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Date 17th June 1985
Language most shows a man.
Speak, that I may see thee.

Ben Jonson

It is many times with a fraudulent design that men stick their corrupt doctrines with the cloves of other men's wit.

Thomas Hobbes
ABSTRACT

In recent years, philosophers of social science have drawn attention to the contributions of suggestive models or metaphors to political understanding. In doing so, they have suggested a distinction between models or archetypes of great scope and generality -- politics seen as mechanical or organic relations, for example -- and the individual metaphorical utterances in which they are presented. Historians of political thought have made a similar distinction between 'languages' or 'ideologies' which prescribe norms and conventions for political argument, and the expression and development of these languages and ideologies in texts.

This dissertation shows these two developments to be complementary by investigating the extent to which political languages or ideologies are themselves made up of suggestive models of political activity. Taking our point of departure from Max Black's suggestion that a metaphor be seen as "the tip of a submerged model," we shall look for such models in groups of political metaphors sharing the same theme.

Analysis of the concept 'metaphor' shows that understanding a metaphorical utterance is conditional upon a reader recreating a context in which the ground of the metaphorical identification is rendered intelligible by the
point of the utterance. This distinguishes political metaphors from metaphors used in explanatory or literary contexts. The principled strategies which authors and audiences use to produce and comprehend metaphors in political contexts are then shown to utilize existing conceptual classifications in the form of 'metaphorical fields' embedded in political discourse. These fields bring together abstract metaphor themes and concrete political doctrines to create political metaphors. In a field, the political value of 'imagery' — medicine, theatre, parts of the body or family relations — remains relatively fixed.

Using illustrations mainly from metaphorical fields in which politics is seen as a therapeutic activity, political metaphors are shown to functions as maps, orienting men in a political world that is their own creation.
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Scope and limits of the 'field' and the 'instrument' as complementary analogues for political metaphors; using political metaphors as maps of political life.
This dissertation uses two methods of analysis. The first is the philosophical analysis of a concept, the concept 'metaphor'. The second is historical, and is applied to a body of political metaphors as understood in the terms clarified by the philosophical investigation.

The philosophical investigation is undertaken in the conviction that we shall not understand disputes about the application of the term 'metaphor' to particular utterances, or disputes about the proper place of metaphorical utterances in political discourse, until we understand the criteria by which the term has been consistently applied by those who have already considered these questions. In particular, we shall beg the most important question for philosophical analysis if we attempt to define metaphor stipulatively. The question 'what is a metaphor?' can only be answered by examining the self-conscious use of the term, and noting the distinctions that such usage implies. To proceed differently would cut off our whole inquiry from the only possible source of example and illustration: men using metaphors. Thus, we seek a justification for using 'metaphor' in one way rather than another, not to impose our own view and ignore the rest. The first requirement is a survey of usage.
This survey of usage, if it is to be a critical tool, must be more than a mere list of disparate claims about metaphor. It must recognize that individual concepts are part of a whole conceptual system, and that what serves to clarify a particular concept above all else is a display of the connections between that concept and others to which it is closely related. In other words, a survey of usage must be productive of distinctions relevant to the project of isolating the concept 'metaphor' from the system of concepts in which it has its life. It aims at a synoptic view.

Now, such a method imposes a certain discipline on author and reader alike. The literature on metaphors is vast, and has expanded exponentially in the last twenty years. But, if it is impossible to consider the whole field, it is nonetheless vital to cast our net widely enough to understand why metaphors have been a perennially interesting topic. In this survey, we shall show that part of the confusion and disagreement surrounding metaphor has been a confusion of more than one concept, and our discussion has to be broad and illuminating enough to give something more than a caricature of the rival candidates. Thus the reader's patience will be sorely tried. In a work ostensibly about political metaphor, the whole of chapter two and much of chapter three will be taken up with the attempt to establish such relevant distinctions as those between metaphorical and
literal utterances, metaphor and concept formation, and metaphor and model.

The philosophical assumptions which inform the whole work lead us to reject that neat method which sees a study of political metaphor choosing among a range of 'theoretical instruments', and then applying them to a carefully delimited body of data. This dissertation will seek a coherent notion of metaphor from amongst the confused jumble of theories about metaphor, and the proof that it is a coherent notion will come from its ability to illuminate the conduct of men actually using metaphors in real historical contexts. Theory and data do not stand in the extrinsic relation of instrument and object; they are part of the same conceptual universe.

In these circumstances the argument of the work as a whole tends to be submerged beneath the details of conflicting theories, essential distinctions and passages of illustration. Here, then, is that argument, stripped of any philosophical support or historical illustration. The basic 'unit of analysis' is the metaphorical utterance. An utterance is a use of language by an assignable agent in a particular spatio-temporal context to communicate an intended meaning to an audience. It is a metaphorical utterance when the meaning of the utterance is not communicated directly by what is said, but indirectly by
indicating inferential strategies by means of which the audience may move from what is said to what is meant. In a way exactly analogous to the meaning of literal utterances, the meaning assigned to a metaphorical utterance may diverge from the intended meaning, either by a failure to distinguish what is meant from what is said, or by an audience's failure to follow those same inferential strategies in the comprehension of the metaphor that were used to produce it. Thus, when a writer asserts that his sovereign is the sun, he means to attribute certain solar qualities to his monarch, and we must infer what those attributes are from what he has said.

The ability to use principled inferential strategies to produce a reading of a metaphorical utterance is then shown to consist of two related parts. The first entails a grasp of the point of the utterance itself, its part in a wide context of proposals and projects which we may discern directly as participants in a dialogue, or reconstruct as readers of a text. We may have determined, for example, that our writer is exploring the concept of sovereignty with his sovereign as sun metaphor, rather than engaging in a display of loyalty or composing a poem. The second part of metaphorical comprehension entails a linguistic ability, and serves to introduce the most important theoretical term used in the argument, the metaphorical field.
The abstract metaphor-theme 'sovereign as sun' suggests an almost infinite number of possible attributes. However, previous use of the theme in metaphorical utterances helps to fix certain meanings for the attributes in well defined contexts like political argument, and thus assigns particular political values to attributes like brightness, warmth, or central position. The values that these attributes do assume will obviously be related to current doctrines about sovereignty, and to current astronomical beliefs. Gradually, the connections that are established between sovereignty and the sun fix a 'field' of possible attributions—the metaphorical field of sovereign-as-sun—which is used as a basis for the construction and interpretation of particular metaphorical utterances embodying that theme. A metaphorical field is, therefore, an area of discourse structured by a doctrine in a way that assigns a relatively fixed value to the components of the field. To know that the author of a particular sovereign as sun metaphor is not merely engaged in exploring the concept of sovereignty but that he is an early seventeenth-century Frenchman of a particular ideological cast, directs us to the metaphorical field which supports his particular attributions.

Chapter three is concerned to show that a consistent notion of the metaphorical field can be discerned at the
root of much confused talk about 'conceptual metaphors' or 'metaphors in thought', and with the special relevance of this to political language. Chapter four demonstrates how metaphorical fields in political discourse arise, are sustained and fall into desuetude, by stressing the importance of existing political doctrines in structuring the field. The fortunes of a metaphorical field are shown to be related in the most intimate way to changes in our understanding of its constituent parts.

This, then, is the project of the first four chapters: to produce a coherent description of the metaphorical utterance which distinguishes it from the literal utterance, and to show how metaphorical utterances are rendered intelligible by a grasp of their point and a knowledge of the metaphorical field which informed their production. Together they form a fully articulated, if complex, context within which a metaphorical utterance can be understood. This much holds for any metaphorical utterance. However, the special concern of this work is with political metaphors. Beginning in chapter three, the argument takes note of the special peculiarities of political contexts that make political metaphors distinctive. The most important feature here, it is argued, is that partially constitutive character of political language which is noted in the text by speaking of political discourse. As has been aptly observed, the very
concepts which mark off politics as a distinctive activity -- authority, legitimacy, justice, and others -- are nothing more than the sum of what men can be brought to believe about them. They are self-authenticating.

Given this self-authenticating character, the terms of political discourse are inevitably subject to contest and controversy. Chapters five to seven attempt to 'close the context' for understanding political metaphors by locating them within the specialized controversies surrounding the terms of political discourse. Given the close connection that has already been established between the structure of a metaphorical field and the doctrines that are 'receiving the image' -- as sovereignty was receiving the sun image -- we should expect metaphorical fields assigning particular values to metaphorical attributes to be located within the warring 'languages' or 'ideologies' which make up political discourse. In chapter five, for example, distinctive metaphorical fields based on the same metaphor-theme, the masses as forces of nature, are shown to have been the property of different ideological groups. Thus, both the metaphorical field and the persuasive project which serve to render a metaphorical utterance intelligible are shown to be located within historically determinate ideologies. The theoretical problem of understanding a political metaphor is shown to be a problem in the history of political thought.
the reconstruction of discourse, and is approached as such in chapter five.

Chapters six and seven serve to illustrate this notion of the metaphorical utterance supported by a field which is itself located within an ideology. A single metaphor-theme is taken -- politics as medicine -- and the metaphorical fields in which utterances embodying the theme had their life are traced in sixteenth-century English political thought, and in Nazi writings. The studies themselves, though historical in character, should be seen less as self contained exercises in the history of political thought, than as an illustration and a vindication of the concept of political metaphor which has emerged from the analysis in the preceding chapters.

This dissertation is a work of political philosophy, not political science, the history of political thought, or that amphibious enterprise, political theory. As such, it cannot have either the crystalline elegance of the 'theory' applied to a body of 'data', or the relaxed and swiftly moving form of the narrative. It much more resembles a conversation between the author and those disembodied voices whose origins are recorded in the footnotes. These voices may be stilled as the author's own becomes more distinct, but his voice must emerge naturally from the conversation. It cannot commit the intellectual imposture of shouting down
or boorishly ignoring the other voices in the conversation.

Conversations, as Michael Oakeshott has reminded us, have no object or end in view, but at least one important conclusion may be drawn from this study. The history of political thought is full of metaphorical fields whose story has yet to be told, and which, in the telling, may illuminate an already familiar narrative. I once heard a Ph.D. examiner remark -- in suitably gruff, Churchillian tones -- that a dissertation marked the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end. I hope that subsequent investigations in the history of political thought may prove the value of the method that this exercise in conceptual clarification reveals.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author of a doctoral dissertation accumulates many debts in the course of his endeavour -- by no means all of them intellectual -- and it is his most pleasant duty to acknowledge them. My thanks go to all those who have helped make this possible. No one can object if I should single out for special mention the University of British Columbia and the Isaak Walton Killam Memorial Trust for their generous financial assistance; David Manning, who showed by his example that political philosophy could be both rigorous and stimulating; George Feaver, who, patiently pointing out infelicities of style and argument, could have rendered the whole experience enjoyable in departments far less hospitable than U.B.C.'s; and my wife, Anne, who was always there to remind me that life has much more to offer than the study of political metaphors.
CHAPTER ONE

Approaches to the Problem

The central place of metaphor in political understanding has been remarked upon so often that it is now a commonplace. It is true that many writers have indiscriminately used 'metaphor' as a synonym for 'model', and that their interest has been connected with methodological innovations in political science. As empiricist and positivist precepts have come under attack, so the work of anti-empiricist philosophers of science who have drawn attention to scientific metaphors as part of their demonstration that scientific 'facts' are 'theory laden' has come to prominence. Under their influence, the notion that theories in the social sciences are to be seen as 'models' of an area of reality, with its corollary that such models are at least suggested by fertile metaphors, has become widely accepted. Political theory itself has not escaped unscathed from these developments, although here attention has been more diffuse. Once again the point of departure has been the conception of political theory entertained by logical positivists. Theorists such as T.D.
Weldon and Margaret Macdonald argued that a metaphor masquerading as a logical connection could often be found at the root of the mistakes of traditional political theorists. The rehabilitation of traditional theorising brought with it a more generous appreciation of the role of models and analogies in political thought, swelling at length into a panegyric on the "indispensibility" of metaphors to political understanding.

Obviously these arguments stand in need of clarification. We have already alluded to the confusion surrounding the use of the terms 'metaphor', 'model' and 'analogy'. Has this lack of precision engendered conceptual confusion? What is the status of an explanation couched in terms of a suggestive metaphor? Has mutual recognition of the role of metaphors brought an anti-empiricist political science closer to the concerns of traditional political theory again? Intriguing as they are, these are not the questions we shall be directly addressing here. The battle for the respectability of models and metaphors in explanation has been won: the remaining pockets of resistance can safely be left to those coming up in support. Our objective -- if we may continue the military metaphor -- will be to press on and make contact with some converging ideas in the history of political thought. Here arguments associated with the work of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock
have drawn attention to some interesting connections between political theory and political action which suggest a new significance for political metaphors.  

Both Skinner and Pocock have been struck by the extent to which the language available to a political writer may have set limits to what he could have meant by what he said, with obvious consequences for the historian who wishes to reconstruct the author's meaning. Their investigations into the connection between language and political understanding have shed much light on the relation of "normative vocabularies" to political thought. Pocock has been impressed by the extent to which men communicate in "language systems", "within which they are constrained to speak, but which they modify by the speech acts they perform." Skinner has been more cautious about "constraints", but is similarly prone to decompose a body of texts into a set of conventions, rules or norms that make up the 'languages' or 'ideologies' being used by an author, with a view to asking what an author is doing with the linguistic resources at his disposal. This emphasis on what political writers were "doing with words" -- to use Austin's famous phrase -- has inevitably tended to locate these writers' projects within the world of political events and practices, opening up the possibility of studying the texts of political theory as elements in historical ideologies.
Once we have taken this step, and begun to consider the ways in which the language that a writer has at his disposal may set limits to, or at least pose certain problems for, the political projects that he has in mind, then the link with accounts of metaphor and model in political theory is evident. Skinner himself has drawn attention to the use of metaphors to change the meaning of evaluative terms, and he has further reminded us that when this issues in conceptual change our whole interrelated system of dividing up 'cultural experience' is at stake. More radical yet is the possibility that the concepts expressed in a political 'language' or 'ideology' may contain certain embedded metaphors -- as scientific theories appear to do -- which help to constitute our cultural experience. If this is so, then no account of political action is complete without an understanding of the use of such metaphors in political argument, and the ensuing contests over their interpretation. If we can discover the existence of ruling metaphors in political 'languages' -- politics as theatre, as pilgrimage or as mechanism, for example -- how will such metaphors constrain those who use these languages, and how might they be changed and contested?

At this point a preliminary distinction must be made. We have already noted that there is some ambiguity in theoretical uses of the terms 'model' and 'metaphor'. 
Clearly, some distinction needs to be drawn between, on the one hand, the sentences in which the student of rhetorical figures might identify a metaphor, a metonym or a synecdoche, and, on the other hand, the theoretical models and the 'ruling metaphors' of a political ideology. For the moment, we shall simply mark this distinction in terms of generality. Following the usage of Max Black we shall refer to an archetype where an argument is structured in terms of a consistent analogical extension, carrying across concepts from one domain to another, where they do not obviously belong. Examples of archetypes would include Aristotle's conception of citizens as friends, Augustine's conception of human life as a journey, or Hobbes's conception of sovereignty as artificial personality. We would contrast these general and abstract archetypes with particular statements in which details of the analogical extension are explicitly expressed -- Hobbes's oxymoron of the sovereign as a "mortal god", for example.

In fact, it is very rare to find a political writer explicitly setting out archetypes. More often we have to recreate an author's archetypes from the explicit metaphors he uses, and, to this extent, archetypes must be seen as abstractions. A justly famous study of exactly this kind, contrasting two archetypes of artistic representation, sums up this relation:
We tend to describe the nature of something in similes and metaphors, and the vehicles of these recurrent figures, when analysed, often turn out to be attributes of an implicit analogue through which we are viewing the object we describe.

By means of a detailed examination of these "recurrent figures" M. H. Abrams was able to recover the archetypes of the 'mirror' and the 'lamp' which served to distinguish two very different aesthetic theories. The project of the present work is to show how such implicit archetypes may be reconstructed from the metaphors found in political discourse.

We shall begin by considering some philosophical puzzles about metaphorical utterances and their treatment in recent work on the subject. Distracting as this may be, we cannot approach the questions which really concern us without some preliminary understanding of why metaphor is a subject which has fostered so much controversy, and what philosophical issues turn on the various divergent approaches to the subject. Following this review and conceptual clarification, we shall begin our investigation into political metaphors by examining some accounts which have much to say about the notion of an archetype, but often at the expense of denying that metaphorical utterances have any interest for the theorist at all. We shall examine the close connection of archetypes with concept formation, and
the central role this creates for archetypes in a political discourse that is partly constitutive of political activity. However, we shall show that a proper appreciation of this role depends upon our clearly distinguishing between metaphors and archetypes, and we shall introduce more precision into our study of political archetypes with the aid of the concept 'metaphorical field'.

The following two chapters will deal in detail with the relationship between metaphorical utterances and metaphorical fields in political discourse. The first chapter will explain how well-established metaphorical fields may be found supporting conventional political metaphors, and clarify the relation of a conventional political metaphor to a political doctrine. The second of these chapters will outline the type of investigation (an historical one, it will be argued) which recovers the meaning of a political metaphor as a first step towards establishing the existence of metaphorical fields in historically identifiable political 'languages' or 'ideologies'. Finally, the research programme that this approach to political metaphor generates will be set to work on some metaphorical utterances in which politics is endowed with some of the attributes of medicine.

It is, perhaps, disappointing that two-thirds of this work should be taken up with the task Locke called
"underlabouring", "clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge." However, this is a common experience of those who set out to do something relatively new in the social sciences. Ours is a subject in which rubbish has a tendency to accumulate, and many who have set about clearing a space for their projects have found this a task issuing in a sizeable work in its own right. In another sense, we may take heart from the argument of Peter Winch's much misunderstood classic *The Idea of a Social Science*. Dismissing Locke's metaphor of the philosopher as underlabourer and the scientist as master-builder, he reminds us that there is much to learn about social life from conceptual analysis because shared concepts speak directly about the activity and understanding of those who use them. Our account of the role of language and metaphor in politics stands firmly in this tradition, and in the conclusion we shall return to consider our own archetypes for language and metaphor and what they can tell us about our understanding of the relation between language and politics.

One reason why there are not more studies of political metaphor resides in the difficulty of delimiting the topic. In fact, this difficulty is by no means confined to
political metaphors. As we shall discover, a frustrating feature of works on metaphor has been a continuous disagreement amongst commentators about the puzzles that metaphors are supposed to pose. Paolo Valesio has wittily touched on this:

Metaphor has received a great deal of linguistic attention of late; but we have now come to a grave impasse. The fleet of studies on metaphor is in disarray. Some of the ships have been lost on the high seas of generality, while others have run aground against the reefs of mere technicalities.

Of course, the severity of the disarray is very much a matter of perspective. Linguists and literary critics are no doubt justifiably proud of some of their painstakingly detailed studies which have shown that the phenomenon of metaphor can more readily be accounted for by some linguistic theories than others. On the other hand, studies, particularly those of continental philosophers, which seem to incorporate metaphor into the general phenomenon of creativity and ambiguity in language by no means represent wasted effort. We shall have occasion to exploit the interesting parallels that Paul Ricoeur has drawn between understanding a metaphor and interpreting a text. But Valesio has hit upon an important truth about metaphor studies. There is no such thing as an uncontested unified
theory of metaphor which could be sketched in outline and then 'applied' to metaphors found in political contexts.

Perhaps the demand for a unified theory is unreasonable. It may very well be that our ordinary use of the term 'metaphor' hides a number of significant distinctions — such as those between metaphor and archetype and metaphor and analogy. Certainly, works of synthesis — Paul Ricoeur's *The Rule of Metaphor*, for example — have not notably contributed to a clearing of the air. However, a certain inconvenience arises from the lack of a common focus to metaphor studies. When theorists begin to compare the function or role of metaphor in different areas of discourse, it is by no means clear that they are all referring to the same thing. It is difficult to escape Valesio's conclusion that the study of a body of metaphors drawn from particular cultural contexts is urgently required in the light of questions surrounding the intelligibility of metaphorical utterances. Developing a framework for carrying out just such a study of groups of metaphors will be one of the principal aims of this study. Yet we cannot escape from the general uncertainty over the application of the term 'metaphor' unless we carry out the the task of conceptual clarification which will be attempted in the next chapter.

Moreover, existing work on political metaphors reveals the same lack of a common focus, and it is further dispersed
by differences in interest amongst students of politics. Detailed studies of specific metaphors have almost always cast political metaphors in the role of villain. This is especially true of German-language studies which have been influenced by the model of an 'ideal communication context', in contrast with which actual political disputes cannot but appear as crude deformations. In a review of this literature, Peter Stummer includes metaphors in a list of eight topics which students of political language have analysed as techniques for influencing political behaviour. The central notion is that of semantic deceit, and metaphors find themselves in the same company as slogans, key-words and stereotypes. In an introductory text on political language, metaphors are dealt with under the general heading of "affective-evaluative" devices, together with neologisms, euphemisms, invective, slogans and keywords.  

The emphasis in these technical studies is always on metaphor as a sleight of hand, a trick that is performed on words. Locating the metaphorical process at the level of the word -- an important and influential way of tackling the problem, as we shall see -- has the general consequence that metaphors are seen as a word-game. This appears in political studies in the refracted sense that such metaphors are devious ploys, substitutes for rational argument, which are to be unmasked by careful analysis. In cases, like the
German studies, where analysis of the semantic components of a 'word-metaphor' is the preferred form of 'unmasking' -- an analysis of "net" in "social security net", for example -- the resulting emphasis is on the simplification and polarization that is achieved when a complex political problem is summed up in a metaphor. In a French study, the thrust of the semantic analysis is reversed and a word used metaphorically is said to release supplementary semantic content into discourse, but the critical emphasis is the same. Metaphors are now regarded with suspicion because of their ambiguity and lack of precision. Both kinds of analysis share a common tendency to draw their examples from slogans and cliches: "iron curtain", "le cordon sanitaire", or "this treaty is a brick in the framework of soviet foreign policy." In this respect, they follow the pioneering English language work of Harold Lasswell.

The more general studies of political metaphor, those which Valesio referred to as dealing with metaphor as an aspect of creativity and ambiguity in language, have a very different focus. They locate political metaphors not so much in political speech, or even in polemical texts, but in works of theory. Their attitude towards political metaphors is less homogeneous too; the value placed on metaphor varying with the stress placed on creativity as against ambiguity. It is in these studies that treatment of
political metaphor shades into treatment of models and archetypes, and so we find studies of 'mechanical' and 'organic' metaphors in political thought, and attention to the sense in which metaphors at this level of generality might be true or false. There is still a certain amount of unmasking being carried out, but there are very few explicit links with the more technical studies. Worse still, awareness of these technical studies is sometimes coupled with a tendency to dismiss them as not really being concerned with metaphors at all. It will be a major object of this study to show that there are important connections between the archetypes and models of political theories and individual metaphorical utterances. In making these connections we shall be attempting to do justice to the insights of both particular and general studies of political metaphors.

Why, then, is this investigation a proper subject for political philosophy, rather than for the philosophy of language or linguistics? Let us reconsider the parallel drawn by Paul Ricoeur between understanding a metaphor and interpreting a text. Both involve a certain amount of work on the part of the reader, and both contain within themselves the clues which will help the reader on his way. Thus the work is not aimless, but guided by permissions and
prohibitions which suggest some meanings as more plausible than others. However, Ricoeur cites with approval a suggestion made by Monroe Beardsley about poetic metaphor: the most important permission when interpreting a metaphor is that that metaphor should be allowed to mean all that it can mean.\textsuperscript{22} In doing so, Ricoeur explicitly links himself with the general account of metaphor, in which metaphors are seen as paradigms of linguistic creativity. In his own words, "metaphors transpose the meanings of ordinary language by way of unusual uses."\textsuperscript{23}

As the technical theorists of political metaphors have reminded us, political metaphors are metaphors identified by their use in political contexts. They proceed to mistake the significance of this important fact by going on to draw a sharp distinction between 'information' and 'persuasion', or between 'describing' and 'evaluating', locating political metaphors always in the second part of the distinction. Once we show that judgements of value are located within political discourse, not externally imposed upon neutral facts, the cogency of such distinctions disappears. However, the technical theorists are surely correct in drawing our attention to the political contexts of political metaphors. For here, far from allowing metaphors to mean "all that they can mean", political writers have striven to keep their metaphors under control, and adapt them to their own
purposes as far as possible.

Ricoeur's emphasis on the work that has to be put in to the understanding of a metaphor is not thereby entirely misplaced. His account of how to go about this work is primarily directed at literary metaphors and literary texts. In politics, the indisputable tendency for metaphors to mean more than their authors intended them to mean must be set in the context of real political issues over which the authors of political metaphors find themselves divided. These divisions are not brought about by persuading people to evaluate a set of independent facts: they arise when people in possession of different 'languages' (in the sense that Pocock uses that term) disagree about the significance of events, and the more that we can learn about the significance of such languages, the better we shall be able to understand the source of the disagreements. So disputes over the meanings of political metaphors are not to be taken as marking the limits of an author's creative imagination, but as vital evidence for competing social philosophies. For example, we so often find metaphors in which politics is taken to manifest some of the attributes of a journey that we may reasonably suspect the existence of an archetype (or series of archetypes) here. But why did Aristotle seem to think that politics was like a journey undertaken by a group of friends, and Augustine call the company 'pilgrims'? Why
was Rousseau apparently searching so diligently for a resting place, while Oakeshott takes such pains to set his political travellers on a boundless sea with neither harbour nor anchorage? Is there some mistake here, or are we simply dealing with irreconcilable views of politics? It may very well be that politics as journey metaphors disclose all of these attributes and more. However, here are a series of metaphorical 'termini' which may serve as crucial evidence for what Aristotle, Augustine, Rousseau and Oakeshott saw themselves to be doing. This is part of the significance of political metaphors for the student of politics which cannot be captured by literary or philosophical approaches to metaphor.24

The parallels between understanding a metaphor and interpreting a text do not stop here. The controversy surrounding the question of how to read political metaphors is surely part of that venerable dispute with which Ricoeur begins his analysis — the dispute over the relative merits of spoken and written discourse.25 Socrates sets the terms of this dispute with great elegance in a famous analogy between writing and painting:

You know Phaedrus, that's the strange thing about writing which makes it truly analogous to painting. The painter's products stand before us as though they were alive, but if you question them they maintain a most majestic silence. It is
the same with written words; they seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever. And once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts about all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the right people, and not to address the wrong.

Released from the practice of question and answer which might clarify spoken meaning, written words go on "saying the same thing" as long as the inscription survives. As Ricoeur points out, the practice of reading intervenes, and in making an interpretation the reader takes both parts in the dialogue, speaker and interlocutor, teacher and pupil, even politician and audience. The ambiguity and creativity of political metaphor clearly raises Socrates's problem in an acute form, for it brings us to that further set of problems to which he alludes at the end of his warning. Who are the "right people", and how is a writer to prevent his text from falling into the wrong hands?

In part, an answer has been provided in the work of Pocock and Skinner to which we have already alluded. They have reminded us that political discourse -- like other areas of discourse -- is hedged around with rules and
conventions which prescribe how to say and do certain things. There is no reason to expect that the interpretative strategies associated with metaphorical utterances will be any less conventional. Of course, these strategies are themselves subject to historical change, and perhaps the most influential account of how they change has been that put forward by Vico in *The New Science*. The present study will attempt to uncover conventions of this sort. But another aspect of Pocock and Skinner's work has shown that there is no general solution to Socrates's distrust of written materials. Writing does 'drift about', and we can expect that there will be many possible interpretations of a political metaphor in addition to whatever an author may have intended, and our interest here lies in what motivated a reader to deviate from what has become the standard or conventional meaning of a political metaphor.

Here, however, we must return to a point made against the technical theorists of political metaphor, and invoke that rather overworked distinction between first- and second-order statements. Socrates's reference to the right and the wrong hands into which writings may fall is, in this sense, a first-order statement: it is repeated by modern theorists of political metaphor when they tell us that this or that ought to be the meaning of a particular metaphorical utterance, or who make specific aesthetic or ethical
judgements about it. These imperatives and judgements are by no means illicit, indeed they are a crucial part of any sophisticated form of political life. But there are also investigations which lead to the production of second-order statements about political metaphor — of which the attempt to recover the historical meaning of a particular metaphorical utterance is an example — and the present work is concerned with second-order inquiry in this sense.

Once again, we must emphasize that this distinction is not intended to belittle other investigations into political metaphors. It is, however, specifically directed against that confusion of levels of inquiry manifested in some studies of political metaphor, notably in the technical studies of contemporary political writings and speeches. Many political metaphors of the kind stigmatized as slogans, cliches or stereotypes may very well be simple and direct. However, the attempt to detract from their political impact by analysing them as variants on a semantic trick must be seen for what it is, a political manoeuvre connected with the project of moulding political argument in the image of a certain model of communication. As if to parody their own point, most of these writings are filled with jargon, dubious distinctions and hidden judgements of value not at all dissimilar to the texts and speeches they purport to unmask.27
Our own investigation into political metaphor takes as its motto an epigram by Ben Jonson which makes a rather different analogy between writing and painting. If indeed it is language that most shows a man, then it does not matter whether that man speaks or writes. As in painting, where technique is an important clue to the identity of the artist, so in politics we have come to realize how much we can learn about a writer from the way he manipulates the linguistic resources at his disposal. His use of metaphor is part of his technique: what part is the question that concerns us here.

Doubtless Jonson had more than just this in mind when he sought to 'see' men in their writings. There is a fascinating and difficult form of political analysis intimated here, which might take as its point of departure Karl Kraus's assertion that "I cannot get myself to accept that a whole sentence can ever come from half a man." But judgements about who is or is not "half a man", and about the significance of such a man's political activity, however appropriate to the higher literary journalism in which Kraus engaged with such distinction, will not concern us here. The political attitude to political metaphor which might result can best be seen in the continuing disputes over whether metaphors are a 'proper' part of political language. George Orwell's passionate denunciation of the cliched metaphors
which he associated with the apolitical consensus of wartime government, and his plea for metaphors which were genuinely informative 'pictures' is one such reaction. The complete distrust of any political metaphor on the part of the members of the Royal Society circle in England after the 'enthusiasm' of the Civil War and Interregnum is another. Here, too, we might mention Bentham's lifelong struggle against the unnecessary use of fictions in political discourse, particularly the substitution of physical expressions for psychological ideas. His analysis of the phrase 'to be under an obligation' is classic. Metaphors he considered to be only the visible, and hence less dangerous, evidence of these fictive processes at work. In general, as Melvin Lasky has rightly pointed out, such fear of political metaphor is symptomatic of a belief that political language has got out of hand, that more is being promised than could possibly be delivered.

Our interest in political metaphors, then, will be directed towards showing the connections that have existed between political metaphors and political activity, rather than affirming that one particular kind ought to exist. To return to Jonson's epigram, we are less interested in judging what a man shows in the language he uses, than in investigating his metaphor of vision. How does a man show himself in the meaning he attaches to a political metaphor?
In pursuit of this end, we begin with an analysis of the complex concept 'metaphor'.
CHAPTER TWO

Two Ideas for One:
Metaphors Reconsidered

The first impression of anyone confronting the literature on metaphor, after the initial shock of its volume, must be surprise at the scope and extent of the disagreement amongst the major theorists. Not only do theorists of metaphor disagree over how to answer such elementary questions as what a metaphor is or how a metaphor works, but they do so along lines recognizably similar to those we briefly considered in the preceding chapter. In one sense, then, what follows will be in this tradition, for we shall disagree with many of the most important and influential accounts of metaphor that there is space to consider.

This may be thought to require some explanation, if not apology. There is a story told of how Sir Alfred Ayer, exasperated beyond measure by the relentless and destructive criticisms of J.L. Austin, at length burst out "you are like a greyhound who doesn't want to run himself and bites the other greyhounds so that they cannot run either."¹ While not wishing to suggest that so distinguished a simile applies to
myself, so much of the present chapter will be critical in intent that it is as well to remember that it will serve as preparation for the 'running' that is to take place later. In it, an understanding of metaphor will be developed which can serve as the foundation for our investigations into political metaphors. In fact, we may suspect that many of the disagreements amongst theorists stem from differences of interest and perspective rather than from points of substance. In such cases our choices will be guided by our overriding interest in the place of metaphors in political language.

What are our targets, and why is preliminary investigation into the theory of metaphor necessary at all? Consider the following examples.

Nor are the things among which we are created created for us since we have been recreated in Him. These things should be for necessity's use, not for love's affection; they should be like the traveller's inn, not like the possessor's prize. Refresh yourself and move on. You are travelling, think to whom you have come, for so great is He who has come to you. In leaving this life you make room for the next comer. This is the condition of an inn: you go that another may come. (Augustine)

For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them, but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas . . . (Hobbes)

Could they be happier without it, the law as a useless thing would of itself vanish, and that ill-deserves the name of confinement which hedges
Is it then true, that the French government was such as to be incapable or undeserving of reform; so that it was of absolute necessity that the whole fabric should at once be pulled down and the area cleared for the erection of theoretic experimental edifice in its place? (Burke)

Now, on some accounts each of these passages would be called 'metaphorical', for there are references to inns, counters, hedges and edifices which are not meant to be taken literally. On other accounts, though, only the second passage with its explicit formulation that "words are wise men's counters" would be treated as a metaphor. Accordingly, some might distinguish between the passages themselves and some metaphorical part of them, while some speak freely of each in its entirety as a metaphorical utterance. Some would employ a whole catalogue of rhetorical terms to distinguish metaphor from such near relations as metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole or oxymoron; others would be content with a distinction between metaphor and simile; yet others happily speak of 'figures' in general.

Above all, then, we need to be clear about the criteria for the application of the term 'metaphor' if we are to be able to employ it consistently and fruitfully in later chapters. It would be useful to know why there is such disagreement on what is to count as a metaphor, particularly
when we come to consider whether metaphors have any general role in political language — what has been called a function — or whether we have a wide range of uses to consider. Otherwise we shall always be open to the charge that the phenomena we have considered are too broad or too narrow in scope, or not 'really' metaphors at all.

Here the danger of proceeding too abruptly is obvious. We may be tempted to settle the matter by producing a stipulative definition of what is to count as a metaphor for the purposes of the present study which would beg one or more of the very questions that theories of metaphor set out to answer. One very sophisticated study, Christine Brooke-Rose's *A Grammar of Metaphor* provides a perfect case in point. Brooke-Rose was concerned to show that syntactical variations in metaphorical sentences — for example, whether what we shall later call the focal word of a metaphor is a verb or a noun — have consequences for what can be said in such a sentence. Specifically, she noted that different grammatical links mediate differences in intention and effect which could not be ignored by those seeking to understand metaphors, especially literary critics. Unfortunately, she assumed that syntax was also the defining feature of a metaphor, so that sentences of the form 'A is like B', or 'As A ... so B', were excluded from her study because they presented no special syntactical difficulties.
This decision, backed by a tradition of taxonomising rhetorical treatises, gave her the following definition of a metaphor.

Metaphor in this study is any replacement of one word by another, or any identification of one thing, concept or person with another. My concern is with how this replacement or identification is made through words.

Now, unlike the replacement of one word by another, the identification of one thing, concept or person with another is a metalinguistic possibility which may be realised in language in a number of ways, including the syntactic forms which Brooke-Rose excluded. So when she takes Rosamund Tuve to task for including T. S. Eliot's line "evening ... like a patient etherized" as a metaphor, the ambiguity is revealed. In an important sense this line is to be distinguished from the comparison that is made in the sentence "patient A was etherized like patient B," and the fact that its syntax is identical with Eliot's metaphor only shows that syntax cannot be used to identify metaphors. We might stretch a point and call this a case of identification after all, but then we are entitled to know more about the 'identification' that is involved here. This is a question that requires conceptual investigation, an investigation that will clarify what we mean when we use the term.
'metaphor' on different occasions. In other words, the conceptual investigation must come first if we are not to beg the very questions our inquiry will eventually oblige us to answer. But we must, for the moment, set political language to one side, for although it may furnish us with helpful illustrations at various points, the modern theories of metaphor we shall be examining have not, for all their sophistication, ventured far afield for their examples.

II. No formula gives the meaning of a metaphor independently of its context.

Let us begin with a link to those classical theories of metaphor from which modern theories have evolved. The sixteenth-century rhetorician Henry Peacham, analysing the words of the psalmist, "thy word is a lantern unto my feet and a light unto my paths," concluded that;

lantern, light, paths ... have not their proper signification but by translation do signify other things, much like unto them.

Peacham thus proposes both a principle of identification and a schematic account of the meaning of a metaphor in this neat definition, which draws on the work of both Aristotle and Cicero. His example is to be identified as a metaphor because it contains one or more words which "have not their
proper signification". A word cannot be a lantern, so that the term 'lantern' must signify something else -- but what does it signify? Here we are told to translate the word 'lantern' into another word whose "proper signification" will make sense of the sentence. The only further clue that Peacham gives us, which reinforces the metaphorical character of his own explanation, is that the relevant word will be "nie and likely" to the original.

The definition itself is clearly modelled on Aristotle. Metaphor belongs to that general species of trope where words are used other than in their proper sense; it is to be differentiated from other tropes because its proper signification is restored through "translation" (incidentally preserving part of the etymology of 'metaphor'). Unfortunately, both the notion of improper signification and translation are incomplete, and they may be radically misleading. Both require clarification.

Consider the claim that in a metaphor a word is used in some way that is 'improper'. The influence of this line of argument is difficult to overestimate, for it seems to mark a clean break between metaphorical and literal language in terms of the proper and improper uses of words. In a simple assertion, like the one Peacham uses in his example, such a distinction has an air of plausibility. But if we take the slightly more complex case of negation, we see that this
will not do. In "no man is an island," what words lack their proper signification? In fact, Peacham's definition fails in just the same way that Brooke-Rose's did; it fails to include all the relevant instances.

Considerations of this kind lead to a more general and far-reaching criticism of the proposal to restore proper signification by "translation". If we simply substitute one word for another in the sentence, we are entitled to ask about the point of this particular game with words. There are stock answers available — "filling gaps in the language", or "investing the referent with a certain colour" — but there is a serious objection here. The metaphor of 'translation' must be cashed out if the definition is to be of any practical service in understanding metaphors, and this cannot be done. In its place we find various formulae purporting to explain how an auditor moves from the literal meaning of the sentence which confronts him to its metaphorical meaning. Such formulae have tended to cluster around two ideas — similarity or resemblance on the one hand, and comparison or analogy on the other.

All such formulae confront an impossible task. They are required to show how the meaning of every possible metaphor can be computed by applying the formula to the literal meanings of the sentences involved. Consider Peacham's
metaphor again: "thy word is a lantern unto my feet and a light unto my paths." Helped by the parallel structure of the two predicates, a resemblance formula would propose substitute words for 'lantern' and 'light' by trying to find the names of things that resembled lanterns and lights. An obvious candidate might be 'illumination'. Once again we have the problem of triteness. Although the sentiment is a familiar one, we might still feel that the sentence says something more than that God's word is illuminating. More important, have we really explained the metaphor here at all? Is the sense in which a lamp illuminates the same as the sense in which a word illuminates? If so, then there was no 'improper signification' in the original sentence, and the metaphor disappears. If not, all we have discovered is a species of ambiguity based on homonyms, an ambiguity which a competent speaker of English is accustomed to resolve according to context, as in "meet me on the corner by the bank." If this is so, then the resemblance formula itself is irrelevant.

One response to such a failure, much favoured in recent writings on metaphor, is to make the formula a great deal more complicated. Instead of looking for substitute words, we are urged to consider the ways in which certain key words in a metaphor might change their meaning, and the formula now promises to determine the new meaning for us.
Alternatively, it is claimed that metaphors are condensed comparisons in which the exact terms of the comparison are omitted. A comparison formula is then invoked to remedy this omission.

It is important to be clear about the part played by the formula here. A FORMULAIC approach treats a metaphor as a semantic puzzle to which it alone provides the key. The formula is not a dispensible device, suitable for explaining to someone who has hitherto failed to grasp the meaning of a metaphor how he might best go about doing so -- what we shall call a principle of interpretation -- but an integral part of the meaning of the metaphor. Knowledge of the formula is a condition of understanding the metaphor. According to the comparison formula, for example, Peacham's metaphor means that God's word is like a lantern in the following respects ..., and it undertakes to fill in the gaps. On such an account, it is the need to appeal to the relevant formula that distinguishes metaphorical from literal utterances.

The strong requirement that the formula shall unambiguously determine the meaning of the utterance is the ultimate stumbling block here. Consider Harold Macmillan's complaint during the Suez affair that, "the Afro-Asian pack was in full cry, with the United States and the Soviet Union as Joint-Masters." According to the sophisticated
similarity formula offered by Gustav Stern, someone hearing this metaphor calls to mind the subject of the metaphor, the diplomats, and the metaphorical referent, the pack of hounds. Then he picks out the element in the meaning of 'pack of hounds' which is applicable to the behaviour of the diplomats, and excludes other elements of its meaning as irrelevant. This formula errs on the side of precision. Macmillan's point, we might reply, is not that the diplomats pursued France and Britain 'with determination' or 'with deadly intent' or any of the other attributes which might literally apply to both diplomats and foxhounds, but that they did it in an instinctive way, coordinated by the Americans and the Russians as trained animals might be led. Stern's formula misses this entirely.

On the other hand, the comparison formula -- that the diplomats behaved like foxhounds -- is far too imprecise. Did they pour into the United Nations building snuffling and barking with President Eisenhower and Mr. Khruschev bringing up the rear in hunting pink? Of course not, but it is very difficult to imagine how comparisons are to be restricted to more relevant predicates without appealing to contextual notions of relevance which undermine the primacy of the formula. In other words, if the formula is part of the meaning of the utterance, the points of comparison between diplomats and foxhounds would have to be finite in scope and
recognizably independent of any context in which such a comparison would be made. However, as Max Black has pointed out, one of the most interesting features of a novel metaphor, like Macmillan's, is the way in which it suggests new points of comparison which we might have been hard put to discover before encountering the utterance in a particular context.

Of course, it is a relatively simple matter to come up with points of similarity or comparison once we do know the context of Macmillan's remark, the actions he was referring to and the point of his utterance, but this undercuts the claim of the formula to explain the meaning of a metaphor by simply rephrasing it. As Israel Scheffler has concluded:

Any impression that the formulaic approach offers us a firm rule for decoding metaphors must evaporate upon learning that the rule in question requires a context by context selection of the very criteria by which decoding is to proceed. And the notion that such a rule explains the 'mechanics' of metaphor must founder with the realisation that the mechanism operates through judgements of the importance specific to various contexts.

