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City planning and the political and fiscal repercussions of high unemployment King, Dianne Elizabeth Mary 1985

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CITY PLANNING AND THE POLITICAL AND FISCAL REPERCUSSIONS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT By DIANNE ELIZABETH MARY KING B.A. The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (The School of Community and Regional Planning) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March 1985 (c) Dianne Elizabeth Mary King, 1985 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Community and Regional Planning The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date 16 Ap r i l 1985 DE-6 (3/81) i i ABSTRACT The environment of c i t y planning p r a c t i c e includes increasing unemployment rates i n the communities p r a c t i t i o n e r s serve. There should be e f f e c t s of t h i s ; however, there i s l i t t l e discussion i n the l i t e r a t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between high unemployment and planning. This thesis i s an exploratory study of that r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t examines the e f f e c t s of high unemployment on c i t y planning as mediated by the p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l environments. Three levels of planning are considered: s t r a t e g i c , normative, and operational planning. The subjective q u a l i t y of the workplace i s also considered. A preliminary review of the l i t e r a t u r e s on unemployment, on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i t s economic antecedents, on planning, and on municipal f i s c a l s t r e s s , was followed by interviews with twenty-two planners, c o u n c i l l o r s , and administrators of nongovernmental services for the unemployed. The thesis describes the r e l a t i o n s h i p between unemployment and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . (Canadian data on magnetic tape which can be used i n quantitative work i n this area are l i s t e d i n the Appendix.) The implications of that r e l a t i o n s h i p are then developed for c i t y planning. The e f f e c t s on planning of unemployment-related municipal f i s c a l pressure are also explored. A number of hypotheses are generated which take into account i i i contextual e f f e c t s . These are incorporated into four future scenarios which make d i f f e r e n t assumptions about the a b i l i t y of l e f t - and right-of-center governments to reduce the unemployment rate. The thesis concludes with directions f o r future research and some general issues. TABLE OF CONTENTS i v page LIST OF TABLES v i i LIST OF FIGURES v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ix CHAPTERS I. INTRODUCTION 1 PURPOSE 2 METHODOLOGY 3 PROBLEMS IN DATA COLLECTION 8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 10 TERMINOLOGY 12 Unemployment 12 P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n 13 City Planning 14 OVERVIEW 17 I I . BACKGROUND 18 FACTS ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT 18 The Unemployment Rate 18 The Unemployment Experience 20 THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 23 Socioeconomic Status and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n 23 The P o l i t i c i z a t i o n of Economic Well-being 26 THE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT 28 Strategic Planning 28 Normative Planning 29 Operational Planning 30 Quality of the Workplace 31 CONCLUSION 31 I I I . THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT 33 POLITICAL APATHY 33 V PROTEST 37 Factors that Moderate Protest 38 The 1930's and Today 43 LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION 44 Increased Liberalism 44 Status P o l a r i z a t i o n 45 Increased Conservatism 46 RISING UNEMPLOYMENT AND AUTHORITARIANISM 52 SUMMARY 53 IV. CITY PLANNING AND THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT 56 STRATEGIC PLANNING 56 Conservatism and Strategic Planning 56 Liberalism and Innovation 62 Po l a r i z a t i o n and Strategic Planning 63 NORMATIVE PLANNING 64 Apathy and Normative Planning 64 Protest and Value Premises 65 Po l a r i z a t i o n and Normative Planning 65 OPERATIONAL PLANNING 65 QUALITY OF THE WORKPLACE 66 SUMMARY . 66 Strategic Planning 67 Normative Planning 67 Operational Planning 68 Quality of the Workplace 68 V. CITY PLANNING AND THE FISCAL REPERCUSSIONS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT . 69 HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND MUNICIPAL FINANCES 69 STRATEGIC PLANNING 71 Ex p l i c i t n e s s of C r i t e r i a 71 Economic Planning 72 Misrepresentation of Budgets 73 Ad hoc Decisions 73 A Trade-off Mode of Planning 74 V i s i b i l i t y of Performance 75 Reduced Goal Achievement 76 NORMATIVE PLANNING 77 OPERATIONAL PLANNING 78 THE QUALITY OF THE WORKPLACE 7 9 v i SUMMARY 80 Strategic Planning 80 Normative Planning 81 Operational Planning 81 Quality of the Workplace 81 VI. CONCLUSION 82 CLOSING THE GAP 82 POSSIBLE FUTURES 83 Unemployment Projections 83 The Neoconservatism Scenario 84 The P o l a r i z a t i o n Scenario 85 The Apathy Scenario 85 The Liberalism Scenario 87 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 87 Unemployment and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n : Research Needs . . . 87 The P o l i t i c a l Environment of Planning: Research Needs 89 Planning under F i s c a l Restraint: Research Needs 90 GENERAL ISSUES 91 The Two Faces of Planning 91 Independence for Planners 91 The H i s t o r i c a l Perspective 92 REFERENCES 93 APPENDIX 106 v i i LIST OF TABLES page I. Municipality and P o s i t i o n of Respondents 6 I I . Canadian Studies on magnetic tape in the University of B r i t i s h Columbia's Data Bank that contain measures of both Economic Status and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n 107 v i i i LIST OF FIGURES page 1. A n a l y t i c a l Framework showing the relationships between High Unemployment, P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , F i s c a l Pressure, and Ci t y Planning . 4 2. Unemployment and Income Trends: Canada, B r i t i s h Columbia, and Metropolitan Vancouver 19 3. Factors underlying the r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the A n a l y t i c a l Framework . 32 4. Percentages of T o t a l Appropriations, C i t y of Vancouver: Planning and Social Planning Departments, Economic Development O f f i c e , Health and S o c i a l Welfare account, Public Works account, and P o l i c e Department (half of t o t a l appropriations) 58 5. Ratios of Appropriations: Planning and S o c i a l Planning Departments, and the Economic Development O f f i c e 59 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT For Henry Hightower's guidence, openness, and patience throughout t h i s learning experience, I would l i k e to express my sincere thanks. To Jaimie Wallin, i n Administrative, Adult, and Higher Education, my gratitude for being r e a l i s t i c with respect to the time required f o r the study. My thanks, also, to Bob C o l l i e r , Administrator of the Munic i p a l i t y of Delta, f o r h i s moral support, to Brahm Wiesman, f o r h i s in t e r e s t i n my work and encouragement to continue the work I have begun, and to Richard Johnston and Jean Laponce, i n the P o l i t i c a l Science Department, f o r the i r i n i t i a l guidence. 1 would also l i k e to acknowledge my anonymous respondents, f o r th e i r time and thoughtfulness, and my parents, f o r th e i r patience and p r a c t i c a l assistance. Thanks also go to Jim L., who commented on an early d r a f t , and to my s i s t e r , Lynda, and to Ela i n e , for the i r f a i t h i n me. F i n a l l y , I express my gratitude to the many writers whose own work made this thesis possible. Any errors remaining i n the thesis are, or course, my own. 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION C i t y planners have been working i n the face of increasing unemployment rates i n t h e i r communities. However, there i s l i t t l e discussion of the implications of high unemployment for the planning environment. High unemployment i s usually treated as an object of planning a c t i v i t y rather than as a factor i n the planning process. This thesis asks how high unemployment a f f e c t s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and how the p o l i t i c a l environment, as well as f i s c a l pressures, a f f e c t c i t y planning during high unemployment. P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s generally agree that economic conditions a f f e c t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; however, "the precise r e l a t i o n s h i p . . . i s a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t to pin down" ( A l t , 1979:3). "We have l i t t l e information about what happens to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n during times of depression" (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:95). In h i s review of P o l i t i c s , P o l i c y and the  European Recession, Grant states that contributors are not sure how to tal k about the impact of recession on parties and pressure groups (1983). Given that p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have not come up with a c l e a r account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between economic conditions and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that there has been l i t t l e discussion of the implications of this r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r c i t y planning. Yet c i t y 2 planning i s l i k e l y to be affected by p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n at least two ways: through p o l i t i c i a n s ' responses to p o l i t i c a l pressures and through d i r e c t exchanges between planners and p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e c i t i z e n s . Discussions of the e f f e c t s of unemployment-related f i s c a l pressure on municipal government are easier to f i n d than discussions of unemployment-related p o l i t i c a l pressures. However, the growing amount of l i t e r a t u r e on municipal f i s c a l stress i s l a r g e l y American and does not discuss c i t y planning e x p l i c i t l y . Yet budget le v e l s and procedures undoubtedly a f f e c t an organizational a c t i v i t y l i k e planning. PURPOSE The thesis aims to f i l l a gap i n planners' knowledge about the planning environment. I t explores the e f f e c t s of high unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the implications for c i t y planning of p o l i t i c a l and budgetary pressures during high unemployment. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the thesis aims to 1. characterize p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n during high unemployment (Chapter I I I ) ; 2. explore the implications for c i t y planning of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n during high unemployment (Chapter IV); 3. characterize planning under budgetary pressure (Chapter V). A basic premise of the study i s that high unemployment has a d i r e c t e f f e c t on planning i n the form of f i s c a l pressure, as well as an i n d i r e c t 3 e f f e c t In terms of p o l i t i c a l l y mediated responses to high unemployment. P o l i t i c a l factors influence planners both d i r e c t l y through personal observations and exchanges with c i t i z e n s , and i n d i r e c t l y through the actions of council and senior governments. Figure 1 depicts the variables and r e l a t i o n s h i p s examined i n the th e s i s . Relationships beyond the scope of the study are indicated with a dotted l i n e . An understanding of the p o l i t i c a l environment may help planners to better a n t i c i p a t e and a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n change. Cox argues that only those European nations that have been able to mitigate the ef f e c t s of p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the recession have been able to tackle the basic s t r u c t u r a l and c y c l i c a l economic problems (1982:16). In addition, the growing l i t e r a t u r e on the p o l i t i c s of planning tends to adopt a neomarxist approach ( c f . Bolan, 1980). A systems view, such as that taken i n the th e s i s , and encompassing psychological and h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s , should throw new l i g h t on this area of planning theory. METHODOLOGY A preliminary review of the l i t e r a t u r e s on unemployment, on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i t s economic antecedents, on planning, and on municipal f i s c a l s t r e s s , were followed by interviews with twenty-two planners, c o u n c i l l o r s , and administrators of nongovernmental services for the unemployed. Additional l i t e r a t u r e , including the Annual Reviews of the Ci t y of Vancouver Planning Department, was consulted during the analysis and write-up. 4 OTHER FACTORS JL. F i s c a l Pressure ECONOMY Unemployment MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION Planners 7\ P o l i t i c a l Participation PUBLIC COUNCIL SENIOR GOVERNMENTS /\ Figure 1. A n a l y t i c a l Framework showing the relationships between High Unemployment, P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , F i s c a l Pressure, and C i t y Planning (Adapted from Frey, 1983) 5 Interviews were held with a d i r e c t o r and assistant d i r e c t o r of planning, the head of a planning d i v i s i o n , eight c i t y planners, two s o c i a l planners, s i x c o u n c i l l o r s , and three administrators of union, church, and nonprofit programs for the unemployed. Eighteen interviews were with persons i n the C i t y of Vancouver, and four with persons from the surrounding m u n i c i p a l i t i e s of West Vancouver, New Westminster, Delta, and Surrey. Table I depicts the positions of the respondents and the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s i n which they work. Respondents are not i d e n t i f i e d because of the p o l i t i c a l nature of the interviews. P o t e n t i a l respondents were referred to the writer by d i r e c t o r s of planning, i n i t i a l respondents, or the thesis advisers. Subjects were sought who had exposure to the public i n order that they would be able to describe changes i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the implications f or t h e i r work. Five of the planners i n the Vancouver C i t y Planning Department are i n Area Planning; two are i n Central Area planning with previous experience i n other d i v i s i o n s . The two s o c i a l planners are i n So c i a l Services Planning. To obtain interviews with the mayor and c o u n c i l l o r s , a formal request was c i r c u l a t e d by the Aldermen's Secretary. Six c o u n c i l l o r s consented. Three are with the Committee of Progressive Electors or the C i v i c Independents, which support labor, and three with The Electors Action Movement or the Non-Partisan Association, which advocate free-enterprise, although there i s some cross-voting. 6 Table I- Municipality and P o s i t i o n of Respondents ^ " ^ ^ MUNICIPALITY POSITION ^ ^ ^ ^ Van. W. Van. New West. Delta Surrey TOTAL Planner 9 1 1 1 1 13 Cou n c i l l o r 6 6 Administrator, Service f o r Unemployed 3 3 TOTAL 18 1 1 1 1 22 Van. New West. W. Van. = Vancouver = New Westminster = West Vancouver 7 Except for one telephone interview and two personal interviews which were between f i f t e e n and f i f t y minutes i n length, the interviews were f i f t y to ninety minutes long. Given the exploratory nature of the study, the interviews were open-ended. Planners and c o u n c i l l o r s were asked to describe changes i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n since the onset of the current recession and to make causal a t t r i b u t i o n s where possible. Respondents were then asked to describe how these changes had influenced t h e i r work. In the f i r s t interview, f i l i n g cards were used to present concepts for feedback; however, t h i s i n e f f i c i e n t procedure was abandoned i n favor of verbal probing. Respondents generally had some d i f f i c u l t y describing changes i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and accounting f o r any changes observed. However, with two or three exceptions, they seemed very interested i n the study focus. The interviews underscore the need for more debate and better theory i n this area. Because public o f f i c i a l s may have l i t t l e contact with, or concern about, people who may not p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s , the p o l i t i c a l behavior of the unemployed was explored with administrators of services f o r t h i s group. The format of the interviews was the same as for the planners and c o u n c i l l o r s except that questions focused on the e f f e c t of unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , e f f o r t s to organize the unemployed, and the reactions of public o f f i c i a l s . In view of differences between m u n i c i p a l i t i e s with respect to how hard they had been h i t by the recession, i t was decided, a f t e r several interviews, to focus on Vancouver. Unless otherwise noted, therefore, i t 8 can be assumed that respondents quoted i n the remainder of the thesis are r e f e r r i n g to the s i t u a t i o n i n Vancouver. The e f f e c t of high unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n was i n f e r r e d from the p o l i t i c a l science l i t e r a t u r e , which tends to focus on e l e c t o r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the United States at the state and national l e v e l s , as well as from Johnston's analysis of data on the 1979 and 1980 Canadian elections (1983), material on the Great Depression of the 1930's, the t h e o r e t i c a l background on unemployment and on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n presented i n Chapter I I , and the interviews. The implications of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n for c i t y planning were inf e r r e d from the planning and public administration l i t e r a t u r e s , as well as from the t h e o r e t i c a l background on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and planning presented i n Chapter I I , the Planning Department Annual Reviews, and the interviews. And, f i n a l l y , the implications of f i s c a l pressure for planning were gathered from the l i t e r a t u r e on municipal f i s c a l s t r e s s , the Annual Reviews, and the interviews. PROBLEMS IN DATA COLLECTION Several methodological problems were encountered at the outset. F i r s t , Canadian studies of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a v a i l a b l e on magnetic tape i n the University of B r i t i s h Columbia's Data Bank tend to focus on p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n national and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s and predate the current recession. These studies are l i s t e d i n the Appendix for the use of future i n v e s t i g a t o r s . They w i l l provide an i n t e r e s t i n g contrast to studies conducted during the 1980's when these become a v a i l a b l e . 9 L e t t e r s to municipal o f f i c i a l s were a p o t e n t i a l source of information about c i t i z e n s ' preferences and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c i t i z e n s who try to influence o f f i c i a l s . However, the Vancouver C i t y Clerk's o f f i c e indicated that only some l e t t e r s are forwarded to that o f f i c e , and only some of these are f i l e d . The record of public meetings i s also sketchy. Data would have to be extrapolated from overtime or h a l l r e n t a l budgets. The F e s t i v a l Committee has a p a r t i a l record of demonstrations. However, p r i o r to 1981 (the end of the protest era, according to one o f f i c i a l ) groups did not usually consult the C i t y before staging an event. In addition, records are kept a l p h a b e t i c a l l y by the name of the organization. To determine any change i n a c t i v i t y over the years would involve a time-consuming search through selected groups' f i l e s . Council minutes could have provided information about delegations. However, because a small number of i n d i v i d u a l s make repeat appearances which c o u n c i l l o r s tend to ignore, according to those c o u n c i l l o r s interviewed, and because accessing the information would have been an i n e f f i c i e n t use of time considering the l i m i t e d view of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i t would provide, t h i s path was foregone. Open-ended interviews were selected as the most e f f i c i e n t method of data c o l l e c t i o n and the most f o r g i v i n g of the lack of theory i n t h i s area. Future investigators may have the resources and theory to examine more quantitative data. F i n a l l y , there i s l i t t l e systematic study of the planning environment upon which to draw. Most work i n t h i s area i s of the case study v a r i e t y . 