

TEXT, CONTEXT, COMMUNICATION, AND METAPHORS:
INITIATING DIALOGUE IN TRANSACTIVE PLANNING

by

PAUL J CHERNOFF

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Department of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
1956 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Y3

Date June 13, 1984

Abstract

Transactive Planning is based upon the establishment of a dialogue between the planner and the client. The present study explores how the planner can attempt to initiate a dialogue with a client, in terms of subject-matter-related communication. The establishment of dialogue is partially dependent upon the planner's ability to make his or her knowledge relevant to the client. The planner can do this only if he or she can communicate effectively. Effective communication occurs when the intentions behind the words are conveyed with the words. This is dependent upon all of the people involved in the act of dialogic communication actively sharing some values.

As an example of how a dialogue could be initiated, this study examines the case of a planner who sympathizes with the idea of Community Land Trusts, and who attempts to initiate a dialogue with a client who holds a traditional view of land. The subject-matter of the proposed dialogue is land tenure and land-use reform. The issues of land tenure and land-use reform are intimately related to how land is conceptualized and the system of values attached to these conceptualizations. The planner and the client need a common reference point, composed of shared values, to which both can refer when either of them introduces new knowledge. The planner must demonstrate to the client that both their value-systems share similarities. These shared similarities will be a common reference point for the dialogue. If this is not done, the client may interpret the knowledge that the planner communicates in a manner which is contrary to the planner's intentions.

A methodology is developed and applied to compare the concepts that a member of the dominant culture of the United States of America uses to describe land to those used by a planner who advocates Community Land Trusts. The concepts are interpreted so as to reveal the values which each person associates with them. The values revealed are then reorganized according to how the values define the goals of land tenure. A comparison is made between how each person defines each goal because these definitions reflect their value-systems. If the planner initially emphasizes the goals which both he and the client

define in a similar manner, then there is a greater probability that a dialogue can be established.

Six goals were selected by the methodology: security, individual equity, individual legacy, community access, community equity, and community legacy. The analysis shows that the planner and the client agree the most on how to define security. This reflects that the planner and the client perceive some of the rights of individual land-users in a similar manner. If the planner starts a dialogue from this point of agreement, then the areas of disagreement could be later introduced in terms of what is already agreed upon. In many other situations it is important for planners to identify the goals which they and their clients define in a similar manner so these goals can serve as a reference point. This reference point is the common ground upon which both the planner and the client can base their dialogue.

The common ground of dialogue is made up of the similarities that exist between different world-views. A dialogue is not limited to, but builds upon, the similarities between the world-views held by the planner and the client. A metaphoric view of reality can provide the basis for establishing the similarities between world-views. A metaphoric view enables us to connect values to both each other and to concepts in a systemic manner. Since the world is known in terms of concepts, the values that are associated with these concepts can be compared to the values that are associated with different concepts. A dialogue can be based upon similarities which are discovered between value-systems.

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We say that, in order to communicate, people must agree with one another about the meanings of words. But the criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g., ostensive definitions--but also an agreement in judgements. It is essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgements.

--Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

CHAPTER ONE

REALITY IS A METAPHOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAND AND LANGUAGE

The purpose of this thesis is to aid the land-use planner to improve communication with a client over issues involving alternative forms of land tenure. Effective communication is dependent upon both participants having a common interest in the subject-matter of communication. Since the subject-matter in this case is land, this means that both the planner and the client must base their communication on the similar ways in which they value land, before moving into areas of disagreement. Communication is dependent upon all participants interpreting what is being said in a similar manner (Fish 1980). Similar interpretations can be ensured if planners can identify in what ways they and their clients interpret, and thus conceive of, land in a similar manner.

I am proposing that in order to understand how people conceive of land, and what values are associated with their conceptions, that these conceptualizations are to be understood as metaphors. A metaphorical theory of reality assumes that value and meaning are not inherent in objects, but are created by people (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Metaphors are embedded in a value-system. If conceptualizations are considered metaphoric, then the comparison of conceptualizations can be based on the comparison of metaphors. It is these metaphors that will enable the planner to improve communication with the client.

A case study approach is adapted to focus the issues associated with communication and dialogue. A case study will also serve as an example of how planners could apply the theory presented in this paper. For my case study, I am comparing what land symbolizes to the dominant culture of the United States of America and to the proponents of Community Land Trusts (CLT); Community Land Trusts are one among many forms of land-use reform which a planner can advocate. In order for CLTs to be established, their proponents must not only know what land means to most Americans, but also they must understand how the different concepts of land are related to non-land values. Many people interested in land-use reform have met with limited success partially because of the

fact that their conceptions of land were alien to the average American.

During the 1970s, planners who were part of the environmental movement saw land changing from *land is a commodity* to *land is a common (or public) good*. This latter concept went against American traditions. Many planners did not realize this. The environmental movement expected all rational people who did not have a large financial stake in the exploitation of land to support the movement. Little or no concern for the interests of those who were to be most affected by some proposed legislation was shown by the movement (Popper 1981). These items are related by the fact that the cultural values associated with land were never dealt with.

Land is an integral part of any culture. Land is the basis of human life; we live on it and we live off of it. It is a source of power and wealth, both for a society as a whole and for individuals within the society (Wolf 1981). In all cultures, land has symbolic meaning that goes beyond the earth composing it. This meaning affects what and who decides how land is to be used. How land is controlled in a society reflects and contributes to the culture and social structure. Any conceptualization of land has important symbolic and pragmatic aspects that can never be fully disentangled from one another.

1.1 Land and Culture

As Peter Nabokov tells us in his book, *Indian Running*, when you track down a seemingly isolated or minimal feature of Indian life, such as running, the whole system opens before your eyes; and this is true because of the interrelatedness of all the components of a genuine tradition [Brown 1982, 8].

In attempting to understand how a culture conceives of land, we also learn about the culture. Land, or any other concept, cannot be separated from its cultural context. Just as running opens Indian life to your eyes, an examination of land opens a way of life to the examiner. All cultures value land in a manner which is complementary to the culture. Land is imbued with symbolic values which connects it to the rest of the culture.

How land is conceived of varies from culture to culture. Not only the meaning of the word land, but the very boundaries of what the word can mean, varies. To the dominant culture of the United States, land is property--an object to be conquered, tamed, and controlled. Aldo Leopold ([1949] 1970) claimed that the land-human relationship based upon defining land as property allows for the extraction and consumption of land-based resources for economic gains. This relationship does not include any responsibility towards the land. In contrast, the Plains Indians of the 18th and 19th centuries revered the land and did not attempt to manipulate it for human purposes (Worster 1979). Other cultures have devised other conceptualizations of land. How any culture conceptualizes land is reflected in other aspects of the culture.

Conceptualizations of land are evident at the base of a culture's social institutions. Land tenure, one such institution, is always based upon some concept of land. American Indian and European concepts of land were so different from each other that the European settlers and their descendants did not recognize American Indian land tenure to be land tenure (Wolf 1981). This is not to say that the seizure of land in the New World from Indians by European settlers was not motivated by other causes, for example, racism, greed, and imperialism, but European concepts of land, at the very least, lent legitimacy to the taking of Indian land.

Any method of land management is based not only on economic interests, the distribution of power, historical forces, and what are commonly known as pragmatic considerations, but also on the conceptions of land that are accepted by the culture. All of these factors are related to and support each other. While most planners are not involved in cross-cultural situations, any change a planner proposes on how land is controlled is based on a conceptualization of land that probably differs from the socially accepted concepts of land. Resistance to change will not only come from people protecting their economic interests, but also from how people will symbolically view the changes in the control of land.

In order for planners to come to terms with this resistance, they need a theory of reality which allows for conflicts between how land is conceptualized. This theory must also allow for these different conceptualizations to be equally valid. These conceptualizations should be accepted as being nonarbitrary and rational if a dialogue on land is desired. A metaphoric theory of reality fulfills these requirements.

1.2 Metaphor

"The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 5). A metaphor aids us in forming a coherent picture--a structured gestalt--of some aspect of reality. Metaphors reveal certain aspects of concepts in a structured and systemic manner. They do this by both highlighting and hiding certain aspects of concepts, and reality in general. They have an important role in setting our mental agenda because of the way in which we use them to structure reality.

Any theory of metaphors is based upon a theory of language. Before considering a metaphoric interpretation of concepts, the literal school of language and metaphor will be examined. During this examination it will become evident that all metaphors have structure. These structures are composed, at least partially, by values. After metaphors are linked to values they can be related to the conceptualization of land.

1.2.1 language

Metaphors have often been seen as aberrations by many schools of language theory. While this view has changed in the past ten years, it still characterizes the popular conception of metaphors which is dominant in the social sciences which have a Positivist or neo-Positivist legacy. This view of language considers words to be defined only by their inherent properties. A dictionary definition of words is considered to be made up of the words' inherent properties. A word is considered to be neutral in meaning. This is the literal school of language.

The followers of the literal approach to language tend to support what Max Black (1962) calls the substitution view of metaphors. According to this view, metaphors can be understood only within the framework of the literal language. Metaphors are merely substituted for some equivalent literal expression, and are merely a way of saying one thing while meaning another. In some cases, the metaphor is used as a substitute for some yet-to-be-invented word or expression. Or it might just be an old word picking up a new meaning. The followers of this theory tell us that it is sometimes used to divert the attention of the reader away from the subject so as to add to the reader's pleasure. In other words, metaphor is no more than decoration, and does not belong in serious writing. However, the substitution view does not explain all uses of metaphor.

A similar but more complex theory is the comparison view (Black 1962). This theory goes beyond the substitution view because it allows for irony, hyperbole, and for metaphors to alter the literal meaning of words. While reading a metaphoric text, the reader still restructures the text to its literal meaning. The chief characteristic of metaphor becomes that of analogy or similarity. Metaphors are like similes, except the former imply comparison while the latter state comparison by using the word "as" or "like". The metaphor "Charles is a pig" means "Charles is like a pig (in eating in a gross manner.)" But is this metaphor really about how Charles eats, or his habits of personal hygiene? By insisting that all metaphors have a literal and inherent meaning, reading leads to uncertainty, as when a reader has to decide in what respect Charles is like a pig. The comparison view of metaphor cannot satisfactorily deal with ambiguity.

In contrast to literal theories of metaphor, Black's (1962) definition of "interactive metaphor" accepts that words can have meaning beyond some single object. Black finds that metaphors do not have precise literal meanings. This allows for metaphors to stand for a system of ideas, which, though not sharply delineated, are sufficiently well-defined to have meaning. They function by making us think of one object by comparing it to another.

Metaphors are made up of a primary and a secondary subject. The primary subject is being described by the secondary subject. The result is that, within a metaphor, certain aspects of the primary subject are emphasized with others are suppressed according to how a person thinks of the secondary subject. A metaphor is a filter screening out all but the commonly associated attributes of the secondary subject. To use Black's example of how metaphors function, to call a man a wolf is to call to mind the wolf-like attributes of a man, and to suppress the nonwolf-like attributes. This example does not display a simple situation because the metaphor is dependent upon how the reader interprets the word wolf.

The interpretation of the secondary subject, and thus a metaphor, is dependent upon the context in which the metaphor appears. This includes, in addition to the context consisting of the text the metaphor is inside, the metaphor's cultural context. Which wolf-like attributes are noticed will be dependent upon both the cultural and the individual contexts in which they are used. The use of special metaphors by Apaches, called "wise words," are an example of the importance of cultural context.

An Apache would chastise girls who did not help with the chores by saying that "butterflies are girls." Despite the word order, "girls" is the primary subject and "butterflies" is the secondary subject. This phrase is translated into English as "butterflies are girls" so to reflect that this special usage of metaphor. To call girls "butterflies" in English might mean that they are pretty, like butterflies. But an Apache would not be referring to the physical beauty of the girls, but would be calling attention to the fact that the girls were, like butterflies, mindlessly fluttering about (Basso 1976). A metaphor is like a mask in Bali, it can only be understood in some context.

Masks are dense with meaning. Their fixed expressions are charged with significance that does not lend itself to simple analysis. It is impossible to understand a mask without examining the person who wears it, and the tree from which it was carved. In isolation a mask is a lifeless museum-piece or a decorative wall-hanging. But in the context of performance, the mask becomes the center of a complex of intersecting forces [Jenkins 1981, 17].

Black concludes that it is valid to use metaphors in writing philosophy if they add to the argument and if the contexts in which they appear are not too ambiguous. Black considers metaphors to be an important *adjunct* to literal language and thus he does not question the literal school of language theory very seriously.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Ludwig Wittgenstein ([1953] 1978) examines the nature of language and in so doing questions the literal approach to it. He wonders what the individual words of a language signify: he wonders if words are merely the names for objects, or if they imply something in addition. Words have more than one meaning, or interpretation, and we can attempt to narrow the meaning of any one word by defining it. A definition consists of more words, which in turn can be misunderstood. Wittgenstein finds a lack of conciseness in all language. He wonders how it is possible to communicate anything with words.

"One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?" (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1978, 15). One must be familiar with how to do something with it. Names are not understood in terms of some strange object, but in terms of what we already know. In order to know what a king is in chess, one must first know what chess is, what a game is, what a piece is, etc. The king in chess is more than the name of a piece of wood or metal or plastic, it is a concept that has a particular meaning within the context of the game of chess. By itself, the word king can have many meanings, but its meaning in any one case is dependent upon the context within which it is used. In order to understand the use of the word king, one must have knowledge of the context that it is used in. If the reader does not know what chess is, he or she will not know what the writer means by king.

A word has more than one meaning, but how can this be? "Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are *related* to one another in many different ways" (Wittgenstein [1953] 1978, 31). The

different meanings of a word are related to each other. How they are is not clear. What exists is a web of relationships that are accepted. We understand this web as a gestalt, rather than through the "true literal meaning" of words. When examining why we consider card games, sports games, and board games all to be games despite a great number of differences among them, Wittgenstein denies that a single linear thread links all of them together. Rather, the meanings of the word "game", or any other word, are linked through a complicated network of overlapping and criss-crossing similarities. Game is not just the name of an object; it is a concept that covers the entire family of games. Any member of this family can also be a member of other families at the same time. This family is also not static; its meanings change every time it is used, not only due to the context of its use, but also according to what the reader thinks what a game is and is not. Game is a concept with fuzzy boundaries that are constantly shifting. Its meaning is not only dependent upon certain inherent properties, but also upon how it relates to a number of other factors and how we understand these concepts.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's (1980) view of language coincides with that of Wittgenstein. These authors are not looking for precision in language but rather for an explanation of how people understand the world and each other. They use metaphors to obtain a better understanding of language and the conceptualization of experience. Metaphors are not subsidiary to language, but are an integral part of language. The theory of literal language is rejected because all language is metaphorical. Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that language is a web. We define words mainly by how they are related to other words. We understand concepts partly in terms of other concepts. Metaphors are no longer rare, but are pervasive in everyday life, because they are the basis of language and of understanding human experience.

It would be wrong to leave our understanding of language at the level of everything is understood in terms of everything else. If taken to *reductio ad absurdum*, we could decide that all language is meaningless. For example, if we understand words in terms of other words, and these defining words in terms of others, . . . we conclude that

language is meaningless rather than it is a rich web of interactions. This would contradict the fact that we do attribute meaning to words, sentences and stories and that people often do agree on meaning. If language is taken as a purely subjective experience, then there is no room for either a shared reality or communication. Wittgenstein points out that despite the ambiguities of language, communication does occur. What is needed to explain how communication is possible is a theory of knowledge that links personal experiences with social reality and scientific knowledge.

1.2.2 knowledge

The New Rationality presented by Clyde Weaver, Joanne Jessop, and Veechibala Das "requires that social science be informed by different realms of experience and knowing, all essential to an appreciation of human affairs" (1983, 2). They divide these dimensions of knowledge into three categories: *Personal Knowledge*, *Sociological Knowledge*, and *Positive Knowledge*. These categories do not represent the only way to divide up the dimensions of knowledge, nor do they necessarily cover all of the dimensions of knowledge. Rather, they cover the dimensions of knowledge that have been predominant throughout the history of planning. Each category, or realm, is partially autonomous because each has its own distinct epistemology, method, and rationality.

Personal Knowledge is comprised of personal experience and our subjective internal worlds. It is in this realm that Sheldon B. Kopp's (1971) three ways of knowing--rational knowing (thinking), empirical knowing (information gained by our senses), and metaphorical knowing (the intuitive grasping of situations)--meet. Knowledge and action are linked in this realm because it is experimental and experiential in nature. It is not a realm of objective facts, though it does include the effect an objective fact has on us; it is a realm of values (Laing 1982). It contains the meaning individuals find/create in the world. This type of knowledge is ahistorical and does not explain why or how different people can attach meanings to symbols in a similar manner.

Sociological Knowledge is the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman 1966; Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983). It is in this realm that historical conditions come into being. Sociological Knowledge is not concerned so much with how individuals view the world, as with how historical, social, and institutional forces shape or contribute to the values of groups. Knowledge and values become structured into different groupings or ideologies. These groupings are often treated as objects in their own right.

Positive Knowledge is made up of that which is believed to be universal and causal laws. "It is objective, universal knowledge (i.e. repeatable), whose function is object appraisal, prediction and control. This is the popularly accepted 'scientific method'" (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 5). It is limited to the observable. It is reductionist, which means that it attempts to reduce and understand everything by breaking it down into parts (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). People who deal exclusively with Positive Knowledge tend to believe that it is universal and not conditional. "[T]here is a tendency to forget that all science is bound up with human culture in general, and that scientific findings, even those which at the moment appear the most advanced and esoteric and difficult to grasp, are meaningless outside their cultural context" (Schrodinger 1952, 109-110).

These three realms of knowledge are neither separate nor independent of each other. There is no border marking where one realm stops and another starts. Personal Knowledge comes from the direct experience of individuals, but experience is shaped by the other realms e.g. language, which is largely part of Sociological Knowledge. Sociological Knowledge originated from the collective phenomena of many individuals' Personal Knowledge, though this realm is autonomous. Positive Knowledge can challenge a world view reflecting conceptually organized social experience. The contents of Positive Knowledge exist within the contexts of Personal and Sociological Knowledge: Positive Knowledge is based in the biases of a culture and its scientists. While each of the three realms of knowledge have some autonomy, they are all bound up in each other.

Metaphors reflect all three realms of knowledge. New metaphors are created in the realm of Personal Knowledge, since this realm is the source of innovation: "the

spontaneous, creative products of the mind" (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 3). When metaphors become socially accepted, they become part of the world view of a society. These acceptable metaphors reflect back into the realm of Personal Knowledge, since they are used to interpret experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Turbayne 1970). When socially accepted metaphors are taken literally they become assumptions of Positive Knowledge. However, it is in this realm of knowledge that metaphors can be "exploded." And when old metaphors are discarded in Positive Knowledge, new ones are created in Personal Knowledge.

Metaphors are linked with the realms of knowledge because the human conceptual system is largely metaphorical in nature. Metaphors are not limited to language, but are pervasive in thought and action (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Wittgenstein showed us that words such as game are not merely naming objects, but are concepts held together by a network of similarities. These networks are not arbitrary in nature, but are the result of interaction of these three realms of knowledge, and can be said to have a structure. The word "metaphor" is now best understood as "metaphorical concept" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 6).

1.2.3 structure

Although how metaphors are understood is dependent upon their contexts, as long as we assume that the context of a metaphor is stable, we can say that a metaphor is made up of a structure. This structure exists mostly in the realm of Sociological Knowledge and explains how a group of people can independently interpret a metaphor in a similar manner. But it is dependent upon Personal Knowledge, since it is individuals who create, maintain, and are directly influenced by metaphorical concepts.

Lakoff and Johnson relied upon Eleanor Rosche's work in developing the metaphorical concept. Rosche's (1977) work in cross-cultural and experimental psychology has led her to a theory of how humans categorize and conceptualize reality. Her work helps explain not only why the structure of metaphors are not arbitrary, but also why some

metaphors are more tightly defined than others.

Rosch rejects the digital, Aristotelian notion of categorization, which has room only for well bounded (i.e. well defined) concepts and lacks a rational basis for the internal structure of categories. Here categories consist of a static list of otherwise unrelated attributes. An object is either a member of a category, or it is not; there are no degrees of belonging. Rosch finds the process of categorization to be dynamic and analogic, rather than digital, in nature because the former allows for degrees of belonging.

The foundation of her theory is the *prototype*. Categories are formed around prototypes (i.e. best examples). The prototype is a mental schema that does not lend itself to a feature description. Rosch has discovered that the ranking within a category is not so much based on physical features as on features of a more abstract nature. A member of a category is ranked according to how closely it resembles the prototype. A robin is a bird *par excellence* because it is the image conjured up by most Americans when they hear the word bird. This image is the prototypical bird. A penguin is only a *technical* bird because it differs greatly from the prototypical bird while having some of its features. This type of ranking shows up in English in the form of "hedges", which includes terms such as "almost" and "virtually" (Lakoff 1975; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Once a prototype is created a category is formed around it.

