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Text, context, communication, and metaphors : initiating dialogue in transactive planning Chernoff, Paul J. 1984

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TEXT, CONTEXT, COMMUNICATION,  AND METAPHORS:  INITIATING DIALOGUE IN TRANSACTIVE  PLANNING  by  PAUL J CHERNOFF B.G.S., The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1981  A THESIS SUBMITTED  IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS  FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES School of Community and Regional Planning  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY  OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1984  ® Paul J Chernoff, 1984  In p r e s e n t i n g requirements  this thesis f o r an  of  British  it  freely available  agree t h a t for  that  Library  s h a l l make  for reference  and  study.  I  f o r extensive copying of  h i s or  be  her  copying or  f i n a n c i a l gain  University  the  s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may  understood  the  shall  g r a n t e d by  the  representatives. publication  not  be  of  Community and  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h 1956 Main Mall V a n c o u v e r , Canada V6T 1Y3  Date  DE-6  (3/81)  J u n e 13.  1984  further this  this  Columbia  Planning  my  It is thesis  a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my  Regional  thesis  head o f  permission.  Department o f  the  I agree that  permission by  f u l f i l m e n t of  advanced degree a t  Columbia,  department or for  in partial  written  Abstract Transactive Planning is based upon the establishment of a dialogue between the planner and the client.  The present study explores how the planner can attempt to initiate  a dialogue with a client, in terms of subject-matter-related communication..  The establish-  ment of dialogue is partially dependent upon the planner's ability to make his or her knowledge relevant to the client municate effectively.  The planner can do this only if he or she can com-  Effective cornmunication occurs when the intentions behind the words  are conveyed with the words.  This is dependent upon all of the people involved in the  act of dialogic communication actively sharing some values. As an example of how a dialogue could be initiated, this study examines the case of a planner who sympathizes with the idea of Community Land Trusts, and who attempts to initiate a dialogue with a client who holds a traditional view of land. matter of the proposed dialogue is land tenure and land-use reform.  The subject-  The issues of land  tenure and land-use reform are intimately related to how land is conceptualized and the system of values attached to these conceptualizations.  The planner and the client need a  common reference point, composed of shared values, to which both can refer when either of them introduces new knowledge. their value-systems share similarities. point for the dialogue.  The planner must demonstrate to the client that both These shared similarities will be a common reference  If this in not done, the client may. interpret the knowledge that  the planner communicates in a manner which is contrary to the planner's intentions. A methodology is developed and applied to compare the concepts that a member of the dominant culture of the United States of America uses to describe land to those used by a planner who advocates Community Land Trusts.  The concepts are interpreted so as  to reveal the values which each person associates with them.  The values revealed are then  reorganized according to how the values define the goals of land tenure.  A comparison is  made between how each person defines each goal because these definitions reflect their value-systems.  If the planner initially emphasizes the goals which both he and the client ii  define in a similar manner, then there is a greater probability that a dialogue can be established. Six goals were selected by the methodology: security, individual equity, individual legacy, community access, community equity, and community legacy.  The analysis shows that  the planner and the client agree the most on how to define security.  This reflects that  the planner and the client perceive some of the rights of individual land-users in a similar manner.  If the planner starts a dialogue from this point of agreement, then the  areas of disagreement could be later introduced in terms of what is already agreed upon. In many other situations it is important for planners to identify the goals which they and their clients define in a similar manner so these goals can serve as a reference point This reference point is the common ground upon which both the planner and the client can base their dialogue. The common ground of dialogue is made up of the similarities that exist between different world-views.  A dialogue is not limited to, but builds upon, the similarities  between the world-views held by the planner and the client  A metaphoric view of  reality can provide the basis for establishing the similarities between world-views.  A  metaphoric view enables us to connect values to both each other and to concepts in a systemic manner.  Since the world is known in terms of concepts, the values that are  associated with these concepts can be compared to the values that are associated with different concepts.  A dialogue can be based upon similarities which are discovered between  value-systems.  iii  Table of Contents Abstract Figures Charts Acknowledgements  , ;  .".  .  ii vi vii viii  CHAPTER ONE. REALITY IS A METAPHOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAND AND LANGUAGE ~ 1.1 Land and Culture ~ 1.2 Metaphor _ 1.2.1 language 1.2.2 knowledge _ 1.2.3 structure 1.2.4 values .. . .— Values and needs Values and the symbolic universe Values and metaphors 1.2.5 land 1.3 Land in the United States of America 1.3.1 the received culture 1.3.2 the community land trust proponents 1.3.3 land metaphors 1.4 Planning 1.5 Outline of the Paper  1 2 4 4 9 11 15 15 —17 19 19 20 21 22 24 24 28  CHAPTER TWO. T H E TRANSLATION OF METAPHORS 2.1 Text and Context 2.2 The Reader and the Text 2.3 Translation and Communication in Context 2.4 Dialogue and the Translation of Metaphors 2.5 Dialogue, Textualism, and Metaphor  30 32 36 41 46 49  CHAPTER THREE. ISOMORPHISM AND METAPHORS 51 3.1 Definitions 54 3.1.1 schema .. 54 3.1.2 social category „ 55 3.1.3 feature ~~ 56 3.1.4 goal 56 3.1.5 isomorphism i 1 . .. 57 3>2 ^^xoccdurc »•»»—• 58 3»2*>L the m&tnx lyorkshect »••••«•••»«•#•»«•••••••••«•••••»*••••*••••••••••••«••••••»••••»*•»«».•»»«,»»*«•••**»•*•••••#••••••••••••••••»»»•»•* 58 Land in the received culture. Land in the community land trust. 3.2.2 the goal worksheet .. 3.2.3 the isomorphism worksheet Total agreement Partial agreement Conflict No agreement. 3.2.4 identifying isomorphisms . 3.3 Summary: Isomorphism and the Translation of Metaphors iv  ~  60 60 66 69 69 69 70 70 70 75  CHAPTER FOUR. TRANSACTIVE PLANNING, MUTUAL LEARNING, AND DIALOGUE : ~ 4.1 Rational Comprehensive Planning 4.2 Land-Use Planning 4.3 Transactive Planning 4.3.1 dialogue and mutual learning 4.3.2 mutual learning, metaphors, and the learning society 4.4 Redefining the Land-Use Planner's Role 4.5 Methodology and Communication 4.6 Sunrrnary: The Spirit of Transactive Planning  77 78 80 84 85 87 90 93 96  CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSIONS  98  APPENDIX ONE. DEFINITIONS 6.1 Social Category Definition Sources 6.1.1 political 6.1.2 economic 6.1.3 legal 6.1.4 social 6.2 Goal Dictionary Definitions 6.2.1 security 6.2.2 individual equity 6.2.3 individual legacy 6.2.4 community access 6.2.5 community equity 6.2.6 community' legacy  102 102 102 102 103 103 104 104 104 104 104 105 105  APPENDLX TWO. SAMPLE WORKSHEETS BIBLIOGRAPHY  106 108  v  Figures 1 Production of Features  56  2 Semantic Space of Social Categories  63  3 Semantic Space of Goals  67  vi  Charts  1 Received Culture Matrix Worksheet  64  2 CLT Proponents Matrix Worksheet  65  3 RC Goal Worksheet  •  68  4 CLT Proponents Goal Worksheet  68  5 Security Isomorphism Worksheet  72  6 Individual Equity Isomorphism Worksheet  72  7 Individual Legacy Isomorphism Worksheet  73  8 Community Access Isomorphism Worksheet  73  9 Community Equity Isomorphism Worksheet  74  10 Community Legacy Isomorphism Worksheet  74  11 The Goal Worksheet  106  12 Isomorphism Worksheet  106  13 Matrix Worksheet  107  vii  Acknowledgements  Not only does even journey of 1000 miles start with a single step, but during 1  every journey we meet people who help us on our way. and Shelagh Lindsey for their invaluable aid.  I wish to thank Clyde Weaver  In particular I feel that I should note that  great amount of patience they both had with me as I slowly found my way and finally decided upon a direction.  They were willing to help me despite the number of blind  alleys that I ran (not walked) into, times that I got lost, and my command (or lack of it) of the written word.  1 was only able to write this thesis due to the generous amount  of support that I received A special note of thanks to Anneliese Kramer-Dahl for opening a new for me to journey through which eventually resulted in this thesis.  I regret that she decided to leave  Vancouver for Singapore, because her help on the thesis would have been appreciated. While she left before I started writing the thesis or even knew what the thesis was going to be about, I would have never have discovered some of the avenues that I took, nor have met Shelagh Lindsey, without her. Lorraine Wier and David Hulchanski both helped me in both their remarks and in recommending books.  I would also like to thank Henry Hightower, and Shlomo Hasson  for their comments on my work.  While their comments applied mostly to areas beyond  this thesis, I have attempted to respond to them when I could. My father deserves a special note of thanks for having put up with a son who must at times seemed determined to never graduate.  His belief that I was doing  something worthwhile was a source of important support. Of my fellow students, Barbara Fraser and Wayne Yeechong deserve a special note of thanks for helping my prepare for my oral defence.  While their help in this occurred  after the bulk of my thesis was written, the suggestions that they made on how to present it not only allowed me to summarize my thoughts for the oral presentation, but they also allowed me to fine-tune the final written work.  viii  But most of those who helped me in less direct ways must go unnamed, though the authorship should include "and a cast of thousands."  My friends, who include fellow  students, landlords, and past professors, have added to my thoughts and provided emotional support in ways that are beyond counting.  These people should know who they are.  consider myself fortunate to have had my life enriched by so many.  ix  I  We say thai, in order to communicate, people must agree with one another about the meanings of words. But the criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g., ostensive definitions—but also an agreement in judgements. It is essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgements. —Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics  x  1 CHAPTER ONE REALITY IS A METAPHOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAND AND LANGUAGE The purpose of this thesis is to aid the land-use planner to improve communication with a client over issues involving alternative forms of land tenure.  Effective communica-  tion is dependent upon both participants having a common interest in the subject-matter of communication.  Since the subject-matter in this case is land, this means that both the  planner and the client must base their communication on the similar ways in which they value land, before moving into areas of disagreement  Communication is dependent upon  all participants interpreting what is being said in a similar manner (Fish 1980).  Similar  interpretations can be ensured if planners can identify in what ways they and their clients interpret, and thus conceive of, land in a similar manner. I am proposing that in order to understand how people conceive of land, and what values are associated with their conceptions, that these conceptualizations are to be understood as metaphors.  A metaphorical theory of reality assumes that value and meaning are  not inherent in objects, but are created by people (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). are embedded in a value-system.  Metaphors  If conceptualizations are considered metaphoric, then the  comparison of conceptualizations can be based on the comparison of metaphors.  It is these  metaphors that will enable the planner to improve communication with the client A case study approach is adapted to focus the issues associated with communication and dialogue.  A case study will also serve as an example of how planners could apply  the theory presented in this paper.  For my case study, I am comparing what land sy-  mbolizes to the dominant culture of the United States of America and to the proponents of Community Land Trusts (CLT); Community Land Trusts are one among many forms of land-use reform which a planner can advocate.  In order for CLTs to be established, their  proponents must not only know what land means to most Americans, but also they must understand how the different concepts of land are related to non-land values.  Many  people interested in land-use reform have met with limited success partially because of the  2 fact that their conceptions of land were alien to the average American. During the 1970s, planners who were part of the environmental movement saw land changing from  land  is a  commodity  to  concept went against American traditions.  land  is a  common  (or public)  good.  Many planners did not realize this.  This latter The en-  vironmental movement expected all rational people who did not have a large Financial stake in the exploitation of land to support the movement  Little or no concern for the in-  terests of those who were to be most affected by some proposed legislation was shown by the movement (Popper 1981).  These items are related by the fact that the cultural values  associated with land were never dealt with. Land is an integral part of any culture. on it and we live off of it  Land is the basis of human life; we live  It is a source of power and wealth, both for a society as  a whole and for individuals within the society (Wolf 1981). symbolic meaning that goes beyond the earth composing it who decides how land is to be used.  In all cultures, land has This meaning affects what and  How land is controlled in a society reflects and  contributes to the culture and social structure.  Any conceptualization of land has important  symbolic and pragmatic aspects that can never be fully disentangled from one another. 1.1 Land and Culture As Peter Nabokov tells us in his book, Indian Running, when you track down a seemingly isolated or minimal feature of Indian life, such as running, the whole system opens before your eyes; and this is true because of the interrelatedness of all the components of a genuine tradition [Brown 1982, 8]. In attempting to understand how a culture conceives of land, we also learn about the culture.  Land, or any other concept, cannot be separated from its cultural context  Just as running opens Indian life to your eyes, an examination of land opens a way of life to the examiner. culture.  All cultures value land in a manner which is complementary to the  Land is imbued with symbolic values which connects it to the . rest of the culture.  3 How land is conceived of varies from culture to culture.  Not only the meaning of  the word land, but the very boundaries of what the word can mean, varies.  To the  dominant culture of the United States, land is property—an object to be conquered, tamed, and controlled.  Aldo Leopold ([1949] 1970) claimed that the land-human relationship based  upon defining land as property allows for the extraction and consumption of land-based resources for economic gains. the land.  This relationship does not include any responsibility towards  In contrast, the Plains Indians of the 18th and 19th centuries revered the land  and did not attempt to manipulate it for human purposes (Worster 1979). have devised other conceptualizations of land.  Other cultures  How any culture conceptualizes land is re-  flected in other aspects of the culture. Conceptualizations of land are evident at the base of a culture's social institutions. Land tenure, one such institution, is always based upon some concept of land.  American  Indian and European concepts of land were so different from each other that the European settlers and their descendants did not recognize American Indian land tenure to be land tenure (Wolf 1981).  This is not to say that the seizure of land in the New World from  Indians by European settlers was not motivated by other causes, for example, rascism, greed, and imperialism, but European concepts of land, at the very least, lent legitimacy to the taking of Indian land. Any method of land management is based not only on economic interests, the distribution of power, historical forces, and what are commonly known as pragmatic considerations, but also on the conceptions of land that are accepted by the culture. factors are related to and support each other.  All of these  While most planners are not involved in  cross-cultural situations, any change a planner proposes on how land is controlled is based on a conceptualization of land that probably differs from the socially accepted concepts of land.  Resistance to change will not only come from people protecting their economic in-  terests, but also from how people will symbolically view the changes in the control of land.  4  In order for planners to come to terms with this resistance, they need a theory of reality which allows for conflicts between how land is conceptualized. also allow for these different conceptualizations to be equally valid.  This theory must These conceptualizations  should be accepted as being nonarbitrary and rational if a dialogue on land is desired.  A  metaphoric theory of reality fulfills these requirements. 1.2 Metaphor "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 5).  A metaphor aids us in forming a co-  herent picture—a structured gestalt—of some aspect of reality. aspects of concepts in a structured and systemic manner.  Metaphors reveal certain  They do this by both highlight-  ing and hiding certain aspects of concepts, and reality in general.  They have an important  role in setting our mental agenda because of the way in which we use them to structure reality. Any theory of metaphors is based upon a theory of language.  Before considering a  metaphoric interpretion of concepts, the literal school of language and metaphor will be examined.  During this examination it will become evident that all metaphors have structure.  These structures are composed, at least partially, by values.  After metaphors are linked to  values they can be related to the conceptualization of land. 1.2.1 language Metaphors have often been seen as aberrations by many schools of language theory. While this view has changed in the past ten years, it still characterizes the popular conception of metaphors which is dominant in the social sciences which have a Positivist or neo-Positivist legacy. inherent properties.  This view of language considers words to be defined only by their A dictionary definition of words is considered to be made up of the  words' inherent properties. literal school of language.  A word is considered to be neutral in meaning.  This is the  5  The followers of the literal approach to language tend to support what Max Black (1962) calls the substitution view of metaphors.  According to this view, metaphors can be  understood only within the framework of the literal language.  Metaphors are merely sub-  stituted for some equivalent literal expression, and are merely a way of saying one thing while meaning another. yet-to-be-invented new meaning.  In some cases, the metaphor is used as a substitute for some  word or expression.  Or it might just be an old word picking up a  The followers of this theory tell us that it is sometimes used to divert the  attention of the reader away from the subject so as to add to the reader's pleasure.  In  other words, metaphor is no more than decoration, and does not belong in serious writing. However, the substitution view does not explain all uses of metaphor. A similar but more complex theory is the comparison view (Black 1962).  This  theory goes beyond the substitution view because it allows for irony, hyperbole, and for metaphors to alter the literal meaning of words.  While reading a metaphoric text, the re-  ader still restructures the text to its literal meaning. becomes that of analogy or similarity.  The chief characteristic of metaphor  Metaphors are like similes, except the former imply  comparison while the latter state comparison by using the word "as" or "like".  The me-  taphor "Charles is a pig" means "Charles is like a pig (in eating in a gross manner.)" But is this metaphor really about how Charles eats, or his habits of personal hygiene? By insisting that all metaphors have a literal and inherent meaning, reading leads to uncertainty, as when a reader has to decide in what respect Charles is like a pig.  The  comparison view of metaphor cannot satisfactorily deal with ambiguity. In contrast to literal theories of metaphor, Black's (1962) definition of "interactive metaphor" accepts that words can have meaning beyond some single object that metaphors do not have precise literal meanings.  Black finds  This allows for metaphors to stand  for a system of ideas, which, though not sharply delineated, are sufficiently well-defined to have meaning. another.  They function by making us think of one object by comparing it to  6 Metaphors are made up of a primary and a secondary subject ject is being described by the secondary subject  The primary sub-  The result is that, within a metaphor,  certain aspects of the primary subject are emphasized with others are suppressed according to how a person thinks of the secondary subject  A metaphor is a filter screening out all  but the commonly associated attributes of the secondary subject.  To use Black's example  of how metaphors function, to call a man a wolf is to call to mind the wolf-like attributes of a man, and to suppress the nonwolf-like attributes.  This example does not dis-  play a simple situation because the metaphor is dependent upon how the reader interprets the word wolf. The interpretation of the secondary subject, and thus a metaphor, is dependent upon the context in which the metaphor appears.  This includes, in addition to the context con-  sisting of the text the metaphor is inside, the metaphor's cultural context  Which wolf-like  attributes are noticed will be dependent upon both the cultural and the individual contexts in which they are used.  The use of special metaphors by Apaches, called "wise words,"  are an example of the importance of cultural context. An Apache would chastise girls who did not help with the chores by saying that "butterflies are girls."  Despite the word order, "girls" is the primary subject and "butter-  flies" is the secondary subject  This phrase is translated into English as "butterflies are  girls" so to reflect that this special usage of metaphor. English might mean that they are pretty, like butterflies.  To call girls "butterflies" in But an Apache would not be  referring to the physical beauty of the girls, but would be calling attention to the fact that the girls were, like butterflies, mindlessly fluttering about (Basso 1976).  A metaphor is  like a mask in Bali, it can only be understood in some context Masks are dense with meaning. Their fixed expressions are charged with significance that does not lend itself to simple analysis. It is impossible to understand a mask without examining the person who wears it, and the tree from which it was carved. In isolation a mask is a lifeless museum-piece or a decorative wall-hanging. But in the context of performance, the mask becomes the center of a complex of intersecting forces [Jenkins 1981, 17].  7 Black concludes that it is valid to use metaphors in writing philosophy if they add to the argument and if the contexts in which they appear are not too ambiguous. ers metaphors to be an important  adjunct  Black consid-  to literal language and thus he does not ques-  tion the literal school of language theory very seriously. In  Philosophical  Investigations,  Ludwig Wittgenstein ([1953] 1978) examines the nature  of language and and in so doing questions the literal approach to it.  He wonders what  the individual words of a language signify: he wonders if words are merely the names for objects, or if they imply something in addition.  Words have more than one meaning, or  interpretation, and we can attempt to narrow the meaning of any one word by defining it. A definition consists of more words, which in turn can be misunderstood. finds a lack of conciseness in all language.  Wittgenstein  He wonders how it is possible to communi-  cate anything with words. "One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. 15).  But what does one have to know?"  (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1978,  One must be familiar with how to do something with it  Names are not under-  stood in terms of some strange object, but in terms of what we already know.  In order  to know what a king is in chess, one must first know what chess is, what a game is, what a piece is, etc.  The king in chess is more than the name of a piece of wood or  metal or plastic, it is a concept that has a particular meaning within the context of the game of chess.  By itself, the word king can have many meanings, but its meaning in  any one case is dependent upon the context within which it is used.  In order to unde-  rstand the use of the word king, one must have knowledge of the context that it is used in.  If the reader does not know what chess is, he or she will not know what the writ-  er means by king. A word has more than one meaning, but how can this be?  "Instead of producing  something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, are  related  but that they  to one another in many different ways" (Wittgenstein [1953] 1978, 31).  The  8  different meanings of a word are related to each other.  How they are is not clear.  What exists is a web of relationships that are accepted.  We understand this web as a  gestalt, rather than through the "true literal meaning" of words.  When examining why we  consider card games, sports games, and board games all to be games despite a great number of differences among them, Wittgenstein denies that a single linear thread links all of them together.  Rather, the meanings of the word "game", or any other word, are  linked through a complicated network of overlapping and criss-crossing similarities.  Game is  not just the name of an object; it is a concept that covers the entire family of games. Any member of this family can also be a member of other families at the same time. This family is also not static; its meanings change every time it is used, not only due to the context of its use, but also according to what the reader thinks what a game is and is not  Game is a concept with fuzzy boundaries that are constantly shifting.  Its meaning  is not only dependent upon certain inherent properties, but also upon how it relates to a number of other factors and how we understand these concepts. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's (1980) view of language coincides with that of Wittgenstein.  These authors are not looking for precision in language but rather for an  explanation of how people understand the world and each other.  They use metaphors to  obtain a better understanding of language and the conceptulization of experience. are not subsidiary to language, but are an integral part of language. language is rejected because all language is metaphorical. that language is a web. words.  Metaphors  The theory of literal  Lakoff and Johnson emphasize  We define words mainly by how they are related to other  We understand concepts partly in terms of other concepts.  Metaphors are no  longer rare, but are pervasive in everyday life, because they are the basis of language and of understanding human experience. It would be wrong to leave our understanding of language at the level of everything is understood in terms of everything else. could decide that all language is meaningless.  If taken to  reductio  ad  absurdum,  we  For example, if we understand words in  terms of other words, and these defining words in terms of others, . . .  we conclude that  9 language is meaningless rather than it is a rich web of interactions.  This would contradict  the fact that we do we attribute meaning to words, sentences and stories and that people often do agree on meaning.  If language is taken as a purely subjective experience, then  there is no room for either a shared reality or communication.  Wittgenstein points out  that despite the ambiguities of language, communication does occur.  What is needed to  explain how communication is possible is a theory of knowledge that links personal experiences with social reality and scientific knowledge.  1.2.2 knowledge The New Rationality presented by Clyde Weaver, Joanne Jessop, and Veechibala Das "requires that social science be informed by different realms of experience and knowing, all essential to an appreciation of human affairs" (1983, 2). knowledge into three categories: Knowledge.  Personal Knowledge,  They divide these dimensions of  Sociological  Knowledge,  and  Positive  These categories do not represent the only way to divide up the dimensions  of knowledge, nor do they necessarily cover all of the dimensions of knowledge.  