10 Research i n related areas, such as s o c i a l work, budgeting, and public administration, i s a useful supplement to the planning l i t e r a t u r e , although caution must be exerted i n generalizing from d i f f e r e n t contexts. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY The trends i n planning to be discussed i n the thesis do not n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t from the p o l i t i c a l impact of unemployment. Unemployment i s only one of many factors a f f e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n f l a t i o n (MacKuen, 1983; Fisher and Huizinga, 1982), income (Kinder and Mebane, 1983; Rosenstone, 1982; F a i r , 1978:171), the voter's general sense of whether the nation's economy i s improving or d e t e r i o r a t i n g (Kiewiet, 1983), fo r e i g n a f f a i r s (Mackuen, 1983), and regional or c u l t u r a l factors (Clarke et a l . , 1979) are stronger predictors of p o l i t i c a l preferences than unemployment i n c e r t a i n circumstances. In a d d i t i o n , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s undoubtedly only one of many factors a f f e c t i n g planning. Some attempt i s made i n the thesis to d i s t i n g u i s h between the e f f e c t s of the p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l environments, but this i s only a beginning. The temporal dimension of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between unemployment and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n (lags, cumulative e f f e c t s , etc.) i s beyond the scope of the t h e s i s . L i t t l e i s known about this aspect of the problem, and to attempt to explore this matter would unduly complicate the dis c u s s i o n . An exception to this i s the discussion of an increasing unemployment rate. The reader interested i n the temporal dimension may wish to consult the work of MacKuen (1983), Hibbs, (1979), F i o r i n a (1981), Paldam (1981), Monroe (1979), F a i r (1978), Bloom and Price (1975), and 11 Goodhart and Bhansali (1970). Due to the lack of research at the l o c a l l e v e l , the discussion i n Chapter III focuses on p o l i t i c s at the p r o v i n c i a l and national l e v e l s . However, as two c o u n c i l l o r s suggested, most people are not very active i n c i t y p o l i t i c s and do not d i s t i n g u i s h among the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of government. The large and diverse budgets of large m u n i c i p a l i t i e s may also f a c i l i t a t e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n from larger p o l i t i c a l arenas. I t appears, moreover, that the l e f t - r i g h t dimension of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s more important i n B.C. p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s (U.B.C. p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , 1985) and Vancouver p o l i t i c s (Gutstein, 1983:15) than i n national p o l i t i c s . This suggests that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between unemployment and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n found at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l may be a conservative estimate of this r e l a t i o n s h i p i n Vancouver p o l i t i c s . By focusing on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the thesis takes an atomistic view of the p o l i t i c a l environment. Discussion of i n d i v i d u a l behavior dominates that of p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t groups, and s o c i a l a c t i o n movements. I t i s assumed that groups shape themselves to a t t r a c t supporters more than i n d i v i d u a l s compromise t h e i r values to be a part of a p o l i t i c a l group. That the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , exploration of which i s beyond the scope of the t h e s i s . Readers may be disappointed that l i t t l e i s said about c i t i z e n s ' reactions to government cutbacks. While the thesis sows the seeds f o r a chapter on "How Cutbacks A f f e c t P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " the c u l t i v a t i o n of such a chapter i s future work. A book would be a more appropriate format than the thesis for yet another l e v e l of a n a l y s i s . 12 Given that Figure 1 distinguishes between planners and co u n c i l , i t would appear that c o u n c i l receives short s h r i f t thereafter. In the in t e r e s t s of s i m p l i c i t y , i t was decided to handle the ro l e of council passim rather than separately with a l l of the d e f i n i t i o n a l and t h e o r e t i c a l treatment given unemployment, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and planning. The consequences of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r the composition of council are discussed throughout Chapter I I I , while the r o l e of council i n the mediation of c i t i z e n s ' responses to high unemployment i s discussed at various points i n Chapter IV. The thesis i s directed p r i m a r i l y towards municipal planners. Regional and nongovernmental planning are beyond the scope of the th e s i s . So, too, are planning education and theory i n substantive areas of planning. The focus i s on planning p r a c t i c e . TERMINOLOGY This section defines the major variables--unemployment, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and c i t y p lanning—as they are viewed i n the th e s i s . Unemployment The o f f i c i a l unemployment rate as reported by S t a t i s t i c s Canada i s the percentage of the n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l c i v i l i a n labor force without a job or l a i d o f f and seeking work. However, t h i s s t a t i s t i c underestimates the number of discouraged unemployed workers who have given up trying to fi n d a job, and the number of underemployed workers who cannot obtain s u f f i c i e n t hours of work. The e f f e c t of considering only c i v i l i a n employment i s to s l i g h t l y exaggerate the unemployment rate. However, i n 13 the balance, the o f f i c i a l unemployment rate probably underestimates unemployment, p a r t i c u l a r l y during periods of high unemployment when unemployed workers are more l i k e l y to become discouraged (see Chapter I I ) . I t i s sometimes argued that the unemployment rate i s i n f l a t e d by secondary income earners whose income i s not e s s e n t i a l to the support of the family. However, i t appears that wives entered the workforce between 1971 and 1981 p r i m a r i l y to o f f s e t d e c l i n i n g family income ( S t a t i s t i c s Canada, 1984). The unemployment rate can, therefore, be considered a measure of deprivation. Trends i n unemployment and some of the psychological and s o c i a l e f f e c t s of unemployment with relevance f o r the discussion of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Chapter I I I are outlined i n further d e t a i l i n Chapter I I . P o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n P o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s defined as involvement of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a c t i v i t i e s intended to influence government (elected o f f i c i a l s or the administration). Preparatory a c t i v i t i e s l i k e "keeping informed" w i l l not be considered here. P o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a multi-dimensional concept. The modes i d e n t i f i e d by f a c t o r analysis include voting, campaigning and other p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t y , contacting o f f i c i a l s with respect to a community problem, and contacting o f f i c i a l s with respect to a private problem (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972). Some modes, such as demonstrating, have received less a t t e n t i o n and could constitute separate modes. Some people are ac t i v e i n most modes--the complete 14 modes. Some people are active i n most modes — the complete a c t i v i s t s — w h i l e others are act i v e i n none--the apathetics or in a c t i v e s . Before the d i f f e r e n t modes were i d e n t i f i e d , i t was common to talk about gladiators and spectators a f t e r Milbrath's seminal book on how and why people p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s (1965). The i n t e n s i t y dimension s t i l l has v a l i d i t y as a separate dimension (Milbrath and Goel, 1977). Chapter II provides further d e t a i l on some of the e s s e n t i a l features of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n which are c r i t i c a l to understanding both the impact of unemployment on i t and the p o l i t i c a l s e t ting of planning. C i t y planning For the purposes of this thesis, c i t y planning i s defined as a professional advisory function i n municipal government which attempts to make policy-making more r a t i o n a l and a n t i c i p a t o r y . This d e f i n i t i o n b e l i e s the degree of disagreement on this point and i s , therefore, somewhat a r b i t r a r y and personal. As a r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , planning attempts to 1. i d e n t i f y a problem and the stakes i n i t s r e s o l u t i o n . The ant i c i p a t o r y component of planning requires the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of gaps between projected trends and goals, and the formulation of community goals; 2. determine a range of alternate solutions l i k e l y to include the best one (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962); 3. assess the obstacles, opportunities, and s i d e - e f f e c t s ; 15 4. make recommendations. However, the p o l i t i c a l process tends to outweigh long-range and comprehensive plans based on p r i n c i p l e s of r a t i o n a l i t y (Blowers, 1980; Catanese, 1974:24). Therefore, i t i s argued that some degree of r a t i o n a l i t y must be traded-off for proposals with a higher chance of being adopted (Catanese, 1974; Benveniste, 1972:118). But then, planners may be c r i t i c i z e d f o r being re a c t i v e , incremental and bureaucratic (Blowers, 1980). The p o s i t i o n taken i n the thesis i s that the "expert's dilemma" (Benveniste, 1972:118) i s unavoidable and planners w i l l f i n d themselves making compromises. As conditions which fo s t e r one aspect of planning may hinder another, i t i s useful to d i s t i n g u i s h between three levels of planning: the s t r a t e g i c , normative, and operational l e v e l s (Smith, 1982; Ozbekan, 1973). Thus, the p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l repercussions of high unemployment (discussed i n Chapters IV and V respectively) w i l l be discussed under the headings of "Strategic Planning," "Normative Planning," and "Operational Planning." Strategic planning i s the an a l y s i s , evaluation, and s e l e c t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e means (Smith, 1982:362). Rational comprehensive planning tends to focus on s t r a t e g i c planning. The ends are taken as given, or i t i s assumed there i s a single public i n t e r e s t . Normative planning i s the reconsideration of the value premises underlying decisions, and the d e f i n i t i o n of desired ends and ideals (Smith, 1982:362). The ends are not taken for granted, nor i s an objective 16 public i n t e r e s t assumed. Normative planning i s concerned with the proper p o l i t i c a l procedure for reaching solutions and with the communication of information. F i n a l l y , operational planning i s the determination of what w i l l be done; i n contrast, s t r a t e g i c planning i s concerned with what can be done, normative planning with what should be done (Smith, 1982:362). Operational planning involves the c u l t i v a t i o n of consensus. There i s also disagreement about the scope of the planning function. Some planners argue that they should r e s t r i c t themselves to land use issues (Reade, 1982). Others take a broader view which encompasses s o c i a l issues or p o l i t i c s (e.g. Forester, 1982; Webber, 1978; Davidoff, 1965). The view taken i n this thesis i s that c i t y planning covers a l l areas of municipal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Thus, i n some c i t i e s , planning may be r e s t r i c t e d to land use. In other c i t i e s , s o c i a l and/or economic p o l i c y may be appropriate subjects. Some planners contend that p o l i t i c a l involvement ta i n t s the numbers they provide ( S t e r n l i e b , 1978:299). Others contend that planning i s p o l i t i c a l whether or not i t i s recognized as such (Davidoff, 1965), and i t tends to be used to mediate and prevent s o c i a l c o n f l i c t (Blowers, 1980:37). The view underlying t h i s thesis i s that i n ad d i t i o n to providing the numbers, planners have a role i n f a c i l i t a t i n g constructive debate, that i s in normative planning. Public involvement can be a means to this end. F i n a l l y , i t has been argued that planning should extend access to 17 opportunities by ensuring the most e f f i c i e n t and equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources (Lynch, 1981; Webber, 1968). In the absence of a p r a c t i c a l and accepted theory of s o c i a l j u s t i c e , decisions about the d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources are b a s i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l l y motivated. The writer's p o s i t i o n i s that when planners disagree with c o u n c i l , they should use persuasion, but they should not presume that they know the public i n t e r e s t better than do the elected representatives. On issues about which they f e e l strongly, planners should seek to change the value p o s i t i o n of council through the e l e c t o r a l system as private i n d i v i d u a l s . OVERVIEW Chapter I has presented the problem, s p e c i f i e d the purpose and si g n i f i c a n c e of the study, described the methodology and problems encountered i n data c o l l e c t i o n , discussed the l i m i t a t i o n s of the study, and defined the major v a r i a b l e s . Chapter II characterizes unemployment, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and c i t y planning i n f u l l e r d e t a i l . Following t h i s , Chapter III w i l l describe how unemployment a f f e c t s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Chapter IV w i l l then explore the implications for c i t y planning of the themes discussed i n Chapter I I I . Chapter V outlines the f i s c a l repercussions of high unemployment for m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and the implications for c i t y planning. The f i n a l chapter of the thesis assesses the progress made i n closing the gap, i d e n t i f i e d at the outset, i n our knowledge. I t speculates on future trends, suggests di r e c t i o n s f o r further research i n the area, and r e f l e c t s on some general issues i n planning. 18 CHAPTER II BACKGROUND This chapter provides a f u l l e r d e s c r i p t i o n of the study variables than could be afforded i n Chapter I and fleshes out the study framework introduced i n Chapter I. Some of the es s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of unemployment, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and the planning environment are presented to f a c i l i t a t e understanding of the following chapters. FACTS ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT This section provides a b r i e f look at aggregate trends i n , and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of, unemployment, followed by a sketch of the experience of unemployment. The Unemployment Rate Figure 2 depicts trends i n unemployment for Vancouver, B r i t i s h Columbia, and Canada. Unemployment had hovered between four and ten percent since the 1950's u n t i l the early 1980's, when the rate reached i t s highest l e v e l since the 1930's. Care must be taken i n generalizing from h i s t o r i c a l data, however, as lat e r d e f i n i t i o n s of unemployment are more i n c l u s i v e . For this reason, the d i f f e r e n t data series are i d e n t i f i e d i n Figure 2. B r i t i s h Columbia's unemployment rate i s usually higher than Ontario's 7. 70 65 60 55 —?l-00 Average d u r a t i o n o f unemployment — 71-201 =- D484-490 / ^ K i 1 1 1 71-20L/V'' — DI24-133 — — V D484J-427_^/ — — — 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D49I-497 71-201^ H e a l t h j Income s h a r e bottom 607. o f i n d i v i d u a l s P e r c e n t a g e o f low income p e r s o n s P a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e Unemployment r a t e 1966 70 75 80 84 46 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 84 21 25 30 35 40 4-5 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 84 METRO-VANCOUVER BRITISH COLUMBIA , CANADA Figure 2 . Unemployment and Income Trends: Canada, B r i t i s h Columbia, and Metropolitan Vancouver (Source: S t a t i s t i c s Canada, catalogue nos. shown). 20 and the p r a i r i e provinces' (Economic Council of Canada, 1977). However, since 1984, B.C. has had the second or t h i r d highest unemployment rate i n Canada. Public sector f i r i n g s have undoubtedly contributed to increased r e l a t i v e unemployment. Unemployment tends to be highest i n the i n t e r i o r of B.C. (247. i n the f i r s t quarter of 1984) and lowest i n the Lower Mainland (147. during the same period) since the primary, construction, manufacturing, and transportation industries have higher rates of unemployment than the service and f i n a n c i a l sectors (B.C. Central Credit Union, 1984:2). Bl u e - c o l l a r Canadians, and increasingly, c l e r i c a l workers and people i n sales, as well as Canadians with l i t t l e education or at the beginning or end of their working l i v e s , have the highest rates of unemployment (Deaton, 1983:16-17). In general, lower status i n d i v i d u a l s are the most l i k e l y to be unemployed (Schlozman and Verba, 1979). The Unemployment Experience The unemployed usually s u f f e r a loss of income. Since the onset of the recession i n 1982, the number of people below the poverty l i n e (see Figure 2) and the rate of transfer payments ( S t a t i s t i c s Canada, 1982; K i r s h , 1983:75) have increased. In addition, Figure 2 shows how the income share of the bottom s i x t y percent of the population has decreased i n recent years. I t appears that economic inequality increases with a steep r i s e in unemployment. The unemployed also tend to experience reductions i n self-confidence, s o c i a l contact with coworkers and f r i e n d s , r e s i d e n t i a l and marital 21 s t a b i l i t y , and health (Borgen and Amundson, 1984; Kirsh, 1983; Rosenstone, 1982; Brenner, 1973; Bernstein, 1970; Gallacher, 1969). I n i t i a l shock and depression tend to be followed by optimism and job search, whereas extended unemployment tends to produce resignation (Borgen and Amundson, 1984:103; K i r s h , 1983:62; Hayes and Nutman, 1981). Health differences between the long term unemployed and the employed gradually disappear (Buss and Redburn, 1983:49), suggesting that the unemployed adjust to th e i r circumstances. Borgen and Amundson have found that people who have not anticipated unemployment and women with few supports tend to experience higher than average swings i n emotions (1984:32). Repeated la y o f f s may also i n t e n s i f y the response to joblesness (Kasl and Cobb, 1979). In contrast, immigrants are more persistent than average i n t h e i r job search and have less noticable emotional swings (Borgen and Amundson, 1984:65,78,104). Secondary wage earners experience r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e emotional upheaval and a gradual downturn i n emotions (Borgen and Amundson, 1984:61). Where unemployment i s anticipated, Borgen and Amundson found that many emotions are f e l t before unemployment begins (p. 50). F i n a l l y , they discovered that unemployed youths with l i t t l e or no post-secondary education exhibit resentment and l i t t l e constructive job search a c t i v i t y (p. 104). As the duration of unemployment increases, unemployed union workers tend not to renew the i r memberships (Schlozman and Verba, 1979:262). However, there i s disagreement about the e f f e c t of unemployment on organizational p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n general. Some researchers have observed decreased p a r t i c i p a t i o n (Kennedy and Davis, 1984; Ostheimer and R i t t , 22 1982:379; Crysdale, 1965:17-18). Others have found no e f f e c t (Schlozman and Verba, 1979:262). Two of the planners who were interviewed thought that unemployment would a f f e c t middle socioeconomic status persons more than low status persons whom the planners assumed would be accustomed to economic hardship. "Status" i s