UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Ideology, tradition and social development : a study on critical and hermeneutical theories of planning Yeechong, Wayne 1983

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1983_A8 Y44.pdf [ 9.94MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0095738.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0095738-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0095738-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0095738-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0095738-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0095738-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0095738-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0095738-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0095738.ris

Full Text

IDEOLOGY, TRADITION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT A STUDY ON CRITICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL THEORIES OF PLANNING by WAYNE YEECHONG B.A., C a l i f o r n i a State U n i v e r s i t y , Fresno, 1972 M.S., C a l i f o r n i a State U n i v e r s i t y , Fresno, 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES SCHOOL OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1983 © Wayne Yeechong, 1983 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head o f my department o r by h i s or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f ^ovtW*\unibj A*\4 jfe^ionat 'Planning The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date Octette*- /4 E-6 (3/81) i i ABSTRACT Recent planning l i t e r a t u r e raises important questions about the o b j e c t i v i t y of knowledge and the relationships among theory, experience and practice. Social learning theories of planning, in p a r t i c u l a r , are concerned with these matters. Two current German schools of philosophy, c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneuties, as developed by Jiirgen Habermas and Hans-GeOrg Gadamer respectively, have examined these matters in great d e t a i l . However, i t appears that planning theorists have not given these schools the attention they deserve. The present study explores concepts in c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics as they relate to the f i e l d of planning. It intends to contribute to current discussions in s o c i a l learning theories. In addition to interpreting ideas of the two schools, the study aims at c r i t i c a l l y examining these ideas. Hence i t includes an analysis of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer as well as that between two commentators. F i n a l l y the study discusses how c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics might contribute to the f i e l d of planning and why some of the concepts in these two schools have to be further developed before they can address planning issues d i r e c t l y . With the help of concepts in c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics, this study attempts to situate the planning process in the context of so c i a l evolution. It finds that Habermas raises questions pertinent to planning: c o n f l i c t of interests, spontaneity, nature-human relations and relations among humans. Yet his answers are not always s a t i s f a c t o r y . His assumption of suppressed generalizable interests and his use of reconstructive sciences are not e n t i r e l y convincing. Gadamer stresses the significance of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n in society and people's self-understanding of their t r a d i t i o n . His argument leads to the following conclusion: a planning process which i s not based on the self-understanding of the people d i r e c t l y implicated is bound to destroy s o c i a l meanings inherent in that society. But Gadamer ignores some of the major problems in contemporary i n d u s t r i a l society: c o n f l i c t and rapid s o c i a l change. In short, Habermas and Gadamer deal with d i f f e r e n t issues related to planning. Planning theorists should seriously take into account the ideas of both thinkers. This study proposes a theory of planning that answers Habermas' questions by employing hermeneutical insights. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS A b s t r a c t i i Acknowledgement v i A b b r e v i a t i o n s v i i i Note On T r a n s l a t i o n s x 1. INTRODUCTION 1 S o c i a l L e a r n i n g T h e o r i e s 2 S e t t i n g Of The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 4 V a r i a t i o n s Of A Theme By Hegel 6 2. HABERMAS: CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 13 Legacy Of Kant And Hegel 14 The Marxian Problematic 17 Ag a i n s t P o s i t i v i s m 25 P e i r c e ' s R e f l e c t i o n On N a t u r a l Sciences 26 D i l t h e y ' s R e f l e c t i o n On Human Sciences 29 Notion Of Emancipation 37 The P s y c h o a n a l y t i c Model 39 From E a r l y To Recent W r i t i n g s 43 A c t i o n , Experience And D i s c o u r s e 45 R e c o n s t r u c t i o n And S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n 50 R e c o n s t r u c t i v e Sciences 56 The Advocacy Model 62 Approach To Planning 68 3. GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS OF TRADITION 81 F o r e - s t r u c t u r e Of Understanding In Heidegger 84 The Heideggerian View Of Time And H i s t o r y 87 Prejudgments 90 Hegel's D i a l e c t i c Of Consciousness 93 F u s i o n Of Horizons 95 H i s t o r i c a l Dimension Of Herrneneutics 98 Notion Of A p p l i c a t i o n 100 C r i t i q u e Of S c i e n t i f i c Method 103 C r i t i q u e Of R a t i o n a l Planning 108 V 4. THE DEBATE BETWEEN CRITICAL THEORY AND HERMENEUTICS 119 The B a s i c D i f f e r e n c e Between Habermas And Gadamer ...119 L i m i t s Of Prejudgments And S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n 120 Question Of Language . 122 T h e r a p e u t i c Approach To S o c i a l Development 125 R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Of A u t h o r i t y 127 Moving Beyond Habermas And Gadamer ...128 Analyses By M i s g e l d And Mendelson 129 Prejudgments And S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n R e c o n s i d e r e d 131 A u t h o r i t y R e c o n s i d e r e d 133 The Advocacy Model Examined 136 Norms In T r a d i t i o n And In R e c o n s t r u c t i v e S c i e n c e s ...138 Mendelson: Doubts On R e c o n s t r u c t i v e S c i e n c e s 139 M i s g e l d : P r i o r i t y Of P r a c t i c e 141 From The Debate To Theory Of P l a n n i n g 148 5. A HERMENEUTICAL THEORY OF PLANNING 154 B u i l d i n g On Gadamer And M i s g e l d 154 P l a n n i n g S i t u a t i o n As Herme n e u t i c a l S i t u a t i o n 157 Problem Of Nature 160 I n t e r a c t i o n Of S o c i a l Groups 166 P l a n n i n g , S o c i a l L e a r n i n g And S o c i a l E v o l u t i o n 173 Comparison With Habermas' Model 176 6. CONCLUSION 183 A Summary 183 S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n Of Hermeneutics 186 Appendix: Schematic Of Habermas' Model 188 B i b l i o g r a p h y 189 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT For h i s p a t i e n c e as a t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r alone, Peter Boothroyd deserves a medal. Over the yea r s , I changed my t o p i c s e v e r a l times, c o v e r i n g a wide range of r e l a t e d m a t e r i a l s . Peter d i d not forsake the student who accomplished l i t t l e . P i l e s of p a r t i a l and o b s o l e t e d r a f t s of my t h e s i s document my academic development d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . There were moments of joy, when new h o r i z o n s emerged. There were days of f r u s t r a t i o n , when o b s t a c l e s appeared insurmountable. Without a sympathetic super-v i s o r , i t i s d o u b t f u l i f the t h e s i s c o u l d have been completed. Both Clyde Weaver and Henry Hightower o f f e r e d v a l u a b l e c r i t i c i s m s on an e a r l y d r a f t . They exposed some of the c e n t r a l weaknesses i n my o r g a n i z a t i o n and development of ide a s . They were a t the same time encouraging. I wished I had c o n s u l t e d them more f r e q u e n t l y . Gary Wedeking of the Philosophy Department read the same e a r l y d r a f t . His remarks l e d me to r e c o n s i d e r my approach i n w r i t i n g a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y o r i e n t e d t h e s i s . Peter was ins t r u m e n t a l i n h e l p i n g me shape my ideas i n t o the present form. Despite the unconventional t o p i c f o r a plann i n g t h e s i s and the slow progress I was making, Brahm Wiesman showed h i s i n t e r e s t i n my work and demonstrated h i s support f o r me. I c o u l d not have expected more from the D i r e c t o r of the School. One of the foremost s c h o l a r s on the Habermas-Gadamer debate, D i e t e r M i s g e l d at the On t a r i o I n s t i t u t e f o r S t u d i e s i n v i i E d ucation i s a remarkably modest and approachable person. His comments on my recent d r a f t enhanced my confidence i n my present endeavor. B i l l L e i s s at Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y i s another prominent s c h o l a r on c r i t i c a l theory who commented on my work. I t was an honor to have him as the e x t e r n a l examiner at my o r a l defence. Ideas are never c r e a t e d e n t i r e l y by a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l . I n t e l l e c t u a l ideas must be s u s t a i n e d i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l community and can only grow on f a v o r a b l e i n t e l l e c t u a l s o i l . My peers at West M a l l Annex have no doubt c o n t r i b u t e d to my t h i n k i n g , although we do not always agree with one another. The presence of many a r t i s t f r i e n d s keeps reminding me people express themselves i n a v a r i e t y of forms. My a n a l y t i c a l l y t r a i n e d mind has been somewhat e n r i c h e d by such an environment. ***** Late a t n i g h t , faced with the p r o j e c t I immersed myself i n , I o f t e n wondered i f i t was r e a l l y worth the e f f o r t . Through the loudspeakers came Schubert's S t r i n g Q uintet i n C. I t was a contemplation of the world emotional yet r e s t r a i n e d . I t was a s t r u g g l e f o r meaning i n l i f e a long and lonesome journey. But even i n the darkest moments a beam of hope shone through. Schubert always r e t a i n e d a sense of optimism. I knew Schubert! v i i i ABBREVIATIONS The f o l l o w i n g a b b r e v i a t i o n s are used i n the te x t and i n the notes. B i b l i o g r a p h i c a l d e t a i l s are given i n the b i b l i o g r a p h y , BT M.Heidegger, Being and Time. CES J.Habermas, Communication and the E v o l u t i o n of S o c i e t y . "CT and H" D.Misgeld, " C r i t i c a l Theory.and Hermeneut i c s " . flDC" D.Misgeld, "Discourse and Co n v e r s a t i o n " . "1844 MSS" K.Marx, "Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c a l Manuscripts of 1844". "GH" D.Misgeld, "On Gadamer's Hermeneutics". "H-G Debate" J.Mendelson, "The Habermas-Gadamer Debate". KHI J.Habermas, Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s . LC J.Habermas, L e g i t i m a t i o n C r i s i s . PhH H-G.Gadamer, P h i l o s o p h i c a l Hermeneutics. PhS G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology of S p i r i t . " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI" J.Habermas, "A P o s t s c r i p t to Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s " . "Retreat" D.Misgeld, "Habermas' Retreat from Hermeneutics". "Review of TM" J.Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Tru t h and Method". TM H-G.Gadamer, Truth and Method. ix TP TRS "Utopian Content" J.Habermas, Theory and P r a c t i c e . J.Habermas, Toward A R a t i o n a l  S o c i e t y . D.Misgeld, "Science, Hermeneutics and the Utopian Content of the L i b e r a l -Democratic T r a d i t i o n " . X NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS Many of the l i t e r a r y sources u t i l i z e d i n the present r e s e a r c h have German o r i g i n s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t r a n s l a t i o n s of important terms have not been s t a n d a r d i z e d . The use of d i f f e r e n t t r a n s l a t i o n s of a key term i n the same essay i s not only c o n f u s i n g , i t tends to obscure the o r i g i n a l meanings, m i s l e a d readers, and make a sound argument v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n s i s not always p o s s i b l e due to the d i f f e r e n c e i n the ranges of meaning between the c l o s e s t p a i r of German-English words. But i n many cases t h i s problem can be m i t i g a t e d . Although p u b l i s h e d E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s are c i t e d i n t h i s essay, e f f o r t has been made to check c r u c i a l t e c h n i c a l terms a g a i n s t the o r i g i n a l German t e x t s . Whenever necessary these t r a n s l a t i o n s are m o d i f i e d a c c o r d i n g to the f o l l o w i n g scheme without f u r t h e r n o t i c e . Comments on other t r a n s l a t i o n s are made i n notes. B i l d u n g s e l f - f o r m a t i o n or c u l t u r e (depending on context) Bi l d u n g s p r o z e s s s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process G e i s t S p i r i t N aturwissenschaft n a t u r a l s c i e n c e G e i s t e s w i s s e n s c h a f t human sc i e n c e V o r u r t e i l prejudgment (as used by Gadamer) 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION The purpose of t h i s study i s to d i s c u s s the s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r p l a n n i n g of the debate between two c u r r e n t German sc h o o l s of philo s o p h y , c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics, as developed by Jurgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer r e s p e c t i v e l y . The relev a n c e of c r i t i c a l theory has a l r e a d y been addressed i n pl a n n i n g l i t e r a t u r e . 1 But the r i c h n e s s i n the concepts of t h i s s c h o o l , l e t alone of the debate between i t and hermeneutics, appears not to have been adequately c o n s i d e r e d by p l a n n i n g t h e o r i s t s . On the b a s i s of the a n a l y s i s of c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics, the study proceeds to explore the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p l a n n i n g and s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . I t i s intended that t h i s e x p l o r a t i o n deepen and extend the i n s i g h t s of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s of p l a n n i n g . At a gen e r a l l e v e l , we may c o n c e p t u a l i z e p l a n n i n g as an a c t i v i t y by which s o c i e t y s t e e r s i t s e l f , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , toward a d e s i r a b l e f u t u r e . E s s e n t i a l l y , p l a n n i n g here i s co n s i d e r e d at a s o c i e t a l l e v e l ( i n c l u d i n g e n t i t i e s such as community, r e g i o n and n a t i o n , and e x c l u d i n g e n t i t i e s such as i n d i v i d u a l person, p r i v a t e group and c o r p o r a t i o n ) and i s taken to be a g o a l - o r i e n t e d a c t i v i t y . We b e l i e v e t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y broad to i n c l u d e p r a c t i c a l l y a l l views i n academic and p r o f e s s i o n a l p l a n n i n g l i t e r a t u r e . S o c i a l L e a r n i n g T h e o r i e s The s o c i a l l e a r n i n g concept i n p l a n n i n g o u t l i n e d below i s g e n e r a l one. I t c o n s i s t s of a group of t h e o r i e s which are not e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t i n d e t a i l s . 2 Well-known t h e o r i s t s i n c l u d e John Friedmann, Donald Schon, Edgar Dunn, C h a r l e s Hampden-Turner, Donald M i c h a e l , e t c . 3 S o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s emerged i n recent years as a r e s u l t of the r e c o g n i t i o n of severe l i m i t a t i o n s of r a t i o n a l and comprehensive concepts of p l a n n i n g . Due t o the many r a p i d and u n p r e d i c t a b l e changes o c c u r i n g i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , s t a n d a r d i z e d ways of c o n f r o n t i n g - or even d e f i n i n g - problems and o p p o r t u n i t e s can no longer be taken f o r granted. T h i s i s the s o c i a l r e a l i t y s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i s t s attempt to grapple with. In s o c i a l l e a r n i n g , groups and i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n a s i t u a t i o n p l a y a c t i v e r o l e s i n changing t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s and b e h a v i o r s i n order to c o n f r o n t the s i t u a t i o n . Often, a separate p a r t y - l e t us c a l l them plann e r s - a s s i s t s the p a r t i e s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d i n t h e i r chang pr o c e s s . T h e o r i s t s promoting the s o c i a l l e a r n i n g concept tend to eschew the terms "planning" and "planner" s i n c e i t i s d i f f e r e n t from the more e s t a b l i s h e d ones - e s p e c i a l l y r a t i o n a l and comprehensive p l a n n i n g - and the t h e o r i s t s do not wish to confound e s t a b l i s h e d images with new ones." The meanings of "planning" and "planner" have s h i f t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n the past 3 and w i l l probably continue to do so i n the f u t u r e . At any po i n t of time i n h i s t o r y , there has never been a consensus on what these terms mean. 5 I f we co n s i d e r p l a n n i n g i n the broad sense mentioned e a r l i e r , then the term can accomodate the s o c i a l l e a r n i n g concept as w e l l . The b a s i c assumption of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g i s t h a t , each p a r t y i n v o l v e d i n a s i t u a t i o n possesses v a l u a b l e e x c l u s i v e knowledge. Hence no s i n g l e p a r t y nor an o u t s i d e r i s i n a p o s i t i o n to decide u n i l a t e r a l l y the best s o l u t i o n to a predicament. Furthermore, i t i s assumed that much v a l u a b l e knowledge cannot be d e r i v e d a p r i o r i ; i t can only be ac q u i r e d through experience. Hence s o c i a l l e a r n i n g i s bound t o be somewhat experimental i n nature. The purpose of t h i s p l a n n i n g approach i s to have i n v o l v e d p a r t i e s s o l v e t h e i r own problems. With s o c i a l l e a r n i n g , the s t a t u s quo i s not immune a g a i n s t fundamental q u e s t i o n i n g and r e o r g a n i z a -t i o n . Due to the experimental nature of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g , p l a n n i n g process and implementation are completely i n t e r t w i n e d . The government does not have to be an a c t o r i n s o c i a l l e a r n i n g . In p r a c t i c e , however, a c t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n s o c i a l l e a r n i n g may have t o be backed up by some government c o n t r o l s and r e g u l a t i o n s . 6 As a r e s u l t of the short h i s t o r y of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s , many s i g n i f i c a n t ideas i n these t h e o r i e s are s t i l l i n a developmental stage. But o u t s i d e the f i e l d of p l a n n i n g c l o s e l y r e l a t e d ideas have been explored and s e r i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d i n the l a s t two c e n t u r i e s . We are r e f e r r i n g to the German p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n which begins with Kant and culminates i n the c u r r e n t 4 debate between c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics. The debate b r i n g s i n t o focus a number of key p h i l o s o p h i c a l i s s u e s c o n cerning s o c i a l development. Since these i s s u e s are a l s o c e n t r a l to s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s we b e l i e v e a study on t h i s debate can c o n t r i b u t e to the development of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s . In the present study a t t e n t i o n i s drawn to the two p r o t a g o n i s t s of the debate - Jurgen Habermas of c r i t i c a l theory and Hans-Georg Gadamer of hermeneutics - whose thought can only be adequately comprehended i n the context of the German i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n to which they b e l o n g . 7 C r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics r e v o l v e around s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n a r y frameworks d e r i v e d from Hegel. S o c i a l e v o l u t i o n here i s understood i n a broad sense. I t r e f e r s t o s o c i a l changes governed by a b a s i c c o n t i n u i t y i n s o c i e t y over time; i t does not imply the n o t i o n s of t e l e o l o g y or p r o g r e s s . With the h e l p of ideas emerging from the debate, we can s i t u a t e p l a n n i n g i n the context of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . S e t t i n g of the Habermas-Gadamer Debate In 1960 the H e i d e l b e r g s c h o l a r Hans-Georg Gadamer p u b l i s h e d h i s magnum opus, Wahrheit und Methode, 8 which s t a r t e d the c u r r e n t movement i n hermeneutics. B u i l d i n g on the humanist t r a d i t i o n of Hegelian d i a l e c t i c s and Heideggerian e x i s t e n t i a l phenomenology, Gadamer opened up a new p e r s p e c t i v e on the phenomenon of human understanding and the nature of human s c i e n c e s . 9 T h i s book i s p o t e n t i a l l y r i c h i n consequences f o r the study of s o c i e t y and s o c i a l development. The F r a n k f u r t 5 p h i l o s o p h e r and s o c i o l o i g i s t Jiirgen Habermas acknowledged the achievement of Gadamer and borrowed some of the l a t t e r ' s concepts to c o n s t r u c t h i s own c r i t i c a l theory. On the other hand, Habermas a l s o r e j e c t e d part of Gadamer's thought; h i s view toward hermeneutics was made e x p l i c i t i n the a r t i c l e "Zur Logik der S o z i a l w i s s e n s c h a f t e n " i n 1967. 1 0 Thus Habermas i n i t i a t e d the debate. In the same year Gadamer c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d with the paper "Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und I d e o l o g i e k r i t i k " , 1 1 r e p u d i a t i n g e s p e c i a l l y Habermas' t h e r a p e u t i c approach to s o c i a l development. Since then f u r t h e r exchanges have taken p l a c e and other t h e o r i s t s have d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y j o i n e d the now famous debate, which i s s t i l l going on today. Instead of a n a l y z i n g the debate from a h i s t o r i c a l p o i n t of view, i t would probably be more rewarding to examine the key i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . We s h a l l begin with an e x p o s i t i o n of the t h e o r i e s of Habermas and Gadamer; then we s h a l l compare them. These w i l l be f o l l o w e d by a d i s c u s s i o n of two other t h e o r i s t s ' p r o p o s a l s on a l t e r n a t i v e approaches to s o c i a l development, based on ideas of both Gadamer and Habermas. The present study does not attempt t o s c r u t i n i z e a l l a s p e c t s of Habermas' and Gadamer's t h e o r i e s . Emphasis w i l l be p l a c e d on where the two t h e o r i e s c o l l i d e and what t h i s means to p l a n n i n g . 6 V a r i a t i o n s of a Theme by Hegel In order to e l u c i d a t e the ideas of Habermas and Gadamer, l e t us e x t r a c t a u n i f y i n g theme from the two t h e o r i e s . The theme i s Hegel's concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n . " S e l f - f o r m a t i o n " i s the t r a n s l a t i o n of B i l d u n g , which means formation, e d u c a t i o n , c u l t i v a t i o n and c u l t u r e . In Hegelian philosophy B i l d u n g a l s o connotes "maturation, f u l f i l m e n t , joy, s u f f e r i n g , a drenching i n the stream of time and an emergence to the p l a t e a u of judgment". 1 2 I t i s a profound h o l i s t i c developmental concept of s o c i e t y . 1 3 For Hegel (1770-1831), c u l t u r e i s the product of a h i s t o r i c a l s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process ( B i l d u n g s p r o z e s s ) of mankind; i t i s c o n t i n u o u s l y e v o l v i n g . S e l f - f o r m a t i o n i n v o l v e s p r o g r e s s i v e development of human consc i o u s n e s s , freedom and r a t i o n a l i t y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . Such development can occur only through continuous i n t e r a c t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l s and s o c i e t y : A c t i o n i s always i n d i v i d u a l ; i t i s always I who a c t . I t i s my purpose which I want t o f u l f i l . T h i s purpose may be a good one, a u n i v e r s a l aim; on the other hand, the i n t e r e s t may be a p a r t i c u l a r , a p r i v a t e one. T h i s does not mean that i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y opposed to the u n i v e r s a l good. On the c o n t r a r y , the u n i v e r s a l must be a c t u a l i z e d through the p a r t i c u l a r . 1 " But each i n d i v i d u a l i s a l s o the c h i l d of a people at a d e f i n i t e stage of i t s development. One cannot s k i p over the S p i r i t of h i s people Only through h i s own e f f o r t can he be i n harmony with h i s substance; he must b r i n g the w i l l demanded by h i s people to h i s own c o n s c i o u s n e s s , to a r t i c u l a t i o n . The i n d i v i d u a l does not invent h i s own content; he i s what he i s by a c t i n g out the u n i v e r s a l as h i s own c o n t e n t . 1 5 On the one hand, s o c i e t y e v o l v e s as a r e s u l t of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n ; and on the other hand, i n d i v i d u a l s can develop themselves o n l y w i t h i n the g e n e r a l framework of s o c i e t y . 1 6 As we 7 s h a l l see, the Hegelian concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n has d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the t h e o r e t i c a l foundations of Marx, Gadamer, Habermas and many other s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s . S e l f - f o r m a t i o n i s not to be construed as p a r t of the b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n of mankind. Rather, i t i s the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of an omnipresent human s p i r i t i n s o c i e t y . For Hegel, S p i r i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y embodied i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . 1 7 To the extent i n d i v i d u a l human beings alone can take a c t i o n , S p i r i t does not have an e x i s t e n c e independent of i n d i v i d u a l s . However, S p i r i t i s not merely the sum of i n d i v i d u a l s . C o n s c i o u s l y and u n c o n s c i o u s l y , people p i c k up behaviors and a t t i t u d e s from s o c i e t y , p r a c t i c e them and pass them on to f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s . S o c i a l p r a c t i c e s - the embodiment of S p i r i t - are thus s u s t a i n e d i n s o c i e t y r a t h e r than i n the heads of i n d i v i d u a l s . A l t e r n a t i v e l y speaking, S p i r i t e x i s t s p r i o r t o , and remains a f t e r , the e x i s t e n c e of each i n d i v i d u a l . In Hegelian t h i n k i n g the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process i s the movement of S p i r i t : S p i r i t i s never at r e s t but always engages i n ever p r o g r e s s i n g motion The s e l f - f o r m a t i v e S p i r i t (der s i c h b ildende G e i s t ) matures slowly and q u i e t l y toward the new form, d i s s o l v i n g one p a r t i c l e of the e d i f i c e of i t s p r e v i o u s world a f t e r the o t h e r , while i t s t o t t e r i n g i s suggested only by some symptoms here and there The gradual crumbling which d i d not a l t e r the physiognomy of the whole i s i n t e r -rupted by the break of day t h a t , l i k e l i g h t n i n g , a l l at once r e v e a l s the e d i f i c e of the new world The beginning of the new S p i r i t i s the product of a f a r - r e a c h i n g r e v o l u t i o n i n ever so many forms of c u l t u r e and education (Bildungsformen); i t i s the p r i z e f o r an immensely t a n g l e d path and an e q u a l l y immense amount of e x e r t i o n and t o i l . 1 8 Hegel i s d e s c r i b i n g how, i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process, mankind 8 s t r u g g l e s toward higher l e v e l s of consciousness, freedom and r a t i o n a l i t y . The process e n t a i l s i n c e s s a n t gradual changes c u l m i n a t i n g i n stages of quantum l e a p s , with each stage b u i l d i n g on the accomplishment of the p r e v i o u s one. The o l d c u l t u r a l form i s c a n c e l l e d , a b o l i s h e d ; but at the same time c e r t a i n rudiments are preserved and a f f i r m e d , so that the new form emerges from the o l d one and transcends i t : 1 9 In the S p i r i t who stands on a higher l e v e l than another, the lower concrete e x i s t e n c e has been reduced to an i n s i g n i f i c a n t moment; what formerly was the matter i t s e l f has become a simple s h a d e . 2 0 T h i s i s the p a t t e r n of S p i r i t i n a c t i o n . And the a c t i o n of S p i r i t i s none other than the self-development of mankind: The c r i t e r i o n of S p i r i t i s i t s a c t i o n , i t s a c t i v e essence. Man i s h i s own a c t i o n , the sequence of h i s a c t i o n s , that i n t o which he has been making h i m s e l f . 2 1 Both Habermas and Gadamer r e a l i z e the p r o f u n d i t y of the concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n and the p e n e t r a t i n g i n s i g h t i t o f f e r s t o the a n a l y s i s of s o c i e t y . They i n t e r n a l i z e much of the concept without embracing a l l of Hegel's thought. We b e l i e v e the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s between Habermas and Gadamer can be best i l l u m i n a t e d i f t h e i r t h e o r i e s are p e r c e i v e d as two v a r i a t i o n s of the Hegelian theme. In t h i s essay we take s e l f - f o r m a t i o n to be the general Hegelian concept o u t l i n e d above as w e l l as i t s v a r i a t i o n s i n Marx, Habermas, Gadamer, e t c . The v a r i a t i o n r e f e r r e d to should be p l a i n from the c o n t e x t . S e v e r a l i n t e r r e l a t e d terms w i l l be used; they a l l belong to the concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n , although each one s t r e s s e s one aspect of the concept. S e l f - f o r m a t i v e 9 process (Bildungsprozess) r e f e r s to the process i t s e l f , the movement over time. C u l t u r e ( B i l d u n g ) , a product of the s e l f -f ormative p r o c e s s , i s the t o t a l i t y of s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s of a people, together with t h e i r i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e meanings, at a given p o i n t i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s . S o c i a l p r a c t i c e i n v o l v e s i n t e r a c t i o n with people and nature; c e r t a i n l y i t i s s u b j e c t to m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s ( p h y s i c a l - c h e m i c a l laws and b i o l o g i c a l r equirements). L i f e - w o r l d (Lebenswelt), a l s o a product of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s , r e f e r s t o the c u l t u r a l world an i n d i v i d u a l or a group encounters i n everyday l i f e ; i t p l a c e s an emphasis on experiences that have l a s t i n g e f f e c t s on i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n and b e h a v i o r . 2 2 T r a d i t i o n ( U e b e r l i e f e r u n g ) s t r e s s e s what i s handed down or t r a n s m i t t e d from the past; i t e s t a b l i s h e s a l i n k from the past to the pre s e n t , and hence, to the f u t u r e as w e l l . Other terms such as h i s t o r y and s o c i e t y are o b v i o u s l y a l s o r e l a t e d to s e l f - f o r m a t i o n . NOTES See e.g. J . F o r e s t e r , " C r i t i c a l Theory and Planning P r a c t i c e " , J o u r n a l of the American Planning A s s o c i a t i o n , vol.46, pp.275-86, 1980; and, G.C.Hemmens and B . S t i f t e l , "Sources f o r the Renewal of Planning Theory", J o u r n a l of  the American Planning A s s o c i a t i o n , vol.46, pp.341-5, 1980. The term " s o c i a l l e a r n i n g " here i s not to be confused with the kind a s s o c i a t e d with b e h a v i o r a l psychology - P a v l o v i a n and S k i n n e r i a n c o n d i t i o n i n g . Sometimes the term " s o c i a l guidance" i s used f o r t h i s approach, but i t i s a l s o u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , s i n c e i t suggests that there i s an a c t i v e guide to be f o l l o w e d by the p a s s i v e l y guided. 10 Friedmann, R e t r a c k i n g America, Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Anchor, 1973; Friedmann, The Good S o c i e t y , Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979; Schon, Beyond the S t a b l e S t a t e , New York: Norton, 1971; Dunn, Economic and Soc i a l Development, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971; Hampden-Turner, R a d i c a l Man, Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Anchor,1971; M i c h a e l , L e a r n i n g to Plan and Planning to Learn, San F r a n c i s c o : Jossey-Bass, 1973. E.g. Friedmann, The Good S o c i e t y , o p . c i t . , uses the terms " r a d i c a l p r a c t i c e " and " r a d i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r " , and Dunn, o p . c i t . , uses the terms " c r e a t i v e s o c i a l l e a r n i n g " and " e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l l e a d e r s of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g systems". Cf. J.Friedmann and B.Hudson, "Knowledge and A c t i o n " , J o u r n a l of the American I n s t i t u t e of Planners, vol.40, pp.2-16, 1974; and, M.Rein, " S o c i a l P l a n n i n g : The Search fo r L e g i t i m a c y " , J o u r n a l of the American I n s t i t u t e of  Planners, v o l . 3 5 , pp.233-44, 1969. T e r r y Moore - i n "Why Allow Planners to Do What They Do? A J u s t i f i c a t i o n from Economic Theory", J o u r n a l of the  American I n s t i t u t e of Planners, vol.44, pp.387-98, 1978 -o f f e r s a good synopsis of why government c o n t r o l s and r e g u l a t i o n s are necessary. While these measures do have t h e i r r o l e s i n s o c i e t y , by themselves they are i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r coping with a s o c i e t y t h a t i s no longer i n a " s t a b l e s t a t e " . The term " c r i t i c a l theory" u s u a l l y r e f e r s to a f a m i l y of r e l a t e d t h e o r i e s developed by members of the F r a n k f u r t School, i n c l u d i n g Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas, Schmidt, Wellmer and o t h e r s . In the present essay the term c r i t i c a l theory i s r e s t r i c t e d to the theory of Habermas. In the past few years p l a n n i n g t h e o r i s t s - such as J . F o r e s t e r , G.Hemmens and B . S t i f t e l - have shown some i n t e r e s t i n the work of Habermas. But the nature of t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n Habermas i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from what i s presented i n t h i s essay. They seek to apply Habermas' c o n c l u s i o n s ; we c r i t i c a l l y examine Habermas' t h e o r i z i n g . T r a n s l a t e d as Truth and Method, New York: Crossroad, 1975. The t r a n s l a t i o n w i l l h e r e a f t e r be r e f e r r e d to as TM. In t h i s essay the term "human s c i e n c e s " i s the t r a n s l a t i o n of G e i s t e s w i s s e n s c h a f t e n which i n c l u d e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s and c e r t a i n d i s c i p l i n e s i n the humanities (other t r a n s l a t i o n s found i n l i t e r a t u r e i n c l u d e c u l t u r a l s c i e n c e s , s c i e n c e s of man, human s t u d i e s , h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l s t u d i e s , humanistic s t u d i e s , etc.) G e i s t e s w i s s e n s c h a f t i s used i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to Naturwissenschaft ( n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ) . One c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the humanist t r a d i t i o n i s i t s o b j e c t i o n to p o s i t i v i s m which a p p l i e s the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e methodology to human s c i e n c e s . Gadamer a t t r i b u t e s the beginning of modern humanist t r a d i t i o n t o I t a l i a n p h i l o s o p h e r G.B.Vico (1668-1744). T r a n s l a t e d as "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method", i n Understanding and S o c i a l I n q u i r y , F.R.Dallmayr and T.A.McCarthy (ed.) , Notre Dame and London: U n i v e r s i t y of Notre Dame Press, 1977. The t r a n s l a t i o n w i l l h e r e a f t e r be r e f e r r e d to as "Review of TM". T r a n s l a t e d as "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical R e f l e c t i o n " , i n P h i l o s o p h i c a l Hermeneutics, D.E.Linge (ed.), Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r ess, 1976. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Hermeneutics w i l l h e r e a f t e r be r e f e r r e d to as PhH. G.A.Kelly, I d e a l i s m , P o l i t i c s and H i s t o r y , London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969, p.342. The t r a n s l a t i o n of Bildun g i s not s t a n d a r d i z e d . In f a c t , due to i t s m u l t i f a r i o u s meanings, i t cannot be represented, by a s i n g l e s t a n d a r d i z e d E n g l i s h e x p r e s s i o n . We deem J.Shapiro's t r a n s l a t i o n of Bi l d u n g i n t o s e l f - f o r m a t i o n most s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r the present purpose. But even so, sometimes B i l d u n g has to be rendered i n t o some other words i n order to convey the meaning more adequately. G.W.F.Hegel, Reason i n H i s t o r y , R.S.Hartmann ( t r a n s . ) , I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1953, p.35. I b i d . , pp.38-9. One may note that K a r l Popper - i n The Open S o c i e t y and I t s  Enemies, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1945 - p o r t r a y s H e g e l i a n p o l i t i c a l theory as t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . As Walter Kaufmann - i n "The Hegel Myth and I t s Method", P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, vol.60, pp.459-86, 1951 - b r i l l i a n t l y demonstrates, Popper has g r o s s l y d i s t o r t e d Hegel. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Popper's reading of Hegel has exerted a tremendous i n f l u e n c e on the E n g l i s h speaking world. For some of the best recent commentaries on Hegel's p o l i t i c a l thought, see C h a r l e s T a y l o r , Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975, and, S . A v i n e r i , Hegel's Theory of  the Modern S t a t e , Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1972. T h i s i s what C h a r l e s T a y l o r c a l l s "the p r i n c i p l e of necessary embodiment", o p . c i t . , p.83. He a p t l y s t r e s s e s the c e n t r a l i t y of t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n the Hegelian concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n . See T a y l o r ' s l u c i d c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of embodiment of S p i r i t i n o p . c i t . , Ch.3. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the p r i n c i p l e of embodiment i s a l s o emphasized by John O ' N e i l l , i n "Embodiment and H i s t o r y i n Hegel and Marx", i n So c i o l o g y as a Skin Trade, New York: Harper and Row, 1972. " S p i r i t " i s the t r a n s l a t i o n of G e i s t . In the past G e i s t was 1 2 o f t e n rendered "mind", which i s i n a c c u r a t e and m i s l e a d i n g . The commonly accepted E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t today i s S p i r i t . G.W.F.Hegel, "Preface t o Phenomenology", i n Hegel: Text and  Commentary, W.Kaufmann ( t r a n s . ) , Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Anchor, 1966, pp.20-2. T h i s concept i s captured i n Hegel's use of the word Aufhebung, which means sim u l t a n e o u s l y c a n c e l l a t i o n , p r e s e r v a t i o n and u p - l i f t . There i s no s a t i s f a c t o r y E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t f o r Aufhebung. I b i d . , p.44. Reason i n H i s t o r y , o p . c i t . , p.51. The term Lebenswelt was not used by Hegel h i m s e l f ; i t was coin e d by E.Husserl i n the 1930s i n r e a c t i o n to Heidegger's e x i s t e n t i a l t h i n k i n g . We borrow t h i s term from H u s s e r l without endorsing h i s phi l o s o p h y . 13 CHAPTER TWO HABERMAS: CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY1 Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s , f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n German i n 1968, i s Habermas' " e a r l y " major work. 2 Although he had p u b l i s h e d other books p r i o r to t h a t , i t i s i n KHI that he s y s t e m a t i c a l l y s e t s up the framework of h i s c r i t i c a l theory. We s h a l l s t a r t w i t h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s work, f o r two reasons. F i r s t , i n KHI Habermas r e v e a l s much of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l r o o t s and p r e s e n t s r i g o r o u s arguments to c l a r i f y h i s p o s i t i o n . Kant, Hegel and Marx probably e x e r t the most enduring i n f l u e n c e on Habermas d e s p i t e h i s l a t e r expansion i n t o systems theory, a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y and other i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n s . We suggest that h i s a n a l y s i s of Kant, Hegel and Marx i n KHI should not be overlooked. In h i s recent works, by c o n t r a s t , Habermas tends to borrow f i n d i n g s e x t e n s i v e l y from a m u l t i t u d e of sources. H i s comments on these f i n d i n g s are u s u a l l y b r i e f and sometimes vague. As he c h a r a c t e r i z e s h i m s e l f , he has become more of a " s y n t h e s i z e r " than an " a n a l y s t " . 3 I t i s d i f f i c u l t to grasp h i s recent t h i n k i n g without a background in h i s e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s , e s p e c i a l l y KHI. Second, although Habermas has m o d i f i e d h i s framework s i n c e KHI, the changes are made to d e a l with some problematic areas i n the e a r l y framework. Without knowing what 14 he changes from, one cannot t e l l what he changes t o . There i s no doubt the understanding of Habermas' i n t e n t i o n s would be enhanced i f one i s f a m i l i a r with the w r i t i n g s of the f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuses For the present purpose, however, we b e l i e v e i t i s p o s s i b l e to i n t e r p r e t Habermas without r e l a t i n g h i s thought to the c r i t i c a l theory t r a d i t i o n . We s h a l l not be i n v o l v e d with the l a t t e r . In KHI Habermas c o n s i d e r s h i s p r o j e c t t o be the l a t e s t e f f o r t toward a c r i t i q u e of knowledge which s t a r t e d with Kant two c e n t u r i e s ago. In order to grasp Habermas' thought l e t us t r a c e how he p e r c e i v e s the accomplishments and f a i l u r e s of h i s predecessors and how he d e f i n e s h i s own task i n t h i s book. Legacy of Kant and Hegel D e s p i t e the prevalence of e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e s i n the 18th century, Kant (1724-1804) r e f u s e d to take f o r granted that s c i e n t i f i c knowledge based on sense-experience and s c i e n t i f i c method r e p r e s e n t s the o b j e c t i v e world. In C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason Kant w r i t e s : But though a l l our knowledge begins with experience, i t does not f o l l o w that i t a l l a r i s e s out of e x p e r i e n c e . For i t may w e l l be that even our own f a c u l t y of knowledge ( s e n s i b l e impressions s e r v i n g merely as the occasion) s u p p l i e s from i t s d e l f Knowledge that i s thus independent of experience and even of a l l impressions of the senses ... i s e n t i t l e d a p r i o r i , and d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the e m p i r i c a l , which has i t s sources a p o s t e r i o r i , that i s , i n experience." F u r t h e r , while the matter of a l l appearance i s given to us a 15 p o s t e r i o r i only, i t s form must l i e ready f o r the se n s a t i o n s a p r i o r i i n the mind. 5 As opposed to the e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i o n , Kant p o s t u l a t e s that there i s a s u b j e c t i v e dimension to a l l knowledge, and that p a r t of t h i s s u b j e c t i v e dimension i s the human mental f a c u l t y . The way a person experiences the world i s governed by such s u b j e c t i v e elements. For Kant, "pure reason" i s that which c o n t a i n s the p r i n c i p l e s whereby we know anything a b s o l u t e l y a p r i o r i . An organon of pure reason would be the sum-total of those p r i n c i p l e s a c c o r d i n g to which a l l modes of pure a p r i o r i knowledge can be a c q u i r e d and a c t u a l l y brought i n t o b e i n g . 6 Kant i s concerned with "the c r i t i q u e of the f a c u l t y of pure reason". He c o n s i d e r s a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of a p r i o r i knowledge e s s e n t i a l f o r judging the r e l i a b i l t y of knowledge. "Otherwise the u n q u a l i f i e d h i s t o r i a n or c r i t i c i s p a s s i n g judgments upon the groundless a s s e r t i o n s of others by means of h i s own, which are e q u a l l y g r o u n d l e s s . " 7 C o n s i d e r i n g the i n t e l l e c t u a l c l i m a t e of those days, Kant's achievement should not be underrated. I t seems reasonable t h a t Habermas takes Kant to be h i s p o i n t of departure f o r a h i s t o r i c a l account of the c r i t i q u e of knowledge. The Kantian epistemology was c r i t i c i z e d by Hegel. Although Kant's i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o a p r i o r i knowledge i s presumed to be f r e e from p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , Hegel f i n d s evidences to the c o n t r a r y . Habermas condenses Hegel's argument i n t o three p o i n t s . F i r s t , Kant i m p l i c i t l y a ccepts the v a l i d i t y of mathematics and p h y s i c s , adopts the s c i e n t i f i c procedure, and uses t h e i r 16 g e n e r a l i z e d form as the b a s i s of h i s i n q u i r y . Second, Kant assumes a complete, f i x e d knowing s u b j e c t , independent of i t s s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . T h i r d , Kant e n t e r t a i n s a concept of knowing su b j e c t d i f f e r e n t from that of the a c t i n g s u b j e c t (and c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , he separates the c r i t i q u e of knowledge from the c r i t i q u e of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n ) . 8 Hegel observes that Kant f a i l s to take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n human consciousness i s a product of h i s t o r y , the outcome of a continuous s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s . According to Hegel, then, the v a l i d i t y of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s always judged with r e s p e c t to the standard of a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l e r a , the a p r i o r i knowledge of a knowing subject i s always h i s t o r i c a l , and the concepts governing both knowledge and r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s are always shaped by the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s . Hegel argues that the i n q u i r y i n t o knowledge must begin with experience, of phenomena in the l i f e - w o r l d ; only through stages of s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n on experiences can consciousness d e v e l o p . 9 Hegel thus shows that Kant's c r i t i q u e of knowledge i s "dependent on something p r i o r and g i v e n " , 1 0 something t h a t Kant has taken f o r granted. "Hegel r a d i c a l i z e s the approach of the c r i t i q u e of knowledge by s u b j e c t i n g i t s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s to s e l f -c r i t i c i s m . " 1 1 T h i s i s a breakthrough Habermas t r u l y a p p r e c i a t e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y Hegel a l s o smuggles i n h i s own p r e s u p p o s i t i o n - Absolute knowledge. For Hegel, the s e l f - f o r m a f i v e process of mankind proceeds toward Absolute knowledge, the u l t i m a t e g o a l of the u n i v e r s a l o r d e r . "In t h i s knowing ... S p i r i t has concluded the movement i n which i t has shaped i t s e l f . " 1 2 The evolvement of mankind comes to an end. In t h i s f i n a l stage of h i s t o r y , "appearance becomes i d e n t i c a l with e s s e n c e " ; 1 3 human knowledge c o i n c i d e s with the u l t i m a t e t r u t h . Hegel even e n t e r t a i n s the idea that " h i s t o r y i s a c o n s c i o u s , s e l f - m e d i a t i n g process -S p i r i t emptied out i n t o Time". 1* In other words, the s e l f -formative process and i t s eventual outcome has been p l o t t e d out a l l along as p a r t of the cosmic order. In Habermas' view, while i n a sense Hegel r a d i c a l i z e s the c r i t i q u e of knowledge, i n another sense he abandons the c r i t i q u e of knowledge by p o s i t i n g the Absolute. Habermas p o i n t s out: i t was Marx (1818-1883) who a p p r e c i a t e d the r a d i c a l elements i n Hegel and attempted to r e v i v e them. 1 5 The Marxian Problematic For Kant, the knowing and a c t i n g s u b j e c t i s the i n d i v i d u a l o n l y . Hegel p o s t u l a t e s a h i s t o r i c a l s u b j e c t , S p i r i t , i n a d d i t i o n to the f i n i t e , i n d i v i d u a l one. Marx adopts the concept of s e l f -formation as the s e l f - c r e a t i o n of mankind through i t s own l a b o r ; he applauds Hegel f o r t h i s " outstanding achievement": 1 6 Hegel grasps the s e l f - c r e a t i o n of man as a" process, o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as l o s s of the o b j e c t , as a l i e n a t i o n and transcendence of t h i s a l i e n a t i o n , and ... he, t h e r e f o r e , grasps the nature of l a b o r , and conceives o b j e c t i v e man ( t r u e , because of r e a l man) as the r e s u l t of h i s own l a b o r . The r e a l , a c t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n of man to hi m s e l f as a r e a l s p e c i e s -being ( i . e . as a human being) i s only p o s s i b l e so f a r as he r e a l l y b r i n g s f o r t h a l l h i s species-powers (which i s onl y p o s s i b l e through the c o o p e r a t i v e endeavors of mankind and as an outcome of h i s t o r y ) and t r e a t s these powers as o b j e c t s , which can only be done a t f i r s t i n the form of a l i e n a t i o n . 1 7 However, Marx accuses Hegel of " m y s t i f y i n g " the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e 18 process by p o s i t i n g S p i r i t as the h i s t o r i c a l s u b j e c t ; he argues that Hegel p l a c e s undue emphasis on the s p i r i t u a l dimension of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process, at the expense of the m a t e r i a l d i m e n s i o n . 1 8 Marx i n d i c a t e s that Hegel pays l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to human m a t e r i a l requirements, Hunger, f o r example, i s a human m a t e r i a l need t h a t has to be s a t i s f i e d by o b j e c t s o u t s i d e the human body. For Marx,"the f a c t that man i s an embodied, l i v i n g , r e a l , s e n t i e n t , o b j e c t i v e being with n a t u r a l powers, means that he has r e a l , sensuous o b j e c t s as the o b j e c t s of h i s being, or that he can only express h i s being i n r e a l , sensuous o b j e c t s " . 1 9 Thus Marx re f o r m u l a t e s the concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n with h i s m a t e r i a l emphasis: H i s t o r y i s nothing but the su c c e s s i o n of the separate generations, each of which e x p l o i t s the m a t e r i a l , the c a p i t a l funds, the p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s handed down to i t by a l l preceding g e n e r a t i o n s , and thus, on the one hand, cont i n u e s the t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t y i n completely changed circumstances and, on the other, m o d i f i e s the o l d circumstances with a completely changed a c t i v i t y . 2 0 L i k e Hegel, Marx observes that o l d c u l t u r a l forms are superseded by new ones: each of these forms i s c a n c e l l e d , p r e s e r v e d and transcended. Again l i k e Hegel, Marx s t r e s s e s that each stage of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process can only emerge from the pre v i o u s one: Men make t h e i r own h i s t o r y , but they do not make i t j u s t as they p l e a s e ; they do not make i t under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances d i r e c t l y encountered, given and t r a n s m i t t e d from the pas t . The t r a d i t i o n of a l l the dead generations weighs l i k e a nightmare on the b r a i n of the l i v i n g . 2 1 What Marx r e j e c t s are the Hegelian n o t i o n s of S p i r i t and the Absolute; f o r him, the h i s t o r i c a l s u b j e c t i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e 19 process i s the human s p e c i e s whose e v o l u t i o n does not terminate at an a b s o l u t e l e v e l . With the Marxian v e r s i o n of s e l f -formation, human development i s no longer conceived as m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the cosmic order. While Marx accepts the e x i s t e n c e of a nature t h a t e x i s t s independent of the mind and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of tr a n s c e n d i n g the laws of nature, he holds that the human sp e c i e s has access to nature - i n terms of both knowledge and a c t i o n - only through s o c i a l c a t e g o r i e s , which are dependent upon the l a b o r p r o c e s s . 2 2 The labor process i s seen by Marx as the mechanism of s e l f -f ormation: on the one hand, i t governs the way nature i s transformed, and on the other hand, i t transforms the l a b o r i n g s u b j e c t s themselves (the human s p e c i e s ) : Labor i s , i n the f i r s t p l a c e , a process i n which both man and Nature p a r t i c i p a t e , and i n which man of h i s own accord s t a r t s , r e g u l a t e s , and c o n t r o l s the m a t e r i a l r e - a c t i o n s between h i m s e l f and Nature. He opposes h i m s e l f t o Nature as one of her own f o r c e s By thus a c t i n g on the e x t e r n a l world and changing i t , he at the same time changes h i s own n a t u r e . 2 3 Thus the s e l f - f o r a m t i o n of mankind i s not separated from the e v o l u t i o n of nature. In f a c t Marx c o n s i d e r s the e v o l u t i o n s of nature, modes of p r o d u c t i o n and human consciousness to be aspects of the same h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s : 2 4 H i s t o r y i t s e l f i s a r e a l p a r t of n a t u r a l h i s t o r y , of the development of nature i n t o man. Na t u r a l s c i e n c e w i l l one day i n c o r p o r a t e the s c i e n c e of man, j u s t as the s c i e n c e of man w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ; there w i l l be a s i n g l e s c i e n c e . 