Rather,  they cover the dimensions of knowledge that have been predominant throughout the history of planning.  Each category, or realm, is partially autonomous because each has its own  distinct epistemology, method, and rationality. Personal  worlds.  Knowledge  is comprised of personal experience and our subjective internal  It is in this realm that Sheldon B. Kopp's (1971) three ways of knowing—ra-  tional knowing (thinking), empirical knowing (information gained by our senses), and metaphorical knowing (the intuitive grasping of situations)—meet  Knowledge and action are  linked in this realm because it is experimental and experiential in nature.  It is not a re-  alm of objective facts, though it does include the effect an objective fact has on us; it is a realm of values (Laing 1982). world.  It contains the meaning individuals find/create in the  This type of knowledge is ahistorical and does not explain why or how different  people can attach meanings to symbols in a similar manner.  10 Sociological  Knowledge  is the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman  1966; Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983). into being.  It is in this realm that historical conditions come  Sociological Knowledge is not concerned so much with how individuals view  the world, as with how historical, social, and institutional forces shape or contribute to the values of groups. ideologies.  These groupings are often treated as objects in their own right  Positive  laws.  Knowledge and values become structured into different groupings or  Knowledge  is made up of that which is believed to be universal and causal  "It is objective, universal knowledge (i.e. repeatable), whose function is object ap-  praisal, prediction and control. Jessop, and Das 1983, 5).  This is the popularly accepted 'scientific method'" (Weaver,  It is limited to the observable.  It is reductionist, which means  that it attempts to reduce and understand everything by breaking it down into parts (Prigogine and Stengers 1984).  People who deal exclusively with Positive Knowledge tend  to believe that it is universal and not conditional. all  "[TJhere is a tendency to forget that  science is bound up with human culture in general, and that scientific findings, even  those which at the moment appear the most advanced and esoteric and difficult to grasp, are meaningless outside their cultural context" (Schrodinger 1952, 109-110). These three realms of knowledge are neither separate nor independent of each other. There is no border marking where one realm stops and another starts.  Personal Know-  ledge comes from the direct experience of individuals, but experience is shaped by the other realms e.g. language, which is largely part of Sociological Knowledge.  Sociological  Knowledge originated from the collective phenomena of many individuals' Personal Knowledge, though this realm is autonomous.  Positive Knowledge can challenge a world view  reflecting conceptually organized social experience.  The contents of Positive Knowledge exist  within the contexts of Personal and Sociological Knowledge: Positive Knowledge is based in the biases of a culture and its scientists.  While each of the three realms of knowledge  have some autonomy, they are all bound up in each other. Metaphors reflect all three realms of knowledge.  New metaphors are created in the  realm of Personal Knowledge, since this realm is the source of innovation: "the  11 spontaneous, creative products of the mind" (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 3).  When  metaphors become socially accepted, they become part of the world view of a society. These acceptable metaphors reflect back into the realm of Personal Knowledge, since they are used to interpret experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Turbayne 1970).  When socially  accepted metaphors are taken literally they become assumptions of Positive Knowledge. wever, it is in this realm of knowledge that metaphors can be "exploded."  Ho-  And when old  metaphors are discarded in Positive Knowledge, new ones are created in Personal Knowledge. Metaphors are linked with the realms of knowledge because the human conceptual system is largely metaphorical in nature.  Metaphors are not limited to language, but are  pervasive in thought and action (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Wittgenstein showed us that  words such as game are not merely naming objects, but are concepts. held together by a network of similarities.  These networks are not arbitrary in nature, but are the result of  interaction of these three realms of knowledge, and can be said to have a structure.  The  word "metaphor" is now best understood as "metaphorical concept" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 6). 1.2.3 structure Although how metaphors are understood is dependent upon their contexts, as long as we assume that the context of a metaphor is stable, we can say that a metaphor is made up of a structure.  This structure exists mostly in the realm of Sociological Knowledge and  explains how a group of people can independently interpret a metaphor in a similar manner.  But it is dependent upon Personal Knowledge, since it is individuals who create,  maintain, and are directly influenced by metaphorical concepts. Lakoff and Johnson relied upon Eleanor Rosche's work in developing the metaphorical concept  Rosche's (1977) work in cross-cultural and experimental psychology has led  her to a theory of how humans categorize and conceptualize reality.  Her work helps ex-  plain not only why the structure of metaphors are not arbitrary, but also why some  12 metaphors are more tightly defined than others. Rosch rejects the digital, Aristotelian notion of categorization, which has room only for well bounded (i.e. well defined) concepts and lacks a rational basis for the internal structure of categories. butes.  Here categories consist of a static list of otherwise unrelated attri-  An object is either a member of a category, or it is not; there are no degrees  of belonging.  Rosch finds the process of categorization to be dynamic and analogic, rather  than digital, in nature because the former allows for degrees of belonging. The foundation of her theory is the prototype. totypes (i.e. best examples). to a feature description.  Categories are formed around pro-  The prototype is a mental schema that does not lend itself  Rosch has discovered that the ranking within a category is not  so much based on physical features as on features of a more abstract nature. of a category is ranked according to how closely it resembles the prototype.  A member A robin is  a bird par excellence because it is the image conjured up by most Americans when they hear the word bird.  This image is the prototypical bird.  A penguin is only a technical  bird because it differs greatly from the prototypical bird while having some of its features. This type of ranking shows up in English in the form of "hedges", which includes terms such as "almost" and "virtually" (Lakoff 1975; Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Once a proto-  type is created a category is formed around it. Membership in a category is based upon a perceived similarity to a prototype which forms the core of the category.  When we think of a category, we think of its prototype.  Many objects can be considered to be members of a variety of categories because they resemble more than one prototype, but in most cases they are associated with only one category.  Objects are understood in terms of the categories to which they are assigned  even if the observed properties of an object differ somewhat from those of the prototype. Prototypes affect how we see reality: they guide us to view the features of reality that are part of some prototype we possess. A prototype is made up of an interaction of its features or properties (Rosche 1977).  "We experience them [prototypes] as a gestalt; that is, the complex of properties  13 occurring together is more basic to our experience than their occurance" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 71).  Since we can list only the features of which we are conscious, we can  best describe a prototype by comoaring it to an example of a prototype's structure is not possible.  par  excellance.  A direct analysis  For any prototype, we are more aware of indi-  vidual features than the interaction of features.  At the same time the features of a pro-  totype are not totally distinct from one another, but are partially defined by each other. . Features blend into each other, and many exist at an unconscious level. situations exist because a prototype is an emergent structure.  These confusing  The notion of prototype as  emergent structure links concept and category. An emergent structure has features but are characteristic of the whole which are not explanable from its components, because the features are the result of the interrelation of two or more components, which in turn might be features (Watzlawick, et al. 1967).  The  etymology of the word "emerge" supplies an example of an emergent structure: the Middle Dutch ancestor of "emerge", is  masche,  maische  which means "knitted fabric."  Fabric ap-  pears only after fibers interact with each other in an organized and systemic manner. Conceptualization results in the creation of prototypes, and categorization is the comparision of objects to prototypes.  Prototypes can change and disappear over time because  new knowledge can challenge them.  Most prototypes are stable because, once they are  created and accepted, they shape how we sense the world.  The prototypes that belong to  a person or a culture are structured in such a manner that they tend to reinforce one another.  Prototypes, and thus concepts and categories, are never arbitrary, but are related  to experience and existing knowledge. There is a very high degree of agreement among different cultures about certain concrete types of categories.  This is because (a) real-world attributes do not occur inde-  pendently of each other; and (b) "categories are determined because the world appears to be so structured that in taxonomies of concrete objects, there is generally one level of abstraction at which the most basic category cuts can be made" (Rosch 1977, 28-29). is known as the basic level.  This  At this level categories correlate very strongly to sensory  14 experience.  1  Concepts and categories, as they move away from physical objects and become more abstract and distant from sensory experience, can differ more from culture to culture and from person to person.  People create prototypes as they interact with their environment  North American whites tend to view abstract concepts as physical objects. this is the personification of inflation: "inflation is the enemy."  An example of  This personification and  reification affects our actions. Lakoff and Johnson find that some concepts are more tightly defined than others. The most tightly defined concepts can be considered to fill the basic level, and less well-defined concepts exist at the various higher and more abstract levels. that are considered to fill the basic level are called basic concepts.  The concepts  According to the lit-  eral school of language, these basic concepts are called "primitives," and are unanalyzable. An alternative view can be based on Rosch's notion of prototype.  Basic concepts consist  of prototypes that are elaborated metaphorically (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). is the core of a concept.  The prototype  Primitives are now defined in terms of a prototype that is  characterized by a recurrent complex of features (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). is an infinitely analyzable gestalt of co-occurring features.  A prototype  We analyze basic concepts in  terms of these features, which are capable of a wide range of variation.  These features  are only understood when combined in a gestalt to form a prototype. Basic concepts are those concepts in which the prototype is more evident than is its metaphorical elaboration.  More abstract concepts, which are named metaphorical concepts,  become possible through metaphorical elaboration which allows for the extension of the prototype.  No concept is either purely metaphorical or purely prototypical, but is always a  'Rosch states "The basic level of classification, the primary level at which cuts are made in the environment, appears to result from the combination of those two principles [(a) and (b) in the text]; it is the most general and inclusive level at which categories can delineate real-world correlational structures" (1977, 29). I have replaced "real-world correlational structures" with "sensory experience," otherwise it can be taken that this primary level is "more real" than any other, rather than Lakoff and Johnson's point that at this level, concepts are merely more tightly defined. This "primary level" is affected by other levels. Rosch's major point is not that the products of cognition are the same, but that certain processes of cognition are universal, which allows for cultural differences in categorization.  15 blending of the two.  This often leads to confusion between levels of abstraction.  Confu-  sion among various levels of metaphors—higher level metaphors being those which are more abstract and less well-bounded—is common.  Any analysis of metaphors should dis-  tinguish between (a) the metaphors that we employ in structuring the experience and (b) the experience itself, as we structure it (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 82). also be able to explore how metaphors are related to experience.  An analysis should  Since experience and  Personal Knowledge contain meaning and value, the objective of any analysis is dependent upon the establishment of a relationship between metaphors and values. metaphors aid in institutionalizing the values of a culture.  Socially acceptable  The values associated with a  metaphor are to be found among the features of the metaphor's prototype.  1.2.4 values The exploration of the relationships between metaphors and values reveals not only how they relate to one another, but how they relate to other levels of reality.  After un-  derstanding how a value-system functions, it becomes possible to compare one to another; not just to examine differences, but also to find similarities between them. Metaphors are not neutral, but are comprised of, and associated with, values.  The  metaphors found acceptable to a society—those which are part of Sociological Knowledge—contain that society's values when viewed by a member of that society.  Meta-  phors are structured so as to show how these values reinforce each other, and to lay shadows over any contradictions between different values.  It is through these values that  metaphors begin to take on their practical aspects, as well as shaping and being shaped by institutions.  This does not mean that these values cannot contradict each other, but rather,  that a person's attention is drawn away from the contradictions. Values  and  needs.  Much of applied social science has been concerned with  finding and meeting the needs of people.  The idea of "human needs" suggest that uni-  versal needs exist, and that a list of such needs can be created. such a list have grown to become very complicated.  Attempts at building  Such lists start with basic physical  16  needs, and later add on all sorts of psychological needs to explain why people sometimes willingly sacrifice physical needs (Lee 1959).  It has been found that any list of needs  ends .up being culture specific; different cultures do not agree upon what people need. More complex theories try to state that certain needs go with different cultures and levels of technological development  This search for basic human needs results in lists, rather  than a systemic and analytical way of describing needs. The anthropologist Dorothy Lee challenged the premise "that culture is group of patterned means for the satisfaction of a list of human needs" (1959, 70).  In viewing  culture only as a means of satisfying needs, it is not only assumed that a list of basic human needs exists, but that the fulfillment of needs are the basis of human motivation. While certain physical needs do exist, Lee suggests that most needs arise out of values, rather than the reverse.  Even physical needs can be seen to arise out of the interaction  of a value for self-preservation and personal experience. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the father of General Systems Theory, agrees with Lee that motivation springs out of values rather than needs. We may also say that man has values which are more than biological and transcend the sphere of the physical world. These cultural values may be biologically irrelevent or even deleterious: it is hard to see that music, say, has any adaptive or survival value; the values of nation and state become biologically nefarious when they lead to war and to the killing of innumerable human beings [von Bertalanffy 1968, 197]. The premise of seeing human motivation as being based on values, rather than needs, is to allow for viewing human beings as active, rather than passive, entities. Reflex theory has presupposed that the primary element of behavior is response to external stimuli. In contrast, recent research shows that with increasing clarity that autonomous activity of the nervous system, resting in the system itself, is to be considered primary [von Bertalanffy 1968, 208]. By this, von Bertalanffy means that humans do not just react to external stimulation and physical needs, but that they can act spontaneously, and that most motivation lies in value systems. ior.  James Ogilvy (1977) substantiates this by distinguishing between action and behav-  17  Needs motivate behavior, but if action differs from behavior precisely by virtue of the distinction between mechanical necessity and voluntary choice then needs are hardly sufficient as conditions for care and intention. Care is noncompulisve preference [Ogilvy 1977, 65]. Neither Lee, von Bertalanffy, nor Ogilvy are denying that passive behavior can or does exist, but they do deny that reaction to stimuli explains motivation.  Motivation stems from  the values of the individual, though these values are often derived from a culture. How values are important to humans cannot be understood unless they can be related to human perception.  "Except for the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, man  lives in a world not of things but of symbols" (von Bertalanffy 1956, 37).  Value-systems  emerge from the symbolic universe that we live in (von Bertalanffy 1968) and it is essential to understand this connection in order to understand how values motivate us. Values  and  the  symbolic  universe.  We may also say that the various symbolic universes, material and non-material, which distinguish human cultures from animal societies, are part, and easily the most important part, of man's behavior system. It can be justly questioned whether man is a rational animal; but he certainly is a symbol-creating and symbol-dominated being throughout [von Bertalanffy 1968, 215-216].  The symbolic universe is not arbitrary, it is emergent from the mental universe, which in turn is emergent from the physical one (Davidson 1983). emergent from the symbolic universe.  In turn, values are  But what are the criteria for human symbols?  Mark Davidson (1983), von Bertalanffy's biographer, says that von Bertalanffy's criteria for human symbols are: (1) they must be representative rather than merely expressive; (2) they are chosen without any biological connection to the thing that they represent; and (3) they are transmitted by tradition or education rather than by instinct  Human symbols are free  of biological constraints, even though they can be traced to the physical world. can be more articulate than animals.  Humans  "Even if human symbols are somehow rooted in in-  stinct, [von] Bertalanffy noted, they are unique to humans because we can make them and change them" (Davidson 1983, 139).  18  Man . . . is surrounded by a universe of symbols. Starting from language which is the prerequisite of culture, to symbolic relationships with his fellows, social status, laws, science, art, morals, religion and innumerable other things, human behavior, except for the basic aspects of the biological needs of hunger and sex, is governed by svmbolic entities [von Bertalanffy 1968, 197].  We do not create our symbolic universes only from personal experience; Sociological Knowledge plays an important role in the development of each individual's symbolic universe.  Symbolic universes and value-systems can be viewed as places where the Personal  and Sociological realms of Knowledge meet  Sociological Knowledge, through society, affects  an individual's value system. A society, while not an organism, can be seen in terms of a model.  It organiza-  tion is accepted as "proper" and it rewards and punishes the actions of its members.  To  reject the beliefs of the society one lives in is to go against the tide, even if one still retains many of the culture's values. Received Culture (RC).  The dominant culture of a society is known as the  The RC which is in the realm of Sociological Knowledge in any  culture, because it is the dominant social construction of reality.  Values in this realm are  shaped by historical forces, such as class structure, position, and social forces (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983).  The RC can be considered to be the social manifestation of this  Sociological Knowledge.  It is reinforced, for example, by language, social relations, and  economic forces. Historian Lawrence Goodwyn (1978), in his history of the Populist movement in the United States, describes why it was so hard for individuals to reject the RC.  To reject  the RC meant not only rejecting some socially accepted symbols, but also the social manifestation of those symbols.  Rejecting the Republican Party in the northern states shortly  after the Civil War meant rejecting the RC. For a farmer in Iowa or Illinois to leave the Republican Party in order to become a Populist he had to overcome not only his memories associated with the "Party-that-saved-the-Union," but the enduring and very visible civic presence of that same party in his own time and locale. In the towns and hamlets of the rural North and West in the late nineteenth century, the Fourth of July was a day of Republican celebration. The commander of the local unit of the Grand Army of the Republic  19 could be counted upon not only to rekindle memories of loyal "boys in blue," but to lead the Fourth of July parade itself. And this latter was no small political gesture—for included in the rank parading the (Republican) flag were the town's aging bankers, ministers, and plain people. The past thus blended into the present as a political statement grounded in patriotism and expressed by one's reaffirmed Republican allegiance. Standing up against one's minister, civic leaders, and economic and cultural models not only tested a person's range of psychological autonomy but his intellectual ability to define what authentic patriotism was. The impediments to political nonconformity were impressive. Sectionalism was not merely a patriotic memory, it traded on received patterns of deference in the present [Goodwyn 1978, 99-100]. Values  phors are symbols.  and  metaphors.  The symbolic universe contains metaphors since meta-  Von Bertalanffy notes that a systematic relationship exists between sy-  mbols and values, so we can assume that the relationship between metaphors and symbols are systemic.  Symbols, and thus metaphors, are largely comprised of values, and it is this  composition of values that allows metaphors to transcend biological needs. come values because they are at least partially comprised of values. with metaphors are features of the metaphors.  Metaphors be-  The values associated  An analysis of the features should reveal  some of the values of a metaphor. Socially accepted metaphors perpetuate the values of the RC.  Sub-cultures that re-  ject, or reject parts of, the RC form new metaphors of their own that are made up of their own values.  An examination of the metaphors that different groups use to concep-  tualize land should reveal the values that the group associates with land. 1.2.5 land  Since all language and concepts are metaphorical in nature, any definition of land is a metaphor.  A great number of definitions of land exist in the United States.  D. Marquis, Jr. (1979) lists some major concepts of land.  Stewart  While not all of them fit  equally well into the American Received Culture, they are all part of American culture (this includes fringe sub-cultures).  Some definitions share a great deal of cohesiveness with  each other, while others appear to be in conflict; though even those that seem to be diametrically opposed to each other often share some structural similarities.  20  Two  groups that do not share the same land metaphors might be sharing some  values that they associate with land.  If the two groups are part of the same larger cul-  ture, then we expect to see both agreement and disagreement on which values they associate with land.  The purpose of examining the land metaphors of two groups is to see  the values that both groups associtate with land.  1.3 Land in the United States of America If a man's home is his castle, then his home is his fertility. To take away his rights in the land is nothing less than castration. [—a resident of Brandy wine Creek, Pennsylvania] [Strong 1975, 169]. In the United States, an entire mystic surrounds the right to own land and to do with it as one wishes.  While land has always been subject to public regulation, Americans  almost always resist the introduction of measures that even vaguely infringe on ownership or  the economic rewards of ownership (Popper 1981).  It is believed by many that the  basis of an affluent, stable, and democratic society is based upon private ownership of land (Green 1977; Siegan 1976; Bjork 1980). vision of a nation of farmers. and  the French Physiocrats.  tues of competition.  This belief can be traced to Thomas Jefferson's  This, in turn, goes back both to John Locke ([1689] 1955)  This is linked to the belief in the free market and the vir-  "[E]very individual whould have the right to pursue his own interest,  within the limits set by law, without regard for the interest of others lead to the greatest social welfare" (Bjork 1980, 4).  because  this will  Any analysis of land tenure that  ignores the values associated with forms of land tenure will fail to show where much resistance to any alteration of land tenure comes from. Since metaphors are embedded in value systems, a metaphorical look at land, or rather, a look at the metaphor held by groups that describe land should give the planner access to the values of the groups, and more particularly, the values that are associated with land.  In this thesis, two such groups, henceforth to be know as the two  are examined.  subjects,  One subject, the Received Culture, represents the status quo and the  21 traditional. view of land in the United States.  The other subject, the Community Land  Trust proponents, seek a change in land tenure, and, consequently, how land is understood.  1.3.1  the received  The  culture  Received Culture is the dominant culture of a nation or society (Goodwyn  1978), and is best defined by the institutions, beliefs, and values that are national in character.  The RC is representative of the entrenched view and defends the status quo.  The RC of the United States includes the national prototype of how land is viewed and treated, even though this prototype might vary in any specific locality.  It is beyond the  scope of this paper to attempt to describe the RC in its entirety, so the the RC will be discussed only in terms of how it conceives of land, the values and beliefs it attaches to these metaphorical concepts, and the rational supporting them. Historically in the RC, the concept of land ownership has been linked with development  Locke  ([1689] 1955), whose ideas concerning natural rights and the government's  role in protecting these rights were influential in the writing of the United States Constitution, believed that rights of land ownership came from the mixing of labor and land. Activities such as clearing the land, planting crops, putting up buildings, fencing the land, or other methods of developing the land are examples of mixing labor and land.  The  development of land was incorporated with the clear delineation of ownership—even the commons of New England towns were clearly marked and used in limited ways by the residents of the town.  Other forms of land tenure and land-use, such as those of  American Indian tribes, were not seen to be a valid form of land tenure, justifying the taking of Indian land by settlers. Ownership of land was associated with wealth and freedom. Jefferson's opinions about ownership of land. agriculture.  This can be traced to  He believed that all wealth was based in  He linked land with agriculture, and saw land as a means for individuals to  achieve independence from others. of government (Green 1977).  The self-sufficiency  of individuals would limit the power  His opinions were, and still are, influential in America.  22  Jefferson's idea of national development through settlement eventually became the land policy of the federal government (Hibbard 1924).  The first one hundred years of  United States history shows the federal government divesting itself of its land holdings (Wolf 1981).  While initially attempting to raise revenue through the sale of land, land  was later given to those willing to develop it  The belief that land "and its use by in-  dividuals, is a business enterprise, pure and simple" (Wolf 1981, 64), has continued, even with the increase of government intervention in land-use control.  