used interchangeably with "socioeconomic status" which refers loosely to educational achievement, occupational status, and income l e v e l . The middle status unemployed may experience as much stress as the lower status unemployed; however, they may be more e f f e c t i v e i n handling stress (Kirsh, 1983:18-20; Catalano and Dooley, 1983; Scott and Acock, 1979). Displaced blue c o l l a r workers experience more downward mobility (Foltman, 1968; Crysdale, 1965) and are more l i k e l y to withdraw s o c i a l l y (Crysdale, 1965:17-18; Aiken et a l . , 1968:86). (Displaced workers are workers who have l o s t t h e i r jobs to a plant closure and who may be reemployed at the time of the study.) S i m i l a r l y , a respondent claimed that the "non-savings" unemployed are absorbed i n looking f o r work and bargains, doing things themselves, and walking (instead of d r i v i n g or taking the bus). A number of factors may moderate the impact of unemployment, including optimism about economic growth and job opportunities, personal savings, and s o c i a l support (Buss & Redburn, 1983:56-57; K i r s h , 1983; Hayes and Nutman, 1981; Kasl and Cobb, 1979). F i n a l l y , the unemployed tend to c i t e personal as opposed to economic 23 factors for t h e i r unemployment (Tanner et a l . , 1984; K i r s h , 1983:47; Bakke, 1940). Psychological studies f i n d that people generally believe they deserve th e i r fate (Lerner, 1981:21). In conclusion, unemployment appears to have two major e f f e c t s which may a f f e c t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n : economic deprivation and s o c i a l marginality. In addition, lower status groups appear to be affected more often i f not more severely, although age, e t h n i c i t y , s o c i a l support, nationa l economic conditions, and many other f a c t o r s , influence the psychosocial impact of unemployment. F i n a l l y , the a t t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or joblessness has implications for i t s p o l i t i c i z a t i o n . THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Several features of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n are c r i t i c a l to understanding the impact of unemployment on i t and i t s relevance for c i t y planning. F i r s t , the e f f e c t s of socioeconomic status are discussed, followed by a discussion of the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of economic well-being. Socioeconomic Status and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n One of the most thoroughly documented findings i n p o l i t i c a l science i s that higher socioeconomic status persons are more p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e than lower status persons (Mishler, 1979:92-97; Milbrath and Goel, 1977:92). Education may be the most important f a c t o r i n this r e l a t i o n s h i p (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:98). Education i s associated with other v a r i a b l e s , such as income and memberships, which f a c i l i t a t e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; i t fosters cognitive s k i l l s which f a c i l i t a t e learning about p o l i t i c s ; i t brings people i n contact with p o l i t i c a l s t i m u l i ; i t helps people to understand the s i g n i f i c a n c e of p o l i t i c a l decisions; i t fosters personal e f f i c a c y and the b e l i e f that one can influence government; i t f a c i l i t a t e s discussion about p o l i t i c s with a wider range of people; and i t provides experience with bureaucracy (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:35-36; Milbrath and Goel, 1977:38, 100). However, education i s less strongly r e l a t e d to voting than to nonelectoral forms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:96,100-1; Rothman, 1974:329). Occupational status, i n general, contributes l i t t l e to the r e l a t i o n s h i p between status and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , although some jobs have a f a c i l i t a t i v e e f f e c t on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n s i m i l a r to education (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:27, 35). These are jobs that c u l t i v a t e cognitive, s o c i a l , and negotiating s k i l l s ; that depend d i r e c t l y on government p o l i c i e s ; and that produce i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the middle cla s s (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:29; Milbrath and Goel, 1977:103-4). Professionals and businessmen are p a r t i c u l a r l y active i n lobbying and holding elected o f f i c e (Mishler, 1979:92; Milbrath and Goel, 1977:104-105). They are able to bypass e l e c t o r a l channels and communicate d i r e c t l y with elected o f f i c i a l s (Mishler, 1979:92). Professionals prefer professional channels to protest (Rothman, 1974:343) and are about average with respect to campaigning (Mishler, 1979:93). Poverty appears to reduce p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but otherwise increased income has l i t t l e impact on voting (Rosenstone, 1982:35; Mishler, 1979:96). Low income persons are also less l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n programs aimed at changed l i f e s t y l e s or attitudes than i n programs aimed at improving economic and s o c i a l conditions obviously a f f e c t i n g them 25 (Rothman, 1974:295). Income appears to f a c i l i t a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a c t i v i t i e s that require self-esteem or money, such as campaigning and donating money (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:97). In addition, economic optimism about personal and national conditions i s associated with increased voting and a vote for the right-of-center Republican party i n the northern United States (Campbell et a l . , 1960:397). The r e l a t i o n s h i p between socioeconomic status and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s moderated by the organization of the working class (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972:208; Lipset, 1960). Working class organizations, l i k e volunteer organizations of the middle c l a s s , f o s t e r r a t i o n a l decision-making, c o l l e c t i v e goals, and promotion based on achievement (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:111). Organization of the working class also increases partisanship, which subsequently stimulates p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ; thus, labor union members are more l i k e l y to have strong stands on issues and to vote than nonunionized workers (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:40-47, 112). Status p o l a r i z a t i o n i s the degree to which the working and middle classes support the labor and conservative parties respectively. The degree of status polarized voting varies considerably across countries, being higher i n B r i t a i n than i n the United States and Canada (Hibbs, 1982a; Clarke et a l . , 1979:128; Crewe et a l . , 1977; F r a n k l i n and Mughan, 1978). In B.C., about one-third of the working class supports S o c i a l C r e d i t , and these tend to be i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c persons; about one-third of the middle class supports the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.), and these believe i n a strong r o l e for the state i n s o c i a l p o l i c y and economic 26 regulation (U.B.C. p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , 1985). After 1972, former L i b e r a l s tended to support the N.D.P., whereas former Conservatives tended to support the S o c i a l Credit party (U.B.C. p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , 1985). The various modes of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n mentioned i n Chapter I are associated with d i f f e r e n t s k i l l l e v e l s and a t t i t u d e s , and, consequently, with d i f f e r e n t types of participants (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972). Since the modes also d i f f e r i n t h e i r influence on p o l i t i c i a n s (Verba and Nie, 1972), i t stands to reason that d i f f e r e n t groups have d i f f e r e n t levels of influence on government. Nevertheless, p a r t i c i p a t i o n can increase or decrease s o c i a l inequality depending on who takes advantage of i t ; leaders tend to respond to p a r t i c i p a n t s and not to t h e i r s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (Verba and Nie, 1972:342; Guerrette, 1979:132). The P o l i t i c i z a t i o n of Economic Well-being A t t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the economy to government i s c r i t i c a l to the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of personal circumstances (Johnston, 1983; Feldman, 1982). To the extent that people locate the causes of their economic problems either i n the immediate environment or i n t h e i r own f a i l i n g s , personal discontent i s u n l i k e l y to have p o l i t i c a l consequences.... i n accounting for national economic conditions, the public w i l l often point to p o l i t i c a l factors (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979:157). Voters tend to vote out the incumbent government during slow or negative economic growth (Amacher and Boyes, 1982; Lewis-Beck, 1980; Tufte, 1975; F i o r i n a , 1978; Frey and Schneider, 1978; Bloom and P r i c e , 1975; Kramer, 1971) and this e f f e c t crosses party lines (Campbell et a l . , 1960). The tendency for incumbents to r e t i r e from p o l i t i c s when they believe t h e i r chances of r e e l e c t i o n are poor further reduces the chances of the incumbent government being reelected (Ke r n e l l , 1978). Elections with a high amount of competition and c o n f l i c t , such as might be found i n a recession, are associated with high rates of voter turnout (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:132-140; Rothman, 1974:365). However, the perception that economic c r i s i s i s a p o l i t i c a l resultant may produce psychological resignation and p o l i t i c a l withdrawal on top of any produced by economic deprivation (Fr i e d , 1982:10,12). In addition, economic individualism ( b e l i e f i n equal opportunity and i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or economic well-being) reduces the relevance of personal economic well-being to p o l i t i c a l decisions (Feldman, 1982; Schlozman and Verba, 1979; Brody and Sniderman, 1977). For a minority who r e j e c t economic individualism, " d e c l i n i n g well-being i s related to negative evaluations of the government's economic performance" (Feldman, 1982:459). S i m i l a r l y , partisanship appears to be more important than personal economic grievances i n national economic outlook ( A l t , 1979:112) and evaluations of the incumbent party (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979:514). I t d i s t o r t s economic evaluations i n a "cognitive dissonance reducing manner" (Kramer, 1983:104; Tufte, 1978:130-134; Campbell et a l , 1960:388). On the other hand, the tendency for Independents and Democrats i n the United States to be more se n s i t i v e to unemployment while the Republicans are more s e n s i t i v e to i n f l a t i o n , r e f l e c t s objective status differences (Hibbs, 1982a). 28 There are several preconditions of organized protest: a c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y , b e l i e f that the group i s exploited, the formulation of goals, and c r e d i b i l i t y of goal attainment; i n addition, having been i n better circumstances recently increases the c r e d i b i l i t y of goal attainment (Kriesberg, 1979:323-4,323). Status inconsistency, p a r t i c u l a r l y high educational status combined with occupational status, i s also associated with p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n protest movements (Rothman, 1974:331,335). In conclusion, socioeconomic status tends to a f f e c t the l e v e l , mode, and d i r e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l behavior, but i t i s not the overriding f a c t o r . Fluctuations i n personal economic well-being tend to be p o l i t i c i z e d only under c e r t a i n conditions. Even so, partisanship may color the perception of economic conditions. THE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT F i n a l l y , this section describes some basics of the planning environment. I t i s organized according to the three l e v e l s of planning defined i n Chapter I: s t r a t e g i c , normative, and operational planning. The subjective q u a l i t y of the workplace i s also considered, but as an end i n i t s e l f , since job s a t i s f a c t i o n i s only i n d i r e c t l y related to performance (Rothman, 1974:473). Strategic Planning Selbst defines organizational c r i s i s as anything that i n t e r f e r e s with the acceptable attainment of objectives or organizational s u r v i v a l , or that has a detrimental personal e f f e c t as perceived by the majority of the employees or c l i e n t s (1978:854). Among the various types of organizational 29 c r i s e s Selbst i d e n t i f i e s are resource, r o l e , and domain c r i s e s ; i n a domain c r i s i s , the objectives of the organization are s e r i o u s l y questioned (p. 858). A r o l e c r i s i s may reduce e f f i c i e n c y , effectiveness, and innovativeness (Rothman, 1974:69). In addition, Selbst suggests that organizational c r i s i s may produce anxiety and, i n the long run, a loss of confidence (1978:865). These are two of the conditions which Janis has demonstrated produce concurrence seeking or "groupthink" (1982). According to Janis, groupthink hinders the analysis and evaluation of a l t e r n a t i v e s , r i s k s , and objectives, as well as the use of information and contingencies. S i m i l a r l y , Selbst argues that acute c r i s i s produces an emphasis on h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n s and v i s i b l e c r i t e r i a , while chronic c r i s i s produces an ad hoc approach to problems (1978:865). On the p o s i t i v e side, organizational c r i s i s may stimulate improved management or change power r e l a t i o n s for the better (Selbst, 1978:852). In a d i f f e r e n t vein, a l i b e r a l or reform-oriented c l i e n t e l e may f a c i l i t a t e innovation (Rothman, 1974:435). Strategic planning may also be f a c i l i t a t e d where there i s general agreement on goals (Chetkow-Yanoov, 1982:172). Normative Planning There are several features of the p o l i t i c a l environment with relevance f o r the reconsideration of the value base of decisions during high unemployment. F i r s t , responsiveness to i n t e r e s t groups generally depends on t h e i r concentration and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y i n the community (Rothman, 1974:269), and on how well informed they are (Howard, 1984:14). O f f i c i a l s 30 tend to share the preferences of p o l i t i c a l l y a ctive i n d i v i d u a l s ; however, they are less responsive to these i n d i v i d u a l s when community c o n f l i c t i s high (Verba and Nie, 1972:333). Appointed o f f i c i a l s may be more responsive than p o l i t i c i a n s (Friedman, 1975:201). Developers are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n t i a l because the c i t y depends on them for creating the "physical and economic substance" of the c i t y (Layton, 1984:404; Dickerson et a l . , 1980:10-11). Dependence on developers i s accentuated by economic recession (Layton, 1984:404). Dependence tends to reduce planning to "a series of ad hoc reactions... leading to a form of pre-emptive decision-making" (Blowers, 1980:38). C i t i z e n consultation may influence p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n by generating a l t e r n a t i v e s and by providing "a forum f o r alternate spokesman subsequently elected to c o u n c i l " ( F i s h , 1981:96). The reform movement i n the s i x t i e s and seventies made p o l i t i c i a n s and municipal s t a f f more wary of developers (Tennant, 1981:138; Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975). However, the benefits of c i t i z e n consultation tend to accrue to the middle class because of the s k i l l s required for p a r t i c i p a t i o n (Riedal, 1972:214) and the t y p i c a l focus of planning programs on land use (Layton, 1984:405,410; Simmie, 1974:154). Operational Planning With respect to operational planning, disagreement on goals has a negative impact by hindering compromise (Chetkow-Yanoov, 1982:172; Bolan, 1969). Environmental uncertainty and organizational i n s t a b i l i t y also reduce agreement on actions (Selbst, 1978; Bolan, 1969). 31 Quality of the Workplace F i n a l l y , with respect to the q u a l i t y of the workplace for planners, Selbst suggests that anything which produces the a n t i c i p a t i o n of organizational c r i s i s may f o s t e r anxiety, while long-run threat tends to produce lowered morale, the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of problems, and resigned i n d i f f e r e n c e (1978:865). S i m i l a r l y , an on-going c r i s i s may produce a loss of confidence (Selbst, 1978:865). CONCLUSION Figure 3 depicts a more refined version of the a n a l y t i c a l framework o r i g i n a l l y presented i n Chapter I (see Figure 1). I t suggests that unemployment, and i t s e f f e c t s on attention, income, and organizational a c t i v i t y , as well as the a t t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for joblessness a f f e c t the i n t e n s i t y , form, d i s t r i b u t i o n , and content of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Socioeconomic status, age, e t h n i c i t y , and s o c i a l support a f f e c t both the impact of high unemployment on personal economic circumstances as well as p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n d i r e c t l y . The nature of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i n turn, a f f e c t s the composition of council and i t s e l e c t o r a l outlook and p o l i c i e s (Frey, 1983). P o l i c i e s , i n turn, as well as organizational c r i s i s , c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i t i c a l pressures, and dependency on business influence the various l e v e l s of planning and the q u a l i t y of the workplace for planners. The next chapter now turns to an in-depth analysis of the e f f e c t s of unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . E t h n i c i t y Age S u p p o r t s Socioeconomic s t a t u s F i s c a l p r e s s u r e Economy Unemployment Income O r g a n i z a t i o n a l A c t i v i t y Focus of A t t e n t i o n = J A t t r i b u t i o n o f R e s p o n s i b i l i t y P l a n n i n g Dependence on B u s i n e s s O r g a n i z a t i o n a l C r i s i s Q u a l i t y o f Wor k p l a c e = 1 P e r c e i v e d C o n f l i c t Leve 1 D i s t r i b u t i o n C o n t e n t Form o f par t i c i p a t i o n P o l i c i e s E l e c t o r a l o u t l o o k Figure 3. Factors underlying the r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the A n a l y t i c a l Framework \ CHAPTER III THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT This chapter explores the impact of high unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . F i r s t , the conditions under which unemployment reduces p a r t i c i p a t i o n are discussed. This i s followed by consideration of the circumstances which produce protest, defined as p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a c r i t i c a l nature. The l e f t - r i g h t dimension of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s then discussed, with a s p e c i a l section on how high unemployment and neoconservatism have affected p o l i t i c s i n Vancouver. The f i n a l section looks b r i e f l y at the e f f e c t of high unemployment on the democracy-authority dimension. POLITICAL APATHY From the Chapter II discussion, i t appears that unemployment has a negative e f f e c t on several factors associated with p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n : membership i n a union and possibly other types of organizations, r e s i d e n t i a l s t a b i l i t y , marriage, feelings of e f f i c a c y , economic optimism, and income. In f a c t , survey data suggest that the unemployed are less l i k e l y than employed persons to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:29; Brody and Sniderman, 1977:346; Schlozman and Verba, 1979:241), write to o f f i c i a l s , and campaign (Schlozman and Verba, 1979:241). 