Our rejection of the formulaic approach to understanding metaphors will have important consequences for future claims about the intelligibility of political metaphors. By rejecting the 'translation' formula, we have circumvented
the whole debate over the 'improper' use of words. Whatever the possibilities that political metaphors offer for spreading confusion, these possibilities cannot be attributed to the misuse of words. Consequently, they cannot be remedied by 'plain-speaking' or simply by avoiding metaphors. The thrust of the linguistic critique of political metaphors, inspired in part by Bentham, is thereby deflected. It may indeed be true that "every improper term contains the germ of a fallacious proposition", but metaphors do not contain "improper terms".  

If the translation formula has lost ground in recent years, it has been replaced by the comparison formula as the 'commonsense' account of metaphor. Under the influence of the comparison view some political theorists have suggested that political metaphors may be analysed with the aid of just such an abstract formula, without regard to their contexts of use. The demonstration that no such formula can explain the meaning of a metaphor, and that points of comparison, whatever parts they might play in interpretation, are not antecedent to the appearance of a metaphor in a specific context, must cast doubt upon such a practice.

III. Metaphors are to be studied as language use, not as part of a language system.
One response to the failure of such simple formulae to give an adequate account of the meaning of a metaphor has been to lay the blame upon the theories of language which underwrite them. Men like Peacham, or even Stern, were working with 'pre-scientific' theories, and it is therefore unsurprising that their results were "general and impressionistic". However, recent developments in the science of linguistics have changed all that, and we are promised a theory which is both precise in its identification of metaphors and general in its explanation of how they function.\textsuperscript{10}

The distinctive character of linguists' treatments of metaphor derives from their general acceptance of a distinction between language behaviour and a language system. The linguist attempts to construct a model of the language system from the regularities that he observes in the language behaviour which furnishes his data.\textsuperscript{11} Many of these models have been some variation on the theme that a language system is made up of a dictionary of lexical items together with a set of rules which govern their arrangement and combination. The primary virtue of such a model, and the very foundation of the impressive achievements of modern linguistics, lies in the clear distinction between what belongs to the language system and what are merely extraneous, contingent features of language behaviour. From
this distinction flows the basic divide in linguistic theories of metaphor: are metaphors to be explained in terms of the rules of the system, or are they beyond the scope of linguistic inquiry, part of language behaviour?12 If the latter, then we must look elsewhere for theoretical treatments of metaphor, to disciplines such as psychology, psycholinguistics, pragmatics or stylistics. However, some accounts have been advanced in which it is proposed that metaphors belong to the language system, and it is to these that we must now turn.

As we might expect, proponents of a linguistic theory of metaphor base their accounts on the need to preserve the pristine clarity of the distinction between system and behaviour. It is noted that metaphors are treated in historical semantics as agents of meaning change, and often as one of the most important ways in which a natural language grows and develops. It would be unfortunate, or so it is argued, if we were to concede that an explanation of metaphor lay beyond the scope of linguistics, especially as 'dead metaphors' even find their way into the lexicon. What is more, a most important feature of a natural language seems to be missed if we ignore the way in which a statement, such as Enoch Powell's description of, "archbishops who live in palaces ... with the bedclothes pulled right up over their heads," may not only be given
several different readings by a native speaker, but differs from a sentence which that speaker would recognize as being incorrect or ill-formed.\textsuperscript{13} Our account of a language system ought to be able to accommodate it.

According to linguists, when we say that we have understood Powell's utterance we have assigned the sentence a particular interpretation. How we arrived at this interpretation must be explained in a broadly similar way whether it is a metaphorical or a literal interpretation if the linguist's explanation is going to be convincing.\textsuperscript{14} There can be no drawing back from this demand by an appeal to context, for the context of Powell's utterance will play exactly the same part in our interpretation of it as the context of the statement, "he will come here tomorrow," does in a literal interpretation. In other words, context will supplement the ordinary linguistic competence that we are trying to account for, not substitute for it.

Although this is not the place to submit such theories to detailed examination, it must be said that they have not been notably successful on their own terms. It has been easy enough to identify what is special about a metaphorical interpretation -- attaching a new sense to one or more words in the utterance -- but much more difficult to show how this is done as a recognizable variant of a literal reading. The structuralist authors of the \textit{Rhétorique générale} set the
problem up in a characteristically linguistic way in their analysis of the famous advertising slogan, "mettez un tigre dans votre moteur!" With a rare flash of humour, they remark that 'tigre' must be given "un sens modifié".

Jusqu'à nouvel ordre, la lexicalisation de tigre comme produisant la signifié 'super-super carburant' (ou quelque chose d'approchant) n'étant pas acquise, il faut expliquer pourquoi les automobilistes atteints par le message en question n'ont pas tenté d'introduire un fauve dans leur mécanique.

It has proved very difficult to show how this modified sense is attached to words without the appeal to context which we saw to be inadmissible. If a rule -- for example, a rule specifying certain relations between semantic features -- has to be reinterpreted in each case of metaphor, we are not explaining metaphorical interpretation as part of linguistic competence at all.

This difficulty has not prevented modern semiotic theory from taking up the challenge posed by metaphorical expressions. Umberto Eco, for example, reduces metaphors to chains of metonymic connections making up the underlying language system. These relations of "contiguity" must have already existed in the system, for, "in truth",

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Clearly, this denial that anyone can invent a new metaphor -- they can only grasp the possibilities inherent in the language system -- is a consequence of a profoundly influential philosophical position. As Eco explicitly acknowledges, his adversary is the doctrine that he calls "idealism", the belief that the speaking subject is anything other than a grammatical fiction. For Eco, nothing can be said that is not already at least potentially available in the language code, so that the critical relation is not that between thinking subjects and their "life world" -- as continental phenomenologists had argued -- but between subjects and the 'signifiers' of the code.¹⁸

This is not a debate which will directly concern us here. However, it is very clear that the semiotic approach to metaphors has greatly influenced some continental writings on political metaphors. Denying that speaking can be understood in any sense relevant to continental philosophy as an individual expressing 'himself', the project of "deconstructing" the codes in which political discourse is carried on has achieved a certain notoriety. The deconstruction of metaphors has a prominent part to play here, precisely because metaphors, as we have seen, are held to reveal the internal structures of language codes. Yet
semiological criticism has an important drawback for political critics, a drawback scrupulously respected by its most distinguished proponents, and wilfully ignored by popularizers. It is strongly anti-realist in its denial that we can ever 'get beyond' language codes. There is always a code to be deconstructed.

To consider semiotic theories in the detail that they deserve would entail too great a digression from the main aims of the present work. We must be content to repeat a point made by Meyer Abrams in summing up the significance of his work on the metaphors of aesthetics. He insists that the use of "canonical metaphors" is only intelligible if they are held to be the responses of intelligent agents to understood situations, and these agents find it worthwhile to employ such metaphors:

Such a canonical metaphor, in my view, flourishes and recurs because its particular pertinence and area of focus make it profitable in critical discourse. And it is profitable because, even though less than fully adequate, it provides us with a fuller understanding of something beyond its own internal economy.19

In short, political metaphors are employed because of what political agents can find out about politics with their aid. It is up to us to discern what was found out about politics, and why each metaphor was used in one way rather than in
another. Once again, we are insisting on the autonomy of the study of political metaphors from more general literary and linguistic concerns.

For these reasons, summing up linguistic theories of metaphor, the student of political metaphors might consider a constructive suggestion by John Lyons. He argues that metaphors could lie outside the scope of linguistics, having less to do with the rules and structures of a language system than with what he refers to as the strategies of creative language use: "the language user's ability to extend the system by means of motivated, but unpredictable, principles of abstraction and comparison." A linguistic theory of metaphor would have very little to say about unpredictable principles, but the suggestion that metaphors be approached through an interpretative strategy is an interesting one. We are led to consider the principles actually employed in constructing and understanding a particular metaphor -- two of which Lyons has already suggested -- and the "motivation" that prompted their employment. The reference to lack of predictability allows for the possibility of truly novel metaphors, but this does not entail that a metaphorical reading, once made, cannot then be explained.

In other words, our account of why it was that the motorists who were attracted by the slogan, "mettez un tigre
dans votre moteur," should flock to buy petrol rather than an endangered species of wild animal will have two parts. First it will explain why these people decided that a metaphorical reading was an appropriate one in the circumstances. Second, rather than attempting to explain how they produced the metaphorical reading as a special case of understanding the meaning of a word, we shall look at metaphorical interpretation as a principled, if unpredictable, way of establishing sense at the level of the sentence. We must then consider what more can be said about such principles.

IV. How do we recognize metaphorical utterances?

Our first question, then, is how to discern whether a sentence is to be read metaphorically or not. Put like this, the question itself is extremely misleading, for it has suggested to many theorists, especially linguists, that we are looking for some infallible criterion which marks a sentence as a metaphor.21 If we ask why a reader thought it was appropriate to interpret a particular utterance as a metaphor we are much less likely to be misled in this way, for it has become something of a commonplace in theories of metaphor to note that no such infallible criterion has yet been discovered. Theorists who set out to find some
'semantic impertinence' which signals a need for a metaphorical reading, soon discover that there is always a simple metaphor which is not 'impertinent' in the way that they have stated. In particular, the phenomenon of 'twice-true' sentences -- 'he is a clown', for example -- which may be equally metaphorical or literal assertions has persuaded theorists to fall back on a reader's inferences from the context of the sentence. But what does 'context' mean here?

Once again, if we are looking for an infallible criterion, the admission that a context-by-context selection of the relevant criterion is needed to distinguish between metaphorical and literal utterances must cast doubt upon the whole enterprise. As Max Black has argued, it makes much more sense to see the ability to recognize a metaphor as just that -- an ability, like the ability to recognize jokes or puns. We may be able to give reasons for preferring a metaphorical to a literal reading, and one of the most important reasons will be that a literal reading is unsatisfactory in an obvious way. There is a patent absurdity in a literal reading of "put a tiger in your tank" as there is an obvious falsity to the claim that archbishops really do live in palaces with the bedclothes pulled up over their heads and a banality to the literal assertion that no man is an island. Our recognition of this fact may suggest
to us that we interpret such statements metaphorically, but we have to decide that this is so in individual cases. As a consequence, someone who wants their utterances to be given a metaphorical interpretation will sometimes use certain conventional stylistic devices to alert us to his intention -- characteristic grammatical constructions, for example. On the other hand, our 'knack' for producing metaphorical readings may desert us, and we are all familiar with the experience of having someone point out a metaphor where we had settled for a literal reading.

Treating metaphors in this way has a number of incidental advantages. For example, we see how fruitless it is to argue over whether a metaphorical utterance must have been intended metaphorically. As I have suggested, someone may signal their intention to speak metaphorically in a number of conventional ways -- and identifying these ways will be important to us when we are trying to recover what someone meant in saying something -- but we are less interested in whether or not an auditor does interpret the utterance metaphorically or literally than in why he should think it appropriate to give the particular interpretation that he does, and in how he arrives at it. Rather than being puzzled by Donald Davidson's example of the two stories in the newspaper, one reporting Hemingway's death in an airplane crash, the next superceding it with an account of
his being missing, but both headlined "Hemingway lost in Africa", we are provided with an interesting sidelight on metaphorical competence. The editor presumably thought it safe to assume that the story would guide the reader's interpretations, first to a metaphor, then to a literal reading.

In addition to these considerations, Timothy Binkley has shown that to suppose that a criterion like falsity or nonsensicality is part of the meaning of a metaphor entails an oversimplified account of the way that metaphors are actually used. Thus (to take a more realistic example than Binkley's), consider Burke's defence of the constitution of the Ancien Régime.

Your constitution it is true, whilst you were out of possession, suffered waste and dilapidation; but you possessed in some parts the walls and in all the foundation of a noble and venerable castle.

There are many reasons that could be put forward for a metaphorical reading. Once such a reading has been made, however, its negation is not the statement that 'a constitution is not a castle', but the assertion that the French constitution was dilapidated and had wasted beyond repair, leaving only rubbish to be cleared from the site of a new constitutional edifice. The function of the claim that
a constitution is not a castle might be to justify our metaphorical reading to someone who had failed to find the metaphor, but it plays no part in an explanation of what the metaphor means.

V. Metaphors considered as semantic innovation.

If this rejection of a distinguishing criterion for metaphorical and literal utterances is correct, the main burden of our conceptual investigation shifts. It settles firmly on the second question which we teased from le groupe μ's demand for an explanation, that is, onto an account of the principles on which a metaphorical reading is made or the way in which a statement read metaphorically makes sense. Having already cast doubt upon the efficacy of traditional formulae and upon the relevance of linguistic investigations, we turn to those philosophers of language who have concerned themselves with metaphorical utterances. Here we find three broadly different lines of argument which I shall distinguish in outline before considering in detail.

The first approach most resembles the theories we have already examined. Those who pursue it argue that in a metaphor the sense established at the level of the sentence imposes a change of meaning upon one or more key words in the sentence. The problem for such theorists is to explain
how a word can acquire a new sense in a single, novel instance, and it is usually tackled by appeal to a metaphorical extension of the literal sense of the word involved, but without suggesting that the new sense is computed by means of a formula. The literary critics I. A. Richards and William Empson have been formative influences upon this tradition of theorising, most notably upon Max Black, whose work we shall consider in detail. Beneath a brilliant surface of eclecticism, a similar theory may perhaps be discerned in the writings of Paul Ricoeur. We shall refer to these accounts as INNOVATION theories.

Both of the other approaches differ from innovation theories in arguing that a metaphorical reading of a sentence involves no change of sense for any word in the original utterance. This neatly circumvents the problem of how to assign a new meaning to a word, but now the problem is to explain how an auditor assigns a meaning to an utterance if he has determined that a literal meaning is inappropriate. At this point the two approaches diverge. One — we shall call it the INDIRECTION theory — argues that a metaphorical utterance is one of a group of utterances in which a speaker says one thing but means another. We are then owed an account of the special principles which auditors use to move from sentence meaning to utterance meaning when the latter is metaphorical. The principal
exponent of the theory has been John Searle. Against this, the CONSEQUENTIALIST theory maintains that the literal meaning of an utterance is the only meaning that the sentence will bear, but suggests that a speaker using a sentence metaphorically is relatively uninterested in the literal meaning of the sentence he utters (a meaning which is closely identified by such theorists with propositional content). The speaker's primary concern, it is argued, is with the special effects that his utterance has on his audience. A consequentialist conveniently sidesteps all the difficulties involved in showing how an auditor makes a special sense out of a metaphorical utterance, but the cogency of the theory depends on the account that he gives of the terms 'effects' and 'consequences'. Until recently, consequentialist accounts of metaphor were associated with emotivism in ethics and literary criticism, but the thesis has now been given a new lease of life by Donald Davidson.

We begin, then, with the innovation theory and with its most influential formulation in the writings of Max Black. In his pioneering essay 'Metaphor', Black introduced a distinction between the 'focus' and the 'frame' of a metaphor which plays a crucial role in any innovation theory. He uses as an example "the chairman ploughed through the discussion."
An obvious point to begin with is the contrast between the word 'ploughed' and the remaining words by which it is accompanied. This would be commonly expressed by saying that ploughed has here a metaphorical sense, while the other words have literal senses. Although we point to the whole sentence as an instance ... of metaphor, our attention quickly narrows to a single word whose presence is the proximate reason for the attribution. ... In general, when we speak of a relatively simple metaphor we are referring to an expression in which some words are used metaphorically and where the remainder are used non-metaphorically.

This metaphorical word - the focus - is identified by the need to find a new sense for it if the statement as a whole is to make sense. The chairman did not really make a furrow in the committee room, so 'ploughed' needs something more than its everyday range of meanings. This idea of a speaker or hearer attaching a new sense to a word is, Black has claimed, "too familiar to arouse perplexity." The problem of metaphor then becomes a matter of showing how the focus acquires its new sense. This much about metaphor may be derived from a careful reading of Richards or Empson: Black's special contribution is to propose a solution to the problem in terms of an "interaction" between focus and frame.

Recall Burke's metaphor that a constitution is a castle (a summary of his whole utterance which Black would call a "metaphor-theme"), expressed in the statement that, "your
constitution it is true, whilst you were out of possession suffered waste and dilapidation." Black would say that this metaphor has as its primary subject the constitution of the Ancien Régime, and as its secondary subject a set of implications supported by the idea of a dilapidated castle. The metaphor works, not by comparing a constitution with a castle, but by projecting back upon the primary subject the set of implication associated with the secondary subject of this particular metaphor. The result is to organise and "filter" a particular view of the primary subject while simultaneously effecting changes in the meaning of the focal words ('waste' and 'dilapidation').

Evidently, this account rests on Black being a little more forthcoming about how the implications sustained by the secondary subject are created and then projected back on the primary subject. In his more recent writings Black has obligingly listed five "projective relations": identity, similarity, analogy, extension and metaphorical coupling. How might this work in the case of Burke's metaphor? A castle, we might say, is a massively constructed edifice, solidly founded; some of its upper works may fall into disrepair; but they may yet be of use if their foundation or not decayed. Here is our implication complex. Projected upon the constitution of the Ancien Régime this yields the claims that a constitution is deeply embedded in a nation's
political life; that the various rights and privileges which it guarantees might fall into desuetude; but that the process has not gone so far as to touch the fabric of the constitution and thus leave no basis upon which to revive those rights remaining, and to found others more suitable to modern conditions.

The first projection in this example would be an example of analogy, the second a similarity based on the analogy, whilst the third contains its own metaphor, the 'fabric of the constitution', mediated by the original analogy. Our interpretation here has been guided by Black's general remarks that his analysis seeks to preserve the ambience of a good metaphor, the feeling and tone with which it invests the primary subject, while at the same time giving some rigour to the idea of projection and the concomitant extended sense of "waste and dilapidation". Has Black succeeded here?

Note first how important a part is played by analogy in the projective relations. Black has explicitly recognized this, conceding that his original formulation of the problem paid insufficient attention to the relation between a metaphor and an analogue model:

Every implication complex supported by a metaphor's secondary subject, I now think, is a model of the ascriptions imputed to the primary
subject Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model.

As we have suggested, the difference that Black still maintains between a metaphor and a model is to be found in the explicit nature of the comparisons that characterize a model, with a consequent loss of "power to illuminate" compared with a good metaphor. A metaphor, in Black's sense of the term, is open-ended, and he explains this, first, in terms of a secondary subject's imposing more than one implication complex on its primary subject, and second, because the projections themselves may be open-ended, involving their own metaphorical relations, ad hoc similarities and extensions. In this sense, too, the projective relations are not to be thought of as rules or formulae, but as closer to the creative strategies of interpretation mentioned by Lyons. Formulating the implications, specifying the analogies and teasing out the ensuing relations of likeness and difference may result in increased precision, but a price will be paid in terms of illumination.

Criticism of Black's account concentrates on three main areas, in each of which serious problems are exposed. The first line of criticism has been directed at his claim, made in his original essay, that a metaphor which involves
interaction between its subjects -- that is, any really illuminating metaphor -- cannot be paraphrased. In Black's own words, that a literal paraphrase purporting to state the "cognitive content" of such a metaphor, "will not have the same power to enlighten and inform as the original." The main stumbling block here is the notion of a "cognitive content". We may happily accept that the literal paraphrases involved in our interpretation of Burke's metaphor are only a part of what the metaphor 'means', but we should note that an extended sense of 'meaning' is being invoked here. In particular, this extended sense sits unhappily with the notion of a cognitive content. In a later essay, Black deals with the weakness of literal paraphrases by referring to the "emphasis and resonance" of a strong metaphor, which, together with the "power to enlighten and inform" direct our attention away from narrow senses of 'meaning', especially away from those connected with truth. However, in this sense of 'meaning', metaphors share with literal utterances like the mot juste or the epigram a feeling that only this word or phrase will do, analogously, perhaps, with the sense in which we think that a musical phrase must be played in just this particular way to be 'correct'.

These are undoubtedly interesting phenomena, and it is useful to be reminded that they play a central part in the comprehension of metaphorical utterances, but they surely
point more towards the effects of the utterance rather than towards anything that is recognizably a cognitive content. 34 Once a metaphor has suggested a certain set of implications to us -- and we can happily concede that we might have been hard put to arrive at them without its aid -- what is to prevent us from paraphrasing the result? Black's remarks seem much less relevant to metaphors as devices for communicating specific 'contents' as they are to the sense in which a metaphorical utterance is a performance or an event with recognizable consequences. We shall have more to say about this when we come to consider consequentialist theories, but on the whole question of literal paraphrases and cognitive contents it is difficult to fault Donald Davidson's trenchant critique.

There is, then, a tension in the usual view of metaphor. For, on the one hand, the usual view wants to hold that a metaphor does something no plain prose can possibly do, and, on the other hand, it wants to explain what a metaphor does by appealing to a cognitive content -- just the sort of thing plain prose is designed to express. 35

But what now is to be made of 'interaction', the original concept upon which this radical prohibition on paraphrase is based? Many critics have expressed unabashed scepticism that anything remotely resembling interaction takes place in a metaphor. We recall that Black took over
the term from Richards, where the latter was concerned to combat the view that the secondary subject of a metaphor was a mere embellishment of the real or underlying meaning of the statement. His special concern was to be able to analyse the relative contributions made by both primary and secondary subjects to the meaning of the whole utterance, and, by speaking of interaction, he emphasized that the meaning was a product of the combination of both subjects in context, not analyzable from the properties of each taken separately. This is a very sound point, the cornerstone of a successful critique of formulaic theories, and a necessary foundation for any sophisticated analysis of the projective relations of a novel metaphor such as that offered by Black.

However, the notion of interaction plays another role in Black's own theory, and one that bears examination. He appeals to interaction to explain how the focal word or phrase acquires a new meaning, and in this sense it is the centrepiece of his semantic innovation account. The problem Black has set himself is to show how the projective relations that arise out of 'interaction' are so completely watertight that they can determine a new meaning for a word. In other words, he suggests that the implication complex, in addition to predicing certain things of the primary subject, "reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject." In Burke's metaphor which we have been
using as an example, we are to show how 'waste and dilapidation' now mean -- for speakers and hearers -- loss of rights and decay of institutions. Yet, as commentators as different in orientation as Ricoeur and Scheffler have pointed out, it is difficult to see how such 'new meanings' are attached without an appeal to auditors' judgements in context. If this is so, then the temptation to look upon the projective relations as rules or formulae independently of their use in particular contexts is removed, and the fear that prompted Richards to introduce the notion of semantic interaction is done away with.

Furthermore, the whole notion of a metaphor seems to be undermined by the demand that the focal words change their meaning, by interaction or any other means. We are inclined to suggest that if, in Burke's metaphor, 'waste and dilapidation' really mean loss of rights, then the sense in which his claim is a metaphorical one is lost. As we shall see, the notion of an interaction between primary and secondary subjects has some interesting applications to conventional political metaphors, but it cannot carry the theoretical weight that Black demands. He handles the difficult question about metaphor -- explaining how a constitution could be said to have fallen into disrepair -- with his careful account of the different ways in which a hearer may project the implications of 'disrepair' onto the
VI. Alternatives to semantic innovation: indirect speech and the consequences of a metaphorical utterance.

Considerations of exactly this last kind have prompted the indirection and consequentialist accounts of metaphor. The former account, it will be recalled, argues that what a metaphorical utterance means is not what it says, but something else. This 'something else' will be another statement with straightforward, literal truth conditions (a paraphrase, if you will), arrived at by applying certain principles of inference specific to metaphors to the original statement. Thus the projective relations that Black has been developing are still relevant to any account of how metaphors work, it is just that Black and other innovation theorists have mistaken their proper function. They are not an integral part of the meaning of the metaphor -- as truth conditions are an integral part of the meaning of a literal assertion -- but aids in "calling to mind" the relevant paraphrase. Consequentialists have no truck with any talk of the meaning of metaphorical utterances; metaphors are employed for their special effects or consequences, not to communicate propositional content.

Undoubtedly John Searle's formulation of the
indirection approach to metaphors -- that when a speaker utters a statement metaphorically he says one thing but means another -- has a certain elegance which innovation theories lack. Based on a distinction between sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning developed by Searle and Grice, it simply claims that, in a metaphorical assertion, sentence meaning is given by the truth conditions of what is said; speaker's utterance meaning is given by the truth conditions of another literal statement, different from the first but related to it indirectly. There is no longer any need to speak of metaphorical meanings, but we do need to know how a hearer moves from what he hears to what he thinks the speaker means; in other words, how he constructs or infers the statement which is the meaning of the metaphorical utterance.\(^{38}\)

A detailed comparison of innovation and indirection theories would require an analysis of theories of meaning which is, once again, well beyond the scope of the present work. Let us, instead, consider the ways in which Black's account of metaphor may be fruitfully modified by the positive proposals of indirection and consequential theorists. The clear advantage of the indirectionist's claim that, in a metaphor, we may distinguish between what a speaker or writer says and what he means, is the way in which it takes us right away from tinkering with sentence
meaning in our effort to make sense of the metaphor. We no longer have any temptation to suggest that any word has changed its meaning, so we have no more use for the various baroque theoretical edifices which purport to show how this may be done. In addition, it fits very happily with our suggestion that understanding a metaphor involves motivated inferential strategies on the part of the reader and the writer. It makes sense to ask what part Burke's metaphor played in his overall project in the Reflections when we are trying to decide what it means. We are thereby led to consider what Burke was doing in speaking metaphorically.

The disadvantage lies in the ever present danger that an indirection theory will reduce metaphor to an ornament. If Burke really only meant that the constitution of the Ancien Régime had fallen into desuetude but not beyond hope of restoration, why did he feel it necessary to talk about walls and foundations? Innovation theorists fear that unless we can show how a particular metaphorical construction was necessary to impose new meanings on certain key words, we will necessarily return to the view that metaphors are mere 'clothing' for an underlying literal meaning. Searle's reply to this -- that it is only by going through sentence meaning that it is possible to arrive at the speaker's utterance meaning -- may appear to be a lame one, but it deserves close consideration.
First, Searle is on strong ground when he says that innovation theories tend to confuse the question of how a metaphor works with the question of what a metaphor means. There can only be one answer to the latter question; that a metaphor means what it does in the same way that any other use of language 'means'. We saw the difficulties which dogged attempts to show that words could have a literal meaning and a metaphorical meaning. We ought to be suspicious of talk about different 'kinds' of meaning.

Second, the suggestion that a reader or hearer first 'goes through' sentence meaning before he can arrive at utterance meaning should remind us of Black's suggestion that a metaphor organises or filters our thinking about a subject. Claims about the distinctive effects of speaking metaphorically have tended to be played down in the attempt to rehabilitate the cognitive status of metaphor. Black's idea that the degree of emphasis that a writer places on his exact wording is closely linked with the 'resonance' of a metaphor clearly resembles Searle's insistence that it is the different inferential steps which recover a speaker's meaning that give a distinctive 'feel' to different metaphors.

Donald Davidson has pursued this idea furthest, to the extent of denying that the meaning of a metaphor is ever a proposition -- or, at least, that it hardly ever is. Why, he
asks, do other theorists have such difficulty in explaining what a metaphor means in terms of a cognitive content?

The reason it is often so hard to decide is, I think, that we imagine there is a content to be captured when all the while we are focussing on what the metaphor makes us notice. If what the metaphor makes us notice were finite in scope and propositional in nature this would not in itself lead to trouble; we would simply project the content that the metaphor brought to mind onto the metaphor. But in fact there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, and much of what we are caused to notice is not propositional in character. When we try to say what a metaphor "means" we soon realise that there is no end to what we want to mention. . . . How many facts or propositions are conveyed by a photograph? None, an infinity, or one great unstable fact? Bad question. A picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture.

There is undoubtedly a weakness here in the equivocation on what exactly a metaphor might help us "notice". It is hard to see why it should not include propositional knowledge, even if this by no means exhausts the meaning of the metaphor -- in the extended sense of meaning. Davidson even uses the same words as Searle and Black to explain how this knowledge might be derived: "project the content that the metaphor brought to mind onto the metaphor." But this equivocation notwithstanding, it is a powerful and suggestive account of the way in which metaphors function. They bring us up short and make us
notice something we might otherwise overlook. We shall find the notion of 'seeing as' particularly useful, and Davidson's point that in order to see something as something else, nothing can take the place of having experience, is worth noting. If nothing else, it suggests a way of analysing the metaphors of "filter" and "calling to mind" which we shall pursue in Chapter Four. But his denial that one of the consequences might be knowledge that can be passed on in propositional form is certainly an odd one, and we may suspect that it is prompted more by his strict account of the relation between meaning and truth than by attending to the possible consequences of a metaphorical utterance.

VII. Metaphors as indirect attribution.

How do Black's views on metaphor look when modified in the light of Searle's and Davidson's comments? We retain the focus on metaphor as a phenomenon at the level of the sentence or even the text. We also retain and develop the notion that the propositional content of a metaphor is arrived at by a process of projecting a set of implications sustained by the combination of primary and secondary subjects back onto the primary subject. There is no great harm done in calling this 'interaction' if we wish. But, in
addition to the propositional content of a metaphorical utterance, we must recognize that the operation of the various projective relations or principles of metaphorical interpretation may give rise to a number of interesting effects -- in particular, they may cause us to notice something about or attend to an aspect of a subject which we might otherwise have overlooked. On the one hand we have an apparent loss: no exhaustive account of the principles of metaphorical interpretation can be expected, for this would deny the creativity we rightly associate with a metaphor. On the other hand, we gain in being able to consider the question of why anyone should want to use a metaphor with greater precision. In particular, we see that no very general answer to this question can be expected. There is no one 'function' of metaphor in political language, and we are to look to the actual practice and projects of those who have used political metaphors to determine their reasons.  

In future, then, when we refer to 'metaphor', we shall be referring to a particular kind of attribution, where to attribute is, "to use a device in order to ascribe certain qualities, properties, relations, actions, states or dispositions to some or other subject." A metaphorical attribution is one that is INDIRECT in the sense that Searle has given to that term.

This definition, it should be noted, does not imply
that a metaphorical attribution is one in which the qualities or properties ascribed to a subject are necessarily deviant in any sense, nor need they even be properties or qualities which might be unexpected when ascribed to that subject. This would involve a search for the metaphorical warrant within the sentence, a search which we have shown to be fruitless. Searle's indirection theory is based instead upon Grice's notion of conversational implicature for its account of how an indirect statement -- including a metaphor -- differs from a direct one. Very schematically, Grice argued that a speaker and a hearer share certain presuppositions about the character of conversation, for example, that speaker and hearer cooperated in making their meanings transparent to one another, presuppositions which may be deliberately flouted when a speaker says one thing and means another. As we have seen, Searle argues that metaphors belong in this class of utterances.

Once the hearer has grasped that the speaker's attribution is indirect in this sense, he uses his knowledge of the principles on which a metaphor may be constructed in order to arrive at the speaker's meaning. If the speaker merely wishes to assert a proposition, we must assume that he has special reasons for asserting it indirectly, and that these have to do with the interesting effects of making the
hearer 'think through' a metaphorical attribution. However, the danger that a hearer will not be able to reconstruct the principles on which the metaphor is constructed, or will arrive at some quite different meaning, is an occupational hazard of speaking metaphorically.

Obviously, as a theory of metaphor this brief sketch leaves a great deal to be desired. As a framework within which political metaphors can be studied, it is perfectly adequate. It allows us to identify metaphors, and shows us where to look for some of the more interesting effects of metaphorical utterances. It confronts, if it does not resolve, the major philosophical puzzles raised by the concept 'metaphor', and we can move on to consider metaphors in discourse that is recognizably political.
In the previous chapter, we approached metaphors through a consideration of language and uses of language. This conjunction is an important one for, while recognizing the contribution of a 'language system' to the sense of a metaphorical utterance, it nevertheless emphasises the work put in by authors and audiences when they construct and understand metaphors. Ultimately, we are directed away from language considered as a 'code' or 'structure', and towards the projects and activities of those who use it.

Objections to treating metaphors as an aspect of language -- whether of 'code' or of use -- have not been wanting. Such objections, however, have usually been part of a more general argument about the relation between language, thought and action which is not itself particularly compelling or cogent. The argument has a tendency to conclude that all language is in some sense metaphorical, and to locate metaphors themselves at the level of concept formation. Despite such idiosyncracies, these accounts of
metaphor are well worth considering on their own merits, and they are of special interest to us because of their association with an influential treatment of political language which we shall shortly encounter. In fact, an assertion about the 'pre-linguistic' character of metaphor plays an important part in most accounts of why political metaphors are such a prominent feature of political language.

The principal objection to a linguistic treatment of metaphor arises from considerations of this sort. There is a paradox in trying to investigate metaphorical utterances, it is claimed, because the more carefully we look, the more evident it becomes that the language we are using to describe these utterances is itself metaphorical. The only way that linguists and philosophers have appeared to escape this paradox is by making an artificial distinction between figurative and non-figurative language, and carefully using the one to describe the other. However, this is no real escape because it begs the question of whether figurativeness is not a general feature of all language -- all language might be metaphorical -- for we have assumed a distinction which we really ought to have established by argument. We are constantly reminded of this circularity by the metaphorical character of our own descriptions of metaphor, for the empty jargon of philosophy or linguistics
is only an illusory alternative to obvious metaphors like 'tenor and vehicle', 'turning', 'tension' or 'verbal leaps'. Taking our cue from the fact that 'metaphor' is itself a metaphor, with its connotations of 'carrying across', we are urged to locate its essential character outside language, preferably in 'thought'.

We might be tempted not to take this line of argument very seriously. After all, the reflexive capabilities of language are not particularly mysterious. However, the fact that many of these objections arise out of a rather dated metaphysical desire to transcend what are perceived to be the constraining limits of language should not cause us to overlook the more interesting points that they raise. We should certainly be aware that the metaphorical-literal pair can appear a dubious distinction, especially if metaphorical attribution is analysed as a deviation from a standard model of predication. In such cases, the appearance of metaphors in an account of metaphor would be a serious flaw. Our account has made no such absolute distinctions, allowing a continuum of relatively more or less figurative readings, and giving no special priority of the literal over the figurative. The objection may hold against formulaic theories, but not elsewhere.

More serious objections to our argument so far are to be discerned in the claim that metaphor is an attribute of
thought rather than language. We have already suggested that it is connected with a further claim that to deny the conceptual dimension of metaphor is inevitably to underestimate its potential, a double charge which is neatly made by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.

Metaphor is typically viewed as a characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than of thought or action. For this reason most people think that they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found on the contrary that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.

Metaphor would be pervasive indeed if this were true. But such a sweeping claim only makes 'metaphor' itself more mysterious than ever. Are there literal concepts, for example, and if not, is 'metaphor' just another name for a concept? The other side of exactly the same coin has been expressed by Warren Shibbles, also concerned that the restriction of metaphor to language deprecates it and leads to the belief that a metaphor is a dispensable stylistic device. Working with the linguistic theories of W. M. Urban, he argued that if, as Urban thought, language precedes or determines thought through the categories and distinctions which it imposes upon experience, then a metaphor is as
equally an "avenue to knowledge" as the most severely literal expression. Both of these objections seek to meet formulaic theories by pointing out that language cannot be understood only in terms of signs and operations, but is inextricably bound up with a conceptual system in terms of which people think and act. We shall refer to views like these as CONSTRUCTIVIST theories of metaphor.

The reminder that we are dealing with a set of related concepts expressed in language is an important one, but constructivist theories flirt with a dangerous absurdity. Lakoff and Johnson skirt the issue warily with the formulation that, "metaphor is . . . not just in language but in thought and action." However, Shibbles, more ambitiously, is led to speculate whether language might not 'determine' thought. The genuine objection here, as Lakoff and Johnson make clear, is to a theory which treats metaphor as an aspect of "language alone", but it is difficult to imagine how there could be such a language where signs had no sense. Machiavelli's famous metaphor that a prince, "must be a fox in order to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten off wolves," expresses a certain 'thought' about the conduct of princes. Lakoff and Johnson have given us a valuable reminder that the conceptual connections revealed by this metaphor are worth pursuing. At its simplest, it tells us something about our ordinary concept 'prince', the meaning
we ordinarily express and the people we pick out by the term, that the attribution of fox and wolf behaviour is metaphorical. One thing that we do know about a prince is that he is not, literally speaking, either a fox or a lion. But we do not add anything to this by saying that we really have a metaphorical thought here, for the language and the thought are conceptually connected. Saussure expressed this connection, in a famous analogy, as being like two sides of the same sheet of paper.

The real danger of absurdity lies in bringing together the argument about the primacy of figurative language with the notion that a thought is something psychological, a "movement of thought". Then we are likely to be told that a metaphor is nothing less than the basic operation of thinking, the bringing of hitherto unknown phenomena under familiar categories, and the capacity to produce new categories by association. This is firmly in the tradition of the whole 'origins of language' argument, in which it is claimed that all words were originally metaphors and that what we innocently call literal language is merely language that has disguised its figurative origins.\(^5\)

We shall refer to this extension of the constructivist theory as the FOSSIL theory, for its exponents conceive of words as having once been live metaphors, but, becoming embedded in a language and acquiring definite sense and
reference, at length hardening into literal terms. The etymologist's skill is analogous to that of the paleontologist -- from the fossilized remains he reconstructs the original life of a word like 'perception', 'scruple' or 'attention', showing us how a primitive and impoverished language is enriched by metaphorical extension of terms. The problem then becomes whether our words for mental processes offer us a picture of the way in which all words were formed, or whether they -- and many of our words for political practices -- themselves stand in need of explanation as special cases of the metaphorical attributions we have been examining.

We must recognize that constructivist theories are designed to rescue metaphors from the depreciating tendencies of a rhetorical analysis in which a metaphor becomes no more than clever linguistic trick. At their most cogent, the constructivists remind us that language-use expresses concepts held by those who speak and write, and connects what people say with what they do and what they want. On this view, metaphors are to be examined for what they can tell us about the concepts entertained by those who use them, especially the conceptual boundaries which are marked when someone prefers a metaphorical to literal reading of a particular utterance. What is the significance for conduct when men talk about politics in terms usually
associated with the theatre or the bedroom? Has the acceptance of such metaphors changed men's understanding of political activity -- their concepts of politics -- or has it merely illustrated something which could be expressed in terms recognizably literal?

These are important and interesting questions raised by a constructivist theory of metaphor, questions which we shall attempt to answer when studying particular political metaphors, but two points need to be clarified. First, they are questions about the language used by particular men engaged in political activity, not questions about an abstraction, 'political language'. Second, that asking such questions in this way locates the presence or absence of a metaphor within a particular discourse. No external standard is to be applied to determine whether a statement is metaphorical or literal: the issue is to be decided by the presence or absence of the inferential strategies characterizing metaphorical readings in a particular audience's reading. Much will depend on the context of the utterance, and here we may draw a preliminary distinction between the original context and subsequent secondary contexts in which the original statement may be used again, or perhaps be an object of study. An utterance is only metaphorical according a certain interpretation of it.

The mistake of some constructivists is to sever this
link between metaphor and language-use, and to locate metaphors in 'thought', a context as abstract as the 'language' it was designed to supercede. This is particularly evident when a mild constructivism is extended into the full-blown fossil theory. It makes no difference then how a writer or speaker is using the term 'government', for example, or what any real audience might have taken him to mean. What interests the fossil theorist is the etymological connections between government and navigation, and he overlooks the genuine and interesting distinctions between cases in which such etymological connections are deliberately revived by an author as part of his persuasive project, cases in which such connection are inadvertently drawn upon by an audience, and the general run of cases in which the word is neither used nor understood with any hint of guiding, steering or navigating.

These objections notwithstanding, we should not overlook the genuine insights offered by a mild constructivism as a theory of language and metaphor. It reminds us that the way people use words is a clue to the criteria which they accept for the correct application of those words. Changes in usage, the blurring or separating of conceptual boundaries and other evidence for contested criteria, are all connected with changes in the way that people understand their world. Constructivists are right to
draw our attention to the role of metaphors here, for the inferential strategies used to make sense of a metaphorical utterance can often provide us with an overview of a whole area of interrelated concepts that go to make up a social philosophy. A conventional metaphor will reveal an orderly set of distinctions, while a novel metaphor may show us an attempt at the deliberate realignment.

If we are to take proper advantage of constructivism, the temptation to turn from the complexities of language-use to the pristine abstractions of 'language' or 'thought' must be avoided. Here the student of political metaphor has an advantage over the linguist or the philosopher of language, for the activity of politics is always before him, reminding him of the real activities that furnish his examples and illustrations. We shall not underestimate the contribution of language to political activity. But if we keep in mind what all the talking is about, we shall better be able to understand the specific contributions of political metaphors.

II. The case against political metaphors 'in thought'.

I have suggested that constructivist theories of metaphor have found some exponents among theorists of political language. David Yamada, for example, argues that
metaphors involve "comparison and juxtaposition" of a subject and a modifier. However, his subjects and modifiers prove to bear no relation to the metaphorical utterances we have been considering. We learn that *vita activa*, *vita contemplativa*, *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, Christian Commonwealth and Kingdom of Darkness, bourgeoisie and proletariat are all, "metaphors evoking pictures of the human condition." As stated, these are not metaphors at all, at least in the sense what we have come to attach to that term. Perhaps they might be thought of as metaphor-themes or archetypes, the set of model-like relations which Max Black claimed to discern underlying certain suggestive metaphors. But if they are models, we are entitled to ask what they are models of, and to say that they are models of the "human condition" is hardly very helpful, for we have no independently specifiable account of that condition which would enable us to compare the one with the other. Yamada himself would doubtless reject this reduction of his 'metaphors', for it appears that the pictures of the human condition are supposed to be evoked by the combination of the two sides of each pair. Such metaphors, he suggests, "impart new meanings not directly derived from empirical experience."  

Perhaps a metaphorical pair like *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* is best viewed as a conceptual model. In other
words, rather than taking each term singly and mapping it against an area of reality which is independently specifiable, we bring our political experience under a dual conceptual classification which will make it significant in ways that it was not before. Better still, we might say that it allows us to express a significance for which we previously lacked appropriate terms. To talk about politics in terms of the vita activa and the vita contemplativa creates new significance in political activity, it poses hitherto unsuspected questions about the value of political life, and suggests novel ways of justifying or condemning political practices and institutions. The appearance of such novel conceptual classifications constitutes the very possibility of proceeding in these ways. But we have here two distinct sets of questions, and we must keep them distinct. First, we want to know whether this is a defensible view of political language; and we shall seek to show that it is. Second, given such an account of political language, does it make sense to call all or part of political language, 'metaphorical'? We shall seek to show that it does not.

