EMOTION, OBJECT AND JUSTIFICATION

by

BONNELLE LEWIS STRICKLING

B.A., Ohio University, 1964
M.A., The University of Iowa, 1971

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Department of Philosophy

The University of British Columbia  
1956 Main Mall  
Vancouver, Canada  
V6T 1Y3  

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is the emotion-object relationship and the problem of the justification of emotions as it bears on the emotion-object relationship. In order to analyse the emotion-object relationship, we must first have a concept of emotion. To develop such a concept, we will examine the possible constituent or constituents of such a concept, asking both whether each could be the only constituent and whether each could be a constituent, of the concept of emotion. The constituents are feeling, behavior, and belief.

Feeling cannot be the only constituent of emotions because there are not enough distinct feelings to account for the number of emotions we seem to have. Furthermore, views such as Hume's involve the claim that these feelings are incorrigible, and this is false. We are often confused about our feelings. The Schachter-Singer study indicates that, though feelings are not the means by which we identify emotions, nevertheless we will not claim to have an emotion unless we experience some feeling.

Behavior too fails as the sole constituent of the concept of emotion, since there are not enough consistent behavior patterns with which to identify emotions. However, again, we will want to say that sometimes behavior does play a part in emotions.

Finally, beliefs cannot be the only constituent of the concept of emotion since, if Schachter and Singer are right, we will not call something an emotion without the presence of feeling. But beliefs can allow us to account for the number of emotions we have, and do seem to be present in
every emotion. These beliefs are evaluative beliefs, beliefs that indicate that we have assessed some situation or person in the light of our standards for the gratification of our various desires for affection, meaningful work, aesthetic excellence and so on.

The notion of an object for emotions can emphasize either the fact that emotions are contentful, or that they have causal ties to the world. That is, we can either talk about objects in terms of the beliefs involved in emotions, or we can talk about them from the standpoint of the responsive hence relational character of emotions. Since we can easily talk about the contentful feature of emotions without utilizing the notion of an object, and since the common sense notion of an object is something in the world, it is this sense of object that will be considered. If we conjoin the notion of an object with each constituent of an emotion, we can see that beliefs are the only constituent of that concept that can take an object. However, many things can go wrong with our beliefs about objects. We make not only isolated mistakes about the features of objects, but also systematic ones, as in the case of prejudices, neuroses and psychoses, and the various areas of anxiety that exist in most of our lives. Thus we must take this into consideration when constructing a picture of the emotion-object relationship, accounting both for cases where the beliefs involved are completely correct, and cases where mistake occurs. We will say that, in cases of mistake, when the most crucial features of the object are present in the belief, such as spatio-temporal location, and other basic physical characteristics, we will say that the emotion has an object, but the emotion is unjustified. If grosser mistakes are present, we will say both that the emotion has no object and is not justified.
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Preface

Since I completed the research for this thesis, several works on the subject of emotion have appeared. I wish to mention three that I found particularly interesting. Amelie Rorty's excellent anthology *Explaining Emotions* contains a wide range of papers that are all worth serious consideration. Agnes Heller's *A Theory of Feelings* presents an interesting Marxist alternative to the more usual views. Finally, William Lyons' *Emotion* is a splendid work, providing a thorough survey of the existing views and developing a view which, happily, coincides with several of my major conclusions in this thesis.
INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I intend to construct both a concept of occurrent emotion and a causal account of the emotion-object relationship. Like J.R.S. Wilson, whose causal account has been extremely helpful, I am most concerned with the way in which emotions are connected to the world. This connection is of special interest because of the nature of emotions: emotions are responses, and, as such, it is important to see what they are responses to.

The best way to give an account of the emotion-object relationship is to first construct a concept of emotion, then see what feature or features of an emotion could permit it to take an object. It is important to start with a common sense notion of object; attempts to begin an account of the emotion-object relationship in terms of, e.g., grammatical objects, are bound to come to grief, since they presuppose some other kind of object that the grammatical object somehow reflects.

I have discussed the question of justification at length because the number of unjustified emotions is greatly underestimated and, in turn, the importance of this fact to the question of the emotion-object relationship is underestimated as well. There are a substantial number of questions about justification to which I have not addressed myself at all, since they are not relevant here.

In terms of procedure, I will begin with the concept of emotion. I will consider three possible constituents: feeling, behavior, and belief. I will ask first, whether each one could be the sole constituent of a concept of emotion, next whether each one could be one constituent of a concept of emotion. Finally, I will distinguish between a constituent of an emotion as
opposed to other mental states such as thinking, and the constituents of specific emotions, such as fear or gratitude. Having constructed a concept of emotion, I will go on to consider which constituent or constituents of the concept of emotion could enable it to take an object; and finally, with the help of some considerations about justification, will construct a causal account of the emotion-object relationship.
CHAPTER I

FEELINGS

In our consideration of emotion as constituted entirely by feelings, we will ask two questions: (a) Could emotions be just feelings and nothing more? (b) If it is not the case that emotions are feelings and nothing more, ought the concept of emotion to include feelings? Both David Hume and William James have made major contributions to the feeling theory, and we will consider their views here as representative.

Part 1: Hume

Hume speaks of both emotions and passions; the difference is not clear. He uses the terms "emotion" as opposed to "passion" informally, sometimes using them as if they denoted different states, sometimes using them as though the latter were a species of the former. For examples of each use, consider the following, typical of the many instances of both that occur throughout the Treatise:

And as the impressions of reflexion, viz, passions desires and emotion...¹

In this passage, Hume seems to distinguish between passions and emotions, but consider the next two passages:

Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediate or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.²

What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is
These two uses occur throughout the Treatise without any evident preference for one at the expense of the other; since he names specific passions, but not specific emotions, a possible solution might be that only certain emotions, the ones specifically named such as love, hatred, pride and humility, are passions, and the rest are emotions. However, the frequent use of these terms as synonymous, plus the fact that Hume is not at all forthcoming about the difference between passions and emotions when he speaks of them in conjunction rather than as synonymous, seems to be to invite the treatment of passions and emotions as having the same nature, at least for the purpose of discovering what constitutes a passion or emotion.

Hume's view about passions or emotions is that they are feelings, in the sense that they are experiences each of which has a unique character, indescribable but recognizable by the person having them; and they are incorrigible. To examine his view in more detail, let us examine his theory of impressions.

For Hume, the mind contains two kinds of things: impressions and ideas. The difference between impressions and ideas lies in the vividness of each:

...in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind. Impressions are highly vivid, while ideas are less so. Emotions or passions are impressions. There is, however, more than one kind of impression. They can be either simple or complex; simple impressions "...admit of no distinction nor separation..." while complex impressions have distinguishable parts. Both simple and complex impressions can be further divided into impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection.
Impressions of sensation arise "... in the soul originally, from unknown causes..."\(^6\), while impressions of reflection are impressions of desire or aversion caused by ideas left by impressions of sensation. Passions or emotions are for the most part simple impressions of reflection, though the mixed emotions are, of course, complex. However, even mixed emotions, while containing constituents in the sense that there is more than one emotion or passion present, contain only one kind of constituent; that is, mixed or unmixed, passions or emotions are constituted only by impressions of reflection and not, e.g., beliefs or bits of behavior. Furthermore, each passion is unique and indefinable except through an account of the causal conditions under which it arises:

The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them...\(^7\)

And finally, they are incorrigible:

For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality as the perception, 'tis impossible any thing shou'd to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken.\(^8\)

Thus, though we may sometimes have mixed emotions, and emotions may sometimes be transformed into each other or even by synthesis produce an entirely new one, nevertheless we cannot be wrong about which emotion or emotions we are experiencing. To think we experience grief and to experience grief are one in the same.
There are two quite straightforward and fatal objections to Hume's view. One challenges the incorrigibility thesis, the other Hume's claim that emotions or passions are simple in that they have only one kind of constituent. Let us take them in order.

It is false that we can never err about how we feel. Consider the following example: I am talking to my friend Mary about the break-up of my marriage. When she asks me how I feel about discovering that Charles has been involved for years with the woman who lives in the apartment above us, I reply that I feel rather sorry for Charles, since he has had to sneak around so frequently in the past years. I notice Mary's sceptical look; later, going over the conversation in my mind, I remember that both my hands and teeth were clenched a good deal of the time, and I begin to suspect that what I feel is not compassion but anger. I call Mary and tell her I was wrong—really I am very angry at Charles and Mrs. Feldkamp. Not only does Mary find this plausible, which she would certainly not do if Hume's view were true and she were not hopelessly muddled about emotions, she believes me immediately. Hume's view cannot account for this sort of mistake, which occurs frequently enough to be significant. Further, that this mistake can be and is made, and, perhaps more important, that it can be rectified by appeals to, e.g., behavior, is important for seeing that Hume's view is inadequate in the sense that passions or emotions are not represented as containing enough different kinds of constituents. To see this difficulty more clearly, consider the following example: a woman who has a severely disturbed child is advised by her doctor and other members of her family to put this child in an institution. Though the mother can see the wisdom of this, at the same time she loves the child and fears it will not be well-treated, that the workers
in the institution will not take the trouble to fulfill the apparently trivial special requests that the child takes so seriously - a particular stuffed animal to sleep with, always putting the left shoe on first. At the same time, she may be very angry with the child for causing so much disruption in the home, for forcing her attention away from the other children and her husband. She may also feel guilty about all of this. Such a person might plausibly say at the time that, while she knows herself to be in some emotional state, she is confused and does not know which emotional state. Often stress or a new situation can produce this kind of emotional turmoil. One is aware of a great deal of moving and shifting inside, but cannot put a name to one's condition. This is a difficulty for the Humean view because, on Hume's view, such a person has no reason to say that she is in an emotional state at all. For Hume, emotions are on a par with all other sensations, sensations such as color or sound, in that they are all impressions and, from the standpoint of kinds of constituents, simple. Thus, there is no way to distinguish an emotion from the other impressions except by means of the recognition of its unique character. For Hume, the unique character serves two purposes: it enables us to distinguish one emotion from another, and it enables us to distinguish emotions from other mental states by being able to identify individual emotions. Thus we can't know we are having an emotion without knowing which one, since it is knowing which one that allows us to say we are having an emotion at all. There is, of course, the causal story to which we may appeal, but this is not a feature of the emotion itself. Again, the usual way one identifies one's state as emotional even though one doesn't know which emotion one has is by means of other constituents of emotion, such as certain beliefs or behavior. This,
again, implies a multiple constituent view of emotion, which would be un-
acceptable to Hume.

Another extremely suggestive line of argument against the view that
emotions are feelings is the one mounted by Stanley Schachter and Jerome
Singer in their paper "Cognitive, Social and Physiological Determinants of
Emotional States". Though Schachter and Singer's paper is directed
mainly at views such as William James', in which the claim is made that
emotions are constituted by unique physiologically caused feelings,
nevertheless their arguments still offer a means of resistance to Hume's
view. Furthermore, since I will argue that James' view is not nearly so
straightforward as is often supposed, I prefer to offer it at this point
rather than proposing it as a rejection of a view which it is not entirely
clear that James holds.

Schachter and Singer offer the hypothesis that we do not in fact
identify our emotions via their felt qualities. Rather, we call certain
states of physiological excitation emotion because they occur simultaneously
with, and are interpreted by means of, cognitive states. Thus if I walk down
a dark alley and meet a man with a gun, I have both a physiological response
and a set of cognitions based on my general knowledge of such situations - of
the purpose of someone's lurking in a dark alley, of the function of guns.
To show that we do not identify our emotions by means of their felt qualities
alone, Schachter and Singer designed an experiment in which the physiological
sensations alone were produced with drugs. The subjects were influenced by
by means of the expressed emotional states of others, and later asked to
report on their feelings. In support of supposing such a procedure to show
anything about emotions, Schachter and Singer cite studies in which it has
been shown that, far from there being unique feeling states for each emotion, there are a very limited number of feeling states plus other elements. Schachter and Singer are interested in just what these elements might be, as well as the way in which they are acquired. The former will be of more interest to us than the latter.

Schachter and Singer divided the subjects into two groups. One group was injected with epinephrin (a form of adrenalin) while the other was injected with a placebo. Both groups were told they had been injected with "Suproxin". The subjects in the group that was injected with epinephrine were further divided into three groups. The first group was told that sometimes the "Suproxin" had the side-effects that are in fact the side-effects of epinephrine: pounding heart, shaking, flushed face. The second group was told that the injection was mild and harmless, with no side effects. A third group was told that side effects such as itching, numb feet or slight headache might occur, side effects which are not in fact associated with epinephrine. All the members of the group that received the placebo were told that the injection was mild, harmless and without side effects. Thus one group, accurately informed about side-effects (called by Schachter and Singer "epinephrine informed"), had a plausible explanation for the physiological arousal that took place, while the group that lacked information ("epinephrine ignorant") asnd the group that had incorrect information about side effects ("epinephrine misinformed") had no such explanation available. The subjects were then isolated and each was asked to fill out a questionnaire. Soon each subject was joined by a confederate of the experimenters' (called a "stooge" by Schachter and Singer) masquerading as just another subject. The stooge then performed one of two pre-planned
routines, either beginning with an expression of mild irritation with the questions on the questionnaire and terminating with an expression of rage, or beginning with childlike playful activity and ending with an expression of what Schachter and Singer called "euphoria" - great cheerfulness and joie de vivre. Afterwards, upon being questioned about their states, the group that had an explanation, the epinephrine informed, did not tend to attribute emotions to themselves at all; they simply accepted the explanation of their states that had been offered to them at the beginning of the experiment, and were not swayed by the stooges. On the other hand, the epinephrine ignorant and the epinephrine misinformed tended on the whole to describe themselves as being in the emotional state expressed by the stooges who joined them. The placebo injected experienced few feelings and were in general less inclined to attribute emotional states to themselves than those who were injected with epinephrine. Thus, not only were the epinephrine ignorant and the epinephrine misinformed inclined to attribute particular emotional states, such as anger and euphoria, to themselves as a result of acquiring a cognitive component but, at a more basic level, they were willing to identify themselves as being in an emotional state only if the cognitive component was present. The results from the placebo-injected group suggest in their turn that, while the cognitive component induces identification of oneself as being in an emotional state when added to a feeling stage, the feeling state is also required, necessary though not sufficient.

What does all this suggest? Quite a number of things. First, it is interesting to note just how suggestible the drugged subjects are. Perhaps this is a function of the drug in the sense that the drug affects the solidity of normal ego boundaries and makes people more influenceable, but it is also a
function of the drug in the sense that the drug produces feelings for which, in some cases, there is no explanation. This in turn suggests that, when we have strong physiological feelings for which there is no explanation, we earnestly seek an explanation. Schachter and Singer believe that the explanation we accept is a function of two things: first we associate these physiological feelings with having emotions, and second we tend to identify our emotional states by means of the emotional states of the people around us. That we do the latter is partly a result of the former - if we did not associate feelings with emotions we might just diagnose ourselves as coming down with the flu when we have these mysterious feelings and leave it at that. But because we do associate these feelings with emotions, we begin, so to speak, to look for the missing component - we seek a cognitive context for these feelings. Schachter and Singer leave us with a good many questions about the exact nature of the cognitive component. For example it seems that the cognitive component could include both a causal explanation and beliefs of some sort about one's immediate situation. It is not clear to what extent our identification of our states as emotions is the result of our associating certain beliefs with being in a certain emotional state, a state that usually includes the feelings we are experiencing, or whether we identify our states as emotions because we believe that feeling states that are caused by certain cognitive components are emotions. These are not mutually exclusive theories, but they are different. Further, we never discover just what they have in mind when they speak of the cognitive component as based on knowledge. As we have seen, the cognitive component acquired when the subjects were alone with the stooges, while it involved knowledge in the sense that one requires knowledge to understand the language, interpret someone's tone of voice and
so on, did not express only applications of factual knowledge, but responses
to knowledge. For example, one of the stooge's inciting remarks in the
sequence of remarks that end in an expression of rage, is (referring to an
item on the questionnaire) "This really irritates me. It's none of their
business how much my father makes." This remark involves not only
knowledge of the item on the questionnaire, but also an evaluation of the
material in the questionnaire. This evaluative element seems important in
emotions, but is never mentioned in the discussion of the cognitive element.
However, for all its faults, the Schachter-Singer study does suggest very
strongly that emotions are not constituted just by feelings. Even though he
analysis of the cognitive element still needs to be performed, they have
shown that having feelings is not, so to speak, self-explanatory. If we have
some cognitive material, such as a causal explanation of the feelings in
physiological terms, that may satisfy us (though of course it may not,
depending on the circumstances - if one's closest friend had died at the same
time one was aware of having a violent attack of the flu, it would
undoubtedly be extremely difficult to sort out which feelings belonged to
which cognitive content). But if we have feelings and no explanation, and if
those feelings are feelings we can associate with certain emotions we will
often attribute emotions to ourselves on this basis. Schachter and Singer
are inclined to believe that cognitive content is largely acquired by means
of our perception of the cognitive content of others, but one need not
believe this to believe that the cognitive is important in the concept of
emotion. Further, the data gathered by questioning the placebo-injected
subjects suggests that we will not identify ourselves as being in emotional
states unless some feeling is present - the placebo-injected subjects were
exposed to the stooges to exactly the same extent as the epinephrine-injected subjects. In the end, what Schachter and Singer suggest as a general view is that emotions are complex; that is, they have more than one kind of constituent, and at least two of these are some cognitive component and feelings.

It might be objected at this point that the Schachter-Singer study leaves Hume untouched: naturally the subjects did not identify their feelings as emotions purely on the grounds of their felt qualities, because they weren't emotions. On Hume's view, each emotion has a unique felt quality, and the feelings produced by epinephrine were not those feelings. This, however, does not account for the propensity of the subjects to identify their states as emotions when cognitive content was added.

Would we do well to follow Schachter and Singer and call the feeling that occurs in emotion the experience of physiological change? I think not. It would simplify our ways of talking about feelings a great deal, but it would also be a highly speculative claim. Schachter and Singer themselves did not claim that the feelings involved were measured or entirely localized in some part of the body, though they refer to other experiments in which the activity of the viscera are measured. The difficulty is that there are many feelings, especially the subtle and elusive ones such as ones that are involved in certain types of nostalgia, or feelings of familiarity, that do not lend themselves to the claim that all the feelings involved in emotions are the experience of physiological change, because they are not easy to locate in the way a tight stomach or the tension in a clenched jaw is easy to locate. At the same time there is a feeling component. Confusion arises on this point, I suspect, because the distinction between saying that something
is a feeling when it has a localizable physiological cause on the one hand, and saying that something is a feeling because it is experienced on the other, is not drawn sharply enough. Schachter and Singer believe that all experienced feeling has a physiological cause, but one does not need to believe this to make the claim that emotions involve physiological feelings. Everything that is felt is felt physiologically, there is no other way to feel things. If one feels nostalgic, or is in some situation that feels familiar, these are both experienced physiologically, though not in the crude way in which one feels gastric disturbance, and not with an obvious physiological cause. Certainly some emotions involve very complex and subtle feelings, though by no means all or even most. Nevertheless Schachter and Singer seem to me to be making an important and fundamental point, though they are also making a point about causality, which we need not embrace. I will have more to say about the complexity of emotional states in Chapter 3, Part 4.

Part 2: William James

William James sets out his view on emotions in Chapter XXV of The Principles of Psychology. This view is usually taken to center around the arguments in favor of the claim that emotions are physiologically caused and experienced feelings, and nothing more. The following two passages typify the usual characterization of James' position:

If we adopt the theory of feeling as bodily sensation, the identification of the emotions with 'pure feeling' reduces to William James' position that an emotion is to be identified with sensations of bodily changes which make emotion an upset or disturbed state.

For James the essential point is that an emotion is an awareness of bodily changes as they occur. There is
a situation which arouses bodily changes reflexively. The awareness of these changes constitutes conscious emotion.\textsuperscript{13}

However, consensus notwithstanding, James’ view is not best understood by describing it in this way. Perhaps it would be best to say that James has both an explicit and an implicit view. The explicit view is the one described by Alston and Young, though some additional explanation is needed to put the view in its proper context. The implicit view is never worked out, only suggested, because James was working with an apparently unexamined assumption about the nature of emotions that, one suspects, prevented him from utilizing his own potentially useful and original view.

First of all, it is important to have clearly in mind exactly what James is arguing both in favor of and, in this case especially, against. James does want to argue that emotions are feelings, and he does believe that the experience of emotion is the experience of sensations caused by physiological activity. However, he never argues systematically in favor of the view that emotions have only one constituent and that constituent is feeling. Rather, he sees his opponent as someone who believes that emotions are feelings, but non-physical feelings—spiritual or mental rather than physical:

I have thus fairly propounded what seems to me the most fruitful way of conceiving of the emotions... The only way coercively to disprove it...would be to take some emotion, and then exhibit qualities of feeling in it which should be demonstrably additional to all those which could possibly be derived from the organs affected at the time. But to detect with certainty such purely spiritual qualities of feeling would be a task beyond human power. We have, as professor Lange says, absolutely no immediate criterion by which to distinguish between spiritual and corporeal feelings; and, I may add, the more we sharpen our introspection, the more localized all our qualities of feeling become...\textsuperscript{14}
What he does not argue for, but seems to assume, is that emotions are feelings. That is, he seems to regard as uncontroversial the claim that emotions are feelings of some kind, and never offers a full dress argument against the view that emotions could have constituents other than feeling, such as beliefs or behavior. He does argue against the view that physiological experiences are somehow attached to a spiritual experience, that there are two separate constituents, the latter causing the former:

Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions* is that the mental perception of some excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. 15

But even here, it is a question of one feeling causing another and not, e.g., a thought causing a feeling.

James' argument for his claim has two main constituents: first, that his findings in previous chapters show that the perception of objects causes bodily changes and that each one of these changes is felt, and, second, that a thought-experiment in which we try to imagine emotions without bodily sensations leaves no "mind-stuff" as James calls it, no mental material from which emotions are constituted but rather leaves only a "cold and neutral state of intellectual perception." 16 With respect to the first claim, there is obviously a good deal of work still to be done here, but it seems plausible as long as one is careful to state it as the claim that everything we notice (in some extended sense of "notice") causes change which is

*James distinguishes between coarser and subtler emotions. The distinction is irrelevant to the view expressed above by James: his general claim about emotions holds equally for both sorts of emotion.
additional to the physiological changes involved in perception itself. However, certain difficulties arise if James means his claim that emotions are feelings to be a general theory of emotion, able to account for not only the causes and nature of feeling, but also to account for the way in which we distinguish one emotion from another. There are emotions that, from a purely sensational view, are indistinguishable which we nevertheless do identify and distinguish between or among. For example, consider anger and resentment. In both of these emotions, one may experienced increased heart rate, tightening jaw muscles and so on. But while in anger one feels hard done by, in resentment one feels unfairly hard done by, and it is this difference that enables us to make the distinction. Or consider one of James' own illustrations, grief as described by C. Lange. In Lange's description of the typical physiological constituent of grief he mentions a feeling of weariness, a feeling of oppression, of cold, the drying of mucous membranes with the exception of eyes, since crying and the subsequent red and swollen face are also typical. This is certainly a vivid picture of physiological changes often found when someone is unhappy, but there are many forms of happiness of which grief is only one. Grief has specifically to do with the belief that one has lost someone of great value, whereas other forms of sadness, such as extreme depression, deep regret or melancholy, may have to do not with the loss of some person, but with a general sense that life isn't going well, believing the past to have great value and the future none, believing oneself to be worthless and life not to be worth living - views expressed in the beliefs through which we distinguish these emotions from each other. One possible move for James here might seem to be to say that, whether we can give complete physiological descriptions or not, nevertheless
we can feel the differences and our emotions are individually identifiable because they are experientially distinct — in short, he might take a version of Hume's position on this point. This move is ruled out by the following passage:

"Any classification of the emotions is seen to be as true and as 'natural' as any other, if it only serves some purpose' and such a question as 'What is the 'real' or 'typical' expression of anger, or fear?' is seen to have no objective meaning at all. Instead of it we now have the question as to how any given 'expression' of anger or fear may have come to exist' and that is a real question of physiological mechanics on the one hand, and of history on the other..."

Clearly, if classification of emotions is as flexible as this, the emotions have no special character that we can recognize immediately as grief, resentment, and so on.

More difficulties arise for James' feeling view when we look at the varied physiological changes James mentions in his examples: crying, laughing, flushing of the face, dilation of nostrils, striking out. James apparently counts both voluntary and involuntary behavior as relevant physiological change; this does not fit well with his claim that the bodily changes involved in emotions are reflexive. Perhaps certain reflexive bodily changes eventually give rise to some inclination to voluntary action, but voluntary action is not itself a reflex.

With respect to the second element in his argument, the thought-experiment he invites us to perform, James argues that, if we imagine some emotion entirely without physiological experiences, we will be left with only thoughts, and no special mental constituent out of which emotional feeling could be constituted:

"If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left
behind, no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all the remains."\textsuperscript{18}

What one thinks about this claim of James' depends on what one supposes him to be arguing against. Obviously he is not arguing about the probable absence of ideas as a result of subtraction of feeling, since ideas remain after the experiment is formed. Rather, he seems to be arguing that there is no other sort of feeling than physiological feeling in emotions. But even supposing his claim to be true, supposing that the absence of feeling would lead us to deny that we were having emotions but rather were having thoughts of some sort, we still have only the claim that physiological feeling is crucial to emotion. We still must deal with the results of James' failure to address himself to the more general question of what constitutes an emotion. However, all need not be lost; let us look at what we might make of James' view using only the constituents he gives us.