34 High unemployment would presumably increase the number of people adversely affected and reduce the o v e r a l l l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . However, under c e r t a i n circumstances, explored i n the following section, high unemployment fosters protest. Five respondents reported decreased p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n public meetings concerning B.C. Place. However, this i s not necessa r i l y due to high unemployment. The issue may be worn out, or potential p a r t i c i p a n t s may have been dis t r a c t e d by p r o v i n c i a l issues. Decreased p a r t i c i p a t i o n at public meetings could also r e f l e c t a slowdown i n the rate of new development. In contrast, two planners noted that the c i t i z e n s ' committees are as act i v e as ever. These committees were established by the l o c a l area planning program. Recently, three more committees were established to plan mitigation of the impacts of t r a n s i t stations on l o c a l residents. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l area planning i s generally higher than p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n city-wide a f f a i r s ( G i l and Lucchesi, 1979:554). Pa r e n t h e t i c a l l y , a c o u n c i l l o r noted that since the recession, self-employed persons, who are not e l i g i b l e for unemployment insurance, have less time for p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . These people are not unemployed as defined i n Chapter I, pointing to the need to reevaluate our conceptualization of unemployment. Three conditions were i d e n t i f i e d which may exacerbate the negative e f f e c t of high unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n : a r i s i n g unemployment rate, the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party as incumbent, and chronic high 35 unemployment. Risi n g unemployment. Rosens tone contends that unemployment temporarily reduces p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n while the unemployed make adjustments; the negative e f f e c t of unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n appears to disappear by the sixteenth week (1982). This suggests that a r i s i n g unemployment rate would reduce p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n more than would a stable unemployment rate. The l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party as incumbent. Given the t r a d i t i o n a l alignment between the working class and the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party (usually the labor, s o c i a l i s t , or l i b e r a l party, depending on the number of major parties and other f a c t o r s ) , the unemployed are more l i k e l y to abstain from voting i n federal elections when the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party i s incumbent, than when the conservatives are incumbent. Johnston contends that the unemployed may wish "to punish the L i b e r a l governments but f i n d the Conservatives an inappropriate vehicle by which to do so. No such compunctions r e s t r a i n the unemployed from punishing the Conservatives by a swing to the L i b e r a l s " (1983:22). This pattern does not hold i n B.C. where the unemployed tended to support the Conservative party i n the 1980 national e l e c t i o n . This province may be susceptible to the claim that the New Democratic Party i s bad for investment (Johnston, 1983:26). However, conservative party v i c t o r i e s i n Canada, the United States, and Great B r i t a i n , suggest B.C.'s voting pattern i s no longer the exception. This trend i s p a r t i a l l y a function of persistent high unemployment, to which the discussion now turns. 36 Persistent high unemployment. With the economy the most important problem facing the nation, one would expect years of economic f a i l u r e to loosen t i e s to p o l i t i c a l parties and the p o l i t i c a l system ( A l t , 1979:200). Indeed, decreased partisanship and voter turnout have been documented for several countries since the 1960's (Tuckel and Tejera, 1983; Coates, 1982:141; Rosenstone, 1982:43; A l f o r d , 1982; A l t , 1979). The perceived a b i l i t y of the Canadian, American and B r i t i s h governments to manage the economy has eroded during this period (Pammett, 1984:284; Kiewiet, 1983:113; A l t , 1979:171). This i s why we do not f i n d anger so much as "bemused detachment" and an " a p o l i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e " (Pammett, 1984:284). The President of the p o l l i n g firm, Decima, believes that the current recession has fostered a "post-survivor mentality," the b e l i e f that i n d i v i d u a l s are better equipped to solve their economic problems than are business and government (Nagle, 1983). A l t e r n a t i v e l y , Orr argues that low turnout coincides with a renaissance of l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n grass roots and community s e l f - h e l p organizations (1982). Public o f f i c i a l s i n the United States, p a r t i c u l a r l y at the l o c a l l e v e l , have been under pressure to provide ways for c i t i z e n s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n government decisions, e s p e c i a l l y f i n a n c i a l decisions (Rehfuss, 1978:1). However, Bradshaw claims that disillusionment with the c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n process and economic pressures are causing c i t i z e n s to question the funding of public p a r t i c i p a t i o n programs and to reexamine the demands made on t h e i r own resources (1982:358). 37 PROTEST This section looks at the circumstances which f a c i l i t a t e or moderate protest during high unemployment. I t concludes with a b r i e f comparison of the depressions of the 1930's and 1980's. The unemployment rate i s a stronger determinant of p o l i t i c a l behavior than the personal experience of unemployment (Weatherford, 1983:885; Kinder, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981:150,152, 1979; Campbell et a l . , 1960:399). High unemployment seems to f o s t e r the perception that unemployment i s a community problem. Thus, Hayes and Nutman contend that by 1980, the B r i t i s h media had become sympathetic toward the unemployed (1981:5). Although the i n d i v i d u a l experience of unemployment may reduce p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , very high unemployment may increase p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by the unemployed and employed a l i k e . R e call from Chapter II that the electorate tends to vote out the incumbent during slow or negative economic growth and that the e f f e c t crosses party l i n e s . Those f i n a n c i a l l y worse o f f are s u b s t a n t i a l l y more l i k e l y to vote out the incumbent during slow or negative economic growth than during rapid growth ( A l f o r d , 1982:14-15; Tufte, 1978:129). Conversely, in good times, persons worse o f f may be more supportive of the status quo than persons better o f f as they stand to gain the most from continuing growth ( A l f o r d , 1982:17). Cross-sectional data suggest that high unemployment i s associated with 38 increased voting rates (Silberman and Durden, 1975). S i m i l a r l y , survey data on voting i n the 1980 federal e l e c t i o n (Johnston, 1983:43) suggest that the unemployed are less l i k e l y to abstain from voting i n regions with above average unemployment rates. In B.C., the unemployed were more l i k e l y than the employed to vote (Johnston, 1983:43). This may r e l a t e to the high l e v e l of organized labor i n this province. On the other hand, high unemployment tends to produce polarized p o l i t i c s , as discussed i n the next section, and c o n f l i c t , i n turn, tends to stimulate p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as noted i n Chapter I I . Survey data on voting i n the 1980 national e l e c t i o n also suggest, when viewed i n conjunction with e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s , that the unemployed support p a r t i e s weak i n t h e i r province. Recall that the Canadian Commonwealth Federation and S o c i a l Credit Party were born i n the 1930's. The United Party of B.C. formed i n 1984, but i t i s too early to t e l l whether i t i s a v i a b l e party. There are several factors which moderate protest, including the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the unemployed, economic individualism, fear of repression, economic dependency, chronic high unemployment, and widespread unemployment. These are b r i e f l y discussed i n turn. Factors that Moderate Protest C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the unemployed. At high l e v e l s of unemployment, the unemployed are a s o c i a l l y heterogenous group (Garraty, 1978). This hinders the formation of the c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y required for c o l l e c t i v e protest. 39 R e c a l l from Chapter II that professionals tend to avoid c o n f l i c t . S i m i l a r l y , the " n o n t r a d i t i o n a l " unemployed (professionals, managers, and technicians) generally avoid protest. A September 1984 meeting of a n o n t r a d i t i o n a l unemployed support group concluded that the n o n t r a d i t i o n a l unemployed are unaccustomed to protest, confrontation, and high p r o f i l e a c t i v i t i e s . However, two c o u n c i l l o r s suggested that unionized professionals are more l i k e l y than nonunionized professionals to construe unemployment as a community problem and to protest. Although lower status i n d i v i d u a l s bear the brunt of unemployment, they may be p o l i t i c a l l y i n a c t i v e for reasons more c l o s e l y related to t h e i r socioeconomic status than to t h e i r current employment status (Schlozman and Verba, 1979; Kramer, 1971). R e c a l l from Chapter II that low income in d i v i d u a l s tend to shun abstract causes. This may help to explain why the unemployed are d i f f i c u l t to organize (Kennedy and Davis, 1984:39; Garraty, 1978:195). For example, the Unemployed Workers of Manitoba, a group which lobbies for the unemployed i n such areas as welfare l e g i s l a t i o n and unemployment insurance regulations, i s having d i f f i c u l t y a t t r a c t i n g members (Globe and M a i l , 1 May 1984:5). Nevertheless, i t appears that the working class provides the bulk of the e l e c t o r a l response to economic decline (Hibbs, 1982b:274, Weatherford, 1978; Campbell et a l . , 1960:384). In addition, "since he i s r e l a t i v e l y disadvantaged and perceives few t r a d i t i o n a l means of e f f e c t i v e influence, the alienated worker i s a prime r e c r u i t [for protest groups] i f organized and l e d " (Mishler, 1979:94). Because the unemployed cannot s t r i k e , they may be more l i k e l y to use the streets for protest (Piven and Cloward, 40 1979:21-2). However, protest tends to be sporadic, unfocused, r h e t o r i c a l and melancholic (Garraty, 1978:182). Factors which reduce p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y tend to work against organized protest. Protest may be more organized where there i s a strong labor movement. When the unemployment rate i s high and unions' bargaining strength i s threatened by the loss of members, unions are compelled to become more p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e . This e f f e c t was suggested by a respondent who works with unemployed union members. In B.C., the unions appear to be responsible for most of the organized protest (e.g. S o l i d a r i t y , the Unemployment Action Centres, the Labour Council, and the Commission on Economic A l t e r n a t i v e s ) . Four c o u n c i l l o r s , two s o c i a l planners, and two c i t y planners claimed that there i s increased class c o n f l i c t or class consciousness. They probably had i n mind those a c t i v i t i e s i n which the unions have been involved, as Schlozman and Verba found that the unemployed are no more cl a s s conscious than the employed (1979:110). However, t h e i r study was conducted before the present recession and, thus, may not capture the e f f e c t of high unemployment on union a c t i v i t y and i t s r o l e i n p o l i t i c i z i n g economic well-being. Economic individualism. Recall from Chapter II that economic individualism negates the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of economic well-being. The e a r l i e s t form of protest during the Great Depression was lo o t i n g and denials of evictions (Piven and Cloward, 1977:49). In 1929, i t was 41 generally f e l t that the depression would be s h o r t - l i v e d (Piven and Cloward, 1977:45; Gallacher, 1969:60) and i t was given l i t t l e news coverage (Piven and Cloward, 1977:45). However, by l a t e 1932, there was fear of widespread pauperism (Gallacher, 1969:73). The extent of d i s t r e s s b e l i e d the customary conviction that one's economic fortune was a matter of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (Piven and Cloward, 1977:43-44; Gallacher, 1969:31,70). P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o c i a l a c t i o n movements tends to increase as awareness of the s t r u c t u r a l causes of s o c i a l problems increases (Rothman, 1974:338), and i n the l a t e years of the Great Depression, people were demanding a p o l i t i c a l economy that would prevent a reoccurrence (Gallacher, 1969:108). The National Unemployed Workers' Association of Canada demanded a moratorium on e v i c t i o n s , work at union wages, and noncontributory insurance (Gallacher, 1969:141). In B.C., L i b e r a l s demanded a minimum income and work with wages (Ormsby, 1962). A g i t a t i o n by the unemployed became balanced pressure put upon government, and this was followed by pressure from employed individuals to ensure th e i r l i v l i h o o d s were never endangered (Gallacher, 1969:141). S i m i l a r l y , Garraty contends that, by 1900, p a r t i a l l y as a r e s u l t of the most severe depression up to that time, unemployment came to be recognized as a s o c i a l problem for which some general protections were needed (1978:121-130). By 1911, England had an unemployment insurance program; by 1935, a l l of the i n d u s t r i a l nations except France had a s i m i l a r program (Garraty, 1978:213). Garraty also suggests that "the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of what may be c a l l e d 42 the Keynesianism value system has a l t e r e d the psychology of unemployment": workers are more l i k e l y to hold the government responsible for unemployment than previously (1978:251). However, as w i l l be discussed i n the next section, Keynesianism appears to be f a l l i n g into disrepute. Fear of repression. Fears of repression during the 1930's were legitimate fears (Garraty: 1978:184). Demonstrators frequently clashed with p o l i c e and, on one occasion, the American president used m i l i t a r y force (Piven and Cloward, 1977:49,53). Canadian readers may r e c a l l that the 1935 On-to-Ottawa Trek ended i n bloodshed i n Regina. Economic dependency. Garraty contends that dependency on government r e l i e f moderated protest during the Depression (1978:186,187). R e c a l l from Chapter II that poverty reduces p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and that dependency on welfare increases during a period of high unemployment. However, i t appears that d e s t i t u t e people i n the 1930's came to hate the bureaucrats and regulations which deprived them of t h e i r s e l f - r e s p e c t (Broadfoot, 1973:15), pointing to the p o t e n t i a l for protest. P e r s i s t e n t unemployment. Persistent unemployment tends to be discounted. Increasingly high l e v e l s of unemployment became acceptable during the 1930's (Garraty, 1978:167). During the prosperity of the 1940's, the Canadian government was committed to f u l l employment; however, since unemployment began to r i s e i n the 1960's, f u l l employment has been redefined to include higher and higher l e v e l s of "normal" unemployment (Vancouver Unemployment Action Centre, 1983:2; Deaton, 1983:15; Garraty, 1978:242-7). 43 Widespread high unemployment. That countries of diverse p o l i t i c a l persuasions are experiencing high unemployment probably i n t e n s i f i e s the perception that governments are unable to manage the economy. Garraty claims that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l nature of the 1930's depression prevented blame being directed at i n d i v i d u a l governments (1978:182). People perceived they were a l l i n the same boat, that there was no enemy (Broadfoot, 1973:358). Runciman claims that there was more economic i n e q u a l i t y than people r e a l i z e d , as there was l i t t l e information on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of property (1966:73). The 1930's and Today The l a s t time the unemployment rate was above ten percent was i n the 1930's. Readers w i l l undoubtedly be interested i n comparisons between that period and the 1980's. The impression e x i s t s that there was more protest at that time; however, comparative studies do not appear to e x i s t . Several factors could possibly have contributed to higher l e v e l s of protest then: F i r s t , the unemployment rate at the peak of the Depression was about nineteen percent as opposed to twelve percent i n 1984. Because the early unemployment s t a t i s t i c s exclude some forms of unemployment now included (such as l a y o f f s ) , the difference between the two periods of unemployment i s greater than the o f f i c i a l unemployment rate indicates. In addition, the unemployed may have been a more cohesive group i n the 1930's than today. Unemployed workers are currently divided between programs established by unions and c h a r i t i e s . In contrast, i n several provinces during the 1930's, unemployed sin g l e men were concentrated i n 44 r e l i e f camps where p o l i t i c a l discussions leading to protest were a major form of recreation. This comparison was made by a man i n conversation with the writer, who had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the On-to-Ottawa Trek and who i s s t i l l a c t i v e i n the labor movement. During the 1930's, there was fear of widespread pauperism, and d e s t i t u t e or sympathetic people demanded that the p r o v i n c i a l government provide r e l i e f f o r the unemployed and f i n d markets for l o c a l production (Gallacher, 1969). Today's s o c i a l programs reduce the i n t e n s i t y of economic deprivation associated with unemployment, although there i s increasing concern about th e i r adequacy. F i n a l l y , during the Depression, the government came to be seen as having some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards the unemployed. In the 1980's, the e f f i c a c y of government intervention i s being questioned. Alberta's minister of manpower recently stated that unemployment motivates the workforce; " i f any p o l i t i c i a n had said i n 1934 that unemployment was a good thing, he would have been very quickly looking for a new job himself" (Todd, 1984). LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION This section considers, i n turn, the conditions under which high unemployment produces increased l i b e r a l i s m , status p o l a r i z a t i o n , and, f i n a l l y , increased conservatism. Increased Liberalism Because the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party generally reduces unemployment at the expense of i n f l a t i o n (Hibbs, 1977), increased unemployment tends to give 45 the L i b e r a l , Democratic, and Labour parties i n Canada, the U.S., and B r i t a i n an e l e c t o r a l advantage (e.g. Johnston, 1983; Monroe and Laughlin, 1983; Hibbs, 1982a; Schlozman and Verba, 1979; Garraty, 1978:186; Goodman and Kramer, 1975; Meltzer and V e l l r a t h , 1975). The p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between unemployment and l i b e r a l i s m , therefore, depends on the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party's reputation f o r economic management. However, Canadians perceive larger differences between the parties than may a c t u a l l y e x i s t (Johnston, 1983:16; Hibbs, 1977:1473). Since voters tend to vote out the incumbent i n an economic downturn, the e l e c t i o n of an opposition party on the l e f t does not n e c e s s a r i l y s i g n i f y an i d e o l o g i c a l s h i f t . Furthermore, businessmen and bankers may become lobbyists for the poor where the unemployment rate i s high (Piven and Cloward, 1977:64; Campbell et a l . , 1960:384); however, this does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t altruism or increased l i b e r a l i s m . In every case, reform agencies established by the Canadian government during the Depression were cast i n the mold advocated by business ( F i n k e l , 1979:168). Status P o l a r i z a t i o n Status polarized voting has been observed f o r the 1930's (Campbell et a l . , 1960) as well as for the recession years of 1958 and 1960 (Weatherford, 1978). In B r i t a i n , those personally better o f f tend to increase support of the Conservative party, whereas those worse o f f tend to decrease t h e i r support of the Conservatives (Butler and Stokes, 1974:384). Working class Americans were most severely affected by the 1958 and 1960 recessions and were most l i k e l y to vote according to t h e i r class (Weatherford, 1978). 