On the first question, Yamada has clearly hit upon an aspect of political language which is of great importance. The possession of certain concepts, and the language with which to express them, is a precondition of men being said
to have performed certain actions. An obvious example -- and a favourite of philosophers of science, is voting. Unless men possess the concept of a vote, understand the connection between marking a ballot and choosing a representative, then no matter how many crosses they may draw, it is only in a very restricted sense of the term that they may be described as having 'voted'. But Yamada is making an even more ambitious claim than this one. He proposes that some of these constitutive concepts in political understanding are, in fact, conceptual metaphors. These, we might imagine, are concepts 'structured' in terms of an activity which is recognizably not political activity. Unfortunately, as we have seen, in this sense Yamada's own examples are puzzling ones whose metaphorical character is not immediately obvious.

Part of the problem here is a lack of suitable distinctions, especially between a 'conceptual metaphor' and a metaphorical utterance. Having rejected the idea that these may be distinguished because one is a metaphor in 'thought' and the other in 'language', we have proposed a distinction in terms of levels of generality. Thus, following the usage of our introductory chapter, we shall refer to metaphors of great generality which seem to organize the conceptual boundaries of a whole area of understanding as archetypes, and reserve the term 'metaphor'
for metaphorical utterances. This distinction, then, opens up the possible relations between political archetypes and political metaphors as an area for investigation. We can easily see, for example, that a politics as theatre archetype may well contribute to the intelligibility of particular metaphorical utterances, but we must not forget that an archetype is itself no more than an abstraction from the particular utterances in which it is embodied, and may be created, sustained and destroyed by them.

The other component of the problem, clearly manifested in Yamada's work, is a tendency to call such constitutive concepts 'metaphorical' without discrimination. If we are to save the notion of a special relation between archetype and metaphor -- to be elaborated in terms of shared metaphor themes -- this tendency must be resisted. Now, Yamada wants to call such concepts 'metaphors' because of an imagined contrast between concepts and 'empirical experience'. If we can demonstrate that no such contrast can be sustained, we shall have undermined this distinction and found a space cleared for our own analysis.

The two components of the problem are related through the shared concept of 'political language'. As we have seen, someone holding a constructivist theory of political language is already committed to the view that political activity is partly constituted by the concepts entertained
by those who participate in that activity. Our strategy will be to demonstrate the cogency of this view, because it clearly contradicts the other claim that there is also a substratum of 'empirical political experience' against which all political concepts may be contrasted as 'metaphors', analogously to the way in which literal utterances are contrasted with metaphorical utterances. In other words, if the claim that political concepts are metaphorical is not to be an empty one, there must be something 'literal' against which they can be contrasted. This is the role in which 'empirical political experience' is cast, and by expressing doubts about it we shall undermine the original distinction.

The notion of empirical political experience has as its correlate a weak theory of political language which we shall now investigate. In this theory, the vocabulary of politics has attracted all the attention, most of it critical. Politics as practised has often appeared to be a great deal of 'talk', far more talk, it is often darkly hinted, than the distinctly meagre achievements of those so engaged can possibly warrant. To account for all this idle chatter, certain peculiarities of political language have been seized upon, notably its vagueness and ambiguity, and hence the apparent ease with which a lack of real activity may be masked by obfuscation. Reformers of every stamp have been particularly outraged by the manner in which abuses whose
remedy they have clearly perceived have been rendered more intractable merely by the way that their opponents have been able to talk about them. Man's freedom of action has been fettered by the illusions of words.\footnote{9}

Bentham (an astute observer of political language, whose theory of fictions takes him well beyond this weak theory of illusion) was moved to this memorable outburst, which contains all the essential points.

A perpetual vein of nonsense, flowing from a perpetual abuse of words -- words having a variety of meanings, where words with single meanings were equally at hand; the same words used in a variety of meanings in the same page; words used in meanings not their own, where proper words were equally at hand; words and propositions of the most unbounded signification, turned loose without any of those exceptions or modifications which are so necessary on every occasion to reduce their import within the compass, not only of right reason, but even of the design in hand, of whatever nature it might be: the same inaccuracy, the same inattention in the penning of this cluster of truths on which the fate of nations was to hang, as if it had been an oriental tale, or an allegory for a magazine; stale epigrams, instead of necessary distinctions; figurative expressions preferred to simple ones; sentimental conceits as trite as they are unmeaning preferred to apt and precise expressions; frippery ornament preferred to the majestic simplicity of good sound sense; and the acts of the senate loaded and disfigured by the tinsels of the playhouse.\footnote{10}

Note particularly how figurative expressions attract Bentham's ire; the garden of political eloquence is
perceived to contain more than its fair share of tropical
growths. The reason for Bentham's rejection is not difficult
to see, for he clearly considers metaphors and other
figurative expressions to be little more than ornaments,
better replaced by simple and unambiguous prose. On this
view it is easy to explain the appearance of political
metaphors, where plain prose would suffice, by reference to
the workings of "sinister interests". Yet, in his last
clause, Bentham himself gestures in the direction of a
highly conventional political metaphor (that of politics as
theatre), even if only to dismiss its relevance. Perhaps the
picturesque character of political language which he so
deplores is symptomatic of something more important about
politics than its imperfection?

In fact, the weak theory of political language as a
vocabulary of emotion and deception breaks down into a more
sophisticated account as soon as it is closely examined,
something Bentham himself saw in admitting certain
"necessary fictions". Failure to progress beyond a weak
theory is usually caused by the operation of an author's own
political prejudices: his political associates speak plain
prose, his enemies the language of guile and deception.
Kenneth Hudson's account of the language of modern British
politics is a perfect example. He offers us a number of
statements in the guise of "conclusions to which any
observer might well be likely to come," which include;

We cannot afford more pay for less work.
There is inadequate discipline throughout the whole of our school system.
We have a marvellous police force. 11

By way of contrast we are offered two sets of examples of party political language;

1) The British Rail workers aren't isolated victims. Almost every week someone somewhere is being sacrificed to union tyranny. 12
2) Enough and more than enough has been said and written about the intervention of law into industrial relations, but if workers always obeyed class legislation we would not be in this hall today because there would be no trade union movement. 13

On the one hand we have common sense, plainly expressed, on the other only symbolic flag-waving in which phrases like 'union tyranny' or 'class legislation' are not to be taken seriously but seen as "thumbprints of group vocabulary".

The idea of group vocabulary is an important one, and Hudson has some perceptive remarks to make about the extent of such vocabularies in modern British politics. However, its proper significance is quite lost if it is identified only by contrast with common sense, and its proper employment restricted to the expression of group solidarity.
Fortunately, once we examine these examples of 'common sense' the distinction dissolves, for they turn out to be equally political in character and by no means conclusions to which all right-thinking people might assent. Such plain talk is radically ambiguous. Who are "we", who cannot afford more pay for less work? What does "afford" mean here -- lower profits, declining markets, higher unemployment? The complex set of relations between unit labour costs and output which economic theory attempts to establish has been discarded in favour of a highly partial diagnosis of an economic problem. Our task here is not to condemn this, but to discover what use is being made of language, and what status this language-use has.

Here we should notice that Hudson's common sense has much more in common with his examples of party political language than he is prepared to admit, particularly that both are expressions of value and therefore not true or false in the same way that propositions about states of affairs could be. Most obviously, we could imagine another group for whom these were not important values at all, and who would therefore find a different significance in factual information about productivity, truancy or the number of policemen injured in the course of their duties. In this ability to express the political significance of actions and events, we find one of the defining features of political
language.

If this is so, then "thumbprints" like "union tyranny" or "class legislation" must be seen in a different light, for they can no longer be contrasted with the generally accepted conclusions of an unprejudiced observer. In a justly famous essay, Clifford Geertz has pointed the way with an analysis of an apparently similar empty rhetorical flourish, the characterisation of the Taft-Hartley Act as 'slave-labour' legislation. He draws our attention to the metaphor here not to deplore it, but to show how metaphors and other figures of speech are a convenient way of characterizing events in order to express their significance for particular groups. The slave labour metaphor, in its simple way, expresses the opposition of the American labour movement to legislative interference by characterizing it with a well-known cold war image. "Union tyranny" and "class legislation" are intended to call to mind similar well-known images from the history of British trade unionism by means of metaphorical attribution.

Two different questions are raised here. The first concerns the metaphors themselves, the understanding that an auditor brings to bear and the consequences of him accepting or rejecting the characterization. Geertz stresses the cultural aspect, the way such metaphors appeal to public knowledge and assumptions. The specific resonance of the
metaphor is then not so much a matter of individual imagination as the recognition of shared meaning. How this individual recognition is usually effected will concern us in the next chapter. The second question, however, returns us to our concern with the development of a more satisfactory account of political language. As Geertz notes, a metaphor is but a "feeble representation" of "an inherent structure of interrelated meanings" which go to make up something he calls an ideology.\textsuperscript{15} Trite metaphors, like the ones we have been considering, offer us, in simplified form, a glimpse of an altogether more remarkable process, the growth and development of political discourse itself. This is the full constructivist account of political language, in which the meaning that political activity has for any participant is linked to the language in which he describes and justifies his participation.

Certainly, proponents of a weak theory of political language seem to imagine that politics could be what Oakeshott stigmatized as an empirical activity. As he points out, this is not so much an undesirable kind of activity as an impossible one.

Of course politics are the pursuit of what is desired and of what is desired at the moment, but precisely because they are this, they can never be the pursuit of merely what recommends itself from moment to moment.\textsuperscript{16}
In other words, proponents of the weak theory assume that any description of what political agents are doing is uncomplicated by any need to refer to their self-understanding. Perhaps a request for such information might be met by references to the struggle for temporary advantage, the pursuit of office, or with a cliche like 'the art of the possible'. But these are already complex human activities, bounded by shared or contested concepts about the nature of offices, the physical and temporal boundaries of their jurisdiction, the authority of their procedures and the legitimacy of their practices. Doubtless a politician who spent too much time interrogating the presuppositions on which his understanding of politics rested would find himself hopelessly outmanoeuvred by his less inquisitive adversaries, but if we wish to understand the space within which such manoeuvres take place, we would be well advised to consider the background beliefs which bound it.

The weak view oversimplifies in another way, revealed by the prejudices of its exponents as they extol one set of beliefs as common sense and brush off the rest as mere posturing. Group vocabularies do not contrast with an 'empirical' language of common sense but with other group vocabularies in which different beliefs about authority or legitimacy are expressed. It is within such group vocabularies that projects may be assessed in terms of their
desirability, and even the most expedient 'politique' must acknowledge the limits which this sets on his freedom of action. To recommend his conduct to his followers he must show that it can plausibly be described within the terms of the group's vocabulary.\textsuperscript{17} It must be recognizably 'in the national interest' or 'progressive' or expressing the leader's 'unshakable will', for this is what the group desires.

Political language thus understood is something more than a means of expressing platitudes about errant schoolchildren and refractory trades-unionists. Perhaps it is best described as discourse, a relatively stable area of language-use, with a characteristic vocabulary and a grammar which marks the interrelation of the concepts which go to make up the 'domain' of politics.\textsuperscript{18} Thus we may distinguish between terms used to express beliefs about the authority of offices from those which are used to elaborate an understanding of the association which sustains political activity and marks it off from religious or commercial life. Within political discourse, and contributing to its ultimate 'shape', are the various sub-codes, which we have called group vocabularies or ideologies. We have tried to suggest that they are rather more than oddities of expression, and we shall have more to say about them in chapter five when we come to consider political ideologies in detail.
These favourite spatial metaphors of discourse analysis are used advisedly here. As political discourse changes, so the shape of political activity alters and is eventually transformed. But such transformations are undertaken by men whose conduct exhibits a self-understanding which they acquire and elaborate through discursive activity. To investigate their understanding by means of the language that they employ will therefore be a task of the first importance.

III. Are political metaphors derived from resemblances between their primary and secondary subjects?

We have elaborated and defended a constructivist account of political discourse by showing the inadequacy of the view that peculiarities of political vocabulary are the accidental by-product of guile and deception. Instead, we have stressed that the concepts expressed in political discourse are logically prior to any sophisticated or autonomous political activity, conduct in which agents exhibit a self-understanding which includes the concept 'politics'. However, it was a similarly constructivist account of metaphor which prompted us to investigate the metaphors found in political discourse, and the temptation is to combine the two accounts in the assertion that, precisely because political discourse is partially
constitutive of political activity, it is ipso facto metaphorical. This temptation must be resisted. If we identify political language with metaphorical language, then the specific roles played by metaphors in political discourse are lost in the general peculiarities of the discourse as a whole.

We can now see that it was just such an impulse to combine the two claims which lay behind Yamada's account of political language. 'Bourgeoisie' and 'Kingdom of Darkness' are not obviously metaphors, but they are obviously concepts which fit easily into a constructivist account of political discourse. We must presuppose possession of the relevant concept before anyone can be said to have behaved in a self-consciously 'bourgeois' manner, or to have identified a human manifestation of the 'kingdom of darkness'. This is what Yamada means when he says that their employment in politics creates meaning not derivable from empirical experience. Since 'experience' here is held to be logically prior to language and concept-formation, such a view underpins the radical thesis which we have called the fossil theory of metaphor. All words, this theory claims, were originally metaphors, for this is the only way in which words can be created. Those words we call literal are only terms which have become so familiar that the original metaphorical extension is no longer perceived.
Epistemologically, the fossil theory suffers from the grave drawback that it undermines the notion of truth. Each person will be in a position to create his own metaphors for his 'experience', and it will be a matter of chance which pass into the language as descriptive terms. This being so, all descriptions are illusions whose illusory nature has been forgotten. Some philosophers, notably Nietzsche, have felt at home with this vertiginous conclusion; for others it has undermined the very cognitive respectability they sought to grant metaphor in the first instance. We may entertain suspicions about the part played by "empirical experience" here, but this is not the place to pursue them, since we have already ruled out the notion of empirical political experience. Our particular quarry is much easier to track down, for the appearance of the fossil theory in political discourse is more than usually misleading and unsatisfactory.

Notice first that the fossil theory is a theory of names. It is a theory that certain terms are introduced into our vocabulary because of a fancied resemblance between a new phenomenon and something familiar. Here is the link between the fossil theory of metaphor and the weak theory of political language again. This weak theory was also a theory of names, and it was transformed into something more satisfactory by locating words in the context of political
activity -- seeing how they were used. When this was done, we noticed how the terms of political discourse expressed competing conceptions of political life, and could not be divided into neutral 'descriptive' terms and evaluative 'political' words. The fossil theory of political metaphor can be transformed in exactly the same way.

The figure of speech known as catachresis has a crucial part to play in the fossil theory. Catachresis encompasses such idioms as 'the head of a pin', 'the foot of a mountain' or 'the neck of a bottle', which are apparently figurative but have no literal replacement in the dictionary of a language. The explanation for these idioms is that they have filled a gap in the language by metaphorical extension, and this plausible argument is generalized to explain the origins of most if not all words. Where we lack a word, or so it is argued, we proceed by analogy based on resemblances between the the thing designated and something familiar, often part of our bodies. There are some obvious gaps in the original argument -- why do we have the summit of a mountain instead of the head, and then the quite different expression, the head of a valley, without a corresponding foot, for example? More seriously, catachresis is usually confined to the names of physical objects whose physical resemblance to the object designated by the root term is readily apparent. When the argument is transferred from this general level to political discourse, the central concept
of resemblance poses more problems than it solves.

This is especially awkward because it is a supposed need to 'fill gaps in the language' by metaphorical extension based on resemblance which is the main prop of the fossil theory of political metaphor. The difficult and insubstantial character of political concepts, we are told, leads us to search for metaphorical analogues as a provisional basis for understanding. In Eugene Miller's version of the theory, "political things" like 'law' or 'authority' cannot be known by direct acquaintance, but are apprehended by metaphorically extending words drawn from more concrete kinds of activity. The notion of a physical resemblance of the kind supposedly involved in catachresis is brought out in Miller's own metaphors, as he describes political theory as the inquiry into the political metaphors which give form to our political experience.

In the course of inquiry there is a growing awareness of the shape of things as a whole, and this awareness increasingly helps us to see the partiality and distortion of the perspective from which we began. We perceive order in experience whose meaning was vague and inchoate at first. Things fall into place.

Whatever simple plausibility is possessed by the theory that the foot of a mountain is so called because of a perceived resemblance to our own feet, the notion of resemblance is
severely stretched in so sophisticated a theory of the terms of political discourse.

The hidden assumption of such accounts is that the descriptive terms of political discourse were introduced in response to some confusion or puzzlement on the part of political actors. Faced with "inchoate experience", they attempted to shape politics in the image of family relations, stockbreeding or theatrical performance. But this, of course, neglects the motivation for introducing such terms, or, rather, it allows the Socratic quest for knowledge beyond mere opinion to serve as a surrogate motive. The enormous range of metaphor-themes to which Miller has drawn attention must, on his account, be explained as so many partial and one-sided perspectives, each offering an insight into the nature of "political things, as such", each one to be discarded when its partiality has been exposed.

Now, it is doubtless true that some political metaphors have been introduced and used in this way. But these are metaphors connected with the activity of political philosophy. The vast majority of the examples cited by Miller were not introduced in the context of this activity at all, but were meant to serve some immediate political purpose, and this is particularly true of those descriptive terms now part of our uncontested political discourse which
may have been introduced into that discourse in the form of a metaphor. Students of sixteenth-century political thought, for example, have become increasingly aware of the emergence of the modern concept of the state at this period, an emergence nowhere more evident than in the confident use of the word 'state' in recognizably modern contexts. It seems probable, as Oakeshott has argued, that some of these early uses of the term were self-consciously metaphorical, and were intended to draw attention to the emerging political conditions as extensions of the 'estate' of the medieval lord. 'State' had many competitors -- 'commonwealth', 'republic', 'empire', 'policy', even 'community' -- but the eventual triumph of 'state' is not so much an indication of the emergent conditions being ill-understood, as an indication of the success of the political projects of sixteenth-century princes and their advisors. Robbed of this illusory contrast with "inchoate experience", we can still see that 'state' may have been introduced into our vocabulary as a metaphor, and even see that a certain notion of 'resemblance' is involved here. But rather than imposing form on chaos, it was intended to create resemblance between what was emerging and what had gone before, a notion of 'resemblance' which is far removed from the simple physical recognition implied by catachresis.

That this is so may be confirmed by the example of the
term 'government', at first sight even more favourable to Miller's thesis than 'state'. Its etymological link with navigation does seem to point to just that sort of less complex and non-political activity which would support a fossil theory of political metaphor. Here, it would seem, was a case of someone casting round for an analogue to clarify the activity of ruling. Yet it is notoriously difficult to find an example of the term being used in this way. Its appearance in classical political thought is usually part of an argument designed to recommend a particular form of government. A medieval example which might be considered a metaphorical use of 'gubernator' shows a similar link with a complex political argument. Part of Pope Leo I's account of the authority of the papal office was the claim that, having been entrusted by Saint Peter with the entire direction of the activities of the Church, the Pope was gubernator. As with a possible reference of 'state' to an estate, the term is being used here to refer to complex doctrines about political life for particular political purposes. If there is any sense of resemblance relevant here, it is not to some imagined analogue whose physical resemblance justifies the use of the term in the absence of any other terms being available, but a politically motivated attempt to bring an audience to recognize the relevance of a political doctrine in the face
of competing doctrines. If the attempt is successfully brought off, the resemblance may be said to have been created.

In sum, when attempting to combat the undoubted charm of the fossil theory of metaphor in politics, it is sometimes helpful to remember Max Black's complaint that to treat catachresis as a species of metaphor is analogous to identifying a corpse as a special case of a person. In addition, Black's critique of the comparison view of metaphor reminds us that the fossil theory relies heavily on the idea that there are certain prior resemblances between politics and other human activities which a metaphor brings to our notice. By stressing the particular purposes with which 'live' metaphors are used, we escape this fallacy, and are enabled to bring out the highly specific points of resemblance which a political metaphor creates by introducing new terms into political discourse. In other words, the evident abundance of metaphors in political discourse, though a consequence of the constructivist character of political language, is not to be confused with it.
V. The genuine conceptual connections that a metaphor shows.

What can be made of talk about conceptual metaphors? Obviously we cannot stipulate that the term shall not be extended to cover all those cases in which we habitually talk about one thing in term of another. We can only point out the confusion and ambiguity that such usage engenders, and the dubious arguments about concept-formation which buttress attempts to extend the notion into a theory that all our concepts (or all our language) are metaphorical. And yet 'conceptual metaphor' does have an important function, for it calls our attention to a level of analysis in which metaphors are seen, not just as whole sentences as opposed to isolated words, but as entailing such wider unities as text and context. The converse of Lakoff and Johnson's argument that novel metaphors may be created from concepts that are already 'metaphorically structured' in terms of one another is the implication that to understand how such metaphors are created and interpreted will involve reference to the conceptual relation on which they are based. To understand certain spatial metaphors, for example, might involve showing how part of our ordinary understanding of political relations has come to be expressed in terms of such spatial coordinates as up and down or left and right.

An example used by Lakoff and Johnson themselves may
clarify the use we are making of their ideas here. They remark that there is a conceptual metaphor in English which they call the argument-is-warfare metaphor. It appears in such everyday expressions as 'winning an argument' or 'defending a (theoretical) position'. Now, our emphasis on metaphor as a strategy of interpretation has led us to consider the occasions on which a reader would consider a metaphorical reading of a sentence an appropriate strategy to use, and on the resources at his disposal when he makes such a reading. The problem with Lakoff and Johnson's examples, as one critic has perceptively remarked, is that ordinary readers would not consider themselves to be making metaphorical readings in such cases -- arguments simply are things in which winners successfully defend positions. It is possible to undermine this understanding of an argument by pointing out alternative ways of conceiving of the activity, but to do so is to offer one's own interpretation of the kind of activity arguing might be, rather than explaining metaphors.

The first appearance of such novel, if trite, metaphors as, say, 'sniping' at an opponent, or 'mounting a frontal assault on his (cognitive) position' would then be analysed rather differently. For Lakoff and Johnson, these phrases are extension into the "unused portion" of a conceptual metaphor. For us, the metaphorical reading that such phrases
are given is to be explained in terms of the close connection that the reader has found between arguments and other adversarial activities, which might include games as well as warfare, for example. The repeated appearance of such metaphors may well result in the creation of a metaphorical field in the context of which future metaphors will be understood, but the concepts which bound this field, however intimately they are perceived to be related, must ultimately remain distinct if the sense of 'metaphor' here is not to be obliterated.

In this sense, we are doing more than just reversing Lakoff and Johnson's argument. We are grounding concepts in complex human activities rather than in experience or physical sensation. This allows us to keep metaphor in reserve, as it were, to use for attributions which are out of the ordinary. Certainly the possibility of metaphorical attribution depends on the ways in which we ordinarily understand our world, but to deny that there can be any understanding of a complex human activity, like politics, which is not itself metaphorical is a confusion which ultimately prevents us from understanding the special uses of political metaphors, and directly contradicts the ordinary experience of political agents.

This is not to deny that we can learn much about political archetypes from Lakoff and Johnson's account of
'conceptual metaphor'. However, we have already had occasion to warn that an archetype is an abstraction created from a set of metaphorical utterances which share the same theme. Bearing this caution in mind, what can be said about political archetypes independently of the individual metaphorical utterances which create them? The topic falls into two parts, the first analysing the contribution of extra-discursive factors to the creation of archetypes, the second the historical creation and development of metaphor-themes within political discourse. We shall consider them under the headings of symbol-classifications and metaphorical fields respectively.

Under the first heading is included much that will be familiar to the student of 'archetypes' as that term has been used by Jung and his followers. Here our attention is drawn to the reference made in many political metaphors to symbols and to the combination of such symbols in schemes of classification which fix their meaning within political discourse, particularly moetic classifications of opposites. Such symbol classifications are evoked by the many political metaphors which refer to objects with symbolic significance for an audience. Examples include father and mother, up and down, sun and moon and many colour terms. 'Sun' and 'moon' are used this way when Sir Thomas Elyot argued that monarch was the form of government,
that . . . is best approved, and hath longest continued, and is most ancient. For who can deny, but that all thynge in heven and earth is governed by one god, by one perpetual order, by one providence? One Sonne ruleth over the day, and one Moone over the nyght.

The reference is not just to the objects sun and moon, but to their symbolic significance for an Elizabethan audience. Especially important here is the sense in which sun and moon were seen as symbolic of that providential order to which Elyot has already referred. By means of such symbolism, the last sentence of Elyot's passage reasserts metaphorically what the previous sentence has asserted literally.

Elyot's metaphor thus refers to the whole symbolic representation of the natural order, of which sun and moon were a visible reminder. Other writers, particularly those developing the concept of sovereignty, used the dyad 'sun-moon' to make the point that, in this natural order, there was one source of light, other apparently light emitting bodies being mere reflections of the sun's splendour. On other occasions, the connection of the sun with light is allowed to stand alone as a symbol of the majesty of a monarch, or it may be put into a spatio-temporal context where its rising stands for youth and vigour and its setting for decline and old age. Under the title of 'archetypes', Michael Osborn has made a special
study of these symbolic connections, stressing that their use in metaphors implies a "double association". Because the symbols or archetypes have already been used to organize an area of human experience, ordering and classifying it in various ways, they bring the associations implied by the classification with them when they are employed in new contexts, such as in a political metaphor. They are thus an extremely economical way of making a conceptual connection.

In Elyot's metaphor we saw a connection established between monarchy and the natural, providential order. In an example from one of Churchill's most famous wartime speeches, made after the defeat of France in 1940, the double association of symbols in metaphors is used to guide interpretation and to turn banal phrases into a moving exhortation.

If we stand up to him (Hitler), all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad sunlit uplands. But, if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.

Churchill underlines the gravity and momentousness of the choice facing his audience by means of a triple moetic symbol classification in which the fruits of continued
resistance are represented by light, forward and upward movement, while the consequences of defeat are pictured as darkness, backwards and downwards movement. In doing so, he combines advocacy of continued resistance with rejection of the very possibility of any third course. The internal coherence of the symbol classification in turn transforms his banal reference to the new Dark Age, by means of the novel reference to the sinister gleam of moonlight for the 'perverted science' of National Socialism. It is this characteristic care for the internal coherence of the metaphor which contributes most to its success.

A reader's knowledge of a symbol classification will thus have many relevant consequences for his understanding of a metaphor. In describing how his knowledge influences his interpretation, we have stressed the double association that a symbol carries when its appearance is metaphorical. It is part of a symbol classification involving conventional associations for particular cultures, and it uses these associations in quite specific ways in the individual metaphors. It is important to be aware of both these elements, the general cultural significance and the specific metaphorical employment, if we are to do full justice to the role of symbolism in political metaphors, especially in our analysis of metaphorical utterances as events. Once again, the danger lies in restricting the notion of a metaphor to
the general significance of the symbols it happens to employ, forgetting the varied metaphorical references to symbol classifications that are actually involved.

On this last point, students of symbolism have consistently argued that the "natural symbols" or "primary factors" which can be found performing symbolic functions across a wide variety of cultures are to be understood as "vehicles for significance" rather than as significant in their own right. How they come to take on the significance that they actually have is then a matter for explanation in individual cases. It is perfectly possible that there may be some element of metaphorical attribution involved in certain cases, but, as we have already shown, the thesis that symbols are themselves the metaphorical extension of a very basic 'pre-linguistic experience' combines a general philosophical implausibility with the fact that the meanings of such symbols are not always constant across cultures. Symbolism of physical space fits the thesis best, but the evidence for body, colour and other more complex symbolism is less convincing.

Bearing this point in mind will decrease the temptation to explain particular political metaphors which employ symbols by moving directly to the 'natural meaning' that the symbol is supposed to possess. The associations that the symbol brings to the metaphor are to be historically located
in the historical experience of those who create and interpret the metaphor. As we noted in introducing the topic of symbolism, this is especially important in analysing metaphors as acts of communication. We will not materially advance our understanding of how political metaphors were used in political argument, if we systematically ignore the knowledge that an audience used in arriving at its interpretation in favour of a hypothesis about the universal significance of a symbol.

The other area in which the understanding of a metaphor is to be explained is more difficult to describe. It is the sense in which a natural language as it is spoken and written discloses 'pictures' of an area of discourse in idioms, conventional expressions and metaphors. Often, the full significance of these pictures are unknown to those who habitually speak and write in terms of them. 'Discourse analysis' has gone some way towards revealing the structure of these pictures by teasing out the implications of 'speaking this way', using as its material anything from vocabulary to characteristic grammatical constructions. Such figurative ways of speaking predispose readers and hearers towards metaphorical interpretations which conform to the pictures which are implied by their ordinary ways of speaking, making apparently obscure metaphors easy to understand.
The significance of this phenomenon for metaphor has been explored by the linguist Harald Weinrich under the title of "metaphorical fields". Noting how traditional literary criticism has tended to group metaphors together either according to their subjects (metaphors about love or death, for example), or according to their 'imagery' (sickness imagery or journey imagery), he has been concerned to show that these taxonomies are completely artificial. He was thus led to develop the notion of a metaphorical field in discourse, such as 'love-as-sickness' or 'death-as-journey', in terms of which particular metaphors have been formed and interpreted. Thus, analysing Verlaine's line, "Votre âme est un paysage choisi," he suggests that the metaphor is constructed and interpreted in the act of bringing to mind its near relations that also occupy the metaphorical field of 'soul-as-landscape'. Here we find such idioms as 'streams of thought', 'the tree of knowledge', 'peaks of joy' and 'abyss of loneliness'. Often such metaphorical fields, through familiarity, lose their metaphorical character and become part of the semantic field which fixes the meaning of related terms, such as body, soul and spirit.

An awareness of the metaphorical fields in which many political metaphors are located will play an important part in our investigations. From a rather wider perspective it
restates our opposition to formulaic and especially to comparison views of metaphor. In other words, in place of the artificial distinction between a subject and its modification through various 'imagery', we locate the metaphor in an image field which holds principal and secondary subjects together. It is only by taking the two together, as Weinrich insists, that we have a metaphor at all. On the other hand, while fully acknowledging that our language is shot through with pictures in discourse, by distinguishing between metaphorical and semantic fields we avoid Lakoff and Johnson's empty claim that any concept of a complex activity must be metaphorically structured. We may now usefully distinguish between cases in which political discourse is to be understood against the background of a metaphorical field -- politics-as-theatre or politics-as-organism, for example -- and when it is to be understood as part of a semantic field bounded by such concepts as 'state' and 'civil society' or 'corpus imperii' and 'corpus ecclesiae'.

Furthermore, while recognizing the unity of a metaphorical field, we may analytically distinguish between the image producing and image receiving fields. On the side of the image receiving field we need to carefully distinguish between those metaphors which concern political life as a mode of association, those which concern the
activity of ruling, and those which concern attributes of political offices like authority or legitimacy. On the image producing side, we may now pay special attention to the way in which the metaphorical field as a whole was shaped by the image producing concept. What were its own conceptual relations and what did they contribute to the metaphorical field? Here Michael Walzer's notion of a reference world is useful, suggesting that changes in our understanding of nature, mechanical relations or the human body might lead to changes in the metaphorical fields in which such concepts participate, always remembering that it is the total field which interests us.  

For example, if we wish to understand what Rousseau means when he says that, "le corps politique, pris individuellement, peut être considéré comme un corps organisé, vivant et semblable à celui de l'homme," we shall need to find the metaphorical field in which "le corps politique" is located. We may be surprised to discover from other essays in the Encyclopédie that 'corps politique' and 'corps organisé' occupy the same field as 'le corps artificiel', and this in turn may help us to reconstruct the concept of nature and artifice which makes up the reference world or image producing field for this particular political-association-as-body field. Our reconstruction will be of great help in making sense of other puzzling metaphors.
in Rousseau's writings, for example, the idea of the "social bond" which holds together members of the body politic and admits of varying degrees of tautness. Emerging from the same metaphorical field are words like 'organisation' and 'constitution' which have become straightforwardly literal terms of modern political discourse. It may be readily appreciated that 'le corps politique' would have rather different possibilities in a metaphorical field where the image producing field was constituted by concepts of microcosm and macrocosm, or a modern distinction between living nature and the 'merely mechanical'.

VI. Metaphorical field and metaphorical utterance as levels of analysis.

The present chapter began by contrasting our account of metaphorical utterances and the interpretative strategies used to make sense of them, with an account which stressed that metaphor is only another name for the very process by which utterances have meaning at all. However, this constructivist view of metaphor was shown to be in constant danger of becoming the empty claim that all language is metaphorical. The attempt to give the claim substance by contrasting metaphorical or conceptual thinking with a more basic 'empirical experience' was rejected when no sense could be attributed to the notion of empirical experience.
The fascination that this view of metaphor has held for theorists of political metaphor was shown to arise from a mistaken identification of the plausible claim that political discourse is partially constitutive of political activity with the view that such discourse must be metaphorical. Again, the view was shown to require the incoherent notion of 'empirical politics'. However, such considerations do serve to remind us that there are still things to be said about interpreting metaphors which may not be captured by concentration on the utterance. We picked out two things of particular relevance to political metaphors, their relation to symbol classifications and to metaphorical fields in discourse.

In the course of this chapter we have tried to maintain and clarify the distinction between archetypes and metaphors in political language. We have pointed out that a distinction along these lines suggests the importance of discovering how an archetype is established by persistent metaphorical usages, and how its existence affects the intelligibility of future metaphors sharing the same theme. Weinrich's theory of the metaphorical field, and the analytical distinction it permits between image producing and image receiving fields fills in the abstract notion of an archetype with concrete details about the metaphorical fields which can actually be shown to have existed in the
discourse of historical political agents. At the same time, it solves one of the most pressing problems of political metaphors, mentioned in chapter one. We are no longer hampered by artificial distinctions between metaphors that happen to have been used in politics and those that have not, or with enormous lists of the different 'images' used by acknowledged 'political writers'. Our task is to reconstruct a number of metaphorical fields in which an aspect of politics makes up the image receiving field, and to do so in specific historical contexts. To this end, we shall examine some examples of conventional political metaphors, and relate them to political activity and political doctrines.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Rhetorical Structure
Of Conventional Metaphors

Following Weinrich we have considered the ways in which metaphors may be set in 'metaphorical fields' created in discourse. When such metaphorical fields are particularly well defined, the result is often a series of metaphors restricted to a small number of familiar uses. Political discourse is no exception, and we are familiar with such well-known conventional metaphors as political association as human body, ruling as medicine, or political office as trust. Indeed, it is in this guise that metaphors are most familiar to the student of political thought, yet this very familiarity has engendered a thoughtlessness resulting in talk of the metaphor of the body politic or the patriarchal metaphor. Unwittingly, attention is diverted from the use to which such metaphors are being put -- and hence from what they might mean -- and focussed instead upon an abstract notion, the 'imagery' supposedly evoked by such metaphors irrespective of the varied contexts in which they are employed.\(^1\) As a result, both the metaphorical and the political character of the utterances that embody them are
in danger of being lost, and we are left to marvel at the credulity of those who could mistake a king for a father, or alternatively, driven to create an elaborate theory of comparison and analogy by way of explanation.

This warning, first sounded in the course of rejecting similarity and comparison formulae as explanations of how metaphors worked is only made more emphatic by the close relation between discourse and conduct in politics. It is true of course that a great part of political reflection is concerned with "the nature of political things," but, except for the utopian, it is not an investigation into images so much as an attempt to discover the outlines and possibilities of the political world that men have made, and are in the course of making. The language that these men use both reveals what they understand themselves to be doing and serves as a point of departure for mature consideration of their achievement. Characteristically, as we noted in chapter one, it recommends even as it describes. As Michael Oakeshott has put it in the case of modern European states, "the character of a state is not a model from which copies may be struck off; it is what the effort to understand this experience has made of it."^3

It is, then, to miss what is most interesting about conventional political metaphors to treat them as extended comparisons between states and beehives or rulers and
shepherds, comparisons which were eventually discarded because they clashed with the 'reality' of political association or rulership at crucial points. To the extent that metaphors of the state as apiary or as sheepfold had some currency in political discourse, then such metaphors were part of the known world which explorers of the emergent concept of the state took with them on their intellectual journeys, and they were themselves part of the political experience which these men undertook to clarify. It is up to us to discover what they took the import of state as beehive metaphors to be, which we shall not easily do by investigating the almost endless points of comparison between states and beehives as we understand those terms. The same point might be urged with equal justice about the activities of those who were less concerned with the use of these metaphors to reflect on 'political things' than to convince their fellows that much could be learned about the proper ordering of states by attending to some aspect of the life of the bee.

In fact, conventional metaphors are conventional not because they appeal to conventional imagery, but because they have conventional uses in argument. They fall into desuetude not because they are shown to be false, but because they lack the flexibility to adapt to new uses without becoming implausible. These rather elliptical
assertions will be explained in the next two chapters, where an important part of the argument will be devoted to showing how a conventional metaphor becomes part of a political doctrine, and how it comes to lose its plausibility and find its place usurped by a new favourite.

II. An example of different uses of 'the same' organic metaphor.

What is meant by contrasting metaphors that have conventional uses with metaphors that appear to share the same imagery? As an example, consider the series of metaphors in which an aspect of political life is described in terms of our knowledge of the human body, metaphors sometimes referred to, rather grandly, as 'the organic conception of the state'. Here, it seems, is a clear case where the identity of such a 'conception' is provided precisely by the imagery irrespective of the uses to which the various metaphors embodying it are being put. Yet, however counterintuitive it may seem, when we look more closely at the metaphors themselves, the identity dissolves.

Isolated organic metaphors may be found in the earliest examples of political literature. However, an examination of the systematic use to which such metaphors were put in classical Greek and Roman political thought shows that there
are important distinctions to be drawn. First there are those metaphors which assert that political association is characterised by the same harmony that obtains amongst parts of the body. Second, there are those which assert that political offices, notably the offices of rulers or magistrates, are of the same end-directed character as parts of the body. Third, there are metaphors which draw attention to the role of vital centres in the human body, the anima, head or heart, and attempt to make connections between them and the legitimacy of various political arrangements. Obviously there are coherences between the different uses, but it is important to determine the exact coherence that the authors of these metaphors were seeking to establish before pointing out the ones which may strike us, especially since we seem so much less disposed to find them convincing.

Plato's investigation into the nature of justice provides examples of this first kind of metaphor, examples which are buttressed by the microcosm-macrocosm idea. This notion, which is not itself a metaphor, finds literal expression in the argument that justice in the city is justice in the soul of man writ large.\(^4\) The doctrine of anthropocentric microcosm -- the belief that the principles and properties of the human body may be projected into the cosmos\(^5\) -- tends in general to result in complex analogical reasoning, like the correspondences between the soul of the
tyrannic man and the state of a city ruled by a tyrant, which are of great subtlety. But it can also give rise to metaphors related to the structural correspondences of the original analogies, such as the passage in the Republic where the rightly ordered state is described as 'healthy' and the unjust as 'fevered'. This in turn suggests a whole series of metaphors in which the activity of ruling is elaborated in medical terms, an early example appearing in the Laws where external wars undertaken to overcome factional strife within a city are described as "purgatives".

Greek thought is lacking in good examples of organic metaphors about rulership, but Aristotle produces a metaphor legitimizing a relationship in the course of his defence of slavery. Distinguishing between dominion over slaves and rule over free men, he argues that, "the rule of mind over body is absolute, the rule of intelligence over desire is constitutional and royal." Turning to Roman writings, we can recognize the affinity between Aristotle's metaphor and the oft-repeated fable of the feet which rebelled against the belly, attributed by Roman historians to Menenius Agrippa and justifying a particular relationship between the Senate and the plebians. In these examples, organic metaphors are used to legitimate offices and institutions by appealing to their 'natural' characters. In metaphors of the
second type, also found in Roman thought, the end-directed character of the body's vital organs is used to make an argument about the alleged end-directed character of ruling. Both the senate and the emperors were described as 'heads' of the body politic, but Seneca seems to have been the first to argue that, as the health of the head was of supreme importance to the health of the body, so we could deduce the privileges and responsibilities of rulership in the \textit{corpus reipublicae}.\footnote{11}

There are obvious coherences between metaphors of the second and third types -- the natural character of the ruling part may suggest further analogies between the activity of ruling and important bodily functions. However, the coherences are not intrinsic to the metaphor-themes, they are suggested by the background concepts, arguments and doctrines in which the particular metaphorical utterances are employed. This is made clear when we contrast Roman organic metaphors with those of the early Christians. Here, metaphors of the first kind, about the character of association, are no longer used to express a conception of the harmony of the political and natural orders, but to underline the all-encompassing totality in which the believer finds himself. Saint Paul is our source here:

\begin{quote}
For as the body is one, and hath many members, and
\end{quote}
Despite its uncompromising insistence that the many are one the body of Christ, this metaphor nevertheless coexisted with others used to make arguments of the second and third type about the distinctions necessary in political association. Saint Paul himself argued that we could distinguish between greater and lesser powers, and that the lesser powers all worked together towards the end of maintaining the whole under the direction of the head.  

Of even greater moment for later political thinkers was the way in which the relation between spiritual and temporal powers came to be justified in metaphors relating the physical members of the body to a ruling anima. Saint Augustine was particularly adept with these metaphors, using them to subordinate the claims of the earthly city to those of the heavenly city. As Tilman Struve points out, Augustine was much more prone to use organic metaphors which stressed human biology when describing the civitas terrena than in his descriptions of the civitas Dei, which was characterized as a mystical corpus Christi. Such a distinction, of course, lies at the heart of Augustine's reluctance to grant the Roman Empire the status of respublica, where he uses
just such a biologically grounded organic metaphor in his argument.  

Thus, conventional organic imagery, once it has been located in a context of political argument, can be seen to disguise a number of different conventional uses of a metaphorical field. The differences stem not only from the different organic concepts that are employed — which bodily functions are seen as 'vital', for example — but from the different doctrines and arguments that the metaphors are taken to support. As we saw in the cases of Aristotle and Augustine, an argument of some complexity and sophistication may turn upon a point that a metaphor is used to make. The danger here, especially if the 'imagery' is stressed at the expense of the argument, is that we may overlook the work being done by the metaphor, and write it off as an indirect allusion to familiar topoi, or even as an emotional appeal devoid of rational content.

