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The cloves of wit : an investigation into the intelligibility of political metaphors Rayner, Jeremy David 1983

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THE CLOVES OF WIT AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF POLITICAL METAPHORS By JEREMY DAVID RAYNER B.A., Cambridge Unive r s i t y , 1975 M.A., Durham Unive r s i t y , 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1983 Jeremy David Rayner, 1983 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6 n/811 Language most shows a man. Speak, that I may see thee. Ben Jonson It i s many times with a fraudulent design that men sti c k t h e i r corrupt doctrines with the cloves of other men's wit. Thomas Hobbes ABSTRACT In recent years, philosophers of s o c i a l science have drawn attention to the contributions of suggestive models or metaphors to p o l i t i c a l understanding. In doing so, they have suggested a d i s t i n c t i o n between models or archetypes of great scope and generality — p o l i t i c s seen as mechanical or organic r e l a t i o n s , for example — and the in d i v i d u a l metaphorical utterances i n which they are presented. Historians of p o l i t i c a l thought have made a similar d i s t i n c t i o n between 'languages' or 'ideologies' which prescribe norms and conventions for p o l i t i c a l argument, and the expression and development of these languages and ideologies i n texts. This d i s s e r t a t i o n shows these two developments to be complementary by investigating the extent to which p o l i t i c a l languages or ideologies are themselves made up of suggestive models of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Taking our point of departure from Max Black's suggestion that a metaphor be seen as "the t i p of a submerged model," we s h a l l look for such models i n groups of p o l i t i c a l metaphors sharing the same theme. Analysis of the concept 'metaphor' shows that understanding a metaphorical utterance i s conditional upon a reader recreating a context i n which the ground of the metaphorical i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s rendered i n t e l l i g i b l e by the point of the utterance. This distinguishes p o l i t i c a l metaphors from metaphors used i n explanatory' or l i t e r a r y contexts. The p r i n c i p l e d strategies which authors and audiences use to produce and comprehend metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l contexts are then shown to u t i l i z e e x i s t i n g conceptual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n the form of 'metaphorical f i e l d s ' embedded i n p o l i t i c a l discourse. These f i e l d s bring together abstract metaphor themes and concrete p o l i t i c a l doctrines to create p o l i t i c a l metaphors. In a f i e l d , the p o l i t i c a l value of 'imagery' — medicine, theatre, parts of the body or family r e l a t i o n s — remains r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d . Using i l l u s t r a t i o n s mainly from metaphorical f i e l d s i n which p o l i t i c s i s seen as a therapeutic a c t i v i t y , p o l i t i c a l metaphors are shown to functions as maps, o r i e n t i n g men i n a p o l i t i c a l world that i s t h e i r own creation. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i i ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS v i PREFACE x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xix CHAPTER ONE 1 CHAPTER TWO 23 CHAPTER THREE 67 CHAPTER FOUR 114 CHAPTER FIVE 155 CHAPTER SIX 200 CHAPTER SEVEN 251 CHAPTER EIGHT 2 93 FOOTNOTES 317 BIBLIOGRAPHY 3 46 v ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 1 I 'Models' and 'languages' distinguished from metaphorical utterances - outline of project. II Delimiting the topic; general and technical studies i n l i n g u i s t i c s and i n p o l i t i c a l studies. I l l The analogy between understanding a metaphor and interpreting a text - f i r s t and second order statements about p o l i t i c a l metaphor. 2. TWO IDEAS FOR ONE: METAPHORS RECONSIDERED 23 I Identifying metaphors; the danger of s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s - conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n required. II A ' c l a s s i c a l ' theory of metaphor; "improper s i g n i f i c a t i o n " and "tra n s l a t i o n " as c r i t e r i a of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n - t h i s i s a FORMULAIC approach; i t s defects cannot be overcome by making the formula more sophisticated. I l l L i n g u i s t i c treatments of metaphor; metaphors i n the 'language-code' - problems with locating metaphors at the l e v e l of the word - metaphors as strategies of interpretation - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and meaning as d i s t i n c t problems. IV Identifying metaphors not a l i n g u i s t i c problem - a knack or s k i l l , l i k e recognizing a joke; no 'metaphorical warrant". V Theories of metaphorical interpretation - Max Black and the INNOVATION account; c r i t i c i s m s of innovation theories, e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r denial of the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i t e r a l paraphrase and the notion of i n t e r a c t i o n . VI John Searle and INDIRECTION accounts; saying one thing and meaning another as an alternative to semantic innovation - Donald Davidson and CONSEQUENTIALIST accounts; the e f f e c t s of a metaphorical utterance. VII Metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n s defined - t h i s d e f i n i t i o n indebted to the work of Searle and Grice. 3. RECOGNITION AND RESEMBLANCE: "CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR" IN POLITICS 67 I Objections to the treatment of metaphors as an aspect of language; 'metaphors i n thought' and the CONSTRUCTIVIST approach - i t s dangers - words as dead metaphors; the FOSSIL theory of metaphor - the value of reminders of the conceptual connections displayed i n a metaphor. II The c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory of p o l i t i c a l metaphor - a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory of p o l i t i c a l language distinguished from the claim that a l l p o l i t i c a l language i s metaphorical -a 'weak', non-constructivist theory of p o l i t i c a l language considered and rejected - p o l i t i c a l l i f e 'constructed' i n v i p o l i t i c a l language; p o l i t i c a l discourse. I l l The f o s s i l theory behind the view that a l l p o l i t i c a l language i s metaphorical - problems with the notion of 'resemblance' here - resemblance created within discourse. IV The contribution of conceptual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s to the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of metaphors; (i) symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and extradiscursive factors ( i i ) i n t r a d i s c u r s i v e 'pictures' analysed as metaphorical f i e l d s within discourse. VI Summary. 4. THE RHETORICAL STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL METAPHORS 114 I Conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphors as indicators of the existence of metaphorical f i e l d s - they are conventional because they have conventional uses i n argument. II 'The organic conception of the state' decomposed into three conventional metaphors - the d i s t i n c t i o n s not based on 'imagery' but on differences i n the doctrines they are used to express - coherences between metaphors and doctrines. I l l P o l i t i c a l metaphors and 'seeing as' - what does a p o l i t i c a l metaphor make us notice? - noticing and knowledge. IV Rhetorical strategies used to l i n k metaphors with doctrines - exploiting semantic ambiguity, creating a r h e t o r i c a l world and using p o l i t i c a l symbols. V P o l i t i c a l metaphors may describe but cannot j u s t i f y conduct unaided - a background doctrine c a r r i e s the burden of j u s t i f i c a t i o n - metaphors make us notice t h i s background; an example from the theory of patriarchalism. 5. IDENTITY AND MEANING: POLITICAL METAPHORS IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT 155 I Closure of context and meaning - some problems with Judith Shklar's account of how to study p o l i t i c a l metaphors h i s t o r i c a l l y . II Quentin Skinner's methodology as an alternative; treating utterances as meaningful actions - two examples, a novel metaphor and a conventional metaphor -locating metaphors i n id e o l o g i c a l disputes. I l l Scepticism about the concept 'ideology' - where are self-professed ideologists? - i d e n t i f y i n g ideologies i n the b e l i e f s and attitudes held by r e a l h i s t o r i c a l agents. IV These b e l i e f s and attitudes present a puzzle; what i s t h e i r r e l a t i o n to conduct? - not prudential reasoning, but judgements of value. V Can t h i s notion of ideology serve as a "context of meaning" for metaphorical utterances? - ideology and doctrine - conventional metaphors as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c components of id e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s . VI The example of "Victorian c r i t i c s of democracy" - dis t i n g u i s h between metaphor themes cutting across i d e o l o g i c a l boundaries and v i i metaphorical f i e l d s embedded i n p a r t i c u l a r ideologies and already invested with p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . 6. POLITICS ILLNESS AND MEDICINE (1) 200 I Wide currency of metaphors sharing the p o l i t i c s as medicine theme; the contribution of symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s -the meaning of p o l i t i c a l utterances embodying the theme to be sought i n s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l contexts - "card catalogue ahistoricism". II The d o c t r i n a l background of sixteenth-century English p o l i t i c s as medicine metaphors; c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l thought and medicus reipublicae, Augustine and sin as sickness, Marsilius and the r e s t r i c t e d authority of the physician. I l l Tudor p o l i t i c a l thought and the central place of obedience - i t s severity mitigated by a le g a l language and commonwealth ideals. IV Sin and sickness i n the body p o l i t i c - metaphors condemning sedition; the King as medicus. V The s o c i a l c r i t i c as physician to the body p o l i t i c - the persona of the disinterested physician; Thomas Starkey's Dialogue. VI C a l v i n i s t theories of resistance and the physician who betrays his trust; John Ponet's Short Treatise. VII Medical theory as a model for p o l i t i c a l understanding; Bodin and the English p o l i t i q u e s . 7. POLITICS, ILLNESS AND MEDICINE (2) 251 I P o l i t i c s as medicine metaphors i n national socialism - the aesthetic and epistemological coherence of these metaphors with " c u l t u r a l pessimism"; t h e i r promise of cure and renewal - the b i o l o g i c a l model of p o l i t i c s . II Locating the metaphors i n Mein Kampf - the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of moral with physical decay. I l l The h i s t o r i c a l context supported the daring of these metaphors; Nazism as a style of p o l i t i c s -nineteenth century attacks on the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of l i b e r a l i s m with medicine and progress - these attacks a r t i c u l a t e d i n a new, s c i e n t i f i c idiom; conservative Social Darwinism. IV Nazism makes e x p l i c i t use of t h i s background -changes i n the meaning of the words 'parasite' and 'decomposition' as evidence for conceptual changes -metaphors exploit these changes. V The l i n k s between metaphors and conceptual change re i t e r a t e d - the force of Nazi metaphors partly explained by t h e i r consistent exp l o i t a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s here; Thomas Mann's impotent c r i t i c i s m s - the varied functions of p o l i t i c a l metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l discourse - exploiting and challenging metaphorical f i e l d s . v i i i 8 . F I E L D S , INSTRUMENTS AND MAPS: METAPHORS FOR P O L I T I C A L METAPHORS 293 S c o p e a n d l i m i t s o f t h e ' f i e l d 1 a n d t h e ' i n s t r u m e n t ' a s c o m p l e m e n t a r y a n a l o g u e s f o r p o l i t i c a l m e t a p h o r s ; u s i n g p o l i t i c a l m e t a p h o r s a s maps o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e . PREFACE T h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n uses two methods of a n a l y s i s . The f i r s t i s the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s of a concept, the concept 'metaphor 1. The second i s h i s t o r i c a l , and i s a p p l i e d to a body of p o l i t i c a l metaphors as understood i n the terms c l a r i f i e d by the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s undertaken i n the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t we s h a l l not understand d i s p u t e s about the a p p l i c a t i o n of the term 'metaphor' to p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e s , or d i s p u t e s about the proper p l a c e of m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e s i n p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , u n t i l we understand the c r i t e r i a by which the term has been c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d by those who have a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d these q u e s t i o n s . In p a r t i c u l a r , we s h a l l beg the most important q u e s t i o n f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s i f we attempt to d e f i n e metaphor s t i p u l a t i v e l y . The q u e s t i o n 'what i s a metaphor?' can only be answered by examining the s e l f - c o n s c i o u s use of the term, and n o t i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t such usage i m p l i e s . To proceed d i f f e r e n t l y would cut o f f our whole i n q u i r y from the o n l y p o s s i b l e source of example and i l l u s t r a t i o n : men u s i n g metaphors. Thus, we seek a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u s i n g 'metaphor' i n one way r a t h e r than another, not to impose our own view and ignore the r e s t . The f i r s t requirement i s a survey of usage. This survey of usage, i f i t i s to be a c r i t i c a l t o o l , must be more than a mere l i s t of disparate claims about metaphor. I t must recognize that i n d i v i d u a l concepts are part of a whole conceptual system, and that what serves to c l a r i f y a p a r t i c u l a r concept above a l l else i s a display of the connections between that concept and others to which i t i s c l o s e l y related. In other words, a survey of usage must be productive of d i s t i n c t i o n s relevant to the project of i s o l a t i n g the concept 'metaphor' from the system of concepts in which i t has i t s l i f e . I t aims at a synoptic view. Now, such a method imposes a certain d i s c i p l i n e on author and reader a l i k e . The l i t e r a t u r e on metaphors i s vast, and has expanded exponentially i n the l a s t twenty years. But, i f i t i s impossible to consider the whole f i e l d , i t i s nonetheless v i t a l to cast our net widely enough to understand why metaphors have been a perennially i n t e r e s t i n g topic. In t h i s survey, we s h a l l show that part of the confusion and disagreement surrounding metaphor has been a confusion of more than one concept, and our discussion has to be broad and illuminating enough to give something more than a caricature of the r i v a l candidates. Thus the reader's patience w i l l be sorely t r i e d . In a work ostensibly about p o l i t i c a l metaphor, the whole of chapter two and much of chapter three w i l l be taken up with the attempt to est a b l i s h such relevant d i s t i n c t i o n s as those between metaphorical and x i l i t e r a l utterances, metaphor and concept formation, and metaphor and model. The philosophical assumptions which inform the whole work lead us to reject that neat method which sees a study of p o l i t i c a l metaphor choosing among a range of 'theoretical instruments', and then applying them to a c a r e f u l l y delimited body of data. This d i s s e r t a t i o n w i l l seek a coherent notion of metaphor from amongst the confused jumble of theories about metaphor, and the proof that i t i s a coherent notion w i l l come from i t s a b i l i t y to illuminate the conduct of men actually using metaphors i n r e a l h i s t o r i c a l contexts. Theory and data do hot stand i n the e x t r i n s i c r e l a t i o n of instrument and object; they are part of the same conceptual universe. In these circumstances the argument of the work as a whole tends to be submerged beneath the d e t a i l s of c o n f l i c t i n g theories, essential d i s t i n c t i o n s and passages of i l l u s t r a t i o n . Here, then, i s that argument, stripped of any philosophical support or h i s t o r i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n . The basic 'unit of analysis' i s the metaphorical utterance. An utterance i s a use of language by an assignable agent i n a pa r t i c u l a r spatio-temporal context to communicate an intended meaning to an audience. I t i s a metaphorical utterance when the meaning of the utterance i s not communicated d i r e c t l y by what i s said, but i n d i r e c t l y by x i i i n d i c a t i n g i n f e r e n t i a l strategies by means of which the audience may move from what i s said to what i s meant. In a way exactly analogous to the meaning of l i t e r a l utterances, the meaning assigned to a metaphorical utterance may diverge from the intended meaning, either by a f a i l u r e to distinguish what i s meant from what i s said, or by an audience's f a i l u r e to follow those same i n f e r e n t i a l strategies i n the comprehension of the metaphor that were used to produce i t . Thus, when a writer asserts that his sovereign i s the sun, he means to attribute certain solar q u a l i t i e s to his monarch, and we must i n f e r what those attributes are from what he has said. The a b i l i t y to use p r i n c i p l e d i n f e r e n t i a l strategies to produce a reading of a metaphorical utterance i s then shown to consist of two related parts. The f i r s t e n t a i l s a grasp of the point of the utterance i t s e l f , i t s part i n a wide context of proposals and projects which we may discern d i r e c t l y as participants i n a dialogue, or reconstruct as readers of a text. We may have determined, for example, that our writer i s exploring the concept of sovereignty with his sovereign as sun metaphor, rather than engaging i n a display of l o y a l t y or composing a poem. The second part of metaphorical comprehension e n t a i l s a l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y , and serves to introduce the most important t h e o r e t i c a l term used i n the argument, the metaphorical f i e l d . x i i i The abstract metaphor-theme 'sovereign as sun' suggests an almost i n f i n i t e number of possible a t t r i b u t e s . However, previous use of the theme i n metaphorical utterances helps ^ t o f i x cert a i n meanings for the attributes i n well defined contexts l i k e p o l i t i c a l argument, and thus assigns p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l values to attributes l i k e brightness, warmth, or central p o s i t i o n . The values that these attributes do assume w i l l obviously be related to current doctrines about sovereignty, and to current astronomical b e l i e f s . Gradually, the connections that are established between sovereignty and the sun f i x a ' f i e l d ' of possible a t t r i b u t i o n s - - the metaphorical f i e l d of sovereign-as-sun — which i s used as a basis for the construction and interpretation of p a r t i c u l a r metaphorical utterances embodying that theme. A metaphorical f i e l d i s , therefore, an area of discourse structured by a doctrine i n a way that assigns a r e l a t i v e l y fixed value to the components of the f i e l d . To know that the author of a p a r t i c u l a r sovereign as sun metaphor i s not merely engaged i n exploring the concept of sovereignty but that he i s an early seventeenth-century Frenchman of a p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l cast, d i r e c t s us to the metaphorical f i e l d which supports his p a r t i c u l a r a t t r i b u t i o n s . Chapter three i s concerned to show that a consistent notion of the metaphorical f i e l d can be discerned at the xiv root of much confused talk about 'conceptual metaphors' or 'metaphors i n thought', and with the special relevance of t h i s to p o l i t i c a l language. Chapter four demonstrates how metaphorical f i e l d s i n p o l i t i c a l discourse a r i s e , are sustained and f a l l into desuetude, by stressing the importance of e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l doctrines i n structuring the f i e l d . The fortunes of a metaphorical f i e l d are shown to be related i n the most intimate way to changes i n our understanding of i t s constituent parts. This, then, i s the project of the f i r s t four chapters: to produce a coherent description of the metaphorical utterance which distinguishes i t from the l i t e r a l utterance, and to show how metaphorical utterances are rendered i n t e l l i g i b l e by a grasp of t h e i r point and a knowledge of the metaphorical f i e l d which informed t h e i r production. Together they form a f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e d , i f complex, context within which a metaphorical utterance can be understood. This much holds for any metaphorical utterance. However, the special concern of t h i s work i s with p o l i t i c a l metaphors. Beginning i n chapter three, the argument takes note of the special p e c u l i a r i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l contexts that make p o l i t i c a l metaphors d i s t i n c t i v e . The most important feature here, i t i s argued, i s that p a r t i a l l y c onstitutive character of p o l i t i c a l language which i s noted i n the text by speaking of p o l i t i c a l discourse. As has been aptly observed, the very xv concepts which mark off p o l i t i c s as a d i s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y — authority, legitimacy, j u s t i c e , and others — are nothing more than the sum of what men can be brought to believe about them. They are self-authenticating. Given t h i s self-authenticating character, the terms of p o l i t i c a l discourse are inevitably subject to contest and controversy. Chapters f i v e to seven attempt to 'close the context' for understanding p o l i t i c a l metaphors by locating them within the specialized controversies surrounding the terms of p o l i t i c a l discourse. Given the close connection that has already been established between the structure of a metaphorical f i e l d and the doctrines that are 'receiving the image' — as sovereignty was receiving the sun image — we should expect metaphorical f i e l d s assigning p a r t i c u l a r values to metaphorical attributes to be located within the warring 'languages' or 'ideologies' which make up p o l i t i c a l discourse. In chapter f i v e , for example, d i s t i n c t i v e metaphorical f i e l d s based on the same metaphor-theme, the masses as forces of nature, are shown to have been the property of d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l groups. Thus, both the metaphorical f i e l d and the persuasive project which serve to render a metaphorical utterance i n t e l l i g i b l e are shown to be located within h i s t o r i c a l l y determinate ideologies. The t h e o r e t i c a l problem of understanding a p o l i t i c a l metaphor i s shown to be a problem i n the history of p o l i t i c a l thought, xv i the reconstruction of discourse, and i s approached as such i n chapter f i v e . Chapters six and seven serve to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s notion of the metaphorical utterance supported by a f i e l d which i s i t s e l f located within an ideology. A single metaphor-theme i s taken -- p o l i t i c s as medicine -- and the metaphorical f i e l d s i n which utterances embodying the theme had t h e i r l i f e are traced i n sixteenth-century English p o l i t i c a l thought, and i n Nazi writings. The studies themselves, though h i s t o r i c a l i n character, should be seen less as s e l f contained exercises i n the history of p o l i t i c a l thought, than as an i l l u s t r a t i o n and a vi n d i c a t i o n of the concept of p o l i t i c a l metaphor which has emerged from the analysis i n the preceding chapters. This d i s s e r t a t i o n i s a work of p o l i t i c a l philosophy, not p o l i t i c a l science, the history of p o l i t i c a l thought, or that amphibious enterprise, p o l i t i c a l theory. As such, i t cannot have either the c r y s t a l l i n e elegance of the 'theory' applied to a body of 'data', or the relaxed and swi f t l y moving form of the narrative. I t much more resembles a conversation between the author and those disembodied voices whose orig i n s are recorded i n the footnotes. These voices may be s t i l l e d as the author's own becomes more d i s t i n c t , but h i s voice must emerge naturally from the conversation. It cannot commit the i n t e l l e c t u a l imposture of shouting down x v i i or boorishly ignoring the other voices i n the conversation. Conversations, as Michael Oakeshott has reminded us, have no object or end i n view, but at least one important conclusion may be drawn from t h i s study. The history of p o l i t i c a l thought i s f u l l of metaphorical f i e l d s whose story has yet to be t o l d , and which, i n the t e l l i n g , may illuminate an" already f a m i l i a r narrative. I once heard a Ph.D. examiner remark — i n suitably gruff, C h u r c h i l l i a n tones — that a d i s s e r t a t i o n marked the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end. I hope that subsequent investigations i n the history of p o l i t i c a l thought may prove the value of the method that t h i s exercise i n conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n reveals. x v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author of a doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n accumulates many debts i n the course of his endeavour — by no means a l l of them i n t e l l e c t u a l — and i t i s his most pleasant duty to acknowledge them. My thanks go to a l l those who have helped make t h i s possible. No one can object i f I should single out for s pecial mention the University of B r i t i s h Columbia and the Isaak Walton Killam Memorial Trust for t h e i r generous f i n a n c i a l assistance; David Manning, who showed by his example that p o l i t i c a l philosophy could be both rigourous and stimulating; George Feaver, who, p a t i e n t l y pointing out i n f e l i c i t i e s of style and argument, could have rendered the whole experience enjoyable i n departments far less hospitable than U.B.C.'s; and my wife, Anne, who was always there to remind me that l i f e has much more to o f f e r than the study of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. xix CHAPTER ONE Approaches to the Problem The central place of metaphor i n p o l i t i c a l understanding has been remarked upon so often that i t i s now a commonplace. I t i s true that many writers have indiscriminately used 'metaphor' as a synonym for 'model', and that t h e i r i n t e r e s t has been connected with methodological innovations i n p o l i t i c a l science. As empiricist and p o s i t i v i s t precepts have come under attack, so the work of a n t i - e m p i r i c i s t philosophers of science who have drawn attention to s c i e n t i f i c metaphors as part of t h e i r demonstration that s c i e n t i f i c 'facts' are 'theory laden' has come to prominence."'' Under t h e i r influence, the notion that theories i n the s o c i a l sciences are to be seen as 'models' of an area of r e a l i t y , with i t s c o r o l l a r y that such models are at least suggested by f e r t i l e metaphors, has become widely accepted. P o l i t i c a l theory i t s e l f has not escaped unscathed from these developments, although here attention has been more d i f f u s e . Once again the point of departure has been the conception of p o l i t i c a l theory entertained by l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s . Theorists such as T.D. 1 Weldon and Margaret Macdonald argued that a metaphor masquerading as a l o g i c a l connection could often be found at the root of the mistakes of t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l 3 theorxsts. The r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l theorising brought with i t a more generous appreciation of the role of models and analogies i n p o l i t i c a l thought, swelling at length into a panegyric on the " i n d i s p e n s i b i l i t y " of 4 metaphors to p o l i t i c a l understanding. Obviously these arguments stand i n need of c l a r i f i c a t i o n . We have already alluded to the confusion surrounding the use of the terms 'metaphor1, 'model' and 'analogy'. Has t h i s lack of precision engendered conceptual confusion? What i s the status of an explanation couched i n terms of a suggestive metaphor? Has mutual recognition of the role of metaphors brought an ant i - e m p i r i c i s t p o l i t i c a l science closer to the concerns of t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l theory again? Intriguing as they are, these are not the questions we s h a l l be d i r e c t l y addressing here. The bat t l e for the r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of models and metaphors i n explanation has been won: the remaining pockets of resistance can safely be l e f t to those coming up i n support. Our objective — i f we may continue the m i l i t a r y metaphor — w i l l be to press on and make contact with some converging ideas i n the history of p o l i t i c a l thought. Here arguments associated with the work of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock 2 have drawn attention to some int e r e s t i n g connections between p o l i t i c a l theory and p o l i t i c a l action which suggest a new 5 significance for p o l i t i c a l metaphors. Both Skinner and Pocock have been struck by the extent to which the language available to a p o l i t i c a l writer may have set l i m i t s to what he could have meant by what he said, with obvious consequences for the h i s t o r i a n who wishes to reconstruct the author's meaning. Their investigations into the connection between language and p o l i t i c a l understanding have shed much l i g h t on the r e l a t i o n of "normative vocabularies" to p o l i t i c a l thought. Pocock has been impressed by the extent to which men communicate i n "language systems", "within which they are constrained to speak, but which they modify by the speech acts they perform." Skinner has been more cautious about "constraints", but i s s i m i l a r l y prone to decompose a body of texts into a set of conventions, rules or norms that make up the 'languages' or 'ideologies' being used by an author, with a view to asking what an author i s doing with the l i n g u i s t i c resources at h i s disposal. This emphasis on what p o l i t i c a l writers were "doing with words" — to use Austin's famous phrase — has inevitably tended to locate these writers' projects within the world of p o l i t i c a l events and practices, opening up the p o s s i b i l i t y of studying the texts 7 of p o l i t i c a l theory as elements i n h i s t o r i c a l ideologies. 3 Once we have taken t h i s step, and begun to consider the ways i n which the language that a writer has at his disposal may set l i m i t s to, or at least pose certa i n problems for, the p o l i t i c a l projects that he has i n mind, then the l i n k with accounts of metaphor and model i n p o l i t i c a l theory i s evident. Skinner himself has drawn attention to the use of metaphors to change the meaning of evaluative terms, and he has further reminded us that when t h i s issues i n conceptual change our whole i n t e r r e l a t e d system of d i v i d i n g up 'cu l t u r a l experience' i s at stake. More r a d i c a l yet i s the p o s s i b i l i t y that the concepts expressed i n a p o l i t i c a l 'language' or 'ideology' may contain cert a i n embedded metaphors — as s c i e n t i f i c theories appear to do — which help to constitute our c u l t u r a l experience. If t h i s i s so, then no account of p o l i t i c a l action i s complete without an understanding of the use of such metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l argument, and the ensuing contests over t h e i r interpretation. If we can discover the existence of r u l i n g metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l 'languages' — p o l i t i c s as theatre, as pilgrimage or as mechanism, for example -- how w i l l such metaphors constrain those who use these languages, and how might they be changed and contested? 1^ At t h i s point a preliminary d i s t i n c t i o n must be made. We have already noted that there i s some ambiguity i n t h e o r e t i c a l uses of the terms 'model' and 'metaphor'. 4 C l e a r l y , some d i s t i n c t i o n needs to be drawn between, on the one hand, the sentences i n which the student of r h e t o r i c a l figures might i d e n t i f y a metaphor, a metonym or a synechdoche, and, on the other hand, the t h e o r e t i c a l models and the 'ruling metaphors' of a p o l i t i c a l ideology. For the moment, we s h a l l simply mark t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of generality. Following the usage of Max Black we s h a l l refer to an archetype where an argument i s structured i n terms of a consistent analogical extension, carrying across concepts from one domain to another, where they do not obviously belong."'"1' Examples of archetypes would include A r i s t o t l e ' s conception of c i t i z e n s as friends, Augustine's conception of human l i f e as a journey, or Hobbes's conception of sovereignty as a r t i f i c i a l personality. We would contrast these general and abstract archetypes with p a r t i c u l a r statements i n which d e t a i l s of the analogical extension are e x p l i c i t l y expressed — Hobbes's oxymoron of the sovereign as a "mortal god", for example. In fact, i t i s very rare to f i n d a p o l i t i c a l writer e x p l i c i t l y setting out archetypes. More often we have to recreate an author's archetypes from the e x p l i c i t metaphors he uses, and, to t h i s extent, archetypes must be seen as abstractions. A j u s t l y famous study of exactly t h i s kind, contrasting two archetypes of a r t i s t i c representation, sums up t h i s r e l a t i o n : 5 We tend to describe the nature of something i n similes and metaphors, and the vehicles of these recurrent figures, when analysed, often turn out to be attributes of an i m p l i c i t analogue through which we are viewing the object we describe. By means of a detailed examination of these "recurrent figures" M. H. Abrams was able to recover the archetypes of the 'mirror' and the 'lamp' which served to dis t i n g u i s h two very d i f f e r e n t aesthetic theories. The project of the present work i s to show how such i m p l i c i t archetypes may be reconstructed from the metaphors found i n p o l i t i c a l discourse. We s h a l l begin by considering some philosophical puzzles about metaphorical utterances and t h e i r treatment i n recent work on the subject. D i s t r a c t i n g as t h i s may be, we cannot approach the questions which r e a l l y concern us without some preliminary understanding of why metaphor i s a subject which has fostered so much controversy, and what philosophical issues turn on the various divergent approaches to the subject. Following t h i s review and conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n , we s h a l l begin our investigation into p o l i t i c a l metaphors by examining some accounts which have much to say about the notion of an archetype, but often at the expense of denying that metaphorical utterances have any i n t e r e s t for the th e o r i s t at a l l . We s h a l l examine the close connection of archetypes with concept formation, and 6 the central role t h i s creates for archetypes i n a p o l i t i c a l discourse that i s p a r t l y c o n s t i t u t i v e of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . However, we s h a l l show that a proper appreciation of t h i s role depends upon our c l e a r l y distinguishing between metaphors and archetypes, and we s h a l l introduce more precision into our study of p o l i t i c a l archetypes with the aid of the concept 'metaphorical f i e l d 1 . The following two chapters w i l l deal i n d e t a i l with the rela t i o n s h i p between metaphorical utterances and metaphorical f i e l d s i n p o l i t i c a l discourse. The f i r s t chapter w i l l explain how well-established metaphorical f i e l d s may be found supporting conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphors, and c l a r i f y the r e l a t i o n of a conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphor to a p o l i t i c a l doctrine. The second of these chapters w i l l outline the type of investigation (an h i s t o r i c a l one, i t w i l l be argued) which recovers the meaning of a p o l i t i c a l metaphor as a f i r s t step towards establishing the existence of metaphorical f i e l d s i n h i s t o r i c a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e p o l i t i c a l 'languages' or 'ideologies'. F i n a l l y , the research programme that t h i s approach to p o l i t i c a l metaphor generates w i l l be set to work on some metaphorical utterances i n which p o l i t i c s i s endowed with some of the attributes of medicine. I t i s , perhaps, disappointing that two-thirds of t h i s work should be taken up with the task Locke c a l l e d 7 "underlabouring", "clearing the ground a l i t t l e , and removing some of the rubbish that l i e s i n the way of knowledge." However, t h i s i s a common experience of those who set out to do something r e l a t i v e l y new i n the s o c i a l sciences. Ours i s a subject i n which rubbish has a tendency to accumulate, and many who have set about clearing a space for t h e i r projects have found t h i s a task issuing i n a sizeable work i n i t s own ri g h t . In another sense, we may take heart from the argument of Peter Winch's much misunderstood c l a s s i c The Idea of a Social Science. Dismissing Locke's metaphor of the philosopher as underlabourer and the s c i e n t i s t as master-builder, he reminds us that there i s much to learn about s o c i a l l i f e from conceptual analysis because shared concepts speak d i r e c t l y about the a c t i v i t y and understanding of those who 13 use them. Our account of the role of language and metaphor in p o l i t i c s stands firmly i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , and i n the conclusion we s h a l l return to consider our own archetypes for language and metaphor and what they can t e l l us about our understanding of the r e l a t i o n between language and p o l i t i c s . One reason why there are not more studies of p o l i t i c a l metaphor resides i n the d i f f i c u l t y of delimiting the topic. In fact, t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s by no means confined to 8 p o l i t i c a l metaphors. As we s h a l l discover, a f r u s t r a t i n g feature of works on metaphor has been a continuous disagreement amongst commentators about the puzzles that metaphors are supposed to pose. Paolo Valesio has w i t t i l y touched on t h i s : Metaphor has received a great deal of l i n g u i s t i c attention of late; but we have now come to a grave impasse. The f l e e t of studies on metaphor i s i n disarray. Some of the ships have been l o s t on the high seas of generality, while others have run aground against the reefs of mere t e c h n i c a l i t i e s . Of course, the severity of the disarray i s very much a matter of perspective. Linguists and l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s are no doubt j u s t i f i a b l y proud of some of t h e i r painstakingly detailed studies which have shown that the phenomenon of metaphor can more read i l y be accounted for by some l i n g u i s t i c theories than others. On the other hand, studies, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of continental philosophers, which seem to incorporate metaphor into the general phenomenon of c r e a t i v i t y and ambiguity i n language by no means represent wasted e f f o r t . We s h a l l have occasion to exploit the int e r e s t i n g p a r a l l e l s that Paul Ricoeur has drawn between understanding a metaphor and interpreting a text. But Valesio has h i t upon an important truth about metaphor studies. There i s no such thing as an uncontested u n i f i e d 9 theory of metaphor which could be sketched i n outline and then 'applied' to metaphors found i n p o l i t i c a l contexts. Perhaps the demand for a u n i f i e d theory i s unreasonable. I t may very well be that our ordinary use of the term 'metaphor' hides a number of s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s — such as those between metaphor and archetype and metaphor and analogy. Certainly, works of synthesis — 15 Paul Ricoeur's The Rule of Metaphor, for example — have not notably contributed to a clearing of the a i r . However, a certain inconvenience arises from the lack of a common focus to metaphor studies. When theorists begin to compare the function or role of metaphor i n d i f f e r e n t areas of discourse, i t i s by no means clear that they are a l l re f e r r i n g to the same thing. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to escape Valesio's conclusion that the study of a body of metaphors drawn from p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l contexts i s urgently required i n the l i g h t of questions surrounding the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of metaphorical utterances. Developing a framework for carrying out just such a study of groups of metaphors w i l l be one of the p r i n c i p a l aims of t h i s study. Yet we cannot escape from the general uncertainty over the application of the term 'metaphor' unless we carry out the the task of conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n which w i l l be attempted i n the next chapter. Moreover, e x i s t i n g work on p o l i t i c a l metaphors reveals the same lack of a common focus, and i t i s further dispersed 10 by differences i n i n t e r e s t amongst students of p o l i t i c s . Detailed studies of s p e c i f i c metaphors have almost always cast p o l i t i c a l metaphors i n the role of v i l l a i n . This i s es p e c i a l l y true of German-language studies which have been influenced by the model of an 'ideal communication context', i n contrast with which actual p o l i t i c a l disputes cannot but appear as crude deformations. In a review of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e , Peter Stummer includes metaphors i n a l i s t of eight topics which students of p o l i t i c a l language have analysed as techniques for influencing p o l i t i c a l behaviour. The central notion i s that of semantic deceit, and metaphors f i n d themselves i n the same company as slogans, key-words 16 and stereotypes. In an introductory text on p o l i t i c a l language, metaphors are dealt with under the general heading of "affective-evaluative" devices, together with neologisms, 17 euphemisms, invective, slogans and keywords. The emphasis i n these technical studies i s always on metaphor as a sle i g h t of hand, a t r i c k that i s performed on words. Locating the metaphorical process at the l e v e l of the word — an important and i n f l u e n t i a l way of tac k l i n g the problem, as we s h a l l see — has the general consequence that metaphors are seen as a word-game. This appears i n p o l i t i c a l studies i n the refracted sense that such metaphors are devious ploys, substitutes for r a t i o n a l argument, which are to be unmasked by careful analysis. In cases, l i k e the 11 German s t u d i e s , where a n a l y s i s of the semantic components of a 'word-metaphor' i s the p r e f e r r e d form of 'unmasking' — an a n a l y s i s of "net" i n " s o c i a l s e c u r i t y net", f o r example — the r e s u l t i n g emphasis i s on the s i m p l i f i c a t i o n and p o l a r i z a t i o n t h a t i s achieved when a complex p o l i t i c a l 18 problem i s summed up i n a metaphor. In a French study, the t h r u s t of the semantic a n a l y s i s i s r e v e r s e d and a word used m e t a p h o r i c a l l y i s s a i d to r e l e a s e supplementary semantic content i n t o d i s c o u r s e , but the c r i t i c a l emphasis i s the same. Metaphors are now regarded with s u s p i c i o n because of 19 t h e i r ambiguity and l a c k of p r e c i s i o n . Both kinds of a n a l y s i s share a common tendency to draw t h e i r examples from slogans and c l i c h e s : " i r o n c u r t a i n " , " l e cordon s a n i t a i r e " , or " t h i s t r e a t y i s a b r i c k i n the framework of s o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " In t h i s r e s p e c t , they f o l l o w the p i o n e e r i n g 20 E n g l i s h language work of Harold L a s s w e l l . The more g e n e r a l s t u d i e s of p o l i t i c a l metaphor, those which V a l e s i o r e f e r r e d to as d e a l i n g w i t h metaphor as an aspect of c r e a t i v i t y and ambiguity i n language, have a very d i f f e r e n t focus. They l o c a t e p o l i t i c a l metaphors not so much i n p o l i t i c a l speech, or even i n p o l e m i c a l t e x t s , but i n works of theory. T h e i r a t t i t u d e towards p o l i t i c a l metaphors i s l e s s homogeneous too; the value p l a c e d on metaphor v a r y i n g w i t h the s t r e s s p l a c e d on c r e a t i v i t y as a g a i n s t ambiguity. I t i s i n these s t u d i e s t h a t treatment of 12 p o l i t i c a l metaphor shades into treatment of models and archetypes, and so we f i n d sudies of 'mechanical' and 'organic' metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l thought, and attention to the sense i n which metaphors at t h i s l e v e l of generality might be true or f a l s e . There i s s t i l l a certain amount of unmasking being ca r r i e d out, but there are very few e x p l i c i t l i n k s with the more technical studies. Worse s t i l l , awareness of these technical studies i s sometimes coupled with a tendency to dismiss them as not r e a l l y being concerned with metaphors at a l l . I t w i l l be a major object of t h i s study to show that there are important connections between the archetypes and models of p o l i t i c a l theories and i n d i v i d u a l metaphorical utterances. In making these connections we s h a l l be attempting to do j u s t i c e to the insights of both p a r t i c u l a r and general studies of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. Why, then, i s t h i s investigation a proper subject for p o l i t i c a l philosophy, rather than for the philosophy of language or l i n g u i s t i c s ? Let us reconsider the p a r a l l e l drawn by Paul Ricoeur between understanding a metaphor and 21 interpreting a text. Both involve a c e r t a i n amount of work on the part of the reader, and both contain within themselves the clues which w i l l help the reader on his way. Thus the work i s not aimless, but guided by permissions and 13 prohibitions which suggest some meanings as more plausible than others. However, Ricoeur c i t e s with approval a suggestion made by Monroe Beardsley about poetic metaphor: the most important permission when interpreting a metaphor i s that that metaphor should be allowed to mean a l l that i t 22 can mean. In doing so, Ricoeur e x p l i c i t l y l i n k s himself with the general account of metaphor, i n which metaphors are seen as paradigms of l i n g u i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y . In his own words, "metaphors transpose the meanings of ordinary 23 language by way of unusual uses." As the technical theorists of p o l i t i c a l metaphors have reminded us, p o l i t i c a l metaphors are metaphors i d e n t i f i e d by th e i r use i n p o l i t i c a l contexts. They proceed to mistake the significance of t h i s important fact by going on to draw a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between 'information' and 'persuasion 1,or between 'describing' and 'evaluating', locating p o l i t i c a l metaphors always i n the second part of the d i s t i n c t i o n . Once we show that judgements of value are located within p o l i t i c a l discourse, not externally imposed upon neutral fa c t s , the cogency of such d i s t i n c t i o n s disappears. However, the technical theorists are surely correct i n drawing our attention to the p o l i t i c a l contexts of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. For here, far from allowing metaphors to mean " a l l that they can mean", p o l i t i c a l writers have striven to keep t h e i r metaphors under control, and adapt them to t h e i r own 14 purposes as far as possible. Ricoeur's emphasis on the work that has to be put i n to the understanding of a metaphor i s not thereby e n t i r e l y misplaced. His account of how to go about t h i s work i s primarily directed at l i t e r a r y metaphors and l i t e r a r y texts. In p o l i t i c s , the indisputable tendency for metaphors to mean more than t h e i r authors intended them to mean must be set i n the context of r e a l p o l i t i c a l issues over which the authors of p o l i t i c a l metaphors f i n d themselves divided. These d i v i s i o n s are not brought about by persuading people to evaluate a set of independent facts: they ari s e when people i n possession of d i f f e r e n t 'languages' (in the sense that Pocock uses that term) disagree about the significance of events, and the more that we can learn about the significance of such languages, the better we s h a l l be able to understand the source of the disagreements. So disputes over the meanings of p o l i t i c a l metaphors are not to be taken as marking the l i m i t s of an author's creative imagination, but as v i t a l evidence for competing s o c i a l philosophies. For example, we so often f i n d metaphors i n which p o l i t i c s i s taken to manifest some of the attributes of a journey that we may reasonably suspect the existence of an archetype (or series of archetypes) here. But why did A r i s t o t l e seem to think that p o l i t i c s was l i k e a journey undertaken by a group of friends, and Augustine c a l l the company 'pilgrims'? Why 15 was Rousseau apparently searching so d i l i g e n t l y for a resting place, while Oakeshott takes such pains to set his p o l i t i c a l t r a v e l l e r s on a boundless sea with neither harbour nor anchorage? Is there some mistake here, or are we simply dealing with i r r e c o n c i l e a b l e views of p o l i t i c s ? I t may very well be that p o l i t i c s as journey metaphors disclose a l l of these attributes and more. However, here are a series of metaphorical 'termini' which may serve as c r u c i a l evidence for what A r i s t o t l e , Augustine, Rousseau and Oakeshott saw themselves to be doing. This i s part of the significance of p o l i t i c a l metaphors for the student of p o l i t i c s which cannot be captured by l i t e r a r y or philosophical approaches to metaphor. The p a r a l l e l s between understanding a metaphor and interpreting a text do not stop here. The controversy surrounding the question of how to read p o l i t i c a l metaphors i s surely part of that venerable dispute with which Ricoeur begins his analysis — the dispute over the r e l a t i v e merits 25 of spoken and written discourse. Socrates sets the terms of t h i s dipute with great elegance i n a famous analogy between writing and painting: You know Phaedrus, that's the strange thing about writing which makes i t t r u l y analogous to painting. The painter's products stand before us as though they were a l i v e , but i f you question them they maintain a most majestic silence. I t i s 16 the same with written words; they seem to t a l k to you as though they were i n t e l l i g e n t , but i f you ask them anything, from a desire to be instructed, they go on t e l l i n g you just the same thing forever. And once a thing i s put i n writing, the composition, whatever i t may be, d r i f t s about a l l over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand i t , but equally of those who have no business with i t ; i t doesn't know how to address^ the r i g h t people, and not to address the wrong. Released from the practice of question and answer which might c l a r i f y spoken meaning, written words go on "saying the same thing" as long as the i n s c r i p t i o n survives. As Ricoeur points out, the practice of reading intervenes, and i n making an interpretation the reader takes both parts i n the dialogue, speaker and interlocutor, teacher and p u p i l , even p o l i t i c i a n and audience. The ambiguity and c r e a t i v i t y of p o l i t i c a l metaphor c l e a r l y raises Socrates's problem i n an acute form, for i t brings us to that further set of problems to which he alludes at the end of his warning. Who are the "right people", and how i s a writer to prevent his text from f a l l i n g into the wrong hands? In part, an answer has been provided i n the work of Pocock and Skinner to which we have already alluded. They have reminded us that p o l i t i c a l discourse — l i k e other areas of discourse — i s hedged around with rules and 17 conventions which prescribe how to say and do certai n things. There i s no reason to expect that the inte r p r e t a t i v e strategies associated with metaphorical utterances w i l l be any less conventional. Of course, these strategies are themselves subject to h i s t o r i c a l change, and perhaps the most i n f l u e n t i a l account of how they change has been that put forward by Vico i n The New Science. The present study w i l l attempt to uncover conventions of t h i s sort. But another aspect of Pocock and Skinner's work has shown that there i s no general solution to Socrates's d i s t r u s t of written materials. Writing does ' d r i f t about', and we can expect that there w i l l be many possible interpretations of a p o l i t i c a l metaphor i n addition to whatever an author may have intended, and our int e r e s t here l i e s i n what motivated a reader to deviate from what has become the standard or conventional meaning of a p o l i t i c a l metaphor. Here, however, we must return to a point made against the technical theorists of p o l i t i c a l metaphor, and invoke that rather overworked d i s t i n c t i o n between f i r s t - and second-order statements. Socrates's reference to the right and the wrong hands into which writings may f a l l i s , i n t h i s sense, a f i r s t - o r d e r statement: i t i s repeated by modern theorists of p o l i t i c a l metaphor when they t e l l us that t h i s or that ought to be the meaning of a p a r t i c u l a r metaphorical utterance, or who make s p e c i f i c aesthetic or e t h i c a l 18 judgements about i t . These imperatives and judgements are by no means i l l i c i t , indeed they are a c r u c i a l part of any sophisticated form of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . But there are also investigations which lead to the production of second-order statements about p o l i t i c a l metaphor — of which the attempt to recover the h i s t o r i c a l meaning of a p a r t i c u l a r metaphorical utterance i s an example — and the present work i s concerned with second-order inquiry i n t h i s sense. Once again, we must emphasize that t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not intended to b e l i t t l e other investigations into p o l i t i c a l metaphors. I t i s , however, s p e c i f i c a l l y directed against that confusion of lev e l s of inquiry manifested i n some studies of p o l i t i c a l metaphor, notably i n the technical studies of contemporary p o l i t i c a l writings and speeches. Many p o l i t i c a l metaphors of the kind stigmatized as slogans, c l i c h e s or stereotypes may very well be simple and d i r e c t . However, the attempt to detract from t h e i r p o l i t i c a l impact by analysing them as variants on a semantic t r i c k must be seen for what i t i s , a p o l i t i c a l manoeuvre connected with the project of moulding p o l i t i c a l argument i n the image of a cert a i n model of communication. As i f to parody t h e i r own point, most of these writings are f i l l e d with jargon, dubious d i s t i n c t i o n s and hidden judgements of value not at a l l d i s s i m i l a r to the texts and speeches they purport to 27 unmask. 19 Our own investigation into p o l i t i c a l metaphor takes as i t s motto an epigram by Ben Jonson which makes a rather d i f f e r e n t analogy between writing and painting. I f indeed i t i s language that most shows a man, then i t does not matter whether that man speaks or writes. As i n painting, where technique i s an important clue to the i d e n t i t y of the a r t i s t , so i n p o l i t i c s we have come to r e a l i z e how much we can learn about a writer from the way he manipulates the l i n g u i s t i c resources at his disposal. His use of metaphor i s part of his technique: what part i s the question that concerns us here. Doubtless Jonson had more than just t h i s i n mind when he sought to 'see' men i n t h e i r writings. There i s a fascinating and d i f f i c u l t form of p o l i t i c a l analysis intimated here, which might take as i t s point of departure Karl Kraus's assertion that "I cannot get myself to accept 2 8 that a whole sentence can ever come from half a man." But judgements about who i s or i s not "half a man", and about the significance of such a man's p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , however appropriate to the higher l i t e r a r y journalism i n which Kraus engaged with such d i s t i n c t i o n , w i l l not concern us here. The p o l i t i c a l attitude to p o l i t i c a l metaphor which might r e s u l t can best be seen i n the continuing disputes over whether metaphors are a 'proper' part of p o l i t i c a l language. George Orwell's passionate denunciation of the c l i c h e d metaphors 20 which he a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the a p o l i t i c a l consensus of wartime government, and h i s p l e a f o r metaphors which were genuinely 29 i n f o r m a t i v e ' p i c t u r e s ' i s one such r e a c t i o n . The complete d i s t r u s t of any p o l i t i c a l metaphor on the p a r t of the members of the Royal S o c i e t y c i r c l e i n England a f t e r the 'enthusiasm' of the C i v i l War and Interregnum i s another. Here, too, we might mention Bentham's l i f e l o n g s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the unnecessary use of f i c t i o n s i n p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y the s u b s t i t u t i o n of p h y s i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l i d e a s . His a n a l y s i s of the phrase "to be under an o b l i g a t i o n ' i s c l a s s i c . Metaphors he c o n s i d e r e d to be o n l y the v i s i b l e , and hence l e s s dangerous, 30 evidence of these f i c t i v e p rocesses a t work. In g e n e r a l , as M e l v i n Lasky has r i g h t l y p o i n t e d out, such f e a r of p o l i t i c a l metaphor i s symptomatic of a b e l i e f t h a t p o l i t i c a l language has got out of hand, t h a t more i s being promised 31 than c o u l d p o s s i b l y be d e l i v e r e d . Our i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l metaphors, then, w i l l be d i r e c t e d towards showing the connections t h a t have e x i s t e d between p o l i t i c a l metaphors and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , r a t h e r than a f f i r m i n g t h a t one p a r t i c u l a r k i n d ought to e x i s t . To r e t u r n to Jonson's epigram, we are l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n j u d g i n g what a man shows i n the language he uses, than i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g h i s metaphor of v i s i o n . How does a man show h i m s e l f i n the meaning he a t t a c h e s to a p o l i t i c a l metaphor? 21 In pursuit of t h i s end, we begin with an analysis of the complex concept 'metaphor1. 22 CHAPTER TWO Two Ideas for One: Metaphors Reconsidered The f i r s t impression of anyone confronting the l i t e r a t u r e on metaphor, a f t e r the i n i t i a l shock of i t s volume, must be surprise at the scope and extent of the disagreement amongst the major t h e o r i s t s . Not only do theorist s of metaphor disagee over how to answer such elementary questions as what a metaphor i s or how a metaphor works, but they do so along l i n e s recognizably similar to those we b r i e f l y considered i n the preceding chapter. In one sense, then, what follows w i l l be i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , for we s h a l l disagree with many of the most important and i n f l u e n t i a l accounts of metaphor that there i s space to consider. This may be thought to require some explanation, i f not apology. There i s a story t o l d of how S i r A l f r e d Ayer, exasperated beyond measure by the re l e n t l e s s and destructive c r i t i c i s m s of J.L. Austin, at length burst out "you are l i k e a greyhound who doesn't want to run himself and bites the other greyhounds so that they cannot run e i t h e r . " 1 While not wishing to suggest that so distinguished a simile applies to 23 myself, so much of the present chapter w i l l be c r i t i c a l i n intent that i t i s as well to remember that i t w i l l serve as preparation for the 'running 1 that i s to take place l a t e r . In i t , an understanding of metaphor w i l l be developed which can serve as the foundation for our investigations into p o l i t i c a l metaphors. In fa c t , we may suspect that many of the disagreements amongst theorists stem from differences of inte r e s t and perspective rather than from points of substance. In such cases our choices w i l l be guided by our overriding i n t e r e s t i n the place of metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l language. What are our targets, and why i s preliminary investigation into the theory of metaphor necessary at a l l ? Consider the following examples. Nor are the things among which we are created created for us since we have been recreated i n Him. These things should be for necessity's use, not for love's a f f e c t i o n ; they should be l i k e the t r a v e l l e r ' s inn, not l i k e the possessor's pr i z e . Refresh yourself and move on. You are t r a v e l l i n g , think to whom you have come, for so great i s He who has come to you. In leaving t h i s l i f e you make room for the next comer. This i s the condition of an inn: you go that another may come. (Augustine) For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them, but they are the money of fools , that value them by the authority of an A r i s t o t l e , a Cicero, or a Thomas . . . (Hobbes) Could they be happier without i t , the law as a useless thing would of i t s e l f vanish, and that i l l - d e s e r v e s the name of confinement which hedges 24 us i n only from bogs and precipices. (Locke) Is i t then true, that the French government was such as to be incapable or undeserving of reform; so that i t was of absolute neccessity that the whole f a b r i c should at once be pulled down and the area cleared for the erection of theoretic experimental e d i f i c e i n i t s place? (Burke) Now, on some accounts each of these passages would be c a l l e d 'metaphorical 1, for there are references to inns, counters, hedges and e d i f i c e s which are not meant to be taken l i t e r a l l y . On other accounts, though, only the second passage with i t s e x p l i c i t formulation that "words are wise men's counters" would be treated as a metaphor. Accordingly, some might di s t i n g u i s h between the passages themselves and some metaphorical part of them, while some speak f r e e l y of each i n i t s . e n t i r e t y as a metaphorical utterance. Some would employ a whole catalogue of r h e t o r i c a l terms to distinguish metaphor from such near r e l a t i o n s as metonymy, synechdoche, hyperbole or oxymoron; others would be content with a d i s t i n c t i o n between metaphor and simile; yet others happily speak of 'figures' i n general. Above a l l , then, we need to be clear about the c r i t e r i a for the application of the term 'metaphor' i f we are to be able to employ i t consistently and f r u i t f u l l y i n l a t e r chapters. I t would be useful to know why there i s such disagreement on what i s to count as a metaphor, p a r t i c u l a r l y 25 when we come to consider whether metaphors have any general role i n p o l i t i c a l language — what has been c a l l e d a function — or whether we have a wide range of uses to consider. Otherwise we s h a l l always be open to the charge that the phenomena we have considered are too broad or too narrow i n scope, or not ' r e a l l y ' metaphors at a l l . Here the danger of proceeding too abruptly i s obvious. We may be tempted to s e t t l e the matter by producing a s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of what i s to count as a metaphor for the purposes of the present study which would beg one or more of the very questions that theories of metaphor set out to answer. One very sophisticated study, Christine Brooke-Rose's A Grammar of Metaphor provides a perfect case i n point. Brooke-Rose was concerned to show that s y n t a c t i c a l variations i n metaphorical sentences — for example, whether what we s h a l l l a t e r c a l l the fo c a l word of a metaphor i s a verb or a noun -- have consequences for what can be said i n such a sentence. S p e c i f i c a l l y , she noted that d i f f e r e n t grammatical l i n k s mediate differences i n intention and e f f e c t which could not be ignored by those seeking to understand metaphors, es p e c i a l l y l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s . Unfortunately, she assumed that syntax was also the defining feature of a metaphor, so that sentences of the form 'A i s l i k e B*, or 'As A ... so B', were excluded from her study because they presented no special s y n t a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 26 This decision, backed by a t r a d i t i o n of taxonomising r h e t o r i c a l t r e a t i s e s , gave her the following d e f i n i t i o n of a metaphor. Metaphor i n t h i s study i s any replacement of one word by another, or any i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of one thing, concept or person with another. My concern i s with how t h i s replacement or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s made through words. Now, unlike the replacement of one word by another, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of one thing, concept or person with another i s a metalinguistic p o s s i b i l i t y which may be r e a l i s e d i n language i n a number of ways, including the syntactic forms which Brooke-Rose excluded. So when she takes Rosamund Tuve to task for including T. S. E l i o t ' s l i n e "evening ... l i k e a patient etherized" as a metaphor, the ambiguity i s 3 revealed. In an important sense t h i s l i n e i s to be distinguished from the comparison that i s made i n the sentence "patient A was etherized l i k e patient B," and the fact that i t s syntax i s i d e n t i c a l with E l i o t ' s metaphor only shows that syntax cannot be used to i d e n t i f y metaphors. We might stretch a point and c a l l t h i s a case of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a f t e r a l l , but then we are e n t i t l e d to know more about the ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' that i s involved here. This i s a question that requires conceptual investigation, an investigation that w i l l c l a r i f y what we mean when we use the term 27 'metaphor' on d i f f e r e n t occasions. In other words, the conceptual investigation must come f i r s t i f we are not to beg the very questions our inquiry w i l l eventually oblige us to answer. But we must, for the moment, set p o l i t i c a l language to one side, for although i t may furnish us with helpful i l l u s t r a t i o n s at various points, the modern theories of metaphor we s h a l l be examining have not, for a l l t h e i r sophistication, ventured far a f i e l d for t h e i r examples. I I . No formula gives the meaning of a metaphor independently  of i t s context. Let us begin with a l i n k to those c l a s s i c a l theories of metaphor from which modern theories have evolved. The sixteenth-century r h e t o r i c i a n Henry Peacham, analysing the words of the psalmist, "thy word i s a lantern unto my feet and a l i g h t unto my paths," concluded that; lantern, l i g h t , paths . . . have not t h e i r proper s i g n i f i c a t i o n but by tr a n s l a t i o n do s i g n i f y other things, much l i k e unto them. Peacham thus proposes both a p r i n c i p l e of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and a schematic account of the meaning of a metaphor i n t h i s neat d e f i n i t i o n , which draws on the work of both A r i s t o t l e and Cicero. His example i s to be i d e n t i f i e d as a metaphor because i t contains one or more words which "have not t h e i r 28 proper s i g n i f i c a t i o n " . A word cannot be a lantern, so that the term 'lantern' must s i g n i f y something else -- but what does i t signify? Here we are t o l d to translate the word 'lantern' into another word whose "proper s i g n i f i c a t i o n " w i l l make sense of the sentence. The only further clue that Peacham gives us, which reinforces the metaphorical character of his own explanation, i s that the relevant word w i l l be "nie and l i k e l y " to the o r i g i n a l . The d e f i n i t i o n i t s e l f i s c l e a r l y modelled on A r i s t o t l e . Metaphor belongs to that general species of trope where words are used other than i n t h e i r proper sense; i t i s to be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from other tropes because i t s proper s i g n i f i c a t i o n i s restored through "tra n s l a t i o n " ( i n c i d e n t a l l y preserving part of the etymology of 'metaphor'). Unfortunately, both the notion of improper s i g n i f i c a t i o n and t r a n s l a t i o n are incomplete, and they may be r a d i c a l l y misleading. Both require c l a r i f i c a t i o n . Consider the claim that i n a metaphor a word i s used i n some way that i s 'improper'. The influence of t h i s l i n e of argument i s d i f f i c u l t to overestimate, for i t seems to mark a clean break between metaphorical and l i t e r a l language i n terms of the proper and improper uses of words. In a simple assertion, l i k e the one Peacham uses i n his example, such a d i s t i n c t i o n has an a i r of p l a u s i b i l i t y . But i f we take the s l i g h t l y more complex case of negation, we see that t h i s 29 w i l l not do. In "no man i s an is l a n d , " what words lack t h e i r proper s i g n i f i c a t i o n ? In fa c t , Peacham's d e f i n i t i o n f a i l s i n just the same way that Brooke-Rose's did; i t f a i l s to include a l l the relevant instances. Considerations of t h i s kind lead to a more general and far-reaching c r i t i c i s m of the proposal to restore proper s i g n i f i c a t i o n by " t r a n s l a t i o n " . If we simply substitute one word for another i n the sentence, we are e n t i t l e d to ask about the point of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r game with words. There are stock answers available — " f i l l i n g gaps i n the language", or "investing the referent with a certa i n colour"^ — but there i s a serious objection here. The metaphor of 'translation' must be cashed out i f the d e f i n i t i o n i s to be of any p r a c t i c a l service i n understanding metaphors, and t h i s cannot be done. In i t s place we f i n d various formulae purporting to explain how an auditor moves from the l i t e r a l meaning of the sentence which confronts him to i t s metaphorical meaning. Such formulae have tended to clu s t e r around two ideas — s i m i l a r i t y or resemblance on the one hand, and comparison or analogy on the other. A l l such formulae confront an impossible task. They are required to show how the meaning of every possible metaphor can be computed by applying the formula to the l i t e r a l meanings of the sentences involved. Consider Peacham's 30 metaphor again: "thy word i s a lantern unto my feet and a l i g h t unto my paths." Helped by the p a r a l l e l structure of the two predicates, a resemblance formula would propose substitute words for 'lantern' and ' l i g h t ' by t r y i n g to f i n d the names of things that resembled lanterns and l i g h t s . An obvious candidate might be 'illumination'. Once again we have the problem of t r i t e n e s s . Although the sentiment i s a fam i l i a r one, we might s t i l l f e e l that the sentence says something more than that God's word i s illuminating. More important, have we r e a l l y explained the metaphor here at a l l ? Is the sense i n which a lamp illuminates the same as the sense i n which a word illuminates? I f so, then there was no 'improper s i g n i f i c a t i o n ' i n the o r i g i n a l sentence, and the metaphor disappears. I f not, a l l we have discovered i s a species of ambiguity based on homonyms, an ambiguity which a competent speaker of English i s accustomed to resolve according to context, as i n "meet me on the corner by the bank." If t h i s i s so, then the resemblance formula i t s e l f i s i r r e l e v a n t . One response to such a f a i l u r e , much favoured i n recent writings on metaphor, i s to make the formula a great deal more complicated. Instead of looking for substitute words, we are urged to consider the ways i n which certain key words i n a metaphor might change t h e i r meaning, and the formula now promises to determine the new meaning for us. 31 A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t i s claimed that metaphors are condensed comparisons i n which the exact terms of the comparison are omitted. A comparison formula i s then invoked to remedy t h i s omission. It i s important to be clear about the part played by the formula here. A FORMULAIC approach treats a metaphor as a semantic puzzle to which i t alone provides the key. The formula i s not a dispensible device, suitable for explaining to someone who has hitherto f a i l e d to grasp the meaning of a metaphor how he might best go about doing so — what we s h a l l c a l l a p r i n c i p l e of interpretation — but an i n t e g r a l part of the meaning of the metaphor. Knowledge of the formula i s a condition of understanding the metaphor. According to the comparison formula, for example, Peacham1s metaphor means that God's word i s l i k e a lantern i n the following respects . . . , and i t undertakes to f i l l i n the gaps. On such an account, i t i s the need to appeal to the relevant formula that distinguishes metaphorical from l i t e r a l utterances. The strong requirement that the formula s h a l l unambiguously determine the meaning of the utterance i s the ultimate stumbling block here. Consider Harold Macmillan's complaint during the Suez a f f a i r that, "the Afro-Asian pack was i n f u l l cry, with the United States and the Soviet Union " 6 as Joint-Masters. According to the sophisticated 32 s i m i l a r i t y formula offered by Gustav Stern, someone hearing t h i s metaphor c a l l s to mind the subject of the metaphor, the diplomats, and the metaphorical referent, the pack of hounds. Then he picks out the element i n the meaning of 'pack of hounds' which i s applicable to the behaviour of the diplomats, and excludes other elements of i t s meaning as 7 i r r e l e v a n t . This formula errs on the side of precision. Macmillan's point, we might reply, i s not that the diplomats pursued France and B r i t a i n 'with determination' or 'with deadly intent' or any of the other attributes which might l i t e r a l l y apply to both diplomats and foxhounds, but that they did i t i n an i n s t i n c t i v e way, coordinated by the Americans and the Russians as trained animals might be led. Stern's formula misses t h i s e n t i r e l y . On the other hand, the comparison formula — that the diplomats behaved l i k e foxhounds — i s far too imprecise. Did they pour into the United Nations building s n u f f l i n g and barking with President Eisenhower and Mr. Khruschev bringing up the rear i n hunting pink? Of course not, but i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to imagine how comparisons are to be r e s t r i c t e d to more relevant predicates without appealing to contextual notions of relevance which undermine the primacy of the formula. In other words, i f the formula i s part of the meaning of the utterance, the points of comparison between diplomats and foxhounds would have to be f i n i t e i n scope and 33 recognizably independent of any context i n which such a comparison would be made. However, as Max Black has pointed out, one of the most in t e r e s t i n g features of a novel metaphor, l i k e Macmillan's, i s the way i n which i t suggests new points of comparison which we might have been hard put to discover before encountering the utterance i n a pa r t i c u l a r context. Of course, i t i s a r e l a t i v e l y simple matter to come up with points of s i m i l a r i t y or comparison once we do know the context of Macmillan's remark, the actions he was r e f e r r i n g to and the point of his utterance, but t h i s undercuts the claim of the formula to explain the meaning of a metaphor by simply rephrasing i t . As I s r a e l Scheffler has concluded; Any impression that the formulaic approach offers us a firm rule for decoding metaphors must evaporate upon learning that the rule i n question requires a context by context selection of the very c r i t e r i a by which decoding i s to proceed. And the notion that such a rule explains the 'mechanics' of metaphor must founder with the r e a l i s a t i o n that the mechanism operates through judgement^ of the importance s p e c i f i c to various contexts. Our r e j e c t i o n of the formulaic approach to understanding metaphors w i l l have important consequences for future claims about the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. By rej e c t i n g the 'translation' formula, we have circumvented 34 the whole debate over the 'improper' use of words. Whatever the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that p o l i t i c a l metaphors o f f e r for spreading confusion, these p o s s i b i l i t i e s cannot be attributed to the misuse of words. Consequently, they cannot be remedied by 'plain-speaking' or simply by avoiding metaphors. The thrust of the l i n g u i s t i c c r i t i q u e of p o l i t i c a l metaphors, in s p i r e d ' i n part by Bentham, i s thereby deflected. I t may indeed be true that "every improper term contains the germ of a f a l l a c i o u s proposition", but g metaphors do not contain "improper terms". If the t r a n s l a t i o n formula has l o s t ground i n recent years, i t has been replaced by the comparison formula as the 'commonsense' account of metaphor. Under the influence of the comparison view some p o l i t i c a l theorists have suggested that p o l i t i c a l metaphors may be analysed with the aid of just such an abstract formula, without regard to t h e i r contexts of use. The demonstration that no such formula can explain the meaning of a metaphor, and that points of comparison, whatever parts they might play i n interpr e t a t i o n , are not antecedent to the appearance of a metaphor i n a s p e c i f i c context, must cast doubt upon such a practice. I l l . Metaphors are to be studied as language use, not as  part of a lanuage system. 35 One response to the f a i l u r e of such simple formulae to give an adequate account of the meaning of a metaphor has been to lay the blame upon the theories of language which underwrite them. Men l i k e Peacham, or even Stern, were working with ' p r e - s c i e n t i f i c 1 theories, and i t i s therefore unsurprising that t h e i r results were "general and impressionistic". However, recent developments i n the science of l i n g u i s t i c s have changed a l l that, and we are promised a theory which i s both precise i n i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of metaphors and general i n i t s explanation of how they f u n c t i o n . 1 0 The d i s t i n c t i v e character of l i n g u i s t s ' treatments of metaphor derives from t h e i r general acceptance of a d i s t i n c t i o n between language behaviour and a language system. The l i n g u i s t attempts to construct a model of the language system from the r e g u l a r i t i e s that he observes i n the language behaviour which furnishes his d a t a . 1 1 Many of these models have been some v a r i a t i o n on the theme that a language system i s made up of a dictionary of l e x i c a l items together with a set of rules which govern t h e i r arrangement and combination. The primary v i r t u e of such a model, and the very foundation of the impressive achievements of modern l i n g u i s t i c s , l i e s i n the clear d i s t i n c t i o n between what belongs to the language system and what are merely extraneous, contingent features of language behaviour. From 36 t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n flows the basic divide i n l i n g u i s t i c theories of metaphor: are metaphors to be explained i n terms of the rules of the system, or are they beyond the scope of 12 l i n g u i s t i c inquiry, part of language behaviour? If the l a t t e r , then we must look elsewhere for t h e o r e t i c a l treatments of metaphor, to d i s c i p l i n e s such as psychology, psycholinguistics, pragmatics or s t y l i s t i c s . However, some accounts have been advanced i n which i t i s proposed that metaphors belong to the language system, and i t i s to these that we must now turn. As we might expect, proponents of a l i n g u i s t i c theory of metaphor base t h e i r accounts on the need to preserve the p r i s t i n e c l a r i t y of the d i s t i n c t i o n between system and behaviour. I t i s noted that metaphors are treated i n h i s t o r i c a l semantics as agents of meaning change, and often as one of the most important ways i n which a natural language grows and develops. I t would be unfortunate, or so i t i s argued, i f we were to concede that an explanation of metaphor lay beyond the scope of l i n g u i s t i c s , e s p e c i a l l y as 'dead metaphors' even f i n d t h e i r way into the lexicon. What i s more, a most important feature of a natural language seems to be missed i f we ignore the way i n which a statement, such as Enoch Powell's description of, "archbishops who l i v e i n palaces . . . with the bedclothes pulled r i g h t up over t h e i r heads," may not only be given 37 several d i f f e r e n t readings by a native speaker, but d i f f e r s from a sentence which that speaker would recognize as being 13 incorrect or ill - f o r m e d . Our account of a language system ought to be able to accomodate i t . According to l i n g u i s t s , when we say that we have understood Powell's utterance we have assigned the sentence a p a r t i c u l a r interpretation. How we arrived at t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must be explained i n a broadly s i m i l a r way whether i t i s a metaphorical or a l i t e r a l i nterpretation i f 14 the l i n g u i s t ' s explanation i s going to be convincing. There can be no drawing back from t h i s demand by an appeal to context, for the context of Powell's utterance w i l l play exactly the same part i n our int e r p r e t a t i o n of i t as the context of the statement, "he w i l l come here tomorrow," does in a l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In other words, context w i l l supplement the ordinary l i n g u i s t i c competence that we are tryi n g to account for, not substitute for i t . Although t h i s i s not the place to submit such theories to detailed examination, i t must be said that they have not been notably successful on t h e i r own terms. I t has been easy enough to i d e n t i f y what i s special about a metaphorical interpretation — attaching a new sense to one or more words in the utterance — but much more d i f f i c u l t to show how t h i s i s done as a recognizable variant of a l i t e r a l reading. The s t r u c t u r a l i s t authors of the Rhetorique generale set the 38 problem up i n a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y l i n g u i s t i c way i n t h e i r analysis of the famous advertising slogan, "mettez un t i g r e dans votre moteur!" With a rare f l a s h of humour, they remark that ' t i g r e ' must be given "un sens modifie". Jusqu'a nouvel ordre, l a l e x i c a l i s a t i o n de t i g r e comme produisant l a s i g n i f i e 'super-super carburant' (ou quelque chose d'approchant) n'etant pas acquise, i l faut expliquer pourquoi les automobilistes a t t e i n t s par le message en question n^ont pas ^+:ente d'introduire un fauve dans leur mecanique. I t has proved very d i f f i c u l t to show how t h i s modified sense i s attached to words without the appeal to context which we saw to be inadmissible. If a rule — for example, a rule specifying certain r e l a t i o n s between semantic features --has to be reinterpreted i n each case of metaphor, we are not explaining metaphorical interpretation as part of l i n g u i s t i c 16 competence at a l l . This d i f f i c u l t y has not prevented modern semiotic theory from taking up the challenge posed by metaphorical expressions. Umberto Eco, for example, reduces metaphors to chains of metonymic connections making up the underlying language system. These relations of "contiguity" must have already existed i n the system, for, " i n truth", 39 the force of every successful and inventive metaphor l i e s i n the fact th.