Basically, we have two claims, one of which he argues for, one that constitutes an assumption on which this argument is based. He argues that emotions are physiological feelings and nothing else based on the assumption that emotions are some sort of feeling and nothing else. He also offers a number of examples of the sort of physiological experience he means, including both voluntary and involuntary behavior. He offers us the thought experiment, which leaves us with intellectual perception and (in passages additional to the one offered) moral judgment when physiological experience is taken away. If we do not allow James his assumption that emotions are feelings of some kind and at the same time give full credit to his claim that without feeling, we would have no emotions, we have a potentially promising multiconstituent view. After all, it is the question of the metaphysical
nature of the cause of emotional feeling that really interests James - he clearly has no objection to saying that thoughts and beliefs can occur at the same time as these feelings and, furthermore, the feelings themselves are classified as such only in a very expanded sense. The only argument James ever offers in favor of the view that emotions must be feelings of some sort is an argument by implication, given the claim in the following passage:

"Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions thus shade imperceptively into each other. Every object that excites and instinct excites and emotion as well."¹⁹

James' view that emotions are like instincts, that both are reflexive and involuntary, implies that they could be constituted by only the sort of thing that could be appropriately described as reflexive. This limits the constituents of emotion to involuntary behavior or physiological change - reflexiveness in this sense is not a term much in use about thoughts. However, since he himself offers examples of feeling that is voluntary behavior, one might suppose that he does not have a particularly hard line on this question. And even if he does, there are good reasons to reject the view that emotions must be constituted only by feelings. On the other hand, it may well be true that we are not willing to identify ourselves as being an emotional state without feeling experienced physiologically, if not unambiguously physiologically caused: consider the results of the Schachter-Singer study.

Thus we can construct what we might call the revisionist James: emotions involve feelings, in the sense that the presence of feelings can be seen as a necessary though not sufficient condition for our attributing emotions to ourselves. At the same time, feelings alone cannot allow us to identify and distinguish among all the emotions that, in our ordinary lives,
we seem to be able to. James himself mentions thoughts, moral judgment, and voluntary behavior as elements that may occur at the same time as emotional feeling; these additional elements can be seen as potential constituents of emotion. More will be said about both in Chapters 2 and 3.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I


2. Ibid., p. 275.

3. Ibid., p. 437.

4. Ibid., p. 1.

5. Ibid., p. 2.

6. Ibid., p. 8.

7. Ibid., p. 277.

8. Ibid., p. 190.


10. Ibid., p. 385.


15. Ibid., p. 448.


17. Ibid., p. 454.


19. Ibid., p. 443.
CHAPTER 2

BEHAVIOR

There are two main questions we want to ask in our consideration of behavior. (a) Could a behaviorist view do justice to the concept of emotion, and (b) if not, does behavior come into the concept of emotion in any way?

In order to answer (a), I will offer two different behaviorist accounts, those of B.F. Skinner and E.C. Tolman. I have chosen these two behaviorists because they represent two sorts of behaviorism, and each one represents an aspect of possible behaviorist accounts that I wish to bring out. Skinner calls himself a "radical" behaviorist, while Tolman represents the more usual view. I will argue that while neither of these views will serve our purposes, this does not mean that behavior does not enter into emotions at all.

In Part 3, I will discuss (b). I will argue that some kinds of behavior often do enter into emotions, though not always. I will further argue that there are several different sorts of activities that can count as the relevant behavior, and that this will make any account of emotions that includes behavior more complex than any account that includes the view that some particular pattern of behavior typifies or is always a constituent of emotions.

Part 1: B.F. Skinner

B.F. Skinner calls his position radical behaviorism, since he does not deny the reality of inner events, but only denies that they have any place in causal explanations of behavior. Though the aspect of his view mainly
concerned with emotions as causes of behavior is not directly relevent to our
present concerns, still we must mention it as it comes into and is in fact
the occasion of his views on emotion. For Skinner emotions are inner events
of a particular kind: feelings, which for him are the experience of
physiological change. While he has no objection to our saying we have
feelings, he strongly objects to our giving them any extra-physical status or
attributing causal significance to them:

"The position can be stated as follows: what is
felt or introspectively observed is not some nonphysical
world of consciousness, mind, or mental life, but the
observer's own body. This does not mean, as I shall show
later, that introspection is a kind of physiological
research, nor does it mean (and this is the heart of the
argument) that what are felt or introspectively observed
are the causes of behavior."¹

Skinner does not argue for this view of emotions, in the sense that he
does not actively consider the possibility that emotions might be better
defined as something other than, or more complex than, feelings. But he does
claim that we can translate statements about emotions as causes into
statements about observable causal conditions:

"An organism behaves as it does because of its
current structure, but most of this is out of reach
of introspection. At the moment we must content
ourselves, as the methodological behaviorist
insists, with a person's genetic and environmental
histories. What are introspectively observed are
certain collateral products of those histories."²

Does this mean that Skinner believes that all statements about emotion
can be translated, without residue, into statements about behavior? No.
First of all, emotions are feelings. Second, even if one wanted to translate
our unexamined statements about feelings into statements about behavior, it
could not be done without changing the meaning. Skinner believes that many
of our statements about emotion and other inner causes, particularly as
causes of behavior, embody a kind of wishful thinking that is misleading, and, naturally, ought to be left out:

"The extraordinary appeal of inner causes and the accompanying neglect of environmental histories and current setting must be due to more than a linguistic practice. I suggest that it has the appeal of the arcane, the occult, the hermetic, the magical—these mysteries which have held so important a position in the history of human thought. It is the appeal of an apparently inexplicable power, in a world which seems to lie beyond the senses and the reach of reason. It is the appeal still enjoyed by astrology, numerology, parapsychology and psychical research."

Thus he does not believe that statements about behavior and physiology are all we do mean by statements about inner causes of behavior; rather he thinks that is all we ought to mean:

"The exploration of the emotional and motivational life of the mind has been described as one of the great achievements in the history of human thought, but it is possible that it has been one of the great disasters. In its search for internal explanation, supported by the false sense of cause associated with feelings and introspective observations, mentalism has obscured the environmental antecedents which would have led to a much more effective analysis..."

It is useful here to notice that Skinner's opponent seems to be someone very much like Hume, who holds that emotion is feeling but feeling in some extra-physical sense. In fact his view very much resembles William James'. James too wanted to argue that emotions are feelings, and feelings are physiological. Leaving aside for the moment my proposed revision of James' view there are, as we have seen, good reasons to reject the view that emotions are feelings. With respect to the view that certain behavior can be correlated with the feelings that Skinner claims constitute emotions, I will argue in Parts 2 and 3 that it will be extremely difficult to show that any pattern or patterns of behavior characterizes or is any more than one of
several behavioral patterns that are not structurally similar. This difficulty is particularly acute in Skinner's case, since he does not attempt to make precise the notion of behavior in use. He offers examples in which behavior is characterized by its terminating with the achievement of a goal, and behavior patterns that simply have names; such as waving one's arms. There are so many possible ways to behave when one is in an emotional state, some entirely idiosyncratic, some with no apparent connection to one's state, some with purposes and some without, some that we would be hard to put to describe in any coherent way at all*, that an analysis like Skinner's must fail because, insofar as it depends on the claim that certain patterns of behavior correlate with certain feelings, it fails to account for our experience. As I will argue at some length in Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter, the differences among emotions often lie in the differences among the associated beliefs rather than behavior patterns. Again, consider the difference between anger and resentment. Some possible behaviors might easily be identical: shaking one's fist, uttering threats, attempting in general to do harm. The difference lies in the associated beliefs: in resentment, one believes that one has been badly treated and unfairly

* For example, consider the following passages from Eudora Welty's "June Recital":

"As she struggled, her round face seemed stretched wider than it was long by a feeling that failed to match the feeling of everybody else. It was not the same as sorrow. Miss Eckhart, a stranger to their cemetary, where none of her people lay, pushed forward with her unstylish, winter purse swinging on her arm, and began to nod her head - sharply, to one side and then the other... Her vigorous nods ... inreasing in urgency. It was the way she nodded at pupils to bring up their rythm, helping out the metronome."
treated, while one need not believe one has been unfairly treated, but only badly treated, to be angry. This suggests that we identify emotions in some way other than by behavior. Even if we say that, for Skinner, emotions are feeling and behavior in that some behavior correlates with felt physiological states, this problem still exists.

Part 2: Tolman

E.C. Tolman, in his book *Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men*, presents us with a picture of emotion in which emotions are constituted by patterns of behavior and the feelings connected with that behavior. These patterns can be characterized as behavior whose purpose (determined by the results of the behavior) is to bring about certain physiological states, such as the satiation of hunger or the absence of pain, and behavior whose purposes "show" that the organism has "evaluated" the stimuli in certain ways, by the choice of more and more efficient means through which the purpose may be achieved. Emotions have a character which is determined by what sort of good or bad consequences one's patterns of behavior demonstrate one to be approaching or avoiding. The kind of behavior Tolman has in mind becomes clearer in the following passages:

Thus fear ... is distinguished and named, primarily, by virtue of its being (i) an avoidance of the physiological disturbance of pain or injury, plus (ii) an expectation that the way to avoid such pain or injury is by escaping from the sign-object in question. Similarly, rage would be distinguished by virtue of its being (i) an avoidance of the physiological disturbance of blocking or interference, plus (ii) an expectation that the way to avoid such blocking is to destroy the sign-object in question.6

The feelings involved are the feelings that either occur during the behavior
due to physiological change, or that occur in preparation for this behavior, again due to physiological change.

We have already seen that feeling theories have their difficulties. But the difficulties posed by the status of feelings in Tolman's theory are connected to more fundamental problems, problems concerning Tolman's claim that there are consistent patterns of behavior. It is only insofar as they occur in behavior patterns that feelings have a place in Tolman's view. Let us, then, consider these more basic problems.

My main criticism is this: in order to make good this position, we will have to enlarge our definitions of the purposes claimed to be exhibited, such as 'intention to destroy' in anger so enormously that they have virtually no meaning. Consider anger (Tolman does not distinguish between rage and anger). Sometimes when someone is angry, she does physically attack those with whom she is angry. In addition, some people attack others verbally, intending to cause psychological damage. Sometimes, however, one simply leaves the room. In this case, particularly if one is really angry, such an action seems to indicate the desire to avoid destroying or harming those with whom one is angry. Since Tolman has no criterion for acting on something other than actually doing so, i.e., he does not talk about "suppressed" purposes or "substitute" actions - this sort of action would seem to constitute an exception, and occurs frequently enough to be significant. At this point, an ingenious Tolmanite might answer that leaving the room is a way of affecting the person with whom one is angry - if I want to leave the room, I want to deprive you of my company, and to want to do so is to want to destroy your peace of mind, sense of contentment in the relationship, etc. But again, this seems a long way from Tolman's sense of
"destroy" which has to do with rendering something incapable of further potentially harmful action. Making someone unhappy or uncomfortable by leaving the room is extremely unlikely to render him incapable of further potentially harmful action, and in fact increases the danger of potentially harmful action, since we may now have someone who may be both in the mood to attack and frustrated of an object.

At this point, the behaviorist might say that the descriptions need revision, but that the revised description will name a set of behavior patterns. For example, the behaviorist might say that, though one could not say that all the behavior associated with anger could be said to have a destructive purpose, it could be described as behavior which is designed to somehow eliminate the stimulus, whether by destroying it or removing oneself from its presence. And perhaps this is so. But if it is, what is there to distinguish anger from, say, fear, which also involves behavior designed to eliminate the stimulus, whether by fight or flight? While it does seem to be possible to make some very general remarks about the apparent purpose of behavior - one can say fairly confidently that some behavior is meant to avoid and some to approach - this is by no means enough, such as the aforementioned distinction between anger and resentment, based on the presence of a belief about fairness in one which is not present in the other. If this sort of behaviorist view offers an impoverished picture of our emotional lives by eliminating the differences among emotions, the theory ought to be rejected.

There is another objection that can be offered here, an objection to Tolman's claim that the behavior involved in emotions has as its purpose an effect on the stimulus. Consider Jack, who has had a particularly
frustrating day. No single frustrating happening has been enraging, but several taken together have produced in Jack a really furious state. As Jack is driving back to Richmond after a hard day at the stock exchange, he suddenly realizes that he feels very angry, and even realizes why. He strongly wishes to express this feeling and do something to relieve the tightness in his chest. Jack begins to scream at the top of his lungs, saying exactly how terrible, how aggravated he feels; and, a few minutes later, does indeed feel much better. His behavior is not designed to affect the stimuli. The stimuli are such things as rising gold prices, the unpredictability of the stock market, his new woman trainee, straight out of the Wharton School and, he suspects, far more intelligent than himself. His behavior is purely expressive. One cannot say that this behavior is just a substitute for acting on the stimulus, because he does not want to act on gold prices, the stock market or his new trainee. None of these things alone, or even together, makes him want to destroy them. He has simply accumulated too much minor irritation. Quite a lot of behavior that one associates with negative emotion - the uttering of expletives in a loud tone of voice, slamming doors, crumpling one's fifth draft into a tiny ball - is not purposive in Tolman's sense. It is not designed to affect the stimulus, but a way of dealing with feelings of aggravation and designed entirely for one's own benefit.

**Part 3: Possible patterns of behavior - Revisionist View**

Suppose we agree that Tolman is wrong, and that behavior does not exhibit a sufficiently uniform pattern of purposes so that we can distinguish among emotions. Does this mean that there are no patterns of behavior at all
associated with emotions? Surely there is some sense in which behavior could be part of a concept of emotion. For example, would we not say that some behavior can constitute one of the criteria for the presence of an emotion? If we would be willing to say this, what sort of behavior would it be? Let us begin by asking what kind of behavioral evidence strongly inclines us to say that someone has an emotion. Keeping in mind our objections to Tolman's account we can exclude patterns of behavior which exhibit particular purposes as the sole candidate. But perhaps there are other patterns of behavior that, taken together, could be seen as characteristic of some emotions, and there is no reason that one of these could not be purposive behavior. Let us look at some of these patterns.

Some people have some patterns of behavior that are peculiar to them and through which, if they feel confused about their own states, they may attribute emotions to themselves. For example, if I am feeling agitated, confused, and at the same time notice that I am manifesting a strong tendency to eat everything I can get my hands on, I may conclude from past experience that I am angry but just don't want to admit it to myself. In addition, we often attribute emotions to others on the basis of inductive evidence gained from ourselves or them. For example, I may think that, since I behave in certain ways when I am angry, you behave in the same ways. Or I may know you well enough to know that, whenever your foot starts to tap, you are becoming really furious. In some cases, we would unhesitatingly attribute anger to someone, even an unknown someone, on the basis of behavior. If her face is contorted and she is pounding her fist on the table and shouting (and not making a political speech), we would unhesitatingly say that she is angry. However, we cannot always generalize so easily, for it seems true to say
that, given the right story, any behavior could be an expression of any emotion. For example, we generally think of a slap on the face as behavior associated with anger, and of a friendly kiss as an indication of affection. But consider two football players, slapping each other hard to show they're really tough guys, but clearly understanding between them that this is a show of affection between two men who are afraid of being thought 'soft'. And consider the episode in the television serial "All in the Family" in which Sammy Davis, Jr. gives Archie Bunker, the arch-bigot, a resounding kiss. It is quite clear that the kiss is an act which springs from anger and the desire for revenge, and as such, an ingenious move. Many more examples like these can be produced, and they undercut the view that, even if we remove the requirement that behavior be purposive in a certain set of ways, and even though there may be both what we think of as "typical" expressions of emotion, such as scowling and pounding the table, and/or patterns that are regular though idiosyncratic, it is also the case that there are all sorts of behaviors that are emphatically non-typical and impossible to classify in their infinite variety.

A somewhat more promising area, from the standpoint of general application, is the area of facial expressions, tone of voice, bodily postures and so on. Psychotherapists often form hypotheses on the basis of observing these behavioral features. But not enough is known about the correlations between, e.g., tones of voice and emotional state. Does it usually mean someone is angry if she speaks in a high, tight voice? Is someone who holds her body very rigidly usually frightened? The answer to these questions often seems to be yes, and if there should turn out to be high degrees of correlation in these kinds of cases, perhaps patterns of
Some behavior could be more appropriately called manners of behavior. What is most obviously true about saying that not every emotion involves a particular kind of behavior is that specific kinds of behavior, such as slamming doors, throwing things, kicking the dog, etc., do not always occur, or that behavior cannot in general be justly characterized as having a certain purpose or set of purposes. If we assume that there may be some pattern or patterns in behavior, we may be able to account for deviation from a pattern or set of patterns by taking into account the fact that some people have highly developed abilities to control their inclinations or desire to do the things that would exhibit pattern. Instead, they do other things, such as sitting tight-lipped, clenching their fists, or simply leaving the situation that has produced the anger. In particular, it is true that some people control the behavior they exhibit at the time of the actual incident that has caused the inner state in which they find themselves. For example, if I am such a person, and someone says something to me that I consider insulting, I may not loudly announced that I am angry, or pound on the table with my fist. I may simply grit my teeth and walk out of the door. I may, however, when I am alone, mutter to myself, stamp my feet, etc. Or I may not even do that. I may continue to grit my teeth, and simply sit tensely reading a newspaper.

Sometimes certain ways of doing things are characteristic of certain emotions. This is reflected in ordinary language by the use of adverbial emotion words, e.g., "She sadly walked away." "He angrily put down his book". There appear to be characteristic ways of performing any act that is
often indicative of certain occurent inner states. For example, if I am angry I may not do some particular thing or things, such as door-slamming or foot stamping, but whatever my activity, I do it with unusual force: I may snap my newspaper, slam plates down on a table, answer questions abruptly, be unusually impatient with can openers that don't work, and so on. One might object that this does not involve any real distinction between what is done and how it is done, that all my examples can be seen as "whats" rather than "hows". That is, instead of plate slamming being an instance of putting a plate down violently, plate slamming is a particular bit of behavior, and the same is true of newspaper snapping, can opener rattling, etc. As far as this objection goes, it is true. But it seems to me to be a matter of choosing one's descriptions most usefully. If we adopt my view, we get a pattern, not a list. If we just say that plate-slamming is a specific kind of behavior, then we have yet another item for the interminable list of kinds of behavior that could express emotion. Furthermore, to just say that plate-slamming and newspaper snapping are specific kinds of behavior is to ignore an important feature that they have in common, and which can provide us with an explanation of why these things are done in apparently counter-productive ways. After all, it takes considerably more energy, and is much more dangerous to the plates, to slam them down on the table, ad the same is true of snapping newspapers. This behavior cannot be explained by citing the usual purposes of these activities - getting the table ready for dinner and finding out the hockey scores. But it can be explained by citing the connection of manners of behavior with emotion: "She's slamming the plates because she's angry."
And finally, consider the following behavioral phenomena: often, when someone is angry, she finds relatively subtle ways, such as insulting looks or "accidental" pushes and shoves to do indirectly what she would like to do directly. But sometimes, instead, she tightens her muscles and prevents herself from doing anything. This suggests that, at least in some cases, we would talk about "primary" and "secondary" behavior. The primary behavior is the behavior that is ordinarily associated with the emotion (if any), the secondary is the inhibiting behavior. This picture seems especially applicable to anger and grief.

These examples suggest that, under some conditions, some kinds of behavior may be consistently correlated with certain emotions, though this may often be entirely idiosyncratic. But we must beware of making too much of this sort of evidence: it is interesting and informative to notice that, when both philosophers and psychologists speak of behavioral components of emotions, the examples most frequently used are examples of anger and grief, or of great joy and love. These examples are particularly appealing because they are ones in which the emotions involved are often particularly conspicuous in their spontaneous expression. But consider emotions such as awe, aesthetic bliss, religious transcendence. There are no typical expressions that come to mind for such emotions, as well as the many other complex and subtle emotions, emotions which often have no names, that one experiences in connection with relationships with others, works of art and the infinite, not to mention one's work, one's dog or one's grandmother's china. Thus we must conclude modestly that while in some cases behavior comes into emotion in some typical ways, there is a great deal of unknown territory here as well.

2. Ibid., p. 16.

3. Ibid., p. 178.

4. Ibid., p. 182.


7. Ibid., p. 267.
CHAPTER 3

BELIEFS

Part 1: A proposal on the connection of emotion and belief

It is not so much that the emotion restricts the object or the beliefs about the object. Rather it is that the object, or the beliefs about the object, restricts the emotion. That is, what emotion I can feel towards an item in the world is restricted by what I take to be true of that item.\(^1\)

...we are not afraid of x unless we take x to be dangerous; we are not angry at x unless we take x to be acting contrary to something we want; we do not have remorse over having done x unless we regard it as unfortunate that we did x; we are not grief stricken over x unless we see x as the loss of something we wanted very much; we do not have pity for x unless we take x to be in an undesirable state...\(^2\)

Wilson and Alston express a view which, when developed at greater length and in more detail, I believe to be correct. For Wilson and Alston there is a conceptual connection between having an emotion with an object, and having a belief about that object. No belief, no emotion*. This seems to me to be true, and not accidentally. That is, it is true because, in general, beliefs of a certain kind are indeed the constituents, perhaps the most important constituents, of emotions.

Furthermore, that particular emotions and particular beliefs have this connection is itself an indication of a deeper connection, shown by the identification of some state as an emotion as opposed to, e.g., a sensation,

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* It is also true that no belief, no object. But that is not the point here for either Wilson or Alston. The issue is the identification and limiting of distinct emotions.
by means of the presence of a particular sort of belief. Thus we have two separate but connected tasks before us: the discovery of the connection between particular beliefs and particular emotions, and the discovery of the connection of beliefs of a certain kind (to be specified later in the course of our investigations) and the identification of some state as an emotion rather than some other state, in particular a sensation. Let us now look briefly at the appropriate methods for answering each of these questions.

First of all, for procedural reasons we must note that there is both a conceptual and an empirical component involved in discovering whether specific emotions involve specific beliefs. However, in order to answer the empirical question, we must already have some concept of emotion operating: I can't say whether each case of being angry involves believing myself to be hard done by unless I already have some concept of anger by means of which to select the examples. Of course I will want to say more about the empirical question, and will before I finish. But I must rely on usage as a means of launching an enquiry. If it does turn out that there are different beliefs for each emotion, then we will have a way of distinguishing emotions from each other: we can distinguish them by means of the various beliefs.

The second question is the more difficult question; is there any reason to suppose that beliefs are indeed a crucial aspect of the concept of emotion. It is especially important to be clear about what will count as an answer to this question. How could we tell whether emotions always involve some sort of belief? Again, we must rely on an already-active concept of emotion, though this time it is emotion and not particular emotions that is at issue. We do seem to have such a concept, by means of which we distinguish emotions from other states. And one feature of this concept is
that there are many different emotions. Given the concept, they all have a structure in common, nevertheless they are various. And whatever our theory about what makes an emotion an emotion, it must be able to account for this feature. The main difficulties with both the feeling theories of emotion and the behaviorist theories is that, on these views, such variety cannot be accounted for. Feelings are not sufficiently distinct from each other to account for these differences, and behavioral patterns are not consistent enough to form the basis for making these distinctions. This suggests that there must be some other way to account for the differences, some other element by means of which we distinguish emotions from each other. Thus, one way to tell whether beliefs are part of emotions is to see whether beliefs must be present in particular emotions and whether they could allow us to account for the number of emotions there seem to be. Let us now look at these two questions in an order of the appropriateness of which will become, I hope, self-evident.

**Part 2: Beliefs as individuators**

It is uncontroversially the case that there is a conceptual connection between particular beliefs and particular emotions. That this so can most easily be seen by looking at the results of denying it. Suppose I claim to be afraid, and at the same time claim not to believe myself or someone with whom I feel intimately connected to be in danger. Having made sure I understand the language, you would be justified in having quite serious reservations about my truthfulness. This same sort of thing is true of emotions such as affection, gratitude, resentment, anger - the emotions that constitute the bulk of our daily emotional experience. It is also true
of the more (statistically) unusual emotions, such as extreme aesthetic bliss aesthetic distaste, and the emotions that are tied to a particular sort of appreciation of style, whether personal or aesthetic. If I tell you that I was positively ravished by Verdi's "Otello", it would be otiose to ask me whether I found it particularly sensually beautiful, and if I say I find Satie's music simultaneously amusing and intellectually delightful, you would not need to ask me whether I thought it witty. There may be more than one belief tied to an emotion - for example, when I feel affectionate towards someone, I may believe that he is endearingly childlike, touchingly attentive and considerate, warm and friendly, and so on. These beliefs have in common that they are positive assessments of someone's personal qualities with respect to my personal preferences in certain areas of human behavior. If, rather than centering on someone's treatment of me, my beliefs centered on a positive assessment of his treatment of others with respect to living up to moral principles, the emotion would be moral admiration or respect. (There is at least one emotion, awe, which will be discussed later, that seems to include quite different kinds of beliefs which must occur conjointly, but this is unusual.) We can advance our case by looking at what seems to me to be a typical case of emotional uncertainty: Jack and I lived together for several years, and I broke off the relationship. Recently, we have been seeing each other just as "friends"; I find these encounters trying, but am unable to decide to stop doing it once and for all. Whenever I spend an evening with him, I return home in an emotional muddle, a muddle based on my inability to decide how I feel, even though I am convinced that it is an emotional state of some sort I'm in - I try to decide, using various methods. For example, I examine my physical state: my stomach is upset, my muscles
are tight. But this is consistent either with anger or with resisting the pain that accompanies a deep feeling of pity or regret. Examining my behavior, I find myself sometimes avoiding him completely while at other times I want to see him. But both of these behaviors are consistent with wanting to avoid anger-provoking or pity-evoking situation or, on the other hand, wanting to be with someone in order to let him know how angry one is, or to know better what his needs are so that one can help. In short, neither the experienced physiological disturbance nor the behavior involved can help me decide which emotion I feel. Of course, there is always the possibility that I feel several alternately, but the problem still arises: I don't know which is which.