Membership in a category is based upon a perceived similarity to a prototype which forms the core of the category. When we think of a category, we think of its prototype. Many objects can be considered to be members of a variety of categories because they resemble more than one prototype, but in most cases they are associated with only one category. Objects are understood in terms of the categories to which they are assigned even if the observed properties of an object differ somewhat from those of the prototype. Prototypes affect how we see reality: they guide us to view the features of reality that are part of some prototype we possess.

A prototype is made up of an interaction of its features or properties (Rosche 1977). "We experience them [prototypes] as a *gestalt*; that is, the complex of properties

occurring together is more basic to our experience than their occurrence" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 71). Since we can list only the features of which we are conscious, we can best describe a prototype by comparing it to an example *par excellence*. A direct analysis of a prototype's structure is not possible. For any prototype, we are more aware of individual features than the interaction of features. At the same time the features of a prototype are not totally distinct from one another, but are partially defined by each other. Features blend into each other, and many exist at an unconscious level. These confusing situations exist because a prototype is an emergent structure. The notion of prototype as emergent structure links concept and category.

An emergent structure has features but are characteristic of the whole which are not explainable from its components, because the features are the result of the interrelation of two or more components, which in turn might be features (Watzlawick, *et al.* 1967). The etymology of the word "emerge" supplies an example of an emergent structure: the Middle Dutch ancestor of "emerge" is *masche*, *maische* which means "knitted fabric." Fabric appears only after fibers interact with each other in an organized and systemic manner.

Conceptualization results in the creation of prototypes, and categorization is the comparison of objects to prototypes. Prototypes can change and disappear over time because new knowledge can challenge them. Most prototypes are stable because, once they are created and accepted, they shape how we sense the world. The prototypes that belong to a person or a culture are structured in such a manner that they tend to reinforce one another. Prototypes, and thus concepts and categories, are never arbitrary, but are related to experience and existing knowledge.

There is a very high degree of agreement among different cultures about certain concrete types of categories. This is because (a) real-world attributes do not occur independently of each other; and (b) "categories are determined because the world appears to be so structured that in taxonomies of concrete objects, there is generally one level of abstraction at which the most basic category cuts can be made" (Rosch 1977, 28-29). This is known as the basic level. At this level categories correlate very strongly to sensory

experience.¹

Concepts and categories, as they move away from physical objects and become more abstract and distant from sensory experience, can differ more from culture to culture and from person to person. People create prototypes as they interact with their environment. North American whites tend to view abstract concepts as physical objects. An example of this is the personification of inflation: "inflation is the enemy." This personification and reification affects our actions.

Lakoff and Johnson find that some concepts are more tightly defined than others. The most tightly defined concepts can be considered to fill the basic level, and less well-defined concepts exist at the various higher and more abstract levels. The concepts that are considered to fill the basic level are called basic concepts. According to the literal school of language, these basic concepts are called "primitives," and are unanalyzable. An alternative view can be based on Rosch's notion of prototype. Basic concepts consist of prototypes that are elaborated metaphorically (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The prototype is the core of a concept. Primitives are now defined in terms of a prototype that is characterized by a recurrent complex of features (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). A prototype is an infinitely analyzable gestalt of co-occurring features. We analyze basic concepts in terms of these features, which are capable of a wide range of variation. These features are only understood when combined in a gestalt to form a prototype.

Basic concepts are those concepts in which the prototype is more evident than is its metaphorical elaboration. More abstract concepts, which are named metaphorical concepts, become possible through metaphorical elaboration which allows for the extension of the prototype. No concept is either purely metaphorical or purely prototypical, but is always a

¹Rosch states "The basic level of classification, the primary level at which cuts are made in the environment, appears to result from the combination of those two principles [(a) and (b) in the text]; it is the most general and inclusive level at which categories can delineate real-world correlational structures" (1977, 29). I have replaced "real-world correlational structures" with "sensory experience," otherwise it can be taken that this primary level is "more real" than any other, rather than Lakoff and Johnson's point that at this level, concepts are merely more tightly defined. This "primary level" is affected by other levels. Rosch's major point is not that the products of cognition are the same, but that certain processes of cognition are universal, which allows for cultural differences in categorization.

blending of the two. This often leads to confusion between levels of abstraction. Confusion among various levels of metaphors--higher level metaphors being those which are more abstract and less well-bounded--is common. Any analysis of metaphors should distinguish between (a) the metaphors that we employ in structuring the experience and (b) the experience itself, as we structure it (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 82). An analysis should also be able to explore how metaphors are related to experience. Since experience and Personal Knowledge contain meaning and value, the objective of any analysis is dependent upon the establishment of a relationship between metaphors and values. Socially acceptable metaphors aid in institutionalizing the values of a culture. The values associated with a metaphor are to be found among the features of the metaphor's prototype.

1.2.4 values

The exploration of the relationships between metaphors and values reveals not only how they relate to one another, but how they relate to other levels of reality. After understanding how a value-system functions, it becomes possible to compare one to another; not just to examine differences, but also to find similarities between them.

Metaphors are not neutral, but are comprised of, and associated with, values. The metaphors found acceptable to a society--those which are part of Sociological Knowledge--contain that society's values when viewed by a member of that society. Metaphors are structured so as to show how these values reinforce each other, and to lay shadows over any contradictions between different values. It is through these values that metaphors begin to take on their practical aspects, as well as shaping and being shaped by institutions. This does not mean that these values cannot contradict each other, but rather, that a person's attention is drawn away from the contradictions.

1.2.4.1 Values and needs. Much of applied social science has been concerned with finding and meeting the needs of people. The idea of "human needs" suggest that universal needs exist, and that a list of such needs can be created. Attempts at building such a list have grown to become very complicated. Such lists start with basic physical

needs, and later add on all sorts of psychological needs to explain why people sometimes willingly sacrifice physical needs (Lee 1959). It has been found that any list of needs ends up being culture specific; different cultures do not agree upon what people need. More complex theories try to state that certain needs go with different cultures and levels of technological development. This search for basic human needs results in lists, rather than a systemic and analytical way of describing needs.

The anthropologist Dorothy Lee challenged the premise "that culture is group of patterned means for the satisfaction of a list of human needs" (1959, 70). In viewing culture only as a means of satisfying needs, it is not only assumed that a list of basic human needs exists, but that the fulfillment of needs are the basis of human motivation. While certain physical needs do exist, Lee suggests that most needs arise out of values, rather than the reverse. Even physical needs can be seen to arise out of the interaction of a value for self-preservation and personal experience.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the father of General Systems Theory, agrees with Lee that motivation springs out of values rather than needs.

We may also say that man has values which are more than biological and transcend the sphere of the physical world. These cultural values may be biologically irrelevant or even deleterious: it is hard to see that music, say, has any adaptive or survival value; the values of nation and state become biologically nefarious when they lead to war and to the killing of innumerable human beings [von Bertalanffy 1968, 197].

The premise of seeing human motivation as being based on values, rather than needs, is to allow for viewing human beings as active, rather than passive, entities.

Reflex theory has presupposed that the primary element of behavior is response to external stimuli. In contrast, recent research shows that with increasing clarity that autonomous activity of the nervous system, resting in the system itself, is to be considered primary [von Bertalanffy 1968, 208].

By this, von Bertalanffy means that humans do not just *react* to external stimulation and physical needs, but that they can act spontaneously, and that most motivation lies in value systems. James Ogilvy (1977) substantiates this by distinguishing between action and behavior.

Needs motivate *behavior*, but if *action* differs from behavior precisely by virtue of the distinction between mechanical necessity and voluntary choice then needs are hardly sufficient as conditions for care and intention. Care is *noncompulsive preference* [Ogilvy 1977, 65].

Neither Lee, von Bertalanffy, nor Ogilvy are denying that passive behavior can or does exist, but they do deny that reaction to stimuli explains motivation. Motivation stems from the values of the individual, though these values are often derived from a culture.

How values are important to humans cannot be understood unless they can be related to human perception. "Except for the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, man lives in a world not of things but of symbols" (von Bertalanffy 1956, 37). Value-systems emerge from the symbolic universe that we live in (von Bertalanffy 1968) and it is essential to understand this connection in order to understand how values motivate us.

1.2.4.2 Values and the symbolic universe.

We may also say that the various symbolic universes, material and non-material, which distinguish human cultures from animal societies, are part, and easily the most important part, of man's behavior system. It can be justly questioned whether man is a rational animal; but he certainly is a symbol-creating and symbol-dominated being throughout [von Bertalanffy 1968, 215-216].

The symbolic universe is not arbitrary, it is emergent from the mental universe, which in turn is emergent from the physical one (Davidson 1983). In turn, values are emergent from the symbolic universe. But what are the criteria for human symbols? Mark Davidson (1983), von Bertalanffy's biographer, says that von Bertalanffy's criteria for human symbols are: (1) they must be representative rather than merely expressive; (2) they are chosen without any biological connection to the thing that they represent; and (3) they are transmitted by tradition or education rather than by instinct. Human symbols are free of biological constraints, even though they can be traced to the physical world. Humans can be more articulate than animals. "Even if human symbols are somehow rooted in instinct, [von] Bertalanffy noted, they are unique to humans because we can make them and change them" (Davidson 1983, 139).

Man . . . is surrounded by a universe of *symbols*. Starting from language which is the prerequisite of culture, to symbolic relationships with his fellows, social status, laws, science, art, morals, religion and innumerable other things, human behavior, except for the basic aspects of the biological needs of hunger and sex, is governed by symbolic entities [von Bertalanffy 1968, 197].

We do not create our symbolic universes only from personal experience; Sociological Knowledge plays an important role in the development of each individual's symbolic universe. Symbolic universes and value-systems can be viewed as places where the Personal and Sociological realms of Knowledge meet. Sociological Knowledge, through society, affects an individual's value system.

A society, while not an organism, can be seen in terms of a model. Its organization is accepted as "proper" and it rewards and punishes the actions of its members. To reject the beliefs of the society one lives in is to go against the tide, even if one still retains many of the culture's values. The dominant culture of a society is known as the Received Culture (RC). The RC which is in the realm of Sociological Knowledge in any culture, because it is the dominant social construction of reality. Values in this realm are shaped by historical forces, such as class structure, position, and social forces (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983). The RC can be considered to be the social manifestation of this Sociological Knowledge. It is reinforced, for example, by language, social relations, and economic forces.

Historian Lawrence Goodwyn (1978), in his history of the Populist movement in the United States, describes why it was so hard for individuals to reject the RC. To reject the RC meant not only rejecting some socially accepted symbols, but also the social manifestation of those symbols. Rejecting the Republican Party in the northern states shortly after the Civil War meant rejecting the RC.

For a farmer in Iowa or Illinois to leave the Republican Party in order to become a Populist he had to overcome not only his memories associated with the "Party-that-saved-the-Union," but the enduring and very visible civic presence of that same party in his own time and locale. In the towns and hamlets of the rural North and West in the late nineteenth century, the Fourth of July was a day of Republican celebration. The commander of the local unit of the Grand Army of the Republic

could be counted upon not only to rekindle memories of loyal "boys in blue," but to lead the Fourth of July parade itself. And this latter was no small political gesture--for included in the rank parading the (Republican) flag were the town's aging bankers, ministers, and plain people. The past thus blended into the present as a political statement grounded in patriotism and expressed by one's reaffirmed Republican allegiance. Standing up against one's minister, civic leaders, and economic and cultural models not only tested a person's range of psychological autonomy but his intellectual ability to define what authentic patriotism was. The impediments to political nonconformity were impressive. Sectionalism was not merely a patriotic memory, it traded on received patterns of deference in the present [Goodwyn 1978, 99-100].

1.2.4.3 Values and metaphors. The symbolic universe contains metaphors since metaphors are symbols. Von Bertalanffy notes that a systematic relationship exists between symbols and values, so we can assume that the relationship between metaphors and symbols are systemic. Symbols, and thus metaphors, are largely comprised of values, and it is this composition of values that allows metaphors to transcend biological needs. Metaphors become values because they are at least partially comprised of values. The values associated with metaphors are features of the metaphors. An analysis of the features should reveal some of the values of a metaphor.

Socially accepted metaphors perpetuate the values of the RC. Sub-cultures that reject, or reject parts of, the RC form new metaphors of their own that are made up of their own values. An examination of the metaphors that different groups use to conceptualize land should reveal the values that the group associates with land.

1.2.5 land

Since all language and concepts are metaphorical in nature, any definition of land is a metaphor. A great number of definitions of land exist in the United States. Stewart D. Marquis, Jr. (1979) lists some major concepts of land. While not all of them fit equally well into the American Received Culture, they are all part of American culture (this includes fringe sub-cultures). Some definitions share a great deal of cohesiveness with each other, while others appear to be in conflict; though even those that seem to be diametrically opposed to each other often share some structural similarities.

Two groups that do not share the same land metaphors might be sharing some values that they associate with land. If the two groups are part of the same larger culture, then we expect to see both agreement and disagreement on which values they associate with land. The purpose of examining the land metaphors of two groups is to see the values that both groups associate with land.

1.3 Land in the United States of America

If a man's home is his castle, then his home is his fertility. To take away his rights in the land is nothing less than castration. [--a resident of Brandywine Creek, Pennsylvania] [Strong 1975, 169].

In the United States, an entire mystic surrounds the right to own land and to do with it as one wishes. While land has always been subject to public regulation, Americans almost always resist the introduction of measures that even vaguely infringe on ownership or the economic rewards of ownership (Popper 1981). It is believed by many that the basis of an affluent, stable, and democratic society is based upon private ownership of land (Green 1977; Siegan 1976; Bjork 1980). This belief can be traced to Thomas Jefferson's vision of a nation of farmers. This, in turn, goes back both to John Locke ([1689] 1955) and the French Physiocrats. This is linked to the belief in the free market and the virtues of competition. "[E]very individual should have the right to pursue his own interest, within the limits set by law, without regard for the interest of others *because* this will lead to the greatest social welfare" (Bjork 1980, 4). Any analysis of land tenure that ignores the values associated with forms of land tenure will fail to show where much resistance to any alteration of land tenure comes from.

Since metaphors are embedded in value systems, a metaphorical look at land, or rather, a look at the metaphor held by groups that describe land should give the planner access to the values of the groups, and more particularly, the values that are associated with land. In this thesis, two such groups, henceforth to be known as the two *subjects*, are examined. One subject, the Received Culture, represents the status quo and the

traditional view of land in the United States. The other subject, the Community Land Trust proponents, seek a change in land tenure, and, consequently, how land is understood.

1.3.1 the received culture

The Received Culture is the dominant culture of a nation or society (Goodwyn 1978), and is best defined by the institutions, beliefs, and values that are national in character. The RC is representative of the entrenched view and defends the status quo. The RC of the United States includes the national prototype of how land is viewed and treated, even though this prototype might vary in any specific locality. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to describe the RC in its entirety, so the the RC will be discussed only in terms of how it conceives of land, the values and beliefs it attaches to these metaphorical concepts, and the rationale supporting them.

Historically in the RC, the concept of land ownership has been linked with development. Locke ([1689] 1955), whose ideas concerning natural rights and the government's role in protecting these rights were influential in the writing of the United States Constitution, believed that rights of land ownership came from the mixing of labor and land. Activities such as clearing the land, planting crops, putting up buildings, fencing the land, or other methods of developing the land are examples of mixing labor and land. The development of land was incorporated with the clear delineation of ownership--even the commons of New England towns were clearly marked and used in limited ways by the residents of the town. Other forms of land tenure and land-use, such as those of American Indian tribes, were not seen to be a valid form of land tenure, justifying the taking of Indian land by settlers.

Ownership of land was associated with wealth and freedom. This can be traced to Jefferson's opinions about ownership of land. He believed that all wealth was based in agriculture. He linked land with agriculture, and saw land as a means for individuals to achieve independence from others. The self-sufficiency of individuals would limit the power of government (Green 1977). His opinions were, and still are, influential in America.

Jefferson's idea of national development through settlement eventually became the land policy of the federal government (Hibbard 1924). The first one hundred years of United States history shows the federal government divesting itself of its land holdings (Wolf 1981). While initially attempting to raise revenue through the sale of land, land was later given to those willing to develop it. The belief that land "and its use by individuals, is a business enterprise, pure and simple" (Wolf 1981, 64), has continued, even with the increase of government intervention in land-use control. A large part of intervention at all levels of government has included enabling a profit to be made from the land. Much federally owned land is still used for private profit. The federal government has always supported ownership of land by individuals. 981).

One of the rights Locke defined as part of land ownership was the right to transfer land freely. Within the context of a capitalist society, this becomes the right to buy and sell land. Land is treated as any other commodity, and the market is seen to be the best judge of its use. The market does not conflict with the rights of individuals to use land as they wish, since the market is seen to be part of the natural environment. This results in the criteria for land-use to be similar across the country. Constance Perin (1977) points out the one important source of this similarity is that the rules governing capital investments are national, and not regional, in character.

1.3.2 the community land trust proponents

The proponents of Community Land Trusts are advocates of an alternative mode of land tenure. The CLT proponents view individuals, society, and nature in a manner that differs from that of the members of the RC. Sources on CLTs include the Institute for Community Economics (1981), Chuck Matthei (1981), Lynton K. Caldwell (1974), John Blackmore (1978), and Randee Gorin Fenner (1980). Community Land Trusts are relatively new: the first was founded in 1972. Technically, this alternative can exist within the existing legal framework of the United States. While some CLTs are recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as nonprofit organizations, the full legality of this particular

method of land tenure has not yet been tested in a court of law (Institute for Community Economics 1982). CLTs differ from the culturally acceptable method of land tenure.

The CLT model accepted by the CLT proponent is the one developed in the 1960s by Robert Swann and Ralph Borsodi, and is presently being advocated by the Institute for Community Economics (ICE). The CLT "itself was conceived as a democratically controlled institution that would hold land for the common good of any community, while making it available to individuals within the community through long-term leases" (ICE 1982, *vii*). While the CLT model is not appropriate for all individual circumstances, the model is intended to be applicable throughout the United States.

A Community Land Trust is an organization created to hold land for the benefit of a community and of individuals within the community. It is a democratically structured nonprofit corporation, with an open membership and a board of trustees elected by the membership. The board typically includes residents of trust owned lands, other community residents, and public-interest representatives [ICE 1982, 18].

It is important to differentiate between CLTs and land conservation trusts because they have similar organizational structures and land acquisition techniques. However, the goals of these two types of land trusts differ.

Conservancy trusts normally withhold their lands from all human use except for limited scientific or education field study and some carefully regulated recreational use. CLTs, on the other hand, are usually concerned with housing, agriculture, economic development, and other basic human land uses [ICE 1982, 30].

While real differences between the two types of land trusts exists, they can be complementary (ICE 1982). This is because they share some similar ideas on the role of land in society.

The purpose of CLTs is to aid social change by changing methods of land tenure, and thus the status of land. The single most important aspect of CLTs is that they remove land from the market place. This removal of land from the speculative market allows for a community to have greater control over local land-uses and resources. The rejection of the market place conflicts with the RC's land metaphors (Popper 1981; Wolf

1981).

1.3.3 land metaphors

Each of these two subjects holds a schema, or a collection, of metaphors about land. While this reflects the different values that they hold, they still have many values in common. In order for them to communicate with each other about how land should be controlled, they must first discover what values they share. Some styles of planning can make use of these similarities.

In contrast to this approach Frank J. Popper (1981) noted, when reviewing the environmental land-use reform movement of the late 1960s and 1970s in the United States, that planners neither understood that many of its values were foreign to traditional American attitudes (e.g. individualism, the private property ethic, veneration of the market, contempt for bureaucracy) nor could they see when their values and goals coincided with those of local land owners. While the Community Land Trust movement is different from the environmental movement, many of its problems can be similar. Though many CLT proponents have shown more astuteness in understanding how land is valued, and is possibly more interested in the values of those people whom it wants to convince. The purpose of doing an analysis and comparison of the CLT proponent and RC's land metaphors is to find where agreement occurs in the values systems of the two subjects so as to aid a planner who supports the idea of CLTs to communicate the knowledge which his or her land metaphors are based upon.

1.4 Planning

But since a metaphor is not a metaphor *per se* but only for someone, from one point of view it is better to say that sometimes the metaphor is not noticed; it is hidden. This is, if X is aware of the metaphor, while Y is not, X says that Y is being taken in by the metaphor, or being used by it, or taking it literally. But for Y it is not a case of taking the metaphor literally at all, because for him there is no metaphor. He is speaking literally or taking it literally [Turbayne 1970, 23-24].

One object of planning is that we learn to control our metaphors, rather than be controlled by them. Colin Murray Turbayne (1970) claims that if we do not realize that we are using metaphors, then they control us, but if we *do* recognize them for what they are, then we can be in control. Perhaps control is not the best word, but our being aware of metaphors allows us to create and destroy them, and to recognize their limitations. To be aware of metaphors means to take an active role in creating reality. To be unaware results in the user being a victim of metaphor. The planner's role is to prevent the client from becoming a victim.