2 5 Here Marx i s not proposing the r e d u c t i o n of human s c i e n c e s to n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , i n the manner of p o s i t i v i s m ; r a t h e r , he intends to show that n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s are completely 20 i n t e r t w i n e d . F u r t h e r , Marx maintains t h a t , i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e pr oc ess, the mode of p r o d u c t i o n i s more primary than human cons c i o u s n e s s , as the former shapes the l a t t e r : Men are the producers of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n s , ideas, e t c . - r e a l , a c t i v e men, as they are c o n d i t i o n e d by a d e f i n i t e development of t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s and the i n t e r c o u r s e corresponding to these, up to i t s f u r t h e s t forms. Consciousness can never be anything e l s e than c o n s c i o u s e x i s t e n c e , and the e x i s t e n c e of men i s t h e i r a c t u a l l i f e - p r o c e s s . 2 6 To t h i s extent, an i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t can comprehend i t s e l f only when i t r e a l i z e s i t s h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d s o c i a l r o l e i n the c o n t e x t of m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . In Marxian t h i n k i n g each stage of h i s t o r y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s d i s t i n c t i v e mode of p r o d u c t i o n , which i s a s p e c i f i c combination of f o r c e s and r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . Habermas e x p l a i n s the Marxian terms: f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n c o n s i s t s of l a b o r f o r c e , p r o d u c t i o n technology and knowledge f o r o r g a n i z i n g the l a b o r f o r c e ; 2 7 r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n are s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and mechanisms which determine how f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n are u t i l i z e d , and i n d i r e c t l y , how s o c i a l l y produced wealth i s d i s t r i b u t e d . 2 8 Based on these two Marxian concepts, Habermas introduces two of h i s own: i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n and communicative a c t i o n . Instrumental a c t i o n i s p r o d u c t i v e work aiming at the t e c h n i c a l c o n t r o l of n a t u r e . 2 9 As a r e s u l t of p r o d u c t i v e work, human m a t e r i a l needs can be s a t i s f i e d ; humans can f r e e themselves from nature imposed s u f f e r i n g s such as hunger and c o l d . Hence i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n i s r e l a t e d to f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n . 3 0 21 Communicative a c t i o n i s human i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i n the framework of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s : i t i n c l u d e s the r e g u l a t i o n of human r e l a t i o n s h i p through e s t a b l i s h e d norms as w e l l as s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . Hence communicative a c t i o n i s connected to r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . 3 1 Habermas probably i s not suggesting that c e r t a i n human a c t i o n s are e x c l u s i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l while others are e x c l u s i v e l y communicative; i n f a c t most human a c t i o n s seem to c o n s i s t of both components, a l b e i t with v a r y i n g p r o p o r t i o n s . Habermas makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between these two concepts i n order t o diagnose a s e r i o u s problem inherent i n Marx. Marx p l a c e d so much emphasis on m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n that he seemed to have taken f o r granted that s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s e x i s t i n order to serve the purpose of m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n ; i n other words, f o r c e s of pr o d u c t i o n and r e l a t i o n s of pr o d u c t i o n appeared to him d i f f e r e n t aspects of a u n i f i e d p r o c e s s . But Marx was by no means a naive t h i n k e r . The Hegel and Marx s c h o l a r Shlomo A v i n e r i observes: [Marx] a t t r i b u t e s to human mind the c a p a c i t y to evolve a model of the f i n a l product p r i o r to the p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e of the product i t s e l f . The way i n which Marx t r e a t s t h i s problem s t r o n g l y suggests that he d i d not lo s e s i g h t of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l dilemma i n v o l v e d , though he d i d not s p e l l out the process through which the i d e a l model i s c r e a t e d i n man's mind p r i o r to m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . 3 2 Marx was aware of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n h i s m a t e r i a l i s t c o nception of h i s t o r y , but unable to sol v e i t . The problem that Habermas attempts to grapple with i s s i m i l a r to the one A v i n e r i p o i n t s out. A c c o r d i n g to Habermas, the d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s from Marx's f a i l u r e to d i s t i n g u i s h i n s t r u m e n t a l and communicative a c t i o n s as 22 two types of a c t i o n , each having i t s own l o g i c of o p e r a t i o n and i t s own development i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s . He maintains i t h a t the two developments do not converge, although they are i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . 3 3 In a l a t e r work, Habermas c l a r i f i e s h i s view on t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p : The r u l e s of communicative a c t i o n do develop i n r e a c t i o n to changes i n the domain of i n s t r u m e n t a l and s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n ; but i n doing so they f o l l o w t h e i r own l o g i c . 3 4 Thus the " i d e a l model" of p r o d u c t i o n f o l l o w s the l o g i c of communicative a c t i o n , not i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n - a concept Marx d i d not e n t e r t a i n . The s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s , as Habermas sees i t , i s not a u n i f i e d process but a product of two r e l a t i v e l y independent p r o c e s s e s . In Habermas' view, a major consequence of Marx's inadequate conception of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process i s that i t v i t i a t e s the l a t t e r ' s c r i t i q u e of i d e o l o g y . We have seen t h a t , f o r Marx, ideas i n s o c i e t y are c o n d i t i o n e d by the mode of p r o d u c t i o n . But Marx c a r r i e s i t f u r t h e r ; he claims these ideas represent thoughts of the domineering c l a s s i n that p a r t i c u l a r mode of p r o d u c t i o n : The ideas of the r u l i n g c l a s s are i n every epoch the r u l i n g i d e a s , i . e . the c l a s s which i s the r u l i n g m a t e r i a l f o r c e of s o c i e t y , i s at the same time i t s r u l i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l f o r c e . 3 5 A c e r t a i n type of r u l i n g ideas i s necessary to j u s t i f y a r u l i n g p o s i t i o n . In other words, a r u l i n g c l a s s i s compelled, merely i n order to c a r r y through i t s aim, to r e p r e s e n t i t s i n t e r e s t as the common i n t e r e s t of a l l the members of s o c i e t y , that i s , expressed i n i d e a l f o r m . 3 6 T h i s i s the use of i d e o l o g y . 23 • The Marxian c r i t i q u e of ideology i s based on three r e l a t e d premises. F i r s t , there i s a d e f i n i t e c l a s s s t r u c t u r e i n s o c i e t y : the r u l i n g c l a s s and the n o n - r u l i n g c l a s s ( e s ) . Second, the r u l i n g c l a s s c o n t r o l s the means of m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s i s performed at the expense of the n o n - r u l i n g c l a s s ( e s ) (although the r u l i n g c l a s s a l s o s u f f e r s under t h i s mode of p r o d u c t i o n , without i t s r e a l i z i n g i t ) . T h i r d , the r u l i n g c l a s s j u s t i f i e s i t s p o s i t i o n with an i d e o l o g y . In l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m , the two b a s i c c l a s s e s are the bourgeoise and the p r o l e t a r i a t , with the former c o n t r o l l i n g the means of p r o d u c t i o n . The l e g i t i m a t i o n b a s i s of l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m i s the p r i n c i p l e of e q u i v a l e n t exchange of la b o r and commodities. Marx's c r i t i q u e of p o l i t i c a l economy (the c a p i t a l -i s t mode of production) has demonstrated the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of e q u i v a l e n t exchange under l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m . To t h i s extent, Marx has unmasked the bourgeois ideology - an accomplishment Habermas acknowledges. 3 7 However, s i n c e the l a t e 19th century, l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m has been g r a d u a l l y r e p l a c e d by s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m . And co r r e s p o n d i n g l y , a c c o r d i n g to Habermas, the ideology of e q u i v a l e n t exchange has been s u b s t i t u t e d with a t e c h n o c r a t i c background i d e o l o g y . Now the q u e s t i o n Habermas r a i s e s i s , can Marxian theory adequately perform a c r i t i q u e of t h i s new ideolo g y . Under the new ideology, Habermas observes, the primary s o c i e t a l goal i s system maintenance: t h i s i n c l u d e s economic s t a b i l i t y and growth as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l employment s e c u r i t y . 24 income s t a b i l i t y , s o c i a l welfare and o p p o r t u n i t y f o r upward m o b i l i t y . To t h i s end, p o l i t i c s i s " o r i e n t e d toward the e l i m i n a t i o n of d y s f u n c t i o n s and avoidance of r i s k s that threaten the s y s t e m " . 3 8 Thus the l e g i t i m a t i o n b a s i s of s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m i s e x c l u s i v e l y t e c h n o c r a t i c m a n i p u l a t i o n of s o c i e t y for the purpose of system maintenance. As f a r as Habermas i s concerned, t h i s way of t h i n k i n g i s an i d e o l o g y . For i t "makes a f e t i s h " of the progress of s c i e n c e and t e c h n o l o g y ; 3 9 i t shuts out q u e s t i o n s on whether t e c h n o c r a t i c measures c o n t r i b u t e to o v e r a l l human development i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i o n of mankind. Habermas p o i n t s out: "The q u e s t i o n i s not whether we completely u t i l i z e an a v a i l a b l e ' or c r e a t a b l e p o t e n t i a l , but whether we choose what we want f o r the purpose of the p a c i f i c a t i o n and g r a t i f i c a t i o n of e x i s t e n c e . " " 0 The answer to the f i r s t q u e s t i o n i s expressed i n t e c h n i c a l terms; i t i s c o n t i n u o u s l y being worked out i n s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . The second q u e s t i o n r e f e r s to s o c i e t a l members' r e f l e c t i o n s on the kind of s o c i e t y they d e s i r e ; i t i s by no means a t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n . Hence the answer to i t n e c e s s i t a t e s u n r e s t r a i n e d communication among members of s o c i e t y . I t i s Habermas' c o n t e n t i o n that the new ideology e l i m i n a t e s the second q u e s t i o n . Habermas n o t i c e s t h a t , u n l i k e the case of l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m , c l a s s s t r u c t u r e i n s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m cannot be c l e a r l y d e f i n e d . He argues that the new ideology t h r i v e s on "a p o l i t i c a l form of d i s t r i b u t i n g s o c i a l rewards that guarantees mass l o y a l i t y " . " 1 The new system f u r n i s h e s everybody with p r i v a t i z e d m a t e r i a l goods, l e i s u r e time and achievement 25 o p p o r t u n i t i e s so that c a p i t a l i s t s , managers, p r o f e s s i o n a l s , s k i l l e d and u n s k i l l e d workers a l i k e share the same i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g the system. Besides, the p o l i t i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n mechanism makes t e c h n o c r a t i c adjustments according t o p u b l i c demands. Hence s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m does not f i t i n t o the framework of Marxian a n a l y s i s . A c c o r d i n g to Habermas, the fundamental problem with s o c i e t y today i s not so much a t e c h n i c a l one as a communicative one. Since Marx d i d not d i f f e r e n t i a t e the l o g i c of communicative a c t i o n from t h a t of i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n , Habermas concludes t h a t Marxian theory i s no longer e f f e c t i v e . A g a i n s t P o s i t i v i s m D e s p i t e the s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s Hegel and Marx made to the concept of knowledge, Habermas laments that these t h i n k e r s simultaneously s t r i p p e d the c r i t i q u e of knowledge of i t s c u t t i n g edge. T h i s p e r m i t t e d p o s i t i v i s m to f l u o r i s h i n the 19th and 20th c e n t u r i e s . * 2 Habermas c h a r a c t e r i z e s p o s i t i v i s m as f o l l o w s : i t takes the achievements of s c i e n c e s f o r granted; knowledge i s d e f i n e d as the f i n d i n g s of s c i e n c e s ( i . e . r e s u l t s of the s c i e n t i f i c method); the l i m i t s of knowledge correspond to the l i m i t s of the s c i e n t i f i c method; anything that i s not p o t e n t i a l l y v e r i f i a b l e by s c i e n c e i s rendered meaningless. P o s i t i v i s m r e p l a c e s epistemology with the philosophy of s c i e n c e . The l a t t e r only aims at improving s c i e n t i f i c methodology; i t o b l i t e r a t e s the knowing s u b j e c t i n the name of o b j e c t i v i t y . Thus i n Habermas' 26 view, the p o s i t i v i s t concept of knowledge i s a r e g r e s s i o n to the pre-Kantian l e v e l . " 3 C e r t a i n l y Habermas r e a l i z e s that p o s i t i v i s m , a p a r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e toward s c i e n c e , does not c o i n c i d e with s c i e n c e i t s e l f . But he denounces p o s i t i v i s m ' s l a c k of fundamental q u e s t i o n i n g of sc i e n c e : By making a dogma of the s c i e n c e s ' b e l i e f i n themselves, p o s i t i v i s m assumes the p r o h i b i t i v e f u n c t i o n of p r o t e c t i n g s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y from e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . 1 I t i s c l e a r that Habermas c o n s i d e r s p o s i t i v i s m to be an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the t e c h n o c r a t i c i d e o l o g y : p o s i t i v i s m and t h i s i d eology r e i n f o r c e each other. For t h i s reason p o s i t i v i s m becomes Habermas' prime t a r g e t of a t t a c k i n h i s c r i t i q u e of knowledge. Against the main c u r r e n t of p o s i t i v i s m , a c c o r d i n g to Habermas, the l a t e 19th century saw the beginning of s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n of the s c i e n c e s . Habermas i d e n t i f i e s two of the p i o n e e r s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n as C h a r l e s Sanders P e i r c e (1839-1914) i n the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s and Wilhelm D i l t h e y (1833-1911) i n the human s c i e n c e s . P e i r c e ' s R e f l e c t i o n on N a t u r a l Sciences P e i r c e was somewhat c a u t i o u s about the p o s i t i v i s t a t t i t u d e toward the v a l i d i t y of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . While the p o s i t i v i s t s ' major concern was to c l a r i f y the s c i e n t i f i c method w i t h i n the e s t a b l i s h e d framework, P e i r c e took a s t e p beyond. He i n q u i r e d i n t o the procedure in which s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s were e s t a b l i s h e d . T h i s l e d him to take i n t o account s c i e n t i s t s i n a d d i t i o n to s c i e n c e s themselves."" In other words, P e i r c e 27 introduced an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e element i n h i s l o g i c of i n q u i r y . Instead of r e l y i n g on an o b j e c t i v e s c i e n t i f i c method alone, P e i r c e d e f i n e d s c i e n t i f i c knowledge to be the kind of i n f o r m a t i o n whose v a l i d i t y i s accepted through the consensus of a community of i n q u i r e r s . Habermas e x p l a i n s : True means for him [ P e i r c e ] i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that have stood up to i n d e f i n i t e l y repeated t e s t s and are i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d i n the long run. From t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of r e a l i t y P e i r c e can conclude that e v e r y t h i n g r e a l i s knowable and t h a t , i n s o f a r as we know r e a l i t y , we know i t as i t i s . 4 5 Since consensus i s not always ob t a i n e d and any consensus obtained i s s u b j e c t to change, v a l i d i t y of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge cannot be d e f i n i t e at any p o i n t of time. But P e i r c e had confidence i n the s c i e n t i f i c method and i n s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s . He b e l i e v e d t h a t a d e f i n i t e answer would be a v a i l a b l e i f the process of i n q u i r y proceeds f a r enough: the s t r u c t u r e of s c i e n t i f i c method granantees i t . 4 6 Put d i f f e r e n t l y , nobody can be c e r t a i n about i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i f i c f i n d i n g s , whose v a l i d i t y i s s ubject to continuous r e v i s i o n s through the process of i n q u i r y ; yet i n p r i n c i p l e a d e f i n i t e answer i s forthcoming. Habermas observes that P e i r c e ' s n o t i o n of knowledge a c q u i s i t i o n makes sense only i f one c r u c i a l c o n d i t i o n i s f u l f i l l e d : "the assumption of a c t u a l progress i n s c i e n t i f i c knowledge". 4 7 With t h i s assumption, Habermas argues, P e i r c e succumbed to an o b j e c t i v i s m he d i d not r e a l i z e : The f a c t of s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s induces P e i r c e to d e f i n e u n i v e r s a l p r o p o s i t i o n s e x c l u s i v e l y i n r e l a t i o n to the a n t i c i p a t e d end of the process of i n q u i r y as a whole and yet to assume at the same time t h a t , i n i n c r e a s i n g measure, we o b j e c t i v e l y a r r i v e a t the t r u e statements even before the consummation of t h i s process - d e s p i t e s u b j e c t i v e 28 u n c e r t a i n t y about the t r u t h value of every s i n g l e one of these statements." 8 What P e i r c e d i d was a s o f t e n i n g of the edges of o b j e c t i v e s c i e n c e s without renouncing them; he kept the door open to i n q u i r y at a l l times. With h i s emphasis on a community of i n q u i r e r s P e i r c e i n t r o d u c e d the concept of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y to the c r i t i q u e of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. U n l i k e Kant, whose c r i t i q u e was based on the i n d i v i d u a l knowing s u b j e c t independent of the l i f e - w o r l d , P e i r c e ' s c r i t i q u e was based on the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of a community of s c i e n t i s t s a f f e c t e d by experiences i n the l i f e -world. Thus i n Habermas' view P e i r c e advanced beyond Kant i n t h i s r e s p e c t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Habermas i n d i c a t e s t hat P e i r c e d i d not adequately c o n c e p t u a l i z e "the ground of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i n which i n v e s t i g a t o r s are always a l r e a d y s i t u a t e d when'they attempt to b r i n g about consensus about m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l problems".* 9 According to Habermas, t h i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s grounded i n communicative a c t i o n , which does not f o l l o w the l o g i c of i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n : The communication of i n v e s t i g a t o r s r e q u i r e s the use of language that i s not c o n f i n e d to the l i m i t s of t e c h n i c a l c o n t r o l over o b j e c t i f i e d n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s . I t a r i s e s from symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n between s o c i e t a l s u b j e c t s who r e c i p r o c a l l y know and reco g n i z e each other as unmistakable i n d i v i d u a l s . 5 0 In the way t h a t he c r i t i z e s Marx, Habermas f i n d s P e i r c e ' s major weakness i n h i s i n a b i l i t y to make a proper d i s t i n c t i o n between communicative and i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n s . In Habermas' view, only human s c i e n c e s - which d e a l with communicative a c t i o n - can shed 29 l i g h t on the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y which has been presupposed i n any n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ; 5 1 s i n c e P e i r c e d i d not see t h i s , h i s s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s l a c k e d a genuine b i t e on . p o s i t i v i s m . D i l t h e y ' s R e f l e c t i o n on Human Sciences One of D i l t h e y ' s most renowned c o n t r i b u t i o n s to human sc i e n c e s i s h i s formal d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s . The d i f f e r e n c e , a c c o r d i n g to him, i s not so much i n the o b j e c t of study as i n the a t t i t u d e of the knowing s u b j e c t toward the o b j e c t of study. He p o i n t s cut t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , although both p h y s i o l o g y and psychology study humans, the former i s a n a t u r a l s c i e n c e whereas the l a t t e r i s a human s c i e n c e . 5 2 The c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n of n a t u r a l science i s " e x p l a n a t i o n " : 5 3 systematic f o r m u l a t i o n of experiences i n t o n a t u r a l laws of ca u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s so that c o n t r o l of the n a t u r a l world becomes p o s s i b l e through the study of i t s l a w s . 5 " In c o n t r a s t , the c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n of human scie n c e i s " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " : 5 5 g r a s p i n g of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i n l i f e e x p r e s s i o n s so that r e p r o d u c t i o n of ex p r e s s i o n s becomes p o s s i b l e under a p p r o p r i a t e s i t u a t i o n s i n l i f e . Reproduction of expressions i s governed by a system of i n t e r a c t i o n s (Wirkgunqszusammenhanq) 5 6 i n which "common v a l u e s and o r d e r l y procedures f o r r e a l i z i n g them are e s t a b l i s h e d and accepted as u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y v a l i d " . 5 7 With t h i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n of c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s , two kinds of s u b j e c t -matter f o r s c i e n c e s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d : The range of human s c i e n c e s i s determined by the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of l i f e i n the e x t e r n a l world. 30 S p i r i t can only understand what i t has c r e a t e d . Nature, the subject-matter of the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , embraces the r e a l i t y which has a r i s e n independently of the a c t i v i t y of s p i r i t . E v e r y t h i n g on which man has a c t i v e l y impressed h i s stamp forms the s u b j e c t -matter of human s c i e n c e s . 5 8 H a i l i n g the Heg e l i a n n o t i o n of embodiment of S p i r i t "a profound and f o r t u n a t e c r e a t i o n " , 5 9 D i l t h e y m o d i f i e d i t i n t o h i s own concept of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of l i f e . Instead of seeing the world as m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the cosmic order, D i l t h e y p e r c e i v e s s o c i e t y as the t o t a l i t y of human l i f e e x p r e s s i o n s ; i We must s t a r t from the r e a l i t y of l i f e : l i f e c o n t a i n s the sum of a l l mental a c t i v i t i e s ( d ie  T o t a l i t a e t des s e e l i s c h e n Zusammenhanges). Hegel c o n s t r u c t e d m e t a p h y s i c a l l y , we analyze the g i v e n . 6 0 While human s c i e n c e s are concerned with mental a c t i v i t i e s , D i l t h e y s t r e s s e s t h a t they are not independent of nature: "human sc i e n c e s embrace many p h y s i c a l f a c t s and are based on knowledge of the p h y s i c a l w o r l d " . 6 1 Thus D i l t h e y d e s c r i b e s h i s approach to human s c i e n c e s : I s t a r t from the p h y s i c a l world as I see i t , I n o t i c e that mental f a c t s have t h e i r p l a c e i n the temporal and s p a t i a l arrangements of the e x t e r n a l world T h i s i s the o r i g i n of the s c i e n t i f i c approach which proceeds from the e x t e r n a l t o the i n t e r n a l , from m a t e r i a l to mental c h a n g e s . 6 2 T h i s approach f o l l o w s from the no t i o n that l i f e i s o b j e c t i f i e d i n the n a t u r a l world. D i l t h e y 1 s main i n t e r e s t i n human s c i e n c e i s the study of i t s methodology. As a r e s u l t of the d i f f e r e n c e i n o r i e n t a t i o n between n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s the e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c methodology of the former i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the l a t t e r . In human s c i e n c e s the knowing sub j e c t and the subject-matter of study cannot be c l e a r l y separated. T h i s i s due to the 31 p e c u l i a r i t y of "understanding". In D i l t h e y ' s way of t h i n k i n g there i s an in t i m a t e i n t e r r e l a t i o n (Zusammenhang) of l i f e , e x p r e s s i o n and understanding which manifests i t s e l f i n everyday i n t e r p e r s o n a l communication and i n s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s : 6 3 We can only know o u r s e l v e s thoroughly through understanding; but we cannot understand o u r s e l v e s and others except by p r o j e c t i n g what we have a c t u a l l y experienced i n t o every e x p r e s s i o n of our own and o t h e r s ' l i v e s . So man becomes the s u b j e c t -matter of human s c i e n c e s only when we r e l a t e e xperience, e x p r e s s i o n and understanding t o each other.«• For D i l t h e y the proper methodology f o r human s c i e n c e s i s h e r m e n e u t i c s . 6 5 The subject-matter f o r understanding i s a " t e x t " , as the l i f e - w o r l d (or p a r t of i t ) i s c a l l e d i n the context of hermeneutical s c i e n c e s . There i s a h i s t o r i c a l reason f o r the use of the term t e x t . In the e a r l y days hermeneutics d e a l t with the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of holy s c r i p t u r e s and c l a s s i c l i t e r a t u r e , i . e . w r i t t e n t e x t s . Since the 18th century i t was g e n e r a l l y h e l d t h a t , understanding of a h i s t o r i c a l t e x t r e q u i r e s the i n t e r p r e t e r to imagine h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f to be p a r t of the l i f e - w o r l d of that p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l era i n q u e s t i o n . 6 6 D i l t h e y extended t h i s concept of understanding to human s c i e n c e s i n g e n e r a l , whose subejet-matter of study - the l i f e - w o r l d (or pa r t of i t ) - resembles a w r i t t e n t e x t i n many ways. 6 7 As methodology, the task of hermeneutics i s t e x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Hermeneutical understanding "can be d e s c r i b e d as a p r o j e c t i o n of the s e l f i n t o some given e x p r e s s i o n " : 6 8 I t c o u l d not be c o n s i d e r e d simply as an a c t of thought; t r a n s p o s i t i o n , r e - c r e a t i o n (Nachbilden), r e - e x p e r i e n c i n g (Nacherleben), - these f a c t s p o i n t e d 32 toward the t o t a l i t y of mental l i f e which was a c t i v e i n i t . In t h i s respect i t i s connected with experience which, a f t e r a l l , i s merely a becoming aware of the whole mental r e a l i t y i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . So a l l understanding c o n t a i n s something i r r a t i o n a l because l i f e i s i r r a t i o n a l ; i t cannot be represented by a l o g i c a l f o r m u l a . 6 9 To the extent the i n t e r p r e t e r of a t e x t must imagine himse l f or h e r s e l f to become p a r t of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process of the t e x t (to r e - c r e a t e i t , re-experience i t ) i n order to understand, t h e r e cannot be a standard way to understand, nor can the v a l i d i t y of any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n be v e r i f i e d e m p i r i c a l l y . Now here i s a dilemma. On the one hand, an i n t e r p r e t e r has immediate access t o merely one p a r t of the content of a t e x t a t a time: i t i s impossible f o r anyone to grasp the content of the e n t i r e text at the beginning of a reading; he or she can only attempt t o understand the t e x t g r a d u a l l y , p a r t by p a r t . On the other hand, s i n c e every p a r t of a text i s an e x p r e s s i o n of the l i f e - w o r l d , and the meaning of an e x p r e s s i o n cannot be e s t a b l i s h e d o u t s i d e of the context of the l i f e - w o r l d to which the e x p r e s s i o n belongs, understanding of p a r t s i s impossible without understanding the whole. T h i s i s a problem p e c u l i a r to hermeneutics known as the "hermeneutical c i r c l e " : " i t [ i s ] only p o s s i b l e to understand a p a r t i n terms of i t s p l a c e i n a l a r g e r whole, yet the whole [can] only become comprehensible i n terms of i t s p a r t s " . 7 0 But the hermeneutical c i r c l e i s not a v i c i o u s c i r c l e , as i t might f i r s t appear to be. T h i s i s due to hermeneutics' immediate p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n to l i f e . D i l t h e y p o i n t s out that s o c i a l l i f e always f o l l o w s some p r i n c i p l e of o r g a n i z a t i o n ; i t i s never 33 completely c h a o t i c . He argues that a p r i n c i p l e of o r g a n i z a t i o n can occur only because there i s meaning i n l i f e : The c a t e g o r y of meaning d e s i g n a t e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p , inherent i n l i f e , of p a r t s of a l i f e to the whole The meaning of a past moment ... i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r communal l i f e because the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r v e n e d i n the shaping of mankind c o n t r i b u t e d to i t with h i s e s s e n t i a l being The p a r t i c u l a r moment gains meaning from i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the whole, from the connection between past and f u t u r e , between i n d i v i d u a l and mankind. 7 1 I t i s the e x i s t e n c e of a coherence i n s o c i a l meaning that g i v e s r i s e t o a p r i n c i p l e of o r g a n i z a t i o n . But n e i t h e r meaning nor s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s f i x e d ; they keep b u i l d i n g on the past i n a s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s : Our view of the meaning of l i f e changes c o n s t a n t l y . Every p l a n f o r your l i f e express a view of the meaning of l i f e . The purposes we set f o r the f u t u r e are determined by the meaning we give to the p a s t . 7 2 Now the i n t e r r e l a t i o n of experience, e x p r e s s i o n and understanding can be b e t t e r i l l u s t r a t e d with the concept of meaning. "An experience i s a u n i t made up of p a r t s l i n k e d by a common meaning" and "every e x p r e s s i o n has a meaning i n so f a r i t i s a s i g n which s i g n i f i e s or p o i n t s t o something that i s pa r t of l i f e " . 7 3 With experience, one can understand how c e r t a i n p a r t s of l i f e , r e p r esented by ex p r e s s i o n s , are connected to the whole. T h i s i s the way one understands the meaning of an e x p r e s s i o n . In order to approach the hermeneutical c i r c l e an i n t e r p r e t e r must s t a r t out with some preconceived c o n c e p t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l i f e - w o r l d , no matter how inadequate t h i s c o nception may be. As the i n t e r p r e t e r experiences t h i s l i f e - w o r l d , he or she attempts to i n t e g r a t e i n d i v i d u a l e x p r e s s i o n s i n terms of t h i s c o n c e p t i o n . F u r t h e r 34 experience r e v e a l s i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s between e x p r e s s i o n s and the pre c o n c e i v e d conception, which leads to a c o r r e c t i o n of the l a t t e r . Attempts are again made to i n t e g r a t e experiences i n terms of the c o r r e c t e d c o n c e p t i o n . With each r e p e t i t i o n of t h i s procedure the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s imagined s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process p r o g r e s s i v e l y resembles the kind i n the t e x t ; he or she g r a d u a l l y d i s c o v e r s the coherence i n meaning i n the l i f e - w o r l d under study. Consequently h i s or her understanding improves: the hermeneutical c i r c l e does not r e t u r n to i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . T h i s way of approaching the hermeneutical c i r c l e has been c h a r a c t e r i z e d as "a s p i r a l approximation toward g r e a t e r accuracy and knowledge". 7" Although the hermeneutical method l a c k s the r i g o r of the e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c method of the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , D i l t h e y d i d not abandon the n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y : Every s c i e n c e i m p l i e s a c l a i m to v a l i d i t y . I f there are to be s t r i c t l y s c i e n t i f i c human s c i e n c e s they must aim more c o n s c i o u s l y and c r i t i c a l l y at v a l i d i t y . 7 5 D i l t h e y r e a l i z e d there i s a c o n f l i c t between the goal of o b j e c t i v i t y i n human s c i e n c e s and the notion that knowledge i n these s c i e n c e s a r i s e s from l i f e . He b e l i e v e d t h i s problem can be s o l v e d by c o n s i d e r i n g an o b j e c t i v e system of i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n each c u l t u r e : I f i n d the p r i n c i p l e f o r the settlement of the c o n f l i c t w i t h i n these s c i e n c e s i n the understanding of the h i s t o r i c a l world as a system of i n t e r a s t i o n s c e n t e r e d on i t s e l f ; each i n d i v i d u a l system of i n t e r a c t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n i t has, through the p o s i t i n g of valu e s and t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n , i t s center w i t h i n i t s e l f , but a l l are s t r u c t u r a l l y l i n k e d i n t o a whole i n which the meaning of the whole web of the s o c i a l - h i s t o r i c a l world a r i s e s from the s i g n i f i c a n c e 35 of the i n d i v i d u a l p a r t s ; thus every value-judgment and every purpose p r o j e c t e d i n t o the f u t u r e must be based e x c l u s i v e l y on these s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n -s h i p s . 7 6 Thus D i l t h e y was convinced that' the hermeneutical method c o u l d be and should be o b j e c t i v e i n i t s own f a s h i o n : i f the i n t e r p r e t e r keeps working on the part-whole r e l a t i o n , e v e n t u a l l y , i n p r i n c i p l e , the hermeneutical c i r c l e can be d i s s o l v e d and the s o c i a l - h i s t o r i c a l world under study would then present i t s e l f to the i n t e r p r e t e r o b j e c t i v e l y . Put d i f f e r e n t l y , D i l t h e y assumed the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n e u t r a l o bserver: while i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t e r s take t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n s as p o i n t s of departure, they are supposed to a r r i v e at the same d e s t i n a t i o n . Habermas a p p r e c i a t e s the advancement D i l t h e y made re g a r d i n g human s c i e n c e s . But he a l s o exposes the l a t t e r ' s major weakness. What D i l t h e y ignored, a c c o r d i n g t o Habermas, was th a t a l l s c i e n c e s are governed by " i n t e r e s t s " . Here Habermas i n t r o d u c e s the concepts of t e c h n i c a l and p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s . The former governs the viewpoint of p o s s i b l e t e c h n i c a l c o n t r o l ; i t i s the c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t behind i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n and the b a s i s of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . The l a t t e r governs the viewpoint of e f f e c t i v e communication; i t i s the c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t behind communicative a c t i o n and the b a s i s of human s c i e n c e s . 7 7 When Habermas speaks of p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t he uses the term " p r a c t i c a l " not i n the o r d i n a r y sense but i n a Kantian sense. In Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and C r i t i q u e of  P r a c t i c a l Reason Kant d i s c u s s e s the m o r a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n ; what i s p r a c t i c a l to him i s always t i e d to m o r a l i t y . 7 8 36 C e r t a i n l y Habermas does not s u b s c r i b e to the Kantian a p r i o r i n otion of m o r a l i t y , but he i n h e r i t s the moral c o n n o t a t i o n of the word " p r a c t i c a l " . 7 9 For Habermas, human i n t e r a c t i o n i s always anchored i n norms and s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ; e f f e c t i v e communication r e q u i r e s o b s e r v a t i o n of norms. I t i s i n t h i s sense that he c a l l s communicative a c t i o n p r a c t i c a l . 8 0 "The p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t d e f i n e s the l e v e l of hermeneutics i t s e l f a p r i o r i i n the same way that the t e c h n i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t d e f i n e s the framework of the e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c s c i e n c e s . " 8 1 T h i s , a c c o r d i n g to Habermas, i s what D i l t h e y f a i l e d to r e a l i z e . As we s h a l l see l a t e r , Gadamer shows that understanding a te x t i s not a matter of t r a n s p o s i n g o n e s e l f i n t o the t e x t , r e -c r e a t i n g and r e - e x p e r i e n c i n g the t e x t . Rather, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s analogous to a d i a l o g u e , with i n t e r p r e t e r and t e x t as c o n v e r s a t i o n p a r t n e r s . The i n t e r p r e t e r does not simply r e c e i v e i n f o r m a t i o n from the t e x t ; he or she helps c r e a t e i t . L e a r n i n g from Gadamer, Habermas develops a s i m i l a r argument a g a i n s t D i l t h e y : s i n c e D i l t h e y p e r c e i v e d the i n t e r p r e t e r as an observer of the t e x t i n s t e a d of a p a r t i c i p a n t communicating with the t e x t , he c o u l d not see that the hermeneutical process i t s e l f i t s e l f i s governed by norms. 8 2 Thus i n Habermas' view D i l t h e y ' s way of t h i n k i n g e l i m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n of human s c i e n c e s at a higher l e v e l . The d i s t i n c t i o n D i l t h e y made between n a t u r a l and human scie n c e s i s c r u c i a l to the foundation of Habermas' c r i t i c a l theory. L a r g e l y based on t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n Habermas develops h i s own c a t e g o r i e s of a c t i o n and c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t . While 37 i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n and t e c h n i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t correspond to n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , communicative a c t i o n and p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t correspond to human s c i e n c e s . On can t e l l t hat D i l t h e y ' s i n f l u e n c e on Habermas i s immense. 8 3 Notion of Emancipation Habermas c o n s i d e r s the above mentioned concept of two c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s inadequate f o r a c r i t i q u e of s o c i e t y . For him, these two i n t e r e s t s e s s e n t i a l l y e x p l a i n the f u n c t i o n i n g of the s t a t u s quo but they do not r e v e a l the d i r e c t i o n i n which s o c i e t y moves. For t h i s reason he introduced a t h i r d element, c a l l e d emancipatory c o g n i t i v e ' i n t e r e s t , which guides the d i r e c t i o n s of the two "lower" i n t e r e s t s . Habermas d e r i v e s t h i s element of h i s theory from Hegel and Marx. I t was Hegel who developed the concept of mankind moving i n the d i r e c t i o n of g r e a t e r freedom, consciousness and r a t i o n a l i t y i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s . More p r e c i s e l y , mankind was seen to be p r o g r e s s i n g toward g r e a t e r freedom through s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n in a process guided by Reason. The Hegelian n o t i o n of Reason i s "the t h i n k i n g which f o l l o w s r e a l i t y i n i t s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and t h e r e f o r e can see each l e v e l t u r n s i n t o the next one". 8* T h i s kind of t h i n k i n g i s s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n on e x p e r i e n c e s . I t r e v e a l s how mankind can overcome i t s a d v e r s i t i e s and advance to a higher l e v e l of freedom. The beauty of Reason, i n Habermas' view, i s the s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e power i t c o n t a i n s ; 8 5 i t permits mankind to search f o r a b r i g h t e r f u t u r e unobscured by the ideology of any h i s t o r i c a l epoch. "The act of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n t h a t 'changes a 38 l i f e ' i s a movement of e m a n c i p a t i o n . " 8 6 Habermas thus i n c o r p o r a t e s Reason i n t o h i s own theory as emancipatory c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t , which i s an o r i e n t a t i o n toward freedom and "aims at the p u r s u i t of r e f l e c t i o n " . 8 7 L i k e many other Hegelian n o t i o n s , Reason i s not f i x e d ; i t has to be a c t u a l i z e d i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s . By the same token, the s p e c i f i c content of emancipatory c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t e v o l v e s . But Habermas observes that the n o t i o n of Reason p l a c e s e x c e s s i v e emphasis on thought. He maintains that emancipation can only be r e a l i z e d i n the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . 8 8 Marx has a l r e a d y shown t h a t human freedom at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l i n c l u d e s freedom from n a t u r a l n e c e s s i t y as w e l l as freedom from i n t e r f e r i n g power of other humans. 8 9 Habermas argues that while emancipation from nature-imposed requirements i s achieved i n i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n , emancipation from human r e p r e s s i o n can only be achieved through u n d i s t o r t e d communicative a c t i o n . 9 0 Hence a l l knowledge and a c t i o n , and indeed, t e c h n i c a l and p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s , are u l t i m a t e l y guided by an i n t e r e s t i n emancipation. More a c c u r a t e l y , we should say these i n t e r e s t s are embodied i n a l l knowledge and a c t i o n s i n c e , as Habermas s t r e s s e s , i n t e r e s t i s not e x t e r n a l to knowledge and a c t i o n . 9 1 For Habermas, f r e e i n g communication from d i s t o r t i o n r e q u i r e s s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n ; i t i s not a by-product of a change of the mode of p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s c l e a r Habermas' n o t i o n of emancipation owes as much to Hegel as to Marx. 39 The P s y c h o a n a l y t i c Model In order to f a c i l i t a t e s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l , Habermas seeks to develop a c r i t i c a l s c i e n c e . T h i s s c i e n c e i s intended to generate knowledge f o r r e d i r e c t i n g a "deviant s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s " 9 2 through s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n ; i n other words, i t i s to be a v e h i c l e f o r the emancipation of mankind. 9 3 To t h i s end Habermas adopts p s y c h o a n a l y s i s as the model of h i s c r i t i c a l s c i e n c e : P s y c h o a n a l y s i s i s r e l e v a n t to us as the only t a n g i b l e example of a s c i e n c e i n c o r p o r a t i n g methodical s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . The b i r t h of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s opens up the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r r i v i n g at the dimension t h a t p o s i t i v i s m c l o s e d o f f , and of doing so i n a methodological manner that a r i s e s out of the l o g i c of i n q u i r y . 9 " Dream a n a l y s i s - the hallmark of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s - i s a type of t e x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Habermas c o n s i d e r s p s y c h o a n a l y s i s to be a m o d i f i e d hermeneutical s c i e n c e ; but he a l s o p o i n t s out that the former i n c l u d e s a dimension not found i n D i l t h e y ' s methodology. While D i l t h e y r e s t r i c t e d h i s i n q u i r y to c o n s c i o u s l y intended e x p r e s s i o n s i n the l i f e - w o r l d , Freud (1856-1939) focused h i s a t t e n t i o n on unconscious meaning s t r u c t u r e s (Sinnzusammenhaenge) d i s c l o s e d i n h i s p a t i e n t ' s dreams. For D i l t h e y , a s u b j e c t ' s l i f e e x p r e s s i o n s can i n p r i n c i p l e be completely understood by the s u b j e c t i t s e l f . Inadequate or u n i n t e l l i g i b l e e x p r e s s i o n s , i . e . d i s t o r t i o n s from what i s intended, are c o n s i d e r e d a c c i d e n t s ; they play no s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the methodology. For Freud, however, omissions and d i s t o r t i o n s i n a. dream tex t must be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a n a l y z e d . A f t e r a s c r e e n i n g process, the contents l e f t are the r e a l "dream symbols", which are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by 40 t h e i r r e s i s t e n c e to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Yet i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of dream symbols i s p r e c i s e l y the task of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . Habermas observes t h a t , u n l i k e D i l t h e y ' s hermeneutics, which d i s c o v e r s the meaning of a p o s s i b l y d i s t o r t e d t e x t , p s y c h o a n a l y s i s searches f o r the meaning of a t e x t d i s t o r t i o n . 9 5 Let us summarize how Habermas p e r c e i v e s the l o g i c of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s : the s o c i a l norms are represented by the model of u n d i s t o r t e d communication, under which a l l l i f e e x p r e s s i o n s are comprehensible; the p a t i e n t ' s s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process has d e v i a t e d from the norms, so h i s or her communication, as manifested i n dreams, becomes d i s t o r t e d ; i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s the p a t i e n t s e l f - r e f l e c t s and r e a l i z e s the source of the d i s t o r t e d communication; by c o r r e c t i n g t h i s d i s t o r t i o n , the p a t i e n t c o r r e c t s h i s or her s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process and l i f e then becomes normal. 9 6 To the extent dream symbols r e s i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the p a t i e n t , the i n t e r p r e t i n g process has to be performed by a t h e r a p i s t and the outcome suggested to the p a t i e n t , who must then decide to accept or r e j e c t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : The i n t e l l e c t u a l work i s shared by p h y s i c i a n and p a t i e n t i n the f o l l o w i n g way: The former r e c o n s t r u c t s what has been f o r g o t t e n from the f a u l t y t e x t s of the l a t t e r , from h i s dreams, a s s o c i a t i o n s , and r e p e t i t i o n s , while the l a t t e r , animated by the c o n s t r u c t i o n s suggested by the p h y s i c i a n as hypotheses, remembers Only the p a t i e n t ' s r e c o l l e c t i o n decides the accuracy of the c o n s t r u c t i o n . 9 7 I f the p a t i e n t r e j e c t s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n i s to be sought and the process repeated u n t i l a f i n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s accepted by the p a t i e n t . The p a t i e n t ' s s e l f -41 r e f l e c t i o n i s then c o m p l e t e . 9 8 Freud extended h i s psychology i n t o s o c i a l theory. The n o r m a l i t y or deviance of an i n d i v i d u a l i s judged a c c o r d i n g to the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of the s o c i e t y to which t h i s i n d i v i d u a l belongs; by the same token, Freud h e l d that the p a t h o l o g i c a l s t a t e of s o c i e t a l s e l f - f o r a m t i o n can be determined i n r e l a t i o n to other c u l t u r e s . 9 9 T h i s i s how Habermas i n t e r p r e t s Freud's s o c i a l theory: due to m a t e r i a l s c a r c i t y people must work i n order to s u r v i v e ; c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t to combat s c a r c i t y r e q u i r e s the establishment of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , which impose demands on people so that t h e i r wishes are repressed; the i m p o s i t i o n of s o c i a l norms i s accomplished i n a s u b t l e and unconscious manner, through r e l i g i o n s , r i t e s , i d e a l s , v a l u e s , s t y l e s and a r t ; t h i s d i s t o r t e d s t r u c t u r e of communication i s a necessary e v i l i n mankind's s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t nature, but the p r i c e mankind pays i s the r e p r e s s i o n of human i n s t i n c t s , which i s the root of s o c i e t a l p a t h o l o g y . 1 0 0 Freud assumed that the u l t i m a t e purpose of human o r g a n i z a t i o n i s the c o n t r o l of nature, so that t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s would reduce the need f o r r e p r e s s i o n . With t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s , a c c o r d i n g to him, the r i g i d i f i e d power s t r u c t u r e i n s o c i e t y and the ideology that r a t i o n a l i z e s i t become o b s o l e t e ; they can no longer be l e g i t i m i z e d . Hence p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n has to be taken to c o r r e c t the d i s t o r t e d communication. The goal i s to b r i n g s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n l i n e with the achieved t e c h n o l o g i c a l l e v e l . In s h o r t , s o c i e t y should seek to minimize 42 r e p r e s s i o n of human i n s t i n c t s w i t h i n the framework of c u r r e n t t e c h n o l o g i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t s . 1 0 1 In Habermas' view, Freud's s o c i a l theory i s an improvement over Marx's i n one important r e s p e c t : the former separates communicative a c t i o n from i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n . Freud r e a l i z e d that a separate course of a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d f o r a change i n s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , which does not f o l l o w a u t o m a t i c a l l y from t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n s . 1 0 2 Yet Habermas r e j e c t s Freud's n a t u r a l i s t i c stance. Freud took human i n s t i n c t s to be "the prime mover of h i s t o r y " ; he f a i l e d to see that human needs and d r i v e s are shaped by c u l t u r e , t hat the form of such needs and d r i v e s i s i t s e l f the product of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 1 0 3 Since mankind can never completely c o n t r o l nature, i t f o l l o w s from Freud's theory t h a t a c e r t a i n degree of r e p r e s s i o n i n s o c i e t y i s always j u s t i f i e d . T h i s , a c c o r d i n g to Habermas, i s the major flaw i n Freudian t h i n k i n g . Marx, on the other hand, knew from the very beginning that human nature i s c o n d i t i o n e d by the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s : "The c u l t i v a t i o n of the f i v e senses i s the work of a l l p r e v i o u s h i s t o r y . " 1 0 " Educated i n the humanist t r a d i t i o n of Hegel, Marx and hermeneutics, Habermas does not f a l l i n t o the n a t u r a l i s t i c t r a p ; he r e f u s e s to share the pessimism of Freud. Instead of extending p s y c h o a n a l y s i s from the i n d i v i d u a l t o s o c i e t a l l e v e l c e n t e r i n g on the concept of i n s t i n c t , Habermas attempts to c a p i t a l i z e on the concept of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n : J u s t as i n the c l i n i c a l s i t u a t i o n , so i n s o c i e t y , p a t h o l o g i c a l compulsion i t s e l f i s accompanied by the i n t e r e s t i n i t s a b o l i t i o n . Both the pathology of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and that of i n d i v i d u a l c onsciousness r e s i d e i n the medium of language and of communicative a c t i o n and assume the form of a 43 s t r u c t u r a l deformation of communication. That i s why for the s o c i a l system, too, the i n t e r e s t inherent i n the pressure of s u f f e r i n g i s a l s o immediately an i n t e r e s t i n enlightenment; and r e f l e c t i o n i s the only p o s s i b l e dynamic through which i t r e a l i z e s i t s e l f . 