A large part of inter-  vention at all levels of government has included enabling a profit to be made from the land.  Much federally owned land is still used for private profit.  The federal government  has always supported ownership of land by individuals. 981). One  of the rights Locke defined as part of land ownership was the right to  transfer land freely. buy  and sell land.  Within the context of a capitalist society, this becomes the right to Land is treated as any other commodity, and the market is seen to  be the best judge of its use.  The market does not conflict with the rights of individuals  to use land as they wish, since the market is seen to be part of the natural environment This results in the critieria for land-use to be similar across the country.  Constance Perin  (1977) points out the one important source of this similarity is that the rules governing capital investments are national, and not regional, in character.  1.3.2 the community land trust proponents The land tenure.  proponents of Community Land Trusts are advocates of an alternative mode of The CLT proponents view individuals, society, and nature in a manner that  differs from that of the members of the RC.  Sources on CLTs include the Institute for  Community Economics (1981), Chuck Matthei (1981), Lynton K. Caldwell (1974), John Blackmore (1978), and Randee Gorin Fenner (1980). new: the first was founded in 1972.  Community Land Trusts are relatively  Technically, this alternative can exist within the  existing legal framework of the United States.  While some CLTs are recognized by the  Internal Revenue Service as nonprofit organizations, the full legality of this particular  23 method of land tenure has not yet been tested in a court of law (Institute for Community Economics 1982). The  CLTs differ from the cultually acceptable method of land tenure.  CLT model accepted by the CLT proponent is the one developed in the 1960s  by Robert Swann and Ralph Borsodi, and is presently being advocated by the Institute for Community Economics (ICE).  The CLT "itself was conceived as a democratically controlled  institution that would hold land for the common good of any community, while making it available to individuals within the community through long-term leases" (ICE 1982, v/7). While the CLT model is not appropriate for all individual circumstances, the model is intended to be applicable throughout the United States. A Community Land Trust is an organization created to hold land for the benefit of a community and of individuals within the community. It is a democratically structured nonprofit corporation, with an open membership and a board of trustees elected by the membership. The board typically includes residents of trust owned lands, other community residents, and public-interest representatives [ICE 1982, 18]. It is important to differentiate  between CLTs and land conservation trusts because  they have similar organizational structures and land acquisition techniques.  However, the  goals of these two types of land trusts differ. Conservancy trusts normally withhold their lands from all human use except for limited scientific or education field study and some carefully regulated recreational use. CLTs, on the other hand, are usually concerned with housing, agriculture, economic development, and other basic human land uses [ICE 1982, 30]. While real differences between the two types of land trusts exists, they can be complementary (ICE 1982).  This is because they share some similar ideas on the role of land  in society. The and  purpose of CLTs is to aid social change by changing methods of land tenure,  thus the status of land.  The single most important aspect of CLTs is that they re-  move land from the market place.  This removal of land from the speculative market al-  lows for a community to have greater control over local land-uses and resources.  The re-  jection of the market place conflicts with the RC's land metaphors (Popper 1981; Wolf  24  1981).  1.3.3 land metaphors Each of these two subjects holds a schema, or a collection, of metaphors about land.  While this reflects the different values that they hold, they still have many values  in common.  In order for them to communicate with each other about how land should  be controlled, they must first discover what values they share.  Some styles of planning  can make use of these similarities. In contrast to this approach Frank J. Popper (1981) noted, when reviewing the environmental land-use reform movement of the late 1960s and 1970s in the United States, that planners neither understood that many of its values were foreign to traditional American attitudes (e.g. individualism, the private property ethic, veneration of the market, contempt for bureauracy) nor could they see when their values and goals coincided with those of local land owners.  While the Community Land Trust movement is different from the  environmental movement, many of its problems can be similar.people whom Though many CLT proponents have shown more astuteness in understanding how land is valued, and is possibly more interested in the values of those people whom it wants to convince.  The  purpose of doing an analysis and comparison of the CLT proponent and RC's land metaphors is to find where agreement occurs in the values systems of the two subjects so as to aid a planner who supports the idea of CLTs to communicate the knowledge which his or her land metaphors are based upon.  1.4 Planning But since a metaphor is not a metaphor per se but only for someone, from one point of view it is better to say that sometimes the metaphor is not noticed; it is hidden. This is, if X is aware of the metaphor „ while Y is not, X says that Y is being taken in by the metaphor, or being used by it, or taking it literally. But for Y it is not a case of taking the metaphor literally at all, because for him there is no metaphor. He is speaking literally or taking it literally [Turbayne 1970, 23-24].  25 One object of planning is that we learn to control our metaphors, rather than be controlled by them.  Colin Murray Turbayne (1970) claims that if we do not realize that  we are using metaphors, then they control us, but if we do recognize them for what they are, then we can be in control.  Perhaps control is -not the best word, but our being  aware of metaphors allows us to create and destroy them, and to recognize their limitations.  To be aware of metaphors means to take an active role in creating reality.  be unaware results in the user being a victim of metaphor.  To  The planner's role is to  prevent the client from becoming a victim. The victim of metaphor accepts one way of sorting or bundling or allocating the facts as the only way to sort, bundle, or allocate. The victim not only has a special view of the world but regards it as the only view, or rather, he confuses a special view of the world with the world. He is thus, unknowingly, a metaphysician [Turbayne 1970, 27]. In order for clients who are assumed to be a member of the RC to become more receptive to new ideas—new metaphors—they must first realize that their metaphors are metaphors.  In order for planner to aid in this, she or he must first understand the life  cycle of a metaphor. Turbayne considers a metaphor to have a life made up of three stages.  In the  first stage, a metaphor is considered to be inappropriate by the members of a society, and can only be part of Personal Knowledge.  It is felt by society that the metaphor is com-  paring two different things that have no relevance to each other. metaphor is accepted as a metaphor. ciety as a make-believe contrucL  In the second stage, the  It enters Sociological Knowledge, and is used in so-  In the third stage it becomes commonplace: it is taken  to be the literal truth and is not longer taken to be a metaphor.  It is now entrenched  in Sociological Knowledge and can have an affect on Positive Knowledge.  When it reaches  this stage, it is said to be "hidden" or "dead." The planner aids clients in discovering hidden metaphors.  When a metaphor be-  comes archaic when, during its third stage, it is recognized to be a metaphor, it becomes archaic.  While it could be taken to be a socially acceptable metaphor, it can also end  26  up being totally rejected by society if it is now taken to be misleading.  The planner  should emphasize to the client that a metaphor can only be replaced by another metaphor, and not by the "literal truth."  The planner's job can be considered to encourage, and to  participate in, the following process: first, the detection of the presence of the metaphor; second, the attempt to "undress" the metaphor by presenting the literal truth, "to behold the deformity of error we need only undress it"; and third, the restoration of the metaphor, only this time with awareness of its presence [Turbayne 1970, 56].  Achieving the first part is not easy.  Not only are there many people who have  no motivation to find and challenge predominant metaphors because they benefit from the metaphors, but also the metaphors are deeply entrenched in the culture.  In the RC, hid-  den land metaphors are very strong not just for rich and poor landowners, but also for nonlandowners.  Alternative metaphors could be found to be threatening to many people.  Land represents most of the material wealth for poor landowners.  A change in  land metaphors could lead to a change in how land is owned and controlled, and how people believe that they will benefit from the land.  To those who own land, their land  is seen to be a possible key to vast wealth, or even just to climb out of poverty, because the value of the land could rise. A Vermont developer explained: "Nine out of ten people speculating in land never really make it big. But the promise that they might hit the jackpot is what keeps them at it And the biggest defenders of the right to get all you can out of land will not be the one winner, but the nine losers, who can always hope that someday they'll score" [Popper 1981, 212]. To the nonlandowner, the house on a lot is often seen as a future right or hope. The American dream of hard work inevitably rewarded is idealized in a singular scenario for ascending the ladder of achievement, definitive movement from one social category and it status to the next, upward [Perin 1977, 81]. The American dream is the single-family-detached house which is supported by the metaphors of the RC.  27 The planner who ignores the values associated with land when he or she advocates a change in land tenure, claiming that it will be to the benefit of the public, is sure to be rejected by those he or she is trying to help.  What is needed is a style of planning  which aids people to recognize that the present method of land tenure is partially based upon human concepts, rather than upon nature. phors.  In this paper, these concepts are meta-  The planner can only suggest new metaphors, which might very well be rejected  anyway, after the old metaphors are recognized as such.  This is not to deny that other  interests, such as financial, class, status, and power, take a part in the formation of institutions of land tenure.  These other interests are involved in the creation and adoption of  metaphors, at both the conscious and the unconscious levels. Transactive Planning is the style of planning that is best suited for the metaphoric theory of reality. client  In Transactive Planning, a dialogue occurs between the planner and the  Both participants learn to be self-critical during the course of dialogue (Friedmann  1973, 1979).  The participants learn from each other, each sharing his or her special kind  of knowledge with the other.  Together they deconstruct old metaphors and build new  ones. In Transactive Planning it is assumed that we create reality, but that we do not have control over it.  Creation is not equated with control.  lent" and defies our attempts to predict its actions.  The environment is "turbu-  Planning in the traditional sense, was  based on the planner's supposed ability to predict the future in a scientific and neutral manner.  The actions that occur in Transactive Planning are aimed at the near future. I shall venture a judgement here that many people, particularly planners, may initially have difficulty in accepting. Whether as individuals, groups, or organizations, men of action have in fact little interest in the future except for a very short stretch of time beyond the present The excitement over the systematic study of the future found in some academic circles, philanthropic foundations, and research organizations reflects the predilections of those who are essentially divorced from action. Put more pointedly, the futurologists, as they are called, are either unabashed ideologists paid for their labor by those who seek to justify their own actions or escapists fleeing from the very tough and real issues of the day [Friedmann 1973, 137].  28 People of action never ask "What is likely to happen?" but, "What shall I do?" The planner no longer gazes into the distant future, but instead pays attention to the recent past and the near future in terms of the interests and requirements of clients.  As  mentioned above, the discovery of metaphors can occur during the course of dialogue. what is dialogue and how can it be started?  But  This paper will address a portion of this  question.  1.5 Outline of the Paper In this paper I will look at how a land-use planner can better communicate a world-view that is different from the one held by the client  Only then would it be  possible to effectively communicate the CLT proponents' view of land to members of the RC.  By reducing each view to a schema of metaphors, a methodology for interpreting the  situation and establishing, in a tentative manner, a way of initiating communication becomes possible.  The mode of communication being initiated is dialogue, for this is the best  mode for relating different world-views. the transactive style of planning.  This dialogue has to be understood in terms of  Then the land-use planner using Transactive Planning is  in a position to not only communicate a new world-view, but to help the client learn to be critical of his or her own world view. Chapter two, The Translation of Metaphors, presents a theory of communication in which a successful dialogue is dependent upon each subject interpreting each other's words in a similar manner.  This is based upon a textual interpretation of reality in which the  world is interpreted in terms of metaphors.  The translation of metaphors is shown to be  able to occur during dialogue if the planner and the client realize what values and goals they are sharing. Chapter three, Isomorphism and Metaphors, contains a methodology the land-use planner could use to set up an initial shared context for dialogue between CLT proponents—which he or she is a member of—and members of the RC.  This is done  by the planner analyzing each subject's schema of land metaphors, and looking for  29 similarities in the values associated with each subject's schema of metaphors.  These simi-  larities are called isomorphisms because they represent structural similarities of the two subj ects' value- systems. Chapter four, Transactive Planning, Mutual Learning, and Dialogue, suggests how the context of dialogue can be a part of land-use planning.  Dialogue is a major component  of Transactive Planning, and during dialogue each participant should be learning from the other.  In the planning situation, one participant, the planner, holds one type of knowledge  and the other, the client, holds another type. types of knowledge interact  Mutual learning occurs when these two  Transactive Planning does not stop at mutual learning, but  continues on to action, experimentation, and reflection.  The chapter concentrate's on how  the land-use planner's role is redefined by Transactive Planning, and how communication fits into this new role. Chapter five, Conclusions, reviews the importantce of how the planner listens and speaks to the client later is speculated on.  While this paper concentrates on initiating dialogue, what can happen Metaphors, textuality, and Transactive Planning are not absolutes, but  can change durig the course of dialogue, so the planner must be advised not to trade on type of dogmatism for another. The establishment of a dialogue between two people who hold radically different interpretations of the world is a difficult task.  When planners wish to start a dialogue with  their clients, they must be able to communicate their intentions and to understand the clients' values.  The fact that planners and clients may interpret reality in different ways  forms a barrier to successful communication.  Planners can improve how they initiate dialo-  gues if they can ensure that they and their clients share the same situations.  30 CHAPTER TWO  THE TRANSLATION OF METAPHORS Communication always occurs in a variety of contexts; how a person interprets these contexts determines what he or she believes the situation, in which communication is occurring, to be.  If a speaker and listener do not agree on the context of communication,  then they are in different situations.  They will be unable to communicate effectively be-  cause the listener will be interpreting the speaker's words in a manner not intended by the speaker.  Planners should not assume that they hold the same context of communica-  tion as does their clients. The and  contexts held by people are based on how they interpret reality.  If a planner  a client interpret some part of reality, such as land, in radically different ways, then  the contexts in which they communicate on that part of reality could be very different If the planner wants a dialogue on land, he or she must ensure that he or she and the client interpret land in a similar manner.  This is a major problem if the planner wants  to have a dialogue with the client because he or she wants the client to realize that other interpretations of land are possible. The  literary theorist Stanley Fish (1980) states that persuasion is not so much based  on convincing someone what the facts are, but rather, how "reality" should be interpreted. Meaning is produced in the course of interpretation, and is not inherent in that which is being interpreted (Fish 1980).  Planners sympathetic with, or who are, CLT proponents are  interested in altering some of the meanings which are normally associated with land.  Per-  suasion can occur in a number of forms of communication, and the best form for the CLT proponents to persuade members of the RC that CLTs are legitimate is that of dia• logue. Dialogue is not a technique of persuasion, though persuasion may occur during it When planners enter a dialogue they are risking themselves and their ideas.  In essence,  by entering into a dialogue, they are entering a situation in which listening has a higher  31  priority than persuasion.  Dialogue is the only context in which a planner can hope to  succeed in persuading clients to question dominant institutions of land tenure.  But the ob-  jective of dialogue is not. that of consensus. A dialogue "includes the possibility and indeed the likelihood of conflict" (Friedmann 1979, 103).  It allows for disagreement within a larger context of agreement  This larger  context is the trust between the participants of a dialogue (Friedmann 1973, 1979; Freire 1970, [1969] 1973).  According to John Friedmann, who developed Transactive Planning, dia-  logue can be viewed as a context of communication in which the participants accept each other and are willing both to learn from each other, and to learn together.  Even if they  do not come to a common agreement on what action should be taken, they should come to a common understanding of what they agree on. Dialogic relations come into being between two separate identities, a you and a me, and they occur exclusively in this dyadic form. Joined in dialogue, we build a common ground between us, a new reality, for which we are responsible. This ground we hold in common trust [Friedmann 1979, 104]. A beginning point for dialogue are the shared points of departure' (Fish 1980).  A  shared point of departure is a belief or value which both participants agree that they share and is the common ground that dialogue is built upon. related to these points. parture.  Differences of opinion are  Reference points are another name for these shared points of de-  How can these points be found? The metaphors that each participant uses to conceptualize some common object can  lead us to these reference points.  If the constellations of metaphors overlap, it is the  overlap that can form the initial common ground held by participants.  The metaphors can  then be translated in terms of this common ground, so both the client can better understand the intentions of the planner, and visa versa. Before we can understand how metaphors could be translated during dialogue, we need a better understanding of how metaphors are generated. and meaning.  Metaphor is related to value  Meanings and metaphors are created by a reader interpreting a text.  The  32 notion of textuality, which will lead us to how readers create the meanings of texts, is an appropriate place to start. 2.1  Text and Context  What is meant by the term "text"? It may initially be seen as a situated use of language marked by a tense interaction between mutually implicated yet at times contestatory tendencies. On this view, the very opposition between what is inside and what is outside texts is rendered problematic, and nothing is seen as being purely and simply inside or outside texts. . . . One of the more challenging aspects of recent inquiries into textuality has been the investigation of why textual processes cannot be confined within the bindings of the book [LaCapra 1983, 26]. Textuality includes the notion that a text is always read within some context and context define each other.  What is a text?  The word "text" commonly refers to a  manuscript of some sort, but what are the features of a text? tains no printed words be referred to as a text?  Text  Can something which con-  To view an object as a text not only  reveals certain aspects of the object, but also brings attention to its situation—its context. When the world is designated as a text we divide up the world in such a way that the relationship of its parts is analogous to that of a manuscript and how it is read.  Context  and text exist simultaneously, interpenetrating each other: one does not precede the other. The  reader should treat the context as if it were a text  A context is interpreted both  in terms of its text and its own context The  notion of textuality raises more questions about the meaning of any individual  text than it answers.  What purpose is served by reading something in a textual manner,  to read something within some specific context? More generally, the notion of textuality serves to render less dogmatic the concept of reality by pointing to the fact that one is "always already" implicated in problems of language use as one attempts to gain critical perspective on these problems, and it raises the question of both the possibilities and the limits of meaning. For the historian, the very reconstruction of a context or a reality takes place on the basis of textualized remainders of the past The historian's position is not unique in that all definitions of reality are implicated in textual processes. . . . The more general problem is to see how the notion of textuality makes explicit the question of the relationships among uses of language, other signifying practices, and various modes of human activity that are bound up with  33 processes of signification [LaCapra 1983, 26-27].  Textuality implies the rejection of the premise that a manuscript contains an explicit meaning which can be interpreted in one, and only one, proper manner (LaCapra 1983; Fish 1980). preted.  The interpretation of a text is dependent upon how its contexts are inter-  However, a text cannot be separated from its contexts (LaCapra 1983).  A textual  approach when applied to other than a manuscript, such as land, reveals that meaning no longer resides within the text believed to be.  Rather, the meaning arises from the context in which it is  Meaning is not natural in origin, but cultural and social.  This approach  questions how much and what kind of meaning a text can hold, and how a text's meaning is dependent upon its context There is the common notion that a text can be read in a context-free manner, that is to say, a nontextual reading. stent with the textual approach.  The acceptance of only one  true  context is inconsi-  A contextual interpretation avoids the dogma that only  one acceptable interpretation is possible.  Usually nontextual readers are unaware that they  are restricting a text to a single context rather than reading it in a context-free manner. The context . . . does not exist. The search for it is a quest for a will-o'-the-wisp generated by a questionable theory of meaning. The context itself is a text of sort; but for interpretation and informed criticism. It cannot become the occasion for a reductive reading of texts. By contrast, the context itself raises a problem analogous to that of "intertextuality." For the problem in understanding context—and a fortiori the relation of context to text—is a matter of inquiry into the interacting relationships among a set of more or less pertinent contexts. Only this comparative process itself creates a "context" for a judgement that attempts to specify the relative importance of any given context The view of fin-de-siecle Vienna itself as the "cradle" of modernity serves as a suggestive stimulus to research insofar as it remains on an allusive level. Promoted to the status of an interpretative framework for understanding the relation between texts and contexts, it becomes problematic in the extreme and may function as a pretext for avoiding or foreclosing an investigation into significant issues in historical interpretation [LaCapra 1983, 95-96].  The historian Dominick LaCapra (1983) points out that the concepts of text and context do not solve problems, but rather makes the interpretation of a text a way of raising problems.  A context is not absolute reality.  A number of contexts exist for every  34  text, and each of these contexts raises certain types of questions about the interpretation of both the text and its contexts.  The precise nature of the relations between texts and their  various pertinent contexts is a problem for inquiry. "For complex texts, one has a set of interacting contexts whose relations to one another are variable and problematic and whose relation to the text being investigated raises difficult issues in interpretation" (LaCapra 1983, 35). problematic in its own way. interpretation. by the reader.  Any particular type of context is  It will raise certain types of questions about the text and its  A context is never static, but has its own textuality and must be interpreted When reading a text, a context should be chosen with the consciousness  of the types of issues it is likely to raise. Indeed, in historiography, the demand for a close reading of contexts themselves has recently beome widespread, in part through the impact of Clifford Geertz's elaboration in anthropology of the notion of "thick description." The special value of this notion is the insistence upon the way a context has its own complex particularity that calls for detailed interpretation—indeed the way it may fruitfully be seen on the analogy of the text [LaCapra 1983, 16].  Intellectual history is like literary criticism because they share a need to formulate as a problem the relationship between texts and their various pertinent contexts.  The  planner can use these disciplines as a model for formulating his or her own problems. It is only when the precise nature of this relationship is posited as a genuine problem that one will be able to counteract the dogmatic assumption that any given context—the author's intention's, a corpus of texts, a genre, a biography, the economic infrastructure, modes of production, society and culture in some all-consuming and frequently circular sense, codes, conventions, paradigms, or what have you—is the context for the adequate interpretation of texts [LaCapra 1983, 16]. A good interpretation does not settle the question of the best way of understanding a text "A 'good' interpretation reactivates the process of inquiry, opening up new avenues of investigation, criticism, and self-reflection"  (LaCapra 1983, 38).  When an object is read as  a text, this is not to find its "true qualities," but to question how it is conceptualized. It is not uncommon to consider a non-manuscript object to be a text. treated as a text  History is often  To call something a text means that we are consciously interpreting it  35 within some context, and not that we are attributing any inherent meaning to the object Land is a text.  As such, it has both a large number of contexts and readers.  Both the planner and client read land in their own manner.  They each find different  meaning in land when they interpret it because they each read land in different contexts. There can be an overlapping between the readings. to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) are metaphors. text metaphors are created.  The interpretations of land according  By interpreting land within a particular con-  Since multiple contexts exist, any reader can be expected to  come up with a multitude of metaphors to describe a text  A planner is to find the  metaphors that clients use to describe land. The role of a planner is similar to a historian, in that she or he is interpreting sources that in turn are interpretations of a situation.  The planner is attempting to inter-  pret a situation from others' points of view, and then to interpret these collective points of view as a single situation.  