^t p r i o r to i t no one had grasped the resemblance. Clearly, t h i s denial that anyone can invent a new metaphor — they can only grasp the p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent i n the language system . — i s a consequence of a profoundly i n f l u e n t i a l philosophical position. As Eco e x p l i c i t l y acknowledges, his adversary i s the doctrine that he c a l l s "idealism", the b e l i e f that the speaking subject i s anything other than a grammatical f i c t i o n . For Eco, nothing can be said that i s not already at least p o t e n t i a l l y available i n the language code, so that the c r i t i c a l r e l a t i o n i s not that between thinking subjects and t h e i r " l i f e world" -- as continental phenomenologists had argued — but between 18 subjects and the ' s i g n i f i e r s ' of the code. This i s not a debate which w i l l d i r e c t l y concern us here. However, i t i s very clear that the semiotic approach to metaphors has greatly influenced some continental writings on p o l i t i c a l metaphors. Denying that speaking can be understood i n any sense relevant to continental philosophy as an i n d i v i d u a l expressing ' h i m s e l f , the project of "deconstructing" the codes i n which p o l i t i c a l discourse i s c a r r i e d on has achieved a certain notoriety. The deconstruction of metaphors has a prominent part to play here, p r e c i s e l y because metaphors, as we have seen, are held to reveal the i n t e r n a l structures of language codes. Yet 40 semiological c r i t i c i s m has an important drawback for p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c s , a drawback scrupulously respected by i t s most distinguished proponents, and w i l f u l l y ignored by popularizers. I t i s strongly a n t i - r e a l i s t i n i t s denial that we can ever 'get beyond' language codes. There i s always a code to be deconstructed. To consider semiotic theories i n the d e t a i l that they deserve would e n t a i l too great a digression from the main aims of the present work. We must be content to repeat a point made by Meyer Abrams i n summing up the significance of his work on the metaphors of aesthetics. He i n s i s t s that the use of "canonical metaphors" i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e i f they are held to be the responses of i n t e l l i g e n t agents to understood situations, and these agents f i n d i t worthwhile to employ such metaphors: Such a canonical metaphor, i n my view, flourishes and recurs because i t s p a r t i c u l a r pertinence and area of focus make i t p r o f i t a b l e i n c r i t i c a l discourse. And i t i s pr o f i t a b l e because, even though less than f u l l y adequate, i t provides us with a f u l l e r under stancL^ng of something beyond i t s own int e r n a l economy. In short, p o l i t i c a l metaphors are employed because of what p o l i t i c a l agents can f i n d out about p o l i t i c s with t h e i r aid. I t i s up to us to discern what was found out about p o l i t i c s , and why each metaphor was used i n one way rather than i n 41 another. Once again, we are i n s i s t i n g on the autonomy of the study of p o l i t i c a l metaphors from more general l i t e r a r y and l i n g u i s t i c concerns. For these reasons, summing up l i n g u i s t i c theories of metaphor, the student of p o l i t i c a l metaphors might consider a constructive suggestion by John Lyons. He argues that metaphors could l i e outside the scope of l i n g u i s t i c s , having less to do with the rules and structures of a language system than with what he refers to as the strategies of creative language use: "the language user's a b i l i t y to extend the system by means of motivated, but unpredictable, 20 p r i n c i p l e s of abstraction and comparison." A l i n g u i s t i c theory of metaphor would have very l i t t l e to say about unpredictable p r i n c i p l e s , but the suggestion that metaphors be approached through an in t e r p r e t a t i v e strategy i s an i n t e r e s t i n g one. We are led to consider the p r i n c i p l e s a ctually employed i n constructing and understanding a p a r t i c u l a r metaphor -- two of which Lyons has already suggested — and the "motivation" that prompted t h e i r employment. The reference to lack of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y allows for the p o s s i b i l i t y of t r u l y novel metaphors, but t h i s does not e n t a i l that a metaphorical reading, once made, cannot then be explained. In other words, our account of why i t was that the motorists who were attracted by the slogan, "mettez un t i g r e 42 dans votre moteur," should flock to buy p e t r o l rather than an endangered species of wild animal w i l l have two parts. F i r s t i t w i l l explain why these people decided that a metaphorical reading was an appropriate one i n the circumstances. Second, rather than attempting to explain how they produced the metaphorical reading as a special case of understanding the meaning of a word, we s h a l l look at metaphorical interpretation as a p r i n c i p l e d , i f unpredictable, way of establishing sense at the l e v e l of the sentence. We must then consider what more can be said about such p r i n c i p l e s . IV. How do we recognize metaphorical utterances? Our f i r s t question, then, i s how to discern whether a sentence i s to be read metaphorically or not. Put l i k e t h i s , the question i t s e l f i s extremely misleading, for i t has suggested to many the o r i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y l i n g u i s t s , that we are looking for some i n f a l l i b l e c r i t e r i o n which marks a 21 sentence as a metaphor. If we ask why a reader thought i t was appropriate to interpret a p a r t i c u l a r utterance as a metaphor we are much less l i k e l y to be misled i n t h i s way, for i t has become something of a commonplace i n theories of metaphor to note that no such i n f a l l i b l e c r i t e r i o n has yet been discovered. Theorists who set out to f i n d some 43 'semantic impertinence' which signals a need for a metaphorical reading, soon discover that there i s always a simple metaphor which i s not 'impertinent' i n the way that 22 they have stated. In p a r t i c u l a r , the phenomenon of 'twice-true' sentences — 'he i s a clown', for example — which may be equally metaphorical or l i t e r a l assertions has persuaded theorists to f a l l back on a reader's inferences 23 from the context of the sentence. But what does 'context' mean here? Once again, i f we are looking for an i n f a l l i b l e c r i t e r i o n , the admission that a context-by-context selection of the relevant c r i t e r i o n i s needed to di s t i n g u i s h between metaphorical and l i t e r a l utterances must cast doubt upon the whole enterprise. As Max Black has argued, i t makes much more sense to see the a b i l i t y to recognize a metaphor as just that — a n a b i l i t y , l i k e the a b i l i t y to recognize jokes 24 or puns. We may be able to give reasons for preferring a metaphorical to a l i t e r a l reading, and one of the most important reasons w i l l be that a l i t e r a l reading i s unsatisfactory i n an obvious way. There i s a patent absurdity i n a l i t e r a l reading of "put a t i g e r i n your tank" as there i s an obvious f a l s i t y to the claim that archbishops r e a l l y do l i v e i n palaces with the bedclothes pulled up over t h e i r heads and a banality to the l i t e r a l assertion that no man i s an i s l a n d . Our recognition of t h i s fact may suggest 44 to us that we interpret such statements metaphorically, but we have to decide that t h i s i s so i n i n d i v i d u a l cases. As a consequence, someone who wants t h e i r utterances to be given a metaphorical interpretation w i l l sometimes use certain conventional s t y l i s t i c devices to a l e r t us to his intention -- c h a r a c t e r i s t i c grammatical constructions, for example. On the other hand, our 'knack' for producing metaphorical readings may desert us, and we are a l l f a m i l i a r with the experience of having someone point out a metaphor where we had s e t t l e d for a l i t e r a l reading. Treating metaphors i n t h i s way has a number of i n c i d e n t a l advantages. For example, we see how f r u i t l e s s i t i s to argue over whether a metaphorical utterance must have been intended metaphorically. As I have suggested, someone may signal t h e i r intention to speak metaphorically i n a number of conventional ways — and i d e n t i f y i n g these ways w i l l be important to us when we are t r y i n g to recover what someone meant i n saying something — but we are less interested i n whether or not an auditor does interpret the utterance metaphorically or l i t e r a l l y than i n why he should think i t appropriate to give the p a r t i c u l a r interpretation that he does, and i n how he arrives at i t . Rather than being puzzled by Donald Davidson's example of the two stories i n the newspaper, one reporting Hemingway's death i n an airplane crash, the next superceding i t with an account of 45 his being missing, but both headlined "Hemingway l o s t i n A f r i c a " , we are provided with an i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e l i g h t on 25 metaphorical competence. The editor presumably thought i t safe to assume that the story would guide the reader's interpretations, f i r s t to a metaphor, then to a l i t e r a l reading. In addition to these considerations, Timothy Binkley has shown that to suppose that a c r i t e r i o n l i k e f a l s i t y or nonsensicality i s part of the meaning of a metaphor e n t a i l s an oversimplified account of the way that metaphors are 2 6 actually used. Thus (to take a more r e a l i s t i c example than Binkley's), consider Burke's defence of the constitution of the Ancien Regime. Your constit u t i o n i t i s true, whilst you were out of possession, suffered waste and d i l a p i d a t i o n ; but you possessed i n some parts the walls and i n a l l t n § 7 foundation of a noble and venerable c a s t l e . There are many reasons that could be put forward for a metaphorical reading. Once such a reading has been made, however, i t s negation i s not the statement that 'a const i t u t i o n i s not a c a s t l e ' , but the assertion that the French constitution was dilapidated and had wasted beyond repair, leaving only rubbish to be cleared from the s i t e of a new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e d i f i c e . The function of the claim that 46 a c o n s t i t u t i o n i s not a. c a s t l e might be to j u s t i f y our metaphorical reading to someone who had f a i l e d to f i n d the metaphor, but i t plays no part i n an explanation of what the metaphor means. V. Metaphors considered as semantic innovation. I f t h i s r e j e c t i o n of a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c r i t e r i o n f o r metaphorical and l i t e r a l utterances i s correct, the main burden of our conceptual i n v e s t i g a t i o n s h i f t s . I t s e t t l e s f i r m l y on the second question which we teased from l e groupe s demand fo r an explanation, that i s , onto an account of the p r i n c i p l e s on which a metaphorical reading i s made or the way i n which a statement read metaphorically makes sense. Having already cast doubt upon the e f f i c a c y of t r a d i t i o n a l formulae and upon the relevance of l i n g u i s t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , we turn to those philosophers of language who have concerned themselves with metaphorical utterances. Here we f i n d three broadly d i f f e r e n t l i n e s of argument which I s h a l l d i s t i n g u i s h i n o u t l i n e before considering i n d e t a i l . The f i r s t approach most resembles the theories we have already examined. Those who pursue i t argue that i n a metaphor the sense established at the l e v e l of the sentence imposes a change of meaning upon one or more key words i n the sentence. The problem f o r such t h e o r i s t s i s to explain 47 how a word can acquire a new sense i n a single, novel instance, and i t i s usually tackled by appeal to a metaphorical extension of the l i t e r a l sense of the word involved, but without suggesting that the new sense i s computed by means of a formula. The l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s I. A. Richards and William Empson have been formative influences upon t h i s t r a d i t i o n of theorising, most notably upon Max Black, whose work we s h a l l consider i n d e t a i l . Beneath a b r i l l i a n t surface of eclecticism, a similary theory may perhaps be discerned i n the writings of Paul Ricoeur. We 29 s h a l l refer to these accounts as INNOVATION theories. Both of the other approaches d i f f e r from innovation theories i n arguing that a metaphorical reading of a sentence involves no change of sense for any word i n the o r i g i n a l utterance. This neatly circumvents the problem of how to assign a new meaning to a word, but now the problem i s to explain how an auditor assigns a meaning to an utterance i f he has determined that a l i t e r a l meaning i s inappropriate. At t h i s point the two approaches diverge. One — we s h a l l c a l l i t the INDIRECTION theory — argues that a metaphorical utterance i s one of a group of utterances i n which a speaker says one thing but means another. We are then owed an account of the special p r i n c i p l e s which auditors use to move from sentence meaning to utterance meaning when the l a t t e r i s metaphorical. The p r i n c i p a l 48 exponent of the theory has been John Searle. Against t h i s , the CONSEQUENTIAL!ST theory maintains that the l i t e r a l meaning of an utterance i s the only meaning that the sentence w i l l bear, but suggests that a speaker using a sentence metaphorically i s r e l a t i v e l y uninterested i n the l i t e r a l meaning of the sentence he utters (a meaning which i s c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d by such theorists with propositional content). The speaker's primary concern, i t i s argued, i s with the special e f f e c t s that his utterance has on his audience. A consequentialist conveniently sidesteps a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n showing how an auditor makes a special sense out of a metaphorical utterance, but the cogency of the theory depends on the account that he gives of the terms 'effects' and 'consequences'. U n t i l recently, consequentialist accounts of metaphor were associated with emotivism i n ethics and l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , but the thesis has now been given a new lease of l i f e by Donald Davidson. We begin, then, with the innovation theory and with i t s most i n f l u e n t i a l formulation i n the writings of Max Black. In his pioneering essay 'Metaphor', Black introduced a d i s t i n c t i o n between the 'focus' and the 'frame' of a metaphor which plays a c r u c i a l role i n any innovation theory. He uses as an example "the chairman ploughed through the discussion. 1 1 49 An obvious point to begin with i s the contrast between the word 'ploughed' and the remaining words by which i t i s accompanied. This would be commonly expressed by saying that ploughed has here a metaphorical sense, while the other words have l i t e r a l senses. Although we point to the whole sentence as an instance ... of metaphor, our attention quickly narrows to a single word whose presence i s the proximate reason for the a t t r i b u t i o n . . . . In general, when we speak of a r e l a t i v e l y simple metaphor we are r e f e r r i n g to an expression i n which some words are used metaphorically and ^where the remainder are used non-metaphorically. This metaphorical word - the focus - i s i d e n t i f i e d by the need to f i n d a new sense for i t i f the statement as a whole i s to make sense. The chairman did not r e a l l y make a furrow i n the committee room, so 'ploughed' needs something more than i t s everyday range of meanings. This idea of a speaker or hearer attaching a new sense to a word i s , Black has 31 claimed, "too f a m i l i a r to arouse perplexity." The problem of metaphor then becomes a matter of showing how the focus acquires i t s new sense. This much about metaphor may be derived from a careful reading of Richards or Empson: Black's special contribution i s to propose a solution to the problem i n terms of an "interaction" between focus and frame. Recall Burke's metaphor that a constitution i s a castle (a summary of h i s whole utterance which Black would c a l l a "metaphor-theme"), expressed i n the statement that, "your 50 c o n s t i t u t i o n i t i s true, whilst you were out of possession suffered waste and d i l a p i d a t i o n . " Black would say that t h i s metaphor has as i t s primary subject the constitution of the Ancien Regime, and as i t s secondary subject a set of implications supported by the idea of a dilapidated c a s t l e . The metaphor works, not by comparing a consti t u t i o n with a ca s t l e , but by projecting back upon the primary subject the set of implication associated with the secondary subject of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r metaphor. The r e s u l t i s to organise and " f i l t e r " a p a r t i c u l a r view of the primary subject while simultaneously e f f e c t i n g changes i n the meaning of the f o c a l words ('waste1 and 'd i l a p i d a t i o n ' ) . Evidently, t h i s account rests on Black being a l i t t l e more forthcoming about how the implications sustained by the secondary subject are created and then projected back on the primary subject. In his more recent writings Black has o b l i g i n g l y l i s t e d f i v e "projective r e l a t i o n s " : i d e n t i t y , s i m i l a r i t y , analogy, extension and metaphorical coupling. How might t h i s work i n the case of Burke's metaphor? A c a s t l e , we might say, i s a massively constructed e d i f i c e , s o l i d l y founded; some of i t s upper works may f a l l into d i s r e p a i r ; but they may yet be of use i f t h e i r foundation or not decayed. Here i s our implication complex. Projected upon the constitution of the Ancien Regime t h i s y i e l d s the claims that a constitution i s deeply embedded i n a nation's 51 p o l i t i c a l l i f e ; that the various rights and p r i v i l e g e s which i t guarantees might f a l l into desuetude; but that the process has not gone so far as to touch the fa b r i c of the constitution and thus leave no basis upon which to revive those rights remaining, and to found others more suitable to modern conditions. The f i r s t projection i n t h i s example would be an example of analogy, the second a s i m i l a r i t y based on the analogy, whilst the t h i r d contains i t s own metaphor, the 'fabric of the constitution', mediated by the o r i g i n a l analogy. Our interpretation here has been guided by Black's general remarks that his analysis seeks to preserve the ambience of a good metaphor, the f e e l i n g and tone with which i t invests the primary subject, while at the same time giving some rigour to the idea of projection and the concomitant extended sense of "waste and d i l a p i d a t i o n " . Has Black succeeded here? Note f i r s t how important a part i s played by analogy i n the projective r e l a t i o n s . Black has e x p l i c i t l y recognized t h i s , conceding that his o r i g i n a l formulation of the problem paid i n s u f f i c i e n t attention to the r e l a t i o n between a metaphor and an analogue model: Every implication complex supported by a metaphor's secondary subject, I now think, i s a model of the ascriptions imputed to the primary 52 subject^ Every metaphor i s the t i p of a submerged model. As we have suggested, the difference that Black s t i l l maintains between a metaphor and a model i s to be found i n the e x p l i c i t nature of the comparisons that characterize a model, with a consequent loss of "power to illuminate" compared with a good metaphor. A metaphor, i n Black's sense of the term, i s open-ended, and he explains t h i s , f i r s t , i n terms of a secondary subject's imposing more than one implication complex on i t s primary subject, and second, because the projections themselves may be open-ended, involving t h e i r own metaphorical r e l a t i o n s , ad hoc s i m i l a r i t i e s and extensions. In t h i s sense, too, the projective r e l a t i o n s are not to be thought of as rules or formulae, but as closer to the creative strategies of interpretation mentioned by Lyons. Formulating the implications, specifying the analogies and teasing out the ensuing r e l a t i o n s of likeness and difference may r e s u l t i n increased precision, but a price w i l l be paid i n terms of illumination. C r i t i c i s m of Black's account concentrates on three main areas, i n each of which serious problems are exposed. The f i r s t l i n e of c r i t i c i s m has been directed at his claim, made in his o r i g i n a l essay, that a metaphor which involves 53 i n t e r a c t i o n between i t s subjects — that i s , any r e a l l y i l l u m i n a t i n g metaphor — cannot be paraphrased. In Black's own words, that a l i t e r a l paraphrase purporting to state the "cognitive content" of such a metaphor, " w i l l not have the 3 3 same power to enlighten and inform as the o r i g i n a l . " The main stumbling block here i s the notion of a "cognitive content". We may happily accept that the l i t e r a l paraphrases involved i n our interpretation of Burke's metaphor are only a part of what the metaphor 'means', but we should note that an extended sense of 'meaning' i s being invoked here. In p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s extended sense s i t s unhappily with the notion of a cognitive content. In a l a t e r essay, Black deals with the weakness of l i t e r a l paraphrases by r e f e r r i n g to the "emphasis and resonance" of a strong metaphor, which, together with the "power to enlighten and inform" d i r e c t our attention away from narrow senses of 'meaning', es p e c i a l l y away from those connected with truth. However, i n t h i s sense of 'meaning', metaphors share with l i t e r a l utterances l i k e the mot juste or the epigram a f e e l i n g that only t h i s word or phrase w i l l do, analogously, perhaps, with the sense i n which we think that a musical phrase must be played i n just t h i s p a r t i c u l a r way to be ' c o r r e c t 1 . These are undoubtedly i n t e r e s t i n g phenomena, and i t i s useful to be reminded that they play a central part i n the comprehension of metaphorical utterances, but they surely 54 point more towards the e f f e c t s of the utterance rather than 34 towards anything that i s recognizably a cognitive content. Once a metaphor has suggested a c e r t a i n set of implications to us — and we can happily concede that we might have been hard put to ar r i v e at them without i t s aid — what i s to prevent us from paraphrasing the result? Black's remarks seem much less relevant to metaphors as devices for communicating s p e c i f i c 'contents' as they are to the sense i n which a metaphorical utterance i s a performance or an event with recognizable consequences. We s h a l l have more to say about t h i s when we come to consider consequentialist theories, but on the whole question of l i t e r a l paraphrases and cognitive contents i t i s d i f f i c u l t to f a u l t Donald Davidson's trenchant c r i t i q u e . There i s , then, a tension i n the usual view of metaphor. For, on the one hand, the usual view wants to hold that a metaphor does something no p l a i n prose can possibly do, and, on the other hand, i t wants to explain what a metaphor does by appealing to a cognitive content -- just the^sort of thing p l a i n prose i s designed to express. But what now i s to be made of 'interaction', the o r i g i n a l concept upon which t h i s r a d i c a l p r o h i b i t i o n on paraphrase i s based? Many c r i t i c s have expressed unabashed scepticism that anything remotely resembling in t e r a c t i o n takes place i n a metaphor. We r e c a l l that Black took over 55 the term from Richards, where the l a t t e r was concerned to combat the view that the secondary subject of a metaphor was a mere embellishment of the r e a l or underlying meaning of the statement. His special concern was to be able to analyse the r e l a t i v e contributions made by both primary and secondary subjects to the meaning of the whole utterance, and, by speaking of int e r a c t i o n , he emphasized that the meaning was a product of the combination of both subjects i n context, not analyzable from the properties of each taken 3 6 separately. This i s a very sound point, the cornerstone of a successful c r i t i q u e of formulaic theories, and a necessary foundation for any sophisticated analysis of the projective r e l a t i o n s of a novel metaphor such as that offered by Black. However, the notion of int e r a c t i o n plays another role i n Black's own theory, and one that bears examination. He appeals to int e r a c t i o n to explain how the fo c a l word or phrase acquires a new meaning, and i n t h i s sense i t i s the centrepiece of his semantic innovation account. The problem Black has set himself i s to show how the projective r e l a t i o n s that arise out of 'interaction' are so completely watertight that they can determine a new meaning for a word. In other words, he suggests that the implication complex, i n addition to predicating ce r t a i n things of the primary subject, " r e c i p r o c a l l y induces p a r a l l e l changes i n the 37 secondary subject." In Burke's metaphor which we have been 56 using as an example, we are to show how 'waste and di l a p i d a t i o n ' now mean -- for speakers and hearers — loss of rights and decay of i n s t i t u t i o n s . Yet, as commentators as d i f f e r e n t i n orientation as Ricoeur and Scheffler have pointed out, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how such 'new meanings' are attached without an appeal to auditors' judgements i n context. If t h i s i s so, then the temptation to look upon the projective r e l a t i o n s as rules or formulae independently of th e i r use i n p a r t i c u l a r contexts i s removed, and the fear that prompted Richards to introduce the notion of semantic inte r a c t i o n i s done away with. Furthermore, the whole notion of a metaphor seems to be undermined by the demand that the f o c a l words change t h e i r meaning, by inte r a c t i o n or any other means. We are i n c l i n e d to suggest that i f , i n Burke's metaphor, 'waste and di l a p i d a t i o n ' r e a l l y mean loss of ri g h t s , then the sense i n which his claim i s a metaphorical one i s l o s t . As we s h a l l see, the notion of an interaction between primary and secondary subjects has some int e r e s t i n g applications to conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphors, but i t cannot carry the the o r e t i c a l weight that Black demands. He handles the d i f f i c u l t question about metaphor — explaining how a constitution could be said to have f a l l e n into d i s r e p a i r — with his c a r e f u l account of the d i f f e r e n t ways i n which a hearer may project the implications of 'disrepair' onto the 57 notion of a constitution. The attempted demonstration of how fo c a l words 'change t h e i r sense 1 seems superfluous. VI. Alternatives to semantic innovation; i n d i r e c t speech and  the consequences of a metaphorical utterance. Considerations of exactly t h i s l a s t kind have prompted the i n d i r e c t i o n and consequentialist accounts of metaphor. The former account, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , argues that what a metaphorical utterance means i s not what i t says, but something else. This 'something else' w i l l be another statement with straightforward, l i t e r a l truth conditions (a paraphrase, i f you w i l l ) , arrived at by applying certain p r i n c i p l e s of inference s p e c i f i c to metaphors to the o r i g i n a l statement. Thus the projective r e l a t i o n s that Black has been developing are s t i l l relevant to any account of how metaphors work, i t i s just that Black and other innovation theorists have mistaken t h e i r proper function. They are not an i n t e g r a l part of the meaning of the metaphor — as truth conditions are an i n t e g r a l part of the meaning of a l i t e r a l assertion — but aids i n " c a l l i n g to mind" the relevant paraphrase. Consequentialists have no truck with any talk of the meaning of metaphorical utterances; metaphors are employed for t h e i r special e f f e c t s or consequences, not to communicate propositional content. Undoubtedly John Searle's formulation of the 58 i n d i r e c t i o n approach to metaphors -- that when a speaker utters a statement metaphorically he says one thing but means another — has a certain elegance which innovation theories lack. Based on a d i s t i n c t i o n between sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning developed by Searle and Grice, i t simply claims that, i n a metaphorical assertion, sentence meaning i s given by the truth conditions of what i s said; speaker's utterance meaning i s given by the truth conditions of another l i t e r a l statement, d i f f e r e n t from the f i r s t but related to i t i n d i r e c t l y . There i s no longer any need to speak of metaphorical meanings, but we do need to know how a hearer moves from what he hears to what he thinks the speaker means; i n other words, how he constructs or i n f e r s the statement which i s the meaning of 3 8 the metaphorical utterance. A detailed comparison of innovation and i n d i r e c t i o n theories would require an analysis of theories of meaning which i s , once again, well beyond the scope of the present work. Let us, instead, consider the ways i n which Black's account of metaphor may be f r u i t f u l l y modified by the p o s i t i v e proposals of i n d i r e c t i o n and consequential t h e o r i s t s . The clear advantage of the i n d i r e c t i o n i s t 1 s claim that, i n a metaphor, we may di s t i n g u i s h between what a speaker or writer says and what he means, i s the way i n which i t takes us r i g h t away from tinkering with sentence 59 meaning i n our e f f o r t t o make sense of the metaphor. We no longer have any temptation t o suggest t h a t any word has changed i t s meaning, so we have no more use f o r the v a r i o u s baroque t h e o r e t i c a l e d i f i c e s which p u r p o r t to show how t h i s may be done. In a d d i t i o n , i t f i t s very h a p p i l y w i t h our sugg e s t i o n t h a t understanding a metaphor i n v o l v e s motivated i n f e r e n t i a l s t r a t e g i e s on the p a r t of the reader and the w r i t e r . I t makes sense t o ask what p a r t Burke's metaphor p l a y e d i n h i s o v e r a l l p r o j e c t i n the R e f l e c t i o n s when we are t r y i n g t o d e c i d e what i t means. We are thereby l e d to c o n s i d e r what Burke was doing i n speaking m e t a p h o r i c a l l y . The disadvantage l i e s i n the ever p r e s e n t danger t h a t an i n d i r e c t i o n theory w i l l reduce metaphor to an ornament. I f Burke r e a l l y o n l y meant t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Ancien  Regime had f a l l e n i n t o desuetude but not beyond hope of r e s t o r a t i o n , why d i d he f e e l i t necessary t o t a l k about w a l l s and foundations? Innovation t h e o r i s t s f e a r t h a t u n l e s s we can show how a p a r t i c u l a r m e t a p h o r i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n was necessary t o impose new meanings on c e r t a i n key words, we w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y r e t u r n t o the view t h a t metaphors are mere ' c l o t h i n g ' f o r an u n d e r l y i n g l i t e r a l meaning. S e a r l e ' s r e p l y to t h i s — t h a t i t i s on l y by going through sentence meaning t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a r r i v e a t the speaker's u t t e r a n c e meaning -- may appear to be a lame one, but i t deserves c l o s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 60 F i r s t , S e a r l e i s on s t r o n g ground when he says t h a t i n n o v a t i o n t h e o r i e s tend to confuse the q u e s t i o n of how a 39 metaphor works w i t h the q u e s t i o n of what a metaphor means. There can o n l y be one answer to the l a t t e r q u e s t i o n ; t h a t a metaphor means what i t does i n the same way t h a t any other use of language 'means'. We saw the d i f f i c u l t i e s which dogged attempts t o show t h a t words c o u l d have a l i t e r a l meaning and a m e t a p h o r i c a l meaning. We ought to be s u s p i c i o u s of t a l k about d i f f e r e n t 'kinds' of meaning. Second, the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a reader or hearer f i r s t 'goes through' sentence meaning b e f o r e he can a r r i v e a t u t t e r a n c e meaning should remind us of B l a c k ' s suggestion t h a t a metaphor o r g a n i s e s or f i l t e r s our t h i n k i n g about a s u b j e c t . Claims about the d i s t i n c t i v e e f f e c t s of speaking m e t a p h o r i c a l l y have tended t o be p l a y e d down i n the attempt to r e h a b i l i t a t e the c o g n i t i v e s t a t u s of metaphor. Black's i d e a t h a t the degree of emphasis t h a t a w r i t e r p l a c e s on h i s exact wording i s c l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h the 'resonance 1 of a metaphor c l e a r l y resembles S e a r l e ' s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t i t i s the d i f f e r e n t i n f e r e n t i a l steps which recover a speaker's meaning t h a t g i v e a d i s t i n c t i v e ' f e e l ' t o d i f f e r e n t metaphors. Donald Davidson has pursued t h i s i d e a f u r t h e s t , t o the e x t e n t of denying t h a t the meaning of a metaphor i s ever a p r o p o s i t i o n — or, a t l e a s t , t h a t i t h a r d l y ever i s . Why, he 61 asks, do other t h e o r i s t s have such d i f f i c u l t y i n e x p l a i n i n g what a metaphor means i n terms of a c o g n i t i v e content? The reason i t i s o f t e n so hard t o decide i s , I t h i n k , t h a t we imagine t h e r e i s a content t o be captured when a l l the w h i l e we are f o c u s s i n g on what the metaphor makes us n o t i c e . I f what the metaphor makes us n o t i c e were f i n i t e i n scope and p r o p o s i t i o n a l i n nature t h i s would not i n i t s e l f l e a d t o t r o u b l e : we would simply p r o j e c t the content t h a t the metaphor brought to mind onto the metaphor. But i n f a c t t h e r e i s no l i m i t to what a metaphor c a l l s t o our a t t e n t i o n , and much of what we are caused t o n o t i c e i s not p r o p o s i t i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r . When we t r y to say what a metaphor "means" we soon r e a l i s e t h a t there i s no end to what we want to mention. . . . How many f a c t s or p r o p o s i t i o n s are conveyed by a photograph? None, an i n f i n i t y , or one g r e a t u n s t a b l e f a c t ? Bad q u e s t i o n . A p i c t u r e i s not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words^are the wrong currency to exchange f o r a p i c t u r e . There i s undoubtedly a weakness here i n the e q u i v o c a t i o n on what e x a c t l y a metaphor might h e l p us " n o t i c e " . I t i s hard t o see why i t should not i n c l u d e p r o p o s i t i o n a l knowledge, even i f t h i s by no means exhausts the meaning of the metaphor — i n the extended sense of meaning. Davidson even uses the same words as S e a r l e and Black to e x p l a i n how t h i s knowledge might be d e r i v e d : " p r o j e c t the content t h a t the metaphor brought to mind onto the metaphor." But t h i s e q u i v o c a t i o n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , i t i s a powerful and s u g g e s t i v e account of the way i n which metaphors f u n c t i o n . They b r i n g us up s h o r t and make us 62 notice something we might otherwise overlook. We s h a l l f i n d the notion of 'seeing as' p a r t i c u l a r l y useful, and Davidson's point that i n order to see something as something else, nothing can take the place of having experience, i s worth noting. If nothing else, i t suggests a way of analysing the metaphors of " f i l t e r " and " c a l l i n g to mind" which we s h a l l pursue i n Chapter Four. But his denial that one of the consequences might be knowledge that can be passed on i n propositional form i s c e r t a i n l y an odd one, and we may suspect that i t i s prompted more by his s t r i c t account of the r e l a t i o n between meaning and truth than by attending to the possible consequences of a metaphorical utterance. VII. Metaphors as i n d i r e c t a t t r i b u t i o n . How do Black's views on metaphor look when modified i n the l i g h t of Searle's and Davidson's comments? We r e t a i n the focus on metaphor as a phenomenon at the l e v e l of the sentence or even the text. We also r e t a i n and develop the notion that the propositional content of a metaphor i s arrived at by a process of projecting a set of implications sustained by the combination of primary and secondary subjects back onto the primary subject. There i s no great harm done i n c a l l i n g t h i s 'interaction' i f we wish. But, i n 63 addition to the propositional content of a metaphorical utterance, we must recognize that the operation of the various projective r e l a t i o n s or p r i n c i p l e s of metaphorical inte r p r e t a t i o n may give r i s e to a number of in t e r e s t i n g e f f e c t s — i n p a r t i c u l a r , they may cause us to notice something about or attend to an aspect of a subject which we might otherwise have overlooked. On the one hand we have an apparent loss: no exhaustive account of the p r i n c i p l e s of metaphorical interpretation can be expected, for t h i s would deny the c r e a t i v i t y we r i g h t l y associate with a metaphor. On the other hand, we gain i n being able to consider the question of why anyone should want to use a metaphor with greater precision. In p a r t i c u l a r , we see that no very general answer to t h i s question can be expected. There i s no one 'function' of metaphor i n p o l i t i c a l language, and we are to look to the actual practice and projects of those who 41 have used p o l i t i c a l metaphors to determine t h e i r reasons. In future, then, when we refer to 'metaphor1, we s h a l l be r e f e r r i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r kind of a t t r i b u t i o n , where to attr i b u t e i s , "to use a device i n order to ascribe cert a i n q u a l i t i e s , properties, r e l a t i o n s , actions, states or 42 dispositions to some or other subject." A metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n i s one that i s INDIRECT i n the sense that Searle has given to that term. This d e f i n i t i o n , i t should be noted, does not imply 64 t h a t a m e t a p h o r i c a l a t t r i b u t i o n i s one i n which the q u a l i t i e s or p r o p e r t i e s a s c r i b e d to a s u b j e c t are n e c e s s a r i l y d e v i a n t i n any sense, nor need they even be p r o p e r t i e s or q u a l i t i e s which might be unexpected when a s c r i b e d to t h a t s u b j e c t . T h i s would i n v o l v e a search f o r the m e t a p h o r i c a l warrant w i t h i n the sentence, a search which we have shown to be f r u i t l e s s . S e a r l e ' s i n d i r e c t i o n theory i s based i n s t e a d upon G r i c e ' s n o t i o n of c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t u r e f o r i t s account of how an i n d i r e c t statement — i n c l u d i n g a metaphor — d i f f e r s from a d i r e c t o n e . ^ Very s c h e m a t i c a l l y , G r i c e argued t h a t a speaker and a hearer share c e r t a i n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s about the c h a r a c t e r of c o n v e r s a t i o n , f o r example, t h a t speaker and hearer cooperated i n making t h e i r meanings t r a n s p a r e n t to one another, p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s which may be d e l i b e r a t e l y f l o u t e d when a speaker says one t h i n g and means another. As we have seen, S e a r l e argues t h a t metaphors belong i n t h i s c l a s s of u t t e r a n c e s . Once the hearer has grasped t h a t the speaker's a t t r i b u t i o n i s i n d i r e c t i n t h i s sense, he uses h i s knowledge of the p r i n c i p l e s on which a metaphor may be c o n s t r u c t e d i n order to a r r i v e a t the speaker's meaning. I f the speaker merely wishes to a s s e r t a p r o p o s i t i o n , we must assume t h a t he has s p e c i a l reasons f o r a s s e r t i n g i t i n d i r e c t l y , and t h a t these have to do w i t h the i n t e r e s t i n g e f f e c t s of making the 65 hearer 'think through' a metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n . However, the danger that a hearer w i l l not be able to reconstruct the p r i n c i p l e s on which the metaphor i s constructed, or w i l l a r r i v e at some quite d i f f e r e n t meaning, i s an occupational hazard of speaking metaphorically. Obviously, as a theory of metaphor t h i s b r i e f sketch leaves a great deal to be desired. As a framework within which p o l i t i c a l metaphors can be studied, i t i s pe r f e c t l y adequate. I t allows us to i d e n t i f y metaphors, and shows us where to look for some of the more int e r e s t i n g e f f e c t s of metaphorical utterances. I t confronts, i f i t does not resolve, the major philosophical puzzles raised by the concept 'metaphor', and we can move on to consider metaphors i n discourse that i s recognizably p o l i t i c a l . 