1 0 5 The methodology of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , Habermas concludes, i s Freud's true c o n t r i b u t i o n to s o c i a l theory, d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t Freud h i m s e l f was unaware of i t . The c r i t i c a l s c i e n c e Habermas has i n mind i s to f o l l o w the t h e r a p e u t i c model of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ; i t can f r e e s o c i e t y from i t s i d e o l o g y . From E a r l y to Recent W r i t i n g s In the preceding pages we d i s c u s s e d Habermas' concept of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process, mainly by f o l l o w i n g h i s argument i n Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s . E s s e n t i a l l y he p o i n t s out there are two b a s i c components i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s : i n s t r u m e n t a l and communicative a c t i o n s . Although i n t e r r e l a t e d , n e i t h e r of these components can be reduced to the other. There i s a t h i r d component, emancipation, which c o r r e c t s the s e l f -f ormative process when i t becomes d e v i a n t . Corresponding t o the three types of a c t i v i t i e s , Habermas c l a s s i f i e s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i n t o three spheres: n a t u r a l , human and c r i t i c a l s c i e n c e s . The o r i e n t a t i o n s of the three c a t e g o r i e s of knowledge and a c t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o him, are governed by three c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s - t e c h n i c a l , p r a c t i c a l and emancipatory - which are embedded i n a l l knowledge and a c t i o n . The s p e c i f i c contents of these i n t e r e s t s , however, are not f i x e d : they are outcomes of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process; i n other words, they are c u l t u r a l as 44 w e l l as h i s t o r i c a l . KHI e s t a b l i s h e s the foundation of Habermas' l a t e r w r i t i n g s . T h i s does not mean he has not changed h i s views s i n c e then. In f a c t he has m o d i f i e d h i s p o s i t i o n by s h i f t i n g emphases, e l a b o r a t i n g on d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s and i n c o r p o r a t i n g new elements, some of which are not e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with e a r l i e r ones. In "A P o s t s c r i p t to Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s " Habermas i n d i c a t e s the new d i r e c t i o n of h i s f u t u r e endeavors. He e x p l a i n s t h a t i n the preceding few years s e v e r a l other w r i t e r s have made much headway i n the c r i t i q u e of the s c i e n t i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n i n s o c i e t y "which makes c r i t i c i s m l e s s urgent. What i s now needed i s the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a theory of communication (which I hope to be a b l e to work out s o o n ) " . 1 0 6 Thus Habermas wishes to d i r e c t h i s e f f o r t toward what he c o n s i d e r s the l e a s t developed aspects of h i s c r i t i c a l theory. T h i s c l a r i f i e s the i n t e n t i o n of h i s l a t e r essays on communication such as "What Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?", and h i s e x p l o r a t i o n of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n i n terms of h i s concept of communication, i n c l u d i n g the essay "Toward a R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of H i s t o r i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m " . Although Habermas seldom makes d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e to KHI i n h i s recent works, there i s no i n d i c a t i o n he has completely renounced the t r i p a r t i t e model he e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e . On the c o n t r a r y , h i s recent r e s e a r c h t o p i c s would seem fragmentary and incoherent i f taken by themselves; h i s i n t e n t i o n becomes i n t e l l i g i b l e only i f these t o p i c s are c o n s i d e r e d e f f o r t s to develop or modify h i s e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n . For example, h i s c r i t i q u e of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g i n L e g i t i m a t i o n C r i s i s i s an 45 e l a b o r a t i o n of h i s c r i t i q u e of t e c h n o c r a t i c i d e o l o g y , and "Toward a R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of H i s t o r i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m " i s a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the Marxian conception of h i s t o r y based on h i s own n o t i o n of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n . Besides, h i s d e t a i l a n a l y s i s of the s t r u c t u r e of speech a c t s and u t t e r a n c e s i n "What Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?" would seem i r r e l e v a n t to s o c i a l theory u n l e s s one i s f a m i l i a r with KHI and " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI". For t h i s reason, KHI i s of primary import f o r understanding Habermas' c r i t i c a l theory. Rudiments of many of Habermas' recent r e s e a r c h d i r e c t i o n s can be found i n h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n to Theory and P r a c t i c e 1 0 7 and " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI". For our present purpose i t i s not necessary to a n a lyze a l l the m a t e r i a l s t h a t Habermas has w r i t t e n s i n c e KHI. But a few changes that a f f e c t the b a s i c framework of h i s c r i t i c a l theory deserve a t t e n t i o n . We s h a l l d i s c u s s these i n the r e s t of the c h a p t e r . A c t i o n , Experience and D i s c o u r s e In a r e v i s i o n of the e a r l i e r model Habermas makes an important d i s t i n c t i o n between the realm of a c t i o n and experience and t h a t of d i s c o u r s e . In KHI Habermas had not yet d e f i n e d " d i s c o u r s e " . Speech communication was c o n s i d e r e d p a r t of communicative a c t i o n . There Habermas argued that s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n , such as c r i t i q u e of ideology, c o u l d only take p l a c e through communicative a c t i o n . Now he f i n d s t h i s concept too vague and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ; i t has to be m o d i f i e d . With the new f o r m u l a t i o n , d i s c o u r s e i s given a s p e c i a l , somewhat independent 46 s t a t u s from the realm of everyday s o c i a l p r a c t i c e where people act and e x p e r i e n c e . 1 0 8 According to Habermas, when people p a r t i c i p a t e i n communicative and i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n s i n d a i l y l i f e , they n a i v e l y assume t h e i r a c t i o n s are based on t r u e i n f o r m a t i o n . They a l s o u n c r i t i c a l l y accept that the norms of t h e i r a c t i o n s are c o r r e c t and that the norms f o r judging a c t i o n s are a p p r o p r i a t e . In other words, there i s an i m p l i c i t , u n r e f l e c t i v e approval of e x i s t i n g s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . 1 0 9 With h i s hermeneutical method, D i l t h e y i n v e s t i g a t e d s o c i a l norms of a c t i o n . But he d i d not q u e s t i o n whether these norms were j u s t i f i a b l e : he simply accepted them as they were. Furthermore, D i l t h e y d i d not take i n t o account there were norms governing the process of i n q u i r y i t s e l f . For Habermas, these c r i t i c a l i s s u e s concerning norms must be t a c k l e d i n a course of argumentative reasoning separated from a c t i o n . Habermas argues that experience i n the l i f e - w o r l d must c l a i m t o be o b j e c t i v e , to the extent i t can be i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d . 1 1 0 He probably means that a d i f f e r e n t person can p o t e n t i a l l y experience something s i m i l a r under s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h i s i s due to the a p r i o r i knowledge that i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y shared: Whenever I p e r c e i v e something, t h i s experience n e c e s s a r i l y has the o b j e c t i v i t y by v i r t u e of the c a t e g o r i c a l framework i n which I i n t e r p r e t my experience a p r i o r i as an experience of o b j e c t s i n the w o r l d . l T l When Habermas speaks of experience he u s u a l l y r e f e r s to experience i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e , as d i s t i n c t from, say, data 47 a c q u i r e d from experiments. The former i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to a c t i o n i n l i f e whereas the l a t t e r i s withdrawn from the everyday w o r l d . 1 1 2 Habermas contends that experience i n everyday l i f e , l i k e a c t i o n , i s e s s e n t i a l l y u n r e f l e c t i v e . To the extent humans are speaking s u b j e c t s , they are capable of making statements about a c t i o n s and ex p e r i e n c e s . The subject-matter of a statement may be t h i n g s , r e l a t i o n s h i p between people and t h i n g s , or r e l a t i o n s h i p among people. Hence i t covers the sphere of i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n , communicative a c t i o n , or both. Habermas 1 main concern here i s the kind of statements about experience i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e . He observes: "Since experience c l a i m s to be o b j e c t i v e there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of e r r o r or d e c e p t i o n . " 1 1 3 In h i s view, whether a statement about experience i s f r e e from e r r o r or decept i o n cannot be judged by experience a l o n e . C e r t a i n l y , the outcome of a c t i o n s taken on the b a s i s of a s t a t e d experience informs the a c t o r something about the o b j e c t i v i t y of the s t a t e d e x p e r i e n c e . Yet, Habermas argues, the " o b j e c t i v i t y of s t a t e d experience i s not the same as the t r u t h of a s t a t e m e n t " . 1 1 0 The l a t t e r cannot be determined without a due process of reasoning. S t a t e d sxperience merely p r o v i d e s i n f o r m a t i o n f o r reas o n i n g . In order to q u e s t i o n v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , Habermas intr o d u c e s the concept of d i s c o u r s e . When the v a l i d i t y of a statement w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content i s i n q u e s t i o n , i t i s presented as pa r t of a d i s c o u r s e . At t h i s stage, the content of the statement i s co n s i d e r e d h y p o t h e t i c a l o n l y . "What we c a l l a f a c t i s the content of a statement a f t e r i t has been s u b j e c t e d to a 48 d i s c o u r s e t h a t i s now ( f o r the time being) concluded. A f a c t i s what we want to a s s e r t as true a f t e r a d i s c u r s i v e t e s t . " 1 1 5 Obviously influenced, by P e i r c e , Habermas takes t r u t h to be something whose v a l i d i t y i s accepted through the consensus of a community of i n q u i r e r s - a concept c a l l e d "a consensus theory of t r u t h " . 1 1 6 T h i s consensus i s an e x p l i c i t agreement among p a r t i c i p a n t s of the d i s c o u r s e . U n l i k e P e i r c e , Habermas does not s assume that the u l t i m a t e t r u t h i s g r a d u a l l y being unfolded. The purpose of a d i s c o u r s e i s to a r r i v e at a consensus about a probl e m a t i c c l a i m through argumentative rea s o n i n g . The c l a i m i n q u e s t i o n can be "the t r u t h of u t t e r a n c e s " . I t can a l s o be "the c o r r e c t n e s s of norms f o r a c t i o n " and "the ap p r o p r i a t e n e s s of norms f o r v a l u a t i o n which we are to f o l l o w " . 1 1 7 In other words, a d i s c o u r s e i s an i n q u i r y i n t o the spheres of i n s t r u m e n t a l as w e l l as communicative a c t i o n . A d i s c o u r s e presupposes the e x i s t e n c e of a s t r u c t u r e and a set of r u l e s governing the d i s c o u r s e . T h i s i s what Habermas c a l l s an " i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n " . I t c o n s i s t s of " s t r u c t u r a l elements of communication which make reasoning p o s s i b l e " . 1 1 8 In KHI Habermas complained that P e i r c e d i d not p r o p e r l y work out the l o g i c of l i n g u i s t i c communication f o r the purpose of v a l i d a t i n g t r u t h c l a i m s . In order t o go beyond P e i r c e , Habermas i n v e s t i g a t e s the requirements of an i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n . For our present purpose, we do not have to be i n v o l v e d with the d e t a i l s of those s t r u c t u r a l elements Habermas d i s c o v e r e d . For Habermas, a d i s c o u r s e i s a s p e c i f i c type of speech communication. He d e l e g a t e s statements e x p r e s s i n g a c t i o n and 49 experience to the realm of a c t i o n and experience i t s e l f . For these statements do not d i s p u t e the norms of a c t i o n nor v e r i f y c l a i m s about experience; they operate at an u n r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l . D i s c o u r s e , then, must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a c t i o n and experience as w e l l as statements e x p r e s s i n g them. A d i s c o u r s e operates at a l e v e l t h a t permits r e f l e c t i o n : Because of t h e i r communicative s t r u c t u r e , d i s c o u r s e s do not compel t h e i r p a r t i c i p a n t s to a c t . Nor do they accomodate processes whereby i n f o r m a t i o n can be a c q u i r e d . They are purged of a c t i o n and experience. The r e l a t i o n between d i s c o u r s e s and i n f o r m a t i o n i s one where the l a t t e r i s fed i n t o the former. The output of d i s c o u r s e s , on the other hand, c o n s i s t s i n r e c o g n i t i o n or r e j e c t i o n of problematic t r u t h c l a i m s . D i s c o u r s e s produce nothing but a r g u m e n t s . 1 1 9 In a d i s c o u r s e , " a l l motives except that of the c o o p e r a t i v e search f o r t r u t h are e x c l u d e d " . 1 2 0 As a r e s u l t of consensus reached through d i s c o u r s e s , t r u t h c l a i m s can be s e t t l e d , norms of a c t i o n and e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a can a l s o be j u s t i f i e d . Habermas b e l i e v e s that the use of d i s c o u r s e s i s the only way t h a t renders s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n of s o c i e t y p o s s i b l e . But d i s c o u r s e i s not the same as s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n . The use of d i s c o u r s e s i s a necessary but i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n of s o c i e t y , as we s h a l l see l a t e r . The realm of d i s c o u r s e , which generates t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, i s l i n k e d to the realm of a c t i o n and experience by c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s . T e c h n i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s u b j e c t s problems i n the sphere of i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n to argumentative reasoning i n a d i s c o u r s e . The t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge thus gained i s again d i r e c t e d by t h i s i n t e r e s t back to the s p e c i f i c content 50 of a p p l i c a t i o n i n everyday l i f e , i . e . i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t serves the corresponding f u n c t i o n i n the sphere of communicative a c t i o n . These c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s can be conceived as g e n e r a l i z e d motives f o r systems of a c t i o n , which are guided by means of the communication of statements which can be t r u e . A c t i o n s are channeled by the r e c o g n i t i o n of c l a i m s to v a l i d i t y that can be r e s o l v e d d i s c u r s i v e l y . 1 2 1 T h i s n o t i o n of the two "lower" c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s i s an e x t e n s i o n of what Habermas presented i n KHI; i t i s now i n t e g r a l l y connected to the new concept of d i s c o u r s e . There i s a t h i r d c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t , the emancipatory, which aims at s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . In KHI Habermas adopted the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model to r e a l i z e t h i s i n t e r e s t . Now he p o i n t s out that "the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c d i a l o g u e i s not a d i s c o u r s e " . 1 2 2 He argues that s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n has to be achieved independently of d i s c u r s i v e reasoning. In order to f o l l o w Habermas' argument, we have to see how he d i f f e r e n t i a t e s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n from s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n . R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n In Habermas' view, the concept of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n he developed i n KHI - an i n h e r i t a n c e from Kant and Hegel - has to be m o d i f i e d . He p o i n t s out that i n t r a d i t i o n a l German philosophy the term " r e f l e c t i o n " covers two d i f f e r e n t forms of s e l f -knowledge, which he c l a i m s s c h o l a r s u s u a l l y confuse. Habermas admits that i n KHI he had the same t r o u b l e as those s c h o l a r s . Now he c o n s i d e r s the d i s t i n c t i o n between these two forms of 51 self-knowledge c r u c i a l to c r i t i c a l theory. He thus has to c l a r i f y h i s concept of r e f l e c t i o n , which i s intended to i n c l u d e both forms: On the one hand, i t denotes the r e f l e c t i o n upon the c o n d i t i o n s of p o t e n t i a l a b i l i t i e s of a knowing, speaking and a c t i n g s u b j e c t as such; on the other hand, i t denotes the r e f l e c t i o n upon u n c o n s c i o u s l y produced c o n s t r a i n t s to which a determinate s u b j e c t (or a determinate group of s u b j e c t s , or a determinate s p e c i e s s u b j e c t ) succumbs in i t s process of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n . 1 2 3 Habermas i n d i c a t e s t hat Kant's search f o r a p r i o r i grounds of knowledge (and m o r a l i t y ) i s r e f l e c t i o n of the f i r s t k i n d . I t i n q u i r e s the c o n d i t i o n s under which a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge i s p o s s i b l e and the form i n which knowledge appears. A c c o r d i n g to Habermas, recent development i n t h i s mode of r e f l e c t i o n can be found i n the philosophy of language. I t seeks to d i s c o v e r "generative r u l e s and c o g n i t i v e schemata". 1 2" Generative r u l e s r e v e a l the c o n d i t i o n s under which l i n g u i s t i c communication i s p o s s i b l e ; c o g n i t i v e schemata show the form i n which l i n g u i s t i c communication takes p l a c e . Hegel i n c o r p o r a t e d the Kantian sense of r e f l e c t i o n , but he a l s o i n t r o d u c e d a second sense of r e f l e c t i o n . T h i s i s the c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e , guided by Reason, that i s o r i e n t e d toward the transcendence of the present form of knowledge and a c t i o n . "In other words, he embraced a concept of r e f l e c t i o n which c o n t a i n s the idea of an a n a l y t i c a l emancipation from o b j e c t i v e i l l u s i o n s " 1 2 5 - i l l u s i o n s c o l l e c t i v e l y h e l d by a l l members of s o c i e t y a t any p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n h i s t o r y . Habermas observes that Freud developed the second n o t i o n of r e f l e c t i o n i n t o the t h e r a p e u t i c method of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . The Freudian method aims 52 at r e s c u i n g the i n d i v i d u a l p a t i e n t from h i s or her i l l u s i o n s . In KHI Habermas focused on t h i s second n o t i o n of r e f l e c t i o n , which he c a l l e d s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n or c r i t i c i s m . He extended the F r e u d i a n method i n t o h i s c r i t i c a l t heory: s o c i e t y was to emancipate i t s e l f from i t s o b j e c t i v e i l l u s i o n s through s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . Now he b e l i e v e s he had p r e v i o u s l y n e g l e c t e d the f i r s t n o t i o n of r e f l e c t i o n , with the r e s u l t that c r i t i c a l theory s u f f e r e d from the l a c k of a s o l i d t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r the purpose of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . I n s p i r e d by Kant's r i g o r o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the forms of knowledge, Habermas seeks to develop the Kantian sense of r e f l e c t i o n f o r a p p l i c a t i o n i n c r i t i c a l theory. He i s convinced that a " s e p a r a t i o n of the a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s of reasoning from those of experience" i s j u s t i f i e d and n e c e s s a r y . 1 2 6 Since a d i s c o u r s e i s a process of reasoning, i t i s important to f i n d out the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge p a r t i c i p a n t s must have i n order to c a r r y out a d i s c o u r s e . T h i s i s a task Kant d i d not perform. Hence i t i s the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge - i n c l u d i n g a p r i o r i knowledge - of reasoning that Habermas i s most concerned with here. He c a l l s t h i s transformed Kantian mode of r e f l e c t i o n r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n : R e c o n s t r u c t i o n s t r y to understand anonymous systems of r u l e s which can be f o l l o w e d by any s u b j e c t a t a l l p r o v i d e d i t has the r e q u i s i t e c o m p e t e n c e s . 1 2 7 A branch of study d e a l i n g with r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s i n a p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d i s what Habermas c a l l s r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e . He c i t e s l o g i c , g eneral l i n g u i s t i c s and u n i v e r s a l pragmatics (Habermas' own theory of speech communication) as examples of 53 r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . While the n o t i o n of r e c o n s t u c t i o n owes i t s o r i g i n to Kant and i s much i n f l u e n c e d by him, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the Kantian mode of r e f l e c t i o n . Kant's c r i t i q u e of knowledge s t a r t s with a knowing s u b j e c t . The a p r i o r i knowledge Kant d i s c o v e r e d belongs to t h i s s u b j e c t . In c o n t r a s t , " r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s ... do not encompass s u b j e c t i v i t y " . 1 2 8 They are concerned with anonymous r u l e systems which do not belong to any s u b j e c t . However, any subject can l e a r n to comply with these r u l e systems and a c q u i r e a l e v e l of competence i n the use of them. For i n s t a n c e , people can competently apply the p r i n c i p l e s of l o g i c or g e n e r a l l i n g u i s t i c s a f t e r p r o p e r l y l e a r n i n g them. Habermas maintains that p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge f o r reasoning always e x i s t s among competent s u b j e c t s . I t e x i s t s i n an i n t u i t i v e or i m p l i c i t form. In other words, competent s u b j e c t s o f t e n f o l l o w anonymous r u l e systems i n t h e i r everyday l i f e without being aware of them. Hence a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n does not seek to c r e a t e r u l e s . Rather, i t attempts to render i m p l i c i t r u l e s e x p l i c i t : A s u c c e s s f u l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ... r a i s e s an "uncons-c i o u s l y " f u n c t i o n i n g r u l e system to consciousness i n a c e r t a i n manner; i t renders e x p l i c i t the i n t u i t i v e knowledge that i s given with competence with respect to the r u l e s i n the form of "know how". 1 2 9 For Habermas, the anonymous r u l e systems r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s seek to understand are not p u r e l y a p r i o r i . A r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e s a p o s t e r i o r i elements as w e l l . T h i s means an i n q u i r y i n t o anonymous r u l e systems i s p a r t i a l l y rooted i n e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s . According to Habermas, what i s 54 r e c o n s t r u c t e d can be s u b s t a n t i a t e d by competent s u b j e c t s . In the case of grammatical theory, say, competent speakers can t e l l i f a sentence i s grammatical. Hence a grammatical theory must be c o n s i s t e n t with the judgments of competent s p e a k e r s . 1 3 0 The r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s Habermas has i n mind are those at the l e v e l of general t h e o r i e s (such as general l i n g u i s t i c s , r a t h e r than the l i n g u i s t i c theory of a p a r t i c u l a r language). The anonymous r u l e systems to be d i s c o v e r e d are h e l d to be u n i v e r s a l : R e c o n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t e to p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge of a general s o r t , to u n i v e r s a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , and not only to the p a r t i c u l a r competences of i n d i v i d u a l groups or to the a b i l i t y of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i -d u a l s . 1 3 1 Since a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n q u i r e s at the l e v e l of "a general c a p a b i l i t y , a general c o g n i t i v e , l i n g u i s t i c , or i n t e r a c t i v e competence", Habermas d e c l a r e s that r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s aim at "the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of species c o m p e t e n c e s " . 1 3 2 The a p r i o r i knowledge Kant searched f o r i s supposed to be u n i v e r s a l : i t i s shared by every s i n g l e knowing s u b j e c t . One possesses t h i s knowledge simply because one i s a member of the human s p e c i e s . R e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s , on the other hand, do not assume that every knowing, a c t i n g and speaking s u b e j c t possesses the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge represented by e x p l i c i t anonymous r u l e systems. Only competent s u b j e c t s conform to these r u l e systems. Not everybody i s competent, or n e c e s s a r i l y so; but one can a c q u i r e competence through l e a r n i n g . Everybody has the p o t e n t i a l to become competent s u b j e c t s . I t i s i n t h i s sense that Habermas speaks of u n i v e r s a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . 1 3 3 55 Hence a c r u c i a l concept a s s o c i a t e d with r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s competence, which i s b u i l t i n t o the d e f i n i t i o n of the former. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n s attempt to understand i m p l i c i t anonymous r u l e systems as p r a c t i c e d by competent s u b j e c t s , not those p r a c t i c e d by incompetent ones. Whether a s u b j e c t i s competent cannot be determined s o l e l y on an e m p i r i c a l b a s i s . Otherwise the r e l a t i o n s h i p between competence and r e c o n s t r u c t e d r u l e systems would be c i r c u l a r . T h i s i s why Habermas i n d i c a t e s that i n r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , "the d i s t i n c t i o n between drawing on a p r i o r i knowledge and drawing on a p o s t e r i o r i knowledge becomes b l u r r e d " . 1 3 " The sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between these two modes of knowledge made by Kant cannot be maintained. By r e n d e r i n g i m p l i c i t anonymous r u l e systems of competent s u b j e c t s e x p l i c i t , i t i s hoped that incompetent s u b j e c t s would l e a r n to become competent by adhering to these e x p l i c i t r u l e s . That i s the purpose of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . R e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s are not intended to r e p l a c e c r i t i c a l s c i e n c e s , which are r e q u i r e d f o r s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to Habermas, the t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge generated i n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s has no p r a c t i c a l consequences: "By l e a r n i n g l o g i c or l i n g u i s t i c s I a c q u i r e t h e o r e t i c a l knowldge, but i n general I do not thereby change my p r e v i o u s p r a c t i c e of reasoning or s p e a k i n g . " 1 3 5 He probably means that people who l e a r n anonymous r u l e systems can become more e f f e c t i v e reasoners or speakers; but they do not gain i n s i g h t i n t o the problem they wish to s o l v e simply by l e a r n i n g r u l e systems. Hence r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s do not o b v i a t e s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n s . However, s e l f -56 r e f l e c t i o n s should not be a r b i t r a r y : they, must r e l y on the t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s p rovided by r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . Habermas gi v e s an example: A u n i v e r s a l pragmatic capable of understanding the c o n d i t i o n s of why l i n g u i s t i c communication i s at a l l p o s s i b l e has to be the t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r e x p l a i n i n g s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d communication and d e v i a n t processes of s o c i a l i z a t i o n . 1 3 6 The p o i n t i s : one must have a p r e - n o t i o n , or rough understanding, of what u n d i s t o r t e d communication i s before one can t r a c e systematic d i s t o r t i o n s . T h i s i s the way Habermas r e l a t e s s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n to r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t a l s o e x p l a i n s why d i s c o u r s e s alone - which are based on r u l e systems - are i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r emancipation. R e c o n s t r u c t i v e Sciences One of the most important r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s Habermas seeks to develop i s what he c a l l s " u n i v e r s a l pragmatics" - a g e n e r a l theory of speech communication. According t o him, u n i v e r s a l pragmatics s t u d i e s speech i n a way s i m i l a r to g e n e r a l l i n g u i s t i c s s t u d i e s language (language i n ge n e r a l r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l languages). An u t t e r a n c e i s the elementary u n i t of speech i n the sense that a sentence i s the elementary u n i t of l a n g u a g e . 1 3 7 Habermas c l a i m s there are four general p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n s u c c e s s f u l speech communication. F i r s t , the sentence u t t e r e d must be comprehensible. T h i s means the words used belong to a n a t u r a l language and the sentence i s c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance with the grammer of the language. The sentence i s comprehensible 57 to the extent the hearer i s competent i n the use of the language. Second, the utterance must r e f e r to some r e a l i t y i n the world: i t c l a i m s that something i n the world i s t r u e . In other words, the speaker imparts some knowledge to the hearer. T h i r d , the u t t e r a n c e must represent what the speaker i n t e n d s . T h i s r e f e r s to the honesty, s i n c e r i t y or t r u t h f u l n e s s of the speaker. The speaker expects the hearer to t r u s t him or her. F i n a l l y , what i s u t t e r e d must conform to recognized s o c i a l norms or to accepted s e l f - i m a g e s . T h i s means the speakers has to speak i n a manner that the hearer can r e l a t e t o . Habermas p o i n t s out t h a t , of the four p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , o n l y the f i r s t one i s p e r t i n e n t to l i n g u i s t i c s , s i n c e l i n g u i s t i c s s t u d i e s sentences, not u t t e r a n c e s . The three a d d i t i o n a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s are p e c u l i a r to pragmatics: they take i n t o account the s o c i a l r e a l i t y i n which the u t t e r e d sentence i s embedded. 1 3 8 These four p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , Habermas c l a i m s , are always a l r e a d y i m p l i c i t i n any speech a c t o r i e n t e d toward understanding. U n i v e r s a l pragmatics, as a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e , makes them e x p l i c i t . Much of the essay "What Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?" i s a d e t a i l a n a l y s i s of the s t r u c t u r e of speech and i t s elementary u n i t , the u t t e r a n c e . In the essay Habermas c l a s s i f i e s speech a c t s i n t o a v a r i e t y of c a t e g o r i e s . The category he focuses on c o n s i s t s only of speech a c t s that are p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ( i . e . they make c l a i m s about something i n the world), v e r b a l , e x p l i c i t , i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y unbounded ( i . e . the contents are not d e f i n e d i n terms of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ) and context independent ( i . e . the meanings do not 58 s h i f t a c c o r d i n g to c o n t e x t ) . 1 3 9 Habermas r i g o r o u s l y r e c o n s t r u c t s the anonymous r u l e system f o r u t i l i z i n g speech a c t s i n t h i s c a t e gory. T h i s d e t a i l a n a l y s i s of speech a c t s seems to be a d i g r e s s i o n from Habermas' other w r i t i n g s , i f we do not r e a l i z e i t i s undertaken f o r a d e f i n i t e reason. As we have seen, a d i s c o u r s e i s a process of argumentative reasoning that examines the v a l i d i t y c l a i m s of statements. In order f o r statements t o be examined e f f e c t i v e l y , Habermas argues, they must conform to a c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e . According to him, t h i s s t r u c t u r e i s the anonymous r u l e system of the s p e c i a l category of speech a c t s mentioned a b o v e . 1 " 0 I t f o l l o w s t h a t a competent speaker i n a d i s c o u r s e has to observe the r u l e s r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n u n i v e r s a l pragmatics, s p e c i f i c a l l y , the four general p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of s u c c e s s f u l speech communication and the anonymous r u l e system of the s p e c i a l category of speech a c t s . F u r t h e r , i t f o l l o w s t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s of a d i s c o u r s e are r e q u i r e d to be competent speakers before the d i s c o u r s e can f u l f i l i t s r o l e i n c r i t i c a l theory. U n i v e r s a l pragmatics i s not the only r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e Habermas develops as a component of c r i t i c a l theory. He extends the idea of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n t o two other a r e a s : ego development and s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . We s h a l l b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e these. Convinced t h a t " b a s i c p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l concepts can be interwoven because the p e r s p e c t i v e s p r o j e c t e d i n them of an autonomous ego and an emancipated s o c i e t y r e c i p r o c a l l y r e q u i r e one a n o t h e r " 1 " 1 - a theme that has been 59 pursued by e a r l i e r c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s - Habermas decides to r e c o n s t r u c t the p s y c h o l o g i c a l development of an i n d i v i d u a l . A c c o r d i n g to the r e c o n s t r u c t e d model, presented i n "Moral Development and Ego I d e n t i t y " , there are seven stages of moral consciousnes i n the developemt of ego i d e n t i t y . 1 4 2 The competence of an i n d i v i d u a l i s to be determined with r e s p e c t to these stages. At the lowest stage, the i n d i v i d u a l - i n t h i s case a c h i l d - only a c t s i n reponse to a n t i c i p a t e d punishments and rewards. As moral consciousness moves up the s c a l e - which u s u a l l y occurs with maturation of a c h i l d - the i n d i v i d u a l becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y autonomous and concerned about p r i n c i p l e s . At the highest stage - which i s not always a t t a i n e d - the i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a t e s i n d i s c o u r s e s to q u e s t i o n and j u s t i f y v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : The meaning of the t r a n s i t i o n from the s i x t h to the seventh stage can be found i n the f a c t that need i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are no longer assumed as given, but are drawn i n t o the d i s c u r s i v e formation of w i l l . 1 4 3 Habermas thus sees that proper p s y c h o l o g i c a l development of the i n d i v i d u a l i s e s s e n t i a l i f the i n d i v i d u a l i s to c o n t r i b u t e to a d i s c o u r s e , which i n turn i s c r u c i a l to emancipation. In KHI Habermas c r i t i c i z e d Marx f o r h i s f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h i n s t r u m e n t a l and communicative a c t i o n s as two r e l a t i v e l y independent processes, with the r e s u l t that the l a t t e r ' s theory of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n i s i n a p p l i c a b l e to s t a t e -r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m . But Habermas does not completely abandon Marx's theory of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n , which i s p o p u l a r l y known as h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . 1 4 4 He sees much merit i n h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m and attempts to r e c o n s t r u c t i t . Besides employing 60 the term r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n the sense of a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e , Habermas e x p l a i n s : In the present connection, r e c o n s t r u c t ion s i g n i f i e s t a k i n g a theory apart and p u t t i n g i t back'together again i n a new form i n order to a t t a i n more f u l l y the goal i t has set f o r i t s e l f . T h i s i s the normal way of d e a l i n g with a theory that needs r e v i s i o n i n many r e s p e c t s but whose p o t e n t i a l f o r s t i m u l a t i o n has s t i l l not been e x h a u s t e d . 1 4 5 What he does i s the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of a communicative dimension, i n c l u d i n g the concept of competence, i n t o h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . In the essays " H i s t o r i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m and the Development of Normative S t r u c t u r e s " and "Toward a R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of H i s t o r i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m " , Habermas draws a p a r a l l e l between s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n and ego developemt. With some p r e c a u t i o n s , he extends the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the l a t t e r i n t o that of the former: One can see here the i d e n t i t y of the c onscious s t r u c t u r e s that a r e , on the one hand, embodied in the i n s t i t u t i o n s of laws and m o r a l i t y and that are, on the other hand, expressed i n the moral judgments and a c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s . 1 4 6 The l i n k between the two i s the l i n g u i s t i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of understanding which permits s o c i o c u l t u r a l l e a r n i n g : "the r e p r o d u c t i o n of s o c i e t y and the s o c i a l i z a t i o n of i t s members are two aspects of the same process; they are dependent on the same s t r u c t u r e s . " 1 4 7 There i s a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two: I t i s the p e r s o n a l i t y system that i s the bearer of the ontogenetic l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s ; and i n a c e r t a i n way, only s o c i a l s u b j e c t s can l e a r n . But s o c i a l systems, by drawing on the l e a r n i n g c a p a c i t i e s of s o c i a l s u b e j c t s , can form new s t r u c t u r e s i n order to s o l v e s t e e r i n g problems that t h r e a t e n t h e i r 61 continued e x i s t e n c e . To t h i s extent the e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a r n i n g process of s o c i e t i e s i s dependent on the competences of the i n d i v i d u a l s that belong to them. The l a t t e r i n t u r n a c q u i r e t h e i r competences not as i s o l a t e d monads but by growing i n t o the symbolic s t r u c t u r e s of t h e i r l i f e - w o r l d s . 1 " 8 With concepts i n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s - anonymous r u l e system and competence - Habermas e l a b o r a t e s on the Hegelian n o t i o n of i n t e r a c t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y . In Marx's theory of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n s o c i e t y progresses in stages c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e modes of p r o d u c t i o n ( c o n s i s t i n g of f o r c e s and r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n ) . For each l e v e l of f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n there corresponds a s p e c i f i c l e v e l of r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n ; i n other words, the former l a r g e l y determines the l a t t e r . As we have p o i n t e d out e a r l i e r , Habermas c r i t i c i z e s Marx f o r not s e p a r a t i n g the l o g i c s of i n s t r u m e n t a l and communicative a c t i o n s . According to Habermas, the same f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n can g i v e r i s e to a c e r t a i n range of p o s s i b l e s o c i a l s y s t e m s . 1 * 9 Within t h i s range some s t r u c t u r e s governing human r e l a t i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d r a t i o n a l , o t hers not. Normative s t r u c t u r e s are the r a t i o n a l ones; they are a r r i v e d at through consensus i n d i s c o u r s e s , which are independent of the l o g i c of development of f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n . 1 5 0 Habermas' r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i n v o l v e s a s e p a r a t i o n of the l o g i c from the dynamics of development. Although he f o l l o w s Marx i n i n c o r p o r a t i n g the idea of s o c i a l p r ogress i n t o h i s theory of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n , 1 5 1 Habermas maintains that h i s t o r y , as i t a c t u a l l y occurs, does not n e c e s s a r i l y conform to the l o g i c of s o c i a l p r o g r e s s : "we need r e q u i r e of h i s t o r y n e i t h e r u n i l i n e a r i t y nor n e c e s s i t y , n e i t h e r 62 c o n t i n u i t y nor i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y . " 1 5 2 Only when s o c i e t a l members reach a consensus on normative s t r u c t u r e s , and only when these normative s t r u c t u r e s are embodied i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s of laws and m o r a l i t y and expressed i n the moral judgments and a c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s , would the developemt of s o c i e t y proceed along i t s l o g i c a l course. I t f o l l o w s that s o c i a l progress r e q u i r e s proper p s y c h o l o g i c a l development of i n d i v i d u a l s and o b s e r v a t i o n of the r u l e s of u n i v e r s a l pragmatics i n d i s c o u r s e s , i n a d d i t i o n to development of f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n . We may say Habermas' v e r s i o n of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s t e l e o l o g i c a l i n terms of the l o g i c , but not the dynamics, of development. T h i s i s how he m o d i f i e s Hegel and Marx. The r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s : u n i v e r s a l pragmatics, ego development and r e c o n s t r u c t e d h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , have become an i n t e g r a l p a r t of c r i t i c a l theory. The Advocacy Model In L e g i t i m a t i o n C r i s i s Habermas in t r o d u c e s h i s advocacy m o d e l . 1 5 3 He r e a l i z e s that s o c i e t y i s not n e c e s s a r i l y homogeneous, that i t p o s s i b l y c o n s i s t s of groups with c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . Here Habermas i s not r e f e r r i n g to the concepts of t e c h n i c a l and p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s , which he c l a i m s t o be u n i v e r s a l , but t o t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t s . In t h i s context he w r i t e s : I use the term " i n t e r e s t s " f o r needs t h a t are - to the extent of the withdrawal of l e g i t i m a t i o n and the r i s i n g of the consciousness of c o n f l i c t - rendered s u b j e c t i v e and detached, as i t were, from the c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n s of commonly shared val u e s supported by t r a d i t i o n (and made b i n d i n g i n norms of 63 a c t i o n ) . 1 5 0 Habermas b e l i e v e s that common or " g e n e r a l i z a b l e " i n t e r e s t s e x i s t in s o c i e t y and can t h e o r e t i c a l l y be separated from p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of v a r i o u s groups. G e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s are the common i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of needs of a l l people i n s o c i e t y . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the outcome of a consensus to be a r r i v e d at through p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s 1 5 5 - a type of d i s c o u r s e which we s h a l l e l a b o r a t e on s h o r t l y . I n t e r e s t s that are g e n e r a l i z a b l e are no longer s u b j e c t i v e or detached from the s o c i e t a l whole. Habermas c a l l s s o c i a l norms t h a t express g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s " j u s t i f i a b l e " norms and cla i m s that norms which do not express such i n t e r e s t s are "based on f o r c e " . 1 5 6 C o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s , i n Habermas' view, can only be a s c e r t a i n e d i n p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s . As long as no c o n f l i c t i s found i n t h i s manner, pro v i d e d that such d i s c o u r s e s do take p l a c e , s o c i e t y i s c o n s i d e r e d unproblematic. As soon as c o n f l i c t i s d i s c o v e r e d c r i t i c a l theory makes the assumption that there i s a "suppression of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s " , or an ideology, i n s o c i e t y . 1 5 7 One can see that i n LC Habermas m o d i f i e s h i s concept of ideology he presented i n the e a r l i e r work Toward A R a t i o n a l  S o c i e t y . In LC, ideology i s d e f i n e d i n terms of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s ; i t can be confirmed only i n d i s c o u r s e s . In TRS the ideology of s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m i s taken to be e x c l u s i v e l y t e c h n o c r a t i c manipulation of s o c i e t y f o r the purpose of system maintenance. T h i s ideology e x i s t s as a r e s u l t of l a c k of u n r e s t r a i n e d communication i n s o c i e t y . The que s t i o n of 64 o v e r a l l human development i s thus n e g l e c t e d . Habermas c o n s i d e r s t h i s ideology of s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m to be a s p e c i a l case of ideology based on the n o t i o n of suppressed g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s . Suppressed g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s are i d e o l o g i c a l because the s o c i e t y i n v o l v e d " e i t h e r a s s e r t s or c o u n t e r f a c t u a l l y supposes a g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of i n t e r e s t s " while at the same time avoids " t h e m a t i z a t i o n and t e s t i n g of d i s c u r s i v e - v a l i d i t y c l a i m s " . 1 5 8 In TRS Habermas had not yet separated d i s c o u r s e form communicative a c t i o n , nor had he worked out the p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . H i s m o d i f i c a t i o n of the c r i t i c a l theory framework i n the e a r l y s e v e n t i e s enables him to d e f i n e ideology in a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d manner. Based on the assumption of suppressed g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s , a s o c i a l t h e o r i s t qua advocate r e c o n s t r u c t s what he or she c o n s i d e r s to be "hidden i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s of i n v o l v e d i n d i v i d u a l s or groups" and i d e n t i f i e s "the normative power [norms based on f o r c e ] b u i l t i n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n a l system of a s o c i e t y " . 1 5 9 As a c r i t i c of i deology the t h e o r i s t o f f e r s the outcome of h i s or her r e c o n s t r u t i o n to the p u b l i c and recommends h y p o t h e t i c a l j u s t i f i a b l e norms. The advocated hypothesis would then have to be confirmed and accepted by consensus through p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e among the people i n v o l v e d i n the c o n f l i c t before i t i s c o n s i d e r e d v a l i d . 1 6 0 At t h i s p o i n t we should perhaps c l a r i f y what Habermas means by p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . For him, there are two kinds of d i s c o u r s e , namely, t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l : In t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s - which serve to ground a s s e r t i o n s - consensus i s produced a c c o r d i n g to 65 r u l e s of argumentation d i f f e r e n t from those o b t a i n i n g i n p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s - which serve to j u s t i f y recommended norms. However, i n both cases the goal i s the same: a r a t i o n a l l y motivated d e c i s i o n about the r e c o g n i t i o n (or r e j e c t i o n ) of v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . 1 6 1 In a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , statements about experience and a c t i o n are examined by p a r t i c i p a n t s who attempt t o reach a consensus about the t r u t h c l a i m s of the statements. S e l f -r e f l e c t i o n i s not i n v o l v e d . In a p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , h y p o t h e t i c a l s o c i a l norms are i n t r o d u c e d and recommended by an advocate f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s to j u s t i f y . As a r e s u l t of the advocate's suggestions, the supp r e s s i o n of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s comes to l i g h t and p a r t i c i p a n t s of the d i s c o u r s e a c q u i r e i n s i g h t i n t o the problem i n q u e s t i o n (the nature of the c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s ) . When p a r t i c i p a n t s e v e n t u a l l y reach a consensus to accept the recommended norms, s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s s a i d to have been achieved. In the former case, the input f o r argumentative reasoning c o n s i s t s of statements about experience and a c t i o n ; i n the l a t e r case, i t c o n s i s t s of recommended norms. Hence i n the advocacy model, the kind of d i s c o u r s e r e q u i r e d i s p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , a process which i n v o l v e s both r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . In working out hidden i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s and j u s t i f i a b l e norms the t h e o r i s t does not t h e o r i z e s u b j e c t i v e l y . Rather, he or she adheres to r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . In h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m Habermas argues there are " s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e p a t t e r n s of development of normative s t r u c t u r e s " . 1 6 2 T h i s means that j u s t i f i a b l e norms are d e r i v e d from r e c o n s t r u c t e d h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , and i n d i r e c t l y , from 66 ego development and u n i v e r s a l pragmatics. Thus the advocate's hypothesis i s s c i e n t i f i c a l l y based and adapted to the p a r t i c u l a r case of c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of advocacy i s that i t helps s o c i e t y e s t a b l i s h a s o c i a l system that i s r a t i o n a l at a given l e v e l of f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n . The advocacy model makes p r o v i s i o n f o r a compromise. Habermas rec o g n i z e s there are p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s , i . e . non-g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s , i n a d d i t i o n to g e n e r a l i z a b l e ones. He argues that a compromise of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s can be j u s t i f i e d "only i f both c o n d i t i o n s are met; a balance of power among the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d and the n o n - g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of the n e g o t i a t e d i n t e r e s t s e x i s t . " 1 6 3 Without a balance of power, the outcome of a compromise would remain r e p r e s s i v e . I f an attempt to compromise i s made on i n t e r e s t s r e g a r d l e s s of whether they are g e n e r a l i z a b l e , s o c i e t y would r e s i g n i t s e l f t o "an impene-t r a b l e p l u r a l i s m of a p p a r e n t l y u l t i m a t e value o r i e n t a t i o n s " . 1 6 " Whether the compromise indeed s a t i s f i e s these two c o n d i t i o n s again has to be determined through d i s c o u r s e . Habermas' advocacy model can be c o n s i d e r e d a refinement of the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model he had d e s c r i b e d i n KHI. There are four major aspects to t h i s refinement. F i r s t , u n l i k e the case of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , where there i s only one p a t i e n t , the advocacy model r e c o g n i z e s there are groups with p o s s i b l y c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y and thus has to take i n t o account t h i s h e t e r o g e n e i t y . The p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model aims at c o r r e c t i n g d e v i a t i o n s i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process of s o c i e t y . T h i s n o t i o n 67 becomes vague once s o c i e t y i s no longer taken to be homogeneous - which group in s o c i e t y i s deviant? The advocacy model solves t h i s problem by d e f i n i n g the suppression of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s to be s o c i a l pathology; i t aims at removing such s u p p r e s s i o n . Second, r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s are u t i l i z e d i n the advocacy model. D i s c o u r s e s among groups are c a r r i e d out i n accordance with anonymous r u l e systems of u n i v e r s a l pragmatics. The advocate r e c o n s t r u c t s hidden i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s and proposes j u s t i f i a b l e norms i n accordance with anonymous r u l e systems of r e c o n s t r u c t e d h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m and other r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . These are necessary s i n c e , i n Habermas' view, the advocate should have a p r e - n o t i o n of what u n d i s t o r t e d communication i s and the stages of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n are before he or she can h e l p c o r r e c t the s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d communication i n s o c i e t y . 