To understand the temptations here, consider Aristotle's metaphor again:

The rule of mind over body is absolute, the rule of intelligence over desire is constitutional and royal.
On the one hand, it might seem that the burden of the argument is carried by the microcosmic idea in the special context of Aristotelian psychology, already expounded in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. The metaphor merely acts as a reminder of this argument by invoking an image of bodily 'rule'. On the other hand, and against this view, it must be urged that, even if this were true, it could not establish the point that Aristotle seeks to make here. The success of the argument depends upon his establishing that master and slave can plausibly be distinguished in an analogous way to mind and body, and free men and their rulers in the same way as intelligence and desire. He attempts to support this identification with some subsidiary points about the similarity of slaves to tools and animals, but the primary metaphoric identification in the passage must be made by the audience themselves. They must see the point of the argument before they can grasp the ground of the metaphor, and they are at liberty to accept or reject it. To the extent that they are already disposed to see slaves in this way, the metaphor will gain added force, to be sure, from the conceptual background, which will make it seem like a striking illustration of the microcosmic idea. To the extent that a modern audience is influenced by ethical theories which condemn the treatment of other human beings as means, they will be disposed to reject the metaphor -- as most
modern commentators have done -- as weak and strained.

This objection to treating political metaphors as 'imagery' marks a distinct advance in our attempt to explain the intelligibility of political metaphors. It treats Aristotle's passage as a complete metaphorical utterance, but it rests its explanation on the idea of a disposition, a disposition that both the metaphor and the microcosmic idea somehow 'express'. There is a clear danger of circularity here, for we cannot describe or isolate such a disposition independently of the arguments or metaphors in which it is expressed. Perhaps the proponents of the first line of argument are correct in assuming that the doctrine itself has an independent part to play, but that the metaphor is not thereby rendered redundant or ornamental.

Consider this very interesting feature of Aristotle's metaphor. It will be recalled that innovation accounts of metaphor, particularly Max Black's, argued that an interaction took place between subject and predicate expressions in a metaphor, so that in addition to the more obvious semantic changes that the predicate expression wrought upon the subject, the effects of subject expression upon predicate could not be overlooked either. Similarly, Weinrich argued that the structure of image receiving and image producing fields was a result of their combination in a single metaphorical field. In Aristotle's metaphor, this
interaction effect is so powerful that the position of subject and predicate expressions in the argument is reversed in the metaphorical utterance. Although the passage is nominally about the master and slave relationship and the distinction between this and rule over free men, the metaphor says that "the rule of mind over body is absolute, and the rule of intelligence over desire is constitutional and royal." The metaphorical field has all but obliterated the distinction between image receiving and image producing fields. How has this come about?

In this case, as in other conventional metaphors we shall examine, the initial plausibility of the metaphorical attribution is suggested by reference to a background of shared beliefs. The metaphor is to be understood against a background where political relations and the relations of nature are so closely identified as not to be perceived as metaphorically related at all. Thus, in another famous passage, Aristotle argues that, as in a well governed city the ruler is not required to be present to see that every act of the citizens is properly performed, so in an animal the soul "is situated in a central organ of authority" and the other parts duly perform their functions without immediate supervision. The uses of the metaphorical field in particular utterances are unintelligible without an understanding of its full ramifications.
However, if political metaphors are to be located against a background of beliefs and attitudes, it is essential that the precise role of this conceptual background be precisely delimited. If it is the background which provides a context within which the metaphorical utterance can be seen to have a point, the background itself cannot make the particular connection that the authors seeks. The argument from disposition is correct up to this point -- that the audience itself must make the connection -- but it is unwilling to allow that there can be links between a metaphor and background concepts and doctrines that are other than purely contingent. Aristotle's metaphors suggest that there are very close connections between background concepts and conventional metaphors, and that the metaphor is used to extend certain implications of the background into political life and so characterize political events and practices in a politically significant way. How far it can be extended will be up to those who read and hear metaphorical utterances and have to make the relevant connections. The record of successful extension will be preserved in metaphorical fields and conventional political metaphors.

The rest of this chapter will be concerned to show how a metaphor establishes the political significance of a conceptual background. The connection it establishes is not
a logically necessary one: a defence of slavery could not be deduced from Aristotle's psychology. In this sense, the conceptual background is like a map without a key; as yet the symbols bear only an internal relation to one another, thus setting some limits to what use may be made of them, but not completely delimiting their application. Putting the map to work to display the political significance of events and practices is a matter of making coherent connections. Once established, such connections may make political beliefs seem every bit as relevant to understanding aspects of the original background as vice versa, hence the interesting interaction effects we have observed.

Of course, put like this, no real explanation of the intelligibility of political metaphors has been offered. The suggestions that a metaphor may 'establish a coherence' or make us 'notice an aspect', are as mysterious as the claim that a metaphor 'expresses a disposition'. Part of the mystery here may be dispelled by clarifying the notion of 'coherence', not least because we shall encounter two different, though related, kinds of coherence. They may be thought of as two poles at the ends of a continuum. At one end -- we shall call it the epistemological end -- political metaphors shade into analogy and model. At the epistemological end authors are asserting structural correspondences in which they describe aspects of political
life in terms of well-developed vocabularies drawn from both theoretical and practical experience. Here we find those metaphors of politics as theatre, family life or anatomy which are used to extend our understanding of political association. At the other end of the scale -- the aesthetic end -- writers may be trying to express something that they feel about political life by evoking attitudes and emotions which would be appropriate to family life, drama or disease. Here metaphors shade into other forms of pictorial expression, notably cartoon and caricature.

From what has been said already about interaction effects and the unity of the metaphorical field, it should be clear that to distinguish too sharply between epistemological and aesthetic coherences will be a mistake. Both are possibilities inherent in any metaphor, and it is the use that an author makes of his metaphor that will exploit more of one possibility and less of another. Above all, it should be evident that political metaphors are never used to make purely epistemological connections. To do so would be to rob them of any function in political life. As Henry Drucker has noted, the connections which audiences can be persuaded to make by political metaphor are intimately bound up with agreements and disagreements in political life. An audience may simply refuse to accept the ground of a metaphor if it is aesthetically displeasing. As he puts
it, there is a link here between,

the relative strengths and weaknesses of analogical arguments on the one hand, and the fact that where like-minded people agree in their politics they are often unable to win over men who disagree with them.

The exact mix of aesthetic and epistemological coherence will obviously depend on the author's circumstances and his project. In the use of philosophical arguments for political purposes, aesthetic coherence will be subordinate, though never entirely absent. In a speech on a political occasion, the aesthetic may dominate, but since what we feel about something is intimately related to what we know about it, epistemological coherence can never be entirely lacking. In trivial metaphors, rapidly approaching the status of cliches, the appeal is often to something an audience knows at first hand. As sixteenth-century authors could easily slip into talk about 'bridling' or 'giving rein' to an argument, so modern political writers have been accused of trivializing politics by their constant resort to metaphors of sports and games. On the other hand, what an educated reader knows is considerably wider than the shared knowledge of a popular audience, and it is the elusive conjecture of knowledge and feeling in politics which we shall now explore.
III. Metaphors that make us notice a doctrine.

The justification for treating political metaphors as a distinct topic for investigation lies, we have argued, in the recognizably political character that their use in political argument gives to them. Part of this character, as we have seen, derives from the way in which metaphors may be used to extend a background conception into political life, and to invest it with political significance. Again, it must be emphasized that metaphors are not the only way of doing this. Especially when structural correspondences are at stake, models and historical exempla are often more important. The role of the medieval corporation in shaping early modern reflection on the character of the state, or the model of the covenanting church in reflection on the character of civil obligation spring to mind. However, it is the metaphorical connection which interests us here, a connection which is at once more direct and looser than the connections made by models or literal comparisons. A metaphor does not necessarily invite its audience to compare a state with a body or to look at historical associations, but to identify state and body. Because the exact implications are not spelled out, much is left to the reader or hearer, and there is no guarantee that metaphorically suggested connections will not be made idiosyncratically or
even at all. Authors may seek to abate this uncertainty with the aid of various rhetorical strategies designed to persuade an audience to make only relevant connections, but they cannot entirely abate it without sacrificing the power of a metaphor to make people notice something about political life that they might otherwise have overlooked. Even a conventional metaphor, whilst it remains a metaphor, partakes of this power.

We have already noticed a similarity between certain metaphors and pictures, those metaphors which sacrifice epistemological for aesthetic coherence with a doctrine. This similarity ought to remind us of Donald Davidson's point that the way pictures make us notice things could be generalized into a theory of metaphor. We might then conclude that what is required is an investigation into the way in which such 'pictures' work -- a new "psychology of the imagination", as Ricoeur once suggested. However, we must recall Davidson's point that, to the extent that we can describe such a picture in words, we are thereby missing the essential element, shared by metaphors and pictures, of the experience of noticing. "Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture," as Davidson put it. Thus, although the notion that a metaphor makes us see something is obviously important here, the idea that what we see is a mental picture should be resisted. More helpful altogether
is the notion, preserved in our ordinary way of speaking about metaphors, that a metaphor makes us see something as something else. Thus Augustine proposed that we see life on earth as no more than "a shadow of what is to come," or John of Salisbury invited us to see human life as a tragic drama played out before the eyes of God. This experience of 'seeing as' has been carefully analysed by Wittgenstein as a problem in the philosophy of mind, and despite its apparent lack of relevance it is well worth diverging from our argument for a moment to see what this everyday way of speaking about metaphors entails.  

Wittgenstein begins with an examination of the experience of someone looking at a picture he calls the 'duck-rabbit', a composite figure he derives from the psychologist Jastrow, which may be seen either as a duck's head facing one way or a rabbit's head facing the other. He notes that someone confronted by the picture and noticing only one of its aspects might say, "I see a rabbit," but not, "I see it as a rabbit." However, if he were then to be struck by the fact that it could also be seen as a duck, he might say, "now I see it as a duck." Similarly, a third party, who knew about the dual aspect of the figure, could say, "now he is seeing it as a duck." This shows that 'seeing as' is conceptually connected with the experience of noticing an aspect. The special relevance this has for
understanding metaphors is brought out by Wittgenstein's next remarks, where he points out that this experience of noticing an aspect is not itself part of perception. If someone who had noticed an aspect of the picture were asked to draw what he had noticed, he could only draw a copy of the original picture. In fact, Wittgenstein notes, 'seeing as' has a great deal in common with such related experiences as feeling that a piece of music is being played correctly, or re-arranging the internal organisation of a three-dimensional figure to see it as an empty box rather than a solid cube, for example.

Here then is a clear link between 'seeing as' and the suggestion that a metaphor is intended to make us notice something in political life. Of course, there is a notable difference between this more generalized noticing and the noticing that goes on when we literally see something as something else, because the substratum of physical perception is missing. However, as we have just noted, the whole thrust of Wittgenstein's analysis has been to deny that 'seeing as' is a matter of physically seeing one thing and then having an interpretation imposed upon it. What is more, he further distances 'seeing as' from sense impression by contrasting that kind of experience with the experience of having a toothache. Unlike having a toothache, the former kind of experience has as its logical condition that the
person claiming the experience has the ability to apply the aspect that he claims to see. Such abilities are often quite simple, for example, where we demand geometrical knowledge from someone who claims to see first one side and then another as the base of triangle. On the other hand, and more relevant to understanding metaphors, it can be a very complex kind of ability, as in the case of someone who claims to be able to hear a piece of music as a march. As Wittgenstein concludes, the striking peculiarity of the experience of 'seeing as' is that "the substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique."²¹

Here, then, is the necessary corrective to Davidson's throw-away remarks about metaphors nudging us into noticing an aspect of something. Instead of falling back on the weak suggestion that such noticing is prompted by the semantic absurdity of a metaphor, we see that it is precisely the sense that a metaphor makes which prompts the experience. Just as we would be dubious about the claims of a man to have found a piece of music sad if he could not explain what was sad about it (if he had not mastered the conventions of musical expression), so we would be sceptical of the claim to have noticed something about politics as the result of a drama metaphor if a man were ignorant of real theatrical performances or the doctrines and arguments associated with them. It is thus unlikely that political metaphors will have
their greatest impact amongst the ignorant and uninstructed, as it is sometimes claimed. We are reminded that metaphors are uses of language, and appeal to the vocabulary of background concepts to make their point. Thus the technical mastery which underlies the comprehension of a conventional political metaphor entails a knowledge of the background concepts which are being employed, and a grasp of the point of employing them in a particular political context.

IV. How are specific connections made between metaphors and doctrines in order to create fields?

This, then, is the general explanation of how political metaphors work. The appeal to background concepts in a metaphorical field creates the logical condition where someone may be said to have noticed an aspect of political life which they had hitherto overlooked. The stress here is on the creation of a logical condition: the metaphor cannot be said to cause someone to notice an aspect, because ultimately they have to accept the ground of the metaphor, its place in a political argument. Given that an author and his audience have the requisite mastery of doctrine and vocabulary, what are the ways in which particular connections between politics and background conceptions may be suggested? Here we move into the province of rhetoric, the ways in which an audience may be persuaded to accept the
ground of the metaphor as a prerequisite for their having the experience of noticing. Doubtless there are many such rhetorical strategies, but three in particular stand out as commonly encountered devices.

The first, and much the least important, involves an appeal to a semantic ambiguity — or "pregnancy" as Empson quaintly calls it — in some part of the vocabulary of the doctrine which is then used to support a metaphorical reading. Early twentieth-century critics of what we call 'consumerism' made much of the economists' preoccupation with 'consumption'. The word has an interesting history of use, especially in its early connections with waste and wasting diseases, and it was employed by early economists precisely because of these connections. Mercantilists were all for the suppression of home consumption, especially of wasteful, 'luxury' goods, on the grounds that resources were thereby irrevocably 'consumed'. With the advent of an interest in markets, the consumer received somewhat more appreciative treatment from the economists, but the word itself could not escape so easily from its earlier associations, and from the parallel alimentary senses it had meanwhile acquired.

Thus R. H. Tawney made a renewed call for the suppression of "economic appetites" in just such terms:
Like a hypochondriac who is so absorbed in the processes of his own digestion that he goes to his grave before he has begun to live, industrialized communities neglect the very object for which it is worth while to acquire riches in their feverish preoccupation with the means by which riches can be acquired.\textsuperscript{24}

The pathological field of material consumption-as-disease, a field supported by the historical associations of the word and by explicit medical references, appears again in the works of Dean Inge, whose essays were an important part of the fashionable pessimism of his times. Even before he wrote on 'Consumptionism', Inge saw the pernicious influence of economic science as a central element in 'Our Present Discontents':

When political economy was treated as a philosophy of life it began to be mischievous. A book on the science of the stomach without a knowledge of physiology or the working of the other organs would not be much use.\textsuperscript{23}

Opposition to industrial society, a society which Tawney sees as heartless and Inge as Godless, is to be mobilized by having an audience see it as diseased. This way they may be brought to notice the immoral waste and emptiness and the preoccupation with worldly things which Tawney and Inge find so distressing. Not only this, but noticing them in such a way brings out their significance for the general argument

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that the modern age is a degenerate one.

In other words, if the audience follows through this metaphorical characterization, they may come to take up the attitudes of Tawney and Inge. First, however, they must share the view that materialism is wrong, and invoking a semantic connection is a comparatively weak way of suggesting this. To a greater extent than other rhetorical strategies, the revival of episodes in the semantic histories of words demands a prior if unarticulated disposition to accept the ground of the metaphor. In this respect Tawney and Inge knew their audiences: a less nostalgic era may have been less disposed to find the pursuit of wealth pathological, and so resist the picture of consumption as a disease.

Like the first, the second strategy continues to stress aesthetic coherence, but uses the vocabulary of its background concepts in a precise, and at first sight more prosaic way, to establish very particular connections with political events and practices. In this way, epistemological coherences become possible. Its most popular vehicle is the extended metaphor in which a series of lesser figurative devices serve to repeat the ground of the metaphorical identifications. Because of this self-consciously literary character it is a strategy which has tended to attract the attention of literary critics rather than political
philosophers (and rightly so), but it is not improper to make some assessment of its political significance here. Since to successfully sustain one of these extended metaphors is part of what it means to be a great stylist, examples tend to be confined to a few well-known figures whose theoretical significance is often less than their literary reputations.

Milton's *Areopagitica* offers us a convenient example of this literary strategy at work. The extended metaphor which carries the argument against the licensing of books is that of books as living things. It is first worked out in the following characteristic passage, disarmingly introduced by the admission that it is of the greatest moment to Church and Commonwealth how books "demeane themselves".

For books are not absolutely dead things but doe containe a potencie of life in them to be as active as that soule was whose progeny they are... I know they are as lively, and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon's teeth; and being sown up and down may chance to spring up armed men. And yet on the other hand, unless wariness be used as good almost kill a man as kill a good book: who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image, but he who destroyes a good Book kills reason itself kills the Image of God... We should be wary therefore what persecution we raise against the living labours of publick men ... since we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a martyrdom, and if it extend to the whole impression, a kind of massacre, whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elementall life but strikes at the ethereall and first essence, the breath of reason itselfe,
slaiues an immortalitie rather than life.  

Notice the complete coherence of what is, in fact, a series of metaphorical redescriptions of the act of censorship, which, taken in sum, create the extended metaphor of books as living things. Figurative comparison between the argument of a book and the soul of its author draws into this basic structure the theological doctrine that man is closest to God in the exercise of his reason, and together they support the daring oxymoron of the final phrase, that censorship slays immortality. Particularly interesting here is the way in which Milton tones down the series of homicide metaphors by use of the 'kind of' modifier, letting the repetition establish the connection in case his very explicit references be thought too bold.

Clearly it is Milton's object that his readers should take up exactly the same attitude to the licensing of books as they would to the taking of a life. In short, he wishes them to notice the aspect under which the two acts may be seen as identical. To the counter argument that in certain cases, notably in battle, killing may be justified, his extended metaphor is admirably adapted to counter with a new development foreshadowed in the reference to the myth of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth. As Michael Walzer has reminded us, it was a central feature of the Puritan
conception of life that men were pitched into a deadly struggle against Satanic forces for the preservation of their immortal souls. It was a conception in which military metaphors flourished, proclaiming the battle of the Godly, assisted by heavenly battalions, against evil in all its manifestations. Milton was perfectly at home with this conception and its metaphorical expressions (compare the epic angelic battle in *Paradise Lost*), and the theme duly appears in *Areopagitica* introduced in another extended metaphor. Here precise and detailed use of military terms serves to point out that licensing deprives us of the very chance to test our arms and prove our adherence to God's word in open encounter with the forces of Satan. Not only is Milton's original books-as-living things metaphor internally coherent, but it connects with other conventional metaphors central to the background concepts shared by Milton and many in his audience.

This use of sophisticated extended metaphors to link a set of ideas, events and practices by means of precise technical detail has been noted by Paul Fussell, where he refers to the creation of a "rhetorical world". The phrase serves to remind us that the details are not piled up purely for aesthetic effect, a demonstration of literary skills only, but serve a persuasive purpose to which such skills are subordinate. Two more examples may help clarify this
point. We recognize in Bernard Mandeville's extended metaphor of political association as a bowl of punch a metaphor in which the details are subordinate to the satirical thrust of the whole argument. Mandeville is quite explicit about this, begging the reader's apology in obviously ironical tones for comparing a "great thing" to a "mean, trivial one". Compare the very different subordination of a metaphor to a persuasive project that goes on in the following passage from Burke, introduced by Fussell as an example of the creation of a rhetorical world.

In *A Letter to a Noble Lord*, referring to the revolutionists use of old cement and building materials as emergency sources of gunpowder, (Burke) delivers this image eloquent of the revolutionary destruction of the orthodox principles of hierarchy and discreteness: "Churches, play-houses, coffee houses, all alike are destined to be mingled and equalised and blended into one common rubbish; and well sifted and lixiviated (mixed with lye), to crystallize into true, democratic, explosive, insurrectionary nitre."

This extended metaphor of revolutionary ideas as gunpowder is supported by a series of metonyms in which physical objects stand for the abstract ideas which are elaborated within their confines. Thus the revolution as a whole is represented by the action of destroying buildings for munitions. Detail is added by the reference to real
buildings — churches, play-houses and coffee houses — standing for religion, the arts and intellectual life, which are not the sorts of things that may be physically torn down. Like Milton's metaphor, the technical details — the sifting, lixiviating and crystallizing — serve to create a rhetorical world whose real counterpart is already intimately known, enjoyed and invested with political significance for his audience. Certainly epistemological coherence is not lacking for, as Fussell reminds us, Burke is speaking of the destructions of the traditional, unselfconscious political life he purported to find in eighteenth-century England. However, let us not forget that much of the power of his metaphor derives from the fact that many in his audience would have been as distressed by the loss of a favourite coffee house as they would by the more distant and abstract prospect of the undermining of a whole social order. The ideological impulse at work in Burke's metaphor is to make the connection between the two that is basic to modern conservatism; but the passage is more than a mere denunciation of a revolution based on abstract principles of politics, it is also a call to arms.

If the art of the literary metaphor and its rhetorical world suggest a way in which conventional metaphors might be born, the third rhetorical strategy suggests how they might fall into desuetude. This strategy has been identified and
analysed by Michael Walzer in a study of political symbolism. Trying to fathom the link between background concepts and political doctrines in the seventeenth century, Walzer was led to conclude that, although the rejection of certain traditional political ideas was clearly related to the acceptance of some new cosmological and theological concepts, the link was not one of logical necessity. If it had been, he reasoned, the 'new philosophy' -- which John Donne had seen "calling all in doubt" -- would have been much more iconoclastic than it actually was. To explain this discrepancy, Walzer argues that a cosmology does not so much provide a set of propositions to political thinkers, but "a series of striking and suggestive images." Such images are less the work of the unguided imagination than the revaluation of experiences in the light of the new ideas. For example, the sixteenth-century cosmology of harmony had tended to set a particular and not very significant value on wandering and vagabondage; the new cosmology of mechanical motion and the emphasis on fallen man in Protestant theology combined to make physical and social mobility into symbols invested with a special meaning and value. As Walzer points out, these symbols involve a dual reference, once to the theoretical structures of natural philosophy and theology, and once again to the political and economic world. In the process of this imaginative transformation, marginal men
were no longer lost amongst the various symbols of chaos contrasted with harmony, but were foregrounded as symbols of a new social order.

Whatever might be thought of Walzer's historical details, his account of political symbols and their reference worlds is a useful one, for it allows us to build up a composite picture of how conventional political metaphors arise, are sustained and fall into desuetude. The notion that political symbols have a double reference is particularly interesting because our analysis of rhetorical worlds suggests that extended political metaphors which make skilful use of such figurative devices as metonymy, synecdoche or personification may create political symbols from the familiar details of everyday life. When they are used in metaphors in a way coherent with contemporary developments in science, philosophy or theology, such extended metaphors may forge the links with background concepts which would create the double reference of political symbols that Walzer has identified. Once created, the symbols may be used again in political metaphors with the weight of a social theory behind them.

This connection between elements of everyday experience and theoretical arguments in the light of which both are invested with political significance is not a logical connection. Since it is made by metaphor, it need not even
be an analogical connection. The rhetorical function of the metaphor is to suggest the connection that the author is trying to establish -- for example, to connect the author's struggle to set his ideas before the public with man's struggle for salvation. If successfully established, warfare becomes a symbol for polemical writing which can be used again, and the conventional metaphor of writing-as-fighting will have been created. However, the metaphor is now closely tied to the background of theological concepts in which life is seen as a struggle, and any weakening of adherence to the background doctrine will leave the metaphor stranded, expressing an attitude fewer and fewer people now hold. How many people, when they applaud Areopagitica as a milestone in the establishment of freedom of expression see Milton's metaphors as anything more than clever conceits? They are persuaded that an author has an abstract right to publish his opinions abroad; nothing could be further from Milton's vision of God's people armed with His word. We cannot strip away Milton's metaphors to arrive at the 'underlying argument' against censorship. Reading the text today we have to understand why Milton thought that these images were appropriate to his argument if we are to discover what that argument really was.

V. The role of the background doctrine is to back a metaphorical description with a justification.
The notion that a metaphor may express an argument, rather than merely illustrate it, has often been resisted by theorists of metaphor. Those who have been primarily interested in the contribution of metaphors to scientific discourse have been especially likely to stress self-awareness as a vital check on the use of metaphor to express arguments. Both Colin Turbayne and Douglas Berggren, for example, have emphasized that, unless a scientific metaphor is put forward with an implication of 'make believe', the result is a myth in which the theorist is used by his metaphor rather than the other way around.\textsuperscript{34} Drop the pretence, says Turbayne, and the metaphor becomes a mask, obscuring the subject matter rather than illuminating it.\textsuperscript{35}

Now, it is not possible to convict either Turbayne or Berggren of an over-simplified realism here, for they are both alert to the ways in which scientific discourse helps constitute its own subject matter. Yet the relevance of their strictures to political metaphor is obviously limited. Why should this be so? The reason, it seems, is that politics as a practical activity, provides a different context for the understanding of metaphors than science, a theoretical activity. This distinction holds for metaphors which are directed towards influencing the conduct of political agents, and metaphors which are designed to provide some theoretical illumination of an area of
political life, and accounts, in part, for the ambivalent attitude towards political metaphors of those political writers who have felt unhappy with this distinction. The political metaphors we have been considering are not primarily tools for investigation, but means of persuasion. They belong in a discourse in which description and justification go hand in hand, and if they are to persuade, they cannot simultaneously carry the suggestion of make believe. Does this mean that they are no more than myths?

It is certainly true that metaphors have a problem of logical grammar to overcome here, a problem Wittgenstein identifies in analysing the sense of "trickery" involved in metaphors of religious experience. He draws a sharp distinction between description and justification by means of metaphor.

I can say 'thank those bees for their honey as if they were kind people who had prepared it for you,' that is intelligible and describes how I would like you to conduct yourself. But I cannot say: 'thank them, because, look, how kind they are!'

In other words, when metaphors are used to justify it is always possible to counter by pointing out that books are not living things, neither are the institutions of society things that could be torn down and turned into gunpowder. It
is true that some political writers and speakers do their best to overcome this problem by sleight of hand according to skill and circumstances. It is also true that many political metaphors take the descriptive 'as if' for an escape route; this is particularly true of metaphors appealing to an attitude -- 'behave towards the revolutionaries as if they had come to tear down your favourite coffee house.' This is surely part of what Burke is saying. However, it has the unfortunate corollary that anyone in his audience who is not disposed to feel any sympathy to churches, theatres or coffee houses, or who is already unsympathetic to the metaphor, will simply reject it out of hand.

While not underestimating either the extent or the influence of metaphors like these in politics, to explain the persistence of highly popular conventional metaphors used in the context of complex doctrines, something more is obviously needed. The argument of the present chapter has sought to establish ways in which conventional metaphors extend beliefs and attitudes associated with political doctrines into political life. When such an extension is successfully accomplished, the intelligibility of future uses of the metaphor-theme rests on the doctrines themselves, and the doctrines carry the burden of justification. Understood as descriptions, in the sense in which Wittgenstein was
using that term, the metaphors bring to our attention political doctrines and the beliefs and attitudes associated with them.

An example may help to clarify this argument. References to the prince-as-father metaphorical field in sixteenth-century English political thought were of two rather different kinds. At a popular level the prevailing theological idiom of justification appealed to such Biblical passages as the Fifth Commandment, Saint Peter's exhortation that servant's obey their masters or the ubiquitous Pauline charge to obey the powers that be for a general account of the grounds of obligation to superior powers. Sermons, homilies and catechisms repeated the message; all superior powers are to be obeyed because their rank is established by God as part of His plan. Contemporary audiences made no meaningful distinction between specifically civil obligations and any other kind. In a text unchanged since 1547, the Elizabethan homily on obedience declared:

Every degree of people, in their vocacion, callyng and office, hath appoynted to them their dutie and ordre. Some are in high dege, some in lowe, some kynges and princes, some inferiors and subjectes, priestes and laimen, masters and servauntes, fathers and chyldren, husbands and wives, ryche and poore, and every one have nede of other: so that in all thynge is to be lauded and prayed the goodly ordre of God, without the whiche no house, no citie, ne commonwealth can continue and endure.
In this popular sense, King James I stood firmly in the old tradition, using metaphors of the good king as kindly master and father in *Basilikon Doron*, and expressing his own sense of duty as that of a "father to his children". He assiduously promoted the publication of the anonymous tract *God and King*, which based civil obligation on the Fifth Commandment.

Interestingly, as Gordon Schochet has shown, James I never attempted to base the authority of his office on the right of a father, despite being happy to characterize himself as *Pater Patriae*. Now, the authority of the monarch was precisely the issue which preoccupied political thinkers in the early Stuart era, so why was discussion carried on without patriarchal metaphors? An important reason was that one of the prevailing idioms in which authority was discussed was not a theological one, but rather a genetic explanation of the origins of offices. This provided a very different background for metaphors of the prince as father, one in which domestic metaphors were generally used with a caution that they were 'merely' metaphors. As Sir Thomas Smith put it, after suggesting that the household and the family mark the first appearance of aristocratic government, "yet this cannot be called Aristocracie, but Metaphorice, for it is but an howse, and a little spark resembling as it were that government."
As Schochet shows, one consequence of this feeling that patriarchal metaphors were implausible vehicles for expressing doctrines about the authority of offices, and of the distrust of metaphors in a theoretical capacity, was the working out of a 'moral theory' in which the authority of civil offices was traced back to Adam's dominion over Eve. Ultimately, for reasons which do not concern us here, this theory could not prevail over one which derived the authority of civil offices from a covenant of those thereby obliged. Patriarchal metaphors in turn did not disappear, but were restricted to more popular accounts of obligation. The natural character of the family relation clearly could not be used to direct attention to background concepts which put special stress on the artificial character of a covenant. 40

Thus the apparent decline in importance of patriarchal metaphors in the seventeenth century must be explained both in terms of the decline in importance of a particular conception of the world which these metaphors had conventionally been used to express, and in terms of a related change in the direction of political speculation. The one robbed familial metaphors of the background of justification which they had enjoyed in the sixteenth century; the other impeded new uses, because the new doctrines lacked coherence with the meaning that the family
as a symbol still enjoyed. Lacking epistemological coherence with a background doctrine, patriarchal metaphors remained plausible only because of their aesthetic coherence with the experience of family life.

We are thus confronted with an example of the symbolic transformation of private sentiment into public significance which Clifford Geertz has identified as the primary function of political ideologies. Familial metaphors turned the widely shared experience of family life into a doctrine about the character of kingship. In Geertz's essay, he remarks that these metaphorical connections between sentiment and significance can fail in at least two ways. They can misfire if the metaphor is strained beyond the credulity of its audience, as it strained the imagination of many of James's parliamentary opponents to see him as the father of his people. They can lose their meaning altogether, as the family as a symbol tended to lose its political meaning when modern distinctions between public and private life began to enjoy wide currency.

It is hardly surprising that this 'cultural' dimension to political metaphors is something which has been stressed by anthropologists such as Geertz. But in identifying ideologies as the 'cultural systems' within which political metaphors operated to create public meanings out of sentiment and prejudice, we are once again reminded that the
political experience of men studied by the historian of political thought -- as opposed to the anthropologist -- is already a highly sophisticated construct. Thus, the manner in which familial metaphors were deprived of a part of their justificatory force by the rise to prominence of a new historical idiom in political argument is particularly interesting, for the example serves to locate political metaphors within those 'languages' which have recently interested historians of political thought. The coherence that a metaphor establishes between a background of beliefs and attitudes, and political events and practices is a coherence internal to various modes of articulating such beliefs and attitudes. Consequently, the analysis of political metaphors as rhetorical phenomena must give way to a consideration of political metaphors in their historical contexts.
Identity and Meaning
Political Metaphors in their Historical Contexts

What is meant by the vague injunction that political metaphors should be studied 'in their historical contexts'? In one sense, the claim itself should come as no great surprise, for the notion of context has already been used to distinguish between utterances which suggest metaphorical readings and those which do not, and between plausible and less plausible readings. But 'context' by itself is a broad and unilluminating term; the context of an utterance is infinitely wide and potentially infinitely detailed. We need to specify what is relevant about a context to render a metaphor intelligible. In this case, the appeal to context is first of all designed to identify utterances which carry metaphorical resonance, either intended by an author, recognized by an audience or both. Second, it is required to furnish plausible interpretations of what this resonance might have been, especially in the light of the possible connections between a metaphor and a conceptual background elaborated in the previous chapter. In short, a 'closure of context' is required, an ability to show what is to count as
a plausible contextual interpretation, and what is to be discarded.

The first three chapters have been designed to show that a metaphor is intelligible as a use of language. They have been concerned both with what Max Black has -- somewhat confusingly -- called the cognitive context of a metaphor, and with the preconditions that have to be met before someone can be said to have grasped a metaphor. In chapter four we considered these conditions in the special case of political metaphors, and added an analysis of the consequences of grasping the meaning of a political metaphor. By linking these conditions and consequences through the notion of 'seeing as', it was suggested that there was a close connection between what an audience knows and what it can be said to have made of a political metaphor. The activity of politics, it was argued, furnished a context for the interpretation of political metaphors which served to distinguish them from metaphors used in the course of theoretical inquiry. This being so, the general problem of interpretation is replaced by specific problems of historical interpretation, and the promise to distinguish political metaphors as a sub-class of 'metaphor', made in chapter one, is redeemed.

Now, the historical interpretation of particular metaphorical utterances raises, in an acute form, all those
problems besetting the status of the history of political thought as an historical enterprise. Consider, for example, the treatment of political metaphors by Judith Shklar, who has taken the view that the history of political thought is the study of certain perenially interesting problems by means of texts that happen to have been written in the past. Interestingly enough, Shklar begins her treatment of political metaphors by observing the close connection between political theory and rhetoric, in the sense that both are forms of persuasion. She suggests that, in consequence, the great political theorists have all been masters of metaphor. This fact in turn guides the interest that an historian of political thought has in an author's metaphors.

When one looks at political metaphors, for instance, one wants to know how they work, within the context of a writer's general purposes. One does not want to judge their legitimacy or validity or grammatical correctness.

She is thus led to pose the very question that interests us here; unfortunately, her answers raise many more problems than they resolve.

Turning to Rousseau's works, Shklar notes that, although Rousseau uses the term "the body politic" on numerous occasions, she has determined that it is usually no
more than a casual synonym for 'civil society'. How has she arrived at this conclusion? Apparently by applying the methodological injunction that, "there is no way of knowing when the use of a metaphor is meaningful and when it is not, unless one has looked at each occasion of its appearance." Shklar's use of the phrase 'when the use of a metaphor is meaningful' is highly idiosyncratic. She is apparently referring to a prior construction, 'the metaphor of the body politic', and appears to have carried out a search amongst Rousseau's writings to determine whether he has ever used the phrase with the meaning that she attributes to the abstract construction. In fact, 'the body politic' in Shklar's account is not entirely abstract, for its meaning is said to be partly based on a history of previous uses of the phrase. Wherever Rousseau departs from the expected meaning, his use is "not meaningful".

Even allowing that Shklar views the history of political thought as an exercise valuable only insofar as it sheds light on perennial problems -- a view which obviously colours what she finds meaningful in a text -- there are problems with her account. Our denial that it makes sense to speak of the metaphor of the body politic was based on two related arguments. First, that the meaning of a metaphor was not the result of applying an abstract image to an equally abstract subject, but the meaning of a complete sentence in
which the subject expression contributed as much to the meaning of the whole as the predicate expression. Second, that the meaning of a metaphor is a function of the use to which it is being put. So even if Rousseau is only using the phrase 'the body politic' to mean civil society, it is not thereby meaningless; this is what it means.

Perhaps it will be objected here that Shklar's point is to distinguish between Rousseau's uses and the conventional uses of 'the body politic' which, for reasons of her own, she finds more interesting. As we have seen, such metaphors do have histories of use, but there is more than one conventional organic metaphor, more than one way in which organic attributes have conventionally been used in political argument. Certainly an historical account of the use of such metaphors is indispensable for knowing the implications of using them conventionally at any one time. But our treatment of an author's use must be historical in the sense which Shklar first suggested if we are to close the context of interpretation. Instead of picking and choosing the interpretations that might be meaningful to us -- for there are an infinite variety of these -- we must begin by considering the interpretations which could have been meaningful to Rousseau and his contemporaries, "within the context of a writer's general purposes."

In fact, as we have suggested in discussing
metaphorical fields in chapter three, there are implications connected with Rousseau's descriptions of civil society as *un corps politique* and *un corps organisé* which may be of considerable significance for his argument as a whole. But we will not find out whether this is in fact so or not without beginning from the writer's "general purposes" -- that is, his project and the resources he found to hand. The literary critic must take a back seat to the historian.

II. Locating political metaphors in ideologies as a precondition of historical treatment.

How does a consideration of an author's project or general purposes serve to close the context of interpretation for the historian? John Dunn has reminded us of what is at stake here.

To abstract an argument from the context of truth criteria it was designed to meet is to convert it into a different argument. . . . If the effort to learn from the philosophers of the past is a plausible heuristic it would be most odd if it can be carried out in general by failing to grasp their actual arguments.

As a corrective to the view that a properly historical interest in the arguments of political theorists must necessarily belittle the activity of an historian of political thought this is admirable, but it does not go
quite far enough. The central problem of the history of political thought is that, unlike events, 'thoughts' are problematic subjects for historical investigation. After all, they do not have spatio-temporal extension. One way around this difficulty has been to concentrate on activities in which thoughts are expressed, and 'arguments' are straightforward candidates here. The problem with Dunn's account is simply that, considered as an activity, arguments are not designed to meet truth-criteria, but designed to persuade. Certainly, the propositions that arguments may express have truth criteria attached, but propositions are not activities.

More promising is the deservedly famous line of argument developed by Quentin Skinner from the original work on speech acts by J. L. Austin. Austin drew a distinction between the 'locutionary meaning' of an utterance and its 'illocutionary' and 'perlocutionary force' which reappears in Skinner's distinction between what an author said and what he may have meant by what he said. Locutionary meaning, or what an author said, is grasped by means of a knowledge of the meanings of the words used and the rules governing their combination in sentences, which may involve the historian researching archaic meanings and idioms. Illocutionary force, however, is grasped in the act of understanding what it is that is being done in uttering
these words with these meanings on this occasion. As research into speech acts has shown, this is a matter of grasping the complex intention that the utterance, as an intended act of communication must have embodied. For example, at a minimum, for you to understand my utterance, "It's coming," as a warning, you must not only understand the locutionary act by knowing the referent of 'it' on this occasion, and the relevant sense of the verb 'to be', but you must grasp that I intended it as a warning, and further intended that you should recognize this intention.  

Treating political arguments as illocutionary acts, people "doing things with words", certainly provides an historical subject, a real activity. Furthermore, it is recognizably the kind of activity within which we have located the utterance and comprehension of political metaphors. Although we rejected the notion that 'metaphoring' was itself an illocutionary act, we saw that an important part of understanding a metaphor included a grasp of the illocutionary act being performed, a grasp of what the author was trying to do with his metaphor. What, then, is to count as a plausible interpretation of an illocutionary act performed in the past?

Skinner's own first attempts at answering this question were not notably successful. He suggested that illocutionary acts could only be performed under various conventions
specific to the act, and it was recognition of the relevant conventions on the part of the auditor which was a necessary condition of his securing uptake. Although promising, this line of argument foundered on the objection that not all speech acts are conventional, and if, as Skinner at first wanted to argue, the historian can only recover the historical meaning of those speech acts which are conventional, the number of arguments thereby rendered intelligible would be absurdly small.

However, Skinner and others associated with his enterprise did not give up. The notion that utterances could be treated as meaningful actions, and the notion that the meaning that such an action could have for contemporaries was limited by a context of shared attitudes, beliefs and, in certain instances, conventions, was a fruitful one. To find the link between these two notions, consider the problems set for historical interpretation by the following political metaphors.

In Sir Richard Morison's *Exhortation*, we come across an entirely novel metaphor. The Bishop of Rome, says Morison, "will do what he can to overrun this way, what a pestiferous Poole, that floweth out of course, that seeketh against nature to destroy the head, from whence it first did spring." The first step is to identify the "pestiferous Poole" as a punning allusion to Reginald Pole. Pole was one
of the most distinguished opponents of the Henrician Reformation, author of the tract *De Unitate Ecclesiastica* condemning Henry's conduct in the name of the universal church, and later to be Cardinal and Papal Legate in the reign of Mary. Pole's kinsmen had already been implicated both in a treasonable conspiracy and in a popular uprising -- the Pilgrimage of Grace -- the latter occasioning Morison's pamphlet. Morison is arguing that Pole and his kinsmen are instruments in the unnatural activity of rebellion, turning against the head, which has the double reference to head of the body politic and head of a river. In both cases, the message is driven home that here is an unnatural activity, against the order of Creation. Thus the Pope is accused of fomenting actions contrary to the obedience to higher powers taught in the Bible, and the whole image of the overrunning stream fits nicely into Morison's general project of linking the rebels at home with danger from abroad.

In this description of Morison's 'rhetorical world', linked to real events by the pun, the emphasis is on showing how knowledge of a context helps make sense of a novel metaphor. We make use of the officially inspired campaign of legitimizing tracts produced under the direction of Thomas Cromwell in the 1530s. We note, too, the conventional metaphor of order, and the conventional targets of the
campaign, particularly the Pope and other interested foreign parties fomenting misguided subjects to rebel against their lawful sovereign and supreme head, Henry VIII. In doing so, we render the metaphor intelligible as part of Morison's political project.

On the other hand, if a metaphor is itself one of the conventions of argument, if we have identified the existence of conventional uses for that particular metaphor amongst a writer's contemporaries, the metaphor itself may constitute part of the evidence from which the meaning of the argument is to be inferred. Brendan Bradshaw's version of a controversial passage from More's *Utopia* is a convenient example here. Bradshaw argues that the attempt to locate *Utopia* either in the Platonist tradition, where the argument is that until the institution of philosopher-kings, philosophers will only become corrupted by giving counsel to princes issues in a recommendation to a life of *otium*, or in the Christian Humanist tradition, where a naive confidence in the value of wise counsel and good education recommends a posture of *negotium*, is misguided. To support his argument that *Utopia* is intended to be a critique of both positions, Bradshaw appeals to More's use of a ship of state metaphor. The conventional use of this metaphor, he claims, still current at the beginning of the sixteenth century, was derived from Plato's description of the skilled navigator.
whose advice was mocked by a deaf shipmaster and an ignorant crew. More, by using the metaphor, accepted the assumptions on which the problem was based, but turned it into a critical device by arguing that "you must not abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds." Thus, according to Bradshaw, More is recommending negotium at the same time as accepting Plato's point that the philosopher will find politics a difficult and dangerous activity, on the grounds that intellectual has a moral duty not to desert his commonwealth when the going gets a little rough.

