , I t h i n k C h a r l e s i s a complete i d i o t , an inadequa te bumbler who can b a r e l y t i e h i s own s h o e s . A t t h i s p o i n t one w o u l d , j u s t l y , doubt t h a t I knew the meaning of " r e s p e c t " and a l l the emotions I have t h a t I c l a i m are based on my b e l i e f s about whether I am g e t t i n g the r e s p e c t I t h i n k I deserve are v e r y l i k e l y to be u n j u s t i f i e d . (3) The e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s t h a t appear i n e m o t i o n s . Because these b e l i e f s are the p r o d u c t of combin ing (1) and (2 ) , we can see t h a t the 109 mistakes made here w i l l be caused by mistakes about facts, interpretations, what counts as f u l f i l l i n g some c r i t e r i o n or, in the sense of conceptual error, what could count as f u l f i l l i n g some c r i t e r i o n . Depending on one's views, i t may also include moral mistakes. I do not propose to discuss moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n of emotions further. Though we have looked at the ways i n which things can go wrong in the evaluation process, we are not yet prepared to see how the question or j u s t i f i c a t i o n bear on the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p . To do th i s , we must f i r s t look at some of the causes of the mistakes we have j u s t discussed. Though mistakes i n b e l i e f are often simple ones, caused simply by inadequate attention to the evidence or the f a i l u r e to think through the implications of some concept such as respect, there are mistakes that are made in more complex ways, af f e c t i n g b e l i e f s on the deepest possible l e v e l . To see how these mistakes come to be made, l e t us begin by introducing the notion of cognitive background for emotional response. Part 3: Cognitive Background for Emotional Response Everyone has a set of b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe that help form the basis for gathering and sel e c t i n g evidence, applying various interpretations and choosing c r i t e r i a for what w i l l count as f u l f i l l i n g the desires that are part of the evaluative element of emotions. These b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe determine which features of the world one notices and which one rejects, whether one's standards are such that few things or many things would count as f u l f i l l i n g one's desires, or whether one sees any hope at a l l for f u l f i l l i n g one's desires thus can allow oneself to admit having them. They provide the foundations for our be l i e f s about how 110 trustworthy, f r i e n d l y , e t c . people are l i k e l y to be or how l i f e i s l i k e l y to go. They begin to be formed i n ear ly childhood, and have a great deal to do with what sorts of people we pre fer , how sens i t ive we are about various things , and so on. Some sets of these be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions provide useful foundations for acquir ing b e l i e f s that r e f l e c t the world accurately and provide us with reasonable expectations for events i n the world . If one has included i n one's be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions that, e . g . the world is i n t e r e s t i n g , not unduly threatening, an appropriate object of c u r i o s i t y , that c o n f l i c t s can be resolved; that the actions of others are , on the whole, the r ea l test of the i r in tent ions ; that as George E l i o t says, each of us has " . . a n equivalent centre of s e l f , whence the l ight s and shadows must always f a l l with a cer ta in d i f f e rence . " I t i s very l i k e l y that one w i l l be r e a l i s t i c , reasonably well-informed about and tolerant of the di f ferences between oneself and others , and possessed of a cer ta in amount of useful information about the wor ld . However, i f one's be l ie f s and d i spos i t ions include the be l i e f s that e . g . , everyone i s out for her/himself , the world is i n hopeless chaos, one i s helpless to improve one's l i f e i f things go wrong, no-one r e a l l y loves anyone and a l l re l a t ionsh ips are sexual manipulation for the purpose of domination, i t is very l i k e l y that one's be l i e f s about one's present experiences w i l l be d i s t o r t e d . These b e l i e f s and d i spos i t ions are extremely powerful because they are derived from the f i r s t sets of be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions we acquire, at a time when we lack information about the world and at the same time want i t a great d e a l . At that po in t , we are i n no pos i t i on to think c r i t i c a l l y , thus we tend to accept what i s o f fered . We acquire these be l ie f s and d i spos i t ions as c h i l d r e n from those with whom we spend the most time and those who have the 111 most influence on the qu a l i t y of our l i v e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y our emotional l i v e s . In most cases, this means adults and es p e c i a l l y parents. On the whole, the b e l i e f s and dispositions are either those that the i n f l u e n t i a l adults have, some form of resistence to their b e l i e f s and dispositions (often the opposite) and/or b e l i e f s we construct about them (and, sometimes, about everyone) as a r e s u l t of assessing their behavior i n the l i g h t of our desires. It i s these early influences that are the most powerful determinants of fundamental b e l i e f s . If one's parents are strongly committed to being well-informed, keeping an open mind on various subjects such as sex and forms of personal relationships, are kind and considerate to each other and oneself, one i s very l i k e l y to be the same. If one's parents are extremely narrow-minded and prudish, r e j e c t i n g every picture of the world that d i f f e r s i n any respect from their own, considering sexual pleasure and any sort of relationship except heterosexual marriage nasty, one i s l i k e l y to be the same, though i t i s this sort of parental attitude that can often produce b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe as exactly opposite as possible. If one's parents are kind and tolerant, one i s l i k e l y to expect the same from the world. If one's parents are cruel and frus t r a t i n g , one may come to believe that unhappiness and f r u s t r a t i o n , even i n adult l i f e , i s inevitable because one can expect no cooperation from one's fellow human beings. We can also acquire these fundamental b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe through bringing psychological defenses into play. That i s , one's l i f e may be so thoroughly unpleasant that one i s simply unable to keep on looking at what goes on, and one may come not to notice certain kinds of 112 unpleasant fac t s , e s p e c i a l l y ones that have to do with the ongoing f r u s t r a t i o n of important de s i re s . Or, as a re su l t of very deprived chi ldhoods , some people come to bel ieve they deserve spec ia l a t tent ion and develop unusually exacting requirements for what w i l l count as love and a f f e c t i o n , as i f they were hoping to be consoled for childhood neglect; i n such cases, one can f a i l to notice f r i e n d l y behavior because i t f a i l s to meet one's high standards for what counts as f r i e n d l y . Or, as i n the many examples offered by the p s y c h i a t r i s t R.D. Laing, one may f ind oneself i n a family i n which there i s so much confusion, i n which c o n f l i c t i n g and even contradic tory at t i tudes and behaviors are required by the most dominant and/or i n f l u e n t i a l family members or the structure of roles in the family, that one becomes confused and develops some very odd-looking be l ie f s and d i spos i t i ons to be l i eve , e . g . , everyone who claims to.be a f r iend i s r e a l l y a secret enemy, seeking to manipulate one for her/his own g a i n . The fundamental be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions to believe are of several k inds . We need be l ie f s about the way things already are to provide a foundation for add i t iona l informat ion. These be l i e f s include both straightforward be l i e f s about the facts and be l ie f s that are based on c e r t a i n assessments of these f ac t s . For example, I may bel ieve both that human crue l ty to other human beings i s a p e c u l i a r l y pers i s tent t r a i t , both h i s t o r i c a l l y and i n the present and, at the same time, that human beings are not b a s i c a l l y e v i l , but tormented into wickedness by economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , the c lass system, and so on. The f i r s t b e l i e f i s just a straightforward summing up of observations of the human c o n d i t i o n . But the second requires that I assess my information i n a d i f f e rent way - i t requires that I take s e r ious ly some aspects of human behavior, u t i l i z i n g some c r i t e r i o n for basic 113 e v i l n e s s , and excuse or explain the r e s t . For example, I do notice the enormous number of cruel things people do to each other, and I do notice the persistence of this behavior i n a general way, but I also notice how sorry most people are and how g u i l t y they f e e l after doing some p a r t i c u l a r l y awful thing, which I believe indicates the presence of the desire and capacity to do better, and I notice how, at least for myself, and those I know best, anxiety over acquiring the basics of l i f e makes one more prone to cruel behavior. So I have both information and the di s p o s i t i o n to interpret that information i n certain ways which are determined by my c r i t e r i a . The information i t s e l f i s determined by my disp o s i t i o n to notice, perceptually, some things rather than others, based on whatever my c r i t e r i a are (usually unconscious i n perception) for no t i c i n g . Both the beli e f s and dispositions to believe which enable us to make the assessments, and which the assessments y i e l d , gradually form a general world picture which i n turn generates more b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe, usually favoring the assessments and c r i t e r i a that are already i n place i n the form of beli e f s and dispositions to bel i e v e . Some of these b e l i e f s and dispositions are, of course, conscious and consciously chosen. For example, I may be well aware that I tend to l i k e people who have i n t e l l e c t u a l interests better than those who don't, believing them to be more interesting, with c r i t e r i a for interestingness that have been consciously worked out. Or I may have thought long and hard about my aesthetic c r i t e r i a , and come to believe that choral music i s , from the standpoint of communicating emotion, greatly superior to instrumental music. But some of these b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe may be i n a sense secret, not to others but to those who have them. That i s , though I may have dispositions to believe that form p e r f e c t l y i d e n t i f i a b l e patterns from a 1 1 4 t h i r d - p e r s o n s t a n d p o i n t , I m y s e l f e i t h e r cannot or do not i d e n t i f y them. For example , I may c o n s c i o u s l y b e l i e v e t h a t my former husband s h o u l d r e m a r r y , t h a t the new woman i n h i s l i f e i s b e a u t i f u l , i n t e l l i g e n t , and j u s t r i g h t f o r h i m . B u t , whenever her name and i n d e e d the name of any woman w i t h whom he i s i n v o l v e d comes up i n c o n v e r s a t i o n , I s a y d e n i g r a t i n g t h i n g s about h e r , perhaps i n the f a m i l i a r " i n s u l t d i s g u i s e d as compl iment " form, as i n " Jane c e r t a i n l y has done w e l l i n her c a r e e r . Of c o u r s e , t h a t means s h e ' s not a t home much, and C h a r l e s always v a l u e d f a m i l y l i f e so h i g h l y . . . " . On a deeper l e v e l , I may have had a v e r y unhappy c h i l d h o o d , a p r i s o n e r of moody and v i o l e n t p a r e n t s . Now t h a t I am an a d u l t , I of cour se r e a l i z e t h a t a g r e a t many p e o p l e are not l i k e t h a t , and t h a t I c a n form r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h them and change my l i f e f o r the b e t t e r . B u t I s t i l l f i n d myse l f f l i n c h i n g whenever some l o v e d o n e ' s v o i c e r a i s e s even a l i t t l e , c o n s t a n t l y w a t c h i n g peop le s u s p i c i o u s l y to see whether t h e i r b e h a v i o r c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as m e n a c i n g , whether they might not be angry w i t h me but u n w i l l i n g to show i t u n t i l they s t r i k e o u t a t me u n e x p e c t e d l y . I f someone asked me whether I r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t everyone i s dangerous and p r o b a b l y out to get me, I would deny i t , s i n c e I r e a l i z e how i r r a t i o n a l such a b e l i e f i s and , a t the c o n s c i o u s l e v e l , I d o n ' t b e l i e v e i t . But u n c o n s c i o u s l y , I am s t i l l a s s e s s i n g the w o r l d i n the same way I l e a r n e d t o , out of s e l f - d e f e n s e , as a c h i l d . The b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e c e r t a i n t h i n g s about my p a r e n t s t h a t I a c q u i r e d by a s s e s s i n g t h e i r b e h a v i o r i n the l i g h t o f my d e s i r e s f o r a f f e c t i o n and a p p r o v a l , perhaps even s u r v i v a l , a re i n a p p r o p r i a t e to the p r e s e n t , s i n c e my p a r e n t s are dead , and my p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h t h r e a t has l e d me to d e v e l o p c r i t e r i a f o r what counts as good i n t e n t i o n s t h a t are so u n r e a l i s t i c t h a t no one can meet them - I o f t e n d o n ' t even n o t i c e f r i e n d l y a d v a n c e s . 