66 CHAPTER THREE R e c o g n i t i o n and Resemblance Conceptual Metaphor i n P o l i t i c s In the p r e v i o u s chapter, we approached metaphors through a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of language and uses of language. T h i s c o n j u n c t i o n i s an important one f o r , w h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g the c o n t r i b u t i o n of a 'language system' t o the sense of a m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e , i t n e v e r t h e l e s s emphasises the work put i n by authors and audiences when they c o n s t r u c t and understand metaphors. U l t i m a t e l y , we are d i r e c t e d away from language c o n s i d e r e d as a 'code' or ' s t r u c t u r e ' , and towards the p r o j e c t s and a c t i v i t i e s of those who use i t . O b j e c t i o n s t o t r e a t i n g metaphors as an aspect of language -- whether of 'code' or of use — have not been wanting. Such o b j e c t i o n s , however, have u s u a l l y been p a r t of a more g e n e r a l argument about the r e l a t i o n between language, thought and a c t i o n which i s not i t s e l f p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m p e l l i n g or cogent. The argument has a tendency to conclude t h a t a l l language i s i n some sense m e t a p h o r i c a l , and t o l o c a t e metaphors themselves a t the l e v e l o f concept formation. D e s p i t e such i d i o s y n c r a c i e s , these accounts of 6 7 metaphor are w e l l worth c o n s i d e r i n g on t h e i r own m e r i t s , and they are of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t t o us because of t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h an i n f l u e n t i a l treatment of p o l i t i c a l language which we s h a l l s h o r t l y encounter. In f a c t , an a s s e r t i o n about the ' p r e - l i n g u i s t i c 1 c h a r a c t e r of metaphor p l a y s an important p a r t i n most accounts of why p o l i t i c a l metaphors are such a prominent f e a t u r e of p o l i t i c a l language. The p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n to a l i n g u i s t i c treatment of metaphor a r i s e s from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h i s s o r t . There i s a paradox i n t r y i n g t o i n v e s t i g a t e m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e s , i t i s claimed, because the more c a r e f u l l y we look, the more e v i d e n t i t becomes t h a t the language we are u s i n g to d e s c r i b e these u t t e r a n c e s i s i t s e l f m e t a p h o r i c a l . The o n l y way t h a t l i n g u i s t s and p h i l o s o p h e r s have appeared to escape t h i s paradox i s by making an a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between f i g u r a t i v e and n o n - f i g u r a t i v e language, and c a r e f u l l y u s i n g the one to d e s c r i b e the o t h e r . However, t h i s i s no r e a l escape because i t begs the q u e s t i o n of whether f i g u r a t i v e n e s s i s not a g e n e r a l f e a t u r e of a l l language --a l l language might be m e t a p h o r i c a l — f o r we have assumed a d i s t i n c t i o n which we r e a l l y ought to have e s t a b l i s h e d by argument. We are c o n s t a n t l y reminded of t h i s c i r c u l a r i t y by the m e t a p h o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r of our own d e s c r i p t i o n s of metaphor, f o r the empty jargon of philosophy or l i n g u i s t i c s 68 i s only an i l l u s o r y alternative to obvious metaphors l i k e 'tenor and v e h i c l e 1 , 'tarning', 'tension' or 'verbal leaps'. Taking our cue from the fact that 'metaphor' i s i t s e l f a metaphor, with i t s connotations of 'carrying across', we are urged to locate i t s e s s e n t i a l character outside language, preferably i n 'thought'. We might be tempted not to take t h i s l i n e of argument very seriously. After a l l , the r e f l e x i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s of language are not p a r t i c u l a r l y mysterious. However, the fact that many of these objections arise out of a rather dated metaphysical desire to transcend what are perceived to be the constraining l i m i t s of language should not cause us to overlook the more int e r e s t i n g points that they r a i s e . We should c e r t a i n l y be aware that the met a p h o r i c a l - l i t e r a l pair can appear a dubious d i s t i n c t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i f metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n i s analysed as a deviation from a standard model of predication. In such cases, the appearance of metaphors in an account of metaphor would be a serious flaw. Our account has made no such absolute d i s t i n c t i o n s , allowing a continuum of r e l a t i v e l y more or less f i g u r a t i v e readings, and giving no special p r i o r i t y of the l i t e r a l over the fi g u r a t i v e . The objection may hold against formulaic theories, but not elsewhere. More serious objections to our argument so far are to be discerned i n the claim that metaphor i s an att r i b u t e of 69 thought rather than language. We have already suggested that i t i s connected with a further claim that to deny the conceptual dimension of metaphor i s inev i t a b l y to underestimate i t s p o t e n t i a l , a double charge which i s neatly made by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Metaphor i s t y p i c a l l y viewed as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of language alone, a matter of words rather than of thought or action. For t h i s reason most people think that they can get along p e r f e c t l y well without metaphor. We have found on the contrary that metaphor i s pervasive i n everyday l i f e , not just i n language but thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, i n terms of which we both think^and act, i s fundamentally metaphorical i n nature. Metaphor would be pervasive indeed i f t h i s were true. But such a sweeping claim only makes 'metaphor' i t s e l f more mysterious than ever. Are there l i t e r a l concepts, for example, and i f not, i s 'metaphor' just another name for a concept? The other side of exactly the same coin has been expressed by Warren Shibbles, also concerned that the r e s t r i c t i o n of metaphor to language deprecates i t and leads to the b e l i e f that a metaphor i s a dispensible s t y l i s t i c device. Working with the l i n g u i s t i c theories of W. M. Urban, he argued that i f , as Urban thought, language precedes or determines thought through the categories and d i s t i n c t i o n s which i t imposes upon experience, then a metaphor i s as 7 0 equally an "avenue to knowledge" as the most severely 2 l i t e r a l expression. Both of these objections seek to meet formulaic theories by pointing out that language cannot be understood only i n terms of signs and operations, but i s i n e x t r i c a b l y bound up with a conceptual system i n terms of which people think and act. We s h a l l refer to views l i k e 3 these as CONSTRUCTIVIST theories of metaphor. The reminder that we are dealing with a set of related concepts expressed i n language i s an important one, but c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theories f l i r t with a dangerous absurdity. Lakoff and Johnson s k i r t the issue warily with the formulation that, "metaphor i s . . . not just i n language but i n thought and action." However, Shibbles, more ambitiously, i s led to speculate whether language might not 'determine 1 thought. The genuine objection here, as Lakoff and Johnson make clear, i s to a theory which treats metaphor as an aspect of "language alone", but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine how there could be such a language where signs had no sense. Machiavelli's famous metaphor that a prince, "must be a fox i n order to recognize traps, and a l i o n to frighten o f f wolves," expresses a certain 'thought' about the conduct of princes. Lakoff and Johnson have given us a valuable reminder that the conceptual connections revealed by t h i s metaphor are worth pursuing. At i t s simplest, i t t e l l s us something about our ordinary concept 'prince', the meaning 71 we o r d i n a r i l y express and the people we pick out by the term, that the a t t r i b u t i o n of fox and wolf behaviour i s metaphorical. One thing that we do know about a prince i s that he i s not, l i t e r a l l y speaking, either a fox or a l i o n . But we do not add anything to t h i s by saying that we r e a l l y have a metaphorical thought here, for the language and the thought are conceptually connected. Saussure expressed t h i s connection, i n a famous analogy, as being l i k e two sides of the same sheet of paper. The r e a l danger of absurdity l i e s i n bringing together the argument about the primacy of f i g u r a t i v e language with the notion that a thought i s something psychological, a "movement of thought". Then we are l i k e l y to be t o l d that a metaphor i s nothing less than the basic operation of thinking, the bringing of hitherto unknown phenomena under f a m i l i a r categories, and the capacity to produce new categories by association. This i s firmly i n the t r a d i t i o n of the whole 'origins of language' argument, i n which i t i s claimed that a l l words were o r i g i n a l l y metaphors and that what we innocently c a l l l i t e r a l language i s merely language 5 that has disguised i t s f i g u r a t i v e o r i g i n s . We s h a l l refer to t h i s extension of the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory as the FOSSIL theory, for i t s exponents conceive of words as having once been l i v e metaphors, but, becoming embedded in a language and acquiring d e f i n i t e sense and 72 r e f e r e n c e , a t l e n g t h hardening i n t o l i t e r a l terms. The e t y m o l o g i s t ' s s k i l l i s analogous to t h a t of the p a l e o n t o l o g i s t — from the f o s s i l i z e d remains he r e c o n s t r u c t s the o r i g i n a l l i f e o f a word l i k e ' p e r c e p t i o n ' , ' s c r u p l e ' or ' a t t e n t i o n ' , showing us how a p r i m i t i v e and impoverished language i s e n r i c h e d by m e t a p h o r i c a l e x t e n s i o n g of terms. The problem then becomes whether our words f o r mental processes o f f e r us a p i c t u r e of the way i n which a l l words were formed, or whether they — and many of our words f o r p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e s — themselves stand i n need of e x p l a n a t i o n as s p e c i a l cases of the m e t a p h o r i c a l a t t r i b u t i o n s we have been examining. We must r e c o g n i z e t h a t c o n s t r u c t i v i s t t h e o r i e s are designed to rescue metaphors form the d e p r e c i a t i n g tendencies of a r h e t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s i n which a metaphor becomes no more than c l e v e r l i n g u i s t i c t r i c k . At t h e i r most cogent, the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s remind us t h a t language-use expresses concepts h e l d by those who speak and w r i t e , and connects what people say w i t h what they do and what they want. On t h i s view, metaphors are to be examined f o r what they can t e l l us about the concepts e n t e r t a i n e d by those who use them, e s p e c i a l l y the conceptual boundaries which are marked when someone p r e f e r s a m e t a p h o r i c a l to l i t e r a l r e a d i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e . What i s the s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r conduct when men t a l k about p o l i t i c s i n terms u s u a l l y 73 associated with the theatre or the bedroom? Has the acceptance of such metaphors changed men's understanding of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y — t h e i r concepts of p o l i t i c s — or has i t merely i l l u s t r a t e d something which could be expressed i n terms recognizably l i t e r a l ? These are important and in t e r e s t i n g questions raised by a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory of metaphor, questions which we s h a l l attempt to answer when studying p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l metaphors, but two points need to be c l a r i f i e d . F i r s t , they are questions about the language used by p a r t i c u l a r men engaged i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , not questions about an abstraction, ' p o l i t i c a l language'. Second, that asking such questions i n t h i s way locates the presence or absence of a metaphor within a p a r t i c u l a r discourse. No external standard i s to be applied to detemine whether a statement i s metaphorical or l i t e r a l : the issue i s to be decided by the presence or absence of the i n f e r e n t i a l strategies characterizing metaphorical readings i n a p a r t i c u l a r audience's reading. Much w i l l depend on the context of the utterance, and here we may draw a preliminary d i s t i n c t i o n between the o r i g i n a l context and subsequent secondary contexts i n which the o r i g i n a l statement may be used again, or perhaps be an object of study. An utterance i s only metaphorical according a certain interpretation of i t . The mistake of some c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s i s to sever t h i s 74 l i n k between metaphor and language-use, and to locate metaphors i n 'thought', a context as abstract as the 'language' i t was designed to supercede. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y evident when a mild constructivism i s extended into the full-blown f o s s i l theory. I t makes no difference then how a writer or speaker i s using the term 'government', for example, or what any r e a l audience might have taken him to mean. What interests the f o s s i l .theorist i s the etymological connections between government and navigation, and he overlooks the genuine and in t e r e s t i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s between cases i n which such etymological connections are del i b e r a t e l y revived by an author as part of his persuasive project, cases i n which such connection are inadvertently drawn upon by an audience, and the general run of cases i n which the word i s neither used nor understood with any hint of guiding, steering or navigating. These objections notwithstanding, we should not overlook the genuine insights offered by a mild constructivism as a theory of language and metaphor. I t reminds us that the way people use words i s a clue to the c r i t e r i a which they accept for the correct application of those words. Changes i n usage, the bl u r r i n g or separating of conceptual boundaries and other evidence for contested c r i t e r i a , are a l l connected with changes i n the way that people understand t h e i r world. Constructivists are r i g h t to 75 draw our attention to the role of metaphors here, for the i n f e r e n t i a l strategies used to make sense of a metaphorical utterance can often provide us with an overview of a whole area of i n t e r r e l a t e d concepts that go to make up a s o c i a l philosophy. A conventional metaphor w i l l reveal an orderly set of d i s t i n c t i o n s , while a novel metaphor may show us an attempt at the deliberate realignment. If we are to take proper advantage of constructivism, the temptation to turn from the complexities of language-use to the p r i s t i n e abstractions of 'language' or'thought' must be avoided. Here the student of p o l i t i c a l metaphor has an advantage over the l i n g u i s t or the philosopher of language, for the a c t i v i t y of p o l i t i c s i s always before him, reminding him of the r e a l a c t i v i t i e s that furnish his examples and i l l u s t r a t i o n s . We s h a l l not underestimate the contribution of language to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . But i f we keep i n mind what a l l the ta l k i n g i s about, we s h a l l better be able to understand the s p e c i f i c contributions of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. I I . The case against p o l i t i c a l metaphors 'in thought'. I have suggested that c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theories of metaphor have found some exponents among theorists of p o l i t i c a l language. David Yamada, for example, argues that 76 metaphors involve "comparison and juxtaposition" of a subject and a modifier. However, his subjects and modifiers prove to bear no r e l a t i o n to the metaphorical utterances we have been considering. We learn that v i t a a c t i v a, v i t a contemplativa, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, C h r i s t i a n Commonwealth and Kingdom of Darkness, bourgeoisie and p r o l e t a r i a t are a l l , "metaphors evoking pictures of the human condition." As stated, these are not metaphors at a l l , at least i n the sense what we have come to attach to that term. Perhaps they might be thought of as metaphor-themes or archetypes, the set of model-like rel a t i o n s which Max Black claimed to discern underlying certain suggestive metaphors. But i f they are models, we are e n t i t l e d to ask what they are models of, and to say that they are models of the "human condition" i s hardly very h e l p f u l , for we have no independently s p e c i f i a b l e account of that condition which would enable us to compare the one with the other. Yamada himself would doubtless r e j e c t t h i s reduction of his 'metaphors', for i t appears that the pictures of the human condition are supposed to be evoked by the combination of the two sides of each pair. Such metaphors, he suggests, "impart new meanings not d i r e c t l y 8 .derived from empirical experience." Perhaps a metaphorical pair l i k e gemeinschaft and gesellschaft i s best viewed as a conceptual model. In other 77 words, rather than taking each term singly and mapping i t against an area of r e a l i t y which i s independently s p e c i f i a b l e , we bring our p o l i t i c a l experience under a dual conceptual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which w i l l make i t s i g n i f i c a n t i n ways that i t was not before. Better s t i l l , we might say that i t allows us to express a significance for which we previously lacked appropriate terms. To t a l k about p o l i t i c s i n terms of the v i t a activa and the v i t a contemplativa creates new significance i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , i t poses hitherto unsuspected questions about the value of p o l i t i c a l l i f e , and suggests novel ways of j u s t i f y i n g or condemning p o l i t i c a l practices and i n s t i t u t i o n s . The appearance of such novel conceptual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s constitutes the very p o s s i b i l i t y of proceeding i n these ways. But we have here two d i s t i n c t sets of questions, and we must keep them d i s t i n c t . F i r s t , we want to know whether t h i s i s a defensible view of p o l i t i c a l language; and we s h a l l seek to show that i t i s . Second, given such an account of p o l i t i c a l language, does i t make sense to c a l l a l l or part of p o l i t i c a l language, 'metaphorical'? We s h a l l seek to show that i t does not. On the f i r s t question, Yamada has c l e a r l y h i t upon an aspect of p o l i t i c a l language which i s of great importance. The possession of cer t a i n concepts, and the language with which to express them, i s a precondition of men being said 7 8 to have performed certain actions. An obvious example — and a favourite of philosophers of science, i s voting. Unless men possess the concept of a vote, understand the connection between marking a b a l l o t and choosing a representative, then no matter how many crosses they may draw, i t i s only i n a very r e s t r i c t e d sense of the term that they may be described as having 'voted'. But Yamada i s making an even more ambitious claim than t h i s one. He proposes that some of these con s t i t u t i v e concepts i n p o l i t i c a l understanding are, i n f a c t , conceptual metaphors. These, we might imagine, are concepts 'structured' i n terms of an a c t i v i t y which i s recognizably not p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Unfortunately, as we have seen, i n t h i s sense Yamada's own examples are puzzling ones whose metaphorical character i s not immediately obvious. Part of the problem here i s a lack of suitable d i s t i n c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y between a 'conceptual metaphor' and a metaphorical utterance. Having rejected the idea that these may be distinguished because one i s a metaphor i n 'thought' and the other i n 'language', we have proposed a d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of levels of generality. Thus, following the usage of our introductory chapter, we s h a l l refer to metaphors of great generality which seem to organize the conceptual boundaries of a whole area of understanding as archetypes, and reserve the term 'metaphor' 79 for metaphorical utterances. This d i s t i n c t i o n , then, opens up the possible r e l a t i o n s between p o l i t i c a l archetypes and p o l i t i c a l metaphors as an area for investigation. We can e a s i l y see, for example, that a p o l i t i c s as theatre archetype may well contribute to the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of p a r t i c u l a r metaphorical utterances, but we must not forget that an archetype i s i t s e l f no more than an abstraction from the p a r t i c u l a r utterances i n which i t i s embodied, and may be created, sustained and destroyed by them. The other component of the problem, c l e a r l y manifested i n Yamada's work, i s a tendency to c a l l such con s t i t u t i v e concepts 'metaphorical' without discrimination. If we are to save the notion of a special r e l a t i o n between archetype and metaphor — to be elaborated i n terms of shared metaphor themes — t h i s tendency must be r e s i s t e d . Now, Yamada wants to c a l l such concepts 'metaphors' because of an imagined contrast between concepts and 'empirical experience 1. If we can demonstrate that no such contrast can be sustained, we s h a l l have undermined t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and found a space cleared for our own analysis. The two components of the problem are related through the shared concept of ' p o l i t i c a l language'. As we have seen, someone holding a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t theory of p o l i t i c a l language i s already committed to the view that p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s p a r t l y constituted by the concepts entertained 8 0 by those who p a r t i c i p a t e i n that a c t i v i t y . Our strategy w i l l be to demonstrate the cogency of t h i s view, because i t c l e a r l y contradicts the other claim that there i s also a substratum of 'empirical p o l i t i c a l experience' against which a l l p o l i t i c a l concepts may be contrasted as 'metaphors', analogously to the way i n which l i t e r a l utterances are contrasted with metaphorical utterances. In other words, i f the claim that p o l i t i c a l concepts are metaphorical i s not to be an empty one, there must be something ' l i t e r a l ' against which they can be contrasted. This i s the role i n which 'empirical p o l i t i c a l experience' i s cast, and by expressing doubts about i t we s h a l l undermine the o r i g i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n . The notion of empirical p o l i t i c a l experience has as i t s correlate a weak theory of p o l i t i c a l language which we s h a l l now investigate. In t h i s theory, the vocabulary of p o l i t i c s has attracted a l l the attention, most of i t c r i t i c a l . P o l i t i c s as practised has often appeared to be a great deal of 'talk', far more t a l k , i t i s often darkly hinted, than the d i s t i n c t l y meagre achievements of those so engaged can possibly warrant. To account for a l l t h i s i d l e chatter, cer t a i n p e c u l i a r i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l language have been seized upon, notably i t s vagueness and ambiguity, and hence the apparent ease with which a lack of r e a l a c t i v i t y may be masked by obfuscation. Reformers of every stamp have been p a r t i c u l a r l y outraged by the manner i n which abuses whose 81 remedy they have c l e a r l y perceived have been rendered more intra c t a b l e merely by the way that t h e i r opponents have been able to t a l k about them. Man's freedom of action has been 9 fettered by the i l l u s i o n s of words. Bentham (an astute observer of p o l i t i c a l language, whose theory of f i c t i o n s takes him well beyond t h i s weak theory of i l l u s i o n ) was moved to t h i s memorable outburst, which contains a l l the e s s e n t i a l points. A perpetual vein of nonsense, flowing from a perpetual abuse of words — words having a variety of meanings, where words with single meanings were equally at hand; the same words used i n a variety of meanings i n the same page; words used i n meanings not t h e i r own, where proper words were equally at hand; words and propositions of the most unbounded s i g n i f i c a t i o n , turned loose without any of those exceptions or modifications which are so necessary on every occasion to reduce t h e i r import within the compass, not only of right reason, but even of the design i n hand, of whatever nature i t might be: the same inaccuracy, the same inattention i n the penning of t h i s c l u s t e r of truths on which the fate of nations was to hang, as i f i t had been an o r i e n t a l t a l e , or an allegory for a magazine; stale epigrams, instead of necessary d i s t i n c t i o n s ; f i g u r a t i v e expressions preferred to simple ones; sentimental conceits as t r i t e as they are unmeaning preferred to apt and precise expressions; frippery ornament preferred to the majestic s i m p l i c i t y of good sound sense; and the acts of the senate l o a c ^ i and disfigured by the t i n s e l s of the playhouse. Note p a r t i c u l a r l y how f i g u r a t i v e expressions a t t r a c t Bentham's i r e ; the garden of p o l i t i c a l eloquence i s 82 perceived to contain more than i t s f a i r share of t r o p i c a l growths. The reason for Bentham's re j e c t i o n i s not d i f f i c u l t to see, for he c l e a r l y considers metaphors and other f i g u r a t i v e expressions to be l i t t l e more than ornaments, better replaced by simple and unambiguous prose. On t h i s view i t i s easy to explain the appearance of p o l i t i c a l metaphors, where p l a i n prose would s u f f i c e , by reference to the workings of " s i n i s t e r i n t e r e s t s " . Yet, i n his l a s t clause, Bentham himself gestures i n the d i r e c t i o n of a highly conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphor (that of p o l i t i c s as theatre), even i f only to dismiss i t s relevance. Perhaps the picturesque character of p o l i t i c a l language which he so deplores i s symptomatic of something more important about p o l i t i c s than i t s imperfection? In f a c t , the weak theory of p o l i t i c a l language as a vocabulary of emotion and deception breaks down into a more sophisticated account as soon as i t i s cl o s e l y examined, something Bentham himself saw i n admitting certain "necessary f i c t i o n s " . F a i l u r e to progress beyond a weak theory i s usually caused by the operation of an author's own p o l i t i c a l prejudices: his p o l i t i c a l associates speak p l a i n prose, his enemies the language of guile and deception. Kenneth Hudson's account of the language of modern B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s i s a perfect example. He o f f e r s us a number of statements i n the guise of "conclusions to which any 83 observer might well be l i k e l y to come," which include; We cannot afford more pay for less work. There i s inadequate d i s c i p l i n e throughout the whole of our school system. , , We have a marvellous police force. By way of contrast we are offered two sets of examples of party p o l i t i c a l language; 1) The B r i t i s h R a i l workers aren't i s o l a t e d victims. Almost every week someori^ somewhere i s being s a c r i f i c e d to union tyranny. 2) Enough and more than enough has been said and written about the intervention of law into i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , but i f workers always obeyed class l e g i s l a t i o n we would not be i n t h i s h a l l today because there would be no trade union movement. On the one hand we have common sense, p l a i n l y expressed, on the other only symbolic flag-waving i n which phrases l i k e 'union tyranny' or 'class l e g i s l a t i o n ' are not to be taken seriously but seen as "thumbprints of group vocabulary". The idea of group vocabulary i s an important one, and Hudson has some perceptive remarks to make about the extent of such vocabularies i n modern B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . However, i t s proper significance i s quite l o s t i f i t i s i d e n t i f i e d only by contrast with common sense, and i t s proper employment r e s t r i c t e d to the expression of group s o l i d a r i t y . 84 Fortunately, once we examine these examples of 'common sense' the d i s t i n c t i o n dissolves, for they turn out to be equally p o l i t i c a l i n character and by no means conclusions to which a l l right-thinking people might assent. Such p l a i n t a l k i s r a d i c a l l y ambiguous. Who are "we", who cannot afford more pay for less work? What does "afford" mean here — lower p r o f i t s , d e c lining markets, higher unemployment? The complex set of r e l a t i o n s between unit labour costs and output which economic theory attempts to e s t a b l i s h has been discarded i n favour of a highly p a r t i a l diagnosis of an economic problem. Our task here i s not to condemn t h i s , but to discover what use i s being made of language, and what status t h i s language-use has. Here we should notice that Hudson's common sense has much more i n common with his examples of party p o l i t i c a l language than he i s prepared to admit, p a r t i c u l a r l y that both are expressions of value and therefore not true or f a l s e i n the same way that propositions about states of a f f a i r s could be. Most obviously, we could imagine another group for whom these were not important values at a l l , and who would therefore f i n d a d i f f e r e n t s i gnificance i n factual information about productivity, truancy or the number of policemen injured i n the course of t h e i r duties. In t h i s a b i l i t y to express the p o l i t i c a l s ignificance of actions and events, we f i n d one of the defining features of p o l i t i c a l 85 language. If t h i s i s so, then "thumbprints" l i k e "union tyranny" or "class l e g i s l a t i o n " must be seen i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , for they can no longer be contrasted with the generally accepted conclusions of an unprejudiced observer. In a j u s t l y famous essay, C l i f f o r d Geertz has pointed the way with an analysis of an apparently si m i l a r empty r h e t o r i c a l f l o u r i s h , the characterisation of the Taft-Hartley Act as 14 'slave-labour' l e g i s l a t i o n . He draws our attention to the metaphor here not to deplore i t , but to show how metaphors and other figures of speech are a convenient way of characterizing events i n order to express t h e i r significance for p a r t i c u l a r groups. The slave labour metaphor, i n i t s simple way, expresses the opposition of the American labour movement to l e g i s l a t i v e interference by characterizing i t with a well-known cold war image. "Union tyranny" and "class l e g i s l a t i o n " are intended to c a l l to mind sim i l a r well-known images from the history of B r i t i s h trade unionism by means of metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n . Two d i f f e r e n t questions are raised here. The f i r s t concerns the metaphors themselves, the understanding that an auditor brings to bear and the consequences of him accepting or r e j e c t i n g the characterization. Geertz stresses the c u l t u r a l aspect, the way such metaphors appeal to public knowledge and assumptions. The s p e c i f i c resonance of the 86 metaphor i s then not so much a matter of i n d i v i d u a l imagination as the recognition of shared meaning. How t h i s i n d i v i d u a l recognition i s usually effected w i l l concern us i n the next chapter. The second question, however, returns us to our concern with the development of a more sa t i s f a c t o r y account of p o l i t i c a l language. As Geertz notes, a metaphor i s but a "feeble representation" of "an inherent structure of i n t e r r e l a t e d meanings" which go to make up 1 5 something he c a l l s an ideology. T r i t e metaphors, l i k e the ones we have been considering, o f f e r us,' i n s i m p l i f i e d form, a glimpse of an altogether more remarkable process, the growth and development of p o l i t i c a l discourse i t s e l f . This i s the f u l l c o n s t r u c t i v i s t account of p o l i t i c a l language, i n which the meaning that p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y has for any pa r t i c i p a n t i s linked to the language i n which he describes and j u s t i f i e s his p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Certainly, proponents of a weak theory of p o l i t i c a l language seem to imagine that p o l i t i c s could be what Oakeshott stigmatized as an empirical a c t i v i t y . As he points out, t h i s i s not so much an undesirable kind of a c t i v i t y as an impossible one. Of course p o l i t i c s are the pursuit of what i s desired and of what i s desired at the moment, but p r e c i s e l y because they are t h i s , they can never be the pursuit of me^ly what recommends i t s e l f from moment to moment. 8 7 In other words, proponents of the weak theory assume that any description of what p o l i t i c a l agents are doing i s uncomplicated by any need to r e f e r to t h e i r self-understanding. Perhaps a request for such information might be met by references to the struggle for temporary advantage, the pursuit of o f f i c e , or with a c l i c h e l i k e 'the art of the p o s s i b l e 1 . But these are already complex human a c t i v i t i e s , bounded by shared or contested concepts about the nature of o f f i c e s , the physical and temporal boundaries of t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n , the authority of t h e i r procedures and the legitimacy of t h e i r practices. Doubtless a p o l i t i c i a n who spent too much time interrogating the presuppositions on which h i s understanding of p o l i t i c s rested would f i n d himself hopelessly outmanoeuvred by his less i n q u i s i t i v e adversaries, but i f we wish to understand the space within which such manoeuvres take place, we would be well advised to consider the background b e l i e f s which bound i t . The weak view oversimplifies i n another way, revealed by the prejudices of i t s exponents as they extol one set of b e l i e f s as common sense and brush o f f the rest as mere posturing. Group vocabularies do not contrast with an 'empirical' language of common sense but with other group vocabularies i n which d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f s about authority or legitimacy are expressed. I t i s within such group vocabularies that projects may be assessed i n terms of t h e i r 88 d e s i r a b i l i t y , and even the most expedient 'politique' must acknowledge the l i m i t s which t h i s sets on his freedom of action. To recommend his conduct to his followers he must show that i t can plausibly be described within the terms of 17 the group's vocabulary. I t must be recognizably 'in the national i n t e r e s t ' or 'progressive' or expressing the leader's 'unshakable w i l l ' , for t h i s i s what the group desires. P o l i t i c a l language thus understood i s something more than a means of expressing platitudes about errant schoolchildren and refractory trades-unionists. Perhaps i t i s best described as discourse, a r e l a t i v e l y stable area of language-use, with a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c vocabulary and a grammar which marks the i n t e r r e l a t i o n of the concepts which go to 18 make up the 'domain' of p o l i t i c s . Thus we may d i s t i n g u i s h between terms used to express b e l i e f s about the authority of o f f i c e s from those which are used to elaborate an understanding of the association which sustains p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and marks i t o f f from r e l i g i o u s or commercial l i f e . Within p o l i t i c a l discourse, and contributing to i t s ultimate 'shape', are the various sub-codes, which we have c a l l e d group vocabularies or ideologies. We have t r i e d to suggest that they are rather more than oddities of expression, and we s h a l l have more to say about them i n chapter f i v e when we come to consider p o l i t i c a l ideologies i n d e t a i l . 8 9 These favourite s p a t i a l metaphors of discourse analysis are used advisedly here. As p o l i t i c a l discourse changes, so the shape of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y a l t e r s and i s eventually transformed. But such transformations are undertaken by men whose conduct exhibits a self-understanding which they acquire and elaborate through discursive a c t i v i t y . To investigate t h e i r understanding by means of the language that they employ w i l l therefore be a task of the f i r s t importance. I l l . Are p o l i t i c a l metaphors derived from resemblances  between t h e i r primary and secondary subjects? We have elaborated and defended a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t account of p o l i t i c a l discourse by showing the inadequacy of the view that p e c u l i a r i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l vocabulary are the accidental by-product of guile and deception. Instead, we have stressed that the concepts expressed i n p o l i t i c a l discourse are l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to any sophisticated or autonomous p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , conduct i n which agents exhibit a s e l f understanding which includes the concept ' p o l i t i e s ' . However, i t was a s i m i l a r l y c o n s t r u c t i v i s t account of metaphor which prompted us to investigate the metaphors found i n p o l i t i c a l discourse, and the temptation i s to combine the two accounts i n the assertion that, p r e c i s e l y because p o l i t i c a l discourse i s p a r t i a l l y 90 c o n s t i t u t i v e of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , i t i s ipso facto metaphorical. This temptation must be r e s i s t e d . I f we i d e n t i f y p o l i t i c a l language with metaphorical language, then the s p e c i f i c roles played by metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l discourse are l o s t i n the general p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the discourse as a whole. We can now see that i t was just such an impulse to combine the two claims which lay behind Yamada's account of p o l i t i c a l language. 'Bourgeoisie' and 'Kingdom of Darkness' are not obviously metaphors, but they are obviously concepts which f i t e a s i l y into a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t account of p o l i t i c a l discourse. We must presuppose possession of the relevant concept before anyone can be said to have behaved i n a self-consciously 'bourgeois' manner, or to have i d e n t i f i e d a human manifestation of the 'kingdom of darkness'. This i s what Yamada means when he says that t h e i r employment i n p o l i t i c s creates meaning not derivable from empirical experience. Since 'experience' here i s held to be l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to language and concept-formation, such a view underpins the r a d i c a l thesis which we have c a l l e d the f o s s i l theory of metaphor. A l l words, t h i s theory claims, were o r i g i n a l l y metaphors, for t h i s i s the only way i n which words can be created. Those words we c a l l l i t e r a l are only terms which have become so f a m i l i a r that the o r i g i n a l metaphorical extension i s no longer perceived. 91 Epistemologically, the f o s s i l theory suffers from the grave drawback that i t undermines the notion of truth. Each person w i l l be i n a p o s i t i o n to create his own metaphors for his 'experience 1, and i t w i l l be a matter of chance which pass into the language as descriptive terms. This being so, a l l descriptions are i l l u s i o n s whose i l l u s o r y nature has 19 been forgotten. Some philosophers, notably Nietzsche, have f e l t at home with t h i s vertiginous conclusion; for others i t has undermined the very cognitive r e s p e c t a b i l i t y they sought to grant metaphor i n the f i r s t instance. We may entertain suspicions about the part played by "empirical experience" here, but t h i s i s not the place to pursue them, since we have already ruled out the notion of empirical p o l i t i c a l experience. Our p a r t i c u l a r quarry i s much easier to track down, for the appearance of the f o s s i l theory i n p o l i t i c a l discourse i s more than usually misleading and unsatisfactory. Notice f i r s t that the f o s s i l theory i s a theory of names. I t i s a theory that certain terms are introduced into our vocabulary because of a fancied resemblance between a new phenomenon and something f a m i l i a r . Here i s the l i n k between the f o s s i l theory of metaphor and the weak theory of p o l i t i c a l language again. This weak theory was also a theory of names, and i t was transformed into something more sati s f a c t o r y by locating words i n the context of p o l i t i c a l 92 a c t i v i t y — seeing how they were used. When t h i s was done, we noticed how the terms of p o l i t i c a l discourse expressed competing conceptions of p o l i t i c a l l i f e , and could not be divided into neutral 'descriptive 1 terms and evaluative ' p o l i t i c a l ' words. The f o s s i l theory of p o l i t i c a l metaphor can be transformed i n exactly the same way. The figure of speech known as catachresis has a c r u c i a l part to play i n the f o s s i l theory. Catachresis encompasses such idioms as 'the head of a pin', 'the foot of a mountain' or 'the neck of a bo t t l e ' , which are apparently f i g u r a t i v e but have no l i t e r a l replacement i n the dictionary of a language. The explanation for these idioms i s that they have f i l l e d a gap i n the language by metaphorical extension, and th i s plausible argument i s generalized to explain the origin s of most i f not a l l words. Where we lack a word, or so i t i s argued, we proceed by analogy based on resemblances between the the thing designated and something f a m i l i a r , often part of our bodies. There are some obvious gaps i n the o r i g i n a l argument — why do we have the summit of a mountain instead of the head, and then the quite d i f f e r e n t expression, the head of a val l e y , without a corresponding foot, for example? More seriously, catachresis i s usually confined to the names of physical objects whose physical resemblance to the object designated by the root term i s read i l y apparent. When the argument i s transferred from t h i s general l e v e l to p o l i t i c a l discourse, the central concept 9 3 of resemblance poses more problems than i t solves. This i s e s p e c i a l l y awkward because i t i s a supposed need to ' f i l l gaps i n the language' by metaphorical extension based on resemblance which i s the main prop of the f o s s i l theory of p o l i t i c a l metaphor. The d i f f i c u l t and insubstantial character of p o l i t i c a l concepts, we are t o l d , leads us to search for metaphorical analogues as a pro v i s i o n a l basis for understanding. In Eugene M i l l e r ' s version of the theory, " p o l i t i c a l things" l i k e 'law' or 'authority' cannot be known by d i r e c t acquaintance, but are apprehended by metaphorically extending words drawn from more concrete kinds of a c t i v i t y . The notion of a physical resemblance of the kind supposedly involved i n catachresis i s brought out i n M i l l e r ' s own metaphors, as he describes p o l i t i c a l theory as the inquiry into the p o l i t i c a l metaphors which give form to our p o l i t i c a l experience. In the course of inquiry there i s a growing awareness of the shape of things as a whole, and t h i s awareness increasingly helps us to see the p a r t i a l i t y and d i s t o r t i o n of the perspective from which we began. We perceive order i n experience whose meaning was vagu^ and inchoate at f i r s t . Things f a l l into place. Whatever simple p l a u s i b i l i t y i s possessed by the theory that the foot of a mountain i s so c a l l e d because of a perceived resemblance to our own feet, the notion of resemblance i s 94 severely stretched i n so sophisticated a theory of the terms of p o l i t i c a l discourse. The hidden assumption of such accounts i s that the descriptive terms of p o l i t i c a l discourse were introduced i n response to some confusion or puzzlement on the part of p o l i t i c a l actors. Faced with "inchoate experience", they attempted to shape p o l i t i c s i n the image of family r e l a t i o n s , stock-breeding or t h e a t r i c a l performance. But t h i s , of course, neglects the motivation for introducing such terms, or, rather, i t allows the Socratic quest for knowledge beyond mere opinion to serve as a surrogate motive. The enourmous range of metaphor-themes to which M i l l e r has drawn attention must, on his account, be explained as so many p a r t i a l and one-sided perspectives, each o f f e r i n g an insight into the nature of " p o l i t i c a l things, as such", each one to be discarded when i t s p a r t i a l i t y has been exposed. Now, i t i s doubtless true that some p o l i t i c a l metaphors have been introduced and used i n t h i s way. But these are metaphors connected with the a c t i v i t y of p o l i t i c a l philosophy. The vast majority of the examples c i t e d by M i l l e r were not introduced i n the context of t h i s a c t i v i t y at a l l , but were meant to serve some immediate p o l i t i c a l purpose, and t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of those descriptive terms now part of our uncontested p o l i t i c a l discourse which 9 5 may have been introduced into that discourse i n the form of a metaphor. Students of sixteenth-century p o l i t i c a l thought, for example, have become increasingly aware of the emergence of the modern concept of the state at t h i s period, an emergence nowhere more evident than i n the confident use of the word 'state' i n recognizably modern contexts. I t seems probable, as Oakeshott has argued, that some of these early uses of the term were self-consciously metaphorical, and were intended to draw attention to the emerging p o l i t i c a l conditions as extensions of the 'estate' of the medieval lor d . 'State' had many competitors — 'commonwealth', 'republic', 'empire', 'policy', even 'community' — but the eventual triumph of 'state' i s not so much an i n d i c a t i o n of the emergent conditions being ill-understood, as an i n d i c a t i o n of the success of the p o l i t i c a l projects of sixteenth-century princes and t h e i r advisors. Robbed of t h i s i l l u s o r y contrast with "inchoate experience", we can s t i l l see that 'state' may have been introduced into our vocabulary as a metaphor, and even see that a c e r t a i n notion of 'resemblance' i s involved here. But rather than imposing form on chaos, i t was intended to create resemblance between what was emerging and what had gone before, a notion of 'resemblance' which i s far removed from the simple physical recognition implied by catachresis. That t h i s i s so may be confirmed by the example of the 96 term 'government1, at f i r s t sight even more favourable to M i l l e r ' s thesis than 'state'. Its etymological l i n k with navigation does seem to point to just that sort of less complex and n o n - p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y which would support a f o s s i l theory of p o l i t i c a l metaphor. Here, i t would seem, was a case of someone casting round for an analogue to c l a r i f y the a c t i v i t y of r u l i n g . Yet i t i s notoriously d i f f i c u l t to f i n d an example of the term being used i n t h i s way. Its appearance i n c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l thought i s usually part of an argument designed to recommend a p a r t i c u l a r form of government. A medieval example which might be considered a metaphorical use of 'gubernator' shows a sim i l a r l i n k with a complex p o l i t i c a l argument. Part of Pope Leo I's account of the authority of the papal o f f i c e was the claim that, having been entrusted by Saint Peter with the ent i r e d i r e c t i o n of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Church, 2 1 the Pope was gubernator. As with a possible reference of 'state' to an estate, the term i s being used here to refer to complex doctrines about p o l i t i c a l l i f e for p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l purposes. If there i s any sense of resemblance relevant here, i t i s not to some imagined analogue whose physical resemblance j u s t i f i e s the use of the term i n the absence of any other terms being available, but a p o l i t i c a l l y motivated attempt to bring an audience to recognize the relevance of a p o l i t i c a l doctrine i n the face 97 of competing doctrines. If the attempt i s successfully brought o f f , the resemblance may be said to have been created. In sum, when attempting to combat the undoubted charm of the f o s s i l theory of metaphor i n p o l i t i c s , i t i s sometimes help f u l to remember Max Black's complaint that to treat catachresis as a species of metaphor i s analogous to 22 i d e n t i f y i n g a corpse as a special case of a person. In addition, Black's c r i t i q u e of the comparison view of metaphor reminds us that the f o s s i l theory r e l i e s heavily on the idea that there are certa i n p r i o r resemblances between p o l i t i c s and other human a c t i v i t i e s which a metaphor brings to our notice. By stressing the p a r t i c u l a r purposes with which ' l i v e ' metaphors are used, we escape t h i s f a l l a c y , and are enabled to bring out the highly s p e c i f i c points of resemblance which a p o l i t i c a l metaphor creates by introducing new terms into p o l i t i c a l discourse. In other words, the evident abundance of metaphors i n p o l i t i c a l discourse, though a consequence of the c o n s t r u c t i v i s t character of p o l i t i c a l language, i s not to be confused with i t . 