In both these examples the meaning of an utterance has been taken to be the meaning of an action performed in making the utterance. The explanation proceeded by citing a context of beliefs, attitudes and conventions which rendered this activity intelligible. In one case the metaphor itself was what had to be explained, in the other case a conventional metaphorical usage formed part of the context in which the intelligibility of the activity was displayed. In his more recent writings, Skinner has referred to the linguistic activities that make up the subject matter of the history of political thought as taking place within a context of "ideologies".

We can hardly claim to be concerned with the
history of political theory unless we are prepared to write it as real history -- that is as the record of an actual activity and in particular as the history of ideologies.

In saying this, Skinner acknowledged the complex relation of context and activity which our two examples reveal. On the one hand, an activity is only intelligible in the context that made it what it was. On the other hand, the beliefs, attitudes, norms and conventions which go to make up a context serve as a storehouse of resources for individual writers in contemplating their activities of justifying, commending, delegitimizing, or denigrating. These resources cannot be used at will, for they will be associated at particular times and places with various ideological traditions. Any explanation of actors' adherence to the tradition must be defined partly in terms of their recognition of the normative force of the beliefs and conventions that make up the identity of the tradition. To appeal to such adherents, a writer must recognize the existence of these norms even as he seeks to change them, just as More seems to have done with the Platonist tradition. So, in addition to locating particular arguments in a context formed by the clash of ideologies, the ideologies themselves have a history, which is a history of their use.
III. Scepticism about 'ideology': is the concept useful?

Before we can use this notion of an ideological context to interpret political metaphors, however, we must deal with a pervasive scepticism about the whole concept of ideology, a scepticism which has fed on the confusion generated by conflicting uses of the term. Skinner is some help here, for although he has shown little interest in clarifying the term 'ideology' in his own works, he has pointed out that, as he uses the term, an ideological context furnishes a context of meaning -- an account of what the beliefs people hold mean -- not a context of causes -- an account of why certain people hold particular beliefs. We shall follow Skinner in making this distinction because it allows us to sidestep the greater part of the argument surrounding 'the problem' of ideology.

This problem may be set out as follows. We may without much difficulty recognize and distinguish between the historical phenomena we have called ideological traditions in modern Europe: a list would certainly include liberalism, socialism, conservatism, nationalism, anarchism, fascism and national socialism. We can do this because there are self-professed liberals, socialists, etc., busily engaging in such activities as identifying their friends and enemies, stating and modifying their doctrines, and formulating
programmes which contain actions purporting to be
distinctively liberal or socialist actions. However, while
all this material is vital historical evidence for
establishing the identity of particular ideological
traditions, it does not immediately delimit the application
of the term 'ideology'. More often than not, indeed, a
self-professed liberal or socialist would reject the
application of the term 'ideologist' to himself, his beliefs
and his actions, even while he proclaims their liberal or
socialist character.

It might be objected here that this poses no problems
for the theorist who seek to understand the formal character
of ideological beliefs, for it is up to him to define and to
use the term 'ideology' in a consistent way. In fact, it is
precisely by means of stipulative definitions of this sort
that most theoretical studies of ideology have been carried
out ('in the following pages I use the term "ideology" to
mean'). The theory of ideology has a history of its own, and
is not lacking in exemplary definitions which may be drawn
upon with an eye to the continuity of the enterprise. The
works of Marx and his followers, and those of Karl Mannheim
and the sociologists of knowledge stand out as important
here. 13

However, this theoretical highhandedness only compounds
the problem of correct application -- and this quite apart
from the difficulties raised by the accounts of the relation between belief and conduct in the writings of Marx, Mannheim and their followers. If two philosophers of science fall to arguing about the proper scope of models in scientific explanation, limits are set to the use that they can make of the term 'model' by the actual practice of scientists which will furnish their illustrations. But these limits are precisely what is lacking in arguments about the proper application of the term 'ideology', for, as we have seen, political agents either reject the term altogether, or use it as an uninteresting term of abuse.

Two general consequences attend this separation of theorists' accounts of ideology from real political activity. First, there is a tendency for disagreements amongst theorist to degenerate into tedious wrangling over the meaning of terms, with one appealing to historical precedent, another to pragmatic considerations, and yet another to his supposed achievement of having synthesized all previous definitions into one, all-encompassing, super definition. Their only result is the spawning of a host of pseudo-problems, the solutions to which are contained in the original definition (Is political philosophy ideological? Was Aristotle an ideologist? Is ideology false or nonsensical?). The problems posed by the discourse of actual liberals and socialists remains untouched. Second, the
historical identity of an ideological tradition with all its occasional incoherencies and accidental lacunae is replaced by the imaginative reconstruction of the theorist himself, prompted chiefly by a desire to find and display a set of core beliefs that might serve to define liberalism or socialism. In this way, ideologies are given an air of timelessness that belies their origins in political activity and makes nonsense of the changing contexts in which such beliefs are held or discarded. Taken together, it is not at all surprising that we should encounter suggestions that the term 'ideology' should be discarded as unnecessarily ambiguous and misleading.

Appealing as this last solution may be, we should recall the place of ideologies in Skinner's argument. An ideology is to be identified as a real historical phenomenon; beliefs, attitudes, norms and conventions which people actually held. The mapping out of those ideological traditions which make up a "context of meaning" for the particular dispute that interests us (the location of our metaphors), and the discovery of the actual shape of these traditions at a particular time will be historical tasks. The map might be simple - Papalist against Imperialist during the Investiture Crisis, for example -- or it might be a good deal more complex -- as in the dispute between communists, socialists, liberals and conservatives over the
correct appreciation of right-wing populist movements in the nineteen-twenties and -thirties. But the identity of the various ideologies will be described in terms of an acceptance on the part of their adherents of distinctive discourse, dogmas and styles of action, a distinction largely maintained, of course, in self-conscious contrast with one another. Since we are less interested in explaining how people came to hold these beliefs or accept the normative force of these conventions than in using the fact that they do to understand what they are saying and doing, there is less temptation to insist on doctrinal purity at the expense of historical realism. A conservative is a man who calls himself a conservative. If his claim is contested, he has not necessarily made a mistake; the contest is itself evidence for changes in the identity of the tradition. His inclusion or exclusion from the canon of conservative thought will ultimately be a judgement made by self-professed adherents, and, in this sense, the canon is constantly being revised.

IV. Ideological beliefs make sense as judgements of value, not as a species of practical reasoning.

However, if we take the identity of an ideological tradition on its own terms, as a set of shared beliefs and practices that certain historical figures can be shown to
have used in politics, a rather more interesting 'problem' of political ideology arises. Instead of trying to explain why certain people held the beliefs that they did (often with the implication that this is an inquiry into psycho-pathology), we might show some interest in why they found their beliefs relevant to their activities. Given that such men were not all guilty of a monumental category blunder, what is it about the usual rag-bag of theology, jurisprudence, philosophy, history or natural science that appeals to the adherents of an ideological tradition, and why is there a problem here?

Consider the assertion — made by Lord Hugh Cecil in the course of his popular exposition of the conservative viewpoint — that conservatism is compounded of a distrust of the unknown and a love of the familiar, a reverence for religion and authority, and a feeling for the greatness of one's country. Almost in the same breath, Cecil informs his reader that such a viewpoint entails the following policies: a defence of the existing constitution, the maintenance of the established church and a generous provision for national defence.16 Now, whilst it is perfectly clear that these policy statements may serve as straightforward descriptions of actions — opposition to female enfranchisement or to the abolition of the House of Lords veto, for example — it is by no means so clear just what work is being done by the
beliefs put forward as the distinguishing marks of conservatism. A love of the familiar and reverence for authority might equally well have justified amendment of the existing constitution on the grounds that political circumstances required it if what was genuinely familiar was to be retained. Nor is there any particularly close connection between a feeling for the greatness of one's country and providing generously for national defence, unless that greatness receives prior specification in terms of military might. Indeed, most of Cecil's book is taken up with explaining how the Conservative Party proposes to deal with contingent circumstances by means of specific policies, and we hear very little about the creed of the conservative. In short, the creed is not 'put into practice' in quite the same way as the policies are.

This is the point at which those who use ideology as a term of abuse quite reasonably conclude that Cecil's conservative creed is nothing more than an ex post facto rationalisation designed to rally to his cause those who are too ignorant or too feckless to rationally analyse his policies, by means of an appeal to their servile or patriotic instincts. Now, nothing is more common than to hear of ideologies being 'put into practice', but it is precisely this innocent-looking little phrase which is at the root of our difficulties here. On the one hand, the
statements that we have identified as distinctively ideological in Cecil's book are of quite the wrong order to generate policy statements, courses of action which might be, for example, the act of loving one's country. But, on the other hand, recognition of this fact must not tempt us to elevate such statements into a theory of politics which is somehow prior to the activity of politics itself, setting the ends to be pursued by means of policies, and hence being 'put into practice'. To do so leads directly to the scepticism which sees in ideology only rationalization, because, as Oakeshott has demonstrated in a famous essay, there can be no such theory in which the ends are set prior to the activity.

A cook is not a man who has a vision of a pie and then tries to make it; he is a man skilled in cookery, and both his projects and his achievements spring from that skill.\footnote{17}

Thus an ideologist is not a man who has a vision of his goal spring full-blown from his own imagination, 'the struggle for liberty against tyranny', 'the realization of the nation's destiny', or 'a reverence for religion and authority', which he then tries to put into practice as one might seek to increase military power by buying more battleships. First, we are reminded that conclusions like
these depend upon the prior existence of traditions of reflection for the very possibility of their formulation. Second, we are still left with the problem of explaining what such reflection is about if it is not practical reasoning. But this latter problem dissolves when we rid ourselves of the mental straighjacket engendered by the phrase 'putting theories into practice'.

In other words, the problem of reconciling ideologists' beliefs with their actions takes on a different cast if we are prepared to listen more closely to what they actually have to say, instead of arriving so easily at the conclusion that ideology must have the form of a theory about the world -- "the logic of an idea applied to politics," as Hannah Arendt has it. In fact, Cecil has told us what it is that the conservative values, or the value that policies like buying more battleships have in themselves. In an analogous way, Hobhouse proclaimed that the liberal values 'liberty', and Laski announced that the socialist values 'social justice'. It may very well transpire on examination that the kinds of actions and institutions which attract praise or blame as conforming to or departing from 'the familiar', 'liberty' or 'social justice' may not be markedly dissimilar, but it would be a mistake to conclude from this that ideologies are of no consequence. It would be strange indeed if such near contemporaries as Cecil, Hobhouse and
Laski should have held very different views of the political possibilities of the age. They are not offering judgements of possibilities couched in the language of practical reason, but ethical yardsticks by which such policies are to be measured. As Cecil reminds us, the conservative is quite as hostile to injustice and as "unwilling to acquiesce in the suffering of people from poverty and its attendant evils" as the liberal or the socialist, but his reasoning is different. Instead of reminding us of the value of individual self-development or the dignity of labour (which he could only regard as sententious nonsense), he would elaborate his beliefs in terms of the religious commandments about our duties to those less fortunate than ourselves, and especially to the duty of charity which is part of a traditional relationship of master and servant. It is difficult to deny that what a man values is relevant to his conduct.

To make this same point rather differently, consider the following remark by Rush Rhees, a passage cited by Tim Robinson in the course of a making a similar argument.

If a man is determined to fight for liberty (for the furtherance of liberty in this society) -- then fine. But if he says he is determined to
fight for liberty for the reason that ... then I lose interest, and similarly if he is determined to fight for the achievement of communism.

In one sense Rhees's lack of interest in further justification is quite understandable, and this is the sense in which we expect reasons for actions to elucidate a context in which the action appeared a reasonable thing to do. As we have seen, the actions that a man 'fighting for liberty' might perform are not related to the fact that he is fighting for liberty in the same way that practical reason links a desired outcome to our knowledge of our current state of affairs and the means at our disposal to realise that outcome. However, Rhees's disregard for what would be forthcoming, that is, a further justification of why fighting for liberty is to be valued, betrays a certain lack of interest in political life (perhaps justifiable given his philosophical concerns), and, possibly, a confusion of ideological beliefs with moral or religious notions.

This latter would be an understandable confusion. We have seen that when an ideologist tells us that his actions are to be understood as the preservation of something he loves or the promotion of a socialist society we are not being offered a prudential explanation but an expression of the value that the action has for the person performing it,
and because of this we have referred to ideological beliefs as having an ethical character. This suggests a close connection between ideological beliefs and moral notions, as, for example, when someone explains his conduct as loyalty or filial devotion. Now it is true that in the latter case we would not be much interested if someone were to say that he "spent so much time with his elderly parents because it was his duty, and this was because ...," for we already know that a duty of this kind furnishes a reason for an action. But consider the case in which such a duty had come to be thought rather archaic; then the further explanation might be forthcoming that the person concerned was 'a trifle old-fashioned about such things,' which is an explanation in the form of a further justification. With ideological beliefs, however, the objectivity of moral notions is entirely lacking, and further justifications are perfectly in order precisely because the claims that 'liberty' or 'social justice' are to be valued will be met with opposition. And, of course, such explanations will have a practical edge, for they are not meant merely to elucidate what the conservative or liberal thinks he is doing, but to persuade others to entertain his values too.

The explanations of his conduct offered by the ideologist are distinctive. We have seen that they are concerned neither with means–ends rationality nor with moral
notions properly so-called, but they are explanations nonetheless. It is worth insisting on this point because the claim that an ideological belief is an expression of value is sometimes taken to mean that it could be replaced by a primitive vocal ejaculation, an expression of approbation or disapproval like 'boo' or 'hurrah'. It is, perhaps, possible that someone might go through life with a rudimentary understanding of politics in which these were his only reactions to the course of events. Yet we would insist that his understanding of political life was rudimentary precisely because politics as a practice has sustained reflection about its character which offers complex resources for the project of ethical justification we have identified as ideology. Quite apart from attempts to persuade others to accept these ethical characterizations, it is hardly surprising that men should think it important to explain why it is that they value some aspects of political life and so justify their own actions in other's eyes, nor that they should press to the limits of imagination and artifice to do so.

We have identified ideological argument as a practice concerned with promoting, defending and attacking a range of ethical characterizations of political events, actions and institutions. As we noted when citing Oakeshott, the sense of particular judgements (that a course of action is to be
seen as "the irruption of the proletariat onto the stage of history" for example) is logically unimaginable without the prior existence of the practice of making this sort of judgement. However, examining the historical evidence of ideological traditions, we are at once made aware that disagreements surround such judgements. It is true, of course, that such disagreements ultimately spring from differences of interest, disposition and prejudice, for such are the motive forces of political activity. But the language which articulates these differences is by no means a transparent 'medium' for the conduct of disputes. Political 'languages' have their own part to play, and this observation conveniently brings us back to Skinner's claim that ideological disputes will furnish the 'real activity' which the historian of political thought seeks as his subject matter.

V. How can an ideology furnish a context of meaning for a metaphorical utterance?

This said, it remains quite probable that Skinner does not intend to be very specific in his use of the term 'ideology', finding it a convenient synonym for the 'assumptions and conventions' found holding together distinctive schools of writers. The argument of the preceding sections has attempted to develop this notion in a
way that might not necessarily command Skinner's approval, and to show how ideological arguments are closely tied to disposition and prejudice. This has the added advantage of defending the notion against a general scepticism that sees ideologies as, at best, smokescreens behind which the 'real politics' of power and interest is carried on.

Often, of course, political metaphors will attempt to appeal directly to the disposition, expressing some stylistic or temperamental element dear to the adherents of a particular ideology. Harold Macmillan's metaphor describing the diplomatic consequences of the Suez affair (encountered in chapter two) is a clear case of this. In asserting that "the Afro-Asian pack was in full cry, with the United States and the Soviet Union as joint masters," the prime-minister's legendary grasp of political circumstances was no doubt put to the test. Lacking any conventional clues to its point, this utterance might as easily have been taken to mean that an international pariah had been hounded to a well-deserved fate by an outraged community of nations as in its intended sense of the orchestrated persecution of a plucky small nation punished for standing up for its rights. Political metaphors which appeal to aesthetic coherence with feeling and prejudice -- here, sympathy for the underdog -- always court the greatest risk of ignominious failure. They may easily be rejected by
an audience of contrary disposition. Setting out to describe and justify in a single metaphor, without the support of background doctrine that more sophisticated metaphors can call upon for support, they are creatures of an occasion. The metaphors found in ideological disputes are often of this kind, especially when their purpose is to rally the faithful or display the writer's credentials, and an historian with a sensitive eye for nuance can often find his way right to the heart of an ideological dispute with the aid of a few well-chosen metaphors.

Thus, metaphors which appeal directly to a disposition are by no means uninteresting, and may indeed be extremely valuable historical evidence, but their wide distribution in the language of politics should not tempt us to overlook those metaphors which express claims to knowledge, albeit knowledge which purports to have political significance. In such cases, the historical context which the historian must build up to support his interpretation may be one of considerable complexity. In addition to the arrangement of conflicting ideological traditions, he must be aware of more general idioms which characterized political argument in the period he is investigating, idioms which may be spoken by adherents of many different ideologies at once. At one time the idiom may be natural science, at another time theology, it might be geometry or it might be an
understanding of the relation of the past to the present constituting a conception of history. These idioms, too, will add vocabulary, distinctive claims to knowledge and forms of proof to the language of politics, and may themselves serve to support a metaphor.

Naturally certain idioms may be associated with particular ideologies, and this makes their employment in other ideological traditions a difficult business. James Tully's painstaking account of the way in which Locke sought to detach the successful idiom of natural law from the defence of absolutism with which it had become conventionally associated, and to overcome its apparent failure to sustain a compact theory of property familiar to his ideological associates, provides a classic example of the difficulties here. As we might expect, the project was not immediately successful in political terms. On the other hand, when an idiom does achieve widespread currency, it may pose problems for the identity of an ideology, as is suggested by the increasingly testy way in which Engels sought to disassociate the evolutionary arguments of late-nineteenth-century Marxism from those of Social Darwinist liberals. Finally, we may find idioms rejected as inappropriate to political argument, as later sixteenth-century writers referred disparagingly to "Mr. More's Utopia", or as contemporaries reacted to Hobbes's
abstract civil science. Thus, both idiom and ideology must be taken into account in creating a context of meaning for sophisticated political metaphors.

Mere complexity of context is no virtue in itself. It becomes one in conjunction with our instrumentalist account of political language (and hence of political metaphor), which we derived from Skinner. From this it follows that the linguistic context in which a writer finds himself furnishes the instruments with which to prosecute his political activities, and, unless these instruments are both flexible and varied, the resulting picture is the ludicrously inapt one of men imprisoned in a world marked by precisely determined conventions of discourse. The instrumentalism inherent in this vision of political thought -- men doing things with words -- demands that innovation and open-endedness are features of political discourse, and that imagination and an eye for political possibility are a mark of the greatest political writers. To see political metaphors as instruments being used in a fully developed historical context helps us avoid the greatest pitfall in previous treatments of the subject. We are able to avoid the tendency to see political metaphors not so much as instruments but as conduits down which the stream of political reflection is doomed to flow until an innovative genius came to smash the mould and reorientate political
thought.

Conventional political metaphors have been particularly ill-used in this respect; it is not uncommon to read that the history of later medieval political thought is the story of men endlessly following out the implications of an organic metaphor. Even so sophisticated an historian as Gierke does not entirely escape this tendency, arguing that "the idea of organic society failed to issue in the legal idea of personality," as if the ideal of legal personality was somehow inherent in organic metaphors and only a perverse Aristotelianism prevented this being discovered. It is true that conventional organic metaphors had conventional uses in argument, but there was no logical problem in manipulating them, only practical ones. To take a closely related example, there was no logical contradiction in a medieval emperor using an *anima-corpus* metaphor to legitimize his activities *vis à vis* the Church. The problem, as Walter Ullmann has pointed out, was that such metaphors had become "thoroughly Christocentric", so that they were implausible instruments for asserting the priority of temporal over spiritual powers. The Christocentric background that supported the metaphor and its uses had to come under sustained attack before this implausibility could be dispelled.

The temptation to speak of the 'implications' of a
metaphor-theme, as if these were fixed for all time, may reappear under more difficult circumstances. For instance, where political writers have used more than one conventional metaphor, what may look like a problem of logical incompatibility between the 'implications' of the metaphors will turn out to be tensions in the doctrine that they are used to express. Thus J. R. Burrow draws our attention to two characteristic metaphors of the late eighteenth century German Romantic idiom -- the state as a work of art and the state as an organism. However, he proceeds to argue that their use has certain drawbacks in that the state as a work of art might suggest elements of cameralist doctrine, and the state as an organism might seem to deny individual autonomy.\(^{26}\) Now, as Burrow's admirable brief account of Romanticism makes clear, these contradictions were not so much the implications of any such metaphors considered in the abstract. They point instead to a tension in the doctrine that the metaphors were being used to express. What kind of community could there be "where each strives to develop himself from his own inmost nature?"\(^{27}\) Could citizens be free, self-conscious moral agents in the stringent sense that the Romantics demanded? The perilous coherence in their use of metaphors takes us at once to this tension, one that was to be resolved by many erstwhile Romantics in the subordination of the individual to the
VI. Historical method used to distinguish between metaphor theme, metaphorical field and metaphorical utterance.

This injunction to determine the meaning of a political metaphor from the use to which it is put poses problems of its own. In particular, it might be wondered whether the analysis of metaphors to determine the identity of a group of writers can ever proceed without creating from their individual uses an abstraction — the metaphor of the state as mechanism in the liberal tradition, for example. However, if the creation of this abstraction can be historically supported as a metaphorical field within which determinate historical actors can be shown to have worked, we will have recreated an important element in an historical 'language'. Consider the complex relation between ideology, idiom and metaphor in the case of a small group of writers active in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and identified by Benjamin Lippincott as "Victorian critics of democracy." Ideologically, some of the most prominent critics like Maine, Bagehot and Lowe were liberals unhappy with the direction that liberalism seemed to be taking under the direction of Gladstone, Bright or Harrison. Thus they became isolated from the mainstream of English liberalism, ambiguous figures who have sometimes been claimed for

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conservatism. They mark a moment in English liberalism when the last vestiges of its Whig inheritance briefly reappeared in the arguments over the extension of the franchise, an archaic idiom which found few sympathetic ears amongst contemporary liberals.

Idiomatically most archaic were the many echoes of that 'sceptical Whiggism' which Duncan Forbes has located in the writings of Hume and Smith, particularly manifest in the later writer's concern with the constitution as the fragile product of many unique historical circumstances and their concern with liberty as the rule of law. A distinctive contribution of their own was a concern with 'the masses', no longer the plebian mob of the eighteenth century, but a unique and perenially interesting product of industrial development, now organized in trade unions, increasingly literate -- if 'uncultured' -- and ever more alarming. If these writers were indeed 'critics of democracy', then this latter term must be understood in the precise sense of a form of government by the many which the older idiom had preserved. Overlaying all this, and more arresting to the modern eye, is the idiom of academic inquiry which permeates their work -- Maine's concern with comparative history, or Bagehot's with natural science -- an idiom which has given modern ideologies their distinctive and highly misleading appearance of 'theories' of politics.
The single most important metaphor-theme which runs through all their work is that of the destructive impact of natural forces on delicate artificial constructions. The title of Carlyle's famous essay on the Second Reform Act is only the most well-known of these, and, as his example should indicate, as an abstract metaphor-theme it cut right across ideological boundaries. On the one hand, we must seek the pervasive popularity of the abstract theme at the very highest level of generality. There seems to be a peculiar sense of satisfaction to be had from using metaphors of natural forces to describe violent social change, supported in the first instance by well known symbols and idiomatic expressions. We find no incongruity in talking about change as a tide, a current or a wind, of great electoral victories as landslides, and of governments collapsing or being swept away. Melvin Lasky has catalogued the appeal of metaphors invoking "elemental forces of nature" for revolutionaries in all times and places. Perhaps it reflects a basic dispositional divide that some should exult in these forces and others fear them.

On the other hand, the relation between the abstract theme and such very general dispositions is pre-political. We are seeking a metaphorical field in which political life is the image receiving field, and which is ordered and structured by political doctrines. The appearance of a
metaphorical field of political change-as-natural disaster can be seen in this outburst.

The great and immediate object of the agitation is to give the electoral power to numbers. A million of men out to be added to the constituencies at once. This would double them and more than double them. . . . It would swamp every existing influence and power in the state. Wealth, intelligence, education, experience, learning, professional capacity, commercial or political knowledge would be overwhelmed at the rush of the power of numbers. . . . To call this a Reform would be like giving the name of an alteration to one of those momentous convulsions of Nature which at intervals of hundreds of years dry up lakes and estuaries, and submerge great continents. The Reform would be a great and violent revolution. It would rive a great chasm between the present and the past history of the country.

Sir Henry Maine, who mockingly noted that, as far as 'democracy' was concerned, "there is no word about which a denser mist of vague language and a larger heap of loose metaphors has collected,"

and who poured scorn on Sir Wilfred Lawson's claim that, "the great tide of democracy is rolling on, and no hand can stay its majestic course,"

seems to have been much taken with elemental metaphors himself. His objection was to the use to which they were put, for, in the course of explaining how the dangers inherent in democracy may yet be guarded against by sensible constitutional provision, he made use of the theme himself.
It would seem that, by a wise Constitution, Democracy may be made nearly as calm as water in a great artificial reservoir; but if there is a weak point anywhere in the structure, the mighty force which it controls will burst forth and spread destruction far and near. \(^{36}\)

Here, then, is the conventional use for such metaphors amongst our chosen group of writers. They are used to express the doctrine that the British Constitution is a delicate artificial contrivance which cannot support the irruption into political life of the masses and all that they are taken to represent. Time and again the same contrast is made. On the one hand there was delicacy. The constitution was "a machine of exquisite delicacy" according to the Quarterly Review,\(^{37}\) though Bagehot chose to stress its artificial character in referring to safety valves and regulators.\(^{38}\) On the other hand, there were threatening forces which were not even brute, but elemental.

Defending the House of Lords as a "bulwark", Bagehot feared that "if the House of Peers ever goes it will go in a storm, and the storm could not leave all else as it is."\(^{39}\) Others were even less sanguine about the world that might resurface after the deluge. Rounding out this rhetorical world of natural disaster, we find explicit statements of the damage that might be wrought by ill-considered constitutional changes. Maine gave way to fears that were positively melodramatic.
The British political system, with the national greatness and the material prosperity attendant upon it, may yet be launched into space and find its last affinities in silence and cold.

Robert Lowe, summing up his famous speech on the proposals for parliamentary reform, argued for delay on a principle familiar to the students of F. M. Cornford. The time is not yet ripe, he said, to destroy the "imperceptible aggregation of centuries."

Democracy you may have at any time. Night and day the gate is open that leads to that bare and level plain, where every ant's nest is a mountain and every thistle a forest tree.

It is in their use of metaphor that we are able to locate these writers in the liberal tradition, for they are all making the argument that extension of the franchise was a retrograde step. The new arrangements, in Bagehot's view, were grossly inefficient, and in Maine's view likely to lead to a regression from a society based on contract to one based on status. Their democratic landscape was not the "darkling plain,/ where ignorant armies clash by night," whose very lack of familiarity makes it odious to the conservative. On the contrary, it was all too familiar, a regression to a barbarism which liberals believed they had overcome. Doubtless the aesthetic appeal was to a broadly
similar range of sentiment, but differences like these alert us to distinctions between the political arguments that the metaphors are being used to express.

The clash of ignorant armies also draws our attention to a similar, if less well-marked distinction in the use of military metaphors by some of these anti-democratic writers. Carlyle, it will be recalled, had an ironic and almost Nietzschean welcome for the appearance of the lower orders in politics. Their arrival ushered in the figures of the Drill Sergeant and the Hero with his private army. This Romantic vision could not be further from the sober liberalism of Maine. In the liberal tradition, popular government was connected with 'Caesarism', a connection which Maine took infinite pains to establish in the minds of his readers.

Bagehot furnishes a useful example here because he clearly perceived an alternative use for military metaphors, one which was becoming increasingly popular in his own time. Both conservatives and socialists were appealing to the notion of military discipline in politics, although for very different ends. The socialist usage has, perhaps, the more interesting history, reaching one of its finest expressions in Lenin's vision of the vanguard of the party battling their way out of the swamp towards the high places on a narrow path and under fire, and a distant echo may be
heard in the quaint proposal of the British Labour Party to nationalize "the commanding heights of the economy." Bagehot, however, was unimpressed. Noting that "metaphors from law and metaphors from war make most of our current moral phrases," he set about answering them on their own terms.

Life is not a set campaign, but an irregular work, and the main forces in it are not overt resolutions but latent and half involuntary promptings. The mistake of military ethics is to exaggerate the concept of discipline, and so to present the moral force of the will in a baser form than it ever ought to take.

Bagehot was also concerned about the political consequences of this moral theory, where force of will replaces the promptings of the imagination. Switching metaphors, he concluded that whereas the military ethic is admirable for putting the axe to the tree, it knows nothing of the "quiet force" by which the forest grew in the first place.

Maine, as usual, was more direct in his identification of the contemporary social forces which were the bearers of the military ethic. In a forceful figurative comparison which is much more than a spurious lesson from history, he announced "in the most serious spirit" that since the century during which the Roman
Emperors were at the mercy of the Praetorian soldiery, there has been no such insecurity of government as the world has seen since rulers became delegates of the community.44

Maine creates his military metaphors with some rhetorical skill, notably in the appeal to his audience's knowledge of the Praetorian Guard -- perhaps through Gibbon's vivid and moralizing account of their activities -- and to the general Victorian distrust of soldiers and soldiering. However, it is directed at the adherents of a particular ideology, the Whiggish-liberals whose idiom and arguments we have already identified. To the Victorian radical-liberal or even to the Conservative, the resonance of this metaphor is lacking. As in the case of the forces of nature -- where men of a different stripe like John Bright positively exulted in the prospect of the "volcanic eruption" which he believed to be inevitable if the franchise were not extended -- the soldier was a symbol with positive valency for many of Maine's opponents.45

Maine's attempts to support his metaphor by its epistemological coherence with the doctrine of Caesarism was of limited success because the doctrine itself enjoyed no great currency outside his own circle.46 Deprived of this support, it rested on an aesthetic coherence with a
disposition to see the mentality of the masses as the mentality of the 'other ranks'. The lower orders were not hurricanes, torrents or volcanoes -- or even much characterized by military discipline, whatever the opponents of 'political trade unions' might think -- but to characterize them in this way assigned a value to working class political participation which was quite unmistakable.

The political metaphors we have just considered exhibit a number of features common to metaphors deployed in the context of ideologies. In fact, in the course of analysing them, we have produced a vignette of an ideological dispute. Notice, first, how the meanings of the metaphors are marked by the ethical concerns of ideologists. Despite sharing the same theme -- the mass electorate as a natural force -- the meanings of the particular metaphorical utterances are very different, depending on whether they are used by radical-liberals or Whig-liberals. On one side there is fear of danger and the eventual prospect of catastrophe; on the other, hope, even exultation, in the prospect of harnessing a gigantic 'progressive' force. This is what is meant when we speak of using metaphors to endow events, institutions and practices with an ethical character.

Notice, however, that using metaphors in this way demands the prior acceptance of a whole ideological outlook
from an audience, if that audience is to accept the metaphorical characterization. The intelligibility of these metaphorical utterances is predicated upon a particular attitude to political life; they express the doctrines that men of a particular disposition have accepted as cogent, because they are aesthetically and epistemologically coherent with these doctrines. To accept the metaphorical characterization is to accept the attitude. For this reason, such metaphors are both potent means of persuasion, and, when directed at an audience of completely contrary disposition, bound to fail. They are props for the like-minded and bait for the uncommitted. Confronted with the claim that a rising torrent threatens to sweep away the bulwark of existing institutions, a man's ideological commitments will be revealed in the dread or pleasure with which he looks forward to this event.

From the historian of political thought's point of view we should also notice that identifying the existence of a metaphor-theme in a set of texts is only a first step. Texts may share a metaphor-theme without this telling us anything about the way in which the individual metaphorical utterances are used in politics and, consequently, without telling us what value is to be assigned to the elements in the metaphorical field that they form in a political language. Recreating the context of meaning is a vital step
in distinguishing the different metaphors that may share the same theme, and in showing the significance of shared themes for those who did deploy them in the context of ideological disputes.

The recreation of a metaphorical field is in every way as important as the recreation of the other elements in a political 'language' or ideology, because the field is part of the conventional framework within which, or at least with reference to which, an author must work. The struggle to establish and to overturn these conventions is, of course, taking place all the time. It is manifest in attempts to determine that only these shall be the inferential steps to be taken in arriving at the meaning of a metaphorical utterance which embodies a particular metaphorical theme, and such struggles are vital clues to the battle lines between conflicting ideologies. In the clash of interpretations, the like-minded are distinguished from their ideological adversaries.
The search for means to express doctrines about the activity of ruling has often issued in metaphors of a conscientious physician ministering to the needs of a sick patient. So often, in fact, that the temptation to search for an underlying unity in the material is overwhelming. Disease and medical attributions in political language display a continuity and an undiminishing popularity which suggest an experience more permanent than the transitory projects of statesmen and their apologists. In an important sense, of course, this suggestion might be meaningfully pursued. Disease is one of the biological constants of human life, and, as such, is an obvious candidate for symbolic significance. Often, indeed, it stands opposed to health in a moetic classification, and the pair is charged with ethical content.

It is not at all surprising that such symbols should then be drawn upon for use in political metaphors. As Judith Schlanger puts it,
Il est évidemment qu'en matière socio-politique l'appréciation du malsain est toujours fonction d'un jugement normatif sur l'état de santé, et que par conséquent, au moins implicitement, elle traduit toujours une appréciation politique.

This fact notwithstanding, precisely what kind of ethical judgement is being passed, and what sort of political values asserted, are, as we have insisted throughout, an historical question demanding clarification of the 'context of meaning' in which the metaphor appears. As Rodney Needham noted, symbol classifications are only potential bearers of values, and the actual values that they possess for particular people cannot be settled \textit{a priori}. It is easy enough to conclude from our armchairs that health has a positive valency and disease a negative one, but this conclusion will not stand the test of a more complex reality.

A line of reasoning of just this illegitimate kind leads Schlanger to conclude that it is not possible to advocate violent political upheaval by attributing disease characteristics to the activities of revolutionaries. To do so, she suggests, must necessarily imply that the uprising is both involuntary and to be condemned. Such a conclusion flies in the face of the argument we have put forward in the preceding chapters, and can be shown to be false. Schlanger begins by disregarding Needham's warning about symbol classifications. We could cite many examples in which the
generally positive values of health and negative values of disease are inverted; the value placed in melancholia or 'spleen', for example, when they are used as a foil to criticize what passes for normality. This in turn suggests a more complex symbolism involving notions of normality and abnormality which will obviously contradict Schlanger's claim. Similarly, there are cases where the symptoms of the disease are looked upon as an indication of a cure for a much more deep-seated disorder. Here, for example, is Mary Wollstonecraft offering a second opinion to Burke's more famous diagnosis of the French Revolution.

Thus had France grown up, and sickened on the corruption of a state diseased. But, as in medicine there is a species of complaint in the bowels which works its own cure, and leaving the body healthy gives an invigorated tone to the whole system, so there is in politics; and whilst the agitation of its regeneration continues, the excrementitious humours exuding from the contaminated body will excite a general dislike and contempt for the nation; and it is only the philosophical eye, which looks into the nature and weighs the consequences of human actions, that will be able to discern the cause which has produced so many dreadful effects.

In addition, Wollstonecraft's language reminds us the symbols used in metaphors have dual reference worlds, and both the existing state of medical knowledge and the relative sophistication of author and audience will play a
part in determining the arguments that politics-as-medicine metaphors can plausibly support. We need to know how illnesses themselves were perceived and how cures were supposed to be effected, both at scientific and popular levels of discourse. There will clearly be differences in scope for such metaphors between a society in which diseases are thought to be the product of human agency, and a society in which diseases are seen as the product of negligence before the impersonal forces of nature. The fact that the human animal is subject to disease and death should not lead us to ignore the many different ways in which disease and death have been understood by those under their sway.

Schlanger is thus quite right to draw our attention to the ethical judgements being made when people speak of sickness and health in social and political contexts. She is wrong to imagine that the symbolism implied in these judgements sets any limits on usage, particularly in the case of metaphors. Besides ignoring the dual reference worlds of symbols in politics, such limits presuppose that there is a logical connection between a given metaphor and the doctrine that it expresses. Thus Schlanger thought that political action as disease metaphors logically implied involuntary action, and therefore could not be used to justify revolutionary actions. We have rejected such a logical connection on two grounds. First, that the reference
worlds of revolutionary theories and medical theories differ so much at different times and places that no general account of their relations could satisfy the demands of logical necessity. This is the basis of our request for historical clarification of the context of a metaphorical utterance. Second, that even when we have clarified the context of a metaphorical utterance in this way, the author of a political metaphor will often be found attempting to establish connections which are not in any sense necessary, but which he hopes to make plausible by means of the rhetorical structures of his metaphor. For these reasons, we have followed Judith Shklar's suggestion that political metaphors are to be analysed in terms of their success or failure within a framework of their author's purposes, and not in terms of their logical consistency or grammatical correctness.

These points, made at length in previous chapters, have been laboured once more because a failure to take them into account will seriously handicap an investigation into the uses of a particular metaphor-theme -- in this case 'politics-as-medicine'. The principal danger here is that "card-catalogue ahistoricism" discerned by a reviewer in Melvin Lasky's study of revolutionary metaphors. In Lasky's case, an undue emphasis on the 'imagery' of metaphors used by revolutionaries to justify their various projects
resulted in the unrealistic assumption of a uniform revolutionary experience so that the author could indulge himself in literary criticism. Closer to our present concerns, Susan Sontag's *Illness as Metaphor* is similarly flawed. Sontag's effort at 'liberating' our ideas of illness from those she finds in metaphors -- in order to replace them with notions she finds more humane -- necessarily overlooks the varied uses to which these metaphors have been put in the effort to build up a composite ahistorical picture of an illness-image suitable for criticism and eventual replacement. Sometimes, indeed, Sontag departs from this plan and provides a penetrating historical reconstruction; but more often she lapses into anachronism.  

Ahistoricism is a luxury that the student of politics-as-medicine metaphors can ill afford, for, as Schlanger wittily reminds us, so often here "le pronostic commande le diagnostic".  

Recovery of the prognosis -- the problem and how it was perceived -- is crucial to understanding why a particular metaphor was used and what it was taken to mean. Clearly, a history of politics-as-medicine metaphors along these lines would be an enormous undertaking, quite beyond the scope of the present study. As an alternative, two rather different historical contexts will be sketched -- English political thought in the sixteenth century, and National Socialism in modern
Germany -- and the varied uses of the politics as medicine theme portrayed. These rather disparate contexts have been chosen with a deliberate end in view. First, both support a sufficient number of easily accessible metaphors for internal comparison and contrast. Second, the sixteenth century examples allow us to compare the different uses of the same theme made by ideological opponents in similar contexts, while the German examples will be used to illustrate the use of a single theme within an ideology. Finally, the two very different contexts will allow us to examine the effects of drastic changes in both popular and scientific medical beliefs on the plausibility and scope of a single metaphor-theme, the better to weigh the symbolic and referential aspects of political metaphors.

II. Conventional politics as medicine metaphors.

Sixteenth-century Englishmen did not invent the politics as medicine theme. A whole tradition of classical and Christian political thought put into their hands an instrument that was already shaped in a distinctive way by being associated with a number of highly conventional usages. In particular, classical thought bequeathed two related metaphor-themes. One strand used disease as an emblem of disorder in the body politic; most Renaissance
scholars would be familiar with Livy's description of the internal divisions which beset the Roman state after the fall of Carthage as a disease. The other theme sought to characterize ruling as an end-directed activity, one which has as its telos the health of the body politic as the physician had the health of his patients as the end of his activities. This was a favourite theme of Plato's, appearing as explicit analogies in the Statesman, the Laws and the Republic, where it is the first of the series of analogies used to explain the notion of justice as 'rendering what is due.' Of course, the idea that politics and medicine are both end-directed activities is a literal comparison; metaphors appear when this comparison is used as a basis for seeing the ruler as a physician to the body politic, medicus reipublicae. This conception links the two different strands in terms of a shared notion of a body politic subject to illness and death. The resulting active conception of the statesman as an expert who uses a body of knowledge to maintain the life of the state against its internal and external enemies was well expressed by Seneca. He argued that the metaphor of medicus reipublicae eventually breaks down because the physician, seeing inevitable death in his patient, must seek to make his death easy, whereas the statesman is always obliged to maintain the life of the state with all his strength however terminal its illnesses.
might appear.  

The plausibility of medicus reipublicae obviously rested on the continued acceptance of organic notions of political association. The metaphorical field which supported these metaphors was structured by the idea of a political body susceptible to disease and mortality as then understood. Tilman Struve re-emphasizes the dependence of medicus metaphors on this conception when they reappear in the medieval advice books.

The classical picture of the king as medicus reipublicae, which had already been restated by Wipo in the eleventh century, and from that time on can be seen in the political theory of the high and late middle ages up until Machiavelli, was hardly conceivable without this underlying representation of the state as an organism.

However, the political doctrines which these metaphors were used to express were no longer drawn from the republican, or even imperial tradition of Roman thought, but were directed towards the Christian prince, and a whole new set of conventional uses had been given to medicus metaphors by the authority of Saint Augustine. In general, the classical writers had been of mixed opinions about the diseases threatening the health of the corpus reipublicae. Augustine was a great deal more confident and single-minded in his diagnosis; the principal threat to peace and justice in the
civitas terrena was sin. Augustine, of course, thought that sin was a permanent condition of earthly life, and he identified Christ and not any temporal ruler as medicus humilis holding out hope of a cure. However, he did leave his successors a number of conventional metaphors which found their way into more explicitly political writings. We should briefly note those that turned on the trust which the patient has in the physician based on the latter's vocation to heal, rather than flatter or please, those that remind the patient that he cannot hide a disease from a competent physician, and those which stress the inevitably painful character of medical cures.  