46 In the e i g h t i e s , status p o l a r i z a t i o n has been observed i n the Netherlands (Peper, 1982:109) and Germany (Cox, 1982:18), and i n B r i t a i n among less strong Labour supporters ( A l t , 1979:256). C o n f l i c t appears to be over income r e d i s t r i b u t i o n (Peper, 1982:109) and the r o l e of government (Cox, 1982:18). Cox notes that German unions are angry about increased business p r o f i t s contrasted with decreased wages and s o c i a l expenditures (p. 19). This seems to describe the current s i t u a t i o n i n B.C., as w e l l . Coates argues that the recession strengthened the f a c t i o n within B r i t a i n ' s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s which wished to make a break with the economic p o l i c i e s of the 1960's and replace them with p o l i c i e s c l o s e r to the p a r t i e s ' very p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l philosophies (1982:144). However, he notes that entrenched i n t e r e s t s have forced a r e t r e a t back to the middle road (p. 147). In contrast, Butler and Stokes have described how the affluence of the f o r t i e s , f i f t i e s , and s i x t i e s reduced class consciousness and status polarized voting i n B r i t a i n (1974:194-205). They suggest that the Labour party separated i t s e l f from the unions and became more middle class i n composition; and, subsequently, the convergence of Labour and Conservative p o l i c i e s produced a decrease i n the perceived differences between the p a r t i e s and i n voter turnout, e s p e c i a l l y i n working class areas; and produced a more unpredictable e l e c t o r a t e . Increased Conservatism Under ce r t a i n conditions, high unemployment may increase p o l i t i c a l support for the conservative party or i t s ideas. F i r s t , the e f f e c t of r i s i n g unemployment i s examined, followed by the e f f e c t of s t a g f l a t i o n , 47 and, f i n a l l y , the e f f e c t of high unemployment and neoconservatism i n p o l i t i c s i n Vancouver. Rising unemployment. A r i s i n g unemployment rate may give the conservative party an e l e c t o r a l advantage given the t r a d i t i o n a l alignment between the working class and the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party. The Democrats and Independents i n the United States are more l i k e l y than the Republicans to be unemployed and, presumably, to be dis t r a c t e d from voting by recent unemployment (Rosenstone, 1982:43). Goodman and Kramer found that the l e v e l of unemployment i s associated with support for the Democrats, whereas the rate of increase i n the l e v e l of unemployment i s associated with support f o r the Republicans (1975). S t a g f l a t i o n . Unemployment must compete with many issues for at t e n t i o n . When the unemployment rate increases, concern about i t increases; however, when the unemployment rate i s stable, concern about i n f l a t i o n increases and only the unemployment experience of p a r t i c u l a r groups (older persons who remember the Great Depression) seem to influence public opinion (Fisher and Huizinga, 1982:16-7; Hibbs, 1979). S t a g f l a t i o n may reduce the l e f t i s t party's e l e c t o r a l advantage. As unemployment and pr i c e s began to r i s e simultaneously i n the l a t e 1950's, the Keynesian analysis of unemployment began to lose favor, and by the mid seventies, i t was being argued that government spending increases unemployment (Garraty, 1978:239,249). The unemployed are more averse to i n f l a t i o n than to unemployment (Hibbs, 1979:715; A l t , 1979:193) when they believe that increased 48 i n f l a t i o n i s the p r i c e of reduced unemployment ( A l t , 1979:193). Taxpayers want reduced taxes and, to a lesser extent, reduced s o c i a l spending (Clark and Ferguson, 1983:177; Ladd and Wilson, 1982:139; Danziger and Ring, 1982:48). In many countries, s o c i a l goals have been shunted aside i n favor of economic objectives, and v i o l a t i o n s of trade union r i g h t s have increased (1984--Gloomy year, 1985). In addition, survey data suggest that macroeconomic conditions are more important to the popularity of the American president than r e d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s (Monroe and Laughlin, 1983:337). A l t contends that "people must f e e l well o f f before they can be persuaded to be generous towards others i n th e i r s o c i a l outlook" (1979:272). This same sentiment was expressed by a respondent who had assumed that the S o c i a l Credit party would have been voted out i n the l a s t p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . The decline of the B r i t i s h economy produced a greater decline i n working class than middle class support for the Labour incumbent (Hibbs, 1982b:273). S i m i l a r l y , Labour supporters whose economic p o s i t i o n had deteriorated were more l i k e l y than supporters of other p a r t i e s to cease favoring spending on s o c i a l services ( A l t , 1979:260). In the United States, opposition to welfare expenditures increased at a l l income l e v e l s between 1973 and 1977 (Clark and Ferguson, 1983:181). C l a s s i c a l democratic and marxist theories both hold that economic se c u r i t y and equality are preconditions for altruism. S i m i l a r l y , Maslow's "hierarchy of needs" i l l u s t r a t e s how basic needs, such as hunger, t h i r s t , s e c u r i t y , and achievement, must be s a t i s f i e d before less urgent needs, such as j u s t i c e , beauty, and order can be met (1968). There i s also 49 experimental evidence to suggest that s c a r c i t y encourages s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Subjects i n one experiment divided a payment between themselves and a co-worker more f a i r l y when the payment was s u f f i c i e n t than when i t was i n s u f f i c i e n t (Greenberg, 1981:294). However, the working class i s not n e c e s s a r i l y less class conscious. B r i t i s h Labour supporters were not less l i k e l y to cease sympathizing with s t r i k e r s than Labour and non-Labour supporters whose economic positions had improved ( A l t , 1979:26). But Labour supporters are i n a dilemma because the public i s less w i l l i n g to pay f o r s o c i a l programs (Butler and McNaughton, 1984:24; Hibbs, 1982b:273; A l t , 1979:261). Of those Labour supporters whose economic circumstances had deteriorated, less strong supporters became more partisan than strong supporters ( A l t , 1979:256). An alternate explanation i s that government intervention i s perceived to hinder economic growth. In 1952, i n the context of prosperity, a s u b s t a n t i a l number of Democrats supported Eisenhower, accepting the Republican theme of prosperity without government intervention (Campbell et a l . , 1960:399). Vancouver p o l i t i c s . One c o u n c i l l o r noted resentment by the unemployed of tax d o l l a r s going to community service groups, adding, " I t ' s hard to s e l l s o f t . " S i m i l a r l y , a planner reported seeing newcomers at c i t i z e n s ' committee meetings complaining about the " f a t " at Ci t y H a l l , even though r e a l C i t y expenditures per capita a c t u a l l y decreased between 1971 and 1983 ( C i t y of Vancouver, 1983:9). Two respondents noted that since the recession, c i t i z e n s seem to care 50 less about the q u a l i t y of development i n the c i t y and more about job c r e a t i o n : "People get hyper about jobs and complain about refusal s of development a p p l i c a t i o n s . " More people than anticipated wanted to p a r t i c i p a t e i n discussions on [the i n n e r - c i t y conversion areas], and revisions were needed to recognize emerging goals such as streamlining of the development process and increasing housing densities....The Fairview Heights program encountered i t s own delays r e s u l t i n g from s t a f f being unable to reach agreement with the c i t i z e n s planning committee who challenged data and upheld t h e i r support for apartment rezoning i n the area (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:22). Seventy-six percent of respondents to the "Choices for Vancouver's Future" pamphlet (n=450) agreed with the "Coreplan" strategy not to l i m i t growth at this time; only 24 percent f e l t that the benefits of l i m i t i n g growth would outweigh the disadvantages (St o t t , 1984:15). In contrast, the prerecessionary "Goals for Vancouver" report devoted more space to issues of aesthetics than economics (Vancouver Planning Commission, 1980). Even no-growth advocates may have softened t h e i r stance to one of " d o - i t - w e l l , " according to a planner from a neighboring municipality. Increased concern about jobs and economic growth i s appropriate i n a recession, but, as one planner noted, people seem to be less w i l l i n g to consider a l t e r n a t i v e s that w i l l create j u s t as many jobs while preserving noneconomic goals. As the wife of the Canada Ports Corporation chairman so aptly put i t a f t e r a v i s i t to Taiwan, "We have to decide what kind of p o l l u t i o n we want, whether i t ' s smoke or d i r t or unemployment" (Daniels, 1985). This point was raised at a workshop i n the Planning Department to discuss why the public was not more supportive of council with respect to c o n t r o l l i n g the development of B.C. Place. 51 The development industry may be taking advantage of this h y s t e r i a about jobs by pressing for a streamlined approval process and less exacting development regulations. Six respondents noted that developers, b u i l d e r s , a r c h i t e c t s , and construction workers are more act i v e i n contacting o f f i c i a l s and more v i s i b l e at council meetings, although one c o u n c i l l o r said that they are less interested i n running for o f f i c e as they cannot afford to lose a government contract. One planner believes that c i t i z e n s have been manipulated by B.C. Place which, for example, closed i t s b r i e f s to council i n late 1983 and early 1984 with the argument that the Corporation's development strategy would create jobs. S i m i l a r l y , a planner from a neighboring municipality described how the construction industry lobbied f or reduced standards on the basis that i t would be able to produce more affordable housing. However, while standards were not enforced, prices did not f a l l . Another planner suggested that the c i t i z e n s ' committees have provided an open forum wherein developers have won the sympathy of c i t i z e n s . On the other hand, developers may be responding to the removal of development incentives i n 1982 such as soft-cost w r i t e - o f f s and the Multi-Unit R e s i d e n t i a l Building Program. In the recent Vancouver c i v i c e l e c t i o n (17 November 1984), the conservative Non-Partisan Association (N.P.A.) gained i n the popular vote and picked up a seat on the Parks Board. However, i n the ensuing by-e l e c t i o n (2 February 1985), to s e t t l e a contested aldermanic seat, the Committee of Progressive E l e c t o r s ' candidate was returned. This unexpected r e s u l t , given the trend towards conservatism j u s t described, 52 may be due to the controversy about P r o v i n c i a l education cutbacks, which was at fever p i t c h at the time of the by-election. Education tends to be a b i p a r t i s a n issue (Clark and Ferguson, 1983:177). Indeed, Vancouver's pola r i z e d council i s unanimous i n i t s support of school board autonomy. The controversy may have hurt the chances of the N.P.A. candidate with "Socred" t i e s . On the other hand, B r i t i s h Columbians may be becoming d i s i l l u s i o n e d with r e s t r a i n t . An opinion p o l l indicates that voters d i s l i k e the Soci a l C redit government's lack of f e e l i n g , and even Socred supporters may have abstained i n the recent by-election i n the former Socred stronghold of North Okanagan (Barrett, 1984:2). Perhaps as a r e s u l t of these sentiments, the " r e s t r a i n t " was replaced by theme of "renewal" i n the government's t h i r d anniversary and 1985 budget speeches. Before, the discussion i s summarized, we take a b r i e f look at the implications of high unemployment for tolerance of authority. RISING UNEMPLOYMENT AND AUTHORITARIANISM A r i s i n g unemployment rate may fos t e r support for the party with the strongest leadership. I t may produce uncertainty which appears to increase tolerance of authority (Arrow, 1974:93). B i l l Bennett was "marketed" as a tough leader i n the 1983 e l e c t i o n because p o l l s showed that " B r i t i s h Columbians were beginning to lose ' s p i r i t ' i n the face of economic hardship" (Barrett, 1984:2). Leadership was a major issue i n recent c i v i c elections as well as i n the elections of Reagan, H i t l e r , and Roosevelt, which took place i n the context of economic decline. 53 SUMMARY This chapter has explored the impact of unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The following r e l a t i o n s h i p s were hypothesized and are graded according to the confidence which can be placed i n them. Two stars (**) indicate that the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s frequently observed i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. One s t a r (*) s i g n i f i e s that the evidence i s weak or that the r e l a t i o n s h i p holds only i n c e r t a i n contexts. F i n a l l y , no star indicates that the proposition i s speculation. 1. High unemployment reduces conventional p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n when the unemployment rate i s r i s i n g , as recently unemployed persons are preoccupied; (*) when the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party i s incumbent, as voters may wish to punish the incumbent party but f i n d the right-of-center party an inappropriate v e h i c l e by which to do so; (*) when high unemployment i s a chronic s i t u a t i o n , as years of economic f a i l u r e may loosen t i e s to the p o l i t i c a l system. (*) 2. High unemployment produces p o l i t i c a l i n e q u a l i t y where the working class i s poorly organized, as lower status i n d i v i d u a l s , who bear the burden of unemployment, tend to be p o l i t i c a l l y i n a c t i v e ; (*) when the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party i s incumbent, as the unemployed, who are larg e l y working class i n d i v i d u a l s , wish to punish the government but f i n d the right-of-center party an inappropriate veh i c l e by which to do so. (*) 54 3. High unemployment fosters protest, as i t tends to increase the perception that unemployment i s a community problem and, consequently, unemployment i s more l i k e l y to be p o l i t i c i z e d . However, due to factors that moderate p a r t i c i p a t i o n , protest tends to be "sporadic, unfocused, r h e t o r i c a l , and melancholic." (**) 4. Protest i s moderated by the following f a c t o r s : the fact that the unemployed are largely lower status i n d i v i d u a l s who tend to be p o l i t i c a l l y i n a c t i v e where the working class i s poorly organized; (*) the s o c i a l heterogeneity of the unemployed at high l e v e l s of unemployment; (*) the tendency f or nonunionized professionals to avoid p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t ; (*) economic individualism, as government i s not held responsible for personal economic circumstances; (**) fear of repression; (*) dependency on welfare; (*) persistent high unemployment, as the unemployment rate tends to be discounted; (*) widespread high unemployment, as i t i s d i f f i c u l t to a t t r i b u t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to any p a r t i c u l a r government. (*) 5. High unemployment fosters increased l i b e r a l i s m or support f o r the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party - when the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party has a reputation f o r reducing 55 unemployment; (*) when the conservative party i s incumbent and voters want a change; (**) when the need for increased government intervention i s perceived. (*) 6. High unemployment produces status p o l a r i z a t i o n , as those worse o f f tend to be working class i n d i v i d u a l s who increase t h e i r support f o r the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party, while those better o f f tend to increase t h e i r support f o r the right-of-center party. (*) 7. High unemployment fosters increased conservatism or support f o r the right-of-center party when the unemployment rate i s r i s i n g , given the t r a d i t i o n a l alignment between the working cl a s s and the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party, as working class i n d i v i d u a l s are most l i k e l y to be preoccupied with unemployment; (*) when the i n f l a t i o n rate i s also high, since people tend not to support p o l i c i e s which w i l l increase government spending or hinder economic growth. (*) 8. R i s i n g unemployment fosters uncertainty and tolerance f o r authority. This concludes the discussion of the p o l i t i c a l repercussions of high unemployment. The next chapter turns to the implications f o r c i t y planning of the e f f e c t s hypothesized i n this chapter. 56 CHAPTER IV CITY PLANNING AND THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT This chapter explores the implications for c i t y planning of the p o l i t i c a l repercussions of high unemployment. The Chapter II theory and the Chapter III propositions are synthesized with input from the interviews. The discussion i s organized according to the le v e l s of planning i d e n t i f i e d i n the introduction: s t r a t e g i c , normative, and operational. This i s followed by a b r i e f discussion of the implications of the p o l i t i c a l environment for the qu a l i t y of the workplace f o r planners. STRATEGIC PLANNING This section examines the d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s of increased conservatism, l i b e r a l i s m , and status p o l a r i z a t i o n on st r a t e g i c planning. Conservatism and Strategic Planning In the previous chapter, i t was argued that high unemployment fosters support for the conservative party when the unemployment rate i s r i s i n g (given the t r a d i t i o n a l alignment between the working class and the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party) or when the i n f l a t i o n rate i s high. Conservatism appears to reduce s t r a t e g i c planning by reducing funding 57 for planning. This i s not to say that increased planning i s necessarily a good thing. The Canadian I n s t i t u t e of Planners' Task Force on the Future of the Planning Profession has, for example, encouraged planners "to de-regulate matters which are no longer of value to society" (1982:13). Nevertheless, Thomas contends that planners i n Conservative B r i t a i n are l i m i t i n g themselves to environmental issues i n which t h e i r expertise i s generally acknowledged and which have appeal that cuts across party l i n e s ; "meanwhile whole areas of planning debate, notably, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i a l welfare and town planning may have a l l but disappeared" (1984:69-70). Even i n the a f f l u e n t f i f t i e s , the Conservatives i n B r i t a i n pursued "more s t r i c t l y environmental goals with zest...while lessening government's sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the f u l l e s t implementations of other s o c i a l - p o l i c y features of town planning" (Foley, 1973:87). This suggests that the current attack on s o c i a l planning i s as much a p o l i t i c a l as f i s c a l e f f e c t . In 1984, appropriations to the Planning and So c i a l Planning Departments (as a proportion of t o t a l c i t y appropriations) were reduced (see Figure 4), and both departments are the target of further cuts (Krangle, 1984). Cuts have not been across-the-board as one planner suggested. The Economic Development O f f i c e , which does economic planning, has not been cut back (see Figure 4), and appropriations to the o f f i c e have increased as a r a t i o of appropriations for physical and s o c i a l planning (see Figure 5). However, the most notable change i n funding for planning since 1975 i s i n s o c i a l planning as a r a t i o of appropriations for physical planning. 58 Pu b l i c Works Po l i c e ( h a l f of t o t a l ) Health and Welfare Planning S o c i a l Planning Economic Development 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84-Figure 4. Percentage of Tot a l Appropriations, C i t y of Vancouver: Planning and S o c i a l Planning Departments, Economic Development O f f i c e , Health and S o c i a l Welfare account, Public Works account, and P o l i c e Department (half of t o t a l appropriations). (Source: C i t y of Vancouver Operating Budget. Old accounts have been adjusted for consistency with present accounts.) 