115 Our b e l i e f s and d i spos i t ions to bel ieve together form the foundations for our various judgments; i n p a r t i c u l a r , some of these be l ie f s and d i spos i t i ons to bel ieve together const i tute what might be c a l l e d our personal world view: what, i f anything, we think about the nature of our fellow human beings, what intent ions and behavior we can reasonably expect from them, what we bel ieve the world has to offer ourselves i n pa r t i cu l a r and people i n genera l . These are the be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions to bel ieve we acquire and have acquired through in te re s t i n and attempts to f u l f i l l the desires which under l ie our emotions. It i s our be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions to bel ieve one thing rather than another about the l i k e l i h o o d of our f u l f i l l i n g these desires that const i tute our world view i n this sense. Of course, one cannot separate these views from our more general views - i n a complicated world, what one thinks about the world p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y about the degree of danger i n which we a i l f ind ourselves , can often depend on whether one feels reasonably s a t i s f i e d with l i f e and cheerful about one's r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the state of one's work and so on: perhaps the more one sees l i f e as enjoyable and rewarding, the more one worries about los ing i t thus the more dangerous the world s i tua t ion seems, or perhaps the more cheerful one i s the more l i k e l y one thinks a happy re so lu t ion of c o n f l i c t s . At any rate , as we w i l l soon see, one's be l i e f s cannot be i so la ted from each other -the t e r r i b l e psychologica l pr ice paid by people who attempt to do this i s wel l known. But the be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions to believe with which we are concerned here are those whose subject matter i s at least p a r t l y the possible f u l f i l l i n g or f rus t ra t ion of our strongest des i re s . It i s these be l ie f s and d i spos i t ions to bel ieve that I propose, for obvious reasons, to c a l l cogni t ive background for emotional response, hereafter c a l l e d CBFERs. These 116 b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e are r e i n f o r c e d and f u r t h e r deve loped by a p o l i c y o f i n q u i r y t h a t a f f e c t s bo th c o n t e n t and e p i s t e m i c p r o c e s s , e p i s t e m i c p r o c e s s b e i n g the way i n which our b e l i e f s are formed. T h i s p o l i c y o f i n q u i r y i s c o n s t i t u t e d by the b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e t h a t c o n t r o l the c o n t e n t of b e l i e f s and the p r o c e s s of o b s e r v a t i o n , i n d u c t i o n and r e v i s i o n t h a t r e s u l t s i n more b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e and r e i n f o r c e m e n t f o r the b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e a l r e a d y i n p l a c e . B e f o r e we go on to see i n more d e t a i l how t h i s p o l i c y works and how t h i n g s can go wrong, l e t us f i r s t l ook a t some problems connec ted w i t h u n c o n s c i o u s b e l i e f s . Then we w i l l c o n s i d e r model e p i s t e m i c proces s and d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the p o l i c y o f i n q u i r y . P a r t 4: Some thoughts on u n c o n s c i o u s b e l i e f s An i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e of CBFERs i s the d i f f e r e n c e between c o n s c i o u s and u n c o n s c i o u s b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e . As I n o t e d b r i e f l y above , w h i l e some of the c o g n i t i v e background i s c o n s t i t u t e d by c o n s c i o u s l y h e l d b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e which can be c o n s c i o u s l y e v a l u a t e d and r e v i s e d by o n e s e l f i n the l i g h t of c r i t i c i s m both from o n e s e l f and o t h e r s , some i s c o n s t i t u t e d by b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t are c o n s c i o u s but which r e s i s t o n e ' s e f f o r t s to r e v i s e : one may see t h a t one i s wrong, but be unab le t o c o n v i n c e o n e s e l f to change o n e ' s mind i n the sense t h a t the proposed change never seems to become an i n t e g r a l e lement of b e l i e f , bu t r e q u i r e s a s t r u g g l e i n e v e r y c a s e , a c o n s c i o u s a t tempt to d i s l o d g e a s t u b b o r n b e l i e f or b e l i e f s . The e x i s t e n c e of t h i s l a t t e r k i n d of case i s e v i d e n c e f o r the e x i s t e n c e of c o n s t i t u e n t s t h a t are e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to d e a l w i t h : u n c o n s c i o u s b e l i e f s and u n c o n s c i o u s d i s p o s i t i o n s to b e l i e v e . O f t e n , t h a t one 117 holds unconscious b e l i e f s and has unconscious dispositions to believe can be discovered by looking at what one does i n fact believe, and the way one does i n f a c t assess the evidence, and asking whether the b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe of which one i s conscious can adequately account for both. Such examination can often provide clues to the nature of underlying b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe. This i s often d i f f i c u l t , since unconscious b e l i e f s and dispositions are, i f we are to believe the psychoanalysts, unconscious for a reason.* Nevertheless, i f one p e r s i s t s , one can, for example discover that, to one's discomfort, one has the tendency to be much nicer and sympathetic to one's older students, e s p e c i a l l y those with l i v e s much l i k e one's own, strongly suggesting that one believes those students more deserving, their ways of l i f e more worthwhile (so l i k e oneself!). Or perhaps one finds that one nearly always believes other people's conversation boring except when the subject of their opinions about oneself arises, suggesting that one's b e l i e f s about the r e l a t i v e importance of oneself and others are not a l l they should be. And from the standpoint of one's professional l i f e , one might find oneself tending to believe, without much r e f l e c t i o n , that Heidegger and Sartre are inconsequential philosophers whose work i s not worth taking seriously, which may indicate that one believes one's philosophical in t e r e s t s should be, for p r a c t i c a l reasons, regulated by considerations about *Not, of course, the usual sense of reason, as having conscious motive or purpose. This i s a metaphorical use, and indicates the presence of an hypothesis: that there i s a hidden part of the mind whose concern i s the prevention of the conscious experience of pain, g u i l t , and/or despair, and when certain things happen i n the world, i t takes control and defends the conscious mind against p o t e n t i a l l y destructive, i n the sense of despair-producing knowledge. This involves a complex notion of the mind and a concept of self-deception which there i s no space to discuss here. 118 what w i l l gain approval from those who are i n a pos i t ion to do something for one p r o f e s s i o n a l l y . It i s important to notice that when one does discover these things , i t i s , p rec i s e ly , a sense of discovery one has and not one of , so to speak, c r e a t i o n . The existence of such be l i e f s and d i spos i t ions to bel ieve p a r t l y explains the d i f f i c u l t y of changing some conscious b e l i e f s : I seem unable to convince myself that Frank i s not a snide male chauvinist (he i s n ' t ) because I bel ieve that most men i n pos i t ions of power become snide male chauvinis ts even i f they d i d n ' t begin that way. This is the sort of d i f f i c u l t y we often complain about when we say that someone i s "unreasonable". Some of us seem not to be amenable to reason i n some areas because "reason", the correc t ing information, only reaches the source of our convict ion with extreme d i f f i c u l t y , i f at a l l . While my fr iends argue that I misperceive Frank - he d i d n ' t mean the compliment he offered me at lunchtime as a sarcas t ic remark, he d i d n ' t ask me to teach two sections of P h i l . 103 because he thinks women are only f i t for f i r s t - y e a r courses, and so on, I am unmoved because they are not reaching the source of the d i f f i c u l t y . It i s not that I need to attend more c a r e f u l l y to Frank's behavior, but rather than I have some deeply buried b e l i e f s which, at the time of o r i g i n , began as correct be l ie f s about how I was l i k e l y to be treated by my father and uncles (and indeed a good many other men as well) but which I have mistakenly generalized to a l l men. U n t i l I have come to grips with these b e l i e f s , I w i l l continue to have great d i f f i c u l t i e s with my perceptions of men; my di spos i t ions to bel ieve the worst and d i scard the hopeful are too s t rong . In many cases the more unreasonable one seems, the more deeply buried the relevant be l ie f s are, and the more 119 l i k e l y i t i s that the b e l i e f s and/or dispositions to believe i n question are intimately connected with the f u l f i l l m e n t or f r u s t r a t i o n of e s p e c i a l l y cherished desires. In connection with our concern with unconscious b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe, we w i l l be working with an hypothesis that should be stated e x p l i c i t l y : the hypothesis that the unconscious mind could sensibly be said to work i n the same way as the conscious mind. Always supposing i t makes sense to talk about the unconscious mind, I do not believe this to be an u n j u s t i f i e d hypothesis, at least for the limited area under discussion. I t seems that we must account somehow for the odd and faulty b e l i e f s that often turn out to be at the bottom of u n j u s t i f i e d emotions; i n p a r t i c u l a r , the b e l i e f s that are b e l i e f s about the way people are generally that are based on what seems now to be i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence, e.g. the behavior of the members of one's family and their behavior i n relationship to each other and a small and helpless c h i l d , through the eyes of that c h i l d . The curious and i n t e r e s t i n g fact i s that under certain circumstances, one's psychological development does not keep pace with the development of one's body. Further, one's mind often seems to r e s i s t the e f f o r t s to, so to speak, bring i t into the present by f a i l i n g to absorb information that would show an already held b e l i e f or b e l i e f s or dispositions to believe to be f a l s e . It seems strange to describe this process as "not wanting to know", or "refusing to believe x because i t would cause too much pain", and even stranger to talk about strategies - to say that the unconcious "decides" to confuse the conscious mind about j u s t how awful the goings-on i n one's family are and so on. I t sounds strange"because a l l of these ways of talking suppose that one can meaningfully talk about wanting, refusing, deciding, planning strategies, 120 and a l l the other mental a c t i v i t y the concepts of which o r d i n a r i l y involve the concepts of conscious de l ibera t ion and choice , going on without our awareness. Yet i f we cannot ta lk i n this way, i t is very d i f f i c u l t to make sense of the pheonomena. Furthermore, we can often catch ourselves doing a l l these things more or less consciously i n the sense that we t r i c k ourselves, so to speak: we f ind ourselves thinking about some p a r t i c u l a r l y nasty b i t of information about, e . g . , a f r i e n d , wishing we hadn't heard i t , and having our minds go blank - " f o r g e t t i n g " , as we say. We can often, i f we're honest, catch ourselves deciding whether we w i l l allow ourselves to " forget" an unpleasant appointment. The boundary between conscious and unconcious a c t i v i t y i n the mind seems to me to be far more f l u i d than some people suppose, and my suspicion is that , i f we paid extremely careful a t tent ion to the workings of our minds, which at any moment are thoroughly complex and mul t i - l ayered , we would often f ind ourselves deciding to believe one thing rather than another - dec id ing to bel ieve and act on whatever w i l l be the leas t trouble and/or most f l a t t e r i n g to various au thor i t i e s , and hiding these decis ions from ourselves by blanking out, concentrating on something else while f u r t i v e l y working out our s t ra teg ie s , pro ject ing our ugly thoughts onto someone e l se , and so on. Therefore, i n order to be able to discuss these matters i n some coherent manner, I intend to help myself to this model. Part 5: Epistemic process Considering the foregoing, the opportunit ies for manipulation and threat inherent i n every s i t u a t i o n invo lv ing c h i l d r e n , the desires that most of us have to be agreeable and l i k e d , emotionally comfortable, and the be l i e f that most of us (often secret ly ) have, that we deserve to be consoled for our 121 d i f f i c u l t i e s i n l i f e , and c e r t a i n l y considering the often shocking and frightening state of the world, i t i s surprising that we are able to be clear-headed about anything, and do not suffer in a thorough-going way from childhood and anxiety-produced mistakes and general confusion. That we do not, that we are often clear-headed about things i s partly due simply to the fact that the world makes certain demands on us; some facts are so obtrusive and persistent that, no matter what our desires, we can't get away from them without psychic disturbance so severe as not to be worth i t . We often face facts just because, i n the ordinary sense, we must. Yet these facts that we often face so e a s i l y are for the most part a combination of u t t e r l y non-threatening facts and facts that have a good deal of survival value, that are either of limited or overwhelming, perhaps ultimate, personal importance. For example, there i s no reason that i t should be threatening for most people t to know the bus schedules, that the zoo closes at 5:00 P.M., that a report that must be typed should be double spaced, nor to understand how, at least i n p r i n c i p l e , earthquakes and volcanoes work, that gravity prevents us from f a l l i n g off the earth, that E=MC2» And i t might turn out to be absolutely c r u c i a l to know that buses often won't stop at crosswalks, that the best place to stand i n an earthquake i s under a door frame, that carbon monoxide i s odorless and can be generated by faulty heaters, etc. However, as soon as we find ourselves considering facts in which we have neither a purely casual in t e r e s t nor a survival-based i n t e r e s t , but facts which bear on the possible f u l f i l l m e n t of our strongest desires ( i n addition to, of course, s u r v i v a l ) , as soon as the desires for love and friendship, s a t i s f y i n g work, and/or on-going economic security come into play, our capacity for self-deception