Apart from the Augustinian conception of sin as illness, the various diseases maintained a relatively free place in the conventional metaphorical field. Their meanings could be fixed in at least two ways. The first was by analogy with the accounts of illness in medical theory. The principle paradigm throughout this period derived from the work of Galen, and rested on the belief that health depended on a harmony obtaining amongst the four humours which made up the human body. Every person approximated to one of the four temperaments according to which of the humours predominated, and physicians were taught to recognize the melancholic or the phlegmatic 'type' according to certain stereotypical features. Disease indicated a more serious
imbalance amongst the humours, and was treated by contrary remedies designed to deal with the excess or deficiency of the humour deemed responsible, bearing in mind the original temperament of the patient. Although Galenism came under attack later in the sixteenth century from the 'chemists', whose doctrines, influenced by Paracelsus, stressed 'sympathies' rather than 'contraries', the orthodox medicine received considerable stimulus from the humanist enterprise of textual recovery. Many of the most important Tudor physicians were considerable classical scholars.  

Galenism influenced politics as medicine metaphors mainly through the conventional metaphor that the healthy body politic maintained a harmony and proportion amongst its members. Occasionally a determined princely counsellor might organize his treatise by tracing out the exact consequences of an excess or deficiency in each of the humours in the body politic -- Engelbert of Admont in his *De Regimine Principium*, for example -- but John of Salisbury's recourse to the fable of the feet that rebelled against the belly is more representative of this genre. Amongst variants, we might note in passing Aquinas's Aristotelian argument for one "governing part" whose end is the health of the whole, and whose deliberations are confined to the best means to this end, as the physician does not deliberate whether to cure the sick patient, but only how best to effect a cure.
From the other end of the body politic, as it were, Christine de Pisan argued that the common people should love and obey their princes at all times, just as wise men who value their health asks a physician to prescribe a regime for them, even thought they are not actually ill.\textsuperscript{14}

Alternatively, the meanings of specific illnesses might have been fixed in the politics-as-medicine field by means of correspondences associated with the 'seven deadly sins'.\textsuperscript{15} In fact, this connection was not often invoked, which underlines the importance of the connection through the 'harmony' that characterises both health and good order. For this, the general notions of sickness and lack of anatomical proportion were perfectly adequate. These conventional metaphors were basic resources for Tudor writers when they came to make their own medical attributions to the realm of politics. Before we move on to examine these attributions, however, we must consider a series of novel politics as medicine metaphors which drew upon quite different connections between medieval politics and medicine. Their author was Marsilius of Padua.

As is well-known, the circumstances giving rise to the writings of the \textit{Defensor Pacis} are to be traced to the desire of the Italian city republics to resist the spread of Papal domination in Northern Italy, a domination that was backed by arguments designed to legitimize the superiority
of the Pope's acknowledged spiritual jurisdiction even in temporal affairs. Marsilius's reply took the form of an argument designed to show that there is a categorial distinction between spiritual and secular authority, and that only the latter has any rightful claim to exercise coercive jurisdiction over men. In contrast, the task of the Church is simply to minister to the spiritual needs of its members. On the one hand, the 'congregation of the faithful' (as Marsilius defined the Church) must be a voluntary association because no man can be forced to believe, but, on the other hand, since the temporal authority is the sole source of coercive jurisdiction, priests are as much subject to it as any one else, the Pope included.

Whatever theological worth these arguments might have been thought to possess, they were above all novel, and Marsilius clearly felt the need to support them with figurative illustrations, including medical ones. Now, as Oswei Temkin has argued, the competence of a medieval physician was not generally thought to extend beyond the sphere of natural philosophy. The question of moral responsibility for being diseased, although very much an open one, was a matter between the patient and God, and quite outside the physician's purview. Marsilius makes use of this restriction in a highly partial way, in the process turning his back on conventional medicus reipublicae.
metaphors. He argues that the principal role of both priest and physician is to diagnose disease, the one spiritual and the other physical sickness, so that those physically or spiritually polluted might be prevented from infecting others. The power to separate the diseased from the healthy -- to expel a heretic or a leper from the community -- does not, however, belong either to the physician or the priest but to the temporal power, which Marsilius has located within the community itself.¹⁸ Even the learning from which the physician's skill springs, he argues, is disseminated by human institutions under temporal authority. Finally, he points out that, whereas a physician is duty bound to help his patients return to and remain in good health, he has no authority to force anyone to take his advice or to follow his treatment, and so it is with the spiritual health which is the special concern of the priest.

There is a genuine political metaphor behind these arguments, an invitation to see the priest as physician to the soul, and it depends for its persuasive power on the audience perceiving its ground. It is true that Marsilius has prepared the way with some skill, leaning heavily on the corporate life of a city republic, and regulation of corporations by the civil power. He was himself a physician, taking his M.D. at Padua, and practising on and off there during his varied career. He reminds us that the practice of
a skill, however learned and useful, has no coercive powers necessarily attached to it. Yet the fact remains that a priest is not a physician, that there are important differences between medical science and theology and that administering the sacraments is not like dispensing a herbal remedy. A dedicated supporter of Papal pretensions might thus reject the underlying metaphor of the priest-physician as weak and ill-judged on just these grounds.

For someone of a contrary disposition, however, the metaphors are by no means obviously implausible. Whatever may be said about the secularising spirit that supposedly suffuses his argument, Marsilius does not neglect the prevailing theological idiom of argument, making an explicit connection between his metaphor and the fact that Christ had referred to himself as a physician who comes to teach and practice and not to rule.¹⁹ The metaphor leans heavily on the argument that coercive jurisdiction belongs to the 'weightier part' of the community which 'cannot be misled' and to which mere parts must necessarily be subordinate even to the extent of having their teaching and practice supervised.²⁰ The true novelty of the metaphor, which is at once its strength and weakness, lies in its conscious rejection of the organic conceptions which would have provided an accepted background of assumptions. It is a strength because the metaphor transcends the merely
conventional; it is a weakness because Marsilius must then work that much harder to make it plausible. As we shall see when we come to examine sixteenth-century examples, conventional metaphors provide the historian with invaluable evidence of generally accepted background assumptions, whilst novel metaphors are often more interesting precisely because their author must help his audience along in order to make them intelligible.

III. The central place of the doctrine of obedience to superior powers.

A striking feature of Tudor political thought was its concern with obedience. This has sometimes been misunderstood to the extent of denying that the numerous tracts on obedience count as 'political thought' at all. Low-level rural violence was endemic in Tudor England, and the ideological devices deployed to remind the errant subject of his duty on such occasions was correspondingly simple, a mixture of familiar biblical injunctions to obey the 'higher powers', and even more familiar tales of the untimely ends met by previous malcontents. The homily on obedience we encountered in chapter four is good example of the former kind, and the treatment of Jack Cade in the Mirror for Magistrates neatly combines both. However, Tudor sovereigns from Henry VIII onwards were especially nervous
of the possibility that peasant violence might be harnessed by men of substance whose resistance turned not only on the factional strife attending the consolidation of power by the central government, but upon more complex ideological and theological arguments surrounding the Reformation. Thus, sixteenth-century arguments about obedience exude something of the robust and urgent atmosphere in which they were nurtured, an atmosphere which may sometimes be mistaken for crudity by modern sensibilities more at home with political obligation as an intellectual exercise.

Even the casual reader of early Tudor political thought, though, quickly becomes aware that the modern concept of political obligation is lacking. There was no defence against the argument that obedience was owed to superior powers. We have seen something of this attitude expressed in early patriarchal metaphors, but body politic metaphors were much more common here. Motivating these usages there seems to have been a deep-rooted respect not only for the person of the monarch or for the institution of monarchy, but for a whole system of rank and degree, of orderly relations of superiority and inferiority conceived as a bulwark against barely imaginable chaos. As Quentin Skinner has noted, these sentiments were particularly clearly expressed in English humanist educational treatises -- Elyot's *Book Named the Governor* is the most well-known
example -- where the potentially subversive claim that virtue should govern the ruling part of the state is firmly subordinated to the identification of good order with the maintenance of degree. It is a view still to be found in the carefully worked out details of order and precedence, duty and obligation in so sophisticated a piece of analysis as Sir Thomas Smith's *De Republica Anglorum* written in the 1560s.

Two factors tended to mitigate the severity of the Tudor conception of order. One was the heritage of late-medieval legal thought which founded political association on mutual recognition of binding laws. Characteristically, Sir John Fortescue elaborated this notion in body politic language, complete with a dubious piece of etymology.

For just as the body is held together by the nerves, so this body mystical is bound together and united into one by the law, which is derived from the word *ligando*, and the members and bones of this body, which signify the solid basis of truth by which the community is sustained, preserve their rights through the law, as the body natural does through the nerves.

This understanding of a law which established the 'status' of everyone, including the king, is of obvious importance in shaping the *medicus reipublicae* field. If, as seemed
plausible in English political thought from the thirteenth century on, the king was part of the body politic, bound to it by legal ties which established the status regni, it was only with difficulty that the king could be thought of as standing outside the range of the diseases which threatened that body. A paradoxical corollary of the idea that the "estate of king" was not subject to disease or old age, was that the metaphorical diseases of the body politic threatened all estates alike.  

The other limits on the Tudor notion of order which influenced the scope and direction of politics as medicine metaphors was also distinctively English. If reflection on the character of political association disclosed the picture of a community bound together by laws, there was also a closely related inquiry into the ends of government couched in the language of the "very and true commonweal". Simply put, the end of government was declared to be the common wealth. It is vital to understand that this "wealth" was not conceived only, or even mainly, in material terms. It was always qualified by the divinely inspired order of the commonwealth, often by equating the common wealth with peace and justice. The stress was always on the interdependence of the parts, the necessity of each man following his vocation without envy or pride, to the mutual benefit of all and to the glory of God. As Edmund Dudley put it, in a manuscript
written in 1510 whilst awaiting execution;

Every man after the honour and degree that God and his prince hath called him to, and after that part or portion to lead his life, and not to malign or envy his superiors, nor disdain or set at nought his inferiors.  

Again, commonwealth as body metaphors were the principal figurative vehicles for expressing ideas about the commonwealth, often merging insensibly with body politic metaphors about the character of political association. The physiological harmony and anatomical proportion which were taken to characterize the human body were ideal for describing the well-ordered commonwealth.  

Thus, if an "ideology of order" did exist, it was by no means monolithic; those who, for various reason, came to challenge it were not without resources. Against this background we shall now compare four rather different sets of politics as medicine metaphors. In the first case, politics as medicine metaphors were used in a series of tracts condemning sedition and defending government policy against the complaints of rebellious subjects. The second group of metaphors appear in the course of humanist 'advice to princes' books which flourished during the same period. The third group were used in the course of some novel arguments advanced by the Marian exiles who began to urge
that subjects enjoyed a right of rebellion against their rulers. Finally, we shall examine how medical metaphors played a part in the development of a rather different understanding of political association from those just advanced, an understanding which gained in popularity near the end of the sixteenth century.

IV. Metaphors used to express the doctrine of obedience.

The late-medieval understanding of political association was modified in a number of ways by the Reformation. One such modification involved a relative lack of emphasis on the extent to which all alike were associated under law, and an increased emphasis on the origins of political association in man's sinful character. It readily disclosed an Augustinian conception of men seeking in politics some temporary alleviation of the symptoms of sin. Few expressed this conception more clearly than Henry Bullinger, defending it against the resistance theories we shall later examine. As a condition of their fallen state, he said, all men are led from birth by self-love.

And for that cause, God, who loveth man, who keepeth and preserveth civility, peace and human society hath prepared and applied a medicine against those grievous diseases of man; he hath appointed the magistrate.... Whosoever subverteth
this ordinance of God, till such time as men do leave their wayward disposition, he bringeth utter confusion to every state, and aideth wrongful dealers and robbers to repress and root out the best sort of people.\textsuperscript{28}

Here, kings, princes and magistrates are, as Oakeshott has put it, \textit{theraputae},\textsuperscript{29} entrusted with the care of their chronically ill subjects. It was an understanding of political association in which \textit{medicus} metaphors were highly plausible vehicles, their particular resonance coming from this mainly Lutheran inspired doctrine of non-resistance.

Clearly, the principal manifestations of this "wayward disposition" was a tendency for subjects to rebel against their lawful governors, misled by "seditious" doctrines. The use of \textit{medicus} metaphors here was influenced by the tradition of talking about subjects as "members" of the body politic. There was much play on the sense in which, like a member of the natural body which no longer contributed to the health of the whole organism, these rebellious members could no longer be thought of as integral parts of the body politic. The physician became a surgeon.

This view was not always crudely expressed. Starkey made the justification for surgery quite plain. Since every man has been called to his part by God to serve the common order in the hope of eternal life;
If any private person repugn sediciously, moved by any scruple of conscience supersticiously conceived, if he may neither be brought to knowledge by good instruction, nor yet to obedience by gentle admonition, he is not worthy to live in that common policy, nor yet to be a member thereof, as one that abhoreth from all good order and civility.

Putting the same point more polemically for public consumption, Richard Morison would return to the argument that such men were not truly human, for their behaviour was more like that of a beast bereft of reason. The second time around he improved the charge by punning on "unkindness"; treason is a species of unkindness, for rebels go from "the kind of man that nature put into them" to animals.

The most straightforward remedy for sedition, then, was amputation of the offending 'members'. In times of acute stress, when rebellion was actively being prosecuted, this was often the only remedy being advanced. The body politic had taken on a fantastic shape, the feet wanted to be the head, the shoulders wanted eyes and so forth, and a drastic reshaping was necessary to restore the original proportions. No doubt these were cases in which the diagnosis had been shaped by the prognosis in a very obvious way. In general, however, these were counsels of despair. In more sober moments, the commonwealth idiom reasserted itself, and a whole series of writers posed the rhetorical question, 'what can government do to restore the harmony of
the well-ordered commonwealth? Galenist medicine was particularly useful here because, like modern medicine, it conceived of diseases not so much as entities in themselves but as states of the body to be contrasted with health and marked by peculiar symptoms.

The distinctive character of this idiom may be seen by contrasting it with an alternative approach to rebellion. This latter approach, derived from Machiavelli, made an early and isolated appearance in an advice book written by Stephen Gardiner for Mary's husband Philip II of Spain, suggesting ways of maintaining his state when in England. Gardiner treats his theme of restoring England to the Universal Church as an exercise in temporal ingenuity; Philip comes almost as a conquering prince to a new realm.33

The particular interest that Gardiner's text has from our point of view is that its medical metaphors follow Machiavelli, indicating how the prince is to adapt the means at his disposal to the ends he seeks, exactly as the physician confronts the sick patient whom he seeks to restore to health. In Machiavelli's Prince, the prince was urged to be aware of the symptoms of sedition and unrest so that he may catch them while a 'cure' is still possible. In Gardiner's text the emphasis is on justifying cruelty by the prince on the grounds that the surgeon must sometimes resort to the iron and the fire when lesser medicine is
insufficient. In both cases, the prince is urged to be economical in his use of violence.  

This conception of a prudential art of politics was by no means entirely absent from the more traditional understanding of politics in England, but it was arrived at by a different route. Writers in the commonwealth idiom remained mesmerized by the sinfulness of rebellion, but their diagnoses began to be couched in physiological rather than anatomical terms. In some well-known cases this was not much more than decoration. Thus the novelty of Robert Crowley's search for the causes of sedition is deceptive.

Sedicion, therefore, being a dangerous disease in the body of the commonwealth, must be cured as the expert physicians do use to cure the dangerous disease in a natural body. And as the most substantial way in curing diseases is by putting away the causes whereof they grew, so it is in the pulling up of sedition. For if the cause be once taken away, then must the effects needs fail.

Reflecting a comfortable belief that the commonwealth, under its godly prince Edward VI, was basically well-ordered, the causes of sin turn out to be the familiar failings of fallen men; ignorance, folly and a wayward dissatisfaction with one's calling. The treatment -- godly sermons to admonish sin, and removal of the most obvious temptations -- require no very complex diagnosis. Insofar as Crowley's metaphors
express any doctrine at all, we should note that his physician stands outside the body politic. Even where the performance of the physician is open to criticism, as in John Hales's celebrated Defence, the complaint is one of neglect, easily glossed as bad advice, rather than professional incompetence.  

Above all, on this view, the practice of medicine was not to be seen as offering analogies with governing. The connections stressed by the metaphors were primarily aesthetic. Elyot, who perfectly expressed this view in the Governor, urges magistrates not to "disdain to be resembled unto physicians", when he comes to discuss the part played by experience or "practice" in government.

That part of physic called rational, whereby is declared the faculties and powers of the body, the causes, accidents and tokens of sicknesses, cannot always be sure without some experience in the temperature of distemperature of the regions, of the disposition of the patient in diet, concoction, quietness, exercise and keep.

In fact, no analogue of the "causes, accidents and tokens of sicknesses" is mentioned in Elyot's treatise, and the practical experience of the magistrate supposedly commensurate with that of a physician turns out to be an inquiry into "who among the inhabitants be men towards the public weal best disposed." They are to be encouraged, and
the less "well disposed" admonished.

Now, the purpose of considering these rather limited uses of politics and medicine metaphors has not been to criticize their authors for failing to act like social scientists. Apart from the anachronism involved, it is by no means clear whether a prince might not in fact be best served by a diligent inquiry into the motives and conduct of his subjects, rather than by a search for the 'causes' of discontent. The point has been to show how doctrines which included an element of non-resistance tended to set the king apart from the body politic, and could plausibly be expressed in metaphors which saw the king as medicus entrusted with the cure of patients who were not the best judges of their own health. However, the commonwealth idea tended to be subversive of this notion, not only because it emphasized that the king, as an estate, was part of the commonwealth, but because it suggested to some writers that they were specially qualified to give advice on the health of the commonwealth. To such men, their qualifications seemed not unlike those of skilfull and compassionate phsycians.

V. A related field: the social critic as physician to the body politic.

Crowley, Hales and Elyot were thus by no means the only
writers to use politics as medicine metaphors in seeking remedies for a diseased body politic. In other hands, the acceptance of man's sinful nature as a 'given', and a concern with what would later be called 'secondary causes', suggested the metaphor of the writer as physician to the body politic. Undoubtedly, these metaphors owed some of their considerable popularity to the rhetorical convention that a writer should offer an apology for his own shortcomings, or, particularly when dealing with sensitive issues, for daring to treat of the subject at all. To don the mask of the physician brought with it the advantages of implying that the problem being analysed was analogous to a serious disease without explicitly saying so (the implied judgement of value noted by Schlanger), of foregrounding the qualifications claimed by the writer as a diagnostician, and of covering any annoyance or distress that his diagnosis may cause by the positive notion of the physician's painful cure. Yet it is important for us to note that what is being emphasized here is not the professional competence of the physician, as we are accustomed to defer to the man of science, so much as his disinterestedness and honesty compared with the evasions and deceptions of the sick patient. So John Ponet, before weighing the significance of various monstrous births, a comet and an eclipse as signs of the disorder or the universe while Mary occupies the throne
of England and persecutes the faithful, offers the following apology.

But as it is a most sure token of death, when the sick man feeleth not his disease, nor can tell where his grief is, being asked in what place his pain lieth: so in all Realmes and congregations of people, when they do not feel the common calamities and miseries that are among them, it is a most certain and infallible sign that the destruction and the end of it is at hand . . . . And therefore give me leave (I beseech you) to open your wounds, and to search the cause of your calamities, and then to minister and pour in to them some wholesome balm, and cover them with some comfortable plaster.

This persona of the learned but disinterested inquirer was particularly useful when analysing the character of a commonwealth which readily disclosed an ideal character against which actual associations might be measured and found wanting. Once again, the commonwealth idea was no more than a framework of readily available concepts and vocabulary within which thought could be organised, and hence could be used to demand an arrest in change and development as well as to promote reforming schemes. Yet, whatever the courses of action being urged under cover of analysis, it was clearly imperative that the writer himself should be seen striving for the common wealth and not his own private or factional advantage, and once more the special relationship of patient and physician was pressed
into service. In Sir Thomas Smith's *Discourse*, a metaphor of this kind appears both to introduce the section in which specific remedies are proposed, and as a general apology for having the temerity to air such grievances at all; "For hard were it to heal a sore which a man would not have opened to his physician, nor yet of a surfeit that a man would not declare the occasion of." 39

For John Ponet, who had already characterised himself as a competent and well-intentioned physician and an unjust ruler as an evil and negligent one, the attributes are then transferred to the good governor whose lack of interest in his own private good is put up as the mark of his special virtue.

And as a good physician earnestly seeketh the health of his patient and a shipmaster the health and safeguard of those he hath in his ship, so doth a good governor seek the health of those he ruleth. 40

Underlying these metaphors is, of course, the claim that the writer as physician is only called for when the ruler as physician has notably failed, a conclusion which was not to be baldly advertised in literal terms. The *persona* of the kindly physician was a useful one indeed.

It was the affinity of the commonwealth idea for expression in body politic language that really provided the
occasion for the employment of disease and medical metaphors in a systematic way. The whole point of the commonwealth idea was that each man should subordinate himself to the whole; and not in the crassly materialist way that we are exhorted to participate in the creation of 'bigger cake' that our own slices might be larger, but in order that the wisdom of God's ordinances, which fitted every man to some occupation useful to his fellows, might not be frustrated by sin. The obvious parallel with the parts of the human body was alluded to by most writers in explaining how a properly ordered commonwealth tends always to the common wealth. The classic of the whole genre is undoubtedly Starkey's Dialogue, written in the early 1530s, but unpublished until the nineteenth century. A very pathology of the diseased commonwealth is revealed to our horrified gaze by Starkey's probing pen.

He begins with the traditional assertion that the commonwealth of a politic body is analogous to the health of a human body, a state in which all the parts are in harmony and performing their allotted functions, "every part coupled to another." Indeed, he is so concerned to maintain this analogy that he contradicts himself when he comes to point out that, since the commonwealth is a mode of association, it is perfectly compatible with any rightly ordered form of government. Reminding his audience that a body may be
healthy in any one of the four complexions determined by the physicians (sanguine, melancholic, phlegmatic and choleric), he proceeds to conclude that a commonwealth may be healthy under any one of four forms of state, although as a good Aristotelian he can only come up with three! This imagery becomes a fully-fledged metaphor when the participants in the dialogue turn from considering the nature of an ideal commonwealth ("our mark to shoot at") to examining the manner in which the commonwealth of England falls short.

For like as the physicians little it availeth to know the body, complexion thereof, and most perfect state, except they also can discern and judge all kinds of sickness and diseases which commonly destroy the same; so to us now this universal and scholastical consideration of a very and true common wealth little shall profit and litte shall avail, except we also truly search out all common fancies and general misorders, which, as sickness and diseases, be manifest impediments and utterly repugnant to the maintenance of the same.

The diseases themselves are chosen with an eye to the correspondences dear to Renaissance cosmology instead of to the conventional symbolism of sin and disease. It is true that Starkey's choice of dropsy as the analogue for ill-employment might be thought to hark back to the symbolism of the seven 'deadly sins', where it was traditionally associated with covetousness or avarice, but
this would appear to be a coincidence, as none of the other diseases have such a connection.\textsuperscript{44} All the diseases of the frame of the commonwealth are said to depend for their cure on finding a remedy for the "disease of the head", the frenzy which overcomes a politic body which is without good laws and virtuous rulers. Thus the head itself is not immune from disorder.

The diagnosis brings us on to the final section of the dialogue where it is no surprise to find the medical metaphors receiving further elaboration. Perhaps echoing More's sentiment that, whatever the difficulties, it is incumbent on the educated man to play his part in his commonwealth, Starkey admits that it is a good deal easier to discern the diseases of a body politic than to cure them. However, he cannot draw back now, for "the process of our communication hitherto is but of little or no value, except we find out convenient remedies prudently to be applied to such sores and diseases in our politic body."\textsuperscript{46} The significance of these metaphors is that they function as a guarantee that the problems of the commonwealth will be treated as an exercise in natural philosophy, a search for causes and remedies. Master Lupset's triumphant urging of the life of negotium over Pole's objections proves to be no merely conventional victory. The modern reader is often exasperated by the fact that the diagnosis proceeds from an
ideal, the commonwealth as a model of righteous living and a preparation for the life to come, so that the remedies, as well as sometimes striking us as unimaginative, are shot through with ethical criticism. Yet Starkey, as his metaphors will attest, is concerned to deal with men as he found them -- indeed he draws an explicit contrast between Plato's project in the Republic -- and the fact that he found them to be sinful was by no means an obstacle to his analysis.

The real oddity of Starkey's account is his typically humanist belief that education can make someone not just a better educated man but a better man without qualification. His political proposals, too, show a certain feebleness of grasp on the political possibilities of his day, notably in his plan to revive the office of Constable of England as a check on the monarch. He shows no signs of being aware of the real 'constitutionalist' thought being elaborated by the common lawyers like Christopher St. Germain. Above all, he shared the widespread desire to make men better, and he may, as Elton has argued, have shared the belief that edicts might suffice; something we can certainly stigmatize as "naive". But, when all this is said, the development of the commonwealth idea in the hands of Starkey or Smith was immeasurably superior to the use of commonwealth vocabulary to advance conventional pieties by men like Latimer, Crowley.
or the curiously priggish young prince, Edward VI.\textsuperscript{48} The difference is nowhere better revealed than in their medical metaphors. With Smith and Starkey, to reiterate our argument, their metaphors signal a commitment to treating the ills of the realm as a problem of natural philosophy, with causes to be discovered and removed. With Crowley, as we have seen, the medical metaphors are no more than conventional apologies, their radical implications withdrawn as soon as they appear, and the causes are themselves revealed to be man's irremediably sinful character. The only palliative, therefore, is an exhortation to godly living, or, that failing, swift punishment. The medical and body politic metaphors that run right through Edward VI's manuscript on the reform of abuses in church and state are another good example. Here the figurative language is used to organize, rather than to attribute any characteristics of disease or medicine to politics, and the result is a list of conventional abuses, followed by a list of remedies, including "good laws", "good education", "encouraging the good", "engendering friendship" and "punishing vagabonds".\textsuperscript{49}

However, having marked this distinction, we must not overestimate the differences between Smith and Starkey on the one hand, and Crowley and Edward VI on the other, for they did at least inhabit the same moral universe. The differences stemmed from the fact that, while all
acknowledged that man's fallen character was the root of the world's disorder, the former, by treating it as a settled disposition, were able to go beyond it to the occasions upon which men might be tempted to evil actions.

VI. An alternative field: a right to resist the "murdering physician".

One of our reasons for urging the historical treatment of political metaphors has been our rejection of the claim that the relation of a metaphor to a doctrine is a logical one. We have sometimes expressed this by saying that there is no abstract logic of a metaphor, forcing thought down well-marked paths. It is, therefore, of special interest to us to note that the early theorists of a right of resistance, though fewer in number and lacking the immediate political influence of the apologists, were equally adept at using the politics as medicine theme. This was done, of course, by setting out the present state of affairs as unnatural and diseased, rather as Starkey had done, but proposing an altogether more radical remedy. Especially interesting here was the way in which explicit metaphors appeared to direct the audience's attention to aspects of the work of a physician which had been intentionally filtered out of the commonwealth accounts -- for example, the way in which a sick patient may sometimes resist the
good offices of the physician through fear or ignorance, or towards the special relationship of physician and patient.

Thus John Knox, faithful to the title of his infamous "blast", arrests our attention in the very first paragraph with a powerful representation of the unnatural and anomalous character of "the monstrous regiment of women".

For, who can deny but that it repugneth to nature that the blind shall be appointed to lead and conduct such as do see; that the weak and sick and impotent persons should nourish and keep the haile and strong; and finally that the foolish, mad and frantic, shall govern the discreet and give counsel to such as be of sober minds? But such be all women compared to man in bearing authority: for their sight in civil regimen is but blindness, their strength weakness, their counsel foolishness, and judgement phrensy, if it be rightly considered.

However, the purpose of this vigorous passage is not merely to paint a picture of a realm 'against nature'. The arguments of Knox, and the English exiles John Ponet and Christopher Goodman, were designed to develop the potentially subversive Lutheran claim that the powers that be are ordained of God specifically to fulfil a set of divinely ordained duties; without stumbling over Luther's own insistence that, because these powers are ordained of God, nothing can be done if they are derelict in their duties. As Quentin Skinner has argued, this radical step was
taken not by the Lutherans, but by Calvinists like Knox, Ponet and Goodman. 51

The radical argument for a right of resistance on the part of members of a commonwealth against tyrannical and ungodly rulers was based on an argument from private law which exploited the divinely ordained duties of an office of rule. First aired by the Saxon canonist Gregory Bruck, the argument maintained that a prince who persecuted the faithful had overstepped the bounds of his office. His subjects' case against him was held to be analogous to the legal remedies available against a judge who, committing notorious injuries, was deemed to have resumed the status of a private citizen, and hence was open to prosecution by his victims.

Skinner suggests that this argument was adopted by the English Calvinists and used to advance the claim to a right of resistance. He finds it clearly enunciated in Goodman's How Superior Powers Ought to be Obeyed of their Subjects, but advanced only "tentatively" by Ponet. 52 In fact, the argument is clear enough in Ponet's work, but it is expressed metaphorically.

Then they are much to blame, that being put in trust in Courts and Parliaments to make laws and statutes to the advancement of God's glory, and conservation of the liberties and common wealth of their country, do neglect their office and charge,
being appointed to be not only keepers of God's people, not of hogs neither of horses and mules which have no understanding, but of that dear flock which Christ purchased with the price of his heart blood: but also as physicians and surgeons, to redress reform and heal, if anything be amiss. And if a physician for lucre or other men's pleasure, would take upon him the healing of a sore diseased person, and for lack of knowledge or upon other evil purpose would minister things to hurt or kill the person, were he not worthy to be taken and punished as a butcher and man murderer.

We see here how the medicus reipublicae is dusted off and put to new work, with the telos of justice being replaced by a characteristically Reformation concern for the advancement of God's glory. Important, too, is the elaboration of the relation between rulers and subjects in terms of the trust that holds between the sick patient and his physician, where we feel a special sense of outrage if that trust should be betrayed. The very choice of physician and surgeon here is doubly significant, indicating the beginnings of a new reference-world for the medical symbols in politics. In the first half of the sixteenth century the foundations of the professional status of English medicine had been laid, regulating medical practitioners and excluding the unlicensed. The Royal College of Physicians had received its Charter from Henry VIII in 1518, and the Company of Barber-Surgeons had been incorporated in 1548, and their early records show a vigorous campaign against
"quacks and empirics". So it is highly significant the Ponet should choose them as the bearers of offices, fallible human beings who might be punished for major derelictions which controvert the end to which their office had been established.54

The choice of physician has an added significance, emphasizing the element of 'trust' which Ponet wishes to foreground in his account of the duties of a ruler. For, hand in hand with the development of medicine as a profession, went complaints that practitioners were abusing their monopoly privileges. It was not just superstition that sent ordinary people to the cunning folk, but the difficulty and expense of obtaining medical care of any kind. Robert Crowley, an infallible source of conventional pieties, devotes a special section of his admonitory poem The Voice of the Last Trumpet to the misdeeds of physicians who are accused of murdering "thousands", notably by neglecting all but the richest patients and by the widespread practice of diagnosis by urinoscopy without ever setting eyes on the patient.55 Thus Ponet's metaphorical allusion to "murdering" physicians, as well as carrying along the argument from law, could expect to find a satisfactory aesthetic coherence with the experience of his audience. Considered in its context, it must be judged a masterly rhetorical touch.

In immediate practical terms, arguments like those of
Knox, Ponet or Goodman had little impact, due in part to the speedy demise of Mary and the accession of Elizabeth I. It was with a certain obvious embarrassment that the Protestant divines who returned from exile to assume positions in the hierarchy of the once-more reformed and godly Church of England set out to rebut the charges of their co-religionists that a woman was unfit to rule. Most interesting from our point of view was the way in which the motivation for these defences was an ethical conservatism that again found expression in traditional imagery of harmony and order. The question of a woman ruler (now compounded by being Supreme Head of the Church of England) was dealt with in embarrassed asides, such as Aylmer's point that it did not really matter since there was Parliament to be considered as well. The real battle was fought against the claims to a right of resistance to be determined by subjects themselves, and it was to be waged with varying degrees of skill, but always successfully, throughout the reign of Elizabeth.

Thus Aylmer inveighed against these pernicious doctrines with a metaphor that really waited upon the germ theory for full force. Humoral theories, however, recognized that the body's humoral balance could be upset by contagion with something unwholesome, so the good Bishop, alluding to the title of his treatise, saw his task as cleansing the
land of corrupt theories that the puzzled subject might once more know that his whole duty lay in obedience.

For like as a man inhabiting a stinking, filthy and unwholesome house, situated in a corrupt and unclean air, cannot but be subject to that contagion, so these minds of ours, being lodged in so impure an harborowe, must needs be defiled by the filth.

The impact of the humoral theory of medicine on politics-as-medicine field here is especially interesting in the light of the metaphors we shall examine in the next chapter. The defenders of the Elizabethan Church settlement were perfectly aware that Catholics and 'Puritans' -- and their subversive political ideas -- were dangers to the peace and quiet of the realm. However, it made no sense to them to express this in terms of the ideas of their adversaries being specific diseases, for no such concept was employed in medical theory. A very similar idea could nonetheless be expressed in terms of the imbalance of the humours. This was the point of Aylmer's reference to "contagion". Thus the anonymous author of this appreciation, found in the State Papers, was quite unimpressed by the argument that no harm could come from allowing a papal nuncio to visit England since peace had been restored to the realm.
As when a man's body after long sickness being mitely well recovered and the good humours quieted and the evil humours overcome if the good be overcome and the evil fed and cherished and so error committed, the peril of recidivation will be greater to the body than the first sickness was. Even so this commonwealth being of late well recovered and settled and quieted and the evil members thereof . . . either reformed or put to silence . . . and the good quieted and comforted . . . if this coming of the papal nuntio . . . should be permitted thereof should come such a disquiet and change in the body of the commonweal as thereof the peril would be greater than was at the first.

In general, however, the Elizabethan period saw a decline in the use of politics as medicine metaphors to express doctrines about obligation. The metaphors are occasionally found associated with the conception of the Church as a body subject to age and infirmity -- used by Jewel to urge that the practices of the Church of England marked a return to those of the "first born". For his pains, he was stigmatized as a "mountebank that goes abroad with diverse things for men's bodies" in an amusing passage by John Rastell, but these hardly count as political attributions.

This was partly to do with a gradual decline in the popularity of the old order and harmony account of political association, and of the body politic language in which it was expressed. It is impossible to say that one caused the decline of the other because they were so closely linked.
Certainly, resistance theories tended to undermine both the notion that order and stability were to be valued above all else, and the notion that the 'member' of the body came at all times under the direction of the 'governing part'. When the authors of the tract attributed to Robert Persons came to use medical and body metaphors, the result is a study in ineptitude.

And therefore as the whole body is of more authority than the only head, and may cure the head if it be out of time, so may the weal public cure or cut off their heads, if they infest the rest, being that a body civil may have diverse heads by succession, and it is not bound ever to one, as a body natural is, which body natural if it had the same ability that when it had an aching or sickly head, it could cut it off and take another, I doubt not but it would do so, and that all men would confess that it had authority sufficient and reason to do the same rather than all the other parts should perish or live in pain and continual torment.

The author's self-consciousness about the differences between a body politic and a body natural robs the metaphor of any aesthetic or even epistemological coherence with the doctrine being urged. There is something ludicrous about a body chopping off its own head and taking another, and although there is a Marsilian connection evident in the argument that the "whole body" is the source of authority, a determined critic might be moved to ask how a headless body
is able to "reason". The whole passage is possibly evidence in favour of Person's claim that the text was written by a committee.

VII. A new development: the statesman as cunning physician.

There is thus ample evidence to support Skinner's claim that it was highly characteristic of the humanist political project for authors to see themselves as physicians to the body politic. Although we have seen that there are important differences in the diagnoses that the various self-characterised physicians made, we have also been made aware of the close connection between their metaphors and the ruling conception or archetype of political association as a body. As we have had occasion to notice in previous chapters, while political metaphors are flexible, they are not infinitely malleable. As political doctrines change, so certain uses of the politics as medicine theme became less plausible.

We have noted the aesthetic connection between the 'ideology of order' and medical theories about the humoral balance of the healthy body. However, writing in 1569, Sir Thomas Smith brought into focus another aspect of human bodies which would increasingly attract the attention of political theorists.
For the nature of man is never to stand still in one manner of estate, but to grow from the less to the more, and decay from the more again to the less, till it come to the fatal end and destruction with many turns and turmoils of sickness and recovering, seldom standing in perfect health neither of a man's body itself nor of the politic body which is compounded of the same.

To the historian with a practical turn of mind, or to the "politique", the idea that any body politic was "seldom standing in perfect health" was no doubt highly suggestive; but the acceptance of the idea sundered the conceptual connection between political order and the harmony of the body. Instead, men were invited to see political association in terms of the life and death of real human bodies, the natural phenomena that physicians were investigating and treating. Although Starkey's Dialogue clearly shows that a theological idiom was no bar to reflection on the natural causes of unrest, these earlier politics as medicine metaphors were shaped by a conception of politics which included non-resistance and the commonwealth idea. The common purpose of seeking peace and stability were radically undermined by Smith's interest in mutability as a basic condition of man's life, and, by extension, of his political life.

An important consequence of this interest in the sickness and death of states came with the formulation of
what were to be called "maxims of state", or prudential knowledge of political survival. It was here that a new politics-as-medicine field was to establish plausibility and coherence for medical metaphors, passing over the supposed disinterestedness of the physician in favour of the special knowledge that was the foundation of his practical skill. Of course there was resistance to the spread of such notions, but by the end of the sixteenth century the physician of the "politiques" and the "statistes" was a recognizably different figure from the humanist "physician to the body politic".

One of the best examples of a metaphor which derived from this novel conception appears in a book which, while not translated into English until 1606, attracted great interest in England from the moment of its French publication in 1576.

Seeing therefore that the power and influence of the stars may, by the power of God, that is by wisdom (by the gift and goodness of almighty God given unto man) be avoided: and that wise physicians have found the means to change the diseases and to alter fevers contrary unto their natural course, to the intent the more easily to cure them, or at leastwise to assuage them; why should not the wise politician or governor of a Commonwealth, foreseeing the conversions and changes which naturally happen unto Commonwealths, by good laws and convenient remedies prevent the ruin thereof; or if the force of the mischief be so great, and the destruction so certain, as that it can by no wisdom of man be prevented or stayed, yet shall he perform that which cunning physicians do, who by the symptoms appearing on the critical
days, and by the causes of the disease, do more certainly and better guess of the sick man's death in what manner it shall be: and so yet in good time giveth thereof warning unto his ignorant subjects lest that they should upon the sudden be utterly oppressed with the ruin of the falling estate and commonwealth.

Of course, this line of defence for astrology was a familiar one, thought it is interesting to see it deployed in the same context as the activities of the "wise physician". Apparently more relevant to our own interests is the reference to the "cunning physician" who may alter the natural course of fevers, or give a patient warning of his impending death. As John Pocock has reminded us, the Elizabethan conception of the public actor was tied to the court, and focussed on the shifting "imperfectly legitimized" relations between courtiers, statesmen and the Queen. It was, no doubt, for hints on how to manage this relation that, as a contemporary recorded;

you cannot step into a scholar's study but (ten to one) you shall likely find open either Bodin De Republica or Le Royes Exposition upon Aristotle's Politics or some other French or Italian Politique discourse.

Indeed, the classics were ransacked for generalizations or maxims which might be of some help, Tacitus and Thucydides being particular favourites. Here, as Peter Burke has
pointed out, the connection with medical inquiry was made quite explicitly. The emphasis of Elizabethan medicine on 'secondary causes', the use of Hippocrates's *Aphorisms* as a model for political maxims, and the belief that medical knowledge was the fruit of practical experience rather than mere 'book learning' all played their part.

The interest in 'secondary causes' -- which was so central to the Jacobean understanding of history and politics -- was perhaps the most important factor establishing new conventional uses for politics as medicine metaphors. In late-sixteenth-century treatises on syphilis, for example, we can see exactly the same justification for medical treatment as was offered in Bodin's seemingly irrelevant remarks about the astrologer and the wise physician. These practical and homely treatises -- written in English because syphilis was treated by barber-surgeons -- all began with an Aristotelian distinction between original and proximate causes. Knowledge of the venereal origins of the disease, and the cures advanced, in no way contradicted the fact that the appearance of the disease and its unchecked ravages were to be taken as a sign of God's displeasure. As Richard Clowes noted, it is "a sickness very loathsome and odious, yea, troublesome and dangerous, a notable testimony against that sin", and Peter Lowe began his own treatise with a suitably pious reminder of this
We may (no doubt) attribute the original of all diseases into the indignation of God, as the first cause, who recompenseth every man according to his works. For to refrain the filthy lusts of men and women, God hath permitted this sickness to reign amongst them as a punishment for sin. Other treatises alluded to the same argument used by Bodin: the wisdom that issued in medical knowledge about the causes and cures of diseases, even the very herbs and minerals used in treatment, were as much the gift of God as the diseases were his punishment. In sum, the practice of medicine offered a powerful archetype for men seeking to find a space for "politique" activity within a divinely created order, simultaneously legitimating this activity and offering a model for the knowledge on which it was to be based.

Thus, within a generally stable framework of Tudor medicine, different political doctrines altered the shape of the politics-as-medicine metaphorical field, foregrounding some elements and passing over others. Henry VIII's apologists focussed on the medicus appointed to keep sinful men in bounds, the humanist on the medicus as a disinterested seeker after health obstructed by the self-deceptions of his patients, while the resistance theorists were moved to remind the medicus of the duties of
his office. At length, the physician became "statiste", skilled in the knowledge of the causes of mutability, heralding the break-up of the old theme of political association as a body. The picture is one of a flexible and potent instrument, creating images rather than confined by imagery.
Sixteenth-century Englishmen found the metaphorical field of politics-as-medicine a most useful part of their political inheritance, equally at home chastising the unruly subject, petitioning the humanist prince, or establishing the right of a subject to resist a prince's impious and ungodly exactions. Most of the emphasis in our analysis has been on the underlying epistemological connections between the metaphors and the doctrines that they were used to express. We have stressed how conventional uses derived from Cicero, Seneca or Augustine helped establish what a writer might mean in arguing that a wise physician knew when a limb must be amputated or cauterized to save the whole body. We found less conventional uses, some apparently hearkening back to Marsilius's distinction between the authority of the community and mere professional competence, others stressing the special relation of trust that should exist between a ruler and his subjects in a novel metaphorical attribution. We separated the conventional from the non-conventional uses of metaphors by showing the many different ways in which the
conventional metaphors were all supported by the background conception of political association as a body politic characterized by order and harmony amongst its parts.