1 6 5 T h i r d , i n the advocacy model, the symptom of s o c i a l pathology i s c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s . A p a t i e n t ' s s u f f e r i n g i s the reason f o r seeking p r o f e s s i o n a l h e l p from a psychoanalyst; by the same token a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s has to be r e s o l v e d with the help of a s o c i a l t h e o r i s t qua advocate. Fourth, the i s s u e of compromise does not e x i s t i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s s i n c e only one p a t i e n t i s i n v o l v e d at a time. Keeping i n mind t h i s refinement one can t e l l the advocacy model runs i n p a r a l l e l t o the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model. Both i n v o l v e a d i v i s i o n of l a b o r : i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i t i s between t h e r a p i s t and p a t i e n t , and i n the advocacy model i t i s between advocate and s o c i a l groups. The t h e r a p i s t r e c o n s t r u c t s the c h i l d h o o d scene; the p a t i e n t only says "yes" or "no". The advocate 68 r e c o n s t r u c t s i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s and proposes j u s t i f i a b l e norms based on r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s ; s o c i a l groups only c o n f i r m or r e j e c t the h y p o t h e s i s through d i s c o u r s e . Neither the p a t i e n t not s o c i a l groups do t h e i r own t h e o r i z i n g ; nor do they c r i t i c i z e the t h e o r i e s o f f e r e d to them. In f a c t one can perhaps understand the advocacy model b e t t e r by o b s e r v i n g the l o g i c of the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model. For i n s t a n c e , Habermas does not c l a r i f y what happens i f the advocated h y p o t h e s i s i s not accepted by consensus. Presumably - l e a r n i n g from the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model -the advocate has to a c q u i r e more i n f o r m a t i o n and make improvements to the hypothesis i n f u r t h e r rounds, u n t i l the r e v i s e d h y p othesis i s f i n a l l y accepted. The c r i t i q u e of ideology would then be complete. Approach to P l a n n i n g Habermas d e r i v e s h i s appraoch to p l a n n i n g from the advocacy model. He g i v e s a b r i e f account of t h i s approach a g a i n s t the backdrop of N i k l a s Luhmann's systems the o r y . Observing the complexity of modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y Luhmann argues that the o n l y r e a l i s t i c s o l u t i o n to s o c i e t a l problems i s to f r e e p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n from the i n t e r f e r e n c e of p a r t i c i p a t o r y p o l i t i c s . T h i s autonomous a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s to take a s c i e n t i f i c and systematic approach to i n c r e a s e i t s c a p a c i t y to process in f o r m a t i o n and to determine how s o c i e t y must adapt to the changing environment. I t i s assumed that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has the general r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a b i l i t y to handle s o c i e t a l problems i n such a way that s o c i e t y can f u n c t i o n smoothly. To 69 t h i s extent, not only i s input from the p u b l i c domain s u p e r f l u o u s , i t undermines the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 1 6 6 Habermas' major complaint here i s that systems theory s p e l l s "the end of the i n d i v i d u a l " , t h a t i t "gives up the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between power and t r u t h i n favor of a n a t u r e - l i k e development withdrawn from r e f l e c t i o n " . 1 6 7 Put d i f f e r e n t l y , systems theory d e a l s with s o c i a l development e x c l u s i v e l y from the p e r s p e c t i v e of i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n ; i t t r e a t s both nature and human r e l a t i o n i n terms of systematic, c o n t r o l f o r the purpose of system m a i n t e n a n c e . 1 6 8 Systems theory transforms "questions of v a l i d i t y i n t o q u e s t i o n s of  b e h a v i o r " . 1 6 9 For Habermas, the v a l i d i t y of s o c i a l norms has to be j u s t i f i e d , and t h i s i s something Luhmann does not permit i n h i s thoery. In s o c i a l development, Habermas argues, norms must be c r i t i c a l l y examined through p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e . However, " t h i s procedure of normative genesis must, of course, be connected to the s y s t e m s - t h e o r e t i c approach i f i t i s to c o n t r i b u t e to a s u i t a b l e theory of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . " 1 7 0 In other words, Habermas i s impressed with systems theory's p o t e n t i a l i n a d d r e s s i n g complex t e c h n i c a l problems i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , but at the same time he condemns i t s l a c k of a s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e component. The remedy, i n h i s view, i s to couple systems theory with the advocacy model. The former i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s i n the c o n t r o l of nature and i n o r g a n i z i n g human r e l a t i o n s . The l a t t e r d e a l s with r e f l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s i n s o c i e t y - i n c l u d i n g the r e l a t e d i s s u e s of 70 j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of norms, suppression of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s , c r i t i q u e of ideology and compromise - through p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . In p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e people r e f l e c t on what a systematic a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has taken f o r granted and thus d e p r i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of i t s autonomous s t a t u s . T h i s marriage of systems theory and the advocacy model i s Habermas' c r i t i c a l -r e c o n s t r u c t i v e approach to p l a n n i n g . 1 7 1 NOTES 1 The chapter t i t l e "Habermas: The C r i t i q u e of Ideology" and the next one "Gadamer: The Hermeneutics of t r a d i t i o n " are taken from Paul Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the C r i t i q u e of Ideology", i n Hermeneutics and the Human Sci e n c e s , J.B.Thompson (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981. These t i t l e s seem to capture the essence of the debate. 2 Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s , Boston: Beacon, 1971. He r e a f t e r i t w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as KHI. 3 "The D i a l e c t i c s of R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n : An Interview with Jurgen Habermas", T e l o s , no.49, 1981, pp.30-1. 4 C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason, N.K.Smith ( t r a n s . ) , New York: S t . M a r t i n ' s , 1929, p.41-3. 5 I b i d . , p.66. 6 I b i d . , p.58. 7 I b i d . , p.60. 8 KHI, pp.13-8. 9 G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology of S p i r i t , A . V . M i l l e r ( t r a n s . ) , Oxford and New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977. H e r e a f t e r i t w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as PhS. The word Kant employed f o r "experience" was Erfahrung, by which he meant c e r t a i n immediate p a r t i c u l a r s e n s a t i o n . E r l e b n i s a c q u i r e d a 71 t e c h n i c a l meaning and gained p o p u l a r i t y with W.Dilthey and h i s contemporaries a f t e r the 1870s, to set i t s e l f a p a r t from E r f a h r u n g . In a d d i t i o n to a sense of immediacy E r l e b n i s (experience, sometimes c a l l e d l i v e d experience) connotes a content that has enduring s i g n i f i c a n c e . "As a g a i n s t the a b s t r a c t i o n of the understanding and the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of p e r c e p t i o n or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h i s concept i m p l i e s the c o n n e c t i o n with t o t a l i t y , with i n f i n i t y " (Gadamer, TM, p.57 ). Hegel used the word Erfahrung o n l y . But o b v i o u s l y what he means i s c l o s e r to E r l e b n i s than to Erfahrung i n the Kantian sense. KHI, p.8. I b i d . , p.19. PhS, p.490. I b i d . , p.57. I b i d . , p.492. KHI, pp.19-24. There i s a theory about the " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l break" i n Marx - espoused e s p e c i a l l y by s t r u c t u r a l M a r x i s t s ( A l t h u s s e r , G o d e l i e r , e t c . ) - m a i n t a i n i n g that "mature" Marxian philosophy i s non-Hegelian. But evidence i s a g a i n s t t h i s theory. For i n s t a n c e , i n Afterword to the Second German E d i t i o n of C a p i t a l I_, c o n s i d e r e d one of Marx's mature works, Marx remarks of Hegel: "I t h e r e f o r e openly avowed myself the p u p i l of that mighty t h i n k e r " . A l s o , the recent p u b l i c a t i o n of G r u n d r i s s e , Marx's p e r s o n a l notebooks o u t l i n i n g many of h i s mature works, v i n d i c a t e s that the mature Marx i s no l e s s H egelian than the young Marx (see e s p e c i a l l y Forward to G r u n d r i s s e by M a r t i n N i c o l a u s ) . In our present study, we assume a c o n t i n u i t y i n Marx's w r i t i n g s and draw on the e n t i r e corpus of h i s works. Although Habermas admits he has "learned something from M a r x i s t s l i k e G o d e l i e r " (Communication and the E v o l u t i o n of  S o c i e t y , Boston: Beacon, 1979, p.124; h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as CES), he does not accept the s t r u c t u r a l Marxist a n t i -humanistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marx. Habermas' reading of Marx i s c l o s e r to that of "the H e g e l i a n - M a r x i s t t r a d i t i o n from Lukacs to Adorno" ( I b i d . ) . K.Marx, "Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c a l Manuscripts of 1844" i n E a r l y W r i t i n g s , T.B.Bottomore (ed. and t r a n s . ) , New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, pp.202-3. The Manuscripts w i l l h e r e a f t e r be r e f e r r e d to as "1844 MSS". According to Marx, Hegel conceives the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process mainly as "movements of thought". T h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n i s i n a c c u r a t e : we have seen that S p i r i t i s 72 n e c e s s a r i l y embodied in s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . Marx was p o s s i b l y aware of t h i s f a c t ; he was employing polemics a g a i n s t Hegel i n order to b r i n g out h i s own ideas. R i c h a r d B e r n s t e i n - i n P r a x i s and A c t i o n , P h i l a d e l p h i a : U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania Press, 1971 - c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s out that t h i s d i f f e r e n c e between Hegel and Marx i s best seen as a major s h i f t i n emphasis. For a s i m i l a r view, see a l s o John O ' N e i l l , "Embodiment and H i s t o r y i n Hegel and Marx", o p . c i t . 1 9 "1844 MSS", p.207 2 0 K.Marx and F.Engels, The German Ideology, New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1970, p.57. 2 1 K.Marx, The E i g h t e e n t h Brumaire of L o u i s Bonaparte, Moscow: Progress P u b l i s h e r s , 1934, p.10. 2 2 One of the best commentaries that c l a r i f i e s t h i s concept i s A l f r e d Schmidt, The Concept of Nature i n Marx, London: NLB, 1971. Habermas adopts a s i m i l a r view. 2 3 K.Marx, C a p i t a l , 3 volumes, Moscow: Progress P u b l i s h e r s , 1954-9, v o l . 1 , p.173. 2 t t Marx was much i n f l u e n c e d by C h a r l e s Darwin's theory of b i o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n . 2 5 "1844 MSS", p.164. 2 6 Marx and Engels, o p . c i t . , p.47. The popular n o t i o n h e l d by c e r t a i n M a r x i s t s that " s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e determines conscio u s n e s s " i s an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of Marx's thought. 2 7 U s u a l l y the concept f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n a l s o i n c l u d e s n a t u r a l resources and t o o l s . Cf. M.Godelier, "System, S t r u c t u r e and C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n C a p i t a l " , i n The S o c i a l i s t  R e g i s t e r 1967, B.Brewster ( t r a n s . ) , R.Miliband and J . S a v i l l e (ed.), New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967, p.92. 2 8 CES, pp.138-9. 2 9 The term " c o n t r o l of nature" should perhaps be c l a r i f i e d . For e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s the term might connote some kind of b r u t a l i t y toward the w i l d e r n e s s : damming of r i v e r s , denuding of f o r e s t s , and so on. But f o r Habermas and many other s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s the term takes on a d i f f e r e n t meaning. There are n a t u r a l requirements f o r human s u r v i v a l (e.g., food consumption). C a r r y i n g out of a c t i v i t i e s to s a t i s f y such requirements (e.g. food p r o d u c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g g a t h e r i n g of w i l d f r u i t s ) i s the c o n t r o l of nature. I t may or may not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r the e c o l o g i c a l balance of nature, depending on how i t i s c a r r i e d out. 73 In a s l i g h t l y l a t e r work, Toward A R a t i o n a l S o c i e t y , Habermas e l a b o r a t e s on the concept of "work", which he r e -d e f i n e s as p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . T h i s concept i n c l u d e s i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n and s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n . The former r e f e r s to t e c h n i c a l means to achieve a goal while the l a t t e r r e f e r s to the process of g o a l - s e t t i n g . See Toward A R a t i o n a l S o c i e t y , Boston: Beacon, 1970, pp.91-2. H e r e a f t e r t h i s book w i l l be c i t e d as TRS. In our present study we use the term in s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n i n i t s broader sense to i n c l u d e both g o a l - s e t t i n g and g o a l - a c h i e v i n g . T h i s would be c o n s i s t e n t with Habermas' terminology i n KHI and would a l s o take i n t o account h i s l a t e r t h i n k i n g . "Work" here i s the t r a n s l a t i o n of A r b e i t ; the same word has been t r a n s l a t e d as " l a b o r " i n r e l a t i o n to Marx. "Labor" suggests manual l a b o r , which was e s s e n t i a l l y how i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n was c a r r i e d out back i n the days of Marx; but t h i s i s no longer true today, s i n c e many people i n v o l v e d i n the c o n t r o l of nature are p r o f e s s i o n a l s , t e c h n i c i a n s , bureaucrats, e t c . KHI, p.53. A v i n e r i , The S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Thought of K a r l Marx, Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968, p.81. KHI, p.55. CES, p.148. Marx and Engels, o p . c i t . , p.64. I b i d . , pp.65-6. Habermas analyzes the is s u e of l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m and s t a t e - r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m i n TRS, f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n German i n 1968, the same year as KHI. In t h i s and the next few paragraphs we draw on TRS, which complements the a n a l y s i s of i n s t r u m e n t a l and communicative a c t i o n s i n KHI. TRS, pp.102-3. I b i d . , p.111. I b i d . , p.119. I b i d . , P.112. For an i l l u s t r a t i o n , see A l v i n Gouldner's The Coming C r i s i s  of Western S o c i o l q y , New York: Basi c Books, 1970, which c o n t a i n s an account of how p o s i t i v i s m has dominated s o c i o l o g y u n t i l very r e c e n t l y and how i t i s s t i l l i n f l u e n t i a l today. See a l s o Anthony Giddens, " P o s i t i v i s m and I t s C r i t i c s " i n S t u d i e s i n S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Theory, London: Hutchinson, 1977. KHI, pp.67-90. I b i d . , p.67. I b i d . , p.107. I b i d . , pp.92-3. I b i d . , p.92. I b i d . , p.100. I b i d . , p. 137. I b i d . I b i d . , p. 140. W.Dilthey, S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s , H.P.Rickman (ed. and t r a n s . ) , Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976, p.171. I b i d . , p.89. I b i d . , p.172. I b i d . , p.89. One of the most p r e v a l e n t terms i n D i l t h e y ' s w r i t i n g s i s Zusammenhang, which means coherence, connection, r e l a t i o n , c o n t i n u i t y , context, o r d e r , p a t t e r n . He uses t h i s term by i t s e l f and i n v a r i o u s combinations. E s s e n t i a l l y he intends to emphasize that every aspect of human e x i s t e n c e ( l i f e , e xperience, e x p r e s s i o n , a c t i o n , understanding,. meaning, s o c i e t y , h i s t o r y , e tc.) i s connected to every other aspect. T h i s complexity of human l i f e cannot be reduced to c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s . When t r a n s l a t e d , Zusammenhang appears as a number of d i f f e r e n t E n g l i s h words. Thus the emphasis D i l t h e y i n t e n d s i s not so w e l l pronounced. Zusammenhang i s a l s o one of Habermas' f a v o r i t e terms. I b i d . , p.197. I b i d . , p.192. "To form" here i s the t r a n s l a t i o n of b i l d e n , which i s the verb of B i l d u n g . D i l t h e y i m p l i e s the s u b j e c t -matter of human s c i e n c e s i s the product of the s e l f -formative process of mankind. I b i d . , pp.192-3. I b i d . , p.194. I b i d . , p.163. I b i d . , p.164. 75 6 3 I b i d . , p.175. 6 " I b i d . , p.176. 6 5 I b i d . , p.228. 6 6 See e.g. Gadamer, TM, pp.153ff. 6 7 Recent s t u d i e s on the extension of w r i t t e n t e x t to t h i s broader context can be found i n C h a r l e s T a y l o r , " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the Sciences of Man", Review of  Metaphysics, vol.25, no.1, pp.3-51, 1971, and Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text", i n Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, o p . c i t . 6 8 D i l t h e y , o p . c i t . , p.226. 6 9 I b i d . , p.230. 7 0 H.P.Rickman, Wilhelm D i l t h e y : Pioneer of the Human S t u d i e s , London: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1979, p.34. 7 1 D i l t h e y , o p , c i t . , pp.235-6. 7 2 I b i d . , p.236. 7 3 I b i d . 7 4 H.P.Rickman, I n t r o d u c t i o n to D i l t h e y ' s S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s , o p . c i t . , p.11. 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 D i l t h e y , o p . c i t . , p.183. I b i d . , pp.183-4. KHI, p.176. I.Kant, C r i t i q u e of P r a c t i c a l Reason and Other W r i t i n g s i n  Moral Philosophy, L.W.Beck Ted. and t r a n s . ) , Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1949. In f a c t the moral sense of " p r a c t i c a l " can be t r a c e d to A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean E t h i c s , M.Ostwald ( t r a n s . ) , I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1962, Book S i x . Phronesis ( p r a c t i c a l wisdom) i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from techne (from which we get the words t e c h n i c a l and t e c h n o l o g y ) . The l a t t e r i s concerned w i t h p r o d u c t i o n ; the former i n v o l v e s what i s v i r t u o u s . The term Habermas uses i s das p r a k t i s c h e  E r k e n n t n i s i n t e r e s s e ( p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t ) . J.Sharipo p o i n t s out, i n the p r e f a c e to h i s t r a n s l a t i o n of Habermas' Toward A R a t i o n a l S o c i e t y : "In c u r r e n t E n g l i s h , ' p r a c t i c a l ' o f t e n means 'down-to-earth' or 'expedient'. In 76 the t e x t , t h i s sense of ' p r a c t i c a l ' would f a l l under ' t e c h n i c a l ' . ' P r a c t i c a l ' ( p r a k t i s c h ) always r e f e r s t o symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i n a normative order, to e t h i c s and p o l i t i c s " (TRS, p . v i i ) . 8 1 KHI, p.178. 8 2 I b i d . , pp.179ff. 8 3 C e r t a i n l y a major i n f l u e n c e on Habermas i s Hannah Arendt, who " s t r e s s e s p a r t i c u l a r l y three f e a t u r e s : the f a c t of human p l u r a l i t y , the symbolic nature of the web of human r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and the f a c t of human n a t a l i t y , the cou n t e r p a r t of m o r t a l i t y " (Habermas, "On the German-Jewish H e r i t a g e " , T e l o s , no.44, 1980, p.128. But D i l t h e y D i l t h e y ' s f o r m u l a t i o n probably g i v e s Habermas' model a more formal s t r u c t u r e . 6 U C h a r l e s T a y l o r , Hegel, o p . c i t . , p.116. 8 5 KHI, p p . l 9 7 f . 8 6 I b i d . , p.212. 8 7 I b i d . , p.198. 8 8 I b i d . , p.211. 8 9 Besides these two asp e c t s of freedom, I.Meszaros i n d i c a t e s there i s a t h i r d aspect: freedom to develop i n d i v i d u a l p o t e n t i a l . The p r e r e q u i s i t e s of t h i s i n d i v i d u a l aspect of freedom are the two s o c i a l ones: b a s i c m a t e r i a l needs must be s a t i s f i e d as a r e s u l t of s o c i a l p r o d u c t i o n and a f a v o r a b l e s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l environment must e x i s t . See Meszaros, Marx's Theory of A l i e n a t i o n , 4th ed., London: M e r l i n p r e s s , 1975, pp.153-4. 9 0 KHI_, p.53. 9 1 I b i d . , pp.196f. 9 2 I b i d . , p.189. 9 3 Habermas r e a l i z e s that emancipation has two components: from n a t u r a l n e c e s s i t y and from human domination. He focuses on the second component probably because he b e l i e v e s that technology today has advanced to such a l e v e l t h a t the f i r s t component i s no longer a major problem. Cf. Habermas, L e g i t i m a t i o n C r i s i s , Boston: Beacon, 1975, pp.119-20. H e r e a f t e r L e g i t i m a t i o n C r i s i s w i l l be c i t e d as LC. 9" KHI, p.214. 77 9 5 Ibid». pp.215-21. 9 6 I b i d . , pp.223-37. 9 7 9 9 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 3 1 0 H 1 0 6 1 0 7 I b i d . , p.230. 9 8 The a c t u a l t h e r a p e u t i c process i s more complicated. Let us mention one d e t a i l that has s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s on c r i t i c a l theory. Habermas p o i n t s out, the p a t i e n t ' s r e j e c t i o n of the t h e r a p i s t ' s h y p othesis does not mean the hypothesis i s n e c e s s a r i l y wrong. Often, i t only i n d i c a t e s the p a t i e n t has not yet overcome h i s or her r e s i s t e n c e t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In other words, the therapy i s incomplete. On the other hand, a "yes" from the p a t i e n t must a l s o be taken c a u t i o u s l y . For the p a t i e n t may want to conceal the i l l n e s s ; he or she pretends to accept the hypothesis even though he or she i s not r e a l l y convinced of i t s accuracy. See i b i d . , p.267-9. Habermas' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t h e r a p e u t i c p rocess r e v e a l s h i s p e r c e p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t and s o c i e t y . I b i d . , p.274. 1 0 0 I b i d . , pp.275-9. I b i d . , pp.280-4. I b i d . , pp.281-4. I b i d . , pp.285-6. "1844 MSS", p.161. 1 0 5 KHI, p.288. "A P o s t s c r i p t to Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s " , Philosophy of the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , v o l . 3 , pp.157-89, 1973, p.105. H e r e a f t e r t h i s a r t i c l e w i l l be c i t e d as " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI". * Theory and P r a c t i c e , Boston: Beacon, 1973, h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as TP. los " P o s t s c r i p t t o KHI", p.168. Habermas' use of the term " a c t i o n " can be c o n f u s i n g . While d i s t i n g u i s h i n g d i s c o u r s e from a c t i o n , he sometimes c l a s s i f i e s d i s c o u r s e as communicative a c t i o n , sometimes not. For example, i n CES, p.209, the schematic shows d i s c o u r s e to be a kind of communicative a c t i o n . Yet on the same page, i n the note " A c t i o n v s . D i s c o u r s e " , d i s c o u r s e i s used i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to communicative a c t i o n . To make t h i n g s more complicated, he sometimes uses d i s c o u r s e as opposed to communication (Cf. TP, p.19; and, " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI", p. 174). However, Habermas does i n t e n d t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n 78 between a c t i o n and d i s c o u r s e i n the sense we present here. What he means by a c t i o n and communication i n other p l a c e s w i l l depend on c o n t e x t . 1 0 9 " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI_", p.168; and, TP, p.18. 1 1 0 " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI.", pp.168-9. 1 1 1 I b i d . , p.169. 1 1 2 I b i d . 1 1 3 I b i d . , p.168. 1 1 « I b i d . , p.169. 1 1 5 I b i d . , p.168. 1 1 6 TP, p.19. 1 1 7 I b i d . , p.18. 1 1 8 " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI", p.168. 1 1 9 I b i d . 1 2 0 LC, p.108. 1 2 1 TP, p.21. 1 2 2 I b i d . , p.22. 123 " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI", p.182. 1 2 a I b i d . 1 2 5 I b i d . , p.183. 1 2 6 i b i d . , p.172. Habermas e l a b o r a t e s on t h i s p o i n t i n CES, pp.21f f . W 7 " p o s t s c r i p t to KHI", p.183. 1 2 8 r£pr p.22. 1 2 9 I b i d p.23. "Know how" i s a term Habermas borrows from the I n T I y t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r G i l b e r t Ryle. I t r e f e r s to consciousness of i m p l i c i t r u l e s . See CES, p p . i ^ -5. 1 3 0 CES, p.14. 1 3 1 I b i d . 1 3 2 I b i d . 79 1 3 3 Habermas' idea of r u l e f o l l o w i n g and competence i s d e r i v e d from the l i n g u i s t i c theory of Noam Chomsky. 1 3 4 I b i d . , p.24. 1 3 5 I b i d . , p.23. 1 3 6 " P o s t s c r i p t t o KHI, p.184. 1 3 7 CES, p.26. 1 3 8 I b i d . , pp.27-9. 1 3 9 I b i d . , pp.36-40. 1 4 0 I b i d . , p.64; a l s o , TP, p.17. 1 4 1 CES, p.71. 1 4 2 Habermas' idea of stages of moral consciousness i s e s s e n t i a l l y an extension of Lawrence Kohlberg's c o g n i t i v e developmental psychology. 1 4 3 I b i d . , p.93. 1 4 4 Marx never used the term h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . The term was co i n e d by M a r x i s t s . Marx c a l l e d h i s theory of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n the m a t e r i a l i s t c o nception of h i s t o r y . Habermas opts f o r the popular term. 1 4 5 I b i d . , p.95. 1 4 6 I b i d . , p.99. 1 4 7 I b i d . 1 4 8 I b i d . , p.154. 1 4 9 Habermas p r e f e r s not to adopt the term r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n s i n c e "to speak of the r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n m i s l e a d i n g l y suggests a narrow economistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " (LC, p.17). 1 5 0 CES, p.120. 1 5 1 I b i d . , p.142. 1 5 2 I b i d . , p.140. 1 5 3 U s u a l l y "advocacy" r e f e r s to the notion of advocating i n t e r e s t s of p a r t i c u l a r groups i n s o c i e t y . See e.g. P.Davidoff, "Advocacy and P l u r a l i s m i n P l a n n i n g " , J o u r n a l  of the American I n s t i t u t e of Planners, v o l . 3 1 , pp.331-8, 1965. Habermas uses the term i n a d i f f e r e n t sense. See LC, p.117. For him, "advocacy" r e f e r s to the n o t i o n of advocating the i n t e r e s t s of s o c i e t y as a whole, not those of p a r t i c u l a r groups. LC, pp.113-4. I b i d . , p.108. I b i d . , p.111. I b i d . , p.113. I b i d . , pp.112-3. I b i d . , p.114 and p.113. I b i d . , p.108 and pp.113-4. I b i d . , p.107. CES, p.98. LC, p.112. I b i d . , p.108. Habermas i n d i c a t e s t h i s p r e - n o t i o n of u n d i s t o r t e d communication i s necessary even f o r p s y c h o a n a l y s i s at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l - a p o i n t he had n e g l e c t e d when w r i t i n g KHI (See " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI/', p. 184). LC, pp.131-8. I b i d . , p.136. In LC Habermas uses the terms "systems i n t e g r a t i o n " and " s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n " ; i t r e v e a l s h i s i n f l u e n c e by systems theory. These terms roughly correspond t o in s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n and communicative a c t i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y , although Habermas does not c l a r i f y the r e l a t i o n s h i p . See pp.1-8. I b i d . , p.6. I b i d . , p.140. I b i d . , p. 1 41 . 81 CHAPTER THREE GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS OF TRADITION L i k e Habermas, Gadamer i s i n v o l v e d i n the problems of knowledge and a c t i o n , s c i e n c e and technology as w e l l as s o c i a l development. In f a c t the two share a somewhat s i m i l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l h e r i t a g e . No l e s s than Habermas, Gadamer i s profoundly indebted to the Hegelian concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n . 1 T h i s concept can be c o n s i d e r e d the backbone of both c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics; i t i s t h e i r bulwark a g a i n s t any argument f o r o b j e c t i v e knowledge and t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o n t r o l of s o c i e t y . However, few Hegel s c h o l a r s today would defend the n o t i o n of the Absolute nor the cosmic p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to which Reason o p e r a t e s ; 2 Habermas and Gadamer are no e x c e p t i o n s . In regard t o t h e i r stances toward p o s i t i v i s m and philosophy of s c i e n c e , one can r e a d i l y t e l l the two t h i n k e r s are on the same s i d e of the f e n c e . 3 They even h o l d s i m i l a r views on the r o l e of ph i l o s o p h y i n contemporary s o c i e t y . For Habermas, philosophy i s t o perform the c r i t i q u e of i d e o l o g y : Philosophy i s pr e s e r v e d i n s c i e n c e as c r i t i q u e . A s o c i a l theory that puts f o r t h the c l a i m to be a s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n of the h i s t o r y of the s p e c i e s cannot simply negate p h i l o s o p h y . Rather, the h e r i t a g e of phi l o s o p h y i s s u e s i n the c r i t i q u e of id e o l o g y , a mode of thought that determines the method of s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s i t s e l f . Outside of c r i t i q u e , 82 however, philosophy r e t a i n s no r i g h t . " For Gadamer, philosophy i s a u n i v e r s a l agent f o r awakening of consc iousness: The task of making consciousness aware of extant d i f f e r e n c e s between peoples and nations assumes a p r i o r i t y i n a world where [ r a t i o n a l ] p l a n n i n g and progress seem to guarantee the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l d e s i r e s . Such a awakening of consciousness, however, i s now h a r d l y ever performed by s c i e n c e . I t i s more r e a d i l y a r e s u l t of a c r i t i q u e of s c i e n c e To awaken a consciousness of what i j ; , n e c e s s a r i l y supposes the awakening of consciousness as to what s c i e n c e i s . But i t e q u a l l y i n c l u d e s p r e s e r v i n g the openness of one's own consciousness, and to be cognizant of the f a c t t h at not e v e r y t h i n g jjs, i s or c o u l d become the o b j e c t of s c i e n c e . 5 Both t h i n k e r s are g r a v e l y concerned with the t r e n d of i n c r e a s i n g t e c h n o c r a t i c manipulation of s o c i e t y and they c h a l l e n g e that way of t h i n k i n g at i t s foundations. D i l t h e y i s no doubt a major p r e c u r s o r of both Gadamer and Habermas. Habermas applauds "Gadamer's f i r s t - r a t e c r i t i q u e of the o b j e c t i v i s t i c s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the human s c i e n c e s " 6 which i s represented by D i l t h e y . In f a c t , i t was Gadamer's p e n e t r a t i n g c r i t i q u e of D i l t h e y that s t i m u l a t e d Habermas' i n t e r e s t i n hermeneutics, which p e r m i t t e d the l a t t e r to venture i n a d i r e c t i o n untrodden by h i s predecessors i n the c r i t i c a l theory t r a d i t i o n . 7 Although both Gadamer and Habermas have transcended D i l t h e y ' s o b j e c t i v i s m , these two c u r r e n t t h i n k e r s can h a r d l y deny D i l t h e y ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and human sc i e n c e s and h i s concept of the process of understanding are i n d i s p e n s a b l e to t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l backgrounds. With t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s i n mind, Habermas and Gadamer are able to c r i t i c i z e technocracy without 83 o b l i t e r a t i n g the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of modern sc i e n c e and technology. For them, the answer to today's s o c i e t a l problems i s not to be found i n the romantic image of a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e r a . The study of u t i l i z a t i o n of s c i e n c e and technology f o r s o c i a l development f a l l s i n t o the realm of human s c i e n c e s . Besides, there i s p h i l o s o p h y , which serves as c r i t i q u e of s c i e n c e and technology, and of s o c i e t y i n g e n e r a l . U n l i k e Habermas, Gadamer d i s p l a y s l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e from Marx; he h a r d l y pays any a t t e n t i o n to P e i r c e and s e r i o u s l y doubts the v a l i d i t y of a s o c i a l theory based on the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model. Instead, Gadamer has i n h e r i t e d the phenomenological t r a d i t i o n of H u s s e r l and Heidegger. Having s t u d i e d under Heidegger in the 1920s, Gadamer extends h i s teacher's a n a l y s i s of the fundamental c o n d i t i o n s of human e x i s t e n c e to the s o c i e t a l l e v e l , with the h e l p of Hegelian p h i l o s o p h y . In T r u t h and Method Gadamer examines the evolvement of modern hermeneutics and l a y s out much of the foundation of c u r r e n t hermeneutical t h i n k i n g . Since we intend to c o n t r a s t the theory of Habermas with that of Gadamer, i t i s reasonable that we s t a r t with the l a t t e r ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p to D i l t h e y . I t was mentioned e a r l i e r t h a t Gadamer endeavors to go beyond D i l t h e y . But Gadamer does not seek to improve D i l t h e y ' s methodology of human s c i e n c e s : i n s t e a d , he i n v e s t i g a t e s the fundamental c o n d i t i o n s of p o s s i b l e human understanding. In Gadamer's own words: The hermeneutics developed here i s not, t h e r e f o r e , a methodology of human s c i e n c e s , but an attempt to 84 understand what the human s c i e n c e s t r u l y a r e , beyond t h e i r m ethodological s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and what connects them with the t o t a l i t y of our experience of world I t i s not my i n t e n t i o n t o make p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r s c i e n c e s or the conduct of l i f e , but t o t r y to c o r r e c t f a l s e t h i n k i n g about what they a r e . 8 Hence Gadamer's work cannot be seen as a d i r e c t c o n t i n u a t i o n of D i l t h e y ' s e f f o r t . One was occupied with methodology whereas the other e x p l o r e s what methodology - any methodology - has taken f o r granted. T h i s s h i f t i n g of d i r e c t i o n i n hermeneutics takes p l a c e when Gadamer i n c o r p o r a t e s Heidegger's i n s i g h t s . F o r e - s t r u c t u r e of Understanding i n Heidegger In Being and Time Heidegger (1889-1976) observes that human knowledge has been compartmentalized i n t o many su b j e c t areas, the systematic i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n each of which i s s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h . But a l l b a s i c concepts i n each area of re s e a r c h has al r e a d y been shaped by p r e s c i e n t i f i c knowledge which r e p r e s e n t s aspects of human e x i s t e n c e , Heidegger p o i n t s out, so that t r u e progress i n research should i n v o l v e " i n q u i r i n g i n t o the ways i n which each p a r t i c u l a r area i s b a s i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d " , r a t h e r than j u s t "an increase i n i n f o r m a t i o n " . 9 Heidegger c o n s i d e r s Kant's quest f o r a p r i o r i knowledge to be a ste p i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , as long as the i n q u i r y does not take i n t o account the meaning of human e x i s t e n c e i n g e n e r a l , Heidegger c l a i m s i t remains "naive and opaque". 1 0 H i s reasoning goes as f o l l o w s . A b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s i t i c of human e x i s t e n c e i s that each i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t s i n a world. By "world" here Heidegger does not 85 mean the p h y s i c a l or o b j e c t i v e world. Rather, he r e f e r s to something l i k e a per s o n a l world: i t i s the t o t a l i t y of meaning r e l a t i o n s an i n d i v i d u a l has with e n t i t i e s around h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f . 1 1 He i l l u s t r a t e s the concept of the world with the example of equipment. As an i n d i v i d u a l grows up and becomes acquainted with the environment, he or she l e a r n s about p i e c e s of equipment: what they are f o r and how they are used. The meaning of the equipment to the i n d i v i d u a l i s embedded i n i t s " s e r v i c e a b i l i t y , conduciveness, u s a b i l i t y , m a n i p u l a b i l i t y " , e t c . The equipment by i t s e l f ( i . e . without people) i s meaningless. T h i s i s why a world i s n e i t h e r o b j e c t i v e nor s u b j e c t i v e . 1 2 Due to the f a c t that an i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t s i n a world, he or she i s always a l r e a d y acquainted with surrounding e n t i t i e s ( i n c l u d i n g h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f and other humans) i n the sense of having some kind of a t t i t u d e toward them: "having to so with something, producing something, g i v i n g something up and l e t t i n g i t go, undertaking, accomplishing, e v i n c i n g , i n t e r r o g a t i n g , c o n s i d e r i n g , d i s c u s s i n g , determining " , 1 3 These a t t i t u d e s or concerns are always o p e r a t i v e , whether the i n d i v i d u a l i n v o l v e d i s aware of them. They precede any knowledge, s c i e n t i f i c or otherwise. According to Heidegger, i f there i s such a t h i n g as knowing at a l l , " i t belongs s o l e l y t o those e n t i t i e s which know." 1 4 These e n t i t i e s he r e f e r s to are humans. Hence "knowing i s grounded beforehand" i n the everyday mode of human e x i s t e n c e . 1 5 The a p r i o r i knowledge Kant searched f o r i s not the most fundamental. For i n knowing, one simply adopts a new a t t i t u d e toward the world one has a l r e a d y d i s c o v e r e d . 1 6 To 86 t h i s extent, Heidegger maintains that an analysis of the structures of huamn existence - or e x i s t e n t i a l structures - i s in order. He c a l l s the outcome of such an analysis "fundamental ontology". 1 7 According to Heidegger's analysis, one of the key e x i s t e n t i a l structures i s "understanding". 1 8 This notion of understanding, unlike that of Dilthey, does not refer to any methodology. Rather, t h i s understanding i s a basic characteris-t i c of human existence, regardless of what methodology i s employed in the pursuit of knowledge. The difference between the two notions of understanding i s c r u c i a l since i t underlies Gadamer's "ontological turn" from Dilthey. For Heidegger, interpretation i s the e x p l i c i t form of understanding. 1 9 An interpretation of an entity i s always governed by three basic conditions: some comprehension of the t o t a l i t y of involvement in which the entity i s embedded ("fore-having"), the i n i t i a l step that the entity i s approached ("fore-si g h t " ) , and an ant i c i p a t i o n that determines the way the entity i s conceived ("fore-conception"). These three basic conditions constitute what i s known as the fore-structure of understanding.-Thus "an interpretation i s never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to u s " . 2 0 These presuppositions depend on how the person involved perceives the object of understanding in the context of other e n t i t i e s in the world. Heidegger terms the t o t a l i t y of these presuppostions the "hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n " . 2 1 Put simply, " a l l interpretation, which i s supposed to generate understanding or knowledge, must 87 i t s e l f be based on p r i o r understanding of what i s to be known through i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . 2 2 Since D i l t h e y ' s hermeneutical method does not take i n t o account the e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e of understanding, Heidegger r e l e g a t e s i t to a d e r i v a t i v e s t a t u s . 2 3 Gadamer accepts Heidegger's b r i e f comment on D i l t h e y ; he develops i t i n t o a c r i t i q u e of s c i e n t i f i c method i n g e n e r a l . The Heideggerian View of Time and H i s t o r y Heidegger argues t h a t the most fundamental b a s i s of e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e s i s t e m p o r a l i t y , so t h a t the a n a l y s i s of human e x i s t e n c e must be grounded i n the concept of t i m e . 2 " For him, "time" i s more than the o r d i n a r y n o t i o n of an o b j e c t i v e measure of d u r a t i o n s i n which sequences of events take p l a c e , more than what one reads from a c l o c k or a c a l e n d a r . When d i r e c t l y encountered, "time" i s the way an i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e i v e s h i s or her f u t u r e , past and present i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a meaningful whole. I t i s r e f l e c t e d i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a t t i t u d e toward e n t i t i e s i n the world. Although there i s a general agreement about the measurement of time - as i n the use of a c l o c k or a c a l e n d a r - i n d i v i d u a l s r e l a t e to time d i f f e r e n t l y . Even f o r the same i n d i v i d u a l , Heidegger p o i n t s out, c e r t a i n time may be seen to be more p r e c i o u s than o t h e r s . Hence time i s n e i t h e r o b j e c t i v e nor s u b j e c t i v e . 2 5 There are d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t e m p o r a l i t y . But they a l l conform to the p r i n c i p l e of what Heidegger c a l l s "the p r i o r i t y of the f u t u r e " . 2 6 One t h i n k s and a c t s i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the f u t u r e . I t i s t h i s a n t i c i p a t i o n t h at shapes the 88 i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n of the past and the present as w e l l as the world i n t h i s c o n t e x t . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the f u t u r e i n t e m p o r a l i t y v a r i e s with cases. In many cases, i n d i v i d u a l s are concerned mainly with the immediate or the immediate f u t u r e . O c c a s s i o n a l l y they think i n the s c a l e of t h e i r l i f e t i m e and make d e c i s i o n on that b a s i s . 2 7 T h i s fundamental r e l a t i o n s h i p between f u t u r e , past and present, a c c o r d i n g to Heidegger, i s the temporal c o n s t i t u t i o n of human e x i s t e n c e . Heidegger l i n k s i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e to the concept of h i s t o r y . F i r s t of a l l , he rec o g n i z e s that an i n d i v i d u a l does not e x i s t alone i n the world: there are other humans around. As one grows up, one g r a d u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e s one's world, d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , with the help of o t h e r s . For i n s t a n c e , one l e a r n s form o t h e r s how p i e c e s of equipment are used. We have mentioned that the world i s not s u b e j c t i v e . Heidegger now c l a r i f i e s that "the world i s always the one that I share with O t h e r s " . 2 8 When one t h i n k s or a c t s , even i n s o l i t u d e , one has al r e a d y presupposed the e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r s . For one encounters others simply through i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n one's world; as Heidegger puts i t , "Others are encountered e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y " . 2 9 T h i s s o c i a l nature of humans i s co n s i d e r e d a b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of human e x i s t e n c e . 3 0 Although i n d i v i d u a l s can make t h e i r c h o i c e s and a c t i n v a r i o u s ways, they do not have complete freedom. In a d d i t i o n to the f i n i t u d e of i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e one has to face and the e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e s one cannot transcend, Heidegger p o i n t s out, one i s governed by the " d e s t i n y " of one's community or 89 people. De s t i n y does not r e s u l t from the doing of any s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l ; i t i s a l s o beyond the c o n t r o l of any p a r t i c u l a r person. Besides being shaped by c o l l e c t i v e deeds of a people i n the past, d e s t i n y i s the outcome of the shared way i n which a people grasps the r e l a t i o n s h i p between f u t u r e , past and present. Hence d e s t i n y i s human r e a l i t y due to the f a c t that human e x i s t e n c e i s s o c i a l l y and temporally c o n s t i t u t e d . I t guides " i n advance" what an i n d i v i d u a l would encounter. In order to a l t e r d e s t i n y , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d : "only i n communicating and i n s t r u g g l i n g does the power of d e s t i n y become f r e e " . 3 1 As i n the case of i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e , Heidegger sees h i s t o r y i n terms of t e m p o r a l i t y . Only when one a n t i c i p a t e s one's f u t u r e , he i n d i c a t e s , would one be a b l e to act i n order to r e a l i z e what i s h i s t o r i c a l l y p o s s i b l e . 3 2 With t h i s concept of h i s t o r y , Heidegger e s t a b l i s h e d a c e r t a i n l i n k between i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y . Yet he d i d not s y s t e m a t i c a l l y or e x p l i c i t l y e x p l o r e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two, i n the sense of what Hegel had done before him. There i s a l a c k of consensus among s c h o l a r s on whether Heidegger's w r i t i n g s p r o p e r l y address s o c i e t a l i s s u e s . 3 3 N e v e r t h e l e s s , Being  and Time i s s u g g e s t i v e i n t h i s r e s p e c t . Gadamer e x t r a c t s some c e n t r a l ideas from i t and f o r m a l l y extends these ideas to the a n a l y s i s of s o c i e t y . 90 Prejudgments Gadamer i s convinced that Heidegger's a n a l y s i s of e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e s i s an immensely v a l u a b l e t o o l f o r h i s own study on the hermeneutics of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . With Gadamer, the context of the problem of understanding i s broadened t o the s o c i e t a l l e v e l . Human understanding, as Gadamer p e r c e i v e s i t , i s grounded i n c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . In other words, c o n d i t i o n s of understanding, which d e f i n e p o s s i b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s , are handed down through the ages. These c o n d i t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e what Gadamer c a l l s prejudgments 3" - a concept d e r i v e d from the concept of f o r e - s t r u c t u r e of understanding. Heidegger has e x p l a i n e d that understanding i s never f r e e from p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and that h i s t o r y i s p o s s i b l e due to the temporal c o n s t i t u t i o n of human e x i s t e n c e , Gadamer goes on to show how p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s develop h i s t o r i c a l l y i n s o c i e t y as a r e s u l t of the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s . In Heidegger's c o n c e p t i o n , the world i s not s u b j e c t i v e ; i t i s something an i n d i v i d u a l shares with o t h e r s . Gadamer e l a b o r a t e s on and s t r e s s e s the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e nature of human understanding when he i n t r o d u c e s the concept of prejudgment. For him, t h i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s the product of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , which e s s e n t i a l l y shapes the way an i n d i v i d u a l understands. While Heidegger focusses on the i n d i v i d u a l , Gadamer s h i f t s the emphasis to s o c i e t y . The concept of prejudgment can perhaps be c l a r i f i e d i n terms of Gadamer's a n a l y s i s of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, two i n t e l l e c t u a l movements i n the 18th and 19th c e n t u r i e s . The Enlightenment e l e v a t e s reason to supremacy: " i t 91 i s not t r a d i t i o n , but reason that c o n s t i t u t e s the u l t i m a t e source of a l l a u t h o r i t y " . 3 5 On the other hand, Romanticism, a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t the Enlightenment, b l i n d l y adheres to t r a d i t i o n without regard to reason; " i t shares the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of the Enlightenment and only reverses the e v a l u a t i o n of i t , seeking to e s t a b l i s h the v a l i d i t y of what i s o l d , simply because i t i s o l d " . 3 6 What these two movements f a i l to r e c o g n i z e , Gadamer r e v e a l s , i s that t r a d i t i o n and reason are not d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed. He argues i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. " T r a d i t i o n does not p e r s i s t by nature"; i t has to be " a f f i r m e d , embraced, c u l t i v a t e d " through "an act of reason, though an inconspicuous o n e " . 3 7 Conversely, "reason e x i s t s f o r us only i n c o n c r e t e , h i s t o r i c a l terms, i . e . i t i s not i t s own master, but remains c o n s t a n t l y dependent on the given circumstances i n which i t o p e r a t e s " . 3 8 To the extent both the Enlightenment and Romanticism r e f u s e to acknowledge t h e i r prejudgments they succumb to i l l u s i o n s . For Gadamer, " t r u e prejudgments must s t i l l f i n a l l y be j u s t i f i e d by r a t i o n a l knowledge, even though the task may never be a b l e to be f u l l y c o m p l e t e d " . 3 9 E s s e n t i a l l y Gadamer maintains t h a t prejudgments are inherent i n t r a d i t i o n : they are omnipresent. Prejudgments can never be e l i m i n a t e d , although they can be m o d i f i e d i n accordance with reason, which always stands w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the concept of prejudgment to hermeneutics i s w e l l expressed i n the f o l l o w i n g famous passage: In f a c t h i s t o r y does not belong to us, but we belong to i t . Long before we understand o u r s e l v e s through the process of s e l f - e x a m i n a t i o n , we understand o u r s e l v e s i n a s e l f - e v i d e n t way i n the f a m i l y , 92 s o c i e t y and s t a t e i n which we l i v e . The focus of s u b j e c t i v i t y i s a d i s t o r t i n g m i r r o r . The s e l f -awareness of the i n d i v i d u a l i s only a f l i c k e r i n g i n the c l o s e d c i r c u i t s of h i s t o r i c a l l i f e . That i s why prejudgments of the i n d i v i d u a l , f a r more than h i s judgments, c o n s t i t u t e the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y of h i s b e i n g . 4 0 Analogous t o Heidegger's e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e s , prejudgments are c a s t i n o n t o l o g i c a l terms: they are p a r t of the i r r e d u c i b l e r e a l i t y of human e x i s t e n c e . While Gadamer does not e l a b o r a t e on i t , we r e a l i z e that the concept of prejudgment can be seen at two l e v e l s : the s o c i e t a l and the i n d i v i d u a l . For Gadamer intends to b u i l d on Heidegger's e x i s t e n t i a l t h i n k i n g r a t h e r than r e p l a c i n g i t . At the s o c i e t a l l e v e l , prejudgments c o n s t i t u t e an aspect of contemporary c u l t u r e , as we have j u s t d i s c u s s e d . As such, prejudgments are r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous among people s h a r i n g the same c u l t u r e , a n d perhaps even more so among those s h a r i n g the same s u b - c u l t u r e . But prejudgments are a l s o d i f f e r e n t i a t e d on an i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s , as Heidegger's i n q u i r y i n t o the f o r e - s t r u c t u r e of understanding suggests. Due to a d i v e r s i t y of i n d i v i d u a l experiences and the unique s i t u a t i o n s each i n d i v i d u a l c o n f r o n t s , the c u l t u r a l l y determined component of prejudgments i s r e f i n e d at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l . Thus the prejudgments of no two i n d i v i d u a l s are e x a c t l y a l i k e , although they i n e v i t a b l y share many common f e a t u r e s i f the i n d i v i d u a l s belong t o the same c u l t u r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Gadamer's w r i t i n g s are mainly concerned with the common f e a t u r e s i n h e r i t e d from t r a d i t i o n . He probably t h i n k s Heidegger has s u f f i c i e n t l y covered the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l . In order to e x p l a i n the dynamics i n v o l v e d i n the 93 t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of prejudgments, Gadamer u t i l i z e s the concept of h o r i z o n , which i s "the range of v i s i o n that i n c l u d e s e v e r y t h i n g that can be seen from a vantage p o i n t " . 4 1 He i m p l i e s that the vantage p o i n t one takes i s shaped by one's c u l t u r a l background and i n d i v i d u a l experiences and are i n f l u e n c e d by the c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n . Now Gadamer cl a i m s that a h o r i z o n i s not a r i g i d f r o n t i e r : The h i s t o r i c a l movement of human l i f e c o n s i s t s i n the f a c t that i t i s never u t t e r l y bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a t r u l y c l o s e d h o r i z o n . The h o r i z o n i s , r a t h e r , something i n t o which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change f o r a person who i s moving. 4 2 Gadamer goes on to c l a i m that the movement of a h o r i z o n i s connected to an awareness of one's prejudgments: "the h o r i z o n of the present i s being c o n t i n u a l l y formed, in that we have c o n t i n u a l l y to t e s t a l l our prejudgments". 