98 V. The genuine conceptual connections that a metaphor shows. What can be made of talk about conceptual metaphors? Obviously we cannot st i p u l a t e that the term s h a l l not be extended to cover a l l those cases i n which we habitually t a l k about one thing i n term of another. We can only point out the confusion and ambiguity that such usage engenders, and the dubious arguments about concept-formation which buttress attempts to extend the notion into a theory that a l l our concepts (or a l l our language) are metaphorical. And yet 'conceptual metaphor' does have an important function, for i t c a l l s our attention to a l e v e l of analysis i n which metaphors are seen, not just as whole sentences as opposed to i s o l a t e d words, but as e n t a i l i n g such wider u n i t i e s as text and context. The converse of Lakoff and Johnson's argument that novel metaphors may be created from concepts that are already 'metaphorically structured' i n terms of one another i s the implication that to understand how such metaphors are created and interpreted w i l l involve reference to the conceptual r e l a t i o n on which they are based. To understand cert a i n s p a t i a l metaphors, for example, might involve showing how part of our ordinary understanding of p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s has come to be expressed i n terms of such s p a t i a l cordinates as up and down or l e f t and rig h t . An example used by Lakoff and Johnson themselves may 99 c l a r i f y the use we are making of t h e i r ideas here. They remark that there i s a conceptual metaphor i n English which they c a l l the argument-is-warfare metaphor. I t appears i n such everyday expressions as 'winning an argument1 or 'defending a (theoretical) p o s i t i o n ' . Now, our emphasis on metaphor as a strategy of interpretation has led us to consider the occasions on which a reader would consider a metaphorical reading of a sentence an appropriate strategy to use, and on the resources at his disposal when he makes such a reading. The problem with Lakoff and Johnson's examples, as one c r i t i c has perceptively remarked, i s that ordinary readers would not consider themselves to be making metaphorical readings i n such cases — arguments simply are 23 things i n which winners successfully defend positions. I t i s possible to undermine t h i s understanding of an argument by pointing out alternative ways of conceiving of the a c t i v i t y , but to do so i s to o f f e r one's own interpretation of the kind of a c t i v i t y arguing might be, rather than explaining metaphors. The f i r s t appearance of such novel, i f t r i t e , metaphors as, say, 'sniping' at an opponent, or 'mounting a f r o n t a l assault on his (cognitive) pos i t i o n ' would then be analysed rather d i f f e r e n t l y . For Lakoff and Johnson, these phrases are extension into the "unused portion" of a conceptual metaphor. For us, the metaphorical reading that such phrases 100 are given i s to be explained i n terms of the close connection that the reader has found between arguments and other adversarial a c t i v i t i e s , which might include games as well as warfare, for example. The repeated appearance of such metaphors may well r e s u l t i n the creation of a metaphorical f i e l d i n the context of which future metaphors w i l l be understood, but the concepts which bound t h i s f i e l d , however intimately they are perceived to be related, must ultimately remain d i s t i n c t i f the sense of 'metaphor' here i s not to be obl i t e r a t e d . In t h i s sense, we are doing more than just reversing Lakoff and Johnson's argument. We are grounding concepts i n complex human a c t i v i t i e s rather than i n experience or physical sensation. This allows us to keep metaphor i n reserve, as i t were, to use for attr i b u t i o n s which are out of the ordinary. Certainly the p o s s i b i l i t y of metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n depends on the ways i n which we o r d i n a r i l y understand our world, but to deny that there can be any understanding of a complex human a c t i v i t y , l i k e p o l i t i c s , which i s not i t s e l f metaphorical i s a confusion which ultimately prevents us from understanding the special uses of p o l i t i c a l metaphors, and d i r e c t l y contradicts the ordinary experience of p o l i t i c a l agents. This i s not to deny that we can learn much about p o l i t i c a l archetypes from Lakoff and Johnson's account of 101 'conceptual metaphor'. However, we have already had occasion to warn that an archetype i s an abstraction created- from a set of metaphorical utterances which share the same theme. Bearing t h i s caution i n mind, what can be said about p o l i t i c a l archetypes independently of the i n d i v i d u a l metaphorical utterances which create them? The topic f a l l s into two parts, the f i r s t analysing the contribution of extra-discursive factors to the creation of archetypes, the second the h i s t o r i c a l creation and development of metaphor-themes within p o l i t i c a l discourse. We s h a l l consider them under the headings of symbol-classifications and metaphorical f i e l d s respectively. Under the f i r s t heading i s included much that w i l l be fa m i l i a r to the student of 'archetypes' as that term has been used by Jung and his followers. Here our attention i s drawn to the reference made i n many p o l i t i c a l metaphors to symbols and to the combination of such symbols i n schemes of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which f i x t h e i r meaning within p o l i t i c a l discourse, p a r t i c u l a r l y moetic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of opposites. Such symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are evoked by the many p o l i t i c a l metaphors which refer to objects with symbolic significance for an audience. Examples include father and mother, up and down, sun and moon and many colour terms. 'Sun' and 'moon' are used t h i s way when S i r Thomas Elyot argued that monarch was the form of government, 102 that . . . i s best approved, and hath longest continued, and i s most ancient. For who can deny, but that a l l thynge i n heven and earth i s governed by one god, by one perpetual order, by one providence? One Sonne2ruleth over the day, and one Moone over the nyght. The reference i s not just to the objects sun and moon, but to t h e i r symbolic significance for an Elizabethan audience. E s p e c i a l l y important here i s the sense i n which sun and moon were seen as symbolic of that providential order to which Elyot has already referred. By means of such symbolism, the l a s t sentence of Elyot's passage reasserts metaphorically what the previous sentence has asserted l i t e r a l l y . Elyot's metaphor thus refers to the whole symbolic representation of the natural order, of which sun and moon were a v i s i b l e reminder. Other writers, p a r t i c u l a r l y those developing the concept of sovereignty, used the dyad 'sun-moon' to make the point that, i n t h i s natural order, there was one source of l i g h t , other apparently l i g h t emitting bodies being mere r e f l e c t i o n s of the sun's splendour. On other occasions, the connection of the sun with l i g h t i s allowed to stand alone as a symbol of the majesty of a monarch, or i t may be put into a spatio-temporal context where i t s r i s i n g stands for youth and vigour and i t s setting for decline and old age. Under the t i t l e of 'archetypes', Michael Osborn has made a special 103 study of these symbolic connections, stressing that t h e i r 25 use i n metaphors implies a "double association". Because the symbols or archetypes have already been used to organize an area of human experience, ordering and c l a s s i f y i n g i t i n various ways, they bring the associations implied by the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n with them when they are employed i n new contexts, such as i n a p o l i t i c a l metaphor. They are thus an extremely economical way of making a conceptual connection. In Elyot's metaphor we saw a connection established between monarchy and the natural, p r o v i d e n t i a l order. In an example from one of Church i l l ' s most famous wartime speeches, made after the defeat of France i n 1940, the double association of symbols i n metaphors i s used to guide inter p r e t a t i o n and to turn banal phrases into a moving exhortation. If we stand up to him ( H i t l e r ) , a l l Europe may be free and the l i f e of the world may move forward into broad s u n l i t uplands. But, i f we f a i l , then the whole world, including the United States, including a l l that we have known and cared for, w i l l sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more s i n i s t e r , and perhaps nigre protracted, by the l i g h t s of perverted science. C h u r c h i l l underlines the gravity and momentousness of the choice facing his audience by means of a t r i p l e moetic symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n which the f r u i t s of continued 104 resistance are represented by l i g h t , forward and upward movement, while the consequences of defeat are pictured as darkness, backwards and downwards movement. In doing so, he combines advocacy of continued resistance with r e j e c t i o n of the very p o s s i b i l i t y of any t h i r d course. The i n t e r n a l coherence of the symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n turn transforms his banal reference to the new Dark Age, by means of the novel reference to the s i n i s t e r gleam of moonlight for the 'perverted science' of National Socialism. I t i s t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c care for the i n t e r n a l coherence of the metaphor which contributes most to i t s success. A reader's knowledge of a symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i l l thus have many relevant consequences for his understanding of a metaphor. In describing how his knowledge influences his in t e r p r e t a t i o n , we have stressed the double association that a symbol ca r r i e s when i t s appearance i s metaphorical. It i s part of a symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n involving conventional associations for p a r t i c u l a r cultures, and i t uses these associations i n quite s p e c i f i c ways i n the i n d i v i d u a l metaphors. I t i s important to be aware of both these elements, the general c u l t u r a l significance and the s p e c i f i c metaphorical employment, i f we are to do f u l l j u s t i c e to the role of symbolism i n p o l i t i c a l metaphors, es p e c i a l l y i n our analysis of metaphorical utterances as events. Once again, the danger l i e s i n r e s t r i c t i n g the notion of a metaphor to 105 the general significance of the symbols i t happens to employ, forgetting the varied metaphorical references to symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s that are actually involved. On t h i s l a s t point, students of symbolism have consistently argued that the "natural symbols" or "primary factors" which can be found performing symbolic functions across a wide variety of cultures are to be understood as "vehicles for sign i f i c a n c e " rather than as s i g n i f i c a n t i n 27 t h e i r own r i g h t . How they come to take on the significance that they actually have i s then a matter for explanation i n in d i v i d u a l cases. I t i s p e r f e c t l y possible that there may be some element of metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n involved i n certain cases, but, as we have already shown, the thesis that symbols are themselves the metaphorical extension of a very basic ' p r e - l i n g u i s t i c experience' combines a general philosophical i m p l a u s i b i l i t y with the fact that the meanings 2 8 of such symbols are not always constant across cultures. Symbolism of physical space f i t s the thesis best, but the evidence for body, colour and other more complex symbolism 29 i s less convincing. Bearing t h i s point i n mind w i l l decrease the temptation to explain p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l metaphors which employ symbols by moving d i r e c t l y to the 'natural meaning' that the symbol i s supposed to possess. The associations that the symbol brings to the metaphor are to be h i s t o r i c a l l y located 106 i n the h i s t o r i c a l experience of those who create and interpret the metaphor. As we noted i n introducing the topic of symbolism, t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y important i n analysing metaphors as acts of communication. We w i l l not materially advance our understanding of how p o l i t i c a l metaphors were used i n p o l i t i c a l argument, i f we systematically ignore the knowledge that an audience used i n a r r i v i n g at i t s inte r p r e t a t i o n i n favour of a hypothesis about the universal significance of a symbol. The other area i n which the understanding of a metaphor i s to be explained i s more d i f f i c u l t to describe. I t i s the sense i n which a natural language as i t i s spoken and written discloses 'pictures' of an area of discourse i n idioms, conventional expressions and metaphors. Often, the f u l l s i g nificance of these pictures are unknown to those who habitually speak and write i n terms of them. 'Discourse analysis' has gone some way towards revealing the structure of these pictures by teasing out the implications of 'speaking t h i s way', using as i t s material anything from vocabulary to c h a r a c t e r i s t i c grammatical constructions. Such f i g u r a t i v e ways of speaking predispose readers and hearers towards metaphorical interpretations which conform to the pictures which are implied by t h e i r ordinary ways of speaking, making apparently obscure metaphors easy to understand. 107 The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s phenomenon f o r metaphor has been explored by the l i n g u i s t Harald Weinrich under the 30 t i t l e of "metaphorical f i e l d s " . Noting how t r a d i t i o n a l l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m has tended to group metaphors together e i t h e r according to t h e i r subjects (metaphors about love or death, f o r example), or according to t h e i r 'imagery' (sickness imagery or journey imagery), he has been concerned to show that these taxonomies are completely a r t i f i c i a l . He was thus l e d to develop the notion of a metaphorical f i e l d i n discourse, such as 'love-as-sickness' or 1death-as-journey', i n terms of which p a r t i c u l a r metaphors have been formed and interpreted. Thus, analysing Verlaine's l i n e , "Votre ante est un paysage c h o i s i , " he suggests that the metaphor i s constructed and interpreted i n the act of bringing to mind i t s near r e l a t i o n s that also occupy the metaphorical f i e l d of 1soul-as-landscape'. Here we f i n d such idioms as 'streams of thought', 'the tree of knowledge', 'peaks of joy' and 'abyss of l o n e l i n e s s ' . Often such metaphorical f i e l d s , through f a m i l i a r i t y , lose t h e i r metaphorical character and become part of the semantic f i e l d which f i x e s the meaning of re l a t e d terms, such as body, soul , . 31 and s p i r i t . An awareness of the metaphorical f i e l d s i n which many p o l i t i c a l metaphors are located w i l l play an important part i n our i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . From a rather wider perspective i t 108 restates our opposition to formulaic and es p e c i a l l y to comparison views of metaphor. In other words, i n place of the a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between a subject and i t s modification through various 'imagery', we locate the metaphor i n an image f i e l d which holds p r i n c i p a l and secondary subjects together. I t i s only by taking the two together, as Weinrich i n s i s t s , that we have a metaphor at a l l . On the other hand, while f u l l y acknowledging that our language i s shot through with pictures i n discourse, by distinguishing between metaphorical and semantic f i e l d s we avoid Lakoff and Johnson's empty claim that any concept of a complex a c t i v i t y must be metaphorically structured. We may now u s e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between cases i n which p o l i t i c a l discourse i s to be understood against the background of a metaphorical f i e l d -- p o l i t i c s - a s - t h e a t r e or politics-as-organism, for example -- and when i t i s to be understood as part of a semantic f i e l d bounded by such concepts as 'state' and ' c i v i l society' or 'corpus imperii' and 'corpus ecclesiae'. Furthermore, while recognizing the unity of a metaphorical f i e l d , we may a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between the image producing and image receiving f i e l d s . On the side of the image receiving f i e l d we need to c a r e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between those metaphors which concern p o l i t i c a l l i f e as a mode of association, those which concern the 109 a c t i v i t y of r u l i n g , and those which concern attributes of p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e s l i k e authority or legitimacy. On the image producing side, we may now pay special attention to the way in which the metaphorical f i e l d as a whole was shaped by the image producing concept. What were i t s own conceptual r e l a t i o n s and what did they contribute to the metaphorical f i e l d ? Here Michael Walzer's notion of a reference world i s useful, suggesting that changes i n our understanding of nature, mechanical r e l a t i o n s or the human body might lead to changes i n the metaphorical f i e l d s i n which such concepts p a r t i c i p a t e , always remembering that i t i s the t o t a l f i e l d 32 which int e r e s t s us. For example, i f we wish to understand what Rousseau means when he says that, 11 le corps p o l i t i q u e , p r i s individuellement, peut etre considere comme un corps organise, vivant et semblable a c e l u i de l'homme," we s h a l l need to f i n d the metaphorical f i e l d i n which " l e corps p o l i t i q u e " i s located. We may be surprised to discover from other essays i n the Encyclopedie that 'corps p o l i t i q u e ' and 'corps organise' occupy the same f i e l d as 'le corps  a r t i f i c i e l ' , and t h i s i n turn may help us to reconstruct the concept of nature and a r t i f i c e which makes up the reference world or image producing f i e l d for t h i s p a r t i c u l a r political-association-as-body f i e l d . Our reconstruction w i l l be of great help i n making sense of other puzzling metaphors 110 i n Rousseau's w r i t i n g s , f o r example, the i d e a of the " s o c i a l bond" which holds together members of the body p o l i t i c and admits of v a r y i n g degrees of t a u t n e s s . Emerging from the same m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d are words l i k e ' o r g a n i s a t i o n ' and ' c o n s t i t u t i o n ' which have become s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y l i t e r a l terms of modern p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I t may be r e a d i l y a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t ' l e corps p o l i t i q u e ' would have r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n a m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d where the image producing f i e l d was c o n s t i t u t e d by concepts of microcosm and macrocosm, or a modern d i s t i n c t i o n between 3 4 l i v i n g nature and the 'merely mechanical'. VI. M e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d and m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e as l e v e l s  of a n a l y s i s . The p r e s e n t chapter began by c o n t r a s t i n g our account of m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e s and the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s used to make sense of them, wi t h an account which s t r e s s e d t h a t metaphor i s o n l y another name f o r the very process by which u t t e r a n c e s have meaning a t a l l . However, t h i s c o n s t r u c t i v i s t view of metaphor was shown to be i n constant danger of becoming the empty c l a i m t h a t a l l language i s m e t a p h o r i c a l . The attempt to g i v e the c l a i m substance by c o n t r a s t i n g m e t a p h o r i c a l or conceptual t h i n k i n g w i t h a more b a s i c ' e m p i r i c a l experience' was r e j e c t e d when no sense c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d t o the n o t i o n of e m p i r i c a l experience. I l l The fascination that t h i s view of metaphor has held for theorists of p o l i t i c a l metaphor was shown to ari s e from a mistaken i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the plausible claim that p o l i t i c a l discourse i s p a r t i a l l y c o n s t i t u t i v e of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y with the view that such discourse must be metaphorical. Again, the view was shown to require the incoherent notion of 'empirical p o l i t i e s ' . However, such considerations do serve to remind us that there are s t i l l things to be said about interpreting metaphors which may not be captured by concentration on the utterance. We picked out two things of p a r t i c u l a r relevance to p o l i t i c a l metaphors, t h e i r r e l a t i o n to symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and to metaphorical f i e l d s i n discourse. In the course of t h i s chapter we have t r i e d to maintain and c l a r i f y the d i s t i n c t i o n between archetypes and metaphors in p o l i t i c a l language. We have pointed out that a d i s t i n c t i o n along these l i n e s suggests the importance of discovering how an archetype i s established by persistent metaphorical usages, and how i t s existence a f f e c t s the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of future metaphors sharing the same theme. Weinrich's theory of the metaphorical f i e l d , and the a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n i t permits between image producing and image receiving f i e l d s f i l l s i n the abstract notion of an archetype with concrete d e t a i l s about the metaphorical f i e l d s which can actually be shown to have existed i n the 112 d i s c o u r s e of h i s t o r i c a l p o l i t i c a l agents. At the same time, i t s o l v e s one of the most p r e s s i n g problems of p o l i t i c a l metaphors, mentioned i n chapter one. We are no longer hampered by a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s between metaphors t h a t happen to have been used i n p o l i t i c s and those t h a t have not, or with enormous l i s t s of the d i f f e r e n t 'images' used by acknowledged ' p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r s ' . Our t a s k i s t o r e c o n s t r u c t a number of m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d s i n which an aspect of p o l i t i c s makes up the image r e c e i v i n g f i e l d , and to do so i n s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t s . To t h i s end, we s h a l l examine some examples of c o n v e n t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l metaphors, and r e l a t e them to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s . 0 113 CHAPTER FOUR The Rhetorical Structure Of Conventional Metaphors Following Weinrich we have considered the ways in which metaphors may be set i n 'metaphorical f i e l d s ' created i n discourse. When such metaphorical f i e l d s are p a r t i c u l a r l y well defined, the r e s u l t i s often a series of metaphors r e s t r i c t e d to a small number of f a m i l i a r uses. P o l i t i c a l discourse i s no exception, and we are f a m i l i a r with such well-known conventional metaphors as p o l i t i c a l a s s c i a t i o n as human body, r u l i n g as medicine, or p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e as t r u s t . Indeed, i t i s i n t h i s guise that metaphors are most f a m i l i a r to the student of p o l i t i c a l thought, yet t h i s very f a m i l i a r i t y has engendered a thoughtlessness r e s u l t i n g i n ta l k of the metaphor of the body p o l i t i c or the p a t r i a r c h a l metaphor. Unwittingly, attention i s diverted from the use to which such metaphors are being put -- and hence from what they might mean — and focussed instead upon an abstract notion, the 'imagery' supposedly evoked by such metaphors ir r e s p e c t i v e of the varied contexts i n which they are employed. 1 As a r e s u l t , both the metaphorical and the p o l i t i c a l character of the utterances that embody them are 114 i n danger of being l o s t , and we are l e f t to marvel at the cr e d u l i t y of those who could mistake a king for a father, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , driven to create an elaborate theory of comparison and analogy by way of explanation. This warning, f i r s t sounded i n the course of re j e c t i n g s i m i l a r i t y and comparison formulae as explanations of how metaphors worked i s only made more emphatic by the close r e l a t i o n between discourse and conduct i n p o l i t i c s . I t i s true of course that a great part of p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s 2 concerned with "the nature of p o l i t i c a l things," but, except for the Utopian, i t i s not an investigation into images so much as an attempt to discover the outlines and p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the p o l i t i c a l world that men have made, and are i n the course of making. The language that these men use both reveals what they understand themselves to be doing and serves as a point of departure for mature consideration of t h e i r achievement. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , as we noted i n chapter one, i t recommends even as i t describes. As Michael Oakeshott has put i t i n the case of modern European states, "the character of a state i s not a model from which copies may be struck o f f ; i t i s what the e f f o r t to understand t h i s 3 experience has made of i t . " I t i s , then, to miss what i s most inter e s t i n g about conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphors to treat them as extended comparisons between states and beehives or rul e r s and 115 shepherds, comparisons which were e v e n t u a l l y d i s c a r d e d because they c l a s h e d w i t h the ' r e a l i t y ' of p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n or r u l e r s h i p a t c r u c i a l p o i n t s . To the extent t h a t metaphors of the s t a t e as a p i a r y or as s h e e p f o l d had some currency i n p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , then such metaphors were p a r t of the known world which e x p l o r e r s of the emergent concept of the s t a t e took w i t h them on t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l j o urneys, and they were themselves p a r t of the p o l i t i c a l e xperience which these men undertook to c l a r i f y . I t i s up to us to d i s c o v e r what they took the import of s t a t e as beehive metaphors to be, which we s h a l l not e a s i l y do by i n v e s t i g a t i n g the almost endless p o i n t s of comparison between s t a t e s and beehives as we understand those terms. The same p o i n t might be urged w i t h equal j u s t i c e about the a c t i v i t i e s of those who were l e s s concerned w i t h the use of these metaphors to r e f l e c t on ' p o l i t i c a l t h i n g s ' than to convince t h e i r f e l l o w s t h a t much c o u l d be l e a r n e d about the proper o r d e r i n g of s t a t e s by a t t e n d i n g to some aspect of the l i f e of the bee. In f a c t , c o n v e n t i o n a l metaphors are c o n v e n t i o n a l not because they appeal to c o n v e n t i o n a l imagery, but because they have c o n v e n t i o n a l uses i n argument. They f a l l i n t o desuetude not because they are shown to be f a l s e , but because they l a c k the f l e x i b i l i t y t o adapt to new uses without becoming i m p l a u s i b l e . These r a t h e r e l l i p t i c a l 116 assertions w i l l be explained i n the next two chapters, where an important part of the argument w i l l be devoted to showing how a conventional metaphor becomes part of a p o l i t i c a l doctrine, and how i t comes to lose i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y and f i n d i t s place usurped by a new favourite. II . An example of d i f f e r e n t uses of 'the same' organic  metaphor. What i s meant by contrasting metaphors that have conventional uses with metaphors that appear to share the same imagery? As an example, consider the series of metaphors i n which an aspect of p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s described i n terms of our knowledge of the human body, metaphors sometimes referred to, rather grandly, as 'the organic conception of the state'. Here, i t seems, i s a clear case where the i d e n t i t y of such a 'conception' i s provided p r e c i s e l y by the imagery ir r e s p e c t i v e of the uses to which the various metaphors embodying i t are being put. Yet, however counterintuitive i t may seem, when we look more close l y at the metaphors themselves, the i d e n t i t y dissolves. Isolated organic metaphors may be found i n the e a r l i e s t examples of p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . However, an examination of the systematic use to which such metaphors were put in c l a s s i c a l Greek and Roman p o l i t i c a l thought shows that there 117 are important d i s t i n c t i o n s to be drawn. F i r s t there are those metaphors which assert that p o l i t i c a l association i s characterised by the same harmony that obtains amongst parts of the body. Second, there are those which assert that p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e s , notably the o f f i c e s of rule r s or magistrates, are of the same end-directed character as parts of the body. Third, there are metaphors which draw attention to the role of v i t a l centres i n the human body, the anima, head or heart, and attempt to make connections between them and the legitimacy of various p o l i t i c a l arrangements. Obviously there are coherences between the d i f f e r e n t uses, but i t i s important to determine the exact coherence that the authors of these metaphors were seeking to es t a b l i s h before pointing out the ones which may s t r i k e us, es p e c i a l l y since we seem so much less disposed to f i n d them convincing. Plato's investigation into the nature of j u s t i c e provides examples of t h i s f i r s t kind of metaphor, examples which are buttressed by the microcosm-macrocosm idea. This notion, which i s not i t s e l f a metaphor, finds l i t e r a l expression i n the argument that j u s t i c e i n the c i t y i s 4 ju s t i c e i n the soul of man writ large. The doctrine of anthropocentric microcosm — the b e l i e f that the p r i n c i p l e s and properties of the human body may be projected into the 5 cosmos — tends i n general to re s u l t i n complex analogical reasoning, l i k e the correspondences between the soul of the 118 tyrranic man and the state of a c i t y ruled by a tyrant, which are of great subtlety. But i t can also give r i s e to metaphors related to the st r u c t u r a l correspondences of the the o r i g i n a l analogies, such as the passage i n the Republic where the r i g h t l y ordered state i s described as 'healthy' 7 and the unjust as 'fevered'. This i n turn suggests a whole series of metaphors i n which the a c t i v i t y of r u l i n g i s elaborated i n medical terms, an early example appearing i n the Laws where external wars undertaken to overcome f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e within a c i t y are described as g "purgatives". Greek thought i s lacking i n good examples of organic metaphors about rulership, but A r i s t o t l e produces a metaphor l e g i t i m i z i n g a relat i o n s h i p i n the course of his defence of slavery. Distinguishing between dominion over slaves and rule over free men, he argues that, "the rule of mind over body i s absolute, the rule of i n t e l l i g e n c e over desire i s g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and royal." Turning to Roman writings, we can recognize the a f f i n i t y between A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphor and the oft-repeated fable of the feet which rebelled against the b e l l y , attributed by Roman historians to Menenius Agrippa and j u s t i f y i n g a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Senate and the ple b i a n s . 1 ^ In these examples, organic metaphors are used to legitimate o f f i c e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s by appealing to t h e i r 'natural' characters. In metaphors of the 119 second type, a l s o found i n Roman thought, the e n d - d i r e c t e d c h a r a c t e r of the body's v i t a l organs i s used t o make an argument about the a l l e g e d e n d - d i r e c t e d c h a r a c t e r of r u l i n g . Both the senate and the emperors were d e s c r i b e d as 'heads' of the body p o l i t i c , but Seneca seems t o have been the f i r s t to argue t h a t , as the h e a l t h of the head was of supreme importance t o the h e a l t h of the body, so we c o u l d deduce the p r i v i l e g e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of r u l e r s h i p i n the corpus  r e i p u b l i c a e . There are obvious coherences between metaphors of the second and t h i r d types — the n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r of the r u l i n g p a r t may suggest f u r t h e r a n a l o g i e s between the a c t i v i t y of r u l i n g and important b o d i l y f u n c t i o n s . However, the coherences are not i n t r i n s i c , t o the metaphor-themes, they are suggested by the background concepts, arguments and d o c t r i n e s i n which the p a r t i c u l a r m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e s are employed. T h i s i s made c l e a r when we c o n t r a s t Roman or g a n i c metaphors wi t h those of the e a r l y C h r i s t i a n s . Here, metaphors of the f i r s t k i n d , about the c h a r a c t e r of a s s o c i a t i o n , are no longer used to express a conception of the harmony of the p o l i t i c a l and n a t u r a l o r d e r s , but to u n d e r l i n e the all-encompassing t o t a l i t y i n which the b e l i e v e r f i n d s h i m s e l f . S a i n t Paul i s our source here: For as the body i s one, and hath many members, and 120 a l l the members of t h a t ^ o d y being many are one body, so a l s o i s C h r i s t . D e s p i t e i t s uncompromising i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the many are one the body of C h r i s t , t h i s metaphor n e v e r t h e l e s s c o e x i s t e d w i t h others used t o make arguments of the second and t h i r d type about the d i s t i n c t i o n s necessary i n p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n . S a i n t Paul h i m s e l f argued t h a t we c o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h between g r e a t e r and l e s s e r powers, and t h a t the l e s s e r powers a l l worked together towards the end of 13 m a i n t a i n i n g the whole under the d i r e c t i o n of the head. Of even g r e a t e r moment f o r l a t e r p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s was the way i n which the r e l a t i o n between s p i r i t u a l and temporal powers came to be j u s t i f i e d i n metaphors r e l a t i n g the p h y s i c a l members of the body t o a r u l i n g anima. S a i n t Augustine was p a r t i c u l a r l y adept w i t h these metaphors, u s i n g them t o subordinate the cl a i m s of the e a r t h l y c i t y t o those of the heavenly c i t y . As Tilman Struve p o i n t s out, Augustine was much more prone t o use o r g a n i c metaphors which s t r e s s e d human b i o l o g y when d e s c r i b i n g the c i v i t a s t e r r e n a than i n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s of the c i v i t a s D e i , which was c h a r a c t e r i z e d 14 as a m y s t i c a l corpus C h r i s t i . Such a d i s t i n c t i o n , o f course, l i e s at the he a r t of Augustine's r e l u c t a n c e to grant the Roman Empire the s t a t u s of r e s p u b l i c a , where he uses 121 just such a b i o l o g i c a l l y grounded organic metaphor i n his argument. Thus, conventional organic imagery, once i t has been located i n a context of p o l i t i c a l argument, can be seen to disguise a number of d i f f e r e n t conventional uses of a metaphorical f i e l d . The differences stem not only from the d i f f e r e n t organic concepts that are employed — which bodily functions are seen as ' v i t a l ' , for example — but from the d i f f e r e n t doctrines and arguments that the metaphors are taken to support. As we saw i n the cases of A r i s t o t l e and Augustine, an argument of some complexity and sophistication may turn upon a point that a metaphor i s used to make. The danger here, es p e c i a l l y i f the 'imagery' i s stressed at the expense of the argument, i s that we may overlook the work being done by the metaphor, and write i t o f f as an i n d i r e c t a l l u s i o n to f a m i l i a r topoi, or even as an emotional appeal devoid of r a t i o n a l content. To understand the temptations here, consider A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphor again: The rule of mind over body i s absolute, the rule of i n t e l l i g e n c e over desire i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and royal. 122 On the one hand, i t might seem t h a t the burden of the argument i s c a r r i e d by the microcosmic i d e a i n the s p e c i a l c o ntext of A r i s t o t e l i a n psychology, a l r e a d y expounded i n the Nichomachean E t h i c s . The metaphor merely a c t s as a reminder of t h i s argument by i n v o k i n g an image of b o d i l y ' r u l e 1 . On the other hand, and a g a i n s t t h i s view, i t must be urged t h a t , even i f t h i s were t r u e , i t c o u l d not e s t a b l i s h the p o i n t t h a t A r i s t o t l e seeks to make here. The success of the argument depends upon h i s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t master and s l a v e can p l a u s i b l y be d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n an analagous way to mind and body, and f r e e men and t h e i r r u l e r s i n the same way as i n t e l l i g e n c e and d e s i r e . He attempts to support t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h some s u b s i d i a r y p o i n t s about the s i m i l a r i t y o f s l a v e s to t o o l s and animals, but the, primary metaphoric i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n the passage must be made by the audience themselves. They must see the p o i n t of the argument bef o r e they can grasp the ground of the metaphor, and they are a t l i b e r t y to accept or r e j e c t i t . To the extent t h a t they are a l r e a d y d i s p o s e d to see s l a v e s i n t h i s way, the metaphor w i l l g a i n added f o r c e , to be sure, from the co n c e p t u a l background, which w i l l make i t seem l i k e a s t r i k i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of the microcosmic i d e a . To the extent t h a t a modern audience i s i n f l u e n c e d by e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s which condemn the treatment of other human beings as means, they w i l l be d i s p o s e d to r e j e c t the metaphor — as most 123 modern commentators have done -- as weak and strained. This objection to treating p o l i t i c a l metaphors as 'imagery 1 marks a d i s t i n c t advance i n our attempt to explain the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. I t treats A r i s t o t l e ' s passage as a complete metaphorical utterance, but i t rests i t s explanation on the idea of a d i s p o s i t i o n , a d i s p o s i t i o n that both the metaphor and the microcosmic idea somehow 'express'. There i s a clear danger of c i r c u l a r i t y here, for we cannot describe or i s o l a t e such a d i s p o s i t i o n independently of the arguments or metaphors i n which i t i s expressed. Perhaps the proponents of the f i r s t l i n e of argument are correct i n assuming that the doctrine i t s e l f has an independent part to play, but that the metaphor i s not thereby rendered redundant or ornamental. Consider t h i s very i n t e r e s t i n g feature of A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphor. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that innovation accounts of metaphor, p a r t i c u l a r l y Max Black's, argued that an i n t e r a c t i o n took place between subject and predicate expressions i n a metaphor, so that i n addition to the more obvious semantic changes that the predicate expression wrought upon the subject, the e f f e c t s of subject expression upon predicate could not be overlooked either. S i m i l a r l y , Weinrich argued that the structure of image receiving and image producing f i e l d s was a r e s u l t of t h e i r combination i n a single metaphorical f i e l d . In A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphor, t h i s 124 i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t i s so powerful that the position of subject and predicate expressions i n the argument i s reversed i n the metaphorical utterance. Although the passage i s nominally about the master and slave rel a t i o n s h i p and the d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i s and rule over free men, the metaphor says that "the rule of mind over body i s absolute, and the rule of i n t e l l i g e n c e over desire i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and royal." The metaphorical f i e l d has a l l but obli t e r a t e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between image receiving and image producing f i e l d s . How has t h i s come about? In t h i s case, as i n other conventional metaphors we s h a l l examine, the i n i t i a l p l a u s i b i l i t y of the metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n i s suggested by reference to a background of shared b e l i e f s . The metaphor i s to be understood against a background where p o l i t i c a l r e l ations and the r e l a t i o n s of nature are so cl o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d as not to be perceived as metaphorically related at a l l . Thus, i n another famous passage, A r i s t o t l e argues that, as i n a well governed c i t y the r u l e r i s not required to be present to see that every act of the c i t i z e n s i s properly performed, so i n an animal the soul " i s situated i n a central organ of authority" and the other parts duly perform t h e i r functions without immediate supervision."^ The uses of the metaphorical f i e l d i n p a r t i c u l a r utterances are u n i n t e l l i g i b l e without an understanding of i t s f u l l ramifications. 