59 Figure 5. Ratios of Appropriations: Planning and S o c i a l Planning Departments and the Economic Development O f f i c e . (Source: C i t y of Vancouver Operating Budget. Old accounts have been adjusted f or consistency with present accounts.) 60 This may r e f l e c t the transfer of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for s o c i a l welfare to the p r o v i n c i a l government (see Figure 4). The So c i a l Planning Department may have also been spared s i g n i f i c a n t cuts to date because Vancouver has had a left-wing council since 1982. The c i t y has increased operating grants to community service groups whose funding has been cut by the p r o v i n c i a l government. The S o c i a l Planning department has also earned a reputation for e f f i c i e n c y (McMartin, 1984). One s o c i a l planner remarked that council " r e l i e s on the department to f i l l i n the cracks." F i n a l l y , s o c i a l planning i n Vancouver has some protection as a separate departmental function. In a neighboring municipality, the only s o c i a l planner was replaced with a general purpose planner. Economic planning may be the l e a s t l i k e l y component of planning to be affected by increased conservatism during a period of high unemployment because the municipality has a s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n economic growth. However, an integrated approach to planning may be necessary to deal with deep-seated economic problems ( L i c h f i e l d , 1979:7). Reade contends that planners have less understanding of t h e i r subject matter and objectives than other government advisors (1982:51). However, Lithwick believes that planners are becoming more circumspect i n t h e i r interventions (1982:6). This suggests that increased conservatism may have some r a t i o n a l i t y advantages. On the other hand, resources may be directed away from planning work to defensive a c t i v i t i e s (Lithwick, 1982:6). The p r o v i n c i a l government i s considering l e g i s l a t i o n that would provide incentives for m u n i c i p a l i t i e s to deregulate land use (Palmer, 1985). B i l l 9, The Municipal Amendment Act, has already removed authority 61 from regional d i s t r i c t s , although a l l of the Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , except one, joined together to contract the services of the D i s t r i c t (Droettboom, 1984:9-10). I t was mentioned at the beginning of this section, that the Task Force on the Future of the Planning Profession i s encouraging s e l e c t i v e deregulation. I t wants planners to recognize the needs of the market when writing or evaluating regulations (1982:14). S i m i l a r l y , the Ten Year Task Force of the Vancouver Planning Department has highlighted the need to "sharpen up our regulating processes." 1983 was the tenth year of the Annual Review management process. The Task Force was to evaluate the department's achievements and a n t i c i p a t e changes (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:51). Unfortunately, except for b r i e f comments i n the 1983/1984 Annual Review, documentation i s for i n t e r n a l use only. Subsequently, the Planning Department gave lower p r i o r i t y to the departmental objective of "regulating and guiding private and public actions and continually improving regulatory by-laws" (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:51,54). Of course, the "review and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " work of the Planning Department i s p a r t i a l l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the age of the department: p o l i c i e s and regulations "developed at d i f f e r e n t times for d i f f e r e n t purposes. As a r e s u l t there i s not a s a t i s f a c t o r y , coordinated, organized body of p o l i c y " (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:80). However, the following incidents suggest that the Planning Department i s responding to external pressures for deregulation. 62 Two planners and two c o u n c i l l o r s reported that the C i t y i s less c a r e f u l with respect to the q u a l i t y of small developments, given complaints by developers, unemployed construction workers, and anonymous i n d i v i d u a l s about refusa l s of development ap p l i c a t i o n s . Another planner reported f e e l i n g frustrated by the unwillingness of c i t i z e n s to consider a l t e r n a t i v e approaches to the development of B.C. Place. In addition, a planner from a neighboring municipality described how pressure by developers and a r c h i t e c t s produced t a c i t approval of compact housing. The development industry had argued that compact housing would be more affordable. However, when i t became apparent that increased d e n s i t i e s had not made housing more affordable, the municipality halted t h i s p r a c t i c e . At the time of the interview, the municipality was, instead, exploring the f e a s i b i l i t y of housing cooperatives as an a l t e r n a t i v e to compact housing. Demands for economic growth and job creation need not r e s u l t i n what Blowers has c a l l e d "pre-emptive decision-making." The C i t y of Vancouver commissioned two studies of the development permit process and assigned extra s t a f f to speed up the e x i s t i n g service. In addition, the Planning Department produced a contingency plan for the c e n t r a l business d i s t r i c t , which controls economic growth (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:64). Liberalism and Innovation Chapter II argued that unemployment produces a s h i f t toward the l e f t under three conditions: 1) when the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party has a reputation 63 for reducing unemployment; 2) when the unemployment rate i s high and the conservative party i s incumbent; and 3) when the need for increased government intervention i s perceived. R e c a l l from Chapter II that a l i b e r a l c l i e n t e l e f a c i l i t a t e s innovation. This suggests that a s h i f t to the l e f t may expand the range of means considered i n the achievement of objectives. The Labour-controlled Greater London Council, for example, intends to use planning i n an "ambitious i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t strategy to achieve desired s o c i a l and economic goals" (Thomas, 1984:70). Of course, when increased support f o r the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party r e f l e c t s the deep-seated b e l i e f that capitalism i s not working, the p o l i t i c a l environment w i l l be more hospitable to planning than when the voters have merely punished the incumbent party which happens to be conservative at the time. P o l a r i z a t i o n and Strategic Planning P o l a r i z a t i o n may have a negative e f f e c t on st r a t e g i c planning. Greater consensus within the working and middle classes, r e s p e c t i v e l y , may impede the analysis of means. Recall from Chapter II that dominant groups tend to r e s t r i c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decision-making and the scope of issues (Chetkow-Yanoov, 1982:172). In addition, Mintzberg notes that a p o l i t i c i z e d environment tends to foster l e g i t i m i z i n g roles ( l i a i s o n , spokesman, and negotiator) at the expense of the entrepreneur r o l e (1973:108). On the other hand, p o l a r i z a t i o n may be a source of c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . Such i s the basis of our parliamentary system. 64 NORMATIVE PLANNING This section considers the e f f e c t s on normative planning of apathy, protest, and status p o l a r i z a t i o n . Apathy and Normative Planning The previous chapter argued that the unemployed tend to be underrepresented when the working class i s poorly organized, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party i s incumbent. I f the p o l i t i c a l l y i n a c t i v e unemployed have a d i s t i n c t set of p o l i c y preferences, then normative planning i s reduced unless planners counter this e f f e c t . One planner noted that groups "must speak up f i r s t ; planners are good r e c i p i e n t s of information," adding that Canadian planners generally do not have a community organizer or advocate r o l e which seeks to strengthen p o l i t i c a l l y disadvantaged neighborhoods or groups. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that this respondent was not aware of any apathetic unemployed persons. Standard public involvement programs may a c t u a l l y r e i n f o r c e underrepresentation of the unemployed, as they tend to focus on land use and to a t t r a c t middle class and organized groups (Blowers, 1980:32,70). R e c a l l from Chapter II that low income persons, the majority of unemployed, generally shun programs that do not aim to improve t h e i r immediate l i v i n g conditions. I t was also suggested i n Chapter III that persistent high unemployment reduces voter turnout and working class p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t seems reasonable to expect that i n a p o l i t i c a l l y apathetic environment, the 65 value base of planning remains unchallenged. Planning can be expected to r e f l e c t the values of i n t e r e s t groups, i n a brokerage s t y l e of planning. Protest and Value Premises Chapter III described how a high or r i s i n g unemployment rate fosters protest. Protest tends to increase uncertainty and solicitousness i n public o f f i c i a l s gauging p o l i t i c a l winds (Piven & Cloward, 1977:28). Increased solic i t o u s n e s s does not necessarily r e s u l t i n the meaningful reevaluation of value premises, however. Re c a l l that the reforms of the t h i r t i e s were shaped by business. C i t i z e n consultation may be used to n e u t r a l i z e demands (Hulchanski, 1974). In addition, uncertainty may increase intolerance, prejudice, and cynicism among planners as others (Emery and T r i s t , 1975:59). R e c a l l , on the other hand, that organized protest may increase the e l e c t o r a l chances of reformers. P o l a r i z a t i o n and Normative Planning Status p o l a r i z a t i o n may reduce normative planning. Chapter II noted how community c o n f l i c t tends to reduce the responsiveness of o f f i c i a l s . However, by f a c i l i t a t i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the working c l a s s , p o l a r i z a t i o n may promote the reconsideration of values i n planning i n the long run. OPERATIONAL PLANNING This section considers the e f f e c t s on operational planning of status p o l a r i z a t i o n , a s h i f t to either the r i g h t or l e f t , and increased tolerance of authority. F i r s t , planners i n a polarized environment may have d i f f i c u l t y c u l t i v a t i n g agreement on actions. I t was noted i n Chapter II that community c o n f l i c t hinders decision-making. 66 In contrast, a s h i f t to either the r i g h t or l e f t , which r e f l e c t s increased p o l i t i c a l homogeneity, should reduce the uncertainty c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a polarized p o l i t i c a l environment. Presumably, this would f a c i l i t a t e long-range planning. Increased tolerance of authority may also f a c i l i t a t e operational planning. Arrow argues that authority economizes on the exchange of information (1974:74). However, he notes that this advantage i s countered by the p o s s i b i l i t y of "unnecessary e r r o r s , " that i s , by a reduction i n s t r a t e g i c planning. QUALITY OF THE WORKPLACE Increased conservatism may produce r o l e confusion i n planners faced with defending t h e i r profession (Healy et a l . , 1982b; S t e r n l i e b , 1978:205). Recall that role confusion tends to reduce job s a t i s f a c t i o n . P o l a r i z a t i o n may also increase r o l e confusion, as planners may be more aware of competing demands. However, none of the planners who were interviewed expressed confusion about th e i r r o l e . They seemed to f e e l that the l e f t i s t majority on council i s on t h e i r side. SUMMARY Chapter IV has described the impact of the p o l i t i c a l repercussions of high unemployment on s t r a t e g i c , normative, and operational planning. The hypotheses generated in this chapter are l i s t e d below and graded according to the three star system described i n Chapter I I I . 67 Strategic Planning 1. Increased conservatism reduces s t r a t e g i c planning by reducing funding for planning; (*) increasing acceptance of deregulation and a reduced scope for planning a c t i v i t i e s ; (*) compelling planners to d i r e c t resources away from planning work to defensive a c t i v i t i e s . (*) 2. Increased l i b e r a l i s m widens the range of means considered i n the achievement of objectives. (*) 3. Status p o l a r i z a t i o n reduces s t r a t e g i c planning by producing greater consensus within the working and middle classes; f o s t e r i n g l e g i t i m i z i n g r o l e s . Normative Planning 4. Underrepresentation of the unemployed reduces normative planning unless planners have a community organizer r o l e . 5. In a p o l i t i c a l l y apathic environment, p a r t i c u l a r l y where the working class i s underrepresented, the value base of planning i s not challenged and planners are brokers of i n t e r e s t group pressures. 6. Protest promotes the reconsideration of value premises by increasing p o l i t i c a l uncertainty and s o l i c i t o u s n e s s of o f f i c i a l s . (*) 7. Protest reduces normative planning by producing prejudice and intolerance i n planners, as a function of uncertainty. 68 8. By reducing the responsiveness of o f f i c i a l s , status p o l a r i z a t i o n reduces normative planning, but, by increasing p a r t i c i p a t i o n rates, i t increases normative planning i n the long run. (*) Operational Planning 9. Polarized p o l i t i c s hinder the c u l t i v a t i o n of consensus. 10. A s h i f t to either the r i g h t or l e f t f a c i l i t a t e s long-range planning by reducing p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t and uncertainty. 11. Increased tolerance of authority f a c i l i t a t e s decision-making. Quality of the Workplace 12. Increased conservatism reduces the q u a l i t y of the workplace for planners by challenging the ratio n a l e of planning, and producing r o l e confusion and job d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . (*) 13. P o l i t i c a l p o l a r i z a t i o n increases r o l e confusion and job s a t i s f a c t i o n by producing c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i t i c a l pressures. The thesis now turns to an examination of the f i s c a l repercussions of high unemployment and the implications for planning. 69 CHAPTER V CITY PLANNING AND THE FISCAL REPERCUSSIONS OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT This chapter discusses the implications of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t for the various l e v e l s of planning and the q u a l i t y of the workplace. F i r s t , a few words are said about municipal finances during high unemployment. HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND MUNICIPAL FINANCES High unemployment a f f e c t s both c i t y revenues and expenditures. I t tends to put a l i d on taxes as the number of land assessment notices that are appealed increases (4,600 f i g h t assessments, 1984). At the same time, where mun i c i p a l i t i e s have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e l i e f , such as during the Great Depression, welfare expenditures increase. In Vancouver, budgetary pressure has,been reduced by the transfer of monies from the Property Endowment Fund to balance the l a s t two budgets. However, some c o u n c i l l o r s believe the C i t y should be more cautious and cut services since the recession could be prolonged. Mayor Harcourt has indicated that unless taxes are raised, funding f o r parks and recreation, planning, s o c i a l planning, and l i b r a r i e s w i l l be cut (Krangle, 1984). "At a time of public expenditure cuts, planning i s p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable as the necessity f o r large, apparently non-productive planning 70 departments i s questioned" (Blowers, 1980:18). Layton contends that while the affluence of 1950's through the early 1970's "provided may crumbs to d i s t r i b u t e to the poor and disadvantaged," since the late 1970's, "good planning p o l i c i e s and humane s o c i a l programs are being haphazardly tossed to the wind (1984:391). He adds that i n the 1970's, progressive reforms could be afforded, whereas i n the 1980's, p o l i t i c i a n s are rea l i g n i n g themselves with business (p. 410). In this sense, the e f f e c t s of f i s c a l pressure resemble the e f f e c t s of increased conservatism; both may orig i n a t e with high unemployment. The City of Vancouver Planning Department has experienced budget cuts since mid-1982, at a time when P r o v i n c i a l megaprojects and the elimination of the o f f i c i a l regional planning function by the Province increased workloads i n the Overall Planning d i v i s i o n (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984). The Area Planning d i v i s i o n i s implementing l o c a l area plans slowly, but surely, because of i t s commitment to c i t i z e n s (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1983:21; 1984:64,73). On the other hand, slowed economic growth may free planners from development permit work (Procos, 1983:104). In Vancouver, applications for major developments have leveled o f f , producing more balanced workloads i n the Zoning d i v i s i o n (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1983, 1984). Even during economic growth, the planning budget tends to fluctuate as f e d e r a l l y funded housing programs come and go, and as "master" plans (e.g. the l o c a l area and cen t r a l business d i s t r i c t plans) are started up and completed (see Figure 5 i n Chapter IV). Thus, many Vancouver planners are temporary s t a f f . 71 In 1982 and 1983, the S o c i a l Planning Department received more money fo r community program grants previously funded by the p r o v i n c i a l government. However, as noted i n Chapter IV, t o t a l funding of the S o c i a l Planning Department decreased i n 1984 (see Figure 5). In contrast, the Economic Development O f f i c e has received steady increases i n funding although these are a small percentage of the t o t a l appropriations. STRATEGIC PLANNING This section examines some of the e f f e c t s of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t on s t r a t e g i c planning. P o s i t i v e e f f e c t s were noted with respect to the e x p l i c i t n e s s of c r i t e r i a and the l e v e l of economic planning. Negative trends were noted with respect to the misrepresentation of budgets, ad hoc decisions, a trade-off mode of planning, increased concern with the v i s i b i l i t y of performance, and reduced goal achievement. E x p l i c i t n e s s of C r i t e r i a F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t may f o s t e r the use of more e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i a i n the evaluation of a l t e r n a t i v e s . B r i t i s h l o c a l governments, required to maintain budgets at the same l e v e l , have tended to widen the parameters of budget review and to require more e x p l i c i t analysis of the r e l a t i o n s h i p among community resources, objectives and problems, and expenditures (Greenwood et a l . , 1980). S i m i l a r l y , Rubin found that retrenchment at u n i v e r s i t i e s fosters a more systematic, e x p l i c i t , and comparative approach to budgeting as well as increased c o l l e c t i o n of data and t h e i r use i n decision-making (1980). The Vancouver Planning Department, too, claims that "we must be clearer i n 72 our recommendations about assigning resources to planning work" (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:52). However, Greenwood et a l . found that improvements to s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s declined over time (1980:42). They suggest that improvements which are not made immediately may be d i f f i c u l t to make; that the p o t e n t i a l for improvement may decline; and that panic may cease to be a motivating factor (pp. 42-44). Economic Planning As mentioned i n Chapter IV, m u n i c i p a l i t i e s may be more interested than usual i n economic planning when the unemployment rate i s high. In the United States, c i t i e s are encouraging groups to form community development corporations to acquire property and e s t a b l i s h businesses (Swartz, 1982:277). B r i t i s h planners are also becoming more entrepreneurial and promotional (Healy et a l . , 1982a:13). In i t s most recent Annual Review, the Vancouver Planning Department gave higher p r i o r i t y to the objective of "suggesting and u t i l i z i n g programs that provide resources to improve Vancouver" (Cit y of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:54). The objectives are not numbered, but the change i n order i s suggestive considering the order has remained unchanged fo r years. One planner remarked that planners should be giving more emphasis to community development and fund r a i s i n g i n order to generate resources. A stronger economic r o l e has also been advocated i n the planning l i t e r a t u r e (Hutton, 1983; Friedman, 1979:590). M u n i c i p a l i t i e s , i n general, are demanding stronger powers to develop th e i r l o c a l economies (Union of B.C. M u n i c i p a l i t i e s , 1983). 