4 3 These c l a i m s are not obvious, u n l e s s we r e l a t e them to Hegel's a n a l y s i s of how consciousness develops. Hegel's D i a l e c t i c of Consciousness According to Hegel, consciousness d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f from independent e n t i t i e s , and knowledge i s what r e l a t e s consciousness to these e n t i t i e s . But human consciousness i s not merely knowledge of e n t i t i e s , f o r one i s c o n s c i o u s of the t r u t h of knowledge as w e l l . Hence consciousness can be seen i n i t s two c a p a c i t i e s : ' consciousness i s , on the one hand, consciousness of the o b j e c t , and on the other hand, consciousness of i t s e l f ; consciousness of what f o r i t i s the True, and consciousness of i t s knowledge of the t r u t h . 4 0 94 Hegel i l l u s t r a t e s the p r o g r e s s i o n of consciousness with the method of i n q u i r y . Whatever the goal of consciousness i s , an i n q u i r y cannot take p l a c e without some p r e s u p p o s i t i o n which can serve as i t s u n d e r l y i n g c r i t e r i o n . For an examination c o n s i s t s in a p p l y i n g an accepted standard, and i n determining whether something i s r i g h t or wrong on the b a s i s of the agreement or disagreement of the t h i n g examined." 5 Put d i f f e r e n t l y , Hegel i n d i c a t e s that i n any i n q u i r y , a goal has to be o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d i n terms of some i m p l i c i t c r i t e r i o n - a c r i t e r i o n embodied i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . Consciousness, i n i t s f i r s t c a p a c i t y , compares an e n t i t y with the c r i t e r i o n . I f the c r i t e r i o n i s met and consciousness i n i t s second c a p a c i t y judges that the goal i s s t i l l not reached, then there i s a " c o n t r a d i c t i o n " . I t f o l l o w s that the c r i t e r i o n i s inadequate. Since the c r i t e r i o n i s p o s i t e d by consciousness i t s e l f , not by an e x t e r n a l e n t i t y , "the i n v e s t i g a t i o n becomes a comparison of consciousness with i t s e l f " . 4 6 A c o n t r a d i c t i o n a l e r t s consciousness to i t s own incompleteness. T h i s s i t u a t i o n " brings about a s t a t e of d e s p a i r " , 4 7 f o r consciousness r e a l i z e s there are o b s t a c l e s on the path toward i t s g o a l : consciousness must s t r u g g l e to overcome the c o n t r a d i c t i o n . For Hegel, the removal of c o n t r a d i c t i o n has a determinate outcome: "a new form has thereby immediately a r i s e n " . 4 8 The inadequate c r i t e r i o n i s r e p l a c e d by a more adequate one, the e n t i t y assumes an appearance t h a t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f more f u l l y , and knowledge of the e n t i t y becomes more a c c u r a t e . 4 9 But these changes are none other than the development of consciousness i t s e l f . C o n t r a d i c t i o n thus r e s u l t s i n the attainment of a higher l e v e l 95 of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . The process repeats i t s e l f as long as a c o n t r a d i c t i o n o c c u r s , with each step depending on the outcome of the p r e v i o u s one. We have seen t h a t , i n Hegelian t h i n k i n g , i n d i v i d u a l s can develop themselves only w i t h i n the framework of s o c i e t y and s o c i e t y develops as a r e s u l t of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . In other words, the development of i n d i v i d u a l consciousness always s t a r t s with the S p i r i t at that p a r t i c u l a r moment i n history-, and any i n d i v i d u a l achievement c o n t r i b u t e s to S p i r i t . Hence at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l there i s a component of the developmental process p a r a l l e l to the one at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l . That i s the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process of mankind. Hegel c o n s i d e r s the p r o c e s s to be "the necessary p r o g r e s s i o n and i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of the forms of the u n r e a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s " which " w i l l by i t s e l f b r i n g to pass the completion of the s e r i e s " . 5 0 F u s i o n of Horizons In the manner that Hegel speaks of t e s t i n g the presupposed c r i t e r i o n , a process which r e s u l t s i n a higher l e v e l of consciousness and an improved c r i t e r i o n , Gadamer speaks of t e s t i n g prejudgments which leads t o an expansion of h o r i z o n and m o d i f i e d prejudgments. If one encounters a s i t u a t i o n which does not make sense a c c o r d i n g to e x i s t i n g prejudgments and yet the s i t u a t i o n i s an undeniable r e a l i t y , then there i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n the Hegelian sense. In other words, " c o l l i s i o n with o t h e r ' s h o r i z o n s makes us aware of assumptions so deep-seated that they would otherwise remain u n n o t i c e d " . 5 1 T h i s means the e x i s t i n g prejudgments can no longer be j u s t i f i e d : they must 96 be transformed i n such a way that the new h o r i z o n becomes broad enough to account f o r t h i s s i t u a t i o n . T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n c o n s i s t s of the c a n c e l l a t i o n of i n a p p r o p r i a t e elements of e x i s t i n g prejudgments, c o n f i r m a t i o n of other elements, and i n c o r p o r a t i o n of new elements so that the o l d prejudgments are transcended (the Hegelian concept of Aufhebung). " I t i s the u n t i r i n g power of experience, t h a t i n the process of being i n s t r u c t e d , man i s c e a s e l e s s l y forming a new preunderstand-i n g " . 5 2 Unless one stubbornly c l o s e s one's mind to the c h a l l e n g e of new s i t u a t i o n s , e x i s t i n g prejudgments are s u s c e p t i b l e to continuous a l t e r a t i o n s . I t can be seen that the m o d i f i c a t i o n of prejudgments i s not e n t i r e l y automatic: i t depends on one's w i l l i n g n e s s to open up one's m i n d . 5 3 Gadamer d e f i n e s " s i t u a t i o n " t o be something r e p r e s e n t i n g "a standpoint that l i m i t s the p o s s i b i l i t y of v i s i o n " . He e x p l a i n s : The very idea of a s i t u a t i o n means that we are not standing o u t s i d e i t and hence are unable to have any o b j e c t i v e knowledge of i t . We are always w i t h i n the s i t u a t i o n , and to throw l i g h t on i t i s a task that i s never e n t i r e l y completed. 5" In a hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n one i n t e r p r e t s a t e x t . The i n t e r p r e t e r i s always governed by a l i m i t a t i o n of v i s i o n . For Heidegger, a hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n c o n s i s t s of a l l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p r o c e s s . Emphasizing p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o p e r a t i n g at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l , Gadamer d e f i n e s a hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n to be "the s i t u a t i o n i n which we f i n d o u r s e l v e s with regard to the t r a d i t i o n t h a t we t r y to u n d e r s t a n d " . 5 5 The t e x t to be i n t e r p r e t e d always r e p r e s e n t s an aspect of t r a d i t i o n and hence must be seen i n that 97 c o n t e x t . R e f l e c t i o n on p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i s necessary i f true understanding of a t e x t i s d e s i r e d . But i t i s a process that never comes to an end: p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s can only be changed, not e r a d i c a t e d . What r e f l e c t i o n leads to i s an expansion of h o r i z o n . C e r t a i n l y , the formation of an expanded horizon i s not simply a q u a n t i t a t i v e change. With a new h o r i z o n , the s i t u a t i o n i s seen i n a new l i g h t . In a hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n , what i s to be understood always r e p r e s e n t s another h o r i z o n , be i t the h o r i z o n of a w r i t e r , a c o n v e r s a t i o n p a r t n e r , a c u l t u r e or a h i s t o r i c a l p a s t . For the t e x t to be i n t e r p r e t e d - w r i t i n g , speech, l i f e -world, e t c . - i s never i s o l a t e d from the c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n to which the w r i t e r , speaker or a c t o r belongs. And the w r i t e r , speaker or a c t o r i s c o n f i n e d to h i s or her p a r t i c u l a r h o r i z o n which i s l a r g e l y determined by c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . Hence i n the process of understanding one extends one's ho r i z o n to encompass the r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n of the other p a r t y ' s h o r i z o n . T h i s i s what Gadamer c a l l s a " f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s " . 5 6 He e l a b o r a t e s on the concept: T h i s p l a c i n g of o u r s e l v e s i s not the empathy of one i n d i v i d u a l f o r another, nor i s i t the a p p l i c a t i o n to another person of our own c r i t e r i a , but i t always i n v o l v e s the attainment of a h i g h e r u n i v e r s a l i t y that overcomes, not only our own p a r t i c u l a r i t y , but a l s o t hat o f . t h e other One l e a r n s to look beyond what i s c l o s e at hand - not i n order to look away from i t , but to see i t b e t t e r w i t h i n a l a r g e r whole and i n t r u e r p r o p o r t i o n . 5 7 One can r e a d i l y t e l l the concept of f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s i s d e r i v e d from Hegel's a n a l y s i s of how consciousness develops. As with Heidegger, Gadamer does not consider an a c t of 98 understanding to be an a c q u i s i t i o n of something e n t i r e l y new. I t i s rather the adoption of a new a t t i t u d e toward the world one i s a l r e a d y acquainted with. Thus a f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s , with the corresponding t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of prejudgments, i s the mechanism by which a new a t t i t u d e i s adopted. T h i s i s what Gadamer means by " a l l understanding i s u l t i m a t e l y a s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " . 5 8 H i s t o r i c a l Dimension of Hermeneutics We have seen that understanding depends on prejudgments, which are p r o d u c t s of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n , a t both the s o c i e t a l and i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l s . But i n d i v i d u a l a c t s of understanding a l s o c o n t r i b u t e to the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process of mankind, so that these a c t s are c o n s e q u e n t i a l at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l : In a t r a d i t i o n t h i s process of f u s i o n i s c o n t i n u a l l y going on, f o r there o l d and new c o n t i n u a l l y grow together to make something of l i v i n g v a l u e , without e i t h e r being e x p l i c i t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the o t h e r . 5 9 Gadamer's concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n owes so much to Hegel that he d e c l a r e s : "Hegel has thought through the h i s t o r i c a l dimension i n which the problem of hermeneutics i s r o o t e d . " 6 0 Hegel observes that the i n d i v i d u a l human i s a f i n i t e being, not only i n terms of b i o - p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e - which i s o b v i o u s l y t r u e - but i n terms of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h i s i s why an i n d i v i d u a l must i d e n t i f y with S p i r i t , the h i s t o r i c a l subject t h a t transcends i n d i v i d u a l f i n i t u d e . So f a r Gadamer's thought runs i n p a r a l l e l to t h a t of Hegel: the former's concept of t r a d i t i o n corresponds to the embodiment of S p i r i t . For Gadamer, the f i n i t e i n d i v i d u a l consciousness i s an aspect of the ongoing c u l t u r a l 99 t r a d i t i o n to which the i n d i v i d u a l belongs. While the Hegelian S p i r i t m a n i f e s t s the cosmic order - a " n e c e s s i t y " , t r a d i t i o n serves no purpose o u t s i d e i t s e l f . 6 1 But Hegel goes f u r t h e r : the p r o g r e s s i o n of consciousness of S p i r i t e v e n t u a l l y reaches an abs o l u t e l e v e l ; " t h i s l a s t shape of S p i r i t " i s "absolute knowing" or "comprehensive knowing". 6 2 Here Gadamer t r u l y p a r t s company with Hegel. L e a r n i n g from N i e t z s c h e (1844-1900), Gadamer e l u c i d a t e s the f i n i t u d e of i n d i v i d u a l consciousness with the concept of memory: F o r g e t t i n g belongs w i t h i n the context of remembering and r e c a l l i n g F o r g e t t i n g ... i s a c o n d i t i o n of the l i f e of mind. Only by f o r g e t t i n g does the mind have a chance of t o t a l renewal, the c a p a c i t y to see e v e r y t h i n g with f r e s h eyes, so that what i s long f a m i l i a r combines with the new i n t o a many l e v e l l e d u n i t y . 6 3 N i e t z s c h e ' s n o t i o n of memory at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l i s captured by eminent N i e t z s c h e s c h o l a r Walter Kaufmann: A people with a b s o l u t e l y no memory of t h e i r past would be unable to abide by a proven way of l i f e , and to keep the law; a c u l t u r e with no t r a d i t i o n , w ith no memory of past techniques or customs, would be s i m i l a r l y i n c a p a c i t a t e d . On the other hand, a people or c u l t u r e without the a b i l i t y t o f o r g e t would be unable to make d e c i s i o n s , to a c t , and to be c r e a t i v e . 6 4 Hegel saw only one s i d e of the c o i n ; N i e t z s c h e saw b o t h . 6 5 T h i s i s the i n s i g h t Gadamer i n c o r p o r a t e s i n t o hermeneutics: Remembering, f o r g e t t i n g , and r e c a l l i n g belong to the h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of man and are themselves p a r t of h i s h i s t o r y and h i s s e l f - f o r m a t i o n . 6 6 Hence f o r Gadamer h i s t o r y i s not o r i e n t e d toward any u l t i m a t e goal and the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process never comes to a h a l t . By the same token, prejudgments always e x i s t , although they are c o n t i n u o u s l y being transformed to adapt to changing s o c i e t a l and 100 i n d i v i d u a l c o n d i t i o n s . Notion of A p p l i c a t i o n Although Gadamer's a n a l y s i s c e n t e r s on the problem of human understanding, i t should be c l e a r that he i s concerned with both knowledge and a c t i o n . For he l i n k s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to a p p l i c a t i o n and t r e a t s them as d i f f e r e n t aspects of the hermeneutical phenomenon. How one i n t e r p r e t s a text depends on the intended a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , whether one i s conscious of t h i s i n t e n t i o n or not: one does not i n t e r p r e t something f r e e from i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s and then apply i t to a concre t e s i t u a t i o n . 6 7 The idea that an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s shaped by i t s p e r c e i v e d i m p l i c a t i o n s can be seen as an extension of Heideggerian concepts. According to the concept of f o r e -s t r u c t u r e of understanding, when one understands an e n t i t y one p e r c e i v e s i t i n the context of the t o t a l i t y of involvement. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are no doubt pa r t of t h i s involvement as w e l l : they are p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p r o c e s s . According t o the concept of time, i f one i n t e r p r e t s an e n t i t y i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the f u t u r e , then one sees something " i n advance" as an i n t e g r a l component of the t o t a l i t y . 6 8 N a t u r a l l y a p p l i c a t i o n s of an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are expected to become p a r t of the f u t u r e . Hence a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the p o s s i b l e outcomes of an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a f f e c t s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i t s e l f . On the other hand, any a p p l i c a t i o n of c u l t u r a l elements 101 such as norms, i d e a l s , laws and s c r i p t u r e s t o d a i l y l i f e has a l r e a d y embodied an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these c u l t u r a l e l e m e n t s . 6 9 To the extent a person f e e l s an a c t i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e or i n a p p r o p r i a t e , r i g h t or wrong, good or bad, the person has a l r e a d y i m p l i c i t l y i n t e r p r e t e d what i s a p p r o p r i a t e , r i g h t or good. At the fundamental l e v e l , Gadamer p o i n t s out, judgment "cannot be taught i n g e n e r a l , but only p r a c t i c e d from case to case ... because no demonstration from concepts i s a b l e to guide the a p p l i c a t i o n of r u l e s " . 7 0 S e t t i n g up r u l e s to guide a p p l i c a t i o n of r u l e s i n e v i t a b l y leads to an i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s . U l t i m a t e l y a judgment r e s t s on something that i s presupposed i n everyday p r a c t i c e , something that escapes t h e o r i z i n g . Thus an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s o f t e n expressed not i n words, but i n a c t i o n i t s e l f . We have seen t h a t Heidegger c o n s i d e r s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to be the e x p l i c i t form of understanding. T h i s Gadamer agrees. He f u r t h e r p o i n t s out that "understanding i s always an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , 7 1 although i t may sometimes be an i m p l i c i t form of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . An i m p l i c i t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t e n m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n a c t i o n , which e s s e n t i a l l y i s a p p l i c a t i o n of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Hence to the two i n t e g r a l components of a hermeneutical act that Heidegger mentions - understanding and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - Gadamer adds a t h i r d one: a p p l i c a t i o n . For him, understanding, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n are three components fused together i n any s i n g l e hermeneutical a c t : they comprise "one u n i f i e d p r o c e s s " . 7 2 I t i s worth n o t i n g that one of the admirers of t h i s aspect 102 of Gadamer i s Habermas, who b r i n g s out the former's idea l u c i d l y : I f i n d Gadamer's r e a l achievement i n the demonstration that hermeneutical understanding i s l i n k e d with t r a n s c e n d e n t a l n e c e s s i t y to the a r t i c u l a t i o n of an a c t i o n - o r i e n t i n g s e l f -u nderstanding. The immanent connec t i o n of understanding and a p p l i c a t i o n can be seen i n the examples of theology and j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Both the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the B i b l e i n preaching and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o s i t i v e law i n a d j u d i c a t i o n serve s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as guideposts of how to apply the evidence i n a given s i t u a t i o n . The p r a c t i c a l l i f e -r e l a t i o n to the s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the c l i e n t s i s not simply a subsequent c o r o l l a r y to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Rather, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s r e a l i z e d i n the a p p l i c a t i o n i t s e l f . 7 3 Based on h i s analyses of l e g a l and t h e o l o g i c a l hermeneutics, Gadamer extends t h i s p r i n c i p l e to a l l a s p e c t s of l i f e . He observes t h a t , i n every s i n g l e moment of l i f e , one i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y i n t e r p r e t s the s i t u a t i o n one c o n f r o n t s and takes a c t i o n i n accordance with t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Since no i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s f r e e from prejudgments, n e i t h e r i s any a c t i o n . Thus at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l , h i s t o r y proceeds i n a d i r e c t i o n t h a t i s shaped by human i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e i r world, which i n tu r n i s grounded i n t r a d i t i o n . Recognizing the power of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Gadamer cl a i m s that hermeneutics i n v o l v e s "the mode of the whole human experience of the w o r l d " : 7 * the hermeneutical phenomenon i s u n i v e r s a l . 103 C r i t i q u e of S c i e n t i f i c Method Much of the groundwork f o r Gadamer's c r i t i q u e of s c i e n t i f i c method has been l a i d out by Heidegger. Together with h i s own concepts such as prejudgment, f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s and a p p l i c a t i o n , Gadamer i s able to c a r r y out a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of s c i e n t i f i c method. One of h i s major t a r g e t of a t t a c k i n T r u t h  and Method i s D i l t h e y . In D i l t h e y ' s methodology of human s c i e n c e s , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a t e x t i s based on the assumption of a meaningful part-whole r e l a t i o n inherent i n the t e x t . The r e l a t i o n i s to be e x p l o r e d through imagined p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the kind of l i f e i m p l i c a t e d i n the t e x t . With s u c c e s s i v e movements between the whole and the p a r t s , the e n t i r e t e x t would e v e n t u a l l y be f u l l y understood i n an o b j e c t i v e manner. In other words, the hermeneutical c i r c l e i s d i s s o l v e d . Gadamer s e i z e s the weaknesses in D i l t h e y ' s t h i n k i n g by p o i n t i n g out two r e l a t e d problems. F i r s t , D i l t h e y i s not s e r i o u s about the n o t i o n of f i n i t u d e of human co n s c i o u s n e s s . He n a i v e l y b e l i e v e s that understanding, i n the form of t r a n s p o s i t i o n , r e - c r e a t i o n and r e - e x p e r i e n c i n g , can overcome the f i n i t u d e : He sees one's own world of experience as the mere s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r an expansion t h a t , i n a l i v i n g t r a n s p o s i t i o n , f i l l s out the narrowness and f o r t u i t o u s n e s s of one's own experience by the i n f i n i t y of what i s a v a i l a b l e i n the r e - e x p e r i e n c i n g of the h i s t o r i c a l world At any r a t e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t D i l t h e y d i d not regard the f a c t t h a t f i n i t e h i s t o r i c a l man was t i e d to a p a r t i c u l a r time and p l a c e as any fundamental impairment of the p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge i n the human s c i e n c e s . 7 5 Consequently Gadamer i n d i c a t e s that D i l t h e y f a l l s i n t o the i l l u s i o n t h a t p o t e n t i a l understanding i s beyond any l i m i t a t i o n . 1 04 Second, D i l t h e y t h i n k s the s t a r t i n g p o i n t of any i n q u i r y i s immaterial to the f i n a l outcome: He d e c l a r e s that only sympathy makes true understanding p o s s i b l e D i l t h e y speaks about u n i v e r s a l sympathy ... which fundamentally transcends the b a r r i e r s that the s u b j e c t i v e a c c i d e n t of p r e f e r e n c e and a f f i n i t y f o r an o b j e c t has set to understand. 7 6 Instead Gadamer shows that the s t a r t i n g p o i n t - the way one experiences the world - i s always shaped by one's prejudgments. T h i s i s not a b a r r i e r that can be transcended by any s c i e n t i f i c method, as D i l t h e y b e l i e v e s . For " i t i s the aim of s c i e n c e to o b j e c t i f y experience that i t no longer c o n t a i n s any h i s t o r i c a l e l e m e n t " . 7 7 S c i e n t i f i c method i s "concerned to guarantee ... that these b a s i c experiences can be repeated by anyone". 7 8 Hence a complete r e l i a n c e on s c i e n c e can never do j u s t i c e to the concept of prejudgment. For Gadamer, understanding i s a f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s , which i s not the same as empathy or sympathy. He argues t h a t understanding a t e x t i s analogous to understanding one's c o n v e r s a t i o n p a r t n e r i n a d i a l o g u e : Just as i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n , when we have d i s c o v e r e d the standpoint and h o r i z o n of the other person, h i s ideas become i n t e l l i g i b l e , without our n e c e s s a r i l y having to agree with him, the person who t h i n k s h i s t o r i c a l l y comes to understand the meaning of what has been handed down, without n e c e s s a r i l y agreeing with i t , or seeing himself i n i t . 7 9 In order to p r o p e r l y understand a c o n v e r s a t i o n p a r t n e r one must respe c t the p a r t n e r ' s ideas as he or she presents i t . T h i s i s the only way to l e a r n about the o t h e r ' s p o i n t of view. In the same manner, when i n t e r p r e t i n g a t e x t , the i n t e r p r e t e r must pay a t t e n t i o n to what the t e x t has to say to him or her, rather than 105 simply e x t r a c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from i t or p r e t e n d i n g the i n t e r p r e t e r can transpose h i m s e l f or h e r s e l f i n t o the t e x t . Gadamer warns one a g a i n s t an "overhasty a s s i m i l a t i o n " of the t e x t "to our e x p e c t a t i o n s of meaning". 8 0 Only when one permits a t e x t to "make i t s own meaning h e a r d " 8 1 would an adequate f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s take p l a c e . In t h i s sense te x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has a d i a l o g i c c h a r a c t e r . In regard to the hermeneutical c i r c l e , Gadamer cl a i m s that i t " i s not d i s s o l v e d i n p e r f e c t understanding but, on the c o n t r a r y , i s most f u l l y r e a l i z e d " . 8 2 Hence even i n p e r f e c t understanding one does not a t t a i n o b j e c t i v e knowledge; r a t h e r , what i s to be understood comes i n t o the best l i g h t under the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s c u l t u r a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d s u b j e c t i v i t y . Gadamer f u r t h e r e x p l i c a t e s what he c a l l s the h i g h e s t type of hermeneutical experience i n terms of an I-Thou r e l a t i o n s h i p : In human r e l a t i o n the important t h i n g i s ... to experience the Thou t r u l y as a Thou, i . e . not to overlook h i s c l a i m and to l i s t e n to what he has to say to us. To t h i s end, openness i s necessary Without t h i s kind of openness to one another there i s no genuine human r e l a t i o n s h i p . 8 3 T h i s , a c c o r d i n g to Gadamer, i s the proper p r i n c i p l e behind a c o n v e r s a t i o n as w e l l as a te x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In Gadamer's o p i n i o n , D i l t h e y ' s n o t i o n of hermeneutical experience i s of a lower type. For a c l a i m to o b j e c t i v e knowledge of other people i s a d e n i a l of openness to what these people say: One c l a i m s to express the o t h e r ' s c l a i m and even to understand the other b e t t e r than the other understands himself The c l a i m to understand the other person i n advance performs the f u n c t i o n of keeping the c l a i m of the other person at a d i s t a n c e 1 0 6 I t i s l i k e the r e l a t i o n between the I and the Thou. A person who r e f l e c t s h i m s e l f out of the m u t u a l i t y of such a r e l a t i o n changes t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p and d e s t r o y s i t s moral bond. A person who r e f l e c t s h i m s e l f out of a l i v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p to t r a d i t i o n d e s t r o y s the true meaning of t h i s t r a d i t i o n i n e x a c t l y the same way. 8 4 In one s t r o k e Gadamer pronounces the l i m i t a t i o n of D i l t h e y ' s methodology and e l e v a t e s the concept of hermeneutical experience to a higher l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . Gadamer's c r i t i q u e of methodology i n human s c i e n c e s a p p l i e s e q u a l l y to n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s : The h i s t o r y of mathematics or of the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s i s a l s o a p a r t of the h i s t o r y of the human s p i r i t and r e f l e c t s i t s d e s t i n y . 8 5 The image of s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y has to be s h a t t e r e d , s i n c e what i s known i n any s c i e n c e " c e r t a i n l y a l s o embraces the being of the s c i e n t i s t " who i s above a l l a l i v i n g c r e a t u r e and a human. 8 6 Consequently "each s c i e n c e , as a s c i e n c e , has a f i e l d of i t s r e s e a r c h set out i n advance, and to have knowledge of t h i s f i e l d i s to have power over i t " . 8 7 Hence i n Gadamer's view even n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s have a hermeneutical f o u n d a t i o n . 8 8 Although Gadamer does not mention the concept of a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , one can see that each s c i e n c e , by the very f a c t i t attempts to understand a sphere of the world, i s c o n d i t i o n e d by i t s intended a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s does not mean Gadamer i d e n t i f i e s s c i e n c e with technology. In f a c t he has c l a r i f i e d h i s p o s i t i o n that he does n o t . 8 9 The intended a p p l i c a t i o n of s c i e n c e by s c i e n t i s t s i s a s u b t l e one. While i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i s t s may not t h i n k e x p l i c i t l y i n terms of a p p l i c a t i o n , the method employed and the r e s e a r c h t o p i c s chosen 107 are r e f l e c t i o n s of t h e i r p r e j udgments. 9 0 Gadamer's a t t i t u d e should not be taken as h i s anim o s i t y toward s c i e n c e per se. In f a c t , the concept of prejudgment only r e v e a l s "the l i m i t a t i o n of 'method', but not that of s c i e n c e " : What the t o o l of method does not achieve must - and e f f e c t i v e l y can - be achieved by a d i s c i p l i n e of q u e s t i o n i n g and re s e a r c h , a d i s c i p l i n e t h a t guarantees t r u t h . 9 1 Here Gadamer r e f e r s to a need to recognize the t r u t h of t r a d i t i o n and to take a c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e toward s c i e n c e . In ; other words, Gadamer maintains that the v a l i d i t y of s c i e n c e has to be judged c r i t i c a l l y and c o n t i n u o u s l y with r e s p e c t t o i t s context i n the c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . Each s c i e n c e r e p r e s e n t s only one sphere of knowledge, which has i t s foundation i n everyday human e x i s t e n c e . Thus the development of sc i e n c e must be c o n s i s t e n t with the o v e r a l l human s p i r i t . L i k e D i l t h e y , Gadamer p e r c e i v e s the ba s i c d i f f e r e n c e s between n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s . 9 2 Yet the l a t t e r r e f u s e s to endorse any methodology's c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y . Rather than o b l i t e r a t i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between these two major f i e l d s of study, Gadamer adds a new dimension to i t - the no t i o n that s c i e n t i f i c , as w e l l as n o n - s c i e n t i f i c , knowledge i s always embedded i n c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . 9 3 108 C r i t i q u e of R a t i o n a l Planning Gadamer's views on plan n i n g are w e l l expressed i n h i s paper "Notes on Planning f o r the Future" which, to a l a r g e extent, i s a r e b u t t a l of the idea that the world should be r a t i o n a l l y and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e g u l a t e d for the purpose of m a i n t a i n i n g o r d e r . 9 * This c r i t i q u e of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g i s best seen as an e x t e n t i o n of Gadamer's c r i t i q u e of s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y . When s c i e n t i s t s ignore t h a t they are products of t h e i r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s and b e l i e v e t h a t they are f r e e from prejudgments, the s c i e n c e they c r e a t e " i s concerned o n l y with those methods and p o s s i b i l i t i e s which are necessary f o r the s c i e n t i f i c c o n t r o l of t h i n g s " . 9 5 By sc i e n c e here Gadamer i s probably r e f e r r i n g to n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s and p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , which f o l l o w the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e m o d e l . 9 6 We r e c a l l what D i l t h e y observed as the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e model: e s t a b l i s h s c i e n t i f i c laws and c o n t r o l the environment based on the knowledge of such laws. The adoption of t h i s s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e i n s o c i a l development i s what Gadamer c o n s i d e r s to be the foundation of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g : p l a n n i n g l e g i t i m i z e d by the "notion of a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y c e r t i f i e d r a t i o n a l i t y " . 9 7 A c c o r d i n g to Gadamer, there i s an i n t r i n s i c c o n t r a d i c t i o n in the concept of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g : "the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between t i m e l e s s t r u t h , which i s sought a f t e r by s c i e n c e , and the temporal c o n d i t i o n of those who u t i l i z e s c i e n c e . " 9 8 In a r a t i o n a l model, a course of a c t i o n i s chosen not simply because i t i s p o s s i b l e ; i t has to be f e a s i b l e . Contrary to what r a t i o n a l planners i m p l i c i t l y presuppose, Gadamer p o i n t s out, the c r i t e r i a 109 f o r f e a s i b i l i t y are by no means e t e r n a l t r u t h s ; they are shaped by a temporal c o n d i t i o n i n the form of c u l t u r e or s u b - c u l t u r e at a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t of h i s t o r y : For what i s f e a s i b l e i s not simply what i s p o s s i b l e or, w i t h i n the realm of the p o s s i b l e , the p u r e l y advantageous. Moreover, every advantage and p r e f e r e n c e i s weighed a c c o r d i n g to a d e f i n i t e standard which one p o s i t s , or which has a l r e a d y been e s t a b l i s h e d . I t i s the aggregate of what i s s o c i a l l y a d m i s s i b l e : the norms, ev o l v e d from e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s and f o r t i f i e d by t r a i n i n g and s e l f - e d u c a t i o n , which determine t h i s s t a n d a r d . " Gadamer thus accuses supporters of the r a t i o n a l model f o r n e g l e c t i n g the c r u c i a l f a c t o r s of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n and prejudgments which are always b u i l t i n t o the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . There i s a second aspect of temporal c o n d i t i o n : the concept of s i t u a t i o n . How one i n t e r p r e t s a s i t u a t i o n c e r t a i n l y depends on one's c u l t u r a l background, but i t a l s o depends on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s experience and present encounters. A s i t u a t i o n i s thus always governed by the i n d i v i d u a l ' s h o r i z o n . T h i s c r e a t e s a " t e n s i o n between a formal knowledge a v a i l a b l e to everyone, as i t i s a s s o c i a t e d with the concept of a teachable s c i e n c e , and the knowledge of what i s p r a c t i c a l and good f o r o n e s e l f " . 1 0 0 The l a t t e r depends on a given s i t u a t i o n ; i t i s t h i s k i nd of knowledge that the r a t i o n a l model f a i l s to take i n t o account. Rebuking the r a t i o n a l model, Gadamer proposes the model of " p i l o t i n g " or s t e e r i n g (Mode11 des S t e u e r n s ) . The l a t t e r c o n s i s t s of two i n t e g r a l n o t i o n s : the maintenance of e q u i l i b r i u m , which o s c i l l a t e s i n a p r e c i s e l y set amplitude, and guidance, that i s , the s e l e c t i o n of a d i r e c t i o n which i s p o s s i b l e w i t h i n the o s c i l l a t i n g e q u i l i b r i u m . 1 0 1 The f i r s t n o t i o n i s a r e c o g n i t i o n that each s o c i e t y operates 110 under i t s own dynamics: s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s are the embodiment of the human s p i r i t i n that s o c i e t y . 1 0 2 Such dynamics must be preserved i f the human s p i r i t i s not to be d e s t r o y e d : "only where the f o r c e s of e q u i l i b r i u m are maintained can the f a c t o r s of human v o l i t i o n and d e s i r e be of any c o n s e q u e n c e . " 1 0 3 O b v i o u s l y behind t h i s i s the Hegelian idea that people can develop themselves only w i t h i n the general framework of s o c i e t y . Yet w i t h i n t h i s general framework there are d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b l e d i r e c t i o n s that the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process of t h i s s o c i e t y can take. Thus the second n o t i o n of p i l o t i n g r e f e r s to the choosing of a course of a c t i o n that enhances the human s p i r i t r a t h e r than v i o l a t i n g i t . In other words, s o c i a l development must be grounded i n the c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n of the people whose l i v e s are to be a f f e c t e d by the development. For Gadamer, the model of p i l o t i n g does not seek to introduce something f o r e i g n i n t o the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s ; r a t h e r , i t endeavors to c o r r e c t the process when s e r i o u s s o c i e t a l problems occur: When the bounds are exceeded the balance i s o f f s e t completely and, i f at a l l p o s s i b l e , must be c o r r e c t e d by a new expenditure of e f f o r t . Consequently, the re-establishment of e q u i p o i s e i s nothing more than the r e i n t r o d u c t i o n of an o s c i l l a t i n g e q u i l i b r i u m . 1 0 " By s e l e c t i n g a d i r e c t i o n w i t h i n the general s o c i e t a l framework, p i l o t i n g r e s t o r e s the inherent s o c i e t a l dynamics. T h i s , a c c o r d i n g to Gadamer, cannot be achieved i n any c e n t r a l i z e d management or p l a n n i n g based on s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y . Gadamer immediately d e c l a r e s the l i m i t a t i o n s of the model of p i l o t i n g : " t h i s model a l s o cannot hide the kinds of assumptions - knowledge of goals and d i r e c t i o n s - which are 111 necessary f o r p i l o t i n g . " 1 0 5 Besides the i s s u e s of c u l t u r e and s i t u a t i o n , which Gadamer has i n q u i r e d , there i s s t i l l the i s s u e of who c a r r i e s out the task of p i l o t i n g , i n other words, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e l l e c t u a l s and the general p u b l i c . Gadamer mentions the need f o r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which means the p u b l i c ' s knowledge of g o a l s and d i r e c t i o n s i s e s s e n t i a l . But i n contemporary s o c i e t y , s c i e n c e and technology are so p e r v a s i v e that t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s are not r e a d i l y understood by everybody. In Gadamer's view t h i s r e q u i r e s an awakening of consciousness, which i s the task of p h i l o s o p h y . He d i s c u s s e s what t h i s e n t a i l s : With j u s t i f i e d a n x i e t y one may ask what the awakening of consciousness to these problems, as long as they remain c o n f i n e d to small i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , i s to accomplish The problem of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i s a problem i n i t s e l f . But, what i s m i r r o r e d i n t h e i r understanding - t h e i r naive s u p e r i o r i t y notwithstanding - can become the conscious p r o p e r t y of e v e r y o n e . 1 0 6 There s t i l l remains the q u e s t i o n of whether the i n t e l l e c t u a l s ' understanding r e f l e c t s the p u b l i c ' s experiences and s i t u a t i o n s . T h i s i s a c r u c i a l p o i n t Gadamer has not c l a r i f i e d . 1 0 7 The model of p i l o t i n g he proposes l e a v e s a number of important i s s u e s he has not s e r i o u s l y t a c k l e d . 1 1 2 NOTES 1 See e.g. Gadamer's own h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s of Bil d u n g i n TM, pp.10-9. 2 Cf. C h a r l e s T a y l o r , Hegel, o p . c i t . , pp.537ff. 3 See Gadamer's w r i t i n g s , e.g. TM, pp.408ff; "Notes on Planning f o r the Future", Daedalus, vol.95, 1966, p.588; and, Reason i n the Age of S c i e n c e , Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981, pp.151-69. ft KHI, p.63. 5 "Notes on Planning f o r the Future", o p . c i t . , pp.587-9. 6 "Review of TM", p.344. 7 For analyses of why Habermas was a t t r a c t e d to hermeneutics i n order to c a r r y on the m i s s i o n of the F r a n k f u r t School, see D.Misgeld, " C r i t i c a l Theory and Hermeneutics: The Debate between Habermas and Gadamer", in On C r i t i c a l  Theory, John O ' N e i l l (ed.), New York: Seabury Press, 1976; J.Mendelson, "The Habermas-Gadamer Debate", New German  C r i t i q u e , no.18, pp.44-73, 1979; and, Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'", i n TRS. 8 TM, p . x i i i . 9 M.Heidegger, Being and Time, J.Macquarrie and E.Robinson ( t r a n s . ) , New York: Harper and Row, 1962, p.29. H e r e a f t e r i t w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as BT. In order to s i m p l i f y the d i s c u s s i o n here, we s h a l l a v o i d much of Heidegger's complicated s p e c i a l vocabulary, e s p e c i a l l y terms l i k e Dasein, Being, and many hyphenated e x p r e s s i o n s . We attempt to summarize some of Heidegger's b a s i c ideas while keeping the number of t e c h n i c a l terms to a minimum. The s o l e purpose here i s to f u r n i s h some background f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g Gadamer, who does not adopt Heidegger's e s o t e r i c v o c abulary. 0 I b i d . , p.31. 1 I b i d . , pp.91-5. 2 I b i d . , pp.95-102. 3 I b i d . , p.83. * I b i d . , p.87. I b i d . , p.88. 1 13 I b i d . , p.90. I b i d . , pp.33-4. I b i d . , p.182. I b i d . , pp.188-90. I b i d . , pp.191-2. I b i d . , p.275. J.L.Mehta, M a r t i n Heidegger: The Way and the V i s i o n , Honolulu: The U n i v e r s i t y Press of Hawaii, 1976, p.161. BT, p.450. I b i d . , p.277. I b i d . , p.471. I b i d . , p.378. I b i d . , pp.372-8. " A n t i c i p a t i o n " i s a term Heidegger r e s e r v e s f o r the case of an i n d i v i d u a l c o n s i d e r i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s and making a c h o i c e - a mode of e x i s t e n c e he c a l l s " a u t h e n t i c " . He uses the term "awaiting" f o r the case of an i n d i v i d u a l not c o n s i d e r i n g - p o s s i b i l i t i e s and simply f o l l o w i n g the popular trend or l e t t i n g t h i n g s be - a mode of e x i s t e n c e he c a l l s " i n a u t h e n t i c " . Even i n the case of i n a u t h e n t i c t e m p o r a l i t y , one s t i l l has the f u t u r e i n mind, a l b e i t to a l e s s e r degree. I b i d . , p.155. I b i d . In BT Heidegger does not use terms l i k e " s o c i a l " or " s o c i e t y " . In order to analyze the fundamental s t r u c t u r e of human r e l a t i o n s he uses h i s own e x p r e s s i o n s such as "Being-with", "Being-with-Others", "Dasein-with" and "with-world". I b i d . , p.436. I b i d . , p.437. E.g. D.C.Hoy and M . B l i t z , i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e ways, argue t h a t BT has profound p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . N . R o t e n s t r e i c h , on the other hand, i s not convinced that Heidegger's a n a l y s i s demonstrates any i n s i g h t c o n cerning s o c i e t y . See Hoy, " H i s t o r y , H i s t o r i c i t y , and H i s t o r i o g r a p h y i n Being and Time", i n Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, M.Murray (ed.), New Haven and London: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1978; B l i t z , Heidegger's Being and Time and the 1 14 P o s s i b i l i t y of P o l i t i c a l Philosophy, I t h a c a and London: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981; and, R o t e n s t r e i c h , "The O n t o l o g i c a l S tatus of H i s t o r y " , American P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 9 , pp.49-58, 1972. "Prejudgment" i s the t r a n s l a t i o n of V o r u r t e i l , which i s o f t e n taken l i t e r a l l y to be " p r e j u d i c e " . But Gadamer s t r e s s e s t h a t h i s use of the word does not c a r r y the n egative c o n n o t a t i o n of f a l s e or unfounded judgment, as p r e j u d i c e does. By V o r u r t e i l Gadamer r e f e r s to a " p r o v i s i o n a l d e c i s i o n " , which "can have a p o s i t i v e and a n e g a tive v a l u e " (TM, p.240). In order to a v o i d t h i s misunderstanding we f o l l o w the suggestion of D.Misgeld and render V o r u r t e i l i n t o prejudgment. See M i s g e l d , "On Gadamer's Hermeneutics", Philosophy of the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , v o l . 9 , 1 979;, p.221n. TM, p.241. I b i d . , p.242. I b i d . , p.250. I b i d . , p.245. I b i d . , p.242. I b i d . , p.245. I b i d . , p.269. I b i d . , p.271. I b i d . , p.273. Hegel, PhS, p.54. I b i d . , p.52. I b i d . , p.53. I b i d . , p.50. I b i d . , p.51. To i l l u s t r a t e Hegel's way of t h i n k i n g l e t us c o n s i d e r an example. A goal may be the "good l i f e " and the c r i t e r i o n would be embodied in s o c i a l p r a c t i c e probably as a c e r t a i n k i n d of p e r s o n a l p o s s e s s i o n , s o c i a l s t a t u s , p l e a s u r e , e t c . Such c r i t e r i o n u s u s a l l y cannot be made completely e x p l i c i t ; i t d e f i e s p r e c i s e d e s c r i p t i o n . I f people have a c q u i r e d the kind of p o s s e s s i o n , s o c i a l s t a t u s , p l e a s u r e , e t c . t h a t i s supposed to be the essence of the "good l i f e " and yet they do not f e e l they have r e a l l y a t t a i n e d the "good l i f e " , then 115 the c r i t e r i o n must be inadequate. But the c r i t e r i o n i s set by people, i t can be changed by people. With an improved c r i t e r i o n , l i f e would be experienced i n a new and more f u l f i l l i n g manner. I b i d . , p.50. D.E.Linge, E d i t o r ' s I n t r o d u c t i o n to Gadamer's P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Hermeneutics, o p . c i t . , p . x x i . Gadamer, PhH, p.38. Gadamer c o i n s the term Wirkungsgesch'ichte, which i s t r a n s l a t e d v a r i o u s l y as e f f e c t i v e - h i s t o r y , h i s t o r i c a l i n f l u e n c e , h i s t o r y of e f f e c t s , e t c . E s s e n t i a l l y i t r e f e r s to the e f f e c t of prejudgments on any hermeneutical act and s t r e s s e s that prejudgments are a product of h i s t o r y . He a l s o c o i n s the term w i r k u n g s g e s c h i c h t l i c h e s Bewusstsein, which i s t r a n s l a t e d v a r i o u s l y as e f f e c t i v e - h i s t o r i c a l c onsciousness, consciousness of . h i s t o r i c a l i n f l u e n c e , consciousness of the h i s t o r y of e f f e c t s , consciousness that i s a u t h e n t i c a l l y h i s t o r i c a l , e t c . With t h i s consciousness, prejudgments do not remain f i x e d . Yet t h i s c onsciousness i s f i n i t e and i s a l s o shaped by h i s t o r y . The ideas expressed i n these two terms are s i m i l a r to those we have d i s c u s s e d concerning prejudgments and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of prejudgments. TM, p.269. I b i d . I b i d . , p.273. I b i d . , p.272. I b i d . , p.231. I b i d . , p.273. I b i d . , p.310. I b i d . , pp.1 O f f . Hegel, PhS, p.485. TM, p.16. W.Kaufmann, N i e t z s c h e , 4th e d i t i o n , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974, p.145. N i e t z s c h e ' s c r i t i q u e of the h i s t o r i c a l a t t i t u d e was d i r e c t e d mainly a g a i n s t German s c h o l a r s of h i s own days. I t a l s o p o i n t e d to a c e r t a i n u n d e s i r a b l e "Hegelian" i n f l u e n c e on those s c h o l a r s , who p l a c e d an e x c e s s i v e emphasis on 1 16 d e t a i l h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h . In The Use and Abuse of H i s t o r y N i e t z s c h e argues: while one must l e a r n from the past, what i s t r u l y important i s that one takes a c t i o n to l i v e i n the pr e s e n t . In order not to be o v e r l y burdened with the past one must be able to fo r g e t a spects of the pa s t . As N i e t z s c h e puts i t : "we would serve h i s t o r y only so f a r as i t serves l i f e " ( t r a n s , by A . C o l l i n s , I n d i a n a p o l i s : Bobbs-M e r r i l l , 1957). 6 6 TM, p.16. 6 7 I b i d . , pp.274-8. 6 8 BT, p.364. 6 9 TM, pp.274-8. 7 0 I b i d . , p.30. 7 1 I b i d . , p.274. 7 2 I b i d . , p.275. 7 3 "Review of TM", p.351. 7 f l PhH, p.15. 7 5 TM, pp.205-6. 7 6 I b i d . 7 I b i d . , 8 I b i d . 9 I b i d . , 0 I b i d . , 1 I b i d . 2 I b i d . , 3 I b i d . , * I b i d . , 5 I b i d . , 6 I b i d . , 7 I b i d . p. 31 1 . p.270. p.272. p.261 . p.324. pp.322-4. p.251 . p.410. Thomas Kuhn's c e l e b r a t e d a n a l y s i s on paradigm s h i f t 1 1 7 demonstrates that even a "hard" s c i e n c e l i k e p h y s i c s i s not independent of human i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the n a t u r a l world: the h i s t o r y of p h y s i c s i s p a r t of human h i s t o r y . See Kuhn, The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c R e v o l u t i o n , 2nd e d i t i o n , Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1970. In a symposium Gadamer counts Kuhn as one of h i s a l l i e s : "When Thomas Kuhn p u b l i s h e d The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c R e v o l u t i o n , I was very p l e a s e d because i t supported my view. The framework of t h e o r e t i c a l assumptions which guide s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n has a communicative s i d e which i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s i s connected to language. That argument supports the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the hermeneutical approach" (Gadamer et a l , Summation of "Hermeneutics and S o c i a l S c ience", C u l t u r a l Hermeneutics, v o l . 2 , 1975, p.336. I b i d . , p.335-6. An i n t e r e s t i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l study on the community of s c i e n t i s t s by R.Boguslaw r e v e a l s some of the prejudgments of s c i e n t i s t s and s u b t l e intended a p p l i c a t i o n s of s c i e n c e . See Boguslaw, "Values i n the Research S o c i e t y " , i n The  Research S o c i e t y , E . G l a t t and M.W.Shelly (ed.), New York: Gordon and Breach, 1968. TM, p.447. I b i d . , pp.251-3. The new d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s -one that i n c o r p o r a t e s the idea of prejudgment - has been e l a b o r a t e d by C h a r l e s T a y l o r , although T a y l o r does not make d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e to Gadamer. See T a y l o r , "Understanding i n Human Sc i e n c e " , Review of Metaphysics, vol.34, no.1, pp.25-no A r\n f\ ————— T h i s paper was p r e s e n t e d at the Conference on C o n d i t i o n s of World Order, 1965, and p u b l i s h e d i n E n g l i s h i n 1966 as "Notes on Planning f o r the Future", o p . c i t . A r e v i s e d German v e r s i o n appeared in 1967. Among the c o n f e r e e s , n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s and economists (such as Conrad Waddington and Jan Tinbergen) tended to favor r a t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g f o r world o r d e r ; other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s (such as Raymond Aron and Henry K i s s i n g e r ) were g e n e r a l l y s k e p t i c a l of t h i s i d e a . Gadamer was most s t e a d f a s t l y a g a i n s t any systematic r a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the world. Although Gadamer's paper i s mainly about pl a n n i n g at the g l o b a l l e v e l , many of the arguments are a l s o a p p l i c a b l e to the n a t i o n a l and s u b - n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . In Gadamer's paper, the term "planning" r e f e r s to r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g . Gadamer's p r e f e r r e d approach to s o c i a l development i s " p i l o t i n g " . In conformance with our terminology we s h a l l i n c l u d e t h i s approach as p l a n n i n g . I b i d . , p.576. 1 18 9 6 Cf. Gadamer's view on the s t a t u s of today's s o c i a l s c i e n c e s i n PhH, p.40. 9 7 "Notes on P lanning for the Future", o p . c i t . , p.580. 9 8 I b i d . 9 9 I b i d . , pp.580-1. 1 0 0 I b i d . , pp.581-2. 1 0 1 I b i d . , p.582. 1 0 2 In t h i s paper Gadamer uses concepts i n p h y s i c s ( e q u i l i b r i u m , o s c i l l a t i o n , amplitude) and b i o l o g y ( s e l f -c o r r e c t i v e systems of l i v i n g organism) ra t h e r than a concept l i k e human s p i r i t . T h i s i s understandable s i n c e the paper aimed at n a t u r a l and s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s who probably were u n f a m i l i a r with the humanist t r a d i t i o n . I t i s c l e a r what Gadamer has i n mind i s the concept of B i l d u n g , which cannot be adequately e x p l a i n e d i n p h y s i c a l or b i o l o g i c a l terms. T h i s i s why we i n t e r p r e t t h i s paper in the context of Gadamer's other w r i t i n g s . 1 0 3 I b i d . 1 0 " I b i d . , pp.583-4. 1 0 5 I b i d . , p.583. 1 0 6 I b i d . , p.588. 