becomes more and more pronounced as the possible outcomes of situations 122 become more and more l i k e l y to be unpleasant and f r u s t r a t i n g . And i n these cases, I suggest that what saves us i s a desire to know, to be well-informed, that i s s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to compete with the powerful and more f a m i l i a r desires for approval and comfort. Perhaps this desire i s not for knowledge for i t s own sake, but knowledge for, again, p r a c t i c a l reasons: i t might turn out that, i n the long run, there i s more p r a c t i c a l value, perhaps even more su r v i v a l value, to be had from knowing how things are than from deceiving oneself as a r e s u l t of the desires for comfort or consolation. At any rate, however the desire to know may be connected to other desires, i t leads us to adopt a p o l i c y of inquiry, which i s constituted by certain b e l i e f s and dispositions that we consider epistemically preferable because they produce the best results - the most knowledge, the most r e l i a b l e c r i t e r i a . Let us now consider the b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe that constitute a p o l i c y of inquiry. What I have i n mind i s the commitment to a general position concerning the r e l a t i v e importance of being well-informed vs. being emotionally comfortable, approved of or consoled. This position i s constituted by a set of b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe that have as t h e i r subject matter two major components: that evidence be gathered i n certain ways (content), and that certain procedures be followed i n construct-ing and adopting b e l i e f s (process) . The p o l i c y on content i s contained in the f i r s t of the three elements of the p o l i c y on epistemic process (a) b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe that govern gathering evidence (b) b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe governing assessment of and willingness to draw conclusions from evidence (c) b e l i e f s and dispositions to believe governing correction of mistakes. Though i t i s tempting to c a l l the p o l i c y 123 on p r o c e s s i d e a l e p i s t e m i c p r o c e d u r e , i t would be b e t t e r when g i v i n g such a rough c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n to d e s c r i b e t h i s p r o c e s s by s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n b e l i e f s and d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e r u l e s o f thumb t h a t we employ i n each of these a r e a s , c e r t a i n model p rocedure s t h a t we b e l i e v e y i e l d t h e b e s t r e s u l t s , (a) In the areas of g a t h e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n or c o l l e c t i n g e v i d e n c e , s i n c e t h i s w i l l be the f o u n d a t i o n f o r whatever c o n c l u s i o n s we draw. We do n o t , f o r example , draw c o n c l u s i o n s about the c h a r a c t e r t r a i t s of o t h e r s a f t e r one meet ing a t a c rowded, n o i s y c o c k t a i l p a r t y , nor do we s a y , on t h e e v i d e n c e o f one e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t a l l members of any r a c i a l or r e l i g i o u s group have a c e r t a i n s e t o f t r a i t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , we do not s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i g n o r e c e r t a i n s o r t s o f e v i d e n c e , e . g . f a c t s t h a t a r e d i f f i c u l t f o r our c u r r e n t v iews to accomodate , (b) In the a rea o f drawing c o n c l u s i o n s , we d i s t i n g u i s h between a l l o w i n g o u r s e l v e s to draw c o n c l u s i o n s and r e f u s i n g to do s o . We w i l l a l l o w o u r s e l v e s to take up a b e l i e f o r p o s i t i o n on some mat ter o n l y when we have , as ment ioned above , a f u l l and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ampl ing of e v i d e n c e . O t h e r w i s e , we tend to r e g a r d our p r e s e n t b e l i e f s as i n a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t a t -i v e , and o u r s e l v e s n o t e n t i t l e d to c o n c l u s i v e b e l i e f s . However, we a l s o tend n o t to r e s i s t t a k i n g up some b e l i e f o r s e t of b e l i e f s i f p r o v i d e d w i t h f u l l and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e e v i d e n c e ; t h a t i s , we do not r e fu se to draw c o n c l u s i o n s . The d i s t i n c t i o n I have i n mind here i s the d i f f e r e n c e between the s o r t o f ca se i n which one i s concerned to make sure t h a t o n e ' s e v i d e n c e about , e . g . , someone's c h a r a c t e r i s drawn from a number of s i t u a t i o n s i n which a v a r i e t y o f c a u s a l f a c t o r s p l a y e d a r o l e , and not s i m p l y from one or two e x p e r i e n c e s , a n d , on the o t h e r hand , the s o r t of case i n which i s the i s s u e i s t a k i n g p r o p e r a c c o u n t of the s o r t of e v i d e n c e t h a t i s sometimes c a l l e d overwhe lming , where f a i l u r e to draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s sugges t s t h a t one e i t h e r does n o t 124 know how i n d u c t i o n works or i s a v o i d i n g some c o n c l u s i o n one would p r e f e r not to have to f a c e . A f a m i l i a r example of t h i s i s o f f e r e d by the case of p o l i t i c i a n s o f Watergate fame, who, f aced w i t h as much e v i d e n c e as anyone c o u l d need to draw a t l e a s t some t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s , s u d d e n l y found themse lve s unable to draw even the most modest o n e s . In g e n e r a l , we tend to draw c o n c l u s i o n s so r e a d i l y and c o n s t a n t l y t h a t the f a i l u r e to do so sugges t s t h a t o t h e r d e s i r e s , perhaps the f a m i l i a r ones f o r comfor t and a d m i r a t i o n , are i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h o n e ' s d e s i r e to know. At the l e a s t , the r e s i s t a n c e t o a s s e s s i n g the e v i d e n c e w i t h an eye to drawing c o n c l u s i o n s i n some s i t u a t i o n s r e q u i r e s e x p l a n a t i o n , (c) F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s the c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r - the b e l i e f t h a t outcomes , e s p e c i a l l y s u r p r i s i n g ones t h a t i n d i c a t e t h a t o n e ' s b e l i e f s might not have been c o r r e c t or s u f f i c i e n t l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , a re c a r e f u l l y examined and the m i s t a k e n , i n c o m p l e t e or i n s u f f i c i e n t b e l i e f s c o r r e c t e d , c o m p l e t e d , or f i l l e d o u t . To be ab le to do t h i s r e q u i r e s a w i l l i n g n e s s to b e l i e v e (perhaps " a d m i t " comes c l o s e r here) t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t one has n e g l e c t e d i m p o r t a n t e v i d e n c e , or m i s c o n s t r u e d the a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e . A g a i n , t h i s seems to be something we do q u i t e n a t u r a l l y . A p p l y i n g t h i s to the e v a l u a t i v e p r o c e s s , we can see how any mis takes i n p r o c e d u r e c o u l d l e a d to mi s t akes about the f a c t s , and though i t might seem to a p p l y o n l y to f i n d i n g o u t and f o r m i n g b e l i e f s about the f a c t s and not to f o r m i n g c r i t e r i a , i t i s no t d i f f i c u l t to see how the former a f f e c t s the l a t t e r . In our d i s c u s s i o n of the s o r t s of t h i n g s t h a t can go wrong w i t h c r i t e r i a , one i m p o r t a n t p o t e n t i a l d i f f i c u l t y was b e i n g m i s t a k e n , as a r e s u l t o f i n a d e q u a t e i n q u i r y about what counts as f u l f i l l i n g c r i t e r i a f o r b e i n g , e . g . , r e s p e c t f u l or a f f e c t i o n a t e . You and I may agree t h a t i t i s a good 125 th ing to be respect fu l to others , but s t rongly disagree about what counts as being r e s p e c t f u l . Our disagreement can often be resolved by gathering more evidence - by, e . g . , point ing out the connection between our att i tudes and behavior towards someone and her r e a c t i o n . If I intend that my behayior be re spec t fu l towards my students, and I f ind that often my att i tudes or behavior make them fee l f o o l i s h or s tup id , c l e a r l y I don't understand what makes people f ee l that one values the i r opinions , thinks them worth taking s e r ious ly , or has regard for the i r characters , which i n the ordinary way i s one of the resul t s of being r e s p e c t f u l . We behave re spec t fu l ly p a r t l y because we want to make others f e e l worthwhile and s i g n i f i c a n t (because, of course, we bel ieve they a re ) . Thus, i f we make mistakes about the facts , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i f we are unwi l l ing to draw conclusions for which we have plenty of evidence and are unwi l l ing to admit the p o s s i b i l i t y of having made a mistake, we may f ind ourselves with c r i t e r i a that are mistaken i n that i t i s f a l se that cer ta in at t i tudes and behavior w i l l produce the resul t s that respectfulness o r d i n a r i l y produces and, at worst, we may f ind ourselves with c r i t e r i a that are so se r ious ly mistaken that there i s conceptual mistake -that sort of thing j u s t cou ldn ' t count as respect ful because to be respect fu l j u s t i s to behave i n ways x, y and z and, whatever one c a l l s i t , one i s behaving i n ways a, b, and c . With a l l this i n mind, l e t us begin to look at the causes of d i f f i c u l t i e s i n CBFERs. Part 6: D i f f i c u l t i e s i n and because of the p o l i c y of inquiry In general , d i f f i c u l t i e s occur as a r e s u l t of a combination of 126 constraints that regulate content, and of alterations of model epistemic procedure. From the standpoint of content, the usual constraints are constraints on what can count as a source of information, and what information is acceptable as a possible constituent of some belief or disposition to believe. In many cases these constraints are minor, temporary, and connected to some anomalous situation: "Don't mind Aunt Ella, she's been rude to everyone since Uncle Jim died". "Professor Smythe-Robbins winks at a l l the graduate students when he's been drinking." In other cases, they are extensive and misleading, forming a permanent policy. Sometimes doubt i s cast on any source of information that does not have some special status, e.g., is not a member of the family: "Don't contradict your father. He always knows what he's talking about." Sometimes i t is ideological: "You can't believe a word she says - she's a communist." Some belief content may be unacceptable no matter who has i t : "Of course we have her best interests at heart: we're her parents aren't we?" "Certainly the minister's wife doesn't look down on us because we're poor; she's a Christian after a l l ! " In a family where such policies are in effect, one usually adopts them since failure to do so can result in severe penalties. One can face rejection and, at worst, even physical mistreatment for strongly disagreeing with one's parents as a child. As child or adult, one may create one's own temporary constraints, as a result of being in a frightening or extremely painful situation. One may be in a natural disaster or a war, or suffering from the loss of an especially loved friend, and as a kind of psychological protective measure, be unable to take in the changed situation. Thus one discounts certain potentially disturbing sources of information, rejects any bad news 127 about the friend's condition, u n t i l one i s able to come to grips with the s i t u a t i o n through a diminishing of fear or g r i e f . In such situations s e l e c t i o n takes place very quickly rather than gradually. Alterations of model epistemic procedure stem from the same sorts of desires to eliminate content, but they a f f e c t content i n a much more general way. Consider, for example, a man who fears his c h i l d might be using drugs, yet does not want to believe i t i s so. In order to keep himself from believing i t , he simply refuses to take i n and/or connect the evidence - he disregards the strange smells, the gossip of his friends, and so on. Alterations with even more widespread effects can be i l l u s t r a t e d by looking at the following pair of examples. Suppose someone i s so hurt by her parents' b e l i e f that she i s ugly that she, i n self-protection, rejects the whole subject and refuses to assess information or form b e l i e f s of any kind on the subject, i n fact r e s i s t s even a moderate amount of information-gathering concerning her personal appearance. Because her p o l i c y i s that nothing having to do with personal appearance w i l l be taken i n , she even f a i l s to correct her mistaken picture of herself as a r e s u l t of the more reasonable assessments of her f r i e n d s . Perhaps she i s not ugly at a l l , but, e.g., the victim of her parents' wish that they had not had children so late i n l i f e , and their constant and s p i t e f u l resentment of her presence. Or consider a case i n which j u s t the opposite takes place: instead of denying the good opinions of others, this person accepts them and, as well, transforms anything that looks l i k e c r i t i c i s m into a subtle form of praise. Perhaps such a person has been an only c h i l d , the apple of her parents' c o l l e c t i v e eye, and has been brought up to believe that everything she does i s absolutely wonderful and that she i s the f a i r e s t of them a l l . It i s 128 possible for such a person to transform a l l c r i t i c i s m into praise, or f a i l to take i t seriously as a r e s u l t of the character of the c r i t i c i z e r . For example, "He said that j u s t to get my attention; he's shy and can't bring himself to say how beautiful he thinks I am" or "Oh, she's j u s t jealous." In both cases, the person i n question refuses to take seriously and r e f l e c t on the opinions of others and, as a r e s u l t does not consider the p o s s i b i l i t y that she has made a mistake, i n e f f e c t refuses to do so. If we assume that the formation of c r i t e r i a for s a t i s f a c t i o n of one's desires, and perhaps even se l e c t i o n of some desires over others i s affected by information, we can see that both of these elements w i l l be