The victim of metaphor accepts one way of sorting or bundling or allocating the facts as the only way to sort, bundle, or allocate. The victim not only has a special view of the world but regards it as the only view, or rather, he confuses a special view of the world with the world. He is thus, unknowingly, a metaphysician [Turbayne 1970, 27].

In order for clients who are assumed to be a member of the RC to become more receptive to new ideas--new metaphors--they must first realize that their metaphors are metaphors. In order for planner to aid in this, she or he must first understand the life cycle of a metaphor.

Turbayne considers a metaphor to have a life made up of three stages. In the first stage, a metaphor is considered to be inappropriate by the members of a society, and can only be part of Personal Knowledge. It is felt by society that the metaphor is comparing two different things that have no relevance to each other. In the second stage, the metaphor is accepted as a metaphor. It enters Sociological Knowledge, and is used in society as a make-believe construct. In the third stage it becomes commonplace: it is taken to be the literal truth and is not longer taken to be a metaphor. It is now entrenched in Sociological Knowledge and can have an affect on Positive Knowledge. When it reaches this stage, it is said to be "hidden" or "dead."

The planner aids clients in discovering hidden metaphors. When a metaphor becomes archaic when, during its third stage, it is recognized to be a metaphor, it becomes archaic. While it could be taken to be a socially acceptable metaphor, it can also end

up being totally rejected by society if it is now taken to be misleading. The planner should emphasize to the client that a metaphor can only be replaced by another metaphor, and not by the "literal truth." The planner's job can be considered to encourage, and to participate in, the following process:

first, the detection of the presence of the metaphor; second, the attempt to "undress" the metaphor by presenting the literal truth, "to behold the deformity of error we need only undress it"; and third, the restoration of the metaphor, only this time with awareness of its presence [Turbayne 1970, 56].

Achieving the first part is not easy. Not only are there many people who have no motivation to find and challenge predominant metaphors because they benefit from the metaphors, but also the metaphors are deeply entrenched in the culture. In the RC, hidden land metaphors are very strong not just for rich and poor landowners, but also for nonlandowners. Alternative metaphors could be found to be threatening to many people.

Land represents most of the material wealth for poor landowners. A change in land metaphors could lead to a change in how land is owned and controlled, and how people believe that they will benefit from the land. To those who own land, their land is seen to be a possible key to vast wealth, or even just to climb out of poverty, because the value of the land could rise.

A Vermont developer explained: "Nine out of ten people speculating in land never really make it big. But the promise that they might hit the jackpot is what keeps them at it. And the biggest defenders of the right to get all you can out of land will not be the one winner, but the nine losers, who can always hope that someday they'll score" [Popper 1981, 212].

To the nonlandowner, the house on a lot is often seen as a future right or hope.

The American dream of hard work inevitably rewarded is idealized in a singular scenario for ascending the ladder of achievement, definitive movement from one social category and its status to the next, upward [Perin 1977, 81].

The American dream is the single-family-detached house which is supported by the metaphors of the RC.

The planner who ignores the values associated with land when he or she advocates a change in land tenure, claiming that it will be to the benefit of the public, is sure to be rejected by those he or she is trying to help. What is needed is a style of planning which aids people to recognize that the present method of land tenure is partially based upon human concepts, rather than upon nature. In this paper, these concepts are metaphors. The planner can only suggest new metaphors, which might very well be rejected anyway, after the old metaphors are recognized as such. This is not to deny that other interests, such as financial, class, status, and power, take a part in the formation of institutions of land tenure. These other interests are involved in the creation and adoption of metaphors, at both the conscious and the unconscious levels.

Transactive Planning is the style of planning that is best suited for the metaphoric theory of reality. In Transactive Planning, a dialogue occurs between the planner and the client. Both participants learn to be self-critical during the course of dialogue (Friedmann 1973, 1979). The participants learn from each other, each sharing his or her special kind of knowledge with the other. Together they deconstruct old metaphors and build new ones.

In Transactive Planning it is assumed that we create reality, but that we do not have control over it. Creation is not equated with control. The environment is "turbulent" and defies our attempts to predict its actions. Planning in the traditional sense, was based on the planner's supposed ability to predict the future in a scientific and neutral manner. The actions that occur in Transactive Planning are aimed at the near future.

I shall venture a judgement here that many people, particularly planners, may initially have difficulty in accepting. Whether as individuals, groups, or organizations, men of action have in fact little interest in the future except for a very short stretch of time beyond the present. The excitement over the systematic study of the future found in some academic circles, philanthropic foundations, and research organizations reflects the predilections of those who are essentially *divorced* from action. Put more pointedly, the futurologists, as they are called, are either unabashed ideologists paid for their labor by those who seek to justify their own actions or escapists fleeing from the very tough and real issues of the day [Friedmann 1973, 137].

People of action never ask "What is likely to happen?" but, "What shall I do?" The planner no longer gazes into the distant future, but instead pays attention to the recent past and the near future in terms of the interests and requirements of clients. As mentioned above, the discovery of metaphors can occur during the course of dialogue. But what is dialogue and how can it be started? This paper will address a portion of this question.

1.5 Outline of the Paper

In this paper I will look at how a land-use planner can better communicate a world-view that is different from the one held by the client. Only then would it be possible to effectively communicate the CLT proponents' view of land to members of the RC. By reducing each view to a schema of metaphors, a methodology for interpreting the situation and establishing, in a tentative manner, a way of initiating communication becomes possible. The mode of communication being initiated is dialogue, for this is the best mode for relating different world-views. This dialogue has to be understood in terms of the transactive style of planning. Then the land-use planner using Transactive Planning is in a position to not only communicate a new world-view, but to help the client learn to be critical of his or her own world view.

Chapter two, The Translation of Metaphors, presents a theory of communication in which a successful dialogue is dependent upon each subject interpreting each other's words in a similar manner. This is based upon a textual interpretation of reality in which the world is interpreted in terms of metaphors. The translation of metaphors is shown to be able to occur during dialogue if the planner and the client realize what values and goals they are sharing.

Chapter three, Isomorphism and Metaphors, contains a methodology the land-use planner could use to set up an initial shared context for dialogue between CLT proponents--which he or she is a member of--and members of the RC. This is done by the planner analyzing each subject's schema of land metaphors, and looking for

similarities in the values associated with each subject's schema of metaphors. These similarities are called isomorphisms because they represent structural similarities of the two subjects' value-systems.

Chapter four, Transactive Planning, Mutual Learning, and Dialogue, suggests how the context of dialogue can be a part of land-use planning. Dialogue is a major component of Transactive Planning, and during dialogue each participant should be learning from the other. In the planning situation, one participant, the planner, holds one type of knowledge and the other, the client, holds another type. Mutual learning occurs when these two types of knowledge interact. Transactive Planning does not stop at mutual learning, but continues on to action, experimentation, and reflection. The chapter concentrate's on how the land-use planner's role is redefined by Transactive Planning, and how communication fits into this new role.

Chapter five, Conclusions, reviews the importance of how the planner listens and speaks to the client. While this paper concentrates on initiating dialogue, what can happen later is speculated on. Metaphors, textuality, and Transactive Planning are not absolutes, but can change during the course of dialogue, so the planner must be advised not to trade on type of dogmatism for another.

The establishment of a dialogue between two people who hold radically different interpretations of the world is a difficult task. When planners wish to start a dialogue with their clients, they must be able to communicate their intentions and to understand the clients' values. The fact that planners and clients may interpret reality in different ways forms a barrier to successful communication. Planners can improve how they initiate dialogues if they can ensure that they and their clients share the same situations.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TRANSLATION OF METAPHORS

Communication always occurs in a variety of contexts; how a person interprets these contexts determines what he or she believes the situation, in which communication is occurring, to be. If a speaker and listener do not agree on the context of communication, then they are in different situations. They will be unable to communicate effectively because the listener will be interpreting the speaker's words in a manner not intended by the speaker. Planners should not assume that they hold the same context of communication as does their clients.

The contexts held by people are based on how they interpret reality. If a planner and a client interpret some part of reality, such as land, in radically different ways, then the contexts in which they communicate on that part of reality could be very different. If the planner wants a dialogue on land, he or she must ensure that he or she and the client interpret land in a similar manner. This is a major problem if the planner wants to have a dialogue with the client because he or she wants the client to realize that other interpretations of land are possible.

The literary theorist Stanley Fish (1980) states that persuasion is not so much based on convincing someone what the facts are, but rather, how "reality" should be interpreted. Meaning is produced in the course of interpretation, and is not inherent in that which is being interpreted (Fish 1980). Planners sympathetic with, or who are, CLT proponents are interested in altering some of the meanings which are normally associated with land. Persuasion can occur in a number of forms of communication, and the best form for the CLT proponents to persuade members of the RC that CLTs are legitimate is that of dialogue.

Dialogue is not a technique of persuasion, though persuasion may occur during it. When planners enter a dialogue they are risking themselves and their ideas. In essence, by entering into a dialogue, they are entering a situation in which listening has a higher

priority than persuasion. Dialogue is the only context in which a planner can hope to succeed in persuading clients to question dominant institutions of land tenure. But the objective of dialogue is not that of consensus.

A dialogue "includes the possibility and indeed the likelihood of conflict" (Friedmann 1979, 103). It allows for disagreement within a larger context of agreement. This larger context is the trust between the participants of a dialogue (Friedmann 1973, 1979; Freire 1970, [1969] 1973). According to John Friedmann, who developed Transactive Planning, dialogue can be viewed as a context of communication in which the participants accept each other and are willing both to learn from each other, and to learn together. Even if they do not come to a common agreement on what action should be taken, they should come to a common understanding of what they agree on.

Dialogic relations come into being between two separate identities, a you and a me, and they occur exclusively in this dyadic form. Joined in dialogue, we build a common ground between us, a new reality, for which we are responsible. This ground we hold in common trust [Friedmann 1979, 104].

A beginning point for dialogue are the shared points of departure (Fish 1980). A shared point of departure is a belief or value which both participants agree that they share and is the common ground that dialogue is built upon. Differences of opinion are related to these points. Reference points are another name for these shared points of departure. How can these points be found?

The metaphors that each participant uses to conceptualize some common object can lead us to these reference points. If the constellations of metaphors overlap, it is the overlap that can form the initial common ground held by participants. The metaphors can then be translated in terms of this common ground, so both the client can better understand the intentions of the planner, and visa versa.

Before we can understand how metaphors could be translated during dialogue, we need a better understanding of how metaphors are generated. Metaphor is related to value and meaning. Meanings and metaphors are created by a reader interpreting a text. The

notion of textuality, which will lead us to how readers create the meanings of texts, is an appropriate place to start.

2.1 Text and Context

What is meant by the term "text"? It may initially be seen as a situated use of language marked by a tense interaction between mutually implicated yet at times contestatory tendencies. On this view, the very opposition between what is inside and what is outside texts is rendered problematic, and nothing is seen as being purely and simply inside or outside texts. . . . One of the more challenging aspects of recent inquiries into textuality has been the investigation of why textual processes cannot be confined within the bindings of the book [LaCapra 1983, 26].

Textuality includes the notion that a text is always read within some context. Text and context define each other. What is a text? The word "text" commonly refers to a manuscript of some sort, but what are the features of a text? Can something which contains no printed words be referred to as a text? To view an object as a text not only reveals certain aspects of the object, but also brings attention to its situation--its context. When the world is designated as a text we divide up the world in such a way that the relationship of its parts is analogous to that of a manuscript and *how* it is read. Context and text exist simultaneously, interpenetrating each other: one does not precede the other. The reader should treat the context as if it were a text. A context is interpreted both in terms of its text and its own context.

The notion of textuality raises more questions about the meaning of any individual text than it answers. What purpose is served by reading something in a textual manner, to read something within some specific context?

More generally, the notion of textuality serves to render less dogmatic the concept of reality by pointing to the fact that one is "always already" implicated in problems of language use as one attempts to gain critical perspective on these problems, and it raises the question of both the possibilities and the limits of meaning. For the historian, the very reconstruction of a context or a reality takes place on the basis of textualized remainders of the past. The historian's position is not unique in that all definitions of reality are implicated in textual processes. . . . The more general problem is to see how the notion of textuality makes explicit the question of the relationships among uses of language, other signifying practices, and various modes of human activity that are bound up with

processes of signification [LaCapra 1983, 26-27].

Textuality implies the rejection of the premise that a manuscript contains an explicit meaning which can be interpreted in one, and only one, proper manner (LaCapra 1983; Fish 1980). The interpretation of a text is dependent upon how its contexts are interpreted. However, a text cannot be separated from its contexts (LaCapra 1983). A textual approach when applied to other than a manuscript, such as land, reveals that meaning no longer resides within the text. Rather, the meaning arises from the context in which it is believed to be. Meaning is not natural in origin, but cultural and social. This approach questions how much and what kind of meaning a text can hold, and how a text's meaning is dependent upon its context.

There is the common notion that a text can be read in a context-free manner, that is to say, a nontextual reading. The acceptance of only one *true* context is inconsistent with the textual approach. A contextual interpretation avoids the dogma that only one acceptable interpretation is possible. Usually nontextual readers are unaware that they are restricting a text to a single context rather than reading it in a context-free manner.

The context . . . does not exist. The search for it is a quest for a will-o'-the-wisp generated by a questionable theory of meaning. The context itself is a text of sort; but for interpretation and informed criticism. It cannot become the occasion for a reductive reading of texts. By contrast, the context itself raises a problem analogous to that of "intertextuality." For the problem in understanding context--and a fortiori the relation of context to text--is a matter of inquiry into the interacting relationships among a set of more or less pertinent contexts. Only this comparative process itself creates a "context" for a judgement that attempts to specify the relative importance of any given context. The view of fin-de-siecle Vienna itself as the "cradle" of modernity serves as a suggestive stimulus to research insofar as it remains on an allusive level. Promoted to the status of an interpretative framework for understanding the relation between texts and contexts, it becomes problematic in the extreme and may function as a pretext for avoiding or foreclosing an investigation into significant issues in historical interpretation [LaCapra 1983, 95-96].

The historian Dominick LaCapra (1983) points out that the concepts of text and context do not solve problems, but rather makes the interpretation of a text a way of raising problems. A context is *not* absolute reality. A number of contexts exist for every

text, and each of these contexts raises certain types of questions about the interpretation of both the text and its contexts. The precise nature of the relations between texts and their various pertinent contexts is a problem for inquiry.

"For complex texts, one has a set of interacting contexts whose relations to one another are variable and problematic and whose relation to the text being investigated raises difficult issues in interpretation" (LaCapra 1983, 35). Any particular type of context is problematic in its own way. It will raise certain types of questions about the text and its interpretation. A context is never static, but has its own textuality and must be interpreted by the reader. When reading a text, a context should be chosen with the consciousness of the types of issues it is likely to raise.

Indeed, in historiography, the demand for a close reading of contexts themselves has recently become widespread, in part through the impact of Clifford Geertz's elaboration in anthropology of the notion of "thick description." The special value of this notion is the insistence upon the way a context has its own complex particularity that calls for detailed interpretation--indeed the way it may fruitfully be seen on the analogy of the text [LaCapra 1983, 16].

Intellectual history is like literary criticism because they share a need to formulate as a problem the relationship between texts and their various pertinent contexts. The planner can use these disciplines as a model for formulating his or her own problems.

It is only when the precise nature of this relationship is posited as a genuine problem that one will be able to counteract the dogmatic assumption that any given context--the author's intention's, a corpus of texts, a genre, a biography, the economic infrastructure, modes of production, society and culture in some all-consuming and frequently circular sense, codes, conventions, paradigms, or what have you--is *the* context for the adequate interpretation of texts [LaCapra 1983, 16].

A good interpretation does not settle the question of the best way of understanding a text. "A 'good' interpretation reactivates the process of inquiry, opening up new avenues of investigation, criticism, and self-reflection" (LaCapra 1983, 38). When an object is read as a text, this is not to find its "true qualities," but to question how it is conceptualized. It is not uncommon to consider a non-manuscript object to be a text. History is often treated as a text. To call something a text means that we are consciously interpreting it

within some context, and not that we are attributing any inherent meaning to the object.

Land is a text. As such, it has both a large number of contexts and readers. Both the planner and client read land in their own manner. They each find different meaning in land when they interpret it because they each read land in different contexts. There can be an overlapping between the readings. The interpretations of land according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) are metaphors. By interpreting land within a particular context metaphors are created. Since multiple contexts exist, any reader can be expected to come up with a multitude of metaphors to describe a text. A planner is to find the metaphors that clients use to describe land.

The role of a planner is similar to a historian, in that she or he is interpreting sources that in turn are interpretations of a situation. The planner is attempting to interpret a situation from others' points of view, and then to interpret these collective points of view as a single situation. The planner differs from a historian in that a planner can be a subject of his or her own investigation. There is no contradiction in the planner taking two roles, one of being a planner who is helping clients help themselves, and the other of being a CLT proponent and thus reading land in a particular manner, if the planner is capable of being self-critical and is willing to change. The purpose of the planner's investigation of land metaphors is not to write a scholarly paper, but to create a basis for his or her own actions. This makes it mandatory for the planner to become aware of the metaphors he or she possesses.

The planner is reading texts which are composed of the interpretations of land by both the RC and CLT proponents. Land is an *object* and the RC and CLT proponents are *subjects*. The subject interprets and object; this is the interaction of object and subject which produces *metaphors*. The planner's *sources* are others' interpretations of the two subject-object relationships, though some of the sources are produced by the subjects themselves. These sources, when combined, will result in two texts. A form of parallelism occurs between what the planner is doing and what he or she is looking at. The planner is reading a text so he or she can interpret how the subjects are reading *their* text

(i.e. the object). While the historian is "involved in the effort to understand both what something meant in its own time and what it may mean for us today" (LaCapra 1983, 18), the planner is involved in the effort to understand what an object means to some subject and to him or herself.

The context is part of the reader's understanding of a text: the reader *is* a context. The reader is never a single context, but a multiplicity of contexts. The reader is never conscious of all, or probably even a majority, of them, but can consciously decide to emphasize any particular context. This does not mean that interpretation can be arbitrary. LaCapra argues that the reading of a text is not totally subjective. This raises question of the relationship between the reader and the text, and what makes both a valid context and a valid interpretation.

2.2 The Reader and the Text

Skilled reading is usually thought to be a matter of discerning what is there, but if the example of my students can be generalized, it is a matter of knowing how to *produce* what can thereafter be said to be there. Interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of constructing. Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them [Fish 1980, 327].

In the above quote Fish claims that, in contrast to the belief that a text has inherent meaning, readers produce the meaning of a text. The contexts of the text are important in the process in which meaning is produced. The contexts of a text guide, but do not control, the reading of a text and the production of meaning. It is possible to direct the reading of a text with a context that is foreign to the original context. The contexts of a text, or of the reading of a text, are not inherent in the text but are part of the reader. It is the reader, not the text, which creates meaning.

Reading is never arbitrary. The reader and the text are part of the same system, interacting through dialogue. The how of reading can partially determine what the text is. For example, in order for a text to be a poem, the reader must know of a poetic context. This is similar to saying that land can be a commodity only in a society which

has the institution of the market economy. A text, or land, is not limited to being one thing or another, but becomes something when interacting with--being interpreted by--a subject. However, a reader can never arbitrarily call a text a poem. In order to name a text to be a poem, the text must respond to the "poem" context in a proper manner.

Reading is not "merely subjective" because the reader does not have total control over contexts, and the text has a role to play in the production of meaning. The reader is not omniscient about the text, the contexts, nor himself or herself. The reader reads the text within contexts, and these contexts--how the reader reads the text--will guide the production of meaning (Fish 1980). This should not be confused with contextual determinism. The text-context relationship contains tension, because the text is capable of contradicting its context.

According to LaCapra, dialogue should be at the heart of textuality. In order to have a dialogue with a text, it must be listened to. If the text is ignored, or if the reader projects her or his beliefs into the text, then dialogue does not occur.² "Indeed, what may be most insistent in a modern text is the way it challenges one or more of its contexts" (LaCapra 1983, 35). To say that a text is *understood* in terms of its context is not to say that a text is the *same* as its context. A text is capable of challenging its reader.

A text is a network of resistances, and a dialogue is two-way affair; a good reader is also an attentive and patient listener. Questions are necessary to focus interest in an investigation, but a fact may be pertinent to a frame of reference by contesting or even contradicting it. An interest in what does not fit a model and an openness to what one does not expect to hear from the past may even help to transform the very questions one poses to the past [LaCapra 1983, 64].