1 0 7 In the l a t e r German v e r s i o n Gadamer d e l e t e d h i s b r i e f remark on the r o l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l s . He does not d i s c u s s t h i s i s s u e elsewhere. Apparently t h i s i s something he has not p r o p e r l y thought out. 119 CHAPTER FOUR THE DEBATE BETWEEN CRITICAL THEORY AND HERMENEUTICS The Basic D i f f e r e n c e between Habermas and Gadamer In the preceding chapters we have witnessed two v a r i a t i o n s of a theme by Hegel. For Habermas, the d r i v i n g f o r c e s behind s e l f - f o r m a t i o n are i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n and communicative a c t i o n . In i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n people c o n t r o l nature whereas i n communicative a c t i o n people i n t e r p r e t the s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d l i f e - w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g t o Habermas, a c r i t i q u e of ideology - based on the model of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s and l a t e r the advocacy model - i s r e q u i s i t e to c o r r e c t the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process when i t has become d e v i a n t . For Gadamer, s e l f - f o r m a t i o n i s continuous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , a process which g i v e s r i s e to the c u r r e n t l i f e - w o r l d . Even t e c h n i c a l c o n t r o l of nature i s embedded i n t r a d i t i o n : what i s c o n t r o l l e d and how i t i s c o n t r o l l e d are governed by s o c i e t y ' s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n . Gadamer i n d i c a t e s that t r a d i t i o n should not be b l i n d l y f o l l o w e d : reason must be employed to decide whether aspects of t r a d i t i o n are to be preserved or to be changed. N e v e r t h e l e s s , reason i t s e l f i s embedded i n t r a d i t i o n , as Gadamer p o i n t s out: what makes sense and what does not cannot be determined o u t s i d e of the context of t r a d i t i o n . T h i s i s why 120 Gadamer cl a i m s the u n i v e r s a l i t y of hermeneutics i n the s e l f -formative process of mankind whereas Habermas only takes hermeneutics to be one component of the p r o c e s s . In f a c t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n the concept of s e l f - f o r m a t i o n l u r k s behind a l l c e n t r a l i s s u e s of the Habermas-Gadamer debate. L i m i t s of Prejudgments and S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n While Habermas r e l a t e s knowledge and a c t i o n to the concept of i n t e r e s t , Gadamer r e l a t e s them to the concept of prejudgment. There are s i m i l a r i t i e s between these two concepts, but they are not the same. For Habermas, t e c h n i c a l and p r a c t i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t s govern i n s t r u m e n t a l and communicative a c t i o n s ; they a l s o c o n s t i t u t e the bases of n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s . S i m i l a r l y f o r Gadamer prejudgments shape a l l knowledge and a c t i o n . So f a r there i s no. major q u a r r e l between the two t h i n k e r s . However, a c c o r d i n g to Habermas, there i s a t h i r d c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t . When s o c i e t y has become dev i a n t i n the s e l f -formative process, c r i t i c a l s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d to b r i n g s o c i e t y back to i t s normal path - an act of emancipation. The c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t behind t h i s i s the i n t e r e s t i n emancipation. I f we f o l l o w Gadamer's l i n e , of t h i n k i n g we see t h a t , s i n c e ideas are embodied i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , i n a d e v i a t e d s o c i e t y s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s as w e l l as thoughts are d e v i a t e d . Any c r i t i c a l s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n that c l a i m s to transcend the d e v i a t e d s o c i e t y must detach i t s e l f from the c u l t u r a l background from which i t a r i s e s . The p o s s i b i l i t y of such detachment i s p r e c i s e l y denied by the concept of prejudgment. Gadamer c l a r i f i e s h i s p o s i t i o n , probably 121 having Habermas i n mind but without mentioning the l a t t e r by name: A c r i t i c a l consciousness that p o i n t s to a l l s o r t s of prejudgment and dependency, but one that c o n s i d e r s i t s e l f a b s o l u t e l y f r e e of prejudgment and independent, n e c e s s a r i l y remains ensnared i n i l l u s i o n s . For i t i s i t s e l f motivated i n the f i r s t p l a c e by that of which i t i s c r i t i c a l . I t s dependency on that which i t d e s t r o y s i s i n e s c a p a b l e . 1 Thus Gadamer argues: no matter how c r i t i c a l one c l a i m s one's s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s , i t f i r s t of a l l belongs to the person's c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . T h i s i s a p o s i t i o n Habermas cannot a c c e p t . He i n s i s t s that "a s t r u c t u r e of preunderstanding or prejudgment that has been rendered transparent can no longer f u n c t i o n as a prejudgment". 2 But Gadamer wonders how prejudgments can become tra n s p a r e n t i n the f i r s t p l a c e . He reminds Habermas that any s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s f i n i t e , while t r a d i t i o n i s an i n f i n i t e source that cannot be exhausted i n a r e f l e c t i v e p r o c e s s . T r a d i t i o n manifests i t s e l f i n everyday s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s of the p a s t , present and f u t u r e ; r e f l e c t i o n b r i n g s "something - but not every t h i n g " t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h i s i s what Gadamer means when he says that r e f l e c t i o n on t r a d i t i o n i s " i n e s c a p a b l y more being than c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and being i s never f u l l y m a n i f e s t " . 3 F o l l o w i n g Hegelian t h i n k i n g , both Habermas and Gadamer co n s i d e r v a r i o u s appearances or phenomena to be elements of the whole t r u t h : "essence i s not supposed to stay p e r s i s t e n t l y behind or beyond appearance."" Hence what appears to everybody in d a i l y l i f e i s not something f a l s e but a p a r t i a l t r u t h . For Habermas, ideology i s a s o c i e t a l m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p a r t i a l t r u t h as the whole t r u t h ; i t i s the outcome of s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 122 d i s t o r t e d communication i n s o c i e t y . The s o l u t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to him, i s a c o r r e c t i o n of such d i s t o r t i o n through a c r i t i c a l s c i e n c e . For Gadamer, p a r t i a l t r u t h a r i s e s from the narrowness of h o r i z o n . The remedy, then, i s to promote understanding, or the f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s . With an expansion of h o r i z o n t h i n g s would be seen i n a broader c o n t e x t , or p a r t s i n a t r u e r p r o p o r t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the t o t a l i t y , although the whole t r u t h i s u n a t t a i n a b l e by any human being. Since knowledge of the t r u t h i s always p a r t i a l , i n Gadamer's view, there does not e x i s t a vantage p o i n t from which communication can be judged s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d . In response to a number of c r i t i c s - and i n d i r e c t l y t o Gadamer - Habermas admits t h a t h i s concept of c r i t i q u e of ideology i n Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s i s inadequate. He thus i n t r o d u c e s r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s to p r o v i d e a normative b a s i s f o r h i s c r i t i q u e of ideology, as he c l a r i f i e s i n h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n to Theory and P r a c t i c e and " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI". But t h i s r e v i s e d model a l s o runs i n t o d i f f i c u l t y - a p o i n t we s h a l l e l a b o r a t e on i n l a t e r s e c t i o n s . Question of Language Language occ u p i e s a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n i n the t h e o r i e s of both Gadamer and Habermas. As we have seen, Gadamer c o n s i d e r s a l l knowledge and a c t i o n to be governed by people's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n . He f u r t h e r argues t h a t , w i t h i n any t r a d i t i o n , language i s of prime s i g n i f i c a n c e : " i t i s the nature of t r a d i t i o n to e x i s t i n the medium of language, so 123 that the p r e f e r r e d o b j e c t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a l i n g u i s t i c one". 5 T h i s does not mean that language determines " a l l the m a t e r i a l being of l i f e - p r a c t i c e . I t only suggests that there i s no s o c i e t a l r e a l i t y , with a l l i t s concrete f o r c e s , that does not b r i n g i t s e l f to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a consciousness that i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d . " 6 For t h i s reason Gadamer maintains t h a t the power of language i s u n i v e r s a l . In other words, language u n d e r l i e s a l l a s p e c t s of human l i f e ; i t i s the unconscious f o r c e behind the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e f o r c e . One i n t e r p r e t e r of Gadamer puts i t n i c e l y : Every h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n e l i c i t s new attempts to render the world i n t o language. Each makes i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n to the t r a d i t i o n , but i s i t s e l f i n e v i t a b l y charged with new unspoken p o s s i b i l i t i e s that d r i v e our t h i n k i n g f u r t h e r and c o n s t i t u t e the r a d i c a l c r e a t i v i t y of t r a d i t i o n . 7 The r o l e of language i n the s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process i n Gadamer's theory has been compared to the Hegelian S p i r i t . 8 Habermas has no doubt about the key r o l e of language i n s e l f - f o r m a t i o n ; but he r e f u s e s to grant language the s t a t u s of u n i v e r s a l i t y . With h i s model of communication, work and emancipation, Habermas i n d i c a t e s that Gadamer has n e g l e c t e d the two other dimensions: S o c i a l a c t i o n s can only be comprehended i n an o b j e c t i v e framework that i s c o n s t i t u t e d c o n j o i n t l y by language, labor and domination. 9 What d i s t u r b s Habermas most i s Gadamer's encompassing conception of language, e s p e c i a l l y statements l i k e the f o l l o w i n g : A fundamental c o n v e r s a t i o n i s never one that we want t o conduct The people c o n v e r s i n g • a r e f a r l e s s the l e a d e r s of i t than the l e d . No one knows what w i l l "come out" i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n A c o n v e r s a t i o n has a s p i r i t of i t s own, and ... the 124 language used i n i t bears i t s own t r u t h w i t h i n i t , i . e . i t r e v e a l s something which h e n c e f o r t h e x i s t s . 1 0 Language always f o r e s t a l l s any o b j e c t i o n to i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n . I t s u n i v e r s a l i t y keeps pace with the u n i v e r s a l i t y of reason Language i s the language of reason i t s e l f . 1 1 From c h i l d h o o d on people l e a r n about t h e i r world through the medium of language. To t h i s extent language i s by no means simply a t o o l people u t i l i z e t o express themselves. For people cannot c o n c e p t u a l i z e the world other than the way that i t i s b u i l t i n t o that p a r t i c u l a r language: they are "possessed by" the l a n g u a g e . 1 2 In Habermas' o p i n i o n . t h i s conception of language s e r i o u s l y undermines the p o s s i b i l i t y of emancipation through s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n . He accuses Gadamer of not l o o k i n g beyond what i s a l r e a d y embodied i n language: Language becomes a c o n t i n g e n t a b s o l u t e T h i s power becomes o b j e c t i v e i n the h i s t o r i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of h o r i z o n s of p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e . 1 3 The r e s u l t i s that Gadamer's hermeneutics " f a i l s to r e c o g n i z e the t r a n s c e n d i n g power of r e f l e c t i o n t h a t i s a l s o o p e r a t i v e " i n hermeneutical e x p e r i e n c e . 1 * In a d d i t i o n to being a foundation of s o c i a l p rocesses and i n s t i t u t i o n s , Habermas holds that "language i s a l s o a medium of domination and s o c i a l power; i t serves t o l e g i t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s of o r g a n i z e d f o r c e " ; hence "language i s a l s o i d e o l o g i c a l " . 1 5 T h i s "deception with language", a c c o r d i n g to Habermas, i s something Gadamer does not r e a l i z e . Gadamer r e p l i e s that Habermas takes the scope of hermeneutics too narrowly: 125 From the hermeneutical st a n d p o i n t , r i g h t l y understood, i t i s a b s o l u t e l y absurd to regard the concrete f a c t o r s of work and p o l i t i c s as o u t s i d e the scope of h e r m e n e u t i c s . 1 6 Even the c r i t i q u e of ideology, a c c o r d i n g to Gadamer, " i s i n i t s e l f a l i n g u i s t i c a c t of r e f l e c t i o n . " 1 7 N e v e r t h e l e s s Habermas maintains that there i s "reason to assume that the background consensus of e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n s and of language-games may be a f o r c e d consensus which r e s u l t e d from pseudo-communication"; 1 8 and hence a c r i t i q u e of e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n cannot be c a r r i e d out w i t h i n the Gadamerian framework. Therapeutic Approach to S o c i a l Development Gadamer's d i r e c t a t t a c k on Habermas focuses on the l a t t e r ' s t h e r a p e u t i c approach to s o c i a l development. At the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l the psychoanalyst i s f i r s t of a l l a member of s o c i e t y , which has c e r t a i n norms. A p a t i e n t i s one who has d e v i a t e d from s o c i a l norms. The psychoanalyst thus attempts to b r i n g the p a t i e n t back t o s o c i e t y : the former t r e a t s the l a t t e r i n accordance with s o c i a l norms. In other words, the psychoanalyst i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of s o c i e t y i n the t h e r a p e u t i c p r o c e s s . When the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model i s extended t o the s o c i e t a l l e v e l , as Gadamer observes, the s i t u a t i o n i s a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t . The s o c i a l t h e o r i s t qua t h e r a p i s t b e l i e v e s t h a t communication i n s o c i e t y i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d . He or she regards the e n t i r e s o c i e t y as p a t i e n t i n order t o c o r r e c t t h i s d i s t o r t i o n . Here the t h e o r i s t can no longer t r e a t the p a t i e n t ( s o c i e t y ) i n accordance with s o c i a l norms (which are c o n s i d e r e d t o be d i s t o r t e d ) ; he or she i s no longer a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of s o c i e t y . 126 T h i s s i t u a t i o n thus i m p l i e s the t h e o r i s t stands o u t s i d e of s o c i e t y and i s s u p e r i o r to s o c i e t y . A c c o r d i n g to Gadamer, t h i s i s where Habermas' p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model breaks down at the s o c i e t a l l e v e l . 1 9 Paraphrasing Gadamer, a c r i t i c w r i t e s : S e r i o u s or i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t s between s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l groups are not simply the r e s u l t of d i s t o r t e d communication, of a temporary d i s r u p t i o n of mutual comprehension; r a t h e r , they are grounded " i n the d i f f e r e n c e of concrete i n t e r e s t s and the d i s c r e p a n c y of e x p e r i e n c e s " . To assume a t h e r a p e u t i c posture i n t h i s context b e t r a y s a c o n s i d e r a b l e measure of d o c t r i n a i r e arrogance: the charge that opponents are mentally incompetent or deranged i m p l i e s a "monopoly of mental r e c t i t u d e " - a c l a i m which can be viewed as "a s p e c i a l case of derangement". 2 0 In h i s i n d i r e c t response to Gadamer, Habermas d i s s o c i a t e s h i m s e l f from Leninism - v i a a c r i t i q u e of Georg Lukacs. He argues that c r i t i c a l theory i s not a theory of p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n ; i t does not seek to implant consciousness i n t o the heads of the masses, as Lenin advocates. Instead, the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model r e q u i r e s a theory worked out by t h e o r i s t s to be accepted by the masses before i t i s c o n s i d e r e d v a l i d . 2 1 Habermas' r e p u d i a t i o n of Leninism does not spare him from Gadamer's a c c u s a t i o n . Gadamer p o i n t s out that the d o c t o r - p a t i e n t r e l a t i o n i s unequal from the very beginning. I f equal s o c i a l p a r t n e r s h i p among everybody i s to be a t t a i n e d , the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model poses severe p r o b l e m s . 2 2 Habermas p r o v i d e s no s a t i s f a c t o r y answer to t h i s . 127 R e h a b i l i t a t i o n of A u t h o r i t y Habermas agrees with "the hermeneutical i n s i g h t " that understanding "cannot simply leap over the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p s to t r a d i t i o n " . 2 3 But i n a s s o c i a t i o n with h i s concept of t r a d i t i o n , Gadamer i n t r o d u c e s a p r o v o c a t i v e idea -the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y . He argues that the essence of a u t h o r i t y i s not b l i n d obedience: The a u t h o r i t y of persons i s based u l t i m a t e l y , not on the s u b j e c t i o n and a b d i c a t i o n of reason, but on r e c o g n i t i o n and knowledge - knowledge, namely, that the other i s s u p e r i o r to o n e s e l f i n judgment and i n s i g h t and t h a t f o r t h i s reason h i s judgment takes precedence, i . e . i t has p r i o r i t y over one's own. T h i s i s connected with the f a c t that a u t h o r i t y cannot a c t u a l l y be bestowed, but i s a c q u i r e d and must be a c q u i r e d , i f someone i s to l a y c l a i m to i t . 2 " He c i t e s the examples of teachers and experts as people r e p r e s e n t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e f i e l d s . Gadamer c o n s i d e r s a u t h o r i t y to be something t r a n s m i t t e d from the past and i s thus p a r t of t r a d i t i o n ; f o r him the respect f o r t r a d i t i o n i n c l u d e s the r e s p e c t f o r a u t h o r i t y . A c a l l f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y f l i e s i n the face of t h e o r i s t s who c r i t i c i z e power and domination i n s o c i e t y . No wonder Habermas i s i n c l i n e d to p l a c e Gadamer i n the c o n s e r v a t i v e camp. Habermas s t a r t s with t r a d i t i o n but he has no d e s i r e to preserve i t . On the c o n t r a r y , he attempts to r i d t r a d i t i o n of i t s dominative c h a r a c t e r . Gadamer b e l i e v e s t r a d i t i o n and a u t h o r i t y are not- to be followed without the use of reason; but the way he c o n s i s t e n t l y favors the r e s p e c t f o r a u t h o r i t y and p r e s e r v a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n with l i t t l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r other a l t e r n a t i v e s - which can a l s o be the outcome of reason - r e v e a l s h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e b i a s . 128 T h i s a t t i t u d e i s what Gadamer c a l l s " t r a d i t i o n a l i s m " 2 5 - a major t a r g e t of Habermas' c r i t i c i s m . Gadamer r e p l i e s to c r i t i c s who " f e e l the l a c k of an u l t i m a t e r a d i c a l i t y i n the drawing of c o n c l u s i o n s " from h i s a n a l y s i s . He admits h i s emphasis on the past i s one-sided. N e v e r t h e l e s s he defends h i s one-sidedness by c l a i m i n g i t has "the t r u t h of a c o r r e c t i v e " a g a i n s t the p r e v a i l i n g ' modern t h i n k i n g which ignores the power of t r a d i t i o n . 2 6 Moving Beyond Habermas and Gadamer Let us epitomize the debate as f o l l o w s . Gadamer p o i n t s out that there are l i m i t s to s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n . In h i s o p i n i o n , Habermas' n o t i o n of c r i t i c a l s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n exceeds such l i m i t s , and thus becomes an i l l u s i o n . While Habermas would not c l a i m that c r i t i c a l s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n i s devoid of l i m i t s , he does not c l a r i f y what the l i m i t s a re. Habermas accuses Gadamer of not adequately e x p l o r i n g v a r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n the f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of human development; i n f a c t , the former argues that the l a t t e r ' s c o n ception of language v i r t u a l l y excludes such p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Both Gadamer and Habermas have r a i s e d key p h i l o s o p h i c a l i s s u e s c o n cerning s o c i a l development. N e i t h e r one should be ignored. Yet the two p o s i t i o n s seem to be mutually e x c l u s i v e : adoption of one p o s i t i o n a u t o m a t i c a l l y i m p l i e s the r e j e c t i o n of the o t her. So there cannot be a happy compromise, i n the sense that the two p o s i t i o n s are both c o r r e c t , complementary to each other and to be given roughly equal weight. E c l e c t i c i s m can be 129 achieved only at the cost of l o g i c a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y . To the extent the two p r o t a g o n i s t s of the debate re f u s e to modify t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e stances, n e i t h e r one i s able to overcome the o t h e r ' s o b j e c t i o n s . I t remains the task of other t h e o r i s t s to solve t h i s impasse. Commentators of the debate do not a r r i v e at a unanimous c o n c l u s i o n . 2 7 Those who s i d e with e i t h e r Habermas or Gadamer without s e r i o u s l y answering the o b j e c t i o n s of the other would c o n t r i b u t e l i t t l e to the f u r t h e r development of the debate or i t s r e s o l u t i o n . The working out of a s a t i s f a c t o r y theory of s o c i a l development cannot a f f o r d to ignore the key i s s u e s r a i s e d . Analyses by M i s g e l d and Mendelson Gadamer's c o n s e r v a t i v e facade does not discourage r a d i c a l t h i n k e r s from t a k i n g him s e r i o u s l y ; a f t e r a l l , Marx d i s c o v e r e d the " r a t i o n a l k e r n e l " w i t h i n Hegel's " m y s t i c a l s h e l l " . S e v e r a l t h i n k e r s r e a l i z e there i s untapped p o t e n t i a l i n hermeneutics. One who has made some headway i n developing such p o t e n t i a l i s D i e t e r M i s g e l d , a Toronto s o c i a l t h e o r i s t who has w r i t t e n a number of essays on the Habermas-Gadamer debate. Taking Gadamer as the p o i n t of departure and d i s c a r d i n g h i s t r a d i t i o n a l i s m -the c o n s e r v a t i v e aspect of h i s theory - M i s g e l d argues that an improved hermeneutics can answer Habermas' c h a l l e n g e . Gadamer's theory shows t h a t , by v i r t u e of one's i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e , one's s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e power i s n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d . The hermeneutical theory of s o c i a l development suggested by 130 M i s g e l d r e c o g n i z e s t h i s u n a l t e r a b l e r e a l i t y , yet endeavors to maximize the development of human p o t e n t i a l i n the s e l f -formative process whenever p o s s i b l e . In s h o r t , i t seeks to " p o l i t i c a l l y and e x i s t e n t i a l l y r a d i c a l i z e " Gadamer's hermeneutics. 2 8 There i s another attempt to r e s o l v e the impasse i n the debate: a " t r u l y h e r m e n e u t i c a l l y - e n l i g h t e n e d c r i t i c a l t heory" proposed by Jack Mendelson. 2 9 Mendelson i s convinced t h a t c r i t i c a l theory can become a more adequate s o c i a l t heory than hermeneutics, although he r e a l i z e s t h a t a t the present stage of development c r i t i c a l theory encounters fundamental problems i t must overcome. While Mendelson i s c a u t i o u s about Habermas' e a r l i e r model, h i s major concern i s the l a t t e r ' s recent preoccupation with r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s : a s o c i a l theory based on anonymous r u l e systems i s incompatible with the idea that knowledge and a c t i o n are dependent upon one's experience of the l i f e - w o r l d . Mendelson b e l i e v e s that Habermas has to pay more a t t e n t i o n to hermeneutics i n order to b r i d g e t h i s gap. Thus M i s g e l d and Mendelson rep r e s e n t two o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s i n approaching the Habermas-Gadamer debate. One s t a r t s from the p o s i t i o n of Gadamer and attempts to improve i t , p a r t i a l l y with Habermas' ideas; the other s t a r t s from the p o s i t i o n of Habermas and i n c o r p o r a t e s some of Gadamer's i n s i g h t s . The two d i r e c t i o n s do not converge; sometimes they share s i m i l a r concerns, but address them i n d i f f e r e n t manners. In the r e s t of t h i s chapter we s h a l l examine the arguments of M i s g e l d and Mendelson i n some d e t a i l . They do not cover a l l 131 i s s u e s r a i s e d by everyone i n t e r e s t e d i n the debate. But we b e l i e v e they b r i n g to l i g h t the g i s t . o f what i s i n v o l v e d . Prejudgments and S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n Reconsidered As we noted e a r l i e r , Gadamer r e j e c t s Habermas' c l a i m that prejudgments can become t r a n s p a r e n t . Mendelson comes to Habermas' rescue by r e - i n t e r p r e t i n g the l a t t e r ' s p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to Mendelson, prejudgments can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t o two types: "those i n e v i t a b l e preunderstandings which d e r i v e simply from one's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c u l t u r e , and those f a l s e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s which are anchored i n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d forms of communication." 3 0 He maintains t h a t c r i t i c a l theory attempts to d i s s o l v e the second type through s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n ; he a l s o conceded that b r i n g i n g e v e r y t h i n g i n t o c onsciousness i s an im p o s s i b l e task. Mendelson thus i m p l i e s that c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics are not incompatible; i n f a c t , c r i t i c a l theory b u i l d s on hermeneutics and goes beyond i t . Assuming t h a t t h i s i s indeed Habermas' p o s i t i o n , we s t i l l have to see i f i t i s v i a b l e . One obvious d i f f i c u l t y i s drawing the l i n e between the two kinds of prejudgments: the " i n e v i t a b l e " and the " f a l s e " . L i k e Gadamer, M i s g e l d doubts the p o s s i b i l i t y of drawing such a l i n e by a t h e o r i s t . For t h i s would amount to s e t t i n g up an o b j e c t i v e i d e a l of what l i f e ought to be, and " i t i s with regard to the p o s s i b i l i t y of f o r m u l a t i n g such a n o t i o n of an i d e a l form of l i f e t h a t hermeneutics w i l l take i t s f i n a l c r i t i c a l stance over a g a i n s t c r i t i c a l t h e o r y " . 3 1 M i s g e l d s t r e s s e s that hermeneutics does not exclude 132 c r i t i c i s m of t r a d i t i o n ; i t does b e l i e v e that a c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e v a l u a b l e to s o c i a l change n e c e s s a r i l y emerges from c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . 3 2 To t h i s extent, v a l u a b l e c r i t i c i s m i s never i s o l a t e d from the t r a d i t i o n from which emerges; i t cannot be based on an o b j e c t i v e i d e a l . No doubt Gadamer r e v e a l s h i s b i a s toward p r e s e r v a t i o n of what i s handed down from the past - a t r a d i t i o n a l i s m that M i s g e l d r e f u s e s to e n d o r s e . 3 3 But M i s g e l d a l s o notes that Gadamer does not s p e c i f y what t r a d i t i o n a l form or content i s t o be preserved. Gadamer does not defend any p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l , economic or p o l i t i c a l form simply because i t i s the e x i s t i n g one. T h i s i s not the p o s i t i o n of a c o n s e r v a t i v e , argues M i s g e l d . 3 4 However, Gadamer pays l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to e x p l o r a t i o n of v a r i o u s modes of l i f e based on people's s e l f -understanding; h i s emphasis i s on p r e s e r v a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n r a t h e r than r e a l i z i n g p o s s i b l e f u t u r e s . Heidegger p o i n t s out t h a t i n the process of understanding one d i s c o v e r s one's p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 3 5 For Heidegger, choosing and r e a l i z i n g one's p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s an important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of human e x i s t e n c e . He makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between the case of an i n d i v i d u a l choosing to r e a l i z e h i s or her p o s s i b i l i t i e s ("authentic") and the case of an i n d i v i d u a l simply a c c e p t i n g the given ( " i n a u t h e n t i c " ) . 3 6 There i s no i n t r i n s i c i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between the c o n d i t i o n s governing the act of understanding (the f o r e - s t r u c t u r e s of understanding) and a c h o i c e among d i f f e r e n t modes of human e x i s t e n c e based on understanding. By the same token, the weight of t r a d i t i o n should not prevent s o c i e t y from choosing i t s own d e s t i n y . Although Gadamer b u i l d s on Heidegger's 133 thought, he l a r g e l y ignores the i n q u i r y concerning p o s s i b l e f u t u r e s . T h i s does not make Gadamer's proposal " i n a u t h e n t i c " , f o r he r e f u s e s to f o l l o w t r a d i t i o n b l i n d l y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , h i s p r e o c c u p a t i o n with the past leaves l i t t l e room f o r c r e a t i v e ways to d e a l with new s i t u a t i o n s . T h i s seems to be one reason that M i s g e l d c o n s i d e r s Gadamer's theory to be inadequate f o r s o c i a l development and to be u s e f u l only as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t . A u t h o r i t y Reconsidered On the i s s u e of a u t h o r i t y Mendelson, f o l l o w i n g Habermas, p o i n t s out that a u t h o r i t y "may be rooted not o n l y i n knowledge but a l s o i n f o r c e and f e a r " . 3 7 Mendelson i l l u s t r a t e s h i s case with the example of an a u t h o r i t y - t e a c h e r . I n i t i a l l y a student accepts teachings "on the b a s i s of the teacher's a u t h o r i t y : In "coming of age" the student i s able to r e f l e c t upon the unfree context i n which he f i r s t i n t e r n a l i z e d these teachings and can examine them i n the l i g h t of h i s own matured c r i t i c a l c a p a c i t i e s . In t h i s case, a u t h o r i t y and knowledge- do not converge, r a t h e r they are at o d d s . 3 8 Although Mendelson accuses Gadamer f o r hot making a " d i s t i n c t i o n between genuine non-coercive r e c o g n i t i o n and p s e u d o - r e c o g n i t i o n based on f o r c e " , 3 9 he h i m s e l f and Habermas seem to have a s i m i l a r problem with two d i f f e r e n t concepts of a u t h o r i t y . Let us c a l l the f i r s t concept f r e e l y acknowledged a u t h o r i t y and the second one c o e r c i v e a u t h o r i t y . In f a c t the two a d j e c t i v e s d e r i v e d from the noun " a u t h o r i t y " , namely " a u t h o r i t a t i v e " and " a u t h o r i t a r i a n " , roughly represent these two concepts r e s p e c t i v e l y . * 0 Gadamer's concept i s the former one: a u t h o r i t y i s based on s u p e r i o r knowledge i n a f i e l d ; i t has to be a c q u i r e d 134 and be v o l u n t a r i l y acknowledged by o t h e r s . For Gadamer, a u t h o r i t y and knowledge are not opposed to each o t h e r . Habermas' concept i s e s s e n t i a l l y the l a t t e r one: a u t h o r i t y i s always a s s o c i a t e d with power and domination, so that knowledge a c q u i r e d from s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n would turn a g a i n s t a u t h o r i t y i f the two c o n t r a d i c t each o t h e r . I t i s t r u e t h a t Gadamer ignores the second concept of a u t h o r i t y , but then Habermas and Mendelson a l s o confuse the two concepts by not c o n s i d e r i n g them s e p a r a t e l y . Let us r e f e r to the teacher-student example. Under the f i r s t concept the teacher has s u p e r i o r knowledge i n a f i e l d , students recognize t h i s and accept the knowledge. With t h e i r matured c r i t i c a l c a p a c i t y , these students may p o i n t out that the teacher's knowledge i s inadequate or erroneous. I f the te a c h e r ' s a u t h o r i t y i s based on knowledge - as opposed to c o e r c i o n - he or she would r e c e i v e c r i t i c i s m with an open mind and be prepared t o modify the knowledge as necessary. In t h i s case a u t h o r i t y and knowledge are not at odds. Under the second concept the teacher i s i n a p o s i t i o n to use f o r c e and i n s t i l l f e a r among students. Students would only pretend to accept the t e a c h i n g s ; they probably would not i n t e r n a l i z e them, c o n t r a r y to what Mendelson b e l i e v e s . As long as f o r c e and f e a r p e r s i s t , a c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e toward the f i e l d of knowledge imparted by the teacher cannot a l t e r t h i s c o e r c i v e n e s s . I t r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t k i n d of knowledge - knowledge concerning the power s t r u c t u r e and i t s e f f e c t s - to overcome an a u t h o r i t y based on c o e r c i o n . In t h i s case c o e r c i v e a u t h o r i t y i s at odds not with c r i t i c i s m s of the 135 knowledge imparted but with o b j e c t i o n s to the power s t r u c t u r e to which the teacher belongs. Although these two kinds of a u t h o r i t y may be present i n one person, an a n a l y s i s that does not d i s t i n g u i s h the two concepts may f a i l to i d e n t i f y s o c i a l problems i n v o l v e d . When M i s g e l d speaks of a u t h o r i t y he r e f e r s to the f i r s t concept. I n t e r p r e t i n g Gadamer, he c l a r i f i e s that a u t h o r i t y i s not r e s t r i c t e d to s p e c i f i c persons or i n s t i t u t i o n s : i t i s embedded in c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . Anyone who l e a r n s from others or from the past i s a c c e p t i n g a u t h o r i t y . I t i s the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l can only a c q u i r e a l i m i t e d amount of f i r s t - h a n d knowledge: one has to depend on what are g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d r e l i a b l e sources i n v a r i o u s f i e l d s . " 1 Understood t h i s way the i s s u e of a u t h o r i t y would merge with that of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , with the n o t i o n of a u t h o r i t y empahsizing a conscious search f o r r e l i a b l e knowledge. Mendelson i n d i c a t e s he has no o b j e c t i o n to " a u t h o r i t y " i f taken i n t h i s broad sense. But he wonders i f the term " a u t h o r i t y " i s s t i l l a p p r o p r i a t e s i n c e i t d e v i a t e s so much from i t s o r d i n a r y u s a g e . 0 2 To the extent that a u t h o r i t y can mean something a u t h o r i t a t i v e or something a u t h o r i t a r i a n , and t h a t the meaning i s u s u a l l y not c l a r i f i e d , Mendelson seems to have a p o i n t . 1 36 The Advocacy Model Examined Gadamer's c r i t i q u e of a s o c i a l theory based on the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model h i t s one of Habermas' major weak spo t s . Few commentators would defend t h i s model without r e s e r v a t i o n . Mendelson i s not e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d with the model e i t h e r , but he g i v e s Habermas c r e d i t f o r attempting to provide safeguards a g a i n s t complete domination of s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m by i n t e l l e c t -u a l s . " 3 Misgeld's view here i s s i m i l a r to that of Gadamer's -the s u p e r i o r i t y of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i s inherent i n the model."* Mendelson does not d i s c u s s the advocacy model. M i s g e l d , on the other hand, analyzes i t i n d e t a i l . Before we present Misgeld's view on the model, l e t us c o n s i d e r the case of Marx. Among o t h e r s , W i l l i a m L e i s s p o i n t s out a major dilemma i n Marx's t h e o r i z i n g : c l a s s consciousness and the subsequent establishment of "a q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t epoch of human h i s t o r y " depends on the assumption of "the p o t e n t i a l e x i s t e n c e of a c l a s s with an i n t e r e s t i n g e n e r a l emancipation".* 5 Yet Marx f a i l e d t o demonstrate that the assumption i s p l a u s i b l e . According to L e i s s , "the i s s u e of whether the d i a l e c t i c of c a p i t a l i s t or bourgeois s o c i e t y i s i n f a c t i n h e r e n t l y capable of producing a c l a s s or group that can f u n c t i o n as the agent of a q u a l i t a t i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n h i s t o r y toward g e n e r a l emancipation ... was a c e n t r a l concern of c r i t i c a l t h e o r y . " * 6 L i k e the e a r l i e r c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s , Habermas i s concerned with t h i s i s s u e . He assumes there are suppressed g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y . U n l i k e Marx, who had conf i d e n c e i n the p r o l e t a r i a t , Habermas has no conf i d e n c e i n any s o c i a l group i n 137 c a r r y i n g out the task of general emancipation. He b e l i e v e s an hypothesis s u p p l i e d by an advocate i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e . M i s g e l d p o i n t s out t h a t Habermas has not been ab l e to demonstrate the e x i s t e n c e of g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s . Claiming the e x i s t e n c e of such i n t e r e s t s and saying they are suppressed "sounds l i k e a c i r c u l a r argument"." 7 To t h i s extent, Habermas does not f a r e any b e t t e r than Marx. Now the d i f f e r e n c e i s that the former r e l i e s on r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s to uphold h i s c l a i m : "Habermas' argument t r e a t s the model of suppressed yet g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s as one which can be t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d . " " 8 In M i s g e l d ' s o p i n i o n , t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l l y an " o b j e c t i v i s t form of r e f l e c t i o n " . " 9 For the i d e a l s e s t a b l i s h e d by r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s o b l i t e r a t e what s o c i a l groups have a l r e a d y a r t i c u l a t e d or expressed i n l i f e . To the extent that the advocacy model i s a refinement of the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c model, and that the refinement does not a l t e r the b a s i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e o r i s t and s o c i e t a l members, Gadamer's o b j e c t i o n to the l a t t e r model a p p l i e s to the former. M i s g e l d does not argue along t h i s l i n e , but he does q u e s t i o n the r o l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l s Habermas a s s i g n s i n c r i t i c a l t h e o r y : [Habermas] has not r e a l l y r e f l e c t e d on the f o l l o w i n g i s s u e : can those of whom i t i s s a i d that they have i m p l i c i t l y mastered the n o t i o n of an i d e a l s i t u a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e , of communication f r e e from domination, ever become c r i t i c s of the t h e o r y ? 5 0 Put d i f f e r e n t l y , M i s g e l d asks: can an " o b j e c t i v i s t form of r e f l e c t i o n " be c r i t i c i z e d by i t s addressees? 1 38 Norms i n T r a d i t i o n and i n R e c o n s t r u c t i v e Sciences The working out of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s and t h e i r p l a c e s i n c r i t i c a l theory are the f o c i of Habermas' more recent endeavors. These are d i r e c t i o n s Habermas embarked on a f t e r h i s d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Gadamer i n the l a t e s i x t i e s and e a r l y s e v e n t i e s . The debate on the m e r i t s of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s i s c a r r i e d out by commentators such as M i s g e l d and Mendelson. Perhaps we can grasp the issue i n terms of two d i f f e r e n t concepts of norm, one espoused by Gadamer and the other by Habermas. Gadamer, who i s convinced that t r a d i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s s o c i a l r e a l i t y f a r more than do i n d i v i d u a l judgments, n a t u r a l l y b e l i e v e s t h at the proper way to a c t cannot be judged independently of the e x i s t i n g way of l i f e i n s o c i e t y . As M i s g e l d puts i t : "There are no a h i s t o r i c a l s o c i a l norms." 5 1 Under t h i s concept, a norm i s not an i d e a l s o c i e t y s t r i v e s f o r ; i t i s something that has a l r e a d y been a c h i e v e d by s o c i e t y as a whole, though not n e c e s s a r i l y by everybody i n that s o c i e t y . Norms e x i s t whether or not people are aware of them; they are embodied i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . When p r a c t i c e s are passed from one g e n e r a t i o n to the next, norms are t r a n s m i t t e d along with them: when people l e a r n something new they at the same time l e a r n about the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of using i t under v a r i o u s circumstances. Since s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s e volve through a s e l f - f o r m a t i v e process, norms evolve a c c o r d i n g l y . 5 2 For Habermas, e x i s t i n g norms may harbor i d e o l o g y ; they may be the outcome of s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d communication. He i s 139 s u s p i c i o u s of the v a l i d i t y of norms embodied i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s and thus proposes a d i f f e r e n t concept of norm - j u s t i f i a b l e norms - which i s based on the assumption of suppressed g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s . As we have seen e a r l i e r , h y p o t h e t i c a l j u s t i f i a b l e norms are formulated by a s o c i a l t h e o r i s t and o f f e r e d to the p u b l i c , who then confirms these norms through p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . Unless no c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s e x i s t s i n s o c i e t y , c r i t i c a l theory takes j u s t i f i a b l e norms to be d i f f e r e n t from e x i s t i n g ones. A j u s t i f i a b l e norm i s an i d e a l f o r s o c i e t y to pursue. Both M i s g e l d and Mendelson are bothered by the h i g h l y t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r of t h i s recent d i r e c t i o n c r i t i c a l theory takes: s i n c e j u s t i f i a b l e norms are a r r i v e d at through r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s such as u n i v e r s a l pragmatics and r e c o n s t r u c t e d h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , they are d i v o r c e d from e x i s t i n g s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s and thus l a c k p o l i t i c a l r e l e v a n c e . Mendelson: Doubts on R e c o n s t r u c t i v e Sciences Mendelson expresses h i s doubts about the u s e f u l n e s s of Habermas' communication theory: For i t to become a h i s t o r i c a l l y - e f f e c t i v e standard the r a t h e r formal c r i t e r i a of u n d i s t o r t e d communication would have to be a r t i c u l a t e d as a more con c r e t e v i s i o n of new i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s . 5 3 While Mendelson has no o b j e c t i o n to the formal c r i t e r i a or norms Habermas worked out i n u n i v e r s a l pragmatics, h i s grave concern i s what they r e a l l y mean i n concre t e s i t u a t i o n s . U n i v e r s a l c r i t e r i a can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n m u l t i t u d i n o u s ways t h a t , u n l e s s there i s an unambiguous method to apply them to p a r t i c u l a r 140 cases, they remain empty n o t i o n s . For Mendelson, " t h i s r e l a t i o n of the u n i v e r s a l to the p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u t e s an unbridgeable g u l f " between r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s and s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . 5 " He c i t e s with a p p r o v a l a remark by Paul Ricoeur - another commentator of the debate: Ricoeur has argued that "there are no other paths, i n e f f e c t , f o r c a r r y i n g out our i n t e r e s t i n emancipation than by i n c a r n a t i n g i t w i t h i n c u l t u r a l a c q u i s i t i o n s . Freedom only p o s i t s i t s e l f by t r a n s v a l u a t i n g what has a l r e a d y been e v a l u a t e d " . Otherwise, "the s e l f - p o s i t i n g of freedom i s condemned to remain e i t h e r an empty concept or a f a n a t i c a l demand". 5 5 Ricoeur thus p o i n t s out that the meaning of freedom to a people can only be determined i n the context of that c u l t u r e : freedom i s not something that can be completely t h e o r i z e d . Mendelson t h i n k s Habermas' r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s have t r o u b l e c o n f r o n t i n g Ricoeur's hermeneutical i n s i g h t s : t h e o r e t i c a l l y d e r i v e d norms are not n e c e s s a r i l y p r a c t i c a l . Mendelson proposes an a l t e r n a t i v e d i r e c t i o n f o r c r i t i c a l t h e ory. Convinced that a s o c i a l theory has p o l i t i c a l relevance only i f i t emerges from e x i s t i n g s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , he argues t h a t c r i t i c a l theory should s t a r t with "the e n t i r e apparatus of c o n s t i t u t i o n s , e l e c t i o n s , p a r t i e s and parliaments which embodies democratic i d e a l s " and which " s t i l l has a l i v i n g presence i n l a t e c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s " . 5 6 T h i s apparatus would represent the e x i s t i n g norms in p o l i t i c s . I f r e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s r e v e a l that democratic i d e a l s cannot p o s s i b l y be r e a l i z e d under the present l i b e r a l democratic p o l i t i c a l apparatus - which i s supposed to be the c r i t e r i o n of the i d e a l s - then there i s a " c o n t r a d i c t i o n " i n the sense of Hegel and Marx. A c r i t i c a l theory f o l l o w i n g t h i s 141 d i r e c t i o n would "both a n t i c i p a t e a b e t t e r s o c i e t y and resonate with l a r g e numbers of p e o p l e " . 5 7 Norms that emerge from the c r i t i q u e would then be p e r t i n e n t to the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e d and be ready to be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o p r a c t i c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Mendelson does not r e j e c t r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s completely. He b e l i e v e s that a c r i t i c a l standard d e r i v e d from r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s may be v a l u a b l e i n c e r t a i n cases i f , i n the f u t u r e , Habermas i s a b l e to " c o n c r e t i z e [ h i s theory] i n t o more down-to-earth demands". 5 8 Should t h a t happen, Mendelson argues, h i s own approach and r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s would not be " a l t e r n a t i v e s but complementary steps i n a s i n g l e p r o c e s s " . 5 9 M i s g e l d : P r i o r i t y of P r a c t i c e I t i s c l e a r Habermas wants to r e t a i n a l i f e - w o r l d p e r s p e c t i v e i n c r i t i c a l theory, as he i n d i c a t e s i n L e g i t i m a t i o n  C r i s i s , f o r that i s the only way to keep c r i t i c a l theory from degenerating i n t o a theory of i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n or a systems theory. But the l i f e - w o r l d i s too e l u s i v e f o r Habermas, who decides to ground i t i n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . 6 0 As Mendelson and M i s g e l d see i t , the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s i n t o c r i t i c a l theory undermines the l i f e - w o r l d p e r s p e c t i v e . While Mendelson i s c a u t i o u s about the a p p l i c a t i o n of u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s to p r a c t i c e , M i s g e l d i s c r i t i c a l of i t . He argues that "the a p p l i c a t i o n of s t r i n g e n t c r i t e r i a f o r theory formation i n some systematic way i s not compatible with the requirement f o r t h e o r i e s to be p r a c t i c a l l y e n l i g h t e n i n g " . 6 1 142 Let us c o n s i d e r a l i f e - w o r l d p e r s p e c t i v e . The way people p e r c e i v e r e a l i t y i s governed by t h e i r prejudgments, which are i n t u r n determined by t h e i r c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l backgrounds as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l experiences and the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n . The v a l i d i t y of norms cannot be assessed by s o c i e t a l members without i n v o l v i n g t h e i r prejudgments: i t i s s i t u a t i o n -bound. As M i s g e l d puts i t : " A c t i o n o r i e n t i n g knowledge i s ... r a d i c a l l y dependent upon s i t u a t i o n a l l y generated knowledge." 6 2 Now l e t us c o n s i d e r Habermas' use of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . He assumes that people's fore-knowledge (probably e q u i v a l e n t to what Gadamer c a l l s prejudgments), or at l e a s t a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of i t , can be rendered e x p l i c i t i n t o u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d anonymous r u l e systems. A s o c i a l t h e o r i s t qua advocate formulates h y p o t h e t i c a l j u s t i f i a b l e norms based on u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s of communicative competence, a c t i o n competence and s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . S o c i e t a l members do not work out t h e i r own t h e o r i e s nor propose norms f o r d i s c u s s i o n ; they merely c o n f i r m and accept those o f f e r e d by the advocate. The experiences of s o c i e t a l members do not c o n t r i b u t e to the f o r m u l a t i o n of j u s t i f i a b l e norms, which are d e r i v e d from the anonymous r u l e s of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . Besides, s o c i e t a l members d i s c u s s the advocate's hypothesis only i n the c a p a c i t y of what Habermas c o n s i d e r s competent speakers. The requirement of competence i n speaking, i . e . o b s e r v a t i o n of s t r i n g e n t r u l e s , l e a v e s l i t t l e room f o r c u l t u r a l and i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s among s o c i e t a l members. In f a c t Habermas i n d i c a t e s that h i s theory of u n i v e r s a l pragmatics i s based on the premise of homogeneity 143 among p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a d i s c o u r s e . I t i s an i d e a l i z e d case... in which p a r t i c i p a n t s share a t r a d i t i o n and t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n s are normatively i n t e g r a t e d to such an extent that they s t a r t from the same d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n and do not d i s a g r e e about the c l a i m s to v a l i d i t y that they r e c i p r o c a l l y r a i s e . 6 3 When u n i v e r s a l pragmatics i s a p p l i e d to a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , as i n the case of the advocacy model, i t encounters a s e r i o u s problem. A c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y i m p l i e s people i n v o l v e d p l a y d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l r o l e s (such as c a p i t a l i s t s , workers, producers, consumers, deve l o p e r s , e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s ) . These people are to engage i n a p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . From a l i f e - w o r l d p e r s p e c t i v e , a d i f f e r e n c e i n s o c i a l r o l e s would mean a d i f f e r e n c e i n prejudgments among p a r t i c i p a n t s of the d i s c o u r s e , so that there cannot be merely one s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . T h i s v i o l a t e s the premise of u n i v e r s a l pragmatics. A d i s c o u r s e d e a l i n g with c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i s thus i m p o s s i b l e . Habermas does not seem to have n o t i c e d t h i s problem. From our a n a l y s i s i t f o l l o w s that the i n t e n t of c r i t i c a l theory to embrace both r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s and a l i f e - w o r l d p e r s p e c t i v e i n e v i t a b l y leads to i n t e r n a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y . Between the two, one has to choose. U n l i k e c r i t i c a l theory, hermeneutics does not seek to develop a g e n e r a l theory of what s o c i e t y i s , what i t should be and then apply the theory to p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s . M i s g e l d p o i n t s out, hermeneutics recognizes "the p r i o r i t y of p r a c t i c e - and seeks a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of knowledge i n which knowledge i s understood, from the beginning, as the knowledge one has of one's h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n . The l a t t e r a r i s e s from the conduct 144 of l i f e i t s e l f . " 6 " Hermeneutics accepts "the l o c a t i o n of t h e o r i z i n g or r e f l e c t i v e n e s s i n contingent s t a r t i n g p o i n t s " . 6 5 For Habermas, anything a person wishes t o express e x p l i c i t l y to ot h e r s can be expressed i n e x p l i c i t speech: In a given language, f o r every i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n that a speaker wants to take up e x p l i c i t l y with another member of h i s language community, a s u i t a b l e p e r f o r m a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n i s e i t h e r a v a i l a b l e or, i f necessary, can be in t r o d u c e d through a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a v a i l a b l e e x p r e s s i o n s . 6 6 T h i s p e r f o r m a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n r e f e r s to an e x p l i c i t speech a c t i o n s a t i s f y i n g a set of requirements Habermas d e l i n e a t e s . 