125 However, i f p o l i t i c a l metaphors are to be l o c a t e d a g a i n s t a background of b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t the p r e c i s e r o l e o f t h i s c o n c e p t u a l background be p r e c i s e l y d e l i m i t e d . I f i t i s the background which p r o v i d e s a context w i t h i n which the me t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e can be seen t o have a p o i n t , the background i t s e l f cannot make the p a r t i c u l a r c o n n e c t i o n t h a t the authors seeks. The argument from d i s p o s i t i o n i s c o r r e c t up t o t h i s p o i n t — t h a t the audience i t s e l f must make the connection — but i t i s u n w i l l i n g t o al l o w .that there can be l i n k s between a metaphor and background concepts and d o c t r i n e s t h a t are oth e r than p u r e l y c o n t i n g e n t . A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphors suggest t h a t t h e r e are very c l o s e connections between background concepts and c o n v e n t i o n a l metaphors, and t h a t the metaphor i s used t o extend c e r t a i n i m p l i c a t i o n s of the background i n t o p o l i t i c a l l i f e and so c h a r a c t e r i z e p o l i t i c a l events and p r a c t i c e s i n a p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t way. How f a r i t can be extended w i l l be up to those who read and hear m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e s and have t o make the r e l e v a n t connections. The r e c o r d of s u c c e s s f u l e x t e n s i o n w i l l be pre s e r v e d i n me t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d s and c o n v e n t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l metaphors. The r e s t o f t h i s chapter w i l l be concerned t o show how a metaphor e s t a b l i s h e s the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of a conce p t u a l background. The con n e c t i o n i t e s t a b l i s h e s i s not 1 2 6 a l o g i c a l l y necessary one: a defence of slavery could not be deduced from A r i s t o t l e ' s psychology. In t h i s sense, the conceptual background i s l i k e a map without a key; as yet the symbols bear only an in t e r n a l r e l a t i o n to one another, thus setting some l i m i t s to what use may be made of them, but not completely delimiting t h e i r application. Putting the map to work to display the p o l i t i c a l significance of events and practices i s a matter of making coherent connections. Once established, such connections may make p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s seem every b i t as relevant to understanding aspects of the o r i g i n a l background as vice versa, hence the int e r e s t i n g i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s we have observed. Of course, put l i k e t h i s , no r e a l explanation of the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l metaphors has been offered. The suggestions that a metaphor may 'establish a coherence' or make us 'notice an aspect', are as mysterious as the claim that a metaphor 'expresses a d i s p o s i t i o n ' . Part of the mystery here may be d i s p e l l e d by c l a r i f y i n g the notion of 'coherence', not least because we s h a l l encounter two d i f f e r e n t , though related, kinds of coherence. They may be thought of as two poles at the ends of a continuum. At one end — we s h a l l c a l l i t the epistemological end — p o l i t i c a l metaphors shade into analogy and model. At the epistemological end authors are asserting s t r u c t u r a l correspondences i n which they describe aspects of p o l i t i c a l 127 l i f e i n terms of well-developed vocabularies drawn from both t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l experience. Here we fi n d those metaphors of p o l i t i c s as theatre, family l i f e or anatomy which are used to extend our understanding of p o l i t i c a l association. At the other end of the scale -- the aesthetic end — writers may be tr y i n g to express something that they f e e l about p o l i t i c a l l i f e by evoking attitudes and emotions which would be appropriate to family l i f e , drama or disease. Here metaphors shade into other forms of p i c t o r i a l expression, notably cartoon and caricature. From what has been said already about int e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s and the unity of the metaphorical f i e l d , i t should be clear that to di s t i n g u i s h too sharply between epistemological and aesthetic coherences w i l l be a mistake. Both are p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent i n any metaphor, and i t i s the use that an author makes of his metaphor that w i l l e x p l o i t more of one p o s s i b i l i t y and less of another. Above a l l , i t should be evident that p o l i t i c a l metaphors are never used to make purely epistemological connections. To do so would be to rob them of any function i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . As Henry Drucker has noted, the connections which audiences can be persuaded to make by p o l i t i c a l metaphor are intimately bound up with agreements and disagreements i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . An audience may simply refuse to accept the ground of a metaphor i f i t i s a e s t h e t i c a l l y displeasing. As he puts 128 i t , t h e r e i s a l i n k here between, the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of a n a l o g i c a l arguments on the one hand, and the f a c t t h a t where like-minded people agree i n t h e i r p o l i t i c s they are o|^en unable to win over men who d i s a g r e e w i t h them. The exact mix of a e s t h e t i c and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l coherence w i l l o b v i o u s l y depend on the author's circumstances and h i s p r o j e c t . In the use of p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes, a e s t h e t i c coherence w i l l be s u bordinate, though never e n t i r e l y absent. In a speech on a p o l i t i c a l o c c a s i o n , the a e s t h e t i c may dominate, but s i n c e what we f e e l about something i s i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to what we know about i t , e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l coherence can never be e n t i r e l y l a c k i n g . In t r i v i a l metaphors, r a p i d l y approaching the s t a t u s of c l i c h e s , the appeal i s o f t e n to something an audience knows a t f i r s t hand. As s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y authors c o u l d e a s i l y s l i p i n t o t a l k about ' b r i d l i n g ' or ' g i v i n g r e i n ' t o an argument, so modern p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r s have been accused of t r i v i a l i z i n g p o l i t i c s by t h e i r c onstant r e s o r t t o metaphors of s p o r t s and games. On the other hand, what an educated reader knows i s c o n s i d e r a b l y wider than the shared knowledge of a popular audience, and i t i s the e l u s i v e c o n j u c t u r e of knowledge and f e e l i n g i n p o l i t i c s which we s h a l l now e x p l o r e . 129 I I I . Metaphors that make us notice a doctrine. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for treating p o l i t i c a l metaphors as a d i s t i n c t topic for investigation l i e s , we have argued, i n the recognizably p o l i t i c a l character that t h e i r use i n p o l i t i c a l argument gives to them. Part of t h i s character, as we have seen, derives from the way i n which metaphors may be used to extend a background conception into p o l i t i c a l l i f e , and to invest i t with p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Again, i t must be emphasized that metaphors are not the only way of doing t h i s . E s p e c i a l l y when st r u c t u r a l correspondences are at stake, models and h i s t o r i c a l exempla are often more important. The role of the medieval corporation i n shaping early modern r e f l e c t i o n on the character of the state, or the model of the covenanting church i n r e f l e c t i o n on the 18 character of c i v i l o bligation spring to mind. However, i t i s the metaphorical connection which interests us here, a connection which i s at once more d i r e c t and looser than the connections made by models or l i t e r a l comparisons. A metaphor does not necessarily i n v i t e i t s audience to compare a state with a body or to look at h i s t o r i c a l associations, but to i d e n t i f y state and body. Because the exact implications are not spelled out, much i s l e f t to the reader or hearer, and there i s no guarantee that metaphorically suggested connections w i l l not be made i d i o s y n c r a t i c a l l y or 130 even a t a l l . Authors may seek t o abate t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h the a i d of v a r i o u s r h e t o r i c a l s t r a t e g i e s designed to persuade an audience to make onl y r e l e v a n t connections, but they cannot e n t i r e l y abate i t without s a c r i f i c i n g the power of a metaphor t o make people n o t i c e something about p o l i t i c a l l i f e t h a t they might otherwise have overlooked. Even a c o n v e n t i o n a l metaphor, w h i l s t i t remains a metaphor, partakes o f t h i s power. We have a l r e a d y n o t i c e d a s i m i l a r i t y between c e r t a i n metaphors and p i c t u r e s , those metaphors which s a c r i f i c e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o r a e s t h e t i c coherence w i t h a d o c t r i n e . T h i s s i m i l a r i t y ought t o remind us of Donald Davidson's p o i n t t h a t the way p i c t u r e s make us n o t i c e t h i n g s c o u l d be g e n e r a l i z e d i n t o a theory of metaphor. We might then conclude t h a t what i s r e q u i r e d i s an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the way i n which such ' p i c t u r e s ' work — a new "psychology o f 19 the i m a g i n a t i o n " , as Ricoeur once suggested. However, we must r e c a l l Davidson's p o i n t t h a t , t o the extent t h a t we can d e s c r i b e such a p i c t u r e i n words, we are thereby m i s s i n g the e s s e n t i a l element, shared by metaphors and p i c t u r e s , of the experience of n o t i c i n g . "Words are the wrong currency to exchange f o r a p i c t u r e , " as Davidson put i t . Thus, although the n o t i o n t h a t a metaphor makes us see something i s o b v i o u s l y important here, the i d e a t h a t what we see i s a mental p i c t u r e should be r e s i s t e d . More h e l p f u l a l t o g e t h e r 131 i s the notion, preserved i n our ordinary way of speaking about metaphors, that a metaphor makes us see something as something else. Thus Augustine proposed that we see l i f e on earth as no more than "a shadow of what i s to come," or John of Salisbury i n v i t e d us to see human l i f e as a tr a g i c drama played out before the eyes of God. This experience of 'seeing as' has been c a r e f u l l y analysed by Wittgenstein as a problem i n the philosophy of mind, and despite i t s apparent lack of relevance i t i s well worth diverging from our argument for a moment to see what t h i s everyday way of 20 speaking about metaphors e n t a i l s . Wittgenstein begins with an examination of the experience of someone looking at a picture he c a l l s the 'duck-rabbit 1, a composite figure he derives from the psychologist Jastrow, which may be seen either as a duck's head facing one way or a rabbit's head facing the other. He notes that someone confronted by the picture and noticing only one of i t s aspects might say, "I see a rabbit," but not, "I see i t as a rabbit." However, i f he were then to be struck by the fact that i t could also be seen as a duck, he might say, "now I see i t as a duck." S i m i l a r l y , a t h i r d party, who knew about the dual aspect of the figure, could say, "now he i s seeing i t as a duck." This shows that 'seeing as' i s conceptually connected with the experience of noticing an aspect. The special relevance t h i s has for 132 understanding metaphors i s brought out by W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s next remarks, where he p o i n t s out t h a t t h i s experience of n o t i c i n g an aspect i s not i t s e l f p a r t of p e r c e p t i o n . I f someone who had n o t i c e d an aspect of the p i c t u r e were asked to draw what he had n o t i c e d , he c o u l d o n l y draw a copy of the o r i g i n a l p i c t u r e . In f a c t , W i t t g e n s t e i n notes, 'seeing as' has a g r e a t d e a l i n common with such r e l a t e d experiences as f e e l i n g t h a t a p i e c e of music i s being p l a y e d c o r r e c t l y , or r e - a r r a n g i n g the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n of a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l f i g u r e to see i t as an empty box r a t h e r than a s o l i d cube, f o r example. Here then i s a c l e a r l i n k between 'seeing as' and the suggestion t h a t a metaphor i s intended to make us n o t i c e something i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Of course, t h e r e i s a notable d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s more g e n e r a l i z e d n o t i c i n g and the n o t i c i n g t h a t goes on when we l i t e r a l l y see something as something e l s e , because the substratum of p h y s i c a l p e r c e p t i o n i s m i s s i n g . However, as we have j u s t noted, the whole t h r u s t of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s has been to deny t h a t 'seeing as' i s a matter of p h y s i c a l l y seeing one t h i n g and then having an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n imposed upon i t . What i s more, he f u r t h e r d i s t a n c e s 'seeing as' from sense impression by c o n t r a s t i n g t h a t k i n d of experience w i t h the experience of having a toothache. U n l i k e having a toothache, the former k i n d of experience has as i t s l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n t h a t the 133 person claiming the experience has the a b i l i t y to apply the aspect that he claims to see. Such a b i l i t i e s are often quite simple, for example, where we demand geometrical knowledge from someone who claims to see f i r s t one side and then another as the base of t r i a n g l e . On the other hand, and more relevant to understanding metaphors, i t can be a very complex kind of a b i l i t y , as i n the case of someone who claims to be able to hear a piece of music as a march. As Wittgenstein concludes, the s t r i k i n g p e c u l i a r i t y of the experience of 'seeing as' i s that "the substratum of t h i s 21 experience i s the mastery of a technique." Here, then, i s the necessary corrective to Davidson's throw-away remarks about metaphors nudging us into noticing an aspect of something. Instead of f a l l i n g back on the weak suggestion that such noticing i s prompted by the semantic absurdity of a metaphor, we see that i t i s pr e c i s e l y the sense that a metaphor makes which prompts the experience. Just as we would be dubious about the claims of a man to have found a piece of music sad i f he could not explain what was sad about i t ( i f he had not mastered the conventions of musical expression), so we would be s c e p t i c a l of the claim to have noticed something about p o l i t i c s as the r e s u l t of a drama metaphor i f a man were ignorant of r e a l t h e a t r i c a l performances or the doctrines and arguments associated with them. I t i s thus u n l i k e l y that p o l i t i c a l metaphors w i l l have 134 t h e i r greatest impact amongst the ignorant and uninstructed, as i t i s sometimes claimed. We are reminded that metaphors are uses of language, and appeal to the vocabulary of background concepts to make th e i r point. Thus the technical mastery which underlies the comprehension of a conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphor e n t a i l s a knowledge of the background concepts which are being employed, and a grasp of the point of employing them i n a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l context. IV. How are s p e c i f i c connections made between metaphors and  doctrines i n order to create f i e l d s ? This, then, i s the general explanation of how p o l i t i c a l metaphors work. The appeal to background concepts i n a metaphorical f i e l d creates the l o g i c a l condition where someone may be said to have noticed an aspect of p o l i t i c a l l i f e which they had hitherto overlooked. The stress here i s on the creation of a l o g i c a l condition: the metaphor cannot be said to cause someone to notice an aspect, because ultimately they have to accept the ground of the metaphor, i t s place i n a p o l i t i c a l argument. Given that an author and his audience have the re q u i s i t e mastery of doctrine and vocabulary, what are the ways i n which p a r t i c u l a r connections between p o l i t i c s and background conceptions may be suggested? Here we move into the province of rhetoric, the ways i n which an audience may be persuaded to accept the 1 3 5 ground of the metaphor as a prerequisite for t h e i r having the experience of noticing. Doubtless there are many such r h e t o r i c a l strategies, but three i n p a r t i c u l a r stand out as commonly encountered devices. The f i r s t , and much the least important, involves an appeal to a semantic ambiguity — or "pregnancy" as Empson quaintly c a l l s i t — i n some part of the vocabulary of the doctrine which i s then used to support a metaphorical 22 reading. Early twentieth-century c r i t i c s of what we c a l l 'consumerism' made much of the economists' preoccupation with 'consumption'. The word has an i n t e r e s t i n g history of use, e s p e c i a l l y i n i t s early connections with waste and wasting diseases, and i t was employed by early economists pr e c i s e l y because of these connections. M e r c a n t i l i s t s were a l l for the supression of home consumption, esp e c i a l l y of wasteful, 'luxury' goods, on the grounds that resources were thereby irrevocably 'consumed'. With the advent of an i n t e r e s t i n markets, the consumer received somewhat more 23 appreciative treatment from the economists, but the word i t s e l f could not escape so e a s i l y from i t s e a r l i e r associations, and from the p a r a l l e l alimentary senses i t had meanwhile acquired. Thus R. H. Tawney made a renewed c a l l for the suppression of "economic appetites" i n just such terms: 136 Like a hypochondriac who i s so absorbed i n the processes of his own digestion that he goes to his grave before he has begun to l i v e , i n d u s t r i a l i z e d communities neglect the very object for which i t i s worth while to acquire riches i n t h e i r feverish preoccupation^with the means by which riches can be acquired. The pathological f i e l d of material consumption-as-disease, a f i e l d supported by the h i s t o r i c a l associations of the word and by e x p l i c i t medical references, appears again i n the works of Dean Inge, whose essays were an important part of the fashionable pessimism of his times. Even before he wrote on 'Consumptionism1, Inge saw the pernicious influence of economic science as a central element i n 'Our Present Discontents': When p o l i t i c a l economy was treated as a philosophy of l i f e i t began to be mischievous. A book on the science of the stomach without a knowledge of physiology or the working of the other organs would not be much use. Opposition to i n d u s t r i a l society, a society which Tawney sees as heartless and Inge as Godless, i s to be mobilized by having an audience see i t as diseased. This way they may be brought to notice the immoral waste and emptiness and the preoccupation with wordly things which Tawney and Inge fi n d so d i s t r e s s i n g . Not only t h i s , but noticing them i n such a way brings out t h e i r significance for the general argument 137 that the modern age i s a degenerate one. In other words, i f the audience follows through t h i s metaphorical characterization, they may come to take up the attitudes of Tawney and Inge. F i r s t , however, they must share the view that materialism i s wrong, and invoking a semantic connection i s a comparatively weak way of suggesting t h i s . To a greater extent than other r h e t o r i c a l strategies, the r e v i v a l of episodes i n the semantic h i s t o r i e s of words demands a p r i o r i f unarticulated d i s p o s i t i o n to accept the ground of the metaphor. In t h i s respect Tawney and Inge knew t h e i r audiences: a less nostalgic era may have been less disposed to f i n d the pursuit of wealth pathological, and so r e s i s t the picture of consumption as a disease. Like the f i r s t , the second strategy continues to stress aesthetic coherence, but uses the vocabulary of i t s background concepts i n a precise, and at f i r s t sight more prosaic way, to e s t a b l i s h very p a r t i c u l a r connections with p o l i t i c a l events and practices. In t h i s way, epistemological coherences become possible. Its most popular vehicle i s the extended metaphor i n which a series of lesser f i g u r a t i v e devices serve to repeat the ground of the metaphorical i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . Because of t h i s self-consciously l i t e r a r y character i t i s a strategy which has tended to a t t r a c t the attention of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s rather than p o l i t i c a l 138 philosophers (and r i g h t l y so) , but i t i s not improper to make some assessment of i t s p o l i t i c a l s ignificance here. Since to successfully sustain one of these extended metaphors i s part of what i t means to be a great s t y l i s t , examples tend to be confined to a few well-known figures whose t h e o r e t i c a l significance i s often less than t h e i r l i t e r a r y reputations. Milton's Areopagitica o f f e r s us a convenient example of 2 6 t h i s l i t e r a r y strategy at work. The extended metaphor which c a r r i e s the argument against the l i c e n s i n g of books i s that of books as l i v i n g things. I t i s f i r s t worked out i n the following c h a r a c t e r i s t i c passage, disarmingly introduced by the admission that i t i s of the greatest moment to Church and Commonwealth how books "demeane themselves". For books are not absolutely dead things but doe containe a potencie of l i f e i n them to be as active as that soule was whose progeny they are... I know they are as l i v e l y , and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon's teeth; and being sown up and down may chance to spring up armed men. And yet on the other hand, unless wariness be used as good almost k i l l a man as k i l l a good book: who k i l l s a man k i l l s a reasonable creature, God's image, but he who destroyes a good Book k i l l s reason i t s e l f k i l l s the Image of God... We should be wary therefore what persecution we rais e against the l i v i n g labours of publick men . . . since we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a martydome, and i f i t extend to the whole impression, a kind of massacre, whereof the execution ends not i n the slaying of an elementall l i f e but strikes at the e t h e r e a l l and f i r s t essence, the breath of reason i t s e l f e , 139 s l a i e s an immortalitie rather than l i f e . Notice the complete coherence of what i s , i n fact, a series of metaphorical redescriptions of the act of censorship, which, taken i n sum, create the extended metaphor of books as l i v i n g things. Figurative comparison between the argument of a book and the soul of i t s author draws into t h i s basic structure the theological doctrine that man i s closest to God i n the exercise of his reason, and together they support the daring oxymoron of the f i n a l phrase, that censorship slays immortality. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g here i s the way i n which Milton tones down the series of homicide metaphors by use of the 'kind o f modifier, l e t t i n g the r e p e t i t i o n e s t a b l i s h the connection i n case his very e x p l i c i t references be thought too bold. Clearly i t i s Milton's object that his readers should take up exactly the same attitude to the l i c e n s i n g of books as they , would to the taking of a l i f e . In short, he wishes them to notice the aspect under which the two acts may be seen as i d e n t i c a l . To the counter argument that i n certain cases, notably i n b a t t l e , k i l l i n g may be j u s t i f i e d , his extended metaphor i s admirably adapted to counter with a new development foreshadowed i n the reference to the myth of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth. As Michael Walzer has reminded us, i t was a central feature of the Puritan 140 conception of l i f e that men were pitched into a deadly struggle against Satanic forces for the preservation of t h e i r immortal souls. I t was a conception i n which m i l i t a r y metaphors flourished, proclaiming the b a t t l e of the Godly, assisted by heavenly battalions, against e v i l i n a l l i t s 2 8 manifestations. Milton was p e r f e c t l y at home with t h i s conception and i t s metaphorical expressions (compare the epic angelic b a t t l e i n Paradise Lost), and the theme duly appears i n Areopagitica introduced i n another extended metaphor. Here precise and detailed use of m i l i t a r y terms serves to point out that l i c e n s i n g deprives us of the very chance to t e s t our arms and prove our adherence to God's 29 word i n open encounter with the forces of Satan. Not only i s Milton's o r i g i n a l books-as-living things metaphor i n t e r n a l l y coherent, but i t connects with other conventional metaphors central to the background concepts shared by Milton and many i n his audience. This use of sophisticated extended metaphors to l i n k a set of ideas, events and practices by means of precise technical d e t a i l has been noted by Paul F u s s e l l , where he refers to the creation of a " r h e t o r i c a l world". The phrase serves to remind us that the d e t a i l s are not p i l e d up purely for aesthetic e f f e c t , a demonstration of l i t e r a r y s k i l l s only, but serve a persuasive purpose to which such s k i l l s are subordinate. Two more examples may help c l a r i f y t h i s 141 point. We recognize i n Bernard Mandeville's extended metaphor of p o l i t i c a l association as a bowl of punch a metaphor i n which the d e t a i l s are subordinate to the 30 s a t i r i c a l thrust of the whole argument. Mandeville i s quite e x p l i c i t about t h i s , begging the reader's apology i n obviously i r o n i c a l tones for comparing a "great thing" to a "mean, t r i v i a l one". Compare the very d i f f e r e n t subordination of a metaphor to a persuasive project that goes on i n the following passage from Burke, introduced by F u s s e l l as an example of the creation of a r h e t o r i c a l world. In A Letter to a Noble Lord, r e f e r r i n g to the r e v o l u t i o n i s t s use of o l d cement and building materials as emergency sources of gunpowder, (Burke) delivers t h i s image eloquent of the revolutionary destruction of the orthodox p r i n c i p l e s of hierarchy and discreteness: "Churches, play-houses, coffee houses, a l l a l i k e are destined to be mingled and equalised and blended into one common rubbish; and well s i f t e d and l i x i v i a t e d (mixed with l y e ) , to c r y s t a l l i z e into tr.ue, democratic, explosive, insurrectionary n i t r e . This extended metaphor of revolutionary ideas as gunpowder i s supported by a series of metonyms i n which physical objects stand for the abstract ideas which are elaborated within t h e i r confines. Thus the revolution as a whole i s represented by the action of destroying buildings for munitions. D e t a i l i s added by the reference to r e a l 142 buildings — churches, play-houses and coffee houses — standing for r e l i g i o n , the arts and i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e , which are not the sorts of things that may be p h y s i c a l l y torn down. Like Milton's metaphor, the technical d e t a i l s — the s i f t i n g , l i x i v i a t i n g and c r y s t a l l i z i n g -- serve to create a r h e t o r i c a l world whose r e a l counterpart i s already intimately known, enjoyed and invested with p o l i t i c a l s ignificance for his audience. Certainly epistemological coherence i s not lacking for, as F u s s e l l reminds us, Burke i s speaking of the destructions of the t r a d i t i o n a l , unselfconscious p o l i t i c a l l i f e he purported to f i n d i n eighteenth-century England. However, l e t us not forget that much of the power of his metaphor derives from the fact that many i n his audience would have been as distressed by the loss of a favourite coffee house as they would by the more distant and abstract prospect of the undermining of a whole s o c i a l order. The i d e o l o g i c a l impulse at work i n Burke's metaphor i s to make the connection between the two that i s basic to modern conservatism; but the passage i s more than a mere denunciation of a revolution based on abstract p r i n c i p l e s of p o l i t i c s , i t i s also a c a l l to arms. If the art of the l i t e r a r y metaphor and i t s r h e t o r i c a l world suggest a way i n which conventional metaphors might be born, the t h i r d r h e t o r i c a l strategy suggests how they might f a l l into desuetude. This strategy has been i d e n t i f i e d and 143 analysed by Michael Walzer i n a study of p o l i t i c a l symbolism. Trying to fathom the l i n k between background concepts and p o l i t i c a l doctrines i n the seventeeth century, Walzer was led to conclude that, although the re j e c t i o n of certai n t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l ideas was c l e a r l y related to the acceptance of some new cosmological and theological 32 concepts, the l i n k was not one of l o g i c a l necessity. I f i t had been, he reasoned, the 'new philosophy' — which John Donne had seen " c a l l i n g a l l i n doubt" — would have been much more ic o n o c l a s t i c than i t actually was. To explain t h i s discrepancy, Walzer argues that a cosmology does not so much provide a set of propositions to p o l i t i c a l thinkers, but "a 33 series of s t r i k i n g and suggestive images." Such images are less the work of the unguided imagination than the revaluation of experiences i n the l i g h t of the new ideas. For example, the sixteenth-century cosmology of harmony had tended to set a p a r t i c u l a r and not very s i g n i f i c a n t value on wandering and vagabondage; the new cosmology of mechanical motion and the emphasis on f a l l e n man i n Protestant theology combined to make physical and s o c i a l mobility into symbols invested with a special meaning and value. As Walzer points out, these symbols involve a dual reference, once to the th e o r e t i c a l structures of natural philosophy and theology, and once again to the p o l i t i c a l and economic world. In the process of t h i s imaginative transformation, marginal men 144 were no longer l o s t amongst the various symbols of chaos contrasted with harmony, but were foregrounded as symbols of a new s o c i a l order. Whatever might be thought of Walzer's h i s t o r i c a l d e t a i l s , his account of p o l i t i c a l symbols and t h e i r reference worlds i s a useful one, for i t allows us to b u i l d up a composite picture of how conventional p o l i t i c a l metaphors a r i s e , are sustained and f a l l into desuetude. The notion that p o l i t i c a l symbols have a double reference i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g because our analysis of r h e t o r i c a l worlds suggests that extended p o l i t i c a l metaphors which make s k i l f u l use of such f i g u r a t i v e devices as metonymy, synechdoche or p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n may create p o l i t i c a l symbols from the f a m i l i a r d e t a i l s of everyday l i f e . When they are used i n metaphors i n a way coherent with contemporary developments i n science, philosophy or theology, such extended metaphors may forge the li n k s with background concepts which would create the double reference of p o l i t i c a l symbols that Walzer has i d e n t i f i e d . Once created, the symbols may be used again i n p o l i t i c a l metaphors with the weight of a s o c i a l theory behind them. This connection between elements of everyday experience and t h e o r e t i c a l arguments i n the l i g h t of which both are invested with p o l i t i c a l significance i s not a l o g i c a l connection. Since i t i s made by metaphor, i t need not even 145 be an analogical connection. The r h e t o r i c a l function of the metaphor i s to suggest the connection that the author i s try i n g to es t a b l i s h — for example, to connect the author's struggle to set his ideas before the public with man's struggle for salvation. I f successfully established, warfare becomes a symbol for polemical writing which can be used again, and the conventional metaphor of writing-as-fighting w i l l have been created. However, the metaphor i s now clos e l y t i e d to the background of theological concepts i n which l i f e i s seen as a struggle, and any weakening of adherence to the background doctrine w i l l leave the metaphor stranded, expressing an attitude fewer and fewer people now hold. How many people, when they applaud Areopagitica as a milestone in the establishment of freedom of expression see Milton's metaphors as anything more than clever conceits? They are persuaded that an author has an abstract r i g h t to publish his opinions abroad; nothing could be further from Milton's v i s i o n of God's people armed with His word. We cannot s t r i p away Milton's metaphors to arrive at the 'underlying argument' against censorship. Reading the text today we have to understand why Milton thought that these images were appropriate to his argument i f we are to discover what that argument r e a l l y was. V. The role of the background doctrine i s to back a  metaphorical description with a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 146 The notion that a metaphor may express an argument, rather than merely i l l u s t r a t e i t , has often been r e s i s t e d by theorists of metaphor. Those who have been primarily interested i n the contribution of metaphors to s c i e n t i f i c discourse have been es p e c i a l l y l i k e l y to stress self-awareness as a v i t a l check on the use of metaphor to express arguments. Both Colin Turbayne and Douglas Berggren, for example, have emphasized that, unless a s c i e n t i f i c metaphor i s put forward with an implication of 'make believe', the r e s u l t i s a myth i n which the the o r i s t i s used 34 by his metaphor rather than the other way around. Drop the pretence, says Turbayne, and the metaphor becomes a mask, 35 obscuring the subject matter rather than illuminating i t . Now, i t i s not possible to convict either Turbayne or Berggren of an over-simplified realism here, for they are both a l e r t to the ways i n which s c i e n t i f i c discourse helps constitute i t s own subject matter. Yet the relevance of th e i r s t r i c t u r e s to p o l i t i c a l metaphor i s obviously limited. Why should t h i s be so? The reason, i t seems, i s that p o l i t i c s as a p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , provides a d i f f e r e n t context for the understanding of metaphors than science, a th e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y . This d i s t i n c t i o n holds for metaphors which are directed towards influencing the conduct of p o l i t i c a l agents, and metaphors which are designed to provide some t h e o r e t i c a l illumination of an area of 147 p o l i t i c a l l i f e , and accounts, i n part, for the ambivalent attitude towards p o l i t i c a l metaphors of those p o l i t i c a l writers who have f e l t unhappy with t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . The p o l i t i c a l metaphors we have been considering are not primarily tools for investigation, but means of persuasion. They belong i n a discourse i n which description and j u s t i f i c a t i o n go hand i n hand, and i f they are to persuade, they cannot simultaneously carry the suggestion of make believe. Does t h i s mean that they are no more than myths? I t i s c e r t a i n l y true that metaphors have a problem of l o g i c a l grammar to overcome here, a problem Wittgenstein i d e n t i f i e s i n analysing the sense of " t r i c k e r y " involved i n metaphors of r e l i g i o u s experience. He draws a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between description and j u s t i f i c a t i o n by means of metaphor. I can say 'thank those bees for t h e i r honey as i f they were kind people who had prepared i t for you, 1 that i s i n t e l l i g i b l e and describes how I would l i k e you to conduct yourself. But I cannot say: 'thank them, because, look, how kind they a r e l ^ g — because the next moment they may sting you. In other words, when metaphors are used to j u s t i f y i t i s always possible to counter by pointing out that books are not l i v i n g things, neither are the i n s t i t u t i o n s of society things that could be torn down and turned into gunpowder. I t 148 i s true that some p o l i t i c a l writers and speakers do t h e i r best to overcome t h i s problem by s l e i g h t of hand according to s k i l l and circumstances. I t i s also true that many p o l i t i c a l metaphors take the descriptive 'as i f for an escape route; t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r y true of metaphors appealing to an attitude — 'behave towards the revolutionaries as i f they had come to tear down your favourite coffee house.' This i s surely part of what Burke i s saying. However, i t has the unfortunate c o r o l l a r y that anyone i n his audience who i s not disposed to f e e l any sympathy to churches, theatres or coffee houses, or who i s already unsympathetic to the metaphor, w i l l simply r e j e c t i t out of hand. While not underestimating either the extent or the influence of metaphors l i k e these i n p o l i t i c s , to explain the persistence of highly popular conventional metaphors used i n the context of complex doctrines, something more i s obviously needed. The argument of the present chapter has sought to e s t a b l i s h ways in which conventional metaphors extend b e l i e f s and attitudes associated with p o l i t i c a l doctrines into p o l i t i c a l l i f e . When such an extension i s successfully accomplished, the i n t e l l i g i b i l t y of future uses of the metaphor-theme rests on the doctrines themselves, and the doctrines carry the burden of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Understood as descriptions, i n the sense i n which Wittgenstein was 149 using that term, the metaphors bring to our attention p o l i t i c a l doctrines and the b e l i e f s and attitudes associated with them. An example may help to c l a r i f y t h i s argument. References to the prince-as-father metaphorical f i e l d i n sixteenth-century English p o l i t i c a l thought were of two rather d i f f e r e n t kinds. At a popular l e v e l the pr e v a i l i n g theological idiom of j u s t i f i c a t i o n appealed to such B i b l i c a l passages as the F i f t h Commandment, Saint Peter's exhortation that servant's obey t h e i r masters or the ubiquitous Pauline charge to obey the powers that be for a general account of the grounds of obligation to superior powers. Sermons, homilies and catechisms repeated the message; a l l superior powers are to be obeyed because t h e i r rank i s established by God as part of His plan. Contemporary audiences made no meaningful d i s t i n c t i o n between s p e c i f i c a l l y c i v i l obligations and any other kind. In a text unchanged since 1547, the Elizabethan homily on obedience declared: Every degree of people, i n th e i r vocacion, callyng and o f f i c e , hath appoynted to them t h e i r dutie and ordre. Some are i n high degre, some i n lowe, some kynges and princes, some i n f e r i o r s and subiectes, priestes and laimen, masters and servauntes, fathers and chyldren, husbands and wives, ryche and poore, and every one have nede of other: so that i n a l l thynges i s to be lauded and praysed the goodly ordre of God, without the whiche no house, no c i t i e , ne commonwealth can continue and endure. 150 In t h i s popular sense, King James I stood firmly i n the old t r a d i t i o n , using metaphors of the good king as kindly master and father i n Basilikon Doron, and expressing his own sense of duty as that of a "father to his children". He assiduously promoted the publication of the anonymous t r a c t God and King, which based c i v i l o b ligation on the F i f t h Commandment. Interestingly, as Gordon Schochet has shown, James I never attempted to base the authority of his o f f i c e on the r i g h t of a father, despite being happy to characterize 3 8 himself as Pater Patriae. Now, the authority of the monarch was p r e c i s e l y the issue which preoccupied p o l i t i c a l thinkers i n the early Stuart era, so why was discussion ca r r i e d on without p a t r i a r c h a l metaphors? An important reason was that one of the p r e v a i l i n g idioms i n which authority was discussed was not a theological one, but rather a genetic explanation of the o r i g i n s of o f f i c e s . This provided a very d i f f e r e n t background for metaphors of the prince as father, one i n which domestic metaphors were generally used with a caution that they were 'merely' metaphors. As S i r Thomas Smith put i t , a f t e r suggesting that the household and the family mark the f i r s t appearance of a r i s t o c r a t i c government, "yet t h i s cannot be c a l l e d A r i s t o c r a c i e , but Metaphorice, for i t i s but an howse, and a 39 l i t t l e spark resembling as i t were that government." 151 As Schochet shows, one consequence of t h i s f e e l i n g that p a t r i a r c h a l metaphors were implausible vehicles for expressing doctrines about the authority of o f f i c e s , and of the d i s t r u s t of metaphors i n a t h e o r e t i c a l capacity, was the working out of a 'moral theory 1 i n which the authority of c i v i l o f f i c e s was traced back to Adam's dominion over Eve. Ultimately, for reasons which do not concern us here, t h i s theory could not p r e v a i l over one which derived the authority of c i v i l o f f i c e s from a covenant of those thereby obliged. P a t r i a r c h a l metaphors i n turn did not disappear, but were r e s t r i c t e d to more popular accounts of obligation. The natural character of the family r e l a t i o n c l e a r l y could not be used to d i r e c t attention to background concepts which put s p e c i a l stress on the a r t i f i c i a l character of a covenant. Thus the apparent decline i n importance of p a t r i a r c h a l metaphors i n the seventeenth century must be explained both i n terms of the decline i n importance of a p a r t i c u l a r conception of the world which these metaphors had conventionally been used to express, and i n terms of a related change i n the d i r e c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l speculation. The one robbed f a m i l i a l metaphors of the background of j u s t i f i c a t i o n which they had enjoyed i n the sixteenth century; the other impeded new uses, because the new doctrines lacked coherence with the meaning that the family 152 as a symbol s t i l l enjoyed. Lacking epistemological coherence with a background doctrine, p a t r i a r c h a l metaphors remained plausible only because of th e i r aesthetic coherence with the experience of family l i f e . We are thus confronted with an example of the symbolic transformation of private sentiment into public significance which C l i f f o r d Geertz has i d e n t i f i e d as the primary function 41 of p o l i t i c a l ideologies. F a m i l i a l metaphors turned the widely shared experience of family l i f e into a doctrine about the character of kingship. In Geertz' s essay, he remarks that these metaphorical connections between sentiment and significance can f a i l i n at least two ways. They can m i s f i r e i f the metaphor i s strained beyond the cr e d u l i t y of i t s audience, as i t strained the imagination of many of James's parliamentary opponents to see him as the father of his people. They can lose t h e i r meaning altogether, as the family as a symbol tended to lose i t s p o l i t i c a l meaning when modern d i s t i n c t i o n s between public and private l i f e began to enjoy wide currency. I t i s hardly surprising that t h i s ' c u l t u r a l ' dimension to p o l i t i c a l metaphors i s something which has been stressed 42 by anthropologists such as Geertz. But i n i d e n t i f y i n g ideologies as the 'c u l t u r a l systems" within which p o l i t i c a l metaphors operated to create public meanings out of sentiment and prejudice, we are once again reminded that the 153 p o l i t i c a l experience of men s t u d i e d by the h i s t o r i a n of p o l i t i c a l thought — as opposed to the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t — i s a l r e a d y a h i g h l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d c o n s t r u c t . Thus, the manner i n which f a m i l i a l metaphors were d e p r i v e d of a p a r t of t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t o r y f o r c e by the r i s e t o prominence of a new h i s t o r i c a l idiom i n p o l i t i c a l argument i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g , f o r the example serves to l o c a t e p o l i t i c a l metaphors w i t h i n those 'languages' which have r e c e n t l y i n t e r e s t e d h i s t o r i a n s of p o l i t i c a l thought. The coherence t h a t a metaphor e s t a b l i s h e s between a background of b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s , and p o l i t i c a l events and p r a c t i c e s i s a coherence i n t e r n a l t o v a r i o u s modes of a r t i c u l a t i n g such b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s . Consequently, the a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l metaphors as r h e t o r i c a l phenomena must g i v e way to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l metaphors i n t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t s . 