The notion of context is at the heart of the dialogue between reader and text. The reader interprets the text within contexts. Any context suggests to the reader a path of inquiry and the reader creates meaning while journeying along this path. The text, through being read, suggests new paths to the reader and is capable of changing its

²While some projection on the reader's part is probably unavoidable, it is to be minimized.

context--the context it is being read in--by contesting its context. Just as LaCapra claims that the text-context boundary is blurred, Fish claims that the distinction between text and reader is blurred. This is because the reader *is* a context, and a method of reading is a context that is chosen by the reader, and thus, is both part of and within the context which is the reader.

The reader produces the meaning of the text through interpretation. No interpretation is arbitrary, but is understood in terms of socially acceptable methods of interpretation.

A pluralist is committed to saying that there is something in the text which rules out some readings and allows others (even though no *one* reading can ever capture the text's "inexhaustible richness and complexity"). His best evidence is that in practice "we all in fact" do reject unacceptable readings and that more often than not we agree on the readings that are to be rejected. . . . [B]ut if, as I argued, the text is always a function of interpretation, then the text cannot be the location of the core of agreement by means of which we reject interpretations. We seem to be at an impasse: on the one hand there would seem to be no basis for labeling an interpretation unacceptable, but on the other we do it all the time.

This, however, is an impasse only if one assumes that the activity of interpretation is itself unconstrained; but in fact the shape of that activity is determined by the literary institution which at any one time will authorize only a finite number of interpretative strategies. Thus, while there is no core of agreement *in* the text, there is a core of agreement (although one subject to change) concerning the ways of *producing* the text [Fish 1980, 342].

Any and all contexts of reading are based upon social norms (Fish 1980). This Sociological Knowledge is produced by what Fish calls the interpretive community. The interpretive community decides which strategies of interpretation are acceptable. Any new strategy of interpretation will be understood in terms of the norm.

Rhetorically the new position announces itself as a break from the old, but in fact it is radically dependent on the old, because it is only in the context of some differential relationship that it can be perceived as new or, for that matter, perceived at all [Fish 1980, 349].

How the CLT proponents interpret land is understood in terms of the RC's interpretative strategy, because the CLT interpretation is a reaction to the RC (ICE 1982). The RC's interpretation is socially accepted, and the CLT proponents are attempting to make

their interpretation, and thus their interpretative strategy, socially accepted. This directs us towards the question of "how does a new strategy of interpretation become accepted by an interpretive community?" This is best understood in terms the criteria used to judge the validity of the reading of a text.

A valid reading is dependent upon being based on an accepted interpretive strategy. Some external circumstance must support an interpretive strategy. For example, if "a letter in which Faulkner [a writer from the southern United States] confides that he has always believed himself to be an Eskimo changeling" (Fish 1980, 346), were to surface, then new interpretations of Faulkner's works within the context of an Eskimo reader would be produced because this context would be based on a valid interpretative strategy, namely, the relation between the author's life and the text. While only some readings of a text are acceptable at any time, the potential readings, which includes the ridiculous, are unlimited.

In fact, my examples are very serious, and they are serious in part because they are so ridiculous. The fact that they *are* ridiculous, or are at least perceived to be so, is evidence that we are never without canons of acceptability; we are always "right to rule out at least some readings." But the fact that we can imagine conditions under which they would *not* seem ridiculous, and that readings once considered ridiculous are now respectable and even orthodox, is evidence that the canons of acceptability can change. Moreover, that change is not random but orderly and, to some extent, predictable. A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) from which it can emerge into respectability [Fish 1980, 349].

In literary criticism, new interpretative strategies are often not presented as interpretative strategies, but "merely" as a description of some text. This "description" must be related to what has already been said about the text, *and*

as a consequence of saying it the work must be shown to possess ~~in a~~ a greater degree than had hitherto been recognized the qualities that properly belong to literary productions. . . . In short, the new interpretation must not only claim to tell the truth about the work i.e. the text (in a dependent opposition to the falsehood or partial truths told by predecessors) but it must claim to make the work better. (The usual phrase is "enhance our appreciation of.") Indeed, these claims are finally inseparable since it is assumed that the truth about a work will be what penetrates to the essence of its literary value [Fish 1980, 351].

Acceptable interpretations are taken to be descriptions, so new interpretations are often presented as descriptions. Descriptions are socially acceptable interpretations that are no longer questioned and are a part of Sociological and Positive Knowledge. "[W]hatever they [literary critics] do, it will only be interpretation in another guise because, like it or not, interpretation is the only game in town" (Fish 1980, 355). Description amounts to interpretation, and is often not taken to be an interpretation because it is a socially and culturally acceptable interpretation. If people believe that they are describing, instead of interpreting, the world, how can new interpretations be accepted, or even discussed?

The acceptance of new interpretive strategies can occur during the course of dialogue between the interpretive community and a sub-community. This dialogue is of a broader scope than the one between the reader and the text, because in this case more than one subject is involved. This requires us to examine the process of communication. Communication between two subjects is more complex than between the reader and the text. While the text itself is not capable of the act of interpreting (though it *is* an interpretation) both subjects do interpret. In dialogue, each subject is constantly interpreting the utterances of the other.

The planner is to aid in starting and sustaining this dialogue. How the planner reads the subjects' interpretations of land becomes important in approaching this task. Planners should be aware that they are interpreting, not describing, and that their activities will have consequence. These activities are comparable to the work of a literary critic. "The critic is taught to think of himself as a transmitter of the best that had been thought and said by others, and his greatest fear is that he will stand charged of having substituted his own meanings for the meanings of which he is supposedly the guardian; his greatest fear is that his will be found guilty of having interpreted" (Fish 1980, 355). Since how each subject interprets land is related to how they interpret each other's statements, the planner needs to understand how they interpret land. Before the planner interprets how the two subjects interpret land the planner must define his or her own interpretive strategy. The validity of this strategy must be based upon the types of inquiries

that the strategy will lead him or her to, and the relevance of the inquiries to the issues at hand.

Before it can be suggested how a dialogue could be initiated by a planner, dialogue must be defined. Before this is done we need a more explicit theory of communication. Dialogue between two subjects who use different strategies of interpretation is a context of communication. This means that issues of communication cannot be separated from the issues of the dialogue. Since we are interested in the subject-matter of communication that is conveyed with words, understanding language can help in understanding the dialogic process.

2.3 Translation and Communication in Context

Even with the largely conscious uses of verbal language, a translator in the usual sense of the term (that is, a person who is trained to transpose meaning from one spoken language into another) needs to know much more than the languages involved. Translating is an art, and even a bad human translator is much better than the best translating machine in existence. But it is a frustrating art, for even the best translation entails a loss--perhaps not so much of objective information as of that intangible essence of any language, its beauty, imagery and metaphors for which there is no one-to-one translation [Watzlawick 1976, 8-9].

The notions of translation and textuality are related. Textuality, as understood here, implies that the reader produces the meaning of the text, and that in doing so the reader should be having a dialogue with it. Translation can be seen to be built upon this because a goal of translation is to interpret a text in order to produce a new text which resides in some new context. The translated text is to have a similar meaning in its new context as the original is believed to have had in its old. The most prevalent form of translation is that from the contexts of one language and culture to the contexts of another language and culture.

As LaCapra mentioned, nothing is purely part of the text or part of the context. If language is a context, then it contributes to the meaning that is produced from a text, and is not distinct from it. "An additional problem lies in the fact that language not

only conveys information but also expresses a world view. The nineteenth-century linguist Wilhelm von Humbolt once remarked that different languages are not so many designations of the same thing; they are different views of it" (Watzlawick 1976, 9). Translation is more than the word-for-word correlation between different languages. The translator, after translating a text, should be able to interpret both texts (the translation and the original) in approximately the same manner. In fact, any particular translation is dependent upon how the original text is interpreted by the translator. Even in a word-for-word translation, problems exist because there are "equivalent" words in different languages which do not share the same meaning in all instances. The proper translation of a single word not only depends upon its placement in the text (the text serving as a context for the word), but also upon the contexts of the text itself. The translation of any part of a text is based upon an interpretation of the text.

Bruno Bettelheim's (1982) criticisms of the English translation of Sigmund Freud's works are rooted in this issue. He questions the language used in the English texts, and the intentions of the translators. He claims that Freud's translators assumed that the accepted American context of psychiatry was the only valid context for reading Freud's works. In effect, he is not only challenging the dominant American strategy of interpreting Freud's texts, but American psychiatry itself.

Bettelheim can claim to have a valid strategy of interpretation because he grew up in Freud's Vienna, German is his native language, and he studied psychiatry in Freud's context.

It can be argued that translators ought to concern themselves with rendering only what the author wrote, as closely as the difference in languages permits. But to deal accurately with a subject such as psychoanalysis, and with language so carefully chosen for nuances as Freud's was, translators need to be very sensitive not only to what is written but also to what is implied. . . . In short, they must also translate the author's attempts to convey covert meanings [Bettelheim 1982, 31].

Freud's use of language, Bettelheim argues, did not come across in the English translations. "The translators' tendency to replace words in ordinary use with medical terms

and learned borrowings from Greek and Latin is evident throughout the *Standard Edition*" (Bettelheim 1982, 51).³ Freud, who wrote in German, used everyday words which had both intellectual and emotional connotations to the average speaker of German. *Es*, *ich*, and *Über-Ich* are the everyday words for it, I, and "over I." But they have been translated in the English editions as the *id*, the *ego*, and the *superego*, all of which are Greek terms. For the American reader the words do not have the emotional impact that the original German had for the German-speaking reader. Why they were translated in this manner is due to the context of American psychiatry, and the belief that psychoanalysis should be restricted to members of the medical profession. "Only the wish to perceive psychoanalysis as a medical specialty can explain why three of Freud's most important concepts were translated not into English but into a language whose most familiar use today may be for writing prescriptions" (Bettelheim 1982, 52-53). While the original German texts could challenge the context of American psychiatry, the English translations could not.

Bettelheim is also distressed that Freud's metaphors were translated in the same spirit. Freud frequently used metaphors due to the very nature of psychoanalysis, and because

metaphors are more likely than a purely intellectual statement to touch a human cord and arouse our emotions, and thus give us a feeling for what is meant. A true comprehension of psychoanalysis requires not only an intellectual realization but a simultaneous response: neither alone will do. A well-chosen metaphor will permit both [Bettelheim 1982, 38].

But many of Freud's metaphors were not translated in this context. Perhaps the most important of Freud's metaphors was that of "mental illness." Mental illness has been translated as to confirm that psychoanalysis is a part of medical science, which was not, according to Bettelheim, Freud's intention. The interpretation of the phrase mental illness is not only dependent upon its use in the text (e.g. Freud's works) but also the contexts in which the text is interpreted. Bettelheim's interpretation of mental illness and the standard

³The *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* is the most recent English translations of Freud's work, and Bettelheim believes this one to be the most faithful translation.

American interpretation convey different meanings which can be traced to differences in believing how the original German texts should be translated into English. Watzlawick considers the situation when two subjects perceive the same text in different contexts to be a type of confusion.

The type of confusion that occurs when translating a text into a different language can also occur between two people speaking the same language (Watzlawick 1976). Communication is not limited to the spoken and written word, but it includes body language, actions, and the interpretation of situations. An example of this is a couple on the second night of their honeymoon who had a big fight, which arose because the husband was acting aloof, gloomy, and antagonistic to his wife and a couple she was conversing with.

Years later, they discovered that they had approached the situation "honeymoon" with two very different interpretations. The husband saw the honeymoon as a period of exclusive togetherness, while the wife saw the honeymoon as "the first opportunity to practice her newly acquired social role" (Watzlawick 1976, 8). While the wife saw her conversation with another couple as part of her interpretation of honeymoon, the husband took her actions as a sign that he was insufficient to fulfill her needs. There was no interpreter who could have spotted the conflict in their translations.

The reason for confusion in this example is the same as for why Bettelheim claims Freud was mistranslated into English: the husband and wife interpreted honeymoon in radically different ways just as Bettelheim and the American psychiatric community interpret psychoanalysis in radically different ways. The husband and wife were interpreting the actions of each other as if the actions were texts. While they were communicating with each other, they failed to perceive the motivations for the other's actions.

Notice that we do not have here a case of indeterminacy or undecidability but of a determinacy and decidability that do not always have the same shape and that can, and in this instance do, change. . . . Neither meaning was imposed . . . on a more normal one by a private, idiosyncratic interpretive act; both interpretations were a function of precisely the public and constituting norms (of language and understanding) It is just that these norms are not embedded in the language . . . but inhere

in an institutional structure within which one hears utterances as already organized with reference to certain assumed purposes and goals. . . . [T]heir interpretive activities are not free, but what constrains them are the understood practices and assumptions of the institution and not the rules and fixed meanings of a language system [Fish 1980, 306].

So confusion in communication stems from the participants interpreting the situation--the context of the communication--in different ways i.e. they are following different strategies of interpretation. While the participants might not feel confused, they misunderstood the rationale for the others' actions. The notion of communication is more complex than that of interpretation because the former depends upon a number of participants who are creating and interpreting texts simultaneously while the latter looks at only one reader in action. In the honeymoon fight, while the husband and wife both named their context honeymoon, they interpreted it differently, but each acted as if they were sharing the same context, and did not recognize that they were *not* sharing the same context. Interpretation always occurs, but the same cannot be said for successful communication.

[U]nderstanding is always possible, but not from the outside. That is, the reason that I can speak and presume to be understood by someone . . . is that I speak to him *from within* a set of interests and concerns, and it is in relation to those interests and concerns that I assume he will hear my words. If what follows is communication or understanding, it will not be because he and I share a language, in the sense of knowing the meanings of individual words and the rules for combining them, but because a way of thinking, a form of life, shares us, and implicates us in a world of already-in-place objects, purposes, goals, procedures, values, and so on; and it is to the features of that world that any words we utter will be heard as necessarily referring [Fish 1980, 303-304].

Successful communication was not occurring because the husband and the wife interpreted honeymoon in different ways without realizing it. They were both interpreting the other's actions and words in a way that was devoid of the meaning that they were intended to convey. Words and actions do not contain meanings within themselves though they are necessary for the production of meaning, and thus do not refer to a public and stable norm.

When two groups have different strategies of interpretation for some text how can they communicate with each other about the text? When a planner and a client interpret land in different ways how can dialogue aid communication? How is this dialogue initiated and sustained? The answers lie in how metaphors can be translated.

2.4 Dialogue and the Translation of Metaphors

Joined in dialogue, we build a common ground between us, a new reality for which we are responsible. This ground we hold in common trust [Friedmann 1979, 104].

The translation of metaphors can occur during the process of dialogue if this common ground is built. While the planner and the client have different strategies of interpreting land, they have some similarities in what values they associate with land. These similarities can form the basis of a common ground. This common ground can serve as a common context. Since a common context is necessary for successful communication; dialogue--which is a mode of communication--is dependent upon this context. In this context any new ideas about interpreting land could be translated into terms which are mutually agreed upon. The planner does not create the translations, but, by using his or her interpretation of the situation, helps identify this initial context of communication so a self-sustained dialogue becomes possible. It is within this type of dialogue that the land metaphors will be translated. In order to see how dialogue could enable this to come about, the concept of dialogue must be explored.

Dialogue between people, as distinct from the dialogue between the reader and the text, is a form of person-centered communication. In dialogue each person addresses the other directly. It is assumed that information and meaning do not exist independent of the people who communicate and receive it. Dialogue between people, like having a dialogue with a text, is based upon the act of listening. Anyone participating in a dialogue must be willing to be challenged and to change. This is only possible when the other participants are accepted, even with differences in opinions. Dialogue does not include a

commitment to agree with the other, but an acceptance of the possibility of irreconcilable differences. The outcome of any dialogue might be the agreement to disagree.

Nothing will change normal conversation into dialogue as quickly as the question that speaks directly to the heart. And once a relation of dialogue has been established, it will continue for as long as there exists a mutual determination to sustain it. The dialogic relation values what is being said not because it is either true or false according to some absolute standard, but precisely because it is important to the person saying it. Often unbeknown to himself, he is, in fact, turning to you for confirmation, denial, encouragement, or redirection of his thought and often of his life as well. He is addressing a question to you. In a relation of dialogue you, who are being addressed, are asked to respond precisely to this question. This is what dialogue is all about [Friedmann 1981, 239].

This mutual determination is related to the shared interests and commitments that are necessary for successful communication. It also emphasizes the treatment of the other as a person, and not as tool directed toward goals. This means that a planner should not be interested in controlling the client, but in authentically helping him or her in a non-paternalistic manner. Mutual interest and participation are necessary for dialogue.

The life of dialogue cannot be sustained unless there is a sense of partaking in the interest of the other. Mutual participation in a matter of common concern is not a precondition of authentic dialogue; it may evolve through dialogue. Where it fails to evolve, the dialogue is interrupted.

We sometimes use one another to advance different interests. To the extent that this occurs, dialogue becomes an instrument to subordinate the other to your will. Presenting yourself to the other according to the demands of the situation is an inescapable part of dialogue, but "using" the other for interests that are not shared destroys any possibility of sustaining it. The life of dialogue is a relation of equality between two persons. It must not be perverted into an instrumental relationship [Friedmann 1973, 180].

If shared interests are necessary, then a dialogue cannot be established until issues of mutual concern have been identified. These issues cannot be abstract and impersonal, but must be related to the lives of the people involved. The planner and the client must believe that the issues are related. Telling people what their concerns are, or should be, seems to be the worst way for a planner to begin a dialogue, since this puts the client in an antagonistic position. The initiators of a dialogue should start from where people have already identified the issues that are important to them, and where the initiators

agree with them.

We should remember that dialogue is a context of communication. Successful communication of intentions, motivations, procedures, goals, and values is dependent upon both participants in a dialogue interpreting some of the other contexts of the communication in similar ways. If each participant reads the other as a text then their interpretive strategies should be similar. In order to start and to sustain a dialogue, the subject who wishes to start the dialogue must find out what it has in common the other, and where they differ. They can start with what they agree about. Since the words that they will use do not contain a public and stable norm, they cannot naively assume that they both interpret words in a similar manner.

How does communication ever occur if not by reference to a public and stable norm? The answer . . . is that communication occurs within situations and that to be in a situation is already to be in possession (or to be possessed by) a structure of assumptions, of practices understood to be relevant in relation to purposes and goals that are already in place; and it is within the assumption of these purposes and goals that any utterance is *immediately* heard. . . . What I have been arguing is that meanings come already calculated, not because of norms embedded in the language but because language is always perceived, from the very first, within a structure of norms. That structure, however, is not abstract and independent but social; and therefore it is not a single structure with a privileged relationship to the process of communication as it occurs in any situation but a structure that changes when one situation, with its background of practices, purposes, and goals, has given way to another [Fish 1980, 318].

In order to start a dialogue, an initial context that is shared by all participants must be established. The initial context should be made up of the values, assumptions, and goals that are shared by all parties. These will come from the planner's reading of the land metaphors of the subjects. Since it is a planner sympathetic with CLT proponents who wants to establish a dialogue with members of the RC, and not the other way around, it becomes imperative that the planner identify which of his or her values are similar to those held by the RC. Once this context is identified, its metaphors can be translated during the course of dialogue.

A metaphor is created in some original contexts. The proper interpretation is done within these contexts. When some of these contexts are changed, then the metaphor could be translated to fit the new contexts and still convey approximately the intended meaning. When we speak about the translation of metaphors, we can mean: (1) the selection of an alternate metaphor; (2) an explanation of the intent of a particular metaphor; (3) or the transmission of the proper strategy of interpretation that the metaphor was created within. Dialogue aims for the latter, though it does allow for the other two. People can become their own interpreters through an agreement on an initial interpretive strategy.

The interpretive strategy and the produced meaning of a text are bound together (Fish 1980). This linkage is an integral part of communication. If the planner and the client see that their own interpretations of their own land metaphors have similarities, then their methods of interpreting land itself would also have similarities. Communication could occur if a context consisting only of the similar ways that they view land could be established. If any new--new to either participant in the dialogue--concepts or interpretations would come up in dialogue, they would be understood in terms of the common ground, which originates from the initial context. Rather than comparing metaphors for simple agreement or disagreement, the features of the metaphors are being compared for similarities. The metaphors will enter dialogue once a common ground is established.

2.5 Dialogue, Textualism, and Metaphor

The shared context is the common ground held by the participants of a dialogue. Conflicting views are to be understood in terms of this shared context. As the dialogue continues, its context is expected to change and to grow. Just as a text, as it is being read, can change its context if the text challenges or contests the context (LaCapra 1983), similarly in a dialogue the utterances of one participant challenge how the other is listening. Not only does each participant challenge the views of the other, but he or she also becomes self-critical. This is because "dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking" (Freire 1970, 81).