6 7 The c e n t r a l i t y of e x p l i c i t speech i n c r i t i c a l theory can be seen from the way i t i s a p p l i e d , i n the form of d i s c o u r s e , to p o l i t i c s . In the context of p l a n n i n g Habermas d e f i n e s " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " to be "a general t a k i n g p a r t , on the b a s i s of equal o p p o r t u n i t y , i n d i s c u r s i v e processes of w i l l - f o r m a t i o n " . 6 8 For him s o c i a l a c t i o n should take p l a c e i n accordance w i t h j u s t i f i a b l e norms reached through p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . H i s preoccupation with d i s c o u r s e i m p l i e s that he b e l i e v e s l i f e - at l e a s t the p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l p o r t i o n of l i f e - can be completely represented i n d i s c o u r s e , a s p e c i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of e x p l i c i t s p e e c h . 6 9 I t seems as though v e r b a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d ideas can become the s o l e guide of l i f e . M i s g e l d r e v e a l s the n a i v e t y of Habermas' p o s i t i o n : E x p l i c i t argument, ... while o f t e n needed, cannot be the b a s i s of l i f e l i v e d i n common. One would become confused, l o s e one's g r i p on everyday events, were one to o r i e n t to t h i s idea of argument f o r agreement on what needs doing and may be done as the only means f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a l i f e t o g e t h e r . 7 0 No c u l t u r e worth speaking about can be thought of as grounded i n the e x p l i c i t weighing of arguments and 145 in only one process of d e l i b e r a t i o n (a d i s c o u r s e of a t h e o r e t i c a l kind debating " c l a i m s " ) . I f estrangement from t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r e i s not l i v e d , i t cannot merely be produced by the c o g n i t i v e l y pure form of argument Habermas s i n g l e s o u t . 7 1 Here M i s g e l d agrees with Gadamer's i n s i g h t that "being" always reaches beyond c o n s c i o u s n e s s : 7 2 l i f e can never f u l l y manifest i t s e l f i n speech. I t f o l l o w s that i n hermeneutical t h i n k i n g p o l i t i c s encompasses the e n t i r e spectrum of s o c i a l l i f e , not merely p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . For the same reason M i s g e l d c o n s i d e r s Mendelson's proposed c r i t i q u e of l i b e r a l democratic p o l i t i c a l apparatus as the impetus f o r s o c i a l change to be too narrowly c o n c e i v e d . 7 3 Habermas' n o t i o n of competence i s a l s o s u b j e c t to c r i t i c i s m : competence d e f i n e d i n terms of the s t r i n g e n t r u l e s of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s i s out of touch with the much broader realm of l i f e . I f competence r e f e r s to the a b i l i t y to conduct a meaningful l i f e or the a b i l i t y to b r i n g about a b e t t e r s o c i e t y , then the competence Habermas has i n mind cannot do j u s t i c e to many people who are s u c c e s s f u l i n those r e s p e c t s . M i s g e l d shows that Habermas " f a i l s to n o t i c e the competence e s t a b l i s h e d i n d a i l y experience and d e l i b e r a t i o n " . 7 " For i n s t a n c e , competence i n p o l i t i c s i s manifested i n a l l kinds of s o c i a l a c t i o n , o r g a n i z e d and unorganized, v e r b a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d and not a r t i c u l a t e d , from p a s s i v e r e s i s t e n c e to open s t r u g g l e . M i s g e l d b e l i e v e s that some of the most p r o g r e s s i v e changes i n s o c i e t y r e s u l t from the e f f o r t of s o c i a l movements (such as the f e m i n i s t , black and environmental movements). People i d e n t i f y with a s o c i a l movement because i t s a c t i v i t i e s resonate with 1 46 these people's experiences, i n c l u d i n g "the l i v e d form of op p r e s s i o n , dependence and e x c l u s i o n " . 7 5 People p a r t i c i p a t e i n s o c i a l a c t i o n because i t expresses or may l e a d to the kind of l i f e they d e s i r e . Many of these a c t i v i t i e s are the outcome of i m p l i c i t understanding rather than formal d i s c o u r s e . Accomplishments of s o c i a l movements o f t e n cannot be t r a c e d t o speakers who adhere to the r u l e s of u n i v e r s a l pragmatics. Here the speech of people engaged i n a c t i o n cannot be c o n s i d e r e d i n i s o l a t i o n from the a c t i o n i t s e l f . C o ntrary to Habermas' i n t e n t i o n to separate d i s c o u r s e from communicative a c t i o n , a meaningful d i s c o u r s e concerning the s i t u a t i o n cannot be "purged of a c t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e " . 7 6 The f a c t that speech i s not a l l there i s to l i f e does not mean speech i s p o l i t i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . There i s l i t t l e doubt e x p l i c i t argumentation c o n s t i t u t e s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t of p o l i t i c s today. I t behooves us to f u r t h e r examine the nature of p o l i t i c a l d i a l o g u e s . M i s g e l d f i n d s the p o s i t i o n s of both Habermas and Gadamer u n s a t i s f a c t o r y : they p o r t r a y extreme cases t h a t are v i r t u a l l y n o n - existent i n p r a c t i c e . 7 7 In the case of Habermas, speech a c t i s c l a s s i f i e d i n t o d i f f e r e n t types so t h a t only the one conforming to a s p e c i f i c format i s c o n s i d e r e d s u i t a b l e f o r d i s c o u r s e , independent of the content of the d i s c o u r s e . The r i g i d i t y of the format p r e c l u d e s any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c o n t i n g e n c i e s i n a l i f e - w o r l d . Gadamer, on the other hand, does not d i s t i n g u i s h d i f f e r e n t types of speech a c t and pays l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to r u l e s f o r employing speech. I t seems as though speech d e f i e s any a n a l y s i s . 147 M i s g e l d presumes that when Gadamer speaks of c o n v e r s a t i o n he has i n mind a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n . In that case, p a r t i c i p a n t s cooperate to e x p l o r e a concept. They have no p a r t i s a n i n t e r e s t and do not take any progress or setback p e r s o n a l l y . Consequently, p a r t i c i p a n t s do not defend t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s or a t t a c k others s y s t e m a t i c a l l y . The outcome of the c o n v e r s a t i o n i s somewhat u n p r e d i c t a b l e . 7 8 What Gadamer s t r e s s e s i s the openness of a c o n v e r s a t i o n . But a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l d i a l o g u e i n t h i s f a s h i o n would be i n a c c u r a t e . While f o r Habermas the u n i v e r s a l r u l e s of d i s c o u r s e " o b j e c t i f y r e a l i t y " , 7 9 i t i s the reverse f o r Gadamer: the content of a c o n v e r s a t i o n r e v e a l s i m p l i c i t r u l e s of speech i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r c o n v e r s a t i o n . 8 0 One focuses on the g e n e r a l , the other on the p a r t i c u l a r . O b viously Gadamer's c o n v e r s a t i o n i s not the same as Habermas' d i s c o u r s e . In an a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n , as M i s g e l d p o i n t s out, a d i a l o g u e c o n s i s t s of elements i n what Gadamer c a l l s c o n v e r s a t i o n as w e l l as those i n what Habermas c a l l s d i s c o u r s e . 8 1 M i s g e l d g i v e s Habermas c r e d i t f o r developing g e n e r a l c r i t e r i a f o r d i s c o u r s e . He i s r e f e r r i n g to the four g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n s u c c e s s f u l speech communication Habermas worked out i n u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . 8 2 These general c r i t e r i a serve as a common purpose f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s to work toward. But these are only construed as general o r i e n t a t i o n s f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s attempting to s o l v e problems through d i a l o g u e . D e t a i l r u l e s of speech cannot be s p e c i f i e d i n advance. Only through mutual adjustments of i m p l i c i t r u l e s as a r e s u l t of 148 understanding the content i n v o l v e d can p a r t i c i p a n t s g r a d u a l l y d i s c o v e r one another's p o i n t of view. Only through a process of q u e s t i o n i n g and weighing of arguments can the s i n c e r i t y of p a r t i c i p a n t s be determined. From The Debate to Theory of Planning Let us summarize Misgeld's r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of Gadamer's hermeneutics. The s e l f - f o r m a t i o n of s o c i e t y c o n s i s t s of more c o n t i n u i t i e s than d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s . T h i s has to remain so or e l s e people would l o s e t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n i n l i f e and t h e i r sense of community. Systematic redesign of s o c i e t y , no matter how w e l l intended, would i n e v i t a b l y d e s t r o y s o c i a l meanings and coherence. T h i s does not mean, however, that people cannot be c r i t i c a l of the s t a t u s quo. The meaningful c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e i s the one "from w i t h i n " : 8 3 the kind that emerges from people who have a c t u a l l y committed themselves and have l i v e d through the problems. "Without having l i v e d the commitment we would not know what to turn t o , when we turn away from i t " . 8 f t T h i s c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e , embodied i n s o c i a l a c t i o n , i s found i n many s o c i a l movements. F u r t h e r s o c i a l change can occur, i f people d i s c u s s problems e x p l i c i t l y , based on t h e i r own e x p e r i e n c e s . M i s g e l d has remarked that Gadamer's work i s best t r e a t e d as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e : improvement to Gadamer's theory i s necessary i f hermeneutics i s to p r o p e r l y address the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s of contemporary i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . M i s g e l d h i m s e l f has no doubt c o n t r i b u t e d to t h i s undertaking and probably w i l l continue to do so. Although the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of 1 49 hermeneutics i s apparently s t i l l at a p r e l i m i n a r y stage, the suggestions so f a r touch the very heart of p l a n n i n g . Many ideas i n hermeneutics seem to be i n harmony with those i n s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s of plan n i n g today. I t makes sense to f u r t h e r pursue the r e l a t i o n s h i p between hermeneutics and p l a n n i n g . NOTES 1 PhH, pp.93-4. 2 "Review of TM", p.358. 3 PhH, p.38. * G.W.F.Hegel, The Logi c of Hegel (from the En c y c l o p a e d i a of the P h i l o s o p h i c a l S c i e n c e s ) , W.Wallace ( t r a n s . ) , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874, p.206. 5 TM, p.351. 6 PhH, p.35. 7 D.E.Linge, E d i t o r ' s I n t r o d u c t i o n to PhH, p p . l v - l v i . 8 See e.g. Ri c h a r d Palmer, Hermeneutics, Evanston: Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969. 9 "Review of TM", p.361. 1 0 TM, p.345. 1 1 I b i d . , p.363. 1 2 PhH, pp.62-3; Linge, E d i t o r ' s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o PhH, p . x x i v . 1 3 "Review of TM", p.359. 1" I b i d . 1 5 I b i d . , p.360. 1 6 PhH, p.31. 150 I b i d . , p.30. J.Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to U n i v e r s a l i t y " , i n Contemporary Hermeneutics, J . B l e i c h e r (ed.), London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p.208. PhH, pp.18-43. F.Dallmayr, " C r i t i c a l Theory C r i t i c i z e d " , Philosophy of the  S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , v o l . 2 , 1972, p.223. TP, pp.30-40. PhH, p.42. "Review of TM", p.357. TM, p.248. I b i d . , p.250. I b i d . , p.xxv ( i n Foreword to Second German E d i t i o n and i n c l u d e d i n the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n ) . Cf. D.Misgeld, " C r i t i c a l Theory and Hermeneutics: The Debate between Habermas and Gadamer", o p . c i t . , h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as "CT and H"; J.Mendelson, "The Habermas-Gadamer Debate", o p . c i t . , h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as "H-G Debate"; P.Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the C r i t i q u e of Ideology", o p . c i t . ; R.Bubner, "Theory and P r a c t i c e i n the L i g h t of the H e r m e n e u t i c - C r i t i c i s t Controversy", C u l t u r a l Hermeneutics, v o l . 2 , pp.337-52, 1975; T.McCarthy, The C r i t i c a l Theory of  Juergen Habermas, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978, pp.187-93; and, A.Giddens, "Habermas' C r i t i q u e of Hermeneutics", i n S t u d i e s i n Soc i a l and P o l i t i c a l Theory, London: Hutchinson, 1977. D.Misgeld, "Habermas' Retreat from Hermeneutics", Canadian  J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l Theory, v o l . 5 , no.1-2, 1981, p.10. H e r e a f t e r t h i s a r t i c l e w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as "Ret r e a t " . "H-G Debate", p.44. I b i d . , p.62. "CT and H", p.171. "On Gadamer's Hermeneutics", o p . c i t . , p.226. T h i s a r t i c l e w i l l h e r e a f t e r be r e f e r r e d to as "GH". "R e t r e a t " , pp.10 and 12. "GH", p.226. I b i d . , p.68. Heidegger i n d i c a t e s h i s use of the terms " a u t h e n t i c " and " i n a u t h e n t i c " i s a matter of terminology: i t i s not to be taken as an e t h i c a l judgment. "H-G Debate", p.60. I b i d . I b i d . Peter Boothroyd brought to our a t t e n t i o n the use of the a d j e c t i v e " a u t h o r i t a t i v e " i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n . "CT and H", p.167. "H-G Debate", p.62n. I b i d . , pp.67-8. Cf. "CT and H", p.171; and, "Retreat", pp.21-2. W.Leiss, " C r i t i c a l Theory and I t s Future", P o l i t i c a l  Theory, v o l . 2 , 1974, p.341. I b i d . , pp.342-3. "Retreat", p.28. I b i d . , p.29. I b i d . , p.30. I b i d . , p.20. "CT and H", p.178. M i s g e l d , i n "GH", shows that the hermeneutical n o t i o n of norm i s not to be confused w i t h those i n s t r u c t u r a l -f u n c t i o n a l i s m and ethnomethodology. In s t r u c t u r a l -f u n c t i o n a l i s m norms are "imposed" on people i n order to m a i n t ain s t a b i l i t y i n s o c i e t y . Norms are i n t r o d u c e d to people who are then supposed to i n t e r n a l i z e them f o r g u i d i n g p r a c t i c e . These norms do not a r i s e from p r a c t i c e . Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, i s r e l a t i v i s t i c . I t does not l i n k p r a c t i c e to i t s h i s t o r i c a l development. "H-G Debate", p.73. I b i d . I b i d . 1 52 I b i d . , p.71. I b i d . , p.72. I b i d . , p.73 . I b i d . Cf. T.McCarthy, The C r i t i c a l Theory of Juergen Habermas, o p . c i t . , p.355. "Retreat", p.15. I b i d . , p. 1 6. CES., pp.208-9. "Retreat", p.17. D.Misgeld, "Science, Hermeneutics and the Utopian Content of the L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t i c T r a d i t i o n " , New German C r i t i q u e , no.22, 1981, p.132. H e r e a f t e r t h i s a r t i c l e w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as "Utopian Content". CES, p.40. I b i d . , pp.36-40. LC, p.134. Habermas argues that n o n - l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n can only perform h i g h l y r e s t r i c t e d f u n c t i o n s . He i m p l i e s a l l n o n - l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n can i n p r i n c i p l e be r e presented i n e x p l i c i t speech (CES, pp.37-8). Many w r i t e r s , i n c l u d i n g Gadamer, make an important d i s t i n c t i o n between "symbol" and " s i g n " . While a s i g n i s an i n d i c a t o r f o r a c t i o n , a symbol conveys an e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t thought. N o n - l i n g u i s t i c symbols are p e r v a s i v e i n l i f e , from f i n e a r t to everyday human a c t i o n . These- symbols can never be adequately expressed l i n g u i s t i c a l l y . Cf. esp. Susanne Langer's v i v i d d i s c u s s i o n on d i s c u r s i v e and p r e s e n t a t i o n a l symbols, i n Philosophy i n a New Key, 3rd e d i t i o n , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1957. The k i n d of n o n - l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n Habermas r e f e r s to are s i g n s ; he has not s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of n o n - l i n g u i s t i c symbols. "Retreat", p.9. I b i d . , p.10. I b i d . , p.9. "Utopian Content", p.132. 153 I b i d . , p.139. "Retreat", p.37. " P o s t s c r i p t to KHI", p.168 D.Misgeld, "Discourse and Hermeneutics, v o l . 4 , 1977, w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as "DC 7 8 I b i d . , pp.326-7. 7 9 I b i d . , p.329. 8 0 I b i d . , p.333. 8 1 I b i d . , p.327. 8 2 "GH", p.232. 8 3 "DC" , p.336. 8 4 I b i d . C o n v e r s a t i o n " , C u l t u r a l p.327. H e r e a f t e r t h i s a r t i c l e 154 CHAPTER FIVE A HERMENEUTICAL THEORY OF PLANNING B u i l d i n g on Gadamer and M i s g e l d H i s t o r i c a l l y hermeneutics has been h o s t i l e t o p l a n n i n g due to the l a t t e r ' s image as c e n t r a l i z e d r a t i o n a l management of s o c i e t y . But the f i e l d of p l a n n i n g has evolved. The ste r e o t y p e d image that i s s t i l l g e n e r a l l y h e l d i s no longer a c c e p t a b l e to most p l a n n i n g t h e o r i s t s today - p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n f l u e n c e d by s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s of p l a n n i n g . Hence hermeneutics and pla n n i n g do not have to be at odds. In f a c t we s h a l l show that hermeneutics i s v a l u a b l e to the f i e l d of planning and can be extended i n t o t h i s f i e l d . On the other hand, we s h a l l argue that hermeneutics needs to i n c o r p o r a t e the i d e a of p l a n n i n g i f i t i s to f u l l y develop i t s p o t e n t i a l i n p o l i t i c s . Let us begin with the second p o i n t by reviewing the thoughts of Gadamer and M i s g e l d c o n c e r n i n g problem s o l v i n g i n contemporary i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . Gadamer's r e p u d i a t i o n of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g a p p l i e s to any systematic r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of s o c i e t y , be i t at the g l o b a l l e v e l or the l o c a l l e v e l ; i t e q u a l l y a p p l i e s to s e c t o r a l or smaller p r o j e c t s where techno c r a t s d e f i n e problems and f u r n i s h s o l u t i o n s i n the name of s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y . Gadamer c h a r a c t e r i z e s a 155 wholesome s o c i e t a l dynamic as an " o s c i l l a t i n g e q u i l i b r i u m " grounded i n c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . He c o n s i d e r s s e r i o u s s o c i e t a l problems to be an o f f s e t of balance to the e q u i l i b r i u m . The s o l u t i o n , he b e l i e v e s , i s to r e s t o r e the e q u i l i b r i u m through what he c a l l s the model of p i l o t i n g - a model he d i s c u s s e s i n general terms o n l y . I t appears that he has i n mind a new e q u i l i b r i u m t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as the o l d one. Gadamer does not address the i s s u e s of changing s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , needs and concerns. If the model of p i l o t i n g f a i l s to take these r e a l i t i e s i n t o account, or simply r e l e g a t e s them to the category of d i s t u r b a n c e s to the e q u i l i b r i u m , then i t d e f i n i t e l y i s inadequate f o r d e a l i n g with the r a p i d l y changing i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y today. F u r t h e r , Gadamer's view toward the r o l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i s ambivalent. I n t e l l e c t u a l s are to awaken consciousness, which i s the task of philosophy and presumably i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of p i l o t i n g . But i f consciousness i s the s e l f -understanding of people d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r everyday l i f e , then i t has l i t t l e to do with i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Gadamer seems to have posed the problem of i n t e l l e c t u a l s without being able to s o l v e i t . M i s g e l d upholds Gadamer's p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g , but r e f u s e s to share the l a t t e r ' s c o n f i d e n c e i n the v i a b i l i t y of p r e s e r v i n g t r a d i t i o n . M i s g e l d b e l i e v e s that a c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e "from w i t h i n " toward what i s handed down from the past can be an important p a r t of e l a b o r a t i n g t r a d i t i o n . In other words, t r a d i t i o n i s not simply p r e s e r v a t i o n of the past; i t seeks out new d i r e c t i o n s of development as w e l l . T h i s seeking 156 out of new d i r e c t i o n s i s by no means a r b i t r a r y ; i t i s based on experience i n l i f e . While Gadamer t h i n k s of s o c i e t y as a whole as belonging to a c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , M isgeld i s c a r e f u l to d i f f e r e n t i a t e s u b - c u l t u r e s w i t h i n the l a r g e r whole. Due to d i f f e r e n c e s i n e xperiences, s u b - c u l t u r e s are not always in harmony with the l a r g e r c u l t u r e . C e r t a i n s o c i a l groups may be t r a d i t i o n a l l y oppressed, e x p l o i t e d or excluded. They see no reason to preserve those aspects of t r a d i t i o n ; they s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t them; they search f o r new d i r e c t i o n s t h a t o f f e r l i b e r a t i o n from t h e i r m i s e r i e s . Since what counts as l i b e r a t i o n cannot be separated from p a r t i c i p a n t s ' own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t , the change process must be a c t i v e l y c a r r i e d out by those d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d . T h i s i s why M i s g e l d c o n s i d e r s the emergence of s o c i a l movements a good example i n hermeneutics. While s o c i a l movements are important change agents i n s o c i e t y , they cannot s o l v e a l l the s o c i e t a l problems. In p u r s u i t of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r g o a l s , d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l groups may run i n t o c o n f l i c t . T h i s o f t e n happens when v a r i o u s groups demand access to a common pool r e s o u r c e . The r a t h e r spontaneous a c t i v i t i e s of s o c i a l movements have to be supplemented by the more formal process of p l a n n i n g . Habermas has addressed the problem of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t . Yet h i s p r o p o s a l - the advocacy model and the p l a n n i n g approach based on i t - i s h i g h l y d i s p u t a b l e . When we c o n s i d e r a p l a n n i n g process, we should s e r i o u s l y take i n t o account the i s s u e s he attempts to grapple with, without endorsing h i s p r o p o s a l . We s h a l l argue that a theory of p l a n n i n g which b u i l d s on the 157 thoughts of Gadamer and M i s g e l d would be more s a t i s f a c t o r y when d e a l i n g with s i m i l a r i s s u e s . As we have i n d i c a t e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i s essay, at a ge n e r a l l e v e l , we c o n c e p t u a l i z e p l a n n i n g as an a c t i v i t y by which s o c i e t y s t e e r s i t s e l f , d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , toward a d e s i r a b l e f u t u r e . I t i s c l e a r that p l a n n i n g cannot proceed without an adequate knowledge of human problems, goals and ways to a t t a i n these g o a l s . A c c o r d i n g to the hermeneutical p o s i t i o n , human a c t i o n , g o a l s, s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and dynamics are a l l p a r t of the s e l f - f o r m a t i o n of mankind; i t maintains that these human a t t r i b u t e s are not to be t r e a t e d as n a t u r a l phenomena, and that i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e to explore them with the e m p i r i c a l -a n a l y t i c method which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . I f people i n v o l v e d i n p l a n n i n g r e a l i z e t h a t they and others have f e e l i n g and a s p i r a t i o n , are e x p r e s s i v e and c r e a t i v e beings, as opposed t o the view that they are o b j e c t s to be c o n t r o l l e d and manipulated f o r the purpose of e f f i c i e n t s o c i e t a l f u n c t i o n i n g , then they would see that the pl a n n i n g process i s compatible with the hermeneutical p o s i t i o n . I t i s apparent now why hermeneutics can be s i g n i f i c a n t to p l a n n i n g theory and p r a c t i c e . P l anning S i t u a t i o n as Hermeneutical S i t u a t i o n Before we proceed to examine the p e r t i n e n c e of hermeneutics i n p l a n n i n g , l e t us e s t a b l i s h the domain of our i n q u i r y . Comprehensive p l a n n i n g , with i t s systematic f o r m u l a t i o n of ends and means, to such an extent that no member of the p u b l i c knows how these would a f f e c t him or her i n p r a c t i c e , 1 i s n a t u r a l l y 158 a n t i t h e t i c a l to hermeneutical t h i n k i n g . Planning that i s based on a problem d e f i n e d by people other than those d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i s again i n i m i c a l to a p h i l o s o p h y s t r e s s i n g the p r i o r i t y of everyday l i f e . With these i n mind we s h a l l c o n f i n e our domain of i n q u i r y to a p a r t i c u l a r kind of s i t u a t i o n , which can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as f o l l o w s . F i r s t , l e t us assume a problem i s recognized by people whose l i v e s are a f f e c t e d or expected to be a f f e c t e d by the problem. 2 These people d e s i r e t o s o l v e the problem. Second, these people do not form a homogeneous whole: they p l a y d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l r o l e s and have p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . 3 For the convenience of our d i s c u s s i o n , l e t us assume these people are a number of s o c i a l groups r e p r e s e n t i n g v a r i o u s s o c i a l r o l e s and p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . T h i r d , no s i n g l e group i s able to s o l v e the problem u n i l a t e r a l l y . There may be a v a r i e t y of reasons f o r t h i s , i n c l u d i n g the l a c k of resources and o p p o s t i i o n of other groups. Hence some c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t i s deemed necessary. We s h a l l c a l l a s i t u a t i o n s a t i s f y i n g these c r i t e r i a a p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n . To the extent a problem i s d e f i n e d not o b j e c t i v e l y , but by people a f f e c t e d by i t , a s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d l i f e -world i s i m p l i e d i n t h i s n o t i o n of p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n . The way people d e f i n e the problem and f i g u r e out s o l u t i o n s to i t thus depends on t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . We s h a l l show that a p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n i s indeed a hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n , i n v o l v i n g a t e x t ( l i f e - w o r l d ) to be i n t e r p r e t e d by v a r i o u s people. One n o t i c e s there are d i f f e r e n c e s between the p l a n n i n g 159 s i t u a t i o n and the case of w r i t t e n t e x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In our d i s c u s s i o n of D i l t h e y ' s theory we a l r e a d y mentioned how i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the l i f e - w o r l d can f o l l o w the model of the w r i t t e n t e x t . There are two other d i f f e r e n c e s , however. F i r s t , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a w r i t t e n t e x t normally i n v o l v e s one i n t e r p r e t e r , whereas p l a n n i n g i n v o l v e s s e v e r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s . The p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n i n v a r i a b l y encounters what Donald Schon c a l l s the Rashomon e f f e c t , i n which "the same s t o r y , t o l d from the p o i n t of view of s e v e r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , fragments i n t o s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t and incompatible s t o r i e s " . " Seen t h i s way the p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n i s comparable to the case of a w r i t t e n t e x t i n t e r p r e t e d s imultaneously by s e v e r a l i n t e r p r e t e r s , who may not agree with one another. Second, when we say a w r i t t e n t e x t "speaks" we use the term m e t a p h o r i c a l l y ; but i n p l a n n i n g , p a r t i c i p a n t s a c t u a l l y speak as l i v i n g persons. As we have seen, Gadamer draws an analogy between t e x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and c o n v e r s a t i o n . Furthermore, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n cannot be separated from the i n t e n t i o n of problem s o l v i n g . T h i s corresponds to Gadamer's notion that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n are i n t e g r a l p a r t s of a s i n g l e h ermeneutical a c t . Hence the p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n can be.regarded as a complex v a r i a t i o n of w r i t t e n t e x t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t i s a hermeneutical s i t u a t i o n . 1 60 Problem of Nature In many pl a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n s u t i l i z a t i o n of n a t u r a l r esources ( i n the broad sense of p l a n t s , animals, m i n e r a l s , water, a i r , space and time) i s an important i s s u e . What aspect of nature counts as a resource, from a hermeneutical p e r s p e c t i v e , i s c u l t u r a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y d e f i n e d . The same o b j e c t may have d i f f e r e n t meanings and co n s i d e r e d d i f f e r e n t resources by d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l groups (an animal or p l a n t may be t r e a t e d as p o t e n t i a l food, b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l , or t r e a s u r e d as something a e s t h e t i c or even s a c r e d ) . In other p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n s nature may be l e s s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d , but i t i s not a category to be ne g l e c t e d . H i s t o r i c a l l y hermeneutics has p a i d l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to the concept of n a t u r e . D i l t h e y r e a l i z e d the fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s ; yet h i s study i s on the l a t t e r . For Gadamer, there i s a hermeneutical dimension i n both n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s . But again h i s a n a l y s i s focuses on the l a t t e r . Misgeld has not d i s c u s s e d t h i s i s s u e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between mankind and nature remains an undeveloped n o t i o n i n hermeneutics. The concept of nature underwent c o n s i d e r a b l e development from Hegel through Marx to c r i t i c s of Marx. Hermeneutics can probably l e a r n something from the Marxian h e r i t a g e . Both Hegel and Marx maintained that there are laws of nature independent of human knowledge of them. These laws are o p e r a t i v e i n a l l c u l t u r e s and i n a l l stages of h i s t o r y . As opposed to "laws of the l a n d " , which are not a b s o l u t e , but "something p o s i t e d , something o r i g i n a t e d by men",5 Hegel p o i n t e d 161 out: The laws of nature simply are what they are and are v a l i d as they are; they are not l i a b l e to encroachment, though i n c e r t a i n cases man may t r a n s g r e s s them. To know the laws of nature, we must l e a r n to know nature, s i n c e i t s laws are r i g i d and i t i s onl y our ideas about them that can be f a l s e . 6 S i m i l a r l y Marx a s s e r t e d : No n a t u r a l laws can be done away with. What can change i n h i s t o r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t circumstances i s only the form i n which these laws a s s e r t themselves. 7 Thus the laws of nature, i n c l u d i n g those d i s c o v e r e d i n p h y s i c s , chemistry and b i o l o g y , l i m i t what humans can do. But these laws do not determine human a c t i v i t i e s : the l a t t e r are shaped by c u l t u r e and h i s t o r y subject to the c o n s t r a i n t s of the former. I m p l i c i t l y Hegel and Marx demarcated the realm of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s from t h a t of human s c i e n c e s . In a d d i t i o n , Marx p a i d c l o s e a t t e n t i o n to the human p h y s i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l requirements, which Hegel v i r t u a l l y i g n o r e d . For Marx, not only does human e x i s t e n c e depend on nature, the meaning of l i f e i s l i n k e d t o i t as w e l l : P l a n t s , animals, m i n e r a l s , a i r , l i g h t , e t c . c o n s t i t u t e , from the t h e o r e t i c a l aspect, a p a r t of human consciousness as o b j e c t s of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e and a r t ; they are man's s p i r i t u a l i n o r g a n i c nature, h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l means of l i f e , which he must f i r s t prepare f o r enjoyment and p e r p e t u a t i o n . So a l s o , from the p r a c t i c a l a spect, they form a p a r t of human l i f e and a c t i v i t y . In p r a c t i c e man l i v e s only from these n a t u r a l products, whether i n the form of food, h e a t i n g , c l o t h i n g , housing, etc Nature i s the i n o r g a n i c body of man; that i s to say nature, e x c l u d i n g the human body i t s e l f . To say that man l i v e s from nature means that nature i s h i s body with which he must remain i n a continuous interchange i n order not to d i e . The statement that the p h y s i c a l and mental l i f e of man, and nature, are interdepend-ent means simply that nature i s interdependent with i t s e l f , f o r man i s a p a r t of n a t u r e . 8 162 I t i s c l e a r t h a t Marx p e r c e i v e d the i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between mankind and the r e s t of nature. He s t r e s s e d the r o l e of nature i n m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n : nature i s p o t e n t i a l s o c i a l wealth w a i t i n g t o be transformed by s o c i a l l a b o r . 9 T r e a t i n g nature e x c l u s i v e l y i n terms of p r o d u c t i o n and consumption, however, i s an a t t i t u d e p e c u l i a r to c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y : For the f i r s t time, nature becomes p u r e l y an o b j e c t f o r mankind, p u r e l y a matter of u t i l i t y ; ceases to be r e c o g n i z e d as a power for i t s e l f C a p i t a l d r i v e s beyond n a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s and p r e j u d i c e s as much as beyond nature worship, as w e l l as a l l t r a d i t i o n a l , c o n f i n e d , complacent, encrusted s a t i s f a c t i o n s of present needs, and r e p r o d u c t i o n s of o l d ways of l i f e . 1 0 Marx b e l i e v e d that i n c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y , producers would " r a t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e t h e i r interchange with n a t u r e " . 1 1 He i m p l i e d t h a t the i s s u e of nature-human r e l a t i o n would be a u t o m a t i c a l l y s e t t l e d with the emergence of s o c i a l i z e d p r o d u c t i o n . Marx d i d not a n t i c i p a t e the environmental c r i s i s or the dwindling of n a t u r a l resources which are g e n e r a l l y re c o g n i z e d as major problems i n contemporary i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . Even a c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y i s not immune a g a i n s t these p r o b l e m s . 1 2 Habermas p e r c e i v e s nature mainly i n i t s c a p a c i t y f o r s a t i s f y i n g human m a t e r i a l needs: by c o n t r o l l i n g nature mankind l i b e r a t e s i t s e l f from nature imposed s u f f e r i n g s . Perhaps to a g r e a t e r degree than Marx, Habermas views nature i n terms of m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n and consumption. 1 3 Preoccupied with d i s t o r t e d communication, he leaves t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s on i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n toward nature e s s e n t i a l l y untouched. Presumably j u s t i f i c a t i o n of s o c i a l norms would s e t t l e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between mankind and nature i n a d d i t i o n to those 1 6 3 among humans. Habermas has not gone beyond Marx as f a r as the concept of nature i s concerned. 1" The a b i l i t y of Habermas' theory i n d e a l i n g with c u r r e n t environmental and n a t u r a l resource problems has been s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n e d . 1 5 An a n a l y s i s of d e f i c i e n c i e s i n Marx's concept of nature would shed l i g h t on Habermas' case. I t would a l s o h e l p develop a concept of nature i n hermeneutics. Marx's concept can be improved i n at l e a s t two r e s p e c t s . F i r s t of a l l , i t should take i n t o account e c o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s among l i v i n g t h i n g s and t h e i r b i o - p h y s i c a l environments. There are e c o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s governing nature as much as p h y s i c a l and chemical ones. In a d d i t i o n to human b i o l o g i c a l requirements, i t i s necessary to i n c l u d e e c o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s as laws of n a t u r e . 1 6 C o n s i d e r i n g Marx's s o p h i s t i c a t e d view of the nature-human r e l a t i o n , he probably would have done so i f ecology had been widely d i s c u s s e d back i n h i s days. The second p o i n t i s r e l a t e d to the f i r s t one, and i s no l e s s important. The amount of n a t u r a l resources a v a i l a b l e i s l i m i t e d (e.g. c l e a n a i r , c l e a n water, hydro power, a r a b l e l a n d ) . Besides, non-renewable resources are not r e p l a c e a b l e once they are d e p l e t e d or d e s t r o y e d (e.g. m i n e r a l s , f o s s i l f u e l s , n a t u r a l landscape, endangered s p e c i e s ) . D e s p i t e Marx's emphasis that nature i s p o t e n t i a l s o c i a l wealth, he f o r g o t that a c e r t a i n q u a n t i t y of n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l i s r e q u i r e d f o r m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n and t h a t the q u a n t i t y i s l i m i t e d . 1 7 Marx's c o n c e p t u a l framework presents no major problems p r o v i d e d that n a t u r a l resources are abundant r e l a t i v e to the demands of s o c i e t y and that the 1 64 e c o l o g i c a l balance i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r e d . T h i s i s no longer the case i n contemporary i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . Hence one must take i n t o account not merely how s o c i a l l a b o r transforms nature f o r the purpose of m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n , but what the changing nature means to s o c i e t y . Marx was always aware of the f a c t that s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g i s more than m a t e r i a l c o nsumption. 1 8 He r e a l i z e d that a r t i s t i c , i n t e l l e c t u a l and r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t i e s as w e l l as p l a i n o l d t r a d i t i o n a l ways of l i f e depend on nature f o r r e s o u rces, although he was not sympathetic t o a l l t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . At any r a t e , i t i s c l e a r that a s o c i e t y s o l e l y concerned with t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of nature f o r the sake of m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n may dry up the sources of m a t e r i a l as w e l l as non-material a s p e c t s of s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g . Recognizing the s i g n i f i c a n c e of e c o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and the q u a n t i t y of n a t u r a l resources a v a i l a b l e i s not the same as saying these f a c t o r s are to be used to determine how people should l i v e . No more than other laws of nature, e c o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s do not d i c t a t e a s p e c i f i c way of l i f e . The l a c k or a n t i c i p a t e d lack of c e r t a i n n a t u r a l resources does not mean there i s b a s i c a l l y only one a l t e r n a t i v e f o r s o c i e t y . Furthermore, r e c o g n i z i n g n a t u r a l f a c t o r s by no means i m p l i e s that nature has an " e n d - i n - i t s e l f " so that humans must f i t themselves i n t o the grand scheme of n a t u r e . 1 9 E n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s are wont to say: "There i s no such t h i n g as a f r e e l u n c h " which means "every gain i s won a t some c o s t " . 2 0 But what i s a gain and what co s t i s acceptable? There are no u n i v e r s a l or e t e r n a l answers. "Gain" and " c o s t " are a b s t r a c t 1 65 n o t i o n s ; they a c q u i r e p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e only when i n t e r p r e t e d i n concrete terms. From a hermeneutical p e r s p e c t i v e , a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are governed by c u l t u r e and h i s t o r y . The very i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a substance as a s p e c i f i c resource has a l r e a d y presupposed a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l framework. Questions of " g a i n " and " c o s t " are by no means t e c h n i c a l ones. Laws of nature and q u a n t i t y of n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l s merely e s t a b l i s h the m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s which humans cannot transcend. Within such c o n s t r a i n t s , c u l t u r e and h i s t o r y p l a y c r u c i a l r o l e s i n shaping the way people a c t u a l l y l i v e . 2 1 Marx a l s o c o n s i d e r e d n a t u r a l f a c t o r s to be m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s - not determinants - of human l i f e . T h i s was seen to be so even at the su b s i s t e n c e l e v e l : The way i n which men produce t h e i r means of sub s i s t e n c e depends f i r s t of a l l on the nature of the a c t u a l means of s u b s i s t e n c e they f i n d i n e x i s t e n c e and have to reproduce. T h i s mode of pr o d u c t i o n must not be c o n s i d e r e d simply as being the p r o d u c t i o n of the p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e of the i n d i v i d u a l s . Rather i t i s a d e f i n i t e form of a c t i v i t y of these i n d i v i d u a l s , a d e f i n i t e form of exp r e s s i n g t h e i r l i f e , a d e f i n i t e mode of l i f e on t h e i r p a r t . 2 2 Though knowledge of m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s has expanded s i n c e the days of Marx, h i s o b s e r v a t i o n that each people expresses i t s e l f i n i t s own manner remains an i n v a l u a b l e i n s i g h t up to t h i s day. Ne i t h e r Habermas nor hermeneutics has s t u d i e d the i m p l i c a t i o n s of m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s i n the f a s h i o n d i s c u s s e d above. Yet a g e n e r a l i z e d Marxian concept of nature can be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o hermeneutics as long as the realm of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s does not c o l l a p s e i n t o that of human s c i e n c e s . 2 3 I f we look beyond Marx's i n t r i c a t e a n a l y s i s of d i f f e r e n t stages of 166 h i s t o r y we see that Marx and hermeneutics share the view that the c u l t u r e of a people at any p o i n t of h i s t o r y i s a product of t r a d i t i o n . Taking nature i n t o account, hermeneutics would argue that people c o n t i n u o u s l y i n t e r p r e t and r e - i n t e r p r e t t h e i r knowledge of m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s i n the context of t h e i r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . On the other hand, knowledge of m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s a l s o i n f l u e n c e s the way people judge the adequacy of t h e i r e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e . A p p r o p r i a t e s o c i a l change would then be pursued. To put i t d i f f e r e n t l y , hermeneutics denies that c u l t u r e can be s y n t h e s i z e d on the b a s i s of d e t a i l knowledge of how nature operates and what c o n d i t i o n nature i s i n . An attempt to c r e a t e an i d e a l c u l t u r e i n a t e c h n o c r a t i c manner would only s t r i p humans of t h e i r humanity. Instead of f o r s a k i n g c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , hermeneutics encourages people to b u i l d on t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n , r e f l e c t c o n s t a n t l y on m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s and be c r e a t i v e w i t h i n such c o n s t r a i n t s . Through a continuous s e l f -formative process of p r e s e r v a t i o n , c a n c e l l a t i o n and transcendence, people can meet the demands of nature and at the same time l e a d a meaningful l i f e . 2 * I n t e r a c t i o n of S o c i a l Groups Gadamer and M i s g e l d have l a i d out much of the foundation i n d i s p e n s a b l e to a p l a n n i n g theory that adopts a hermeneutical p o i n t of view. However, n e i t h e r one of them has e x p l i c i t l y analyzed the case of a t e x t ( l i f e - w o r l d ) i n t e r p r e t e d simultaneously by d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s , although M i s g e l d ' s w r i t i n g r e g a r d i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n and d i s c o u r s e p o i n t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . 167 S i n c e the phenomenon of s e v e r a l p a r t i e s d e a l i n g with the same problem i s c r u c i a l t o a p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n , i t behooves us to f u r t h e r explore i t . The f o l l o w i n g i s a t e n t a t i v e a n a l y s i s of the nature of p l a n n i n g based on hermeneutical p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s an example to i l l u s t r a t e what a hermeneutical theory of p l a n n i n g might be concerned with. We s h a l l focus our a t t e n t i o n on i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n of s o c i a l groups, the r o l e of planners and the r o l e of e x p e r t s . If no s i n g l e group can s o l v e a given problem u n i l a t e r a l l y , then some kind of agreement among groups i s r e q u i s i t e before a c t i o n s are c a r r i e d out. Let us c a l l the a c t i o n s based on agreement planned a c t i o n s . 2 5 L a t e r we s h a l l show t h a t planned a c t i o n s alone do not s o l v e a l l s o c i e t a l problems; they must be embedded in a s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n a r y framework. In other words, planned a c t i o n s are necessary, but i n s u f f i c i e n t , f o r d e s i r a b l e s o c i a l change. The way one p e r c e i v e s what planned a c t i o n s are a p p r o p r i a t e depends on one's understanding of both the problem and the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the proposed course of a c t i o n . And s i n c e the groups i n v o l v e d must l i v e with the consequences of the planned a c t i o n s , t h e i r understanding - as d i s t i n c t from the understanding of some independent p a r t y - i s of prime importance. Now the e x i s t e n c e of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l r o l e s and p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s i m p l i e s the lack of u n i f o r m i t y i n prejudgments among the groups: each group d e f i n e s the problem i n i t s own way and p e r c e i v e s s o l u t i o n s to the problem i n i t s own way. In other words, each group i s c o n f i n e d to a l i m i t e d h o r i z o n , shaped by c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s as w e l l as 168 s o c i a l r o l e s and p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . Under such circumstances i t i s d i f f i c u l t to reach agreement. Only when there i s s u b s t a n t i a l o v e r l a p p i n g of h o r i z o n s would these groups have a reasonable common understanding of the problem and be i n a p o s i t i o n to d e a l with i t . An expansion of h o r i z o n i s thus an e s s e n t i a l component of a pl a n n i n g p r o c e s s . I n t e r a c t i o n among groups can be enhanced i f c o o r d i n a t e d by a p a r t y that has no s u b s t a n t i v e i n t e r e s t i n the problem. We can c a l l t h i s p a r t y p l a n n e r s . Hence a plan n e r ' s task i s to f a c i l i t a t e v a r i o u s groups to broaden t h e i r h o r i z o n s through i n t e r a c t i o n , u n t i l t h e i r inadequate h o r i z o n s become more adequate ones. In a plann i n g process e f f o r t i s made to reach an agreement of planned a c t i o n s . 2 6 In contemporary i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y many of the problems encountered i n p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n s i n c l u d e t e c h n i c a l components r e q u i r i n g knowledge i n n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s as w e l l as a p p l i e d f i e l d s (such as economics, ecology, e n g i n e e r i n g , law). The s o c i a l groups i n v o l v e d i n a p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n may not have the t e c h n i c a l knowledge background to analyze t h e i r problem p r o p e r l y . They need advice from e x p e r t s . Experts are people r e c o g n i z e d f o r t h e i r s u p e r i o r knowledge i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e f i e l d s . 2 7 As long as knowledge i s not taken to be f r e e from prejudgments, there i s no reason s o c i a l groups should adopt e x p e r t s ' views without r e s e r v a t i o n . Hence groups l e a r n from e x p e r t s through expansions of h o r i z o n s : they q u e s t i o n experts when they become s u s p i c i o u s and a s s i m i l a t e ideas that make sense to themselves. 169 S o c i a l t h e o r i s t s can be c o n s i d e r e d a type of expert as w e l l . They o f f e r a l t e r n a t i v e views of s o c i e t y based on t h e i r a nalyses of the given s i t u a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the nature-human r e l a t i o n and the r e l a t i o n among humans. While t e c h n i c a l experts are engaged i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d s p e c i f i c areas of s o c i a l f u n c t i o n i n g , s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s are concerned with the s o c i a l t o t a l i t y . As Paul Piccone puts i t , the r a t i o n a l i t y of the former i s "only i n s t r u m e n t a l i n c h a r a c t e r " ; i t r e q u i r e s the l a t t e r to t a c k l e " s u b s t a n t i a l q u e s t i o n s of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n " . 2 8 In hermeneutical t h i n k i n g s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s do not a c t i n the c a p a c i t y of t h e r a p i s t s or advocates. Agnes H e l l e r keenly observes: In the f r e e market system, the theory comes to the f r e e market, too; people take i t or leave i t , make use of i t or n e g l e c t i t a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own needs. 2 9 People do not have to adopt one of the f i n i t e number of t h e o r i e s presented t o them. Those w i l l i n g to thi n k o f t e n e x t r a c t ideas from t h e o r i e s i n order t o enhance t h e i r understanding of the s i t u a t i o n . But even i n a f r e e market the s e l e c t i o n of ideas i s by no means a r b i t r a r y : i t i s governed by these people's prejudgments. In the M a r x i s t t r a d i t i o n , ever s i n c e L e n i n , there has been a concern with the problem of s p o n t a n e i t y . For Len i n , " s p o n t a n e i t y " i s the a t t i t u d e adopted and a c t i o n taken by the p r o l e t a r i a t as a r e s u l t of th e i r - own expe r i e n c e s . Spontaneity l e a d s to trade unionism w i t h i n a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y r a t h e r than a r e v o l u t i o n that g i v e s b i r t h to s o c i a l i s m . The s o l u t i o n , 170 a c c o r d i n g to Len i n , i s to have i n t e l l e c t u a l s develop a theory and implant i t i n t o the heads of the p r o l e t a r i a t . 3 0 C r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s are not f o l l o w e r s of L e n i n . They recognize the problem of spontaneity but do not accept Lenin's s o l u t i o n . Herbert Marcuse contends: "The primary l i b e r a t i o n cannot be 'spontaneous' because such spontaneity would only express the values and goals d e r i v e d from the e s t a b l i s h e d s y s t e m . " 3 1 Marcuse o f f e r s no s p e c i f i c approach; h i s view toward the f u t u r e i s e s s e n t i a l l y p e s s i m i s t i c . Habermas probably agrees with Marcuse's remark. The advocacy model i s Habermas' answer t o the problem of sp o n t a n e i t y . I t d i f f e r s from Leninism i n two major r e s p e c t s . F i r s t , while Lenin takes h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l s ' theory to be v a l i d without any feedback from the p r o l e t a r i a t , Habermas' advocate r e q u i r e s c o n f i r m a t i o n and acceptance from s o c i a l groups a f t e r t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s before the h y p o t h e t i c a l theory i s c o n s i d e r e d v a l i d . Second, while the l e g i t i m a c y of L e n i n i s t theory i s based on the i n t e l l e c t u a l s ' p o s i t i o n s i n the vanguard p a r t y , which i s supposed to think and a c t on behalf of the p r o l e t a r i a t , the c r e d i b i l i t y of the advocate's hypotheses r e s t s on r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s , which are h e l d to be o b j e c t i v e and u n i v e r s a l . T h i s way Habermas b e l i e v e s he can p r o t e c t h i m s e l f from a c c u s a t i o n s of L e n i n i s t p r o c l i v i t i e s . 