154 CHAPTER FIVE Identity and Meaning P o l i t i c a l Metaphors i n t h e i r H i s t o r i c a l Contexts What i s meant by the vague injunction that p o l i t i c a l metaphors should be studied 'in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l contexts'? In one sense, the claim i t s e l f should come as no great suprise, for the notion of context has already been used to d i s t i n g u i s h between utterances which suggest metaphorical readings and those which do not, and between plausible and less plausible readings. But 'context' by i t s e l f i s a broad and unilluminating term; the context of an utterance i s i n f i n i t e l y wide and p o t e n t i a l l y i n f i n i t e l y detailed. We need to specify what i s relevant about a context to render a metaphor i n t e l l i g i b l e . In t h i s case, the appeal to context i s f i r s t of a l l designed to i d e n t i f y utterances which carry metaphorical resonance, either intended by an author, recognized by an audience or both. Second, i t i s required to furnish plausible interpretations of what t h i s resonance might have been, e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t of the possible connections between a metaphor -and a conceptual background elaborated i n the previous chapter. In short, a 'closure of context' i s required, an a b i l i t y to show what i s to count as 155 a plausible contextual interpretation, and what i s to be discarded. The f i r s t three chapters have been designed to show that a metaphor i s i n t e l l i g i b l e as a use of language. They have been concerned both with what Max Black has — somewhat confusingly — c a l l e d the cognitive context of a metaphor, and with the preconditions that have to be met before someone can be said to have grasped a metaphor. In chapter four we considered these conditions i n the special case of p o l i t i c a l metaphors, and added an analysis of the consequences of grasping the meaning of a p o l i t i c a l metaphor. By l i n k i n g these conditions and consequences through the notion of 'seeing as', i t was suggested that there was a close connection between what an audience knows and what i t can be said to have made of a p o l i t i c a l metaphor. The a c t i v i t y of p o l i t i c s , i t was argued, furnished a context for the interpretation of p o l i t i c a l metaphors which served to di s t i n g u i s h them from metaphors used i n the course of th e o r e t i c a l inquiry. This being so, the general problem of interpretation i s replaced by s p e c i f i c problems of h i s t o r i c a l interpretation, and the promise to dis t i n g u i s h p o l i t i c a l metaphors as a sub-class of 'metaphor', made i n chapter one, i s redeemed. Now, the h i s t o r i c a l i nterpretation of p a r t i c u l a r metaphorical utterances ra i s e s , i n an acute form, a l l those 156 problems besetting the status of the history of p o l i t i c a l thought as an h i s t o r i c a l enterprise. Consider, for example, the treatment of p o l i t i c a l metaphors by Judith Shklar, who has taken the view that the history of p o l i t i c a l thought i s the study of c e r t a i n perenially i n t e r e s t i n g problems by means of texts that happen to have been written i n the past. Interestingly enough, Shklar begins her treatment of p o l i t i c a l metaphors by observing the close connection between p o l i t i c a l theory and rhetoric, i n the sense that both are forms of persuasion. She suggests that, i n consequence, the great p o l i t i c a l t heorists have a l l been masters of metaphor. This fact i n turn guides the i n t e r e s t that an h i s t o r i a n of p o l i t i c a l thought has i n an author's metaphors. When one looks at p o l i t i c a l metaphors, for instance, one wants to know how they work, within the context of a writer's general purposes. One does not want to judge t h e i r legitimacy or v a l i d i t y or grammatical correctness. She i s thus led to pose the very question that interests us here; unfortunately, her answers rais e many more problems than they resolve. Turning to Rousseau's works, Shklar notes that, although Rousseau uses the term "the body p o l i t i c " on numerous occasions, she has determined that i t i s usually no 157 more than a casual synonym for ' c i v i l society'. How has she arrived at t h i s conclusion? Apparently by applying the methodological injunction that, "there i s no way of knowing when the use of a metaphor i s meaningful and when i t i s not, 2 unless one has looked at each occasion of i t s appearance." Shklar's use of the phrase 'when the use of a metaphor i s meaningful' i s highly i d i o s y n c r a t i c . She i s apparently r e f e r r i n g to a p r i o r construction, 'the metaphor of the body p o l i t i c ' , and appears to have car r i e d out a search amongst Rousseau's writings to determine whether he has ever used the phrase with the meaning that she attributes to the abstract construction. In fact, 'the body p o l i t i c ' i n Shklar's account i s not e n t i r e l y abstract, for i t s meaning i s said to be p a r t l y based on a history of previous uses of the phrase. Wherever Rousseau departs from the expected meaning, his use i s "not meaningful". Even allowing that Shklar views the history of p o l i t i c a l thought as an exercise valuable only insofar as i t 3 sheds l i g h t on perennial problems — a view which obviously colours what she finds meaningful i n a text — there are problems with her account. Our denial that i t makes sense to speak of the metaphor of the body p o l i t i c was based on two related arguments. F i r s t , that the meaning of a metaphor was not the r e s u l t of applying an abstract image to an equally abstract subject, but the meaning of a complete sentence i n 158 which the subject expression contributed as much to the meaning of the whole as the predicate expression. Second, that the meaning of a metaphor i s a function of the use to which i t i s being put. So even i f Rousseau i s only using the phrase 'the body p o l i t i c ' to mean c i v i l society, i t i s not therby meaningless; t h i s i s what i t means. Perhaps i t w i l l be objected here that Shklar's point i s to d i s t i n g u i s h between Rousseau's uses and the conventional uses of 'the body p o l i t i c ' which, for reasons of her own, she finds more in t e r e s t i n g . As we have seen, such metaphors do have h i s t o r i e s of use, but there i s more than one conventional organic metaphor, more than one way i n which organic attributes have conventionally been used i n p o l i t i c a l argument. Certainly an h i s t o r i c a l account of the use of such metaphors i s indispensible for knowing the implications of using them conventionally at any one time. But our treatment of an author's use must be h i s t o r i c a l i n the sense which Shklar f i r s t suggested i f we are to close the context of interpretation. Instead of picking and choosing the interpretations that might be meaningful to us — for there are an i n f i n i t e v ariety of these — we must begin by considering the interpretations which could have been meaningful to Rousseau and his contemporaries, "within the context of a writer's general purposes." In fact, as we have suggested i n discussing 159 m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d s i n chapter t h r e e , t h e r e are i m p l i c a t i o n s connected w i t h Rousseau's d e s c r i p t i o n s of c i v i l s o c i e t y as un corps p o l i t i q u e and un corps o r g a n i s e which may be of c o n s i d e r a b l e s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r h i s argument as a whole. But we w i l l not f i n d out whether t h i s i s i n f a c t so or not without b e g i n n i n g from the w r i t e r ' s "general purposes" — t h a t i s , h i s p r o j e c t and the resources he found to hand. The l i t e r a r y c r i t i c must take a back seat to the h i s t o r i a n . I I . L o c a t i n g p o l i t i c a l metaphors i n i d e o l o g i e s as a  p r e c o n d i t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l treatment. How does a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of an author's p r o j e c t or g e n e r a l purposes serve to c l o s e the context of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r the h i s t o r i a n ? John Dunn has reminded us of what i s a t stake here. To a b s t r a c t an argument from the context of t r u t h c r i t e r i a i t was designed to meet i s to convert i t i n t o a d i f f e r e n t argument. . . . I f the e f f o r t to l e a r n from the p h i l o s o p h e r s of the past i s a p l a u s i b l e h e u r i s t i c i t would be most odd i f i t can be c a r r i e d out i n g e n e r a l by f a i l i n g to grasp t h e i r a c t u a l arguments. As a c o r r e c t i v e to the view t h a t a p r o p e r l y h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t i n the arguments of p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s must n e c e s s a r i l y b e l i t t l e the a c t i v i t y of an h i s t o r i a n of p o l i t i c a l thought t h i s i s admirable, but i t does not go 160 quite far enough. The central problem of the history of p o l i t i c a l thought i s that, unlike events, 'thoughts' are problematic subjects for h i s t o r i c a l investigation. After a l l , they do not have spatio-temporal extension. One way around t h i s d i f f i c u l t y has been to concentrate on a c t i v i t i e s i n which thoughts are expressed, and 'arguments' are straightforward candidates here. The problem with Dunn's account i s simply that, considered as an a c t i v i t y , arguments are not designed to meet t r u t h - c r i t e r i a , but designed to persuade. Certainly, the propositions that arguments may express have truth c r i t e r i a attached, but propositions are not a c t i v i t i e s . More promising i s the deservedly famous l i n e of argument developed by Quentin Skinner from the o r i g i n a l work on speech acts by J. L. Austin. Austin drew a d i s t i n c t i o n between the 'locutionary meaning' of an utterance and i t s 1 i l l o c u t i o n a r y ' and 'perlocutionary force' which reappears i n Skinner's d i s t i n c t i o n between what an author said and 4 what he may have meant by what he said. Locutionary meaning, or what an author said, i s grasped by means of a knowledge of the meanings of the words used and the rules governing t h e i r combination in sentences, which may involve the h i s t o r i a n researching archaic meanings and idioms. Il l o c u t i o n a r y force, however, i s grasped i n the act of understanding what i t i s that i s being done i n uttering 161 these words with these meanings on t h i s occasion. As research into speech acts has shown, t h i s i s a matter of grasping the complex intention that the utterance, as an intended act of communication must have embodied. For example, at a minimum, for you to understand my utterance, "It's coming," as a warning, you must not only understand the locutionary act by knowing the referent of ' i t ' on t h i s occasion, and the relevant sense of the verb 'to be', but you must grasp that I intended i t as a warning, and further intended that you should recognize t h i s intention. Treating p o l i t i c a l arguments as i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, people "doing things with words", c e r t a i n l y provides an h i s t o r i c a l subject, a r e a l a c t i v i t y . Furthermore, i t i s recognizably the kind of a c t i v i t y within which we have located the utterance and comprehension of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. Although we rejected the notion that 'metaphoring' was i t s e l f an i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, we saw that an important part of understanding a metaphor included a grasp of the i l l o c u t i o n a r y act being performed, a grasp of what the author was t r y i n g to do with his metaphor. What, then, i s to count as a plausible interpretation of an i l l o c u t i o n a r y act performed i n the past? Skinner's own f i r s t attempts at answering t h i s question were not notably successful. He suggested that i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts could only be performed under various conventions 162 s p e c i f i c to the act, and i t was recognition of the relevant conventions on the part of the auditor which was a necessary . . 7 condition of his securing uptake. Although promising, t h i s l i n e of argument foundered on the objection that not a l l speech acts are conventional, and i f , as Skinner at f i r s t wanted to argue, the h i s t o r i a n can only recover the h i s t o r i c a l meaning of those speech acts which are conventional, the number of arguments thereby rendered i n t e l l i g i b l e would be absurdly small. However, Skinner and others associated with his enterprise did not give up. The notion that utterances could be treated as meaningful actions, and the notion that the meaning that such an action could have for contemporaries was l i m i t e d by a context of shared attitudes, b e l i e f s and, i n c e r t a i n instances, conventions, was a f r u i t f u l one. To f i n d the l i n k between these two notions, consider the problems set for h i s t o r i c a l i nterpretation by the following p o l i t i c a l metaphors. In S i r Richard Morison's Exhortation, we come across an e n t i r e l y novel metaphor. The Bishop of Rome, says Morison, " w i l l do what he can to overrun t h i s way, what a pestiferous Poole, that floweth out of course, that seeketh against nature to destroy the head, from whence i t f i r s t did g spring." The f i r s t step i s to i d e n t i f y the "pestiferous Poole" as a punning a l l u s i o n to Reginald Pole. Pole was one 163 of the most distinguished opponents of the Henrician Reformation, author of the tr a c t De Unitate E c c l e s i a s t i c a condemning Henry's conduct i n the name of the universal church, and l a t e r to be Cardinal and Papal Legate i n the reign of Mary. Pole's kinsmen had already been implicated both i n a treasonable conspiracy and i n a popular uprising the Pilgrimage of Grace — the l a t t e r occasioning Morison's pamphlet. Morison i s arguing that Pole and his kinsmen are instruments i n the unnatural a c t i v i t y of re b e l l i o n , turning against the head, which has the double reference to head of the body p o l i t i c and head of a r i v e r . In both cases, the message i s driven home that here i s an unnatural a c t i v i t y , against the order of Creation. Thus the Pope i s accused of fomenting actions contrary to the obedience to higher powers taught i n the Bible, and the whole image of the overrunning stream f i t s n i c e l y into Morison's general project of l i n k i n g the rebels at home with danger from abroad. In t h i s description of Morison's ' r h e t o r i c a l world', linked to r e a l events by the pun, the emphasis i s on showing how knowledge of a context helps make sense of a novel metaphor. We make use of the o f f i c i a l l y inspired campaign of le g i t i m i z i n g t r a c t s produced under the d i r e c t i o n of Thomas Cromwell i n the 1530s. We note, too, the conventional metaphor of order, and the conventional targets of the 164 campaign, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Pope and other interested foreign parties fomenting misguided subjects to rebel against t h e i r lawful sovereign and supreme head, Henry VIII. In doing so, we render the metaphor i n t e l l i g i b l e as part of Morison's p o l i t i c a l project. On the other hand, i f a metaphor i s i t s e l f one of the conventions of argument, i f we have i d e n t i f i e d the existence of conventional uses for that p a r t i c u l a r metaphor amongst a writer's contemporaries, the metaphor i t s e l f may constitute part of the evidence from which the meaning of the argument i s to be inferred. Brendan Bradshaw's version of a controversial passage from More's Utopia i s a convenient 9 example here. Bradshaw argues that the attempt to locate Utopia either i n the P l a t o n i s t t r a d i t i o n , where the argument i s that u n t i l the i n s t i t u t i o n of philosopher-kings, philosophers w i l l only become corrupted by giving counsel to princes issues i n a recommendation to a l i f e of otium, or i n the C h r i s t i a n Humanist t r a d i t i o n , where a naive confidence i n the value of wise counsel and good education recommends a posture of negotium, i s misguided. To support his argument that Utopia i s intended to be a c r i t i q u e of both positions, Bradshaw appeals to More 1s use of a ship of state metaphor. The conventional use of t h i s metaphor, he claims, s t i l l current at the beginning of the sixteenth century, was derived from Plato's description of the s k i l l e d navigator 165 whose advice was mocked by a deaf shipmaster and an ignorant crew. More, by using the metaphor, accepted the assumptions on which the problem was based, but turned i t into a c r i t i c a l device by arguing that "you must not abandon the ship i n a storm because you cannot control the winds.11 ^ Thus, according to Bradshaw, More i s recommending negotium at the same time as accepting Plato's point that the philosopher w i l l f i n d p o l i t i c s a d i f f i c u l t and dangerous a c t i v i t y , on the grounds that i n t e l l e c t u a l has a moral duty not to desert his commonwealth when the going gets a l i t t l e rough. In both these examples the meaning of an utterance has been taken to be the meaning of an action performed i n making the utterance. The explanation proceeded by c i t i n g a context of b e l i e f s , attitudes and conventions which rendered t h i s a c t i v i t y i n t e l l i g i b l e . In one case the metaphor i t s e l f was what had to be explained, i n the other case a conventional metaphorical usage formed part of the context in which the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the a c t i v i t y was displayed. In his more recent writings, Skinner has referred to the l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s that make up the subject matter of the history of p o l i t i c a l thought as taking place within a context of "ideologies". We can hardly claim to be concerned with the 166 history of p o l i t i c a l theory unless we are prepared to write i t as re a l history — that i s as the record of an actual a c t i v i t y and i n p a r t i c u l a r as the history of ideologies. In saying t h i s , Skinner acknowledged the complex r e l a t i o n of context and a c t i v i t y which our two examples reveal. On the one hand, an a c t i v i t y i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the context that made i t what i t was. On the other hand, the b e l i e f s , attitudes, norms and conventions which go to make up a context serve as a storehouse of resources for in d i v i d u a l writers i n contemplating t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s of j u s t i f y i n g , commending, delegitimizing, or denigrating. These resources cannot be used at w i l l , for they w i l l be associated at p a r t i c u l a r times and places with various i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s . Any explanation of actors' adherence to the t r a d i t i o n must be defined partly i n terms of t h e i r recognition of the normative force of the b e l i e f s and conventions that make up the id e n t i t y of the t r a d i t i o n . To appeal to such adherents, a writer must recognize the existence of these norms even as he seeks to change them, just as More seems to have done with the Pla t o n i s t t r a d i t i o n . So, i n addition to locating p a r t i c u l a r arguments i n a context formed by the clash of ideologies, the ideologies themselves have a history, which i s a history of th e i r use. 167 I I I . Scepticism about 'ideology': i s the concept useful? Before we can use t h i s notion of an i d e o l o g i c a l context to interpret p o l i t i c a l metaphors, however, we must deal with a pervasive scepticism about the whole concept of ideology, a scepticism which has fed on the confusion generated by c o n f l i c t i n g uses of the term. Skinner i s some help here, for although he has shown l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n c l a r i f y i n g the term 'ideology' i n his own works, he has pointed out that, as he uses the term, an i d e o l o g i c a l context furnishes a context of meaning — an account of what the b e l i e f s people hold mean — not a context of causes — an account of why 12 c e r t a i n people hold p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s . We s h a l l follow Skinner i n making t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n because i t allows us to sidestep the greater part of the argument surrounding 'the problem 1 of ideology. This problem may be set out as follows. We may without much d i f f i c u l t y recognize and distinguish between the h i s t o r i c a l phenomena we have c a l l e d i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s i n modern Europe: a l i s t would c e r t a i n l y include l i b e r a l i s m , socialism, conservatism, nationalism, anarchism, fascism and national socialism. We can do t h i s because there are self-professed l i b e r a l s , s o c i a l i s t s , etc., bus i l y engaging in such a c t i v i t i e s as i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r friends and enemies, stating and modifying t h e i r doctrines, and formulating 168 programmes which contain actions purporting to be d i s t i n c t i v e l y l i b e r a l or s o c i a l i s t actions. However, while a l l t h i s material i s v i t a l h i s t o r i c a l evidence for establishing the i d e n t i t y of p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , i t does not immediately delimit the application of the term 'ideology'. More often than not, indeed, a self-professed l i b e r a l or s o c i a l i s t would r e j e c t the application of the term 'ideologist' to himself, his b e l i e f s and his actions, even while he proclaims t h e i r l i b e r a l or s o c i a l i s t character. I t might be objected here that t h i s poses no problems for the t h e o r i s t who seek to understand the formal character of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s , for i t i s up to him to define and to use the term 'ideology' i n a consistent way. In fact, i t i s p r e c i s e l y by means of s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h i s sort that most t h e o r e t i c a l studies of ideology have been ca r r i e d out ('in the following pages I use the term "ideology" to mean'). The theory of ideology has a history of i t s own, and i s not lacking i n exemplary d e f i n i t i o n s which may be drawn upon with an eye to the continuity of the enterprise. The works of Marx and his followers, and those of Karl Mannheim and the s o c i o l o g i s t s of knowledge stand out as important here. However, t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l highhandedness only compounds the problem of correct application — and t h i s quite apart 169 from the d i f f i c u l t i e s raised by the accounts of the r e l a t i o n between b e l i e f and conduct i n the writings of Marx, Mannheim 14 and t h e i r followers. If two philosophers of science f a l l to arguing about the proper scope of models i n s c i e n t i f i c explanation, l i m i t s are set to the use that they can make of the term 'model' by the actual practice of s c i e n t i s t s which w i l l furnish t h e i r i l l u s t r a t i o n s . But these l i m i t s are prec i s e l y what i s lacking i n arguments about the proper application of the term 'ideology', f o r , as we have seen, p o l i t i c a l agents either r e j e c t the term altogether, or use i t as an uninteresting term of abuse. Two general consequences attend t h i s separation of t h e o r i s t s ' accounts of ideology from r e a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . F i r s t , there i s a tendency for disagreements amongst th e o r i s t to degenerate into tedious wrangling over the meaning of terms, with one appealing to h i s t o r i c a l precedent, another to pragmatic considerations, and yet another to his supposed achievement of having synthesized a l l previous d e f i n i t i o n s into one, all-encompassing, super 15 d e f i n i t i o n . Their only r e s u l t i s the spawning of a host of pseudo-problems, the solutions to which are contained i n the o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n (Is p o l i t i c a l philosophy ideological? Was A r i s t o t l e an ideologist? Is ideology fa l s e or nonsensical?). The problems posed by the discourse of actual l i b e r a l s and s o c i a l i s t s remains untouched. Second, the 170 h i s t o r i c a l i d e n t i t y of an i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n with a l l i t s occasional incoherencies and accidental lacunae i s replaced by the imaginative reconstruction of the t h e o r i s t himself, prompted c h i e f l y by a desire to f i n d and display a set of core b e l i e f s that might serve to define l i b e r a l i s m or socialism. In t h i s way, ideologies are given an a i r of timelessness that b e l i e s t h e i r o r i g i n s i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and makes nonsense of the changing contexts i n which such b e l i e f s are held or discarded. Taken together, i t i s not at a l l surprising that we should encounter suggestions that the term 'ideology' should be discarded as unnecessarily ambiguous and misleading. Appealing as t h i s l a s t solution may be, we should r e c a l l the place of ideologies i n Skinner's argument. An ideology i s to be i d e n t i f i e d as a r e a l h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon; b e l i e f s , attitudes, norms and conventions which people actually held. The mapping out of those i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s which make up a "context of meaning" for the p a r t i c u l a r dispute that interests us (the location of our metaphors) , and the discovery of the actual shape of these t r a d i t i o n s at a p a r t i c u l a r time w i l l be h i s t o r i c a l tasks. The map might be simple - Papalist against Imperialist during the Investiture C r i s i s , for example — or i t might be a good deal more complex — as i n the dispute between communists, s o c i a l i s t s , l i b e r a l s and conservatives over the 171 correct appreciation of right-wing populist movements i n the nineteen-twenties and - t h i r t i e s . But the i d e n t i t y of the various ideologies w i l l be described i n terms of an acceptance on the part of t h e i r adherents of d i s t i n c t i v e discourse, dogmas and styles of action, a d i s t i n c t i o n largely maintained, of course, i n self-conscious contrast with one another. Since we are less interested i n explaining how people came to hold these b e l i e f s or accept the normative force of these conventions than i n using the fact that they do to understand what they are saying and doing, there i s less temptation to i n s i s t on do c t r i n a l purity at the expense of h i s t o r i c a l realism. A conservative i s a man who c a l l s himself a conservative. If his claim i s contested, he has not necessarily made a mistake; the contest i s i t s e l f evidence for changes i n the i d e n t i t y of the t r a d i t i o n . His inclusi o n or exclusion from the canon of conservative thought w i l l ultimately be a judgement made by self-professed adherents, and, i n t h i s sense, the canon i s constantly being revised. IV. Ideological b e l i e f s make sense as judgements of value,  not as a species of p r a c t i c a l reasoning. However, i f we take the i d e n t i t y of an id e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n on i t s own terms, as a set of shared b e l i e f s and practices that certain h i s t o r i c a l figures can be shown to 172 have used i n p o l i t i c s , a rather more in t e r e s t i n g 'problem' of p o l i t i c a l ideology a r i s e s . Instead of t r y i n g to explain why certa i n people held the b e l i e f s that they did (often with the implication that t h i s i s an inquiry into psycho-pathology) , we might show some in t e r e s t i n why they found t h e i r b e l i e f s relevant to t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . Given that such men were not a l l g u i l t y of a monumental category blunder, what i s i t about the usual rag-bag of theology, jurisprudence, philosophy, history or natural science that appeals to the adherents of an i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n , and why i s there a problem here? Consider the assertion — made by Lord Hugh C e c i l i n the course of h i s popular exposition of the conservative viewpoint — that conservatism i s compounded of a d i s t r u s t of the unknown and a love of the f a m i l i a r , a reverence for r e l i g i o n and authority, and a f e e l i n g for the greatness of one's country. Almost i n the same breath, C e c i l informs his reader that such a viewpoint e n t a i l s the following p o l i c i e s : a defence of the e x i s t i n g constitution, the maintenance of the established church and a generous provision for national 16 defence. Now, whilst i t i s pe r f e c t l y clear that these policy statements may serve as straightforward descriptions of actions — opposition to female enfranchisement or to the a b o l i t i o n of the House of Lords veto, for example — i t i s by no means so clear just what work i s being done by the 173 b e l i e f s put forward as the distinguishing marks of conservatism. A love of the f a m i l i a r and reverence for authority might equally well have j u s t i f i e d amendment of the e x i s t i n g constitution on the grounds that p o l i t i c a l circumstances required i t i f what was genuinely f a m i l i a r was to be retained. Nor i s there any p a r t i c u l a r l y close connection between a f e e l i n g for the greatness of one's country and providing generously for national defence, unless that greatness receives p r i o r s p e c i f i c a t i o n i n terms of m i l i t a r y might. Indeed, most of C e c i l ' s book i s taken up with explaining how the Conservative Party proposes to deal with contingent circumstances by means of s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s , and we hear very l i t t l e about the creed of the conservative. In short, the creed i s not 'put into practice' i n quite the same way as the p o l i c i e s are. This i s the point at which those who use ideology as a term of abuse quite reasonably conclude that C e c i l ' s conservative creed i s nothing more than an ex post facto r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n designed to r a l l y to his cause those who are too ignorant or too feckless to r a t i o n a l l y analyse his p o l i c i e s , by means of an appeal to t h e i r s e r v i l e or p a t r i o t i c i n s t i n c t s . Now, nothing i s more common than to hear of ideologies being 'put into practice', but i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s innocent-looking l i t t l e phrase which i s at the root of our d i f f i c u l t i e s here. On the one hand, the 174 statements that we have i d e n t i f i e d as distinctively-i d e o l o g i c a l i n C e c i l ' s book are of quite the wrong order to generate p o l i c y statements, courses of action which might be, for example, the act of loving one's country. But, on the other hand, recognition of t h i s fact must not tempt us to elevate such statements into a theory of p o l i t i c s which i s somehow p r i o r to the a c t i v i t y of p o l i t i c s i t s e l f , setting the ends to be pursued by means of p o l i c i e s , and hence being 'put into p r a c t i c e 1 . To do so leads d i r e c t l y to the scepticism which sees i n ideology only r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , because, as Oakeshott has demonstrated i n a famous essay, there can be no such theory i n which the ends are set p r i o r to the a c t i v i t y . A cook i s not a man who has a v i s i o n of a pie and then t r i e s to make i t ; he i s a man s k i l l e d i n cookery, and both his projects. and his achievements spring from that s k i l l . Thus an id e o l o g i s t i s not a man who has a v i s i o n of his goal spring full-blown from his own imagination, 'the struggle for l i b e r t y against tyranny 1, 'the r e a l i z a t i o n of the nation's d e s t i n y 1 , or 'a reverence for r e l i g i o n and authority', which he then t r i e s to put into practice as one might seek to increase m i l i t a r y power by buying more battleships. F i r s t , we are reminded that conclusions l i k e 175 these depend upon the p r i o r existence of t r a d i t i o n s of r e f l e c t i o n for the very p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r formulation. Second, we are s t i l l l e f t with the problem of explaining what such r e f l e c t i o n i s about i f i t i s not p r a c t i c a l reasoning. But t h i s l a t t e r problem dissolves when we r i d ourselves of the mental straighjacket engendered by the phrase 'putting theories into practice'. In other words, the problem of r e c o n c i l i n g i d e o l o g i s t s ' b e l i e f s with t h e i r actions takes on a d i f f e r e n t cast i f we are prepared to l i s t e n more cl o s e l y to what they actually have to say, instead of a r r i v i n g so e a s i l y at the conclusion that ideology must have the form of a theory about the world — "the l o g i c of an idea applied to p o l i t i c s , " as Hannah Arendt has i t . In f a c t , C e c i l has t o l d us what i t i s that the conservative values, or the value that p o l i c i e s l i k e buying more battleships have i n themselves. In an analogous way, Hobhouse proclaimed that the l i b e r a l values ' l i b e r t y ' , and Laski announced that the s o c i a l i s t values 'social j u s t i c e ' . I t may very well transpire on examination that the kinds of actions and i n s t i t u t i o n s which a t t r a c t praise or blame as conforming to or departing from 'the f a m i l i a r ' , ' l i b e r t y ' or ' s o c i a l j u s t i c e 1 may not be markedly d i s s i m i l a r , but i t would be a mistake to conclude from t h i s that ideologies are of no consequence. I t would be strange indeed i f such near contemporaries as C e c i l , Hobhouse and 176 Laski should have held very d i f f e r e n t views of the p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the age. They are not o f f e r i n g judgements of p o s s i b i l i t i e s couched i n the language of p r a c t i c a l reason, but e t h i c a l yardsticks by which such p o l i c i e s are to be measured. As C e c i l reminds us, the conservative i s quite as h o s t i l e to i n j u s t i c e and as "unwilling to acquiesce i n the suffering of people from poverty and i t s attendant e v i l s " as the l i b e r a l or the s o c i a l i s t , but his reasoning i s d i f f e r e n t . Instead of reminding us of the value of in d i v i d u a l self-development or the dignity of labour (which he could only regard as sententious nonsense), he would elaborate his b e l i e f s i n terms of the r e l i g i o u s commandments about out duties to those less fortunate than ourselves, and esp e c i a l l y to the duty of charity which i s part of a t r a d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of master and servant. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to deny that what a man values i s relevant to his conduct. To make t h i s same point rather d i f f e r e n t l y , consider the following remark by Rush Rhees, a passage c i t e d by Tim Robinson i n the course of a making a similar argument. If a man i s determined to f i g h t for l i b e r t y (for the furtherance of l i b e r t y i n t h i s society) then f i n e . But i f he says he i s determined to 177 f i g h t for l i b e r t y for the reason that — . . . then I lose i n t e r e s t , and s i m i l a r l y i f he i s determined^ to f i g h t for the achievement of communism. In one sense Rhees's lack of in t e r e s t i n further j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s quite understandable, and t h i s i s the sense i n which we expect reasons for actions to elucidate a context i n which the action appeared a reasonable thing to do. As we have seen, the actions that a man 'fighting for l i b e r t y * might perform are not related to the fact that he i s f i g h t i n g for l i b e r t y i n the same way that p r a c t i c a l reason l i n k s a desired outcome to our knowledge of our current state of a f f a i r s and the means at our disposal to r e a l i s e that outcome. However, Rhees's disregard for what would be forthcoming, that i s , a further j u s t i f i c a t i o n of why f i g h t i n g for l i b e r t y i s to be valued, betrays a certain lack of in t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e (perhaps j u s t i f i a b l e given his philosophical concerns), and, possibly, a confusion of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s with moral or r e l i g i o u s notions. This l a t t e r would be an understandable confusion. We have seen that when an i d e o l o g i s t t e l l s us that his actions are to be understood as the preservation of something he loves or the promotion of a s o c i a l i s t society we are not being offered a prudential explanation but an expression of the value that the action has for the person performing i t , 178 and because of t h i s we have referred to i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s as having an e t h i c a l character. This suggests a close connection between i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s and moral notions, as, for example, when someone explains his conduct as lo y a l t y or f i l i a l devotion. Now i t i s true that i n the l a t t e r case we would not be much interested i f someone were to say that he "spent so much time with his e l d e r l y parents because i t was his duty, and t h i s was because for we already know that a duty of t h i s kind furnishes a reason for an action. But consider the case i n which such a duty had come to be thought rather archaic; then the further explanation might be forthcoming that the person concerned was 'a t r i f l e old-fashioned about such things," which i s an explanation i n the form of a further j u s t i f i c a t i o n . With i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s , however, the o b j e c t i v i t y of moral notions i s e n t i r e l y lacking, and further j u s t i f i c a t i o n s are pe r f e c t l y i n order p r e c i s e l y because the claims that ' l i b e r t y ' or 's o c i a l j u s t i c e ' are to be valued w i l l be met with opposition. And, of course, such explanations w i l l have a p r a c t i c a l edge, for they are not meant merely to elucidate what the conservative or l i b e r a l thinks he i s doing, but to persuade others to entertain his values too. The explanations of his conduct offered by the id e o l o g i s t are d i s t i n c t i v e . We have seen that they are concerned neither with means-ends r a t i o n a l i t y nor with moral 179 notions properly so-called, but they are explanations nonetheless. I t i s worth i n s i s t i n g on t h i s point because the claim that an i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f i s an expression of value i s sometimes taken to mean that i t could be replaced by a prim i t i v e vocal ejaculation, an expression of approbation or 19 disapproval l i k e 'boo' or 'hurrah'. I t i s , perhaps, possible that someone might go through l i f e with a rudimentary understanding of p o l i t i c s i n which these were his only reactions to the course of events. Yet we would i n s i s t that his understanding of p o l i t i c a l l i f e was rudimentary pr e c i s e l y because p o l i t i c s as a practice has sustained r e f l e c t i o n about i t s character which offers complex resources for the project of e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n we have i d e n t i f i e d as ideology. Quite apart from attempts to persuade others to accept these e t h i c a l characterizations, i t i s hardly surprising that men should think i t important to explain why i t i s that they value some aspects of p o l i t i c a l l i f e and so j u s t i f y t h e i r own actions i n other's eyes, nor that they should press to the l i m i t s of imagination and a r t i f i c e to do so. We have i d e n t i f i e d i d e o l o g i c a l argument as a practice concerned with promoting, defending and attacking a range of e t h i c a l characterizations of p o l i t i c a l events, actions and i n s t i t u t i o n s . As we noted when c i t i n g Oakeshott, the sense of p a r t i c u l a r judgements (that a course of action i s to be 180 seen as "the i r r u p t i o n of the p r o l e t a r i a t onto the stage of history" for example) i s l o g i c a l l y unimaginable without the pr i o r existence of the practice of making t h i s sort of judgement. However, examining the h i s t o r i c a l evidence of id e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , we are at once made aware that disagreements surround such judgements. I t i s true, of course, that such disagreements ultimately spring from differences of in t e r e s t , d i s p o s i t i o n and prejudice, for such are the motive forces of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . But the language which a r t i c u l a t e s these differences i s by no means a transparent 'medium' for the conduct of disputes. P o l i t i c a l 'languages' have t h e i r own part to play, and t h i s observation conveniently brings us back to Skinner's claim that i d e o l o g i c a l disputes w i l l furnish the 'real a c t i v i t y ' which the h i s t o r i a n of p o l i t i c a l thought seeks as his subject matter. V. How can an ideology furnish a context of meaning for a  metaphorical utterance? This said, i t remains quite probable that Skinner does not intend to be very s p e c i f i c i n his use of the term 'ideology', finding i t a convenient synonym for the 'assumptions and conventions' found holding together 20 d i s t i n c t i v e schools of writers. The argument of the preceding sections has attempted to develop t h i s notion i n a 181 way t h a t might not n e c e s s a r i l y command Skinner's a p p r o v a l , and t o show how i d e o l o g i c a l arguments are c l o s e l y t i e d t o d i s p o s i t i o n and p r e j u d i c e . T h i s has the added advantage of defending the n o t i o n a g a i n s t a g e n e r a l s c e p t i c i s m t h a t sees i d e o l o g i e s as, a t b e s t , smokescreens behind which the ' r e a l p o l i t i c s ' of power and i n t e r e s t i s c a r r i e d on. Often, of course, p o l i t i c a l metaphors w i l l attempt to appeal d i r e c t l y t o the d i s p o s i t i o n , e x p r e s s i n g some s t y l i s t i c or temperamental element dear to the adherents of a p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g y . H a r o l d Macmillan's metaphor d e s c r i b i n g the d i p l o m a t i c consequences of the Suez a f f a i r (encountered i n chapter two) i s a c l e a r case of t h i s . In a s s e r t i n g t h a t "the A f r o - A s i a n pack was i n f u l l c r y , wit h the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union as j o i n t masters," the p r i m e - m i n i s t e r ' s legendary grasp o f p o l i t i c a l circumstances was no doubt put to the t e s t . L a c k i n g any c o n v e n t i o n a l c l u e s to i t s p o i n t , t h i s u t t e r a n c e might as e a s i l y have been taken t o mean t h a t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a r i a h had been hounded t o a w e l l - d e s e r v e d f a t e by an outraged community of n a t i o n s as i n i t s intended sense