Since neither perception of physiological disturbance nor behavior will enable me to decide which emotion or emotions I am having, I must turn to some other method: I must consult my beliefs. Most of us have had the experience of being uncertain about our emotions; we wonder whether we are in love, angry rather than sad. When we try to clarify our feelings, we most often find ourselves examining our thoughts with an eye to bringing in beliefs: do I love x? I think he's handsome, he has all the major virtues, he's usually excellent and intelligent company, I find his taste in music congenial and his conversation entrancing. Considering all of these beliefs together brings to my attention that I am developing the complex belief concerning the extraordinary desirability of someone's company, his/her superior attractiveness (not necessarily or even usually from an objective standpoint) and special emotional link to myself that is characteristic of love. I discover that I have these beliefs by bringing to my mind the sorts of thoughts I have when I'm with x that might be relevant to my inquiry.
Or suppose I'm trying to decide which of two emotions I have, a more complex task: am I filled with pity or rage? I begin to inspect my thoughts, noticing specially when I have thoughts about x's character that have to do with his being unpleasant or insulting on the one hand, hard done by or luckless on the other - I try to discover what my beliefs are. Consider, too, the evidence provided by the now-familiar pair, anger and resentment. They can easily involve roughly the same feelings and behavior; the difference between them lies in the belief. In anger, one simply believes oneself to be hard done by, while in resentment, one believes oneself to be unfairly hard done by. The same sort of thing can be said of affection and admiration, sadness and grief. The members of these pairs cannot be distinguished unless we bring in beliefs.

All of this strongly suggests that beliefs provide the means for distinguishing among emotions, a means that is provided neither by feeling nor by behavior. And if this is so, beliefs also provide us with the means for accounting for the great number of emotions we attribute to ourselves.

Part 3: Beliefs and the identification of emotion

At the end of Part 1, I suggested that two ways to tell whether beliefs are a crucial part of emotions were to see whether beliefs must be present in particular emotions and whether they could allow us to account for the number of emotions there are. Part 2 strongly suggests that they are and they can. Thus we can say tentatively that to have a belief is a crucial part of having an emotion. However, we cannot see just how crucial beliefs are to emotions until we look at an example where the issue is not just which emotion one is having, but whether one is having an emotion at all. To this
end, consider the following example: I emerge from a faculty meeting feeling physically uncomfortable, with odd strained feelings in my arms and legs, and an upset stomach. At first I ask myself whether I might not be getting the flu, a genuine possibility with winter approaching accompanied by the usual wet feet and drafts. I go home and, when I get there, I find myself displaying a tendency to slam doors and pans. Again I wonder if perhaps I'm not coming down with something until I also notice that my thoughts keep involuntarily wandering back to the faculty meeting, clustering around the unattractive performance of one of my colleagues - one of those men who thinks it's all right to make sexist jokes as long as he keeps assuring one that some of his best friends are women. After a short while, I begin to take my own thoughts seriously, and I realize that in fact I feel so odd and am doing everything with such excessive force because I am angry - I feel insulted by my colleague's remarks. I also realize that I have kept the relevent belief from myself because I know in my heart that, once I am conscious of having the belief about being insulted, I am going to have to face the fact that I am furious, that I haven't really "gotten used" to the free-floating sexism in the world as I thought I had, which in turn provokes some disturbing reflections (which I would just as soon avoid) about being in the position of being a junior faculty member on temporary appointment who is unlikely to be able to get away with much loud moral indignation at faculty meetings. Clearly in this case, it is the presence of belief that, so to speak, crystallizes my varied experiences and behavior into an emotion. It is when I realize that from my point of view I have been treated crudely, nastily, and disrespectfully that I begin to feel angry, that I can explain why I seem to be unable to close a door without slamming it. Furthermore,
the very fact that I have chosen at some level to deceive myself by keeping
the relevant belief from myself (instead of, for example, preventing myself
from noticing how physically odd I feel) is an indication that at some level
I know quite well what part belief plays in emotion.

Consider, also, the emotions, especially the more subtle and complex
ones, that have no names. For example, there is the emotion that involves
one's acceptance of life's difficulties and at the same time the conviction
that one's efforts are worthwhile, together with strong but difficult to
describe feelings. Or consider the following complex and unnameable emotion:

...this beauty, this exquisite beauty, and the tears
filled his eyes as he looked at the smoke words
languishing and melting in the sky and bestowing
upon him, in their inexhaustible charity and
laughing goodness, one shape after another of
unimaginable beauty and signalling their
intention to provide him, for nothing, for ever,
for looking merely, with beauty, more beauty!
Tears ran down his cheeks. 3

This emotion seems to be partly gratitude, partly aesthetic pleasure, partly
some sort of mystical experience. It has no name, though it certainly seems
to be an emotion. We can identify it as such by the presence of certain
beliefs, which supplement the feelings and behavior present: that something
is beautiful, that something is charitable and good, added to one of the most
common behavioral components of emotion, tears and, by implication, feeling,
since the use of the words "languishing" and "melting" seem to imply those
feelings on the part of the subject. I suggest that, if we knew only of the
crying and the feelings of melting and languishing, we would be reluctant to
call this an emotion, and would be likely to ascribe the behavior and
feelings to some physiological disturbance: drunkenness, perhaps. (Though
of course drunkenness itself does not, as we all know, preclude the genuine
experience of emotion.)
When we ask whether beliefs are a component of emotion, we can also see this as a question about the constituents of emotion as opposed to sensations or feelings alone. Anthony Kenny\(^4\), whose views we will discuss later, was extremely concerned about this question. If it is true, as it seems to be, that beliefs are a crucial component of emotions, their presence will enable us to distinguish between emotions and sensations. Emotions involve beliefs, while sensations do not. That is to say, beliefs are an essential aspect of something's being an emotion, while they are not an essential aspect of something's being a sensation. Of course, one may have thoughts or beliefs while one is having a sensation, and it may even be a thought or belief about the sensation. But the absence of such thoughts or beliefs will not damage the credentials of certain tingles or burnings as sensations. However, in the case of emotions, the beliefs involved are crucial. Without them, whatever feelings one has could as easily be symptoms of the flu, and the behavior would be ambiguous. The beliefs involved are the individuators, and whatever feelings or behavior are connected with those beliefs (in ways to be discussed at great length) are the ones that are part of the emotion.

That beliefs are crucial for the identification of individual emotions gives them considerable importance in the concept of emotion. Since the concept of emotion must include the features common to emotions, and since this feature, the necessary presence of beliefs in order to individuate emotions, is common to emotions, we will want to include it in the general concept of emotion. Does this mean that every emotion must have a belief of the requisite kind? Clearly, the presence of beliefs is necessary for individuation; however, it may be objected that some emotions, such as
violent rage or intense passions of various kinds seem, from a purely experiential standpoint, not to have much cognitive content. Here "not much" is the key. There is no doubt that in some emotions, beliefs are considerably less prominent than others. It may well be that sometimes I am much more aware of the physiological upheaval taking place than my evaluative belief or beliefs. But there is no reason to suppose that feeling destroys reason; no matter how angry I am, if asked I will be able to say why, unless I am confused about my own states or am in the grip of an unconscious emotion. On the other hand, in some emotions the evaluative component may be extremely prominent and the feeling and behavioral (if any) much less. If I find myself deeply moved by Spinoza's views on the human condition, I will undoubtedly have in mind very complex evaluations, and the feeling component will be somewhat less prominent.\(^5\)

One of the consequences of this view is that, if emotions involve beliefs, and beliefs involve concepts, then having emotions depends on being able to have at least some concepts. That is, if I cannot have the concept of being treated unfairly, then I cannot feel resentful. And, if we assume that having a great many concepts involve speaking a language, we seem to be committed to the view that, where there is no language, there is no resentment, aesthetic joy and so on. Though I am inclined to say that this just is the case, it is, I think, preferable to remain agnostic. One wants to remain agnostic here from ignorance rather than philosophical cowardice, ignorance in the following sense: while it is possible to imagine some being behaving in a way that would lead us to believe that she is angry, it is extremely difficult to imagine anyone's being able to communicate, non-linguistically, some set of beliefs such as those expressed in the
passage from *Mrs. Dalloway*. And, since this is the case, one simply doesn't know whether it is possible to have certain concepts non-linguistically, thus certain beliefs. Given the behaviorist literature, in which only a few emotions are attributed to animals through their behavior, we can say that, in the case of animals, we tend not to believe that they have emotions other than the ones for which firm behavioral criteria have been set. Since firm behavioral criteria have been set only for emotions such as rage and a sense of satisfaction, emotions where there is obvious consistent behavior such as throwing oneself against the bars of a cage or ceasing to eat, very few emotions are attributed to animals. Thus the most we can say is that the more complex the beliefs, the less likely a non-linguistic being is to be able to communicate them, thus the less likely it is that we can know them.

**Part 4: More Light**

Our discussion on beliefs included examples of the techniques one sometimes uses for clarifying emotional confusion. We have seen how extremely important beliefs are for emotions, we can see why discovering them is helpful. We have been able to explain a phenomenon connected with emotional confusion: we are sometimes reluctant to attribute emotions to ourselves at all unless we know what our beliefs are. One may be experiencing disturbing physiological change, and exhibiting behavior that surprises even oneself and, nevertheless, it may never cross one's mind that one is in an emotional state unless one becomes clearly aware of the relevant beliefs. In light of this, I suggest that in cases where people seem convinced that they are in some emotional state, such as in the example on p. 40, but seem unclear about their beliefs, it is because these cases
sufficiently resemble complete cases, cases where beliefs are present to
cause one to associate these cases with the other more complete cases.
Perhaps the context is the same - perhaps one felt the same way the last time
one heard a speech by Jack Horner or attended the CPA. Perhaps the same
people are involved. But whatever the cue, there is an association of these
cases with the others, and through this association, an identification of
one's state.

Finally, an account of another puzzling phenomenon. It may seem, just
from an experiential standpoint, that beliefs do not individuate emotions
because the feelings involved seem so intimately associated with the beliefs
that it is almost as if there are as many different feelings as beliefs.
This is particularly true of people who have a great many aesthetic
experiences, which often tend to be more complex, from the standpoint of
beliefs, than resentment or affection. Such people may be tempted to say
that it is all very well to say that feelings do not individuate,
nevertheless one's experience is of unique, though sometimes, elusive,
feelings. I have a great deal of sympathy with this objection, but I think
it can be met without adding to our theory. Let us begin by reminding
ourselves that emotions are, among other things, states of consciousness, and
being conscious is a noisy business. At any given moment of consciousness,
not only are there the components of whatever the center of one's attention
happens to be at the time but a great many other thoughts and memories, plus
various images (in some cases - some people claim to have no images at all).
Even if I am filled with resentment and have the appropriate belief, still I
have various thoughts and images in the background - my grocery list, the
dream I had last night, and so on. And, in cases where my emotions concern
matters very important to me, such as the state of my marriage or the death of one of my parents, there are a great many associations and memories that are attached, so to speak, to the relevant beliefs. For example, suppose I am feeling grief about my mother's death. When I think of her funeral, and have the belief that I will miss her a great deal, I find attached to my thoughts of her various associations - images of myself as a child, of birthdays and holidays, sitting on her lap, and so on. These images and thoughts are accompanied often not by distinct feelings, but by fluctuations in feeling. I may feel more and less tightness in my stomach, pain in my solar plexus, etc., as well as the subtler and less distinctly physiologically locatable feelings. All of this sets up a very complex state of consciousness. In the case of aesthetic emotions, the situation is even more complicated. Suppose one is listening to Die Walküre. When Wotan says farewell to Brunnhilde, one has beliefs not only about the events in the opera, but associated beliefs about father-daughter relationships, musical expressions of such a situation, other hearings of Die Walküre, various interpretations of myth, and so on. Thus it is not surprising that people sometimes believe themselves to have unique feeling states. In fact, the situation is so complex, one's consciousness is so filled with beliefs and feelings that it becomes difficult to distinguish clearly between thought and feeling. But we ought not to confuse this complexity with unique feeling states, for, as we have seen, this view is mistaken: Schachter and Singer argue that there are no unique feeling states, and I have argued that emotions are not characterized by unique feeling states.
Suppose we say that beliefs are a crucial component in emotion. How far does this take us toward a general theory of emotion? It takes us a very short way. We do not yet know what sorts of beliefs they are, nor do we know what their relationship is to the rest of the components of emotion. Both of these questions will be taken up in this section.

So far in Chapter 3, I have discussed beliefs as a component of emotion. I have argued that the conceptual link between beliefs and emotions is an indication that beliefs are crucial components of emotions. I have given examples, but have not yet talked in any detail about what types of beliefs these beliefs are. The following passage from William Alston's "Emotion and Feeling" will be helpful in setting the stage for this discussion; Alston's characterization of the beliefs involved in emotion is straightforward, and can form a basis for the development of a thorough-going account:

...let us standardize our terminology for the cognitive factor. Many theorists employ terms like 'judgment', 'appraisal', or 'evaluation'. These can be misleading if they are taken to imply a conscious formulation of a judgment; after all, one can be frightened by something without having time to say to oneself, 'That is dangerous.' On this count, terms like 'apprehension' or 'recognition' are preferable. Perhaps the most judicious choice would be 'perceive x as ...' or 'take x to be...', with the understanding that 'perceive' is being used in a wide sense which is not restricted to sense data, but can involve memory belief, and intellectual realization as well. For a general characterization of what the subject of an emotion takes x to be, we have slipped into the terms 'desirable' and 'undesirable'. These seem preferable to the more traditional contrast of 'good' and 'evil', which today has too narrow a connotation, or such terms as 'beneficial' and 'harmful', which are not sufficiently wide... Since the term 'evaluation' can be used for taking something to be desirable or
undesirable, we shall henceforth refer to this factor as a perceptual evaluation of something, or to be still more concise, simply an evaluation of something.6

It will be helpful to clarify two points in the foregoing, both having to do with terminology.

First, we must be very careful with the formulation "perceive x as desirable or undesirable", since "perceive" here is used, as Alston says, to characterize experiences ranging from having sense-data to remembering. We must be careful because it is important to keep in mind that in fact this "perceiving" can be, in part, the possession and use of a highly complex set of beliefs. We do not want to minimize the role played by thought and evaluation. I suspect that Alston chose "perceive" partly in order to do justice to first-person experience; sometimes, especially with very strong emotions, we do seem for example to see someone's bad intentions towards us in his face, even though he may look quite ordinary to others. It seems to me more useful in talking about this component of emotion to use the term "beliefs" rather than "perception", and I will do so hereafter.

Second, Alston says we need not be conscious of formulating a judgment, since we may not have time for reflection. This is certainly true in cases of, say, fear of an attacking bear. But it is also true that many of these evaluations take place below the level of consciousness even if one has a great deal of time for reflection. Large numbers of our emotions have to do with our personal relationships, and our evaluations of other people as, e.g., possible friends, are often performed at such a deep level that they seem completely intuitive; one is only conscious of an emotional pull, or unusual feeling of interest, associated with rather vague and simple beliefs
concerning, e.g., "attractiveness". It is misleading to suppose that, if only we had enough time, all our evaluations would be conscious.

Finally, a word of caution about "evaluation": there is a temptation, when faced with the word "evaluation", to suppose that whatever evaluation is going on is from a moral or aesthetic standpoint, since these are familiar values. But evaluation can take place from the standpoint of any desire or goal. Thus, when we talk about evaluation, we will be talking about some kind of measuring or appraising in terms of something desired. I will use "evaluation" and "assessment", interchangeably. All this will become clearer below.

**Part 6: Desires: the basis for evaluation**

Emotions occur when something matters to us. If I become angry or hurt when Charles is unkind to me, it is a clear indication that his affection or at least his concern for my feelings is important to me. Depending on who we are, it is of great importance to us that we have creative work, material security, aesthetic experiences, goodwill, physical beauty, a happy and loving family life, and probably a great many other things. That is to say, we care about these things. "Care" here is contrasted to indifference. Our caring about kindness, material security, creative work, etc., can be explained in terms of our having very strong desires for these things. People often express these desires verbally in, for example, explanation of their actions. Furthermore, talking in terms of desires helps us explain emotional response because it introduces, by implication, the notion of satisfaction. We can tell that the thoughts we have about love, material security and creativity are desires and not just speculations, etc., by
noting that they can be satisfied. Richard Wollheim\(^7\) differentiates desires from sensations in the following way, which also applies to differentiating desires from any other kind of mental activity:

In the case of a sensation, there are two possible outcomes. The sensation persists, or it ceases. In the case of a desire, there are three outcomes. The desire persists, it ceases, or it is satisfied. The third possibility is opened up, I claim, by the essential association of a desire with a thought, so that what matches the thought satisfies the desire. This does not mean that, if one desires something, one knows what will satisfy one's desires, for one might not know that associated thought. Indeed, it might be that it is only when the desire is satisfied that one knows what one desired...

Similarly, a man may come to know what he wants to say only when he finds the words for it; which does not mean that he makes do with, or that he merely does not look beyond those words. 'That was what I was looking for all the time' can be used to mark a discovery.\(^8\)

When we actually have love, are engaged in creative activity, have material security, we feel satisfied. It is not just that the thoughts about these things persist or stop, or that we find some way to make them stop. And if we do not have these things, we feel, in various ways, dissatisfied. We feel frustrated or, if we are refused or rejected by others, we feel resentful or angry.

**Part 7: Desires and aesthetic emotions**

One may say: it is all very well to connect the emotions we experience in human relationships with desires, and even the emotions we experience when we suffer career setbacks or successes, but what about aesthetic emotions? Would one want to say that people have a desire or desires for aesthetic experience, and that when aesthetic emotions occur this desire or these desires are being fulfilled? This is a difficult objection to answer just
because there is so much less evidence available here than in the case of the emotions that take place in personal relationships. A great many people, even intelligent and sophisticated people, spend little time on the arts. Nevertheless, there are some suggestive things that can be said.

First, a feeling of enormous gratification and satisfaction is common in connection with aesthetic experiences. For example, sometimes one finds works not only beautiful but somehow illuminating, and feels a kind of clear-headed pleasure together with having various subtle and complex beliefs, and an underlying feeling of great satisfaction. This feeling of satisfaction is so pervasive in aesthetic experience that one is inclined to think that, as in personal relationships, there are desires involved. In fact, I strongly suspect that it is the unfamiliarity of aesthetic experience, and the resultant lack of familiar terminology, such as "anger", "gratitude", etc., that makes the connection between aesthetic emotions and desires appear tenuous. If we do identify the desires via the satisfactions, aesthetic desires are extremely complex, perhaps even more complex than the desires connected with human relationships. In the case of music, for example, there is the satisfaction having to do with formal qualities, satisfactions resulting from expression or representation of emotional states, satisfactions having to do with hearing certain sounds. There are even some who claim to feel satisfied by a musical representation of some view of the world. However, there is no reason that this should not be so, that aesthetic desires should not at least be at least as complex, if not more than desires having to do with human relationships.

There is one special consideration about aesthetic emotions: there is a whole range of emotions that have to do with people's intentions towards us
and how we wish to be treated that will not appear among aesthetic emotions. For example, even if I very much dislike some of Bruckner's works, and find them irritatingly derivative, I am not angry with Bruckner for writing them, and I am not angry with his music since in the ordinary way, I am only angry with human agents about whose intentions towards me and/or whose part I take to be bad. Writing music I dislike does not constitute bad intentions towards me, perhaps no intentions towards me or any one at all. However, again, the fact that aesthetic emotions differ from the emotions involved in personal relationships in that they are, so to speak, one-sided, seems no reason to say that their structure is any different from the emotions involved in personal relationships.

Part 8: Evaluation

Given what I have said about the connection between emotions and desire, we can now begin to see what Alston means when he says:

For a general characterization of what the subject of an emotion takes $x$ to be, we have slipped into the terms 'desirable' and 'undesirable'.

We can also begin to see why he calls this process "evaluation". If having some emotions rather than other is related to the extent to which our desires are fulfilled or fail to be fulfilled, then it seems natural to characterize the belief element as perceiving something or someone as desirable or undesirable. We will in fact seem our relationships to other people or states of affairs in terms of these desires. Furthermore, we can see why Alston might want to use the term "evaluation", since if we have beliefs about the extent to which our desires are fulfilled or unfulfilled, we must arrive at these beliefs by comparing what we have to what we want or, to put
it another way, by measuring what we have in terms of what we want. These wants will, of course, vary from person to person, with respect to how much we want something as opposed to something else. For example, a great many of my desires may fit into the category "desire for affection and friendship", while relatively few of my desires may fit into the category "desire for material security". Some people seem to want aesthetic experiences more than anything, some people want intellectual pursuits, and most of us want some sort of moral order. It doesn't matter which desires are in question. As long as this comparing or measuring is taking place, we have evaluation. We now need to ask exactly what part of this evaluation plays in emotions, and how the beliefs that I have argued are components of emotions are related to evaluation.

There are three main elements in evaluation: (1) my beliefs about the facts - which is actually happening, how someone is behaving, what her/his intentions are (2) which desires of mine apply to the situation, the criteria for their being fulfilled, and my beliefs about what sorts of behavior, intentions, characteristics of works of art, and/or states of affairs in the world count as fulfilling these criteria. It is important to distinguish between my criteria for the fulfilling of my desires and my beliefs about which behavior, intentions, etc., count as fulfilling them, for people may have identical views about the former and widely varying views about the latter. For example, you and I may both have as criteria for fulfilling our desires for good will that other people, particularly our nearest and dearest, treat us with consideration. Yet you may believe that it counts as treating someone with consideration to interrupt her work in order to tell her that there is an opera on television, and I may consider it
terribly inconsiderate and fly into a rage. What we count as considerate, kind, fair, etc., has a great deal to do with our individual psychological histories, our tastes and preferences. Disagreements between people about what fulfills these criteria often cause great damage to relationships, just because each person believes his/her criteria to be conspicuously correct, or even the only reasonable ones. "But I thought you liked opera - I thought you'd be pleased!" "Can't you see I'm working and don't want to be interrupted?" This distinction will turn out to be extremely important when we talk about justification. (3) the product of the evaluation - the belief which I have that is actually part of an occurrent emotion, such as "I am in serious danger", "I consider your behavior insulting", "What a lovely and harmonically interesting passage." This product is the result of the application of my criteria for fulfilling my desires and beliefs about what counts as meeting these criteria, to my beliefs about and interpretations of the facts.

That I list these things in order does not mean that they happen, temporally, in order, though of course the product of the evaluation does, of necessity, occur after the application of the criteria to the beliefs about events. What I want to emphasize is that we already have the desires, with the criteria attached, if we think of these desires as general or dispositional, or, if we think of, e.g., "the desire for goodwill" as a complex of particular desires, the desire is, in connection with events in the world, what activates the whole process. For example suppose I am attending, unwillingly, a departmental lunch, but my mind is really on my work. I manage to make polite conversation during lunch, but I am really thinking of my work all the while. I am listening to what's being said in a
half-hearted way, and I hear one of my colleagues say to me "Why don't you
dress up more for teaching? I can't understand why all women don't wear
dresses to work - it improves the scenery so much." Ordinarily, this sort of
remark fails severely to meet my criteria for what counts as ordinary
goodwill. However, I am so preoccupied with my work that I don't even bother
to answer and in fact I don't even feel particularly insulted simply because,
at the moment, my mind is almost completely elsewhere. My desire for
goodwill isn't very active at the moment, since there's only room in my mind
for a certain amount of activity at any given time. In this sense, the
various desires activate the process by being operative at the time. If I
go to a party with the express intent of meeting eligible men, and the
eligible men whom I consider appropriate candidates treat me in a manner that
fails to meet my standards for what counts as goodwill, then I will probably
be hurt or angry. But if my mind is on my work and I go to the party under
protest, with no interest in men eligible or otherwise, I will probably be
indifferent. If the desire is present, the criteria are also present, and if
not, not. If I am in the process of changing my mind about the criteria, or
am uncertain about my desires, I may have to actually think about whether my
feelings are hurt, but this is fairly unusual. This is, of course, an
oversimplification. Usually more than one desire is active, since life is
complicated and desires are many. I offer these examples for the sake of
making the point that it is the desires that partly determine that the
process takes place, and do not occur after the beliefs about behavior,
intentions, and so on. Furthermore, all this happens very quickly and often
at a semi-conscious level. My evaluations are rarely laborious processes
whose every step I can observe unless I am attempting to retrace my
evaluate steps.

Clearly, not every element of this process is present in an occurrent emotion. Only the last element - the belief that is yielded by the application of of the criteria, is present. We will return to these elements when we discuss justification.

It might be objected here that, in some cases, the beliefs we seem to have when we have emotions are not evaluative at all; they do not seem to have any element that could only have been yielded by some evaluation. For example, suppose someone walks up to me and hits me squarely on the jaw. The belief that I have, insofar as the belief is that thought which I have in my mind, is just "You hit me!", and this does not contain any element of evaluation. However, if we examine the thought carefully, we will see that it is really a kind of shorthand for an extremely complex set of beliefs that might be something like the following: "You hit me and I am outraged at your uncivilized and unpleasant behavior", which is clearly evaluative in the requisite manner.

Another possible exception is emotional experience connected with music. It has been suggested to me that emotional experience connected with music need contain no evaluations and often does not, though of course people who think a great deal about music may apply some later. Perhaps there are two components to musical experience: a basic component, which is constituted by completely non-cognitive feeling responses to music, and an acquired or secondary component, which is constituted by the kinds of emotional responses that occur as a result of cultivation of one's music sense, increase in musical knowledge and appreciation, and so on. On this
view, feeling is a kind of primitive response to music and evaluation may be completely absent.