The planner differs from a historian in that a planner can be  a subject of his or her own investigation.  There is no contradiction in the planner taking  two roles, one of being a planner who is helping clients help themselves, and the other of being a CLT proponent and thus reading land in a particular manner, if the planner is capable of being self-critical and is willing to change.  The purpose of the planner's in-  vestigation of land metaphors is not to write a scholarly paper, but to create a basis for his or her own actions.  This makes it mandatory for the planner to become aware of  the metaphors he or she possesses. The planner is reading texts which are composed of the interpretations of land by both the RC and CLT proponents. are  subjects.  Land is an  object  and the RC and CLT proponents  The subject interprets and object; this is the interaction of object and subject  which produces  metaphors.  The planner's  sources  are others' interpretations of the two  subject-object relationships, though some of the sources are produced by the subjects themselves.  These sources, when combined, will result in two texts.  A form of parallelism  occurs between what the planner is doing and what he or she is looking at is reading a text so he or she can interpret how the subjects are reading  The planner  their  text  36 (i.e. the object).  While the historian is "involved in the effort to understand both what  something meant in its own time and what it may mean for us today" (LaCapra 1983, 18), the planner is involved in the effort to understand what an object means to some subject and to him or herself. The context is part of the reader's understanding of a text: the reader is a context.  The reader is never a single context, but a multiplicity of contexts.  The reader is  never conscious of all, or probably even a majority, of them, but can consciously decide to emphasize any particular context  This does not mean that interpretation can be arbitrary.  LaCapra argues that the reading of a text is not totally subjective.  This raises question of  the relationship between the reader and the text, and what makes both a valid context and a valid interpretation.  2.2 The Reader and the Text Skilled reading is usually thought to be a matter of discerning what is there,' but if the example of my students can be generalized, it is a matter of knowing how to produce what can thereafter be said to be there. Interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of constructing. Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them [Fish 1980, 327].  In the above quote Fish claims that, in contrast to the belief that a text has inherent meaning, readers produce the meaning of a text portant in the process in which meaning is produced.  The contexts of the text are imThe contexts of a text guide, but  do not control, the reading of a text and the production of meaning.  It is possible to  direct the reading of a text with a context that is foreign to the original context.  The  contexts of a text, or of the reading of a text, are not inherent in the text but are part of the reader.  It is the reader, not the text, which creates meaning.  Reading is never arbitrary. interacting through dialogue.  The reader and the text are part of the same system,  The how of reading can partially determine what the text is.  For example, in order for a text to be a poem, the reader must know of a poetic context  This is similar to saying that land can be a commodity only in a society which  37 has the institution of the market economy.  A text, or land, is not limited to being one  thing or another, but becomes something when interacting with—being interpreted by—a subject  However, a reader can never arbitrarily call a text a poem.  In order to name a  text to be a poem, the text must respond to the "poem" context in a proper manner. Reading is not "merely subjective" because the reader does not have total control over contexts, and the text has a role to play in the production of meaning. is not omniscient about the text, the contexts, nor himself or herself.  The reader  The reader reads  the text within contexts, and these contexts—how the reader reads the text—will gudie the production of meaning (Fish 1980). ism.  This should not be confused with contextual determin-  The text-context relationship contains tension, because the text is capable of contra-  dicting its context According to LaCapra, dialogue should be at the heart of textuality. have a dialogue with a text, it must be listened to.  In order to  If the text is ignored, or if the  reader projects her or his beliefs into the text, then dialogue does not occur.  2  "Indeed,  what may be most insistent in a modern text is the way it challenges one or more of its contexts" (LaCapra 1983, 35).  To say that a text is  is not to say that a text is the  same  as its context.  understood  in terms of its context  A text is capable of challenging its  reader. A text is a network of resistances, and a dialogue is two-way affair; a good reader is also an attentive and patient listener. Questions are necessary to focus interest in an investigation, but a fact may be pertinent to a frame of reference by contesting or even contradicting it An interest in what does not fit a model and an openness to what one does not expect to hear from the past may even help to transform the very questions one poses to the past [LaCapra 1983, 64]. The notion of context is at the heart of the dialogue between reader and text The reader interprets the text within contexts.  Any context suggests to the reader a path  of inquiry and the reader creates meaning while journeying along this path.  The text,  through being read, suggests new paths to the reader and is capable of changing its  While some projection on the reader's part is probably unavoidable, it is to be minimized.  2  38 context—the context it is being read in—by contesting its context  Just as LaCapra claims  that the text-context boundary is blurred, Fish claims that the distinction between text and reader is blurred.  This is because the reader is a context, and a method of reading is a  context that is chosen by the reader, and thus, is both part of and within the context which is the reader. The reader produces the meaning of the text through interpretation.  No interpreta-  tion is arbitrary, but is understood in terms of socially acceptable methods of interpretation. A pluralist is committed to saying that there is something in the text which rules out some readings and allows others (even though no one reading can ever capture the text's "inexhaustible richness and complexity"). His best evidence is that in practice "we all in fact" do reject unacceptable readings and that more often than not we agree on the readings that are to be rejected [B]ut if, as I argued, the text is always a function of interpretation, then the text cannot be the location of the core of agreement by means of which we reject interpretations. We seem to be at an impasse: on the one hand there would seem to be no basis for labeling an interpretation unacceptable, but on the other we do it all the time. This, however, is an impasse only if one assumes that the activity of interpretation is itself unconstrained; but in fact the shape of that activity is determined by the literary institution which at any one time will authorize only a Finite number of interpretative strategies. Thus, while there is no core of agreement in the text, there is a core of agreement (although one subject to change) concerning the ways of producing the text [Fish 1980, 342]. Any and all contexts of reading are based upon social norms (Fish 1980). Sociological Knowledge is produced by what Fish calls the interpretive community. terpretive community decides which strategies of interpretation are acceptable.  This The in-  Any new  strategy of interpretation will be understood in terms of the norm. Rhetorically the new position announces itself as a break from the old, but in fact it is radically dependent on the old, because it is only in the context of some differential relationship that it can be perceived as new or, for that matter, perceived at all [Fish 1980, 349].  How the . CLT proponents interpret land is understood in terms of the RC's interpretative strategy, because the CLT interpretation is a reaction to the RC (ICE 1982). RC's interpretation is socially accepted, and the CLT proponents are attempting to make  The  39  their interpretation, and thus their interpretative strategy, socially accepted.  This directs us  towards the question of "how does a new strategy of interpretation become accepted by an interpretive community?"  This is best understood in terms the criteria used to judge the  validity of the reading of a text A valid reading is dependent upon being based on an accepted interpretive strategy. Some external circumstance must support an interpretive strategy.  For example, if "a letter  in which Faulkner [a writer from the southern United States] confides that he has always believed himself to be an Eskimo changeling" (Fish 1980, 346), were to surface, then new interpretations of Faulkner's works within the context of an Eskimo reader would be produced because this context would be based on a valid interpretative strategy, namely, the relation between the author's life and the text  While only some readings of a text are  acceptable at any time, the potential readings, which includes the ridiculous, are unlimited. In fact, my examples are very serious, and they are serious in part because they are so ridiculous. The fact that they are ridiculous, or are at least perceived to be so, is evidence that we are never without canons of acceptability; we are always "right to rule out at least some readings." But the fact that we can imagine conditions under which they would not seem ridiculous, and that readings once considered ridiculous are now respectable and even orthodox, is evidence that the canons of acceptability can change. Moreover, that change is not random but orderly and, to some extent, predictable. A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) from which it can emerge into respectability [Fish 1980, 349].  In literary criticism, new interpretative strategies are often not presented as interpretative strategies, but "merely" as a description of some text  This "description" must be  related to what has. already been said about the teyt. and as a consequence of saying it the work must be shown to possess—m—a-~ greater degree than had hitherto been recognized the qualities that properly belong to literary productions. . . . In short, the new interpretation must not only claim to tell the truth about the work i.e. the .text (in a dependent opposition to the falsehood or partial truths told by predecessors) but it must claim to make the work better. (The usual phrase is "enhance our appreciation of.") Indeed, these claims are finally inseparable since it is assumed that the truth about a work will be what penetrates to the essense of its literary value [Fish 1980, 351].  40 Acceptable interpretations are taken to be descriptions, so new interpretations are often presented as descriptions.  Descriptions are socially acceptable interpretations that are  no longer questioned and are a part of. Sociological and Positive Knowledge.  "[W]hatever  they [literary critics] do, it will only be interpretation in another guise because, like it or not, interpretation is the only game in town" (Fish 1980, 355).  Description amounts to  interpretation, and is often not taken to be an interpretation because it is a socially and culturally acceptable interpretation.  If people believe that they are describing, instead of in-  terpreting, the world, how can new interpretations be accepted, or even discussed? The acceptance of new interpretive strategies can occur during the course of dialogue between the interpretive community and a sub-community.  This dialogue is of a broader  scope than the one between the reader and the text, because in this case more than one subject is involved.  This requires us to examine the process of communication.  Communi-  cation between two subjects is more complex than between the reader and the text  While  the text itself is not capable of the act of interpreting (though it is an interpretation) both subjects do interpret.  In dialogue, each subject is constantly interpreting the utterances  of the other. The planner is to aid in starting and sustaining this dialogue.  How the planner  reads the subjects' interpretations of land becomes important in approaching this task. Planners should be aware that they are interpreting, not describing, and that their activities will have consequence.  These activities are comparable to the work of a literary critic.  "The critic is taught to think of himself as a transmitter of the best that had been thought and said by others, and his greatest fear is that he will stand charged of having substituted his own meanings for the meanings of which he is supposedly the guardian; his greatest fear is that his will be found guilty of having interpreted" (Fish 1980, 355). Since how each subject interprets land is related to how they interpret each other's statements, the planner needs to understand how they interpret land.  Before the planner inter-  prets how the two subjects interpret land the planner must define his or her own interpretive strategy.  The validity of this strategy must be based upon the types of inquiries  41  that the strategy will lead him or her to, and the relevance of the inquiries to the issues at hand. Before it can be suggested how a dialogue could be initiated by a planner, dialogue must be defined.  Before this is done we need a more explicit theory of communication.  Dialogue between two subjects who use different strategies of interpretation is a context of communication.  This means that issues of communication cannot be separated from the is-  sues of the dialogue.  Since we are interested in the subject-matter of communication that  is conveyed with words, understanding language can help in understanding the dialogic process.  2.3 Translation  and Communication  in Context  Even with the largely conscious uses of verbal language, a translator in the usual sense of the term (that is, a person who is trained to transpose meaning from one spoken language into another) needs to know much more than the languages involved. Translating is an art, and even a bad human translator is much better than the best translating machine in existence. But it is an frustrating art, for even the best translation entails a loss—perhaps not so much of objective information as of that intangible • essence of any language, its beauty, imagery and metaphors for which there is no one-to-one translation [Watzlawick 1976, 8-9]. The notions of translation and textuality are related.  Textuality, as understood here,  implies that the reader produces the meaning of the text, and that in doing so the reader should be having a dialogue with it  Translation can be seen to be built upon this be-  cause a goal of translation is to interpret a text in order to produce a new text which resides in some new context  The translated text is to have a similar meaning in its new  context as the original is believed to have had it its old.  The most prevalent form of  translation is that from the contexts of one language and culture to the contexts of another language and culture. As LaCapra mentioned, nothing is purely part of the text or part of the context If language is a context, then it contributes to the meaning that is produced from a text, and is not distinct from it  "An additional problem lies in the fact that language not  42 only conveys information but also expresses a world view.  The nineteenth-century linguist  Wilhelm von Humbolt once remarked that different languages are not so many designations of the same thing; they are different views of it" (Watzlawick 1976, 9). more than the word-for-word correlation between different languages.  Translation is  The translator, after  translating a text, should be able to intepret both texts (the translation and the original) in approximately the same manner.  In fact, any particular translation is dependent upon how  the original text is interpreted by the translator.  Even in a word-for-word translation,  problems exist because there are "equivalent" words in different languages which do not share the same meaning in all instances.  The proper translation of a single word not  only depends upon its placement in the text (the text serving as a context for the word), but also upon the contexts of the text itself.  The translation of any part of a text is  based upon an interpretation of the text Bruno Bettelheim's (1982) criticisms of the English translation of Sigmund Freud's works are rooted in this issue.  He questions the language used in the English texts, and  the intentions of the translators.  He claims that Freud's translators assumed that the ac-  cepted American context of psychiatry was the only valid context for reading Freud's works. In effect, he is not only challenging the dominant American strategy of interpreting Freud's texts, but American psychiatry itself. Bettelheim can claim to have a valid strategy of interpretation because he grew up in Freud's Vienna, German is his native language, and he studied psychiatry in Freud's context It can be argued that translators ought to concern themselves with rendering only what the author wrote, as closely as the difference in languages permits. But to deal accurately with a subject such as psychoanalysis, and with language so carefully chosen for nuances as Freud's was, translators need to be very sensitive not only to what is written but also to what is implied. . . . In short, they must also translate the author's attempts to convey covert meanings [Bettelheim 1982, 31].  Freud's use of language, Bettelheim argues, did not come across in the English translations.  "The translators' tendency to replace words in ordinary use with medical terms  43 and learned borrowings from Greek and Latin is evident througout the (Bettelheim 1982, 51).  3  Standard  Freud, who wrote in German, used everyday words which had both  intellectual and emotional connotations to the average speaker of German. Uber-Ich  are the everyday words for it, I, and "over I."  in the English editions as the terms.  Edition"  id,  the  ego,  and the  Es, ich, and  But they have been translated  superego,  all of which are Greek  For the American reader the words do not have the emotional impact that the  original German had for the German-speaking reader.  Why they were translated in this  manner is due to the context of American psychiatry, and the belief that psychoanalysis should be restricted to members of the medical profession.  "Only the wish to perceive  psychoanalysis as a medical specialty can explain why three of Freud's most important concepts were translated not into English but into a language whose most familiar use today may be for writing prescriptions" (Bettelheim 1982, 52-53).  While the original German  texts could challenge the context of American psychiatry, the Engish translations could not Bettelheim is also distressed that Freud's metaphors were translated in the same spirit  Freud frequently used metaphors due to the very nature of psychoanalysis, and be-  cause metaphors are more likely than a purely intellectual statement to touch a human cord and arouse our emotions, and thus give us a feeling for what is meant A true comprehension of psychoanalysis requires not only an intellectual realization but a simultaneous response: neither alone will do. A well-chosen metaphor will permit both [Bettelheim 1982, 38]. But many of Freud's metaphors were not translated in this context portant of Freud's metaphors was that of "mental illness."  Perhaps the most im-  Mental illness has been trans-  lated as to confirm that psychoanalysis is a part of medical science, which was not, according to Bettelheim, Freud's intention.  The interpretation of the phrase mental illness is  not only dependent upon its use in the text (e.g. which the text is interpreted.  Freud's works) but also the contexts in  Bettelheim's interpretation of mental illness and the standard  The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud is the most recent English translations of Freud's work, and Bettelheim believes this one to be the most faithful translation. 3  44 American interpretation convey different meanings which can be traced to differences in believing how the original German texts should be translated into English.  Watzlawick con-  siders the situation when two subjects perceive the same text in different contexts to be a type of confusion. The type of confusion that occurs when translating a text into a different language can also occur between two people speaking the same language (Watzlawick 1976).  Com-  munication is not limited to the spoken and written word, but it includes body language, actions, and the interpretation of situations.  An example of this is a couple on the se-  cond night of their honeymoon who had a big fight, which arose because the husband was acting aloof, gloomy, and antagonistic to his wife and a couple she was conversing with. Years later, they discovered that they had approached the situation "honeymoon" with two very different interpretations.  The husband saw the honeymoon as a period of  exclusive togetherness, while the wife saw the honeymoon as "the first opportunity to practice her newly acquired social role" (Watzlawick 1976, 8).  While the wife saw her  conservation with another couple as part of her interpretation of honymoon, the husband took her actions as a sign that he was insufficient to fulfill her needs.  There was no  interpreter who could have spotted the conflict in their translations. The reason for confusion in this example is the same as for why Bettelheim claims Freud was mistranslated into English: the husband and wife interpreted honeymoon in radically different ways just as Bettelheim and the American psychiatric community interpret psychoanalysis in radically different ways.  The husband and wife were interpreting the ac-  tions of each other as if the actions were texts.  While they were communicating with  each other, they failed to perceive the motivations for the other's actions. Notice that we do not have here a case of indeterminancy or undecidability but of a determinacy and decidability that do not always have the same shape and that can, and in this instance do, change. . . . Neither meaning was imposed . . . on a more normal one by a private, idiosyncratic interpretive act; both interpretations were a function of precisely the public and constituting norms (of language and understanding) . . . . It is just that these norms are not embedded in the language . . . but inhere  45  in an institutional structure within which one hears utterances as already organized with reference to certain assumed purposes and goals. . . . [T]heir interpretive activities are not free, but what constrains them are the understood practices and assumptions of the institution and not the rules and fixed meanings of a language system [Fish 1980, 306]. So confusion in communication stems from the participants interpreting the situation—the context of the communication—in different ways i.e. they are following different strategies of interpretation.  While the participants might not feel confused, they  misunderstood the rationale for the others' actions.  The notion of communication is more  complex than that of interpretation because the former depends upon a number of participants who are creating and interpreting texts simultaneously while the latter looks at only one reader in action.  In the honeymoon fight, while the husband and wife both named  their context honeymoon, they interpreted it differently, but each acted as if they were sharing the same context, and did not recognize that they were not sharing the same context  Interpretation always occurs, but the same cannot be said for successful communica-  tion. [Understanding is always possible, but not from the outside. That is, the reason that I can speak and presume to be understood by someone . . . is that I speak to him from within a set of interests and concerns, and it is in relation to those interests and concerns that I assume he will hear my words. If what follows is communication or understanding, it will not be because he and I share a language, in the sense of knowing the meanings of individual words and the rules for combining them, but because a way of thinking, a form of life, shares us, and implicates us in a world of already-in-place objects, purposes, goals, procedures, values, and so on; and it is to the features of that world that any words we utter will be heard as necessarily referring [Fish 1980, 303-304].  Successful communication was not occuring because the husband and the wife interpreted honeymoon in different ways without realizing it.  They were both interpreting the  other's actions and words in a way that was devoid of the meaning that they were intended to convey.  Words and actions do not contain meanings within themselves though  they are necessary for the production of meaning, and thus do not refer to a public and stable norm.  46 When two groups have different strategies of interpretation for some text how can they communicate with each other about the text?  When a planner and a client interpret  land in different ways how can dialogue aid communication? and  sustained?  How is this dialogue initiated  The answers lie in how metaphors can be translated.  2.4 Dialogue and the Translation of Metaphors Joined in dialogue, we build a common ground between us, a new reality for which we are responsible. This ground we hold in common trust [Friedmann 1979, 104]. The mon  translation of metaphors can occur during the process of dialogue if this com-  ground is built.  While the planner and the client have different strategies of inter-  preting land, they have some similarities in what values they associate with land. similarities can form the basis of a common ground. common context.  These  This common ground can serve as a  Since a common context is necessary for successful communication;  dialogue—which is a mode of communication—is dependent upon this context  In this  context any new ideas about interpreting land could be translated into terms which are mutually agreed upon.  The planner does not create the translations, but, by using his or  her interpretation of the situation, helps identify this initial context of communication so a self-sustained  dialogue becomes possible.  metaphors will be translated.  It is within this type of dialogue that the land  In order to see how dialogue could enable this to come  about, the concept of dialogue must be explored. Dialogue between people, as distinct from the dialogue between the reader and the text, is a form of person-centered communication. other directly.  In dialogue each person addresses the  It is assumed that information and meaning do not exist independent of  the people who communicate and receive it.  Dialogue between people, like having a dia-  logue with a text, is based upon the act of listening. must be willing to be challenged and to change.  Anyone participating in a dialogue  This is only possible when the other  participants are accepted, even with differences in opinions.  Dialogue does not include a  47  commitment to agree with the other, but an acceptance of the possibility of inreconcilable differences.  The outcome of any dialogue might be the agreement to disagree. Nothing will change normal conversation into dialogue as quickly as the question that speaks directly to the heart And once a relation of dialogue has been established, it will continue for as long as there exists a mutual determination to sustain it The dialogic relation values what is being said not because it is either true or false according to some absolute standard, but precisely because it is important to the person saying it Often unbeknown to himself, he is, in fact, turning to you for confirmation, denial, encouragement, or redirection of his thought and often of his life as well. He is addressing a question to you. In a relation of. dialogue you, who are being addressed, are asked to respond precisely to this question. This is what dialogue is all about [Friedmann 1981, 239].  This mutual determination is related to the shared interests and commitments that are necessary for successful communication.  It also emphasizes the treatment of the other  as a person, and not as tool directed toward goals.  This means that a planner should  not be interested in controlling the client, but in authentically helping him or her in a non-paternalistic manner.  Mutual interest and participation are necessary for dialogue.  The life of dialogue cannot be sustained unless there is a sense of partaking in the interest of the other. Mutual participation in a matter of common concern is not a precondition of authentic dialogue; it may evolve through dialogue. Where it fails to evolve, the dialogue is interrupted. We sometimes use one another to advance different interests. To the extent that this occurs, dialogue becomes an instrument to subordinate the other to your will. Presenting youself to the other according to the demands of the situation is an inescapable part of dialogue, but "using" the other for interests that are not shared destroys any possibility of sustaining it The life of dialogue is a relation of equality between two persons. It must not be perverted into an instrumental relationship [Friedmann 1973, 180]. If shared interests are necessary, then a dialogue cannot be established until issues of mutual concern have been identified.  These issues cannot be abstract and impersonal,  but must be related to the lives of the people involved. believe that the issues are related.  