affected not only by exclusion of s p e c i f i c content, but also by this more general tampering. For example, most of us l i k e to think ourselves reasonably a t t r a c t i v e , and are kindly disposed towards those who hold such views about us. In fact, the expression of such a view i s a common ploy when one t r i e s to improve one's relations with someone. But a person who rejects the whole subject of attractiveness w i l l not have "acts as i f I'm a t t r a c t i v e to her/him" as one of her c r i t e r i a for the expression of goodwill. Such an attitude could be so widespread that i t could a f f e c t one's desire to be i n good physical condition; someone could think oneself so p h y s i c a l l y hopeless that she could become i n d i f f e r e n t to her body altogether. There are a great many kinds of cases; what they have i n common is that, in each case, prudential considerations enter into be l i e f a c q u i s i t i o n . Though "prudential" i s more o r d i n a r i l y associated with the contrast between moral and p r a c t i c a l matters, I think i t can also be usefully employed to mark the d i s t i n c t i o n between epistemological considerations, which have to do with knowing what i s the case, and p r a c t i c a l considerations, where producing a 129 b e l i e f with cer ta in content (or, o f ten , without a cer ta in content) i s considered more des irable than knowing what i s the case, for reasons having to do with psycholog ica l wel l -be ing , one's own or someone e l s e ' s . By now i t should be easy to see how tampering with e i ther content or epistemic process can also a f fect content i n d i r e c t l y . If I have a p o l i c y of d i sregarding anything said by someone whose p o l i t i c a l views are Marxist , I w i l l have very few be l i e f s whose content i s some aspect of a genuine Marxist view. I may have a great many be l i e f s whose content consists i n i l l - f o u n d e d genera l iza t ions about the badness or dangerousness of Marxists , but very few views having as the i r content considerations connected to whether or not the p r o l e t e r i a t needs to be led by a vanguard, or whether Trotsky was a r ight-wing r e v i s i o n i s t ; that i s , I w i l l not only lack a great deal of genuine information but I w i l l a lso f a i l to form views about or develop in terpre ta t ions of important happenings i n the world, e i ther the publ ic world or my own personal realm. Or, i f I have been brought up in a family i n which grimness and pessimism are the order of the day, I may genuinely only not ice those events i n the world that are grounds for grimness and pessimism. Real perceptual problems can develop as a re su l t of the r i g i d i t y of some be l ie f s or the i r inappropriate a p p l i c a t i o n - one may cons i s tent ly f a i l to see things that c o n f l i c t with one's p o l i c i e s , and thus w i l l c e r t a i n l y af fect content . There i s also a more ins id ious way that prudent ia l ly influenced p o l i c i e s of inqu i ry can af fect content i n d i r e c t l y . As any psychoanalyst can t e l l us, one reason these p o l i c i e s are extremely i n f l u e n t i a l and long- l ived is that they are e a s i l y and per s i s t en t ly (though c e r t a i n l y not l eg i t imate ly ) transformed from spec i f i c p o l i c i e s with s p e c i f i c content to much more general ones. For example, one may begin by 130 b e l i e v i n g "only my father knows anything" and move on to "only men who act l i k e my father know anything" to "only men that are dominant, f o r c e f u l and beat me know anything". The origins of these p o l i c i e s are a l l too soon l o s t to the conscious mind, leaving a general b e l i e f that one holds with unusual tenacity, and that one believes expresses "the way things are". Often people think such b e l i e f s self-evident, since they both believe them with absolute and unwavering conviction and are not aware of their o r i g i n s . Perhaps this phenomenon has to do with the fact that, as children, we are looking not only for information but for, so to speak, instructions on how to proceed. Our desires are for general as well as p a r t i c u l a r truths. Whatever the explanation, we can see that the effects of any policy of inquiry, whether prudentially influenced or not, are extremely wide-ranging. And when prudential considerations enter into these p o l i c i e s , the res u l t i s l i k e l y to be wide-ranging false b e l i e f s . As well, any interference of prudential considerations with either s p e c i f i c content or with epistemic process w i l l have wide-ranging effects because our b e l i e f s are connected to each other, often i n ways of-which we are not aware. Once we begin modifying some b e l i e f s , we must modify others i n order to support the o r i g i n a l ones. Probably everyone has had the experience of discovering b e l i e f s i n oneself, p a r t i c u l a r l y false b e l i e f s , whose existence came as a complete surprise. One j u s t wasn't aware of having allowed, e.g., a vague and consoling b e l i e f that somehow everything w i l l come out right, a b e l i e f adopted during the nuclear war fears of the f i f t i e s , to cloud one's mind to the point of causing one to l i t e r a l l y forget that China has exploded a nuclear device. That this sort of thing happens suggests that once one begins to acquire false but comforting b e l i e f s , once one begins to tamper with the process of be l i e f formation, the 131 process i s to a cer ta in extent se l f -perpetuat ing . In general , what we f ind when this happens i s that what was once a l imi ted d i s t o r t i o n i n some areas of CBFERs, e i ther l imi ted i n the sense of there being a small number of be l i e f s invo lved , as i n the case of a badly-treated c h i l d , or l imi ted i n the sense of a f f ec t ing a r e l a t i v e l y small area of CBFERs temporarily as in a traumatized adu l t , becomes wide-spread and systematic - the more tampering the more d i s t o r t i o n . Hereafter, the resul t s of the interference of prudent ia l considerat ions with a p o l i c y of inqu i ry w i l l be ca l l ed d i s to r ted CBFERs. Let us t ry to summarize the way i n which d i s tor ted CBFERs are formed and perpetuated. The d i f f i c u l t i e s with s p e c i f i c content are ea s i ly summarized: e i ther one re jects information and/or pers i s t s i n holding on to be l ie f s already i n place i n the face of obvious evidence to the contrary . This in turn affects one's choice of desires or c r i t e r i a insofar as they are affected by informat ion . It i s , however, interference in the p o l i c y of inqui ry by means of tampering with epistemic process that produces the most pers i s tent and wide-spread d i f f i c u l t i e s . Let us summarize those d i f f i c u l t i e s : though we have discussed epistemic process in formal ly , l e t us look more c a r e f u l l y at the way i n which prudent ia l considerations can i n t e r f e r e . There are three basic ways that prudence inter feres with b e l i e f formation, one for each element i n model epistemic process: (a) the subs t i tu t ion of prudent ia l considerations for the requirement that the evidence be as f u l l and representative as possible before a be l i e f about i t i s constructed (b) the adoption as a p o l i c y of r ev i s ing what one observes i n the l i g h t of one's most s trongly held be l i e f s (rather than, e . g . , the ones 132 t h a t make the most s e n s e ) ; (c) the r e f u s a l to admit the p o s s i b i l i t y o f m i s t a k e . Taken s e p a r a t e l y o r t o g e t h e r , these k i n d s o f i n t e r f e r e n c e can p roduce d i s t o r t e d CBFERs by c a u s i n g us to be i n a d e q u a t e l y i n f o r m e d , i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y p e r c e p t u a l l y s e l e c t i v e and b l i n d to e r r o r , and by r e q u i r i n g s y s t e m a t i c change i n b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e . And s i n c e these k i n d s o f mi s takes are caused by b e l i e f s t h a t o r i g i n a t e i n c o n t e x t s where o n e ' s s t r o n g e s t d e s i r e s were e i t h e r a t odds w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n i n o n e ' s e n v i r o n m e n t , o r s a t i s f i e d v i r t u a l l y b e f o r e the d e s i r e s were e x p r e s s e d , they a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to a f f e c t the e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s tha t are i n v o l v e d i n e m o t i o n s , s i n c e emotions are produced i n p a r t by the assessment of event s i n the l i g h t o f these same d e s i r e s . P a r t 7: M i s t a k e s and j u s t i f i c a t i o n There are two i m p o r t a n t o b s e r v a t i o n s we can make as a r e s u l t o f our d i s c u s s i o n of background b e l i e f s and e p i s t e m i c p r o c e d u r e . F i r s t , we can see t h a t d i s t o r t e d CBFERs can a f f e c t a l l a rea s o f the e v a l u a t i v e p r o c e s s and are bound to produce a good many f a l s e b e l i e f s and m i s l e a d i n g c r i t e r i a , e s p e c i a l l y i n s i t u a t i o n s where s t r o n g d e s i r e s are i n v o l v e d . T h i s means that t h e r e w i l l be a good many u n j u s t i f i e d e m o t i o n s , s i n c e f a l s e b e l i e f s cause t h e emot ion i n which they a p p e a r , o r have a p a r t i n p r o d u c i n g , to be u n j u s t i f i e d . Thus any t h o r o u g h - g o i n g a c c o u n t of the e m o t i o n - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l have to i n c l u d e some a c c o u n t o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between emotion and o b j e c t when the emot ion i s u n j u s t i f i e d , e l s e run the r i s k of l e a v i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l number o f examples unaccounted f o r . Second , because CBFERs are e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t bo s h i f t and a f f e c t the new i n f o r m a t i o n we g e t , we can now see why, sometimes , emotions do not change 133 when b e l i e f s seem to c h a n g e . U s i n g our p r e v i o u s example, suppose I b e l i e v e , as a r e s u l t o f a c o m b i n a t i o n of u n f o r t u n a t e c h i l d h o o d e x p e r i e n c e s and the s u b s e q u e n t bad c h o i c e s to which the r e s u l t i n g d i s t o r t e d CBFERs i n c l i n e d me, t h a t a l l men are u n t r u s t w o r t h y . As a r e s u l t , I am u n s u a l l y q u i c k to anger i n my r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h men. My f r i e n d F r a n k v e r y much wants me to g i v e up t h i s v i e w , and p o i n t s o u t ways i n which he has shown h i m s e l f to be t r u s t w o r t h y , ways i n which men we both know have shown themselves to be t r u s t w o r t h y and so o n . As Frank t a l k s to me, I take h i s p o i n t i n the sense t h a t I u n d e r s t a n d , i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , what h e ' s s a y i n g ; I even agree that the e v i d e n c e s t r o n g l y p o i n t s towards the t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s of a l l these men. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s not so easy to make m y s e l f see a l l t h a t when Frank i s n ' t a r o u n d , because the b e l i e f s t h a t have g e n e r a t e d my mis taken judgment of F r a n k a r e the r e s u l t o f v e r y o l d d i s t o r t e d CBFERs t h a t have had time to accumulate a good d e a l o f ( p a r t l y s e l f - i n d u c e d ) c o n f i r m a t i o n i n my l i f e . In the case o f a v e r y g e n e r a l b e l i e f such as t h i s one , there are a l a r g e number of b e l i e f s , and c r i t e r i a i n which b e l i e f s p l a y a major r o l e , i n v o l v e d ; i n o r d e r t h a t my b e l i e f s about men change so that I 'm g e n u i n e l y c o n v i n c e d that men are m e r e l y members of the human race w i t h a v a r i e t y o f f a u l t s and v i r t u e s j u s t as women a r e , I must undo a number of o t h e r m i s c o n c e p t i o n s . T h i s takes a v e r y l ong t ime and i s d i f f i c u l t a t b e s t . Thus u n l e s s Frank i s r i g h t there p o i n t i n g o u t the t r u t h , o r u n l e s s I f o r c e m y s e l f to i g n o r e my deeper b e l i e f s and c o n c e n -t r a t e j u s t on what I c a n work out i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , I j u s t d o n ' t see the wor ld t h a t way. . Of c o u r s e , t h i s does n o t mean t h a t I'm i n c a p a b l e of d o i n g s o . R a t h e r , tha t I have these d i f f i c u l t i e s shows tha t o f t e n , chang ing the b e l i e f s i n v o l v e d i n emotions i s not as s i m p l e as c o r r e c t i n g o n e ' s view about some s e t o f f a c t s . Some b e l i e f s t h a t o c c u r i n emotions are the r e s u l t of d i s t o r t e d 134 CBFERs, thus rest on an extremely complex foundation of b e l i e f s which themselves must be given up before I can change the present r e s u l t of that complex foundation. I may be able to see, i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , that something i s f a l s e , but CBFERs have a kind of epistemic weight that tips the balance towards b e l i e f that w i l l be cosistent with them. In contrast, b e l i e f s that are the r e s u l t of uncensored content and model epistemic process and not of dis t o r t e d background b e l i e f s are r e l a t i v e l y easy to change by getting s t r a i g h t about the facts because they are a r e s u l t of an epistemic p o l i c y that i s aimed toward getting s t r a i g h t about the facts rather than, e.g., being comfortable, thinking well of oneself, or avoiding anxiety. 135 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 1. Oxford Eng l i sh Dic t ionary , s . v . " J u s t i f y " . 2. Gabriele T a y l o r , " J u s t i f y i n g the Emotions", Mind 84 ( July 1975): 390-402. 3. George E l i o t , Middlemarch, ( N . p . : n . p . , 1871-72; Penguin, 1965), p . 243. 4. R.D. La ing , The Divided S e l f , (N .p . : Tavistock Publ icat ions L t d . , 1959; P e l i c a n , 1965); with A. Esterson Sani ty , Madness and the Family, ( N . p . : Tavistock Publ ica t ions 1964; P e l i c a n , 1970). 