3 2 But s t i l l , he r e l i e s too h e a v i l y on i n t e l l e c t u a l s ; he le a v e s v i r t u a l l y no room f o r the s o c i a l groups' own ideas d e r i v e d from t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l i f e - w o r l d s . One does not have to be a M a r x i s t to be concerned with the problem of s p o n t a n e i t y . Marcuse's comment probably makes some 171 sense to anyone who does not take the s t a t u s quo f o r granted. In t r e a t i n g s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s as e x p e r t s , the way i t was d e s c r i b e d above, we b e l i e v e i t i s p o s s i b l e to address the problem of spontaneity without e s t a b l i s h i n g the hegemony of i n t e l l e c t u a l s . S o c i a l t h e o r i s t s qua experts need not impose p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r i e s on s o c i a l groups. I t i s understood that they o f f e r a l t e r n a t i v e views of s o c i e t y based on t h e i r e x p e r t i s e i n t h i s f i e l d of knowledge. Thus we have seen that i n a p l a n n i n g process each s o c i a l group expands i t s h o r i z o n toward two d i r e c t i o n s : the experts and the other s o c i a l groups. In doing so, each group p e r c e i v e s the s i t u a t i o n i n a broader context. The i n t e n t i o n of a p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s , from a hermeneutical p e r s p e c t i v e , i s to h e l p s o c i a l groups to become b e t t e r equipped to solve t h e i r common problem. In order to take a c l o s e r look at the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of the groups and the common problem they encounter, l e t us borrow a b e a u t i f u l passage from B e r t e l l Oilman, who i s i n t e r p r e t i n g Marx: A l l i n d i v i d u a l s who s e r v i c e one another through the d i v i s i o n of l a b o r share a communal i n t e r e s t by v i r t u e of t h e i r interdependence However, the same d i v i s i o n of labor which e s t a b l i s h e s the communal i n t e r e s t a l s o c r e a t e s a host of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s i n the s p e c i a l i z e d t a s k s which f a l l i n t o d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s Now, i t happens that i n p u r s u i n g t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s i n d i v i d u a l s l o s e s i g h t of the communal one The r e s u l t i s , though i t i s c r e a t u r e of t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l s are only c o n s c i o u s of the community when they come i n t o c o n f l i c t with i t , when they are r e s t r i c t e d i n t h e i r attempt to s a t i s f y p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s With the communal i n t e r e s t l o s t behind a host of competing p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s , s o c i e t y becomes a b a t t l e g r o u n d . People experience o t h e r s only by s t r u g g l i n g a g a i n s t them. 3 3 172 We may not a t t r i b u t e p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s s o l e l y to a d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , we may d i s a g r e e with Marx's c o n c l u s i o n s i n h i s m a t e r i a l i s t ' s conception of h i s t o r y , and we may not share h i s optimism t h a t s t r u g g l e s among groups can someday be e l i m i n a t e d , yet we do a p p r e c i a t e Oilman's passage f o r p l a c i n g the p l a n n i n g process i n p e r s p e c t i v e - without h i s i n t e n t i o n to do so. What Marx reminds us i s that s o c i a l groups do not l i v e i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i s o l a t e d worlds. The emergence of a common problem -i n c l u d i n g c o n f l i c t s - i s a symptom of t h e i r s t r a y i n g from the interdependence that has been taken f o r granted. Given the task to s o l v e a problem together, as i n a planning s i t u a t i o n , s o c i a l groups would have to re-examine t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s i n the context of the l a r g e r whole. And we can say with Gadamer that the s i t u a t i o n " i n v o l v e s the attainment of a higher u n i v e r s a l i t y t h at overcomes, not only our own p a r t i c u l a r i t y , but a l s o t h a t of the o t h e r " . 3 " But t h i s happens on l y when people are w i l l i n g to open up t h e i r minds to l i s t e n to o t h e r s , or as Gadamer puts i t , "to experience the Thou t r u l y as a T hou". 3 5 In t h i s r e s p e c t planners can probably help, s i n c e t h e i r l a c k of s u b s t a n t i v e i n t e r e s t s spares them from the antagonism and d i s t r u s t t h a t u s u a l l y e x i s t among groups i n a p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n . A t t a i n i n g a higher l e v e l of u n i v e r s a l i t y does not mean a l l group c o n f l i c t s w i l l be r e s o l v e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y , i t only means people can see i s s u e s and s o l u t i o n s more c l e a r l y than b e f o r e . An agreement on planned a c t i o n s may or may not be reached. Temporary compromises may be necessary. Any expansion of h o r i z o n 173 i s s t i l l f i n i t e ; i t never reaches an absolute l e v e l . For these reasons one cannot expect p l a n n i n g to s o l v e s o c i e t a l problems once and f o r a l l . D i f f e r e n t problems crop up from time to time, so that p l a n n i n g i s an e x e r c i s e that never becomes o b s o l e t e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , good p l a n n i n g can reduce human s u f f e r i n g , encourage c o o p e r a t i o n and r e k i n d l e the human s p i r i t . P l a n n i n g , S o c i a l L e a r n i n g and S o c i a l E v o l u t i o n A hermeneutical theory of p l a n n i n g can have f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences. One p o s s i b l e outcome i s a formal agreement on planned a c t i o n s , which sometimes c a r r i e s the weight of law. Perhaps more important are the i n f o r m a l s o c i a l changes that may occur as a r e s u l t of improved s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of goals as w e l l as meaningful and e f f e c t i v e ways to achieve these goals l e a r n e d through p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s e s . To t h i s extent, the o v e r a l l e f f e c t of p l a n n i n g i s s o c i a l l e a r n i n g . Seeing everyday l i f e i n a broader s o c i e t a l c o n t e x t , people may decide to change t h e i r own l i f e - s t y l e s , develop a b e t t e r sense of community, exp l o r e a l t e r n a t i v e modes of p r o d u c t i o n and consumption. They may a l s o stage a p r o t e s t , a g e n e r a l s t r i k e or perhaps even a r e v o l u t i o n , i f they are convinced these are a p p r o p r i a t e . 3 6 The Hegelian i n s i g h t of necessary embodiment of idea or meaning i n p r a c t i c e i s i n t e g r a l t o hermeneutics. Gadamer takes the d r i v i n g f o r c e of s o c i e t y to be c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n - a set of p r a c t i c e s handed down from the p a s t . He p o i n t s out that s e l f -r e f l e c t i o n or t h e o r i z i n g can never completely r e v e a l the ideas embodied i n p r a c t i c e . M i s g e l d l i k e w i s e s t r e s s e s the p r i o r i t y of 174 p r a c t i c e . In a d d i t i o n to l o o k i n g at s o c i e t y as a whole, he pays a t t e n t i o n to the m u l t i f a r i o u s ways d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l groups express themselves i n l i f e and the meanings embodied i n those ways of l i f e . T h i s Hegelian i n s i g h t can be extended i n t o s o c i a l l e a r n i n g i n g e n e r a l . S o c i a l l e a r n i n g permits a fundamental, yet o f t e n g r a dual, r e s t r u c t u r i n g of s o c i e t y and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of c u l t u r e to accomodate e v o l v i n g human a s p i r a t i o n s and the changing scene of the m a t e r i a l world (such as dwin d l i n g n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s ) . Many s o c i a l a c t i o n s taken may not be organized and goals may not be v e r b a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d . Much of the emerging consciousness i s embodied i n a new set of s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s t r a n s m i t t e d through everyday l i f e . When the new consciousness and p r a c t i c e s proceed i n a d i r e c t i o n i d e n t i f i a b l e as s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the c o n v e n t i o n a l or mainstream way of l i f e , they become a s o c i a l movement. A commonly accepted d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l movement i s "a c o l l e c t i v i t y a c t i n g with some c o n t i n u i t y to promote or r e s i s t a change i n the s o c i e t y or group of which i t i s a p a r t " . 3 7 T h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s compatible with the concept of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g d e s c r i b e d above. S o c i a l movements are c r u c i a l agents f o r s o c i a l change "from below". For they express what people b e l i e v e i n and what they need, not so much i n t h e o r e t i c a l terms as i n s o c i a l a c t i o n . E v e n t u a l l y , some of the p r a c t i c e s i n s o c i a l movements are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ; they become p a r t of the mainstream s o c i e t y . 3 8 But the d i r e c t i o n i n which s o c i a l l e a r n i n g or s o c i a l 175 movement takes may not be b e n e f i c i a l to any group i n the long run; and i t may not be b e n e f i c i a l to s o c i e t y as a whole. T h i s i s where p l a n n i n g comes i n . In a p l a n n i n g process, people l e a r n t o see t h e i r a c t i o n s and ideas i n a broader s o c i e t a l context, so that s o c i a l movements can become responsive to the needs of s o c i e t y as a whole. Planning seen i n the context of s o c i a l l e a r n i n g does not r e s t r i c t i t s e l f t o minor or moderate reforms w i t h i n an otherwise r i g i d i f i e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l system, as most advocates of l i b e r a l democracy tend to b e l i e v e i n , 3 9 nor i s i t c o n f i n e d to changes based on formal p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s which j u s t i f y norms. However, no matter how d r a s t i c the s o c i a l a c t i o n s might turn out to be, they are not performed under the d i r e c t i o n of a vanguard p a r t y . " 0 That i s why hermeneutical t h i n k i n g cannot be c a t e g o r i z e d as l i b e r a l , democratic s o c i a l i s t or M a r x i s t . S o c i a l l e a r n i n g i n f i l t r a t e s a l l aspects of l i f e ; i t does not begin with p l a n n i n g and i t does not end with p l a n n i n g . Good p l a n n i n g , however, can act as a c a t a l y s t f o r d e s i r a b l e s o c i a l change. I t should be c l e a r by now that the f o r m a l i t y of p l a n n i n g cannot s u b s t i t u t e the apparent chaos of s o c i a l movements. In f a c t , the two are complementary to each other i n the s e l f -formation of mankind. 1 76 Comparison with Habermas' Model The hermeneutical theory of p l a n n i n g suggested above i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the c r i t i c a l - r e c o n s t r u c t i v e approach t o plann i n g proposed by Habermas. In both cases, disagreement or p o t e n t i a l disagreement among groups i s the p o i n t of departure f o r p l a n n i n g . R e s o l u t i o n of disagreement i s the immediate goal and improving s o c i e t y i s the u l t i m a t e g o a l . But that i s where the s i m i l a r i t i e s end. The two t h e o r i e s d i f f e r i n t h e i r premises and proceed i n d i f f e r e n t manners. Many of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the two t h e o r i e s have been mentioned d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y . We s h a l l e l a b o r a t e on a few p o i n t s below. The c r i t i c a l - r e c o n s t r u c t i v e approach i s based on the assumption of the e x i s t e n c e of suppressed g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s . In the p l a n n i n g process the advocate t e n t a t i v e l y r e c o n s t r u c t s hidden i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s i n accordance with r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . When these are f i n a l i z e d through d i s c u s s i o n s , the i n t e r e s t s of a l l groups are supposed t o be p l a i n to view. The problem i s then to be s o l v e d on that b a s i s . From the hermeneutical p e r s p e c t i v e i t i s naive to b e l i e v e a s i t u a t i o n can be rendered t r a n s p a r e n t s i n c e prejudgments cannot be completely e l i m i n a t e d . The hermeneutical approach assumes groups are interdependent. Through i n t e r a c t i o n groups l e a r n from one another and from e x p e r t s . They g e n e r a l l y d i s c o v e r there i s an interdependence among them. But t h i s interdependence can never be f u l l y v e r b a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d or even be f u l l y known. The knowledge of interdependence m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n the way groups 1 77 attempt to s o l v e the problem. Habermas does not c l a r i f y the r o l e of t e c h n i c a l experts i n h i s model. Presumably they are i n v o l v e d i n s y s t e m s - t h e o r e t i c a n a l y s e s . I t appears that t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s are l e f t to experts and that s o c i a l groups only d i s c u s s i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s i n order to a p p r o p r i a t e or c r i t i c i z e t e c h n i c a l f i n d i n g s . In the hermeneutical approach, on the other hand, groups do not d i s c u s s i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s i n the a b s t r a c t form. Due to t h e i r d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l r o l e s , groups u s u a l l y have a g e n e r a l idea what t h e i r concerns and needs are. But i t i s o f t e n necessary to l e a r n from t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s and s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s to enhance t h e i r understanding of how the s i t u a t i o n a f f e c t s them and what a l t e r n a t i v e s are p l a u s i b l e . D i s c u s s i o n s i n v o l v e c o n c r e t e a c t i o n s f o r s o l v i n g the problem, the consequences and the f a i r n e s s of these a c t i o n s . With an improved knowledge base, groups can develop c r e a t i v e s o l u t i o n s to the problem. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine how a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n on i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n s - as proposed by Habermas - can generate a s o l u t i o n other than what i s already s p e c i f i e d i n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . The n o t i o n of p l a n n i n g i n c r i t i c a l theory r e s t s on the idea of s o c i e t a l p r o g r e s s to higher l e v e l s on the s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n a r y s c a l e . Stages of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n are r e v e a l e d i n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s . A hermeneutical theory of p l a n n i n g does not determine in advance what i s p r o g r e s s . Progress i s dependent upon people's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t ; i t does not conform to s c i e n t i f i c c r i t e r i a . In hermeneutics, s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n i s not t e l e o l o g i c a l , e i t h e r i n the sense of i n e v i t a b l e stages of development i n 178 h i s t o r y (as i n Hegel and Marx) or i n the sense of a u n i v e r s a l l o g i c of how s o c i e t y should develop from the lowest to the h i g h e s t l e v e l (as i n Habermas). The hermeneutical approach suggested above does not answer a l l q u e s t i o n s concerning a p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n . Obviously there i s much room f o r improvements. N e v e r t h e l e s s we b e l i e v e we have shown that i t i s a more s a t i s f a c t o r y and r e a l i s t i c approach than what Habermas proposes. NOTES See A . A l t s h u l e r , "The Goals of Comprehensive Planning", J o u r n a l of the American I n s t i t u t e of Planners, vol.31, pp.186-95, 1965. The term "comprehensive p l a n n i n g " has been d e f i n e d i n more than one way. Cf. J.Friedmann, "A Response to A l t s h u l e r : Comprehensive Planning as a Process", J o u r n a l  of the American I n s t i t u t e of Planners, v o l . 3 1 , pp.195-7, 1965. What we are concerned here i s a p a r t i c u l a r concept A l t s h u l e r d i s c u s s e s i n h i s paper, not the v a r i o u s usages of the term. We use the word "problem" here i n a n e u t r a l sense. I t does not have to connote something u n d e s i r a b l e ; i t c o u l d be an o p p o r t u n i t y , a c h a l l e n g e . B a s i c a l l y a problem i s a s o c i e t a l i s s u e people are i n t e r e s t e d i n d e a l i n g w i t h . We use the word " i n t e r e s t " i n the general sense of concern and need, not the s p e c i f i c sense i n Habermas' d e f i n i t i o n . D.Schon, Beyond the Stable S t a t e , New York: Norton, 1971, p.210. G.W.F.Hegel, Philosophy of R i g h t , Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952, p.224. I b i d . K.Marx, "Marx to L.Kugelmann, J u l y 11, 1868", i n K a r l Marx  and F r e d e r i c k E n g e l s : S e l e c t e d Correspondence, Moscow: 179 F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1953, p.251. "1844 MSS", pp.126-7. See e.g. C a p i t a l , o p . c i t . , v o l . 1 , pp.173ff; and, C r i t i q u e  of the Gotha Program, Moscow: Fo r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, 1959, pp.14f. K.Marx, G r u n d r i s s e , New York: V i n t a g e , 1973, p.410. C a p i t a l , o p . c i t • , v o l . 3 , p.820. Cf. W.Leiss' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n of Marx's concept of nature, i n The Domination of Nature, New York: George B r a z i l l e r , 1972, pp.81-6. Cf. KHI_, pp.25-42. Habermas has mentioned that the " e c o l o g i c a l balance d e s i g n a t e s an a b s o l u t e l i m i t to growth" i n con n e c t i o n with h i s a n a l y s i s of c r i s i s tendencies i n advanced c a p i t a l i s m . But he seems to t r e a t the environmental c r i s i s as something p e c u l i a r to c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . He i m p l i e s t h a t he agrees with Marx: s o c i a l i z e d p r o d u c t i o n would r e s o l v e the issue of nature-human r e l a t i o n (see LC, pp.41-3). Cf. J.Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature i n Habermas", T e l o s , no.40, pp.41-69, 1979. W.Leiss p o i n t s out, ever s i n c e the Enlightenment, indus-t r i a l s o c i e t y has been i n c r e a s i n g i t s c o n t r o l over nature. Although the term c o n t r o l of nature may be n e u t r a l , i t o f t e n connotes domination, manipulation and e x p l o i t a t i o n . The concept of i n t e r a c t i o n i s more a p p r o p r i a t e as f a r as the nature-human.relation i s conerned. A t t e n t i o n to e c o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s p l a c e s t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n i n a b e t t e r p e r s p e c t i v e . See The Domination of Nature, o p . c i t . E.F.Schumacher succumbs to the popular misconception that Marx t r e a t e d "as v a l u e l e s s e v e r y t h i n g that we have not made o u r s e l v e s " (Small Is B e a u t i f u l , London: Abacus, 1973, p. 1 1 ). In C r i t i q u e of the Gotha Program Marx argued s p e c i f i c a l l y how v a l u a b l e i s nature. What Marx f o r g o t was the q u a n t i t y of resource, e s p e c i a l l y non-renewable resourc e , a v a i l a b l e i n nature. In t h i s sense Schumacher's remark i s p a r t i a l l y c o r r e c t . A n t h r o p o l o g i s t M a r s h a l l S a h l i n s goes f u r t h e r than Marx. Based on e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s on hunters and g a t h e r e r s , he argues that these people are a f f l u e n t d e s p i t e t h e i r low m a t e r i a l consumption. These people have low e x p e c t a t i o n s on m a t e r i a l goods which can r e a d i l y be met by t h e i r mode of p r o d u c t i o n . That way of l i f e i s meaningful t o them. S a h l i n s d e c l a r e s that poverty i s above a l l "a r e l a t i o n between 180 people ... a s o c i a l s t a t u s . As such i t i s the i n v e n t i o n of c i v i l i z a t i o n " (Stone Age Economics, Chicago and New York: A l d i n e . A t h e r t o n , 1972, p.37). J.Whitebook c r i t i c i z e s Habermas f o r h i s lack of a n a t u r a l i s t i c e t h i c with the r e s u l t t h at the l a t t e r cannot d e a l with the environmental c r i s i s . Whitebook i n d i c a t e s that Habermas' "communicative e t h i c s r e p r e s e n t s a v a r i a t i o n on the a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c theme i n that i t maintains that man, by v i r t u e of h i s communicative c a p a c i t y , i s the only v a l u e -b e a r i n g being that can be i d e n t i f i e d . Thus, communicative e t h i c s , as a form of anthropocentrism, r u l e s out any conc e p t i o n of nature as an 'end i n i t s e l f Habermas' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l stance prevents the s o r t of d i r e c t access to nature that would make any c l a i m f o r nature as an end-in-i t s e l f p o s s i b l e " (Whitebook, o p . c i t . , pp.52-3). A review of i n f l u e n t i a l l i t e r a t u r e on environmental i s s u e s shows the main concerns are human s u r v i v a l and human q u a l i t y of l i f e i n a broad sense. Cf. R.Carson, S i l e n t S p r i n g , Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1962; G.Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Scien c e , vol.162, pp.1243-8, 1968; B.Commoner, The C l o s i n g C i r c l e , New York: Bantam, 1971; D.Meadows et a l , The L i m i t s to Growth, New York: S i g n e t , 1972; and, G . T . M i l l e r , L i v i n g i n the Environment, Belmont, C a l i f . : Wadsworth, 1975. Whitebook does not seem to r e a l i z e that even " r e s p e c t f o r nature" and " l i v i n g i n harmony with nature" are human a t t i t u d e s , which are governed by s o c i a l norms; they are a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c , i n the sense Whitebook uses the term. B.Commoner, o p . c i t . , pp.41-2. M.Sahlins p r o v i d e s some of the best arguments and e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s i n support of t h i s p o s i t i o n . He concludes that " c u l t u r e must conform to m a t e r i a l c o n s t r a i n t s , but ... i t does so a c c o r d i n g to a d e f i n i t e symbolic scheme which i s never the only one p o s s i b l e " ( C u l t u r e and P r a c t i c a l Reason, Chicago and London: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1976, p . v i i i ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the s t r u c t u r a l i s t c o n c e p t u a l framework that S a h l i n s b u i l d s on tends to be too r i g i d : i t c o n f i n e s the study of c u l t u r e t o s p e c i f i c forms and o r d e r s . I t s emphasis on the "s y n c h r o n i c " at the expense of the " d i a c h r o n i c " a l s o runs i n t o d i f f i c u l t y when e x p l a i n i n g s o c i a l change. S a h l i n s does not c l a r i f y how he can overcome these d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n s t r u c t u r a l i s m . Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, o p . c i t . , p.42. In the extreme case of R i c h a r d Rorty, who a l s o c a l l s h i s theory hermeneutics, the d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and human s c i e n c e s i s e l i m i n a t e d . Nature i s no longer taken s e r i o u s l y . Problem s o l v i n g becomes nothing but "the c o n v e r s a t i o n of mankind"; i t re f u s e s to take i n t o account the nature-human r e l a t i o n . Rorty's r e d u c t i o n i s m cannot 181 p o s s i b l y d e a l with most p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n s . See Rorty, Philosophy and the M i r r o r of Nature, P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979. W.Leiss p r e s e n t s a p a r a l l e l argument f o r what he c a l l s a "negative theory of needs". According t o him, t h i s theory i s "negative i n the sense that i t r e f r a i n s from d e f i n i n g the c a t e g o r i e s that might be a p p r o p r i a t e to a coherent network of needs. Only the i n d i v i d u a l s and groups who d i s c o v e r f o r themselves the inadequacy of the e x i s t i n g system can p r o v i d e those c a t e g o r i e s " (The L i m i t s to  S a t i s f a c t i o n , Toronto and B u f f a l o : U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto P r e s s , 1976, pp.101-2). Let us d e s c r i b e a s i m p l i f i e d r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s : t h e r e i s a p l a n n i n g stage, which produces a p l a n ; and then t h e r e i s an implementation stage, which puts the plan i n t o a c t i o n . The implementation of a plan i s a type of planned a c t i o n . In our case, planned a c t i o n i s not c o n f i n e d t o the narrow sense of implementation of an o f f i c i a l p l a n . What we c a l l an agreement on planned a c t i o n s roughly corresponds to a plan i n the r a t i o n a l model; i t a l s o corresponds to j u s t i f i a b l e norms i n Habermas' advocacy model. But these three are not i d e n t i c a l concepts. An agreement on planned a c t i o n s , a p l a n , and j u s t i f i e d norms are a r r i v e d at through d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s . What they have i n common i s that they a l l serve as a b a s i s f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n p r i o r to the a c t i o n i t s e l f . There i s no i n t r i n s i c n e c e s s i t y that every p l a n n i n g s i t u a t i o n would lead to an agreement on planned a c t i o n s . The need f o r c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t does not e n t a i l c o o p e r a t i o n would always take p l a c e . For example, Marx argued that i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , r e s o l u t i o n of c l a s s c o n f l i c t s r e q u i r e s nothing short of a p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n . Even i f we di s a g r e e w i t h Marx's a n a l y s i s , there i s no reason t o assume that an agreement can be reached among s o c i a l groups. For the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e may be opp r e s s i v e toward c e r t a i n groups. If oppressors i n s i s t to remain oppressors, an agreement i s u n l i k e l y w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , we s h a l l argue that a plan n i n g process, as a s o c i a l l e a r n i n g process, can be b e n e f i c i a l to s o c i e t y whether an agreement i s reached or not. What we c a l l experts here correspond to what Gadamer c a l l s a u t h o r i t i e s . S ince the term a u t h o r i t y o f t e n connotes power and domination, we p r e f e r to use the term expert which does not have such a c o n n o t a t i o n . "Symposium: The Role of the I n t e l l e c t u a l i n the 1980s", T e l o s , no.50, pp.115-60, 1981-2. A . H e l l e r , "Theory and P r a c t i c e : T h e i r R e l a t i o n to Human Needs", S o c i a l P r a x i s , v o l . 1 , 1973, p.361. 182 V. I . L e n i n , What Is To Be Done?, London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1963. H.Marcuse, C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n and R e v o l t , Boston: Beacon, 1972, p.47. On a c l o s e r look, one n o t i c e s there are s u b t l e s i m i l a r i t i e s between Habermas and L e n i n . In p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , a "no" from the p a t i e n t o f t e n i n d i c a t e s the p a t i e n t ' s r e s i s t e n c e to therapy. Now Habermas extends p s y c h o a n a l y s i s to c r i t i c a l t heory. When s o c i e t y r e j e c t s the c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t ' s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , Habermas probably c o n s i d e r s s o c i e t a l members to be r e f u s i n g to admit they are s u f f e r i n g from t h e i r i d e o l o g y . Hence the c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t must attempt to c o r r e c t s o c i e t a l members' p e r c e p t i o n . While Habermas' c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t r e l i e s on r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s , the theory of Marx i s sometimes a l s o i n t e r p r e t e d as s c i e n c e -the s c i e n c e of h i s t o r y . The A l t h u s s e r i a n s c h o o l , i n p a r t i c u l a r , attempts to j u s t i f y Leninism by i n t e r p r e t i n g Marx's theory as a s c i e n c e - something understood only by Party i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Only the Party knows when to s e i z e the r i g h t moment to f o l l o w the l o g i c a l course of h i s t o r y . B. Oilman, A l i e n a t i o n , 2nd e d i t i o n , Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976, p.215. TM, p.272. I b i d . , p.324. Most t h e o r i s t s today argue that p o l i t i c a l r e v o l u t i o n s i n h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s are extremely u n l i k e l y ; i n other p a r t s of the world, however, they do occur. R.H.Turner and L . M . K i l l i a n , C o l l e c t i v e Behavior, Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1957, p.308. The c l a s s i c s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of s o c i a l movements by C. Dawson and W.E.Gettys suggests there are four stages i n a s o c i a l movement: unrest, excitement, f o r m a l i z a t i o n and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . See I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i o l o g y , New York: Ronald Press, 1934, pp.708-9. Cf. C.B.Macpherson, The L i f e and Times of L i b e r a l  Democracy, Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977. Cf. V . I . L e n i n , o p . c i t . 183 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION In t h i s study we i n q u i r e about the concept of p l a n n i n g i n the context of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . We have compared, c o n t r a s t e d and c r i t i c a l l y e v a l u a t e d ideas r e l a t e d to p l a n n i n g which emerge from two competing s c h o o l s of thought i n the German p h i l o s o -p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , namely, c r i t i c a l theory and hermeneutics. Both schools are deeply concerned with p h i l o s o p h i c a l i s s u e s such as o b j e c t i v i t y of knowledge, experience, thought and a c t i o n , theory and p r a c t i c e , which are a l s o the f o c i of d i s c u s s i o n s i n s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s of p l a n n i n g today. Let us summarize our f i n d i n g s . A Summary The c r i t i c a l theory of Habermas o f f e r s v a l u a b l e i n s i g h t s and p r e s e n t s a c h a l l e n g e to p l a n n i n g t h e o r i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i s s u e s mentioned above. The q u e s t i o n s Habermas e x p l i c i t l y and i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e s are important ones. Problems l i k e c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s , s p o n t a n e i t y , nature-human r e l a t i o n s and human r e l a t i o n s should be p r o p e r l y addressed i n the f i e l d of p l a n n i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Habermas' use of r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s and h i s advocacy model are q u e s t i o n a b l e . Besides, some of h i s 184 other ideas, i n c l u d i n g h i s assumption of suppressed g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s and h i s preoccupation with speech, are not e n t i r e l y c o n v i n c i n g . Habermas' pl a n n i n g approach, which i s d e r i v e d from these ideas, s u f f e r s as a r e s u l t . The hermeneutics of Gadamer c o n s i s t s of s e v e r a l profound n o t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the nature of human understanding. Recognizing the s i g n i f i c a n c e of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , hermeneutics f u r n i s h e s a sound t h e o r e t i c a l foundation f o r a c r i t i q u e of both o b j e c t i v i s m and s u b j e c t i v i s m . Hermeneutics a l s o avoids some of the problems that have plagued Habermas, such as the l a t e n t o b j e c t i v i s m i n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e s and the arrogance of c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s . Yet Gadamer's emphasis on p r e s e r v i n g t r a d i t i o n prevents him from seeing new s o c i a l d i r e c t i o n s i n a f a v o r a b l e l i g h t . Since Gadamer's thought i s not r e a d i l y a p p l i c a b l e to the s o l v i n g of c u r r e n t s o c i a l problems, h i s w r i t i n g s tend to escape the a t t e n t i o n of p l a n n i n g t h e o r i s t s . He has not r e c e i v e d the r e c o g n i t i o n he deserves i n the s o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i e s of p l a n n i n g . Having d i s c o v e r e d the untapped p o t e n t i a l i n hermeneutics, M i s g e l d b u i l d s on Gadamer's works. Shedding the t r a d i t i o n a l i s m of h i s predecessor, M i s g e l d explores the p r o g r e s s i v e aspects of hermeneutical t h i n k i n g , i n p a r t i c u l a r , the p r i o r i t y of p r a c t i c e i n t h e o r i z i n g and the c o n t r i b u t i o n of s o c i a l movements. He s t r e s s e s the p o l i t i c a l r e levance of hermeneutics to contemporary s o c i e t y and thus b r i n g s hermeneutics a step c l o s e r t o the f i e l d of p l a n n i n g . However, he has not e x p l o r e d the concept of pla n n i n g d i r e c t l y . 185 I n s p i r e d by the h i g h l y s u g g e s t i v e ideas of Gadamer and Mi s g e l d , we attempt to extend hermeneutics i n t o the f i e l d of p l a n n i n g . We argue that p l a n n i n g and s o c i a l movements i n t e r p e n e t r a t e and that both are e s s e n t i a l t o a s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n that i s conducive to the development of human p o t e n t i a l s w i t h i n the c o n s t r a i n t s of the changing m a t e r i a l world. Both pla n n i n g and s o c i a l movement are embedded i n c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . T h e i r goals and a c t i v i t i e s a r i s e from l i f e , and hence t h e i r meanings cannot be f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d except by those whose l i v e s are d i r e c t l y i m p l i c a t e d . S o c i a l movement i s a general e x p r e s s i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r group or a p a r t i c u a l r aspect of l i f e . P l a n n i n g , on the other hand, focuses on problem s o l v i n g among groups, and i n d i r e c t l y , among d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of s o c i e t y ( i n c l u d i n g the d i v i s i o n of l a b o r ) . A plan n i n g problem that draws v a r i o u s groups together i s u s u a l l y narrow i n scope and r e l a t i v e l y r e s t r i c t e d i n space and time. In order f o r the s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g achieved i n a plan n i n g process to b e n e f i t s o c i e t y i n the long run, a c t i v i t i e s based on such s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g have to be c a r r i e d on i n s o c i a l movements, and i n g e n e r a l , d a i l y l i f e . That i s why a hermeneutical theory of p l a n n i n g p l a c e s p l a n n i n g i n the f a b r i c of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , d a i l y l i f e and s o c i a l movements. The u l t i m a t e purpose of plann i n g i s i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n to a s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n t hat i s c o n s i s t e n t with human a s p i r a t i o n s . T h i s concept of p l a n n i n g s t r e s s e s s o c i a l l e a r n i n g ; i t pen e t r a t e s the roots of s o c i e t a l problems to an extent that i s beyond the fathom of those who b e l i e v e that p l a n n i n g i s e s s e n t i a l l y the r e g u l a t i o n of human a c t i v i t i e s f o r the purpose of e f f i c i e n t 186 s o c i e t a l f u n c t i o n i n g . S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n of Hermeneutics The hermeneutical foundation of pl a n n i n g we have d i s c u s s e d i s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept; i t does not p r e s c r i b e a systematic s t r a t e g y f o r p l a n n i n g p r a c t i t i o n e r s to f o l l o w . As M i s g e l d p o i n t s out, t h e o r i e s u s e f u l f o r gu i d i n g p r a c t i c e must a r i s e from p r a c t i c e d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to t h a t s i t u a t i o n . 1 Even so, such t h e o r i e s are only t e n t a t i v e . Experimentation i s always r e q u i r e d . Long ago Hegel r e a l i z e d that a c c u r a t e t h e o r i e s about s o c i e t y are always r e t r o s p e c t i v e , never p r e d i c t i v e . He expresses i t i n one of h i s most o f t e n c i t e d passages: One word more about g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n as to what the world ought t o be. Philosophy i n any case always comes on the scene too l a t e to give i t . As the thought of the world, i t appears only when a c t u a l i t y i s a l r e a d y there cut and d r i e d a f t e r i t s s e l f -formative process has been completed The owl of Minerva spreads i t s wings only with the f a l l i n g of the dusk. 2 Hegel thus p o i n t s to the l i m i t a t i o n of a l l t h e o r i e s , i n c l u d i n g h i s own. Hermeneutics i n c o r p o r a t e s these words of wisdom i n t o i t s own way of t h i n k i n g ; 3 i t teaches that no theory can p r e d i c t the f u t u r e of s o c i e t y with any accuracy, so that planned a c t i o n s cannot be e s t a b l i s h e d once and f o r a l l . In f a c t hermeneutics i s n e c e s s a r i l y s e l f - a p p l i c a b l e . Current hermeneutical t h i n k i n g i s a s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n of contemporary i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . No l e s s than other a s p e c t s of s o c i e t y hermeneutics i s subject to continuous evolvement. But p r e c i s e l y because i t sp r i n g s from the s o i l of t h i s s o c i e t y to address some of i t s major concerns, i n c l u d i n g the area of s o c i a l 187 development, hermeneutical t h i n k i n g i s p e r t i n e n t to the study of s o c i e t a l problems i n t h i s s o c i e t y . Perhaps hermeneutics deserves a p l a c e i n p l a n n i n g thought today. NOTES "Retreat", p.17. Philosophy of Right, o p . c i t . , p.13. Cf. esp. C h a r l e s T a y l o r , " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the Sciences of Man", o p . c i t . , pp.48-51. APPENDIX SCHEMATIC OF HABERMAS' MODEL Type of A c t i v i t y I n s t r u m e n t a l Act i on Communicative Act i o n D i s c o u r s e * C r i t i q u e of I d e o l o g y P s y c h o a n a l y t i c Model Advocacy Model* Goal of A c t i v i t y t e c h n i c a l c o n t r o l e f f e c t i ve communicat i o n e x a m i n a t i o n of t r u t h c l a i m s / j u s t i f i c a t i o n of norms emancipat i o n c o n f 1 i c t r e s o l u t i o n / emanci pat i on F u n c t i o n of A c t i v i t y i n S e l f - f o r m a t i v e P r o c e s s work (human vs. n a t u r e ) i n t e r a c t i o n ( r e l a t i o n s h i p among humans) c o n f i r m a t i o n of d e v i a t i o n i n s e l f - f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s c o r r e c t i o n of d e v i a n t s e l f -f ormat i ve p r o c e s s advancement to h i g h e r l e v e l on e v o l u t i o n a r y sea 1 e C o g n i t i v e I n t e r e s t t e c h n i ca1 p r a c t i c a l ( i ndi r e c t 1 y emanc i p a t o r y ) emanc i p a t o r y H i e r a r c h y of I n t e r e s t a t S p e c i e s L e v e l b a s i c ("low") bas i c ("1ow") u11 i mate ("h i gh") So u r c e of S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s Type o f Act i v i t y n a t u r a l s c i e n c e human s c i e n c e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e sc i ence (uni v e r s a 1 pragmat i c s ) c r i t i ca1 s c i e n c e (model of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ) c r i t i q u e b a s e d on r e c o n s t r u c t i ve s c i e n c e s Methodology of t h i s S c i e n c e / Model empi r i ca1 -a n a l y t i c hermeneut ica1 r e c o n s t r u c t i on of anonymous r u l e systems t h e r a p e u t i c / c r i t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i v e / c r i t i ca1 NOTES: 1. T h i s s c h e m a t i c i s o n l y a rough a p p r o x i m a t i o n of Habermas' t h e o r y - many d e t a i l s a r e o m i t t e d . 2. T h i s s c h e m a t i c i s based on Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s , and as m o d i f i e d i n l a t e r works. Columns marked w i t h * i n d i c a t e t h e i r i n t r o d u c t i o n i n l a t e r works. 189 BIBLIOGRAPHY A l t s h u l e r , A l a n . "The Goals of Comprehensive P l a n n i n g " . J o u r n a l of the  American I n s t i t u t e of Planners. Vol.31, pp.186-95. 1965. A r i s t o t l e . Nicomachean E t h i c s . M.Ostwald ( t r a n s . ) . I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l . 1962. A v i n e r i , Shlomo. Hegel's Theory of the Modern S t a t e . Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e s i t y P r e s s . 1972. A v i n e r i , Shlomo. The S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Thought of K a r l Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1968. B e r n s t e i n , R i c h a r d . P r a x i s and A c t i o n . P h i l a d e l p h i a : U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania P r e s s . 1971. B l i t z , Mark. Heidegger's Being and Time and the P o s s i b i l i t y of P o l i t i c a l  P h ilosophy. Ithaca and London: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1981 . Boguslaw, Robert. "Values i n the Research S o c i e t y " , i n The Research S o c i e t y . E . G l a t t and M.W.Shelly (ed.). New York: Gordon and Breach. 1 968. Bubner, Rvidiger. "Theory and P r a c t i c e i n the L i g h t of the Hermeneutic-C r i t i c i s t C ontroversy". C u l t u r a l Hermeneutics. Vol.2, pp.337-52. 1975. Carson, Rachel. S i l e n t S p r i n g . Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n . 1962. Commoner, Barry. The C l o s i n g C i r c l e . New York: Bantam. 1971. Dallmayr, Fred R. " C r i t i c a l Theory C r i t i c i z e d " . Philosophy of the S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s . Vol.2, pp.211-29. 1972. 1 D a v i d o f f , P a u l . "Advocacy and P l u r a l i s m i n P l a n n i n g " . J o u r n a l of the  American I n s t i t u t e of Planners. Vol.31, pp.331-8. 1965. Dawson, C a r l , and W.E.Gettys. I n t r o d u c t i o n to S o c i o l o g y . New York: Ronald P r e s s . 1934. D i l t h e y , Wilhelm. S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s . H.P.Rickman (ed. and t r a n s . ) . Cambridg Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1976. Dunn, Edgar S., J r . Economic and S o c i a l Development. B a l t i m o r e and London: Johns Hopkins P r e s s . 1971. F o r e s t e r , John. " C r i t i c a l Theory and Planning P r a c t i c e " . J o u r n a l of the  American Planning A s s o c i a t i o n . Vol.46, pp.275-86. 1980. Friedmann, John. "A Response to A l t s h u l e r : Comprehensive P l a n n i n g as a Process". J o u r n a l of the American I n s t i t u t e of Planners. Vol.31, pp.195-7. 1 965. Friedmann, John. R e t r a c k i n g America. Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Anchor. 1973. Friedmann, John. The Good S o c i e t y . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 1979. Friedmann, John, and B a r c l a y Hudson. "Knowledge and A c t i o n " . J o u r n a l of the American I n s t i t u t e  of Planners. Vol.40, pp.2-16. 1974. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Notes on Planning f o r the Future". Daedalus. Vol.95, pp.572-89. 1965. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Tr u t h and Method. New York: Crossroad. 1975. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Hermeneutics. D.E.Linge (e d . ) . Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . 1976. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Reason i n the Age of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1981 . Gadamer, Hans-Georg, et a l . Summation of "Hermeneutics and S o c i a l S c i e n c e " . C u l t u r a l  Hermeneutics. Vol.2, pp.329-36. 1975. 191 Giddens, Anthony. Studie s i n Soc i a l and P o l i t i c a l Theory. London: Hutchinson. 1 977. G o d e l i e r , Maurice. "System, S t r u c t u r e and C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n C a p i t a l " , i n The  S o c i a l i s t R e g i s t e r 1967. B.Brewster ( t r a n s . ) . R.Miliband and J . S a v i l l e (ed.). New York: Monthly Review P r e s s . 1967. Gouldner, A l v i n . The Coming C r i s i s of Western S o c i o l o g y . New York: B a s i c Books. 1970. Habermas, Jii r g e n . "A Review of Gadamer's Tr u t h and Method", i n Understanding  and S o c i a l I n q u i r y . F.R.Dallmayr and T.A.McCarthy (ed.) Notre Dame and London: U n i v e r s i t y of Notre Dame Pr e s s . 1977. Habermas, Jii r g e n . Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s . Boston: Beacon. 1971. Habermas, Jiirgen. Toward A R a t i o n a l S o c i e t y . Boston: Beacon. 1970. Habermas, Jii r g e n . "The Hermeneutic Claim to U n i v e r s a l i t y " , i n Contemporary  Hermeneutics. J . B l e i c h e r (ed.). London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan P a u l . 1980. Habermas, Jii r g e n . Theory and P r a c t i c e . Boston: Beacon. 1973. Habermas, J i i r g e n . "A P o s t s c r i p t to Knowledge and Human I n t e r e s t s " . Philosophy  of the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s . Vol.3, pp.157-89. 1973. Habermas, Ji i r g e n . L e g i t i m a t i o n C r i s i s . Boston: Beacon. 1975. Habermas, Jii r g e n . Communication and the E v o l u t i o n of S o c i e t y . Boston: Beacon. 1979. Habermas, Ji i r g e n . "On the German-Jewish H e r i t a g e " . T e l o s . No.44, pp.127-131. 1980. Habermas, Jii r g e n . "The D i a l e c t i c s of R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n : An Interview with Jiirgen Habermas". T e l o s . No. 49, pp. 5-31. 1981. 1 92 Hampden-Turner, C h a r l e s . R a d i c a l Man. Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Anchor. 1971. Hardin, G a r r e t t . "The Tragedy of the Commons". Science. Vol.162, pp.1243-8. 1968. Hegel, G.W.F. "Preface to Phenomenology", i n Hegel: Text and Commentary. W.Kaufmann ( t r a n s . ) . Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Anchor. 1966. Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of S p i r i t . A . V . M i l l e r ( t r a n s . ) . Oxford and New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1977. Hegel, G.W.F. The Lo g i c of Hegel (from The Encyclopaedia of the P h i l o s o p h i c a l S c i e n c e s ) . W.Wallace ( t r a n s . ) . Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1874. Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of Righ t . T.M.Knox ( t r a n s . ) . Oxford and New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1952. Hegel, G.W.F. Reason i n H i s t o r y . R.S.Hartmann ( t r a n s . ) . I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l . 1953. Heidegger, M a r t i n . Being and Time. J.Macquarrie and E.Robinson ( t r a n s . ) . New York: Harper and Row. 1962. H e l l e r , Agnes. "Theory and P r a c t i c e : T h e i r R e l a t i o n to Human Needs". S o c i a l P r a x i s . V o l . 1 , pp.359-73. 1973. Hemmens, George C , and Bruce S t i f t e l . "Sources f o r the Renewal of Planning Theory". J o u r n a l of the American Planning A s s o c i a t i o n . Vol.46, pp.341-5. 1980. Hoy, David Couzens. " H i s t o r y , H i s t o r i c i t y , and H i s t o r i o g r a p h y i n Being and  Time, i n Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. M.Murray Ted.). New Haven and London: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1978. Kant, Immanuel. C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason. N.K.Smith ( t r a n s . ) . New York: S t . M a r t i n ' s . 1929. Kant, Immanuel. C r i t i q u e of P r a c t i c a l Reason and Other W r i t i n g s i n Moral  Philosophy. L.W.Beck (ed. and t r a n s . ) . Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r ess. 1949. 193 Kaufmann, Walter. "The Hegel Myth and I t s Method". P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review. Vol.60, pp.459-86. 1951. Kaufmann, Walter. N i e t z s c h e , 4th e d i t i o n . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1974. K e l l y , George Armstrong. Ideali s m , P o l i t i c s and H i s t o r y . London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1969. Kuhn, Thomas S. The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c R e v o l u t i o n , 2nd e d i t i o n . Chicago and London: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s . 1970. Langer, Susanne K. Philosophy i n a New Key, 3rd e d i t i o n . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1957. L e i s s , W i l l i a m . The Domination of Nature. New York: George B r a z i l l e r . 1972. L e i s s , W i l l i a m . " C r i t i c a l Theory and I t s Fut u r e " . P o l i t i c a l Theory. Vol.2, pp.330-49. 1974. L e i s s , W i l l i a m . The L i m i t s to S a t i s f a c t i o n . Toronto and B u f f a l o : U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto P r e s s . 1976. Le n i n , V l a d i m i r I l i c h . What Is To Be Done?. S.V.Utechin and P.Utechin ( t r a n s . ) . London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1963. McCarthy, Thomas A. The C r i t i c a l Theory of Juergen Habermas. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 1978. Macpherson, C B . The L i f e and Times of L i b e r a l Democracy. Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1977. Marcuse, Herbert. C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n and R e v o l t . Boston: Beacon. 1972. Marx, K a r l . "Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c a l Manuscripts of 1844", i n E a r l y  W r i t i n g s . T.B.Bottomore (ed. and t r a n s . ) . New York: McGraw-H i l l . 1964. 194 Marx, K a r l . The E i g h t e e n t h Brumaire of L o u i s Bonaparte. Moscow: Progress P u b l i s h e r s . 1934. Marx, K a r l . G r u n d r i s s e . M.Nicolaus ( t r a n s . ) . New York: V i n t a g e . 1973. . Marx, K a r l . "Marx to L.Kugelmann, J u l y 11, 1868", i n K a r l Marx and  F r e d e r i c k E n g e l s : S e l e c t e d Correspondence. Moscow: F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House. 1953. Marx, K a r l . C a p i t a l , 3 v o l . Moscow: Progress P u b l i s h e r s . 1954-9. Marx, K a r l . C r i t i q u e of the Gotha Program. Moscow: Fo r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House. 1959. Marx, K a r l , and F r e d e r i c k Engels. The German Ideology. New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s . 1 970. Meadows, D o n e l l a H., et a l . The L i m i t s to Growth. New York: S i g n e t . 1972. Mehta, Jarava L a i . M a r t i n Heidegger: The Way and the V i s i o n . Honolulu: U n i v e r s i t y Press of Hawaii. 1976. Mendelson, Jack. "The Habermas-Gadamer Debate". New German C r i t i q u e . No.18, pp.44-73. 1979. Meszaros, I s t v a n . Marx's Theory of A l i e n a t i o n , 4th e d i t i o n . London: M e r l i n . 1975. M i c h a e l , Donald. L e a r n i n g to P l a n and Planning to Learn. San F r a n c i s c o : Jossey-Bass. 1973. M i l l e r , G . Tyler, J r . L i v i n g i n the Environment. Belmont, C a l i f . : Wadsworth. 1 975. M i s g e l d , D i e t e r . " C r i t i c a l Theory and Hermeneutics: The Debate between Habermas and Gadamer", i n On C r i t i c a l Theory. J . O ' N e i l l ( e d . ) . New York: Seabury. 1976. 195 M i s g e l d , D i e t e r . "Discourse and C o n v e r s a t i o n " . C u l t u r a l Hermeneutics. Vol.4, pp.321-44. 1977. M i s g e l d , D i e t e r . "On Gadamer's Hermeneutics". Philosophy of the S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s . V o l . 9 , pp.221-39. 1979. M i s g e l d , D i e t e r . "Habermas' Retreat from Hermeneutics". Canadian J o u r n a l of  P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l Theory. Vol.5, no.1-2, pp.8-44. 1981. M i s g e l d , D i e t e r . "Science, Hermeneutics and the Utopian Content of the L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t i c T r a d i t i o n " . New German C r i t i q u e . No.22, pp.123-44. 1981. Moore, T e r r y . "Why Allow Planners to Do What They Do? A J u s t i f i c a t i o n from Economic Theory". J o u r n a l of the American I n s t i t u t e of  Planners. Vol.44, pp.387-98. 1978. N i e t z s c h e , F r i e d r i c h . The Use and Abuse of H i s t o r y . A . C o l l i n s ( t r a n s . ) . I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l . 1957. Oilman, B e r t e l l . A l i e n a t i o n , 2nd e d i t i o n . Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1976. O ' N e i l l , John. S o c i o l o g y as a Skin Trade. New York: Harper and Row. 1972. Palmer, R i c h a r d E. Hermeneutics. Evanston: Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1969. Piccone, Paul, et a l . "Symposium: The Role of the I n t e l l e c t u a l i n the 1980s". T e l o s . No.50, pp.115-60. 1981-2. Popper, K a r l . The Open S o c i e t y and I t s Enemies, 2 v o l . London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l . 1945. Rein, Ma r t i n. " S o c i a l P l a n n i n g : The Search f o r L e g i t i m a c y " . J o u r n a l of  the American I n s t i t u t e of P l a n n e r s . Vol.35, pp.233-44. 1969. 196 Rickman, H.P. Wilhelm D i l t h e y : Pioneer of the Human S t u d i e s . London: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . 1979. Ricoeur, P a u l . Hermeneutics and the Human S c i e n c e s . J.B.Thompson (ed. and t r a n s . ) . Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1981. Rorty, R i c h a r d . Philosophy and the M i r r o r of Nature. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1979. R o t e n s t r e i c h , Nathan. "The O n t o l o g i c a l Status of H i s t o r y " . American P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y . V o l 9, pp.49-58. 1972. S a h l i n s , M a r s h a l l . Stone Age Economics. Chicago and New York: A l d i n e . A t h e r t o n . 1972. S a h l i n s , M a r s h a l l . C u l t u r e and P r a c t i c a l Reason. Chicago and London: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press. 1976. Schmidt, A l f r e d . The Concept of Nature i n Marx. London: NLB. 1971. Schon, Donald A. Beyond the Sta b l e S t a t e . New York: Norton. 1971. Schumacher, E.F. Small Is B e a u t i f u l . London: Abacus. 1973. T a y l o r , C h a r l e s . " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the Sciences of Man". Review of  Metaphysics. Vol.25, no.1, pp.3-51. 1971. T a y l o r , C h a r l e s . Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . 1975. T a y l o r , C h a r l e s . "Understanding i n Human S c i e n c e " . Review of Metaphysics. Vol.34, no.1, pp.25-38. 1980. Turner, Ralph H., and Lewis M . K i l l i a n . C o l l e c t i v e Behavior. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . 1 957. Whitebook, J o e l . "The Problem of Nature i n Habermas". T e l o s . No.40, pp.41-69. 1979. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0095738/manifest

Comment

Related Items