The planner and the client must  Telling people what their concerns are, or should be,  seems to be the worst way for a planner to begin a dialogue, since this puts the client in an antagonistic position.  The initiators of a dialogue should start from where people  have already identified the issues that are important to them, and where the initiators  48 agree with them. We should remember that dialogue is a context of communication.  Successful com-  munication of intentions, motivations, procedures, goals, and values is dependent upon both participants in a dialogue interpreting some of the other contexts of the communication in similar ways.  If each participant reads the other as a text then their interpretive strategies  should be similar.  In order to start and to sustain a dialogue, the subject who wishes to  start the dialogue must find out what it has in common the other, and where they differ. They can start with what they agree about  Since the words that they will use do not  contain a public and stable norm, they cannot naively assume that they both interpret words in a similar manner. How does communication ever occur if not by reference to a public and stable norm? The answer . . . is that communication occurs within situations and that to be in a situation is already to be in possession (or to be possessed by) a structure of assumptions, of practices understood to be relevant in relation to purposes and goals that are already in place; and it is within the assumption of these purposes and goals that any utterance is immediately heard. . . . What I have been arguing is that meanings come already calculated, not because of norms embedded in the language but because language is always perceived, from the very first, within a structure of norms. That structure, however, is not abstract and independent but social; and therefore it is not a single structure with a privileged relationship to the process of communication as it occurs in any situation but a structure that changes when one situation, with its background of practices, purposes, and goals, has given way to another [Fish 1980, 318].  In order to start a dialogue, an initial context that is shared by all participants must be established.  The initial context should be made up of the values, assumptions,  and goals that are shared by all parties. the land metaphors of the subjects.  These will come from the planner's reading of  Since it is a planner sympathetic with CLT pro-  ponents who wants to establish a dialogue with members of the RC, and not the other way around, it becomes imperative that the planner identify which of his or her values are similar to those held by the RC.  Once this context is identified, its metaphors can  be translated during the course of dialogue.  49 A metaphor is created in some original contexts. within these contexts.  The proper interpretation is done  When some of these contexts are changed, then the metaphor could  be translated to fit the new contexts and still convey approximately the intended meaning. When we speak about the translation of metaphors, we can mean: (1) the selection of an alternate metaphor; (2) an explanation of the intent of a particular metaphor; (3) or the transmission of the proper strategy of interpretation that the metaphor was created within. Dialogue aims for the latter, though it does allow for the other two.  People can become  their own interpreters through an agreement on an initial interpretive strategy,. The  interpretive strategy and the produced meaning of a text are bound together  (Fish 1980).  This linkage is an integral part of communication.  If the planner and the  client see that their own interpretations of their own land metaphors have similarities, then their methods of interpreting land itself would also have similarities.  Communication could  occur if a context consisting only of the similar ways that they view land could be established.  If any new—new to either participant in the dialogue—concepts  or interpretations  would come up in dialogue, they would be understood in terms of the common ground, which originates from the initial context  Rather than comparing metaphors for simple  agreement or disagreement, the features of the metaphors are being compared for similarities. 2.5  The  metaphors will enter dialogue once a common ground is established.  Dialogue, Textualism, and Metaphor  The  shared context is the common ground held by the participants of a dialogue.  Conflicting views are to be understood in terms of this shared context continues, its context is expected to change and to grow.  As the dialogue  Just as a text, as it is being  read, can change its context if the text challenges or contests the context (LaCapra 1983), similarly in a dialogue the utterances of one participant challenge how the other is listening.  Not only does each participant challenge the views of the other, but he or she also  becomes self-critical.  This is because "dialogue,. which requires critical thinking, is also  capable of generating critical thinking" (Freire 1970, 81).  50 Participants in dialogue must encourage an attitude of permissiveness towards self-criticism and collective evaluation.  The purpose of dialogue is similar to that of the  notions of textuality and of metaphorical concepts: it is to render the concept of reality less dogmatic (LaCapra 1983; Friedmann 1973, 1979; Freire 1970, 1973).  During dialogue  the world-views of the participants are challenged.  A result of this challenging, new inter-  pretative strategies and avenues of action open up.  The participants learn to question the  metaphorical concepts and interpretive strategies which they hold the dearest  It is only  when they decide themselves that their metaphors are manufactured, rather than natural, can they decide to create new ones.  New metaphors might be exchanged for old, or the old  ones may be kept, but even if they are, they are kept with the knowledge that they are metaphors.  The participants can return to the mastering of the metaphors rather than be-  ing mastered by them. A change in world-views becomes possible once both participants learn to be self-critical.  The planner can raise issues not previously considered by the client, and even  in conflict with the latter's established beliefs. the shared goals and of the dialogue itself.  These new issues will be seen in light of The metaphors can be successfully translated  because a common context which allows for the transmission of meaning will have been established.  51 CHAPTER THREE ISOMORPHISM AND METAPHORS People associate values with any metaphor.  These values are systemicly associated  with each other, with metaphors and with the contexts of the metaphors, so they form a structure.  The planner wishes to uncover the extent to which the values associated with  the land metaphors of the two subjects overlap by examining these structures.  Planners  need methods of interpreting the structure and values of his or her own land metaphors as well as those of the client and provide an exampel of one.  In this chapter i review the criteria for such a method, The analysis made in this chapter assumes that a plan-  ner conceives of land as does a CLT proponent, and that the client is a member of the Received Culture, so the structure of the land metaphors of CLT proponents is being compared to that of RC land metaphors. Structures can exist only within a set of contexts. the result of the interaction of text and context  We can say that structure is  This does not deny the importance of  structure, but it does deny that structures are universal or value-free.  The value systems  that make up the structure of land for the CLT proponents and the members of the RC are different, because the contexts are different  Each subject interprets land in a stru-  ctured manner, and these structures form the basis of the metaphors that conceptualize land. The purpose of a method which could be adopted by a planner would be to establish isomorphisms between the structures of his or her own metaphors and those of the client similar.  Isomorphisms are a measure of similarity, i.e. the degree to which metaphors are The method explained by the author was devised to show that it is possible to  identify degrees of isomorphism between the land metaphors for both subjects—a member of the RC and a proponent of Community Land Trusts.  Reliable methods which are re-  plicatable to establish this kind of agreement are not well advanced.  There is no intention  at this stage to suggest that any planner could perform the proposed procedures.  The  method was devised and performed to show that it is possible to establish degrees of  52 similarity.  Another reason for the proposed method is to advocate that for the dialogic  transaction in Transactive Planning to be successful, a planner should be expected to search out isomorphisms, even though the method used may be, by the nature of the context, only interpretive and so unrepeatable. The starting point of the method is to establish what goals are held by the two subjects.  As Fish (1980) has indicated, any utterance is heard within the context of goals.  Utterances as the material of dialogue for both subjects, has a structure of assumptions and practices.  A planner, as already mentioned, can use several forms of utterance by the  CLT proponents and the RC to ascertain their goals and their degree of similarity. logue initially depends upon shared goals.  Dia- •  So any method of metaphoric analysis should  begin by establishing shared goals and values associated with land. locates a reference point of agreement for both subjects.  Hopefully, the method  Once established, communication  can become mutually contextual. There is a major methodological issue in Transactive Planning dependent as it is upon dialogue.  The method itself is part of the dialogue.  During the establishment of  isomorphic levels of agreement, the subjects could be engaged in dialogue.  Any method  proposed is occuring as the subjects are translating their own metaphors for each other. However, the implication of any consideration of methodology at all is that the planner will have sought out metaphors with a high degree of isomorphism so that a successful dialogue can even begin. Bearing this methodological limitation in mind, metaphors with a high degree of isomorphism are, as reference points, a dialogic strategy for the planner.  As the dialogue  proceeds, the metaphors with a high level of isomorphisms may no longer dominate it Once embarked upon, other issues become part of the communicative context  However, a  planner should try to initiate dialogue through some method in which he or she has established mutual goals for which there is a high degree of similarity with respect to how the goals are defined.  53 As Friedmann (1973) mentions, a matter of common concern should either be identified before a dialogue, or it must evolve during the dialogue.  If the common goals for  the two' methods of land tenure can be identified, then this can become the common concern.  It may also lead to greater or different concern.  If planners start with those goals  which they believe are shared with their clients, these goals will not only serve as an initial reference point for any new ideas that they bring up, but they will also demonstrate that they are interested in the welfare of the clients and are attempting to be of service to them rather than trying to manipulate them.  The essence of dialogue is mutual trust,  and by being able to speak of some of the goals of the clients, planners show that their own concerns coincide with the clients'. The strength of any metaphoric analysis comparable in some respects to the method proposed is that the subject initiating the dialogue is more likely to be conscious of how he or she is reading the text of their own communications.  Equally of value in this  method is that it acknowledges those aspects of the reading which are, by definition, beyond the conscious control of the planner, i.e. his or her own assumptions and biases. the dialogue, the planner will try to explore the issues concerning the client.  In  The planner  must respect the client's views or he or she will not be motivated to find similarities between their views.  Without this motivation to identify similarities, there is little reason for  the planner to initiate a dialogue. Several limitations of any method to identify isomorphisms have already been mentioned.  It must be understood that metaphoric analysis, at this stage of sophistication, re-  mains a planner's interpretation of the situation.  The author, as a prospective planner, re-  cognizes that analysis of this kind is itself contextual i.e. limited by the non-repeatability of a method which should have just that characteristic. The discussion of the method the author has devised begins with a definition of terms.  This is followed by the procedures adopted to find the isomorphisms and the rea-  sons for that procedure. became possible.  As a result of the procedures, the identification of isomorphisms  The implications of these findings to Transactive Planning can then be  54  discussed.  3.1  Definitions  As previously discussed, a metaphor is one interpretation of a text that is made by a reader.  Each reader is expect to produce more than one metaphor is interpreting any  text, since the semantic space of any one metaphor is limited.  The semantic space of  metaphors will often overlap. Semantic space is the expected boundaries of the meaning that is attaced to a . concept  These boundaries are a cultural convention and part of Sociological Knowledge.  For  example, the semantic space of a word is the socially accepted range of meanings that may be attached to the word.  Similar words that are part of different languages can  cause confusion if they do not share the same semantic space because in certain contexts they will not share the same meaning. The readers of the text are referred to as subjects. pants in a dialogue. text.  They are the potential partici-  The planner is trying to understand how the subject interprets the  The two subjects are the CLT proponents and the members of the Received Culture.  The planner is one of the subjects and thus must be capable of being self-critical.  It is  the planner, as a CLT proponent who is suggesting that new metaphors be adopted by society.  The other subject represents the status quo and its accepted metaphors.  The pro-  ponent of the dialogue is the CLT proponents. The text that is being interpreted by both subjects is referred to as the object The issue at hand is usually a result of each subject's reading of the text.  The object is  land.  3.1.1  schema  A schema is a set of related metaphors. space.  Each metaphor is defined by its semantic  The planner is to fill in the schema for each subject  The same schema format  will be used for both subjects, but the metaphors selected to fill the format will differ for each subject  The schema is defined by the planner's interpretation of social and  55  cultural norms. The task of allocating metaphors to the schema is a difficult one, because it is difficult to dissociate and differentiate the metaphors from their emergent structures. planner's task is similar to the task of a semiologist (Barthes [1964] 1967).  The  The planner,  in most cases, will depend upon some institutions and literature about the object to derive the metaphors of the subjects.  "[0]therwise, he will have to observe more patiently how  consistently certain changes and recurrences are produced, like a linguist confronted with an unknown language" (Barthes [1964] 1967, 67).  3.1.2 social category Social categories are a way of understanding the social system.  The planner will  use the same social categories to interpret the metaphor schemas of both subjects.  The  features produced within the context of a social category reflect how the subject interprets its own metaphors. Social categories are defined by the semantic space that they occupy.  The social  category's semantic space serves as a context for viewing the subject's metaphors.  The  viewing of metaphors within social categories should Teveal the ideology of the subject as the subject relates to the object and the parts of the subject's social philosophy that fall within the social categories. The semantic space of each social category will be defined in a way that allows for the planner to judge whether or not a feature is a member of a given social category.  This will be done by outlining each category's semantic space.  upon dictionary definitions of the  social categories.  This will be based  The dictionaries used should include  dictionaries of the English language, or the social social sciences, and of philosophy.  These  definitions will then be presented in a graphic form, that should show the terms that are most closely associated with the name of the social category. denotative features of the social category (Eco 1976).  These associated terms are  56 The planner has to decide which social categories are relevant to the issues that the proponent are bringing up. issue of land tenure (ICE 1982).  The planner, as a CLT proponent, is concerned with the The question of which social categories to choose is de-  pendent upon how the proponent defines and presents the issue. litical issue?  As a legal issue?  one type of context  Is it presented as a po-  An issue is often presented by a proponent in more than  What the planner needs to know is how the subjects interpret their  metaphors in terms of the types of issues that are believed to be at hand.  Once a dia-  logue is started, the issues and types of contexts chosen at this point are the initial focus of attention.  3.1.3  feature  Features are how each subject reads its own metaphors in the context of the social categories.  Features of metaphors will be the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the sub-  jects as they are related to the object (land) by a subject aspects of how each subject interprets land.  Features will emphasize certain  The following figure shows how features are  produced from the subject-object relationship.  Subject metaphor  feature  feature  r- Object  social category-  feature  Figure 1 -  feature  metaphor  feature  1  feature  1  feature  Production of Features  3.1.4 goal Goals are a special type of feature.  They are not derived from the metaphors, but  are those stated by the proponent to be the desired consequences of its strategy of interpretation.  As with the social categories, each goal will be initially defined in terms of the  semantic space that it occupies.  The features of each subject's schema of metaphors will  57 be reorganized in terms of the semantic space of the stated goals, by the planner.  This  new organization of features will then form the basis of the search for isomorphisms, since it is goals, as defined by assumptions and values, that form contexts of communication (Fish 1980).  Once the features are reorganized around the goals, then the planner can  view how each subject defines the goals, and compare how each goal is defined by each subject to each other.  Each subject might define the goals, in terms of their metaphors  about the object, in radically different terms.  If there are any goals defined in a similar  manner, then they will serve as the basis of the initial context of communication. In defining the criteria for a feature to be associated with a goal, the semantic space of the goal must be defined as it was with the social categories. tions should lead to denotative features of the goal.  Dictionary defini-  But there is also a need for the  planner to interpret this semantic space in terms of how the proponent defines this semantic space.  How the proponents define the semantic space of the goals should not be  confused with how the proponents propose to  fill  the semantic space.  3.1.5 isomorphism An isomorphism is a similarity shared by two structures. by both subjects are compared. similar they are.  How each goal is defined  The degree of isomorphism is measured in terms of how  Goals which are defined in a similar manner by both subjects are said  to be isomorphic, because it will be assumed by the planner and the proponent that each subject structures the goal in a similar manner. When looking for isomorphisms, we are literally looking for similar forms.  Isomor-  phisms are part of the process of understanding because they provide a context for the understanding of a form that is new to us (Hofstadter 1979).  We understand the new  form by comparing it to one with which we are already familiar (Fish 1980). searching for similarity of form to allow us to find similarity of substance.  So we are  This can be  better understood if form and content are not viewed as two unrelated items. The historical pattern in the investigation of matter has been the explanation of diverse substances as combinations of a few simpler substances.  58 Diversity of form replaces diversity of substance [Rucker 1983, 28]. Since we are looking for isomorphisms, we are looking for similarity between structures.  It is the emergent cores of metaphors that will form the structures at which we  will look.  This emergent core forms the prototype of a concept  Since we cannot directly compare the emergent structures of metaphors because we cannot analyze them directly, we will have to compare the features of the metaphors in an organized manner in order to hypothesize that isomorphism exist in a particular case. When looking for isomorphisms, we are now looking for a large number of similar features that seem to be organized in a similar manner.  How this will be done is depen-  dent upon how the planner is reading the collections of metaphors, and how these features can be organized so as to form an initial context for communication.  3.2  Procedure  The procedure consists of the completion of three types of worksheets.  Even  though only the isomorphism worksheets are analyzed, the matrix worksheets and the goal worksheets are necessary in order to fill out the isomorphism worksheets. The matrix worksheet is used to generate the features of the land metaphors of the two subjects.  Once the features are generated, then the features can be reorganized in  terms of the goals that have been selected for the goal worksheet  Only after the se-  mantic space of the goals have been filled with features can the planner compare how each subject conceptualizes these goals in terms of land.  This comparison is done on the  isomorphism worksheets.  3.2.1  the matrix  worksheet  The first worksheet that has to be completed in the matrix worksheet  This process  has four steps: 1) choosing the metaphors, 2) choosing the social categories, 3) defining the semantic space of the social categories,and 4) generating the features.  In the first step, the  planner decides which metaphors are used by the subjects to describe the object in terms  59 of the pertinent issues.  Before any metaphors can be chosen, a schema for the metaphors  to fit into must be outlined. The  The first type is  schema. the  This schema is made up of three types of land metaphors.  point in  society  where  land  control decisions  become  manifested.  The  important social influences on the use of land might not be apparent at this point; this point is where decisions appear (and may be) made. fluences  land-use  decisions.  The second type is  how society  in-  Influence can range from meager influences to actual control,  though this often refers to that part of society which has little or no control of a particular piece of land. tenure.  The third type is the  social justification  for  the  method  of land  This last unit reflects how it is believed society benefits from land tenure, and  the social reality surrounding the object fills in the units of the The  It is now the time to assess how each subject  schema.  metaphors chosen for each subject is based upon how each subject describes  land in terms of who or what controls it, and the criteria for deciding land-use. The subjects are not expected to be aware that their descriptions of land are metaphors (Turbayne 1970).  This is especially true for the RC, since its descriptions are accepted as  commonplace, thus its metaphors are hidden.  The planner will have to decide upon the  schema and how each side coneptualizes land through reading the sources. The  sources that make up the planner's texts are varied and pertinent to how the  subjects interpret land. of the subjects.  Many sources will be pertinent to both, rather than to just one,  This is not surprising because the CLT model is defined in terms of  land tenure in the RC: the former is a subculture of the latter.  For example, sources  about the RC will not only come from writers defending the status quo, but also from critics of the status quo, which includes the CLT proponents. Sources should also be of the proper scale.  Since the subjects are national in  scope, the bulk of the sources should be from a national, as distinct from a local, viewpoint  60 Land  ways.  in  the  received  The RC describes land in a number of  culture.  Thus, there is no one dominant metaphor of land, but a family of metaphors that  usually complement each other, though they can also conflict with each other in certain situations.  Any single book on land-use economics will present more than one conceptuali-  zation of land, and then reconcile them (Barlowe 1958; Ely and Wehrwein [1940] 1964; Renne 1958).  Commonalities exist between these differing descriptions of land because they  all exist with the context of the RC. A variety of way of describing land in the RC include: land is private property, commodity, utility, homeplace, natural resource, space, a factor of production, a consumption good, situation, and capital (Barlowe 1958; Marquis 1979).  The first three—private property,  commodity, and utility—were picked because they best fill the land schema and the importance attached to them in the planner's text  Land  is private property  points to the place  in society where decisions about land-use are often made, the owner of the land: the land owner is entitled to use his or her land as he or she sees fit (Andrews 1979; Bjork 1980; Clawson 1973; Nozick 1974; Wolf 1981).  Land economics texts refer to the private  property aspects of land which form the basis of land law (Barlowe 1958; Ely and Wehrwin [1940] 1964; Renne 1958).  This returns us to Locke's view that a government  should protect the rights of individuals.  Land  is a  commodity  points to how society in-  fluences how land is used: the land market controls land-use (Bjork 1980; Nozick 1974; Michelman 1981; Siegan 1976).  Land  is a utility  gives the social justification for how so-  ciety influences land-use: land gains values from human consumption (Leopold [1949] 1970; Strong 1975; Andrews 1979), and should be allowed to serve the greatest good according to this assumption.  These metaphors are in opposition to the CLT proponents' metaphors. Land  in  the  metaphors than the RC. dominates.  Land  is a  community  land  trust.  The CLT proponents advocate different  Land is a common trust, basic resource, and the land ethic pre-  common  trust  points to both the individual land user (leaseholder)  and the local community (through the CLT board of directors) to make land-use decisions (ICE 1982).  Land  is a basic  resource  is based upon Henry George's conception of how  61  society should treat land and how land acquires its value, even though the CLT is not an enactment of George's single-tax theory (ICE 1981; George 1880; Brown et al. 1955).  The  social justification for the method of land tenure, the land ethic, sees inherent value in the land without consumption of the land (Leopold [1949] 1970; ICE 1982; Fener 1980). While the CLT model stresses how land could be best used for society, the fact that it is complementary to conservtion trust, and the origins of the CLT model, suggest that land is more than a utility or a consumer good. Social categories. As mentioned before, the choice of social catgories is based upon the proponent's definition and analysis of the issue, and how it believes that it should be resolved.  The Community Land Trust Handbook (ICE 1982) is being used for  this reason, since it is the most important document on CLTs.  The CLT proponents are  attempting to move land-use decisions from the economic realm into the political realm. This is reflected in its supporters' concerns for greater direct community control over the land.  Thus it becomes important to view how the RC and the CLT model view the  proper role of land within the political and economic social categories.  The CLT itself is  a legal institution, and stresses the role of the law in protecting the leaseholder.  The case  studies in the Community Land Trust Handbook stress the types of social relations and institutions that are associated with acutal CLTs. fined in terms of their semantic space. The  In figure 2, these social categories are de-  The name of each social category is in capitals.  sources that formed the basis of these definitions are printed in appendix one. After the social categories are chosen and their semantic spaces defined, then the  features of the metaphors can be generated by the planner.  The sources which were used  to identify the metaphors will also be used in the identification of their features. tional sources will be needed at this point  Addi-  Very often the sources used to name the  metaphors will not define the features in adequate detail.  The planner will have to ex-  plore the contexts that the social categories make up so as to reveal the larger ideology in which land is being viewed.  The generation of features should not only result in a  better understanding of how a subject views land, but also serve as a window on the  62 subject's overall ideology.  For example, one political context for the land metaphors of the  RC is the political philosophy of Locke ([1689] 1955), which encompasses the notion of natural rights.  