136 CHAPTER 6 EMOTION AND OBJECT REVISITED In Chapter 4, I hinted at the sort of account I want to give of the emotion-object relationship by promising to show how Kenny's view, that emotions are non-contingently connected to objects, thus cannot be causally connected, can be incorporated into a causal emotion-object account. I said that we would see that Kenny does not need the notion of an object to make the point about emotions he wants to make. If this turns out to be so, the f i e l d i s l e f t l argely to Wilson's notion of an object as an event or person, something in the world, and a causal account seems far more plausible. In this chapter, I want to show how an account similar to but not i d e n t i c a l to Wilson's (through using Wilson's as a guide) can be offered, and how a revised version of Kenny's analysis can be shown to be consistent with this account. F i r s t , however, we must look at Kenny's analysis, and deal with the objections he offers to any causal account. We can then go on to the question of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a causal account, and f i n a l l y we can formulate a complete account of the emotion-objection r e l a t i o n s h i p . Part 1: The legitimacy of a causal analysis J.R.S. Wilson argues both that a causal analysis of the emotion-object relationship i s legitimate, and that one can give a causal analysis of the relationship between the content of a b e l i e f and an event or person in the world. I too wish to of f e r a causal analysis, but from a somewhat d i f f e r e n t standpoint. Given the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a causal analysis, I want to be able to give a causal account of the emotion-object relationship from the 137 standpoint of showing how p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s i n the emotion become connected with a p a r t i c u l a r object, and of talking about the causal conditions that r e s u l t s i n the f a i l u r e of these b e l i e f s to connect with objects in any apparently comprehensable way. In order to do t h i s , I need only show that a causal analysis i s legitimate. Once i t can be seen that a causal analysis i s legitimate, the foregoing discussions w i l l provide a causal account of the sort I want. Thus my chief concern here i s to show that there is no reason to reject a causal analysis. Wilson presents a number of arguments i n favor of the legitimacy of causal analysis. He believes his most important opponent to be Anthony Kenny, i n Kenny's book Action, Emotion and W i l l . Wilson takes issue with Kenny on the matter of c a u s a l i t y , o f f e r i n g several arguments against Kenny's view. I w i l l give accounts of two of them here. In Chapter Nine of Action, Emotion and W i l l , Kenny offers his d e f i n i t i o n of an object: In the f i r s t part of ths book I spoke frequently of the 'object' of an emotion or desire, contrasting the object of such a mental attitude with i t s cause... The objects of mental attitudes are sometimes c a l l e d " i n t e n s i o n a l " * objects... The sense of "object" which I have hitherto employed and wish now to discuss i s one which derives from the grammatical notion of the object of a t r a n s i t i v e verb. The object i s fear i s what i s feared, the object of loved i s what i s loved ... Thus, for Kenny, the object of an emotion i s something mental and not something physical, what we have been c a l l i n g b e l i e f s and/or content. But this s t i l l leaves the claim that the connection between emotion and object i s *Kenny says "int e n s i o n a l " when he means " i n t e n t i o n a l " . 138 non-contingent mysterious, since i t seems jus t as contingently true that a c e r t a i n emotion contains cer ta in i n t e n t i o n a l mater ia l as i t dos that my fear i s caused by something external such as an approaching bear. His c la im becomes c learer when we examine Kenny's notion of a formal ob jec t . Kenny's concept of a formal object has l i t t l e to do with the c r i t e r i a for objecthood per se, and much more to do with the c r i t e r i a for something's being a p a r t i c u l a r emotion, which i s determined by i t s having a cer ta in sort of ob jec t . The concept of a formal object i s der ived, according to Kenny, from a s cho la s t i c adage about the objects of ac t ions : objects specify ac t s . Objects " . . d e s c r i b e species of the genus described by a verb a l o n e . . " That i s , objects t e l l us what sort of eat ing , smoking, e tc . i s going on: i s one eat ing lamb chops or sprouts, smoking a c igar or a pipe? While material objects determine the metaphysical l i m i t s of act ions , i n the sense that, e . g . , p h y s i c a l l y exis tent things can be burned but thoughts cannot, formal objects set the conceptual l i m i t s for a c t i o n . Only what i s wet can be dr ied , only what i s d i r t y can be cleaned: To assign a formal object to an act ion i s to place r e s t r i c t i o n s on what may occur as the d i r e c t object of a verb descr ib ing the a c t i o n . 4 In the same way, emotions are spec i f i ed by the ir objects . M a t e r i a l l y , s ince they are i n t e n t i o n a l , and one can think about anything, they can be about anything. But formally emotions are spec i f i ed by the kinds of be l ie f s that character ize the i n t e n t i o n a l mater ia l : one can only fear what is dangerous, be gra te fu l for what i s good. We must d i s t ingu i sh c a r e f u l l y between Kenny's notion of an object and his notion of a formal ob ject . While an object i s an in tent iona l object , a formal object i s a set of c r i t e r i a that specify the character of the 139 i n t e n t i o n a l object. The intentional object contains, so to speak, what i s loved, feared, and so on. The formal object t e l l s us what sort of i n t e n t i o n a l object we must have i n order to have a genuine case of love or fear. It is important to notice that the formal object specifies the character of the i n t e n t i o n a l object i n that i t s p e c i f i e s what kind of b e l i e f the person who has the emotion must have about something. If I fear the bear, the formal object s p e c i f i e s that I must believe the bear to be dangerous. Of course, I can have b e l i e f s about anything at a l l , since I can think about anything at a l l ; i t i s some of the b e l i e f s , i n p a r t i c u l a r the evaluating b e l i e f s , that must be of a c e r t a i n kind. This does not exhaust the intentional contents, since there are b e l i e f s other than evaluative b e l i e f s involved. Kenny argues that emotions and objects are non-contingently connected and that objects cannot be causes. However, the only sort of connection that presents i t s e l f as a candidate for non-contingent connection i s conceptual connection. Thus Kenny i s claiming that emotion and object are conceptually connected. Certainly It does seem to be true that there i s a conceptual connection between a formal object and a p a r t i c u l a r emotion for Kenny. The formal object s p e c i f i e s the b e l i e f s that characterize the intentional content of p a r t i c u l a r emotions. In addition, I have argued that, both conceptually and as a matter of f a c t , b e l i e f s are constituents of emotions, and since b e l i e f s have content, emotions do as well. So in this sense, that intentional objects are present i s part of the concept of emotion. But what i s c e r t a i n l y not true i s that there i s any conceptual connection between an emotion, e.g., fear, and any p a r t i c u l a r content, in the sense of a connection between dangerousness and any p a r t i c u l a r dangerous thing. Other problems seem to me to arise from Kenny's unexplicated claim that 140 the notion of object he uses i s derived from the concept of the object of a t r a n s i t i v e verb. The object of a t r a n s i t i v e verb i s defined in the following way i n the Oxford English Dictionary: 7. Gram. A substantive word, phrase, or clause, immediately dependent on, or 'governed by', a verb as expressing, i n the case of a verb of action, the person or thing to whch the action i s directed, or on which i t i s exerted. Unfortunately, this i s not very illuminating with respect to the relationship between emotion and object. For while i t i s true that the objects of thought i n the sense of intentional objects are non-physical (the OED c a l l s this use of 'object' "metaphorical"), this does not seem to be l i k e the sort of object-taking expressed by a t r a n s i t i v e verb. The interesting difference between objects of action and objects of thought i s that objects of action have one object, while objects of thought may have two: one i n precisely the same way that an action has an object, and the other i n the sense that the thought has content. It i s the former that seems to be most l i k e the object of a t r a n s i t i v e verb. U n t i l Kenny's notion of an object i s clearer, i t i s not possible to further evaluate the claim that emotions and objects are conceptually connected. Kenny also argues against a causal relationship between emotion and object on experiential grounds. He argues that, i f we analyze the emotion-object relationship as causal, we w i l l have to say that we arrive at our knowledge of what our emotions are about inductively. He offers the example of happiness at one's mate's recovery from i l l n e s s : If I f e e l great happiness and r e l i e f because my wife unexpectedly recovers from a mortal i l l n e s s , I do not f i r s t discover that I f e e l happy and relieved, and then draw the conclusion that this f e e l i n g i s caused by my wife's recovery (e.g. on the grounds that I have observed that whenever she so recovers I have just this f e e l i n g ) . 6 141 Here Kenny wants to say t h a t , w h i l e i t may be t r u e that my mate ' s r e c o v e r y i s the o b j e c t of my e m o t i o n , i t i s no t a l s o the c a u s e . W h i l e I can know the o b j e c t o f my emotion i m m e d i a t e l y , I c a n n o t know the cause i n t h i s way, and to say t h a t I cannot know the o b j e c t i m m e d i a t e l y does not do j u s t i c e to my e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . W i l s o n o f f e r s s e v e r a l arguments a g a i n s t Kenny : we need o n l y l ook a t two h e r e . F i r s t , W i l s o n argues t h a t Kenny i s wrong to say t h a t a c o n n e c t i o n , s u c h as the c o n n e c t i o n between emotion and o b j e c t , c o u l d be e i t h e r c o n t i n g e n t or n o n - c o n t i n g e n t : The n e c e s s a r y / c o n t i n g e n t c o n t r a s t has i t s p r i m a r y a p p l i c a t i o n i n the c o n t e x t of t a l k about s t a t e m e n t s , p r o p o s i t i o n s , f a c t s , t r u t h s , e t c . . A n e c e s s a r y p r o p o s i t i o n i s one t h a t can be shown to be t r u e w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to the f a c t s - i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , t rue a p r i o r i . A c o n t i n g e n t p r o p o s i t i o n i s one whose t r u t h or f a l s i t y can o n l y be de termined by r e f e r e n c e to the f a c t s - i t i s c o n t i n g e n t l y t r u e , t rue a p o s t e r i o r i . 7 S i n c e a c o n n e c t i o n o r r e l a t i o n cannot be true o r f a l s e , a c o n n e c t i o n or r e l a t i o n i s n e i t h e r c o n t i n g e n t nor n o n - c o n t i n g e n t . However, i t may be the case t h a t some c o n c e p t e n t a i l s some o t h e r c o n c e p t , so that they are n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d to each o t h e r . For example , the c o n c e p t o f a f a t h e r e n t a i l s the c o n c e p t of a c h i l d . But t h i s does not mean t h a t the c o n n e c t i o n between f a t h e r and c h i l d i s no t c o n s p i c u o u s l y c a u s a l . W i l s o n b e l i e v e s t h a t Kenny may have m i s t a k e n l y moved from making a p o i n t about a c o n c e p t u a l c o n n e c t i o n between emotions and b e l i e f s t h a t Kenny sometimes c a l l s o b j e c t s , to c l a i m i n g that the c o n n e c t i o n between emot ion and o b j e c t i t s e l f i s n o n - c o n t i n g e n t , and t h i s seems to me p l a u s i b l e . W i l s o n ' s nex t argument i s a g a i n s t K e n n y ' s c l a i m t h a t , i f o b j e c t s were c a u s e s , we would know o n l y i n d u c t i v e l y what our emotions are about , and s i n c e 142 t h i s i s f a l s e , s i n c e we know i m m e d i a t e l y and not i n d u c t i v e l y , o b j e c t s c a n n o t be c a u s e s . W i l s o n r e p l i e s t h a t i n f a c t to say t h a t one f e e l s r e l i e f a t a n y t h i n g i m p l i e s a c a u s a l a c c o u n t , because the v e r y a p p l i c a t i o n of the term " r e l i e f " i m p l i e s a c a u s a l a c c o u n t which would presumably ( W i l s o n does not o f f e r d e t a i l s ) i n v o l v e the p r e v i o u s s u f f e r i n g of p a i n , a n x i e t y and so o n . To a s t r e n g t h e n e d v e r s i o n of K e n n y ' s c l a i m , t h a t one c o u l d not a r r i v e a t one ' s b e l i e f t h a t what one f e e l s i s r e l i e f a t o n e ' s w i f e ' s r e c o v e r y , W i l s o n answers t h a t , on the c o n t r a r y , one might i n d e e d f i n d o n e s e l f a t a l o s s about how to i d e n t i f y and d e s c r i b e o n e ' s r e a c t i o n to an e v e n t , even to o n e s e l f : One sometimes , s u r e l y , has to work o u t e x a c t l y what one f e e l s . Such work ing o u t might i n v o l v e g a t h e r i n g o n e ' s t h o u g h t s , a b s t r a c t i n g o n e s e l f to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t from the r e a c t i o n , and t r y i n g to look a t i t as a whole , and might perhaps a l s o i n v o l v e t h i n k i n g back t o how one f e l t on o t h e r o c c a s i o n s . 8 Thus sometimes we do use i n d u c t i o n ; one might even want to say t h a t , more o f t e n than one s u s p e c t s , the immediate i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of o n e ' s own re sponses t h a t Kenny speaks of i s made p o s s i b l e by a s s o c i a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from h a v i n g had those re sponses i n the same c o n t e x t b e f o r e . I have argued i n Chapte r 3, P a r t s 2 and 3 t h a t we can be confused about our f e e l i n g s and r e s o l v e t h i s c o n f u s i o n by compar ing our p r e s e n t s t a t e of p a s t s t a t e s , w i t h r e s p e c t to such t h i n g s as b o d i l y e x p e r i e n c e s , thought p a t t e r n s , and l a r g e r c o n t e x t . W i l s o n a l s o sugges t s tha t K e n n y ' s c l a i m c o u l d be based on an a n a l y s i s of the c o n c e p t " r e a c t i o n " ; t h a t i s , f o r an emot ion to be a p p r o p r i a t e l y termed a r e a c t i o n to an e v e n t , i t may be p a r t of the c o n c e p t of h a v i n g a r e a c t i o n , and even p a r t of the c o n c e p t of some emotions as r e a c t i o n s , t h a t one know of the c a s u a l c o n n e c t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y . W i l s o n sugges t s t h a t . b e i n g h o r r i f i e d by a c a t a s t r o p h e might i n v o l v e such c o n c e p t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . But he does not t h i n k t h i s a p p l i e s i n e v e r y c a s e , and I a g r e e . 