73 However, this emphasis on economic planning i s not s o l e l y a response to economic recession and high unemployment. Reduced federal involvement i n community development (Lithwick, 1982:7-8) and the f a i l u r e of conventional macroeconomic p o l i c i e s (Lee, 1980:68) may have contributed to i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t approaches to the economy. Misrepresentation of Budgets Budgetary pressure, p a r t i c u l a r l y severe pressure (Schick, 1980) has been shown to encourage the misrepresentation of budgets, including the underestimation of revenues and manipulation of a l l o c a t i o n s (Levine et a l , 1981; Rubin, 1980; Caiden, 1980). With respect to m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , this occurs less frequently i n m u n i c i p a l i t i e s with a c i t y manager (Levine et a l . , 1981:47). Paradoxically, such r i s k y strategies tend to increase f i s c a l uncertainty (Rubin, 1980). Ad hoc Decisions Inadequate or ad hoc budgeting tends to impede long range planning. Under budgetary pressure, program development i s generally sporadic and favors programs with low i n i t i a l costs, although multi-year implications may be brought out to dampen demands (Schick, 1980:122). Three planners claimed that planning i s becoming more reactive due to increased workloads. Increased workloads tend to increase decision d i f f i c u l t y and the "use of oversight," and i t may be the more important and d i f f i c u l t problems that are l e f t unresolved (Cohen et a l . , 1976:34-35). One planner commented that there i s less " r e a l " planning, which was equated with the development of technical guidelines. 74 A s o c i a l planner described planning i n that department as more an t i c i p a t o r y than before the recession. However, this was a t t r i b u t e d to the developmental stage of the department; as the backlog of needs was met, the department was able to plan for future needs. This may change under continued f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t . A Trade-off Mode of Planning One of the recommendations of the Vancouver Ten Year Task Force was to set p r i o r i t i e s (Vancouver Ci t y Planning Department, 1984:105). The 1983/1984 Annual Review u t i l i z e d three l e v e l s of p r i o r i t y where previously there were two. "Work which cannot be achieved with current funding" (previously second p r i o r i t y work) has been s p l i t into two l e v e l s of p r i o r i t y : "important work which requires a d d i t i o n a l funds" (second p r i o r i t y ) and "desirable work which can be deferred" ( t h i r d p r i o r i t y ) . The Review also states that c a r e f u l programming and e f f e c t i v e p r i o r i t y - s e t t i n g are important i n maximizing capacity and e f f i c i e n c y ( C i t y of Vancouver Planning Department, 1983:77). One s o c i a l planner i s o p t i m i s t i c that hard times w i l l produce more e f f i c i e n t community services--"community groups need to learn to set p r i o r i t i e s " - - b u t i s concerned that groups might spend too much time r a i s i n g funds and not enough time s e r v i c i n g the public. With respect to m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , Levine et a l . found that severe f i s c a l pressure produces cuttin g rather than e f f i c i e n c y (1981:81). A physical planner f e l t that there i s more " r e a l " planning now, defined as "being forced to make hard choices." Recall that another planner f e l t that there i s less r e a l planning now. This difference has 75 more to do with the two planners' perspectives on planning than with the perception of budgetary pressure which both planners acknowledged. The planner who believes there i s more r e a l planning i s probably r e f e r r i n g to the degree of change i n the department, whereas the one who believes there i s less r e a l planning may be r e f e r r i n g to the quality of that change. Like the planner who believes there i s now more r e a l planning, Susskind (1980) argues that f i s c a l stress o f f e r s "opportunities for managerial reform." However, Hartman contends that the problem i s not how to plan without adequate funding, but how to bring about changes that ensure needs are adequately funded (1978:82). S i m i l a r l y , Hulchanski argues that the r e s u l t of accepting constraints i s a "trade-offs mode of decision-making," i n contrast to planning as the "progressive i n c l u s i o n within the scope of human choice and decision, matters that e a r l i e r appeared as constraints or unavoidable outcomes" (1974:65). There i s also concern that p r i o r i t i e s planning, by d i v i d i n g up the problem and i d e n t i f y i n g what can be cut, f a c i l i t a t e s major cuts (Hearn, 1982:172). V i s i b i l i t y of Performance In an organizational c r i s i s such as that produced by f i s c a l pressure, the " v i s i b i l i t y of performance may assume p o l i t i c a l importance" (Selbst, 1978:866). In response to scrutiny by the Conservative government, B r i t i s h planners are i n i t i a t i n g and coordinating quickly executed and v i s i b l e projects (Thomas, 1984:69). They are seeking to prove t h e i r relevance by getting things done (Healey et a l . , 1982:10). S i m i l a r l y , S t e r n l i e b contends that "the sheer f r u s t r a t i o n i n the i n a b i l i t y to d e l i v e r , which so many planners f e e l , makes for a vast impatience and a questioning of the 76 relevance of the theory" (1978a:xi). In general, planners must concern s themselves only with those issues that are definable, concrete and solvable to be considered good managers of change and responsive to both p o l i t i c i a n s and s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t groups (Catanese, 1974:170). However, organizations which emphasize low costs and quantity of products are less innovative that those which emphasize q u a l i t y (Rothman, 1974:471). S i m i l a r l y , the Ten Year Task Force of the Vancouver Planning Department has recommended that the department improve i t s public r e l a t i o n s (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:105). For example, the Overall Planning D i v i s i o n intends to expand the readership of the Quarterly Review (p. 62,65). While "improving communications" has been a stated objective for many years, emphasis on communications at this time may be a response to diminished support for planning. Reduced Goal Achievement Rubin found that the combined e f f e c t of cutbacks and budget uncertainty at u n i v e r s i t i e s was to reduce rewards so far that many administrators did not try to maximize goals (Rubin, 1980). S i m i l a r l y , F r i e d argues that p e r s i s t e n t low grade psychological stress produces s e l e c t i v e i n a t t e n t i o n and narrowed v i s i o n ( F r i e d , 1982:18). Arrow suggests, furthermore, that overload causes information to be f i l t e r e d according to preconceptions (1974:75). Retreat into routine i s a common response to ineffectiveness owing to inadequate resources ( S t e r n l i e b , 1978a:xii). Organizational c r i s i s produces an emphasis on hierarchy and procedures, intolerance of change, "loss of confidence and an ad hoc approach to day-to-day problems, aptly 77 c a l l e d ' c r i s i s management,1 often observed i n l o c a l public agencies" (Selbst, 1978:865). Decisions may have to be made over (Rubin, 1980:177). The Vancouver Planning Department found that f l u c t u a t i n g s t a f f resources and "the lack of senior supervision below the l e v e l of Associate Director meant that the work program proceeded i n f i t s and s t a r t s less e f f i c i e n t l y than i t might have otherwise," and inadequate funding required s t a f f to do "arduous o r i g i n a l research" that could have been purchased (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1983:16). The department i s concerned that i t may " s l i p behind" (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:52). NORMATIVE PLANNING It would seem that normative planning would be reduced when c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n policy-making i s r e s t r i c t e d . In Sweden, i n t e r e s t groups have been excluded from i n v e s t i g a t i v e commissions on the grounds of greater operational e f f i c i e n c y , decreasing t h e i r role i n basic p o l i c y formation (Olsen, 1982:205). The Vancouver Planning Department cut back i t s formal l i a i s o n with the l o c a l area c i t i z e n s ' committees; however, this was due to the completion of the l o c a l area plans (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:24). The department also intends to cut costs by sub s t i t u t i n g "'hard' data and opinion p o l l s for d i r e c t c i t i z e n consultation through committees and meetings" (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1983:63). While surveys can be used to c l a r i f y community values, the danger exists that they w i l l be used to give legitimacy to decisions which have already been made. 78 Despite stated intentions, planners attended eleven percent more pub l i c meetings a f t e r work hours i n 1983 than i n 1982 (City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:5). According to a d i v i s i o n head, protest following approval of the development of a f a s t foods o u t l e t i n a small business area, without the usual public review, reaffirmed the department's b e l i e f i n the necessity of s t a r t i n g out with legitimacy. This v a s c i l l a t i o n r e f l e c t s the dual character of c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n : while c i t i z e n consultation i s expensive, i t i s useful to increase c i t i z e n s ' awareness of"constraints on government and to l e g i t i m i z e government when i t can no longer meet demands by increasing expenditures (Hulchanski, 1974:53,59). One planner stated that council expects "meaningful p a r t i c i p a t i o n , hard slogging, so that c i t i z e n s do not have u n r e a l i s t i c expectations." On the other hand, departments, competing f o r funding, may also use c i t i z e n consultation to buil d support for programs (McCurdy, 1977:119). OPERATIONAL PLANNING F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t may reduce operational planning by producing competition f o r resources. In addition, Selbst contends that i f an organizational c r i s i s develops gradually, s t a f f "may divide t h e i r opinions, questioning the premises of the l i k e l y r e s u l t of the c r i s i s , and p o l a r i z i n g t h e i r responses" (1978:865). This could hinder consensus on planning issues. On the other hand, f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t may produce c e n t r a l i z e d executive or p o l i t i c a l c ontrol over departments and budgets i n order to f a c i l i t a t e operational planning (Levine et a l . , 1981:199; Hining et a l . , 1980). 79 THE QUALITY OF THE WORKPLACE In t h i s section, the effects of budgetary pressure on the q u a l i t y of the workplace for planners are examined. Selbst contends that " i n the short run, and under p o s i t i v e conditions of s t a f f motivation, c r i s i s may serve to unify and mobilize the s t a f f " (1978:866). S i m i l a r l y , Vancouver's c i t y planners have proved they can work well under unusual pressure (Vancouver Planning Department, 1984:33). One of the s o c i a l planners noted that morale i n the department was high despite some uneasiness and suggested that the many job o f f e r s s o c i a l planners receive i n the course of t h e i r work (which puts them in contact with the federal government, community agencies, and business) has cushioned a n x i e t i e s . Planners i n a neighboring municipality were reportedly f i n d i n g their work more varied and i n t e r e s t i n g . In other circumstances, f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t may reduce the q u a l i t y of the workplace for planners. C e n t r a l i z a t i o n of control would reduce the number of decision-making p o s i t i o n s . However, professionals enjoy autonomy (Rothman, 1974:173). Based on trends i n appropriations and demands for economic growth, the autonomy of physical and s o c i a l planners may be c u r t a i l e d more than that of economic planners. However, i n the neighboring municipality mentioned i n the previous paragraph, cutbacks fostered a team approach which the respondent indicated planners were enjoying. Budgetary pressure may also reduce job s e c u r i t y , remuneration, and prest i g e for planners. Rubin observed a r e d i r e c t i o n of resources at 80 u n i v e r s i t i e s away from providing prestige toward problem-solving (1980:167). In the long run, the profession may have d i f f i c u l t y keeping and a t t r a c t i n g good students, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n physical and s o c i a l planning. SUMMARY This chapter has explored the implications of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t f o r planning. As i n previous the chapters, the hypotheses generated by the study are l i s t e d below and are graded according to t h e i r confidence l e v e l . Two stars indicate that we can have confidence i n the proposition. One star indicates that the evidence f o r the proposition i s weak or that the r e l a t i o n s h i p does not hold i n many circumstances. No star s i g n i f i e s that the proposition i s speculative. St r a t e g i c Planning 1. F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t has these p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s on s t r a t e g i c planning: i t f osters the development of e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i a ; (*) supports economic planning. (**) 2. F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t has these negative e f f e c t s on s t r a t e g i c planning: i t f o s t ers misrepresentation of budgets, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the absence of a c i t y manager; (*) produces less a n t i c i p a t o r y planning; (*) produces a trade-off mode of planning; (*) fosters concern about the v i s i b i l i t y of performance; (*) 81 reduces goal achievement. (*) Normative Planning 3. F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t reduces normative planning when funding for c i t i z e n consultation i s reduced; - when c i t i z e n consultation i s used to mold expectations or le g i t i m i z e decisions. Operational Planning 4. F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t reduces operational planning by-producing competition f o r resources; - producing polarized opinions with respect to gradual c r i s i s development. 5. F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t f a c i l i t a t e s operational planning by fost e r i n g c e n t r a l i z e d decision-making. (*) Quality of the Workplace 6. F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t improves the q u a l i t y of the workplace i n the short run and under p o s i t i v e conditions of s t a f f motivation by making work more i n t e r e s t i n g . (*) 7. F i s c a l r e s t r a i n t reduces the q u a l i t y of the workplace when decision-making i s ce n t r a l i z e d ; (*) when job security i s reduced; when s a l a r i e s and funding f o r prestige items are reduced (*). The next chapter concludes the thesis with a summary, projections, research needs, and some general issues. 82 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION This chapter concludes the thesis with a few comments about what has been achieved; speculates on future trends i n the economy, p o l i t i c s , and planning; provides d i r e c t i o n s for future research; and r e f l e c t s on a few general issues i n planning. CLOSING THE GAP The thesis has brought together data and perspectives on the p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l environments of planning and proposed some general r e l a t i o n s h i p s which require v a l i d a t i o n . Probably more questions may have been raised than have been answered. Following the introduction of the study i n the f i r s t chapter, Chapter II fleshed out the background of the study. Chapter III then discussed how unemployment a f f e c t s the nature of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t was intended that this chapter should increase readers' awareness of unemployment as a factor i n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e i r appreciation of the complexity of that r e l a t i o n s h i p , and their f a m i l i a r i t y with some of the contextual factors and d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s . Chapter IV suggested how the p o l i t i c a l repercussions of high unemployment may a f f e c t c i t y planning. The goal of this chapter was to 83 increase readers' awareness of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a factor i n planning as well as readers' appreciation of contextual f a c t o r s . The ef f e c t s of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t on planning were discussed i n Chapter V. This chapter provided an opportunity for readers to develop a better understanding of the f i s c a l environment of planning. This chapter should help to put the previous chapters i n context. POSSIBLE FUTURES This section examines trends i n unemployment and outlines four possible futures of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and planning. The scenarios d i f f e r i n the assumptions made about the success of governments to counteract the trend towards continued high unemployment and to a t t r a c t p o l i t i c a l support. The f i r s t two scenarios, the Neoconservative and P o l a r i z a t i o n scenarios, have a conservative government incumbent; the next two, the Apathy and Liberalism scenarios, have a l e f t - o f - c e n t e r government incumbent. F i r s t , a few words on the prospects for f u l l employment. Unemployment Projections International competition, technological change, high i n t e r e s t rates, business debts, caution about reinvesting, and continued entry of women and baby-boomers into the work force w i l l probably maintain high levels of unemployment throughout the 1980's ( S i n c l a i r , 1984; McG i l l i v r a y , 1984; McNish, 1984; Cook, 1984; Walker, 1984). However, by the end of the decade, fewer women and young people should be entering the work force (Commission of Inquiry into Part-Time Work, 1983:21); increased l e v e l s of s e l f - and part-time employment may 84 characterize a larger proportion of the work force; vocational and technical t r a i n i n g may be i n greater demand; unions may be more involved i n investment funds and other innovations to create jobs (Gray, 1984:10); and union d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and concessions may reduce lockouts and production costs (Hemeon, 1984), thereby reducing unemployment s l i g h t l y by the end of the 1980's. Nevertheless, high unemployment i s l i k e l y to be a feature of the planning environment i n B.C. for the remainder of the 1980's. The Neoconservatism Scenario This scenario assumes that conservative p o l i c i e s succeed i n reducing unemployment, thereby increasing working class support for the conservative party and government spending r e s t r a i n t . At the same time, the party on the l e f t may incorporate some of the themes of the neoconservatives' success, thereby losing i t s more partisan supporters. With respect to Vancouver p o l i t i c s , the Non-Partisan Association (N.P.A.) should have an e l e c t o r a l advantage. A conservative trend could lead to reduced funding of planning, p a r t i c u l a r l y s o c i a l and physical planning. Defensive strategies may fur t h e r s t r a i n departmental resources, and budgets may be misrepresented. Planners may become more concerned with the v i s i b i l i t y of performance and less able to make long-range plans or to involve