The break-up of this background picture came slowly, but it was clearly taking place by the end of the century. Gradually we find less about the harmony and proportion of the body politic, and more about its disorders and eventual mortality. This change not only altered the epistemological connections between political doctrines and medical metaphors, but the aesthetic connections as well. Recalling Walzer's analysis, we see that the symbolic significance of the human body has changed, throwing into prominence the practical skills of the physician and his knowledge of 'secondary causes'. Late sixteenth-century metaphors express the precariousness of life at court, and the search for practical maxims with which to abate it. This very close connection between epistemological and aesthetic coherence in plausible political metaphors should not be underestimated. It is a link we shall encounter again in studying the medical metaphors of National Socialists.

Recent research on national socialism and fascism has drawn attention to these ideologies as "cultural phenomena".¹ In other words, rather than attempting to explain their successes in economic or even specifically political terms, the suggestion is that they might
profitably be seen as responses to a widely felt lack of confidence in the culture of Western Europe after the First World War. Certainly, the belief that European civilization was 'decadent' or even 'degenerate' was a popular, even respectable, position in the arts, in criticism and in theoretical disciplines, even before 1914. It became, in that notoriously vague phrase, part of the intellectual climate of Europe in the decades that followed.

Attempts to dispel the gloom were not lacking, ranging from an optimistic reaffirmation of the liberal belief in progress, to movements which self-consciously sought a break with their own cultural heritage, eager to embrace whatever modernity might bring. However, a deep pessimism and a fear of the future was still evident, expressed in popular historical works, like Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*, and in representative works of fiction. We may recognize it in the self-paralyzing detachment of Robert Musil's *Man Without Qualities*, as much as in the remorseless odyssey of sickness and death encountered in Céline's *Journey to the Edge of the Night*.² No doubt other examples spring to mind, but the parallel which Céline -- a doctor -- drew between physical disease and the slow death of western culture was a momentous one. The various diagnoses put forward -- including the suggestion that the disease was an incurable one -- interest us less in themselves than in
their relation to the remedies suggested. If the relationship is not always quite so crude as a diagnosis controlled and suggested by a prognosis, this is because diagnosis and prognosis were already part of a well-established metaphorical field to be found at the heart of the doctrines of fascism and national socialism. To show how medical metaphors established a connection between cultural pessimism and politics is the task of this chapter, but we shall begin at the end of the story.

Some years before Céline wrote his famous novel there was already a man using his enforced leisure to elaborate a diagnosis of the ills of the world, and to offer himself in the role of physician -- half man of science and half charismatic healer. From his prison cell, Hitler even conversed in the twin metaphors of politics as medicine and medicine as warfare which were to become so familiar in the next twenty years.

Yes, yes, it is quite right that I have changed my opinion concerning the methods to fight Jewry. I have realised that up to now I have been much too soft! While working out my book I have come to the realisation that in the future the most severe methods of fighting will have to be used to let us come through successfully. I am convinced that this is a vital question not just for our people but for all peoples. For Juda is the plague of the world.
As we shall see, this trio of medicine, politics and warfare was one of the organising themes of national socialism, a theme which had been developed from a metaphorical field already well-established in European politics and literature.

The very general coherence of metaphors which bring together medicine and warfare has not gone unnoticed. Susan Sontag, who finds the combination distasteful, dates the appearance of warfare metaphors in medicine from the early investigations into the bacterial origins of some diseases in the 1880s.\(^4\) However, although these developments certainly helped to stabilize the field, popularizing the notion of micro-organisms as the invisible agents of sickness and death, medicine and warfare can be seen functioning as symbols of progress at least as early as the Enlightenment. As Peter Gay has noted, the philosophes characteristically used both medical and warfare metaphors to elaborate their project of overcoming the obstacles restraining the progress of the human spirit.\(^5\)

The result was a complex interplay of literal and metaphorical uses of language. Once a person or a practice had become the subject of a medical metaphor, the warfare attributes are established almost as a matter of course, for we speak of invasions and defences, struggle and extermination in medical contexts without the slightest
sense of implausibility. In fact, we are unlikely to notice anything at all metaphorical about 'an invasion of the body's defences'. In practice, the way we have come to talk about medicine as a war against obstinate and unseen enemies has greatly extended the significance of modern politics and medicine metaphors. Because of this, Nazi metaphors proved resistant to that line of criticism which would prevent political action being justified in military terms on the grounds that the justification was 'only a metaphor'. The sense of implausibility which accompanies a metaphor which has been stretched too far -- and no one could accuse the Nazis of restraint here -- was crucially absent because the medical field was already organised in military terms. It boded ill for whoever became the subject of a medical metaphor.

But what of the original attribution? Why did these politics as medicine metaphors prove so invulnerable to the sophisticated ironic criticisms that can be turned against political metaphors? Swift, for example, was able to have much fun with the politics as medicine metaphors of his own day by means of just such an ironic strategy, taking the metaphors literally with absurd consequences. During his visit to the "school of political projectors" on the island of Laputa, Gulliver meets a "most ingenious doctor" who maintains a strict resemblance between bodies politic and
bodies natural. The doctor's proposal that physicians should attend to the common ailments of senators is an occasion for much Swiftian merriment about the "flatus" and "crudeness" of digestion that attends the legislative activity. By the end of his visit, it is the metaphors themselves that have been completely exploded. If the semantic structure of the politics-as-medicine field prevented such criticisms from affecting the attribution of warfare characteristics to modern politics, how was the original attribution of medicine itself protected?

In this case, national socialism had its ideological arguments to fall back on. As an ideology, Nazism included a doctrine perfectly adapted to supporting the attribution of disease and medical characteristics to political life. Indeed, anyone puzzled by Nazi medical metaphors was, by means of them, directed to systematic arguments about the racial types and the project of national regeneration couched in the vocabulary, if not the 'logical form', of biology. In other words, the apparent excesses of Nazi medical metaphors merely served to confront an audience with the ideological core of national socialism, where they would find an epistemological coherence between doctrine and metaphor. This, then, was the rhetorical structure of Nazi politics as medicine metaphors. To explain how this structure came to be so plausible despite the apparent
crudity and excess of the metaphors themselves is our next task.

There can be no doubt that these metaphors were excessive, by any standards. Consider this example from one of Hitler's monologues.

The discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions that have taken place in the world. The battle we are engaged in today is of the same sort as the battle waged during the last century by Pasteur and Koch. How many diseases have their origin in the Jewish virus? Japan would have been contaminated too, if it had stayed open to the Jews. We shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jew. Everything has a cause, nothing comes by chance.

Here an audience (admittedly a captive one) is being invited to see the presence of Jews in a nation as a virus acting on a healthy body. It is a classic example of metaphorical 'seeing as'. Its structure is marked by the conventional association of medicine and warfare: once the medical attribution has been made, the Jewish "contamination" is a call to "battle", the outcome of which must be "elimination". The connection with Nazi doctrine is made through the reference to Pasteur and Koch, identifying Nazi racial theories with the impressive advance of modern medicine. It is a powerful justification of a political programme which would eventually result in a world war.
To recapitulate, there exists a basic objection which might be brought against such a metaphor as this. It is a political objection, belonging to the very nature of ideological disputes. Arising from a rock-bottom disagreement in disposition and prejudice, it would deny the validity of the metaphor on the grounds that human beings cannot be characterized as micro-organisms. Recognizing the ideological impulse in the Nazi metaphor, an opponent must treat it as a condensed or elliptical argument. Swift's project of literalization is only one of the more sophisticated versions of such an objection, pointing out that one cannot justify treating certain kinds of men as one would a dangerous micro-organism because there are important and relevant differences between men and viruses, differences which are disguised by condensing the argument into a metaphor. But it is at just this point that the ideologist has an answer, his arguments designed to show that there is indeed a significant analogy where his opponent claims that the metaphor breaks down, so that, although the metaphor is a condensed argument, it is not thereby an improper one.

In this case, it is incumbent upon national socialists to show that Jews are like a virus in some relevant respects, and this the arguments about the racial characteristics of the Volk are designed to do. Thus
metaphors like Hitler's deployed in a ideological argument, attempt to escape literalization by showing that opponents have mistaken the structure of the metaphor itself. The metaphorical character of Hitler's disease attribution, or so it might be plausibly argued, lies not in the treatment of men as micro-organisms, because there is no essential difference, except in scale, between a man and a virus -- for they both stand in the same relation to 'nature's iron laws' according to a Nazi. The metaphorical attributions are the medical and military ones, and these gain their force firstly from the biological picture that the ideology presents, and secondly from the conventional relations we have already established between medicine and warfare. The work of justification is being carried on at an entirely different level, free from the qualifications that an unsupported metaphor always entails, and, indeed, it is at the level of racial doctrine that such metaphors must be shown to be false.

Of course, displaying the logical relation between an ideology and a metaphor should not be confused with the discovery of a causal sequence. An ideology is not created in order to justify a metaphor: metaphors like these are spawned from parent ideologies, which explains the all-important continuities in vocabulary between metaphor and doctrine. Because the Nazi picture of life is a
biological one, there is an epistemological coherence between the doctrine and the medical and military metaphors, a coherence which was duly exploited. Indeed, the literal continuities that the metaphors helped to sustain were continually stressed in Nazi literature using exactly this vocabulary. Himmler, for example, characterized the battle between Menschen and Untermenschen as being "like the struggle of men against some epidemic disease, like the struggle of bacteria against the healthy body." By 1929 Goebbels had already drawn the practical implications of this coherence for the benefit of anyone insensitive enough to have overlooked it, using a striking literal comparison.

Let the Jews cry "terror". We reply with the famous words of Mussolini: "Terror? Never! Its social hygiene." We get rid of these people the way a physician gets rid of bacteria.

If this is the rhetorical structure of Nazi disease metaphors, how, then, are we to explain their extraordinary success?

II. The role of politics as medicine metaphors in Mein Kampf.

The locus classicus of these metaphors, in an argument balanced uneasily on the borderline between the literal and
the metaphorical, is undoubtedly Hitler's own account of the collapse of the German war effort and the proclamation of the Weimar Republic in *Mein Kampf*. The argument is the centrepiece of National Socialism's mythical history of Germany -- the unfolding drama of steady Jewish infiltration into German national life, with the concomitant spread of Bolshevism (part of the Jewish plot for world domination), culminating in an ignominious paralysis of the political will behind the front line, leaving the German soldier betrayed in his moment of victory. Our interest in this particular piece of modern mythology consists in its being told in terms of a creeping sickness, a sickness all the more deadly for not being immediately catastrophic in its effects. Men, we are plausibly told, judge danger by its immediacy, and no one had thought to link the "alien virus" spreading from the East with the isolated symptoms of sickness and decay for which it was actually responsible. Once the war had begun, it was too late. With the best elements in German culture at the front, the conditions were ripe for the Jewish virus to break out and complete its deadly work.

The central passage is an extended figurative comparison. As with many political metaphors, its meaning is underlined in literal terms immediately in order to cut down on unwanted and potentially confusing associations, but the
resonance that remains is thereby focussed on its object.

It was no accident that men mastered the plague more easily than tuberculosis. The one comes in terrible waves of death that shake humanity to the foundations; the other slowly and stealthily; the one leads to terrible fear, the other to gradual indifference. The consequence is that man opposed the one with all the ruthlessness of his energy, while he tries to control consumption with feeble means. Thus he masters the plague, while tuberculosis masters him. Exactly the same is true of diseases of national bodies. If they do not take the form of catastrophe, man slowly begins to get accustomed to them and at length, though it may take some time, perishes all the more certainly of them.

This is immediately followed by that curious and sometimes misunderstood passage on the ravages of syphilis, a no less terrible poisoning of the national body, "running parallel with" political, ethical and moral contamination. Some critics have been inclined to dismiss it as no more than the morbid fantasy of an unbalanced mind, but to do so is to miss its proper significance. Certainly, it seems at first glance to contain much material that is both disconnected and irrelevant, remarks about racially mixed marriages, the failure of the intelligensia to combat the Jewish menace because of poor physical condition, and a diatribe on "Art Bolshevism", for example. Even this makes sense, however, when we recall the Hitler's purpose here is to paint a picture of the decay of German culture, a picture organized
by its biological assumptions. Thus, political, moral and ethical contamination -- unthinkable outside a biological context -- are to be explained in exactly the same way as physical illness, and Hitler refers to Jewish immigration as "the resultant syphilization of our people". The fact that German intellectuals were poor physical specimens, or that contemporary styles of painting and sculpture were welcomed by them, are symptoms of the underlying decay, as the symptoms of syphilis are the external signs of the presence of alien micro-organisms. Syphilis is particularly appropriate here, quite apart from its associations with immorality, for Hitler is able to refer to it, using popular medical notions, as a "poisoning of the blood", reemphasizing the continuity of the argument with the doctrine of the purity of the Volkskörper. But this is not all. As we have seen, it is characteristic of National Socialism as an ideology that the metaphorical attribution is pressed far beyond qualified description. Supported by the biological and racial doctrines of his ideology, Hitler is arguing that, as syphilis has its cause in the "poisoning of a healthy body" by a virus, so we must look for the alien element in the German national body responsible for the contamination of her culture. It is part of an explanation, and ultimately a justification for action.

Again and again National Socialism returned to the
theme of the continuity between spiritual or moral and physical values. It was an important part of their condemnation of city life and their promotion of a cult of the countryside, a concept that found expression in many areas, from Hitler's fantastic schemes to populate the captured eastern territories with armed peasant communities, to the clean-cut outdoor style promoted by many Nazi organizations. In an unpublished manuscript, Hitler worked himself up into a characteristic frenzy of disease and medical imagery on the subject.

This overfilling of an inadequate living space not seldom also leads to the concentration of people in work centres which look less like cultural centres, and rather more like abcesses in the national body in which all evil, vices and diseases seem to unite. Above all, they are breeding grounds of blood-mixing and bastardization, of race lowering, thus resulting in those purulent infection centres in which the intellectual Jewish racial-maggots thrive and finally effect further destruction.

Although these by no means exhaust the range of possible examples, we might compare Hitler's metaphors with some from a passage in Rosenberg's *Myth of the Twentieth Century*, a more self-consciously literary piece than anything to which Hitler ever aspired. Similar metaphors recur; the evocation of "blood", the city as a germ centre for racial pollution, the wasting sickness that saps the
"will to struggle", and the famous metaphor of "asphalt", a popular allusion to Weimar in Volkish circles.

Either we attain through a re-experiencing and cultivation of primal blood combined with an elevated will to struggle, a new purifying level of achievement, or even the last Germanic Western values will vanish amidst filthy metropolitan crowds, crippled upon the hot, barren asphalt of a bestialized inhumanity or trickling away, in the form of a self-bastardizing emigration, as a sickness-inducing germ, to South America, China, the Dutch Indies and Africa.

Medical and disease metaphors have a systematic part to play in National Socialism, setting the tone of the important mythological account of the German defeat in 1918, and of the tasks which face the German people if the damage is to be repaired. The story is set up in terms of a physiological picture of decay and degeneration. The metaphors extend this decay to the realm of spiritual and moral values, they identify the enemy and the means to defeat him. The metaphors are sustained in this project by being employed to express specific doctrines about the biological character of political and social life, the doctrines of National Socialist ideology. But there are many other ways in which biological accounts of social life could be expressed, and if we are not to fall back onto a 'magical' account of how political metaphors work, we have
to make clear the connection between the vocabulary of sickness, decay and degeneration -- deployed in such a masterly way in the Nazi metaphors -- and its significance for European politics. Why could opposition to the variety of liberalism which Thomas Mann, for example, associated with Weimar, find such successful expression in disease and medical metaphors?

III. The historical development of the field.

The intellectual origins of National Socialism have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Perhaps this is only to be expected as a natural reaction to the once prevailing orthodoxy that Nazism was an intellectual aberration devoid of rational content. Many of the specific doctrines of Nazism we know to have been familiar concerns in Imperial Germany. We also know a great deal, for example, about the Volkish movements, whose ideals Hitler appropriated as a suitable vehicle for the nationalist sentiments that were so important to his programme. The intimate connection between nationalism and anti-semitism in pre-1914 Central Europe has come to our attention as well. But from the point of view of our examination of National Socialism through the medium of its disease metaphors, these particular historical links (though undoubtedly
central to any account of Nazi ideology as a whole) are less important than a more general observation, arrived at by those historians who have treated Nazism as a cultural phenomenon. This is the claim that one of the great achievements of National Socialism was to have brought to perfection a new style of politics, a style that arose in the late nineteenth-century in response to the dissatisfaction of mass electorates.¹⁴

The new style, or so it is argued, developed in a confrontation with the style of 'rational conduct' in politics that had come to be associated with European liberalism. How much weight should be given to this confrontation in any explanation of the rise of fascism and national socialism is a question which, fortunately, does not concern us here. However, the medical and disease metaphors of National Socialism become much more significant and intelligible if they are seen as part of the intrusion of a new style into European political life. We are surely familiar with this style in action: the organization imposed upon crowds, the special discipline of para-military groups, and public violence to terrorize opponents, for example. As we have seen, we should not expect to be able to divorce political conduct from ideological considerations, either as mere 'practice' to be explained by theory, or as standing in need of ex post facto justification. When we examine
National Socialism as an ideology, we find an account of why this new style of politics is desirable, an account buttressed by gleanings from most of the principal critics of nineteenth-century liberalism. Combined, these form that "collage effect" noted by Schorske as another feature of political doctrines in the "new politics". Oddments from great men like Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, or from common publicists such as Wagner or Chamberlain, were welded together by this style, and given the distinctive hallmark of National Socialism.

Clearly, this style could not have been a total invention: in many ways it was a discovery, the gradual unravelling of implications that takes place when ideas are unselfconsciously explored. One place this exploration led was into the sanatorium. Exactly how it came about that conservative critics of liberalism should have developed the notion of social pathology, we do not have space to enquire, but develop it they certainly did. Perhaps we might appeal here to the general affinity of social criticism for medical figures, the affinity noted by Judith Schlanger, but it is the precise form that this affinity took which interests us here, and we must begin with the association of medicine and liberalism.

The link between medicine and 'progressive' opinion had already been made quite explicitly in the Enlightenment, as
we have already noted. Here there was a definite sense in which progress in medicine and progress in society at large was felt to go hand in hand. First in France and later in England and Germany, 'public health' movements had drawn the strongest possible literal connections between politics and medicine. Writing shortly after the 1848 upheavals, Rudolf Virchow, one of the most prominent exponents of the public health concept and a future leader of the German Progressive Party, made this connection in the form of a general theory of disease and cultural change.

Epidemics of a character unknown so far appear, and often disappear without trace when a new culture period has started. Thus did leprosy and the English sweat. The history of artificial epidemics is therefore the history of the disturbances of human culture. Their changes announce to us in gigantic signs the turning point of culture into new directions. Each culture revolution is followed by epidemics because a large sector of the population is only slowly absorbed by the new cultural movement and only slowly participates in its blessings.

The history of progress becomes the history of health. The state of the nation's health is an infallible guide to the wisdom of its statesmen. The statesman himself has at his disposal the twin sciences of medicine and liberalism, the one to identify and eradicate the diseases which were the inevitable consequences of dogma and superstition, the
other to so order social and political relationships that such 'artificial' diseases would never occur again. A highly laudable object indeed, but one whose language was resonant with political possibility.

In fact, the critics of liberalism seem to have fully grasped the intimate connection between liberalism, progress and health, for they reacted to it with a picture of a social order afflicted by deadly diseases beyond cure, diseases that were the consequences of liberalism itself. Thus the familiar sickness and death metaphors unfolded in the capable hands of aristocratic conservatives, appalled at the forces let loose by liberals, apparently wittingly; and these metaphors were further refined by the aristocrats' spiritual heirs, the young men of the fin de siècle for whom liberalism offered only a slow death by boredom. It was at this point, as Schorske has noted, that the new political style became a possibility, an alliance of all those elements who had failed to find what they had wanted, or what they had been promised, in the political world that liberals had created. Thus the modern political language of the sick-bed became a resource for European political ideologies.

Among these aristocratic conservatives, few offer us better examples of disease metaphors than Count Gobineau — not, it must be clearly understood, because his arguments
were in any meaningful sense 'precursors' of National Socialism, but because of his opposition to the liberal tradition, and the deep pessimism which found expression in his metaphors. Gobineau was an early and talented exponent of the idea of an incurable disease, hastened on its destructive course by the idiocies of liberal politicians, and a pioneer in the use of lurid disease and medical imagery to shock and disgust.\(^{19}\) His thesis of a natural, aristocratic governing elite defined in racial terms and its inevitable decline through miscegenation, led him to the notion of degeneration. Now, this concept can be treated in a number of ways, and was the subject of many differing approaches in the nineteenth century, but the interesting part about Gobineau's formulation is the creeping in of natural scientific notions, leading to that uneasy balance between literal and metaphorical which we noted as characteristic of Nazi metaphors. On the one hand, in his novel \textit{Les Pléaides}, he could present a clearly metaphorical formulation in which his profound pessimism is perfectly expressed by the notion of senility.

Statesmen will merely be the suppliers of rather ineffectual plasters, and distillers of opium, morphine, chloral and other soporific cure-alls, and after a few months or a few years, they will see their patients lapsing into convulsions. The very name of the illness is evidence that it is incurable. It is none other than senility.\(^{20}\)
Yet Gobineau has a strong desire to offer something more than a suggestive metaphor, and he co-opts the idiom of natural science to satisfy it. This is an important step, for it signals the fact that Gobineau is not content to answer the liberal claims about progress and medicine with the simple rejoinder that the 'disease' is beyond medical ministrations, that it is moral and spiritual rather than physical (a claim that de Maistre with his strong religious sensibility, found quite adequate). Oppressed, perhaps, by the growing prestige of natural science, he takes the dispute onto the enemy's ground.

The word 'degenerate' when applied to a people means . . . that the people has no longer the same blood in its veins, continuous adulteration having gradually affected the quality of the blood.21

The literary possibilities of this metaphor-theme were to be explored by novelists, particularly the French decadents. The sickly aesthete became a recognized 'type' of decadent hero, a particular prey to psychological disorders with distressing physical consequences, the spiritual emblem of the society he despised. Here the pessimism is profound; normality is a completely pathological condition containing within itself the seeds of its own inevitable destruction. At a personal level, as Barbey d'Aurevilly, a perceptive
critic of Huysman's *A Rebours* remarked, the only solution was the muzzle of a pistol or the foot of the Cross. Most decadents, however, were assumed to have lost the will to perform any kind of positive action, and Prince Noronsoff, hero of Jean Lorrain's *Le vice errant* was not alone as he waited "halluciné, bordu de spasmes et d'épouvante" for the Asiatic hordes whose arrival would herald "le décomposition de vieux monde". 22

If literature of this kind further popularized the concept of social pathology, expanding the vocabulary and developing the allusions, there ran parallel with it an attempt to handle 'decomposition' in the manner of the scientist, much as Gobineau had wanted to do with degeneration. Of course, after 1859, the classic model for such attempts was Darwin. With complete earnestness, utterly devoid of irony, the literal implications of such a doctrine were worked out. While we may assume that it was the metaphorical resonance of terms like 'degeneration' and 'decomposition' which first made them politically useful, they stood in need of further justification if they were to appeal to a wider audience than the aristocratic conservative evaluating the destruction of the world he loved. Biology was to provide this justification, for the effect of its intrusion into politics was to narrow the range of possible attributes by linking up the disease
metaphors of social pathology to a biological picture of social progress. Not only were medical metaphors endowed with the prestige of evolutionary theories, but ease of comprehension was fostered as well.\textsuperscript{23}

At the heart of these medical metaphors lay a claim about the literal identity of the physical and the social worlds, a claim that every advance in the physical sciences seemed to establish upon firmer ground. The possibilities were almost endless: where liberals found in Darwin the vocabulary of progress through evolution, their critics seized upon the principle of selection itself. Both contributed to an influx of biological metaphors into political language. The interest in the operation of 'natural selection' in social life was accompanied, as one critic has noted, by a considerable brutalization of political language, especially in Germany where the neutral 'struggle for life' received a highly idiosyncratic translation as the \textit{Kampf ums Dasein}.\textsuperscript{24}

It proved a simple matter to develop reactionary conservatism of the pessimistic sort espoused by Gobineau in this evolutionary idiom. Concern was expressed that modern society was 'unnatural' in its tendency to mitigate the harsher necessities of the struggle for life, and particular scorn was directed at the idea of democratic political institutions. Ernst Haeckel was only the most influential of
many writers who drew attention to the way in which democratic institutions subverted the 'right of the strongest' and tended to promote mediocrity, with potentially disastrous consequences for the race as a whole. The important points to note here, are the very wide audiences reached by such thinking, displayed in popular bestsellers like Haeckel's own *Welträtsel*, and the continuing trend to literalize medical and biological terms in politics.

The city continued to be a source of fascination regarded with horrified ambivalence. On the one hand, city life was seen as the epitome of all that was unnatural about modern civilization. To a Monist League specialist in 'social biology', cities were "hotbeds of moral decay" and "constant centres of varied infectious diseases, especially infectious sexual diseases". On the other hand, they could be seen as displaying the principle of natural selection at its fiercest and most salutary. The very prevalence of infectious diseases served to weed out the weakest elements; "tuberculosis is friend of our race", as John Haycraft put it. These possibilities were refined still further in Alexander Tille's study of East London. In his view, "darkest England" provided the clearest possible example of natural selection at work in society.
With inexorable severity, nature separates the men who have sunk to the level of animals from the others and thus, in a sense, East London functions as a national sanatorium of which few have any suspicion, and all who seek to help the 'unfortunates' only diminish the enormous significance it has in that capacity.  

From here it was but a short step, soon taken, towards helping 'natural' selection along in an effort to undo generations of misguided philanthropy. Habitual criminals, the mentally ill, the chronically disabled and sexual offenders were all candidates for Lebensvernichtung. There were no longer any sharp conceptual boundaries between politics and medicine, for both could only be in the deepest sense unnatural if they failed to subordinate themselves to the crude necessities of this biological picture.

IV. The relation of the field to conceptual change.

We have now gone some way towards explaining the intelligibility of Hitler's disease and medical metaphors, his repeated emphasis on the intimate links between moral and physical decay, his singling out of the city as a "plague centre", and his morbid fascination with sexual diseases. His particular achievement was more than just a recognition of the traditional discursive resources at his disposal. It was to form them into a coherent ideology which
transcended its narrow origins in conservative and nationalist opposition to liberalism and "modernity". Thus, to take one of the central features of National Socialist doctrine, we know that anti-semitism was well established in nationalist circles long before Hitler had any influence. His dubious achievement was to promote anti-semitism to the status of a medical discovery, and hold out hope of a 'cure' for nations in peril. His diagnostic procedures were obviously greatly aided by existing anti-semitic doctrines, but National Socialism imposed an internal coherence upon these ideas (as it did with so many others) by expressing them in metaphorical terms.

The biological character of the National Socialist conception of society, remarked upon by so many critics, served to justify the medicine and warfare metaphors when they were felt to stand in need of some justification. We now see that their complex rhetorical structure looks something like this. The metaphors themselves are the visible sign of the the manner and extent to which biology organised and structured Hitler's thinking about society and politics. Based on a highly conventional metaphorical field the development of which we have just charted, these metaphors gave notice of a single-minded welding together of the disparate elements in Hitler's intellectual heritage. Aesthetically, the focus on the Jew as the bearer of
degenerating diseases brought to society and politics a whole range of attitudes and beliefs about disease and death. Epistemologically, they found justification in the familiar arguments of Nazi racial doctrine, which offered an explanation in the idiom of natural science for those who were disposed to seek one. As we have seen, once this connection between politics and medicine has been established, our popular conceptions of disease and immune reactions introduce the vocabulary of warfare into the metaphorical field. There was nothing stylistically mixed in contemptuously referring to Jews in the diminutive form Judlein, and then describing them as "evil as the black death", for the little Jew crept about his deadly work as inconspicuously as the plague bacillus spread death. But Victor Klemperer, who remarks on the apparent contrast, is quite right to draw our attention to the anxiety deliberately fostered by this metaphor, an anxiety which was supposed to find its release in a war on the Jews.  

The all-pervasiveness of the biological conception of society on which these metaphors were founded has been demonstrated in a number of studies. It may be seen, for example, in the way that the abstract notion of the Volkskörper -- a common term in nationalist circles, used to draw attention to an organic relation between a people and its culture -- became more and more concrete. Eventually, we
find the intrusion of alien elements which disturb the organic relation spoken of in such a straightforwardly medical way that 'blood-poisoning' (Blutvergiftung) was said to result. This example is clearly linked with a pseudo-scientific notion of race and culture. More concrete still was the identification of those deemed responsible for the blood-poisoning. Often this alien element was identified as a parasite -- for reasons we shall shortly discover. Then the term Parasit was sometimes varied by its near synonym Schädlings, which had a general figurative meaning of subversive. In the final stages of the war, as the Wehrmacht began to suffer serious desertions, we find the apotheosis of the politics, medicine and warfare trio in an armband issued to security forces which read Volkschädlingsbekämpfer.29

The case of the term Parasit is even more interesting. As Alexander Bein has demonstrated, the word underwent a double transformation. Beginning with the sense of human 'hanger-on' in Greek comedy and early modern English drama, it was introduced to biology in the eighteenth century only to turn back to human referents in the nineteenth in metaphors.30 It was used thus by Proudhon in his claim that "le Juif est par temperament antiproducteur . . . toujours frauduleux et parasite."31 More ominously still, Paul de Lagarde exploited the biological connections of the term in
a series of medical metaphors in which the Jews, as bearers of "modernity", are likened to a disease invading a healthy body. In this guise, der judische Parasit became a centrepiece of Nazi social pathology, integrating the biological theories of race absent in the work of Proudhon or Lagarde with the much older popular stereotype of the 'Wandering Jew'. Because the Jew has no home of his own, the account ran, he is a unique phenomenon, a human being without an organic relation to nature. Instead, he is condemned to wander the earth, living in the body of healthy people. These he will inevitably debilitate because he is the carrier of all the unnatural relations of modern capitalism, paradoxically expressed in such 'typically' Jewish doctrines as pacifism and Bolshevism. The ensuing weakness of the host Volkskörper -- hastened by injudicious blood-mixing -- secures the parasite's position, for his unfortunate host will increasingly lack the will to expel him. If this extensive myth lacked logical consistency, it more than made up for it in identifying the agents responsible for the decomposition of the modern world, agents which, however terrible, could nonetheless be fought.

'Decomposition' itself was part of this biological conception of human relations, as Renate Schafer as shown in her study of the word zersetzen. Beginning this time with an exclusively scientific sense, the decomposition of a
chemical substance into elementary properties, it was introduced into aesthetics as a term for destructive and negative criticism of an aesthetic 'whole'. By the middle of the nineteenth century it was commonly used to denote the breakdown of 'organic' social relations, returning to science by means of analogy, but this time to biology rather than chemistry. In this sense, it appears in Mommsen's notorious claim that the Jews are the "ferment of decomposition".34

Once part of Nazi discourse, the term was, of course, pressed to the very limits of contrivance and imagination. Delicate sensibilities were not spared in the effort to portray the Jews as agents of decomposition, undermining German society: rottenness, putrefaction, decomposing matter, and fungus were all epithets applied at one time or another under the influence of this conception. A particularly unpleasant example, cited at the Nuremberg Trials, appears in one of the children's storybooks produced by Julius Streicher's Stürmerverlag. In a transparent allegory, a mother teaches her child to distinguish edible from poisonous muchrooms on the same principle that is later used to distinguish Jews from Aryans.

The cumulative effect of these usages was to produce that "detailed medical history of the Volkskörper",35 the medical history which received its mature expression in Mein
Kampf. The diagnosis made, the physician's duty is clear; to save the health of the patient by eradicating the disease-bearing organisms with all the means at his disposal. In another blurring of literal and metaphorical boundaries, a National Socialist physician, Professor Hans Reiter, remarked that "the doctor fights like a biological soldier for the health of the people."

Conceptual boundaries had shifted: war is medicine and medicine is war.

In the end, of course, the treatment was quite literally a military one. Warfare, as Hitler remarked, is only the natural reaction of a healthy body defending itself against invading organisms, the sign that the immune system is working at last. Even the war itself was blamed on the Jews, made necessary by their last-ditch efforts to prevent the return to health of the German Volkskörper, its bringing together of German Blut und Boden wherever they may be found. Nor was Hitler prepared to repeat the mistake of the First War once hostilities were under way.

When the best were dying at the front, one could at least have destroyed the vermin at home. One should have applied ruthlessly all military means of power in order to root out this pestilence.

Here is the literal Kampf ums Dasein. If this war should be lost, Hitler went on, humanity is doomed. The planet will

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travel silently through space, devoid of life, or, in another, more revealing version, populated only by microbes.\textsuperscript{39} Warfare is nature's own version of trial by combat between the healthy races and those enfeebled by the Jewish parasites. With the Russians poised to take Berlin, Goebbels reminded the unfortunate citizens that their captors would be "mercenaries of a parasitical race's world conspiracy".\textsuperscript{40}

From first to last these metaphors are plausible expression of a doctrine whose unifying tendency is a reduction of social life to a set of biological relations. The picture supports these metaphorical attributions to the extent that contemporary audiences had difficulty distinguishing what was literal from what was metaphorical. The deeply conventional nature of the attributions cut down on unwanted associations and focussed on their targets with remorseless intensity. Together they played a crucial part in establishing that new style of political activity which promised to release the patient from the sanatorium in which the modern world and its agents, liberalism and Judaism, had confined him.

V. Criticisms of political metaphors are blunted when conceptual change is left out of account.

The notion that linguistic changes, by altering
conceptual boundaries, may alter what an audience perceives to be literal and metaphorical is an important one. We have used it to explain why Nazi metaphors, which may seem to us ugly and revolting, or merely forced and strained, were apparently acceptable to many of those to whom they were addressed. We have argued that they were protected from implausibility by the widespread acceptance of biological notions about social and political relations. The advance of this notion can be charted by changes of meaning in such key terms as 'decomposition' and 'parasite'. In the first case there is a genuine change of meaning in the sense of a change in the criteria for applying the term correctly. The claim that societies are subject to decomposition is motivated by a social theory which denies that there is any essential difference between natural processes and social practices. Of course, as Quentin Skinner has noted, change of meaning like this changes conceptual connections too, in this case stressing the link between anti-social activities and the concept of collective guilt, and severing the link with individual responsibility. With 'parasite', the advance of the biological conception of society was already so marked that only change of reference was involved. Indeed, the whole point of this move was to keep the conceptual connections constant, and to describe the Jews in just the same terms appropriate to the behaviour of
parasitic organisms. Social perceptions had changed to the point where this move was an acceptable one.

This close relation between language and political theory is obviously of the first importance for political metaphor, for it controls the relation between what will be perceived as literal and what as metaphorical uses of language. Thus the biological conceptions supported the extended and apparently daring medical metaphors of the Nazis in two ways. First there were many terms with medical and pathological connections in ordinary language -- like Parasit -- connections which could be further exploited in metaphors. Second, because the ruling biological conception involved an already familiar and extensive metaphorical field of politics-as-medicine, there was a solid base on which apparently bold and implausible metaphors could be constructed.

Hitler's dubious achievement was to draw from this biological conception of society a coherent notion of mass politics, a conception in which the individual was nothing except for his membership in the Volk, and the worth of a man depended on his race. Of course, this fully fledged notion of nationalism and mass politics required an even greater change in the meaning of moral terms, and, whatever may be said by apologists about Nazi-Deutsch or Lingua Tertii Imperii, it never completely overcame traditional
moral notions about individual responsibility. Late in the
war Himmler complained bitterly that people still refused to
recognize the properly scientific basis of the 'final
solution', and were continually pestering him to spare the
life of a 'good Jew' while continuing to endorse the general
plan of destruction. To actually carry out the murders
required that confused abnegation of responsibility for
conduct which Nazism attempted to encourage, and which is
exemplified in the testament of Rudolf Höss, commandant of
Auschwitz.42

The connection between language and political
doctrines, a connection which metaphors 'map' by marking the
bounds of the literal, explains the political failure of the
internal criticism of Nazi language. Gifted critics were not
lacking, but Thomas Mann's attack on Nazi politics as
medicine metaphors exemplifies the impotence of the literary
critic in politics. His claim was not that the metaphors
were 'only metaphors', but the sophisticated criticism that
they were the wrong metaphors, crude and simplistic.

The secret of life and death, of health and
sickness, means nothing to Nazis -- but for
philosophical criticism, once so flourishing in
Germany, it should have carried some significance.
The concept of humanity is not exhausted by the
biological side of life; the spiritual element is
part of its bios also, and the ideas of 'health'
and 'sickness' are to be handled with the greatest
cautions in such a connection. A higher and indeed
the highest life may come from sickness and death may lurk in apparently blooming health.

Here, Mann is offering a different conception of humanity, one which is not "exhausted by the biological side of life". Unfortunately he was too late, for the time when this extended and abstract concept of health and sickness flourished was long past when he wrote, part of the romantic and 'idealist' heritage of German conservatism. The biological emphasis, which Mann genteelly deplored, had co-opted this abstraction, made it concrete, and thereby destroyed it. The "higher life" of sickness which Mann explored in his novels had been rendered irrelevant to political life by the urgent metaphors of incurable disease, syphilis and tuberculosis, the unseen enemies of the Volk.

Mann's objection, in fact, was to the whole style of the 'new politics'. It was an objection so deeply rooted that he was even moved to defend the Weimar Republic against Nazism. But his defence was ultimately an over-intellectualized one, ignoring the fact that sickness and death had already become potent political symbols deployed in powerful political metaphors. The time for criticism of language was past; it was time to confront an ideology which was finding its expression in action as well as in doctrine. As Goebbels confided to his diary after
In stigmatizing the Nazi metaphors as crude, Mann fell foul of this prescient warning. The time for political aesthetics was past because political biology had arrived. A blunt and persuasive conception of political life was being urged which capitalized on the nameless dread of incurable diseases. Its associated metaphors even pervade modern accounts of Nazism. As Mann found out, a significant proportion of his audience "didn't want to know about" his ideas of humanity.

In this sense, the contrast between the sixteenth-century and the twentieth-century metaphors throws into sharp relief the contrasting political discourse in which they have their home. This contrast is sometimes made by suggesting that sixteenth-century political thought was dominated by analogies and correspondences. So it was, but at the heart of national socialist thought we have also discovered a set of analogies. The difference, then, is not that sixteenth-century thought was dominated by an archetype or picture -- the body politic -- and that this modern
ideology was not, but it is to be found in the different archetypes that dominate both. If anything can be said to control the meanings of the metaphors, it is these background conceptions and their influence on the metaphorical field.

Within a given discourse, politics as medicine metaphors can be seen performing at least four distinct roles. Most obviously, they can be used to drive home the ruling doctrine by repeating the metaphor-theme which dominates that discourse. Early Tudor metaphors stressing order in the healthy, well-proportioned body are of this kind, as are all the Nazi metaphors we have just examined. These metaphors come closest to the paradigm of certain exponents of discourse analysis in which 'language' is said to speak rather than an author. The aesthetic and epistemological coherence already exists between a metaphor-theme and a doctrine when they are combined in a metaphorical field. Specific metaphorical utterances have only to focus upon relevant subjects; Jews, foreigners, rebellious peasants, Catholics, and others.

Second, a metaphor may attempt to exploit an unused part of the field, in order to overcome structural constraints in the discourse. This is particularly clear in the relation of writer as physician metaphors to the politics-as-medicine metaphorical field in the Tudor period.
Where the humble counsellor could not presume, the dedicated physician to the body politic fearlessly exposed. We may expect such metaphors to exploit to the full the *personae* legitimized by the background conception; friend, trustee, healer or expert.

Third, this strategy of exploiting parts of the ruling metaphorical field which have hitherto remained in the distant background may proceed so far as to threaten its coherence. In the case of Ponet's metaphor of the ungodly tyrant as a physician subject to the authority of the community, we find a metaphorical utterance turned against the prevailing interpretation of the whole body politic picture. Such tenuous success as it did enjoy must be attributed to the existence of an alternative, Marsilian interpretation of the body politic, and to the local popularity of the doctrine it expressed. In the case of Thomas Mann's frontal assault on the Nazi metaphors in the name of an older and more extensive conception of the *bios* as an analogue for political life, its failure was complete.

Finally, the appearance of a new metaphorical field, involving a new background conception of political association and such attendant symbol transformations as those analysed in connection with the birth and decay of conventional metaphors, may result in wholesale changes in the coherence of metaphorical utterances with political
doctrines. We have seen something of this in the appearance of novel physician metaphors and the rise of the statesman and the 'politique man' in later-Elizabethan politics. Many of the Nazi metaphors are themselves unthinkable without that background of popular evolutionary thought which transformed marginal social figures into symbols of national degeneration. It is, therefore, as equally misguided to argue that certain metaphors are always conservative in character as it is to argue that others are necessarily radical. Political metaphors are only conservative or radical in relation to the discourse from which they are drawn, and the political projects which they serve.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Fields, Instruments and Maps:
Metaphors for Political Metaphors.

Two fundamental analogies have guided this work. In one, we have appealed to a familiar spatial theme and spoken of metaphorical fields. In the other, we have attributed some of the characteristics of tools and instruments to political metaphors. Sometimes these attributions have been explicit, but more often they have shown up in scattered phrases and expressions -- in fact, they have appeared in the same form as many of the political metaphors we have been studying, as "the tip of a submerged model". Let us conclude by turning our analysis back on itself, and draw together our arguments by revealing what has hitherto been submerged.