143 Part 2; The d e s i r a b i l i t y of a causal analysis Supposing i t to be legitimate, why would anyone especially want to give a causal account of the emotion-object relationships? Wilson wants a causal analysis because he sees the emotion-object relationship as a relationship between an emotion and something i n the world, and he believes only a causal account can show how these two items actually connect. He introduces his discussion of emotion and object by describing emotions as reactions or responses to events. I wish to emphasize this feature of emotions from an experiential standpoint; that i s , not only i s i t the case the emotions are reactions or responses, but we experience them i n this way o r d i n a r i l y ; that i s , we experience ourselves as connected to the world and our emotions as part of this connection rather than as a series of gratuitous and inexplicable happenings.* That a causal account can be given i s part of the concept of responsiveness. My interests are close to Wilson's, but the f o c i of our interests d i f f e r . Wilson i s espec i a l l y concerned with giving an account of cases i n which the b e l i e f s involved are j u s t i f i e d , while I am more interested i n being able to offer a complete causal account, an account that can take into consideration both j u s t i f i e d and u n j u s t i f i e d emotions. In t h i s sense, I want to see how emotions work, and I believe that, i n the end, an account that takes into account u n j u s t i f i e d emotions w i l l cast l i g h t on what sort of account we need for j u s t i f i e d emotions. To see how we can get a * This responsive character i s the basis for our deep uneasiness when we find ourselves i n emotional states for which we have no explanation. These emotions v i o l a t e our notions of the nature of emotions. This may be the explanation for our apparently ardent desire for content for our emotions, as demonstrated by the Schachter-Singer study. This i s especially true of powerful emotions that don't f i t easily into our expected patterns of response, e.g., when, sometimes one finds to one's horror that one is tremendously angry with a loved one for no apparent reason. 144 complete account, l e t us f i r s t look at Wilson's account of j u s t i f i e d emotions. I have already discussed the concept of cognit ive background for emotional response and i t s profound ef fect on the re l a t ionsh ip between what we encounter i n the world and what we bel ieve about what we encounter. The two often vary considerably, and this means that there are a good many u n j u s t i f i e d emotions. The s ign i f i cance i s , as i s perhaps obvious, that there are a good many emotions whose connection to the world could be mysterious, at l eas t compared to the firm connectedness of j u s t i f i e d emotions. I r o n i c a l l y , given hi s account, this mysteriousness i s the very thing that Wilson sees as most undes irable , and mentions p a r t i c u l a r l y at the beginning of Emotion and Object as an outcome to be c a r e f u l l y avoided. Wilson sees d i f f i c u l t y i n connecting emotions to happenings i n the world as a poss ible outcome of construing objects as be l i e f s of some sor t , but i t i s also the outcome of an incomplete causal account of the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p , even i f objects are defined as items or events i n the world . Part of the reason that Wilson's account i s incomplete i n this way i s his excess ively narrow conception of what counts as having an object , and his notion of what counts as being what he c a l l s a "malfounded" emotion. I w i l l have a great deal to say about Wilson's c r i t e r i a for object-taking i n Part 3 of this chapter: for the moment, I j u s t want to discuss the outcome of his using those c r i t e r i a . For Wilson, an emotion i s e i ther f u l l y j u s t i f i e d - everything goes r i gh t and the object exis ts i n the world - or i t i s "malfounded" - the object does not e x i s t , so the emotion has no ob ject . He accounts for malfounded emotions by c a l l i n g them "aspirant cases" of emotions with ob ject s . They meet the subjective requirements for being an emotion, invo lv ing be l ie f s that seem to have objects , but f a i l to 145 meet the objective conditions, that objects e x i s t , and that they have a cert a i n causal connection to the emotion i n question. This account does not take us f a r , because, while we can see what elements would have to be added to produce an emotion with an object, we s t i l l cannot see how malfounded emotions are produced, how they are connected to the world i f not through an object. We know what malfounded emotions f a i l to be, but we wo not know what they are. This d i f f i c u l t y i s compounded by the fact that u n j u s t i f i e d emotions do not always y i e l d the unambiguous metaphysical claims that are the basis for Wilson's c a l l i n g some emotions malfounded. As we have seen, a good many things can go wrong with emotions. For example, suppose, because of distorted background b e l i e f s , I regard every policeman I meet as a vicious monster. I come upon kindly, amiable, cheerful Constable McKenzie. I believe him to be a vicious monster. Do I have an u n j u s t i f i e d emotion? Yes. Does Constable McKenzie exist? Yes. My emotion i s not malfounded i n Wilson's sense, yet one cannot say i t i s a simple case of an emotion with an object. A careful breakdown of causal factors plus examination and revision of Wilson"s causal account w i l l allow us to construct a causal account that w i l l not f a l l prey to such d i f f i c u l t i e s , as we s h a l l see i n Part 3. Part 3: At l a s t Now we come to the causal account. To begin, l e t us set out what we have established so f a r . Up to now, we have developed an analysis of emotion and a view about which component of an emotion takes an object. We have looked b r i e f l y at two di f f e r e n t notions of an object, one of which belongs to Anthony Kenny and the other to J.R.S. Wilson. We have rejected Kenny's notion of an object because what he designates as an object can be seen as the evaluative b e l i e f that is a 146 component of emotion/ and he does not need to talk about objects to talk about t h i s . Furthermore, given Kenny's p ic ture of an in tent iona l object , we would not be construct ing an account of the emotion-object r e l a t ionsh ip that shows the re l a t ionsh ip between emotions and the world, something that must be done i f we are to give a r e a l l y complete account of emotional s i t u a t i o n s . We are adopting, not quite a r b i t r a r i l y , a notion of object Like J . R . S . Wilson's where an object i s an event or an item or a person - something i n the world . This i s not quite a r b i t r a r y because, as we w i l l see, Wilson's notion of an object and the d e f i n i t i o n s we have used from the Oxford Engl i sh Dict ionary that r e f l e c t the common-sense notion of an object and enabled us to discover which component of an emotion takes an object , f i t wel l together. In addi t ion to adopting a notion of an object , we have argued that there i s no reason to r e j e c t a causal account, and good reasons to adopt one. However, l e t us be very c lear about ju s t what sort of causal account i s wanted here . If we are to have a causal theory i t seems uncontrovers ia l to say that we w i l l want a theory that accounts for the emotion-object re l a t ionsh ip as f u l l y as p o s s i b l e . We w i l l want a model of the emotion-object r e l a t i o n s h i p that w i l l enable us to have an account of the idea l emotion-object r e l a t i onsh ip i n causal terms, but that can also be he lpfu l i n providing a causal account of the emotion-object r e l a t ionsh ip where the emotion i s u n j u s t i f i e d , where some element of the causal chain i s missing or has otherwise gone awry. This means that we w i l l need quite a de ta i led account, taking into considerat ion a l l the causal factors both from the standpoint of the person who has the emotion and from the standpoint of the ob ject . For example, we know that genera l ly , ju s t the se lec t ion of possible objects has very much more to do with the desires and be l i e f s of the person who has the 1# emotion than with anything i n the external world, except i n the t r i v i a l sense that the object i n the world provides a causal occasion. From the standpoint of accounting for the objects of un ju s t i f i ed emotion or of cases where some element has gone awry, we need to remember the extent and power of d i s tor ted CBFERS, and how they can be i n f l u e n t i a l even at the perceptual l e v e l . This i s e s p e c i a l l y important to keep in mind when considering the sa lvageabi l ty of Wilson's c r i t e r i a for ob ject- tak ing , which only allows emotions that are f u l l y j u s t i f i e d to have objects . On Wilson's view, for an emotion to have an object the fol lowing three c r i t e r i a must be met: (a) one's emotion must be caused by a t tent ion to the object and not, e . g . , by the object ' s a s soc ia t ion with something e l se ; (b) the emotion must be determined by features of the object - they must "match" (c) the object must e x i s t . I f a l l these c r i t e r i a are met, the emotion has an ob ject ; ' i f not, n o t . * Thus there i s a causal c r i t e r i o n , a relevence c r i t e r i o n for content of b e l i e f s , and a metaphysical c r i t e r i o n . The metaphysical c r i t e r i o n i s so c l e a r l y implied by the relevence c r i t e r i o n that i t w i l l not be considered separately. Let us now examine the de f in i t ions from the OED with which we began our examination of object-taking i n Chapter 4. Object . ( 3 b ) . Something which on being seen excites a p a r t i c u l a r emotion, as admirat ion, hor ror , d i s d a i n , commiseration, amusement. (4) That to which ac t ion , thought, or feel ing i s d i r e c t e d ; the thing (or person) to which something i s done, or upon or about which something operates. * Wilson included a fourth c r i t e r i o n which applies only to emotions whose objects are persons. One must want to do something or other to the purported object , the "something" varying with the emotion - e . g . , anger produces an impulse or desire to harm, p i ty a desire to help , e tc . But we have already seen i n the sect ion on behavior that this i s not always so, on the behavioral l e v e l , and ta lk about desires or impulses to behave generates the same d i f f i c u l t i e s . 148 The f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n i s a causal one, and the second, when we remember that the directedness of an emotion i s what the evaluative be l i e f i s about, has to do with content and i t s connection to the world. The emotion i s directed at 0 whatever the relevant b e l i e f i s about i n the world. Wilson's t h i r d c r i t e r i o n can, I think, be seen as implied i n both d e f i n i t i o n s . Thus we can see that Wilson's c r i t e r i a are not purely a r b i t r a r y ; they set out features of the emotion-object relationship that are conceptually f a m i l i a r . However, in l i g h t of the foregoing discussion of the evaluative component of emotions, and of background b e l i e f s , there i s an important feature of the emotion-object relationship that i s l e f t out of Wilson's account, and which must be taken into consideration. Insofar as any of Wilson's c r i t e r i a or either one of the OED d e f i n i t i o n s are seen to make a claim about the object's being the sole or even the main determinanet of content, these conditions can never be met. As we have seen, the choice of object has far more to do with the evaluative process than i t does any pa r t i c u l a r causal force on the part of the object. If the object of my anger i s the outrageous sexist remarks made by a famous philosopher at the CPA, the outrageous sexist remarks are nevertheless only partly the cause of my anger. I have certain desires, Interests, values, and s e n s i t i v i t i e s that determine my interest i n this sort of s i t u a t i o n , I have standards by which I measure the remarks made i n certain contexts and so on. So the object w i l l 149 never be the sole cause of my emotion, but rather part of the causal story.* With this In mind, we can s t i l l look to Wilson's c r i t e r i a for guidance i n what can count as an object. Let us begin by reminding ourselves that the emotion-object relationship varies a great deal. While i t Is true that sometimes we can d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y between cases i n which everything goes exactly right and the emotion is j u s t i f i e d , and cases i n which nothing goes right and the emotion Is completely u n j u s t i f i e d , sometimes we cannot. Sometimes things go p a r t i a l l y wrong - I believe that the innocent Constable McKenzie i s a vicious monster, because I believe a l l policemen to be vicious monsters. In cases such as this one i t i s true that my emotion i s u n j u s t i f i e d , but i t does not seem to be true that i t lacks an object i n the same way i t would were my b e l i e f about a unicorn. To the extent that my b e l i e f and the item or event that i t i s about match, my b e l i e f seems to have some sort of object. In this case, even though I f a l s e l y believe that Constable McKenzie i s a vicious monster, I nevertheless *Wilson's account of causality leaves open the p o s s i b i l i t y that the causal story w i l l be complex indeed, since he holds that: To say that a certain r e l a t i o n i s causal to say that for two items to be related in that way, the causal network i n which they are enmeshed must conform to a certain pattern. It leaves open the p o s s i b i l i t y that the p a r t i c u l a r way i n which the pattern i s instantiated may be d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t cases." (p. 12) " . . . i f the emotion object r e l a t i o n i s a casual one, i t doesn't follow that the same kind of object always e l i c i t s a similar emotion i n two d i f f e r e n t people, does i t follow that the underlying casual story i n each case. (p. 12) Thus Wilson's account could make room for a more complex account including the subjective conditions, but he gives no such account; that he does not seems to me to be a serious lack and not just a minor lacuna, since i t prevents us from having a complete picture of how emotions connect to the world. 