of the o r c h e s t r a t e d p e r s e c u t i o n of a plucky s m a l l n a t i o n punished 21 f o r s t a n d i n g up f o r i t s r i g h t s . P o l i t i c a l metaphors which appeal t o a e s t h e t i c coherence w i t h f e e l i n g and p r e j u d i c e — here, sympathy f o r the underdog — always c o u r t the g r e a t e s t r i s k of ignominious f a i l u r e . They may e a s i l y be r e j e c t e d by 182 an audience of c o n t r a r y d i s p o s i t i o n . S e t t i n g out to d e s c r i b e and j u s t i f y i n a s i n g l e metaphor, without the support of background d o c t r i n e t h a t more s o p h i s t i c a t e d metaphors can c a l l upon f o r support, they are c r e a t u r e s of an o c c a s i o n . The metaphors found i n i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e s are o f t e n of t h i s k i n d , e s p e c i a l l y when t h e i r purpose i s to r a l l y the f a i t h f u l or d i s p l a y the w r i t e r ' s c r e d e n t i a l s , and an h i s t o r i a n w i t h a s e n s i t i v e eye f o r nuance can o f t e n f i n d h i s way r i g h t to the h e a r t of an i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e w i t h the a i d of a few well-chosen metaphors. Thus, metaphors which appeal d i r e c t l y to a d i s p o s i t i o n are by no means u n i n t e r e s t i n g , and may indeed be extremely v a l u a b l e h i s t o r i c a l evidence, but t h e i r wide d i s t r i b u t i o n i n the language of p o l i t i c s should not tempt us to overlook those metaphors which express c l a i m s to knowledge, a l b e i t knowledge which p u r p o r t s to have p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . In such cases, the h i s t o r i c a l context which the h i s t o r i a n must b u i l d up to support h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be one of c o n s i d e r a b l e complexity. In a d d i t i o n to the arrangement of c o n f l i c t i n g i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , he must be aware of more g e n e r a l idioms which c h a r a c t e r i z e d p o l i t i c a l argument i n the p e r i o d he i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g , idioms which may be spoken by adherents of many d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i e s a t once. A t one time the idiom may be n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , a t another time theology, i t might be geometry or i t might be an 183 understanding of the r e l a t i o n of the pas t t o the prese n t c o n s t i t u t i n g a co n c e p t i o n of h i s t o r y . These idioms, too, w i l l add vocab u l a r y , d i s t i n c t i v e c l a i m s to knowledge and forms of proof t o the language of p o l i t i c s , and may themselves serve t o support a metaphor. N a t u r a l l y c e r t a i n idioms may be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i e s , and t h i s makes t h e i r employment i n othe r i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s a d i f f i c u l t b u s i n e s s . James T u l l y ' s p a i n s t a k i n g account of the way i n which Locke sought t o detach the s u c c e s s f u l idiom of n a t u r a l law from the defence o f a b s o l u t i s m w i t h which i t had become c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d , and to overcome i t s apparent f a i l u r e t o s u s t a i n a compact theory o f p r o p e r t y f a m i l i a r t o h i s i d e o l o g i c a l a s s o c i a t e s , p r o v i d e s a c l a s s i c example of 22 the d i f f i c u l t i e s here. As we might expect, the p r o j e c t was not immediately s u c c e s s f u l i n p o l i t i c a l terms. On the oth e r hand, when an idiom does achieve widespread currency, i t may pose problems f o r the i d e n t i t y of an i d e o l o g y , as i s suggested by the i n c r e a s i n g l y t e s t y way i n which Engels sought t o d i s a s s o c i a t e the e v o l u t i o n a r y arguments of l a t e - n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Marxism from those of S o c i a l D a r w i n i s t l i b e r a l s . F i n a l l y , we may f i n d idioms r e j e c t e d as i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o p o l i t i c a l argument, as l a t e r s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y w r i t e r s r e f e r r e d d i s p a r a g i n g l y to "Mr. More 1s U t o p i a " , or as contemporaries r e a c t e d t o Hobbes's 184 a b s t r a c t c i v i l s c i e n c e . " Thus, both idiom and i d e o l o g y must by taken i n t o account i n c r e a t i n g a context of meaning f o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d p o l i t i c a l metaphors. Mere complexity of context i s no v i r t u e i n i t s e l f . I t becomes one i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h our i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t account of p o l i t i c a l language (and hence of p o l i t i c a l metaphor), which we d e r i v e d from Skinner. From t h i s i t f o l l o w s t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c context i n which a w r i t e r f i n d s h i m s e l f f u r n i s h e s the instruments w i t h which to prosecute h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , and, u n l e s s these instruments are both f l e x i b l e and v a r i e d , the r e s u l t i n g p i c t u r e i s the l u d i c r o u s l y i n a p t one of men imprisoned i n a world marked by p r e c i s e l y determined conventions of d i s c o u r s e . The i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m i n h e r e n t i n t h i s v i s i o n of p o l i t i c a l thought — men doing t h i n g s w i t h words — demands t h a t i n n o v a t i o n and open-endedness are f e a t u r e s of p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , and t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n and an eye f o r p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y are a mark of the g r e a t e s t p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r s . To see p o l i t i c a l metaphors as instruments b e i n g used i n a f u l l y developed h i s t o r i c a l context helps us a v o i d the g r e a t e s t p i t f a l l i n p r e v i o u s treatments of the s u b j e c t . We are able to a v o i d the tendency to see p o l i t i c a l metaphors not so much as instruments but as c o n d u i t s down which the stream of p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s doomed to flow u n t i l an i n n o v a t i v e genius came to smash the mould and r e o r i e n t a t e p o l i t i c a l 185 thought. Con v e n t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l metaphors have been p a r t i c u l a r l y i l l - u s e d i n t h i s r e s p e c t ; i t i s not uncommon to read t h a t the h i s t o r y of l a t e r medieval p o l i t i c a l thought i s the s t o r y of men e n d l e s s l y f o l l o w i n g out the i m p l i c a t i o n s of an o r g a n i c metaphor. Even so s o p h i s t i c a t e d an h i s t o r i a n as Gierke does not e n t i r e l y escape t h i s tendency, a r g u i n g t h a t "the i d e a of o r g a n i c s o c i e t y f a i l e d to i s s u e i n the l e g a l i d e a of p e r s o n a l i t y , " as i f the i d e a l of l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y was somehow i n h e r e n t i n o r g a n i c metaphors and o n l y a perverse A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m prevented t h i s being d i s c o v e r e d . I t i s t r u e t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l o r g a n i c metaphors had c o n v e n t i o n a l uses i n argument, but t h e r e was no l o g i c a l problem i n m a n i p u l a t i n g them, onl y p r a c t i c a l ones. To take a c l o s e l y r e l a t e d example, there was no l o g i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n a medieval emperor u s i n g an 'anima-corpus' metaphor to l e g i t i m i z e h i s a c t i v i t i e s v i s a v i s the Church. The problem, as Walter Ullmann has p o i n t e d out, was t h a t such metaphors had become "thoroughly C h r i s t o c e n t r i c " , so t h a t they were i m p l a u s i b l e instruments f o r a s s e r t i n g the p r i o r i t y of 25 temporal over s p i r i t u a l powers. The C h r i s t o c e n t r i c background t h a t supported the metaphor and i t s uses had to come under s u s t a i n e d a t t a c k before t h i s i m p l a u s i b i l i t y c o u l d be d i s p e l l e d . The temptation to speak of the ' i m p l i c a t i o n s ' of a 1 8 6 metaphor-theme, as i f these were fixed for a l l time, may reappear under more d i f f i c u l t circumstances. For instance, where p o l i t i c a l writers have used more than one conventional metaphor, what may look l i k e a problem of l o g i c a l incompatibility between the 'implications' of the metaphors w i l l turn out to be tensions i n the doctrine that they are used to express. Thus J. R. Burrow draws our attention to two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c metaphors of the late eighteenth century German Romantic idiom — the state as a work of art and the state as an organism. However, he proceeds to argue that t h e i r use has c e r t a i n drawbacks i n that the state as a work of art might suggest elements of cameralist doctrine, and the state as an organism might seem to deny i n d i v i d u a l 2 6 autonomy. Now, as Burrow's admirable b r i e f account of Romanticism makes cle a r , these contradictions were not so much the implications of any such metaphors considered i n the abstract. They point instead to a tension i n the doctrine that the metaphors were being used to express. What kind of community could there be "where each s t r i v e s to 27 develop himself from his own inmost nature?" Could c i t i z e n s be free, self-conscious moral agents i n the stringent sense that the Romantics demanded? The perilous coherence i n t h e i r use of metaphors takes us at once to t h i s tension, one that was to be resolved by many erstwhile Romantics i n the subordination of the i n d i v i d u a l to the 187 V o l k s t a a t . VI. H i s t o r i c a l method used to d i s t i n g u i s h between metaphor  theme, m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d and m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e . T h i s i n j u n c t i o n t o determine the meaning of a p o l i t i c a l metaphor from the use to which i t i s put poses problems of i t s own. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t might be wondered whether the a n a l y s i s of metaphors to determine the i d e n t i t y of a group of w r i t e r s can ever proceed without c r e a t i n g from t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l uses an a b s t r a c t i o n — the metaphor of the s t a t e as mechanism i n the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n , fo.r example. However, i f the c r e a t i o n of t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n can be h i s t o r i c a l l y supported as a m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d w i t h i n which determinate h i s t o r i c a l a c t o r s can be shown to have worked, we w i l l have r e c r e a t e d an important element i n an h i s t o r i c a l 'language 1. Consider the complex r e l a t i o n between i d e o l o g y , idiom and metaphor i n the case of a sma l l group of w r i t e r s a c t i v e i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h century, and i d e n t i f i e d by 2 8 Benjamin L i p p i n c o t t as " V i c t o r i a n c r i t i c s of democracy." I d e o l o g i c a l l y , some of the most prominent c r i t i c s l i k e Maine, Bagehot and Lowe were l i b e r a l s unhappy w i t h the d i r e c t i o n t h a t l i b e r a l i s m seemed to be t a k i n g under the d i r e c t i o n of Gladstone, B r i g h t or H a r r i s o n . Thus they became i s o l a t e d from the mainstream of E n g l i s h l i b e r a l i s m , ambiguous f i g u r e s who have sometimes been claimed f o r 188 c o n s e r v a t i s m . " They mark a moment i n E n g l i s h l i b e r a l i s m when the l a s t v e s t i g e s of i t s Whig i n h e r i t a n c e b r i e f l y reappeared i n the arguments over the e x t e n s i o n of the f r a n c h i s e , an a r c h a i c idiom which found few sympathetic ears amongst contemporary l i b e r a l s . I d i o m a t i c a l l y most a r c h a i c were the many echoes of t h a t ' s c e p t i c a l Whiggism' which Duncan Forbes has l o c a t e d i n the 30 w r i t i n g s of Hume and Smith, p a r t i c u l a r l y m a n i f e s t i n the l a t e r w r i t e r ' s concern w i t h the c o n s t i t u t i o n as the f r a g i l e product o f many unique h i s t o r i c a l circumstances and t h e i r concern w i t h l i b e r t y as the r u l e of law. A d i s t i n c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e i r own was a concern w i t h 'the masses', no l o n g e r the p l e b i a n mob of the e i g h t e e n t h century, but a unique and p e r e n i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g product o f i n d u s t r i a l development, now o r g a n i z e d i n trade unions, i n c r e a s i n g l y l i t e r a t e -- i f 'uncultured' — and ever more alarming. I f these w r i t e r s were indeed ' c r i t i c s of democracy', then t h i s l a t t e r term must be understood i n the p r e c i s e sense of a form o f government by the many which the o l d e r idiom had prese r v e d . O v e r l a y i n g a l l t h i s , and more a r r e s t i n g to the modern eye, i s the idiom of academic i n q u i r y which permeates t h e i r work -- Maine's concern w i t h comparative h i s t o r y , or Bagehot's w i t h n a t u r a l s c i e n c e — an idiom which has giv e n modern i d e o l o g i e s t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e and h i g h l y m i s l e a d i n g appearance of ' t h e o r i e s ' of p o l i t i c s . 189 The single most important metaphor-theme which runs through a l l t h e i r work i s that of the destructive impact of natural forces on delicate a r t i f i c i a l constructions. The t i t l e of C a r l y l e ' s famous essay on the Second Reform Act i s 3 1 only the most well-known of these, and, as his example should indicate, as an abstract metaphor-theme i t cut r i g h t across i d e o l o g i c a l boundaries. On the one hand, we must seek the pervasive popularity of the abstract theme at the very highest l e v e l of generality. There seems to be a peculiar sense of s a t i s f a c t i o n to be had from using metaphors of natural forces to describe v i o l e n t s o c i a l change, supported i n the f i r s t instance by well known symbols and idiomatic expressions. We f i n d no incongruity i n t a l k i n g about change as a t i d e , a current or a wind, of great e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r i e s as landslides, and of governments collapsing or being swept away. Melvin Lasky has catalogued the appeal of metaphors invoking "elemental forces of nature" for revolutionaries i n 3 2 a l l times and places. Perhaps i t r e f l e c t s a basic d i s p o s i t i o n a l divide that some should exult i n these forces and others fear them. On the other hand, the r e l a t i o n between the abstract theme and such very general dispositions i s p r e - p o l i t i c a l . We are seeking a metaphorical f i e l d i n which p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s the image receiving f i e l d , and which i s ordered and structured by p o l i t i c a l doctrines. The appearance of a 1 9 0 m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l change-as-natural d i s a s t e r can be seen i n t h i s o u t b u r s t . The g r e a t and immediate o b j e c t of the a g i t a t i o n i s t o g i v e the e l e c t o r a l power t o numbers. A m i l l i o n of men out to be added to the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s at once. T h i s would double them and more than double them. . . . I t would swamp every e x i s t i n g i n f l u e n c e and power i n the the s t a t e . Wealth, i n t e l l i g e n c e , e d u c a t i o n , experience, l e a r n i n g , p r o f e s s i o n a l c a p a c i t y , commercial or p o l i t i c a l knowledge would be overwhelmed a t the rush of the power of numbers. . . . To c a l l t h i s a Reform would be l i k e g i v i n g the name of an a l t e r a t i o n to one of those momentous c o n v u l s i o n s of Nature which at i n t e r v a l s of hundreds of years dry up l a k e s and e s t u a r i e s , and submerge g r e a t c o n t i n e n t s . The Reform would be a gr e a t and v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n . I t would r i v e a g r e a t chasm betwee^ the p r e s e n t and the p a s t h i s t o r y of the country. S i r Henry Maine, who mockingly noted t h a t , as f a r as 'democracy 1 was concerned, "there i s no word about which a denser mist of vague language and a l a r g e r heap of loose 34 metaphors has c o l l e c t e d , " and who poured scorn on S i r W i l f r e d Lawson's c l a i m t h a t , "the g r e a t t i d e of democracy i s 35 r o l l i n g on, and no hand can stay i t s m a j e s t i c course," seems to have been much taken with elemental metaphors h i m s e l f . H i s o b j e c t i o n was to the use to which they were put, f o r , i n the course of e x p l a i n i n g how the dangers i n h e r e n t i n democracy may y e t be guarded a g a i n s t by s e n s i b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n , he made use of the theme h i m s e l f . 191 I t would seem that, by a wise Constitution, Democracy may be made nearly as calm as water i n a great a r t i f i c i a l reservoir; but i f there i s a weak point anywhere i n the structure, the mighty force which i t controls w i l l ^Igurst f o r t h and spread destruction far and near. Here, then, i s the conventional use for such metaphors amongst our chosen group of writers. They are used to express the doctrine that the B r i t i s h Constitution i s a del i c a t e a r t i f i c i a l contrivance which cannot support the ir r u p t i o n into p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the masses and a l l that they are taken to represent. Time and again the same contrast i s made. On the one hand there was delicacy. The constitut i o n was "a machine of exquisite delicacy" according 37 to the Quarterly Review, though Bagehot chose to stress i t s a r t i f i c i a l character i n r e f e r r i n g to safety valves and 3 8 regulators. On the other hand, there were threatening forces which were not even brute, but elemental. Defending the House of Lords as a "bulwark", Bagehot feared that " i f the House of Peers ever goes i t w i l l go i n a 39 storm, and the storm could not leave a l l else as i t i s . " Others were even less sanguine about the world that might resurface a f t e r the deluge. Rounding out t h i s r h e t o r i c a l world of natural disaster, we f i n d e x p l i c i t statements of the damage that might be wrought by i l l - c o n s i d e r e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes. Maine gave way to fears that were p o s i t i v e l y melodramatic. 192 The B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l system, with the national greatness and the material prosperity attendant upon i t , may yet be launched into space^and f i n d i t s l a s t a f f i n i t i e s i n silence and cold. Robert Lowe, summing up his famous speech on the proposals for parliamentary reform, argued for delay on a p r i n c i p l e f a m i l i a r to the students of F. M. Cornford. The time i s not yet r i p e , he said, to destroy the "imperceptible aggregation of centuries." Democracy you may have at any time. Night and day the gate i s open that leads to that bare and l e v e l p l a i n , where every ant's ne^st i s a mountain and every t h i s t l e a forest tree. I t i s i n t h e i r use of metaphor that we are able to locate these writers i n the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n , for they are a l l making the argument that extension of the franchise was a retrograde step. The new arrangements, i n Bagehot's view, were grossly i n e f f i c i e n t , and i n Maine's view l i k e l y to lead to a regression from a society based on contract to one based on status. Their democratic landscape was not the "darkling p l a i n , / where ignorant armies clash by night," whose very lack of f a m i l i a r i t y makes i t odious to the conservative. On the contrary, i t was a l l too f a m i l i a r , a regression to a barbarism which l i b e r a l s believed they had overcome. Doubtless the aesthetic appeal was to a broadly 193 similar range of sentiment, but differences l i k e these a l e r t us to d i s t i n c t i o n s between the p o l i t i c a l arguments that the metaphors are being used to express. The clash of ignorant armies also draws our attention to a s i m i l a r , i f less well-marked d i s t i n c t i o n i n the use of m i l i t a r y metaphors by some of these anti-democratic writers. C a r l y l e , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , had an i r o n i c and almost Nietschzean welcome for the appearance of the lower orders in p o l i t i c s . Their a r r i v a l ushered i n the figures of the D r i l l Sergeant and the Hero with his private army. This Romantic v i s i o n could not be further from the sober l i b e r a l i s m of Maine. In the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n , popular government was connected with 'Caesarism', a connection which Maine took i n f i n i t e pains to est a b l i s h i n the minds of his readers. Bagehot furnishes a useful example here because he c l e a r l y perceived an al t e r n a t i v e use for m i l i t a r y metaphors, one which was becoming increasingly popular i n his own time. Both conservatives and s o c i a l i s t s were appealing to the notion of m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e i n p o l i t i c s , although for very d i f f e r e n t ends. The s o c i a l i s t usage has, perhaps, the more in t e r e s t i n g history, reaching one of i t s f i n e s t expressions i n Lenin's v i s i o n of the vanguard of the party b a t t l i n g t h e i r way out of the swamp towards the high places on a 42 narrow path and under f i r e , and a distant echo may be 194 heard i n the quaint proposal of the B r i t i s h Labour Party to nationalize "the commanding heights of the economy." Bagehot, however, was unimpressed. Noting that "metaphors from law and metaphors from war make most of our current moral phrases," he set about answering them on t h e i r own terms. L i f e i s not a set campaign, but an i r r e g u l a r work, and the main forces i n i t are not overt resolutions but latent and half involuntary promptings. The mistake of m i l i t a r y ethics i s to exaggerate the concept of d i s c i p l i n e , and so to present the moral force of t h e ^ w i l l i n a baser form than i t ever ought to take. Bagehot was also concerned about the p o l i t i c a l consequences of t h i s moral theory, where force of w i l l replaces the promptings of the imagination. Switching metaphors, he concluded that whereas the m i l i t a r y ethic i s admirable for putting the axe to the tree, i t knows nothing of the "quiet force" by which the forest grew i n the f i r s t place. Maine, as usual, was more d i r e c t i n his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the contemporary s o c i a l forces which were the bearers of the m i l i t a r y ethic. In a f o r c e f u l f i g u r a t i v e comparison which i s much more than a spurious lesson from history, he announced " i n the most serious s p i r i t " that since the century during which the Roman 195 Emperors were at the mercy of the Praetorian soldiery, there has been no such insecurity of government as the world has see^ since rulers became delegates of the community. Maine creates his m i l i t a r y metaphors with some r h e t o r i c a l s k i l l , notably i n the appeal to his audience's knowledge of the Praetorian Guard -- perhaps through Gibbon's v i v i d and moralizing account of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s — and to the general V i c t o r i a n d i s t r u s t of soldiers and s o l d i e r i n g . However, i t i s directed at the adherents of a p a r t i c u l a r ideology, the Whiggish-liberals whose idiom and arguments we have already i d e n t i f i e d . To the V i c t o r i a n r a d i c a l - l i b e r a l or even to the Conservative, the resonance of t h i s metaphor i s lacking. As i n the case of the forces of nature — where men of a d i f f e r e n t s t r i p e l i k e John Bright p o s i t i v e l y exulted i n the prospect of the "volcanic eruption" which he believed to be inevitable i f the franchise were not extended — the s o l d i e r was a symbol with p o s i t i v e valency for many of Maine's 45 opponents. Maine's attempts to support his metaphor by i t s epistemological coherence with the doctrine of Caesarism was of limited success because the doctrine i t s e l f enjoyed no 46 great currency outside his own c i r c l e . Deprived of t h i s support, i t rested on an aesthetic coherence with a 196 d i s p o s i t i o n to see the mentality of the masses as the mentality of the 'other ranks'. The lower orders were not hurricanes, torrents or volcanoes — or even much characterized by m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , whatever the opponents of ' p o l i t i c a l trade unions' might think — but to characterize them i n t h i s way assigned a value to working class p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n which was quite umistakable. The p o l i t i c a l metaphors we have just considered exhibit a number of features common to metaphors deployed i n the context of ideologies. In fact, i n the course of analysing them, we have produced a vignette of an i d e o l o g i c a l dispute. Notice, f i r s t , how the meanings of the metaphors are marked by the e t h i c a l concerns of i d e o l o g i s t s . Despite sharing the same theme -- the mass electorate as a natural force -- the meanings of the p a r t i c u l a r metaphorical utterances are very d i f f e r e n t , depending on whether they are used by r a d i c a l - l i b e r a l s or Whig-liberals. On one side there i s fear of danger and the eventual prospect of catastrophe; on the other, hope, even exultation, i n the prospect of harnessing a gigantic 'progressive' force. This i s what i s meant when we speak of using metaphors to endow events, i n s t i t u t i o n s and practices with an e t h i c a l character. Notice, however, that using metaphors i n t h i s way demands the p r i o r acceptance of a whole i d e o l o g i c a l outlook 197 from an audience, i f that audience i s to accept the metaphorical characterization. The i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of these metaphorical utterances i s predicated upon a p a r t i c u l a r attitude to p o l i t i c a l l i f e ; they express the doctrines that men of a p a r t i c u l a r d i s p o s i t i o n have accepted as cogent, because they are a e s t h e t i c a l l y and epistemologically coherent with these doctrines. To accept the metaphorical characterization i s to accept the attitude. For t h i s reason, such metaphors are both potent means of persuasion, and, when directed at an audience of completely contrary d i s p o s i t i o n , bound to f a i l . They are props for the like-minded and b a i t for the uncommitted. Confronted with the claim that a r i s i n g torrent threatens to sweep away the bulwark of e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , a man's id e o l o g i c a l committments w i l l be revealed i n the dread or pleasure with which he looks forward to t h i s event. From the h i s t o r i a n of p o l i t i c a l thought's point of view we should also notice that i d e n t i f y i n g the existence of a metaphor-theme i n a set of texts i s only a f i r s t step. Texts may share a metaphor-theme without t h i s t e l l i n g us anything about the way i n which the i n d i v i d u a l metaphorical utterances are used i n p o l i t i c s and, consequently, without t e l l i n g us what value i s to be assigned to the elements i n the metaphorical f i e l d that they form i n a p o l i t i c a l language. Recreating the context of meaning i s a v i t a l step 198 i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the d i f f e r e n t metaphors t h a t may share the same theme, and i n showing the s i g n i f i c a n c e of shared themes f o r those who d i d deploy them i n the context of i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e s . The r e c r e a t i o n of a m e t a p h o r i c a l f i e l d i s i n every way as important as the r e c r e a t i o n of the o t h e r elements i n a p o l i t i c a l 'language' or i d e o l o g y , because the f i e l d i s p a r t of the c o n v e n t i o n a l framework w i t h i n which, or a t l e a s t w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o which, an author must work. The s t r u g g l e to e s t a b l i s h and to o v e r t u r n these conventions i s , o f course, t a k i n g p l a c e a l l the time. I t i s manifest i n attempts to determine t h a t o n l y these s h a l l be the i n f e r e n t i a l steps t o be taken i n a r r i v i n g a t the meaning of a m e t a p h o r i c a l u t t e r a n c e which embodies a p a r t i c u l a r m e t a p h o r i c a l theme, and such s t r u g g l e s are v i t a l c l u e s to the b a t t l e l i n e s between c o n f l i c t i n g i d e o l o g i e s . In the c l a s h of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , the like-minded are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l a d v e r s a r i e s . 199 CHAPTER SIX P o l i t i c s , I l l n e s s and Medicine 1 "a sore diseased p o l i t i k e body" The search for means to express doctrines about the a c t i v i t y of r u l i n g has often issued i n metaphors of a conscientious physician ministering to the needs of a sick patient. So often, i n fact, that the temptation to search for an underlying unity i n the material i s overwhelming. Disease and medical at t r i b u t i o n s i n p o l i t i c a l language display a continuity and an undiminishing popularity which suggest an experience more permanent than the transito r y projects of statesmen and t h e i r apologists. In an important sense, of course, t h i s suggestion might be meaningfully pursued. Disease i s one of the b i o l o g i c a l constants of human l i f e , and, as such, i s an obvious candidate for symbolic si g n i f i c a n c e . Often, indeed, i t stands opposed to health i n a moetic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , and the pair i s charged with e t h i c a l content. It i s not at a l l surprising that such symbols should then be drawn upon for use i n p o l i t i c a l metaphors. As Judith Schlanger puts i t , 200 II est evidement qu'en matiere socio-politique 1'appreciation du malsain est toujours fonction d'un jugement normatif sur l ' e t a t de sante, et que par consequent, au moins implicement^ e l l e t r a d u i t toujours une appreciation p o l i t i q u e . This fact notwithstanding, pr e c i s e l y what kind of e t h i c a l judgement i s being passed, and what sort of p o l i t i c a l values asserted, are, as we have i n s i s t e d throughout, an h i s t o r i c a l question demanding c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the 'context of meaning1 i n which the metaphor appears. As Rodney Needham noted, symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are only pot e n t i a l bearers of values, and the actual values that they possess for p a r t i c u l a r people cannot be s e t t l e d a p r i o r i . I t i s easy enough to conclude from our armchairs that health has a p o s i t i v e valency and disease a negative one, but t h i s conclusion w i l l not stand the t e s t of a more complex r e a l i t y . A l i n e of reasoning of just t h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e kind leads Schlanger to conclude that i t i s not possible to advocate v i o l e n t p o l i t i c a l upheaval by a t t r i b u t i n g disease c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to the a c t i v i t i e s of revolutionaries. To do so, she suggests, must necessarily imply that the uprising i s both involuntary and to be condemned. Such a conclusion f l i e s i n the face of the argument we have put forward i n the preceding chapters, and can be shown to be f a l s e . Schlanger begins by disregarding Needham's warning about symbol c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . We could c i t e many examples i n which the 201 g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e values of h e a l t h and negative values of disease are i n v e r t e d ; the value placed i n melancholia or ' s p l e e n 1 , f o r example, when they are used as a f o i l to c r i t i c i z e what passes f o r normality. This i n t u r n suggests a more complex symbolism i n v o l v i n g notions of normality and abnormality which w i l l o b v i o u s l y c o n t r a d i c t Schlanger's c l a i m . S i m i l a r l y , there are cases where the symptoms of the disease are looked upon as an i n d i c a t i o n of a cure f o r a much more deep-seated d i s o r d e r . Here, f o r example, i s Mary W o l l s t o n e c r a f t o f f e r i n g a second o p i n i o n to Burke's more famous diagnosis of the French R e v o l u t i o n . Thus had France grown up, and sickened on the c o r r u p t i o n of a s t a t e diseased. But, as i n medicine there i s a species of complaint i n the bowels which works i t s own cure, and l e a v i n g the body healthy gives an i n v i g o r a t e d tone to the whole system, so there i s i n p o l i t i c s ; and w h i l s t the a g i t a t i o n of i t s regeneration continues, the excrementitious humours exuding from the contaminated body w i l l e x c i t e a general d i s l i k e and contempt f o r the n a t i o n ; and i t i s only the p h i l o s o p h i c a l eye, which looks i n t o the nature and weighs the consequences of human a c t i o n s , t h a t w i l l be able to d i s c e r n the cause which has produced so many dr e a d f u l e f f e c t s . In a d d i t i o n , W o l l s t o n e c r a f t ' s language reminds us the symbols used i n metaphors have dual reference worlds, and both the e x i s t i n g s t a t e of medical knowledge and the r e l a t i v e s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of author and audience w i l l play a 202 part i n determining the arguments that politics-as-medicine metaphors can plausibly support. We need to know how i l l n e s s e s themselves were perceived and how cures were supposed to be effected, both at s c i e n t i f i c and popular level s of discourse. There w i l l c l e a r l y be differences i n scope for such metaphors between a society i n which diseases are thought to be the product of human agency, and a society i n which diseases are seen as the product of negligence before the impersonal forces of nature. The fact that the human animal i s subject to disease and death should not lead us to ignore the many d i f f e r e n t ways i n which disease and death have been understood by those under t h e i r sway. Schlanger i s thus quite r i g h t to draw our attention to the e t h i c a l judgements being made when people speak of sickness and health i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l contexts. She i s wrong to imagine that the symbolism implied i n these judgements sets any l i m i t s on usage, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of metaphors. Besides ignoring the dual reference worlds of symbols i n p o l i t i c s , such l i m i t s presuppose that there i s a l o g i c a l connection between a given metaphor and the doctrine that i t expresses. Thus Schlanger thought that p o l i t i c a l action as disease metaphors l o g i c a l l y implied involuntary action, and therefore could not be used to j u s t i f y revolutionary actions. We have rejected such a l o g i c a l connection on two grounds. F i r s t , that the reference 203 worlds of revolutionary theories and medical theories d i f f e r so much at d i f f e r e n t times and places that no general account of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s could s a t i s f y the demands of l o g i c a l necessity. This i s the basis of our request for h i s t o r i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the context of a metaphorical utterance. Second, that even when we have c l a r i f i e d the context of a metaphorical utterance i n t h i s way, the author of a p o l i t i c a l metaphor w i l l often be found attempting to es t a b l i s h connections which are not i n any sense necessary, but which he hopes to make plausible by means of the r h e t o r i c a l structures of his metaphor. For these reasons, we have followed Judith Shklar's suggestion that p o l i t i c a l metaphors are to be analysed i n terms of t h e i r success or f a i l u r e within a framework of t h e i r author's purposes, and not i n terms of t h e i r l o g i c a l consistency or grammatical correctness. These points, made at length i n previous chapters, have been laboured once more because a f a i l u r e to take them into account w i l l seriously handicap an investigation into the uses of a p a r t i c u l a r metaphor-theme -- i n t h i s case 'politics-as-medicine 1. The p r i n c i p a l danger here i s that "card-catalogue ahistoricism" discerned by a reviewer i n 3 Melvm Lasky's study of revolutionary metaphors. In Lasky's case, an undue emphasis on the 'imagery' of metaphors used by revolutionaries to j u s t i f y t h e i r various projects 204 resulted i n the u n r e a l i s t i c assumption of a uniform revolutionary experience so that the author could indulge himself i n l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m . Closer to our present concerns, Susan Sontag's I l l n e s s as Metaphor i s s i m i l a r l y flawed. Sontag 1s e f f o r t at ' l i b e r a t i n g ' our ideas of i l l n e s s from those she finds i n metaphors — i n order to replace them with notions she finds more humane — necessarily overlooks the varied uses to which these metaphors have been put i n the e f f o r t to b u i l d up a composite a h i s t o r i c a l picture of an illness-image suitable for c r i t i c i s m and eventual replacement. Sometimes, indeed, Sontag departs from t h i s plan and provides a penetrating h i s t o r i c a l 4 reconstruction; but more often she lapses into anachronism. Ahistoricism i s a luxury that the student of politics-as-medicine metaphors can i l l afford, for, as Schlanger w i t t i l y reminds us, so often here " l e pronostic 5 commande le diagnostic". Recovery of the prognosis — the problem and how i t was perceived — i s c r u c i a l to understanding why a p a r t i c u l a r metaphor was used and what i t was taken to mean. Cl e a r l y , a history of politics-as-medicine metaphors along these l i n e s would be an enormous undertaking, quite beyond the scope of the present study. As an a l t e r n a t i v e , two rather d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l contexts w i l l be sketched — English p o l i t i c a l thought i n the sixteenth century, and National Socialism i n modern 2 0 5 Germany — and the varied uses of the p o l i t i c s as medicine theme portrayed. These rather disparate contexts have been chosen with a deliberate end i n view. F i r s t , both support a s u f f i c i e n t number of e a s i l y accessible metaphors for i n t e r n a l comparison and contrast. Second, the sixteenth century examples allow us to compare the d i f f e r e n t uses of the same theme made by i d e o l o g i c a l opponents i n similar contexts, while the German examples w i l l be used to i l l u s t r a t e the use of a single theme within an ideology. F i n a l l y , the two very d i f f e r e n t contexts w i l l allow us to examine the e f f e c t s of d r a s t i c changes i n both popular and s c i e n t i f i c medical b e l i e f s on the p l a u s i b i l i t y and scope of a single metaphor-theme, the better to weigh the symbolic and r e f e r e n t i a l aspects of p o l i t i c a l metaphors. I I . Conventional p o l i t i c s as medicine metaphors. Sixteenth-century Englishmen did not invent the p o l i t i c s as medicine theme. A whole t r a d i t i o n of c l a s s i c a l and C h r i s t i a n p o l i t i c a l thought put into t h e i r hands an instrument that was already shaped i n a d i s t i n c t i v e way by being associated with a number of highly conventional usages. In p a r t i c u l a r , c l a s s i c a l thought bequeathed two related metaphor-themes. One strand used disease as an emblem of disorder i n the body p o l i t i c ; most Renaissance 2 0 6 scholars would be f a m i l i a r with Livy's description of the i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s which beset the Roman state a f t e r the f a l l of Carthage as a disease. The other theme sought to characterize r u l i n g as an end-directed a c t i v i t y , one which has as i t s telos the health of the body p o l i t i c as the physician had the health of his patients as the end of his a c t i v i t i e s . This was a favourite theme of Plato's, appearing as e x p l i c i t analogies i n the Statesman, the Laws and the Republic, where i t i s the f i r s t of the series of analogies used to explain the notion of j u s t i c e as 'rendering what i s 7 due.' Of course, the idea that p o l i t i c s and medicine are both end-directed a c t i v i t i e s i s a l i t e r a l comparison; metaphors appear when t h i s comparison i s used as a basis for seeing the r u l e r as a physician to the body p o l i t i c , medicus  reipublicae. This conception l i n k s the two d i f f e r e n t strands i n terms of a shared notion of a body p o l i t i c subject to i l l n e s s and death. The r e s u l t i n g active conception of the statesman as an expert who uses a body of knowledge to maintain the l i f e of the state against i t s i n t e r n a l and external enemies was well expressed by Seneca. He argued that the metaphor of medicus reipublicae eventually breaks down because the physician, seeing inevitable death i n his patient, must seek to make his death easy, whereas the statesman i s always obliged to maintain the l i f e of the state with a l l his strength however terminal i t s i l l n e s s e s 2 0 7 might appear." The p l a u s i b i l i t y of medicus reipublicae obviously rested on the continued acceptance of organic notions of p o l i t i c a l association. The metaphorical f i e l d which supported these metaphors was structured by the idea of a p o l i t i c a l body susceptible to disease and mortality as then understood. Tilman Struve re-emphasizes the dependence of medicus metaphors on t h i s conception when they reappear i n the medieval advice books. The c l a s s i c a l picture of the king as medicus  reipublicae, which had already been restated by Wipo i n the eleventh century, and from that time on can be seen i n the p o l i t i c a l theory of the high and l a t e middle ages up u n t i l Machiavelli, was hardly conceivable without t h i s underlying representation of the state as an organism. However, the p o l i t i c a l doctrines which these metaphors were used to express were no longer drawn from the republican, or even imperial t r a d i t i o n of Roman thought, but were directed towards the C h r i s t i a n prince, and a whole new set of conventional uses had been given to medicus metaphors by the authority of Saint Augustine. In general, the c l a s s i c a l writers had been of mixed opinions about the diseases threatening the health of the corpus reipublicae. Augustine was a great deal more confident and single-minded i n his diagnosis; the p r i n c i p a l threat to peace and j u s t i c e i n the 208 c i v i t a s terrena was s i n . Augustine, of course, thought that si n was a permanent condition of earthly l i f e , and he i d e n t i f i e d C h r i s t and not any temporal r u l e r as medicus  humilis holding out hope of a cure. However, he did leave his successors a number of conventional metaphors which found t h e i r way into more e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l writings. We should b r i e f l y note those that turned on the trust which the patient has i n the physician based on the l a t t e r * s vocation to heal, rather than f l a t t e r or please, those that remind the patient that he cannot hide a disease from a competent physician, and those which stress the in e v i t a b l y p a i n f u l character of medical c u r e s . ^ Apart from the Augustinian conception of s i n as i l l n e s s , the various diseases maintained a r e l a t i v e l y free place i n the conventional metaphorical f i e l d . Their meanings could be fixed i n at least two ways. The f i r