What is often believed to be the legal foundations of the United States is  another context of understanding the present dominant interpretation of land.  The purpose  of interpreting metaphors in contexts is to view the values that the metaphors are normally associated with, which will be the values of the social categories.  The features are not  only associated with the metaphors, but are also features of the social categories. of metaphors that cannot be related to the social categories are to be ignored.  Features The fea-  tures were generated in the RC and CLT proponents matrix worksheets (see charts 1 and 2).  government/political public policy  POLITICAL  I  activity -management  creation/administration of the law  production/distribution of goods and wealth  I institution  ECONOMIC  resource management  law  I judical system  LEGAL  set of rules  I  codification of political policy  order process  Figure 2 -  J  SOCIAL  control  Semantic Space of Social Categories  POLITICAL independence (s) low negotiation and enforcement costs (ce) local autonomy (s) government protects rights (s) democracy (s) limited government (s) stability (s,i!)  LEGAL  ECONOMIC independence (s) opportunity (a) access to wealth (ie) landowner gains all profits from development (ie) the value of the land is created by labor and capital (ic) stability (s,il) landowner is entitled to profit from the land (ie) right to the product of one*s labor (  stability (s,il) government protects the market (s) government is to protect/maximize land values (s) taxes (ce)  landowner gains all profits from development (ie) access to wealth (ie) efficiency in transaction (ie) money is the only criteria for access to land (a) the market determines land-use (cl) market is benevolent (  land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (cl)  land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (cl) the value of land can be measured (  s = a =  compensation ( land is inheritable (il) owner controls the land ( improvements are part of the land (ie) land is bounded; parcels ( standard criteria for access to land (a) low negotiation and enforcement costs (ce) government protects rights (s) land is owned by a legal entity (  independence (s) opportunity (a) right to the product of one's labor ( stability ( local autonomy (s) the value of land is created by labor and capital (ie) owner controls the land ( investment in the community (ce) selfishness is for the public benefit  compensation (s,ie) rights are transferable by sale (ie) land is bounded; parcels (s,ie) government protects the market (s,ie) money is the only criteria for access to land (a) taxes (ce)  the market is benevolent (a,ce,cl) selfishness is for the public benefit (cl) equitable distribution of wealth (ce) competition (ie) efficiency in transaction (ie)  Received  <d>  low negotiation and enforcement cost (ce) government protects rights (s) home (s)  land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (  Security ie = Individual Equity il = Individual Legacy Community Access ce = Community Equity cl = Community Legacy Chart 1 -  SOCIAL  ire Matrix  Worksheet  POLITICAL  o E E  ECONOMIC  LEGAL  SOCIAL individual and community control of land (s,a,cl) local autonomy (s,a,cl) opportunity (a) rights and responsibilities on lease (s) stability ( cooperation (s,a,cl) outreach and education programs (cl) investment in the community (cl) home (s) equitable use of community wealth (cl) right to the product of one's labor (  individual and community control of land (s,a,cl) local autonomy ( opportunity (a) land-use subject to community limitations (cl) government protects rights (s) democracy (s) leaseholder representation on CLT board of directors (s) outreach and education programs (cl) equitable use of community wealth (cl) nonprofit organization owns the land (s) cooperation (s, political organization (s,cl)  earned equity (ie) access to capital and financing (a) stability (s,il,cl) retention of public funds (ce) insulation from land market forces (s,a,cl) lease fees based on land-use (s,a,ce,cl) community gains appreciated value of land (ce) nonprofit organization (s)  individual and community control of land ( lease is inheritable (il) rights A responsibilities on lease (s) long-term or lifetime lease (s) individual ownership of improvements ( lease protects the value of fixtures (  individual and community control of land (s,a,cl) land is subject to community limits (zoning, etc.) (cl) equitable use of community wealth (cl)  lease fees based on land-use (s,a,ce,cl) land and labor is source of wealth (ie,a) land is a non-specualtive good (a,cl) land value is created by society (ce) improvements are not taxed (ce) population pressure (cl) access to wealth (ie)  lease fees based on land-use (s,a,ce,cl) long-term or lifetime lease (s)  land is a part of the community (cl)  land has inherent value (ce) land vaues cannot be measured (ce)  land is not property ( nature ignores boundaries (  s = a =  land is a part of the community (cl) an individual is a memeber of a community of interdependent parts (ce) land has inherent value (ce) land value cannot be measured (ce)  Security ie = Individual Equity il = Individual Legacy Community Access ce = Community Equity cl = Community Legacy Chart 2 -  CLT Model Matrix  Worksheet  on  66 3.2.2  the goal  worksheet  Once the features have been generated, then the planner's work centers around the goal worksheet features to them.  The planner must choose the relevant goals, define them, and assign the As with the social categories, the goals are based upon the proponent's  interpretation of the issues.  What are the goals, as stated by the proponent, of the  proponent's solution to the problems.  What are the goals of Gommunity Land Trusts?  The goals chosen for the goal worksheets were taken directly from the Community Land Trust Handbook (ICE 1982, 19-24).  Security, individual equity, individual legacy,  community access, community equity, and community legacy are all deemed to be legitimate interest of individuals and communities by the CLT proponents. defined in terms of their semantic space. finitions are printed in appendix one.  In figure 3 the goals are  The sources that formed the basis of these de-  The name of each goal is in capitals.  Once defined, the semantic space of goals will be filled by the features of the metaphors of the subject, and these features will then define the goals in terms of the object.  It is possible for a feature to fit into the semantic space of more than one goal.  On the matrix worksheets, it should be marked those goals are associated with which features.  After they are marked, features should be copied on the goal worksheet under the  goals with which they are associated.  This process going back to the production of fea-  tures might have to be reiterated a number of times until the planner is confident of his or her decisions.  The planner may change his or her mind about one subject after filling  out the other subject's goal sheet, new features of metaphors may come to mind, etc. This process is actually non-linear.  Charts 3 and 4 are the complete goal worksheets.  safety freedom  SECURITY  guarantees  confidence  an individual's claim to property or wealth INDIVIDUAL EQUITY fairness  property inheritance:  INDIVIDUAL LEGACY  heritage  jobs affordable housing  COMMUNITY  ACCESS  social services  members of community having access to the land  community claims on property, wealth, and resources COMMUNITY  EQUITY  fairness heritage COMMUNITY  LEGACY  how a community manges land-use  Figure 3 -  Semantic Space of Goals  - 68 -  SECURITY  INDIVIDUAL EQUITY  independence (p,e,s) local autonomy (p) government protects rights  (P.1)  democracy (p) limited government (p) stability (p,e,s) compensation (1) owner controls the land (l,s) land is bounded; parcels (1) government protects the market (p,l) government is to protect/ maximize land values (p) home (s) land is owned by a legal entity (1)  access to wealth (e) landowner gains all profits from development (e) the value of land is created by labor & capital (e,s) landowner is entitled to profit from the - land (e) right to the product of one's labor (s) compensation (1) owner controls the land (l,s) improvements are part of the land (1) land is bounded; parceled (1) efficiency in transactions (e) rights are transferable by sale (1) equitable distribution of wealth (s)  COMMUNITY ACCESS opportunity (e,s) standard criteria for ownership (1) money is the only criteria for access (e,l) the market is benevolent (e,s)  p =  political  e =  COMMUNITY EQUITY low negotiation & enforcment costs (p!,s) investment in the community (s) taxes (p,l) the value of land can be measured (e,s)  economic  1 = legal  s = social  Chart 3 - RC Goal Worksheet  INDIVIDUAL LEGACY land is inheritable (1) right to the product of one's labor (e,s) stability (p,e,s) land is owned by a legal entity (1)  COMMUNITY  LEGACY  selfishness is for the public benefit (s) the market determines land-use (e,s) the market is benevolent (s) competition (s) land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (p,e,s) the value of land can be measured (e,s)  - 68a -  SECURITY  INDIVIDUAL EQUITY  individual & community control of land (p,s,l) local autonomy (p,s) government protects rights (P) democracy (p) leaseholder representation on CLT board (p) cooperation (s) political organization (p) stability (p,e,s) insulation from land market forces (e) lease fees based on land-use (e.l) nonprofit organization (p,e) rights & responsibilities (l,s) long-term/lifetime leases (1) home (s) ownership of improvements  access to wealth (e) earned equity (e) right to the product of one's labor (s) ownership of improvements  0)  INDIVIDUAL LEGACY right to the product of one's labor (e,s) stability (e,s) lease is inheritable (1) ownership of improvements (1)  lease protects the value of fixtures (1) equitable distribution of wealth (s) land and labor is source of wealth (e,s)  (1) lease protects the value of fixtures (1) COMMUNITY  ACCESS  individual & community control of land (p,s,l) local autonomy (p,s) opportunity (p,s) cooperation (p,s) access to capital & financing (e) insulation from land market forces (e) lease fees based on land-use (e,l) land is a nonspeculative good (e)  p  = political  e =  economic  COMMUNITY  EQUITY  retention of public funds (e) lease fees based on land-use (e,l) community gains appreciated value of land (e) land value is created by society (e) land has inherent value (e,s) land values cannot be measured (e,s) land is not property (1) nature ignores boundaries (1) and individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts (s) improvements are not taxed (e)  1 =  legal  COMMUNITY  LEGACY  individual & community controla of land (p,l,s) local autonomy (p) outreach & education programs (p,s) cooperation (s) political organization (p) stability (e,s) insulation from land market forces (e) lease fees based on land-use (e) land is a non-specualtive good (e) land is part of the community (p,s) land is not property (1) nature ignores boundaries (1) population pressures (e) land-use is subject to community limitations (zoning, etc) (p) lease fees based on land-use (e,l)  s = social  Chart 4 - CLT Proponents Goal Worksheet  69  3.2.3 the isomorphism worksheet On the isomorphism worksheets, the planner compares the features each subject assigns to the same goal. each subject.  Each isomorphism worksheet is divided into two columns, on for  The features of each subject that is assigned to the goal are then assigned  to be put in one of four categories: total agreement, partial agreement, no agreement, and conflict, according to how they compare to the features assigned by either subject  The  features of the other subject that are used to define a goal are said to be the opposing features. Total agreement. Each feature is compared to all of the other features used by the other subject in defining the goal (which are located on the other subject's goal worksheet).  If there is a feature with which it is in total agreement, then it is listed  under total agreement  Total agreement occurs when two features share the same name,  and/or can be defined in a very similar manner.  While 100 percent agreement is rare,  they can be said to be in total agreement if they cover the same issues (the same semantic space) and if they do not disagree with each other.  For example, in chart 5,  both the CLT proponents and the RC list local autonomy under total agreement. While they might disagree exactly on how to achieve local autonomy, in both cases it involves the belief that a community should have some form of control over its future.  For each  goal, each subject will have the same number of features in total agreement Partial agreement. A feature is located in the partial agreement category if it is not listed in the total agreement category, and if there is an opposing feature that partially agrees with it  The agreement is considered to be only partial if one of the  features has a denotative feature which the other feature does not have.  When this oc-  curs, there will often be more than one feature that partially agrees with an opposing feature.  For example, in chart 5, the RC feature land is owned by a legal entity par-  tially agrees with the CLT feature private ownership of improvements and lease protects the values of fixtures. This is because the two CLT features each cover some of the semantic space that the RC feature covers, but not all of it  70 Conflict. Conflict occurs when two opposing features are incompatible with each other.  This incompatibility is not always obvious.  Chart 9 has an example of an  obvious conflict (land value cannot be measured vs. the values of land can be measured). Chart 8 has a less obvious example.  If insulationfromland market forces is a value,  then the market is benevolent is not compatible with it, because the latter implies that there should be no insulation from the land market  It is possible for an feature to be  in agreement (total or partial) with one opposing feature, and in conflict with a different opposing feature, within the same goal. listed in both rows.  If this is the case, then the feature should be  If one subject has features in conflict, then the other subject will  also have features under conflict No agreement. A feature is located under no agreement if it is neither in agreement nor in conflict with an opposing feature.  This means that the feature does not  share any semantic space with the other subject's definition of the goal.  Features listed in  the no agreement catagory cover issues not covered in how the other subject defines the goal. 3.2.4 identifying isomorphisms From the matrix and goal worksheets, we have been able to produce the isomorphism worksheets (Charts 5 to 10).  The goals that are defined in a similar manner, and  the features that make them up and are in agreement, will make up the initial context of communication.  For the purpose of these worksheets, each subject defines a goal according  to the features that it assigns to it The first step to be taken is the identification of which goals can be said to be similar, meaning that both subjects defined them in a similar manner.  If how the pro-  ponent defines a goal includes some features in total agreement, and no features in conflict, then the minimal amount of similarity exists for it to be part of the initial context. When measuring for similarity, only one of the subjects need be examined since they reflect each other where features are in total and partial agreement  The proponent is the  71  subject used because it wants to know where its values are similar to the values of the RC.  Attributes that are under partial agreement also support  are in no  agreement are ignored  conflict between the two The  at this point because they  similarity. neither add  But  to agreement nor  subjects in terms of that specific goal.  general rule is: the more features in agreement the better, and  conflict the worse. the mininum  Of  standards  the six goals, security, individual equity, and  total and  number of features, and  the more in  individual legacy meet  of similarity since none of their features are in conflict.  three, security is the most similar because it has agreement—both  features that  partial. not by  It should  be  Of  these  the greatest number of features in noted that this counting  is in total  percentage of the features used to define the goal.  This  is because more features are assumed to carry more information than fewer features, and thus able to be  used to be  the basis of a larger and  size of the isomorphisms is measured by The  two  equity, and flict, and  at most only one  the least similarity, and it is not an during can  they  define community  it covers importan issues and  appropriate goal for the initial context, but one  the course  of dialogue.  It is important  lead to a picture of where the two  that should  legacy bears proponents,  come out later  to examine where conflict occurs, since this  subjects disagree in a consistent manner.  conflict occur, and  least similar manner,  what patterns are evident?  worksheet for security (chart 5) will serve as an greatest amount of agreement  Community  values of the C L T  After identify the goals that are defined in the most and where does agreement and  access, community  All three of these goals contain features that are in con-  that is in total or partial agreement.  while  The  the number of features that are in agreement  subjects are least similar in how  community legacy.  better defined initial context.  The  isomorphism  example for analysis since it contains the  - 72 -  SECURITY CLT Proponents Total Agreement  local autonomy (p,s) government protects rights (p) democracy (p) stability (p,e,s) home (s)  local autonomy (p) government protects rights (p) democracy (p) stability (p,e,s) home (s) Partial Agreement  individual & community control of the land (P,s,l) leaseholder representation on CLT board of directors (p) lease fees based on land-use (e,l) nonprofit organization (p) longterm/lifetime leases (1) ownership of improvements (1) lease protects the value of fixtures (1)  owner controls the land (l,s) land is owned by a legal entity (1)  No Agreement  cooperation (s) political organization (p) insulation from land market forces (e) rights & responsibilities (l,s)  independence (p,e,s) limited government. (p) compensation (1) land is bounded; parcels (1) government protects the market (p,l) government is to protect/maximize land values (p) Conflict  p e 1 s  = = =  political economic legal social Chart 5 -  Security Isomorphism Worksheet  - 72a -  INDIVIDUAL EQUITY CLT proponents  EC Total Agreement  access to land (e) right to the product of one's labor (s)  access to wealth (e) right to the product of one's labor (s)  Partial Agreement  ownership of improvements (1) lease protects the values of fixtures (1) earned equity (e)  improvements are part of the land (1) compensation (1)  /Vj? Agreement  landowner gains all profits from development (e) the value of land is created by labor & capital (e,s) landowner is entitled to profit from the land (e,s) owner controls the (l,s) land is bounded; parcels (1) government protects the market (p,l) efficiency in transactions (e) rights are transferable by sale (1) Conflict  p e 1 s  = = = =  political economic legal social Chart 6 -  Individual Equity Isomorphism Worksheet  - 73 -  INDIVIDUAL LEGACY  £ L I Proponents  E£ Total Agreement  right to the product of one's labor (e,s) stability (p,e,s)  right to the product of one's labor (e,s) stability (p,e,s)  Partial Agreement  lease is inheritable (1) ownership of improvements (1)  land is inheritable (1) land is owned by a legal entity (1) No Agreement  Conflict  p e 1 s  = — = -  political economic legal social Chart 7 - Individual Legacy Isomorphism Worksheet  - 73a -  COMMUNITY £LT  ACCESS  Proponents  ££ Total Agreement  opportunity (p,s)  opportunity (e,s) Partial Agreement  NJS Agreement  individual & community control of land (p) local autonomy (p,s) cooperation (p,s) access to capital & financing (e) lease fees based on land-use (e,l)  standard criteria for ownership (1)  Conflict insulation from land market forces (e) land is a nonspeculative good (e)  p e 1 s  = = = =  the market is benevolent (e,s) money is the only criteria for access  political economic legal social Chart 8 - Community Access Isomorphism Worksheet  - 74 -  COMMUNITY  EQUITY  CLI Proponents  E£ Total Agreement  Partial Agreement lease fees based on land-use (e,l)  taxes (p,l)  Es Agreement retention of public funds (e) community gains appreciated value of land (e) land value is created by society (e) land has inherent value (e,s) land is not property (1) nature ignores boundaries (1) an individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts (s) Improvements are not taxed (e)  low negotiation & enforcement costs (p,l,s) efficiency in transactions (e) investment in the community (s)  Conflict land values cannot be measured (e)  p e 1 s  = = = =  the value of land can be measured (e,s)  political economic legal social Chart 9 -  Community Equity Isomorphism Worksheet  - 74a  COMMUNITY  LEGACY  EC  m:--£lQPQD£DJS  Total Agreement  Partial Agreement  Agreement  outreach & education programs (p,s) political organization (p) stability (e,s) land is a part of the community (p,s) nature ignores boundaries (1) local autonomy (p)  land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (p,e,s)  Conflict  cooperation (p,s) individual & community control of land (P,l,s) insulation from land market forces (e) land is a non-speculative good (e) lease-fees based on land-use (e,l) land is not property (1)  p e 1 s  = = = =  competition (s) the market determines land-use (e) selfishness is for the public benefit (s) the market is benevolent (e,s) the value of land can be measured (e,s)  political economic legal social Chart 10 -  Community Legacy Isomorphism Worksheet  75 An analysis of the features in partial agreement supports this identification of which goals have the greatest similarity.  As mentioned above, features that are in partial agre-  ement might be part of a cluster of features that fulfill much of the function of an opposing feature.  This does not mean that the cluster is the same as the opposing feature,  but that it covers much of the same semantic space. Briefly, the isomorphism worksheets show us that there is the most agreement about how security is defined by the two subjects and the least about community legacy.  If the  recognized isomorphisms are taken to be valid, then the creation of a common context is possible.  3.3 Summary: Isomorphism and the Translation of Metaphors The success of initiating a dialogue will be dependent upon how well the metaphors held by each subject are translated to the other in the process of dialogue.  If the plan-  ner is able to find isomorphisms between the value-structures underlying the metaphor schemas, then these isomorphisms can allow for the translation of ideas which are foreign to the other.  After the planner performs the analysis, the isomorphisms which are located  suggest the best goals which a proponent should bring up first. The analysis suggests that the CLT proponents, in initiating a dialogue with members of the RC should concentrate on the goals of security, individual equity, and individual legacy, with the greatest emphasis on security.  While how the CLT proponents define these  goals is dependent upon how they define the other three, it is here they will be best understood by the RC, and after there is agreement on how to define these three goals (or partially define them) then the other goals should be introduced, after a certain amount of trust has already been established. Within each goal, the proponents should try to move from the areas of total agreement to partial agreement to no agreement. on what the features in total agreement mean.  They first have to establish if they agree The CLT proponents have to relate how  their features under partial agreement function similarly, as a group, to the RC's features  76 listed under partial agreement  When they get to features under no agreement, they should  be referred to features already mentioned. the features under no agreement  The agendas of the two subjects diverge for  The agendas of the two subjects diverge, CLT pro-  ponents are attempting to introduce their new agenda items, and only refer to the RC's agenda items if members of the RC bring them up. Having knowledge about which goals are in conflict is important to the CLT proponents in sustaining communication with the RC.  If the CLT proponents want to per-  suade members of the RC that their method of interpreting land is most appropriate, they must anticipate challenges.  Challenges can be expected to come over goals which are de-  fined in desimilar manners by the subjects. The methodology can be used by the planner to interpret part of the pre-dialogue situation. the client  The analysis is tentative, and suggests how a planner might listen and speak to As with any context, the text can challenge it  The planner must listen care-  fully for utterances of the client (or the planner's own utterances) which contradict this initial context of communication. tion to a set of objective facts. and speak.  The importance of the analysis is not to reduce the situaIt is to provide a way for the planner to initially listen  The nature of dialogue is to change the contexts of communication, so the  planner should never become overly attached to his or her own interpretations.  Transactive  Planning is based upon the ability of dialogue to challenge both the planner and the client  77  CHAPTER FOUR  TRANSACTIVE PLANNING, MUTUAL LEARNING, AND DIALOGUE A planner who is a CLT proponent conceptualizes land differently from how his or her client  This means that the planner needs a style of planning in which he or she  can successfully  convey the knowledge that his or her metaphors of land are based upon  to the client  This style of planning should not assume that the planner is right, but  rather that the planner has knowledge that could be important to the client  This kno-  wledge is not limited to the issue that the planner is dealing with, but includes the activity of planning itself.  If the planner is interested in social change, the role of an im-  partial planner who merely advises a client is undesireable.  Transactive Planning enables  the planner to contribute his or her knowledge while accepting its limitations by revisioning the planner-client relationship. Transactive Planning rejects the traditional planner-client relationship in which the neutral planner-technician advises the client-government on the creation and/or implementation of policies.  Rather, this relationship is now defined in terms of the type of kno-  wledge the planner and the client are expect to have; both are equal participants in the planning process. ning.  The initiation of a dialogue is only the first step in Transactive Plan-  In a dialogue in Transactive Planning, two types of knowledge are joined together:  Personal Knowledge and Positive Knowledge.  The metaphors of the client are mostly based  on personal experience, while those of the planner are more likely to be based upon knowledge that is "built up and is expressed in the form of models that can be formally communicated, critically examined, and revised on the basis of new observations" (Friedmann 1973, 101). Transactive planning can best be understood in terms of Rational Comprehensive Planning (RCP) since the former was a rection to the latter. iod from about 1950 to 1965.  RCP predominated the per-  It was based mostly on Positive Knowledge because it  proposed that the planner's proper role was that of central coordinator and technician.  The  78  planner had the most comprehensive view of urban and regional issues, and had the ability to predict the future.  Since the mid-1960s many styles of planning have arisen as a re-  action to the faults of RCP.  Transactive Planning is one of them.  Since RCP is still  the most prevalent image of planning, to better understand Transactive Planning, RCP should be reviewed firsL 4.1 Rational Comprehensive Planning Rational-Comprehensive was the planning framework which attempted to apply logical positivism to society. It defined rationality exclusively in terms of Positive Knowledge and instrumental calculation. Such knowledge was claimed to be objective and universal. The deep structures of Sociological Knowledge and embedded impressions of personal experience were rejected. Politicians chose the values; planners provided the processed facts [Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 19-20].  In Rational Comprehensive Planning the planner is a technician, an expert who possesses scientific knowledge which can be used to transform the quality of the life of the public (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983).  The planner takes on the role of the neutral so-  cial scientist who is able to collect and analyze data, and suggest in a value-free manner alternative policies.  Planners are interested mostly in how to make better decisions.  Mak-  ing a decision is not seen to be related to its implementation; decisions were to be made on a purely intellectual level (Friedmann and Hudson 1974).  This view of reality made it  unnecessary for the planner to be involved with the implementation of the plans in a direct manner (Friedmann 1973).  The basis of RCP is rooted in the belief of the  planner's ability to predict the future. The planner's ability to predict the future is based in the concepts of rationality and comprehensive.  In RCP these two concepts are almost synonymous.  Rationality is  seen to be objective and universal, a window on "how things really are" and "how things happen."  