150 t r u l y believe that he i s Constable McKenzie. Given our discussion of di s t o r t e d CBFERs, i t i s obvious that there w i l l be a good many emotions containing b e l i e f s of this kind, thus a good many emotions that may or may not have objects. On Wilson's view, these emotions would probably be malfounded, since there i s no Constable McKenzie who i s a vicious monster. But I think this would be a mistake. We o r i g i n a l l y decided to adopt the picture of an object as something i n the world because such a picture would account for our experiences more thoroughly than simply regarding objects as some sort of b e l i e f whose connection to the world i s a mystery. Using this same sort of guideline, i t seems to do greater j u s t i c e to those of our experiences i n which very l i t t l e i s inappropriate to say that emotions that involve some false b e l i e f s about something that r e a l l y exists have objects. In these cases, i t i s not that one's b e l i e f s are completely unconnected to the world; some elements are connected and some are not. However, i f we decide to say that emotions that involve some false b e l i e f s and some true ones take objects, we have considerably weakened Wilson's second c r i t e r i o n for object-taking. We need to be sure that we can reformulate the c r i t e r i a so that there i s s t i l l some way to dis t i n g u i s h between emotions that take objects and emotions that do not; we do not want to be committed to saying that any emotion that just seems subjectively to have an object does i n fact have one. To avoid t h i s , l e t us f i r s t look at just how we are weakening or changing Wilson's c r i t e r i a . On Wilson's view, i n order that an emotion have an object, i t must be both caused by attention to the object, and i t s features must be determined by features of the object; this i s guaranteed by there being a match between the relevant b e l i e f s and the item or event i n the world. With the proposed revisions, i t w i l l s t i l l be the case that the relevant b e l i e f s are caused by 151 attention to the object, but i t w i l l not be the case that a l l features of the relevant b e l i e f are determined by attention to the object, since there i s no longer a complete match. How are we to incorporate this change into a c r i t e r i o n that does any work? How can we avoid saying something as vague as "Well, sometimes i t does and sometimes i t doesn't and i f the difference between the b e l i e f and the item or event in the world i s not too great, the emotion has an object."? We can, I think, avoid this by distinguishing between cases i n which one i s b a s i c a l l y right about the object of one's b e l i e f , but wrong about some properties, and cases i n which one i s wrong about v i r t u a l l y everything. For example, i n the case of Constable McKenzie, while he i s not v i c i o u s , he i s a policeman. Thus there i s a substantial resemblence between my b e l i e f and the appropriate item in the world. For not only do I believe he i s a policeman, I also believe that he i s that policeman, standing on the corner of Georgia and Hornby at 4:00 on a Friday afternoon, and so on. That i s , I am right about his job, his sex, his location in time and space, and his basic physical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In cases l i k e this one, where I have a great many of the properties of the object of my b e l i e f r i g h t , i t seems to me unobjectionable to say that, while my b e l i e f i s u n j u s t i f i e d , my emotion nevertheless has an object. By the same token, when the b e l i e f s involved are even mistaken on the l e v e l of role or occupation (where relevant) sex, l o c a t i o n i n time and space and basic physical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , we w i l l say that emotion i s both u n j u s t i f i e d and objectless. Clearly, there is no p r i n c i p l e d way to d i s t i n g u i s h between emotions with objects and emotions without; in the end, i t i s mostly a matter of the number of properties that b e l i e f s and items have in common. Yet i s i s not just a matter of numbers: the important thing i s that the b e l i e f s and items in the world that match are 152 what the emotion i s about. I f , for example, I am right about the buildings forming a background to Constable McKenzie, right about the street and the time, but u t t e r l y mistaken about Constable McKenzie, taking him for a swindling Jesuit rather than a vicious monster of a policeman, then my emotion has no object. Or, i f I am so completely wrong about the purported object of my emotion that no object of that kind could, conceptually, be the object of that emotion, my emotion has no object. For example, suppose I believe, for whatever odd reasons, that the person who now stands before me i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y charitable, morally upright and generous I r i s h Setter, and I f e e l deep gratitude and moral admiration towards this dog. An I r i s h Setter i s an inappropriate object of gratitude just on conceptual grounds, since i t cannot be i n t e n t i o n a l l y gratuitously f u l f i l l i n g my desires or those of others, or acting on p r i n c i p l e - both requirements for being the object of gratitude or moral admiration. In this case, the emotion has no object. And making the d i s t i n c t i o n i n the ways I have suggested i s not e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y from a causal standpoint. The more d i f f i c u l t a causal story i s to construct, i n the sense that one has to bring i n more and more distorted CBFERs to account for such substantial mistakes, the more l i k e l y i t i s that the emotion i s not only u n j u s t i f i e d but has no object. Radical error about, e.g., b i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the object of one's b e l i e f s plus great d i f f i c u l t y i n constructing a plausible causal story are both indicative of substantial disorder of mind, of the tendency to make very d i f f e r e n t kinds of mistakes than the sort of mistake made when one has a strong prejudice against policemen. One can e a s i l y construct a causal story for a prejudice against policemen - one was i n the Chicago r i o t s of 1968, saw one's friends struck down by policemen and so on. It i s much more d i f f i c u l t to Imagine how one 153 could take a policeman for a Jesuit or a human being for an I r i s h Setter. Thus new c r i t e r i a begin to emerge. We w i l l say that an emotion has an object i f (1) i t i s caused by attention to the object and not associated with something else and (2) i t s d i s t i n c t i v e features are mostly determined by the object. C r i t e r i o n (1) i s unchanged, but c r i t e r i o n (2) i s d i f f e r e n t : i t i s no longer necessary that the b e l i e f and the person or even i n the world match in every respect. For j u s t i f i e d emotions, of course, Wilson's c r i t e r i a stand. But we are not yet f i n i s h e d . It might be thought that Wilson's second c r i t e r i o n provides a guarantee that a certain causal story holds, since i t seems at f i r s t glance that the properties of b e l i e f s and the properties of items i n the world w i l l only match in the appropriate fashion i n the former are determined by the l a t t e r . That i s , i t i s only i f the evaluative process i s performed with no interference from di s t o r t e d CBFERs or prudentially determined p o l i c i e s of inquiry that the properties an item i s believed to have are the properties i t indeed has. But such i s not the case; consider the following p o s s i b i l i t y . As a result of distorted CBFERs and a prudentially influenced policy of inquiry formulated to reduce the perceived unpleasant features of urban l i f e , I have come to believe that a l l policemen are kind, amiable and cheerful. Eventually, just by coincidence, I am l i k e l y to be right at least once. I met Constable McKenzie and he i s indeed kind, amiable and cheerful. Constable McKenzie is the cause of my b e l i e f in the sense that he does not remind me of someone else, and from the standpoint of the second c r i t e r i o n , there i s a perfect match. The d i f f i c u l t y i s that my b e l i e f s about the constable's character have been produced not by my observation of his actions, f a c i a l expressions, etc., but by my prudentially influenced policy of inquiry and distorted CBFERs; 154 prudential considerations have done nearly a l l the work here. That this sort of d i f f i c u l t y can occur requries that we have some c r i t e r i o n that specifies the i d e a l casual story. Unfortunately, without a good deal more psychological knowledge, one i s ill-equipped to construct such a c r i t e r i o n with any precision. However, one can make some suggestions. Ideally, new information and evaluation plus CBFERs and a policy of inquiry that act as foundations for true b e l i e f s rather than hindrances each have their roles to play i n the causal story of emotions. While i t is almost impossible to acquire too much new information (because the mind usually s t a r t s to reject i t at a certain point) I t does seem highly possible, indeed a l l too common i n cases of d i s t o r t e d CBFERs and a prudentially influenced p o l i c y of inquiry for certain elements i n evaluation to be interfered with and i n turn themselves i n t e r f e r e with the character of the new information. The problem i s that, u n t i l we know considerably more about how a l l this works, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know quite what to say. It i s tempting to say that what goes wrong i n cases of u n j u s t i f i e d emotion due to distorted CBFERs or a prudentially affected policy of inquiry i s that somehow there are an excess of subjectively determined causal factors, that what happens when I am grateful to a highly i d e a l i z e d department chairwoman for my job rather than just f e e l i n g a mild appreciation for a perfectly routine hiring e f f i c i e n t l y carried through i s that I have allowed various strong desires, such as the desire to replace my mother who has recently died, to help construct c r i t e r i a for gratitude that have l i t t l e to do with seeing how things are in the real world. And of course this i s true. But i s is also misleading. In cases of both j u s t i f i e d and u n j u s t i f i e d emotions, subjective factors play a r o l e . They play a role insofar as desires and CBFERs of some sort are always present, and 155 insofar as the process of evaluation that eventually produces emotion i s a psychological process. Furthermore, the policy of inquiry determines to a large extent what sorts of perceptions are allowed to be evaluated. Thus we have an enormous complex made up of desires, CBFERs distorted or otherwise, c r i t e r i a , a policy of inquiry plus the evaluation process that must take place for each emotion. In the l i g h t of t h i s , the difference between the ideal causal story for j u s t i f i e d emotions and the flawed one for u n j u s t i f i e d emotions cannot be adequately expressed by saying that j u s t i f i e d emotions are somehow less subjectively determined than the sort of u n j u s t i f i e d emotions we have looked at. Subjective processes are involved i n both cases. What we can say i s that u n j u s t i f i e d emotions that are u n j u s t i f i e d as a result of distorted CBFERs involve quantitatively more subjective factors in that there are l i t e r a l l y extra causal steps that are involved i n maintaining a prudentially determined policy of inquiry. In the model epistemic process described in Chapter 5, there can be a certain amount of s e l e c t i v i t y of perceptions as a r e s u l t of interest based on desire. That i s , i f one i s especially interested i n whether or not the lake i s frozen hard enough to skate on, one i s not l i k e l y to pay much attention to people drinking hot chocolate in the huts on shore, but one i s l i k e l y to pay quite a l o t of attention to the surface of the i c e , how far out people seem to be skating, and so on. In the case of u n j u s t i f i e d emotions, there i s the ordinary s e l e c t i v i t y as described above, and there i s also a kind of psychological tampering with the evidence so that i t can f i t with whatever purpose i s expressed In prudentially influenced policy of inquiry. In this sense, there i s an extra step. Thus the causal story w i l l look d i f f e r e n t for j u s t i f i e d and u n j u s t i f i e d emotions, though i t i s d i f f i c u l t to say anything very precise. As a third c r i t e r i o n , we might 156 require that, for j u s t i f i e d emotions, only certain causal procedures can be present in the realm of evaluation, CBFERs and policy of inquiry, c e r t a i n kinds of epistemic mistakes cannot be made, and, as a kind of insurance, only a c e r t a i n number of causal steps are allowed. Minor modifications can be made for emotions that are u n j u s t i f i e d but have objects, but any major deviations w i l l render emotions objectless and u n j u s t i f i e d . To think of the d i f f i c u l t y i n this quantitative way also suggests an interpretation of certain psychological d i f f i c u l t i e s . Many people who have serious psychological problems seem to have l i t t l e enthusiasm for dealing with the events of everyday l i f e - they l i t e r a l l y seem not to have enough energy. If maintaining di s t o r t e d background b e l i e f s requires extra causal steps, and we assume that there i s a relationship between quantity of steps in causal procedure and the amount of energy needed to engage in this causal procedure, we can see that for people with serious d i f f i c u l t i e s so much energy is required to keep the di s t o r t e d CBFERs in place that i t i s