Participants in dialogue must encourage an attitude of permissiveness towards self-criticism and collective evaluation. The purpose of dialogue is similar to that of the notions of textuality and of metaphorical concepts: it is to render the concept of reality less dogmatic (LaCapra 1983; Friedmann 1973, 1979; Freire 1970, 1973). During dialogue the world-views of the participants are challenged. A result of this challenging, new interpretative strategies and avenues of action open up. The participants learn to question the metaphorical concepts and interpretive strategies which they hold the dearest. It is only when they decide themselves that their metaphors are manufactured, rather than natural, can they decide to create new ones. New metaphors might be exchanged for old, or the old ones may be kept, but even if they are, they are kept with the knowledge that they are metaphors. The participants can return to the mastering of the metaphors rather than being mastered by them.

A change in world-views becomes possible once both participants learn to be self-critical. The planner can raise issues not previously considered by the client, and even in conflict with the latter's established beliefs. These new issues will be seen in light of the shared goals and of the dialogue itself. The metaphors can be successfully translated because a common context which allows for the transmission of meaning will have been established.

CHAPTER THREE

ISOMORPHISM AND METAPHORS

People associate values with any metaphor. These values are systemically associated with each other, with metaphors and with the contexts of the metaphors, so they form a structure. The planner wishes to uncover the extent to which the values associated with the land metaphors of the two subjects overlap by examining these structures. Planners need methods of interpreting the structure and values of his or her own land metaphors as well as those of the client. In this chapter I review the criteria for such a method, and provide an example of one. The analysis made in this chapter assumes that a planner conceives of land as does a CLT proponent, and that the client is a member of the Received Culture, so the structure of the land metaphors of CLT proponents is being compared to that of RC land metaphors.

Structures can exist only within a set of contexts. We can say that structure is the result of the interaction of text and context. This does not deny the importance of structure, but it does deny that structures are universal or value-free. The value systems that make up the structure of land for the CLT proponents and the members of the RC are different, because the contexts are different. Each subject interprets land in a structured manner, and these structures form the basis of the metaphors that conceptualize land.

The purpose of a method which could be adopted by a planner would be to establish isomorphisms between the structures of his or her own metaphors and those of the client. Isomorphisms are a measure of similarity, i.e. the degree to which metaphors are similar. The method explained by the author was devised to show that it is possible to identify degrees of isomorphism between the land metaphors for both subjects--a member of the RC and a proponent of Community Land Trusts. Reliable methods which are replicatable to establish this kind of agreement are not well advanced. There is no intention at this stage to suggest that any planner could perform the proposed procedures. The method was devised and performed to show that it is possible to establish degrees of

similarity. Another reason for the proposed method is to advocate that for the dialogic transaction in Transactive Planning to be successful, a planner should be expected to search out isomorphisms, even though the method used may be, by the nature of the context, only interpretive and so unrepeatable.

The starting point of the method is to establish what goals are held by the two subjects. As Fish (1980) has indicated, any utterance is heard within the context of goals. Utterances as the material of dialogue for both subjects, has a structure of assumptions and practices. A planner, as already mentioned, can use several forms of utterance by the CLT proponents and the RC to ascertain their goals and their degree of similarity. Dialogue initially depends upon shared goals. So any method of metaphoric analysis should begin by establishing shared goals and values associated with land. Hopefully, the method locates a reference point of agreement for both subjects. Once established, communication can become mutually contextual.

There is a major methodological issue in Transactive Planning dependent as it is upon dialogue. The method itself is part of the dialogue. During the establishment of isomorphic levels of agreement, the subjects could be engaged in dialogue. Any method proposed is occurring as the subjects are translating their own metaphors for each other. However, the implication of any consideration of methodology at all is that the planner will have sought out metaphors with a high degree of isomorphism so that a successful dialogue can even begin.

Bearing this methodological limitation in mind, metaphors with a high degree of isomorphism are, as reference points, a dialogic strategy for the planner. As the dialogue proceeds, the metaphors with a high level of isomorphisms may no longer dominate it. Once embarked upon, other issues become part of the communicative context. However, a planner should try to initiate dialogue through some method in which he or she has established mutual goals for which there is a high degree of similarity with respect to how the goals are defined.

As Friedmann (1973) mentions, a matter of common concern should either be identified before a dialogue, or it must evolve during the dialogue. If the common goals for the two methods of land tenure can be identified, then this can become the common concern. It may also lead to greater or different concern. If planners start with those goals which they believe are shared with their clients, these goals will not only serve as an initial reference point for any new ideas that they bring up, but they will also demonstrate that they are interested in the welfare of the clients and are attempting to be of service to them rather than trying to manipulate them. The essence of dialogue is mutual trust, and by being able to speak of some of the goals of the clients, planners show that their own concerns coincide with the clients'.

The strength of any metaphoric analysis comparable in some respects to the method proposed is that the subject initiating the dialogue is more likely to be conscious of how he or she is reading the text of their own communications. Equally of value in this method is that it acknowledges those aspects of the reading which are, by definition, beyond the conscious control of the planner, i.e. his or her own assumptions and biases. In the dialogue, the planner will try to explore the issues concerning the client. The planner must respect the client's views or he or she will not be motivated to find similarities between their views. Without this motivation to identify similarities, there is little reason for the planner to initiate a dialogue.

Several limitations of any method to identify isomorphisms have already been mentioned. It must be understood that metaphoric analysis, at this stage of sophistication, remains a planner's interpretation of the situation. The author, as a prospective planner, recognizes that analysis of this kind is itself contextual i.e. limited by the non-repeatability of a method which should have just that characteristic.

The discussion of the method the author has devised begins with a definition of terms. This is followed by the procedures adopted to find the isomorphisms and the reasons for that procedure. As a result of the procedures, the identification of isomorphisms became possible. The implications of these findings to Transactive Planning can then be

discussed.

3.1 Definitions

As previously discussed, a metaphor is one interpretation of a text that is made by a reader. Each reader is expected to produce more than one metaphor in interpreting any text, since the semantic space of any one metaphor is limited. The semantic space of metaphors will often overlap.

Semantic space is the expected boundaries of the meaning that is attached to a concept. These boundaries are a cultural convention and part of Sociological Knowledge. For example, the semantic space of a word is the socially accepted range of meanings that may be attached to the word. Similar words that are part of different languages can cause confusion if they do not share the same semantic space because in certain contexts they will not share the same meaning.

The readers of the text are referred to as subjects. They are the potential participants in a dialogue. The planner is trying to understand how the subject interprets the text. The two subjects are the CLT proponents and the members of the Received Culture. The planner is one of the subjects and thus must be capable of being self-critical. It is the planner, as a CLT proponent, who is suggesting that new metaphors be adopted by society. The other subject represents the status quo and its accepted metaphors. The proponent of the dialogue is the CLT proponents.

The text that is being interpreted by both subjects is referred to as the object. The issue at hand is usually a result of each subject's reading of the text. The object is land.

3.1.1 schema

A schema is a set of related metaphors. Each metaphor is defined by its semantic space. The planner is to fill in the schema for each subject. The same schema format will be used for both subjects, but the metaphors selected to fill the format will differ for each subject. The schema is defined by the planner's interpretation of social and

cultural norms.

The task of allocating metaphors to the schema is a difficult one, because it is difficult to dissociate and differentiate the metaphors from their emergent structures. The planner's task is similar to the task of a semiologist (Barthes [1964] 1967). The planner, in most cases, will depend upon some institutions and literature about the object to derive the metaphors of the subjects. "[O]therwise, he will have to observe more patiently how consistently certain changes and recurrences are produced, like a linguist confronted with an unknown language" (Barthes [1964] 1967, 67).

3.1.2 social category

Social categories are a way of understanding the social system. The planner will use the same social categories to interpret the metaphor schemas of both subjects. The features produced within the context of a social category reflect how the subject interprets its own metaphors.

Social categories are defined by the semantic space that they occupy. The social category's semantic space serves as a context for viewing the subject's metaphors. The viewing of metaphors within social categories should reveal the ideology of the subject as the subject relates to the object and the parts of the subject's social philosophy that fall within the social categories.

The semantic space of each social category will be defined in a way that allows for the planner to judge whether or not a feature is a member of a given social category. This will be done by outlining each category's semantic space. This will be based upon dictionary definitions of the *social categories*. The dictionaries used should include dictionaries of the English language, or the social sciences, and of philosophy. These definitions will then be presented in a graphic form, that should show the terms that are most closely associated with the name of the social category. These associated terms are denotative features of the social category (Eco 1976).

The planner has to decide which social categories are relevant to the issues that the proponent are bringing up. The planner, as a CLT proponent, is concerned with the issue of land tenure (ICE 1982). The question of which social categories to choose is dependent upon how the proponent defines and presents the issue. Is it presented as a political issue? As a legal issue? An issue is often presented by a proponent in more than one type of context. What the planner needs to know is how the subjects interpret their metaphors in terms of the types of issues that are believed to be at hand. Once a dialogue is started, the issues and types of contexts chosen at this point are the initial focus of attention.

3.1.3 feature

Features are how each subject reads its own metaphors in the context of the social categories. Features of metaphors will be the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the subjects as they are related to the object (land) by a subject. Features will emphasize certain aspects of how each subject interprets land. The following figure shows how features are produced from the subject-object relationship.




Figure 1 - Production of Features

3.1.4 goal

Goals are a special type of feature. They are not derived from the metaphors, but are those stated by the proponent to be the desired consequences of its strategy of interpretation. As with the social categories, each goal will be initially defined in terms of the semantic space that it occupies. The features of each subject's schema of metaphors will

be reorganized in terms of the semantic space of the stated goals, by the planner. This new organization of features will then form the basis of the search for isomorphisms, since it is goals, as defined by assumptions and values, that form contexts of communication (Fish 1980). Once the features are reorganized around the goals, then the planner can view how each subject defines the goals, and compare how each goal is defined by each subject to each other. Each subject might define the goals, in terms of their metaphors about the object, in radically different terms. If there are any goals defined in a similar manner, then they will serve as the basis of the initial context of communication.

In defining the criteria for a feature to be associated with a goal, the semantic space of the goal must be defined as it was with the social categories. Dictionary definitions should lead to denotative features of the goal. But there is also a need for the planner to interpret this semantic space in terms of how the proponent defines this semantic space. How the proponents define the semantic space of the goals should not be confused with how the proponents propose to *fill* the semantic space.

3.1.5 isomorphism

An isomorphism is a similarity shared by two structures. How each goal is defined by both subjects are compared. The degree of isomorphism is measured in terms of how similar they are. Goals which are defined in a similar manner by both subjects are said to be isomorphic, because it will be assumed by the planner and the proponent that each subject structures the goal in a similar manner.

When looking for isomorphisms, we are literally looking for similar forms. Isomorphisms are part of the process of understanding because they provide a context for the understanding of a form that is new to us (Hofstadter 1979). We understand the new form by comparing it to one with which we are already familiar (Fish 1980). So we are searching for similarity of form to allow us to find similarity of substance. This can be better understood if form and content are not viewed as two unrelated items.

The historical pattern in the investigation of matter has been the explanation of diverse substances as combinations of a few simpler substances.

Diversity of form replaces diversity of substance [Rucker 1983, 28].

Since we are looking for isomorphisms, we are looking for similarity between structures. It is the emergent cores of metaphors that will form the structures at which we will look. This emergent core forms the prototype of a concept.

Since we cannot directly compare the emergent structures of metaphors because we cannot analyze them directly, we will have to compare the features of the metaphors in an organized manner in order to hypothesize that isomorphism exist in a particular case. When looking for isomorphisms, we are now looking for a large number of similar features that seem to be organized in a similar manner. How this will be done is dependent upon how the planner is reading the collections of metaphors, and how these features can be organized so as to form an initial context for communication.

3.2 Procedure

The procedure consists of the completion of three types of worksheets. Even though only the isomorphism worksheets are analyzed, the matrix worksheets and the goal worksheets are necessary in order to fill out the isomorphism worksheets.

The matrix worksheet is used to generate the features of the land metaphors of the two subjects. Once the features are generated, then the features can be reorganized in terms of the goals that have been selected for the goal worksheet. Only after the semantic space of the goals have been filled with features can the planner compare how each subject conceptualizes these goals in terms of land. This comparison is done on the isomorphism worksheets.

3.2.1 the matrix worksheet

The first worksheet that has to be completed in the matrix worksheet. This process has four steps: 1) choosing the metaphors, 2) choosing the social categories, 3) defining the semantic space of the social categories, and 4) generating the features. In the first step, the planner decides which metaphors are used by the subjects to describe the object in terms

of the pertinent issues. Before any metaphors can be chosen, a schema for the metaphors to fit into must be outlined.

3.2.1.1 The schema. This schema is made up of three types of land metaphors. The first type is *the point in society where land control decisions become manifested*. The important social influences on the use of land might not be apparent at this point; this point is where decisions appear (and may be) made. The second type is *how society influences land-use decisions*. Influence can range from meager influences to actual control, though this often refers to that part of society which has little or no control of a particular piece of land. The third type is the *social justification for the method of land tenure*. This last unit reflects how it is believed society benefits from land tenure, and the social reality surrounding the object. It is now the time to assess how each subject fills in the units of the *schema*.

The metaphors chosen for each subject is based upon how each subject describes land in terms of who or what controls it, and the criteria for deciding land-use. The subjects are not expected to be aware that their descriptions of land are metaphors (Turbayne 1970). This is especially true for the RC, since its descriptions are accepted as commonplace, thus its metaphors are hidden. The planner will have to decide upon the schema and how each side conceptualizes land through reading the sources.

The sources that make up the planner's texts are varied and pertinent to how the subjects interpret land. Many sources will be pertinent to both, rather than to just one, of the subjects. This is not surprising because the CLT model is defined in terms of land tenure in the RC: the former is a subculture of the latter. For example, sources about the RC will not only come from writers defending the status quo, but also from critics of the status quo, which includes the CLT proponents.

Sources should also be of the proper scale. Since the subjects are national in scope, the bulk of the sources should be from a national, as distinct from a local, viewpoint.

3.2.1.2 *Land in the received culture.* The RC describes land in a number of ways. Thus, there is no one dominant metaphor of land, but a family of metaphors that usually complement each other, though they can also conflict with each other in certain situations. Any single book on land-use economics will present more than one conceptualization of land, and then reconcile them (Barlowe 1958; Ely and Wehrwein [1940] 1964; Renne 1958). Commonalities exist between these differing descriptions of land because they all exist with the context of the RC.

A variety of way of describing land in the RC include: land is private property, commodity, utility, homeplace, natural resource, space, a factor of production, a consumption good, situation, and capital (Barlowe 1958; Marquis 1979). The first three--private property, commodity, and utility--were picked because they best fill the land schema and the importance attached to them in the planner's text. *Land is private property* points to the place in society where decisions about land-use are often made, the owner of the land: the land owner is entitled to use his or her land as he or she sees fit (Andrews 1979; Bjork 1980; Clawson 1973; Nozick 1974; Wolf 1981). Land economics texts refer to the private property aspects of land which form the basis of land law (Barlowe 1958; Ely and Wehrwin [1940] 1964; Renne 1958). This returns us to Locke's view that a government should protect the rights of individuals. *Land is a commodity* points to how society influences how land is used: the land market controls land-use (Bjork 1980; Nozick 1974; Michelman 1981; Siegan 1976). *Land is a utility* gives the social justification for how society influences land-use: land gains values from human consumption (Leopold [1949] 1970; Strong 1975; Andrews 1979), and should be allowed to serve the greatest good according to this assumption. These metaphors are in opposition to the CLT proponents' metaphors.

3.2.1.3 *Land in the community land trust.* The CLT proponents advocate different metaphors than the RC. Land is a common trust, basic resource, and the land ethic predominates. *Land is a common trust* points to both the individual land user (leaseholder) and the local community (through the CLT board of directors) to make land-use decisions (ICE 1982). *Land is a basic resource* is based upon Henry George's conception of how

society should treat land and how land acquires its value, even though the CLT is not an enactment of George's single-tax theory (ICE 1981; George 1880; Brown *et al.* 1955). The social justification for the method of land tenure, *the land ethic*, sees inherent value in the land without consumption of the land (Leopold [1949] 1970; ICE 1982; Fener 1980). While the CLT model stresses how land could be best used for society, the fact that it is complementary to conservation trust, and the origins of the CLT model, suggest that land is more than a utility or a consumer good.

3.2.1.4 Social categories. As mentioned before, the choice of social categories is based upon the proponent's definition and analysis of the issue, and how it believes that it should be resolved. The *Community Land Trust Handbook* (ICE 1982) is being used for this reason, since it is the most important document on CLTs. The CLT proponents are attempting to move land-use decisions from the *economic* realm into the *political* realm. This is reflected in its supporters' concerns for greater direct community control over the land. Thus it becomes important to view how the RC and the CLT model view the proper role of land within the political and economic social categories. The CLT itself is a *legal* institution, and stresses the role of the law in protecting the leaseholder. The case studies in the *Community Land Trust Handbook* stress the types of *social* relations and institutions that are associated with actual CLTs. In figure 2, these social categories are defined in terms of their semantic space. The name of each social category is in capitals. The sources that formed the basis of these definitions are printed in appendix one.

After the social categories are chosen and their semantic spaces defined, then the features of the metaphors can be generated by the planner. The sources which were used to identify the metaphors will also be used in the identification of their features. Additional sources will be needed at this point. Very often the sources used to name the metaphors will not define the features in adequate detail. The planner will have to explore the contexts that the social categories make up so as to reveal the larger ideology in which land is being viewed. The generation of features should not only result in a better understanding of how a subject views land, but also serve as a window on the

subject's overall ideology. For example, one political context for the land metaphors of the RC is the political philosophy of Locke ([1689] 1955), which encompasses the notion of natural rights. What is often believed to be the legal foundations of the United States is another context of understanding the present dominant interpretation of land. The purpose of interpreting metaphors in contexts is to view the values that the metaphors are normally associated with, which will be the values of the social categories. The features are not only associated with the metaphors, but are also features of the social categories. Features of metaphors that cannot be related to the social categories are to be ignored. The features were generated in the RC and CLT proponents matrix worksheets (see charts 1 and 2).




Figure 2 - Semantic Space of Social Categories

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

LEGAL

SOCIAL

Private Property
 independence (s)
 low negotiation and enforcement costs (ce)
 local autonomy (s)
 government protects rights (s)
 democracy (s)
 limited government (s)
 stability (s,il)

independence (s)
 opportunity (a)
 access to wealth (ie)
 landowner gains all profits from development (ie)
 the value of the land is created by labor and capital (ic)
 stability (s,il)
 landowner is entitled to profit from the land (ie)
 right to the product of one's labor (ie,il)

compensation (s,ie)
 land is inheritable (il)
 owner controls the land (s,ie)
 improvements are part of the land (ie)
 land is bounded; parcels (s,ie)
 standard criteria for access to land (a)
 low negotiation and enforcement costs (ce)
 government protects rights (s)
 land is owned by a legal entity (s,ie,il)

independence (s)
 opportunity (a)
 right to the product of one's labor (ie,il)
 stability (s,il)
 local autonomy (s)
 the value of land is created by labor and capital (ie)
 owner controls the land (s,ie)
 investment in the community (ce)
 selfishness is for the public benefit (cl)
 low negotiation and enforcement cost (ce)
 government protects rights (s)
 home (s)

Commodity
 stability (s,il)
 government protects the market (s)
 government is to protect/maximize land values (s)
 taxes (ce)

landowner gains all profits from development (ie)
 access to wealth (ie)
 efficiency in transaction (ie)
 money is the only criteria for access to land (a)
 the market determines land-use (cl)
 market is benevolent (a,ce,cl)

compensation (s,ie)
 rights are transferable by sale (ie)
 land is bounded; parcels (s,ie)
 government protects the market (s,ie)
 money is the only criteria for access to land (a)
 taxes (ce)

the market is benevolent (a,ce,cl)
 selfishness is for the public benefit (cl)
 equitable distribution of wealth (ce)
 competition (ie)
 efficiency in transaction (ie)

Utility
 land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (cl)

land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (cl)
 the value of land can be measured (ce,cl)

land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (ce,cl)

s = Security ie = Individual Equity il = Individual Legacy
 a = Community Access ce = Community Equity cl = Community Legacy

Chart 1 - Received Culture Matrix Worksheet

	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	LEGAL	SOCIAL
Common Trust	<p>individual and community control of land (s,a,cl) local autonomy (s,a,cl) opportunity (a) land-use subject to community limitations (cl) government protects rights (s) democracy (s) leaseholder representation on CLT board of directors (s) outreach and education programs (cl) equitable use of community wealth (cl) nonprofit organization owns the land (s) cooperation (s,a,cl) political organization (s,cl)</p>	<p>earned equity (ie) access to capital and financing (a) stability (s,il,cl) retention of public funds (ce) insulation from land market forces (s,a,cl) lease fees based on land-use (s,a,ce,cl) community gains appreciated value of land (ce) nonprofit organization (s)</p>	<p>individual and community control of land (s,a,cl) lease is inheritable (il) rights & responsibilities on lease (s) long-term or lifetime lease (s) individual ownership of improvements (s,ie,il) lease protects the value of fixtures (s,ie)</p>	<p>individual and community control of land (s,a,cl) local autonomy (s,a,cl) opportunity (a) rights and responsibilities on lease (s) stability (s,il,cl) cooperation (s,a,cl) outreach and education programs (cl) investment in the community (cl) home (s) equitable use of community wealth (cl) right to the product of one's labor (ie,il)</p>
Natural Resource	<p>individual and community control of land (s,a,cl) land is subject to community limits (zoning, etc.) (cl) equitable use of community wealth (cl)</p>	<p>lease fees based on land-use (s,a,ce,cl) land and labor is source of wealth (ie,a) land is a non-speculative good (a,cl) land value is created by society (ce) improvements are not taxed (ce) population pressure (cl) access to wealth (ie)</p>	<p>lease fees based on land-use (s,a,ce,cl) long-term or lifetime lease (s)</p>	
Land Ethic	<p>land is a part of the community (cl)</p>	<p>land has inherent value (ce) land values cannot be measured (ce)</p>	<p>land is not property (ce,cl) nature ignores boundaries (ce,cl)</p>	<p>land is a part of the community (cl) an individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts (ce) land has inherent value (ce) land value cannot be measured (ce)</p>

s = Security ie = Individual Equity il = Individual Legacy
a = Community Access ce = Community Equity cl = Community Legacy

Chart 2 - CLT Model Matrix Worksheet

3.2.2 the goal worksheet

Once the features have been generated, then the planner's work centers around the goal worksheet. The planner must choose the relevant goals, define them, and assign the features to them. As with the social categories, the goals are based upon the proponent's interpretation of the issues. What are the goals, as stated by the proponent, of the proponent's solution to the problems. What are the goals of Community Land Trusts?