I cannot refute this view, but I am not sympathetic to it, for several reasons. However, let us first examine the evidence most favorable to this position. Possibly the most persuasive evidence is the phenomenological character of the experience. Musical experience especially is often composed more dominantly of feeling than of belief. Furthermore, music offers quite a different realm of emotional experience than, for example, literature. Though both music and painting offer non-verbal realms of experience, the initial impact of music is more powerful, more pervasive. From Shakespeare to Nabokov writers and thinkers have remarked on the immediate and powerful emotional effects of music. Music does not seem to require the same amount of cognitive activity to have a strong effect as do literature and painting; it seems to work directly on the listener in some way. This prominent feature of musical experience seems to me to provide evidence for speculation that one's response to music is fundamentally a response of feeling, though cognitive factors may later enter in and complicate the experience. Perhaps sounds have a unique affect on human beings, and perhaps certain sounds have certain very definite effects.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that one's emotional responses to music gain complexity and even depth of feeling with the widening of one's understanding of music, both from repetition and from reflection, at least in the case of great music. One grows to love Schubert's great C-Major Symphony in part simply be hearing it often. (Though of course the very opposite may well happen in the case of music that is not of such high quality. Some popular music contains so little in the way of invention that listening to it
once all the way through is barely tolerable.) Presumably this is because one cannot very well hear such a complex work thoroughly at one sitting, and one's awareness of its beauties increases as one notices more and more. Interestingly, one does seem to hear more and more and not just different things each time. One can also increase both the range and intensity of emotional response to music by learning more about it, which also seems to cause one to notice more. In both these elements there is a strong cognitive evaluative element. In the case of hearing a work often, one's responses become more intense and complex because more music is "getting through", we notice more and more about the work cumulatively. In the case of learning more about music, the same sort of thing goes on: more and more "gets through", so that one appreciates not only the sound quality, but the arrangements and patterns of sound. In neither case is it simply a case of appreciating the complexity of pattern or the cleverness of the composer - one literally hears something different if one can hear longer musical phrases and can tell the difference between music with balanced phrasing, subtleties produced through dynamics rather than tampering with tempi, and music that is played, one might say, note by note, with inappropriate rubato. All of these elements require a high degree of cognitive activity both before and during the musical experience. Of course the cognitive activity before and the cognitive activity during will be of a rather different order, since the cognitive activity before is preparation, while the cognitive activity during is part of an emotional experience, with its attendant spontaneity and feeling. Nevertheless cognitive activity does take place, the new emotions do involve evaluations and these emotions are not different in kind from the emotions felt when first encountering a work - they are just as
feeling-laden, just as apparently spontaneous, different only in that there will be more of them and some of them will be considerably more profound. There is no difference in their status as emotions, the latter are not "more intellectual" than the former. And since this is the case, I cannot see any ground for saying, at least any experiential ground, that emotions involved in musical experience do not have cognitive content. In Part 3 of this chapter, I pointed out that emotions that involve a very intense feeling component may seem to be all feeling because the intensity of the feeling is a distraction. But that simply reflects a characteristic of emotions in general - there is considerable variation in the intensity and noticeableness of the various constituents. Furthermore, even if one pictures emotions as being considerably more like being swept off one's feet with feeling than I have sketched here, some beliefs must be present. What must be missing is not all belief of any kind, but only evaluative belief. In order to have an emotion about something, one must first be paying attention to it. If, for example, I have a series of strong emotions about Tristan and Isolde, I must at least notice the music. If I am to have no evaluative beliefs, what I must do is notice the music and then have feeling, but perform no evaluations. I suggest that, even in cases where people think they only notice and do not evaluate, yet have strong feelings, the evaluation slips in through the noticing - if we were to describe our experiences, the description would include evaluative terminology. Consider the following passage from B.H. Haggin's 35 Years of Music:

...we hear music which tells us of the sublimity of human forgiveness - music which, after what has come before, is overwhelming. And it becomes even more overwhelming when it is taken up softly by the others and is carried to a point of super-earthly religious exaltation."
It is extremely difficult for a music listener to describe her/his responses to music without using evaluative language in the description, and I think it is exactly this sort of thing that Alston had in mind in a passage in Part 5 of this chapter, in which he characterizes evaluative beliefs as "perceiving x as ..." or "taking x to be ...". We do experience music as sublime, transcendentally beautiful, uplifting and so on, and all of this is highly evaluative. One reason the presence of evaluation seems particularly likely to me is that, when we are interested enough to recall even the most action packed and unreflective sequence of consciousness, it nearly always turns out to be much more densely packed with both belief and evaluation than we had thought at the time. The other has to do with memory. When we remember extremely intense emotional experiences, we tend to remember the cognitive content much more clearly than the feeling content. I suspect that, were it the case that some emotions lacked evaluations, we would not be able to remember them at all easily, since without cognitive content, the rest is quite difficult to remember. Consider the difficulty one has anyway in remembering literally how something felt - even the most intense and all-encompassing feelings are often forgotten, while the cognitive content remains intact. Many women claim that they forget the pains of childbirth in between the birth of each child, and we often have dreams in which we have acute but strange feelings which we can hardly recall upon awakening, a problem created at least partly by the unfamiliar conceptual schemes involved, which are themselves difficult to remember. Being able to remember a feeling has a great deal to do with being able to remember how things were, how you saw the world at the time. I suspect that, if some emotions contained no evaluative beliefs, we would scarcely be able to remember them
at all and indeed it seems to be true that the stronger the feeling content is and the less evaluative belief dominates, the more difficult emotions are to remember. (It is of course possible to have very strong feelings and very complex cognitive content.) It is interesting to note that often, when people recount some intensely feeling-laden emotional response, saying "I'll never forget that day ...", what they begin by describing is not the remarkable feeling they had, but what else was going on - they give a context, a situation where certain sorts of evaluations ("I'd never seen such a large bear in my life - I thought we were done for ...") are understandable, hence also the feelings that accompanied them.

Thus, I reject the view that musical emotions can lack evaluative content, but, since my arguments are speculative rather than conclusive, since many people seem convinced that this is so, and since there are experiential grounds for taking such a view seriously, I am willing to designate it as a possible (the only) exception to the general theory I outline here.

**Part 9: Picking out evaluative beliefs**

There are a great many beliefs present in the mind at any one time. How can we pick out the one that is a constituent of an occurrent emotion? First of all, as we have seen, the belief must be evaluative. Second, it must occur in concert with feeling and sometimes behavior. If one has a completely justified emotion, in which reality triumphs over wishful thinking, this complex will vary with the presence or absence of the object. If I am very angry with Charles, my anger will increase in his presence and diminish in his absence, unless I am thinking about him in his absence, in
which case it will recur. However, this is not true of unjustified emotions, in which one may have a number of false beliefs that are untouched by realistic considerations. Some of these emotions either have no object, or have an object only tenuously, therefore cannot vary with its absence or presence. In cases like these, they come and go with the presence of certain fantasies.

If one has several evaluative beliefs, one may also be able to pick out the relevant evaluative belief by the extent to which this belief tends to crowd out other beliefs and by the intensity with which one holds to it. The evaluative beliefs that are constituents of occurrent emotions very often draw one's attention again and again, especially in the case of very strong emotions. However, one can only say "very often", because the evaluative beliefs that are constituents of mild emotions - minor annoyances, lukewarm affections, are neither so powerful nor so persistent, so that picking them out is entirely a matter of their being part of a complex that varies with either an object or fantasy.

In cases of extreme emotional confusion, where one strongly suspects that the confusion is due to one's having more than one emotion, there may be two evaluative beliefs competing for one's attention, or it may be difficult to see any evaluative beliefs clearly because of one's confused state. In cases like these, we have the options of simply waiting out our confusion, hoping to be able to see more clearly, or we may ask ourselves questions aimed at connecting our present state with others that occurred in situations similar to the present one, states that we were able to sort out. We can connect the past with the present, and make some good guesses about one's emotional states now. For example, I may remember that the last time I saw
my father's best friend, the one he used to stay out all night drinking with but who also helped send me to university, I felt the same confusion I feel now, upon seeing him again. I had this same sense of warring emotions, and I infer from this, and from the thoughts I am able to notice that I have the same evaluative beliefs now that I did then: I still believe that Edward hurt our family for purely selfish pleasures, that he was indifferent to our suffering, and at the same time, I also still believe that he acted far beyond both the call of duty and what I deserved, considering the way I'd treated him, in paying most of my tuition for university. In short, I am still extremely angry, and still extremely grateful. Of course, none of these methods is foolproof. Connecting the past with the present, both in the way just discussed and in general using cases where evaluative belief and the other constituents that make up an occurrent emotion were extremely clear, where one was in no doubt at all, to illuminate more complex and/or more difficult cases is both a useful and a general practice. But there is no principle of picking out the relevent evaluative beliefs except by specifying a certain causal process, the one already mentioned: the beliefs must be evaluative as a result of a particular sort of evaluative process which is activated by desires. We can specify that they vary with the rest of the constituents of an occurrent emotion, but this is not available to immediate inspection, only over time.

Part 10: Other theories about belief: Bedford and Gordon

Now that we have the foundation of an analysis of the belief component, we are in a position to see the value of other theories of belief which,
while they cannot provide a complete account, nevertheless bring out certain points about the belief component. I have in mind particularly Errol Bedford's views in his paper "Emotion" and Robert Gordon's views in "Emotions and Knowledge". Let us begin with Bedford's views.

Bedford takes the position that, when we use emotion words, we are not reporting feelings. Rather:

...emotion words form part of the vocabulary of appraisal and criticism, and a number of them belong to the more specific language of moral criticism. Normally, the verbs in their first person use imply the speaker's assessment of something, and in their third-person use carry an implication about an assessment by the person they refer to.

...it would be a mistake to imagine that the primary function of these statements is to communicate psychological facts. Their principle functions are judicial not informative, and when they are informative, it is often not merely psychological information that they give.

For Bedford, to say such things as "I envy Schnabel's technique" and "I feel ashamed about it now" is not to say that I have certain feelings, but to praise Schnabel, to admit responsibility, or offer "a plea in mitigation". If I am right about the evaluative process, we can see not that Bedford is right, but how he might have come to have this view, and the extent to which this is a correct view about one aspect of having emotions.

Bedford believes that (1) there is a conceptual tie between the use of emotion words and having certain beliefs - no envy without the belief that someone is good at something, no shame without the belief that one is
responsible and (2) that beliefs incorporate a value judgement (assuming that "admission of responsibility" includes "admission of responsibility that one is to blame", which I think is clear from the context). Furthermore, when we use emotion words, as Bedford puts it, the ordinary "conversational point" of doing so is to communicate these beliefs, rather than to name a feeling.

It is certainly true that sometimes the ordinary conversational point of our using certain emotion words, such as envy, is to communicate a value judgment rather than report a feeling. This is not, however always or even usually the case. It is only the case when value judgments are the subject at issue. One can easily imagine two pianists discussing contemporary North American piano teaching methods versus older European methods and one saying that, while technical virtuosity and austerity are all very well, one nevertheless envies a technique such as Schnabel's which combines passion and virtuosity. Bedford would say, quite correctly, that in such a case it is not one's experiences that are at issue here, but Schnabel's technique and its excellence - the speaker is emphasizing just how good she thinks Schnabel is. However, this remark will only work for emphasizing just how good one thinks Schnabel is if the sentence ordinarily has to do with the state of the speaker. Using Bedford's notion of "ordinary conversational point" the ordinary conversational point of remarks about envy is to communicate something about the state of the one said to be envious; the conversational point of the remark about Schnabel is to communicate something about Schnabel by citing him as the cause of the state the term "envy" ordinarily conveys - Schnabel is so good that one is emotionally affected in a particular way. Since the conversation is about Schnabel and not oneself, one's own state is
offered only as a device for emphasis. And, from the point of view of the evaluative process, this remark works as a way of praising Schnabel as opposed to a simple remark about an emotional state because it emphasizes the criteria one has for counting something as fulfilling one's desires rather than beliefs about whether or not one's desires are fulfilled. In order to feel envy, I must believe that someone else has something I want very much. In order for me to want whatever it is, I must believe that somthing has certain properties - e.g., it must be extremely attractive or admirable of its kind, perhaps a beautifully preserved eighteenth century home or a brilliant piano technique that enables one to play anything from the most difficult Liszt to sardonic Satie with equal skill and plausibility. Since criteria for evaluation of skill are what's in question, it is criteria and not my desire to see them fulfilled that is emphasized.

We can see that Bedford realizes quite clearly that there is an evaluative process. However, his desire to argue against a Humean "unique sensation" view leads him to emphasize evaluation at the expense of the other components. We can view Bedford's position as a useful adjunct to our basic position on evaluation, showing how the presence of the evaluative process enables us to use what is ordinarily language about feelings, beliefs and sometimes behavior to emphasize the criteria for emotional response rather than the response itself.

In his paper "Emotions and Knowledge", Robert Gordon argues that emotions divide into knowledge-requiring and knowledge-precluding emotions. Some emotions, such as embarrassment, delight, resentment and a good many more, require that one know whatever it is that one is embarrassed or delighted about or resentful of; other emotions, such as hope and worry,
preclude knowledge that whatever one hopes for or is worried about will come to be. While it does seem true that some emotions require that the person who has them feels certain about whatever the emotion is about, and others, such as hope and worry, require uncertainty or doubt, we might well ask why knowledge should be required just for having the emotions that require certainty rather than for justifying them. And it is this strong position, that knowledge rather than true belief is required, that Gordon takes:

I want to show in this brief paper that is is often what a person knows, as opposed to what he merely believes, that determines how his emotion is to be described.  

Gordon seems to me to have confused a good point about justification with a good point about beliefs: certain beliefs are required for emotions, their truth for justification of those emotions. A possible source of his difficulty seems to me to lie in his being unclear about the difference between emotions as described by the subject as opposed to emotions as attributed by a third person. Consider the following passage, and contrast it to the passage quoted earlier:

It appears that, unless one knows or believes certain things, one cannot experience certain emotions at all.

This passage occurs at the beginning of the paper, before he has settled firmly on knowledge and not belief as the requirement. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the original claim is that one cannot experience certain emotions without knowledge or belief, while in the preceding passage which occurs near the end of the paper, the issue is the description of emotion, without reference to the describer as first or third person. This small discrepancy, while perhaps not of great significance in itself, does suggest an important difference, from the standpoint of knowledge, in the
positions of first and third person in the attribution of emotions. If I believe that Charles is seeing another woman (as well as evaluating that information in a certain way) I will be extremely jealous. If I discover later that I was wrong, I may cease to be jealous, but I will continue to attribute jealousy to myself at a past time. However, someone describing my state while I am unjustifiably jealous and knowing that in fact my husband Charles is the most faithful of men, may not even think of ascribing jealousy to me. From a third person standpoint, knowledge of the facts plays an important role in what emotions we are willing to ascribe to others, at least insofar as we assume they know the facts. Because of this (among other things), we are wrong about the emotional states of others from time to time. However, this interesting feature of emotion-ascription is quite different from the question of whether, as a haver of emotions, I am willing to ascribe emotions to myself just on the basis of my beliefs, or whether I require knowledge. The unfortunate consequence of the knowledge requirement is that, if I ascribe an emotion to myself and I turn out to be wrong about the relevant facts — if Charles turns out to be a paragon of fidelity, then I was wrong about my own emotional state — even though I believe myself to be neither confused nor self deceived.

Part 11: The concept of an emotion: a summary and some exceptions

Having considered each candidate for inclusion in the concept of emotion separately, let us now review our results and construct a concept.
(a) The summary

We have considered three possible elements for inclusion in the concept of emotion: feeling, behavior, and belief. I have argued that there is no physiological change and its perception that is typical of emotions or unexplained (causally) feeling; that is, we neither define individual emotions in terms of, nor correlate them with, particular patterns of physiological change and the perception of the patterns. However, we must not exclude feeling from the concept of emotion altogether. The Schachter-Singer study shows that though there are no distinctive feeling patterns for each emotion nevertheless the participants in the study were reluctant to call their state an emotion unless they experienced some feeling especially physiological disturbance, and James can be taken as arguing in favour of such a view. Thus we will include feelings in our concept of emotion; their presence will distinguish emotions from other kinds of mental activity.

I have also argued that, though we can say that some behavior or manner of behavior is typical of some emotions, some people having some emotions, perhaps even many people and/or many emotions, we cannot say that there is some behavior pattern, bit of behavior, or manner of behavior that is typical of every emotion. In general, given the appropriate explanation, any behavior can be seen to be connected with any emotion.

Finally, we have seen that beliefs distinguish emotions from sensations and individual emotions. Beliefs are the backbone of emotions, providing us with a basis of distinguishing among even emotions that have no names, and giving whatever behavior may be associated with emotion a context; this will become clearer when we examine the emotion-object relationship.
Limiting our concept to occurrent emotions, we can now say the following: an emotion is an occurrent state that includes feeling, some behavior, and beliefs. The presence of feeling distinguishes emotions from other kinds of mental activities, the presence of beliefs distinguishes emotions from sensations, and the character of these beliefs individuates emotions. When all of these elements are present in a certain causal relation, we have a paradigm case of an occurrent emotion. This causal relation will be discussed in Part 10.

(b) The exceptions and some theoretical considerations

The question of what to say about emotions that lack a constituent is an important one not just from the standpoint of theoretical classification, but also from the standpoint of dealing with an important feature of emotions: they involve constituents that have an existence independent of their occurrence in emotions. Behavior, evaluative beliefs and feelings all exist whether or not they occur in an emotion. They are in no way mutually dependent. Thus, if one of the constituents is missing, we must explain how we can justify saying that what we have is an incomplete emotion rather than a randomly collected pair of constituents. Of course, as I will argue, one way to know how constituents are bound together is to explain their causal connection. Unhappily, while this is a useful idea theoretically, it isn't much help from the standpoint of the person who actually has the emotion. It is a very rare thing to experience in oneself the causal sequences involved in emotions sufficiently slowly to observe all the causal links being made. Yet, without knowing with any certainty the causal links involved, we do often identify ourselves as being in emotional states, or at least as
provisionally being in emotional states, when a constituent is missing. How do we go about doing this? Let us first examine the import of each missing constituent.

We have already argued that it is not now possible to say that some particular bit or bits of behavior are constituents of each occurrent emotion. However, I have also argued that there are a number of different sorts of possible behavior that might be constituents of emotions, and taking them all together, we will tentatively say that various kinds of behavior very often are constituents of occurrent emotions. My reluctance to say more is dictated not by cowardice, but by relative ignorance, which seems to be general. I suspect that one day it will be possible to explain a great deal more about the connections of various sorts of behavior with the other constituents of emotion, but it is not now possible. We really don't know what the significance of missing bits of behavior is because we don't yet know enough about how behavior comes about in any case. Of course, we know enough at least about constant conjunction to know that if someone is doing something ordinarily associated with quite a different emotion than one she claims to have, we are entitled to doubt. If Jane claims to feel great grief at her husband's death, yet she spends her days shopping for new clothes, spending his money and sparkling with charming laughter at the jokes of handsome young men, one might well wonder if Jane is being entirely frank. But while we might be willing to grant that the behavior connected with the emotion cannot always be clearly identified, and we may be fairly lenient about what criteria we apply here, such is not the case either with feeling or with evaluative belief. Both feeling and evaluative belief are crucial characteristics of emotion, and if either is missing serious doubt is cast.
It appears to be the case that we are more likely to provisionally identify our incomplete states as emotions the more familiar the situation is to us, and the better we know ourselves and others. In general, people have quite individual ways of preventing themselves from feeling emotions they would prefer not to feel. For some people, feeling is inhibited and they find themselves behaving oddly and evaluating the situation in a certain way, but having "no feelings", a description that in itself is a signal that something is hidden, since we all have feelings of various sorts constantly. Suppose, for example, I have a meeting with my estranged husband to talk to him about dividing up our mutual possessions. He, who has always claimed to be a non-materialist, complained about our standard of living and generally made supercilious remarks about my expensive tastes, has developed a passion for possessions. In particular, he wants the most expensive pieces of furniture and, the last straw, our books. Since I know he doesn't open a book from one year to the next, I strongly (and correctly) suspect that he thinks a booklined living room with beautiful and conspicuously expensive furniture would give him a good start on impressing and seducing as many young women as possible, his proneness to which was one of the causes of our impending divorce. Since I both read constantly and am quite fond of our books, this strikes me as really iniquitous on his part. However, when I come home, I am not aware of any particular feelings, except perhaps a feeling of tension, but only a tendency to slam down objects and think about what a thorough-going rascal Charles really is. Knowing myself as I do, it doesn't take long for me to realize that I am stifling some very intense feeling, and the minute I admit that to myself, and stop holding my breath, I become, paradigmatically, absolutely furious. The same sort of thing holds
with missing beliefs. Given the same example, I might return with feelings of general upset and restlessness, clenched teeth, and acid stomach and a tendency to be very critical of everyone who has the misfortune to come into contact with me. When asked if my meeting with Charles went badly, I reply that I wasn't even thinking about Charles, but about the Russians in Afghanistan. Again, if I know myself well, I will soon begin to be suspicious, consciously admit to myself my evaluations of Charles' behavior and become, paradigmatically, absolutely furious. My ability to do this in both these cases is based on a great deal of self-knowledge, familiarity with my own emotional patterns and, of course, a willingness to ask myself certain kinds of questions - I do, after all, want to know. Presumably I want to know because it has proved to be more illuminating in the past to assume that what I have is an incomplete emotion of some kind rather than some bits of behavior and feeling or belief that are completely unconnected. However, if this were the first time either of these states had occurred, the process of getting myself to the point where all the constituents are present might take longer. It might simply not occur to me that I am in some sort of potentially emotional state.

It is in this sort of case that it seems most useful to speak of oneself as being in an emotional state, because to do so one can assume a connectedness between or among the various states in which one finds oneself. In addition, one can realistically expect oneself to have, momentarily, a paradigmatic occurrent emotion. We might want to call these sorts of incomplete emotions provisional or potential emotions if we wish to be precise.
The same sorts of considerations do not apply to what are sometimes
called "unconscious" emotions, cases in which two of the elements are present
but the third, much expected, refuses to appear. Often, we are willing to
say that we are in some emotional state because we believe ourselves to
understand why the missing element doesn't make its appearance, perhaps we
are frightened by the idea of certain experiences, perhaps the emotion
involves some beliefs about things we'd just as soon not think about, very
likely we are reluctant to experience certain kinds of pain. This sort of
use seems to me to mark the other side of a borderline - there is no firm
belief here that the missing element will soon manifest itself, perhaps even
good reason to suppose that, even if it should, it will not be in the near
future. We might wish to speak of ourselves as being in emotional states to
emphasize the importance of getting to the bottom of the missing element, or
again, in order to give the experience a familiar kind of organization,
rather than its being seen as a random collection of behavior, feelings or
belief. We could specify this use as legitimate for the latter purpose,
especially, e.g., in therapeutic contexts where it is important to emphasize
the presence of emotional response, while at the same time making clear that
we are not dealing with paradigm cases of occurrent emotion.

Finally, there is the case of music, where it is possible to argue that
the emotions that are responses to music lack, in their most basic form, an
evaluative belief. This is not a case of a missing element which will soon
be supplied. On this view, musical emotions need not have any evaluative
belief - there is something special about music that makes this constituent
of emotion unnecessary. Here, we would simply have to make an exception for
music in a way that we have not in other cases where constituents are missing but expected.

This brings us to the question of what type of theory this is. There are two obvious possibilities: an essentialist theory, where every element must be present, and a family resemblance theory where every element need not be present in every case. It is tempting to classify my view as an essentialist one, yet I am willing to make exceptions for incomplete emotions and, somewhat reluctantly, for the emotions involved in musical experiences. On the other hand, it is not possible to classify this view as a family resemblance theory. One of the major stumbling blocks to doing so is the fact that each of the constituents of occurrent emotions has independent status outside its occurrence in emotions. It is the presence of all the elements that creates a certainty that it is an emotion we are experiencing, not just a value judgment, behavioral inclination or intestinal upset. William Alston has argued that a theory of emotion must be a family resemblance theory, since all the elements are not present all the time. However, this characterization of family resemblance theory is not the usual one: he argues that emotions with one constituent missing are not clear cases of emotion, and that what we need is a theory that can admit both paradigm cases and cases that deviate to a certain extent from the paradigm:

Thus the full range of cases exhibits what Wittgenstein calls 'family resemblences'. There is a list of typical features, such that some are present in all cases, no one feature is present in all cases, and the paradigm cases exhibit all the features.  

There seem to me to be two difficulties with Alston's position. First, assuming that it is Wittgenstein's notion of what constitutes family
resemblance that is at work here, Alston's picture does not seem exactly like Wittgenstein's. Consider the following passages from Philosophical Investigations. ¹⁹

Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to each other in many different ways. ²⁰

For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. ²¹

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'; build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc., overlap and criss-cross the same way. ²²

Wittgenstein does not deny that, given some concept (in the above examples, the concept of a game) there may be cases that have all the features of the concept, but he clearly believes this to be neither typical nor necessary. The point of having a family resemblance theory rather than an essentialist theory is at least partly to be able to include some otherwise incomplete examples as full-blooded instances of the concept in question rather than borderline cases based on a paradigm. Some cases of family resemblance will of course have fewer of the features of the concept than others. But, given characteristics ABCD as the constituents of a concept, it is equally legitimate for some instance to have ABC, BC, ACD, AD, etc. - each of these instances counts just as fully as being a case of that concept as the others. Alston's characterization is much more like an essentialist view which allows the odd borderline case.

Second, though I do believe that some potential emotions ought to be counted as emotions, I believe this should be the case not just because the instance closely resembles the paradigm but also because the explanation that
it implicitly provides enables one to make sense out of otherwise randomly occurring elements, and because they will, any minute, presumably become full-blooded occurrent emotions. Thus my view seems not to fit comfortably into either the essentialist or family resemblance picture. On the one hand, while I am unwilling to call borderline cases emotions except in cases where that counts as an illuminating explanation and principle of organization, which seems to exclude family resemblance theory, the fact that I am willing to make an exception of music, and in fact that I am willing to make the special exceptions I make because of explanatory value would seem to exclude essentialist theory.

Part 12: The causal story: limitations and speculations

To say that the elements of the concept of an emotion occur in concert is not enough; one wants to know how they are connected. Ideally, from the standpoint of neatness and thoroughness, one would like to say that the elements of an occurrent emotion are tied together by having a common causal genesis; beliefs and desires in the evaluative process cause the final individuating belief or beliefs, these beliefs cause, in a complex way, some voluntary and involuntary behaviors, and all of these occurrences cause physiological change which itself causes, again in a complex way, feeling. Though the account of how beliefs and desires connect causally with behavior is indeed complex and clearly there are things that must be said here about the problematic connection between mind and body, we can still talk, with D. Davidson, about reasons for action. The account of the connection between physiological change and feeling presents no principled difficulty; we can talk about the connection between the various nervous systems and certain
kinds of experiences, and point out that feelings for which we now have no causal explanations are physiological. The real difficulties arise when one claims that beliefs cause physiological change; one can say nothing here about reasons for action, and an explanation utilizing entirely physiological components is not open to us. If we say that beliefs cause physiological change, we covertly endorse the view that the mind/body relationship is causal, without acknowledging the speculative nature of this claim. I do acknowledge the speculative nature of the claim.