c i t i z e n s i n planning i n a meaningful way. Deregulation may thwart environmental goals. In a d d i t i o n , c r i t i c i s m of the r a t i o n a l e and value of planning may produce r o l e confusion and reduced innovativeness and job s a t i s f a c t i o n . On the p o s i t i v e side, increased p o l i t i c a l homogeneity may f a c i l i t a t e 85 operational planning. Departmental f i s c a l pressure may, i n addition, f o s t e r the development of e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i a . In the short run, work may be more i n t e r e s t i n g . The P o l a r i z a t i o n Scenario The P o l a r i z a t i o n scenario assumes that conservative economic p o l i c i e s f a i l to reduce unemployment, thereby increasing economic deprivation and status p o l a r i z a t i o n . Protest should become more organized, then taper o f f . The l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party should have an e l e c t o r a l advantage. This scenario probably comes clos e s t to describing p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s i n B.C. Had N.P.A./Team formed a majority on Vancouver's c i t y council during the period that the Committee of Progressive E l e c t o r s / C i v i c Independents have held a majority, this scenario could have described the l o c a l scene as w e l l . While the conservative party s t i l l forms the government, protest may produce reconsideration of the value base of decisions; witness the r e v e r s a l of S o c i a l Credit p o l i c i e s from " r e s t r a i n t " to "renewal." On the other hand, protest may reduce normative planning by producing uncertainty, prejudice, and intolerance. S i m i l a r l y , p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t may reduce the responsiveness of planners, f o s t e r l e g i t i m i z i n g r o l e s , and produce r o l e confusion and job d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , planners may be constrained i n t h e i r analysis of alternate strategies by the p o l a r i z a t i o n of views. P o l a r i z a t i o n can also be expected to reduce the c u l t i v a t i o n of consensus. At the same time, municipal f i s c a l stress may f o s t e r the development of e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i a and economic planning. In the short run, work may be 86 more i n t e r e s t i n g . However, r e s t r a i n t may also produce misrepresentation of budgets, ad hoc decisions, a trade-off mode of planning, concern about the v i s i b i l i t y of performance, and reduced goal achievement. Funding for c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n may be reduced or c i t i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n may be used to mold expectations. Over a period of time, polarized opinions may develop i n the department which may hinder decision-making. Competition for departmental resources may also reduce operational planning. F i n a l l y , r e s t r a i n t may reduce the q u a l i t y of the workplace by producing c e n t r a l i z e d decision-making and reduced job sec u r i t y and compensation." The Apathy Scenario In t h i s scenario, the l e f t - o f - c e n t e r party's economic p o l i c i e s f a i l , thereby increasing apathy, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the working c l a s s . This s i t u a t i o n would p r e v a i l , for example, i f the New Democratic Party came to power i n the next p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n but f a i l e d to reduce the unemployment rate. I f the recession deepens and the l e f t i s t majority on Vancouver's c i t y council can no longer borrow enough from the Property Endowment Fund to make i t unnecessary to rai s e taxes, council may also f i n d i t s e l f i n th i s s i t u a t i o n . Owing to reduced p a r t i c i p a t i o n by p o t e n t i a l supporters of the l e f t i s t party, the right-of-center party could subsequently be reelected. However, the l a t t e r would not have as strong a mandate as i n the Neoconservatism scenario. Cynicism and apathy may reduce c r i t i c a l evaluation of the value base of planning decisions. In addition, underrepresentation of the unemployed and working class people, alienated by the f a i l u r e of the l e f t i s t party to help them, could hamper normative planning unless planners have a 87 community organizer r o l e . Planners could become brokers of those i n t e r e s t groups which are a c t i v e . In addition, to these p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s , the e f f e c t s of f i s c a l stress apply, as outlined i n the P o l a r i z a t i o n scenario. The Liberalism Scenario F i n a l l y , i n the Liberalism scenario, the party on the l e f t i s successful i n reducing unemployment. For example, the New Democratic Party, i f elected i n 1986, could reduce unemployment by the end of the e i g h t i e s , aided by demographic f a c t o r s . Or Vancouver's c i t y council could s u c c e s s f u l l y boost the l o c a l economy. This development would give greater credence to l i b e r a l i s m . P o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the working c l a s s , which would f e e l more f a i r l y represented, should subsequently increase. A l i b e r a l i z e d p o l i t y should support an increased r o l e f or planning. In addition, increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the working class may f o s t e r the reconsideration of the value premises of planning decisions. F i n a l l y , increased p o l i t i c a l homogeneity may f a c i l i t a t e decision-making and long-term planning. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH This study points to the need f o r further research on the p o l i t i c a l and f i s c a l environments of planning. Following are some of the research d i r e c t i o n s provided by the thesis which are organized by chapter. Unemployment and P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n : Research Needs The discussion i n Chapter III suggested the need for more Canadian content, comparative research, disaggregated studies, better 88 conceptualization of unemployment, and data on the p o l i c y preferences of the unemployed. Canadian content. Many of the data i n this thesis were American or B r i t i s h . Although the data did not seem to be at odds with the a v a i l a b l e Canadian data or the interviews, i t i s too early to make s o l i d comparisons. More Canadian studies are required. Comparative research. Related to the need f o r Canadian data i s that f o r comparative research. Crossnational research would provide insights into p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , r e l i g i o n , etc. as contextual variables i n the re l a t i o n s h i p between unemployment and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . One of the assumptions made i n this thesis was that research on p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n national and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s could be applied to the study of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l o c a l p o l i t i c s . C l e a r l y , this assumption requires v a l i d a t i o n with comparative work. Disaggregated studies. Knowledge of d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s helps us to understand the factors involved i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p and to predict v a r i a t i o n s . This study suggests the need for two types of disaggregated studies. The f i r s t would examine the e f f e c t of unemployment on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n for d i f f e r e n t subpopulations. Occupational status, age, and partisanship are some factors that have received some attention i n the l i t e r a t u r e and i n this thesis; however, further study i s warranted. The influence of e t h n i c i t y and immigrant status are p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n a c i t y l i k e Vancouver. The second type of study would examine the e f f e c t of unemployment on 89 d i f f e r e n t dimensions of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The thesis examined voter turnout, the d i r e c t i o n of party support, and, to a lesser extent, demonstrations, campaigning, writing o f f i c i a l s and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n public meetings. The a v a i l a b l e data do not permit comprehensive analysis of the various dimensions of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . This i s unfortunate because the d i f f e r e n t aspects of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t e r a c t . Factor analysis of unemployment. A tentative c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of unemployment was provided i n Chapter I I . A factor analysis of unemployment and i t s r e l a t i v e s , involuntary part-time employment and i n s u f f i c i e n t self-employment, i s needed to help us achieve a better understanding of unemployment and i t s p o l i t i c a l impact, and to f a c i l i t a t e model b u i l d i n g . P o l i c y preferences of the unemployed. Chapter III pointed to the lack of information on the p o l i c y preferences of the unemployed. Without this information i t i s d i f f i c u l t to assess the impact of high unemployment on p o l i t i c a l equality. The P o l i t i c a l Environment of Planning: Research Needs Four basic research needs or topics come out of Chapter IV: cro s s - s e c t i o n a l data, consolidation of the relevant s o c i a l science research, decision-making contexts, and communications i n planning. Cross-sectional data. Much of the planning l i t e r a t u r e i s of the case study v a r i e t y with few controls of extraneous v a r i a b l e s . Cross-sectional data would help us determine the role of organizational f a c t o r s , planning s t y l e , community c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , etc. i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between planning and the p o l i t i c a l environment. 90 Consolidation of research findings. Neoconservatism has highlighted the need for better theory and greater consensus i n planning (Hightower, 1984:72; Lithwick, 1982:6). The planning l i t e r a t u r e tends to be i d i o s y n c r a t i c and polemical. More meaningful var i a t i o n s i n conceptualization might develop from a common ground. Much of the data c o l l e c t e d by s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s has d i r e c t implications for planning. However, not enough at t e n t i o n has been given to the consolidation and dissemination of this material. Decision-making contexts. More study i s needed of decision-making contexts or contingencies. Work i n this area would help to bridge the gap between s o c i a l science and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . Communications i n planning. Chapter IV also h i g h l i g h t s the need for research and t r a i n i n g i n communications. Recall one planner's conviction that developers are manipulating the public's h y s t e r i a about jobs. C r i t i c a l theory i s promising i n this regard. Planning under F i s c a l Restraint: Research Needs The main need i n the area of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t and planning i s for comparative studies. By comparing the e f f e c t s of r e s t r a i n t on d i f f e r e n t planning bodies, organizational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which modify the e f f e c t s of budgetary pressure might be i d e n t i f i e d . The l i t e r a t u r e c i t e d i n Chapter V was l a r g e l y borrowed from the public administration l i t e r a t u r e . Research on the f i s c a l environment of c i t y planning, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s required. However, there i s a danger that research which i s designed to reduce trade-offs may receive short s h r i f t . 91 GENERAL ISSUES The thesis concludes by r e f l e c t i n g on some general issues: the dual nature of planning, independence f o r planners, and the h i s t o r i c a l perspective. The Two Faces of Planning The thesis h i g h l i g h t s the c o n f l i c t i n planning between the technical and p o l i t i c a l sides of planning. For example, conservatism may produce a trade-offs mode of planning i n place of the s c i e n t i f i c reduction of trade-offs. Paradoxically, the increasing emphasis i n planning theory on the moral and p o l i t i c a l side of planning (Hemmens, 1980:259) may have weakened planners' technical expertise i n substantive areas needed to bring about the reduction of trade-offs. At the same time, p o l i t i c a l expertise may be es s e n t i a l to the achievment of s o c i a l planning objectives during high unemployment, such as the reversal of the development of p o l i t i c a l i n e q u a l i t y and cynicism. The best planners have undoubtedly c u l t i v a t e d both technical and p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s (Meltsner, 1976). Independence of Planners Neoconservative c r i t i c i s m of planning can be expected to rai s e the issue of independence for planners. However, the planner i s unlike the ombudsman who i s not supposed to question s t r a t e g i c or normative dec i s i o n s . The idea of an independent appointed government body shaping p o l i c y should be repugnant i n a representative democracy. 92 Conversely, the trend towards p r i v a t i z a t i o n raises doubts about planners' r i g h t to a place i n government at a l l . Why should planners have more d i r e c t access to p o l i t i c i a n s than private planning bodies? Are government planners necess a r i l y more e f f e c t i v e than planners with private organizations? Were the Neoconservatism scenario to be more f u l l y r e a l i z e d , these questions would undoubtedly be raised, and planners should be prepared with t h e i r answers. Crossnational studies may be useful i n t h i s regard. The H i s t o r i c a l Perspective The Task Force of the Future of the Planning Profession has suggested that continued high unemployment produces the need to plan for increased l e i s u r e time and to r e d i s t r i b u t e income on a non-job basis (1982:34). I t i s beyond the scope of the thesis to say whether a guaranteed income and adequate educational and r e c r e a t i o n a l opportunities would substitute f or a job, although the discussion of conservatism i n Chapter III suggests that the expense and discriminatory nature of such a set of programs would not be acceptable to the employed taxpayer, at least at this time. Garraty contends that . . . i f there i s a lesson to be learned from the h i s t o r y of [unemployment], i t i s that sound att i t u d e s and p o l i c i e s are responses to p a r t i c u l a r conditions, which change over time. I n f l a t i o n was the bogy of the age of John Maynard Keynes; fear of i t caused a quarter of the world's work force to s u f f e r unemployment. Fear of unemployment must not become the bogy of modern times (1978:262). I n f l a t i o n i s possibly the bogy of the 1980's. What t h i s discussion suggests i s that an appreciation of h i s t o r y could help planners avoid bandwagon approaches to planning. 93 REFERENCES Aiken, Michael, Louis A. Ferraan and Harold L. Sheppard. 1968. Economic F a i l u r e , A l i e n a t i o n , and Extremism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. A l f o r d , John R. 1982. Pocketbook Voting: Economic Conditions and Individual Level Voting. 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The Sun. 2 November:C12. 106 APPENDIX Table II l i s t s some of the studies on magnetic tape i n the University of B r i t i s h Columbia's Data Bank, which contain survey data on i n d i v i d u a l s ' economic status and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Several data f i l e s containing aggregate e l e c t i o n and census data are also included. As mentioned i n Chapter I, these studies should be useful i n comparative research. The table records the type of data a v a i l a b l e , the nature of the economic status and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n v a r i a b l e s , the l e v e l of p o l i t i c s to which measures of p a r t i c i p a t i o n apply, and other variables of p o t e n t i a l i n t e r e s t . As a l l of the studies contain some measure of income and demographic information (age, sex, and marital s t a t u s ) , these variables are not shown i n the table. Other features of the studies that are not shown, but which may a f f e c t the use of any p a r t i c u l a r study, should be mentioned. Some studies use d i f f e r e n t samples so that a l l of the variables shown f o r a p a r t i c u l a r study are not n e c e s s a r i l y amenable to crosstabulation. In addition, the v a r i a b l e l i s t s f o r the time series studies are not n e c e s s a r i l y complete fo r every year i n the s e r i e s . F i n a l l y , the table does not indicate the time frame of the v a r i a b l e s , such as whether responses pertain to current or past a c t i v i t i e s . The temporal context of the variables a f f e c t s the meaning of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them. T a b l e I I . C a n a d i a n s t u d i e s o n m a g n e t i c t a p e i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ' s D a t a B a n k t h a t c o n t a i n m e a s u r e s o f b o t h E c o n o m i c S t a t u s a n d P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n <&A$ A/AA^WZW, ^W^WAW^M ^A^MMA^^WA^ 4/// /As/ "A A<? A (WAv /@A®& M%AA^W/AW/ ^M^A^WAMV >As>A^ Ar* As* /*v A.o A** ASy*&s /Q. A^A^A^yAA^A^AA^A^A WMMWAA STUDY AND LIBRARY NUMBER DATA ECONOMIC STATUS POLITICAL ACTIVITY ARENA OTHER VARIABLES Canadian G a l l o p P o l l s X S o c i a l Change I n Canada 1981 (#3671 S635 1981) 1979 (#3671 S635 1979) 1977 (#3671 S635 1977) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X F a t a l i s m X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X F e e l r e . p r o t e s t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X F e e l r e . p r o t e s t , a i d to unemployed Cdn. N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n 1980 (#3271 C353 1980) 1979 (#3271 C353 1980) 1974 (#3271 C353 1974) 1972 (#3271 C353 1972) p r e - e l e c t i o n p r e - e l e c t i o n p o s t - e l e c t i o n 1972 (Que. sample) (#3271 H345 1972) 1968 (#3271 M458 1968A) 1965 (#3271 C343 1965) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X x x x x x x x x C l a s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X x x x x x x x x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X B.C. E l e c t i o n Study, 1979-80 (#3272 E44 1979-80) 1972 (#3272 P768 1972) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X B.C. P o l i t i c a l A t t i t u d e s 1979 (#3272 B7586 1979) 1978 (#3272 B7586 1978) Mar. 1977 (#3272 B7585 1977) Day Care 4 S e r v i c e s . . . . 1976 (#3672 K639 1976) Jan . 1975 (#3272 B758 1975) Dec. 1975 (#3272 B7582 1975) Work, Welfa r e and S o c i a l S e r v i c e s (#3672 K6398 1975) B.C. V o t i n g P a t t e r n s 1972-3 (#3272 B759 1977) X X X X X X X X X X X X Work e t h i c X X X X X X X X X X X X Work e t h i c X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Use o f s e r v i c e s X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Want change O n t a r i o P r o v i n c i a l E l e c t i o n , 1977 (#3271 D785 1977) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X C l a s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s Work E t h i c Survey (#3815 T545 1974) X X X X X X X X F e e l r e . unemployed Cdn. Census & Fed. f l e c t i o n 1968-74 (#3071 B434 1974) 1908-68 (#3071 B43 C3 1972) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X A t t i t u d e s toward L o c a l Gov't i n N f l d . (#3271 G733 1973) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X F e e l r e . p a r t i c i p a -t i o n . Teuure 1973 Que. P r o v i n c i a l E l e c t i o n (#3271 H346 1973) X X X X X X X X X X X X X A i r P o l l u t i o n . . . T r a i 1 (#6172 M222 P t 3 1972) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X A l b e r t a 1971 Research P r o j e c t (#3271 B347 1971) X X X X X X X X X X x x x x x x x x Vancouver C i v i c E l e c t ' n 1970 (#3272 F588 1970) X X X X X X X Tenure C r o s s n a t ' l F i v e Community (#3000 A334 1969) X X X X X X X X X X X X X L e v e l p a r t i c i p a t i o n O n t a r i o P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e (#3271 H634 06 1968) X X x x x x x X X x x x x x x x x F e e l r e . change Waterloo South B y e l e c t l o n (#3271 U548 W3 1964) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Tenure Que. P r o v . and Fed. E l e c t ' n , 1962 (#3271 P553 1962) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Que. P r o v i n c i a l E l e c t i o n , 1960 (#3271 P554 1960) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 

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