The goals chosen for the goal worksheets were taken directly from the *Community Land Trust Handbook* (ICE 1982, 19-24). Security, individual equity, individual legacy, community access, community equity, and community legacy are all deemed to be legitimate interest of individuals and communities by the CLT proponents. In figure 3 the goals are defined in terms of their semantic space. The sources that formed the basis of these definitions are printed in appendix one. The name of each goal is in capitals.

Once defined, the semantic space of goals will be filled by the features of the metaphors of the subject, and these features will then define the goals in terms of the object. It is possible for a feature to fit into the semantic space of more than one goal. On the matrix worksheets, it should be marked those goals are associated with which features. After they are marked, features should be copied on the goal worksheet under the goals with which they are associated. This process going back to the production of features might have to be reiterated a number of times until the planner is confident of his or her decisions. The planner may change his or her mind about one subject after filling out the other subject's goal sheet, new features of metaphors may come to mind, etc. This process is actually non-linear. Charts 3 and 4 are the complete goal worksheets.




Figure 3 - Semantic Space of Goals

SECURITY

independence (p,e,s)
local autonomy (p)
government protects rights (p,l)
democracy (p)
limited government (p)
stability (p,e,s)
compensation (l)
owner controls the land (l,s)
land is bounded; parcels (l)
government protects the market (p,l)
government is to protect/ maximize land values (p)
home (s)
land is owned by a legal entity (l)

INDIVIDUAL EQUITY

access to wealth (e)
landowner gains all profits from development (e)
the value of land is created by labor & capital (e,s)
landowner is entitled to profit from the land (e)
right to the product of one's labor (s)
compensation (l)
owner controls the land (l,s)
improvements are part of the land (l)
land is bounded; parceled (l)
efficiency in transactions (e)
rights are transferable by sale (l)
equitable distribution of wealth (s)

INDIVIDUAL LEGACY

land is inheritable (l)
right to the product of one's labor (e,s)
stability (p,e,s)
land is owned by a legal entity (l)

COMMUNITY ACCESS

opportunity (e,s)
standard criteria for ownership (l)
money is the only criteria for access (e,l)
the market is benevolent (e,s)

COMMUNITY EQUITY

low negotiation & enforcement costs (p,l,s)
investment in the community (s)
taxes (p,l)
the value of land can be measured (e,s)

COMMUNITY LEGACY

selfishness is for the public benefit (s)
the market determines land-use (e,s)
the market is benevolent (s)
competition (s)
land-use is determined by the greatest good for the greatest number (p,e,s)
the value of land can be measured (e,s)

p = political e = economic l = legal s = social

Chart 3 - RC Goal Worksheet

SECURITY

individual & community
 control of land (p,s,l)
 local autonomy (p,s)
 government protects rights
 (p)
 democracy (p)
 leaseholder representation on
 CLT board (p)
 cooperation (s)
 political organization (p)
 stability (p,e,s)
 insulation from land market
 forces (e)
 lease fees based on land-use
 (e,l)
 nonprofit organization (p,e)
 rights & responsibilities (l,s)
 long-term/lifetime leases (l)
 home (s)
 ownership of improvements
 (l)
 lease protects the value of
 fixtures (l)

INDIVIDUAL EQUITY

access to wealth (e)
 earned equity (e)
 right to the product of
 one's labor (s)
 ownership of improvements
 (l)
 lease protects the value of
 fixtures (l)
 equitable distribution of
 wealth (s)
 land and labor is source of
 wealth (e,s)

INDIVIDUAL LEGACY

right to the product of
 one's labor (e,s)
 stability (e,s)
 lease is inheritable (l)
 ownership of improvements
 (l)

COMMUNITY ACCESS

individual & community
 control of land (p,s,l)
 local autonomy (p,s)
 opportunity (p,s)
 cooperation (p,s)
 access to capital & financing
 (e)
 insulation from land market
 forces (e)
 lease fees based on land-use
 (e,l)
 land is a nonspeculative
 good (e)

COMMUNITY EQUITY

retention of public funds (e)
 lease fees based on land-use
 (e,l)
 community gains appreciated
 value of land (e)
 land value is created by
 society (e)
 land has inherent value (e,s)
 land values cannot be
 measured (e,s)
 land is not property (l)
 nature ignores boundaries (l)
 and individual is a member
 of a community of
 interdependent parts (s)
 improvements are not taxed
 (e)

COMMUNITY LEGACY

individual & community
 control of land (p,l,s)
 local autonomy (p)
 outreach & education
 programs (p,s)
 cooperation (s)
 political organization (p)
 stability (e,s)
 insulation from land market
 forces (e)
 lease fees based on land-use
 (e)
 land is a non-speculative
 good (e)
 land is part of the
 community (p,s)
 land is not property (l)
 nature ignores boundaries (l)
 population pressures (e)
 land-use is subject to
 community limitations (zoning,
 etc) (p)
 lease fees based on land-use
 (e,l)

p = political e = economic l = legal s = social

3.2.3 the isomorphism worksheet

On the isomorphism worksheets, the planner compares the features each subject assigns to the same goal. Each isomorphism worksheet is divided into two columns, one for each subject. The features of each subject that is assigned to the goal are then assigned to be put in one of four categories: *total agreement*, *partial agreement*, *no agreement*, and *conflict*, according to how they compare to the features assigned by either subject. The features of the other subject that are used to define a goal are said to be the *opposing features*.

3.2.3.1 Total agreement. Each feature is compared to all of the other features used by the other subject in defining the goal (which are located on the other subject's goal worksheet). If there is a feature with which it is in total agreement, then it is listed under total agreement. Total agreement occurs when two features share the same name, and/or can be defined in a very similar manner. While 100 percent agreement is rare, they can be said to be in total agreement if they cover the same issues (the same semantic space) and if they do not disagree with each other. For example, in chart 5, both the CLT proponents and the RC list *local autonomy* under *total agreement*. While they might disagree exactly on how to achieve *local autonomy*, in both cases it involves the belief that a community should have some form of control over its future. For each goal, each subject will have the same number of features in total agreement.

3.2.3.2 Partial agreement. A feature is located in the partial agreement category if it is not listed in the total agreement category, and if there is an opposing feature that partially agrees with it. The agreement is considered to be only partial if one of the features has a denotative feature which the other feature does not have. When this occurs, there will often be more than one feature that partially agrees with an opposing feature. For example, in chart 5, the RC feature *land is owned by a legal entity* partially agrees with the CLT feature *private ownership of improvements and lease protects the values of fixtures*. This is because the two CLT features each cover some of the semantic space that the RC feature covers, but not all of it.

3.2.3.3 Conflict. Conflict occurs when two opposing features are incompatible with each other. This incompatibility is not always obvious. Chart 9 has an example of an obvious conflict (*land value cannot be measured vs. the values of land can be measured*). Chart 8 has a less obvious example. If *insulation from land market forces* is a value, then *the market is benevolent* is not compatible with it, because the latter implies that there should be no insulation from the land market. It is possible for a feature to be in agreement (total or partial) with one opposing feature, and in conflict with a different opposing feature, within the same goal. If this is the case, then the feature should be listed in both rows. If one subject has features in conflict, then the other subject will also have features under conflict.

3.2.3.4 No agreement. A feature is located under no agreement if it is neither in agreement nor in conflict with an opposing feature. This means that the feature does not share any semantic space with the other subject's definition of the goal. Features listed in the no agreement category cover issues not covered in how the other subject defines the goal.

3.2.4 identifying isomorphisms

From the matrix and goal worksheets, we have been able to produce the isomorphism worksheets (Charts 5 to 10). The goals that are defined in a similar manner, and the features that make them up and are in agreement, will make up the initial context of communication. For the purpose of these worksheets, each subject defines a goal according to the features that it assigns to it.

The first step to be taken is the identification of which goals can be said to be similar, meaning that both subjects defined them in a similar manner. If how the proponent defines a goal includes some features in total agreement, and no features in conflict, then the minimal amount of similarity exists for it to be part of the initial context. When measuring for similarity, only one of the subjects need be examined since they reflect each other where features are in total and partial agreement. The proponent is the

subject used because it wants to know where its values are similar to the values of the RC. Attributes that are under partial agreement also support similarity. But features that are in no agreement are ignored at this point because they neither add to agreement nor conflict between the two subjects in terms of that specific goal.

The general rule is: the more features in agreement the better, and the more in conflict the worse. Of the six goals, security, individual equity, and individual legacy meet the minimum standards of similarity since none of their features are in conflict. Of these three, security is the most similar because it has the greatest number of features in agreement--both total and partial. It should be noted that this counting is in total number of features, and not by percentage of the features used to define the goal. This is because more features are assumed to carry more information than fewer features, and thus able to be used to be the basis of a larger and better defined initial context. The size of the isomorphisms is measured by the number of features that are in agreement.

The two subjects are least similar in how they define community access, community equity, and community legacy. All three of these goals contain features that are in conflict, and at most only one that is in total or partial agreement. Community legacy bears the least similarity, and while it covers important issues and values of the CLT proponents, it is not an appropriate goal for the initial context, but one that should come out later during the course of dialogue. It is important to examine where conflict occurs, since this can lead to a picture of where the two subjects disagree in a consistent manner.

After identify the goals that are defined in the most and least similar manner, where does agreement and conflict occur, and what patterns are evident? The isomorphism worksheet for security (chart 5) will serve as an example for analysis since it contains the greatest amount of agreement.

SECURITY

CLT Proponents

RC

Total Agreement

local autonomy (p,s)
government protects rights (p)
democracy (p)
stability (p,e,s)
home (s)

local autonomy (p)
government protects rights (p)
democracy (p)
stability (p,e,s)
home (s)

Partial Agreement

individual & community control of the land (p,s,l)
leaseholder representation on CLT board of directors (p)
lease fees based on land-use (e,l)
nonprofit organization (p)
longterm/lifetime leases (l)
ownership of improvements (l)
lease protects the value of fixtures (l)

owner controls the land (l,s)
land is owned by a legal entity (l)

No Agreement

cooperation (s)
political organization (p)
insulation from land market forces (e)
rights & responsibilities (l,s)

independence (p,e,s)
limited government (p)
compensation (l)
land is bounded; parcels (l)
government protects the market (p,l)
government is to protect/maximize land values (p)

Conflict

-

-

p = political
e = economic
l = legal
s = social

INDIVIDUAL EQUITY

CLT proponents

RC

Total Agreement

access to land (e)	access to wealth (e)
right to the product of one's labor (s)	right to the product of one's labor (s)

Partial Agreement

ownership of improvements (l)	improvements are part of the land (l)
lease protects the values of fixtures (l)	compensation (l)
earned equity (e)	

No Agreement

-	landowner gains all profits from development (e)
	the value of land is created by labor & capital (e,s)
	landowner is entitled to profit from the land (e,s)
	owner controls the (l,s)
	land is bounded; parcels (l)
	government protects the market (p,l)
	efficiency in transactions (e)
	rights are transferable by sale (l)

Conflict

- -

- p = political
- e = economic
- l = legal
- s = social

INDIVIDUAL LEGACY

CLT Proponents

RC

Total Agreement

right to the product of one's labor (e,s)
stability (p,e,s)

right to the product of one's labor (e,s)
stability (p,e,s)

Partial Agreement

lease is inheritable (l)
ownership of improvements (l)

land is inheritable (l)
land is owned by a legal entity (l)

No Agreement

-

-

Conflict

-

-

p = political
e = economic
l = legal
s = social

Chart 7 - Individual Legacy Isomorphism Worksheet

COMMUNITY ACCESS

CLT Proponents

RC

Total Agreement

opportunity (p,s)

opportunity (e,s)

Partial Agreement

-

-

No Agreement

-

-

individual & community control of land (p)
local autonomy (p,s)
cooperation (p,s)
access to capital & financing (e)
lease fees based on land-use (e,l)

standard criteria for ownership (l)

Conflict

insulation from land market forces (e)
land is a nonspeculative good (e)

the market is benevolent (e,s)
money is the only criteria for access (e,l)

p = political
e = economic
l = legal
s = social

Chart 8 - Community Access Isomorphism Worksheet

COMMUNITY EQUITY

CLT Proponents

RC

Total Agreement

-

-

Partial Agreement

lease fees based on land-use (e,l)

taxes (p,l)

No Agreement

retention of public funds (e)

low negotiation & enforcement costs (p,l,s)

community gains appreciated value of land

efficiency in transactions (e)

(e)

investment in the community (s)

land value is created by society (e)

land has inherent value (e,s)

land is not property (l)

nature ignores boundaries (l)

an individual is a member of a community

of interdependent parts (s)

Improvements are not taxed (e)

Conflict

land values cannot be measured (e)

the value of land can be measured (e,s)

- p = political
- e = economic
- l = legal
- s = social

COMMUNITY LEGACY

CLT Proponents

RC

Total Agreement

-

-

Partial Agreement

-

-

No Agreement

outreach & education programs (p,s)
political organization (p)
stability (e,s)
land is a part of the community (p,s)
nature ignores boundaries (l)
local autonomy (p)

land-use is determined by the greatest good
for the greatest number (p,e,s)

Conflict

cooperation (p,s)
individual & community control of land
(p,l,s)
insulation from land market forces (e)
land is a non-speculative good (e)
lease-fees based on land-use (e,l)
land is not property (l)

competition (s)
the market determines land-use (e)
selfishness is for the public benefit (s)
the market is benevolent (e,s)
the value of land can be measured (e,s)

p = political
e = economic
l = legal
s = social

Chart 10 - Community Legacy Isomorphism Worksheet

An analysis of the features in partial agreement supports this identification of which goals have the greatest similarity. As mentioned above, features that are in partial agreement might be part of a cluster of features that fulfill much of the function of an opposing feature. This does not mean that the cluster is the same as the opposing feature, but that it covers much of the same semantic space.

Briefly, the isomorphism worksheets show us that there is the most agreement about how security is defined by the two subjects and the least about community legacy. If the recognized isomorphisms are taken to be valid, then the creation of a common context is possible.

3.3 Summary: Isomorphism and the Translation of Metaphors

The success of initiating a dialogue will be dependent upon how well the metaphors held by each subject are translated to the other in the process of dialogue. If the planner is able to find isomorphisms between the value-structures underlying the metaphor schemas, then these isomorphisms can allow for the translation of ideas which are foreign to the other. After the planner performs the analysis, the isomorphisms which are located suggest the best goals which a proponent should bring up first.

The analysis suggests that the CLT proponents, in initiating a dialogue with members of the RC should concentrate on the goals of security, individual equity, and individual legacy, with the greatest emphasis on security. While how the CLT proponents define these goals is dependent upon how they define the other three, it is here they will be best understood by the RC, and after there is agreement on how to define these three goals (or partially define them) then the other goals should be introduced, after a certain amount of trust has already been established.

Within each goal, the proponents should try to move from the areas of total agreement to partial agreement to no agreement. They first have to establish if they agree on what the features in total agreement mean. The CLT proponents have to relate how their features under partial agreement function similarly, as a group, to the RC's features

listed under partial agreement. When they get to features under no agreement, they should be referred to features already mentioned. The agendas of the two subjects diverge for the features under no agreement. The agendas of the two subjects diverge, CLT proponents are attempting to introduce their new agenda items, and only refer to the RC's agenda items if members of the RC bring them up.

Having knowledge about which goals are in conflict is important to the CLT proponents in sustaining communication with the RC. If the CLT proponents want to persuade members of the RC that their method of interpreting land is most appropriate, they must anticipate challenges. Challenges can be expected to come over goals which are defined in desimilar manners by the subjects.

The methodology can be used by the planner to interpret part of the pre-dialogue situation. The analysis is tentative, and suggests how a planner might listen and speak to the client. As with any context, the text can challenge it. The planner must listen carefully for utterances of the client (or the planner's own utterances) which contradict this initial context of communication. The importance of the analysis is not to reduce the situation to a set of objective facts. It is to provide a way for the planner to initially listen and speak. The nature of dialogue is to change the contexts of communication, so the planner should never become overly attached to his or her own interpretations. Transactive Planning is based upon the ability of dialogue to challenge both the planner and the client.

CHAPTER FOUR

TRANSACTIVE PLANNING, MUTUAL LEARNING, AND DIALOGUE

A planner who is a CLT proponent conceptualizes land differently from how his or her client. This means that the planner needs a style of planning in which he or she can successfully convey the knowledge that his or her metaphors of land are based upon to the client. This style of planning should not assume that the planner is right, but rather that the planner has knowledge that could be important to the client. This knowledge is not limited to the issue that the planner is dealing with, but includes the activity of planning itself. If the planner is interested in social change, the role of an impartial planner who merely advises a client is undesirable. Transactive Planning enables the planner to contribute his or her knowledge while accepting its limitations by revisioning the planner-client relationship.

Transactive Planning rejects the traditional planner-client relationship in which the neutral planner-technician advises the client-government on the creation and/or implementation of policies. Rather, this relationship is now defined in terms of the type of knowledge the planner and the client are expected to have; both are equal participants in the planning process. The initiation of a dialogue is only the first step in Transactive Planning. In a dialogue in Transactive Planning, two types of knowledge are joined together: Personal Knowledge and Positive Knowledge. The metaphors of the client are mostly based on personal experience, while those of the planner are more likely to be based upon knowledge that is "built up and is expressed in the form of models that can be formally communicated, critically examined, and revised on the basis of new observations" (Friedmann 1973, 101).

Transactive planning can best be understood in terms of Rational Comprehensive Planning (RCP) since the former was a reaction to the latter. RCP predominated the period from about 1950 to 1965. It was based mostly on Positive Knowledge because it proposed that the planner's proper role was that of central coordinator and technician. The

planner had the most comprehensive view of urban and regional issues, and had the ability to predict the future. Since the mid-1960s many styles of planning have arisen as a reaction to the faults of RCP. Transactive Planning is one of them. Since RCP is still the most prevalent image of planning, to better understand Transactive Planning, RCP should be reviewed first.

4.1 Rational Comprehensive Planning

Rational-Comprehensive was the planning framework which attempted to apply logical positivism to society. It defined rationality exclusively in terms of Positive Knowledge and instrumental calculation. Such knowledge was claimed to be objective and universal. The deep structures of Sociological Knowledge and embedded impressions of personal experience were rejected. Politicians chose the values; planners provided the processed facts [Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 19-20].

In Rational Comprehensive Planning the planner is a technician, an expert who possesses scientific knowledge which can be used to transform the quality of the life of the public (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983). The planner takes on the role of the neutral social scientist who is able to collect and analyze data, and suggest in a value-free manner alternative policies. Planners are interested mostly in how to make better decisions. Making a decision is not seen to be related to its implementation; decisions were to be made on a purely intellectual level (Friedmann and Hudson 1974). This view of reality made it unnecessary for the planner to be involved with the implementation of the plans in a direct manner (Friedmann 1973). The basis of RCP is rooted in the belief of the planner's ability to predict the future.

The planner's ability to predict the future is based in the concepts of rationality and comprehensive. In RCP these two concepts are almost synonymous. Rationality is seen to be objective and universal, a window on "how things really are" and "how things happen." Comprehensive alludes to the planner's supposed abilities not only to view an issue in its entirety, but also to "see it as it *really* is" better than the other participants in the urban decision process. A comprehensive picture, which only accepts ends-mean

rationality, is supposed to lead us to knowledge about the future. If prediction is possible then purposeful intervention is also possible. "The 'ideal type' defender of comprehensive planning would contend that a serious effort should be made to plan the future evolution of all important economic and social patterns in detail" (Altshuler 1973). The planner has a critical role in shaping the future to ensure that the goals of the community are met.