We must also ask ourselves about the importance of the inner causal chain's having a certain order. As sketched above, my view is that belief comes first. However, there are some cases, for example the cases cited by the Schachter-Singer study, where people first have feelings then adopt cognitive content which seems consistent with the feeling, or which they find satisfactory in some way. Schachter and Singer's work makes the point that, in the absence of some explanation, we eagerly seek to fill in what we perceive as a gap, indicating that these sensations generally come with either a physiological explanation or some sort of cognitive component. If we call the result of this search an emotion this means that there is no single principle of connection among the constituents of an emotion. In addition, there are cases such as music where there is an argument to be made in favor of feeling as the first element. The difficulty in producing some sort of rule lies in the already-acknowledged speculative nature of any causal claim here. The most straightforward solution seems to me to call states that have all the elements present, and in which the elements vary systematically, emotions. Curiously, even emotions such as the Schachter-Singer sort are likely to vary systematically, since the evaluative belief
arrived at through desire for an explanation for a mysterious feeling will probably fade when the feeling fades. We can note the differences among these emotions by talking about justification and difficulties about object-taking. Both the Schachter-Singer sort of emotion and music will raise problems when we speak of justification since, even if one's emotions are justified in the Schachter-Singer study, it will be by accident, and, in the case of music, one cannot speak of the justifiability of feelings. Both these questions will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 6.

Part 13: Two categories of emotion and some exceptions

Let us return briefly to Alston's picture of the results of evaluation, and the question of whether his categories are exhaustive.

For a general characterization of what the subject of an emotion takes x to be, we have slipped into the terms 'desirable' and 'undesirable'. These seem preferable to the more traditional contrast of 'good' and 'evil', which today has too narrow a connotation, or such terms as 'beneficial' and 'harmful', which are not sufficiently wide. This way of characterizing emotion makes the assumption that emotions can be divided without strain into two categories. We ought at least to ask whether this is so.

At first glance, the two-value view seems to be the right one, particularly as we have emphasized how emotions are connected with the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of various desires. Certainly the emotions that are the most often involved in human relationships lend themselves to this sort of "pro-con" categorization. But there are emotions that do not fit so easily into these categories. They are the emotions astonishment, surprise,
amazement, and, in a different way from the foregoing three, awe. Let us look at the definitions of these emotions in the Oxford English Dictionary:

Astonishment. 4. Mental disturbance or excitement due to the sudden presentation of anything unlooked for or unaccountable; wonder temporarily overpowering the mind; amazement.

Amazement. 4. Overwhelming wonder, whether due to mere surprise or to admiration.

Wonder. II.7. The emotion excited by the perception of something novel and unexpected, or inexplicable; astonishment mingled with perplexity or bewildered curiosity. Also, the state of mind in which this emotion exists.

Surprise. 4. The feeling or emotion excited by something unexpected, or for which one is unprepared. B. The feeling or mental state, akin to astonishment and wonder, caused by an unexpected occurrence or circumstance.

Awe. 2. Dread mixed with veneration, reverential or respectful fear; the attitude of a mind subdued to profound reverence in the presence of supreme authority, moral greatness or sublimity, or mysterious sacredness.

Astonishment, wonder and surprise are defined conjointly in terms of their causes, the presentation of something unexpected or unexplainable, and the state of the individual - i.e., unpreparedness. Amazement is defined in terms of wonder, and of being surprised, which will also be explained in terms of its cause, the presentation of something unexpected or unexplainable. "Awe" is defined in terms of both emotions and causes. In awe, we have a mixture of "pro" and "con" emotions, dread and reverence, and of definition in terms of causes, the presence of some sort of greatness or authority, either sacred or secular. Assuming that I am right in saying that the beliefs that are present in emotions are yielded by an evaluation, we could see astonishment, wonder, surprise and amazement as the emotional
responses present when one struggles to perform an evaluation and cannot because of an inability to decide what the state of affairs is that one is attempting to evaluate, or as a result of not having enough categories with which to assess something. In the former sort of case, the evaluative process is blocked from the very beginning, and one simply feels disoriented. One doesn't know how to begin to evaluate a situation that one cannot take in because one is too startled or confused. In the latter sort of case, one has no difficulties with the facts but doesn't know what to make of them because they are so far outside one's range of experiences. For example, imagine someone who has led a very sheltered, conventional life walking into a party where there is a psychedelic light show taking place. Everyone is extremely high on drugs and behaving very peculiarly from the standpoint of someone who has spent her life going to church picnics and tea parties. Such a person simply would not know what to make of all this. It is not that she doesn't know what events are taking place, that the people present are taking drugs, that a rock band is playing unusually loud music. All of this is perfectly clear to her. But she doesn't know whether the situation is desirable or undesirable because she has only a few categories of what counts as desirable, such as "doing my duty", "helping others", "behaving like a lady", etc., and what is going on in the new situation doesn't fit easily into any of these categories. She just doesn't know either whether she desires something like this, or even what "this" is. This state may soon yield to the view that the situation is desirable or undesirable, but all occurrent emotions are transient states. There is an evaluative belief present, for example, "Something very peculiar is going on here."
Awe is interesting in a different way, in that it seems to include both pro and con emotions. This in itself is not particularly surprising; we often have emotional conflicts in which we seem to be having both pro and con emotions simultaneously, though in fact what we have are alternating emotions pulling us this way and that. What is interesting about awe is that it is individuated by the conjunction of two beliefs, one pro and one con: veneration and dread. Without this conjunction, one would not have awe, but veneration or dread. One is not quite sure what to say here, except that, again, there is the element of the unknown, as in "mysterious sacredness", but the emotion itself involves the beliefs that something is extremely worthwhile and at the same time dangerous. The fear may be present because the degree of worthiness is so great that one might reasonably fear its power.

With these exceptions, the two-value view seems to be the right one.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3


2. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Alston, p. 481.


8. Ibid., p. 19.


15. Ibid., p. 94.


17. Ibid., p. 408.


20. Ibid., p. 31e.
21. Ibid., p. 313.

22. Ibid., p. 32e.


25. Ibid., s.v. "Amazement".

26. Ibid., s.v. "Wonder".

27. Ibid., s.v. "Surprise".

28. Ibid., s.v. "Awe".
CHAPTER 4

EMOTION AND OBJECT

There are two major accounts of the emotion-object relationship: Anthony Kenny's in *Action, Emotion and Will* and J.R.S. Wilson's *Emotion and Object*. Starting from the notion of an object as derived from the notion of a transitive verb, Kenny characterizes objects as intentional, and as conceptually connected to emotions. Further, Kenny introduces the notion of a formal object, which is constituted by a set of criteria for identifying what can count as an object of a particular emotion, e.g., it is part of the concept of fear that the object of fear be seen as dangerous. For Kenny, that emotions have objects and causes where sensations need not have objects, but do have causes, allows to distinguish between emotions and sensations. We can test for the presence of objects by applying the following test for cognitive contents: if I claim to be x because p, and in order to be x because p I must know or believe that p, my condition has an object and hence is an emotion. If not, I am having a sensation. Objects cannot be causes, since they are non-contingently connected to emotions, and causality is a contingent connection.

Wilson, on the other hand, is largely concerned with the causal question, and with the relationship between emotion and object as a relationship between a complex occurrent state of mind and something in the world. Wilson does not deny that there is a conceptual connection between an emotion and a certain belief, but he does not believe that we locate the object just by means of cognitive factors. Rather, he believes that cognitive factors and causal factors conjointly determine objects. The
following two passages from *Emotion and Object* briefly summarize Wilson's position:

Those cases in which an emotion has an object are just those cases in which someone's concern with an item in the world takes the form of feeling an emotion towards it as object...

... if his present state is a response or reaction to a particular happening, he must be in that state at least partly because he observed or learnt of that happening. The 'because', I would claim, is a causal 'because.'

Both of these characterizations are rough, and both views will be discussed again in Chapters 5 and 6. However, we have enough material that see that Kenny and Wilson have serious differences of opinion about the causal relationship between emotion and object. I think these two views can eventually be made harmonious, but before any attempts at recasting are made, let us note that they emphasize different aspects of emotional experience, and use the notion of an object to do so.

There are two main features of emotional experience that can be brought out by introducing the notion of an object. First of all, there is the fact that emotions have cognitive content: they contain thoughts and beliefs about events and persons. Furthermore, they contain certain kinds of beliefs about events and persons. It is this aspect of emotional experience that is emphasized by Kenny's notion of what constitutes an object. For Kenny, it is the presence of cognitive content that enables us to locate an object and hence to locate an emotion, and the formal objects sets the standard for what can count as an object. Second, there is the fact that emotions are responses. They do not occur arbitrarily or in a vacuum, but partly as a result of the awareness of certain happenings in the world. Attention to this feature of emotional experience emphasizes the connectedness of emotions
and the world and concentrates on explicating that connectedness. This in turn can give rise to a causal view of objects, as it does in Wilson's case.

Is there some prima facie reason, unconnected with the internal consistency of each, to prefer one approach to the other as an account of what it is to be an object? There seem to me to be two reasons for preferring Wilson's sort of approach to Kenny's. First, insofar as "object" has a consistent use, it is most often used to designate something in the world. There is also, however, a theoretical reason. If we take Kenny's position, that objects are intentional, we will still have to offer an account of the connection of emotions to the world. The responsive character of emotions is so conspicuous that any account that neglected it, that neglected to talk about the connection between goings-on in the world and occurrent emotions, would be seriously flawed. And how will we introduce these considerations? What language do we have in which to discuss them? I suggest that object-language is the most plausible language to use. Furthermore, it is possible to describe Kenny's position and the point he wishes to make without even mentioning the world "object"; as we shall see, he may well be better off without it. If Kenny's position can be re-described (with some necessary modifications) without bringing in the notion of an object, this notion is available for an analysis of the connection between emotions and the world. (At this point, this modified version of Kenny's view is merely a promissory note, but it is one that will be redeemed in Chapter 5.)

I want now to introduce the notion of an object as something in the world. This seems to me to be the common-sense notion of an object. In order to bring out two features of objects which seem to me to be central, I
want to adopt two definitions from the Oxford English Dictionary, which I believe capture both aspects very well.

Object. 3b. Something which on being seen excites a particular emotion, as admiration, horror, disdain, commiseration, amusement. (4) That to which action, thought, or feeling is directed.

As we can see, each of these definitions emphasizes a different aspect of the relationship between emotion and object where the object is something in the world. The first definition emphasizes the status of the object as efficient cause of the emotion. The second emphasizes the role of object as that which an emotion is about: it is concerned with the connection between the world and the contentfulness of emotions, which are in this sense capable of being directed at something. Ideally, the concept of an object that we eventually adopt will include all these features. In order to have a thorough look at which elements of an emotion could take an object, it will be both illuminating and useful to conjoin each component of the concept of emotion with both definitions from the OED. The first definition will hereafter be called the causal definition, while the second will be called the target definition.

Part 1: Which component takes the object?

The following possibilities will be considered:

1. x is the object of change in physiological state.
2. x is the object of feeling.
3. x is the object of voluntary behavior.
4. x is the object of belief.
For the sake of thoroughness, (1) and (2) will be considered separately, though the two together constitute the "feeling" component of the concept of emotion, felt physiological change.

(1) "x is the object of change in physiological state." The OED definition that seems most promising here is the causal definition. I have argued that physiological change does take place in occurrent emotions, and, if this is so, then whatever causes occurrent emotions will be causally connected in some way to physiological state. But the difficulty is that we do not know just what does cause change in physiological state, though, as I have said, we may strongly suspect that beliefs can do so. If we did, we would be able to say more precisely just how change in physiological state fits into the concept of occurrent emotions.

The target definition will not do here, because there is no sense in which a change in physiological state could be directed at anything. The target definition seems to be using "directed" in an essentially relational sense, where there are two relata, one directed towards the other. Had the definition allowed the interpretation "directed towards a goal" in the sense of achieving some state or end, we might be able to say that from a biological standpoint, the body directs physiological change at preparing the body for action or something of that kind. But this preparation is directed towards bringing some state of affairs into being, rather than being directed at something other than itself that already exists.

(2) "x is the object of feeling." Here the causal definition seems the most likely candidate: "x is that which excites feelings", where "excites" means "causes". On the view I have presented, what causes feelings
is physiological change. Thus physiological change is the object of feeling.

The target definition would not do because there seems to be no sense in which a feeling could be directed towards anything.

(3) "x is the object of behavior". In this case, both the causal definition and the target definition could be appropriate. Using the causal definition, we will say "x is that which on being seen excites behavior: where, again, "excites" means "causes". What causes behavior upon being seen is some event or state of affairs in the world. If I run upon seeing a bear, the bear is what I have seen or noticed that causes my behavior.

Using the target definition, we will say "x is that to which voluntary behavior is directed." This sounds promising, but we need to be careful here about what exactly is meant by "directed". When we speak of behavior being directed, it is tempting, since behavior is physical activity, to think of behavior as being "pointed" somehow in a physical direction. Thus, if I shake my fist at Charles, my behavior is directed towards Charles since my fist is pointed towards him. But suppose, though it is Charles with whom I am angry, I shake my fist at his mother, since I know it will annoy him no end if I frighten her, and I wish to annoy him to no end. If we take "directed" to mean "physically directed" we will then have to say that Charles' mother, who is largely irrelevant to my disagreement with Charles, is the object of my behavior, since it is physically directed at her.

Further, there is an obvious sense in which my behavior is directed not at Charles' mother, but at Charles. It is Charles with whom I am angry, Charles whom I wish to annoy, and this suggests a notion of "directed" that has nothing to do with physical direction. Rather, it has to do with my beliefs.
The beliefs that are connected with my anger are about Charles - his insulting behavior, his inviting his mother over for dinner on our anniversary. In this sense, my behavior is directed only insofar as my beliefs are directed.

Now let us move on to the sort of voluntary behavior that has been characterized as "manners of behavior" rather than behavior in the sense of specific actions. Will the notion of the object of behavior change using this concept of voluntary behavior? I think not. Using the causal definition, the same arguments apply here that were appropriate to particular bits of voluntary behavior. Using the target definition, if we make the mistake of thinking of "directed" as "physically directed", we will have the same difficulties. Charles and I have had an argument and, instead of shaking my fist at him, I pretend there's nothing wrong and begin to set the table for dinner. However, instead of gently placing the plates on the table as is my habit, I slam them down as hard as I can without breaking them. If we think of "directed" as physical direction, we would have to conclude that the table is the object of my behavior. But, insofar as I have anything in mind, it is Charles. Perhaps I want to frighten him, make him uncomfortable, let him know that the argument isn't over yet. If this is so, then it is my beliefs that are directed and that give my behavior whatever direction it has. Or I may have no intentions that include Charles' becoming aware of my feelings. I may simply be so angry with him that I have to do something, so I slam plates. Again, insofar as my beliefs are directed towards anything, they are directed towards Charles, for it is Charles with whom I am angry.

(4) "X is the object of belief". Here both the causal definition and the target definition can be used. Let us begin with the causal definition.
I am angry with Charles, and I have the belief "I consider that remark insulting" or "You insulted me". What is the cause of my belief? It seems to me that a perfectly straightforward sense of "cause" here is "reason for". What is my reason for having such a belief? There are two senses in which I may have reasons for my belief: (a) I have certain evidence for my belief, and (b) I have a particular set of standards according to which certain remarks count as insulting. Using (a), we could clarify the request for reasons by saying "Why do you believe that happened rather than something else?" Using (b), we could clarify the request for reasons by saying "Why does that count as an insult rather than a compliment or a demand for information?" The former request for clarification has to do with getting clear about what events took place, and the other has to do with justifying evaluation of the facts given a particular set of standards. If I am asked for reasons for my belief in the sense of getting clear about events, the reason for my belief and thus the cause is the relevant event or events. Given my knowledge of the language, I believe that Charles made the remark he did because I heard him utter a sentence or series of sentences. If I am asked for the reasons for my belief in the sense of justifying my evaluation of Charles' remark, I will say that the reason for my belief is that I consider remarks of that kind insulting because they cast aspersions on my intelligence, sex, good looks, cooking or whatever, and my standards for insult include casting aspersions on these things. Or, if the question is posed with an eye to finding out why I find that particular remark insulting rather than totally inoffensive, I may reply that Charles knows that I am particularly sensitive on the topics of my intelligence, sex, good looks, cooking, etc., and though it may seem to be an inoffensive remark it is really by my standards an
especially nasty insult. Thus, using the causal definition, the object of my beliefs is either events or a particular set of standards.

Using the target definition, the object of my belief is that towards which it is directed. The most natural sense of "directed" here is "about". A belief is directed towards that event or state of affairs that it is about. That this is the most plausible interpretation is reinforced by the reminder that, in the target definition, an object is defined not only as that towards which a thought or feeling is directed, but also "the thing (or person) to which something is done, or upon or about which something operates". Insofar as it involves mental activity that upon or about which a belief operates, at least a conscious belief, can only be whatever it is about in the world. If I believe that Charles insulted me, my belief is an activity that revolves around Charles.

**Part 2: The winner**

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that there is only one real candidate for object taking: belief. If we are to have a notion of object that takes into account both definitions only beliefs will do because, while the causal definition will fit with all the components, the target definition will not. We have seen that, though it may appear to be the case that behavior can be directed, such an appearance is misleading. Behavior is only directed insofar as the beliefs that accompany it are directed. Nor can physiological change or feelings be said to be directed. Only the belief that is yielded by the evaluation process and which individuates emotions can be said to be directed. An object is what this belief is about, and is its efficient cause. However, we are not yet ready to give a full account of the
emotion-object relationship. To see just how objects cause beliefs, and the extent to which beliefs, in order to take objects, must be about them, we must first look at the problem of the justification of emotion.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

2. Ibid., p. 77.
CHAPTER 5
JUSTIFICATION

The question of whether and how emotions can be said to justified is a substantial one, and I will not attempt to treat every aspect of it. Rather, I will discuss only the parts of the question that will have a bearing on the emotion-object relationship. Let us begin by looking at just what we mean when we say an emotion is justified.

Part 1: The justified element of emotion

Given our consideration of emotions so far, we can see that only one element of emotions is a likely candidate for justification, and that element is belief. The following two definitions, selected from those appearing under "justification" in the Oxford English Dictionary will be useful here:

Justify. 3. To show (a person or action) to be just or in the right. 6. To show or maintain the justice or reasonableness of (action, claim, etc.); to adduce adequate grounds for; to define as right or proper.¹

Thus if I attempt to justify my emotions, I attempt to show that they are not wrong, mistaken or unreasonable or that they do not lack adequate grounds. But what is it about emotions that could be said to be justified in these senses?

We have seen that emotions are complex, composed of perception of physiological change, other less explicable feelings, behavior, and beliefs. It makes no sense to speak of justifying a physiological change, unless we mean by justify "show the purpose of", which does not fit the definitions offered above. Certainly it makes no sense to speak of justifying the perception of physiological change or other feelings unless there is a
question of something more than perception, e.g., one is accused of giving
too much attention to pleasant feelings on the grounds that to do so is
sinful. And when we speak of perception of physiological change or other
feelings, we are speaking just of awareness of feeling, not length or
intensity of attention. Various behaviors seem promising at first, but, as
we have seen, they are not a consistent component of emotions and, even if
they were, they seem entirely separable. We have no difficulty with the
question of whether my anger need be expressed in particular ways, e.g., I
might be entirely justified in being very angry with someone for making a
rude sexist remark, but entirely unjustified in physically attacking such a
person. The absence of justification for my behavior does not affect the
justifiability of my emotion. This strongly suggests that behavior cannot be
the element whose justification is in question when we seek to justify
emotions. This same objection holds even for manners of behavior. You might
be justifiably delighted to see me, but unjustified in ending every gesture
with a jolly flourish, since your doing so is frightening the baby. As was
the case with object-taking, we are left with beliefs.

Since beliefs are the individuators of particular emotions, it is easy
to see why their being justified or not is of great importance: when we have
a change of these individuating beliefs, we have a different emotion.
Furthermore, beliefs are the sorts of things for which one can have reasons,
that one can support by citing facts, theories, principles, etc. Finally we
have seen that insofar as emotions have objects, they are objects of belief,
and that the belief or beliefs are the product of an evaluative process.
Thus, since problems connected with justification are problems with beliefs,
and problems with beliefs can generate problems with object-taking we must
Part 2: Justification of emotions

Strategically, it will be easiest to talk about justification if we approach it from the point of view of unjustified emotions. There are a good many things that can go wrong with emotions and, as we shall see, they occur in different places in the evaluative process. Tracing these mistakes to their origins can help to locate and demonstrate different senses of justification. In order to do this, we must discuss the justification of desires as well as beliefs. Strictly speaking, desires are not part of emotions but one of the conditions under which they occur. However, in order to consider the evaluative process thoroughly, we must take them into consideration.

In my discussion of evaluation, I have said that evaluation has three elements: (1) beliefs about what is the case, (2) desires, and criteria for having those desires fulfilled, which will involve beliefs and (3) the belief that is yielded by the evaluation of (1) in terms of (2). My discussion of justification will begin with an examination of what can go wrong in each state, and I will take the stages in order.

(1) Beliefs about the facts. One of the things that can go wrong with emotions that is the simplest to locate is a mistake about the facts. My mistakes about the facts can be of two kinds: a mistake about events or a mistake in my interpretation of events, where "interpretation" covers beliefs about someone's intentions, beliefs about the significance of various facial
expressions, bodily positions, tones of voice, etc. Let us look at these two possibilities.

(a) Mistakes about the facts. Sometimes I am just wrong about what is actually happening. For example, I may have misheard someone or been misinformed in some other way. Or I may connect beliefs about the facts that are, by themselves, quite legitimate in such a way as to produce a mistaken result. For example, suppose I am camping in the woods. I am very nervous about bears, and am listening carefully to all the sounds I hear. Suddenly, I hear a great rustling and bumping, and I immediately assume that a bear is coming through the woods. I am terrified - I believe that I am in danger from a bear; I cower in my tent all night. However, when I wake up in the morning, I discover that a dead tree has fallen down in the night, which accounts for the rustling and bumpings, and there is no sign of a bear. I have made an existential mistake, as the result of an unwarranted inference, from rustlings and bumpings to the presence of a bear.

(b) Mistakes about interpretation. Suppose I am having a discussion with someone about world politics. Just as I am explaining my view on the significance of recent developments in the Middle East, the person to whom I am speaking curls his lip in a way that I interpret as a sneer. I believe that I have been insulted, since I believe that his sneer was directed at my view. I become angry. However, it turns out that this person has a nervous tic. What I thought was a sneer was really just an involuntary muscle contraction; my anger is unjustified. This is a mistake about someone's intentions; I have not made a mistake about the movement of the man's lip - it really did curl. What I am mistaken about is what he meant by that.
Usually, when someone curls his lip in a particular way, he intends that I take it as an insult. Very often, beliefs about someone's intentions can play an important role in emotions. For example, when a child gives his mother a valentine, even though the valentine itself is not particularly attractive, the mother is often deeply touched, because she realizes that the child's intention was to do something he thought would please her.*

I can also make a mistake about someone's attitude toward me because our criteria differ, and I mistakenly assume that that sort of behavior means that the person in question dislikes me, has no respect for my views, etc.

(2) Desires and the criteria for their being fulfilled. Let us first consider the desires themselves.

(a) Desires. As I have argued earlier, emotions are responses to the events in the world based on the extent to which these events count as fulfilling one's desires. Thus to ask for justification of desires is to ask for justification of emotions at a very deep level.

One clear sense in which one might be unjustified in choosing to emphasize and pursue one desire over another is the moral sense. From a

*It is important to distinguish knowing or having beliefs about someone's intentions from evaluation of someone's intentions. It is sometimes easy to confuse the two; to do so is to assume that human beings are a great deal more sensitive than in fact we are. It is quite possible to know someone's intentions and be uninterested. For example, the relevant desire may not be present. Or we may be unable to take someone seriously: some people's attempt at insult are so feeble that it's difficult to see them as anything but laughable. Or, we may be completely uninterested in someone's intentions even though we know what they are, because she has disqualified herself from consideration as a candidate for human relationships. There are a good many ways in which one can so disqualify oneself; one may, for example, be under stress thus temporarily "not oneself", one may have been coerced, or worst of all, one may be so thoroughly neurotic, immoral, immature, etc. that one is simply beyond consideration as an ordinary responsible human being.
moral standpoint, a desire that has a moral component often ought to triumph over desires which do not. For example, most of us would agree that the desire for the material well-being of others as well as one's self is often a version of the moral desire for the good of all, and that it ought to be taken more seriously than the desire for many luxurious items for oneself and one's loved ones. Thus it seems obvious that a rich industrialist who feels resentment because someone tells him it is more important because morally right to provide welfare for the needy than to provide the tax breaks and Cadillacs that he would prefer has an unjustified emotion. The desire to have one's material desires satisfied not merely adequately but opulently ought not to take precedence over a desire containing a moral principle: that the basic needs of people who have no resources at all should be supplied from the resources of people who have more than enough. However, once we leave such straightforward cases and take up the competition among moral desires, or among desires all of which are concerned with purely preferential matters, it becomes more difficult to see how these choices could be said to be justified or not.