Spatial metaphors about language are most commonly associated with varieties of structuralism, where they are almost inevitable. The very idea that we may speak of the structure of an abstraction, 'language', offers many powerful and suggestive analogies which have been profitably extended into other areas of inquiry. ¹ The reader familiar
with structuralist theories of language, however, will be
aware that very little use has been made of them in the
present work, despite our referring to metaphorical
'fields'. In particular, Roman Jakobson's famous distinction
between metaphor and metonymy in terms of the Saussurean
dichotomy between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes
of language has been passed over entirely, in favour of
older classifications derived from the traditional
rhetorical handbooks. In one way, however, our use of the
spatial metaphor of a 'field' has been consonant with the
structuralist project, for we have used it to draw attention
to the network of conventional relations that underly the
production and comprehension of even the most novel
metaphor. This has been tempered by a continuous emphasis on
the use of metaphors in political life -- hence the
instrumental analogies -- which has reminded us of the
intentions and projects of those who have formulated and
responded to political metaphors. To render a political
metaphor intelligible, we have located it in a rather wider
context than the original 'field' analogy might have
suggested, but it is worth pursuing the implications of the
'field' a little further before turning to 'instruments'.

The notion of a metaphorical field was deliberately
introduced to clarify the relation between political
metaphors, considered as utterances, and archetypes or
metaphor-themes. Our insistence that such archetypes had no real existence other than their expression in particular metaphorical utterances made it difficult to analyse these archetypes without appearing to reify an abstraction. This difficulty was overcome in part by referring to the shared themes of groups of metaphorical utterances -- natural disasters, medicine, organisms and others. However, when we came to analyse political metaphors more closely -- notably those involving the medicine and natural disaster themes -- we found that we could be more specific about the meaning that such themes acquired by virtue of their participation in political argument. In contrast to those very general archetypes familiar to the student of psychology, which find expression in symbol classifications as potential bearers of meaning, many of the metaphor-themes we found in political metaphors already had a meaning assigned to them because of their close connection with specific political doctrines. Thus, unlike the more general archetypes of human experience, these metaphor-themes are already invested with political significance, and this fact required explanation, and a terminology that could express the relevant distinctions.

Here Harald Weinrich's notion of the metaphorical field (Bildfeld) was brought in to accentuate the connection between the 'themes' of political metaphors -- theatre,
medicine, family -- and the doctrines which were associated with them and invested them with political significance. Weinrich's account of the metaphorical field, made up of an image-supplying field and an image-receiving field in combination, helps us discuss political metaphors as already belonging to those 'languages' or 'ideologies' in politics discussed by historians of political thought. With its aid, we are able to locate political metaphors within political discourse. The spatial metaphor, imposing itself over a possible visual metaphor, reminds us that the field is made up of 'elements' whose 'value' is determined by their position in the field as a whole. Thus a particular conception of politics elaborated in a political doctrine will impose an order on conceptions of, say, the theatre, as much as theatrical attributions will organise a conception of political life when the two are combined in a metaphorical field. John of Salisbury's theatrical metaphors are organised by a field which combines his distinctive political doctrines with a theatrum mundi conception of theatre. The result is very different from the associations brought to politics by the distinctive combination of Rousseau's political doctrines with his conception of the artificiality of theatre. This central insight of 'interaction' must be retained and developed if we are to avoid the mistaken view that primary 'political experience'
is organised and 'given meaning' by 'images' imported from better understood human activities. Political activity is already an exhibition of self-understanding on the part of political agents, and this understanding itself contributes to the intelligibility of political metaphors.

Once this had been established, the genuine connection between political metaphors and conceptual change becomes evident. A metaphorical field in a political 'language' and the conventional metaphors associated with it are evidence for changes in political concepts, changes which can be reconstructed by recovering the original metaphorical utterances which established the field. The appearance of ruler as physician metaphors stressing the element of trust in the relation between physician and patient provided us with an example of such a change. Certainly, metaphors of the delinquent physician were partly motivated by the familiarity of the intended audience with such men, but the metaphor was introduced into a dispute which was already of considerable conceptual complexity. The successful introduction of 'trust' as an appraising term in political discourse marked the appearance of a new 'language' of politics, one partly made up of the metaphorical field of the ruler-as-professional physician, and hence it marked the emergence of a new concept of rulership.

Quentin Skinner has referred to the "almost
paralyzingly radical" character of disputes over concepts. The change in the meaning of 'ruler' which is entailed by the introduction of 'trust' as an accepted form of appraisal has ramifications through an entire conceptual scheme. The argument that kings and princes were put in trust by their subjects and accountable to them for their trusteeship is quite incommensurable with even the related view that they hold their trusteeship of God. As Skinner puts it;

what this tells us about such changes is that we must be prepared to focus not on the 'internal structure' of particular words, but rather on their role in upholding complete social philosophies.

The special significance of political metaphors here is to alert us to the contest that is being fought over such concepts. As we have argued, one very interesting effect of a political metaphor is the possibility of making an audience notice something that they had previously overlooked. This can also be done by literal prose, of course, -- otherwise 'metaphoring' would be a discrete speech act -- but the adoption of a metaphorical strategy on the part of an author is an indication that literal prose is simply not strong or effective enough for his purposes. He is asking us to see that politics is not just like medicine, but can actually be identified with it in certain respects.
This in turn suggests that the author expects opposition to the doctrines that turn upon this metaphorical identification, and we are alerted to the clash of social philosophies ('languages' or 'ideologies') that such resistance entails. In other words, once we accept the partially constitutive role of concepts in political life, the radical nature of disagreements over conceptual boundaries becomes clear.

However, we should recall that another line of argument developed during our analysis of politics as medicine metaphors showed that political metaphors may be equally at home sustaining conceptual boundaries as assailing them. This is because metaphorical fields become established parts of political ideologies in the form of sets of metaphorical utterances sharing the same theme and having conventional uses in argument. Metaphors on the theme of the disproportionate body and its unnatural character being used to criticize rebellion in Tudor England furnished us with one set of examples. Metaphors on the theme of the triumph of medical science over infectious diseases used to justify Nazi racial policy provided another. At issue here is the historical stability of such fields and the radical consequences of their being overturned.

Finally, the explicit links between metaphorical fields and ideologies draw our attention once again to the
political implications of those analyses of political metaphors which seek to unmask or 'deconstruct' them. Here, too, is one of the limits of the 'field' analogy as we are using it, because the link with ideologies reminds us that disputes over the significance of political metaphors are disputes about politics and not 'merely' about language. Indeed, the whole drift of our arguments about the partially constitutive character of political language and about the political meaning of political metaphors has been to deny that there could be any such dispute over political language which is not of political significance. One visual and spatial metaphor for language which we must entirely reject is the notion that language is a mirror of reality.

Erich Heller quotes a story about Confucius which perfectly illustrates this point. Confucius was once asked what he would do first if it were left to him to administer a country. The master said: "it would certainly be to correct the language." "Surely," they said, "this has nothing to do with the matter. Why should language be corrected?" The master's answer was: "if language is not correct then what is said is not what is meant. If what is said is not what is meant, then what ought to be done remains undone; if this remains undone, morals and art will deteriorate; if morals and art deteriorate, justice will go astray; if justice goes astray, the people will stand about in helpless confusion. Hence there must be no arbitrariness in what is said. This matters above everything."
In fact, Confucius's demand amounts to nothing less than the abolition of politics. 'What ought to be done' is a matter of genuine dispute, not a question capable of being determined once and for all if only words were used correctly and not 'arbitrarily'. Of course, the historian of political thought is perfectly familiar with proposals to abolish politics and to usher in the reign of 'peace' or 'justice', but he may now be able to recognize this same design behind the claim that political metaphors need to be unmasked. The temptation itself can be greatly reduced if we locate political metaphors not in abstract 'languages', but in real political activity.

Of course, political metaphors are as open to abuse as any other type of utterance. As Elie Kedourie has aptly remarked, constantly talking about politics in terms more appropriate to logic or to love may lead us to a "dangerous confusion" of public and private. We may come to forget the essential element of power in political relations in our eagerness to recognize 'contradictions' or to embrace our fellow citizens in mystical communion. Thus confused, we become easy prey for the tough-minded, and public life is corrupted by the widening gulf between what is said and what is done. Perhaps, charitably interpreted, this is part of what Confucius meant, for, whatever we may choose to believe about the character of political association and
authoritative relations, rulership involves coercive jurisdiction over men. We do ourselves a disservice, or so it is argued, if we are beguiled by tempting metaphors into forgetting this fact.

This is a useful reminder, a reminder that political metaphors remain metaphors, and that, at some point at least, politics is different from medicine, theatre or travel. However, it has been an important part of our argument that the link between what is said and what is done in political life is a closer one than either Confucius or Kedourie seem willing to allow. If politics is anything more than power plus ideology, it is so because men act on their beliefs. The element of belief is just as important as the element of coercion, for it is only to the extent that men entertain beliefs about authority and legitimacy that political life can be said to exist at all. An important step in our argument was to show how substantive differences in beliefs about the legitimate exercise of political power can often be traced to distinctive metaphors: in the active interpretation of these metaphors by the adherents of different ideological traditions, we have seen how political metaphors may be creative. By offering different models for political relations, basic dispositional differences can be expressed in terms which sustain rather than threaten the identity of political life. As Richard Sennett has remarked,
"the fear of imagination in politics comes from the fear of illusion: it is like refusing to use a tool at all because it can be misused." It is one of the most interesting features of a practice like politics that reality and illusion are, at least in part, a consequence of what men themselves can be brought to believe.

Sennett's reference to the use of tools brings us conveniently to the second of the underlying analogies in our account of political metaphor. Weinrich's concept of the metaphorical field cannot entirely escape from its origins in linguistics. He invoked it to explain why metaphors can be found grouped around familiar themes in literature. Arguing that an historical account of usage (a 'diachronic' account as he calls it) is a mere redescription of what is to be explained, he urges the necessity of a synchronic account of the structural supports that a metaphor draws upon for its intelligibility. Inevitably, this perspective focusses our attention on the structure of the field itself, at the expense of the use of particular metaphorical utterances. This the analogy with tools and instruments is designed to remedy.

Speaking of metaphors as instruments at once restores human agency -- instruments have to be used by someone for particular tasks. It is especially important to stress this in the case of political metaphors because, as we have seen,
the connection between metaphorical utterances and the doctrines that they express are not logical ones. They are connections which have to be established according to the competence and interests of authors and audiences. Of course, repeated uses of a conventional metaphor in the same way will help establish such a connection even as it destroys the 'power to enlighten and inform' which we think of as characteristic of novel metaphors. It may very well be that "familiarity breeds abbreviated access,"\textsuperscript{10} but here familiarity is with a use in argument, a recognizable place in political discourse.

It has been objected that an instrument is a misleading analogy for any aspect of political language, because the relations of an instrument to the material on which it works and the task it performs are external ones. Michael Shapiro, for example, cautions that we should think of language "as a bearer of political content rather than as just a tool to speak about extradiscursive political phenomena."\textsuperscript{11} This is a useful reminder, but it is a point which we have made ourselves in denying that political metaphors are imposed upon 'political experience' from without, and it is presupposed in all our talk about metaphorical fields. The instrumental analogy has been introduced as a means to balance this account of language as a 'structure' with an account of language-use.
Most important here, unless we locate language and metaphor in a real context of language-use, we are prone to forget that language points outside itself, to activities and practice in the social world. Should this fact be overlooked, it is but a short step to the conclusion that language-use is merely a matter of endlessly 'affirming' the structures of language itself, and that metaphors tell us more about this internal structure than about the projects and aspirations of those who use them. It has been a continuous theme of the present work that a study of political metaphors is a suitable topic for the political philosopher or the historian of political thought, precisely because of this link with political activity. As the work of John Pocock has shown, it is doubtless true that, once uttered, utterances pass beyond the control of their authors. This is, perhaps, even more true of a metaphorical utterance, over whose meaning an author has only the most tenuous control in the first instance. Furthermore, it is extremely plausible to consider the conventional restrictions on what an author might mean by his metaphorical utterance, and what an audience -- not necessarily the original audience he was addressing -- might be able to take him to mean. All of these soften the 'extrinsic' relation of language to the world which the instrumental analogy seems to imply.
In fact, we have taken great pains to exclude the possibility of an 'extrinsic' relation between political language and political activity. After all, one of our major arguments has been to establish a link between the analysis of political 'languages' (as Pocock uses that term) or 'ideologies' (as we have used it, partly following Skinner) and the interpretation of political metaphors. We have shown how more than one such ideology is usually available at any one time, giving rise to characteristic alternative and competing meanings for what might otherwise appear to be the same metaphor. It is important, then, to be reminded that a reader never comes to a text innocently, but reads according to the conventions and presuppositions of the ideologies with which he is familiar and at home. But neither language nor metaphor 'says' anything; people say things, and they do so in utterances which we may distinguish according to an influential dichotomy as metaphorical or literal. In this study, we have attempted to bring out some of the instrumental implications of men speaking metaphorically.

The instrumental perspective, then, allows us to raise the question of why anyone should seek to write or speak metaphorically, and why someone else might attempt to comprehend an utterance as a metaphor. In fact, as we have argued, there is no very general answer to these questions,
but our analysis of political metaphors has suggested some of the more pressing reasons. As we have already noted, one such reason arises from the clash of political ideologies, which is the very stuff of politics. Here an author seeks to harness the creative powers of a metaphor to realign familiar conceptual categories, to suggest new perspectives and to bring an audience to notice something which he finds unusually significant. In chapter four in particular, we attempted to strip away some of the mystery surrounding the way that metaphors accomplish these ends, and to show how metaphors could be used to express doctrines in argument. The notion that a metaphor could be coherent with a doctrine was suggested, and epistemological coherence distinguished from aesthetic coherence. Again, there is no doubt that the charm of a creative metaphor is sometimes deliberately allowed to substitute for coherence, but this is not necessary illicit. The experience of noticing an aspect may be accompanied by many kinds of emotion, and the test must be whether the emotion is appropriate to the occasion.

The claim that men have reasons for employing certain metaphors in argument and for creating metaphorical fields once more points beyond discourse. Balancing the fact that conventional metaphors impose themselves because they are conventional, is the corollary that they have become conventional because particular men found them useful or
illuminating. We saw in the case of late-Tudor medical metaphors, that their use was closely connected with the investigative spirit in medicine and politics, the perception that the 'cunning' of the Hippocratic physician was a quality appropriate to a courtier, and the closely related belief that the knowledge of the physician was a source of his power over men. All of these remind us in the strongest possible terms of the real human activities that politics as medicine metaphors drew upon and were intended to serve.

However, once established, particularly in the form of a metaphorical field embedded in a political 'language' -- as the 'body politic' was embedded in sixteenth century languages of order -- metaphors offer men other advantages which furnish reasons for their use. As Foucault has remarked, the power of discourse resides not so much in its ability to mask existing relations of domination and subordination, but in its ability to produce and legitimate new relations. Political metaphors which are broad and illuminating enough to function, in Black's terms, as the tip of a submerged model have a central role to play here. They bring to political life structures and hierarchies which have already been established in other practices -- or discursive domains, as Foucault might insist. in the ensuing process of interaction, on which we have already remarked,
the establishment of a metaphorical field with an aspect of politics in the image-receiving role will quickly politicize the image-supplying domain.

At its most innocent, this use of metaphor gives rise to the rhetorical persona -- the kindly physician from whom it is impossible to conceal one's ills, or the drama critic commenting in a constructive way on the performance, and educating performers and audience alike. These are roles which are easily perceived, and as easily discarded. Rather more insidious are the personae enjoined by a discourse dominated by a suggestive model, for here discourse will be pervaded both by live metaphors and by literal expressions of metaphorically organised concepts which may not be so easy to recognize. Kenneth Minogue, for example, has drawn attention to the extent to which Machiavelli's political scepticism derived from a politics as theatre metaphor of very general scope indeed. This has implications not only for understanding such a crucial Machiavellian term as fantasia, but for understanding Machiavelli's whole conceptual universe. By rendering this metaphor explicit, perhaps more explicit than Machiavelli himself might have intended it to be, we may often gain insights into his thought which would be denied to a less inventive interpretation. Minogue's contention that Machiavelli understood political elites as actors, whose successful
entertainment of the mob prevented dissension and violence from breaking out in the audience is a case in point. Nowhere does Machiavelli say as much, but, as Minogue points out, it is certainly plausible to see this as an "underlying image". We have attempted to cash out the spatial metaphor here, and to explain how an underlying image comes to be expressed in political doctrines, and how to reconstruct such 'images' from their appearance in explicit metaphorical utterances.

It might be objected that this conclusion jettisons the instrumentalist perspective entirely, in favour of a more 'structural' orientation again. If, to pursue our example, Machiavelli is actually using a special theory of political imagination, the demonstration that his usages hide an implicit politics as theatre metaphor neatly excises the historical Machiavelli in favour of his 'discourse', which is metaphorical to us but not necessarily to him. Yet it is at this moment, when structure and instrument are in precarious balance, that political metaphors take on life and significance. To express their significance we must have recourse to a third model whose presence has occasionally been felt in the preceding pages -- metaphors as maps. Maps must be constructed, and they are constructed for particular purposes according to well established conventions of representation. The same stretch of countryside will look
quite different on a road map, a geological map, and a map showing land-use, although all three will obviously be related to each other and to the geographical features that they represent. In an analogous way, the metaphorical fields available to men of similar historical and political backgrounds will represent their shared experience in different but related ways.

However, unlike the relation of a map to a landscape, the relation of political metaphors to politics, as we have recently observed, is not a purely extrinsic one. The appearance of a new political metaphor may indicate dissatisfaction with the alternatives, but it is much more like the revision of an existing map than the surveying of an entirely new one. This is what we mean by asserting that political metaphors are rendered intelligible within ideological traditions. The conventions governing the possible relation of political metaphors to politics -- how to read the map -- are built up by generations of authoritative pronouncements by acknowledged ideological masters. The points that men have reached on their journeys of exploration -- expressed in the doctrines peculiar to specific ideologies -- have been reached with the aid of such maps. The field of terms which makes up, say, the sixteenth century politics-as-medicine field is arranged in a way that is the outcome of the actual use of utterances
embodying that theme. The field was created by men making a connection between sin and disease, and in so doing they created a map of sixteenth-century political life which could be revised, but could not be ignored. To revise the map meant revising the conceptual connections which underpinned the 'ideology of order', and, if theorists are now inclined to play down what was once thought to be its monolithic character, we should not underestimate how radical were the revisions involved. If the materials were at hand in the form of alternative political ideologies, they had yet to be constructed into a map of English political life in which events and practices fell into place in a way that would be nearly as plausible as under the old scheme. Here, of course, the tumultuous events of the sixteenth century were crucial in creating a context in which a struggle over metaphorical fields made sense. A felt need to justify, to legitimate, or to oppose gives point to a demand for revision. But the partially constitutive character of language in politics meant that in revising, these men were not so much bringing their maps closer to 'reality' as altering the terms under which it could be seen. This is the intrinsic connection between a political metaphor and the 'reality' it describes.

Here, then, is the special place of historical exegesis in the study of political metaphor. We have stressed that
metaphors of any kind are only intelligible when a reader or hearer has at his disposal means to reconstruct a context in which the utterance has a 'point'. Otherwise, the ground of the metaphorical attribution must remain mysterious, and the utterance is open to confused interpretation or rejection. The difference between literary or explanatory contexts and political ones lies in the intrusion of political ideologies. With their aid, political metaphors can be more than merely descriptive or imaginative, they can be used to justify a political attitude by bringing the reader into the conceptual framework of the relevant ideology, inviting him to read politics with the aid of a particular map. He may resist the invitation by rejecting the metaphor, but the intelligibility of the metaphor remains tied to the ideologies that order and regulate the field from which it is drawn.

The metaphorical moment reveals itself most clearly when the field is being reordered under the pressing imperative of political change. Here fields are in flux and individual utterances urging new political doctrines are attempting to create new stability. But the balance of structure and use can also be found in the most mundane conventional metaphors, as we saw in the chapter four, and, properly analysed, the ideological impulse which sustains the field and prompts its use can eventually be discerned.
This is why the study of political metaphors must at least begin with a historical understanding of utterances in context, and why we have insisted all along that archetypes and even metaphorical fields are abstractions from the language-use of real historical actors. The claim to have understood a political metaphor as a contribution to politics involves, as a condition of the intelligibility of the metaphor, its location within an ideology, and, preferably, within a metaphorical field. The field may be hypothetical, but then the interpretation will be hypothetical too. As Pocock has argued in the case of the 'languages' he abstracts from political disputes, the demonstration that a particular author was aware of employing that 'language' is always an important part of demonstrating the plausibility of reading a text as a contribution to the development of the 'language' itself. We may, if we choose, seek to understand a metaphor according to the conventions and norms governing explanatory or imaginative contexts. We may look upon a political metaphor as part of a contribution to a theoretical understanding of politics, or as an exercise in the creative imagination, for both are venerable traditions of understanding which will impose quite different canons of interpretation upon the utterance. The historical explanation of the circumstances surrounding the utterance may indeed have its part to play
in both these understandings, but its contribution will be rather different to the central place it has in understanding the role of a political metaphor in political life.

In an historical explanation, the reconstructed metaphorical fields await the demonstration that they have been intentionally 'spoken' according to the standards laid down for such a demonstration in chapter five. Metaphorical fields are particularly slippery in this respect, for, as we have seen, what an author meant by a particular utterance, the use that he made of the field, is only a small part of what a given metaphorical utterance could mean. We can contemplate his metaphor and tease from it all kinds of implications and insights which may never have occurred to the author of the original utterance. There is nothing illegitimate in doing so, providing we do not then go on to use the language of intention and impute these meanings to him, or, worse still, imply that this is what he 'really' meant. Without the historical evidence that an author's metaphors, idioms and literal utterances were the conscious employment of a political ideology and its related metaphorical fields, the claim that he is using that field is an empty one.

Where does this leave the investigation? The metaphorical moment is an uneasy balance between 'field' and
'instrument', a balance which must be maintained at all costs if metaphors are to be understood as both meaning and event. Political metaphors have diverse uses. To explain the part that they play in expressing political doctrines, we have had recourse to an abstraction, the metaphorical field, and we have linked this abstraction to similar constructs designed to accommodate the existence of rules and conventions in political discourse -- 'languages' and ideologies. But, whatever explanatory uses we make of these abstractions, we must hold fast to Ben Jonson's insight. Even when 'language' is a grammatical subject, what it shows is a man and his manifold activities, not a reflection of itself. Hobbes, lucid as ever, was clear on this point. It is men who "stick their corrupt doctrines with the cloves of other men's wit." They find that 'wit', as they find the material for metaphorical fields, already in existence; but they put it to use. Thus, we locate the use of language and metaphor in the realm of individual responsibility, where it belongs.
NOTES

NOTES TO PAGES 1 to 3

Chapter One


5 Pocock and Skinner differ on important points, but for the purposes of this chapter we shall overlook their differences. For convenient summaries of their arguments and bibliographies, see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. ix-xv, and J. G. A. Pocock,


17 Rolf Bachem, Einfuhrung in die Analyse politischer Texte (Munchen; R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), pp. 50-54.

18 E.g. the analysis in Raimund Drommel and Gerhard Wolff, "Metaphern in der politische Rede," Der Deutschunterricht, 30 (1978), pp. 71-86, where it is assumed at the outset that political metaphors lose any 'pictorial character' that a metaphor might have in literature.

20 Harold Lasswell, *The Language of Politics* (Cambridge MA; M.I.T. Press, 1965), especially his work on key symbols and slogans.


23 Ibid, p. 181.

24 I owe these examples to a series of unpublished papers on politics as journey metaphors by George Feaver.

25 Ricoeur is very illuminating on the way in which "reading" replaces "dialogue" once "inscription" preserves discourse as "archive", resulting in an "asymmetrical relation of reader and text -- one of the parties stands for both." He is less convincing when he attempts to generalize this distinction by arguing that dialogue implies a real reference to the world, whereas (literary?) texts create their own quasi-world. Socratic questioning had little to do with pointing. See Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics*, pp. 147, 174.


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31 Melvin Lasky, Utopia and Revolution (Chicago; Chicago University Press, 1976), pp. 70ff.

Notes to Chapter Two


7 Stern, Meaning and Change of Meaning, p. 305.


9 This assertion, first made by Samuel Butler, is repeated approvingly by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Remarks on the Use and Abuse of Some Political Terms 1832, ed. Thomas Raleigh (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1898), p. 11.

10 These splendid examples of hubris may be found in Owen Thomas, Metaphor and Related Subjects (New York; Random House, 1969), p. 4.


12 There is a very clear discussion of this point in Samuel R. Levin, The Semantics of Metaphor (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 75-77.


18 This is lucidly discussed in Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 103-9, esp. pp. 104-5.


21 There is an interesting discussion of this point by Ina Loewenberg, who argues that metaphors are not recognized at the level of the sentence, but at the level of the utterance. This leads her to sketch a speech act theory of metaphor which has problems of its own. See Ina Loewenberg, "Identifying Metaphors," Foundations of Language, 12 (1975), pp. 315-38, esp. p. 331.

22 This difficulty has dogged the work of Monroe Beardsley, especially in his search for a "metaphorical warrant". For an unconvincing defence of the notion see his "Note," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 35 (1976), pp. 218-22; more generally, see Monroe Beardsley, "Metaphorical Senses," Nous, 12 (1978), pp. 3-5.


25 Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony, pp. 39-40; of course, the
editor was intentionally exploiting an ambiguity.


28 These categories are drawn from a review article by Philip Pettit, "Theories of Language and Meaning," *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 2nd April, 1980, p.13; I have renamed Pettit's 'emotivist' category, 'consequentialist'.


33 Black, "Metaphor," p. 46.


35 Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," p. 43.


39 J. J. A. Mooij's defence of the 'comparison' formula for interpreting metaphors seems to overlook this distinction. The many ingenious examples he gives of how metaphors may be interpreted by means of a comparison are less convincing as examples of computing the meaning of a sentence containing a metaphor. See J. J. A. Mooij, *A Study of Metaphor* (Amsterdam; North Holland Publishing, 1976).
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41 The same conclusion is arrived at in Merrie Bergman, "Metaphorical Assertions," Philosophical Review, XLI (1982).
42 David Novitz, Pictures and Their Use in Communication (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), p. 89.

Notes to Chapter Three

7 David Takao Yamada, Metaphors in Political Thought; An Essay in Comparison, Diss. University of California at Santa Barbara, 1975, p. 9.
8 ibid, p. 9.
NOTES TO PAGES 84 to 103


12 ibid, p. 71

13 ibid, p. 62


15 ibid, p. 213, note 30.


17 This I take to be Michael Bentley's point about "liberal doctrine". Regardless of motivation, once a doctrine has been formulated it sets limits to what can plausibly be claimed as activity in conformity with it. See Michael Bentley, *The Liberal Mind* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 4, 179.


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26 Cited in Osborn, "Archetypal Metaphors," p. 120.


28 For a version of this argument, and some pointed criticism, see Brenda Beck, "The Metaphor as Mediator Between Semantic and Analogic Modes of Thought," Current Anthropology, 19 (1978), esp. the remarks of Sapir and Crocker, p. 94.

29 For a careful study of left-right symbolism in politics which suggests a general explanation for valencies, see Jean A. Laponce, Left and Right: the Topography of Political Perceptions (Toronto; Toronto University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 10-11.

30 A convenient English introduction to Weinrich's earlier writings on metaphor is to be found in Winfried Schleiner, The Imagery of John Donne's Sermons (Providence RI; Brown University Press, 1970), pp. 63-8.

31 Harald Weinrich, "Allgemeine Semantik der Metapher," in his Sprache in Texten (Stuttgart; Klett Verlag, 1976), pp. 326-7. In the present work metaphorical fields will always be distinguished by the form 'politics-as-theatre'.


Notes to Chapter Four

1 I. A. Richards has drawn attention to the fatal
ambiguity in the notion of 'imagery'. On the one hand, the meaning of a particular metaphor, and on the other what he calls the 'vehicle' of a metaphor abstracted from any context in which it could serve as a vehicle.


4 Plato, Republic, 368d-369.


6 Plato, Republic, 576c-d.

7 ibid, 372e, cf. 556e.

8 Plato, Laws, 628b-d.

9 Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, chapter 5.


14 Struve, organologische Staatsauffassung, p. 57.


22 Stripped of its hostility to 'linguistic idealism', Eco's theory of metaphorical comprehension through chains of 'subjacent metonyms in the language code' may help to explain how this strategy works. The alimentary and pathological meanings of consumption have certainly been 'codified', but what makes us notice that they are, in Eco's own metaphor, 'subjacent'? See Umberto Eco, "The Semantics of Metaphor," in his The Role of the Reader, p. 73. For a less dogmatic account of the 'isomorphisms' in a language and their exploitation in a metaphor, see F. M. Engel, "Isomorphism and Linguistic Waste," Mind, LXXIV 1965, pp. 28-45.


26 Convenient not only for the purposes of illustration, but because its rhetorical structure has been closely analysed in John X. Evans, "Imagery as Argument in Milton's Areopagitica," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 8 (1966-67), pp. 189-205.


35 Turbayne, Myth of Metaphor, p. 21.


37 Certayne Sermons or Homilies (London, 1587), sig. Ni.

38 Gordon Schochet, Partiarchalism (Oxford; Basil
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Blackwell, 1975), p. 87; this example draws heavily on Schochet's work, but attempts to distinguish more clearly when 'patriarchalism' is a theory and when it is a metaphor.


40 Interestingly, another 'interaction' seems to have taken place, with some Puritan writers using covenant metaphors to question the 'natural' character of family relations, see Walzer, Revolution of the Saints, pp. 193-6.


42 Cf. the essays in J. David Sapir and J. Christopher Crocker, ed., The Social Uses of Metaphor (Pittsburgh; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974).

Notes to Chapter Five


6 For a discussion of Austin's theory to which these remarks are greatly indebted, see Roy Harris, The Language Makers (London; Duckworth, 1980), pp. 88-92.


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A7x.


13 Marx's references to ideology, as his followers remind us, are scattered and fragmentary, but the account of it as a distorted reflection of reality may be found in K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology (London; Lawrence and Wishart, 1965); for Mannheim, see his Ideology and Utopia (New York; Harvest Books, 1936).


16 Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (London; Williams and Norgate, n.d.), p. 244.


20 This is stressed in James Tully, "The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner's approach to the Study of Political Theory," unpublished paper delivered to the C.P.S.A. annual meetings, Ottawa, 1982.

21 This point was suggested to me by Dr. David Manning.


23 E.g. Sir Thomas Smith's remarks about the "vaine imaginations, Phantasmes of philosophers to occupie the time," De Republica Anglorum, ed. Alston, p. 118; and John Foxe's suggestion that those of his contemporaries whose "stoical stomachs and unsociable natures" rendered them unfit to live in a real commonwealth should be sent "ad rem publicam Platonis or Mr. More's Utopia." Foxe, "A Sermon of Christ Crucified," cited in William Haller, The Elect Nation (New York; Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 99-100.

24 Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, ed. F. W. Maitland (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1900), pp. 29-30.


27 Humboldt, Limits, p. 19.


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39 Bagehot, English Constitution, p. xxxiii.


42 V. I. Lenin, What is to be Done? (London; Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 43.


An interesting light on these fears of 'Caesarism' is shed by the following letter from General Wolsey to his wife, written in 1880, where England's most popular officer looked forward to the day "(when) the licence of democracy and socialism will be conquered by the sword, and succeeded by cruel military despotism. Then it will be that the man of talk will give way to the man of action, and the Gladstones, Harcourts, Morleys and all that most contemptible of God's creatures will black the boots of some successful Cavalry Colonel. A new Cromwell will clear the country of these frothing talkers, and the soldiers will rule. Would that my lot could have been cast in such an era." Cited in Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society, 1815-1914 (London; Longmans, 1980), p. 227.

Notes to Chapter Six


4 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor (New York; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978), chapter nine; as one commentator has perceptively remarked, "far from debunking the social meaning of illness, Sontag strengthens our belief that an understanding of illness and an understanding of the understanding of illness are important features in an actual historical landscape," Virgil Nemoianu, "The Semantics of Bramble's Hypochondria," Clio, 9 (1979-80), p. 40.

5 Schlanger, Les métaphores, p. 185.

6 Livy, History, 30, 44, 8; cf. Tilman Struve, Die Entwicklung der organologische Staatsauffassung, p. 33.

7 Plato, Statesman, 293b; Laws, I 628d; Republic, I 332c.

8 Struve, organologische Staatsauffassung, p. 35.

10 This paragraph is based on Winfried Schleiner, *The Imagery of John Donne's Sermons* (Providence RI; Brown University Press, 1970), pp. 70-1.


14 Christine de Pisan, *The Book of the Body Politic*, III 3, ed. Diane Bornstein (Heidelberg; Carl Winter, 1977), pp. 168-9; Christine also uses the fable of the complaining feet, III 1, p. 166.


18 For these references I am indebted to George Rosen, "The Historical Significance of Some Medical References in the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius of Padua," *Sudhoff's Archiv*, 37 (1953), pp. 350-6.


21 Cf. Christopher Morris's remark that "in one sense", lacking a theory of the state, there was no such thing as Tudor political thought. Christopher Morris, Political Thought in England: Tyndale to Hooker (London; Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 1.


25 The 'ideal character' disclosed by the commonwealth notion is concisely sketched in J. W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London; Methuen Books, 1928), part II, chapter III.


27 This notion has been advanced in W. H. Greenleaf, Order, Empiricism and Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 44-54.


34 Gardiner, Discourse, p. 141.


36 "If the sickman complain to the physician and bring his friends with him to show him his grief, and to tell him also what will do him good, and give him money for his labour, and the physician will not put his hand to help him, is it any marvel though he fall into a frenzy. What other thing is sedition but civil frenzy. Who then I beseech you is the cause of this frenzy and sedition, either the sickman and they that labour for the sickman to the physician, or the physician himself?" The Defence of John Hales, in A Discourse of the Commonweal, ed. Elizabeth Lamond (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1929), p. lxvi.


38 John Ponet, A Short Treatise of Politic Power (Strasbourg?; 1556), sig. K2v.


40 Smith, Discourse, p. 95.

41 Thomas Starkey, A Dialogue Between Cardinal Pole and Thomas Lupset, ed. J. M. Cowper (London; Early English Text Society, 1878).

42 Starkey, Dialogue, pp. 57-8; the argument here is not entirely clear -- although Starkey declares that monarchy is the best kind of 'state', and goes on to identify it with the sanguine temperament -- conventionally thought to be the most desirable -- no other identifications are offered. Although tyranny is mentioned, all four temperaments or complexions are judged to be "perfect", which is, after all, the basis of the analogy with the
three types of state that support a "commonwealth". Perhaps this passage would have been revised if the manuscript had ever reached the press.


44 Stephen Gardiner also used dropsy to characterize a state of affairs in which some members of the body politic were swelled up with riches while others wasted away for want of nourishment, *Discourse*, p. 131; for the association of dropsy with avarice or covetousness, see Bloomfield, *Seven Deadly Sins*, pp. 176-7, 195-7.


46 *ibid*, p. 143.


52 *ibid*, pp. 222-3.


55 Robert Crowley, "The Voice of the Last Trumpet," in
his Select Works, ed. Cowper, pp. 79-82.

56 John Aylmer, An Har borowe for Faithful and Trew Subjects, sig. A2; Matthew Parker expressed identical sentiments by borrowing from the homily on obedience when writing to Sir Nicholas Bacon on the subject of the resistance theories. "If such principles be spread into men's heads, as now they be framed and referred to the judgement of the subject, of the tenant and of the servant, to discuss what is tyranny, and to discern whether his prince, his landlord, his master is a tyrant by his own fancy and collection supposed, what lord of the council shall ride quietly minded in the streets among desperate beasts? What master shall be sure in his bedchamber?"


60 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. Dewar, p. 4.


65 William Clowes, A Brief and Necessay Treatise
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66 Many more examples might be cited, see the useful discussion in Kocher, *Science and Religion*, p. 271.

Notes to Chapter Seven


2 Michael Biddiss has remarked on the representative character of these two novels in *The Ages of the Masses* (Hassocks; Harvester Press, 1977), pp. 311-2; a contemporary economist was moved to note, "that the times are strangely and desperately perturbed even congenital optimists now know. All the economists have taken to writing of contemporary civilization as if they were specialists in psychiatry and psychopathology. The social system is admitted to be in the last stages of a wasting disease. The atmosphere of modern life smells like a sick-room." Cited in Alexander Bein, "'Der judische Parasit,' Bermerkungen zur Semantik der Judenfrage," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 13 (1965), p. 133.


6 I am indebted for this reference to Maurice J. Quinlan, "Swift's Use of Literalization as a Rhetorical Device," *PMLA*, 82 (1967), p. 519. The full passage will be found in chapter four of the *Voyage to Laputa*.


Cited in Viktor Reimann, The Man Who Created Hitler, trans. Stephen Wendt (London; William Kimber, 1977), p. 102; Goebbels taste for these metaphors may be gathered from his early novel Michael, where he wrote that "to be bourgeois is nothing more than a zoological condition," cited in Helmut Herber, Goebbels (New York; Hawthorn Press, 1972), p. 34.


E.g. Joachim Fest, who notes in passing Hitler's compulsive washing, and his conviction that he could actually feel "microbes rushing at me" when people were smoking in the same room -- but these elements of his own personality cannot explain the appeal of the metaphors; see Joachim Fest, Hitler, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York; Vintage Books, 1975), p. 101.


Schorske, Vienna, pp. 119-20.

Judith Schlanger, Les métaphores de l'organisme, above, chapter six, note 5.

E.g., the following, from a French text published in 1792; "Who, then, should denounce tyrants if not the doctors, who make men their sole study, and who each day, in the homes of poor and rich, among ordinary citizens and among the highest in the land, in cottage and in mansion, contemplate the human miseries that have no other origin than tyranny and slavery." Lanthenas, De l'influence de la liberté sur la santé, cited in Michel Foucault, The Birth of
the Clinic, trans, A. M. Sheldon Smith (New York; Vintage Books, 1975), p. 33. Herein, perhaps, lies a sketch for an answer to the question of the origins of modern disease and politics metaphors -- the sense in which some later eighteenth-century writers, under the influence of Rousseau's ideas, saw the modern era as characterized by 'unnatural' diseases which civilized man had brought upon himself by his way of life. For a good example, with explicit references to Rousseau, see J. P. Frank, A System of Complete Medical Police, trans. and ed. Erna Lesky (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

18 Cited in Erwin H. Ackerknecht, Rudolf Virchow (Madison WI; University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), pp. 121-7. The young Virchow, a liberal, showed a liking for military metaphors when describing the events of 1848; "eventually the days of March arrived. The great fight of criticism against authority, of natural science against dogma, of the citizens' rights against rules of human arbitrariness," ibid, p. 44.

19 E.g., on the collapse of France in 1871; "for a country to disintegrate like this, the disease must wreak its work from within: the wounds inflicted by the foreign assailant produce cuts, but never this purulent liquefaction of the marrow and the blood." Cited in Michael Biddiss, Father of Racist Ideology (London; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), p. 214.

20 Cited in Biddiss, Father of Racist Ideology, p. 266.

21 Cited Biddiss, p. 114, and note his comments on the "reification" of Gobineau's organic metaphors.


24 Hans Gunther Zmarzlick, "Der Sozialdarwinismus in Deutschland als geschichtliches Problem," Vierteljahrshefte


28 Victor Klemperer, "LTI": Die unbewältigte Sprache (München; Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969), p. 177


30 Alexander Bein, "'Der judische Parasit',' see above, note 1.

31 Proudhon, Césarisme et Christianisme, cited in Bein, p. 129.

32 Lagarde also referred to Jews as "trichinae and bacillae", not to be educated but to be exterminated; see Stern, Cultural Despair, p. 62.


34 Schafer, p. 64.

35 Behring, "Die Sprache," p. 107; only Goebbels, as Behring rightly observes, made any notable development of the vocabulary of Mein Kampf.

36 Cited in Yves Ternon and Socrates Helman, Les médecins allemands et le national-socialisme (Tournai; Casterman, 1973), p. 116, where the role of the German medical profession is examined.

37 "Ich habe wirklich die Absicht, germanisches Blut in
der ganzen Welt zu holen, zu rauben und zu stehlen, wo ich kann," cited in Ackermann, *Himmler als Ideologe*, p. 207, note 80; for Hitler, see, for example, a conversation with the Croatian foreign minister in 1944, "if the Jews were given their way, as they are in the Soviet paradise, they would carry out the maddest plans. This is how Russia has become a plague centre for humanity...If only one country, for whatever reason, tolerates a Jewish family in it, that family will become the germ centre for fresh sedition." Cited in Fest, *Hitler*, p. 651. Jackel notes how determined Hitler was to make this connection between war and the Jews, even to the extent of falsely dating a speech in which he outlined extermination plans to September 1st, 1939, *Hitler's World View*, p. 60.

38 *Mein Kampf*.

39 For "devoid of men", see *Mein Kampf*, p. 63; and for the victory of the microbes, *Table Talk*, p. 39.

40 Klemperer, *LTI*, p 182.


42 E.g."When in the summer of 1941 (Hitler) himself gave me the order to prepare the installations at Auschwitz where mass exterminations could take place, and personally to carry out these exterminations, I did not have the slightest idea of their scale of consequences. Nevertheless the reason behind the extermination programme seemed to me to be right. I did not reflect upon it at the time: I had been given an order and I had to carry it out. Whether this mass extermination of the Jews was necessary or not was something on which I could not allow myself to form an opinion. For I lacked the necessary breadth of vision," *Commandant of Auschwitz* (London; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1959), p. 144.


44 Stern draws this distinction between 'idealistic' and ' nihilistic' cultural pessimism in the last chapter of his *Cultural Despair*.

46 E.g., when Fest discusses the influence of the ludicrous figure of Lanz von Liebenfels on Hitler, he remarks that, "one might say that Hitler did not so much absorb the man's ideology as catch the infection that underlay it," Hitler, p 37; in Les médecins allemands, Ternon and Helman have a chapter headed "Les germes; racisme et anti-semitisme," p. 21.

Notes to Chapter Eight


4 idem.


7 This "self-authenticating" character of political beliefs is ably exploited in Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston; Little Brown, 1960), esp. p.289.


10 Christopher M. Bache, "Towards a Unified Theory of Metaphor," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 39


14 Minogue, "Theatricality," p. 156.

15 Pocock, "Reconstruction," p. 978; this is a murky area -- Pocock himself suggests that such an interpretation must demonstrate that it could have been, or preferably was, performed by someone else living at some other time, or else succumb to the "myth-making" which ascribes authority over history to certain texts.

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