Comprehensive alludes to the planner's supposed abilities not only to view an  issue in its entirety, but also to "see it as it really is" better than the other participants in the urban decision process.  A comprehensive picture, which only accepts ends-mean  79  rationality, is supposed to leads us to knowledge about the future. then purposeful intervention is also possible.  If prediction is possible  "The 'ideal type' defender of comprehensive  planning would contend that a serious effort should be made to plan the future evolution of all important economic and social patterns in detail" (Altshuler 1973).  The planner has  a critical role in shaping the future to ensure that the goals of the community are met A main assumption underlying central planning is that a powerful authority is needed to direct and coordinate the movement of the many parts compromising an interlocking system of relations, and that a central plan is necessary for this purpose [Friedmann 1978, 163].  This planning paradigm implies that the allocation of resources should be centralized. This allocation process would be a linear process, such as planning-programing-budgeting, and would neatly organize governmental action. competition because it serves the public interest the public good.  This planning process should not have RCP evolved to include the defining of  While planners were originally supposed to fulfill the goals set by poli-  ticians, the politicians hardly ever formulated system-wide objectives, ranked in order of importance. Since a full description of the public interest in this sense is hardly ever formulated by political decision makers, planners themselves have had to attempt to identify and order the relevant values. This, in turn, has prompted planners to assume a model of society in which a stable consensus on the relevant values is not only attainable but also predictable. They postulate a society in which enlightened citizens acting on complete information, will maximize the welfare of the community of which they form a part In the bird's-eye perspective of central planners, therefore, society appears harmoniously ordered;, conflict and struggle are either absent or subordinated to the superior wisdom of a collective mind (i.e. a central planning agency) [Friedmann 1973, 53-54]. The planner's claim to the ability to measure the public interest depended upon the status of the rationality of economics, that of means-end rationality. The public interest under such a paradigm was conceived as primarily epiphenomenal, a reification of what could be understood as an aggregation of individual goods. At best it was a mass phenomenon. This position was based on the political economists' view of human nature and psychology, within the philosophical tradition influenced by Locke, Bentham and Bentley [Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983].  80 In this paper RCP is also to be understood in light of land-use planning.  The  presupposition of a mechanical reality of causal laws was unable to examine the problems of communication in terms of its context in more than a superficial manner.  For the  most part it was unable to generate a critique of the foundation of land metaphors of the RC.  In addition, when a RCP approach to land did attempt to challenge some isolated  part of prevalent practices of land management and tenure, its practitioners were not able to accept, the validity of opposition view nor to fully comprehend the role of land in American society.  Planners tended more to unintentionally threaten their clients and to  often fail to communicate with their client because they did not accept other versions of reality.  This was because RCP is based on the premises of one true reality, and of Po-  sitive Knowledge being the only valid means of attaining this knowledge. 4.2 Land-Use Planning Land-use planning has been associated with master plans and zoning since the 1920s, and also with centralized regulation since the late 1960s.  The rise of the latter  came from the environmentalists' dissatisfaction with the local regulation of land-use.  Until  the late 1960s, most federal and state policies regarding land are noted for their lack of planning (Wolf 1981; Clawson 1973; Hibbard 1924).  Even the federal action of the 1950s  amounted to either the building of large projects, most notably in public housing and the Interstate Highway System, and the encouragement of local plannning (or rather, the making of local master plans and the adaptation of zoning).  Land-use planning is best understood  in terms of the history of land in the eyes of all levels of government in United States history. Traditionally it is believed that when land-use is determined by the market land will then be used in the "highest and best" manner. reflects this opinion.  The federal government's land policy  In the first hundred years of United States history, the transfer of  federally. owned land into private ownership was government policy (Hibbard 1924; Wolf 1981; Clawson 1973).  The conservation of the remaining federal lands by the federal  81  government in did not start to occur until the 1870s, with the establishment of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 and John Wesley Powell's report on arid lands and the need for conservation in the Mountain West, in 1878 (Alexander 1977; Hibbard 1924; Worster 1979). But a cohesive federal policy towards either federal or non-federal lands has never been created. The 1920s saw the beginning of zoning at the local level of government.  Zoning  originally met much resistence and is still not unanimously accepted by the public, even though zoning grew out of the common law of nuisance, and public restrictions on landuse go back to at least 1826 in New York City.  Historically, zoning has been used to  protect the value of residential land, most often surburban residences (Weaver and Babcock 1979; Perin 1977; Wolf 1981; Nielson 1977; Bjork 1980; Siegan 1976). local regulations affect land values.  Zoning and other  Like the later Clean Air Act of 1970, public regula-  tion of land was acceptable to many land owners after it was shown to them that it would provide protection of property values (Wolf 1981; Popper 1981).  While zoning can  prevent the theoretical maximum return on investment in land, it is also called property, insurance.  Zoning has also created new opportunities for land speculators, especially through  rezoning.  Since zoning has been guided by "practical" influences (e.g. development pressure,  bribes, politics, etc.) and it protects property values for the most part, it has become an accepted institution. Planning, at the local level, was limited to the police powers of the municipality, which limited the ways in which planners could challenge the land-market  But even zon-  ing and other local regulations gain much of their value by manipulating the land-market Through zoning, land use and value can be manipulated. It is for this reason that land planning, which so often depends on a zoning solution, is itself mistrusted and even feared. As a process that increasingly seeks ways to exert public power over all aspects of private land use and community development, land planning is political and has fundamental economic implications [Wolf 1981, 182].  Coinciding with the advent of zoning was the master plan, which in theory zoning ordinances were and are to be based upon.  Without the master plan, zoning becomes  82  vulnerable to charges of being arbitrary government intervention.  The master plan, though  often only advisory in nature and lacking any regulatory power (zoning was to be the mechanism of enforcement), was based upon the planner's use of Positive Knowledge.  It is  supposed to be a policy statement, taking into account present and future highway and road improvements, utility services, and other physical components of town development; it was to be a comprehensive picture of the community and its future development  "The  basic idea [of a master plan] is the creation of a pleasant, livable, desirable community" (Wolf 1981, 147).  While these plans might have been based upon expected future demands  of the land-market, the concept of deciding in advance by the government of how land should be used, while consistent with RCP, went against the American land-use tradition of depending on the market The environmental land-use reform movement of the 1970s is an example of the weaknesses of the RCP paradigm when the planner is advocating an institutional change. The state land-use legislation encouraged by the environmental movement, while not meaning to challenge the land-market system, was advocating centralized regulation of permissible land-uses.  "[T]he common, defining feature of centralized regulatory programs is that they  add regional, state, or federal intervention to land-use decisions that had been entirely local" (Popper 1981, 13).  In accords with RCP, it was assumed that from the state level,  planners would have a more comprehensive view that was necessary for environmental protection than was possible for local governments.  It was also assumed that environmental  protection, as defined by the movement, would be in the public interest  And it was as-  sumed that the effects of state legislation could be predicted to an adequate degree. In practical administrative terms, regulation is a straightforward procedure. A regulated interest seeks permission from a regulatory agency for approval of an action it wants to take. The agency, acting under the guidance of its legislation, can approve, disapprove, or approve conditionally. It must then make sure the regulated interest does as it has been told. The agency also has the responsibility of watching over the continuing actions of the regulated interest to make sure it does not violate the regulatory . legislation. The regulatory agency and the regulated interest can appeal each other's actions to the courts [Popper 1981, 18].  83 Besides the problems involved in implementation, the advocates of this legislation did not realize that their metaphor of land were foreign to those of the average American. In particular, the movement never understood how different, even alien, its own approaches were from those that most Americans, if they thought about the matter, would have preferred. Land-use reformers rarely seemed to grasp the force of the opposed private property sentiment or the depth of the enmity they were arousing until it was too late [Popper 1981, 210]. The most successful reform legislation had two features, the first was a strong citizen participitation in the creation of the legislation.  The second was that much of the  public was trying to protect what they considered to be their rights, and saw concrete benefits from the legislation.  The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act (1972) exemplfies  both of these traits. For many voters, including those how held property elsewhere, the coastal issue often meant not environmental protection or private property rights but continued public access to beaches and other attractive shore areas. These persons were willing to vote for any measure that promised to preserve that access, which they considered their right [Popper 1981, 101]. While the land-use reform movement was not a failure and considering what it was up against can be considered to be successfull much work to be done.  in that sense, by its own standards it left  It becomes obvious that any new reform movement that aimed  at removing land from the influences of the market on a permanent basis would be unpopular.  RCP cannot deal with changes in conceptualizing reality because it accepts one  view of reality as possibly being valid. The environmental movement of the 1970s, while not intending to threaten the land market, was trying to add nonmarket considerations, through the state and federal levels of government, into land-use decisions.  While it was somewhat successful, its success was li-  mited by the fact that The movement has never effectively dealth with the purely material, selfaggrandizing, economic interest in land. The movement wanted land to begin to be treated primarily as a resource that was subject to stringent centralized regulation. The opposition wanted it to continue to be treated primarily as a loosely and locally regulated commodity on which its owners could make a profit—with luck, a killing [Popper 1981, 212].  84  In using a modified RCP paradigm, the movement avoided dealing with the role of land in American society, and land's symbolic significance. In summarizing the RCP paradigm, four features stand out  It rested on a version  of rationality that was believed to be best for establishing the "truth."  This rationality al-  lowed the planner to understand the "real" situation, which included the definition of the public interest.  The ideal planner was a neutral technician who used rationality to make,  optimal decisions (from an "objective" point of view).  The planner's claim to a compre-  hensive view of a situation supported the idea of centralized coordination or control. While the RCP paradigm is no longer dominant, it had an effect on all following styles of planning, including Transactive planning.  4.3 Transactive Planning [I]n accord with custom, planning stands for advance decisionmaking. . . . For this traditional connotation, I shall now substitute the linking of knowledge to action as the essential meaning of planning. In this formulation, planning is concerned with neither knowledge nor with action alone, but with the mediation between them [Friedmann 1978, 166]. In Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning, Friedmann (1973) redefines the role of the planner, within his style of Learning Theory, from one who makes decisions in advance to one who links knowledge and action by helping communities and people solve their own problems.  Instead of doing away with multiple perspectives,  Friedmann shows how different perspectives are necessary and how the planner's perspective can add to that of the clients'.  Friedmann does this by presenting two different types of  knowledge: processed knowledge and personal knowledge* Each has a different method of knowing: the planner works chiefly with processed knowledge abstracted from the world and manipulated according to certain postulates of theory and scientific method; his client works primarily from the personal knowledge he draws directly from experience. Although personal knowledge is much richer in content and in its ability to differentiate among the minutiae of daily life, it is less systematized and orderly than processed knowledge. It is also less capable of being "In this paper, Friedmann's personal knowledge is differentiated from the Personal Knowledge of Weaver, Jessop, and Das (1983) on the basis of capitalization.  85 generalized and, therefore, is applicable only to situations where the environment has not been subject to substantial change. The "rule of thumb" by which practical people orient their actions is useful only so long as the context of action remains the same. Processed knowledge, on the other hand, implies a theory about some aspect of the world. L i mited in scope, it offers a general explanation for the behavior of a small number of variables operating under a specified set of constraints [Friedmann 1973, 172-173].  Friedmann's personal knowledge encompasses not only- Personal Knowledge, but also some Sociological Knowledge, though what is possessed of the latter is seen by the holder to be of a personal nature.  Processed knowledge, being scientific and often statistical in  nature, is Positive Knowledge., but it mostly carries its assumptions from Sociological Knowledge. 1983).  Learning theory is center around Personal Knowledge (Weaver, Jessop, and Das  Because of this classification of knowledge, Transactive Planning can accept different  world-views as being valid and rejects the notion of "one true world-view." Transactive Planning centers on the relationship between the planner and client, and how knowledge is exchanged. Scientific or processed knowledge and personal knowledge would be mixed in a transactive style of planning through mutual learning in a life of dialogue. . . . The future would be created by establishing a learning society, re-educating people to work together on shared tasks [Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 24]. Planning is not just the exchange of knowledge, but also the creation of knowledge. is because knowledge is a process, not an artifact (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 24).  "Substance and process become meshed"  The essence of the relationship between planner and  client is best understood in terms of dialogue and mutual learning.  4.3.1 dialogue and mutual  This  learning  Radical practice is carried out into the world upon the living word of dialogue. In dialogue we engage the other in the fullness of his being-as-a-person and therefore as an equal. All dialogue is open ended and allows for transformation of the self and other in a process of transactive learning. The life of dialogue is thus a medium of transforming action [Friedmann 1979, 39].  86 Dialogue, as presented in chapter two, is a context of communication in which it is recognized that information is not independent of the persons through whom it becomes available.  Each person addresses the other directly, the substance of communication is  about shared interest of mutual concern, and people communicate their world-views to others.  Dialogue is not just a form of communication, but "is a particular form of human  relation.  Not a form of speech but carried on the groundswell of the spoken word, it  might be more properly called a relation in dialogue" (Friedmann 1979, 103-104).  Dialogue  is a relationship which encourages self-transformation by all involved; in order to enter dialogue one must be couragous enough to be vulnerable and open to change (Friedmann 1973, 1979).  "Dialogue is a reciprocal relation.  Open toward the partner in dialogue, it  pretends no artifice; it is itself alone" (Friedmann 1979, 64).  When planner and client  come together in dialogue, mutual learning can result In mutual learning, the Positive Knowledge of the planner becomes linked with the Personal Knowledge of the client.  It is the joining together of these two types of kno-  wledge that is the basis of linking knowledge and action. In mutual learning, planner and client each learn from the other—the planner from the client's personal knowledge, the client from the planner's technical expertise. In this process, the knowledge of both undergoes a major change. A common image of the situation evolves through dialogue; a new understanding of the possibilities for change is discovered. And in accord with this new knowledge, the client will be predisposed to act [Friedmann 1973, 185]. Mutual learning can only occur in the course of dialogue.  People involved in mu-  tual learning must be relating to each other as individuals, and not as social actors, because in dialogue, the other must be treated as an equal.  "Radical practice seeks neither  to dominate nor to exercise coercive power" (Friedmann 1979, 40).  Because the planner  and the client work together as equals, the planner must also be open to change. planner can encourage change only by opening him or herself to change.  The  But it also  takes patience to allow for the other to change at his or her own rate; while change can be encouraged, it cannot be forced from the outside.  87  The same principle applies to mutual learning. Learning cannot be imposed; it obeys the laws by which a structure of thinking, feeling, and valuing is changed. The planner may learn rapidly. But the more he assimilates his client's knowledge, the greater the complexity of which he is aware. To change the reasons why people act the way they do and produce the results they do, one must respect the processes by which they learn. . . . Students do not learn because their teachers want them to. They learn only when they are ready to accept the new perceptions and to make new images their own [Friedmann 1973, 186-188]. In order to encourage the client to change, the planner must have some understanding of the client's structure of thinking, feeling, and valuing. must be consistent and complementary to this structure.  How change is induced  The planner must try to locate  the motivation, that already exists within the client, for change. Similarly, the planner involved in mutual learning will not start by destroying the world view of his client He will withhold his judgements, respecting his client's freedom and autonomy. To begin a restructuring of the client's field of cognition, the planner must discover within that field itself the points that provide an opening. What are the client's interests? What are the inconsistencies in his way of thinking and feeling? What are his secret doubts? What aspects of his knowledge are not supported by the values he affirms? It is through a process of selective focusing at such critical points that the planner can achieve the transformation and expansion of his client's learning [Friedmann 1973, 188].  While the planner cannot find this opening until involved in the dialogue, the work necessary to find this opening starts before the dialogue.  The methodology proposed in the  last chapter might be called "a prelude to mutual learning," because it precedes the dialogical relationship.  Not only does the methodology suggest an initial context for communi-  cation, but it also suggests what the planner should look for in the course of dialogue. It can be considered to be part of the homework that Transactive Planning requires on the part of the planner. 4.3.2 mutual learning, metaphors, and the learning society The invention of a metaphor full of illustrative power is the achievement of genius. It is to create by saying "no" to the old associations, the things that have constantly gone together, the things already sorted, and "yes" to new associations by crossing old sorts to make new ones, but it is also an achievement to "undress" a hidden metaphor that has become part of the traditional way of allowcating the facts, for this too involves  88 breading old association [Turbayne 1970, 57].  An important object of mutual learning is that the client is to learn to become more aware of his or her own interpretive strategies and to become self-critical.  This is  similar to one of the objectives of the education programs for Brazilian and Chilean peasants run by Freire (1973).  Freire wanted the peasants to realize that much of what they  believed to be natural in origin was actually cultural, and that as members of that culture they had the right to participate in and to shape the culture.  To rephrase this in terms  of metaphors, the client is to be aided in recognizing that his or her interpretion of the world is metaphoric, and not literal, in nature.  "There is a difference between using a  metaphor and taking it literally, between using a model and mistaking it for the thing modeled" (Turbayne 1970, 3).  To recognise a metaphor allows one to evaluate it in terms  of various kinds of knowledge, and to change it  In the first step of mutual learning the  planner is not handing over a new schema of metaphors to the client, but is aiding the client to become aware of some of his or her own metaphors. This is important in a learning society.  Friedmann (1973) defined that a learning  society is able to guide its own development. American society needs a heightened capacity for learning about itself and, to make what it learns effective in guiding its own development, a way to transform learning into appropriate actions. This implies that we must find a way to join scientific and technical intelligence with personal knowledge at the critical points for social intervention. I have argued that transactive planning is the most appropriate method for achieving this linkage [Friedmann 1973, 190]. The learning society would have structural conditions for a transactive style of planning to be maximized.  "Transactive planning integrates processes of mutual learning with an or-  ganized capacity and willingness to act" (Friedmann 1973, 195). to learn from its environment.  The society must be able  This does not only mean that it adapts to an environment  that changes in unexpected ways, but that it changes the way it views the environment when its vision no longer fits the environment  89 In order to be flexible, the learning society needs a cellular structure of organization.  This type of organization strongly links the learning individual to social institutions.  "A society organized according to this principle would have as it smallest effective unit the task-oriented working group" (Friedmann 1973, 196).  These working groups may be chara-  cterized by such features as temporary, small scale, interpersonal, voluntary membership, selfguiding, and responsible. complete.  They are centered around a task, and disband when the task is  Working groups. communicate with other groups, which results in networks of  communication.  Members of the groups are to identify themselves with the society and not  the groups and networks that they are part of at any one moment; this encourages the cellular structure to be permeable, for working groups and networks to have open memberships, and to be easily created and disbanded. While present American society is not a learning society, the structure of the learning society can serve as guidelines for the activity of CLT proponents.  Transactive Plan-  ning can occur outside of the learning society. If transactive planning skills are to be learned, therefore, what better way is there than to establish task-related working groups in which transactive planning naturally will take place because it is essential to the groups's performance? In other words, the requisite cognitive and interpersonal skills will be developed in individuals because they are engaged in transactive planning [Friedmann 1973, 240]. Because Transactive Planning does not make use of central coordination, a "cell" can be created at any time by CLT proponents.  "As the complexity of the task increases,  new cells may be created" (Friedmann 1973, 240).  In these cells dialogue occur.  Dialogue  holds the group together. Beyond dialogue lies the cognitive effort itself. Theories formulated in the course of the work will come to be tested in practice, a critical review must follow. Experts may be asked to join in group deliberations and in the formulation of a course of action. But mutual learning is not confined to the dialogue between members and experts. Each member, himself possessing special knowledge, will of necessity impart his learning to others, just as he will learn in turn [Friedmann 1973, 241].  90 Learning must be widely diffused throughout the social body.  "A guided transfor-  mation of society is possible only insofar as it begins with a transformation of man" (Friedmann 1973, 231). ing man.  The learning society is dependent upon the existence of the learn-  Since the CLT proponents do not exist in a learning society, they must,  through dialogue and mutual learning encourage the rise of this learning man. If man is to learn effectively, four of his abilities must be strengthened: the ability to question existing reality, the ability to draw general lessons from concrete experience, the ability to text these lessons in practice, and the ability sincerely to examine the results [Friedmann 1973, 232].  The ability to question reality corresponds to the discovery of hidden metaphors, and the ability to draw general lessons from concrete experience corresponds to the creation of new metaphors.  This occurs during mutual learning.  The testing of these metaphors, and  the evaluation of them occurs during action based on them. The methodology presented is to aid planners to lead clients to question their own metaphors about land.  This strengthens the ability to question existing reality, by the re-  cognition that the conceptualization of land is not inherent in land, but is created by people.  The planner will only be in the position to suggest new land metaphors after the  clients recognize and question their own metaphors.  If new land metaphors are adopted,  they might not be the ones that are suggested by the planner, but ones created in the process of dialogue.  Since the planner would be part of this dialogue, he or she would  be participating in the creation of these new metaphors. is this participation in dialogue.  The core of Transactive Planning  RCP does not allow for the understanding of a situation  where two groups can have conflicting views of reality. 4.4 Redefining the Land-Use Planner's Role Transactive Planning redefines the role of a land-use planner. the land-use planner is not interested in a new set of problems.  This occurs because  The goals of any land-  use planning activity now includes the question of these goals in a very broad manner. is assumed that the planner, by himself or herself, is inadequate to the task of planning  It  91 and must work with the client in questioning the many assumptions that are normally made.  This new role includes a framework which allows for the type of communication  that is required for the establishment of dialogue. For the land-use planner who agrees with the CLT proponent's critique of ownership and control of land in the United States, it is no longer meaningful to describe land as being either public or. private property (ICE 1982). As simple labels, the terms do not fit the complicated property arrangements we have been discussing, and they divert attention from the dynamic nature of these modern arrangements. If the problems facing American individuals and communitites are to be solved, a new understanding of property is needed—an understanding based on a clear view of the ways in which individual and community interest are related [ICE 1982, 16-17]  Yet the planner is limited to using the language of the client.  