A main assumption underlying central planning is that a powerful authority is needed to direct and coordinate the movement of the many parts comprising an interlocking system of relations, and that a central plan is necessary for this purpose [Friedmann 1978, 163].

This planning paradigm implies that the allocation of resources should be centralized. This allocation process would be a linear process, such as planning-programming-budgeting, and would neatly organize governmental action. This planning process should not have competition because it serves the public interest. RCP evolved to include the defining of the public good. While planners were originally supposed to fulfill the goals set by politicians, the politicians hardly ever formulated system-wide objectives, ranked in order of importance.

Since a full description of the public interest in this sense is hardly ever formulated by political decision makers, planners themselves have had to attempt to identify and order the relevant values. This, in turn, has prompted planners to assume a model of society in which a stable consensus on the relevant values is not only attainable but also predictable. They postulate a society in which enlightened citizens acting on complete information, will maximize the welfare of the community of which they form a part. In the bird's-eye perspective of central planners, therefore, society appears harmoniously ordered; conflict and struggle are either absent or subordinated to the superior wisdom of a collective mind (i.e. a central planning agency) [Friedmann 1973, 53-54].

The planner's claim to the ability to measure the public interest depended upon the status of the rationality of economics, that of means-end rationality.

The public interest under such a paradigm was conceived as primarily epiphenomenal, a reification of what could be understood as an aggregation of individual goods. At best it was a mass phenomenon. This position was based on the political economists' view of human nature and psychology, within the philosophical tradition influenced by Locke, Bentham and Bentley [Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983].

In this paper RCP is also to be understood in light of land-use planning. The presupposition of a mechanical reality of causal laws was unable to examine the problems of communication in terms of its context in more than a superficial manner. For the most part it was unable to generate a critique of the foundation of land metaphors of the RC. In addition, when a RCP approach to land did attempt to challenge some isolated part of prevalent practices of land management and tenure, its practitioners were not able to accept the validity of opposition view nor to fully comprehend the role of land in American society. Planners tended more to unintentionally threaten their clients and to often fail to communicate with their client because they did not accept other versions of reality. This was because RCP is based on the premises of one true reality, and of Positive Knowledge being the only valid means of attaining this knowledge.

4.2 Land-Use Planning

Land-use planning has been associated with master plans and zoning since the 1920s, and also with centralized regulation since the late 1960s. The rise of the latter came from the environmentalists' dissatisfaction with the local regulation of land-use. Until the late 1960s, most federal and state policies regarding land are noted for their lack of planning (Wolf 1981; Clawson 1973; Hibbard 1924). Even the federal action of the 1950s amounted to either the building of large projects, most notably in public housing and the Interstate Highway System, and the encouragement of local planning (or rather, the making of local master plans and the adaptation of zoning). Land-use planning is best understood in terms of the history of land in the eyes of all levels of government in United States history.

Traditionally it is believed that when land-use is determined by the market land will then be used in the "highest and best" manner. The federal government's land policy reflects this opinion. In the first hundred years of United States history, the transfer of federally owned land into private ownership was government policy (Hibbard 1924; Wolf 1981; Clawson 1973). The conservation of the remaining federal lands by the federal

government in did not start to occur until the 1870s, with the establishment of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 and John Wesley Powell's report on arid lands and the need for conservation in the Mountain West in 1878 (Alexander 1977; Hibbard 1924; Worster 1979). But a cohesive federal policy towards either federal or non-federal lands has never been created.

The 1920s saw the beginning of zoning at the local level of government. Zoning originally met much resistance and is still not unanimously accepted by the public, even though zoning grew out of the common law of nuisance, and public restrictions on land-use go back to at least 1826 in New York City. Historically, zoning has been used to protect the value of residential land, most often suburban residences (Weaver and Babcock 1979; Perin 1977; Wolf 1981; Nielson 1977; Bjork 1980; Siegan 1976). Zoning and other local regulations affect land values. Like the later Clean Air Act of 1970, public regulation of land was acceptable to many land owners after it was shown to them that it would provide protection of property values (Wolf 1981; Popper 1981). While zoning can prevent the theoretical maximum return on investment in land, it is also called property insurance. Zoning has also created new opportunities for land speculators, especially through rezoning. Since zoning has been guided by "practical" influences (e.g. development pressure, bribes, politics, etc.) and it protects property values for the most part, it has become an accepted institution.

Planning, at the local level, was limited to the police powers of the municipality, which limited the ways in which planners could challenge the land-market. But even zoning and other local regulations gain much of their value by manipulating the land-market.

Through zoning, land use and value can be manipulated. It is for this reason that land planning, which so often depends on a zoning solution, is itself mistrusted and even feared. As a process that increasingly seeks ways to exert public power over all aspects of private land use and community development, land planning is political and has fundamental economic implications [Wolf 1981, 182].

Coinciding with the advent of zoning was the master plan, which in theory zoning ordinances were and are to be based upon. Without the master plan, zoning becomes

vulnerable to charges of being arbitrary government intervention. The master plan, though often only advisory in nature and lacking any regulatory power (zoning was to be the mechanism of enforcement), was based upon the planner's use of Positive Knowledge. It is supposed to be a policy statement, taking into account present and future highway and road improvements, utility services, and other physical components of town development; it was to be a comprehensive picture of the community and its future development. "The basic idea [of a master plan] is the creation of a pleasant, livable, desirable community" (Wolf 1981, 147). While these plans might have been based upon expected future demands of the land-market, the concept of deciding in advance by the government of how land should be used, while consistent with RCP, went against the American land-use tradition of depending on the market.

The environmental land-use reform movement of the 1970s is an example of the weaknesses of the RCP paradigm when the planner is advocating an institutional change. The state land-use legislation encouraged by the environmental movement, while not meaning to challenge the land-market system, was advocating centralized regulation of permissible land-uses. "[T]he common, defining feature of centralized regulatory programs is that they add regional, state, or federal intervention to land-use decisions that had been entirely local" (Popper 1981, 13). In accord with RCP, it was assumed that from the state level, planners would have a more comprehensive view that was necessary for environmental protection than was possible for local governments. It was also assumed that environmental protection, as defined by the movement, would be in the public interest. And it was assumed that the effects of state legislation could be predicted to an adequate degree.

In practical administrative terms, regulation is a straightforward procedure. A regulated interest seeks permission from a regulatory agency for approval of an action it wants to take. The agency, acting under the guidance of its legislation, can approve, disapprove, or approve conditionally. It must then make sure the regulated interest does as it has been told. The agency also has the responsibility of watching over the continuing actions of the regulated interest to make sure it does not violate the regulatory legislation. The regulatory agency and the regulated interest can appeal each other's actions to the courts [Popper 1981, 18].

Besides the problems involved in implementation, the advocates of this legislation did not realize that their metaphor of land were foreign to those of the average American.

In particular, the movement never understood how different, even alien, its own approaches were from those that most Americans, if they thought about the matter, would have preferred. Land-use reformers rarely seemed to grasp the force of the opposed private property sentiment or the depth of the enmity they were arousing until it was too late [Popper 1981, 210].

The most successful reform legislation had two features. The first was a strong citizen participation in the creation of the legislation. The second was that much of the public was trying to protect what they considered to be their rights, and saw concrete benefits from the legislation. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act (1972) exemplifies both of these traits.

For many voters, including those who held property elsewhere, the coastal issue often meant not environmental protection or private property rights but continued public access to beaches and other attractive shore areas. These persons were willing to vote for any measure that promised to preserve that access, which they considered their right [Popper 1981, 101].

While the land-use reform movement was not a failure and considering what it was up against can be considered to be successful in that sense, by its own standards it left much work to be done. It becomes obvious that any new reform movement that aimed at removing land from the influences of the market on a permanent basis would be unpopular. RCP cannot deal with changes in conceptualizing reality because it accepts one view of reality as possibly being valid.

The environmental movement of the 1970s, while not intending to threaten the land market, was trying to add nonmarket considerations, through the state and federal levels of government, into land-use decisions. While it was somewhat successful, its success was limited by the fact that

The movement has never effectively dealt with the purely material, self-aggrandizing, economic interest in land. The movement wanted land to begin to be treated primarily as a resource that was subject to stringent centralized regulation. The opposition wanted it to continue to be treated primarily as a loosely and locally regulated commodity on which its owners could make a profit--with luck, a killing [Popper 1981, 212].

In using a modified RCP paradigm, the movement avoided dealing with the role of land in American society, and land's symbolic significance.

In summarizing the RCP paradigm, four features stand out. It rested on a version of rationality that was believed to be best for establishing the "truth." This rationality allowed the planner to understand the "real" situation, which included the definition of the public interest. The ideal planner was a neutral technician who used rationality to make optimal decisions (from an "objective" point of view). The planner's claim to a comprehensive view of a situation supported the idea of centralized coordination or control. While the RCP paradigm is no longer dominant, it had an effect on all following styles of planning, including Transactive planning.

4.3 Transactive Planning

[I]n accord with custom, planning stands for advance decisionmaking. . . . For this traditional connotation, I shall now substitute the linking of knowledge to action as the essential meaning of planning. In this formulation, planning is concerned with neither knowledge nor with action alone, but with *the mediation between them* [Friedmann 1978, 166].

In *Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning*, Friedmann (1973) redefines the role of the planner, within his style of Learning Theory, from one who makes decisions in advance to one who links knowledge and action by helping communities and people solve their own problems. Instead of doing away with multiple perspectives, Friedmann shows how different perspectives are necessary and how the planner's perspective can add to that of the clients'. Friedmann does this by presenting two different types of knowledge: *processed knowledge* and *personal knowledge*.⁴

Each has a different method of knowing: the planner works chiefly with processed knowledge abstracted from the world and manipulated according to certain postulates of theory and scientific method; his client works primarily from the personal knowledge he draws directly from experience. Although personal knowledge is much richer in content and in its ability to differentiate among the minutiae of daily life, it is less systematized and orderly than processed knowledge. It is also less capable of being

⁴In this paper, Friedmann's *personal knowledge* is differentiated from the *Personal Knowledge* of Weaver, Jessop, and Das (1983) on the basis of capitalization.

generalized and, therefore, is applicable only to situations where the environment has not been subject to substantial change. The "rule of thumb" by which practical people orient their actions is useful only so long as the context of action remains the same. Processed knowledge, on the other hand, implies a theory about some aspect of the world. Limited in scope, it offers a general explanation for the behavior of a small number of variables operating under a specified set of constraints [Friedmann 1973, 172-173].

Friedmann's personal knowledge encompasses not only Personal Knowledge, but also some Sociological Knowledge, though what is possessed of the latter is seen by the holder to be of a personal nature. Processed knowledge, being scientific and often statistical in nature, is Positive Knowledge, but it mostly carries its assumptions from Sociological Knowledge. Learning theory is center around Personal Knowledge (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983). Because of this classification of knowledge, Transactive Planning can accept different world-views as being valid and rejects the notion of "one true world-view."

Transactive Planning centers on the relationship between the planner and client, and how knowledge is exchanged.

Scientific or *processed knowledge* and *personal knowledge* would be mixed in a *transactive style of planning* through *mutual learning* in a *life of dialogue*. . . . The future would be created by establishing a *learning society*, re-educating people to work together on shared tasks [Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 24].

Planning is not just the exchange of knowledge, but also the creation of knowledge. This is because knowledge is a process, not an artifact. "Substance and process become meshed" (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 24). The essence of the relationship between planner and client is best understood in terms of dialogue and mutual learning.

4.3.1 dialogue and mutual learning

Radical practice is carried out into the world upon the living word of dialogue. In dialogue we engage the other in the fullness of his being-as-a-person and therefore as an equal. All dialogue is open ended and allows for transformation of the self and other in a process of transactive learning. The life of dialogue is thus a medium of transforming action [Friedmann 1979, 39].

Dialogue, as presented in chapter two, is a context of communication in which it is recognized that information is not independent of the persons through whom it becomes available. Each person addresses the other directly, the substance of communication is about shared interest of mutual concern, and people communicate their world-views to others. Dialogue is not just a form of communication, but "is a particular form of human relation. Not a form of speech but carried on the groundswell of the spoken word, it might be more properly called a relation in dialogue" (Friedmann 1979, 103-104). Dialogue is a relationship which encourages self-transformation by all involved; in order to enter dialogue one must be courageous enough to be vulnerable and open to change (Friedmann 1973, 1979). "Dialogue is a reciprocal relation. Open toward the partner in dialogue, it pretends no artifice; it is itself alone" (Friedmann 1979, 64). When planner and client come together in dialogue, mutual learning can result.

In mutual learning, the Positive Knowledge of the planner becomes linked with the Personal Knowledge of the client. It is the joining together of these two types of knowledge that is the basis of linking knowledge and action.

In mutual learning, planner and client each learn from the other--the planner from the client's personal knowledge, the client from the planner's technical expertise. In this process, the knowledge of both undergoes a major change. A common image of the situation evolves through dialogue; a new understanding of the possibilities for change is discovered. And in accord with this new knowledge, the client will be predisposed to act [Friedmann 1973, 185].

Mutual learning can only occur in the course of dialogue. People involved in mutual learning must be relating to each other as individuals, and not as social actors, because in dialogue, the other must be treated as an equal. "Radical practice seeks neither to dominate nor to exercise coercive power" (Friedmann 1979, 40). Because the planner and the client work together as equals, the planner must also be open to change. The planner can encourage change only by opening him or herself to change. But it also takes patience to allow for the other to change at his or her own rate; while change can be encouraged, it cannot be forced from the outside.

The same principle applies to mutual learning. Learning cannot be imposed; it obeys the laws by which a structure of thinking, feeling, and valuing is changed. The planner may learn rapidly. But the more he assimilates his client's knowledge, the greater the complexity of which he is aware. To change the reasons why people act the way they do and produce the results they do, one must respect the processes by which they learn. . . . Students do not learn because their teachers want them to. They learn only when they are ready to accept the new perceptions and to make new images their own [Friedmann 1973, 186-188].

In order to encourage the client to change, the planner must have some understanding of the client's structure of thinking, feeling, and valuing. How change is induced must be consistent and complementary to this structure. The planner must try to locate the motivation, that already exists within the client, for change.

Similarly, the planner involved in mutual learning will not start by destroying the world view of his client. He will withhold his judgements, respecting his client's freedom and autonomy. To begin a restructuring of the client's field of cognition, the planner must discover within that field itself the points that provide an opening. What are the client's interests? What are the inconsistencies in his way of thinking and feeling? What are his secret doubts? What aspects of his knowledge are not supported by the values he affirms? It is through a process of selective focusing at such critical points that the planner can achieve the transformation and expansion of his client's learning [Friedmann 1973, 188].

While the planner cannot find this opening until involved in the dialogue, the work necessary to find this opening starts before the dialogue. The methodology proposed in the last chapter might be called "a prelude to mutual learning," because it precedes the dialogical relationship. Not only does the methodology suggest an initial context for communication, but it also suggests what the planner should look for in the course of dialogue. It can be considered to be part of the homework that Transactive Planning requires on the part of the planner.

4.3.2 mutual learning, metaphors, and the learning society

The invention of a metaphor full of illustrative power is the achievement of genius. It is to create by saying "no" to the old associations, the things that have constantly gone together, the things already sorted, and "yes" to new associations by crossing old sorts to make new ones. but it is also an achievement to "undress" a hidden metaphor that has become part of the traditional way of allowcating the facts, for this too involves

breeding old association [Turbayne 1970, 57].

An important object of mutual learning is that the client is to learn to become more aware of his or her own interpretive strategies and to become self-critical. This is similar to one of the objectives of the education programs for Brazilian and Chilean peasants run by Freire (1973). Freire wanted the peasants to realize that much of what they believed to be natural in origin was actually cultural, and that as members of that culture they had the right to participate in and to shape the culture. To rephrase this in terms of metaphors, the client is to be aided in recognizing that his or her interpretation of the world is metaphoric, and not literal, in nature. "There is a difference between using a metaphor and taking it literally, between using a model and mistaking it for the thing modeled" (Turbayne 1970, 3). To recognise a metaphor allows one to evaluate it in terms of various kinds of knowledge, and to change it. In the first step of mutual learning the planner is not handing over a new schema of metaphors to the client, but is aiding the client to become aware of some of his or her own metaphors.

This is important in a learning society. Friedmann (1973) defined that a learning society is able to guide its own development.

American society needs a heightened capacity for learning about itself and, to make what it learns effective in guiding its own development, a way to transform learning into appropriate actions. This implies that we must find a way to join scientific and technical intelligence with personal knowledge at the critical points for social intervention. I have argued that transactive planning is the most appropriate method for achieving this linkage [Friedmann 1973, 190].

The learning society would have structural conditions for a transactive style of planning to be maximized. "Transactive planning integrates processes of mutual learning with an organized capacity and willingness to act" (Friedmann 1973, 195). The society must be able to learn from its environment. This does not only mean that it adapts to an environment that changes in unexpected ways, but that it changes the way it views the environment when its vision no longer fits the environment.

In order to be flexible, the learning society needs a cellular structure of organization. This type of organization strongly links the learning individual to social institutions. "A society organized according to this principle would have as its smallest effective unit the *task-oriented working group*" (Friedmann 1973, 196). These working groups may be characterized by such features as temporary, small scale, interpersonal, voluntary membership, self-guiding, and responsible. They are centered around a task, and disband when the task is complete. Working groups communicate with other groups, which results in *networks* of communication. Members of the groups are to identify themselves with the society and not the groups and networks that they are part of at any one moment; this encourages the cellular structure to be *permeable*, for working groups and networks to have open memberships, and to be easily created and disbanded.

While present American society is not a learning society, the structure of the learning society can serve as guidelines for the activity of CLT proponents. Transactive Planning can occur outside of the learning society.

If transactive planning skills are to be learned, therefore, what better way is there than to establish task-related working groups in which transactive planning naturally will take place because it is essential to the groups's performance? In other words, the requisite cognitive and interpersonal skills will be developed in individuals because they are engaged in transactive planning [Friedmann 1973, 240].

Because Transactive Planning does not make use of central coordination, a "cell" can be created at any time by CLT proponents. "As the complexity of the task increases, new cells may be created" (Friedmann 1973, 240). In these cells dialogue occurs. Dialogue holds the group together.

Beyond dialogue lies the cognitive effort itself. Theories formulated in the course of the work will come to be tested in practice, a critical review must follow. Experts may be asked to join in group deliberations and in the formulation of a course of action. But mutual learning is not confined to the dialogue between members and experts. Each member, himself possessing special knowledge, will of necessity impart his learning to others, just as he will learn in turn [Friedmann 1973, 241].

Learning must be widely diffused throughout the social body. "A guided transformation of society is possible only insofar as it begins with a transformation of man" (Friedmann 1973, 231). The learning society is dependent upon the existence of the learning man. Since the CLT proponents do not exist in a learning society, they must, through dialogue and mutual learning encourage the rise of this learning man.

If man is to learn effectively, four of his abilities must be strengthened: the ability to question existing reality, the ability to draw general lessons from concrete experience, the ability to test these lessons in practice, and the ability sincerely to examine the results [Friedmann 1973, 232].

The ability to question reality corresponds to the discovery of hidden metaphors, and the ability to draw general lessons from concrete experience corresponds to the creation of new metaphors. This occurs during mutual learning. The testing of these metaphors, and the evaluation of them occurs during action based on them.

The methodology presented is to aid planners to lead clients to question their own metaphors about land. This strengthens the ability to question existing reality, by the recognition that the conceptualization of land is not inherent in land, but is created by people. The planner will only be in the position to suggest new land metaphors after the clients recognize and question their own metaphors. If new land metaphors are adopted, they might not be the ones that are suggested by the planner, but ones created in the process of dialogue. Since the planner would be part of this dialogue, he or she would be participating in the creation of these new metaphors. The core of Transactive Planning is this participation in dialogue. RCP does not allow for the understanding of a situation where two groups can have conflicting views of reality.

4.4 Redefining the Land-Use Planner's Role

Transactive Planning redefines the role of a land-use planner. This occurs because the land-use planner is not interested in a new set of problems. The goals of any land-use planning activity now includes the question of these goals in a very broad manner. It is assumed that the planner, by himself or herself, is inadequate to the task of planning

and must work with the client in questioning the many assumptions that are normally made. This new role includes a framework which allows for the type of communication that is required for the establishment of dialogue.

For the land-use planner who agrees with the CLT proponent's critique of ownership and control of land in the United States, it is no longer meaningful to describe land as being either public or private property (ICE 1982).