not surprising that such people haven't enough energy for everyday l i f e . So at l a s t we have a complete causal story, though some of the elements are not as clear and precise as one would wish. An emotion begins with the s e l e c t i o n of something i n the world as of interest because one or more of one's desires i s active. This person or event i s evaluated, using both information from the world and various epistemic p o l i c i e s and b e l i e f s , and the evaluation yields a b e l i e f that contains the r e s u l t , which in turn triggers various physiological processes and f e e l i n g s , and sometimes s p e c i f i c behaviors or manners of behavior. This process may proceed unimpeded, as i n cases where emotions have objects and are j u s t i f i e d . Minor d i f f i c u l t i e s may occur, as a r e s u l t of which we have emotions that have objects but are u n j u s t i f i e d ; major 157 d i f f i c u l t i e s w i l l result in. emotions that are both objectless and u n j u s t i f i e d . Part 4; Some d i f f i c u l t cases - emotions about the future and past Given this account, do emotions about the future have objects? I f we say that what i t i s for an emotion to have an object i s for i t to be caused by learning of or paying attention to something i n the world, one of the things that follows from this i s that emotions about the future have no objects. The do, of course, have content, but that i s a di f f e r e n t matter. However, we can do better than to simply say that emotions about the future have no objects. We can offer a causal account of at least some of them. Suppose I am afr a i d a nuclear war. When asked to f i l l out my b e l i e f s , I say that while we are not now having a nuclear war, nevertheless the behavior of the Russians and the Americans leads me to predict that we w i l l have one before long. If a b e l i e f about the future can be spelled out in this way, we can say that one's fears are, to a great extent based on b e l i e f s about the facts, since i t i s on the basis of certain facts that I now have the emotion I do. The difference between the b e l i e f s involved i n this emotion and the be l i e f s involved i n an emotion that has an object i s that i n the l a t t e r case, the evaluative be l i e f that appears i n the emotions i s about the same thing as the b e l i e f s that appear i n the facts and interpretation stage, while the same thing i s not true i n the former case. What seems to happen i s that we notice and interpret the facts and, on the basis of our b e l i e f s about, e.g., the intentions of the Americans and the Russians, we do something i n addition to noticing and interpreting; we make a prediction. This i s an extra step that is present i n a l l emotions about the future. Granted, some predictions are on better grounds than others - i f the Russians and Americans actually say they are going to war, I am on far 158 better ground for predicting that they w i l l go to war than I am i f I just notice that they are not getting along well at conferences. However, to the extent that these emotions contain a prediction, a l l the be l i e f s involved are not relevent to whatever actions, persons, etc., constitute the fa c t s . And insofar as they are not relevent, the emotion i s u n j u s t i f i e d . And since the be l i e f s are only p a r t i a l l y caused by learning about or noticing something about the world, but were substantially caused by the b e l i e f s I already have about the conditions under which I am e n t i t l e d to make predictions, the emotion does not have an object. Emotions that are about events, persons, etc. i n the past present d i f f e r e n t problems. These emotions once did have objects, and i t seems rather hard to say that they do not now have objects. Let us consider the way in which a good many emotions about the past are caused. I am l i s t e n i n g to the CBC, and suddenly I hear Chopin's Fantaisie Impromptu, which brings back the memory of a par t i c u l a r childhood piano r e c i t a l . It i s as i f I am again i n the Women's Club on a hot June afternoon, and the most talented piano pupil i s playing the Fantaisie Impromptu. I am stabbed by pangs of the purest envy as I hear her. One i s r e a l l y tempted to say i n an example such as this one that my emotion has an object: the object of my envy i s Sally, the g i r l who played Chopin so b e a u t i f u l l y . Certainly i t i s true that S a l l y was the object of the emotion then. But now, what has set off the causal chain i s hearing Chopin. What I notice or learn of i s Chopin's Fantaisie Impromptu which, by association, triggers my memory, including the emotion. That this i s what happens excludes this emotion from having an object - the emotion must be determined by relevent features of the object, not by some accidental association. In fa c t , this i s the kind of example that Wilson uses to 159 contrast with cases where one's b e l i e f s are a c t u a l l y determined by the object. It's not, after a l l , as i f there i s a coincidence of objects; the object of my emotion then was S a l l y , not the Fantaisie Impromptu, and i t i s the Fantaisie  Impromptu to which I am now paying attention. This sort of causal story i s t y p i c a l of emotions about the past, even i f I am remembering my g i r l i s h passion for someone who has long since become a platonic f r i e n d . I have emotions about my present friendship, but the remembered passionate love i s an association with the present f r i e n d - i t i s my friend at sixteen for whom I f e l t those intense emotions. And as i n the f i r s t case, we can give a causal explanation, of how I happened to have that emotion, but we cannot say that the event or person that triggered the emotion i s the one to which we are responding. Thus there i s a causal connection between the person or even i n the present and the emotion -one of them reminds me of the other. But this i s not the requisite causal connection for object taking; there must be a coincidence between what i s evaluated i n the present and the object of the emotion, at least to the extent we have discussed i n the previous section. Part 5: Theoretical c l a s s i f i c a t i o n F i n a l l y , we must ask ourselves what sort of theory we have about object taking. Are we prepared to argue that any case that varies from the paradigm i s not a genuine case? We have already discussed the various p o s s i b i l i t i e s that arise where there i s a difference between object and cognitive content. Now l e t us look at more unusual cases, such as the case of music. Here one might argue that the causal l i n k that usually holds between object and cognitive content instead holds between object and f e e l i n g , thus changing the causal relationship both between object and emotional constituent, and among 160 the emotional constituents themselves. Instead of the object causing a cer t a i n cognitive sequence, and the evaluation involved i n this sequence causing the other emotional constituents, the object may cause feeling, and the feeling may cause behavior. The d i f f i c u l t y i s that the power of music to produce d i s t i n c t i v e f e e l i n g i s an extremely mysterious one, one which I am not completely convinced e x i s t s , but which many people do so believe. Perhaps i t would be easiest to designate music as an exception and say that, however i t happens, and while we w i l l want to say that music must have cognitive content of some kind since i t must at least be noticed, i t need not have evaluative content. And since this i s the case, i t w i l l be impossible to say whether musical emotions have objects and are j u s t i f i e d or u n j u s t i f i e d except insofar as the be l i e f s cultivated after the fact are j u s t i f i e d or u n j u s t i f i e d or have objects. Or perhaps we could say that, should we adopt this view about musical emotions, the object of the emotion i s the thing i n the world that causes the non-evaluative cognitive content. Another d i f f i c u l t case i s the sort cited by Schachter and Singer, where the causal r e l a t i o n between emotion and object i s unusual i n another way. Here, the feeling occurs f i r s t , as a result of the inj e c t i o n of a drug. Evaluative b e l i e f s and whatever behavior i s involved comes l a t e r , when the subjects of the experiment have chosen their evaluative b e l i e f s . This i s an extremely unusual and c e r t a i n l y a t y p i c a l causal story. One might be reluctant to i d e n t i f y the states as emotions at a l l , except that a l l consituents are present and the subjects themselves claim i n these cases to be in emotional states. Given that, there seems to be no reason to discount these odd states as emotion. However, do we want to c a l l them emotions with objects? This i s d i f f i c u l t to answer because Schachter and Singer are speaking of emotional response over a period of time, hence of many occurrent emotions. But let us 161 construct an example of a single instance. I have a certain r e s t l e s s agitated f e e l i n g that's making me uncomfortable, and I don't understand i t , since I ( f a l s e l y ) believe either that the drug has other e f f e c t s , or have had no explanation at a l l . In the room with me i s an extremely angry fellow, who begins to express h o s t i l i t y toward the experimenters, more and more intense h o s t i l i t y a l l the time. These evaluations f i t i n well with the feelings I'm already having, i n the sense that when I'm angry, I often f e e l just this way. So i t i s not long before I too am thinking i l l of the experimenters, fee l i n g angry at their nosiness and inconsiderateness. In some ways, this situation s t r u c t u r a l l y resembles the s i t u a t i o n of the "unconscious" emotions, except that the missing element comes from an external cue, and not from some inner event. And sometimes therapy can be very much l i k e this - one of the things some therapists do i s try, by means of reconstruction of events in the past, to restore the c l i e n t to some sort of normal emotionally responsive l i f e , and sometimes this process can be helped along by making suggestions when certain emotional constituents are missing. There i s no reason that an evaluation suggested by someone else cannot count as genuine as long as one truly adopts i t as one's own. Curiously, It i s not obvious that the Schachter-Singer emotion i s e n t i r e l y u n j u s t i f i e d , since one may be perfectly correct in one's b e l i e f s >that the experimenters are manipulators, l i e to their subjects, ask them questions that are none of their business, and don't pay them enough. However, the causal chain i s di f f e r e n t from the usual one in the case of f u l l y j u s t i f i e d emotions: the cognitive content, the evaluation, does not cause the f e e l i n g , since the feeling i s already present. Rather, the discomfort generated by the unexplained fee l i n g provides a motiviation for f i r s t of a l l looking for an object and an explanation for these feelings. This i s 162 conveniently supplied by the stooge. One's attention i s directed to a certairiobject, a certain evaluation i s adopted, perhaps one has some c r i t e r i a already present that allow acceptance of the stooge's evaluation. So while this may be an emotion with an object, i t i s an emotion with an object that i s acquired not through the a c t i v i t y of one's desires, but through the d i r e c t i o n of another, and b e l i e f s that are only accidentally j u s t i f i e d i f at a l l . One has not gone through the usual attention and evaluation processes. It seems best to say that this emotion has an object, but i t is not an emotion that i s wholly j u s t i f i e d . Let us now return to the question raised at the beginning of this section: What sort of theory is this? I have already argued that my theory emotion does not f i t e a s i l y into either the e s s e n t i a l i s t or family resemblence categories. But what of the analysis of the emotion-object relationship? Again, d i f f i c u l t i e s of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a r i s e . I allow a certain amount of deviation from the paradigms of j u s t i f i c a t i o n and object-taking, so that emotions need not be f u l l y j u s t i f i e d to have an object. This would seem to make an e s s e n t i a l i s t view u n l i k e l y . Furthermore, there are cases such as music where an analysis of object-taking w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t given the, (possibly) unusual nature of emotions connected with music. On the other hand the kinds of d i f f i c u l t i e s that arise i n emotion-object relationships do not lend themselves to family resemblence theory. Various cases of emotions with objects do not resemble each other exactly because many things can go wrong in the causal chain. But far from having some element absent, the more frequent d i f f i c u l t i e s l i e in the presence of extra elements, espe c i a l l y as a result of d i s t o r t i o n s i n the policy of inquiry. The presence of these elements produces u n j u s t i f i e d or p a r t i a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d emotions, so we cannot allow such cases to 163 count as legitimate. It i s true that sometimes the object i s missing, but again, we must count these cases as i l l e g i t i m a t e , though allow a great deal of l a t i t u d e about just what i s missing. In general, the problem with c l a s s i f y i n g this view i s that, i n the emotion-object re l a t i o n s h i p , whether an emotion i s j u s t i f i e d and has an object i s a question of degree rather than straightforwardly a question of kind. There are a large number of b e l i e f s involved i n the emotions, and the situations i n the world that give r i s e to emotional response are extremely complicated. If one must choose, i t seems that an e s s e n t i a l i s t view i s more suitable here, since I do propose paradigms, but i t must be an e s s e n t i a l i s t view i n which a good deal more v a r i a t i o n and tolerence for exceptions than usual i s allowed. 164 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 1. Kenny, Action, Emotion and W i l l , p. 187. 2. Ibid., pp. 187-188. 3. Ibid., p. 188. 4. Ibid., p. 189. 5. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Object". 6. Kenny, Action, Emotion and W i l l , p. 73. 7. Wilson, Emotion and Object, p. 21. 8. Ibid., p. 119. 9. 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