Suppose one is trying to decide between two moral values; it is an important choice because these values, say honesty and kindness, could easily turn out to be mutually exclusive in some cases. Assuming that the person in question is conceptually well-equipped and has a clear picture of the consequences of acting on these values, there seems to be no way to justify choosing one at the expense of the other unless as part of an already existing moral system, and this leaves us in precisely the same position as when we started. If one believes that moral views are based only on reason, perhaps we could say that it is more reasonable to choose one rather than the
other; this, however, is by no means obvious. The same sort of difficulty arises when trying to choose among desires that do not involve value, at least not in a moral or aesthetic sense. Suppose one is trying to decide whether to spend more time on one's desires for professional achievement, time at home with one's family, or time on furthering one's general education. Assuming one is not presently neglecting one's loved ones, this is purely a matter of preference. Clearly, one cannot, simultaneously, spend most of one's time working at one's books and articles, a great deal of time with one's nearest and dearest and a great deal of time at the library, discovering all the things one's always wanted to know about the sciences but hasn't had time to find out. One must choose, but assuming again that one is well-informed about the results of one's choices and how to go about getting what one wants, there is no obvious way involving either reason or morality to go about making such a choice, thus no sense in which choosing one over the others could be said to be justified or unjustified.

As we have seen, it is possible to say that the choice of one desire over another is unjustified if in choosing, one makes some conceptual or factual mistake. But this only means that one's conceptual structure or decision-making procedure is faulty; it does not affect the justifiability or unjustifiability of the desires themselves. One would have to show that they could not be justified.

Another consideration about desires is based on their limitations as inner events: criticism of desires seems to have the most force insofar as desires issue in behavior. For example, we might say that one ought not to want large cars and enormous amounts of money because, given the state of the economy, what one would have to do to get them would be bad for us and others
in the short term, and perpetuate a particularly cruel form of capitalism in
the long term; or if thwarting someone's desires for constant attention or
goodwill issues in violent behavior towards others, we might want to say that
one ought not to have the desires. But it seems more sensible to say that,
whatever one's desires, one ought not to act greedily or hit other people for
not giving one what one wants. When desires are detached from behavior, they
seem innocuous enough.

Gabriele Taylor, in her paper "Justifying The Emotions"\textsuperscript{2}, argues that
there are cases in which we could say that it is wrong \textit{not} to have an
emotion. The examples she gives are cases in which one has a mistaken notion
about one's own worth - one believes oneself so superior that no criticism
from others can make one angry, or one believes oneself so inferior that no
amount of unfair criticism can make one angry. This suggests that, by the
same token, it might be wrong not to have certain emotions because one lacks
the appropriate desires. For example, suppose someone has all the usual
desires - desires for goodwill for herself, material security, creative
work - but lacks two desires: the desire for the well-being of others and the
desire for a moral order. She is completely uninterested in how other people
are treated, either by herself or others. As far as she is concerned, the
existence of other people is acceptable as long as they don't get in her way,
but she couldn't care less what happens to them. If there are any such
people, one wants intuitively to say that it is wrong not to have the desires
for the well-being of others and for a moral order, and, by implication,
wrong not to have the emotions based on them, such as righteous indignation,
compassion, and shame. But again, one suspects that the root of this
objection is that the lack of the desires for the well-being of others and a
moral order, hence the lack of righteous indignation, etc., leads to failure to act on behalf of others when, given some set of moral principles, one ought to. Even having compassion for others can be seen as worthwhile because the knowledge that someone feels compassionate can affect one in the same way that a "good deed" sometimes does: it is consoling and cheering to believe that someone understands and cares that much for one. Were this not the case, compassion might not be considered such a worthwhile emotion.

(b) Criteria. There are two main ways in which criteria can go wrong: they can be based on insufficient evidence, or they can be internally conceptually inconsistent.

Our criteria for what counts as fulfilling a desire involve both choosing among various different sorts of satisfactions, and deciding what is to count as a genuine case of that satisfaction. For example, you and I may choose one of the same criteria for the manifestation of goodwill: we agree that showing respect for others counts as showing goodwill. But we disagree about what counts as respect: I may believe that, if I respect someone, I must always listen patiently to what she has to say, even though I consider it mistaken, while you may believe that what really counts as respect is treating someone as an equal. When someone says something with which you disagree, you immediately let her know and explain why. You believe that people who behave in the way I prefer are patronizing. In general, the mistakes that are made in choice of satisfaction and what counts as satisfaction are different.

When we choose to value respect over helpfulness as a manifestation of goodwill, we are in part making a decision that is based on observation. We have observed that, e.g., treating others with respect makes them much
happier than giving a great deal of advice, which many find annoying. Sometimes our observations are inadequate; we either have not got enough evidence or have not got enough of the right kind of evidence. I may simply not have observed carefully enough or gathered enough examples, or perhaps I have made a mistaken assumption about the extent to which one case is representative of all cases; I may mistakenly believe that, since my closest friend likes to be treated in a certain way, the same must be true of everyone else. Or perhaps I have gathered evidence only from people in gestalt therapy groups, and not from people who are religious in the traditional Christian sense.

In deciding what will count as satisfaction, there is conceptual mistake. When we decide to count honesty rather than tolerance of error as respect, we are choosing partly on the basis of what could count as respect. There are conceptual limits that must be observed or we have not got a genuine case of respect. For example, suppose I claim that I respect Charles, even though I constantly belittle him, am rude to him and rarely ask his opinion about anything of importance. When asked if I believe this behavior counts as respect because it shows that I believe Charles to have the sort of formidably strong character that can take abuse without flinching, I reply that I think nothing of the kind. Rather, I think Charles is a complete idiot, an inadequate bumbler who can barely tie his own shoes. At this point one would, justly, doubt that I knew the meaning of "respect" and all the emotions I have that I claim are based on my beliefs about whether I am getting the respect I think I deserve are very likely to be unjustified. (3) The evaluative beliefs that appear in emotions. Because these beliefs are the product of combining (1) and (2), we can see that the
mistakes made here will be caused by mistakes about facts, interpretations, what counts as fulfilling some criterion or, in the sense of conceptual error, what could count as fulfilling some criterion. Depending on one's views, it may also include moral mistakes. I do not propose to discuss moral justification of emotions further.

Though we have looked at the ways in which things can go wrong in the evaluation process, we are not yet prepared to see how the question or justification bear on the emotion-object relationship. To do this, we must first look at some of the causes of the mistakes we have just discussed. Though mistakes in belief are often simple ones, caused simply by inadequate attention to the evidence or the failure to think through the implications of some concept such as respect, there are mistakes that are made in more complex ways, affecting beliefs on the deepest possible level. To see how these mistakes come to be made, let us begin by introducing the notion of cognitive background for emotional response.

**Part 3: Cognitive Background for Emotional Response**

Everyone has a set of beliefs and dispositions to believe that help form the basis for gathering and selecting evidence, applying various interpretations and choosing criteria for what will count as fulfilling the desires that are part of the evaluative element of emotions. These beliefs and dispositions to believe determine which features of the world one notices and which one rejects, whether one's standards are such that few things or many things would count as fulfilling one's desires, or whether one sees any hope at all for fulfilling one's desires thus can allow oneself to admit having them. They provide the foundations for our beliefs about how
trustworthy, friendly, etc. people are likely to be or how life is likely to go. They begin to be formed in early childhood, and have a great deal to do with what sorts of people we prefer, how sensitive we are about various things, and so on. Some sets of these beliefs and dispositions provide useful foundations for acquiring beliefs that reflect the world accurately and provide us with reasonable expectations for events in the world. If one has included in one's beliefs and dispositions that, e.g. the world is interesting, not unduly threatening, an appropriate object of curiosity, that conflicts can be resolved; that the actions of others are, on the whole, the real test of their intentions; that as George Eliot says, each of us has "..an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference." It is very likely that one will be realistic, reasonably well-informed about and tolerant of the differences between oneself and others, and possessed of a certain amount of useful information about the world. However, if one's beliefs and dispositions include the beliefs that e.g., everyone is out for her/himself, the world is in hopeless chaos, one is helpless to improve one's life if things go wrong, no-one really loves anyone and all relationships are sexual manipulation for the purpose of domination, it is very likely that one's beliefs about one's present experiences will be distorted.

These beliefs and dispositions are extremely powerful because they are derived from the first sets of beliefs and dispositions we acquire, at a time when we lack information about the world and at the same time want it a great deal. At that point, we are in no position to think critically, thus we tend to accept what is offered. We acquire these beliefs and dispositions as children from those with whom we spend the most time and those who have the
most influence on the quality of our lives, particularly our emotional lives. 
In most cases, this means adults and especially parents. On the whole, the 
beliefs and dispositions are either those that the influential adults have, 
some form of resistance to their beliefs and dispositions (often the 
opposite) and/or beliefs we construct about them (and, sometimes, about 
everyone) as a result of assessing their behavior in the light of our 
desires. It is these early influences that are the most powerful 
determinants of fundamental beliefs. If one's parents are strongly committed 
to being well-informed, keeping an open mind on various subjects such as sex 
and forms of personal relationships, are kind and considerate to each other 
and oneself, one is very likely to be the same. If one's parents are 
extremely narrow-minded and prudish, rejecting every picture of the world 
that differs in any respect from their own, considering sexual pleasure and 
any sort of relationship except heterosexual marriage nasty, one is likely to 
be the same, though it is this sort of parental attitude that can often 
produce beliefs and dispositions to believe as exactly opposite as possible. 
If one's parents are kind and tolerant, one is likely to expect the same from 
the world. If one's parents are cruel and frustrating, one may come to 
believe that unhappiness and frustration, even in adult life, is inevitable 
because one can expect no cooperation from one's fellow human beings.

We can also acquire these fundamental beliefs and dispositions to 
believe through bringing psychological defenses into play. That is, one's 
life may be so thoroughly unpleasant that one is simply unable to keep on 
looking at what goes on, and one may come not to notice certain kinds of
unpleasant facts, especially ones that have to do with the ongoing frustration of important desires. Or, as a result of very deprived childhoods, some people come to believe they deserve special attention and develop unusually exacting requirements for what will count as love and affection, as if they were hoping to be consoled for childhood neglect; in such cases, one can fail to notice friendly behavior because it fails to meet one's high standards for what counts as friendly. Or, as in the many examples offered by the psychiatrist R.D. Laing, one may find oneself in a family in which there is so much confusion, in which conflicting and even contradictory attitudes and behaviors are required by the most dominant and/or influential family members or the structure of roles in the family, that one becomes confused and develops some very odd-looking beliefs and dispositions to believe, e.g., everyone who claims to be a friend is really a secret enemy, seeking to manipulate one for her/his own gain.

The fundamental beliefs and dispositions to believe are of several kinds. We need beliefs about the way things already are to provide a foundation for additional information. These beliefs include both straightforward beliefs about the facts and beliefs that are based on certain assessments of these facts. For example, I may believe both that human cruelty to other human beings is a peculiarly persistent trait, both historically and in the present and, at the same time, that human beings are not basically evil, but tormented into wickedness by economic difficulties, the class system, and so on. The first belief is just a straightforward summing up of observations of the human condition. But the second requires that I assess my information in a different way - it requires that I take seriously some aspects of human behavior, utilizing some criterion for basic
evilness, and excuse or explain the rest. For example, I do notice the enormous number of cruel things people do to each other, and I do notice the persistence of this behavior in a general way, but I also notice how sorry most people are and how guilty they feel after doing some particularly awful thing, which I believe indicates the presence of the desire and capacity to do better, and I notice how, at least for myself, and those I know best, anxiety over acquiring the basics of life makes one more prone to cruel behavior. So I have both information and the disposition to interpret that information in certain ways which are determined by my criteria. The information itself is determined by my disposition to notice, perceptually, some things rather than others, based on whatever my criteria are (usually unconscious in perception) for noticing. Both the beliefs and dispositions to believe which enable us to make the assessments, and which the assessments yield, gradually form a general world picture which in turn generates more beliefs and dispositions to believe, usually favoring the assessments and criteria that are already in place in the form of beliefs and dispositions to believe. Some of these beliefs and dispositions are, of course, conscious and consciously chosen. For example, I may be well aware that I tend to like people who have intellectual interests better than those who don't, believing them to be more interesting, with criteria for interestingness that have been consciously worked out. Or I may have thought long and hard about my aesthetic criteria, and come to believe that choral music is, from the standpoint of communicating emotion, greatly superior to instrumental music. But some of these beliefs and dispositions to believe may be in a sense secret, not to others but to those who have them. That is, though I may have dispositions to believe that form perfectly identifiable patterns from a
third-person standpoint, I myself either cannot or do not identify them. For example, I may consciously believe that my former husband should remarry, that the new woman in his life is beautiful, intelligent, and just right for him. But, whenever her name and indeed the name of any woman with whom he is involved comes up in conversation, I say denigrating things about her, perhaps in the familiar "insult disguised as compliment" form, as in "Jane certainly has done well in her career. Of course, that means she's not at home much, and Charles always valued family life so highly...". On a deeper level, I may have had a very unhappy childhood, a prisoner of moody and violent parents. Now that I am an adult, I of course realize that a great many people are not like that, and that I can form relationships with them and change my life for the better. But I still find myself flinching whenever some loved one's voice raises even a little, constantly watching people suspiciously to see whether their behavior could be interpreted as menacing, whether they might not be angry with me but unwilling to show it until they strike out at me unexpectedly. If someone asked me whether I really believe that everyone is dangerous and probably out to get me, I would deny it, since I realize how irrational such a belief is and, at the conscious level, I don't believe it. But unconsciously, I am still assessing the world in the same way I learned to, out of self-defense, as a child. The beliefs and dispositions to believe certain things about my parents that I acquired by assessing their behavior in the light of my desires for affection and approval, perhaps even survival, are inappropriate to the present, since my parents are dead, and my preoccupation with threat has led me to develop criteria for what counts as good intentions that are so unrealistic that no one can meet them - I often don't even notice friendly advances.
Our beliefs and dispositions to believe together form the foundations for our various judgments; in particular, some of these beliefs and dispositions to believe together constitute what might be called our personal world view: what, if anything, we think about the nature of our fellow human beings, what intentions and behavior we can reasonably expect from them, what we believe the world has to offer ourselves in particular and people in general. These are the beliefs and dispositions to believe we acquire and have acquired through interest in and attempts to fulfill the desires which underlie our emotions. It is our beliefs and dispositions to believe one thing rather than another about the likelihood of our fulfilling these desires that constitute our world view in this sense. Of course, one cannot separate these views from our more general views—in a complicated world, what one thinks about the world political situation, particularly about the degree of danger in which we all find ourselves, can often depend on whether one feels reasonably satisfied with life and cheerful about one's relationships, the state of one's work and so on: perhaps the more one sees life as enjoyable and rewarding, the more one worries about losing it thus the more dangerous the world situation seems, or perhaps the more cheerful one is the more likely one thinks a happy resolution of conflicts. At any rate, as we will soon see, one's beliefs cannot be isolated from each other—the terrible psychological price paid by people who attempt to do this is well known. But the beliefs and dispositions to believe with which we are concerned here are those whose subject matter is at least partly the possible fulfilling or frustration of our strongest desires. It is these beliefs and dispositions to believe that I propose, for obvious reasons, to call cognitive background for emotional response, hereafter called CBFERs. These
beliefs and dispositions to believe are reinforced and further developed by a policy of inquiry that affects both content and epistemic process, epistemic process being the way in which our beliefs are formed. This policy of inquiry is constituted by the beliefs and dispositions to believe that control the content of beliefs and the process of observation, induction and revision that results in more beliefs and dispositions to believe and reinforcement for the beliefs and dispositions to believe already in place. Before we go on to see in more detail how this policy works and how things can go wrong, let us first look at some problems connected with unconscious beliefs. Then we will consider model epistemic process and difficulties in the policy of inquiry.

Part 4: Some thoughts on unconscious beliefs

An important feature of CBFERs is the difference between conscious and unconscious beliefs and dispositions to believe. As I noted briefly above, while some of the cognitive background is constituted by consciously held beliefs and dispositions to believe which can be consciously evaluated and revised by oneself in the light of criticism both from oneself and others, some is constituted by beliefs and dispositions that are conscious but which resist one's efforts to revise: one may see that one is wrong, but be unable to convince oneself to change one's mind in the sense that the proposed change never seems to become an integral element of belief, but requires a struggle in every case, a conscious attempt to dislodge a stubborn belief or beliefs. The existence of this latter kind of case is evidence for the existence of constituents that are extremely difficult to deal with: unconscious beliefs and unconscious dispositions to believe. Often, that one
holds unconscious beliefs and has unconscious dispositions to believe can be discovered by looking at what one does in fact believe, and the way one does in fact assess the evidence, and asking whether the beliefs and dispositions to believe of which one is conscious can adequately account for both. Such examination can often provide clues to the nature of underlying beliefs and dispositions to believe. This is often difficult, since unconscious beliefs and dispositions are, if we are to believe the psychoanalysts, unconscious for a reason.* Nevertheless, if one persists, one can, for example discover that, to one's discomfort, one has the tendency to be much nicer and sympathetic to one's older students, especially those with lives much like one's own, strongly suggesting that one believes those students more deserving, their ways of life more worthwhile (so like oneself!). Or perhaps one finds that one nearly always believes other people's conversation boring except when the subject of their opinions about oneself arises, suggesting that one's beliefs about the relative importance of oneself and others are not all they should be. And from the standpoint of one's professional life, one might find oneself tending to believe, without much reflection, that Heidegger and Sartre are inconsequential philosophers whose work is not worth taking seriously, which may indicate that one believes one's philosophical interests should be, for practical reasons, regulated by considerations about

*Not, of course, the usual sense of reason, as having conscious motive or purpose. This is a metaphorical use, and indicates the presence of an hypothesis: that there is a hidden part of the mind whose concern is the prevention of the conscious experience of pain, guilt, and/or despair, and when certain things happen in the world, it takes control and defends the conscious mind against potentially destructive, in the sense of despair-producing knowledge. This involves a complex notion of the mind and a concept of self-deception which there is no space to discuss here.
what will gain approval from those who are in a position to do something for one professionally. It is important to notice that when one does discover these things, it is, precisely, a sense of discovery one has and not one of, so to speak, creation.

The existence of such beliefs and dispositions to believe partly explains the difficulty of changing some conscious beliefs: I seem unable to convince myself that Frank is not a snide male chauvinist (he isn't) because I believe that most men in positions of power become snide male chauvinists even if they didn't begin that way. This is the sort of difficulty we often complain about when we say that someone is "unreasonable". Some of us seem not to be amenable to reason in some areas because "reason", the correcting information, only reaches the source of our conviction with extreme difficulty, if at all. While my friends argue that I misperceive Frank - he didn't mean the compliment he offered me at lunchtime as a sarcastic remark, he didn't ask me to teach two sections of Phil. 103 because he thinks women are only fit for first-year courses, and so on, I am unmoved because they are not reaching the source of the difficulty. It is not that I need to attend more carefully to Frank's behavior, but rather than I have some deeply buried beliefs which, at the time of origin, began as correct beliefs about how I was likely to be treated by my father and uncles (and indeed a good many other men as well) but which I have mistakenly generalized to all men. Until I have come to grips with these beliefs, I will continue to have great difficulties with my perceptions of men; my dispositions to believe the worst and discard the hopeful are too strong. In many cases the more unreasonable one seems, the more deeply buried the relevant beliefs are, and the more
likely it is that the beliefs and/or dispositions to believe in question are intimately connected with the fulfillment or frustration of especially cherished desires.

In connection with our concern with unconscious beliefs and dispositions to believe, we will be working with an hypothesis that should be stated explicitly: the hypothesis that the unconscious mind could sensibly be said to work in the same way as the conscious mind. Always supposing it makes sense to talk about the unconscious mind, I do not believe this to be an unjustified hypothesis, at least for the limited area under discussion. It seems that we must account somehow for the odd and faulty beliefs that often turn out to be at the bottom of unjustified emotions; in particular, the beliefs that are beliefs about the way people are generally that are based on what seems now to be insufficient evidence, e.g. the behavior of the members of one's family and their behavior in relationship to each other and a small and helpless child, through the eyes of that child. The curious and interesting fact is that under certain circumstances, one's psychological development does not keep pace with the development of one's body. Further, one's mind often seems to resist the efforts to, so to speak, bring it into the present by failing to absorb information that would show an already held belief or beliefs or dispositions to believe to be false. It seems strange to describe this process as "not wanting to know", or "refusing to believe x because it would cause too much pain", and even stranger to talk about strategies - to say that the unconscious "decides" to confuse the conscious mind about just how awful the goings-on in one's family are and so on. It sounds strange because all of these ways of talking suppose that one can meaningfully talk about wanting, refusing, deciding, planning strategies,
and all the other mental activity the concepts of which ordinarily involve
the concepts of conscious deliberation and choice, going on without our
awareness. Yet if we cannot talk in this way, it is very difficult to make
sense of the phenomena. Furthermore, we can often catch ourselves doing all
these things more or less consciously in the sense that we trick ourselves,
so to speak: we find ourselves thinking about some particularly nasty bit of
information about, e.g., a friend, wishing we hadn't heard it, and having our
minds go blank - "forgetting", as we say. We can often, if we're honest,
catch ourselves deciding whether we will allow ourselves to "forget" an
unpleasant appointment. The boundary between conscious and unconscious
activity in the mind seems to me to be far more fluid than some people
suppose, and my suspicion is that, if we paid extremely careful attention to
the workings of our minds, which at any moment are thoroughly complex and
multi-layered, we would often find ourselves deciding to believe one thing
rather than another - deciding to believe and act on whatever will be the
least trouble and/or most flattering to various authorities, and hiding these
decisions from ourselves by blanking out, concentrating on something else
while furtively working out our strategies, projecting our ugly thoughts onto
someone else, and so on. Therefore, in order to be able to discuss these
matters in some coherent manner, I intend to help myself to this model.

Part 5: Epistemic process

Considering the foregoing, the opportunities for manipulation and
threat inherent in every situation involving children, the desires that most
of us have to be agreeable and liked, emotionally comfortable, and the belief
that most of us (often secretly) have, that we deserve to be consoled for our
difficulties in life, and certainly considering the often shocking and frightening state of the world, it is surprising that we are able to be clear-headed about anything, and do not suffer in a thorough-going way from childhood and anxiety-produced mistakes and general confusion. That we do not, that we are often clear-headed about things is partly due simply to the fact that the world makes certain demands on us; some facts are so obtrusive and persistent that, no matter what our desires, we can't get away from them without psychic disturbance so severe as not to be worth it. We often face facts just because, in the ordinary sense, we must. Yet these facts that we often face so easily are for the most part a combination of utterly non-threatening facts and facts that have a good deal of survival value, that are either of limited or overwhelming, perhaps ultimate, personal importance.

For example, there is no reason that it should be threatening for most people to know the bus schedules, that the zoo closes at 5:00 P.M., that a report that must be typed should be double spaced, nor to understand how, at least in principle, earthquakes and volcanoes work, that gravity prevents us from falling off the earth, that $E=MC^2$. And it might turn out to be absolutely crucial to know that buses often won't stop at crosswalks, that the best place to stand in an earthquake is under a door frame, that carbon monoxide is odorless and can be generated by faulty heaters, etc. However, as soon as we find ourselves considering facts in which we have neither a purely casual interest nor a survival-based interest, but facts which bear on the possible fulfillment of our strongest desires (in addition to, of course, survival), as soon as the desires for love and friendship, satisfying work, and/or on-going economic security come into play, our capacity for self-deception becomes more and more pronounced as the possible outcomes of situations
become more and more likely to be unpleasant and frustrating. And in these cases, I suggest that what saves us is a desire to know, to be well-informed, that is sufficiently strong to compete with the powerful and more familiar desires for approval and comfort. Perhaps this desire is not for knowledge for its own sake, but knowledge for, again, practical reasons: it might turn out that, in the long run, there is more practical value, perhaps even more survival value, to be had from knowing how things are than from deceiving oneself as a result of the desires for comfort or consolation. At any rate, however the desire to know may be connected to other desires, it leads us to adopt a policy of inquiry, which is constituted by certain beliefs and dispositions that we consider epistemically preferable because they produce the best results - the most knowledge, the most reliable criteria.

Let us now consider the beliefs and dispositions to believe that constitute a policy of inquiry. What I have in mind is the commitment to a general position concerning the relative importance of being well-informed vs. being emotionally comfortable, approved of or consoled. This position is constituted by a set of beliefs and dispositions to believe that have as their subject matter two major components: that evidence be gathered in certain ways (content), and that certain procedures be followed in constructing and adopting beliefs (process). The policy on content is contained in the first of the three elements of the policy on epistemic process (a) beliefs and dispositions to believe that govern gathering evidence (b) beliefs and dispositions to believe governing assessment of and willingness to draw conclusions from evidence (c) beliefs and dispositions to believe governing correction of mistakes. Though it is tempting to call the policy
on process ideal epistemic procedure, it would be better when giving such a 
rough characterization to describe this process by saying that there are 
certain beliefs and dispositions that constitute rules of thumb that we 
employ in each of these areas, certain model procedures that we believe yield 
the best results. (a) In the areas of gathering information or collecting 
evidence, since this will be the foundation for whatever conclusions we draw. 
We do not, for example, draw conclusions about the character traits of others 
after one meeting at a crowded, noisy cocktail party, nor do we say, on the 
evidence of one experience, that all members of any racial or religious group 
have a certain set of traits. Furthermore, we do not systematically ignore 
certain sorts of evidence, e.g. facts that are difficult for our current 
views to accommodate. (b) In the area of drawing conclusions, we distinguish 
between allowing ourselves to draw conclusions and refusing to do so. We 
will allow ourselves to take up a belief or position on some matter only when 
we have, as mentioned above, a full and representative sampling of evidence. 
Otherwise, we tend to regard our present beliefs as inadequately representa-
tive, and ourselves not entitled to conclusive beliefs. However, we also tend 
not to resist taking up some belief or set of beliefs if provided with full 
and representative evidence; that is, we do not refuse to draw conclusions. 
The distinction I have in mind here is the difference between the sort of 

case in which one is concerned to make sure that one's evidence about, e.g., 
someone's character is drawn from a number of situations in which a variety 
of causal factors played a role, and not simply from one or two experiences, 
and, on the other hand, the sort of case in which is the issue is taking 
proper account of the sort of evidence that is sometimes called overwhelming, 
where failure to draw certain conclusions suggests that one either does not
know how induction works or is avoiding some conclusion one would prefer not to have to face. A familiar example of this is offered by the case of politicians of Watergate fame, who, faced with as much evidence as anyone could need to draw at least some tentative conclusions, suddenly found themselves unable to draw even the most modest ones. In general, we tend to draw conclusions so readily and constantly that the failure to do so suggests that other desires, perhaps the familiar ones for comfort and admiration, are interfering with one's desire to know. At the least, the resistance to assessing the evidence with an eye to drawing conclusions in some situations requires explanation. (c) Finally, there is the correction of error - the belief that outcomes, especially surprising ones that indicate that one's beliefs might not have been correct or sufficiently representative, are carefully examined and the mistaken, incomplete or insufficient beliefs corrected, completed, or filled out. To be able to do this requires a willingness to believe (perhaps "admit" comes closer here) that it is possible that one has neglected important evidence, or misconstrued the available evidence. Again, this seems to be something we do quite naturally.