As simple labels, the terms do not fit the complicated property arrangements we have been discussing, and they divert attention from the dynamic nature of these modern arrangements. If the problems facing American individuals and communities are to be solved, a new understanding of property is needed--an understanding based on a clear view of the ways in which individual and community interest are related [ICE 1982, 16-17]

Yet the planner is limited to using the language of the client. If the planner introduces new metaphors, they are likely to be misunderstood and rejected. This is because the American culture already attaches many strong symbolic images to land which are not easily changed or discarded. When planners decide that *they* are going to provide new land metaphors, the new metaphors are usually rejected by the public. A planning strategy based on the RCP paradigm which is meant to produce this sort of change will meet great resistance. An example of this is the environmental land-use reform movement of the 1970s.

Land exists within a cultural context, and even if it could be done, it is not the land-use planner's place to change and create a new culture in order to dictate land-use policy. Rather, the planner must find a way to share his or her processed knowledge with the client. Together they can create new metaphors, if new ones are desired by the client, which would be the result of mixing Positive and Personal Knowledge. This could be best achieved under Transactive Planning because it encourages self-transformation through mutual learning. The land-use planner now wants to enter into a dialogue with the client so mutual learning can occur. For the planner to limit his or her activity to the making of master plans, reviewing zoning ordinances, or demanding centralized regulation is

premature, since each of these activities are based upon a certain conceptualization of what are land-use problems and how they should be solved. While it is expected that the planner would have notions of what the problems and the solutions are before dialogue, no action is taken until mutual learning occurs, and the action taken can differ from that which the planner previously envisioned.

Transactive Planning itself is not neutral, but is supposed to result in solutions that are a continuation of the Transactive Planning process. "There does, in fact, appear to be an irreducible ideological component in every historical account of reality" (White 1973, 21). If the land-use planner limits him- or herself to creating a dialogue without realizing the full political implications of dialogue, then the types of answers that Transactive Planning is supposed to come up with will not materialize. "Despite its discussion of perspectivism, Learning Theory [e.g. Transactive Planning] as such has avoided serious treatment of ideology and social power relations; viz. the fundamental attributes of Sociological Knowledge" (Weaver, Jessop, and Das 1983, 25). The ideology of Transactive Planning and/or the reason for initiating it will be at the level of its entire approach. This is particularly relevant in terms of the types of land-use problems the CLT proponents view.

While CLTs can be used in many situations, by different groups, the planner who supports them is concerned with creating access to land for those who presently do not have it, namely the poor. By turning renters into leaseholders, protecting farms from subdivision pressures, and having communities retain the value that they, as a whole, have invested into the land, they are trying to shift the political control over the land from economic forces of the land market and the owners of land to those who live on the land. This is better understood when it is known that 75 percent of the privately held land in America is owned by 5 percent of the private landholders, and that absentee ownership is increasingly common (ICE 1982).⁵ The opponents of land-use and land reform

⁵"Three percent of the population owns about 55 percent of all American land and 95 percent of the private acreage, most of it in ranches, farms, and forests. This includes ownership by fewer than six hundred companies and corporations of about 11 percent of the nation's land area, and some 23 percent of all private land in America" (Wolf 1981, xiii).

include many who do not have anything to gain through CLTs. "They are in the main united; they know exactly what they want: the status quo, which has benefited them for years, or something as close to it as possible' (Popper 1981, 94). This does not mean that those who have little to gain from the status quo will support change, no matter how complete their understanding of the problem is.

It is this last group that are the potential clients of planners. It is with them that Transactive Planning could have its greatest success if it can lead to action that overcomes the social power relationships. Not only do CLTs need money to operate, and to buy land,⁶ but a hostile local government can make development of CLT land difficult, though a cooperative one can greatly aid the formation of a CLT. The planner's processed knowledge would have to include sources of information and material support, and how successful and unsuccessful attempts at starting CLTs have dealt with these problems.⁷ And the planner has to be aware that in a non-"learning society" the planner's processed knowledge must include Transactive Planning itself and how to initiate a dialogue.

The methodology presented in chapter three is not only a method of generating and organizing Sociological Knowledge, but also Positive Knowledge. In order that it is properly used in the context of Transactive Planning, its Sociological Knowledge base as well of that of Transactive Planning must be understood so its limits can be noted. Its intended use is to aid in starting the communication that dialogue, mutual learning, and, ultimately, Transactive Planning, depends upon.

4.5 Methodology and Communication

The purpose of the methodology is to help initiate communication between the planner and the client. It was designed to be used in Transactive Planning; by itself the methodology is insufficient for the establishment of dialogue, and it does not cover all of the issues involved in how land is controlled. Nor is it meant to. By taking a

⁶The ICE has a revolving loan fund to aid in the setting up of CLTs.

⁷The ICE also serves as a clearing house of CLT case studies and technical information for CLTs and people interested in them.

relativistic view of conceptualizations, it does not deal directly with social power relations, though this should be a concern to the land-use planner.

It does deal with how land is interpreted within a cultural context, and how that interpretation is part of a person's ideology and conceptualization of an idealized social system. Any such conceptualization can be seen to be based upon an underlying schema of metaphors; metaphors which are reinforced by the subject's ideology and affect how land is perceived. Any change of a person's schema is not the result of social engineering by an "outsider," but by the person being self-critical, and this self-criticism can be aided by another subject. But if and how self-transformation occurs is dependent upon many factors, such as social position of the person. Those who benefit from the present system and/or find security--be it financial, social, psychological, etc.--in it are unlikely to turn against it.

The methodology is to help initiate a dialogue in a way that is non-threatening to the client by showing that the planner or proponents are concerned about the same goals and interests. Processed and personal knowledge can not be joined until the client believes that the processed knowledge is relevant to the client's life and interests.

It is also important that other sources of trust exist between client and planner before the dialogue is initiated. This trust is not established over the content of the dialogue, but on a more personal basis. Marie Cirillo, one of the founders of the Community Land Association CLT in Clairfield, Tennessee only suggested the idea of CLTs after living in the town for over 10 years (ICE 1982). In dialogue, the person is part of the message, and is an integral part of communication. While the methodology does not cover this facet of dialogue, it is meant to be helpful in the introduction of the subject itself once other pre-conditions of dialogue are met.

The analysis done in chapter three shows that on the national level, CLT proponents and the RC do share some concerns about the interests of the individual. That while the RC believes that these interests are best served by the private ownership of land and the CLT proponent holds an alternative to this, they are both trying to ensure the security of the individual in terms of land tenure. They both (in theory) allow for a

person not only to feel secure but also to reap what they have sown. They both see the family as a legitimate social unit, in which property can be passed on. And they both view the individual to be living in a capitalist society.

But they differ in how they view community interests. The RC sees no conflict between community interest and individual interests, provided the former are allowed to arise from the latter. While the CLT proponents see interdependence between community and individual interest, they believe that these interests can come into conflict with each other, so some acceptable balance needs to be defined. This difference also reflects that the RC's community is often societal in nature, while the CLT proponent views community in geographical terms. While this analysis can serve as a guide to a planner, the planner should realize that this analysis was largely meant to be an example of the methodology, and not a substitute for the planner's own analysis of a particular situation.

Neither the analysis nor the methodology show that the population represented by the subject is non-homogenous. Any community in the United States will differ from the RC prototype which was the basis of this analysis. Thus, this methodology should be re-done for every community in which the planner works, to give the planner a better understanding of the immediate local issues, culture, and values. And even within a small community, the population is still best considered to be non-homogeneous; even if a common ideology is prevalent, there will be a difference in how social power is held. The methodology only becomes a useful planning tool after the planner recognizes its limitations.

The methodology can aid the planner to allow for communication to occur in a situation so that each subject understands the language of the other. Until this is accomplished dialogue, and thus mutual learning, is not possible. And once dialogue is established, the planner can try to advance it so that the client realizes that its strategy of interpretation is *interpretation*, and that other interpretations, even if not desirable, are possible.

The methodology does no more than suggest an approach on initiating communication. The planner must be flexible once dialogue begins to change his or her theories on

where the his or her and the client's schema of land metaphors coincide and where they conflict. Dialogue is to have a life of its own, a life that the planner is to participate in but not control. The methodology is best taken as a first or early step on the part of the planner, but it is a step on a much longer journey that is not only along an unmarked path, but also enters the unexplored wilderness itself.

4.6 Summary: The Spirit of Transactive Planning

Unless teaching can be placed on the firm ground of a trusting relationship, mutual learning will be reduced to a mere trickle of disconnected facts from teacher to student and expert to client [Friedmann 1973, 238].

In order to enter into dialogue with the client, a planner must heighten his or her own, and the client's, ability to dialogue. Dialogue is difficult to initiate and sustain, especially if the planner and/or the client feel threatened. The methodology and analysis presented in chapter three is meant to help a planner to be able to demonstrate that his or her values are not alien to the client.

In order for planners to succeed in their goal, which involves the solution of certain problems related to land tenure and land-use, they must view dialogue as something more than the mere exchange of information. Dialogue must be elevated to mutual learning and a form of relationship. When dialogue is fitted into the process of Transactive Planning this becomes possible. Dialogue is a valid part of planning when it has the potential to result in action.

But before the planner can teach anything, they must be able to learn. Freire writes about the time when peasants were shown a picture of a drunk man and two sober men. The purpose of the picture was to lead into a dialogue that would be about the evils of alcohol. But when the peasants were asked who the hard working people were in the picture, they said it was the drunk, because he was obviously a hard working man who drank because he did not earn enough to support his family. While this shocked the presentors of the picture, it allowed for a dialogue on the problems of

alcoholism in terms of the role alcohol played in peasant society rather than a lecture on the "evils" of alcohol which would not have been effective. The educators had to learn from their "students" before they could impart what they had to say. In practising Transactive Planning, the proponent must start learning from and about the client before dialogue even begins.

If the land-use planner has a view of land that makes his or her a CLT proponent then Transactive Planning would be an appropriate style of planning. The planner will always have some viewpoint and this viewpoint will affect all of his or her actions, including how he or she participates in dialogue or makes suggestions. Transactive Planning recognizes this by making the planner a full participant in the planning process while not leaving him or her in control of the process.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

A land-use planner who is interested in changing social institutions related to land should not ignore the cultural values that link land and these institutions. While these institutions exist for many reasons besides the cultural values of a society, these values are important when a planner communicates new knowledge to a client. Transactive Planning is capable of acknowledging the importance of values in communication, and by linking knowledge and action goes beyond communication to the implementation of policies. In order to successfully practice Transactive Planning, it is necessary for planners to be able to communicate their knowledge so as to be able to initiate dialogue.

In this paper I have addressed some of the problems related to communicating knowledge when a dialogue is being initiated. As Friedmann points out, this knowledge cannot be understood independently of dialogue when dialogue is a context of communication. Friedmann's work has concentrated on basing a style of planning on a person-centered context of communication, but not only must a planner be authentic in wanting to establish a trusting relationship with the client. In this paper I have looked at communication within the context of dialogue, because a planner needs to be able to understand and to be understood, especially when initiating dialogue. This ability is related to the problems of communicating the subject-matter of a dialogue, in terms of how people understand language. In Transactive Planning the planner listens to the client; this paper is meant to raise questions of how the planner should listen.

How the planner listens and speaks to the client is one of the planner's contexts of communication. How any listener interprets utterances is shaped by the contexts he or she listens in, so if the planner and the client are listening to each other in a similar manner, then they will be interpreting the words of each other in a way consistent with the intentions of the other. If a planner identifies which contexts he or she shares with the client, then these contexts can lead to the establishment of a common ground for

dialogue. One problem in attempting to initiate a dialogue is how to find a context that they share so it can become, initially, the dominant context of the dialogue.

If the planner and the client share some of the same values and goals, even if they hold different world-views, the planner's attempt at communication should be initially centered around what he or she believes they do share. The context of values is very important to communication and is intimately related to dialogue because dialogue is supposed to be based on the common concerns of the participants. The values that the planner and the client share and define in a similar manner can form the initial context of communication. These shared values will serve as reference points, a context of communication which will aid in ensuring that the planner and the client understand each other. They are the common ground that both the planner and the client can base their dialogue on, and refer to when new knowledge is introduced. I am not saying that they will agree with each other about what should be done, what the situation is, or even the validity of the other's statements. Agreement on how to interpret each other's words allow for agreement on what they are disagreement about. This is opposed to a case of disagreement where they are talking past each other. The planner's objective is to reach this level of agreement.

The initial context that is identified by the planner is tentative at best. A planner is limited in both estimating the contexts possessed by the client and in letting any one context dominate how he or she communicates. Proper listening is not based upon the scientific establishment of the "proper" context of communication, but upon how the planner makes use of a context which he or she believes is shared with the client. If the planner is listening carefully, he or she should note contradictions between both the client's and his or her own utterances, and what the planner expected to hear. This is because just as a text can contradict its contexts, an utterance can challenge the manner in which it is listened. The common context is not something that is agreed upon by the planner and the client, but evolves during the course of dialogue. The purpose of the initial context of the planner is to aid the planner in understanding and being understood. It is

based upon the planner's attempts to put him or herself in the client's shoes, and then exploring where they might agree on how they interpret some aspect of the world.

Once the common ground of dialogue is established, it will change and grow as dialogue continues. This is because dialogue is a dynamic process which is not limited to the initial common ground, but transforms it. The initial reference points identified by the planner will be succeeded by others. As dialogue continues what the planner and the client agree that they agree about will change. They can both change their minds about established opinions, create new areas of agreement, or decide that they do not agree on issues that they previously agreed on. Any context that the planner starts with is likely to be discarded as dialogue by the time dialogue is established.

The importance of how the planner and the client listen will remain because they will never share the same exact contexts of communication, and it is likely that they will drift apart from time to time. This is similar to one point Martin Buber ([1932] 1970) stresses: an I-You relationship will always degenerate into an I-It relationship. The participants in a dialogue must constantly renew the I-You relationship. When listening, the participants in a dialogue will have to return, on occasion, to a point which they both agree that they understood each other, and rebuild the dialogue anew.

During dialogue, not only does the common ground change, but all other contexts can change. World-views, Transactive Planning, and even the nature of dialogue itself can change during dialogue. Planners should not believe that they possess some meta-theory of communication or planning that is the "one true reality" and thus not subject to change. Concepts such as textuality and metaphoric reality, while providing the basis for a world-view that accepts other world-views to be valid, are capable of being changed or rejected in the course of dialogue. Planners have to keep in mind that one purpose for adopting these concepts is to reveal and deconstruct dogmas, and not to establish new ones.

Perhaps what is the difficult aspect of Transactive Planning is the prodding of the client to recognize that his or her interpretation of the world is an interpretation. It is only when interpretations are recognized can we hope to avoid being unknowingly

manipulated by them. The metaphorical view of reality aids in recognizing interpretations for what they are. While metaphors can be used to deconstruct other world-views, it is also capable of being deconstructed because it is an interpretation of reality. It is still useful if knowledge is taken to be part of a process rather than a thing. Knowledge changes with action and forms the basis of action. This paper is concerned with the action of initiating dialogue, and knowledge that is important to this.

A land-use planner who wants to communicate his or her knowledge to a client needs to tentatively identify what concerns he or she shares with the client. New knowledge is understood in terms of old knowledge. When initiating a dialogue, a planner cannot separate the subject-matter of the communication from the relationship with the client because they each affect the other. A planner who believes in a metaphorical view of reality can accept this link between communication and dialogue, and explore how differing world-views can have similarities with each other. While a metaphorical world-view does have its limitations, how communication is defined within it can aid planners in developing new strategies of communication that can lead to action.

APPENDIX ONE

DEFINITIONS

6.1 Social Category Definition Sources

6.1.1 political

Political. . . 1. Of, pertaining to, or dealing with the study, structure, or affairs of government, politics, or the state. 2. Having a definite or organized policy or structure of government. 3. Characteristic of or resembling politics, political parties, or politicians [AHD].⁸

Political Institution. The social institution, or complex of social norms and roles, that serves to maintain social order, to exercise power to compel conformity to the existing system of authority, and to provide the means for changes in the legal or administrative systems. the political institution includes the traditions and laws by which a society is coordinated and administered and is the major repository of force [MDOS].⁹

Politics. 1. That which has to do with governing. 2. Managing, directing and enforcing the affairs of public policy and decisions or of political parties. 3. That field of study which deals with civil-social problems and develops approaches to their solution [DOP].¹⁰

6.1.2 economic

Economic. . . . 1. Of or pertaining to the production, development, and management of material wealth, as of a country, household, or business enterprise. 2. Of or pertaining to economics. 3. Of or pertaining to the necessities of life; utilitarian [AHD].

Economy. . . 3. The management of the resources of a country, community, or business: *the American economy*. 4.a. A system for the management and development of resources: *an agricultural economy*. b. The economic system of a country or area [AHD].

Economic Institution. The system of social roles and norms organized

⁸AHD = *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*. (1971) Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

⁹MDOS = Theodorson, George A. and Theodorson, Achilles G. 1969, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

¹⁰Angeles, Peter A. 1981. *Dictionary of Philosophy*, New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

about the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. The function of the economic institution is to provide for the material needs and demands of the members of a society, ranging from the basic means for survival to goods intended for conspicuous consumption [MDOC].

6.1.3 legal

Legal. . . 1. Of, relating to, or concerned with law: *legal papers*. 2.a. Authorized by or based on law: *a legal act*. b. Established by law; statutory. 3. In conformity with or permitted by law; statutory. 4. Recognized or enforced by law rather than by equity. 5. In terms of or created by the law: *a legal offense* [AHD].

6.1.4 social

Social. . . 1.a. Living together in communities. b. Characterizing such communal living. c. Of or pertaining to society. 2. Living in an organized group or similar close aggregate: *social insects*. 3. Involving allies or members of a confederacy [AHD].

Social. Having to do with interrelationships between individuals or groups. A social factor is said to exist when the behavior of even one individual is affected by another person or group, whether that person (or persons) is physically present or not [MDOS].

Social Control. Any social or cultural means by which systematic and relatively consistent restraints are imposed upon individual behavior and by which people are motivated to adhere to traditions and patterns of behavior that are important to the smooth function of a group of society. . . . The term is usually defined so that the end of social control is seen as order and the attainment of social values, and not exploitation, selfish gain, or the benefit of those who have power [MDOS].

Social Process. Any identifiable, repetitive pattern of social interaction [MDOS]

Social Reality. The reality, or conception of what actually exists, that is established and maintained by the consensus of the group. A stable worldview with regard to existence of phenomena requires the validation of other people [MDOS].

6.2 Goal Dictionary Definitions

6.2.1 security

Security. . . 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. 3. Anything that gives or assumes safety. . . . 6. *Plural*. Written evidence of ownership of creditorship; especially, a stock certificate. 7. Measures adopted to guarantee freedom or security of action, communication, or the like, as in wartime [AHD].

6.2.2 individual equity

Individual. . . 1.a. Of or pertaining to a single human being. b. By or for one person: *and individual portion*. 2. Existing as a distinct entity; single; separate [AHD].

Equity. . . 1.a. The state, ideal, or quality of being just, impartial, and fair. 2. Something that is just, impartial, and fair. 3. The residual value of a business or property beyond any mortgage thereon and liability therein. 4. *Law*. . . . c. An equitable right or claim [AHD].

6.2.3 individual legacy

Legacy. . . 1. Money or property bequeathed to someone by a will. 2. Something handed down from an ancestor or predecessor, or from the past [AHD].

6.2.4 community access

Community. . . 1.a. A group of people living in the same locality and under the same government. b. The district or locality in which they live. 2. A social group or class having common interest. . . . 4. Society as a whole; the public. . . . 6. Common possession or participation [AHD].

Community. 1. A concentrated settlement of people in a limited territorial area, within which they satisfy many of their daily needs through a system of interdependent relationships. A community is a self-conscious social unit and a focus of group identification [MDOS].

Access. . . . 1. A means of approaching or nearing; passage. 2. The act

of approaching. 3. The right to enter or make use of. 4. The state or quality of being easy to approach or enter [AHD].

A community has a legitimate interest in maintaining access to its land for all of its members [ICE 1982, 7].

6.2.5 community equity

A community has a legitimate interest in retaining and utilizing for the common good whatever value it has created or nurtured [ICE 1982, 7]

6.2.6 community legacy

A community has a legitimate interest in preserving its environment and guiding its own development in a way that will provide for the legitimate interest of future generations [ICE 1982, 8].

APPENDIX TWO

SAMPLE WORKSHEETS

GOAL

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

GOAL

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

GOAL

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

sx = social category x

Chart 11 - The Goal Worksheet

GOAL

Subject

Object

Total Agreement

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

Partial Agreement

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

No Agreement

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

Conflict

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

feature(sx)

sx = social category x

Chart 12 - Isomorphism Worksheet

	Social Category	Social Category	Social category	Social Category
Metaphor	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
Metaphor	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
Metaphor	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)
	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)	feature (gx)

gx goal x (e.g. security)

Chart 13 - The Matrix Worksheet

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