If the planner in-  troduces new metaphors, they are likely to be misunderstood and rejected.  This is because  the American culture already attaches many strong symbolic images to land which are not easily changed or discarded.  When planners decide that they are going to provide new  land metaphors, the new metaphors are usually rejected by the public.  A planning strategy  based on the RCP paradigm which is meant to produce this sort of change will meet great resistence.  An example of this is the environmental land-use reform movement of  the 1970s. Land exists within a cultural context, and even if it could be done, it is not the land-use planner's place to change and create a new culture in order to dictate land-use policy.  Rather, the planner must find a way to share his or her processed knowledge  with the client  Together they can create new metaphors, if new ones are desired by the  client which would be the result of mixing Positive and Personal Knowledge.  This could  be best achieved under Transactive Planning because it encourages self-transformation through mutual learning.  The land-use planner now wants to enter into a dialogue with the client  so mutual learning can occur.  For the planner to limit his or her activity to the making  of master plans, reviewing zoning ordinances, or demanding centralized regulation is  92  premature, since each of these activities are based upon a certain conceptualization of what are land-use problems and how they should be solved.  While it is expected that the  planner would have notions of what the problems and the solutions are before dialogue, no action is taken until mutual learning occurs, and the action taken can differ from that which the planner previously envisioned. Transactive Planning itself is not neutral, but is supposed to result in solutions that are a continuation of the Transactive Planning process.  "There does, in fact, appear to be  an irreducible ideological component in every historical account of reality" (White 1973, 21). If the land-use planner limits him- or herself to creating a dialogue without realizing the full political implications of dialogue, then the types of answers that Transactive Planning is supposed to come up with will not materialize.  "Despite its discussion of perspectivism,  Learning Theory [e.g. Transactive Planning] as such has avoided serious treatment of ideology and social power relations; viz. the fundamental attributes of Sociological Knowledge" (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 25).  The ideology of Transactive Planning and/or the rea-  son for initiating it will be at the level of its entire approach.  This is particularly rele-  vant in terms of the types of land-use problems the CLT proponents view. While CLTs can be used in many situations, by different groups, the planner who supports them is concerned with creating access to land for those who presently do not have it, namely the poor.  By turning renters into leaseholders, protecting farms from sub-  dividsion pressures, and having communities retain the value that they, as a whole, have invested into the land, they are trying to shift the political control over the land from economic forces of the land market and the owners of land to those who live on the land.  This is better understood when it is known that 75 percent of the privately held  land in America is owned by 5 percent of the private landholders, and that absentee ownership in increasingly common (ICE 1982). The opponents of land-use and land reform 5  "Three percent of the population owns about 55 percent of all American land and 95 percent of the private acreage, most of it in ranches, farms, and forests. This includes ownership by fewer than six hundred companies and corporations of about 11 percent of the nation's land area, and some 23 percent of all private land in America" (Wolf 1981, xiii). J  93 include many who do not have anything to gain through CLTs.  "They are in the main  united; they know exactly what they want: the status quo, which has benefited them for years, or something as close to it as possible' (Popper 1981, 94).  This does not mean  that those who have little to gain from the status quo will support change, no matter how complete their understanding of the problem is. It is this last group that are the potential clients of planners.  It is with them  that Transactive Planning could have its greatest success if it can lead to action that overcomes the social power relationships. buy  land,  6  Not only do CLTs need money to operate, and to  but a hostile local government can make development of CLT land difficult,  though a cooperative one can greatly aid the formation of a CLT. The planner's processed knowledge would have to include sources of information and material support, and how successful and unsuccessful attempts at starting CLTs have dealt with these problems.  7  And the planner has to be aware that in a non-"learning society" the planner's processed knowledge must include Transactive Planning itself and how to initiate a dialogue. The  methodology presented in chapter three is not only a method of generating and  organizing Sociological Knowledge, but also Positive Knowledge.  In order that it is properly  used in the context of Transactive Planning, its Sociological Knowledge base as well of that of Transactive Planning must be understood so its limits can be noted.  Its intended use  is to aid in starting the communication that dialogue, mutual learning, and, ultimately, Transactive Planning, depends upon. 4.5 Methodology and Communication The  purpose of the methodology is to help initiate communication between the  planner and the client  It was designed to be used in Transactive Planning; by itself the  methodology is insufficient for the establishment of dialogue, and it does not cover all of the issues involved in how land is controlled.  Nor is it meant to.  By taking a  The ICE has a revolving loan fund to aid in the setting up of CLTs. The ICE also serves as a clearing house of CLT case studies and technical information for CLTs and people interested in them.  6 7  94  relativistic view of conceptualizations, it does not deal directly with social power relations, though this should be a concern to the land-use planner. It does deal with how land is interpreted within a cultural context, and how that interpretation is part of a person's ideology and conceptualization of an idealized social system.  Any such conceptualization can be seen to be based upon an underlying schema of  metaphors; metaphors which are reinforced by the subject's ideology and affect how land is perceived.  Any change of a person's schema is not the result of social engineering by an  "outsider," but by the person being self-critical, and this self-criticism can be aided by another subject  But if and how self-transformation occurs is dependent upon many factors,  such as social position of the person.  Those who benefit from the present system and/or  find security—be it financial, social, psychological, etc.—in it are unlikely to turn against it. The methodology is to help initiate a dialogue in a way that is non-threaatening to the client by showing that the planner or proponents aie concerned about the same goals and interests.  Processed and personal knowledge can not be joined until the client  believes that the processed knowledge is relevant to the client's life and interests. It is also important that other sources of trust exist between client and planner before the dialogue is initiated.  This trust is not established over the content of the dialo-  gue, but on a more personal basis.  Marie Cirillo, one of the founders of the Community  Land Association CLT in Clairfield, Tennessee only suggested the idea of CLTs after living in the town for over 10 years (ICE 1982).  In dialogue, the person is part of the mes-  sage, and is an integral part of communication.  While the methodology does not cover  this facet of dialogue, it is meant to be helpful in the introduction of the subject itself once other pre-conditions of dialogue are met The analysis done in chapter three shows that on the national level, CLT proponents and the RC do share some concerns about the interests of the individual.  That  while the RC believes that these interests are best served by the private ownership of land and the CLT proponent holds an alternative to this, they are both trying to ensure the security of the individual in terms of land tenure.  They both (in theory) allow for a  95 person not only to feel secure but also to reap what they have sown.  They both see  the family as a legitimate social unit, in which property can be passed on.  And they  both view the individual to be living in a capitalist society. But they differ in how they view community interests.  The RC sees no conflict  between community interest and individual interests, provided the former are allowed to arise from the latter.  While the CLT proponents see interdependence between community  and individual interest, they believe that these interests can come into conflict with each other, so some acceptable balance needs to be defined.  This difference also reflects that  the RC's community is often societal in nature, while the CLT proponent views commumty in geographical terms.  While this analysis can serve as a guide to a planner, the planner  should realize that this analysis was largely meant to be an example of the methodology, and not a substitute for the planner's own analysis of a particular situation. Neither the analysis nor the methodology show that the population represented by the subject is non-homogenious.  Any community in the United States will differ from the  RC prototype which was the basis of this analysis.  Thus, this methodology should be re-  done for every community in which the planner works, to give the planner a better understanding of the immediate local issues, culture, and values.  And even within a small  community, the population is still best considered to be non-homogeneous; even if a common ideology is prevalent, there will be a difference in how social power is held.  The  methodology only becomes a useful planning tool after the planner recognizes its limitations. The methodology can aid the planner to allow for communication to occur in a situation so that each subject understands the language of the other. plished dialogue, and thus mutual learning, is not possible. -  Until this is accom-  And once dialogue is esta-  blished, the planner can try to advance it so that the client realizes that its strategy of interpretation is interpretation, and that other interpretations, even if not desireable, are possible. The methodology does no more than suggest an approach on initiating communication.  The planner must be flexible once dialogue begins to change his or her theories on  96 where the his or her and the client's schema of land metaphors coincide and where they conflict.  Dialogue is to have a life of its own, a life that the planner is to participate  in but not control.  The methodology is best taken as a first or early step on the part  of the planner, but it is a step on a much longer journey that is not only along an unmarked path, but also enters the unexplored wilderness itself. 4.6 Summary: The Spirit of Transactive Planning Unless teaching can be placed on the firm ground of a trusting relationship, mutual learning will be reduced to a mere trickle of disconnected facts from teacher to student and expert to client [Friedmann 1973, 238]. In order to enter into dialogue with the client, a planner must heighten his or her own, and the client's, ability to dialogue.  Dialogue is difficult to initiate and sustain,  especially if the planner and/or the client feel threatened.  The methodology and analysis  presented in chapter three is meant to help a planner to be able to demonstrate that his or her values are not alien to the client In order for planners to succeed in their goal, which involves the solution of certain problems related to land tenure and land-use, they must view dialogue as something more than the mere exchange of information. ing and a form of relationship. Planning this becomes possible.  Dialogue must be elevated to mutual learn-  When dialogue is fitted into the process of Transactive Dialogue is a valid part of planning when it has the po-  tential to result in action. But before the planner can teach anything, they must be able to learn.  Freire  writes about the time when peasants were shown a picture of a drunk man and two sober men.  The purpose of the picture was to lead into a dialogue that would be about  the evils of alcohol.  But when the peasants were asked who the hard working people  were in the picture, they said it was the drunk, because he was obiously a hard working man who drank because he did not earn enough to support his family.  While this  shocked the presenters of the picture, it allowed for a dialogue on the problems of  97 alcoholism in terms of the role alcohol played in peasant society rather than a lecture on the "evils" of alcohol which would not have been effective.  The educators had to learn  from their "students" before thay could impart what they had to say.  In practising Tran-  sactive Planning, the proponent must start learning from and about the client before dialogue even begins. If the land-use planner has a view of land that makes his or her a CLT proponent then Transactive Planning would be an appropriate style of planning.  The planner  will always have some viewpoint and this viewpoint will affect all of his or her actions, including how he or she participates in dialogue or makes suggestions.  Transactive Planning  recognizes this by making the planner a full participant in the planning process while not leaving him or her in control of the process.  98 CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS  A land-use planner who is interested in changing social institutions related to land should not ignore the cultural values that link land and these institutions.  While these in-  stitutions exist for many reason besides the cultural values of a society, these values are important when a planner communicates new knowledge to a client  Transactive Planning is  capable of aknowledging the importance of values in communication, and by linking knowledge and action goes beyond communication to the implementation of policies.  In order  to successfully practice Transactive Planning, it is necessary for planners to be able to communicate their knowledge so as to be able to initiate dialogue. In this paper I have addressed some of the problems related to communicating knowledge when a dialogue is being initiated.  As Friedmann points out, this knowledge  -cannot be understood independently of dialogue when dialogue is a context of communication.  Friedmann's work has concentrated on basing a style of planning on a person-cen-  tered context of communication, but not only must a planner be authentic in wanting to establish a trusting relationship with the client  In this paper I have looked at communi-  cation within the context of dialogue, because a planner needs to be able to understand and to be understood, expecially when initiating dialogue.  This ability is related to the  problems of communicating the subject-matter of a dialogue, in terms of how people understand language.  In Transactive Planning the planner listens to the client; this paper is  meant to raise questions of how the planner should listen. How  the planner listens and speaks to the client is one of the planner's contexts  of communication.  How any listener interprets utterances is shaped by the contexts he or  she listens in, so if the planner and the client are listening to each other in a similar manner, then they will be interpreting the words of each other in a way consistent with the intentions of the other.  If a planner identifies which contexts he or she shares with  the client, then these contexts can lead to the establishment of a common ground for  99 dialogue.  One problem in attempting to initiate a dialogue is how to Find a context that  they share so it can become, initially, the dominant context of the dialogue. If the planner and the client share some of the same values and goals, even if they hold different world-views, the planner's attempt at communication should be initially centered around what he or she believes they do share.  The context of values is very  important to communication and is intimately related to dialogue because dialogue is supposed to be based on the common concerns of the participants.  The values that the  planner and the client share and define in a similar manner can form the initial context of communication,.  These shared values will serve as reference points, a context of com-  munication which will aid in ensuring that the planner and the client understand each other.  They are the common ground that both the planner and the client can base their  dialogue on, and refer to when new knowledge is introduced.  I am not saying that they  will agree with each other about what should be done, what the situation is, or even the validity of the other's statements.  Agreement on how to interpret each other's words allow  for agreement on what they are disagreement about. agreement where they are talking past each other.  This is opposed to a case of disThe planner's objective is to reach this  level of agreement The initial context that is identiFied by the planner is tentative at best  A planner  is limited in both estimating the contexts possessed by the client and in letting any one context dominate how he or she communicates.  Proper listening is not based upon the  scientific establishment of the "proper" context of communication, but upon how the planner makes use of a contex which he or she believes is shared with the client  If the plan-  ner is listening carefully, he or she should note contradictions between both the client's and his or her own utterances, and what the planner expected to hear.  This is because  just as a text can contradict its contexts, an utterance can challenge the manner in which it is listened.  The common context is not something that is agreed upon by the planner  and the client, but evolves during the course of dialogue.  The purpose of the initial con-  text of the planner is to aid the planner in understanding and being understood.  It is  100  based upon the planner's attempts to put him or herself in the client's shoes, and then exploring where they might agree on how they interpret some aspect of the world. Once the common ground of dialogue is established, it will change and grow as dialogue continues.  This is because dialogue is a dynamic process which is not limited to  the initial common ground, but transforms it planner will be succeeded by others.  The initial reference points identified by the  As dialogue continues what the planner and the  client agree that they agree about will change.  They can both change their minds about  established opinions, create new areas of agreement, or decide that they do not agree on issues that they previously agreed on.  Any context that the planner starts with is likely  to be discarded as dialogue by the time dialogue is established. The importance of how the planner and the client listen will remain because they will never share the same exact contexts of communication, and it is likely that they will drift apart from time to time.  This is similar to one point Martin Buber ([1932] 1970)  stresses: an I-You relationship will always degenerate into an I-It relationship. cipants in a dialogue must constantly renew the I-You relationship.  The parti-  When listening, the  participants in a dialogue will have to return, on occasion, to a point which they both agree that they understood each other, and rebuild the dialogue anew. During dialogue, not only does the common ground change, but all other contexts can change.  World-views, Transactive Planning, and even the nature of dialogue itself can  change during dialogue.  Planners should not believe that they possess some meta-theory of  communication or planning that is the "one true reality" and thus not subject to change. Concepts such as textuality and metaphoric reality, while providing the basis for a worldview that accepts other world-views to be valid, are capable of being changed or rejected in the course of dialogue.  Planners have to keep in mind that one purpose for adopting  these concepts is to reveal and deconstruct dogmas, and not to establish new ones. Perhaps what is the difficult aspect of Transactive Planning is the prodding of the client to recognize that his or her interpretation of the world is an interpretation. only when interpretations are recognized can we hope to avoid being unknowingly  It is  101  manipulated by them. for what they are.  The metaphorical view of reality aids in recognizing interpretations While metaphors can be used to deconstruct other world-views, it is  also .capable of being deconstructed because it is an interpretation of reality. useful if knowledge is taken to be part of a process rather than a thing. changes with action and forms the basis of action.  It is still Knowledge  This paper is concerned with the ac-  tion of initiating dialogue, and knowledge that is important to this. A land-use planner who wants to communicate his or her knowledge to a client needs to tentatively identify what concerns he or she shares with the client wledge is understood in terms of old knowledge.  New kno-  When initiating a dialogue, a planner  cannot separate the subject-matter of the communication from the relationship with the client because they each affect the other.  A planner who believes in a metaphorical view  of reality can accept this link between communication and dialogue, and explore how differing world-views can have similarities with each other.  While a metaphorical world-view  does have its limitations, how communication is defined within it can aid planners in developing new strategies of communication that can lead to action.  102 APPENDIX ONE DEFINITIONS  6.1 Social Category Definition Sources  6.1.1 political Political. . . 1. Of, pertaining to, or dealing with the study, structure, or affairs of government, politics, or the state. 2. Having a definite or organized policy or structure of government 3. Characteristic of or resembling politics, political parties, or politicans [AHD]. 8  Political Institution. The social institution, or complex of social norms and roles, that serves to maintain social order, to exercise power to compel conformity to the existing system of authority, and to provide the means for changes in the legal or administrative systems, the political institution includes the traditions and laws by which a society is coordinated and administered and is the major repository of force [MDOS]. 9  Politics. 1. That which has to do with governing. 2. Managing, directing and enforcing the affairs of public policy and decisions or of political parties. 3. That field of study which deals with civil-social problems and develops approaches to their solution [DOP]. 10  6.1.2 economic Economic. . . . 1. Of or pertaining to the production, development, and management of material wealth, as of a country, household, or business enterprise. 2. Of or pertaining to economics. 3. Of or pertaining to the necessities of life; utilitarian [AHD]. Economy. . . 3. The management of the resources of a country, community, or business: the American economy. 4.a. A system for the management and development of resources: an agricultural economy, b. The economic system of a country or area [AHD]. Economic Institution.  The system of social roles and norms organized  AHD = The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (1971) Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 'MDOS = Theodorson, George A. and Theodorson, Achilles G. 1969, A Modern Dictionary of Sociology. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. Angeles, Peter A. 1981. Dictionary of Philosophy, New York: Harper & Row Publishers. 8  10  103  about the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. The function of the economic institution is to provide for the material heeds and demands of the members of a society, ranging from the basic means for survival to goods intended for conspicuous consumption [MDOC].  6.1.3 legal Legal. . . 1. Of, relating to, or concerned with law: legal papers. 2.a. Authorized by or based on law: a legal act. b. Established by law; statutory. 3. In conformity with or permitted by law; statutory. 4. Recognized or enforced by law rather than by equity. 5. In terms of or created by the law: a legal offense [AHD].  6.1.4 social Social. . . La. Living together in communities, b. Characterizing such communal living, c. Of or pertaining to society. 2. Living in an organized group or similar close aggregate: social insects. 3. Involving allies or members of a confederacy [AHD]. Social. Having to do with interrelationships between individuals or groups. A social factor is said to exist when the behavior of even one individual is affected by another person or group, whether that person (or persons) is physically present or not [MDOS]. Social Control. Any social or cultural means by which systematic and relatively consistent restraints are imposed upon individual behavior and by which people are motivated to adhere to traditions and patterns of behavior that are important to the smooth function of a group of society. . . . The term is usually defined so that the end of social control is seen as order and the attainment of social values, and not exploitation, selfish gain, or the benefit of those who have power [MDOS]. Social Process. [MDOS]  Any identifiable, repetitive pattern of social interaction  Social Reality. The reality, or conception of what actually exists, that is established and maintained by the consensus of the group. A stable worldview with regard to existence of phenomena requires the validation of other people [MDOS].  104  6.2 Goal Dictionary Definitions  6.2.1 security Security. . . 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. 3. Anything that gives or assumes safety. . . . 6. Plural. Written evidence of ownership of creditorship; especially, a stock certificate. 7. Measures adopted to guarantee freedom or security of action, communication, or the like, as in wartime [AHD].  6.2.2 individual equity  Individual. . . La. Of or pertaining to a single human being, b. By or for one person: and individual portion. 2. Existing as a distinct entity; single; separate [AHD]. Equity. . . La. The state, fair. 2. Something that is of a business or property ein. 4. Law. . . . c. An  ideal, or quality of being just, impartial, and just, impartial, and fair. 3. The residual value beyond any mortgage thereon and liability therequitable right or claim [AHD].  6.2.3 individual legacy Legacy. . . 1. Money or property bequeathed to someone by a will. 2. Something handed down from an ancestor or predecessor, or from the past [AHD].  6.2.4 community access Community. . . La. A group of people living in the same locality and under the same government, b. The district or locality in which they live. 2. A social group or class having common interest . . . 4. Society as a whole; the public. . . . 6. Common possession or participation [AHD]. Community. 1. A concentrated settlement of people in a limited territorial area, within which they satisfy many of their daily needs through a system of interpendent relationships. A community is a self-conscious social unit and a focus of group identification [MDOS]. Access. . . .  1. A means of approaching or nearing; passage. 2. The act  105 of approaching. 3. The right to enter or make use of. 4. The state or quality of being easy to approach or enter [AHD]. A community has a legitimate interest in maintaining access to its land for all of its members [ICE 1982, 7].  6.2.5 community equity  A community has a legitimate interest in retaining and utilizing for the common good whatever value it has created or nurtured [ICE 1982, 7]  6.2.6 community legacy A community has a legitimate interest in preserving its environment and guiding its own development in a way that will provide for the legitimate interest of future generations [ICE 1982, 8].  APPENDIX TWO SAMPLE  WORKSHEETS  GOAL  GOAL  GOAL  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  sx = social category x Chart 11 -  The Goal Worksheet GOAL  Subject  Object Total Agreement  feature(sx)  feature(sx) feature(sx) Partial Agreement  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx) No Agreement feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx) Conflict  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  feature(sx)  sx = social category x Chart, 12 -  Isomorphism Worksheet  Social  Social category  Social CalrcorT  Social Category  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature feature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature fcntitrc feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature feature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature (gx) feature ,(gx) feature (gx) feature (gx)  feature feature feature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature feature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature feature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature feature feature  feature feature feature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature rcature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature feature feature  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  feature feature feature feature  gx  goal  (gx) (gx) (gx) (gx)  x (e.g.  security)  Chart 13 -  The Matrix  Worksheet  108 BIBLIOGRAPHY  Alexander, Thomas G. 1977. 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