Applying this to the evaluative process, we can see how any mistakes in procedure could lead to mistakes about the facts, and though it might seem to apply only to finding out and forming beliefs about the facts and not to forming criteria, it is not difficult to see how the former affects the latter. In our discussion of the sorts of things that can go wrong with criteria, one important potential difficulty was being mistaken, as a result of inadequate inquiry about what counts as fulfilling criteria for being, e.g., respectful or affectionate. You and I may agree that it is a good
thing to be respectful to others, but strongly disagree about what counts as being respectful. Our disagreement can often be resolved by gathering more evidence - by, e.g., pointing out the connection between our attitudes and behavior towards someone and her reaction. If I intend that my behavior be respectful towards my students, and I find that often my attitudes or behavior make them feel foolish or stupid, clearly I don't understand what makes people feel that one values their opinions, thinks them worth taking seriously, or has regard for their characters, which in the ordinary way is one of the results of being respectful. We behave respectfully partly because we want to make others feel worthwhile and significant (because, of course, we believe they are). Thus, if we make mistakes about the facts, and particularly if we are unwilling to draw conclusions for which we have plenty of evidence and are unwilling to admit the possibility of having made a mistake, we may find ourselves with criteria that are mistaken in that it is false that certain attitudes and behavior will produce the results that respectfulness ordinarily produces and, at worst, we may find ourselves with criteria that are so seriously mistaken that there is conceptual mistake - that sort of thing just couldn't count as respectful because to be respectful just is to behave in ways x, y and z and, whatever one calls it, one is behaving in ways a, b, and c.

With all this in mind, let us begin to look at the causes of difficulties in CBFERs.

Part 6: Difficulties in and because of the policy of inquiry

In general, difficulties occur as a result of a combination of
constraints that regulate content, and of alterations of model epistemic procedure.

From the standpoint of content, the usual constraints are constraints on what can count as a source of information, and what information is acceptable as a possible constituent of some belief or disposition to believe. In many cases these constraints are minor, temporary, and connected to some anomalous situation: "Don't mind Aunt Ella, she's been rude to everyone since Uncle Jim died". "Professor Smythe-Robbins winks at all the graduate students when he's been drinking." In other cases, they are extensive and misleading, forming a permanent policy. Sometimes doubt is cast on any source of information that does not have some special status, e.g., is not a member of the family: "Don't contradict your father. He always knows what he's talking about." Sometimes it is ideological: "You can't believe a word she says - she's a communist." Some belief content may be unacceptable no matter who has it: "Of course we have her best interests at heart: we're her parents aren't we?" "Certainly the minister's wife doesn't look down on us because we're poor; she's a Christian after all!" In a family where such policies are in effect, one usually adopts them since failure to do so can result in severe penalties. One can face rejection and, at worst, even physical mistreatment for strongly disagreeing with one's parents as a child. As child or adult, one may create one's own temporary constraints as a result of being in a frightening or extremely painful situation. One may be in a natural disaster or a war, or suffering from the loss of an especially loved friend, and as a kind of psychological protective measure, be unable to take in the changed situation. Thus one discounts certain potentially disturbing sources of information, rejects any bad news
about the friend's condition, until one is able to come to grips with the situation through a diminishing of fear or grief. In such situations selection takes place very quickly rather than gradually.

Alterations of model epistemic procedure stem from the same sorts of desires to eliminate content, but they affect content in a much more general way. Consider, for example, a man who fears his child might be using drugs, yet does not want to believe it is so. In order to keep himself from believing it, he simply refuses to take in and/or connect the evidence - he disregards the strange smells, the gossip of his friends, and so on. Alterations with even more widespread effects can be illustrated by looking at the following pair of examples. Suppose someone is so hurt by her parents' belief that she is ugly that she, in self-protection, rejects the whole subject and refuses to assess information or form beliefs of any kind on the subject, in fact resists even a moderate amount of information-gathering concerning her personal appearance. Because her policy is that nothing having to do with personal appearance will be taken in, she even fails to correct her mistaken picture of herself as a result of the more reasonable assessments of her friends. Perhaps she is not ugly at all, but, e.g., the victim of her parents' wish that they had not had children so late in life, and their constant and spiteful resentment of her presence. Or consider a case in which just the opposite takes place: instead of denying the good opinions of others, this person accepts them and, as well, transforms anything that looks like criticism into a subtle form of praise. Perhaps such a person has been an only child, the apple of her parents' collective eye, and has been brought up to believe that everything she does is absolutely wonderful and that she is the fairest of them all. It is
possible for such a person to transform all criticism into praise, or fail to take it seriously as a result of the character of the criticizer. For example, "He said that just to get my attention; he's shy and can't bring himself to say how beautiful he thinks I am" or "Oh, she's just jealous." In both cases, the person in question refuses to take seriously and reflect on the opinions of others and, as a result does not consider the possibility that she has made a mistake, in effect refuses to do so. If we assume that the formation of criteria for satisfaction of one's desires, and perhaps even selection of some desires over others is affected by information, we can see that both of these elements will be affected not only by exclusion of specific content, but also by this more general tampering. For example, most of us like to think ourselves reasonably attractive, and are kindly disposed towards those who hold such views about us. In fact, the expression of such a view is a common ploy when one tries to improve one's relations with someone. But a person who rejects the whole subject of attractiveness will not have "acts as if I'm attractive to her/him" as one of her criteria for the expression of goodwill. Such an attitude could be so widespread that it could affect one's desire to be in good physical condition; someone could think oneself so physically hopeless that she could become indifferent to her body altogether.

There are a great many kinds of cases; what they have in common is that, in each case, prudential considerations enter into belief acquisition. Though "prudential" is more ordinarily associated with the contrast between moral and practical matters, I think it can also be usefully employed to mark the distinction between epistemological considerations, which have to do with knowing what is the case, and practical considerations, where producing a
belief with certain content (or, often, without a certain content) is considered more desirable than knowing what is the case, for reasons having to do with psychological well-being, one's own or someone else's.

By now it should be easy to see how tampering with either content or epistemic process can also affect content indirectly. If I have a policy of disregarding anything said by someone whose political views are Marxist, I will have very few beliefs whose content is some aspect of a genuine Marxist view. I may have a great many beliefs whose content consists in ill-founded generalizations about the badness or dangerousness of Marxists, but very few views having as their content considerations connected to whether or not the proletariat needs to be led by a vanguard, or whether Trotsky was a right-wing revisionist; that is, I will not only lack a great deal of genuine information but I will also fail to form views about or develop interpretations of important happenings in the world, either the public world or my own personal realm. Or, if I have been brought up in a family in which grimness and pessimism are the order of the day, I may genuinely only notice those events in the world that are grounds for grimness and pessimism. Real perceptual problems can develop as a result of the rigidity of some beliefs or their inappropriate application - one may consistently fail to see things that conflict with one's policies, and thus will certainly affect content. There is also a more insidious way that prudentially influenced policies of inquiry can affect content indirectly.

As any psychoanalyst can tell us, one reason these policies are extremely influential and long-lived is that they are easily and persistently (though certainly not legitimately) transformed from specific policies with specific content to much more general ones. For example, one may begin by
believing "only my father knows anything" and move on to "only men who act like my father know anything" to "only men that are dominant, forceful and beat me know anything". The origins of these policies are all too soon lost to the conscious mind, leaving a general belief that one holds with unusual tenacity, and that one believes expresses "the way things are". Often people think such beliefs self-evident, since they both believe them with absolute and unwavering conviction and are not aware of their origins. Perhaps this phenomenon has to do with the fact that, as children, we are looking not only for information but for, so to speak, instructions on how to proceed. Our desires are for general as well as particular truths. Whatever the explanation, we can see that the effects of any policy of inquiry, whether prudentially influenced or not, are extremely wide-ranging. And when prudential considerations enter into these policies, the result is likely to be wide-ranging false beliefs. As well, any interference of prudential considerations with either specific content or with epistemic process will have wide-ranging effects because our beliefs are connected to each other, often in ways of which we are not aware. Once we begin modifying some beliefs, we must modify others in order to support the original ones. Probably everyone has had the experience of discovering beliefs in oneself, particularly false beliefs, whose existence came as a complete surprise. One just wasn't aware of having allowed, e.g., a vague and consoling belief that somehow everything will come out right, a belief adopted during the nuclear war fears of the fifties, to cloud one's mind to the point of causing one to literally forget that China has exploded a nuclear device. That this sort of thing happens suggests that once one begins to acquire false but comforting beliefs, once one begins to tamper with the process of belief formation, the
process is to a certain extent self-perpetuating. In general, what we find when this happens is that what was once a limited distortion in some areas of CBFERs, either limited in the sense of there being a small number of beliefs involved, as in the case of a badly-treated child, or limited in the sense of affecting a relatively small area of CBFERs temporarily as in a traumatized adult, becomes wide-spread and systematic - the more tampering the more distortion. Hereafter, the results of the interference of prudential considerations with a policy of inquiry will be called distorted CBFERs. Let us try to summarize the way in which distorted CBFERs are formed and perpetuated.

The difficulties with specific content are easily summarized: either one rejects information and/or persists in holding on to beliefs already in place in the face of obvious evidence to the contrary. This in turn affects one's choice of desires or criteria insofar as they are affected by information. It is, however, interference in the policy of inquiry by means of tampering with epistemic process that produces the most persistent and wide-spread difficulties.

Let us summarize those difficulties: though we have discussed epistemic process informally, let us look more carefully at the way in which prudential considerations can interfere.

There are three basic ways that prudence interferes with belief formation, one for each element in model epistemic process: (a) the substitution of prudential considerations for the requirement that the evidence be as full and representative as possible before a belief about it is constructed (b) the adoption as a policy of revising what one observes in the light of one's most strongly held beliefs (rather than, e.g., the ones
that make the most sense); (c) the refusal to admit the possibility of mistake. Taken separately or together, these kinds of interference can produce distorted CBFERs by causing us to be inadequately informed, inappropriately perceptually selective and blind to error, and by requiring systematic change in belief structure. And since these kinds of mistakes are caused by beliefs that originate in contexts where one's strongest desires were either at odds with the possibilities for their satisfaction in one's environment, or satisfied virtually before the desires were expressed, they are particularly likely to affect the evaluative beliefs that are involved in emotions, since emotions are produced in part by the assessment of events in the light of these same desires.

Part 7: Mistakes and justification

There are two important observations we can make as a result of our discussion of background beliefs and epistemic procedure. First, we can see that distorted CBFERs can affect all areas of the evaluative process and are bound to produce a good many false beliefs and misleading criteria, especially in situations where strong desires are involved. This means that there will be a good many unjustified emotions, since false beliefs cause the emotion in which they appear, or have a part in producing, to be unjustified. Thus any thorough-going account of the emotion-object relationship will have to include some account of the relationship between emotion and object when the emotion is unjustified, else run the risk of leaving a substantial number of examples unaccounted for.

Second, because CBFERs are extremely difficult to shift and affect the new information we get, we can now see why, sometimes, emotions do not change
when beliefs seem to change. Using our previous example, suppose I believe, as a result of a combination of unfortunate childhood experiences and the subsequent bad choices to which the resulting distorted CBPERs inclined me, that all men are untrustworthy. As a result, I am unusually quick to anger in my relationships with men. My friend Frank very much wants me to give up this view, and points out ways in which he has shown himself to be trustworthy, ways in which men we both know have shown themselves to be trustworthy and so on. As Frank talks to me, I take his point in the sense that I understand, intellectually, what he's saying; I even agree that the evidence strongly points towards the trustworthiness of all these men. Nevertheless, it is not so easy to make myself see all that when Frank isn't around, because the beliefs that have generated my mistaken judgment of Frank are the result of very old distorted CBPERs that have had time to accumulate a good deal of (partly self-induced) confirmation in my life. In the case of a very general belief such as this one, there are a large number of beliefs, and criteria in which beliefs play a major role, involved; in order that my beliefs about men change so that I'm genuinely convinced that men are merely members of the human race with a variety of faults and virtues just as women are, I must undo a number of other misconceptions. This takes a very long time and is difficult at best. Thus unless Frank is right there pointing out the truth, or unless I force myself to ignore my deeper beliefs and concentrate just on what I can work out intellectually, I just don't see the world that way. Of course, this does not mean that I'm incapable of doing so. Rather, that I have these difficulties shows that often, changing the beliefs involved in emotions is not as simple as correcting one's view about some set of facts. Some beliefs that occur in emotions are the result of distorted
CBFERs, thus rest on an extremely complex foundation of beliefs which themselves must be given up before I can change the present result of that complex foundation. I may be able to see, intellectually, that something is false, but CBFERs have a kind of epistemic weight that tips the balance towards belief that will be consistent with them. In contrast, beliefs that are the result of uncensored content and model epistemic process and not of distorted background beliefs are relatively easy to change by getting straight about the facts because they are a result of an epistemic policy that is aimed toward getting straight about the facts rather than, e.g., being comfortable, thinking well of oneself, or avoiding anxiety.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Justify".


CHAPTER 6

EMOTION AND OBJECT REVISITED

In Chapter 4, I hinted at the sort of account I want to give of the emotion-object relationship by promising to show how Kenny's view, that emotions are non-contingently connected to objects, thus cannot be causally connected, can be incorporated into a causal emotion-object account. I said that we would see that Kenny does not need the notion of an object to make the point about emotions he wants to make. If this turns out to be so, the field is left largely to Wilson's notion of an object as an event or person, something in the world, and a causal account seems far more plausible. In this chapter, I want to show how an account similar to but not identical to Wilson's (through using Wilson's as a guide) can be offered, and how a revised version of Kenny's analysis can be shown to be consistent with this account. First, however, we must look at Kenny's analysis, and deal with the objections he offers to any causal account. We can then go on to the question of the desirability of a causal account, and finally we can formulate a complete account of the emotion-objection relationship.

Part 1: The legitimacy of a causal analysis

J.R.S. Wilson argues both that a causal analysis of the emotion-object relationship is legitimate, and that one can give a causal analysis of the relationship between the content of a belief and an event or person in the world. I too wish to offer a causal analysis, but from a somewhat different standpoint. Given the acceptability of a causal analysis, I want to be able to give a causal account of the emotion-object relationship from the
standpoint of showing how particular beliefs in the emotion become connected with a particular object, and of talking about the causal conditions that result in the failure of these beliefs to connect with objects in any apparently comprehensible way. In order to do this, I need only show that a causal analysis is legitimate. Once it can be seen that a causal analysis is legitimate, the foregoing discussions will provide a causal account of the sort I want. Thus my chief concern here is to show that there is no reason to reject a causal analysis.

Wilson presents a number of arguments in favor of the legitimacy of causal analysis. He believes his most important opponent to be Anthony Kenny, in Kenny's book *Action, Emotion and Will*. Wilson takes issue with Kenny on the matter of causality, offering several arguments against Kenny's view. I will give accounts of two of them here.

In Chapter Nine of *Action, Emotion and Will*, Kenny offers his definition of an object:

> In the first part of the book I spoke frequently of the 'object' of an emotion or desire, contrasting the object of such a mental attitude with its cause... The objects of mental attitudes are sometimes called "intensional"* objects...

> The sense of "object" which I have hitherto employed and wish now to discuss is one which derives from the grammatical notion of the object of a transitive verb. The object is fear is what is feared, the object of loved is what is loved...

Thus, for Kenny, the object of an emotion is something mental and not something physical, what we have been calling beliefs and/or content. But this still leaves the claim that the connection between emotion and object is

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*Kenny says "intensional" when he means "intentional".*
non-contingent mysterious, since it seems just as contingently true that a
certain emotion contains certain intentional material as it does that my fear
is caused by something external such as an approaching bear. His claim
becomes clearer when we examine Kenny's notion of a formal object.

Kenny's concept of a formal object has little to do with the criteria
for objecthood per se, and much more to do with the criteria for something's
being a particular emotion, which is determined by its having a certain sort
of object. The concept of a formal object is derived, according to Kenny,
from a scholastic adage about the objects of actions: objects specify acts.
Objects "...describe species of the genus described by a verb alone." 3 That
is, objects tell us what sort of eating, smoking, etc. is going on: is one
eating lamb chops or sprouts, smoking a cigar or a pipe? While material
objects determine the metaphysical limits of actions, in the sense that, e.g.,
physically existent things can be burned but thoughts cannot, formal objects
set the conceptual limits for action. Only what is wet can be dried, only
what is dirty can be cleaned:

    To assign a formal object to an action is to place
    restrictions on what may occur as the direct object
    of a verb describing the action. 4

In the same way, emotions are specified by their objects. Materially, since
they are intentional, and one can think about anything, they can be about
anything. But formally emotions are specified by the kinds of beliefs that
characterize the intentional material: one can only fear what is dangerous, be
grateful for what is good.

We must distinguish carefully between Kenny's notion of an object and
his notion of a formal object. While an object is an intentional object, a
formal object is a set of criteria that specify the character of the
intentional object. The intentional object contains, so to speak, what is loved, feared, and so on. The formal object tells us what sort of intentional object we must have in order to have a genuine case of love or fear. It is important to notice that the formal object specifies the character of the intentional object in that it specifies what kind of belief the person who has the emotion must have about something. If I fear the bear, the formal object specifies that I must believe the bear to be dangerous. Of course, I can have beliefs about anything at all, since I can think about anything at all; it is some of the beliefs, in particular the evaluating beliefs, that must be of a certain kind. This does not exhaust the intentional contents, since there are beliefs other than evaluative beliefs involved.

Kenny argues that emotions and objects are non-contingently connected and that objects cannot be causes. However, the only sort of connection that presents itself as a candidate for non-contingent connection is conceptual connection. Thus Kenny is claiming that emotion and object are conceptually connected. Certainly it does seem to be true that there is a conceptual connection between a formal object and a particular emotion for Kenny. The formal object specifies the beliefs that characterize the intentional content of particular emotions. In addition, I have argued that, both conceptually and as a matter of fact, beliefs are constituents of emotions, and since beliefs have content, emotions do as well. So in this sense, that intentional objects are present is part of the concept of emotion. But what is certainly not true is that there is any conceptual connection between an emotion, e.g., fear, and any particular content, in the sense of a connection between dangerousness and any particular dangerous thing.

Other problems seem to me to arise from Kenny's unexplicated claim that
the notion of object he uses is derived from the concept of the object of a transitive verb. The object of a transitive verb is defined in the following way in the Oxford English Dictionary:

7. Gram. A substantive word, phrase, or clause, immediately dependent on, or 'governed by', a verb as expressing, in the case of a verb of action, the person or thing to which the action is directed, or on which it is exerted.

Unfortunately, this is not very illuminating with respect to the relationship between emotion and object. For while it is true that the objects of thought in the sense of intentional objects are non-physical (the OED calls this use of 'object' "metaphorical"), this does not seem to be like the sort of object-taking expressed by a transitive verb. The interesting difference between objects of action and objects of thought is that objects of action have one object, while objects of thought may have two: one in precisely the same way that an action has an object, and the other in the sense that the thought has content. It is the former that seems to be most like the object of a transitive verb. Until Kenny's notion of an object is clearer, it is not possible to further evaluate the claim that emotions and objects are conceptually connected.

Kenny also argues against a causal relationship between emotion and object on experiential grounds. He argues that, if we analyze the emotion-object relationship as causal, we will have to say that we arrive at our knowledge of what our emotions are about inductively. He offers the example of happiness at one's mate's recovery from illness:

If I feel great happiness and relief because my wife unexpectedly recovers from a mortal illness, I do not first discover that I feel happy and relieved, and then draw the conclusion that this feeling is caused by my wife's recovery (e.g. on the grounds that I have observed that whenever she so recovers I have just this feeling).
Here Kenny wants to say that, while it may be true that my mate's recovery is the object of my emotion, it is not also the cause. While I can know the object of my emotion immediately, I cannot know the cause in this way, and to say that I cannot know the object immediately does not do justice to my emotional experiences.

Wilson offers several arguments against Kenny: we need only look at two here. First, Wilson argues that Kenny is wrong to say that a connection, such as the connection between emotion and object, could be either contingent or non-contingent:

The necessary/contingent contrast has its primary application in the context of talk about statements, propositions, facts, truths, etc.. A necessary proposition is one that can be shown to be true without reference to the facts - it is necessarily true, true a priori. A contingent proposition is one whose truth or falsity can only be determined by reference to the facts - it is contingently true, true a posteriori. Since a connection or relation cannot be true or false, a connection or relation is neither contingent nor non-contingent. However, it may be the case that some concept entails some other concept, so that they are necessarily related to each other. For example, the concept of a father entails the concept of a child. But this does not mean that the connection between father and child is not conspicuously causal. Wilson believes that Kenny may have mistakenly moved from making a point about a conceptual connection between emotions and beliefs that Kenny sometimes calls objects, to claiming that the connection between emotion and object itself is non-contingent, and this seems to me plausible.

Wilson's next argument is against Kenny's claim that, if objects were causes, we would know only inductively what our emotions are about, and since
this is false, since we know immediately and not inductively, objects cannot be causes. Wilson replies that in fact to say that one feels relief at anything implies a causal account, because the very application of the term "relief" implies a causal account which would presumably (Wilson does not offer details) involve the previous suffering of pain, anxiety and so on. To a strengthened version of Kenny's claim, that one could not arrive at one's belief that what one feels is relief at one's wife's recovery, Wilson answers that, on the contrary, one might indeed find oneself at a loss about how to identify and describe one's reaction to an event, even to oneself:

One sometimes, surely, has to work out exactly what one feels. Such working out might involve gathering one's thoughts, abstracting oneself to a certain extent from the reaction, and trying to look at it as a whole, and might perhaps also involve thinking back to how one felt on other occasions. Thus sometimes we do use induction; one might even want to say that, more often than one suspects, the immediate identification of one's own responses that Kenny speaks of is made possible by associations resulting from having had those responses in the same context before. I have argued in Chapter 3, Parts 2 and 3 that we can be confused about our feelings and resolve this confusion by comparing our present state of past states, with respect to such things as bodily experiences, thought patterns, and larger context. Wilson also suggests that Kenny's claim could be based on an analysis of the concept "reaction"; that is, for an emotion to be appropriately termed a reaction to an event, it may be part of the concept of having a reaction, and even part of the concept of some emotions as reactions, that one know of the casual connection immediately. Wilson suggests that being horrified by a catastrophe might involve such conceptual considerations. But he does not think this applies in every case, and I agree.
Part 2: The desirability of a causal analysis

Supposing it to be legitimate, why would anyone especially want to give a causal account of the emotion-object relationships? Wilson wants a causal analysis because he sees the emotion-object relationship as a relationship between an emotion and something in the world, and he believes only a causal account can show how these two items actually connect. He introduces his discussion of emotion and object by describing emotions as reactions or responses to events. I wish to emphasize this feature of emotions from an experiential standpoint; that is, not only is it the case the emotions are reactions or responses, but we experience them in this way ordinarily; that is, we experience ourselves as connected to the world and our emotions as part of this connection rather than as a series of gratuitous and inexplicable happenings.* That a causal account can be given is part of the concept of responsiveness. My interests are close to Wilson's, but the foci of our interests differ. Wilson is especially concerned with giving an account of cases in which the beliefs involved are justified, while I am more interested in being able to offer a complete causal account, an account that can take into consideration both justified and unjustified emotions. In this sense, I want to see how emotions work, and I believe that, in the end, an account that takes into account unjustified emotions will cast light on what sort of account we need for justified emotions. To see how we can get a

* This responsive character is the basis for our deep uneasiness when we find ourselves in emotional states for which we have no explanation. These emotions violate our notions of the nature of emotions. This may be the explanation for our apparently ardent desire for content for our emotions, as demonstrated by the Schachter-Singer study. This is especially true of powerful emotions that don't fit easily into our expected patterns of response, e.g., when, sometimes one finds to one's horror that one is tremendously angry with a loved one for no apparent reason.
complete account, let us first look at Wilson's account of justified emotions.

I have already discussed the concept of cognitive background for emotional response and its profound effect on the relationship between what we encounter in the world and what we believe about what we encounter. The two often vary considerably, and this means that there are a good many unjustified emotions. The significance is, as is perhaps obvious, that there are a good many emotions whose connection to the world could be mysterious, at least compared to the firm connectedness of justified emotions. Ironically, given his account, this mysteriousness is the very thing that Wilson sees as most undesirable, and mentions particularly at the beginning of Emotion and Object as an outcome to be carefully avoided. Wilson sees difficulty in connecting emotions to happenings in the world as a possible outcome of construing objects as beliefs of some sort, but it is also the outcome of an incomplete causal account of the emotion-object relationship, even if objects are defined as items or events in the world. Part of the reason that Wilson's account is incomplete in this way is his excessively narrow conception of what counts as having an object, and his notion of what counts as being what he calls a "malfounded" emotion. I will have a great deal to say about Wilson's criteria for object-taking in Part 3 of this chapter: for the moment, I just want to discuss the outcome of his using those criteria. For Wilson, an emotion is either fully justified - everything goes right and the object exists in the world - or it is "malfounded" - the object does not exist, so the emotion has no object. He accounts for malfounded emotions by calling them "aspirant cases" of emotions with objects. They meet the subjective requirements for being an emotion, involving beliefs that seem to have objects, but fail to
meet the objective conditions, that objects exist, and that they have a
certain causal connection to the emotion in question. This account does not
take us far, because, while we can see what elements would have to be added to
produce an emotion with an object, we still cannot see how malfounded emotions
are produced, how they are connected to the world if not through an object.
We know what malfounded emotions fail to be, but we wo not know what they are.
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that unjustified emotions do not
always yield the unambiguous metaphysical claims that are the basis for
Wilson's calling some emotions malfounded. As we have seen, a good many
things can go wrong with emotions. For example, suppose, because of distorted
background beliefs, I regard every policeman I meet as a vicious monster. I
come upon kindly, amiable, cheerful Constable McKenzie. I believe him to be a
vicious monster. Do I have an unjustified emotion? Yes. Does Constable
McKenzie exist? Yes. My emotion is not malfounded in Wilson's sense, yet one
cannot say it is a simple case of an emotion with an object. A careful
breakdown of causal factors plus examination and revision of Wilson's causal
account will allow us to construct a causal account that will not fall prey to
such difficulties, as we shall see in Part 3.

Part 3: At last.....

Now we come to the causal account. To begin, let us set out what we
have established so far.

Up to now, we have developed an analysis of emotion and a view about
which component of an emotion takes an object. We have looked briefly at two
different notions of an object, one of which belongs to Anthony Kenny and the
other to J.R.S. Wilson. We have rejected Kenny's notion of an object because
what he designates as an object can be seen as the evaluative belief that is a
component of emotion, and he does not need to talk about objects to talk about this. Furthermore, given Kenny's picture of an intentional object, we would not be constructing an account of the emotion-object relationship that shows the relationship between emotions and the world, something that must be done if we are to give a really complete account of emotional situations. We are adopting, not quite arbitrarily, a notion of object like J.R.S. Wilson's where an object is an event or an item or a person - something in the world. This is not quite arbitrary because, as we will see, Wilson's notion of an object and the definitions we have used from the Oxford English Dictionary that reflect the common-sense notion of an object and enabled us to discover which component of an emotion takes an object, fit well together. In addition to adopting a notion of an object, we have argued that there is no reason to reject a causal account, and good reasons to adopt one. However, let us be very clear about just what sort of causal account is wanted here.

If we are to have a causal theory it seems uncontroversial to say that we will want a theory that accounts for the emotion-object relationship as fully as possible. We will want a model of the emotion-object relationship that will enable us to have an account of the ideal emotion-object relationship in causal terms, but that can also be helpful in providing a causal account of the emotion-object relationship where the emotion is unjustified, where some element of the causal chain is missing or has otherwise gone awry. This means that we will need quite a detailed account, taking into consideration all the causal factors both from the standpoint of the person who has the emotion and from the standpoint of the object. For example, we know that generally, just the selection of possible objects has very much more to do with the desires and beliefs of the person who has the
emotion than with anything in the external world, except in the trivial sense that the object in the world provides a causal occasion. From the standpoint of accounting for the objects of unjustified emotion or of cases where some element has gone awry, we need to remember the extent and power of distorted CBFERS, and how they can be influential even at the perceptual level. This is especially important to keep in mind when considering the salvageability of Wilson's criteria for object-taking, which only allows emotions that are fully justified to have objects.

On Wilson's view, for an emotion to have an object the following three criteria must be met: (a) one's emotion must be caused by attention to the object and not, e.g., by the object's association with something else; (b) the emotion must be determined by features of the object - they must "match" (c) the object must exist. If all these criteria are met, the emotion has an object; if not, not.* Thus there is a causal criterion, a relevance criterion for content of beliefs, and a metaphysical criterion. The metaphysical criterion is so clearly implied by the relevance criterion that it will not be considered separately. Let us now examine the definitions from the OED with which we began our examination of object-taking in Chapter 4.

Object. (3b). Something which on being seen excites a particular emotion, as admiration, horror, disdain, commiseration, amusement.
(4) That to which action, thought, or feeling is directed; the thing (or person) to which something is done, or upon or about which something operates.

* Wilson included a fourth criterion which applies only to emotions whose objects are persons. One must want to do something or other to the purported object, the "something" varying with the emotion - e.g., anger produces an impulse or desire to harm, pity a desire to help, etc. But we have already seen in the section on behavior that this is not always so, on the behavioral level, and talk about desires or impulses to behave generates the same difficulties.
The first definition is a causal one, and the second, when we remember that the directedness of an emotion is what the evaluative belief is about, has to do with content and its connection to the world. The emotion is directed at whatever the relevant belief is about in the world. Wilson's third criterion can, I think, be seen as implied in both definitions. Thus we can see that Wilson's criteria are not purely arbitrary; they set out features of the emotion-object relationship that are conceptually familiar. However, in light of the foregoing discussion of the evaluative component of emotions, and of background beliefs, there is an important feature of the emotion-object relationship that is left out of Wilson's account, and which must be taken into consideration.

Insofar as any of Wilson's criteria or either one of the OED definitions are seen to make a claim about the object's being the sole or even the main determinanet of content, these conditions can never be met. As we have seen, the choice of object has far more to do with the evaluative process than it does any particular causal force on the part of the object. If the object of my anger is the outrageous sexist remarks made by a famous philosopher at the CPA, the outrageous sexist remarks are nevertheless only partly the cause of my anger. I have certain desires, interests, values, and sensitivities that determine my interest in this sort of situation, I have standards by which I measure the remarks made in certain contexts and so on. So the object will
never be the sole cause of my emotion, but rather part of the causal story.* With this in mind, we can still look to Wilson's criteria for guidance in what can count as an object.

Let us begin by reminding ourselves that the emotion-object relationship varies a great deal. While it is true that sometimes we can distinguish clearly between cases in which everything goes exactly right and the emotion is justified, and cases in which nothing goes right and the emotion is completely unjustified, sometimes we cannot. Sometimes things go partially wrong - I believe that the innocent Constable McKenzie is a vicious monster, because I believe all policemen to be vicious monsters. In cases such as this one it is true that my emotion is unjustified, but it does not seem to be true that it lacks an object in the same way it would were my belief about a unicorn. To the extent that my belief and the item or event that it is about match, my belief seems to have some sort of object. In this case, even though I falsely believe that Constable McKenzie is a vicious monster, I nevertheless

*Wilson's account of causality leaves open the possibility that the causal story will be complex indeed, since he holds that:

To say that a certain relation is causal to say that for two items to be related in that way, the causal network in which they are enmeshed must conform to a certain pattern. It leaves open the possibility that the particular way in which the pattern is instantiated may be different in different cases." (p. 12) "...if the emotion object relation is a casual one, it doesn't follow that the same kind of object always elicits a similar emotion in two different people, does it follow that the underlying casual story in each case. (p. 12)

Thus Wilson's account could make room for a more complex account including the subjective conditions, but he gives no such account; that he does not seems to me to be a serious lack and not just a minor lacuna, since it prevents us from having a complete picture of how emotions connect to the world.
truly believe that he is Constable McKenzie. Given our discussion of distorted CBFERs, it is obvious that there will be a good many emotions containing beliefs of this kind, thus a good many emotions that may or may not have objects. On Wilson's view, these emotions would probably be malfounded, since there is no Constable McKenzie who is a vicious monster. But I think this would be a mistake. We originally decided to adopt the picture of an object as something in the world because such a picture would account for our experiences more thoroughly than simply regarding objects as some sort of belief whose connection to the world is a mystery. Using this same sort of guideline, it seems to do greater justice to those of our experiences in which very little is inappropriate to say that emotions that involve some false beliefs about something that really exists have objects. In these cases, it is not that one's beliefs are completely unconnected to the world; some elements are connected and some are not. However, if we decide to say that emotions that involve some false beliefs and some true ones take objects, we have considerably weakened Wilson's second criterion for object-taking. We need to be sure that we can reformulate the criteria so that there is still some way to distinguish between emotions that take objects and emotions that do not; we do not want to be committed to saying that any emotion that just seems subjectively to have an object does in fact have one. To avoid this, let us first look at just how we are weakening or changing Wilson's criteria.

On Wilson's view, in order that an emotion have an object, it must be both caused by attention to the object, and its features must be determined by features of the object; this is guaranteed by there being a match between the relevant beliefs and the item or event in the world. With the proposed revisions, it will still be the case that the relevant beliefs are caused by
attention to the object, but it will not be the case that all features of the relevant belief are determined by attention to the object, since there is no longer a complete match. How are we to incorporate this change into a criterion that does any work? How can we avoid saying something as vague as "Well, sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't and if the difference between the belief and the item or event in the world is not too great, the emotion has an object."? We can, I think, avoid this by distinguishing between cases in which one is basically right about the object of one's belief, but wrong about some properties, and cases in which one is wrong about virtually everything. For example, in the case of Constable McKenzie, while he is not vicious, he is a policeman. Thus there is a substantial resemblance between my belief and the appropriate item in the world. For not only do I believe he is a policeman, I also believe that he is that policeman, standing on the corner of Georgia and Hornby at 4:00 on a Friday afternoon, and so on. That is, I am right about his job, his sex, his location in time and space, and his basic physical characteristics. In cases like this one, where I have a great many of the properties of the object of my belief right, it seems to me unobjectionable to say that, while my belief is unjustified, my emotion nevertheless has an object. By the same token, when the beliefs involved are even mistaken on the level of role or occupation (where relevant) sex, location in time and space and basic physical characteristics, we will say that emotion is both unjustified and objectless. Clearly, there is no principled way to distinguish between emotions with objects and emotions without; in the end, it is mostly a matter of the number of properties that beliefs and items have in common. Yet is is not just a matter of numbers: the important thing is that the beliefs and items in the world that match are
what the emotion is about. If, for example, I am right about the buildings forming a background to Constable McKenzie, right about the street and the time, but utterly mistaken about Constable McKenzie, taking him for a swindling Jesuit rather than a vicious monster of a policeman, then my emotion has no object. Or, if I am so completely wrong about the purported object of my emotion that no object of that kind could, conceptually, be the object of that emotion, my emotion has no object. For example, suppose I believe, for whatever odd reasons, that the person who now stands before me is a particularly charitable, morally upright and generous Irish Setter, and I feel deep gratitude and moral admiration towards this dog. An Irish Setter is an inappropriate object of gratitude just on conceptual grounds, since it cannot be intentionally gratuitously fulfilling my desires or those of others, or acting on principle—both requirements for being the object of gratitude or moral admiration. In this case, the emotion has no object. And making the distinction in the ways I have suggested is not entirely arbitrary from a causal standpoint. The more difficult a causal story is to construct, in the sense that one has to bring in more and more distorted CBFERs to account for such substantial mistakes, the more likely it is that the emotion is not only unjustified but has no object. Radical error about, e.g., biological classification of the object of one's beliefs plus great difficulty in constructing a plausible causal story are both indicative of substantial disorder of mind, of the tendency to make very different kinds of mistakes than the sort of mistake made when one has a strong prejudice against policemen. One can easily construct a causal story for a prejudice against policemen—one was in the Chicago riots of 1968, saw one's friends struck down by policemen and so on. It is much more difficult to imagine how one
could take a policeman for a Jesuit or a human being for an Irish Setter.

Thus new criteria begin to emerge. We will say that an emotion has an
object if (1) it is caused by attention to the object and not associated with
something else and (2) its distinctive features are mostly determined by the
object. Criterion (1) is unchanged, but criterion (2) is different: it is
no longer necessary that the belief and the person or even in the world match
in every respect. For justified emotions, of course, Wilson's criteria stand.
But we are not yet finished.

It might be thought that Wilson's second criterion provides a guarantee
that a certain causal story holds, since it seems at first glance that the
properties of beliefs and the properties of items in the world will only match
in the appropriate fashion in the former are determined by the latter. That
is, it is only if the evaluative process is performed with no interference
from distorted CBFERs or prudentially determined policies of inquiry that the
properties an item is believed to have are the properties it indeed has. But
such is not the case; consider the following possibility. As a result of
distorted CBFERs and a prudentially influenced policy of inquiry formulated to
reduce the perceived unpleasant features of urban life, I have come to believe
that all policemen are kind, amiable and cheerful. Eventually, just by
coincidence, I am likely to be right at least once. I met Constable McKenzie
and he is indeed kind, amiable and cheerful. Constable McKenzie is the cause
of my belief in the sense that he does not remind me of someone else, and from
the standpoint of the second criterion, there is a perfect match. The
difficulty is that my beliefs about the constable's character have been
produced not by my observation of his actions, facial expressions, etc., but
by my prudentially influenced policy of inquiry and distorted CBFERs;
prudential considerations have done nearly all the work here. That this sort of difficulty can occur requires that we have some criterion that specifies the ideal casual story. Unfortunately, without a good deal more psychological knowledge, one is ill-equipped to construct such a criterion with any precision. However, one can make some suggestions.

Ideally, new information and evaluation plus CBFERs and a policy of inquiry that act as foundations for true beliefs rather than hindrances each have their roles to play in the causal story of emotions. While it is almost impossible to acquire too much new information (because the mind usually starts to reject it at a certain point) it does seem highly possible, indeed all too common in cases of distorted CBFERs and a prudentially influenced policy of inquiry for certain elements in evaluation to be interfered with and in turn themselves interfere with the character of the new information. The problem is that, until we know considerably more about how all this works, it is difficult to know quite what to say. It is tempting to say that what goes wrong in cases of unjustified emotion due to distorted CBFERs or a prudentially affected policy of inquiry is that somehow there are an excess of subjectively determined causal factors, that what happens when I am grateful to a highly idealized department chairwoman for my job rather than just feeling a mild appreciation for a perfectly routine hiring efficiently carried through is that I have allowed various strong desires, such as the desire to replace my mother who has recently died, to help construct criteria for gratitude that have little to do with seeing how things are in the real world. And of course this is true. But is is also misleading. In cases of both justified and unjustified emotions, subjective factors play a role. They play a role insofar as desires and CBFERs of some sort are always present, and
insofar as the process of evaluation that eventually produces emotion is a psychological process. Furthermore, the policy of inquiry determines to a large extent what sorts of perceptions are allowed to be evaluated. Thus we have an enormous complex made up of desires, CBFERs distorted or otherwise, criteria, a policy of inquiry plus the evaluation process that must take place for each emotion. In the light of this, the difference between the ideal causal story for justified emotions and the flawed one for unjustified emotions cannot be adequately expressed by saying that justified emotions are somehow less subjectively determined than the sort of unjustified emotions we have looked at. Subjective processes are involved in both cases. What we can say is that unjustified emotions that are unjustified as a result of distorted CBFERs involve quantitatively more subjective factors in that there are literally extra causal steps that are involved in maintaining a prudentially determined policy of inquiry. In the model epistemic process described in Chapter 5, there can be a certain amount of selectivity of perceptions as a result of interest based on desire. That is, if one is especially interested in whether or not the lake is frozen hard enough to skate on, one is not likely to pay much attention to people drinking hot chocolate in the huts on shore, but one is likely to pay quite a lot of attention to the surface of the ice, how far out people seem to be skating, and so on. In the case of unjustified emotions, there is the ordinary selectivity as described above, and there is also a kind of psychological tampering with the evidence so that it can fit with whatever purpose is expressed in prudentially influenced policy of inquiry. In this sense, there is an extra step. Thus the causal story will look different for justified and unjustified emotions, though it is difficult to say anything very precise. As a third criterion, we might
require that, for justified emotions, only certain causal procedures can be present in the realm of evaluation, CBFERs and policy of inquiry, certain kinds of epistemic mistakes cannot be made, and, as a kind of insurance, only a certain number of causal steps are allowed. Minor modifications can be made for emotions that are unjustified but have objects, but any major deviations will render emotions objectless and unjustified. To think of the difficulty in this quantitative way also suggests an interpretation of certain psychological difficulties. Many people who have serious psychological problems seem to have little enthusiasm for dealing with the events of everyday life - they literally seem not to have enough energy. If maintaining distorted background beliefs requires extra causal steps, and we assume that there is a relationship between quantity of steps in causal procedure and the amount of energy needed to engage in this causal procedure, we can see that for people with serious difficulties so much energy is required to keep the distorted CBFERs in place that it is not surprising that such people haven't enough energy for everyday life.

So at last we have a complete causal story, though some of the elements are not as clear and precise as one would wish. An emotion begins with the selection of something in the world as of interest because one or more of one's desires is active. This person or event is evaluated, using both information from the world and various epistemic policies and beliefs, and the evaluation yields a belief that contains the result, which in turn triggers various physiological processes and feelings, and sometimes specific behaviors or manners of behavior. This process may proceed unimpeded, as in cases where emotions have objects and are justified. Minor difficulties may occur, as a result of which we have emotions that have objects but are unjustified; major
difficulties will result in emotions that are both objectless and unjustified.

Part 4: Some difficult cases - emotions about the future and past

Given this account, do emotions about the future have objects? If we say that what it is for an emotion to have an object is for it to be caused by learning of or paying attention to something in the world, one of the things that follows from this is that emotions about the future have no objects. The do, of course, have content, but that is a different matter. However, we can do better than to simply say that emotions about the future have no objects. We can offer a causal account of at least some of them. Suppose I am afraid a nuclear war. When asked to fill out my beliefs, I say that while we are not now having a nuclear war, nevertheless the behavior of the Russians and the Americans leads me to predict that we will have one before long. If a belief about the future can be spelled out in this way, we can say that one's fears are, to a great extent based on beliefs about the facts, since it is on the basis of certain facts that I now have the emotion I do. The difference between the beliefs involved in this emotion and the beliefs involved in an emotion that has an object is that in the latter case, the evaluative belief that appears in the emotions is about the same thing as the beliefs that appear in the facts and interpretation stage, while the same thing is not true in the former case. What seems to happen is that we notice and interpret the facts and, on the basis of our beliefs about, e.g., the intentions of the Americans and the Russians, we do something in addition to noticing and interpreting; we make a prediction. This is an extra step that is present in all emotions about the future. Granted, some predictions are on better grounds than others - if the Russians and Americans actually say they are going to war, I am on far
better ground for predicting that they will go to war than I am if I just notice that they are not getting along well at conferences. However, to the extent that these emotions contain a prediction, all the beliefs involved are not relevant to whatever actions, persons, etc., constitute the facts. And insofar as they are not relevant, the emotion is unjustified. And since the beliefs are only partially caused by learning about or noticing something about the world, but were substantially caused by the beliefs I already have about the conditions under which I am entitled to make predictions, the emotion does not have an object.

Emotions that are about events, persons, etc. in the past present different problems. These emotions once did have objects, and it seems rather hard to say that they do not now have objects. Let us consider the way in which a good many emotions about the past are caused. I am listening to the CBC, and suddenly I hear Chopin's *Fantaisie Impromptu*, which brings back the memory of a particular childhood piano recital. It is as if I am again in the Women's Club on a hot June afternoon, and the most talented piano pupil is playing the *Fantaisie Impromptu*. I am stabbed by pangs of the purest envy as I hear her. One is really tempted to say in an example such as this one that my emotion has an object: the object of my envy is Sally, the girl who played Chopin so beautifully. Certainly it is true that Sally was the object of the emotion then. But now, what has set off the causal chain is hearing Chopin. What I notice or learn of is Chopin's *Fantaisie Impromptu* which, by association, triggers my memory, including the emotion. That this is what happens excludes this emotion from having an object - the emotion must be determined by relevant features of the object, not by some accidental association. In fact, this is the kind of example that Wilson uses to
contrast with cases where one's beliefs are actually determined by the object. It's not, after all, as if there is a coincidence of objects; the object of my emotion then was Sally, not the *Fantaisie Impromptu*, and it is the *Fantaisie Impromptu* to which I am now paying attention. This sort of causal story is typical of emotions about the past, even if I am remembering my girlish passion for someone who has long since become a platonic friend. I have emotions about my present friendship, but the remembered passionate love is an association with the present friend—it is my friend at sixteen for whom I felt those intense emotions. And as in the first case, we can give a causal explanation, of how I happened to have that emotion, but we cannot say that the event or person that triggered the emotion is the one to which we are responding. Thus there is a causal connection between the person or even in the present and the emotion—one of them reminds me of the other. But this is not the requisite causal connection for object taking; there must be a coincidence between what is evaluated in the present and the object of the emotion, at least to the extent we have discussed in the previous section.

**Part 5: Theoretical classification**

Finally, we must ask ourselves what sort of theory we have about object taking. Are we prepared to argue that any case that varies from the paradigm is not a genuine case? We have already discussed the various possibilities that arise where there is a difference between object and cognitive content. Now let us look at more unusual cases, such as the case of music. Here one might argue that the causal link that usually holds between object and cognitive content instead holds between object and feeling, thus changing the causal relationship both between object and emotional constituent, and among
the emotional constituents themselves. Instead of the object causing a certain cognitive sequence, and the evaluation involved in this sequence causing the other emotional constituents, the object may cause feeling, and the feeling may cause behavior. The difficulty is that the power of music to produce distinctive feeling is an extremely mysterious one, one which I am not completely convinced exists, but which many people do so believe. Perhaps it would be easiest to designate music as an exception and say that, however it happens, and while we will want to say that music must have cognitive content of some kind since it must at least be noticed, it need not have evaluative content. And since this is the case, it will be impossible to say whether musical emotions have objects and are justified or unjustified except insofar as the beliefs cultivated after the fact are justified or unjustified or have objects. Or perhaps we could say that, should we adopt this view about musical emotions, the object of the emotion is the thing in the world that causes the non-evaluative cognitive content.

Another difficult case is the sort cited by Schachter and Singer, where the causal relation between emotion and object is unusual in another way. Here, the feeling occurs first, as a result of the injection of a drug. Evaluative beliefs and whatever behavior is involved comes later, when the subjects of the experiment have chosen their evaluative beliefs. This is an extremely unusual and certainly atypical causal story. One might be reluctant to identify the states as emotions at all, except that all constituents are present and the subjects themselves claim in these cases to be in emotional states. Given that, there seems to be no reason to discount these odd states as emotion. However, do we want to call them emotions with objects? This is difficult to answer because Schachter and Singer are speaking of emotional response over a period of time, hence of many occurrent emotions. But let us
construct an example of a single instance. I have a certain restless agitated feeling that's making me uncomfortable, and I don't understand it, since I (falsely) believe either that the drug has other effects, or have had no explanation at all. In the room with me is an extremely angry fellow, who begins to express hostility toward the experimenters, more and more intense hostility all the time. These evaluations fit in well with the feelings I'm already having, in the sense that when I'm angry, I often feel just this way. So it is not long before I too am thinking ill of the experimenters, feeling angry at their nosiness and inconsiderateness. In some ways, this situation structurally resembles the situation of the "unconscious" emotions, except that the missing element comes from an external cue, and not from some inner event. And sometimes therapy can be very much like this - one of the things some therapists do is try, by means of reconstruction of events in the past, to restore the client to some sort of normal emotionally responsive life, and sometimes this process can be helped along by making suggestions when certain emotional constituents are missing. There is no reason that an evaluation suggested by someone else cannot count as genuine as long as one truly adopts it as one's own. Curiously, it is not obvious that the Schachter-Singer emotion is entirely unjustified, since one may be perfectly correct in one's beliefs that the experimenters are manipulators, lie to their subjects, ask them questions that are none of their business, and don't pay them enough. However, the causal chain is different from the usual one in the case of fully justified emotions: the cognitive content, the evaluation, does not cause the feeling, since the feeling is already present. Rather, the discomfort generated by the unexplained feeling provides a motivation for first of all looking for an object and an explanation for these feelings. This is
conveniently supplied by the stooge. One's attention is directed to a
-certain object, a certain evaluation is adopted, perhaps one has some criteria
already present that allow acceptance of the stooge's evaluation. So while
this may be an emotion with an object, it is an emotion with an object that is
acquired not through the activity of one's desires, but through the direction
of another, and beliefs that are only accidentally justified if at all. One
has not gone through the usual attention and evaluation processes. It seems
best to say that this emotion has an object, but it is not an emotion that is
wholly justified.

Let us now return to the question raised at the beginning of this
section: What sort of theory is this? I have already argued that my theory
emotion does not fit easily into either the essentialist or family resemblance
categories. But what of the analysis of the emotion-object relationship?
Again, difficulties of classification arise. I allow a certain amount of
deviation from the paradigms of justification and object-taking, so that
emotions need not be fully justified to have an object. This would seem to
make an essentialist view unlikely. Furthermore, there are cases such as music
where an analysis of object-taking will be particularly difficult given the,
(possibly) unusual nature of emotions connected with music. On the other hand
the kinds of difficulties that arise in emotion-object relationships do not
lend themselves to family resemblance theory. Various cases of emotions with
objects do not resemble each other exactly because many things can go wrong in
the causal chain. But far from having some element absent, the more frequent
difficulties lie in the presence of extra elements, especially as a result of
distortions in the policy of inquiry. The presence of these elements produces
unjustified or partially unjustified emotions, so we cannot allow such cases to
count as legitimate. It is true that sometimes the object is missing, but again, we must count these cases as illegitimate, though allow a great deal of latitude about just what is missing.

In general, the problem with classifying this view is that, in the emotion-object relationship, whether an emotion is justified and has an object is a question of degree rather than straightforwardly a question of kind. There are a large number of beliefs involved in the emotions, and the situations in the world that give rise to emotional response are extremely complicated. If one must choose, it seems that an essentialist view is more suitable here, since I do propose paradigms, but it must be an essentialist view in which a good deal more variation and tolerance for exceptions than usual is allowed.

2. Ibid., pp. 187-188.

3. Ibid., p. 188.

4. Ibid., p. 189.

5. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Object".


8. Ibid., p. 119.

SOURCES CONSULTED


